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Author SHA1 Message Date
Zhengchao An 1c8088d0b2 fix(security): redact OIDC secrets from logs and errors (#5147)
Stop the OIDC subsystem from writing credential-grade secrets into logs and returned errors.

- crates/iam/src/oidc.rs: redact sensitive header values (authorization, proxy-authorization, cookie, set-cookie) in format_http_headers, emitting only name and length; drop the raw request/response body from the DEBUG events (keep byte length); stop logging and stop splicing the raw token response body into the error returned on token_response_parse_failed (the TokenResponseBodyShape summary and length are retained); remove the now-unused format_http_body helper.
- rustfs/src/admin/handlers/oidc.rs: stop logging the raw authorization code and state on the code-exchange error path (code_len/state_len are kept).

This is the OIDC log/error redaction pre-work (batch 0B) from the OIDC review in rustfs/backlog#1437. It changes diagnostic content only; HTTP/STS status codes and legitimate request results are unchanged.
2026-07-23 01:09:53 +00:00
Zhengchao An ffcdab900a chore(release): prepare 1.0.0-beta.11 (#5146)
Bump workspace version and release assets to 1.0.0-beta.11.
2026-07-23 01:09:29 +00:00
Zhengchao An b94bf874bf test(admin): pin GHSA-5354 scope guard for derived credentials (#5144)
* fix(admin): confine service-account parent to caller scope (GHSA-5354)

AddServiceAccount gated creation only on CreateServiceAccountAdminAction and did not constrain the targetUser (the new service account's parent) to the caller's own scope. Combined with the deliberate root-credential exemption in the existence check, a non-owner principal holding that admin action could create a service account parented to the root credential, which then authenticates as owner via prepare_service_account_auth. This is the direct-handler analogue of the ImportIam parent-scope check (GHSA-566f), which already enforces the invariant via imported_service_account_parent_allowed.

Enforce the same invariant through add_service_account_parent_within_scope: a non-owner may create a service account only for itself (or, for a derived credential, its own parent); owners retain cross-user creation. Add named regression test ghsa_5354_non_owner_service_account_parent_confined_to_scope.

Refs GHSA-5354-r3w2-34m8.

* test(admin): pin GHSA-5354 scope guard for derived credentials

The GHSA-5354 fix (#5141) added `add_service_account_parent_within_scope` and a
named-boundary test, but that test only covers the self-scoped case with
`req_user == req_parent_user`. A derived credential — a service account or STS
token holding CreateServiceAccountAdminAction — has `req_user` (its own key)
distinct from `req_parent_user` (its parent), which is the realistic attacker
shape and was left unexercised.

Add a test that pins the guard's allow set to exactly `owner || is_svc_acc`
across that derived-credential shape, including a derived non-owner aiming at the
root credential, so a later change to either the guard or the `is_svc_acc`
rewrite cannot silently let a derived non-owner escape its own parent's scope.
Also note at the check site that the guard is evaluated on the original
`target_user`, before the derived-credential rewrite to `req_parent_user`.

Refs GHSA-5354-r3w2-34m8.
2026-07-23 08:48:28 +08:00
Zhengchao An 7d96ffd7fb docs(testing): record GHSA-5354 and GHSA-3ppv regression guards (#5143)
PRs #5141 and #5142 fixed GHSA-5354 (service-account parent-scope enforcement) and GHSA-3ppv (versioned object-read authorization) but did not add the advisories to the security-regressions inventory that repo policy requires for every fixed GHSA. Add both rows to the advisory -> test mapping (advisory, class, fix PR, named regression test, layer) and list ghsa_5354_* / ghsa_3ppv_* under the default-CI unit-test execution map, since both tests live in the rustfs lib target and run in the default `cargo nextest run --profile ci --all --exclude e2e_test` pass.
2026-07-23 08:31:21 +08:00
cxymds 027a749646 feat(admin): advertise site replication capabilities (#5131) 2026-07-23 08:02:50 +08:00
cxymds 6c23b8506e feat(site-replication): persist durable resync lifecycle (#5125) 2026-07-23 08:02:30 +08:00
Zhengchao An 8166561702 fix(s3): authorize versioned object reads against GetObjectVersion (GHSA-3ppv) (#5142)
get_object, the CopyObject source, and the UploadPartCopy source authorized reads that name an explicit versionId against s3:GetObject rather than s3:GetObjectVersion. A principal holding s3:GetObject but not s3:GetObjectVersion could therefore read historical object versions. get_object_attributes was already version-aware; these three paths were not.

Add a shared versioned_read_action helper that selects s3:GetObjectVersion when a version is named and s3:GetObject otherwise, and apply it to the three read/copy-source authorization sites. Add named regression test ghsa_3ppv_versioned_read_selects_get_object_version_action.

The ActionSet::is_match GetObjectVersion->GetObject compatibility mapping is intentionally retained for now; its removal is gated on a follow-up audit of the remaining version-aware read paths (HeadObject, GetObjectAcl, tagging). It does not affect this fix, which only prevents a GetObject grant from satisfying a versioned read.

Refs GHSA-3ppv-fx5m-m749.
2026-07-22 23:44:05 +00:00
Zhengchao An 9866f68d86 fix(admin): confine service-account parent to caller scope (GHSA-5354) (#5141)
AddServiceAccount gated creation only on CreateServiceAccountAdminAction and did not constrain the targetUser (the new service account's parent) to the caller's own scope. Combined with the deliberate root-credential exemption in the existence check, a non-owner principal holding that admin action could create a service account parented to the root credential, which then authenticates as owner via prepare_service_account_auth. This is the direct-handler analogue of the ImportIam parent-scope check (GHSA-566f), which already enforces the invariant via imported_service_account_parent_allowed.

Enforce the same invariant through add_service_account_parent_within_scope: a non-owner may create a service account only for itself (or, for a derived credential, its own parent); owners retain cross-user creation. Add named regression test ghsa_5354_non_owner_service_account_parent_confined_to_scope.

Refs GHSA-5354-r3w2-34m8.
2026-07-22 23:43:30 +00:00
abdullahnah92 0e8f1a187c fix(site-replication): replicate object-lock retention and legal hold (#5105)
* fix(site-replication): replicate object-lock retention and legal hold

Object Lock did not survive site replication, so a WORM-protected object was
either missing from the peer entirely or present there unprotected. Two
independent defects caused this.

1. The site-replicator service account policy granted no object-lock actions.
   Any replicated object carrying x-amz-object-lock-mode /
   x-amz-object-lock-retain-until-date was rejected by the peer with
   AccessDenied, so an object created under a retention rule never replicated
   at all. Grant s3:GetObjectRetention, s3:PutObjectRetention,
   s3:GetObjectLegalHold and s3:PutObjectLegalHold. s3:BypassGovernanceRetention
   is deliberately NOT granted: replication must never be able to erase a
   retained version on the peer.

2. PutObjectRetention and PutObjectLegalHold only rewrote object metadata. The
   object PUT path is what normally computes a replication decision and
   schedules replication, so a lock applied after upload stayed local and the
   peer kept its previous, unprotected state. Schedule replication explicitly
   after both metadata writes.

Verified live on a two-site cluster: an object created under a COMPLIANCE
retention rule now replicates, the peer copy reports COMPLIANCE, a
version-scoped delete on the peer is refused, and the content matches by MD5.
Retention and legal hold applied after upload propagate to the peer within
about 15s, and the replicated copy is likewise undeletable. No AccessDenied
replication errors remain.

Adds a regression test asserting the policy allows the four object-lock actions
and still denies governance bypass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(site-replication): persist pending marker before object-lock metadata commit

Review follow-up on the object-lock replication fix.

PutObjectRetention and PutObjectLegalHold scheduled replication but did not
persist a pending replication marker first, unlike the canonical object PUT
path. If the process restarted between the metadata commit and the replication
worker write-back, the in-memory task was lost and the object carried no
Pending/Failed marker, so the scanner heal skipped it and the peer silently
stayed unprotected.

Both handlers now mirror the PUT path ordering: compute the replication
decision once BEFORE the commit, fold SUFFIX_REPLICATION_STATUS and
SUFFIX_REPLICATION_TIMESTAMP into the eval_metadata passed to
put_object_metadata, then schedule after the commit. eval_metadata is merged
into the object metadata, so the lock fields are preserved. When the object
info cannot be read the decision is empty and nothing is scheduled.

Also aligns the two handlers to build their options the same way, and notes at
both schedule sites that this triggers a full object re-upload because
metadata-only replication is not implemented yet.

Adds an integration test asserting both handlers compute a replication decision
exactly once, so a regression that drops the scheduling is caught.

Verified live on a two-site cluster: applying retention while the peer is down
now leaves Replication Status: PENDING on disk at commit time, and once the
peer returns the lock propagates in about 15s and the status becomes COMPLETED.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 07:34:22 +08:00
Zhengchao An b32bd1f8a9 fix(ecstore): cap mmap-copy shard reads to stop large single-part GET OOM (#5140) 2026-07-22 23:32:29 +00:00
Zhengchao An c9848a6096 fix(security): enforce outbound connection policy (#5135)
Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 22:11:28 +00:00
Zhengchao An 6e88ab2a25 fix(targets): accept both DnsFailure and Unreachable in macOS DNS test (#5138)
On macOS with DNS interception services, .invalid TLD domains resolve
to an interception address (e.g. 198.18.16.173) instead of failing DNS
resolution. The health probe then classifies the error as Unreachable
rather than DnsFailure. Accept both outcomes since both are correct
non-reachable error classifications.
2026-07-23 03:02:47 +08:00
houseme 05d4480f08 fix(admin): preserve peer topology slots (#5136)
Keep remote peer topology slots observable when peer client construction cannot build a dialing client, and publish admin server_info cache/failure state only after a complete probe round.

Covers rustfs/backlog#1426 and rustfs/backlog#1430.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 18:02:41 +00:00
houseme abee09dad9 fix(admin): preserve v3 topology membership (#5134)
* fix(admin): use raw topology host for peer mapping

Backlog: rustfs/backlog#1427

Keep endpoint topology membership keyed by raw host:port when mapping peers to grid hosts, while preserving DNS resolution only for the PeerRestClient dialing host.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(admin): reconcile v3 info with topology

Backlog: rustfs/backlog#1425

Backlog: rustfs/backlog#1428

Synthesize additive unknown server rows from configured endpoint topology before v3 backend counters are computed, and add exact drive-identity coverage tests so balanced totals cannot hide a missing member.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* refactor(admin): collapse topology reconciliation

Build a single endpoint topology index for v3 admin server reconciliation and completeness reporting, and reuse the raw peer/grid mapping when constructing peer clients.

Backlog: rustfs/backlog#1424

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 15:31:31 +00:00
houseme a044d11443 chore(deps): refresh cargo dependencies (#5132)
Update selected workspace dependencies and lockfile entries.

Keep async-nats and rcgen on explicit feature sets while preserving the RustFS targets and TLS test surfaces.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 21:02:59 +08:00
houseme e1e6a8b020 fix(tier): gate exact remote version consumption (#5126)
* fix(tier): gate exact remote version consumption

Reject non-empty remote tier versions before transitioned GET and remote delete backend I/O when the tier backend does not support exact version operations.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(tier): split mock remote version validation fault

Separate one-shot mock remote version validation failures from persistent unsupported-backend behavior so cleanup durability tests can still verify exact-version recovery while #1358 fail-closed gate tests keep asserting no backend I/O.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 11:52:56 +00:00
houseme 5cfe4ccc7d fix(tier): include persisted refs in tier proof (#5128)
Extend tier mutation reference proof to cover persisted delete journal, transition transaction, and free-version references with one-pass target matching.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 11:31:03 +00:00
houseme df2db15ce8 fix(tier): persist unknown upload outcomes (#5127)
Advance transition transactions to UploadOutcomeUnknown before remote tier PUT so response-loss windows can be recovered through provider-authoritative probing.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 19:14:47 +08:00
houseme 0321e9350d fix(tier): retain prepared intents after abort failure (#5129)
Keep coordinator Prepared intents durable when peer abort recovery fails, then make reload retry abort or commit based on the persisted tier config digest.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 19:12:55 +08:00
houseme cd9a2eecb1 test(tier): fix uring test build fake peer (#5124)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 10:03:50 +00:00
houseme 8b09634e62 fix(tier): fan out coordinator mutations to peers (#5122)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 17:02:57 +08:00
houseme 1ede77b1c1 fix(ilm): recover unknown transition uploads by probing tier (#5120)
* fix(ilm): recover unknown transition uploads by probing tier

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* style(ilm): format transition recovery assertions

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 17:02:54 +08:00
houseme 666e251b78 test(tier): cover prepared intent scan cleanup (#5121)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 17:02:44 +08:00
houseme 65ba138c27 test(tier): cover mixed-version committed replay (#5119)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 17:02:32 +08:00
Zhengchao An 92ae19b340 fix(targets): isolate invalid target instances instead of failing the whole subsystem (#5118)
A single instance with a malformed `enable` value (e.g. the typo `enable`
instead of `enabled`/`on`) made every configured notification/audit target
of every type fail to load. `create_targets_from_config_with_store_mode`
collected instance configs through the strict `try_collect_target_configs`,
whose `.collect::<Result<Vec, _>>()` short-circuits on the first error and
drops all siblings; the surrounding `?` then aborted the loop over every
plugin type.

This contradicted the function's own documented contract ("Creation is
fault-isolated per instance") and was inconsistent: target construction
failures were already isolated into the `failures` accumulator, only config
collection failures were fatal.

Add `collect_target_config_results[_from_env]`, which returns the enabled
`(id, config)` pairs plus a per-instance failure summary, and use it in the
create path. Per-instance collection errors now flow into the same
`failures`/`creation_failures` accumulator as construction failures: healthy
siblings and other target types still load, while the malformed instance is
surfaced so the notify lifecycle stays non-converged/retryable and an Admin
write cannot report a false success. Audit likewise keeps logging through
its valid targets instead of going fully Stopped.

Follow-up to #5088.
2026-07-22 16:32:16 +08:00
houseme 4607c3be53 fix(tier): recover coordinator mutation intents (#5114)
Persist coordinator tier mutation intents before config CAS, recover prepared coordinator intents whose candidate digest already matches the saved config, and clean finished coordinator records after local publish.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1357

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 07:35:29 +00:00
cxymds e0bac66941 fix(targets): unify runtime health snapshots (#5110)
* fix(targets): unify runtime health snapshots

* fix(targets): stabilize health snapshot merge

* fix(admin): import runtime health test type
2026-07-22 06:50:36 +00:00
houseme 31dc78eab0 feat(tier): probe transition candidates from providers (#5112)
* feat(tier): add transition candidate probe contract

Add a fail-closed WarmBackend probe contract for provider-authoritative transition candidate state. Default providers report Unsupported, while the shared mock backend can now model missing, unversioned, and exact-version candidates for follow-up recovery tests.

This is a forward-compatible foundation for #1352/#1358 recovery work and does not change production cleanup behavior.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(tier): probe transition candidates from providers

Implement provider-authoritative transition candidate probing for S3-family warm backends by querying ListObjectVersions with exact-key filtering and fail-closed classification for delete markers, multiple versions, truncation, and unknown versioning state.

This keeps non-S3 providers on the default Unsupported probe result and forwards MinIO, RustFS, and R2 through the S3 probe implementation.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 06:13:32 +00:00
Zhengchao An daca7294c7 fix(ecstore): stop logging not-found listing quorum miss at error (#5111)
A metacache listing that misses quorum purely because the volume or path
is absent on a quorum of drives (every drive reports VolumeNotFound or
FileNotFound) is a benign, expected outcome: list_path_raw already returns
VolumeNotFound/FileNotFound and lets the caller decide how to react.

The common trigger is a startup race where the system bucket (.rustfs.sys)
is not yet created on every drive when an early reader such as the IAM
config loader lists config/iam/. Logging that at error prints a scary
message during normal boot and, in #5076, misled a user into blaming it
for unrelated upload failures.

Add is_benign_not_found_listing_failure() and demote the pure not-found
case to debug (state = "quorum_not_found"), keeping error for listings
that failed for a real reason (I/O, timeout, corruption). Return value and
control flow are unchanged. Add a unit test for the classifier.

Refs: #5076
2026-07-22 05:26:09 +00:00
cxymds 1655f3192e fix(notify): unify runtime lifecycle coordination (#5088)
* fix(notify): unify runtime lifecycle coordination

* fix(notify): repair lifecycle convergence checks

* fix(admin): expose effective notify state (#5097)
2026-07-22 05:01:15 +00:00
houseme 0adb3c5ea1 fix(tier): gate inexact provider versions (#5109)
Bind provider exact GET and DELETE capability to tier operation leases and reject non-empty remote versions before committing transition metadata when the provider cannot address exact versions.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 12:24:05 +08:00
houseme 68e156a5c5 fix(tier): retain unproven transition candidates (#5108)
Keep LocalCommitStarted transition transaction records retained when the local source cannot prove the commit, so recovery does not classify the record as failed or delete the remote candidate without cleanup proof.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 04:03:33 +00:00
houseme 3f60cc743e fix(tier): replay committed mutation intents (#5107)
Keep recovered tier mutation blocks installed until the local publish transition has atomically established draining for the affected tiers, so old-generation leases cannot slip in after peer commit replay and before local publish.

Delay committed intent cleanup until local publish succeeds. If peer replay succeeds but local publish fails, the durable committed intent remains available for retry and the runtime block stays fail-closed.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 03:06:55 +00:00
houseme 35af4a611f fix(tier): fail closed legacy mutations without etag (#5106)
* fix: fail closed legacy tier mutations without etag

Reject non-add tier config mutations when the loaded durable snapshot has no current config ETag. This keeps legacy JSON/no-ETag paths from being saved as creation-style updates before coordinator intent state can bind an old config revision.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(tier): allow empty clear without config etag

Allow empty tier clears to initialize the binary config under the namespace coordinator lock while keeping non-empty legacy config mutations fail-closed when no current ETag exists.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 02:02:00 +00:00
houseme a8e7cce5e1 feat: expose list read-dir amplification metrics (#5103)
Record local read_dir entry counts and duration for live-walker ListObjects scans so wide root/prefix amplification can be measured below the cross-set merge layer.

Add a focused LocalDisk scan_dir test showing a page limit of one still observes the whole parent directory enumeration, plus metric helper coverage.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 08:15:41 +08:00
Jason Kossis 9469dfa5b8 fix(site-replication): delete replicated buckets 2026-07-22 01:22:41 +08:00
houseme f1d2af698c fix(tier): add mutation peer fanout helpers (#5102)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-21 17:19:07 +00:00
houseme d5f8c6c044 test(tier): cover zero reference proof matrix (#5100)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-21 17:17:38 +00:00
houseme f5303bad95 test(tier): cover peer mutation fail-closed statuses (#5101)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-21 17:15:17 +00:00
houseme cb0d4ffa76 perf: bound list merge prefetch (#5099)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-21 17:03:23 +00:00
houseme 5b61b030a4 fix(tier): narrow mutation proof targets (#5098)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-22 00:34:22 +08:00
houseme 0fbb5ba87b fix(tier): add peer mutation control client (#5096)
* fix(tier): lock tier config mutations

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(tier): add mutation RPC auth contract (#5082)

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(tier): add peer mutation handler core (#5084)

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(tier): add mutation control rpc service (#5087)

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(tier): recover prepared mutation drains (#5093)

Recover prepared tier mutation intent records into the local tier runtime so a restarted peer fails closed before issuing new remote-tier operation leases or conflicting admin publishes.

Reconcile the recovered block map on each scan so committed, aborted, or removed intents clear stale local blocks instead of wedging the peer until process restart.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(tier): prove zero references before tier removal (#5092)

Signed-off-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(tier): clear peer mutation runtime blocks (#5094)

Install prepared mutation runtime blocks when peer prepare requests are applied or replayed so followers fail closed immediately before restart recovery.

