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Author SHA1 Message Date
Oliver Kieselbach 4b74995e79 shared: drop Private Preview wording from ContactEmail seeding comment
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 20:34:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5d8d9e8d40 web: show tenant contact email in config report tenant status
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 17:58:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 25bd2c175e web: bump nanoid to 3.3.18 and js-yaml to 4.3.1 (Dependabot high alerts)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 14:00:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 830edb98e7 agent: suppress distress dispatch when the auth failure came from a dead endpoint
Follow-up to 13dd6723: a platform-403 (stopped/retired app, HTML error
page) now skips the DeviceNotRegistered/AuthCertificateRejected distress
report - it would be sent to the very endpoint that just answered with a
platform page, and its classification would be wrong. Counting and the
shutdown thresholds are unchanged, so a dead endpoint still drives the
agent to its soft shutdown instead of retrying forever.

The one-report-per-streak gate moves from "count == 1" to a streak-scoped
flag: an endpoint-unavailable failure no longer consumes the streak's
report slot, so a later genuine 403 from a live backend still dispatches.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 13:42:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1ebc2675b1 gather-rules: WQL property projections, portal enable-gating, author from JWT
- WMI guard accepts SELECT <property-list> FROM <class> for any class already
  allowed via SELECT * (strict data subset); same algorithm in agent, portal
  validator, and MCP validate_rule (incl. trim fix); guardrails.json unchanged
- Portal refuses to enable custom rules with not-allowed targets: create lands
  disabled, invalid edit force-disables, "Blocked on devices" badge, GitHub-issue
  hint for allowlist requests; agent stays the enforcement boundary
- Rule Author is stamped from the creator's token (display name > UPN) at create
  and preserved through every update, incl. cross-tenant GA edits
- bumpVersion keeps the segment count ("1.0.0" -> "1.1.0")

Customer feedback: SELECT BatteryStatus FROM Win32_Battery + on_change was
impossible because SELECT * re-emits on every charge-percent fluctuation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 13:41:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 283c2ed214 web,ci: make Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1 actually downloadable
The docs page and the admin UI both told customers to run
Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1, but the script was never published
anywhere -- it only exists in this private repo. Publish it on the
download alias next to the agent artifacts and reference it:

- build-agent.yml: upload the script on publish_as_stable runs
- admin UI: copied grant command now starts with an irm -OutFile
  download line; prose links the script directly
- utils/config.ts: new AGENT_DOWNLOAD_URL registry constant

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 13:33:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 13dd6723da agent: classify platform-403 as endpoint-unavailable + self-update retry after await-enrollment
Field case sits-d.cloud 2026-08-09: a pinned pre-cutover agent (2.0.1282)
hit the stopped legacy Function App. Azure answers with a platform-level
403 HTML page, which the agent reported as "device is not authorized" -
support chases a non-existent authorization problem, and the stranded
build never rescues itself because the startup self-update check runs
pre-enrollment where OOBE has no network.

Two fixes:
- BackendApiClient reads the 401/403 body: an HTML response cannot come
  from our backend, so it is classified as endpoint stopped/retired/
  proxied (BackendAuthException.EndpointUnavailable, page title in the
  message) instead of a device-authorization verdict.
- AgentBootstrap retries the self-update check once after the MDM
  certificate appears (proof of connectivity) when the startup check
  never reached the manifest, with relaxed timeouts (10s check / 60s
  download). An applied update restarts into a current binary BEFORE
  session registration hits a retired endpoint. Marker files are also
  written on this trigger so agent_version_check reflects the latest
  verdict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 13:32:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach cb6d80a76e agent: transliterate typographic punctuation to ASCII in log output
Agent logs are written UTF-8 without BOM; cp1252-guessing viewers
(Outlook web attachment preview) render em dashes as mojibake. Map
em/en dash, arrow, ellipsis, curly quotes and NBSP to ASCII at the
central sanitize step so every message is covered without touching
call sites. Genuine non-ASCII payload (paths, names) stays verbatim.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 12:41:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 024c90d68f ci: cache the MiniLM embedding model so MCP tests stop 429ing on huggingface
The vector-search tests tokenize with the real Xenova/all-MiniLM-L6-v2
model. transformers.js caches it under node_modules by default, which npm ci
recreates on every run — so each CI run re-downloaded the tokenizer/weights
from huggingface.co, and a rate-limited response (429) failed the whole MCP
job (run 31252869254; unrelated to the commit under test). Persist the model
via actions/cache and point HF_CACHE_DIR (already honored by
vector-search-provider.ts) at it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-08 12:37:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 54044c5d9c esp: continue-anyway observation mode — bounded 60-min defang for device-phase failures
Classic UD fleets held at the Device-ESP timeout wall by one slow blocking
app showed ~100% Failed (tenant c9787ba2: 948/1000 esp_terminal_failure)
although the profile allows "Continue anyway" and users demonstrably reach
the desktop — the classic advisory defang requires AccountSetupEnteredUtc
and never applied there.

New operator-set tenant opt-in EnableEspContinueAnywayObservation
(ConfigVersion 36 -> 37, default off):

- DecisionCore: a Device-phase EspTerminalFailure with ContinueAnyway
  allowed + opt-in observed (EspConfigDetected payload fact — kernel stays
  config-free) + Classic/Unknown non-pre-prov scenario defangs into the
  advisory rail with a 60-min AdvisoryCompletion window. Real end via the
  DAD-validated real-user desktop + Hello gate (IME user-session gate is
  structurally unavailable without the AccountSetup anchor): eager
  completion on DesktopArrived, category recovery via the 4910a5a5 hook,
  expiry un-defangs to the original esp_terminal_failure — every observed
  session still gets a terminal verdict.
- Honest outcome: enrollment_complete under an unresolved advisory carries
  espSoftFailure/completionSource (also on the classic post-AccountSetup
  advisory path); backend stamps EspSoftFailure/CompletionSource on the
  Sessions row (+ index mirror, terminal-tuple preservation); web renders
  an amber "with issues" badge plus a session-detail banner. No new
  terminal status — Succeeded + marker.
- Agent: remote-config field merged into AgentConfiguration; stamped into
  both esp_config_detected emitters (orchestrator bootstrap via live
  Func<bool> seam, DeviceInfoCollector via host/factory pass-through).
- Admin UI: GA-only toggle in the tenant management modal (next to
  Bootstrap Token) + stored/runtime rows in the tenant config report;
  GA-gated on both write paths (PUT silently reverts for tenant admins,
  field patch rejects with 400).

Tests: 13 new ContinueAnywayObservationTests; DecisionCore 513, Agent V2
2162, Functions 3948, SummaryDialog 44, vitest 632, tsc clean.
Docs: docs/agent/continue-anyway-observation.md (OKF) + index/log.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-08 12:28:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3b3e8a7614 analyze: delay auto-analyze visibility 30s so rules stop racing the terminal flush
The enqueue fires in the very ingest batch that carries enrollment_failed /
enrollment_complete — by design the FIRST event of the agent's terminal
sequence. The worker's hot loop dequeued sub-second and evaluated rules
against a stream still missing the terminal-flush rows (stuck-promotion's
synthetic app_install_failed, app_tracking_summary, agent_shutting_down),
and the RuleResult dedup made the gap permanent. Session 53d1e9f6:
ANALYZE-ESP-004's optional app_install_failed condition never matched and
{{appName}} rendered as a literal placeholder (confidence 80, factor never
fired). A 30 s visibilityTimeout covers the flush including the agent's
late-event grace.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-08 12:28:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 115b4ec8c2 bootstrap: promote Windows 365 Cloud PC relax to v2.3 production script
Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 takes over the field-tested v2.3-dev.3 logic
unchanged (code-only diff vs dev: ScriptVersion + log file name); comments
condensed to customer-facing descriptions, dev changelog collapsed into one
v2.3 entry. Pester suite moved to Install-AutopilotMonitor.Tests.ps1 (neutral
test user names), dev script and dev suite removed. Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent
dry-run tester mirrors the Cloud PC trigger and the guard-4 uptime exemption.

Pester 29/29 green under PS 5.1 and pwsh 7; parse + pure-ASCII checks pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-08 09:18:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8ec5a5debd offboarding: close the un-offboard race — config freeze + fail-closed wipe guard
While a tenant offboarding is queued or draining, the TenantConfiguration
tombstone (Disabled=true, 'Offboarding in progress') is the cascade's only
auth gate. A GA lifting Disabled mid-cascade re-opened the tenant against a
wipe that was still coming: data written afterwards was destroyed, and
sessions registered after enumeration survived as orphans while their event
partitions were wiped.

Three layers close it:
- PUT config/{tenantId} returns 409 while the row is the offboarding
  tombstone — for all callers, GA included
- TenantConfigPatchService refuses patch AND revert against the tombstone
  (a revert restores a pre-offboarding snapshot with Disabled=false — the
  exact race)
- TenantOffboardingHandler re-reads the config before the destructive
  post-drain phases and fail-closes with 'unoffboard_race' when the
  tombstone is gone but the wipe has not run (last line of defense)

Shared predicate: TenantOffboardFunction.IsOffboardingTombstone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 16:25:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ff35270d5d agent: legacy bootstrap-config without TenantIdWaitSeconds must not disable the wait
A bootstrap-config.json written before the TenantIdWaitSeconds property
existed deserialized the missing field to 0, which the runtime treated as
an explicit opt-out and skipped the 600s TenantId wait entirely — exactly
the wait Hybrid-Join devices need while their Entra registration lands.

TenantIdWaitSeconds is now nullable: missing/null means 'not configured'
and falls through to the agent default (600s); an explicit 0 remains the
legacy fast-fail opt-out. The install merge carries null through instead
of freezing the default into the file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 16:24:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 312e849573 email: welcome + farewell templates to green branding
Header gradient, CTA button, and links move from the old blue
(#2563eb/#4f46e5) to the landing-page green palette (#1e8a4c/#33b161).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 16:11:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7433df528d web: mark-led OG/Twitter image + PNG apple-touch-icon
The OG image was an unreadable shrunken hero at card size; replace it
with a centered mark-first design (big green shape, large wordmark,
single tagline). Safari cannot use SVG for apple-touch-icon and fell
back to a letter tile — point the icons config at the file-convention
apple-icon.png, now the green mark on white (180x180).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 15:17:23 +02:00
Claude d86ae18a5e distress: carry the W365 Cloud PC marker into Devices Not Registered
First W365 field run: the rejected Cloud PC appeared in the report as an
anonymous "Microsoft Corporation / Virtual Machine" row — nothing told the
admin that the fix is the Cloud PC validator, not an Autopilot-registration
hunt. The agent's CloudPcDetector verdict (Windows365 key AND
CloudManagedDesktopExtension service) now rides the pre-auth distress channel:

- Agent: DistressReporter captures isCloudPc at construction (optional ctor
  arg, test fakes stay source-compatible); BackendClientFactory feeds it from
  CloudPcDetector; DistressReport.IsCloudPc on the wire (~18 bytes, fits the
  1536-byte payload cap without a bump — comment updated)
- Backend: DistressReportEntry.IsCloudPc, table column + read mapping
  (legacy rows -> false), structured log + AgentDistressReport AI event key;
  GetDeviceNotRegisteredFunction aggregates sticky-true per serial (same OR
  semantics as the Sessions IsCloudPc merge) and the data-quality notice
  names the new self-reported field. GA global/distress-reports serializes
  the full entry and picks it up automatically.
- Web: Cloud PC badge in the Devices Not Registered table (same sky badge as
  the session table) + conditional hint pointing at the Windows 365 Cloud PC
  Validation toggle and the W365CloudPcValidation Graph add-on.
- Tests: sticky-true + no-marker aggregation cases; MakeEntry helper gains
  the optional flag. Docs: third transport rail in
  backend/cloudpc-device-validation.md + log entry.

Unverified like every distress field — triage context only, never an auth
input. Verified: web tsc clean, eslint 0 errors (file's single warning
pre-exists). .NET build/tests run in CI (no SDK in this sandbox).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RqEFrcAHhWgCvgJgHGzMuv
2026-08-07 10:52:35 +00:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1c5f69a9fe w365: CloudPc device validator — cert-CN-bound fallback for Cloud PCs (#127)
* w365: CloudPc device validator — cert-CN-bound fallback for Cloud PCs

Windows 365 Cloud PCs are never Autopilot-registered, so the serial lookup
(and the Corporate Identifier fallback) structurally reject them and Cloud PC
first-connect enrollment could not be monitored. New stage-3 fallback in the
device-validation chain: extract the Intune device id from the chain-validated
MDM client certificate's Subject CN (field-verified: CN == managedDevice id ==
cloudPC.managedDeviceId) and require a matching cloudPC object in the claimed
tenant (Graph v1.0 virtualEndpoint/cloudPCs, $filter=managedDeviceId eq).
Only service-provisioned Cloud PCs have such an object — a regular enrolled
non-Autopilot device still ends in the 403, and local W365 markers are never
consulted for auth.

- Shared: ValidatorType.CloudPc = 5, TenantConfiguration.ValidateCloudPcDevice
  (default false, tenant-admin writable), GraphAppPermissions.CloudPCReadAll,
  GraphFeatureCatalog feature W365CloudPcValidation -> CloudPC.Read.All
- Backend: CloudPcDeviceValidator (AutopilotDeviceValidator sibling contract:
  30/5 min cache, 2 attempts, transient->503; GUID gate before the OData
  filter; exact-match guard; Graph 403 = definitive "grant missing", not
  transient), SecurityValidator CN extraction + fallback stage + hard gate,
  wiring through the 5 agent endpoints, TableConfigRepository persistence
- Consent script: W365CloudPcValidation in catalog/ValidateSet/help; NEW
  GraphFeatureCatalogSyncTests pins C# catalog <-> grant script (previously
  comment-only lock-step)
- Bootstrap dev script v2.3-dev.3: guard 4 (uptime window) exempted while the
  Cloud-PC relax is active — Cloud PCs run headless for days before first
  connect; the fresh-profile window is the time anchor there (+ Pester tests)
- Web: validation toggle + context plumbing, ValidatedBy "CloudPc" label,
  privacy-page validation claim generalized (Last updated bumped)
- Docs: OKF concept doc backend/cloudpc-device-validation.md + index + log

Verified: web tsc clean, ESLint 0 errors (99 pre-existing warnings = ratchet
cap, none added). .NET build/tests and Pester run in CI — SDK download and
pwsh are unavailable in this sandbox's network policy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RqEFrcAHhWgCvgJgHGzMuv

* w365: agent-side IsCloudPc flag + engine expectation "no Device-ESP phase"

Companion to the CloudPc validator: the agent now classifies Windows 365
Cloud PCs locally with the bootstrap's field-verified marker AND
(HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows365 key + installed
CloudManagedDesktopExtension service, probed via its Services registry key
so net48 needs no System.ServiceProcess). SKIP-safe: any error resolves
false. Never an auth input - backend admission stays exclusively the
cert-CN-bound Graph lookup (ValidatedBy=CloudPc); the two signals are
independent and may disagree.

Two transport rails:

- Session metadata: SessionRegistration.IsCloudPc -> Sessions table
  (sticky-true OR across re-registrations, IsSelfDeployingProfile pattern)
  -> SessionsIndex full mirror -> SessionSummary -> new isCloudPc search
  filter end to end (SearchSessions + QueryRawSessions + pagination
  fingerprint + all three in-memory predicates; MCP search_sessions /
  query_raw_sessions params + summary projection; web type, Cloud PC pill,
  SessionInfoCard enrollment label, CSV export appended column).
- Decision engine: isCloudPc rides the EnrollmentFactsObserved payload,
  recorded set-once for BOTH values in EnrollmentScenarioObservations.CloudPc
  and annotates the scenario profile reason
  cloud_pc_first_connect:no_device_esp_expected - the engine-recorded
  expectation that Device-ESP already ran headless at provisioning and the
  session starts at Account Setup. Deliberately reason+observation only:
  no completion arm depends on DeviceSetup, Mode stays AccountSetup/IME-
  classified (Classic), EspConfig keeps configured-FirstSync semantics.
  Positive marker surfaces as cloud_pc_marker in the audit-trail census.
  Updater idempotency: the cloudPcAnnotates gate keeps the generic v1
  reason branch from re-claiming the slot on repeat posts (would bump
  EvidenceOrdinal every post). Additive-nullable observation - no state
  schema bump (v4 convention), serializer roundtrip pinned.

Tests: CloudPcDetector resolver (marker AND, throwing probe), registration
body, facts-signal payload shape, updater annotation/idempotency/
self-deploying interplay, reducer observation both values + census fold,
serializer roundtrip, index projection superset, sticky-true both
directions. Suites: DecisionCore 500, Functions 3941, Agent V2 2154,
vitest 632 - all green; tsc web+MCP clean; ESLint 0 errors (cap 99).

Docs: cloudpc-device-validation.md follow-up section replaced with the
shipped mechanism + log entry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 12:31:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 17affb6dfd Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/Autopilot-Monitor 2026-08-06 18:20:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach acf4d0eeaa bootstrap(dev): v2.3-dev.2 - Cloud PC detection on captured evidence
First W365 field test (2026-08-06) proved the assumed WMI signature wrong:
a real Cloud PC reports the generic Manufacturer='Microsoft Corporation' +
Model='Virtual Machine'; the 'Cloud PC Enterprise ...' string exists only in
Intune/Graph inventory. Probe on the live Cloud PC captured two local
markers instead: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows365 and the
CloudManagedDesktopExtension service (W365 management agent).

Get-CloudPcModel is replaced by Test-IsCloudPc requiring BOTH markers (each
alone has look-alikes: W365-Boot physical clients / legacy managed-desktop
agents). Raw identity and both marker states are always logged. Tests
updated to the marker model (26 tests, green under PS 5.1 and pwsh 7).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 18:14:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4c1889d011 bootstrap(dev): always log raw Manufacturer/Model for Cloud PC diagnosis
First W365 field test failed: the log said only "CloudPC: False" with no way
to tell whether Win32_ComputerSystem reported unexpected values or the query
failed. Get-CloudPcModel now logs the raw identity on every run and the
error message on failure. Detection pattern itself unchanged until the
probe from the real Cloud PC delivers evidence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 17:59:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach da4de79a9d web: keep Load all clear of Prev/Next on phone-width pagination (#126) 2026-08-06 17:10:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6f3f35e1cd web: one-click reset to "All tenants (aggregated)" in tenant scope selector
While a specific tenant is selected on an aggregated-capable page, an x
button next to the dropdown jumps straight back to the aggregate view
instead of requiring a dropdown roundtrip.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 15:55:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ca22be5cd0 notifications: dedupe duplicate Pre-Provisioning Completed webhook + traffic-light icons
The V2 agent emits whiteglove_complete twice (raw Shell-Core event 62407 +
engine timeline event, ~1s apart). The Pending status write was not
idempotent (terminal guard allowed Pending->Pending as a "transition") and
the ingest fallback additionally forced the transitioned flag, so tenants
received the Teams card twice (HSD report). Pending->Pending is now refused
in IsTerminalTransitionAllowed, and the ingest fallback distinguishes an
already-sealed session (duplicate, no notification) from a genuine write
failure.

Notification titles now use neutral traffic-light circles (green/yellow/red)
instead of rocket/checkmark/cross/siren emojis (customer feedback).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 15:13:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c421b81751 web: fix all 16 exhaustive-deps lint warnings, ratchet cap 115 -> 99
Wrap ad-hoc fetch closures in useCallback and complete effect deps
(SectionPlatformUsage, usage-metrics, diagnosis, TenantConfigContext,
SignalRContext, dashboard, fleet-health, useProgressSignalR). Convert
sla's initialLoad to a ref so the fresh-once flag can't retrigger the
fetch effect. Document the three intentional live-ref bumps in unmount
cleanups (cancellation counters) with justified disables.

Also fixes a real stale-closure bug: TenantConfigContext's save callback
serialized webhookNotifyOnHardwareRejection without depending on it, so
toggling only that setting saved the old value.

The 3 react-compiler preserve-manual-memoization infos remain (compiler
bailouts, not defects) - cap ratcheted to the exact current count of 99.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 15:10:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7636a00e24 web: fix lint regression from Load-all — lift sweep state into useDashboardSessions
The Load-all button reconstructed 'sweep running' locally via a
set-state-in-effect on loadingMore, adding a 116th react-hooks warning
over the 115 cap. The hook already knows loadMore vs loadAll apart, so
expose loadingAll from useDashboardSessions and drop the local state and
effect entirely.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 14:39:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 90294455e0 added "Load all" link 2026-08-06 14:26:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4def73f193 rules: reserve the built-in rule-ID namespace against tenant custom rules
Tenant rule IDs were free-form with only a point-in-time existence check,
so a customer could occupy a gap or retired ID like ANALYZE-SEC-002; a
later built-in with that ID would then silently shadow the tenant's rule
at merge time (global wins, tenant copy skipped) and their RuleStates
would start toggling our rule.

Enforcement: RuleIdPolicy (Shared) reserves (ANALYZE|GATHER)-<CAT>-<NUM>
case-insensitively, with the CUSTOM category as the sanctioned tenant
namespace (we never ship built-ins in a category named CUSTOM). Both
rule services reject reserved IDs on create AND on the custom-branch of
update (updates upsert, so PUT was a bypass); update endpoints now map
InvalidOperationException to 409 like create. Web forms mirror the check
inline; MCP validate_rule emits a warning finding and the authoring
guide now documents the reservation (guide templates moved to
GATHER-CUSTOM-101/ANALYZE-CUSTOM-101 — the old numeric examples would be
rejected). No existing prod custom rule violates the pattern (verified
against all 13 tenant-partition rows), so nothing needs grandfathering.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 14:15:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6bab2d3db9 updated command 2026-08-06 13:53:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 78b8dd0f1b tests: fix ContinuationToken key-rotation flake — scope the test key to the async context
The rotation test swapped the process-wide static test signing key
mid-test; xUnit runs test classes in parallel, so any pagination test
encoding/decoding during that window failed with bad_signature instead
of its expected reject reason (seen as order-dependent one-off failures
in CI). New AsyncLocal-scoped override confines the swap to the
rotation test's own execution context; the process-wide TestSetup
default is untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 13:51:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 14acfd5c59 rules: renumber Secure Boot rule to ANALYZE-SEC-008 — SEC-002 is a retired ID
ANALYZE-SEC-002 was the sunset AutoLogon rule; BuiltInRulesTests pins
that the ID never returns (the CI failure on main). Reusing a retired
ID would also inherit any historical tenant state keyed to it. Rule
content is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 13:51:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 22d4c6c677 updated commands 2026-08-06 13:30:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9fce499f4c rules: ANALYZE-SEC-002 — warn when Secure Boot is disabled
Fires on secureboot_status.uefiSecureBootEnabled=false; legacy BIOS
devices (registry key absent, agent sets note field) are skipped via
precondition. +20 confidence on physical devices. Validated with MCP
validate_rule (0 findings) and test_analyze_rule dry-runs: fired at 90
on a physical SecureBoot:False session, silent on a SecureBoot:True
session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 13:27:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8c7a6410d2 web(mcp-usage): mobile-friendly layout for admin + reporting sections
Headers stack below sm, summary cards go 2-up on phones, top endpoints
show tool name with route as secondary line, and the top-users table is
replaced by stacked rows so requests/last-active are no longer cut off
on narrow screens.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 12:01:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c158768343 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/Autopilot-Monitor 2026-08-05 22:55:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 75197a4184 Logparser pattern testing with the agent's exact .NET engine (test_log_pattern) (#125)
* updated commands

* feat(backend): logparser pattern test endpoint with agent-exact semantics

POST /api/rules/gather/test-pattern evaluates a logparser gather-rule regex
against pasted sample lines exactly the way the agent would on the device.
Motivated by a field incident: a customer verified a pattern with a PHP regex
tester and the .NET engine matched differently.

- CmTraceLogParser moves Agent -> AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Logging so agent
  (IME tracker, logparser collector, stall probe, IME matching mode) and
  backend run the SAME parsing implementation. Pure mechanical move, agent
  behavior unchanged (V2.Core suite 2147/2147 green).
- TestLogPatternFunction mirrors LogParserCollector verbatim: Regex(Compiled,
  1s timeout, NO IgnoreCase -> case-sensitive), first match per line, group
  "0" excluded / unsuccessful groups omitted, format cmtrace (default, match
  against parsed message) vs text (raw line), per-line outcomes incl.
  parse_failed/regex_timeout, and the agent's "set parameter format=text"
  hint verbatim. Pure compute, no tenant data. Caps: 200 lines, 8KB/line.
- Policy: TenantAdminOrGlobalReader (same tier as the analyze dry-run).
- Tests pin the parity showcases: case-sensitivity, envelope invisibility in
  cmtrace mode, optional-group omission, format hint, request validation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(mcp): test_log_pattern tool + logparser lint and guide hardening

- test_log_pattern: wraps POST /api/rules/gather/test-pattern — tests a
  logparser regex against pasted sample lines with the agent-exact .NET
  semantics (case-sensitive, cmtrace/text mode). Description steers clients
  away from JS/PHP/Python regex testing.
- validate_rule: logparser parameter lint (missing/non-compiling pattern,
  unknown format value = silently cmtrace on the agent) + info pointing to
  test_log_pattern; nextStep for valid logparser drafts routes there too.
- rule_authoring_guide: logparser section now states the matching semantics
  (case-SENSITIVE, .NET, first match per line, cmtrace default) and two new
  pitfalls (engine mismatch, plain-text log under cmtrace default).
- Catalog snapshot + handler/validator tests extended (MCP suite 532 green).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(okf): test-pattern endpoint + shared CmTraceLogParser in rule authoring surface

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-05 22:48:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 179a441e64 updated commands 2026-08-05 20:21:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach acc95471a6 bootstrap(dev): Pester-testable structure + guard/relax test suite + CI
Refactor Install-AutopilotMonitor-dev.ps1 (v2.3-dev) into functions
(Get-CloudPcModel, Get-RealUserProfilePaths, Get-RelaxDecision,
Get-BootstrapDecision with reason codes) with an Invoke-Bootstrap main and
a dot-source entry guard, so the Pester suite can load the logic without
executing the bootstrap. Behaviour when run directly is unchanged.

Fixes a refactoring leak found by smoke-run: Write-Log used Write-Output,
which turned function return values into arrays and swallowed console
output; now Write-Host, guarded by a dedicated logging-purity test.

Add Install-AutopilotMonitor-dev.Tests.ps1 (25 tests: Cloud PC detection,
relax scenarios incl. the W365 field case, guards 1-5, profile collection
with WMI failure path) and .github/workflows/pester.yml running the suite
under Windows PowerShell 5.1 (IME runtime) plus an ASCII guard over all
bootstrap scripts. Tests pass 25/25 under PS 5.1 and pwsh 7.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-05 20:17:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 29ced81d6e docs(okf): tool-telemetry — record the real SDK 1.30 rejection shape
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-05 20:15:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4966d23a46 fix(mcp): rejection sniffer must match the isError-result shape, not a JSON-RPC error envelope
Second live miss, root cause found via end-to-end repro against the real SDK
stack: SDK 1.30 catches every McpError around the tool handler (Zod input
validation, unknown/disabled tool) and answers with a SUCCESSFUL JSON-RPC
response whose result is a CallToolResult { isError: true, text: "MCP error
<code>: ..." } — a JSON-RPC error envelope never exists for these. The sniffer
now recognizes both shapes and extracts the code from the text prefix; handler
soft errors (toolError) never carry that prefix, so they are not double-logged.
Repro verified: the sniffer logs tool_call_rejected against a live
express + StreamableHTTPServerTransport + zod-tool stack.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-05 20:14:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 59ba8301a8 fix(mcp): rejection sniffer must capture res.write chunks, not only res.end
Live verification caught the miss: tool_call and search_zero_hit lines arrived,
tool_call_rejected did not. SDK 1.30 bridges the web-standard Response through
Hono's getRequestListener, which pipes ReadableStream bodies as Uint8Array
chunks via res.write followed by a BARE res.end() — the end(chunk) inspection
never saw the envelope. The sniffer (now attachToolCallRejectionSniffer in
telemetry.ts, unit-testable) wraps both write and end, reassembles up to 10 KB
and decodes string/Uint8Array chunks; tests pin the streaming path, the direct
end(string) path, the over-cap silence and the disabled no-wrap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-05 20:05:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b142fa0994 updated bootstrapper for W365 devices 2026-08-05 19:49:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach afa8750cbb feat(mcp): tool-call quality telemetry — soft errors, result size, zero-hit searches, arg rejections
withToolTelemetry now receives the tool args and inspects the RESULT: handlers
never throw (toolError returns isError:true), so the previous isError flag was
effectively always false. Each MCP_TOOL_LOGGING line now carries soft-error
status, resultChars + overCap (vs. the anthropic/maxResultSizeChars hint),
a size-bounded args summary and the caller scope — the only telemetry that
covers backend-free tools (search_docs, validate_rule, get_resource).

New signals: search_zero_hit on the three search tools (unmet-demand signal)
and tool_call_rejected for JSON-RPC-level Zod/unknown-tool rejections, sniffed
at the /mcp route since the SDK answers those before any handler runs.

Bicep default toolLoggingEnabled=true (desired state; live flag via
az containerapp update). Docs: docs/mcp/tool-telemetry.md with KQL examples.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-05 19:16:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3c1229a301 MCP rule authoring: deterministic context, validate_rule, and session dry-run (#124)
* feat(backend): dry-run endpoint for draft analyze rules (rule authoring)

POST /api/rules/analyze/dryrun evaluates a DRAFT analyze rule against one
session's events and returns a full diagnostic trace: per-condition
matched/evidence (incl. per-eventType occurrence counts), per-factor
confidence breakdown, verdict, and the would-be MatchedConditions map for
{{token}} interpolation preview. Persists nothing: no RuleResult row, no
session-status change, no notifications.

- RuleEngine.DryRun.cs: DryRunRuleAsync / DryRunEvaluate share the exact
  evaluators (EvaluatePrecondition/EvaluateCondition/EvaluateConfidenceFactor)
  with the production path but evaluate ALL conditions instead of breaking on
  the first failed required one; parity with EvaluateRule is pinned by tests.
- DryRunAnalyzeRuleFunction: TenantAdminOrGlobalReader (read-in-effect POST),
  GA/GlobalReader cross-tenant via session tenant resolution, 1 MB body cap,
  structural draft validation (unknown source/operator, correlation without
  joinField, invalid regex, non-evaluable confidenceFactor DSL) with
  actionable error messages.
- EndpointAccessPolicyCatalog: register the new route.
- RuleEngineDryRunTests: trace semantics, production parity matrix,
  side-effect freedom (VerifyNoOtherCalls), draft validation matrix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(mcp): rule-authoring resources — guide, schemas, guardrails

Deterministic authoring context for customer AIs, replacing chunked
search_docs retrieval for rule creation: get_resource (and the MCP-protocol
resources) now serve

- rule_authoring_guide: hand-written, complete authoring knowledge (collector
  types, triggers, condition sources, operators, confidence model incl. the
  exact factor-condition DSL shapes, {{token}} interpolation order, guardrail
  matching semantics, pitfalls, validate->dry-run workflow)
- rule_schemas: the JSON Schemas (2020-12) for gather + analyze rules
- rule_guardrails: the on-device collection allowlists

Schemas + guardrails are generated into rule-authoring.generated.ts by a new
combine.js emitter (same pattern as the web guardrails mirror; rules/ stays
the single source of truth and CI guardrails-in-sync guards the file).
rule-authoring-drift.test.ts additionally pins generated == repo source,
guide enums == schema enums, and the get_resource size cap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(mcp): validate_rule + test_analyze_rule tools and author-rule prompt

Closes the authoring loop for customer AIs: draft -> validate -> dry-run
against a real session -> iterate -> create in the portal.

- validate_rule (MCP-local, no backend call): ajv 2020-12 validation against
  the baked schemas, guardrail pre-flight mirroring the agent matching
  semantics (hive-stripped segment-bounded registry/file prefixes,
  whitespace-bounded WMI, exact commands, /-bounded event log channels, hard
  blocks), and semantic lint for schema-valid-but-dead rules (unreachable
  threshold, non-evaluable factor DSL, unknown eventTypes, unanchored
  not_regex allowlists, unresolvable {{tokens}}, trigger cross-fields,
  outputEventType conventions/collisions).
- test_analyze_rule: calls the new POST /api/rules/analyze/dryrun and adds
  the {{token}}-interpolated explanation/remediation preview via the
  existing interpolate-rule-template.
- author-rule MCP prompt guiding scenario -> resources -> draft -> validate
  -> dry-run.
- Both tools are visible to every role (backend enforces
  TenantAdminOrGlobalReader on the dryrun route); catalog snapshot updated.
- deps: ajv + ajv-formats promoted to direct dependencies.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(okf): rule authoring surface concept doc

docs/rules/rule-authoring-surface.md: the AI-assisted authoring stack
(deterministic MCP resources via combine.js baking, MCP-local validate_rule
layers, the dry-run trace twin with its parity + side-effect invariants, and
what is deliberately absent); registered in index.md, logged 2026-08-05.

Customer docs (rules/ai-assisted-rule-authoring.md + SUMMARY + FAQ entry) are
committed in the autopilotmonitor-docs repository separately.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-05 17:24:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b4e409783e updated commands 2026-08-04 20:23:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach eb94c612e7 fix(agent): gather phase/event triggers follow the engine-reduced timeline
phase_change/phase_exit/on_event gather triggers (and the phase-scope
gates) were driven by the pre-reduce SignalIngress.SignalPosted stream,
so any raw signal carrying an EspPhase payload fired them before the
decision engine had applied its gates. In session 32312a32 (RealmJoin
tenant) a Phase Start rule on FinalizingSetup fired at the raw ESP-exit
EspPhaseChanged(FinalizingSetup) signal, 7 minutes before the engine's
RealmJoin-gated phase_transition(FinalizingSetup) - and read
HKLM\SOFTWARE\RealmJoin\Custom\BIOS before the RealmJoin package that
creates it had run (exists=false).

GatherRuleExecutorHost now subscribes to the new TimelineEventStream:
EventTimelineEmitter publishes every emitted event's (eventType, phase)
post-reduce, so phase triggers fire exactly when the UI timeline shows
the phase, and on_event sees engine-emitted event types
(enrollment_complete, phase_transition, realmjoin_resolved, ...) that
never existed on the raw signal stream - restoring V1 semantics and the
documented "On Event with enrollment_complete" pattern. Raw-signal
consumers with OS-state semantics (DeviceInfoHost, UserEspKeepAwakeHost,
ProvisioningPackageHost) stay on the raw feed deliberately.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 14:44:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ed5fcf3dc3 chore(deps): bump transitive npm deps to resolve Dependabot alerts
- mcp: hono 4.12.31->4.13.0 (ReDoS in CORS middleware), fast-uri
  3.1.4->3.1.5 (host confusion), ip-address 10.1.0->10.4.0 (SSRF
  bypasses), postcss 8.5.21->8.5.25 (sourceMappingURL file read)
- web: postcss 8.5.22->8.5.25, brace-expansion (DoS, npm audit)

Lockfile-only changes within existing semver ranges.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 11:57:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9ba67162aa fix: session duration inflated by inherited tz-skewed IME log timestamps (#123)
Session df1fcf47 (WG Part 1, real ~1h16m) reported 8h15m: one do_telemetry
event inherited an unrelated, 8h-shifted IME log line timestamp via
LastMatchedLogTimestamp, and the backend re-anchored StartedAt on it.

Three layers:
- Agent: OnDoTelemetryReceived now carries the source-line timestamp; the
  DO-collector poll path passes null and the adapter stamps the clock
  instead of inheriting whatever line matched last.
- Backend: StartedAt alignment and duration-start selection reject
  earliest-event timestamps more than 2h before the current anchor
  (MaxStartedAtBackwardShift), on all four mutation sites incl. the
  SessionsIndex dual-write decision.
- Parser: CMTrace time fields with a UTC-bias suffix ("+480") now parse
  and honor the writer-declared offset instead of failing to match.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 11:54:41 +02:00
dependabot[bot] efc96258d6 chore(deps-dev): bump the web group (#122)
Bumps the web group in /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web with 2 updates: [@types/react](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/react) and [@types/react-dom](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/react-dom).


Updates `@types/react` from 19.2.17 to 19.2.18
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/react)

Updates `@types/react-dom` from 19.2.3 to 19.2.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/react-dom)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: "@types/react"
  dependency-version: 19.2.18
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@types/react-dom"
  dependency-version: 19.2.4
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-04 11:19:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9d8b0fc254 feat: tenant-config field schema - MCP writes get types right on the first attempt (#121)
Follow-up to the E2E finding (95 vs 95.0): a model driving update_tenant_config
had to guess field names and JSON types from a config read. New reflection-
generated schema surface makes guessing unnecessary:

- Backend: GET config/fields-schema (GlobalAdminOnly) - built from the
  TenantConfiguration model + the patch service deny-lists at runtime, so it can
  NEVER drift from what the patch endpoint enforces. Per field: camelCase name,
  JSON type (string/boolean/integer/number), nullability (null clears), format
  hints (json / date-time), writability + deny reason, GA-only marker (phase 2),
  revert-protected marker. Literal route; FindPolicy literal-over-template
  precedence pinned by test (same mechanism as config/all).
- MCP: new strictGa READ_ONLY tool get_tenant_config_schema; update_tenant_config
  description + GA instructions headline steer the model to call it before
  composing a patch.
- Tests: drift canary (every model property appears exactly once), deny-list
  consistency, type exemplars incl. the decimal SLA column class, policy +
  route-precedence pins, MCP catalog/registration/request-shape. Backend 3854
  green, vitest 465 green, tsc clean.

Deploy order: backend first, then MCP redeploy.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 17:33:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f3028041af feat(web): tenant list shows plan badge (Community/Pro) instead of Preview
The green "Preview" badge was the activation-gate whitelist marker from the
preview era. With public availability + auto-approve live it carried no
information. Rows now show the plan tier (legacy "enterprise" resolves to
Pro, everything else Community); the amber "Waitlist" badge still appears
for unapproved tenants.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 15:50:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3628c7bc79 fix(backend): revert rehydration - whole-valued double columns must not become Int32
Prod finding during the first live E2E (gktatooine): revert_tenant_config failed
fail-closed with "could not be rehydrated". Root cause: JSON cannot distinguish
95.0 from 95, so the snapshot rehydrator turned the whole-valued SLA rate columns
(decimal? in the model, double in storage) into Int32 - and TableEntity.GetDouble
throws on the type mismatch. The rehydrator now forces GetDouble for columns the
model declares as decimal/double/float, mirroring the existing DateTime handling.

The roundtrip canary test is hardened into a reflection filler that sets EVERY
writable property non-default (with a deliberately whole-numbered decimal), so no
column type can escape the fidelity check again; plus a focused pin on the exact
prod failure. Suite 3849 green. No data was harmed: the fail-closed guard refused
the write, the snapshot itself is intact.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 14:45:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 395fdd49df Transactional tenant-config writes via MCP + ConfigurationBackups safety net (#120)
* feat(backend): pre-write config backup net - every tenant/admin config save snapshots first

New ConfigurationBackups table (PK=tenantId or GlobalConfig, RK=reverse-ticks+guid,
newest-first) holds the raw stored row as EntityJson before any overwriting save of
TenantConfiguration or AdminConfiguration. Hook lives in TableConfigRepository, the
single choke point all writers funnel through - fail-soft (a backup hiccup never
breaks a save), skips row creations and noise-only changes (LastAuthClientId flips),
prunes to the newest 2 per partition. Source/reason tagging via a new
SaveTenantConfigurationAsync overload (not optional params - Moq expression trees,
CS0854); portal-put/plan/auth/app-homing/offboard call sites tagged.

Offboarding: backup partition wiped in the bulk phase (TenantPartitionTables) and by
the marker-cleanup tombstone sweep; the GlobalConfig partition never matches a tenant
GUID and survives. Table registered in TableNames.All + CriticalBackupTables.All.

Groundwork for the transactional MCP config-write flow (patch/revert endpoints follow).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(backend): transactional tenant-config field patch + revert with verified writes

New GA-only surface (policy catalog: GlobalAdminOnly + RouteParam):
- PATCH config/{tenantId}/fields - field-level patch through TenantConfigPatchService:
  fresh ETag read -> field gate (deny-list incl. plan/trial, HomedAppClientId,
  auth provenance; unknown fields 400 with the name) -> patch onto a clone ->
  shared validation -> fail-CLOSED backup -> CAS replace -> fresh re-read ->
  verify that EXACTLY the intended fields changed -> automatic ETag-conditional
  rollback on drift (catches Store/Map serialization asymmetry).
- POST config/{tenantId}/revert - restore from a ConfigurationBackups snapshot
  (latest by default); snapshots current state first (revert is revertible),
  preserves plan/homing/provenance fields unless includeProtectedFields.
- GET config/{tenantId}/backups - metadata + masked diff only, never EntityJson.

Supporting changes: IConfigRepository gains GetTenantConfigurationWithEtagAsync +
TryReplaceTenantConfigurationAsync (412 -> false, no implicit backup hook);
validators moved from the PUT into shared TenantConfigValidation (PUT re-pointed,
forwarding shims keep test call sites); GET config/{tenantId} honors ?view=redacted
so a GA's MCP session never pulls clear-text secrets into model context.
Caller-tier deny-lists (TenantAdmin/DelegatedAdmin) ship now for the phase-2 flip.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(mcp): tenant-config write tools - update/revert with snapshot-backed verified writes

First mutating surface on the MCP server, strictGa (real Global Admin) only:
- get_tenant_config: full config read, ALWAYS ?view=redacted (secrets never
  reach model context; pinned by config-write-tools tests)
- update_tenant_config: field-level patch via PATCH config/{tenantId}/fields;
  required reason; response = applied fields + masked diff + backupId
- list_tenant_config_backups: snapshot metadata + masked diff only
- revert_tenant_config: restore latest/named snapshot; protected fields stay
  current unless includeProtectedFields; revert is itself revertible

New MUTATING annotation + TenantGuidSchema (path-traversal guard) in shared.ts;
role-aware instructions headline (non-GA keeps the exact READ-ONLY wording);
catalog snapshot test extends GA_FULL + new CONFIG_WRITE_GA_STRICT difference
list (Global Reader/tenant/delegated see none of the four).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(backend): de-flake session-deletion heartbeat test - condition-gated handler instead of wall-clock window

The heartbeat test held the handler for a FIXED 350ms and expected the 50ms
heartbeat timer to tick >=3 times inside that window. On loaded CI runners the
heartbeat Task.Delay stretches disproportionately to the handler delay, the
handler completes with <3 heartbeats fired, and the awaited condition can never
become true afterwards (CI failure on PR #120). The handler now holds the
message in-flight UNTIL the test observed 3 heartbeats (with ct + own 15s
deadline as termination guards), so the assertion is reached deterministically
regardless of scheduler jitter. Verified: 12/12 local runs green, full suite green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 14:30:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5edb64f3c9 fix(web): confirm-dialog errors surface in-dialog + dark-mode sheet gaps
The GA offboard and app-homing confirm dialogs reported failures via the
admin page-level error banner, which sits behind the tenant editor modal
(z-50) and the dialogs themselves (z-[60]) - the user saw nothing. Both
dialogs now take an error prop and render the failure inline; the section
routes homing/offboard failures into dedicated states cleared on open.

Dark mode: class-by-class audit of the offboard UI against the global
override sheet. The dialogs were already covered; the real gaps were
missing family members in globals.css - border-{red,amber,green,purple}-100,
border-{blue,sky,yellow,rose,emerald}-300, and text-red-600/700 (mapped to
red-400, mirroring the cyan/rose 600-to-400 convention).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 10:56:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 46965af290 feat(backend): finalize + arm the offboarding farewell email
Replace the [DRAFT] placeholder with the final copy (thank-you, gentle
feedback pointer to GitHub/LinkedIn, welcome-back note, last-email notice)
and remove the OffboardFarewellEmailArmed scaffolding gate. Tests move from
the disarmed-by-default contract to the armed contract (gate ordering,
never-throw, template pins). GitHub links in both email templates now point
to the renamed repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 10:20:27 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1bfdb68ff6 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/Autopilot-Monitor 2026-08-02 18:02:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5ee5114d5c updated modification datetimes page 2026-08-02 18:02:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a7bb7ebf15 feat: Pro requires a tenant contact address - gated at plan entry, never as a runtime lockout
Backend: POST config/{id}/trial now denies with 409 ContactEmailRequired
when no contact address is stored (extracted EvaluateTrialStart verdict,
order test-pinned: consumed/already-Pro win over the contact prompt). The
gate is live at the API even while the trial CTA stays behind its
"coming soon" flag; GA plan assignment stays unblocked by design. The
feature-flags payload gains contactEmailSet (bool only, never the
address - contract test updated).

Web: trial CTA shows a "set a contact address first" note instead of the
start button when the flag flips on; dashboard gets an amber non-blocking
banner for Pro tenants without a contact (admins only, fail-safe: only an
explicit contactEmailSet:false nags, so loading/error/older-backend states
stay quiet); GA tenant editor warns when assigning Pro to a tenant
without a contact address.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 17:58:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a7a1cc43c1 fix(backend): welcome mail survives the auto-approve race - send-on-save + once-only marker
First production auto-approve (mueller-steinag.ch) activated 64s after signup,
5s before the user saved their notification address on the activation page -
the approval path found no address and silently skipped the welcome mail.

Both racing paths now write-then-read: the notification-email save path checks
approval fresh (bypassing the 30s negative cache) and triggers the send when
activation already happened. A conditional-insert welcome-email-sent marker in
PreviewWhitelist makes the send once-only across both paths; it is consumed
strictly after the address check so it can never be burned without an address.
Revoke clears the marker, the GA resend endpoint sends unconditionally and
consumes it best-effort.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 17:33:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2a5ad65dd7 fix(web): explicit JSX spaces where Turbopack eats them - "onlyto" class of typos
Turbopack drops the ambient space between an inline element and adjacent
prose in certain multi-line JSX text layouts (Babel/SWC preserve it), so
the live portal rendered "onlyto reach you", "IsEnabledflag",
"...ps1script", "5 minutesfor GitHub's", "Unavailableand the cascade".
User-reported on the Contact section; the other five sites were found by
scanning the compiled bundle for space-less text nodes after elements.

Fix: explicit {" "} at each affected boundary - it compiles to its own
text-node and cannot be trimmed. Verified in a fresh build: all six sites
now emit ..."})," ","to reach... Sites whose gap comes from ml-*/mx-*
margins or flex gap were left alone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 17:31:04 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 960b3d8ed9 chore(deps): bump github/codeql-action from 4 to 4.37.3 (#119)
Bumps [github/codeql-action](https://github.com/github/codeql-action) from 4 to 4.37.3.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/compare/v4...v4.37.3)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: github/codeql-action
  dependency-version: 4.37.3
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-02 16:52:33 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 86bb255b11 feat(web): GA offboard button in tenant management - with type-to-confirm and ban-semantics note
The admin tenant editor gains a danger zone that queues the existing
offboarding cascade (DELETE tenants/{id}/offboard, policy already admits
GA). Guarded by a type-OFFBOARD confirmation dialog so a stray click can
never trigger it, Global Admin included.

