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783 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Oliver Kieselbach 08455cc5f9 OOBE quality update: install events from the System log, servicing steps, a bounded engine phase in Shadow mode (D-310)
Report 3a2207978e4c: a session was failed 30 min after the ESP exit while Windows installed its
OOBE quality update. The update watcher had been blind since July and the engine had no notion
of the phase.

- Windows Update client: 19/20/43/44 come from the System log (provider-filtered XPath), as the
  provider manifest routes them; 25/26/31/41 from Operational via their own config list.
  Updates are classified os/defender/store/other: only Windows/.NET updates become rows, the
  rest is counted into windows_update_activity_summary. Per-channel watermarks persist a record
  only after its row and engine signal were handed to the ingress.
- Servicing: CBS steps from the Setup log (windows_update_servicing), client UpdateAgentLCU.
- Engine: OsUpdateActivity and OsUpdateFacts (event-time ordered) anchor an OOBE update phase
  after the ESP exit. Each state has its own bound: the update runs at most 3 h (then Failed
  oobe_update_not_finished), after it the user has 60 min to sign in (then the engine stops
  waiting without a verdict), after the sign-in one window of grace.
- The phase acts only in OobeUpdatePhaseMode=Active. Shadow, the default, reports what it would
  decide as oobe_update_phase_shadow right before today's verdict. The agent stamps the mode on
  EnrollmentFactsObserved at every start; a later stamp can take Active away, never grant it.
- Agent: a stop without a verdict ends the session like the max-lifetime watchdog
  (agent_shutting_down reason=stopped_waiting); the backend classifies it honestly (verdict
  origin stopwait), never Failed.
- Measurement: oobe_update_page (the update page and its ExpeditedUpdate_* names; a 62407 value
  only as boolean, integer or HRESULT) and oobe_update_state (NDUP and ESP-policy registry
  values), both Debug and bounded per run.
- ANALYZE-DEV-004 1.2.0 counts install and download failures only, never scan failures.
- Event types in Constants, MCP catalog and web; shared manifests regenerated; privacy page
  names Windows updates installed during the enrollment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 15:09:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 87c5bf018c bump pointer: internal (gather-rule state released, B-hx3 field verify)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 22:26:18 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0d6c03d64b Public texts no longer name a customer domain or IME decompiles
- Two code comments of the gather-rule timeline feed named a customer's domain next to the
  session id; the session id stays as the regression anchor.
- The get_ime_pattern_health description and the IME Pattern Health admin text no longer send
  the reader to "the IME decompile"; the IME-TOKEN-FAILURE and IME-DO-TEL pattern descriptions
  say "verified against IME x" / "absent from the x builds" (rules/dist regenerated).
- Code comments that cited decompiled IME builds cite the IME version instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 22:00:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b14866c9a6 bump pointer: internal (gather-rule state committed, B-hx3)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 21:46:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 25b133d3d0 bump pointer: internal (gather-rule state across restarts, D-309)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 21:45:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 684167292f Gather rules keep their place across agent restarts; byte-exact logparser reader; MCP filters by gather event types
- Logparser positions per (rule, file) and the on_change values persist in
  State\gather-rule-state.json, bound to the session id. A reboot, hard kill or WhiteGlove
  Part 2 no longer replays a log from byte 0 or re-emits an unchanged on_change result. A
  replaced log (fingerprint of its first 4 KB) is read from the beginning. Positions are saved
  after the events went out; restoring the file is fail-soft. --run-gather-rules stays in memory.
- LogLineReader: a maxLines stop loses no line, an unfinished last line is never split
  (interval rules wait one run, one-shot triggers read it again next run), UTF-16/UTF-32 logs
  are read by their byte order mark from any position, line ends as StreamReader.ReadLine,
  logLineNumber counts from the start of the file, lines over 32 MB are skipped. A maxLines
  value that is no positive number falls back to 1000.
- UserProfileResolver no longer caches "no user signed in yet" (detection retried at most
  every 30 s); guarded callers expand the token with the profile they checked.
- MCP get_session_events, search_sessions_by_event and query_raw_events accept a gather
  rule's own outputEventType; an empty first-page result for an uncatalogued type carries
  eventTypeNote with the closest built-in types instead of being rejected up front.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 21:45:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6474860a57 bump pointer: internal (lesson from the vulnerabilities feedback)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 20:15:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d23f2eae3e bump pointer: internal (vulnerabilities feedback fixes, D-308)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 20:14:40 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fae6aa0b92 Vulnerabilities band filters always find entries, list controls stay put, first load shows the progress dialog
The summary endpoint takes perBand: above 0 it adds bandCves and bandSoftware, each severity and
priority band's top entries outside the lists. The portal asks for 10 per band and shows them only
under a filter, so Attend lists its 7 CVEs instead of nothing; the MCP tool never asks and keeps its
size. The Most exposed controls sit below the title in every state, bands with 0 entries are
disabled, and the first load shows CalculatingDialog (the Geographic Performance dialog without its
page) with separate estimates for all tenants and one tenant. D-308.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 20:13:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 43dfb731f1 bump pointer: internal (vulnerabilities tab redesign, D-307)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 19:38:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach dd5534b0c9 Vulnerabilities tab shows a severity donut, the priority ladder and the most exposed software
The exposure summary groups CVE index rows by product: every new row carries the finding's
CPE vendor:product as Product, and a row without it borrows the product of a row with the
same title. The summary adds topSoftware, distinctSoftware and kevAffectedSessions, and
known-exploited CVEs and products stay listed below the topN cut (capped so the MCP result
stays under its 50k cap). The shared panel is rebuilt: KPI tiles, a severity donut and the
Act/Attend/Track ladder as list filters, and a Most exposed card with Software and CVEs
lenses. get_vulnerability_summary describes the new fields. D-307.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 19:35:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 54334de378 Rule pages point to AI-assisted rule authoring
The community box on the gather and analyze rule pages gets a line that an
assistant connected via MCP can draft, validate and test a rule, linking the
AI-assisted rule authoring docs page.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 19:11:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9671191eef bump pointer: internal (/plans nav marking, slash links, MCP docs, D-306)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 18:43:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c5a4feb762 Internal links on the public pages end with a slash
The host answers /plans, /about, /privacy and the other page paths with a
301 to the slash path first. The navbar, the footer, the landing and
get-started calls to action, the terms page and two portal links to
/settings now point at the slash path directly. A guard renders every
public page with the build's trailing-slash setting and fails on an
internal link without it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 18:41:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2253fca533 bump pointers: internal, .claude/commands (AI page and marketing click counts, D-305)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 18:16:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ff9e79dcc7 Landing gets an AI page (/ai) and counts clicks and section views
New public page /ai, linked from the navbar (AI), the Then just ask section
and the footer. It shows what an AI client can answer from the structured
enrollment data: a question gallery whose answer panel switches between chat
app, VS Code, terminal and self-hosted, the data path (where the model runs,
what reaches us) and how to connect. A test keeps every MCP tool and argument
on the page in line with the server's registrations for tenant users.

The landing, /get-started and /ai send anonymous click and section-view
counts (marketing_cta_clicked, marketing_section_viewed); every link and
button carries a data-track id. Layouts with their own OpenGraph metadata
keep the shared image and the large Twitter card again. The navbar tightens
between lg and xl so the new entry fits at 1024 px. The FAQ names the
documented MCP clients, and the terminal demo uses the real search_sessions
argument (deviceName).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 18:15:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e54b4585b8 bump pointers: internal, .claude/commands (event follow-up page live, D-304)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 17:17:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7894d61e0b Event follow-up page for the Workplace Ninja Summit 2026
Unlisted page /events/<slug>/ for the link in the post-event mail: try it,
request a walkthrough, read the docs, plus the free community editions of
SCEPman and MyWorkID. It is noindex and kept out of the sitemap, robots.txt
and llms.txt. Every call to action sends one anonymous click event
(event_followup_clicked). The customer quote is now shared with the landing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 17:11:48 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 090f47d4fb Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-10-01 13:14:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c2d68b6537 bump pointer: internal (landing GitHub stars, D-303)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 13:13:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5b0dfaad99 Landing shows the GitHub star count and a customer quote
The navbar gets a "Star" pill with the repository's star count from sm up;
phones keep the bare GitHub mark. A new section before the closing CTA
shows one customer quote with a star ask underneath. The footer's
"Star us on GitHub" line is gone, so the page asks twice, not three times.

The count is read once per web deploy (deploy-web.yml, own step, job token
only there) and inlined by next build as NEXT_PUBLIC_GITHUB_STARS, so
visitors' browsers never contact GitHub and the CSP stays as it is.
Without a value the pill renders without a counter (D-303).

The desktop links, bell and sign-in now start at lg instead of md: the bar
already overflowed between 768 and ~1000 px and the pill widened it further.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 13:13:33 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 50d29e61e8 chore(deps): bump the web-security group across 1 directory with 3 updates (#170)
Bumps the web-security group with 3 updates in the /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web directory: [next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js), [brace-expansion](https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion) and [dompurify](https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify).


Updates `next` from 16.3.5 to 16.3.6
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/compare/v16.3.5...v16.3.6)

Updates `brace-expansion` from 1.1.18 to 1.1.21
- [Release notes](https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/compare/v1.1.18...v1.1.21)

Updates `dompurify` from 3.4.14 to 3.4.16
- [Release notes](https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/compare/3.4.14...3.4.16)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: next
  dependency-version: 16.3.6
  dependency-type: direct:production
  dependency-group: web-security
- dependency-name: brace-expansion
  dependency-version: 1.1.21
  dependency-type: indirect
  dependency-group: web-security
- dependency-name: dompurify
  dependency-version: 3.4.16
  dependency-type: indirect
  dependency-group: web-security
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-01 11:16:00 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 4b03ba4e19 chore(deps): bump fast-uri (#169)
Bumps the mcp-security group with 1 update in the /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp directory: [fast-uri](https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri).


Updates `fast-uri` from 3.1.7 to 3.1.8
- [Release notes](https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri/compare/v3.1.7...v3.1.8)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: fast-uri
  dependency-version: 3.1.8
  dependency-type: indirect
  dependency-group: mcp-security
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-01 11:15:42 +02:00
dependabot[bot] f0aec031f3 chore(deps): bump the actions group with 2 updates (#168)
Bumps the actions group with 2 updates: [github/codeql-action/init](https://github.com/github/codeql-action) and [github/codeql-action/analyze](https://github.com/github/codeql-action).


Updates `github/codeql-action/init` from 4.38.0 to 4.38.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/compare/b96794f015dfd88f77b49b1c93e0fa7110f94c63...2892aa5e19bbd11bc0cff5427e3b750a04d9e3c2)

Updates `github/codeql-action/analyze` from 4.38.0 to 4.38.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/compare/b96794f015dfd88f77b49b1c93e0fa7110f94c63...2892aa5e19bbd11bc0cff5427e3b750a04d9e3c2)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: github/codeql-action/init
  dependency-version: 4.38.2
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: actions
- dependency-name: github/codeql-action/analyze
  dependency-version: 4.38.2
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: actions
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-01 09:28:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 66208b3767 bump pointer: internal (rule notification placeholders, D-302)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 18:25:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c60e07dfd4 Rule notifications resolve {{token}} placeholders before they are sent
A stored rule result keeps the rule's template; only the web and the MCP
server resolved it. The notification builders sent the explanation as
stored, so a channel card showed {{reason}}, {{appName}},
{{failedSubcategory}} and {{errorCode}} although the session had recorded
all four values.

- RuleTemplateInterpolator: the backend copy of the resolution, applied in
  BuildRuleFiredAlert and AddRuleResultSections before the text is cut.
  In a notification a list item whose value was not recorded is dropped
  and a token in running text becomes an en dash.
- The cut lands on a line, sentence or word boundary instead of a
  character count; the limits are unchanged.
- tests/fixtures/rule-template-interpolation/cases.json: one case file
  run by the backend, the web and the MCP server.
- The engine's evidence auto-field list is one constant. The web, the MCP
  interpolator and the validate_rule token lint gain timeoutHours, which
  the engine already recorded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 18:12:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f564ee6a06 bump pointer: internal (hello wait timeout released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 15:50:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ec025686ce bump pointer: internal (hello wait timeout plan, D-301)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 15:38:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 821c41e2ba Tenant Hello wait timeout up to 1 hour (#167)
* feat: tenant Hello wait timeout up to 1 hour

The "Hello Wait Timeout" setting (30..300 s in the UI) had no effect in the
V2 agent: its only consumer, HelloTracker.StartHelloWaitTimer, has no
production caller, while the decision engine armed a fixed 300 s
hello_safety deadline after the ESP exit and the tracker ran a fixed 300 s
completion timer after the wizard start.

The setting is now the real Hello budget, clamped to 300..3600 s
(HelloWaitTimeout in AutopilotMonitor.Shared). Every value that was valid
before (<= 300, including the old 30 s default) keeps today's 5 minutes.

- Engine: the agent stamps helloWaitTimeoutSeconds on EnrollmentFactsObserved
  (only when > 300), recorded set-once in EnrollmentScenarioObservations.
  All six hello_safety arm sites share one builder with the tenant window;
  a fact that arrives after hello_safety was armed moves it out. The WDP
  backstop is never shorter than the tenant window; the signal census
  surfaces hello_wait_extended.
- Agent: the Hello tracker's wizard completion timer uses the same budget;
  the stall probe skips session_stalled while hello_safety is pending.
- Backend: ValidateModel rejects values outside 300..3600; stored rows are
  read as their effective value, so legacy 30 s rows never block unrelated
  saves or backup reverts. Default 30 -> 300; shared manifest and wire types
  regenerated.
- Web: input 300..3600, bounds pinned against the C# constants.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S17pipjWqjZ8ULAu1JrFyG

* fix: keep the Hello wait's 30 s minimum and default, raise only the maximum

Product decision: the setting keeps its UI contract (30 s minimum and
default, same description); only the maximum moves to 3600 s. Configured
values up to 300 s keep the built-in 5-minute Hello window, larger values
extend it.

- HelloWaitTimeout: MinSeconds/DefaultSeconds 30; BuiltInSeconds 300 is the
  floor of EffectiveSeconds.
- Backend validates only a changed value (30..3600), like the retention cap;
  the read-time normalization is gone again.
- The agent stamps the tenant window only above BuiltInSeconds.
- Web keeps the original text and default; only the maximum and its hint
  change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S17pipjWqjZ8ULAu1JrFyG

* fix: Hello wait default 300 s, stale-fire guard, deferred stall report

Product decision: default 300 s (what V2 has always waited), minimum 30 s
still accepted, maximum 3600 s. Values up to 300 s keep the built-in
5-minute window, which the settings hint now says.

Review follow-ups:
- Engine: a hello_safety fire whose incarnation was replaced (armed due
  later than the fire's due time) is dead-ended, same guard as RealmJoin —
  a late tenant window could otherwise be undercut by the queued fire of
  the built-in deadline. The tenant fact is recorded only when it extends
  the built-in window.
- Stall probe: session_stalled is held back while a tenant-extended Hello
  wait (hello_safety or the WDP backstop) is pending and emitted once it is
  over and the session is still idle; real activity drops it. Default
  tenants never hit the guard.
- Comments: WDP backstop wording, 5-min reference, AgentConfiguration.
- Web pins the default against the shared manifest; tracker constructor
  defaults use HelloWaitTimeout.DefaultSeconds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S17pipjWqjZ8ULAu1JrFyG

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 15:36:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ec3eaa6437 fix(web): sitemap and llms.txt list public pages at their canonical /page/ URL (#166) 2026-09-29 14:13:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d36c9a659d Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-09-29 12:02:55 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c27dbf2aa2 bump pointer: internal (client role gates plan)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 11:46:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 28443d11fa fix(web): don't send SignalR joins and bootstrap reads the backend refuses by role
Every visit by a user without a tenant role joined the tenant broadcast
group before the dashboard redirected to /progress, and the settings
area loaded the bootstrap session list for every role. The backend
refused both by rule: 134 AddToGroup 403s, 19 serial-less session
joins and 27 bootstrap-list 403s in 30 days, each one also an
api_request_failed event.

- lib/signalrGroupAccess mirrors the backend's same-tenant join rules
  (broadcast and member-notify groups need an own role or platform
  scope, the admin-notify group the Admin or a GA, a session group a
  serial for roleless callers, global-admins platform scope, an
  unparseable name is a 400). Cross-tenant joins stay with the
  backend's platform/delegated admission. The gate keys on
  hasOwnTenantOrPlatformRole, not hasTenantReadScope: a delegated admin
  without an own role is refused the home tenant's groups too.
- SignalRContext.joinGroup applies it before sending: a refused join
  reaches onDenied with the server's status and is never held for the
  reconnect rejoin. joinGroup depends on the caller's role fields as
  primitives, so its identity changes only when auth/me resolves, the
  same commit that delivers the tenant id consumers join with. That
  also ends the "tenant-" join the dashboard sent before the tenant id
  was known (the 400s).
- TenantConfigContext loads bootstrap sessions only for
  canManageBootstrapSessions (mirror of BootstrapManagerOrGA: GA, Admin,
  Operator with the bootstrap grant).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 11:46:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0c41b0f449 bump pointer: .claude/commands (ux-insights rejoin baseline)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 11:22:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7799fdb725 bump pointer: .claude/commands (platform-health baselines 2026-09-29)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 11:04:44 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 0c1a2a4192 chore(deps-dev): bump tsx (#165)
Bumps the mcp group in /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp with 1 update: [tsx](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx).


Updates `tsx` from 4.23.13 to 4.23.15
- [Release notes](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/blob/master/release.config.cjs)
- [Commits](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/compare/v4.23.13...v4.23.15)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: tsx
  dependency-version: 4.23.15
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-29 11:00:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0356770ae8 bump pointer: internal (operator group customer label, D-300)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 10:58:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3a9a074be1 Operator groups can carry a customer label; customers still never see the group name
Under D-267 a managed tenant saw every operator-provisioned access as
"Platform support". A customer in two operator groups run by different teams
got two identical entries under "Who can read this tenant" and could not tell
them apart.

A Global Admin can now give an operator group a customer label (at most 80
characters) with the existing PATCH global/tenant-groups/{groupId}, which takes
only the fields to change: name and/or customerLabel, where an empty label
clears it. The customer sees the label as the entry name; a group without one
and direct grants keep "Platform support". Owned (self-service) groups refuse a
label with 409, because their customers see the managing tenant's name.
RenameTenantGroupAsync becomes UpdateTenantGroupAsync, one read-modify-write on
the meta row.

DelegationSelfService.CustomerNameOf is now the one source of the name a
customer sees for a group. The managers view and the Group detail of the audit
rows written under every member tenant (assign, unassign, group delete) both use
it. Those audit rows carried the internal group name to the customer's audit
page before this change.

Admin, Tenant Groups: operator groups show "Customers see: ..." and get a
"Customer label" button next to Rename. The customer page is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 10:58:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a3870e7dcc bump pointer: internal (pre-provisioning seal + registration failure reason live)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 01:59:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8cb5d42edc Seal pre-provisioning despite IME's AccountSetup line; report why a session never registered
WhiteGlove seal: IME reports "EspPhase: AccountSetup" from the device session
as soon as the device apps are done when the user ESP is enabled. The sealing
classifier counted that as user activity (-40) and left pre-provisioning Part 1
unsealed, so no whiteglove.complete marker was written and the Part-2 boot hit
the 48-hour emergency break. The excluder now also needs the ESP registry to
show AccountSetup progress: the adapter stamps accountSetupProgress on
WhiteGloveShellCoreSuccess, only after the tracker has actually read the
AccountSetup subcategories (unread is never "untouched"). The new excluder is a
subset of the old one, so a verdict can only rise; signals without the key
score as before. WhiteGloveShellCoreSuccess v1 gets its replay fixture.

The Part-1 exit writes whiteglove.complete as its first step instead of after
analyzers, diagnostics upload, grace and drain, where a reseal could kill the
process before it.

Registration failures: a run that exits because register-session failed
records outcome, last error, network link at start and end, the wall-clock
attempt window and the config-fetch outcome in registration-failure.json. The
emergency break sends the record as AgentErrorReport.PriorRegistrationFailure
(null for older agents); the backend bounds it and adds it to the ops details,
the App Insights dimensions and the timeline data. Retry behaviour is unchanged.

The raw registry trigger whiteglove_signal_* is renamed save_result_step_*: the
step exists in every 25H2 enrollment and the old name read as a
pre-provisioning signal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 01:38:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fa637369e1 bump pointer: internal (emergency break session age live)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 00:05:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach edf30d35e0 Emergency break reports the session age; a break without a session row is Info
The agent measured the session age at its 48 h break but never sent it.
AgentErrorReport now carries SessionAgeHours (optional, null for older
agents), and the backend puts it into the ops details, the timeline data and
the App Insights dimension. It is information only: the backend cannot derive
it (no row, or a row registered seconds before the break after a hibernate
resume), and it never feeds the severity.

The backend now reads the Sessions row once for the owner binding and the
break verdict. A report for a session without a row (in practice one that
never registered) is Info and writes no timeline event and no EventType index
row: nothing can close or open that session, and the orphan sweep deleted the
event a day later with a Warning of its own. A row under cascade delete gets
nothing written past the lock. Terminal stays Info with lateCleanup; an open
status or a failed read stays Warning with the historical write. Break
materialization now requires GUID ids.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 23:40:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3b4228e3a1 bump pointer: internal (session-owner binding stage 2 live)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 23:38:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a029d69d5e Session-owner binding stage 2: refuse sessions bound to another device
Each Sessions row is bound to the device identity that registered it. The
binding ran in shadow; it now refuses every foreign-identity outcome:
register-session answers 403 with session_owner_mismatch before anything is
written, agent telemetry 403 in the error envelope (SessionOwnerMismatch),
the hosted diagnostics upload URL 403. The error channel stays 200 and only
skips its write into the named session. An evaluation defect fails open.

The agent already rotates its session id on the 403 at registration; it now
does the same for the coded 409 (session id claimed by another tenant) instead
of retrying six times and exiting, and fails without retry on any other coded
409 (BackendRefusalException, never an auth failure). A snapshot restored
after a rotation adopts the current session id.

A guard test pins the four call sites and fails when a site observes the
binding without acting on the refusal. Privacy page: session binding under
how data is protected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 23:12:18 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach daae1ce1fa bump pointer: internal (paged cross-partition merge released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 21:02:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d90cf24508 bump pointer: internal (D-294/D-295 paged cross-partition merge)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 20:53:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 32f1fd4132 Click-next lists change page only after the page loaded
The audit log, ops events, rule submissions and session reports each
carried a copy of the same paging state. Next bumped the page number and
cursor stack before the request and kept them when it failed, so a failed
request showed "Page 3" over the rows of page 1.

useCursorPager (pure transitions in lib/cursorPager) owns rows, cursors
and the stack; the page number is derived from the stack. A move commits
only after its page loaded, and only the latest move commits. The fetch is
read through useLatest, which retires the per-page workarounds for the
token getter's changing identity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 20:53:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ffb09e60fa Global audit and ops-event pages continue from one RowKey watermark
The cross-partition pages (audit log over all tenants, ops events over
all categories) kept one continuation entry per partition that still had
rows. On the tenant fan-out the nextLink outgrew the host's URL limit:
the follow-up request was rejected with HTTP 414 before the function ran,
so Next never loaded a second page for a Global Admin.

The continuation is now the (RowKey, Partition) of the last returned row.
Every page reads each partition through BoundedFanOut (pageSize + 1 rows
after the watermark) and merges by (RowKey, Partition), which is the
display order in both tables. Partitions after the watermark's partition
continue with `RowKey ge`, the others with `RowKey gt`, so equal ops
RowKeys across categories survive a page cut. The merge no longer sorts
by the resolved OccurredUtc while advancing by RowKey, which could skip
rows where the two disagree.

The fan-out was unbounded (Task.WhenAll over every tenant); it now runs
with the shared cross-tenant concurrency ceiling like the session list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 20:53:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f920b6228e fix(web): suspended and offboarded tenants get their page again (#164) 2026-09-28 18:23:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1765773116 bump pointer: internal (RealmJoin app install rows released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 18:21:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5c7295019b bump pointer: internal (D-292/D-293 RealmJoin app install rows)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 10:19:18 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a0ad769231 RealmJoin packages count as app installs next to Intune apps
App install rows now carry their install channel. The ingest folds the RealmJoin
watcher's package started/completed events into AppInstallSummaries rows (channel
"realmjoin", keyed by scope + package id; duration = completion minus the observed
start). IME rows keep their key and have no channel column, so they read as before.

Every per-app aggregate groups on (channel, name): apps list, app analytics and
sessions (new ?source=, default ime), metrics/app, SLA top failing apps and the
version-regression radar (tracker key, episode key, bell link, ops event). The app
install SLA rate includes RealmJoin packages. The ESP-blocking stamp stays IME-only.
RealmJoin packages do not feed the software inventory or CVE correlation.

Web: a RealmJoin pill and an All / Intune / RealmJoin filter on Software > Installs,
the pill on app detail, Fleet Health and SLA, source-aware app links and PDF meta
line, and a hint in the empty Inventory tab. The pill moves out of InstallProgress
into a shared component. MCP: get_app_install_metrics names the source field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 10:19:18 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 64da9f850b bump pointer: internal (D-291 chain build without downloads)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 09:07:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5dae21968b Client-certificate chain building never downloads an issuer
The platform forwards whatever certificate the TLS client presented, so an
unauthenticated caller can hand in a leaf signed by a CA it made up. The
chain engine then fetched the leaf's AIA caIssuers URL before rejecting it:
an attacker-directed GET from the backend, and a worker blocked for the
10 s retrieval timeout. Every legitimate issuer is embedded and Intune
certificates carry no AIA, so downloads are now disabled and the unused
retrieval timeout is gone.

The regression test signs a leaf with a CA that is neither embedded nor
sent and asserts that the listener behind its AIA URL sees no connection;
a self-signed leaf never reaches that path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 09:06:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 59897dfbd8 bump pointer: internal (B-g9t editor verify)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 20:33:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f4551ea1ed bump pointer: internal (D-288/D-289/D-290 live)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 20:21:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e816c92b88 Tenant configuration has one conditional write path; the full-model PUT is gone
A tenant configuration row is never written blind any more (D-290). Three writers saved
from the 5-minute instance cache and four wrote a fresh read without an ETag: auto-re-enable
could lift a suspension a Global Admin had just renewed, the PUT could write the cached
Disabled=false over the offboarding tombstone during the drain barrier, and a concurrent
first login could overwrite the write-once OnboardedBy.

- TenantConfigurationService.CreateOrUpdateAsync next to UpdateAsync (shared core): fresh
  read with ETag, tombstone refused, mutation decides, conditional replace, conditional
  insert for a missing row, re-read and re-decide on a lost race.
- SaveConfigurationAsync and IConfigRepository.SaveTenantConfigurationAsync deleted; new
  TryCreateTenantConfigurationAsync. The default row of GetConfigurationAsync is a
  conditional insert.
- Converted: first-login seed (writes only while the stored row has no domain; only the
  winning login fires the signup side effects), auto-re-enable (decided on the fresh row),
  auth client-id tracking, app-homing flip, conferred-Pro grace stamp, offboarding tombstone.
- PUT/POST config/{tenantId} removed (function, catalog entries, response DTO). The Global
  Admin tenant editor sends only its changed fields to the field PATCH; the Collect Logs
  quick-config PATCHes its two diagnostics fields with ?intent=collect-logs, which keeps
  the CollectLogsQuickConfigEnabled ops event. Shared diff helper lib/tenantConfigSave.ts.
- Tests: create-or-update and default-row races, concurrent first login, renewed
  suspension, tombstone paths; repository and service doubles in ConfigRepoMockExtensions.
  Regenerated shared manifest and wire types (web, MCP).

Deploy order: backend, then web right after (the old web's editor save and quick-config
use the removed PUT).

Bumps internal (D-290, plan, docs).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 20:11:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a16a70fba5 Self-service trial stays once per tenant across offboarding; plan writers decide on the fresh row
Offboarding deletes the tenant configuration, and the returning tenant's first login recreated
it with TrialConsumed=false, so the one-time 30-day Pro trial could be chained by offboarding
and re-onboarding.

- The offboard click reads the configuration fail-loud and ORs TrialConsumed into the
  OffboardingByTenantPointer (sticky across rounds, same ETag CAS as OffboardCount).
- The first-login write (HandleNewTenantDomainAsync, the one write that sets OnboardedBy)
  carries it onto the new row; an unreadable pointer means no write, retried next login.
  Re-onboarding itself is unchanged, auto-approve included.
- TenantConfigurationService.UpdateAsync: fresh projected row with ETag, offboarding
  tombstone refused (403 TenantSuspended), mutation may decline, conditional replace with
  the ordinary pre-write backup, re-read and re-decide on a lost race (409 after 3).
  SetTenantPlanTier and StartTrial use it, so a warm instance's cached row is never saved
  (it could lift the tombstone during the drain barrier) and two concurrent trial starts
  cannot both pass.
- Tests: TenantConfigUpdateTests (service + both endpoints), pointer stickiness and the
  offboard endpoint in TenantOffboardFunctionTests, first-login carry-over in
  AuthFunctionSideEffectTests; shared EndpointHarness.

Bumps internal (D-288, D-289, plan, docs).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 19:08:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1b2bdd8f35 bump pointer: internal (SSRF gate released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 13:43:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 942bd86238 bump pointer: internal (SSRF gate live-verify)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 13:08:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7a920049ca bump pointer: internal (D-287 Node/Next version plan)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 12:48:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2eeb4da950 bump pointer: internal (B-h4m CodeQL note)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 12:38:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 20a80cbdc6 bump pointer: internal (SSRF address gate D-286, B-h4m)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 12:37:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c59e65ee0a fix(backend): webhook SSRF gate moves onto the connection
SsrfGuard.ValidateDestinationAsync resolved the webhook host and checked
it, then HttpClient resolved it again for the POST, so a DNS-rebinding
host could pass the check and be connected to an internal address.

The webhook client's SocketsHttpHandler now connects through
SsrfGuard.ConnectToPublicAddress: it resolves once per connection,
refuses the connection if any address is blocked, enforces HTTPS and
connects the socket only to the checked addresses; TLS still runs against
the request host. The pre-flight check is removed, the registration moves
to AddWebhookNotificationHttpClient so a test can prove the wiring, the
notification retry policy no longer retries a refused destination, and
the test endpoint reports the refusal with the same message as before.

IsBlockedAddress follows the same model as the MCP server: all IANA
special-purpose space, IPv6 only 2000::/3, zone ids and IPv4-mapped
addresses refused (IPNetwork.Contains judges a mapped address by its
IPv4 form, so those are refused first).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 12:36:06 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 89aa9e1f10 fix(mcp): CIMD fetch checks the address inside the socket's own DNS lookup
The SSRF gate resolved the client_id host, checked the answer and then
handed the hostname to fetch(), which resolved it again at connect time.
A DNS-rebinding host could pass the check with a public answer and be
connected to an internal one.

The metadata fetch now runs through a dedicated undici dispatcher whose
connect.lookup is the gate: one resolution per connection, every address
must be public, the socket connects only to those addresses. The global
fetch is untouched.

The address classifier now refuses every IANA special-purpose block
(IPv4), allows only global unicast 2000::/3 minus its special-purpose
blocks (IPv6), and refuses zone ids and IPv4-mapped addresses. The tests
enumerate the unedited IANA registries (tests/fixtures/
iana-special-purpose-addresses) and prove on loopback sockets that a
refused host opens no socket and that an allowed one is connected to
exactly the address the gate returned.

Adds undici ^8.11.2 (engines >=22.19.0).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 12:35:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2d3700cfaf bump pointer: internal (B-5p4 release state)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 17:16:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5a182f3f16 bump pointer: internal (B-5p4 DO-geo deploy/verify)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 17:10:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 889b843d6d feat(agent): Delivery Optimization geo endpoint as last-resort geolocation provider
When ipinfo.io (plus retry) and ifconfig.co both fail, the agent now asks
geo.prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com/geo. It returns only CountryCode and
ExternalIpAddress, but it belongs to the DO/Windows Update endpoint set Autopilot
needs anyway, so it stays reachable where public geo services are blocked.
The session then gets a country-only device_location (source "do-geo", no
timezone, so timezone auto-set stays pending) instead of none.

- GeoLocationService: the three providers share one TryProvider skeleton;
  response parsers are internal and unit-tested; GeoLocationResult.Describe()
  skips missing parts ("DE" instead of ", , DE") in the event message and log.
- Failure trace carries doGeoError + lastResortProvider.
- Backend: geographic location keys skip empty region/city, so country-only
  sessions group as "DE" rather than ", DE"; drilldown still round-trips.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 17:08:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9b91119239 bump pointer: internal (way 3 docs live)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 14:58:33 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1e74d67da9 fix(web): service-principal member form names both uses — automation (access_as_application) and an app sending its users' tokens (delegated access_as_user, users read-only)
The ClientAppNotRegistered refusal (D-279, now enforced) sends Tenant Admins
to this form; its hint required access_as_application, which an app acting
on behalf of users does not need.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 14:51:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ed013bbdda bump pointers: internal (hash repair via v2.0.1466), .claude/commands (platform-health repair note)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 14:51:37 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4b40619d1d bump pointer: internal (client-app binding enforced, way 3 documented)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 14:48:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3ce1f2b036 bump pointer: internal (D-285 plan live)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 14:06:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 673f045212 fix(web): platform settings saves send only the changed fields via PATCH global/config (D-285)
Each save handler still builds the edited configuration but now sends changedAdminConfigFields(loaded, edited) through lib/adminConfigSave.ts, and nothing at all when nothing changed. This covers the Global Settings, the diagnostics paths, the ops alerts and the vulnerability section. The MCP access policy patches its single field without reading first. A page loaded before another writer (the agent release pipeline, a second operator, a sync job) can no longer revert that writer's fields. Deployed after the backend that serves PATCH global/config.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 13:55:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach df640e3684 fix(backend): admin configuration is written only in its changed columns; PATCH global/config replaces the full-model PUT (D-285)
On 2026-09-25 a Global Settings save from a page loaded before an agent release wrote the whole configuration back and reverted the release's LatestAgentV2* hashes. After that, every 2.0.1465 agent reported IntegrityCheckFailed. The flaw was structural: every writer (portal PUT, plan tiers, three vulnerability-sync stamp paths) replaced the whole row from the copy it held, usually the 5-minute cache.

- IConfigRepository.UpdateAdminConfigurationAsync(mutate, updatedBy) is the one write path. It reads the row fresh with its ETag and applies the mutation to a copy materialized from that read. It computes the changed columns from the converter projections and writes only those onto the freshly read raw entity; a null value drops the column. The replace is conditional, and a conflict triggers a re-read and retry. A no-op writes nothing. Pipeline-owned and unknown columns survive. The full-model SaveAdminConfigurationAsync / SaveConfigurationAsync are removed, and the first row is created with AddEntity.
- PATCH global/config with { fields } (PatchAdminConfigurationRequest) replaces PUT/POST. Its field gate is derived from the persisted columns and rejects server stamps, LatestAgentV2* / LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion, PlanTierDefinitionsJson, the sync stamps and redacted placeholders. The route catalog lists PATCH.
- Plan tiers, TriggerMsrcSync, TriggerVulnerabilityDataSync, VulnerabilityDataSyncFunction and VulnerabilityCacheRefreshService.StampAsync each hand in a mutation.
- Tests: AdminConfigurationChangedFieldsTests (stale-page toggle keeps the release hashes, concurrent pipeline write re-read and kept, no-op, rejection, null drop, first row, gate); existing tests adapted; the request guard allows the admin field map.
- Regenerated shared manifest and wire types (web utils + MCP). The web still sends PUT until the web commit that follows the backend deploy.
- The internal pointer is bumped to D-285.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 13:51:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 59bea9d888 bump pointers: internal (plan envelope live), .claude/commands (platform-health markers)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 13:11:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e2c91afda2 feat(mcp): seal refresh tokens of registered self-hosted clients so that deleting the registration also ends copies (D-283)
A portal-registered client (amc_) now receives its Entra refresh token only as a compact JWE (RFC 7516, dir + A256GCM, kid amc-rt-v1). The key is derived from OAuthStateSigningKey. At refresh, the registration comes from the envelope, never from the client_id parameter. Before, a copy of the token redeemed without client_id went to the organizations authority and skipped the registration check.

A raw refresh token presented with an amc_ client id is accepted and returned sealed, so these clients migrate on their next refresh. All other clients are unchanged. jose becomes a production dependency; it was a dev-only transitive dependency before. The internal pointer is bumped to D-283/D-284.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 13:00:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach eb47c4d69a bump pointer
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 12:32:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 91d56f2bbb bump pointer
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 11:58:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 12b847360c feat(web): Intune Enrollment Validation in the tenant settings; banners follow any device validation (D-282)
The option is a regular tenant-admin toggle in its own "Without pre-registration" block, with the
add-on permission state read from the existing graph-permissions status endpoint. The dashboard
banner and the admin Ready badge key on "any validation method enabled" (feature flag
deviceValidationEnabled, manifest-driven validate* fields) instead of Autopilot alone, so a
device-preparation tenant that validates by device association is no longer told that agent
ingestion is blocked. Stale "shadow mode" wording for Device Association is gone, the
Not-registered report names every method, sessions show "Intune Enrollment", and the privacy
page and FAQ list the new method. Grant script help describes the IntuneDeviceBinding feature
as Intune Enrollment Validation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 11:57:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2e736f40ad feat(backend,shared): Intune Enrollment Validation admits enrolled devices without pre-registration (D-282)
The certificate's Intune managedDevice id is looked up in the tenant's Intune. With the tenant
switch ValidateIntuneDeviceBinding on, that lookup is the last accepting link of the validator
chain: an enrolled device that is not being retired, wiped or deleted is admitted as
ValidatorType.IntuneEnrollment. A 404 for a certificate younger than 60 minutes is
NotFoundRecentEnrollment (503, never cached); a missing grant is 503 with 120 s.

For devices another validator admitted, the lookup only observes: in the background, never
admitting or rejecting, and only when the app token carries
DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All, so a tenant without the add-on costs no Graph call.
Outcomes ride on the request row (CertDeviceBinding, role, serial match, owner and enrollment
type).

TenantConfiguration.HasAnyDeviceValidation() is the single gate precondition; the feature flags
expose it as deviceValidationEnabled (replaces validateAutopilotDevice).

The agent parses ValidatorType strictly: release the agent before this backend.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 11:57:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9c3e5ecb30 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-09-25 06:55:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 27ce316206 bump pointer 2026-09-25 06:55:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7280b61d28 fix(web): self-hosted AI clients are ones the organization hosts itself (#163)
"Runs on its own servers" read as on-premises only and collided with the
MCP server. The criterion is who hosts the client (on premises or in the
cloud), matching the customer docs.


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012P3YpD3CSsR8Sy1Ubg4pUw

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 05:43:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 79f1ecd378 Tenant Config Report: show self-hosted AI client registrations (#162)
The registrations (name, callback URL, client id) live in their own table,
not in TenantConfiguration, so the report only showed the limit. Fetch
GET tenants/{tenantId}/mcp-client-registrations fail-soft alongside the
other side views and render them in the Tenant Status section, plus the
platform switch. The limit row is relabelled to say it is a limit.


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DbRs7NCppizQ7wWFjN7n3M

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 20:54:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b6791d37e0 ci(codeql): exclude js/missing-rate-limiting; a test pins every OAuth route to its limiter (D-281)
The query recognizes only npm limiter packages, never oauthRateLimit /
oauthTokenRateLimit, and flags a handler as soon as it calls a function
named like *auth*, *login* or *verify*. All six alerts it ever raised were
on throttled OAuth routes (the last two came from tenantAuthority()).

What it stood in for is now a test: every route of the OAuth router must
run a per-IP limiter first unless it is one of the three named discovery
documents, /oauth/token must carry the strict budget, and a router.use()
middleware fails the check. Verified by mutation: removing the limiter
from /oauth/authorize fails the test with the route name.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 18:58:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4f1b4f8c03 fix(mcp): URL-encode the registration id in the tenant-client lookup path
The registration lookup put a client_id-derived value into the backend URL
path unencoded. The amc_ regex already limits it to 32 hex characters, so
nothing changes at runtime, but every other request-derived path segment in
the MCP server goes through encodeURIComponent, and CodeQL counts only that
(or a ?/# prefix) as a request-forgery barrier - a regex capture group is
not one. Closes code-scanning alert js/request-forgery on oauth.ts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 18:33:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 869580c9df feat(web): progress portal deep link /progress?serial=
A ?serial= parameter (serial number or exact device name) runs one lookup
as soon as sign-in has resolved the tenant, so organisations can send users
a link to follow their own device. Every hit writes the found session's
serial back into the URL for reload, bookmark and copying. Authorization is
unchanged: sign-in stays mandatory and roleless callers still need the exact
serial server-side. The query survives the login redirect because
ProtectedRoute keeps pathname + search. progress_serial_submitted carries
source form | link.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 17:14:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1a96cd20da feat(web,backend): AI Integration settings page; one self-hosted client per tenant, raisable by a Global Admin
- Settings > Tenant > AI Integration (between SLA Targets and Bootstrap
  Sessions) explains the normal connection first - server URL for Claude,
  ChatGPT, VS Code and other hosted assistants, nothing to register - and
  shows the self-hosted client registration below it (Tenant Admin, platform
  switch on). The page is visible to admins, platform scopes and anyone with
  MCP access. The self-hosted example text is neutral.
- A tenant may hold one self-hosted client registration. The GA-only
  TenantConfiguration.McpClientRegistrationLimit (1-10) raises it on request:
  reverted for non-GA callers on PUT, refused on PATCH, edited in the Global
  Admin tenant dialog. MCP_SERVER_URL joins the portal URL registry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 15:00:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8e637cf86a feat(web): docs link of the self-hosted AI clients section points at its own docs section
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 14:47:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 93c6e1facb feat(mcp): tenant-bound registrations for self-hosted MCP clients (D-280)
A self-hosted AI client redirects to its own domain, which the vendor
redirect allowlist never admits, so it could not use the browser sign-in.
Tenant Admins can now register the client's exact OAuth callback in the
portal and configure the client with client id amc_<registrationId>.

- MCP OAuth proxy: an amc_ id is resolved through the backend; its
  registration is the redirect allowlist entry for that exact callback.
  Authorize and token run at the registering tenant's Entra authority, and
  the token endpoint discards a token of any other tenant (code and
  refresh). Lookups are cached for 60 s, a failed lookup fails closed. Every
  other client keeps the allowlist check before its resolution.
- Backend: table McpClientRegistrations, TenantAdminOrGA routes
  tenants/{tenantId}/mcp-client-registrations (list, create, delete; at
  most three, https or loopback http, exact URI, audited) and the anonymous,
  per-IP rate-limited lookup auth/mcp/client-registrations/{id} (under
  /api/auth for the client-certificate exclusion list).
- AdminConfiguration.McpClientRegistrationEnabled (default off) is the
  platform switch: off hides the portal section and makes every lookup 404.
  auth/me carries it for the sidebar.
- Portal: Settings > Tenant > Self-hosted AI clients (Tenant Admin / Global
  Admin), and the switch in Admin > Settings > Global.
- Tests: MCP tenant-client flow (authority, tid check, revocation, cache,
  allowlist), backend round trip, wire parity, validation, cap, switch,
  audit; nav visibility. Manifests and wire types regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 14:10:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4a4bbc056a fix(mcp): the OAuth proxy advertises and returns token auth method none
The proxy issues no client secrets, but its authorization server metadata
named no token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported (RFC 8414 then implies
client_secret_basic) and /oauth/register echoed a requested secret-based
method. A client following that default registered with client_secret_basic
and then failed the token exchange ("client_secret_basic authentication
requires a client_secret"), reproduced with the SDK calls a self-hosted chat
client makes. The metadata now lists ["none"] and registration always answers
none (RFC 7591 lets the server replace a requested value).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 13:35:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c59b366560 feat(auth): client-app binding for delegated tokens - measured always, enforced behind a switch (D-279)
A user token obtained by an application other than the platform's own
registrations (for example a self-hosted AI client using on-behalf-of) was
accepted with the user's full role; only audience, issuer, signature and
lifetime were checked. Such tokens are now classified on every request.

- ClientAppBindingMiddleware (after authentication, before policy enforcement)
  records the request dimensions ClientAppBinding (registered | unregistered |
  unidentified) and ClientAppId, plus a throttled Warning.
- AdminConfiguration.EnforceClientAppBinding (default off; Admin > Settings >
  Global): when on, a foreign client is refused with 403 ClientAppNotRegistered
  unless the application is an enabled member of the caller's tenant (the
  app:<client-id> row a service principal uses). An admitted caller keeps their
  identity but gets the application caps: at most Viewer, no platform role,
  DelegatedReader on managed tenants, roleless tiers closed except auth/mcp.
- AdminIdentity.IsCapped (application or admitted foreign client) is what the
  global, delegated and member-role resolvers switch on; RequestContext carries it.
- Own clients = the audience trust set plus EntraId:TrustedClientAppIds, a
  client-only trust for the local development registration that never widens
  the accepted audiences.
- Tests: classification, unforgeable cap marker, middleware in both modes, caps
  through the real policy middleware, pipeline order; manifests and wire types
  regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 13:28:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d0aded5401 chore: bump internal (D-278, MCP client plan draft)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 12:41:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8f9c683b7c chore: bump infra (redirect-allowlist parameter description)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 09:45:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e82878af57 feat(mcp): name the rejected token's aud/azp/tid and the rejected redirect targets in the auth log lines
A backend 401 on `initialize` logged only the UPN, and the backend's own trace
("IDX10214 audience validation failed") never names the token; a registration
rejection logged only a count of redirect_uris. Diagnosing a self-hosted client
(LibreChat) that first failed DCR on its own callback host and then presented
tokens minted for another resource took a customer round trip.

- access-guard: `invalid-token-claims` and `backend-rejected-token` carry
  `aud=... azp=... tid=...` (unverified claims; control characters stripped, capped)
- oauth/register: the rejection names origin + path of up to three rejected
  redirect_uris (never the query); the error_description names the actual
  defaults (VS Code, not Google)
- tests for both lines; skill catalog in .claude/commands (mcp-telemetry) updated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 09:44:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d60e858e95 chore: bump internal (signature-check lesson)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 14:27:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f6ce9ae0a0 chore: bump internal (web perf audit released, first RUM comparison)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 13:38:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b4f26401f5 perf(web): stop recording own-origin non-API fetches as dependencies (D-277)
Route payloads (__next.*.txt, index.txt), static JSON and the router's HEAD
self-requests were 20k of 62k dependency rows per week and nobody reads them.
lib/webTelemetryExclusions.ts builds the patterns (own origins minus /api/,
plus relative non-API URLs) for two layers: excludeRequestFromAutoTracking-
Patterns for string fetches, and a dependency initializer that drops the
finished item by its absolute target - the SDK's own check sees an empty URL
for the URL objects Next's router passes to fetch (verified against the ingest
batch: 11 such fetches, 0 shipped; API, SignalR and token rows still shipped).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 12:42:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2b5004fb33 perf(web): web perf audit 2026-09-23 - cache headers, intent prefetch, seeds, SignalR refcount, lazy telemetry
P1 - full loads
- staticwebapp.config.json: /_next/static/* immutable, /landing/* max-age=86400
  (SWA default was max-age=30 for hashed assets); guard test pins it
- components/NavLink.tsx: prefetch on hover/focus/touch for the portal chrome
  (prefetch={false} also disabled the hover prefetch); landing links stay off
- app/layout.tsx: preconnect to the API origin
- lib/dashboardSeed.ts + lib/prefetchSeeds.ts: the dashboard's first list and
  stats requests start with auth/me and are handed to the hooks as one-shot
  seeds (the own-tenant list URL carries no tenantId; the backend reads the JWT)
- lib/msalConfig.ts: the login request carries the API scope, so one token
  redemption serves the first API call; Graph consent via extraScopesToConsent

P2 - chatter per navigation
- lib/signalrGroupRegistry.ts + contexts/SignalRContext.tsx: group membership
  is reference-counted with a 2 s grace leave; reconnect rejoins run in
  parallel; on/off/invoke and the context value are memoised; the dashboard's
  unconditional leave no longer drops the notification bell's global-admins
  membership; consumers pair every join with a cleanup leave
- app/sessions/hooks: both group joins in parallel, the join catch-up is
  dropped while the initial walk is in flight, identical session deltas skip
  the state update
- lib/cachedAuthFetch.ts: TTL cache for feature flags, tenant list and latest
  versions with invalidation on every write path; FeedbackBubble defers its
  status call

P3 - pure derivations only (D-274): memoised filter arrays, one-pass phase
  summary, status counts, useDeferredValue on both search inputs

P4 - landing
- lib/authHint.ts + AuthGate + globals.css: the loading overlay is applied by
  an inline head script only when the site root is opened by a browser with an
  auth hint; the prerendered HTML carries no overlay; CSS lifts it after 8 s
- hero as WebP srcset (81 KB instead of a 180 KB PNG), dead landing-v1 CSS
  removed, terminal demo pauses off-screen, duplicate twitter image dropped

Telemetry (D-276)
- lib/appInsightsRuntime.ts: the SDK is its own chunk, deferred until idle on
  the public host, remote config fetch off (blkCdnCfg), initial trackPageView
  on both hosts, Web Vitals as web_vital_* custom metrics

Verified: tsc, eslint --max-warnings 0, vitest 127 files / 1442 tests, next
build, Playwright click-through of every portal route, settings section,
session views and public pages on the production bundle against the live API.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 12:10:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 00f4cb1f26 fix(agent,web): a script run duration is judged from both lines' provenance; an offset-error span is omitted, never shown (D-273)
A platform script that ran 10 s was shown as "1h 00m" (session 4377911b): its
start line was self-anchored (+120 min) while its result line, re-read after an
overwrite rewind and therefore never fresh, fell back to the agent's cached zone
(+60 min), was rejected as ahead of the clock, and the duration was taken from
the raw pair. The same shape fired script_timeout_suspected daily in one tenant
on 2-9 s scripts read as 17 h. Fleet 2026-09-20..23: about 1 % of script
durations, 28 of 28 inflated ones carrying derivedTimestamp.

Agent: ScriptExecutionState binds the provenance of its start, result and exit
lines (CmTraceLineProvenance, persisted); EmitScriptCompleted judges the pair -
verified (both measured, or both assumed with the same offset from the same
file), unverified, or suppressed with durationSuppressedReason
(rejected-endpoint | offset-grid, CmTraceOffsetCalibrator.IsOnOffsetGrid) - and
always emits durationProvenance plus startSourceOffset*. A held completion's
sourceOffset* tags now describe its own result line; script_timeout_suspected
only judges a measurable duration; the emitted-run marker is capped at the
clock so a future-shifted result no longer swallows the next run's start.

Web: the reducer applies the same rule to stored events from older agents,
pairing a final with the latest script_started of its policy, and the panel
shows "n/a" with the explanation where the run time would be.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 09:50:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e091e50862 chore: bump internal (plan and backlog on the commit state)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 09:47:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 27ce07b111 chore: bump internal and .claude/commands (IME wait states D-271, ime-diffs note D-272)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 09:46:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f06fe5afc0 feat(agent): registry observer surfaces IME install-deadline waits and app-in-use deferrals (D-271)
ImeRegistryAppStateObserver reads a fourth IME registry surface,
Win32Apps\OperationalState\<userGuid>\<appGuid>: the install deadline a
downloaded app waits for (ExecutionDeadlineTime, IME 1.106) and the
app-in-use deferral counters (DeferralsUsed, DeferUntilTime,
DeferralMaxDeferrals, DeferralAutoDeferred, IME 1.105). Both travel on the
existing registry_app_state event as data (installDeadlineUtc, deferralsUsed,
deferralMaxDeferrals, deferUntilUtc, deferralAutoDeferred) with the change
triggers installDeadline / deferralsUsed / deferUntil, and the message says
the state in words ("downloaded, install deadline ... UTC", "deferred by user
1/3 until ... UTC", "auto-deferred ..."). No new event type.

ClassifyStatusServiceStatus maps IME's legacy AppInstallStatus explicitly:
1000/1002/1004 installed, 1001/1003 installing, 2000 band notApplicable,
3000 failed, anything else unjudged. The 1000 band was treated as installed,
but IME maps every InProgress enforcement state to 1001, so a running app
counted as terminal success on the registry rail (observability only).

Tests: explicit status mapping, both registry timestamp shapes, the new
change triggers, the wait-state text, and the tick flow for a deadline and a
deferral event. Mutation proof: classifier and trigger broken on purpose
turn exactly the five expected tests red.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 09:46:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 37e920237c chore: bump internal (Web-Performance-Audit 2026-09-23)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 09:30:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7279650772 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-09-23 08:32:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d8ab70b166 chore(rules): override fast-json-patch to 3.1.1 (Dependabot #103)
ajv-cli 5.0.0 is the latest release and still declares fast-json-patch ^2.0.0,
so neither Dependabot nor npm audit fix can move past CVE-2021-4279. An npm
override forces 3.1.1 into the lockfile; the 3.x API is backward compatible and
the validate command used in combine-rules.yml never touches the package.
Verified: npm ci from the lockfile plus all four ajv validate steps pass locally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 08:29:58 +02:00
dependabot[bot] fb8703a4c6 chore(deps): bump the actions group with 3 updates (#160)
Bumps the actions group with 3 updates: [azure/login](https://github.com/azure/login), [github/codeql-action/init](https://github.com/github/codeql-action) and [github/codeql-action/analyze](https://github.com/github/codeql-action).


Updates `azure/login` from 3.0.2 to 3.1.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/azure/login/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/azure/login/compare/7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c...a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906)

Updates `github/codeql-action/init` from 4.37.9 to 4.38.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/compare/cdf488f595d80d6e07e03d4674febd5ab45fa938...b96794f015dfd88f77b49b1c93e0fa7110f94c63)

Updates `github/codeql-action/analyze` from 4.37.9 to 4.38.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/compare/cdf488f595d80d6e07e03d4674febd5ab45fa938...b96794f015dfd88f77b49b1c93e0fa7110f94c63)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: azure/login
  dependency-version: 3.1.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: actions
- dependency-name: github/codeql-action/init
  dependency-version: 4.38.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: actions
- dependency-name: github/codeql-action/analyze
  dependency-version: 4.38.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: actions
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-23 08:18:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ac3fa8b2b6 chore: bump internal (B-2am deployed)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 21:29:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach efcb4f9ca1 fix(offboarding): farewell feedback reaches the backend again; farewell mail leaves an ops event; suspended page instead of alert
The offboard endpoint tombstones the tenant (Disabled=true, "Offboarding in
progress") before it answers 202, so the departing admin submits the farewell
feedback from an already-suspended tenant. Since the suspension gate moved onto
the shared authorization path (43ddc601, 2026-08-29) every feedback POST was
403 TenantSuspended — invisible, because nobody clicked and the two stored
feedbacks predate the gate (D-270).

- Endpoint catalog: `AllowedDuringOffboarding` on exactly
  POST tenants/{tenantId}/offboard/feedback; the middleware ignores the
  offboarding tombstone for that route only. An operator suspension still
  denies; policy tier, cross-tenant check and the function's active-marker
  check are untouched. Middleware tests for all four cases plus a catalog
  ratchet pinning the flag to the one route.
- Farewell mail: IOffboardFarewellEmailSender.SendAsync returns whether the
  provider accepted; the offboarding worker records FarewellEmailSent /
  FarewellEmailSkipped / FarewellEmailFailed like the welcome mail — the
  send's own success log is Information and never reaches Application
  Insights. Missing Email:ApiKey logs Warning. Handler tests per outcome;
  OpsAlertRules catalog and the generated manifests (Web + MCP vocabulary)
  carry the three types.
- Web: auth/me 403 TenantSuspended no longer shows alert() and forces a
  logout. AuthContext keeps the user signed in with claims-only info and
  ProtectedRoute renders a suspended page: for the offboarding tombstone
  "Your organization is being offboarded" with the farewell feedback form
  (a reload during the 6-minute preparation window keeps the form), for any
  other suspension the reason text plus contact links; both with sign-out.
  The feedback widget moved from OffboardingSection into
  components/OffboardingFeedbackForm.tsx.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 21:18:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7a7a31e8e3 chore: bump internal (B-z9d root cause)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 20:26:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3fdcbabd48 chore: bump internal (backlog B-az5, B-z9d)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 20:11:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b2e8c7627f chore: bump internal and .claude/commands (context diet)
internal: operations facts as reference doc, leaner CLAUDE.md, context-diet plan. .claude/commands: shorter skill descriptions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 20:02:27 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach bd08d13011 chore: bump internal (mcp catalog sight check in Claude Code done)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 19:55:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 10c69f592e chore: bump internal (mcp-catalog-context-audit released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 18:41:06 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fe0b2dc7fe refactor(mcp): catalog diet — shared argument texts, scope-first instructions, $schema stripped (D-269)
Every tool description and both role instructions now fit the 2048-char host cap
(Claude Code truncated the Global Admin instructions and two descriptions silently).
Pagination, projection and scope mechanics are said once in the instructions and
the shared pageSize/continuation/tenantId/days texts; role markers left tools only
that role can see; get_resource lists its sections on the argument. The SDK $schema
URL is stripped from tools/list.

Measured (compact tools/list): Global Admin 111.4 KB -> 89.1 KB, Reader 94.7 -> 74.3,
tenant user 64.5 -> 51.3, delegated 75.1 -> 55.6 KB. catalog-budget.test.ts pins the
new ceilings, the variant counts and the empty over-cap list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 18:14:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a0f007fd43 fix(mcp): synthetic tenant examples, catalog budget test and audit script (D-269)
list_tenants named a real customer domain as its example; the filterTenantList test
carried three real tenants. Both now use synthetic names and GUIDs.

catalog-budget.test.ts pins the per-role wire catalog as a ratchet (size, repeated
argument texts, no foreign domains or GUIDs, the 2048-char host truncation cap with
the four known over-cap texts listed). scripts/audit-catalog.ts dumps and sizes the
catalog per role for before/after measurements.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 14:02:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1b27babd17 ci: zizmor gate for the workflow files plus a clean baseline (D-268)
zizmor (static analysis for GitHub Actions) now runs twice: locally before a
workflow commit (hard rule in .claude/CLAUDE.md) and as the `zizmor` job next to
the pin gate in action-pins.yml (zizmorcore/zizmor-action pinned by SHA, zizmor
1.30.1 pinned, SARIF into Code scanning, severity low and above). Like the pin
gate it reports and does not block. zizmor.yml holds the single reasoned ignore.

Baseline fixes so the gate starts green:
- persist-credentials: false on every checkout except combine-rules.yml, the one
  job that pushes with the checkout credentials (ignored in zizmor.yml, with reason)
- publish-scripts.yml: id-token: write moves from the workflow to the publish job;
  indexnow-notify.yml: permissions: {}
- deploy-mcp.yml: env values referenced as shell variables inside bash steps
  instead of template expansion
- pester.yml / publish-scripts.yml: reusable workflow via the self-repository form
  $/ (GitHub changelog 2026-07-30); the pin gate treats $/ like ./
- combine-rules.yml: ajv-cli installed with npm ci from rules/scripts/package-lock.json
  (no ts-node peer, no lifecycle scripts) instead of an ad-hoc global install;
  Dependabot watches /rules/scripts
- azure/login pin comment corrected to the tag the SHA actually is (v3.0.2; v3
  moved on to v3.1.0), no runtime change
- Dependabot: 7-day cooldown on every ecosystem (security updates are exempt)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 12:56:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 100d2242fa chore: regenerate shared manifest and wire types (TenantManagerItem.Name doc)
The XML summary added on TenantManagerItem.Name in ef280b7b rides into
shared-manifests.json as the field's doc; CI run 35701895623 caught the drift.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 10:02:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 089b1b38fd Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-09-22 09:53:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ac465839a5 chore: bump internal (backlog B-umq for D-267)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 09:52:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ef280b7bb5 fix(backend): managed tenants see operator-provisioned access as "Platform support"
GET delegations/managers no longer exposes the name of an operator-created
Tenant Group to the customer; both operator shapes (groups and direct grants)
carry the neutral label. Assignees, reader count and source stay visible.
Web badge reads "Provisioned by operators". D-267.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 09:52:00 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 233737f333 chore(deps-dev): bump the web group (#159)
Bumps the web group in /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web with 2 updates: [@types/node](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/node) and [autoprefixer](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer).


Updates `@types/node` from 22.20.2 to 22.20.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/node)

Updates `autoprefixer` from 10.5.6 to 10.6.1
- [Release notes](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/compare/10.5.6...10.6.1)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: "@types/node"
  dependency-version: 22.20.4
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: autoprefixer
  dependency-version: 10.6.1
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-22 09:29:05 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 909904e928 chore(deps): bump the mcp group (#158)
Bumps the mcp group in /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp with 2 updates: [zod](https://github.com/colinhacks/zod) and [@types/node](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/node).


Updates `zod` from 4.6.2 to 4.6.5
- [Release notes](https://github.com/colinhacks/zod/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/colinhacks/zod/compare/v4.6.2...v4.6.5)

Updates `@types/node` from 22.20.2 to 22.20.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/node)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: zod
  dependency-version: 4.6.5
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
- dependency-name: "@types/node"
  dependency-version: 22.20.4
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-22 09:28:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 59ab47de8c chore: bump internal (D-266 network link changes are not activity)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 00:48:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f252a0709f fix(agent): network link changes no longer count as enrollment activity
network_state_change and network_connectivity_check join the non-activity
list next to power_state_change. A flapping dock or access point kept the
idle-stopped periodic collectors running for the whole episode and reset
the stall clock of the enrollment it was stalling. The events are emitted
unchanged; the device-info network snapshots stay activity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 00:48:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d6d9638981 chore: bump internal (D-265 recurring health-script runs, backlog B-c6h)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 00:38:55 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 020248fbda feat(agent): collapse recurring health-script runs into one summary per policy
IME re-runs remediation policies on its own schedule for as long as the
device is up, so an enrollment that waits for its user reported every run
of every policy. The tracker now emits a policy's first run and every run
whose result differs from the last reported one (compliance, exit code,
stderr, remediation status, error code); repeats are counted and surface
as one script_recurrence_summary per policy when the tracker stops.

The start signal of a known policy is held until its result is known,
because the running indicators pair a start with a later result; a start
without any result is still emitted after a grace. The counters live in
the tracker state file next to the file positions, so a hard kill rolls
both back together. Platform scripts are untouched. The summary does not
count as enrollment activity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 00:38:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a06a0dbfff chore: bump internal (D-264 emergency break stays a start-time check, backlog B-drn)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 00:08:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 96c24e0688 chore: bump internal (D-263 excessive-events recount, backlog B-7wp)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 23:46:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c156350183 fix(backend): excessive-events sweep warns and blocks on recounted rows
The stored EventCount doubles on replayed upload batches and was only
corrected at terminal transitions, so the sweep judged running sessions on
an inflated number. It now recounts a candidate before it records the ops
event or blocks the device, skips candidates it cannot verify, and limits
the recount to candidates with a pending action. The warn text no longer
claims an agent loop bug.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 23:45:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 15b25ff509 chore: bump internal (D-261 typed wrapper bodies, D-262 req.Query, backlog B-t5z)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 22:31:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5163d7d6a0 refactor(backend): read the request query through req.Query only
73 sites in 68 files built the query collection with
HttpUtility.ParseQueryString(req.Url.Query), 15 files used req.Query and five mixed
both. HttpRequestData.Query is that same call, cached per request, and the ASP.NET
Core request type does not override it, so the change is behaviour-neutral.

- QueryParamGuardTests: ParseQueryString in the Functions project is limited to a
  named baseline of three sites that parse something other than the request query.
- A fact pins req.Query against HttpUtility.ParseQueryString (repeated keys, encoded
  values, caching) so a worker update that changes the implementation fails a test.
- Test mocks that set Url answer Query through CallBase; a loose mock returns null.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 22:28:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9fd343d328 fix(backend): typed bodies and error envelope for backup, session-restore and delegation wrappers
Six functions wrote their responses through a private wrapper taking the body as
object, which no typed-response guard could see. Their error bodies carried the code
in the error slot, no correlation id, and RestoreRow returned the raw exception text
on a 500.

- Backup job status, row restore and backup trigger answer through ResponseHelper:
  errors are the envelope, the 500 is sanitized, the 202 body is BackupTriggerResponse.
- Same for the session-deletion maintenance trigger, RestoreSession's three error
  sites and the delegation acknowledgements (MessageResponse).
- Backup codes are constants (Constants.BackupErrorCodes) and part of apiErrorCodes;
  RunAlreadyActive and EnqueueFailed join ApiErrorCodes.
- TypedResponseGuardTests gains guard F: no HttpResponseData-returning method with an
  object parameter. BackupWireParityTests pins that the move from the backup
  serializer options to the worker pipeline leaves the wire unchanged.
- Web reads BackupTriggerResponse from the generated wire types.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 22:19:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach aef88f3337 chore: bump internal (IME archiver pre-walk check doc, backlog B-ryg)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 20:59:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 12af1d6c76 fix(backend): IME archiver accepts an existing archive entry before walking the hosts
A version whose installer was already in the archive could only turn
Archived through the 409 on the write-once upload, which needs a
distribution host that still serves the build. For a version no host
serves any more the row stayed Failed:VersionMismatch next to its own
blob and re-walked every host once a day.

The archiver now checks the archive first: an entry whose ProductVersion
is the observed version ends the job as Archived with the hash and size
of the archived bytes and no download; a missing provenance sidecar is
written without a source URL. An entry holding another build, or an
unreadable one, is not accepted and the walk runs as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 20:58:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5433bff3db chore: bump internal (navbar profile photo plan and backlog)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 17:40:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 355509aa7c feat(web): show the signed-in user's profile photo in the navbar avatar
The browser loads the photo straight from Microsoft Graph with the User.Read
scope already consented at sign-in; it never reaches the backend. Any failure
(no photo, token, network) falls back to the initials. One request per account
and tab, cached in sessionStorage including the no-photo answer.

The four copied avatar blocks in the navbar become one UserAvatar component.
Graph host added to the URL registry and to connect-src in both CSPs; the
privacy page states where the photo comes from and that it is not stored.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 17:39:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7fb78a7e29 update pointer 2026-09-21 15:31:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach bfd8d58142 chore: bump internal (WNS deck plan)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 15:27:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8ad472d1bc fix(agent): single-instance guard counts a same-named process only in session 0
A process name is not a protected namespace: any user session can keep a
binary named like the agent resident, which made every agent start during
that session exit 1 before registration and let install mode report a
runtime launch that never happened.

The guard and install mode's launch verification now share one rule
(FindSiblingAgentPid): a name match counts only in session 0 and never for
the caller itself. Every runtime start lands there (Scheduled Task, WMI
launch from the SYSTEM install chain, self-update restart), so behaviour
for real agents is unchanged. The session id comes from the process
snapshot, so no handle is opened; a process that cannot be read does not
count, which fails open into two agents rather than none.

Two interactive --console runs in the same user session no longer block
each other; an interactive run next to the session-0 runtime still does.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 15:23:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fc5e2cd751 chore: bump internal (D-259 final, SLA plan and backlog)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 15:10:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9540791441 fix(web): SLA page headlines the window the alerts judge and shows "No data" for an empty period
Banner and the success-rate/duration gauges read the evaluation period
(last 30 days) instead of the current ISO week and name the window in their
labels; the app install gauge says "this week". A target whose period holds
no finished enrollment renders a neutral "No data" card and is left out of
the banner count; with nothing to judge the banner is neutral.

Banner logic moved to lib/slaStatus.ts (pure, tested).

Needs the backend of the previous commit: the page reads
evaluationPeriod / evaluationWindowDays.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 15:08:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 058da1627f fix(sla): alert and dashboard judge one rolling 30-day window; an empty period is no data; a lasting breach repeats only on new enrollments
The SLA breach alert judged the calendar month while the dashboard headline
showed the current ISO week, so an alert could report 78 % while the page it
links to showed 0 everywhere - and an empty week rendered as 0.0 % "Breached".

- SlaEvaluationWindow is the single definition of the SLA populations:
  success rate and P95 duration on terminal sessions of the last 30 days
  (rolling), app installs on the install attempts of the current ISO week.
  The breach evaluator and SlaMetricsService both read it, including the
  one-decimal rounding, so the value shown is the value judged.
- SlaMetricsResponse carries EvaluationPeriod and EvaluationWindowDays;
  SlaSnapshot carries Period and HasData. A period without a finished
  enrollment meets every target flag and is marked HasData = false.
- The dashboard reads from whichever starts earlier, the selected months or
  the evaluation window; trend and violators stay on the selected months.
- A lasting breach is notified again only after the cooldown AND once
  something finished since the last notification. A new breach episode after
  a resolve still notifies. Resolve notifications are unchanged.
- Alert period fact and telemetry tag follow the window constant.
- SlaMetricsService takes a nowProvider; the week-boundary workaround in its
  tests is gone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 15:08:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach cb9b3fe404 fix(agent): diagnostics paths collect exactly the folder the guard validated, and never the hard-blocked event logs
A configured diagnostics entry is resolved once to folder, pattern and recursion, and
that target is what gets validated and enumerated; recursion asks the guard before
entering a subfolder, and the user-profile token is expanded before validation.
Security, PowerShell and Sysmon event logs are refused per file, by name and by
resolved channel, in every mode; the portal flags such a path before it is saved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 14:58:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 12315b2f2d fix(web): Monitoring nav is ordered by admin usage, Progress Portal moves to the end
Directly under Dashboard the Progress Portal collected misclicks: 418 of 1,050
admin page views in 90 days went on to the dashboard within 5 seconds, from
every origin page. It is the end-user page; regular users keep it as their only
entry via REGULAR_USER_ITEMS. Annotations showed the same walk-through pattern
and moves down with it. Fleet Health, Geographic Perf. and Software lead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 13:56:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0a4a051866 feat(web): dashboard stat cards get one descriptive icon per metric, red only when sessions failed
All five cards showed the same bar-chart glyph on a differently coloured
block, so the colour carried no meaning. Each card now has a small grey
outline icon for its metric (pulse, check, stopwatch, calendar, x) in the
top-right corner, and the label gets the freed width. Failed Today turns
its value and icon red only when the count is above zero and reads
"No failures" at zero.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 13:40:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f47d961947 fix(web): rule pages tell non-admins that contributing is admin-only instead of failing with 403
The analyze and gather rule pages loaded the community submissions list for
every role. rules/submissions is TenantAdminOrGA, so an Operator or Viewer got
a 403 and a red "Failed to load your community submissions" banner on every
page visit (16 denials in 24 h from two operators of one tenant).

The pages now skip the list for callers who cannot read it and the
contribution box says that only tenant admins can contribute and follow the
tenant's submissions. Tenant admins, Global Admins and a global-scope override
are unchanged; the backend policy stays as it is.

Bumps the internal and .claude/commands gitlinks (platform-health marker
catalog, backlog).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 13:27:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c701d0d694 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-09-19 14:40:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d4a3edf849 fix(offboarding): a completed run removes the tenant's superseded dead letters (D-256)
A retry after a poisoned offboarding is a new envelope with a new history
row, and nothing ever deleted from a poison queue. The dead letter of the
failed run therefore stayed until its 7-day TTL and kept the poison backlog
alert firing daily for a tenant that was already gone.

TenantOffboardingHandler.HandleAsync now reports a TenantOffboardingOutcome.
On Completed the worker receives tenant-offboarding-poison in batches and
deletes the envelopes of that tenant; other tenants' and malformed messages
reappear untouched. The sweep never throws: a failure there would keep the
completed envelope on the main queue and end with a Completed run in poison.
A re-pickup of a completed envelope sweeps again.

Other poison queues stay terminal on purpose; their failures have no later
success that supersedes the dead letter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-19 14:09:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e164eac1eb feat(backend,web): manual maintenance trigger answers 202, the run is single-flight (D-255)
The trigger ran the whole maintenance inside the HTTP request (about three
minutes against a 230 s gateway limit): the portal reported a timeout while the
run went on, a second click started a second run, and nothing serialized those
runs against each other or against the 2h timer.

Backend
- MaintenanceRunGate: the timer and the manual run enter through one blob
  lease. A held lease writes MaintenanceSkippedLocked and runs nothing;
  MaintenanceStarted is written after the lease is held, the lease is released
  last.
- POST maintenance/trigger validates the date, probes the lease (409 while a
  run is active), enqueues on maintenance-trigger (fail-hard) and answers 202
  with the typed TriggerMaintenanceResponse. MaintenanceTriggerQueueWorker
  (self-polling) runs it; a failing or skipped run is not retried.
- The run report travels in the details of MaintenanceCompleted.
- BlobLeaseLockStore is the shared base of the lease lock stores;
  SessionDeletionMaintenanceLockStore derives from it, behaviour unchanged.
- The probe lets a failed lease release surface as 5xx: a probe lease still
  held at worker pickup would turn the queued run into a silent skip.

Web
- useOpsRunStatus: run status from ops events (latest Started newer than the
  latest Completed/Failed = active), used by the session-cleanup banner
  (rendering unchanged) and the maintenance trigger section.
- Trigger section: queued / already-active messages, status line, polls every
  15 s while a run is active, button disabled meanwhile. The 230 s fetch
  timeout is gone.

Shared manifest, generated wire types and the MCP ops-event vocabulary
regenerated (two new ops event types, reshaped response).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-19 13:50:06 +02:00
Claude c81591b498 feat(offboarding): operator retry of a Failed tenant offboarding from Tenant Management
A Failed offboarding was a dead end: the worker returns early on a Failed
history, the offboard re-click refuses to re-enqueue on a Failed marker, and
the marker cleanup only warns. Recovery meant deleting the marker row in Table
Storage by hand, while the tenant sat in the list as a tombstone counted on the
Waitlist (its whitelist row is wiped early in the cascade).

- GET global/tenants/{tenantId}/offboarding returns the offboarding record
  (marker status, failed phase, attempts, history details) as the typed
  TenantOffboardingStatusResponse; GA + Reader, never delegated.
- POST global/tenants/{tenantId}/offboarding/retry re-drives a Failed run: the
  History row keeps its RowKey and DrainCompletedAt (the worker's resume anchor)
  and counts the retry, marker and history go back to Initiated, the ordinary
  resume path re-affirms the Disabled-gate, waits out the remaining drain
  barrier and enqueues the envelope. Completed / in-flight answer 409, no
  marker 404, a missing history row 500 before any write. Global audit row
  RETRY/TenantOffboarding. Nothing retries on its own.
- Tenant editor: an "Offboarding" card replaces the Offboard action while the
  cascade owns the row (status, started by, attempts, failed phase and error);
  Failed offers "Retry offboarding…" behind the type-to-confirm dialog in its
  retry variant.
- Tenant list: tombstone rows carry an Offboarding badge (own Status facet)
  instead of Suspended, and no longer count as Waitlist.
- Tests: retry decision (reset order, drain anchor, conflicts, not found,
  enqueue failure, remaining-barrier delay), status projection, wire parity
  facts, filter facet. Shared manifest and generated wire types regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XPG5WCmSwfNAv4xkK62n5r
2026-09-18 10:30:06 +00:00
Oliver Kieselbach d8c03d9d95 fix(web): manual maintenance trigger waits for the run instead of timing out at 30 s
The run answers when it is done (about three minutes); the default fetch
timeout reported "signal timed out" although the run completed, which invites
a second click and a second run. Wait up to the gateway limit of 230 s.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 11:18:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ffb133f0b9 fix(backend): platform counters no longer freeze under retention (D-254)
The landing-page counters stood still since D-198: the two-hourly recompute
was their only writer and merged Max(live figure, stored figure), while
retention prunes the live figure below the stored one - so new enrollments
never showed up again.

- Hot path increments the per-tenant counters only (CAS): enrollments at the
  fresh registration, successes at the one status seam every Succeeded writer
  passes (transitioned && Succeeded), events per ingest batch. No batch
  touches the global row.
- The maintenance run floors the tenant counters at the live figures (one
  multi-field write per tenant), sums the tenant rows and adds the growth
  since the previous run to the platform row. The previous sums live in a
  baseline row written in one transaction with the platform row. A total is
  never derived from an absolute figure again: a shrinking source (retention,
  offboarding) costs the growth of one interval instead of freezing the
  counter. Without a baseline the sum is a lower bound only.
- TotalTenants rolls up the tenant rows with enrollments, UniqueDeviceModels
  a persisted set of seen models. TotalUsers stays a high-water-mark (a
  persisted user set would outlive the user-activity retention).
- The platform row is merged with its read ETag and never carries
  IssuesDetected: the former full-row upsert undid every increment that
  landed during the run.
- Reads that feed the baseline are not fail-soft, and a floor that could not
  be written skips the rollup of that run - a swallowed zero would be added
  as growth a second time.

Shared manifest and generated wire types: doc comment of PlatformStats only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 10:48:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b3fe321f0d fix(offboarding): owned-group wipe no longer poisons every tenant offboarding
The wipe of the tenant's own self-service Tenant Group handed the derived
group id ("msp-{tenantId}") to the tenant-GUID entry points of SafeWipeService.
Their GUID guard threw on every attempt, so each offboarding since the
self-service delegation change ran into max_dequeue and ended Failed after the
tenant tables were already wiped.

- SafeWipeService: WipeByOwnedGroupPartitionAsync / WipeByOwnedGroupRowKeyAsync
  take the tenant GUID and derive the group id themselves; matching filters in
  OffboardingFilters.
- The public wipe entry points are no longer virtual: they validate and hand
  over to protected virtual cores. Test fakes override the cores only, so the
  guard runs under every fake. With the old handler code 16 handler tests fail
  on the guard, which is how this shipped unnoticed.
- Tests: handler regression on the owned-group anchors, owned-group variants
  incl. verify-abort on a foreign group, filter shapes and guards.

Deploy and recovery of the stuck offboarding: B-5g6.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 09:41:21 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 69d210c51d chore(deps): bump the mcp group (#156)
Bumps the mcp group in /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp with 3 updates: [compression](https://github.com/expressjs/compression), [zod](https://github.com/colinhacks/zod) and [@types/node](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/node).


Updates `compression` from 1.8.1 to 1.8.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/expressjs/compression/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/expressjs/compression/blob/master/HISTORY.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/expressjs/compression/compare/v1.8.1...v1.8.2)

Updates `zod` from 4.5.4 to 4.6.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/colinhacks/zod/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/colinhacks/zod/compare/v4.5.4...v4.6.2)

Updates `@types/node` from 22.20.1 to 22.20.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/node)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: compression
  dependency-version: 1.8.2
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
- dependency-name: zod
  dependency-version: 4.6.2
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: mcp
- dependency-name: "@types/node"
  dependency-version: 22.20.2
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-15 11:33:51 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 06a88e9897 chore(deps): bump the web group (#157)
Bumps the web group in /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web with 10 updates:

| Package | From | To |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [@microsoft/applicationinsights-web](https://github.com/microsoft/ApplicationInsights-JS) | `3.4.3` | `3.4.4` |
| [next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js) | `16.3.4` | `16.3.5` |
| [react](https://github.com/react/react/tree/HEAD/packages/react) | `19.2.8` | `19.3.0` |
| [@types/react](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/react) | `19.2.18` | `19.3.0` |
| [react-dom](https://github.com/react/react/tree/HEAD/packages/react-dom) | `19.2.8` | `19.3.0` |
| [@types/react-dom](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/react-dom) | `19.2.7` | `19.3.0` |
| [@next/bundle-analyzer](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/next-bundle-analyzer) | `16.3.4` | `16.3.5` |
| [@types/node](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/node) | `22.20.1` | `22.20.2` |
| [autoprefixer](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer) | `10.5.5` | `10.5.6` |
| [eslint-config-next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/eslint-config-next) | `16.3.4` | `16.3.5` |


Updates `@microsoft/applicationinsights-web` from 3.4.3 to 3.4.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/microsoft/ApplicationInsights-JS/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/microsoft/ApplicationInsights-JS/blob/main/RELEASES.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/microsoft/ApplicationInsights-JS/commits)

Updates `next` from 16.3.4 to 16.3.5
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/compare/v16.3.4...v16.3.5)

Updates `react` from 19.2.8 to 19.3.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/react/react/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/react/react/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/react/react/commits/v19.3.0/packages/react)

Updates `@types/react` from 19.2.18 to 19.3.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/react)

Updates `react-dom` from 19.2.8 to 19.3.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/react/react/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/react/react/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/react/react/commits/v19.3.0/packages/react-dom)

Updates `@types/react-dom` from 19.2.7 to 19.3.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/react-dom)

Updates `@next/bundle-analyzer` from 16.3.4 to 16.3.5
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.5/packages/next-bundle-analyzer)

Updates `@types/node` from 22.20.1 to 22.20.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/node)

Updates `@types/react` from 19.2.18 to 19.3.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/react)

Updates `@types/react-dom` from 19.2.7 to 19.3.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/react-dom)

Updates `autoprefixer` from 10.5.5 to 10.5.6
- [Release notes](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/compare/10.5.5...10.5.6)

Updates `eslint-config-next` from 16.3.4 to 16.3.5
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.5/packages/eslint-config-next)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: "@microsoft/applicationinsights-web"
  dependency-version: 3.4.4
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: next
  dependency-version: 16.3.5
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: react
  dependency-version: 19.3.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@types/react"
  dependency-version: 19.3.0
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: react-dom
  dependency-version: 19.3.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@types/react-dom"
  dependency-version: 19.3.0
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@next/bundle-analyzer"
  dependency-version: 16.3.5
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@types/node"
  dependency-version: 22.20.2
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@types/react"
  dependency-version: 19.3.0
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@types/react-dom"
  dependency-version: 19.3.0
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: autoprefixer
  dependency-version: 10.5.6
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: eslint-config-next
  dependency-version: 16.3.5
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-15 11:33:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach aee30f68e8 chore(submodule): tenant-management-filters plan and deploy item B-h7n
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-15 11:29:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3db9a884de feat(web): facet filters for the Tenant Management list
Replaces the two Ready/Waitlist toggles with a Filter popover of five
facets (Plan, Paying, Trial, App registration, Status): OR within a
facet, AND across facets, each option carrying the count it would match
under the other facets, active selections as removable chips, and a
plan breakdown (Community / Pro with paying / Trial / MSP) over all
tenants in the statistics line.

The list badge, the filter and the edit modal now derive the effective
edition through one function; a trial-only tenant reads "Pro (Trial)"
in the list instead of "Community". The App facet is bound to the
dual-app parallel window (legacyConfigured), like the badge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-15 11:28:57 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0037b8cb12 chore(submodule): WDP docs push and Cloud PC automatic-mode backlog items
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-12 23:59:48 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 205b13dbb9 chore(submodule): backlog items for the ARM64 requirements docs push
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-12 23:24:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b938a03367 chore(submodule): backlog item for the published-DPA deploy
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 23:36:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d474c2be9f fix(web): privacy and terms point to the published DPA instead of "available on request"
The DPA is published in the customer docs and accepted on the Get started
page before the first sign-in (D-251); the onboarding records the accepted
version on the tenant (D-252). The legal pages still described it as
available on request and as a Pro-only signed document.

- privacy: the Roles section says the DPA is published, applies to both
  plans, is accepted at sign-up with the version recorded, and that an
  individually signed DPA prevails; External Services links the DPA and its
  sub-processor list; Changes no longer hinges on "if you hold a signed
  DPA"; Contact no longer offers to send one.
- terms: the DPA is no longer listed as a Pro differentiator; Security and
  Transparency links the DPA as applying to both plans. Last updated
  11 September 2026.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 23:35:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 96390beeb9 chore(submodule): drop the separate todo file from the working-file rules
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 23:29:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fe63a0a352 chore(submodule): park the zone-anchoring plan behind B-ugv
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 22:02:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2e36e9c234 fix(web): Fleet Health model rows without failures link to all sessions of the model — the "Health by Device Model" deep link carried status=Failed unconditionally, so a 100 % row landed on a list that is empty by definition; the Failed filter now travels only when the bucket has failed sessions, and the link title says which list opens
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 22:00:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b83aa6d97d chore(submodule): plan for the AgentExecutor.log zone-anchoring defect
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 21:52:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f42fcbcb3c fix(web): the app/script panel divider names the ESP phase, not the assignment — sections read "Device Setup" / "Account Setup" from the phase timeline's table with a tooltip that device-assigned work runs under Account Setup too (a Cloud PC runs its device scripts after the user signed in), Device Preparation sessions get no divider, and user-assigned app and download rows carry a User pill from the extension's own targeting
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 21:48:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f70ba354f8 feat(web): additional managed tenants are add-ons — the Pro plan card reads "2 managed tenants included, additional tenants as add-ons" and a full slot count in Delegated Access suggests buying add-ons instead of asking for a larger package
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 20:03:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fc17047290 feat(web): plan cards — the Pro MSP line says 2 managed tenants are included and more are available on request
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 19:54:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7bbc2cbddf feat(backend): the tenant row records the accepted DPA version — HandleNewTenantDomainAsync writes Constants.CurrentDpaVersion (2026-09-1.7) into TenantConfiguration.DpaVersion in the same first write as OnboardedBy, once, and later logins never touch it; the field is system-owned (patch deny-list, PUT preserve, revert-protected), projected by config/all, the MCP tenant list and the GA tenant report; no backfill (D-252)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 19:30:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9a78daa880 chore(submodule): work files — D-251 settled (DPA accepted with the onboarding)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 19:05:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5d532d3dbc feat(web): Pro is available — /buy hands off to Microsoft Marketplace and Cleverbridge (no price on the page), the plan cards show the list price of €149 / month, the self-service 30-day trial opens in the portal Plan section, and the get-started sign-in waits for a Terms of Use + DPA tick (D-251)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 18:45:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a22c26eb9d feat(web): session detail — the Download, Install and Script panels mark where the user phase begins: a quiet "Device phase" caption over the first row and a "User phase" divider before the first row that started after the device entered Account Setup, so user-targeted apps and user-context scripts stand out; sessions without a user phase render unchanged
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 17:28:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b84c467255 chore(web): admin settings nav — Config Reseed and Usage Plans move up behind Diagnostics Log Paths so the MCP-related entries (Usage Plans, MCP Users, Delegated Admins, Tenant Groups) sit together
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 17:02:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 53124e94a6 feat(web): Optional Graph capabilities — tick features in the table to build the grant command (all ticked ⇒ -Features All, ScriptDisplayNames pre-ticked), Copy permissions follows the selection, and the grant card names Azure Cloud Shell as a run location
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 16:48:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 838068fd31 chore(submodule): work files for the MCP quota build (D-250) — commit hashes and the staging-list lesson
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 16:46:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 71282f3556 feat(backend,web,mcp): the MCP quota follows the delegating tenant — every request is checked and counted on the caller's home tenant, a managed tenant is never charged or blocked by its manager's reads, and every delegation slot bought beyond the edition's included ones grows both the account and the organization windows by operator-editable per-slot values (D-250)
Backend/Shared:
- McpQuotaService: ResolveHomeAsync reads definitions, entitlements, plan name and purchased slots once per check; Grow adds slots × per-slot value to every window (a lifted window stays unlimited); the decision and McpPlanLimits carry the breakdown; CheckManyAsync, the charge scope and TargetTenantId are gone
- McpQuotaEnforcementMiddleware: one home charge for every caller; IsExempt = Global Admin only (counted, never blocked; the Global Reader stays quota'd); two 429 texts (organization / user)
- TenantEntitlementService.GetPurchasedDelegatedSlots = max(0, effective slot limit − catalog count), 0 without the delegation right; FeatureEntitlementCatalog gains McpSlot*RequestLimit (Pro 300/6000 per account, 900/18000 per organization = 30 % of the Pro windows; Community and conferred Pro 0)
- PlanTierDefinition gains four nullable slot fields; GET/PUT global/config/plan-tiers return the catalog (UsagePlanCatalogDefaults per edition) so a blank field is explained
- McpUsageQuotaNode / McpOrganizationQuotaNode carry purchasedDelegatedSlots and the slot values (absent without purchased slots)
- Removed: the Tenant Group flag ChargeHomeTenantQuota with its scope plumbing (HomeChargedTenantIds, IsDelegatedAggregate, CatalogDecisionResult), Narrow/quotaExcludedTenants on the session envelopes and the X-MCP-Quota-Excluded-Tenants header, targetTenantId on the 429 body, the foreign-home attribution on McpTenantUsage (HomeTenantId, delegated/homeTenantId on the organization report) and the managed tenant's budget on the manager's managed-tenant list; PATCH global/tenant-groups/{id} is a rename

Web: SectionUsagePlans with four slot inputs, catalog placeholders and a built-in-defaults line; SectionMcpUsage renders "base + slots × per-slot" on both cards and drops the delegated badge; SectionTenantGroups without the charge toggle; SectionDelegatedAccess, the accept page and the privacy page state the new model (privacy last updated 2026-09-11).
MCP: get_fleet_overview no longer merges an exclusion list, the 429 renderer names only the caller's organization, the delegated-scope instruction states the home-charge model; wire types regenerated.
Tests: quota service slot-growth suite, entitlement purchased-slot matrix, conferred-Pro self-service writes (403/409), parity facts for the new and the removed fields; the radar analytics fixture is dated off the real clock (it had aged out of the 30-day window).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 16:46:27 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7080dcc45a fix(backend): rule catalogs — a GitHub reseed newer than the deployed build closes the embedded self-seed (RuleCatalogStamp), the IME self-seed sunsets retired patterns, and IME pattern health reads the global partition instead of the embedded catalog (D-249)
The self-seed of every fresh backend instance treated the embedded catalog as authoritative and wrote it over a newer GitHub reseed: on 2026-09-11 it re-inserted PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE three hours after the reseed had deleted it (D-248), so agents ran 83 patterns. Every explicit reseed now stamps its kind in AdminConfiguration (PK RuleCatalog); the three self-seeds do nothing while a github stamp is newer than BackendBuildInfo.BuildUtc, and an empty table is still seeded from the binary. The IME self-seed deletes built-in rows the embedded catalog no longer ships.

ImePatternHealthService (health matrix and the ime_pattern_hits ingest filter) takes the pattern list from the seeded global partition via ImeLogPatternService.GetGlobalCatalogAsync, never from BuiltInImeLogPatterns, so the health page and the drift statistics follow a reseed without a deploy; the response carries catalog { source, stampedAt, patternCount } (manifests regenerated, web line, MCP description).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 12:09:18 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5a62714dc2 chore(submodule): fleet baseline for the IME overwrite fix (40.7 % fallback before, 0 % after) and the P6 todo
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 03:46:37 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c930d18f1e feat(agent,mcp): the IME log tracker's poll-loop pauses become measurable — longest pass and longest gap between passes as session maxima in agent_metrics_snapshot, ime_pattern_hits and the MCP coverage block (B-wr4)
Test-VM session c3ecb568 (2.0.1460): the tracker loop was not scheduled for 26 s at 100 %
VM CPU while the rest of the agent kept running; five results were read before their
executor end blocks — held and completed correctly (D-247) — and nothing in the fleet
telemetry could have shown the pause (ime_backlog_bytes is an instantaneous value).

- ImeLogTracker.RunPollPassAsync hosts the loop body (file reads, the pending-completion
  flush, the token-failure window) and times it on a monotonic clock (MonotonicMillisProvider,
  Stopwatch in production): PassMaxMs = longest single pass (time INSIDE — reads, ledger
  verification, regex), PassGapMaxMs = longest pause between the end of one pass and the
  start of the next (the 100 ms delay, SaveState and any scheduling delay). Restart-safe
  like the other health counters (TrackerHealthData); ImeTrackerHealth carries both.
- agent_metrics_snapshot: ime_pass_max_ms / ime_pass_gap_max_ms; ime_pattern_hits:
  passMaxMs / passGapMaxMs.
- MCP session coverage: sessionTotals.passMaxMs / passGapMaxMs, and from 5 s on a note that
  says the lines were read late, not lost — every event keeps its log line's timestamp; the
  overwrite note and the pause note join when both apply.
- Tests: ImeLogTrackerPollTimingTests (maxima over three passes with a fake clock, fresh
  tracker at zero, restart keeps and never lowers them); MCP coverage tests for the note
  threshold. Agent suite 2941 green, solution build 0 warnings, MCP tsc clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 03:41:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 583c81c9a8 chore(submodule): IME overwrite fix verified in the field (2.0.1460, five held results), B-pd2/B-2rs closed, B-wr4 opened
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 03:26:40 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 483ec8b8e0 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-09-11 02:55:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 328446864a chore(submodule): todo for P5 of the IME overwrite fix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 02:53:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 106480ef52 fix(agent,rules): health-script lines never feed a platform-script slot — PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE deleted, HS-INVOCATION opens an unowned invocation in the IME log, the no-marker fallback stays within files platform runs open in (D-248)
Test-VM session 24dc69d1 (2.0.1459) had the overwrite geometry the result hold (D-247)
was built for, yet the hold never fired: "Powershell execution is done, exitCode = 0" —
written by IME's health-script worker (AgentCommon ScriptWorker) to both
IntuneManagementExtension.log and HealthScripts.log — was read as PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE and
attributed to the pending platform script c81b8053 1.2 s before its executor even started
(IME-log marker: the last PS-SCRIPT-GENERATED; HealthScripts.log: the no-marker fallback to
the last platform start). The completion went out at the result line with the foreign exit
code, and the run's own end block, recovered 150 ms later by the rewind, was dropped as
already emitted. Both codes were 0 by luck; a failing health script would have turned a
succeeded platform script into script_failed. The worker's launch line flipped the pending
script's context the same way (338d9434, twice in one run).

- rules: PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE deleted — the line is health-script-only (3 hits = 3 cycles,
  platform scripts never produce it), HS-EXITCODE already carries the value, and a line that
  lands inside a parallel platform run's window cannot be attributed by position.
  HS-INVOCATION (new): the worker's command line `"…\agentexecutor.exe"  -remediationScript`
  (identical from IME 1.104.102 to 1.105.152) as agentInvocationArgument of a non-powershell
  kind — the launch line it writes next stays with that invocation. Both take effect on the
  next reseed for every agent from 2.0.1458 on.
- tracker: a file without markers resolves to the platform run in flight only when a
  platform run has ever opened in that file (IntuneManagementExtension.log after a rollover,
  AgentExecutor.log); HealthScripts.log and the app logs never qualify. Test seams:
  ProcessLogMessageForTest takes the source file, ClearInvocationMarkersForTest.
- tests: ImeLogTrackerPlatformScriptContaminationTests +5 with the session's real lines —
  the worker's exit line pre-fills nothing, its launch line flips no context, HealthScripts.log
  lines resolve to no platform script, the context line after an IME-log rollover still finds
  the run in flight, and no shipped pattern reads the worker's exit line.
- rules/dist regenerated (node rules/scripts/combine.js); analyze-rules.json catches up with
  ANALYZE-OFFICE-001 1.1.1 (6657c6b9 was committed without its dist).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 02:52:43 +02:00
github-actions[bot] d3a45f958d chore: regenerate rules/dist + generated TS from individual files 2026-09-11 00:29:54 +00:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6657c6b9c0 fix(rules): ANALYZE-OFFICE-001 explains what the detector actually reports
office_install_failed is emitted only for an error code in the C2R INSTALL scenario; a window without on-disk proof ends silently. The old text described a StreamingFinished-based failure and attributed the early "done" of the built-in app type to IME, which never sees Office CSP installs. Text only, version 1.1.1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 02:28:12 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6c5e2fd921 chore(submodule): IME overwrite plan closed as RELEASED after the 2.0.1459 test-VM run
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 02:04:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 65842b87bf chore(submodule): todo for P4 of the IME overwrite fix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 01:34:01 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b323c52364 fix(agent): a platform script's IME result waits for its executor end block before the completion is emitted; a start line older than the emitted result never opens a new run (D-247)
The first agent with the ledger (2.0.1458, session e7f3c910) lost nothing — 16/16 results,
20/20 end blocks, 20 rewinds — yet 3 of 16 completions carried no exit code and one policy
got an agentexecutor_fallback duplicate. The IME result line reaches the tracker before the
AgentExecutor.log end block of the same run: always when the block was overwritten (the check
the result triggers recovers it one pass later), often without any overwrite (the
AgentExecutor.log read of a pass precedes the IME log read by tens of milliseconds while the
exit line and the result line are 8–30 ms apart), and whenever the poll loop stalls (2 s at
100 % VM CPU). Emitting at the result line dropped every recovered end block, and the late
start line reopened the slot, cleared the emitted-marker and the fallback emitted the same
run again 15 s later.

- CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResult (one core for the handler and the test seam) emits at
  the result line only when the slot has its exit code; otherwise the result stays on the
  slot (ResultObservedAtUtc, ResultPatternId, ResultHeldSinceUtc) and
  FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults — the former FlushStalePlatformScriptResults, still the
  home of the 15 s exit-code fallback — emits it at the end of the pass in which the exit
  code arrived (the block's output lines come with it), at shutdown, or after
  PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace (5 s, wall clock).
- The emitted-marker is a Dictionary keyed by policy id with the run's source timestamp
  (state file: PlatformScriptResultEmittedAt; the old list is read as MinValue). A start
  line strictly older than the emitted result is the late start line of that run: it owns
  the lines behind it in its file, opens no slot, emits no script_started. A start line at
  or after a held result closes the hold as the next run; a start line that meets a slot
  the result opened stamps StartedAtUtc.
- The adapter binds the completion to the result line (ResultObservedAtUtc, patternId =
  ResultPatternId) the way the fallback binds to the exit line, so a held emit keeps its
  timestamp, pattern and duration.
- Exit-code lines whose owner has no pending slot any more log why they are dropped;
  ApplyExitCode is shared by the handler and the test seam.
- Tests: ImeLogTrackerResultHoldTests (11) and ImeLogTrackerAdapterResultHoldTests (1); six
  existing cases that encoded the immediate emit without an exit code now flush explicitly.
  Agent suite 2933 green, solution build 0 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 01:33:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 321a6efc81 chore(submodule): P2 of the IME overwrite fix — plan, concept doc, todo
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 00:14:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5ecb2a998b feat(web,mcp): the IME overwrite counters surface — session page row "Overwritten log blocks recovered"; get_session_summary coverage carries overwriteRewinds/overwriteBytesReprocessed and a recovered-not-missing note, never a gap (D-246, P2)
The agent (v2.0.1458) counts the log blocks it re-read after a concurrent IME process had overwritten bytes behind its bookmark. The IME Tracker rows on the session page show the count and bytes as their own row, apart from Skipped work; the MCP coverage block adds both counters to sessionTotals and, when rewinds > 0, an imeTracker.note saying the script results and exit codes in those blocks are complete — no coverage.gaps line, no degraded flag, so an assistant does not read recovered data as a blind spot. Sessions from older agents carry neither key and show neither.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 00:14:55 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach bb6df93b51 chore(submodule): agent v2.0.1458 released
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 00:02:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 096a049deb chore(submodule): todo for the IME overwrite fix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 23:40:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b9caf524c3 chore(submodules): concept doc, D-246, plan and skill helper for the IME multi-writer overwrite fix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 23:40:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 197de1d718 fix(agent): the IME log tracker verifies and rewinds when a concurrent IME process overwrote bytes behind its bookmark; executor lines belong to the invocation at their file position (D-246)
IME's trace listener opens every log once per process with FileMode.Append and FileShare.ReadWrite
and writes at its own stream position afterwards. AgentExecutor.exe (two processes per user-context
script, one per detection script) has such a listener on AgentExecutor.log and on
IntuneManagementExtension.log, so a process that resumes logging after another one appended
overwrites those bytes: the final file holds the last writer, a byte-position tailer has read the
first version. Session 46749560 lost 6 of 16 platform-script results and 4 of 16 executor end
blocks with every tracker health counter at zero — results fell back to the exit code (one Success
where IME said Failed), one finished script stayed Incomplete. The agentexecutor_fallback results
in the fleet are this race, not late IME logging.

The tracker now keeps a fingerprint ledger of every entry it processed from the two multi-writer
files (FNV-1a 64 over the decoded bytes, one CmTraceEntryAssembler shared by the read loop and the
verification so entry boundaries are identical by construction), verifies it on every script end
signal, on a byte-budgeted cadence while an invocation is in flight (256 KB/s, at least 1 s
apart), in a 4 KB guard zone on every growth pass and on a fragment at the bookmark, and rewinds
to the first changed entry; entries whose (offset, hash) still read unchanged are skipped,
everything else is processed as backlog (never fresh, never a calibration anchor). The
policyId-less executor lines are owned by the nearest preceding invocation marker in their file
(PS-AGENT-ARG opens, PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START upgrades to the platform script, PS-AGENT-INVOCATION and
PS-AGENT-COMPLETED close) instead of a last-started pointer, so an end block a rewind uncovers
reaches its own script. Restart seeds the ledger from the 64 KB behind the persisted bookmark;
a rollover clears it. Four restart-safe counters (ime_overwrite_rewinds,
ime_overwrite_bytes_reprocessed, ime_verify_passes, ime_verified_bytes) ride agent_metrics_snapshot
and ime_pattern_hits — recovered data, not skipped work, no new event type.

Tests: ImeLogTrackerOverwriteRewindTests (15) drive the positional-overwrite write pattern against
both files, including the two field scenarios with the shipped patterns; agent suite 2921 green,
backend known-actions list extended for the two new patterns.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 23:40:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 18d4f08f2b chore(submodule): todo closed for the request-row marker (D-244)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 21:42:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ddf450d87d chore(submodule): plan request-row marker RELEASED (D-244)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 21:41:46 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e3b2113365 chore(submodules): import-session time shift, token, note and scrub semantics; demo import work files (D-242, D-245)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 21:13:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6a85f45604 backend: agent request rows carry the admitting device validator and the proven tenant (D-244)
SecurityValidator stamps ValidatedTenantId once the certificate tenant binding
(or the bootstrap token) proves the tenant, and DeviceValidation once the
device-validation chain has run: the admitting ValidatorType name, None for a
tenant without a validator, Transient for the 503, Rejected for the 403 of
stage device. RequestTelemetryMiddleware resolves the row's TenantId in one
place (policy tenant, proven tenant, then the X-Tenant-Id header only on the
routes that validate it) and copies DeviceValidation as a dimension.

Register, config and upload-url rows carried no TenantId before, so
tenant-filtered KQL missed exactly the calls that run the validation, and the
validators' success line is Information-level and never reaches App Insights.
Proving which validator admitted a device is now one query.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 19:48:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a2d1aedcad fix(web,mcp): a script still running when observation ends is Incomplete, not running forever (D-243)
Session 2ebcd480: the last platform script started 27 s after enrollment_complete and its
start line was the session's last event; two days later the Script Executions panel still
ticked "Running (175306s — stuck?)" in amber with "1 running" in the header. Same blind
spot as D-237, one panel over.

Web: applyObservationEnd in lib/scriptExecutions.ts marks a Running placeholder on a
terminal session as Incomplete (bounded by session.lastEventAt); the row stops ticking and
shows "Incomplete" in slate with the watched span as a lower bound, the header counts
"N incomplete" apart from running/succeeded/failed, and the card keeps its React key across
the live→terminal flip. No backend change: there is no per-script row, and the session
counters count finals only.

MCP: get_session_summary adds coverage.scripts.stillRunning and a coverage.gaps line for
terminal sessions, folded from script_started without a later result — the same rule as the
web placeholder.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 19:10:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e955faa97e Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-09-10 12:50:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2b755bf99a fix(deps): raise sharp override to ^0.35.4 in MCP and Web (GHSA-rgj7-g3m4-5g8c)
sharp < 0.35.4 bundles a libheif with GHSA-g89c-p67h-r497 and
GHSA-2jg2-4ch7-h545 (Dependabot alert #100, high). Both packages already
pinned sharp through an override; the floor moves to the patched release.
MCP pulls it via @huggingface/transformers, Web via next. Lockfile changes
are limited to sharp, its @img/* binaries and one @emnapi/runtime dedupe.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 12:43:27 +02:00
dependabot[bot] ce1162a055 chore(deps): bump the web-security group across 1 directory with 2 updates (#155)
Bumps the web-security group with 2 updates in the /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web directory: [js-yaml](https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml) and [sharp](https://github.com/lovell/sharp).


Updates `js-yaml` from 4.3.1 to 4.3.2
- [Changelog](https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/blob/4.3.2/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/compare/4.3.1...4.3.2)

Updates `sharp` from 0.35.3 to 0.35.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/lovell/sharp/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/lovell/sharp/compare/v0.35.3...v0.35.4)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: js-yaml
  dependency-version: 4.3.2
  dependency-type: indirect
  dependency-group: web-security
- dependency-name: sharp
  dependency-version: 0.35.4
  dependency-type: indirect
  dependency-group: web-security
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-10 12:10:17 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 447786b447 chore(deps): bump hono (#154)
Bumps the mcp-security group with 1 update in the /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp directory: [hono](https://github.com/honojs/hono).


Updates `hono` from 4.13.0 to 4.13.7
- [Release notes](https://github.com/honojs/hono/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/honojs/hono/compare/v4.13.0...v4.13.7)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: hono
  dependency-version: 4.13.7
  dependency-type: indirect
  dependency-group: mcp-security
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-10 12:01:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2b4dbe087a fix(web,backend): MCP Usage under a tenant override shows only that tenant (D-241 amended)
- GetMcpOrganizationUsageResponse.daily: charged requests per day inside the range from the same McpTenantUsage rows (BuildOrganizationDaily, MSP reads included); manifest + wire types regenerated (web + MCP copy); fold test
- Web: viewing another tenant no longer fetches the caller's own usage — no UPN, plan badge or own quota; the summary tiles and the daily chart come from the tenant's daily series. The own tenant stays the caller's usage page. Internal gitlink.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 03:38:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6804bcfd4e fix(web): Reporting — Global Admin banner and tenant selector in the page header, section control row back to its old layout
The reporting layout (ReportingSidebar) now owns the override-only scope, renders the banner above the header and the selector next to the title like Fleet Health, and hands the scope to the sections through ReportingScopeContext (one hook instance). Delegated callers get neither. Fixes the five-line wrap of the section control row on phones; internal gitlink.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 03:27:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d2221eb0b9 feat(web,backend): MCP Usage page follows the global-admin tenant selector for its organization cards (D-241)
- Backend: GET global/metrics/mcp-usage/organization?tenantId= (GlobalReadOrAdmin, TenantScoping.None on purpose — the route enumerates accounts, so the delegated path stays out; 400 without a GUID, no aggregate); GetMcpOrganizationUsageResponse carries `quota` (tenant plan + daily/monthly windows summed from the same McpTenantUsage rows); McpQuotaService.ResolveTenantPlanAsync with public TenantPlanLimits; two folds tests
- Web: TenantScopeSelector on /settings/reporting/mcp-usage (override-only, hidden for a delegated scope), scopedApi.mcpOrganizationUsage, Organization-quota card from the organization response (falls back to the caller's own node only on the own tenant), latest-wins fetch guard, wording follows the viewpoint
- Manifest + wire types regenerated (web + MCP copy); internal + skills gitlinks

Deploy order: Backend before Web — under a tenant override the page calls the new route.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 03:18:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9ac6de7c7d chore: bump internal gitlink (B-fes reworded to a measurement task)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 02:43:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f5613be495 fix(web): Network Timeline — more headroom above the phase lane so "Completed (timeout)" stays inside the drawing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 02:34:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 819b6c8e4f docs(mcp): correct the query_raw_events cap figure in the payload page-size rationale (250 KB, not 500 KB); internal gitlink
Comment-only. The 500 KB figure is query_table's cap; query_raw_events serializes under
MAX_RESULT_SIZE_CHARS.events = 250 KB. Live 2026-09-10: 100 app_install_failed rows = 193 KB.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 02:33:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9c1fb07f33 fix(web): Network Timeline — session link in portal green; Duration and Asleep tiles name the enrollment figure where the observed span differs
The band and its tiles cover the observed span (until the agent stopped); the
session page measures the enrollment (first activity event → verdict). The
tiles now carry that figure as a sub-line so both pages read the same two
numbers. enrollmentWindowOf in lib/standby.ts is the shared definition, used
by the session hook as well.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 02:28:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fa31872903 fix(agent,engine,web): keep the due time as the deadline stamp; draw timeout verdicts hollow in the Network Timeline (D-238 revised)
Revises 14b185db after the pre-release review. The fleet measurement (30 days,
all tenants) showed 87 of 821 sessions with a sleep episode had their verdict
inside the episode — 59 of them one tenant's self-deploying devices closed two
minutes before the device-only detection came due and reopened 5–7 days later.
Stamping the firing clock would have turned those outages into session
duration and pushed the tenant's mean duration from minutes to days.

- OnDeadlineFired posts OccurredAtUtc = DueAtUtc again; the due time stays in the
  payload and the two stale-fire guards keep reading it (any stamp stays safe).
- Network Timeline: a timeout verdict (helloOutcome timeout, device-only detection
  window) is drawn as a hollow marker "Completed (timeout)" with a legend line and a
  plain-language tooltip — a wait expired, nothing observed on the device; the
  Asleep block is never split at it. finalizing_grace alone is not an indicator.
- Session Info standby note clips to the two WhiteGlove spans when the card shows
  the combined WhiteGlove duration; the dedup key is consumed only by a usable
  observation (review findings).
- Stale comments describing the firing-clock contract corrected.

Tests: DeadlineFireTimeStampTests (reducer stays correct for any stamp),
EnrollmentOrchestratorTests (due-time stamp + payload), networkTimelineModel
timeout markers (3), standby windows, WhiteGlove windows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 01:55:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b08b79eafe test(mcp): revert_tenant_config backupId is required — schema and description pin (D-240 review)
Left out of e43d916c's explicit file list by mistake; part of the same change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 01:47:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e43d916c24 fix(mcp): spec gates, secret-safe error text, enforced response cap, payload-coupled pageSize, client cancellation (D-239, D-240)
Request gates: an Origin other than the server's own is refused with 403 before any token
work (spec MUST); a token the backend rejects is answered 401 + WWW-Authenticate
error="invalid_token" instead of a final 403. The auth.ts header now names the
backend-audience token forwarding as a deliberate deviation (D-239) instead of calling
it spec-conformant.

Secrets: the per-argument echo policy travels in the tool-call context, so toolError's
"Parameters used" block masks update_tenant_config.fields the same way the log line
does. revert_tenant_config requires backupId (a retried revert without one restored the
snapshot the previous revert had just created). /oauth/token relays Entra errors through
an allowlist (error, capped description, error_codes). OAuthStateSigningKey is required
in production (B-uba).

Results: toolResultText enforces the response cap — a page above it is refused with an
overflow answer naming the pageSize that fits (from this page's bytes per row), never
rows or a nextLink; the telemetry logs the size the page would have had (B-zhp).
query_raw_events with DataJson in the effective projection defaults to 50 rows and
refuses more than 100 before the backend runs (30-day measurement: p90 3.3 KB, outliers
21-29 KB per row) (B-s2y). The caller context carries the request's cancellation signal:
apiFetch, the retry wait and the timeout fallback stop when the client goes away, and the
tool_call line logs cancelled instead of an error.

Tests: 9 new files (origin guard both eras over HTTP, 401 + cancellation, apiFetch abort,
arg policy in error text, signing key, token error body, overflow, raw-events pageSize,
telemetry overflow/cancelled); vitest 844 green, tsc 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 01:47:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 14b185db35 fix(agent,engine,web): a deadline decision is stamped with the firing clock, never the due time (D-238)
A HelloSafety deadline due during Modern Standby fired after wake but was stamped
with its due time, so enrollment_complete and CompletedAt landed inside the sleep
window: the Network Timeline drew "Completed" in the middle of the Asleep block
and three views named three different standby durations.

- OnDeadlineFired posts OccurredAtUtc = FiredAtUtc and carries the due time under
  SignalPayloadKeys.DeadlineDueAtUtc; the stale-fire guards (RealmJoin re-arm,
  SelfDeploying guard C) identify the incarnation via DecisionEngine.DeadlineDueAtUtc,
  which falls back to the signal time for pre-key signal logs.
- SignalSerializer renders Date-tokenized payload strings as ISO-8601 round-trip text
  instead of the culture-formatted JValue.ToString() (a replayed deadlineDueAtUtc came
  back as "4/20/2026 9:55:00 AM").
- Web: the Session Info standby note is clipped to the same window as the duration
  next to it (lib/standby.ts) and printed with seconds, matching the attribution chip.

Tests: DeadlineFireTimeStampTests (late HelloSafety fire, guard C, RealmJoin re-arm,
helper fallback), SerializationTests date-like payload round-trip,
EnrollmentOrchestratorTests late fire, lib/__tests__/standby.test.ts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 01:05:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach baa51102fd feat(web,backend,mcp): app rows without a terminal state become Incomplete instead of running forever (D-237)
An app still installing when the session's observation ended has no terminal
event and never will. The session page ticked Date.now() - startedAt for it
("11h 39m" on a session that finished hours ago), and its AppInstallSummaries
row stayed InProgress forever - ranked behind failures in the app's session
list and counted in totalInstalls with no named bucket.

Web: applyObservationEnd marks such rows Incomplete once the session is
terminal (isTerminalStatus), bounded by session.lastEventAt; the panel shows a
slate Incomplete badge and the watched span as a lower bound, the "active"
pill excludes them, and the download panel carries the parallel flag. Covers
every historic session without a backfill.

Backend: CloseOpenAppInstallsForSessionAsync closes InProgress rows without a
CompletedAt as Incomplete - at the terminal seam, again on the ingest batch
that carries agent_shutting_down for a terminal session (rows opened after
the verdict), and from the 30-day sweep. The sticky-status reconcile keeps
Incomplete against a late progress-only batch and lets a real terminal win.
App metrics and app analytics disclose the bucket (incomplete,
totalIncomplete) outside the failure rate; manifest and wire types
regenerated.

MCP: get_session_summary coverage gains an apps block and a gaps line naming
the apps the agent's last app_tracking_summary still listed as installing or
downloading, terminal sessions only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 00:02:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5577f5e7e5 feat(rules): rule submissions — retention (withdrawn 30d, declined 90d), contact email, pending-first tenant list, operator hard delete (D-236 amended)
Closed submissions leave through the daily maintenance sweep (RuleSubmissionRetention, one place for rule and test); pending/approved/published never. The submit dialog takes an optional contact email (a UPN is not always a mailbox), stored for the reviewer and never published. The tenant list shows pending rows by default with the rest behind Show all, and the contribute button shows for every writer, also before the first custom rule exists. DELETE global/rule-submissions/{id} (GlobalAdminOnly, MCP delete_rule_submission) removes test/demo rows for operator and tenant alike. Bumps internal and .claude/commands gitlinks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 23:27:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 61892592e4 feat(rules): community rule submissions — submit custom rules from the portal, review via GA page or MCP, publish by repo commit + reseed (D-236)
Tenant admins submit references to their own gather/analyze rules; the server freezes the rule, records pre-flight findings and fire stats, and stores it under a 12-character id (RuleSubmissions, SessionReports layout). Attribution is the submitter's frozen choice (anonymous by default) and becomes the published author. Review (approve with reserved id / decline with comment) through /admin/reports/rule-submissions or the MCP tools list_rule_submissions, get_rule_submission, review_rule_submission, reseed_rules_from_github; published is derived from the global catalog, never stored. Analyze rules now get the same server-side author stamp as gather rules; ANALYZE-ID-001 carries author Community. Privacy page names the credit; bumps internal and .claude/commands gitlinks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 22:53:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1e2ca46946 chore: bump internal gitlink (ESP-004 released, B-kfu)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 17:40:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8224c8f1a8 fix(rules,engine,agent): ESP-004 gates on the esp_apps_timeout verdict; not_exists absence gate; Shell-Core failure inherits settle detail (D-234, D-235)
ANALYZE-ESP-004 fired on every ESP terminal failure of a Continue-anyway
profile and rendered the configured FirstSync limit as elapsed time — the
mayHaveContinuedAnyway flag only says the profile has the button. The rule
now requires the agent's own verdict (app_install_failed with
failureType=esp_apps_timeout), names that app via a same-event filter, reads
failedSubcategory from esp_failure_settle_started and words the limit as a
limit. Verified with test_analyze_rule: cb7036a6 fires, 683f1eff (0x80070652
after 19 min) stays silent.

Rule engine: not_exists with a dataField on event_type/event_data
conditions matches when no event of the type carries a non-empty value —
including an absent type — instead of being dead behind the fieldValue null
short-circuit. Schema and MCP authoring guide say so.

Agent: a Shell-Core 62407 failure that lands inside the provisioning
tracker's 30-s settle window (a third of all ESP terminal failures) now
inherits the pending errorCode / failedSubcategory / category /
likelyCulpritApps, so enrollment_failed, Sessions.FailureReason and the
termination-time app classification see the HRESULT the registry had
already named. failureType stays the Shell-Core value.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 17:20:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d7f39895f5 fix(web): omit the two default field values from the browser catalog (D-233)
The Entra family (D-231) pushed utils/error-codes.json to 123026 bytes against
the 120000-byte client-bundle budget, breaking the Web CI job.

Raising the cap would have been the wrong repair -- it was set three days ago
with the v2 catalog, and a guard that gets widened whenever content grows is not
a guard. The bytes were elsewhere: confidence "high" holds for 562 of 641 rows
and source "msdoc" for about half, ~19 KB of bundle spent repeating two
constants. The sync now omits them and errorCodeMap restores them while building
the map, so every consumer still sees a complete entry and errorCodeTooltip
renders exactly as before. 123026 -> 102399 bytes, cap unchanged, ~17 KB of
headroom left.

Dropping the fields outright was rejected: the tooltip renders both, so they are
provenance a customer sees. The vocabulary test now asserts on the resolved
entry via getErrorCodeEntry rather than the raw file -- a default changed on one
side only would otherwise make tooltips lie about provenance silently.
2026-09-09 15:26:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 790bd35385 small gather rule description change 2026-09-09 14:59:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 34c9fd42fe chore: bump internal and .claude/commands gitlinks
internal: D-231/D-232, the plan with its review, backlog B-y5d and B-s2y.
.claude/commands: the platform-health marker-catalog corrections from the
2026-09-09 health pass (weekday vs weekend ingest baseline, CAS retried scales
with load, WhatsNewNotificationSent is not proof of a run).
2026-09-09 14:55:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 19a336870c fix(mcp): put the catalog pointer on the parameter, not only the tool (D-232)
Seven of 44 tool errors in the 7-day telemetry were invented catalog values, and
in every case the tool description already said the right thing while the
parameter description was bare or contradicted it.

update_tenant_config is the clean proof: its description says "Call
get_tenant_config_schema FIRST", but the fields parameter said "Use
get_tenant_config for current values and exact field names" -- and over 30 days
the model called get_tenant_config 12 times and get_tenant_config_schema once.
The text next to the argument wins, and get_tenant_config cannot answer what it
was pointed at: it shows only the fields this tenant has set, with no type,
writability or nullability.

Also: get_session_events.eventType (event_types catalog, matching the pointer
search_sessions_by_event.eventType already carries), query_table (list_tables)
and test_analyze_rule.rule (rule_schemas, validate_rule first).
2026-09-09 14:55:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5ba5942d0b feat(error-codes): parse the Entra device-registration family (D-231)
The catalog held 2 of 607 entries in entra-join, while the 0x801Cxxxx DSREG
family is what an enrollment meets during hybrid join and the ESP account-setup
phase. The Windows Hello PIN error page is the only MS table that documents it;
both of its tables are now parsed, restricted to 0x801c* (607 -> 641 entries).