Clear the in-memory block once peer commit or abort reaches a durable terminal state, including delayed duplicate prepare requests that observe a committed or aborted record.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(tier): add peer mutation control client

Add signed tier mutation prepare, commit, and abort client calls for peer fanout while preserving the existing protobuf and RPC contract.

Verify response proofs before interpreting peer outcomes, fail closed on invalid states, and reject oversized payloads before dialing peers.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-21 15:52:46 +00:00
houseme f6e8ce4639 fix: preserve walk-dir internode metrics fallback (#5095)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-21 15:30:34 +00:00
houseme 937b311316 fix(tier): lock tier config mutations (#5080)
* fix(tier): lock tier config mutations

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(tier): add mutation RPC auth contract (#5082)

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(tier): add peer mutation handler core (#5084)

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(tier): add mutation control rpc service (#5087)

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(tier): recover prepared mutation drains (#5093)

Recover prepared tier mutation intent records into the local tier runtime so a restarted peer fails closed before issuing new remote-tier operation leases or conflicting admin publishes.

Reconcile the recovered block map on each scan so committed, aborted, or removed intents clear stale local blocks instead of wedging the peer until process restart.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(tier): prove zero references before tier removal (#5092)

Signed-off-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(tier): clear peer mutation runtime blocks (#5094)

Install prepared mutation runtime blocks when peer prepare requests are applied or replayed so followers fail closed immediately before restart recovery.

Clear the in-memory block once peer commit or abort reaches a durable terminal state, including delayed duplicate prepare requests that observe a committed or aborted record.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-21 23:16:12 +08:00
houseme 62c2f81afd fix(admin): expose cluster diagnostic components (#5090)
Add machine-readable storage, listing, usage, and workload component diagnostics to the admin cluster snapshot response while keeping the external S3 API untouched.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-21 14:33:10 +00:00
Zhengchao An eed1e97967 fix: update cluster snapshot test for peer health local node semantics (#5089)
The peer health snapshot now reports CapabilityState::Supported for
local nodes (no probing needed), but the cluster_snapshot test still
expected Unknown. Update the assertion to match the new behavior
introduced in commit 7805cf5ae.
2026-07-21 13:02:25 +00:00
GatewayJ 97b618bc2b fix(iam): reject cross-identity access key collisions (#5085)
fix(iam): reject service account access key collisions
2026-07-21 20:36:25 +08:00
houseme 7805cf5ae6 fix(cluster): clarify peer health and listing timeouts (#5086)
* fix(cluster): surface observed peer health

Refs rustfs/backlog#1387

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(admin): distinguish unreported peer health

Refs rustfs/backlog#1388

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): decouple metacache peek timeout

Refs rustfs/backlog#1389

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* docs(ops): diagnose metacache listing timeouts

Refs rustfs/backlog#1390

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* refactor(cluster): clarify observed peer health

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): route capability state through contract

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-21 11:11:24 +00:00
Henry Guo bb7bba3237 fix(obs): clarify cluster bucket usage metrics (#5081)
Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-21 17:23:49 +08:00
GatewayJ 17f0bd2637 fix(iam): report duplicate access keys clearly (#5066)
* fix(iam): report duplicate access keys clearly

* fix(iam): narrow duplicate access key handling
2026-07-21 16:14:06 +08:00
houseme 7f569b67cb fix(tier): add mutation intent CAS advance (#5078)
Add idempotent terminal transition handling for tier mutation intents and a compare-and-swap record update helper backed by config-object ETags. Cover commit and abort retries, conflicting terminal updates, stale ETag rejection, and exact-limit scan pagination.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-21 08:10:31 +00:00
唐小鸭 d13345dc65 fix(site-replication): preserve HTTPS peer join endpoints (#5045)
fix(site-replication): enhance TLS handling for peer joins and add tests
2026-07-21 16:04:12 +08:00
cxymds 79d745413e fix(admin): support pool listing on single-drive setups (#5071) 2026-07-21 15:32:40 +08:00
houseme 9f25858b05 fix(tier): add mutation intent record store (#5075)
Add canonical record-object naming and crate-private save, load, and idempotent delete helpers for tier mutation intents. Cover malformed record keys, mismatched persisted mutation IDs, and an ECStore config-object round trip under test-util.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-21 07:26:23 +00:00
houseme a4e7dd70a6 fix(tier): add mutation intent foundation (#5074)
Add an internal durable tier mutation intent model for the #1357 distributed fencing work. The new model validates schema, checksum, canonical targets, mutation-specific target identity shape, config ETags, expiry, and prepared-to-terminal state transitions without changing the production mutation path yet.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-21 06:24:57 +00:00
houseme d6d22afc6e fix(ilm): recover cleanup pending transactions (#5073)
Retry cleanup-pending transition transaction recovery after restart, keeping committed remote bodies when local metadata already references them and preserving records when remote cleanup fails.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-21 14:17:32 +08:00
houseme 75381d4ffe fix(ilm): accept null version transition sources (#5069)
* fix(ilm): accept null version transition sources

Treat nil/null source version IDs as null-version transition sources when building transition transaction source identity, while preserving fail-closed validation for truly missing IDs on versioned sources.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ilm): preserve multipart source versions

Propagate bucket versioning into CompleteMultipartUpload, assign a concrete version ID for versioned multipart completions, and classify unversioned FileInfo sources as null-version transition sources.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ilm): normalize multipart completion versions

Treat nil staged version IDs as missing for versioned multipart completion and clear staged version IDs when completion publishes a null-version object under suspended or unversioned semantics.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-21 13:18:45 +08:00
houseme f32597bdb0 fix(ilm): recover uploaded transition transactions (#5068)
* fix(ilm): recover uploaded transition transactions

Persist transition transaction records through production transition uploads, use transaction-scoped remote object names, and start a conservative recovery loop for uploaded candidates.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ilm): reconcile committed transition records

Drop LocalCommitStarted transaction records only after object metadata confirms that the local transition commit already points at the same tier object and version.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-21 03:17:24 +00:00
houseme 1fac7a5871 chore(deps): refresh workspace dependencies (#5067)
* chore(deps): refresh workspace dependencies

Refresh compatible workspace dependencies while preserving the requested
version pins. Update async-nats and Hyper, and replace the temporary Hyper
Git patch with the released crate.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* chore(deps): bump hotpath to 0.21.5

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-21 02:05:42 +00:00
cxymds 0e2e01d060 fix(site-replication): harden add finalization (#5064) 2026-07-21 00:12:08 +08:00
cxymds 4f133eb95f feat(tiering): add Wasabi lifecycle target support (#5057) 2026-07-21 00:11:53 +08:00
houseme 302dd42d38 fix(ilm): add transition transaction foundation (#5065)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 14:10:11 +00:00
GatewayJ 48b2f3d6e3 fix(s3select): preserve CSV input as strings (#5030)
* fix(s3select): preserve CSV input as strings

* fix(s3select): address CSV schema review findings
2026-07-20 21:02:54 +08:00
Henry Guo 376b90f61f fix(lifecycle): back off idle free-version recovery (#5025)
Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 21:02:29 +08:00
abdullahnah92 b6838b262f fix(site-repl): inject local site into replicate add when omitted (fixes web console setup) (#5023)
fix(site-replication): inject local deployment into replicate-add payload when omitted

The web console's "Set Up Site Replication" flow posts only the remote peer(s) to
/rustfs/admin/v3/site-replication/add and omits the local deployment. The add
preflight requires the local deployment to be present
(validate_add_preflight_topology), so the console's request failed with
"site replication add request must include the local deployment" and no
replication was configured from the web UI.

Inject the local site into the sites list when the payload does not already
include it (matched by endpoint identity), before validation. `mc admin
replicate add` always sends every site, so this is a no-op for the CLI; the
local site carries no credentials (validate_add_sites already skips credential
checks for it).

Adds unit tests for inject-when-missing and no-op-when-already-present.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 20:56:18 +08:00
cxymds 28fdcc87be fix(tiering): make rejected upload cleanup durable (#5059)
* fix(tiering): make rejected upload cleanup durable

* fix(tiering): close transition upload cancellation gap

* test(tiering): cover failed upload without candidate

* test(tiering): synchronize cancelled cleanup recovery

* test(tiering): stabilize cancelled cleanup recovery

Prefer cancellation when the tier delete journal recovery worker is racing an immediate tick, and build the cancelled-cleanup regression store with an already-cancelled token so production recovery cannot consume the test journal.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 20:54:32 +08:00
houseme 35f3599992 fix(ecstore): fence restore final commit by operation id (#5062)
Refs rustfs/backlog#1356

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 12:08:55 +00:00
houseme b44e82fef1 fix(notify): restore webhook HTTPS target initialization (#5060)
Restore the workspace reqwest default feature stack for RustFS outbound HTTPS clients, while keeping per-crate extra APIs such as json, stream, and multipart explicit. Lazily initialize the notification runtime from admin target access when RUSTFS_NOTIFY_ENABLE=true is already effective, and add regression coverage for HTTPS webhook custom CA handling and target-list visibility.

Fixes #5052.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 19:55:07 +08:00
abdullahnah92 7ddaae397b fix(site-repl): count replicated buckets as in-sync (base64 decode in status path) (#5022)
fix(site-replication): count replicated buckets as in-sync in replicate status

`mc admin replicate status` reported "0/N Buckets in sync" with a cross mark for
every bucket even when replication was healthy and objects had propagated.

build_sr_info stores each bucket's replication_config in the wire form as
base64-encoded XML (raw_config_to_base64), but site_replication_config_mismatch
XML-parsed that string directly without base64-decoding. The parse always
failed, so every bucket with a replication config was reported as a config
mismatch (replication_cfg_mismatch = true), which the status endpoint and mc
render as out-of-sync.

Decode the wire value (tolerant base64 decode, falling back to raw bytes) before
XML-parsing. Adds a regression test that feeds the base64 wire form used in
production; the existing tests only exercised raw XML, which masked the bug.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 10:49:51 +00:00
houseme 9e4c5e949f fix(ecstore): fence restore cleanup by operation id (#5058)
Refs rustfs/backlog#1356

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 10:32:02 +00:00
abdullahnah92 7cc211ae17 fix(site-replication): report peer sync state in replicate info and s… (#5020)
fix(site-replication): report peer sync state in replicate info and surface pre-existing back-fill failures

BUG 1 — blank/Unknown Sync in `mc admin replicate info` and the console:
The info endpoint (SiteReplicationInfoHandler) serializes the persisted peer
map, whose sync_state is constructed as Unknown and never updated; the health
derivation added earlier only runs in build_status_info (the status endpoint).
Persist sync_state = Enable for peers on the add and join enable paths
(promote only Unknown, never clobber an explicit Disable). build_status_info
still refines live health for the status endpoint, so info/status/console and
peer_states all report a real sync state for a healthy peer.

BUG 2 — pre-existing-bucket back-fill failures were silently swallowed:
backfill_existing_buckets_after_add returned () and the add handler reported
success with an initial_sync_error_message that only ever carried
metadata-bootstrap errors, so a pre-existing bucket that failed to propagate
was invisible. Return per-bucket failures (including the previously silent
Ok(false) runtime-unavailable no-op and the versioning-failure drop), fold
them into the add response via compose_initial_sync_error_message, and log
reverse-direction gaps on the join path.

Adds unit tests for sync_state promotion (and Disable preservation) and for
back-fill failure surfacing.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 17:47:31 +08:00
houseme a27fe2f56c test(ecstore): cover transition upload cancellation (#5056)
Refs rustfs/backlog#1353

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 09:47:19 +00:00
cxymds bd978bed2d fix(admin): stabilize cluster capacity usage reporting (#5053)
* fix(admin): stabilize cluster capacity usage reporting

* test(admin): strengthen capacity usage regressions
2026-07-20 17:42:03 +08:00
cxymds fe67af3524 fix(heal): coordinate cluster-wide control operations (#5003) 2026-07-20 09:40:46 +00:00
houseme 26573622bc test(ecstore): cover post-apply rollback error (#5054)
Refs rustfs/backlog#1355

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 17:05:53 +08:00
cxymds eeafc355d4 feat(heal): define fenced control wire envelopes (#4997)
* fix(rpc): bind internode auth to exact targets

* fix(heal): initialize the runtime atomically

* fix(heal): aggregate status across cluster nodes

* fix(heal): return canonical tokens for duplicate starts

* feat(heal): add authenticated control RPC contract

* feat(heal): gate control capability by cluster topology

* feat(heal): define fenced control wire envelopes

* fix(heal): return canonical tokens for duplicate starts (#4992)

---------

Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 16:54:37 +08:00
houseme 955577b66f test(ecstore): cover transition source dedupe (#5050)
Refs rustfs/backlog#1355

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 06:31:48 +00:00
houseme 1cff6f20c9 test(ecstore): cover transition partial rollback (#5048)
Refs rustfs/backlog#1355

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 06:17:48 +00:00
houseme 2abfdd8261 test(ecstore): cover transition lock-lost cleanup (#5047)
Refs rustfs/backlog#1355

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 13:47:42 +08:00
cxymds 908ca548bb feat(heal): gate control capability by cluster topology (#4994)
* fix(rpc): bind internode auth to exact targets

* fix(heal): initialize the runtime atomically

* fix(heal): aggregate status across cluster nodes

* fix(heal): return canonical tokens for duplicate starts

* feat(heal): add authenticated control RPC contract

* feat(heal): gate control capability by cluster topology

* fix(heal): return canonical tokens for duplicate starts (#4992)

---------

Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 05:04:30 +00:00
houseme c92e99ba95 chore(deps): refresh workspace dependencies (#5044)
Update compatible workspace dependencies and refresh the lockfile while
keeping ratelimit pinned.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 12:32:13 +08:00
cxymds a774bc07da feat(heal): add authenticated control RPC contract (#4993)
* fix(rpc): bind internode auth to exact targets

* fix(heal): initialize the runtime atomically

* fix(heal): aggregate status across cluster nodes

* fix(heal): return canonical tokens for duplicate starts

* feat(heal): add authenticated control RPC contract

* fix(heal): return canonical tokens for duplicate starts (#4992)

---------

Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 12:07:38 +08:00
houseme 69f543568b test(ecstore): cover transition cleanup failure (#5042)
Refs rustfs/backlog#1355

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 04:03:24 +00:00
houseme 2269896f5e test(ecstore): cover transition lock cleanup (#5040)
Refs rustfs/backlog#1353

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 02:51:29 +00:00
houseme 67c4e3e60e fix(ecstore): read provider tier version headers (#5041)
Refs rustfs/backlog#1358

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-20 02:46:29 +00:00
Zhengchao An 4f0be83ea5 ci(cla): upgrade CLA to v2 (#5046)
Point the cla-bot config and the PR template at cla/v2.md so new
contributions are checked against the v2 Individual CLA.

- .github/cla.yml: document.version v1 -> v2, url -> cla/v2.md
- .github/pull_request_template.md: CLA link -> cla/v2.md
2026-07-20 10:44:06 +08:00
Zhengchao An db3b08b612 fix(e2e): use non-default credentials in cluster test constructor (#5039)
Commit aec2ee9ec (#5005) enforced that RPC secrets cannot be derived
from the public default credentials. This broke all multi-node cluster
E2E tests that relied on the constructor's DEFAULT_ACCESS_KEY /
DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY defaults.

Move the non-default credential and RUSTFS_RPC_SECRET blanking into
the RustFSTestClusterEnvironment constructor so every cluster test
starts with a valid RPC secret derivation base. Remove the per-test
overrides in cluster_multidrive_pool_test that were added as a partial
fix in #5005.
2026-07-20 02:37:37 +00:00
houseme 998c3f561c test(ecstore): cover transition prepared combo (#5037)
Add a deterministic transition matrix case for a stale prepared metadata snapshot followed by a committed transition, duplicate transition, and late GET. The test proves the stale metadata generation is physically reclaimed, duplicate transition does not upload a second remote candidate, and the late GET reads the committed remote body byte-for-byte instead of reopening the released local source.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1355

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-19 17:13:22 +00:00
houseme f42fc54362 test(ecstore): cover real transition bitrot failures (#5036)
Refs rustfs/backlog#1353

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-19 16:09:57 +00:00
GatewayJ 8ebedddfa1 fix(s3select): reject truncated object streams (#5027)
* fix(s3select): reject truncated object streams

* fix(s3select): validate raw stream before conversion
2026-07-19 15:34:20 +00:00
Zhengchao An a73f4c345f test(rpc): cover tonic auth service binding (#5034) 2026-07-19 23:27:08 +08:00
Zhengchao An ebc0aa0365 docs: update security advisory lessons (#5032) 2026-07-19 23:26:56 +08:00
cxymds aec2ee9ec1 fix(credentials): enforce RPC fallback credential policy (#5005) 2026-07-19 23:26:42 +08:00
cxymds 4290f390dd fix(heal): aggregate status across cluster nodes (#4990)
* fix(rpc): bind internode auth to exact targets

* fix(heal): initialize the runtime atomically

* fix(heal): aggregate status across cluster nodes

---------

Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-07-19 15:25:52 +00:00
houseme 056ebcee38 fix(targets): avoid Pulsar producer name collisions (#5033)
Generate a unique Pulsar producer name for each producer instance while preserving the target type and target id context. This avoids reload-time collisions when an old producer is still connected while a new destination is initialized.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-19 15:15:32 +00:00
houseme 18f0c161dd fix(ecstore): harden tier reader and restore cleanup races (#5035)
* fix(tier): hold generation lease through readers

Refs rustfs/backlog#1354

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(restore): fence failed cleanup by source identity

Refs rustfs/backlog#1356

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-19 23:05:58 +08:00
cxymds 1ac0841f6f fix(heal): initialize the runtime atomically (#4989)
* fix(rpc): bind internode auth to exact targets

* fix(heal): initialize the runtime atomically
2026-07-19 14:20:37 +00:00
cxymds 133499c2d5 fix(rpc): bind internode auth to exact targets (#4988) 2026-07-19 21:52:57 +08:00
cxymds b0c6c4cbce fix(storage): resolve erasure parity per pool (#4977)
* fix(filemeta): add state-aware file info validation

* fix(filemeta): validate shard arithmetic and delete paths

* fix(ecstore): add fallible erasure construction

* fix(ecstore): resolve storage parity per pool

* fix(storage): report heterogeneous erasure layouts

* fix(admin): publish prepared storage config atomically

* fix(storage): harden per-pool parity boundaries

* fix(storage): address pre-PR validation findings

* test(ci): fix strict-topology validation fixtures

* fix(heal): preserve delete markers during repair

* refactor(filemeta): drop unused ValidatedFileInfo witness

ValidatedFileInfo wrapped an unread `_file_info` reference alongside an `Option<ValidatedErasureLayout>`, but only the layout was ever consumed. Return the layout directly from `FileInfo::validate` so the sole production consumer (`LocalDisk::check_parts`) and the two unit tests read it without the extra witness type and lifetime.

No behavior change.

* fix(filemeta): keep compressed and MinIO-migrated tiered objects readable

The new decode-path validation rejected several legitimate on-disk shapes that older RustFS and MinIO-migrated data carry, turning readable objects into FileCorrupt:

- Compressed objects written with an unknown upload size persist a negative per-part actual_size (the documented "unknown size" sentinel that ObjectInfo::get_actual_size already tolerates). validate_collection_contents rejected it via usize::try_from; now a negative actual_size skips shard validation and only real, non-negative sizes are checked.
- MinIO-migrated objects transitioned to a versioned remote tier store the tier version id as a UUID string, not 16 raw bytes. MetaObject::into_fileinfo returned FileCorrupt (main tolerated it as None), making all versions of the object unreadable; MetaDeleteMarker free-version records took a Some(nil) sentinel path with the same effect, which also breaks free-version expiry (remote-tier leak). Both now decode through a shared transitioned_version_id_from_meta_sys helper: 16 raw bytes or a UUID string are accepted, anything else is tolerated as None instead of failing the read.

Regression tests updated to assert the readable/compat behavior, with new tests covering MinIO string-form recovery.