Both the suspension block and the danger zone now spell out the
semantics: suspension is the durable lock-out lever (blocks sign-in and
auto-activation, data stays); offboarding is NOT a ban - the cascade
deletes the config row including any suspension, so a completed offboard
lets the tenant re-onboard and auto-activate on the next sign-in.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 16:48:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d3a10dfb96 fix(backend): tenant activation is race-proof - conditional insert dedupes welcome mail and ops event
Double signup on two instances enqueued two auto-approve envelopes; both
workers could pass the approved-check (stale 30s negative cache) and both
ran the activation side effects - duplicate welcome mail plus duplicate
TenantAutoApproved ops event/Telegram ping. Same duplicate on queue
redelivery after a failed message delete.

The whitelist add is now a conditional INSERT (AddEntity, 409 = already
approved) so storage arbitrates concurrent activations: exactly one caller
sees "newly added" and runs mail/promote/ops event; losers drop quietly.
The GA approve endpoint stays idempotent (200 + alreadyApproved instead of
a duplicate mail on re-approve).

Also fixes a silent-failure path: the repo swallowed storage errors and
returned false, which ApproveAsync ignored - a failed whitelist write
still sent the welcome mail and reported success. Storage errors now
throw (queue path retries, HTTP path 500s).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 16:32:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 80d0b30cba fix(backend): activation-gate review findings - OnboardedBy immutable via PUT, suspension gate reads fresh
Two findings from the re-run public-availability review:

- UpdateTenantConfigurationFunction preserved HomedAppClientId, LastAuth*
  and plan fields against round-trip clobber but not OnboardedBy, despite
  AuthFunction documenting it as write-once: any own-tenant admin PUT could
  overwrite or null it, corrupting audit provenance and letting a
  revoke -> re-approve cycle auto-promote an attacker-chosen UPN. Now
  preserved like the other system-owned fields.

- TenantAutoApproveHandler checked the suspension gate through the cached
  TryGetConfigurationAsync (5-min per-instance TTL): a tenant suspended
  right after signup could still be auto-approved from a stale view. Now
  reads via GetConfigurationFreshAsync; a storage error propagates so the
  message retries (flag re-checked per attempt) instead of silently
  downgrading the tenant to manual approval.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 16:13:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach aee723e497 fix(backend): app-homing flip reads config fresh - stale cache could rewind concurrent writes
FlipAsync read the tenant config through the cached GetConfigurationAsync
(5-min per-instance TTL, fail-open to CreateDefault) and saved the whole
entity back: a flip could silently rewind fields another writer changed
within the TTL, and a transient storage read error would have persisted a
default config over the real row. Now reads via GetConfigurationFreshAsync
(cache-bypassing, errors propagate) and aborts loudly when no config row
exists instead of materializing a default one.

Daily-review finding 2026-07-31.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 16:01:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 427c923530 feat(web): mobile menu for landing navbar - sign in was unreachable on phones
Below md the landing navbar only showed the Get started CTA: Sign in was
hidden sm:block and the nav links (Product/Capabilities/Compare/Docs) had
no mobile counterpart at all. Returning users on a phone had no visible
way to log in.

- burger toggle (<md) opens a solid panel under the bar: nav links,
  GitHub, and a prominent Sign in button; closes on link click, backdrop
  tap, and Escape
- Get started stays always visible in the top bar; GitHub icon and Sign
  in text button move into the menu below md
- panel uses opaque --lp-surface: nested backdrop-blur inside the nav
  does not blur page content, a translucent panel let the hero bleed
  through
- 320px fit: px-4 below sm and the wordmark hides below 360px (mark only)

Verified via Playwright at 320/390/1280px: menu open/close paths, anchor
scroll to #features, desktop layout unchanged; tsc and ESLint clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 13:12:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b46a8f1571 fix(rules): merge collision guard - stale tenant rule copies no longer crash rule notifications
Tenants seeded in the pre-global-partition era can still carry per-tenant
copies of built-in rules (IsBuiltIn=false debris, e.g. ANALYZE-ID-002 on one
prod tenant). They pass the custom-rule filter and put the same RuleId twice
into the merged list, blowing up ToDictionary(r => r.RuleId) in
AnalyzeOnEnrollmentEndHandler.SafeNotifyRuleChannelsAsync and silently
dropping rule channel notifications for that tenant.

Guard the merge in AnalyzeRuleService + GatherRuleService: a tenant row whose
RuleId collides with a merged global rule is skipped (global wins) with a
warning log.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 00:40:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6e294c010e fix(web): validation-gate toggles persist - disable was local state only
Prod report 2026-08-01 (tenant b54dc1af): corporate-identifier validation
"came back on" after every disable. Audit log shows the truth: not a single
True->False entry ever - the disable NEVER reached the server. The validation
section has no save bar, and only the consent-driven ENABLE paths persisted;
the toggle setters (disable via confirm dialog, and enabling the second gate
while the first already carries the consent) wrote plain React state that
silently reverted on the next config load.

New TenantConfigContext.saveValidationGate routes those setter calls through
the shared config PUT with explicit override values; local gate state re-syncs
from the server response (or snaps back on failure), and the section save
indicator covers the write.

tsc clean, vitest 631/631, ESLint ratchet holds (115).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 00:32:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach dc54c9555c fix(web): correct Entra roles for admin consent - Application Administrator is not sufficient
The validation info box and the detect-access error still claimed Application
Administrator could grant the consent. Per MS Learn (grant-admin-consent),
Application/Cloud Application Administrator are excluded for Microsoft Graph
app roles (application permissions) - our consent includes the app-only
DeviceManagementServiceConfig.Read.All. Correct roles: Global Administrator
or Privileged Role Administrator, matching the funnel banner and docs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 21:21:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 784fd99240 fix(web): consent verify rides AAD propagation; funnel banner actions + dark mode
- Post-consent verification now POLLS the access-check (up to 5 attempts,
  15s apart) instead of a single shot: right after a successful admin consent
  the app-only token often mints with an EMPTY roles claim for 30-90s
  (observed live: tenant 5ca2b350, GrantedRoleCount=0 at T+43s), which the
  single-shot probe misreported as "permission not granted" while the homing
  flip and consent were actually fine. The access-check invalidates and
  re-mints fresh per call, so the poll converges as soon as Microsoft has
  propagated the role; the consent spinner stays up meanwhile. Final "absent"
  message now names propagation as the likely cause instead of sounding fatal.
- Funnel banner gains always-visible actions ("Grant consent for the new app"
  + "Detect existing access" on the autopilot gate, idempotent when already
  enabled): tenants whose validations are already ON had no consent button to
  click, and the per-toggle detect link under Corporate Identifier would
  enable that validation as a side effect.
- Dark mode: funnel/flipped/legacy banners and the admins-only notice were
  light-palette-only and unreadable on dark.

tsc clean, vitest 631/631, ESLint ratchet holds (115).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 21:15:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 607d6615b0 fix(auth): app-homing flip survives stale full-model config writers
Prod incident 2026-07-31 18:03Z (tenant b54dc1af): the consent-driven homing
flip landed and 600ms later the frontend persisted the validation toggle via
the generic config PUT - round-tripping a config loaded BEFORE the flip. The
GA branch treated the stale null HomedAppClientId as an intentional revert to
legacy, silently undoing the flip (App Insights: AppHomingFlipped 18:03:00.44,
PUT revert warning 18:03:01.03).

- HomedAppClientId is now IMMUTABLE via the generic PUT for ALL callers, GA
  included: a full-model round-trip can never carry flip intent. The only
  writers are the consent auto-flip and POST config/{tenantId}/app-homing
  (which the GA tenant-management panel already uses).
- HandleAuthClientIdTrackingAsync (same failure class, cross-instance): the
  last-seen tracking write now mutates a cache-BYPASSING fresh read via new
  TenantConfigurationService.GetConfigurationFreshAsync instead of blind-saving
  the up-to-5-min-stale cached view - the login right after a flip is exactly
  the one that carries a changed audience and triggers this write.

3 regression tests (fresh-entity mutation preserves a concurrent flip,
fresh-already-current suppresses the write, steady state stays zero-I/O).
Backend xUnit 3767/3767.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 20:20:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8d4f7ea0f9 fix(web): app-homing funnel banner - prominent card with permission hint + docs link
The plain info box was easy to overlook. Upgrade to a bordered gradient card
with icon and heading, state that admin consent needs a tenant-wide-consent
role (Global Administrator / Privileged Role Administrator), and link the
portal-setup docs article describing the required permissions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 20:17:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0e2d620ad4 feat(auth): self-service app-homing flip via consent flow + GA lever
Re-consent, verify and flip collapse into the existing consent flow: the
consent URL funnels legacy-homed tenants to the primary app registration,
and consent-status/access-check verify admin consent via an app-only token
probe under explicit primary credentials, then auto-flip HomedAppClientId.

- AdminConfiguration.SelfServiceAppHomingEnabled: kill switch (default off,
  cache-bypassing fail-closed read); gates funnel + auto-flip + tenant-admin
  manual flip. GA path deliberately survives the kill switch.
- POST config/{tenantId}/app-homing (TenantAdminOrGA): tenant admins flip to
  primary only, probe-gated; GA gets force + revert. Pure decision helper
  EvaluateManualFlip shared by function and tests.
- GraphTokenService.GetAccessTokenForAppAsync: probe seam with explicit app
  credentials, cache-safe via app-scoped token keys.
- EntraAppRolesEnabled does not block a flip; it emits a Warning ops event
  (AppHomingFlippedWithEntraRoles) reminding to re-assign enterprise-app roles.
- Web: homing badge + "App Registration Homing" panel with confirm dialog in
  GA tenant management (typed homedAppClientId hardens the PUT round-trip),
  funnel/success banners in tenant settings with switchAuthApp re-login,
  admin-config kill-switch round-trip, ops event types dual-registered.
- Browser telemetry (App Insights): pre-init event buffer so module-init auth
  events survive; strategic events across the whole flow (app_homing_flipped,
  consent_flow_*, consent_verify_failed, auth_app_fallback_*, auth_app_switched,
  auth_app_homing_learned, app_homing_manual_flip*).

Backend must deploy before web (additive JSON fields); everything is inert
while EntraId:LegacyClientId is unset. Enable the kill switch in the admin
portal after the dual app-reg config swap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 19:52:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 69d61c6c26 feat(backend): dynamic poison-queue enumeration for health + ops monitoring
The static MonitoredPoisonQueues watch-list had already drifted twice
(tenant-auto-approve-poison, session-deletion-maintenance-poison missing).
Health check and maintenance watcher now enumerate every existing *-poison
queue in the storage account at runtime; an absent queue has never had a
poison-move and is healthy by definition, so enumeration covers everything
a list would. Enumeration failure surfaces as warning (never a silent
all-clear) on the health card and skips the maintenance tick.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 18:59:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach cfb28d83b6 added png logo 2026-07-31 18:48:12 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f795fbcb4e feat(auth): dual app-reg parallel operation - legacy gktatooine app alongside new C4A8 app
True parallel operation, no forced re-consent: existing tenants keep signing
in via the legacy app (1a400946), new tenants land on the C4A8 app (886ab5e2).

Model "default legacy, funnel primary, learn in the background":
- Web: am_auth_app flag -> NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_DEFAULT_APP -> primary; get-started
  CTA hands over with ?authapp=primary; auth/me homedApp updates the flag so an
  operator tenant flip takes effect on each user's NEXT login; AADSTS90094/65001
  one-shot cross-app retry, AADSTS65004 -> failed screen with previous-app link;
  am_login_attempt pins redirect returns to the app that started them.
- Backend: TenantConfiguration.HomedAppClientId (null = legacy, GA-only flip via
  PUT config) + LastAuthClientId/Since observability; EntraAppRegistry resolves
  the acting app per tenant (no-op until the legacy config pair is set); Graph
  client-credentials, admin-consent URLs and the surfaced client id follow the
  homed app (app-scoped cache keys); JwtBearer [Authorize] pipeline now shares
  the middleware audience builders (was single-audience - would 401 legacy
  tokens after the swap); middleware trusts EntraId:LegacyClientId implicitly.
- well-known association file now lists both app ids (publisher domain);
  deploy-web passes NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_LEGACY_CLIENT_ID / _DEFAULT_APP;
  mcp-server.bicep default client id -> C4A8 app.

Backend xUnit 3730/3730, vitest 625/625 (13 new), tsc/ESLint clean, next build ok.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 18:12:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d9d22bc443 fix(web): drop Beta pills on Submit Logs and Report Session
Feature-maturity badges were a leftover of the preview era — with the product
publicly available, a lone "Beta" pill only signals uncertainty. Both features
are fully functional; the dashboard banner already carries the actively-developed
framing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 14:38:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6bd5728652 feat(platform): public availability — tenant activation replaces Private Preview, optional auto-approve
Backend: shared TenantApprovalService (whitelist add + auto-promote shape-guard +
welcome email), AdminConfiguration.AutoApproveNewTenants (default off, uncached
fail-closed accessor), tenant-auto-approve queue (1-min visibility delay, worker
drops on flag-off/approved/suspended/missing config, approves as "System
(auto-approve)" + TenantAutoApproved ops event), 30s negative whitelist cache,
gate 2 error PendingActivation with mode-neutral message, signup strings and
welcome email without preview wording.

Web: /preview → /activation (SWA 301, robots, AuthGate), AuthContext accepts both
error codes and clears pending state on successful auth/me, activation page polls
every 30s and auto-redirects into the portal, dashboard banner reframed to
"Actively developed" + feedback call, terms/privacy/get-started updated, feature
badges → Beta, admin-config web chain + auto-approve checkbox, OPS_EVENT_TYPES.

Deliberately unchanged: PreviewWhitelist/PreviewConfig tables, internal preview/*
API routes, preview_signup notification type, Microsoft DevPrep preview mentions.

Verified: solution build 0 errors, xUnit 3701/3701, tsc 0 errors, vitest 612/612,
ESLint ratchet holds (0/115), next build exports /activation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 14:30:57 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d6affae8fc fix(web): plan card — bootstrap bullet wording (run already before MDM enrollment)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 13:40:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a70c5de667 feat(plan): rename Enterprise plan to Pro; Pro includes Bootstrap by default and Unrestricted Mode on request
- FeatureEntitlementCatalog: TenantEdition.Pro, canonical tier "pro", legacy
  stored "enterprise" stays readable as Pro (no data migration); new
  entitlements BootstrapIncluded + UnrestrictedModeAvailable
- TenantEntitlementService: IsBootstrapEnabled (Pro-included OR additive GA
  flag) and IsUnrestrictedModeActive (Pro AND GA gate AND tenant toggle,
  read-time - trial expiry/downgrade re-arms guardrails fail-closed)
- All bootstrap endpoint gates + SecurityValidator use the effective check;
  /auth/me and feature-flags expose effective availability values
- PlanManagement accepts community|pro; AlreadyPro; Pro trial wording
- Web: edition.ts accepts legacy "enterprise" (deploy-order safety), Pro
  labels/cards + new Pro feature bullets, effective section gating,
  terms/privacy renamed with Last-updated bump
- Tests: catalog matrix, effective-gate payload tests, helper tests incl.
  trial-expiry re-gate (backend 3692 green, web 612 green)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 13:04:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e62bac9fea fix(web): hooks-refs batch 2.5 — ProtectedRoute wasAuthenticated ref to state; refs category at zero
wasAuthenticated was written AND read during render (the only such
case). Historical per-mount state belongs in useState, adjusted during
render via the guarded official pattern — behavior-identical: the value
is only consulted in !isAuthenticated renders, which can only follow a
render that already set it. Auth-gate control flow (auto re-login,
loading early-return, post-login return URL) untouched.