The block runs after PROSE_ENTRIES so the Autopilot-specific text for 0x801c03ea
keeps precedence over the generic one. The Mitigation column is not carried --
the catalog describes codes, it does not advise. A "SYMBOL: text" cell yields a
symbol (0x801c004d -> DSREG_NO_DEFAULT_ACCOUNT). The run fails below 30 keys,
because parseTables drops non-matching rows silently and a reshaped page would
otherwise look like a clean run.

decode() now strips zero-width and bidi marks: the page carries U+200B in one
hex cell and four description cells, JS \s does not match it, and such a hex
cell fails every ^0x...$ test. Placed in decode() rather than in the new source
so the next parsed page cannot walk into it -- regeneration shows 34 added,
0 changed.

0x801C044F, the zero-hit lookup that started this, is on none of the three MS
pages and deliberately stays unknown.
2026-09-09 14:55:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach aa20d9102c fix(backend): show the freshly published agent version, not the previous one (D-230)
The What's new panel prints "Latest agent version" under the release
entries, and the session list draws its outdated badges from the same
endpoint — but the value was cached 12h in each Function instance and 1h
in the browser, so the panel announced the previous release for up to 13h
and two instances could disagree.

- LatestVersionsService: TTL 12h -> 5 min; keep the last successful result
  and serve it when the blob read fails, so the shorter TTL cannot blank
  the version line on a transient hiccup (failure marker 5 min -> 1 min).
- GetLatestVersions: Cache-Control max-age 3600 -> 60.
- No refresh callback from build-agent.yml: the cache is per instance, a
  warm-up request would leave every other instance stale.

The origin is a ~200-byte no-cache blob behind the download alias that
Front Door does not cache, so a warm instance now reads it at most 12x/h.

Backend deploy (workflow_dispatch) pending — B-uq7.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 12:26:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 097be1700b chore: bump internal gitlink
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 12:10:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f1457d823d chore: bump .claude/commands gitlink 2026-09-09 12:02:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 12e66299e6 feat(rules): allow-list folders under the signed-in user's profile (D-228, D-229)
Gather rules and admin-configured diagnostics paths could never reach a
folder below a user profile. The %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token lifts the
C:\Users hard block for AppData\Local and AppData\Roaming, but lifting is
not admitting: the path then fell into filePrefixes, which is matched
literally against the already-expanded path, and the profile name is not
known when that list is authored. The exception only ever worked in
unrestricted mode, and no agent test passed a non-null userProfilePath.

D-228 introduces userProfileFilePrefixes, holding entries relative to the
profile root (AppData\Local\RealmJoin). Both guards resolve them against
the detected profile and match segment-bounded; entries that are rooted,
contain "..", or sit outside AppData\Local / AppData\Roaming are dropped at
load, so configuration can only narrow the hard block's exception, never
widen it. The allowlist is anchored to the detected profile, so a rule
cannot reach another user's AppData. The AppData subdirectory list existed
in both guard classes with the GatherRuleGuards copy unused; it is now one
list and DiagnosticsPathGuards delegates. filePrefixes additionally gains
C:\ProgramData\RealmJoin\choco\logs.

D-229 fixes the pre-flight validators, which must only ever reject what the
agent rejects:
- the portal returned "allowed" on the lifted hard block without consulting
  the allowlist, so a rule the agent refuses passed the enable gate and then
  failed silently on the device with a security_warning;
- the MCP validator offered logparser the diagnosticsPathPrefixes list that
  no collector consults (four paths reported allowed that the agent blocks);
- the MCP validator did not expand environment variables at all, reporting
  %ProgramData% targets as blocked although the device reads them.

Measured before changing the portal: no rule in any tenant used the token,
so nothing that was working gets disabled.

Verified: solution build 0 warnings, agent 2897 tests, web 1257 + tsc +
eslint 0, MCP 779, guardrails.json validates against its schema, rules/dist
regenerates without drift. The six new agent tests were green against the
unchanged guard first, which is what proves the exception was inert.

Takes effect on devices only after an agent release: guardrails.json is an
EmbeddedResource in the agent assembly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 11:54:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e9a01de9da chore: bump .claude/commands gitlink
Event reference in /ux-insights completed and live-verified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 10:06:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5f793ea01a chore: bump .claude/commands gitlink
Marker-catalog rows for the What's new panel events and the digest timer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 09:58:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e86f7efed3 feat(bootstrap): verify the publisher of the extracted agent binaries before --install (D-227)
The SHA-256 check proves the ZIP is the one version.json names, but that
manifest lives in the same container as the ZIP: it cannot outlive a
compromise of the download host. The expected publisher travels inside this
script, which the loader verified before running it, so the chain from the
file an administrator assigns to the process that starts is publisher-anchored
end to end.

Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 v2.4 -> v2.5:
- Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries checks every AutopilotMonitor.*.exe/.dll in the
  extracted payload for status Valid and the same subject pin the loader
  carries; the gate runs immediately before --install and throws on any
  rejection, exactly like the hash check.
- Third-party assemblies keep their own publisher's signature and are not
  checked: System.Management.Automation.dll ships unsigned, so a gate over all
  files would refuse the live payload.
- An extracted folder with no binary of ours is a rejection, not a pass.
- The SHA-256 manifest check is unchanged and still runs first: it proves the
  bytes, the signature proves the author.

Verified against the live payload 2.0.1454 (all five of our PEs Valid and
glueckkanja AG, gate passes); appending one byte to AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll
makes it reject. Pester 55/55.

The portal privacy and about pages carried the pre-signing wording and are
corrected in the same change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 23:11:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 78bfad0ec6 web: the portal What's new panel names the currently published agent version
A quiet third line in the panel header ("Latest agent version 2.0.1452",
faint, the number monospaced) reads from the existing config/latest-versions
endpoint. The monospaced string is the same one the session list shows in its
"Agent Version" column, so a reader can tell at a glance whether their fleet
runs the latest agent.

Portal and signed-in only: the endpoint is AuthenticatedUser, and the public
site has no session list to compare against. The gate sits on the mount of the
small component, so the landing page never even issues the request; a missing
version renders nothing.
2026-09-08 22:37:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f5efadfd07 ci: pin every third-party action to a commit SHA, gated and Dependabot-maintained (D-226)
A tag is a mutable pointer owned by the action's publisher. These jobs are not
ordinary CI: they hold the code-signing Key Vault token (D-223), the federated
storage credentials (D-222), and combine-rules.yml holds a contents:write token
that pushes to main. Whoever could repoint v7 would run code with all of that.

azure/login and Azure/functions-action were already pinned; the actions/* and
github/codeql-action references were not, on the usual argument that GitHub owns
them and shares the runner's trust boundary. That argument does not survive the
fact that they run in the same jobs as the signing identity. All seven are now
pinned by SHA with the version in a trailing comment -- the comment is what keeps
the line reviewable, and Dependabot rewrites both together.

action-pins.yml is the guard: pins nobody enforces rot, and no review reliably
catches one @v4 added to a 200-line workflow. It lives in its own workflow because
ci.yml deliberately ignores changes to the other workflow files, so a job placed
there would stay silent for exactly the commits it must inspect. Like CI it reports
rather than blocks -- main is unprotected; making it binding would mean adding it
as a required status check, which is a branch-protection decision.

Verified both directions: 49 references pass against the repo, and a fixture with
@v7, @main and a bare SHA fails with three annotations while the local reusable
workflow refs are skipped.

Two floating tool versions closed while here. wix went from the range 5.* to 5.0.2
-- it writes the bytes of the MSI customers install, where AzureSignTool only signs
them. ajv was the worse one: unpinned, and npm runs lifecycle scripts at install,
so a hijacked release would have executed with the push token before a single rule
was validated; now exact versions with --ignore-scripts.

Line endings: sed -i rewrote the workflow files as LF. Git normalises on commit, so
the content diff is unaffected and indexnow-notify.yml carries no change at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 22:14:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c26eca2f01 chore: bump internal gitlink
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 21:36:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9f1879a9f3 fix(agent): raise the captured script output cap from 2K to 8K
The portal showed the two-stage bootstrap output ending in ...[truncated]. That marker
comes from the agent, not from the web view: the stdout is cut at capture time, so no
amount of UI space brings the rest back.

Measured over 1,486 script outputs in the fleet (2026-08-25..09-08): median 39, p90 644,
max 1,501 chars, and the 2,048 cap had never been hit -- the maximum was our own
one-stage bootstrap. The loader preamble of ~460 chars pushed exactly that output over
the edge, i.e. this is a consequence of D-224 and it hit the one output an operator
actually reads.

8,192 covers the realistic worst case (download retries plus relax logging, ~2,700) and
stays 4x below the 32K-char Table Storage property limit that bounds the event
downstream. Other scripts are unaffected in practice: p90 is 644 chars.

Reaches the fleet with the next agent release.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 21:36:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c24c7bf7ef fix(publish): serve the customer scripts as a download, not as a web page
The blobs carry Content-Type: text/plain and no Content-Disposition, so every browser
renders them inline -- the documented "download the bootstrapper script" step turns into
"select this text and save it yourself", with whatever the editor then does to the line
endings and the signature block.

x-ms-blob-content-disposition makes the link a download in every browser, which is a
server-side fact rather than a per-browser hint in the docs. Command-line clients (the
loader, the MSI runner, curl) ignore the header, so nothing on the device path changes.

Metadata only: the script bytes are untouched, so no version bump and the bump guard
still sees the published copies as current.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 21:07:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5fac3d6004 Agent Host changes for agents/whats-new-notification-settings (#153) 2026-09-08 20:51:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7605d2e9f5 fix(loader): log the signer CN instead of the whole EV subject
The full subject of an EV certificate is a line of street address and registration
numbers and pushed the useful part of the log line off the screen. The CN answers the
question the log has to answer. The full subject is still logged in the one case where it
is the finding itself: a valid signature from a publisher that is not us.

Loader 1.1 -> 1.2; a Pester case pins the short form. Suite on PS 5.1: 45/45.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:49:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7bf5412d63 docs(mcp): teach the diag-zip map the loader log
bootstrap-loader.log is new with the two-stage bootstrap and told the diag tooling
nothing so far. Names which channel a device was assigned: the loader logs there when
assigned directly, and to bootstrap-msi.log when it runs from the MDM-LOB MSI.

Takes effect with the next MCP deploy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:47:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b53ceb1a7c chore: bump internal gitlink (MSI loader consolidation)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:47:01 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 647581b4ff refactor(msi): the MSI carries the shared stage-1 loader instead of its own downloader
Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1 and Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 had become the same script:
download the current installer, run it, log, always exit 0. The MSI copy additionally
downloaded and executed WITHOUT verifying what it got, which is exactly the gap the loader
was written to close. The MSI is now packaging only -- it installs and runs the same file
that is assigned directly in Intune, and both delivery channels get publisher verification
from one implementation.

Dropped from the MSI path: its own Deployed-marker check. That guard lives in stage 2 and
runs there anyway, so the only cost is one download on a device that is already deployed.

Kept: the log file name. bootstrap-msi.log is what the diagnostics tooling keys on to tell
the MDM-LOB channel apart from the Intune script channel, so the loader takes -LogFileName
(default bootstrap-loader.log) and the custom action passes bootstrap-msi.log. A Pester
test now pins that contract across the two files -- renaming the parameter on either side
would leave the MSI channel logging under the wrong name.

Package version 1.0.2 -> 1.1.0 so Intune LOB update detection sees the new payload, and a
new component GUID because the key path file changed.

Loader 1.0 -> 1.1. Bootstrap suite on Windows PowerShell 5.1: 44/44.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:41:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach db9b1995bc refactor: move the error-code generator from scripts/ to tools/ (D-225)
scripts/ at the repo root is the customer surface: everything under
Bootstrap/ and CustomerSetup/ is published to the download container by
Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1, Authenticode-signed and version-gated. The
error-code generator is a maintainer tool no workflow runs, so it diluted
that invariant. .github/scripts/ was not the alternative -- it holds only
helpers a workflow step invokes, and unlike guardrails-in-sync and
shared-manifests-in-sync the catalog has no CI drift gate (the generator
needs IME_ENUMS_JSON from operator tooling and live MS Learn fetches).

REPO_ROOT stays ../.. at the new depth, so only the documented path moved:
the generator header and README, the C# and TypeScript comments, the test
summary, and the description header of error-codes.json together with the
generator literal that emits it (the two must stay identical or the next
regeneration diffs). The web sync re-ran clean at 607 entries with no
change to utils/error-codes.json, which drops the header.
2026-09-08 20:35:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7563435837 feat(ci): Authenticode-sign the bootstrap MSI and the runner it embeds (D-223)
MSI carries an Authenticode signature like any PE, so the same identity and the same
ordering rules apply: signing identity logs in first and only for the Key Vault token,
the storage login stays last, and no environment: on the job.

The embedded Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1 is signed BEFORE wix build -- wix embeds the
file as it finds it, so signing afterwards would leave the copy inside the MSI unsigned,
and a device under an AllSigned policy needs the runner to carry its own signature.

The MSI is signed after the build and before the hash and the upload, then both files are
verified (Valid, timestamped, optional publisher pin) while nothing is published yet.
The provenance attestation now also skips runs that upload nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:34:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e39f2abb61 chore: bump internal gitlink (comment lesson)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 19:21:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 47dad7143f docs(ci): tighten the code-signing comments in build-agent
Public repo: keep the reasoning that a later change could break -- signing must precede
the release hashes, the job must never carry an environment, the timestamp is not
optional -- and drop the rest. Comments only, no behaviour change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 19:20:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d81f41dc72 chore: bump internal gitlink (D-223/D-224 plans and decisions)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:59:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach cc6be10532 fix(publish): read the signed bytes back as byte[], not as a wrapped Object[]
The ',' operator elsewhere in this file exists because PowerShell unrolls an array
RETURNED from a function; a property assignment does not unroll, so it wrapped the
byte[] in an Object[] of length 1 and the upload failed converting it back. Signing
itself was fine -- run 34253331703 signed all six scripts and uploaded none, so nothing
reached the download alias.

Added the invariant that would have caught it: signed bytes must be longer than the
unsigned form, since a signature only ever adds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:54:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0ac548bfce feat(bootstrap): two-stage loader and Authenticode-signed customer scripts (D-224)
Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 is the new stage 1 -- the file an administrator assigns in
Intune. It carries no enrollment logic: it downloads the published installer, verifies its
Authenticode signature, and runs it in the same process, passing through every remaining
argument. Assigning the installer directly stays supported and unchanged.

The point of the split is that the customer-held artifact stops changing. Today every
bootstrap change forces customers to replace their Intune copy, so the fleet runs a
distribution of script versions we do not control. It is also what makes script signing
worth doing: signing a file that gets swapped by hand each release is a one-off gain,
signing a loader that never changes is permanent.

The loader is deliberately minimal, because it is the one piece that cannot be fixed
remotely -- every guard placed in it would be frozen for years. All guards stay in stage 2.

Verification pins the certificate SUBJECT, never a thumbprint: certificates get renewed and
a deployed loader cannot be, so a thumbprint pin would strand the fleet at the next
renewal. A hash oracle was rejected for a different reason -- it would have to be fetched
from the same host as the script, so it could not survive a compromise of that host, while
the expected publisher travels inside the loader.

Fail-closed on verification, fail-soft on exit: nothing runs without a valid signature from
us (running unverified code as SYSTEM is the risk being removed here), but the loader still
exits 0, because a device without monitoring is acceptable and a failed enrollment step is
not. The accepted cost is that a device which can never fetch or verify stays silent.

Publisher changes:

- every published script is signed (loader, installer, both -Dev renders,
  Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent, Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn), and signing is the LAST
  transformation: it covers exactly the CRLF/UTF-8 bytes Get-PublishBytes produced, so
  nothing may normalise or re-encode them afterwards.
- signing is mandatory for a real publish. Only -DryRun may run unsigned, because the PR
  gate executes the publisher without any Azure login.
- comparisons against a published copy strip the signature block first. A timestamped
  signature differs on every run, so without stripping the version-bump guard and the
  drift check would report a change for every unchanged script.
- the bump guard became Assert-VersionBump and now covers the loader as well.
- version.json gains loaderVersion. Additive, no consumer yet: stage 2 is current by
  construction, so only stage 1's version says anything about a customer's Intune copy.
- -SignedOutputDir writes the exact uploaded bytes for the CI artifact, in a dry run too --
  that is how a signed script gets inspected before it reaches anyone.

publish-scripts.yml logs in with the signing identity first and only to fetch the Key Vault
token (azure/login sets the default az account and the storage login has to be the one that
stays), then publishes and offers the signed scripts as an artifact. build-agent.yml passes
the same parameters on a stable cutover.

Tests: 14 new Pester cases, including that a validly signed script from a FOREIGN publisher
is refused -- that is what an attacker with any code-signing certificate can produce. Full
bootstrap suite on Windows PowerShell 5.1: 43/43.

Not covered: the MSI runner still downloads stage 2 without verifying it, and the customer
docs still describe the direct assignment only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:48:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9c1d0586ef ci: skip the provenance attestation on test runs of build-agent
A dispatch with upload_blob=false and create_release=false publishes nothing, so the
Sigstore attestation would write a permanent public transparency-log entry for bytes
nobody ever receives. The step now runs only when the run actually ships something.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:34:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 21ec5e4773 ci: Authenticode-sign the agent binaries before the release hashes are computed (D-223)
Every assembly we author -- AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe, AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe
and the three AutopilotMonitor.*.dll beside them -- is signed with AzureSignTool (pinned
7.0.1) against a certificate in the corporate code-signing Key Vault, SHA-256 file digest
plus an RFC-3161 timestamp. Third-party assemblies keep their own publisher's signature.

The position of the step is load-bearing: signing rewrites the PE file, so it has to run
before the staging copy, the ZIP and every SHA-256 in "Create release artifact". Those
hashes are the bootstrap's integrity oracle (version.json, AdminConfiguration) -- signing
after hashing would publish hashes that no downloaded file can ever match.

The signing identity is a SECOND federated principal in the same tenant and logs in FIRST,
only to fetch a Key Vault token; the storage login of D-222 follows and owns the az context
from there, because azure/login sets the default account and the last login wins. Both
federated credentials carry the subject repo:okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor:ref:refs/heads/main,
so this job must never be given a GitHub 'environment:' -- that rewrites the OIDC subject
claim and would break BOTH logins at once.

No unsigned fallback and no dispatch input to skip signing: a missing repository variable,
a Key Vault failure or a non-zero azuresigntool exit code fails the run before anything is
published. azuresigntool is a native tool, so $LASTEXITCODE is checked explicitly --
PowerShell does not throw on a non-zero exit, and a silently unsigned release is exactly
the outcome signing exists to prevent.

Verification runs against the STAGED bytes, not the build output: every AutopilotMonitor.*
PE in the ZIP must be Valid, must carry a timestamp (without one the signature dies with
the certificate) and all of them must share one signing certificate. Setting the optional
repository variable CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT additionally pins the publisher, so the gate
proves "signed by us" instead of "signed by someone trusted".

The build provenance attestation now covers the ZIP and both EXEs, so an extracted binary
can be verified without the ZIP. Authenticode and the attestation answer different
questions and both stay: who published this binary (offline, what Windows, SmartScreen and
WDAC evaluate) versus which build produced these exact bytes (gh attestation verify).

Not covered here: the customer bootstrap script (its signature block changes the published
bytes and must follow the dev render; see B-57c, the two-stage loader), the bootstrap MSI,
and the local build.ps1 path, which from now on produces unsigned bits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:20:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e4a5a6654d ci: workflows authorize Azure Storage with the federated identity, not SAS secrets (D-222)
Every storage write against autopilotmonitoreu -- build-counter CAS, agent ZIP and MSI,
version manifests, customer bootstrap scripts, the AdminConfiguration hash oracle -- now
rides on the existing federated credential (subject repo:.../ref:refs/heads/main) instead
of a long-lived SAS in repo secrets.

The REST calls themselves are unchanged: '?<sas>' became an Authorization header, so the
ETag-CAS of the counters, Content-MD5 and the no-cache contract survive verbatim. That is
also why this is not a rewrite onto 'az storage blob upload' -- it cannot express If-Match,
and two concurrent builds could then mint the same build number.

.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1 is the single place that knows the resource id,
the az invocation and the service version. x-ms-version is mandatory for Entra-authorized
requests (>= 2017-11-09) and for any Table request without a SAS; 2021-08-06 was verified
live against both the blob and the table endpoint of this account.

azure/login added to build-agent, build-msi, publish-scripts (plus id-token: write) and
deploy-web; deploy-backend and deploy-mcp already had it. Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1
-DryRun acquires NO token: the PR gate runs it without any Azure login, and that must
stay true.

The AdminConfiguration merge lost its "secret not configured" skip branch -- a failure
there now surfaces instead of silently leaving the hash oracle pointing at an older build.

AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN, AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN and AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN
are retired once the first runs are green. AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN stays: that
account lives in the pre-migration tenant, where this principal has no identity -- it dies
with the mirror, not before.

Requires on the SP: Storage Blob Data Contributor on the containers 'agent' and 'versions',
Storage Table Data Contributor on the table 'AdminConfiguration'. Granted 2026-09-08.
2026-09-08 17:38:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 01bc35aa97 new ordering for What's new section 2026-09-08 15:48:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e33d85c01d Agent Host changes for agents/gather-rule-exitcode-info-update (#151) 2026-09-08 14:57:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4e73ba8900 Agent Host changes for agents/improve-changelog-promotion-ui (#152) 2026-09-08 14:57:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4df52b3da9 Agent Host changes for agents/timeline-search-enhancement (#150) 2026-09-08 14:47:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 844d86410c Agent Host changes for agents/mcp-server-beschreibung-lieferung (#149) 2026-09-08 14:46:15 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 9514e1033d chore(deps): bump the web group (#148)
Bumps the web group in /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web with 5 updates:

| Package | From | To |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js) | `16.3.3` | `16.3.4` |
| [@next/bundle-analyzer](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/next-bundle-analyzer) | `16.3.3` | `16.3.4` |
| [@types/react-dom](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/react-dom) | `19.2.5` | `19.2.7` |
| [autoprefixer](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer) | `10.5.4` | `10.5.5` |
| [eslint-config-next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/eslint-config-next) | `16.3.3` | `16.3.4` |


Updates `next` from 16.3.3 to 16.3.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/compare/v16.3.3...v16.3.4)

Updates `@next/bundle-analyzer` from 16.3.3 to 16.3.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.4/packages/next-bundle-analyzer)

Updates `@types/react-dom` from 19.2.5 to 19.2.7
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/react-dom)

Updates `autoprefixer` from 10.5.4 to 10.5.5
- [Release notes](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/compare/10.5.4...10.5.5)

Updates `eslint-config-next` from 16.3.3 to 16.3.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.4/packages/eslint-config-next)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: next
  dependency-version: 16.3.4
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@next/bundle-analyzer"
  dependency-version: 16.3.4
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@types/react-dom"
  dependency-version: 19.2.7
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: autoprefixer
  dependency-version: 10.5.5
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: eslint-config-next
  dependency-version: 16.3.4
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-08 13:07:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b2236bf65f web: card and page headers stack below sm so their action buttons stay on screen at phone width
Title and trailing controls shared one non-wrapping flex row with the controls
marked flex-shrink-0. At 440px (iPhone 16 Pro Max) that squeezed the Operational
Events title into an 86px column and pushed the Refresh buttons of Agent Metrics
and the Tenant Config Report past the viewport, scrolling the whole page sideways.
SectionCardHeader now stacks below sm, which covers all 32 cards that use it.

A width sweep over the portal routes at 440px found two more real overflows, fixed
here as well: the audit From/To date pair, and Alert Rules, where the unbreakable
event-type names and a channel-name input without min-w-0 pushed the severity
selects 99px off screen.

Verified: every swept route now measures zero horizontal overflow at 440px, desktop
is unchanged at 1440px. The header test asserted "no trailing group" via the absence
of gap-3, which the wrapper itself now carries; it checks flex-wrap instead and pins
the stacking classes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 01:35:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 31535b07e0 web+backend: a warming MCP health card says only "Starting instance... (attempt n of 12)" and re-probes for ~60s before it warns (D-220)
The card composed its line from the backend's explanation ("did not answer within
3s - it scales to zero when idle ... ~20-30s"): probe mechanics nobody waiting on a
starting instance needs. It now writes its own one-liner and ignores check.message,
so the server's "warming" and a client-side probe timeout read identically and the
wording does not depend on a backend deploy. The backend message is shortened but
still carries the budget for direct API callers.

The re-poll budget of 8 x 5s (~40s) expired on a real cold start - Container Apps
activation has no upper bound we control - so it is now 12 x 5s (~60s), with a test
pinning that the stated seconds come from cadence x attempts.
2026-09-07 21:27:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 066b6e6f04 backend+web: the MCP health probe answers a cold container in 3s with status "warming" instead of holding the request for 30s, and the System Health card re-probes until it is up (D-220)
Measured over 14 days, GET health/mcp answered in 4..148ms when warm and timed out at 30s
in 50 of 83 calls — the median call took 27,972ms. A cold start is 20-30s of Container Apps
activation (~98% KEDA plus image mount, ~500ms application), so no UI wait covers it and the
generous timeout only bought a long wall in front of the same answer. The browser's own
budget is the same 30s, so the backend's carefully worded warning never reached the user at
all: they saw a raw DOMException.

Backend: the budget drops to 3s, which sits in the widest observed latency gap
(2347ms..3930ms) so jitter cannot flip the verdict. Our own cancellation now reports the new
status "warming" at Information level (with minReplicas=0 a cold probe is the expected path,
and logging it as a warning poisons the ops signal); HttpRequestException is split out of
that catch and stays a real warning, still without the host in the message. The warm-hit
threshold drops to 750ms — ~5x the warm maximum, deliberately generous because every
measurement comes from a near-idle single-user system and warm latency will rise under
concurrency — and moves into McpReachableMessage so a test can pin the boundary. The XML doc
now describes the probe that exists rather than the wake-signal design the measurements
disproved.

"warming" is a new status value rather than an added DTO boolean because the backend deploys
before the web: an unknown value degrades to a grey card with a clean banner, whereas a
boolean would leave old web showing yellow and "Warnings detected" on every cold start.
HealthCheck.Status now documents the five-value vocabulary, which rides into both generated
TypeScript mirrors as JSDoc.

Web: resolveMcpCardState owns display, banner rating and the poll decision as a pure
function (the suite runs on node, so testable logic cannot live in JSX). A warming server
re-probes every 5s for up to 8 attempts and stays out of the overall banner exactly as
"unknown" already does — scaling from zero is expected behaviour, not a degraded platform —
and only becomes a real warning once the re-polls are spent. The card keeps showing
"warming" while the next probe is in flight so it cannot flicker, carries the blue
in-progress look instead of yellow, and was hoisted out of the healthResult guard: a failing
detailed check would otherwise hide a card that is still polling.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 18:25:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a1e2b76a9f web: the session Vulnerability Report names its inventory badge "Identification Confidence" (header and legend, Inventory and Delta tab); the Software Inventory analyzer toggle uses the rose accent like the other Agent Analyzer toggles
The column showed high/medium/low under the header "Identification", which reads as a method rather than a rating. The wire field is `confidence` and the tooltip already says "identification confidence"; the header and legend now match. The analyzer toggle and its hover border were still emerald from before the section moved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 13:13:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 29e5b8251d web(rules): analyze and gather rule cards get a two-row header on every breakpoint — badge row with fixed-width toggle, severity and rule-id columns on top, the full title below with threshold, sparkline and hit rate right-aligned; gather badges ordered category, type, collector like the analyze card
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 13:11:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 02168a5c55 chore: bump internal gitlink (geo-statistics-explained plan, D-219, backlog B-fpu/B-csp)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 12:12:12 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a6b6661320 web(geo): the Location Performance table states what Avg Duration, P95 and vs Global are computed over (footnote with docs links, header and benchmark tooltips); a location without a succeeded session shows no duration instead of 0 min / -100% in the fastest bucket
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 12:10:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0c72666a7a chore: bump skills gitlink (CAS marker row corrected to the pre-fix code path)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 10:35:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9023321db9 chore: bump skills gitlink (platform-health KQL fix + 09-07 marker baselines)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 07:48:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7ef097529c backend: deleting an owned tenant group stamps the retention grace anchor on every member (conferred Pro ended without ProDowngradedUtc)
The portal hides Delete for owned (msp-{home}) groups, but DELETE global/tenant-groups/{groupId} accepts any id: a Global Admin deleting one ended Pro (MSP) for every member with no grace anchor, so a member that raised its retention under Pro was clamped to the Community cap at the next sweep. DeleteGroupCoreAsync now snapshots the owner and calls ProConferralService.RecordLossAsync(member, owner, "group-deleted") per member, owner excluded, independent of assignees. Two tests in RevokeEnforcementTests; internal docs list the fourth writer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 00:15:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e7df69efe4 backend+web: vulnerability summary carries a priority breakdown (act/attend/track); the exposure panel shows Act and Attend tiles and every severity or priority chip filters the top-CVE list (D-218)
Act equals the KEV set by construction (CvePriority: KEV => act), so the KEV tile becomes the Act tile and Attend joins it instead of a duplicate count. The breakdown is counted in the backend over every CVE in the window, like the severity breakdown, because the list is top-N. Both panel consumers read the generated CveExposureSummary type; the MCP tool description names the new block. Wire types regenerated for web and MCP.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 22:30:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2c7efa2733 backend: key-safe X-MCP-Tool-Name prefix for the usage row key (CodeQL cs/log-forging #91)
The caller-supplied X-MCP-Tool-Name header went verbatim into the UserUsageLog
row key ({yyyyMMdd}_{tool}:{endpoint}) and from there into the CAS-conflict
warning of TableCasRetry. EndpointNormalizer.ToolNameKey now strips CR/LF and
every other control character or line separator, replaces the characters Table
Storage rejects in keys (/ \ # ?) and caps the length at 64; an empty result
skips the prefix. Real tool names pass through unchanged, so existing usage
rows keep their keys. A header with an illegal key character previously made
every usage increment fail with 400 (fail-soft, counter never advanced).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 22:19:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2742549827 chore: bump skills gitlink (platform-health marker baselines + GetBootstrapScript trap)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 22:07:46 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3c45f5cb09 chore: regenerate the shared manifest and wire types for the NtpServer summary text (D-216 follow-up)
The manifest committed with d5d1d7bf carried the types section of the previous HEAD, so
the ntpServer doc string still read "null = use agent default"; SharedManifestParityTests
compares byte-for-byte. Generated output only, no wire change. Bumps the internal gitlink
(plan review addendum).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 22:02:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d5d1d7bfbd backend+web: one agent-config derivation (AgentConfigResolver) served on agent/config and GET config/{tenantId}/effective-agent-config; wire-type initializer defaults in the shared manifest; the Tenant Config Report reads both (D-216)
The report still carried two hand copies after D-215: a typed map of C#
initializer defaults for the "custom" highlight, and a TypeScript mirror of
GetAgentConfigFunction's resolution rules for the runtime column.

Backend: the derivation moves verbatim into Services/AgentConfigResolver
(Build = pure, ResolveAsync loads tenant + admin config and the two rule
catalogs). GetAgentConfigFunction keeps the kill verdict, the migrate logging
and the device fields on top; ParseAgentMajor, ResolveDiagnosticsUploadEnabled,
MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths and ResolveMigrateTarget move with it (call sites and
tests retargeted; the QueryParams ratchet baseline shrinks by the file). New
GlobalAdminOnly route config/{tenantId}/effective-agent-config returns the same
AgentConfigResponse without a device (optional ?agentVersion=, default the V2
line). AgentConfigResolverTests pin the rules that used to live in the web:
upload 10, Hosted destination without SAS, SAS regardless of mode, unrestricted
only with entitlement + gate + toggle, operator knobs from AdminConfiguration,
analyzer defaults, hash line per major, migrate override and rejection.

Manifest: SharedManifestParityTests emits "defaults" next to "fields" for
TenantConfiguration and AdminConfiguration and an "agentConfig" section with
the AgentConfigResponse / CollectorConfiguration / AnalyzerConfiguration class
defaults (fresh-instance values; nested objects null). TenantConfiguration.
NtpServer gets the initializer "time.windows.com" the table read already
applies, so the manifest default and a stored row agree.

Web: the catalog rows lose value() and default; the runtime column renders
the endpoint's response, the highlight compares against the manifest defaults,
informational rows (reasons, timestamps, identities, secrets) never read as
custom. Previously excluded fields are visible (configVersion, catalog counts,
sealing pattern ids, hash oracle, migrate target); the collector class
defaults sit in a collapsed "Collector Internals" section. Fail-soft: while the
backend is not deployed the runtime column shows a notice.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 21:59:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f4e2088b69 chore: bump internal gitlink (lessons: shared index) 2026-09-06 21:57:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 55425058a8 chore: bump internal gitlink (dashboard-search plan review) 2026-09-06 21:57:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach eec0d17607 chore: bump internal + skills gitlinks (D-217 plan/review, lessons, ux-insights marker row) 2026-09-06 21:54:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 43f5304ba4 web+backend: dashboard search gets field qualifiers (model=, manufacturer=), AND-ed terms and exclusions, parsed identically on both sides; Fleet Health model rows link with that search (D-217)
The "Health by Device Model" link searched "{Manufacturer} {Model}" as one substring; the server's
free-text predicate tested it per field, so once the failed sessions were outside the loaded first
page the sweep returned nothing.

- lib/searchQueryTokens.ts: tokenizer shared by the timeline and the session search (terms, quotes,
  leading minus, key=value / key:value qualifier when the separator precedes any quote)
- app/dashboard/utils/sessionSearchQuery.ts: 15 qualifiers = exactly the fields both sides search,
  matcher over session fields + client-derived extra text, suggestion field lookup, link builder
- useDashboardFilters / SessionTable: filter and suggestions use the grammar; fuzzy only for a
  single free term; session_searched gains a `qualifiers` count
- Helpers/SessionSearchQuery.cs: the same grammar for q= on /api/search/sessions (+ global), parsed
  once per request; MatchesFreeText is a thin wrapper
- utils/session-search-syntax.cases.json: one case file run by vitest and by
  SessionFreeTextSearchTests (parity proof)
- FleetModelHealth/FleetSlowModel/FleetFailingModel: manufacturer + model as stored plus label,
  grouped on the pair; useFleetHealth uses the generated wire types; "Unknown" is not a link
- shared manifest + wire types regenerated for the three DTOs

Backend suite 6158/6159 (the one failure is SharedManifestParityTests against uncommitted WIP of a
parallel task), web vitest 1177/1177, build 0 warnings.
2026-09-06 21:54:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b21472dd8c web(progress): pre-provisioned device parked after the technician part sits on Account setup instead of a forever-running device apps step
The progress portal placed the active step purely by the stored phase. After
whiteglove_complete the backend caps that phase at Apps (Device), so the end
user saw "Waiting for you to sign in" above a step list that still showed
"Installing apps (device)" as running at 43 % (customer report).

The seal detection the headline already used is now one helper,
isParkedAfterTechnicianPart (pre-provisioned, whiteglove_complete, no resumedAt
and no whiteglove_resumed), and resolveActiveStepIndex places such a session on
the first user step: every device step done, 57 %, Account setup current. A
stale Complete phase on older sessions can no longer push it past the sign-in;
once resumed the placement is phase-driven again.

Vitest 24/24, tsc and eslint clean. Backlog B-ydz carries the post-deploy check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 21:24:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e3991d55be web(admin): Tenant Config Report renders from an exhaustive catalog over the generated wire types (D-215)
The report typed its own TenantConfig interface and drifted for five months: 31 stored
fields were missing (payingCustomer, the MSP overrides, three validation gates, the SLA
block, four analyzer flags, app-homing and trial bookkeeping) and three runtime values
were wrong (upload interval 30 instead of 10, diagnostics-enabled without the Hosted
destination, unrestricted mode without the entitlement).

tenantConfigReportCatalog.ts is Record<keyof TenantConfiguration> and
Record<keyof AgentConfigResponse | CollectorConfiguration | AnalyzerConfiguration>:
every key is rendered or excluded with a reason, so a new C# property fails tsc once the
wire type is regenerated. Runtime rows carry the GetAgentConfigFunction rule and a source
tag; entitlement values come from feature-flags, operator knobs from global/config.
A vitest pins the same parity against SHARED_MANIFEST.tenantConfiguration.fields and the
resolution rules (upload 10, Hosted destination, flags-driven unrestricted mode, admin
idle timeout, analyzer defaults). Empty strings count as unset for the custom highlight.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 21:08:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 864d1ed31e backend: MCP usage counters go through TableCasRetry with an 8-attempt jittered budget instead of three immediate retries (B-c92)
Parallel tool calls of one user hit the same (user, day, endpoint) row in the same instant; without backoff the losers stayed synchronised and 3 of 6 increments were lost. Both increments now use the one CAS helper (merge patch, AddEntity on 404, StorageCasConflict marker) with UsageCounterRetries = 8; the tenant counter's attribution columns travel in the merge patch. Tests pin the budget, the patch shape and the create path.
2026-09-06 19:04:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 76ef1e53ca chore: bump internal gitlink (final check 2026-09-06: plans released, backlog long-tail rewritten, todo cleared) 2026-09-06 18:48:46 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7dd298f04e chore: bump skills gitlink (session skills: exit-code class, packaging counters, WU symbols)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 18:21:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 66452621c6 exit-code class per app + reboot rule: IME-EXITCODE-CLASS, ANALYZE-APP-018, exitCode on every terminal app event (D-214)
- IME-EXITCODE-CLASS captures the return-code class of the installer exit code ("lpExitCode is defined as <Success|SoftReboot|HardReboot|Retry|Failed>", verified against the IME string literal) as exitCodeClass on AppPackageState; new action captureExitCodeClass, persisted across the agent restart a reboot causes, last value wins across a Retry loop. IME-EXITCODE-MAPPED-FAILED keeps the error path; both match the same line.
- Adapter: exitCodeClass whenever known, exitCode on every terminal state (Installed/Postponed/Skipped/Error) instead of Error only.
- ANALYZE-APP-018 (warning, apps): app_install_completed.exitCodeClass in SoftReboot,HardReboot; +25 HardReboot, +15 observed system_reboot_detected; never fails the session.
- Web: completed-app exit badge amber (failed stays red), "mapped as SoftReboot/HardReboot/Retry" on timeline and Install Progress.
- Tests: pack end to end (phase, current app, class lines, negatives, restart round trip), adapter payloads, linearity samples, backend rule engine + known actions.
- internal gitlink: plan, D-214, backlog.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 18:08:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0b23d93957 updated last modified 2026-09-06 17:49:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4281a6d81b chore: bump internal gitlink (rules category groups plan, Paket 3) 2026-09-06 17:39:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fe919a51aa web rules pages: group analyze and gather rules by category with collapsible headers, counters and Expand/Collapse All (state per tab in localStorage); reveal a rule inside its group from telemetry, template copy and view-copy
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 17:37:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0dcf0eb503 Observation coverage in get_session_summary, absence audit with coverage lint, diagnostics packaging counters (D-213)
MCP: coverage block (window, IME tracker, collectors, upload, diagnostics, gaps) built from the
health events the summary already fetches (session-coverage.ts, data.<key> slices); validate_rule
warns on a required not_exists of an IME-log-derived event without the ime_tracker_degraded
precondition; authoring guide 'absence'; instructions and prompts point at coverage.gaps.
Rules: guardrails.json imeLogDerivedEventTypes (schema + combine). Backend: catalog invariant test —
absence rules carry the coverage gate or a documented exception (ANALYZE-ID-004).
Agent: diagnostics_uploaded/_upload_failed carry packaging counters (truncated, includedFiles,
skippedFiles, skippedByReason, problemsByKind) — counts only, never paths.
Also: shared-manifests.json regenerated (was stale at HEAD; McpAccessPolicy doc string) + codegen.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 17:35:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e2fb99d5d8 mcp access-guard: surface the suspension text from the policy envelope; AdminConfiguration.McpAccessPolicy comment matches the enforced AllMembers semantics; internal gitlink (MCP-Nebenbefunde, B-4s2)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 17:12:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a3ee613b60 scripts/error-codes: decode entities in one pass and strip tags until none remain (CodeQL 89/90)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 16:33:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d2197c6a57 error-code catalog v2: generated from primary sources, symbols and families, MCP lookup_error_code (D-211/D-212)
Shared: error-codes.json schemaVersion 2 (607 entries, 50 IME enforcement states) generated
by scripts/error-codes/generate.mjs from MS Learn tables and the IME enums of one build;
ErrorCodeEntry gains symbol/category/imeRetriesDuringEsp, ErrorCodeCatalog gains
TryLookupDetailed (HRESULT_FROM_WIN32 derivation as data), TryLookupBySymbol,
TryLookupEnforcementState. Backend enricher siblings carry symbol/category/derivedFromWin32
plus enforcementStateInfo. Web: validating, minifying sync; formatErrorCodeSource for every
tooltip; windows_update_failed badge; script error codes decoded; bundle budget test.
Agent: WindowsUpdateTracker reads the catalog symbol (WU_E_UNKNOWN sentinel, load failure
never costs an event). MCP: error-code-catalog.ts (lexical-only), lookup_error_code for every
role, search_knowledge merges catalog hits, get_session_summary key events carry
errorCode/errorText, Dockerfile COPY + ERROR_CODES_PATH. ANALYZE-APP-014 1.2.1 corrects the
0x80073cf0 gloss. Gitlinks: internal (D-211/D-212, plan review, backlog), .claude/commands.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 16:24:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e5997bc50e chore: bump internal gitlink (error-code catalog v2 plan)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 15:25:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 75138016ce chore: bump internal gitlink (analysis notes revision 2)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 14:46:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fc4772efb0 chore: bump internal gitlink (analysis notes: detection-coverage ideas)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 14:42:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0bde428fa0 web: GA tenant modal — MCP switch and suspension moved down next to offboarding
Order at the end of the modal: MCP Access, Tenant Suspension, Offboard Tenant. Rarely used
levers sit together; the frequently edited plan, contact and limit sections come first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 14:13:40 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 16ca3a059c backend/web/mcp: per-tenant MCP switch as an operator control (D-210)
TenantConfiguration.McpDisabled + McpDisabledReason (GA-only, same deny-list and PUT guard as Disabled).
Front door: McpUserService denies every caller of a closed home tenant below the platform roles.
Per request: PolicyEnforcementMiddleware denies a closed home or target tenant for X-Client-Source: mcp
(403 McpDisabled) and narrows the delegated fleet bound, never to null. ClientSourceHeader is the one
reader of the header. The MCP access guard surfaces the backend reason verbatim. GA tenant modal,
list badge and config report; wire types regenerated; internal doc, health marker, gitlinks bumped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 14:01:01 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1bfc80e6db chore: bump internal gitlink (release backfill plan RELEASED, D-209)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 13:26:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fa705a2ef6 updated Readme.md 2026-09-06 13:13:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 81f807e124 web: modal overlays render through ModalPortal into <body> (D-208)
A fixed overlay still receives its parent's box-model margins: the tenants page's
space-y-8 wrapper gave the edit dialog's backdrop a 32 px margin-top, leaving the
navbar un-dimmed. All 21 full-screen overlays now portal to document.body.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 12:27:01 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a4f7c88785 chore: bump internal gitlink (request-wire-contract RELEASED, live verify) 2026-09-06 12:02:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 54259f070f chore: bump internal gitlink (request-wire-contract GEBAUT, D-207, B-r95/B-cme) 2026-09-06 11:42:37 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 26cef3ab06 web: request bodies as jsonBody<T> against the generated wire types (D-207)
Every request body in app/, components/, contexts/, hooks/ and lib/ is encoded
as jsonBody<SomeRequest>(…) from lib/apiClient.ts; the apiClient ratchet gains
the `body[:=] JSON.stringify(` pattern (74 → 10 sites) and refuses a bare
jsonBody(. The hand-written RestoreRowRequestBody/RestoreRowMode are the
generated RestoreRowRequest/RestoreRowMode now; scriptDisplayNames posts through
fetchJson; the tenant-group and delegation mutate helpers take a pre-encoded body.

What the typing surfaced and fixes here: canManageBootstrapTokens and `all` are
sent explicitly, AdminConfiguration goes back on the wire through
toWireAdminConfiguration (the outbound twin of fromWire…), TenantManagementSection
uses the wire TenantConfiguration instead of a local subset, nameless CPE entries
are filtered before they are sent, the session action posts
QueueSessionActionRequest, create-from-template sends { variables }.

Remaining baseline (with reason): the three rule/pattern pages, whose local rule
types diverge from the wire — B-cme.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 11:42:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 00ad230ffe mcp: request bodies typed against the generated wire types (jsonBody<T>, D-207)
The eight backend POST/PUT/PATCH bodies name their request DTO through
jsonBody<T> from client.ts — the one place a body is encoded — so a renamed
or retyped backend field fails tsc instead of surfacing as a 400 at runtime.
The apiFetch guard additionally refuses `body: JSON.stringify(` and a bare
`jsonBody(` with an empty baseline.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 11:42:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3d920a8113 shared+backend: IApiRequest marker, one RequestBody reader, every request body a Shared wire type (D-207)
Every HTTP request body the web, the MCP or the agent sends is now a flat class in
AutopilotMonitor.Shared implementing IApiRequest — the request twin of IApiResponse.
WireTypeManifestBuilder exports the implementers as a third root, so the request DTOs
reach wire-types.generated.ts on both clients; for request types a nullable property
keeps `| null` (a PATCH may send an explicit null to clear an override).

Functions read a body only through RequestBody.ReadAsync<T>/ReadOptionalAsync<T>
(System.Text.Json, ApiJsonOptions.Read = wire options + case-insensitive; empty or
malformed body = 400 envelope, never a 500) whose generic constrains on IApiRequest.
ReadNewtonsoftAsync<T> stays for the Newtonsoft-bound cluster (tenant/admin config via
the patch service's PopulateObject, rule and pattern documents) as a frozen per-file
baseline. The tenant-plan PATCH keeps its presence-sensitive JsonDocument walk with the
keys derived from PatchTenantPlanRequest by nameof (PlanPatchKeyParityTests).

35 nested request classes, 7 JObject/JsonDocument hand-walks and the anonymous
DeserializeAnonymousType bodies moved to Shared; the two identical TicketRequests are
one DownloadTicketRequest; ServerAction is no longer the request (QueueSessionActionRequest,
the stored row is built server-side); create-from-template takes { "variables": … }
instead of a bare map. Fields the endpoints default server-side are nullable now
(CPE mapping, report attachments, feedback rating on dismissal, upn for applications).

TypedRequestGuardTests: no raw deserializer under Functions/ (named exemptions: agent
routes frozen by D-200, Azure Monitor webhook, upstream/stored-column parses), the
Newtonsoft branch only in its baseline, no request type in the Functions assembly, every
DTO flat and in Shared. RequestBodyTests cover both readers, the cap and the envelope.
QueryParamGuardTests baseline shrinks by 14 (the Content-Length TryParse lives in the reader).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 11:42:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f6eac1964a chore: bump internal gitlink (both plans RELEASED, live verify, B-fq7 / B-8va)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 04:10:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e1b5b9d163 backend+web: per-user rate limits split by throttle surface — portal (public client) gets its own global budget, MCP/integrations keep override and floor (D-206)
The surface comes from the signed appidacr/azpacr claim (0 = public client = portal;
secret/certificate, app-only or missing = integration), never from a header: portal SPA,
MCP server and API share one app registration in production, so the client id cannot tell
them apart and any token holder controls headers. New AdminConfiguration field
PortalUserRateLimitRequestsPerMinute (default 600, Global Settings round-trip, wire types
regenerated); the existing user budget is relabelled MCP & integrations and keeps the tenant
override and the Pro floor; buckets are keyed per surface; ThrottleSurface is a request
dimension next to ClientSource so the classification is auditable (platform-health check 2).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 03:45:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 094833f831 backend: a Graph 401/403 on the first validator attempt invalidates the tenant token and retries fresh; the agent keeps getting 503 for a permission gap (D-205)
A freshly onboarded tenant spent 45 minutes in 503 because a second instance held a
roleless app-only token minted before the consent; InvalidateTenant never reaches other
instances. GraphAuthFailure is the shared step for all five Graph validators: attempt 1
drops the cached token and reports transient so the existing loop re-mints; attempt 2
keeps each validator's semantics (Autopilot/DeviceAssociation transient with Retry-After
120, CorporateIdentifier/CloudPc/IntuneBinding definitive) and logs a stable marker.
SecurityValidator hands the agent the largest Retry-After requested. Platform-health
check 6 and the marker catalog know both markers; the cloudpc concept doc carries the
contract.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 03:35:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3579ce0add chore: bump internal gitlink (typed call sites RELEASED, verify) 2026-09-06 02:55:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0188860d1c chore: bump internal gitlink (storage-budgets plan RELEASED)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 02:52:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 871a1ac059 chore: bump internal (typed call sites plan GEBAUT, D-204, envelope doc consumers, B-7sw) and .claude/commands (mcp-telemetry retries) gitlinks 2026-09-06 02:37:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 298a182fbb shared+web: backup job status and restore-row payloads join the wire contract; the web reads the generated types (audit package 5, stage 4b)
BackupJobStatus, RestoreRowPreviewResponse and RestoreRowCommitResponse were the last response payloads the
portal typed by hand: the C# classes existed in Shared but were not marked [WireContract], so the manifest
never carried them. The attribute pulls them and their enums (BackupJobKind/State, BackupOutcome,
RestoreRowDiffKind, RestoreRowCommitOutcome) into shared-manifests.json and both generated wire-type files;
the three backup pages import those and lib/api.ts drops eleven hand-written mirrors. Attribute only: no
runtime behaviour changes, no backend deploy needed.

Still hand-written in lib/api.ts, with reason: BackupManifest/BackupTableEntry (a blob passed through by
GET global/backups/{id}), BackupTriggerResponse (the 202 body of global/backups/trigger is an anonymous
object outside the typed regime) and the RestoreRow request body.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 02:34:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e71223507c web: customs archive reads the generated types, annotations page follows nextLink through the typed builder, dead PaginatedResponse removed (audit package 5, stage 4a)
The five hand-written customs-archive response types in lib/api.ts duplicated CustomsArchiveRunListResponse,
CustomsArchiveEntryListResponse, CustomsArchiveRunSummary, CustomsArchiveEntrySummary and
TenantOffboardingCustomsArchiveEntry from the manifest; the two pages import those. The annotations page
built its next-page URL from API_BASE_URL + nextLink instead of the scoped builder plus extractContinuation.
PaginatedResponse<T> had no importer. types/diagnostics.ts states why it stays hand-written (no wire DTO
for GET diagnostics/paths).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 02:28:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 02187f0f3c web: the last raw API call sites join the call layer; ratchet baseline for authenticatedFetch reaches zero (audit package 5, stage 3d)
Rules pages, apps tabs, audit, delegations, diagnosis, fleet health, geographic, health check, SLA, usage
metrics, the notification and SignalR contexts, the feedback bubble, global search and the shared hooks
now call fetchJson/fetchOk; the activation page's hand-rolled Bearer fetch (no 401 retry, no
telemetry) joins the layer too. The SignalR join/leave paths keep their visible-refusal semantics through
ApiError, the delegation acceptance explains refusals by code, the health check keeps its 403 wording,
and the local mirrors of SlaMetricsResponse and PlatformUsageMetrics give way to the generated types.

No page, component, hook or context calls authenticatedFetch directly any more. What stays is
documented per file in the baseline's PERMANENT map: the auth/me bootstrap, the SWA's own version.json,
the public stats manifest, the delete-cascade classifier's 202 body, and seven TokenExpiredError
branches where the UI must act differently from showing the message (route, rethrow, batch, retry flag).

Ratchet baseline: 39 → 0 raw fetches, 40 → 7 parses, 25 → 8 token checks (from 228 / 221 / 140).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 02:21:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3e2f62daeb backend: host.json holds Azure.Identity, Microsoft.AspNetCore and Microsoft.Hosting.Lifetime at Warning
About 12 MB/day of severityLevel-1 traces without diagnostic value (MSAL verbose, StatusCodeResult,
CORS success, Application started). Application logs were Warning+ already via Function: Warning.
Measured and documented in internal/docs/backend/telemetry-ingest-shaping.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 02:11:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c8b8a8dbb4 web(sessions/dashboard/progress): every API call through fetchJson/fetchOk/fetchBlob (audit package 5, stage 3c)
The 33 raw authenticatedFetch sites under app/sessions, app/dashboard and app/progress are gone. Hooks
that receive addNotification as a parameter report failures through notifyApiError (same rendering as
notifyError, injected notifier); fail-soft reads that used to check res.ok read through
.catch(nullOnApiError). The delete-cascade classifier accepts the ApiError of a refused DELETE next to
the 202 Response, so the 409/503/404 branches keep their wording; the polling probe reads the status
from either. Session and event reads name their wire types (GetSessionResponse, GetSessionEventsResponse,
SearchSessionsResponse, SessionStatsResponse, the progress and rule-stats responses); the legacy
list-shaped fallbacks on the single-session read are gone. SessionTimeBreakdownDto is the generated type.

Ratchet baseline: 72 → 39 raw fetches, 67 → 40 parses, 36 → 25 token checks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 02:09:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9e4c5f11c5 chore: bump internal gitlink (plan verify line, trace-noise backlog idea)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 02:00:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b16e72c10e web(settings): every API call through fetchJson/fetchOk, errors through apiErrorText (audit package 5, stage 3b)
The 46 raw authenticatedFetch sites under app/settings are gone: 20 by the transformer, the rest by hand.
The tenant config load keeps its 403 fallback to the feature-flags view through ApiError; the access
check treats a backend refusal as an outcome and only a failed round trip as transient; delegated
access, MCP users and the offboarding flows read their specialised envelopes through ApiError.code
and ApiError.body. Twenty 'Session Expired toast / else inline' catch dialects collapse to the inline
message apiErrorText already renders; local mirrors of McpUserEntry, PlanTierDefinition,
HardwareRejectedResponse and DeviceNotRegisteredResponse give way to the generated types.

Ratchet baseline: 115 → 72 raw fetches, 111 → 67 parses, 59 → 36 token checks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 01:56:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5cb9b0b30b backend: storage SDK budgets under the agent timeout, ingest 503 on an exhausted budget, request-token fan-outs, single-flight factory budget, ProcessStall monitor (audit F09, D-203)
- StorageClientOptions: Table/Queue 8 s per attempt × 3 attempts + capped backoffs = 25.8 s < the
  agent's 30 s upload timeout (pinned by test); Blob 60 s × 4. Every production client takes its
  options from there. No Polly over the SDK.
- StorageErrors.IsTransient(Exception): OperationCanceled / IO / HttpRequest / Aggregate-of-those
  / RequestFailed status 0; the ingest answers 503 + Retry-After instead of 500.
- The ingest still takes no caller cancellation (a batch is a unit). GetAllSessionsPageAsync
  carries the request token down to BoundedFanOut (Global Admin list); SingleFlightCache hands its
  factory a 30 s budget token and evicts on timeout (tenant ids, app-summary snapshot, session stats).
- ProcessStallMonitor: 1 s tick drift ≥ 1 s ⇒ ProcessStall event (sampling bypass) + metric with
  cause gc / threadpool / unknown from GC.GetTotalPauseDuration and thread-pool counters;
  GcPauseMs on request rows ≥ 100 ms. Measures the instance-local 5–10 s pauses seen in production.
- Gitlinks: internal (plan, D-203, concept doc, B-9hf, lesson), .claude/commands (marker rows).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 01:51:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c925001a8a web(admin): every API call through fetchJson/fetchOk/fetchBlob, errors through apiErrorText (audit package 5, stage 3a)
The 113 raw authenticatedFetch sites under app/admin are gone: 73 by the transformer (fetch + ok-check
+ json parse become one typed call), the rest by hand — 404-as-empty lists read through
.catch(nullOn404), the app-homing, offboard, delegated-admin and tenant-group flows read the
specialised envelope through the new ApiError.body, downloads use fetchBlob, action calls fetchOk.
Session-expired branches that only logged or set the same message are gone; apiErrorText renders
every failure with the reference.

Typing the responses surfaced eight local mirrors that had drifted from the wire types (required
fields the backend leaves optional): BlockedDevice, FeedbackEntry, DistressReport, OpsEvent,
SessionReport, IdentityBinding, UnmatchedSoftwareEntry, DailySummary and the whole
SectionPlatformUsage metric set are now aliases of the generated types, with the optional fields
handled where they render. AdminConfiguration keeps its literal-union narrowing through
fromWireAdminConfiguration instead of an unchecked parse.

Ratchet baseline: 228 → 115 raw fetches, 221 → 111 parses, 140 → 59 token checks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 01:41:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e494334720 mcp: apiFetch<T> at every call site, one retry on 429/503 within Retry-After, typed error envelope (audit package 5, stage 2)
apiFetch takes a mandatory wire type (60 call sites name their generated DTO; the 28 as-casts
and 31 unknown results are gone) and refuses an empty or malformed 2xx body. It retries once on
429 (never the MCP quota) or 503 when Retry-After is at most 10 s — GET only, never with a
caller-supplied signal, opt-in via retry:true otherwise — and counts the retry on the tool-call
context, which withToolTelemetry writes as `retries` on the tool_call line. ApiError.parsed is
the generated ApiErrorResponse plus domain fields and carries retryAfterSeconds; toolError
renders it in the 503, envelope and rate-limit branches. The lean-projection default lives in
one helper (leanFieldSelection) instead of two copies.

apifetch-typed.guard.test.ts refuses a bare apiFetch( or apiFetch<unknown>; apifetch-retry.test.ts
pins the retry, the opt-outs and the body contract. tools-delegated fakes now answer text() with
the body they claim (the client parses text, not json).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 01:13:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1554540431 web: one API call layer (fetchJson/fetchOk/fetchBlob), notifyError, ratchets with the full baseline (audit package 5, stage 1)
lib/scopedFetch.ts becomes lib/apiClient.ts: ApiError carries retryAfterSeconds (body first,
Retry-After header second), fetchJson<T> refuses empty and malformed 2xx bodies instead of
handing back undefined, sets Content-Type for string bodies, fetchOk covers action calls and
fetchBlob downloads. describeApiError renders 429/503 with the server's retry advice;
apiErrorText is the one-string form for inline error slots; apiErrorNotification folds the
"Session Expired" dialect into one place and NotificationContext.notifyError uses it.
useAuthenticatedFetch throws ApiError (correlation id preserved), drops the dead 204 branch
and onTokenExpired. dedupedFetchJson<T> for the three feature-flag readers.

lib/__tests__/apiClient.guard.test.ts ratchets raw authenticatedFetch(/dedupedAuthFetch(/
.json()/instanceof TokenExpiredError per file against a baseline that may only shrink
(a count above fails as a new site, below as a stale entry); fetchJson without a type
argument is a violation. Baseline today: 228 raw fetches, 221 parses, 140 token checks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 01:01:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fef09690d2 web: coalesce live timeline refetches per burst instead of per SignalR signal
Agent uploads arrive as bursts of batches ~0.3 s apart with seconds of silence in
between, and every batch raises a SignalR signal. The 300 ms trailing debounce on the
session page either refetched once per batch or hid a tight burst until it paused;
session 46096bcd produced 155 full first-page reads for 261 batches in 13 minutes.

lib/burstScheduler: leading edge + trailing debounce + max wait. The first signal after
a quiet period refetches at once, later signals of a burst refetch once after the
burst's last signal, and a burst that never pauses still refetches every max-wait
(spool replay after reconnect/reboot). Fetch semantics are unchanged: every run reads
the full first page, the server stays the single source of truth, no incremental path.

Session page: trailing 300 ms, max wait 1 s. Progress portal (same pattern, two
requests per refresh): trailing 500 ms, max wait 1.5 s. scheduleFetchEvents loses its
delayMs parameter; the scheduler is created lazily on the first signal so refs stay
out of render (react-hooks/refs). Seven fake-timer tests pin the timing rules.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 00:41:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3a975fa74f chore: bump internal gitlink (wire-contract plan RELEASED, short-sentence lesson) 2026-09-05 23:47:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 69c6353fb1 chore: bump internal (plan gebaut, D-200/D-201/D-202, drift-guards) and .claude/commands (platform-health 422 marker) gitlinks 2026-09-05 23:28:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2b9bf3cd3f backend: one query-parameter parser (QueryParams) with a lenient and a strict contract, ratcheted (D-202)
Helpers/QueryParams replaces fourteen private days/limit parsers, the three
TryParseUtc copies, eleven identical pageSize blocks and ~50 inline TryParse sites
under Functions/ and Pagination/. Lenient (Int/IntOrNull/UtcInstant): absent, garbage
or below-minimum means the call site's default, above-maximum clamps. Strict
(TryInt/TryPageSize/TryUtcInstant): absent is null, anything else invalid is a 400
with a message that names the parameter. Integers are invariant-culture, instants are
invariant UTC (AssumeUniversal | AdjustToUniversal), whitespace counts as absent.
Defaults and ranges stay arguments at every call site.

Settled differences: the Apps windows clamp above 365 instead of falling back to 30,
days=0 or negative yields the default everywhere, the two global geo endpoints and
the session list cap days at 365, SLA months is capped at SlaMetricsService.MaxMonths
on the HTTP layer, a whitespace date means no filter on every route, the admin batch
sizes reject values above their maximum, and the three culture-dependent
DateTime.TryParse sites parse as UTC.

QueryParamGuardTests ratchets TryParse out of Functions/ and Pagination/ (baseline:
headers, raw cells, the agent version major, the se= of a stored SAS URL);
QueryParamsTests carries the cases the removed copies pinned.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 23:26:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d99e16314b agent+backend: one telemetry wire class, 422 poison for rejected items, agent responses in the typed regime (D-200/D-201)
TelemetryItemKind moves to Shared; TelemetryItem.ToWire() maps onto TelemetryItemDto
and the uploader serialises the DTO, so both ends share one wire class. The spool line
keeps writing Kind by name (StringEnumConverter registered in TelemetryItemSerializer).

IngestTelemetryFunction.PartitionBatch routes by exact kind name and collects every
item it cannot route or parse; a non-empty rejection list answers the batch with 422 +
TelemetryItemsRejectedResponse (poison, rejectedRowKeys, reason) before anything is
persisted, logs a Warning and writes the new TelemetryItemsRejected ops event. The
agent's existing poison protocol drops exactly the named RowKeys and re-uploads the
rest; before this the ingest skipped the items, answered 200 and the agent cleared
its spool.

Contract tests from both sides: TelemetryWireContractTests (agent) freezes the real
batch body under tests/fixtures/telemetry-wire/ and parses the pinned poison body;
TelemetryWireFixtureTests (backend) dispatches every frozen body with zero rejections,
requires an arm per kind and pins the poison body.

Agent-facing responses implement IApiResponse and go through ResponseHelper, request
types carry [WireContract]; plain ingest refusals use the error envelope, the
register-session and upload-url refusals keep their DTO bodies (the agent reads
ErrorCode/Message). Manifests and generated wire types regenerated (also picks up
four types HEAD had left out of the manifest).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 23:10:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e4203e0f15 chore: bump .claude/commands (platform-health skill, backend-logs corrections) and internal (marker-catalog rule) gitlinks; drop stale index dual-write mention in the dependency filter comment
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 22:53:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2a5366d9c3 chore: bump internal gitlink (D-198/D-199, counters concept doc, storage-hardening plan GEBAUT)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 22:31:33 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9c9cf24ddc backend: platform counters recomputed instead of incremented, RuleStats keyed per scope and day with CAS batches (audit F06, D-198/D-199)
PlatformStats(global,current) took a GET plus a full-row upsert without ETag
from every ingest batch: increments were lost under concurrency and a writer
clobbered fields another writer had just changed. RuleStats put every tenant's
daily rule traffic into one date partition (1,459 rows on 2026-09-04), the
writer issued four serial calls per evaluated rule without ETag, and the
reader was a cross-partition scan whose 10k cap dropped the newest dates.

- D-198: TotalEnrollments / SuccessfulEnrollments / TotalEventsProcessed have
  no hot-path writer; the two-hourly recompute is the only source. Only
  IssuesDetected still increments, through TableCasRetry (ETag + field-only
  merge, AddEntity for a missing row, conflicts as StorageCasConflict). The
  tenant counters share the helper.
- D-199: RuleStats PartitionKey "{scope}_{date}", RowKey ruleId.
  RecordRuleStatsAsync merges a session's increments per rule, reads the
  partition once and writes one transaction (UpdateReplace with ETag / Add),
  retrying on 412/409. Readers are PartitionKey ranges per scope; aggregation
  and the regression radar fan out over the registered tenants; the cleanup
  deletes per scope. RuleStats joins the offboarding composite wipe.
- Legacy rows (PartitionKey = date) are read by an extra query and cleaned by
  a date range that checks every row for a bare-date key, until 2026-12-05.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 22:30:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ec0d8ad735 backend: blob proxy lifetime and timing, one delegation key per process, shared KEV instance, single-flight config misses (audit F11/F12)
- DiagnosticsBlobStreamer disposes the download result on every exit path
  (it was disposed only on the 413 branch), measures open and transfer
  separately and fires DiagnosticsDownloadProxied after the copy with
  Completed=true/false.
- UserDelegationKeyCache: one user delegation key per process (24 h, re-mint
  under a lock with 2 h margin or when a SAS would outlive it) instead of one
  storage round-trip per download or upload SAS.
- KevDataService is resolved as one singleton over the typed-client handler
  pipeline; the cache warmer used to hydrate a throwaway transient instance
  while the correlation service held a cold one.
- Admin and tenant configuration services single-flight concurrent cache
  misses (Lazy<Task> per key); the MemoryCache and the in-place projection
  semantics stay untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 22:14:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fc9e9d13e6 backend: keep slow storage successes and count CAS conflicts as a metric (audit F10)
The dependency filter dropped every successful storage call and the expected
412/409 outcomes, so storage-side latency and ETag contention were invisible
until a call failed outright (seven days of App Insights held zero storage
dependency rows).

- StorageDependencyFilterProcessor keeps a successful storage call at or above
  2 s and stamps SlowStorage=true; the operation name is on the row, the table
  name is not (the Azure SDK span carries neither URL nor table).
- StorageMetrics wraps TelemetryClient.GetMetric("StorageCasConflict",
  operation, table, outcome): pre-aggregated per minute, bypasses the worker's
  adaptive sampling, null-tolerant for tests.
- The CAS loops report conflicts: session event count, session counter
  reconcile, session store, tenant stats, MCP user/tenant usage.
- TableStorageService keeps its two-argument constructors (Moq matches by
  exact arity); DI resolves the three-argument overload.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 22:09:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d0cb7e66f4 backend: byte-aware table transactions and classified storage failures on the ingest (audit F07)
Every entity-group transaction was chunked by count only; 100 payload-heavy rows
(Signals with chunked PayloadJson, Events with 30k-char Message + DataJson) could
exceed the 4 MiB transaction cap, and the failure surfaced as an opaque 500. The
agent halves its batch only on 413 and treats 5xx as "replay later", so such a
batch wedged the device forever.

- TableTransactionBatcher: 100 actions, 3.5 MB per transaction, 1 MB per entity,
  never across partitions; an entity that cannot fit throws
  TableEntityTooLargeException. Used by the event, signal, transition, restore
  and rules writers; delete-only batches keep their count chunking.
- StorageErrors: one classifier for RequestFailedException (transient 408/429/
  5xx, payload-too-large by status or error code, already-exists incl. the
  Azurite 400 shape); the two IsAlreadyExistsStatus copies use it.
- Event writer: per-row fallback only for data-shaped rejections; throttling,
  outages and oversize batches propagate. Single and batched writer share one
  entity builder.
- IngestTelemetryFunction: payload too large -> 413, transient -> 503 with
  Retry-After: 5, anything else 500.
- TableStorageChunking.MaxPropertyChars is the one 30,000-char bound.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 22:03:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach bd66480ccc chore: bump internal gitlink (remove-decision-inspector RELEASED)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 05:05:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b05f1f6bcf chore: bump internal gitlink (remove-v2-index-tables RELEASED)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 04:51:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 12ad9c9436 Remove the Decision Inspector: web subpage, three session read endpoints, renderer deps (D-197)
Web: app/sessions/inspector, Inspector button, inspectorUrl, legacy /sessions/{id}/inspector
redirect, SWA rewrites, api.inspector; drops @xyflow/react, dagre, @types/dagre.
Backend/Shared: GetSessionSignals/DecisionGraph/ReducerVerification functions, DecisionGraphBuilder,
ReducerVerifier, their DTOs and tests, the QueryBySessionAsync readers and SignalQueryLimits;
three catalog entries fewer. Signals/DecisionTransitions tables and ingest unchanged; operator
analysis reads them through MCP. Wire manifests regenerated (web + MCP copy).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 04:51:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c8ce7cdb37 backend: remove the V2 index tables and their dual-write pipeline (D-196)
The five cross-session index tables (SessionsByTerminal, SessionsByStage,
DeadEndsByReason, ClassifierVerdictsByIdLevel, SignalsByKind) were write-only
since M5.d: no endpoint, MCP tool or web page ever read them, while the
dual-write cost a serial queue send per signal/transition on the ingest path,
a 5-13 min full scan of Signals + DecisionTransitions every two hours and five
property-filter scans per session deletion (audit 2026-09-05 F05).

Removed: the tables from TableNames.All (schema hash changes, next cold start
runs a full pass without them), the telemetry-index-reconcile queue name,
producer, envelope, handler, queue function and 2h timer, the cross-partition
Timestamp scans on the signal/transition repositories, the EnableIndexDualWrite
flag (model, config mapping, admin UI, generated wire types), cascade steps
11-15 (later steps renumbered 11-18), the deletion wrappers and the offboarding
wipe entries. DiscriminatorPkProp stays as a step class so manifests written
before this change still resume.

Order of operations: deploy first, then delete the queue pair and the five
tables in the portal (B-88h). Deleting the tables before the deploy 500s every
delete preview/enqueue and poisons offboarding.

Submodules: .claude/commands (import_session.py), internal (D-196, docs, plan).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 04:27:48 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 56d4dd8b84 chore: bump internal gitlink (queue-trigger plan RELEASED, live verify)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 03:16:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 86fdc5aca9 backend: stateless queue consumers become [QueueTrigger] functions; webhooks go through a queue; poll loop receives one message at a time
Audit 2026-09-05 F01/F02. Analyze, VulnerabilityCorrelate, TenantAutoApprove,
IndexReconcile and ImeMsiArchive are now host-managed queue functions under
Functions/Queue bound to the DataStorage connection (identity-based, resolved
by the host): the Flex scale controller wakes an instance for a message, the
host renews the lease and owns the retry/poison ladder. The four cascade
workers with lease/CAS state stay self-polling BackgroundServices; their base
now receives one message per poll so waiting messages can no longer expire
under another worker. Terminal enrollment alerts and hardware-rejection alerts
are enqueued on notification-dispatch (channel ids only, resolved at send
time) instead of fire-and-forget sends the host could drop on scale-in.
Requires the app setting DataStorage__queueServiceUri before deploy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 02:52:37 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 87c5bc59dc chore: bump internal gitlink (error envelope RELEASED)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 01:57:06 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 21b30b21c2 chore: bump internal gitlink (lessons rule block)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 01:44:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f94f1c0c4e chore: bump internal gitlink (lesson: no Front Door for the API)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 01:44:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a6a9883451 chore: bump internal gitlink (error envelope + correlation docs, D-192/D-193)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 01:37:57 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 03116a97d1 mcp: one correlation id per tool call — sent to the backend, logged, shown in every error
withToolTelemetry mints a UUID per tool call and runs the handler in a
ToolCallContext (tool name + correlation id); apiFetch stamps it as
X-Correlation-ID next to X-MCP-Tool-Name, so every backend request of the call
(pagination scans included) and the MCP_TOOL_LOGGING tool_call line carry the
same id — a row-level join between the MCP log and the backend's request rows.
ApiError reads the X-Correlation-ID response header (body correlationId as
fallback), and the error handler names it in every branch — 5xx, quota 429,
structured 4xx and the unstructured 401/403/404/429 texts that had none. The
handler reads the envelope's `code` (errorCode as the pre-envelope fallback),
the quota body's `error`, and the log proxy's `upstreamCode`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 01:33:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2abc78ab6d web: send X-Correlation-ID on every API call, read the error envelope, show the reference
authenticatedFetch mints one UUID per logical call (kept across the 401 retry,
where caller headers now survive too), sends it as X-Correlation-ID — the id
the backend echoes, stamps on its request row and writes into every error body
— and tracks api_request_failed {path, method, status, correlationId} for any
final status >= 400. App Insights gets enableCorsCorrelation + W3C
distributedTracingMode scoped to the API host, so portal dependency rows and
backend request rows share an operation_Id.

fetchJson/ApiError read the envelope (error, code, correlationId, hint; the
pre-envelope `message` as fallback), describeApiError renders message +
short reference, addNotification takes an optional reference the bell renders
as "Ref …"; the error boundaries show and track Next's digest. Consumers of
renamed fields follow: delete-session parser (code ?? hint, PascalCase codes),
app-homing (code ?? reason). API_ERROR_CODES comes from the manifest, and
HOME_TENANT_UNRESOLVED plus the cascade codes are `satisfies ApiErrorCode`.
InstallsTab is the first site showing the reference.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 01:29:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6e54b52376 backend: migrate the 458 anonymous error bodies to the typed envelope helpers
Every non-2xx body in the Functions project now goes through ResponseHelper
(ErrorAsync / BadRequestAsync / NotFoundAsync / ForbiddenAsync /
UnauthorizedAsync / ConflictAsync / InternalServerErrorAsync): 408 sites by a
pattern-exact rewrite of the CreateResponse + WriteAsJsonAsync + return shape,
50 by hand. The eight private BadRequestAsync shadow helpers are gone; the raw
500 catch blocks use InternalServerErrorAsync (sanitized message, correlation
id, MCP hint). 429s keep Retry-After via retryAfterSeconds.

Specialised error bodies where a consumer reads more than the prefix:
AppHomingDeniedResponse (kebab reason codes now Constants.AppHomingReasonCodes,
probe result), TenantConfigPatchFailedResponse (backupId, drift),
QueryBackendLogsErrorResponse (upstreamCode, statusCode, source, hint,
upstream). Twenty-one message-first 200 bodies that the old error tolerance had
let through are typed too (MessageResponse, PreviewWhitelistActionResponse,
SuccessMessageResponse). New codes: PayloadTooLarge, UpstreamError,
UpstreamTimeout, the three trial-gate codes; the agent security path
(SecurityValidationExtensions) writes the envelope with the retry window.

TypedResponseGuardTests: WriteBaseline is empty again — the anonymous
WriteAsJsonAsync ratchet now covers error bodies with zero tolerated sites.
Manifest and generated TypeScript regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 01:21:01 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7cef2ea361 backend: one typed error envelope (IApiErrorResponse) on every non-2xx body
Every error body now leads with { error, code, correlationId }: the generic
ApiErrorResponse (hint?, retryAfterSeconds?, operation?) plus the specialised
McpQuotaExceededResponse (reordered; `message` became `error`),
DelegatedSlotLimitReachedResponse (+correlationId) and the new
SessionDeletionRejectedResponse (replaces the anonymous delete arms). The
correlation id is stamped by the writers — ResponseHelper.ErrorAsync and the
new ApiErrorWriter for the middleware side (auth 401, policy 403/503, rate
limit 429, MCP quota 429, global exception 500) — never by call sites.
exceptionType and rateLimitInfo leave the wire; Constants.ApiErrorCodes is the
code vocabulary and is exported as the manifest section `apiErrorCodes`
(API_ERROR_CODES for web + MCP). CorrelationIdMiddleware names the readable
headers via Access-Control-Expose-Headers.

Guard: TypedResponseGuardTests no longer tolerates anonymous error shapes;
the 458 legacy sites in 149 files are frozen in WriteBaseline to melt down.
New facts: envelope-prefix reflection, ApiErrorWriter body/header pins,
exact-shape pins for the generic envelope and the changed specialised bodies.

Reverses the "error bodies stay anonymous" clause of D-043 (decision entry
follows with the docs stage).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 00:56:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5b5ee0e8fd chore: bump internal gitlink (release verify)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 21:43:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7bcc4f00b1 chore: bump internal gitlink (release verify 2026-09-04)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 21:42:33 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 34ec44e3d4 backend: duration evaluators refuse mixed timestamp provenance only
The first cut refused every reader-zone-fallback endpoint. The DeviceSetup line is
written before the agent starts and is backlog on every device, so that silenced
ANALYZE-ESP-001 for all agents without an era anchor (control sessions 2708e6b4 and
18d80f9c came back "not measurable" after the deploy). Two fallback endpoints share the
writer-zone error and cancel it; only a span mixing a fallback endpoint with an anchored
one (or with "now" for an open phase) is unmeasurable — the a7140f98 shape.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 21:34:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f607e21c13 agent+rules: Hybrid Join user affinity from the IME user token; IME backlog eras anchored by the bootstrap record
hybrid_login_pending now measures the absence of a real-user desktop after a reboot
(cancelled by the DesktopArrivalDetector or a real JoinInfo user), is never armed on
WhiteGlove devices (resume marker, Part-2 flag, .part1- archive) and reports the
JoinInfo placeholder as a fact only — on a Hybrid join the AD sign-in never replaces it.
New EntraUserAffinityDetector: armed at the real-user desktop on Hybrid devices, the
first IME-TOKEN-SUCCESS line after the desktop posts ime_user_token_acquired; ten
minutes without one post entra_user_affinity_pending with the IME token-failure codes.
ImeLogTracker exposes raw per-line token callbacks past the historic-replay gate;
HelloTracker surfaces User Device Registration 304/305 as device_registration_event.
ANALYZE-ID-004 v2.0.0 keys on those events (event_type not_exists gained a branch),
GATHER-DEVICE-006 follows, GATHER-DEVICE-007/008 collect the Entra operational log.
Constants + MCP catalog gain the five types (D-072), the guard test learns the
multi-line OnTraceEvent shape, gather_* outputs pass the MCP filter gate by prefix.

CMTrace: ImeLogEraPreScan/CmTraceEraTable anchor the backlog era that holds the
bootstrap execution record against the Deployed install marker (0.13-0.36 s in the
field), whole era or nothing, sibling files by local time; origin era-anchored.
Backend phase_duration/app_install_duration refuse a reader-zone-fallback endpoint.

Decisions D-190, D-191. Session a7140f98.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 21:12:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5940e9fc6a auth: application principals — app-only tokens flow as app:<client-id> members (B-nuw)
A service principal (idtyp=app, typically behind a federated credential) is admitted only
with the access_as_application application permission and then keys every role table,
binding, audit actor and throttle bucket as app:<client-id>. Caps at resolution: Viewer in a
tenant, DelegatedReader on managed tenants, never a platform role; the roleless catalog tiers
are closed to applications except GET auth/mcp. MCP guard keys on the same principal key.
Members / MCP Users / Delegated Access get a User / Service principal switch; usage views
badge App; McpServicePrincipalFirstSeen ops event and PrincipalKind request dimension.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 19:17:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 98cfd76232 plans: Pro (MSP) — a permanent-Pro managing tenant confers Pro on its managed tenants, derived at read time (B-qvu)
A tenant in the owned group of a permanent-Pro tenant is effectively Pro with source "msp":
badge "Pro (MSP)" (also over its own Pro), the Pro entitlement set without the delegation
right (no transitive delegation, no slots), no trial CTA. Nothing is written for that —
TenantConfiguration.ManagedByProTenantId is a load-time projection from a process-wide
index over the Tenant Groups table (owner tier read raw, never through the config service),
so the end of the delegation, the manager losing its permanent tier, or its offboarding
revert automatically. The one write is the retention grace anchor (ProDowngradedUtc),
stamped by ProConferralService from the four paths that end a conferring relationship.

- FeatureEntitlementCatalog.Resolve → EditionResolution { Edition, Source, OwnPro };
  Get(resolution) returns ProViaMsp for conferred Pro; the 3-argument ResolveEdition is
  gone so every caller resolves from the config (incl. the projection)
- DelegatedAdminService home gate checks the DelegatedAdminAllowed entitlement, not the edition
- TrialExpirySweep reads through the config service: a managed tenant's expired trial emits nothing
- feature-flags + plan response carry editionSource; config/all projects payingCustomer and
  managedByProTenantId; shared manifest + web/MCP codegen regenerated
- PayingCustomer: GA-only sales bookkeeping flag on the plan endpoint, no entitlement effect
- web: "Pro (MSP)" label/tooltips, plan section badge, delegated-access hints, tenant
  management chips + paying checkbox

Tests: catalog matrix, ManagedTenantProIndexTests (incl. mutual management without recursion,
fail-closed on storage error), ProConferralServiceTests, projection on every config read path,
feature-flags payload, parity facts, serialization (projection never stored), plan transitions,
edition gate, sweep. Backend 5902 green, web tsc/vitest/lint clean, MCP tsc/vitest green.

Concept doc + D-188 in internal (gitlink); customer docs in the docs repo (MCP redeploy needed).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 18:31:48 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 09e68a614f web(geo): legend buckets under the Performance Map toggle which markers are shown
Click a bucket to narrow the map to it, add more with further clicks, Show all
or the last toggle returns to the full map; a Color-by switch resets it. Camera
fit and marker radius scale stay on the full location list so filtering never
moves or rescales the map. Customer docs updated in the docs repo.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 16:32:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 88290caadc security: sanitize method and decoded path in the privileged-denial record
CodeQL flagged the new denial flow (cs/log-forging #83-#87): header values and the request
path travel from the deny branch into a log line, the ops-events table and the alert
channels. Headers were already stripped of control characters and capped; the path was not,
and Request.Path is percent-DECODED, so %0A arrives as a newline. BuildPrivilegedDenial now
cleans method and path (LogSanitizer) and caps the path at 256 chars, once, before any sink.
Test pins CR/LF stripping and the cap. The remaining alerts are the known false-positive
class (structured ILogger sinks with sanitized discrete properties).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 16:25:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f442dce9a4 logs proxy: a rejected query is the caller's 400, so the MCP shows the store's error in full
Live check after the x29 deploy: a KQL syntax error came back as 502, and the MCP sanitizes
every 5xx down to the error code — the syntax message and the forwarded upstream JSON were
invisible, exactly the parity loss the proxy exists to avoid. Upstream 4xx (other than
401/403) now maps to 400 with message, hint and `upstream`; 401/403 (the managed identity's
missing read grant, with a hint naming the role) and store 5xx stay 502. The MCP's structured
4xx renderer appends `upstream` as a fenced block (capped), and keeps sanitizing 5xx.

Tests: status mapping theory, hint texts, upstream rendering on 400 and non-rendering on 502.
Backend 5849, MCP 693 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 16:14:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4f03f39e9a chore: bump internal gitlink (q8n post-verify)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 16:11:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 38b667799c ci: workflow-only commits no longer trigger CI and CodeQL
The 9eb8cac5 filters covered gitlink bumps and prose but not the
workflow files themselves, so every edit to build-agent.yml or a deploy
workflow still cost a full CI and CodeQL run. Neither reads any other
workflow: CI runs the suites and drift guards, CodeQL analyzes C# and
TypeScript. paths-ignore cannot negate, so each file lists the other
twelve workflows explicitly and leaves itself out; .github/scripts and,
for CI, .github/codeql join the list for the same reason.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 16:05:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a5f74d6abc ci(agent): release body no longer repeats the release title
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 16:01:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d0e09301a1 ci(agent): release body drops the Installation and Included Components sections
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 15:59:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 177915ea6b chore: bump gitlinks (agent-release approval gate, plan released with v2.0.1448)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 15:58:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b89008e745 ci(agent): customer release notes come in through the release_notes dispatch input, never from CI (D-187)
build-agent.yml gains an optional release_notes input; the release body opens with
"What's new" from that input, or a generic fallback linking to the docs changelog
plus a marker the operator tooling uses to anchor the next notes, so releases
dispatched by hand leave no gap. --generate-notes dropped (pull requests only);
a compare link to the previous tag replaces it. Plan-first rule: plans live in
internal/work/plans from the first draft. Gitlinks: internal, .claude/commands.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 15:47:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach cfa1cbbed2 security: cap the privileged-denial alarm so a valid token cannot flood the operator
Any signed-in user holds a token the GA-only routes refuse with 403, so the assume-breach
alarm was a push-flood vector: one event per caller AND route per hour, multiplied by
Flex instances. PrivilegedDenialReporter now keys the throttle on the caller alone (a sweep
over the whole GA surface is one event; every attempt still lands in the Warning trace) and
carries a fixed per-instance window budget: 5 events per hour, then ONE Critical storm
marker (same event type, so the same Telegram rule pushes it) and trace-only silence until
the window resets. Worst case per instance and hour: 6 pushes. Global Reader slips count
against the budget too. Tests pin the per-caller throttle, the storm marker and the Reader
accounting; D-185 amended.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 14:54:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach aa1881ec44 chore: bump internal gitlink (backlog ids B-xxx)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 14:48:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 744e35ee9b mcp: get_deployment_state — live vs verified-deployed for backend, web, mcp and agent (x29 phase 3)
One call replaces the six fetches of the backend-version skill: backend /api/health vs
versions/backend.json, portal /version.json vs versions/web.json, this server's own build
(build-info.ts, now shared with /health and the boot line) vs versions/mcp.json, and the
agent release manifest. Per component: live, manifest, drift (in-sync | drifted | unknown |
not-applicable) with a note that names the missing half — a manifest 404 is "never deployed
since manifests exist", never a silent in-sync; failed fetches land in partialErrors
(allSettled). The well-known hosts join config.ts as the URL guard requires. Platform scope
(GA + Global Reader); catalog snapshot updated. The local git comparison stays in the skill.

Closes the build of backlog x29 (all four phases); deploy + live verification tracked as
backlog `sch`, the user-side RBAC / app settings / alert rule as `ket`.

Tests: deployment-state (drift arithmetic, fan-out, 404, unreachable), MCP 691 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 14:07:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 884b74cb8c reports: ticket-gated download of session-report ZIPs for the MCP (x29 phase 2)
The report ZIP a tenant admin submitted and the preserved diagnostics copy could only be
fetched with a storage key through an az script. They now follow the diagnostics ticket
model: mint under the caller's JWT, download with a short-lived HMAC ticket, bytes proxied
through the backend — a storage SAS never leaves it.

Backend
- DiagnosticsDownloadTicket gains a purpose parameter (default diag-dl-v1, new
  report-dl-v1): a ticket for one download surface is rejected on the other (wrong_purpose).
- POST global/session-reports/download-ticket (GlobalReadOrAdmin, same tier as the portal's
  download-url): flat-name guard, existence check, best-effort size, ticket bound to the
  caller's home tenant; reuses DiagnosticsDownloadTicketResponse (destination SessionReports).
- GET global/session-reports/download (PublicAnonymous, ticket is the sole authority):
  per-IP limit + decode via the new TicketDownloadPrelude (shared with the diagnostics route),
  streamed from the session-reports container with BlobStorageService.OpenReadAsync.
- Constants.BlobContainers.SessionReports replaces three duplicated literals.
- Pins: catalog completeness/JWT-exempt theories, auth-skip, no-store, purpose tests.

MCP
- get_session_report_download (platform scope) mirrors get_session_diagnostics: kind
  (session-report / preserved-diagnostics / diag-files-report), size, download URL, expiry,
  instructions; catalog snapshot updated.

Submodules: session-report-debug skill on the tool, fetch-report-zip.sh deleted; plan/todo.
Tests: backend 5839, MCP 683, solution build green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 14:01:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 67316a0fbd chore: bump internal gitlink (q8n lessons)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 13:50:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 501f994c7a logs proxy: three telemetry stores, a wall-clock budget and typed partial results (x29 phase 1)
POST /api/global/raw/logs (MCP query_backend_logs) now takes `source` = backend | web | mcp
and `budgetSeconds` 5..180 (default 30). Parity with the az CLI was already by construction
(same Kusto REST endpoint, verbatim query); the four remaining deltas were properties of the
proxy and are gone (D-186):

Backend
- LogQuerySources (Shared vocabulary, exported as manifest section `logSources`) and
  LogQuerySourceCatalog: APPINSIGHTS_APP_ID → backend, APPINSIGHTS_WEB_APP_ID → web (both
  api.applicationinsights.io), MCP_LOG_ANALYTICS_WORKSPACE_ID → mcp (api.loganalytics.io).
  A missing setting makes one source answer 503 naming it, never the others.
- AppInsightsQueryFunction: injectable IHttpClientFactory (named client without timeout) and
  TokenCredential; one CancellationTokenSource per request plus `Prefer: wait=<budget>`
  upstream, 504 names the budget; typed QueryBackendLogsResponse keeps the Kusto
  tables[].columns/rows verbatim (JsonElement cells) and adds source, budgetSeconds,
  elapsedMs and `partial`/`partialReason` when the store cut the result (previously
  swallowed); on failure the full upstream error JSON rides along as `upstream`.
- TypedResponseGuard: the last SerializeBaseline entry is gone (typed request record).

MCP
- query_backend_logs: source (z.enum from the generated LOG_SOURCES), budgetSeconds, a client
  signal of budget + 15 s, rawTable result cap, description with per-source table hints.

Submodules
- .claude/commands: backend-logs / ux-insights / mcp-telemetry on `source`; query-appinsights.sh
  deleted (35 call sites rewritten); az only for the live container tail.
- infra: migration scripts carry the two new app settings and role assignments
  (Monitoring Reader on the portal component, Log Analytics Reader on the MCP workspace).
- internal: concept doc backend/log-query-proxy.md, D-186, docs and plan updated.

Tests: catalog resolution, budget clamp, Kusto parsing incl. PartialError, error extraction,
wire parity of the new response; backend 5832, MCP 683, web tsc, solution build green.
Before live use: grant the two roles and set the two app settings (see the plan file).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 13:50:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c38f0cf2b0 fix(agent): keep-awake releases on the user-ESP page exit, not the synthesized completion; guard change reverted (q8n)
Reverts the HasAccountSetupActivity tightening from f0a3f043: measured on 485 Classic
(SkipUser=false) sessions, 96 see a single Shell-Core 62407 before any AccountSetup
progress and 75 of them complete AccountSetup only through the user-apps-settled synthesis,
which needs that exit remembered as the edge. Windows confirmed categorySucceeded in 0/485,
so the synthesis is the load-bearing completion path; presence semantics stay and are
documented as such.

UserEspKeepAwakeHost instead gets an additive progress probe
(ProvisioningStatusTracker.HasAccountSetupProgress via EspAndHelloHost) and releases on an
EspExiting that arrives after the AccountSetup registry left notStarted — the real user-ESP
page exit (progress precedes it by >= 1 min fleet-wide; the Device->Account handoff exit
always precedes progress). AccountSetupProvisioningComplete no longer releases; desktop
arrival is deliberately not a trigger (explorer.exe ran before the final exit in all 385
two-exit sessions). Sessions with only the handoff exit hold until the safety cap. Release
reason user_esp_exited replaces account_setup_complete. D-183 rewritten.

Tests: host (release on exit+progress, handoff exit holds, completion no longer releases,
exit before engage ignored), tracker (presence stays true / progress false on the pre-written
all-notStarted JSON). Solution build 0 warnings; agent suite 2823 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 13:48:40 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 729ee56bde security: assume-breach alarm for the Global-Admin-only surface (x29 phase 0)
The 2026-09-04 audit found no bypass of the GA boundary, but a failed attempt left
only a Warning trace without identity, and a non-GA tools/call for a GA-only MCP tool
never reached the backend at all. This makes the boundary observable without adding
a second alarm writer (D-185):

Backend
- PrivilegedRouteDenied (Security): raised from the policy middleware's deny path for
  every 403 by an authenticated caller on a GlobalAdminOnly route. Critical for a
  caller without a platform role, Warning for a Global Reader. Details carry upn, oid,
  tid, client source, MCP tool name, correlation id, reason and policy. Throttled one
  hour per caller+path per instance (PrivilegedDenialReporter, IPrivilegedDenialReporter
  seam). PolicyResult now surfaces the denied tier; the DENIED log line gains oid, tid,
  clientSource and mcpTool.
- GET global/raw/access-probe: no-op GlobalAdminOnly route whose denial IS the signal
  (AccessProbeResponse DTO, catalog entry, parity test).
- Defense in depth: AppInsightsQueryFunction and both TableQueryFunction triggers re-check
  IsGlobalAdmin in the body (RawGlobalAdminGate); an empty RequestContext fails closed.
- Dual-register: OpsEventTypes.All, OpsAlertRulesSection.tsx, regenerated manifests.

MCP
- ga-tool-probe.ts: before dispatch, a caller without the GlobalAdmin role naming a
  strictGa tool leaves an unconditional [mcp-security] line (tool, upn, scope) and fires
  the access probe with X-MCP-Tool-Name; the SDK answer stays "Tool not found".
- GA_STRICT_TOOL_NAMES exported and pinned equal to the registered GA-minus-Reader set.
- debug-session prompt names query_backend_logs/query_table only for strictGa (Readers
  were told to call tools they cannot see); tool_call_rejected lines carry scope + upn;
  config-tool comment corrected against the actual catalog tiers.

Tests: reporter (severity, details, throttle, fail-soft), middleware policy surfacing and
IsPrivilegedDenial/BuildPrivilegedDenial, Program.cs middleware order source scan, raw
gate 403, probe catalog + JWT pins, wire parity; MCP probe unit tests, Global Reader over
HTTP on both eras, runtime refusal fires the probe, prompt gate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 13:29:06 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f0a3f04398 fix(agent,rules): AccountSetup activity means observed progress; same-event filter for event_data conditions (q8n)
Agent: ProvisioningStatusTracker.HasAccountSetupActivity now requires at least one
AccountSetup subcategory past notStarted. Windows writes AccountSetupCategory.Status with
every subcategory notStarted BEFORE the Device-ESP page exits, so the presence check
confirmed the Device->Account handoff (Shell-Core 62407) as the final ESP exit; the
user-apps-settled synthesis then completed AccountSetup and released the User-ESP
keep-awake minutes before the real exit (fleet: 77 % of keep-awake sessions, median 3 min;
on battery that is enough for Modern Standby). D-183.

Rule engine: filterField/filterOperator/filterValue now apply to event_data and
event_data_array as a same-event filter (shared ApplyValueFilter with event_count).
ANALYZE-DEV-012 v1.1.0 excludes backfilled pre-session episodes (backfilled equals false);
a second independent condition could not, since each condition scans all events on its
own. D-184. Schema, Shared model, MCP authoring guide and generated types follow.

Tests: ProvisioningStatusTrackerAccountSetupActivityTests (the verbatim all-notStarted
registry JSON), SleepEpisodeRuleTests (+3 backfill cases), RuleEngineEventDataFilterTests.
Solution build 0 warnings; agent suite 2820 and backend suite 5791 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 13:11:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 49013c3cc4 chore: bump internal gitlink (cockpit path links)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 12:59:27 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 32cbc3620e chore: bump internal gitlink (cockpit reader view)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 12:53:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ae9c1b0744 chore: bump internal gitlink (cockpit edit)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 12:42:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9eb8cac507 ci: skip CI and CodeQL on gitlink bumps and prose-only commits
Every "chore: bump internal gitlink" commit ran the full CI matrix and
both CodeQL analyses, because a gitlink bump reports the bare path
'internal' (no trailing slash) and the existing 'internal/**' filter
does not match it. Both workflows now ignore the bare and nested forms
of the three private submodule paths plus markdown, LICENSE and the
.github metadata files. CodeQL's weekly unfiltered schedule remains
the backstop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 05:00:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 69ed763640 chore: bump internal gitlink (cockpit stats tiles) 2026-09-04 04:51:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 369650aeeb chore: bump internal gitlink (cockpit chrome) 2026-09-04 04:47:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0280366cc3 chore: bump internal gitlink (lesson) 2026-09-04 04:36:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ac2b52cc4d chore: bump internal gitlink (todo cleared) 2026-09-04 04:36:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8faa304c94 chore: trim public CLAUDE.md to the public half; bump internal gitlink 2026-09-04 04:32:57 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 95817f1296 chore: bump internal gitlink (cockpit live file view) 2026-09-04 04:30:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e6981bad99 chore: bump internal gitlink (cockpit browse) 2026-09-04 04:26:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 99717f03e2 chore: bump internal gitlink (cockpit file view) 2026-09-04 04:18:06 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 04f53b882c chore: bump internal gitlink (cockpit date view) 2026-09-04 04:10:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 558153f29c chore: bump internal gitlink (cockpit decisions view) 2026-09-04 04:07:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 91ba9d24a1 chore: bump internal gitlink 2026-09-04 03:54:12 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e8ecb5537c chore: bump internal gitlink (backlog ids) 2026-09-04 03:54:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6e4563b2a0 chore: bump internal gitlink (backlog cockpit) 2026-09-04 03:31:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 435aef867c CLAUDE: public half keeps directives, knowledge map, hard rules and code quality; process, working files, OKF, customer-claims detail live in the private half
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 03:15:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e76f312adb chore: bump internal gitlink (rules moved into the private instruction half) 2026-09-04 03:13:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach eac470e781 chore: bump internal gitlink (lesson) 2026-09-04 03:12:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 685a86215b chore: bump skills and internal gitlinks (skills rework 20 -> 16, MCP-first) 2026-09-04 03:12:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8a259241b5 chore: operator scripts leave the public tree (versioned in the private infra submodule); scripts/ keeps only Bootstrap and CustomerSetup 2026-09-04 02:43:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fd41dded3d chore: bump internal gitlink (private instructions: operations facts) 2026-09-04 02:23:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach db020789e1 chore: private submodule docs/ becomes internal/ (knowledge + decisions + work files + private instructions)
- .gitmodules: docs -> internal, repo renamed to Autopilot-Monitor-internal; the OKF bundle now lives at internal/docs/
- .claude/CLAUDE.md rewritten: where knowledge lives, working-file rules, hard rules; imports the private half from internal/CLAUDE.md (silently absent without submodule access)
- .claude/architecture-principles.md moved into the internal bundle (reconciled against the code)
- tasks/ (gitignored) retired; working files live in internal/work/
- doc path references docs/<bundle> -> internal/docs/<bundle> in code comments, skills gitlink, codeql paths, build script
- rule descriptions no longer cite an internal doc path (customer-visible text); rules/dist regenerated
- public tree no longer names private operator tooling
- .claude/commands gitlink: skill docs point at the new paths
2026-09-04 02:19:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 186c151046 fix(web): tenant filter resolves a typed domain name, session search matches tenant domain and ID
A domain typed into the cross-tenant filter only became a tenant ID when a suggestion was
picked; submitted raw it was dropped by the fetch (not a GUID) while the client scope compared
it against session tenant IDs, leaving zero rows and "No sessions found for this tenant yet".
Submit now resolves GUID / exact domain / unique substring, updates the box to the ID, fetches
with the resolved value, and the empty state says "No tenant matches" for unresolvable input.

The search box never matched the tenant column: tenant ID and domain are now part of the
searchable text and the suggestion dropdown (cross-tenant only), sourced from one
tenantId-to-domain map shared by table and filter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 18:20:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c4c253a03a feat(app-homing): name the add-on roles that block the self-service switch and hand the admin the fix
Two tenants clicked the migration banner, consented the new app, and were refused by the
role-superset probe without ever learning why: the previous app's service principal holds a
tenant-side add-on grant (DeviceManagementScripts.Read.All) that no re-consent can produce, and
the grant command on the Optional Graph capabilities page pre-fills the homed (previous) app.

Backend: the probe now separates manifest roles (still propagating after consent ⇒ transient,
the retry converges) from add-on roles (permanent ⇒ MissingRoles names them). consent-status and
access-check carry appHomingPending + appHomingMissingRoles; the manual flip's probe payload
carries missingRoles. The access-check invalidates the Graph caches BEFORE the homing probe so
"Detect existing access" judges a fresh primary token after the admin's grant.

Web: TenantConfigContext learns the blocking roles from either response and the post-consent
poll keeps going while the switch is still converging (previously it stopped on the first
legacy-side reconcile and left the tenant un-switched). Settings → Autopilot Validation shows a
"One more step" banner with the roles, the grant command pre-filled with the NEW app's client id
and -Permissions, and the re-check button; the admin flip error names the roles too.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 17:08:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f833882e07 fix(ops): AgentEmergencyBreak ops event severity follows session state at break time
The agent's 48h emergency break is wall-clock, so devices powered on after a shelf
period fire it days after the sweep already terminalized the session (2026-09-03
audit: 224 of 269 breaks in three days were such late cleanups from one kiosk tenant,
all Warning, burying the real ones).

- ReportAgentErrorFunction.ClassifyEmergencyBreak: session already terminal
  (Succeeded/Failed/Incomplete) => Info + lateCleanup=true; open, unknown or
  unreadable => Warning (historical semantics). Row read is best-effort.
- OpsEventService.RecordAgentEmergencyBreakAsync takes the severity and stamps
  sessionStatusAtBreak/lateCleanup into message and details.
- Timeline event agent_emergency_break stays Warning (classifier rule 3 keys on type).
- SessionOwnerBindingObserver: document that the ops-event throttle is per Function
  instance (IMemoryCache) and deliberately so.
- Tests for both branches, the fail-safe path and the pure rule; docs submodule bumped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 16:03:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0505e5d5bd feat(web): switchable color modes and legend on the geographic performance map
The Performance Map gets a "Color by" selector (enrollment duration, success rate,
API latency, DO peer efficiency, App-Load-Score) and a legend under the map. One
bucket definition per mode (mapColorModes.ts) feeds both the Leaflet markers and
the Location Performance table badges, so map, legend and table share thresholds.
The map's duration scale moves to the table's 0.8/1.0/1.2/1.5 ladder.

Also: page.tsx uses the generated wire types instead of drifted local interfaces,
formatThroughput comes from lib/formatting, marker tooltips show latency and DO share.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 15:56:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a4140c4e4c docs(readme): refresh screenshots, add social preview source
The four README screenshots were still from the private preview (old blue
logo, preview banner). Retaken in the light theme with the current logo,
tenant view only, no banner. Fleet Health uses the 90-day window; the geo
map has too few locations in the own tenant to read as a world map.

Also stores the GitHub social preview as source (HTML composition plus the
anonymized dashboard capture it embeds) and the rendered 1280x640 PNG.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 14:50:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0e928b5506 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-09-03 14:29:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ce9efb6f6c docs(repo): AGPL-3.0 root license, MCP section in README, security policy and issue forms
- Root LICENSE is now the verbatim AGPL-3.0 text so GitHub detects the license
  instead of showing "Other"; the split model (MIT for Agent + Shared) is
  explained in the README and each component keeps its own license file.
- README: MCP server in the component list, an "AI Integration (MCP)" section
  with example prompts and the server URL, and a neutral Feedback section.
- SECURITY.md routes reports to private GitHub Security Advisories.
- CONTRIBUTING.md is a feedback routing page (issues, discussions, security,
  Report Session button), CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md is short and neutral.
- Issue forms for bug reports and feature requests; blank issues disabled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 14:29:14 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 73961f67f2 build(deps-dev): bump @humanfs/node (#146)
Bumps the web-security group with 1 update in the /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web directory: [@humanfs/node](https://github.com/humanwhocodes/humanfs/tree/HEAD/packages/node).


Updates `@humanfs/node` from 0.16.7 to 0.16.8
- [Release notes](https://github.com/humanwhocodes/humanfs/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/humanwhocodes/humanfs/blob/main/packages/node/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/humanwhocodes/humanfs/commits/node-v0.16.8/packages/node)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: "@humanfs/node"
  dependency-version: 0.16.8
  dependency-type: indirect
  dependency-group: web-security
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-03 13:27:42 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 48fe68b87c build(deps): bump fast-uri in /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp (#143)
Bumps [fast-uri](https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri) from 3.1.5 to 3.1.7.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri/compare/v3.1.5...v3.1.7)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: fast-uri
  dependency-version: 3.1.7
  dependency-type: indirect
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-03 13:15:00 +02:00
dependabot[bot] f1820b2b43 build(deps): bump qs in /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp (#144)
Bumps [qs](https://github.com/ljharb/qs) from 6.15.2 to 6.16.0.
- [Changelog](https://github.com/ljharb/qs/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/ljharb/qs/compare/v6.15.2...v6.16.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: qs
  dependency-version: 6.16.0
  dependency-type: indirect
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-03 13:14:46 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 78f810a326 build(deps): bump the mcp group (#145)
Bumps the mcp group in /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp with 2 updates: [zod](https://github.com/colinhacks/zod) and [tsx](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx).


Updates `zod` from 4.5.2 to 4.5.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/colinhacks/zod/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/colinhacks/zod/compare/v4.5.2...v4.5.4)

Updates `tsx` from 4.23.12 to 4.23.13
- [Release notes](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/blob/master/release.config.cjs)
- [Commits](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/compare/v4.23.12...v4.23.13)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: zod
  dependency-version: 4.5.4
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
- dependency-name: tsx
  dependency-version: 4.23.13
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-03 13:14:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9207b066db changed dependabot to batching 2026-09-03 13:06:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0d41f50ace feat(web): answer-engine optimization — problem-framed FAQ on /about, entity graph JSON-LD, llms.txt, AI crawlers in robots
- /about: "Common Questions" section (15 user problems → feature answers) from one source array, mirrored as FAQPage JSON-LD
- root layout: SoftwareApplication JSON-LD becomes an @graph with Person (author/publisher), Organization glueckkanja AG (provider), WebSite, featureList, softwareHelp
- public/llms.txt with portal, docs, and source links
- robots: explicit allow block for GPTBot, OAI-SearchBot, ChatGPT-User, ClaudeBot, Claude-SearchBot, Claude-User, PerplexityBot, Perplexity-User, Google-Extended
- drop the unverified "policy conflicts" claim from the analyze-rules feature card

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 00:41:06 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b294d2025d feat(plans): tenant-wide MCP usage-plan override + Community upgrade hint on quota 429
- TenantConfiguration.McpUsagePlanOverride: a SectionUsagePlans plan name pinned to a whole
  tenant (members' default user plan + organization windows); precedence per-user override >
  tenant override > edition default; never changes the edition
- PATCH config/{tenantId}/plan accepts mcpUsagePlan (validated against the definitions,
  400 on unknown names; null/blank clears), audited, echoed as mcpUsagePlan/mcpUsagePlanOverride
- Tenant Management: "MCP usage plan (override)" select fed by global/config/plan-tiers
- Quota 429: every Community block now says Community is sized for occasional use and Pro
  lifts the window; managed-tenant block names whose plan governs it
- Field in BaseDeniedFields/RevertProtectedFields/projection, Store/Map, manifests regenerated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 23:51:48 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 12a75ef13d feat(delegation): MCP quota follows the managed tenant, delegated tenant slots, self-service delegation
Phase A — the budget follows the data
- A delegated (MSP) read is charged to the MANAGED tenant's organization MCP budget and checked against
  its plan; the caller's own budget still follows the home tenant. 429 names the managed tenant (domain)
  and the Pro upgrade path; new McpQuotaExceededResponse.targetTenantId.
- Bounded fleet aggregate (global/sessions, global/stats/sessions): exhausted managed tenants are excluded
  softly — RequestContext.AllowedTenantIds is narrowed (never widened, never null; pinned) and echoed as
  quotaExcludedTenants. Global Admins stay exempt and are tracked on their home tenant only.
- Tenant Group flag ChargeHomeTenantQuota (PATCH global/tenant-groups/{id}, audited per tenant): reads
  through the group are charged to the assignee's home tenant (operator-managed service groups).
- McpTenantUsage rows carry UserPrincipalName / HomeTenantId / LastRequestAt; new
  GET metrics/mcp-usage/organization (budget by account incl. delegated readers) rendered on MCP Usage.
- MCP: get_fleet_overview (delegated + platform) over the two subset-tier routes; error handler names
  the managed tenant. Other delegated tools stay tenant-mandatory.

Phase B — delegated tenant slots
- EditionEntitlements.MaxDelegatedTenants (Community 0 / Pro 2), TenantConfiguration.MaxDelegatedTenantsOverride
  (GA-only via PATCH config/{tenantId}/plan { maxDelegatedTenants }), DelegatedSlotService counting distinct
  managed tenants per home tenant through identity bindings (+ pending invitations + 24 h holds), enforced
  fresh on grant / group assign / add-tenant with 409 DelegatedSlotLimitReached; GA UI offers
  "raise to N & retry"; GET global/delegated-slots/{tenantId}; feature-flags entitlements.maxDelegatedTenants.

Phase C — self-service delegation
- One implicit Tenant Group msp-{tenantId} per managing tenant (OwnerTenantId on the meta row);
  DelegationInvitations table (invitations + slot release holds); DelegationInviteTicket (HMAC, 7 days,
  locates the row only — the accepting tenant is always the JWT tenant; one-shot via ETag).
- DelegationSelfService: ordered accept chain (distinct codes), remove/revoke with 24-hour slot hold, dual
  audit and live-stream disconnect, assignees bound to tenant membership, "who manages my tenant" view;
  GA release-hold escape hatch. No delegations/* route carries {tenantId} (pinned).
- Web: Settings → Tenant → Delegated Access, /delegations/accept?token=, AuthGate keeps the deep link
  across the activation detour, Tenant Management holds + release, owned groups read-only in GA UI.
- Offboarding wipes both sides (documented two-bucket membership); 90-day sweep of terminal rows.
- Trust pages (terms, privacy) and generated wire types updated; docs submodule bumped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 21:37:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5494fd1862 fix(web): re-home hop peeks the post-login deep link instead of re-saving it
CodeQL flagged the re-save in AuthGate (js/clear-text-storage-of-sensitive-data,
alert #82): the value flowed back into sessionStorage from the consumed
return URL. The link only has to survive one more sign-in round trip, so the
re-home path now reads it without clearing and never writes it again.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 17:26:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6c6d746532 feat(web): small "Docs" link in every portal page header
Session details, diagnosis, annotations, fleet health, geographic performance,
SLA, software, usage metrics, audit log, system health, IME log patterns and the
rules pages link to their guide from the end of the header control group.
Navbar help links use the DOCS_PATHS catalog (service announcements no longer
goes through a redirect).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 16:34:37 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7563ec9158 feat(web): DocsLink shows a one-word label on narrow screens
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 16:18:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4e1a3c6312 feat(auth): prepare the new app registration as the default sign-in app
- Backend: the app-homing consent probe now requires the primary app's Graph
  roles to be a superset of the legacy app's, so a mere sign-in consent
  (User.Read, no application role) can never auto-flip a tenant onto an app
  without the device-validation permission.
- Web: dashboard banner for tenants still on the previous app (per-tab
  dismiss, docs link); docs links on the settings funnel banner, the flipped
  banner and the failed-sign-in screen; immediate re-homing after a redirect
  sign-in on the other app (one hop per tab, never after a cross-app
  fallback); the www -> portal handover passes the learned app as ?authapp=.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 16:18:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3eb1f39c4b feat(web): bulk actions capped at 100 sessions, deletes above 10 require typing DELETE
The dashboard selection could grow across pages without limit and a bulk delete was one click on the red button. The effective selection is now cut to BULK_MAX_TARGETS (100, the largest page size) and every pick path (row, Shift range, page checkbox) fills only up to the remaining room. The delete dialog lists every target and, above BULK_TYPED_CONFIRM_THRESHOLD (10), asks for the word DELETE before the button arms. Block stays one click because it expires after 24 hours.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 15:26:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7e82decc01 feat(plan): company name in the tenant contact profile, required with the contact address at the Pro trial entry point
CompanyName joins ContactEmail as the tenant contact profile: optional on Community,
both required by the self-service trial start (one 409 ContactProfileRequired verdict
naming every missing part). GA plan assignment stays soft (admin warning). Feature
flags expose companyNameSet as a boolean only; TenantTrialStarted carries companyName.
Web: Contact section field, Plan gate and dashboard banner name what is missing,
admin panel/report/search know the company. Privacy page lists the new datum.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 12:52:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach af7850d786 Revert "fix(web): MCP Usage page tolerates a backend without the tenant quota fields"
This reverts commit 62c7a29b46.
2026-09-02 12:00:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 62c7a29b46 fix(web): MCP Usage page tolerates a backend without the tenant quota fields
The organization-quota card called toLocaleString on undefined when the
backend predates the tenant quota (deploy window, local dev against prod),
tripping the error boundary. Tenant fields are optional on the client now;
the card renders only when they are present.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 11:58:33 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 78a043db08 feat(web): shared SectionCardHeader with docs links in every settings section
- SectionCardHeader replaces 33 hand-copied card headers across settings, rules and admin pages
- DocsLink + lib/docsPaths: every tenant-facing section links its documentation page (new tab)
- docsPaths guard test encodes the GitBook URL rule (group slug, not folder name)
- delete dead MaintenanceSection duplicate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 11:02:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ec3f0ce237 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-09-02 10:35:01 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach eb47dfb6ce feat(mcp): organization-wide MCP quota next to the per-user quota
Every X-Client-Source: mcp request is now charged against two budgets: the
caller's own daily/monthly windows (per-user override or tenant edition plan)
and the organization-wide daily/monthly windows of the token's tenant, which
always follow the tenant's edition plan so a per-user override never widens
them. Ten accounts no longer mean ten times the budget.

Tenant counters live in the new McpTenantUsage table (PK = tenantId,
RK = {yyyyMMdd}_{oid}: one partition range per check, no hot row, never a
property scan over UserUsageLog); exact-PK offboarding bucket and 90-day
retention included. PlanTierDefinition gains nullable tenant limits (null =
catalog fallback: Community 300/9000, Pro 3000/60000; 0 = unlimited). The 429
body carries level=user|tenant and a message naming whose budget it is,
X-MCP-Quota-Tenant-* headers ride along, and mcp-usage/me exposes both
budgets (wire types regenerated).

MCP server: the quota 429 body was rendered as Error: undefined because it
has no error key; it now gets a dedicated block with the reset time and a
level-specific suggestion. Web: Usage Plans edits the tenant limits; the
self-service MCP Usage page renders both budgets (the quota node was never
displayed before).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 10:32:15 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 7a2465fecf build(deps-dev): bump postcss-selector-parser (#142)
Bumps [postcss-selector-parser](https://github.com/postcss/postcss-selector-parser) from 6.1.2 to 6.1.4.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/postcss/postcss-selector-parser/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/postcss/postcss-selector-parser/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/postcss/postcss-selector-parser/compare/v6.1.2...6.1.4)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: postcss-selector-parser
  dependency-version: 6.1.4
  dependency-type: indirect
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-02 10:26:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4b8b2a5a6d fix(mcp): AllMembers grants tenant members only, not every authenticated token; per-user overrides stay visible
McpAccessPolicy.AllMembers returned Allowed for any valid JWT, so a Progress
Portal end-user without a role could open an MCP session. The AllMembers path
now requires an effective role (Admin / Operator / Viewer) in the token's
tenant, resolved by the new TenantMemberRoleResolver that the policy
middleware shares (table first, Entra app-role claim when the tenant opted
in). Explicit grants (platform role, delegated scope, enabled McpUsers row)
and the Disabled-row kill-switch keep working in a policy-independent order;
auth/mcp and auth/me hand the token's app roles through.

The MCP Users settings section shows the user list under AllMembers too, as
the per-user override list (individual usage plan, disable = block).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 10:03:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4521e248b3 test(agent): V2 Core scenario budgets become one 30 s deadlock guard
The fixture waited 5 s per posted signal and the scenarios 10 s for a
terminal stage. Those are deadlock guards, not performance assertions:
every applied step performs 5-6 WriteThrough + Flush(true) writes and 2-3
atomic renames synchronously on the ingress worker, and on a cold GitHub
runner volume the first scenarios after the parallel phase still blew the
5 s budget even though the collection is already serialised (run
33581374985: the first four scenarios in run order failed, the other nine
passed; the rerun of the same commit was green). One constant,
EnrollmentOrchestratorFixture.SettleTimeoutMs = 30 s, now covers the
per-signal, terminal-stage and uploader waits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 04:30:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4c32d66a63 ci: print failed-test messages in the .NET test steps
`dotnet test --verbosity quiet` also sets the console logger to quiet, which
drops the "Error Message" block of a failed test — run 33581374985 showed
only four "[FAIL]" lines for the V2 Core scenario flake and nothing about
which fixture budget blew. An explicit `--logger "console;verbosity=minimal"`
keeps the build quiet but prints the failed tests with message and stack.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 04:22:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a635ac3bc6 feat(health): operator-only cards and URLs follow the Global-Admin view; stacked URL rows
The server already strips SignalR Quota, Poison Queues and every endpoint URL
for non-Global-Admins, but the page mirrored the Global-Admin VIEW only for the
build blocks, so demo mode still showed the full operator report. The new
lib/healthCheckView.ts applies the same rule presentation-side (cards + URL
detail rows), and both card render paths share one HealthDetails component
that puts URL values on their own line under the label instead of wrapping
them right-aligned next to it.

The healthy agent-binaries message no longer advertises the legacy blob; that
account stays in the Global-Admin-only details.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 03:57:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d59286b8b3 chore(mcp): keep X-MCP-Pretty out of the repo's own client config
The per-client opt-in stays available on the server; this repo's .mcp.json no longer sets it,
so operator sessions run compact too and pay no indentation tokens. Set the header in your own
client config when you need to read raw results.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 03:33:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 05641d4076 feat(mcp): per-client pretty-printed results via the X-MCP-Pretty header
Compact JSON stays the platform default: measured with an OpenAI-family tokenizer on realistic
payloads, 2-space indentation costs 14-46 % more tokens (2-2.7 tokens per line for newline,
indent and colon spacing) — gzip removes it from the wire, not from a model's context. A human
reading results in an interactive client opts in per client with `X-MCP-Pretty: 1`; the access
guard stores the preference on the caller context and stringifyResult honours it. This repo's
.mcp.json sets the header so operator sessions in Claude Code get readable output. The
MCP_PRETTY_JSON environment switch remains the global escape hatch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 03:30:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7288220341 perf(mcp): smaller results and parallel type walks (perf audit P4)
- get_session_diagnostics no longer embeds the ~5k-character ZIP layout per ticket; it points at
  the static diag_zip_layout resource (read once per conversation). Prompt text updated.
- get_resource accepts `section` to read one top-level part of the rule-authoring trio; the
  section list in the description is derived from the live catalogs. RESOURCE_NAMES now lives in
  resource-catalog.ts as the single source of the name enum and the ResourceName type (the inline
  z.enum baseline entry is retired with it).
- search_knowledge no longer repeats type/title inside metadata.
- search_events walks up to three candidate event types concurrently (TYPE_WALK_CONCURRENCY);
  pages within a type stay sequential, results stay in candidate order, budget/truncation
  semantics unchanged.