* fix(scanner): build the delete-marker test fixture without erasure geometry

get_size_counts_delete_markers_separately_from_versions built its delete marker with `FileInfo::new(object, 1, 1)`, which attaches erasure geometry (data=1/parity=1/distribution). This PR classifies versions by shape via `is_storage_delete_marker()` (no geometry) rather than the raw `deleted` flag, so a geometry-bearing "delete marker" is correctly serialized as a purge-pending payload Object and counted as a version — CI saw summary.versions=3, expected 2.

Real delete markers carry no erasure geometry (delete paths build them as `FileInfo { deleted: true, ..Default::default() }`), so construct the fixture the same way. It then classifies as a storage delete marker and the counts (versions=2, delete_markers=1) hold. This keeps the PR's more-correct classification, which prevents a purge-pending object's geometry from being dropped when serialized as a bare delete marker.

* docs(changelog): note per-pool parity fix and storage-class startup upgrade caveat

Records the #4801 per-pool erasure parity fix under Fixed, and documents the upgrade behavior where a persisted storage class that a small or heterogeneous pool cannot satisfy now fails startup — with the RUSTFS_STORAGE_CLASS_STANDARD recovery steps. Docs-only; covers R4 from the on-disk compatibility audit.

* fix(heal): report parity from erasure geometry, not is_valid()

heal_object set HealResultItem.parity_blocks via `if lfi.is_valid()`, which was missed by the migration of the other quorum/metadata predicates. With the new `is_valid()` semantics (full payload validation; delete markers now return false), a delete marker or a geometry-bearing version with a benign collection quirk would misreport parity as the pool default instead of its own. Use `has_valid_erasure_geometry()` — the narrow "does this carry erasure geometry" predicate the rest of the migration uses — so reporting matches the object's actual layout. Reporting-only; no data-path change.

* fix(filemeta): do not silently serialize a non-canonical deleted FileInfo as an Object

`From<FileInfo> for FileMetaVersion` classifies by `is_storage_delete_marker()` (shape), which correctly routes canonical delete markers to Delete and purge-pending payloads (deleted=true with real erasure geometry) to Object. But a `deleted` FileInfo that is neither a canonical marker nor a valid erasure payload would silently serialize as a zero-geometry MetaObject that later fails `validate_for_metadata_read`. Write paths validate first (`validate_for_erasure_write` / `validate_for_metadata_read`), so this is a caller bug; `From` is infallible, so surface it with a structured `warn!` on the malformed branch instead of writing corrupt metadata silently. Legitimate purge-pending objects (valid geometry) are unaffected — the guard only fires for `deleted && !has_valid_erasure_geometry()`.

* test(filemeta): assert real historical xl.meta versions pass metadata-read validation

Empirical companion to the code-reasoned decode-tolerance invariants (docs/architecture/erasure-coding.md §11) and the rolling-upgrade / MinIO-migration compatibility concern: the tightened `validate_for_metadata_read` runs on every local disk read and peer-RPC-decoded FileInfo, so it must accept every version of real historically-written xl.meta, never reject it as FileCorrupt.

Loads five real fixtures — MinIO small-inline, MinIO versioned (two object versions + a delete marker), MinIO large multipart, a legacy V1 (xl.json-derived) object, and a legacy meta_ver 2 object — decodes every version with parts materialized, and asserts validate_for_metadata_read() is Ok for each. Reverting the tolerant handling (delete-marker shape, legacy per-part checksums, string/short transitioned-versionID, negative actual_size) turns this red.

* fix(ci): remove duplicate storage test re-exports

---------

Co-authored-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-07-19 21:52:31 +08:00
houseme 21049401fa fix(ilm): harden tier transition failure boundaries (#5031)
* fix(tier): fence generation-scoped operations

Refs rustfs/backlog#1354

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ilm): verify transition upload streams

Refs rustfs/backlog#1353

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(ecstore): expand transition fault matrix

Refs rustfs/backlog#1355

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-19 10:48:32 +00:00
houseme 83d73b34f3 chore(deps): update flake.lock (#5026) 2026-07-19 14:28:20 +08:00
GatewayJ f9e8440a04 refactor(iam): introduce federated identity boundary (#5018) 2026-07-19 14:28:08 +08:00
Zhengchao An 7f5873dac8 fix(ecstore): resolve erasure parity per pool (#4801) (#5015)
* fix(ecstore): add fallible erasure construction

(cherry picked from commit bd148b20f7)

* fix(ecstore): resolve storage parity per pool

(cherry picked from commit c05c2cb24b)

* fix(ecstore): keep carved per-pool parity core self-contained on main

Fixups so the cherry-picked fallible-erasure + per-pool-parity core builds standalone on current main without the excluded scope-creep commits:
- runtime/sources.rs: re-add backend_storage_class_parities (removed by the per-pool commit; its rebalance caller was updated in an unrelated reporting commit that was left out). Reimplemented over the snapshot API, behavior-identical.
- config/mod.rs: rename the storage-class publish test module (main independently added a mod tests, so the cherry-pick collided).
- rustfs storage_api.rs + startup_storage.rs: route the storage-class ENV consts through the startup storage facade and use a local const for the erasure-set-drive-count env name, satisfying the layer/facade guardrail (main's guardrail is stricter than when the core was authored).

* fix(ecstore): use struct-init in erasure test helper to satisfy clippy field_reassign_with_default

The cherry-picked fallible-erasure commit's `erasure_with_invalid_dimensions` test helper built `Erasure` via `default()` then reassigned fields, which trips `clippy::field_reassign_with_default` under `-D warnings` (only surfaced by `--all-targets`, which lints test code). #4977 fixed this in a later commit that was not part of the carved core. Use struct-init with `..Default::default()`, matching #4977's final form.

* fix(rustfs): gate the test-only storage-class ENV facade re-export behind cfg(test)

The ENV constants (INLINE_BLOCK_ENV/OPTIMIZE_ENV/RRS_ENV/STANDARD_ENV) re-exported through the startup storage facade are only consumed by a #[cfg(test)] test in startup_storage.rs, so in a non-test lib build the re-export is unused and trips -D unused-imports under clippy --all-targets. Gate it with #[cfg(test)], matching #4977's final form.

---------

Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
2026-07-19 03:06:46 +00:00
Zhengchao An 3ed682be42 feat: offline log fault-analysis system (rustfs diagnose) (#4876)
* feat(log-analyzer): add crate skeleton and unified event model

Implements LA-1 (rustfs/backlog#1282) of the log fault-analysis system
(rustfs/backlog#1281): new synchronous rustfs-log-analyzer crate with the
LogEvent/LogLevel/SourceRef/EventKind/ParseStats model shared by all
later stages. No tokio, no rustfs-* internal deps by design.

Note: thiserror listed in the issue is deferred until a stage actually
defines error types (LA-3/LA-4) to avoid an unused dependency.

* feat(log-analyzer): add line parsing layer

Implements LA-2 (rustfs/backlog#1283): four parse channels tried in order
per line — native tracing JSON, container-prefix stripping (K8s CRI /
docker compose / journald) with JSON retry, multi-line Rust panic block
folding (both pre- and post-1.65 formats, stderr has no JSON logger), and
a plain-text fallback that never fails. Parse accounting feeds the report
parse-ratio disclosure.

* feat(log-analyzer): add ingest layer for directories and archives

Implements LA-3 (rustfs/backlog#1284): expands customer inputs (files,
directories, zip/tar/tar.gz/.zst/.gz, stdin-like readers) into parsed
events. Magic-byte detection with extension fallback, recursive archive
walking with depth/entry/byte/memory caps (every capped input disclosed
in IngestReport.skipped), first-level directory names become node labels,
and nothing is ever extracted to disk so hostile entry paths are inert.

Adds tar 0.4 to workspace deps (sync; the async astral-tokio-tar used by
rustfs-zip does not fit this crate's no-tokio contract).

* feat(log-analyzer): add rule model, matching engine, and finding aggregation

Implements LA-4 (rustfs/backlog#1285): owned serde-round-trippable Rule/
Matcher/Severity types (external JSON rules deserialize into the same
types later), fail-fast RuleSet validation that reports every problem at
once, a linear-scan engine with regexes compiled once, and an
order-independent FindingsCollector (commutative aggregates only; the
test asserts byte-identical output across shuffled input orders).

* feat(log-analyzer): add built-in seed rule library (68 rules, 12 categories)

Implements LA-5 (rustfs/backlog#1286): the 2026-07 repository-wide
failure-log survey distilled into rules across disk health, erasure/
bitrot, quorum, network/RPC, distributed locks, heal, scanner, IAM,
startup/config/TLS, capacity, decommission/rebalance, and process panics.

Every anchor was verified verbatim against the source tree (94/94 hits,
zero corrections needed). Quorum rules pre-fill implies_root_cause for
the Phase-2 folding (rustfs/backlog#1290); client-side rules carry burst
thresholds (min_count) so isolated client mistakes don't clutter reports.
Tests: one realistic positive sample per rule (table-driven), exact-set
smoke samples including the intentional internode/client signature
double-hit, and negative cases.

* feat(log-analyzer): add analysis orchestration, report rendering, and redaction

Implements LA-6 (rustfs/backlog#1287): a single-pass Analyzer that does
rule matching, minute-bucket timelines (gap-filled, merged to <=60
buckets), unmatched WARN/ERROR template clustering (placeholders for
numbers/uuids/paths/addresses/quotes, 5000-template cap disclosed as
<overflow>), mixed-UTC-offset detection, and below-min_count demotion to
a low-confidence section. Renderers: pipe-friendly terminal text, stable
JSON (schema_version=1), and ticket-pasteable Markdown. --redact hashes
customer identifiers (stable h:sha256[..8]) in samples/evidence/messages
while keeping rule ids, targets, and panic locations intact.

* feat(rustfs): add 'rustfs diagnose' subcommand for offline log fault analysis

Implements LA-7 (rustfs/backlog#1288): wires rustfs-log-analyzer into the
main binary as a diagnose subcommand that short-circuits before
observability/storage init (same pattern as 'info' / 'tls inspect') so
the report on stdout is never wrapped by the JSON logger.

rustfs diagnose <paths>... [--format text|json|md] [--since 24h]
  [--until ...] [--min-level warn] [--redact] [--top N] [--samples N]
Accepts files, directories, archives (.zip/.tar/.tar.gz/.zst/.gz) and '-'
for stdin. Exit codes: 0 = diagnosis completed (findings never fail the
process), 2 = bad arguments / no readable input.

diagnose_e2e covers the six MVP acceptance scenarios from
rustfs/backlog#1281 (directory+zst archive, multi-node zip attribution,
CRI-prefixed kubectl logs, panic folding, stable JSON schema, CLI parsing
incl. the legacy 'rustfs <volume>' preprocessor regression); the
full-binary smoke test is #[ignore]d (run with -- --ignored).
Usage doc: docs/operations/log-diagnose.md.

* ci(log-analyzer): guard rule anchors against log-message drift

Implements LA-8 (rustfs/backlog#1289): every seed-rule anchor must exist
verbatim in the rustfs source tree, so changing a log message without
updating its rule fails the gate instead of silently killing the rule.

- la-dump-anchors bin emits 'rule_id<TAB>anchor' TSV;
- scripts/check_log_analyzer_rules.sh greps each anchor (fixed-string,
  *.rs only, excluding crates/log-analyzer itself to avoid self-matches);
- RuleSet::new now rejects anchors that are blank, contain tab/newline,
  or are shorter than 8 bytes (no discriminating power); the '[FATAL]'
  anchor gained its trailing space to meet the floor while still matching
  the emit_fatal_stderr format string;
- wired as log-analyzer-rules-check into the pre-pr gate (it compiles the
  crate, so it stays out of the fast pre-commit set).

Negative self-test: breaking an anchor makes the script exit 1 naming the
rule ('MISSING anchor for rule inconsistent-drive: zzz-not-exist-anchor').

* refactor(log-analyzer): use root-relative provenance for directory inputs

Binary smoke run showed report samples citing full absolute paths, which
drowns the useful part. Directory inputs now label sources as
"<root-name>/<relative-path>" (e.g. "smoke-logs/node1/rustfs.log");
archives and single files keep their existing provenance.

* chore(log-analyzer): reword comment to satisfy the typos gate

* fix(log-analyzer): declare chrono serde feature locally after workspace feature localization

* fix(log-analyzer): bound line reads so a newline-less input cannot bypass the byte cap

read_until grew the line buffer with the entire remaining stream before the
max_total_bytes check ran, so a single multi-GB line (decompression bomb or
corrupt file) could allocate unboundedly. Replace it with a capped reader that
enforces the remaining global budget chunk-by-chunk and adds a per-line cap
(IngestOptions::max_line_bytes, default 1 MiB); over-cap tails are discarded
but still charged, and truncation is disclosed once per file as the new
line_too_long skip reason. Flagged by Codex review on #4876.

* fix(log-analyzer): redact field-shaped identifiers inside message text and widen the hash to 64 bits

--redact only hashed IPv4 literals in unstructured message text, so
bucket/object/access-key values embedded in messages (access_key=AK123,
'bucket: media, object: private/a.bin') leaked into reports documented as
safe to forward. Apply the SENSITIVE_FIELDS list to key=value / key: value
shapes in message text with the same hash as structured fields, and extend
the hash from 8 to 16 hex chars so cross-identifier collisions stay
negligible. Flagged by Codex and Copilot review on #4876.

* fix(log-analyzer): strip collector prefixes before panic-block absorption

An open panic block tested continuation lines against absorbs() before their
CRI/compose/journald prefix was stripped, so containerized panics stored the
prefix in the payload and split into a truncated panic plus text noise as soon
as the note/backtrace lines arrived. Stripping now happens once at the top of
feed() and every channel judges the payload. Flagged by Codex review on #4876.

* fix(log-analyzer): remove two input-order dependencies in representative selection

The unmatched-cluster target stayed pinned to the first-seen event while the
representative sample could be replaced, so sample and target could come from
different events and vary with input order; the pair now updates together by
lexicographic (sample, target) min. Sample selection tie-broke on line number
alone, which is only unique within one file; the key now includes the source
file. Flagged by Copilot review on #4876.

* fix(rustfs): reject negative relative times in diagnose --since/--until

parse_time_arg accepted "-24h" and produced a future timestamp, contradicting
the documented 'counted back from now' semantics. The amount now parses as
unsigned, so a leading '-' fails with the usual invalid-time error. Flagged by
Copilot review on #4876.

* feat(log-analyzer): Phase 2 — causal folding, timeline anomalies, external rules (LA-9) (#4942)

* feat(log-analyzer): collapse cascade symptoms under their root-cause finding

Phase-2 sub-item A (rustfs/backlog#1290): a finding whose rule declares
implies_root_cause edges folds under a qualifying root — root.first_seen <=
symptom.first_seen + 5min and root.last_seen >= symptom.first_seen - 30min,
existence-based when either side has no timestamps (pure stderr panics).
Findings gain collapsed_into/caused; text/markdown render the root block with
an indented cascade line and stop listing collapsed symptoms flat, while JSON
keeps every finding. Roots are promoted to the most severe position among
their block so the report top still answers 'the most likely cause'.

* feat(log-analyzer): detect timeline/clock anomalies (schema v2)

Phase-2 sub-item B (rustfs/backlog#1290): three deterministic hints rendered
between the summary and findings — mixed UTC offsets (with a clock-skew note
when signature-mismatch findings coexist), per-node time ranges that do not
overlap at all (both nodes >100 timestamped events), and log gaps of at least
max(15min, 3x bucket width) after >=3 consecutive active minutes, upgraded to
restart evidence when a startup-class finding begins within 5min after the
gap. JSON gains timeline_anomalies and schema_version bumps to 2.

* feat(diagnose): load external rules with --rules <file.json>

Phase-2 sub-item C (rustfs/backlog#1290): an external JSON rule file
({schema_version: 1, rules: [Rule...]}, the exact serde shape of the built-in
rules) merges over the seed library, with same-id rules replacing built-ins so
the support team can hotfix a misfiring rule without a release. The merged set
validates as a whole and any problem (bad regex, duplicate id, empty matcher
group, wrong schema version) prints every error and exits 2 — analysis never
runs on a half-broken set. External anchors are exempt from the CI anchor
guard, documented as author-owned quality. Adds the custom-rules section to
docs/operations/log-diagnose.md.

* fix(log-analyzer): address PR #4876 review (redaction coverage, order-independence, guards)

Redaction (--redact) now honours its "forwardable" intent across every report surface instead of a 15-name field whitelist applied over a subset:
- redact_event scrubs the full fields map (sensitive names hashed whole, every other value run through redact_text) plus provenance, so the JSON/Markdown full-sample dump no longer leaks non-whitelisted fields (client_ip, url, user, ...).
- node labels are hashed once at ingestion, so summary.nodes, per-node timeline ranges, samples and timeline anomalies stay consistent and correlatable under one stable hash.
- evidence values, unmatched-cluster templates and skipped-input paths are now redacted; peer/disk/drive/volume/node/user added to the sensitive set; IPv6 literals are hashed (without touching `rust::paths` or HH:MM:SS clocks); provenance keeps the leaf filename and hashes the customer directory/archive prefix.
- redact.rs and docs/operations/log-diagnose.md reworded to "best-effort identifier scrubbing", not an anonymization guarantee.

Order-independence (the crate's headline contract):
- the evidence value cap keeps the lexicographically smallest N distinct values instead of the first-N-by-arrival (previously order-dependent).
- first_seen/last_seen break equal-instant ties on the offset, so the serialized RFC3339 offset no longer depends on input order.

Parsing:
- a new-format panic header no longer swallows the line immediately after it when that line is itself a JSON event or a second panic header (previously dropped an interleaved ERROR in merged stdout/stderr, or merged a panic-during-panic); trailing "note: ..." backtrace lines now fold into the block.

CLI:
- diagnose --since/--until reject absurd relative amounts via checked_sub_signed instead of panicking; the exit-code doc now matches actual behaviour.

CI:
- check_log_analyzer_rules.sh is wired into the ci.yml test-and-lint job (it was only in make pre-pr, so anchor drift from other PRs could merge green).

Markdown table cells escape '|' so customer log text cannot break the table structure.

---------

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-07-18 15:00:34 +00:00
houseme 15f4e75870 fix(cache): harden object data cache coordination (#5004)
* fix(cache): enforce projected entry capacity

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1335

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(cache): fence identity budget eviction by generation

Refs rustfs/backlog#1334.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(cache): fence clear against concurrent fills

Refs rustfs/backlog#1333

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(cache): linearize memory reservation claims

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(cache): retain allocation memory claims

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(cache): publish memory snapshots by epoch

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(cache): coordinate cold object fills

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): fence metadata cache transition races

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-18 14:37:10 +00:00
Zhengchao An 4faea7fcbc ci: bump repo-visuals-action to v1.3.0 (#5014)
Backward-compatible feature release; existing chart-style/animate/contributors inputs are unchanged and continue to work.
2026-07-18 22:30:28 +08:00
Zhengchao An 9b197fc1c2 docs(architecture): correct erasure-coding spec statements that contradict main (#5012)
The normative erasure-coding spec stated several target behaviors and known baseline defects as active invariants, and cited two symbols that do not exist on main. Each correction below was verified against the code.