react-hooks/refs: 26 -> 0. Lint ratchet 115.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 10:29:27 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1e94a7aa91 fix(web): hooks-refs batch 2.4 — useDashboardSessions mirror refs via useLatest
Nine render-phase mirror writes replaced: scope/filter/pagination
mirrors sync post-commit via useLatest; consuming callbacks list the
stable refs in their deps. Drops two write-only refs
(joinGlobalAdminsRef, loadingMoreRef) that nothing read. Imperative
refs (fetchGen/fetchLock/loadAllToken/submittedFilter) untouched.
Lint ratchet 119.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 10:24:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c330e5c91a fix(web): hooks-refs batch 2.3 — useDashboardStats mirror refs via useLatest
Seven scope mirror refs sync post-commit via useLatest instead of
render-phase writes; fetchStats lists the stable refs it reads in its
deps. Lint ratchet 128.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 10:19:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6015548172 fix(web): hooks-refs batch 2.2 — useFleetHealth mirror refs via useLatest
Four scope mirror refs (routeGlobal, selectedTenantId, tenantId, days)
now sync post-commit via useLatest instead of render-phase writes.
fetchData lists the stable refs it reads in its deps. Lint ratchet
135.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 10:16:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3f661d097d fix(web): hooks-refs batch 2.1 — useLatest helper; useAuthenticatedFetch + presence off render-phase ref writes
Render-phase ref mirror writes tear under concurrent rendering
(react-hooks/refs). New hooks/useLatest.ts syncs the mirror in a passive
effect instead; refs from custom hooks are not linter-known-stable, so
consumers list them in dep arrays (identity is stable — no re-creation).
Lint ratchet 141 -> 139.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 10:11:59 +02:00
379 changed files with 20251 additions and 2018 deletions
+6
View File
@@ -270,6 +270,12 @@ jobs:
if (Test-Path "scripts/Bootstrap/Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent.ps1") {
Send-Blob -Local "scripts/Bootstrap/Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent.ps1" -BlobName "Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent.ps1" -ContentType "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
}
# Customer-side Graph add-on grant script -- docs and admin UI link
# https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1
if (Test-Path "scripts/CustomerSetup/Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1") {
Send-Blob -Local "scripts/CustomerSetup/Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1" -BlobName "Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1" -ContentType "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
}
}
# Update AdminConfiguration LatestAgentV2* -- ONLY on stable cutover. The hash-oracle
+15 -1
View File
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ jobs:
# in eslint.config.mjs + exhaustive-deps) — when you fix warnings, lower
# the cap to match; never raise it.
- name: Lint
run: npm run lint -- --max-warnings 141
run: npm run lint -- --max-warnings 99
- name: Tests
run: npm test
@@ -107,8 +107,22 @@ jobs:
- name: Typecheck
run: npx tsc --noEmit
# The vector-search tests tokenize with the real all-MiniLM-L6-v2 model
# (~23 MB tokenizer + ONNX weights). transformers.js caches under
# node_modules by default, which npm ci recreates — so every CI run
# re-downloaded from huggingface.co and rate-limits (429) failed the job
# (run 31252869254). Persist the model across runs instead; HF_CACHE_DIR
# is honored by vector-search-provider.ts.
- name: Cache embedding model
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: ${{ github.workspace }}/.hf-cache
key: hf-model-Xenova-all-MiniLM-L6-v2
- name: Tests
run: npm test
env:
HF_CACHE_DIR: ${{ github.workspace }}/.hf-cache
guardrails-in-sync:
name: Generated guardrails match rules/guardrails.json
+2 -2
View File
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ jobs:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
- name: Initialize CodeQL
uses: github/codeql-action/init@v4
uses: github/codeql-action/init@v4.37.3
with:
languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
build-mode: ${{ matrix.build-mode }}
@@ -68,6 +68,6 @@ jobs:
run: dotnet build AutopilotMonitor.sln --configuration Release
- name: Analyze
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v4
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v4.37.3
with:
category: /language:${{ matrix.language }}
+4
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ jobs:
uses: Azure/static-web-apps-deploy@v1
env:
NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_CLIENT_ID }}
# Dual app-reg window: previous app registration (unset = single-app behaviour)
# and the default app for browsers without a stored selection (legacy|primary).
NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_LEGACY_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_LEGACY_CLIENT_ID }}
NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_DEFAULT_APP: ${{ vars.NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_DEFAULT_APP }}
NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI: ${{ vars.NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI }}
NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI: ${{ vars.NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI }}
NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL: ${{ vars.NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL }}
+61
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
name: Pester (Bootstrap scripts)
# Runs the Pester suite for the Intune bootstrap scripts under Windows PowerShell 5.1
# (the runtime IME uses to execute platform scripts) so guard/relax logic changes are
# verified without resetting a device. Like ci.yml it reports rather than blocks.
on:
push:
branches: [main]
paths: ['scripts/Bootstrap/**']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['scripts/Bootstrap/**']
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: pester-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
pester:
name: Bootstrap guard tests (PS 5.1)
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- name: Install Pester 5+
shell: powershell
run: |
Install-PackageProvider -Name NuGet -MinimumVersion 2.8.5.201 -Force -Scope CurrentUser | Out-Null
Install-Module Pester -Scope CurrentUser -Force -SkipPublisherCheck -MinimumVersion 5.5.0
- name: Run Pester
shell: powershell
run: |
Import-Module Pester -MinimumVersion 5.5.0
$c = New-PesterConfiguration
$c.Run.Path = 'scripts/Bootstrap'
$c.Run.Exit = $true
$c.Output.Verbosity = 'Detailed'
Invoke-Pester -Configuration $c
- name: Guard scripts stay pure ASCII
shell: powershell
run: |
$failed = $false
Get-ChildItem 'scripts/Bootstrap' -Filter '*.ps1' | ForEach-Object {
$bytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($_.FullName)
for ($i = 0; $i -lt $bytes.Length; $i++) {
if ($bytes[$i] -gt 127) {
Write-Host "::error file=scripts/Bootstrap/$($_.Name)::Non-ASCII byte 0x$('{0:X2}' -f $bytes[$i]) at offset $i. PS 5.1 (IME) reads BOM-less files as ANSI and corrupts multi-byte chars."
$failed = $true
break
}
}
}
if ($failed) { exit 1 }
Write-Host 'All bootstrap scripts are pure ASCII.'
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
# <img src="docs/images/logo.svg" height="28" alt="" /> AutopilotMonitor
[![Status](https://img.shields.io/badge/status-Private%20Preview-orange)](https://www.autopilotmonitor.com)
[![Status](https://img.shields.io/badge/status-live-brightgreen)](https://www.autopilotmonitor.com)
[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT%20%2B%20AGPL--3.0-blue)](LICENSE)
[![Website](https://img.shields.io/badge/website-autopilotmonitor.com-2ea44f)](https://www.autopilotmonitor.com)
Advanced monitoring and troubleshooting solution for Windows Autopilot deployments. Gain full visibility into every enrollment session with a detailed event timeline, fleet health dashboards, and session reporting. Define custom analysis rules to automatically detect issues and gather rules to collect targeted evidence. Retrieve diagnostics packages on demand, configure agent settings like auto-reboot behavior and automatic timezone adjustment — all managed centrally from the web dashboard.
## Private Preview
## Availability
Autopilot Monitor is currently running as a **Private Preview**. Visit **[autopilotmonitor.com](https://www.autopilotmonitor.com)** to request access and learn more.
Autopilot Monitor is **publicly available** — the Community plan is free. Sign in with your work account at **[autopilotmonitor.com](https://www.autopilotmonitor.com)**; new organizations complete a short activation step after first sign-in.
<p align="center">
<img src="docs/images/SessionList.png" width="45%" />
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---
type: Concept
title: Continue-Anyway Observation Mode — Device-Phase ESP Failure Defang
description: Operator-set tenant opt-in that turns an immediate Device-phase ESP terminal failure on a Continue-Anyway-enabled profile into a bounded 60-minute observation; the DAD-validated real-user desktop plus the Hello gate detect the true end, and the session completes as Succeeded with an esp-soft-failure marker.
resource: /src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore/Engine/DecisionEngine.Edge.cs
tags:
- agent
- decision-engine
- esp
- continue-anyway
- soft-failure
- tenant-config
timestamp: 2026-08-08T00:00:00+02:00
---
# Continue-Anyway Observation Mode
## Problem
A Classic user-driven enrollment whose Device ESP hits the configured terminal timeout
(`syncFailureTimeoutMinutes`, typically 30) fails **before AccountSetup is ever entered**.
The classic advisory defang (`HandleEspTerminalFailureV1`) requires
`AccountSetupEnteredUtc != null`, so these sessions hard-fail immediately — even when the
ESP profile allows "Continue anyway" and users demonstrably dismiss the failure screen and
reach a working desktop. A fleet held at the timeout wall by one slow blocking app then
shows ~100% Failed (tenant c9787ba2: 948/1000 `esp_terminal_failure`, culprit "Encompass
Hybrid Installer"), which tells the tenant nothing.
## Mechanism
Opt-in flow (default off — absence keeps the immediate hard fail):
1. **Tenant setting** `EnableEspContinueAnywayObservation` (`TenantConfiguration`,
operator-set only, NOT exposed in the tenant admin settings UI; the toggle lives in
the Global-Admin tenant management modal next to Bootstrap Token / Unrestricted Mode,
and the field is GA-gated on both write paths — the generic PUT silently reverts it
for tenant admins, the field patch rejects it with 400) → served via `agent/config`
(`AgentConfigResponse`, ConfigVersion 37).
2. **Agent** stamps `espContinueAnywayObservationEnabled=true` into the
`EspConfigDetected` signal payload (both emitters: the orchestrator FirstSync
bootstrap and `DeviceInfoCollector.PostEspConfigDetectedSignal`) — only when enabled,
so the kernel stays config-free and replay/recovery reconstruct the fact from the
signal log.
3. **Engine** (`HandleEspTerminalFailureV1`): a terminal ESP failure is defanged into an
`esp_failure_advisory` (`advisoryReason=esp_failure_defanged_continueanyway_observation`)
when ALL hold: profile allows Continue-Anyway, observation opt-in observed,
`AccountSetupEnteredUtc == null`, and the scenario is Classic/Unknown with
`PreProvisioningSide=None` and no registry self-deploying marker (WhiteGlove /
SelfDeploying / DevicePreparation have no interactive user to press the button).
4. **Observation window**: the shared `AdvisoryCompletion` deadline is armed with a
**60-minute** window (classic advisory: 30) — long enough for failure screen →
Continue anyway → sign-in → desktop, or a full device-phase re-run via "Try again".
## Detecting the real end
The active-advisory-without-AccountSetup shape is unique to this arming site, so
`IsContinueAnywayObservationActive(state)` (advisory recorded ∧ not resolved ∧
AccountSetup never entered) needs no separate opt-in re-check. Three outcomes:
* **Continue anyway** — the DAD-validated real-user desktop arrives (defaultuser0/SYSTEM
excluded at the detector) and the Hello gate is satisfied (resolved, or policy
explicitly disabled without an observed wizard): `HandleDesktopArrivedV1` completes
eagerly through Finalizing (trigger `DesktopArrived:ContinueAnywayObservation`) — the
session end reflects the real end, not the window edge. The IME user-session gate is
deliberately waived: it anchors on `AccountSetupEnteredUtc`, which is structurally
absent here. The terminal `enrollment_complete` carries `espSoftFailure=true`,
`completionSource=continue_anyway_observation` and the failed category; the backend
stamps `EspSoftFailure`/`CompletionSource` on the Sessions row (+ SessionsIndex
mirror) and the web renders the amber "with issues" badge plus a detail banner.
Sessions completing under the CLASSIC advisory (AccountSetup entered) carry the same
marker with `completionSource=continue_anyway_post_accountsetup`.
* **Try again** — the ESP re-runs the failed category; `DeviceSetupProvisioningComplete`
resolves the advisory via the 4910a5a5 recovery hook (`esp_failure_advisory_resolved`)
and the session continues on the normal rails, completing clean (no marker).
* **Nothing** — the window expires: un-defang to `enrollment_failed` with the original
`esp_terminal_failure` reason and
`advisoryReason=continue_anyway_observation_window_expired_without_completion_evidence`;
`LastFailureTrigger=EspTerminalFailure` keeps the likely-stuck app promotion on. Every
observed session therefore still gets a terminal verdict ≤ ~60 min after the failure.
Deadline-fire edge cases mirror the classic paths: desktop + unknown Hello promotes to
`AwaitingHello` with the HelloSafety window (never-observed promote), and enforcement
progress since arming re-arms the window (30-min re-arm, convergent) instead of failing a
device mid-"Try again".
## Status semantics
No new terminal status: the session is `Succeeded` + `EspSoftFailure=true` (user
decision 2026-08-08). Success-rate conventions stay untouched; honesty lives in the
badge, the detail banner, and ANALYZE-ESP-004 (which continues to fire on the un-defang
expiry path via `mayHaveContinuedAnyway`).
# Examples
Session `53d1e9f6-4eef-4f3b-a999-c63e96c5148d` (tenant c9787ba2, 2026-08-07) is the
motivating shape: DeviceSetup/Certificates failed at the 30-min wall while "Encompass
Hybrid Installer" was still installing, AccountSetup 0/5, Continue-Anyway allowed —
hard-failed under the default semantics.
Tests: `ContinueAnywayObservationTests` (DecisionCore.Tests) — defang, 60-min arming,
opt-out/scenario regressions, eager desktop completion with marker, clean-completion
marker absence, expiry un-defang, hello promotes, category recovery.
# Citations
* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore/Engine/DecisionEngine.Edge.cs` — arming site,
observation branches in `HandleAdvisoryCompletionDeadlineFired`,
`IsContinueAnywayObservationActive`.
* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore/Engine/DecisionEngine.Classic.cs` —
`HandleDesktopArrivedV1` observation completion, `BuildEnrollmentCompleteEffect`
soft-failure marker.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/EventIngestProcessor.Classification.cs`
/ `TableStorageService.Sessions.cs` — session stamping + index mirror.
* `src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/components/SessionStatusBadge.tsx` — amber badge.
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---
type: Concept
title: W365 Cloud PC Device Validation — Cert-CN-Bound Fallback Validator
description: Why Windows 365 Cloud PCs can never pass the Autopilot serial lookup, and how the CloudPc validator admits exactly the tenant's service-provisioned Cloud PCs by binding the MDM certificate's Subject CN (= Intune device id) to the Graph virtualEndpoint/cloudPCs inventory.
resource: src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/CloudPcDeviceValidator.cs
tags:
- backend
- security
- device-validation
- windows365
- cloudpc
- graph
timestamp: 2026-08-06T00:00:00+02:00
---
# W365 Cloud PC Device Validation
Windows 365 Cloud PCs are provisioned headless by the Windows 365 service and are
**structurally never Autopilot-registered** — the serial lookup against
`windowsAutopilotDeviceIdentities` (and the Corporate Identifier fallback, whose
serials nobody can pre-import for VMs minted at provisioning time) always misses.
Before this validator, a Cloud PC agent died in the 403 "Device not registered"
even though its mTLS cert was perfectly valid, so Cloud PC first-connect
enrollment (Account Setup, RealmJoin, Hello) could not be monitored.
# Schema — the validator chain
`SecurityValidator.ValidateRequestAsync` stage 4 runs the same chain for every
device; there is **no device-type routing** and the local W365 markers
(Windows365 registry key, CloudManagedDesktopExtension service) are never
consulted for auth — they gain an attacker nothing:
1. **Autopilot serial lookup** (`ValidateAutopilotDevice`) — unchanged primary.
2. **Corporate Identifier** (`ValidateCorporateIdentifier`) — unchanged fallback.
3. **CloudPc** (`ValidateCloudPcDevice`, default off) — only reached when 1+2
missed. Extracts the Intune device id from the **chain-validated** client
certificate's Subject CN (`TryGetIntuneDeviceIdFromCertSubject`: CN present
AND canonical GUID, else definitive reject) and requires a `cloudPC` object
with `managedDeviceId eq <CN>` in the claimed tenant
(`GET /v1.0/deviceManagement/virtualEndpoint/cloudPCs?$filter=…`).
`ValidatedBy = ValidatorType.CloudPc (5)`.
Only machines actually provisioned by the Windows 365 service have a `cloudPC`
object — a regular Intune-enrolled non-Autopilot device still ends in the 403,
so the "Autopilot devices only" contract of stages 1–2 is not widened. The
tenant hard gate accepts `ValidateCloudPcDevice` as a third satisfying flag.
## Why the cert CN, not headers or local markers
Field-verified 2026-08-06 on a real W365 Enterprise Cloud PC (gktatooine.net):
- MDM client cert Subject `CN=07623d56-…` == Intune `managedDevice.id` ==
`cloudPC.managedDeviceId`. The CN cannot be forged without the Intune MDM
Device CA (chain pinned to embedded roots, `CustomRootTrust`).
- `$filter=managedDeviceId eq '…'` is supported server-side on **v1.0** — no
paging fallback needed.
- `managedDevice.serialNumber` matches local `Win32_BIOS.SerialNumber` exactly;
the "Cloud PC Enterprise …" model string exists **only** in Graph, never in
local WMI (local WMI reports Manufacturer='Microsoft Corporation',
Model='Virtual Machine').
Threat model: a valid Intune cert from a *different* tenant fails (its CN does
not exist in the claimed tenant's Cloud PC inventory — this is a *tenant
binding* the serial-based validators do not have); spoofed serial headers and
faked local W365 markers are irrelevant (never consulted); a rogue enrolled VM
with doctored SMBIOS cannot mint a `cloudPC` object (service-side state, not
device-reported inventory — the reason the model-string gate was rejected).
Retired/deprovisioned Cloud PCs disappear from the inventory and their
validation dies with them (compensates the absent cert revocation check).
Residual: a compromised *legitimate* Cloud PC of the tenant — same trust level
as any tenant device today, rate-limited by cert thumbprint.
## Graph permission plumbing
- Optional add-on permission `CloudPC.Read.All` — NOT part of the default
consent set. Feature `W365CloudPcValidation` in `GraphFeatureCatalog` →
surfaces automatically in the "Optional Graph capabilities" UI (the feature
table and grant command are backend-driven) and in
`Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1` (`-Features W365CloudPcValidation`).
`GraphFeatureCatalogSyncTests` pins C# catalog ↔ grant script (previously
comment-only lock-step).
- A Graph **403** (permission not granted) is a definitive negative (cached
5 min), NOT transient — a 503 Retry-After loop cannot fix a missing grant.
The error message names the add-on feature.
- Same resilience contract as `AutopilotDeviceValidator`: 30/5 min
positive/negative cache, 2 attempts, transient → agent-facing 503.
## Bootstrap script interplay (v2.3-dev.3)
The Cloud-PC relax in `Install-AutopilotMonitor-dev.ps1` additionally exempts
**guard 4** (12 h uptime window): a Cloud PC runs headless for days before the
user's first connect, and the monitorable phase (Account Setup) only starts at
that first connect — the single-fresh-profile window (< 15 min) is the time
anchor there, not boot uptime. The OOBE-restore trigger keeps the uptime guard.
## Agent-side IsCloudPc flag + decision-engine expectation
Same change set, agent side. `CloudPcDetector` (V2.Core) re-uses the bootstrap's
field-verified marker AND — `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows365` key **plus**
installed `CloudManagedDesktopExtension` service (probed via its
`HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services` key; the agent deliberately has no
`System.ServiceProcess` dependency). SKIP-safe: any error resolves `false`.
Three independent transport rails, never an auth input:
- **Session metadata** — `SessionRegistration.IsCloudPc` →
Sessions table (sticky-true OR across re-registrations, like
`IsSelfDeployingProfile`) → SessionsIndex full mirror → `SessionSummary` →
search filter `isCloudPc` (portal, `/api/search/sessions`, `/api/raw/sessions`,
MCP `search_sessions`/`query_raw_sessions`). Agent-reported and unverified —
can legitimately disagree with the server-derived `ValidatedBy = CloudPc`
(e.g. Cloud PC admitted via a stage that ran earlier).
- **Distress channel** — `DistressReport.IsCloudPc` (captured once at
`DistressReporter` construction, `BackendClientFactory`) rides every pre-auth
distress report → `DistressReportEntry.IsCloudPc` → the "Devices Not
Registered" report aggregates it **sticky-true** per serial
(`GetDeviceNotRegisteredFunction`) and the portal insight renders a Cloud PC
badge plus a hint pointing at the Cloud PC validation toggle + the
`W365CloudPcValidation` add-on. Same UNVERIFIED contract as all distress
fields; rows from older agents read false. Fits the existing 1536-byte
payload cap without a bump.
- **Decision engine** — the marker rides the `EnrollmentFactsObserved` payload
(`isCloudPc`), is recorded set-once for BOTH values in
`EnrollmentScenarioObservations.CloudPc`, and annotates the scenario profile
reason `cloud_pc_first_connect:no_device_esp_expected`. That is the
engine-recorded expectation "no Device ESP phase will appear": Device-ESP ran
headless at provisioning, the session starts at Account Setup. Deliberately
reason+observation only — no completion arm depends on DeviceSetup, `Mode`
is still classified by AccountSetup/IME signals (Classic), and `EspConfig`
keeps the *configured* FirstSync semantics. The positive marker surfaces as
`cloud_pc_marker` in the terminal audit-trail signal census.
# Citations
- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/CloudPcDeviceValidator.cs`
- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/SecurityValidator.cs` — stage 4 chain, `TryGetIntuneDeviceIdFromCertSubject`
- `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Models/Graph/GraphFeatureCatalog.cs` — `W365CloudPcValidation`
- `scripts/CustomerSetup/Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1` — customer-side grant
- `scripts/Bootstrap/Install-AutopilotMonitor-dev.ps1` — Cloud-PC relax + guard-4 exemption
- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/CloudPcDeviceValidatorTests.cs`, `SecurityValidatorTests.cs`, `GraphFeatureCatalogSyncTests.cs`
- `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Security/CloudPcDetector.cs` — agent-side marker AND
- `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore/State/EnrollmentScenarioObservations.cs` — `CloudPc` fact; reason annotation in `EnrollmentScenarioProfileUpdater`
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
---
type: concept
title: Tenant Activation & the Once-Only Welcome Mail
description: How a signup becomes an activated tenant (manual approve or auto-approve queue), and how the welcome mail is sent exactly once even though activation and the user-provided address race each other.
resource: backend
tags: [activation, auto-approve, welcome-email, preview-whitelist, race]
timestamp: 2026-08-02
---
# Schema
## Activation
A tenant is **activated** when the row `PartitionKey={tenantId}, RowKey="approved"` exists
in the `PreviewWhitelist` table (legacy name kept on purpose). Everything else in the
portal gates on that row via `PreviewWhitelistService.IsApprovedAsync` (5 min positive /
30 s negative cache).
Two activation routes, one shared implementation
(`TenantApprovalService.ApproveWithSideEffectsAsync`):
* **Manual**: Global Admin approves in the admin panel (`POST /api/preview/whitelist/{tenantId}`).
* **Auto**: signup unconditionally enqueues a `tenant-auto-approve` envelope; the queue
worker (`TenantAutoApproveHandler`) re-checks the `AutoApproveNewTenants` flag
(uncached, fail-closed), the suspension gate (fresh config read), then approves.
Typical latency: ~1 minute after signup.
The whitelist add is a **conditional INSERT** (`AddEntityAsync`, 409 = lost) — storage
arbitrates concurrent activations; exactly one caller runs the side effects
(TenantAdmin auto-promote of the signup UPN, welcome mail, `TenantAutoApproved` ops event).
## The welcome-mail race
The welcome mail goes to the **notification email** (`RowKey="notification-email"` in the
same table) — the only reliable address: it is typed by the user on the activation-pending
page (`PUT /api/preview/notification-email`). The signup admin UPN may have no mailbox and
`ContactEmail` is merely seeded from the notification email.
That makes activation and address entry concurrent writers. With auto-approve, activation
usually wins (observed in production: approve at T+64 s, address saved at T+69 s → the
approval path found no address and the mail was silently skipped).
**Arbitration — write-then-read on both sides plus a send-once marker:**
* The approval path writes the `approved` row, then reads the address.
* The save path (`SavePreviewNotificationEmail`) writes the address row, then checks
approval **fresh** (`IsApprovedFreshAsync` — the 30 s negative cache would hide the
activation for exactly this window).
* Since both do write-then-read, at least one sees both halves and calls
`TenantApprovalService.TrySendWelcomeEmailAsync`.
* There, a conditional insert of `RowKey="welcome-email-sent"` decides who actually
sends: at most one wins. The marker is consumed strictly **after** the address check —
consuming it without an address would permanently suppress the mail.
Marker lifecycle: revoke (`RevokeAsync`) deletes it (re-approve = fresh activation =
fresh mail); the offboarding cascade wipes the whole `PreviewWhitelist` partition anyway.
The Global-Admin resend endpoint (`POST /api/preview/send-welcome-email/{tenantId}`)
always sends (explicit intent) and consumes the marker best-effort so the automatic
paths never duplicate afterwards.
# Examples
* Auto-approve wins the race: approve at T+64 s finds no address → logs "deferred to the
notification-email save path"; user saves address at T+69 s → save path sees approved
(fresh read), wins the marker, sends. Response carries `welcomeEmailSent: true`.
* Address saved before manual approve (classic shape): approval path finds the address,
wins the marker, sends; a later re-save of the same address does not re-send.
# Citations
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TenantApprovalService.cs` — shared activation + `TrySendWelcomeEmailAsync`
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/Activation/TenantAutoApproveHandler.cs` — queue-side gates
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Rules/PreviewWhitelistFunction.cs` — save-path trigger, GA resend
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/DataAccess/TableStorage/TableConfigRepository.cs` — conditional inserts (approved / welcome-email-sent)
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/TenantApprovalServiceTests.cs` — ordering + dedup pins
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@@ -23,12 +23,14 @@ https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com (separate repository).
* [Gather Rule Debug Log](agent/gather-rule-debug-log.md) - EnableGatherRuleDebugLog (ConfigVersion 36): the per-tenant local trace file that explains every gather-rule evaluation decision — scope skips, on_change suppression, empty collector results, logparser position/parse-mode outcomes — for rules that produce no timeline events.
* [MDM Reboot Coalescing](agent/mdm-reboot-coalescing.md) - Attributing the mid-ESP coalesced reboot ("second sign-in") to the device-assigned policy URIs that forced it: aggregated DM-Enterprise 2800 observations (neutral, flush-time watermark) + the ANALYZE-ESP-005 advisory gated on an actually-observed reboot.
* [Secure Boot CA-2023 Detection](agent/secureboot-ca2023-detection.md) - Why ANALYZE-SEC-001 v3 reads the UEFI db/KEK variables directly instead of trusting the SecureBoot\Servicing registry, and how the one-sided uefiCa2023FirmwareConfirmed marker plus a not_exists precondition give absence-tolerant suppression across old and new agents.
* [Continue-Anyway Observation Mode](agent/continue-anyway-observation.md) - EnableEspContinueAnywayObservation (ConfigVersion 37, operator-set): Device-phase ESP terminal failures on Continue-Anyway profiles get a bounded 60-min observation instead of an immediate hard fail; the DAD-validated real-user desktop + Hello gate detect the true end, the session completes Succeeded + EspSoftFailure (amber "with issues" badge), expiry un-defangs to the original esp_terminal_failure.
* [ESP Policy-Provider Stall Detection](agent/esp-policy-provider-stall.md) - The EnrollmentStatusTracking CSP's no-timeout Setup/Apps wait is keyed to the Intune-registered "Sidecar" provider by NAME: co-management's "ConfigMgr" parks the user ESP at "Apps (Identifying)" for days even with TrackingPoliciesCreated=1 (issue #106); the always-on two-arm esp_policy_provider_stalled tripwire (provider_incomplete | sidecar_provider_missing) and the SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Autopilot gather-rule allowlist entry that surface it.
# Rules
* [Gather Rule Phase Scoping, One-Shot Triggers & Emit-on-Change](rules/gather-rule-phase-scoping.md) - Restricting gather rules to enrollment phases (activePhases / activeFromPhase sticky latch), one-shot collection at a phase's start/end (phase_change / phase_exit), and emitMode "on_change" result-dedup.
* [Gather Rule Guardrails](rules/gather-rule-guardrails.md) - Why the allowlists in rules/guardrails.json are enforced on the agent and nowhere else, which hard blocks survive unrestricted mode, and the rule that every collector must call a guard and emit security_warning on refusal.
* [Rule Authoring Surface](rules/rule-authoring-surface.md) - How customer AIs author rules against the real contract: the baked MCP resources (guide/schemas/guardrails via combine.js), the MCP-local validate_rule pre-flight, and the side-effect-free POST rules/analyze/dryrun whose trace twin shares the production evaluators (parity + side-effect-freedom pinned by tests).
# Backend
@@ -37,11 +39,14 @@ https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com (separate repository).
* [Device Journeys & First-Time-Right](backend/device-journeys.md) - How a device's terminal enrollment attempts are grouped into journeys (trim+casefold device key with junk-serial exclusion, first-success end, 30-day gap, WhiteGlove = one attempt), the DeviceHistories chain with its tombstone-driven deleted-session pruning, the additive daily FTR aggregates, and the banner/fleet/MCP surfaces.
* [Enrollment Time Attribution](backend/time-attribution.md) - How a terminal session's authoritative wall clock (DurationSeconds, WhiteGlove pause excluded) is partitioned into named segments with an explicit unattributed remainder, ESP-blocking apps as positive evidence with "up to" what-if bounds, reboot spans from event gaps, and the breakdown/aggregate tables the sweep maintains.
* [Rule Regression Radar](backend/rule-regression-radar.md) - How analyze-rule hit-rate regressions are detected (7-day window ≥2× the 28-day baseline with disjoint Wilson intervals), which suppressions keep the radar quiet (grace period, edit-in-window, kill switch), how alert episodes live in the ruleregression tracker keyspace with re-arm semantics, and the on-fire dimension correlation with its "correlated, not necessarily causal" wording contract.
* [Tenant Activation & the Once-Only Welcome Mail](backend/tenant-activation-welcome-mail.md) - How a signup becomes an activated tenant (manual approve or the auto-approve queue), and the write-then-read + conditional-marker arbitration that sends the welcome mail exactly once even though activation and the user-typed notification address race each other.
* [W365 Cloud PC Device Validation](backend/cloudpc-device-validation.md) - Why Cloud PCs can never pass the Autopilot serial lookup, and the cert-CN-bound CloudPc fallback validator: Subject CN (= Intune device id) matched against the tenant's Graph virtualEndpoint/cloudPCs inventory — admits exactly the service-provisioned Cloud PCs, nothing else.
* [ServerActions & On-Demand Diagnostics](backend/server-actions-on-demand-diagnostics.md) - The queue-on-session, deliver-on-ingest action channel, the TenantAdminOrOperator tier with in-function per-type re-gating, the portal's Collect Logs flow (quick-config orders rotate_config before request_diagnostics), and the hosted-prefix sweep in the offboarding cascade.
# MCP Server
* [MCP Docs Corpus](mcp/docs-corpus.md) - How the published customer documentation becomes the `search_docs` corpus: CRLF-safe heading chunking, build-time embedding as a third precomputed section, and why a docs edit needs an MCP redeploy.
* [MCP Tool Telemetry](mcp/tool-telemetry.md) - The three telemetry layers for judging tool quality: backend App Insights via X-MCP-Tool-Name, the per-user usage table, and the MCP_TOOL_LOGGING stderr lines (soft errors, result size vs. cap, zero-hit searches, Zod rejections).
# Web Portal
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# Log
## 2026-08-10
* **Update**: `rules/gather-rule-guardrails.md` — WMI matcher generalized from literal prefix matching to shape parsing: `SELECT <* | property-list> FROM <class>` is allowed when the class is derived from the existing `SELECT * FROM <class>` entries (a projection is a strict subset; motivated by `SELECT BatteryStatus FROM Win32_Battery` + `on_change` battery polling that `SELECT *` defeats via fluctuating charge %). Same algorithm mirrored agent/portal/MCP; guardrails.json unchanged. Portal now also gates enabling on the client-side validation (invalid-target custom rules create disabled, cannot be toggled on, force-disable on invalid edit, "Blocked on devices" badge) — UX only, the agent guard stays the boundary. Gather-rule Author is now stamped from the creator's JWT (display name → UPN) at create and immutable on update.
* **New**: `agent/continue-anyway-observation.md` — Continue-Anyway observation mode (`EnableEspContinueAnywayObservation`, ConfigVersion 37, operator-set): Device-phase ESP terminal failures on Continue-Anyway profiles are defanged into a 60-min observation window (Classic/Unknown, non-pre-prov only); real-user desktop + Hello gate complete the session as Succeeded + `EspSoftFailure`/`CompletionSource` (amber "with issues" badge + detail banner), category recovery resolves clean, expiry un-defangs to the original `esp_terminal_failure`. Registered in the Agent index section. Related backend fix (no doc): the auto-analyze enqueue now carries a 30 s `visibilityTimeout` so rule evaluation no longer races the agent's terminal flush (ANALYZE-ESP-004's `{{appName}}` placeholder).
## 2026-08-07 (later)
* **Update**: `backend/cloudpc-device-validation.md` — third `IsCloudPc` transport rail: the pre-auth distress channel. `DistressReport.IsCloudPc` (CloudPcDetector verdict captured at `DistressReporter` construction) → `DistressReportEntry`/table column → "Devices Not Registered" aggregation (sticky-true per serial, same OR semantics as the Sessions merge) → portal Cloud PC badge + actionable hint ("enable Windows 365 Cloud PC Validation + W365CloudPcValidation add-on"). Motivated by the first W365 field run: the rejected Cloud PC showed up as anonymous "Microsoft Corporation / Virtual Machine" with no clue that the fix is the Cloud PC validator, not Autopilot registration. UNVERIFIED like all distress fields; ≤18 bytes, fits the 1536-byte cap.
## 2026-08-07
* **Update**: `backend/cloudpc-device-validation.md` — the "deliberately out of scope" follow-up landed in the same PR: agent-side `IsCloudPc` flag (`CloudPcDetector`, bootstrap-verified marker AND: Windows365 key + CloudManagedDesktopExtension service key, SKIP-safe) rides two rails — `SessionRegistration` → Sessions/Index (sticky-true) → `SessionSummary` + `isCloudPc` search filter (portal/raw/MCP), and the `EnrollmentFactsObserved` payload → `EnrollmentScenarioObservations.CloudPc` (set-once, both values) with profile reason `cloud_pc_first_connect:no_device_esp_expected` + `cloud_pc_marker` in the audit-trail census. Reason+observation only: no completion arm depends on DeviceSetup, Mode stays AccountSetup/IME-classified, EspConfig keeps configured-FirstSync semantics. Never an auth input.
## 2026-08-06
* **Creation**: Added `backend/cloudpc-device-validation.md` — the CloudPc fallback validator (`ValidatorType.CloudPc = 5`, tenant flag `ValidateCloudPcDevice`): W365 Cloud PCs are structurally never Autopilot-registered, so stage 4 gains a third stage that binds the chain-validated MDM cert's Subject CN (= Intune device id, field-verified on a real Cloud PC) to the tenant's `virtualEndpoint/cloudPCs` inventory — admits exactly the service-provisioned Cloud PCs, no device-type routing, local W365 markers never consulted for auth. New optional Graph add-on `W365CloudPcValidation` → `CloudPC.Read.All` (catalog + grant script now pinned by `GraphFeatureCatalogSyncTests`; Graph 403 = definitive "grant missing", not transient). Bootstrap dev script v2.3-dev.3 exempts guard 4 (uptime) while the Cloud-PC relax is active — the fresh-profile window is the time anchor at first connect, not boot uptime. Follow-up deliberately out of scope: agent-side `IsCloudPc` classification + decision-engine "no Device ESP" expectation.
## 2026-08-05 (later)
* **Update**: `rules/rule-authoring-surface.md` — new section `POST /api/rules/gather/test-pattern`: the logparser pattern tester (agent-exact .NET matching: no IgnoreCase, first-match-per-line, cmtrace vs text mode, verbatim format=text hint), motivated by a field incident where a PHP-verified regex behaved differently under .NET. `CmTraceLogParser` moved Agent → `AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Logging` so agent and backend share the ONE parsing implementation (timestamp caveat: AssumeLocal = server TZ on backend, endpoint reports no timestamps). MCP: new `test_log_pattern` tool, logparser lint in `validate_rule`, guide gains the case-sensitivity/engine-mismatch pitfalls.
## 2026-08-05
* **Creation**: Added `mcp/tool-telemetry.md` — the three MCP tool-telemetry layers (App Insights `McpToolName`, per-user usage table, `MCP_TOOL_LOGGING` stderr lines) and the new quality signals: soft-error capture (`toolError` returns instead of throwing, so backend telemetry counted those calls as successes), `resultChars`/`overCap` vs. the inline-size hint, bounded args summaries, caller scope, `search_zero_hit` on the three search tools (unmet-demand signal), and `tool_call_rejected` for JSON-RPC-level Zod/unknown-tool rejections sniffed at the `/mcp` route (previously invisible everywhere). Bicep default for `toolLoggingEnabled` flipped to `true` (documented desired state; live flag set via `az containerapp update`).
* **Creation**: Added `rules/rule-authoring-surface.md` — the AI-assisted rule-authoring stack: three deterministic MCP resources (`rule_authoring_guide` hand-written, `rule_schemas` + `rule_guardrails` generated into `rule-authoring.generated.ts` by a new combine.js emitter, drift-guarded twice), the MCP-local `validate_rule` (ajv 2020-12 against the single-rule $defs, guardrail pre-flight mirroring GatherRuleGuards matching semantics incl. hard blocks, semantic lint for schema-valid-but-dead rules), and the side-effect-free `POST /api/rules/analyze/dryrun` (TenantAdminOrGlobalReader; `RuleEngine.DryRun.cs` trace twin sharing the production evaluators, all-conditions trace with per-condition evidence + matchingEventCount, parity and side-effect-freedom pinned by RuleEngineDryRunTests). MCP `test_analyze_rule` wraps the endpoint with `{{token}}`-interpolated previews; `author-rule` prompt drives the draft → validate → dry-run loop. Deliberately absent: gather-rule remote execution, rule writes via MCP.
## 2026-08-04
* **Update**: `rules/gather-rule-phase-scoping.md` — new section "Which phase feeds the triggers": `GatherRuleExecutorHost` now drives `phase_change`/`phase_exit`/`on_event` gather triggers (and the phase-scope gates) from the post-reduce `TimelineEventStream` (every emitted event's `(eventType, phase)` published by `EventTimelineEmitter`) instead of the pre-reduce `SignalIngress.SignalPosted` payloads. Trigger: session `32312a32` (RealmJoin tenant rsneuffen.de) — a Phase-Start rule on FinalizingSetup fired at the raw ESP-exit `EspPhaseChanged(FinalizingSetup)` signal, 7 minutes before the engine's RealmJoin-gated `phase_transition(FinalizingSetup)`, reading `HKLM\SOFTWARE\RealmJoin\Custom\BIOS` before the RealmJoin package created it. Phase triggers now fire exactly when the timeline shows the phase; `on_event` additionally sees engine-emitted event types (`enrollment_complete`, `realmjoin_resolved`, …) for the first time in V2, restoring V1 semantics and the documented end-of-enrollment pattern. Other raw-signal hosts (DeviceInfo, keep-awake, PPKG) deliberately unchanged.
## 2026-08-02
* **Creation**: Added `backend/tenant-activation-welcome-mail.md` — triggered by the first production auto-approve (activation at signup+64 s, notification address saved at +69 s → welcome mail silently skipped, since the approval path is the only sender and reads the address once). Fix documented in the doc: the notification-email save path now also triggers the send (`PUT /api/preview/notification-email` → fresh approval check `IsApprovedFreshAsync`, bypassing the 30 s negative cache), and a conditional-insert `welcome-email-sent` marker in `PreviewWhitelist` makes the send once-only across both racing paths (marker consumed strictly after the address check; revoke clears it, offboarding wipes the partition, the GA resend endpoint sends unconditionally and consumes it best-effort).
## 2026-07-29
* **Update**: `agent/gather-rule-debug-log.md` — three trace enrichments: (1) new `phase` stage writing an enrollment-phase transition marker (`phase change: Old -> New`, ruleId `-`) so every rule-level line reads against the current phase; (2) logparser now writes one line per regex match — line number, matched text, capture groups — capped at 10 per file per run (the per-file summary keeps the full count); (3) the invalid-regex `error` line includes the offending pattern string.
+81
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@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
---
type: concept
title: MCP Tool Telemetry
description: The three telemetry layers for judging MCP tool quality — backend App Insights via X-MCP-Tool-Name, the per-user usage table, and the MCP_TOOL_LOGGING stderr lines that carry the signals the backend cannot see (soft errors, result size vs. cap, zero-hit searches, Zod rejections).
resource: src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/telemetry.ts
tags: [mcp, telemetry, observability, tool-quality]
timestamp: 2026-08-05
---
# Schema
Three layers answer "are the MCP tools doing their job, and are tools missing?":
1. **Backend App Insights** — every tool handler runs inside `withToolTelemetry`
(`src/telemetry.ts`), which propagates the tool name via AsyncLocalStorage so
`apiFetch` stamps `X-MCP-Tool-Name` on each backend request.
`RequestTelemetryMiddleware` copies it into the request telemetry as
`McpToolName`: per-tool call volume, latency percentiles and HTTP failure
rates by KQL. Blind spot: tools that never call the backend, and handler-level
soft errors (see layer 3).
2. **Usage table** — `McpQuotaEnforcementMiddleware.TrackUsage` counts per
user/day under the key `toolname:endpoint`; surfaced by the `get_api_usage`
tool. Counts only, every call counts as success.
3. **stderr JSON lines** (`MCP_TOOL_LOGGING=true`, queryable via Container App
Logs) — the layer that carries what the other two structurally cannot:
- `tool_call`: duration, `isError` **including soft errors** (handlers never
throw — `toolError` *returns* `isError: true`, so backend-only telemetry
records those calls as successes), `resultChars` + `overCap` (result
exceeds the tool's `anthropic/maxResultSizeChars` hint → the host truncates
it; a frequently-overCap tool needs tighter defaults or projections), a
size-bounded args summary, and the caller scope (ga/delegated/tenant).
This is the ONLY telemetry for backend-free tools: `search_docs`,
`validate_rule`, `get_resource`, the local ranking of `search_knowledge`.
- `search_zero_hit`: query text (capped) whenever `search_events` /
`search_knowledge` / `search_docs` return zero results — the most direct
"missing docs / missing knowledge / missing tool?" demand signal.
- `tool_call_rejected`: rejections the SDK answers *before* any handler runs
(Zod argument validation, unknown/disabled tool). Two non-obvious facts,
both found by live verification: SDK 1.30 wraps these McpErrors as a
*successful* JSON-RPC response whose result is `{ isError: true, text:
"MCP error <code>: …" }` — a JSON-RPC error envelope never exists for
them — and the Hono bridge (`getRequestListener`) may stream the body as
`res.write` chunks with a bare `res.end()`. The sniffer in the `/mcp`
route therefore wraps both `write` and `end`, reassembles up to 10 KB and
matches both shapes (`attachToolCallRejectionSniffer` in `telemetry.ts`).
Handler soft errors never carry the `MCP error` prefix, so they are not
double-logged. This is the strongest "the schema or description confuses
the model" signal and was previously invisible everywhere.
The env flag defaults to `true` in `infra/mcp-server.bicep` (documented desired
state — the template is not routinely deployed; the live flag is set with
`az containerapp update --set-env-vars MCP_TOOL_LOGGING=true`).
# Examples
Count zero-hit queries to find unmet demand (Log Analytics):
```kusto
ContainerAppConsoleLogs_CL
| where Log_s has '"type":"search_zero_hit"'
| extend d = parse_json(Log_s)
| summarize count() by tostring(d.tool), tostring(d.query)
```
Per-tool soft-error and truncation rates:
```kusto
ContainerAppConsoleLogs_CL
| where Log_s has '"type":"tool_call"'
| extend d = parse_json(Log_s)
| summarize calls = count(), errors = countif(d.isError == true),
overCap = countif(d.overCap == true), p95ms = percentile(tolong(d.durationMs), 95)
by tool = tostring(d.tool)
```
# Citations
- `src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/telemetry.ts` — wrapper + log emitters
- `src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/index.ts` — `/mcp` rejection sniffer
- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Middleware/RequestTelemetryMiddleware.cs` — `McpToolName` stamping
- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Middleware/McpQuotaEnforcementMiddleware.cs` — usage-table counting
+12 -3
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@@ -7,14 +7,14 @@ description: >-
guard rather than trusting rule.Target.
resource: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Telemetry/Gather
tags: [gather-rules, security, guardrails, agent]
timestamp: 2026-07-22
timestamp: 2026-08-10
---
# Concept
A gather rule is authored by a **tenant administrator** through `POST /api/rules/gather` and executed by the agent as **SYSTEM** on an enrolling device. The backend does not validate `collectorType`, `target`, or `parameters` at all — it only enforces scope/emit-mode fields, a 1 MB body cap, and that the rule lands in the caller's own tenant partition. Everything that decides *what a rule may reach* is therefore enforced **on the agent**, in `GatherRuleGuards`.
This is the security boundary. The portal's `ValidationIndicator` is a convenience: it does not block submit, and the API is reachable directly.
This is the security boundary. The portal's `ValidationIndicator` is a convenience — the API stays reachable directly and the backend stays validation-free — but since 2026-08 the portal additionally **gates enabling** on the same client-side validation: a custom rule whose target fails validation cannot be toggled on, is created `enabled=false`, and an edit that makes the target invalid force-disables the rule (`targetBlocked` in `app/gather-rules/types.ts`). An enabled rule with an invalid target shows a "Blocked on devices" badge. All of this is UX, not security — the agent guard remains the enforcement point.
# Schema
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ item in `AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.csproj`) and regenerated into the portal
| --- | --- | --- |
| `IsRegistryPathAllowed` | `registryPrefixes` | prefix, boundary `\` or end |
| `IsFilePathAllowed` | `filePrefixes` | `Path.GetFullPath` first, then prefix + boundary |
| `IsWmiQueryAllowed` | `wmiQueryPrefixes` | prefix, boundary whitespace or end |
| `IsWmiQueryAllowed` | `wmiQueryPrefixes` | `SELECT <* \| property-list> FROM <class>`; class = case-insensitive equality against classes derived from the `SELECT * FROM <class>` entries, boundary whitespace or end (trailing `WHERE` allowed). Non-canonical entries (none today) fall back to literal prefix + boundary |
| `IsCommandAllowed` | `allowedCommands` | **exact** match, trimmed — never prefix |
| `IsEventLogChannelAllowed` | `eventLogChannels` | prefix, boundary `/` or end |
@@ -71,6 +71,15 @@ Two collectors were added to this contract on 2026-07-22 after shipping without
remote config. The operator using it is already a local admin, so it relaxes the
allowlist exactly the way unrestricted mode does — hard blocks still apply.
**WMI property projections (2026-08):** `SELECT BatteryStatus FROM Win32_Battery` is
allowed because `SELECT * FROM Win32_Battery` is — a projection exposes a strict subset
of the allowed class. The matcher parses the query shape instead of literal-prefix
matching; the allowed-class set is derived at load time from the existing
`wmiQueryPrefixes` entries, so `rules/guardrails.json` needs no new key. The same
algorithm is mirrored in the portal (`utils/guardValidation.ts`) and the MCP server
(`rule-validation.ts`); agents older than the change still block projections with a
`security_warning` until they self-update.
# Citations
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Telemetry/Gather/GatherRuleGuards.cs`
+33 -2
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ tags:
- backend
- gather-rules
- config
timestamp: 2026-07-20T00:00:00+02:00
timestamp: 2026-08-04T00:00:00+02:00
---
# Problem
@@ -64,6 +64,35 @@ enter-rule and an exit-rule on the same phase never cannibalise each other's slo
* Old agents do not know the trigger value and simply never fire the rule (silent no-op) —
which is why `phase_exit` needs no ConfigVersion bump: no new field is transported.
# Which "phase" feeds the triggers — the emitted timeline, not raw signals
The phase the executor sees is fed by `GatherRuleExecutorHost` from the **post-reduce
`TimelineEventStream`**: `EventTimelineEmitter` publishes every emitted event's
`(eventType, phase)` after the decision engine reduced the originating signal. Phase triggers
therefore fire exactly when the UI timeline shows the phase — by construction.
This replaced the original V2 wiring (`SignalIngress.SignalPosted`), which fires at enqueue
time with the **raw** collector payload. The raw phase can run minutes ahead of the
engine-declared one: in session `32312a32` (RealmJoin tenant) the Shell-Core ESP-exit
synthesized `EspPhaseChanged(FinalizingSetup)` at 12:18, while the engine — holding the
transition behind the RealmJoin completion gate until the first deployment resolved — declared
`phase_transition(FinalizingSetup)` at 12:25. A `phase_change` rule on `FinalizingSetup`
reading `HKLM\SOFTWARE\RealmJoin\Custom\BIOS` fired 7 minutes early and read the key before
the RealmJoin package wrote it (`exists=false`).
Consequences of the emitted-event feed:
* `phase_change` / `phase_exit` / phase **scope** gates all follow the engine-reduced phase
(single feed, consistent with the portal's "collects once when the enrollment reaches …").
* `on_event` now sees **every emitted event type**, including engine-emitted ones
(`enrollment_complete`, `phase_transition`, `realmjoin_resolved`, …) that never existed on
the raw signal stream — the documented "On Event with `enrollment_complete`" end-of-enrollment
pattern only works because of this. This restores V1 semantics (V1 fired triggers from every
emitted `EnrollmentEvent`).
* Other hosts (`DeviceInfoHost`, `UserEspKeepAwakeHost`, `ProvisioningPackageHost`) still key
off the raw signal stream deliberately — their collections are about OS state at the raw
boundary (ESP exit, keep-awake), not about timeline agreement.
# Scope semantics (agent, `GatherRuleExecutor`)
* Scope applies to **all trigger types**:
@@ -130,7 +159,9 @@ enter-rule and an exit-rule on the same phase never cannibalise each other's slo
# Citations
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Telemetry/Gather/GatherRuleExecutor.cs` — scope gates, latch, canonical hash