Deliberately not done (operator decision): a longer undici keep-alive (runtime dependency for a
single-digit-ms in-region gain; the backend sends no Keep-Alive hint) and precomputed tool JSON
schemas (7-12 ms per request on a dev CPU, would need SDK-registration patching).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 03:13:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ea7b850ef0 perf(mcp): lean event projection only on unfiltered reads; filtered reads stay complete
30-day tool telemetry: callers pass fields explicitly in more than 90 % of get_session_events /
query_raw_events calls, and reads filtered by eventType keep the payload about half the time
(the ime-decompile skill reads data.msiDownloadUrl after an eventType filter without fields).
So the lean default (no data / no DataJson) now applies only to unfiltered timeline reads and
announces itself in-band (omittedFields + omittedNote); a read filtered by
eventType/severity/source returns full events as before. Never worse than the former default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 02:59:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e85dd082d6 perf: read caches, cross-tenant fan-out and lean MCP results (2026-09 perf audit, P1)
Backend
- SingleFlightCache<T>: per instance, TTL, single-flight, failures never cached, expiry sweep, optional single slot
- Rule catalog caches in TableStorageService.Rules.cs: gather rules / rule states / IME patterns per partition (60 s), every Store/Delete invalidates, hand-outs are clones (GatherRule/ImeLogPattern/RuleState.Clone()); GatherRuleService and ImeLogPatternService seed behind a gate and read global/tenant concurrently; GetAgentConfig reads rules and patterns concurrently
- Tenant-id snapshot (60 s) shared by every cross-tenant fan-out; the paged session list no longer rescans TenantConfiguration per page
- BoundedFanOut + DrainSessionsIndexWindowAsync: one PartitionKey-anchored, RowKey-bounded, projected query per tenant; GetAllSessionStatsAsync drains with SessionStatsProjection under a 30 s single-flight cache; GetGeoWindowSessionsAsync reads the index key range; GetSessionsByDateRangeAsync fans out per tenant
- App summaries: cross-tenant windowed projected reads fan out per tenant over a union projection and share a single-slot 60 s snapshot (Installs tab pair, app detail, usage refs); days clamp on global/metrics/app
- CancellationToken on the uncached geo/date-range reads (IMaintenanceRepository)
- EventFieldProjection accepts data.<key> slices
- BackendStartupMs measured from Main (StartupClock) instead of Process.StartTime, which carried the Flex placeholder lifetime

Web
- Dashboard stats: 30 s SignalR debounce in the GA aggregate scope (every tenant's events drove a cross-tenant drain every 3 s)

MCP
- Compact JSON tool results and resources (MCP_PRETTY_JSON=true opts back in)
- DEFAULT_FIRST_PAGE_SIZE 50 for every paginated tool; the auto-exhaust budget is row-based (2000 rows) so scan coverage does not shrink
- Lean first-page projections: get_session_events without data, query_raw_events without DataJson; announced in-band (omittedFields/omittedNote) and restorable via fields; a continuation keeps the nextLink projection
- get_session_summary fetches the timeline with the triage fields plus data.<key> slices for its guards

Docs: docs/backend/read-caches-and-cross-tenant-fanout.md (submodule 11fc393).
Deploy order: backend, web, then MCP (the summary's data.<key> projection needs the new backend).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 02:55:18 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 034aaa03c8 feat(web): dashboard Select mode for bulk session delete / device block
Opt-in Select button (Admin Mode) adds a checkbox column, row-click
toggles selection, Shift+click ranges, header checkbox selects the page,
Esc/Done leaves. Bulk actions loop over the per-session endpoints with
three requests in flight and one summary toast; no bulk endpoint.
Confirm modals list the targets. Also translates the block tooltip and
the block error alerts to English.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 01:42:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9b6b03dac5 fix(backend): verdict radar carries legacy:{rule} into the sweep:{rule} baseline; derive ESP-message rows as esp_failure_fallback
The 2026-08-23 instrumentation cutover re-fired as per-path share regressions
(sweep:r6 lift 8x, sweep:r5_incomplete 5x) because the single stamped baseline
day already cleared the 5-hit floor while the legacy:* history was not counted.
Rule-shaped legacy rows now fold into the per-path BASELINE of sweep:{rule}
(baseline only - derived rows never become window evidence). Failed rows whose
reason is the agent's esp_failure message derive as agent:esp_failure_fallback,
matching the stamped ingest path, which removes the fake agent:failed drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 01:01:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fd6f359e1c update wording 2026-09-02 00:54:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e99a7d67c0 test(agent): ScenarioTests join the SerialThreading collection
The V2 Core integration scenarios drive the real orchestrator against
wall-clock budgets (5 s per signal, 10 s for Completed / uploader). In
isolation every scenario finishes in under a second; inside the fully
parallel suite on a 4-core runner the same scenarios took 4-7 s locally
and blew the budgets on two slow GitHub runners (CI runs 33564658714 and
33565773888). Serialising them after the parallel phase, like
EnrollmentOrchestratorTests and RecoveryPathTests already are, brings
them back under 700 ms without changing the budgets.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 00:52:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 45a1620f6b chore: remove root build.ps1
A plain wrapper around dotnet restore/build that nothing referenced. Its
"next steps" advertised a local self-hosting workflow (Azurite, func start)
the project does not support, and its name collided with the real agent
release script scripts/Deployment/build.ps1 that the docs and workflows
mean by "build.ps1". Building is `dotnet build AutopilotMonitor.sln`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 00:20:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1955efdae5 test: replace the operator's own tenant/device identities with synthetic values
Test code used the real test-tenant GUID, a real UPN, a real VM serial (and
its Intune-normalized form) and a real hostname as literals. None of the
assertions depended on the specific values; they are contoso/1111…/1234… now.
The one that stays is CertTenantBindingTests: its tenant GUID is stamped
inside device-cert-sample.pem and can only change together with the fixture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 00:13:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a5c42de28c chore: move infra/ into a private submodule
The two Bicep templates — and the deployment scripts still to come — do not
belong in a public repository. They now live in okieselbach/Autopilot-Monitor-infra
(full history via git-filter-repo) and are mounted back at infra/, so the code
comments pointing at infra/mcp-server.bicep stay valid. No workflow reads
infra/, so CI is unaffected. The *.parameters.json ignore rule moved into the
submodule.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 00:06:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 19c4354224 docs: README assets move to .github/assets, drop the architecture link
The screenshots and the logo lived in docs/images, which is now a private
submodule and cannot render on the public README. They are README assets
only (no doc page references them), so they move to .github/assets — the
usual home for repository-level images — and leave the docs bundle.
The architecture link pointed into the private docs; the technical
documentation is not part of the public surface any more.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 00:02:40 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8e439176fd chore: move docs/ into a private submodule, drop the change log
This repository is public; the technical docs carried security-mechanism
gaps, incident details and operator process. They now live in the private
repository okieselbach/Autopilot-Monitor-docs-internal (full history,
extracted with git-filter-repo) and are mounted back at docs/, so every
code, skill and memory path reference stays valid.

log.md is gone: it duplicated the commit messages. index.md remains the map.
CLAUDE.md: concept docs only for invariants and decisions a later change
could silently break; commit inside the submodule first, then bump here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 23:53:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 73c0fbdd7e docs: device identity block binding, session-scoped blocks, progress lookup, validator budget
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 23:37:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach bffb76625c perf(backend): time budget for the Graph device validators
The four Graph-backed validators ran on the unnamed HttpClient (100 s default timeout), two attempts each, sequentially, with an uncancellable token retry chain underneath: GetAgentConfig tails of 30-102 s for an agent that gives up after 30 s. DeviceValidationBudget gives the chain one 20 s token and each attempt a linked 8 s token that also bounds token acquisition; exhaustion is a transient result (503 + Retry-After) and the second attempt is skipped once the chain token is spent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 23:37:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d8ef8b11b0 fix(backend): progress-portal lookup resolves exact serial/device name via index queries
The lookup scanned only the newest 100 SessionsIndex rows, so any enrollment older than that horizon answered 'Device Not Found' and a member substring search could land on a newer device. Exact serial and device name now run as server-side eq filters over the tenant partition (stored form or upper-case), newest session wins, then a point-read; the substring page remains the members/GA-only fallback.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 23:37:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fb49dc9ad2 fix(backend): bind device block/kill to the certificate identity and repair session-scoped auto-unblock
CWE-807: the kill switch was keyed only by the caller-declared X-Device-SerialNumber, so omitting or forging the header dodged block and kill. A block now mirrors onto the device's certificate identities (Sessions.OwnerDeviceId) as id:{guid} alias rows in BlockedDevices, resolved at block time; KillSwitchEvaluator checks serial, then identity, then version and stamps the DeviceIdentityBinding request dimension. Alias rows are hidden from listings and exempt from the legacy-key migration; unblock removes them. Session-scoped watchdog blocks were unreachable (no session id ever reached the evaluator): ingest now carries the verdict past the body parse and re-evaluates with the session id, and holds the registered serial against the block list when the header differs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 23:37:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 27bf96f23f docs: demo session import concept (OKF)
Records the import-session skill: the 23-step cascade inverse, the single
replacement table over keys and strings, what never travels (Owner*,
deletion/diagnostics columns), the SoftwareInventory counter semantics,
scrubbing rules, provenance lane, and the safety model (insert-only under
the new id, key invariant, zero-leak assertion, automatic rollback).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 23:15:27 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0f1f2e593f chore: bump .claude/commands (import-session skill)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 23:14:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4b5ae562c7 fix(web): drop retired /docs, /roadmap and /changelog from sitemap lastmod generator
The generator still listed the removed docs sections, roadmap and changelog
(all moved to docs.autopilotmonitor.com / retired), and lacked /get-started,
which the sitemap emits -- so that entry got "now" as lastmod on every build.

- PAGE_MAP now matches exactly the URLs app/sitemap.ts emits
- generator fails on a missing source file instead of using the deleted
  file's last commit date
- sitemap throws at build time for a URL without a lastmod entry
- fix stale comment: the /docs redirects live in staticwebapp.config.json

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 22:55:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d6783fe327 feat: free-text note search on the annotation lists
Both annotation list routes (sessions/annotations/list, global/session-
annotations) accept ?q= -- a case-insensitive substring over the note and
the verdict, deliberately not the lane, author or rule ids, which have their
own filters. Table Storage has no contains, so it is applied in the same
client-of-Azure back-fill loop as ruleId (filtered-out rows never consume
page budget) and bound into the continuation fingerprint, so a cursor issued
for one search cannot be replayed against another; nextLink echoes it.

Portal: a debounced search box on the Annotations page (the setState lives
in the timer callback, not the effect body). MCP: list_session_annotations
gains `query` -> q. Response DTO unchanged, no wire break.

Why: demo sessions imported into the operator's own tenant fall out of every
dashboard/geo/SLA time window. A note ("wifi switch") plus this search is
how they are found again -- and it is generally useful for any judged session.

Deploy order: backend first, then web and MCP (the parameter is silently
ignored by an older backend).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 22:49:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2fe1095758 perf(raw-events): budgeted, resumable cross-session scan; tenant from index rows; MCP pageSize override + timeout retry
query_raw_events timed out twice on the same continuation and lost all work each time. Per page the
cross-session path resolved every session's tenant through a SessionsIndex full-table scan (the
EventTypeIndex row already carries TenantId), ran up to 1000 per-session queries serially, applied the
date window last and against the Azure system Timestamp, and had no deadline; the retry was identical
because the nextLink freezes pageSize and the explicit value was dropped.

Backend
- RawEventsScan: index walked in chunks of 100, 20 parallel session fetches, 15 s budget checked
  between chunks; cursor always after the last fully processed chunk; QueryRawEventsResponse.Partial
  marks a budget-ended page (nothing missing up to nextLink).
- Date window pushed down: Events RowKey range inside the session partition
  (BusinessTimestamp.EventDateFrom/ToClause) + sound index write-time pre-filter
  (startedAfter - MaxFutureToleranceHours - 1h). The session-StartedAt RowKey was rejected as a
  prefilter (WhiteGlove Part 2 emits weeks later).
- Raw date filters and ordering now use the business time (RawEventTime: OccurredUtc -> RowKey ->
  system Timestamp); unparsable startedAfter/startedBefore is a 400; bare values are UTC.
- Same scan sat behind search_sessions_by_event, search_sessions_by_cve and the deviceProperties path
  of search_sessions: all read Sessions by point read with the tenant their index row carries
  (BatchGetSessionsByKeyAsync, IndexRowKeys.ResolveTenantId); the scan-based batch helper is gone.

MCP
- followNextLink(..., overrides): an explicit pageSize (and fields on the raw tools) applies to a
  continuation in every nextLink-paginated tool; pageSize schemas lose their .default(),
  pageSizeForCall sends the first-page default only on a first-page call.
- scanWithTimeoutFallback on the auto-exhaust tools: one retry with a halved pageSize on the same
  cursor, marked retriedWithPageSize; timeout error text distinguishes continuation calls.
- Generated wire types regenerated (partial?: boolean).

Docs: docs/backend/raw-events-scan-budget.md (design, invariants, audit of the remaining unbounded
cross-tenant aggregations with live durations), business-timestamps.md consequences.

Deploy backend first (additive field), then MCP.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 22:35:46 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8a3b4136a6 feat(web): internal annotation lane follows the Global-Admin view
The "Internal (Autopilot Monitor)" lane is labelled "never visible to the
tenant" and sits on the session page shown in every live demo, but it was
gated on the platform identity alone and stayed on screen when the
Global-Admin view was switched off.

visibleLanes() now takes the view flag as an explicit second argument and
combines it with the identity, so the rule also covers the read-only Global
Reader. The /annotations overview additionally filters the rendered ROWS to
the visible lanes: that list is not lane-scoped by the request, so an
internal row would otherwise surface there even with the lane dropped from
the filter dropdown.

Not a permission change -- the backend filters the lane for tenant callers
regardless (GetSessionAnnotationsFunction.FilterLanesForCaller) and owns the
write matrix.

Also fixes the retention-override banner: the bare warning glyph inherited
the base 16px size against 12px text and sat below the first line, with an
mt-0.5 hand-nudge that could not hold it. Replaced by a w-4 h-4 SVG whose
box matches the text-xs line box exactly, so items-start aligns it with no
margin -- and it now matches the icon style of every other alert box.

The IME log pattern controls needed no change: canEdit already reads
isGlobalAdmin && globalAdminMode, so demo mode reaches them through the
effective flag.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 20:43:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7323ca72b2 feat(web): demo presentation mode for live product demos (#141)
* feat(web): demo presentation mode for live product demos

The Global-Admin view toggle only ever reached the nav and the scope hooks.
Every GA extra inside a tenant page was gated on the identity and stayed on
screen when the toggle was switched off -- including the /health-check build
cards, whose commit hashes hyperlink into the private repo, and the Decision
Inspector button on the session detail page.

New useGlobalAdminUi() (real GA *and* global view on) replaces the bare
identity check at the five visible GA surfaces, so switching the toggle off
now yields a genuinely tenant-admin-looking view.

On top of that a hidden demo mode, armed by a self-consuming ?demo=1
(persisted to localStorage, then stripped from the address bar), forces the
global view off for every consumer without touching the stored value, hides
the toggle itself and the platform role badges, and silently replaces
/admin/* with /dashboard rather than rendering the Access Denied card --
whose text would itself reveal that a platform area exists. ?demo=0 clears
it and restores the previous setting. An unrecognised value leaves the
stored flag alone, so a typo cannot drop the operator out mid-presentation.

Admin Mode stays untouched: a tenant admin has it too, so it belongs in an
honest demo. user.isGlobalAdmin is never faked globally -- that would drag
canEditConfig along and leave a GA without an own tenant-admin role unable
to demonstrate anything.

Also hides the settings gear when neither toggle applies, which previously
opened an empty panel for Operators and Viewers as well.

Presentation only. Every rule mirrored here stays enforced server-side
(TenantConfigValidation, GlobalAdminOnly -> 403); no backend file is
touched and demo mode is not a security boundary.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(web): refresh generated page-lastmod

Regenerated by the build (scripts/generate-lastmod.js). The committed file
had drifted: about/privacy/terms carried stale dates and /buy, /help and
/plans were missing entirely, so the sitemap under-reported them.

Pre-existing drift, unrelated to the demo-presentation-mode change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 20:30:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 52ae6541a7 feat(agent): signal-pipeline health block in agent_metrics_snapshot
The 2026-09-01 WG-seal soak on post-SignalIngress-fix builds (memory:
project_wg_seal_postfix_soak_residual) found sessions whose DecisionEngine
never sealed Part 1 while the agent kept running for hours - and telemetry
could not distinguish a frozen ingress worker from a deliberate Weak
sealing-classifier verdict, because the metrics snapshots carried no
pipeline counters at all.

Every agent_metrics_snapshot now carries the block. The fields are MONOTONIC
totals plus a monotonic queue peak - deliberately no momentary queue length:
a snapshot samples the integral, so any two snapshots prove whether the
worker ran in between (a frozen worker keeps signal_pending_count growing
while processed/applied stand still; a momentary gauge would alias between
ticks). Same field pattern the snapshot already uses for the spool
(spool_total_enqueued_count / spool_peak_pending_item_count).

- signal_last_ordinal / signal_processed_total (new ProcessedSignalCount) /
  signal_pending_count / signal_reentrant_total: SignalIngress worker
  progress; signal_queue_peak is a new lock-free Interlocked-max recorded in
  Post (fast + slow path; worker-local follow-up items deliberately excluded)
- decision_stage + decision_last_applied_ordinal: from the immutable
  DecisionState - answers the WG question directly ("minutes after the
  tracker's whiteglove_complete and still not WhiteGloveSealed")
- wg_sealing_level / wg_sealing_score: only after the sealing classifier
  produced at least one verdict (key ABSENCE, not Unknown/0 noise, for every
  non-WG session) - separates "classifier said Weak" from "never ran"

Wiring is a read-only probe chain following the imeTrackerHealthProbe
pattern: EnrollmentOrchestrator passes () => _processor?.CurrentState into
IComponentFactory.CreateCollectorHosts (new optional decisionStateProbe;
test fakes updated), PeriodicCollectorLifecycleHost combines it with its
existing concrete-SignalIngress reference in BuildSignalPipelineProbe, and
AgentSelfMetricsCollector writes the fields fail-soft (a throwing probe
degrades to a snapshot without the block - pinned by test). The snapshot
event travels the collector/event path, which is independent of the signal
pipeline it measures - field-proven by the freeze cases, whose perf/metrics
events kept flowing while the engine stood still.

No backend/web/MCP change needed: no new event type, DataJson is free-form.

Tests: 5 new collector facts (full block, absence semantics x2, fail-soft,
no-probe compatibility) + 2 new SignalIngress facts (processed total stable
across drain; queue peak survives the queue draining - the property a
momentary gauge would not have). Agent suite 2812 green, solution builds
with 0 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 18:26:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d763a885e2 Ops alert channels, ops-events server-side filters, and generated MCP tool vocabularies (#140)
* feat(backend,web): Telegram als Channel-Provider + ein einziger Dispatch-Pfad

Notifications hatten zwei Sendewege: WebhookNotificationService.SendToChannelsAsync fuer
tenant-konfigurierte Channels, und TelegramNotificationService direkt aus dem Ops-Alert-Pfad.
Ein neuer Provider haette beide anfassen muessen.

Neu: NotificationChannelDispatcher ist DIE Channel-Sende-API und routet pro Provider —
WebhookProviderType.Telegram zum Bot, alles andere als gerenderten Webhook-POST.
SendToChannelsAsync wurde aus WebhookNotificationService entfernt statt dupliziert, damit es
keinen zweiten Pfad gibt; alle sieben Call-Sites ziehen um (EventIngestProcessor, RegisterSession,
ReportDistress, SlaBreachEvaluation, AnalyzeOnEnrollmentEnd, TestWebhookNotification).
SendOpsAlertAsync/SendNotificationAsync sind virtual (Test-Seam), TelegramNotificationService
bekommt SendAlertWithResultAsync fuer die Test-Endpoints und RenderAlertText als testbaren Kern.

Telegram (=40) ist der Sonderfall: kein Webhook. Der Channel-Url traegt die CHAT-ID, der Bot-Token
gehoert der Plattform (PreviewConfig). Ein Tenant-Admin wuerde durch UNSEREN Bot senden — deshalb
ist das Gate eine Server-Regel, keine versteckte Dropdown-Option:
ValidateTelegramChannelGate sitzt in TenantConfigValidation.ValidateModel und deckt damit BEIDE
Schreibpfade ab (Full-Model-PUT und den MCP-Field-Patch ueber TenantConfigPatchService) — in der
Update-Function allein waere der Patch-Pfad daran vorbeigelaufen. Ein unveraenderter, GA-angelegter
Channel passiert das Gate, damit ein Tenant-Admin unrelated Config weiter speichern kann.
Telegram-Ziele ueberspringen SsrfGuard.ValidateWebhookUrlFormat (eine Chat-ID ist keine URL und
wuerde immer failen) und werden stattdessen als numerische Id oder @username geprueft.

Mitgeliefert, weil der Dispatcher und die Ops-Seite sie brauchen: NotificationChannel.RedactList /
RestoreRedactedList als geteilte Helfer hochgezogen (TenantConfiguration delegiert jetzt dorthin,
statt eine zweite Kopie zu pflegen), AdminConfiguration.OpsNotificationChannelsJson +
GetOpsNotificationChannels() mit Legacy-Slot-Synthese, OpsAlertRule.NotifyChannelIds/IncludePayload,
NotificationAlert.DataJson (nur GenericJsonRenderer serialisiert es, additiv in schemaVersion 1.0).

Web: der Channel-Editor liegt jetzt in components/notifications/ChannelEditor.tsx und wird von
Tenant- und Admin-Seite geteilt (showEventToggles trennt die Faelle). Telegram erscheint im
Provider-Dropdown nur fuer Global Admins (Prop aus useAuth().user?.isGlobalAdmin, Hausmuster aus
SectionAutopilotValidation); ein bereits konfigurierter Telegram-Channel bleibt fuer alle sichtbar,
damit ein Speichern ihn nicht still verwirft.

Tests: TelegramChannelProviderTests (27) — Dispatcher-Routing inkl. "Telegram erreicht NIE den
SSRF-Pfad", Chat-ID-Validierung, GA-Gate auf beiden Schreibpfaden. Mutationsgeprueft: Gate
invertiert => 5 rot, zurueck => 27 gruen. OpsNotificationChannelsTests + OpsAlertPayloadTests
decken die mitgelieferten Modell-Additionen ab. TestNotifications ist der gemeinsame inerte Stub,
der die 17 bestehenden OpsAlertDispatchService-Konstruktionen ersetzt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(backend,web): Ops-Alerts routen auf benannte Channels statt auf drei feste Slots

OpsAlertRule hatte kein Ziel. Jede matchende Regel ging an alle drei fest verdrahteten Slots in
AdminConfiguration (Telegram-ChatId / Teams-URL / Slack-URL), und nur die ERSTE matchende Regel
wurde ueberhaupt ausgewertet (FirstOrDefault). Ein Conversion-Signal an ein Sales-Team zu binden
hiess also: das Sales-Team bekommt auch jede Security-Regel.

Jetzt: AdminConfiguration.OpsNotificationChannelsJson haelt eine benannte Channel-Liste (dasselbe
NotificationChannel-Modell wie tenant-seitig, nur anderer Scope), und OpsAlertRule.NotifyChannelIds
bindet Regeln daran. Dispatch wertet ALLE matchenden Regeln aus (Where statt FirstOrDefault) und
vereinigt ihre Ziele.

Rueckwaertskompatibel ohne Migrationsjob:
- Leere Channel-Liste => GetOpsNotificationChannels() synthetisiert je konfiguriertem Legacy-Slot
  einen Channel mit stabiler Id (legacy-telegram heisst "Autopilot Monitor IT Engineer") und
  uebernimmt die Legacy-Enabled-Flags — ein bewusst abgeschalteter Provider bleibt abgeschaltet.
- GetAdminConfigurationFunction projiziert DIESELBE Synthese in das Read-Model, damit der Editor
  zeigt, was heute tatsaechlich Alerts empfaengt, und der erste Save exakt das materialisiert.
  Die Alternative waere eine zweite Kopie der Synthese-Regeln im Web gewesen, die vom Dispatcher
  wegdriftet.
- Leere NotifyChannelIds = alle aktivierten Channels. Das ist, was jede heute existierende Regel
  traegt, also verhaelt sich am Deploy-Tag nichts anders.
- Ids, die nicht mehr aufloesen, werden verworfen statt auf Broadcast zurueckzufallen: eine Regel,
  deren einziger Channel geloescht wurde, muss NICHTS erreichen, nicht alles.

Die Legacy-Felder bleiben als Migrationsquelle stehen und werden von der Alerts-Section nicht mehr
geschrieben — aufraeumen erst, wenn produktiv Channels stehen.

Sicherheit: OpsNotificationChannelsJson ist secret-tragend und steht in der Deny-List von
RedactedCopyForReader() (ConfigRedactionTests bewacht Drift). Der Admin-PUT hat bisher keinen
Redacted-Restore — er bekommt jetzt einen fuer die Channel-Liste, damit ein zurueckgespieltes
Reader-View nicht "***REDACTED***" als Chat-ID persistiert, plus die strukturelle Validierung, die
auch die Tenant-Liste passiert.

Neuer Endpoint POST /api/global/config/test-ops-channel (GlobalAdminOnly, im Policy-Catalog
registriert). Kein neues Response-DTO: TestWebhookNotificationResponse hat identische Semantik und
wird geteilt — nur der Doc-Kommentar nennt jetzt beide Routen.

Web: die "Alert Providers"-Karte weicht der Channel-Liste (geteilter ChannelEditor, im Admin-Kontext
mit Telegram und ohne die tenant-spezifischen Event-Toggles). Jede Regel bekommt einen
Channel-Picker; leere Auswahl rendert als "all channels", nicht als Warnung — hier ist das der
gueltige Default. Die Bindungslogik liegt testbar in opsChannelRouting.ts und spiegelt
ResolveTargets: der erste explizite Pick startet vom LEEREN Set, sonst liesse sich eine
Broadcast-Regel nie verengen. handleSaveOpsAlertConfig nimmt jetzt ein Objekt statt elf
positionaler Argumente — bei einem Dutzend Feldern schreibt ein vertauschtes Paar sonst still eine
Webhook-URL in den falschen Provider-Slot.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(backend): TenantTrialStarted + Event-Payload optional pro Regel

Der Trial-Start war stumm. POST config/{tenantId}/trial schrieb nur einen Audit-Entry, und der
GA-Pfad (PATCH plan) feuerte nur beim Downgrade — also war genau der Conversion-Moment, den
Sales/Support interessiert, das einzige Plan-Ereignis ohne Ops-Event.

RecordTenantTrialStartedAsync (Tenant/Info) feuert jetzt aus BEIDEN Schreibpfaden, unterschieden
per selfService-Flag, und jeweils NACH dem persistierten Save (SaveConfigurationAsync ist
fail-loud), damit kein Alert eine Trial ankuendigt, die nicht gespeichert wurde. Der GA-Pfad
haengt an der aufgezeichneten Aenderung, nicht am Request: ein reiner planTier-Edit bleibt still,
ein idempotenter Save mit demselben Datum ebenfalls, und das Beenden einer Trial (explizit null)
ist ein Downgrade und bleibt bei TenantPlanDowngraded.

Payload-Zustellung: WriteAsync reicht die serialisierten Details an DispatchAsync durch — aber ein
Channel bekommt sie nur, wenn eine Regel OpsAlertRule.IncludePayload setzt. Default AUS, bewusst:
ein Ops-Alert ist ein "da ist was, schau nach"-Signal, die meisten Payloads sind im Chat Rauschen,
und manche tragen Felder, die die Baseline nie traegt (Tenant-Domain, Contact-Adresse). Das
Informationsniveau aller bestehenden Regeln bleibt damit unveraendert.

ResolveTargets liefert deshalb zwei Gruppen. Ein Channel, den sowohl eine Payload-Regel als auch
eine schlichte Regel adressiert, landet nur in der Payload-Gruppe: eine Nachricht pro Channel, und
ein unbeteiligtes Geschwister-Match kann ein bewusstes Opt-in nicht aushebeln.

Fuer den angereicherten Alert flacht BuildAlert die Top-Level-Skalare in Facts ab (max 12, Werte
<= 256 Zeichen, Nulls und Verschachteltes raus), damit Card-Formate und der Telegram-Klartext
dieselbe Information tragen wie der GenericJson-Consumer unter "data". EventType wird immer
gesetzt — derselbe Wert steckt schon im "Event"-Fact, also keine zusaetzliche Information, nur ein
stabiler Schluessel zum Verzweigen.

Tests: TenantTrialStartedEventTests (8) — aufgezeichnete Event-Form inkl. Payload-Feldern, und die
Emissionsbedingung des GA-Pfads gegen ApplyPlanChanges gepinnt (greift bei Grant und Verlaengerung,
schweigt bei Trial-Ende, planTier-only und idempotentem Save). Die HTTP-Entry-Points bleiben
ungetestet — Suite-Konvention ist, die reinen Kerne zu testen.

Docs: OKF-Concept backend/ops-notification-channels.md. Registrierung in docs/index.md +
docs/log.md fehlt bewusst — beide Dateien tragen noch fremdes uncommittetes WIP (ops-events
Query-Surface), und ein Teil-Commit darin haette es mitgenommen.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(backend,mcp): ops-events server-side field filters + generated MCP tool vocabularies

The ops-events read could only narrow by category and date window, so answering
"did any AgentEmergencyBreak fire yesterday?" meant pulling a whole category and
filtering it client-side — and for the MCP tool that client is a language model,
so the question cost a category-sized response in model context.

Ops-events filter surface (mirrors the audit-log filter pattern one-for-one):
- OpsEventQueryFilters (Shared) + OpsEventFilterRequest (query -> filters +
  pagination extras) + TableOpsEventRepository.AppendFieldFilters (filters ->
  OData clauses). BOTH filter builders call the appender — the single-category /
  unpaged one and the per-partition fan-out builder that adds the RowKey bound —
  so "no category named" cannot silently return unfiltered rows.
- minSeverity expands to an OR-set, not a range: Table Storage compares strings
  lexicographically and the severity names sort Critical < Error < Info <
  Warning, so `Severity ge 'Warning'` would drop exactly the alert-worthy half.
  The ladder now lives in OpsEventSeverity.Rank, shared with
  OpsAlertDispatchService, so "Warning and above" in a read means what it meant
  when the alert rules fired.
- severity is normalised onto the canonical vocabulary and an unknown value is a
  400: `eq` is case-sensitive, so "?severity=warning" would otherwise return an
  empty page that reads exactly like "no such events happened". eventType stays
  verbatim — stored rows outlive the vocabulary, so a retired type must remain
  searchable in the historical window.
- Every filter value is folded into the continuation fingerprint and echoed on
  nextLink; extras are appended AFTER the pre-existing category/tenantId
  discriminators and skipped when empty, so tokens minted before the filters
  existed still fingerprint identically. The tenantId drill deliberately stays
  in memory (OrdinalIgnoreCase; an OData eq would lose rows on casing).
- MCP get_ops_events gains eventType / severity / minSeverity plus a `days`
  shorthand resolved client-side to a concrete dateFrom (a backend-side "last N
  days" would re-resolve "now" on every page and blow the token fingerprint);
  an explicit bound always wins over the shorthand.

Fixed alongside: the paged cross-category fan-out skipped Platform (Azure
Monitor alerts) because its category list had drifted from OpsEventCategory —
written from day one, invisible to every paged reader, still visible on the
unpaged full-table path. The list is now OpsEventCategory.All plus a reflection
coverage test.

That drift had a structural cause, so the same round closes it for the MCP as a
whole: wire TYPES reached the MCP from day one, but vocabularies did not — types
are erased at runtime and z.enum() needs values, so every tool schema hand-typed
its own copy with nothing to compare against. The copies had drifted:
search_sessions offered 5 of 8 session statuses (no AwaitingUser, no Incomplete
— both real stored statuses), both event readers offered 4 of 6 severities (no
Debug, no Trace), get_ops_events named 6 of 7 ops categories.

- The codegen now emits src/generated/wire-vocabularies.generated.ts (VALUES:
  session statuses, event severities, ops categories/severities/types,
  annotation lanes/verdicts) from the manifest sections listed in
  MCP_VOCABULARIES; SharedManifestParityTests exports the two new ops
  vocabularies. Freshness is pinned twice — byte-equality against a fresh
  codegen run in the MCP suite, and the shared-manifests-in-sync CI job.
- Tool schemas derive their z.enum() from it and descriptions interpolate the
  list instead of spelling it.
- vocabulary-drift.guard.test.ts ratchets what is left: every inline z.enum([..])
  must sit on a baseline naming why it has no backend owner (MCP-local knobs,
  plus rule type / connection type / CVE risk, which have no C# constants class
  yet). A new hand-typed list fails, and so does a stale baseline entry.
- OpsEventTypes (Shared) gives the 77 ops event types a canonical home: the
  OpsEventService write sites use the constants (a raw literal now fails
  OpsEventTypeDualRegisterTests, which moved from regex-scraping to reflection),
  the manifest exports them, and get_resource(name="ops_event_types") serves
  categories + severities + types to the model from the generated copy.

Suites: Backend 5427, MCP 629 + tsc, Web tsc + vitest 965, generator idempotent.

Deploy order: backend BEFORE the MCP redeploy — an MCP that sends filters to an
older backend gets silently unfiltered rows back and presents them as filtered.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: register the ops notification channels doc in the index and log

The concept doc landed with the feature commits; its index entry and log entry
were still uncommitted in the working tree.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 16:57:41 +02:00
dependabot[bot] eedca11214 build(deps): bump the web group (#139)
Bumps the web group in /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web with 5 updates:

| Package | From | To |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [@xyflow/react](https://github.com/xyflow/xyflow/tree/HEAD/packages/react) | `12.11.3` | `12.11.5` |
| [next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js) | `16.3.2` | `16.3.3` |
| [@next/bundle-analyzer](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/next-bundle-analyzer) | `16.3.2` | `16.3.3` |
| [@types/react-dom](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/react-dom) | `19.2.4` | `19.2.5` |
| [eslint-config-next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/eslint-config-next) | `16.3.2` | `16.3.3` |


Updates `@xyflow/react` from 12.11.3 to 12.11.5
- [Release notes](https://github.com/xyflow/xyflow/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/xyflow/xyflow/blob/main/packages/react/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/xyflow/xyflow/commits/@xyflow/react@12.11.5/packages/react)

Updates `next` from 16.3.2 to 16.3.3
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/compare/v16.3.2...v16.3.3)

Updates `@next/bundle-analyzer` from 16.3.2 to 16.3.3
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.3/packages/next-bundle-analyzer)

Updates `@types/react-dom` from 19.2.4 to 19.2.5
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/react-dom)

Updates `eslint-config-next` from 16.3.2 to 16.3.3
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.3/packages/eslint-config-next)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: "@xyflow/react"
  dependency-version: 12.11.5
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: next
  dependency-version: 16.3.3
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@next/bundle-analyzer"
  dependency-version: 16.3.3
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@types/react-dom"
  dependency-version: 19.2.5
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: eslint-config-next
  dependency-version: 16.3.3
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-01 15:53:05 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 73a6817713 build(deps): bump github/codeql-action from 4.37.3 to 4.37.9 (#138)
Bumps [github/codeql-action](https://github.com/github/codeql-action) from 4.37.3 to 4.37.9.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/compare/v4.37.3...v4.37.9)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: github/codeql-action
  dependency-version: 4.37.9
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-01 15:52:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0a0c323f73 fix(backend): CMTrace skew tripwire judges only the current ingest era
Three CmTraceTimeSkewRegression fires on 2026-09-01 (one tenant, sessions
e797117b / c06d639d / d7c8032b, agent 2.0.1445, each exactly -60.0 min,
residual 0.0, 85-88 % grid-conformant) all came from the same stale leg: those
sessions are pre-provisioning, their Part 1 ran on 2026-08-20 under agent
2.0.1409 (before per-line anchoring) and left 23-26 IME samples at -60.00,
while the Part 2 leg that completed that morning is clean at -0.16. The
terminal reconcile scans the whole event partition, so the old leg supplied the
majority of the IME samples and fired against a build the device had
self-updated to minutes earlier. Real skew, 12 days old, already fixed - and
>=821 pending pre-provisioning sessions with agent < 1412 are queued to repeat
it.

Event rows carry no agent version, so the split is drawn on ReceivedAt:
ResolveEraStartUtc walks the batch stamps of BOTH sides back from the newest
one and ends the era at the first gap > EraGapHours (2.0) - above any in-leg
upload gap (self-metrics every few minutes, session_stalled at 60 min idle,
maintenance sweep at 2 h), below every pre-provisioning handover. Median, grid
residual, conformity AND the distinct-batch guard now all run on the same
era-filtered sample set; the batch counters used to come from the full scan.
SessionSkewScan carries ReceivedAt per sample and its 20k cap keeps the NEWEST
samples (chunked trim) - keeping the head would have blinded the detector on
exactly the sessions large enough to reach it. The ops event reports
eraStartUtc plus the excluded per-side counts, so an inherited leg stays
visible without being alarmed on.

Tests: 3 new era facts, mutation-proven (EraGapHours = 100000 turns exactly
those three red). The handover fact also asserts that the old leg judged on its
own still fires, so it is the window that silences it, not a moved threshold.
Backend 5334 green, Agent core 2805 green, solution builds with 0 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 13:53:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach bac26def52 commands: bump to ad441d6 (ux-insights gegen die reale Telemetrie verifiziert)
Zwei Fehlbefunde des 30-Tage-Reports als Warnung im Skill verankert (SignalR-Reconnect-Ratio,
Consent-Funnel aus Frontend-Events), Datenmodell korrigiert (/progress liegt auf portal.,
dcount(user_Id) ist wegen disableCookiesUsage keine Personenzahl, pageViews.duration ist 0,
exceptions-Tabelle ist leer) und die Event-Referenz vollstaendig aus dem Web-Code regeneriert.
Alle 35 Queries der Datei einzeln ausgefuehrt, 35/35 gruen.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-31 19:17:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4c70ea8a0a feat(web): /buy — Marketplace card first, direct-purchase channel named Cleverbridge
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-31 18:15:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach eaef1601d0 feat(backend,mcp,web): typisierung follow-up — the deliberately-untyped remainder is typed end-to-end, and the raw table entities leave the wire (#137)
Closes the documented read-model follow-up of the typed API contract (51737174). Three categories:

WIRE-IDENTICAL moves/substitutions (parity facts where a literal changed, move-only otherwise): RuleDryRun + trace classes and RuleDryRunVerdict move to Shared/RulesApiModels (DryRunAnalyzeRuleResponse.Result concrete; Evidence/MatchedConditions stay heterogeneous by design); BackfillResult(+Sample)/ReclassificationResult(+Sample)/MaintenanceResult move to Shared/AdminApiModels — the shared MaintenanceJobRunResponse union envelope is split into BackfillJobRunResponse/ReclassifyJobRunResponse (identical key layout, split only for the typed slot); TenantConfigFieldSchema moves as a plain class with the record's constructor signature (Shared has no IsExternalInit — call sites just lowercase their named args); HealthCheck moves (HealthCheckResult stays in Functions, it never hits the wire); GlobalNotificationDto moves (one DTO, both notification endpoints); GetMetricsSummaryAsync builds MetricsSummaryTenantItem instead of the anonymous row ([ProjectedItems] dropped, slot concrete, substitution parity fact incl. the per-item windowDays duplicate; IMetricsRepository signature follows).

UNTYPED ENDPOINTS -> DTO (parity facts mandatory): auth/me success body becomes AuthMeResponse (15 keys in exact wire order; role null-omission fact; blocked arms stay anonymous error shapes; AuthFunctionTests.ToDynamic now exposes wire casing so asserts read camelCase for DTOs and error literals alike). auth/mcp becomes CheckMcpAccessResponse — the four fixed keys are non-nullable strings on McpAccessCheckResult, so the dictionary never emitted null values and WhenWritingNull changes nothing; the four conditional keys are nullable slots in exact insertion order, isGlobalAdmin emitted only as literal true; three facts pin plain/platform+delegated/denied against the old Dictionary literal.

ENTITY-HYGIENE (DELIBERATE wire change, exact-JSON shape pins instead of parity facts): GetGlobalAdminsResponse/AddGlobalAdminResponse serve GlobalAdminRow, GET+POST tenants/{id}/admins serve TenantAdminRow, preview/whitelist serves PreviewWhitelistTenantEntry { tenantId } — partitionKey/rowKey/eTag/timestamp (and the whitelist's garbage approvedAt/approvedBy defaults) are gone from the wire. Every wire instance was synthetically back-mapped from Shared read models (GlobalAdminEntry/TenantMember) anyway; the services now map forward into the rows and the ITableEntity types stay storage-only. Consumer audit (web+MCP) found exactly ONE reader of a table key: AdminConfigContext preview-approval (t.partitionKey -> t.tenantId, same change). Shape pins assert the full JSON and table-key absence.

Guard: TypedResponseGuardTests gains an object-slot reflection ratchet over the reachable wire-type graph (IApiResponse + [WireContract] roots, transitive property walk; [ProjectedItems] slots and dictionary values exempt) with mutation-proven red/green; baseline holds exactly RuleDryRunCondition.Evidence, and stale entries fail the ratchet-down arm.

Codegen: manifest 298->311 exported types, every former unknown slot concrete in both wire-types.generated.ts copies; generator idempotent. MCP adopts: access-guard.ts drops its inline auth/mcp cast for CheckMcpAccessResponse (defensive delegatedTenantIds normalization kept), rules.ts drops the local RuleDryRun view (the dead verdict cast disappears; matchedConditions feeds interpolateRuleTemplate typed), get_tenant_config_schema gets its envelope type. Web adopts: new types/auth.ts shim (TenantRole/HomedApp narrowing over AuthMeResponse), AuthContext.UserInfo derives from the wire type and both duplicated as-cast mapping blocks collapse into one toUserInfo(); health-check page, notification contexts and the TenantAdmin types re-export generated interfaces.

Deliberately untouched: config/all + tenants/{id}/admins stay bare arrays (typed items, envelope would break four array-typed web readers — ime-versions precedent); error bodies stay anonymous; error-body ratchet remains a separate PR; the two documented guard baseline entries stay.

Suites: Backend 5330, Agent 2805, DecisionCore 577, SummaryDialog 44, MCP tsc 0 + 617, Web tsc 0 + vitest 957 + eslint 0; solution builds warning-free.

Deploy note: backend + web + MCP all need deployment; the category-C wire change is only visible in the GA admin UI (preview-approval badges) between backend and web deploy.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-31 15:22:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 51737174b2 feat(backend,mcp): typed API contract COMPLETED — every remaining top-level success body is a manifest-exported wire DTO, and the guard now catches the bypass shapes that let them escape. The 08-31 migration's ratchet only saw inline WriteAsJsonAsync(new {...}); four bypass classes had kept ~20 endpoint families untyped: (A) Shared classes without IApiResponse — GeographicMetricsResponse, FleetHealthMetrics, ImePatternHealthResponse, SlaMetricsResponse, PlatformUsageMetrics now implement it (wire byte-identical, interface is empty); (B) Functions-local named response families moved verbatim to Shared — PlatformAgentMetricsResponse/SessionAgentMetric/DeliveryLatencyMetrics/CrashRateMetrics/CrashExceptionSummary, AgentEfficiencyMetricsResponse family (CloneAsCacheHit relocated into the service; init→set for netstandard2.0), OffboardResponse; (C) anonymous/object builders converted to DTOs with old-vs-new wire-parity facts (TypedContractCompletionWireParityTests, 14 facts incl. every vanishing-key case): rule-stats x2 (RuleStatsResponse; uniqueRules is global-only via an optional slot at its exact wire position), verdict-calibration (builder renamed VerdictCalibrationResponseBuilder, PathRow/TrendWindow to Shared), metrics/app (MetricsMath), apps list/analytics/sessions x6 routes (AppsAnalyticsHelper; legacy + paged list share ONE DTO via optional paging keys), ime-versions lean projection (ImeVersionHistoryLeanEntry [WireContract]; bare-array envelope stays, typed as IReadOnlyList<object>), device-journeys + time-attribution fleet envelopes, feature-flags, diagnostics/paths, session restore, cascade-delete Enqueued arm (error arms stay anonymous by design), feedback eligibility/list; (D) Serialize+WriteString path — ListBackupsResponse under the backup surface's own serializer options; AppInsightsQuery's Serialize is an outgoing REQUEST body (not response debt, baselined as such). TypedResponseGuardTests gains three ratchets with mutation-proven red/green: WriteAsJsonAsync(<variable assigned an anonymous object>) (empty baseline), JsonSerializer.Serialize(new{ (error-tolerant; 1 documented request-body entry), and object/Task<object>-returning Build*/Compute*/*Payload/*Response methods (1 documented union entry); the local-WriteJson-wrapper class is closed structurally (generic T : IApiResponse — an interface-typed parameter would serialize zero properties, the generic keeps the concrete type). Manifest regenerated 208→298 exported types; MCP adopts the new types (get_rule_stats typed with the trend-drop as explicit output shaping, get_platform_metrics drops its hand-declared mirror for PlatformAgentMetricsResponse, verdict-calibration-shape derives its rows via extends Omit<generated wire row> so backend renames go tsc-red). Six backend shape-test files switched from default-options serialization to the production wire options via TestWire (ApiJsonOptions; the old default-options runs only matched while payloads were anonymous with lowercase members), and three assertions that pinned null-VALUED keys now pin key ABSENCE — production always omitted them (WhenWritingNull); the parity facts prove the wire itself is unchanged. Deliberately still untyped: auth/me, CheckMcpAccess dictionary, TenantAdmins/GlobalAdmins entity-row arrays and the object-slot payloads (RuleDryRun, HealthCheck, TenantConfigFieldSchema, ...) — the documented read-model follow-up. Suites: Backend 5323, DecisionCore 577, Agent 2805, SummaryDialog 44, MCP 617, Web tsc 0 + vitest 957, generator idempotent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-31 04:32:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c04280cf68 feat(mcp): MCP server adopts the generated wire types — the codegen now writes a second copy of wire-types.generated.ts into McpServer/src/generated (MCP_HEADER, buildMcpWireTypesSource, same freshness contract), pinned by a new MCP vitest freshness test (repo-root discovery like event-types-drift, byte-equal to a fresh codegen run, mutation-proven red/green) and enforced in the CI shared-manifests-in-sync diff check; the hand-declared response shapes and structural inline casts in tools/*.ts now import the generated types on the INPUT side only (tool output contracts unchanged): sessions.ts (GetSessionResponse/GetSessionEventsResponse/GetRuleResultsResponse/GetSessionAnnotationsResponse/DiagnosticsDownloadTicketResponse; get_session_summary events are Partial<EnrollmentEvent>, RuleResult drops the dead ruleTitle??title fallback), admin.ts (usage union GetMcpUserUsage/GetGlobalMcpUsage/GetGlobalMcpUsageDaily, GeographicLocationSessionsLeanResponse, GetAllTenantConfigurationsResponse, QueryRawTableResponse, GetUnmatchedSoftwareResponse, SoftwareInventoryResponse; the client-side pagers pin their wire-critical records/summaries/inventory key names via satisfies keyof so a backend rename goes tsc-red instead of silently paging nothing), search.ts (GetSessionEventsResponse on both event readers, SearchSessionsResponse on the legacy fallback, RawEventsPage = Partial<Pick<QueryRawEventsResponse,...>>), rules.ts (DryRunAnalyzeRuleResponse envelope; the inner RuleDryRun trace stays a local reader because the wire type is deliberately unknown); the raw-session fallback in get_session_diagnostics/get_session_summary is removed — { success, session } IS the pinned contract, and the diag test now asserts a non-enveloped object surfaces as a loud tool error instead of being silently absorbed; rule-stats, global/metrics/platform and verdict-calibration keep local readers (backend still serializes anonymous objects there — no DTO exists to import); MCP suite 617 green, tsc green, generator idempotent
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-31 03:19:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d055eed074 Typed API contract: every success response is a wire DTO, generated end-to-end into TypeScript (#136)
* feat(backend): typed API response infrastructure — IApiResponse marker, wire-settings single source, widened anonymous-body ratchet (batch 0 of typed-api-contract)

IApiResponse (Shared, with SuccessMessageResponse/SuccessOnlyResponse and the
ProjectedItems/WireContract attributes for the upcoming manifest export) plus generic
OkAsync/CreatedAsync/JsonAsync<T> overloads constrained on it, so anonymous success
bodies stop compiling once the legacy object overloads go; ApiJsonOptions is now the
single source of the production wire settings (camelCase, WhenWritingNull, string
enums) used by Program.cs AND the three endpoint-test harnesses (two serialized
PascalCase-with-nulls, one JsonSerializerDefaults.Web — all could pass while the
deployed wire differed); TypedResponseGuardTests replaces OkAsyncBaselineGuardTests
with the same ratchet mechanics over two frozen baselines (44 anonymous helper sites
unchanged, plus 134 anonymous success WriteAsJsonAsync sites across 76 files —
error-shaped bodies stay anonymous by design) and a flatness/location reflection
guard (IApiResponse implementers derive from object and live in Shared, protecting
JSON key order); ApiResponseWireParityTests carries the ordinal old-vs-new
serialization proof each converted site must add

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(backend): Sessions/Annotations/Reports/Raw/Progress success responses are typed wire DTOs (batch 1 of typed-api-contract)

34 anonymous success bodies across 24 functions replaced with flat IApiResponse DTOs
in Shared (SessionApiModels/ReportApiModels + new Annotation/Raw/ProgressApiModels) —
minimal in-place transformation, call structure/status codes untouched, declaration
order == wire order, nullable exactly where a site can emit null (WhenWritingNull);
fields= projections stay IReadOnlyList<object> marked [ProjectedItems(SessionSummary/
EnrollmentEvent)], raw table rows stay PascalCase-verbatim dictionaries (no
DictionaryKeyPolicy — pinned by test), AnnotationWire and the distress-report
aggregations now build named item types instead of anonymous ones, and shared shapes
collapse to one DTO (SessionListResponse x4, SessionAnnotationListResponse x2,
SessionReportListResponse/GetSessionEventsResponse paged+unpaged via absent-null
nextLink); 54 new wire-parity facts serialize each OLD anonymous literal (independent
fixture copied from the pre-migration site) against the new DTO ordinally, with a
null case per vanishing key; ratchet baselines shrink 44->14 helper sites and
134->122 write sites; the three distress-report test files read the now-typed
aggregation items directly instead of via reflection-ToDynamic

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(backend): every anonymous API success body is a typed wire DTO — ratchet baselines empty, legacy object overloads deleted (batches 2-5 of typed-api-contract)

the remaining 141 anonymous success sites (Admin 36, Rules 24, Config 15, Graph 5,
Metrics 16, Vulnerability 17, Infrastructure/Global/Notifications/Bootstrap/
Diagnostics 20 incl. the 429 quota body in McpQuotaEnforcementMiddleware, plus the
14 helper-call sites) now return flat IApiResponse DTOs from Shared (new Admin/
Rules/Config/Graph/Metrics/Vulnerability/Infrastructure/Notifications/Diagnostics
ApiModels; GeographicApiModels extended) — same minimal in-place transformation as
batch 1: declaration order == wire order, nullable exactly where a site can emit
null, dual success/failure sites keep their status-code logic and reuse
SuccessMessageResponse, MCP-critical key names (records/summaries/inventory)
pinned; wire item shapes that were function-local (CustomsArchive Run/EntrySummary,
CpeMappingDto, UnmatchedSoftwareAgg, AutoResolve items, LogPatternTestResult,
CveExposureSummary/SeverityBreakdown/TopCve — records rewritten as flat classes,
netstandard2.0 has no IsExternalInit) moved to Shared so the manifest export sees
them; payload types that must stay in the Functions assembly (RuleDryRun,
PreviewWhitelistEntity, GlobalAdminEntity, HealthCheck, GlobalNotificationDto,
Backfill/Reclassification/MaintenanceResult, TenantAdminEntity,
TenantConfigFieldSchema) ride as object slots — wire-identical via runtime-type
serialization, proven by the parity facts; 126 new wire-parity facts total
(Admin 26, Rules 12, Config 17, Graph 7, Metrics 16, Vulnerability 19,
Infrastructure 21 + Dictionary-key-verbatim and null-value pins); both
TypedResponseGuard baselines are now EMPTY regression guards and the untyped
OkAsync/CreatedAsync(object) overloads are gone, so a new anonymous success body
no longer compiles through the helper and fails the guard through raw
WriteAsJsonAsync; deliberately untouched: error bodies (one anonymous shape by
design), auth/me (AuthDecisionResult.Body slot shared with error bodies, tests
reflect over it), CheckMcpAccess (conditional dictionary keys), raw-byte streamers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(contract): C#→TS wire codegen — shared-manifests v2 exports the full response-type graph as generated TypeScript (batch 6 of typed-api-contract)

SharedManifestParityTests now writes schemaVersion 2: the v1 catalog sections stay
byte-compatible (sectionFieldMap/signalrMessages/sharedManifestChecks untouched),
the consumer-less sessionSummary section is gone, and a new types section carries
every wire type — roots are all IApiResponse implementers plus [WireContract]-marked
types (SlaViolatorSession, ImeVersionHistoryEntry), transitively closed by the new
WireTypeManifestBuilder over refs, collections, dictionaries, enums and
[ProjectedItems] item types (208 types). Fields honour [JsonPropertyName]/
[JsonIgnore], get-only members export readonly, a nullable slot exports optional
(WhenWritingNull omits the KEY — explicit null survives only inside collections and
dictionary values, so the nullable flag lives on nested descriptors only), field
order follows STJ's derived-before-base serialization for the one legacy inherited
wire type (LocationSessionRow : SessionSummary), and unmappable shapes (non-string
dictionary keys, foreign BCL classes) fail the build instead of degrading to
unknown. C# <summary> texts travel as JSDoc: Shared builds XML docs now (doc-quality
warnings CS1591/1573/1574/1584/0419 suppressed — crefs to foreign assemblies cannot
resolve from Shared; CS1570 malformed-XML stays an error, which surfaced a raw
0x01 control char and an unescaped ampersand in existing comments).
generate-shared-manifest-types.js emits utils/wire-types.generated.ts (interfaces +
string-union enums, 2.7k lines) next to the lean literal module, npm run
generate:manifests wraps it, the vitest freshness test pins BOTH outputs, and a new
shared-manifests-in-sync CI job (guardrails-in-sync pattern) fails on drift

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(web): hand-written response types re-export the generated wire interfaces (batch 7+8 of typed-api-contract)

types/session.ts, types/enrollment.ts and types/adminConfig.ts are re-exports over
utils/wire-types.generated.ts (Session = SessionSummary alias for the 25+ barrel
importers; adminConfig keeps only the excessiveEventAutoActionMode literal-union
narrowing and the client-side OpsAlertRule view) — the generated types are never
weakened, consumers adapt: durationSeconds is now optional as on the wire (int? —
consumers guard with ?? 0, which also retires the latent NaN-minutes display on
in-progress sessions), status is the SessionStatus union (fixtures on canonical
values; the generic string-sort test keeps its own fixture type), required bools
break hand-built fixtures once → new test/factories.ts makeSession/makeEvent
(Object.assign, not spread — Partial spread re-widens and tests must force
data: undefined); the string|null lifecycle branches were already truthiness-based.
Duplicate local types deleted: geographic-performance now uses the real
LocationSessionRow wire type (incl. DO fields), GlobalSearch the generated
QuickSearchResult, sla/page.tsx the generated SlaViolatorSession (status stays a
number — C# int, rendered via statusLabels); sessionExportUtils aliases
SessionExportEvent = EnrollmentEvent and derives RuleResultCsvData via Pick, CSV
output unchanged; the three structural ReplayInputEvent clones (InstallEvent,
ScriptInputEvent, DownloadEvent) are aliases now. docs: drift-guards.md replaces the
shrink-only-OkAsync section with the typed-wire-DTO contract, index.md/log.md
updated. tsc 0, vitest 957, eslint 0

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(tests): SlaMetricsServiceTests anchor sessions inside the current ISO week — the 'now - 1h' fixture crossed into LAST week during the first hour of every Monday (UTC), emptying CurrentWeek and failing the three snapshot asserts (CI on Mon 2026-08-31 00:20Z; pre-existing Monday-morning time bomb, unrelated to the DTO migration); the anchor is now clamped to the week's Monday 00:00, proven green inside the same failure window

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-31 02:30:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2b6565b3cb fix(agent): IME matcher line budget charges thread CPU cycles, regex timeouts get one starvation-gated retry - the wall-clock budget and the 1s .NET regex timeout both measured guest-scheduler starvation as match cost on CPU-saturated Hyper-V VMs (session b9f1d134: PS-AGENT-OUTPUT timed out on a line it genuinely matches in 5.8us, factor ~170,000, with 2.5s of process-wide log silence and CPU pinned at 100% during the DeviceSetup script burst; six spurious budget breaks the same pass); MatchLine now charges the per-line budget in cycles the poll thread actually executed (QueryThreadCycleTime, probed once, Stopwatch wall-tick fallback preserving the old behaviour exactly), and a RegexMatchTimeoutException whose attempt consumed < 0.5s of match cost (starvation, not spinning) is retried exactly once - counted into the new regexTimeoutRetries (recovered, NOT skipped work, no degraded event) while an attempt at/over the gate is skipped without a second helping of CPU, so regexTimeouts now means "really burned CPU"; the gate is unreachable in the wall-clock fallback by construction (no retry there); retries surfaced through health snapshot, restart-safe persistence, ime_tracker_degraded, ime_pattern_hits and agent_metrics_snapshot (ime_regex_timeout_retries); known limit: hypervisor-level vCPU steal stays invisible to the guest kernel and still charges cycles - strict improvement over wall clock, not perfect steal accounting
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 21:49:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5f3ae2d06b fix(backend): SessionTenantLookup is claimed first-writer-wins at registration — the sessionId→tenantId row that every Global Admin/Reader cross-tenant session resolve trusts was an unconditional last-writer-wins upsert AFTER the session write keyed by the client-supplied sessionId, so any tenant's device (self-service onboarding) that knew a victim session GUID (portal deep links, Teams/Slack notifications, progress-portal URLs) could re-point the mapping at its own tenant and have every no-tenantId GA read and GA write (globaladmin annotation lane, restore fallback) silently served from a forged session; StoreSessionAsync now claims the row create-only BEFORE any Sessions/SessionsIndex write (409 → read owner: same tenant = re-registration, foreign tenant = SessionTenantConflictException → 409 session_owner_mismatch without disclosing the owner + SessionTenantConflict ops event, nothing written, not fail-soft), the legacy self-heal write is Add-only, ResolveSessionScopeAsync(requireGlobalAdmin) corroborates the resolved tenant against its Sessions row (silent, no operator confirmation), and scripts/Migration/Backfill-SessionTenantLookup.ps1 closed the pre-table window (13509 sessions, 8795 rows added, verify dry-run added=0); no tombstone on deletion by design
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 20:34:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 83e15e49de fix(core,backend): every payload-derived string stored into DecisionState is bounded (FactStringBounds, 256) and the reducer-verification replay streams signals — RealmJoinFacts.WithPackageStarted/Completed left PackageId/Version/Scope unbounded and deduped via a linear ordinal compare over up to 200 rows, so a forged 5000-signal stream with ~400 KB near-identical package ids cost minutes of CPU per GET sessions/{id}/reducer-verification while ReducerVerifier held all decoded payloads (~GBs) live; keys are now bounded BEFORE the dedupe scan (forged near-duplicates collapse to one row), Scope normalised to machine/user, and the same bound applied to failed app ids, HelloOutcome, ImeMatchedPatternId, EspAdvisoryFailureCategory and RJ product version/channel incl. WithVersionOverride — never truncating real telemetry (registry key names ≤ 255, GUIDs, enum-like strings); the agent adapter bounds packageId/version at the source; ReducerVerifier replays decode-fold-discard (head-signal check before the journal so stubbed streams stay silent, mid-stream truncation and count-imbalance semantics unchanged, pinned by tests); ISignalRepository.QueryBySessionAsync carries a cumulative PayloadJson budget (SignalQueryLimits, 32 M chars) reflected in the truncated flag of sessions/{id}/signals and reducer-verification; no ingest cap — stored signals stay verbatim
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 20:06:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3c8ef02191 feat(agent): RealmJoin self-update is observed and reported as realmjoin_autoupdate_detected — realmjoin_detected read the version once from RealmJoin.exe, but the tray AppUpdater often replaces the MSI-shipped binary on its first start minutes after detection (gktatooine 946ccbd6: 4.21.4 -> 4.21.18, whole deployment ran on the new build while the timeline and RealmJoinFacts kept 4.21.4); the updater's only registry write is HKLM\...\Uninstall\RealmJoin (DisplayVersion/InstallDate), so RealmJoinWatcher arms a RegNotifyChangeKeyValue watcher there once Detected fired (appearance-watch on the Uninstall parent until the tray creates the entry), re-reads the binary version after a 2 s debounce (DisplayVersion fallback while the file is locked, channel from baseline) and emits the Info event {previousVersion,newVersion,releaseChannel} plus the typed RealmJoinAutoUpdateDetected signal, whose reducer overrides RealmJoinFacts.ProductVersion/ReleaseChannel (WithVersionOverride) and touches neither gate, deadline nor LastActivityUtc; unreadable baseline at detection is seeded silently; portal device card prefers the updated version ("auto-updated from X"); event registered in Constants/resource-catalog/shared-manifests with replay fixture and watcher/adapter/reducer tests
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 20:02:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 251e82a45a fix(mcp): tool-call logging never records tenant-config secret values — withToolTelemetry/summarizeArgs gain a per-argument ArgPolicy ('keys' | 'drop') declared at the call site, update_tenant_config logs only the NAMES of args.fields (webhook/SAS URLs and custom headers previously went verbatim, up to 200 chars, into the container log stream under the IaC-default MCP_TOOL_LOGGING=true, readable by log consumers below Global Admin); values remain in the GA-gated backup snapshot and audit log. Backend: TenantConfigPatchService no longer returns the Newtonsoft ex.Message on a JSON type mismatch (it quotes the offending value, so a secret sent into a numeric field echoed into the tool response and log line) — only the field path is named. Tests for keys-only/drop rendering, log-line content on success and soft-error paths, and the backend error text
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 19:58:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 01311898a8 fix(ci): no third-party action holds release/deploy credentials by mutable tag — build-agent creates releases with first-party gh release create (job holds contents/id-token/attestations:write), combine-rules pushes generated outputs with plain git (contents:write on main), deploy-web builds the static export in CI (setup-node 22, npm ci, next build — same path ci.yml tests) and uploads it with the exactly pinned SWA CLI 2.0.10 instead of Azure/static-web-apps-deploy (Oryx in-container build, deploy token as action input), attests portal-<sha>.tar.gz and drops the unusable per-PR preview environments; azure/login and Azure/functions-action are SHA-pinned with version comments for Dependabot
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 18:21:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a5bca8a730 fix(web): CSV exports neutralize spreadsheet formula triggers in device-controlled cells (CWE-1236) — generateCsvExport/generateSessionCsvExport/generateRuleResultsCsvExport only doubled quotes, so an event Message, EventType, Source, DataJson, DeviceName, SerialNumber, FailureReason or rule explanation starting with =, +, -, @, tab or CR was evaluated as a formula (HYPERLINK/WEBSERVICE exfiltration, DDE) when a tenant admin opened the exported CSV or the operator opened the problem-report attachment; shared csvCell() now prefixes such cells with an apostrophe in addition to quoting, with regression tests for the DDE/HYPERLINK payloads and all three exporters
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 17:54:40 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 87cb1f1cea fix(backend): mcp-usage/user/{oid} filters usage rows to the caller's tenant and never signals foreign existence — UsageCrossTenantGuard skipped rows with an empty TenantId (legacy rows without the column, tokens without a resolvable tid), so a self-service tenant admin of any tenant could read another tenant's user usage (UPN, endpoints/tool names, per-day counts) by oid; and the distinct 403 CrossTenantAccessDenied vs 200-empty made the route a cross-tenant user-existence oracle; FilterForCaller now returns only rows whose TenantId equals the caller's tid for non-global callers (empty TenantId or empty caller tid ⇒ nothing), the handler always answers 200 with the filtered set (foreign oid ≡ unknown oid), dropped rows are logged as an ops warning only; tests rewritten for the filter semantics
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 17:38:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 44dd8161df fix(agent): ImeProcessWatcher verifies process identity before attaching and re-arms discovery after an exit — it attached to the first IntuneManagementExtension name match, so a standard user starting a renamed binary during AccountSetup could forge an ime_process_exited Warning and mute the real signal for the rest of the session (CWE-807), and even a legitimate IME service restart was never watched again; ImeProcessIdentity requires session 0 + image under the IME install root (QueryFullProcessImageName, cross-bitness), prefers the oldest trusted candidate, logs untrusted matches once per PID, and OnImeExited restarts the discovery timer (ReferenceEquals guard against duplicate events)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 17:07:18 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c84a1c23eb fix(backend): registration StartedAt is clamped to the event skew window (+24h / -168h around server time) in the shared register core — the device-supplied anchor drives the SessionsIndex RowKey, the retention filter, TotalToday and the supersede-predecessor comparison, so a far-future value pinned the row at the head of every list (incl. the Global Admin cross-tenant list), inflated today's counters forever and never became a retention candidate; both cert-auth and bootstrap entries flow through ProcessRegisterAsync, re-registration keeps the earlier stored anchor (min-merge)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 17:03:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4a7eb2749d fix(backend): bootstrap revoke enforces code ownership — DELETE /api/bootstrap/sessions/{code} only scoped the caller's ?tenantId while the repository resolved the owning tenant from CodeLookup and revoked any tenant's code; RevokeBootstrapSessionAsync now takes the caller tenant and refuses a mismatch as not-found (no owner leak, foreign partition never read), with regression tests
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 16:59:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a536553ee3 fix(web): IME Tracker card shows skip counters without the ime_tracker_degraded pointer — a tenant admin cannot act on it; a tooltip explains that pattern coverage may be incomplete and points to Report Session
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 16:38:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ce202c6d47 fix(ops): SlaBreachNotification ops event prints Duration breaches in minutes — the P95 value carried the % unit of the rate breach types ("Duration 864.0% (target 60.0%)"); the unit now follows SlaBreachType like the customer-facing alert builder
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 16:19:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 74902bf185 fix(agent): IME per-line matching budget counts Regex.Match time only — the wall-clock window also held the match handlers and scheduler stalls, and session 946ccbd6 (Hyper-V guest, 5–10 s process-wide stalls, 1 MB log, no line over 5 KB) broke it twice on genuine lines and silently skipped their remaining patterns; ime_pattern_hits is Debug severity (operator/backend signal, hidden from the default timeline — the IME Tracker card and the ingest fold read it regardless); the session page's IME Tracker card moves to the right column under Hardware
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 16:00:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4f021852ee updated command 2026-08-30 15:14:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7a3516e570 feat(observability): IME pattern-drift loop — nothing the log tracker skips or stops matching stays silent: the agent keeps cumulative tracker health counters and a per-pattern match histogram (restart-safe in ImeTrackerState), reports ime_* keys in agent_metrics_snapshot (files tailed, backlog bytes, lines read, matches, oversized/timeouts/budget breaks/held tails/unanchored), raises a one-shot immediate-upload ime_tracker_degraded Warning on the first pass that skipped work, and emits ime_pattern_hits at termination (every enabled pattern, zeros included, IME version); the backend folds the histogram into the permanent per-IME-version ImePatternStats table (built-in IDs only, plausible version only, one partition read + one transactional batch) and evaluates drift without a hard-coded list — baseline = the version with the most reporting sessions (≥100), expected = ≥80 % hit rate there, drift = an expected pattern matched in none of ≥25 sessions on a newer version — raising ImePatternDriftSuspected once per version×pattern (ETag-stamped, dual-registered in the web ops-event list with a new guard test); GET metrics/ime-pattern-health (GlobalReadOrAdmin) + Global Admin → Metrics → IME Pattern Health matrix (drift/silent/low/few cells, open alerts, retired patterns) + session-page "IME Tracker" rows (latest snapshot by max sequence) + MCP get_ime_pattern_health (GA/Reader)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 15:12:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6907a41a84 updated command 2026-08-30 14:40:27 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f4a5eac539 chore(rules): IME pattern-pack hygiene against the IME decompiles (1.97.107.0 / 1.104.102.0 / 1.105.103.0) — no wording drift in any shipped pattern; the 11 disabled legacy patterns whose literals last existed in IME 1.50 (fleet minimum 1.97) are deleted instead of left as re-enable traps (IME-DETECTED-OLD, IME-SET-CURRENT-1/2/3, IME-SKIP-APPLICABILITY-NOTMET, IME-SKIP-DEPENDENCY-DETECT, IME-SKIP-DETECTED, IME-SKIP-UNINSTALL-NOTDETECTED-2, IME-UPDATE-NAME-1/2/3); IME-DO-TIMEOUT-1/2 match the exact source literal "DO downloading is not finished within timeout, jobId = …, fileId = …" instead of two lookaheads; IME-DO-TEL documented as emitter-less from 1.104 on and kept only for the 1.101/1.103 fleet share
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 14:23:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 09492e908c fix(security): IME log-pattern pack is anchored and linear (all 90 patterns start with ^, IME-APP-VERSION spells the report-delta JSON out instead of a chained [^}]*? scan) and the ImeLogTracker read loop is bounded — BoundedLineReader (32 MB per line, evidence: real 5.6 MB "Get policies" lines; exact byte bookmarks, no decoder read-ahead loss on cancel), 2 s per-line matching budget across all patterns, held-back unterminated EOF tails (≤1 MB, 1 s settle) instead of dropping them and raw-matching fragments, a complete entry after a dropped one is no longer swallowed as its close, one Warning per pass (oversizedLines/regexTimeouts/lineBudgetBreaks) instead of silent Debug timeouts; unanchored PS-SCRIPT-CONTEXT false positives on [Win32App] SideCarScript… lines (which overwrote the pending platform script's RunContext) are gone; --run-ime-matching assembles multiline entries like the tracker
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 14:03:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f432353efa fix(security): startup self-update no longer trusts the on-disk remote-config.json cache — Program.LoadCachedSelfUpdateContext (raw deserialize, bypassed the read-side strip) is removed, the boot-time check runs with allowDowngrade:false and the version-v2.json manifest hash as its only integrity gate; LatestAgentSha256 (update-ZIP hash, ranked above the manifest hash in SelfUpdater) joins the CacheConfig/LoadCachedConfig strip lists so neither the startup nor the FromCache runtime path can take a planted ZIP hash or downgrade flag; verify+extract already share one exclusive handle (1daf631a)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 13:53:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1daf631a02 fix(security): self-update verifies and extracts the ZIP through one exclusive FileShare.None handle — SHA-256 is computed on the same stream the ZipArchive reads, so the file can no longer be swapped between verification and extraction (TOCTOU); handle is released before cleanup, open failure aborts with integrity_mismatch marker
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 13:03:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d0190f443d fix(ci): build-agent workflow_dispatch build_number can no longer inject PowerShell — the input and the agent blob SAS reach the version step only via env (BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE, AGENT_SAS_TOKEN) instead of ${{ }} in the script body, and the override is validated against ^\d+$ before the [int] cast and the counter-blob CAS; counter semantics unchanged
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 12:37:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e96f49799f fix(security): McpUsers whitelist rows are honoured only for the identity the UPN is bound to (AdminIdentityBindings tid+oid) — grant, UsagePlan override and Disabled kill-switch no longer follow a same-UPN token from another tenant or a recycled account; POST global/mcp-users binds first (resolver, 422 HomeTenantUnresolved, 409 conflict) and the settings UI shows the home-tenant picker on 422; unbound legacy rows are inert
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 12:13:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4864b2d21d fix(security): gather RuleStats resolve the device-claimed ruleId against the tenant's active gather catalog — title/category/severity come from the catalog rule, unknown or inactive IDs are dropped, and the cross-tenant global_* row is written only for IsBuiltIn/IsCommunity catalog rules (same design as the analyze path); a forged GatherRuleExecutor event can no longer inflate fleet-wide counters, respell a built-in rule's title or mint global rows for retired IDs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 12:13:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 56c37866d1 fix(security): ImeVersionHistory no longer takes a device-reported IME version as a platform fact — RecordImeVersionAsync rejects strings outside MSI ProductVersion bounds (no row/ops event/archive job), a session counts once (UpdateSessionImeAgentVersionAsync returns whether the version changed), a second tenant's sighting stamps CorroboratedAt, and the MemberRead view lists only fleet-confirmed versions (Archived, corroborated, or pre-2026-08-31) while Global scope still sees every row
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 11:38:27 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2852418413 fix(web): progress portal Cloud PC hint becomes a native input tooltip
The extra hint line under the search field made the header say the same
thing three times (subheadline, placeholder, hint). The Cloud PC guidance
now rides on the input's title attribute — the plain browser tooltip on
hover, no cursor change — and the subheadline no longer repeats the input
format. Same guidance is documented in the customer docs (Windows 365
Cloud PCs, Progress Portal).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 11:37:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 268d8652f1 fix(web): progress portal serial input no longer hides its Cloud PC hint
The placeholder carried the Cloud PC instruction ("Cloud PC: the name shown
in the Windows App") and was clipped by the input width, so end users saw a
truncated sentence they could not read. Placeholder is now short ("Serial
number or device name..."), the Cloud PC guidance moved to a permanent hint
line below the field (wired via aria-describedby), the subheadline mentions
the device name as an accepted input, and the button no longer wraps on
narrow viewports.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 11:29:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 66f5543fb7 fix(security): ConsoleBypassWatcher mirrors cmd.exe first-switch-wins parsing — only a leading /c classifies as scripted; a /c inside a /k payload (cmd /k rem /c, cmd /k "title /c") no longer silences a persistent interactive console, which is surfaced as interactive_console_with_command (low)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 02:05:55 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 21d200a1e4 fix(security): config PUT derives its preserved system-owned fields from the PATCH deny-list (BaseDeniedFields) so ProDowngradedUtc/OnboardedAt can no longer be written by a tenant admin — a client-supplied ProDowngradedUtc refreshed the retention-downgrade grace anchor indefinitely, keeping the Pro retention cap on a Community tenant
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 02:01:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8c0cb2c423 fix(security): RemoveGlobalAdmin, RemoveTenantAdmin, DisableTenantAdmin and sub-Admin UpdateMemberPermissions now call DisconnectUserAsync(upn) so a revoked/demoted user loses already-joined global-admins / tenant-{tid} / notify / session SignalR streams instead of keeping them until the socket drops (group authz is join-time only)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 01:59:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 84d06e1cf6 fix(security): LocalAdminAnalyzer never exempts a logged-in local SAM account from the shutdown scan (CWE-807) and matches built-ins by well-known RID so localized Guest/Administrator are not flagged
The shutdown run allowed every logged-in user (explorer.exe owner) dynamically, so a backdoor account created after the startup scan and signed in before enrollment completed was scored 0. The WMI inventory is now read first and a logged-in name that is a local account is rejected for the account and the profile check (reported as logged_in_local_accounts); only Entra/domain identities — the only ones seen in real sessions — remain dynamically allowed for their profile folder.

Built-ins are recognised by RID 500/501/503/504 on the machine SID in addition to their English names: since disabled accounts are inventoried (88dfd331), localized Gast/Invité/Administrateur would otherwise flag every non-English device. kioskUser0 (Assigned Access autologon) joins the built-in list; the profile check skips junctions and $<32 hex> folders (cannot be an account name, pure payload noise). ANALYZE-ID-002 1.3.0 explanation mentions the new field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 01:42:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 88dfd331dd fix(security): LocalAdminAnalyzer inventories disabled accounts and reads Administrators-group membership from the SAM (NetLocalGroupGetMembers on S-1-5-32-544); a dormant /active:no admin backdoor now surfaces as unexpected_admin_members (+40, Error), built-in Administrator enabled-state reported for evidence
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 01:00:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d294415d29 fix(security): CmTraceLogParser parses in linear time (first open / last parseable trailer, timeout-backed trailer regex) instead of a greedy .* regex that backtracked quadratically on hostile lines without a timeout; agent multiline buffer gains a 1 MB char cap next to the 100-line cap, both logged at Warning, and the tail of a dropped entry is skipped instead of raw-matched
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 00:48:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 76af1234ed fix(security): BlockedDevices rows are keyed by the canonicalized serial (trim + upper-invariant) so case-variant serials from a rogue agent or an admin's inventory copy still hit the block/kill row; legacy verbatim-case rows are dual-read and lazily re-keyed
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 00:27:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0515523e49 fix(security): guardrails.json values are emitted into generated TS through a complete encoder (JSON.stringify + U+2028/29) and rejected up-front if they contain control or line-terminator characters; new guardrails schema validated in combine-rules before any bot commit
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 00:19:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a47e94f9a5 fix(security): diagnostics packager reads every file through a handle validated against its pinned source folder; a subdirectory swapped for a junction between enumeration and open is skipped instead of copied
The path guards, the enumeration's reparse-point skip and the per-file attribute check all judged path strings, while the FileStream feeding the ZIP opened that string later (after earlier files were compressed). Under any recursive source folder a local user can write to, a subdirectory turned into a junction in that window made SYSTEM copy the junction target into the tenant-uploaded package.

PinnedSourceFolder holds each section folder open for the whole section (final path must equal the validated path, 8.3-expanded; FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY without delete share, so NTFS refuses renaming it or any ancestor) and opens each candidate with FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, requiring the handle's final path to be exactly <canonical folder>\<relative path>; the archive is fed from that same handle. Manifest: FOLDER REJECTED (...) / SKIPPED (resolved outside validated folder) / FAILED (open). The race is pinned by a test that swaps the directory from the BeforeSourceFileOpen seam; on the previous code the same test copies the junction target.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 00:06:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ecfa59d049 fix(security): PUT preview/notification-email requires a member role once the tenant has members; roleless writes only in the signup window
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 23:57:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6c50a54249 fix(security): escape tenantId in metrics-summary and device-snapshot OData filters; GUID-gate tenantId query param on global metrics/search routes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 23:55:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6e3487756a fix(security): gather-rule on_event feedback loop — timeline feed carries the event source and never dispatches on_event for gather-emitted events; per-rule on_event cap (100/session); backend rejects rules triggering on their own output type / gather_result
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 23:54:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach dbb154bae9 fix(security): percent-encode every path-position id in lib/api.ts; session pages gate URL-derived id on GUID before any fetch
A crafted /sessions?id=x%2F..%2F..%2Fglobal%2Fy%23 deep link let the victim's browser resolve
dot-segments into a different API route and truncate builder suffixes via '#', turning UI
actions into attacker-chosen authenticated same-origin requests. Hydration now also requires
the returned sessionId to match the requested one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 23:45:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c41c2327ab fix(security): validate enrollment summary branding image URL (https-only, no quotes); launcher drops unsafe URLs instead of interpolating them into the dialog command line
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 23:15:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 83effea592 fix(security): hosted diagnostics upload SAS is create-only and bound to the requesting session; existing blob => 409
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 23:13:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1a4a37b77a fix(web): hardware whitelist editor splits typed comma lists into entries ("Dell*, *" stays allow-all); only insights buttons neutralize ','
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 22:56:37 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f56851fc9f fix(security): hardware whitelist — one added entry is always one pattern; server rejects malformed CSV
The tenant hardware whitelist is stored as a CSV and split on ',' at
enforcement time. Manufacturer/model strings in the Rejected-Hardware
insights come from unauthenticated distress signals, so a value like
"Dell Inc.,*" added via "+ Mfr" appended a standalone "*" and silently
turned the manufacturer gate into allow-all.

- Web: shared hardwareWhitelist helper; "+ Mfr"/"+ Model" and the manual
  editor neutralize ',' to the single-char wildcard '?' so a value can
  never split the list.
- Backend: TenantConfigValidation.ValidateHardwareWhitelist in ValidateModel
  (PUT + patch) rejects blank items, control chars, over-long/too many entries.
- Shared: ParseWhitelist trims entries so enforcement matches the editor view.
- Tests: 8 xUnit + 5 vitest.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 22:51:55 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach cbe410cbbc fix(security): reject path-shaped sessionId/tenantId in session-report blob names; BlobNameGuard at every GetBlobClient sink
SubmitSessionReport built the report blob name from the raw route sessionId. Route values are
percent-decoded, so an encoded '/'+'..' reached Azure.Storage.Blobs, which keeps separators, and
System.Uri collapsed the dot segments into a write outside the session-reports container.

- SubmitSessionReport / SubmitDiagFilesReport: 400 unless sessionId/tenantId are GUIDs
- SessionReportService: EnsureValidGuid at entry of both submit paths
- New Security/BlobNameGuard (flat-name invariant) applied in SessionReportService,
  SessionReportDiagnosticsArchiveCopier (pre-check + upload) and the GA download function
- Tests: BlobNameGuardTests, copier rejects non-flat destination without storage calls

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 22:51:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 43ddc60111 fix(security): enforce tenant suspension in PolicyEnforcementMiddleware, not only auth/me
TenantConfiguration.Disabled/DisabledUntil was checked solely in AuthFunction.BuildAuthResult
(GET /api/auth/me), so a direct REST caller with a valid token kept full read/write access for
the whole suspension window and during an offboarding wipe. DecideAsync now denies 403
TenantSuspended when the caller's home tenant or the request's target tenant is currently
disabled (cached, side-effect-free config read). GA/GlobalReader bypass to administer the
tenant; device/anonymous routes keep their SecurityValidator gate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 22:34:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 82b26b4ab9 fix(security): HTML-encode domain in transactional mails; freeze DomainName on config PUT, validate first-login seed
Welcome/farewell mails rendered DomainName unencoded while the full-model
config PUT persisted it verbatim, letting a tenant admin ship attacker HTML
in a signed product mail to an arbitrary recipient. Encode at Render() and
the built-in builders, preserve DomainName from the stored row on PUT for
every caller, and only seed a strict DNS host name at first login.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 22:33:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1733f4fd48 fix(agent): SignalIngress worker re-entrancy — never block the single consumer on its own post
EffectRunner posts ClassifierVerdictIssued from inside DecisionStepProcessor.ApplyStep,
i.e. on the SignalIngress worker thread. With the bounded channel (256) full, Post's
back-pressure slow path blocked the channel's only consumer as a producer: nothing could
ever drain, every collector Post blocked behind it, and the whole decision/monitoring
pipeline froze silently until the max-lifetime watchdog.

Post now detects a call from the worker thread itself and routes the item to a
worker-local follow-up queue that WorkerLoop drains (iteratively, ahead of the channel)
right after the current item. Same processing path — ordinals, SignalLog, emit,
reduce, ApplyStep — just never blocking. Worker posts are accepted during the Stop
drain too, since the verdict belongs to the step being finished. ReentrantPostCount
exposed for observability/tests.

Tests: full channel + worker post releases a blocked foreign producer and processes the
verdict before the next channel item (fails against the previous code by hanging);
follow-up chain drained in order without recursion; verdict posted during Stop drain is
not lost. Docs: agent/decision-engine.md, agent/overview.md, log.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 22:11:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fc46b4c78e feat(security): session-owner binding stage 1 (shadow) + dormant agent session rotation
Agent endpoints authenticated per tenant but authorized session writes on a caller-supplied
session id. Sessions rows now carry the creating device identity (cert thumbprint + Intune
device id from the CN, or bootstrap code + serial) in primary-only Owner* columns.
SessionOwnershipPolicy evaluates register / telemetry / error-report requests against it;
SessionOwnerBindingObserver records the outcome on the request row, as a warning and as a
throttled SessionOwnerMismatch ops event. Nothing is rejected in this stage.

Agent: errorCode parsing on 401/403, one-shot session rotation on session_owner_mismatch
without feeding the auth-failure tracker, spool drop, agent_started.sessionRotated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 21:32:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c18de5d76c fix(security): drop client-writable certificate header; bootstrap routes token-only, fail-closed
SecurityValidator accepted certificate bytes from X-Client-Certificate when X-ARR-ClientCert was
absent. That header is client-writable, and certificate content alone carries no proof of private-key
possession — the TLS handshake does. On platform-cert-enforced routes the fallback was unreachable,
but /api/bootstrap/* is excluded from the platform cert requirement and an EMPTY X-Bootstrap-Token
passed the function gate (Headers.Contains) while the validator treated it as no token and fell
through to the certificate stage, where the fallback header was parsed (live-verified 2026-08-29).

- Only X-ARR-ClientCert is read; the platform strips inbound copies even on excluded paths.
- IsBootstrapRoute (path prefix mirroring the exclusion entry): missing/empty token or unwired
  BootstrapSessionService => 401 before the certificate stage.
- GetBootstrapToken treats an empty header as absent; the three bootstrap functions use it.
- Tests: BootstrapRouteFailClosedTests. Docs: client-cert-tenant-binding.md transport section.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 20:04:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 250cc667dd fix(web): show full UPN in admin feedback list instead of a 200px truncation
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 19:58:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d3261fb890 feat(ops): ops events for Collect Logs usage and diagnostics-upload enablement
CollectLogsQuickConfigEnabled fires when a tenant admin switches on Hosted
diagnostics upload through the session Collect Logs quick-config dialog
(PUT ?intent=collect-logs -> write source portal-collect-logs); every other
enable/disable path emits DiagnosticsUploadEnabled/Disabled (PUT, PATCH,
revert, MCP). SessionActionQueued records portal-queued server actions.
DiagnosticsUploadConfigChange is the single definition behind the
diagnosticsUploadConfigured feature flag and the flip detection. Event types
dual-registered in the OpsAlertRules catalog.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 19:30:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b3bbcf1300 fix(agent): rotate_config applies the fetched config; diagnostics skip gates report their reason
rotate_config only stored the fetched config in RemoteConfigService and never
merged it into the running AgentConfiguration, so the portal quick-config flow
(enable diagnostics upload, then collect) ran the diagnostics gate against the
stale mode=Off and failed with a generic diagnostics_upload_failed 4 ms later.
The action now runs the same ApplyFetchedConfig path as the startup fetch and
reports config_fetch_failed when the live fetch fell back to cache/defaults.
Skipped uploads return a DiagnosticsUploadResult.Skipped with the gate name
(diagnostics_skipped_mode_off / _not_configured / _onfailure_success) instead
of null, so server_action_failed names the actual reason.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 19:30:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a306cd9e40 feat(security): resolve admin identity bindings automatically at grant time; per-tenant bindings panel
Granting a cross-tenant role is "type the UPN" again. AdminIdentityResolver derives the home
tenant + object id from sign-in history (UserActivity: both values came from validated tokens,
most recent sign-in wins), falls back to the UPN domain of an onboarded tenant (tid only, oid
pinned on first sign-in), and never guesses when a UPN was seen under two tenants. Only a
never-seen domain yields 422 HomeTenantUnresolved, on which the portal shows a home-tenant picker.

- IMetricsRepository.GetSignInIdentitiesByUpnAsync (filtered UserActivity scan, grant-time only)
- Grant endpoints: homeTenantId/objectId optional overrides; bindings dropped from the list bodies
- Web: identity fields and binding pills removed from the delegated / tenant-group forms;
  new collapsed "Identity bindings" panel in Tenant Management -> Edit Tenant Configuration
  (bindings homed in that tenant; inline edit / remove via global/identity-bindings)
- Tests: AdminIdentityResolverTests; grant validation now accepts an absent home tenant

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 19:21:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8ec8524252 fix(security): bind platform and delegated roles to the immutable Entra tid+oid, not the UPN string
GlobalAdmins, DelegatedAdmins and TenantGroupAssignments resolved their role from the
upn/preferred_username claim alone while the API accepts tokens from every Entra tenant, so a
genuine token minted in a foreign tenant (re-registered domain) or by a recycled UPN in the home
tenant inherited platform admin.

- New AdminIdentityBindings table: RK = UPN -> home TenantId + ObjectId; in TableNames.All,
  CriticalBackupTables and the full-restore-forbidden auth set; offboarding wipes bindings homed
  in the offboarded tenant
- AdminIdentity (upn + tid + oid) is what GlobalAdminService.GetGlobalRoleAsync and
  DelegatedAdminService.GetScopeAsync resolve on; order row -> binding -> Pro gate, fail-closed
  (no oid / no binding / tid or oid mismatch => no role), mismatches logged at Warning
- Object id pinned on the first sign-in from the bound tenant (ETag-conditional, verified against
  the stored winner); a foreign-tenant token can never claim the pin
- Grants (auth/global-admins, global/delegated-admins, tenant-group assignees) require
  homeTenantId (+ optional objectId) and answer 409 instead of re-homing a bound UPN;
  GET/PUT/DELETE global/identity-bindings is the audited rebind surface
- RequestContext.ObjectId; throttle identity prefers oid so shared UPN strings across tenants no
  longer collide in one rate-limit bucket
- Web: home tenant / object id fields on the grant and assign forms, per-UPN binding pill
- Tests: binding verdict matrix + race semantics, middleware-level denials for foreign-tenant and
  recycled-UPN tokens; OKF doc docs/backend/admin-identity-binding.md

Legacy role rows are inert until their binding is seeded - seed before deploying the backend.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 18:35:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c4be6d4169 fix(security): block javascript:/data: URLs in analyze-rule relatedDocs (stored XSS)
Author-controlled relatedDocs[].url was rendered verbatim as <a href> on the session
detail, diagnosis and analyze-rules pages and never validated server-side, so a
Tenant Admin could store a javascript: URL that executes in the portal origin for
any viewer — including cross-tenant Global/MSP admins.

- Web: safeHttpUrl() guard (absolute http/https only) at all four render sites;
  anything else renders as plain text.
- Backend: ValidateRelatedDocs on Create/Update — blank URLs dropped, non-http(s)
  URLs rejected with 400.
- Tests on both sides.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 17:55:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d558b94cf6 updated commands 2026-08-29 17:24:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9b4222e729 fix(ime-archive): verify MSI ProductVersion and walk primary/secondary/hotfix hosts before archiving
Microsoft serves IME from several versionless hosts carrying different rings at once
(secondary = 1.104.102.0 while hotfix = 1.105.103.0), so "new version == what the
canonical URL serves" filed a 1.104 package under 1.105.103.0. The archiver now spools
each candidate, reads ProductVersion with a managed CFB/MSI reader (Linux host, no
msiexec) and uploads only a match; no match ends as Failed:VersionMismatch. A later
sighting with a version-authoritative CSP URL re-queues an unarchived version at most
once per 24 h (MsiArchiveUpdatedAt + Queued stamp).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 17:23:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach cf76c4338f feat(vuln): manual "Refresh NVD Cache" and "Sync EPSS" with their own last-sync lines
The admin Data Sync Status only offered KEV and MSRC; the NVD stale-row refresh and the EPSS
re-score ran on the nightly timer alone. Both walks move out of the timer into
VulnerabilityCacheRefreshService (singleton, one in-flight slot per walk) so the buttons and the
nightly run share one code path and stamp the same timestamps (NvdCacheLastRefreshUtc — only for
a walk that reached every stale row; EpssLastSyncUtc). POST vulnerability/sync-nvd starts the
minutes-long, rate-limited NVD walk in the background and answers 202 (409 while running); the
page polls sync-status (nvdRefreshRunning, nvdLastRun) every 10 s meanwhile. POST
vulnerability/sync-epss runs synchronously and returns the counts. The timer skips a slot a
manual run holds instead of queueing a duplicate. Shared manifest regenerated for the two new
AdminConfiguration fields.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 11:57:55 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a6184f165b feat(vuln): FIRST EPSS as fourth source, act/attend/track priority, CVSS vector; never cache a refused NVD answer
EPSS: EpssApiClient (api.first.org, 100 ids per batch, unauthenticated, fail-soft). Score, percentile
and date live on the cached CVE — one batch per CPE fill, every cve_* row re-scored by the nightly
sync, only changed rows rewritten and with their original CachedAt. CveIndex carries EpssScore (max,
absent when unscored) and Priority; TopCve exposes both. CvePriority: act = CISA KEV, attend =
EPSS >= 0.1 or CVSS >= 9.0, track = rest — riskLevel/overall_risk semantics unchanged.

NVD throttle: Polly already retried 429s; the defect was that a refused answer came back as an
empty response and was cached as "0 CVEs" for seven days (also the negative auto-resolve cache).
NvdFetchResult separates answered from refused; nothing persists a refusal; a 429 opens a
process-wide cooldown (Retry-After capped at 120 s, else 30 s) so a run fails fast instead of
paying a retry chain per software item; hard-expired rows keep serving meanwhile. The NVD->cache
projection and the row builder are now single functions shared by the live fill and the sync.

CVSS v3 vector string persisted and shown. Portal: EPSS column + pill, priority pill, vector line;
exposure panel pills. MCP tool descriptions and the CVE-audit prompt name the fields. Terms
attribution + privacy page updated in the same change. OKF doc backend/vulnerability-correlation-sources.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 11:07:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d3918cb740 feat(mcp): log the protocol era per request (mcp_request line, MCP_TOOL_LOGGING-gated)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 09:13:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 15722a3885 fix(mcp): log the CIMD success path so metadata-document logins are positively visible
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 09:06:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1a4e13f0e9 feat(mcp): implement MCP spec 2026-07-28 (SDK v2 dual-era handler) and Client ID Metadata Documents
Wire protocol: replace @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.30 with @modelcontextprotocol/server + /node 2.0.0
(zod 4). One per-request factory (mcp-server-factory.ts, extracted from index.ts) serves both eras
through mcp-http.ts: 2026-07-28 clients via createMcpHandler (legacy:'reject', JSON response mode,
server/discover, Mcp-Method routing), 2025 clients through the existing stateless transport with
enableJsonResponse — routed on the SDK's own isLegacyRequest predicate, because the built-in stateless
fallback would answer every current client with SSE and lose the gzip win. Capabilities now declare
listChanged:false explicitly; cacheHints stamp ttlMs/cacheScope:'private' on discover/list results
(5 min) and resource reads (60 min) — the catalog is role-dependent, so never public.

Authorization: advertise client_id_metadata_document_supported; an https client_id is a Client ID
Metadata Document resolved by cimd.ts (URL-shape checks, SSRF gate on every resolved address before any
request, no redirects, 5 s / 16 KB caps, exact client_id match, bounded redirect_uris, 10-60 min cache).
The requested redirect_uri still has to pass the dynamic-registration allowlist; HMAC-signed DCR
client_ids remain the fallback. Field limits moved to oauth-limits.ts (no import cycle).

Tests: mcp-http.test.ts drives the real v2 client over loopback HTTP in both eras and pins role parity;
cimd.test.ts / oauth-cimd.test.ts cover recognition, SSRF, validation, cache and the router paths.
Package 1.5 -> 1.6. OKF doc docs/mcp/protocol-eras-and-cimd.md; mcp-oauth-flow.md updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 08:43:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c39092bf72 ci(mcp): image tag unique per run so docs-only redeploys roll a new revision
A redeploy at an unchanged code sha (the documented way to refresh the
baked-in search_docs corpus) built an image with the identical tag;
az containerapp update saw the same image reference and created no
revision, so the verify step timed out against the old build (run
33215583943). Tag = sha-run_number; build commit/version stay separate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 00:17:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 494744ad3f feat(web): progress portal follows Windows 365 Cloud PC first-connect enrollments
Cloud PC users know the device name the Windows App shows, and the lookup
already accepts device names, so there is no reason to exclude them. The
monitored enrollment starts at first connect in Account Setup (v1 rail,
phases 4 -> 5 -> 7; device phases 1-3 run headless and are never declared),
so the Cloud PC layout lists only the steps the user can actually watch:
First sign-in / Account setup / Installing apps / Finalizing setup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 00:05:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a68c096a26 feat(web): progress portal follows every enrollment scenario (Device Preparation, self-deploying, pre-provisioning)
The end-user page hardcoded the seven Autopilot v1 ESP phases and gated its live
app panel on currentPhase 3/5 — phases a Device Preparation session never
declares — so DevPrep users saw 0 % and no app progress until Finalizing.
Steps now derive from the shared resolvePhaseLayout (v2 layout, skip-user
layout), the v2 app step is promoted from app-event evidence, and the status
vocabulary maps AwaitingUser / parked pre-provisioned devices to a waiting
state and Incomplete to neutral — only Failed stays red. Cloud PCs are named
as unsupported.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-28 21:30:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach bf156cf862 fix(backend): CMTrace skew tripwire ignores backlog-replay bursts via per-sample grid conformity
CmTraceTimeSkewRegression fired 7x in its first soak week; every checked case
was a relaunched agent re-tailing the IME log and uploading one burst holding
most of the session's IME samples with a continuum of ages whose median hit the
15-minute grid by chance. The tripwire now also requires >= 80 % of the IME
deltas (relative to the other side's median) to individually sit within 2 min of
some grid multiple; era-mixing regressions still fire. Fraction is carried in the
ops event message and details.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-28 16:42:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0eaa3527f9 feat(validation,web): device association validator generally available
Microsoft released Windows Autopilot device association on 2026-08-25. The
DevPrep association lookup leaves shadow mode and becomes an accepting method
of the device-validation gate (after Autopilot and Corporate Identifier, before
the Cloud PC fallback; ValidatedBy = DeviceAssociation, transient -> 503). The
toggle is no longer Global-Admin-only: backend PUT revert and GaOnlyFields
dropped, settings toggle shown to every tenant admin under Device Preparation
with the shared consent rule. Landing hero carries a release pill linking to
the docs; dashboard tip added.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 21:20:57 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5055db2de1 feat(rules): detect installer-mutex app failures (0x80070652) and SWG-blocked diagnostics uploads
Two analyze rules born from the pilatus-aircraft diagnosis (2026-08-27):

- ANALYZE-APP-017 "App Install Blocked by Another Installer (0x80070652)":
  fires on app_install_failed with hresultFromWin32 -2147023278
  (ERROR_INSTALL_ALREADY_RUNNING); confidence boosts for MSI exit code
  1618 and for an ESP failure settling with the same code. The 08-26
  burst failed 16 sessions deterministically at ~21 min (IME's fixed
  msiexec-busy retry budget) right after a preceding installer left the
  Windows Installer mutex held - previously only generic
  "Enrollment Failed" fired, naming no cause.
- ANALYZE-NET-001 "Diagnostics Upload Blocked by Web Security Gateway":
  fires on diagnostics_upload_failed answered by an HTML block page
  carrying a recognizable security-product marker (McAfee/Skyhigh,
  Zscaler, Netskope, ...). OnFailure diagnostics are lost exactly on the
  sessions that need them; plain HTML errors without a vendor marker
  (stale/stopped endpoint) stay excluded on purpose.

Both validated via MCP validate_rule (0 errors) and dry-run with
test_analyze_rule: fire on the burst session (confidence 100 / 90),
silent on a timeout-shaped failure and on a succeeded session that
carried unrelated app_install_failed events.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 19:40:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 040e411958 feat(classification,calibration): rule 5a completed-assumed, max-lifetime grace skip, drift-radar floors
First real calibration read (2026-08-27, four days instrumented) drove three
data-backed changes:

- Rule 5a: past grace (or with the agent provably gone), Device Setup done +
  real-user desktop + zero app_install_failed reconciles to Succeeded
  "completed (assumed)" (r5_assumed). r5-Incomplete devices re-enrolled at
  2.6% - the succeeded background, not the ~29% failure level - and the
  sampled desktop half had clean app records. No desktop or any failed app
  stays Incomplete; rule 4 remains the immediate desktop+Hello reconcile.
- Rule 5 skips the AwaitingUser grace once either max-lifetime watchdog shape
  (enrollment_failed/agent_timeout, agent_shutting_down/max_lifetime) is in
  the stream: all five observed maxlife:r5_awaiting parks expired unhealed
  while live-agent parks upgraded 7/26. The maxlife ingest appends its
  trigger event to the read stream so the fact is never missed; late
  telemetry still heals a terminal verdict. WhiteGlove rule 1b keeps its
  park (its one episode healed).
- Drift radar: MinWindowHits raised to 10 (a 3-hit episode survived as
  noise), per-path share regression now needs >=5 baseline hits (new or
  renamed vocabulary cannot "regress"), and rule-shaped legacy:* paths count
  into the silence/classifier-verdict group sums on both sides of the
  2026-08-23 instrumentation cutover - dissolving the lift-124 silence
  artifact. Episodes below the fire floors clear themselves.

Backend only; the new path appears in the calibration matrix dynamically.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 18:10:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 42c45cf567 feat(admin,backend): find a tenant by its notification or contact email
A delivery log names only the recipient, never the tenant the welcome mail was
for. The tenant console's search now matches the notification and contact
address as well as domain and tenant id; the quoted exact mode is unchanged, and
no other address is searchable (an admin UPN never receives platform mail and
would only widen the PII surface of the list).

The addresses live in PreviewWhitelist, not on the tenant config, so a new
GA/Reader-only GET /api/preview/notification-emails returns them as one map --
a single cross-partition scan instead of a point read per tenant. Both sides
join on the lowercased tenant id (address rows carry the JWT tid, a config
PartitionKey's casing is not guaranteed) and matching is case-insensitive,
because stored addresses keep the casing the user typed.

The map is best-effort in the portal: a failed read costs only the
search-by-address, never the tenant list. Addresses stay out of the list rows --
they are a search key, and remain visible in the tenant editor.

Match rules moved out of the component into tenantSearch.ts with unit pins, and
a catalog test pins that the plural route does not resolve to the per-tenant
entry one character away (which would demand a tenantId the route does not
carry, and hand a delegated caller a rescue path into the whole map).

Deploy: backend before web.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 15:41:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b31256c748 fix(activation): capture the welcome-mail address instead of redirecting past it
The activation page held the only address field in the product, and its redirect
effect fired on the first poll after auto-approve — roughly 60 seconds after
signup. Anyone who had not typed by then lost the field, no notification-email row
was ever written, and TrySendWelcomeEmailAsync deferred a mail that nothing would
send later. Nine of twenty-one August signups got a welcome mail; the last one
went out on the 21st.

It stayed hidden because every "not sent" branch logged at Information, and worker
application logs never reach Application Insights below Warning.

- Activation page holds the redirect until the address is saved or deliberately
  skipped, and switches to an "Activated" state while it waits. Visitors who
  arrive at an already-activated tenant are passed straight through as before.
- Recipient resolution falls back from the activation-page address to the tenant
  contact address. The signup admin UPN is deliberately not a fallback: those
  accounts often have no mailbox and the bounces cost sender reputation.
- WelcomeEmailSent / WelcomeEmailSkipped / WelcomeEmailFailed ops events make
  every outcome visible, dual-registered in OPS_EVENT_TYPES.

Three defects in the same path, found while fixing it:

- The sent-marker was consumed before the send and never released on refusal, so
  one provider hiccup suppressed a tenant's welcome mail permanently. It now
  records delivery, not an attempt.
- A missing provider key logged at Debug, hiding the one condition that stops
  every mail at once. Now Warning.
- The Global Admin resend endpoint reported success regardless of what the
  provider answered. It is the manual fallback for exactly this failure, so it now
  returns 502 and leaves the marker free when the message is refused.

The welcome mail is also no longer fire-and-forget: a discarded Task can be torn
down when the invocation ends, and its result is what the ops event reports.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 14:32:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 51f2dabc8c feat(web): explain the blank WiFi signal in the network timeline
The timeline showed WiFi segments with an SSID and no signal, and an "Avg WiFi
signal" stat that simply vanished — on a location-gated device that reads as a
product defect rather than the Windows 24H2 gate that caused it.

No agent change was needed: buildSegments already merges every wifi_signal_info
into the WiFi segment covering its timestamp, so wifiDataLimitedReason rides in
with the sample that was already being read.

- NetSegment.dataLimitedReason, filled from the sample.
- Segments that never got a sample of their own (a mid-session reconnect emits
  no wifi_signal_info) inherit it: the gate is a device-level setting and cannot
  flip during an enrollment. A segment WITH a real reading is never overwritten
  — pinned by a test.
- Tooltip: "Signal: unavailable — Location services off on this device" where
  the percentage would be.
- Stats row: "Avg WiFi signal: n/a (Location services off)" instead of dropping
  the row.

network_state_change is deliberately left alone. That event has never carried
signalPercent or radioType — NetworkChangeDetector collects them into its
snapshot for change detection, but only before_/after_wifiSsid reaches the
payload — so there is no absent field there for a reason to explain, and the
SSID it does carry is unaffected by the gate. Adding it would ship a field
nothing reads.

Verified: web tsc + eslint (0 warnings) + vitest 893/893.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 14:06:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0f9a77c848 feat(agent,web,mcp): surface the 24H2 location gate instead of only logging it
A missing WiFi signal reading is indistinguishable from a bug unless the payload
says why, and the device-level location setting is not something an admin would
think to check. Since 058248d9 the SSID survives the gate via the WinRT tier —
but signal, radio and channel silently vanish with no explanation anywhere.

When the WinRT tier wins AND the native tier reported rc=5, wifi_signal_info now
carries wifiDataLimitedReason = "location_services_off" and the event message
gains "— signal unavailable, Location services off", so the reason reads straight
off the timeline. The portal's WiFi card matches that literal and names the
Intune setting that restores the full payload.

The claim is evidence-only: any other native failure (no WLAN service, no
connected interface) leaves the field null rather than blaming a privacy setting
we did not observe. IsLocationGateDenied is the single predicate, pinned at its
boundaries (rc=5 yes; rc=50, rc=5023, rc=1062 no), and the literal is pinned as
the published agent/portal/MCP contract.

New wifi_signal_info group in the MCP DEVICE_PROPERTIES_CATALOG, so a fleet can
be sized before anyone changes a policy:
search_sessions(deviceProperties: {
  "wifi_signal_info.wifiDataLimitedReason": "location_services_off" })

Backend is untouched — the event payload is opaque DataJson with no projection.
network_state_change and the network timeline deliberately do not carry the
reason yet; that is a second payload plus web change for no extra insight.

Verified: build 0 warnings, agent suite 2553/2553, web tsc + eslint (0 warnings)
+ vitest 889/889, MCP tsc.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 13:58:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d89e3f0b48 fix(backend): cap vulnerability_report severity at Warning
A completed scan is a finding about the software inventory, not an
enrollment failure. Mapping the CVE risk onto Error/Critical made the
report read as a failed enrollment: the diagnosis page collected it as
failure evidence, MCP search lifted it on failure-intent queries, and the
timeline's Error filter filled up with clean sessions. critical/high now
map to Warning, everything else to Info; the CVE severity itself stays in
scan_summary and on the report panel's own scale.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 13:54:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 058248d95c fix(agent): read WiFi SSID via ungated WinRT API — 24H2 location gate
wifi_signal_info was missing on most Windows 11 24H2+ WiFi enrollments
(build 22631 3/3, 26100 37/178, 26200 43/95 over n=276 sessions since 08-01).
Not a parser or language problem: every event that exists carries a full SSID,
so the failure is binary at the reader level.

Since 24H2 Windows gates WlanQueryInterface with
wlan_intf_opcode_current_connection — the only opcode we use — behind
precise-location consent and returns ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED. The consent prompt
only fires for a process in the user's context outside System32, so the agent
(SYSTEM, session 0, before the OOBE privacy page) is denied silently, and it
resolves consent from the HKLM ConsentStore because the S-1-5-18 hive has none
— while the interactive user on the same machine reads the SSID fine via the
per-user NonPackaged value. That is why it tracks the image's location setting,
not hardware, driver or language.

netsh wlan hangs off the same gate, so the 2026-07 netsh fallback and its
multi-language labels never covered the case they were built for; more labels
cannot fix it.

- New WinRtWifiSsidReader: Microsoft's documented replacement
  WlanConnectionProfileDetails.GetConnectedSsid (ungated, SSID only), bound via
  the CLR WinRT projection — no winmd, no NuGet, no csproj change — the same
  mechanism OobeStateReader already uses from the SYSTEM context.
- New WifiInfoProvider owns the tier order (native -> WinRT -> netsh) that both
  collectors had duplicated.
- The step diagnostics added in 2026-07 were logged at Debug while the default
  level is Info, so they never reached a field log. The all-tiers-failed case is
  now a Warning that decodes rc=5 into the location-gate explanation.

Signal, PHY and channel have no ungated source and stay null on tier 2;
deriving a percentage from GetSignalBars would fabricate precision.

Verified: build 0 warnings, agent suite 2542/2542, interop struct sizes measured
live (532/604), and the full WinRT chain resolves and returns the SSID under
net48.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 13:27:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach aab0a0c52c feat(admin): make report ID one-click copyable in report details
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 12:45:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f22feb71ff feat(web): exclude events from the session timeline search
The timeline search box now tokenizes the query instead of treating it as a
single substring: terms are AND-ed and a leading minus hides its matches
(e.g. -app_install_progress), following the convention every other search box
uses. Quoting keeps a term literal, so an exit code like "-1" stays searchable.

The negation is decided at a token's first character, before a quote is
consumed, and terms match the same fields as the positive search (event type,
message, source) joined by a newline so a term can never match across a field
boundary. The event counter follows the search and an active exclusion is
named in a pill next to the severity filters.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 14:33:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c92fe7c2a0 commands: bump to 3061dca (cert tenant binding queries in backend-logs + session-debug) 2026-08-25 12:56:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b7cb75e442 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/Autopilot-Monitor 2026-08-25 12:50:12 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d6895f2c7e feat(security): enforce cert tenant binding — reject cross-tenant certificates
The Intune roots the chain is pinned to are shared by every Intune tenant, so
a valid certificate only ever proved "issued by Intune to someone". Tenant
scoping rested on the device serial, which is printed on the chassis. A
Mismatch now returns 403.

Switched on against measured data, not a hunch: 35,684 requests across 32
tenants since the shadow telemetry landed, every one a Match, with the
Warning channel independently verified to be carrying other traffic so the
zero could not be a telemetry artefact.

Only Mismatch blocks, and the rule lives in one function so "what rejects a
request" has a single answer. ExtensionMissing, Unparseable and
RequestTenantNotAGuid mean "cannot tell" and are tolerated: the sample only
covers devices active in the window, so an older certificate or a
sovereign-cloud CA could still lack the extension, and rejecting on absence
would lock those devices out for something outside their control.
ExtensionMissing is the candidate for later tightening and has its own test
pinning the tolerance, so removing it must be a decision.

Evaluation fails open on its own exception — a defect on our side is not
evidence of a cross-tenant certificate. The 403 body does not echo which
tenant the certificate belongs to; that pair goes to the rejection log.

Device binding (stage 3) is untouched: still shadow, still Global-Admin-only.

Backend 4638/4638, 0 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 12:45:21 +02:00
dependabot[bot] beac51720f build(deps): bump the web group (#135)
Bumps the web group in /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web with 4 updates: [next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js), [@next/bundle-analyzer](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/next-bundle-analyzer), [eslint-config-next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/eslint-config-next) and [vitest](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/tree/HEAD/packages/vitest).


Updates `next` from 16.3.1 to 16.3.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/compare/v16.3.1...v16.3.2)

Updates `@next/bundle-analyzer` from 16.3.1 to 16.3.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.2/packages/next-bundle-analyzer)

Updates `eslint-config-next` from 16.3.1 to 16.3.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.2/packages/eslint-config-next)

Updates `vitest` from 4.1.10 to 4.1.11
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/main/docs/releases.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commits/v4.1.11/packages/vitest)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: next
  dependency-version: 16.3.2
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@next/bundle-analyzer"
  dependency-version: 16.3.2
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: eslint-config-next
  dependency-version: 16.3.2
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: vitest
  dependency-version: 4.1.11
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-25 12:32:44 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 32268ba245 build(deps-dev): bump vitest (#134)
Bumps the mcp group in /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp with 1 update: [vitest](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/tree/HEAD/packages/vitest).


Updates `vitest` from 4.1.10 to 4.1.11
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/main/docs/releases.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commits/v4.1.11/packages/vitest)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: vitest
  dependency-version: 4.1.11
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-25 12:32:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c91d8d4501 fix(agent): complete enrollments with zero user-targeted apps instead of failing them
IME never writes its "Completed user session" line when the user has no
assigned Win32 apps - its zero-app branch returns before that statement
(ApplicationPoller.cs:713-721, identical in 1.80/1.83/1.97/1.104). So
ImeUserSessionCompletedUtc stayed null, every arm of
ShouldTransitionToAwaitingHello was unsatisfiable, and the 30-min
advisory_completion backstop resolved healthy enrollments as
esp_exit_without_completion_evidence. One tenant: 10 of 30 sessions in a week,
all false positives - DAD-validated desktop, Hello provisioned, RealmJoin still
installing. Every Succeeded session there carries ime_user_session_completed;
not one of the failed ones does.

IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS reads the line IME does write there and routes it
through the same OnUserSessionCompleted callback. That is IME's own verdict
rather than a weakened gate: the zero-app branch locks the ESP in with an empty
application list, and the sibling emit site returns ProvisioningComplete right
after logging it. Guarded to the AccountSetup phase so it cannot burn the
adapter fire-once flag on a pre-sign-in timestamp, and replayed on the phase
transition when the observation predates the phase marker. AreUserEspAppsSettled
accepts an empty app list only with that explicit observation, never on
emptiness alone.

Second, independent defect: advisory_completion (30 min) overran the RealmJoin
completion gate, which deliberately holds the session and carries its own
bounded resolution (60 min from detection, activity-extended, 4 h cap). One
session installed 25 RealmJoin packages inside the window, the last 2 min before
the failure, while completion_waiting still read "waiting on:
realmjoin_resolution". The handler now re-arms while that gate is closed and its
own deadline is still armed; convergence comes from the gate itself, which
always ends with an Outcome set.

ime_user_session_completed gains an evidence field (zero_user_apps_enumerated /
user_session_completed) - no new event type, so the Constants ->
resource-catalog -> shared-manifests triple stays untouched. The pattern ships
via the config API and reaches existing agents, where an unknown action is a
single Debug line; the behaviour needs the agent release.

Build 0 warnings. DecisionCore 558/558, V2.Core 2530/2530, Backend 4634/4634,
MCP event-types-drift 6/6.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 12:27:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach bf6850dedc perf(security): log DevPrep association shadow once per lookup, not per request
Same gate the cert-device-binding shadow got in 35a3ed0c, applied to its
sibling. Measured on the live enrollment: 263 identical shadow lines for one
device off a handful of Graph calls, because the cache answered nearly every
request and the log sat outside it.

DeviceAssociationResult.AsCacheHit() copies rather than marking the shared
cached instance, so the first real lookup is never mistaken for a cache hit
and dropped. Transient outcomes are not cached and keep logging every time.

Backend 4633/4633, 0 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 20:18:57 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 35a3ed0cfb perf(security): log device binding once per Graph lookup, not per request
Measured on the first live enrollment: 136 agent requests produced exactly
ONE Graph call, because the 30-minute positive cache absorbed the rest. So
the check is not a throttling risk (the per-request Autopilot serial
validator made 25 calls in the same window) and the positive TTL needs no
change — raising it would only delay noticing a wiped or removed device.

What the 136 requests did cost was 136 log lines all saying the same thing.
Gate the shadow log on ServedFromCache so it emits one line per real lookup.
Cached repeats carry no new information: the reported age just counts up
mechanically from the same enrolledDateTime. Outcomes that are never cached
(Transient, NoDeviceIdInCert) keep logging every time, which is what an
anomaly warrants.

AsCacheHit() copies rather than marking the shared cached instance, so the
first real lookup is never mistaken for a cache hit and dropped.

Backend 4631/4631, 0 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 19:18:37 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ea6a375c4b feat(security): cert-to-device binding, stage 3 GA-gated shadow
Tenant binding (stage 1) proves the client certificate was issued to this
tenant. It does not prove the certificate belongs to a device the tenant
still has: a cert lifted from a decommissioned machine keeps working.

IntuneDeviceBindingValidator resolves the Intune managedDevice id from the
certificate's Subject CN against the tenant's own managedDevices inventory.
Point-GET on managedDevices/{id} rather than an OData filter, so there is no
filter literal to inject into and a 404 is unambiguous. Cache/retry/transient
contract mirrors CloudPcDeviceValidator.

Shadow only, and visible only to Global Admins (same gate as the DevPrep
association preview) because the open question is a race, not an attack: a
device object can appear after the agent's first call. Every result carries
enrolledDateTime and the log line records enrolledAgeSeconds, so a device
created seconds before the request is distinguishable from a foreign cert.
Grep marker: CERT-DEVICE-BINDING-SHADOW.

The lookup is fire-and-forget like the DevPrep shadow so a cold Graph
round-trip never sits in the agent request path. That rules out stage 1's
request-row dimension (the row is written before the task finishes), hence
the Warning log; widening beyond preview should move to inline + dimension.

Needs DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All, granted per tenant via the
customer script as feature IntuneDeviceBinding. The script's catalog,
ValidateSet and help block stay pinned to GraphFeatureCatalog by
GraphFeatureCatalogSyncTests (extended with the help-block case).

Build 0 warnings, backend 4629/4629, web 874/874, tsc clean, eslint 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 18:26:33 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fb79c7711c fix(security): carry cert tenant binding on the request row, not a dead log line
Post-deploy verification of 249e39bc found zero AgentCertTenantBinding rows
across 32k agent requests. Cause: the Match outcome was emitted with
LogInformation, and worker-side ILogger below Warning never reaches App
Insights (provider default rule is Warning+, host forwarding of worker logs
is off). The bulk outcome was therefore invisible, which is indistinguishable
from the code never running — the shadow telemetry had no denominator.

Stamp every outcome onto the request row instead (FunctionContext.Items ->
RequestTelemetryMiddleware -> CertTenantBinding dimension). That row already
exists per request and is unsampled, so the denominator costs no extra
telemetry. Non-Match outcomes keep their Warning trace with full context.

FromCache existed only to sample the dead Match line and is removed with it.

Backend 4606/4606, 0 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 16:40:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 249e39bc68 feat(security): cert tenant binding, stage 1 shadow mode
A chain-valid Intune MDM certificate only proves "issued to some tenant" —
the pinned roots are shared by every Intune tenant. Tenant scoping rested
entirely on the device serial in the downstream validators, which is not a
secret. Bind the tenant stamped into the auth cert to the requested tenant.

The Entra tenant id sits in OID 1.2.840.113556.5.14 of the cert the agent
already presents for mTLS, so this needs no Graph call, no consent and no
agent release. Not 5.6 (Intune Account id, a different GUID) and not 5.4
(device id, stored as 16 bare bytes) — the decoder handles both encodings
and now lives once in Shared, used by agent and backend.

Stage 1 observes only: ObserveCertTenantBinding returns void and swallows
its own exceptions, so it cannot fail an otherwise valid request. Match is
logged only on cert-cache miss, keeping the denominator without per-request
volume. Grep marker for stage 2: CERT-TENANT-BINDING-SHADOW.

Backend 4604/4604, Agent V2.Core 2519/2519, 0 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 16:03:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6bd9139869 fix(agent): cert GUID parser accepts bare 16-byte extension values
Intune's MDM device cert stores the DeviceId in OID 1.2.840.113556.5.4 as a
bare 16-byte GUID with no ASN.1 wrapper, so the strict OCTET-STRING parser
bailed on the tag check and returned null. Verified against a live Intune
device cert: 5.4 is 16 raw bytes, while 5.6 / 5.11 / 5.14 carry the usual
04 10 wrapper.

- ParseGuidFromAsn1OctetString -> ParseGuidFromExtension (the old name no
  longer describes what it parses); both encodings now handled, with the
  shared LE-GUID construction pulled into ToGuid(). The forms cannot
  collide: a wrapped 16-byte GUID is always >= 18 bytes.
- Document the Intune MDM cert OID arc on the class: 5.4 DeviceId,
  5.6 Intune AccountId (NOT the Entra tenant), 5.14 Entra TenantId,
  5.11 undocumented GUID, 5.15/.16/.17/.18/.19/.23 INTEGER enums.
- 13 tests pinning both encodings plus the malformed-input rejections,
  including a bare GUID whose first byte is the 0x04 OCTET STRING tag.