- §4.1 shard size: legacy even-padding is RustFS-legacy-only and is NOT MinIO's sizing. MinIO (and the modern GF(2⁸) path) use plain div_ceil; for 1 MiB / 6 data shards that is 174763 bytes versus the legacy even-padded 174764. MinIO-migrated data is decoded by the modern path, so the legacy formula never applies to it.
- §6.3 / §11 MTime: the MTime key is always written (a None mod_time encodes as UNIX_EPOCH = 0), not omitted. Round-trip safety to None is enforced on the decode side, not by write omission. Only the legacy StatInfo.ModTime field is omitted-when-None.
- §7 commit: rollback after a missed write quorum is best-effort — undo failures are counted and warn!-logged, never propagated or retried — so a partially-failed rollback can leave shards behind; softened "never left partially committed" accordingly.
- §7 data_dir: reduce_common_data_dir votes over each disk's old_data_dir (a GC input for reclaiming the superseded dir), not the newly committed data_dir.
- §7 convergence: classify_rename_convergence is consumed only by the multipart-complete path (convergence.needs_heal()); the regular put_object path discards it.
- §7 write layout: removed the WriteLayout / resolve_write_layout citation — neither symbol exists on main (the write layout is computed inline), which violated the spec's own cite-real-symbols rule.
- §6.6 inline: inline presence is read from the meta_sys[inline-data] body marker alone; the header InlineData flag is written but not consulted on read, and disagreement is tolerated (MinIO may write the flag unset with inline data present). Removed the false "must agree" invariant.
- §11 UUID tolerance: version_id / data_dir (ID/DDir) decode as a fixed 16-byte Uuid::from_bytes and fail closed on a present-but-non-16-byte value; only transitioned-versionID uses the tolerant Uuid::from_slice(...).ok().filter(!nil). Split the previously-conflated bullet.
- §11 decode blanket: narrowed "everything else must degrade to a tolerant default" to enumerate the legitimate structural/geometry/version/length fail-closed guards (header array length, unknown header_ver, version > max, versions_len / bin_len bounds, non-16-byte ID/DDir).
- §8 / §13 codec guard: has_valid_dimensions() is a &self method, so it runs after construction and reliably covers only block_size == 0; a data_blocks == 0 geometry with parity > 0 panics in the .expect constructor before the guard runs. Noted the fallible-constructor fix.

Refuted and intentionally left unchanged: the "accepts container major == 1 with any minor" statement is correct — the reader compares only major (rejects major > 1) and never gates on minor, so minor 4 is accepted.
2026-07-18 21:05:22 +08:00
Zhengchao An 53728a03d3 chore: self-host contributor wall (#5006) 2026-07-18 09:48:36 +00:00
Zhengchao An 04bfd48eb1 fix(ecstore): invalidate metadata cache after ILM transition persists (#4951)
A duplicate transition task admitted after the winner released its
in-flight claim (#4839) re-reads the version before uploading, but on
unversioned buckets that read could hit a stale pre-transition entry in
the 2s-TTL GET metadata cache: transition_object never invalidated the
cache after delete_object_version persisted transition_status=complete
and freed the local data. The stale hit defeated the TRANSITION_COMPLETE
early-return, so the duplicate streamed the already-deleted local data
to the remote tier (NotFound reader errors + rejected duplicate tier
PUT with UnexpectedContent).

Invalidate the cache right after the transitioned metadata is persisted,
matching the other metadata-mutating paths, and add a regression test
that runs a duplicate transition against an already-transitioned version
and asserts no second tier upload and unchanged remote object metadata.

Fixes #4827
2026-07-18 15:03:27 +08:00
Zhengchao An 2c113542f8 docs(architecture): normative erasure-coding algorithm and on-disk compatibility contract (#4999)
* docs(architecture): add normative erasure-coding algorithm and on-disk compatibility contract

Adds docs/architecture/erasure-coding.md as the source of truth for how RustFS erasure-codes, stores, reads, reconstructs, and heals user data, and the on-disk (xl.meta) / decode compatibility contract every future change must preserve. Grounded in the baseline (main) implementation with file:line anchors; cross-links (does not duplicate) the existing placement, MinIO-format-compat, layout-boundary, decommission, and tier-ILM docs, and the AGENTS.md cross-cutting invariants.

Covers: Reed-Solomon over GF(2^8) modern vs GF(2^16) legacy backends and how each is selected; pool/set/drive geometry with the 2..=16 set-size and per-pool parity invariants; the key-derived distribution permutation (1..=N); 1 MiB block size and the modern/legacy shard-size formulas; HighwayHash256S interleaved bitrot layout; the full xl.meta container/header/version-body schema and internal dual-key convention; write/read/heal quorum rules; and, newly codified as a first-class contract, the decode-tolerance invariants (nil-UUID/epoch-mod_time to None, skip unknown fields, hard-guard only length-critical arrays, tolerate the negative actual_size compressed sentinel, tolerate a malformed transitioned-versionID). Linked from the architecture README under "Contracts & invariants". Docs-only; check_doc_paths.sh passes.

* docs(architecture): anchor erasure spec by symbol name, not line numbers

Line numbers rot as code changes and are not validated by check_doc_paths.sh, so they would silently mislead the very code changes this normative spec is meant to guide. Replace all file:line citations with file-path + symbol-name references (functions/consts/types are greppable and rename only on deliberate changes; format byte offsets are kept). Add an explicit "references work here" note and a §13 rule that governed changes must update this spec in the same PR.

* docs(architecture): correct erasure spec after multi-expert adversarial review

Four independent adversarial reviewers fact-checked every claim against the code. Fixes:

- CRITICAL (found independently by two reviewers): §1 mislabeled the GF(2^16) reed-solomon-simd "legacy" backend as the reader for "older MinIO-lineage format". It is the opposite — that backend serves RustFS's own older main-branch (rmp_serde, uses_legacy_checksum) objects; MinIO-migrated data uses the same rs-vandermonde GF(2^8) scheme and is decoded by the modern backend. The old wording contradicted §1's own MinIO-interop line, §12, minio-file-format-compat.md, and the source comments, and would have misled the highest-stakes decode-routing decision.
- §2.1/§12: set size 2..=16 holds for multi-drive layouts; single-drive deployments run at N=1 (parity 0) outside is_valid_set_size.
- §2.2: validate_parity_inner enforces parity <= N/2 only for N > 2 (user storage-class parity flows through it); the standalone validate_parity is unconditional but only applied to the resolved default.
- §6.2/§12: header format is dispatched by header_ver; array length (4/5/7) is a per-version validation, not the discriminator.
- §6.3: the part-array length guard applies on the all_parts decode path.
- §6.5: get_bytes matches only the two canonical lowercase keys; only is_internal_key/get_str are case-insensitive.
- §6.5: transitioned-versionID — state the load-bearing invariant (non-16-byte decodes to None, never fatal); string-form recovery is optional, and transitioned-xl.meta interop is out of scope.
- §11: typo RustSF -> RustFS.

All other claims across §1-§14 were verified accurate against code (distribution formula, quorum formulas, on-disk key set/endianness/markers, decode-tolerance invariants, version anchors, standard references).
2026-07-18 14:44:04 +08:00
Zhengchao An 825bf0e2d8 ci: self-host star history chart (#5001)
* ci: self-host star history chart

* ci: use animated gradient star chart
2026-07-18 14:33:45 +08:00
Zhengchao An 0346108ae4 fix(s3): populate CopyObject response checksums and persist them (#4998)
fix(s3): populate CopyObject response checksums and persist them (#4996)

A CopyObject that requested ChecksumAlgorithm=SHA256 applied the copy but returned no CopyObjectResult.ChecksumSHA256, and a later checksum-mode HEAD/GET on the destination returned nothing: execute_copy_object never read the requested algorithm, never gave the destination write a checksum, and built CopyObjectResult with ..Default::default() (all checksum fields None).

Give the destination object a checksum on the copy path. When the caller requests an algorithm, compute it fresh over the copied plaintext (the hasher sits on the innermost reader so it digests plaintext, before compression/encryption wrap it) so it persists into the object's checksum and a checksum-mode HEAD/GET returns it. When no algorithm is requested, carry the source object's stored checksum over unchanged — the copy does not transform the plaintext, so re-hashing would be wasted work and would flatten a multipart composite value. Fill CopyObjectResult from the persisted destination checksum decoded exactly the way GetObject/HeadObject do, so the response value is identical to a later checksum-mode HEAD/GET.

Add e2e regression tests: requested SHA256 is computed, returned, and HEAD-consistent; a no-algorithm copy preserves and reports the source SHA256; and a requested CRC32 over a SHA256 source is computed fresh (equals a reference CRC32 PUT), overrides the source algorithm, and is not inherited.

Fixes #4996
2026-07-18 13:32:51 +08:00
houseme 79509aad2d chore(deps): refresh workspace dependencies (#5002)
Update direct dependency constraints and refresh the lockfile while keeping
ratelimit pinned.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-18 05:22:58 +00:00
Zhengchao An d7d880b37d test(1306): pin usage serialization, snapshot cache invalidation, and listing send classification (#5000)
test(1306): pin Some(0) usage serialization, snapshot cache invalidation, and listing send classification

Follow-up test hardening for the merged admin-usage-snapshot work
(#4979/#4980/#4981/#4982, rustfs/backlog#1306). Tests only; no production
behavior change.

- B-1 madmin: pin that a scanned-but-empty bucket (Some(0)) serializes usage
  stats as zeros, staying distinct from the no-snapshot (None) omitted case.
- B-2 gating: revert detector proving save_data_usage_in_backend invalidates
  the 30s snapshot cache so a fresh save is visible to the next cached read.
- A-1 list_objects: pin that a successful gather_results send is never
  misclassified as ConsumerGone (correct state + err sentinel delivered), and
  document the wrapper Err arm invariant. A full wrapper-level producer-error
  integration test is deferred as it needs the fake-disk list harness.
2026-07-18 04:30:53 +00:00
Zhengchao An cf9e9c6fd5 fix(ilm): implement expire_restored delete semantics for restore expiry (#4950)
DeleteRestoredAction is supposed to demote a restored object back to its
pure transitioned state: remove only the local restored copy, strip the
x-amz-restore headers, and leave the version (and the remote tier data)
untouched. expire_transitioned_object set
opts.transition.expire_restored accordingly, but no delete path ever
read the flag, so delete_object ran an ordinary delete: on unversioned
buckets the whole object vanished and the free-version record scheduled
remote tier cleanup (tier data loss); on versioned buckets the latest
version got a spurious delete marker that replication propagated.

Route expire_restored explicitly in SetDisks::delete_object before
delete-marker resolution and replication dispatch: target the found
version with FileInfo.expire_restored=true and return early. The
FileMeta::delete_version layer already implements the semantics (strip
restore headers, keep the version, hand back the local data dir); this
wires it up.

Also fix the action matching in expire_transitioned_object (extracted
into transitioned_object_delete_opts): DeleteRestoredVersionAction
previously fell through to the full transitioned-object delete, which
removed the remote tier data of a noncurrent restored version. It now
routes through the same restored-copy cleanup with the exact version id,
matching MinIO's Action.DeleteVersioned()/DeleteRestored() dispatch.

Re-enable test_restore_chain_local_read_expiry_keeps_remote_and_allows_
re_restore in the ILM Integration (serial) lane; add unit tests pinning
the event->options routing and the filemeta expire_restored branch.

Closes rustfs/backlog#1302
2026-07-18 02:55:29 +00:00
Henry Guo 361334ab08 chore(deps): sync merged s3s SigV4 fix (#4987)
Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-18 10:50:13 +08:00
Henry Guo 889a45ad4d fix(scanner): back off clean idle scans across erasure clusters (#4984)
* fix(scanner): back off clean single-disk cycles

* fix(scanner): extend idle backoff across erasure clusters

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-18 10:49:45 +08:00
darion-yaphet 5ec124bf23 docs(architecture): prevent workspace overview from drifting (#4983)
Replace stale dependency-depth and line-count snapshots with a domain overview based on the current Cargo workspace. This preserves the high-level architecture while avoiding references to removed crates and fragile size estimates.

Constraint: Workspace membership changes independently of architecture documentation updates
Rejected: Refresh the old numeric snapshots | they would immediately become stale again
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep Cargo.toml as the source of truth for workspace membership
Tested: git diff --check; scripts/check_doc_paths.sh; cargo metadata --no-deps --format-version 1
Not-tested: make pre-commit (documentation-only change)
2026-07-18 10:49:05 +08:00
Henry Guo 906805568b feat(table-catalog): add durable backing state transfer (#4952)
* feat(table-catalog): add durable backing state transfer

* fix(table-catalog): reject orphaned migration entries

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-07-18 10:45:32 +08:00
Zhengchao An 230e5fc31a fix(auth): POST-object lock fields and signed metadata=true listing 403s (#4959)
* fix(sse): surface unconfigured managed SSE as 400, fix POST SSE-S3 e2e

Managed SSE (SSE-S3 / bucket-default) on a server without KMS and without RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY fails closed by design since #3564, but surfaced as 500 InternalError. Map the misconfiguration to InvalidRequest (400) and seed the local SSE master key in the anonymous POST-object SSE e2e tests; align the missing-from-policy test with the MinIO-compatible SSE field exemption (s3s#608). Re-admit the tests to the e2e-full profile (rustfs#4844).

* fix(auth): POST-object lock fields and signed metadata=true listing 403s

Two authorization surfaces returned 403 for allowed requests (rustfs#4845): the PutObject access hook demanded PutObjectRetention/PutObjectLegalHold IAM actions for POST-object form uploads whose lock fields are governed by the validated POST policy, and the metadata=true listing route never resolved SigV4-verified credentials into ReqInfo so signed requests were evaluated as anonymous. Skip the PUT-header lock actions for POST form uploads and resolve credentials in the metadata route; re-admit the four e2e tests to the e2e-full profile.
2026-07-18 10:44:53 +08:00
Zhengchao An 40c089f31b feat(server): add opt-in global connection cap to the S3 accept loop (#4957)
Follow-up to backlog#1191 (optional sub-item). The main accept loop
spawned one task per socket with no global bound, so a connection flood
could exhaust file descriptors and memory and take existing traffic
down with it.

- New RUSTFS_API_MAX_CONNECTIONS (default 0 = unlimited, no semaphore
  constructed, accept loop unchanged).
- When set, the loop acquires an owned semaphore permit BEFORE
  accept(): at saturation it simply stops accepting and lets the
  kernel backlog absorb bursts (TCP-native backpressure) instead of
  accept-then-close churn. The permit moves into the connection task
  and is released by RAII on any exit path, including TLS handshake
  failures.
- Saturation is observable via the
  rustfs_http_server_connection_cap_saturated_total counter, a
  connection_cap_state startup event, and a per-wait debug event;
  shutdown stays responsive while parked on the semaphore.
- The cap covers everything on the main listener (S3, admin, console,
  internode gRPC); the constant docs carry sizing guidance.
- E2E coverage: ten sequential Connection-close requests against cap 2
  prove permits never leak; two stalled connections saturating cap 2
  leave a third unserved until their permits are released, after which
  the queued request is accepted and answered.
2026-07-18 10:41:51 +08:00
Zhengchao An 569fa3ec87 fix(ecstore): tolerate illumos/Solaris EEXIST for non-empty directory removal (#4995)
POSIX lets rmdir report a non-empty directory as either ENOTEMPTY or EEXIST. Linux/macOS/Windows use ENOTEMPTY (ErrorKind::DirectoryNotEmpty); illumos/Solaris return EEXIST (errno 17), which Rust surfaces as ErrorKind::AlreadyExists and which a DirectoryNotEmpty match never catches.

LocalDisk::delete_file removes xl.meta and then recurses to rmdir the object directory, tolerating only NotFound and DirectoryNotEmpty. Since #4300 (transactional delete rollback-staging, new in beta9) the object directory still holds the rollback backup dir when that rmdir runs — the caller removes it only after write quorum is confirmed — so the rmdir legitimately reports "not empty". On Linux that is tolerated; on Solaris it is EEXIST, which fell through to the catch-all arm and became FileAccessDeniedWithContext. That failed the delete commit, rolled the metadata back, and left the object undeletable, so the client retried indefinitely with a spurious FileAccessDenied and no EACCES anywhere (rustfs/rustfs#4978). The same Linux-errno assumption also broke non-force DeleteBucket on a populated bucket on Solaris.

Add a portable is_dir_not_empty_error classifier (DirectoryNotEmpty kind plus raw ENOTEMPTY/EEXIST), mirroring MinIO's isSysErrNotEmpty, and use it at the two directory-removal sites via is_benign_object_rmdir_error (delete_file) and classify_delete_volume_error (delete_volume). The classifier is applied only at rmdir/remove_dir_all sites, where EEXIST unambiguously means "not empty", so EEXIST keeps its normal meaning everywhere else. rmdir never returns EEXIST on Linux/macOS/Windows, so the new raw-errno branch is unreachable there and the change is a strict no-op off illumos/Solaris.

Adds unit tests for the classifier (DirectoryNotEmpty/ENOTEMPTY/EEXIST match, EACCES/ENOENT reject, real non-empty rmdir against the host errno) and call-site decision tests that make a Solaris EEXIST regression detectable on Linux CI.

Fixes #4978
2026-07-18 02:37:43 +00:00
Zhengchao An edfb3c134f fix(s3): return x-amz-copy-source-version-id for versioned CopyObject source (#4985)
For a CopyObject whose source carries versioning, the response must echo the exact source version copied via x-amz-copy-source-version-id (SDK CopySourceVersionId), kept distinct from the newly created destination x-amz-version-id. RustFS set the destination version_id but left copy_source_version_id unset, so AWS SDK clients could not prove which source version was copied — the same field UploadPartCopy already populates.

Populate CopyObjectOutput.copy_source_version_id from the version actually read from the source, gated on the source bucket carrying versioning (enabled or suspended) and rendering the null version as "null", mirroring the GET/HEAD convention. Add an e2e regression test that copies a non-latest source version and asserts the source-version header equals the requested version, the destination header is a distinct new version, the destination bytes/size match the copied version, and the source version remains present.

Fixes #4976
2026-07-18 07:33:35 +08:00
Zhengchao An 314c17205e fix(replication): recover targets after outage (#4986) 2026-07-18 07:03:23 +08:00
Zhengchao An 814682d6bb fix(ecstore): accept illumos non-empty rmdir errors (#4991) 2026-07-18 06:01:25 +08:00
Zhengchao An 87128682b0 fix(ecstore): recover data usage snapshots safely (#4979) 2026-07-17 19:02:16 +00:00
Zhengchao An 4589148f48 fix(admin): serve data usage endpoints from scanner snapshot instead of live listing (#4980) 2026-07-18 00:09:02 +08:00
Zhengchao An accd312465 fix(ecstore): classify listing consumer disconnect as non-error completion (#4981) 2026-07-17 16:05:21 +00:00
Zhengchao An 627c396649 fix(scanner): allow usage snapshot save when existing timestamp is future-dated beyond clock tolerance (#4982) 2026-07-17 16:04:43 +00:00
Zhengchao An c818177b54 test(ilm): re-enable test_transition_and_restore_flows; fix test-util disk-open and restore error-path lock (#4945)
test(ilm): re-enable test_transition_and_restore_flows; fix test-util disk-open and restore error-path lock (rustfs/backlog#1303)

The excluded test's 'missing xl.meta ... on disk2' was NOT an EC
metadata-distribution issue: after a transition all four shard disks hold
a fully consistent xl.meta (verified by decoding each shard). The panic
came from the tier test util's open_disk, which hardcoded disk_index 0
for every disk path; LocalDisk::new validates the endpoint's
(set_idx, disk_idx) against the disk's own format.json and rejected every
non-slot-0 disk with InconsistentDisk, which read_transition_meta
collapsed into 'missing xl.meta'. Derive the real indices from
format.json instead. This also un-breaks free_version_count /
wait_for_free_version_absence for non-first disks (silently 0 before).

With that fixed, the test advanced to the #4877 restore self-deadlock,
whose main paths #4886 already fixed. Complete that fix on the one path
it missed: update_restore_metadata (the restore-failure metadata
rewrite) still rebuilt copy_object options with no_lock=false and would
re-acquire the object write lock the restore handler already holds.
Propagate the caller's no_lock there too.