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Orchestration/Hosts/GatherRuleExecutorHost.cs` — timeline-event trigger feed
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Orchestration/TimelineEventStream.cs` — post-reduce observer surface
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Rules/GatherRulesFunction.cs` — `ValidateScopeAndEmitMode`
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/GatherRuleService.cs` — partial-PUT merge, `ContentEquivalent`
* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Models/Rules/GatherRule.cs` — field contracts
* Tests: `GatherRuleExecutorPhaseScopeTests`, `GatherRuleExecutorEmitModeTests` (agent); `GatherRuleUpdatePartialMergeTests`, `GatherRuleScopeFieldsTests` (backend)
* Tests: `GatherRuleExecutorPhaseScopeTests`, `GatherRuleExecutorEmitModeTests`, `GatherRuleExecutorHostTimelineFeedTests` (agent); `GatherRuleUpdatePartialMergeTests`, `GatherRuleScopeFieldsTests` (backend)
+152
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@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
---
type: Concept
title: Rule Authoring Surface — MCP Resources, validate_rule, and the Analyze Dry-Run
description: >-
How customer AIs author gather/analyze rules against the real contract: the baked
authoring resources (guide, schemas, guardrails) generated by combine.js, the
MCP-local validate_rule pre-flight, and the side-effect-free backend dry-run that
traces a draft analyze rule against one session's events.
resource: src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/tools/rules.ts
tags: [rules, mcp, analyze-rules, gather-rules, dry-run, authoring]
timestamp: 2026-08-05
---
# Concept
Customers author rules with an AI connected to the MCP server. Retrieval
(`search_docs`) is deliberately NOT the knowledge source for authoring: chunked
top-K retrieval can silently omit an operator, a guardrail prefix, or an enum,
and the AI then produces a plausible-but-dead rule. The authoring surface is
therefore **deterministic**: three `get_resource` entries carry the complete
contract, a local validator rejects what production would reject or silently
ignore, and a backend dry-run evaluates a draft against real session events with
a full trace.
The intended loop: draft → `validate_rule` → `test_analyze_rule` against a real
session (one that should fire, one that should not) → iterate → create in the
portal. The `author-rule` MCP prompt walks a client through exactly this order.
# Schema
## Resources (deterministic authoring context)
| Resource | Content | Source |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `rule_authoring_guide` | Hand-written complete authoring knowledge: collector types, triggers, condition sources, operators, confidence model incl. the exact factor DSL, `{{token}}` interpolation order, guardrail matching semantics, pitfalls | `src/rule-authoring-guide.ts` |
| `rule_schemas` | Both JSON Schemas (2020-12) verbatim | generated |
| `rule_guardrails` | `rules/guardrails.json` verbatim | generated |
Generation: `node rules/scripts/combine.js` bakes schemas + guardrails into
`src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/rule-authoring.generated.ts` (same
pattern as the web's `utils/guardrails.generated.ts`; the tsconfig `rootDir` and
the Docker build's exclusion of `rules/schema` rule out importing the JSON
directly). Drift is closed twice: CI's `guardrails-in-sync` job re-runs
combine.js and fails on any diff, and `rule-authoring-drift.test.ts` pins
generated == repo source plus guide enums == schema enums.
## validate_rule (MCP-local)
`src/rule-validation.ts`, no backend call. Three layers:
1. **Schema** — ajv (draft 2020-12) against the baked schemas, validating the
single-rule `$defs` entry directly (the top-level oneOf wrapper would double
every error).
2. **Guardrails** — mirrors the AGENT's matching semantics from
`GatherRuleGuards.cs` (see [gather-rule-guardrails.md](gather-rule-guardrails.md)):
hive-stripped segment-bounded registry/file prefixes, whitespace-bounded WMI
prefixes, EXACT command matching, `/`-bounded event-log channels, and the
code-enforced hard blocks (`Security` etc. channels, `C:\Users`,
`C:\Windows\System32\config`).
3. **Semantic lint** — schema-valid-but-dead rules: unreachable
confidenceThreshold, factor conditions outside the three parseable shapes
(`exists`, `count >= N`, `phase_duration > N`), unknown event types (warning;
`gather_*` softened to info), unanchored `not_regex` allow-lists,
unresolvable `{{token}}`s, trigger cross-fields, outputEventType
convention/collision checks.
The validator is advisory pre-flight only — the agent re-enforces guardrails
on-device and the backend re-validates structure. It must never be stricter
than production.
## POST /api/rules/analyze/dryrun (backend)
`DryRunAnalyzeRuleFunction` → `RuleEngine.DryRunRuleAsync`. Body
`{ sessionId, rule }` (draft `AnalyzeRule`, 1 MB cap). Policy tier
`TenantAdminOrGlobalReader` — a POST by shape but a pure read in effect, so the
read-only Global Reader is admitted; platform-scope callers reach any tenant's
session via `FindSessionTenantIdAsync` (same pattern as `GetRuleResultsFunction`).
`RuleEngine.DryRun.cs` is a partial-class trace twin of `EvaluateRule`: it
shares the exact evaluators (`EvaluatePrecondition` / `EvaluateCondition` /
`EvaluateConfidenceFactor`) but evaluates **all** conditions instead of breaking
on the first failed required one — the full picture is the point of a dry run.
Verdicts: `fired`, `skipped_by_precondition`, `required_condition_not_met`,
`no_conditions_matched`, `below_confidence_threshold`, `no_events`. Each
condition entry carries `matched`, the production evidence dictionary (or the
evaluator's reason string) and `matchingEventCount` — how many session events
even have that eventType, the first thing to check on an unexpected miss.
Invariants, pinned by `RuleEngineDryRunTests`:
* **Parity**: verdict `fired` ⇔ `EvaluateRule` produces a result, with identical
confidence and evidence keys. Factor evaluation stays sequential against the
accumulating `matchedConditions` (a factor can observe earlier `factor_*`
entries) — reordering would change results.
* **Side-effect freedom**: exactly one strict event read; never a RuleResult
write, never `TryMarkSessionFailedFromRuleAsync`, never a notification.
`wouldMarkSessionAsFailed` is reported, not acted on.
`test_analyze_rule` (MCP) wraps the endpoint and adds the interpolated
explanation/remediation preview via the existing `interpolate-rule-template.ts`
against the returned `matchedConditions`.
## POST /api/rules/gather/test-pattern (backend)
The logparser counterpart to the analyze dry-run, added after a field incident:
a customer verified a logparser regex with a PHP tester and the agent's .NET
engine matched differently. `TestLogPatternFunction` evaluates a pattern against
pasted sample lines with the AGENT's exact matching semantics:
* Regex construction identical to `LogParserCollector`: `Compiled`, 1 s timeout,
**no IgnoreCase** — logparser matching is case-sensitive (unlike analyze-rule
regex conditions, which run IgnoreCase).
* `format` behaves exactly like the rule parameter: `cmtrace` (default) parses
each line via the shared `CmTraceLogParser` and matches against the parsed
MESSAGE only; `text` matches the raw line. First match per line
(`Regex.Match`), group `"0"` excluded, unsuccessful groups omitted — the
returned `groups` are exactly the event-data fields the device would emit.
* Mirrors the agent's diagnostics: per-line outcomes
(`matched | no_match | parse_failed | regex_timeout`), the all-lines-parse-fail
hint ("set parameter format=text") verbatim, and a case-sensitivity note on
zero matches.
* Pure compute on the request body — no tenant data touched. Same policy tier
as the dry-run (`TenantAdminOrGlobalReader`); caps: 200 lines, 8 KB/line,
1 MB body.
Parity is structural, not duplicated: `CmTraceLogParser` moved from the agent
(`Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime`) to **Shared** (`AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Logging`)
so agent and backend run the SAME parsing implementation. Timestamp caveat:
bias-less CMTrace lines parse with `AssumeLocal`, which on the backend is the
server's timezone — the endpoint therefore reports match/parse results, never
timestamps. `test_log_pattern` (MCP) wraps the endpoint; `validate_rule`
additionally lints logparser parameters (missing/non-compiling pattern, unknown
format value) and its `nextStep` routes logparser drafts to `test_log_pattern`.
## What is deliberately absent
* **No gather-rule remote execution** — gather rules run as SYSTEM on devices;
session dry-run is analyze-only. Logparser authors get the pattern tester
above; all gather authors get guardrail pre-flight plus the on-device debug
log ([gather-rule-debug-log](../agent/gather-rule-debug-log.md)).
* **No rule write/deploy via MCP** — creating rules stays in the portal.
# Citations
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Rules/TestLogPatternFunction.cs` — logparser pattern tester
* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Logging/CmTraceLogParser.cs` — shared CMTrace parser (agent + backend)
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/RuleEngine.DryRun.cs` — trace twin + DTOs
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Rules/DryRunAnalyzeRuleFunction.cs` — endpoint + draft validation
* `src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/rule-validation.ts` — validator
* `src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/tools/rules.ts` — validate_rule / test_analyze_rule
* `src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/rule-authoring-guide.ts` — guide resource
* `rules/scripts/combine.js` — MCP module generation
+4 -4
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@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ param apiUrl string = 'https://autopilotmonitor-api-eu.azurewebsites.net'
@description('Container image tag')
param imageTag string = 'latest'
@description('Entra ID app registration client_id used for the OAuth proxy. Public value (appears in JWT aud claim); not a secret.')
param entraClientId string = '1a400946-62c1-4ab4-aa37-f730ac89704d'
@description('Entra ID app registration client_id used for the OAuth proxy. Public value (appears in JWT aud claim); not a secret. Since the C4A8 app-reg move this is the NEW app (the old 1a400946-… app remains valid at the backend for legacy-homed tenants).')
param entraClientId string = '886ab5e2-6144-442c-80cc-9b28e0667731'
@secure()
@description('Entra ID client secret for OAuth token exchange')
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ param mcpPublicUrl string = ''
@description('Base64-encoded HMAC key (>=32 bytes after decode) for signing the OAuth proxy state. Naming and format match the backend\'s PaginationTokenSigningKey for consistency. Empty = generate per-instance random key on startup (acceptable for single-replica deployments since state has 10 min lifetime). Generate with PowerShell: [Convert]::ToBase64String([Security.Cryptography.RandomNumberGenerator]::GetBytes(32))')
param oAuthStateSigningKey string = ''
@description('Enable structured tool-call logging to stderr (queryable via Container App Logs)')
param toolLoggingEnabled bool = false
@description('Enable structured tool-call logging to stderr (queryable via Container App Logs). Volume is one small JSON line per tool call - negligible at current usage.')
param toolLoggingEnabled bool = true
// --- Azure Container Registry ---
+78
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@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-SEC-008",
"title": "Secure Boot is disabled",
"description": "Detects devices enrolling with Secure Boot turned off. Secure Boot is a firmware-level protection against boot-time malware and is a prerequisite for several Windows security features (VBS/Credential Guard, device health attestation) and common Intune compliance policies. Devices that support Secure Boot but have it disabled should be flagged during enrollment. Legacy BIOS devices (no Secure Boot capability) are excluded — the agent marks those with a note field when the SecureBoot registry state key is absent.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "security",
"version": "1.0.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"trigger": "single",
"baseConfidence": 70,
"preconditions": [
{
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "secureboot_status",
"dataField": "note",
"operator": "not_exists",
"value": "",
"description": "Skip when the agent could not find the SecureBoot state registry key (note field set) — that indicates a legacy BIOS / non-UEFI device where Secure Boot is unsupported rather than disabled, so a warning would not be actionable."
}
],
"conditions": [
{
"signal": "secureboot_disabled",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "secureboot_status",
"dataField": "uefiSecureBootEnabled",
"operator": "equals",
"value": "false",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "physical_device",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "hardware_spec",
"dataField": "isVirtualMachine",
"operator": "equals",
"value": "false",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{ "signal": "physical_device", "condition": "exists", "weight": 20 }
],
"confidenceThreshold": 60,
"explanation": "This device enrolled with **Secure Boot disabled**.\n\nThe firmware reports UEFI mode, but Secure Boot is turned off (`HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SecureBoot\\State\\UEFISecureBootEnabled = 0`). Without Secure Boot the boot chain is not verified, which:\n\n- Leaves the device exposed to bootkits and unsigned boot-time code\n- Blocks or weakens Virtualization-based Security (VBS), Credential Guard and Device Health Attestation\n- Typically makes the device **non-compliant** if an Intune compliance policy requires Secure Boot — Conditional Access may then block the user right after enrollment\n\nSecure Boot is usually disabled deliberately in firmware setup (e.g. for imaging, dual-boot or legacy CSM mode) and simply never re-enabled before the device was handed to Autopilot.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Enable Secure Boot in UEFI firmware",
"steps": [
"Reboot into the UEFI firmware setup (typically F2/F10/F12/Del during boot, or Shift+Restart -> Troubleshoot -> UEFI Firmware Settings)",
"Disable Legacy/CSM boot mode if it is active — Secure Boot requires native UEFI boot",
"Enable Secure Boot and ensure the Microsoft UEFI CA keys are selected (factory default key set)",
"Save, reboot and verify in Windows: msinfo32 -> 'Secure Boot State' = On, or PowerShell Confirm-SecureBootUEFI returns True",
"For Hyper-V test VMs: use a Generation 2 VM and enable Secure Boot in the VM's Security settings (template 'Microsoft Windows')"
]
},
{
"title": "Check compliance impact",
"steps": [
"Review Intune compliance policies assigned to this device for a 'Require Secure Boot' setting",
"If the device stays non-compliant, Conditional Access policies may block sign-in — fix firmware settings before user handover"
]
}
],
"relatedDocs": [
{
"title": "Microsoft Learn: Secure Boot",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-secure-boot"
},
{
"title": "Microsoft Learn: Re-enable Secure Boot",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/disabling-secure-boot"
}
],
"tags": ["security", "secureboot", "firmware", "uefi", "compliance"]
}
+87
View File
@@ -2687,6 +2687,93 @@
"truncated",
"coverage"
]
},
{
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-SEC-008",
"title": "Secure Boot is disabled",
"description": "Detects devices enrolling with Secure Boot turned off. Secure Boot is a firmware-level protection against boot-time malware and is a prerequisite for several Windows security features (VBS/Credential Guard, device health attestation) and common Intune compliance policies. Devices that support Secure Boot but have it disabled should be flagged during enrollment. Legacy BIOS devices (no Secure Boot capability) are excluded — the agent marks those with a note field when the SecureBoot registry state key is absent.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "security",
"version": "1.0.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"trigger": "single",
"baseConfidence": 70,
"preconditions": [
{
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "secureboot_status",
"dataField": "note",
"operator": "not_exists",
"value": "",
"description": "Skip when the agent could not find the SecureBoot state registry key (note field set) — that indicates a legacy BIOS / non-UEFI device where Secure Boot is unsupported rather than disabled, so a warning would not be actionable."
}
],
"conditions": [
{
"signal": "secureboot_disabled",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "secureboot_status",
"dataField": "uefiSecureBootEnabled",
"operator": "equals",
"value": "false",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "physical_device",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "hardware_spec",
"dataField": "isVirtualMachine",
"operator": "equals",
"value": "false",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{
"signal": "physical_device",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 20
}
],
"confidenceThreshold": 60,
"explanation": "This device enrolled with **Secure Boot disabled**.\n\nThe firmware reports UEFI mode, but Secure Boot is turned off (`HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SecureBoot\\State\\UEFISecureBootEnabled = 0`). Without Secure Boot the boot chain is not verified, which:\n\n- Leaves the device exposed to bootkits and unsigned boot-time code\n- Blocks or weakens Virtualization-based Security (VBS), Credential Guard and Device Health Attestation\n- Typically makes the device **non-compliant** if an Intune compliance policy requires Secure Boot — Conditional Access may then block the user right after enrollment\n\nSecure Boot is usually disabled deliberately in firmware setup (e.g. for imaging, dual-boot or legacy CSM mode) and simply never re-enabled before the device was handed to Autopilot.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Enable Secure Boot in UEFI firmware",
"steps": [
"Reboot into the UEFI firmware setup (typically F2/F10/F12/Del during boot, or Shift+Restart -> Troubleshoot -> UEFI Firmware Settings)",
"Disable Legacy/CSM boot mode if it is active — Secure Boot requires native UEFI boot",
"Enable Secure Boot and ensure the Microsoft UEFI CA keys are selected (factory default key set)",
"Save, reboot and verify in Windows: msinfo32 -> 'Secure Boot State' = On, or PowerShell Confirm-SecureBootUEFI returns True",
"For Hyper-V test VMs: use a Generation 2 VM and enable Secure Boot in the VM's Security settings (template 'Microsoft Windows')"
]
},
{
"title": "Check compliance impact",
"steps": [
"Review Intune compliance policies assigned to this device for a 'Require Secure Boot' setting",
"If the device stays non-compliant, Conditional Access policies may block sign-in — fix firmware settings before user handover"
]
}
],
"relatedDocs": [
{
"title": "Microsoft Learn: Secure Boot",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-secure-boot"
},
{
"title": "Microsoft Learn: Re-enable Secure Boot",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/disabling-secure-boot"
}
],
"tags": [
"security",
"secureboot",
"firmware",
"uefi",
"compliance"
]
}
]
}
+42
View File
@@ -161,3 +161,45 @@ ${flatArray(guardrails.blockedEventLogChannels)}
} else {
console.warn('guardrails.json not found — skipping guardrails generation');
}
// ── MCP rule-authoring module generation ────────────────────────────────────
// The MCP server exposes the rule schemas + guardrails as get_resource content
// so a customer's AI can author rules against the real contract instead of
// retrieval fragments. The server's tsconfig (rootDir: src, no resolveJsonModule)
// and the Docker build (rules/schema not copied) rule out importing the JSON
// directly — so we bake it into a TS module, exactly like the web mirror above.
// CI's guardrails-in-sync job re-runs this script and fails on any diff, which
// makes drift between rules/* and this generated module impossible to merge.
const mcpAuthoringOutput = path.resolve(
rulesRoot, '..', 'src', 'McpServer', 'autopilot-monitor-mcp', 'src', 'rule-authoring.generated.ts'
);
{
const guardrails = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(guardrailsPath, 'utf8'));
const gatherSchema = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(rulesRoot, 'schema', 'gather-rule.schema.json'), 'utf8'));
const analyzeSchema = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(rulesRoot, 'schema', 'analyze-rule.schema.json'), 'utf8'));
const ts = `/**
* AUTO-GENERATED from rules/guardrails.json + rules/schema/*.schema.json — DO NOT EDIT.
* Run: node rules/scripts/combine.js
*
* Consumed by the MCP server's rule-authoring surface (get_resource +
* validate_rule): the JSON Schemas are the validation contract, the guardrails
* are the agent-side collection allowlists. Single source of truth is rules/;
* the CI guardrails-in-sync job guards this file against drift.
*/
/** JSON Schema (2020-12) for gather rules — rules/schema/gather-rule.schema.json verbatim. */
export const GATHER_RULE_SCHEMA: Record<string, unknown> = ${JSON.stringify(gatherSchema, null, 2)};
/** JSON Schema (2020-12) for analyze rules — rules/schema/analyze-rule.schema.json verbatim. */
export const ANALYZE_RULE_SCHEMA: Record<string, unknown> = ${JSON.stringify(analyzeSchema, null, 2)};
/** Gather-rule collection guardrails — rules/guardrails.json verbatim. */
export const RULE_GUARDRAILS = ${JSON.stringify(guardrails, null, 2)} as const;
`;
fs.writeFileSync(mcpAuthoringOutput, ts, 'utf8');
console.log('rule-authoring.generated.ts: schemas + guardrails baked for MCP server');
}
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
# Pester tests (Pester 5+) for the bootstrap guard/relax logic in
# Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1.
#
# The script under test is dot-sourced; its entry guard prevents the bootstrap
# from executing, so loading it here is side-effect free. External state (WMI,
# registry, filesystem, WinRT) is mocked; profile directories are real folders
# under Pester's $TestDrive with a manipulated CreationTimeUtc.
#
# Run under Windows PowerShell 5.1 to match the IME runtime:
# powershell.exe -NoProfile -Command "& { $c = New-PesterConfiguration; $c.Run.Path = 'scripts\Bootstrap'; $c.Output.Verbosity = 'Detailed'; Invoke-Pester -Configuration $c }"
#
# This file MUST remain pure ASCII (PS 5.1 reads BOM-less files as ANSI).
BeforeAll {
. (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')
function New-FakeProfile {
param([string]$Name, [double]$AgeMinutes)
$p = Join-Path $TestDrive $Name
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $p -Force | Out-Null
(Get-Item $p).CreationTimeUtc = (Get-Date).ToUniversalTime().AddMinutes(-$AgeMinutes)
return $p
}
}
Describe 'Test-IsCloudPc' {
# Local WMI on a Cloud PC is generic ('Virtual Machine'), so detection rests on
# the Windows365 registry key AND the CloudManagedDesktopExtension service
# (both required).
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Log { }
Mock Get-CimInstance { [pscustomobject]@{ Manufacturer = 'Microsoft Corporation'; Model = 'Virtual Machine' } }
}
It 'detects a Cloud PC when both markers are present' {
Mock Test-Path { $true } -ParameterFilter { $Path -eq 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows365' }
Mock Get-Service { [pscustomobject]@{ Name = 'CloudManagedDesktopExtension'; Status = 'Running' } }
Test-IsCloudPc | Should -BeTrue
}
It 'does not detect with the registry key alone (e.g. W365-Boot physical client)' {
Mock Test-Path { $true } -ParameterFilter { $Path -eq 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows365' }
Mock Get-Service { $null }
Test-IsCloudPc | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'does not detect with the service alone' {
Mock Test-Path { $false } -ParameterFilter { $Path -eq 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows365' }
Mock Get-Service { [pscustomobject]@{ Name = 'CloudManagedDesktopExtension'; Status = 'Running' } }
Test-IsCloudPc | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'does not detect a plain device (no markers)' {
Mock Test-Path { $false } -ParameterFilter { $Path -eq 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows365' }
Mock Get-Service { $null }
Test-IsCloudPc | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'still evaluates markers when the WMI identity query fails' {
Mock Get-CimInstance { throw 'RPC server unavailable' }
Mock Test-Path { $true } -ParameterFilter { $Path -eq 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows365' }
Mock Get-Service { [pscustomobject]@{ Name = 'CloudManagedDesktopExtension'; Status = 'Running' } }
Test-IsCloudPc | Should -BeTrue
}
}
Describe 'Get-OobeState' {
It 'returns a non-empty state string and never throws' {
Get-OobeState | Should -Not -BeNullOrEmpty
}
}
Describe 'Get-RealUserProfilePaths' {
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Log { }
}
It 'merges WMI and filesystem views, drops special/system profiles, dedupes' {
Mock Get-CimInstance {
@(
[pscustomobject]@{ Special = $false; LocalPath = 'C:\Users\UserOne' }
[pscustomobject]@{ Special = $true; LocalPath = 'C:\Users\systemprofile' }
[pscustomobject]@{ Special = $false; LocalPath = 'D:\Profiles\Elsewhere' }
)
}
Mock Get-ChildItem {
@(
[pscustomobject]@{ FullName = 'C:\Users\UserOne' }
[pscustomobject]@{ FullName = 'C:\Users\Public' }
[pscustomobject]@{ FullName = 'C:\Users\defaultuser0' }
[pscustomobject]@{ FullName = 'C:\Users\WDAGUtilityAccount' }
)
}
$result = @(Get-RealUserProfilePaths)
$result | Should -Be @('C:\Users\UserOne')
}
It 'falls back to the filesystem view when the WMI query fails' {
Mock Get-CimInstance { throw 'WMI broken' }
Mock Get-ChildItem {
@(
[pscustomobject]@{ FullName = 'C:\Users\SomeUser' }
[pscustomobject]@{ FullName = 'C:\Users\Default' }
)
}
$result = @(Get-RealUserProfilePaths)
$result | Should -Be @('C:\Users\SomeUser')
}
It 'returns an empty result when only special/system profiles exist' {
Mock Get-CimInstance { @() }
Mock Get-ChildItem {
@(
[pscustomobject]@{ FullName = 'C:\Users\Public' }
[pscustomobject]@{ FullName = 'C:\Users\defaultuser1' }
)
}
@(Get-RealUserProfilePaths).Count | Should -Be 0
}
}
Describe 'Get-RelaxDecision' {
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Log { }
# Defaults: physical device, OOBE long done. Individual tests override.
Mock Get-OobeState { 'Completed' }
Mock Test-IsCloudPc { $false }
}
Context 'Windows 365 Cloud PC' {
BeforeEach {
Mock Test-IsCloudPc { $true }
}
It 'relaxes for a single fresh profile although OOBE is Completed (first connect)' {
$p = New-FakeProfile 'CloudPcUser' 0.6
$d = Get-RelaxDecision -ProfilePaths @($p) -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15
$d.Active | Should -BeTrue
$d.IsCloudPc | Should -BeTrue
}
It 'does not relax for an old profile (productive Cloud PC)' {
$p = New-FakeProfile 'CloudPcUser' 30
(Get-RelaxDecision -ProfilePaths @($p) -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15).Active | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'does not relax for two profiles' {
$p1 = New-FakeProfile 'UserA' 2
$p2 = New-FakeProfile 'UserB' 400
(Get-RelaxDecision -ProfilePaths @($p1, $p2) -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15).Active | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'relaxes even when the WinRT OOBE API is unavailable (old build)' {
Mock Get-OobeState { 'Unavailable' }
$p = New-FakeProfile 'CpcUser' 1
(Get-RelaxDecision -ProfilePaths @($p) -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15).Active | Should -BeTrue
}
It 'does not relax for a profile with a future creation time (clock skew)' {
$p = New-FakeProfile 'SkewUser' -10
(Get-RelaxDecision -ProfilePaths @($p) -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15).Active | Should -BeFalse
}
}
Context 'OOBE InProgress (Windows Backup for Organizations)' {
It 'relaxes for a single fresh profile during OOBE' {
Mock Get-OobeState { 'InProgress' }
$p = New-FakeProfile 'RestoreUser' 3
$d = Get-RelaxDecision -ProfilePaths @($p) -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15
$d.Active | Should -BeTrue
}
}
Context 'no trigger' {
It 'does not relax on a physical device with a fresh profile and OOBE Completed' {
$p = New-FakeProfile 'SomeUser' 2
(Get-RelaxDecision -ProfilePaths @($p) -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15).Active | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'stays inactive with no profiles at all' {
(Get-RelaxDecision -ProfilePaths @() -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15).Active | Should -BeFalse
}
}
}
Describe 'Get-BootstrapDecision' {
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Log { }
# Baseline: clean device during Device ESP -- no marker, no profiles, no
# logged-on user, 1h uptime, agent not installed. Tests override selectively.
Mock Get-ItemProperty { $null }
Mock Get-RealUserProfilePaths { @() }
Mock Get-OobeState { 'Completed' }
Mock Test-IsCloudPc { $false }
Mock Get-CimInstance { [pscustomobject]@{ LastBootUpTime = (Get-Date).AddHours(-1) } } -ParameterFilter { $ClassName -eq 'Win32_OperatingSystem' }
$script:cleanAgentBin = Join-Path $TestDrive 'AgentBin'
}
It 'installs on a clean ESP device' {
$d = Get-BootstrapDecision -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 12 -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15 -AgentBinPath $script:cleanAgentBin
$d.Install | Should -BeTrue
$d.ReasonCode | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
$d.RelaxActive | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'skips when the Deployed marker exists (guard 1)' {
Mock Get-ItemProperty { [pscustomobject]@{ Deployed = '2026-08-01T10:00:00Z' } } -ParameterFilter { $Path -eq 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor' }
$d = Get-BootstrapDecision -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 12 -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15 -AgentBinPath $script:cleanAgentBin
$d.Install | Should -BeFalse
$d.ReasonCode | Should -Be 'AlreadyDeployed'
}
It 'skips a productive device with an old profile (guard 2)' {
$script:fakeProfile = New-FakeProfile 'OldUser' 5000
Mock Get-RealUserProfilePaths { @($script:fakeProfile) }
$d = Get-BootstrapDecision -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 12 -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15 -AgentBinPath $script:cleanAgentBin
$d.Install | Should -BeFalse
$d.ReasonCode | Should -Be 'ProfilesFound'
}
It 'installs on a freshly provisioned Cloud PC with one fresh profile' {
$script:fakeProfile = New-FakeProfile 'CloudPcUser' 0.6
Mock Get-RealUserProfilePaths { @($script:fakeProfile) }
Mock Test-IsCloudPc { $true }
# First-connect user is already visible in LogonUI on W365 -- must not block either.
Mock Get-ItemProperty { [pscustomobject]@{ LastLoggedOnUser = 'AzureAD\CloudPcUser' } } -ParameterFilter { $Path -like '*LogonUI*' }
$d = Get-BootstrapDecision -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 12 -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15 -AgentBinPath $script:cleanAgentBin
$d.Install | Should -BeTrue
$d.RelaxActive | Should -BeTrue
}
It 'skips when a real user has logged on and no relax applies (guard 3)' {
Mock Get-ItemProperty { [pscustomobject]@{ LastLoggedOnUser = 'AzureAD\SomeUser' } } -ParameterFilter { $Path -like '*LogonUI*' }
$d = Get-BootstrapDecision -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 12 -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15 -AgentBinPath $script:cleanAgentBin
$d.Install | Should -BeFalse
$d.ReasonCode | Should -Be 'LastLoggedOnUser'
}
It 'does not skip for the defaultuser0 OOBE account (guard 3)' {
Mock Get-ItemProperty { [pscustomobject]@{ LastLoggedOnUser = 'defaultuser0' } } -ParameterFilter { $Path -like '*LogonUI*' }
(Get-BootstrapDecision -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 12 -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15 -AgentBinPath $script:cleanAgentBin).Install | Should -BeTrue
}
It 'skips when uptime exceeds the bootstrap window (guard 4)' {
Mock Get-CimInstance { [pscustomobject]@{ LastBootUpTime = (Get-Date).AddHours(-20) } } -ParameterFilter { $ClassName -eq 'Win32_OperatingSystem' }
$d = Get-BootstrapDecision -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 12 -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15 -AgentBinPath $script:cleanAgentBin
$d.Install | Should -BeFalse
$d.ReasonCode | Should -Be 'UptimeExceeded'
}
It 'installs on a Cloud PC despite uptime over the window when the relax is active (guard 4 exemption)' {
# W365 reality: provisioned days ago, running headless ever since; the user's
# first connect just created the profile. Uptime is meaningless here.
$script:fakeProfile = New-FakeProfile 'FirstConnectUser' 0.6
Mock Get-RealUserProfilePaths { @($script:fakeProfile) }
Mock Test-IsCloudPc { $true }
Mock Get-CimInstance { [pscustomobject]@{ LastBootUpTime = (Get-Date).AddHours(-90) } } -ParameterFilter { $ClassName -eq 'Win32_OperatingSystem' }
$d = Get-BootstrapDecision -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 12 -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15 -AgentBinPath $script:cleanAgentBin
$d.Install | Should -BeTrue
$d.RelaxActive | Should -BeTrue
}
It 'still skips an over-uptime Cloud PC when the relax is NOT active (no fresh profile)' {
Mock Test-IsCloudPc { $true }
Mock Get-CimInstance { [pscustomobject]@{ LastBootUpTime = (Get-Date).AddHours(-90) } } -ParameterFilter { $ClassName -eq 'Win32_OperatingSystem' }
$d = Get-BootstrapDecision -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 12 -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15 -AgentBinPath $script:cleanAgentBin
$d.Install | Should -BeFalse
$d.ReasonCode | Should -Be 'UptimeExceeded'
}
It 'keeps guard 4 for the OOBE-restore relax (physical device, uptime is meaningful)' {
$script:fakeProfile = New-FakeProfile 'RestoreUser' 3
Mock Get-RealUserProfilePaths { @($script:fakeProfile) }
Mock Get-OobeState { 'InProgress' }
Mock Get-CimInstance { [pscustomobject]@{ LastBootUpTime = (Get-Date).AddHours(-20) } } -ParameterFilter { $ClassName -eq 'Win32_OperatingSystem' }
$d = Get-BootstrapDecision -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 12 -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15 -AgentBinPath $script:cleanAgentBin
$d.Install | Should -BeFalse
$d.ReasonCode | Should -Be 'UptimeExceeded'
}
It 'skips when the agent binary is already present (guard 5)' {
$binPath = Join-Path $TestDrive 'AgentBinExisting'
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $binPath -Force | Out-Null
Set-Content -Path (Join-Path $binPath 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe') -Value 'stub'
$d = Get-BootstrapDecision -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 12 -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15 -AgentBinPath $binPath
$d.Install | Should -BeFalse
$d.ReasonCode | Should -Be 'AgentPresent'
}
}
Describe 'logging purity' {
# Regression guard: Write-Log runs inside functions that RETURN decision
# objects. If it ever emits to the output stream again (Write-Output), the
# log lines leak into the return values and turn them into arrays. This
# test deliberately does NOT mock Write-Log.
It 'Get-BootstrapDecision returns exactly one object with real logging' {
Mock Get-ItemProperty { [pscustomobject]@{ Deployed = '2026-08-01T10:00:00Z' } } -ParameterFilter { $Path -eq 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor' }
# Plain local assignment: PowerShell's dynamic scoping makes Write-Log
# (called from Get-BootstrapDecision) resolve this $LogFile instead of
# the ProgramData path defined by the dot-sourced script.
$LogFile = Join-Path $TestDrive 'bootstrap_test.log'
$d = @(Get-BootstrapDecision -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 12 -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes 15 -AgentBinPath (Join-Path $TestDrive 'NoAgent'))
$d.Count | Should -Be 1
$d[0].ReasonCode | Should -Be 'AlreadyDeployed'
Get-Content $LogFile -Raw | Should -Match 'SKIP: Agent was previously deployed'
}
}
+335 -210
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,9 @@
Designed to be deployed via Intune as a PowerShell Script during Autopilot.
Runs very early in the enrollment process (first Intune action) and:
1. Runs pre-flight guards to skip productive devices and ghost re-installs.
An OOBE-relax exemption allows install when a single freshly-created profile
appears DURING OOBE (the "Windows Backup for Organizations" restore case).
A relax exemption allows install when a single freshly-created profile
appears DURING OOBE (Windows Backup for Organizations restore) or on a
freshly provisioned Windows 365 Cloud PC.
2. Downloads the monitoring agent ZIP from Azure Blob Storage
3. Verifies integrity via SHA-256 hash from the version manifest (mandatory)
4. Extracts the agent into %ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor\Agent
@@ -15,14 +16,27 @@
6. Verifies the runtime process actually launched
Agent self-destructs when enrollment completes.
OOBE-relax flow (guards 2+3): a real user profile (or a real LastLoggedOnUser)
normally means "productive -> skip". Windows Backup for Organizations breaks that
by restoring settings and creating ONE profile while still in OOBE. We relax guards
2+3 ONLY when all three positives hold, and nothing else:
(a) the OS positively reports OOBE InProgress (Test-OobeInProgress), AND
(b) there is exactly ONE real user profile, AND
(c) that profile was created within $OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes minutes.
Any miss keeps the original skip (SKIP-safe: we never install on uncertainty).
Relax flow (guards 2+3): a real user profile (or a real LastLoggedOnUser)
normally means "productive -> skip". Two legitimate flows break that assumption:
(1) Windows Backup for Organizations: one user signs in + restores DURING OOBE.
Trigger: the OS positively reports OOBE InProgress.
(2) Windows 365 Cloud PC: W365 provisions headless -- OOBE and Intune enrollment
complete before any user ever connects, so OOBE is never InProgress when
this script runs. The assigned user's profile is created at first connect,
typically seconds before Intune pulls this script. Trigger: the device
positively identifies as a Cloud PC via TWO local markers (both required):
the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows365 registry key AND the
CloudManagedDesktopExtension service.
Either trigger relaxes guards 2+3 ONLY when additionally:
(a) there is exactly ONE real user profile, AND
(b) that profile was created within $OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes minutes.
The Cloud PC trigger additionally exempts guard 4 (uptime window) -- see
.PARAMETER MaxBootstrapWindowHours. Any miss keeps the original skip
(SKIP-safe: we never install on uncertainty). On productive devices the
profile is old, so (b) keeps skipping correctly.
.PARAMETER AgentDownloadUrl
URL to download the agent ZIP from. Defaults to the production download endpoint;
@@ -36,11 +50,14 @@
Maximum device uptime (hours) within which the bootstrap is still considered
valid. Devices booted more than this many hours ago are skipped because we no
longer trust their OOBE state. Default: 12.
Not applied while the Cloud PC relax is active: a Cloud PC runs headless for
days between provisioning and the user's first connect, so the fresh-profile
window (OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes) is the time anchor there, not boot uptime.
.PARAMETER OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes
Maximum age (minutes) of the single profile that may appear during OOBE for the
OOBE-relax exemption to apply. The restore->bootstrap gap is always minutes; an
older profile is treated as a productive device. Default: 15.
Maximum age (minutes) of the single profile that may appear for the relax
exemption to apply. The restore/first-connect -> bootstrap gap is always
minutes; an older profile is treated as a productive device. Default: 15.
.NOTES
- Agent is temporary and auto-removes after enrollment.
@@ -50,12 +67,24 @@
- Scheduled Task survives reboots during enrollment.
- OOBE detection uses Windows.System.Profile.SystemSetupInfo.OutOfBoxExperienceState.
Requires Windows 10, version 1809 (introduced in 10.0.17763.0). Older builds lack
the class -> Test-OobeInProgress returns $false -> original (skip) behaviour. Docs:
the class -> state reads as 'Unavailable' -> original (skip) behaviour. Docs:
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/uwp/api/windows.system.profile.systemsetupinfo
- Guard/relax logic lives in functions; the script only executes when run
directly. Dot-sourcing it (as the Pester suite in
Install-AutopilotMonitor.Tests.ps1 does) loads the functions without side effects.
- This script MUST remain pure ASCII (no Unicode/UTF-8 special chars).
PowerShell 5.1 (IME) reads scripts without BOM as ANSI, corrupting multi-byte chars.
.CHANGELOG
2026-08-08 v2.3 Windows 365 Cloud PC support: a positively identified Cloud PC
(Windows365 registry key AND CloudManagedDesktopExtension
service) now triggers the guard 2+3 relax alongside OOBE
InProgress; the single-fresh-profile conditions are unchanged
and guard 4 (uptime window) is exempted for Cloud PCs.
Raw OOBE state and Cloud PC marker states are now logged.
Guard/relax logic refactored into functions with a dot-source
entry guard so the Pester suite can test it without executing
the bootstrap; behaviour when run directly is unchanged.
2026-07-20 v2.2 Switched default download endpoint from the legacy blob
(autopilotmonitor.blob.core.windows.net) to the Front Door alias
https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/ (route /agent/*).
@@ -97,7 +126,7 @@ param(
)
# Script version (bump on meaningful changes; see .CHANGELOG above)
$ScriptVersion = "2.2"
$ScriptVersion = "2.3"
# Configuration - Everything in ProgramData for easy cleanup
$AgentBasePath = "$env:ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor"
@@ -105,89 +134,151 @@ $AgentBinPath = "$AgentBasePath\Agent"
$AgentLogPath = "$AgentBasePath\Logs"
$LogFile = "$AgentLogPath\bootstrap_agent.log"
New-Item -Path $AgentBasePath -ItemType Directory -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null
New-Item -Path $AgentBinPath -ItemType Directory -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null
New-Item -Path $AgentLogPath -ItemType Directory -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null
# Write-Host (NOT Write-Output): log calls happen inside functions that return
# decision objects; Write-Output would leak every log line into those return values.
function Write-Log {
param([string]$Message)
$timestamp = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
$logMessage = "[$timestamp] $Message"
Write-Output $logMessage
Write-Host $logMessage
Add-Content -Path $LogFile -Value $logMessage -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}
# Positive OOBE check via the documented WinRT API
# Raw OOBE state via the documented WinRT API
# Windows.System.Profile.SystemSetupInfo.OutOfBoxExperienceState.
# Returns $true ONLY when the OS reports InProgress. Any other state (Completed/NotStarted),
# an older OS without the class (< Win10 1809 / 10.0.17763.0), or any error returns $false
# Returns the state string (InProgress/Completed/NotStarted). An older OS without the
# class (< Win10 1809 / 10.0.17763.0) or any error returns 'Unavailable'
# -> SKIP-safe (we never relax a guard on uncertainty).
# Docs: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/uwp/api/windows.system.profile.systemsetupinfo
function Test-OobeInProgress {
function Get-OobeState {
try {
$null = [Windows.System.Profile.SystemSetupInfo, Windows.System.Profile, ContentType = WindowsRuntime]
return ([Windows.System.Profile.SystemSetupInfo]::OutOfBoxExperienceState).ToString() -eq 'InProgress'
return ([Windows.System.Profile.SystemSetupInfo]::OutOfBoxExperienceState).ToString()
}
catch {
return 'Unavailable'
}
}
# Positive Windows 365 Cloud PC detection. Local WMI/SMBIOS on a Cloud PC only
# reports the generic Manufacturer='Microsoft Corporation' / Model='Virtual Machine',
# so identification uses two W365-specific markers instead. BOTH are required (AND):
# each alone has look-alikes (e.g. W365 Boot physical clients, other managed-desktop
# agents). Identity and marker states are logged for diagnosis; any error returns
# $false (SKIP-safe).
function Test-IsCloudPc {
try {
$cs = Get-CimInstance Win32_ComputerSystem -ErrorAction Stop
Write-Log "Computer identity: Manufacturer='$($cs.Manufacturer)' Model='$($cs.Model)'."
}
catch { Write-Log "INFO: computer identity query failed: $($_.Exception.Message)" }
try {
$regMarker = Test-Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows365'
$svcMarker = $null -ne (Get-Service -Name 'CloudManagedDesktopExtension' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
Write-Log "Cloud PC markers: Windows365 registry key=$regMarker; CloudManagedDesktopExtension service=$svcMarker."
return ($regMarker -and $svcMarker)
}
catch {
Write-Log "INFO: Cloud PC marker check failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
return $false
}
}
try {
Write-Log "===== Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap Started ====="
Write-Log "Bootstrap script version: v$ScriptVersion"
# Collects real (non-special) user profiles as full paths (WMI Special flag + filesystem).
# NOTE: callers MUST wrap the result in @(...). PowerShell unrolls function output, so an
# empty result returns $null and a single path returns a scalar string, whose [0] indexer
# would yield its first char ('C') instead of the full path.
function Get-RealUserProfilePaths {
$excludePattern = '^(defaultuser\d*|Public|Default( User)?|All Users|WDAGUtilityAccount)$'
@(
try {
Get-CimInstance Win32_UserProfile -ErrorAction Stop |
Where-Object { -not $_.Special -and $_.LocalPath -like 'C:\Users\*' } |
ForEach-Object { $_.LocalPath }
} catch { Write-Log "INFO: WMI profile query failed, continuing with filesystem check." }
(Get-ChildItem 'C:\Users' -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).FullName
) | Where-Object { $_ -and (Split-Path $_ -Leaf) -notmatch $excludePattern } |
Select-Object -Unique
}
# Relax: the ONLY exemption to guards 2+3. Two triggers (see .DESCRIPTION):
# (1) OOBE InProgress -> Windows Backup for Organizations restore
# (2) Cloud PC identity -> Windows 365 (headless OOBE, profile at first connect)
# Either trigger additionally requires: exactly one real profile AND that profile
# created < $OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes minutes ago. Any miss keeps the original skip.
# Returns an object with: Active (bool), OobeState (string), IsCloudPc (bool).
function Get-RelaxDecision {
param(
[string[]]$ProfilePaths,
[int]$OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes
)
if ($null -eq $ProfilePaths) { $ProfilePaths = @() }
$relaxActive = $false
$oobeState = Get-OobeState
$oobeInProgress = ($oobeState -eq 'InProgress')
$isCloudPc = Test-IsCloudPc
if ($isCloudPc) {
Write-Log "Cloud PC detected (OOBE state: $oobeState)."
}
$relaxTrigger = $null
if ($oobeInProgress) {
$relaxTrigger = "OOBE InProgress (Windows Backup restore case)"
} elseif ($isCloudPc) {
$relaxTrigger = "Cloud PC (headless provisioning, OOBE state: $oobeState)"
}
if ($ProfilePaths.Count -eq 1 -and $relaxTrigger) {
try {
$created = (Get-Item -LiteralPath $ProfilePaths[0] -Force -ErrorAction Stop).CreationTimeUtc
$ageMin = ((Get-Date).ToUniversalTime() - $created).TotalMinutes
if ($ageMin -ge 0 -and $ageMin -lt $OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes) {
$relaxActive = $true
Write-Log ("Relax active: {0} + single profile created {1:N1}min ago (< {2}min). Guards 2+3 relaxed." -f $relaxTrigger, $ageMin, $OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes)
} else {
Write-Log ("Relax NOT applied: {0} + single profile '{1}', but profile created {2:N1}min ago (created {3:u}) is outside the [0, {4})min window." -f $relaxTrigger, (Split-Path $ProfilePaths[0] -Leaf), $ageMin, $created, $OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes)
}
} catch { Write-Log "INFO: profile age check failed; relax not applied. $($_.Exception.Message)" }
} elseif ($ProfilePaths.Count -eq 1) {
Write-Log "Relax NOT applied: single profile present but neither OOBE InProgress nor Cloud PC (OOBE state: $oobeState)."
} elseif ($ProfilePaths.Count -gt 1) {
Write-Log ("Relax NOT applied: {0} real profiles present (relax requires exactly one). OOBE state: {1}; CloudPC: {2}." -f $ProfilePaths.Count, $oobeState, $isCloudPc)
}
return [pscustomobject]@{
Active = $relaxActive
OobeState = $oobeState
IsCloudPc = $isCloudPc
}
}
# Runs pre-flight guards 1-5 and returns the install decision WITHOUT side effects
# beyond logging. Returns an object with:
# Install (bool), ReasonCode (null | AlreadyDeployed | ProfilesFound |
# LastLoggedOnUser | UptimeExceeded | AgentPresent), RelaxActive (bool).
function Get-BootstrapDecision {
param(
[int]$MaxBootstrapWindowHours,
[int]$OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes,
[string]$AgentBinPath
)
# Guard 1: Agent was already deployed on this device (registry marker survives self-destruct)
$deployed = (Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor' -Name 'Deployed' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Deployed
if ($deployed) {
Write-Log "SKIP: Agent was previously deployed at $deployed."
exit 0
return [pscustomobject]@{ Install = $false; ReasonCode = 'AlreadyDeployed'; RelaxActive = $false }
}
# Collect real (non-special) user profiles as full paths (WMI Special flag + filesystem).
$excludePattern = '^(defaultuser\d*|Public|Default( User)?|All Users|WDAGUtilityAccount)$'
# NOTE: the outer @() is required. Without it the trailing Where/Select pipeline
# unwraps a single result back to a scalar string, so $profilePaths[0] would index
# into the string and return its first char ('C') instead of the full path.
$profilePaths = @(
@(
try {
Get-CimInstance Win32_UserProfile -ErrorAction Stop |
Where-Object { -not $_.Special -and $_.LocalPath -like 'C:\Users\*' } |
ForEach-Object { $_.LocalPath }
} catch { Write-Log "INFO: WMI profile query failed, continuing with filesystem check." }
(Get-ChildItem 'C:\Users' -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).FullName
) | Where-Object { $_ -and (Split-Path $_ -Leaf) -notmatch $excludePattern } |
Select-Object -Unique
)
# OOBE-relax: the ONLY exemption to guards 2+3. Matches exactly the Windows Backup for
# Organizations restore (one user signs in + restores DURING OOBE). All three must hold:
# OOBE InProgress AND exactly one profile AND that profile created < N minutes ago.
$oobeRelax = $false
$oobeInProgress = Test-OobeInProgress
if ($profilePaths.Count -eq 1 -and $oobeInProgress) {
try {
$created = (Get-Item -LiteralPath $profilePaths[0] -Force -ErrorAction Stop).CreationTimeUtc
$ageMin = ((Get-Date).ToUniversalTime() - $created).TotalMinutes
if ($ageMin -ge 0 -and $ageMin -lt $OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes) {
$oobeRelax = $true
Write-Log ("OOBE-relax active: OOBE InProgress + single profile created {0:N1}min ago (< {1}min). Guards 2+3 relaxed (Windows Backup restore case)." -f $ageMin, $OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes)
} else {
Write-Log ("OOBE-relax NOT applied: OOBE InProgress + single profile '{0}', but profile created {1:N1}min ago (created {2:u}) is outside the [0, {3})min window." -f (Split-Path $profilePaths[0] -Leaf), $ageMin, $created, $OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes)
}
} catch { Write-Log "INFO: profile age check failed; OOBE-relax not applied. $($_.Exception.Message)" }
} elseif ($profilePaths.Count -eq 1 -and -not $oobeInProgress) {
Write-Log "OOBE-relax NOT applied: single profile present but OutOfBoxExperienceState != InProgress (OOBE already finished / not detectable)."
} elseif ($profilePaths.Count -gt 1) {
Write-Log ("OOBE-relax NOT applied: {0} real profiles present (relax requires exactly one)." -f $profilePaths.Count)
}
# The @() wrap is required, see NOTE on Get-RealUserProfilePaths.
$profilePaths = @(Get-RealUserProfilePaths)
$relax = Get-RelaxDecision -ProfilePaths $profilePaths -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes $OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes
# Guard 2: No real user profile should exist yet (primary productive-device guard),
# unless the OOBE-relax signature holds.
if ($profilePaths.Count -gt 0 -and -not $oobeRelax) {
# unless the relax signature holds.
if ($profilePaths.Count -gt 0 -and -not $relax.Active) {
$details = (($profilePaths | ForEach-Object {
$leaf = Split-Path $_ -Leaf
try {
@@ -195,26 +286,33 @@ try {
"{0} (created {1:u}, {2:N1}min ago)" -f $leaf, $c, ((Get-Date).ToUniversalTime() - $c).TotalMinutes
} catch { "$leaf (age unknown)" }
}) | Select-Object -First 3) -join '; '
Write-Log "SKIP: Real user profile(s) found ($details). OOBE InProgress=$oobeInProgress. Device appears productive."
exit 0
Write-Log "SKIP: Real user profile(s) found ($details). OOBE state: $($relax.OobeState). CloudPC: $($relax.IsCloudPc). Device appears productive."
return [pscustomobject]@{ Install = $false; ReasonCode = 'ProfilesFound'; RelaxActive = $false }
}
# Guard 3: LastLoggedOnUser - during Device ESP no real user has logged on yet
# (same OOBE-relax exemption: the restoring user signs in during OOBE).
# (same relax exemption: the restoring/first-connect user signs in legitimately).
$lastLoggedOnUser = (Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Authentication\LogonUI' -Name 'LastLoggedOnUser' -EA SilentlyContinue).LastLoggedOnUser
if ($lastLoggedOnUser -and $lastLoggedOnUser -notmatch 'defaultuser\d*' -and -not $oobeRelax) {
if ($lastLoggedOnUser -and $lastLoggedOnUser -notmatch 'defaultuser\d*' -and -not $relax.Active) {
Write-Log "SKIP: LastLoggedOnUser found ($lastLoggedOnUser). Device appears productive."
exit 0
return [pscustomobject]@{ Install = $false; ReasonCode = 'LastLoggedOnUser'; RelaxActive = $false }
}