No behaviour change for the MS-Organization-Access probe the agent uses;
TryGetTenantIdFromCert is untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 14:41:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 73373a2c9e feat(agent): compiled-in fallback rule catalogs for the no-config default
The built-in default config shipped empty ImeLogPatterns/GatherRules lists, so a
session that got neither a live fetch nor a cached config ran with the entire IME
tracking pipeline dead — no app installs, no script results, no health-script
compliance, no IME ESP-phase signals — although the agent binary carries all 37
action handlers. The scalar knobs never drift (shared AgentConfigResponse property
initializers are also the backend's fallbacks), but the catalogs cannot come from
initializers.

BuiltInConfigCatalog embeds the SAME CI-combined rules/dist artifacts the backend
embeds and serves (ime-log-patterns.json, gather-rules.json) and feeds the enabled
entries into CreateDefaultConfig. Single source by construction: each agent release
snapshots the catalog state of its own build, so the offline fallback can never
drift further than the running agent version itself. A live fetch (startup,
post-registration recovery, rotate_config) always wins. Fail-soft: a load error
degrades to the previous empty-list behaviour.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 12:14:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6d607c9045 fix(agent): network-link gate before initial config fetch + post-registration recovery
Root cause (tenant aebdce78 audit 2026-08-24, session ba828038): on boot-time
relaunches the agent starts before the Wi-Fi link is up. The Phase 4 config fetch
had no network gate (98f8114d only guarded Phase 6 registration), burned its
10/30/60s retry budget into a dead link and stranded the whole session on built-in
defaults (ConfigVersion=0) — up to ~50% of that tenant's sessions, with no
self-heal short of a manual rotate_config action. Not a version regression: rates
varied wildly per day within the same agent build; the failed requests never
reached the backend.

Two complementary layers:
- RemoteConfigService gates the initial fetch on the shared NetworkLinkWait poll
  (60s cap — longer than registration's 15s because the fetch runs first), so the
  retry budget starts on a live link. rotate_config stays ungated (latency-bound).
- Phase 6.5: after registration proves the backend reachable, TryRecoverConfigAsync
  refetches once and AgentRuntimeConfig.TryRecoverAfterRegistration re-applies the
  live config (same merge/integrity pipeline as Phase 4). LastFetch* keeps the
  original failure record; remote_config_fetch_failed reports it with a recovered
  flag at Info severity, agent_started flags remoteConfigRecovered.

Deliberately not re-run in recovery: kill-signal check (telemetry-channel control
signals cover post-registration kills) and endpoint migration (next start).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 11:53:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3af94d9dcd infra(telemetry): DCR also drops host-emitted successful SignalR dependencies
Live-verified after 0d5e2572 deploy: the worker filter removes every 404/412/409
and worker SignalR row, but the SignalR output-binding calls are emitted by the
host process (SDK rdddsc) and only reachable at ingestion.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 19:15:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0d5e2572aa perf(telemetry): one canonical request record; drop expected storage outcomes and SignalR success deps
- RequestTelemetryMiddleware: SamplingPercentage=100 per item (worker copy was
  adaptively sampled, ItemCount 2-5 on weekdays, despite host.json excludedTypes)
- StorageDependencyFilterProcessor: also drop 404/412/409 storage outcomes
  (InProc + HTTP shape) and successful *.service.signalr.net REST calls
- infra/appinsights-workspace-transforms.bicep: DCR dropping the host HTTP
  request duplicate at ingestion (timer/queue rows kept)
- docs/backend/telemetry-ingest-shaping.md; skills updated

Measured baseline 7d: ~1.3 GB/week removed, requests now 100% with tenant context.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 18:31:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 793e907e60 fix(cveindex): merge findings per CVE before upsert; bounded parallelism
One CVE commonly appears under many findings of the same report (e.g. one
RD CVE across 14 installed RD components). Each occurrence produced its own
concurrent upsert on the same PK/RK, so the stored SoftwareName/OverallRisk
was race-dependent. Collapse to one entity per CVE (highest CVSS wins,
IsKev OR-ed, OverallRisk max) and write with Parallel.ForEachAsync(8) and
per-entity fail-soft logging instead of Task.WhenAll + one outer catch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 17:52:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8e8bb66371 test(agent): thread-safe FakeSignalIngressSink (parked-tripwire CI flake)
Timer-thread Post() appended to a bare List while the test polled it in a
SpinWait foreach -> 'Collection was modified' (run 32644425162, no assert
text). Posted now returns a locked snapshot.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 16:28:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7e1389cf32 fix(ratelimit): keep history and lock in one cache entry; drop leaking per-key lock map
Both sliding-window limiters re-Set the cache entry without its eviction callback.
The replaced entry fired the callback asynchronously, removing the per-key lock while
a new one was already handed out, so two threads could mutate the same List under
different locks; the replacement entry never cleaned its lock, leaking one object per
key for the process lifetime.

The history now lives in a RequestBucket together with its own lock: same list ⇒ same
lock, no callback, no dictionary. Bucket creation is serialized (GetOrCreate is not
atomic) behind a lock-free TryGetValue fast path. The redundant re-Set is gone — the
lookup already refreshes the sliding expiration.

Concurrency tests (16 threads × 500 requests, one key) fail 3/3 on the old code and
pass on the new one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 16:26:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3a89319472 feat(telemetry): startup duration metrics for backend and MCP
StartupTelemetryService emits BackendStartupMs (process start ->
ApplicationStarted) and BackendTableInitMs as App Insights custom
metrics with version/commit/tableInitFullPass/instance dimensions;
TableStorageService exposes LastInitialization. MCP server writes one
{"type":"boot","readyMs"} stderr line per start next to the
tool_call lines so cold-start time is queryable as a trend.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 16:04:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b37e6f975c perf(startup): table schema sentinel gates CreateTableIfNotExists pass
Cold start point-reads a SHA-256 over TableNames.All stored in
AdminConfiguration/SchemaSentinel/tables instead of issuing 66
CreateTableIfNotExists calls. Missing/stale sentinel runs the full
idempotent pass once and rewrites it. SessionsIndex startup backfill
only after a full pass, behind a conditional-insert claim (one instance
under scale-out); IsSessionIndexEmptyAsync no longer treats errors as
empty. Daily maintenance runs IStorageInitializer.EnsureAllAsync to
repair out-of-band table deletions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 15:33:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach cacbd24667 feat(mcp): get_verdict_calibration response shaping (explicit nulls, minSharePct/top, omitted report)
Drop per-row window7/baseline28.sessions (duplicated trend denominators), make
reEnrollRatePct/lift always present with null = withheld, add minSharePct/top
tail trimming that never drops override-carrying rows and reports what was
omitted. Backend wire shape and admin page untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 12:51:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a157d98a40 fix(radar): verdict share regression only for backend-decided paths
First production pass alerted on agent:whiteglove_pending (two tenants in a
WhiteGlove rollout week) and agent:complete_soft (a Continue-Anyway tenant) —
customer workflow mix, not classifier drift. agent:* and register:* are now
ineligible for share_regression (still in the matrix and the silence group);
episodes opened by the broader gate re-arm on the next pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 12:32:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7fa50d09c1 perf(maintenance): one projected 35d Sessions scan shared by all rolling sweeps
The cross-tenant StartedAt-only date-range query is a full-table drain in
Table Storage; time attribution, device journeys, verdict calibration and the
calibration radar's tenant discovery each ran their own — four identical reads
per 2h tick. RunAllAsync / RunManualAsync now load the window once through
GetMaintenanceWindowSessionsAsync (MaintenanceSweepSessionProjection: the union
of the sweeps' columns, drops FailureSnapshotJson/geo/OS/diagnostics) and the
sweeps slice it by StartedAt. MaintenanceSweepProjectionEquivalenceTests pins
that every consumed field survives the projection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 12:19:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 94afc02e62 docs(okf): verdict calibration concept (VerdictPath, prior verdicts, aggregate, radar)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 11:40:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5e4c5e80be feat: verdict calibration drift radar (share / silence / evidence-gap) with ops events
Applies the rule-regression statistics (7d vs 28d, lift >=2, Wilson-separated,
small-n gates) to the verdict-calibration rows: per-path share regression,
sweep+maxlife silence-share regression (agent liveness signal) and an
absolute r6 evidence-gap gate. Episodes live in the notification tracker
(verdictcalibration|kind|path|status), fire one VerdictCalibrationDrift ops
event (operator-only, no tenant bell), re-arm under 1.5x / 15%, and surface as
alerts[] + a Drift pill in the calibration matrix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 11:39:06 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b535973531 feat: verdict calibration aggregate, GA endpoint, MCP tool and operator matrix
Daily (tenant x StartedAt date) buckets per verdict path: count, derived
attribution, 7-day re-enrollment proxy (eligible/re-enrolled), and the
correction stream attributed to the PRIOR path (admin / late completion /
other). Written by the 2h maintenance sweep after the device-journey pass,
180d retention, regenerable. Read via GET global/metrics/verdict-calibration
(GlobalReadOrAdmin, 7d-vs-28d share trend, rates withheld below n=20),
the get_verdict_calibration MCP tool, and the admin metrics section.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 11:22:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7e0c578a59 feat(backend): VerdictPath + PriorStatus/PriorVerdictPath on every session status write
Every status writer now declares the code path that produced the status
(VerdictPaths vocabulary, stamped for all statuses — unlike FailureSource
which is Failed-only), the timeout classifier returns its rule id, and a
write that overrides a prior verdict preserves it as PriorStatus/
PriorVerdictPath (admin mark, late completion, retro). Pre-instrumentation
rows derive a path read-side (VerdictPathDerivation, legacy:* when
ambiguous). Foundation for the verdict calibration aggregate + radar.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 11:06:37 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1257e0d195 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/Autopilot-Monitor 2026-08-23 09:57:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 98f8114d90 fix(classification): self-deploying profiles reconcile to Succeeded after Device Setup, never AwaitingUser
Kiosk tenant audit 2026-08-23: 836 of ~970 self-deploying sessions in one week
were parked AwaitingUser ("Account Setup 0/5") and graduated to Incomplete 51h
later although the devices were finished — the profile has no user phase, so the
classifier's rule 5 was asking for evidence that can never arrive.

- EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier: new rule 1c IsSelfDeployingProvisioned (profile flag +
  Device Setup all-succeeded + no explicit failure) => Succeeded reconcile with an
  honest reason; isSelfDeployingProfile passed by every caller (sweep stage 1+2,
  max-lifetime verdict, late-telemetry heal, legacy retro mode).
- MaintenanceService stage 1: TryReconcileSelfDeployingAsync gate before the Stalled
  marker (mirrors the WhiteGlove Part-2 gate), audit counter SessionsSelfDeployingReconciled.
- LegacyReclassificationService: new admin mode self_deploying_silent (heal-only,
  dry-run by default) + GetSelfDeployingSilentSessionsAsync for the existing backlog.
- Agent SessionRegistrationHelper: wait up to 15s for a network link and retry 6x
  (~62s) instead of 5x (~30s) so the BootTrigger relaunch on Wi-Fi no longer exits 7
  before the link is back (the mechanism that left these sessions silent).
- Tests: 6 classifier cases (gate, within/past grace, user-driven guard, failure,
  pre-Device-Setup), 2 registration tests; docs/backend/silent-session-classification.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 09:55:06 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7b3230d507 fix(web): mobile wrapping for App Details header, Software tables and SLA banner (#133) 2026-08-23 05:19:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 87b7a20223 fix(web): diagnostics path rows wrap the full path on narrow screens
Below `sm` the path owns the first line(s) and wraps in full (flex-wrap,
basis-full, break-all) with badges and controls flowing onto the next line —
a path truncated to "C:\…" is useless on a phone and a tooltip cannot be
hovered there. From `sm` up the row stays a single truncated line. The
"N file types" pill is shown on every width again now that the badge line
has room.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 04:30:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4c19be1de4 feat(web): drop Experimental/Pre-Release badges from Software Inventory & Vulnerability Analyzer
Settings section loses both pills; the vulnerability report footer keeps the
best-effort CVE matching note without the Experimental prefix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 04:26:55 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 93de130cd1 feat(diagnostics): built-in collection catalog visible in the portal, RealmJoin + Device Preparation sections gated
The diagnostics package's built-in collection is now ONE catalog in Shared
(DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.All): the agent iterates it when building the ZIP and
the backend serves the same list to the portal (GET /api/diagnostics/paths,
MemberRead), so what administrators see is exactly what the agent collects.

Agent
- New conditional sections: RealmJoin client/package/Chocolatey/per-user logs
  behind the tenant's RealmJoin Watcher toggle (mirrored onto
  AgentConfiguration.EnableRealmJoinWatcher by RemoteConfigMerger) and the Device
  Preparation bootstrapper event log behind the deterministic WDP marker (probe
  once per build, fail toward Classic). ZIP layout mirrors the disk
  (RealmJoinLogs/Windows|Choco|User). Every skip is a package-manifest line.
- Built-ins bypass DiagnosticsPathGuards by design (reviewed code); caps,
  reparse-point skip and evtx export still apply. No ConfigVersion bump.

Backend
- GET diagnostics/paths (MemberRead, JWT-scoped) with the catalog + global paths.
- MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths: global ∪ tenant dedup (trimmed, case-insensitive) —
  duplicates used to produce duplicate ZIP entry names.

Web
- Collapsed read-only built-in list (RealmJoin on/off in the tenant header,
  neutral in the Global-Admin view), one-line DiagnosticsPathRow for every entry,
  add-row above the lists; tenant context no longer fetches /api/global/config.

Tests: agent RealmJoin on/off, no user session, bootstrapper evtx, probe failure,
merger mirror; backend catalog invariants, payload shape, dedup, policy; web
builtInSectionDisplay. Docs: docs/agent/diagnostics-package.md (+index/log).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 04:09:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b8b95c7e76 refactor(web): move RealmJoin Watcher and Keep Awake from Agent Analyzers to Agent Settings
Both toggles gate collector hosts / device behavior, not IAgentAnalyzers, and
tenants looked for them under Agent Settings. RealmJoin Watcher now sits in the
Agent Collectors card, Keep Awake During User-ESP in Agent Parameters; OOBE
console detection stays with the security analyzers. Section ownership in
SECTION_FIELD_MAP and the per-section reset handlers follow, the Agent Settings
Save/Reset bar moves below both cards it saves, and the Analyzers sidebar
description names all four checks. Wire contract (AnalyzerConfiguration) and
agent are unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 04:06:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e57e081cec docs(web): Discord in notification-provider copy on about, privacy, settings and rule card
Privacy page last-updated bumped to 23 August 2026.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 02:47:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3a60186824 revert(email): drop the gradient slant row and corner cell — solid fallbacks made non-gradient clients worse
Back to the 838da4cc header: one facet gradient, three-row brand mark, 113px
band, clip-path edge for clients that support it. Clients without gradient
support get a flat band instead of band-coloured blocks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 02:30:40 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c35595503f feat(email): header slant and light corner facet without clip-path — gradients Outlook can draw
Row 1 keeps the single facet gradient and adds a top-right cell with its own
dark/light split (the corner facet); row 2 draws the slanted bottom edge as a
green/white gradient in three band-coloured cells. Pixel-measured against the
reference render: band boundaries identical.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 02:22:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 838da4cc8a fix(email): single Outlook-safe facet gradient, no bgcolor inside the brand mark
Outlook web/iOS render exactly one linear-gradient with hex colours and % stops
(multiple layers / rgba stops are dropped), and dark mode inverts cell
backgrounds but not border colours — the white cell in the mark became a black
bar. Facets are now one gradient (top-right light corner dropped), the mark's
middle row is a white-bordered div.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 02:11:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a9937e0f5d fix(email): brand mark as three non-overlapping rows — Outlook ignores negative margins
Triangle / white cell + triangle / triangle, no overlays, no transparent td
borders; matches the reference mark in a side-by-side zoom render.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 02:02:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1dc2cc9a54 fix(email): header rebuilt 1:1 from the approved banner — faceted gradients and four-edge brand mark
Verified side-by-side against the reference render (scratch header-render.html):
three layered half-plane gradients reproduce the light/dark facets, the mark is
a CSS trapezoid plus two green wedges for the slanted right edge and the
descending bottom edge. Still no images in the mail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 01:44:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach dd7ae299a8 fix(email): header restored to the approved rendering (e1de5a89 geometry)
112deg stripe gradient, 13/20/2 border-drawn mark, clip-path edge — the version
the user signed off on; later 'improvements' drifted from it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 01:23:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d96d10ccec fix(email): header matches the reference banner — mark 12/21/0 trapezoid, stripes thin/wide/thin in the proven 8-stop gradient form
Verified against the original SVG mark in a Chromium render; the gradient keeps
the exact stop count that rendered in Outlook earlier.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 01:05:12 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 457fff65f5 fix(email): brand mark back to the div border trick (Outlook paints transparent td borders white)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 00:56:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach dc45694611 docs(okf): email template overrides and image-free mail header
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 00:50:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7569061983 feat(admin): editable email templates — preview, test send and HTML override in Settings
- EmailTemplateService: override-or-built-in resolution per send (PreviewConfig
  table, partition EmailTemplates, 5-min cache, {{domainName}} placeholder,
  30k limit); send path fail-soft, admin read path strict
- GA endpoints global/email-templates/{kind} (GET/PUT/DELETE) and /test, which
  mails the effective template or an unsaved draft to the caller's tenant
  contact address
- portal: Settings → Email Templates with preview frame, test send, HTML editor
- mail header: brand mark drawn with CSS borders, no images left in the mails

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 00:50:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0f5e36db94 fix(email): exact brand mark as PNG again, stripes direction and widths match the reference
The CSS border trapezoid did not reproduce the mark's shape across clients; the
mark is brand identity, so it is the one image in the mail (empty alt). Stripes
now run top-left to bottom-right, thin/wide/thin as in the reference banner.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 00:40:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e1de5a8971 feat(email): image-free header — CSS stripes, slanted edge and border-drawn brand mark
Progressive enhancement: solid bgcolor band + text wordmark everywhere; the
brand mark is a CSS border trapezoid; diagonal stripes (linear-gradient) and the
slanted bottom edge (clip-path) render where supported and degrade to a flat
band elsewhere. No remote images left in either mail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 00:22:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a2d93e884c fix(email): native HTML header that survives blocked images
Solid bgcolor band with the wordmark as real text; only the 36px brand mark is
an image (empty alt). Replaces the full-width header PNG, which collapsed to a
bare green bar on clients that block remote images (iOS Mail).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 00:15:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 425229deee feat(email): branded header image, sign-in link, drop preview banner in welcome/farewell mails
- header is a hosted PNG (www/email/header.png, rendered from the brand mark +
  wordmark) on a solid bgcolor band; mail clients drop CSS gradients, which left
  the old header white
- welcome mail links "sign in" to the portal, active-development banner removed
- em dashes replaced with en dashes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 23:55:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8675e7ee06 feat(backend): provider-neutral EmailService on Mailchimp Transactional (Mandrill), replaces Resend
- EmailService + IEmailService: Mandrill messages/send via typed HttpClient with the
  Notification resilience policy; provider confined to one transport method and the
  Email:* settings (ApiKey, Endpoint, FromAddress, FromName). Resend NuGet dropped.
- open/click tracking explicitly off; sent/queued/scheduled = ok, rejected/invalid = warn
- callers (TenantApprovalService, PreviewWhitelistFunction) depend on IEmailService
- EmailServiceTests pin wire format, result semantics and fail-soft contract
- privacy page + OKF welcome-mail doc updated for the new sub-processor

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 23:26:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e857e99436 fix(web): list Generic JSON provider last in channel provider dropdown
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 21:54:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6435d5f290 feat(notifications): Discord webhook provider + HMAC signing for generic webhooks
Discord (provider 30) renders alerts as a single embed with Discord's
field/length caps; actions become markdown links since webhooks cannot
post buttons. Generic JSON channels gain an optional per-channel signing
secret: requests carry X-AutopilotMonitor-Timestamp and
X-AutopilotMonitor-Signature (sha256 hex HMAC over "{timestamp}.{body}"),
computed over the exact posted JSON with same-named custom headers
stripped first. Secret is redacted for readers and restored by channel
id on save; validation enforces 16-128 printable ASCII characters.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 21:09:12 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 445ce4e75b feat(backend): 30-day retention grace period on Pro downgrade
Retention was the only enforcement point that destroyed state on a
Pro -> Community downgrade: the 12-hourly sweep clamps to the Community
cap at read time and would immediately start hard-deleting the
90-365-day band (trial expiry identical, silently).

New policy: for 30 days after losing Pro
(FeatureEntitlementCatalog.RetentionDowngradeGraceDays) the Pro cap
keeps applying. Anchor model: ProDowngradedUtc (backend-only field,
patch-denied + revert-protected) stamped/cleared by the plan endpoint's
new pure ApplyPlanChanges core on EFFECTIVE-edition transitions (covers
explicitly ended trials; a planTier downgrade under an active trial
deliberately does not stamp); trial expiry anchors read-time via
TrialExpiresUtc. days<=0 (infinite) stays untouched.

Ops visibility: TenantPlanDowngraded (PATCH handler, new OpsEventService
dep) plus TenantRetentionGraceExpiring/Ended from the daily
TrialExpirySweep with the same stateless window mechanics, emitted only
when stored retention exceeds the Community cap; all dual-registered in
the web OPS_EVENT_TYPES catalog. Fanout now uses its _utcNow seam
instead of inline DateTime.UtcNow. OKF doc
backend/plan-downgrade-retention-grace.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 21:00:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4e54ffe4b4 feat(web): shared plan cards, public /plans and /buy pages
Community/Pro comparison cards extracted into a shared module
(components/plans: planData.ts as single copy source, PlanCards.tsx with
marketing/portal surfaces) so the portal Plan section and the new public
/plans page can never drift. Pro price is one constant (null renders
"Pricing - announced soon").

New public pages following the /help pattern: /plans (free-first
messaging, nav item "Plans") and /buy (direct purchase + Microsoft
Marketplace as coming-soon channels). Landing nav, footer, FinalCta and
get-started now link to /plans instead of the docs plans page; portal
Plan section links to /buy via absolute www URL. Purple utilities
neutralized inside .dark .landing-v2; sitemap/robots/lastmod cover
/plans, /buy and the previously missing /help.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 19:46:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 65d45a616e feat(web): Community Edition tag under navbar wordmark
Community tenants see a small "Community Edition" line under the brand
wordmark as a standing reminder (and nudge toward upgrade options); Pro
tenants (incl. trial) keep clean chrome. Label renders only after the
feature-flags fetch confirms the edition - no flash for Pro while loading.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 19:38:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4aa1f07fbb feat(web): green welcome accent + session-dismissable dev banner with telemetry
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 19:17:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ede616444a fix(web): honest skip/uninstall/pending semantics in Download/Install Progress
IME reports skips and uninstall enforcements through the same completed
events, so both panels counted them as successful installs/downloads and
their pills contradicted the app_tracking_summary headers (session 502274b4:
"2 of 8 installed" vs "6 completed").

- Install fold: app_install_completed with state Skipped -> Skipped;
  successful uninstall intent -> new terminal state Uninstalled with its own
  pill and neutral row badge; completed now counts only real installs.
- Download fold: rows are classified by observed byte activity, never by
  intent (Win32 uninstalls re-download the full package and stay visible
  with an Uninstall badge); 0-byte rows sit behind a "no download" toggle.
- Both panels render tracker-known pending apps (summary pendingNames)
  behind a "pending" toggle, so every "X of Y" header fully adds up.
- Headers wrap on narrow screens (flex-wrap + gap instead of space-x).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 18:42:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 61a359ee54 feat(web): public /help page for support channels
Adds www.autopilotmonitor.com/help as a mail-linkable page describing how
to get help: Report Session in the portal for session-specific problems,
GitHub Issues for everything else, LinkedIn for private contact, plus
self-service links (docs, FAQ, announcements, changelog) and the private
security-advisory path. Registered as public path in hostRouting (guard
test pinned) and linked from the site footer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 18:12:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach babc89c776 fix(backend): park silent WhiteGlove Part-2 sessions as AwaitingUser instead of Stalled
fairstone.ca analysis 2026-08-21: after the reseal-reboot technicians routinely
power devices off at the logon screen to box them. Both silence paths (2h
maintenance sweep, agent stall probe) then labeled the expected parking state
"Stalled - Agent silent", and stage 2 later reconciled it to Succeeded on the
Part-1 whiteglove_complete with a reason claiming Account Setup completed.

- EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier: shared pure gate IsWhiteGloveAwaitingUser
  (pre-provisioned + ResumedAt + Device Setup provisioned + zero user evidence
  since resume) with one canonical customer-facing reason; new rollup field
  HasEnrollmentComplete separates real completions from Part-1 whiteglove_complete
- ClassifyTimedOutSession: gated sessions are AwaitingUser within grace and
  reconcile past grace with an honest WhiteGlove reason; on resumed sessions
  whiteglove_complete no longer counts as terminal-complete evidence (rule 2),
  so partial user progress falls through to the honest AwaitingUser/Incomplete rules
- MaintenanceService stage 1 + session_stalled ingest mapping apply the same
  gate (fail-soft to Stalled); sweep audit now carries SessionsAwaitingUser
- Callsites (stage 2, max-lifetime verdict, late-telemetry reconcile, legacy
  reclassification) pass IsPreProvisioned/ResumedAt through

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 22:30:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a2f448cad0 fix(web): day-scale duration formatting in network timeline
fmtDuration rolls hours into days above 24h ("768d 8h" instead of
"18440h 58m") - minutes are noise at day scale. Surfaced by the first
fleet session with a CMOS clock years off (0bd4af1c, 2024 -> 2026 step);
also keeps the slanted clock-marker label inside its headroom. Test
pinned on the real fleet delta.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 21:05:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f15e115dea fix(sessions): backfilled system-timeline events no longer anchor StartedAt/duration
Field case d0c5b672: a pre-agent system_clock_changed event (backfilled from
the Windows event log with its original timestamp, ~14min before the first
real activity) became the partition's earliest row and re-anchored the
session's StartedAt, inflating the duration toward pre-enrollment OOBE idle
time. With the watcher's 24h backfill lookback, the 2h backward-shift guard
only caps this effect, it does not prevent it.

SystemTimelineWatcher rows (clock steps, sleep episodes) are environment
observation, not enrollment activity, and are now excluded from all three
anchor derivations: the Events-table earliest-row probe (new
IsSessionAnchorEligible, probe scans past ineligible rows), the ingest
batch's EarliestEventTimestamp fold, and the web's client-side
enrollment-duration derivation. The events themselves stay on the timeline
unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 20:18:57 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 977c5fb447 fix(web): headroom + symmetric insets for network-timeline marker labels
A left-edge "Clock -3h 0m" label collided with the HTML legend above the
band (first live fleet session d0c5b672). Marker-label headroom grows to
48 units so long labels stay inside the SVG, and the drawing content is
now inset 64 units on BOTH sides - the left inset mirrors the existing
right one, giving edge labels room and a calmer, symmetric frame.

Verified against the live session carrying the first system_clock_changed
event (backfilled step -> marker only, no rebase, as designed).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 20:14:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 27fdd19568 feat(agent): optional Delivery Optimization GroupId from network fingerprint
EnableDoGroupIdAutoSet (ConfigVersion 40, default off): the agent seeds the
DOGroupId policy value with a deterministic GUID derived from the default
gateway's IPv4 + SendARP MAC, RealmJoin-compatible byte layout so mixed
fleets peer together. Foreign DOGroupId/DOGroupIdSource policies always win
(ownership tracked via StartupEventGate fingerprint); no random-GUID
fallback. New do_group_id_auto_set event, portal toggle, admin report row,
manifest/catalog sync, OKF doc. Gateway heuristic deduplicated into
NetworkInterfaceLocator.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 20:09:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 72f7adcb3d feat(web): clock-era axis + sleep segments in network timeline
Consume the two new agent events:

- system_clock_changed: live-observed steps (timeDeltaMs authoritative,
  >=30s; sub-30s NTP nudges ignored) split the stream into clock eras and
  rebase every later timestamp by the cumulative delta, so the axis shows
  true elapsed time. Backfilled steps (pre-agent, replayed from the event
  log) are marked but never rebased. Each step gets a slanted "Clock +1h"
  lifecycle marker with old->new time and reason in the tooltip.
- system_sleep_episode: episodes (emitted retroactively at wake) carve an
  "Asleep" segment out of the active network instead of attributing the
  quiet period to it; tooltip carries kind (Modern Standby/sleep), wake
  source and AC/battery. Episode boundaries get the same era correction
  as the event that carried them.

Stats row gains "Asleep total" and "Clock changes"; the event list
includes both new types (now titled "Network & system events").

Layout: drawing content stops 64 units short of the right viewBox edge
(CONTENT_W), so right-edge lifecycle labels slant up-right like all
others instead of flipping left.

7 new vitest cases pin era rebasing (live/backfilled/nudge), sleep
overlay incl. era-corrected boundaries, and hotspot confidence.

Live verification against fleet data pending - the emitting agent was
released minutes ago; no session carries the events yet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 19:57:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 06cf1c4c12 feat(agent): system timeline watcher — clock steps + sleep episodes as ground truth
Two enrollment blind spots become timeline ground truth from the System event
log via one EventLogWatcher (WindowsUpdateTracker pattern, 24h backfill with
RecordId watermark recovering pre-agent records):

- system_clock_changed (Kernel-General 1): oldTime/newTime/signed timeDeltaMs,
  reason and the setting process. 2s floor suppresses w32time 1ms micro-slews;
  steps >= 5min are Warning + immediate upload. Payload instants are the
  authoritative source (event timestamps can be clamped server-side).
- system_sleep_episode (Power-Troubleshooter 1 classic sleep/hibernate,
  Kernel-Power 507 Modern Standby; 506 deliberately unconsumed): kind,
  enteredAt/exitedAt, durationSeconds, wake source / AC state. 60s real-sleep
  floor filters Modern Standby screen-off scenarios.

ConfigVersion 39 (Collectors.EnableSystemTimelineWatcher +
SystemEventBackfillLookbackMinutes). Both types are non-activity on agent and
backend (idle/stall clocks unaffected; a sleeping device stays Stalled).

Consumers: TimeJumpBadge gains the ground-truth cause "clock-set"
(classifyTimeJump matches backward display steps against recorded clock sets);
EventTimeline badge blocks for both events plus the previously bare
power_state_change; SessionInfoCard keeps the wall-clock duration and adds a
standby note; TimeAttributionCalculator builds SleepSpans (RebootSpan clone,
AttributionVersion 3) persisted as SleepSeconds/SleepSpansJson and rendered in
TimeAttributionLane; ANALYZE-DEV-012 (info, single) fires once per session for
episodes >= 5min - deliberately the only new rule, clock findings stay with
DEV-008 to avoid duplicate-finding flood.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 19:41:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e612c69178 feat(web): feature-form default for the grant command + docs link
The generated PowerShell command now uses the readable -Features form
(first catalog feature as the example) instead of raw permission strings;
a note below lists all available values incl. the All meta-feature and
how to fall back to -Permissions via Copy permissions. The section links
to the Optional Graph Permissions customer docs (via DOCS_URL registry),
and the "What this script does" bullet reflects the Cloud Shell
ambient-identity sign-in. Script help no longer claims the admin UI
generates the -Permissions form.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 19:27:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 829a841d9b feat(web): slanted inline labels for network-timeline lifecycle markers
The gray lifecycle dots (Reboot / Desktop / Completed) were hard to hit
and mute without hovering. Their label is now written directly at the dot,
slanted up-right (flipping up-left near the right edge so it stays inside
the drawing), with the band shifted down to make headroom. The whole
marker group (line, dot, label) shares an enlarged invisible hit target,
and a label is suppressed when its neighbor sits too close - the tooltip
still carries the details.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 19:09:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 10eedded13 feat(web): confidence tier for network-timeline hotspot badge
An SSID matching the typical iPhone hotspot name (".. iPhone") is strong
evidence on its own — such networks now get a plain "Hotspot" badge, while
subnet-only evidence keeps the hedged "Hotspot?". Tooltip and footnote
explain the distinction; detection also fires on iPhone-named SSIDs
outside the Apple hotspot subnet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 19:00:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a9f6ccd86d feat(web): power + network status chips on the progress portal
Taskbar-style chips in the progress page status header showing the
device's last-reported power state (AC/battery with percent, low-battery
warning) and network state (WiFi with SSID tooltip + signal tiers,
Ethernet, offline). Derived purely client-side by folding the event
stream the portal already downloads (power_state_check/change,
network_interface_info, network_state_change, wifi_signal_info) - no
backend, API, or auth change. Chips render only while InProgress and
disappear gracefully for sessions from agents without these events;
devices without a battery show no power chip (Windows-tray parity).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 18:56:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7ba67df1a1 Agent instructions 2026-08-21 18:39:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e214e8dc1a feat(scripts): -Features All meta-value grants every optional permission at once
All is a script-side convenience that expands to every GraphFeatureCatalog
feature (works with -Revoke too). The catalog sync test now pins All in the
ValidateSet while keeping it out of the catalog comparison, and the admin UI
mentions the shorthand next to the generated grant command.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 18:32:48 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f8d0ccd2f5 feat(web): per-session network timeline page + device-details deep link
New /sessions/network-timeline?id=&tenantId= page visualizing every network
the device was on during enrollment: one colored segment per network
(Ethernet / WiFi SSIDs, fixed-order validated palette), hatched offline
gaps, ESP phase context lane, lifecycle + connectivity-check markers with
hover/tap tooltips, stats row and the raw network event list.

Segment model derives from network_interface_info + network_state_change
(before/after), enriches SSIDs from wifi_signal_info, infers missing
post-reconnect SSIDs via matching gateway, and flags probable smartphone
hotspots from vendor-default subnets (Apple 172.20.10.x, Windows
192.168.137.x, legacy Android 192.168.43.x) - always as a heuristic badge.
Axis is honest: linear per segment, minimum width for short segments,
boundary ticks show real times. Mobile scrolls horizontally.

Entry point: "Network timeline" deep link in DeviceDetailsCard's Network
section via new networkTimelineUrl() builder. Route registered in the SWA
config (exact routes before the /sessions/* wildcard, incl. the index.txt
RSC route) and excluded from LegacyPathRedirect's /sessions/{id} rewrite
via the new static-siblings set (test pinned).

Planned follow-up once the agent emits them: clock-change events (rebase
axis into clock eras) and standby/Modern-Standby events (render sleep as
its own segment kind).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 18:26:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c9701301ea feat(scripts): Cloud Shell ambient-identity sign-in for Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn
Try Connect-MgGraph -Identity first (Azure Cloud Shell issues a delegated
token for the signed-in admin, avoiding the device-code flow that
Conditional Access commonly blocks), probe Graph readability, and fall
back to interactive sign-in with explicit scopes otherwise. The
AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All scope guard now applies only to the
interactive path, since ambient-identity tokens carry a fixed scope set.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 18:24:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ba2a390a83 fix(agent): battery-instance fallback for the dead Win32_PowerManagementEvent provider
On Windows 11 24H2/25H2 (observed on builds 26200 and 26220, session
161b838c) the MS_Power_Management_Event_Provider is still registered in the
WMI repository but activating the extrinsic push query fails with
WBEM_E_NOT_FOUND - the legacy provider no longer loads on exactly the OS
builds new devices enroll with, so the power watcher degraded fleet-wide.

Arm chain: try the push event first (still alive on older builds), then
fall back to the intrinsic __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 30 on
Win32_Battery. The WITHIN sampling runs inside WinMgmt, not in the agent;
the handler path is unchanged (payload ignored, re-probe + diff), worst-case
detection latency ~35s incl. debounce. collector_degraded now fires only
when BOTH attempts fail; the arm log line names the active mode.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 15:49:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach dbd7d2ac6f Page-Size-Option „5" 2026-08-21 15:26:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8f24876682 feat(agent): live power-state watcher + battery analyze rules DEV-009/010
Event-driven AC/battery observation during enrollment (no polling): a WMI
Win32_PowerManagementEvent (EventCode 10) push subscription re-probes
GetSystemPowerStatus and diffs snapshots through a pure tracker into
power_state_change events - transition ac_to_battery (Warning, immediate) /
battery_to_ac (Info) / threshold_crossed at 50/30/15% (per-level lifetime
latch, lowest-crossed-only on jumps, arm-time baseline covers sessions
starting low, 5s trailing-edge debounce, emission cap 20). Never armed on
devices without a battery; arm failure surfaces as collector_degraded.
Kill-switch Collectors.EnablePowerStateWatcher (ConfigVersion 38).

power_state_change is classified non-activity on both sides
(SignalActivityClassifier + IsPeriodicOrStallEvent) so battery drain can
neither keep idle collectors alive nor heal a Stalled session.

New analyze rules, both with on_event:power_state_change interim triggers
and deliberately single-required-condition (event_data conditions scan
events independently - no same-instance join):
- ANALYZE-DEV-009 (high): thresholdPercent equals 15
- ANALYZE-DEV-010 (warning): transition equals ac_to_battery

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 15:24:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2d5ee887d7 fix(web): make rule JSON paste-import lossless in both rule editors
The JSON editors serialize the FORM object, but what users paste is usually a
rule EXPORT (e.g. received from another tenant). The create/edit whitelists
rebuilt collector parameters and evaluateOn from form fields the export does
not carry, so a pasted gather rule silently lost every collector parameter and
a pasted analyze rule silently reverted to the enrollment-end default.

Both rules pages get a single shape-tolerant mapper in types.ts:

- gatherRuleToForm unflattens the nested parameters object (authoritative when
  present, so edit-merge leftovers cannot leak), maps nullable rule fields to
  form defaults, imports a missing emitMode as 'always' (the rule's actual
  behavior) instead of the empty-form on_change default, and now also backs
  startEditing so edit and paste share one mapping.
- analyze jsonToForm maps evaluateOn onto the eval* checkboxes (an explicit
  evaluateOn wins over stale form flags in edit-mode merges); terminal-only
  exports fall back to the enrollment-end default.
- tags and the folded effective markSessionAsFailed now survive the import:
  both forms carry tags into the create/save payloads, analyze creates carry
  markSessionAsFailedDefault. notify/notifyChannelIds stay excluded — channel
  ids are tenant-specific.

9 new vitest cases pin both shapes, the merge precedence, and the round-trips;
full web suite 824/824, tsc and eslint clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 14:29:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 81c14bb3ed fix(rules): close the rule-ID namespace gaps around the shared global keyspace
Custom rules are tenant-partitioned and functionally collision-free, but three
surfaces still keyed on the bare non-unique ruleId string:

- RuleStats global aggregate (global_{ruleId}) summed same-ID custom rules of
  unrelated tenants (title/severity last-writer-wins). The global row is now
  catalog-only: analyze gates on IsBuiltIn/IsCommunity, gather gates on the
  reserved-namespace pattern (agent events carry no flag; custom rules can
  never occupy the reserved pattern).
- The 'never ship a built-in in the CUSTOM namespace' commitment from
  RuleIdPolicy was documented but unenforced: combine.js now fails on
  duplicate or non-reserved built-in IDs, BuiltInRuleCatalogPolicyTests pins
  the same invariants on the embedded catalog, and the GitHub reseed rejects
  non-reserved IDs before writing to the global partition.
- DeleteRuleStatesForRuleIdAcrossTenantsAsync (cross-partition delete by bare
  RowKey) now refuses IDs outside the reserved namespace with failed=-1 so
  callers abort the follow-up global catalog delete.

Verified: prod global partitions (45 analyze + 11 gather) are fully inside the
reserved namespace, so the guards touch no existing data. New OKF doc
docs/rules/rule-id-namespace.md captures the identity/collision model.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 14:13:46 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3a0bd74b12 fix(backend): sequence the synthetic vulnerability_report event instead of defaulting to 0
The async queue correlation stored the event with Sequence 0, sorting it to
the top of the timeline (and tripping the time-jump badge) even though it
arrives last. Follow the BuildSessionTimeoutEvent/BuildAgentEmergencyBreakEvent
pattern: max+1 so it sorts last; WhiteGlove Part 1 anchors at the Part-1
terminal markers so a late device_setup report can never cross the web
timeline's sequence-based Part-1/Part-2 split. Also upsert the EventType
index the queue path never wrote, making the event visible to cross-session
search.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 13:57:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 50e7590060 feat: app install durations measure the status-defining attempt
The IME processes the ESP app list in multiple passes (device-ESP evaluation
ending Skipped, real install up to an hour later), and AppInstallSummary
folded first observation -> last terminal across them: a 23-second app late
in the queue reported 4002 s (session 44862cd3, "Set TimeZone").

Backend ingest: new max-folded LastAttemptStartedAt anchors DurationSeconds
(CompletedAt - last attempt start; legacy rows without the anchor keep the
span fallback), replay-guarded additive InstallPassCount, attempt-scoped
DownloadDurationSeconds pairing, and a weaker-terminal guard (completed with
state Skipped/Postponed never overrides Installed/Error, in-batch and in the
cross-batch reconcile). StartedAt stays the earliest-wins window/version-
ordering key. AppsDashboardProjection carries the new columns.

AppVersionRegressionRadar: cutover gate — only attempt-anchored rows enter
the duration population on BOTH comparison sides, so mixed-semantics medians
can neither mask real regressions nor falsely re-arm active episodes.

Time attribution: per-pass segment pairing replaces the first-start ->
last-terminal hull. An app's seconds = sum of its ACTIVE segments (failed
attempts and evaluation passes count; inter-pass idle gaps don't), occupancy
merges the segments, hull endpoints remain for display and what-if bounds.

Agent: a terminal->active transition re-arms BOTH timing endpoints, so event
payload durationSeconds also describes the attempt.

Web/PDF/MCP: labels and tooltips say "install time (final attempt)", the
apps sessions table gets a xN multi-pass chip, the time-series chart carries
a cutover footnote, MCP tool descriptions document the semantics split
between get_app_install_metrics and get_time_attribution.

No backfill: pre-cutover rows keep span values (documented in the public
changelog). OKF doc: docs/backend/app-install-duration-attempt.md.

Suites: Functions 4383, Agent 2407, MCP 564, Web 814 - all green, build 0/0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 13:40:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 61e53a2e9b feat: lead duration cards with median + P90 instead of outlier-skewed average
Enrollment durations are heavily right-skewed; a handful of overnight/WhiteGlove
outliers made the Fleet Health and Dashboard average cards read like hours
(541 min) and answer no real question. Both cards now lead with the median
(robust 'typical enrollment' answer) and keep the tail visible via a P90
subtext. AvgDurationMinutes stays in both DTOs for API compatibility.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 12:49:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7e7b6f8086 fix(backend): declare LastIngestAt in the SessionsIndex manifest
bbc7a1d8 stamped LastIngestAt into IncrementSessionEventCountAsync's merge
entity intending it as Sessions-only ("deliberately not mirrored"), but that
same entity flows through SyncSessionIndexAsync into the index merge — the
field was already landing in SessionsIndex on every ingest batch, just
undeclared. The fail-soft drift guard has been warning ~1,200x/h in prod
since the 08-20 deploy, and a StartedAt-shift full rebuild would silently
drop the column, making index-served session reads lose lastIngestAt that
Sessions-served reads carry.

Declare it properly instead of suppressing: ConditionallyProjected in
SessionIndexFieldManifest, projected in BuildSessionIndexEntity (read side
MapToSessionSummary already handled it), sample value pinned in the
bidirectional manifest tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 01:54:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2e20476559 feat(agent): extend RealmJoin timeout while first deployment is demonstrably active
The 60-min RealmJoinTimeout deadline arms at RJ detection (the RJ agent MSI
install during DeviceSetup) and used to cut off monitoring mid-install: report
55e6afd61c9d (session 46a96078) lost the tail of a large package catalog whose
last observed package completed 3 seconds before the deadline, with the first
deployment only starting 16 minutes into the window.

When the deadline now fires with LastDeploymentPhase 100/101 and deployment
activity (phase change or package observation, persisted restart-safe in
RealmJoinFacts.LastActivityUtc; the detection-time phase capture deliberately
does not count) inside the last 60 min, the handler re-arms to
lastActivity + 60 min instead of timing out — Info event
realmjoin_timeout_extended — clamped at an absolute cap of detection + 4 h.
realmjoin_timeout carries a reason payload (hard_timeout / inactivity /
absolute_cap); a fire of a deadline incarnation superseded by a re-arm
dead-ends via the OccurredAtUtc == DueAtUtc scheduler contract. The idle case
(no activity ever) still times out at 60 min, and phase-200/210 activity never
extends. Packages are only registry-visible at completion, so the inactivity
window keeps the full original 60 min.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 01:11:48 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 990641b19e feat: P14 - per-upload-batch send time separates spool delay from clock offset
Agent stamps X-Send-Time-Utc (device clock, ISO-8601 round-trip) per upload
ATTEMPT; ingest parses it (year>=2000 guard, deliberately no upper clamp) and
server-stamps SentAt onto every event of the request. SentAt - OccurredUtc is
pure spool delay, ReceivedAt - SentAt is network + device-vs-server clock
offset - previously indistinguishable and only separable via median statistics.

clock_skew condition: batches carrying SentAt measure the frame directly
(spool-immune by construction - no spread cap, IME/clamped exclusions
irrelevant, IME-only sessions become measurable; evidence sentAtBatchCount);
legacy batches keep the per-event median path unchanged. CmTraceSkewTripwire
deliberately untouched: its differential median math cancels clock offset as
common mode.

Full persistence chain: Store x2 + Map, fields= projection (sentAt), MCP
get_session_events field list + rule-authoring-guide. New OKF doc
backend/send-time-frame-separation.md.

Suites: Functions 4370 (+16), Agent 2407 (+1), MCP vitest 564 + tsc 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 00:44:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3ca2f3b499 refactor(web): collapse time provenance behind an inline toggle
The labeled provenance rows duplicated values already visible in the
raw JSON dump and inflated the metadata block for every IME event. The
section is now collapsed by default behind a small "time provenance"
toggle sitting inline on the Created row (whose value it explains) -
zero extra height when collapsed, and the base label column returns to
its original width, so the default detail view is pixel-identical to
before P13. Expanding reveals the same rows, indented under Created.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 00:02:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b9fa760404 feat(web): P13 - CMTrace time provenance visible in the session timeline
The per-line self-anchoring provenance (sourceLocalTs, applied offset +
origin, observational writer offset, derived/rejected markers) reaches
the browser but was buried unlabeled in the raw JSON dump. Sequence
stays THE sort order - without exception (now pinned by a regression
test); the corrected UTC is display-only, and a backwards step of the
displayed time within sequence order is marked as information instead
of confusing the reader.

- lib/timeProvenance.ts: readTimeProvenance (camelCase/snake_case,
  tolerant of truncated payloads) + classifyTimeJump with cause
  precedence derived > rejected-source > era-offset; era-offset
  requires applied offsets on BOTH rows - it never guesses.
- TimeJumpBadge on the row AFTER the jump, computed against the
  previous RENDERED row (filters/phase boundaries respected); sky for
  known causes, amber otherwise; tooltip carries both times, the delta
  and the "true write order (sequence)" sentence. Threshold 5 min,
  field-calibrated on 20 sessions: 12/12 normal sessions show zero
  badges, the era-mixed regression session shows exactly its 6.
- Clamped chip (rare) + TIME PROVENANCE detail section: only the
  applied offset says "(applied)"; the writer offset is explicitly
  observational (sticky after era flip-backs); origin chips with
  forward-compatible fallback for unknown values.
- EnrollmentEvent gains timestampClamped/originalTimestamp (wire
  already carried them); formatUtcOffset joins lib/formatting.

Verified: 814 web tests (19 new), tsc/eslint/build clean; Playwright
against e9753578 (badges match the pre-measurement), 9f475bb2 (no
badge on line-anchored rows, detail section correct, raw mode shows
exactly the one predicted jump).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 23:54:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ab61839685 feat(backend): P6 split - CMTrace skew tripwire + customer clock_skew rule
Operator side: CmTraceSkewTripwire piggybacks on the terminal counter
reconcile's partition scan (zero extra reads) and compares median
ReceivedAt-OccurredUtc deltas of IME-derived vs other events. A clean
15-min-grid divergence (residual < 2 min, >=20 samples / >=3 distinct
batches per side) emits the CmTraceTimeSkewRegression ops event
(Agent/Warning, goal: never fires). Bias-dominated sessions are
suppressed; measuredWriterOffsetMinutes is never consulted (sticky
after era flip-backs). Kill switch: CmTraceSkewTripwireDisabled.

Customer side: new clock_skew analyze condition source (skewMetric
clock_jump | sustained_offset, threshold seconds, gt/gte magnitude)
behind built-in ANALYZE-DEV-008 (300 s = the Kerberos/Entra 5-min skew
boundary). Batch-median frames with spool-spread filter, plateau step
detection (a gradual backlog-drain ramp cannot fake a jump) and
end-state persistence; IME-derived events are excluded so a CMTrace
anchoring regression can never fire the customer rule. Evidence carries
field=skewSummary/value for {{skewSummary}} interpolation.

Full mirroring chain: schema enum + skewMetric property, shared
manifest + combine.js regeneration, MCP authoring guide + semantic
lint, web SOURCES/form/card, ops-event dual-register, docs. P5 is
subsumed by the tripwire. PercentileMath is now the single nearest-rank
implementation (Apps/PlatformMetrics delegate).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 22:30:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 34fd40c3ad fix(agent): refuse cross-file calibration anchors, make rejections visible
Field forensics from the 1412 verification run (session 067797d8): the
label/anchor crossing recurred on a provably genuine binary, and the
new anchor-timestamp tripwire delivered — the "+02:00 measured for
IntuneManagementExtension.log" anchor (local 19:51:26.948) does not
exist in ANY log file on the device, and IME.log never produced its
expected first measurement during 24 s of growing passes beforehand.
Mechanism still unexplained; per-line anchoring keeps resolution
immune (all 58 line-anchored events of the session were correct), but
the observational layer must convict the culprit next time:

- CalibrateFrom now receives the iteration's ACTUAL file name next to
  the calibration key. A mismatch — the smoking gun the two field
  occurrences imply but static analysis says is impossible — logs a
  Warning with both names plus the anchor, and refuses the anchor, so
  even the unexplained path can no longer poison the measurement store.
- The first calibrator rejection per file logs at Debug (anchor local
  time + clock). The 24 s of silent non-measurement is exactly what
  made the phenomenon undiagnosable from the agent log.

232 IME tracker tests green against a verified-clean build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 20:18:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a0eb1b9e35 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/Autopilot-Monitor 2026-08-20 19:45:40 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9d677db2a8 docs(okf): CMTrace time resolution — per-line self-anchoring concept
Why the reader-zone assumption and the per-file offset application both
failed, the per-line self-anchoring rule with its strict freshness
contract (LastCheckedUtc on every poll look, 30 s window, no freshness
across restarts), the provenance vocabulary that keeps every event
re-derivable, and the documented limits: the bounded grid-replay edge,
snapshot readers staying on the marked fallback, and the still-open
e9753578 label/anchor crossing with its tripwire.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 19:28:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c728a0bd41 feat(backend): surface genuine agent binary-integrity mismatches as ops events
IntegrityCheckFailed emergency reports used to land in App Insights
only — session e9753578's agent reported a hash mismatch and no product
surface showed it, which cost a day of mis-attributed root-causing.
They now materialize as an AgentBinaryIntegrityMismatch ops event
(Warning, Agent category, dual-registered in the web alert-rule
catalog per feedback_ops_event_types_dual_register).

With suppression for the KNOWN, accepted release race the operator
correctly called out: around every release, agents compare against
hash snapshots that do not belong to their own binary — an older agent
sees the new release's hash on its next config fetch, and a freshly
installed latest agent can receive the PREVIOUS release's hashes from
the 5-minute AdminConfiguration cache (e9753578: genuine 1410 exe
checked against the cached 1409 hash — proven by the 1409 archive
logging "verified OK" with exactly that hash). Both self-heal via the
forced self-update and are suppressed at materialization time against
the CURRENT config: reported running hash == published exe, or
reported version != latest. What remains — an agent claiming the
latest version whose binary is NOT the published one — is the real
signal: tamper, stale blob, or a build outside the release pipeline.
Missing config fails open to recording; visibility beats suppression.

Ops event only, deliberately no timeline event: the report is about
the binary, not the enrollment, and may precede session registration.

Backend suite 4320 green, web tsc clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 19:28:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 64336c0c89 feat(agent): resolve fresh CMTrace lines by per-line self-anchoring
The era-aware successor to the reverted per-file offset application
(04b1a7c6). At a 100 ms poll, every line of a provably fresh pass was
written essentially "now", so its own distance to the agent clock,
rounded to the 15-minute offset grid, IS its writer's UTC offset — no
cross-line state, which is what interleaved writer eras break. The line
timestamp still contributes sub-poll precision and ordering; the grid
absorbs poll latency. Origin: LineAnchored → "line-anchored".

Freshness is stricter than "the file grew": every poll look stamps
LastCheckedUtc (empty first sights included, so AgentExecutor.log
anchors from its very first content), a pass anchors only when the gap
since the last look is ≤ 30 s (FreshLineMaxAge — far above the poll,
far below the 13-minute zone where a line's AGE rounds onto the grid),
and a restart-restored bookmark deliberately carries no freshness at
all — downtime backlog must never anchor. Everything not provably
fresh keeps the uniform reader-zone fallback: wrong in absolute terms,
self-consistent for durations, and marked as such (the revert's core
lesson — partially corrected is strictly worse than uniformly wrong).

Accepted, bounded edge (characterization test): a freshly WRITTEN line
carrying a replayed timestamp aged exactly N×15 min ± 2 min anchors to
≈now — an anchored line lands at now ± 2 min by construction, and
sub-24h replays are treated as current by the historic-replay guard.

The per-file measurement stays observational (Info log +
measuredWriterOffsetMinutes) and now logs the anchor's local timestamp
as a tripwire: session e9753578 logged "+02:00 measured for
IntuneManagementExtension.log" although that file provably held no
+2-era line — a label/anchor pairing the committed code could not be
shown to produce (iteration-local anchor, single sequential call site,
green repro of the exact field scenario, no +2-capable chunk in the
window). The mechanism remains open; the resolution path is immune to
it by design, and CmTraceCalibratorFileIsolationTests pins the file
isolation so a real regression can never ship silently.

Tests: 13 new — resolves-to-T across five writer beliefs, interleaved
eras inside one chunk, first-sight/empty-first-sight/poll-gap/restart
freshness boundaries (including the nastiest backlog: exactly 30 min
old, on-grid), the grid-replay edge, and the committed two-writer-era
fixture replayed at production poll cadence across its write silences.
Agent suite 2406 green against a verified-clean build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 19:28:27 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 59c944618b test(agent): move CMTrace fixture to tests/fixtures and anonymize it
Two corrections to 3c25172d, both found by asking why the repo suddenly had two
fixture locations.

Location: committed test data lives under tests/fixtures/. I had put this one
inside the agent test project without checking, creating a second parallel home.
It does NOT belong in tests/fixtures/enrollment-sessions/ either — that is a
governed corpus of anonymized DecisionSignal JSONL for the Replay Harness, with a
schema, category prefixes and a paired-scenario-test rule that raw log text cannot
satisfy. So: a sibling corpus, tests/fixtures/cmtrace-logs/, with its own README
stating why it is separate.

Anonymization: the fixture carried three real Intune policy/script GUIDs from a
customer tenant. Point 1 of the existing fixture policy requires tenant-scoped
identifiers to be replaced, and I committed without applying it — the check
belonged BEFORE the commit, not after. Replaced with
policy-anon-NNNN-0000-0000-0000-000000000000, consistent with the tenant-anon /
device-anon / user-anon convention already in use. The all-zero GUID is a literal
in IME's own output and stays; the session ID stays as our diagnostic anchor and
is already referenced from the commit history and tasks/todo.md.

The new README carries the commit policy for this corpus, including the rules that
were implicit before: verbatim content (the parser is tested against real
formatting), a header stating what the fixture pins, versioned filenames so a
pinned test cannot silently change meaning, and .cmtrace rather than .log because
*.log is globally gitignored.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 17:54:55 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3c25172dfb test(agent): real two-writer-era CMTrace fixture from session e9753578
Captured from ImeLogs/AgentExecutor.log of the session that exposed the regression
(agent 2.0.1410; device booted on the Pacific OOBE default, agent set W. Europe at
12:13:22Z).

One file, two writer eras: 371 lines rendered at local hour 05 by a writer still
on PDT (UTC-7) and 195 at hour 14 by one already on CEST (UTC+2) - nine hours
apart, interleaved, and no line carries a bias suffix, so nothing in the file
itself says which is which. Exactly the case the per-file calibration could not
express, and the test that was missing.

Analysing the archive also turned up a SECOND, independent defect the revert
commit did not know about: the agent log reports "IntuneManagementExtension.log
writer offset measured 02:00:00" while that file contains ONLY hour-05 lines
(2022 of them, zero at hour 14). A +2 measurement is impossible from its own
content, so the calibration anchor leaked across file boundaries - files are
walked in sorted order and AgentExecutor.log precedes it. Two-eras-per-file and
anchor-leak are separate bugs; both must be fixed.

Extension is .cmtrace.txt, not .log: *.log is globally gitignored, and a fixture
has no reason to claim that extension.

Fixture only, nothing consumes it yet - the era-aware calibrator is next.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 17:47:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach eda61eaade Fix Tenant Groups layout overflowing on phones (#132) 2026-08-20 15:27:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 04b1a7c6e7 revert(agent): stop applying the measured CMTrace offset — one offset per file is wrong
Field regression, session e9753578 (agent 2.0.1410, PST-defaulted device in DE).
Five script_started events resolved 9 h early while their script_completed
counterparts resolved correctly, inflating every platform-script duration to
~32,400 s. Reverts the application introduced in e9dba11b.

Root cause: calibration keeps ONE offset per log file, but a single file can hold
lines from two writer eras. IME restarting across a timezone change leaves older
lines in the old zone and newer ones in the new zone, in the same file. The anchor
is the newest line, so its offset was also applied to the older lines, for which
it does not hold. The class doc even claimed "self-healing on writer restart" —
that reasoning only ever covered FUTURE lines, never the ones already on disk.

The more expensive mistake was the second one: correcting ABSOLUTE timestamps
without checking what depends on their DIFFERENCES. Applying the reader zone
uniformly is wrong in absolute terms but self-consistent — both ends of a duration
are wrong by the same amount, so the duration is right. Correcting only some
timestamps produced a mixed frame inside one session, which is strictly worse than
being uniformly wrong. This is the same asymmetry the original analysis described
for AppInstallSummaries (68 min reported against 8 min real) and then reproduced.

What stays, deliberately:
- Bias-carrying lines still resolve via the writer-declared offset; that path was
  never implicated.
- The measurement keeps running. It costs nothing, feeds the Info log, and is the
  field data the era-aware fix has to be built on — the first anlauf got the era
  question wrong from assumption rather than observation.
- Provenance now separates measured from applied (measuredWriterOffsetMinutes vs
  sourceOffsetMinutes). The broken event was tagged "calibrated" while carrying an
  offset that did not hold for its line; that confusion must not be expressible.
- The fallback path reports the offset it actually applied. An event stating no
  offset cannot be recomputed later, which defeats the point of provenance.

Provenance earned its keep here: 57 events measured -420 (the PDT writer) against
5 at +120 made the diagnosis a two-minute query instead of median statistics over
a session.

Next: era-aware calibration keyed on the IME-STARTED marker, which we already
track, plus a test over a log file containing two writer eras — the case that was
missing.

Agent 2393 green against a verified-clean build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 14:31:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3b59dab2df feat(agent): carry timestamp provenance on IME-derived events
Every IME-sourced event now states what the writer wrote, what offset was applied,
and how that offset was obtained:

  sourceLocalTs       raw local time, verbatim, NO zone suffix
  sourceOffsetMinutes the offset subtracted
  sourceOffsetOrigin  bias | calibrated | reader-zone-fallback

Why: until now the only record of a conversion was the converted value, so a wrong
offset was indistinguishable from a right one. Proving the field defect needed the
diagnostics archive — and of the 5,386 sessions that went through a timezone
change, essentially none had one, so the analysis had to fall back to median
statistics across thousands of sessions to establish what one stored value makes
obvious per session. It also makes a stored timestamp recomputable after the fact,
without an agent release.

No zone suffix on sourceLocalTs on purpose: the value genuinely carries none, and
formatting one in would re-introduce the assumption this whole change removes.

sourceOffsetMinutes is normalised to one sense (local = UTC + offset) across both
origins. The wire bias uses the opposite GetTimeZoneInformation convention
(UTC = local + bias), so a "+480" line is reported as -480; without that the field
would flip sign depending on where the offset came from and be useless to compare.

Added centrally in TagDerivedTimestamp, which all 14 emit sites already call, so
this does not scatter through the adapter. DataJson only — no table schema change,
so no Store/Map/seed chain and no backend deploy needed to start collecting it.

Agent 2393 / backend 4313 green against a verified-clean build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 14:05:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 389426f8f2 fix(agent): future-skew guard that a one-hour timezone error can actually trip
ResolveOccurredAt rejected a source timestamp when ageHours < -1.0. That bound
could not fire for the single most common timezone error: with a one-hour offset
mistake the real value is parseLag - 3600 s, i.e. just ABOVE -1.0. It sat exactly
on the boundary of the case it was meant to catch, which is why every skewed
session sailed past it.

It was asymmetric too — a past-shifted error had to exceed 24 h before anything
noticed, while the measured field errors reached -17 h.

The bound is now derived rather than guessed: writer and reader share one system
clock, and the tracker only sees a line after it was written, so a correctly
converted source timestamp is always at or behind "now". Anything ahead means the
conversion was wrong. MaxFutureSourceSkew is 2 minutes of jitter tolerance —
deliberately far below the hour a timezone mistake produces.

The rejection log now names which bound tripped and by how much, instead of
printing a bare ageHours that reads the same for both directions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 14:05:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e9dba11b96 fix(agent): resolve IME log timestamps with the writer's measured offset
This is the behaviour change the previous two commits prepared. ImeLogTracker no
longer substitutes its own timezone belief for the IME process's; it measures the
writer's offset from a freshly appended line and converts with that.

Freshness is stricter than "the file grew". GetSafePosition returns 0 for an
unknown file, so the first pass reads the whole file and its newest line may be
hours old — anchoring there would measure the line's age, not the writer's offset.
LogFilePositionTracker.HasSeen(), captured BEFORE GetSafePosition creates the
entry, gates calibration on growth against a size we had already observed.

Calibration runs at the END of a qualifying pass, so that pass still uses the
previously measured offset — at most one poll (100 ms) old, and an offset only
moves when a process restarts. Calibrating first would mean buffering the pass,
which is not viable: the first pass over AppWorkload.log can be hundreds of MB.
The cost is a warm-up of one growing pass, during which lines fall back to the
reader zone.

Bias-carrying lines are never used as anchors: they already state the writer's
offset, so they need no measurement and must not overwrite one.

CalibrateFrom logs at Info when the measured offset disagrees with this process's
own zone, naming the correction applied. That disagreement is precisely the
condition that silently corrupted every IME-derived timestamp until now; agreement
stays at Debug so the normal case does not add noise.

Tests are deliberately machine-independent: the assertion is always "a line
written at instant T resolves to T", asserted across writer beliefs of +2, +1, 0,
-7 and +10. That one property covers both field cases — the writer disagreeing
with us (the bug) and the writer agreeing with us (the majority of sessions, where
two stale beliefs cancel and which a fix to the agent's own cache would have
broken). Plus: no calibration on first sight, following a writer restart into a
new zone, and a declared bias honoured without being measured.

CheckLogFilesAsync is internal as a test seam — calibration depends on the pass
structure, which only a real read cycle exercises.

Agent 2390 / backend 4313 green against a verified-clean build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 13:49:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 828cbb5cd0 refactor(shared): CMTrace parser stops guessing the writer's timezone
Behaviour-neutral: 2381 agent and 4313 backend tests pass unchanged.

The parser resolved a bias-less line with DateTimeStyles.AssumeLocal followed by
ToUniversalTime(), i.e. with the READING process's cached zone. That silently
assumes reader and writer agree. They do not — each caches its zone at process
start and neither follows a later tzutil or Windows auto-timezone change — and the
assumption was buried inside a shared helper where no call site could see it.

CmTraceLogEntry now exposes what the line actually contains: LocalTimestamp
(Kind=Unspecified, because the value is meaningless without knowing the writer's
zone) and BiasMinutes. TimestampUtc is populated only when the writer declared its
bias, which is the one case where the offset is genuinely known. Timestamp is
removed rather than deprecated, so the compiler names every site that has to
decide — it immediately turned up ProcessLogMessageForTest, which grep had missed.

The defective path still exists, but now as one named function,
ResolveUtcAssumingReaderZone(), whose documentation states when it is wrong. All
three consumers call it and so keep their current behaviour exactly:
- ImeLogTracker routes every use through ResolveEntryUtc(), the single point where
  the measured offset replaces the fallback in the follow-up change;
- StallProbeCollector and LogParserCollector read file snapshots rather than
  tailing, so they cannot measure an offset and stay on the fallback for now.

The parser also no longer invents a timestamp. An unparseable time used to be
stamped DateTime.UtcNow inside the parser, making a fabricated value
indistinguishable from a real one downstream; it now reports HasTimestamp=false
and leaves the fallback to the caller, which alone knows what is safe in context
(StallProbeCollector still treats such a line as fresh — calling it stale would
hide progress).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 13:35:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 93a42ba5e4 feat(agent): measure the CMTrace writer's UTC offset instead of assuming it
A CMTrace line carries local time and no offset — IME 1.104 writes
DateTime.Now.TimeOfDay in both of its trace listeners. Converting it with the
agent's own TimeZoneInfo.Local assumes both processes agree on the zone. They do
not: each caches its zone at process start and neither follows a later tzutil or a
Windows auto-timezone change, so the error is Offset_writer - Offset_agent and is
zero only by coincidence.

Measured over 11,068 sessions: 26 carry a real zone-offset error, +1 h (GMT to
W. Europe, session bfff9b1c) through -17 h (a writer still on the Pacific OOBE
default while the agent had already moved to E. Australia). Note the sign — this
is why "make the agent's own clock honest" is the wrong fix: in the -17 h cases
the agent was correct and the writer was stale, and clearing the agent's cache
would have broken the majority of sessions where both are stale and the two errors
cancel.

The tracker tails at a 100 ms poll, so a line that appeared since the previous
pass was written essentially "now". That makes the writer's offset measurable:
round(lineLocal - agentUtcNow) onto the 15-minute grid every real UTC offset sits
on. Per source file, because IntuneManagementExtension.log and AppWorkload.log are
written by different processes; re-measured on every fresh anchor, so a writer
restart is picked up within one poll.

The freshness requirement is the load-bearing part and cannot be replaced by the
residual guard: a backlog line exactly 30 minutes old is itself a clean multiple
of the grid, rounds with zero residual, and would calibrate the offset half an
hour wrong. RejectsBacklogLine_EvenWhenItRoundsCleanly pins that the calibrator
cannot detect this on its own — only the caller's freshness rule prevents it.

Additive only; no call site uses it yet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 13:25:48 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach aaacc6ecb2 refactor(backend): order rule evaluation by Sequence, not Timestamp
Sequence is a persisted, strictly monotonic per-session counter assigned at emit
time (EventSequenceCounter: locked, saved before return, survives restarts). It is
immune to every clock problem. Timestamp carries the device clock frame plus, for
CMTrace-derived events, the writing process's timezone belief.

EvaluateAppInstallDurationCondition and EvaluateEventCorrelationCondition both
ordered by Timestamp and expressed "A happened before B" as a timestamp
comparison. Both now order by Sequence and compare Sequence for ordering.

Timestamp deliberately stays where an actual ELAPSED DURATION is meant:
durationSeconds, the evidence fields, and TimeWindowSeconds.

Scope, honestly: this is hardening, not a live bug fix. BuiltInAnalyzeRules.cs
contains zero event_correlation conditions, so the cross-frame join can only be
reached by a self-authored rule. And the app-install duration evaluator pairs
app_install_started with app_install_completed — both IME-sourced, one frame — so
its arithmetic was already correct. (The measured 68-vs-8-minute inflation comes
from EventIngestProcessor.AppInstall, which folds DO-collector download_progress
together with IME app_install_completed; that is fixed at the root in the agent.)

The TimeWindowSeconds check stays exposed: the window IS a duration, so there is
no alternative to a timestamp there. A +1 h skew on B makes any window below
3600 s fail to match. Only the agent-side calibration closes that.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 13:13:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach bbc7a1d8b2 fix(backend): agent-silence sweep must compare clock frames it owns
LastEventAt is the maximum AGENT-supplied event timestamp and therefore lives in
the device clock frame. The silence sweep compared it against a server-derived
cutoff, mixing two frames.

Measured over 11,068 sessions: 26 carry a genuine CMTrace timezone skew on their
IME-derived events, from -17 h to +1 h (a further 27 carry plain device-clock
offsets). At -17 h a live agent looks silent the moment it starts and is marked
Stalled with a customer-visible "Agent silent for 1020min"; at +1 h the sweep is
blind for an hour.

Adds SessionSummary.LastIngestAt, stamped from the server clock in
IncrementSessionEventCountAsync — reaching that method IS contact from the agent,
so it is written unconditionally rather than gated on latestEventTimestamp.

The sweep's server-side filter now spans both frames (LastIngestAt lt X or
LastEventAt lt X): filtering on LastIngestAt alone would silently drop every row
written before the field existed, because Table Storage does not match a filter
against a missing property. The authoritative decision moves into
ServerFrameLastContact() (LastIngestAt ?? LastEventAt ?? StartedAt) and is applied
in both stages — before the Stalled marker and in the stage-2 alive guard.

Deliberately not mirrored into SessionsIndex: the sweep reads Sessions, and the
index manifest is pinned bidirectionally by tests.

shared-manifests.json + .generated.ts regenerated — SharedManifestParityTests is
the drift brake and correctly went red on the new field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 13:12:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5f00124a86 fix(web): keep PDF section titles with their content, show full exit-code text
Section headings now reserve keep-with-next space (charts reserve their full
height), so a title never strands at a page bottom while its table starts on
the next page. Table cells wrap up to 4 lines instead of single-line ellipsis,
and the exit-code column carries the full error description (the 24-char slice
is gone) - that text is what the app owner acts on. Failure-code column widths
rebalanced (Code 42 / Description 62 / Exit 60 / Count 16).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 09:42:57 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d43cfe2bb3 updated last modified page 2026-08-20 09:16:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 78cc038426 fix(agent): record real bytes-down when AutomaticDecompression strips Content-Length
The pipeline's AutomaticDecompression (GZip|Deflate) removes the response
Content-Length header on virtually every backend JSON response, so
net_total_bytes_down in agent_metrics_snapshot read 0 on healthy sessions.
When the header is absent, buffer the content (LoadIntoBufferAsync, 16 MB cap)
and record the DECOMPRESSED payload size — HttpClient buffers responses anyway
(default ResponseContentRead), so no extra memory cost. Fail-soft: a buffering
error keeps 0 and leaves the failure for the caller to observe.
AutomaticDecompression itself stays untouched (pinned by
MtlsHttpClientFactoryTests).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 01:25:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ff8b847dc0 fix(backend): fold do* fields from download_progress — DO data survives IME 1.104
IME 1.104 removed the [DO TEL] log line, leaving the agent's DO collector as
the only do_telemetry source — and its gate only fires when a 3s poll itself
observes the completed download. Fast, interrupted or between-poll-completed
downloads never emit one, so DoDownloadMode stayed -1 and DoAggregator dropped
the whole row: DO bytes read as "practically null" on 1.104 fleets even though
download_progress events carried the full do* set on every poll.

- Shared ApplyDoFields for both writers: download_progress folds byte counters
  and file size via Math.Max (monotonic, replay-idempotent) and sets the mode
  only when >= 0; do_telemetry stays authoritative (last-write-wins) but never
  regresses DoDownloadMode to the -1 unset sentinel.
- DownloadBytes now prefers actually-transferred bytes over doFileSize (the
  file size used to inflate the transfer measure).

Intended effect after deploy: DO aggregates count previously-invisible
incomplete downloads, so app counts/bytes rise. No backfill of historic rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 01:25:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach aab7ae12ff feat(mcp): get_agent_efficiency_metrics tool + honest truncated + full platform pass-through
- New GA-only tool get_agent_efficiency_metrics: near-pass-through of the
  server-side per-version aggregation (120s timeout, default 500 sessions,
  optional tenantId). Added to GA_FULL + PLATFORM_ONLY catalog snapshots.
- platformWindowEcho decides truncated on the backend's sessionsScanned
  (sessions actually covered) and only falls back to the has-snapshots count
  for old backends — the previous comparison read false even when the cap was
  hit exactly, whenever some scanned sessions carried no snapshots.
- get_platform_metrics: 90s timeout (backend fans out one storage query per
  session); spool block, crashRate, deliveryLatency, computedAt,
  computeDurationMs and fromCache are no longer dropped on the MCP side;
  description clarifies totalBytesDown is the agent's own HTTP traffic.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 01:25:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 935f0e8c71 feat(backend): agent-efficiency aggregate + honest scan count + filtered metrics fetch
- New GET /api/global/metrics/agent-efficiency (GlobalReadOrAdmin, ?tenantId=):
  per-agent-version percentiles (CPU, working set, private bytes, threads,
  handles, spool, API latency/requests), crash rates per version, top offender
  sessions per dimension, 5-min cache keyed (days, limit, tenant). First
  backend consumption of agent_thread_count/agent_handle_count.
- PlatformAgentMetricsResponse.SessionsScanned: sessions the scan actually
  covered — the honest basis for the caller's truncated flag (Sessions.Count
  only counts sessions WITH snapshots).
- Per-session fetch no longer drains the full Events partition: new
  GetSessionEventsByTypesAsync (multi-type OData filter + column projection +
  real maxResults enforcement); the 20 delivery-latency sample sessions keep
  the full fetch so latency deltas stay computed over all events.
- Shared AgentMetricsAggregation (crash tally, payload getters, bounded
  fan-out, metrics event types) so the two services cannot drift.
- GetAllSessionsPageAsync gains an optional select projection (default null,
  existing callers unchanged), pinned by an equivalence test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 01:24:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 541dc32ffd feat(web): PDF export for the app install report + usage telemetry
Adds an "Export PDF" button to the app detail page that renders the full
90/30/7-day install report (KPIs, both charts, failure codes, device model
correlation, version breakdown, detection-rule/regression callouts) as a
branded A4 PDF, drawn data-driven with jsPDF — no DOM capture, so the output
is light-palette and theme-independent. jsPDF stays out of the route bundle
via on-click dynamic import (verified: separate async chunk).

Sample messages and the affected-sessions list are deliberately excluded:
the PDF is meant to be emailed outside the org.

Tracks app_report_pdf_exported in Application Insights (windowDays, scope,
durationMs, pageCount, success/errorName — chunk-load failures included).

Generic chrome (header/footer/tables/KPI cells/callouts) lives in
utils/pdf/pdfPrimitives.ts for reuse by future report exports.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 00:57:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 022cc0354b fix(engine): let the observed user-ESP skip stand in for the exit evidence
The five stuck sits-d Cloud PCs carried SkipUserStatusPage=True — verified
across three agent processes (10+ registry reads, True every time) and six
hours of live Shell-Core watching with zero 62407: Windows never rendered a
user ESP page, so no exit and no AccountSetup provisioning registry can ever
exist on this flow. Arm B of ShouldTransitionToAwaitingHello was open from
the bootstrap EspConfigDetected onward, but every evaluation site hangs off
a signal the flow cannot produce, and the AdvisoryCompletion backstop arms
exclusively from an EspExiting signal — an open gate nobody knocks on, six
hours to the max-lifetime watchdog. The earlier lost-exit-through-reboot
diagnosis is retired by the same evidence.

HandleImeUserSessionCompletedV1's completion attempt now accepts the
observed skip in place of IsPostAccountSetupFinalExit (anchor + genuine IME
user-session completion + real-user desktop stay mandatory; Device
Preparation excluded). The knock deliberately lives on the IME edge, not on
desktop arrival: Fix 10's AccountSetup bounce-back would undo a desktop-side
promotion two signals later, while the IME phase line always precedes the
user-session-complete line in log order, so a bounced promotion is
re-knocked by the very next re-emission — restart re-parse included.

Docs and comments no longer claim an ESP-exit recovery that does not exist
(stray duplicate summary in ShellCoreTracker, ImeLogHost restore-callback
comment); the OKF doc is reframed on the evidence and names the residual
SkipUser=false exit-in-downtime gap honestly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 00:40:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3aa8b95676 fix(agent): narrow the Shell-Core replay to the Hello-wizard rail
Round-four review, confirmed — and the cause sits a layer below where I had been
fixing. The IsBackfill return added last round only guarded the coordinator's own
completion logic. Upstream of it, ShellCoreTracker still raised
FinalizingSetupPhaseTriggered, the coordinator still forwarded EspExited to the
adapter before that return, and the adapter discards the args entirely
(OnEspExited(...) => EmitEspExiting()). So a replayed exit still arrived at the
reducer as an ordinary, unmarked EspExiting.

There it is decisive: HandleEspExitingV1 passes espFinalExitInFlight: true for
every arriving exit, and IsPostAccountSetupFinalExit orders exits by ingest
ordinal rather than timestamp — so a historic exit replayed today reads as
post-AccountSetup by construction. With state restored from the snapshot
(AccountSetup entered, a genuine IME user session, desktop arrived) arm C of
ShouldTransitionToAwaitingHello opens on the Device→Account handoff. The reducer
is itself a completion gate and cannot tell the two apart, so the fix has to be
upstream.

The replay is therefore narrowed to what is provably safe: the Hello-wizard start
(62404). That fact is conservative — it vetoes a premature "Hello is disabled"
skip and can never by itself complete a session, so replaying it can only make the
agent wait longer. It is also the observation session 772fe502 wrote the replay
for. A 62407 is no longer raised at all, neither exit nor failure: the exit
because Windows writes the identical description for the intermediate and the
final one and nothing downstream can order it, the failure because re-injecting it
as fresh can fail a session that recovered on retry (ANALYZE-ESP-006). Skipped
records are reported once as an agent_trace with counts and bounds — silently
dropping evidence is how this class of bug survives.

The cross-layer proof is now a pair, as the review asked:
ClassicEspExitingOnRestoredStateTests pins that the reducer opens on any arriving
exit (including one with an hour-old source timestamp), and
ShellCoreTrackerReplayScopeTests pins that the replay never produces one.

Dead machinery removed with it: EspExitedEventArgs.IsBackfill, allowEspExit, the
newest-exit selection, the IsBackfill return. The method is now called
BackfillRecentHelloWizardStart.

One pre-existing integration test drove EspExited through HandleBackfillRecord
because the replay is easier to call than the event-log watcher, and its class doc
claimed that was the production path — it never was, the replay had no caller when
that test was written. Switched to the live path and the doc corrected.

Agent V2.Core 2361, DecisionCore 538, Backend 4287, all green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 19:05:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ec945a93d2 fix(agent): bar replayed ESP exits from the completion gate entirely
Round-three review, confirmed. The previous round stopped a replayed exit from
arming the DEFERRED re-check but left the immediate synthesis attempt right below
it untouched. My justification for that — "pre-existing behaviour" — was simply
wrong: the immediate attempt on a replayed exit never existed, because the
backfill had no caller. I introduced it, and by moving the replay behind the IME
state restore I made the dangerous state reachable by design: if the newest 62407
in the window is only the intermediate DeviceSetup→AccountSetup exit while the
restored app states are already terminal, that attempt opens the strong
AccountSetup gate before the final exit has even happened. A test was pinning the
faulty assumption as expected behaviour.

A replayed exit now returns before touching completion at all — no deferred edge,
no immediate attempt. Nothing available to it can establish its position in time:
Shell-Core writes the identical description for both exits, and every probe that
could order it reads state as it is now rather than at the event's time. The
replay keeps the job it was written for in session 772fe502 — feeding EspExiting,
FinalizingSetup and the Hello wizard to the reducer for the window in which no
agent process was observing. Completion is the exclusive business of exits this
agent watched live.

With the synthesis attempt gone, the replay no longer needs restored app states,
so it moves back into EspAndHelloHost.Start(); that also keeps this host's startup
independent of the IME host's. ImeLogHost.onStateRestored goes back to doing just
the re-check, which is still needed for a live exit observed before the restore
finishes.

The test asserting the faulty assumption is inverted, plus coverage that the
replay is not neutered (EspExiting still forwards) and that a live exit following
a replayed one completes normally.

Agent V2.Core 2364, DecisionCore 533, Backend 4287, all green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 18:25:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b36cf8ff36 fix(agent): order the ESP-exit replay by evidence, size its window by measurement
Round-two review, both findings confirmed against the code.

A replayed exit was being confirmed as post-AccountSetup by reading the registry
at replay time. That read reflects NOW, not the event's time, so an agent that was
down across the DeviceSetup→AccountSetup transition would confirm the stale
intermediate exit and, once the apps settled, synthesise a completion while the
AccountSetup page was still up. Windows offers no way to tell the two apart from
the event itself — Shell-Core writes the identical description
CommercialOOBE_ESPProgress_Page_Exiting for both. So the deferred edge is now
armed by LIVE exits only (EspExitedEventArgs.IsBackfill): only for those is the
continuous-observation argument valid. A replayed exit keeps the single immediate
synthesis attempt it always had.

For that attempt to be worth anything it must see real data, so the replay moved
out of EspAndHelloHost.Start() into ReplayEspExitBackfill(), invoked from
ImeLogHost.onStateRestored — after LoadState() has restored the package states.
That is what makes "the agent came back long after the ESP finished" recoverable.

The five-minute window for non-reboot restarts was unsound: the scheduled task
carries a BootTrigger only, with no restart-on-failure, so after an
exception_crash the agent does not return until the next boot — hours later, long
after Windows wrote the final exit. The window is now measured rather than
guessed: back to the last moment the previous run is known to have been alive,
taking the wider of the snapshot mtime (rewritten every decision step, available
for every exit type) and LastBootUtc. The five-minute default is the floor,
ClampLookbackMinutes the ceiling, and a future timestamp from clock skew is
ignored instead of producing a negative window.

Also switched the backfill tests to the real Shell-Core wording — the invented
string matched the regex but hid the fact that both exits look identical.

9 new tests. Agent V2.Core 2362, DecisionCore 533, Backend 4287, all green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 18:06:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c6ee7808f1 fix(agent): scope the ESP-exit replay to restart recovery only
Follow-up to the review hardening: the replay ran on EVERY agent start with a
5-minute window, first run included. On a first run there is no gap to recover —
no earlier agent process existed — and a 62407 already sitting in the Shell-Core
log belongs to a phase transition this agent was never meant to observe. Replaying
it pushes an EspExiting into the reducer that the pre-fix agent never saw, i.e. a
happy-path behaviour change for no gain.

ResolveEspExitBackfillLookbackMinutes now keys the window to the previous exit
type: first_run (or unknown) disables the replay entirely, clean/hard_kill/
exception_crash keep the 5-minute default because the process is back within
seconds, and reboot_kill widens to "since LastBootUtc" because that gap spans the
forced restart until the post-reboot logon. The result is still clamped to
BackfillLookbackMaxMinutes, so policy and backstop together cannot build an
unbounded event-log query.

With this the happy path is byte-identical to pre-fix behaviour: on a first run
nothing replays, no edge is remembered, and the deferred re-check returns on a
volatile bool read.

No other backfill is affected — the Hello, MDM-reboot, Windows-Update and
ModernDeployment trackers each own a private backfill invoked from their own
Start(), none of which this change touches.

13 policy tests including clock skew across the reboot, a missing boot timestamp
and the clamp backstop. Agent V2.Core 2353, DecisionCore 533, Backend 4287.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 17:37:40 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b61d7023bc fix(agent): harden post-reboot completion recovery after review
Three real regressions, all confirmed against the code before touching it — two of
them introduced by the recovery itself.

The remembered exit edge was unqualified. Shell-Core raises 62407 at every ESP
phase transition, so OnEspExited also latched the DeviceSetup→AccountSetup one;
the deferred re-check would then open the strong AccountSetup gate as soon as the
last user app settled, while the AccountSetup page was still up and its other
subcategories still running. IsConfirmedPostAccountSetupExit() now demands
positive evidence (AccountSetup activity observed, or SkipUser == true) and is
deliberately stricter than the existing IsIntermediateDeviceEspExit() forward
guard: an unknown SkipUser counts as not confirmed. Erring strict costs the
pre-fix stall; erring loose costs a premature Succeeded. The immediate on-edge
synthesis keeps its previous behaviour verbatim.

The replay picked the oldest exit, not the final one. The reader walks
oldest-first and the exit branch is fire-once, so the widened downtime window —
which routinely holds both the intermediate and the final exit — handed over the
intermediate one and the fire-once guard swallowed the exit that matters.
ReplayBackfillRecords buffers the batch and lets only the newest exit-matching
record through; ESP failures and the Hello-wizard rail keep replaying
chronologically.

The replay ran before the IME state restore. ImeLogTracker.Start() restores the
persisted package states via LoadState() without raising OnAppStateChanged, and
ImeLogHost starts after EspAndHelloHost, so the replay evaluated an empty app
list — leaving the sharpest case unfixed: apps already terminal before the
reboot, only the final exit lost to the downtime. ImeLogHost gained an
onStateRestored callback wired to the re-check, and the host order is now pinned
by DefaultComponentFactoryOrderingTests so a reshuffle fails loudly.

11 new tests. Agent V2.Core 2340, DecisionCore 533, Backend 4287, all green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 17:27:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e1b03de5b3 fix(agent): recover ESP completion after a forced mid-ESP reboot
Seven sits-d Cloud PCs enrolled the same day with identical configuration
(~138 required apps at the user-ESP gate, DeviceGuard/DmaGuard device-assigned).
The two that finished AccountSetup before the coalesced reboot landed succeeded;
the five the reboot killed in Stage=EspAccountSetup never derived a completion
again and ended Incomplete on healthy devices. Two defects behind that:

ShellCoreTracker.BackfillRecentEspExitEvents() has existed since session
772fe502 but no caller ever invoked it, so the Shell-Core watcher only saw
records written after Start(). Every agent restart silently dropped an ESP exit
(62407) or Hello-wizard start (62404) from its downtime. EspAndHelloHost.Start()
now calls it, and the fixed 5-minute window is sized to the actual downtime when
the previous run died to a reboot (LastBootUtc, clamped to 360 min).

The user-apps-settled synthesis ran only on the EspExited edge. When the ESP page
exits with apps still in flight the single attempt misses and nothing re-checks —
8110e262 and a89aac2d both reached 138/138 apps, 0 failed, and still never
completed. The exit edge is now recorded and the synthesis re-evaluated from
ImeLogTracker.OnAppStateChanged. No new completion path: the gate conditions are
unchanged, this only gives the existing conservative check a second look. The
fire-once claim moves to Interlocked (edge and re-check run on different threads)
and the re-check does not re-emit app_install_starved.

Rules: ANALYZE-ESP-005 gains on_event:session_stalled so a hung session produces
a finding at the 60-minute stall instead of staying finding-less for hours
(verified against 8110e262 — fired, confidence 95). New ANALYZE-APP-016 turns the
already-emitted app_install_starved events into a customer finding and, unlike
ANALYZE-APP-015, fires even on a succeeded session: 3b9291aa was recorded
Succeeded with 99 required apps that never started installing.

ANALYZE-APP-015 and ANALYZE-ESP-001 were considered for the stall trigger and
deliberately left alone — APP-015 is the documented worked example of the
terminal-precondition trap, and ESP-001's phase_duration gate on a still-open
phase is unverified mid-run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 17:00:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 25bac34acb fix(ci): upload raw bytes, not a stringified array
The first CI run overwrote all four customer-facing scripts on the download
host and the legacy mirror with their own byte values as decimal text
(Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 went from 27331 to 95679 bytes).

PowerShell unrolls an array returned from a function into the output stream, so
the caller receives Object[] rather than byte[]. Invoke-RestMethod serialises an
Object[] body as space-separated decimals. Every hash check stayed green because
[byte[]] parameter coercion repairs the type everywhere except on the wire.
build-agent.yml's Send-Blob was never affected: it read the bytes inside the
function. Proven with a local HttpListener: the old shape puts 50 bytes starting
54,48,32,51,53 ("60 35 13 1...") on the wire where 17 bytes starting 60,35,13,10
("<#\r\n.SYN") are expected.

Fixes:
- ',' on both byte-array returns, plus an explicit [byte[]] at the upload site.
- Read each blob back from storage right after its PUT and abort before the
  mirror and the remaining files. Verifying only at the end left every blob
  corrupted.
- The version-bump guard tolerates an unparseable published copy with a warning
  instead of throwing: that is the state a republish exists to repair, and a
  guard that blocks the repair is worse than no guard.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 15:31:06 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c0be389a95 ci(scripts): version-bump guard compares behaviour, not bytes
Byte comparison made the guard fire on comment fixes, typos in comments and
reflow -- changes no consumer of the version can act on, so forcing a bump for
them is friction without a payoff.

The guard now compares a code fingerprint: the PowerShell token stream with
comments, newlines and line continuations removed. A behaviour change under an
unchanged $ScriptVersion still fails; comment and formatting changes publish
with a warning. That is also the rule the source file's own comment on
$ScriptVersion already states ("bump on meaningful changes").

Tokenising rather than regex-stripping keeps a '#' inside a string literal from
being mistaken for a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 15:15:48 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 91f9d656ae ci(scripts): publish customer scripts on push, decoupled from the agent release
The scripts behind download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/ rotated only on a
publish_as_stable run of build-agent.yml, so a bootstrap fix sat unpublished
until the next agent cutover -- while the WDP bootstrap MSI downloads the
published copy on every enrolling device.

Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 becomes the single owner of the chain: dev render
with anchor check, $ScriptVersion bump guard, uploads (eu + fail-soft legacy
mirror, no-cache), the two version oracles, and verification through the alias.
publish-scripts.yml calls it on every push to main touching the sources; the
publish_as_stable branch of build-agent.yml calls the same code, so a release
still lands a consistent set.

Blobs are published in a deterministic CRLF/UTF-8-without-BOM form. Git
normalises line endings on checkout, so raw working-copy bytes would differ per
environment and make every byte comparison -- guard and verify alike -- depend
on where the workflow ran. The form reproduces the currently published bytes
exactly.

The Pester (PS 5.1) and ASCII gates move into the reusable
bootstrap-script-gates.yml and now block the upload; pester.yml keeps the
pull-request view and drops its push trigger. AdminConfiguration
.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion gets exactly one writer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 15:09:33 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b1e7077d0a fix(agent): spool pending-bytes drift guard + WDP backstop fallback test
Codex findings on d8c84f41/a369ff99: (1) MarkUploaded now recomputes
_pendingBytes from the pending list when accounting drifts negative or
stays non-zero on an empty list — a silent negative would disarm the
spool-pressure trigger. (2) New test covers the DevicePrepCompletion
handler''s AwaitingDesktop fallback (stale/replayed timer without a
desktop fact): synthetic Hello timeout, park, and completion on the
later real desktop arrival. Third finding (HashingCappedReadStream
maxBytes:0) refuted — the 0=uncapped contract is implemented in the
same class and exercised by the heal-path tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 12:59:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d8c84f41c1 fix(agent): spool pressure trigger on pending backlog, not file size
99/100 spool_pressure_detected events in the field were file-size-only
triggers on a near-empty backlog (append-only spool.jsonl grows past 5 MB
in healthy long sessions). TelemetrySpool now tracks PendingBytes (exact
serialized size of the not-yet-uploaded tail, maintained on enqueue /
mark-uploaded / restart rehydrate) and the collector thresholds on that
instead of SpoolFileSizeBytes, which stays as an informational metric.
Snapshot gains spool_pending_bytes; pressure event data carries
pendingBytes + pendingBytesThreshold.

Also: startup recovery scan streams via File.ReadLines instead of
materializing the whole spool with File.ReadAllLines (corrupt-tail
break semantics unchanged).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 17:43:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 12b51bbc24 feat(landing): scenario coverage chips in hero + MSI channel in about claims
Hero gets a quiet checkmark chip row (user-driven, pre-provisioning,
self-deploying, Device Preparation, Windows 365, Entra ID & Hybrid join);
about page deployment claim now includes the MSI LOB channel for WDP.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 15:47:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a369ff99cd feat(wdp): scenario gates for Device Preparation + completion backstop
afee7ae0 audit: WDP sessions ran the full Classic/ESP apparatus. Gates key on
the deterministic BootstrapperAgent ExecutionContext marker only (CloudAssigned*
fallbacks keep Classic behavior).

Paket A (event hygiene): no autopilot_profile/-missing + ZTD query/probe on WDP;
esp_config_detected null-gate (no more unknown/unknown); starved sweep skipped
on WDP (data stays in app_tracking_summary/final-status).

Paket B (resources): EspPolicyProviderStallHost + ProvisioningStatusTracker not
started on WDP; ModernDeployment noise IDs 100/417/418/1005 fully suppressed
(Critical always passes) + Autopilot error backfill skipped; StallProbe skips
ESP category scan and treats noise IDs as harmless.

Paket C (DecisionCore): enrollmentTypeDeterministic payload key seeds
DevicePreparation at High confidence (fallbacks stay Medium); completion_waiting
drops the unsatisfiable account_setup_provisioning_complete gate on WDP; arm D
promotes on real-user desktop; new device_prep_completion 30-min backstop closes
the park-until-watchdog hole; parked tripwire gets a WDP branch.

17 new tests; suites green (532/2307/4287). OKF doc agent/wdp-scenario-gates.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 13:12:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7a131af74d agent(summary): DevicePrep app-wave settle wait + Office/CSP row in summary dialog
Session bc803955 (DevicePrep, Succeeded) rendered "No application data
available" although the M365 CSP package installed during prep and IME
delivered 12 required user apps 9 seconds after final-status was written.

- EnrollmentTerminationHandler: bounded settle wait (20s, 250ms poll) before
  the dialog snapshot - DevicePreparation-only and only while the tracker has
  zero packages, so Classic pays nothing. Root cause of the lost race is IME
  AppWorkload.log flush latency (~10-20s), not the 100ms tracker poll.
  Dialog, starved sweep and app_tracking_summary all see settled data.
- FinalStatusBuilder: synthetic "Microsoft 365 Apps" row from the Office C2R
  detector's persisted lifecycle state (Office CSP installs never flow through
  the IME Win32 pipeline). Prepended to the Device bucket, counted in
  appSummary; Preinstalled state deliberately excluded. No SummaryDialog.exe
  change needed - it renders packageStatesByPhase generically.
- OfficeInstallStateData: CompletedAtUtc + VersionReached stamped on terminal
  persists (duration/version for the row); older state files load fail-soft.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 10:57:46 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e750cfe9dd feat(web): gap badge on timeline rows after multi-hour/day time gaps
Timeline rows render time-of-day only, so a large gap between adjacent
events (and the date change it implies) was invisible without expanding
event details. Rows following a gap >= 1h now show an amber chip
(e.g. "+3h" / "+19d"); hovering reveals the full date. Applies to both
the phase timeline and raw mode, using the same display timestamp as
the row (backfilled events keep their event-log time).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 10:39:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3629728d93 feat(time-attribution): PriorEnrollmentResidue quality flag (v2) + WG-signal comment fix
Session f475e697: a device re-enrolled without a wipe (IME log residue from a
previous enrollment) completes its pre-installed apps as instant detections,
pulling the phase anchors ~6.5 min ahead of the real ESP page — the breakdown
was mechanically exact but semantically wrong, and entered fleet stats as clean.

- New duration-critical flag PriorEnrollmentResidue, set on
  historic_ime_replay_detected; excluded from fleet segment stats via the
  existing DurationCriticalFlags mask. registry_app_baseline successes are
  deliberately NOT a trigger (by-design normal for WDP Batch-1) — pinned by test.
- AttributionVersion 1 -> 2 so the maintenance sweep recomputes in-retention
  breakdowns and flags old residue sessions retroactively (rule 8).
- Web: flag label in TimeAttributionLane; docs: quality-flags section.
- Stale comment fix: SaveWhiteGloveSuccessResult is NOT a WhiteGlove indicator
  on Win11 25H2+ (validated 2026-08-18 against user-driven sessions) —
  observability only, consumed nowhere for classification.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 10:39:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e521fd5cf4 fix(ime-archive): heal provenance.json lost behind the write-once 409 path
Daily-review finding: the MSI upload is write-once (If-None-Match:*), so a
first attempt that died between the MSI and the provenance upload funneled
every retry into the 409 short-circuit — which returned "Archived" without
ever writing provenance.json (permanently lost). The 409 path now checks for
the sidecar and, when missing, rehashes the ARCHIVED bytes and writes it;
heal failures ride the normal retryable ladder.

Also closes the review's test gaps: ImeMsiArchiveQueueWorker + producer
worker-level tests (internal QueueClient test ctors, SessionDeletionWorker
pattern), CorporateIdentifierValidator null/whitespace + OData special-char
+ page-cap-transient tests, registry observer helper tests
(TerminalOutcome/ChangedFields/ClassifyStatusServiceStatus).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 10:21:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0ed1e6f542 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/Autopilot-Monitor 2026-08-18 03:21:54 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 522911c5a7 chore(deps-dev): bump tsx (#130)
Bumps the mcp group in /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp with 1 update: [tsx](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx).


Updates `tsx` from 4.23.11 to 4.23.12
- [Release notes](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/blob/master/release.config.cjs)
- [Commits](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/compare/v4.23.11...v4.23.12)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: tsx
  dependency-version: 4.23.12
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-18 03:20:26 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 0bfe1e327b chore(deps): bump the web group (#131)
Bumps the web group in /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web with 4 updates: [@xyflow/react](https://github.com/xyflow/xyflow/tree/HEAD/packages/react), [next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js), [@next/bundle-analyzer](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/next-bundle-analyzer) and [eslint-config-next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/eslint-config-next).


Updates `@xyflow/react` from 12.11.2 to 12.11.3
- [Release notes](https://github.com/xyflow/xyflow/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/xyflow/xyflow/blob/main/packages/react/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/xyflow/xyflow/commits/@xyflow/react@12.11.3/packages/react)

Updates `next` from 16.3.0 to 16.3.1
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/compare/v16.3.0...v16.3.1)

Updates `@next/bundle-analyzer` from 16.3.0 to 16.3.1
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.1/packages/next-bundle-analyzer)

Updates `eslint-config-next` from 16.3.0 to 16.3.1
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.1/packages/eslint-config-next)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: "@xyflow/react"
  dependency-version: 12.11.3
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: next
  dependency-version: 16.3.1
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@next/bundle-analyzer"
  dependency-version: 16.3.1
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: eslint-config-next
  dependency-version: 16.3.1
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-18 03:20:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2cf7216be5 Token-failure grace window + registry_app_baseline summary
Live findings from the first two 2.0.1402 sessions (Oliver, 2026-08-18):

1. "Failed to get AAD token" is logged routinely during the device phase
   (no user token exists yet) - both test sessions raised the Warning
   although nothing was wrong. The failure is now held pending: any
   IME-TOKEN-SUCCESS match clears it (staleness-gated so a replayed
   success from a previous enrollment cannot mask a current outage), and
   ime_token_failure fires only when no success follows for the 30-min
   grace window, then deduped per errorCode. Genuine auth outages run
   long enough to hit the window; routine device-phase failures never do.

2. New one-shot registry_app_baseline event (Info, only when non-empty):
   summary of the Win32Apps state that predates the agent run - counts
   by enforcement class + capped 50-app typed payload incl.
   LastUpdatedTimeUtc. On WDP the DPP-policy apps install in Batch 1
   before the bootstrap-script agent exists; their outcomes live only in
   this baseline, closing the pre-agent app gap without log backfill.
   The diff rail stays silent on baseline state (anti-replay unchanged).

Event type dual-registered (Constants + MCP catalog + manifests regen).
Tests: grace-window cycle (resolved / unresolved / re-arm dedup),
baseline summary (counts, one-shot, empty). All suites green
(Agent 2274, Functions 4262, MCP 561, web 762), 0 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 03:16:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 587adc5ddf ci(msi): build from project dir - wix resolves File/@Source against cwd
WIX0103 on the first run: Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1 not found because
wix build resolves File/@Source relative to the working directory, not
the wxs location. Matches the local build documented in Package.wxs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 03:11:12 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 84bf2bc2fd commands: bump to 3f98090 (log-name kebab-case in analysis skills) 2026-08-18 03:07:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach dcf1b1c227 ci: Bootstrap-MSI build workflow - blob publish behind the download alias
workflow_dispatch-only, mirroring the agent release contract: validate
the runner script (PS parse + ASCII-only, it runs as SYSTEM on every
enrolling device), wix 5 build, upload versioned + stable blob names to
the agent container (no-cache, no legacy mirror - the MSI channel never
existed there), HEAD-verify the public alias serves the fresh bytes,
Sigstore provenance attestation. MSI version stays source-controlled in
Package.wxs - bumped to 1.0.2 (runner: encoding fix + bootstrap-msi.log
rename). Customer download:
https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap.msi

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 03:07:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6ebdfa41af refactor(agent): unified kebab-case log file naming + date-less agent.log
The agent log directory mixed three conventions (agent_20260817.log,
bootstrap_agent.log, msi-bootstrap.log) while everything else in the
diagnostics ZIP is already kebab-case. All log files now follow
<component>-<content>.log:

  agent.log               (was agent_YYYYMMDD.log; segments agent-NNN.log)
  bootstrap-script.log    (was bootstrap_agent.log; script v2.4)
  bootstrap-msi.log       (was msi-bootstrap.log)
  crash-<utc>.log         (was crash_<utc>.log)
  gather-rules-debug.log  (was gather_rules_debug.log)
  ime-pattern-matches.log (was ime_pattern_matches.log)

The date is dropped from the main log: the agent only lives for one
enrollment, and date rotation split the chronology at local midnight -
which can fall mid-enrollment while the clock is still on the OOBE
default timezone. The existing 50MB size rotation stays as the growth
bound. Legacy dated files are ignored by the rotation probe; crash
detection still picks up legacy crash_*.log once so an in-place
self-update cannot lose a pending crash classification.

Diag collectors glob *.log and need no change. MCP zip-map and docs
note the legacy names for archives from pre-rename agents. Settings UI
hint paths updated. MSI rebuild + bootstrap script publish (v2.4) +
MCP redeploy required to ship.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 02:55:06 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a2c4949473 commands: bump to b431556 (ime-decompile blob-first + import fixes)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 02:36:57 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 81f4a55d88 Bootstrap MSI 1.0.1: version bump for Intune re-upload + log encoding fix
Intune LOB requires a higher ProductVersion to accept a re-upload. Also
includes the runner logging fix: PS 5.1 *>> redirection writes UTF-16LE
into the otherwise ANSI msi-bootstrap.log - route through Add-Content for
a single encoding.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 02:12:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4d3d3c56f4 gitignore: restore ime-files/ - local binaries scratch of /ime-decompile
Still needed: the skill extracts each MSI here (msiexec /a payload for grepping
in binaries); only decompilates go to the ime-decompiles repo and MSIs to the
ime-archive blob container.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 01:51:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 41898d745a updated commands 2026-08-18 01:33:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c05ea4d63b Registry second pillar: IME app state from HKLM with log reconciliation
P2 of the 2026-08-17 IME code audit. IME log wording is an unstable
contract (audit found 9 silently dead patterns, reworded lines, quote
drift, [DO TEL] removal); the registry is IME's internal product
contract - the ESP page and Intune reporting consume it.

ImeRegistryAppStateObserver + ImeRegistryAppStateHost (always-on
observability, no DecisionEngine coupling):
- one recursive RegistryWatcher on HKLM\...\IntuneManagementExtension
  covers Win32Apps (EnforcementStateMessage JSON, ExitCode, Intent),
  EspTrackingWin32Apps and SideCarPolicies\StatusServiceReports;
  2 s debounced snapshot-and-diff + 60 s periodic fallback tick
  (poll-only degraded mode if the watcher fails to arm)
- silent startup baseline: Win32Apps keys survive re-enrollments,
  pre-existing state never replays as fresh events
- registry_app_state (Info, state-change-only, 200/session cap with
  one-shot cap notice)
- app_state_reconciliation (Warning, once per app, immediate upload):
  a changed entry terminal for >= 90 s is compared against the
  log-derived AppPackageState - divergence is the built-in
  log-pattern drift alarm (registry = truth, logs = narrative)

Event types dual-registered (Constants + MCP resource-catalog + shared
manifests regenerated). OKF concept doc agent/registry-app-state-pillar.md
incl. WDP Paket-3 reuse notes. Tests: pure parse/diff/divergence logic +
tick flow via snapshot override (baseline silence, emission, dwell,
fire-once, cap). All suites green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 01:25:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 68eb2da283 IME tracker: tail AppActionProcessor.log; GRS + token-failure signals
P0b/P1 of the 2026-08-17 IME code audit (agent release required):

- Tail AppActionProcessor.log (+ rollover glob) in ImeLogTracker and the
  --run-ime-matching CLI. IME routes every [Win32App][ActionProcessor]
  line there (enforcement decision engine), so IME-NO-ACTION and
  IME-NOT-TARGETED-1/2 could never fire before, and GRS skips were
  invisible. Live session 0fe2c562 carried 16 no-action and 64
  classification lines in that file.

- New patterns (wordings verified in decompiled IME 1.97 AND 1.104):
  IME-GRS-SKIP ("is in GRS. The app will not be enforced." -> Postponed;
  THE canonical silent non-install reason), IME-GRS-CLEARED (early
  subgraph termination, retry next check-in -> Postponed),
  IME-TOKEN-FAILURE ("Failed to get AAD token ... errorCode = N").

- New action imeTokenFailure -> ime_token_failure Warning event (new
  EventType: Constants + MCP resource-catalog + shared manifests
  regenerated). Tracker dedups per distinct errorCode; included in
  the historic-replay guard so stale lines from a previous enrollment
  cannot emit a misleading warning. Complements IME-TOKEN-SUCCESS:
  an auth outage previously left check-ins silently doing nothing.

Tests: adapter emission + unknown-code + tracker dedup; known-actions
catalog extended; all suites green (Functions 4262, Agent 2252, web 762).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 01:01:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ab0f27b5ab Download times: event-window fallback for IME 1.104 (DO TEL removed)
IME 1.104 no longer logs the [DO TEL] line whose JSON carried the
DO-reported download duration - the Download Progress card lost all
times (per-app and total).

Durations now fall back to the observed event window (first download
event -> first completion-marking event) whenever the DO-reported value
is absent, and completed items show "in <duration>" inline. Works
retroactively for already-stored sessions, no agent release required;
the DO-reported value still wins when present (older IME versions).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 00:40:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 32d8151185 updated .gitignore 2026-08-18 00:28:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f3749ccc16 updated commands 2026-08-18 00:24:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ca26cb4f7c backend: auto-archive IME installer on first sighting of a new version
When RecordImeVersionAsync reports a genuinely new IME version (~monthly),
EventIngestProcessor now also enqueues an ime-msi-archive job. The worker
(QueuePollingWorker, heartbeat, pause on ImeMsiArchivingEnabled=false)
downloads the installer and stores it write-once (If-None-Match:*) in the
permanent ime-archive container ({version}/IntuneWindowsAgent.msi +
provenance.json), then merges MsiArchiveStatus/BlobPath/Sha256/Bytes/SourceUrl
onto the ImeVersionHistory row - so every fleet-observed IME build stays
available for decompilation/diffing after Microsoft's versionless CDN moves on.

The download URL comes from agent telemetry (msiDownloadUrl enrichment) and is
treated as untrusted: https-only *.manage.microsoft.com allowlist with exact
filename match, canonical versionless fallback, no redirects, size cap
(MaxImeMsiDownloadSizeMB, default 250, preflight + mid-stream) enforced by a
SHA-256-hashing pass-through stream. Archiver never throws; the worker retries
only transient statuses (download/timeout/error), permanent rejections
complete with their Failed:* status persisted.

Admin settings ImeMsiArchivingEnabled (default true) + MaxImeMsiDownloadSizeMB
via the full 4-file web chain; archive fields on the version-history API are
GA-only (non-GA projection unchanged, redaction tests extended). Shared
manifests regenerated. Tests: archiver status branches via recording subclass
(allowlist, caps, 409 idempotency, cancellation propagation), config defaults.
Backend suite 4262 green, web tsc + vitest 762 green, solution 0 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 00:20:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8ceab7a064 updated commands 2026-08-17 23:51:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ae85dc325c gitignore: exclude local ime-files/ working directory
Machine-local reference files, kept out of version control.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 23:51:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach aeb2be6d64 agent: enrich ime_agent_version with CSP install source (CurrentDownloadUrl)
The EnterpriseDesktopAppManagement CSP records every MSI it enforces under
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseDesktopAppManagement\<SID>\MSI\{ProductCode},
including CurrentDownloadUrl and ProductVersion. New ImeMsiInstallSourceProbe
resolves the entry matching the IME version parsed from the IME log (normalized
ProductVersion match first, IntuneWindowsAgent.msi filename fallback) and the
adapter attaches msiDownloadUrl / msiProductCode / msiProductVersion /
msiMatchedBy to the ime_agent_version event - answering which CDN/AFD endpoint
delivered exactly that IME build. Fail-soft, cached per version, additive keys
only (no new event type). Tests: probe selection/normalization + adapter
enrichment; assembly-wide probe default keeps dev machines deterministic.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 23:29:37 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0474223290 Diagnostics ZIP: in-archive packaging manifest
The agent-log snapshot is zipped BEFORE packaging finishes, so packaging
problems (blocked paths, silent no-match patterns, locked files, evtx
export errors) were invisible in the uploaded archive - twice this made a
missing evtx undiagnosable (sessions a11102f4/3ae7528b). Every packaging
decision is now recorded in package-manifest.txt inside the ZIP: ADDED,
NO MATCH, BLOCKED (path guard), SKIPPED (caps/reparse/no user session),
FAILED (copy), EVTX EXPORTED/ERROR/TIMEOUT, plus each configured
additional path with its expanded folder+pattern. Written unconditionally
so absence of the file identifies a pre-feature archive.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 23:04:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1bdb71be59 evtx export: resolve channel via LogFilePath, never by naming convention
The %4-encodes-slash file naming is a convention, not a contract: the
Microsoft-Autopilot-BootstrapperAgent/BootstrapperAgentServiceLogProvider
channel writes plain BootstrapperAgentServiceLogProvider.evtx. Deriving the
channel from the file name therefore produced an invalid wevtutil target
(and the wrong advice to rename the tenant diag path cost a WDP test
cycle). The channel is now resolved by scanning registered channels for a
matching LogFilePath, with the %4 convention only as fallback. A failed
export no longer skips the file - it falls through to the raw copy, which
succeeds for inactive/archived evtx files.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 22:48:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ccf4f2e054 IME patterns: quote-flexible report deltas for IME 1.104 serialization
Live validation against session 0fe2c562 (IME 1.104.102, first session on
the repaired pattern set) showed all report-delta patterns at zero: IME
1.104 logs the delta JSON with single quotes ({"EnforcementState":...)
where older versions logged doubled quotes ({""EnforcementState"":...).

Every literal quote in the seven delta patterns (DETECTED-INSTALLED-1,
ENFORCEMENT-SUCCESS, ERROR-DOWNLOAD, ERROR-REPORT, NOT-APPLICABLE-2/3/4)
is now matched as "{1,2} to cover both serializations.

Verified against the session's AppWorkload.log via validate-ime-patterns:
ENFORCEMENT-SUCCESS 12 (was 0), ERROR-REPORT 14 (was 0); no CRITICALs;
the 2026-08-17 repair set confirmed live (ESP-TRACK-STATUS 24,
ESP-APP-REGISTERED 12, CACHE-MISS 11 in the agent's own match log).

Also observed in 1.104, tracked separately (no pattern change possible):
[DO TEL] line removed entirely - the DO download-duration display feeds
on it; needs an agent-side replacement (DO collector enrichment).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 22:43:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d192a8e0fa fix(agent): token-aware runtime launch - Scheduled Task first on stripped MSI tokens
The MDM LOB Bootstrap-MSI chain (EnterpriseDesktopAppManagement CSP ->
msiexec -> runner -> bootstrap -> --install) carries a SYSTEM token with
SeTimeZonePrivilege and SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege REMOVED. WMI
Win32_Process.Create duplicates the caller token onto the runtime, so
every MSI-delivered agent ran degraded for its whole life: tzutil exit 5
(ACCESS_DENIED) on timezone auto-set and privilege_denied on SEC-001
firmware reads (observed 2026-08-17, sessions a11102f4/0fe2c562/3ae7528b
vs. platform-script sessions 7b072755/c4c1c2d5 on the same binary).

Install mode now probes its own token (TokenPrivilegeProbe, fail-soft to
"held"): with a full token the proven WMI-first chain is unchanged; on a
stripped token the order flips to schtasks /Run first - the Task
Scheduler service starts the task with a fresh full SYSTEM token - with
a 10s process-verification poll (schtasks only reports "queued", the
2026-04-30 silent-failure lesson), WMI as degraded-but-alive fallback,
BootTrigger defer as the final net (full token there anyway).

Also: MSI runner log encoding - PS 5.1 *>> redirection wrote UTF-16LE
into the Add-Content (ANSI) msi-bootstrap.log, garbling every bootstrap
line; script output now routes through the same Add-Content pipeline.
Runner fix needs an MSI rebuild (wix build) to ship.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 22:39:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 06d92460ed Dashboard session rows: native open-in-new-tab via invisible cell link overlays
Rows were plain <tr onClick> so the browser offered no context-menu entry.
Each non-interactive cell now contains an invisible absolutely-positioned
Link (prefetch off) giving a real href for right-click/middle/ctrl+click;
visuals and SPA click behavior are unchanged. Cells with own buttons or
title tooltips (status, tenantId, actions) keep the row-click fallback.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 22:37:48 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fc3900429c Security: IME log pattern PUT must be GlobalAdminOnly
PUT rules/ime-log-patterns/{patternId} sat on the TenantAdminOrGA tier
while the handler only checks ?global=true and writes the GLOBAL pattern
with no GA re-gate - any customer tenant admin could mutate platform-wide
patterns via direct API call. The UI gate (isGlobalAdmin && globalAdminMode)
was cosmetic only.

Moved the entry to GlobalAdminOnly next to the reseed route and added a
regression test pinning both IME pattern write routes to that tier.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 22:09:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0ffcb2fde2 command update 2026-08-17 21:44:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a3089753d3 IME patterns: repair drift found by decompiled-source audit (IME 1.97 Dec-25)
Audit vs decompiled IME 1.97.107: ~55/79 patterns verified verbatim, but
several were broken or dead against the current V3 pipeline.

Fixes:
- IME-ESP-TRACK-STATUS: drop trailing anchor (line grew ' with name: <n>.')
- HS-COMPLIANCE: tolerate both 'remdiation' typo and corrected wording;
  new HS-COMPLIANCE-POST for the reworded post-detection line
- IME-DETECTION-RESULT: capture DetectedDifferentVersion (ordered first)
- IME-ENFORCEMENT-SUCCESS: unpin OldValue (Error/PendingReboot/null paths)
- IME-ERROR-REPORT: allow unquoted null OldValue on first write
- Disable 11 dead patterns (emitters removed with IME's old V1/V2 pipeline;
  IME-DETECTED-OLD additionally collided with IME-SKIP-INSTALL-DETECTED)

New signals (existing actions, tailed files only):
- IME-ESP-APP-REGISTERED + IME-CACHE-MISS as app-name sources (replacing
  dead IME-UPDATE-NAME-1/2/3)
- IME-WINGET-ERROR (WinGet failures were invisible)
- IME-EXITCODE-MAPPED-FAILED (normal mapped-exit-code failure path)
- IME-STOP-SIGNAL (service stop != OS shutdown)
- IME-RESTART-STOP-PROCESSING (reboot-gated processing abort)

Backend seed diff now also compares Enabled + Parameters - enable/disable
flips and parameter changes previously never propagated to the table.

All exact wordings verified against decompiled source; regex smoke-tested
via validate-ime-patterns.py (engine=regex, 75/75 compiled, all new
patterns fire on synthetic lines with the exact IME format strings).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 21:33:37 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 26cbc897c5 WDP: unify enrollment_type_detected with detector + export locked evtx
Two fixes from the a11102f4 diag analysis:

- enrollment_type_detected re-implemented the old CloudAssigned*-only
  detection and kept reporting "Autopilot v1 (Classic ESP)" on WDP devices
  while the session row already said v2. DeviceInfoCollector now uses
  EnrollmentRegistryDetector.DetectEnrollmentTypeWithRule() - the same
  detector as registration - and the event names the rule that fired.
- Tenant-configured .evtx paths never made it into the diagnostics ZIP:
  active event-log channels hold their file exclusively locked. The
  package service now exports the channel via wevtutil epl (channel name
  derived from the %4-encoded file name) and streams the temp export.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 21:28:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c88629dcf2 Bootstrap MSI: thin MDM LOB delivery vehicle for WDP
WDP batch order is fixed (User -> SLDM/MDM apps -> Scripts -> Win32Apps),
so a WDP-policy script can never observe the app phase live, and a hard
Batch-1 failure leaves zero visibility. LOB MSIs install via OMA-DM during
the first sync - before the SLDM batch - making them the earliest delivery
channel. The MSI carries no logic: it installs one fail-soft runner script
that downloads and executes the CURRENT server-hosted
Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1, so all real bootstrap logic stays updatable
without re-shipping the MSI. Skips via the Deployed regkey when another
channel won the race. Build: wix build Package.wxs -arch x64 (WiX 5).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 20:35:37 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 517041a51c WDP detection: probe DevicePreparation BootstrapperAgent orchestration key
Field-verified on a live WDP enrollment (session 7b072755): WDP devices
carry NO Autopilot profile, so both CloudAssigned* v2 signals are
structurally absent and every WDP session was classified v1. The reliable
marker is the Device Preparation orchestration tree
AutopilotSettings\DevicePreparation\BootstrapperAgent, whose
ExecutionContext JSON carries the WDP policyId - present on WDP, absent on
classic v1 (verified there too; classic only has ESP category VALUES named
DevicePreparation.* on the parent key, hence a subkey probe).

CloudAssigned* checks stay as defence in depth. Profile seeding and the
downgrade guards from earlier today take over once registration carries v2.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 19:08:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach eeaeb9ea7e Corp identifier: match in Intune-normalized space
Field-verified against the portal list: Intune normalizes corporate
identifiers on upload - uppercased, all non-alphanumerics stripped per
component ("Microsoft Corporation,Virtual Machine,7801-5131-..." is stored
as "MICROSOFTCORPORATION,VIRTUALMACHINE,78015131...") and the device
matched + enrolled against that normalized entry. Our exact-match against
the raw device values (and the contains() filter using the dashed serial)
could therefore never hit.

Both sides now normalize before comparison, and the contains() narrowing
uses the normalized serial. Raw-form entries created directly via Graph
still match. The not-found message shows raw AND normalized form so
rejection logs line up with the portal list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 18:25:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3983402983 Corp identifier: read importedDeviceIdentities via GET, no new Graph scope
The searchExistingIdentities ACTION requires
DeviceManagementServiceConfig.ReadWrite.All, which the app deliberately does
not hold - the feature was broken in every tenant. Listing the same data via
GET works with Read.All, which the app already has for
windowsAutopilotDeviceIdentities. No new permission, no customer re-consent.