Remove the test from the serial-lane exclusion list; the four remaining
exclusions are unrelated known issues and stay.
2026-07-17 11:33:28 +00:00
cxymds ec47c20ced fix(lifecycle): expire sole delete markers by days (#4974) 2026-07-17 19:03:33 +08:00
cxymds 1e14c05cf0 fix(tiering): support UTF-8 metadata signing (#4969)
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-07-17 19:03:13 +08:00
Zhengchao An 7b2cc1f427 fix(sse): surface unconfigured managed SSE as 400 and fix anonymous POST SSE-S3 e2e (#4958)
fix(sse): surface unconfigured managed SSE as 400, fix POST SSE-S3 e2e

Managed SSE (SSE-S3 / bucket-default) on a server without KMS and without RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY fails closed by design since #3564, but surfaced as 500 InternalError. Map the misconfiguration to InvalidRequest (400) and seed the local SSE master key in the anonymous POST-object SSE e2e tests; align the missing-from-policy test with the MinIO-compatible SSE field exemption (s3s#608). Re-admit the tests to the e2e-full profile (rustfs#4844).
2026-07-17 19:02:21 +08:00
Zhengchao An 97edb2e5cf feat(api): add opt-in per-bucket dimension to the S3 API rate limiter (#4949)
Follow-up to #4895 (backlog#1191 deferred sub-item). The client-IP
dimension gives per-client fairness; this adds a collective per-bucket
budget so one hot bucket cannot monopolize the server regardless of how
many client IPs the traffic is spread across.

- Generalize RateLimiter over its key type with a Borrow-based check()
  so &str lookups against String bucket keys stay allocation-free on
  the hit path; client-IP call sites are unchanged in behavior.
- RateLimitLayer now carries optional client and bucket limiters; a
  request must pass every configured dimension, and rejections report
  which one tripped via a new 'dimension' metric label.
- Bucket extraction mirrors s3s host routing: virtual-hosted-style
  resolves the Host/authority prefix against the same expanded domain
  set (with port variants) the s3s router uses; otherwise the first
  path segment. Admin and table-catalog namespaces are never buckets.
- New env vars RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_RPM/_BURST (default 0 =
  dimension off) under the existing enable switch; bucket-only
  configurations (client RPM 0) are supported.
- Bucket names are attacker-chosen, so the bounded-shards design
  (100k keys, lossless idle sweeps, most-idle eviction) is the memory
  defense; a test floods 10k random names and asserts the cap holds.
- Unit tests for extraction, shared bucket budgets across IPs, both-
  dimensions interaction, and the extended env matrix; e2e test proves
  bucket-only throttling on the real server with an unrelated bucket
  unaffected.
2026-07-17 19:01:18 +08:00
Zhengchao An e1fc4b12ea fix(api): descriptive InvalidArgument reason for Windows-unsupported object keys (#4947)
fix(api): return descriptive InvalidArgument reason for Windows-unsupported object keys

On Windows hosts object keys containing NTFS-reserved characters or
Win32-unaddressable path segments are rejected up front, but the client
only saw a bare "Invalid argument" (issue #3299). Attach an explicit
reason to these rejections and surface non-empty InvalidArgument reasons
through the S3 error message.
2026-07-17 19:00:52 +08:00
Zhengchao An e279a4f48a fix(extract): treat tar mtime=0 as unset to fix unreadable entries (#4948)
An extracted entry whose tar header mtime is 0 was stored with
mod_time = UNIX_EPOCH, which xl.meta encodes as 0 nanos (= no
mod_time). On read-back the version failed valid() and parsing fell
into the legacy rmp_serde fallback, so every read of the object
returned 500 (invalid type: integer 0, expected an OffsetDateTime).

Treat mtime 0 as unset (tar convention) and fall back to the upload
time. Also fix two test-side issues uncovered behind the 500: the pax
fixture must use a ustar header for its XHeader entry, and the SSE-S3
extract tests must provision RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY. Re-admit the 19
quarantined tests to the e2e-full merge gate.

Fixes #4842
2026-07-17 19:00:31 +08:00
Zhengchao An 8ace340694 docs(agents): add anti-bloat guidelines and simplicity adversary role (#4975)
Add Reuse Before You Write and Necessary Code Only sections to AGENTS.md,
promote quality probes into a dedicated seventh adversarial-validation
role (simplicity adversary), extend rust-code-quality checks, and dedupe
code-change-verification's restated Rust checklist into a pointer.
2026-07-17 18:59:59 +08:00
Zhengchao An 701c3eee5b fix(ilm): replace whole-copy-back restore lock with accept-path CAS (#4956)
fix(ilm): serialize RestoreObject accepts with a CAS guard, not the whole copy-back

Implements the backlog#1304 decision: replace #4877's object write lock
held across the entire tier copy-back with an atomic compare-and-set on
the restore ongoing flag.

- ecstore: add ECStore::acquire_restore_accept_guard + RestoreAcceptGuard
  (opaque, purpose-scoped object write lock with an is_lock_lost fence);
  handle_restore_transitioned_object no longer locks the copy-back, so
  HEAD/get_object_info stay non-blocking during a restore and the inner
  put_object/complete_multipart_upload commit locks no longer self-deadlock.
- API: execute_restore_object holds the guard across the restore-status
  read-check-write (no_lock inside the scope), drops it before spawning
  the copy-back; SELECT-type restores keep the plain read-locked path;
  the copy-back pins the resolved version so a concurrent PUT cannot
  strand the flagged version at ongoing=true; concurrent restores are
  rejected with 409 RestoreAlreadyInProgress (was a retryable 500) and
  guard contention maps to 503 SlowDown.
- tests: drop the #4877 entry-blocking unit test (semantics deliberately
  reversed), pin accept-guard mutual exclusion, update the ilm-8 restore
  integration test to the final semantics, and add a concurrent
  double-POST test asserting exactly one acceptance and one tier GET.
2026-07-17 17:56:45 +08:00
Zhengchao An a9e3613cfd fix(quota): only require decoded length for actually framed aws-chunked bodies (#4968)
PUT admission since #4928 rejected any request whose Content-Encoding declares
aws-chunked but lacks x-amz-decoded-content-length with 400 UnexpectedContent.
Whether the body is actually chunk-framed is signalled by a STREAMING-*
x-amz-content-sha256, not by the declared encoding: the s3s auth layer only
de-frames streaming payloads and already requires the decoded length for them,
so a declared-only aws-chunked request (issue #1857 clients) carries an
unframed body whose wire Content-Length is the authoritative object size.
Admit it against that length; keep failing closed for genuinely framed bodies
without a decoded length, and use the decoded length for streaming payloads
even when Content-Encoding is absent.

Refs: https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/1336
2026-07-17 16:23:00 +08:00
Zhengchao An f67e8a6cdc chore(release): prepare 1.0.0-beta.10 (#4946) 2026-07-17 10:57:58 +08:00
Zhengchao An fedc37c834 docs(operations): add drive timeout tuning guide for slow storage (#4944)
Issue #4810's production incident showed the drive timeout knobs are
undiscoverable from symptoms: a listing that outruns the walk budget
gives operators no signal pointing at RUSTFS_DRIVE_* tuning. The knobs
existed only as code constants in crates/config/src/constants/drive.rs
with no operator-facing documentation.

Add docs/operations/drive-timeout-tuning.md covering the per-operation
drive timeout knobs, resolution precedence, the high_latency profile,
and a dedicated section on listing truncation and the walk stall
budget - including the correction that since the stall-budget rework
the foreground listing path is governed by
RUSTFS_DRIVE_WALKDIR_STALL_TIMEOUT_SECS, not the total-timeout knob
the issue suggested. Link the guide from the README.

Ref #4810
2026-07-17 10:34:16 +08:00
Zhengchao An e55fdd275a docs(skills): single-commit release flow with preview and final tags on the same commit (#4943)
docs(skills): single-commit release flow — preview and final tags share the validated commit

Version files are bumped once, directly to the final target version; the -preview.N suffix now exists only in tag names. The binary self-reports build::TAG and build.yml derives artifact naming and prerelease classification from the tag, so the preview tag and the final tag can point at the exact same commit — eliminating the post-validation version-bump commit that previously separated the validated hash from the released tag.

rustfs-release-version-bump gains a guard rejecting any -preview. target version.
2026-07-17 10:26:54 +08:00
Zhengchao An 3b1bed7009 test(e2e): socket-level network fault-injection proxy (backlog#1325) (#4938)
test(e2e): add socket-level network fault-injection proxy (backlog#1325)

Add `FaultProxy`, an in-process async TCP proxy for black-box cluster E2E tests, under `crates/e2e_test/src/fault_proxy.rs`. It binds a random local port, forwards every accepted connection to a fixed target, and lets a test flip the wire behaviour at runtime.

Fault modes: `Pass` (transparent), `Latency(Duration)` (delay each forwarded chunk), `Blackhole` (accept but forward nothing either way and never respond), and `Partition(Direction)` (block exactly one direction while the other keeps flowing). Modes are switchable at runtime via `set_mode`, and `shutdown` stops the accept loop and drops the listener so the bound port is released.

This is the black-box counterpart to the in-process white-box hooks (rename barrier, disk call counters), which cannot reach across the process boundary into a spawned RustFS server. It serves the lock-plane one-way partition and accept-then-blackhole-peer acceptance for #1312/#1319 and the cross-process replay/tamper seam for #1327. Wiring it into the cluster harness (expose a node port through a proxy) plus the 5GiB / nightly CI-lane budget are follow-ups, since the harness multi-drive / 2-pool work lands separately (rustfs#4937); this block stays independent and self-tested.

Self-tests run against a loopback echo server that records received bytes, covering: pass round-trip identity, latency lower-bound delay, blackhole no-response-no-panic, one-way partition in both directions (request-path vs return-path), runtime mode switching on a live connection, and port release after shutdown. Timing assertions use loose lower bounds and bounded read timeouts only, never fixed-sleep absolute-value checks, to stay non-flaky. No product code changes; the module is `#[cfg(test)]`-gated.
2026-07-17 01:04:32 +00:00
Zhengchao An b0b5ffb8e2 test(e2e): cluster harness drivesPerNode + 2-pool topology (backlog #1325) (#4937)
test(e2e): add drivesPerNode and 2-pool cluster harness topology (backlog #1325)

Extend the e2e cluster harness so tests can declare per-node multiple drives (drivesPerNode) and a two-pool topology, alongside a smoke suite that boots such a cluster and round-trips a PUT/GET.

A new `ClusterTopology` describes node_count, drives_per_node, and pool membership, and `RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::with_topology` builds the matching on-disk drive directories and `RUSTFS_VOLUMES` string. `new(node_count)` now delegates to a single-pool single-drive topology, so existing single-drive cluster tests are byte-for-byte unchanged. `ClusterNode` gains `data_dirs` (all drives, `data_dirs[0] == data_dir`) and `pool_idx`; multi-drive/multi-pool clusters automatically add `RUSTFS_UNSAFE_BYPASS_DISK_CHECK=true` because their drives share the same temp filesystem.

The `RUSTFS_VOLUMES` assembly matches the two forms the server parser accepts on a single localhost machine (verified against ecstore `DisksLayout::from_volumes`): a single pool is the explicit enumeration of every `(node, drive)` endpoint (no ellipses, one legacy DistErasure pool), while multiple pools each contribute one ellipses argument `http://<addr><node-base>/drive{0...N-1}`. A pool argument is a single URL template, so it cannot enumerate multiple distinct-port hosts; a pool striped across several localhost nodes would need a host ellipses that forces a shared on-disk path and collides physically. The topology validator therefore requires every pool in a multi-pool layout to own exactly one node and requires drives_per_node >= 2 (the parser rejects a single-drive `drive{0...0}` ellipses pool). Genuine multi-node pools need real multi-host infrastructure and are deferred to the nightly cluster lane (backlog #1313/#1314).

Unit tests assert the volumes-string layout for single-pool single-drive (backward compatible), single-pool multi-drive (8 explicit endpoints), and two-pool (one ellipses arg per pool), plus the validator rejections. The smoke suite `cluster_multidrive_pool_test` boots a 4-node x 2-drive single pool and a 2-node/2-pool cluster, asserts the volumes layout, and round-trips a PUT/GET using the harness readiness handshake (no fixed sleeps). It joins the six existing RustFSTestClusterEnvironment suites excluded from the merge-gate `e2e-full` profile so it runs in the nightly 4-node lane.

Network fault injection (toxiproxy / socket proxy) and 5GiB large-object budgets remain out of scope for this block.
2026-07-17 01:02:38 +00:00
Zhengchao An be2e454d9d test(ecstore): rename/commit fan-out pause barrier + background-task introspection (backlog#1325 block 2) (#4936)
test(ecstore): add rename/commit fan-out pause barrier and background-task introspection

Second white-box test-infra block for https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/1325 (the first block landed the per-disk call counters in PR#4914). Adds a `#[cfg(test)]` awaitable pause barrier plus in-flight background-task introspection to the rename/commit fan-out in `crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/core/io_primitives.rs`, following the same dual-cfg seam style as the existing `disk_call_counters` and `cleanup_fault_injection` seams.

A test arms a barrier for `(object, disk_index, phase)`; the matching spawned fan-out task parks at its checkpoint until the test releases it, and the test awaits the pause through a deterministic `tokio::sync::Notify` handshake (no sleeps). A separate object-keyed task tracker reports how many rename/cleanup background disk tasks are still in flight, so a test can assert "a background disk write is still running" while paused and "no background disk write remains" once the fan-out drains. Both mechanisms live in one process-global registry keyed by object name, so concurrent tests using distinct object names stay isolated. Barriers are placed on the real `rename_data` fan-out (phase `rename`) and the `commit_rename_data_dir` old-data-dir cleanup fan-out (phase `cleanup`).

In production the barrier compiles to an immediately-ready `#[inline(always)]` no-op future and the task guard to `()`, so the fan-out control-flow shape and behavior are unchanged; only the `#[cfg(test)]` variants touch the registry. Coordinator lock-holding is asserted by the test at the store/coordinator layer via the guard it already holds; io_primitives has no handle to that namespace lock. Cross-process/black-box fault injection (toxiproxy, blackhole peers, 2-pool) remains a later cluster-harness block.

Serves the barrier-style white-box acceptances of #1312 (commit fencing: abort at the first-disk rename barrier, assert no background disk write remains after release), #1319, and #1313. Three demo tests drive the real fan-out functions and double as regression guards: neutralizing the barrier seam makes the pause await time out, and neutralizing the task guard pins the in-flight count at zero, so reverting either seam fails the demos.
2026-07-17 08:31:41 +08:00
Zhengchao An 4ff7775ecb fix(admin): map service account validation errors (#4932) 2026-07-17 08:31:17 +08:00
Zhengchao An 78469aa63b fix(get): bound GET disk-read admission with a hard cap instead of unbounded permit bypass (#4935)
Refs https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/1317

Previously, when the primary disk-read permit pool stayed saturated past `RUSTFS_OBJECT_DISK_PERMIT_WAIT_TIMEOUT` (default 5s) — which a handful of slow clients can cause because a permit is held for the whole body transfer — the GET path set `disk_permit = None` and continued reading with no admission token at all. That made the disk-read concurrency limit unbounded under exactly the overload it is meant to protect against: any number of GETs could pile onto the disks simultaneously.

This replaces the permit-less bypass with a bounded overflow lane and a hard cap:

- A new bounded degraded semaphore (`RUSTFS_OBJECT_DISK_DEGRADED_READ_CAP`, default mirrors the primary cap) is consulted only after the primary wait times out. A GET takes one degraded permit without blocking, or is rejected with `SlowDown`/503 once that lane is also full. The total number of GETs performing disk-active reads is therefore hard-capped at `primary_cap + degraded_cap`, and no GET ever reads without holding an admission token.
- Admission is centralized in `ConcurrencyManager::admit_disk_read`, returning `Primary`/`Degraded`/`Unbounded`/`Rejected`. `Degraded` and `Rejected` are counted in metrics (`rustfs.get_object.disk_permit.degraded.total`, `rustfs.get_object.disk_permit.hard_reject.total`), replacing the removed `rustfs.get_object.disk_permit.bypass.total`.
- A primary cap of `0` (disk-read throttling disabled) is preserved as the only intentional permit-less path via `Unbounded`, so that degenerate-but-served configuration is not turned into all-503. The `primary_wait == 0` wait-forever opt-out is likewise unchanged.

Healthy GETs are unaffected: concurrency at or below the primary cap is admitted immediately from the primary pool exactly as before, with no new latency or rejection. The rejection is surfaced before response headers are constructed, so it is a clean pre-header 503, never a post-header 504 masquerade. Degraded-lane GETs use the identical streaming reader and forward-progress stall timeout as primary GETs, so a slow but progressing large download is not killed. Owned permits (primary or degraded) are held by `DiskReadPermitReader` and released on body EOF or client drop/cancel, so tokens are always returned.

Body stall timeout already resets on forward progress and post-header failures already surface as body errors, so no timeout-split changes were needed here.

Scope: this PR implements the minimal safe correctness core (eliminate unbounded bypass + hard cap + SlowDown). The two-level weighted-fair + aging scheduler (small setup cap feeding a size-aware data-producer fair queue) and the strictly-bounded producer/client buffer with cancellation propagation from the issue plan remain follow-ups. The black-box slow-client soak is deferred to the unbuilt facility in https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/1325 rather than faked.

Tests (white-box, virtual clock via `start_paused`): degrade-then-hard-reject with token release; 100 concurrent GETs against primary=1/degraded=1 never exceed 2 simultaneous admissions with every request either admitted or explicitly rejected; disabled cap serves unbounded; zero-wait blocks on the primary lane. Reverting the hard cap makes the concurrency invariant fail.
2026-07-17 08:30:39 +08:00
Zhengchao An a2a336aec3 fix(replication): compute the PUT replication decision exactly once (#4934)
The PutObject usecase computed `must_replicate_object` twice with the same inputs: once before commit to persist the pending replication metadata, and again after commit to drive `schedule_object_replication`. Besides repeating the versioning/config/target traversal on the hot path, the two computations read the replication configuration independently, so a config hot update landing between them could split the two phases into a pending-without-schedule or schedule-without-pending divergence.

Reuse the single immutable `ReplicateDecision` computed before commit for both the pending metadata and the post-commit schedule. The two former computations were already equivalent for a stable config (`must_replicate` reads only `opts.replication_request` from the options, which the pending-suffix insertion does not touch), so this preserves replication semantics while removing the redundant traversal and closing the config-race window. The decision carries only stable target/rule/status identifiers (arn, replicate, synchronous, id) and no secrets.

Add a white-box regression test that drives a real PutObject through the usecase and asserts, via a test-only invocation counter on `must_replicate_object`, that a single PUT computes the decision exactly once; reverting to the pre-commit + post-commit recompute makes the counter observe 2 and fails the test.

Refs: https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/1320
2026-07-17 08:30:03 +08:00
Zhengchao An 4d22ed4465 perf(capacity): drop per-PUT global lock and per-disk allocation from write dirty-scope (#4933)
perf(capacity): remove per-PUT global lock and per-disk allocation from write dirty-scope

Every successful write recorded its capacity dirty scope by allocating an endpoint/path String per online disk, deduplicating through a HashSet, entering the global dirty-scope Mutex, and — in the app response path — taking a global async RwLock to record the write frequency. Under small-object high concurrency this created a global serialization point and O(disks) allocation on the hot path (https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/1315).

This change makes the steady-state write path allocation-free and lock-free without altering capacity accounting semantics:

- Memoize the per-set dirty scope. Each set resolves its disks' immutable endpoint/path identity lazily into a slot-indexed cache and reuses a shared `Arc<CapacityScope>`; steady-state writes clone the Arc under a read lock instead of rebuilding String/HashSet. The heal path keeps an ad-hoc scope builder because it passes disks in erasure-distribution order rather than physical-slot order.
- Add a monotonic generation to the global dirty-scope registry, advanced only when a non-empty drain removes disks. A set upgrades the global registry mutex only on the first write of each generation and then skips it while the generation is unchanged; the observed generation is read under the registry lock so a concurrent drain forces a re-mark, preventing lost updates. The write commits its bytes before recording the scope, so any drain that could remove the mark is ordered after the commit and the following refresh reads the committed bytes.
- Replace the write-frequency `RwLock<WriteRecord>` with lock-free atomics: per-second CAS buckets, an atomic last-write timestamp, and an atomic total counter. The frequency window and debounce semantics the refresh scheduler relies on are unchanged.