# Guard 4: Bootstrap window check - device uptime must be within accepted OOBE window.
# Sleep/standby does not reset uptime, only real boot/restart does.
# Exempted while the Cloud PC relax is active: a Cloud PC runs headless from
# provisioning until the user's first connect (often days), so boot uptime says
# nothing there -- the fresh-profile window of the relax is the time anchor.
$lastBoot = (Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem).LastBootUpTime
$uptimeHours = ((Get-Date) - $lastBoot).TotalHours
Write-Log "Device uptime: $([int]$uptimeHours)h (last boot: $lastBoot)"
if ($uptimeHours -gt $MaxBootstrapWindowHours) {
Write-Log "SKIP: Device uptime is $([int]$uptimeHours)h. OOBE state is older than accepted bootstrap window of ${MaxBootstrapWindowHours}h."
exit 0
if ($relax.Active -and $relax.IsCloudPc) {
Write-Log "Uptime $([int]$uptimeHours)h exceeds the ${MaxBootstrapWindowHours}h window, but the Cloud PC relax is active (fresh first-connect profile is the time anchor). Continuing."
} else {
Write-Log "SKIP: Device uptime is $([int]$uptimeHours)h. OOBE state is older than accepted bootstrap window of ${MaxBootstrapWindowHours}h."
return [pscustomobject]@{ Install = $false; ReasonCode = 'UptimeExceeded'; RelaxActive = $relax.Active }
}
}
# Guard 5: Is the agent already installed? (leftover from previous run)
@@ -222,148 +320,175 @@ try {
$existingAgent = Get-ChildItem -Path $AgentBinPath -Filter "AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($existingAgent) {
Write-Log "SKIP: Agent already installed at $($existingAgent.FullName)."
return [pscustomobject]@{ Install = $false; ReasonCode = 'AgentPresent'; RelaxActive = $relax.Active }
}
}
return [pscustomobject]@{ Install = $true; ReasonCode = $null; RelaxActive = $relax.Active }
}
# Main bootstrap flow. Only invoked when the script is run directly (see entry guard
# at the bottom); never on dot-source.
function Invoke-Bootstrap {
try {
New-Item -Path $AgentBasePath -ItemType Directory -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null
New-Item -Path $AgentBinPath -ItemType Directory -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null
New-Item -Path $AgentLogPath -ItemType Directory -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null
Write-Log "===== Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap Started ====="
Write-Log "Bootstrap script version: v$ScriptVersion"
$decision = Get-BootstrapDecision -MaxBootstrapWindowHours $MaxBootstrapWindowHours -OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes $OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes -AgentBinPath $AgentBinPath
if (-not $decision.Install) {
exit 0
}
}
Write-Log "Pre-flight checks passed -- no prior deployment, no productive-device signals, within bootstrap window (oobeRelax=$oobeRelax)"
Write-Log "Pre-flight checks passed -- no prior deployment, no productive-device signals, within bootstrap window (relaxActive=$($decision.RelaxActive))"
# Download and extract agent binaries
$agentExePath = Join-Path $AgentBinPath "AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe"
# Download and extract agent binaries
$agentExePath = Join-Path $AgentBinPath "AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe"
if (Test-Path $agentExePath) {
Write-Log "Agent already installed at $agentExePath"
}
else {
Write-Log "Downloading agent from $AgentDownloadUrl..."
try {
# Derive manifest URL from the agent download URL (same blob container)
$versionJsonUrl = $AgentDownloadUrl -replace '[^/]+$', $VersionJsonName
$expectedSha256 = $null
$manifestAttempts = 3
$manifestDelays = @(1, 2) # short backoff between attempts; do not block enrollment
for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le $manifestAttempts; $attempt++) {
try {
Write-Log "Fetching $VersionJsonName (attempt ${attempt}/${manifestAttempts}) from $versionJsonUrl for integrity verification..."
$versionJsonResponse = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $versionJsonUrl -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 5 -ErrorAction Stop
if ($versionJsonResponse.sha256) {
$expectedSha256 = $versionJsonResponse.sha256.ToLowerInvariant()
Write-Log "SHA-256 hash from manifest: $expectedSha256 (version: $($versionJsonResponse.version))"
} else {
Write-Log "WARNING: Manifest has no sha256 field - integrity cannot be verified."
}
break # manifest reached (with or without hash); retrying would not help
}
catch {
Write-Log "WARNING: Could not fetch integrity manifest (attempt $attempt): $($_.Exception.Message)"
if ($attempt -lt $manifestAttempts) {
Start-Sleep -Seconds $manifestDelays[$attempt - 1]
}
}
}
$zipPath = Join-Path $env:TEMP "AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip"
$maxDownloadAttempts = 3
$downloadAttempt = 0
do {
$downloadAttempt++
try {
Write-Log "Download attempt ${downloadAttempt}/${maxDownloadAttempts}"
$downloadStopwatch = [System.Diagnostics.Stopwatch]::StartNew()
Invoke-WebRequest `
-Uri $AgentDownloadUrl `
-OutFile $zipPath `
-UseBasicParsing `
-TimeoutSec 30 `
-ErrorAction Stop
$downloadStopwatch.Stop()
$downloadSeconds = [math]::Round($downloadStopwatch.Elapsed.TotalSeconds, 1)
Write-Log "Downloaded agent to $zipPath (took ${downloadSeconds}s)"
break
}
catch {
if ($downloadAttempt -ge $maxDownloadAttempts) {
throw
}
$retryDelaysInSeconds = @(2, 4, 8)
$retryDelaySeconds = $retryDelaysInSeconds[$downloadAttempt - 1]
Write-Log "Download failed (attempt $downloadAttempt): $($_.Exception.Message). Retrying in ${retryDelaySeconds}s..."
Start-Sleep -Seconds $retryDelaySeconds
}
} while ($downloadAttempt -lt $maxDownloadAttempts)
# SHA-256 from the version manifest is the only accepted integrity proof.
# No hash -> refuse to install an unverified ZIP (SKIP-safe security posture).
if (-not $expectedSha256) {
throw "No SHA-256 hash available from manifest - refusing to install unverified agent ZIP."
}
$actualSha256 = (Get-FileHash $zipPath -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()
Write-Log "Validating SHA-256 hash against manifest"
if ($actualSha256 -ne $expectedSha256) {
throw "SHA-256 integrity check FAILED. Expected='$expectedSha256', Actual='$actualSha256'. Download may be tampered or corrupted."
}
Write-Log "SHA-256 integrity check passed"
Expand-Archive -Path $zipPath -DestinationPath $AgentBinPath -Force
Write-Log "Extracted agent to $AgentBinPath"
Remove-Item $zipPath -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Write-Log "Cleaned up temporary files"
if (-not (Test-Path $agentExePath)) {
throw "Agent executable not found after extraction at $agentExePath"
}
Write-Log "Agent installation completed successfully"
if (Test-Path $agentExePath) {
Write-Log "Agent already installed at $agentExePath"
}
catch {
Write-Log "ERROR downloading/extracting agent: $($_.Exception.Message)"
throw
else {
Write-Log "Downloading agent from $AgentDownloadUrl..."
try {
# Derive manifest URL from the agent download URL (same blob container)
$versionJsonUrl = $AgentDownloadUrl -replace '[^/]+$', $VersionJsonName
$expectedSha256 = $null
$manifestAttempts = 3
$manifestDelays = @(1, 2) # short backoff between attempts; do not block enrollment
for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le $manifestAttempts; $attempt++) {
try {
Write-Log "Fetching $VersionJsonName (attempt ${attempt}/${manifestAttempts}) from $versionJsonUrl for integrity verification..."
$versionJsonResponse = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $versionJsonUrl -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 5 -ErrorAction Stop
if ($versionJsonResponse.sha256) {
$expectedSha256 = $versionJsonResponse.sha256.ToLowerInvariant()
Write-Log "SHA-256 hash from manifest: $expectedSha256 (version: $($versionJsonResponse.version))"
} else {
Write-Log "WARNING: Manifest has no sha256 field - integrity cannot be verified."
}
break # manifest reached (with or without hash); retrying would not help
}
catch {
Write-Log "WARNING: Could not fetch integrity manifest (attempt $attempt): $($_.Exception.Message)"
if ($attempt -lt $manifestAttempts) {
Start-Sleep -Seconds $manifestDelays[$attempt - 1]
}
}
}
$zipPath = Join-Path $env:TEMP "AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip"
$maxDownloadAttempts = 3
$downloadAttempt = 0
do {
$downloadAttempt++
try {
Write-Log "Download attempt ${downloadAttempt}/${maxDownloadAttempts}"
$downloadStopwatch = [System.Diagnostics.Stopwatch]::StartNew()
Invoke-WebRequest `
-Uri $AgentDownloadUrl `
-OutFile $zipPath `
-UseBasicParsing `
-TimeoutSec 30 `
-ErrorAction Stop
$downloadStopwatch.Stop()
$downloadSeconds = [math]::Round($downloadStopwatch.Elapsed.TotalSeconds, 1)
Write-Log "Downloaded agent to $zipPath (took ${downloadSeconds}s)"
break
}
catch {
if ($downloadAttempt -ge $maxDownloadAttempts) {
throw
}
$retryDelaysInSeconds = @(2, 4, 8)
$retryDelaySeconds = $retryDelaysInSeconds[$downloadAttempt - 1]
Write-Log "Download failed (attempt $downloadAttempt): $($_.Exception.Message). Retrying in ${retryDelaySeconds}s..."
Start-Sleep -Seconds $retryDelaySeconds
}
} while ($downloadAttempt -lt $maxDownloadAttempts)
# SHA-256 from the version manifest is the only accepted integrity proof.
# No hash -> refuse to install an unverified ZIP (SKIP-safe security posture).
if (-not $expectedSha256) {
throw "No SHA-256 hash available from manifest - refusing to install unverified agent ZIP."
}
$actualSha256 = (Get-FileHash $zipPath -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()
Write-Log "Validating SHA-256 hash against manifest"
if ($actualSha256 -ne $expectedSha256) {
throw "SHA-256 integrity check FAILED. Expected='$expectedSha256', Actual='$actualSha256'. Download may be tampered or corrupted."
}
Write-Log "SHA-256 integrity check passed"
Expand-Archive -Path $zipPath -DestinationPath $AgentBinPath -Force
Write-Log "Extracted agent to $AgentBinPath"
Remove-Item $zipPath -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Write-Log "Cleaned up temporary files"
if (-not (Test-Path $agentExePath)) {
throw "Agent executable not found after extraction at $agentExePath"
}
Write-Log "Agent installation completed successfully"
}
catch {
Write-Log "ERROR downloading/extracting agent: $($_.Exception.Message)"
throw
}
}
}
Write-Log "Calling agent install mode (--install)..."
& $agentExePath --install
$installExitCode = $LASTEXITCODE
if ($installExitCode -ne 0) {
throw "Agent install failed with exit code $installExitCode"
}
Write-Log "Agent install mode completed successfully"
Write-Log "Calling agent install mode (--install)..."
& $agentExePath --install
$installExitCode = $LASTEXITCODE
if ($installExitCode -ne 0) {
throw "Agent install failed with exit code $installExitCode"
}
Write-Log "Agent install mode completed successfully"
$runtimeProcessName = 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent'
$verifyTimeoutSec = 10
$verifyDeadline = (Get-Date).AddSeconds($verifyTimeoutSec)
$runtimeProc = $null
while ((Get-Date) -lt $verifyDeadline) {
$runtimeProc = Get-Process -Name $runtimeProcessName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object -First 1
if ($null -ne $runtimeProc) { break }
Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500
}
if ($null -ne $runtimeProc) {
$startedUtc = 'unavailable'
try { $startedUtc = $runtimeProc.StartTime.ToUniversalTime().ToString('o') } catch { }
Write-Log ("Runtime process verified: name={0}.exe pid={1} startedUtc={2}" -f $runtimeProcessName, $runtimeProc.Id, $startedUtc)
} else {
Write-Log ("WARNING: Runtime process verification FAILED. Agent --install reported success but no '{0}.exe' process appeared within {1}s. Likely silent block (AV/EDR, AppLocker/WDAC) of the runtime launch. Agent should still come up at next boot via the BootTrigger task. Check Event Viewer > Microsoft > Windows > TaskScheduler/Operational and AV/EDR logs for '{0}.exe'." -f $runtimeProcessName, $verifyTimeoutSec)
}
$runtimeProcessName = 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent'
$verifyTimeoutSec = 10
$verifyDeadline = (Get-Date).AddSeconds($verifyTimeoutSec)
$runtimeProc = $null
while ((Get-Date) -lt $verifyDeadline) {
$runtimeProc = Get-Process -Name $runtimeProcessName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object -First 1
if ($null -ne $runtimeProc) { break }
Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500
}
if ($null -ne $runtimeProc) {
$startedUtc = 'unavailable'
try { $startedUtc = $runtimeProc.StartTime.ToUniversalTime().ToString('o') } catch { }
Write-Log ("Runtime process verified: name={0}.exe pid={1} startedUtc={2}" -f $runtimeProcessName, $runtimeProc.Id, $startedUtc)
} else {
Write-Log ("WARNING: Runtime process verification FAILED. Agent --install reported success but no '{0}.exe' process appeared within {1}s. Likely silent block (AV/EDR, AppLocker/WDAC) of the runtime launch. Agent should still come up at next boot via the BootTrigger task. Check Event Viewer > Microsoft > Windows > TaskScheduler/Operational and AV/EDR logs for '{0}.exe'." -f $runtimeProcessName, $verifyTimeoutSec)
}
Write-Log "===== Bootstrap Completed Successfully ====="
Write-Log "===== Bootstrap Completed Successfully ====="
exit 0
exit 0
}
catch {
Write-Log "===== Bootstrap FAILED ====="
Write-Log "ERROR: $($_.Exception.Message)"
Write-Log "Stack trace: $($_.ScriptStackTrace)"
Write-Log "Please check log file: $LogFile"
$errMsg = "AutopilotMonitor bootstrap failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
if ($errMsg.Length -gt 2048) { $errMsg = $errMsg.Substring(0, 1045) + '...' }
[Console]::Error.WriteLine($errMsg)
exit 1
}
}
catch {
Write-Log "===== Bootstrap FAILED ====="
Write-Log "ERROR: $($_.Exception.Message)"
Write-Log "Stack trace: $($_.ScriptStackTrace)"
Write-Log "Please check log file: $LogFile"
$errMsg = "AutopilotMonitor bootstrap failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
if ($errMsg.Length -gt 2048) { $errMsg = $errMsg.Substring(0, 1045) + '...' }
[Console]::Error.WriteLine($errMsg)
exit 1
# Entry guard: execute only when run as a script (IME, console). Dot-sourcing
# (". .\Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1", as the Pester suite does) only loads
# the functions above and MUST stay side-effect free.
if ($MyInvocation.InvocationName -ne '.') {
Invoke-Bootstrap
}
+32 -12
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
# Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap Guard Test
# Dry-run only: does not exit, does not install, only reports what WOULD happen.
# Mirrors Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 incl. the OOBE-relax exemption for the
# "Windows Backup for Organizations" restore case (guards 2+3).
# Mirrors Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 (v2.3) incl. the relax exemption for
# guards 2+3, triggered by "Windows Backup for Organizations" (OOBE InProgress)
# or a positively identified Windows 365 Cloud PC, and the guard 4 (uptime)
# exemption while the Cloud PC relax is active.
param(
[string]$AgentBinPath = 'C:\ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor\Agent',
@@ -54,6 +56,12 @@ function Test-OobeInProgress {
}
}
# Positive Windows 365 Cloud PC detection: two local markers, BOTH required (AND),
# because each alone has look-alikes. Mirrors Test-IsCloudPc in the bootstrapper.
$cloudPcRegMarker = Test-Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows365'
$cloudPcSvcMarker = $null -ne (Get-Service -Name 'CloudManagedDesktopExtension' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
$isCloudPc = ($cloudPcRegMarker -and $cloudPcSvcMarker)
$AgentExePath = Join-Path $AgentBinPath 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe'
$MaxBootstrapWindowHours = 12
@@ -104,8 +112,9 @@ if ($wmiProfileQueryFailed) {
$profileNames = $profilePaths | ForEach-Object { Split-Path $_ -Leaf }
# OOBE-relax: the ONLY exemption to guards 2+3. Matches exactly the Windows Backup for
# Organizations restore: OOBE InProgress AND exactly one profile AND that profile fresh.
# Relax: the ONLY exemption to guards 2+3. Two triggers -- OOBE InProgress (Windows
# Backup for Organizations restore) or Cloud PC identity (headless provisioning,
# profile at first connect). Either additionally requires exactly one fresh profile.
$oobeInProgress = Test-OobeInProgress
$profileAgeMin = $null
$oobeRelax = $false
@@ -114,12 +123,13 @@ if ($profilePaths.Count -eq 1) {
$created = (Get-Item -LiteralPath $profilePaths[0] -Force -ErrorAction Stop).CreationTimeUtc
$profileAgeMin = [math]::Round(((Get-Date).ToUniversalTime() - $created).TotalMinutes, 1)
} catch { }
if ($oobeInProgress -and $null -ne $profileAgeMin -and $profileAgeMin -ge 0 -and $profileAgeMin -lt $OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes) {
if (($oobeInProgress -or $isCloudPc) -and $null -ne $profileAgeMin -and $profileAgeMin -ge 0 -and $profileAgeMin -lt $OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes) {
$oobeRelax = $true
}
}
Write-Step -Status 'INFO' -Message "OOBE: OutOfBoxExperienceState InProgress = $oobeInProgress ; profileCount = $($profilePaths.Count) ; singleProfileAgeMin = $profileAgeMin ; OOBE-relax = $oobeRelax"
Write-Step -Status 'INFO' -Message "Cloud PC markers: Windows365 registry key = $cloudPcRegMarker ; CloudManagedDesktopExtension service = $cloudPcSvcMarker ; IsCloudPc = $isCloudPc"
Write-Step -Status 'INFO' -Message "OOBE: OutOfBoxExperienceState InProgress = $oobeInProgress ; profileCount = $($profilePaths.Count) ; singleProfileAgeMin = $profileAgeMin ; relax = $oobeRelax"
# Guard 2: No real user profile should exist yet (unless OOBE-relax holds)
if ($profilePaths.Count -gt 0 -and -not $oobeRelax) {
@@ -129,7 +139,8 @@ if ($profilePaths.Count -gt 0 -and -not $oobeRelax) {
$reasons.Add("Real user profile(s) found: $names")
} elseif ($profilePaths.Count -gt 0 -and $oobeRelax) {
$names = ($profileNames | Select-Object -First 3) -join ', '
Write-Step -Status 'PASS' -Message "Guard 2: Profile ($names) present but OOBE-relax active (single fresh profile in OOBE) -- not blocking."
$trigger = if ($oobeInProgress) { 'OOBE InProgress' } else { 'Cloud PC' }
Write-Step -Status 'PASS' -Message "Guard 2: Profile ($names) present but relax active ($trigger + single fresh profile) -- not blocking."
} else {
Write-Step -Status 'PASS' -Message 'Guard 2: No real user profiles found (combined WMI/filesystem view).'
}
@@ -141,7 +152,7 @@ if ($lastLoggedOnUser -and $lastLoggedOnUser -notmatch 'defaultuser\d*' -and -no
$wouldInstall = $false
$reasons.Add("LastLoggedOnUser found: $lastLoggedOnUser")
} elseif ($lastLoggedOnUser -and $lastLoggedOnUser -notmatch 'defaultuser\d*' -and $oobeRelax) {
Write-Step -Status 'PASS' -Message "Guard 3: LastLoggedOnUser ($lastLoggedOnUser) present but OOBE-relax active -- not blocking."
Write-Step -Status 'PASS' -Message "Guard 3: LastLoggedOnUser ($lastLoggedOnUser) present but relax active -- not blocking."
} else {
Write-Step -Status 'PASS' -Message "Guard 3: No real LastLoggedOnUser (value: '$lastLoggedOnUser')."
}
@@ -155,9 +166,15 @@ try {
$uptimeHours = ((Get-Date) - $lastBoot).TotalHours
if ($uptimeHours -gt $MaxBootstrapWindowHours) {
Write-Step -Status 'SKIP' -Message "Guard 4: Device uptime is $([int]$uptimeHours)h. Older than accepted bootstrap window of ${MaxBootstrapWindowHours}h."
$wouldInstall = $false
$reasons.Add("Uptime exceeds bootstrap window: $([int]$uptimeHours)h > ${MaxBootstrapWindowHours}h")
if ($oobeRelax -and $isCloudPc) {
# Cloud PCs run headless for days before the user's first connect; the
# fresh-profile window is the time anchor there, not boot uptime.
Write-Step -Status 'PASS' -Message "Guard 4: Device uptime is $([int]$uptimeHours)h (over ${MaxBootstrapWindowHours}h), but the Cloud PC relax is active -- not blocking."
} else {
Write-Step -Status 'SKIP' -Message "Guard 4: Device uptime is $([int]$uptimeHours)h. Older than accepted bootstrap window of ${MaxBootstrapWindowHours}h."
$wouldInstall = $false
$reasons.Add("Uptime exceeds bootstrap window: $([int]$uptimeHours)h > ${MaxBootstrapWindowHours}h")
}
} else {
Write-Step -Status 'PASS' -Message "Guard 4: Device uptime is $([int]$uptimeHours)h and within bootstrap window of ${MaxBootstrapWindowHours}h."
}
@@ -202,9 +219,12 @@ Write-Host "Deployed marker : $deployed"
Write-Host "DetectedProfileNames : $($profileNames -join ', ')"
Write-Host "ProfileCount : $($profilePaths.Count)"
Write-Host "OobeInProgress (WinRT) : $oobeInProgress"
Write-Host "CloudPcRegistryMarker : $cloudPcRegMarker"
Write-Host "CloudPcServiceMarker : $cloudPcSvcMarker"
Write-Host "IsCloudPc : $isCloudPc"
Write-Host "SingleProfileAgeMinutes : $profileAgeMin"
Write-Host "OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes : $OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes"
Write-Host "OobeRelaxActive : $oobeRelax"
Write-Host "RelaxActive : $oobeRelax"
Write-Host "LastLoggedOnUser : $lastLoggedOnUser"
Write-Host "MaxBootstrapWindowHours : $MaxBootstrapWindowHours"
Write-Host "LastBootUpTime : $lastBoot"
@@ -23,7 +23,11 @@
One or more high-level feature identifiers. The script translates each to the underlying
Graph permissions. Use this when you don't want to know permission strings.
Available features:
- ScriptDisplayNames -> DeviceManagementScripts.Read.All
- ScriptDisplayNames -> DeviceManagementScripts.Read.All
- W365CloudPcValidation -> CloudPC.Read.All
(validates Windows 365 Cloud PCs against the tenant's Cloud PC inventory --
Cloud PCs are never Autopilot-registered, so this enables agent monitoring
of Cloud PC first-connect enrollment)
.PARAMETER Permissions
Microsoft Graph application permission names to grant directly. Use when the admin UI
@@ -76,7 +80,7 @@ param(
[string]$ClientId,
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true, ParameterSetName = 'ByFeatures')]
[ValidateSet('ScriptDisplayNames')]
[ValidateSet('ScriptDisplayNames', 'W365CloudPcValidation')]
[string[]]$Features,
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true, ParameterSetName = 'ByPermissions')]
@@ -97,7 +101,8 @@ $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
# ---- Feature -> Graph permission catalog -----------------------------------
# Keep in lock-step with src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Models/Graph/GraphFeatureCatalog.cs
$FeatureCatalog = @{
'ScriptDisplayNames' = @('DeviceManagementScripts.Read.All')
'ScriptDisplayNames' = @('DeviceManagementScripts.Read.All')
'W365CloudPcValidation' = @('CloudPC.Read.All')
}
# Translate Features -> Permissions when caller used the high-level form.
@@ -94,6 +94,21 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Logging
Assert.Equal("older-002\n", File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(tmp.Path, TodayBaseName + "_002.log")));
}
[Fact]
public void Log_transliterates_typographic_punctuation_to_ascii()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var logger = new AgentLogger(tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info, maxFileSizeBytes: 1024L * 1024);
// The log file is UTF-8 without BOM; cp1252-guessing viewers (Outlook web
// preview) render em dashes as mojibake. Our own punctuation must come out
// as plain ASCII, while genuine non-ASCII payload stays untouched.
logger.Info("check failed \u2014 range 1\u20132 \u2192 done\u2026 \u2018a\u2019 \u201Cb\u201D nb\u00A0sp f\u00FCr M\u00FCller");
var text = File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(tmp.Path, TodayBaseName + ".log"));
Assert.Contains("check failed - range 1-2 -> done... 'a' \"b\" nb sp f\u00FCr M\u00FCller", text);
}
[Fact]
public void Log_swallows_io_errors_silently()
{
@@ -308,9 +308,52 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Gather
[InlineData("SELECT * FROM Win32_UserAccount")]
[InlineData("SELECT * FROM Win32_ShadowCopy")]
[InlineData("SELECT * FROM Win32_OperatingSystemExtra")] // prefix spoofing
[InlineData("SELECT Name FROM Win32_Process")] // projection of a disallowed class
[InlineData("SELECT BatteryStatus FROM Win32_BatteryX")] // class spoofing via projection
public void WmiCollector_OffAllowlistQuery_IsBlockedBeforeTheQueryRuns(string query)
=> AssertBlocked(new WmiCollector().Execute(Rule("wmi", query), Context()), query);
// -------------------------------------------------------------------
// WMI query matcher: "SELECT <* | property-list> FROM <allowed class>"
//
// Guard-level (no WMI touched): a property projection of an allowed class
// exposes a strict subset of the already-allowed SELECT *, so it is admitted.
// -------------------------------------------------------------------
[Theory]
[InlineData("SELECT * FROM Win32_Battery")] // legacy form unchanged
[InlineData("SELECT * FROM Win32_BIOS WHERE PrimaryBIOS = TRUE")] // legacy + WHERE
[InlineData("SELECT BatteryStatus FROM Win32_Battery")]
[InlineData("SELECT BatteryStatus, EstimatedChargeRemaining FROM Win32_Battery")]
[InlineData("select batterystatus from win32_battery")] // case-insensitive
[InlineData("SELECT\tBatteryStatus\tFROM\tWin32_Battery")] // tabs as separators
[InlineData(" SELECT BatteryStatus FROM Win32_Battery ")] // surrounding whitespace
[InlineData("SELECT BatteryStatus,EstimatedChargeRemaining FROM Win32_Battery")] // no space after comma
[InlineData("SELECT Status FROM Win32_Battery WHERE BatteryStatus = 1")] // projection + WHERE
public void WmiGuard_ProjectionOfAllowedClass_IsAllowed(string query)
=> Assert.True(GatherRuleGuards.IsWmiQueryAllowed(query));
[Theory]
[InlineData("SELECT Name FROM Win32_Process")] // class not on the allowlist
[InlineData("SELECT BatteryStatus FROM Win32_BatteryX")] // class spoofing
[InlineData("SELECT * FROM Win32_BatteryX")]
[InlineData("SELECT *, Name FROM Win32_BIOS")] // star mixed into a property list
[InlineData("SELECT FROM Win32_BIOS")] // empty property list
[InlineData("SELECT BatteryStatus FROM")] // missing class
[InlineData("SELECT BatteryStatus FROM Win32_Battery;DROP")] // non-whitespace boundary after class
[InlineData("SELECT BatteryStatus, FROM Win32_Battery")] // trailing comma
[InlineData("")]
public void WmiGuard_MalformedOrDisallowedQuery_IsBlocked(string query)
=> Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsWmiQueryAllowed(query));
[Fact]
public void WmiGuard_NullQuery_IsBlocked()
=> Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsWmiQueryAllowed(null));
[Fact]
public void WmiGuard_UnrestrictedMode_AllowsAnyQuery()
=> Assert.True(GatherRuleGuards.IsWmiQueryAllowed("SELECT Name FROM Win32_Process", unrestrictedMode: true));
[Fact]
public void JsonCollector_UserProfilePath_IsBlockedBeforeTheFileIsOpened()
{
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
using System;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Logging;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
@@ -92,6 +92,27 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
Assert.InRange(entry.Timestamp, before.AddSeconds(-5), after.AddSeconds(5));
}
// ── UTC-bias suffix on the time field → honored, not dropped ──────────
[Theory]
[InlineData("+480", 8 * 60)] // PST writer (UTC-8): UTC = local + 480min
[InlineData("-060", -60)] // UTC+1 writer: UTC = local - 60min
public void TryParseLine_applies_utc_bias_suffix(string bias, int expectedOffsetMinutes)
{
// Session df1fcf47: a writer whose timezone differs from the agent's stamped its
// lines with an explicit bias. Without bias handling the line either failed to
// match at all (old regex) or would be misread in agent-local time.
var line = CmTraceLine("msg", "11:46:19.0226610" + bias, "7-29-2026");
var ok = CmTraceLogParser.TryParseLine(line, out var entry);
Assert.True(ok);
Assert.Equal(
new DateTime(2026, 7, 29, 11, 46, 19, DateTimeKind.Utc).AddTicks(226610).AddMinutes(expectedOffsetMinutes),
entry.Timestamp);
Assert.Equal(DateTimeKind.Utc, entry.Timestamp.Kind);
}
// ── Oversized line → parses, no throw, no truncation of the message ───
[Fact]
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
public ISignalIngressSink? CapturedIngress { get; private set; }
public IClock? CapturedClock { get; private set; }
public AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Transport.Telemetry.ITelemetrySpool? CapturedTelemetrySpool { get; private set; }
public TimelineEventStream? CapturedTimelineEvents { get; private set; }
public CollectorSurfaces CreateCollectorHosts(
string sessionId,
@@ -62,12 +63,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
IReadOnlyCollection<string> whiteGloveSealingPatternIds,
ISignalIngressSink ingress,
IClock clock,
AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Transport.Telemetry.ITelemetrySpool? telemetrySpool)
AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Transport.Telemetry.ITelemetrySpool? telemetrySpool,
TimelineEventStream? timelineEvents = null)
{
CapturedWhiteGloveSealingPatternIds = whiteGloveSealingPatternIds;
CapturedIngress = ingress;
CapturedClock = clock;
CapturedTelemetrySpool = telemetrySpool;
CapturedTimelineEvents = timelineEvents;
foreach (var name in HostNames)
{
Hosts.Add(new FakeCollectorHost(name));
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
IReadOnlyCollection<string> whiteGloveSealingPatternIds,
ISignalIngressSink ingress,
IClock clock,
AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Transport.Telemetry.ITelemetrySpool? telemetrySpool)
AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Transport.Telemetry.ITelemetrySpool? telemetrySpool,
TimelineEventStream? timelineEvents = null)
{
CapturedPatternIds = whiteGloveSealingPatternIds;
return new CollectorSurfaces(Array.Empty<ICollectorHost>());
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
#nullable enable
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.Threading;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
{
/// <summary>
/// GatherRuleExecutorHost feeds its phase_change / phase_exit / on_event triggers from the
/// POST-REDUCE <see cref="TimelineEventStream"/> (emitted timeline events), not from raw
/// signals. Regression anchor: session 32312a32 (rsneuffen.de) — a phase_change rule on
/// FinalizingSetup fired at the raw EspPhaseChanged(FinalizingSetup) signal (ESP exit),
/// 7 minutes before the engine's RealmJoin-gated phase_transition(FinalizingSetup), and read
/// a registry key before the RealmJoin package wrote it. With the timeline feed the rule
/// fires only when the phase declaration is actually emitted.
/// Rules use the absent-registry-path pattern so no real system state is touched; execution
/// is observed via the InformationalEvent posts the host sends through its ingress sink.
/// </summary>
[Collection("SerialThreading")] // rules execute on the shared ThreadPool
public sealed class GatherRuleExecutorHostTimelineFeedTests : IDisposable
{
private const string AbsentPath =
"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\AutopilotMonitorTests\\DefinitelyAbsent_5b1f03a2-0000-0000-0000-000000000000";
private readonly TempDirectory _tmp = new TempDirectory();
private readonly CapturingSink _sink = new CapturingSink();
private readonly TimelineEventStream _stream = new TimelineEventStream();
private GatherRuleExecutorHost? _host;
public void Dispose()
{
_host?.Dispose();
_tmp.Dispose();
}
private sealed class CapturingSink : ISignalIngressSink
{
private readonly List<string> _eventTypes = new List<string>();
private readonly object _gate = new object();
public int CountOf(string eventType)
{
lock (_gate)
{
var n = 0;
foreach (var t in _eventTypes)
if (string.Equals(t, eventType, StringComparison.Ordinal)) n++;
return n;
}
}
public void Post(
DecisionSignalKind kind,
DateTime occurredAtUtc,
string sourceOrigin,
Evidence evidence,
IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string>? payload = null,
int kindSchemaVersion = 1,
object? typedPayload = null)
{
if (kind != DecisionSignalKind.InformationalEvent || payload == null) return;
if (!payload.TryGetValue(SignalPayloadKeys.EventType, out var eventType)) return;
lock (_gate) _eventTypes.Add(eventType);
}
}
private void BuildHost(params GatherRule[] rules)
{
var logger = new AgentLogger(_tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info);
_host = new GatherRuleExecutorHost(
sessionId: "sess",
tenantId: "tenant",
ingress: _sink,
clock: new SystemClock(),
logger: logger,
rules: new List<GatherRule>(rules),
imeLogPathOverride: null,
unrestrictedMode: true,
gatherDebugLogPath: null,
timelineEvents: _stream);
_host.Start();
}
private bool WaitForCount(string eventType, int count, int timeoutMs = 10000)
{
var sw = Stopwatch.StartNew();
while (sw.ElapsedMilliseconds < timeoutMs)
{
if (_sink.CountOf(eventType) >= count) return true;
Thread.Sleep(25);
}
return _sink.CountOf(eventType) >= count;
}
private static GatherRule Rule(string id, string trigger, string? triggerPhase = null, string? triggerEventType = null)
=> new GatherRule
{
RuleId = id,
Title = id,
CollectorType = "registry",
Target = AbsentPath,
Trigger = trigger,
TriggerPhase = triggerPhase ?? string.Empty,
TriggerEventType = triggerEventType ?? string.Empty,
OutputEventType = "gather_host_test",
Enabled = true,
};
[Fact]
public void PhaseChangeRule_FiresOnEmittedPhaseDeclaration_NotOnPhaselessEvents()
{
BuildHost(Rule("GATHER-HOST-001", "phase_change", triggerPhase: "FinalizingSetup"));
// The raw-world sequence of session 32312a32 as it reaches the emitted timeline:
// esp_exiting and hello_wizard_started are emitted WITHOUT a phase declaration
// (the engine holds FinalizingSetup back behind the RealmJoin gate) — no fire.
_stream.Publish("esp_exiting", EnrollmentPhase.Unknown);
_stream.Publish("hello_wizard_started", EnrollmentPhase.Unknown);
Thread.Sleep(300);
Assert.Equal(0, _sink.CountOf("gather_host_test"));
// Only the engine's actual phase declaration fires the rule.
_stream.Publish("phase_transition", EnrollmentPhase.FinalizingSetup);
Assert.True(WaitForCount("gather_host_test", 1));
}
[Fact]
public void OnEventRule_FiresForEngineEmittedEventTypes()
{
// enrollment_complete is an engine-emitted effect event; it never existed on the raw
// InformationalEvent signal stream, so the docs-promised "On Event with
// enrollment_complete" trigger was dead under the previous SignalPosted feed.
BuildHost(Rule("GATHER-HOST-002", "on_event", triggerEventType: "enrollment_complete"));
_stream.Publish("enrollment_complete", EnrollmentPhase.Unknown);
Assert.True(WaitForCount("gather_host_test", 1));
}
[Fact]
public void PhaseFeed_DedupsConsecutiveSamePhaseDeclarations()
{
// "Any phase" phase_change rule fires on every phase TRANSITION — a re-declared
// identical phase (e.g. duplicate esp_phase_changed) must not count as one.
BuildHost(Rule("GATHER-HOST-003", "phase_change", triggerPhase: ""));
_stream.Publish("esp_phase_changed", EnrollmentPhase.DeviceSetup);
Assert.True(WaitForCount("gather_host_test", 1));
_stream.Publish("esp_phase_changed", EnrollmentPhase.DeviceSetup);
Thread.Sleep(300);
Assert.Equal(1, _sink.CountOf("gather_host_test"));
_stream.Publish("esp_phase_changed", EnrollmentPhase.AccountSetup);
Assert.True(WaitForCount("gather_host_test", 2));
}
[Fact]
public void PhaseExitRule_FiresWhenEmittedTimelineLeavesThePhase()
{
BuildHost(Rule("GATHER-HOST-004", "phase_exit", triggerPhase: "AccountSetup"));
_stream.Publish("esp_phase_changed", EnrollmentPhase.AccountSetup);
Thread.Sleep(300);
Assert.Equal(0, _sink.CountOf("gather_host_test"));
_stream.Publish("phase_transition", EnrollmentPhase.FinalizingSetup);
Assert.True(WaitForCount("gather_host_test", 1));
}
[Fact]
public void StoppedHost_NoLongerReactsToTheStream()
{
BuildHost(Rule("GATHER-HOST-005", "on_event", triggerEventType: "enrollment_complete"));
_host!.Stop();
_stream.Publish("enrollment_complete", EnrollmentPhase.Unknown);
Thread.Sleep(300);
Assert.Equal(0, _sink.CountOf("gather_host_test"));
}
}
}
@@ -132,10 +132,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
}
[Fact]
public void First_install_without_wait_arg_uses_agent_default_of_600()
public void First_install_without_wait_arg_persists_null_so_runtime_default_applies()
{
// Generic bootstrap path: PS1 calls `--install` without --tenant-id-wait,
// and there is no persisted config yet. Agent owns the default (600 s).
// and there is no persisted config yet. "Not configured" is persisted as null
// so BuildAgentConfiguration applies the agent-side default (600 s) — freezing
// a number into the file would decouple deployed devices from default changes.
var merged = AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.MergeBootstrapConfig(
existing: null,
bootstrapTokenArg: null!, bootstrapTokenGiven: false,
@@ -144,20 +146,42 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
Assert.Null(merged.BootstrapToken);
Assert.Null(merged.TenantId);
Assert.Equal(600, merged.TenantIdWaitSeconds);
Assert.Null(merged.TenantIdWaitSeconds);
}
[Fact]
public void Existing_config_without_wait_field_treated_as_zero()
public void Legacy_config_without_wait_field_stays_null_on_plain_reinstall()
{
// BackCompat: pre-fix bootstrap-config.json has no TenantIdWaitSeconds field;
// Newtonsoft deserialises that to 0. New install with --tenant-id-wait 600
// overrides cleanly; no extra migration logic required.
// BackCompat: pre-feature bootstrap-config.json has no TenantIdWaitSeconds
// property → nullable deserialisation yields null. A reinstall that does not
// pass --tenant-id-wait must NOT turn that into 0 (which would silently
// disable the wait); null carries through and the runtime default applies.
var existing = new BootstrapConfigFile
{
BootstrapToken = "tok-legacy",
TenantId = "tenant-legacy",
TenantIdWaitSeconds = 0,
TenantIdWaitSeconds = null,
};
var merged = AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.MergeBootstrapConfig(
existing,
bootstrapTokenArg: null!, bootstrapTokenGiven: false,
tenantIdArg: null!, tenantIdGiven: false,
tenantIdWaitSeconds: 0, tenantIdWaitGiven: false);
Assert.Equal("tok-legacy", merged.BootstrapToken);
Assert.Equal("tenant-legacy", merged.TenantId);
Assert.Null(merged.TenantIdWaitSeconds);
}
[Fact]
public void Legacy_config_without_wait_field_takes_explicit_wait_arg()
{
var existing = new BootstrapConfigFile
{
BootstrapToken = "tok-legacy",
TenantId = "tenant-legacy",
TenantIdWaitSeconds = null,
};
var merged = AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.MergeBootstrapConfig(
@@ -170,5 +194,26 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
Assert.Equal("tenant-legacy", merged.TenantId);
Assert.Equal(600, merged.TenantIdWaitSeconds);
}
[Fact]
public void Explicit_zero_opt_out_survives_redeploy_without_wait_arg()
{
// An admin's deliberate `--tenant-id-wait 0` must not be resurrected to a
// wait by a later redeploy that omits the flag.
var existing = new BootstrapConfigFile
{
BootstrapToken = "tok-abc",
TenantId = "tenant-xyz",
TenantIdWaitSeconds = 0,
};
var merged = AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.MergeBootstrapConfig(
existing,
bootstrapTokenArg: null!, bootstrapTokenGiven: false,
tenantIdArg: null!, tenantIdGiven: false,
tenantIdWaitSeconds: 0, tenantIdWaitGiven: false);
Assert.Equal(0, merged.TenantIdWaitSeconds);
}
}
}
@@ -66,6 +66,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
// same facts signal (safe default "false" off-device).
var selfDeploying = payload["isSelfDeployingProfile"];
Assert.True(selfDeploying == "true" || selfDeploying == "false");
// W365 — the Cloud PC marker fact rides the same signal (safe default "false"
// off-device; a build host is not a Cloud PC).
Assert.Contains("isCloudPc", (IDictionary<string, string>)payload);
var cloudPc = payload["isCloudPc"];
Assert.True(cloudPc == "true" || cloudPc == "false");
}
[Fact]
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
{
/// <summary>
/// Pins the TenantIdWaitSeconds resolution order in
/// <see cref="AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.BuildAgentConfiguration"/>:
/// CLI arg &gt; persisted bootstrap-config.json value &gt; agent default (600 s).
/// The regression this guards: a legacy bootstrap-config.json written before the
/// TenantIdWaitSeconds property existed deserialises to null — that must fall
/// through to the 600 s default, NOT be treated as an explicit 0 opt-out
/// (which silently disabled the wait and broke Hybrid-AAD-join devices whose
/// registry TenantId lands minutes after first boot).
/// </summary>
public sealed class TenantIdWaitResolutionTests
{
private static AgentConfiguration Build(BootstrapConfigFile bootstrapConfig, params string[] args) =>
AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.BuildAgentConfiguration(
args: args,
tenantId: "tenant-t",
sessionId: "session-s",
bootstrapConfig: bootstrapConfig,
awaitConfig: null);
[Fact]
public void No_cli_and_no_bootstrap_config_uses_default_600()
{
var cfg = Build(bootstrapConfig: null);
Assert.Equal(600, cfg.TenantIdWaitSeconds);
}
[Fact]
public void Legacy_bootstrap_config_with_null_wait_uses_default_600()
{
var legacy = new BootstrapConfigFile
{
BootstrapToken = "tok-legacy",
TenantId = "tenant-legacy",
TenantIdWaitSeconds = null,
};
var cfg = Build(legacy);
Assert.Equal(600, cfg.TenantIdWaitSeconds);
}
[Fact]
public void Explicit_zero_in_bootstrap_config_disables_wait()
{
var optedOut = new BootstrapConfigFile { TenantIdWaitSeconds = 0 };
var cfg = Build(optedOut);
Assert.Equal(0, cfg.TenantIdWaitSeconds);
}
[Fact]
public void Nonzero_bootstrap_config_value_wins_over_default()
{
var configured = new BootstrapConfigFile { TenantIdWaitSeconds = 1800 };
var cfg = Build(configured);
Assert.Equal(1800, cfg.TenantIdWaitSeconds);
}
[Fact]
public void Cli_arg_wins_over_bootstrap_config_value()
{
var configured = new BootstrapConfigFile { TenantIdWaitSeconds = 1800 };
var cfg = Build(configured, "--tenant-id-wait", "300");
Assert.Equal(300, cfg.TenantIdWaitSeconds);
}
[Fact]
public void Cli_zero_wins_over_bootstrap_config_value()
{
var configured = new BootstrapConfigFile { TenantIdWaitSeconds = 1800 };
var cfg = Build(configured, "--tenant-id-wait", "0");
Assert.Equal(0, cfg.TenantIdWaitSeconds);
}
}
}
@@ -260,6 +260,60 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
Assert.Contains("agent/config", fakeDistress.Calls[0].Message);
}
[Fact]
public void RecordFailure_endpoint_unavailable_suppresses_distress_but_still_counts()
{
var clock = new FakeClock(new DateTime(2026, 4, 21, 10, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc));
var fakeDistress = new FakeDistressReporter();
var tracker = new AuthFailureTracker(maxFailures: 2, timeoutMinutes: 0, clock, NewLogger(), fakeDistress);
int events = 0;
tracker.ThresholdExceeded += (_, _) => events++;
// Platform-403s from a stopped endpoint: a distress report cannot reach it and the
// DeviceNotRegistered classification would be wrong — nothing must be dispatched.
tracker.RecordFailure(403, "agent/config", endpointUnavailable: true);
tracker.RecordFailure(403, "agent/register-session", endpointUnavailable: true);
Assert.Empty(fakeDistress.Calls);
// The shutdown thresholds still apply — a dead endpoint must not retry forever.
Assert.Equal(2, tracker.ConsecutiveFailures);
Assert.Equal(1, events);
}
[Fact]
public void RecordFailure_endpoint_unavailable_does_not_consume_streak_report_slot()
{
var clock = new FakeClock(new DateTime(2026, 4, 21, 10, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc));
var fakeDistress = new FakeDistressReporter();
var tracker = new AuthFailureTracker(maxFailures: 50, timeoutMinutes: 0, clock, NewLogger(), fakeDistress);
// The streak opens with a platform-403 (no dispatch), then a live backend answers
// with a genuine 403 — that one must still produce the streak's single report.
tracker.RecordFailure(403, "agent/config", endpointUnavailable: true);
tracker.RecordFailure(403, "agent/config");
tracker.RecordFailure(403, "agent/config");
Assert.Single(fakeDistress.Calls);
Assert.Equal(DistressErrorType.DeviceNotRegistered, fakeDistress.Calls[0].ErrorType);
}
[Fact]
public void RecordSuccess_rearms_distress_dispatch_for_the_next_streak()
{
var clock = new FakeClock(new DateTime(2026, 4, 21, 10, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc));
var fakeDistress = new FakeDistressReporter();
var tracker = new AuthFailureTracker(maxFailures: 50, timeoutMinutes: 0, clock, NewLogger(), fakeDistress);
tracker.RecordFailure(401, "agent/config");
tracker.RecordSuccess();
tracker.RecordFailure(403, "agent/config");
Assert.Equal(2, fakeDistress.Calls.Count);
Assert.Equal(DistressErrorType.AuthCertificateRejected, fakeDistress.Calls[0].ErrorType);
Assert.Equal(DistressErrorType.DeviceNotRegistered, fakeDistress.Calls[1].ErrorType);
}
[Fact]
public void RecordFailure_without_distress_reporter_is_silent_but_still_tracks()
{
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
{
/// <summary>
/// Pins the marker-AND contract of <see cref="CloudPcDetector.ResolveIsCloudPc"/>: BOTH
/// the Windows365 registry key and the CloudManagedDesktopExtension service key must be
/// present — each alone has plausible look-alikes (W365-Boot physical clients carry
/// Windows365 policy state; the MCMD agent family served other managed-desktop
/// offerings). Mirrors the bootstrap script's field-verified <c>Test-IsCloudPc</c>.
/// </summary>
public sealed class CloudPcDetectorTests
{
private static Func<string, bool> Probe(params string[] existingKeys)
{
var set = new HashSet<string>(existingKeys, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
return path => set.Contains(path);
}
[Fact]
public void Both_markers_present_resolves_true()
{
Assert.True(CloudPcDetector.ResolveIsCloudPc(Probe(
CloudPcDetector.Windows365MarkerKey,
CloudPcDetector.CmdeServiceKey)));
}
[Fact]
public void Windows365_key_alone_resolves_false()
{
// W365-Boot physical client shape: policy state without the on-device MCMD agent.
Assert.False(CloudPcDetector.ResolveIsCloudPc(Probe(CloudPcDetector.Windows365MarkerKey)));
}
[Fact]
public void Cmde_service_alone_resolves_false()
{
// MCMD agent family also served other managed-desktop offerings.
Assert.False(CloudPcDetector.ResolveIsCloudPc(Probe(CloudPcDetector.CmdeServiceKey)));
}
[Fact]
public void No_markers_resolves_false()
{
Assert.False(CloudPcDetector.ResolveIsCloudPc(Probe()));
}
[Fact]
public void Null_probe_resolves_false()
{
Assert.False(CloudPcDetector.ResolveIsCloudPc(null));
}
[Fact]
public void Throwing_probe_degrades_to_false()
{
// SKIP-safe contract: a broken registry read must never classify, let alone throw.
Assert.False(CloudPcDetector.ResolveIsCloudPc(_ => throw new UnauthorizedAccessException("registry denied")));
}
[Fact]
public void DetectIsCloudPc_never_throws_on_build_host()
{
// Real-registry shell: exercises the exception-swallowing wrapper end to end.
// A build host is not a Cloud PC, but the contract under test is "no throw",
// not the detected value.
var ex = Record.Exception(() => CloudPcDetector.DetectIsCloudPc());
Assert.Null(ex);
}
}
}
@@ -137,6 +137,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
Assert.Equal(Environment.MachineName, captured.DeviceName);
Assert.False(string.IsNullOrEmpty(captured.EnrollmentType));
Assert.True(captured.IsUserDriven);
// W365 marker rides the registration body. A build host is not a Cloud PC
// (marker-AND: Windows365 key + CloudManagedDesktopExtension service), so the
// detector's SKIP-safe default is what must land here.
Assert.False(captured.IsCloudPc);
}
[Fact]
@@ -83,13 +83,36 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.SignalAdapters
using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
var app = new AppPackageState("app-do", 0);
f.Tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = ClockNow.AddDays(-7);
adapter.TriggerDoTelemetryFromTest(app);
// Line-grounded path: the [DO TEL] line's own timestamp travels with the callback.
adapter.TriggerDoTelemetryFromTest(app, ClockNow.AddDays(-7));
Assert.Empty(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.DoTelemetry));
f.Tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = ClockNow.AddMinutes(-1);
adapter.TriggerDoTelemetryFromTest(app);
Assert.Single(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.DoTelemetry));
adapter.TriggerDoTelemetryFromTest(app, ClockNow.AddMinutes(-1));
var info = Assert.Single(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.DoTelemetry));
Assert.Equal(ClockNow.AddMinutes(-1), info.OccurredAtUtc);
}
[Fact]
public void Poll_driven_do_telemetry_stamps_clock_ignoring_unrelated_last_matched_line()
{
// Session df1fcf47: the DO collector observed the completion live, but the event
// inherited LastMatchedLogTimestamp from an unrelated, tz-skewed log line 8h in
// the past — which dragged Sessions.StartedAt back and inflated the duration.
// Poll-driven telemetry (null source timestamp) must stamp the clock, never the
// last matched line.
using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture(ClockNow);
using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
var app = new AppPackageState("app-do-poll", 0);
f.Tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = ClockNow.AddHours(-8);
adapter.TriggerDoTelemetryFromTest(app, sourceTimestampUtc: null);
var info = Assert.Single(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.DoTelemetry));
Assert.Equal(ClockNow, info.OccurredAtUtc);
Assert.Equal("true", info.Payload!["derivedTimestamp"]);
// Not a replay — live observation must never trip the replay suppression,
// even with a stale unrelated line on the tracker.
Assert.Empty(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.HistoricImeReplayDetected));
}
[Fact]
@@ -647,13 +647,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.SignalAdapters
int priorDoCalls = 0;
int priorScriptCalls = 0;
f.Tracker.OnImeAgentVersion = _ => priorVersionCalls++;
f.Tracker.OnDoTelemetryReceived = _ => priorDoCalls++;
f.Tracker.OnDoTelemetryReceived = (_, _) => priorDoCalls++;
f.Tracker.OnScriptCompleted = _ => priorScriptCalls++;
using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
f.Tracker.OnImeAgentVersion("1.0.0.0");
f.Tracker.OnDoTelemetryReceived(new AppPackageState("app-1", 0));
f.Tracker.OnDoTelemetryReceived(new AppPackageState("app-1", 0), null);
f.Tracker.OnScriptCompleted(new ScriptExecutionState { PolicyId = "p", ScriptType = "platform" });
Assert.Equal(1, priorVersionCalls);
@@ -667,7 +667,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.SignalAdapters
{
using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture();
Action<string> priorVersion = _ => { };
Action<AppPackageState> priorDo = _ => { };
Action<AppPackageState, DateTime?> priorDo = (_, _) => { };
Action<ScriptExecutionState> priorScript = _ => { };
f.Tracker.OnImeAgentVersion = priorVersion;
f.Tracker.OnDoTelemetryReceived = priorDo;
@@ -153,6 +153,58 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Telemetry.Events
Assert.Equal("Device Setup", (string?)parsed["PhaseName"]);
}
[Fact]
public void Emit_publishes_eventType_and_parsed_phase_to_TimelineEventStream()
{
// Post-reduce observer surface: gather-rule phase/event triggers subscribe here so
// they fire in step with what the timeline shows (session 32312a32 regression).
using var r = new Rig();
var stream = new AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration.TimelineEventStream();
var published = new List<(string EventType, EnrollmentPhase Phase)>();
stream.EventEmitted += (eventType, phase) => published.Add((eventType, phase));
var sut = new EventTimelineEmitter(r.Inner, stream);
sut.Emit(
new Dictionary<string, string>
{
["eventType"] = "phase_transition",
["phase"] = "FinalizingSetup",
},
State(),
At);
sut.Emit(
new Dictionary<string, string> { ["eventType"] = "enrollment_complete" },
State(),
At);
Assert.Equal(2, published.Count);
Assert.Equal(("phase_transition", EnrollmentPhase.FinalizingSetup), published[0]);
Assert.Equal(("enrollment_complete", EnrollmentPhase.Unknown), published[1]);
// Publish happens AFTER the transport enqueue — wire ordering is authoritative.
Assert.Equal(2, r.Transport.EnqueueCount);
}
[Fact]
public void TimelineEventStream_subscriber_exception_does_not_break_the_emit_path()
{
using var r = new Rig();
var stream = new AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration.TimelineEventStream();
var secondSubscriberCalls = 0;
stream.EventEmitted += (_, _) => throw new InvalidOperationException("subscriber bug");
stream.EventEmitted += (_, _) => secondSubscriberCalls++;
var sut = new EventTimelineEmitter(r.Inner, stream);
sut.Emit(
new Dictionary<string, string> { ["eventType"] = "enrollment_complete" },
State(),
At);
// Emit neither threw (would surface as an EffectRunner retry = duplicated event)
// nor skipped the remaining subscribers.
Assert.Equal(1, r.Transport.EnqueueCount);
Assert.Equal(1, secondSubscriberCalls);
}
[Fact]
public void Phase_parameter_with_invalid_value_falls_back_to_Unknown()
{
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
#nullable enable
using System;
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Http;
using System.Text;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Transport
{
/// <summary>
/// 401/403 classification in <see cref="BackendApiClient"/>: a backend JSON 403 is a real
/// device-authorization verdict, while an HTML body means the response came from the Azure
/// platform / an edge proxy (stopped or retired app) and must NOT be reported as
/// "device is not authorized". Field case sits-d.cloud 2026-08-09: a pre-cutover agent hit
/// the stopped legacy Function App and support chased a non-existent authorization problem.
/// </summary>
public sealed class BackendApiClientAuthClassificationTests
{
private sealed class StubHandler : HttpMessageHandler
{
private readonly Func<HttpRequestMessage, HttpResponseMessage> _responder;
public StubHandler(Func<HttpRequestMessage, HttpResponseMessage> responder) => _responder = responder;
protected override Task<HttpResponseMessage> SendAsync(HttpRequestMessage request, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
=> Task.FromResult(_responder(request));
}
private static BackendApiClient BuildClient(HttpStatusCode status, string body, string mediaType)
{
var handler = new StubHandler(_ => new HttpResponseMessage(status)
{
Content = new StringContent(body, Encoding.UTF8, mediaType)
});
return new BackendApiClient(
new HttpClient(handler),
baseUrl: "https://backend.example",
manufacturer: "Contoso",
model: "TestBox",
serialNumber: "SN123",
useBootstrapTokenAuth: false,
bootstrapToken: null,
agentVersion: "2.0.0",
logger: null);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Backend_json_403_is_reported_as_device_not_authorized()