- contains(importedDeviceIdentifier,serial) filter for server-side
  narrowing (mirrors AutopilotDeviceValidator), exact case-insensitive
  match client-side on manufacturerModelSerial identities only
- 400 filter rejection falls back to an unfiltered paged scan
  (60 x 1000 covers the portal maximum of 10 CSVs x 5000 rows);
  page-cap overrun is transient, never a cached false negative
- Graph 401/403 stays a definitive, negative-cached failure with an
  actionable message (now naming Read.All)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 17:47:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4deb5e6a04 Corp identifier: MMS-only matching, Graph 401/403 = definitive failure
Two changes from the WDP live-test follow-up:

- Remove the serialNumber-type probe again (decision: only the documented
  Windows manufacturerModelSerial identifier authorizes; a serial-type entry
  is an Intune-side admin misconfiguration and must not count).
- Classify Graph 401/403 on searchExistingIdentities as DEFINITIVE with an
  actionable message naming the missing permission
  (DeviceManagementServiceConfig.ReadWrite.All / admin consent) and
  negative-cache it. Field case: the missing consent was classified
  transient and trapped the agent in an endless 503 Retry-After loop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 17:36:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5734eb576e Correct corp identifier dual-probe rationale in comments
Docs research showed the serial-only corporate identifier type is NOT the
documented WDP path (Windows only supports manufacturer,model,serial; Intune
ignores serial-type for Windows ownership). The dual probe stays because the
serial type is the only one the portal offers for MANUAL entry, so admins
land there by mistake and an uploaded serial still expresses authorization
intent. Comments and test docs now state that rationale instead of the
incorrect "WDP guidance uses serial type" claim. No behavior change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 17:25:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7fbfea8f4e Corp identifier validation: probe serialNumber type + unmask validator errors
First live WDP enrollment 403d at device validation. Root causes:

- CorporateIdentifierValidator only searched the manufacturerModelSerial
  identifier type, but the Device Preparation guidance has admins upload
  SERIAL-type corporate identifiers - those never matched. The Graph
  searchExistingIdentities call now probes both types in one round-trip.
- SecurityValidator overwrote deviceValidationError per validator, so the
  403 Details only showed the LAST failure (CloudPc) and hid the corporate
  identifier miss. Errors now aggregate in chain order and the transient
  flag is sticky-OR (any transient failure yields 503 Retry-After instead
  of a definitive 403).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 16:41:57 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e5f955354d Hourly SessionSweep interleave: stalled-session sweep every hour instead of 2h
New SessionSweepFunction (cron 0 30 * * * *, offset from the 2h Maintenance
timer at minute 0) runs only MarkStalledSessionsAsTimedOutAsync, halving the
sweep-induced classification latency; thresholds unchanged. The sweep now
returns a SessionSweepResult (counts + catastrophic-failure message) so the
new timer emits SessionSweepCompleted heartbeats / SessionSweepFailed errors
(dual-registered in the ops-alert web catalog). No lease: the sweep is
idempotent, overlap with the 2h chain is a no-op.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 14:33:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 65651dd599 ANALYZE-ID-004 v1.2.0: pre-logon VPN + Hello-as-symptom self-service guidance
From the 3b7ba31f (succeeded) vs gardner/esa (parked) hybrid session comparison:
explanation now covers the cached-credentials/pre-logon-VPN variant and why the
Hello wizard never appearing is downstream of the missing PRT; new remediation
block for VPN machine tunnels, cloud Kerberos trust, explicit Hello disable,
update deferral and pre-provisioning. Links the new docs article.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 13:36:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d0ab3eee40 WDP hardening: sticky-v2 EnrollmentType + DevicePreparation downgrade guards
Two low-risk fixes ahead of the first live Device Preparation enrollment:

- StoreSessionAsync: EnrollmentType is now sticky-v2 across re-registration
  (same contract as the sticky-true booleans) so a degraded AutopilotSettings
  read after a reboot can no longer flip an observed v2 session back to v1.
- EnrollmentScenarioProfileUpdater: ImeUserSessionCompleted,
  SelfDeployingDeadlineConfirmed and WhiteGloveSealingConfirmed no longer
  overwrite an established DevicePreparation profile (seeded at Medium from
  the registry-deterministic v2 fact).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 11:55:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2de8f5c4e6 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/Autopilot-Monitor 2026-08-17 09:35:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fe07f5cef0 command update 2026-08-17 09:35:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 57775d6ba2 mcp: errorMessage in tool_call telemetry + get_rule_stats trend opt-in
Telemetry follow-ups from the 7d tool-quality review:
- tool_call log lines now carry a capped errorMessage (thrown message or
  leading toolError text) so error drilldowns name the failure class
  instead of guessing from args; absent on success.
- get_rule_stats omits per-rule daily trend rows by default (they drove
  50% of calls over the response cap at platform scope); new
  includeTrends arg opts back in, trendsNote marks the omission.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 09:34:03 +02:00
Claude 91b702e239 Fix squeezed Active Users header on mobile
The presence page header was a non-wrapping `flex justify-between`, so on a
phone viewport the title column was compressed to a few characters wide and
"Active Users" plus its description broke one or two words per line next to
the Window/Refresh controls.

Stack the title and controls vertically below the `sm` breakpoint and keep
the existing side-by-side row from `sm` up. The controls also wrap among
themselves on very narrow screens.

The user table had the same problem: its card used `overflow-hidden`, which
clipped the Tenant and Last seen columns off-screen with no way to reach
them. Wrap the table in the repo's usual `overflow-x-auto` container so it
scrolls inside its card, keep cells on one line, and trim cell padding to
`px-4` on mobile.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwjVj2PvpVRk7QUjQf3i8C
2026-08-16 13:19:10 +00:00
Oliver Kieselbach e12da0c99b geo metrics: median API latency as display statistic
A single corrupt session average (request spanning sleep/hibernate counts
wall-clock hours) inflated the request-weighted location mean by orders of
magnitude (Amersfoort: 73286 ms from one 1.38M-ms session). Add
MedianApiLatencyMs per location + global (upper median over per-session
averages, duration convention), base ApiLatencyVsGlobalPct on medians, and
switch web display/sort to the median with the weighted avg in the tooltip.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 14:59:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3ac647a680 mcp tests: exact hostname match in Entra fetch stub (CodeQL alert #76)
The test-only fetch stub matched the Entra authority via substring
(includes), which CodeQL flags as incomplete URL sanitization. Parse the
URL and compare the hostname exactly instead — also strictly more precise
for what the stub intends (intercept only the Entra host).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 11:06:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ecf6e8c5a8 clickable TipOfTheDay 2026-08-15 10:59:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f26721c0f7 web: progress-portal serial-knowledge model — lookup client, serial proof on events/join, reconnect re-proof, visible join denials
- useProgressSearch calls the server-side lookup; the client-side filter
  over the tenant list is gone with the list itself.
- useProgressEvents passes the serial on every events read and refreshes
  the session summary via the lookup (guarded by sessionId so a newer
  re-enrollment of the same serial cannot swap the selected session).
- SignalRContext.joinGroup takes {serialNumber, onDenied}; the serial is
  remembered per group and re-presented on the automatic post-reconnect
  rejoin — without that, a roleless viewer's live updates would die on
  the first network blip. A refused join is now visible (console.warn +
  progress-page notification) instead of a silently frozen page.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 09:42:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 789926fcad backend: progress-portal serial-knowledge model — server-side lookup, serial proof on events + session-group join
Security finding: GET progress/sessions shipped the tenant's latest 100
sessions to any authenticated (roleless) user with the serial filter
applied only in the browser; events and SignalR session-group joins were
open to any known sessionId.

Model now: knowing the device's serial number is the authorization proof.
- progress/sessions/lookup (AuthenticatedUserWithRole + QueryParam)
  resolves at most ONE session server-side: roleless callers need the
  exact serial/device name, members/GA keep substring search. The
  tenant-wide list route is gone (catalog fail-closes it).
- progress events require ?serial= re-proof on every read; missing
  session and serial mismatch answer the same 404 (no existence oracle).
- Session-group joins by roleless same-tenant callers require the serial
  (SerialKnowledgeProof, shared with the events route); member/GA/
  delegated joins are unchanged. MemberRead on progress routes stays
  deliberately rejected (regression history c4dabeee).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 09:42:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 01e76a6ff7 mcp: OAuth-proxy hardening — Entra token timeout, https boot guards, replay note
- /oauth/token: AbortSignal.timeout(15s) on the outbound Entra fetch;
  TimeoutError maps to 504 token_exchange_timeout (502 stays for hard
  failures). Undici defaults previously allowed ~300s per stalled request.
- Boot guards (fail-fast, matching config.ts posture): AUTOPILOT_ENTRA_AUTHORITY
  must be https (sovereign clouds allowed, host not pinned); MCP_PUBLIC_URL pin
  must be https (http tolerated for loopback dev only), trailing slashes
  stripped; production log hint when AUTOPILOT_ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET is unset
  (public-client vs AADSTS7000218 misconfig).
- State one-time-use: documented as accepted residual risk (a nonce store would
  reintroduce the shared state the stateless multi-replica design removed;
  impact bounded by single-use PKCE-bound Entra codes + callback re-validation).
- Tests: oauth-boot-guards.test.ts (validators) + token-timeout route tests
  with Entra-host-scoped fetch stub. Suite: 559 passed, tsc clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 09:31:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach daa6df6bab rules: evaluate 30 device-phase built-ins at the WhiteGlove seal, 6 also on_event
Every built-in whose evidence exists by the end of pre-provisioning Part 1 now
carries evaluateOn [enrollment_end, whiteglove_sealed] — app failures, low disk,
memory pressure, unsupported build, WU failures, clock skew, ESP device
subcategories, mid-ESP reboots, retry-recovery, cert store, local admins,
critical vulnerabilities, firmware CA2023, Secure Boot, AutoLogon, PPKG scans,
Office install and hybrid/TPM/MDM known-error codes. Six rules additionally
evaluate when their (rare, acute) trigger event arrives:
on_event:app_install_failed → APP-002/004/007 + CORR-003,
on_event:windows_update_failed → DEV-004,
on_event:modern_deployment_error → ENRL-003.

Deliberately enrollment-end only: APP-010/ESP-004/ENRL-001 (require
enrollment_complete/failed), ENRL-002 (session_timeout), DEV-001 (Hello =
user phase), APP-015 (user phase, terminal-precondition design), ID-004
(keeps its own hybrid_login_pending trigger). Minor version bump on all 36
changed rules (seed contract); rule JSONs normalized to 2-space formatting;
semantic equality vs HEAD verified (only evaluateOn/version differ).

Backend 4157 tests green (APP-013 version pin updated).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 19:29:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 98fd173fb8 rules+backend+mcp: rule-verify sweep fixes (dead factor, {{token}} evidence, stats cap, list stringify)
Full verify pass over all 54 built-in rules (validate_rule sweep, 30d/7d
get_rule_stats, test_analyze_rule spot checks). Fixes:

- ANALYZE-APP-007 v1.1.0: declare enrollment_failed as a non-required
  condition — the exists-factor referenced an undeclared signal and could
  never apply.
- ANALYZE-APP-014 v1.1.0: add non-required event_data conditions for
  espCategory/espErrorCode/topCandidatePackage/candidateCount/confidence
  so all explanation {{tokens}} resolve instead of rendering literally.
- ANALYZE-ENRL-002 v1.2.0: capture session_timeout.timeoutHours so
  {{timeoutHours}} interpolates (verified via dry-run: renders "5").
- RuleEngine TryFlatLookup/ResolveDotPath: flatten IEnumerable data
  values to a comma-joined string — List fields (e.g. app_tracking_summary
  .pendingNames) stringified to "System.Collections.Generic.List`1[…]",
  breaking contains-matching and {{pendingNames}} interpolation.
- GetRuleStatsAsync: raise the 500-row cap to 10000 and log when hit.
  The scan walks dates ascending, so the old cap silently dropped the
  NEWEST dates of a 30d window — newly added rules (e.g. ANALYZE-SEC-008)
  were entirely missing from global stats.
- MCP validate_rule lint: accept event_data_array itemField as a {{token}}
  resolver — {{identity}} in ANALYZE-SEC-005/006 was a false positive.

Backend 4157 tests green, MCP 548 green + tsc clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 16:50:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 06626a4095 web: evaluateOn in the analyze-rule editor + interim-trigger badge
The evaluateOn feature was API/MCP-only — portal users could not see or set
evaluation triggers. The rule editor gains an Evaluation Triggers section
(enrollment end / WhiteGlove seal checkboxes + on_event type list) with
client-side grammar + hard-block validation sourced from the baked guardrails
mirror (combine.js now emits BLOCKED_INTERIM_TRIGGER_EVENT_TYPES for the web);
rule cards show an 'Interim: …' badge for interim-enabled rules (incl. the
built-in ANALYZE-ID-004). Create/edit payloads round-trip evaluateOn; the
template-copy path already deep-clones it server-side.

Suites: web 762 + tsc + lint clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 16:34:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 22a8c7a51d rules: hard-block high-frequency event types as evaluateOn on_event triggers
A warning does not stop an end user — telemetry-cadence types (performance_snapshot,
agent_metrics_snapshot, download_progress, network_state_change/connectivity_check,
log_entry, agent_trace, stall_probe_check) would turn every ingest batch into an
analyze run. Now enforced in three layers:

- AnalyzeRuleTriggers.BlockedOnEventTypes (code-only enforcement): CRUD write is
  rejected with an explicit message, and OnEventTypes() drops blocked types at
  runtime so even a persisted row (pre-validation data, direct table write) is
  inert for the trigger registry and the engine alike.
- rules/guardrails.json gains blockedInterimTriggerEventTypes as the display/
  pre-flight mirror (baked into the MCP RULE_GUARDRAILS via combine.js); a
  parity test pins mirror and code set against drift — same pattern as the
  gather hard blocks.
- MCP validate_rule: the high-frequency finding is now an ERROR sourced from the
  baked mirror, not a hardcoded warning.

Suites: Backend 4155, MCP 548.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 16:07:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 72136f0273 backend+mcp+web: evaluateOn interim triggers for analyze rules
Implements docs/rules/analyze-rule-triggers.md (spec approved today):

- AnalyzeRule.EvaluateOn (absent = [enrollment_end], today's behavior bit-for-bit)
  with the shared AnalyzeRuleTriggers grammar/matching helpers; grammar enforced
  in tenant rule CRUD and the analyze-rule JSON schema.
- RuleEngine: AnalyzeRunContext (Terminal/Interim/Reanalyze), interim rule filter,
  KO suppression on interim runs, and RuleResult update-semantics replacing the
  permanent dedupe freeze — interim rows refresh, the terminal pass finalizes or
  resolves them (ResolvedAt, kept for audit), Reanalyze preserves lifecycle markers.
- Notification dedupe moves onto RuleResult.NotifiedAt (one send per session+rule,
  stamped after a successful send; survives the manual reanalyze rebuild).
- Handler: whiteglove_sealed / interim_trigger reasons — notify + SignalR yes,
  IssuesDetected + rule stats terminal-only (Rule Regression Radar baselines clean).
- Ingest: InterimTriggerRegistry (per-tenant 5-min TTL cache, fail-soft) gates the
  interim_trigger enqueue (batch eventType intersection) and the whiteglove_sealed
  enqueue on the first genuine WhiteGlove seal.
- Storage: EvaluateOnJson on AnalyzeRules; FirstDetectedAt/LastEvaluatedAt/
  IsInterim/ResolvedAt/NotifiedAt on RuleResults (nullable — legacy rows read as
  final).
- MCP: three authoring lints (terminal-precondition trap, unknown/high-frequency
  on_event types, KO-on-interim), authoring guide + baked schema updated;
  get_session_summary marks interim and excludes resolved findings.
- Web: preliminary badge on interim findings, resolved findings behind a toggle,
  issue counts exclude resolved (analysis section + diagnosis flow).
- ANALYZE-ID-004 v1.1.0: first interim-enabled rule (on_event:hybrid_login_pending),
  threshold raised to 75 so only repeated overdue-login signals fire mid-run.

Suites: Backend 4152, MCP 548, Web 762 + tsc + lint clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 15:53:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9c96881242 docs: spec for analyze-rule evaluateOn triggers (interim evaluation)
OKF concept doc (status SPEC): opt-in interim analyze runs via evaluateOn
(enrollment_end default, whiteglove_sealed, on_event:<type>), RuleResults
update-semantics replacing the permanent dedupe freeze, KO/stat suppression
on interim runs, notification marker decoupled from row existence, and the
validate_rule lints that keep interim rules monotonic. Closes the design for
both the sits-d WhiteGlove notification gap and the esa never-terminal
stuck-session gap with one mechanism.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 15:03:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6c6014940e rules: hybrid user-affinity + never-settled-app detection, dsregcmd on_event snapshot, evidence interpolation fixes
ANALYZE-ID-004 (hybrid sign-in never establishes Entra user affinity),
ANALYZE-APP-015 (required app pending forever, ESP completion deferred),
ANALYZE-ENRL-002 v1.1 (desktop-reached + apps-done evidence), GATHER-DEVICE-006
(dsregcmd /status triggered by hybrid_login_pending). Engine: list evidence
values now comma-joined for UI/{{token}} interpolation; timeoutHours added to
the evidence whitelist so ANALYZE-ENRL-002's explanation interpolates.

Motivated by esa-logistics sessions 3ac8cb0e/95f71149 (user-phase stuck,
GlobalProtect never settling, placeholder identity persisting across reboots).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 13:39:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c60c0bbede settings: admit Operators and the GlobalReader read-only (user decision)
The /settings layout now admits any own-tenant role or platform scope via
hasOwnTenantOrPlatformRole — the same set the sidebar's Configuration
visibility uses, closing the "sidebar shows it, guard bounces it" mismatch
the nav matrix test had ratcheted. Read-only stays enforced by the data
layer: MemberRead serves non-admins redacted config, canEditConfig is
false, and every write path (PUT + field PATCH) is TenantAdminOrGA.
This also realigns the code with the customer docs, which already
documented Operators/Viewers as read-only settings viewers.

The guard-consistency ratchet is now empty and may only stay empty.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 00:04:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c4280e823c fragility audit P5.x + P7: drift guards across SignalR names, RowKeys, config sections, scoped routing
P5.x-A: Constants.SignalRMessages catalog (13 names) + SignalRGroupHelper.HubName;
all backend send sites and web subscriptions typed against the shared-manifest
union (SignalRContext.on/off) — unknown names are tsc errors. Dead eventStream
session-payload handling removed from diagnosis page.

P5.x-B: RowKeyCodec as the single inverted-tick encoder (persisted widths pinned,
UserActivity D20 legacy); DeletionRowDump.Table on tombstone rows with
DeletionTombstoneTables.Resolve replacing the duplicated Contains('_') heuristic
(legacy fallback retained for pre-field manifests).

P7.1: PATCH config/{tenantId}/fields flipped to TenantAdminOrGA (phase 2);
Settings sections save via per-section diff PATCH from sectionFieldMap.ts —
the ~39-field stale round-trip vector is gone; legacy webhook clearing now only
on the notifications save; agent-settings reset no longer discards contact edits.

P7.2/7.3: useGlobalAdminScope is a projection over useAggregatedAdminScope
(resolveConcreteScopeView, test-pinned); scopedApi builders own the tenant/global
endpoint-pair routing for all 11 former hand-rolled call sites; scopedFetch adds
the shared JSON fetch layer.

P7.4: navVisibility extraction + roles x nav-config matrix and nav<->route-guard
consistency test with a ratchet for the two known pre-existing mismatches
(Operator and GlobalReader vs /settings — user decision pending).

P7.5: web build stamp public/version.json (prebuild, GITHUB_SHA), SWA no-store
route, deploy-web verify poll + versions/web.json manifest, Portal Build card.

P7.6: OkAsyncBaselineGuardTests freezes the 44 anonymous-response sites
(shrink-only ratchet).

Verified: dotnet build 0W/0E, Functions.Tests 4123, DecisionCore 519, V2.Core
2206, SummaryDialog 44; tsc 0, ESLint 0, vitest 762/762; mutation proofs for all
new drift nets. Docs: docs/drift-guards.md + versioning.md web row.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 23:17:48 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6dc2506fc5 web: latch server-side session search to once per query
Live verification after the P5/P6 deploy caught a request storm: the dashboard
auto-sweep effect refires whenever the loading flags toggle, and a q= sweep
whose matches were all already loaded changes nothing the effect watches — so
the same /api/search/sessions request looped indefinitely (~6 req/s observed).
The old loadAll() sweep terminated the effect via hasMore=false; searchAll()
deliberately leaves pagination state alone and therefore needs its own latch.

searchAll now runs at most once per trimmed query (latched before the first
await, also on failure); refetch/refetchWith/global-mode-toggle clear the latch
so a new backend scope may search again, and the explicit "Search all sessions"
button bypasses it via force. Ref declared with the sibling refs BEFORE the
mutating callbacks — the React compiler only accepts ref mutations when the
useRef declaration precedes the closure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 20:24:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 88cd29d3b9 backend: lifecycle completeness nets + session-scope point-read + server-side dashboard search (audit P5/P6)
P5.1 Table lifecycle buckets: TableLifecycleBucketTests classifies every
TableNames constant (offboarding buckets via reflection, per-session set from a
real DeletionManifestBuilder run, reviewed KeptByDesign list). Fixes found by
the audit: UsageMetrics offboarding wipe matched 0 rows (PK=date/RK=tenantId)
-> new SafeWipe Variant D (RowKey-anchored, verify protects the "global" row);
PlatformStats tenant partition + ScriptNameCache never wiped -> tenant-PK bucket.

P5.2 SessionsIndex field manifest: SessionIndexFieldManifest (32 always / 18
conditional / 4 primary-only) pinned bidirectionally against
BuildSessionIndexEntity and MapToSessionSummary; full rebuilds now
TableUpdateMode.Replace (heals stale conditional columns); merge sites warn on
non-manifest keys; force-path now mirrors StalledAt write + clear heals.

P5.3/P6.1 Session scope resolution: ResolveSessionScopeAsync (RequestContext)
replaces the 16-site copy-paste fallback; ResolveSessionTenantIdAsync does a
point-read on the new SessionTenantLookup table (PK=sessionId) with legacy
index-scan fallback + self-heal, replacing the cross-partition scan; the
"Count == 0 -> rescan" heuristics are gone. Write paths gate cross-tenant
resolution on IsGlobalAdmin. RecomputeTriggerGate enforces the decided
read-only semantics API-side: reanalyze/rescan now 403 for Viewer/GlobalReader/
cross-tenant tenant roles. Lookup rows ride the deletion cascade (step 22).

P6.2 Server-side dashboard search: q= on search/sessions (+global) matching
exactly the client-side searchable fields, page-backfill loop (max 10 Azure
pages/request), q bound into the pagination fingerprint; the web dashboard's
searchAll() replaces the loadAll() full-history sweep (dedupe-merge, delegated
callers keep the legacy sweep).

P6.3 Context value memoization: TenantConfigContext + Auth/Notification/
Tenant/Theme providers (cuts the externally-triggered re-render cascade).

Verified: solution build 0W/0E; Functions.Tests 4106 (+37), DecisionCore 519,
V2.Core 2206, SummaryDialog 44; tsc/eslint clean; vitest 722 (+4). Drift
detection of both new manifest tests proven by mutation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 19:29:27 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f4d99b43f4 chore: remove accidentally committed verification screenshots
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 18:04:40 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6c2b431aec sessions: viewer-aware empty state for analysis results
The empty state no longer tells read-only viewers to click a button
they do not have.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 18:04:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 383d0694fe rbac: wire Viewer as a real read-everything/change-nothing tier
Four-tier model: Member (Progress Portal only) < Viewer (sees everything,
changes nothing) < Operator < Admin. Backend policies already treated
Viewer correctly (MemberRead admits it, every write tier excludes it) —
this change makes the tier reachable and safe:

- role assignment now validates against Constants.TenantRoles
  (case-insensitive, canonicalized, 400 on unknown) — previously ANY string
  was persisted; also fixes the case-sensitive last-admin guard
- Viewer is assignable in all four role dropdowns; About Roles describes
  the four tiers
- shared hasTenantReadScope() replaces four hand-rolled predicates
  (AuthGate, dashboard x2, useDashboardSessions); Viewers land on the
  dashboard and the full navbar/sidebar ("adminOrOperator" visibility
  renamed to "tenantMember"); Settings admits Viewer read-only
- "Analyze now" stays Admin/GA/Operator (recompute trigger, not a view)
- deleted dead IsTenantMemberAsync (meant Admin-or-Operator — the inverse
  of RequestContext.IsTenantMemberRole)
- 16 endpoint tests for role validation, 15 tests for the scope helper

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 17:51:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 792b7d3b0e agent: enforce DecisionState.SchemaVersion at recovery (branch a2)
A snapshot written by a different state-schema generation (e.g. the
pre-self-update binary) is no longer trusted: it is quarantined like a
corrupt cache and the state is rebuilt from the authoritative SignalLog,
whose signals carry their own KindSchemaVersion — replaying them through
the current reducer is the defined upgrade path. Unreadable log escalates
to the existing total-loss quarantine. Closes the silent-Newtonsoft-default
window where a reshaped field could cause mid-session amnesia across a
self-update. Two adversarial recovery tests pin both paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 17:51:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c48f95b88c tests: cross-language parity manifest + agent safety nets (audit P3/P4)
P3 — shared manifest infrastructure: SharedManifestParityTests reflects the
wire-relevant catalogs out of AutopilotMonitor.Shared into a committed JSON
manifest (regenerate: AM_WRITE_SHARED_MANIFESTS=1 dotnet test); a web codegen
lifts it into literal types; sharedManifestChecks.ts enforces
AdminConfiguration field parity at COMPILE time and 12 vitest tests pin the
value catalogs (sources/operators, lanes/verdicts, severities incl. the
missing Trace=-1, phases both directions, terminal statuses, event-type
typo guard). KnownSources/KnownOperators made internal for the export.

P4 — agent safety nets: DecisionState builder/serializer completeness
(4-site sync tripwire), signal-kind fixture coverage with a shrink-only debt
set (found and fixed realmjoin-timeout-v1.json, which never deserialized),
RemoteConfigMerger completeness tripwire, DefaultComponentFactory ordering
invariants as real construction tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 17:18:18 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4c413337ca annotations: serve writableLanes from the backend write matrix (audit P2)
The GET now computes writableLanes with the SAME function the PUT re-gates
with (IsLaneWritableByCaller, own-tenant binding included) and the card
renders exactly that list — the hand-mirrored TS matrix is deleted. Fixes a
latent UX authz bug (a GA without an own-tenant admin role was offered the
tenantadmin lane and would have hit a 403). Older backends without the field
fail closed to read-only, so web can ship independently; save affordances
appear once the backend is deployed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 17:18:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8277d70915 fix: close live catalog/type drift across web, backend and agent (audit P1)
- adminConfig.ts: drop retired V1 latestAgent*/customSettings ghost fields,
  add the 8 backend fields the interface was missing
- ops alerts: register the Sla category (BreachNotification/ConsecutiveFailures/
  EvaluationCompleted) + OrphanEventsCleaned so operators can route them
- analyze rules: expose app_install_duration in the builder SOURCES;
  fix stale XML docs (event_data_array, count_per_group_gte/in/not_in)
- UploadIntervalSeconds: collapse 5 diverged defaults (10 vs 30) onto
  Constants.DefaultUploadIntervalSeconds = 10 (the served value)
- combine-rules workflow: commit ALL three combine.js outputs and include
  rules/guardrails.json in the path filters
- api.ts apps sessions builders: move trailing optional strings into an
  options object (adjacent optional strings swallowed a forgotten tenantId)
- SummaryDialog: canonical phase display names ("Apps (Device)")
- mcp-server.bicep: fix pre-EU-cutover hostname in deploy docs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 17:17:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e1b3ec25fd web: wrap analysis-card context notes on mobile; fix NaN critical path
The confidence bar and the two fleet-context notes on an analysis finding
shared a non-wrapping flex row, so on phones they squeezed into
word-per-line columns — the row now wraps, each note taking its own line.

Also visible in the same screenshot: "critical path NaNh NaNm" in the
ESP-blocking apps block. The backend omits null fields (WhenWritingNull),
so espAppsOccupancySeconds arrives as undefined and the strict !== null
guard let it through to formatDuration. Loose != null check now hides the
label when the value is absent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 14:33:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 321ae63c63 insights: app-version duration regression radar + per-version duration stats
versionBreakdown on the app analytics responses now carries measuredInstalls,
medianDurationSeconds and p95DurationSeconds per version (measured population:
succeeded, non-skip, plausible duration, no AppId collision). A new pure
AppVersionRegressionRadar detects "median install duration rose from X to Y min
after version Z": versions ordered by first-seen install time (never string
sort), fires at median lift >=2x AND >=300s absolute with >=10 measured
installs on both sides.

Episodes follow the rule-radar pattern in a fourth tracker keyspace
appversionregression|{app}|{version} (409-dedup, refresh keeps FirstNotifiedAt,
re-arm on drain / median back under 1.5x, 30d retention sweep re-arms): one
tenant bell app_version_duration_regression (Admin audience, appDetailUrl href)
plus one AppVersionDurationRegression ops event per episode, dual-registered in
the web OPS_EVENT_TYPES catalog. Runs in the maintenance timer after the rule
radar over one cross-tenant 35d install-summary read; kill switch
AppVersionRegressionRadarDisabled (fail-open). Apps detail page shows an amber
regression banner and a median-duration-by-version chart; OKF concept doc added.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 13:39:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 842db1603a insights: fleet context on analysis cards + rule-filtered session deep link
Each fired analyze rule on the session detail page now reads "Fired in N
enrollment(s) in the last 14 days" (summed client-side from the existing
rule-stats trend — enrollments, never devices; RuleStats carries no serial)
with a "View sessions" deep link. The dashboard accepts ?ruleId=, fetches
the rule's hit-session ids once from the new GET /api/metrics/rule-hit-sessions
endpoint (MemberRead + QueryParam scoping, capped 2000 with a truncated flag)
and filters the loaded list client-side behind a clearable chip.

Side fix: the section's stats fetch now follows the session's tenant for
GA/delegated viewers (global route + tenantId) instead of showing the
viewer's own-tenant numbers next to a foreign session. Dashboard links in
fleet/fleet-health now go through the new canonical dashboardUrl() builder.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 13:38:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c770bbffcf build: keep NuGet audit advisories as warnings in the warning freeze
A CVE published against an already-referenced package must not block an
unrelated hotfix deploy; advisories are handled by bumping the package.
WarningsNotAsErrors NU1901-NU1904 - everything else stays fatal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 09:49:27 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3fbdc8ef62 build: freeze .NET builds at zero warnings (warnings-as-errors)
Repo-wide Directory.Build.props: TreatWarningsAsErrors +
MSBuildTreatWarningsAsErrors. Applies to compiler, MSBuild and NuGet
restore warnings including audit advisories (NU1901-NU1904) - a newly
published CVE fails the build until addressed (fail-closed).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 09:44:40 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 35cea4fe64 build: clear all remaining .NET build warnings to zero
- CmTraceLogParser: annotate TryParseLine (string? line, [NotNullWhen(true)]
  out entry), init string properties (CS8618/CS8625/CS8604)
- Shared: internal NotNullWhen polyfill for netstandard2.0; multi-target
  netstandard2.0;net10.0 so net10 consumers use the BCL attribute and the
  polyfill cannot collide via InternalsVisibleTo (CS0433)
- AgentEndpointMigrationRules.TryNormalizeTarget: now carries [NotNullWhen(true)]
- Functions.csproj: drop DataProtection/Cryptography.Xml security pins made
  redundant by .NET 10 framework-package pruning (NU1510)
- Functions.Tests.csproj: add Microsoft.AspNetCore.App FrameworkReference so
  pruning applies there too and the pins stay unnecessary (NU1903/NU1904)
- Agent tests: nullable test-helper param, Assert.NotNull before dereference

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 09:38:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ade6c4948f annotations: tenant switcher on the overview page + GA-lane guard on the global list
/annotations now carries the standard cross-tenant scope (GA/Reader: "All
tenants" aggregate + per-tenant drill-down via GET global/session-annotations,
delegated: managed subset), with a tenant column and tenant-qualified session
deep links. The global list endpoint now derives excludeGlobalAdminLane from
HasGlobalScope so delegated-rescue callers never receive the platform-internal
globaladmin lane (endpoint-test-pinned).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 09:27:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 83da522dd7 ci: freeze the web lint warning cap at zero (batch 5)
The 99-warning legacy backlog from the React 19 / eslint-plugin-react-hooks
v6 upgrade is fully burned down — CI now fails on any new warning. The
compiler rules stay demoted to "warn" so local dev output remains readable;
the eslint config comments now point to the established fix patterns
instead of the retired ratchet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 19:23:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c15394df87 web: refactor context/sidebar/theme effect-state sync, last lint sites to zero (batch 3)
- AuthContext: delete the SSR isLoading effect — effects never run on the
  server, the guard was unreachable dead code.
- TenantContext: mirror user.tenantId via adjust-during-render; the value
  is still retained while auth resolves and cleared on settled sign-out.
- Global/Tenant notification contexts: scope-masked empty list derived in
  the provider value instead of effect-clearing; loading flag moved into
  the canonical async wrapper.
- New shared hooks/useMediaQuery (useSyncExternalStore, configurable
  server snapshot) — consumed by GlobalSidebar (isDesktop) and
  McpTerminalDemo (prefers-reduced-motion, finished transcript derived).
- GlobalSidebar: route-mode active section derived from pathname;
  active-group and pathname auto-expansion as adjust-during-render, state
  now holds user toggles only.
- ThemeContext: theme read via useSyncExternalStore backed by
  lib/themeStore (manual preference beats OS preference in the snapshot;
  same-tab writes notify through the store's listener list).
- TipOfTheDay: random tip via useSyncExternalStore with module-memoized
  pick (build-time Math.random would freeze one tip and mismatch on
  hydration); re-rolls per mount via cleanup.
- Navbar: previewMode block removed entirely — nothing in the codebase
  consumes the flag anymore, it only persisted itself.
- activation page: ?demo flag via useSyncExternalStore, tri-state null
  sentinel dropped.

Lint is at zero react-hooks warnings repo-wide.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 19:17:55 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 810a6f1f2f web: derive instead of effect-sync across reset/clamp/seed lint sites (batch 2)
Structural fixes for the set-state-in-effect sites that were genuine
state synchronization, using the React-documented patterns:

- adjust-during-render (compare-prev) for reset-on-dep-change: dashboard
  page reset + tenant-filter clear, InstallsTab/MappedSoftwareTab page
  resets, TenantManagementSection URL seeding + page reset,
  OpsAlertRulesSection draft re-seeding, SessionReportsSection deep-link
  auto-open, ReportSessionModal result reset.
- clamp/derive at read: dashboard effectivePage (also removes the
  documented handleNextPage race), backups detail effectiveTableName,
  useBlockDevice scope-masked set, InstallProgress and
  useProgressDerivedData live timers (startedAt-tagged tick state),
  sessions timeBreakdown read guard.
- key-based reset: SessionReportsSection note editor, DeleteConfirmModal
  content remount.
- inverted state: sessions page stores collapsedPhases so new phases are
  expanded by default with no sync effect; hash deep-link expandAll moved
  into its timer callback.
- tagged result state: useScriptDisplayNames stores {key, map} and serves
  the empty map on key mismatch — same staleness guarantee, no
  effect-phase clearing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 19:17:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 019ac3959e web: clear the three preserve-manual-memoization warnings (batch 4)
- useProgressDerivedData: hoist the currentDownload computation into a
  module-level pure helper — the in-loop Map mutation and early return
  kept the compiler from memoizing the body inline.
- DeviceDetailsCard: derive bootTime from events inside the uptime memo
  (deps [events]) — the outer const is a live alias into event data that
  the compiler's alias analysis treats as maybe-mutated.
- useSessionEvents: route the queued follow-up re-invocation through a
  ref — a memoized callback that calls itself directly cannot be
  memoized. The now-traceable mount effect gets the standard wrapper.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 18:56:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9236aba46e web: canonical inner-async wrappers for all fetch-effect lint sites (batch 1)
Convert every useEffect that directly invokes a state-setting fetch
callback to the canonical inner-async shape (const run = async () => {...};
void run();) — the react-hooks/set-state-in-effect rule traces direct
calls but accepts effect-scoped async functions. Semantic no-op: an async
body runs synchronously until its first await, so execution order is
byte-identical. Leading loading/error/data resets that are part of the
fetch flow move to the top of run in unchanged order.

52 files, ~60 sites. Lint 99 -> 36 warnings; remaining sites are
reset/derive effects and sensitive context/sidebar refactors (next
batches).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 18:55:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fda52666d6 web: clear set-state-in-effect lint warning on the annotations page
The annotations overview pushed the ESLint warning count to 100, one over
the frozen --max-warnings 99 cap, failing CI since 66d25f57's run. The
react-hooks/set-state-in-effect rule flags any direct effect call into a
state-setting useCallback, even with every setState behind an await.

Restructure instead of suppressing: loading/error begin-state moves from
fetchPage into the interaction sites (filter selects, load-more; mount is
covered by the initial state), and the effect invokes fetchPage through an
inner async wrapper so no setState is synchronously reachable. Lint is
back to exactly 99.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 17:19:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach dcec6a1863 web: friendly empty/error states on the annotations overview page
A 404 (backend without the route yet, deploy skew) now renders the
regular empty state instead of an error; genuine load failures show a
calm non-technical retry hint in amber instead of raw statusText in red.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 16:42:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 041626494e ci: bump actions/cache v4 -> v6 (Node 24 runtime)
Node 20 actions are deprecated on GitHub runners; actions/cache@v4 was
the last remaining action targeting it (MCP server tests job warning).
v6 runs on node24 like the rest of the workflow actions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 16:41:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fd32a90d57 web: label the GA annotation lane as internal, with a visibility badge
"Autopilot Monitor Team" read like a vendor-to-customer message channel.
The lane only ever renders for platform-scope users, so it now says
"Internal (Autopilot Monitor)" and carries a "never visible to the
tenant" badge on the session card.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 16:39:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 90b8243894 annotations: move tenant list route under the /api/sessions cert-exclusion prefix
/api/session-annotations sat outside every clientCertExclusionPaths
prefix, so browsers got the client-cert picker. Rename-over-exclusion
per the diag-files precedent (the Azure list is portal-only config and
dies on app recreation). Three segments (sessions/annotations/list) on
purpose: a two-segment literal would be eaten by sessions/{sessionId}.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 16:35:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 66d25f57db Cloud-PC-aware autopilot_profile_missing: Info instead of Warning on W365
On Windows 365 Cloud PCs a missing Autopilot profile (ProfileAvailable=0)
is the expected state - Cloud PCs are provisioned by the Windows 365
service, not by Autopilot - so the warning shown for physical devices is
misleading there.

- Agent: emit autopilot_profile_missing as Info with a Cloud-PC-specific
  message when CloudPcDetector matches; payload now carries isCloudPc.
  Evidence collection (ZTD verdict, registry, endpoint probe) unchanged.
- Web: DeviceDetailsCard renders a neutral info note instead of the amber
  warning for Cloud PC sessions (session.isCloudPc, sticky, covers
  existing sessions; or the new event marker).
- MCP: resource-catalog documents the new isCloudPc data field.
- Docs: Cloud PC exception noted in agent/autopilot-ztd-diagnostics.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 16:13:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 84a0424789 annotations: tenant-scoped overview page listing judged sessions
New GET /api/session-annotations (MemberRead + QueryParam, tenant always
the middleware-validated target) backing the portal /annotations page in
the Monitoring sidebar group (deliberately no new Insights group). For
callers without global scope the repository excludes the globaladmin
lane server-side (Lane ne clause), so hidden rows never consume page
budget and an explicit lane filter self-contradicts to empty. Rows
deep-link to the session annotation section. Verdict pill styling moved
to the shared logic module.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 16:13:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 596788cc26 fix dark mode 2026-08-12 14:32:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach aec2d249e1 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/Autopilot-Monitor 2026-08-12 14:23:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a63f126b88 update dark theme script executions 2026-08-12 14:23:06 +02:00
dependabot[bot] d94a91780c chore(deps): bump the web group across 1 directory with 5 updates (#129)
Bumps the web group with 5 updates in the /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web directory:

| Package | From | To |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [@microsoft/signalr](https://github.com/dotnet/aspnetcore) | `10.0.0` | `10.0.11` |
| [@types/leaflet](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/leaflet) | `1.9.21` | `1.9.22` |
| [next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js) | `16.2.12` | `16.3.0` |
| [@next/bundle-analyzer](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/next-bundle-analyzer) | `16.2.12` | `16.3.0` |
| [eslint-config-next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/eslint-config-next) | `16.2.12` | `16.3.0` |



Updates `@microsoft/signalr` from 10.0.0 to 10.0.11
- [Release notes](https://github.com/dotnet/aspnetcore/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/dotnet/aspnetcore/blob/main/docs/ReleasePlanning.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/dotnet/aspnetcore/commits)

Updates `@types/leaflet` from 1.9.21 to 1.9.22
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/leaflet)

Updates `next` from 16.2.12 to 16.3.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/compare/v16.2.12...v16.3.0)

Updates `@next/bundle-analyzer` from 16.2.12 to 16.3.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.0/packages/next-bundle-analyzer)

Updates `eslint-config-next` from 16.2.12 to 16.3.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.0/packages/eslint-config-next)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: "@microsoft/signalr"
  dependency-version: 10.0.11
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@next/bundle-analyzer"
  dependency-version: 16.3.0
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@types/leaflet"
  dependency-version: 1.9.22
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: eslint-config-next
  dependency-version: 16.3.0
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: next
  dependency-version: 16.3.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-11 16:18:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0b83fe2390 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/Autopilot-Monitor 2026-08-11 16:09:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 75c0c60717 web: use absolute destination for sign-in redirect in global error boundary
Next 16.3's new @next/next/no-location-assign-relative-destination rule
flags relative URLs assigned to window.location, pushing the lint warning
count past the CI cap of 99.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-11 15:09:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 29e7aa675a web: native title tooltips explaining each annotation verdict
Same wording as the customer docs; plain browser tooltip, no cursor
change. Applied to the verdict buttons and the read-only pill.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-11 15:06:50 +02:00
dependabot[bot] c28d64fe27 chore(deps-dev): bump tsx (#128)
Bumps the mcp group in /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp with 1 update: [tsx](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx).


Updates `tsx` from 4.23.1 to 4.23.11
- [Release notes](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/blob/master/release.config.cjs)
- [Commits](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/compare/v4.23.1...v4.23.11)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: tsx
  dependency-version: 4.23.11
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-11 14:45:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b2723168fd reports: snapshot session annotations into the report ZIP
SubmitReportAsync adds annotations.json (all lanes) to the package and
annotationCount to report-metadata.json. All lanes are safe: report
blobs are readable only through the GA-only session-reports routes.
Fail-soft like the tenant-context snapshot; the copy outlives the
session=s retention/delete.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-11 14:38:33 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d05d8ef302 web: annotations card collapsed by default with verdict summary header
The verdict comes at the end of a diagnosis, so the card must not take
space from the details/analysis work above it. Clickable chevron header
per section convention; count + verdict pills stay visible collapsed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-11 14:33:40 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2c48968ec6 session annotations: role-separated human verdicts on sessions (flywheel labels)
New SessionAnnotations table (PK=tenantId, RK={sessionId}_{lane}, lanes
operator/tenantadmin/globaladmin) storing structured verdicts + notes with
server-stamped authorship and a fired-rule-id snapshot for join-free
rule-quality evaluation. Per-lane write matrix re-gated in-function with
own-tenant binding; the globaladmin lane is platform-internal and filtered
from tenant callers. Portal: SessionAnnotationsCard on session detail.
MCP: list_session_annotations (ga) + annotate_session (strictGa, GA lane
only) + annotations key in get_session_summary. Lifecycle: cascade steps
17-19, offboarding wipe, critical-backup member. Privacy page gains the
customer-entered-content line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-11 13:30:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2f8ad82b0a gather-rules: mirror hard blocks in portal/MCP, stamp author on PUT-upsert; agent: bootstrap retry tests
Codex follow-ups to 1ebc2675:

- guardrails.json now mirrors blockedCommandPatterns + maxCommandLength and
  carries C:\Windows\System32\config in blockedFilePrefixes; portal
  (guardValidation.ts) and MCP (rule-validation.ts) enforce them in agent
  order (before the unrestricted-mode early-return), so hard-blocked commands
  no longer show "Allowed" in unrestricted tenants. GuardrailsParityTests
  pins the JSON mirror to the C# constants.
- gather-rule schema: collectorType enum gains json/xml (agent + portal
  supported both; MCP validate_rule falsely rejected them); MCP validates
  json/xml targets with file semantics and rejects activePhases +
  activeFromPhase set together (backend 400 parity); authoring guide updated.
- Author anti-spoof: tenant + global UpdateRule stamp the caller's JWT
  display name before the service call, closing the PUT-upsert hole where a
  non-existing ruleId stored the payload author; true updates still preserve
  the original. GatherRulesFunctionAuthorEndpointTests drives the real
  endpoints (first HttpRequestData-level test) proving body authors never win.
- AgentBootstrap.RetrySelfUpdateAfterEnrollment: internal + UpdateInvokerOverride
  test seam (RequestGracefulShutdown idiom), LastVersionCheckSucceeded setter
  internal; AgentBootstrapSelfUpdateRetryTests pin the guard, the relaxed
  await_enrollment timeouts, and the swallow-everything exception contract
  with save/restore of the static state.

Functions 3958, Agent-Core 2200, Web 670, MCP 543 tests green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-11 12:29:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4b74995e79 shared: drop Private Preview wording from ContactEmail seeding comment
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 20:34:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5d8d9e8d40 web: show tenant contact email in config report tenant status
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 17:58:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 25bd2c175e web: bump nanoid to 3.3.18 and js-yaml to 4.3.1 (Dependabot high alerts)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 14:00:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 830edb98e7 agent: suppress distress dispatch when the auth failure came from a dead endpoint
Follow-up to 13dd6723: a platform-403 (stopped/retired app, HTML error
page) now skips the DeviceNotRegistered/AuthCertificateRejected distress
report - it would be sent to the very endpoint that just answered with a
platform page, and its classification would be wrong. Counting and the
shutdown thresholds are unchanged, so a dead endpoint still drives the
agent to its soft shutdown instead of retrying forever.

The one-report-per-streak gate moves from "count == 1" to a streak-scoped
flag: an endpoint-unavailable failure no longer consumes the streak's
report slot, so a later genuine 403 from a live backend still dispatches.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 13:42:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1ebc2675b1 gather-rules: WQL property projections, portal enable-gating, author from JWT
- WMI guard accepts SELECT <property-list> FROM <class> for any class already
  allowed via SELECT * (strict data subset); same algorithm in agent, portal
  validator, and MCP validate_rule (incl. trim fix); guardrails.json unchanged
- Portal refuses to enable custom rules with not-allowed targets: create lands
  disabled, invalid edit force-disables, "Blocked on devices" badge, GitHub-issue
  hint for allowlist requests; agent stays the enforcement boundary
- Rule Author is stamped from the creator's token (display name > UPN) at create
  and preserved through every update, incl. cross-tenant GA edits
- bumpVersion keeps the segment count ("1.0.0" -> "1.1.0")

Customer feedback: SELECT BatteryStatus FROM Win32_Battery + on_change was
impossible because SELECT * re-emits on every charge-percent fluctuation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 13:41:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 283c2ed214 web,ci: make Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1 actually downloadable
The docs page and the admin UI both told customers to run
Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1, but the script was never published
anywhere -- it only exists in this private repo. Publish it on the
download alias next to the agent artifacts and reference it:

- build-agent.yml: upload the script on publish_as_stable runs
- admin UI: copied grant command now starts with an irm -OutFile
  download line; prose links the script directly
- utils/config.ts: new AGENT_DOWNLOAD_URL registry constant

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 13:33:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 13dd6723da agent: classify platform-403 as endpoint-unavailable + self-update retry after await-enrollment
Field case sits-d.cloud 2026-08-09: a pinned pre-cutover agent (2.0.1282)
hit the stopped legacy Function App. Azure answers with a platform-level
403 HTML page, which the agent reported as "device is not authorized" -
support chases a non-existent authorization problem, and the stranded
build never rescues itself because the startup self-update check runs
pre-enrollment where OOBE has no network.

Two fixes:
- BackendApiClient reads the 401/403 body: an HTML response cannot come
  from our backend, so it is classified as endpoint stopped/retired/
  proxied (BackendAuthException.EndpointUnavailable, page title in the
  message) instead of a device-authorization verdict.
- AgentBootstrap retries the self-update check once after the MDM
  certificate appears (proof of connectivity) when the startup check
  never reached the manifest, with relaxed timeouts (10s check / 60s
  download). An applied update restarts into a current binary BEFORE
  session registration hits a retired endpoint. Marker files are also
  written on this trigger so agent_version_check reflects the latest
  verdict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 13:32:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach cb6d80a76e agent: transliterate typographic punctuation to ASCII in log output
Agent logs are written UTF-8 without BOM; cp1252-guessing viewers
(Outlook web attachment preview) render em dashes as mojibake. Map
em/en dash, arrow, ellipsis, curly quotes and NBSP to ASCII at the
central sanitize step so every message is covered without touching
call sites. Genuine non-ASCII payload (paths, names) stays verbatim.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 12:41:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 024c90d68f ci: cache the MiniLM embedding model so MCP tests stop 429ing on huggingface
The vector-search tests tokenize with the real Xenova/all-MiniLM-L6-v2
model. transformers.js caches it under node_modules by default, which npm ci
recreates on every run — so each CI run re-downloaded the tokenizer/weights
from huggingface.co, and a rate-limited response (429) failed the whole MCP
job (run 31252869254; unrelated to the commit under test). Persist the model
via actions/cache and point HF_CACHE_DIR (already honored by
vector-search-provider.ts) at it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-08 12:37:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 54044c5d9c esp: continue-anyway observation mode — bounded 60-min defang for device-phase failures
Classic UD fleets held at the Device-ESP timeout wall by one slow blocking
app showed ~100% Failed (tenant c9787ba2: 948/1000 esp_terminal_failure)
although the profile allows "Continue anyway" and users demonstrably reach
the desktop — the classic advisory defang requires AccountSetupEnteredUtc
and never applied there.

New operator-set tenant opt-in EnableEspContinueAnywayObservation
(ConfigVersion 36 -> 37, default off):

- DecisionCore: a Device-phase EspTerminalFailure with ContinueAnyway
  allowed + opt-in observed (EspConfigDetected payload fact — kernel stays
  config-free) + Classic/Unknown non-pre-prov scenario defangs into the
  advisory rail with a 60-min AdvisoryCompletion window. Real end via the
  DAD-validated real-user desktop + Hello gate (IME user-session gate is
  structurally unavailable without the AccountSetup anchor): eager
  completion on DesktopArrived, category recovery via the 4910a5a5 hook,
  expiry un-defangs to the original esp_terminal_failure — every observed
  session still gets a terminal verdict.
- Honest outcome: enrollment_complete under an unresolved advisory carries
  espSoftFailure/completionSource (also on the classic post-AccountSetup
  advisory path); backend stamps EspSoftFailure/CompletionSource on the
  Sessions row (+ index mirror, terminal-tuple preservation); web renders
  an amber "with issues" badge plus a session-detail banner. No new
  terminal status — Succeeded + marker.
- Agent: remote-config field merged into AgentConfiguration; stamped into
  both esp_config_detected emitters (orchestrator bootstrap via live
  Func<bool> seam, DeviceInfoCollector via host/factory pass-through).
- Admin UI: GA-only toggle in the tenant management modal (next to
  Bootstrap Token) + stored/runtime rows in the tenant config report;
  GA-gated on both write paths (PUT silently reverts for tenant admins,
  field patch rejects with 400).

Tests: 13 new ContinueAnywayObservationTests; DecisionCore 513, Agent V2
2162, Functions 3948, SummaryDialog 44, vitest 632, tsc clean.
Docs: docs/agent/continue-anyway-observation.md (OKF) + index/log.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-08 12:28:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3b3e8a7614 analyze: delay auto-analyze visibility 30s so rules stop racing the terminal flush
The enqueue fires in the very ingest batch that carries enrollment_failed /
enrollment_complete — by design the FIRST event of the agent's terminal
sequence. The worker's hot loop dequeued sub-second and evaluated rules
against a stream still missing the terminal-flush rows (stuck-promotion's
synthetic app_install_failed, app_tracking_summary, agent_shutting_down),
and the RuleResult dedup made the gap permanent. Session 53d1e9f6:
ANALYZE-ESP-004's optional app_install_failed condition never matched and
{{appName}} rendered as a literal placeholder (confidence 80, factor never
fired). A 30 s visibilityTimeout covers the flush including the agent's
late-event grace.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-08 12:28:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 115b4ec8c2 bootstrap: promote Windows 365 Cloud PC relax to v2.3 production script
Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 takes over the field-tested v2.3-dev.3 logic
unchanged (code-only diff vs dev: ScriptVersion + log file name); comments
condensed to customer-facing descriptions, dev changelog collapsed into one
v2.3 entry. Pester suite moved to Install-AutopilotMonitor.Tests.ps1 (neutral
test user names), dev script and dev suite removed. Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent
dry-run tester mirrors the Cloud PC trigger and the guard-4 uptime exemption.

Pester 29/29 green under PS 5.1 and pwsh 7; parse + pure-ASCII checks pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-08 09:18:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8ec5a5debd offboarding: close the un-offboard race — config freeze + fail-closed wipe guard
While a tenant offboarding is queued or draining, the TenantConfiguration
tombstone (Disabled=true, 'Offboarding in progress') is the cascade's only
auth gate. A GA lifting Disabled mid-cascade re-opened the tenant against a
wipe that was still coming: data written afterwards was destroyed, and
sessions registered after enumeration survived as orphans while their event
partitions were wiped.

Three layers close it:
- PUT config/{tenantId} returns 409 while the row is the offboarding
  tombstone — for all callers, GA included
- TenantConfigPatchService refuses patch AND revert against the tombstone
  (a revert restores a pre-offboarding snapshot with Disabled=false — the
  exact race)
- TenantOffboardingHandler re-reads the config before the destructive
  post-drain phases and fail-closes with 'unoffboard_race' when the
  tombstone is gone but the wipe has not run (last line of defense)

Shared predicate: TenantOffboardFunction.IsOffboardingTombstone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 16:25:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ff35270d5d agent: legacy bootstrap-config without TenantIdWaitSeconds must not disable the wait
A bootstrap-config.json written before the TenantIdWaitSeconds property
existed deserialized the missing field to 0, which the runtime treated as
an explicit opt-out and skipped the 600s TenantId wait entirely — exactly
the wait Hybrid-Join devices need while their Entra registration lands.