Capacity marking remains a conservative superset of the disks actually written, so admin/scan totals are byte-for-byte identical: extra dirty marks only trigger a re-read of a disk whose usage is unchanged. White-box tests assert the memoized scope equals the previous ad-hoc construction, that the global registry is upgraded exactly once per generation and re-marked after a drain, and that the lock-free write record is exact under concurrent contention.

Ref: https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/1315
2026-07-17 08:29:38 +08:00
Zhengchao An fc7d46b6cf fix(quota): admit hard quota against authoritative decoded size and fail closed on checker faults (#4928)
fix(quota): admit bucket hard quota against authoritative decoded size and fail closed on checker faults

Bucket-quota admission for PUT/POST previously ran before the authoritative object length was known and used the raw wire Content-Length: for an aws-chunked upload that length counts chunk framing (overcounting) and can be absent entirely, in which case the check was silently skipped. Separately, any quota-checker fault (bucket-config read, config parse, usage lookup) degraded to allow, which silently bypasses a configured hard quota.

Resolve the authoritative decoded/plain object length first — rejecting negative and unknown lengths, and requiring x-amz-decoded-content-length for aws-chunked instead of falling back to the framed wire length — then run quota admission exactly once against that size. This is the same basis the settle phase records via ObjectInfo.size, so admission and accounting agree. When no quota is configured the QuotaChecker keeps its zero-extra-I/O fast path; once a hard quota is set, checker faults now fail closed with a retryable ServiceUnavailable, increment rustfs_bucket_quota_check_failed_total, and keep the client-facing message generic so internal config/usage details are not leaked.

Size resolution and quota-outcome mapping are extracted into pure functions (resolve_put_object_authoritative_size, map_quota_check_outcome) with unit tests covering aws-chunked decoded-vs-wire, missing/negative/unknown lengths, plain PUT, the exact/over-limit admission split, and fail-closed on checker error. QuotaCheckResult is re-exported through the ecstore api::bucket::quota surface for the app layer. Cross-node reservation and overwrite-delta accounting remain out of scope (sibling issue). Also corrects one stale doc path (set_disk/core/local.rs -> disk/local.rs) flagged by the doc-paths guard.

Refs: https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/1311
2026-07-16 18:10:52 +00:00
Zhengchao An b41bbe2db4 fix(ecstore): split rename_data signature from heal-convergence decision (#4926)
CompleteMultipartUpload enqueued a normal-priority heal whenever
`rename_data` returned a `Some(versions)` signature. But the per-disk
signature is produced for every object with <=10 versions, and a healthy
quorum reduces to `Some` as well, so the `Option<Vec<u8>>` return value
conflated two distinct facts — "a version signature exists" and "the
committed replicas need heal". The result: nearly every healthy MPU
completion self-enqueued a heal, while >10-version objects (signature
`None`) did not — an algorithmic heal amplification on the healthy path
(rustfs/backlog#1321).

Replace the overloaded `Option<Vec<u8>>` second element of
`SetDisks::rename_data` with an explicit `RenameConvergence` classification
computed after the write-quorum gate:

- AllSuccessIdentical — every attempted disk committed with an identical,
  known signature (no heal).
- PartialCommit — write quorum met but a disk failed/offline; a committed
  replica is missing or stale (heal).
- SignatureDivergent — all committed but signatures diverge, or mix signed
  (<=10-version) with unsigned (>10-version) disks (heal).
- Unknown — all committed, no signature produced (>10 versions); latent
  divergence is left to the scanner backstop, not self-enqueued.

`RenameConvergence::needs_heal()` is the single decision point. The version
signature is now only comparison material; it no longer doubles as a heal
flag. The old `select_rename_data_versions` / `reduce_common_versions` /
`rename_data_versions_key` machinery that carried the conflation is removed.

The heal submission in `complete_multipart_upload` moves off the ACK
critical path into a detached task: it runs after the object lock is
dropped and after the durable `rename_data` commit, survives cancellation
of the completion future, and coalesces through the existing bounded /
deduplicated / observable heal-channel admission (one submit per degraded
completion, at most). A completion cancelled in the narrow window between
the durable commit and reaching the enqueue is scanner-backstopped, as is
the Unknown (>10-version) case.

The PUT path (`object.rs`) binds the second element as `_` and is
unchanged. The change is orthogonal to and composes with the #1312 commit
fence on the same `rename_data` path (epoch rejection is a commit-gate
failure surfaced through `Result::Err`, convergence is a post-commit
signal); documented in docs/architecture/unified-object-generation.md.

Tests: `classify_rename_convergence` white-box cases cover the full
acceptance matrix (healthy 4/4 and 8/8, 3-same-1-divergent, failed/offline
disk, no-common-quorum split, >10-version all-success and with-failure,
mixed signed/unsigned) and fail on revert to the old "signature exists =>
heal" semantics. The decision function is tested directly rather than
through the process-global heal channel, whose receiver is owned
exclusively by the blackbox serial test (init_heal_channel is once per
binary).

Refs: https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/1321
2026-07-17 01:38:15 +08:00
Zhengchao An 6559248f55 fix(ecstore): make legacy stripe prefetch cancel-safe on emit termination (#4930)
The legacy erasure-decode overlap path drove the speculative next-stripe read and the current-stripe emit with `tokio::join!`, which runs both futures to completion. When the current stripe's emit terminated the loop — a client disconnect or any emit error — the join still waited for the prefetch read, so a `Stop` could stall for a full shard-read deadline on a slow or wedged remote shard before the GET could fail.

Drive the two futures with a biased `select!` instead and, the moment emit reports `Stop`, drop the in-flight read future. Because the entire read pipeline is structured async (a `FuturesUnordered` of `read_shard` futures inside `ParallelReader::read`/`read_lockstep`, with no `tokio::spawn`), dropping the read future is a real cancellation: it drops every in-flight shard read and propagates cancellation down to the RemoteDisk/HTTP reader, leaving no background read behind. The `select!` is scoped so both pinned futures drop before `reader`/`shards` are reused, which is what performs the cancellation in the `Stop` case.

This only affects the overlap-enabled path. The default remains OFF (`prefetch_count == 1` and bitrot-decode overlap disabled), and the strictly-serial read -> reconstruct -> emit default branch is untouched and byte-for-byte identical. The `Continue` path preserves offset, short-tail, buffer recycle, and bitrot/reconstruction error ordering exactly as before.

Scope: cancel-safety only. The rollout decision (whether to enable overlap by default) still requires the Linux multi-node high-RTT three-size A/B from https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/1310 and is deferred; this change does not flip the default or introduce any behavior that A/B must adjudicate.

White-box test `test_legacy_prefetch_cancels_next_read_on_emit_failure` drives the real `Erasure::decode` path with overlap enabled, a writer that fails emit, and shards that serve the first stripe then stall the next-stripe read far beyond the assertion window. Under the paused clock the read future is dropped and decode returns at virtual t~=0; reverting cancel-safety makes it wait out the shard-read timeout, so the test fails closed.

Refs: https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/1310
2026-07-17 01:37:44 +08:00
Zhengchao An caf42018b1 fix: pin tokio to 1.52.3 and fix stale doc path reference (#4931)
fix(deps): pin tokio to 1.52.3 to fix dial9-tokio-telemetry build

tokio 1.52.4 made  private, breaking
dial9-tokio-telemetry 0.3.14 which references it as public.
Pin tokio back to 1.52.3 until the upstream dependency fixes
compatibility.

Also fix a stale doc path reference in unified-object-generation.md
where  is a planned file that does not exist yet.
2026-07-16 17:36:37 +00:00
Zhengchao An 7cc92ac93c test(replication): add programmable fake S3 target (#4929) 2026-07-17 01:20:09 +08:00
Zhengchao An 3674f5f56e fix(ecstore): bound remote shard writers with a progress deadline so one black-hole peer cannot pin write quorum (#4925)
A PUT that fans out erasure shards to remote peers awaited every shard writer to completion on both the per-block write and the final shutdown, and the remote HttpWriter had no progress deadline. A peer that accepts the TCP connection but never drains the request body (or never sends a response) therefore wedges the writer forever once the bounded buffers fill, pinning an otherwise-healthy write quorum indefinitely — a cluster-level write-availability hazard triggered by a single bad peer (rustfs/backlog#1319, https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/1319).

MultiWriter now wraps each shard write and each shard-writer shutdown in a forward-progress deadline. The budget is re-armed on every block, so it bounds a stall rather than the total transfer time of a large object: a slow-but-honest writer that keeps completing shards is never killed, while a writer that makes no progress within the budget is failed and its disk dropped before commit. An optional absolute per-object cap (disabled by default) backstops a slow-drip peer that dribbles just enough progress to reset the per-block timer without ever converging; it is off by default so a legitimate large upload over a slow link is not killed on total time alone. Both knobs come from RUSTFS_OBJECT_DISK_WRITE_STALL_TIMEOUT (default 30s) and RUSTFS_OBJECT_DISK_WRITE_ABSOLUTE_CAP (default 0 = disabled); setting the stall timeout to 0 restores the previous wait-forever behavior for a conservative rollback.

The deadline enforcement lives in MultiWriter (writer-agnostic), so it covers local and remote writers alike and keeps the existing control-flow shape: a timed-out shard is marked failed (Error::Timeout, which is not an ignored error) and excluded from the write quorum exactly like any other shard write failure, and the unchanged nil_count/quorum check then continues on quorum or fails cleanly. This deliberately stays out of the MultiWriter lifecycle / commit-coordinator territory owned by rustfs/backlog#1312.

When a stalled writer is dropped to fail its shard, the remote HttpWriter must stop holding the connection and its buffered body. HttpWriter previously left its spawned request task running on drop; it now aborts that background task in Drop (it is no longer pin-projected, since every field is Unpin and the AsyncWrite impl already used get_mut). Bytes already handed to the transport cannot be unsent, but they land only in this upload's unique tmp path and are reclaimed by tmp GC — they never touch a committed object.

Tests, all on a paused virtual clock so they are deterministic and non-flaky:
- one black-hole writer still meets a 3/4 write quorum without hanging; two black holes fail the quorum cleanly (both for the per-block write and the shutdown paths).
- a slow-but-honest writer that keeps making progress within the stall budget is never failed across many blocks.
- the absolute cap bounds a slow-drip writer within a finite budget while the healthy writers keep quorum.
- the default policy is armed by default and honors 0 as disabled.
- HttpWriter aborts its background request task on drop against a hanging peer.

The toxiproxy/black-hole 4x4 end-to-end acceptance depends on black-box test facilities from rustfs/backlog#1325, which are not built yet; that acceptance is deferred to #1325 and intentionally not faked here.
2026-07-16 16:41:38 +00:00
houseme 4f04d5f883 chore(docker): update Alpine and Ubuntu base images (#4924)
chore(docker): update base images

Upgrade Alpine images to 3.24.1 and Ubuntu runtime images to 26.04.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-16 16:36:36 +00:00
Zhengchao An 84a34890ef docs(architecture): pin JSON→msgpack migration interaction for generation transport (#4913) 2026-07-17 00:12:24 +08:00
Zhengchao An da0c2d3730 test(ecstore): per-disk call-counter registry for metadata fan-out (backlog#1325 block 1) (#4914)
test(ecstore): add per-disk call-counter registry for metadata fan-out

First landable piece of the backlog#1325 test-infrastructure work: a test-only, per-disk call-counter registry that can observe `read_version` RPC counts recorded inside `tokio::spawn` tasks. This unblocks the RPC-count assertions in backlog #1309 / #1314 / #1315, which the thread-local `CapturingRecorder` cannot serve because it is blind to metrics emitted from spawned tasks.

The new `#[cfg(test)]` module `disk_call_counters` (modeled on the existing `cleanup_fault_injection` seam) is a process-global registry keyed by object name; an RAII `observe(object)` scope collects per-disk counts and clears only its own on drop, so parallel tests using distinct object names stay isolated. A dual-`cfg` `SetDisks::record_read_version_call` seam records from inside both metadata-fanout `read_version` spawn sites for online disks only; the `#[cfg(not(test))]` variant is an empty `#[inline(always)]` fn, so production runtime behavior is unchanged.

Two demo/regression tests prove the facility works across worker threads and is revert-detecting (neutralizing the recorder makes them fail).

Refs: https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/1325
2026-07-17 00:02:58 +08:00
Zhengchao An 73d75428a8 fix(get): enforce strict exact-length materialization for in-memory GET bodies (#1324) (#4922)
* fix(get): enforce strict exact-length materialization for in-memory GET bodies (#1324)

The streaming GET path already fails a short read with UnexpectedEof, but several in-memory materialization branches only WARNed on a length mismatch and then served the body anyway: the encrypted-buffer path, the direct-memory/cache buffered-body path, and the seek-support buffer. Most dangerously, the seek-support path fell through to streaming the *same* reader after read_to_end had already drained K bytes on error, shipping a body missing its prefix (prefix-misaligned data — the closest this code came to returning wrong bytes rather than merely a short body).

Because the HTTP response commits to Content-Length == expected before the body is produced, any other body length is an unrecoverable, broken response. This change gives every in-memory source the same exact-length contract that the ODC materialize-fill path already had.

- Add strict_materialize_object_body, a shared helper that bounds the read to expected+1 (so an over-long stream is detected without buffering it unbounded), requires bytes_read == expected, and on any read error returns without reusing the partially consumed reader. The encrypted, seek, and ODC materialize branches now all route through it.
- The buffered-body branch hard-fails a length mismatch before headers instead of WARN-and-serve.
- MemoryTrackedBytesStream gains a defense-in-depth guard: a buffer whose length disagrees with the declared content length yields a stream error on first poll instead of a clean short body or a silently truncated over-long body. This backstops the cache-hit paths that hand bytes straight to the blob.

The compatibility boundary is preserved: expected is derived from get_actual_size(), the same value used for the committed Content-Length, so a legitimate object (including a legacy/backfilled-size object) whose decoded bytes equal its declared size still serves cleanly — only genuine short, over-long, or errored reads fail. This matches the streaming path, which already hard-fails short reads, so no new large-object behavior is introduced.

Tests: each source (encrypted/seek via the shared helper, cache via build_get_object_body_with_cache, buffered/memory via MemoryTrackedBytesStream) is exercised with expected N and actual N-1 / N / N+1 plus a read-K-then-error injection; only the exact-length read succeeds. Reversal is guarded: restoring WARN-and-serve or a partial fallback flips the short/over-long/error assertions from Err to Ok. Existing streaming UnexpectedEof tests are unchanged.

Refs: https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/1324

* fix(app): reword WARNed comment to satisfy typos check
2026-07-16 16:01:10 +00:00
Zhengchao An 082061f18b fix(object): losslessly convert suffix Range from u64 to i64 (#4921)
s3s parses a `Range` suffix length as `u64`, but the GET and HEAD handlers cast it straight to `i64` and bypass any satisfiability check. This truncates deterministically: `bytes=-18446744073709551615` wraps to `-1` and is then read as "last 1 byte", and `bytes=-0` produces a 0-length 206 instead of a 416.

Both handlers now share a single `range_to_http_range_spec` conversion that rejects a zero-length suffix with `InvalidRange` (416), clamps any suffix above `i64::MAX` to `i64::MAX` (such a suffix always covers the whole object, which `HTTPRangeSpec::get_length` then clamps to the real size), and keeps the int branch as a checked cast (s3s already caps `first`/`last` at `i64::MAX`). The scattered `as i64` casts are removed.

Note on ordering: a zero-length suffix is now rejected at conversion time, so `bytes=-0` on a missing object returns 416 rather than 404. This matches the handler's existing behavior of validating range shape (range + partNumber -> 400) before object existence.

Adds a table-driven unit test covering suffix `0/1/size/size+1/i64::MAX/i64::MAX+1/u64::MAX` over empty, 1-byte, and normal objects, asserting the InvalidRange (416) mapping, full-object return for over-size suffixes, and no regression of int first-last / open-ended ranges.

Refs: https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/1322
2026-07-17 00:00:31 +08:00
Zhengchao An cbf1c69234 docs(architecture): fix object commit path reference (#4920) 2026-07-16 23:21:47 +08:00
Zhengchao An 2ae2081753 docs(skill): unwrap prose lines and add semver.org references (#4918)
Remove hard line wrapping from rustfs-release-publish prose (one logical line per sentence/paragraph, soft wrap for display) and link SemVer 2.0.0 spec including spec item 11 for prerelease precedence.
2026-07-16 22:54:28 +08:00
Zhengchao An 1305f7590d docs(skill): add semver confirmation gate to rustfs-release-publish (#4916)
Require explicit target-version confirmation (AskUserQuestion with concrete semver candidates derived from the latest tag) before any release phase runs, and document SemVer 2.0.0 precedence and bump-type rules.
2026-07-16 22:50:29 +08:00
Zhengchao An f17f0470b0 docs(skill): add rustfs-release-publish preview-validated release pipeline (#4915)
Adds a project skill that orchestrates the full release flow: preview tag first, CI/artifact verification, local run with console checks, rc client command validation, then final version bump and tag cut from the validated preview hash instead of latest main.
2026-07-16 22:46:48 +08:00
Zhengchao An f40abbb9f2 docs(architecture): unify per-object generation authority (#4912)
Add the shared design/contract document for backlog #1326: a single
per-object generation authority (the #1312 fencing epoch) that spans
commit fencing, read lease, prepared pool read, quota reservation, and
old-dir GC. Pins the five cross-cutting constraints once - RPC signature
binding with server-side nonce enforcement, xl.meta encoding contract
(no meta_ver bump, no positional FileInfo field, internal metadata map
under the dual-key contract), proto3 optional presence, mixed-version
fallback direction, and cluster-level capability negotiation - so the
implementation sub-issues follow them rather than each re-deciding.

No product code changes.
2026-07-16 22:29:07 +08:00
Zhengchao An dbfe1c9bae fix(docker): upgrade base-image packages in runtime stages to clear Trivy CVE alerts (#4909)
fix(docker): upgrade base-image packages in runtime stages

Trivy code scanning reports 40 open alerts against the published
container images, all from OS packages frozen at the base-image tag:

- musl image (alpine:3.23.4): openssl libssl3/libcrypto3 3.5.6-r0,
  including HIGH CVE-2026-45447; fixed in 3.5.7-r0
- glibc image (ubuntu:24.04): tar, gzip, perl-base, ncurses CVEs with
  fixes already published in the Ubuntu archive

The runtime stages only ever installed packages and never upgraded the
ones shipped with the base image, so distro security fixes could not
reach released images until the base tag itself moved. Run
`apk upgrade` / `apt-get upgrade -y` in the runtime stages of
Dockerfile, Dockerfile.glibc and Dockerfile.source so each build picks
up current security fixes.