{
using var client = BuildClient(
HttpStatusCode.Forbidden,
"{\"success\":false,\"message\":\"Device validation failed\"}",
"application/json");
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<BackendAuthException>(() => client.GetAgentConfigAsync("tenant-1"));
Assert.Equal(403, ex.StatusCode);
Assert.False(ex.EndpointUnavailable);
Assert.Contains("The device is not authorized", ex.Message);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Platform_html_403_is_reported_as_endpoint_unavailable_with_page_title()
{
using var client = BuildClient(
HttpStatusCode.Forbidden,
"<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><title>Web App - Unavailable</title></head><body>stopped</body></html>",
"text/html");
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<BackendAuthException>(() => client.GetAgentConfigAsync("tenant-1"));
Assert.Equal(403, ex.StatusCode);
Assert.True(ex.EndpointUnavailable);
Assert.Contains("Web App - Unavailable", ex.Message);
Assert.Contains("NOT a device-authorization failure", ex.Message);
Assert.DoesNotContain("Check client certificate", ex.Message);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Html_body_with_generic_content_type_is_still_sniffed_as_platform_page()
{
using var client = BuildClient(
HttpStatusCode.Forbidden,
" <html><body>Error 403 - This web app is stopped.</body></html>",
"text/plain");
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<BackendAuthException>(() => client.GetAgentConfigAsync("tenant-1"));
Assert.True(ex.EndpointUnavailable);
Assert.Contains("HTML platform error page", ex.Message);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Backend_401_keeps_authorization_message_and_status()
{
using var client = BuildClient(
HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized,
"{\"success\":false,\"message\":\"certificate rejected\"}",
"application/json");
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<BackendAuthException>(() => client.GetAgentConfigAsync("tenant-1"));
Assert.Equal(401, ex.StatusCode);
Assert.False(ex.EndpointUnavailable);
Assert.Contains("The device is not authorized", ex.Message);
}
}
}
@@ -109,6 +109,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
/// </summary>
public bool EnableTimezoneAutoSet { get; set; } = false;
/// <summary>
/// Continue-Anyway observation mode (operator-set tenant opt-in, delivered via
/// remote config): stamped into the esp_config_detected decision-signal payload so
/// the DecisionEngine defangs a Device-phase ESP terminal failure into a bounded
/// 60-min observation instead of failing immediately. Default: false.
/// </summary>
public bool EnableEspContinueAnywayObservation { get; set; } = false;
/// <summary>
/// Optional custom path to IME logs directory for testing.
/// If set, overrides the default %ProgramData%\Microsoft\IntuneManagementExtension\Logs path.
@@ -272,9 +280,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
/// CloudDomainJoin keys and re-probes on every change until either resolution
/// or this timeout. 0 = no wait, fast-fail on miss (legacy behaviour).
/// <para>
/// Set via the install-time CLI flag <c>--tenant-id-wait &lt;sec&gt;</c>, persisted
/// to <c>bootstrap-config.json</c>. The PS1 bootstrap script owns the production
/// default; the agent itself never assumes one.
/// Set via the CLI flag <c>--tenant-id-wait &lt;sec&gt;</c> or a persisted
/// <c>bootstrap-config.json</c> value; when neither supplies a value the agent
/// applies its own default of 600 s in BuildAgentConfiguration. The 0 default
/// here is only the POCO baseline, not the effective runtime default.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
public int TenantIdWaitSeconds { get; set; } = 0;
@@ -16,8 +16,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
/// <summary>
/// TenantId-wait timeout in seconds, persisted from the <c>--tenant-id-wait</c>
/// install-time arg. Read by AgentBootstrap when the registry probe finds no
/// TenantId on first try. 0 / missing = no wait, legacy fast-fail.
/// TenantId on first try. 0 = explicit opt-out (legacy fast-fail).
/// Null / missing (files written before this property existed) = not configured —
/// the agent-side default (600 s) applies. Nullable so a legacy file without the
/// property cannot masquerade as an explicit 0 and silently disable the wait.
/// </summary>
public int TenantIdWaitSeconds { get; set; }
public int? TenantIdWaitSeconds { get; set; }
}
}
@@ -103,6 +103,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
agentConfig.SendTraceEvents = remoteConfig.SendTraceEvents;
// ---------------- Continue-Anyway observation — remote wins (operator-set tenant
// opt-in; false must clear a stale cached true).
agentConfig.EnableEspContinueAnywayObservation = remoteConfig.EnableEspContinueAnywayObservation;
// ---------------- UnrestrictedMode audit — track old/new for the caller so the
// agent_unrestricted_mode_changed event can fire AFTER the
// orchestrator emitter is alive (V1 parity with
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
// see the AuthCertificateRejected/DeviceNotRegistered distress signal
// without 100 s of needless retry delay.
_logger.Warning($"Config fetch authentication failed: {ex.Message}");
_authFailureTracker?.RecordFailure(ex.StatusCode, "agent/config");
_authFailureTracker?.RecordFailure(ex.StatusCode, "agent/config", ex.EndpointUnavailable);
lastException = ex;
LastFetchAuthStatusCode = ex.StatusCode;
break;
@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
EnableGeoLocation = true,
EnableImeMatchLog = false,
EnableGatherRuleDebugLog = false,
EnableEspContinueAnywayObservation = false,
Collectors = CollectorConfiguration.CreateDefault(),
GatherRules = new System.Collections.Generic.List<GatherRule>(),
ImeLogPatterns = new System.Collections.Generic.List<ImeLogPattern>()
@@ -197,7 +197,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging
/// <summary>
/// Sanitizes log messages to prevent log injection attacks.
/// Escapes control characters that could forge log entries.
/// Redaction patterns can be added here later as needed.
/// Transliterates typographic punctuation to ASCII: the log file is written as
/// UTF-8 without BOM, and customer-side viewers (e.g. Outlook web attachment
/// preview) guess cp1252 and render an em dash as mojibake ("—"). Only our own
/// punctuation is mapped — genuine non-ASCII payload (device names, paths) is
/// kept verbatim. Redaction patterns can be added here later as needed.
/// </summary>
private static string SanitizeLogMessage(string message)
{
@@ -206,6 +210,17 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging
// Escape newlines and carriage returns to prevent log injection
message = message.Replace("\r", "\\r").Replace("\n", "\\n");
message = message
.Replace('\u2014', '-') // — em dash
.Replace('\u2013', '-') // – en dash
.Replace("\u2192", "->") // → arrow
.Replace("\u2026", "...") // … ellipsis
.Replace('\u2018', '\'') // ' left single quote
.Replace('\u2019', '\'') // ' right single quote
.Replace('\u201C', '"') // " left double quote
.Replace('\u201D', '"') // " right double quote
.Replace('\u00A0', ' '); // non-breaking space
return message;
}
}
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
$"size={fileSize}, peers={bytesFromPeers} ({peerCachingPct}%), " +
$"http={bytesFromHttp}, cache={bytesFromCacheServer}, mode={downloadMode}, duration={downloadDuration}");
OnDoTelemetryReceived?.Invoke(pkg);
OnDoTelemetryReceived?.Invoke(pkg, LastMatchedLogTimestamp);
_stateDirty = true;
}
catch (Exception ex)
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
@@ -194,7 +194,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
public Action OnAllAppsCompleted { get; set; }
public Action OnUserSessionCompleted { get; set; }
public Action<string> OnImeSessionChange { get; set; }
public Action<AppPackageState> OnDoTelemetryReceived { get; set; }
// Second arg: the [DO TEL] source log line's timestamp when the DO data came from a
// log line, null when the DO collector observed the completion live via polling. The
// consumer must stamp poll-driven telemetry with the clock — inheriting an unrelated
// line's LastMatchedLogTimestamp put a tz-skewed time on the event (session df1fcf47).
public Action<AppPackageState, DateTime?> OnDoTelemetryReceived { get; set; }
public Action<ScriptExecutionState> OnScriptCompleted { get; set; }
/// <summary>
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Microsoft.Win32;
@@ -88,6 +88,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
/// </summary>
public static string BackendExpectedSha256 { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// True once a <see cref="CheckAndApplyUpdateAsync"/> run actually obtained a version
/// from the manifest (regardless of whether an update was then needed/applied).
/// <para>
/// Consumed by the <c>--await-enrollment</c> path: the startup check runs pre-enrollment
/// where OOBE frequently has no network yet, so a failed check there says nothing about
/// the latest version. Once the MDM certificate appears the device provably has
/// connectivity — the bootstrap retries the check exactly when this is still false.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
public static bool LastVersionCheckSucceeded { get; private set; }
/// <summary>
/// Optional: graceful-shutdown request hook, set by the runtime host once its
/// shutdown machinery is armed (before the orchestrator starts) and cleared in its
@@ -130,14 +142,21 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
/// to cover hotfixes that reuse the same version number.
/// </param>
/// <param name="triggerReason">
/// "startup" (default) or "runtime_hash_mismatch". Recorded in the marker file so the
/// agent_version_check event (outcome=updated) can distinguish the two paths.
/// "startup" (default), "await_enrollment" (post-cert retry in the bootstrap), or
/// "runtime_hash_mismatch". Recorded in the marker file so the agent_version_check
/// event (outcome=updated) can distinguish the paths.
/// </param>
/// <param name="downloadTimeoutMsOverride">
/// Overrides the ZIP download timeout. Startup path leaves null (fast-fail, 10s) to preserve
/// Autopilot boot speed. Runtime trigger passes 60000 because monitoring is already running
/// and we know an update is required.
/// </param>
/// <param name="versionCheckTimeoutMsOverride">
/// Overrides the version-v2.json fetch timeout (default 2500ms, tuned for boot speed).
/// The await-enrollment retry passes a relaxed value: enrollment just completed, the
/// device provably has network, and a stranded old build's last self-rescue chance is
/// worth a few extra seconds before session registration.
/// </param>
/// <param name="allowDowngrade">
/// When false (default), a latest version strictly lower than <paramref name="currentVersion"/>
/// is rejected even when <paramref name="forceUpdate"/> is true — prevents the production
@@ -151,7 +170,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
bool forceUpdate = false,
string triggerReason = "startup",
int? downloadTimeoutMsOverride = null,
bool allowDowngrade = false)
bool allowDowngrade = false,
int? versionCheckTimeoutMsOverride = null)
{
Action<string> log = msg =>
{
@@ -160,7 +180,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
};
var isStartupTrigger = string.Equals(triggerReason, "startup", StringComparison.Ordinal);
// The await-enrollment retry replaces the startup verdict — its markers must win so
// the agent_version_check event reflects the LATEST check, not the pre-network one.
var writeMarkers = isStartupTrigger || string.Equals(triggerReason, "await_enrollment", StringComparison.Ordinal);
var downloadTimeoutMs = downloadTimeoutMsOverride ?? DownloadTimeoutMs;
var versionCheckTimeoutMs = versionCheckTimeoutMsOverride ?? VersionCheckTimeoutMs;
var totalSw = Stopwatch.StartNew();
long versionCheckMs = 0, downloadMs = 0, verifyMs = 0, extractMs = 0, swapMs = 0;
long zipSizeBytes = 0;
@@ -174,16 +198,17 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
try
{
// Step 1: Fetch version-v2.json (2.5s timeout)
// Step 1: Fetch version-v2.json (default 2.5s timeout, relaxed on retry triggers)
var versionSw = Stopwatch.StartNew();
string manifestSha256;
(latestVersion, manifestSha256) = await GetLatestVersionAsync(log);
(latestVersion, manifestSha256) = await GetLatestVersionAsync(log, versionCheckTimeoutMs);
versionSw.Stop();
versionCheckMs = versionSw.ElapsedMilliseconds;
LastVersionCheckSucceeded = latestVersion != null;
if (latestVersion == null)
{
if (isStartupTrigger)
if (writeMarkers)
WriteSkipMarker("version_check_failed", currentVersion, null, "version-v2.json fetch failed or timed out", log);
return; // Could not determine latest version — continue with current
}
@@ -213,7 +238,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
if (!forceUpdate)
{
log($"Self-update: current version {currentVersion} is up to date (latest: {latestVersion})");
if (isStartupTrigger)
if (writeMarkers)
WriteCheckedMarker(currentVersion, latestVersion, versionCheckMs, log);
return;
}
@@ -230,7 +255,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
if (!forceUpdate)
{
log($"Self-update: cannot compare versions (current={currentVersion}, latest={latestVersion}) — skipping");
if (isStartupTrigger)
if (writeMarkers)
WriteSkipMarker("version_compare_failed", currentVersion, latestVersion, "version parse failed", log);
return;
}
@@ -249,7 +274,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
downloadMs = downloadTimerSw.ElapsedMilliseconds;
if (!downloadOk)
{
if (isStartupTrigger)
if (writeMarkers)
WriteSkipMarker("download_failed", currentVersion, latestVersion, $"ZIP download failed within {downloadTimeoutMs}ms", log);
return;
}
@@ -282,7 +307,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
if (!integrityOk)
{
CleanupStaging(null, zipPath);
if (isStartupTrigger)
if (writeMarkers)
WriteSkipMarker("integrity_mismatch", currentVersion, latestVersion, "SHA-256 mismatch on downloaded ZIP", log);
return;
}
@@ -297,7 +322,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
extractMs = extractSw.ElapsedMilliseconds;
if (!extractOk)
{
if (isStartupTrigger)
if (writeMarkers)
WriteSkipMarker("extract_failed", currentVersion, latestVersion, "ZIP extraction failed", log);
return;
}
@@ -310,7 +335,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
{
log("Self-update: staging validation failed — AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe not found in ZIP");
CleanupStaging(stagingDir, zipPath);
if (isStartupTrigger)
if (writeMarkers)
WriteSkipMarker("extract_failed", currentVersion, latestVersion, "AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe not found in ZIP", log);
return;
}
@@ -323,7 +348,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
if (!swapOk)
{
CleanupStaging(stagingDir, zipPath);
if (isStartupTrigger)
if (writeMarkers)
WriteSkipMarker("swap_failed", currentVersion, latestVersion, "file swap failed", log);
return;
}
@@ -355,7 +380,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
catch (Exception ex)
{
log($"Self-update: unexpected error — {ex.Message}. Continuing with current version.");
if (isStartupTrigger)
if (writeMarkers)
{
try { WriteSkipMarker("unexpected_error", currentVersion, latestVersion, ex.Message, log); } catch { }
}
@@ -366,7 +391,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
/// Fetches version-v2.json from blob storage and returns the version string and optional SHA-256 hash.
/// Returns (null, null) if the check fails or times out.
/// </summary>
private static async Task<(string version, string sha256)> GetLatestVersionAsync(Action<string> log)
private static async Task<(string version, string sha256)> GetLatestVersionAsync(Action<string> log, int timeoutMs)
{
try
{
@@ -375,7 +400,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
var versionUrl = $"{Constants.AgentDownloadBaseUrl}/{Constants.AgentVersionFileNameForLine(2)}";
using (var handler = new HttpClientHandler())
using (var client = new HttpClient(handler) { Timeout = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(VersionCheckTimeoutMs) })
using (var client = new HttpClient(handler) { Timeout = TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(timeoutMs) })
{
var json = await client.GetStringAsync(versionUrl);
var obj = JObject.Parse(json);
@@ -396,7 +421,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
}
catch (TaskCanceledException)
{
log($"Self-update: version check timed out ({VersionCheckTimeoutMs}ms) — skipping update");
log($"Self-update: version check timed out ({timeoutMs}ms) — skipping update");
return (null, null);
}
catch (HttpRequestException ex) when (ex.Message.Contains("404"))
@@ -1021,6 +1021,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.DeviceInfo
.ToString(System.Globalization.CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
if (snapshot.AllowContinueAnyway.HasValue)
payload[SignalPayloadKeys.EspAllowContinueAnyway] = snapshot.AllowContinueAnyway.Value ? "true" : "false";
// Tenant opt-in (remote config, not a registry fact) — only stamped when
// enabled; absent = default hard-fail semantics in the engine.
if (_espContinueAnywayObservationEnabled?.Invoke() == true)
payload[SignalPayloadKeys.EspContinueAnywayObservationEnabled] = "true";
var derivationInputs = new Dictionary<string, string>(payload, StringComparer.Ordinal)
{
@@ -35,6 +35,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.DeviceInfo
private readonly IClock _clock;
private readonly Persistence.StartupEventGate _startupGate;
// Live accessor for AgentConfiguration.EnableEspContinueAnywayObservation — read at
// esp_config_detected stamping time so a late remote-config merge takes effect on
// the phase-triggered re-emissions. Null (tests / legacy callers) means disabled.
private readonly Func<bool> _espContinueAnywayObservationEnabled;
private const string RegKeyWindowsCurrentVersion = @"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion";
// Restart dedup (StartupEventGate) — exemptions. boot_time is genuinely new per boot
@@ -65,7 +70,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.DeviceInfo
AgentLogger logger,
ISignalIngressSink signalIngress = null,
IClock clock = null,
Persistence.StartupEventGate startupGate = null)
Persistence.StartupEventGate startupGate = null,
Func<bool> espContinueAnywayObservationEnabled = null)
{
_sessionId = sessionId ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(sessionId));
_tenantId = tenantId ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(tenantId));
@@ -74,6 +80,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.DeviceInfo
_signalIngress = signalIngress;
_clock = clock;
_startupGate = startupGate;
_espContinueAnywayObservationEnabled = espContinueAnywayObservationEnabled;
}
/// <summary>
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Logging;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather.Collectors
{
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using System.Linq;
using System.Reflection;
using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
using Newtonsoft.Json.Linq;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
@@ -35,6 +36,24 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
public static readonly IReadOnlyCollection<string> AllowedCommands;
public static readonly IReadOnlyList<string> AllowedEventLogChannels;
// Derived from AllowedWmiQueryPrefixes: entries of the canonical form
// "SELECT * FROM <class>" contribute their class name; any other entry
// (none today) stays on the legacy literal-prefix path.
private static readonly HashSet<string> AllowedWmiClasses;
private static readonly List<string> ResidualWmiPrefixes;
// Canonical allowlist entry: exactly "SELECT * FROM <class>".
private static readonly Regex CanonicalWmiEntryRegex = new Regex(
@"^SELECT\s+\*\s+FROM\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)$",
RegexOptions.IgnoreCase | RegexOptions.Compiled);
// WQL shape "SELECT <* | property-list> FROM <class>", class token bounded
// by whitespace or end of string (a trailing WHERE clause is permitted,
// "Win32_BIOSX" cannot pass as "Win32_BIOS").
private static readonly Regex WmiQueryRegex = new Regex(
@"^SELECT\s+(?:\*|[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*(?:\s*,\s*[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)*)\s+FROM\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)(?=\s|$)",
RegexOptions.IgnoreCase | RegexOptions.Compiled);
// Hard blocks: never allowed, even in unrestricted mode
private static readonly string BlockedUsersPrefix = Path.GetFullPath(@"C:\Users");
private static readonly string[] AdditionalHardBlockedPathPrefixes = new[]
@@ -101,6 +120,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
AllowedCommands = new HashSet<string>(commands, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
AllowedEventLogChannels = FlattenCategorized(obj, "eventLogChannels", "channels");
DeriveWmiClassAllowlist(AllowedWmiQueryPrefixes, out AllowedWmiClasses, out ResidualWmiPrefixes);
return;
}
}
@@ -115,6 +135,26 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
AllowedWmiQueryPrefixes = new List<string>();
AllowedCommands = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
AllowedEventLogChannels = new List<string>();
AllowedWmiClasses = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
ResidualWmiPrefixes = new List<string>();
}
private static void DeriveWmiClassAllowlist(
IReadOnlyList<string> entries,
out HashSet<string> classes,
out List<string> residual)
{
classes = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
residual = new List<string>();
foreach (var entry in entries)
{
var match = CanonicalWmiEntryRegex.Match(entry.Trim());
if (match.Success)
classes.Add(match.Groups[1].Value);
else
residual.Add(entry);
}
}
private static string LoadEmbeddedGuardrails()
@@ -250,8 +290,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
}
/// <summary>
/// Returns true if the WMI query (trimmed) matches an allowed prefix
/// with boundary matching (next char must be whitespace or end of string).
/// Returns true if the WMI query (trimmed) is "SELECT &lt;* | property-list&gt; FROM &lt;class&gt;"
/// (optionally followed by a WHERE clause) against a class on the allowlist.
/// A property projection exposes a strict subset of the allowed "SELECT *".
/// </summary>
public static bool IsWmiQueryAllowed(string query)
=> IsWmiQueryAllowed(query, unrestrictedMode: false);
@@ -269,7 +310,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
return true;
var trimmed = query.Trim();
return AllowedWmiQueryPrefixes.Any(prefix =>
var match = WmiQueryRegex.Match(trimmed);
if (match.Success && AllowedWmiClasses.Contains(match.Groups[1].Value))
return true;
// Non-canonical allowlist entries keep the legacy literal-prefix match.
return ResidualWmiPrefixes.Any(prefix =>
trimmed.StartsWith(prefix, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(trimmed.Length == prefix.Length || char.IsWhiteSpace(trimmed[prefix.Length])));
}
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport
continue;
}
ThrowOnAuthFailure(response);
await ThrowOnAuthFailureAsync(response).ConfigureAwait(false);
response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
var responseJson = await response.Content.ReadAsStringAsync().ConfigureAwait(false);
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport
using (response)
{
ThrowOnAuthFailure(response);
await ThrowOnAuthFailureAsync(response).ConfigureAwait(false);
response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
var responseJson = await response.Content.ReadAsStringAsync().ConfigureAwait(false);
@@ -282,16 +282,97 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport
/// <summary>
/// Throws <see cref="BackendAuthException"/> for 401/403 responses so callers can
/// distinguish authentication failures from transient server errors.
/// <para>
/// Field case (sits-d.cloud, 2026-08-09): a pre-cutover agent build pointed at a
/// retired Function App; Azure answers for a stopped app with a platform-level 403
/// carrying an HTML error page ("Web App - Unavailable"). Our backend never returns
/// HTML on 401/403 — an HTML body therefore means the response did not come from the
/// backend's auth layer at all (stopped/retired app, edge proxy, WAF). Reporting that
/// as "device is not authorized" sends troubleshooting down the wrong path, so the
/// two cases get distinct messages and the exception carries a flag.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
private static void ThrowOnAuthFailure(HttpResponseMessage response)
private static async Task ThrowOnAuthFailureAsync(HttpResponseMessage response)
{
if (response.StatusCode == System.Net.HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized ||
response.StatusCode == System.Net.HttpStatusCode.Forbidden)
if (response.StatusCode != System.Net.HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized &&
response.StatusCode != System.Net.HttpStatusCode.Forbidden)
{
return;
}
var statusText = $"{(int)response.StatusCode} {response.StatusCode}";
string body = null;
try
{
body = await response.Content.ReadAsStringAsync().ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch
{
// Body is diagnostic-only; classification below treats null as non-HTML.
}
if (LooksLikeHtmlErrorPage(response, body))
{
var title = TryExtractHtmlTitle(body);
var titleText = title != null ? $" (\"{title}\")" : string.Empty;
var host = response.RequestMessage?.RequestUri?.Host ?? "(unknown host)";
throw new BackendAuthException(
$"Backend returned {(int)response.StatusCode} {response.StatusCode}. " +
"The device is not authorized. Check client certificate and Autopilot device validation.",
(int)response.StatusCode);
$"Backend returned {statusText} with an HTML platform error page{titleText} from '{host}'. " +
"This response did not come from the Autopilot Monitor backend — the endpoint appears stopped, " +
"retired, or intercepted by a proxy. This is NOT a device-authorization failure; an outdated " +
"agent build pointing at a stale ApiBaseUrl is the most likely cause.",
(int)response.StatusCode,
endpointUnavailable: true);
}
throw new BackendAuthException(
$"Backend returned {statusText}. " +
"The device is not authorized. Check client certificate and Autopilot device validation.",
(int)response.StatusCode);
}
/// <summary>
/// True when a 401/403 response is an HTML page rather than a backend JSON/plain-text
/// reply. Checks the declared Content-Type first, then falls back to sniffing the body
/// prefix so a platform page served with a generic Content-Type is still recognized.
/// </summary>
private static bool LooksLikeHtmlErrorPage(HttpResponseMessage response, string body)
{
var mediaType = response.Content?.Headers?.ContentType?.MediaType;
if (string.Equals(mediaType, "text/html", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
return true;
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(body))
return false;
var head = body.TrimStart();
return head.StartsWith("<!DOCTYPE", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) ||
head.StartsWith("<html", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
/// <summary>
/// Best-effort extraction of the HTML &lt;title&gt; (e.g. "Web App - Unavailable") so the
/// log line names the platform page without dumping markup. Null when absent/oversized.
/// </summary>
private static string TryExtractHtmlTitle(string body)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(body)) return null;
try
{
var match = System.Text.RegularExpressions.Regex.Match(
body, @"<title[^>]*>\s*(.*?)\s*</title>",
System.Text.RegularExpressions.RegexOptions.IgnoreCase |
System.Text.RegularExpressions.RegexOptions.Singleline,
TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(250));
if (!match.Success) return null;
var title = match.Groups[1].Value;
return title.Length == 0 ? null : (title.Length > 80 ? title.Substring(0, 80) : title);
}
catch
{
return null;
}
}
@@ -330,7 +411,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport
}
/// <summary>
/// Thrown when the backend returns 401 or 403, indicating the device is not authorized.
/// Thrown when the backend returns 401 or 403, indicating the device is not authorized —
/// or, when <see cref="EndpointUnavailable"/> is set, that the 401/403 was a platform-level
/// HTML response (stopped/retired app, edge proxy) rather than a backend auth verdict.
/// </summary>
public class BackendAuthException : Exception
{
@@ -340,9 +423,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport
/// </summary>
public int StatusCode { get; }
public BackendAuthException(string message, int statusCode = 0) : base(message)
/// <summary>
/// True when the 401/403 carried an HTML platform error page — the endpoint itself is
/// stopped/retired/proxied and the status says nothing about this device's authorization.
/// </summary>
public bool EndpointUnavailable { get; }
public BackendAuthException(string message, int statusCode = 0, bool endpointUnavailable = false) : base(message)
{
StatusCode = statusCode;
EndpointUnavailable = endpointUnavailable;
}
}
}
@@ -56,6 +56,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport
private DateTime? _lastReportTime;
private int _reportCount;
// Local W365 marker verdict, captured once at construction (same UNVERIFIED contract
// as the hardware fields). Optional ctor arg so test fakes stay source-compatible.
private readonly bool _isCloudPc;
public DistressReporter(
string baseUrl,
string tenantId,
@@ -64,7 +68,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport
string serialNumber,
string agentVersion,
AgentLogger logger,
X509Certificate2 clientCertificate = null)
X509Certificate2 clientCertificate = null,
bool isCloudPc = false)
{
_tenantId = tenantId;
_manufacturer = manufacturer;
@@ -72,6 +77,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport
_serialNumber = serialNumber;
_agentVersion = agentVersion;
_logger = logger;
_isCloudPc = isCloudPc;
// Capture cert context. Each field is independently nullable so the backend can tell
// "agent had no cert at all" (NoCertInStore + all-null fields) from "agent had a cert
@@ -169,6 +175,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport
HttpStatusCode = httpStatusCode,
Message = Truncate(message, 256),
Timestamp = DateTime.UtcNow,
IsCloudPc = _isCloudPc,
CertSourceState = _capturedCertState,
CertThumbprint = _capturedCertThumbprint,
CertSubject = Truncate(_capturedCertSubject, 96),
@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
IReadOnlyCollection<string> whiteGloveSealingPatternIds,
ISignalIngressSink ingress,
IClock clock,
Transport.Telemetry.ITelemetrySpool? telemetrySpool)
Transport.Telemetry.ITelemetrySpool? telemetrySpool,
TimelineEventStream? timelineEvents = null)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(sessionId)) throw new ArgumentException("SessionId required.", nameof(sessionId));
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(tenantId)) throw new ArgumentException("TenantId required.", nameof(tenantId));
@@ -126,7 +127,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
ingress: ingress,
clock: clock,
logger: logger,
startupGate: _startupEventGate));
startupGate: _startupEventGate,
// Live accessor (not the current value): a remote-config merge landing after
// factory construction must still reach the phase-triggered re-emissions.
espContinueAnywayObservationEnabled: () => _agentConfig.EnableEspContinueAnywayObservation));
// Session caa6cf50 gate-starvation fix: the EspAndHelloTracker's user-ESP-apps-settled
// probe reads the IME log host, which is constructed further down. Same closure-over-
@@ -471,8 +475,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
if (officeHost != null) hosts.Add(officeHost);
// M4.6.δ — Gather-rules runtime executor. Runs "startup" rules once the agent is up
// and "interval" rules on their timers; "phase_change" / "on_event" rules are driven
// by the host's SignalIngress.SignalPosted subscription (MON-A1).
// and "interval" rules on their timers; "phase_change" / "phase_exit" / "on_event"
// rules are driven by the post-reduce TimelineEventStream (emitted timeline events),
// NOT the raw SignalPosted stream — the raw phase can run minutes ahead of the
// engine-declared one (RealmJoin gate, session 32312a32). See TimelineEventStream doc.
if (_remoteConfig.GatherRules != null && _remoteConfig.GatherRules.Count > 0)
{
hosts.Add(new GatherRuleExecutorHost(
@@ -484,7 +490,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
rules: _remoteConfig.GatherRules,
imeLogPathOverride: _agentConfig.ImeLogPathOverride,
unrestrictedMode: _agentConfig.UnrestrictedMode,
gatherDebugLogPath: _agentConfig.GatherRuleDebugLogPath));
gatherDebugLogPath: _agentConfig.GatherRuleDebugLogPath,
timelineEvents: timelineEvents));
}
else if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(_agentConfig.GatherRuleDebugLogPath))
{
@@ -91,6 +91,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
// (tests / legacy callers) means trace events always flow.
private readonly Func<bool>? _traceEventsEnabled;
// Live accessor for AgentConfiguration.EnableEspContinueAnywayObservation — read at
// esp_config_detected stamping time so a remote-config merge that lands after
// construction still takes effect. Null (tests / legacy callers) means disabled.
private readonly Func<bool>? _espContinueAnywayObservationEnabled;
// Max-lifetime watchdog (M4.6.α). Timer is armed in Start() when _agentMaxLifetime != null.
private System.Threading.Timer? _maxLifetimeTimer;
private int _terminatedFired;
@@ -107,6 +112,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
private TelemetrySignalEmitter? _signalEmitter;
private TelemetryTransitionEmitter? _transitionEmitter;
private EventTimelineEmitter? _timelineEmitter;
private TimelineEventStream? _timelineEvents;
private BackPressureEventObserver? _backPressureObserver;
private IDeadlineScheduler? _scheduler;
private ClassifierRegistry? _classifierRegistry;
@@ -172,7 +178,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
TimeSpan? agentMaxLifetime = null,
int uploadBatchSize = 100,
IDeadlineScheduler? schedulerOverride = null,
Func<bool>? traceEventsEnabled = null)
Func<bool>? traceEventsEnabled = null,
Func<bool>? espContinueAnywayObservationEnabled = null)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(sessionId)) throw new ArgumentException("SessionId is mandatory.", nameof(sessionId));
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(tenantId)) throw new ArgumentException("TenantId is mandatory.", nameof(tenantId));
@@ -213,6 +220,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
_schedulerOverride = schedulerOverride;
_traceEventsEnabled = traceEventsEnabled;
_espContinueAnywayObservationEnabled = espContinueAnywayObservationEnabled;
}
/// <summary>
@@ -413,7 +421,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
_transport, _eventSequenceCounter, _sessionId, _tenantId, _traceEventsEnabled);
_signalEmitter = new TelemetrySignalEmitter(_transport, _sessionId, _tenantId);
_transitionEmitter = new TelemetryTransitionEmitter(_transport, _sessionId, _tenantId);
_timelineEmitter = new EventTimelineEmitter(eventEmitter);
// Post-reduce timeline observer: EventTimelineEmitter publishes every emitted event's
// (eventType, phase) here. Fed to the collector-host factory at step 14 so gather-rule
// phase_change/on_event triggers key off the ENGINE-REDUCED timeline (RealmJoin gate
// et al. respected) instead of raw pre-reduce signals — see TimelineEventStream doc.
_timelineEvents = new TimelineEventStream();
_timelineEmitter = new EventTimelineEmitter(eventEmitter, _timelineEvents);
_backPressureObserver = new BackPressureEventObserver(eventEmitter, _clock);
// 5) Deadlines + Classifiers.
@@ -653,7 +666,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
{
var surfaces = _componentFactory.CreateCollectorHosts(
_sessionId, _tenantId, _logger, _whiteGloveSealingPatternIds,
ingress: _ingress, clock: _clock, telemetrySpool: _spool);
ingress: _ingress, clock: _clock, telemetrySpool: _spool,
timelineEvents: _timelineEvents);
CollectorSurfaces = surfaces;
_collectorHosts = surfaces.Hosts;
foreach (var host in _collectorHosts)
@@ -766,6 +780,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
.ToString(System.Globalization.CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
if (snapshot.AllowContinueAnyway.HasValue)
payload[SignalPayloadKeys.EspAllowContinueAnyway] = snapshot.AllowContinueAnyway.Value ? "true" : "false";
// Tenant opt-in (remote config, not a registry fact) — only stamped when
// enabled; absent = default hard-fail semantics in the engine.
if (_espContinueAnywayObservationEnabled?.Invoke() == true)
payload[SignalPayloadKeys.EspContinueAnywayObservationEnabled] = "true";
_ingress!.Post(
kind: DecisionSignalKind.EspConfigDetected,
@@ -51,7 +51,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
getPackageStates: () => imeHost.PackageStates,
onDoTelemetryReceived: pkg =>
{
try { imeHost.Tracker.OnDoTelemetryReceived?.Invoke(pkg); }
// null source timestamp: poll-driven completion, no log line backs it —
// the adapter stamps the clock instead of LastMatchedLogTimestamp.
try { imeHost.Tracker.OnDoTelemetryReceived?.Invoke(pkg, null); }
catch (Exception ex) { logger.Warning($"DeliveryOptimizationHost: OnDoTelemetryReceived invocation threw: {ex.Message}"); }
},
logDirectory: Environment.ExpandEnvironmentVariables(Constants.LogDirectory),
@@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
ISignalIngressSink ingress,
IClock clock,
AgentLogger logger,
Persistence.StartupEventGate? startupGate = null)
Persistence.StartupEventGate? startupGate = null,
Func<bool>? espContinueAnywayObservationEnabled = null)
{
if (ingress == null) throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(ingress));
if (clock == null) throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(clock));
@@ -92,7 +93,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
// when it reads the FirstSync SkipUser/SkipDevice registry values, so that Fix 8's
// reducer guards have the SkipUserEsp/SkipDeviceEsp state facts to read.
_collector = new Monitoring.Telemetry.DeviceInfo.DeviceInfoCollector(
sessionId, tenantId, post, logger, ingress, clock, startupGate);
sessionId, tenantId, post, logger, ingress, clock, startupGate,
espContinueAnywayObservationEnabled);
_observableIngress = ingress as SignalIngress;
}
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Threading;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
@@ -19,17 +18,24 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
private readonly bool _unrestrictedMode;
private int _disposed;
// MON-A1: drive phase_change / on_event gather triggers from the central signal stream.
// V1 fired these from MonitoringService on every EnrollmentEvent (OnPhaseChanged(evt.Phase)
// on phase change + OnEvent(evt.EventType) per event); the V2 host previously only called
// UpdateRules, so 5 of 10 shipped rules (incl. the only enabled one, dsregcmd at
// FinalizingSetup) silently never fired. In V2 every event is an InformationalEvent signal
// carrying eventType + (optional) phase in its payload. Null on test fakes / non-SignalIngress
// sinks — then signal-triggers degrade off (startup + interval rules still run).
private readonly SignalIngress? _observableIngress;
private Action<DecisionSignalKind, IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string>?>? _signalPostedHandler;
// MON-A1 (revised): drive phase_change / phase_exit / on_event gather triggers from the
// POST-REDUCE emitted timeline (TimelineEventStream), not from the raw signal stream.
// V1 fired these from MonitoringService on every emitted EnrollmentEvent; the first V2
// wiring subscribed to SignalIngress.SignalPosted instead, which fires at enqueue time
// with the RAW collector payload — before the reducer has applied gates like the
// RealmJoin completion gate. Consequence (session 32312a32, rsneuffen.de): a phase_change
// rule on FinalizingSetup fired at the raw EspPhaseChanged(FinalizingSetup) signal (ESP
// exit / Hello wizard), 7 minutes before the engine declared phase_transition(FinalizingSetup)
// on the timeline — and before the RealmJoin package wrote the registry key the rule was
// built to read. The raw feed also never carried engine-emitted event types at all, so
// on_event rules on enrollment_complete (documented) could never fire. The emitted-event
// feed restores V1 semantics and matches what the UI timeline shows ("collect once when
// the enrollment reaches this phase"). Null on test fakes / standalone configurations —
// then phase/event triggers degrade off (startup + interval rules still run).
private readonly TimelineEventStream? _timelineEvents;
private Action<string, EnrollmentPhase>? _timelineHandler;
private readonly object _sync = new object();
private string? _lastPhaseName;
private EnrollmentPhase _lastPhase = EnrollmentPhase.Unknown;
public GatherRuleExecutorHost(
string sessionId,
@@ -40,7 +46,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
List<GatherRule> rules,
string? imeLogPathOverride,
bool unrestrictedMode = false,
string? gatherDebugLogPath = null)
string? gatherDebugLogPath = null,
TimelineEventStream? timelineEvents = null)
{
if (ingress == null) throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(ingress));
if (clock == null) throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(clock));
@@ -60,7 +67,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
_executor = new Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather.GatherRuleExecutor(
sessionId, tenantId, evt => post.Emit(evt), logger, imeLogPathOverride,
debugLogPath: gatherDebugLogPath);
_observableIngress = ingress as SignalIngress;
_timelineEvents = timelineEvents;
}
public void Start()
@@ -71,46 +78,43 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
_executor.UnrestrictedMode = _unrestrictedMode;
_executor.UpdateRules(_rules);
// MON-A1: observe the central signal stream so phase_change / on_event rules fire.
if (_observableIngress != null && _signalPostedHandler == null)
// MON-A1 (revised): observe the emitted timeline so phase/event triggers fire in
// step with what the timeline actually shows.
if (_timelineEvents != null && _timelineHandler == null)
{
_signalPostedHandler = OnSignalPosted;
_observableIngress.SignalPosted += _signalPostedHandler;
_timelineHandler = OnTimelineEventEmitted;
_timelineEvents.EventEmitted += _timelineHandler;
}
_logger.Info(
$"GatherRuleExecutorHost: started with {_rules.Count} rule(s), unrestrictedMode={_unrestrictedMode}, signalTriggers={(_observableIngress != null)}.");
$"GatherRuleExecutorHost: started with {_rules.Count} rule(s), unrestrictedMode={_unrestrictedMode}, timelineTriggers={(_timelineEvents != null)}.");
}
/// <summary>
/// Translates posted signals into the executor's phase_change / on_event triggers (MON-A1).
/// Phase: fire <see cref="Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather.GatherRuleExecutor.OnPhaseChanged"/> when
/// the observed phase changes and parses to an <see cref="EnrollmentPhase"/> (raw collector
/// phase strings that aren't enum names are ignored — they carry no gather-rule meaning).
/// Event: fire <see cref="Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather.GatherRuleExecutor.OnEvent"/> for every
/// InformationalEvent's eventType. The executor dispatches rule execution on the ThreadPool,
/// so this stays off the signal-posting hot path; it also dedups phase rules per (rule, phase).
/// Translates emitted timeline events into the executor's triggers. Phase: fire
/// <see cref="Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather.GatherRuleExecutor.OnPhaseChanged"/> when a
/// phase-declaration event (Phase != Unknown) moves the timeline to a new phase — this
/// is by construction the engine-reduced phase, so deferred transitions (RealmJoin gate)
/// fire the rules exactly when the timeline shows them. Event: fire
/// <see cref="Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather.GatherRuleExecutor.OnEvent"/> for every emitted
/// event's type — including engine-emitted types (enrollment_complete, phase_transition,
/// realmjoin_resolved, …) that never existed on the raw signal stream. The executor
/// dispatches rule execution on the ThreadPool, so this stays off the ingress worker's
/// effect path; it also dedups phase rules per (rule, phase).
/// </summary>
private void OnSignalPosted(DecisionSignalKind kind, IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string>? payload)
private void OnTimelineEventEmitted(string eventType, EnrollmentPhase phase)
{
if (payload == null) return;
try
{
lock (_sync)
{
if (payload.TryGetValue(SignalPayloadKeys.EspPhase, out var phaseName)
&& !string.IsNullOrEmpty(phaseName)
&& !string.Equals(phaseName, _lastPhaseName, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
&& Enum.TryParse<EnrollmentPhase>(phaseName, ignoreCase: true, out var phase))
if (phase != EnrollmentPhase.Unknown && phase != _lastPhase)
{
_lastPhaseName = phaseName;
_lastPhase = phase;
_executor.OnPhaseChanged(phase);
}
if (kind == DecisionSignalKind.InformationalEvent
&& payload.TryGetValue(SignalPayloadKeys.EventType, out var eventType)
&& !string.IsNullOrEmpty(eventType))
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(eventType))
{
_executor.OnEvent(eventType);
}
@@ -118,17 +122,17 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
_logger.Verbose($"GatherRuleExecutorHost: signal-trigger dispatch failed: {ex.Message}");
_logger.Verbose($"GatherRuleExecutorHost: timeline-trigger dispatch failed: {ex.Message}");
}
}
public void Stop()
{
if (_observableIngress != null && _signalPostedHandler != null)
if (_timelineEvents != null && _timelineHandler != null)
{
try { _observableIngress.SignalPosted -= _signalPostedHandler; }
try { _timelineEvents.EventEmitted -= _timelineHandler; }
catch { /* best-effort unsubscribe during shutdown */ }
_signalPostedHandler = null;
_timelineHandler = null;
}
// GatherRuleExecutor is IDisposable; no explicit Stop beyond unsubscribe. Rely on Dispose.
}
@@ -39,6 +39,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
/// <c>spool.pendingItemCount</c> / <c>spool.fileSizeBytes</c>. Nullable — fakes and
/// spool-less configurations pass null and the metrics fields are simply absent.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// <paramref name="timelineEvents"/> flows into the <c>GatherRuleExecutorHost</c> so
/// <c>phase_change</c> / <c>phase_exit</c> / <c>on_event</c> gather triggers key off the
/// ENGINE-REDUCED emitted timeline (post-reduce, RealmJoin gate respected) instead of raw
/// pre-reduce signals — see <see cref="TimelineEventStream"/>. Nullable — fakes pass null
/// and the host's phase/event triggers degrade off (startup + interval rules still run).
/// </para>
/// </summary>
CollectorSurfaces CreateCollectorHosts(
string sessionId,
@@ -47,6 +54,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
IReadOnlyCollection<string> whiteGloveSealingPatternIds,
ISignalIngressSink ingress,
IClock clock,
Transport.Telemetry.ITelemetrySpool? telemetrySpool);
Transport.Telemetry.ITelemetrySpool? telemetrySpool,
TimelineEventStream? timelineEvents = null);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
#nullable enable
using System;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
{
/// <summary>
/// Post-reduce observer surface for emitted timeline events: <see cref="Telemetry.Events.EventTimelineEmitter"/>
/// publishes every <see cref="EnrollmentEvent"/> it emits as an <c>(eventType, phase)</c> pair,
/// AFTER the decision engine has reduced the originating signal and its effects have been
/// executed.
/// <para>
/// This is deliberately different from <see cref="SignalIngress.SignalPosted"/>, which fires
/// at enqueue time on the producer thread and therefore only ever carries the RAW collector
/// payload — before the reducer has applied gates like the RealmJoin completion gate that can
/// defer or suppress a phase transition. Consumers that must agree with what the timeline
/// actually shows (the gather-rule phase/event triggers) subscribe here, not to the raw
/// signal stream. See session 32312a32: a <c>phase_change</c> gather rule on FinalizingSetup
/// fired at the raw <c>EspPhaseChanged(FinalizingSetup)</c> signal (ESP exit), 7 minutes
/// before the engine — deferred behind the RealmJoin gate — actually declared
/// <c>phase_transition(FinalizingSetup)</c> on the timeline.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// <b>Threading</b>: <see cref="Publish"/> runs on the ingress worker thread (the effect
/// execution path). Subscribers must stay fast and must not block; subscriber exceptions are
/// swallowed per handler so the emit path can never throw (an exception here would surface
/// as an EffectRunner transient retry and duplicate the emitted event).
/// </para>
/// </summary>
public sealed class TimelineEventStream
{
/// <summary>
/// Raised once per emitted timeline event with its <see cref="EnrollmentEvent.EventType"/>
/// and parsed <see cref="EnrollmentEvent.Phase"/> (<see cref="EnrollmentPhase.Unknown"/>
/// for the vast majority of events — only phase-declaration events carry a real phase,
/// which is exactly the set the UI timeline groups on).
/// </summary>
public event Action<string, EnrollmentPhase>? EventEmitted;
internal void Publish(string eventType, EnrollmentPhase phase)
{
var handler = EventEmitted;
if (handler == null) return;
foreach (Action<string, EnrollmentPhase> subscriber in handler.GetInvocationList())
{
try { subscriber(eventType, phase); }
catch
{
// Subscriber isolation — see class doc: the emit path must never throw.
}
}
}
}
}
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security
private int _consecutiveFailures;
private DateTime? _firstFailureUtc;
private int _thresholdFired; // 0/1 — Interlocked exchange makes the event single-shot
private int _distressDispatched; // 0/1 per failure streak — reset by RecordSuccess
public AuthFailureTracker(
int maxFailures,
@@ -77,18 +78,27 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security
public void RecordSuccess()
{
if (Interlocked.Exchange(ref _consecutiveFailures, 0) == 0) return; // no-op if already zero
Interlocked.Exchange(ref _distressDispatched, 0);
lock (_windowLock) { _firstFailureUtc = null; }
}
/// <summary>
/// Record a 401/403 from the given <paramref name="operation"/>. V1 parity — on the FIRST
/// failure this fires a single distress report via the constructor-injected
/// <see cref="DistressReporter"/> (401 → AuthCertificateRejected, 403 → DeviceNotRegistered).
/// Subsequent failures are logged + counted but do not dispatch further distress signals.
/// Emits <see cref="ThresholdExceeded"/> the first time either ceiling is crossed;
/// subsequent calls after termination is armed are no-ops.
/// Record a 401/403 from the given <paramref name="operation"/>. V1 parity — the first
/// qualifying failure of a streak fires a single distress report via the
/// constructor-injected <see cref="DistressReporter"/> (401 → AuthCertificateRejected,
/// 403 → DeviceNotRegistered). Subsequent failures are logged + counted but do not
/// dispatch further distress signals. Emits <see cref="ThresholdExceeded"/> the first
/// time either ceiling is crossed; subsequent calls after termination is armed are no-ops.
/// </summary>
public void RecordFailure(int statusCode, string operation)
/// <param name="endpointUnavailable">
/// True when the 401/403 was a platform-level HTML response (stopped/retired app, edge
/// proxy — see <see cref="BackendAuthException.EndpointUnavailable"/>). Suppresses the
/// distress dispatch: the report would go to the very endpoint that just answered with a
/// platform error page, and its DeviceNotRegistered classification would be wrong anyway.
/// Counting and the shutdown thresholds are unaffected. Should a later failure in the
/// same streak come from a live backend, that one still dispatches the streak's report.
/// </param>
public void RecordFailure(int statusCode, string operation, bool endpointUnavailable = false)
{
if (Volatile.Read(ref _thresholdFired) == 1) return;
@@ -102,10 +112,21 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security
firstFailureAt = _firstFailureUtc.Value;
}
// V1 parity — only the first consecutive failure produces a distress report. Repeat
// hits at 2..N use the local log only; the backend already knows from the first
// report that the device is unauthorized.
if (count == 1 && _distressReporter != null)
// V1 parity — only one distress report per failure streak. Repeat hits use the local
// log only; the backend already knows from the first report that the device is
// unauthorized. Endpoint-unavailable failures never dispatch (nothing to send to) but
// also never consume the streak's report slot.
if (endpointUnavailable)
{
if (_distressReporter != null && Volatile.Read(ref _distressDispatched) == 0)
{
_logger.Info(
$"AuthFailureTracker: distress report suppressed for {operation} (http {statusCode}) — " +
"endpoint unavailable (platform error page), a report cannot reach a stopped endpoint.");
}
}
else if (_distressReporter != null &&
Interlocked.CompareExchange(ref _distressDispatched, 1, 0) == 0)
{
var distressType = statusCode == 403
? DistressErrorType.DeviceNotRegistered
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
using System;
using Microsoft.Win32;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security
{
/// <summary>
/// Detects whether the agent runs on a Windows 365 Cloud PC, using the same marker
/// evidence the bootstrap script's <c>Test-IsCloudPc</c> settled on after the first
/// W365 field test (2026-08-06) disproved WMI-model matching (a Cloud PC reports only
/// Manufacturer='Microsoft Corporation' + Model='Virtual Machine' locally — identical
/// to any Hyper-V VM):
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item><c>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows365</c> exists, AND</item>
/// <item>the <c>CloudManagedDesktopExtension</c> service (Microsoft Cloud Managed
/// Desktop Extension, the W365 management agent that runs ON Cloud PCs) is
/// installed — probed via its <c>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</c> key,