TenantIdWaitSeconds is now nullable: missing/null means 'not configured'
and falls through to the agent default (600s); an explicit 0 remains the
legacy fast-fail opt-out. The install merge carries null through instead
of freezing the default into the file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 16:24:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 312e849573 email: welcome + farewell templates to green branding
Header gradient, CTA button, and links move from the old blue
(#2563eb/#4f46e5) to the landing-page green palette (#1e8a4c/#33b161).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 16:11:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7433df528d web: mark-led OG/Twitter image + PNG apple-touch-icon
The OG image was an unreadable shrunken hero at card size; replace it
with a centered mark-first design (big green shape, large wordmark,
single tagline). Safari cannot use SVG for apple-touch-icon and fell
back to a letter tile — point the icons config at the file-convention
apple-icon.png, now the green mark on white (180x180).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 15:17:23 +02:00
2229 changed files with 246082 additions and 42722 deletions
+29 -23
View File
@@ -1,37 +1,43 @@
# Agent Directives
- **Plan first.** Enter plan mode for any non-trivial task (3+ steps or an architectural decision) and write the spec before building. If something goes sideways, stop and re-plan instead of pushing on.
- **Plan first.** Enter plan mode for any non-trivial task (3+ steps or an architectural decision) and write the spec before building. The plan file is `internal/work/plans/<slug>.md` from the first draft; the harness plan folder outside the repo is never the storage place, at most a copy for the approval dialog. If something goes sideways, stop and re-plan instead of pushing on.
- **Use subagents liberally** for research, exploration, and parallel analysis — one focus each — to keep the main context clean.
- **Verify before claiming done.** Run the tests, check the logs, show the evidence. Diff against `main` where behaviour could regress.
- **Fix bugs autonomously.** Given a report, a failing test, or an error, resolve it — no hand-holding.
- **Capture corrections.** After any correction from the user, record the pattern and a preventing rule in `tasks/lessons.md`; review it at session start.
- Read files over 500 LOC in chunks. Never treat one grep as proof of absence.
Codex reviews your output once you are done.
## Where knowledge lives
| Content | Location | Rule |
|---|---|---|
| Customer documentation | separate repo `autopilotmonitor-docs` (GitBook; baked into the MCP `search_docs` corpus) | Any change ⇒ MCP redeploy. Commit in that repo (`cd` first). |
| Technical concept docs (OKF bundle) | `internal/` — private submodule, entry point `internal/docs/index.md` | Read the index first. Concept docs only for invariants, mechanisms and architecture a later change could silently break. |
| Decisions, including "we will not build X" | `internal/decisions.md` | One entry per decision: date, decision, why, applies-to, status. |
| Working files, lessons, plans | `internal/work/` | Rules in `internal/CLAUDE.md`. |
| Agent review criteria | `internal/docs/agent/architecture-principles.md` | Check every agent change against it. |
| Private operator instructions | `internal/CLAUDE.md` | Imported at the end of this file. Absent for contributors without submodule access; nothing in it may be copied into this public repo. |
| Infrastructure and operator scripts | `infra/` — private submodule | Bicep plus deploy/backup/migration scripts. Scripts never carry credentials; secrets come from env or a gitignored file next to the script. |
| Skills | `.claude/commands/` — private submodule | Each skill's frontmatter says when to use it. |
| Claude auto-memory | outside the repo, per machine | Private notes only. Anything the project must keep goes into `internal/`. |
## Hard rules
- Agent projects stay on .NET Framework 4.8.
- .NET build warnings are errors; only the NU1901–NU1904 advisories remain warnings.
- Never put real customer domains, tenant names or tenant IDs into code, tests, commits, comments or public docs.
- Deploy order is Backend → Web → MCP. Backend deploys are `workflow_dispatch` only. Verify the deployed version before claiming anything is live.
- Submodules (`internal/`, `infra/`, `.claude/commands/`): commit inside the submodule first, then bump the gitlink here.
- Stage explicit file lists; never `git add -A` or a directory. Pushing is the user's call.
- New API responses need a typed DTO plus the parity fact. MCP vocabularies are generated from the wire types, never retyped.
- Every route belongs in the route policy catalog; every new event type goes into the MCP resource catalog.
- Workflow files under `.github/` go through zizmor before they are committed (`zizmor .` from the repository root, findings from severity low on): fix every finding or ignore it in `zizmor.yml` with a reason. The `zizmor` job in `action-pins.yml` runs the same check on every push.
- The about, terms and privacy pages under `src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/` state facts customers rely on: verify every claim against the code before writing it and update them in the same change as the fact they describe.
## Code Quality
- Simplicity first: minimal, targeted changes. No temporary fixes — find the root cause.
- Where architecture is flawed, state is duplicated, or patterns are inconsistent, propose and implement the structural fix. Ask what a perfectionist reviewer would reject, and fix that too.
- On non-trivial changes, ask whether there is a more elegant way before presenting. Skip it for simple fixes — don't over-engineer.
- English for code comments and everything that carries knowledge.
## Task Management
Keep the plan in `tasks/todo.md` as checkable items, confirm it before implementing, tick items off as you go, and add a review section when done.
## Customer-Facing Claims
`src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/{about,terms,privacy}/page.tsx` and `autopilotmonitor-docs/trust/*` state facts customers and security reviewers rely on. They drift silently.
- Verify every claim against the code before writing it — never carry one forward because it was already on the page.
- Update them in the same change as: runtime/framework versions, roles, notification providers, agent deployment or lifecycle, diagnostics payload, isolation/delegation model, retention caps, sub-processors, or any default governing what is collected.
- Describe only what customers can actually use; operator-only infrastructure is not a feature.
- Trust pages: durable phrasing over exact figures, and bump their "Last reviewed" date.
## Technical Docs — OKF Bundle (`docs/`)
Contributor/AI-facing docs (customer docs live in the `autopilotmonitor-docs` repo). Start at `docs/index.md` before opening individual files.
- New durable knowledge (architecture decisions, flows, non-obvious mechanisms) → an OKF concept doc with YAML frontmatter: `type` (mandatory), plus `title`, `description`, `resource`, `tags`, `timestamp`.
- Register it in `docs/index.md`, note the change in `docs/log.md` (ISO date). `index.md` and `log.md` are reserved names.
- English, structural markdown (`# Schema`, `# Examples`, `# Citations`). Links between docs are RELATIVE — never `/`-prefixed, that breaks GitHub navigation.
Private half of these instructions (process, working files, technical docs, operations): @../internal/CLAUDE.md
-136
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@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
# Autopilot-Monitor — Agent Architecture Principles
The principles are **not nice-to-haves**, they are review criteria: any code
change that violates a principle is either (a) a bug, (b) a reason to change the principle
(with user sign-off), or (c) an explicitly documented exception with rationale.
---
## L.1 Truth Hierarchy (immutable)
`SignalLog` (input) → `Journal` (decisions) → `Snapshot` (cache) → `Projections` (derivable).
No projection patches backwards into the journal or the signal log. On inconsistency, the
lower layer always wins (e.g. discard the snapshot, do not "repair" the signal log).
## L.2 Event Sourcing as Foundation
`SignalLog` is the only input truth. The reducer is pure:
`(oldState, signal) → (newState, transition, effects)`. The backend can re-derive at any
time from `SignalLog`. Replay yields the same `Journal` content.
## L.3 Immutable State
All DTOs in the decision core are `sealed` with get-only properties. No in-place mutation.
"Change" = new instance via `With…` method. This is the difference between "purely testable"
and "subtle heisenbugs".
## L.4 Hypothesis Model instead of Flow Plugins
Fuzziness is constitutive (White-Glove, enrollment type, device-only). A single reducer with
hypothesis fields (`Unknown/Weak/Strong/Confirmed/Rejected`), organized by scenario in partial
classes. **No** plugin runtime, because clean flow boundaries do not match reality.
## L.5 Evidence Determinism
Signal-log determinism is guaranteed: same log → same outcome. Every signal carries an
`Evidence` record with `Kind` (Raw / Derived / Synthetic) and mandatory fields. A signal
without evidence = adapter rejection = bug.
## L.6 Signal Schema Versioning
Every `DecisionSignalKind` has a `SchemaVersion`. The reducer dispatches on
`(Kind, SchemaVersion)` — old versions stay replay-capable. A new version or a new kind
without a replay fixture in `tests/fixtures/signal-kinds/{kind}-v{n}.json` = merge block.
## L.7 Timer Monopoly
Only the Deadline Scheduler (the EffectRunner role) holds decision-relevant timers. Collectors,
signal adapters and the orchestrator must not. `Task.Delay` or `new Timer(...)` in those
layers with session-state impact = merge block. `IClock` interface + virtual clock for
testability.
## L.8 Classifier as Post-Hook Kernel Service
`IClassifier` interface, swappable. The `ClassifierVerdict` flows back into the log as a
synthetic `ClassifierVerdictIssued` signal. `InputHash` (SHA256 over classifier-relevant
snapshot fields) is the anti-loop guard. Classifiers are not baked into the state machine.
## L.9 Clean-Agent Principle on Refactors
For structural refactors: build the new project in parallel to the legacy one, do not flag-
route inside the same process. Strict separation rule: no direct reference to legacy
projects. Code is copied, not shared. Legacy runs out, then gets removed.
## L.10 Generic Telemetry Transport
One spool for all telemetry types (events, signals, decision transitions). `TelemetryItemId`
is the type-agnostic upload cursor; the type-specific counters (`Event.Sequence`,
`SignalOrdinal`, `StepIndex`) remain storage / UI / reducer semantics. Drain guarantee:
"coordinated + idempotent + resumable" — **not** cross-table atomic, which is not achievable
with three separate tables anyway.
## L.11 Separation: Agent Lifecycle vs Session State
`DecisionState` is session-pure. Agent-process flags (crash, admin actions, boot time,
heartbeat status) live separately in `agent-lifecycle.json`, managed by the orchestrator,
never by the reducer. Prevents replay dilution by lifecycle events.
## L.12 Flush-on-Append Persistence
No batching of append operations. `FileOptions.WriteThrough` plus an explicit
`FlushAsync(flushToDisk: true)` per append. Every successful `Append` return means: on disk.
Durability > performance in the crash-prone OOBE context.
## L.13 UI Primacy — End-Users vs Dev Tooling
Product views (EventTimeline, PhaseTimeline) stay slim and stable. Debug / analysis tools
(Inspector with DecisionGraph, SignalStream, VerifierReport) live on their own subpage behind
an `adminMode` gate. The session-detail page does not get overloaded with dev components.
## L.14 Forward Compatibility by Default
Enums via `StringEnumConverter` + `UnknownFallbackEnumConverter` (unknown values → default,
never crash). New schema fields are nullable. The `ReducerVersion` stamp per journal row
allows older backends to read newer rows. Deletions only after a major version bump with
user sign-off.
## L.15 Test Discipline
Flow / scenario tests are prioritized over structural tests. Coverage targets per component
(DecisionCore ≥95 %, classifier 100 %, backend functions ≥85 %). A missing fixture for a
scenario = merge block. CI threshold check is a build failure, not a warning.
## L.16 Fail-Safe Reducer Exceptions
Exception in the reducer → `DecisionTransition` with `DeadEndReason=reducer_exception`, state
unchanged (fail-safe, never destroy state). Signal counts as processed (no retry loop). After
five consecutive exceptions → the orchestrator emits
`enrollment_failed(reason=reducer_instability)`.
## L.17 Effect Error Handling by Class
Three effect classes with their own strategy:
- **Transient** (retry with exponential backoff 100 ms / 400 ms / 1600 ms):
`EmitEventTimelineEntry`, `PersistSnapshot`
- **Critical** (session abort, e.g. on timer-register failure): `ScheduleDeadline`,
`CancelDeadline`
- **Optional** (best-effort, classifier exception → `Inconclusive` verdict, no abort):
`RunClassifier`
Every effect failure is logged as a `DecisionTransition`.
## L.18 Implementation Discipline
- **R1** Pre-flight plan check before every work step
- **R2** Delegate self-contained sub-tasks **and exploration** to subagents (Anthropic
recommendation: preserve main-context window on large refactors — quality assurance)
- **R3** Real verification (DB round-trip, index dual-write, agent signal emission) — no
"it compiles and runs"
- **R4** The plan is authority — deviations require user sign-off
- **R5** Out-of-scope items land in `tasks/todo.md`, not in memory
- **R6** High test coverage is a prerequisite for future refactorability, not a nice-to-have
- **R7** Code-structure discipline: small files (guideline ≤300 LoC), clear folders, partial
classes by scenario, check in with the user on any uncertainty (placement, naming, scope)
---
+49
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name: Bug report
description: Something does not work as documented.
labels: [bug]
body:
- type: markdown
attributes:
value: |
Thanks for the report. Please redact tenant IDs, device names, serial numbers, and anything personal before posting.
For a failed enrollment in your own tenant, the fastest path is the **Report Session** button in the portal — it attaches the session context for support without exposing it here.
- type: dropdown
id: component
attributes:
label: Component
options:
- Web portal
- Agent (on device)
- Bootstrap script / Intune deployment
- MCP server / AI integration
- Analysis rules / log patterns
- Backend / API
- Documentation
- Not sure
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: what
attributes:
label: What happened?
description: What did you do, what did you expect, what happened instead?
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: repro
attributes:
label: Steps to reproduce
placeholder: |
1. …
2. …
- type: input
id: version
attributes:
label: Agent version / portal date
description: Agent version from the session details, or the date you saw it in the portal.
- type: textarea
id: logs
attributes:
label: Logs or screenshots
description: Relevant excerpts only, redacted. Paste text rather than screenshots of text where possible.
render: text
+11
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@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
blank_issues_enabled: false
contact_links:
- name: Question or idea
url: https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/discussions
about: Ask how something works or float a feature idea before it becomes a request.
- name: Documentation
url: https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com
about: Setup guides, troubleshooting, and the security FAQ.
- name: Security vulnerability
url: https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/security/advisories/new
about: Report privately. Please never open a public issue for a security finding.
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
name: Feature request
description: Propose something Autopilot Monitor should do.
labels: [enhancement]
body:
- type: textarea
id: problem
attributes:
label: What problem are you trying to solve?
description: Describe the situation, not the solution. What are you doing today instead?
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: proposal
attributes:
label: Proposed change
description: What would you like to see? Rough is fine.
validations:
required: true
- type: dropdown
id: area
attributes:
label: Area
options:
- Web portal
- Agent (on device)
- Analysis rules / diagnostics
- MCP server / AI integration
- Notifications / integrations
- Reporting
- Other
- type: textarea
id: alternatives
attributes:
label: Alternatives considered
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<!doctype html>
<html><head><meta charset="utf-8">
<link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.googleapis.com">
<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter:wght@400;500;600;700;800&display=swap" rel="stylesheet">
<style>
html,body{margin:0;padding:0;}
body{width:1280px;height:640px;overflow:hidden;font-family:Inter,system-ui,-apple-system,"Segoe UI",sans-serif;color:#0f172a;
background:
radial-gradient(900px 600px at 105% 110%, #dcfce7 0%, rgba(220,252,231,0) 60%),
radial-gradient(700px 500px at -10% -10%, #e0f2fe 0%, rgba(224,242,254,0) 60%),
linear-gradient(180deg,#ffffff 0%,#f6f8f7 100%);
position:relative;}
.grid{position:absolute;inset:0;background-image:linear-gradient(rgba(15,23,42,.045) 1px,transparent 1px),linear-gradient(90deg,rgba(15,23,42,.045) 1px,transparent 1px);background-size:40px 40px;mask-image:linear-gradient(180deg,rgba(0,0,0,.7),rgba(0,0,0,0) 85%);}
.left{position:absolute;left:72px;top:0;height:640px;width:520px;display:flex;flex-direction:column;justify-content:center;z-index:2;}
.brand{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:14px;margin-bottom:26px;}
.brand svg{width:44px;height:40px;}
.brand span{font-size:22px;font-weight:600;letter-spacing:-.01em;color:#0f172a;}
h1{margin:0 0 18px;font-size:50px;line-height:1.06;font-weight:800;letter-spacing:-.035em;}
h1 em{font-style:normal;color:#16a34a;}
p.tag{margin:0 0 30px;font-size:20px;line-height:1.45;color:#475569;font-weight:400;max-width:480px;}
.chips{display:flex;flex-wrap:wrap;gap:10px;margin-bottom:34px;}
.chip{display:inline-flex;align-items:center;gap:8px;padding:8px 14px;border-radius:999px;background:#fff;border:1px solid #e2e8f0;box-shadow:0 1px 2px rgba(15,23,42,.05);font-size:15px;font-weight:500;color:#1e293b;}
.chip i{width:8px;height:8px;border-radius:50%;background:#22c55e;display:inline-block;}
.chip.b i{background:#3b82f6}.chip.p i{background:#8b5cf6}
.foot{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:14px;font-size:15px;color:#64748b;font-weight:500;}
.foot b{color:#0f172a;font-weight:600;}
.foot .dot{width:4px;height:4px;border-radius:50%;background:#cbd5e1;}
.shot{position:absolute;left:600px;top:76px;width:1000px;height:640px;border-radius:14px;background:#fff;
box-shadow:0 30px 80px -20px rgba(15,23,42,.35),0 0 0 1px rgba(15,23,42,.08);overflow:hidden;z-index:1;}
.bar{position:relative;z-index:2;height:34px;background:#f8fafc;border-bottom:1px solid #e2e8f0;display:flex;align-items:center;padding:0 14px;gap:7px;}
.bar i{width:10px;height:10px;border-radius:50%;background:#e2e8f0;display:inline-block;}
.bar .url{margin-left:12px;flex:0 0 auto;height:20px;padding:0 10px;border-radius:6px;background:#fff;border:1px solid #e2e8f0;font-size:11px;line-height:20px;color:#64748b;}
.shot img{position:absolute;left:-214px;top:-16px;width:1440px;height:900px;transform-origin:top left;transform:scale(.94);}
</style></head>
<body>
<div class="grid"></div>
<div class="left">
<div class="brand">
<svg viewBox="0 0 209 191" fill="none" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><path d="M0 180.201L208.401 190.502L188.157 76.2438L5.48363e-06 0L0 180.201Z" fill="#33B161"/></svg>
<span>Autopilot Monitor</span>
</div>
<h1>See every Windows<br>enrollment <em>as it happens</em></h1>
<p class="tag">Live session timelines, fleet health, and on-demand diagnostics for Windows Autopilot and Intune.</p>
<div class="chips">
<span class="chip"><i></i>Live session timeline</span>
<span class="chip b"><i></i>Fleet health</span>
<span class="chip p"><i></i>MCP server for AI troubleshooting</span>
</div>
<div class="foot"><b>autopilotmonitor.com</b><span class="dot"></span>Open source<span class="dot"></span>Free Community plan</div>
</div>
<div class="shot">
<div class="bar"><i></i><i></i><i></i><span class="url">portal.autopilotmonitor.com/dashboard</span></div>
<img src="social-preview-dashboard.png" alt="">
</div>
</body></html>
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+18 -6
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@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
# CodeQL configuration.
#
# The default query suites stay active — this file only filters out two C# queries
# that fire structurally on this codebase, where the flagged behavior is the feature,
# not a defect:
# The default query suites stay active — this file only filters out queries that
# fire structurally on this codebase, where the flagged behavior is the feature
# or the protection exists in a form the query cannot see:
#
# cs/exposure-of-sensitive-information
# Audit and operational logs record WHO performed an action (actor UPN / email)
@@ -15,10 +15,20 @@
# key. The IP is an identifier for throttling, not a secret at rest; storing it in
# the in-memory / table rate-limit key is by design.
#
# js/missing-rate-limiting
# Only the MCP server has Express routes. Every one that does work is throttled by
# our own limiters (oauthRateLimit / oauthTokenRateLimit on /oauth/*, accessGuard
# on /mcp); /health and the OAuth discovery documents return static JSON.
# The query only recognizes limiters from npm packages (express-rate-limit and
# similar) and flags a route handler as soon as it calls a function named
# like *auth*, *login* or *verify*. So it reports throttled and unthrottled
# routes the same way, and every alert it ever raised was a false positive. The
# coverage check it stood in for is a test: every OAuth router route must carry
# a limiter or be named as exempt (MCP oauth-rate-limit.test.ts).
#
# Genuine one-off false positives from OTHER queries (e.g. an open-redirect the taint
# model can't see is allow-listed, a rate-limited route it doesn't recognize) are
# dismissed individually in the Security tab so those queries stay sharp — they are
# NOT suppressed here.
# model can't see is allow-listed) are dismissed individually in the Security tab so
# those queries stay sharp — they are NOT suppressed here.
#
# Log-injection (cs/log-forging) is deliberately NOT filtered: user-controlled values
# are sanitized at the sink via Helpers/LogSanitizer, so the query stays useful for
@@ -29,3 +39,5 @@ query-filters:
id: cs/exposure-of-sensitive-information
- exclude:
id: cs/cleartext-storage-of-sensitive-information
- exclude:
id: js/missing-rate-limiting
+52
View File
@@ -1,25 +1,44 @@
version: 2
# Cooldown: a version is proposed only once it has been public for 7 days, so a
# release that is yanked or found malicious within its first week never reaches a
# PR. Security updates are exempt from the cooldown by Dependabot's own rules.
#
# Grouping: every ecosystem gets one batched PR for minor/patch version
# updates and one batched PR for security updates. Groups apply to version
# updates only by default, so the security-updates groups are declared
# explicitly — otherwise every advisory lands as its own PR.
updates:
- package-ecosystem: nuget
directory: /
schedule:
interval: weekly
cooldown:
default-days: 7
open-pull-requests-limit: 5
groups:
dotnet:
patterns: ['*']
update-types: [minor, patch]
dotnet-security:
applies-to: security-updates
patterns: ['*']
- package-ecosystem: npm
directory: /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web
schedule:
interval: weekly
cooldown:
default-days: 7
open-pull-requests-limit: 5
groups:
web:
patterns: ['*']
update-types: [minor, patch]
web-security:
applies-to: security-updates
patterns: ['*']
# Major bumps are breaking and reviewed deliberately, not auto-PR'd.
# Security updates ignore this filter, so the Security tab stays clean.
ignore:
@@ -30,18 +49,51 @@ updates:
directory: /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp
schedule:
interval: weekly
cooldown:
default-days: 7
open-pull-requests-limit: 5
groups:
mcp:
patterns: ['*']
update-types: [minor, patch]
mcp-security:
applies-to: security-updates
patterns: ['*']
# Major bumps are breaking and reviewed deliberately, not auto-PR'd.
# Security updates ignore this filter, so the Security tab stays clean.
ignore:
- dependency-name: '*'
update-types: ['version-update:semver-major']
# Validator tooling for rules/ (ajv-cli); combine-rules.yml installs it from this
# lockfile with contents:write in hand, so the pins must not go stale.
- package-ecosystem: npm
directory: /rules/scripts
schedule:
interval: weekly
cooldown:
default-days: 7
open-pull-requests-limit: 5
groups:
rules-tooling:
patterns: ['*']
rules-tooling-security:
applies-to: security-updates
patterns: ['*']
# Every action is referenced by commit SHA with the version in a trailing comment;
# action-pins.yml fails any workflow change that reintroduces a mutable tag. Dependabot
# is what keeps those pins current: it rewrites the SHA and the comment together, so the
# pins are reviewed in a PR instead of drifting silently or being bumped by hand.
- package-ecosystem: github-actions
directory: /
schedule:
interval: monthly
cooldown:
default-days: 7
groups:
actions:
patterns: ['*']
actions-security:
applies-to: security-updates
patterns: ['*']
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Returns the request headers that authorize an Azure Storage REST call with Microsoft Entra.
.DESCRIPTION
One place for the storage OAuth contract shared by every publisher in this repo -- the
agent ZIP and MSI, the customer bootstrap scripts, the version manifests and the build
counters. Resource id, the az invocation, the service version and the failure message
live here so they cannot drift between call sites.
Identity comes from whatever `az login` established: the federated GitHub OIDC principal
in CI (azure/login, subject repo:okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor:ref:refs/heads/main), the
operator's own account for the local build. No secret is read, stored or passed around.
x-ms-version is MANDATORY here, not decoration: Entra-authorized requests are rejected
below 2017-11-09, and Table requests without a SAS must carry the header at all. 2021-08-06
is old enough to be deployed in every region and new enough for everything we send.
Callers merge the result into their own headers -- `$auth + @{ ... }` yields a new
hashtable per request, so nothing is shared across uploads:
$auth = & "$PSScriptRoot/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1"
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($auth + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob' }) -Body $bytes
Acquire once per step and reuse: every call shells out to az (~1s) and the token is valid
for the lifetime of a job.
.OUTPUTS
[hashtable] Authorization + x-ms-version.
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param()
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
# The data-plane resource, not management.azure.com -- a management token is accepted by
# neither the blob nor the table endpoint.
$token = az account get-access-token --resource https://storage.azure.com --query accessToken -o tsv 2>$null
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw ('Could not acquire an Azure Storage token. In CI this means the azure/login step ' +
'is missing or its federated credential does not cover this ref; locally, run ' +
'`az login`. A token alone is not enough: the principal also needs Storage Blob ' +
'Data Contributor on the container it writes, and Storage Table Data Contributor ' +
'on the table -- a missing role shows up later as HTTP 403 AuthorizationPermissionMismatch.')
}
return @{
'Authorization' = "Bearer $token"
'x-ms-version' = '2021-08-06'
}
@@ -0,0 +1,563 @@
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Publishes the customer-facing PowerShell scripts behind download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/.
.DESCRIPTION
Single owner of the script-publishing chain. Called from two places:
* publish-scripts.yml -- on every push to main that touches the sources,
so a script fix reaches customers without waiting
for an agent release.
* build-agent.yml -- on a publish_as_stable run, so a release always
lands a consistent set (ZIP + manifest + scripts).
Both callers run the same code. The scripts on the download alias are the live
copy the stage-1 loader downloads on every enrolling device, whether it came from
Intune or from the bootstrap MSI, so "current" is a correctness property, not
cosmetics.
Steps, in order:
1. Parse $ScriptVersion from the loader and the bootstrap source.
2. Render the -Dev variants by literal substitution of the URL/manifest
defaults. A missing anchor is a hard failure -- a silently un-substituted
dev script would point the dev fleet at the stable agent.
3. Version-bump guard: if a published script differs from its source but
carries the same $ScriptVersion, abort. Otherwise the docs badge,
version.json.bootstrapVersion and the portal's "your script is outdated"
hint would all keep asserting a version that is no longer what ships.
4. Build the publish set (loader, bootstrap, both dev renders, the extras).
5. Authenticode-sign every script (see -SigningToken). Signing is the LAST
transformation: it covers the exact CRLF/UTF-8 bytes that get uploaded,
and nothing may touch them afterwards or the signature breaks.
6. Upload every script blob with Cache-Control: no-cache (they rotate in
place), mirrored fail-soft to the legacy account.
7. Reconcile the version oracles: version.json.bootstrapVersion and
.loaderVersion (read-modify-write under If-Match, so a concurrent agent
release cannot lose its agent fields) and
AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion.
8. Verify through the alias -- re-download each blob and compare SHA-256.
Comparisons against a published script always strip its signature block first
(Get-ComparableText). A signature carries a timestamp, so signed bytes differ on
every run; without stripping, the bump guard and the drift check would report a
change for every unchanged script.
.PARAMETER LegacySasToken
Container SAS for the legacy account. Optional -- a mirror failure warns, never fails.
The legacy account lives in a different tenant, so the ambient Entra identity cannot
reach it; this is the only credential the publisher still takes.
.PARAMETER RepoRoot
Repository root. Defaults to the parent of .github/scripts.
.PARAMETER DryRun
Run every check and render, upload nothing. A dry run signs when a token is supplied
and skips signing when it is not: the PR gate runs this without any Azure login.
.PARAMETER SigningToken
Azure Key Vault access token for AzureSignTool. MANDATORY for a real publish -- an
unsigned customer script is not something this repo publishes. Together with
-KeyVaultUrl and -CertificateName.
.PARAMETER ExpectedPublisher
Optional -like pattern the signer subject must match after signing. Pins the publisher
instead of accepting any trusted signature; the loader on the device pins the same way.
.PARAMETER SignedOutputDir
Optional directory that receives a copy of every published file exactly as uploaded.
Used by CI to offer the signed scripts as a build artifact for local inspection.
.EXAMPLE
./Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 -DryRun
.EXAMPLE
./Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 -LegacySasToken $env:LEGACY_SAS -SigningToken $env:AKV_TOKEN `
-KeyVaultUrl $env:KV_URL -CertificateName $env:CERT
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[string]$LegacySasToken,
[string]$RepoRoot,
[string]$SigningToken,
[string]$KeyVaultUrl,
[string]$CertificateName,
[string]$TimestampUrl = 'http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com',
[string]$ExpectedPublisher,
[string]$SignedOutputDir,
[switch]$DryRun
)
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
if (-not $RepoRoot) {
$RepoRoot = (Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '../..')).Path
}
$ContainerUrl = 'https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent'
$LegacyContainerUrl = 'https://autopilotmonitor.blob.core.windows.net/agent'
$AliasUrl = 'https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent'
$TableUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.table.core.windows.net/AdminConfiguration(PartitionKey='GlobalConfig',RowKey='config')"
$BootstrapSource = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'scripts/Bootstrap/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$BootstrapBlob = 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$DevBlob = 'Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1'
# Stage 1. Assigned in Intune once, and embedded in the bootstrap MSI; it downloads the
# bootstrap above on every device and verifies its publisher before running it.
$LoaderSource = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'scripts/Bootstrap/Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$LoaderBlob = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$LoaderDevBlob = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1'
$ScriptContentType = 'text/plain; charset=utf-8'
$SigningEnabled = -not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($SigningToken)
if (-not $DryRun -and -not $SigningEnabled) {
throw ('Publishing requires -SigningToken (plus -KeyVaultUrl and -CertificateName): the ' +
'loader on every device verifies the publisher of what it downloads, so an unsigned ' +
'script would be rejected in the field. Only -DryRun may run without signing.')
}
if ($SigningEnabled -and ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($KeyVaultUrl) -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($CertificateName))) {
throw '-SigningToken needs -KeyVaultUrl and -CertificateName.'
}
function Get-HttpStatus {
param($ErrorRecord)
if ($ErrorRecord.Exception.PSObject.Properties['Response'] -and $ErrorRecord.Exception.Response) {
return [int]$ErrorRecord.Exception.Response.StatusCode
}
return 0
}
function Get-Sha256 {
param([byte[]]$Bytes)
$sha = [System.Security.Cryptography.SHA256]::Create()
try { return [BitConverter]::ToString($sha.ComputeHash($Bytes)).Replace('-', '').ToLowerInvariant() }
finally { $sha.Dispose() }
}
# Raw bytes of a published blob, or $null when it does not exist yet.
function Get-PublishedBytes {
param([string]$Url)
try {
$resp = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $Url -Method Get -UseBasicParsing
} catch {
if ((Get-HttpStatus $_) -eq 404) { return $null }
throw
}
# Comma operator: PowerShell unrolls an array returned from a function into the output
# stream and reassembles it as Object[], which would silently defeat every [byte[]] use
# downstream. ',' wraps it so the byte[] survives the return.
if ($resp.Content -is [byte[]]) { return ,$resp.Content }
return ,[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes([string]$resp.Content)
}
# Deterministic publish form: CRLF, UTF-8 without BOM. Git normalises line endings on
# checkout (a Windows runner yields CRLF, a core.autocrlf=false clone yields LF), so
# publishing the raw working-copy bytes would emit different blobs for identical source
# and make every byte comparison -- guard and verify alike -- environment-dependent.
# CRLF is also what PS 5.1 on the device expects and what is published today.
function Get-PublishBytes {
param([string]$Text)
$normalised = $Text.Replace("`r`n", "`n").Replace("`n", "`r`n")
# ',' keeps this a byte[]: without it PowerShell unrolls the array into the output stream
# and the caller receives Object[]. Invoke-RestMethod then serialises an Object[] body as
# space-separated decimals instead of raw bytes -- a silent corruption of the upload.
return ,(New-Object System.Text.UTF8Encoding $false).GetBytes($normalised)
}
# A PowerShell signature is appended as a comment block at the end of the file, so the
# published bytes are "source + signature". Everything that compares a published script to
# its source has to cut that block off first -- the signature carries a timestamp and is
# therefore different on every publish, while the script above it is unchanged.
function Remove-SignatureBlock {
param([string]$Text)
$marker = '# SIG # Begin signature block'
$index = $Text.IndexOf($marker)
if ($index -lt 0) { return $Text }
return $Text.Substring(0, $index)
}
# Comparison form: no signature, LF, no trailing blank lines. Used for "is the published
# copy still this source" -- never for what gets uploaded.
function Get-ComparableText {
param([string]$Text)
return (Remove-SignatureBlock $Text).Replace("`r`n", "`n").TrimEnd("`n")
}
# Signs the publish set in place: each item's bytes are written to a work directory, signed
# there, verified, and read back as the bytes that will be uploaded. Signing has to be the
# last transformation -- the signature covers exactly these bytes, so nothing may normalise
# or re-encode them afterwards.
function Set-PublishSetSignature {
param([object[]]$Items, [string]$WorkDir)
if (-not (Get-Command azuresigntool -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)) {
throw "azuresigntool is not on PATH. Install it with: dotnet tool install --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1"
}
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $WorkDir | Out-Null
$paths = @()
foreach ($item in $Items) {
$path = Join-Path $WorkDir $item.BlobName
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($path, [byte[]]$item.Bytes)
$paths += $path
}
Write-Host "Signing $($paths.Count) script(s) with certificate '$CertificateName'..."
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url $KeyVaultUrl `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken $SigningToken `
--azure-key-vault-certificate $CertificateName `
--timestamp-rfc3161 $TimestampUrl `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor bootstrap' `
--description-url 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com' `
$paths
# Native tool: PowerShell does not throw on a non-zero exit, and an unnoticed signing
# failure would publish unsigned scripts that every loader in the field then rejects.
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE -- nothing was uploaded."
}
foreach ($item in $Items) {
$path = Join-Path $WorkDir $item.BlobName
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $path
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
throw "Signature on $($item.BlobName) is '$($sig.Status)', expected 'Valid'."
}
# Without a timestamp the signature dies with the certificate, and these scripts sit
# on customer devices far longer than a certificate lifetime.
if (-not $sig.TimeStamperCertificate) {
throw "Signature on $($item.BlobName) carries no timestamp."
}
if ($ExpectedPublisher -and $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -notlike $ExpectedPublisher) {
throw "$($item.BlobName) was signed by '$($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)', expected '$ExpectedPublisher'."
}
# Plain assignment, NO comma operator: the ',' elsewhere in this file exists because
# PowerShell unrolls an array RETURNED from a function, which is not what a property
# assignment does -- here it would wrap the byte[] in an Object[] of length 1 and the
# upload would fail converting it back.
$signedBytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($path)
if ($signedBytes.Length -le $item.Bytes.Length) {
throw ("Signed $($item.BlobName) is $($signedBytes.Length) bytes but the unsigned form " +
"was $($item.Bytes.Length) -- a signature only ever adds bytes, so this is a " +
'read-back bug, not a signing result.')
}
$item.Bytes = $signedBytes
Write-Host " signed $($item.BlobName) ($($signedBytes.Length) bytes, signer $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject.Split(',')[0]))"
}
}
# Aborts when a published script changed behaviour without a version bump. Consumers act on
# the version (docs badge, version.json, the portal's outdated-script hint), so an unchanged
# version has to mean unchanged behaviour.
function Assert-VersionBump {
param(
[string]$BlobName,
[string]$SourceContent,
[string]$SourceOrigin,
[string]$SourceVersion
)
$publishedBytes = Get-PublishedBytes "$AliasUrl/$BlobName"
if ($null -eq $publishedBytes) {
Write-Host "No published $BlobName yet -- version-bump guard skipped (first publish)"
return
}
$publishedText = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($publishedBytes)
if ((Get-ComparableText $publishedText) -eq (Get-ComparableText $SourceContent)) {
Write-Host "Published $BlobName is already this source (signature block aside)"
return
}
$publishedVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $publishedText -Origin "$AliasUrl/$BlobName" -Optional
if ($null -eq $publishedVersion) {
Write-Host "::warning::The published $BlobName is not a readable script (no ScriptVersion found). Republishing over it."
} elseif ($publishedVersion -ne $SourceVersion) {
Write-Host "Version bump: $publishedVersion -> $SourceVersion ($BlobName)"
} elseif ((Get-CodeFingerprint -Text (Remove-SignatureBlock $publishedText) -Origin "$AliasUrl/$BlobName") -eq
(Get-CodeFingerprint -Text $SourceContent -Origin $SourceOrigin)) {
# Comments, typos in comments, reflow -- nothing a consumer of the version can act on.
Write-Host "::warning::$BlobName changed in comments or formatting only; publishing under the unchanged version $SourceVersion."
} else {
throw ("Version-bump guard: $BlobName changed behaviour but ScriptVersion is still $SourceVersion. " +
"Bump it in $SourceOrigin -- the docs badge, version.json and the " +
'portal outdated-script hint all read that value, and customers decide from it whether ' +
'to re-upload their Intune copy. Comment-only and formatting changes do not need a bump.')
}
}
function Get-BootstrapScriptVersion {
param([string]$Content, [string]$Origin, [switch]$Optional)
if ($Content -match '\$ScriptVersion\s*=\s*"([\d\.\-a-zA-Z]+)"') { return $Matches[1] }
# Unreadable SOURCE is fatal. An unreadable PUBLISHED copy must not be: that is exactly
# the state a republish is meant to repair, and a guard that blocks the repair is worse
# than no guard.
if ($Optional) { return $null }
throw "Could not parse ScriptVersion from $Origin"
}
# What the script actually DOES, with comments and layout removed: the PowerShell token
# stream minus comments, newlines and line continuations. Lets the version-bump guard tell
# a behaviour change (must be versioned -- consumers act on the version) apart from a
# comment fix or reflow (nobody needs to know). Tokenising rather than regex-stripping
# keeps '#' inside strings from being mistaken for a comment.
function Get-CodeFingerprint {
param([string]$Text, [string]$Origin)
$tokens = $null
$errors = $null
[System.Management.Automation.Language.Parser]::ParseInput($Text, [ref]$tokens, [ref]$errors) | Out-Null
if ($errors -and $errors.Count -gt 0) {
throw "Parse error in ${Origin}: $($errors[0])"
}
$ignored = @('Comment', 'NewLine', 'LineContinuation', 'EndOfInput')
return (($tokens | Where-Object { $ignored -notcontains $_.Kind.ToString() } | ForEach-Object { $_.Text }) -join "`n")
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. sources
$sourceContent = Get-Content $BootstrapSource -Raw
$sourceBytes = Get-PublishBytes $sourceContent
$scriptVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $sourceContent -Origin $BootstrapSource
Write-Host "Bootstrap script version: $scriptVersion"
$loaderContent = Get-Content $LoaderSource -Raw
$loaderVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $loaderContent -Origin $LoaderSource
Write-Host "Loader script version: $loaderVersion"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 2. dev render
$stableUrlLiteral = '$AgentDownloadUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip"'
$devUrlLiteral = '$AgentDownloadUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Agent-dev.zip"'
$stableManLiteral = '$VersionJsonName = "version.json"'
$devManLiteral = '$VersionJsonName = "version-dev.json"'
if ($sourceContent.IndexOf($stableUrlLiteral) -lt 0 -or $sourceContent.IndexOf($stableManLiteral) -lt 0) {
throw "Bootstrap dev-render: anchor literal missing in $BootstrapSource"
}
$devContent = $sourceContent.Replace($stableUrlLiteral, $devUrlLiteral).Replace($stableManLiteral, $devManLiteral)
Write-Host "Rendered $DevBlob (dev agent URL + version-dev.json)"
# The dev loader must fetch the dev bootstrap, or a dev device would run the stable chain.
$stableLoaderLiteral = '$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"'
$devLoaderLiteral = '$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1"'
if ($loaderContent.IndexOf($stableLoaderLiteral) -lt 0) {
throw "Loader dev-render: anchor literal missing in $LoaderSource"
}
$devLoaderContent = $loaderContent.Replace($stableLoaderLiteral, $devLoaderLiteral)
Write-Host "Rendered $LoaderDevBlob (points at $DevBlob)"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 3. bump guards
Assert-VersionBump -BlobName $BootstrapBlob -SourceContent $sourceContent -SourceOrigin $BootstrapSource -SourceVersion $scriptVersion
Assert-VersionBump -BlobName $LoaderBlob -SourceContent $loaderContent -SourceOrigin $LoaderSource -SourceVersion $loaderVersion
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 4. publish set
# Sources beyond the bootstrap pair, read straight from the repo.
$extraSources = @(
@{ Path = 'scripts/Bootstrap/Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent.ps1'; BlobName = 'Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent.ps1' }
# Customer-side Graph add-on grant script -- docs and admin UI link it directly.
@{ Path = 'scripts/CustomerSetup/Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1'; BlobName = 'Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1' }
)
# Uninstall-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 is deliberately NOT published: nothing links it, and
# an unauthenticated uninstall script on the public download host is not a feature.
# Text is the unsigned publish form and stays the reference for every comparison against a
# published copy; Bytes is what goes on the wire and carries the signature after step 4.
$publishSet = [System.Collections.Generic.List[object]]::new()
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $LoaderBlob; Text = $loaderContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $loaderContent) })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $LoaderDevBlob; Text = $devLoaderContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devLoaderContent) })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $BootstrapBlob; Text = $sourceContent; Bytes = $sourceBytes })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $DevBlob; Text = $devContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devContent) })
foreach ($extra in $extraSources) {
$extraPath = Join-Path $RepoRoot $extra.Path
if (-not (Test-Path $extraPath)) {
throw "Publish source missing: $extraPath"
}
$extraText = Get-Content $extraPath -Raw
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $extra.BlobName; Text = $extraText; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $extraText) })
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 5. sign
# After this point the bytes are final. Normalising, re-encoding or rewriting a line ending
# would invalidate the signature, and the device-side loader would refuse the script.
if ($SigningEnabled) {
Set-PublishSetSignature -Items $publishSet -WorkDir (Join-Path ([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath()) "apm-publish-$PID")
} else {
Write-Host '::warning::No signing token supplied -- dry run continues with unsigned scripts.'
}
$legacySas = if ($LegacySasToken) { $LegacySasToken.TrimStart('?') } else { '' }
# Acquired lazily: a dry run must stay runnable without any Azure login -- the PR gate
# (bootstrap-script-gates.yml) executes this script with -DryRun and never logs in.
$authHeaders = if ($DryRun) { $null } else { & (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1') }
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 6. upload
foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
# Explicit type, not a convenience: an Object[] body is uploaded as space-separated
# decimals rather than raw bytes, and every hash check still passes because [byte[]]
# parameter coercion repairs it everywhere EXCEPT the wire.
[byte[]]$bytes = $item.Bytes
$item | Add-Member -NotePropertyName Sha256 -NotePropertyValue (Get-Sha256 $bytes) -Force
# Exactly the bytes that go on the wire, for the CI artifact. Written in a dry run too:
# that is the run an operator uses to inspect a signed script before it is published.
if ($SignedOutputDir) {
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $SignedOutputDir | Out-Null
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes((Join-Path $SignedOutputDir $item.BlobName), $bytes)
}
if ($DryRun) {
# Doubles as a drift check: says per blob whether the alias already serves this
# source. Compared as text without the signature block -- signed bytes differ on
# every run, so a byte comparison would report drift for every unchanged script.
$served = Get-PublishedBytes "$AliasUrl/$($item.BlobName)"
$state = if ($null -eq $served) { 'MISSING on the alias' }
elseif ((Get-ComparableText ([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($served))) -eq
(Get-ComparableText $item.Text)) { 'already current' }
else { 'STALE on the alias' }
Write-Host " [dry-run] $($item.BlobName) ($($bytes.Length) bytes, sha256 $($item.Sha256)) -- $state"
continue
}
# no-cache on every blob: they all rotate in place and the download alias fronts them
# with Front Door. Route caching is disabled there, but a stale script paired with a
# fresh manifest would fail the bootstrap SHA check -- this keeps that class of bug
# impossible even if caching is ever re-enabled.
#
# Content-Disposition: without it a text/plain blob opens as a web page in every
# browser, and the documented "download the script" step silently becomes "copy this
# text". The header makes the link a download everywhere, and command-line clients
# (the loader, the MSI, curl) ignore it.
$headers = @{
'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'
'Content-Type' = $ScriptContentType
'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache'
'x-ms-blob-content-disposition' = ('attachment; filename="{0}"' -f $item.BlobName)
}
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$ContainerUrl/$($item.BlobName)" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $headers) -Body $bytes | Out-Null
# Read straight back from the blob (authoritative, no CDN in the way) before touching the
# mirror or the next file. The alias verification at the end would catch a bad body too,
# but only after every blob was already overwritten -- these are live customer downloads.
$written = Get-PublishedBytes "$ContainerUrl/$($item.BlobName)"
if ($null -eq $written -or (Get-Sha256 $written) -ne $item.Sha256) {
$writtenLength = if ($null -eq $written) { 'missing' } else { "$($written.Length) bytes" }
throw ("Upload of $($item.BlobName) did not round-trip: sent $($bytes.Length) bytes, " +
"blob now holds $writtenLength. Publishing stopped before the mirror and the " +
'remaining files, so no further blob was touched.')
}
Write-Host " uploaded $($item.BlobName) ($($bytes.Length) bytes, round-trip verified)"
if ($legacySas) {
try {
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$LegacyContainerUrl/$($item.BlobName)?$legacySas" -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body $bytes | Out-Null
Write-Host " mirrored $($item.BlobName) to legacy storage"
} catch {
Write-Host "::warning::legacy mirror failed for $($item.BlobName) -- $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
}
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 7. version oracles
# version.json is the agent manifest; only bootstrapVersion belongs to us. Read from the
# blob (not the alias) for an authoritative ETag, write back under If-Match so a concurrent
# agent release cannot lose its version/sha256 fields.
if (-not $DryRun) {
try {
$manifestResp = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "$ContainerUrl/version.json" -Method Get -UseBasicParsing
$manifestRaw = if ($manifestResp.Content -is [byte[]]) {
[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($manifestResp.Content)
} else { [string]$manifestResp.Content }
$manifest = $manifestRaw | ConvertFrom-Json
if ($manifest.bootstrapVersion -eq $scriptVersion -and $manifest.loaderVersion -eq $loaderVersion) {
Write-Host "version.json already reports bootstrapVersion $scriptVersion and loaderVersion $loaderVersion"
} else {
$etag = '"' + ([string]($manifestResp.Headers['ETag'] | Select-Object -First 1)).Trim('"') + '"'
$manifest | Add-Member -NotePropertyName 'bootstrapVersion' -NotePropertyValue $scriptVersion -Force
# Additive: no consumer reads loaderVersion yet. It exists so support can tell
# which stage-1 file a device was assigned -- stage 2 is always current by
# construction, so its version says nothing about the customer's Intune copy.
$manifest | Add-Member -NotePropertyName 'loaderVersion' -NotePropertyValue $loaderVersion -Force
$body = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(($manifest | ConvertTo-Json -Compress))
$manifestHeaders = @{
'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'
'Content-Type' = 'application/json'
'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache'
'If-Match' = $etag
}
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$ContainerUrl/version.json" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $manifestHeaders) -Body $body | Out-Null
Write-Host "version.json bootstrapVersion -> $scriptVersion, loaderVersion -> $loaderVersion (agent fields untouched)"
if ($legacySas) {
try {
$legacyHeaders = @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'Content-Type' = 'application/json'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$LegacyContainerUrl/version.json?$legacySas" -Method Put -Headers $legacyHeaders -Body $body | Out-Null
} catch {
Write-Host "::warning::legacy mirror failed for version.json -- $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
}
}
} catch {
if ((Get-HttpStatus $_) -eq 412) {
throw 'version.json changed while publishing (concurrent agent release). Re-run this workflow.'
}
throw
}
}
if ($DryRun) {
Write-Host " [dry-run] would set AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion"
} else {
$tableHeaders = @{
'Content-Type' = 'application/json'
'Accept' = 'application/json;odata=nometadata'
'If-Match' = '*'
}
$tableBody = @{ LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion } | ConvertTo-Json
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $TableUrl -Method Merge -Headers ($authHeaders + $tableHeaders) -Body $tableBody | Out-Null
Write-Host "AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion"
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 8. verify via alias
if (-not $DryRun) {
$pending = [System.Collections.ArrayList]::new()
$publishSet | ForEach-Object { [void]$pending.Add($_) }
for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le 6 -and $pending.Count -gt 0; $attempt++) {
if ($attempt -gt 1) { Start-Sleep -Seconds 20 }
foreach ($item in @($pending)) {
$servedBytes = Get-PublishedBytes "$AliasUrl/$($item.BlobName)"
if ($null -ne $servedBytes -and (Get-Sha256 $servedBytes) -eq $item.Sha256) {
Write-Host " verified $($item.BlobName) via $AliasUrl"
$pending.Remove($item)
}
}
if ($pending.Count -gt 0) {
Write-Host " attempt $attempt : $($pending.Count) blob(s) not current on the alias yet"
}
}
if ($pending.Count -gt 0) {
$names = ($pending | ForEach-Object { $_.BlobName }) -join ', '
throw ("Alias still serves stale content for: $names. The blobs were written, so this is a Front Door " +
'cache issue -- purge with: az afd endpoint purge --resource-group rg-autopilotmonitor-prd-gwc ' +
"--profile-name autopilotmonitor-fd --endpoint-name apm-download --content-paths '/agent/*'")
}
}
if ($env:GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY) {
$mode = if ($DryRun) { 'DRY RUN -- nothing uploaded' } else { 'published + verified via the download alias' }
$summary = @(
"### Bootstrap scripts: $mode",
'',
"Loader script version: **$loaderVersion** | Bootstrap script version: **$scriptVersion**",
"Signed: **$(if ($SigningEnabled) { "yes, certificate '$CertificateName'" } else { 'NO (unsigned dry run)' })**",
''
) + ($publishSet | ForEach-Object { "- $($_.BlobName) -- sha256 $($_.Sha256)" })
($summary -join [Environment]::NewLine) | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY -Append -Encoding utf8
}
Write-Host 'Done.'
+9 -12
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@
A failed build burns a number, which is harmless -- uniqueness matters,
density does not.
The blob is public-read; only the write needs the container SAS.
The blob is public-read; only the write needs authorization, and that comes from the
ambient Entra identity (see Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1) -- no secret is passed in.
Why a counter and not the published version manifest: manifests are written
on publish, not on build (the agent writes version.json only for stable
@@ -20,10 +21,7 @@
overwrite each other's versioned artifact.
.PARAMETER CounterUrl
Full URL of the counter blob, without SAS.
.PARAMETER SasToken
Container SAS with create+write permission. A leading '?' is tolerated.
Full URL of the counter blob.
.PARAMETER Override
Explicit build number instead of counter+1. If it is not greater than the
@@ -37,20 +35,19 @@
[int] the reserved build number. Progress goes to the host, not the pipeline.
.EXAMPLE
$n = ./Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $url -SasToken $sas
$n = ./Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $url
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$CounterUrl,
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$SasToken,
[int]$Override = 0,
[int]$MaxAttempts = 5
)
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
# Tolerate both secret formats ("sp=cw&..." and "?sp=cw&...").
$writeUrl = $CounterUrl + '?' + $SasToken.TrimStart('?')
# The write is Entra-authorized; the read below stays anonymous (public container).
$authHeaders = & (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1')
function Get-HttpStatus {
param($ErrorRecord)
@@ -65,7 +62,7 @@ function Read-Counter {
$resp = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $CounterUrl -Method Get -UseBasicParsing
} catch {
if ((Get-HttpStatus $_) -eq 404) {
throw "Counter blob not found at $CounterUrl. Seed it once with the last used build number: PUT the plain integer with 'x-ms-blob-type: BlockBlob' and 'If-None-Match: *'. See docs/versioning.md."
throw "Counter blob not found at $CounterUrl. Seed it once with the last used build number: PUT the plain integer with 'x-ms-blob-type: BlockBlob' and 'If-None-Match: *'. See internal/docs/versioning.md."
}
throw
}
@@ -85,8 +82,8 @@ for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le $MaxAttempts; $attempt++) {
$target = if ($Override -gt 0) { $Override } else { $counter.Value + 1 }
try {
$headers = @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'If-Match' = $counter.ETag }
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $writeUrl -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body "$target" -ContentType 'text/plain' | Out-Null
$headers = $authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'If-Match' = $counter.ETag }
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $CounterUrl -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body "$target" -ContentType 'text/plain' | Out-Null
Write-Host " Reserved build number $target (CAS write ok, attempt $attempt)"
return $target
} catch {
+103
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
name: Workflow gates
# Two checks over the workflow files themselves:
# * verify-pins -- every third-party action is referenced by a full commit SHA plus a
# version comment (stricter than zizmor's unpinned-uses audit).
# * zizmor -- static analysis of every workflow (permissions, credential
# persistence, template injection, ...). Configuration and the
# reasoned ignores live in zizmor.yml at the repository root; the
# same run is expected locally before a workflow change is committed.
#
# Every third-party action must be referenced by a full commit SHA, never by a tag.
# Tags are mutable: whoever controls an action repository can repoint v4 at new code,
# and that code runs inside jobs that hold the code-signing identity, the storage
# credentials and a token that can push to main. A SHA is the only reference an
# upstream owner cannot change under us.
#
# Lives in its own workflow rather than in ci.yml: CI deliberately ignores changes to
# the other workflow files, so a guard placed there would stay silent for exactly the
# commits it needs to inspect. Dependabot's action-pin PRs are the main customer: they
# rewrite workflow files without anyone running zizmor locally.
#
# Like CI, this reports rather than blocks: main is deliberately unprotected, so a red
# run is a signal to act on, not a merge barrier. Making it binding means adding
# 'Verify action pins' as a required status check -- a branch-protection decision, not
# something this file can assert.
#
# The pins are not maintained by hand — .github/dependabot.yml opens a monthly grouped
# PR that rewrites both the SHA and the trailing version comment. The comment is
# therefore required too: it is what makes a pinned line reviewable.
on:
push:
branches: [main]
paths: ['.github/workflows/**', '.github/dependabot.yml', 'zizmor.yml']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['.github/workflows/**', '.github/dependabot.yml', 'zizmor.yml']
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
verify-pins:
name: Verify action pins
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Every third-party action is pinned to a SHA
run: |
set -uo pipefail
failed=0
while IFS=: read -r file line ref; do
# Reusable workflows from this repository (workspace-relative ./ or the
# self-repository form $/) move with the commit that calls them, so there is
# nothing to pin.
case "$ref" in ./*|\$/*) continue ;; esac
if [[ "$ref" =~ ^[^@]+@[0-9a-f]{40}[[:space:]]+#[[:space:]]*[^[:space:]] ]]; then
printf 'ok %s:%s %s\n' "$file" "$line" "$ref"
continue
fi
if [[ "$ref" =~ ^[^@]+@[0-9a-f]{40}[[:space:]]*$ ]]; then
echo "::error file=$file,line=$line::Pinned but the version comment is missing: '$ref'. Write 'owner/action@<sha> # vN' so the line stays reviewable."
else
echo "::error file=$file,line=$line::Action '$ref' is not pinned to a commit SHA. Tags are mutable -- resolve it with: gh api repos/<owner>/<action>/git/ref/tags/<tag>"
fi
failed=1
# -H is load-bearing: with a single matching file grep omits the name, the
# fields shift by one and every diagnostic points at nothing.
done < <(grep -nHE '^[[:space:]]*(-[[:space:]]+)?uses:' .github/workflows/*.yml \
| sed -E 's/^([^:]+):([0-9]+):[[:space:]]*(-[[:space:]]+)?uses:[[:space:]]*/\1:\2:/')
if [ "$failed" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "::error::Unpinned action references found -- fix them before this reaches main."
exit 1
fi
echo "All action references are pinned to commit SHAs."
zizmor:
name: zizmor audit
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write # SARIF upload: findings land in the Code scanning tab next to CodeQL
actions: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
# zizmor itself is version-pinned like every other tool here; bump it together with
# the local install so the gate and the pre-commit run agree on the finding set.
# Informational findings (template expansion of our own step outputs in pwsh) are
# visible locally but do not fail the gate.
- uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@cc914d7f3750a2d13d75c7f184a1060aa0e9d482 # v0.6.4
with:
version: 1.30.1
min-severity: low
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
name: Bootstrap script gates
# Quality gate for the customer-facing PowerShell scripts, factored out so it exists
# once and both callers run the identical checks:
# * pester.yml -- pull requests (reports, does not block the merge button)
# * publish-scripts.yml -- pushes to main, where it BLOCKS the upload to the
# download alias. Devices execute these scripts as SYSTEM
# during enrollment, so a red suite must never ship.
on:
workflow_call:
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
gates:
name: Bootstrap guard tests (PS 5.1)
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Install Pester 5+
shell: powershell
run: |
Install-PackageProvider -Name NuGet -MinimumVersion 2.8.5.201 -Force -Scope CurrentUser | Out-Null
Install-Module Pester -Scope CurrentUser -Force -SkipPublisherCheck -MinimumVersion 5.5.0
# Windows PowerShell 5.1 on purpose: that is the runtime IME uses to execute
# platform scripts, so guard/relax logic is verified without resetting a device.
- name: Run Pester
shell: powershell
run: |
Import-Module Pester -MinimumVersion 5.5.0
$c = New-PesterConfiguration
$c.Run.Path = 'scripts/Bootstrap'
$c.Run.Exit = $true
$c.Output.Verbosity = 'Detailed'
Invoke-Pester -Configuration $c
- name: Guard scripts stay pure ASCII
shell: powershell
run: |
$failed = $false
Get-ChildItem 'scripts/Bootstrap' -Filter '*.ps1' | ForEach-Object {
$bytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($_.FullName)
for ($i = 0; $i -lt $bytes.Length; $i++) {
if ($bytes[$i] -gt 127) {
Write-Host "::error file=scripts/Bootstrap/$($_.Name)::Non-ASCII byte 0x$('{0:X2}' -f $bytes[$i]) at offset $i. PS 5.1 (IME) reads BOM-less files as ANSI and corrupts multi-byte chars."
$failed = $true
break
}
}
}
if ($failed) { exit 1 }
Write-Host 'All bootstrap scripts are pure ASCII.'
# The publish chain renders the -Dev variant by literal substitution and refuses to
# ship when an anchor moved. Running it dry here surfaces that (and any drift against
# the alias) on the PR instead of on the push that would have published.
- name: Publish dry run (dev-render anchors + version-bump guard + drift)
shell: pwsh
run: ./.github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 -DryRun
+271 -76
View File
@@ -27,12 +27,23 @@ on:
required: false
type: boolean
default: false
release_notes:
description: 'Customer-facing notes for the GitHub Release (Markdown bullets). Empty = generic fallback linking to the docs changelog'
required: false
type: string
permissions:
contents: write
id-token: write # keyless Sigstore signing (artifact attestation)
attestations: write # store the provenance attestation
# Shared with publish-scripts.yml: both write version.json (this workflow the agent fields,
# the script publisher bootstrapVersion under If-Match). Serialising them keeps a script push
# from colliding with a release. Never cancel -- a half-published set is worse than a queue.
concurrency:
group: agent-blob-publish
cancel-in-progress: false
env:
LINE_MAJOR: 2
AGENT_PROJECT: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.csproj
@@ -46,8 +57,13 @@ env:
VERSIONED_ZIP: AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v2.zip
STABLE_ZIP: AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip
STABLE_MANIFEST: version.json
STABLE_BOOTSTRAP: Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1
STABLE_BOOTSTRAP_DEV: Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1
# Authenticode via Azure Key Vault; identity and vault come from repository variables.
# CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT is optional and pins the publisher in the verify step.
CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME }}
CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL }}
CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT }}
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL: http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com
jobs:
build:
@@ -56,14 +72,68 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v7
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
# Every released build is signed; a missing variable stops the run before a build
# number is burnt.
- name: Check code-signing configuration
shell: pwsh
run: |
foreach ($name in 'CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID', 'CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME', 'CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL') {
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace([Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable($name))) {
throw "Repository variable $name is not set. Every released build must be Authenticode-signed."
}
}
Write-Host "Code-signing configuration present (certificate '$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME')"
# Logs in FIRST and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account, so the storage login below has to be the last one. Both federated credentials
# are bound to the ref, so this job must never be given an `environment:` -- that would
# change the OIDC subject claim and break both logins.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ env.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
allow-no-subscriptions: true
- name: Acquire Key Vault token for signing
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$token = az account get-access-token --scope https://vault.azure.net/.default --query accessToken --output tsv
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw "Could not acquire a Key Vault token for the code-signing identity."
}
Write-Host "::add-mask::$token"
"CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN=$token" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
# Every storage write below (counter blob, agent ZIP, manifests, AdminConfiguration)
# is authorized by this federated identity -- no SAS secret. One login covers the whole
# job: the federated credential is bound to the ref, and a release run takes ~2 minutes,
# well inside the token lifetime. Only the legacy mirror still needs a SAS: that account
# lives in the pre-migration tenant, where this principal has no identity.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# SDK 10 = single build toolchain (parity with local build.ps1 / global.json).
- name: Setup .NET
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
# Version pinned; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK above.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
# Build numbers come from the shared counter blob -- one counter and one
# implementation for CI and the local build (.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1).
# Reserve-before-build with ETag-CAS: concurrent builds can never mint the same
@@ -71,12 +141,22 @@ jobs:
- name: Reserve build number (counter blob CAS)
id: version
shell: pwsh
# Input and secret reach the script only as environment variables, never as script
# text: ${{ }} is substituted before pwsh parses the block, so a crafted
# build_number could otherwise break out of the quotes and run arbitrary code.
env:
BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE: ${{ inputs.build_number }}
run: |
$override = 0
if ('${{ inputs.build_number }}' -ne '') { $override = [int]'${{ inputs.build_number }}' }
if ($env:BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE -ne '') {
if ($env:BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE -notmatch '^\d+$') {
throw "build_number must be a positive integer, got '$($env:BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE)'"
}
$override = [int]$env:BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE
}
$counterUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent/buildcounter-v$($env:LINE_MAJOR).txt"
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $counterUrl -SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}' -Override $override
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $counterUrl -Override $override
$csproj = Get-Content $env:CSPROJ_PATH -Raw
if ($csproj -match '<VersionPrefix>(\d+\.\d+)</VersionPrefix>') {
@@ -109,6 +189,47 @@ jobs:
- name: Run Agent unit tests
run: dotnet test ${{ env.TEST_PROJECT }} --configuration Release --no-restore --verbosity quiet
# Authenticode over everything we author; third-party assemblies keep their own signature.
#
# THE POSITION IS LOAD-BEARING: signing rewrites the PE file, so it must run before the
# ZIP and every SHA-256 in the next step -- those hashes are the bootstrap's integrity
# oracle, and hashes taken before signing match no downloaded file.
#
# $LASTEXITCODE is checked explicitly: PowerShell does not throw on a native non-zero exit.
- name: Sign agent binaries (Authenticode)
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$targets = @()
$targets += Get-ChildItem -Path "$env:AGENT_OUTPUT/*" -Include 'AutopilotMonitor.*.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.*.dll' -File
$targets += Get-ChildItem -Path "$env:DIALOG_OUTPUT/AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe" -File
if (-not ($targets | Where-Object Name -eq 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')) {
throw "AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe not found in $env:AGENT_OUTPUT -- nothing to sign."
}
if (-not ($targets | Where-Object Name -eq 'AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe')) {
throw "AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe not found in $env:DIALOG_OUTPUT -- nothing to sign."
}
$targets | ForEach-Object { Write-Host "Signing $($_.Name)" }
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
--azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description "Autopilot Monitor Agent" `
--description-url "https://www.autopilotmonitor.com" `
($targets | ForEach-Object { $_.FullName })
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE -- aborting before anything is published."
}
- name: Create release artifact
id: artifact
shell: pwsh
@@ -181,6 +302,8 @@ jobs:
# commit/buildUtc are the same two fields the backend and MCP manifests carry —
# additive, and the bootstrap reads this file by field name, so older installers
# ignore them. sha256/bootstrapVersion stay: those are the customer contract.
# bootstrapVersion is seeded here so the published manifest is never briefly
# missing it; Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 owns and re-asserts the field afterwards.
$manifest | Add-Member -NotePropertyName "sha256" -NotePropertyValue $sha256Hash -Force
$manifest | Add-Member -NotePropertyName "commit" -NotePropertyValue '${{ github.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7) -Force
$manifest | Add-Member -NotePropertyName "buildUtc" -NotePropertyValue ([DateTime]::UtcNow.ToString('o')) -Force
@@ -190,36 +313,64 @@ jobs:
$manifest | ConvertTo-Json -Compress | Set-Content $env:MANIFEST_NAME -Encoding UTF8
Write-Host "$env:MANIFEST_NAME content: $(Get-Content $env:MANIFEST_NAME)"
# Bootstrap = single generic source. Stable variant = source 1:1.
# Dev variant = literal-string substitution of the two URL/manifest defaults.
# Both are uploaded only on -PublishAsStable runs (versioned namespace doesn't carry bootstrap).
if ('${{ inputs.publish_as_stable }}' -eq 'true') {
$stableUrl = '$AgentDownloadUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip"'
$devUrl = '$AgentDownloadUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Agent-dev.zip"'
$stableMan = '$VersionJsonName = "version.json"'
$devMan = '$VersionJsonName = "version-dev.json"'
Copy-Item $env:BOOTSTRAP_SOURCE $env:STABLE_BOOTSTRAP -Force
$content = Get-Content $env:BOOTSTRAP_SOURCE -Raw
if ($content.IndexOf($stableUrl) -lt 0 -or $content.IndexOf($stableMan) -lt 0) {
Write-Error "Bootstrap dev-render: anchor literal missing in $env:BOOTSTRAP_SOURCE"
exit 1
}
$devContent = $content.Replace($stableUrl, $devUrl).Replace($stableMan, $devMan)
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllText("$env:STABLE_BOOTSTRAP_DEV", $devContent, (New-Object System.Text.UTF8Encoding $false))
}
# The customer-facing scripts (stable + dev render, test script, grant script) are
# published by .github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 -- see the upload step.
"versioned_zip_release=$versionedZip" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
"sha256=$sha256Hash" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
"exe_sha256=$exeSha256Hash" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
"bootstrap_version=$bootstrapVersion" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
# Verified against the STAGING copy -- the exact bytes that ship. The invariant is "every
# AutopilotMonitor PE in the ZIP is signed", so a project added later cannot ride along
# unsigned. A missing timestamp fails too: without it the signature dies with the cert.
- name: Verify Authenticode signatures
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$files = Get-ChildItem -Path "staging/agent/*" -Include 'AutopilotMonitor.*.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.*.dll' -File
if ($files.Count -lt 2) {
throw "Expected signed binaries in staging/agent, found $($files.Count)."
}
$failed = $false
$thumbprints = @{}
foreach ($file in $files) {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $file.FullName
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::Signature status is '$($sig.Status)' -- expected 'Valid'."
$failed = $true
continue
}
if (-not $sig.TimeStamperCertificate) {
Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::Signature carries no RFC-3161 timestamp -- it would expire with the certificate."
$failed = $true
continue
}
if (-not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) -and
$sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -notlike $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) {
Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::Signed by '$($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)', expected '$env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT'."
$failed = $true
continue
}
$thumbprints[$sig.SignerCertificate.Thumbprint] = $true
Write-Host "$($file.Name): Valid, timestamped $($sig.TimeStamperCertificate.Subject.Split(',')[0]), signer $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)"
}
if ($thumbprints.Count -gt 1) {
Write-Host "::error::Staged binaries carry $($thumbprints.Count) different signing certificates -- expected exactly one."
$failed = $true
}
if ($failed) {
throw "Signature verification failed. Nothing was published."
}
Write-Host "All $($files.Count) binaries signed with certificate $($thumbprints.Keys -join ', ')"
- name: Upload to Azure Blob Storage
if: inputs.upload_blob
shell: pwsh
run: |
$containerUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent"
$sasToken = "${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}".TrimStart('?')
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
# Legacy mirror (transition until customers moved to the download.-alias):
# blobs are ALSO pushed to the old account so the bootstrap URL baked into
# customers' Intune scripts keeps serving current bits. Fail-soft -- a
@@ -229,7 +380,6 @@ jobs:
function Send-Blob {
param([string]$Local, [string]$BlobName, [string]$ContentType)
$url = "$containerUrl/$BlobName`?$sasToken"
$bytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($Local)
# no-cache on EVERY blob: they all rotate in place (even the per-line ZIP is
# overwritten each build), and the download alias fronts them with Front Door.
@@ -243,7 +393,7 @@ jobs:
$md5.Dispose()
}
Write-Host "Uploading $BlobName ($([math]::Round($bytes.Length / 1MB, 2)) MB)..."
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body $bytes
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$containerUrl/$BlobName" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $headers) -Body $bytes
Write-Host " uploaded $BlobName"
if (-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($legacySasToken)) {
try {
@@ -264,83 +414,95 @@ jobs:
Write-Host "PUBLISH AS STABLE -- writing V2 into stable namespace (customer-facing)" -ForegroundColor Magenta
Send-Blob -Local $env:VERSIONED_ZIP -BlobName $env:STABLE_ZIP -ContentType "application/zip"
Send-Blob -Local $env:MANIFEST_NAME -BlobName $env:STABLE_MANIFEST -ContentType "application/json"
Send-Blob -Local $env:STABLE_BOOTSTRAP -BlobName $env:STABLE_BOOTSTRAP -ContentType "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
Send-Blob -Local $env:STABLE_BOOTSTRAP_DEV -BlobName $env:STABLE_BOOTSTRAP_DEV -ContentType "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
if (Test-Path "scripts/Bootstrap/Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent.ps1") {
Send-Blob -Local "scripts/Bootstrap/Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent.ps1" -BlobName "Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent.ps1" -ContentType "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
}
# Customer-facing scripts: same publisher publish-scripts.yml runs on every push
# to main, so a release lands a set that is consistent with what is already live
# (dev render, version-bump guard, bootstrapVersion oracles, alias verification).
# Runs AFTER version.json so its bootstrapVersion read sees this build's manifest.
# Signed with the same identity: the device-side loader verifies the publisher
# of what it downloads, and the publisher refuses to upload unsigned scripts.
./.github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 `
-LegacySasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-SigningToken $env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN `
-KeyVaultUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL `
-CertificateName $env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME `
-TimestampUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL `
-ExpectedPublisher $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT
}
# Update AdminConfiguration LatestAgentV2* -- ONLY on stable cutover. The hash-oracle
# must never point at a build that is not actually in the stable namespace.
$tableSasToken = "${{ secrets.AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN }}".TrimStart('?')
# LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion is NOT set here: it belongs to the script publisher
# above, which also owns it on script-only pushes. One writer per field.
if ('${{ inputs.publish_as_stable }}' -ne 'true') {
Write-Host "SKIPPED: AdminConfiguration update (versioned-only run -- stable namespace unchanged)"
} elseif ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($tableSasToken) -or $tableSasToken -eq "XXX") {
Write-Host "SKIPPED: Table SAS token not configured -- set AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN secret to enable backend hash-oracle"
} else {
$sha256 = "${{ steps.artifact.outputs.sha256 }}"
$exeSha256 = "${{ steps.artifact.outputs.exe_sha256 }}"
$agentVersion = "${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}"
$bootstrapVersion = "${{ steps.artifact.outputs.bootstrap_version }}"
$tableUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.table.core.windows.net/AdminConfiguration(PartitionKey='GlobalConfig',RowKey='config')?$tableSasToken"
$tableUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.table.core.windows.net/AdminConfiguration(PartitionKey='GlobalConfig',RowKey='config')"
$tableBody = @{
LatestAgentV2Version = $agentVersion
LatestAgentV2Sha256 = $sha256
LatestAgentV2ExeSha256 = $exeSha256
}
if ($bootstrapVersion) {
$tableBody["LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion"] = $bootstrapVersion
}
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $tableUrl -Method Merge -Headers @{
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $tableUrl -Method Merge -Headers ($authHeaders + @{
"Content-Type" = "application/json"
"Accept" = "application/json;odata=nometadata"
"If-Match" = "*"
} -Body ($tableBody | ConvertTo-Json)
Write-Host "AdminConfiguration updated: V2 version=$agentVersion, sha256=$sha256, exeSha256=$exeSha256, bootstrapVersion=$bootstrapVersion"
}) -Body ($tableBody | ConvertTo-Json)
Write-Host "AdminConfiguration updated: V2 version=$agentVersion, sha256=$sha256, exeSha256=$exeSha256"
}
# Sigstore keyless provenance: binds the ZIP digest to this workflow run (repo, ref,
# commit, workflow file) in a public transparency log. The digest covers the identical
# Sigstore keyless provenance: binds the artifact digests to this workflow run (repo, ref,
# commit, workflow file) in a public transparency log. The digests cover the identical
# bytes uploaded to blob (versioned AND stable), so one attestation covers all copies.
# Verify: gh attestation verify <zip> --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
- name: Attest build provenance (ZIP)
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v4
# Complements Authenticode rather than replacing it: the signature says who published a
# binary, the attestation which build produced these exact bytes. Both EXEs are subjects
# of their own so an extracted binary can be verified without the ZIP.
# Verify: gh attestation verify <file> --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
# Skipped on runs that publish nothing -- no log entry for bytes nobody receives.
- name: Attest build provenance
if: inputs.upload_blob || inputs.create_release
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@4d101475d8b20a2381f78447822ac1eab6504dd8 # v4
with:
subject-path: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
subject-path: |
${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
staging/agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe
staging/agent/AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe
- name: Upload build artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
path: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
- name: Upload version metadata
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: version-metadata
path: ${{ env.MANIFEST_NAME }}
# First-party `gh` instead of a third-party action: this job holds contents:write,
# id-token:write and attestations:write, so no code we do not control runs here.
# The "What's new" section comes ONLY from the release_notes input -- CI never
# composes customer-facing text from commits. An empty input writes a generic
# fallback that links to the docs changelog and carries the HTML-comment marker
# below; the operator tooling scans release bodies for that marker to find the
# last release with real notes, so the next noted release covers the gap.
# Never rename the marker. --generate-notes is not used: it lists pull requests
# only (Dependabot noise); the compare link to the previous tag replaces it.
- name: Create GitHub Release
if: inputs.create_release
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v3
with:
tag_name: ${{ steps.version.outputs.tag }}
name: Autopilot Monitor Agent ${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
body: |
## Autopilot Monitor Agent ${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
### Installation
1. Download `AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}.zip`
2. Extract to `C:\ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor\Agent\`
3. Run `AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe --install` to register the Scheduled Task
### Included Components
- **AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe** - Monitoring agent (V2 release line)
- **AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe** - Enrollment summary dialog (WPF)
- **version-v2.json** - Per-line version manifest
shell: pwsh
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
RELEASE_TAG: ${{ steps.version.outputs.tag }}
RELEASE_NAME: Autopilot Monitor Agent ${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
RELEASE_PRERELEASE: ${{ inputs.prerelease }}
RELEASE_ZIP: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
RELEASE_NOTES: ${{ inputs.release_notes }}
RELEASE_BODY_TAIL: |
### Version Info
- **Version:** ${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
- **Build Number:** ${{ steps.version.outputs.build_number }}
@@ -349,13 +511,46 @@ jobs:
- **Published as stable:** ${{ inputs.publish_as_stable }}
### Provenance
This ZIP carries a [GitHub Artifact Attestation](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/attestations) (Sigstore keyless). Verify:
The executables are Authenticode-signed and timestamped. The ZIP and both executables carry a [GitHub Artifact Attestation](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/attestations) (Sigstore keyless). Verify:
```
gh attestation verify AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}.zip --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
```
draft: false
prerelease: ${{ inputs.prerelease }}
files: |
${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
${{ env.MANIFEST_NAME }}
generate_release_notes: true
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$notes = "$env:RELEASE_NOTES".Trim()
if ($notes -eq '') {
$notes = "Minor enhancements and bug fixes. See the [Agent Changelog](https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/changelog/agent-changelog) for details.`n<!-- release-notes: none -->"
}
# Previous release for the compare link. Fail-soft: the first release has none,
# and a listing hiccup must never fail a release.
$prevTag = ''
$eap = $ErrorActionPreference
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Continue'
try {
$prevTag = "$(gh release list --repo $env:GITHUB_REPOSITORY --limit 1 --exclude-drafts --json tagName -q '.[0].tagName' 2>$null)".Trim()
} catch { $prevTag = '' }
$ErrorActionPreference = $eap
$compare = ''
if ($prevTag -ne '' -and $prevTag -ne $env:RELEASE_TAG) {
$compare = "`n`n**Full changelog:** https://github.com/$env:GITHUB_REPOSITORY/compare/$prevTag...$env:RELEASE_TAG`n"
}
$body = "### What's new`n$notes`n`n" + "$env:RELEASE_BODY_TAIL".TrimEnd() + $compare
$notesFile = Join-Path $env:RUNNER_TEMP 'release-notes.md'
Set-Content -Path $notesFile -Value $body -Encoding utf8 -NoNewline
$ghArgs = @(
'release', 'create', $env:RELEASE_TAG,
$env:RELEASE_ZIP, $env:MANIFEST_NAME,
'--repo', $env:GITHUB_REPOSITORY,
'--target', $env:GITHUB_SHA,
'--title', $env:RELEASE_NAME,
'--notes-file', $notesFile
)
if ($env:RELEASE_PRERELEASE -eq 'true') { $ghArgs += '--prerelease' }
& gh @ghArgs
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "gh release create failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE" }
Write-Host "Release $env:RELEASE_TAG created"
+251
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
name: Build & Publish Bootstrap MSI
# Thin MDM LOB delivery vehicle for WDP (Autopilot v2) — see
# src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi/Package.wxs. The MSI is packaging only: it
# carries the SAME stage-1 loader that is assigned directly in Intune, so it is rebuilt
# rarely — only when that loader or the WiX package changes. Version lives in Package.wxs
# — bump it there before dispatching so Intune LOB update detection sees a new
# ProductVersion.
on:
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
upload_blob:
description: 'Upload to blob (customer-facing via download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/)'
required: true
type: boolean
default: true
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # keyless Sigstore signing (artifact attestation)
attestations: write # store the provenance attestation
env:
MSI_PROJECT_DIR: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi
RUNNER_SCRIPT: scripts/Bootstrap/Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1
STABLE_MSI: AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap.msi
# Authenticode via Azure Key Vault; identity and vault come from repository variables.
# CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT is optional and pins the publisher in the verify steps.
CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME }}
CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL }}
CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT }}
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL: http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com
jobs:
build:
runs-on: windows-latest
name: Build Bootstrap MSI
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
# The loader executes as SYSTEM on every enrolling device — a parse error or
# non-ASCII mojibake (PS 5.1 codepage roulette) must fail the build, not the fleet.
# bootstrap-script-gates.yml runs the same checks plus Pester on pushes; this job
# stands on its own because it can be dispatched at any time.
- name: Validate runner script (parse + ASCII-only)
shell: pwsh
run: |
$errs = $null
[System.Management.Automation.Language.Parser]::ParseFile((Resolve-Path $env:RUNNER_SCRIPT), [ref]$null, [ref]$errs) | Out-Null
if ($errs) { $errs | ForEach-Object { Write-Error $_.ToString() }; exit 1 }
if ((Get-Content $env:RUNNER_SCRIPT -Raw) -match '[^\x00-\x7F]') {
Write-Error "Runner script contains non-ASCII characters"
exit 1
}
Write-Host "Runner script parse + ASCII check passed"
- name: Read MSI version from Package.wxs
id: version
shell: pwsh
run: |
$wxs = Get-Content "$env:MSI_PROJECT_DIR/Package.wxs" -Raw
if ($wxs -notmatch 'Version="(\d+\.\d+\.\d+)"') {
Write-Error "Could not parse Version from Package.wxs"
exit 1
}
$version = $Matches[1]
Write-Host "MSI version (from Package.wxs): $version"
"version=$version" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
# Every published MSI is signed; a missing variable stops the run before the build.
- name: Check code-signing configuration
shell: pwsh
run: |
foreach ($name in 'CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID', 'CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME', 'CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL') {
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace([Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable($name))) {
throw "Repository variable $name is not set. Every published MSI must be Authenticode-signed."
}
}
# Logs in FIRST and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account, so the storage login below has to be the last one. Both federated credentials
# are bound to the ref, so this job must never be given an `environment:` -- that would
# change the OIDC subject claim and break both logins.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ env.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
allow-no-subscriptions: true
- name: Acquire Key Vault token for signing
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$token = az account get-access-token --scope https://vault.azure.net/.default --query accessToken --output tsv
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw "Could not acquire a Key Vault token for the code-signing identity."
}
Write-Host "::add-mask::$token"
"CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN=$token" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
# The blob upload below is authorized by this federated identity, not by a SAS.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# Exact version, not a "5.*" range: wix writes the bytes of the MSI that customers
# install, so a compromised or simply broken point release must not flow into a build
# unnoticed. Bumping is a reviewed commit.
- name: Install WiX toolset
run: dotnet tool install --global wix --version 5.0.2
# Version pinned; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
# BEFORE the build: wix embeds the file as it finds it, so a loader signed afterwards
# would leave the copy inside the MSI unsigned. Devices under an AllSigned policy need
# the embedded loader to carry a signature of its own.
- name: Sign bootstrap loader (Authenticode)
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
--azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor bootstrap runner' `
--description-url 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com' `
$env:RUNNER_SCRIPT
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE" }
- name: Build MSI
shell: pwsh
run: |
# wix resolves File/@Source relative to the working directory, not the wxs —
# build from inside the project dir (same as the local build documented in the wxs).
$out = Join-Path (Get-Location) $env:STABLE_MSI
Push-Location $env:MSI_PROJECT_DIR
wix build Package.wxs -arch x64 -o $out
Pop-Location
if (-not (Test-Path $env:STABLE_MSI)) { Write-Error "wix build produced no MSI"; exit 1 }
Write-Host "Built $env:STABLE_MSI ($([math]::Round((Get-Item $env:STABLE_MSI).Length / 1KB)) KB)"
# Signing rewrites the MSI, so it runs before the hash and the upload. A missing
# timestamp fails the run: without it the signature dies with the certificate.
- name: Sign MSI (Authenticode)
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
--azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap' `
--description-url 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com' `
$env:STABLE_MSI
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE" }
# The MSI and the loader it carries -- verified here, before anything is published.
foreach ($file in @($env:STABLE_MSI, $env:RUNNER_SCRIPT)) {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $file
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') { throw "Signature on $file is '$($sig.Status)', expected 'Valid'." }
if (-not $sig.TimeStamperCertificate) { throw "Signature on $file carries no timestamp." }
if ($env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT -and $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -notlike $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) {
throw "$file was signed by '$($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)', expected '$env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT'."
}
Write-Host "$file : Valid, timestamped, signer $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject.Split(',')[0])"
}
Write-Host "SHA-256: $((Get-FileHash $env:STABLE_MSI -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant())"
- name: Upload to Azure Blob Storage
if: inputs.upload_blob
shell: pwsh
run: |
$containerUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent"
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$version = "${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}"
# Same Send-Blob contract as build-agent.yml: no-cache on every blob because the
# stable name rotates in place behind the download alias. No legacy mirror — the
# MSI channel never existed on the legacy account.
function Send-Blob {
param([string]$Local, [string]$BlobName)
$bytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($Local)
$headers = @{
"x-ms-blob-type" = "BlockBlob"
"Content-Type" = "application/octet-stream"
"x-ms-blob-cache-control" = "no-cache"
}
$md5 = [System.Security.Cryptography.MD5]::Create()
$headers["Content-MD5"] = [Convert]::ToBase64String($md5.ComputeHash($bytes))
$md5.Dispose()
Write-Host "Uploading $BlobName ($([math]::Round($bytes.Length / 1KB)) KB)..."
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$containerUrl/$BlobName" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $headers) -Body $bytes
Write-Host " uploaded $BlobName"
}
# Versioned copy for provenance/rollback + stable customer-facing name.
Send-Blob -Local $env:STABLE_MSI -BlobName "AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap-v$version.msi"
Send-Blob -Local $env:STABLE_MSI -BlobName $env:STABLE_MSI
# E2E: the Front Door route /agent/* must serve the fresh bytes on the public alias.
- name: Verify download alias serves the MSI
if: inputs.upload_blob
shell: pwsh
run: |
$localSize = (Get-Item $env:STABLE_MSI).Length
$resp = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/$env:STABLE_MSI" -Method Head -UseBasicParsing
if ($resp.StatusCode -ne 200) { Write-Error "Alias HEAD returned $($resp.StatusCode)"; exit 1 }
$remoteSize = [long]$resp.Headers['Content-Length'][0]
if ($remoteSize -ne $localSize) {
Write-Error "Size mismatch: alias serves $remoteSize bytes, local MSI is $localSize bytes"
exit 1
}
Write-Host "Alias verified: https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/$env:STABLE_MSI ($remoteSize bytes)"
# Sigstore keyless provenance, same as the agent ZIP; covers the signed bytes. Skipped
# on runs that publish nothing -- no log entry for bytes nobody receives. Verify:
# gh attestation verify AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap.msi --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
- name: Attest build provenance (MSI)
if: inputs.upload_blob
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@4d101475d8b20a2381f78447822ac1eab6504dd8 # v4
with:
subject-path: ${{ env.STABLE_MSI }}
- name: Upload build artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
path: ${{ env.STABLE_MSI }}
+137 -18
View File
@@ -7,12 +7,82 @@ name: CI
# The deploy workflows build but never test, so this is the only place the suites
# actually run. It does not gate anything — main is deliberately unprotected, so a
# red run reports rather than blocks. Read the result and follow up.
#
# Path filters: commits that only bump a private submodule gitlink (internal/, infra/,
# .claude/commands), touch prose or edit another workflow cannot change anything the
# suites cover, so they are skipped instead of burning ~15 runner-minutes each. A gitlink bump reports the bare
# path ('internal', no trailing slash), which 'internal/**' does NOT match — both forms
# are listed. GitHub skips only when EVERY changed path matches; a commit that touches
# docs AND code still runs.
on:
push:
branches: [main]
paths-ignore:
- 'internal'
- 'internal/**'
- 'infra'
- 'infra/**'
- '.claude/**'
- '.gitmodules'
- 'zizmor.yml'
- '**/*.md'
- 'LICENSE'
- '.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/**'
- '.github/FUNDING.yml'
- '.github/dependabot.yml'
- '.github/assets/**'
- '.github/codeql/**'
- '.github/scripts/**'
# Every other workflow: nothing here builds or tests anything CI covers. paths-ignore
# cannot negate, so they are listed one by one; ci.yml itself stays out of the list
# so a change to CI runs CI. A new workflow file is opt-in — add it here too.
- '.github/workflows/action-pins.yml'
- '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-agent.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-msi.yml'
- '.github/workflows/codeql.yml'
- '.github/workflows/combine-rules.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-backend.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-mcp.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-web.yml'
- '.github/workflows/indexnow-notify.yml'
- '.github/workflows/oidc-login-test.yml'
- '.github/workflows/pester.yml'
- '.github/workflows/publish-scripts.yml'
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths-ignore:
- 'internal'
- 'internal/**'
- 'infra'
- 'infra/**'
- '.claude/**'
- '.gitmodules'
- 'zizmor.yml'
- '**/*.md'
- 'LICENSE'
- '.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/**'
- '.github/FUNDING.yml'
- '.github/dependabot.yml'
- '.github/assets/**'
- '.github/codeql/**'
- '.github/scripts/**'
# Every other workflow: nothing here builds or tests anything CI covers. paths-ignore
# cannot negate, so they are listed one by one; ci.yml itself stays out of the list
# so a change to CI runs CI. A new workflow file is opt-in — add it here too.
- '.github/workflows/action-pins.yml'
- '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-agent.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-msi.yml'
- '.github/workflows/codeql.yml'
- '.github/workflows/combine-rules.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-backend.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-mcp.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-web.yml'
- '.github/workflows/indexnow-notify.yml'
- '.github/workflows/oidc-login-test.yml'
- '.github/workflows/pester.yml'
- '.github/workflows/publish-scripts.yml'
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
@@ -28,9 +98,11 @@ jobs:
# windows-latest is required: the agent test projects target net48.
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
@@ -41,16 +113,16 @@ jobs:
run: dotnet build AutopilotMonitor.sln --configuration Release --no-restore
- name: Backend tests
run: dotnet test src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests --configuration Release --no-build --verbosity quiet
run: dotnet test src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests --configuration Release --no-build --verbosity quiet --logger "console;verbosity=minimal"
- name: Agent V2 Core tests
run: dotnet test src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests --configuration Release --no-build --verbosity quiet
run: dotnet test src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests --configuration Release --no-build --verbosity quiet --logger "console;verbosity=minimal"
- name: Decision Core tests
run: dotnet test src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests --configuration Release --no-build --verbosity quiet
run: dotnet test src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests --configuration Release --no-build --verbosity quiet --logger "console;verbosity=minimal"
- name: Summary Dialog tests
run: dotnet test src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.Tests --configuration Release --no-build --verbosity quiet
run: dotnet test src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.Tests --configuration Release --no-build --verbosity quiet --logger "console;verbosity=minimal"
web:
name: Web (typecheck + tests)
@@ -59,9 +131,11 @@ jobs:
run:
working-directory: src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
cache: npm
@@ -77,12 +151,11 @@ jobs:
- name: Typecheck
run: npx tsc --noEmit
# Errors fail outright. Warnings are ratcheted: the cap is the current
# count of accepted warnings (React-Compiler hooks-rule findings demoted
# in eslint.config.mjs + exhaustive-deps) — when you fix warnings, lower
# the cap to match; never raise it.
# Errors fail outright, and so does ANY warning: the codebase is
# warning-clean and must stay that way — fix new findings, never
# raise the cap.
- name: Lint
run: npm run lint -- --max-warnings 99
run: npm run lint -- --max-warnings 0
- name: Tests
run: npm test
@@ -94,9 +167,11 @@ jobs:
run:
working-directory: src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
cache: npm
@@ -107,16 +182,32 @@ jobs:
- name: Typecheck
run: npx tsc --noEmit
# The vector-search tests tokenize with the real all-MiniLM-L6-v2 model
# (~23 MB tokenizer + ONNX weights). transformers.js caches under
# node_modules by default, which npm ci recreates — so every CI run
# re-downloaded from huggingface.co and rate-limits (429) failed the job
# (run 31252869254). Persist the model across runs instead; HF_CACHE_DIR
# is honored by vector-search-provider.ts.
- name: Cache embedding model
uses: actions/cache@55cc8345863c7cc4c66a329aec7e433d2d1c52a9 # v6
with:
path: ${{ github.workspace }}/.hf-cache
key: hf-model-Xenova-all-MiniLM-L6-v2
- name: Tests
run: npm test
env:
HF_CACHE_DIR: ${{ github.workspace }}/.hf-cache
guardrails-in-sync:
name: Generated guardrails match rules/guardrails.json
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
@@ -130,3 +221,31 @@ jobs:
git diff --stat
exit 1
fi
shared-manifests-in-sync:
name: Generated wire types match shared-manifests.json
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
# JSON ↔ C# parity is the dotnet job's SharedManifestParityTests; this job pins
# JSON ↔ generated TS (shared-manifests.generated.ts, wire-types.generated.ts and the
# MCP's wire-types + wire-vocabularies copies - the vocabularies are what the MCP
# tool input schemas derive their z.enum() from).
- name: Regenerate
run: node scripts/generate-shared-manifest-types.js
working-directory: src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web
- name: Fail if the generated files drifted
run: |
if ! git diff --quiet -- src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/utils/shared-manifests.generated.ts src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/utils/wire-types.generated.ts src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/generated/wire-types.generated.ts src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/generated/wire-vocabularies.generated.ts; then
echo "::error::Generated wire types are out of date. Run 'npm run generate:manifests' in src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web and commit the result."
git diff --stat
exit 1
fi
+67 -10
View File
@@ -1,22 +1,77 @@
name: CodeQL
# Documentation-only changes cannot affect what CodeQL analyzes (C# and
# TypeScript), so they are filtered out rather than spending ~10 minutes to
# re-report an unchanged result. A commit that touches docs AND code still runs:
# GitHub skips only when EVERY changed path matches the filter.
# Documentation-only changes and private-submodule gitlink bumps (internal/, infra/,
# .claude/commands) cannot affect what CodeQL analyzes (C# and TypeScript), so they
# are filtered out rather than spending ~10 minutes to re-report an unchanged result.
# A gitlink bump reports the bare path ('internal', no trailing slash), which
# 'internal/**' does NOT match — both forms are listed. A commit that touches docs
# AND code still runs: GitHub skips only when EVERY changed path matches the filter.
# Same list as ci.yml except that each file leaves itself out; keep them in step.
on:
push:
branches: [main]
paths-ignore:
- 'docs/**'
- 'internal'
- 'internal/**'
- 'infra'
- 'infra/**'
- '.claude/**'
- '.gitmodules'
- 'zizmor.yml'
- '**/*.md'
- 'LICENSE'
- '.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/**'
- '.github/FUNDING.yml'
- '.github/dependabot.yml'
- '.github/assets/**'
- '.github/scripts/**'
# Every other workflow: none of them changes the C# or TypeScript CodeQL analyzes.
# paths-ignore cannot negate, so they are listed one by one; codeql.yml itself and
# .github/codeql/ stay out of the list. A new workflow file is opt-in — add it here too.
- '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-agent.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-msi.yml'
- '.github/workflows/ci.yml'
- '.github/workflows/combine-rules.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-backend.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-mcp.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-web.yml'
- '.github/workflows/indexnow-notify.yml'
- '.github/workflows/oidc-login-test.yml'
- '.github/workflows/pester.yml'
- '.github/workflows/publish-scripts.yml'
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths-ignore:
- 'docs/**'
- 'internal'
- 'internal/**'
- 'infra'
- 'infra/**'
- '.claude/**'
- '.gitmodules'
- 'zizmor.yml'
- '**/*.md'
- 'LICENSE'
- '.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/**'
- '.github/FUNDING.yml'
- '.github/dependabot.yml'
- '.github/assets/**'
- '.github/scripts/**'
# Every other workflow: none of them changes the C# or TypeScript CodeQL analyzes.
# paths-ignore cannot negate, so they are listed one by one; codeql.yml itself and
# .github/codeql/ stay out of the list. A new workflow file is opt-in — add it here too.
- '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-agent.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-msi.yml'
- '.github/workflows/ci.yml'
- '.github/workflows/combine-rules.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-backend.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-mcp.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-web.yml'
- '.github/workflows/indexnow-notify.yml'
- '.github/workflows/oidc-login-test.yml'
- '.github/workflows/pester.yml'
- '.github/workflows/publish-scripts.yml'
schedule:
# Weekly, so advisories published after a merge still surface. Deliberately
# unfiltered — it re-analyzes the whole tree regardless of what changed, which
@@ -49,15 +104,17 @@ jobs:
build-mode: none
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
if: matrix.language == 'csharp'
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
- name: Initialize CodeQL
uses: github/codeql-action/init@v4.37.3
uses: github/codeql-action/init@2892aa5e19bbd11bc0cff5427e3b750a04d9e3c2 # v4.38.2
with:
languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
build-mode: ${{ matrix.build-mode }}
@@ -68,6 +125,6 @@ jobs:
run: dotnet build AutopilotMonitor.sln --configuration Release
- name: Analyze
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v4.37.3
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@2892aa5e19bbd11bc0cff5427e3b750a04d9e3c2 # v4.38.2
with:
category: /language:${{ matrix.language }}
+39 -9
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ on:
- 'rules/ime-log-patterns/**'
- 'rules/schema/**'
- 'rules/scripts/**'
- 'rules/guardrails.json'
pull_request:
paths:
- 'rules/gather/**'
@@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ on:
- 'rules/ime-log-patterns/**'
- 'rules/schema/**'
- 'rules/scripts/**'
- 'rules/guardrails.json'
jobs:
validate-and-combine:
@@ -22,14 +24,22 @@ jobs:
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
- name: Install ajv-cli
run: npm install -g ajv-cli ajv-formats
# Lockfile and no lifecycle scripts: this job holds contents:write and pushes to
# main, so an install-time script from a hijacked package would run with a token that
# can rewrite the repository. rules/scripts/package-lock.json pins ajv-cli, ajv-formats
# and every transitive package (Dependabot keeps it current); ajv is pure JS and
# needs no install hooks.
- name: Install ajv-cli from the lockfile
working-directory: rules/scripts
run: |
npm ci --ignore-scripts
echo "$PWD/node_modules/.bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
- name: Validate Gather Rules
run: |
@@ -52,12 +62,32 @@ jobs:
ajv validate -s rules/schema/ime-log-pattern.schema.json -d "$f" --spec=draft2020 -c ajv-formats
done
# guardrails.json values are baked verbatim into generated TypeScript that is
# auto-committed to main and shipped to the portal - the schema forbids control
# and line-terminator characters so a "data" PR can never become code.
- name: Validate Guardrails
run: ajv validate -s rules/schema/guardrails.schema.json -d rules/guardrails.json --spec=draft2020 -c ajv-formats
- name: Combine rules into dist/
run: node rules/scripts/combine.js
- name: Commit dist/ changes
# Plain git instead of a third-party action: this step runs with contents:write on
# main, so no code we do not control gets to push. Checkout leaves the job's
# GITHUB_TOKEN in the remote credential helper, which is all `git push` needs.
# NOTE: combine.js writes THREE outputs; committing only dist/ would silently discard
# the two generated TS modules and leave the guardrails-in-sync CI check red.
- name: Commit generated outputs
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' && github.event_name == 'push'
uses: stefanzweifel/git-auto-commit-action@v7
with:
commit_message: "chore: regenerate rules/dist from individual files"
file_pattern: "rules/dist/*"
run: |
set -euo pipefail
git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
git add -- rules/dist/ \
src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/utils/guardrails.generated.ts \
src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/rule-authoring.generated.ts
if git diff --cached --quiet; then
echo "Generated outputs unchanged - nothing to commit"
exit 0
fi
git commit -m "chore: regenerate rules/dist + generated TS from individual files"
git push origin HEAD:main
+10 -8
View File
@@ -19,17 +19,19 @@ jobs:
name: Build and Deploy Backend
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@v3
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
- name: Setup .NET 10
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
@@ -41,7 +43,7 @@ jobs:
id: version
shell: pwsh
run: |
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.txt" -SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.txt"
$csproj = Get-Content ${{ env.CSPROJ_PATH }} -Raw
if ($csproj -notmatch '<VersionPrefix>(\d+\.\d+)</VersionPrefix>') {
@@ -65,7 +67,7 @@ jobs:
run: dotnet publish ${{ env.CSPROJ_PATH }} --configuration Release --output ./publish --no-build -p:SourceRevisionId=${{ github.sha }} -p:BuildNumber=${{ steps.version.outputs.build_number }} -p:BuildTimestampUtc=${{ steps.version.outputs.build_utc }}
- name: Deploy to Azure Functions
uses: Azure/functions-action@v1
uses: Azure/functions-action@c5060b3b8bb1ebbcb531abd00c822ecbaa8ea656 # v1
with:
app-name: ${{ env.FUNCTION_APP }}
package: ./publish
@@ -115,9 +117,9 @@ jobs:
runId = '${{ github.run_id }}'
} | ConvertTo-Json
$sas = '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'.TrimStart('?')
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.json?$sas"
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.json"
# no-cache: rotating pointer, must never be served stale by any fronting cache.
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' } -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }) -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Write-Host "Published versions/backend.json"
Write-Host $manifest
+25 -17
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,11 @@ env:
ACR_NAME: autopilotmonitoreuacr
CONTAINER_APP_NAME: autopilotmonitor-mcp
RESOURCE_GROUP: ${{ secrets.AZURE_MCP_RESOURCE_GROUP }}
IMAGE_TAG: ${{ github.sha }}
# Unique per RUN, not per commit: the docs corpus is baked into the image, so a
# docs-only redeploy at an unchanged code sha must still produce a new image
# reference — with a sha-only tag `az containerapp update` saw the same image
# and silently created no revision (2026-08-28).
IMAGE_TAG: ${{ github.sha }}-${{ github.run_number }}
HEALTH_URL: https://mcp.autopilotmonitor.com/health
VERSIONS_CONTAINER: https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/versions
PACKAGE_JSON: src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/package.json
@@ -22,17 +26,21 @@ jobs:
name: Build and Deploy MCP Server
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
# The published customer documentation lives in its own PUBLIC repo and is
# baked into the image as the search_docs corpus (see the Dockerfile). No
# token is needed. Checking it out here rather than vendoring it keeps the
# docs single-sourced — but it also means EDITING THE DOCS DOES NOT UPDATE A
# RUNNING SERVER; this workflow must be re-run. /health reports the SHA
# captured below so that staleness is checkable.
# RUNNING SERVER; this workflow must be re-run (IMAGE_TAG is per run so the
# re-run actually rolls a new revision). /health reports the SHA captured
# below so that staleness is checkable.
- name: Check out documentation bundle
uses: actions/checkout@v7
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
repository: autopilotmonitor/autopilotmonitor-docs
path: mcp-docs
@@ -41,7 +49,7 @@ jobs:
run: echo "sha=$(git -C mcp-docs rev-parse HEAD)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@v3
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
@@ -54,7 +62,7 @@ jobs:
id: version
shell: pwsh
run: |
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.txt" -SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.txt"
$pkgVersion = (Get-Content ${{ env.PACKAGE_JSON }} -Raw | ConvertFrom-Json).version
$prefix = ($pkgVersion -split '\.')[0..1] -join '.'
@@ -72,7 +80,7 @@ jobs:
"short_sha=$shortSha" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
- name: Login to ACR
run: az acr login --name ${{ env.ACR_NAME }}
run: az acr login --name "$ACR_NAME"
- name: Build and push container image
run: |
@@ -82,17 +90,17 @@ jobs:
--build-arg BUILD_NUMBER=${{ steps.version.outputs.build_number }} \
--build-arg BUILD_COMMIT=${{ steps.version.outputs.short_sha }} \
--build-arg BUILD_UTC=${{ steps.version.outputs.build_utc }} \
-t ${{ env.ACR_NAME }}.azurecr.io/${{ env.CONTAINER_APP_NAME }}:${{ env.IMAGE_TAG }} \
-t ${{ env.ACR_NAME }}.azurecr.io/${{ env.CONTAINER_APP_NAME }}:latest \
-t "$ACR_NAME.azurecr.io/$CONTAINER_APP_NAME:$IMAGE_TAG" \
-t "$ACR_NAME.azurecr.io/$CONTAINER_APP_NAME:latest" \
.
docker push ${{ env.ACR_NAME }}.azurecr.io/${{ env.CONTAINER_APP_NAME }} --all-tags
docker push "$ACR_NAME.azurecr.io/$CONTAINER_APP_NAME" --all-tags
- name: Deploy to Container App
run: |
az containerapp update \
--name ${{ env.CONTAINER_APP_NAME }} \
--resource-group ${{ env.RESOURCE_GROUP }} \
--image ${{ env.ACR_NAME }}.azurecr.io/${{ env.CONTAINER_APP_NAME }}:${{ env.IMAGE_TAG }}
--name "$CONTAINER_APP_NAME" \
--resource-group "$RESOURCE_GROUP" \
--image "$ACR_NAME.azurecr.io/$CONTAINER_APP_NAME:$IMAGE_TAG"
# `az containerapp update` returns once the revision is provisioned, not once
# it serves traffic — and with minReplicas=0 the first request also pays a cold
@@ -139,9 +147,9 @@ jobs:
docsCommit = '${{ steps.docs.outputs.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7)
} | ConvertTo-Json
$sas = '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'.TrimStart('?')
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.json?$sas"
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.json"
# no-cache: rotating pointer, must never be served stale by any fronting cache.
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' } -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }) -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Write-Host "Published versions/mcp.json"
Write-Host $manifest
+170 -47
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,13 @@
name: Deploy Web (Static Web App)
# Build here, upload with the pinned SWA CLI. No third-party action sees the deploy token
# (the CLI is Microsoft-published npm code at an exact version), the build runs on the same
# path ci.yml tests (setup-node 22 + npm ci + next build) instead of Oryx guessing inside the
# action's container, and the exported site is attested like the agent ZIP and the MSI.
#
# PR preview environments were dropped with the action: their per-PR URLs are never
# registered as redirect URIs, so nobody could log in on them anyway.
on:
push:
branches:
@@ -8,35 +16,89 @@ on:
- 'src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/**'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-web.yml'
workflow_dispatch:
pull_request:
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, closed]
branches:
- main
paths:
- 'src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/**'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-web.yml'
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # keyless Sigstore signing (artifact attestation)
attestations: write # store the provenance attestation
env:
PORTAL_VERSION_URL: https://portal.autopilotmonitor.com/version.json
VERSIONS_CONTAINER: https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/versions
WEB_DIR: src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web
# Exact version: `npx --package` resolves from the registry at run time, so the pin is the
# only thing that keeps the deploy step's code fixed. Bump deliberately.
SWA_CLI_VERSION: 2.0.10
jobs:
build_and_deploy_job:
if: github.event_name == 'push' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' || (github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.action != 'closed')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Build and Deploy Job
# Dependabot PRs run without repo secrets, so the deploy token is absent.
# Surface it as an env var so the deploy step can gate on it — secrets
# cannot be referenced directly in an `if:` expression.
env:
DEPLOY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SWA_DEPLOY_TOKEN }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
lfs: false
fetch-depth: 0 # Full history needed for git-based sitemap lastmod dates
- name: Build And Deploy
id: builddeploy
# Skip (green) instead of failing when the token is missing (Dependabot
# PRs); real deploys on main and internal PRs still have it.
if: env.DEPLOY_TOKEN != ''
uses: Azure/static-web-apps-deploy@v1
# Only the version manifest at the very end needs Azure; logging in here rather than
# next to that step keeps a credential problem from surfacing after a live deploy.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# The customer docs repo is the single source of the "What's new" panel: the prebuild
# step (scripts/whats-new/build-whats-new.js) turns changelog/*.md into
# public/whats-new.json and dates every bullet via git blame — hence the full history.
# Public repo, no token. Editing the docs does NOT update the live panel until this
# workflow runs again (push under src/Web/** or a manual dispatch); versions/web.json
# records which docs commit is live.
- name: Check out documentation bundle
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
repository: autopilotmonitor/autopilotmonitor-docs
path: whats-new-docs
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Resolve docs commit
id: docs
run: echo "sha=$(git -C whats-new-docs rev-parse HEAD)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
cache: npm
cache-dependency-path: ${{ env.WEB_DIR }}/package-lock.json
- name: Install dependencies
working-directory: ${{ env.WEB_DIR }}
run: npm ci
# Star counter for the GitHub star link (utils/githubStars.ts). Baked into the static HTML
# so visitors' browsers never call GitHub; stale until the next web deploy. The token stays
# in this step, never in the build. Fail-soft: without a number the link has no counter.
- name: Read GitHub star count (fail-soft)
id: stars
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
run: |
count=$(gh api "repos/$REPO" --jq .stargazers_count 2>/dev/null || true)
if [[ "$count" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
echo "count=$count" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "GitHub stars: $count"
else
echo "::warning::GitHub star count unavailable - the star link renders without a counter"
fi
# next.config output:'export' -- `next build` writes the static site to out/
# (prebuild: sync-error-codes, generate-lastmod, generate-version, whats-new).
- name: Build
working-directory: ${{ env.WEB_DIR }}
env:
NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_CLIENT_ID }}
# Dual app-reg window: previous app registration (unset = single-app behaviour)
@@ -48,37 +110,98 @@ jobs:
NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL: ${{ vars.NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL }}
NEXT_PUBLIC_PLATFORM_STATS_MANIFEST_URL: ${{ vars.NEXT_PUBLIC_PLATFORM_STATS_MANIFEST_URL }}
NEXT_PUBLIC_APPINSIGHTS_CONNECTION_STRING: ${{ secrets.NEXT_PUBLIC_APPINSIGHTS_CONNECTION_STRING }}
# Build stamp for public/version.json (scripts/generate-version.js in prebuild);
# the verify step below polls the deployed file for exactly this commit.
GITHUB_SHA: ${{ github.sha }}
# Docs checkout for public/whats-new.json; the prebuild fails in CI without it.
WHATS_NEW_DOCS_DIR: ${{ github.workspace }}/whats-new-docs
# Star counter from the step above; empty when the lookup failed.
NEXT_PUBLIC_GITHUB_STARS: ${{ steps.stars.outputs.count }}
run: |
npm run build
test -f out/version.json || { echo "out/version.json missing - export did not run"; exit 1; }
test -f out/whats-new.json || { echo "out/whats-new.json missing - whats-new prebuild did not run"; exit 1; }
# One archive of the exact bytes that get uploaded, so the attestation has a single subject.
- name: Package export
id: package
run: |
archive="portal-${GITHUB_SHA::7}.tar.gz"
tar -C "$WEB_DIR/out" -czf "$archive" .
echo "archive=$archive" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
sha256sum "$archive"
# Sigstore keyless provenance: binds the export digest to this workflow run (repo, ref,
# commit, workflow file) in a public transparency log.
# Verify: gh attestation verify portal-<sha>.tar.gz --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
- name: Attest build provenance (portal export)
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@4d101475d8b20a2381f78447822ac1eab6504dd8 # v4
with:
azure_static_web_apps_api_token: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SWA_DEPLOY_TOKEN }}
repo_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} # Used for Github integrations (i.e. PR comments)
action: "upload"
###### Repository/Build Configurations - These values can be configured to match your app requirements. ######
# For more information regarding Static Web App workflow configurations, please visit: https://aka.ms/swaworkflowconfig
app_location: "src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web" # App source code path
api_location: "" # Api source code path - optional
# Static export (next.config output:'export'): Oryx runs `npm run build`
# and uploads the exported out/ directory as plain static files — no
# managed SSR runtime is provisioned anymore. (No is_static_export
# input on this action version; Oryx detects the export from
# next.config + output_location.)
output_location: "out" # Built app content directory - optional
###### End of Repository/Build Configurations ######
subject-path: ${{ steps.package.outputs.archive }}
close_pull_request_job:
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.action == 'closed'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Close Pull Request Job
env:
DEPLOY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SWA_DEPLOY_TOKEN }}
steps:
- name: Close Pull Request
id: closepullrequest
if: env.DEPLOY_TOKEN != ''
uses: Azure/static-web-apps-deploy@v1
- name: Upload build artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
azure_static_web_apps_api_token: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SWA_DEPLOY_TOKEN }}
action: "close"
name: portal-${{ github.sha }}
path: ${{ steps.package.outputs.archive }}
# Upload only -- out/ is already built. --swa-config-location points at the app root,
# where staticwebapp.config.json lives (next export does not copy it into out/).
- name: Deploy to Static Web App
env:
SWA_CLI_DEPLOYMENT_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SWA_DEPLOY_TOKEN }}
run: |
npx --yes --package "@azure/static-web-apps-cli@${SWA_CLI_VERSION}" swa deploy \
--app-location "$WEB_DIR" \
--output-location out \
--swa-config-location "$WEB_DIR" \
--env production \
--no-use-keychain
# The CLI reporting success proves the upload, not that the production host serves the
# new build -- verify against the live /version.json (Cache-Control: no-store via
# staticwebapp.config.json) before publishing the version manifest.
- name: Verify deployed portal build is live
shell: pwsh
run: |
$expectedCommit = '${{ github.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7)
$deadline = [DateTime]::UtcNow.AddMinutes(5)
$attempt = 0
while ([DateTime]::UtcNow -lt $deadline) {
$attempt++
try {
$v = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri '${{ env.PORTAL_VERSION_URL }}' -Method Get -TimeoutSec 30 -Headers @{ 'Cache-Control' = 'no-cache' }
if ($v.commit -eq $expectedCommit) {
Write-Host "Live after $attempt attempt(s): web @ $($v.commit), built $($v.buildUtc)"
exit 0
}
Write-Host "Attempt ${attempt}: serving $($v.commit) -- waiting for $expectedCommit"
} catch {
Write-Host "Attempt ${attempt}: /version.json not answering yet -- $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
Start-Sleep -Seconds 15
}
throw "Portal did not serve commit $expectedCommit within 5 minutes -- deployment not verified, version manifest NOT published"
# Cross-component deploy record, written last and only on a verified deploy --
# same contract as versions/backend.json and versions/mcp.json. docsCommit says which
# docs revision the live What's new panel was generated from (as for the MCP corpus).
- name: Publish version manifest
shell: pwsh
run: |
$manifest = [ordered]@{
component = 'web'
commit = '${{ github.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7)
deployedUtc = [DateTime]::UtcNow.ToString('o')
runId = '${{ github.run_id }}'
docsCommit = '${{ steps.docs.outputs.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7)
} | ConvertTo-Json
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/web.json"
# no-cache: rotating pointer, must never be served stale by any fronting cache.
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }) -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Write-Host "Published versions/web.json"
Write-Host $manifest
+3
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ name: IndexNow Notify (Bing/Yandex)
on:
workflow_dispatch:
# The job only talks to public endpoints; it never needs a repository token.
permissions: {}
jobs:
notify:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ jobs:
name: Federated login + read check
steps:
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@v3
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
+14 -45
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,20 @@
name: Pester (Bootstrap scripts)
# Runs the Pester suite for the Intune bootstrap scripts under Windows PowerShell 5.1
# (the runtime IME uses to execute platform scripts) so guard/relax logic changes are
# verified without resetting a device. Like ci.yml it reports rather than blocks.
# Pull-request view of the bootstrap script gates. Like ci.yml it reports rather than
# blocks the merge button.
#
# There is deliberately no push trigger: publish-scripts.yml runs the very same
# reusable gate workflow on every push to main and blocks the upload to the download
# alias on it. A push trigger here would only duplicate that run, with no consequence.
on:
push:
branches: [main]
paths: ['scripts/Bootstrap/**']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['scripts/Bootstrap/**']
paths:
- 'scripts/Bootstrap/**'
- 'scripts/CustomerSetup/**'
- '.github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1'
- '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
@@ -21,41 +25,6 @@ concurrency:
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
pester:
name: Bootstrap guard tests (PS 5.1)
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- name: Install Pester 5+
shell: powershell
run: |
Install-PackageProvider -Name NuGet -MinimumVersion 2.8.5.201 -Force -Scope CurrentUser | Out-Null
Install-Module Pester -Scope CurrentUser -Force -SkipPublisherCheck -MinimumVersion 5.5.0
- name: Run Pester
shell: powershell
run: |
Import-Module Pester -MinimumVersion 5.5.0
$c = New-PesterConfiguration
$c.Run.Path = 'scripts/Bootstrap'
$c.Run.Exit = $true
$c.Output.Verbosity = 'Detailed'
Invoke-Pester -Configuration $c
- name: Guard scripts stay pure ASCII
shell: powershell
run: |
$failed = $false
Get-ChildItem 'scripts/Bootstrap' -Filter '*.ps1' | ForEach-Object {
$bytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($_.FullName)
for ($i = 0; $i -lt $bytes.Length; $i++) {
if ($bytes[$i] -gt 127) {
Write-Host "::error file=scripts/Bootstrap/$($_.Name)::Non-ASCII byte 0x$('{0:X2}' -f $bytes[$i]) at offset $i. PS 5.1 (IME) reads BOM-less files as ANSI and corrupts multi-byte chars."
$failed = $true
break
}
}
}
if ($failed) { exit 1 }
Write-Host 'All bootstrap scripts are pure ASCII.'
# $/ is the self-repository form: this repository at the running commit.
gates:
uses: $/.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml
+142
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
name: Publish customer scripts
# Keeps the scripts behind download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/ current WITHOUT waiting
# for an agent release. Before this workflow existed, the script blobs rotated only on a
# publish_as_stable run of build-agent.yml, so a bootstrap fix sat unpublished until the
# next agent cutover -- while the WDP bootstrap MSI downloads the published copy on every
# enrolling device.
#
# Same publish code as the release path (.github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1);
# this workflow only supplies a second trigger for it.
on:
push:
branches: [main]
paths:
- 'scripts/Bootstrap/**'
- 'scripts/CustomerSetup/**'
- '.github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1'
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
dry_run:
description: 'Run every check and report drift, upload nothing'
required: true
type: boolean
default: false
permissions:
contents: read
# Shared with build-agent.yml: a script publish and an agent release both touch
# version.json, and the bootstrapVersion read-modify-write must not interleave with the
# release writing its agent fields. Never cancel -- a half-published set is worse than a queue.
concurrency:
group: agent-blob-publish
cancel-in-progress: false
# Authenticode for the customer scripts. Same identity and same repository variables as
# build-agent.yml -- the loader on every device pins this publisher, so the two must not
# drift apart.
env:
CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME }}
CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL }}
CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT }}
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL: http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com
jobs:
# $/ is the self-repository form: this repository at the running commit, never a
# path some earlier step could have written to the workspace.
gates:
uses: $/.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml
publish:
name: Publish to the download alias
needs: gates
runs-on: windows-latest
# Job-scoped: only the publish job federates to Azure, the gates job never holds an
# OIDC token it does not need.
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # OIDC federated login for the storage writes (secret-less)
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Check code-signing configuration
shell: pwsh
run: |
foreach ($name in 'CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID', 'CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME', 'CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL') {
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace([Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable($name))) {
throw "Repository variable $name is not set. Published customer scripts must be signed."
}
}
# First, and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account and the storage login below has to be the one that stays. See D-223 --
# both federated credentials are bound to the ref, so this job must never carry a
# GitHub `environment:`.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ env.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
allow-no-subscriptions: true
- name: Acquire Key Vault token for signing
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$token = az account get-access-token --scope https://vault.azure.net/.default --query accessToken --output tsv
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw "Could not acquire a Key Vault token for the code-signing identity."
}
Write-Host "::add-mask::$token"
"CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN=$token" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
# Authorizes the eu blob writes and the AdminConfiguration merge. The gates job above
# runs the same publisher with -DryRun and deliberately without a login -- a dry run
# must never need Azure credentials.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# Version pinned so a new or compromised NuGet release cannot flow into signing
# unreviewed; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK
# preinstalled on the runner.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
- name: Publish bootstrap + customer scripts
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$dryRun = '${{ inputs.dry_run }}' -eq 'true'
./.github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 `
-LegacySasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-SigningToken $env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN `
-KeyVaultUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL `
-CertificateName $env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME `
-TimestampUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL `
-ExpectedPublisher $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT `
-SignedOutputDir "$env:RUNNER_TEMP/signed-scripts" `
-DryRun:$dryRun
# The exact bytes that were (or, on a dry run, would have been) uploaded. A dry-run
# dispatch is therefore the way to inspect a signed script locally before it reaches
# a single customer. Kept on failure too: a failed alias verification is precisely
# when someone wants to look at the file.
- name: Upload signed scripts
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: signed-scripts
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/signed-scripts
if-no-files-found: ignore
+17 -18
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ bld/
[Ll]ogs/
# Build counter files: the authoritative counter is the shared blob
# (agent container, buildcounter-v{N}.txt, ETag-CAS — see docs/agent/build-counter-blob.md).
# (agent container, buildcounter-v{N}.txt, ETag-CAS — see internal/docs/agent/build-counter-blob.md).
# The local file is only an offline fallback for -SkipUpload/bare-dotnet smoke builds.
buildcounter.txt
@@ -114,17 +114,10 @@ tmpclaude-*-cwd
# Claude skills and scripts are now in a private submodule (.claude/commands/)
# No individual file ignores needed — the submodule handles everything
# Deployment scripts (local only — contain tokens + SAS URLs)
scripts/Deployment/
# Migration tooling (local only, vorerst) — cross-tenant storage/cert migration scripts
scripts/Migration/
# Infra: tracked. The Bicep templates carry no credentials — every secret is a
# @secure() parameter with an empty default, injected at deploy time, and image
# pull runs on managed identity. Keep it that way: never commit a resolved secret
# value or a *.parameters.json holding one.
infra/*.parameters.json
# M2 — local raw session fixtures before anonymization (plan §4 M2)
tests/fixtures/enrollment-sessions-local/
@@ -135,22 +128,28 @@ tests/fixtures/enrollment-sessions-local/
TODO.txt
tools/orphan-analysis.py
tools/export-session-fixture.mjs
tasks/
# Azure Table cleanup backups (dry-run exports + delete manifests)
# Produced by /cleanup-table skill — never commit deletion payloads
# Produced by operator tooling — never commit deletion payloads
db-backups/
plans/REFACTOR_AGENT_V2.md
.claude/scheduled_tasks.lock
.claude/plans/health-script-remediation-fix.md
# Operator-local Azure setup helper — applies lifecycle policy + container
# creation against a live storage account. Not portable across environments
# (storage account name, resource group are operator-specific) so it stays
# out of the repo. Each operator keeps their own copy.
scripts/Backup/setup-backup-container.ps1
docs/Introduction-AutopilotMonitor.pptx
docs/~$Introduction-AutopilotMonitor.pptx
internal/docs/Introduction-AutopilotMonitor.pptx
internal/docs/~$Introduction-AutopilotMonitor.pptx
# Playwright MCP browser artifacts (snapshots, screenshots, console logs)
.playwright-mcp/
# Web build stamp: generated by scripts/generate-version.js on every build (buildUtc
# changes each run) and served at /version.json from the static export.
src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/public/version.json
# What's new payload: generated by scripts/whats-new/build-whats-new.js from the docs
# checkout on every build and served at /whats-new.json from the static export.
src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/public/whats-new.json
# Local IME installer scratch (MSI + extracted payload per version, for grepping
# in binaries). Operator-only, never committed.
ime-files/
+6
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
[submodule ".claude/commands"]
path = .claude/commands
url = https://github.com/okieselbach/Autopilot-Monitor-dotclaude.git
[submodule "docs"]
path = internal
url = https://github.com/okieselbach/Autopilot-Monitor-internal.git
[submodule "infra"]
path = infra
url = https://github.com/okieselbach/Autopilot-Monitor-infra.git
+19
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
# Code of Conduct
This applies to all project spaces: issues, pull requests, discussions, and the documentation repository.
## Expectations
- Be respectful and constructive. Disagree with ideas, not with people.
- Assume good intent. Most confusion is a documentation gap, not malice.
- Keep discussions on topic and searchable: clear titles, reproducible steps, text instead of screenshots of text where possible.
- Never post customer data, tenant IDs, device identifiers, tokens, or log excerpts containing personal data in public issues or discussions. Redact first.
## Not acceptable
Harassment, personal attacks, discriminatory language, publishing others' private information, and sustained disruption of discussions.
## Enforcement
The maintainers may edit, hide, or delete content and may block accounts that violate this code. To raise a concern, contact the maintainers privately through
[GitHub](https://github.com/okieselbach) rather than in a public thread.
+17
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
# Feedback and Issues
Autopilot Monitor is developed and operated by its maintainers. The source is published so that customers and security reviewers can see what runs on their devices and with their data. This page explains where feedback goes.
| I want to… | Go to |
|---|---|
| Report a bug | [New issue → Bug report](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/issues/new/choose) |
| Suggest a feature | [New issue → Feature request](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/issues/new/choose) |
| Ask a question or discuss an idea | [Discussions](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/discussions) |
| Report a security issue | [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) — privately, never as a public issue |
| Read how the product works | [docs.autopilotmonitor.com](https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com) |
## Reporting a problem in your own tenant
For a failed or odd enrollment, the **Report Session** button in the portal is the fastest path. It hands the session context to support without exposing any of it publicly. Use a GitHub issue for problems that are reproducible and not tied to your data.
Please redact tenant IDs, device names, serial numbers, and anything personal before posting in a public issue or discussion.
+12
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
<Project>
<!-- Warning freeze (2026-08-13, backlog cleared to zero): every .NET build in this repo
must stay warning-free. Compiler, MSBuild and NuGet restore warnings are all fatal.
Exception: NuGet audit advisories (NU1901-NU1904) stay warnings — a CVE published
against an already-referenced package must not block an unrelated hotfix deploy;
advisories are handled by bumping the package, not by failing the build. -->
<PropertyGroup>
<TreatWarningsAsErrors>true</TreatWarningsAsErrors>
<MSBuildTreatWarningsAsErrors>true</MSBuildTreatWarningsAsErrors>
<WarningsNotAsErrors>NU1901;NU1902;NU1903;NU1904</WarningsNotAsErrors>
</PropertyGroup>
</Project>
+659 -25
View File
@@ -1,39 +1,673 @@
Autopilot Monitor - Split License
GNU AFFERO GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
Version 3, 19 November 2007
Copyright (c) 2026 Autopilot Monitor Contributors
Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. <https://fsf.org/>
This project uses a split licensing model. Different components are
licensed under different terms:
Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this
license document, but changing it is not allowed.
## MIT License
Preamble
The following components are licensed under the MIT License:
The GNU Affero General Public License is a free, copyleft license for
software and other kinds of works, specifically designed to ensure
cooperation with the community in the case of network server software.
- src/Agent/ - The Autopilot Monitor Agent (deployed to devices)
- src/Shared/ - Shared DTOs, enums, and constants
The licenses for most software and other practical works are designed
to take away your freedom to share and change the works. By contrast,
our General Public Licenses are intended to guarantee your freedom to
share and change all versions of a program--to make sure it remains
free software for all its users.
See src/Agent/LICENSE and src/Shared/LICENSE for the full MIT license text.
When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not price.
Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you have the
freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge for them if
you wish), that you receive source code or can get it if you want it,
that you can change the software or use pieces of it in new free
programs, and that you know you can do these things.
## GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 (AGPL-3.0)
Developers that use our General Public Licenses protect your rights
with two steps: (1) assert copyright on the software, and (2) offer
you this License which gives you legal permission to copy, distribute
and/or modify the software.
The following components are licensed under the AGPL-3.0:
A secondary benefit of defending all users' freedom is that
improvements made in alternate versions of the program, if they
receive widespread use, become available for other developers to
incorporate. Many developers of free software are heartened and
encouraged by the resulting cooperation. However, in the case of
software used on network servers, this result may fail to come about.
The GNU General Public License permits making a modified version and
letting the public access it on a server without ever releasing its
source code to the public.
- src/Backend/ - Azure Functions backend
- src/Web/ - Next.js web frontend
- src/McpServer/ - MCP Server
The GNU Affero General Public License is designed specifically to
ensure that, in such cases, the modified source code becomes available
to the community. It requires the operator of a network server to
provide the source code of the modified version running there to the
users of that server. Therefore, public use of a modified version, on
a publicly accessible server, gives the public access to the source
code of the modified version.
See src/Backend/LICENSE for the full AGPL-3.0 license text.
An older license, called the Affero General Public License and
published by Affero, was designed to accomplish similar goals. This is
a different license, not a version of the Affero GPL, but Affero has
released a new version of the Affero GPL which permits relicensing
under this license.
## Why Split Licensing?
The precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution and
modification follow.
The Agent runs on end-user devices and is licensed under MIT to allow
unrestricted use, modification, and distribution without copyleft
obligations.
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
The server-side components (Backend, Web, McpServer) are licensed under
AGPL-3.0 to ensure that modifications to the server infrastructure
remain open source, especially when deployed as a network service.
0. Definitions.
The Shared library is MIT-licensed because it is a dependency of the
MIT-licensed Agent. Using AGPL for Shared would effectively make the
Agent AGPL as well.
"This License" refers to version 3 of the GNU Affero General Public
License.
"Copyright" also means copyright-like laws that apply to other kinds
of works, such as semiconductor masks.
"The Program" refers to any copyrightable work licensed under this
License. Each licensee is addressed as "you". "Licensees" and
"recipients" may be individuals or organizations.
To "modify" a work means to copy from or adapt all or part of the work
in a fashion requiring copyright permission, other than the making of
an exact copy. The resulting work is called a "modified version" of
the earlier work or a work "based on" the earlier work.
A "covered work" means either the unmodified Program or a work based
on the Program.
To "propagate" a work means to do anything with it that, without
permission, would make you directly or secondarily liable for
infringement under applicable copyright law, except executing it on a
computer or modifying a private copy. Propagation includes copying,
distribution (with or without modification), making available to the
public, and in some countries other activities as well.
To "convey" a work means any kind of propagation that enables other
parties to make or receive copies. Mere interaction with a user
through a computer network, with no transfer of a copy, is not
conveying.
An interactive user interface displays "Appropriate Legal Notices" to
the extent that it includes a convenient and prominently visible
feature that (1) displays an appropriate copyright notice, and (2)
tells the user that there is no warranty for the work (except to the
extent that warranties are provided), that licensees may convey the
work under this License, and how to view a copy of this License. If
the interface presents a list of user commands or options, such as a
menu, a prominent item in the list meets this criterion.
1. Source Code.
The "source code" for a work means the preferred form of the work for
making modifications to it. "Object code" means any non-source form
of a work.
A "Standard Interface" means an interface that either is an official
standard defined by a recognized standards body, or, in the case of
interfaces specified for a particular programming language, one that is
widely used among developers working in that language.
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END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs
If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the greatest
possible use to the public, the best way to achieve this is to make it
free software which everyone can redistribute and change under these
terms.
To do so, attach the following notices to the program. It is safest
to attach them to the start of each source file to most effectively
state the exclusion of warranty; and each file should have at least
the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found.
<one line to give the program's name and a brief idea of what it does.>
Copyright (C) <year> <name of author>
This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as
published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the
License, or (at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public
License along with this program. If not, see
<https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper
mail.
If your software can interact with users remotely through a computer
network, you should also make sure that it provides a way for users to
get its source. For example, if your program is a web application,
its interface could display a "Source" link that leads users to an
archive of the code. There are many ways you could offer source, and
different solutions will be better for different programs; see section
13 for the specific requirements.
You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or
school, if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if
necessary. For more information on this, and how to apply and follow
the GNU AGPL, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+65 -18
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@@ -1,46 +1,93 @@
# <img src="docs/images/logo.svg" height="28" alt="" /> AutopilotMonitor
# <img src=".github/assets/logo.svg" height="28" alt="Autopilot Monitor logo" /> Autopilot Monitor
[![Status](https://img.shields.io/badge/status-live-brightgreen)](https://www.autopilotmonitor.com)
[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT%20%2B%20AGPL--3.0-blue)](LICENSE)
[![Website](https://img.shields.io/badge/website-autopilotmonitor.com-2ea44f)](https://www.autopilotmonitor.com)
Advanced monitoring and troubleshooting solution for Windows Autopilot deployments. Gain full visibility into every enrollment session with a detailed event timeline, fleet health dashboards, and session reporting. Define custom analysis rules to automatically detect issues and gather rules to collect targeted evidence. Retrieve diagnostics packages on demand, configure agent settings like auto-reboot behavior and automatic timezone adjustment — all managed centrally from the web dashboard.
Autopilot Monitor is an open-source, real-time monitoring and troubleshooting platform for **Windows Autopilot** and **Microsoft Intune** enrollment. It records enrollment events, application installations, policies, device state, and diagnostics while provisioning is still running, instead of collecting logs by hand after a failure. Administrators get live enrollment tracking, Enrollment Status Page (ESP) visibility, detailed session timelines, automated issue detection, on-demand diagnostics, fleet health analytics, and AI-assisted troubleshooting through a hosted Model Context Protocol (MCP) server.
The platform supports classic Windows Autopilot and modern Intune provisioning scenarios, including **Windows Autopilot Device Preparation**.
## Availability
Autopilot Monitor is **publicly available** — the Community plan is free. Sign in with your work account at **[autopilotmonitor.com](https://www.autopilotmonitor.com)**; new organizations complete a short activation step after first sign-in.
<p align="center">
<img src="docs/images/SessionList.png" width="45%" />
<img src="docs/images/FleetHealth.png" width="45%" />
<img src=".github/assets/SessionList.png" width="45%" alt="Autopilot Monitor dashboard showing live Windows Autopilot and Intune enrollment sessions" />
<img src=".github/assets/FleetHealth.png" width="45%" alt="Autopilot Monitor fleet health dashboard with Windows Autopilot enrollment analytics and success metrics" />
</p>
<p align="center">
<img src="docs/images/SessionDetails.png" width="45%" />
<img src="docs/images/SessionTimeline.png" width="45%" />
<img src=".github/assets/SessionDetails.png" width="45%" alt="Autopilot Monitor session details showing device information, diagnostics, apps, policies, and enrollment status" />
<img src=".github/assets/SessionTimeline.png" width="45%" alt="Windows Autopilot enrollment timeline showing ESP phases, application installs, policies, events, and errors" />
</p>
## Overview
## Key Features
Autopilot Monitor provides real-time tracking, intelligent diagnostics, and automated troubleshooting for Windows Autopilot enrollment processes. It consists of:
- **Real-time Windows Autopilot monitoring** — follow device provisioning while enrollment is still running
- **Detailed enrollment timelines** — correlate Autopilot, ESP, Intune Management Extension, apps, policies, device state, and system events
- **Enrollment Status Page visibility** — see which phase, application, or policy is delaying provisioning
- **Automated issue detection** — define custom analysis rules that identify known failure patterns
- **Targeted evidence collection** — gather registry values, event log entries, files, log-parser matches, and allow-listed commands when specific conditions are detected
- **On-demand diagnostics** — request diagnostics packages from enrolled devices remotely
- **Fleet health analytics** — success rates, deployment duration, device models, applications, errors, and recurring issues
- **Session reporting** — inspect and share detailed enrollment information for individual devices
- **Windows Autopilot Device Preparation support** — monitor Device Preparation deployments alongside classic Autopilot scenarios
- **Centralized agent configuration** — control diagnostic behavior, automatic reboots, timezone adjustment, and other monitoring settings from the web dashboard
- **AI-assisted troubleshooting** — query enrollment data through the built-in Model Context Protocol server
- **Bootstrap Script** — PowerShell script deployed via Intune that starts monitoring early in the enrollment process
- **Monitoring Agent** — Lightweight .NET application that collects telemetry and evidence during enrollment
## How it works
Autopilot Monitor consists of several components working together throughout Windows enrollment:
- **Bootstrap Script** — PowerShell script deployed through Microsoft Intune that starts monitoring early in the provisioning process
- **Monitoring Agent** — lightweight .NET application that collects telemetry and evidence during enrollment
- **Backend API** — Azure Functions-based ingestion and processing pipeline
- **Web Dashboard** — Next.js application for real-time monitoring and fleet analytics
- **Web Dashboard** — Next.js application for real-time monitoring, troubleshooting, and fleet analytics
- **MCP Server** — Model Context Protocol server that lets AI assistants query Autopilot Monitor data in natural language
## Architecture
## Windows Autopilot and Intune Troubleshooting
For detailed information about the system architecture, components, and data flow, see [Architecture Documentation](docs/architecture.md).
Autopilot Monitor helps investigate common Windows provisioning and enrollment problems such as:
- Windows Autopilot deployments that fail or appear stuck
- Enrollment Status Page (ESP) delays and unusually long deployment phases
- Win32 application installation failures and slow application downloads
- Intune Management Extension problems
- Microsoft Entra join, Hybrid Join, and device registration issues
- policies that block or delay provisioning
- inconsistent behavior across hardware models and recurring failures affecting multiple devices
Because telemetry is collected during enrollment, many problems can be investigated without reproducing the issue or manually collecting logs from the affected device.
## AI Integration (MCP)
Autopilot Monitor ships a hosted **[Model Context Protocol](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)** server. Connect Claude Desktop, VS Code, or any MCP client that speaks Streamable HTTP with OAuth, and ask questions like:
- *"Show me all failed enrollments from the last 24 hours and group them by failure reason."*
- *"Why did session X fail, and which app install caused the delay?"*
- *"Which devices had unusually long ESP application phases this week?"*
- *"Which device models have the highest Autopilot failure rate?"*
- *"Which devices in my fleet are affected by CVE-2024-30078?"*
Server URL: `https://mcp.autopilotmonitor.com/mcp` — sign-in runs through your existing work account, access is scoped to your tenant exactly like in the portal, and the MCP server stores no credentials. Setup guide: **[AI Integration (MCP)](https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/integrations/ai-integration-mcp)**.
## Documentation
Full admin documentation is available at **[docs.autopilotmonitor.com](https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com)**
Full admin documentation is available at **[docs.autopilotmonitor.com](https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com)** — deployment, configuration, monitoring, diagnostics, troubleshooting, analysis and gather rules, integrations, and AI-assisted troubleshooting.
## Open Source
Autopilot Monitor is developed openly on GitHub. The source is published so that customers and security reviewers can see what runs on their devices and with their data: the repository contains the device agent, shared library, backend, web dashboard, and MCP server.
## Feedback
Bug reports and feature requests go through [Issues](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/issues/new/choose), questions and ideas through [Discussions](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/discussions). Security issues are reported privately, see [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md). For a problem in your own tenant, the **Report Session** button in the portal is the fastest path.
## License
This project uses a **split licensing model**:
This project uses a **split licensing model**. The root [LICENSE](LICENSE) is AGPL-3.0, which covers the server-side components; the device-side components carry their own MIT license file:
- **MIT License** — Agent (`src/Agent/`) and Shared library (`src/Shared/`) — unrestricted use on end-user devices
- **AGPL-3.0** — Backend (`src/Backend/`), Web Dashboard (`src/Web/`), and MCP Server (`src/McpServer/`) — server-side components remain open source
- **MIT License** — Agent ([`src/Agent/`](src/Agent/LICENSE)) and Shared library ([`src/Shared/`](src/Shared/LICENSE)) — unrestricted use on end-user devices, no copyleft obligations
- **AGPL-3.0** — Backend ([`src/Backend/`](src/Backend/LICENSE)), Web Dashboard ([`src/Web/`](src/Web/LICENSE)), and MCP Server ([`src/McpServer/`](src/McpServer/LICENSE)) — modifications to server-side components remain open source, especially when deployed as a network service
See [LICENSE](LICENSE) for full details.
The Shared library is MIT because it is a dependency of the MIT-licensed Agent. The license file inside each component directory is authoritative for that component.
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# Security Policy
## Reporting a vulnerability
Please report security issues **privately** through
[GitHub Security Advisories](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/security/advisories/new).
Private vulnerability reporting is enabled, so a report reaches the maintainers without ever being public.
Please do not open a public issue, post on social media, or send email for security findings.
## What to expect
- An acknowledgement and an initial severity assessment.
- A fix or a mitigation plan, with a shared view of timing before anything is disclosed.
- Credit in the advisory if you want it, and none if you prefer to stay anonymous.
Reports are read by the maintainers directly. There is no guaranteed response time and no bug bounty.
## Scope and rules of engagement
Security research against the hosted service is welcome and is not a violation of the
[Terms of Use](https://www.autopilotmonitor.com/terms). While testing, please:
- do not access data of tenants you do not own,
- do not degrade the service for others,
- do not run automated scanners against production.
## Supported versions
The hosted service always runs the current `main`. For the on-device agent, only the
[latest release](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/releases/latest) receives fixes.
## More
The [Security FAQ](https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/trust-and-security/security-faq) and
[Data Flows](https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/trust-and-security/data-flows) pages describe the security model,
data handling, and isolation in detail.
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<#
.SYNOPSIS
Build script for Autopilot Monitor solution.
.DESCRIPTION
Builds all .NET projects and optionally the web UI.
Run this after cloning or when you want to rebuild everything.
.PARAMETER Configuration
Build configuration: Debug or Release (default: Debug)
.PARAMETER IncludeWeb
Also build the web UI (requires Node.js)
.PARAMETER Clean
Clean before building
.EXAMPLE
.\build.ps1
Builds all .NET projects in Debug mode
.EXAMPLE
.\build.ps1 -Configuration Release -IncludeWeb
Builds everything in Release mode including web UI
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[ValidateSet("Debug", "Release")]
[string]$Configuration = "Debug",
[switch]$IncludeWeb,
[switch]$Clean
)
$ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"
Write-Host "============================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host " Autopilot Monitor Build Script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "============================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host ""
$rootPath = $PSScriptRoot
$slnPath = Join-Path $rootPath "AutopilotMonitor.sln"
# Check prerequisites
Write-Host "[1/4] Checking prerequisites..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
# Check .NET SDK
try {
$dotnetVersion = & dotnet --version
Write-Host " ✓ .NET SDK version: $dotnetVersion" -ForegroundColor Green
}
catch {
Write-Host " ✗ .NET SDK not found. Please install .NET 10 SDK." -ForegroundColor Red
exit 1
}
# Check Node.js if building web
if ($IncludeWeb) {
try {
$nodeVersion = & node --version
Write-Host " ✓ Node.js version: $nodeVersion" -ForegroundColor Green
}
catch {
Write-Host " ✗ Node.js not found. Please install Node.js 18+." -ForegroundColor Red
exit 1
}
}
Write-Host ""
# Clean if requested
if ($Clean) {
Write-Host "[2/4] Cleaning solution..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
& dotnet clean $slnPath -c $Configuration
Write-Host " ✓ Clean completed" -ForegroundColor Green
Write-Host ""
}
else {
Write-Host "[2/4] Skipping clean (use -Clean to clean first)" -ForegroundColor Gray
Write-Host ""
}
# Restore packages
Write-Host "[3/4] Restoring NuGet packages..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
& dotnet restore $slnPath
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
Write-Host " ✗ Restore failed" -ForegroundColor Red
exit 1
}
Write-Host " ✓ Restore completed" -ForegroundColor Green
Write-Host ""
# Build solution
Write-Host "[4/4] Building solution ($Configuration)..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
& dotnet build $slnPath -c $Configuration --no-restore
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
Write-Host " ✗ Build failed" -ForegroundColor Red
exit 1
}
Write-Host " ✓ Build completed" -ForegroundColor Green
Write-Host ""
# Build web if requested
if ($IncludeWeb) {
Write-Host "[BONUS] Building web UI..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$webPath = Join-Path $rootPath "src\Web\autopilot-monitor-web"
Push-Location $webPath
try {
Write-Host " Installing npm packages..." -ForegroundColor Gray
& npm install --silent
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
Write-Host " ✗ npm install failed" -ForegroundColor Red
exit 1
}
Write-Host " Building Next.js app..." -ForegroundColor Gray
& npm run build
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
Write-Host " ✗ Web build failed" -ForegroundColor Red
exit 1
}
Write-Host " ✓ Web build completed" -ForegroundColor Green
}
finally {
Pop-Location
}
Write-Host ""
}
# Summary
Write-Host "============================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host " Build Completed Successfully!" -ForegroundColor Green
Write-Host "============================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Output locations:" -ForegroundColor White
Write-Host " Agent: src\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2\bin\$Configuration\net48\" -ForegroundColor Gray
Write-Host " Functions: src\Backend\AutopilotMonitor.Functions\bin\$Configuration\net10.0\" -ForegroundColor Gray
if ($IncludeWeb) {
Write-Host " Web UI: src\Web\autopilot-monitor-web\.next\" -ForegroundColor Gray
}
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Next steps:" -ForegroundColor White
Write-Host " 1. Start Azurite: azurite --silent --location c:\azurite" -ForegroundColor Gray
Write-Host " 2. Start Functions: cd src\Backend\AutopilotMonitor.Functions && func start" -ForegroundColor Gray
if ($IncludeWeb) {
Write-Host " 3. Start Web UI: cd src\Web\autopilot-monitor-web && npm run dev" -ForegroundColor Gray
Write-Host " 4. Test Agent: cd src\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2\bin\$Configuration\net48 && .\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe --console" -ForegroundColor Gray
}
else {
Write-Host " 3. Test Agent: cd src\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2\bin\$Configuration\net48 && .\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe --console" -ForegroundColor Gray
}
-169
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---
type: Reference
title: Autopilot ZTD Diagnostics — Event IDs, Registry Surfaces, Endpoints, Error Codes
description: Windows' own diagnostic surfaces for the Autopilot profile-download (ZTD) flow and known deployment error codes — what the agent reads, what each identifier means, and where the knowledge comes from.
resource: /src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Telemetry/DeviceInfo/ZtdEvidence.cs
tags:
- agent
- autopilot
- ztd
- diagnostics
- event-log
- troubleshooting
timestamp: 2026-07-16T00:00:00+02:00
---
# Autopilot ZTD Diagnostics
Windows documents its own diagnostic surfaces for the Autopilot profile-download flow
(the Zero-Touch Deployment / "ZTD" service round-trip during OOBE). The agent consumes
three of them to turn the `autopilot_profile_missing` warning from a guess into an
evidence-backed verdict, and the backend rule engine uses the error-code map for
known-issue enrichment.
Consumers in this repo:
* `ZtdEvidence.cs` (agent) — one-shot event-log query + `Diagnostics\Autopilot` registry
dump + deployment-service reachability probe on the profile-missing path.
* `ModernDeploymentTracker.cs` (agent) — continuous watcher of the same channel,
Level ≤ 3 only (Warning/Error/Critical) plus targeted Info IDs.
* Analyze rules (backend) — HRESULT/known-issue map (see [Error codes](#schema--error-codes)).
# Schema — ModernDeployment Autopilot event channel
Channel: `Microsoft-Windows-ModernDeployment-Diagnostics-Provider/Autopilot`
(Event Viewer: Application and Services Logs → Microsoft → Windows →
ModernDeployment-Diagnostics-Provider → Autopilot).
| Event ID | Level | Meaning | Agent verdict mapping (`ztdVerdict`) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 100 | Warning | "Autopilot policy [name] not found" — temporary, device is waiting for the profile download. Windows can log hundreds of these per minute (harmless-rollup in `ModernDeploymentTracker`). | `waiting_for_profile_no_internet_confirmation` (when nothing else was logged) |
| 101/103/109/111 | Info | Profile settings retrieval/processing details. | not queried |
| 153 | Info | `ProfileState_Unknown → ProfileState_Available` — a profile was downloaded and is ready. | `profile_downloaded` |
| 160 | Info | Profile settings acquisition beginning. | context only |
| 161 | Info | Profile download succeeded. | `profile_downloaded` |
| 163 | Info | Download not required — device already provisioned (typically after `Sysprep /Generalize`, i.e. Autopilot-for-existing-devices images). | `already_provisioned` |
| 164 | Info | Internet available to attempt policy download — the authoritative witness that the ZTD round-trip could run at OOBE time. | with no 161: `download_attempted_no_profile_returned` (the assignment-gap signature, session 423b5360) |
| 171 | Error | TPM identity confirmation failed (HRESULT in payload) — self-deploying/pre-prov attestation. | context only (`inconclusive` if alone) |
| 172 | Error | Failed to set profile as available — usually follows 171. | context only |
| 807 | Error | `ZtdDeviceIsNotRegistered` — hardware hash not registered in Autopilot. | `device_not_registered` |
| 809 | Error | `ZtdDeviceHasNoAssignedProfile` — the assigned profile was deleted without cleanup. | `assigned_profile_deleted` |
| 815 | Error | `ZtdDeviceHasNoAssignedProfile` — no profile assigned and no tenant default profile. | `no_profile_assigned` |
| 908 | Error | `SerialNumberMismatch` / `ProductKeyIdMismatch` between Autopilot registration and physical hardware. | `serial_or_product_key_mismatch` |
Verdict priority: error IDs are authoritative (807 → 908 → 809 → 815), then the Info-flow
reconstruction (161/153 → 163 → 164 → 100). Implemented in
`ZtdEvidence.ComputeZtdVerdict`, pinned by `ZtdEvidenceVerdictTests`.
# Schema — Diagnostics registry key
`HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Diagnostics\Autopilot` — written by the ZTD client,
dumped verbatim by the agent into the `autopilot_profile` event (`diagnosticsRegistry`):
| Value | Meaning |
| --- | --- |
| `AadTenantId` | GUID of the tenant the user signed into. |
| `CloudAssignedTenantDomain` | Tenant the device is registered with; **blank = not registered with Autopilot**. |
| `CloudAssignedTenantId` | GUID matching `CloudAssignedTenantDomain`; blank when not registered. |
| `IsAutopilotDisabled` | 1 = device not registered **or** profile download failed (network/firewall/timeout) — Microsoft's own catch-all indicator. **Casing caveat:** Windows actually writes `IsAutoPilotDisabled` (capital P; observed session e7dbac7a, 24H2) while the FAQ documents `IsAutopilotDisabled` — all agent lookups are case-insensitive for this reason. |
| `TenantMatched` | 0 = user's tenant ≠ registration tenant → the "username belongs to another organization" OOBE error. |
| `CloudAssignedOobeConfig` | Bitmap of configured OOBE settings (SkipCortanaOptIn=1, OobeUserNotLocalAdmin=2, SkipExpressSettings=4, SkipOemRegistration=8, SkipEula=16). |
The profile cache itself lives in `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\AutopilotPolicyCache`
(`PolicyJsonCache`, `ProfileAvailable`) — `ProfileAvailable=0` plus an empty
`ZeroTouchConfig` is the "blank profile cached" state the troubleshooting FAQ describes
when no profile exists at check time. A reboot re-runs the download and can replace the
blank cache.
# Schema — Endpoints
| Endpoint | Purpose | Agent behavior |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `https://ztd.dds.microsoft.com` | Autopilot Deployment Service — profile delivery during OOBE. | Reachability probe on profile-missing (any HTTP status = reachable). **Note:** several third-party blogs cite `ztd.ssd.microsoft.com`; the official requirements page says `ztd.dds.microsoft.com`. |
| `https://login.live.com` | Second Deployment-Service URL; also needed by the Microsoft Sign-in Assistant (`wlidsvc`) — a policy that disables wlidsvc breaks profile download. | not probed |
| `*.microsoftaik.azure.net` (+ per-vendor EK cert URLs) | TPM attestation for self-deploying/pre-provisioning. | not probed |
| `lgmsapeweu.blob.core.windows.net` | Intune automatic diagnostics upload. | deliberately not probed (decision 2026-07-16: not mission-critical) |
# Observability — when the agent can actually see these errors
The agent's install timing bounds what the known-issue rules can ever observe. In the
normal deployment model the agent is installed by an **Intune platform script via IME —
i.e. only AFTER MDM enrollment succeeded**. Everything that happens before that point
(profile download, TPM attestation in self-deploying/pre-provisioning, the MDM enrollment
handshake itself) is over before our process exists.
| Failure class | Normal flow (IME install) | Bootstrap token mode | Await-enrollment mode |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Enrollment blocked (0x80180014/18, 0xC1036501, 0x801C03F3 → ANALYZE-ENRL-004) | **Invisible** — no enrollment ⇒ no agent, no session. | **Visible** — the bootstrap token exists precisely to report pre-MDM (as of 2026-07: one customer piloting). | **Invisible to the backend** — the agent binary is present but only polls for the MDM certificate; without the cert it cannot authenticate, and monitoring starts only after the cert appears. A hard blocker ends in the await timeout (default 480 min) with nothing uploaded. |
| TPM attestation (ANALYZE-ENRL-003) | **Visible via error backfill** — attestation precedes enrollment, but the startup error backfill (below) replays Autopilot-channel Level 1-2 records from the last 4h, so retry-then-success attempts surface as `backfilled=true` events. | Visible. | Visible via error backfill once monitoring starts. |
| Hybrid-join 0x80004005 (ANALYZE-ENRL-005) | **Visible** — the ODJ/hybrid phase runs during device ESP while the agent is active. | Visible. | Visible after cert arrival. |
| Clock skew (ANALYZE-DEV-007) | **Always** — ntp_time_check is our own event. | Always. | Always. |
The rules stay enabled despite the narrow normal-flow windows: they are evidence-gated
(zero cost when the codes never appear) and they future-proof the bootstrap and
await-enrollment paths.
## Startup error backfill (ModernDeploymentTracker)
At agent start (backfill enabled), the tracker replays Autopilot-channel **Level 1-2**
records from the last **4 hours** through the normal emission pipeline — this is what makes
pre-install errors (TPM attestation retries, ZTD errors 807/809/815/908) visible in the
normal IME deployment flow. Spam containment, in order:
1. **Errors only** — the Warning-level 100 heartbeat storm is excluded by the XPath.
2. **Harmless-ID downgrade + burst rollup** still applies to backfilled records.
3. **Cap** of 25 records per scan (newest first; the tail is logged, not emitted).
4. **RecordId watermark** (`autopilot-error-backfill.json`, advanced by both the backfill
scan and the live watcher) — restarts never re-emit records a previous run forwarded.
5. Backfilled events carry `backfilled: true` plus the original `timeCreated` in their
payload; the event's own timestamp is the emission time, so the session's `StartedAt`
(which the backend aligns to the earliest event) is not dragged backwards.
Presentation (2026-07-28, customer feedback — an unannounced wall of pre-agent Error
events read like a live failure):
- The scan buffers the (capped) record set, first emits an **Info summary event**
(`modern_deployment_log`, payload `backfillSummary: true` + `replayedCount` /
`droppedOverCap` / `lookbackMinutes`) announcing the replay block, then replays the
records **oldest-first** so the timeline sequence follows event-log chronology.
- The web timeline (`EventTimeline.tsx`) badges `backfilled: true` events („⟲ Backfilled",
slate, explanatory tooltip) and renders the original `timeCreated` as the row time with a
"(reported …)" suffix; the expanded metadata block gains a `Recorded` line. Severity is
deliberately **not** downgraded — unresolved pre-agent errors must still surface in the
Error filter.
# Schema — Error codes (backend known-issue map)
Codes documented in the known-issues / troubleshooting-FAQ pages that appear in ESP/enrollment
failures we can observe:
| Code | Meaning / context | Actionable guidance |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `0x800705B4` | Timeout; in self-deploying mode usually "device is not TPM 2.0 capable" (e.g. a VM). | Don't use self-deploying on VMs / non-TPM-2.0 hardware. |
| `0x801C03EA` | TPM attestation failed → Entra join with device token failed. | TPM/firmware issue; check attestation endpoints. |
| `0x81039001` | `E_AUTOPILOT_CLIENT_TPM_MAX_ATTESTATION_RETRY_EXCEEDED` (intermittent, "Securing your hardware"). | Retry provisioning; persistent → firmware. |
| `0x81039023` | TPM attestation failure on Windows 11 (pre-prov/self-deploy). | Fixed by KB5013943 (21H2) or later CU. |
| `0x81039024` | TPM has known vulnerabilities → attestation refused. | Update TPM firmware from OEM. |
| `0x80070490` | TPM attestation failure on AMD ASP fTPM platforms. | Update AMD firmware. |
| `0xC1036501` | Automatic MDM enrollment impossible — multiple MDM configurations in Entra ID. | Consolidate MDM configs. |
| `0x801C03F3` | Entra device object for the Autopilot device was deleted (logged in `Microsoft-Windows-User Device Registration/Admin`). | Deregister + re-register the device (recreates the object). |
| `0x80180014` | Device-record reuse in self-deploying/pre-prov mode, or Windows MDM enrollment disabled ("Enrollment blocked for AP device by SDM One Time Limit Check"). | Intune → Autopilot device → **Unblock device**, or allow Windows (MDM) in enrollment restrictions. |
| `0x80180018` | MDM enrollment refused — licensing (missing Intune/EMS license) or device cap. | Check user license + device limits. |
| `0x80070774` | Hybrid-join ESP failure — domain mismatch between Intune Connector for AD and device targeting. | Install/configure the connector in the matching domain. |
| `0x80004005` | Hybrid-join deployment timeout — **build-dependent known issue**, fixed in KB5065789 (25H2, ≥ 26200.6725), KB5065426 (24H2, ≥ 26100.6584), KB5070312 (23H2, ≥ 22631.6276). | Update the image / install the KB. |
Related non-code known issues worth remembering: clock skew of minutes causes TPM
attestation errors and ESP timeouts (`w32tm /resync /force`; the agent's `ntp_time_check`
event carries the measured offset); multiple/unexpected OOBE reboots can delete kiosk
autologon registry entries (fixed in 24H2 KB5058411); ESP does not support mixing LOB and
Win32 apps ("Another installation is in progress").
# Citations
* [Windows Autopilot troubleshooting FAQ](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/troubleshooting-faq) — event IDs, registry values, process flow. (Checked 2026-07-16.)
* [Windows Autopilot known issues](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/known-issues) — error codes, KB fixes. (Checked 2026-07-16.)
* [Windows Autopilot requirements — Networking](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/requirements?tabs=networking) — endpoint list incl. `ztd.dds.microsoft.com`. (Checked 2026-07-16.)
* Re-check cadence: both Learn pages change regularly (known-issues carries an RSS feed:
`https://learn.microsoft.com/api/search/rss?search=%22Be+informed+about+known+issues+that+might+occur+during+Windows+Autopilot+deployment.%22&locale=en-us&%24filter=`).
When new event IDs / error codes appear, update `ZtdEvidence.cs`, the backend rule map,
and this document together.
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---
type: Concept
title: Agent Build Numbers — Shared Counter Blob with ETag-CAS
description: Why agent build numbers come from a public counter blob reserved before the build, how the compare-and-swap protocol works, and what the repo's buildcounter.txt still does.
resource: /.github/workflows/build-agent.yml
tags:
- agent
- build
- ci
- release
- versioning
timestamp: 2026-07-17T00:00:00+02:00
---
# Agent Build Numbers — Shared Counter Blob
Agent (V2 line) build numbers — the `<n>` in `2.0.<n>` — are minted from a single
shared counter blob so that **local builds (`scripts/Deployment/build.ps1`) and CI
builds (`.github/workflows/build-agent.yml`) can never collide**. Both build paths
stay first-class: local daily-ops builds remain possible, CI builds add provenance
attestation on top.
# Schema
The reserve-before-build CAS protocol itself is shared with the backend and the MCP
server and is documented once in [Version Contract](../versioning.md); the single
implementation is `.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1`. Agent-specific:
- **Counter blob**: `https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent/buildcounter-v{LINE}.txt`
— one per release line, analogous to `version-v{LINE}.json`, and kept in the `agent`
container next to the artifacts it numbers rather than in `versions/`. Content: the
**last used** build number as plain text. Public-read like the rest of the container
(the number is visible in `version-v{LINE}.json` anyway); writes require the SAS.
- The reserved number reaches the build as `BUILD_NUMBER` in the environment. The
csproj honors it and then skips its `PersistBuildCounter` target, so the repo file
is not touched.
- **CI manual override** (`build_number` input): numbers `<=` counter are re-builds
and leave the blob unchanged; numbers `>` counter advance it (monotonic guard).
- V2 was seeded with `1356` on 2026-07-17.
# Consequences
- `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2/buildcounter.txt` is now only an **offline
fallback** for `-SkipUpload` smoke builds and bare `dotnet build` (where the version
does not matter). It is never committed anymore; the CI step that pushed counter
bumps to `main` was removed.
- `AdminConfiguration.LatestAgentV2*` (backend hash-oracle) is updated **only on
stable cutover** (`publish_as_stable` / default `build.ps1` run without
`-VersionedOnly`/`-Dev`) — it must never point at a build that is not actually in
the stable namespace.
- CI builds additionally attest build provenance for the release ZIP via
`actions/attest-build-provenance` (Sigstore keyless, bound to the workflow OIDC
identity). The digest covers the identical bytes uploaded to blob, so one
attestation covers all copies. Verify:
`gh attestation verify <zip> --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor`. Local builds
cannot produce this attestation — provenance is a CI-only property.
# Citations
- [Version Contract](../versioning.md) — the shared CAS protocol and manifest format
- `.github/workflows/build-agent.yml` — "Reserve build number (counter blob CAS)" step
- `.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1` — the shared implementation
- `scripts/Deployment/build.ps1` (gitignored, contains SAS) — local build path
- `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.csproj` —
`BUILD_NUMBER` property + `PersistBuildCounter` target
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---
type: Reference
title: V2 Agent — Decision Engine (DecisionCore)
description: The pure-reducer state machine that decides enrollment completion/failure — signals, state, effects, the A/B/C completion arms, and its invariants.
resource: /src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore
tags:
- agent
- decision-engine
- reducer
- completion
timestamp: 2026-07-11T00:00:00+02:00
---
# V2 Agent — Decision Engine (DecisionCore)
DecisionCore (`src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore`, netstandard2.0) is a **pure
reducer**: a deterministic state machine with no I/O, no clock reads, no threads. The
agent feeds it an ordered stream of *signals*; it returns a new immutable state plus a
list of *effects* the host must execute. Because it is pure, the same persisted signal
stream always reproduces the same journal and terminal outcome — that is what makes
crash recovery a replay instead of a guess (determinism guarantee "L.5",
`Engine/IDecisionEngine.cs`).
# The reducer contract
```
DecisionStep step = engine.Reduce(DecisionState oldState, DecisionSignal signal)
// DecisionStep = { NewState, Transition, Effects[] }
```
- `Reduce` never throws: a handler exception advances only bookkeeping and journals a
`reducer_exception` dead-end (fail-safe L.16).
- Dispatch is a switch on `(signal.Kind, signal.KindSchemaVersion)`; unknown pairs
become journaled dead-ends, never crashes.
- Every step yields a `DecisionTransition` journal record: `Taken` (state change vs
dead-end + reason), `StepIndex`, `FromStage/ToStage`, `Trigger`, `Guards`,
`ReducerVersion`.
# State
`DecisionState` (schema **v4**) is an immutable value object; "change" = builder copy.
Key content:
- Identity + progress: `SessionId`, `TenantId`, `Stage`, `Outcome`, `StepIndex`,
`LastAppliedSignalOrdinal`, `AgentBootUtc` (replay-safety anchor).
- **Facts** as `SignalFact<T>` — value **plus** `SourceSignalOrdinal` provenance, e.g.
`AccountSetupEnteredUtc`, `EspFinalExitUtc`, `DesktopArrivedUtc`, `HelloResolvedUtc`,
`ImeUserSessionCompletedUtc`, `HelloPolicyEnabled`, `HelloOutcome`.
- Aggregates: `AppInstallFacts`, `ScenarioProfile` + `ScenarioObservations`
(enrollment-scenario classification, monotonic), `ClassifierOutcomes`, `RealmJoinFacts`.
- `Deadlines` — active timers the host has been asked to arm.
Stages: `SessionStarted → EspDeviceSetup → EspAccountSetup → AwaitingHello →
AwaitingDesktop → Finalizing → Completed` (plus `Failed`, `WhiteGloveCandidate/Sealed`,
`AwaitingDeviceOnlyEsp` for self-deploying, and edge stages). Terminal =
`Completed | Failed | WhiteGloveSealed`. `Finalizing` is deliberately non-terminal
(grace window). Outcomes: `EnrollmentComplete`, `EnrollmentFailed`,
`WhiteGlovePart1Sealed`, `Aborted`, `AdminPreempted`.
# Signals
`DecisionSignal` is the only input. Fields: `Kind` + `KindSchemaVersion` (dispatch key),
`SessionSignalOrdinal` (monotonic, assigned **only** by the ingress worker — never by
collectors), `OccurredAtUtc`, mandatory `Evidence` (classified `Raw | Derived |
Synthetic` — a signal without evidence is a bug), `Payload` (string dict) and
`TypedPayload` (structured sidecar).
Signal kinds by family (`Signals/DecisionSignalKind.cs`):
- **Raw observations**: `EspPhaseChanged`, `EspExiting`, `EspResumed`,
`EspTerminalFailure`, `DesktopArrived`, `HelloResolved`, `ImeUserSessionCompleted`,
`DeviceSetupProvisioningComplete`, `AccountSetupProvisioningComplete`,
`AppInstallCompleted/Failed`, `AadUserJoinedLate`, `SystemRebootObserved`,
`EspConfigDetected`, `HelloPolicyDetected`, WhiteGlove + RealmJoin kinds, …
- **Synthetic**: `DeadlineFired` (scheduler timer), `ClassifierVerdictIssued`,
`EffectInfrastructureFailure`.
- **Lifecycle**: `SessionStarted`, `SessionAborted`, `AdminPreemptionDetected`.
- **`InformationalEvent`** — the single-rail pass-through: telemetry that must appear
on the Events timeline but never influences decisions.
**Ordering is the ingest ordinal, never wall-clock.** Replayed IME/CMTrace lines carry
backdated source timestamps; all before/after comparisons in the reducer therefore
compare `SourceSignalOrdinal`s (e.g. "final exit after AccountSetup entry").
# Effects — the only side-channel
`DecisionEffect` kinds and how the host's `EffectRunner` treats failures:
| Kind | Purpose | Failure class |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `ScheduleDeadline` / `CancelDeadline` | arm/cancel OS timers that come back as `DeadlineFired` | **critical** — failure aborts the session (a lost timer means silent parking) |
| `EmitEventTimelineEntry` | timeline events incl. terminal `enrollment_complete` / `enrollment_failed` | transient — retried 100/400/1600 ms |
| `PersistSnapshot` | hint to write the recovery snapshot | transient |
| `RunClassifier` | scenario classification; verdict returns as a `ClassifierVerdictIssued` signal | optional — exception ⇒ Inconclusive, never aborts |
Terminal and state-changing timeline effects carry a structured **audit trail** in
`TypedPayload` (built by `DecisionAuditTrailBuilder`): `decisionSource`, `trigger`,
`sessionStage`, `stepIndex`, `signalsSeen`, `signalEvidence`, `signalTimestamps`,
`scenario` — so every completion/failure in the portal is explainable from its own
event payload.
# Completion logic
## The A/B/C arms
The arms are **not** three pipelines — they are three alternative sufficient conditions
inside one guard, `ShouldTransitionToAwaitingHello`
(`Engine/DecisionEngine.Shared.cs`), which gates promotion out of the ESP stages toward
Hello/desktop completion:
- **Arm A — registry-strong AccountSetup success**: `AccountSetupProvisioningSucceededUtc`
is set (the ESP registry reported `categorySucceeded`). Merely *entering* AccountSetup
is insufficient — Shell-Core 62407 fires at every ESP page transition.
- **Arm B — SkipUser flow**: `ScenarioObservations.SkipUserEsp == true` — with no
User-ESP page, the first `esp_exiting` *is* the genuine final exit.
- **Arm C — 4-fact eager completion** (all four mandatory):
1. AccountSetup was entered, and
2. a post-AccountSetup ESP final exit occurred (ordinal-ordered), and
3. a *genuine* IME user-session completion (at-or-after the AccountSetup anchor —
guards against the `defaultuser0` ghost), and
4. a DAD-validated real-user desktop arrival.
Arm C applies eagerly the same conjunction the 30-minute `AdvisoryCompletion`
backstop would eventually trust.
**Layering note:** Arm C's app-install hardening lives in the **adapter**, not the
reducer. `ImeLogTrackerAdapter` defers posting `ImeUserSessionCompleted` while required
user-ESP Install-intent apps are still pending (IME logs "Completed user session" per
*pass*, not once per session — sessions 14690fc2/6cb01530). The reducer stays free of
app-pending guards; adapters sanitize evidence before it becomes a signal.
## Completion attempt sites and sequence
Completion can be attempted from whichever fact arrives last: `HelloResolved`,
`DesktopArrived` (including the Hello-disabled fast-path when `HelloPolicyEnabled ==
false` and an arm holds), `EspExiting`, `ImeUserSessionCompleted`,
`AccountSetupProvisioningComplete`, the Hello safety deadline, or the 30-minute
advisory backstop. All routes converge on `CompleteThroughFinalizingOrDefer`:
1. **Completion gates** (currently only the RealmJoin AND-gate): if RealmJoin was
detected and has no terminal outcome yet, completion is *deferred* — the session
stays in stage and emits `completion_waiting`. Three terminals open the gate:
`Resolved` (DeploymentPhase 110), `FirstDeploymentIncomplete` (phase left the
first-deployment window 100/101 for 200/210 without 110 — the RJ ESP was aborted,
typically by an interactive logon reclassifying the run as secondary-user; emits
the `realmjoin_first_deployment_incomplete` Warning, session 224b2087), and
`Timeout` (hard 60-min deadline). The abort rule reads the *persisted*
`RealmJoinFacts.LastDeploymentPhase` (updated by the typed `RealmJoinPhaseChanged`
signal), so it survives agent restarts — the `RealmJoinDetected` replay path
evaluates it too. A first observation of 210 does **not** release (RJ may have
completed before agent boot and deploy afterwards).
2. `Finalizing` stage + ~5 s `FinalizingGrace` deadline.
3. Grace fires → `Completed`, `EnrollmentComplete` outcome, `enrollment_complete`
timeline event with full audit payload.
**Self-deploying/kiosk** is a separate rail: no Hello, no user desktop —
`AwaitingDeviceOnlyEsp` with a detection deadline as the sole terminal entry, protected
by stale-fire and race guards. A registry-confirmed self-deploying profile also waives
IME false-positive AccountSetup entries.
# Invariants (violating any of these is a bug)
- **Post-terminal dispatch guard**: after `Completed`/`Failed`, every signal is a
bookkept dead-end — **except `InformationalEvent`** (single-rail pass-through must
keep flowing). `WhiteGloveSealed` is unguarded on purpose (Part 2 resumes fresh).
- **`InformationalEvent` never mutates decision state** — exactly one pass-through
timeline effect, payload copied 1:1.
- **`AadUserJoinedLate` is observation-only** — never completion evidence.
- **Hello policy is orthogonal to completion** — `HelloPolicyEnabled` tunes wait
cadence, never gates the outcome.
- **Raw IME "Completed user session" is weak evidence** — can run under `defaultuser0`;
only meaningful with a real-user desktop and the AccountSetup anchor (Arm C).
- **Deadline bases are floored at `AgentBootUtc`** — replayed backdated signals must
not arm past-due timers at boot.
- **Reducer-side deadline cancels need an explicit `CancelDeadline` effect** — a
builder-only removal leaves the OS timer live.
- **No silent parking**: a non-terminal post-AccountSetup session must always hold a
resolution-capable deadline; a 10-min dwell tripwire emits
`session_parked_without_deadline`.
# Hosting & threading (inside the agent)
Wired by `EnrollmentOrchestrator.Start` (`src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Orchestration/`):
- `SignalIngress` — bounded queue (256, back-pressure) + **one** worker thread. Per
signal, in order: assign ordinals → `SignalLog.Append` (durable, *before* reducing;
append failure ⇒ reducer does not run, no ordinal gap) → `engine.Reduce` →
`DecisionStepProcessor.ApplyStep`.
- `DecisionStepProcessor.ApplyStep` (same thread, no locks): journal append (the only
hard-throwing path; 3 consecutive failures escalate to quarantine) → effects run
synchronously via `EffectRunner` → best-effort snapshot → advance `CurrentState` →
one-shot terminal-stage hook (raises the agent's `Terminated` event off-thread).
- The `DeadlineScheduler`'s `Fired` event loops back in as synthetic `DeadlineFired`
signals.
- On restart, `RecoveryCoordinator` folds the persisted signal log through a transient
`new DecisionEngine()` before the live pipeline starts — see
[logs & persistence](logs-and-persistence.md).
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---
type: Concept
title: Agent Endpoint Migration — Config-Channel Re-Home
description: How the backend re-homes agents to a new API base URL (backend move or per-tenant region move) via MigrateToApiBaseUrl on the agent config response, and why HTTP redirects were rejected.
resource: /src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Configuration/EndpointMigration.cs
tags:
- agent
- backend
- config
- migration
- security
timestamp: 2026-07-18T00:00:00+02:00
---
# Problem
The agent's API base URL is compiled into the binary (`Constants.ApiBaseUrl`). No DNS/domain
indirection is possible in front of the API: mTLS client-cert auth does not survive a reverse
proxy (Front Door), and Flex Consumption custom-domain TLS is broken. A backend move (like the
2026-07-18 WEU→GWC subscription migration) therefore hard-cuts every deployed agent still
pointing at the old hostname. In-flight agents self-terminate safely (local MaxLifetime watchdog
+ CleanupService), but their sessions are lost and a per-tenant region move (EU→US) has no
mechanism at all.
# Mechanism
`AgentConfigResponse.MigrateToApiBaseUrl` — served on `GET /api/agent/config` (incl. the
bootstrap wrapper), the same control channel as the kill switch, fetched at every agent
process start.
Agent flow (`Program.RunAgent`, Phase 4):
1. Config fetched from the compiled-in (old) base URL.
2. Kill-switch check runs FIRST — **kill wins over migrate**.
3. `AgentRuntimeConfig.Resolve` detects the migration signal directly after the fetch and
returns early, BEFORE merge / binary-integrity / bootstrap-cleanup — none of those side
effects may run against a config from the backend being abandoned (a migration stub may
advertise stale agent hashes; a spurious `IntegrityCheckFailed` + force-update would be
harmful).
4. `Program.RunAgent` swaps `AgentConfiguration.ApiBaseUrl`, disposes the old client stack,
rebuilds Phase 3 (auth clients) and re-runs Phase 4 against the new URL —
`allowEndpointMigration: false`, so the new backend's config **cannot chain a second hop**.
5. Kill-switch check runs again on the NEW backend's config; startup continues normally
(Phase 5+ builds mTLS/telemetry clients from the updated base URL).
# Hardening (mirrors the kill switch)
* **Live fetch only** — the on-disk config cache strips `MigrateToApiBaseUrl` on write AND
read (`RemoteConfigService.CacheConfig` / `LoadCachedConfig`); `EndpointMigration.ResolveTarget`
re-checks `LastFetchOutcome == Succeeded` as defence-in-depth. A planted cache file can
never re-home an agent.
* **Allowlist validated on BOTH sides** — `AgentEndpointMigrationRules` (Shared, single
source): https only, host must end in `.azurewebsites.net` on a label boundary, no
path/query/userinfo/port. The backend refuses to serve an invalid admin value
(`AgentMigrateRejected` warning); the agent refuses to honour one even if the backend was
compromised.
* **One hop, no loops** — second Resolve pass never migrates; a target equal to the current
base URL is a no-op (steady state during the migration window).
# Operation
Global admin settings (`AdminConfiguration`, admin portal → Global Settings):
* `AgentMigrateApiBaseUrl` — global target, set on the backend being **abandoned**; clear it
after the migration window.
* `AgentMigrateTenantOverridesJson` — JSON object `tenantId → URL` for per-tenant moves.
An entry with an **empty string** pins that tenant against the global target (staged rollout).
Overrides win over the global value.
Delivery evidence: every served target logs `AgentMigrateServed` (Warning — reaches App
Insights) with tenant, serial, agent version and target. Agent-side, the re-home is logged as
`Endpoint migration: backend re-homed this agent from … to …`.
Reach limitation: agents that cannot complete an authenticated config fetch (e.g. cert-broken
devices) never see the signal — they fall back to the local MaxLifetime/emergency-break
lifecycle. During a migration window the old backend must keep running as a serving stub;
keeping the old `*.azurewebsites.net` name parked afterwards also prevents hostname
re-registration by third parties while stragglers drain.
# Citations
* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Services/AgentEndpointMigrationRules.cs` — shared validation rules
* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Models/Config/AgentConfigResponse.cs` — wire field
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Config/GetAgentConfigFunction.cs` — `ResolveMigrateTarget` + serving (ConfigVersion 33)
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Configuration/EndpointMigration.cs` — agent-side evaluation
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2/Runtime/AgentRuntimeConfig.cs` — early return before merge/integrity
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2/Program.cs` — one-hop rebuild in `RunAgent`
* Tests: `AgentEndpointMigrationTests` (backend), `EndpointMigrationTests` + `RemoteConfigServiceCacheHardeningTests` (agent)
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---
type: Concept
title: ESP Policy-Provider Stall Detection — the no-timeout Setup/Apps wait and the co-management Sidecar gap
description: Why the ESP's Apps wait is keyed to the Intune-registered "Sidecar" provider by name — a foreign provider (ConfigMgr) with TrackingPoliciesCreated=1 does not satisfy it — plus the classic never-completes stall, and how the always-on two-arm esp_policy_provider_stalled tripwire (reason=provider_incomplete | sidecar_provider_missing, 15-min wall-clock dwell, StartupEventGate cross-restart dedup) surfaces both.
resource: /src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/SystemSignals/EspPolicyProviderProbe.cs
tags:
- agent
- esp
- enrollment-status-tracking
- co-management
- stall-detection
timestamp: 2026-07-24T00:00:00+02:00
---
# ESP Policy-Provider Stall Detection
## Schema
The Enrollment Status Page decides when its "Apps" category may progress from
"Identifying" using the **EnrollmentStatusTracking CSP**
(<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/enrollmentstatustracking-csp>),
mirrored in the registry under
`HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Autopilot\EnrollmentStatusTracking\{Device|<UserSID>}\…`.
Two contracts matter:
1. **`Setup/Apps/PolicyProviders/<Name>`** — per the CSP doc: *"Existence of this node
indicates to the ESP that it shouldn't show the tracking status message until the
TrackingPoliciesCreated node has been set to true."* This wait has **no timeout**. A
registered provider that never sets `TrackingPoliciesCreated=1` parks the ESP at
"Apps (Identifying)" indefinitely — observed for days in the field. Exists in device
scope (`Device`) and user scope (`S-<SID>`, appears at sign-in).
2. **`DevicePreparation/PolicyProviders/<Name>/InstallationState`** — must reach 2
(NotRequired) or 3 (Completed); 1=NotInstalled, 4=Error. Device scope only. The ESP
applies a default 15-minute timeout here, so these stalls self-surface as ESP errors —
the detector still records them for the diagnostic trail.
Known provider names: **`Sidecar` is the Intune Management Extension** (the CSP doc names
"Intune's agents, such as SideCar"); **`ConfigMgr`** is the Configuration Manager client,
registered during Autopilot-into-co-management — the troubleshooting section of
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/configmgr/comanage/autopilot-enrollment> queries
exactly these registry paths. The same document states that ESP policy providers **are not
aware of each other** and that **pre-provisioning is unsupported** with Autopilot into
co-management.
## The field case (issue #106)
A tenant pre-provisions devices and installs the ConfigMgr client as a blocking app.
Occasionally the user-phase ESP reaches "Apps (Identifying)" and never leaves it — for
hours to days. On those devices `Device\Setup\Apps\PolicyProviders` contains **only a
`ConfigMgr` key (no `Sidecar`)** — and, per the customer's follow-up, **`TrackingPoliciesCreated=1`
IS set under it**. The provider is "complete" by the CSP value contract, yet the ESP
still waits. Manually renaming the key to `Sidecar` — which creates no tracking entries,
only satisfies the name — unblocks the ESP instantly.
The naive CSP-doc reading ("any provider with TrackingPoliciesCreated=1 satisfies the
wait") is therefore wrong for this case. What the evidence supports instead: provider
nodes are registered **by the Intune service at enrollment**, and its ESP-policy WAP
payload always registers `Sidecar` (ConfigMgr joins only via a co-management settings
policy — see the payload documented by Niehaus). The ESP waits on the provider it
expects **by name**; a foreign provider occupying the slot does not satisfy it,
regardless of its completion values. On the affected devices the CM client (installed
as a plain Win32 app, no co-management settings policy) evidently displaced the
Sidecar node — consistent with Microsoft's warning that providers "aren't currently
aware of others" and that pre-provisioning is unsupported with co-management. The exact
CloudExperienceHost mechanism is not publicly documented; the registry signature —
setupApps providers present, `Sidecar` absent — is deterministic either way.
## Detection
`EspPolicyProviderProbe` (fail-soft, static, `ScopedOverride` test seam — structural clone
of `EspTrackingInfoProbe`) enumerates all providers in both kinds and scopes.
`EspPolicyProviderStallDetector` evaluates a pure transition function on a 60-second tick
from the always-on `EspPolicyProviderStallHost` — **two arms**, same 15-minute wall-clock
dwell, one shared event type discriminated by `reason`:
* **Arm 1, `reason=provider_incomplete`** — a provider **continuously incomplete for
≥ 15 minutes**. The dwell clock starts at first incomplete observation and resets on
completion or disappearance. Missing values parse as incomplete
(fail-toward-observation). Catches e.g. Sidecar itself never reporting.
* **Arm 2, `reason=sidecar_provider_missing`** — **≥ 1 `Setup\Apps` provider registered
but none named `Sidecar`**, continuously for ≥ 15 minutes. Deliberately ignores
provider completeness (the field case had `TrackingPoliciesCreated=1`). Sidecar
registering later — the legitimate startup ordering — clears the condition and resets
the clock. DevicePreparation-only snapshots don't activate it.
* When both arms cross in the same round, ONE event is emitted and
`sidecar_provider_missing` wins as `reason` (it explains the hang regardless of the
foreign provider's state).
* Missing root key / empty provider list = normal early enrollment: clears all dwell
state (both arms), never fires.
* One `esp_policy_provider_stalled` **Warning** per newly stalled condition set
(`ImmediateUpload`), one-shot per condition in-process, cross-restart deduped via a
`StartupEventGate` fingerprint over the sorted currently-active fired conditions
(provider keys + a `sidecarMissing` sentinel) — a restart into the same stall stays
silent, a new condition joining re-reports.
* Payload: `reason`, `providers[]` (full table: name, scope, kind, raw values, complete
flag), `stalledProviders[]` with `stalledForMinutes`, `sidecarMissingForMinutes`
(arm 2 only), `sidecarRegistered`, `dwellMinutes`.
* **Purely observational**: emitted via `InformationalEventPost` (dispatch-guard exempt
pass-through) — never touches decision state. No config toggle, no ConfigVersion bump
(precedent: `disk_space_low`).
Deliberately **not** built on `StallProbeCollector` (its idle clock resets on any session
activity — a provider stall coexists with a chatty session) and not on the periodic
collectors (idle-stopped after 15 minutes — exactly the dormant window the dwell must
observe).
## Guardrail companion
`rules/guardrails.json` allow-lists `SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Autopilot` (category
"Autopilot / OOBE / Setup") so tenants can build their own gather rules on the subtree —
e.g. a `not_exists` registry rule on the `Sidecar` provider key. The subtree carries
deployment state only (provider registrations, tracking lists, app IDs, per-user SIDs);
sensitivity is at or below existing entries. Enforcement is agent-side (embedded
resource), so both the detector and the guardrail change ship with the agent release.
## Examples
Customer-case event (abbreviated) — note the provider is "complete" by CSP values, the
hang is carried entirely by `reason=sidecar_provider_missing`:
```json
{
"eventType": "esp_policy_provider_stalled",
"severity": "Warning",
"data": {
"reason": "sidecar_provider_missing",
"dwellMinutes": 15,
"sidecarRegistered": false,
"sidecarMissingForMinutes": 15.0,
"providers": [
{ "name": "ConfigMgr", "scope": "device", "kind": "setupApps",
"trackingPoliciesCreated": 1, "installationState": null, "complete": true }
],
"stalledProviders": []
}
}
```
`reason=sidecar_provider_missing` is the co-management signature;
`reason=provider_incomplete` with `sidecarRegistered=true` covers a stalled Sidecar or
third-party provider — the generalized contract violation.
# Citations
* EnrollmentStatusTracking CSP — <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/enrollmentstatustracking-csp>
* Windows Autopilot into co-management (requirements, provider-conflict warning, troubleshooting registry paths) — <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/configmgr/comanage/autopilot-enrollment>
* Troubleshoot the ESP (models app tracking exclusively via the `Sidecar` subkey) — <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/mem/intune/device-enrollment/understand-troubleshoot-esp>
* Niehaus: the Intune ESP-policy WAP payload registering the provider nodes (`Sidecar` always, `ConfigMgr` only with a co-management settings policy) — <https://oofhours.com/2023/08/25/run-an-sccm-task-sequence-during-autopilot/>
* Niehaus: ESP tracks arbitrarily named providers when they are properly registered — <https://oofhours.com/2023/09/18/track-anything-using-esp/>
* Agent code: `EspPolicyProviderProbe.cs`, `EspPolicyProviderStallDetector.cs`, `EspPolicyProviderStallHost.cs` (SystemSignals / Orchestration.Hosts)
* Related: [MDM Reboot Coalescing](mdm-reboot-coalescing.md), [Gather-Rule Guardrails](../rules/gather-rule-guardrails.md)
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---
type: Concept
title: Gather Rule Debug Log — the per-tenant evaluation trace for rules that produce nothing
description: EnableGatherRuleDebugLog (ConfigVersion 36) makes the agent write a local trace file explaining every gather-rule evaluation decision — scope skips, missing intervalSeconds, on_change suppression, empty collector results, logparser position/parse-mode/no-match outcomes — so customers can self-diagnose rules that never show up in the timeline.
resource: /src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Telemetry/Gather/GatherRuleDebugLog.cs
tags:
- agent
- gather-rules
- diagnostics
- tenant-configuration
timestamp: 2026-07-28T00:00:00+02:00
---
# Gather Rule Debug Log
## Schema
### The problem
A gather rule that produces no timeline events is indistinguishable from a rule that
never ran. The pipeline has many *silent-nothing* exits — before this feature, none of
them were visible to the customer:
| # | Decision point | Where |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Rule delivered but `Enabled=false` | `GatherRuleExecutor.UpdateRules` |
| 2 | `trigger=interval` without `intervalSeconds` — never runs | `UpdateRules` timer filter |
| 3 | Interval timer's first tick comes only after one **full** interval | `UpdateRules` timer creation |
| 4 | Out of phase scope (`activePhases` / `activeFromPhase` not latched); incl. `currentPhase=Unknown` before the first phase signal | `IsRuleInScopeLocked` |
| 5 | phase_change / phase_exit dedup — once per (rule, phase) | `OnPhaseChanged` |
| 6 | Collector returned an **empty** result (e.g. `emitOnlyIfExists=true` and target absent) | `ExecuteRule` |
| 7 | `emit_mode=on_change` — result hash unchanged, emit suppressed | `ShouldEmitOnChange` |
| 8 | Guard blocked the target (emits `security_warning`, but the rule yields no data) | `GatherRuleContext.EmitSecurityWarning` |
| 9 | logparser: no files matched, position tracker says nothing new, regex no-match, plain-text file parsed in default `cmtrace` mode, `maxLines` cap, wildcard capped at 20 files | `LogParserCollector` |
| 10 | Rule execution threw (agent log had only the message, no stack) | `ExecuteRule` catch |
### The setting
`TenantConfiguration.EnableGatherRuleDebugLog` (`bool?`, default null→false), served to the
agent as `AgentConfigResponse.EnableGatherRuleDebugLog` — **ConfigVersion 36**. Portal:
Settings → Agent → Settings, toggle "Gather Rule Debug Log", stored via the usual
tenant-config roundtrip (`TableConfigRepository` Store+Map). Also shown in the admin
tenant-config report.
`RemoteConfigMerger` projects the bool onto a runtime path (same pattern as
`EnableImeMatchLog`): `true` → `Constants.GatherRuleDebugLogPath` =
`%ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor\Logs\gather_rules_debug.log`; `false` → null, unless a
`--gather-debug-log <path>` CLI override supplied a non-default path. The field is not
security-sensitive and deliberately **survives the offline config cache**.
### The trace file
`GatherRuleDebugLog` is an append-only writer held by `GatherRuleExecutor` and exposed
to collectors via `GatherRuleContext.DebugLog(ruleId, stage, message)` (null-safe no-op
when disabled — zero cost on the normal path). Line format:
```
2026-07-28T09:15:02.123Z | RULE-ID | stage | message
```
Stages: `config` (registration summary per rule, header, zero-rules note), `phase`
(enrollment-phase transition marker `phase change: Old -> New`, ruleId `-` — every
rule-level line below it reads against the new phase), `trigger` (timer scheduled,
phase/event fired, dedup), `scope` (skips with reason incl. current phase), `exec`
(execution start), `collector` (null/empty results with likely cause), `guard`
(allowlist block), `emit` (event emitted, hash change), `suppress` (on_change
suppression with hash prefix + streak), `logparser` (per-file outcome: lines read,
position range, match count, parse failures, regex timeouts, mode; plus the
`format=text` hint when every line fails CMTrace parsing; plus one line **per regex
match** — line number, matched text, capture groups — capped at 10 per file per run),
`error` (full exception **with stack trace** — the agent log keeps only the message;
an invalid logparser regex is reported here including the offending pattern string).
Volume control: 10 MB cap with a single `.old` rotation generation (~20 MB worst case).
Every write failure is swallowed — tracing must never break gathering. The trace never
leaves the device on its own — but because it lives in the agent log folder
(`Constants.LogDirectory`), the diagnostics package (`DiagnosticsPackageService`,
`*.log` pattern, `AgentLogs/` section) picks it up automatically, so a customer-initiated
diagnostics upload hands the trace to support without manual copying.
### Semantics
* **No hot-reload** — the flag is consumed once when `DefaultComponentFactory` builds
the `GatherRuleExecutorHost` at session start (per-enrollment lifecycle, same as
`EnableImeMatchLog`). Enable it in the tenant, then the *next* enrollment writes the
trace.
* **Zero-rules case is traced too** — flag on + backend delivered no gather rules →
a one-shot standalone `config` line, so the file is never just absent.
* **`--run-gather-rules` always traces** (operator diagnostic mode; CLI override or
default path) and mirrors every line to the console under `--console`.
## Examples
A logparser rule with `emit_mode=on_change` that "delivers nothing" becomes:
```
... | LP-01 | config | registered: trigger=interval, collector=logparser, target=C:\...\app.log, unscoped, emitMode=on_change, interval=300s
... | LP-01 | trigger | interval timer scheduled every 300s (first run after one full interval — no immediate execution)
... | - | phase | phase change: DeviceSetup -> AccountSetup
... | LP-01 | exec | executing: collector=logparser, target=C:\...\app.log
... | LP-01 | logparser | app.log: read 1000 lines from position 0->81234, matched 0, parseFailures=1000, regexTimeouts=0, mode=cmtrace
... | LP-01 | logparser | every line failed CMTrace parsing — if this is a plain-text log, set parameter format=text
```
— the answer ("plain-text log parsed in CMTrace mode") is in the file.
A matching rule shows *how* it matched (capped at 10 per-match lines per file per run):
```
... | LP-02 | logparser | setupact.log: line 42 matched "Error 0x80070005" — groups: code="0x80070005"
... | LP-02 | logparser | setupact.log: read 500 lines from position 0->40123, matched 1, parseFailures=0, regexTimeouts=0, mode=text
```
and a broken regex names itself:
```
... | LP-03 | error | invalid regex pattern '([unclosed' — rule can never match: Invalid pattern '([unclosed' at offset 10. Not enough )'s.
```
## Citations
* Executor + trace points: `../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Telemetry/Gather/GatherRuleExecutor.cs`
* Writer: `../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Telemetry/Gather/GatherRuleDebugLog.cs`
* Config projection: `../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Configuration/RemoteConfigMerger.cs`
* Backend serve + ConfigVersion: `../../src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Config/GetAgentConfigFunction.cs`
* Phase scoping / emit mode background: `../rules/gather-rule-phase-scoping.md`
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---
type: Concept
title: Hello Wizard Un-Skip — vetoing the policy-disabled Hello shortcut
description: Why a single "WHfB disabled" policy read is not trusted for completion decisions — the HelloWizardStarted signal (prevention + cure) and the HelloTracker confirmation second read.
resource: /src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore
tags:
- agent
- decision-engine
- hello
- completion
- whfb
timestamp: 2026-07-13T00:00:00+02:00
---
# Hello Wizard Un-Skip
Session `772fe502` (2026-07-13) completed as *Succeeded* while the user was inside the
Windows Hello wizard. Cause: the user-scoped WHfB CSP value
(`HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Policies\PassportForWork\{tenant}\{scope}\Policies\UsePassportForWork`)
**flip-flops** during User-ESP while Intune policy sync is still writing. A single read
caught "disabled", the engine set `HelloPolicyEnabled=false` (set-once, poll stops), and
the arm-C completion synthesized `HelloOutcome="Skipped"` → 5 s `finalizing_grace` →
`enrollment_complete` — 230 ms *after* Shell-Core event 62404 (CXID `AADHello`) proved
the wizard had launched. The wizard-start was previously an `InformationalEvent` only
(timeline pass-through, no state mutation).
Two independent defense layers fix this:
# Layer 1 — `DecisionSignalKind.HelloWizardStarted` (engine)
Shell-Core 62404 with CXID `AADHello`/`NGC` is a **genuine wizard-lifecycle observation**
(unlike the unreliable `hello_provisioning_willlaunch` registry snapshot). It is now a
dedicated signal: `ShellCoreTracker.HelloWizardStarted` event → coordinator forward
(`EspAndHelloTracker`, timestamp mirror) → `EspAndHelloTrackerAdapter` (fire-once) →
reducer. The startup backfill also replays 62404 (5-min lookback), so an agent restart
mid-wizard does not lose the observation. The reducer records the set-once fact
`DecisionState.HelloWizardStartedUtc`.
**Prevention** — every "may policy-disabled stand in for a Hello resolution?" decision
routes through one predicate (`DecisionEngine.Completion.cs`):
```
HelloPolicyDisabledWithoutWizard = HelloPolicyEnabled == false && HelloWizardStartedUtc == null
HelloSatisfiedForCompletion = HelloResolvedUtc != null || HelloPolicyDisabledWithoutWizard
```
Once a wizard start is on record, the policy-disabled shortcut is vetoed at all five
Skipped-synthesis sites (EspExiting DeferredCompletion, DesktopArrived fast-path,
ImeUserSessionCompleted arm-C, AdvisoryCompletion deadline, AccountSetupProvisioningComplete
DeferredCompletion) *and* in the `completion_waiting` missing-prerequisites computation.
Sessions then take their pessimistic path: promote to `AwaitingHello` + arm HelloSafety
(300 s). The AdvisoryCompletion handler needed a dedicated
`HelloWizardObservedPromote` branch — its fallthrough is re-arm-or-**fail**, and
prevention alone would have failed a live-wizard session there.
**Cure** — `HandleHelloWizardStartedV1` (`DecisionEngine.Classic.cs`): when the state
already carries the engine-synthesized skip, the handler retracts it — cancel
`finalizing_grace` (if armed), null `HelloResolvedUtc`/`HelloOutcome`, back to
`AwaitingHello`, arm HelloSafety, emit `completion_waiting` (trigger
`HelloWizardStarted:UnSkip`). A real `HelloResolved` — or the HelloSafety timeout —
then decides the session.
Two deliberate design points:
1. **Synthetic-outcome discriminator.** The engine's synthesized outcomes are exact-case
`"Skipped"` / `"Timeout"` (constants `SyntheticHelloOutcomeSkipped`/`...Timeout`);
the tracker vocabulary is all-lowercase (`completed`, `skipped`, `not_configured`,
`timeout`, `wizard_not_started`). The cure only ever retracts the exact-case
`"Skipped"` — tracker-posted resolutions and the deliberate HelloSafety `"Timeout"`
are never touched.
2. **First fact-nulling reducer.** DecisionState facts are otherwise set-once/monotonic.
The retraction is legal exactly here because the fact is provably engine-synthesized
and provably wrong (the wizard it claimed would never appear is running). The cure is
**stage-agnostic** (guarded by the synthetic outcome, not by `Stage==Finalizing`):
a synthetic skip can also sit parked behind a closed RealmJoin completion gate, whose
release path completes on `HelloResolvedUtc != null` — the same bug through another
door.
# Layer 2 — confirmation second read (HelloTracker)
`HelloTracker.ApplyPolicyRead` (extracted state machine, `HelloTracker.cs`):
| Read | Effect |
|------|--------|
| `enabled` (first) | commit immediately (pessimistic direction; `confirmedReads=1`) |
| `disabled` (first) | mark pending only; 10 s poll timer stays alive |
| `disabled` while pending | commit disabled (`confirmedReads=2`) |
| `enabled` while pending | commit enabled + `flipFlopDetected=true` (the 772fe502 catch) |
| `null` while pending | clear pending, keep polling (a vanished value is flip-flop evidence) |
While pending, `_isPolicyConfigured` stays false, so the Hello wait timers use the
longer policy-unknown cadence — the safe direction. The confirmation audit fields ride
on the `hello_policy_detected` event `Data`.
# Residual risk
A wizard that starts only *after* `Completed` (agent already terminal + shut down) is
still not catchable — the dispatch guard dead-ends post-terminal signals by design. The
confirmation read shrinks the window for the stale-disabled commit; the wizard signal
closes it for every ordering where 62404 fires before the 5 s grace elapses.
# Citations
- Reducer handler + prevention predicate: `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore/Engine/DecisionEngine.Classic.cs` (`HandleHelloWizardStartedV1`), `.../DecisionEngine.Completion.cs` (`HelloSatisfiedForCompletion`), `.../DecisionEngine.Edge.cs` (`HelloWizardObservedPromote`)
- Agent signal path: `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/SystemSignals/ShellCoreTracker.cs` (62404 + backfill), `EspAndHelloTracker.cs`, `SignalAdapters/EspAndHelloTrackerAdapter.cs`
- Confirmation read: `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/SystemSignals/HelloTracker.cs` (`ApplyPolicyRead`)
- Fixtures: `tests/fixtures/signal-kinds/hello-wizard-started-v1.json`, `tests/fixtures/enrollment-sessions/userdriven-hello-wizard-unskip-v1.jsonl`
- Related: [Decision Engine](decision-engine.md)
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# V2 Agent
How the on-device agent works:
* [Runtime Overview](overview.md) - lifecycle (install → boot guards → runtime → termination), collector hosts, the single-rail event pipeline to the backend, config & kill switch, on-disk layout.
* [Decision Engine](decision-engine.md) - the pure-reducer state machine (DecisionCore): signals, state, effects, the A/B/C completion arms, invariants, threading.
* [Logs, Persistence & Crash Recovery](logs-and-persistence.md) - every persisted file and why it exists; signal log vs spool; snapshot/journal; the replay-based recovery flow and quarantine.
* [Hello Wizard Un-Skip](hello-wizard-unskip.md) - why a single "WHfB disabled" policy read never decides completion: the HelloWizardStarted signal (prevention + cure) and the HelloTracker confirmation second read.
* [Autopilot ZTD Diagnostics](autopilot-ztd-diagnostics.md) - Windows' own diagnostic surfaces for the profile-download flow: ModernDeployment event IDs (807/815/164/...), the Diagnostics\Autopilot registry key, deployment-service endpoints, and the known-issue error-code map.
* [MDM Reboot Coalescing](mdm-reboot-coalescing.md) - attributing the mid-ESP coalesced reboot ("second sign-in") to the device-assigned policy URIs that forced it: aggregated 2800 observations (neutral, flush-time watermark) + ANALYZE-ESP-005 gated on an actually-observed reboot.
Reading order for newcomers: overview → decision engine → persistence.
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---
type: Reference
title: V2 Agent — Logs, Persistence & Crash Recovery
description: Every file the agent persists under %ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor, why each exists (especially the signal log), and the exact recovery/replay flow after a crash or reboot.
resource: /src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Orchestration/RecoveryCoordinator.cs
tags:
- agent
- persistence
- signal-log
- recovery
- durability
timestamp: 2026-07-11T00:00:00+02:00
---
# V2 Agent — Logs, Persistence & Crash Recovery
An enrollment spans multiple reboots and can be killed at any moment (app-forced
restart, self-update, crash, power loss). The agent therefore persists three distinct
tiers of state — each answers a different question:
1. **Decision truth** (`State\`): *what did the decision engine see and decide?*
Signal log + journal + snapshot. Must be deterministic and replayable.
2. **Transport** (`Spool\`): *what telemetry still has to reach the backend?*
Durable upload queue + cursor. Best-effort; the backend dedups.
3. **Diagnostics** (`Logs\`, `Crashes\`): *what happened, for humans?* Trace log and
crash dumps. Never allowed to affect decisions.
Plus small markers (session identity, completion, quarantine) that steer the next
process start.
# Why a signal log AND an event spool?
They look similar (both JSONL) but serve opposite masters:
- The **signal log** is the *input* truth of the decision engine. Recovery rebuilds
decision state by replaying it; the snapshot is only a cache. An append failure here
**blocks the reducer** — a signal that was never durably logged must not change state,
or a post-crash replay would diverge from what the live run decided (determinism L.1/L.5).
- The **spool** is a *projection* for upload. Writing it is best-effort — a spool
failure must never break ingress, and a lost non-critical item is acceptable because
the backend dedups on `(PartitionKey, RowKey)`.
Same data, two files, because durability requirements differ: the signal log fsyncs
every line; the spool fsyncs only items flagged `RequiresImmediateFlush`.
# Artifact inventory
| Artifact | Path | Format | fsync | Rotation/cap |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Signal log | `State\signal-log.jsonl` | JSONL (`DecisionSignal`/line) | every append (WriteThrough + Flush, bufferSize=1) | none (per-enrollment lifecycle) |
| Journal | `State\journal.jsonl` | JSONL (`DecisionTransition`/line) | every append | atomic truncate only (phantom tail) |
| Snapshot | `State\snapshot.json` | JSON + SHA-256 checksum envelope | temp-write + `File.Replace` | single file |
| Event sequence | `State\event-sequence.json` | `{ LastAssignedSequence }` | atomic | none; survives WhiteGlove Part-2 resume |
| Spool | `Spool\spool.jsonl` | JSONL (`TelemetryItem`/line) | only `RequiresImmediateFlush` items | none — never truncated, cursor skips uploaded items |
| Upload cursor | `Spool\upload-cursor.json` | `{ LastUploadedItemId }` | atomic | idempotent, never regresses |
| Agent trace log | `Logs\agent_YYYYMMDD[_NNN].log` | text `[utc] [LEVEL] msg` | no | 50 MB → suffix rotation; consumed by `/diag-agent-log` |
| Crash dump + record | `Crashes\<stem>.dmp` + `.json` | MiniDump + JSON | n/a (process dying) | 5 files / 7 days |
| Startup-event gate | `State\startup-event-state.json` | JSON dict | no (atomic) | cross-reboot dedup of one-shot probes |
| Bandwidth state | `State\bandwidth-state.json` | JSON samples/counters | no (atomic) | reboot-survivor for the DO bandwidth estimate |
| Session identity | `session.id`, `session.created`, `whiteglove.complete` (root) | text | no | drives emergency-break age check + WG resume |
| Markers | `clean-exit.marker` (root), `enrollment-complete.marker` (State), `quarantine-requested.marker` (State) | text | no | consumed at next start |
| Config cache | `Config\remote-config.json` | JSON | no | security-sensitive fields stripped |
Per-collector state files (`OfficeInstallStatePersistence`, IME tracker state, script
execution state, log-file positions) follow the same fail-soft atomic-replace pattern.
Cleanup (`CleanupService`) removes the agent dirs on self-destruct but **keeps `Logs\`**
for forensics.
# The decision-truth triad
## Signal log — authoritative input
- Written by the single ingress worker, one line per accepted signal, **before** the
reducer runs. Monotonic-ordinal guard on append.
- `bufferSize: 1` is load-bearing: session `b9b92d89` (2026-07-09) was killed mid-append
by a self-update `Environment.Exit`; the default 4096-byte buffer flushed the same
buffered line twice → byte-identical duplicate → non-monotonic ordinal → **recovery
crash-loop**. Fixes (commits `57e4334b` + `a0238a4b`):
- unbuffered append (nothing left for `Dispose` to re-flush),
- read-side tolerance: a byte-identical *consecutive* duplicate line is skipped as a
known crash artifact,
- self-update restarts now route through graceful shutdown (full drain, bounded 15 s
hard-exit fallback) instead of `Environment.Exit`,
- poison-replay quarantine (below) so a corrupt log can never loop the agent again.
- Corrupt-tail rule: readers stop at the first unparsable line (a torn final write is
expected, not fatal).
## Journal — authoritative applied-transition record
One `DecisionTransition` per reducer step, appended in `ApplyStep` step 1 — the **only**
persistence path that hard-throws. Three consecutive append failures escalate to a
quarantine request. Used during recovery to detect BEHIND/AHEAD crash windows against
the snapshot; AHEAD phantom entries are truncated to `.quarantine\<ts>\journal-phantom-tail.jsonl`.
## Snapshot — recovery cache, never truth
Full `DecisionState` (schema **v4**) in a checksum envelope, written best-effort after
meaningful steps (stage transition / non-telemetry effect) or every 100 pass-through
steps. Atomic temp-write + `File.Replace`; a crash mid-save leaves the old file intact.
Load returns `null` on any doubt (missing, IO error, checksum mismatch) — recovery then
falls back to full signal-log replay. Aborted/phantom states are never snapshotted.
# Recovery flow on restart
`RecoveryCoordinator.Recover` runs before the live pipeline; order is load-bearing:
1. **Death-rattle peek**: if the previous exit was unclean, read the prior snapshot
*non-mutatingly* (`TryReadRaw`) for the `previous_crash_detected` context — before
the pipeline may quarantine it.
2. **Quarantine marker** (`quarantine-requested.marker`, written mid-run when the
journal became unappendable): quarantine all segments + snapshot *now*, at a moment
when no writer holds them. Marker is deleted only on full success.
3. **WhiteGlove Part-2 resume**: prior stage `WhiteGloveSealed` → archive the reducer
segments to `.part1-<ts>\` but **preserve `event-sequence.json`** (the Web UI splits
Part 1/2 on the sequence).
4. **Open writers** — each scans its file for the last ordinal/step, stopping at the
first unparsable line.
5. **Pick seed + replay stream**:
- snapshot loads → seed from it, re-stamp `AgentBootUtc` to *now* (replayed signals
must not arm past-due deadlines), replay only the signal-log **tail**
(`ordinal > snapshot.LastAppliedSignalOrdinal`);
- snapshot corrupt → quarantine snapshot only, replay the full signal log;
- log head-corrupt → total-loss quarantine of everything, fresh Initial seed.
6. **Journal alignment**: truncate AHEAD phantoms to the seed's `StepIndex`.
7. **Replay + backfill**: fold the stream through a transient `DecisionEngine`,
re-appending any missing journal entries (closes the BEHIND window).
8. **Poison guard**: if replay itself throws, quarantine snapshot + all segments and
reseed Initial — the agent keeps running with fresh state instead of crash-looping.
**Duplicate avoidance, end to end**: monotonic append guards (signal log + journal) →
consecutive-duplicate skip on read → tail-replay past the snapshot ordinal → AHEAD
truncation → backend `(PartitionKey, RowKey)` dedup for re-uploaded spool items.
**Quarantine semantics**: files are *moved*, never deleted, into
`State\.quarantine\<utc-ts>\` with a `reason.txt` sidecar — evidence survives for
diagnostics ZIPs while the agent restarts from clean state.
# Related
- Pipeline that produces these files: [runtime overview](overview.md)
- What replay must reproduce deterministically: [decision engine](decision-engine.md)
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---
type: Concept
title: MDM Reboot Coalescing — attributing the mid-ESP reboot and second sign-in to policy URIs
description: How the agent observes reboot-required MDM policy flags (DM-Enterprise EventID 2800, aggregated) and how ANALYZE-ESP-005 attributes an actually-observed enrollment reboot to them — including why the raw events stay neutral and why the Shell-Core RebootCoalescing match was removed.
resource: /src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/SystemSignals
tags:
- agent
- esp
- reboot
- policy-attribution
- second-sign-in
timestamp: 2026-07-20T00:00:00+02:00
---
# MDM Reboot Coalescing
Device-assigned MDM policies whose CSP URIs match the OS reboot-required catalog
(`HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\SyncML\RebootRequiredURIs`) force a **coalesced
reboot at the end of ESP DeviceSetup** — the user sees an unexpected restart and a
**second sign-in screen** before AccountSetup. Invisible in the Intune console; most
admins live with it, not knowing that reassigning the profiles to user groups removes the
reboot entirely. Source research: Patch My PC,
["Avoid the second sign-in screen after Autopilot"](https://patchmypc.com/blog/autopilot-unexpected-reboot-autopilot-second-login-screen/).
The session already counts reboots (`system_reboot_detected` → `session.rebootCount`);
this feature adds the **cause attribution**.
# Verified signal facts (session b2e890c1, 2026-07-20)
* **EventID 2800**, `Microsoft-Windows-DeviceManagement-Enterprise-Diagnostics-Provider/Admin`,
one record per URI, verified description shape:
`The following URI has triggered a reboot: (./Device/Vendor/MSFT/Policy/Config/ServiceControlManager/SvchostProcessMitigation).`
Records arrive in sub-second bursts during policy sync.
* **Timing semantics (the critical nuance)**: 2800 fires at EVERY policy sync. Only URIs
applied **during ESP DeviceSetup** are coalesced into the forced mid-ESP restart. In the
verified session the flags fired during AccountSetup (after DeviceSetup completed) —
**no reboot occurred**, and `omadmRebootRequiredFlag` read `false`. A detector that
claims "reboot incoming" on every 2800 is therefore wrong.
* **Shell-Core 62407 "RebootCoalescing" — REMOVED as a signal.** The token appears in the
ROUTINE bootstrap marker on every enrollment:
`Name: 'CommercialOOBE_BootstrapStatusCategory_SubcategoryProcessing_Started', Value: '{"message":"BootstrapStatus: Starting subcategory DeviceSetup.RebootCoalescing...","errorCode":0}'`
— the ESP merely *processes* the RebootCoalescing subcategory (which checks whether a
reboot is needed). A substring match on it is a false positive by construction. If a
real coalesced-reboot record is ever captured on the E2E VM, a precise pattern can be
added then.
# Detector — `MdmRebootPolicyTracker` (`MdmRebootPolicyWatcherHost`)
Live `EventLogWatcher` on the DM-Enterprise Admin channel (EventID 2800) + startup
backfill (default 60 min lookback). Records are **buffered and debounced (10 s)**, then
flushed as **ONE aggregated `mdm_policy_reboot_required` event** per burst:
* `Severity=Info`, neutral message ("Windows flagged N MDM policy URIs as
reboot-required: … (+N more)") — the raw event never claims a reboot.
* `Data`: `rebootUris` (distinct, sorted, capped 20), `uriCount` (uncapped distinct),
`firstRebootUri` (record-time order, drives rule interpolation), `recordCount`,
`unparsedCount`/`sampleDescription` (extraction diagnostics), `backfilled` (all-backfill),
fail-soft `omadmRebootRequiredFlag` probe of
`HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\OMADM\SyncML\RebootRequired` (null = unknown).
* `Timestamp` = earliest record time (backfilled bursts land at their historical instant);
`ImmediateUpload=true` (one event per burst is cheap, and a DeviceSetup burst precedes a
reboot that kills the agent).
* **Watermark is persisted at FLUSH, not at claim** (`mdm-reboot-watermark.json`): if the
coalesced reboot kills the process before the debounced emit, nothing is marked — the
post-restart backfill re-reads and emits the burst. A flushed burst is never repeated.
URI extraction: EventData values starting with `./` preferred, permissive regex over the
description as fallback (trailing punctuation trimmed — the verified text wraps the URI in
parens and ends with a period). Unparsed records still count into the aggregate.
Config (internal steering only, no admin UI — agent-native collector, NOT an
`IAgentAnalyzer`): `Collectors.MdmRebootPolicyWatcherEnabled` (default true),
`Collectors.MdmRebootPolicyBackfillLookbackMinutes` (default 60). ConfigVersion 35.
# Advisory — ANALYZE-ESP-005
The reboot **claim** lives here, and only here. Required conditions (BOTH):
1. `mdm_policy_reboot_required.firstRebootUri` exists (→ `{{firstRebootUri}}` interpolation)
2. `system_reboot_detected` count ≥ 1 — **an actually-observed reboot**
Policy flags alone (e.g. AccountSetup user-policy sync) stay advisory-silent. Optional
confidence: `uriCount ≥ 2` (+10), `omadmRebootRequiredFlag == true` (+15) on base 70 /
threshold 70. Remediation: map URIs to Intune profiles, reassign device → user groups (or
exclude the Autopilot device group), or accept + communicate the restart.
# Non-goals / invariants
* Event type **deliberately distinct from `system_reboot_detected`** — the backend
RebootCount matches that string exactly in two places
(`EventIngestProcessor.Classification` + terminal recount); attribution must never
inflate the reboot count.
* No session-level field / SessionInfoCard change in this iteration (follow-up candidate).
* The `RebootRequiredURIs` catalog itself is not read; only the 2800 events (which carry
the actually-triggered URIs) are consumed.
# Citations
* [Patch My PC — Avoid the second sign-in screen after Autopilot](https://patchmypc.com/blog/autopilot-unexpected-reboot-autopilot-second-login-screen/)
* [Microsoft Learn — Enrollment Status Page tracking](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/enrollment-status)
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---
type: Component Overview
title: V2 Agent — Runtime Overview
description: How the V2 agent boots during Autopilot enrollment, which collectors it runs, how telemetry flows to the backend, and how it decides to stop.
resource: /src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2/Program.cs
tags:
- agent
- runtime
- collectors
- telemetry
timestamp: 2026-07-11T00:00:00+02:00
---
# V2 Agent — Runtime Overview
The agent is a .NET Framework 4.8 executable (`AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe`) that runs as
SYSTEM on Windows devices during Autopilot enrollment. It observes the enrollment
(ESP phases, IME app installs, Hello, desktop arrival, …), streams telemetry to the
backend, and decides locally — via the [decision engine](decision-engine.md) —
when the enrollment is complete or failed. When it reaches a terminal decision it shows
the optional summary dialog, uploads diagnostics, and removes itself.
Projects: `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2` (exe) + `AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core`
(library) + `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore` (portable decision engine).
# Lifecycle
## Install (bootstrap during OOBE)
`AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe --install` is invoked by the Intune Platform Script
(bootstrap) and never runs the monitoring runtime
(`src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2/Program.InstallMode.cs`):
1. Copy payload to `%ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor\Agent\`.
2. Persist `bootstrap-config.json` (bootstrap token, tenant id) and `await-enrollment.json`.
3. Register the `AutopilotMonitor-Agent` scheduled task (BootTrigger, SYSTEM,
`ExecutionTimeLimit=PT0S`, survives battery conditions).
4. Immediate runtime handoff: WMI `Win32_Process.Create` → `schtasks /Run` fallback →
defer to BootTrigger on next reboot. `--install` exits 0 even if both immediate
launches fail (fail-soft; the BootTrigger is the net).
5. Write `HKLM\SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor\Deployed` = UTC timestamp — the **bootstrap
re-entry lock** read by the install script. Never consulted by the agent itself;
intentionally preserved across cleanup.
## Runtime start (each process start / boot)
`Program.Main` → `RunAgent` runs numbered phases (V1-parity exit codes 0–7):
1. **Guards & bootstrap** (`AgentBootstrap.Run`): classify previous exit
(`clean` / `exception_crash` / `hard_kill` / `reboot_kill` via `clean-exit.marker`,
crash logs, boot event 6009); ghost-restart guard (`enrollment-complete.marker`
→ cleanup + exit 0); absolute session-age emergency break; optional waits
(`--await-enrollment` MDM cert poll, `--tenant-id-wait` registry wait); resolve
TenantId from `HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Enrollments`; get-or-create SessionId.
2. **Auth clients** (mTLS with the Intune MDM device client certificate).
3. **Remote config** (`GET /api/agent/config`): live fetch → cached
`Config\remote-config.json` → built-in defaults. Config-channel **kill switch**
checked here, honoured only from a *live* fetch (cache strips all security-sensitive
fields).
4. **Telemetry clients**, **backend session registration**.
5. **`AgentRuntimeHost.Run`**: builds the `EnrollmentOrchestrator`, starts collector
hosts, decision pipeline and upload drain loop, then blocks until shutdown.
## Stop triggers
- **Terminal decision** of the engine (Completed / Failed / WhiteGloveSealed) — the normal path.
- **Max-lifetime watchdog**: `AgentMaxLifetimeMinutes` (default 360) — hard cap per session.
- Backend **kill switch** (config channel at start; telemetry channel via upload responses
→ synthesized `terminate_session` action).
- Auth-failure threshold, self-update restart, Ctrl+C / ProcessExit.
Distinct from agent lifetime: `CollectorIdleTimeoutMinutes` (default 15) stops only the
periodic collectors (Performance, AgentSelfMetrics) when nothing "real" happens; they
restart on new activity.
## Termination sequence
On terminal decision (`EnrollmentTerminationHandler`): stop collectors → build
`FinalStatus` → write `final-status.json` + launch `SummaryDialog` (separate WPF exe in
the user session, opt-in) → 2 s late-event grace → diagnostics ZIP upload →
write `enrollment-complete.marker` → optional reboot → self-destruct cleanup
(skipped for WhiteGlove Part 1, which instead writes the `whiteglove.complete` marker
and leaves state for Part 2).
# Collector model
Collectors are wrapped in **collector hosts** (`ICollectorHost`, built by
`DefaultComponentFactory.CreateCollectorHosts`). Each host owns collector/tracker
classes plus a **signal adapter** that translates raw callbacks into decision signals.
Main hosts (gating in parentheses; several more are opt-in via remote config):
| Host | Watches |
| --- | --- |
| EspAndHelloHost | ESP phases, Shell-Core events, provisioning status, Hello (always) |
| ImeLogHost | IME log tailer (CMTrace) + IME process watcher — app installs (always) |
| DesktopArrivalHost | real-user desktop arrival (always) |
| AadJoinHost | AAD join events + hybrid login pending (always) |
| DeviceInfoHost | one-shot hardware/OS/network inventory (always) |
| StallProbeHost | idle/stall probes (config) |
| WindowsUpdateWatcherHost / OsBuildChangeHost | WU during OOBE, build changes (config / always) |
| DeliveryOptimizationHost | DO counters for bandwidth estimate (config, dormant until installs run) |
| OfficeInstallDetectorHost, ConsoleBypassHost, ProvisioningPackageHost, NetworkChangeHost, RealmJoinHost, GatherRuleExecutorHost, … | feature-specific (mixed gating) |
# Event pipeline (single rail)
Everything a collector observes flows through **one** path — no collector emits
telemetry directly:
```
Collector callback
→ SignalAdapter (dual emission: decision signal + InformationalEvent)
→ SignalIngress.Post() (bounded queue 256, back-pressure blocks producer)
→ single worker thread:
assign ordinals → SignalLog.Append (durable) ← source of truth
→ DecisionEngine.Reduce → apply step/effects
→ telemetry projection (best-effort)
→ TelemetrySpool → batch (≤100) → gzip → POST /api/agent/telemetry
```
- Wire model: `EnrollmentEvent` (`EventType` from `Constants.EventTypes`, monotonic
`Sequence` = canonical order, `Phase`, `ImmediateUpload` for lifecycle-critical items),
wrapped in `TelemetryItem` (Kind = Event / Signal / DecisionTransition, monotonic
`TelemetryItemId` as upload cursor).
- Auth per request: client-cert mTLS + hardware headers (`X-Tenant-Id`,
`X-Device-Manufacturer/-Model/-SerialNumber`, `X-Bootstrap-Token` pre-MDM-cert,
`X-Agent-Version`).
- Retry: 100/400/1600 ms for transient (408/429/5xx); 413 → split batch and halve batch
size; unknown 4xx → items retained (cursor holds) unless the backend flags explicit
poison row keys; offline → spool keeps everything, backend dedups on re-upload;
`DeviceBlocked` pauses the drain until `UnblockAt`.
# Decision integration
Adapters post `DecisionSignal`s; the engine's terminal stage fires
`Terminated` (off the worker thread) → termination sequence above. Engine *effects*
(timeline events like `enrollment_complete`, deadline scheduling, classifier runs,
snapshots) are executed by the `EffectRunner` — the reducer itself is pure. Details:
[decision engine](decision-engine.md); durability and replay:
[logs & persistence](logs-and-persistence.md).
# On-disk layout (`%ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor\`)
| Path | Contents |
| --- | --- |
| `\` | `bootstrap-config.json`, `await-enrollment.json`, `clean-exit.marker`, session-id persistence |
| `\Agent\` | deployed binaries |
| `\State\` | decision persistence (SignalLog, Journal, Snapshot), `enrollment-complete.marker`, `final-status.json`, self-update state, `.quarantine/`, `.part1-<ts>/` |
| `\Spool\` | telemetry spool (offline queue) |
| `\Logs\` | agent trace log, `crash_*.log`, `ime_pattern_matches.log` |
| `\Config\` | `remote-config.json` cache |
| `\Agent-Update\`, `\Updates\` | self-update staging/download |
Per-file details and the recovery flow: [logs & persistence](logs-and-persistence.md).
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---
type: Concept
title: Secure Boot CA-2023 Detection — firmware evidence vs. Windows servicing status
description: Why ANALYZE-SEC-001 v3 reads the UEFI db/KEK variables directly (GetFirmwareEnvironmentVariableExW + SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege) instead of trusting the SecureBoot\Servicing registry key, and how the one-sided uefiCa2023FirmwareConfirmed marker plus a not_exists precondition give absence-tolerant rule suppression across old and new agents.
resource: /src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/UefiSecureBootCertReader.cs
tags:
- agent
- secureboot
- ca2023
- analyze-rules
- backward-compatibility
timestamp: 2026-07-23T00:00:00+02:00
---
# Secure Boot CA-2023 Detection
## Schema
Two independent evidence sources describe the Windows UEFI CA 2023 rollout state:
1. **Servicing registry** (`HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot\Servicing\UEFICA2023Status`)
— reflects whether the *Windows Update* rollout ran and self-verified. Lags reality:
devices whose firmware received the certificate another way (OEM factory image, WinCS
CLI, manual deployment) or where WU simply has not run yet show `unknown`/`notfound`.
2. **Firmware itself** — the UEFI variables `db` (signature database, GUID
`{d719b2cb-3d3a-4596-a3bc-dad00e67656f}`) and `KEK` (GUID
`{8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c}`). Authoritative. Certificate subject CNs are
ASCII bytes inside the DER signature lists, so a byte-substring search for
`Windows UEFI CA 2023` / `Microsoft Corporation KEK 2K CA 2023` decides presence —
the same check `Get-SecureBootUEFI` enables from PowerShell.
`UefiSecureBootCertReader` (agent, `Monitoring/Interop`) reads both variables natively via
`GetFirmwareEnvironmentVariableExW` — no PowerShell runspace during OOBE. The call needs
`SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege`: SYSTEM holds it default-disabled, so the reader enables it
on the process token (`AdjustTokenPrivileges`) and restores the previous state afterwards.
Fail-soft contract like `OobeStateReader`: never throws; failures map to status strings
(`not_uefi` = legacy BIOS via `ERROR_INVALID_FUNCTION`, `variable_not_found`,
`privilege_denied`, `error_<code>`).
This is the repo's only privilege-adjustment code, so it also carries the ownership rules
any future one should copy:
* The process token lives in a `SafeHandle` assigned by the P/Invoke marshaler, so the CLR
owns it from the moment `OpenProcessToken` returns — the critical finalizer releases it
even if `Dispose` never runs (async exception before the instance reaches its `using`).
* The restore obligation is recorded immediately after the successful `AdjustTokenPrivileges`,
and only when the privilege was not *already* enabled; nothing that can throw sits between
the adjustment and that assignment. `Dispose` is idempotent, swallows a failed restore, and
releases the handle in a `finally`.
* The privilege is adjusted on the **process** token, so enable → read → restore is a
process-wide side effect and runs under a static gate. Without it a concurrent reader would
see "already enabled", correctly skip its own restore, and then lose the privilege mid-read
when the first reader disposes — a spurious `privilege_denied` on a machine that holds it.
Fields land on the existing `secureboot_status` event (once per agent start,
restart-deduped by the StartupEventGate): `uefiFirmwareReadStatus`, per-cert booleans
(`uefiDbHasWindowsUefiCa2023`, `uefiDbHasWindowsProductionPca2011`,
`uefiKekHasMicrosoftKek2kCa2023`, …) — emitted only when the respective read succeeded —
plus the marker below.
## The one-sided marker (absence-tolerant suppression)
Rule-engine constraints (pinned by `RuleEnginePreconditionTests`):
* **Conditions** never match on an absent field (null guard) — new fields must stay
`required: false` or the rule dies for every old agent.
* **Preconditions**: `not_exists` passes while the field is absent/empty and fails as soon
as the field is present with *any* value; comparison operators fail closed on absence.
A two-sided boolean therefore cannot drive suppression: `not_exists` on
`uefiDbHasWindowsUefiCa2023` would also suppress the rule when the field is present with
`false`. Hence the **one-sided marker** `uefiCa2023FirmwareConfirmed = true`, emitted
ONLY when the db read succeeded AND the 2023 certificate was found — never as `false`.
ANALYZE-SEC-001 v3 adds a `not_exists` precondition on it:
| Device state | Marker | Rule |
|---|---|---|
| Old agent (no firmware fields) | absent | evaluates exactly like v2 |
| New agent, cert missing or firmware unreadable | absent | evaluates; optional conditions `uefiDbHasWindowsUefiCa2023=false` (+20) / `uefiKekHasMicrosoftKek2kCa2023=false` (+10) raise confidence |
| New agent, firmware confirms cert | present | silently suppressed (the customer-reported false positive) |
Because the marker exists nowhere until the new agent ships, the v3 rule is safe to seed
**before** the agent rollout.
## Examples
Customer-equivalent verification from PowerShell (authoritative, matches the reader):
```powershell
[Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((Get-SecureBootUEFI -Name db).Bytes).Contains('Windows UEFI CA 2023')
[Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((Get-SecureBootUEFI -Name KEK).Bytes).Contains('Microsoft Corporation KEK 2K CA 2023')
```
## Citations
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/UefiSecureBootCertReader.cs` — native reader
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Telemetry/DeviceInfo/DeviceInfoCollector.NetworkAndSecurity.cs` — `CollectSecureBootStatus` / `AppendFirmwareCertFields`
* `rules/analyze/ANALYZE-SEC-001.json` — v3.0.0 rule definition
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/RuleEnginePreconditionTests.cs` — pinned precondition semantics + v3 mirror tests
* Microsoft: [Act now — Secure Boot certificates expire June 2026](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/windows-itpro-blog/act-now-secure-boot-certificates-expire-in-june-2026/4426856)
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---
type: Architecture Guide
title: Autopilot Monitor – Architecture Guide
description: High-level architecture overview and solution layout for contributors.
tags:
- architecture
- agent
- backend
- web
- mcp
timestamp: 2026-07-06T21:39:29+02:00
---
# Autopilot Monitor – Architecture Guide
> High-level architecture overview and solution layout for contributors.
> Full product documentation lives at https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com.
---
## High-Level Overview
```text
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Autopilot Monitor - Architecture |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[Admin/User Browser]
|
| HTTPS
v
+-----------------------------+ OIDC +-------------------------------+
| Web App (Next.js) |<---------------->| Microsoft Identity (Entra ID) |
| Dashboard / Progress | | Auth / Authorization |
+-----------------------------+ +-------------------------------+
^ ^
| |
| | Live updates
| |
| | +---------------------------+
| +-------------------------| SignalR Hub |
| | Real-time event stream |
| +---------------------------+
| ^
| REST / API |
v | events
+---------------------------+ Data & |
| Azure Functions Backend |------> Integrations ---+
| APIs / Ingestion / Rules | \
+---------------------------+ \ +---------------------------+
^ +----->| Storage Tables |
| mTLS | Sessions / Events / Rules |
| telemetry / events +---------------------------+
| +---------------------------+
+---------------------------+ | Notifications |
| Agent on Windows Devices | | Teams / Slack / Webhooks |
| Enrollment + app progress | +---------------------------+
+---------------------------+
+---------------------------+
| MCP Server |
| Azure Container App |
+---------------------------+
```
**Core Data Flow:**
```
Device (Agent) ──JSON telemetry+gzip──► Azure Functions ──► Azure Table Storage
│ │
├── SignalR ─────────►│
│ │
Web Dashboard ◄── REST API ◄──┘
```
| Component | Technology | Purpose |
|-----------|------------|---------|
| **Agent** | .NET Framework 4.8 (Windows) | Runs on devices during enrollment, collects telemetry |
| **SummaryDialog** | .NET Framework 4.8 (WPF) | Post-enrollment summary UI (outcome, app timeline, auto-close) |
| **Backend** | Azure Functions .NET 8 (Isolated Worker) | REST API, event processing, rule engine, storage |
| **Web** | Next.js 15 + TypeScript + React 18 | Dashboard, settings, analytics, real-time UI |
| **Shared** | .NET Standard 2.0 | DTOs, models, enums, constants shared between Agent & Backend |
| **MCP Server** | Azure Container App | Model Context Protocol server for AI-assisted analysis |
---
## Solution Structure
```
AutopilotMonitor.sln
├── src/
│ ├── Shared/
│ │ ├── AutopilotMonitor.Shared/ (netstandard2.0 – DTOs, models, enums, constants)
│ │ └── AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore/ (netstandard2.0 – completion decision engine)
│ ├── Agent/
│ │ ├── AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2/ (net48, Exe – entry point; output named AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe)
│ │ ├── AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/ (net48, Lib – core logic)
│ │ ├── AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/ (net48, xUnit – agent unit tests)
│ │ ├── AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests/ (net48, xUnit – decision engine tests)
│ │ ├── AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog/ (net48, WPF – enrollment summary UI)
│ │ └── AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.Tests/ (net48, xUnit)
│ ├── Backend/
│ │ ├── AutopilotMonitor.Functions/ (net8.0, Azure Functions v4)
│ │ └── AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/ (net8.0, xUnit)
│ ├── McpServer/
│ │ └── autopilot-monitor-mcp/ (TypeScript/Node – MCP server; deployed as Azure Container App)
│ └── Web/
│ └── autopilot-monitor-web/ (Next.js 15, TypeScript)
├── rules/
│ ├── gather/ Individual gather rule JSONs
│ ├── analyze/ Individual analyze rule JSONs
│ ├── ime-log-patterns/ IME regex pattern JSONs
│ ├── schema/ JSON Schema definitions
│ ├── guardrails.json Gather-rule guardrail allow-lists (source)
│ ├── scripts/ combine.js
│ └── dist/ Combined output (embedded in Functions)
├── infra/ Bicep templates (MCP server)
├── scripts/
│ ├── Backup/ Table backup/restore tooling
│ ├── Bootstrap/ Intune deployment scripts
│ ├── CustomerSetup/ Customer onboarding helpers
│ └── Deployment/ CI/CD build scripts
└── .github/workflows/ CI/CD pipelines
```
**Project References:**
```
Shared + DecisionCore ◄── Agent.V2.Core ◄── Agent.V2
◄── Agent.V2.Core.Tests
Shared + DecisionCore ◄── DecisionCore.Tests
Shared + DecisionCore ◄── Functions ◄── Functions.Tests
SummaryDialog ◄── SummaryDialog.Tests (standalone; compiled alongside the agent build)
Web (independent – communicates via REST + SignalR)
McpServer (independent – talks to the backend REST API)
```
---
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---
type: Concept
title: Business Timestamps vs. the Azure Tables System Timestamp
description: Why the system Timestamp is never authoritative, how the 2026-07-18 migration exposed that, and the OccurredUtc + RowKey-decode compensation (mappers, RowKey-range date filters, retention, backfill).
resource: /src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Helpers/BusinessTimestamp.cs
tags:
- backend
- table-storage
- audit-log
- ops-events
- events
- migration
timestamp: 2026-07-20T00:00:00+02:00
---
# Problem
Azure Table Storage's `Timestamp` is a **system property**: the server ignores any supplied
value on write and stamps the row's *write* time; every row rewrite (storage-account
migration, MERGE) resets it. Three tables nevertheless treated it as the business event
time — writes like `["Timestamp"] = evt.Timestamp` were silent no-ops, unnoticed because
write time ≈ event time in normal operation.
The 2026-07-18 EU storage migration rewrote every row, so all migrated rows in
**AuditLogs**, **OpsEvents**, and **Events** read as "2026-07-18 ~13:58 UTC": displays were
wrong, date-window filters matched the wrong rows, and retention froze (nothing older than
the migration moment) with a mass-delete cliff one retention period later.
# Rule
**The system Timestamp is never authoritative.** Every table that needs an event time
stores it in the custom column `OccurredUtc` (`BusinessTimestamp.OccurredUtcColumn`).
Custom columns are copied verbatim by `scripts/Migration/Copy-TableStorage.ps1`, so future
migrations preserve chronology. Migration checklist: any table whose reads/filters depend
on a timestamp must carry it as a custom column — audit this before every storage move.
# Recovery sources per table
The original time survives migrations inside the RowKey:
| Table | RowKey scheme | Decodable |
|---|---|---|
| AuditLogs | `!{MaxTicks-ticks:D19}_{guid:N}` (since 2026-05-06) | Yes; legacy bare-GUID rows (pre-2026-05) are lost |
| OpsEvents | `{MaxTicks-ticks:D19}` | Yes, all rows |
| Events | `{ts:yyyyMMddHHmmssfff}_{seq:D10}` (sanitized agent time) | Yes, all rows (ms precision) |
# Mechanism
`BusinessTimestamp` (Functions/Helpers) is the single source of truth: RowKey decoders,
the OData clause builders, and `GetUtcDateTime` (datetime columns materialize as
`DateTimeOffset` *or* `DateTime` depending on payload shape — always read via this helper).
1. **Read mappers** resolve `OccurredUtc` → RowKey decode → system Timestamp (last
resort; only audit legacy GUID rows end there). Resolvers:
`TableStorageService.ResolveAuditTimestamp`, `TableOpsEventRepository.ResolveTimestamp`,
`TableStorageService.ResolveEventTimestamp` (also used by
`GetEarliestSessionEventTimestampAsync`, which feeds StartedAt/Duration reconciliation —
a system-Timestamp read there would rewrite migrated sessions' derived fields).
2. **Date-window filters and retention use RowKey ranges**, not property comparisons:
OData excludes rows missing a compared property (an `OccurredUtc` filter would drop
every not-yet-backfilled row), and RowKey ranges are index-backed. Boundary semantics
are tick-exact equivalents of the old `Timestamp ge/le` clauses.
**Trap:** audit legacy GUID RowKeys (hex first char) sort *after* all `!`-rows, so
every lower bound `RowKey ge '!…'` must be paired with `RowKey lt '"'`
(`AuditTimeEncodedUpperBound`) — without the guard, a retention sweep would delete all
legacy rows. Pinned by `BusinessTimestampFilterClauseTests`.
3. **Writes** in all three tables now set `OccurredUtc`; the no-op `["Timestamp"]`
entries were removed.
4. **Backfill** (`POST /api/maintenance/backfill-occurred-utc`, GlobalAdminOnly, dry-run
by default, `table=audit|ops`, batched via `maxRows`/`continuation`): MERGE that adds
only `OccurredUtc` decoded from the RowKey — deterministic and idempotent. **Events
rows are deliberately never backfilled** (read-path decode is sufficient; no bulk
mutation of enrollment evidence). Note: a MERGE resets the row's system Timestamp —
irrelevant once nothing depends on it.
5. **Audit retention** runs two passes until ~2027-01: RowKey-range for `!`-rows plus a
`RowKey ge '0' and Timestamp lt …` pass that ages legacy GUID rows out via their frozen
migration-date system Timestamp (remove after 2027-03-01).
# Consequences
* Audit legacy GUID rows have "unknown date" semantics: excluded from date-filtered
views, shown with the (wrong but honest) 2026-07-18 fallback in unfiltered views.
* Raw endpoints (`/api/raw/*`, `query_table`) intentionally keep showing the raw system
Timestamp — they are storage-state inspectors, not business views.
* Event timestamps for pre-cutover rows resolve to the RowKey's sanitized agent time
(ms precision); `ReceivedAt` (server ingest time, rows since 2026-03-19) and
`OriginalTimestamp` (pre-clamp agent time, clamped rows only) remain separate fields.
# Citations
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Helpers/BusinessTimestamp.cs` — decoders + clause builders
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableStorageService.Maintenance.cs` — audit write/mapper/filters/retention
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/DataAccess/TableStorage/TableOpsEventRepository.cs` — ops write/mapper/filters/retention
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableStorageService.Sessions.cs` — event writes, `ResolveEventTimestamp`, earliest-event read
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/OccurredUtcBackfillService.cs` + `Functions/Admin/BackfillOccurredUtcFunction.cs` — backfill
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---
type: Concept
title: W365 Cloud PC Device Validation — Cert-CN-Bound Fallback Validator
description: Why Windows 365 Cloud PCs can never pass the Autopilot serial lookup, and how the CloudPc validator admits exactly the tenant's service-provisioned Cloud PCs by binding the MDM certificate's Subject CN (= Intune device id) to the Graph virtualEndpoint/cloudPCs inventory.
resource: src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/CloudPcDeviceValidator.cs
tags:
- backend
- security
- device-validation
- windows365
- cloudpc
- graph
timestamp: 2026-08-06T00:00:00+02:00
---
# W365 Cloud PC Device Validation
Windows 365 Cloud PCs are provisioned headless by the Windows 365 service and are
**structurally never Autopilot-registered** — the serial lookup against
`windowsAutopilotDeviceIdentities` (and the Corporate Identifier fallback, whose
serials nobody can pre-import for VMs minted at provisioning time) always misses.
Before this validator, a Cloud PC agent died in the 403 "Device not registered"
even though its mTLS cert was perfectly valid, so Cloud PC first-connect
enrollment (Account Setup, RealmJoin, Hello) could not be monitored.
# Schema — the validator chain
`SecurityValidator.ValidateRequestAsync` stage 4 runs the same chain for every
device; there is **no device-type routing** and the local W365 markers
(Windows365 registry key, CloudManagedDesktopExtension service) are never
consulted for auth — they gain an attacker nothing:
1. **Autopilot serial lookup** (`ValidateAutopilotDevice`) — unchanged primary.
2. **Corporate Identifier** (`ValidateCorporateIdentifier`) — unchanged fallback.
3. **CloudPc** (`ValidateCloudPcDevice`, default off) — only reached when 1+2
missed. Extracts the Intune device id from the **chain-validated** client
certificate's Subject CN (`TryGetIntuneDeviceIdFromCertSubject`: CN present
AND canonical GUID, else definitive reject) and requires a `cloudPC` object
with `managedDeviceId eq <CN>` in the claimed tenant
(`GET /v1.0/deviceManagement/virtualEndpoint/cloudPCs?$filter=…`).
`ValidatedBy = ValidatorType.CloudPc (5)`.
Only machines actually provisioned by the Windows 365 service have a `cloudPC`
object — a regular Intune-enrolled non-Autopilot device still ends in the 403,
so the "Autopilot devices only" contract of stages 1–2 is not widened. The
tenant hard gate accepts `ValidateCloudPcDevice` as a third satisfying flag.
## Why the cert CN, not headers or local markers
Field-verified 2026-08-06 on a real W365 Enterprise Cloud PC (gktatooine.net):
- MDM client cert Subject `CN=07623d56-…` == Intune `managedDevice.id` ==
`cloudPC.managedDeviceId`. The CN cannot be forged without the Intune MDM
Device CA (chain pinned to embedded roots, `CustomRootTrust`).
- `$filter=managedDeviceId eq '…'` is supported server-side on **v1.0** — no
paging fallback needed.
- `managedDevice.serialNumber` matches local `Win32_BIOS.SerialNumber` exactly;
the "Cloud PC Enterprise …" model string exists **only** in Graph, never in
local WMI (local WMI reports Manufacturer='Microsoft Corporation',
Model='Virtual Machine').
Threat model: a valid Intune cert from a *different* tenant fails (its CN does
not exist in the claimed tenant's Cloud PC inventory — this is a *tenant
binding* the serial-based validators do not have); spoofed serial headers and
faked local W365 markers are irrelevant (never consulted); a rogue enrolled VM
with doctored SMBIOS cannot mint a `cloudPC` object (service-side state, not
device-reported inventory — the reason the model-string gate was rejected).
Retired/deprovisioned Cloud PCs disappear from the inventory and their
validation dies with them (compensates the absent cert revocation check).
Residual: a compromised *legitimate* Cloud PC of the tenant — same trust level
as any tenant device today, rate-limited by cert thumbprint.
## Graph permission plumbing
- Optional add-on permission `CloudPC.Read.All` — NOT part of the default
consent set. Feature `W365CloudPcValidation` in `GraphFeatureCatalog` →
surfaces automatically in the "Optional Graph capabilities" UI (the feature
table and grant command are backend-driven) and in
`Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1` (`-Features W365CloudPcValidation`).
`GraphFeatureCatalogSyncTests` pins C# catalog ↔ grant script (previously
comment-only lock-step).
- A Graph **403** (permission not granted) is a definitive negative (cached
5 min), NOT transient — a 503 Retry-After loop cannot fix a missing grant.
The error message names the add-on feature.
- Same resilience contract as `AutopilotDeviceValidator`: 30/5 min
positive/negative cache, 2 attempts, transient → agent-facing 503.
## Bootstrap script interplay (v2.3-dev.3)
The Cloud-PC relax in `Install-AutopilotMonitor-dev.ps1` additionally exempts
**guard 4** (12 h uptime window): a Cloud PC runs headless for days before the
user's first connect, and the monitorable phase (Account Setup) only starts at
that first connect — the single-fresh-profile window (< 15 min) is the time
anchor there, not boot uptime. The OOBE-restore trigger keeps the uptime guard.
## Agent-side IsCloudPc flag + decision-engine expectation
Same change set, agent side. `CloudPcDetector` (V2.Core) re-uses the bootstrap's
field-verified marker AND — `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows365` key **plus**
installed `CloudManagedDesktopExtension` service (probed via its
`HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services` key; the agent deliberately has no
`System.ServiceProcess` dependency). SKIP-safe: any error resolves `false`.
Three independent transport rails, never an auth input:
- **Session metadata** — `SessionRegistration.IsCloudPc` →
Sessions table (sticky-true OR across re-registrations, like
`IsSelfDeployingProfile`) → SessionsIndex full mirror → `SessionSummary` →
search filter `isCloudPc` (portal, `/api/search/sessions`, `/api/raw/sessions`,
MCP `search_sessions`/`query_raw_sessions`). Agent-reported and unverified —
can legitimately disagree with the server-derived `ValidatedBy = CloudPc`
(e.g. Cloud PC admitted via a stage that ran earlier).
- **Distress channel** — `DistressReport.IsCloudPc` (captured once at
`DistressReporter` construction, `BackendClientFactory`) rides every pre-auth
distress report → `DistressReportEntry.IsCloudPc` → the "Devices Not
Registered" report aggregates it **sticky-true** per serial
(`GetDeviceNotRegisteredFunction`) and the portal insight renders a Cloud PC
badge plus a hint pointing at the Cloud PC validation toggle + the
`W365CloudPcValidation` add-on. Same UNVERIFIED contract as all distress
fields; rows from older agents read false. Fits the existing 1536-byte
payload cap without a bump.
- **Decision engine** — the marker rides the `EnrollmentFactsObserved` payload
(`isCloudPc`), is recorded set-once for BOTH values in
`EnrollmentScenarioObservations.CloudPc`, and annotates the scenario profile
reason `cloud_pc_first_connect:no_device_esp_expected`. That is the
engine-recorded expectation "no Device ESP phase will appear": Device-ESP ran
headless at provisioning, the session starts at Account Setup. Deliberately
reason+observation only — no completion arm depends on DeviceSetup, `Mode`
is still classified by AccountSetup/IME signals (Classic), and `EspConfig`
keeps the *configured* FirstSync semantics. The positive marker surfaces as
`cloud_pc_marker` in the terminal audit-trail signal census.
# Citations
- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/CloudPcDeviceValidator.cs`
- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/SecurityValidator.cs` — stage 4 chain, `TryGetIntuneDeviceIdFromCertSubject`
- `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Models/Graph/GraphFeatureCatalog.cs` — `W365CloudPcValidation`
- `scripts/CustomerSetup/Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1` — customer-side grant
- `scripts/Bootstrap/Install-AutopilotMonitor-dev.ps1` — Cloud-PC relax + guard-4 exemption
- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/CloudPcDeviceValidatorTests.cs`, `SecurityValidatorTests.cs`, `GraphFeatureCatalogSyncTests.cs`
- `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Security/CloudPcDetector.cs` — agent-side marker AND
- `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore/State/EnrollmentScenarioObservations.cs` — `CloudPc` fact; reason annotation in `EnrollmentScenarioProfileUpdater`
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---
type: Concept
title: Device Journeys & First-Time-Right (F2)
description: How a device's terminal enrollment attempts are grouped into journeys (device key, junk-serial exclusion, first-success end, 30-day gap), where the DeviceHistories chain and the daily FTR aggregates are computed, stored and pruned, and which surfaces serve them.
resource: src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Helpers/DeviceJourneyCalculator.cs
tags:
- backend
- metrics
- device-history
- first-time-right
- insights
timestamp: 2026-07-27T12:00:00+02:00
---
# Device Journeys & First-Time-Right (F2)
Answers "how many devices enrolled right on the first try?" and "show me every attempt
this device made". Session success rate hides wipe-and-retry loops — every retry that
eventually succeeds counts as a success; First-Time-Right (FTR) exposes the real pain.
All grouping semantics live server-side in `DeviceJourneyCalculator` (JourneyVersion 1);
no consumer re-derives them.
# Schema
## Device key
`(TenantId, normalized serial)` — normalization is trim + lower-case. Junk/placeholder
serials are excluded entirely (never a chain, never in FTR, disclosed as a per-day
exclusion count): `System Serial Number`, `To Be Filled By O.E.M.`, `Default string`,
`0`, `None`, `INVALID`, `Unknown` (the agent's WMI-failure sentinel), empty, or shorter
than 4 characters. A motherboard swap changes the serial and therefore the device key;
re-enrollment under a different tenant is a separate key by design.
## Journey
Terminal sessions of a device key ordered by StartedAt. The terminal set is
**Succeeded / Failed / Incomplete** — `Pending` (a sealed WhiteGlove part 1),
`AwaitingUser`, `Stalled` and `InProgress` are OPEN sessions and never attempts.
* A journey **ends** with the first terminal success; the next session starts a new
journey (redeployment).
* A gap of **more than 30 days** since the previous attempt's terminal moment
(`CompletedAt`, fallback StartedAt) starts a new journey even without a success
(device shelved/repurposed). Constant, not a setting — production gaps: median 4.9 h,
92 % < 7 d.
* WhiteGlove part 1 + part 2 share ONE session row, so a completed WG enrollment is ONE
attempt; a WG device still waiting for its user session leaves the journey open —
never a failed attempt.
* **Attempt count** = terminal sessions in the journey (`Failed` and `Incomplete` are
non-successful attempts).
* **FTR rate** = completed journeys with attempt count 1 ÷ all completed journeys.
Open and gap-abandoned journeys never enter numerator or denominator.
Durations shown for attempts are the sessions' authoritative `DurationSeconds` verbatim
(WhiteGlove pause excluded; `Incomplete` deliberately has none) — never
`CompletedAt − StartedAt`, which is later in ~25 % of terminal sessions.
## Persistence & compute
* `DeviceHistories` (PK = TenantId, RK = percent-encoded normalized serial): the chain of
the device's terminal session refs `{sessionId, startedAt, completedAt, status,
enrollmentType, isPreProvisioned, durationSeconds, adminMarked}` capped at the 20 most
recent, plus derived `CurrentJourneyAttempts` (the LAST journey's attempts — the
banner's "Attempt N"), `JourneyCount` (chain-scoped) and `JourneyVersion`. Written
inline at the session-terminal single-writer seam
(`TableSessionRepository.UpdateSessionStatusAsync`, all three terminal statuses,
DeletionState-guarded) so the session banner is fresh; healed by the maintenance sweep.
Deliberately NOT part of the per-session deletion manifest — the row aggregates many
sessions. Wiped on tenant offboarding.
* Sweep (`SweepDeviceJourneysAsync`, 30-day rolling window, 2h tick): (1) drops chain
refs of deleted sessions **tombstone-driven** — every session deletion (cascade and
retention both run through the cascade worker) leaves a `SessionTombstones` marker for
~7 days, far longer than the sweep cadence, and even an expired-but-unpruned marker is
valid deletion evidence; a chain left empty deletes its row. (2) Merges the window's
terminal sessions into their chains (backfill, inline-miss healing, re-terminal
reclassifications). (3) Recomputes the daily FTR aggregates idempotently.
* `DeviceJourneyAggregates` (PK = TenantId or `global`, RK = `{yyyy-MM-dd}`): per day —
completed journeys, first-time-right count, attempt histogram, junk-serial exclusion
count, `JourneyVersion`. A journey buckets on the StartedAt date of its completing
success session (the platform's StartedAt-date convention; late terminals converge via
the sweep). All counts are **additive**, so a window rate is the ratio of summed daily
rows — there is no rolling-window row (unlike the median-based time-attribution
aggregates, which cannot merge). 180-day retention. Rows exist below the ≥20 UI gate
on purpose (the UI needs the n for "insufficient data (n=…)").
# Surfaces
* `GET api/metrics/device-history?serialNumber=&sessionId=` (MemberRead + tenant query
param — the same route serves the web banner and MCP; a Global Admin passes `tenantId`)
— the chain plus, with `sessionId`, that session's server-computed attempt number
(live sessions get their would-be position via a virtual non-successful attempt, so the
redeploy and gap rules apply). `history: null` = no recorded history.
* `GET api/metrics/device-journeys?days=` (MemberRead) /
`GET api/global/metrics/device-journeys?days=&tenantId=` (GlobalReadOrAdmin) —
`{ windowDays, totals, daily, repeatDevices }`. The days selector is honored because
counts are additive. Without `tenantId` the global variant serves the cross-tenant
aggregate rows and `repeatDevices: null` — a per-device list would require scanning
every tenant's partition.
* Repeat devices (violator list, capped 10): devices whose LAST journey took ≥2 attempts
and whose newest terminal session falls inside the window, ordered by attempts then
recency; the failure reason comes from the newest failed attempt (bounded point-reads).
* Web: "Attempt N for this device · View history" banner on session detail (expandable
chain); "First-time-right" section on Fleet Health (rate + weekly trend + attempt
histogram + repeat devices). MCP: `get_device_history` (serial mode / fleet FTR mode).
# Examples
A device fails ESP twice and succeeds on the third try within one week: one journey,
three attempts, completed — counts once in the FTR denominator, not in the numerator,
and the histogram's bucket `3` gains one. The same device redeployed a month later and
succeeding immediately starts journey 2 with attempt count 1 — first-time-right. A
device with `serialNumber = "Unknown"` (WMI failure) never gets a chain; its terminal
sessions surface only as that day's disclosed exclusion count.
# Citations
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Helpers/DeviceJourneyCalculator.cs` — device key, junk list, grouping, attempt numbers (JourneyVersion 1).
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableStorageService.DeviceHistory.cs` — persistence + inline seam entry.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/MaintenanceService.DeviceJourneys.cs` — sweep, tombstone pruning, daily aggregation.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Metrics/GetDeviceJourneyFunctions.cs` — read surfaces.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/DeviceJourneyAndFtrTests.cs` — table-driven grouping/aggregation/attempt-number tests.
* `tasks/insights-expansion-spec.md` — F2 specification and source-data audit (§0.5).
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---
type: Concept
title: OOBE Bootstrap go-Code Flow — Always-200 Script Endpoint
description: The full lifecycle of the bootstrap short-code — created in the portal, typed as `irm go.autopilotmonitor.com/CODE | iex` at Shift+F10, served by GetBootstrapScriptFunction as an always-HTTP-200 PowerShell script — including the two-line injection defense and the rate-limit story behind Front Door.
resource: src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Bootstrap/GetBootstrapScriptFunction.cs
tags:
- backend
- bootstrap
- security
- oobe
timestamp: 2026-07-28T00:00:00+02:00
---
# OOBE Bootstrap go-Code Flow
Bootstrap Sessions let a technician install the agent **before** Intune
enrollment: an admin creates a short-lived session in the portal (Settings →
Bootstrap Sessions), hands the technician a short URL, and the technician types
`irm https://go.autopilotmonitor.com/CODE | iex` into a Shift+F10 console
during OOBE. The URL is deliberately short because it is typed by hand on a
device that has no clipboard.
# Lifecycle
1. **Create** — `POST /api/bootstrap/sessions` (`BootstrapManagerOrGA`).
`BootstrapSessionService.CreateAsync` mints an unambiguous-charset short
code + a GUID token, validity clamped 1–168 h. The response's `bootstrapUrl`
is built from `Constants.BootstrapGoBaseUrl` — the single producer of the
absolute URL (pinned by `CreateBootstrapSessionUrlShapeTests`).
2. **Serve** — `GET /api/bootstrap/go/{code}` (`GetBootstrapScriptFunction`,
`PublicAnonymous`). Customers reach it through the Front Door custom domain
`go.autopilotmonitor.com`, whose `/*` route rewrites onto the API path.
Validation runs in-process (`ValidateCodeAsync` + the tenant's
`BootstrapTokenEnabled` gate) — no HTTP hop to the validate endpoint.
3. **Install** — the generated script downloads the agent ZIP from
`Constants.AgentDownloadBaseUrl`, extracts, and runs
`--install --no-auth --bootstrap-token … --tenant-id …`. The agent monitors
from OOBE start, switches to certificate auth after Intune enrollment, and
self-destructs on completion.
The legacy Next.js `/go/[code]` route (SSR on the SWA) stays alive only for
URLs issued before the migration and is removed with the static-export PR —
see the transition rule in [URL Registry](../url-registry.md).
# Always-200 contract
Every response — success, invalid format, unknown/expired code, disabled
feature, rate limit, internal error — is **HTTP 200 `text/plain`**. The
consumer is `irm | iex`: a non-2xx status would make `irm` throw an opaque
exception on the OOBE console, while a 200 error script surfaces the actual
message via `Write-Host 'ERROR: …'`. Consequences:
- Failures are invisible in status-code metrics; the compensating signal is the
`LogWarning` per rejection (code + client IP).
- Error messages are capped at 200 chars **before** quote-escaping and
single-quote-doubled — a hostile upstream message cannot break out of the
`Write-Host` literal.
A disabled tenant returns the **same generic message** as an unknown code — no
enumeration oracle for whether a code exists.
# Injection defense (two lines)
The script runs as SYSTEM during OOBE, so interpolation is treated as a
security boundary:
1. **`BootstrapScriptValueValidator`** — tenantId/token must be exact canonical
GUIDs, the download URL must be https on an allow-listed host
(`AgentDownloadBaseUrl`/`AgentBlobBaseUrl` hosts) with the strict
`/agent/….zip` path shape, expiry must be future and ≤ 14 days. No accepted
value can contain `$`, quotes, backticks, spaces, or newlines. Kept even
though values are produced in-process — defense-in-depth against tampered
table data.
2. **Single-quoted PS literals** — every interpolated value sits inside
single-quoted PowerShell strings, which do not expand `$()`, `$var`, or
backticks.
The template is a C# raw string with `__TOKEN__` placeholders substituted via
`Replace` (never `$`-interpolation — the script is full of PS `$vars`).
`OobeBootstrapScriptGeneratorTests` pins byte parity with the original
TypeScript template through a golden file, so the legacy route and the backend
serve identical scripts during the transition.
# Rate limiting behind Front Door
The endpoint self-limits per client IP (`bootstrap-script:{ip}`, 20/min via
`ClientIpExtractor.GetRateLimitClientIp`) — anonymous routes are skipped by
`UserRateLimitMiddleware` and must bring their own limiter. Because traffic
arrives through Front Door, the rightmost X-Forwarded-For hop resolves to AFD
egress IPs and buckets would collapse (the shared-bucket 429 incident class);
the AFD-aware extraction therefore honors `X-Azure-ClientIP` only when
`X-Azure-FDID` matches the `FrontDoorProfileId` app setting (fail-closed to
the trusted-hop path otherwise). Verified post-deploy 2026-07-29: real client
IPs are keyed, not AFD egress.
Front Door route caching is DISABLED for this route: the body inlines the
bearer token, so a cache hit would replay one requester's token to another.
`NoStoreCacheMiddleware` covers the `/api/bootstrap/go/` prefix.
# Citations
- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Bootstrap/GetBootstrapScriptFunction.cs`
- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Bootstrap/OobeBootstrapScriptGenerator.cs`
- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/BootstrapScriptValueValidator.cs`
- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/OobeBootstrapScriptGeneratorTests.cs` — golden parity
- `src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/go/[code]/route.ts` — legacy route (transition only)
- [URL Registry](../url-registry.md) — go-URL registry entries + transition rule
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---
type: Concept
title: Rule Regression Radar (F3)
description: How the radar detects analyze rules whose hit rate suddenly rose (7-day window vs 28-day baseline, Wilson-separated), which suppressions keep it quiet, how alert episodes live in the notification tracker, and which surfaces show them.
resource: src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Helpers/RuleRegressionRadar.cs
tags:
- backend
- rules
- regression-radar
- insights
timestamp: 2026-07-27T16:00:00+02:00
---
# Rule Regression Radar (F3)
Detects "this analyze rule suddenly fires much more often" before helpdesk volume does, and
says what the spike correlates with — with honest statistics and honest wording. Analyze
rules only in v1: their daily stats are audit-verified session-deduplicated
(`FireCount` ≈ distinct sessions with a hit, `SessionsEvaluated` the same-source
denominator). Gather rules are excluded until their per-batch stats dedup is fixed —
never silently included with bad math.
# Schema
## Signal & detection
Per (tenant, ruleId), daily hit rate = `FireCount ÷ SessionsEvaluated` from the
`RuleStats` rows — RATES, not counts (absolute counts spike with every rollout wave).
A regression fires only when ALL hold for the trailing 7-day window vs. the prior
28-day baseline:
1. window has ≥ 5 hit sessions AND ≥ 20 evaluated sessions;
2. window rate ≥ 2× baseline rate;
3. the Wilson 95 % intervals are disjoint in the increase direction
(`MetricsMath.WilsonInterval` / `RateIncreaseSeparated` — deterministic, unit-pinned),
so small-n noise never alerts.
## Suppression (false positives are trust damage)
* Rule entity missing (deleted) — never alerts.
* Rule younger than baseline + window (`CreatedAt` within 35 days — grace period for new
rules; the entity timestamp is the honest gate, a stats-row count would fail on
low-volume tenants whose quiet days simply have no rows).
* Rule edited inside the window (`UpdatedAt` ≥ window start) — edits legitimately change
hit rates.
* Empty baseline denominator (rule disabled throughout the baseline).
* Platform kill switch: app setting `RuleRegressionRadarDisabled=true` skips the radar
(fail-open — it only notifies, never mutates data).
## Alert episodes (tracker keyspace)
An episode lives as `ruleregression|{ruleId}` in the notification-tracker table
(the `tpmpss|` pattern): the row IS the dedup (bell + ops event fire exactly once per
episode), the badge state and the `regressions[]` payload — window/baseline counts,
rates, lift (null for a zero-baseline "new signal" — no finite lift is invented), window
dates, and the dimension concentration captured at first fire. Numbers refresh on every
radar pass while the episode stays active; `FirstNotifiedAt` never moves. The episode
closes (badge clears, dedup re-arms) when the window rate falls back under 1.5× baseline
or fires stop entirely; the tracker's 30-day retention sweep also re-arms, so a
month-old still-burning regression rings once more by design.
## Dimension correlation (on fire only)
Hit sessions (RuleResults scan: tenant partition range + RowKey = ruleId + DetectedAt in
window, intersected with the window's sessions) are compared against all window sessions
across `osBuild`, `model` (manufacturer + model), `agentVersion` and `imeVersion`. The
top value by lift is reported with BOTH shares — wording contract: "X % of affected
sessions are on … vs Y % of all sessions — correlated, not necessarily causal". No value
with ≥ 5 hit sessions at ≥ 2× lift → "no clear dimension concentration"; a correlation
failure also yields no claim. App-version correlation for `ANALYZE-APP-*` rules is a
follow-up (needs rule→app matching semantics), tracked with the gather-rule fix.
## Compute & alert path
Runs in the daily maintenance pass right after the rule-stats aggregation
(`RunRuleRegressionRadarAsync`), anchored on YESTERDAY — whole days only, a partial
today would understate the window rate. One 35-day stats read covers all tenants;
evaluation is the pure `RuleRegressionRadar` core. On a NEW episode:
1. `RuleFrequencyRegression` ops event (category Tenant, Warning) with the full numbers
— dual-registered in the web `OPS_EVENT_TYPES` catalog for alert-rule routing.
2. Tenant bell notification (type `rule_frequency_regression`, Admin audience) with the
same numbers and a deep link to the rule's card (`/analyze-rules#rule-card-{ruleId}`).
A sessions-list pre-filtered to rule hits needs a rule filter the session search does
not have yet — follow-up alongside the gather-rule work.
3. v1 channel: bell + ops event only. Provider fan-out (webhook/Telegram) follows once
alert quality is proven — a noisy first version burns trust permanently.
# Surfaces
* `GET api/metrics/rule-stats` (and the global variant with `tenantId`) carries
`regressions[]` — the active episodes. MCP `get_rule_stats` inherits the block.
* Analyze-rules page: per-rule 30-day fire-count sparkline (densified from the `trend`
rows the endpoint already served) and a red "↑ Regression" badge while an episode is
active, with the full numbers in the tooltip.
# Examples
A rule firing on 2 % of sessions for a month jumps to 15 % over a week (15/100 vs
10/500): lift 7.5×, Wilson-separated → one bell, one ops event, badge until the rate
falls back under 3 %. The same jump on 5/20 sessions with a 12 % baseline stays silent —
the intervals overlap, so the spike is not statistically real yet. A rule that never
fired in the baseline and now hits 15 % alerts as a "new signal" with no lift figure.
# Citations
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Helpers/RuleRegressionRadar.cs` — gates, suppression, re-arm, dimension concentration.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Helpers/MetricsMath.cs` — Wilson interval + separation primitive.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/MaintenanceService.RuleRegression.cs` — sweep, episode reconcile, bell/ops wiring.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/DataAccess/TableStorage/TableHardwareRejectionNotificationTracker.cs` — episode keyspace.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/RuleRegressionRadarTests.cs` — hand-computed Wilson vectors + every suppression branch.
* `tasks/insights-expansion-spec.md` — F3 specification and source-data audit (§0.5).
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
---
type: Concept
title: ServerActions & On-Demand Diagnostics Collection
description: The queue-on-session, deliver-on-ingest ServerAction channel (terminate_session / rotate_config / request_diagnostics), the operator-tier authorization split, the portal's Collect Logs flow including the admin quick-config path, and why the offboarding cascade sweeps the hosted diagnostics prefix.
resource: /src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Sessions/QueueSessionActionFunction.cs
tags:
- backend
- agent
- web
- server-actions
- diagnostics
- authorization
timestamp: 2026-07-24T00:00:00+02:00
---
# Schema
**Channel.** A `ServerAction` (`Type`, `Reason`, `RuleId`, `Params`, `QueuedAt`) is queued onto
`Sessions.PendingActionsJson` by server-side writers — the admin endpoint
`POST /api/sessions/{sessionId}/actions`, the RuleEngine, maintenance — and delivered
piggy-backed on the agent's next ingest response. No polling channel exists; delivery latency
equals the agent's telemetry cadence (seconds to ~1 minute during enrollment). Delivery is
at-least-once: the agent's `ServerActionDispatcher` dedups on `Type|RuleId|QueuedAt` and
processes a batch sequentially in queue order. Unknown types are logged and skipped, so new
types roll out server-first. Every action emits `server_action_received` and then
`server_action_executed` or `server_action_failed` into the session timeline.
**Authorization (two layers).** The route sits on `EndpointPolicy.TenantAdminOrOperator`
(tenant Admin, tenant Operator, or Global Admin — no Viewer, no Global Reader: it is a write
tier). Because the route serves multiple action kinds, `QueueSessionActionFunction`
re-gates per type via `IsTypeAllowedForCaller`: Operators may queue only
`request_diagnostics`; `terminate_session` and `rotate_config` require
`RequestContext.IsTenantAdmin || IsGlobalAdmin` (403 otherwise). Any route on this tier with
a multi-kind body MUST follow this same in-function re-gating pattern.
**On-demand collection (`request_diagnostics`).** The dispatcher calls
`DiagnosticsPackageService.CreateAndUploadAsync(enrollmentSucceeded: false, suffix:
"server-requested")` — producing `AgentDiagnostics-{sessionId}-{timestamp}-server-requested.zip`.
Passing `enrollmentSucceeded: false` is what makes on-demand collection work under
`DiagnosticsUploadMode=OnFailure`; only `Off` (or an unconfigured destination) blocks it,
surfacing as `server_action_failed`. The `diagnostics_uploaded` event stamps
`DiagnosticsBlobName` + `Destination` onto the Sessions row (latest wins — an on-demand name
is later replaced by the terminal package), and the SignalR `sessionUpdate` delta carries the
field, so the portal's Download button flips live.
**Portal flow (Collect Logs, session detail header).** The button is always rendered; the
disabled states carry tooltips (inactive session, cross-tenant view, missing role, diagnostics
not configured) as a deliberate nudge. Members below Admin cannot read the tenant config, so
the member-readable feature-flags endpoint exposes `diagnosticsUploadConfigured`
(`mode != Off && (customer SAS present || destination Hosted)`). Progress tracking is
sequence-based (backend-assigned, monotonic), never timestamp-based — agent clock skew and
at-least-once redelivery of older actions cannot produce false matches
(`collectLogsLogic.ts`). Cross-tenant views are gated off because `TenantHelper.GetTenantId`
resolves the tenant strictly from the caller's JWT.
**Admin quick-config.** For an unconfigured tenant, a Tenant Admin's click opens a dialog
that switches the tenant to `Destination=Hosted`, `Mode=OnFailure` (GET full config → patch
exactly those two fields → PUT verbatim), then queues `rotate_config` **before**
`request_diagnostics` — the dispatcher's sequential ordering guarantees the agent refetches
the now-enabled config (the `RemoteConfigMerger` applies diagnostics fields live, remote wins)
before building the package. This works against the already-deployed agent fleet; a
"one-time override" variant would not, because the `mode=Off` check is client-side in
`CreateAndUploadAsync` and the deployed handler reads no params.
**Offboarding cascade.** Latest-wins on `DiagnosticsBlobName` means a session can leave more
hosted blobs behind than the deletion manifest references. The cascade's Hosted branch
therefore sweeps the canonical prefix `{tenantId}/AgentDiagnostics-{sessionId}-`
(`HostedDiagnosticsBlobService.DeleteBySessionPrefixAsync`) plus the manifest-named blob as
belt-and-braces; a non-GUID legacy `SessionId` degrades to the single-name delete instead of
poisoning the cascade. The CustomerSas branch is unchanged (delete only with the `d`
permission; the customer's lifecycle rules stay authoritative).
# Examples
Queue an on-demand collection (Admin or Operator, own tenant):
```
POST /api/sessions/{sessionId}/actions
{ "type": "request_diagnostics", "reason": "On-demand log collection from portal" }
→ 202 { "success": true, "queuedAt": "..." }
```
Operator queueing an admin-only type:
```
POST /api/sessions/{sessionId}/actions
{ "type": "terminate_session" }
→ 403 { "message": "Action type 'terminate_session' requires the Tenant Admin role" }
```
Timeline for a successful round trip: `server_action_received` → `server_action_executed`
(with `blobName`) → `diagnostics_uploaded` → Sessions row + SignalR delta carry the new
`DiagnosticsBlobName`.
# Citations
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Sessions/QueueSessionActionFunction.cs` — allowed types, per-type caller gate.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/EndpointAccessPolicyCatalog.cs` — `TenantAdminOrOperator` tier definition.
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Runtime/ServerActionDispatcher.cs` — dedup, sequential dispatch, telemetry contract.
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Runtime/DiagnosticsPackageService.cs` — mode gates, archive build, suffix.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/Diagnostics/DiagnosticsBlobCascadeDeleter.cs` — hosted prefix sweep.
* `src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/sessions/[sessionId]/components/collectLogsLogic.ts` — button gating matrix, sequence-based progress evaluation.
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
---
type: concept
title: Tenant Activation & the Once-Only Welcome Mail
description: How a signup becomes an activated tenant (manual approve or auto-approve queue), and how the welcome mail is sent exactly once even though activation and the user-provided address race each other.
resource: backend
tags: [activation, auto-approve, welcome-email, preview-whitelist, race]
timestamp: 2026-08-02
---
# Schema
## Activation
A tenant is **activated** when the row `PartitionKey={tenantId}, RowKey="approved"` exists
in the `PreviewWhitelist` table (legacy name kept on purpose). Everything else in the
portal gates on that row via `PreviewWhitelistService.IsApprovedAsync` (5 min positive /
30 s negative cache).
Two activation routes, one shared implementation
(`TenantApprovalService.ApproveWithSideEffectsAsync`):
* **Manual**: Global Admin approves in the admin panel (`POST /api/preview/whitelist/{tenantId}`).
* **Auto**: signup unconditionally enqueues a `tenant-auto-approve` envelope; the queue
worker (`TenantAutoApproveHandler`) re-checks the `AutoApproveNewTenants` flag
(uncached, fail-closed), the suspension gate (fresh config read), then approves.
Typical latency: ~1 minute after signup.
The whitelist add is a **conditional INSERT** (`AddEntityAsync`, 409 = lost) — storage
arbitrates concurrent activations; exactly one caller runs the side effects
(TenantAdmin auto-promote of the signup UPN, welcome mail, `TenantAutoApproved` ops event).
## The welcome-mail race
The welcome mail goes to the **notification email** (`RowKey="notification-email"` in the
same table) — the only reliable address: it is typed by the user on the activation-pending
page (`PUT /api/preview/notification-email`). The signup admin UPN may have no mailbox and
`ContactEmail` is merely seeded from the notification email.
That makes activation and address entry concurrent writers. With auto-approve, activation
usually wins (observed in production: approve at T+64 s, address saved at T+69 s → the
approval path found no address and the mail was silently skipped).
**Arbitration — write-then-read on both sides plus a send-once marker:**
* The approval path writes the `approved` row, then reads the address.
* The save path (`SavePreviewNotificationEmail`) writes the address row, then checks
approval **fresh** (`IsApprovedFreshAsync` — the 30 s negative cache would hide the
activation for exactly this window).
* Since both do write-then-read, at least one sees both halves and calls
`TenantApprovalService.TrySendWelcomeEmailAsync`.
* There, a conditional insert of `RowKey="welcome-email-sent"` decides who actually
sends: at most one wins. The marker is consumed strictly **after** the address check —
consuming it without an address would permanently suppress the mail.
Marker lifecycle: revoke (`RevokeAsync`) deletes it (re-approve = fresh activation =
fresh mail); the offboarding cascade wipes the whole `PreviewWhitelist` partition anyway.
The Global-Admin resend endpoint (`POST /api/preview/send-welcome-email/{tenantId}`)
always sends (explicit intent) and consumes the marker best-effort so the automatic
paths never duplicate afterwards.
# Examples
* Auto-approve wins the race: approve at T+64 s finds no address → logs "deferred to the
notification-email save path"; user saves address at T+69 s → save path sees approved
(fresh read), wins the marker, sends. Response carries `welcomeEmailSent: true`.
* Address saved before manual approve (classic shape): approval path finds the address,
wins the marker, sends; a later re-save of the same address does not re-send.
# Citations
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TenantApprovalService.cs` — shared activation + `TrySendWelcomeEmailAsync`
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/Activation/TenantAutoApproveHandler.cs` — queue-side gates
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Rules/PreviewWhitelistFunction.cs` — save-path trigger, GA resend
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/DataAccess/TableStorage/TableConfigRepository.cs` — conditional inserts (approved / welcome-email-sent)
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/TenantApprovalServiceTests.cs` — ordering + dedup pins
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---
type: Concept
title: Enrollment Time Attribution (F1)
description: How a terminal session's wall clock is partitioned into named segments with an explicit unattributed remainder, how ESP-blocking apps and reboots are attributed, and where breakdowns and fleet aggregates are computed, stored and served.
resource: src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Helpers/TimeAttributionCalculator.cs
tags:
- backend
- metrics
- time-attribution
- insights
timestamp: 2026-07-26T20:00:00+02:00
---
# Enrollment Time Attribution (F1)
Answers "where did the 47 minutes go?" per session and per fleet. Every number is
traceable to observed events; a missing signal produces "unknown" or an explicit
unattributed remainder — never a guess, and the partition is never normalized to 100 %.
# Schema
## Invariant
For every computed breakdown:
```
sum(span seconds) + UnattributedSeconds == WallClockSeconds == session DurationSeconds
```
`DurationSeconds` is the authoritative wall clock — for WhiteGlove it is part 1 + part 2
WITHOUT the pause, and re-terminal stamps move `CompletedAt`, so `CompletedAt − StartedAt`
is never used (it diverges in ~25 % of terminal sessions). Span seconds are floored;
sub-second dust lands in the unattributed remainder.
## Observation windows
Windows are end-anchored on authoritative timestamps and constructed so their lengths sum
exactly to `DurationSeconds`:
* Non-WhiteGlove: one window `[CompletedAt − DurationSeconds, CompletedAt]`.
* WhiteGlove (ONE session row, two windows): part 2 = `[ResumedAt, CompletedAt]`; part 1 =
`[part1End − (DurationSeconds − part2), part1End]` where `part1End` is anchored on the
`whiteglove_part1_complete` event. The pause between the windows is never attributed.
Fallback anchors set the `WhiteGloveAnchorsIncomplete` quality flag.
## Segments
Spans are sliced at phase-declaration events (only declaration events carry
`Phase != Unknown`) plus `desktop_arrived`, in canonical Sequence order; anchors whose
timestamp runs backward are dropped (`ClockSkewDropped`).
| EnrollmentPhase | Segment key |
|---|---|
| Start / DevicePreparation / DeviceSetup | `device_prep` |
| AppsDevice | `esp_apps` |
| AccountSetup / FinalizingSetup | `identity_hello` |
| AppsUser | `user_esp` |
| Complete, `desktop_arrived` event | `desktop_handoff` |
| Failed | attribution ends — tail stays unattributed |
## ESP-blocking apps (positive evidence only)
Per-app intervals use EVENT timestamps (first started/download event → LAST terminal
event, covering IME retries) — never the agent payload timing, which freezes at the first
terminal transition. Blocking membership joins the app id against the session's latest
list-carrying `esp_config_detected` emission: listed ⇒ blocking; absent ⇒ unknown, never
false (`BlockingSetUnknown` / `BlockingSetTruncated` flags). Critical-path occupancy =
overlap-merged union of blocking intervals clipped to the `esp_apps` spans;
`EspAppsOccupancySeconds` is null (unknown) when no lists were observed.
The fleet what-if bound per app X is `max(0, cpEnd − cpEndWithoutX)` (latest interval end
with vs. without X; the idle gap before X counts — the ESP also waits for X to start).
It is an upper bound by construction; every consumer says "up to", never "you will save".
## Reboots
`system_reboot_detected` is detection-time-stamped by the NEXT agent run; the real boot
moment is its `lastBootUtc` payload. Reboot spans are therefore the event-stream gap
bracketing `lastBootUtc`, deduped per boot, clipped to the observation windows, and carried
as a cross-cutting annotation (they overlap the segment they started in — never a slice of
the partition).
## Persistence & compute
* `SessionTimeBreakdowns` (PK = TenantId, RK = SessionId): spans, reboot spans, blocking
intervals (top 20 + uncapped count), quality flags, `AttributionVersion`. Written once at
the session-terminal single-writer seam (`TableSessionRepository.UpdateSessionStatusAsync`,
Succeeded/Failed only — Incomplete deliberately has no duration). Deleted with its session
(deletion-manifest step) and on tenant offboarding.
* Self-healing 30-day maintenance sweep (2h tick): backfills missing breakdowns, folds
late-terminating sessions into their StartedAt-date aggregates, and enforces version
purity — a stale-version row whose events aged out counts as missing, never mixed.
* `TimeAttributionAggregates` (PK = TenantId or `global`, RK = `{yyyy-MM-dd}|{class}` and
`rolling30|{class}`): per enrollment class (`user_driven`, `whiteglove`, `self_deploying`,
`device_preparation` — never mixed) median/p75/p90 per segment over the fixed six-segment
stack (incl. `unattributed`; a session without a segment contributes 0), plus top blocking
apps (≥5 sessions per app row). Clean/flagged/missing counts are part of every row; rows
exist below the ≥20 UI gate on purpose (the UI needs the n for "insufficient data (n=…)").
Daily rows retain 180 days; `rolling30` rows are refreshed whole (a median of per-day
medians is not the range median — the rolling rows are the honest range statistics).
## Surfaces
* `GET api/sessions/{sessionId}/time-attribution` (MemberRead + tenant query param) —
breakdown row or `breakdown: null` (pre-feature / non-terminal / Incomplete = no lane).
* `GET api/metrics/time-attribution` (MemberRead) / `GET api/global/metrics/time-attribution`
(GlobalReadOrAdmin, optional `tenantId`) — `{ windowDays, classes (rolling), daily }`.
* Web: attribution lane under the session-detail phase timeline; "Time attribution" section
on Fleet Health. MCP: `get_time_attribution` (sessionId mode / fleet mode).
# Examples
A 30-minute user-driven session: `device_prep` 5m → `esp_apps` 10m (occupancy 4m by one
blocking app) → `identity_hello` 8m → `user_esp` 5m → `desktop_handoff` 2m, unattributed 0.
A WhiteGlove session with a 2-day pause reports wall clock = part1 + part2 only; the resume
gap before the first part-2 phase declaration is unattributed, not guessed.
# Citations
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Helpers/TimeAttributionCalculator.cs` — calculator + semantics (AttributionVersion 1).
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableStorageService.TimeAttribution.cs` — persistence.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/MaintenanceService.Aggregation.cs` — sweep + aggregation.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/TimeAttributionCalculatorTests.cs` — golden fixtures pinning the invariant.
* `tasks/insights-expansion-spec.md` — F1 specification and source-data audit (§0.5).
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---
okf_version: "0.1"
---
# Autopilot Monitor — Technical Knowledge Bundle
Contributor-facing technical documentation for Autopilot Monitor, organized as an
[Open Knowledge Format (OKF)](https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/knowledge-catalog/blob/main/okf/SPEC.md)
knowledge bundle. Customer-facing product documentation lives at
https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com (separate repository).
# Architecture
* [Architecture Guide](architecture.md) - High-level architecture overview and solution layout for contributors.
* [Version Contract](versioning.md) - One version shape for agent, backend and MCP: the ETag-CAS counter blob that mints build numbers, and the manifests published only after a deploy is verified live.
* [URL Registry](url-registry.md) - Every well-known host lives in one registry file per component (Constants.cs / utils/config.ts / src/config.ts), enforced by guard tests; includes the agent-download migration to the download alias and its deploy-order constraint.
# Agent
* [V2 Agent](agent/index.md) - How the on-device agent works: [runtime overview](agent/overview.md), [decision engine](agent/decision-engine.md) (reducer, signals, completion arms), [logs & persistence](agent/logs-and-persistence.md) (signal log, snapshot, crash recovery), [Hello wizard un-skip](agent/hello-wizard-unskip.md) (why a single "WHfB disabled" read never decides completion), [Autopilot ZTD diagnostics](agent/autopilot-ztd-diagnostics.md) (event IDs, diagnostic registry, endpoints, error-code map).
* [Build Counter Blob](agent/build-counter-blob.md) - How agent build numbers are minted: shared counter blob with ETag-CAS so local and CI builds never collide; CI additionally attests build provenance (Sigstore).
* [Agent Endpoint Migration](agent/endpoint-migration.md) - How the backend re-homes agents to a new API base URL via the config channel (backend move or per-tenant region move): live-fetch-only, allowlist-validated on both sides, one hop, kill wins.
* [Gather Rule Debug Log](agent/gather-rule-debug-log.md) - EnableGatherRuleDebugLog (ConfigVersion 36): the per-tenant local trace file that explains every gather-rule evaluation decision — scope skips, on_change suppression, empty collector results, logparser position/parse-mode outcomes — for rules that produce no timeline events.
* [MDM Reboot Coalescing](agent/mdm-reboot-coalescing.md) - Attributing the mid-ESP coalesced reboot ("second sign-in") to the device-assigned policy URIs that forced it: aggregated DM-Enterprise 2800 observations (neutral, flush-time watermark) + the ANALYZE-ESP-005 advisory gated on an actually-observed reboot.
* [Secure Boot CA-2023 Detection](agent/secureboot-ca2023-detection.md) - Why ANALYZE-SEC-001 v3 reads the UEFI db/KEK variables directly instead of trusting the SecureBoot\Servicing registry, and how the one-sided uefiCa2023FirmwareConfirmed marker plus a not_exists precondition give absence-tolerant suppression across old and new agents.
* [ESP Policy-Provider Stall Detection](agent/esp-policy-provider-stall.md) - The EnrollmentStatusTracking CSP's no-timeout Setup/Apps wait is keyed to the Intune-registered "Sidecar" provider by NAME: co-management's "ConfigMgr" parks the user ESP at "Apps (Identifying)" for days even with TrackingPoliciesCreated=1 (issue #106); the always-on two-arm esp_policy_provider_stalled tripwire (provider_incomplete | sidecar_provider_missing) and the SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Autopilot gather-rule allowlist entry that surface it.
# Rules
* [Gather Rule Phase Scoping, One-Shot Triggers & Emit-on-Change](rules/gather-rule-phase-scoping.md) - Restricting gather rules to enrollment phases (activePhases / activeFromPhase sticky latch), one-shot collection at a phase's start/end (phase_change / phase_exit), and emitMode "on_change" result-dedup.