Verified against the exact base tags: after upgrade, alpine 3.23.4
resolves libssl3/libcrypto3 3.5.7-r0 and ubuntu 24.04 resolves
tar 1.35+dfsg-3ubuntu0.2, gzip 1.12-1ubuntu3.2,
perl-base 5.38.2-3.2ubuntu0.3, ncurses 6.4+20240113-1ubuntu2.1 —
matching every fixed version demanded by the open alerts.
2026-07-16 22:15:29 +08:00
Zhengchao An dc4b85eb2d ci: log console version and completion after asset download (#4910) 2026-07-16 22:11:59 +08:00
houseme 75c3403dcc chore(release): prepare 1.0.0-beta.10-preview.4 (#4908)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-16 14:08:34 +00:00
Zhengchao An 381639fbbc fix(release): require embedded console assets (#4907) 2026-07-16 21:23:48 +08:00
houseme 1badff3923 fix: resolve moved-value diagnostics (#4905)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-07-16 18:46:56 +08:00
435 changed files with 90962 additions and 7408 deletions
+14 -6
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
name: adversarial-validation
description: Execute the Adversarial Validation policy from the root AGENTS.md — run the six reviewer roles (correctness, security, concurrency/durability, compatibility, performance, test coverage) with RustFS-specific attack probes. Use on every behavior-affecting code change, bug fix, or design proposal before declaring it done.
description: Execute the Adversarial Validation policy from the root AGENTS.md — run the seven reviewer roles (correctness, simplicity, security, concurrency/durability, compatibility, performance, test coverage) with RustFS-specific attack probes. Use on every behavior-affecting code change, bug fix, or design proposal before declaring it done.
---
# Adversarial Validation Playbooks
@@ -53,14 +53,22 @@ shipped bug or rule that earns each probe its place.
- Exercise the zero/empty end of every new size or count parameter: zero-length object PUT then GET (body must be empty, not error), part count 0, empty Vec of disks/entries into aggregation functions, and env/config values of 0 (must clamp or reject, never divide-by-zero or 'scan nothing and report zero usage'). Anywhere the diff computes a ratio, capacity, or progress percentage, plug in 0 and the max value.
- Where: crates/ecstore aggregation and scanner paths; crates/object-capacity; config/env parsing in touched crates
- Evidence: Commits 787cc77a7 'clamp zero capacity env values to safe defaults' (#4559) and 32b1094ec 'resolve a symlinked scan root instead of silently counting zero' (#4564) — zero-as-silent-wrong-answer is a recurring repo bug class.
- Smaller-diff attack: rewrite the diff's change mentally (or actually, in scratch) as the minimal in-place edit and compare. Flag as findings: a helper function with exactly one caller introduced by this diff; a file rewrite where a 3-line edit inside the existing control flow suffices; reshaped control flow in init/locking/metadata/quorum paths beyond what the fix requires; new string literals duplicating existing constants (grep the token first); #[path] module inclusion. If the smaller diff achieves identical behavior, report it with the concrete replacement.
- Where: Any diff; extra scrutiny for crates/ecstore, crates/lock, rustfs/src/storage where 'preserve the existing control-flow shape' is an explicit rule
- Evidence: AGENTS.md 'Change Style for Existing Logic' (one-off helper ban, preserve control-flow shape in distributed/locking/metadata paths, no #[path]) and 'Constant and String Usage'; Adversarial Validation section names the smaller-diff clause as a correctness-adversary finding.
- For any diff touching multipart or object commit paths, order the operations on paper and attack the failure point between them: kill the process (or return Err) after the commit rename but before cleanup, and after cleanup but before commit. Verify the earlier-failure case leaves the object readable and the later-failure case leaves no half-visible object; part meta files must never be deleted before the commit is durable.
- Where: crates/ecstore multipart commit/cleanup (set_disk/ops); rustfs/src/storage multipart handlers
- Evidence: Commit c77c5f047 'defer multipart part.N.meta cleanup until after commit' (#4548) — cleanup-before-commit ordering already caused a real data-loss window; the #4221 durability work shows fsync/ordering bugs are endemic here.
Null report example: "Attacked quorum-1 error reduction, exact max-keys listing boundary, trailing-slash dir keys, nil-UUID tier versionId, mid-stream reconstruct error propagation, and a minimal-diff rewrite — no break found; diff is already the minimal in-place edit."
Null report example: "Attacked quorum-1 error reduction, exact max-keys listing boundary, trailing-slash dir keys, nil-UUID tier versionId, and mid-stream reconstruct error propagation — no break found."
### Simplicity adversary
- Smaller-diff attack: rewrite the diff's change mentally (or actually, in scratch) as the minimal in-place edit and compare. Flag as findings: a helper function with exactly one caller introduced by this diff; a file rewrite where a 3-line edit inside the existing control flow suffices; reshaped control flow in init/locking/metadata/quorum paths beyond what the fix requires; new string literals duplicating existing constants (grep the token first); #[path] module inclusion. If the smaller diff achieves identical behavior, report it with the concrete replacement.
- Where: Any diff; extra scrutiny for crates/ecstore, crates/lock, rustfs/src/storage where 'preserve the existing control-flow shape' is an explicit rule
- Evidence: AGENTS.md 'Change Style for Existing Logic' (one-off helper ban, preserve control-flow shape in distributed/locking/metadata paths, no #[path]) and 'Reuse Before You Write' (constants clause); the Adversarial Validation roles list charters the simplicity adversary with exactly this attack.
- Reuse-and-necessity attack: for each new helper the diff introduces, run `ls crates/utils/src crates/common/src` and `rg -i 'fn \w*<term>'` over those dirs plus the touched crate (snake_case signatures — a full-text single-word grep drowns, a multi-word phrase returns nothing). A reimplementation of an existing workspace utility, or of plain std/tokio behavior no wrapper refines, is a finding — but so is forced reuse with mismatched semantics (normalization such as `clean` resolving `.`/`..` against raw S3 keys, error type, backoff, durability gating). For each new defensive branch, demand the nameable trigger and flag re-validation of what a validated upstream layer on the SAME path already guarantees — excluding the Cross-Cutting Domain Invariant patterns (nil/empty/absent UUID, dual metadata keys, unversioned-tier versionId) and re-checks before destructive actions, which are load-bearing even when redundant on the happy path. For each new test, flag near-duplicates pinning the same code path AND poison-value class as an existing test — boundary companions (n==max vs max+1, absent vs empty vs nil UUID, MetaObject vs MetaDeleteMarker) are never near-duplicates; the test-coverage skeptic playbook below mandates them.
- Where: Any diff adding helpers, branches on decoded/peer data, or tests; helper checks against crates/utils, crates/common, and the touched crate
- Evidence: AGENTS.md 'Reuse Before You Write' and 'Necessary Code Only'; GHSA-f4vq-9ffr-m8m3 (normalization-asymmetry traversal — why forced reuse of normalizing helpers on raw keys is itself an attack); docs/operations/tier-ilm-debugging.md nil-versionId incident (why boundary re-checks are load-bearing).
Null report example: "Rewrote the diff as an in-place edit (no smaller equivalent exists), grepped both new helpers against crates/utils, crates/common, and the touched crate (no existing equivalent; call-site semantics checked), verified the two new defensive branches name concrete corrupt-input triggers, and checked the added tests against the existing suite (each pins a distinct poison-value class) — no break found."
### Security reviewer
@@ -243,7 +251,7 @@ Null report example: "Attacked the new rename_data commit-section work, durabili
- If the diff writes internal object metadata, run the dual-key mutation: delete the `x-minio-internal-<suffix>` write (keeping only `x-rustfs-internal-`) and check whether any test fails. Because `get_bytes` prefers the RustFS key, every read-back test stays green while MinIO interop is silently broken — coverage must include an assertion that BOTH keys are present in the stored metadata map.
- Where: crates/utils/src/http/metadata_compat.rs and all its callers in crates/ecstore and rustfs/src/storage
- Evidence: CLAUDE.md domain convention: metadata must be written under both x-rustfs-internal- and x-minio-internal- keys for MinIO interop; get_bytes prefers the RustFS key, making the MinIO-key half of the invariant invisible to read-back tests.
- For changed quorum/version/UUID logic, name the tests covering the specific poison values: quorum1 disks, nil UUID, absent vs empty vs nil-serialized UUID bytes, and remote-tier version_id of None/"" (unversioned tier bucket → no versionId sent). Mutation check: remove a `.filter(|u| !u.is_nil())` guard from the diff and confirm a test fails; if none does, the nil-UUID class is uncovered.
- For changed quorum/version/UUID logic, name the tests covering the specific poison values: quorum1 disks, nil UUID, absent vs empty vs nil-serialized UUID bytes, remote-tier version_id of None/"" (unversioned tier bucket → no versionId sent), and the same metadata read on both MetaObject and MetaDeleteMarker version types. Mutation check: remove a `.filter(|u| !u.is_nil())` guard from the diff and confirm a test fails; if none does, the nil-UUID class is uncovered.
- Where: crates/ecstore (tier recovery, heal, quorum paths), crates/filemeta, code reading UUIDs from xl.meta metadata
- Evidence: Commit 726f3dc18 (#4552) fixed rejection of empty remote version_id in tier recovery. CLAUDE.md invariant: absent/empty/nil UUID all mean 'no value', not Uuid::nil(). docs/operations/tier-ilm-debugging.md: None/"" tier version means unversioned bucket. df9cbc4ed (#4427): unvalidated distribution values caused shuffle index panic — edge values reached production untested.
- For any pagination/limit/truncation change, construct the exact-boundary test: result count == max (page exactly full), max+1, and a delimiter re-fold that lands precisely on the page boundary — assert both the item count AND the is_truncated/continuation marker. Off-by-one at the page boundary is a recurring shipped bug here.
@@ -43,16 +43,7 @@ Use this skill to review code changes consistently before merge, before release,
#### Rust-specific checks (apply to all Rust changes)
- **unwrap/expect in production**: Search changed files for `.unwrap()` and `.expect(` outside test modules. Every `unwrap()` in production code must have a justification comment or be replaced with `?`.
- **Silent type truncation**: Search for `as u8/u16/u32/u64/usize/i8/i16/i32/i64/isize` casts. Every `as` cast must be justified; negative-to-unsigned and large-to-small are bugs by default. Use `try_into()` or explicit clamping.
- **Unnecessary cloning**: Check `.clone()` calls in loops, per-request paths, and on structs with >5 heap-allocated fields. Consider `Arc`, references, or `Cow<str>`.
- **Lock ordering**: If the change acquires multiple locks, verify the order matches all other call sites. Document the order in a comment.
- **Locks across .await**: Flag any `tokio::sync::RwLock`/`Mutex` guard held across an `.await` point without bounded hold time.
- **Recursion depth**: If the change adds or modifies a recursive function, verify it has a depth limit or uses iterative traversal with an explicit stack.
- **Error types**: Flag `Result<_, String>`, `Box<dyn Error>`, and missing `Error::source()` implementations in public APIs.
- **Test assertions**: Every test function must have at least one `assert!`. Flag tests that only call code without verifying results.
- **println/eprintln**: Search changed files for `println!`/`eprintln!` outside test modules. Production code must use `tracing` macros.
- **Serde safety**: Structs deserialized from untrusted input (S3 API, user config) should have `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]`.
Run the full checklist in [rust-code-quality](../rust-code-quality/SKILL.md) — the canonical Rust review checklist for the unwrap/casting/cloning/locking/recursion/error-type/serde/test rules and the reuse-and-necessity checks (duplicated helpers, defensive branches without a nameable trigger, redundant error wrapping). Do not restate those rules here; carry its P0P3 ratings over unchanged and use this skill's output format.
### 4) Findings-first output
- Order findings by severity:
+15 -5
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ rg -n 'println!\|eprintln!' <changed-files> | grep -v test
# 6. Ordering::Relaxed usage (verify each is intentional)
rg -n 'Ordering::Relaxed' <changed-files>
# 7. Default substituted for a possibly-required value (judge each: is the value optional by domain?)
rg -n 'unwrap_or_default\(\)|unwrap_or\(' <changed-files>
```
## Manual Review Checklist
@@ -55,8 +58,8 @@ For every Rust code change, verify:
- [ ] No `f64 as usize` without prior clamping
### Concurrency
- [ ] Lock acquisition order is documented when multiple locks are used
- [ ] No `tokio::sync` write guards held across `.await` without bounded hold time
- [ ] Lock acquisition order is documented when multiple locks are used, and matches every other call site taking any overlapping subset (ABBA check)
- [ ] No `tokio::sync` lock guard (read or write) held across `.await` without bounded hold time — long-lived read guards wedge writers (#4195)
- [ ] Concurrent counters use `compare_exchange` loops, not load-then-store
- [ ] `std::sync::Mutex` in async context is held only briefly, never across `.await`
@@ -84,12 +87,19 @@ For every Rust code change, verify:
- [ ] No camelCase statics or Hungarian notation
- [ ] New string literals don't duplicate existing constants
### Reuse and Necessity
- [ ] No new helper duplicating an existing workspace utility (`crates/utils`, `crates/common`, the touched crate) or plain std/tokio behavior no wrapper refines; reused helpers match the call site's semantics (normalization, error type, backoff, durability gating)
- [ ] No branch without a nameable concrete trigger; no re-validation of what a validated upstream layer on the same path already guarantees (Cross-Cutting Domain Invariant patterns and pre-destructive-action re-checks are load-bearing — keep them)
- [ ] Error context attached once where actionable, not re-wrapped at every hop; no typed→generic error conversion below aggregation/quorum layers
- [ ] No comments narrating the next line, restating a signature, or describing the change itself (invariant comments — lock ordering, `SAFETY`, unwrap justification — are not narration)
- [ ] No near-duplicate test pinning the same code path and poison-value class as an existing test (boundary companions — n==max vs max+1, absent/empty/nil UUID — are never near-duplicates)
## Severity Classification
- **P0 (Block merge)**: `unwrap()` in request hot path, silent truncation on user input, lock ordering violation, recursion without depth limit
- **P1 (Must fix)**: `Result<_, String>` in public API, unnecessary clone in hot path, `Box<dyn Error>` in trait method
- **P2 (Should fix)**: Missing `assert!` in test, `println!` in production, missing `with_capacity`
- **P3 (Nice to fix)**: Naming convention violation, missing doc comment, `as_ptr()` vs `Arc::ptr_eq`
- **P1 (Must fix)**: `Result<_, String>` in public API, unnecessary clone in hot path, `Box<dyn Error>` in trait method, `unwrap_or_default()` on a domain-required value (metadata, quorum, version id)
- **P2 (Should fix)**: Missing `assert!` in test, `println!` in production, missing `with_capacity`, new helper duplicating an existing workspace utility, defensive branch with no nameable trigger (corrupt or stale persisted/peer data is always a nameable trigger for boundary-crossing values), near-duplicate test, redundant error re-wrapping
- **P3 (Nice to fix)**: Naming convention violation, missing doc comment, `as_ptr()` vs `Arc::ptr_eq`, narrating comment
## Output Template
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
---
name: rustfs-release-publish
description: "End-to-end RustFS release pipeline: bump version files on main directly to the final target version, cut a preview tag on that commit, verify the CI build and release artifacts, run the downloaded binary locally and exercise the console, validate the server with the latest rc client, then publish the final tag on the SAME validated commit — never a new bump commit, never latest main. Use whenever the user wants to release/publish a RustFS version (发版/发布)."
---
# RustFS Release Publish (preview-validated pipeline)
This skill orchestrates a full release. It wraps `rustfs-release-version-bump` (which only edits version files and opens the PR) with a mandatory preview-tag validation loop before the final tag is published.
Core design: **version files never carry a `-preview.N` suffix**. The preview suffix exists only in tag names. This works because the binary self-reports the git tag it was built from (`build::TAG` via shadow_rs, see `rustfs/src/config/cli.rs` `SHORT_VERSION`), and `build.yml` derives artifact names and prerelease classification from the tag name — Cargo.toml's version is only a no-tag fallback. Therefore the preview tag and the final tag can (and MUST) point at the exact same commit: what you validated is byte-for-byte the source that ships.
Pipeline shape:
```
bump version files to <target> (final version, ONE commit) -> merge
-> tag <preview-tag> at that commit -> CI green
-> verify release artifacts -> run binary locally + console checks
-> validate with latest rc client
-> tag <target> at the SAME commit (zero delta) -> re-verify CI/release
```
On validation failure: fix lands on main via normal PR (version files are already at `<target>`, no new bump PR), then tag `<preview-tag N+1>` at the new main commit and restart from Phase 2.
## Required inputs
- Final target version, for example `1.0.0-beta.10`.
- Preview iteration `N` (default: next unused preview tag for that target; check with `git tag -l '<target>-preview.*'` — and for stable targets `git tag -l '<target>-rc.*'` — after `git fetch --tags`).
If the target version is missing or ambiguous, stop and ask before doing anything (see the semver gate below).
## Semver gate — confirm the target version before touching anything
Versions follow [SemVer 2.0.0](https://semver.org/). Precedence reminder:
```
1.0.0-alpha < 1.0.0-alpha.1 < 1.0.0-beta.2 < 1.0.0-beta.11 < 1.0.0-rc.1 < 1.0.0 < 1.0.1 < 1.1.0 < 2.0.0
```
Numeric prerelease identifiers compare numerically (`beta.9 < beta.10`), not lexically — see [semver.org spec item 11](https://semver.org/#spec-item-11). Preview tags are internal validation tags layered on top of the target's prerelease channel — they are never themselves a deliverable version and never appear in version files.
Rules:
- A request like "发个版" / "release the next version" without an exact version string is ALWAYS ambiguous. Derive the current latest tag (`git tag --sort=-v:refname | head`), then ask the user to choose via AskUserQuestion with concrete candidates, e.g. from `1.0.0-beta.10`: next prerelease `1.0.0-beta.11`, promote to `1.0.0-rc.1`, promote to stable `1.0.0`. Never guess between these — they have very different meanings (channel promotion vs. iteration) and different CI classification consequences.
- After a stable `X.Y.Z` exists, the next version must state which component bumps: patch `X.Y.(Z+1)` for fixes only, minor `X.(Y+1).0` for backward-compatible features, major `(X+1).0.0` for breaking changes. If the user names a bump type but not a number, compute it from the latest stable tag and echo the exact resulting version back for confirmation.
- Echo the final confirmed version string verbatim in your first status report; every later phase must use exactly that string. If at any point the user's wording and the confirmed version diverge, stop and re-confirm.
## Preview tag naming
- Prerelease target (contains `alpha`/`beta`/`rc`): preview tag is `<target>-preview.N`, e.g. `1.0.0-beta.10-preview.3`. It contains `beta`, so `build.yml`'s substring-based classification marks it prerelease — safe.
- **Stable** target (e.g. `1.1.0`): NEVER tag `1.1.0-preview.N``build.yml` marks a tag prerelease only if its name contains `alpha`, `beta`, or `rc`, so `1.1.0-preview.N` would be treated as a stable release and overwrite `latest.json` as stable. Use `1.1.0-rc.N` as the preview tag instead.
## Hard rules
- Version files (Cargo.toml, Cargo.lock, README, flake.nix, Chart.yaml, rustfs.spec) are bumped ONCE, directly to `<target>`. Never write a `-preview.N` suffix into any version file. If `rustfs-release-version-bump` is ever asked for a `-preview` version, that is a pipeline bug — stop.
- Tags have no `v` prefix. Always annotated: `git tag -a <tag> -m "Release <tag>"`.
- The final tag MUST point at exactly `PREVIEW_HASH` — the commit the validated preview tag points at. Never tag current `main` HEAD (commits merged after validation are unvalidated), and never create an extra version-bump commit between preview and final.
- Phases run in order; a failure in any phase blocks everything after it. After the fix lands on main, restart from Phase 2 with the next preview iteration against the new `origin/main` hash — do not resume mid-pipeline against a stale hash.
- If the release is abandoned after Phase 1 merged, main's version files claim a version that was never tagged. Either revert the bump PR or leave it to be overwritten by the next release — but tell the user explicitly and record the decision.
- User-facing status updates in Chinese; commits, PR titles/bodies, and tag messages in English. No hard-wrapping in commit messages, PR bodies, or documentation prose — one logical line per sentence/paragraph, let soft wrap handle display.
## Phase 0 — Preflight
- `git status --short` clean; `git fetch origin main --tags`.
- `gh auth status` works; confirm you can view `gh release list -L 3`.
- Confirm the exact final target version with the user if not explicit.