/// so the agent needs no System.ServiceProcess dependency.</item>
/// </list>
/// BOTH markers are required (AND): each alone has plausible look-alikes (W365-Boot
/// physical clients may carry Windows365 policy state; the MCMD agent family also
/// served other managed-desktop offerings).
/// <para>
/// Display/context metadata only — the flag rides on <c>SessionRegistration</c> and the
/// <c>EnrollmentFactsObserved</c> signal. It is NEVER an auth input: backend device
/// validation trusts exclusively the cert-CN-bound Graph lookup
/// (<c>CloudPcDeviceValidator</c>), not this locally-derived value.
/// Exception-swallowing, false on any error — mirrors the SKIP-safe bootstrap contract
/// and the <see cref="EnrollmentRegistryDetector"/> degradation rules.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
public static class CloudPcDetector
{
internal const string Windows365MarkerKey = @"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows365";
internal const string CmdeServiceKey = @"SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CloudManagedDesktopExtension";
public static bool DetectIsCloudPc()
{
try
{
return ResolveIsCloudPc(SubKeyExists);
}
catch
{
return false;
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Pure decision logic for <see cref="DetectIsCloudPc"/>. Exposed internally so the
/// marker-AND semantics can be exercised without a real registry (same seam contract
/// as <see cref="EnrollmentRegistryDetector.ResolveHybridJoinFromValues"/>).
/// <paramref name="subKeyExists"/> receives an HKLM-relative subkey path and reports
/// whether it exists; a throwing probe degrades to <c>false</c>.
/// </summary>
internal static bool ResolveIsCloudPc(Func<string, bool> subKeyExists)
{
if (subKeyExists == null) return false;
try
{
return subKeyExists(Windows365MarkerKey) && subKeyExists(CmdeServiceKey);
}
catch
{
return false;
}
}
private static bool SubKeyExists(string subKeyPath)
{
using (var key = Registry.LocalMachine.OpenSubKey(subKeyPath))
{
return key != null;
}
}
}
}
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security
// Feed the central auth-failure tracker so the first-failure distress dispatches
// and the shutdown threshold advances. V1 parity: no retry on auth-failure —
// backend has definitively rejected the cert/token.
authFailureTracker?.RecordFailure(ex.StatusCode, "agent/register-session");
authFailureTracker?.RecordFailure(ex.StatusCode, "agent/register-session", ex.EndpointUnavailable);
return SessionRegistrationResult.AuthFailed(ex.StatusCode, ex.Message);
}
catch (Exception ex)
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security
EnrollmentType = EnrollmentRegistryDetector.DetectEnrollmentType(),
IsHybridJoin = EnrollmentRegistryDetector.DetectHybridJoin(),
IsSelfDeployingProfile = EnrollmentRegistryDetector.DetectSelfDeployingProfile(),
IsCloudPc = CloudPcDetector.DetectIsCloudPc(),
// Deliberately stays true even for self-deploying profiles: the WhiteGlove
// Part1/Part2 merge paths and existing dashboards key on IsUserDriven;
// IsSelfDeployingProfile is the additive classification signal.
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters
private readonly Action<AppPackageState, AppInstallationState, AppInstallationState>? _prevOnAppStateChanged;
private readonly Action<string>? _prevOnPatternMatched;
private readonly Action<string>? _prevOnImeAgentVersion;
private readonly Action<AppPackageState>? _prevOnDoTelemetryReceived;
private readonly Action<AppPackageState, DateTime?>? _prevOnDoTelemetryReceived;
private readonly Action<ScriptExecutionState>? _prevOnScriptCompleted;
private readonly Action<ScriptStartedInfo>? _prevOnScriptStarted;
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters
private readonly Action<AppPackageState, AppInstallationState, AppInstallationState> _ourOnAppStateChanged;
private readonly Action<string> _ourOnPatternMatched;
private readonly Action<string> _ourOnImeAgentVersion;
private readonly Action<AppPackageState> _ourOnDoTelemetryReceived;
private readonly Action<AppPackageState, DateTime?> _ourOnDoTelemetryReceived;
private readonly Action<ScriptExecutionState> _ourOnScriptCompleted;
private readonly Action<ScriptStartedInfo> _ourOnScriptStarted;
@@ -242,10 +242,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters
EmitImeAgentVersion(version);
}
private void OnDoTelemetryReceived(AppPackageState app)
private void OnDoTelemetryReceived(AppPackageState app, DateTime? sourceTimestampUtc)
{
_prevOnDoTelemetryReceived?.Invoke(app);
EmitDoTelemetry(app);
_prevOnDoTelemetryReceived?.Invoke(app, sourceTimestampUtc);
EmitDoTelemetry(app, sourceTimestampUtc);
}
private void OnScriptCompleted(ScriptExecutionState script)
@@ -266,7 +266,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters
EmitAppState(app, oldState, newState);
internal void TriggerPatternMatchedFromTest(string patternId) => MaybeEmitWhiteGloveSealingPattern(patternId);
internal void TriggerImeAgentVersionFromTest(string version) => EmitImeAgentVersion(version);
internal void TriggerDoTelemetryFromTest(AppPackageState app) => EmitDoTelemetry(app);
internal void TriggerDoTelemetryFromTest(AppPackageState app, DateTime? sourceTimestampUtc = null) =>
EmitDoTelemetry(app, sourceTimestampUtc);
internal void TriggerScriptCompletedFromTest(ScriptExecutionState script) => EmitScriptCompleted(script);
internal void TriggerScriptStartedFromTest(ScriptStartedInfo info) => EmitScriptStarted(info);
@@ -876,7 +877,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters
_logger?.Info($"ImeAdapter: IME agent version detected: {version}");
}
private void EmitDoTelemetry(AppPackageState app)
private void EmitDoTelemetry(AppPackageState app, DateTime? sourceTimestampUtc)
{
if (app == null || string.IsNullOrEmpty(app.Id)) return;
@@ -912,11 +913,31 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters
var patternId = _tracker.LastMatchedPatternId;
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(patternId)) data["patternId"] = patternId!;
var now = ResolveOccurredAt(out var derivedFromClock, out var rawSourceTs);
// Two trigger paths with different time grounding (session df1fcf47: a single
// tz-skewed unrelated log line inherited via LastMatchedLogTimestamp dragged the
// session StartedAt back 7h and inflated the reported duration):
// - [DO TEL] log line (sourceTimestampUtc set): the line's own timestamp is the
// event time — resolve/clamp it and apply historic-replay suppression.
// - DO collector poll (sourceTimestampUtc null): the completion was observed live
// via Get-DeliveryOptimizationStatus; no log line is involved, so the clock is
// the only honest source. LastMatchedLogTimestamp must NOT be consulted here.
DateTime now;
bool derivedFromClock;
DateTime? rawSourceTs;
if (sourceTimestampUtc.HasValue)
{
now = ResolveOccurredAt(sourceTimestampUtc, out derivedFromClock, out rawSourceTs);
// Historic replay — a week-old DO summary is not this enrollment's download.
if (SuppressIfHistoricReplay(derivedFromClock, rawSourceTs, SharedEventTypes.DoTelemetry, app.Id))
return;
// Historic replay — a week-old DO summary is not this enrollment's download.
if (SuppressIfHistoricReplay(derivedFromClock, rawSourceTs, SharedEventTypes.DoTelemetry, app.Id))
return;
}
else
{
now = _clock.UtcNow;
derivedFromClock = true;
rawSourceTs = null;
}
TagDerivedTimestamp(data, derivedFromClock, rawSourceTs);
@@ -81,10 +81,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Telemetry.Events
internal const string ReasonParamKey = "reason";
private readonly TelemetryEventEmitter _emitter;
private readonly TimelineEventStream? _timelineEvents;
public EventTimelineEmitter(TelemetryEventEmitter emitter)
public EventTimelineEmitter(TelemetryEventEmitter emitter, TimelineEventStream? timelineEvents = null)
{
_emitter = emitter ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(emitter));
_timelineEvents = timelineEvents;
}
public void Emit(
@@ -142,6 +144,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Telemetry.Events
};
_emitter.Emit(evt);
// Post-reduce observer surface: published AFTER the transport enqueue so subscribers
// (gather-rule phase/event triggers) see exactly the ordering that reaches the wire.
// Publish never throws (subscriber isolation inside the stream).
_timelineEvents?.Publish(evt.EventType, evt.Phase);
}
/// <summary>
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ using System.Net.Http;
using System.Text;
using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Newtonsoft.Json;
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2
$"{(bootstrapTokenGiven ? "*" : "")}, " +
$"tenantId={(string.IsNullOrEmpty(merged.TenantId) ? "no" : "yes")}" +
$"{(tenantIdGiven ? "*" : "")}, " +
$"tenantIdWait={merged.TenantIdWaitSeconds}s" +
$"tenantIdWait={(merged.TenantIdWaitSeconds is int w ? $"{w}s" : "default")}" +
$"{(tenantIdWaitGiven ? "*" : "")})." +
" Star = explicitly set on this --install invocation, others were preserved from prior config.");
}
@@ -361,9 +361,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2
{
BootstrapToken = bootstrapTokenGiven ? bootstrapTokenArg : existing?.BootstrapToken,
TenantId = tenantIdGiven ? tenantIdArg : existing?.TenantId,
// Not given → carry the prior value through, INCLUDING null. Persisting a
// number here would freeze the agent-side default into the file; persisting
// null keeps "not configured" distinguishable from an explicit opt-out (0).
TenantIdWaitSeconds = tenantIdWaitGiven
? tenantIdWaitSeconds
: (existing?.TenantIdWaitSeconds ?? 600),
: existing?.TenantIdWaitSeconds,
};
}
@@ -339,13 +339,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2
// over the agent-side default (600 s). Hybrid-AAD-joined devices typically
// need ~5 min for the AAD device cert to land in the registry; 600 s leaves
// headroom. Pass `--tenant-id-wait 0` to opt out (legacy fast-fail).
// A bootstrap-config.json whose TenantIdWaitSeconds is null (file predates the
// property) is "not configured", NOT an opt-out — the default must still apply.
var tenantIdWaitRaw = GetArgValue(args, "--tenant-id-wait");
const int tenantIdWaitDefaultSeconds = 600;
int tenantIdWaitSeconds = tenantIdWaitDefaultSeconds;
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(tenantIdWaitRaw) && int.TryParse(tenantIdWaitRaw, out var parsedTenantIdWait))
tenantIdWaitSeconds = parsedTenantIdWait;
else if (bootstrapConfig != null)
tenantIdWaitSeconds = bootstrapConfig.TenantIdWaitSeconds;
else if (bootstrapConfig?.TenantIdWaitSeconds != null)
tenantIdWaitSeconds = bootstrapConfig.TenantIdWaitSeconds.Value;
var useBootstrapTokenAuth = !string.IsNullOrEmpty(bootstrapToken);
@@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime
// Await-enrollment is one-shot — remove the persisted config so subsequent restarts proceed normally.
Program.DeleteAwaitEnrollmentConfig(dataDirectory, logger);
RetrySelfUpdateAfterEnrollment(logger, consoleMode);
}
// Event-driven TenantId wait — kicks in only when the user opted-in via
@@ -152,6 +154,46 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime
isWhiteGloveResume: isWhiteGloveResume,
cleanupServiceFactory: cleanupServiceFactory);
}
/// <summary>
/// One-shot self-update retry after the MDM certificate appeared. The startup check in
/// <c>Main</c> runs pre-enrollment, where an --await-enrollment install typically has no
/// network yet — its failure says nothing about the latest version. The certificate is
/// proof of connectivity, and this is the last chance to swap a stranded old build
/// (stale baked-in ApiBaseUrl) for a current one BEFORE session registration hits a
/// retired endpoint (field case sits-d.cloud, 2026-08-09). Timeouts are relaxed vs. the
/// boot-speed-tuned startup check; enrollment is already past OOBE's critical path here.
/// On update success the process restarts and this method never returns; the
/// await-enrollment config was already removed, so the new binary proceeds normally.
/// </summary>
private static void RetrySelfUpdateAfterEnrollment(AgentLogger logger, bool consoleMode)
{
if (SelfUpdater.LastVersionCheckSucceeded)
return; // Startup check reached the manifest — its verdict stands.
try
{
logger.Info("Await-enrollment: startup self-update check had failed (no network in early OOBE) — retrying now that enrollment proves connectivity.");
var agentDir = System.IO.Path.GetDirectoryName(
System.Reflection.Assembly.GetExecutingAssembly().Location) ?? string.Empty;
SelfUpdater.CheckAndApplyUpdateAsync(
currentVersion: Program.GetAgentVersion(),
agentDir: agentDir,
consoleMode: consoleMode,
triggerReason: "await_enrollment",
downloadTimeoutMsOverride: 60000,
// Fresh --await-enrollment installs have no cached remote config yet, so
// there is no admin downgrade override to honour on this path.
allowDowngrade: false,
versionCheckTimeoutMsOverride: 10000).GetAwaiter().GetResult();
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
// Same contract as the startup call site: the updater swallows its own errors;
// anything escaping must not break bootstrap — the current binary continues.
logger.Warning($"Await-enrollment: self-update retry failed unexpectedly: {ex.Message}. Continuing with current version.");
}
}
}
/// <summary>
@@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime
uploadBatchSize: uploadBatchSize,
// Live read: remote config is merged into agentConfig mid-session, so the
// trace-event gate must follow it rather than snapshot at construction.
traceEventsEnabled: () => agentConfig.SendTraceEvents))
traceEventsEnabled: () => agentConfig.SendTraceEvents,
espContinueAnywayObservationEnabled: () => agentConfig.EnableEspContinueAnywayObservation))
{
using (var shutdown = new ManualResetEventSlim(false))
using (var shutdownComplete = new ManualResetEventSlim(false))
@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime
serialNumber: hardware.SerialNumber,
agentVersion: agentVersion,
logger: logger,
clientCertificate: clientCertificate);
clientCertificate: clientCertificate,
isCloudPc: CloudPcDetector.DetectIsCloudPc());
var emergencyReporter = new EmergencyReporter(
apiClient: backendApiClient,
@@ -309,12 +309,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime
var enrollmentType = EnrollmentRegistryDetector.DetectEnrollmentType();
var isHybridJoin = EnrollmentRegistryDetector.DetectHybridJoin();
var isSelfDeploying = EnrollmentRegistryDetector.DetectSelfDeployingProfile();
var isCloudPc = CloudPcDetector.DetectIsCloudPc();
var payload = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.Ordinal)
{
["enrollmentType"] = enrollmentType,
["isHybridJoin"] = isHybridJoin ? "true" : "false",
["isSelfDeployingProfile"] = isSelfDeploying ? "true" : "false",
["isCloudPc"] = isCloudPc ? "true" : "false",
};
var evidence = new Evidence(
@@ -329,7 +331,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime
evidence: evidence,
payload: payload);
logger.Debug($"EnrollmentFactsObserved signal posted (enrollmentType={enrollmentType}, isHybridJoin={isHybridJoin}, isSelfDeployingProfile={isSelfDeploying}).");
logger.Debug($"EnrollmentFactsObserved signal posted (enrollmentType={enrollmentType}, isHybridJoin={isHybridJoin}, isSelfDeployingProfile={isSelfDeploying}, isCloudPc={isCloudPc}).");
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.State;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests
{
/// <summary>
/// W365 — reducer-level coverage for the Cloud PC marker fact riding
/// <see cref="DecisionSignalKind.EnrollmentFactsObserved"/>: the observation records BOTH
/// values set-once (mirror of the registry self-deploying fact), the profile reason
/// carries the "no Device-ESP phase expected" expectation, and the signal census folds the
/// positive marker into terminal audit trails. The engine deliberately has no DeviceSetup
/// arrival requirement, so no behavioural gate is added — the observation is the
/// engine-side context that a session starting at Account Setup is the expected shape.
/// </summary>
public sealed class CloudPcObservationTests
{
private static readonly DateTime T0 = new DateTime(2026, 8, 7, 10, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private static DecisionSignal MakeSignal(
long ordinal,
DecisionSignalKind kind,
DateTime occurredAtUtc,
IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string>? payload = null) =>
new DecisionSignal(
sessionSignalOrdinal: ordinal,
sessionTraceOrdinal: ordinal,
kind: kind,
kindSchemaVersion: 1,
occurredAtUtc: occurredAtUtc,
sourceOrigin: "test",
evidence: new Evidence(EvidenceKind.Synthetic, $"t-{kind}-{ordinal}", $"synthetic {kind}"),
payload: payload);
private static DecisionState ReduceFacts(DecisionEngine engine, DecisionState state, long ordinal, string isCloudPc)
=> engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(ordinal, DecisionSignalKind.EnrollmentFactsObserved, T0.AddSeconds(ordinal),
new Dictionary<string, string>
{
[SignalPayloadKeys.EnrollmentType] = "v1",
[SignalPayloadKeys.IsCloudPc] = isCloudPc,
})).NewState;
[Fact]
public void EnrollmentFactsObserved_true_recordsObservation_andExpectationReason()
{
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = engine.Reduce(
DecisionState.CreateInitial("cpc-1", "t", T0),
MakeSignal(0, DecisionSignalKind.SessionStarted, T0)).NewState;
state = ReduceFacts(engine, state, 1, "true");
Assert.NotNull(state.ScenarioObservations.CloudPc);
Assert.True(state.ScenarioObservations.CloudPc!.Value);
Assert.Equal(1, state.ScenarioObservations.CloudPc!.SourceSignalOrdinal);
Assert.Equal(
EnrollmentScenarioProfileUpdater.CloudPcNoDeviceEspExpectedReason,
state.ScenarioProfile.Reason);
// Stage-agnostic fact signal — the reducer must not move the session anywhere.
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.SessionStarted, state.Stage);
}
[Fact]
public void EnrollmentFactsObserved_false_recordsObservation_setOnce()
{
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = engine.Reduce(
DecisionState.CreateInitial("cpc-2", "t", T0),
MakeSignal(0, DecisionSignalKind.SessionStarted, T0)).NewState;
state = ReduceFacts(engine, state, 1, "false");
Assert.NotNull(state.ScenarioObservations.CloudPc);
Assert.False(state.ScenarioObservations.CloudPc!.Value);
// Set-once: a later contradicting re-read must not overwrite the first sighting
// (same contract as RegistrySelfDeployingProfile — replay-deterministic evidence).
state = ReduceFacts(engine, state, 2, "true");
Assert.False(state.ScenarioObservations.CloudPc!.Value);
Assert.Equal(1, state.ScenarioObservations.CloudPc!.SourceSignalOrdinal);
}
[Fact]
public void Census_foldsPositiveMarker_only()
{
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var initial = engine.Reduce(
DecisionState.CreateInitial("cpc-3", "t", T0),
MakeSignal(0, DecisionSignalKind.SessionStarted, T0)).NewState;
var cloudPcState = ReduceFacts(engine, initial, 1, "true");
var census = DecisionStateSignalCensus.Build(cloudPcState);
Assert.Contains("cloud_pc_marker", census.SignalsSeen);
Assert.True(census.SignalEvidence.ContainsKey("cloudPcMarker"));
var physicalState = ReduceFacts(engine, initial, 1, "false");
var physicalCensus = DecisionStateSignalCensus.Build(physicalState);
Assert.DoesNotContain("cloud_pc_marker", physicalCensus.SignalsSeen);
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.State;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests
{
/// <summary>
/// Continue-Anyway observation mode (tenant c9787ba2, session 53d1e9f6, 2026-08-08).
/// A Device-phase ESP terminal failure (AccountSetup never entered) on a
/// Continue-Anyway-enabled profile is a hard fail by default; with the tenant opt-in
/// (<c>EspContinueAnywayObservationEnabled</c> observation) it is defanged into a 60-min
/// observation advisory instead. Coverage:
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item>Defang + 60-min AdvisoryCompletion arming (vs the classic 30-min window).</item>
/// <item>Opt-out / ContinueAnyway-off / self-deploying-scenario regressions still hard-fail.</item>
/// <item>Real-user desktop + Hello-disabled completes eagerly through Finalizing; the
/// terminal enrollment_complete carries the espSoftFailure marker.</item>
/// <item>Window expiry without desktop un-defangs to esp_terminal_failure.</item>
/// <item>Deadline fire with desktop but unknown Hello promotes to AwaitingHello.</item>
/// <item>Category recovery ("Try again") resolves the advisory (classic 4910a5a5 hook).</item>
/// </list>
/// </summary>
public sealed class ContinueAnywayObservationTests
{
private static readonly DateTime T0 = new DateTime(2026, 8, 7, 15, 16, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private static DecisionSignal MakeSignal(
long ordinal,
DecisionSignalKind kind,
DateTime occurredAtUtc,
IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string>? payload = null,
string sourceOrigin = "test")
{
return new DecisionSignal(
sessionSignalOrdinal: ordinal,
sessionTraceOrdinal: ordinal,
kind: kind,
kindSchemaVersion: 1,
occurredAtUtc: occurredAtUtc,
sourceOrigin: sourceOrigin,
evidence: new Evidence(EvidenceKind.Synthetic, $"{kind}-{ordinal}", "test"),
payload: payload);
}
private static DecisionSignal DeadlineFired(long ordinal, DateTime occurredAtUtc, string deadlineName) =>
MakeSignal(ordinal, DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired, occurredAtUtc,
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline] = deadlineName });
private static DecisionEffect SingleTimelineEffect(DecisionStep step, string eventType) =>
step.Effects.Single(e =>
e.Kind == DecisionEffectKind.EmitEventTimelineEntry
&& e.Parameters != null
&& e.Parameters.TryGetValue("eventType", out var et)
&& et == eventType);
private static ActiveDeadline? FindDeadline(DecisionState state, string name) =>
state.Deadlines.FirstOrDefault(d => d.Name == name);
/// <summary>
/// Replays the session-53d1e9f6 shape up to (but excluding) the ESP terminal failure:
/// Continue-Anyway profile with the tenant observation opt-in stamped into the
/// EspConfigDetected payload, Hello policy disabled, DeviceSetup entered —
/// AccountSetup never reached (the 30-min Device-ESP wall kills it first).
/// </summary>
private static DecisionState SetupObservationEligibleSession(
DecisionEngine engine,
bool observationOptIn = true,
bool continueAnyway = true,
bool helloPolicyDisabled = true)
{
var state = DecisionState.CreateInitial("sess-53d1e9f6", "tenant-c9787ba2", T0);
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(0, DecisionSignalKind.SessionStarted, T0)).NewState;
var espConfig = new Dictionary<string, string>
{
[SignalPayloadKeys.SkipUserEsp] = "false",
[SignalPayloadKeys.SkipDeviceEsp] = "false",
[SignalPayloadKeys.EspSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes] = "30",
[SignalPayloadKeys.EspAllowContinueAnyway] = continueAnyway ? "true" : "false",
};
if (observationOptIn)
{
espConfig[SignalPayloadKeys.EspContinueAnywayObservationEnabled] = "true";
}
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
5, DecisionSignalKind.EspConfigDetected, T0.AddMinutes(1), espConfig)).NewState;
if (helloPolicyDisabled)
{
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
8, DecisionSignalKind.HelloPolicyDetected, T0.AddMinutes(1),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.HelloEnabled] = "false" })).NewState;
}
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
10, DecisionSignalKind.EspPhaseChanged, T0.AddMinutes(2),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.EspPhase] = "DeviceSetup" })).NewState;
return state;
}
private static DecisionStep ApplyDeviceSetupTerminalFailure(DecisionEngine engine, DecisionState state, long ordinal = 50) =>
engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
ordinal, DecisionSignalKind.EspTerminalFailure, T0.AddMinutes(38),
new Dictionary<string, string>
{
["failureType"] = "Provisioning_DeviceSetup_Certificates_Failed",
["failedSubcategory"] = "Certificates",
["category"] = "DeviceSetup",
}));
// ============================================================ defang path ====
[Fact]
public void DeviceSetupFailure_WithOptIn_DefangsToObservationAdvisory()
{
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = SetupObservationEligibleSession(engine);
Assert.Null(state.AccountSetupEnteredUtc);
var preStage = state.Stage;
var step = ApplyDeviceSetupTerminalFailure(engine, state);
// No terminal — stage unchanged, advisory anchored, no LastFailureTrigger.
Assert.Equal(preStage, step.NewState.Stage);
Assert.Null(step.NewState.Outcome);
Assert.NotNull(step.NewState.EspAdvisoryFailureRecordedUtc);
Assert.Equal("DeviceSetup", step.NewState.EspAdvisoryFailureCategory!.Value);
Assert.Null(step.NewState.LastFailureTrigger);
var advisory = SingleTimelineEffect(step, "esp_failure_advisory");
Assert.Equal("esp_failure_defanged_continueanyway_observation", advisory.Parameters!["advisoryReason"]);
Assert.Equal("Warning", advisory.Parameters!["severity"]);
Assert.Equal("true", advisory.Parameters!["mayHaveContinuedAnyway"]);
Assert.DoesNotContain(step.Effects, e =>
e.Parameters != null
&& e.Parameters.TryGetValue("eventType", out var et)
&& et == "enrollment_failed");
}
[Fact]
public void DeviceSetupFailure_WithOptIn_Arms60MinObservationWindow()
{
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = SetupObservationEligibleSession(engine);
var step = ApplyDeviceSetupTerminalFailure(engine, state);
var deadline = FindDeadline(step.NewState, DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion);
Assert.NotNull(deadline);
// 60-min observation window (user decision 2026-08-08) — NOT the classic 30-min
// advisory-completion window.
Assert.Equal(T0.AddMinutes(38).AddMinutes(60), deadline!.DueAtUtc);
}
// ==================================================== negative / regression ====
[Fact]
public void DeviceSetupFailure_WithoutOptIn_StillHardFails()
{
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = SetupObservationEligibleSession(engine, observationOptIn: false);
var step = ApplyDeviceSetupTerminalFailure(engine, state);
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Failed, step.NewState.Stage);
Assert.Equal(SessionOutcome.EnrollmentFailed, step.NewState.Outcome);
Assert.Null(step.NewState.EspAdvisoryFailureRecordedUtc);
SingleTimelineEffect(step, "enrollment_failed");
}
[Fact]
public void DeviceSetupFailure_WithOptIn_ButContinueAnywayDisabled_StillHardFails()
{
// The observation only makes sense when the ESP profile actually offers the
// "Continue anyway" button — without it the user cannot reach the desktop.
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = SetupObservationEligibleSession(engine, continueAnyway: false);
var step = ApplyDeviceSetupTerminalFailure(engine, state);
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Failed, step.NewState.Stage);
Assert.Null(step.NewState.EspAdvisoryFailureRecordedUtc);
SingleTimelineEffect(step, "enrollment_failed");
}
[Fact]
public void DeviceSetupFailure_WithOptIn_OnSelfDeployingProfile_StillHardFails()
{
// Scope gate: self-deploying/kiosk flows have no interactive user who could press
// "Continue anyway" — observation would only ever expire. Immediate fail is truthful.
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = SetupObservationEligibleSession(engine);
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
20, DecisionSignalKind.EnrollmentFactsObserved, T0.AddMinutes(3),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.IsSelfDeployingProfile] = "true" })).NewState;
var step = ApplyDeviceSetupTerminalFailure(engine, state);
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Failed, step.NewState.Stage);
Assert.Null(step.NewState.EspAdvisoryFailureRecordedUtc);
}
[Fact]
public void ClassicAdvisory_WithAccountSetupEntered_KeepsClassicReasonAndWindow()
{
// Regression: the opt-in must not change the classic post-AccountSetup advisory —
// same advisoryReason literal, same 30-min window.
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = SetupObservationEligibleSession(engine);
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
20, DecisionSignalKind.EspPhaseChanged, T0.AddMinutes(17),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.EspPhase] = "AccountSetup" })).NewState;
Assert.NotNull(state.AccountSetupEnteredUtc);
var step = ApplyDeviceSetupTerminalFailure(engine, state);
var advisory = SingleTimelineEffect(step, "esp_failure_advisory");
Assert.Equal("esp_failure_defanged_continueanyway_with_accountsetup", advisory.Parameters!["advisoryReason"]);
var deadline = FindDeadline(step.NewState, DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion);
Assert.Equal(T0.AddMinutes(38).AddMinutes(30), deadline!.DueAtUtc);
}
// ========================================== real end: desktop completion ====
[Fact]
public void ObservationAdvisory_ThenRealUserDesktop_CompletesThroughFinalizing()
{
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = SetupObservationEligibleSession(engine);
state = ApplyDeviceSetupTerminalFailure(engine, state).NewState;
// User pressed "Continue anyway" → signed in → DAD-validated real-user desktop.
var step = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
60, DecisionSignalKind.DesktopArrived, T0.AddMinutes(42)));
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Finalizing, step.NewState.Stage);
Assert.Contains(":ContinueAnywayObservation", step.Transition.Trigger);
// Hello disabled → synthetic skip recorded by the fast-path.
Assert.NotNull(step.NewState.HelloResolvedUtc);
Assert.NotNull(FindDeadline(step.NewState, DeadlineNames.FinalizingGrace));
}
[Fact]
public void ObservationCompletion_EnrollmentComplete_CarriesEspSoftFailureMarker()
{
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = SetupObservationEligibleSession(engine);
state = ApplyDeviceSetupTerminalFailure(engine, state).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
60, DecisionSignalKind.DesktopArrived, T0.AddMinutes(42))).NewState;
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Finalizing, state.Stage);
var step = engine.Reduce(state, DeadlineFired(70, T0.AddMinutes(42.1), DeadlineNames.FinalizingGrace));
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Completed, step.NewState.Stage);
Assert.Equal(SessionOutcome.EnrollmentComplete, step.NewState.Outcome);
var complete = SingleTimelineEffect(step, "enrollment_complete");
var payload = Assert.IsType<Dictionary<string, object>>(complete.TypedPayload);
Assert.Equal("true", payload["espSoftFailure"]);
Assert.Equal("continue_anyway_observation", payload["completionSource"]);
Assert.Equal("DeviceSetup", payload["espSoftFailureCategory"]);
}
[Fact]
public void CleanCompletion_EnrollmentComplete_OmitsEspSoftFailureMarker()
{
// A session without any advisory must not carry the marker — regression guard for
// the BuildEnrollmentCompleteEffect change.
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = SetupObservationEligibleSession(engine);
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
20, DecisionSignalKind.EspPhaseChanged, T0.AddMinutes(17),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.EspPhase] = "AccountSetup" })).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
30, DecisionSignalKind.AccountSetupProvisioningComplete, T0.AddMinutes(20))).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
40, DecisionSignalKind.DesktopArrived, T0.AddMinutes(21))).NewState;
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Finalizing, state.Stage);
var step = engine.Reduce(state, DeadlineFired(50, T0.AddMinutes(21.1), DeadlineNames.FinalizingGrace));
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Completed, step.NewState.Stage);
var complete = SingleTimelineEffect(step, "enrollment_complete");
var payload = Assert.IsType<Dictionary<string, object>>(complete.TypedPayload);
Assert.False(payload.ContainsKey("espSoftFailure"));
Assert.False(payload.ContainsKey("completionSource"));
}
// =============================================== window expiry / deadline ====
[Fact]
public void ObservationWindow_ExpiresWithoutDesktop_UnDefangsToEspTerminalFailure()
{
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = SetupObservationEligibleSession(engine);
state = ApplyDeviceSetupTerminalFailure(engine, state).NewState;
Assert.Null(state.DesktopArrivedUtc);
var step = engine.Reduce(state, DeadlineFired(60, T0.AddMinutes(98), DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion));
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Failed, step.NewState.Stage);
Assert.Equal(SessionOutcome.EnrollmentFailed, step.NewState.Outcome);
// The failure cause IS the original ESP failure — same reason literal, likely-stuck
// promotion stays armed via LastFailureTrigger=EspTerminalFailure.
Assert.Equal(nameof(DecisionSignalKind.EspTerminalFailure), step.NewState.LastFailureTrigger!.Value);
var failed = SingleTimelineEffect(step, "enrollment_failed");
Assert.Equal("esp_terminal_failure", failed.Parameters!["reason"]);
Assert.Equal(
"continue_anyway_observation_window_expired_without_completion_evidence",
failed.Parameters!["advisoryReason"]);
}
[Fact]
public void ObservationWindow_FiresWithDesktopAndDisabledHello_CompletesInsteadOfFailing()
{
// Ordering variant: desktop arrived but (hypothetically) no eager completion ran —
// the deadline-fire conjunction must accept desktop + hello for the observation
// variant without the (structurally impossible) IME user-session gate.
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = SetupObservationEligibleSession(engine, helloPolicyDisabled: false);
state = ApplyDeviceSetupTerminalFailure(engine, state).NewState;
// Hello policy lands AFTER the failure; desktop arrives; no eager completion since
// the fast-path needs the policy fact at desktop-arrival time.
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
60, DecisionSignalKind.DesktopArrived, T0.AddMinutes(42))).NewState;
Assert.NotEqual(SessionStage.Finalizing, state.Stage);
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
65, DecisionSignalKind.HelloPolicyDetected, T0.AddMinutes(43),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.HelloEnabled] = "false" })).NewState;
var step = engine.Reduce(state, DeadlineFired(70, T0.AddMinutes(98), DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion));
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Finalizing, step.NewState.Stage);
Assert.Null(step.NewState.Outcome);
Assert.NotNull(FindDeadline(step.NewState, DeadlineNames.FinalizingGrace));
}
[Fact]
public void ObservationWindow_FiresWithDesktopButUnknownHello_PromotesToAwaitingHello()
{
// Hello policy never observed (no PassportForWork value) — the hello prerequisite is
// structurally unresolvable. The never-observed promote must apply to the observation
// variant instead of failing a desktop-proven session.
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = SetupObservationEligibleSession(engine, helloPolicyDisabled: false);
state = ApplyDeviceSetupTerminalFailure(engine, state).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
60, DecisionSignalKind.DesktopArrived, T0.AddMinutes(42))).NewState;
Assert.Null(state.HelloPolicyEnabled);
var step = engine.Reduce(state, DeadlineFired(70, T0.AddMinutes(98), DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion));
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.AwaitingHello, step.NewState.Stage);
Assert.Null(step.NewState.Outcome);
Assert.NotNull(FindDeadline(step.NewState, DeadlineNames.HelloSafety));
}
// ======================================================= category recovery ====
[Fact]
public void ObservationAdvisory_DeviceSetupRecovery_ResolvesAdvisory()
{
// "Try again" path: the ESP re-runs the device phase and DeviceSetup resolves to
// success — the 4910a5a5 recovery hook must match the observation advisory too.
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = SetupObservationEligibleSession(engine);
state = ApplyDeviceSetupTerminalFailure(engine, state).NewState;
var step = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
60, DecisionSignalKind.DeviceSetupProvisioningComplete, T0.AddMinutes(55)));
Assert.NotNull(step.NewState.EspAdvisoryFailureResolvedUtc);
Assert.Contains(step.Effects, e =>
e.Parameters != null
&& e.Parameters.TryGetValue("eventType", out var et)
&& et == "esp_failure_advisory_resolved");
}
}
}
@@ -490,7 +490,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests
.WithShellCoreWhiteGloveSuccessSeen(sourceSignalOrdinal: 3)
.WithSkipUserEsp(value: true, sourceSignalOrdinal: 4)
.WithEspSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes(value: 90, sourceSignalOrdinal: 5)
.WithRegistrySelfDeployingProfile(value: false, sourceSignalOrdinal: 6))
.WithRegistrySelfDeployingProfile(value: false, sourceSignalOrdinal: 6)
.WithCloudPc(value: true, sourceSignalOrdinal: 7))
.Build();
var json = StateSerializer.Serialize(state);
@@ -504,6 +505,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests
Assert.Equal(5, o.EspSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes!.SourceSignalOrdinal);
Assert.False(o.RegistrySelfDeployingProfile!.Value);
Assert.Equal(6, o.RegistrySelfDeployingProfile!.SourceSignalOrdinal);
Assert.True(o.CloudPc!.Value);
Assert.Equal(7, o.CloudPc!.SourceSignalOrdinal);
// Never-observed facts must rehydrate as null (null ≠ veto — session 62e603c9).
Assert.Null(o.WhiteGloveSealingPatternSeen);
@@ -515,6 +515,99 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests.State
// ================================================================== helpers
// ------------------------------------------------ isCloudPc annotation (W365)
// Cloud PC first connect: Device-ESP already ran headless at provisioning, so the
// profile records the "no Device-ESP phase expected" expectation as the reason.
// Reason-only by design — Mode is classified by AccountSetup/IME signals (Classic),
// and EspConfig keeps the CONFIGURED FirstSync semantics.
[Fact]
public void EnrollmentFactsObserved_cloudPc_annotatesReason_keepsModeUnknown()
{
var signal = MakeSignal(
DecisionSignalKind.EnrollmentFactsObserved,
ordinal: 0,
payload: new Dictionary<string, string>
{
[SignalPayloadKeys.EnrollmentType] = "v1",
[SignalPayloadKeys.IsHybridJoin] = "false",
[SignalPayloadKeys.IsCloudPc] = "true",
});
var profile = EnrollmentScenarioProfileUpdater.ApplyEnrollmentFactsObserved(
EnrollmentScenarioProfile.Empty, signal);
Assert.Equal(EnrollmentMode.Unknown, profile.Mode);
Assert.Equal(EnrollmentScenarioProfileUpdater.CloudPcNoDeviceEspExpectedReason, profile.Reason);
Assert.Equal(EnrollmentJoinMode.AzureAdJoin, profile.JoinMode);
Assert.Equal(EspConfig.Unknown, profile.EspConfig);
}
[Fact]
public void EnrollmentFactsObserved_cloudPc_repeatPost_isIdempotent()
{
Dictionary<string, string> Facts() => new Dictionary<string, string>
{
[SignalPayloadKeys.EnrollmentType] = "v1",
[SignalPayloadKeys.IsHybridJoin] = "false",
[SignalPayloadKeys.IsCloudPc] = "true",
};
var first = MakeSignal(DecisionSignalKind.EnrollmentFactsObserved, ordinal: 0, payload: Facts());
var second = MakeSignal(DecisionSignalKind.EnrollmentFactsObserved, ordinal: 9, payload: Facts());
var p1 = EnrollmentScenarioProfileUpdater.ApplyEnrollmentFactsObserved(
EnrollmentScenarioProfile.Empty, first);
var p2 = EnrollmentScenarioProfileUpdater.ApplyEnrollmentFactsObserved(p1, second);
// The repeat must be a full no-op: the Cloud PC annotation already owns the
// reason slot, and the cloudPcAnnotates gate keeps the generic v1 annotation
// from re-claiming it (which would bump EvidenceOrdinal every post).
Assert.Same(p1, p2);
Assert.Equal(0, p2.EvidenceOrdinal);
}
[Fact]
public void EnrollmentFactsObserved_cloudPcFalse_keepsGenericV1Reason()
{
var signal = MakeSignal(
DecisionSignalKind.EnrollmentFactsObserved,
ordinal: 0,
payload: new Dictionary<string, string>
{
[SignalPayloadKeys.EnrollmentType] = "v1",
[SignalPayloadKeys.IsCloudPc] = "false",
});
var profile = EnrollmentScenarioProfileUpdater.ApplyEnrollmentFactsObserved(
EnrollmentScenarioProfile.Empty, signal);
Assert.Equal("enrollment_facts_observed:v1", profile.Reason);
}
[Fact]
public void EnrollmentFactsObserved_cloudPc_doesNotDisturbSelfDeployingSeed()
{
// Defensive combination (not expected in the field — Cloud PCs are never
// Autopilot-registered): the deterministic self-deploying Mode seed must
// survive; only the reason slot goes to the more specific annotation.
var signal = MakeSignal(
DecisionSignalKind.EnrollmentFactsObserved,
ordinal: 0,
payload: new Dictionary<string, string>
{
[SignalPayloadKeys.EnrollmentType] = "v1",
[SignalPayloadKeys.IsSelfDeployingProfile] = "true",
[SignalPayloadKeys.IsCloudPc] = "true",
});
var profile = EnrollmentScenarioProfileUpdater.ApplyEnrollmentFactsObserved(
EnrollmentScenarioProfile.Empty, signal);
Assert.Equal(EnrollmentMode.SelfDeploying, profile.Mode);
Assert.Equal(ProfileConfidence.High, profile.Confidence);
Assert.Equal(EnrollmentScenarioProfileUpdater.CloudPcNoDeviceEspExpectedReason, profile.Reason);
}
private static DecisionSignal MakeSignal(
DecisionSignalKind kind,
long ordinal,
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Default-value + round-trip tests for <see cref="AdminConfiguration.AutoApproveNewTenants"/>.
/// The flag gates the tenant auto-approve queue worker — defaulting to false keeps new tenant
/// signups on manual Global Admin approval until the operator deliberately opts in.
/// </summary>
public class AdminConfigurationAutoApproveNewTenantsTests
{
[Fact]
public void AutoApproveNewTenants_defaults_to_false_on_new_config()
{
var cfg = new AdminConfiguration();
Assert.False(cfg.AutoApproveNewTenants);
}
[Fact]
public void AutoApproveNewTenants_defaults_to_false_on_CreateDefault()
{
// CreateDefault() is called when no admin-config row exists yet — if it somehow
// enabled auto-approve, tenants would activate without any operator opt-in.
var cfg = AdminConfiguration.CreateDefault();
Assert.False(cfg.AutoApproveNewTenants);
}
[Fact]
public void AutoApproveNewTenants_true_persists_on_the_config()
{
var cfg = new AdminConfiguration { AutoApproveNewTenants = true };
Assert.True(cfg.AutoApproveNewTenants);
}
}
@@ -51,5 +51,7 @@ public class AdminConfigurationRateLimitSyncTests
// ...but NO tenant configuration is enumerated or mutated (sync removed).
repo.Verify(r => r.GetAllTenantConfigurationsAsync(), Times.Never);
repo.Verify(r => r.SaveTenantConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>()), Times.Never);
repo.Verify(r => r.SaveTenantConfigurationAsync(
It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>(), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Never);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.DataAccess;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Moq;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Default-value + fail-closed tests for <see cref="AdminConfiguration.SelfServiceAppHomingEnabled"/>.
/// The flag is the kill switch of the dual app-reg self-service homing flip — defaulting to false
/// keeps the consent funnel and auto-flip off until the operator deliberately opts in, and a
/// storage error must read as "disabled" (kill switch wins over a blip).
/// </summary>
public class AdminConfigurationSelfServiceAppHomingTests
{
[Fact]
public void SelfServiceAppHoming_defaults_to_false_on_new_config()
{
var cfg = new AdminConfiguration();
Assert.False(cfg.SelfServiceAppHomingEnabled);
}
[Fact]
public void SelfServiceAppHoming_defaults_to_false_on_CreateDefault()
{
var cfg = AdminConfiguration.CreateDefault();
Assert.False(cfg.SelfServiceAppHomingEnabled);
}
[Fact]
public void SelfServiceAppHoming_true_persists_on_the_config()
{
var cfg = new AdminConfiguration { SelfServiceAppHomingEnabled = true };
Assert.True(cfg.SelfServiceAppHomingEnabled);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Reader_returns_true_when_flag_enabled()
{
var repo = new Mock<IConfigRepository>();
repo.Setup(r => r.GetAdminConfigurationAsync())
.ReturnsAsync(new AdminConfiguration { SelfServiceAppHomingEnabled = true });
var svc = new AdminConfigurationService(
repo.Object, NullLogger<AdminConfigurationService>.Instance,
new MemoryCache(new MemoryCacheOptions()));
Assert.True(await svc.IsSelfServiceAppHomingEnabledAsync());
}
[Fact]
public async Task Reader_fails_closed_on_repository_error()
{
var repo = new Mock<IConfigRepository>();
repo.Setup(r => r.GetAdminConfigurationAsync())
.ThrowsAsync(new InvalidOperationException("storage down"));
var svc = new AdminConfigurationService(
repo.Object, NullLogger<AdminConfigurationService>.Instance,
new MemoryCache(new MemoryCacheOptions()));
Assert.False(await svc.IsSelfServiceAppHomingEnabledAsync());
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Authorization/validation matrix for <see cref="AppHomingService.EvaluateManualFlip"/> — the
/// pure decision behind <c>POST config/{tenantId}/app-homing</c>. Contract: tenant admins may
/// only flip TO primary, without force, with the self-service flag on, and only after a
/// successful consent probe; Global Admins may flip both directions and force past the probe.
/// </summary>
public class AppHomingDecisionTests
{
private static readonly AppHomingProbeResult ProbeOk = new(Succeeded: true, IsTransient: false);
private static readonly AppHomingProbeResult ProbeFail = new(Succeeded: false, IsTransient: false);
private static readonly AppHomingProbeResult ProbeTransient = new(Succeeded: false, IsTransient: true);
private static AppHomingDecision Evaluate(
bool isGlobalAdmin = false,
bool selfServiceEnabled = true,
bool legacyConfigured = true,
bool currentlyPrimary = false,
bool targetPrimary = true,
bool force = false,
AppHomingProbeResult? probe = null)
=> AppHomingService.EvaluateManualFlip(
isGlobalAdmin, selfServiceEnabled, legacyConfigured, currentlyPrimary, targetPrimary, force, probe);
[Fact]
public void ParallelWindowInactive_denies_for_everyone()
{
var decision = Evaluate(isGlobalAdmin: true, legacyConfigured: false, force: true);
Assert.Equal(AppHomingDecisionKind.Deny, decision.Kind);
Assert.Equal("parallel-window-inactive", decision.ReasonCode);
Assert.Equal(409, decision.StatusCode);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(false, false)] // legacy-homed, target legacy
[InlineData(true, true)] // primary-homed, target primary
public void AlreadyAtTarget_is_a_noop(bool currentlyPrimary, bool targetPrimary)
{
var decision = Evaluate(currentlyPrimary: currentlyPrimary, targetPrimary: targetPrimary);
Assert.Equal(AppHomingDecisionKind.AllowNoOp, decision.Kind);
}
[Fact]
public void NonGa_revert_to_legacy_is_denied()
{
var decision = Evaluate(currentlyPrimary: true, targetPrimary: false);
Assert.Equal(AppHomingDecisionKind.Deny, decision.Kind);
Assert.Equal("revert-is-ga-only", decision.ReasonCode);
Assert.Equal(403, decision.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public void NonGa_force_is_denied()
{
var decision = Evaluate(force: true);
Assert.Equal(AppHomingDecisionKind.Deny, decision.Kind);
Assert.Equal("force-is-ga-only", decision.ReasonCode);
Assert.Equal(403, decision.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public void NonGa_with_flag_off_is_denied()
{
// The kill switch: turning the admin-config flag off must stop tenant-admin flips
// immediately, while the GA path below stays open (operator lever survives).
var decision = Evaluate(selfServiceEnabled: false);
Assert.Equal(AppHomingDecisionKind.Deny, decision.Kind);
Assert.Equal("self-service-disabled", decision.ReasonCode);
Assert.Equal(409, decision.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public void Ga_with_flag_off_still_requires_only_the_probe()
{
var decision = Evaluate(isGlobalAdmin: true, selfServiceEnabled: false);
Assert.Equal(AppHomingDecisionKind.RequireProbe, decision.Kind);
}
[Fact]
public void FlipToPrimary_without_probe_requires_probe()
{
var decision = Evaluate();
Assert.Equal(AppHomingDecisionKind.RequireProbe, decision.Kind);
}
[Fact]
public void FlipToPrimary_with_successful_probe_is_allowed()
{
var decision = Evaluate(probe: ProbeOk);
Assert.Equal(AppHomingDecisionKind.Allow, decision.Kind);
}
[Fact]
public void FlipToPrimary_with_failed_probe_is_denied()
{
var decision = Evaluate(probe: ProbeFail);
Assert.Equal(AppHomingDecisionKind.Deny, decision.Kind);
Assert.Equal("probe-failed", decision.ReasonCode);
Assert.Equal(409, decision.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public void FlipToPrimary_with_transient_probe_is_denied_as_retryable()
{
var decision = Evaluate(probe: ProbeTransient);
Assert.Equal(AppHomingDecisionKind.Deny, decision.Kind);
Assert.Equal("probe-transient", decision.ReasonCode);
Assert.Equal(503, decision.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public void Ga_flip_without_force_also_requires_probe()
{
var decision = Evaluate(isGlobalAdmin: true);
Assert.Equal(AppHomingDecisionKind.RequireProbe, decision.Kind);
}
[Fact]
public void Ga_force_skips_the_probe()
{
var decision = Evaluate(isGlobalAdmin: true, force: true);
Assert.Equal(AppHomingDecisionKind.Allow, decision.Kind);
}
[Fact]
public void Ga_revert_to_legacy_needs_no_probe()
{
// The legacy app is consented by construction — probing it would be meaningless.
var decision = Evaluate(isGlobalAdmin: true, currentlyPrimary: true, targetPrimary: false);
Assert.Equal(AppHomingDecisionKind.Allow, decision.Kind);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.GraphResolution;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.Notifications;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.DataAccess;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Microsoft.ApplicationInsights;
using Microsoft.ApplicationInsights.Extensibility;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Moq;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Unit tests for <see cref="AppHomingService"/> — funnel eligibility, the consent-driven
/// auto-flip, and the flip persist side-effect chain (save + cache invalidation + audit +
/// ops events). The consent probe and the kill-switch flag are mocked at their virtual seams.
/// </summary>
public class AppHomingServiceTests
{
private const string TenantId = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111";
private const string PrimaryId = "aaaaaaaa-0000-0000-0000-000000000001";
private const string LegacyId = "bbbbbbbb-0000-0000-0000-000000000002";
private const string Actor = "admin@contoso.com";
private readonly Mock<AdminConfigurationService> _adminConfigMock;
private readonly Mock<TenantConfigurationService> _tenantConfigMock;
private readonly Mock<GraphTokenService> _graphTokenMock;
private readonly Mock<IGraphFeatureDetector> _detectorMock;
private readonly Mock<IMaintenanceRepository> _maintenanceMock;
private readonly List<OpsEventEntry> _savedOpsEvents = new();
private readonly EntraAppRegistry _registry;
private readonly AppHomingService _sut;
public AppHomingServiceTests() : this(legacyConfigured: true) { }
private AppHomingServiceTests(bool legacyConfigured)
{
var configValues = new Dictionary<string, string?>
{
["EntraId:ClientId"] = PrimaryId,
["EntraId:ClientSecret"] = "primary-secret",
};
if (legacyConfigured)
{
configValues["EntraId:LegacyClientId"] = LegacyId;
configValues["EntraId:LegacyClientSecret"] = "legacy-secret";
}
var configuration = new ConfigurationBuilder().AddInMemoryCollection(configValues).Build();
_registry = new EntraAppRegistry(configuration, NullLogger<EntraAppRegistry>.Instance);
var configRepo = Mock.Of<IConfigRepository>();
var cache = new MemoryCache(new MemoryCacheOptions());
_adminConfigMock = new Mock<AdminConfigurationService>(
configRepo, NullLogger<AdminConfigurationService>.Instance, cache)
{ CallBase = false };
_tenantConfigMock = new Mock<TenantConfigurationService>(
configRepo, NullLogger<TenantConfigurationService>.Instance, cache)
{ CallBase = false };
_graphTokenMock = new Mock<GraphTokenService>(
NullLogger<GraphTokenService>.Instance,
Mock.Of<System.Net.Http.IHttpClientFactory>(),
cache,
configuration,
_registry,
_tenantConfigMock.Object)
{ CallBase = false };
_detectorMock = new Mock<IGraphFeatureDetector>();
_maintenanceMock = new Mock<IMaintenanceRepository>();
_maintenanceMock
.Setup(m => m.LogAuditEntryAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(),
It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<Dictionary<string, string>?>()))
.ReturnsAsync(true);
var opsRepo = new Mock<IOpsEventRepository>();
opsRepo.Setup(r => r.SaveOpsEventAsync(It.IsAny<OpsEventEntry>()))
.Callback<OpsEventEntry>(e => { lock (_savedOpsEvents) _savedOpsEvents.Add(e); })
.Returns(Task.CompletedTask);
var alertDispatch = new OpsAlertDispatchService(
_adminConfigMock.Object,
new TelegramNotificationService(new HttpClient(), configRepo,
NullLogger<TelegramNotificationService>.Instance),
new WebhookNotificationService(new HttpClient(),
NullLogger<WebhookNotificationService>.Instance),
NullLogger<OpsAlertDispatchService>.Instance);
var opsService = new OpsEventService(opsRepo.Object, NullLogger<OpsEventService>.Instance, alertDispatch);
_sut = new AppHomingService(
NullLogger<AppHomingService>.Instance,
_adminConfigMock.Object,
_tenantConfigMock.Object,
_registry,
_graphTokenMock.Object,
_detectorMock.Object,
_maintenanceMock.Object,
opsService,
new TelemetryClient(new TelemetryConfiguration { DisableTelemetry = true }));
// Defaults: flag on, legacy-homed config exists, probe succeeds. FlipAsync reads via
// the cache-bypassing GetConfigurationFreshAsync (read-modify-write on the whole entity).
_adminConfigMock.Setup(x => x.IsSelfServiceAppHomingEnabledAsync()).ReturnsAsync(true);
var config = LegacyHomedConfig();
_tenantConfigMock.Setup(x => x.GetConfigurationFreshAsync(TenantId)).ReturnsAsync(config);
_tenantConfigMock.Setup(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>(), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()))
.Returns(Task.CompletedTask);
SetupProbe(GraphTokenResult.Success("tok"));
}
private static TenantConfiguration LegacyHomedConfig()
{
var config = TenantConfiguration.CreateDefault(TenantId);
config.HomedAppClientId = null;
return config;
}
private void SetupProbe(GraphTokenResult result) =>
_graphTokenMock
.Setup(x => x.GetAccessTokenForAppAsync(TenantId, It.Is<EntraAppCredentials>(c => !c.IsLegacy),
It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.ReturnsAsync(result);
// ── IsFunnelEligibleAsync ───────────────────────────────────────────────
[Fact]
public async Task Funnel_is_eligible_for_legacy_homed_tenant_with_flag_on()
{