* [Gather Rule Guardrails](rules/gather-rule-guardrails.md) - Why the allowlists in rules/guardrails.json are enforced on the agent and nowhere else, which hard blocks survive unrestricted mode, and the rule that every collector must call a guard and emit security_warning on refusal.
* [Rule Authoring Surface](rules/rule-authoring-surface.md) - How customer AIs author rules against the real contract: the baked MCP resources (guide/schemas/guardrails via combine.js), the MCP-local validate_rule pre-flight, and the side-effect-free POST rules/analyze/dryrun whose trace twin shares the production evaluators (parity + side-effect-freedom pinned by tests).
# Backend
* [Business Timestamps](backend/business-timestamps.md) - Why the Azure Tables system Timestamp is never authoritative (migrations reset it), and the OccurredUtc + RowKey-decode compensation for AuditLogs/OpsEvents/Events after the 2026-07-18 migration.
* [OOBE Bootstrap go-Code Flow](backend/oobe-bootstrap-go-flow.md) - The bootstrap short-code lifecycle (portal-created session → `irm go.autopilotmonitor.com/CODE | iex` at Shift+F10 → GetBootstrapScriptFunction), the always-HTTP-200 text/plain contract, the two-line injection defense (GUID/URL/expiry validator + single-quoted PS literals, golden-pinned against the legacy TS template), and the per-IP rate-limit story behind Front Door.
* [Device Journeys & First-Time-Right](backend/device-journeys.md) - How a device's terminal enrollment attempts are grouped into journeys (trim+casefold device key with junk-serial exclusion, first-success end, 30-day gap, WhiteGlove = one attempt), the DeviceHistories chain with its tombstone-driven deleted-session pruning, the additive daily FTR aggregates, and the banner/fleet/MCP surfaces.
* [Enrollment Time Attribution](backend/time-attribution.md) - How a terminal session's authoritative wall clock (DurationSeconds, WhiteGlove pause excluded) is partitioned into named segments with an explicit unattributed remainder, ESP-blocking apps as positive evidence with "up to" what-if bounds, reboot spans from event gaps, and the breakdown/aggregate tables the sweep maintains.
* [Rule Regression Radar](backend/rule-regression-radar.md) - How analyze-rule hit-rate regressions are detected (7-day window ≥2× the 28-day baseline with disjoint Wilson intervals), which suppressions keep the radar quiet (grace period, edit-in-window, kill switch), how alert episodes live in the ruleregression tracker keyspace with re-arm semantics, and the on-fire dimension correlation with its "correlated, not necessarily causal" wording contract.
* [Tenant Activation & the Once-Only Welcome Mail](backend/tenant-activation-welcome-mail.md) - How a signup becomes an activated tenant (manual approve or the auto-approve queue), and the write-then-read + conditional-marker arbitration that sends the welcome mail exactly once even though activation and the user-typed notification address race each other.
* [W365 Cloud PC Device Validation](backend/cloudpc-device-validation.md) - Why Cloud PCs can never pass the Autopilot serial lookup, and the cert-CN-bound CloudPc fallback validator: Subject CN (= Intune device id) matched against the tenant's Graph virtualEndpoint/cloudPCs inventory — admits exactly the service-provisioned Cloud PCs, nothing else.
* [ServerActions & On-Demand Diagnostics](backend/server-actions-on-demand-diagnostics.md) - The queue-on-session, deliver-on-ingest action channel, the TenantAdminOrOperator tier with in-function per-type re-gating, the portal's Collect Logs flow (quick-config orders rotate_config before request_diagnostics), and the hosted-prefix sweep in the offboarding cascade.
# MCP Server
* [MCP Docs Corpus](mcp/docs-corpus.md) - How the published customer documentation becomes the `search_docs` corpus: CRLF-safe heading chunking, build-time embedding as a third precomputed section, and why a docs edit needs an MCP redeploy.
* [MCP Tool Telemetry](mcp/tool-telemetry.md) - The three telemetry layers for judging tool quality: backend App Insights via X-MCP-Tool-Name, the per-user usage table, and the MCP_TOOL_LOGGING stderr lines (soft errors, result size vs. cap, zero-hit searches, Zod rejections).
# Web Portal
* [Portal Navigation Prefetch & the SWA Runtime Bottleneck](web/portal-navigation-prefetch.md) - Why every navigation Link sets `prefetch={false}`: the App Router's viewport prefetch fans out one RSC request per visible link and the Static Web Apps SSR runtime queues them server-side into a multi-minute tail. Records the follow-up measurement (the Standard plan changed nothing; the prefetch storm was an accidental keep-alive), where browser telemetry actually lives, and why this curl build cannot be trusted for HTTP versions.
# Security & Identity
* [MCP OAuth Flow](mcp-oauth-flow.md) - Who authenticates where when connecting an AI client to the MCP server; two identities, three parties plus Entra ID.
# Conventions for this bundle
* Every concept document is a markdown file with YAML frontmatter; `type` is mandatory, `title`, `description`, `resource`, `tags`, and `timestamp` are recommended.
* Use standard **relative** markdown links between documents (e.g. `agent/overview.md`, `../architecture.md`). Do NOT use the spec's `/`-prefixed bundle-absolute form — GitHub resolves those against the repo root (missing `/docs`) and navigation breaks.
* Record notable additions and changes in [log.md](log.md).
* `index.md` and `log.md` are reserved names — never use them for concept documents.
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# Log
## 2026-08-07 (later)
* **Update**: `backend/cloudpc-device-validation.md` — third `IsCloudPc` transport rail: the pre-auth distress channel. `DistressReport.IsCloudPc` (CloudPcDetector verdict captured at `DistressReporter` construction) → `DistressReportEntry`/table column → "Devices Not Registered" aggregation (sticky-true per serial, same OR semantics as the Sessions merge) → portal Cloud PC badge + actionable hint ("enable Windows 365 Cloud PC Validation + W365CloudPcValidation add-on"). Motivated by the first W365 field run: the rejected Cloud PC showed up as anonymous "Microsoft Corporation / Virtual Machine" with no clue that the fix is the Cloud PC validator, not Autopilot registration. UNVERIFIED like all distress fields; ≤18 bytes, fits the 1536-byte cap.
## 2026-08-07
* **Update**: `backend/cloudpc-device-validation.md` — the "deliberately out of scope" follow-up landed in the same PR: agent-side `IsCloudPc` flag (`CloudPcDetector`, bootstrap-verified marker AND: Windows365 key + CloudManagedDesktopExtension service key, SKIP-safe) rides two rails — `SessionRegistration` → Sessions/Index (sticky-true) → `SessionSummary` + `isCloudPc` search filter (portal/raw/MCP), and the `EnrollmentFactsObserved` payload → `EnrollmentScenarioObservations.CloudPc` (set-once, both values) with profile reason `cloud_pc_first_connect:no_device_esp_expected` + `cloud_pc_marker` in the audit-trail census. Reason+observation only: no completion arm depends on DeviceSetup, Mode stays AccountSetup/IME-classified, EspConfig keeps configured-FirstSync semantics. Never an auth input.
## 2026-08-06
* **Creation**: Added `backend/cloudpc-device-validation.md` — the CloudPc fallback validator (`ValidatorType.CloudPc = 5`, tenant flag `ValidateCloudPcDevice`): W365 Cloud PCs are structurally never Autopilot-registered, so stage 4 gains a third stage that binds the chain-validated MDM cert's Subject CN (= Intune device id, field-verified on a real Cloud PC) to the tenant's `virtualEndpoint/cloudPCs` inventory — admits exactly the service-provisioned Cloud PCs, no device-type routing, local W365 markers never consulted for auth. New optional Graph add-on `W365CloudPcValidation` → `CloudPC.Read.All` (catalog + grant script now pinned by `GraphFeatureCatalogSyncTests`; Graph 403 = definitive "grant missing", not transient). Bootstrap dev script v2.3-dev.3 exempts guard 4 (uptime) while the Cloud-PC relax is active — the fresh-profile window is the time anchor at first connect, not boot uptime. Follow-up deliberately out of scope: agent-side `IsCloudPc` classification + decision-engine "no Device ESP" expectation.
## 2026-08-05 (later)
* **Update**: `rules/rule-authoring-surface.md` — new section `POST /api/rules/gather/test-pattern`: the logparser pattern tester (agent-exact .NET matching: no IgnoreCase, first-match-per-line, cmtrace vs text mode, verbatim format=text hint), motivated by a field incident where a PHP-verified regex behaved differently under .NET. `CmTraceLogParser` moved Agent → `AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Logging` so agent and backend share the ONE parsing implementation (timestamp caveat: AssumeLocal = server TZ on backend, endpoint reports no timestamps). MCP: new `test_log_pattern` tool, logparser lint in `validate_rule`, guide gains the case-sensitivity/engine-mismatch pitfalls.
## 2026-08-05
* **Creation**: Added `mcp/tool-telemetry.md` — the three MCP tool-telemetry layers (App Insights `McpToolName`, per-user usage table, `MCP_TOOL_LOGGING` stderr lines) and the new quality signals: soft-error capture (`toolError` returns instead of throwing, so backend telemetry counted those calls as successes), `resultChars`/`overCap` vs. the inline-size hint, bounded args summaries, caller scope, `search_zero_hit` on the three search tools (unmet-demand signal), and `tool_call_rejected` for JSON-RPC-level Zod/unknown-tool rejections sniffed at the `/mcp` route (previously invisible everywhere). Bicep default for `toolLoggingEnabled` flipped to `true` (documented desired state; live flag set via `az containerapp update`).
* **Creation**: Added `rules/rule-authoring-surface.md` — the AI-assisted rule-authoring stack: three deterministic MCP resources (`rule_authoring_guide` hand-written, `rule_schemas` + `rule_guardrails` generated into `rule-authoring.generated.ts` by a new combine.js emitter, drift-guarded twice), the MCP-local `validate_rule` (ajv 2020-12 against the single-rule $defs, guardrail pre-flight mirroring GatherRuleGuards matching semantics incl. hard blocks, semantic lint for schema-valid-but-dead rules), and the side-effect-free `POST /api/rules/analyze/dryrun` (TenantAdminOrGlobalReader; `RuleEngine.DryRun.cs` trace twin sharing the production evaluators, all-conditions trace with per-condition evidence + matchingEventCount, parity and side-effect-freedom pinned by RuleEngineDryRunTests). MCP `test_analyze_rule` wraps the endpoint with `{{token}}`-interpolated previews; `author-rule` prompt drives the draft → validate → dry-run loop. Deliberately absent: gather-rule remote execution, rule writes via MCP.
## 2026-08-04
* **Update**: `rules/gather-rule-phase-scoping.md` — new section "Which phase feeds the triggers": `GatherRuleExecutorHost` now drives `phase_change`/`phase_exit`/`on_event` gather triggers (and the phase-scope gates) from the post-reduce `TimelineEventStream` (every emitted event's `(eventType, phase)` published by `EventTimelineEmitter`) instead of the pre-reduce `SignalIngress.SignalPosted` payloads. Trigger: session `32312a32` (RealmJoin tenant rsneuffen.de) — a Phase-Start rule on FinalizingSetup fired at the raw ESP-exit `EspPhaseChanged(FinalizingSetup)` signal, 7 minutes before the engine's RealmJoin-gated `phase_transition(FinalizingSetup)`, reading `HKLM\SOFTWARE\RealmJoin\Custom\BIOS` before the RealmJoin package created it. Phase triggers now fire exactly when the timeline shows the phase; `on_event` additionally sees engine-emitted event types (`enrollment_complete`, `realmjoin_resolved`, …) for the first time in V2, restoring V1 semantics and the documented end-of-enrollment pattern. Other raw-signal hosts (DeviceInfo, keep-awake, PPKG) deliberately unchanged.
## 2026-08-02
* **Creation**: Added `backend/tenant-activation-welcome-mail.md` — triggered by the first production auto-approve (activation at signup+64 s, notification address saved at +69 s → welcome mail silently skipped, since the approval path is the only sender and reads the address once). Fix documented in the doc: the notification-email save path now also triggers the send (`PUT /api/preview/notification-email` → fresh approval check `IsApprovedFreshAsync`, bypassing the 30 s negative cache), and a conditional-insert `welcome-email-sent` marker in `PreviewWhitelist` makes the send once-only across both racing paths (marker consumed strictly after the address check; revoke clears it, offboarding wipes the partition, the GA resend endpoint sends unconditionally and consumes it best-effort).
## 2026-07-29
* **Update**: `agent/gather-rule-debug-log.md` — three trace enrichments: (1) new `phase` stage writing an enrollment-phase transition marker (`phase change: Old -> New`, ruleId `-`) so every rule-level line reads against the current phase; (2) logparser now writes one line per regex match — line number, matched text, capture groups — capped at 10 per file per run (the per-file summary keeps the full count); (3) the invalid-regex `error` line includes the offending pattern string.
* **Update**: `url-registry.md` (+ `web/portal-navigation-prefetch.md` context) — the portal is now a **full static export** (`output: 'export'`, `trailingSlash: true`): the SWA serves plain files, the managed SSR runtime — the portal's last cold-start source ("Backend call failure" > 45 s) — no longer exists. Detail routes moved from path params to query strings (`/sessions?id=`, `/sessions/inspector?id=`, `/diagnosis?id=`, `/apps/detail?name=`, `/admin/backups/detail?id=`, `/admin/customs-archive/detail?tenantId=&rowKey=`) with all 21 link sites going through the new single-definition builders in `lib/routes.ts`; the 9 `[section]` families prerender via `generateStaticParams` server shells (37 pages, `dynamicParams=false`), server `redirect()` index pages became `ClientRedirect` shells. Legacy PATH-shaped deep links (sent Teams/Slack/webhook notifications hold `/sessions/{id}` forever) are preserved permanently: SWA wildcard rewrites serve the family page and the globally mounted `LegacyPathRedirect` rewrites to the canonical query URL (hash + query preserved; mapping pinned by `lib/__tests__/legacyPathRedirect.test.ts`). `middleware.ts` host routing became the client-side `HostRoutingGuard` (prefix list moved to `lib/hostRouting.ts`); the legacy `/go/[code]` route + `bootstrapValidation.ts` are deleted (BootstrapSessions table verified free of pre-cutover active sessions). `staticwebapp.config.json` now carries the 19 docs/marketing redirects (order-sensitive), the legacy rewrites, `404.html` override and ALL security headers incl. the literalized prod CSP — guarded by the new `swaConfig.guard.test.ts`; maintenance mode changed from whole-file swap to a first-routes-entry insert (README rewritten). Backend notification deep links go through the new `Constants.PortalSessionUrl` (query shape, pinned). Deploy: `deploy-web.yml` uploads `out/` with `is_static_export: true`.
* **Creation**: Added `backend/oobe-bootstrap-go-flow.md` (and a `Bootstrap go-URL` section + web-registry update in `url-registry.md`) — the OOBE bootstrap script endpoint moved from the portal's Next.js `/go/[code]` SSR route into the Function App (`GET /api/bootstrap/go/{code}`, `GetBootstrapScriptFunction`), unblocking the portal's static export; the customer URL became **`go.autopilotmonitor.com/{code}`** (Front Door custom domain, `/*` route with origin-path rewrite, caching disabled — the script inlines the bearer token). New `Constants.BootstrapGoBaseUrl` (single producer via `CreateBootstrapSessionFunction`) + web `BOOTSTRAP_GO_URL` (display only); both guard host lists extended. Security invariants ported to C#: `BootstrapScriptValueValidator` (exact-GUID tenantId/token, https + host-allowlist + `/agent/….zip` path, expiry ≤ 14 d) and `OobeBootstrapScriptGenerator` (Replace-token raw-string template, single-quoted PS literals, 200-char error cap before quote-doubling; always-HTTP-200 text/plain contract for `irm | iex`). Endpoint is `PublicAnonymous` in the catalog, `NoStoreCacheMiddleware`-covered, self-rate-limited `bootstrap-script:{ip}` 20/min (rate-limit reply is also a 200 error script). Tests: golden byte-parity against the TS template, validator invariants incl. hostile-URL cases, format-gate table, and the previously missing BootstrapUrl shape pin. Transition: the legacy www route + `middleware.ts` `/go` prefix stay alive for pre-migration URLs (validity ≤ 168 h) and are removed in the static-export PR no earlier than 168 h after the last www URL was issued. Customer docs `network-endpoints.md` gained the `go.` host (device-facing, Bootstrap-Sessions-only).
* **Update**: `agent/autopilot-ztd-diagnostics.md` — presentation layer for the startup error backfill (customer feedback: an unannounced wall of pre-agent Error events with a single identical timestamp read like a live failure). Agent: the backfill scan now buffers the capped record set, emits an Info summary event first (`modern_deployment_log`, `backfillSummary: true` + `replayedCount`/`droppedOverCap`/`lookbackMinutes`), then replays oldest-first so the timeline sequence follows event-log chronology. Web: `EventTimeline.tsx` badges `backfilled: true` events („⟲ Backfilled", tooltip) and renders the original `timeCreated` as the row time with a "(reported …)" suffix plus a `Recorded` metadata line — works retroactively for already-stored events. Severity is deliberately not downgraded.
* **Creation**: Added `agent/gather-rule-debug-log.md` — the new per-tenant setting `EnableGatherRuleDebugLog` (ConfigVersion 35 → 36, portal toggle under Settings → Agent, `EnableImeMatchLog`-style bool→path projection in `RemoteConfigMerger`). When enabled, the agent writes `%ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor\Logs\gather_rules_debug.log`: one pipe-delimited line per evaluation decision across ten previously silent "produced nothing" exits — disabled rules, `interval` without `intervalSeconds` (never runs), the first-tick-after-one-full-interval window, phase-scope skips incl. `currentPhase=Unknown`, per-(rule, phase) dedup, empty collector results (`emitOnlyIfExists`), `on_change` hash suppression (hash prefix + streak), guard blocks, logparser per-file outcomes (position skips, parse failures with a `format=text` hint when every line fails CMTrace parsing, `maxLines`/wildcard caps), and full exception stacks that the agent log drops. 10 MB cap + one `.old` generation; no hot-reload (per-enrollment lifecycle); flag survives the offline config cache; `--run-gather-rules` always traces and echoes under `--console`; zero-rules delivery leaves a one-line file instead of nothing. Side fix: `GatherRuleExecutorHost` now passes the logger into `InformationalEventPost`, so gather-event emissions appear in the agent DEBUG log.
* **Correction + Update**: `web/portal-navigation-prefetch.md`. The HTTP/1.1 claim in the 2026-07-27 entry below is **wrong** and has been struck from the document: `portal.autopilotmonitor.com` negotiates **h2**, verified by `openssl s_client -alpn h2,http/1.1` and a .NET `HttpClient` returning `HTTP/2.0`. The false reading came from the Windows/Schannel curl build in this environment, which has no HTTP/2 support and therefore always reports `1.1` — do not use it to determine HTTP versions. There is no six-connection cap in play; the queue is server-side in the SWA SSR runtime, which does not change the fix or the evidence, only the mechanism. Added an `Outcome` section with 20 h of post-change telemetry: the Free → Standard plan change (16:02:44 UTC) produced **no measurable latency gain** once stratified by the gap to the previous request (p50 Free → Standard: `<10s` 85 → 95 ms, `5-30min` 429 → 441 ms; tail rates 1.64 %/0.374 % over 2 s/10 s vs 6 and 1 events at n = 258 against 4.2 and 1.0 expected; `browserTimings` Mann-Whitney z = −0.24, p = 0.81). The freezes were removed by `prefetch={false}` (16:34:13 UTC): worst `browserTimings.totalDuration` 225,277 → 4,856 ms. The prefetch storm was also an **accidental keep-alive** — requests under 10 s apart fell from 85 % to 46 %, and on the identical never-cacheable `/sessions/{id}` route the median rose 87 → 211 ms and p90 465 → 1,480 ms, with one 11,441 ms abandoned request (`resultCode 0`) after 517 minutes idle. Synthetic bursts warm the runtime and must not be used to benchmark this (round 1 p50 288 ms vs rounds 4–25 p50 113 ms).
## 2026-07-27
* **Creation**: Added `web/portal-navigation-prefetch.md` (and a `Web Portal` section to the index) — root cause of the minute-long portal freezes. `GlobalSidebar` and `Navbar` render the whole navigation on every page, so the App Router's default viewport prefetch issued one `?_rsc=` request per visible link against `portal.autopilotmonitor.com` (~10,400 in 14 days). *(The original entry attributed the freeze to HTTP/1.1 and a six-connection-per-origin cap — see the 2026-07-28 correction; the queue is server-side.)* When the Static Web Apps managed runtime queued the prefetches (p50 91 ms, p95 896 ms, but max 234 s / 21 samples over 30 s), the navigation the user wanted was stuck behind that queue. Measured on the 2026-07-27 17:25 CEST incident: `/admin/presence?_rsc=` 151 s, three siblings finishing within 340 ms of each other at ~37.5 s, all `200`, while the backend API answered in 1.6–2.2 s and `browserTimings` showed `networkDuration` 16 ms against `processingDuration` 225 s. Every navigation Link now sets `prefetch={false}` — these routes are client components behind `ProtectedRoute` that fetch their own data, so the prefetched RSC payload carried no benefit. The doc also records that browser telemetry lives in a **separate** App Insights resource (`AUTOPILOT_MONITOR_WEB_APPINSIGHTS_ID`) that the MCP `query_backend_logs` tool cannot reach, which is why the freezes left no trace in the backend logs.
* **Creation**: Added `backend/rule-regression-radar.md` — F3 regression radar (analyze rules only; gather rules wait for their per-batch stats dedup fix): per (tenant, rule) daily hit rate from `RuleStats`, firing only when the trailing 7-day window has ≥5 hit sessions and ≥20 evaluated sessions, the rate is ≥2× the prior 28-day baseline AND the Wilson 95 % intervals are disjoint (deterministic `MetricsMath` primitive with hand-computed test vectors). Suppressed for deleted rules, rules younger than baseline+window (`CreatedAt` grace), rules edited inside the window (`UpdatedAt`), empty baselines, and the `RuleRegressionRadarDisabled` app-setting kill switch. Alert episodes live as `ruleregression|{ruleId}` tracker rows (one bell + one `RuleFrequencyRegression` ops event per episode; numbers refreshed while active; re-armed under 1.5× baseline, on fire-stop, or by the 30-day tracker retention). On-fire dimension correlation over osBuild/model/agentVersion/imeVersion with the "correlated, not necessarily causal" wording contract. Surfaces: `regressions[]` in the rule-stats response (MCP inherits), the analyze-rules page's 30-day sparkline and regression badge.
* **Creation**: Added `backend/device-journeys.md` — F2 device history / First-Time-Right: the device key (trim + case-fold serial, junk/placeholder exclusion incl. the agent's `Unknown` WMI sentinel), journey grouping over the terminal set Succeeded/Failed/Incomplete (first success ends a journey, a >30-day gap from the previous attempt's CompletedAt starts one, WhiteGlove's single session row is ONE attempt, open sessions are never attempts), the `DeviceHistories` chain (cap 20, written inline at the terminal seam, healed by the sweep, deleted-session refs pruned tombstone-driven, deliberately not in the per-session deletion manifest) and the additive `DeviceJourneyAggregates` daily rows (window rate = ratio of sums — no rolling row needed, 180-day retention). Surfaces: the session-detail "Attempt N" banner with server-computed attempt numbers (virtual-attempt rule for live sessions), the Fleet Health First-time-right section (≥20-journey gate, attempt histogram, repeat-devices violator list), and the MCP `get_device_history` tool (serial mode / fleet FTR mode).
## 2026-07-25
* **Update**: `agent/secureboot-ca2023-detection.md` — review follow-up on 90012d9 hardened the privilege scope, the repo's only privilege-adjustment code and therefore the precedent for any future one. The process token moved from a raw `IntPtr` to a `SafeHandle` assigned by the P/Invoke marshaler, so the CLR owns it from the moment `OpenProcessToken` returns and the critical finalizer releases it even when `Dispose` never runs — previously an async exception between the successful open and the caller's `using` leaked the handle *with the privilege enabled and no owner left to restore it*. `Dispose` became idempotent and now releases the handle in a `finally`, so a throwing restore cannot strand it; the restore obligation is recorded immediately after the successful `AdjustTokenPrivileges` with nothing throwable in between. The whole enable → read → restore sequence runs under a static gate because the privilege is adjusted on the *process* token: a concurrent reader would see "already enabled", correctly skip its own restore, and then lose the privilege mid-read when the first reader disposed, reporting `privilege_denied` on a machine that holds it.
## 2026-07-24
* **Creation**: Added `backend/server-actions-on-demand-diagnostics.md` — the ServerAction channel (queue on `Sessions.PendingActionsJson`, deliver piggy-backed on the next ingest response, at-least-once with `Type|RuleId|QueuedAt` dedup and sequential dispatch) and the on-demand log collection built on it: the portal's always-visible **Collect Logs** button, the new `EndpointPolicy.TenantAdminOrOperator` tier with the mandatory in-function per-type re-gate (Operators queue only `request_diagnostics`), the member-readable `diagnosticsUploadConfigured` feature flag, the admin quick-config path that must queue `rotate_config` before `request_diagnostics` (works against the deployed fleet — a one-time override would not, the mode gate is agent-side), sequence-based progress matching immune to agent clock skew, and the offboarding cascade's hosted-prefix sweep closing the latest-wins orphan-blob gap.
* **Update**: `agent/esp-policy-provider-stall.md` — the customer's follow-up on issue #106 corrected the field-case mechanics: `TrackingPoliciesCreated=1` WAS set under the foreign `ConfigMgr` provider, so the ESP ignores a foreign provider's completion values and waits on the Intune-registered `Sidecar` provider by name (the rename to `Sidecar` creates no tracking entries yet unblocks instantly). The completeness-keyed detector would have missed exactly this — the incident it was built for. The tripwire is now two-armed under one event type discriminated by `reason`: `provider_incomplete` (unchanged dwell on continuously-incomplete providers) and `sidecar_provider_missing` (≥ 1 Setup/Apps provider registered without `Sidecar`, completeness deliberately ignored, clock reset when Sidecar registers later). Sidecar-missing wins the `reason` when both arms cross in one round; the cross-restart fingerprint gains a `sidecarMissing` sentinel; payload adds `reason` and `sidecarMissingForMinutes`. Evidence for the name-keyed wait: Niehaus' documented Intune WAP payload always registers `Sidecar` (ConfigMgr only via a co-management settings policy) and Microsoft's ESP troubleshooting models app tracking exclusively through the Sidecar subkey.
* **Creation**: Added `agent/esp-policy-provider-stall.md` — a customer diagnosed that pre-provisioned devices with the ConfigMgr client as a blocking app occasionally park the user ESP at "Apps (Identifying)" for days: only a `ConfigMgr` provider is registered under `EnrollmentStatusTracking\Device\Setup\Apps\PolicyProviders` (no `Sidecar` = IME) and `TrackingPoliciesCreated` never becomes 1 — a wait the CSP defines without any timeout; renaming the key to `Sidecar` unblocks immediately. The agent now ships the always-on `esp_policy_provider_stalled` tripwire (60-s tick, 15-min continuous-incompleteness dwell, one-shot per provider, `StartupEventGate` fingerprint across restarts, purely observational via the InformationalEvent rail — no toggle, no ConfigVersion bump), generalized to any provider in both `Setup/Apps` and `DevicePreparation` kinds rather than hardcoding the ConfigMgr case. Companion change: `SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Autopilot` joins the gather-rule registry allowlist so tenants can target the subtree with custom rules (e.g. `not_exists` on the Sidecar key).
* **Creation**: Added `agent/secureboot-ca2023-detection.md` — ANALYZE-SEC-001 warned on devices whose firmware already carried the 2023 certificate, because the agent only read the `SecureBoot\Servicing\UEFICA2023Status` registry value, which mirrors the Windows Update rollout rather than the firmware (customer report). The agent now reads the UEFI `db`/`KEK` variables natively (`GetFirmwareEnvironmentVariableExW` with `SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege` enabled on the process token — first privilege-adjustment code in the repo) and emits per-certificate booleans on `secureboot_status`. Suppression rides on a one-sided marker, `uefiCa2023FirmwareConfirmed`, emitted only on positive confirmation: the engine's `not_exists` precondition fails on any present value, so a two-sided boolean could not distinguish "confirmed" from "checked and missing", while the marker's absence keeps old agents and firmware-missing devices on the v2 path. Rule v3.0.0 is therefore safe to seed before the agent release.
* **Update**: `url-registry.md` — the first release after the alias migration surfaced Front Door caching as a correctness hazard: the alias served the previous `version.json` (`X-Cache: TCP_REMOTE_HIT`) after the origin had rotated, and since manifest and ZIP are independent cache entries, a stale manifest with a fresh ZIP fails the bootstrap SHA-256 check. Route caching on `/agent/*` is now disabled and every blob upload stamps `Cache-Control: no-cache` (CI `Send-Blob`, local `build.ps1`, `versions/*.json` manifests) — all agent-container blobs rotate in place, so nothing there is safely cacheable.
* **Update**: `agent/decision-engine.md` — the RealmJoin completion gate has a third terminal, `FirstDeploymentIncomplete`. Session 224b2087 showed why: an interactive logon 17 s after DeploymentPhase 101 makes RealmJoin reclassify the run as a secondary-user deployment, whose branch writes 200/210 and never 110 — the gate stayed closed until the 60-min hard timeout although Hello and desktop were long resolved. `realmjoin_phase_changed` is now a typed `RealmJoinPhaseChanged` signal, so `RealmJoinFacts.LastDeploymentPhase` is persisted across agent restarts (this also fixes every `realmjoin_timeout` event claiming "last phase: 0"); a transition out of 100/101 into 200/210 releases the gate with the `realmjoin_first_deployment_incomplete` Warning, and the `RealmJoinDetected` replay path evaluates the same rule for restarts that swallow the transition. A first observation of 210 deliberately does not release — session 6f1959c0 started at 210 and only deployed afterwards.
* **Creation**: Added `url-registry.md` — all well-known hosts (own subdomains, both blob accounts, API origin, Graph, Entra login) are now defined once per component (`Constants.cs`, web `utils/config.ts`, MCP `src/config.ts`) and referenced everywhere else; three guard tests fail the build on any literal outside the registries. Written because the EU cutover missed two hardcoded copies of the legacy blob host — `LatestVersionsService` (feeds the portal's version badge) and `ValidateBootstrapCodeFunction` — which kept working only through the fail-soft legacy mirror in `build-agent.yml`; those two plus the agent `SelfUpdater` now use the `download.autopilotmonitor.com` alias (verified serving all four artifacts first). The portal's bootstrap allow-list accepts alias AND legacy host during the transition, which imposes a deploy order: web before (or with) backend. The sweep also surfaced a fourth copy of the www/portal host pair in `middleware.ts` (now derived from the registry via `hostRouting.ts`) and a backend short-link built on the bare apex domain, which only worked through a registrar-level 301.
## 2026-07-22
* **Creation**: Added `versioning.md` — agent, backend and MCP now share one version shape (`<major>.<minor>.<build>` + 7-char commit + build timestamp) and one implementation of the build-number reservation (`.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1`, previously copy-pasted between `build-agent.yml` and `build.ps1`). The backend had been pinned at a hand-written `1.0.0` since inception and now starts at `1.5.1000`; the MCP server's `package.json` version was bumped by hand and now starts at `1.5.300`, and it reports its own commit on `/health` instead of only the documentation bundle's. Both deploy workflows poll their health endpoint until it reports the build just deployed and publish `versions/<component>.json` only then, so a manifest that disagrees with the live endpoint means the instance drifted rather than the pipeline failing halfway. `agent/build-counter-blob.md` keeps the agent-specific parts and now points at the shared protocol; its counter URL was still the pre-cutover storage account.
* **Creation**: Added `rules/gather-rule-guardrails.md` — the gather-rule allowlists are enforced only on the agent (the backend validates no `collectorType`, `target`, or `parameters`), so a collector that forgets to call its guard *is* the vulnerability. Written because two had: `LogParserCollector` read any path in `rule.Target`, bypassing even the `C:\Users` hard block that every other file collector honours, and `EventLogCollector` read any channel including `Security` — while the customer-facing documentation already promised both were allowlisted. Both now guard, with `logparser` checking the directory for wildcard targets (`Path.GetFullPath` throws on `*`) and re-checking each resolved path. Added an event-log channel allowlist (`eventLogChannels`) plus hard-blocked channels held in C# rather than JSON, so a parse error cannot lift them. Also fixed the command timeout, which was inert: `ReadToEnd()` blocks until the pipe closes, so `WaitForExit(30000)` was only reached after the process had already exited and a hung command pinned its worker forever — now read asynchronously and killed at the timeout.
* **Update**: Added `.github/workflows/ci.yml` — the full suite (backend, agent V2 Core, DecisionCore, SummaryDialog, web, MCP) now runs on every pull request and every push to main, plus a job that fails if the generated guardrail files drift from `rules/guardrails.json`. Previously **no** workflow ran tests on a PR: the deploy workflows build without testing, and `build-agent.yml` tested only `DecisionCore.Tests` on manual dispatch — while `trust/security-faq.md` already told customers that automated tests run in CI. Added CodeQL (C# and TypeScript) and Dependabot (nuget, npm ×2, actions). Marked `OfficeBinaryWatcherTests` `[Collection("SerialThreading")]`: its bounded re-probe races the shared ThreadPool and failed once under full-suite load.
## 2026-07-21
* **Update**: `search_docs` and `search_knowledge` now state in their tool descriptions that queries must be in English. Both corpora and `all-MiniLM-L6-v2` are English-only, and the failure is total rather than gradual — a German question returns zero results, not weak ones. The caller is a language model, so translating the question before the call and answering in the user's language costs nothing; a multilingual embedding model would be the alternative but is much larger and would have to be measured against the eval harness first, since it changes English retrieval too.
* **Update**: Added `scripts/eval-docs-search.ts`, an offline retrieval evaluation harness (2465 queries in three classes: chunk headings as a regression detector, rare identifiers, and hand-written questions as the reality anchor), and used it to close a third `search_docs` gap found during the live test. The keyword fallback only fired when semantic search returned *fewer* than `topK`; a pasted identifier like `WOW6432Node` instead returned three chunks at ~0.29 that did not contain the word while the one chunk that did was never considered. It now also fires on a weak semantic head (<0.35), letting exact matches take the front while keeping one semantic result. The threshold is measured, not guessed: 0.35 fixes 335 queries and breaks 0 (identifier recall 66.2% → 81.1%), while 0.40 fixes more but starts demoting hand-written questions. The measurement also resized the problem — identifier queries were only succeeding 66.2% of the time, so the reported case was one of roughly 750.
* **Update**: Closed the two measured recall gaps in `search_docs` (`mcp/docs-corpus.md`). (1) **Token windows** — 87 of 324 chunks exceeded the model's 256-token context and 13% of all tokens never reached the ranking; a character budget cannot fix this (the corpus ranges 2.43–5.81 chars/token), so long text is now embedded as 250-token windows with 40 overlap and scored by its BEST window (`embeddings: number[][]`, max not mean). Token coverage 87% → 100%; "proxy configuration blocking app downloads" went from absent to 0.559 at rank 1; the ten reference queries kept byte-identical scores. Costs +31% vectors, index 2.63 → 3.12 MB. The rules corpus gained the same treatment (128 rules → 172 vectors). (2) **Keyword fallback** — when the semantic pass returns fewer than `topK`, results are topped up via literal `lexicalMatch` on distinctive query terms, requiring two matching terms for corroboration (one incidental substring match returned a page about LLM providers for a sourdough query). Fuzzy matching was measured and rejected: at a threshold low enough to surface "RealmJoin" it invents 5 hits for "SCEPman", which the corpus never mentions. Also sharpened the tool description with the measured context argument for preferring it over fetching the docs site.
* **Creation**: Added `mcp/docs-corpus.md` (new `mcp/` section) — the MCP server gains `search_docs`, a third semantic corpus built from the published customer documentation repository (`autopilotmonitor-docs`, checked out into the Docker build context by the deploy workflow). Documents the h2/h3 + `<details>` chunking with breadcrumb prefixes, the two deliberate size exceptions (tables never split, unbroken changelog lists split at line level), the CRLF precondition (`.` does not match `\r` in JS — headings silently stop matching, which produced 286 wrong-but-plausible chunks before it was found), the optional `docs` section in `search-index.json` and its validation asymmetry, embedding rounding to 6 decimals, and the cross-repo coupling: a docs edit reaches clients only after an MCP redeploy, made checkable via `DOCS_COMMIT` on `/health`. Container resources raised to 0.5 vCPU / 1.0 GiB for the cold-start query-embedder load.
## 2026-07-20
* **Update**: `rules/gather-rule-phase-scoping.md` — the gather-rule form now shows the phase-scope and emit-mode controls only where they can change behavior (`supportsPhaseScope` / `supportsEmitMode`), nulls hidden-control state out of the payload, and rejects a scope mode selected but left unfilled. Offering all three "when" controls unconditionally allowed combinations that could only suppress a one-shot rule, plus a silent no-op state.
* **Update**: Extended `rules/gather-rule-phase-scoping.md` with the `phase_exit` trigger — the closing bookend to `phase_change`, for one-shot collection when a phase is LEFT (e.g. "state at the end of Account Setup"). Documents the evaluation-before-phase-advance rule (triggerPhase match and scope gate see the phase being left), firing into `Failed`, the disjoint `exit:` dedup key space, and why no ConfigVersion bump is needed (no new field — old agents simply never fire the rule).
* **Update**: Reworked `agent/mdm-reboot-coalescing.md` after the first real enrollment (session b2e890c1): 2800 records are now **aggregated per burst** into ONE neutral Info event (`rebootUris[]`/`uriCount`/`firstRebootUri`; watermark persisted at flush so a pre-emit reboot kill loses nothing); the raw event no longer claims a reboot — ANALYZE-ESP-005 is gated on an actually-observed `system_reboot_detected`. **Removed** the Shell-Core `esp_reboot_coalescing` event entirely: the "RebootCoalescing" token appears in the routine `SubcategoryProcessing_Started` bootstrap marker on every enrollment (false positive by construction). Verified 2800 description shape recorded.
* **Creation**: Added `agent/mdm-reboot-coalescing.md` — the agent now attributes the "unexpected mid-ESP reboot + second sign-in" pattern (PMPC research) to the device-assigned policy URIs that forced it: new `MdmRebootPolicyTracker` (DM-Enterprise EventID 2800, per-URI `mdm_policy_reboot_required` events, cross-restart RecordId watermark), a `RebootCoalescing` branch in `ShellCoreTracker` (`esp_reboot_coalescing`, backfill-emitting by design), and the `ANALYZE-ESP-005` advisory (reassign device → user groups). ConfigVersion 35; event types deliberately distinct from `system_reboot_detected` so RebootCount stays uninflated.
* **Creation**: Added `backend/business-timestamps.md` (new `backend/` section) — the 2026-07-18 migration reset every row's system Timestamp, exposing that AuditLogs/OpsEvents/Events had (unknowingly) displayed and filtered on it all along; documents the `OccurredUtc` column, the RowKey decoders and RowKey-range date/retention clauses in `BusinessTimestamp`, the GUID-guard trap, the audit/ops backfill endpoint, and the "system Timestamp is never authoritative" migration rule.
* **Creation**: Added `rules/gather-rule-phase-scoping.md` (new `rules/` section) — gather rules gain `activePhases` (run only during listed phases), `activeFromPhase` (sticky latch from a phase onwards, never via Failed) and `emitMode: "on_change"` (canonical-hash result dedup with `suppressedPolls` observability), ConfigVersion 34. Includes the prerequisite backend fix: the custom-rule toggle PUT no longer wipes the stored rule definition (partial-merge in `GatherRuleService.UpdateRuleAsync`).
## 2026-07-18
* **Creation**: Added `agent/endpoint-migration.md` — config-channel agent re-home (`MigrateToApiBaseUrl` on `GET agent/config`, ConfigVersion 33): backend or per-tenant API-URL moves without DNS indirection (impossible due to mTLS/Flex-TLS). Live-fetch-only with cache strip, `AgentEndpointMigrationRules` allowlist validated on both sides, one hop, kill-switch wins. Built as the lesson from the 2026-07-18 WEU→GWC cutover, which hard-cut all in-flight agents.
## 2026-07-26
* **Creation**: Added `backend/time-attribution.md` — the F1 enrollment time attribution: exact-partition invariant against the session's authoritative DurationSeconds, two-window WhiteGlove model, segment mapping from phase-declaration events, positive-evidence ESP-blocking join with "up to" what-if bounds, reboot spans from event gaps around `lastBootUtc`, and the SessionTimeBreakdowns / TimeAttributionAggregates tables with their terminal-seam + maintenance-sweep compute paths and read surfaces (web lane, fleet panel, MCP `get_time_attribution`).
## 2026-07-17
* **Creation**: Added `agent/build-counter-blob.md` — agent build numbers now come from a shared public counter blob (`buildcounter-v{N}.txt`, reserve-before-build with ETag-CAS) so local `build.ps1` and CI `build-agent.yml` builds can never mint the same number. Documents the CI parity fixes (SummaryDialog.exe.config in the ZIP, EXE-vs-manifest version check, hash-oracle update gated on stable cutover) and the Sigstore provenance attestation on CI-built ZIPs.
## 2026-07-16
* **Creation**: Added `agent/autopilot-ztd-diagnostics.md` — reference for Windows' own ZTD diagnostic surfaces (ModernDeployment Autopilot event IDs incl. 807/809/815/908, the `Diagnostics\Autopilot` registry key, deployment-service endpoints, known-issue error-code map with KB fixes). Backs the agent's `ZtdEvidence` collector (`ztdVerdict` on `autopilot_profile_missing`) and the backend known-issue rules; sources carry a re-check RSS feed.
## 2026-07-13
* **Removal**: Moved `customer-graph-add-on-permissions.md` out of this contributor bundle into the customer documentation repository (`reference/optional-graph-permissions.md`). It was customer-facing product content and did not belong in the tech-docs bundle; removed the entry from `index.md`.
* **Creation**: Added `agent/hello-wizard-unskip.md` — session 772fe502 fix: the `HelloWizardStarted` decision signal (prevention veto + un-skip cure for the policy-disabled Hello shortcut) and the HelloTracker confirmation second read against flip-flopping WHfB CSP values.
## 2026-07-11
* **Creation**: Added the `agent/` section — three concept documents on the V2 agent: `agent/overview.md` (runtime, collectors, telemetry pipeline), `agent/decision-engine.md` (DecisionCore reducer, signals, A/B/C completion arms, invariants), `agent/logs-and-persistence.md` (persisted artifacts, signal log vs spool, recovery/replay flow) plus `agent/index.md`.
* **Creation**: Converted `docs/` into an OKF v0.1 knowledge bundle — added YAML frontmatter to `architecture.md`, `mcp-oauth-flow.md`, and `customer-graph-add-on-permissions.md`; created `index.md` and this log.
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---
type: Reference
title: MCP OAuth Flow — Who Authenticates Where
description: How the two unrelated identities (AI-product account vs. Entra ID work account) and three parties interact when connecting an AI client to the Autopilot Monitor MCP server.
resource: /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/oauth.ts
tags:
- mcp
- oauth
- entra-id
- security
timestamp: 2026-07-11T10:59:31+02:00
---
# MCP OAuth Flow — Who Authenticates Where
**Status:** Reference · **Owner:** MCP Server · **Code:** [`src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/oauth.ts`](../../src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/oauth.ts)
## Why this document exists
Connecting an AI client (Claude Desktop, claude.ai, VS Code, ChatGPT) to the
Autopilot Monitor MCP server involves **two unrelated identities** and **three
parties plus Entra ID**. This regularly confuses users during setup, because
the account signed in to the AI product and the account used for Autopilot
Monitor are usually different people-in-one: e.g. **Luke** uses his normal
account `luke` for his Claude subscription, but his admin account `adm.luke`
for Autopilot Monitor.
The two identities never mix:
* **`luke` (AI-product account)** — only authenticates Luke against Claude
itself. Anthropic needs it to associate the OAuth callback with the right
Claude user and connector. The MCP server never sees this identity.
* **`adm.luke` (Entra ID work account)** — the identity *inside* the token.
Every MCP tool call is authorized as `adm.luke`; roles and tenant scope
derive from it. Anthropic never sees this password, only the issued tokens.
## The parties
1. **AI client + its backend** (e.g. Claude Desktop + claude.ai) — the OAuth
*client*. For hosted surfaces the token exchange and token storage happen
in the vendor's backend, not on the user's machine.
2. **MCP server** (Container App) — acts as a stateless **OAuth proxy /
authorization-server façade** in front of Entra ID. It is *not* an IdP:
it registers clients dynamically (RFC 7591, HMAC-signed stateless
`client_id`), enforces the redirect-URI allowlist and PKCE, and exchanges
codes at Entra using its confidential client secret.
3. **Entra ID** — the real identity provider. This is where `adm.luke` lives.
## Full sequence
```
Claude Desktop Browser (user's MCP server Entra ID
+ claude.ai backend DEFAULT browser!) (OAuth proxy)
│ │ │ │
1. │─ POST /mcp ──────────┼───────────────────────▶│ 401 + WWW-Auth │
2. │─ Discovery ──────────┼───────────────────────▶│ RFC 9728/8414 docs │
3. │─ POST /oauth/register┼───────────────────────▶│ client_id (HMAC- │
│ │ │ signed, embeds the │
│ │ │ registered callback) │
│ │ │ │
4. │─ opens browser ─────▶│─ GET /oauth/authorize ▶│─ 302 to Entra ──────▶│
│ │ (PKCE challenge) │ app-reg client_id, │
│ │ │ prompt=select_acct │
│ │ │ │
5. │ │◀── Microsoft sign-in: account picker ────────│
│ │ ➜ user picks adm.luke HERE │
│ │ │ │
6. │ │◀─ 302 /oauth/callback?code=... ──────────────│
│ │─ code ────────────────▶│ verifies HMAC state, │
│ │ │ re-checks allowlist │
│ │◀─ 302 claude.ai/api/mcp/auth_callback?code=..│
│ │ │ │
│◀═ browser hits claude.ai ═════╗ │ │
│ ➜ the browser MUST have an │ │ │
│ active claude.ai session │ │ │
│ as luke — otherwise │ │ │
│ Anthropic cannot map the │ │ │
│ code to a user/connector │ │ │
│ and the connect fails ════╝ │ │
│ │ │ │
7. │─ Anthropic backend: POST /oauth/token ───────▶│─ + client_secret ───▶│
│ (code + PKCE verifier) │◀─ access + refresh ──│
│◀─ tokens (stored server-side at Anthropic, per connector) │
│ │ │ │
8. │─ POST /mcp + Bearer ─┼───────────────────────▶│ validates Entra JWT │
│ │ │ ➜ acts as adm.luke │
```
## Key properties
* **Step 5 vs. step 6 is the double sign-in.** The whole browser leg runs in
the user's *default* browser. That one browser profile needs **both** an
active session at the AI product (`luke` at claude.ai — same account as in
the desktop app) *and* the Entra sign-in as `adm.luke`. `prompt=
select_account` forces the Entra account picker so an existing SSO session
for the wrong account cannot be silently reused.
* **Step 6 is authenticated at the vendor.** `claude.ai/api/mcp/auth_callback`
is an authenticated Anthropic endpoint; the authorization code is bound to
the Claude user via the browser's claude.ai session cookies. No claude.ai
session (or a different browser profile) → the code lands on a login page
and the connect stalls, even though the Entra half succeeded. This is the
single most common setup failure.
* **The MCP server is a pure intermediary.** Its client secret never leaves
the server; the AI client never talks to Entra directly. The redirect
target is checked twice (authorize + callback) against a strict allowlist
of exact vendor callback URIs, and the proxy state that transits the
user-agent is HMAC-signed with a 10-minute lifetime.
* **PKCE is end-to-end.** The AI client generates the verifier; the proxy
forwards the challenge (step 4) and the verifier (step 7) untouched, and
Entra validates the pair. The proxy additionally *requires* S256 PKCE and
rejects downgrades.
* **Tokens are Entra tokens for `adm.luke`** with audience
`api://<client_id>/access_as_user`. For hosted surfaces they are stored in
the vendor's backend per connector (which is why the connector then works
across desktop, web and mobile). Renewal is a silent `refresh_token` grant
through the same `/oauth/token` proxy — no account picker again.
* **Native CLIs skip step 6's hosted callback.** Claude Code, Gemini CLI and
VS Code's loopback flow use RFC 8252 `http://localhost:<port>` /
`http://127.0.0.1:<port>` redirects instead; there the token exchange runs
on the user's machine and no vendor-side session is involved.
## One-line summary
`luke` authenticates the *return path* of the authorization code to the AI
vendor (step 6); `adm.luke` is the identity *inside* the token that the MCP
server authorizes on every tool call (step 8).
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---
type: Concept
title: MCP Docs Corpus — search_docs and the Cross-Repo Build Coupling
description: How the published customer documentation becomes a third semantic search corpus in the MCP server — CRLF-safe heading chunking, build-time embedding, the corpus hash guard, and why editing the docs does not update a running server.
resource: /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/docs-corpus.ts
tags:
- mcp
- search
- embeddings
- documentation
- build
timestamp: 2026-07-21T19:30:00+02:00
---
# Purpose
The MCP server answers two different kinds of question, and they need two
different corpora.
* *"Why did this enrollment fail?"* → analysis rules, gather rules, IME log
patterns. That is `search_knowledge`, backed by `knowledge-base.ts`.
* *"How do I deploy the agent?" / "Where is my data stored?"* → the published
customer documentation. That is `search_docs`, backed by `docs-corpus.ts`.
They are deliberately **separate indexes**. Merged into one, they would compete
for the same `topK` and dilute each other: a rules query would surface prose
pages, and a product question would surface rule definitions.
# Schema
## Corpus source
The corpus is the `autopilotmonitor-docs` repository — a public OKF bundle
published at `docs.autopilotmonitor.com`. It is **not** vendored into this repo.
The deploy workflow checks it out into `mcp-docs/` of the Docker build context;
the Dockerfile copies it to `/app/docs` in both the build and the final stage
(byte-identical, or the boot-time corpus hash rejects the precomputed index).
`SUMMARY.md` and `log.md` are skipped as navigation scaffolding. `index.md` is
kept — it is the documentation map and answers "what documentation exists" — but
gets no `url`, because the bundle deliberately keeps it out of `SUMMARY.md` and
GitBook therefore never renders it.
## Chunking
A whole page cannot be one document: `trust/security-faq.md` is 36 KB, while
MiniLM-L6-v2 truncates at ~256 tokens. An un-chunked page would silently embed
only its first paragraph.
Chunks are cut at **h2/h3 headings**, which in this bundle are also the semantic
boundaries — `security-faq.md` carries 37 h3s, one per question.
`<details><summary>Q</summary>` blocks (used by `troubleshooting/faq.md`) are
treated the same way, with the summary as the section title. Each chunk is
prefixed with a `Page Title › Section › Subsection` breadcrumb so a hit lifted
out of the middle of a page is self-describing to both the embedder and the
reader.
Two deliberate exceptions to the ~1500-character budget:
* **Markdown tables are never split.** A table broken across chunks leaves
`| --- |` rows with no header — unreadable in a result and meaningless to
embed. Tables carry real answers here (the role matrix, the settings
reference), so an over-long table is allowed to exceed the budget.
* **Unbroken lists split at line level.** The changelog pages are one bullet
list per release with no blank lines, so paragraph splitting cannot touch
them; left whole, everything past the model's window would be truncated away
and become unsearchable.
Short sections are **kept**, not filtered. A one-line answer ("Is it free?" →
"Yes, the Community plan is free") is often the most valuable hit, and the
breadcrumb supplies the context the short body lacks. Only structural residue
(under 25 alphanumeric characters) is dropped.
## CRLF is a correctness precondition
The docs repo is authored on Windows and ships CRLF. In JavaScript `.` does not
match `\r`, so a pattern like `/^(#{2,3})\s+(.*)$/` matches **nothing** on a CRLF
file: `(.*)` stops before the `\r` and `$` never reaches end-of-string.
This was observed during development, and the failure mode is what makes it
dangerous: no crash, no error — headings and frontmatter simply stop being
recognized and every page silently degrades to unlabelled paragraph splits. The
first working build produced 286 plausible-looking chunks that were almost all
wrong; after normalizing, `security-faq.md` went from 29 blind splits to 46 real
question sections.
`normalizeNewlines()` runs before any parsing. Do not remove it, and do not
"fix" a future parsing bug here by adding `\r?` to one pattern.
## Token windows: why a chunk can hold several vectors
Chunking at heading boundaries keeps sections coherent, but it does not bound the
result by *tokens* — and it cannot. Measured on this corpus the ratio ranges from
**2.43 to 5.81 characters per token**, a factor of 2.4, so no character budget maps
reliably onto the model's 256-token window. A budget safe for the worst case
(~620 characters) would shred prose and tables alike.
Left alone, 87 of 324 chunks exceeded the window and **13% of all tokens never
reached the ranking** — silently, since the tokenizer truncates without complaint.
The effect was concrete: in `built-in-rules.md :: Apps` (734 tokens), the strings
`ANALYZE-APP-013`, `ANALYZE-OFFICE-001`, `ANALYZE-CORR-003` and `Click-to-Run` all
sit past the cutoff, so *"proxy configuration blocking app downloads"* did not
retrieve that section at all.
So the *chunk* stays whole and the *embedding* is split instead:
`VectorSearchProvider.index()` cuts long text into 250-token windows with 40 tokens
of overlap and embeds each. A document therefore carries `embeddings: number[][]`,
and `search()` scores it by its **best** window.
- **Max, not mean.** Averaging window vectors would blur a long section's several
topics into one mediocre direction — the same dilution that makes large context
windows worse than chunking. Max keeps a document findable by any one thing it
discusses.
- **The tokenizer is a build-time dependency only.** `index()` runs during the
Docker build; production boots from precomputed vectors and never loads it. It is
also only the vocabulary, not the ONNX weights (~93 ms).
- Cost: 324 chunks → 424 vectors (+31%), index 2.63 → 3.12 MB, and 424 instead of
324 dot products per query — still microseconds.
- The rules corpus benefits too, unplanned: 128 rules now carry 172 vectors.
Measured effect: token coverage 87% → **100%**, *"Office Click-to-Run install never
finished"* 0.318 → **0.442**, *"proxy configuration blocking app downloads"* absent
→ **0.559 at rank 1**. The ten reference queries kept byte-identical scores — their
chunks are short, hence one window, hence the same vector as before.
## Keyword fallback
Semantic ranking alone leaves a gap: proper nouns embed poorly. `RealmJoin` occurs
in 3 chunks yet scores under the threshold.
Fuzzy matching is the wrong remedy, and the corpus says so. At a threshold low
enough to surface `RealmJoin` (0.28), Fuse also returns 5 hits for `SCEPman` — a
word this corpus contains **zero** times. Literal containment has neither problem.
So when the semantic pass returns fewer than `topK`, `search_docs` tops the list up
via `lexicalMatch`, the substring scan every provider already exposes:
- Query terms are filtered to distinctive ones (≥4 characters, non-stopword, max 6).
- A hit needs **corroboration**: at least two matching terms, unless the query has
only one. Without this rule, "how do I bake sourdough bread" matched a page about
LLM providers, because "bake" is a substring of "baked into the image".
- Hits are **appended, never merged**: they carry no cosine similarity, so semantic
results keep the head of the list and keyword hits fill the tail, flagged
`matchType: "keyword"` with `keywordFallback` in the response.
### Language
The corpus and `all-MiniLM-L6-v2` are both English-only, and the failure is total
rather than gradual: "wo werden meine Daten gespeichert" returns **zero** results,
not weak ones, because the query vector lands nowhere near any English chunk.
The fix is a sentence in the tool description telling the caller to query in English
and answer in the user's language — the caller is a language model, so translating
the question before the call costs nothing. A multilingual embedding model would
handle it natively but is substantially larger and would need to be measured against
`scripts/eval-docs-search.ts` first, since it changes English retrieval too.
`search_knowledge` carries the same note for the same reason.
### When it fires
Two triggers, and the second one exists because the first was not enough:
1. **Fewer than `topK` semantic hits** — the obvious case.
2. **A weak semantic head** (best score below `WEAK_SEMANTIC_SCORE`, 0.35). Topping
up only a short list misses the more common failure: a pasted identifier like
`WOW6432Node` returns three chunks at ~0.29 that do not contain the word, while
the single chunk that does never gets considered. When nothing semantic is
convincing, exact matches take the front — keeping at least one semantic result,
so a weak-but-correct hit is never pushed out entirely.
The threshold was chosen by measurement, not intuition. `scripts/eval-docs-search.ts`
scores strategies over 2465 queries in three classes — every chunk heading
(known-item, a regression detector), rare identifiers (the class this fallback
serves), and hand-written questions (the reality anchor, not derived from the
corpus):
| strategy | known-item | literal | handwritten MRR | fixed | broken |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| append-only (previous) | 71.9% | 66.2% | 1.000 | — | — |
| weak < 0.30 | 71.9% | 72.6% | 1.000 | 142 | 0 |
| **weak < 0.35** | **73.7%** | **81.1%** | **1.000** | **335** | **0** |
| weak < 0.40 | 76.3% | 88.2% | 0.944 | 502 | 3 |
| weak < 0.45 | 77.2% | 93.0% | 0.889 | 613 | 5 |
0.35 is strictly dominant: better in every class, worse in none. Higher thresholds
keep repairing more identifier queries but start demoting hand-written questions —
the class that most resembles real use — so the gain is not free past that point.
The measurement also corrected the size of the problem: identifier queries were
succeeding only 66.2% of the time, so `WOW6432Node` was not an outlier but one of
roughly 750 such failures.
## Build-time embedding
Like the rules corpus, docs are embedded once at Docker build time by
`precompute-embeddings.js <rulesDir> <outFile> [docsDir]`, into a third
`PrecomputedSection` (`docs`) of `search-index.json`. The container never embeds
a corpus at boot — only the incoming query.
The `docs` section is **optional** in the file format, which is what makes a
local checkout without the docs repo work: `validatePrecomputedIndex` skips it
when the booting server loaded zero doc chunks. The asymmetry is intentional —
if the server *has* a docs corpus and the file does *not*, that is staleness and
is rejected like any other mismatch.
Embeddings are rounded to 6 decimals on serialize. A float64 component
serializes to ~20 characters of JSON, so 384 dims cost ~7.8 KB per vector;
rounding roughly halves the index file, which is `JSON.parse`d on every
scale-to-zero cold start. The induced L2 norm error (~1e-5 over 384 dims) sits
two orders of magnitude inside `UNIT_NORM_EPSILON`.
## Registration
`search_docs` is registered for **every role**, unlike the platform tools: this
is public documentation carrying no tenant data, and a tenant user asking "how do
I deploy the agent" has as much business here as a Global Admin. It is skipped
entirely when the corpus is empty, so a doc-less build advertises no broken tool.
# Cold start
`minReplicas: 0` means every idle period ends in a cold start someone waits through.
Measured from outside: **24.5 s** to first byte after `ScaledToZero`, against **60 ms**
warm.
Where those seconds go could not be answered from outside the process. Log Analytics
stamps every console line of one ingestion batch with the same time, so the boot
sequence collapses to a single instant however it is queried. The server therefore
times itself — `[boot +Nms]` marks from `process.uptime()`, which includes Node's own
startup and module loading.
Measured in production on a real cold start (31.5 s to first byte that time):
```
+244ms node started (startup + module loading)
+431ms corpora read from disk (+187ms)
+491ms index read, validated, hydrated (+60ms <- for 3.12 MB)
+504ms listening
+677ms query embedder warm (background)
```
**The application accounts for half a second of it.** The other ~31 s — 98% — is
Container Apps activation: KEDA reacting to the request, scheduling a pod, mounting
the 236 MB image, starting the container. The container also boots *faster* than a
development laptop (504 ms against 1273 ms), so nothing here is CPU-starved.
Three conclusions, and two of them overturn assumptions this file previously stated:
- **Index size is irrelevant to startup.** 3.12 MB hydrates in 60 ms. Growing the
corpus is effectively free, and the embedding rounding earns its keep on file size
alone, not on boot time.
- **Raising the container to 0.5 vCPU was not justified by cold start.** The stated
reason was the embedding model load; prebaked, that is 173 ms and runs in the
background, where only the first *search* could ever wait on it. The extra vCPU may
still help concurrent requests, but the cold-start argument does not survive
measurement.
- **The only real lever is `minReplicas: 1`**, which removes activation entirely at
roughly 7× the monthly free consumption grant. Shrinking the image would shave the
mount, but that is a fraction of platform time, not the bulk of it.
# Cross-repo coupling
**Editing the documentation does not update a running MCP server.** The corpus is
baked into the image, so only re-running the *Deploy MCP Server* workflow picks
up doc changes.
That coupling is made checkable rather than memorable: the build passes the docs
checkout SHA as `--build-arg DOCS_COMMIT`, and `/health` reports
`docs: { commit, chunks, sections }`. Comparing that commit against
`git rev-parse HEAD` in `autopilotmonitor-docs` answers "is the deployed
documentation stale?" directly.
Automatic redeploy on a docs push was considered and rejected: it would need a
PAT secret in the docs repo and would turn every typo fix into a container
deployment.
# Examples
Retrieval measured against the real bundle (323 chunks, all-MiniLM-L6-v2):
```
"where is my data stored" → 0.566 troubleshooting/faq.md :: General › Where is my data stored?
"how do I deploy the agent with Intune" → 0.819 troubleshooting/faq.md :: Setup & Agent › How do I deploy the agent?
"which roles exist and what can they do" → 0.500 trust/security-faq.md :: Identity and Access › What roles exist?
"how do I set up Teams notifications" → 0.592 reference/settings.md :: Tenant › Notifications
"what firewall URLs do I need to allow" → 0.374 reference/network-endpoints.md :: (intro)
```
The 0.25 `minScore` default is tuned to that observed band — short keyword
queries on all-MiniLM score low, and a relevant-but-marginal hit lands around
0.34.
# Citations
* `/src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/docs-corpus.ts` — loader, frontmatter
parser, chunker
* `/src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/tools/search.ts` — `search_docs`
registration
* `/src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/precomputed-index.ts` — `docs`
section and its validation asymmetry
* `/src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/Dockerfile` — `mcp-docs/` copy,
`DOCS_COMMIT`
* `/.github/workflows/deploy-mcp.yml` — docs checkout and SHA capture
* `/src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/scripts/eval-docs-search.ts` — retrieval
evaluation harness; run it before changing anything about ranking
* [MCP OAuth Flow](../mcp-oauth-flow.md) — the other MCP concept document
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---
type: concept
title: MCP Tool Telemetry
description: The three telemetry layers for judging MCP tool quality — backend App Insights via X-MCP-Tool-Name, the per-user usage table, and the MCP_TOOL_LOGGING stderr lines that carry the signals the backend cannot see (soft errors, result size vs. cap, zero-hit searches, Zod rejections).
resource: src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/telemetry.ts
tags: [mcp, telemetry, observability, tool-quality]
timestamp: 2026-08-05
---
# Schema
Three layers answer "are the MCP tools doing their job, and are tools missing?":
1. **Backend App Insights** — every tool handler runs inside `withToolTelemetry`
(`src/telemetry.ts`), which propagates the tool name via AsyncLocalStorage so
`apiFetch` stamps `X-MCP-Tool-Name` on each backend request.
`RequestTelemetryMiddleware` copies it into the request telemetry as
`McpToolName`: per-tool call volume, latency percentiles and HTTP failure
rates by KQL. Blind spot: tools that never call the backend, and handler-level
soft errors (see layer 3).
2. **Usage table** — `McpQuotaEnforcementMiddleware.TrackUsage` counts per
user/day under the key `toolname:endpoint`; surfaced by the `get_api_usage`
tool. Counts only, every call counts as success.
3. **stderr JSON lines** (`MCP_TOOL_LOGGING=true`, queryable via Container App
Logs) — the layer that carries what the other two structurally cannot:
- `tool_call`: duration, `isError` **including soft errors** (handlers never
throw — `toolError` *returns* `isError: true`, so backend-only telemetry
records those calls as successes), `resultChars` + `overCap` (result
exceeds the tool's `anthropic/maxResultSizeChars` hint → the host truncates
it; a frequently-overCap tool needs tighter defaults or projections), a
size-bounded args summary, and the caller scope (ga/delegated/tenant).
This is the ONLY telemetry for backend-free tools: `search_docs`,
`validate_rule`, `get_resource`, the local ranking of `search_knowledge`.
- `search_zero_hit`: query text (capped) whenever `search_events` /
`search_knowledge` / `search_docs` return zero results — the most direct
"missing docs / missing knowledge / missing tool?" demand signal.
- `tool_call_rejected`: rejections the SDK answers *before* any handler runs
(Zod argument validation, unknown/disabled tool). Two non-obvious facts,
both found by live verification: SDK 1.30 wraps these McpErrors as a
*successful* JSON-RPC response whose result is `{ isError: true, text:
"MCP error <code>: …" }` — a JSON-RPC error envelope never exists for
them — and the Hono bridge (`getRequestListener`) may stream the body as
`res.write` chunks with a bare `res.end()`. The sniffer in the `/mcp`
route therefore wraps both `write` and `end`, reassembles up to 10 KB and
matches both shapes (`attachToolCallRejectionSniffer` in `telemetry.ts`).
Handler soft errors never carry the `MCP error` prefix, so they are not
double-logged. This is the strongest "the schema or description confuses
the model" signal and was previously invisible everywhere.
The env flag defaults to `true` in `infra/mcp-server.bicep` (documented desired
state — the template is not routinely deployed; the live flag is set with
`az containerapp update --set-env-vars MCP_TOOL_LOGGING=true`).
# Examples
Count zero-hit queries to find unmet demand (Log Analytics):
```kusto
ContainerAppConsoleLogs_CL
| where Log_s has '"type":"search_zero_hit"'
| extend d = parse_json(Log_s)
| summarize count() by tostring(d.tool), tostring(d.query)
```
Per-tool soft-error and truncation rates:
```kusto
ContainerAppConsoleLogs_CL
| where Log_s has '"type":"tool_call"'
| extend d = parse_json(Log_s)
| summarize calls = count(), errors = countif(d.isError == true),
overCap = countif(d.overCap == true), p95ms = percentile(tolong(d.durationMs), 95)
by tool = tostring(d.tool)
```
# Citations
- `src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/telemetry.ts` — wrapper + log emitters
- `src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/index.ts` — `/mcp` rejection sniffer
- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Middleware/RequestTelemetryMiddleware.cs` — `McpToolName` stamping
- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Middleware/McpQuotaEnforcementMiddleware.cs` — usage-table counting
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---
type: Concept
title: Gather Rule Guardrails
description: >-
How gather-rule collectors are fenced in — the allowlists in rules/guardrails.json,
the hard blocks that survive unrestricted mode, and why every collector must call a
guard rather than trusting rule.Target.
resource: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Telemetry/Gather
tags: [gather-rules, security, guardrails, agent]
timestamp: 2026-07-22
---
# Concept
A gather rule is authored by a **tenant administrator** through `POST /api/rules/gather` and executed by the agent as **SYSTEM** on an enrolling device. The backend does not validate `collectorType`, `target`, or `parameters` at all — it only enforces scope/emit-mode fields, a 1 MB body cap, and that the rule lands in the caller's own tenant partition. Everything that decides *what a rule may reach* is therefore enforced **on the agent**, in `GatherRuleGuards`.
This is the security boundary. The portal's `ValidationIndicator` is a convenience: it does not block submit, and the API is reachable directly.
# Schema
Allowlists come from `rules/guardrails.json`, embedded into the agent assembly as
`AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Resources.guardrails.json` (see the `EmbeddedResource`
item in `AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.csproj`) and regenerated into the portal's
`utils/guardrails.generated.ts` by `node rules/scripts/combine.js`.
| Guard | Source list | Match rule |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `IsRegistryPathAllowed` | `registryPrefixes` | prefix, boundary `\` or end |
| `IsFilePathAllowed` | `filePrefixes` | `Path.GetFullPath` first, then prefix + boundary |
| `IsWmiQueryAllowed` | `wmiQueryPrefixes` | prefix, boundary whitespace or end |
| `IsCommandAllowed` | `allowedCommands` | **exact** match, trimmed — never prefix |
| `IsEventLogChannelAllowed` | `eventLogChannels` | prefix, boundary `/` or end |
**Hard blocks live in code, not in the JSON**, so a parse error cannot lift them — on a
parse failure the allowlists fall back to empty and everything is blocked (fail-closed),
but the hard blocks must hold regardless of configuration:
* `BlockedUsersPrefix` (`C:\Users`) and `AdditionalHardBlockedPathPrefixes`
(`C:\Windows\System32\config`) — exception only for `%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%`
under `AppData\Local` / `AppData\Roaming`.
* `HardBlockedCommandPatterns` — download, user/group creation, boot config,
persistence, destructive operations; plus `MaxCommandLength`.
* `HardBlockedEventLogChannels` — `Security` (audit trail of user behaviour) and the
PowerShell channels (script-block logging routinely contains secrets in clear text).
`rules/guardrails.json` mirrors the blocked lists (`blockedFilePrefixes`,
`blockedEventLogChannels`) **for display only**. Enforcement is the C# constant.
# Examples
Every collector must call its guard and return `context.EmitSecurityWarning(...)` on
refusal — that emits the `security_warning` event that makes a block visible in the
timeline instead of failing silently.
```csharp
// FileCollector / JsonCollector / XmlCollector
if (!GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(filePath, context.UnrestrictedMode, userProfilePath))
return context.EmitSecurityWarning(rule, "file", filePath);
```
Two collectors were added to this contract on 2026-07-22 after shipping without it:
* **`LogParserCollector`** read any path in `rule.Target`, bypassing even the `C:\Users`
hard block. It cannot guard `rule.Target` directly — a wildcard filename makes
`Path.GetFullPath` throw — so it guards **the directory** when the filename contains
`*`/`?`, and re-guards **each resolved path** after wildcard expansion (a junction can
surface a file the directory check did not cover).
* **`EventLogCollector`** read any channel, including `Security`.
`ImeLogPathOverride` comes only from the local `--ime-log-path` CLI flag, never from
remote config. The operator using it is already a local admin, so it relaxes the
allowlist exactly the way unrestricted mode does — hard blocks still apply.
# Citations
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Telemetry/Gather/GatherRuleGuards.cs`
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Telemetry/Gather/GatherRuleContext.cs` — `EmitSecurityWarning`
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Gather/GatherRuleCollectorGuardTests.cs`
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Rules/GatherRulesFunction.cs` — what the backend does *not* validate
* `rules/guardrails.json`, `rules/scripts/combine.js`
* Customer-facing counterpart: `autopilotmonitor-docs/rules/gather-rules.md` (§ Security guardrails)
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---
type: Concept
title: Gather Rule Phase Scoping, One-Shot Triggers & Emit-on-Change
description: How gather rules are restricted to enrollment phases (activePhases / activeFromPhase), collect once at a phase boundary (phase_change / phase_exit), and how emitMode "on_change" suppresses repeated identical results.
resource: /src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Telemetry/Gather/GatherRuleExecutor.cs
tags:
- agent
- backend
- gather-rules
- config
timestamp: 2026-08-04T00:00:00+02:00
---
# Problem
Interval gather rules (e.g. a registry poll every 60 s) ran during **all** enrollment phases
and emitted an event on **every** tick — including `exists=false` events while the target key
did not exist yet. A rule needed only from Account Setup onwards produced hundreds of
identical noise events per session and wasted collector runs.
# Schema
Three opt-in fields on `GatherRule` (Shared model, `rules/schema/gather-rule.schema.json`,
delivered to the agent via `GET agent/config`; ConfigVersion 34). Absent fields = legacy
behavior — full back-compat.
| Field | Type | Semantics |
|---|---|---|
| `activePhases` | `string[]` \| null | Rule runs only while the current phase is in the list. Null/empty = unrestricted. |
| `activeFromPhase` | `string` \| null | Sticky latch: activates when the phase first reaches the threshold, then stays active for the rest of the session — including through `Failed`. Null = unrestricted. |
| `emitMode` | `"always"` \| `"on_change"` \| null | `on_change`: poll on the trigger cadence, emit only when the collected result changes. Null/`always` = emit every collection (legacy). |
Canonical phase tokens are the `EnrollmentPhase` enum **names** `Start`(0) …`Complete`(7).
Backend validation (`GatherRulesFunction.ValidateScopeAndEmitMode`) rejects `Unknown`/`Failed`,
numeric tokens, unknown emit modes, and both scope fields set at once (400). The agent
defensively prefers `activePhases` if both arrive anyway.
# One-shot collection at phase boundaries
Scoping answers "while *may* this rule run". The trigger answers "when does it fire". For
one-shot collection the two phase triggers are the bookends of a phase:
| Trigger | Fires |
|---|---|
| `phase_change` | Once when `triggerPhase` is **entered** (dedup key `{ruleId}\|{phase}`). |
| `phase_exit` | Once when `triggerPhase` is **left** (dedup key `exit:{ruleId}\|{phase}`). |
Empty `triggerPhase` means every transition. Both keys live in the same
`_phaseRulesExecuted` set; the `exit:` prefix keeps the two key spaces disjoint, so an
enter-rule and an exit-rule on the same phase never cannibalise each other's slot.
`phase_exit` semantics that are easy to get wrong:
* It is evaluated **before** `_currentPhase` advances, so both the `triggerPhase` match and
the phase-scope gate see the phase being **left**. A rule scoped to `DeviceSetup` therefore
still fires on its own exit, even though the phase being entered is outside that scope.
* A transition into `Failed` **does** fire the exit rules of the failing phase — capturing
state at the failure boundary is the point.
* Exit of `Unknown` never fires (nothing was entered yet), and a repeated identical phase
signal is not a transition.
* An exit rule on `Complete` only fires if something transitions *away* from Complete. For
"at the end of enrollment", use `phase_change` on `Complete` or `on_event` with
`enrollment_complete`.
* Old agents do not know the trigger value and simply never fire the rule (silent no-op) —
which is why `phase_exit` needs no ConfigVersion bump: no new field is transported.
# Which "phase" feeds the triggers — the emitted timeline, not raw signals
The phase the executor sees is fed by `GatherRuleExecutorHost` from the **post-reduce
`TimelineEventStream`**: `EventTimelineEmitter` publishes every emitted event's
`(eventType, phase)` after the decision engine reduced the originating signal. Phase triggers
therefore fire exactly when the UI timeline shows the phase — by construction.
This replaced the original V2 wiring (`SignalIngress.SignalPosted`), which fires at enqueue
time with the **raw** collector payload. The raw phase can run minutes ahead of the
engine-declared one: in session `32312a32` (RealmJoin tenant) the Shell-Core ESP-exit
synthesized `EspPhaseChanged(FinalizingSetup)` at 12:18, while the engine — holding the
transition behind the RealmJoin completion gate until the first deployment resolved — declared
`phase_transition(FinalizingSetup)` at 12:25. A `phase_change` rule on `FinalizingSetup`
reading `HKLM\SOFTWARE\RealmJoin\Custom\BIOS` fired 7 minutes early and read the key before
the RealmJoin package wrote it (`exists=false`).
Consequences of the emitted-event feed:
* `phase_change` / `phase_exit` / phase **scope** gates all follow the engine-reduced phase
(single feed, consistent with the portal's "collects once when the enrollment reaches …").
* `on_event` now sees **every emitted event type**, including engine-emitted ones
(`enrollment_complete`, `phase_transition`, `realmjoin_resolved`, …) that never existed on
the raw signal stream — the documented "On Event with `enrollment_complete`" end-of-enrollment
pattern only works because of this. This restores V1 semantics (V1 fired triggers from every
emitted `EnrollmentEvent`).
* Other hosts (`DeviceInfoHost`, `UserEspKeepAwakeHost`, `ProvisioningPackageHost`) still key
off the raw signal stream deliberately — their collections are about OS state at the raw
boundary (ESP exit, keep-awake), not about timeline agreement.
# Scope semantics (agent, `GatherRuleExecutor`)
* Scope applies to **all trigger types**:
* `interval` — timers keep running; an out-of-scope tick is a free early-return (no
start/stop lifecycle races on phase transitions).
* `startup` — a scoped startup rule not yet in scope at `UpdateRules` is **deferred**: it
runs exactly once from `OnPhaseChanged` when its scope activates (same
`_startupRulesExecuted` dedup; it is not part of the `WaitForStartupRules` latch).
* `phase_change` — evaluated against the **new** phase; the scope gate runs before the
per-(rule, phase) dedup so an out-of-scope pass does not consume the execution slot.
* `on_event` — gated by the current phase.
* **Before the first phase signal** of a session (`_currentPhase == Unknown`) scoped rules are
inactive. Sessions that never produce phase signals never run them (documented behavior).
* **From-phase latch**: activates when `phase != Unknown && phase != Failed && (int)phase >=
(int)fromPhase`. `Failed=99` would ordinal-satisfy every threshold, hence the explicit
exclusion — but once latched, a rule stays active through `Failed`. A config refresh that
delivers a from-phase rule after its threshold passed latches it immediately.
* `--run-gather-rules` (diagnostic CLI) sets `IgnorePhaseScope = true` — no phase context
exists there, scoped rules execute unconditionally (log line marks the bypass).
# Emit-on-change semantics
* The collector result dict is canonically hashed (keys ordinal-sorted at every nesting
level, invariant value formatting, SHA-256) **before** `ruleId`/`ruleTitle` injection.
* First in-scope non-empty result always emits — on an absent registry key that first
`exists=false` event *is* the visible "we're polling now" indicator.
* Unchanged results increment a per-rule suppression counter; the next emitted event carries
`suppressedPolls` + `suppressedSinceUtc` in its `Data` so the gap is observable.
* Composition with `emitOnlyIfExists=true` (collector-level): a miss returns an empty dict —
no emit AND no hash update. Result: zero noise while absent, one event on appearance, then
only on change.
* State is in-memory and survives `UpdateRules` config refreshes; an agent restart causes at
most one re-emit per rule (acceptable under the per-enrollment lifecycle).
* Volatile collectors (eventlog timestamps, logparser positions) degrade `on_change` to
`always` — every poll hashes differently. The option stays visible for them since some
outputs are stable; this is documented, not hidden.
# Portal & delivery
* Create form defaults new rules to `emitMode: "on_change"`; existing rules load as
`always`. The scope UI is a three-way mode (always / during phases / from phase) backed by
a canonical `GATHER_PHASES` list — the same list replaced the free-text `triggerPhase`
input, whose placeholder used to suggest invalid tokens.
* **Controls are shown only where they change behavior** (`supportsPhaseScope` /
`supportsEmitMode` in `types.ts`). Offering all three "when" controls unconditionally
produced meaningless combinations — a scope on a `phase_change` rule naming a concrete
phase can only ever suppress the single firing, and `on_change` has no second result to
compare against. Hidden controls are nulled by `buildScopeFields` so state from an earlier
trigger choice cannot leak into the payload, and `validateScopeSelection` rejects a scope
mode that was selected but left unfilled (which previously serialised to null and silently
ran the rule everywhere while the form still read "From a phase onwards").
Startup is the deliberate exception: a scope there defers the one-shot rather than
suppressing it, so the scope control stays while emit mode is hidden.
* The custom-rule toggle PUT (`{enabled, isBuiltIn, isCommunity}`) previously full-replaced
the stored rule and wiped Title/Target/Trigger — `GatherRuleService.UpdateRuleAsync` now
merges toggle-style partials (empty Title/CollectorType/Target) into the existing row and
preserves `CreatedAt` on full edits. This fix is a prerequisite: without it every toggle
would silently clear the new fields.
* Old agents (Newtonsoft) ignore unknown config properties: scoped rules run everywhere,
`emitMode` is ignored — graceful degradation until the fleet rolls forward.
* `ContentEquivalent` treats null and empty `activePhases` as equal, so pre-existing DB rows
(absent columns → null) never diff against seeds — no reseed churn.
# Citations
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Telemetry/Gather/GatherRuleExecutor.cs` — scope gates, latch, canonical hash
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Orchestration/Hosts/GatherRuleExecutorHost.cs` — timeline-event trigger feed
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Orchestration/TimelineEventStream.cs` — post-reduce observer surface
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Rules/GatherRulesFunction.cs` — `ValidateScopeAndEmitMode`
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/GatherRuleService.cs` — partial-PUT merge, `ContentEquivalent`
* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Models/Rules/GatherRule.cs` — field contracts
* Tests: `GatherRuleExecutorPhaseScopeTests`, `GatherRuleExecutorEmitModeTests`, `GatherRuleExecutorHostTimelineFeedTests` (agent); `GatherRuleUpdatePartialMergeTests`, `GatherRuleScopeFieldsTests` (backend)
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---
type: Concept
title: Rule Authoring Surface — MCP Resources, validate_rule, and the Analyze Dry-Run
description: >-
How customer AIs author gather/analyze rules against the real contract: the baked
authoring resources (guide, schemas, guardrails) generated by combine.js, the
MCP-local validate_rule pre-flight, and the side-effect-free backend dry-run that
traces a draft analyze rule against one session's events.
resource: src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/tools/rules.ts
tags: [rules, mcp, analyze-rules, gather-rules, dry-run, authoring]
timestamp: 2026-08-05
---
# Concept
Customers author rules with an AI connected to the MCP server. Retrieval
(`search_docs`) is deliberately NOT the knowledge source for authoring: chunked
top-K retrieval can silently omit an operator, a guardrail prefix, or an enum,
and the AI then produces a plausible-but-dead rule. The authoring surface is
therefore **deterministic**: three `get_resource` entries carry the complete
contract, a local validator rejects what production would reject or silently
ignore, and a backend dry-run evaluates a draft against real session events with
a full trace.
The intended loop: draft → `validate_rule` → `test_analyze_rule` against a real
session (one that should fire, one that should not) → iterate → create in the
portal. The `author-rule` MCP prompt walks a client through exactly this order.
# Schema
## Resources (deterministic authoring context)
| Resource | Content | Source |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `rule_authoring_guide` | Hand-written complete authoring knowledge: collector types, triggers, condition sources, operators, confidence model incl. the exact factor DSL, `{{token}}` interpolation order, guardrail matching semantics, pitfalls | `src/rule-authoring-guide.ts` |
| `rule_schemas` | Both JSON Schemas (2020-12) verbatim | generated |
| `rule_guardrails` | `rules/guardrails.json` verbatim | generated |
Generation: `node rules/scripts/combine.js` bakes schemas + guardrails into
`src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/rule-authoring.generated.ts` (same
pattern as the web's `utils/guardrails.generated.ts`; the tsconfig `rootDir` and
the Docker build's exclusion of `rules/schema` rule out importing the JSON
directly). Drift is closed twice: CI's `guardrails-in-sync` job re-runs
combine.js and fails on any diff, and `rule-authoring-drift.test.ts` pins
generated == repo source plus guide enums == schema enums.
## validate_rule (MCP-local)
`src/rule-validation.ts`, no backend call. Three layers:
1. **Schema** — ajv (draft 2020-12) against the baked schemas, validating the
single-rule `$defs` entry directly (the top-level oneOf wrapper would double
every error).
2. **Guardrails** — mirrors the AGENT's matching semantics from
`GatherRuleGuards.cs` (see [gather-rule-guardrails.md](gather-rule-guardrails.md)):
hive-stripped segment-bounded registry/file prefixes, whitespace-bounded WMI
prefixes, EXACT command matching, `/`-bounded event-log channels, and the
code-enforced hard blocks (`Security` etc. channels, `C:\Users`,
`C:\Windows\System32\config`).
3. **Semantic lint** — schema-valid-but-dead rules: unreachable
confidenceThreshold, factor conditions outside the three parseable shapes
(`exists`, `count >= N`, `phase_duration > N`), unknown event types (warning;
`gather_*` softened to info), unanchored `not_regex` allow-lists,
unresolvable `{{token}}`s, trigger cross-fields, outputEventType
convention/collision checks.
The validator is advisory pre-flight only — the agent re-enforces guardrails
on-device and the backend re-validates structure. It must never be stricter
than production.
## POST /api/rules/analyze/dryrun (backend)
`DryRunAnalyzeRuleFunction` → `RuleEngine.DryRunRuleAsync`. Body
`{ sessionId, rule }` (draft `AnalyzeRule`, 1 MB cap). Policy tier
`TenantAdminOrGlobalReader` — a POST by shape but a pure read in effect, so the
read-only Global Reader is admitted; platform-scope callers reach any tenant's
session via `FindSessionTenantIdAsync` (same pattern as `GetRuleResultsFunction`).
`RuleEngine.DryRun.cs` is a partial-class trace twin of `EvaluateRule`: it
shares the exact evaluators (`EvaluatePrecondition` / `EvaluateCondition` /
`EvaluateConfidenceFactor`) but evaluates **all** conditions instead of breaking
on the first failed required one — the full picture is the point of a dry run.
Verdicts: `fired`, `skipped_by_precondition`, `required_condition_not_met`,
`no_conditions_matched`, `below_confidence_threshold`, `no_events`. Each
condition entry carries `matched`, the production evidence dictionary (or the
evaluator's reason string) and `matchingEventCount` — how many session events
even have that eventType, the first thing to check on an unexpected miss.
Invariants, pinned by `RuleEngineDryRunTests`:
* **Parity**: verdict `fired` ⇔ `EvaluateRule` produces a result, with identical
confidence and evidence keys. Factor evaluation stays sequential against the
accumulating `matchedConditions` (a factor can observe earlier `factor_*`
entries) — reordering would change results.
* **Side-effect freedom**: exactly one strict event read; never a RuleResult
write, never `TryMarkSessionFailedFromRuleAsync`, never a notification.
`wouldMarkSessionAsFailed` is reported, not acted on.
`test_analyze_rule` (MCP) wraps the endpoint and adds the interpolated
explanation/remediation preview via the existing `interpolate-rule-template.ts`
against the returned `matchedConditions`.
## POST /api/rules/gather/test-pattern (backend)
The logparser counterpart to the analyze dry-run, added after a field incident:
a customer verified a logparser regex with a PHP tester and the agent's .NET
engine matched differently. `TestLogPatternFunction` evaluates a pattern against
pasted sample lines with the AGENT's exact matching semantics:
* Regex construction identical to `LogParserCollector`: `Compiled`, 1 s timeout,
**no IgnoreCase** — logparser matching is case-sensitive (unlike analyze-rule
regex conditions, which run IgnoreCase).
* `format` behaves exactly like the rule parameter: `cmtrace` (default) parses
each line via the shared `CmTraceLogParser` and matches against the parsed
MESSAGE only; `text` matches the raw line. First match per line
(`Regex.Match`), group `"0"` excluded, unsuccessful groups omitted — the
returned `groups` are exactly the event-data fields the device would emit.
* Mirrors the agent's diagnostics: per-line outcomes
(`matched | no_match | parse_failed | regex_timeout`), the all-lines-parse-fail
hint ("set parameter format=text") verbatim, and a case-sensitivity note on
zero matches.
* Pure compute on the request body — no tenant data touched. Same policy tier
as the dry-run (`TenantAdminOrGlobalReader`); caps: 200 lines, 8 KB/line,
1 MB body.
Parity is structural, not duplicated: `CmTraceLogParser` moved from the agent
(`Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime`) to **Shared** (`AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Logging`)
so agent and backend run the SAME parsing implementation. Timestamp caveat:
bias-less CMTrace lines parse with `AssumeLocal`, which on the backend is the
server's timezone — the endpoint therefore reports match/parse results, never
timestamps. `test_log_pattern` (MCP) wraps the endpoint; `validate_rule`
additionally lints logparser parameters (missing/non-compiling pattern, unknown
format value) and its `nextStep` routes logparser drafts to `test_log_pattern`.
## What is deliberately absent
* **No gather-rule remote execution** — gather rules run as SYSTEM on devices;
session dry-run is analyze-only. Logparser authors get the pattern tester
above; all gather authors get guardrail pre-flight plus the on-device debug
log ([gather-rule-debug-log](../agent/gather-rule-debug-log.md)).
* **No rule write/deploy via MCP** — creating rules stays in the portal.
# Citations
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Rules/TestLogPatternFunction.cs` — logparser pattern tester
* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Logging/CmTraceLogParser.cs` — shared CMTrace parser (agent + backend)
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/RuleEngine.DryRun.cs` — trace twin + DTOs
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Rules/DryRunAnalyzeRuleFunction.cs` — endpoint + draft validation
* `src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/rule-validation.ts` — validator
* `src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/tools/rules.ts` — validate_rule / test_analyze_rule
* `src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/rule-authoring-guide.ts` — guide resource
* `rules/scripts/combine.js` — MCP module generation
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---
type: Concept
title: URL Registry — One Place per Component, Guard-Enforced
description: Every well-known own or Microsoft host lives in exactly one registry file per component (Constants.cs, utils/config.ts, src/config.ts); guard tests fail the build on any literal outside them. Includes the agent-download host migration to the download alias.
resource: /src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Constants.cs
tags:
- architecture
- urls
- ci
- convention
timestamp: 2026-07-23T00:00:00+02:00
---
# URL Registry
Every well-known base URL — own hosts (portal, www, docs, download alias, MCP,
API, both blob accounts) and Microsoft hosts (Graph, Entra login) — is defined
in exactly one registry file per component. Code references the constant; the
literal appears nowhere else.
| Component | Registry | Guard test |
|---|---|---|
| C# (Shared/Backend/Agent) | `AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Constants` (`*BaseUrl`) | `HardcodedUrlGuardTests` |
| Web | `utils/config.ts` (`DOCS_URL`, `SITE_URL`, `PORTAL_URL`, `BOOTSTRAP_GO_URL`, `ENTRA_LOGIN_URL`, `API_URL_PROD`, `BLOB_URL_PROD`, `AGENT_DOWNLOAD_HOSTNAMES`) | `utils/__tests__/hardcodedUrls.guard.test.ts` |
| MCP | `src/config.ts` (`API_BASE_URL`, `ENTRA_LOGIN_BASE_URL`, `DOCS_BASE_URL`) | `src/__tests__/hardcoded-urls.guard.test.ts` |
Derived registries build on these instead of repeating hosts:
`lib/hostRouting.ts` computes `PUBLIC_HOST`/`PORTAL_HOST`/`APEX_HOST` from the
URL constants, and `middleware.ts` imports from it.
# Schema
The guards scan non-test source for the enforced host list and fail with
file:line on any occurrence outside the registry. Comment lines are ignored
(docs may cite URLs). Test files are excluded on purpose: a literal in a test
is an independent oracle — `ValidateBootstrapCodeResponseShapeTests` spells the
full agent download URL out so a registry change must be acknowledged in two
places, backend and portal allow-list, consciously.
Why enforced rather than agreed: the registry existed before (both
`Constants.AgentBlobBaseUrl` and the MCP `config.ts` header document earlier
drift), yet the EU cutover still missed two literal copies of the blob host —
`LatestVersionsService` and `ValidateBootstrapCodeFunction` kept reading the
legacy account, silently kept alive only by the fail-soft legacy mirror in
`build-agent.yml`. A convention that is not checked decays; these guards make
the next stray literal a red build instead of a production surprise.
# Agent-download host migration (2026-07-23)
The two legacy readers above plus the agent's `SelfUpdater` now use
`Constants.AgentDownloadBaseUrl` (`download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent`, Front
Door in front of the current blob origin — verified serving `version.json`,
`version-v2.json` and both ZIPs before the switch). The portal's
`bootstrapValidation.ts` allow-lists BOTH the alias and the legacy blob host
(`AGENT_DOWNLOAD_HOSTNAMES`) because bootstrap scripts already deployed in
customer Intune tenants still carry legacy URLs.
Deploy-order constraint: the web allow-list must be live BEFORE (or with) the
backend that serves alias URLs — an old portal build rejects the alias host and
the bootstrap flow dies client-side. Remove the legacy hostname from the
allow-list only after the legacy account is torn down.
**Front Door caching is a correctness hazard here, not a staleness nuisance.**
The first release after the migration exposed it: the alias kept serving the
previous `version.json` (`X-Cache: TCP_REMOTE_HIT`) while the origin was already
updated — and because manifest and ZIP are independent cache entries, a stale
manifest paired with a fresh ZIP fails the bootstrap's SHA-256 check. Two
defenses, both in place since 2026-07-23: route caching on `/agent/*` is
DISABLED, and every blob upload (CI `Send-Blob`, local `build.ps1`, the
`versions/*.json` manifests) stamps `Cache-Control: no-cache` — all these blobs
rotate in place, even the per-line ZIP. If caching is ever re-enabled, the
headers keep the mismatch class impossible.
Deliberately still on the legacy account: the `HealthCheckService` /
`MaintenanceService` legacy-keepalive probes and the fail-soft mirror in
`build-agent.yml` — they exist precisely to keep already-deployed customer
bootstrap scripts working until the customer migration completes.
# Bootstrap go-URL (2026-07-28)
The OOBE bootstrap short-URL moved from `www.autopilotmonitor.com/go/{code}`
(Next.js route, SSR) to **`go.autopilotmonitor.com/{code}`** — a Front Door
custom domain whose `/*` route rewrites onto `/api/bootstrap/go/{code}` on the
Function App (`GetBootstrapScriptFunction`). Registry entries:
`Constants.BootstrapGoBaseUrl` (C#, the single producer via
`CreateBootstrapSessionFunction`) and `BOOTSTRAP_GO_URL` (web, display-only in
the sessions list); `go.autopilotmonitor.com` is on both guards' enforced-host
lists. `CreateBootstrapSessionUrlShapeTests` pins the produced URL as an
independent oracle — before this, no test guarded the bootstrap URL shape at
all.
Front Door route caching for `bootstrap-go` is DISABLED — same hazard class as
the `/agent/*` route above, sharpened: the script body inlines the bearer
token, so a cache hit would replay one requester's token to another.
`NoStoreCacheMiddleware` additionally stamps `no-store` via the
`/api/bootstrap/go/` prefix.
Transition COMPLETED with the static-export PR (2026-07-29): the legacy
Next.js `/go/[code]` route, `utils/bootstrapValidation.ts`, and
`middleware.ts` are deleted — verified safe because the BootstrapSessions
table held zero active sessions predating the URL cutover (all expired
2026-03). The backend is now the only script producer;
`OobeBootstrapScriptGeneratorTests`' golden file remains as the pin of the
shipped template.
Portal detail routes are query-string based since the same PR
(`/sessions?id=…` etc., builders in `lib/routes.ts`, notification producer
`Constants.PortalSessionUrl`). Legacy PATH-shaped links in sent
Teams/Slack/webhook notifications are rewritten forever by SWA wildcard
rewrites + `components/LegacyPathRedirect.tsx`; `staticwebapp.config.json`
carries the production redirects/headers and is guarded by
`utils/__tests__/swaConfig.guard.test.ts` (registry-backed hosts, no
unsafe-eval, route order).
# Citations
- `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Constants.cs` — C# registry
- `src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/utils/config.ts` — web registry
- `src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/config.ts` — MCP registry
- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/HardcodedUrlGuardTests.cs`
- [Version Contract](versioning.md) — the release pipeline this migration protects
-108
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---
type: Concept
title: Version Contract — Agent, Backend, MCP
description: One version shape for all three shipping components, the ETag-CAS counter blob that mints build numbers, and the published manifests that make "what is deployed" checkable from outside.
resource: /.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1
tags:
- build
- ci
- release
- versioning
timestamp: 2026-07-22T00:00:00+02:00
---
# Version Contract
Three components ship from this repository — the agent, the Functions backend and the
MCP server. They share one version shape, one way of minting build numbers, and one
manifest format, so that a version string means the same thing whoever emits it.
```
version = <major>.<minor>.<build> major.minor curated by hand, build minted per build
commit = 7-char short SHA of this repo
buildUtc = ISO-8601 build moment
```
| Component | major.minor from | Counter blob | Reported by |
|---|---|---|---|
| Agent V2 | `VersionPrefix` in `AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.csproj` | `agent/buildcounter-v2.txt` | `agent/version.json` |
| Backend | `VersionPrefix` in `AutopilotMonitor.Functions.csproj` | `versions/backend.txt` | `GET /api/health` |
| MCP | `version` in `package.json` | `versions/mcp.txt` | `GET /health`, MCP handshake |
# Schema
## Build numbers — reserve before build, ETag-CAS
`.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1` is the only implementation; the CI
workflows and the local `build.ps1` all call it.
1. Anonymous `GET` on the counter blob → value `N` and `ETag`. The blob holds the
**last used** number as plain text and is public-read; only the write needs the
container SAS.
2. `PUT N+1` with `If-Match: <etag>`. The quoted ETag form is required — PowerShell
strips the quotes on read, and an unquoted `If-Match` is rejected client-side.
3. `412 Precondition Failed` → a concurrent build reserved first → re-read and retry
(5 attempts, linear backoff).
4. Build with the reserved number.
Reserving *before* the build is what makes concurrent minting impossible. **A failed
build burns a number** — deliberate: uniqueness matters, density does not.
Why a counter and not the published manifest: manifests are written on publish, not on
build. The agent writes `version.json` only for stable releases, so deriving the next
number from it would hand two consecutive dev builds the same number and let the second
overwrite the first's artifact. A state-free scheme such as `git rev-list --count HEAD`
fails for the same reason — two builds of one commit collide.
**Seeding** (once per component): `PUT <last used number>` with `If-None-Match: *`, so
an existing counter can never be clobbered. Agent V2 was seeded with `1356` on
2026-07-17; `versions/backend.txt` with `999` and `versions/mcp.txt` with `299` on
2026-07-22.
## Local builds
No counter is reached, the build number stays `0`, and the commit is empty or
`unknown`. A `1.5.0` with no commit hash on `/api/health` is therefore a developer
machine, not a release — the fallback is the signal, not a defect. The agent is the
exception: `build.ps1` produces uploadable artifacts and reserves a real number unless
`-SkipUpload` is passed.
## Manifests
`versions/backend.json` and `versions/mcp.json` (public-read) record what is deployed:
```json
{ "component": "backend", "version": "1.5.1000", "commit": "abc1234",
"buildUtc": "…", "deployedUtc": "…", "runId": "…" }
```
The MCP manifest adds `docsCommit`, because for that component "which build" and "which
documentation" are separate questions.
Each is written **last and only after the deploy workflow has polled the component's
health endpoint until it reports that exact version and commit**. A green deploy step
alone means the package was accepted, not that it is being served. Consequently a
manifest that disagrees with the live endpoint means the running instance drifted after
the fact (rollback, stale revision) rather than a half-finished pipeline.
The agent keeps its own manifest at `agent/version.json` — the bootstrap derives that
URL from the download URL and verifies the ZIP against its `sha256`, so it cannot move.
It carries the same `commit` and `buildUtc` fields; `sha256` and `bootstrapVersion`
remain, being the customer-facing integrity contract.
# Consequences
- Bumping `major.minor` is a human decision, made in the component's own file
(`VersionPrefix`, or `version` in `package.json`). Nothing bumps it automatically.
- A new component joins by seeding a counter blob and calling the same script; no new
mechanism.
- The counter blobs and manifests live in the `versions` container on
`autopilotmonitoreu` (writes via `AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN`). The agent's
counter stays in the `agent` container next to the artifacts it numbers.
# Citations
- `.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1` — the CAS protocol
- `.github/workflows/deploy-backend.yml`, `deploy-mcp.yml` — reserve, verify, publish
- `.github/workflows/build-agent.yml`, `scripts/Deployment/build.ps1` — agent line
- [Build Counter Blob](agent/build-counter-blob.md) — agent-specific consequences
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---
type: Concept
title: Portal Navigation Prefetch & the SWA Runtime Bottleneck
description: Why every navigation Link in the portal sets prefetch={false} — the App Router's viewport prefetch fires one RSC request per visible link, and the Static Web Apps SSR runtime queues them server-side into a multi-minute latency tail. Also records what the follow-up measurement showed about the Standard SKU and the keep-alive side effect.
resource: src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/components/GlobalSidebar.tsx
tags:
- web
- performance
- nextjs
- static-web-apps
- observability
timestamp: 2026-07-27T18:00:00+02:00
---
# Context
The portal is a Next.js 15 App Router application hosted on Azure Static Web Apps. Every page under
the authenticated shell is a client component behind `ProtectedRoute` that fetches its own data from
the Function App (`autopilotmonitor-api-eu`) after mount. The RSC payload a route returns on
navigation therefore carries no page data — only the shell.
`GlobalSidebar` and `Navbar` render the full navigation on every page. With the App Router's default
prefetch behaviour, each visible `<Link>` triggers a background `GET /<route>?_rsc=<hash>` as soon as
it enters the viewport.
# Mechanism
Two properties combine into a portal-wide freeze:
1. **Fan-out.** The navigation is fully rendered on each page load, so a single navigation issues one
RSC request per visible link — measured at ~10,400 requests over 14 days.
2. **A heavy latency tail on the SSR runtime.** RSC responses are prerendered and edge-cached
(`x-nextjs-cache: HIT`, `s-maxage=31536000`), so the median is fast. On a cache miss or cold start
the Static Web Apps managed runtime queues them **server-side**, and the queue drains all at once.
The navigation the user wants is then stuck behind that queue and the tab shows a loading spinner or a
blank page until it drains. Nothing fails — the requests eventually return `200`, which is why the
failure leaves no error trace anywhere.
> **Correction (2026-07-28).** The original version of this document named a third property: that
> `portal.autopilotmonitor.com` negotiates HTTP/1.1 and the prefetches exhaust the six-connection
> browser cap. **That is wrong.** It came from `curl -w '%{http_version}'` on a Windows build of curl
> whose Schannel backend has no HTTP/2 support, so it can only ever report `1.1`. ALPN says otherwise:
> `openssl s_client -alpn h2,http/1.1` negotiates **h2** on the portal host, confirmed by a .NET
> `HttpClient` request returning `HTTP/2.0`. There is no six-connection cap and connection starvation
> was never the mechanism — the queue is server-side. Verify HTTP versions with `openssl s_client
> -alpn` or `HttpClient`, never with this curl build.
# Evidence
Incident of 2026-07-27, 17:25–17:29 CEST. Browser-side dependencies during the freeze:
| Request | Duration | Status |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `/admin/presence?_rsc=…` | 151,461 ms | 200 |
| `/gather-rules?_rsc=…` | 52,283 ms | 200 |
| `/progress?_rsc=…` | 37,878 ms | 200 |
| `/analyze-rules?_rsc=…` | 37,559 ms | 200 |
| `/audit?_rsc=…` | 37,539 ms | 200 |
| Backend API, same window | 1,600–2,200 ms | 200 |
The three ~37.5 s responses complete within 340 ms of each other — a queue draining, not independent
slow requests. The corresponding `browserTimings` row for `/geographic-performance` reports
`networkDuration` = 16 ms against `processingDuration` = 225,095 ms: the network delivered the
document immediately and the browser then waited nearly four minutes for the `load` event.
Fourteen-day distribution of RSC prefetches: n = 10,428, p50 = 91 ms, p95 = 896 ms, max = 234,230 ms,
38 over 10 s, 21 over 30 s.
# Outcome, measured 2026-07-28
Two changes landed within half an hour of each other on 2026-07-27: the SWA plan went Free → Standard
at 16:02:44 UTC, and `prefetch={false}` went live at 16:34:13 UTC. Twenty hours of production
telemetry separate their effects.
**The Standard plan produced no measurable latency gain.** Latency is governed almost entirely by the
gap to the previous request — the SSR runtime cools down — so raw percentiles only measure the traffic
mix. Stratified by that gap, the two eras are indistinguishable (p50, Free → Standard): `<10s`
85 → 95 ms · `10-60s` 100 → 117 ms · `1-5min` 295 → 310 ms · `5-30min` 429 → 441 ms. Tail rates match
too: Free ran 1.64 % over 2 s and 0.374 % over 10 s (n = 10,163); Standard produced 6 and 1 events at
n = 258 against 4.2 and 1.0 expected. `browserTimings.totalDuration` by Mann-Whitney: n = 436 vs 48,
z = −0.24, **p = 0.81**.
**The prefetch fix is what removed the freezes** — worst `browserTimings.totalDuration` fell from
225,277 ms to 4,856 ms, and the 30-second events stopped.
**It also removed an accidental keep-alive.** The prefetch storm kept the SSR runtime warm: 85 % of
requests used to arrive less than 10 s apart, now 46 % do. On an identical never-cacheable route
(`/sessions/{id}`) the median rose from 87 ms to 211 ms and p90 from 465 ms to 1,480 ms. After 517
minutes idle, one request took 11,441 ms and was abandoned (`resultCode 0`). The trade — minute-long
freezes gone, ~150 ms added to a cold navigation — is worth it, but it is a trade.
Do not benchmark this with a synthetic burst. Firing requests in quick succession warms the runtime
and measures the best case: in a 25-round `curl --parallel-max 6` run, round 1 came in at p50 288 ms
and rounds 4–25 at p50 113 ms.
> **Endgame (2026-07-29).** The cold-start class was eliminated at the root: the portal became a
> full static export (`output: 'export'`) — the SWA-managed SSR runtime no longer exists, so there
> is nothing left to cool down. One escalation drove this: on 2026-07-28 a cold start exceeded the
> SWA's 45-second function limit and the landing page served a hard "Backend call failure" 500.
> The availability test that bridged the gap as a keep-alive stays as plain uptime monitoring.
# Diagnosing this class of problem
The backend Application Insights resource is the wrong place to look — a freeze appears there as an
*absence* of requests, never as an error. Browser telemetry lives in a **separate** Application
Insights resource addressed by `AUTOPILOT_MONITOR_WEB_APPINSIGHTS_ID`, which the MCP
`query_backend_logs` tool does not reach. Query it through
`.claude/commands/scripts/query-appinsights.sh` with that ID exported, and read `dependencies`
(client-side fetches, including RSC prefetches) and `browserTimings` (the network/processing split of
a document load).
# Contract
Navigation `<Link>` elements in `GlobalSidebar` and `Navbar` set `prefetch={false}`. The prefetched
RSC payload buys nothing for these routes, so the only remaining cost of a click is the route's JS
chunk, which the browser caches after first use.
Do not remove the prop to "speed up navigation" without first re-measuring the tail in the web
Application Insights resource — the prefetch is cheap only while the runtime is warm.
# Citations
* `src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/components/GlobalSidebar.tsx` — nav link rendering, rationale comment
* `src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/components/Navbar.tsx` — top-bar and notification links
* [SWA and Oryx node pinning](../architecture.md) — hosting model for the web app
Submodule
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// Autopilot-Monitor MCP Server — Azure Container App Infrastructure
//
// Reconciled against the live deployment on 2026-07-21 (rg-autopilotmonitor-prd-gwc,
// Germany West Central). The template had drifted behind two changes made directly
// in Azure: the EU cutover (registry/API renamed) and the ACR hardening (admin user
// disabled, image pull moved to the app's system-assigned identity).
//
// !! BEFORE RE-DEPLOYING THIS TEMPLATE, READ THIS !!
// The live app carries an ingress custom-domain binding for mcp.autopilotmonitor.com
// (SNI-enabled, with a managed certificate). Custom domains are NOT modelled below,
// because the certificate is bound out-of-band. A full template deployment would
// therefore REMOVE that binding and take the public MCP endpoint offline.
// For routine changes (CPU/memory, env vars, image) prefer the surgical CLI form:
// az containerapp update -n autopilotmonitor-mcp -g rg-autopilotmonitor-prd-gwc --cpu 0.5 --memory 1.0Gi
// Treat this file as the documented desired state and as a rebuild-from-scratch
// recipe — not as a routinely-applied deployment.
//
// On a FROM-SCRATCH deploy the AcrPull assignment below is created only after the
// Container App exists (it needs the app's principalId), so the very first revision
// can fail to pull its image. Re-run the deployment, or restart the revision, once
// the role assignment has propagated. This does not affect updates to a live app.
//
// Deploy (two-stage; required to set the OAuth public URL safely):
// 1. First deploy without mcpPublicUrl:
// az deployment group create \
// --resource-group <rg-name> \
// --template-file infra/mcp-server.bicep \
// --parameters apiUrl=https://autopilotmonitor-api.azurewebsites.net \
// entraClientSecret=<secret-value>
// This emits `containerAppUrl` as an output (e.g. https://autopilotmonitor-mcp.<env-suffix>.<region>.azurecontainerapps.io).
//
// 2. Re-deploy with that URL pinned, so the OAuth proxy never trusts caller-
// supplied X-Forwarded-Host / Host headers when building issuer / WWW-
// Authenticate / redirect_uri metadata:
// --parameters mcpPublicUrl=<containerAppUrl from step 1>
//
// When mcpPublicUrl is set, the MCP server uses it verbatim and ignores any
// forwarded-headers from the request. Without it, the server logs a startup
// warning and falls back to header-derived URLs (acceptable for local dev,
// not for production).
@description('Azure region for all resources')
param location string = resourceGroup().location
@description('Name of the Container App')
param containerAppName string = 'autopilotmonitor-mcp'
@description('Name of the Container App Environment')
param environmentName string = 'autopilotmonitor-env'
@description('Name of the Log Analytics Workspace (dedicated for Container Apps)')
param logAnalyticsName string = 'autopilotmonitor-container-logs'
@description('Name of the Azure Container Registry')
param acrName string = 'autopilotmonitoreuacr'
@description('Backend API URL')
param apiUrl string = 'https://autopilotmonitor-api-eu.azurewebsites.net'
@description('Container image tag')
param imageTag string = 'latest'
@description('Entra ID app registration client_id used for the OAuth proxy. Public value (appears in JWT aud claim); not a secret. Since the C4A8 app-reg move this is the NEW app (the old 1a400946-… app remains valid at the backend for legacy-homed tenants).')
param entraClientId string = '886ab5e2-6144-442c-80cc-9b28e0667731'
@secure()
@description('Entra ID client secret for OAuth token exchange')
param entraClientSecret string = ''
@description('Comma-separated allowlist of redirect_uri hosts for the OAuth proxy. Loopback is always allowed. Empty = built-in default (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google).')
param mcpAllowedRedirectHosts string = ''
@description('Public URL of the MCP server, used verbatim for OAuth issuer / WWW-Authenticate / redirect metadata. REQUIRED in production: the container refuses to boot without it (host-spoofing defense — see config.ts). Set on the second deploy with the value of the containerAppUrl output from the first deploy. The stage-1 deploy is safe because minReplicas=0 means no container runs until this is pinned. Empty falls back to X-Forwarded-Host headers only outside production (NODE_ENV != production).')
param mcpPublicUrl string = ''
@secure()
// NOTE: avoid characters outside cp1252 here (this one used to say a Unicode
// >=). `az bicep build --stdout` writes through the Windows console codec and
// dies with a UnicodeEncodeError on anything it cannot map. Em dashes are fine.
@description('Base64-encoded HMAC key (>=32 bytes after decode) for signing the OAuth proxy state. Naming and format match the backend\'s PaginationTokenSigningKey for consistency. Empty = generate per-instance random key on startup (acceptable for single-replica deployments since state has 10 min lifetime). Generate with PowerShell: [Convert]::ToBase64String([Security.Cryptography.RandomNumberGenerator]::GetBytes(32))')
param oAuthStateSigningKey string = ''
@description('Enable structured tool-call logging to stderr (queryable via Container App Logs). Volume is one small JSON line per tool call - negligible at current usage.')
param toolLoggingEnabled bool = true
// --- Azure Container Registry ---
// Admin user is DISABLED: a registry-wide username/password pair is a static,
// non-rotating credential that would also have to live in a Container App secret.
// The app pulls with its system-assigned identity + AcrPull instead (see below).
resource acr 'Microsoft.ContainerRegistry/registries@2023-07-01' = {
name: acrName
location: location
sku: {
name: 'Basic'
}
properties: {
adminUserEnabled: false
}
}
// AcrPull for the Container App's system-assigned identity — this is what replaces
// the admin credentials. Without it the app cannot pull its own image.
//
// NOTE: this assignment exists on the live registry but could not be enumerated
// during reconciliation (the CLI session lacks Microsoft.Authorization read), so it
// is reproduced here from the documented pattern rather than read back from Azure.
// Verify with:
// az role assignment list --scope <acr-id> --assignee <containerApp principalId>
var acrPullRoleId = '7f951dda-4ed3-4680-a7ca-43fe172d538d'
resource acrPull 'Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments@2022-04-01' = {
scope: acr
name: guid(acr.id, containerAppName, acrPullRoleId)
properties: {
roleDefinitionId: subscriptionResourceId('Microsoft.Authorization/roleDefinitions', acrPullRoleId)
principalId: containerApp.identity.principalId
principalType: 'ServicePrincipal'
}
}
// --- Log Analytics Workspace (required by Container App Environment) ---
resource logAnalytics 'Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces@2023-09-01' = {
name: logAnalyticsName
location: location
properties: {
sku: {
name: 'PerGB2018'
}
retentionInDays: 30
}
}
// --- Container App Environment ---
resource environment 'Microsoft.App/managedEnvironments@2024-03-01' = {
name: environmentName
location: location
properties: {
appLogsConfiguration: {
destination: 'log-analytics'
logAnalyticsConfiguration: {
customerId: logAnalytics.properties.customerId
sharedKey: logAnalytics.listKeys().primarySharedKey
}
}
}
}
// --- Container App ---
resource containerApp 'Microsoft.App/containerApps@2024-03-01' = {
name: containerAppName
location: location
// System-assigned identity: the credential the app uses to pull from the ACR
// (see the AcrPull assignment above). Replaces the former admin-user secret.
identity: {
type: 'SystemAssigned'
}
properties: {
managedEnvironmentId: environment.id
configuration: {
ingress: {
external: true
targetPort: 8080
transport: 'auto'
allowInsecure: false
}
// 'system' = pull with the app's system-assigned identity. No username, no
// password secret — nothing to rotate and nothing to leak from the app config.
registries: [
{
server: acr.properties.loginServer
identity: 'system'
}
]
secrets: [
{
name: 'entra-client-secret'
value: entraClientSecret
}
{
name: 'oauth-state-signing-key'
value: oAuthStateSigningKey
}
]
activeRevisionsMode: 'Single'
}
template: {
containers: [
{
name: 'mcp-server'
image: '${acr.properties.loginServer}/${containerAppName}:${imageTag}'
// 0.5 vCPU, but NOT for the reason originally given. It was raised from
// 0.25 to shorten the scale-to-zero cold start, on the assumption that
// loading the ONNX embedding model dominated it. Measurement disproved
// that: the app boots in 504 ms in production (see the [boot] marks in
// the container log and docs/mcp/docs-corpus.md), of which the prebaked
// embedder is 173 ms in the background. Of a 31 s cold start, ~98% is
// Container Apps activation — pod scheduling, image mount, container
// start — which no CPU setting touches.
//
// It stays at 0.5 because it plausibly helps CONCURRENT requests
// (maxReplicas is 1, so one replica serves up to 10 in-flight calls) and
// because at scale-to-zero the container bills only while active, making
// the difference negligible. If cold start ever needs to actually go
// away, the only lever is minReplicas: 1. Container Apps accepts fixed
// CPU/memory pairs, so memory moves with the CPU.
resources: {
cpu: json('0.5')
memory: '1.0Gi'
}
env: [
{ name: 'AUTOPILOT_API_URL', value: apiUrl }
{ name: 'PORT', value: '8080' }
{ name: 'AUTOPILOT_ENTRA_CLIENT_ID', value: entraClientId }
{ name: 'AUTOPILOT_ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET', secretRef: 'entra-client-secret' }
{ name: 'MCP_ALLOWED_REDIRECT_HOSTS', value: mcpAllowedRedirectHosts }
{ name: 'MCP_PUBLIC_URL', value: mcpPublicUrl }
{ name: 'OAuthStateSigningKey', secretRef: 'oauth-state-signing-key' }
{ name: 'MCP_TOOL_LOGGING', value: toolLoggingEnabled ? 'true' : 'false' }
]
probes: [
{
type: 'Liveness'
httpGet: {
path: '/health'
port: 8080
}
periodSeconds: 30
initialDelaySeconds: 10
}
{
type: 'Readiness'
httpGet: {
path: '/health'
port: 8080
}
periodSeconds: 10
initialDelaySeconds: 5
}
]
}
]
scale: {
minReplicas: 0
maxReplicas: 1
rules: [
{
name: 'http-scaler'
http: {
metadata: {
concurrentRequests: '10'
}
}
}
]
}
}
}
}
// --- Outputs ---
output containerAppUrl string = 'https://${containerApp.properties.configuration.ingress.fqdn}'
output mcpEndpoint string = 'https://${containerApp.properties.configuration.ingress.fqdn}/mcp'
output acrLoginServer string = acr.properties.loginServer
Submodule
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Submodule internal added at d73e9478c3
+10 -2
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,12 @@
"description": "Detects when a Win32 app detection script fails or returns unexpected results.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed"
],
"baseConfidence": 60,
"conditions": [
{
@@ -34,5 +38,9 @@
]
}
],
"tags": ["apps", "detection", "win32"]
"tags": [
"apps",
"detection",
"win32"
]
}
+11 -2
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,13 @@
"description": "Detects app installation failures with specific exit codes or HRESULT error codes and suggests fixes.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed",
"on_event:app_install_failed"
],
"baseConfidence": 80,
"conditions": [
{
@@ -36,5 +41,9 @@
]
}
],
"tags": ["apps", "msi", "error-code"]
"tags": [
"apps",
"msi",
"error-code"
]
}
+9 -1
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@
"severity": "high",
"category": "apps",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed"
],
"baseConfidence": 70,
"conditions": [
{
@@ -29,5 +33,9 @@
]
}
],
"tags": ["apps", "dependency"]
"tags": [
"apps",
"dependency"
],
"version": "1.1.0"
}
+21 -4
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,13 @@
"description": "Detects when disk space is critically low during enrollment, which can cause app installation failures. Confidence increases when app installations actually failed while disk space was low.",
"severity": "critical",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed",
"on_event:app_install_failed"
],
"baseConfidence": 75,
"conditions": [
{
@@ -36,8 +41,16 @@
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{ "signal": "app_failed", "condition": "exists", "weight": 15 },
{ "signal": "enrollment_failed", "condition": "exists", "weight": 10 }
{
"signal": "app_failed",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 15
},
{
"signal": "enrollment_failed",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 10
}
],
"explanation": "Performance monitoring shows disk free space dropped below 5 GB during enrollment. This can cause app installation failures, especially for large Win32 apps.\n\nIf app installations failed in the same session while free space was low, treat storage exhaustion as the likely contributing cause — the confidence score of this finding is raised accordingly. Verify the individual app failures for their concrete error codes before concluding storage was the only cause.",
"remediation": [
@@ -58,5 +71,9 @@
]
}
],
"tags": ["apps", "disk-space", "critical"]
"tags": [
"apps",
"disk-space",
"critical"
]
}
+10 -1
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@
"severity": "high",
"category": "apps",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed"
],
"baseConfidence": 70,
"conditions": [
{
@@ -29,5 +33,10 @@
]
}
],
"tags": ["apps", "download", "timeout"]
"tags": [
"apps",
"download",
"timeout"
],
"version": "1.1.0"
}
+11 -2
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,12 @@
"description": "Detects when the same app installation is attempted 3 or more times during one enrollment — a retry loop caused by unhonored reboot requests, repeated failures, or detection mismatches.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed"
],
"baseConfidence": 70,
"conditions": [
{
@@ -31,5 +35,10 @@
]
}
],
"tags": ["apps", "reboot", "retry", "loop"]
"tags": [
"apps",
"reboot",
"retry",
"loop"
]
}
+24 -2
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,13 @@
"description": "Detects when the app tracking summary reports multiple failed app installations.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed",
"on_event:app_install_failed"
],
"baseConfidence": 75,
"conditions": [
{
@@ -16,10 +22,22 @@
"operator": "gte",
"value": "2",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "enrollment_failed",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "enrollment_failed",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{ "signal": "enrollment_failed", "condition": "exists", "weight": 15 }
{
"signal": "enrollment_failed",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 15
}
],
"explanation": "The app tracking summary reports 2 or more failed app installations during enrollment. This suggests a systemic issue rather than an isolated app failure.",
"remediation": [
@@ -32,5 +50,9 @@
]
}
],
"tags": ["apps", "summary", "multiple-failures"]
"tags": [
"apps",
"summary",
"multiple-failures"
]
}
+11 -1
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed"
],
"baseConfidence": 70,
"conditions": [
{
@@ -28,5 +32,11 @@
]
}
],
"tags": ["apps", "performance", "slow-install", "warning"]
"tags": [
"apps",
"performance",
"slow-install",
"warning"
],
"version": "1.1.0"
}
+16 -2
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed"
],
"trigger": "correlation",
"baseConfidence": 80,
"conditions": [
@@ -34,7 +38,17 @@
}
],
"relatedDocs": [
{ "title": "Win32 app return codes in Intune", "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/apps-win32-app-management#step-4-return-codes" }
{
"title": "Win32 app return codes in Intune",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/apps-win32-app-management#step-4-return-codes"
}
],
"tags": ["apps", "enforcement", "exit-code", "unmapped", "resolved"]
"tags": [
"apps",
"enforcement",
"exit-code",
"unmapped",
"resolved"
],
"version": "1.1.0"
}
+20 -4
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,12 @@
"description": "Detects when the Enrollment Status Page failed because Intune could not verify an app was installed (HRESULT 0x87D1041C). The installer ran but the detection rule did not match afterwards.",
"severity": "critical",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed"
],
"baseConfidence": 90,
"preconditions": [
{
@@ -69,8 +73,20 @@
}
],
"relatedDocs": [
{ "title": "Microsoft Learn: Troubleshoot Windows Autopilot ESP error codes", "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/troubleshoot-tsg" },
{ "title": "Win32 app detection rules in Intune", "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/apps-win32-add#step-4-detection-rules" }
{
"title": "Microsoft Learn: Troubleshoot Windows Autopilot ESP error codes",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/troubleshoot-tsg"
},
{
"title": "Win32 app detection rules in Intune",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/apps-win32-add#step-4-detection-rules"
}
],
"tags": ["apps", "detection", "esp", "0x87d1041c", "intune"]
"tags": [
"apps",
"detection",
"esp",
"0x87d1041c",
"intune"
]
}
+67 -5
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,12 @@
"description": "Detects when the Enrollment Status Page failed on the Apps subcategory and the agent's AppX deployment log scan identified a suspected MSIX/Store package. Store/MSIX apps install outside the Win32 pipeline, so the regular per-app tracking sees nothing — this correlation names the likely culprit.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.0.0",
"version": "1.2.1",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed"
],
"baseConfidence": 75,
"preconditions": [
{
@@ -35,6 +39,51 @@
"operator": "regex",
"value": "^0x80073[cd]",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "appx_esp_category",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "esp_appx_failure_analysis",
"dataField": "espCategory",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "appx_esp_errorcode",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "esp_appx_failure_analysis",
"dataField": "espErrorCode",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "appx_top_candidate_package",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "esp_appx_failure_analysis",
"dataField": "topCandidatePackage",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "appx_candidate_count",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "esp_appx_failure_analysis",
"dataField": "candidateCount",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "appx_scan_confidence",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "esp_appx_failure_analysis",
"dataField": "confidence",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
}
],
"explanation": "The ESP **{{espCategory}}/Apps** subcategory failed with HRESULT **{{espErrorCode}}** — an error from the AppX/MSIX deployment stack, i.e. a **Microsoft Store / MSIX app**, not a Win32 app. These apps install via the EnterpriseModernAppManagement CSP and never appear in the IME Win32 sidecar logs, which is why all tracked Win32/WinGet apps in this session can look green while ESP still reports an Apps failure.\n\nThe agent scanned the AppXDeploymentServer event log during the failure settle window and identified **{{topCandidatePackageName}}** (package `{{topCandidatePackage}}`) as the most likely culprit — its deployment error matches the ESP failure code ({{candidateCount}} candidate(s) total, confidence: {{confidence}}).\n\n**This is a correlation-based assessment, not a confirmed root cause** — validate against the AppXDeploymentServer/Operational event log on the device or in the diagnostics archive before acting.",
@@ -44,7 +93,7 @@
"steps": [
"Open Event Viewer → Applications and Services Logs → Microsoft → Windows → AppXDeploymentServer → Operational on the device (or in the diagnostics archive if uploaded)",
"Filter for Error-level events around the ESP failure time and confirm the package name and HRESULT match this finding",
"Look up the HRESULT: 0x80073cf9 = generic install failure, 0x80073cf0 = invalid/corrupt package, 0x80073cff = sideloading/licensing policy block, 0x80073d02 = blocked because app is in use"
"Look up the HRESULT: 0x80073cf9 = generic install failure, 0x80073cf0 = package could not be opened (unsigned, publisher mismatch, or not found), 0x80073cff = sideloading/licensing policy block, 0x80073d02 = blocked because app is in use"
]
},
{
@@ -65,8 +114,21 @@
}
],
"relatedDocs": [
{ "title": "Microsoft Learn: Troubleshoot Windows Autopilot ESP error codes", "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/troubleshoot-tsg" },
{ "title": "Add Microsoft Store apps to Intune", "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/store-apps-microsoft" }
{
"title": "Microsoft Learn: Troubleshoot Windows Autopilot ESP error codes",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/troubleshoot-tsg"
},
{
"title": "Add Microsoft Store apps to Intune",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/store-apps-microsoft"
}
],
"tags": ["apps", "appx", "msix", "store", "esp", "0x80073cf9"]
"tags": [
"apps",
"appx",
"msix",
"store",
"esp",
"0x80073cf9"
]
}
+80
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-APP-015",
"title": "Required App Never Settled — ESP Completion Deferred",
"description": "The IME reported its user-session completion line, but at least one required app stayed pending — without ever failing or even starting to install — so the agent kept deferring the enrollment completion signal. Typically an assignment/requirement problem (requirement rules never met, dependency never satisfied, or the app needs a context that is not available during ESP, e.g. a VPN client waiting for user sign-in to a portal).",
"severity": "high",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.0.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"trigger": "correlation",
"baseConfidence": 60,
"confidenceThreshold": 55,
"preconditions": [
{
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "enrollment_complete",
"operator": "not_exists",
"description": "Suppress when the pending app eventually settled and the enrollment completed — a transient deferral is normal."
},
{
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "enrollment_failed",
"operator": "not_exists",
"description": "Suppress when the session failed explicitly — the app/ESP failure rules already cover that path; this rule targets the never-finishing case."
}
],
"conditions": [
{
"signal": "completion_deferred",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "agent_trace",
"dataField": "message",
"operator": "contains",
"value": "completion signal deferred",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "apps_pending",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "app_tracking_summary",
"dataField": "pending",
"operator": "gte",
"value": "1",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "pending_app_names",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "app_tracking_summary",
"dataField": "pendingNames",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{ "signal": "pending_app_names", "condition": "exists", "weight": 5 }
],
"explanation": "The Intune Management Extension wrote its user-session completion line, but the agent observed `{{pending}}` required app(s) still pending (`{{pendingNames}}`) and therefore **deferred the enrollment completion signal** — repeatedly, if this happened across several logons or reboots.\n\nA pending app that never transitions to downloading/installing and never fails is almost always an **assignment or requirement problem**, not an install error:\n\n- requirement rules that are never met on this device (OS/architecture/registry/script checks),\n- an unsatisfied dependency or supersedence chain,\n- an app targeted as *required* for the user ESP that needs something unavailable during provisioning (e.g. a VPN client whose portal sign-in only happens after first logon),\n- user-targeted apps on a device where the user identity never fully registered (see the hybrid user-affinity rule if it also fired).",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Identify and unblock the pending app",
"steps": [
"Check the app names listed in this finding's evidence (pendingNames) — these are the apps the ESP is waiting for.",
"In Intune, review the app's requirement rules and dependencies; test them on the device (IntuneManagementExtension.log logs each requirement evaluation).",
"Decide whether the app really must block the ESP: removing it from the ESP's 'blocking apps' list (or making it not-required during enrollment) unblocks completion immediately.",
"If the app is user-targeted on a hybrid-joined device, verify the user's Entra affinity first — without a signed-in Entra user, user-targeted policy never applies."
]
}
],
"relatedDocs": [
{
"title": "Microsoft Learn: Enrollment Status Page — blocking apps",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/intune-service/enrollment/windows-enrollment-status"
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"tags": ["apps", "esp", "completion", "assignment", "pending"]
}
+113
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@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-APP-016",
"title": "Required Apps Never Started — ESP Apps Gate Starved",
"description": "One or more required user-ESP apps never started installing while the ESP AccountSetup apps gate waited on them — the agent observed the ESP page exit with those apps still in a non-terminal, never-started state. Unlike ANALYZE-APP-015 (which reports that completion was DEFERRED because of a pending app, and stays silent once the session reaches a terminal verdict) this rule reports the delivery gap itself and fires regardless of the final outcome: an enrollment that Windows called done while required apps never ran is a successful enrollment with missing software, and the operator must see it.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.0.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed",
"on_event:session_stalled"
],
"trigger": "single",
"baseConfidence": 75,
"confidenceThreshold": 70,
"conditions": [
{
"signal": "starved_apps_present",
"source": "event_count",
"eventType": "app_install_starved",
"operator": "count_gte",
"value": "1",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "many_starved_apps",
"source": "event_count",
"eventType": "app_install_starved",
"operator": "count_gte",
"value": "5",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "appName",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_starved",
"dataField": "appName",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "state",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_starved",
"dataField": "state",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{
"signal": "many_starved_apps",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 15
},
{
"signal": "appName",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 10
}
],
"explanation": "At least one **required** app assigned to the user ESP never started installing. The Intune Management Extension never moved it out of its initial state (`{{state}}`) — it did not download, did not install, and did not fail — while the ESP AccountSetup apps gate was waiting on it. First app observed: `{{appName}}`.\n\nEvery starved app has its own `app_install_starved` timeline event carrying `appId`, `appName` and `state` — open the timeline and filter on that event type for the complete list.\n\nThis is a **delivery** problem, not an install error, and it is invisible in the Intune console: the app simply never appears. Typical causes:\n\n- far more required apps targeted at the ESP than the gate can service in the available window,\n- requirement rules that are never met on this device (OS / architecture / registry / script checks),\n- an unsatisfied dependency or supersedence chain,\n- an app that needs a context unavailable during provisioning (e.g. a VPN client waiting on a portal sign-in),\n- a mid-ESP reboot that cut the gate short — check whether the mid-ESP reboot advisory also fired for this session.\n\nNote that this finding is independent of the session verdict. A session can be marked **Succeeded** and still be missing every app listed here.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Shrink the ESP blocking set",
"steps": [
"Open the Enrollment Status Page profile and review the blocking app list — every required app there must finish before the user reaches the desktop.",
"Move apps that do not have to be present at first logon from *required* to *available*, or remove them from the ESP's blocking apps selection.",
"Prefer a small, deliberately chosen blocking set (security agent, VPN, management tooling) over the full application catalogue."
]
},
{
"title": "Unblock the individual apps",
"steps": [
"Collect the app names from the `app_install_starved` timeline events in this session.",
"For each app, review its requirement rules and dependencies in Intune — IntuneManagementExtension.log records every requirement evaluation.",
"Verify the assignment actually targets the signed-in user (user-targeted apps need an established Entra user affinity; check the hybrid user-affinity finding if it also fired).",
"Re-run an enrollment and confirm the apps now reach a terminal state before the ESP exits."
]
},
{
"title": "Rule out a truncated gate",
"steps": [
"Check whether a mid-ESP reboot was observed for this session — a forced restart during AccountSetup cuts the apps gate short and can starve everything still queued.",
"If so, reassign the reboot-forcing device policies to user groups so the restart lands after AccountSetup."
]
}
],
"relatedDocs": [
{
"title": "Microsoft Learn: Enrollment Status Page — blocking apps",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/intune-service/enrollment/windows-enrollment-status"
},
{
"title": "Microsoft Learn: Win32 app requirement rules",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/intune-service/apps/apps-win32-add"
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"tags": [
"apps",
"esp",
"starvation",
"assignment",
"blocking",
"delivery-gap"
]
}
+92
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@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-APP-017",
"title": "App Install Blocked by Another Installer (0x80070652)",
"description": "Detects Win32 app installs that failed because the Windows Installer was busy with another installation (HRESULT 0x80070652 / MSI exit code 1618, ERROR_INSTALL_ALREADY_RUNNING). The IME retries on a fixed budget (~15-17 minutes across several attempts) and then reports the app as failed; when the app is ESP-blocking, the Device Setup Apps subcategory terminates with it.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.0.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"baseConfidence": 70,
"conditions": [
{
"signal": "mutex_blocked_install",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "hresultFromWin32",
"operator": "equals",
"value": "-2147023278",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "installer_exit_1618",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "exitCode",
"operator": "equals",
"value": "1618",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "esp_failed_with_mutex_code",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "esp_failure_settle_started",
"dataField": "errorCode",
"operator": "equals",
"value": "0x80070652",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{
"signal": "installer_exit_1618",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 10
},
{
"signal": "esp_failed_with_mutex_code",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 20
}
],
"confidenceThreshold": 65,
"explanation": "App **{{appName}}** failed to install because the Windows Installer service was already busy with another installation — HRESULT **0x80070652** / MSI exit code **1618** (`ERROR_INSTALL_ALREADY_RUNNING`). Only one Windows Installer transaction can run at a time; the Intune Management Extension retried on its fixed budget (typically ~15-17 minutes across several attempts) and then reported the app as failed. If this app is required in the Enrollment Status Page, the Device Setup Apps subcategory fails with it and the enrollment terminates.\n\nThis failure is **deterministic per attempt**: as long as the competing installer keeps winning the race, a plain re-enrollment fails again at roughly the same minute mark — retrying without fixing the collision only churns devices.\n\nCommon sources of the competing installation:\n\n- The **preceding Win32 app in the install order**: its installer exits 0 (so IME moves on) but leaves a child `msiexec` transaction or post-install MSI work running. Security agents and proxy clients that chain multiple MSIs are frequent offenders.\n- **OEM factory software** installing on first boot (factory-image provisioning packages, vendor updaters) — typical on brand-new hardware batches.\n- **Microsoft 365 Apps (C2R), driver updaters or Windows servicing** running installations in parallel outside IME's control.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Identify the competing installer",
"steps": [
"In this session's timeline, note which app finished installing immediately before {{appName}} started — its installer is the prime suspect for holding the Windows Installer mutex",
"On a reproduction device, when the failure window is active, check for running installers: Get-Process msiexec | Select-Object Id,StartTime and the in-progress marker key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Installer\\InProgress",
"Check the Application event log for MsiInstaller events around the failure timestamp to see which product held the transaction",
"On factory-fresh hardware, also look for OEM first-boot installers (vendor updater services, factory provisioning packages) that run outside Intune"
]
},
{
"title": "Serialize the install chain",
"steps": [
"Add an Intune Win32 dependency so {{appName}} depends on the app whose installer causes the collision — IME then orders them explicitly instead of racing",
"Alternatively, wrap the offending predecessor so its install script waits until msiexec has fully finished (poll the InProgress registry key or the _MSIExecute mutex with a bounded timeout) before exiting",
"If the app does not have to gate the ESP, remove it from the blocking-app list so a transient 1618 no longer terminates the enrollment; Intune retries it after the desktop"
]
}
],
"relatedDocs": [
{
"title": "Microsoft Learn: MsiExec.exe error messages (1618 = another installation is in progress)",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/error-codes"
},
{
"title": "Microsoft Learn: Troubleshoot Win32 app installations in Intune",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/mem/intune/app-management/troubleshoot-win32-app-install"
}
],
"tags": [
"apps",
"msiexec",
"mutex",
"0x80070652",
"1618",
"esp"
]
}
+98
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@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-APP-018",
"title": "App Return Code Requested a Reboot During Enrollment",
"description": "Detects Win32 apps whose installer exit code maps to Soft reboot or Hard reboot in the app's Intune return-code table (the '[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as ...' line). Hard reboot stops app processing and restarts the device in Device Setup - the mid-enrollment restart and second sign-in; Soft reboot leaves the app pending until the next restart while the ESP moves on. Confidence rises for Hard reboot and when a reboot was actually observed in the session.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.0.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed"
],
"trigger": "single",
"baseConfidence": 60,
"conditions": [
{
"signal": "reboot_return_code",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "app_install_completed",
"dataField": "exitCodeClass",
"operator": "in",
"value": "SoftReboot,HardReboot",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "hard_reboot_return_code",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "app_install_completed",
"dataField": "exitCodeClass",
"operator": "equals",
"value": "HardReboot",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "reboot_observed",
"source": "event_count",
"eventType": "system_reboot_detected",
"operator": "count_gte",
"value": "1",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{
"signal": "hard_reboot_return_code",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 25
},
{
"signal": "reboot_observed",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 15
}
],
"confidenceThreshold": 60,
"explanation": "App **{{appName}}** returned exit code **{{exitCode}}**, which its Intune return-code table maps to **{{exitCodeClass}}** - the installer asked for a restart before its work is complete.\n\n- **SoftReboot**: the Intune Management Extension reports the app as *pending reboot*. The Enrollment Status Page treats it as completed and moves on, and Intune only marks the app installed after the next restart re-evaluates the detection rule. Until then the app may be unusable or half-configured, and the user sees a restart notification.\n- **HardReboot**: the Intune Management Extension stops processing further apps and, in Device Setup, restarts the device right away (the restart grace period does not apply during the ESP) - the same mid-enrollment restart and second sign-in that ANALYZE-ESP-005 attributes to reboot-required policies. In Account Setup the extension does not restart the device itself and the app stays pending.\n\nA restart requested by an installer is normal for many MSI packages (exit codes 3010 and 1641), but during Autopilot it lengthens the ESP, can surprise the user with a restart, and hides the app's real state until after the reboot. The return-code class is the app's own configuration in Intune, not a device fault.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Check the app's return-code mapping",
"steps": [
"Open the app in the Intune admin center > Properties > Program and review the return codes table: exit code {{exitCode}} is currently mapped to {{exitCodeClass}}",
"If the installer only recommends a restart (MSI 3010 ERROR_SUCCESS_REBOOT_REQUIRED, 1641 ERROR_SUCCESS_REBOOT_INITIATED), map the code to Soft reboot instead of Hard reboot so the next app can install before the restart",
"If the app works without an immediate restart, suppress the installer's own reboot (for MSI: REBOOT=ReallySuppress on the install command) so it returns 0 and the restart happens on your schedule",
"Keep Hard reboot only when the following apps genuinely cannot install before the restart - and then expect the mid-ESP restart in every enrollment"
]
},
{
"title": "Take the app out of the ESP critical path",
"steps": [
"If the app is not needed for first use, remove it from the ESP blocking-app list so the restart happens after the user reaches the desktop",
"If it must stay blocking, order it last in Device Setup (dependencies or install order) so a hard reboot does not interrupt the remaining apps",
"For Soft reboot apps, plan a restart at the end of enrollment or accept that the app finishes on the user's first restart"
]
}
],
"relatedDocs": [
{
"title": "Microsoft Learn: Add a Win32 app - Program step (device restart behavior and return codes)",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/app-management/deployment/add-win32#step-2-program"
},
{
"title": "Microsoft Learn: Enrollment Status Page tracking",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/enrollment-status"
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"tags": [
"apps",
"reboot",
"return-code",
"soft-reboot",
"hard-reboot",
"esp",
"second-sign-in"
]
}
+24 -4
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,13 @@
"description": "Correlates an active proxy configuration with app content download failures (Delivery Optimization timeout or download error), suggesting the proxy is blocking or throttling Intune content delivery.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed",
"on_event:app_install_failed"
],
"trigger": "correlation",
"baseConfidence": 60,
"conditions": [
@@ -30,8 +35,16 @@
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{ "signal": "app_install_failed", "condition": "count >= 2", "weight": 15 },
{ "signal": "enrollment_failed", "condition": "count >= 1", "weight": 10 }
{
"signal": "app_install_failed",
"condition": "count >= 2",
"weight": 15
},
{
"signal": "enrollment_failed",
"condition": "count >= 1",
"weight": 10
}
],
"confidenceThreshold": 50,
"explanation": "A proxy (explicit or PAC-based) is configured on this device and app content downloads failed (Delivery Optimization timeout or download content error). Proxies can block or throttle downloads from *.delivery.mp.microsoft.com and other Intune CDN endpoints.\n\nThis is a common root cause when app downloads fail consistently on proxy-connected corporate networks. Note this rule only fires when the failure is download-related — generic app install errors behind a proxy do not trigger it.",
@@ -54,5 +67,12 @@
]
}
],
"tags": ["correlation", "apps", "proxy", "network", "download", "root-cause"]
"tags": [
"correlation",
"apps",
"proxy",
"network",
"download",
"root-cause"
]
}
+20 -4
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,12 @@
"description": "Detects when memory usage stays above 90% across at least 3 performance snapshots during enrollment, indicating sustained memory pressure that can cause app installation failures or system instability.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "device",
"version": "2.0.0",
"version": "2.1.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed"
],
"baseConfidence": 55,
"conditions": [
{
@@ -38,8 +42,16 @@
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{ "signal": "app_failed", "condition": "exists", "weight": 20 },
{ "signal": "enrollment_failed", "condition": "exists", "weight": 15 }
{
"signal": "app_failed",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 20
},
{
"signal": "enrollment_failed",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 15
}
],
"explanation": "Memory usage exceeded 90% in at least 3 performance snapshots during this enrollment — sustained pressure, not a single transient spike. Persistent high memory usage can cause app installation failures, system slowdowns, and ESP timeouts, especially on devices with 8 GB RAM installing several apps concurrently.",
"remediation": [
@@ -53,5 +65,9 @@
]
}
],
"tags": ["device", "memory", "performance"]
"tags": [
"device",
"memory",
"performance"
]
}
+12 -2
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,12 @@
"description": "Detects devices enrolling with an OS build that has reached end of support: Windows 11 22H2 (build 22621) or older, which includes every Windows 10 build. Maintenance note: raise the build cutoff to 22631 after Windows 11 23H2 reaches end of support on 2026-11-10.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "device",
"version": "2.0.0",
"version": "2.1.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed"
],
"baseConfidence": 90,
"conditions": [
{
@@ -52,5 +56,11 @@
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/lifecycle/products/windows-11-home-and-pro"
}
],
"tags": ["device", "os-version", "end-of-support", "windows-11", "windows-10"]
"tags": [
"device",
"os-version",
"end-of-support",
"windows-11",
"windows-10"
]
}

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