Assert.True(await _sut.IsFunnelEligibleAsync(LegacyHomedConfig()));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Funnel_is_not_eligible_when_legacy_pair_unconfigured()
{
var sut = new AppHomingServiceTests(legacyConfigured: false)._sut;
Assert.False(await sut.IsFunnelEligibleAsync(LegacyHomedConfig()));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Funnel_is_not_eligible_for_primary_homed_tenant()
{
var config = LegacyHomedConfig();
config.HomedAppClientId = PrimaryId;
Assert.False(await _sut.IsFunnelEligibleAsync(config));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Funnel_is_not_eligible_when_flag_off()
{
_adminConfigMock.Setup(x => x.IsSelfServiceAppHomingEnabledAsync()).ReturnsAsync(false);
Assert.False(await _sut.IsFunnelEligibleAsync(LegacyHomedConfig()));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Funnel_does_not_block_on_entra_app_roles()
{
// Deliberate: app-role tenants may flip (operator informs them personally); the
// reminder trail is asserted in the flip test below.
var config = LegacyHomedConfig();
config.EntraAppRolesEnabled = true;
Assert.True(await _sut.IsFunnelEligibleAsync(config));
}
// ── TryAutoFlipToPrimaryAsync ───────────────────────────────────────────
[Fact]
public async Task AutoFlip_flips_on_probe_success_with_full_side_effect_chain()
{
var outcome = await _sut.TryAutoFlipToPrimaryAsync(LegacyHomedConfig(), Actor);
Assert.Equal(AppHomingAutoFlipOutcome.Flipped, outcome);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.Is<TenantConfiguration>(c =>
string.Equals(c.HomedAppClientId, PrimaryId, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
&& c.UpdatedBy == Actor), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Once);
_detectorMock.Verify(x => x.InvalidateTenant(TenantId), Times.Once);
_maintenanceMock.Verify(m => m.LogAuditEntryAsync(TenantId, "UPDATE", "TenantConfiguration",
TenantId, Actor, It.Is<Dictionary<string, string>?>(d =>
d != null && d.ContainsKey("HomedAppClientId"))), Times.Once);
Assert.Contains(_savedOpsEvents, e => e.EventType == "AppHomingFlipped");
Assert.DoesNotContain(_savedOpsEvents, e => e.EventType == "AppHomingFlippedWithEntraRoles");
}
[Fact]
public async Task AutoFlip_does_not_flip_on_permanent_probe_failure()
{
SetupProbe(GraphTokenResult.PermanentFailure());
var outcome = await _sut.TryAutoFlipToPrimaryAsync(LegacyHomedConfig(), Actor);
Assert.Equal(AppHomingAutoFlipOutcome.ProbeFailed, outcome);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>(), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Never);
}
[Fact]
public async Task AutoFlip_does_not_flip_on_transient_probe()
{
SetupProbe(GraphTokenResult.TransientFailure());
var outcome = await _sut.TryAutoFlipToPrimaryAsync(LegacyHomedConfig(), Actor);
Assert.Equal(AppHomingAutoFlipOutcome.ProbeTransient, outcome);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>(), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Never);
}
[Fact]
public async Task AutoFlip_is_not_eligible_for_primary_homed_tenant_and_never_probes()
{
var config = LegacyHomedConfig();
config.HomedAppClientId = PrimaryId;
var outcome = await _sut.TryAutoFlipToPrimaryAsync(config, Actor);
Assert.Equal(AppHomingAutoFlipOutcome.NotEligible, outcome);
_graphTokenMock.Verify(x => x.GetAccessTokenForAppAsync(It.IsAny<string>(),
It.IsAny<EntraAppCredentials>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()), Times.Never);
}
[Fact]
public async Task AutoFlip_is_not_eligible_when_flag_off()
{
_adminConfigMock.Setup(x => x.IsSelfServiceAppHomingEnabledAsync()).ReturnsAsync(false);
var outcome = await _sut.TryAutoFlipToPrimaryAsync(LegacyHomedConfig(), Actor);
Assert.Equal(AppHomingAutoFlipOutcome.NotEligible, outcome);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>(), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Never);
}
// ── FlipAsync ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[Fact]
public async Task Flip_of_entra_app_roles_tenant_emits_reminder_ops_event()
{
var config = LegacyHomedConfig();
config.EntraAppRolesEnabled = true;
_tenantConfigMock.Setup(x => x.GetConfigurationFreshAsync(TenantId)).ReturnsAsync(config);
await _sut.FlipAsync(TenantId, PrimaryId, Actor, "manual-ga");
Assert.Contains(_savedOpsEvents, e => e.EventType == "AppHomingFlipped");
Assert.Contains(_savedOpsEvents, e => e.EventType == "AppHomingFlippedWithEntraRoles");
}
[Fact]
public async Task Flip_noops_when_already_at_target()
{
var config = LegacyHomedConfig();
config.HomedAppClientId = PrimaryId;
_tenantConfigMock.Setup(x => x.GetConfigurationFreshAsync(TenantId)).ReturnsAsync(config);
await _sut.FlipAsync(TenantId, PrimaryId, Actor, "manual-ga");
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>(), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Never);
_detectorMock.Verify(x => x.InvalidateTenant(It.IsAny<string>()), Times.Never);
Assert.Empty(_savedOpsEvents);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Flip_throws_when_config_row_missing_and_saves_nothing()
{
// A flip must never materialize a default row (e.g. resurrect an offboarded tenant);
// the fresh read returning null is a hard stop.
_tenantConfigMock.Setup(x => x.GetConfigurationFreshAsync(TenantId))
.ReturnsAsync((TenantConfiguration?)null);
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<InvalidOperationException>(
() => _sut.FlipAsync(TenantId, PrimaryId, Actor, "manual-ga"));
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>(), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Never);
_detectorMock.Verify(x => x.InvalidateTenant(It.IsAny<string>()), Times.Never);
Assert.Empty(_savedOpsEvents);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Flip_back_to_legacy_persists_null_homing()
{
var config = LegacyHomedConfig();
config.HomedAppClientId = PrimaryId;
_tenantConfigMock.Setup(x => x.GetConfigurationFreshAsync(TenantId)).ReturnsAsync(config);
await _sut.FlipAsync(TenantId, null, Actor, "manual-ga");
// The null-homing invariant: legacy is represented as null, never as the legacy GUID.
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.Is<TenantConfiguration>(c =>
c.HomedAppClientId == null), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Once);
_detectorMock.Verify(x => x.InvalidateTenant(TenantId), Times.Once);
}
}
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ public class AuthFunctionSideEffectTests
private readonly Mock<TelegramNotificationService> _telegramMock;
private readonly Mock<GlobalNotificationService> _globalNotificationMock;
private readonly Mock<IMetricsRepository> _metricsRepoMock;
private readonly Mock<AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.Activation.ITenantAutoApproveEnqueuer> _autoApproveEnqueuerMock;
private readonly AuthFunction _sut;
public AuthFunctionSideEffectTests()
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ public class AuthFunctionSideEffectTests
var delegatedAdminMock = new Mock<DelegatedAdminService>(
adminRepo,
new StubTenantEntitlementService(AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security.TenantEdition.Enterprise),
new StubTenantEntitlementService(AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security.TenantEdition.Pro),
cache, Mock.Of<ILogger<DelegatedAdminService>>())
{ CallBase = false };
delegatedAdminMock.Setup(x => x.GetScopeAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string?>()))
@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@ public class AuthFunctionSideEffectTests
{ CallBase = false };
_metricsRepoMock = new Mock<IMetricsRepository>();
_autoApproveEnqueuerMock = new Mock<AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.Activation.ITenantAutoApproveEnqueuer>();
_sut = new AuthFunction(
Mock.Of<ILogger<AuthFunction>>(),
@@ -87,11 +89,15 @@ public class AuthFunctionSideEffectTests
previewMock.Object,
_telegramMock.Object,
_globalNotificationMock.Object,
mcpUserMock.Object);
mcpUserMock.Object,
_autoApproveEnqueuerMock.Object,
new AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security.EntraAppRegistry(
new Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.ConfigurationBuilder().Build(),
Mock.Of<ILogger<AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security.EntraAppRegistry>>()));
// Default: all fire-and-forget calls succeed
_tenantConfigMock
.Setup(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>()))
.Setup(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>(), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()))
.Returns(Task.CompletedTask);
_telegramMock
.Setup(x => x.SendNewTenantSignupAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>()))
@@ -126,12 +132,89 @@ public class AuthFunctionSideEffectTests
// OnboardedBy is the immutable copy of the first-login UPN that auto-promote on
// preview approval reads — UpdatedBy may later be clobbered by background syncs.
Assert.Equal(Upn, config.OnboardedBy);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(config), Times.Once);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(config, It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Once);
_telegramMock.Verify(x => x.SendNewTenantSignupAsync(TenantId, Upn), Times.Once);
_globalNotificationMock.Verify(x => x.CreateNotificationAsync(
"preview_signup", "New Preview Signup",
"preview_signup", "New Tenant Signup",
It.Is<string>(m => m.Contains(TenantId) && m.Contains("contoso.com") && m.Contains(Upn)),
$"/admin/tenants/management?tenantId={TenantId}"), Times.Once);
// Signup enqueues the delayed auto-approve unconditionally — the worker is the
// decision point (flag check at processing time).
_autoApproveEnqueuerMock.Verify(x => x.EnqueueAsync(
It.Is<AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.Activation.TenantAutoApproveEnvelope>(
e => e.TenantId == TenantId && e.SignupUpn == Upn),
AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.Activation.TenantAutoApproveEnvelope.ActivationDelay,
It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()), Times.Once);
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// HandleAuthClientIdTrackingAsync — the write must mutate a cache-BYPASSING
// read, never the (possibly stale) cached view. Regression for the prod
// incident 2026-07-31: the login right after an app-homing flip carries the
// changed audience; blind-saving the stale cached entity reverted the flip.
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
private const string LegacyAppId = "1a400946-62c1-4ab4-aa37-f730ac89704d";
private const string PrimaryAppId = "886ab5e2-6144-442c-80cc-9b28e0667731";
[Fact]
public async Task HandleAuthClientIdTracking_MutatesFreshConfig_PreservingConcurrentHomingFlip()
{
// Cached view: pre-flip (homing null, last-seen legacy). Fresh row: flipped meanwhile.
var cached = DefaultConfig();
cached.DomainName = "contoso.com";
cached.LastAuthClientId = LegacyAppId;
cached.HomedAppClientId = null;
var fresh = DefaultConfig();
fresh.DomainName = "contoso.com";
fresh.LastAuthClientId = LegacyAppId;
fresh.HomedAppClientId = PrimaryAppId; // the concurrent flip that must survive
_tenantConfigMock.Setup(x => x.GetConfigurationFreshAsync(TenantId)).ReturnsAsync(fresh);
await _sut.HandleAuthClientIdTrackingAsync(cached, TenantId, $"api://{PrimaryAppId}");
// The FRESH entity was mutated and saved — the flip survives, the stale view is discarded.
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(fresh, It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Once);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(cached, It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Never);
Assert.Equal(PrimaryAppId, fresh.HomedAppClientId);
Assert.Equal(PrimaryAppId, fresh.LastAuthClientId);
Assert.NotNull(fresh.LastAuthClientIdSince);
}
[Fact]
public async Task HandleAuthClientIdTracking_FreshAlreadyCurrent_DoesNotWrite()
{
// Another instance already recorded the new client id — the fresh re-check must
// suppress the redundant write even though the cached view still looks outdated.
var cached = DefaultConfig();
cached.DomainName = "contoso.com";
cached.LastAuthClientId = LegacyAppId;
var fresh = DefaultConfig();
fresh.DomainName = "contoso.com";
fresh.LastAuthClientId = PrimaryAppId;
_tenantConfigMock.Setup(x => x.GetConfigurationFreshAsync(TenantId)).ReturnsAsync(fresh);
await _sut.HandleAuthClientIdTrackingAsync(cached, TenantId, PrimaryAppId);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>(), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Never);
}
[Fact]
public async Task HandleAuthClientIdTracking_UnchangedOnCachedView_SkipsFreshRead()
{
// Steady state (same app as last time) must stay a zero-I/O no-op.
var cached = DefaultConfig();
cached.DomainName = "contoso.com";
cached.LastAuthClientId = PrimaryAppId;
await _sut.HandleAuthClientIdTrackingAsync(cached, TenantId, $"api://{PrimaryAppId}");
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.GetConfigurationFreshAsync(It.IsAny<string>()), Times.Never);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>(), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Never);
}
[Fact]
@@ -156,7 +239,7 @@ public class AuthFunctionSideEffectTests
await _sut.HandleNewTenantDomainAsync(config, TenantId, Upn);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>()), Times.Never);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>(), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Never);
_telegramMock.Verify(x => x.SendNewTenantSignupAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>()), Times.Never);
}
@@ -168,7 +251,7 @@ public class AuthFunctionSideEffectTests
await _sut.HandleNewTenantDomainAsync(config, TenantId, "");
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>()), Times.Never);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>(), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Never);
}
[Fact]
@@ -179,7 +262,7 @@ public class AuthFunctionSideEffectTests
await _sut.HandleNewTenantDomainAsync(config, TenantId, "nodomain");
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>()), Times.Never);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>(), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Never);
}
[Fact]
@@ -196,7 +279,7 @@ public class AuthFunctionSideEffectTests
await _sut.HandleNewTenantDomainAsync(config, TenantId, Upn);
// SaveConfig should still have been called before the fire-and-forget
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(config), Times.Once);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(config, It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Once);
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -217,7 +300,7 @@ public class AuthFunctionSideEffectTests
Assert.Null(config.DisabledReason);
Assert.Null(config.DisabledUntil);
Assert.Equal("System (auto-re-enable)", config.UpdatedBy);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(config), Times.Once);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(config, It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Once);
}
[Fact]
@@ -230,7 +313,7 @@ public class AuthFunctionSideEffectTests
await _sut.HandleAutoReEnableAsync(config, TenantId);
Assert.True(config.Disabled);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>()), Times.Never);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>(), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Never);
}
[Fact]
@@ -241,7 +324,7 @@ public class AuthFunctionSideEffectTests
await _sut.HandleAutoReEnableAsync(config, TenantId);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>()), Times.Never);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>(), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Never);
}
[Fact]
@@ -254,7 +337,7 @@ public class AuthFunctionSideEffectTests
await _sut.HandleAutoReEnableAsync(config, TenantId);
Assert.True(config.Disabled);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>()), Times.Never);
_tenantConfigMock.Verify(x => x.SaveConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<TenantConfiguration>(), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>()), Times.Never);
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -223,11 +223,11 @@ public class AuthFunctionTests
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Gate 2: Preview Gate
// Gate 2: Activation Gate
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Fact]
public void PreviewGate_NotApproved_Returns403PrivatePreview()
public void PreviewGate_NotApproved_Returns403PendingActivation()
{
var result = AuthFunction.BuildAuthResult(
DefaultConfig(), isGlobalAdmin: false, isGlobalReader: false, isPreviewApproved: false,
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ public class AuthFunctionTests
Assert.False(result.IsSuccess);
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.Forbidden, result.StatusCode);
var body = ToDynamic(result.Body);
Assert.Equal("PrivatePreview", (string)body.error);
Assert.Equal("PendingActivation", (string)body.error);
}
[Fact]
@@ -203,6 +203,38 @@ public class AuthenticationMiddlewareTokenValidationTests
Mint(RsaCreds, audience: "api://some-third-app"), ClientId, SecondaryClientId));
}
// ── Dual app-reg window (C4A8 move): primary=new app, legacy=old app via LegacyClientId ──
// The middleware folds EntraId:LegacyClientId into the additional-id set via
// CombineAdditionalClientIdSources, so both apps' tokens validate in bare AND api:// form.
private const string NewAppId = "886ab5e2-6144-442c-80cc-9b28e0667731";
private const string OldAppId = "1a400946-62c1-4ab4-aa37-f730ac89704d";
[Theory]
[InlineData(NewAppId)]
[InlineData("api://" + NewAppId)]
[InlineData(OldAppId)]
[InlineData("api://" + OldAppId)]
public void DualAppWindow_accepts_both_apps_tokens_in_both_audience_forms(string audience)
{
var clientIds = AuthenticationMiddleware.ResolveConfiguredClientIds(
NewAppId,
AuthenticationMiddleware.CombineAdditionalClientIdSources(OldAppId, null),
out _);
Assert.NotNull(ValidateWith(Mint(RsaCreds, audience: audience), clientIds));
}
[Fact]
public void CombineAdditionalClientIdSources_joins_and_skips_empty_sources()
{
Assert.Equal($"{OldAppId},{SecondaryClientId}",
AuthenticationMiddleware.CombineAdditionalClientIdSources(OldAppId, SecondaryClientId));
Assert.Equal(OldAppId,
AuthenticationMiddleware.CombineAdditionalClientIdSources($" {OldAppId} ", null, ""));
Assert.Null(AuthenticationMiddleware.CombineAdditionalClientIdSources(null, "", " "));
}
// ── BuildValidAudiences: id → {id, api://id}, deduped, empties dropped ────────────────
[Fact]
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Tests for <see cref="CloudPcDeviceValidator"/> — focused on pure-function pieces:
/// JSON-to-DTO mapping (incl. exact-match guard on managedDeviceId) and cache key shape.
/// The HTTP/cache/retry resilience is mirrored 1:1 from <c>AutopilotDeviceValidator</c>;
/// behavioural drift would surface here. Response shapes match a real
/// virtualEndpoint/cloudPCs payload (field-captured 2026-08-06 on a W365 tenant).
/// </summary>
public class CloudPcDeviceValidatorTests
{
private const string TenantId = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111";
private const string DeviceId = "07623d56-1e77-4948-bff5-5bdac8167560";
// -- BuildCacheKey --
[Fact]
public void BuildCacheKey_StableShape()
{
var key = CloudPcDeviceValidator.BuildCacheKey(TenantId, DeviceId);
Assert.Equal($"cloudpc-device-validation:{TenantId}:{DeviceId}", key);
}
[Fact]
public void BuildCacheKey_DistinctFromOtherValidatorKeys()
{
// The validators must NOT share cache keys; otherwise a positive hit in one
// would incorrectly satisfy a lookup in another.
var key = CloudPcDeviceValidator.BuildCacheKey(TenantId, DeviceId);
Assert.StartsWith("cloudpc-device-validation:", key);
Assert.DoesNotContain("autopilot", key);
Assert.DoesNotContain("device-association", key);
}
// -- ParseCloudPcResponse: empty / missing / malformed --
[Fact]
public void Parse_EmptyValueArray_NotFound()
{
var result = CloudPcDeviceValidator.ParseCloudPcResponse("{\"value\":[]}", DeviceId);
Assert.False(result.IsValid);
Assert.False(result.IsTransient);
Assert.Equal(DeviceId, result.IntuneDeviceId);
Assert.Contains("not a Windows 365 Cloud PC", result.ErrorMessage);
}
[Fact]
public void Parse_MissingValueProperty_NotFound()
{
var result = CloudPcDeviceValidator.ParseCloudPcResponse("{}", DeviceId);
Assert.False(result.IsValid);
}
[Fact]
public void Parse_MalformedJson_NotFound_NotTransient()
{
// Defensive: bad payload is treated as "not a Cloud PC", not as a transient
// — transient handling is only triggered by HTTP-level failures.
var result = CloudPcDeviceValidator.ParseCloudPcResponse("this is not json", DeviceId);
Assert.False(result.IsValid);
Assert.False(result.IsTransient);
}
// -- ParseCloudPcResponse: exact-match guard --
[Fact]
public void Parse_DifferentManagedDeviceId_NotFound()
{
// Guards against widened filter semantics: even if Graph returns Cloud PCs whose
// managedDeviceId does not exactly match the queried id, we must reject.
var body = "{\"value\":[{\"id\":\"423a1fb4-6033-4b69-a31f-e7f3f54194dc\",\"managedDeviceId\":\"99999999-9999-9999-9999-999999999999\"}]}";
var result = CloudPcDeviceValidator.ParseCloudPcResponse(body, DeviceId);
Assert.False(result.IsValid);
}
[Fact]
public void Parse_ExactMatch_PopulatesAllFields()
{
var body = $@"{{
""value"":[{{
""id"":""423a1fb4-6033-4b69-a31f-e7f3f54194dc"",
""displayName"":""GKT-CloudPC - Obi-Wan Kenobi"",
""managedDeviceId"":""{DeviceId}"",
""managedDeviceName"":""CPC-cloud-AY5HT"",
""userPrincipalName"":""cloudadmin@gktatooine.net"",
""servicePlanName"":""Cloud PC Enterprise 2vCPU/4GB/128GB""
}}]
}}";
var result = CloudPcDeviceValidator.ParseCloudPcResponse(body, DeviceId);
Assert.True(result.IsValid);
Assert.False(result.IsTransient);
Assert.Equal(DeviceId, result.IntuneDeviceId);
Assert.Equal("423a1fb4-6033-4b69-a31f-e7f3f54194dc", result.CloudPcId);
Assert.Equal("CPC-cloud-AY5HT", result.ManagedDeviceName);
Assert.Equal("Cloud PC Enterprise 2vCPU/4GB/128GB", result.ServicePlanName);
}
[Fact]
public void Parse_CaseInsensitiveIdMatch()
{
var body = $@"{{""value"":[{{""id"":""423a1fb4-6033-4b69-a31f-e7f3f54194dc"",""managedDeviceId"":""{DeviceId.ToUpperInvariant()}""}}]}}";
var result = CloudPcDeviceValidator.ParseCloudPcResponse(body, DeviceId);
Assert.True(result.IsValid);
}
[Fact]
public void Parse_TrimsWhitespace_OnGraphIdBeforeMatching()
{
var body = $@"{{""value"":[{{""id"":""423a1fb4-6033-4b69-a31f-e7f3f54194dc"",""managedDeviceId"":"" {DeviceId} ""}}]}}";
var result = CloudPcDeviceValidator.ParseCloudPcResponse(body, DeviceId);
Assert.True(result.IsValid);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.DataAccess.TableStorage;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.DataAccess;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Azure;
using Azure.Data.Tables;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Moq;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// The universal pre-write snapshot hook in <see cref="TableConfigRepository"/>:
/// every overwriting save of a TenantConfiguration/AdminConfiguration row must first
/// snapshot the stored row into ConfigurationBackups — except row creations and
/// noise-only changes — and a backup-storage failure must never break the save (fail-soft).
/// </summary>
public class ConfigBackupHookTests
{
private const string TenantId = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111";
private sealed class Harness
{
public TableConfigRepository Sut { get; }
public Mock<TableClient> Table { get; } = new();
public Mock<IConfigBackupRepository> Backup { get; } = new();
public List<TableEntity> Upserts { get; } = new();
public Harness(TableEntity? stored)
{
if (stored == null)
{
Table.Setup(c => c.GetEntityAsync<TableEntity>(
It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(),
It.IsAny<IEnumerable<string>>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.ThrowsAsync(new RequestFailedException(404, "Not Found", "ResourceNotFound", null));
}
else
{
Table.Setup(c => c.GetEntityAsync<TableEntity>(
It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(),
It.IsAny<IEnumerable<string>>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.ReturnsAsync(Response.FromValue(stored, Mock.Of<Response>()));
}
Table.Setup(c => c.UpsertEntityAsync(
It.IsAny<TableEntity>(), It.IsAny<TableUpdateMode>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.Returns<TableEntity, TableUpdateMode, CancellationToken>((e, _, _) =>
{
Upserts.Add(e);
return Task.FromResult(Mock.Of<Response>());
});
var serviceClient = new Mock<TableServiceClient>();
serviceClient.Setup(c => c.GetTableClient(It.IsAny<string>())).Returns(Table.Object);
Sut = new TableConfigRepository(
new TableStorageService(serviceClient.Object, NullLogger<TableStorageService>.Instance),
Backup.Object,
NullLogger<TableConfigRepository>.Instance);
}
}
private static TenantConfiguration StoredConfig()
{
var config = TenantConfiguration.CreateDefault(TenantId);
config.DomainName = "contoso.com";
config.UpdatedBy = "admin@contoso.com";
config.DataRetentionDays = 30;
config.TeamsWebhookUrl = "https://contoso.webhook.office.com/hook";
return config;
}
/// <summary>
/// Mirrors production: every real writer round-trips the STORED row (read-modify-write),
/// so time-stamped fields like OnboardedAt match the stored values exactly. Constructing
/// a second CreateDefault instead would fabricate an OnboardedAt diff that cannot occur.
/// </summary>
private static TenantConfiguration RoundtripClone(TenantConfiguration stored)
=> TableConfigRepository.ConvertFromTenantTableEntity(
TableConfigRepository.ConvertToTenantTableEntity(stored));
[Fact]
public async Task RealChange_SnapshotsStoredRow_ThenSaves_ThenPrunes()
{
var stored = StoredConfig();
var harness = new Harness(TableConfigRepository.ConvertToTenantTableEntity(stored));
var incoming = RoundtripClone(stored);
incoming.DataRetentionDays = 90;
incoming.UpdatedBy = "ga@operator.example";
ConfigBackupEntry? snapshot = null;
harness.Backup
.Setup(b => b.UpsertAsync(It.IsAny<ConfigBackupEntry>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.Callback<ConfigBackupEntry, CancellationToken>((e, _) => snapshot = e)
.Returns(Task.CompletedTask);
var saved = await harness.Sut.SaveTenantConfigurationAsync(incoming, "portal-put", "test change");
Assert.True(saved);
Assert.Single(harness.Upserts); // the config row itself
Assert.NotNull(snapshot);
Assert.Equal(TenantId, snapshot!.PartitionKey);
Assert.Equal("portal-put", snapshot.Source);
Assert.Equal("test change", snapshot.Reason);
Assert.Equal("ga@operator.example", snapshot.ChangedBy); // identity about to write
// The snapshot holds the STORED row (retention 30), not the incoming one.
Assert.Contains("\"DataRetentionDays\":30", snapshot.EntityJson);
// Raw secrets ARE in EntityJson (full-fidelity restore source)…
Assert.Contains("contoso.webhook.office.com", snapshot.EntityJson);
// …but the advisory diff masks them by property-name heuristics (ConfigDiffHelper).
Assert.DoesNotContain("contoso.webhook.office.com", snapshot.DiffJson ?? string.Empty);
harness.Backup.Verify(
b => b.PruneAsync(TenantId, Constants.ConfigBackupKeepCount, It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()),
Times.Once);
}
[Fact]
public async Task RowCreation_NoExistingRow_NoSnapshot()
{
var harness = new Harness(stored: null);
var saved = await harness.Sut.SaveTenantConfigurationAsync(StoredConfig(), "portal-put", null);
Assert.True(saved);
Assert.Single(harness.Upserts);
harness.Backup.Verify(
b => b.UpsertAsync(It.IsAny<ConfigBackupEntry>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()), Times.Never);
harness.Backup.Verify(
b => b.PruneAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<int>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()), Times.Never);
}
[Fact]
public async Task NoiseOnlyChange_AuthClientIdFlip_NoSnapshot()
{
var stored = StoredConfig();
var harness = new Harness(TableConfigRepository.ConvertToTenantTableEntity(stored));
// The auth-side-effect write: only LastAuthClientId/Since + bookkeeping move.
var incoming = RoundtripClone(stored);
incoming.LastAuthClientId = "886ab5e2-6144-442c-80cc-9b28e0667731";
incoming.LastAuthClientIdSince = DateTime.UtcNow;
incoming.LastUpdated = DateTime.UtcNow;
incoming.UpdatedBy = "System (auth)";
var saved = await harness.Sut.SaveTenantConfigurationAsync(incoming, "auth", null);
Assert.True(saved); // the save itself still goes through
Assert.Single(harness.Upserts);
harness.Backup.Verify(
b => b.UpsertAsync(It.IsAny<ConfigBackupEntry>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()), Times.Never);
}
[Fact]
public async Task NoOpSave_IdenticalContent_NoSnapshot()
{
var stored = StoredConfig();
var harness = new Harness(TableConfigRepository.ConvertToTenantTableEntity(stored));
var saved = await harness.Sut.SaveTenantConfigurationAsync(RoundtripClone(stored), "portal-put", null);
Assert.True(saved);
harness.Backup.Verify(
b => b.UpsertAsync(It.IsAny<ConfigBackupEntry>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()), Times.Never);
}
[Fact]
public async Task BackupStorageFailure_IsFailSoft_SaveStillSucceeds()
{
var stored = StoredConfig();
var harness = new Harness(TableConfigRepository.ConvertToTenantTableEntity(stored));
harness.Backup
.Setup(b => b.UpsertAsync(It.IsAny<ConfigBackupEntry>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.ThrowsAsync(new RequestFailedException(503, "backup table throttled"));
var incoming = RoundtripClone(stored);
incoming.DataRetentionDays = 90;
var saved = await harness.Sut.SaveTenantConfigurationAsync(incoming, "portal-put", null);
Assert.True(saved);
Assert.Single(harness.Upserts); // the config write went through regardless
}
[Fact]
public async Task LegacyOneArgOverload_StillSnapshots_WithUnknownSource()
{
var stored = StoredConfig();
var harness = new Harness(TableConfigRepository.ConvertToTenantTableEntity(stored));
ConfigBackupEntry? snapshot = null;
harness.Backup
.Setup(b => b.UpsertAsync(It.IsAny<ConfigBackupEntry>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.Callback<ConfigBackupEntry, CancellationToken>((e, _) => snapshot = e)
.Returns(Task.CompletedTask);
var incoming = RoundtripClone(stored);
incoming.DataRetentionDays = 90;
await harness.Sut.SaveTenantConfigurationAsync(incoming);
Assert.NotNull(snapshot);
Assert.Equal("unknown", snapshot!.Source);
}
[Fact]
public async Task AdminConfigSave_SnapshotsUnderGlobalConfigPartition()
{
var stored = new AdminConfiguration
{
UpdatedBy = "ga@operator.example",
GlobalRateLimitRequestsPerMinute = 100,
};
var harness = new Harness(TableConfigRepository.ConvertToAdminTableEntity(stored));
ConfigBackupEntry? snapshot = null;
harness.Backup
.Setup(b => b.UpsertAsync(It.IsAny<ConfigBackupEntry>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.Callback<ConfigBackupEntry, CancellationToken>((e, _) => snapshot = e)
.Returns(Task.CompletedTask);
var incoming = new AdminConfiguration
{
UpdatedBy = "ga@operator.example",
GlobalRateLimitRequestsPerMinute = 200,
};
var saved = await harness.Sut.SaveAdminConfigurationAsync(incoming);
Assert.True(saved);
Assert.NotNull(snapshot);
Assert.Equal("GlobalConfig", snapshot!.PartitionKey);
Assert.Equal("admin-config", snapshot.Source);
harness.Backup.Verify(
b => b.PruneAsync("GlobalConfig", Constants.ConfigBackupKeepCount, It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()),
Times.Once);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.DataAccess.TableStorage;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Azure;
using Azure.Data.Tables;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Moq;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// TableConfigBackupRepository: Store↔Map roundtrip (project rule "table-serialization"),
/// reverse-ticks RowKey ordering (newest-first), and prune-beyond-keep semantics.
/// </summary>
public class ConfigBackupRepositoryTests
{
private const string TenantId = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111";
private sealed class Harness
{
public TableConfigBackupRepository Sut { get; }
public Mock<TableClient> Table { get; } = new();
public List<TableEntity> Upserts { get; } = new();
public List<(string Pk, string Rk)> Deletes { get; } = new();
public Harness()
{
Table.Setup(c => c.UpsertEntityAsync(
It.IsAny<TableEntity>(), It.IsAny<TableUpdateMode>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.Returns<TableEntity, TableUpdateMode, CancellationToken>((e, _, _) =>
{
Upserts.Add(e);
return Task.FromResult(Mock.Of<Response>());
});
Table.Setup(c => c.DeleteEntityAsync(
It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<ETag>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.Returns<string, string, ETag, CancellationToken>((pk, rk, _, _) =>
{
Deletes.Add((pk, rk));
return Task.FromResult(Mock.Of<Response>());
});
var serviceClient = new Mock<TableServiceClient>();
serviceClient.Setup(c => c.GetTableClient(It.IsAny<string>())).Returns(Table.Object);
Sut = new TableConfigBackupRepository(
new TableStorageService(serviceClient.Object, NullLogger<TableStorageService>.Instance),
NullLogger<TableConfigBackupRepository>.Instance);
}
public void SetupQuery(params TableEntity[] rows)
{
var page = Page<TableEntity>.FromValues(rows, continuationToken: null, Mock.Of<Response>());
Table.Setup(c => c.QueryAsync<TableEntity>(
It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<int?>(), It.IsAny<IEnumerable<string>>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.Returns(AsyncPageable<TableEntity>.FromPages(new[] { page }));
}
}
private static ConfigBackupEntry Entry(string rowKey = "0001_abc") => new()
{
PartitionKey = TenantId,
RowKey = rowKey,
TenantId = TenantId,
EntityJson = "{\"DomainName\":\"contoso.com\"}",
ChangedBy = "ga@operator.example",
Source = "mcp-patch",
Reason = "retention bump",
DiffJson = "{\"DataRetentionDays\":\"30 \\u2192 90\"}",
BackupTakenAt = new DateTime(2026, 8, 3, 12, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc),
};
[Fact]
public async Task Roundtrip_StoreAndMap_PreservesEveryField()
{
var harness = new Harness();
var entry = Entry();
await harness.Sut.UpsertAsync(entry);
var stored = Assert.Single(harness.Upserts);
// Feed the stored entity back through the read path (TryGetAsync → Map).
harness.Table.Setup(c => c.GetEntityAsync<TableEntity>(
It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(),
It.IsAny<IEnumerable<string>>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.ReturnsAsync(Response.FromValue(stored, Mock.Of<Response>()));
var mapped = await harness.Sut.TryGetAsync(TenantId, entry.RowKey);
Assert.NotNull(mapped);
Assert.Equal(entry.PartitionKey, mapped!.PartitionKey);
Assert.Equal(entry.RowKey, mapped.RowKey);
Assert.Equal(entry.TenantId, mapped.TenantId);
Assert.Equal(entry.EntityJson, mapped.EntityJson);
Assert.Equal(entry.ChangedBy, mapped.ChangedBy);
Assert.Equal(entry.Source, mapped.Source);
Assert.Equal(entry.Reason, mapped.Reason);
Assert.Equal(entry.DiffJson, mapped.DiffJson);
Assert.Equal(entry.BackupTakenAt, mapped.BackupTakenAt);
}
[Fact]
public void BuildRowKey_LaterTimestamps_SortFirst()
{
var earlier = TableConfigBackupRepository.BuildRowKey(new DateTime(2026, 8, 3, 12, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc));
var later = TableConfigBackupRepository.BuildRowKey(new DateTime(2026, 8, 3, 12, 0, 1, DateTimeKind.Utc));
// Reverse ticks: the LATER backup gets the LEXICOGRAPHICALLY SMALLER RowKey, so
// Azure's RowKey-ascending partition scan returns newest-first.
Assert.True(string.CompareOrdinal(later, earlier) < 0);
}
[Fact]
public void BuildRowKey_SameTick_DistinctViaGuidSuffix()
{
var at = new DateTime(2026, 8, 3, 12, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
Assert.NotEqual(
TableConfigBackupRepository.BuildRowKey(at),
TableConfigBackupRepository.BuildRowKey(at));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Prune_DeletesEverythingBeyondKeep_InScanOrder()
{
var harness = new Harness();
// Scan order = RowKey ascending = newest first (reverse ticks). keep=2 must
// delete rows 3 and 4, never the two newest.
harness.SetupQuery(
new TableEntity(TenantId, "0001_newest"),
new TableEntity(TenantId, "0002_second"),
new TableEntity(TenantId, "0003_old"),
new TableEntity(TenantId, "0004_oldest"));
var deleted = await harness.Sut.PruneAsync(TenantId, keep: 2);
Assert.Equal(2, deleted);
Assert.Equal(new[] { "0003_old", "0004_oldest" }, harness.Deletes.Select(d => d.Rk).ToArray());
}
[Fact]
public async Task Prune_WithinKeep_DeletesNothing()
{
var harness = new Harness();
harness.SetupQuery(
new TableEntity(TenantId, "0001_newest"),
new TableEntity(TenantId, "0002_second"));
var deleted = await harness.Sut.PruneAsync(TenantId, keep: 2);
Assert.Equal(0, deleted);
Assert.Empty(harness.Deletes);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ListByPartition_CapsAtMax()
{
var harness = new Harness();
harness.SetupQuery(
new TableEntity(TenantId, "0001"),
new TableEntity(TenantId, "0002"),
new TableEntity(TenantId, "0003"));
var listed = await harness.Sut.ListByPartitionAsync(TenantId, max: 2);
Assert.Equal(2, listed.Count);
Assert.Equal("0001", listed[0].RowKey);
}
}
@@ -192,4 +192,37 @@ public class ConfigRedactionTests
// Operator/Viewer arrives with IsTenantAdmin=false ⇒ always the redacted copy.
=> Assert.False(GetTenantConfigurationFunction.CanViewSecrets(
new RequestContext { UserRole = role, TenantId = TenantA, TargetTenantId = TenantA }));
// ── ?view=redacted opt-in (MCP get_tenant_config): forces redaction even for GA ──
[Fact]
public void ShouldRedact_GlobalAdmin_ViewRedacted_True()
=> Assert.True(GetTenantConfigurationFunction.ShouldRedact(
new RequestContext { IsGlobalAdmin = true, TenantId = TenantA, TargetTenantId = TenantB },
"?view=redacted"));
[Fact]
public void ShouldRedact_OwnTenantAdmin_ViewRedacted_True()
=> Assert.True(GetTenantConfigurationFunction.ShouldRedact(
new RequestContext { IsTenantAdmin = true, TenantId = TenantA, TargetTenantId = TenantA },
"?view=redacted"));
[Fact]
public void ShouldRedact_GlobalAdmin_NoParam_False()
// Without the opt-in the GA clearance stands — the portal Settings UI depends on it.
=> Assert.False(GetTenantConfigurationFunction.ShouldRedact(
new RequestContext { IsGlobalAdmin = true, TenantId = TenantA, TargetTenantId = TenantB },
""));
[Fact]
public void ShouldRedact_GlobalAdmin_OtherViewValue_False()
=> Assert.False(GetTenantConfigurationFunction.ShouldRedact(
new RequestContext { IsGlobalAdmin = true, TenantId = TenantA, TargetTenantId = TenantB },
"?view=full"));
[Fact]
public void ShouldRedact_ReaderWithoutClearance_AlwaysTrue_RegardlessOfParam()
=> Assert.True(GetTenantConfigurationFunction.ShouldRedact(
new RequestContext { IsGlobalReader = true, TenantId = TenantA, TargetTenantId = TenantB },
"?view=full"));
}
@@ -259,20 +259,21 @@ public class ContinuationTokenTests
public void TryDecode_rejects_token_signed_with_a_different_key()
{
// Simulate key rotation: token issued under key A, validated under key B.
// (We toggle the test key around the encode/decode pair.)
// The scoped (AsyncLocal) override keeps the swap confined to this test's
// execution context — mutating the process-wide test key here raced the
// concurrently running pagination test classes.
var keyA = new byte[32]; for (int i = 0; i < keyA.Length; i++) keyA[i] = (byte)(i * 3 + 1);
var keyB = new byte[32]; for (int i = 0; i < keyB.Length; i++) keyB[i] = (byte)(i * 5 + 7);
var fp = ContinuationToken.ComputeFingerprint(FilterArgsA());
ContinuationToken.SetSigningKeyForTesting(keyA);
ContinuationToken.SetScopedSigningKeyForTesting(keyA);
var encoded = ContinuationToken.Encode(AzureToken, TenantA, fp);
ContinuationToken.SetSigningKeyForTesting(keyB);
ContinuationToken.SetScopedSigningKeyForTesting(keyB);
var ok = ContinuationToken.TryDecode(encoded, TenantA, fp, out _, out var reason);
// Restore the test default before leaving so subsequent tests aren't affected.
TestSetup.Initialize();
ContinuationToken.SetScopedSigningKeyForTesting(null);
Assert.False(ok);
Assert.Equal("bad_signature", reason);
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ public class CriticalTableBackupServiceTests
Assert.Equal(BackupOutcome.Success, result.Outcome);
Assert.True(store.ManifestWritten, "manifest must be written LAST");
Assert.Equal(16, result.Manifest.Tables.Count); // critical-tables catalog count (incl. DelegatedAdmins)
Assert.Equal(17, result.Manifest.Tables.Count); // critical-tables catalog count (incl. DelegatedAdmins + ConfigurationBackups)
Assert.All(result.Manifest.Tables, t =>
Assert.True(t.Status == TableBackupStatus.Ok || t.Status == TableBackupStatus.Empty));
}
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ public class DelegatedAdminEditionGateTests
return new DelegatedAdminService(
repo.Object,
new StubTenantEntitlementService(
tenantId => tenantId == EnterpriseHomeTenant ? TenantEdition.Enterprise : TenantEdition.Community),
tenantId => tenantId == EnterpriseHomeTenant ? TenantEdition.Pro : TenantEdition.Community),
new MemoryCache(new MemoryCacheOptions()),
NullLogger<DelegatedAdminService>.Instance);
}
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ public class DelegatedAdminEditionGateTests
var svc = new DelegatedAdminService(
repo.Object,
new StubTenantEntitlementService(
tenantId => tenantId == EnterpriseHomeTenant ? TenantEdition.Enterprise : TenantEdition.Community),
tenantId => tenantId == EnterpriseHomeTenant ? TenantEdition.Pro : TenantEdition.Community),
new MemoryCache(new MemoryCacheOptions()),
NullLogger<DelegatedAdminService>.Instance);
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ public class DelegatedAdminServiceTests
// the edition filter has its own dedicated tests (DelegatedAdminEditionGateTests).
var svc = new DelegatedAdminService(
repo.Object,
new StubTenantEntitlementService(AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security.TenantEdition.Enterprise),
new StubTenantEntitlementService(AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security.TenantEdition.Pro),
cache,
NullLogger<DelegatedAdminService>.Instance);
return (svc, repo);
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
using System.Collections.Generic;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Resolution matrix for the dual app-registration window (see EntraAppRegistry):
/// legacy unconfigured ⇒ always primary (code deploy is a no-op before the config swap);
/// null homing ⇒ legacy; known ids ⇒ that app; unknown ⇒ primary fallback.
/// </summary>
public class EntraAppRegistryTests
{
private const string PrimaryId = "886ab5e2-6144-442c-80cc-9b28e0667731";
private const string LegacyId = "1a400946-62c1-4ab4-aa37-f730ac89704d";
private static EntraAppRegistry Build(Dictionary<string, string?> settings) =>
new(new ConfigurationBuilder().AddInMemoryCollection(settings).Build(),
NullLogger<EntraAppRegistry>.Instance);
private static EntraAppRegistry DualApp() => Build(new()
{
["EntraId:ClientId"] = PrimaryId,
["EntraId:ClientSecret"] = "primary-secret",
["EntraId:LegacyClientId"] = LegacyId,
["EntraId:LegacyClientSecret"] = "legacy-secret",
});
private static TenantConfiguration Tenant(string? homedAppClientId) => new()
{
TenantId = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111",
HomedAppClientId = homedAppClientId,
};
[Fact]
public void LegacyUnconfigured_AlwaysResolvesPrimary_EvenForNullHoming()
{
var registry = Build(new()
{
["EntraId:ClientId"] = PrimaryId,
["EntraId:ClientSecret"] = "primary-secret",
});
Assert.False(registry.LegacyConfigured);
Assert.Equal(PrimaryId, registry.ResolveForTenant(Tenant(null)).ClientId);
Assert.Equal(PrimaryId, registry.ResolveForTenant(null).ClientId);
Assert.False(registry.ResolveForTenant(Tenant(null)).IsLegacy);
}
[Fact]
public void NullHoming_ResolvesLegacy()
{
var resolved = DualApp().ResolveForTenant(Tenant(null));
Assert.True(resolved.IsLegacy);
Assert.Equal(LegacyId, resolved.ClientId);
Assert.Equal("legacy-secret", resolved.ClientSecret);
}
[Fact]
public void MissingConfigRow_ResolvesLegacy_SameAsNullHoming()
{
Assert.True(DualApp().ResolveForTenant(null).IsLegacy);
}
[Fact]
public void PrimaryHoming_ResolvesPrimary_CaseAndBraceInsensitive()
{
var registry = DualApp();
Assert.False(registry.ResolveForTenant(Tenant(PrimaryId)).IsLegacy);
Assert.False(registry.ResolveForTenant(Tenant(PrimaryId.ToUpperInvariant())).IsLegacy);
Assert.False(registry.ResolveForTenant(Tenant("{" + PrimaryId + "}")).IsLegacy);
}
[Fact]
public void LegacyHoming_ResolvesLegacy()
{
var resolved = DualApp().ResolveForTenant(Tenant(LegacyId));
Assert.True(resolved.IsLegacy);
Assert.Equal("legacy-secret", resolved.ClientSecret);
}
[Fact]
public void UnknownHoming_FallsBackToPrimary()
{
var resolved = DualApp().ResolveForTenant(Tenant("99999999-9999-9999-9999-999999999999"));
Assert.False(resolved.IsLegacy);
Assert.Equal(PrimaryId, resolved.ClientId);
}
[Fact]
public void MalformedLegacyClientId_TreatedAsUnconfigured()
{
var registry = Build(new()
{
["EntraId:ClientId"] = PrimaryId,
["EntraId:LegacyClientId"] = "not-a-guid",
["EntraId:LegacyClientSecret"] = "legacy-secret",
});
Assert.False(registry.LegacyConfigured);
Assert.False(registry.ResolveForTenant(Tenant(null)).IsLegacy);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(PrimaryId, true)]
[InlineData("api://" + PrimaryId, true)]
[InlineData("API://" + PrimaryId, true)]
[InlineData(LegacyId, false)]
[InlineData("api://" + LegacyId, false)]
[InlineData("https://graph.microsoft.com", false)]
[InlineData(null, false)]
[InlineData("", false)]
public void IsPrimary_MatchesBareAndApiPrefixedAudiences(string? audience, bool expected)
{
Assert.Equal(expected, DualApp().IsPrimary(audience));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("api://" + LegacyId, LegacyId)]
[InlineData(LegacyId, LegacyId)]
[InlineData("API://886AB5E2-6144-442C-80CC-9B28E0667731", PrimaryId)]
[InlineData("https://graph.microsoft.com", null)] // non-GUID audience must never persist as provenance
[InlineData("api://not-a-guid", null)]
[InlineData(null, null)]
[InlineData(" ", null)]
public void NormalizeAudience_StripsApiPrefixAndRequiresGuid(string? audience, string? expected)
{
Assert.Equal(expected, EntraAppRegistry.NormalizeAudience(audience));
}
}
@@ -6,8 +6,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Pins the edition-resolution matrix and the per-edition entitlement values of
/// <see cref="FeatureEntitlementCatalog"/>. Fail-closed contract: ONLY the exact tier
/// "enterprise" (or an active trial) yields Enterprise — legacy stored tiers ("free", "pro"),
/// null/empty and unknown values all resolve to Community without any data migration.
/// "pro" / the legacy stored value "enterprise" (or an active trial) yields Pro — the legacy
/// stored tier "free", null/empty and unknown values all resolve to Community without any
/// data migration.
/// </summary>
public class FeatureEntitlementCatalogTests
{
@@ -16,31 +17,34 @@ public class FeatureEntitlementCatalogTests
// ── ResolveEdition matrix ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[Theory]
[InlineData("enterprise")]
[InlineData("pro")]
[InlineData("Pro")]
[InlineData("PRO")]
[InlineData(" pro ")]
[InlineData("enterprise")] // legacy stored value — must stay readable as Pro
[InlineData("Enterprise")]
[InlineData("ENTERPRISE")]
[InlineData(" enterprise ")]
public void ResolveEdition_EnterpriseTier_IsEnterprise(string tier)
public void ResolveEdition_ProOrLegacyEnterpriseTier_IsPro(string tier)
{
Assert.Equal(TenantEdition.Enterprise, FeatureEntitlementCatalog.ResolveEdition(tier, null, Now));
Assert.Equal(TenantEdition.Pro, FeatureEntitlementCatalog.ResolveEdition(tier, null, Now));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("free")]
[InlineData("pro")]
[InlineData("community")]
[InlineData("")]
[InlineData(null)]
[InlineData("premium")] // unknown value → fail-closed
public void ResolveEdition_NonEnterpriseTier_IsCommunity(string? tier)
public void ResolveEdition_NonProTier_IsCommunity(string? tier)
{
Assert.Equal(TenantEdition.Community, FeatureEntitlementCatalog.ResolveEdition(tier, null, Now));
}
[Fact]
public void ResolveEdition_ActiveTrial_IsEnterprise_EvenOnFreeTier()
public void ResolveEdition_ActiveTrial_IsPro_EvenOnFreeTier()
{
Assert.Equal(TenantEdition.Enterprise,
Assert.Equal(TenantEdition.Pro,
FeatureEntitlementCatalog.ResolveEdition("free", Now.AddSeconds(1), Now));
}
@@ -59,11 +63,28 @@ public class FeatureEntitlementCatalogTests
FeatureEntitlementCatalog.ResolveEdition(null, Now.AddDays(-1), Now));
}
[Fact]
public void ResolveEdition_ExpiredTrial_ButEnterpriseTier_StaysEnterprise()
[Theory]
[InlineData("pro")]
[InlineData("enterprise")]
public void ResolveEdition_ExpiredTrial_ButPermanentProTier_StaysPro(string tier)
{
Assert.Equal(TenantEdition.Enterprise,
FeatureEntitlementCatalog.ResolveEdition("enterprise", Now.AddDays(-1), Now));
Assert.Equal(TenantEdition.Pro,
FeatureEntitlementCatalog.ResolveEdition(tier, Now.AddDays(-1), Now));
}
// ── IsPermanentProTier ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[Theory]
[InlineData("pro", true)]
[InlineData(" PRO ", true)]
[InlineData("enterprise", true)] // legacy stored value
[InlineData("free", false)]
[InlineData("community", false)]
[InlineData("", false)]
[InlineData(null, false)]
public void IsPermanentProTier_Matrix(string? tier, bool expected)
{
Assert.Equal(expected, FeatureEntitlementCatalog.IsPermanentProTier(tier));
}
// ── Entitlement values ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -76,20 +97,24 @@ public class FeatureEntitlementCatalogTests
Assert.Null(e.UserRateLimitPerMinute);
Assert.Null(e.DeviceRateLimitPerMinute);
Assert.False(e.DelegatedAdminAllowed);
Assert.False(e.BootstrapIncluded);
Assert.False(e.UnrestrictedModeAvailable);
Assert.Equal("community", e.McpUsagePlanName);
Assert.Equal(100, e.McpDailyRequestLimit);
Assert.Equal(3000, e.McpMonthlyRequestLimit);
}
[Fact]
public void Enterprise_Entitlements_MatchMatrix()
public void Pro_Entitlements_MatchMatrix()
{
var e = FeatureEntitlementCatalog.Get(TenantEdition.Enterprise);
var e = FeatureEntitlementCatalog.Get(TenantEdition.Pro);
Assert.Equal(365, e.RetentionCapDays);
Assert.Equal(150, e.UserRateLimitPerMinute);
Assert.Equal(150, e.DeviceRateLimitPerMinute);
Assert.True(e.DelegatedAdminAllowed);
Assert.Equal("enterprise", e.McpUsagePlanName);
Assert.True(e.BootstrapIncluded);
Assert.True(e.UnrestrictedModeAvailable);
Assert.Equal("pro", e.McpUsagePlanName);
Assert.Equal(1000, e.McpDailyRequestLimit);
Assert.Equal(20000, e.McpMonthlyRequestLimit);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
using System.Security.Claims;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Helpers;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Pins the claim precedence behind gather-rule Author stamping
/// (<see cref="TenantHelper.GetUserDisplayName(ClaimsPrincipal)"/>): display name
/// first, then UPN/email/preferred_username; null for anonymous/app-only callers
/// so CreateGatherRule falls back to the model default "Autopilot Monitor".
/// </summary>
public class GatherRuleAuthorStampingTests
{
private static ClaimsPrincipal Principal(params (string Type, string Value)[] claims)
=> new(new ClaimsIdentity(claims.Select(c => new Claim(c.Type, c.Value)), "TestAuth"));
[Fact]
public void DisplayName_wins_over_upn()
{
var user = Principal(("name", "Alice Admin"), ("upn", "alice@contoso.com"));
Assert.Equal("Alice Admin", TenantHelper.GetUserDisplayName(user));
}
[Fact]
public void Upn_used_when_no_name_claim()
{
var user = Principal(("upn", "alice@contoso.com"), ("preferred_username", "alice@contoso.onmicrosoft.com"));
Assert.Equal("alice@contoso.com", TenantHelper.GetUserDisplayName(user));
}
[Fact]
public void PreferredUsername_is_the_last_fallback()
{
var user = Principal(("preferred_username", "alice@contoso.com"));
Assert.Equal("alice@contoso.com", TenantHelper.GetUserDisplayName(user));
}
[Fact]
public void Null_for_principal_without_identifying_claims()
{
Assert.Null(TenantHelper.GetUserDisplayName(Principal(("tid", "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890"))));
}
[Fact]
public void Null_for_unauthenticated_or_missing_principal()
{
Assert.Null(TenantHelper.GetUserDisplayName((ClaimsPrincipal?)null));
// ClaimsIdentity without an authentication type => IsAuthenticated == false.
Assert.Null(TenantHelper.GetUserDisplayName(new ClaimsPrincipal(new ClaimsIdentity(new[] { new Claim("name", "Ghost") }))));
}
}
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
public class GatherRuleUpdatePartialMergeTests
{
private const string TenantId = "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890";
private const string RuleId = "GATHER-CUST-001";
private const string RuleId = "GATHER-CUSTOM-001";
private static GatherRule ExistingCustomRule() => new()
{
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ public class GatherRuleUpdatePartialMergeTests
Enabled = true,
IsBuiltIn = false,
IsCommunity = false,
Author = "Alice Admin",
CreatedAt = new DateTime(2026, 1, 15, 12, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc),
ActiveFromPhase = "AccountSetup",
EmitMode = "on_change",
@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ public class GatherRuleUpdatePartialMergeTests
Assert.Equal("AccountSetup", written.ActiveFromPhase);
Assert.Equal("on_change", written.EmitMode);
Assert.Equal(existing.CreatedAt, written.CreatedAt);
Assert.Equal("Alice Admin", written.Author);
}
[Fact]
@@ -126,6 +128,33 @@ public class GatherRuleUpdatePartialMergeTests
Assert.Equal(existing.CreatedAt, written.CreatedAt);
}
[Fact]
public async Task FullPayload_preserves_original_Author_even_when_payload_carries_one()
{
var existing = ExistingCustomRule();
var (service, _, stored) = BuildService(existing);
var fullPayload = new GatherRule
{
RuleId = RuleId,
Title = "Collect BIOS Config v2",
CollectorType = "registry",
Target = "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\RealmJoin\\Custom\\BIOS2",
Trigger = "interval",
OutputEventType = "gather_bios_config",
Enabled = true,
// A hand-crafted PUT could try to rewrite attribution — Author is
// stamped at create time and immutable afterwards.
Author = "Spoofed Author",
};
var ok = await service.UpdateRuleAsync(TenantId, fullPayload);
Assert.True(ok);
var written = Assert.Single(stored);
Assert.Equal("Alice Admin", written.Author);
}
[Fact]
public async Task BuiltInRule_toggle_still_goes_through_RuleState_path()
{

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