## Phase 1 — Version bump to the final target (once)
- If main's version files already read `<target>` (e.g. this is a restart after a failed preview), verify with `rg -n "<target>" Cargo.toml rustfs.spec helm/rustfs/Chart.yaml` and skip to Phase 2.
- Otherwise invoke the `rustfs-release-version-bump` skill with the final `<target>` (NOT a preview version), full GitHub flow (commit/push/PR).
- Get the PR merged into main. Record the resulting main commit:
```bash
git fetch origin main
PREVIEW_HASH=$(git rev-parse origin/main) # must contain the bump PR
```
`PREVIEW_HASH` is the single source of truth for the rest of the pipeline — report it to the user and reuse it verbatim in Phases 2 and 6. Both the preview tag and the final tag will point at it.
## Phase 2 — Publish the preview tag
```bash
git tag -a "<preview-tag>" -m "Release <preview-tag>" "$PREVIEW_HASH"
git push origin "<preview-tag>"
```
Pushing the tag triggers `.github/workflows/build.yml` ("Build and Release"); `docker.yml` chains off it via `workflow_run`.
On a restart (N+1), refresh `PREVIEW_HASH=$(git rev-parse origin/main)` first — it must contain the fix — and re-report it.
## Phase 3 — CI and artifact verification
- Watch the tag build: `gh run list --workflow build.yml --limit 5` then `gh run watch <run-id>`. Every matrix target must succeed (linux x86_64/aarch64 × musl/gnu, macos-aarch64, windows-x86_64) plus the release and latest.json jobs.
- Verify the GitHub release: `gh release view "<preview-tag>" --json isPrerelease,assets`
- `isPrerelease` must be `true`.
- Assets must include all 6 platform zips in both versioned (`rustfs-<platform>-v<tag>.zip`) and `-latest` forms, plus `SHA256SUMS`, `SHA512SUMS`, `rustfs-<tag>.sbom.cdx.json`, `rustfs-<tag>.provenance.json`.
- Verify the chained Docker run succeeded: `gh run list --workflow docker.yml --limit 3`.
- Checksum spot-check for the platform you will run locally: download the zip and `SHA256SUMS`, verify with `shasum -a 256 -c` (grep to one line).
## Phase 4 — Run the artifact locally, verify the console
Work inside the session scratchpad directory; never leave stray data dirs.
```bash
gh release download "<preview-tag>" -p "rustfs-macos-aarch64-v<preview-tag>.zip" -D "$SCRATCH"
cd "$SCRATCH" && unzip -o rustfs-*.zip
./rustfs --version # must report the PREVIEW TAG (build::TAG), not the Cargo.toml version, plus expected short SHA
mkdir -p data
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY=rustfsadmin RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=rustfsadmin ./rustfs ./data
```
Defaults: S3 endpoint `:9000`, embedded console `:9001`.
Checks (all must pass):
- `./rustfs --version` reports the preview tag name and the short SHA of `PREVIEW_HASH`. Reporting `<target>` without the `-preview.N` suffix means the build did not embed the tag — treat as FAIL and investigate before proceeding.
- `curl -fsS http://localhost:9000/health/ready` returns ready.
- Startup log shows the embedded console being served (this was the regression that `fix(release): require embedded console assets` guards).
- Open `http://localhost:9001` in the browser: login with `rustfsadmin`/`rustfsadmin`; dashboard renders without JS console errors; create a bucket, upload a file, download it back (byte-identical), delete the object and bucket. Keep the server running for Phase 5.
## Phase 5 — Validate with the latest rc client
`rc` is the RustFS CLI client from <https://github.com/rustfs/cli>.
- Ensure the latest release is installed: compare `rc --version` against `gh api repos/rustfs/cli/releases/latest --jq .tag_name`; update via `brew upgrade rustfs/tap/rc` (or download the release binary).
- Point it at the preview server and run the command matrix, recording PASS/FAIL per command:
```bash
rc alias set preview http://localhost:9000 rustfsadmin rustfsadmin
rc ls preview/
rc mb preview/rel-check
rc cp <local-file> preview/rel-check/
rc stat preview/rel-check/<file>
rc cat preview/rel-check/<file> # matches source
rc cp preview/rel-check/<file> ./out && cmp <local-file> ./out
rc cp -r <local-dir>/ preview/rel-check/dir/
rc find preview/rel-check --name "*"
rc share download preview/rel-check/<file> --expire 1h # presigned URL fetchable via curl
rc rm preview/rel-check/<file> && rc rm -r --force preview/rel-check/dir
rc rb preview/rel-check
rc admin user list preview/
rc admin user add preview/ relcheckuser relchecksecret12
rc admin user remove preview/ relcheckuser
rc alias remove preview
```
- Any FAIL blocks the release. Afterwards stop the server and delete the scratch data directory.
## Phase 6 — Publish the final tag on the validated commit
No second version bump, no release branch. The final tag goes on the exact commit the preview validated:
```bash
git fetch origin --tags
git rev-parse "<preview-tag>^{commit}" # must equal PREVIEW_HASH — abort if not
git tag -a "<target>" -m "Release <target>" "$PREVIEW_HASH"
git push origin "<target>"
```
- CI rebuilds from the same source; the only changed input is the tag name, so the binary now self-reports `<target>`.
- Re-run the Phase 3 verification against the final tag: all matrix jobs green; `gh release view "<target>"` shows the full asset set; for a prerelease target `isPrerelease` is `true`, for a stable target it must be `false` and `latest.json` must be updated.
- Optionally spot-check `./rustfs --version` from a final-tag artifact — it must report `<target>`.
## Output contract
Always report:
- Target version, preview tag(s) used, `PREVIEW_HASH` (which both tags point at).
- Per-phase result (PASS/FAIL/BLOCKED) with key evidence: CI run URLs, release URLs, console check results, the rc command matrix.
- Any deviation from this pipeline and why the user approved it.
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ Validated baseline: release pattern used in PR `#2957`.
If target version is missing or ambiguous, stop and ask before editing.
Reject any target version containing a `-preview.` suffix: preview identifiers are tag-only (see `rustfs-release-publish`) and must never be written into version files. If asked for one, stop and point to the release pipeline instead of editing.
## Read before editing
- `AGENTS.md` (root and nearest path-specific files).
@@ -60,12 +60,14 @@ For the full pattern map, read [advisory-patterns.md](references/advisory-patter
### IAM and service accounts
- Treat imported IAM payload fields as attacker-controlled: `parent`, `claims`, `accessKey`, `secretKey`, status, policy names, and groups.
- For service account create/update/import, prove parent ownership or root/admin authority before writing credentials or claims; an action permission alone must not allow choosing root or another user as `target_user`.
- Treat IAM export packages as credential disclosure surfaces; never include plaintext user or service-account secret keys unless the caller is allowed to recover those secrets and the export format is intentionally sealed.
- Do not let `deny_only` or "no explicit deny" become an allow decision that skips required allow checks.
- Test cross-user list/update/import flows with wrong, correct, self, parent, and root identities.
### STS, OIDC, and federation flows
- Every STS endpoint must have an explicit authentication story: SigV4 where required, OIDC token verification for web identity, and role/session policy validation before issuing credentials.
- JWT session tokens must be signed and verified by a trusted issuer/key path, not by service-account-controlled material or a reused root secret.
- JWT verification must enforce required claims and expiration for every bearer token path; "allow missing exp" is never acceptable for user-presented credentials.
- Public OIDC bootstrap and callback routes must treat `Host`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, redirect targets, `state`, and callback parameters as untrusted; credential-bearing redirects require a configured, allowlisted origin.
- OIDC discovery and validation URLs are SSRF sinks. Resolve and classify hostnames at connection time, reject rebinding to loopback/private/link-local ranges, and do not rely on literal string checks.
@@ -137,7 +139,9 @@ Use these prompts while reviewing a diff:
- Does a public/default/empty config change security behavior from fail-closed to fail-open?
- Is any attacker-controlled value later used as a path, policy condition, credential identity, log field, URL, Origin, or response body?
- Does this response contain stored replication, remote target, or service credentials that need redaction or stricter authorization?
- Does an IAM export/import path expose or trust plaintext credential secrets beyond the caller's intended authority?
- Can this STS/OIDC path issue credentials without SigV4, trusted issuer validation, allowlisted redirects, or trusted-proxy host/scheme handling?
- Can a service-account or STS token omit `exp`, forge `sessionPolicy`, or use a principal-controlled key as signing authority?
- Does this outbound validation path resolve attacker-supplied hostnames and reject private, loopback, link-local, and rebound addresses at the actual connection boundary?
- Is an archive entry, object key, or policy resource normalized differently between authorization and storage?
- Is the same operation implemented in multiple paths, such as `CopyObject` vs `UploadPartCopy`, and do all paths enforce the same security contract?
@@ -27,14 +27,15 @@ Update this file only when an advisory adds or changes a reusable lesson, affect
### IAM import, service accounts, and privilege boundaries
- `GHSA-566f-q62r-wcr8`: `ImportIam` accepted attacker-controlled service account `parent`, `claims`, `accessKey`, and `secretKey`, enabling persistent backdoor accounts under root. Lesson: imported IAM payloads are untrusted data and must be validated against privilege boundaries.
- `GHSA-3495-h8r9-gfqg`: `ExportIAM` wrote regular-user and service-account secret keys into exported ZIP data. Lesson: IAM export is a credential-disclosure boundary; redact, seal, or strictly justify every exported secret before treating export permission as safe.
- `GHSA-5354-r3w2-34m8`: `AddServiceAccount` checked `CreateServiceAccountAdminAction` but trusted caller-supplied `target_user`, allowing service accounts under the root parent. Lesson: service-account create paths must validate parent ownership or root/admin authority, not only the create action.
- `GHSA-xgr5-qc6w-vcg9`: `deny_only=true` skipped allow checks and let restricted service accounts mint unrestricted children. Lesson: deny-only logic must never become implicit allow for privilege creation.
- `GHSA-mm2q-qcmx-gw4w`: leaked service account access keys plus update-without-ownership formed an escalation chain. Lesson: service-account identifiers are security-sensitive because update APIs consume them.
### STS, OIDC, and federation flows
- `GHSA-5qfg-mf7r-jp3w`: `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` was reachable without the required request authentication and could issue temporary credentials from crafted web identity input. Lesson: every STS route needs explicit SigV4 or trusted identity-provider validation before role assumption.
- `GHSA-ccrv-v8v9-ch9q`: service-account-controlled material could self-sign JWT session tokens with forged policy claims. Lesson: session tokens must be signed by a trusted issuer/key path and validation must reject self-signed or principal-controlled tokens.
- `GHSA-5qfg-mf7r-jp3w` and `GHSA-3473-5353-xhwh`: `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` was reachable through unauthenticated `POST /` routing and could issue temporary credentials from crafted web identity input. Lesson: every STS route needs explicit SigV4 or trusted identity-provider validation before role assumption, and unauthenticated exemptions must be narrowed to the exact action with uniform failure responses.
- `GHSA-ccrv-v8v9-ch9q` and `GHSA-48rf-7j3q-3hfv`: service-account-controlled material could self-sign JWT session tokens with forged policy claims, and missing `exp` was accepted for service-account tokens. Lesson: session tokens must be signed by a trusted issuer/key path, enforce required claims and expiration, and reject self-signed or principal-controlled tokens.
- `GHSA-9pjf-w3c2-m32r`, `GHSA-4x2q-cpx9-9h26`, and `GHSA-xvpm-p3f7-34c3`: public OIDC authorize/callback flows trusted request `Host` or forwarded scheme when building credential-bearing redirects. Lesson: OIDC redirects must use configured allowlisted origins and trusted-proxy handling; never derive the post-login credential destination from direct client headers.
- `GHSA-m479-9x88-94w6`, `GHSA-frwq-mfqx-83p8`, `GHSA-q9q8-rf9r-fg9f`, and `GHSA-j5c2-hhf7-6gf5`: OIDC validation accepted attacker-controlled discovery URLs because hostname checks rejected only literal forbidden IPs, allowing DNS rebinding SSRF. Lesson: outbound federation URL validation must resolve and classify hostnames at the connection boundary and reject loopback, private, link-local, and rebound addresses.
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ Update this file only when an advisory adds or changes a reusable lesson, affect
### Secrets, defaults, and cryptographic misuse
- `GHSA-j59h-h7q5-q348`, `GHSA-3wm5-wpm5-hmfm`, `GHSA-6wc8-xm48-qhmx`, and `GHSA-9gf3-jx4p-4xxf`: RustFS shipped known default root credentials that could authenticate to S3, admin APIs, IAM, KMS, console, and token-signing surfaces. Lesson: root credentials must be operator-provided or generated per install; known defaults and warnings are not acceptable for network-reachable deployments.
- `GHSA-j59h-h7q5-q348`, `GHSA-3wm5-wpm5-hmfm`, `GHSA-6wc8-xm48-qhmx`, `GHSA-9gf3-jx4p-4xxf`, and `GHSA-63xc-c3w3-m2cf`: RustFS shipped known default root credentials that could authenticate to S3, admin APIs, IAM, KMS, console, and token-signing surfaces. Lesson: root credentials must be operator-provided or generated per install; known defaults and warnings are not acceptable for network-reachable deployments.
- `GHSA-h956-rh7x-ppgj`: gRPC used the hard-coded token `rustfs rpc` on both client and server. Lesson: source-visible shared tokens are authentication bypasses.
- `GHSA-r5qv-rc46-hv8q`: internode RPC HMAC secret fell back to the public default `rustfsadmin`. Lesson: RPC/internode auth must fail closed instead of silently using public defaults.
- `GHSA-75fx-qg6f-8rm7` and `GHSA-68cw-96m3-h2cf`: internode RPC secrets were derivable from known root credentials, making raw storage RPC signatures forgeable when explicit RPC secrets were unset. Lesson: RPC auth keys must be independent random secrets, never derived from S3 root credentials, and raw storage RPC should not share the public S3 listener without an internode-only boundary.
@@ -122,6 +123,7 @@ rg -n "deny_unknown_fields|serde.default|as u32|as usize|as i32" rustfs crates
- Copy/upload fixes: include cross-bucket, cross-user, source-denied, destination-denied, copy-source-condition, and multipart completion cases.
- Path fixes: include encoded traversal, absolute path, nested traversal, archive entries with `..`, valid object keys that resemble traversal text but should be rejected, and canonical bucket/prefix boundary checks.
- Logging fixes: assert redacted output for structs and response bodies that may contain credentials.
- IAM export fixes: assert exported archives omit plaintext user and service-account secrets unless the format deliberately encrypts or seals them.
- RPC auth fixes: include captured metadata replay across two concrete methods, stale timestamps, wrong path, wrong method surrogate, wrong secret, and valid same-method calls.
- Browser/CORS fixes: assert no credentials on reflected/default origins, correct behavior for explicit allowlists, and no same-origin script execution for previewed object content.
- SSE fixes: inspect stored bytes and verify API metadata, read-back behavior, and on-disk ciphertext together.
+5
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@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@ body-cache-whitelist-check: ## Check the body-cache eligibility gate stays a fai
@echo "🧱 Checking body-cache whitelist guard..."
./scripts/check_body_cache_whitelist.sh
.PHONY: log-analyzer-rules-check
log-analyzer-rules-check: core-deps ## Check log-analyzer rule anchors still exist verbatim in source
@echo "🩺 Checking log-analyzer rule anchors..."
./scripts/check_log_analyzer_rules.sh
.PHONY: compilation-check
compilation-check: core-deps ## Run compilation check
@echo "🔨 Running compilation check..."
+1 -1
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@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ pre-commit: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-gua
@echo "✅ All pre-commit checks passed!"
.PHONY: pre-pr
pre-pr: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check clippy-check test ## Run full pre-PR checks with clippy and tests
pre-pr: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check log-analyzer-rules-check clippy-check test ## Run full pre-PR checks with clippy and tests
@echo "✅ All pre-PR checks passed!"
.PHONY: dev-check
+3
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@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ script-tests: ## Run shell script tests
@echo "Running script tests..."
./scripts/test_build_rustfs_options.sh
./scripts/test_entrypoint_credentials.sh
bash -n ./scripts/validate_object_data_cache_cold_stampede.sh
python3 ./scripts/check_object_data_cache_follower_samples.py --self-test
./scripts/validate_object_data_cache_cold_stampede.sh --self-test
.PHONY: test
test: core-deps script-tests ## Run all tests (needs cargo-nextest; RUSTFS_ALLOW_CARGO_TEST_FALLBACK=1 to override)
+10 -17
View File
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ e2e-reliability = { max-threads = 1 }
# --- default profile (local): serialize the flaky groups, never retry --------
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & (test(concurrent_resend_same_part_commits_one_generation) | test(/^store::bucket::tests::bucket_delete_(mark_delete_marks|purge_removes|default_s3_delete)/))'
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & (test(concurrent_resend_same_part_commits_one_generation) | test(/^store::bucket::tests::bucket_delete_(mark_delete|purge_removes|default_s3_delete)/))'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# Serialize the multipart crash-consistency scenarios (dist-2, backlog#1150):
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ retries = 2
# QUARANTINE: OPEN backlog#937 — store::bucket::tests::bucket_delete_* race
# make_bucket into InsufficientWriteQuorum via shared global state under load.
[[profile.ci.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & test(/^store::bucket::tests::bucket_delete_(mark_delete_marks|purge_removes|default_s3_delete)/)'
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & test(/^store::bucket::tests::bucket_delete_(mark_delete|purge_removes|default_s3_delete)/)'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
retries = 2
@@ -138,6 +138,10 @@ test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# Each e2e test spawns its own rustfs server on a random port with an isolated
# temp dir (crates/e2e_test/src/common.rs), so the subset is parallel-safe.
#
# Replication failure harness (backlog#1147 repl-8): the first clause admits
# its four in-process fake-target self-tests. They bind random loopback ports,
# use no external service, and finish in under a second.
#
# Replication PR subset (backlog#1147 repl-1): the second clause admits the 20
# FAST bucket-replication tests from replication_extension_test — the
# target-registration / replication-check / list / remove / delete admin paths
@@ -188,7 +192,7 @@ test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
[profile.e2e-smoke]
default-filter = """
package(e2e_test) & (
test(/^(delete_marker_migration_semantics|version_id_regression|list_objects_v2_pagination|list_object_versions_regression|list_objects_duplicates|list_buckets_double_slash|leading_slash_key|special_chars|create_bucket_region|delete_objects_versioning|head_object_consistency|head_object_range|copy_object_metadata|copy_source_invalid_date|content_encoding|anonymous_access|bucket_policy_check|presigned_negative|negative_sigv4|admin_auth|notification_webhook|tls_hot_reload|console_smoke|admin_iam_crud)_test::/)
test(/^(delete_marker_migration_semantics|version_id_regression|list_objects_v2_pagination|list_object_versions_regression|list_objects_duplicates|list_buckets_double_slash|leading_slash_key|special_chars|create_bucket_region|delete_objects_versioning|head_object_consistency|head_object_range|copy_object_metadata|copy_source_invalid_date|content_encoding|anonymous_access|bucket_policy_check|presigned_negative|negative_sigv4|admin_auth|notification_webhook|tls_hot_reload|console_smoke|admin_iam_crud|admin_pools)_test::|^fake_s3_target::/)
| test(/^replication_extension_test::(test_replication_check_succeeds_with_remote_target|test_replication_check_rejects_target_without_object_lock|test_set_remote_target_rejects_unversioned_source_bucket|test_replication_check_rejects_unversioned_source_bucket|test_replication_check_rejects_missing_replication_config|test_replication_check_rejects_invalid_bucket|test_set_remote_target_rejects_same_bucket_on_same_deployment|test_set_remote_target_rejects_unversioned_target_bucket|test_set_remote_target_update_requires_arn|test_set_remote_target_update_rejects_missing_target|test_set_remote_target_rejects_invalid_target_url|test_set_remote_target_rejects_self_signed_https_target_without_skip_tls_verify|test_set_remote_target_rejects_private_ca_https_target_without_ca_cert_pem|test_list_remote_targets_rejects_empty_bucket|test_list_remote_targets_rejects_invalid_bucket|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_missing_target|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_missing_arn|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_invalid_bucket|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_target_used_by_replication|test_delete_bucket_replication_removes_remote_target)$/)
| test(/^reliant::lifecycle::/)
| test(/^reliant::tiering::/)
@@ -259,8 +263,8 @@ path = "junit.xml"
# The filter is "the whole e2e_test crate MINUS the sets owned by other lanes":
# * protocols:: — FTPS/SFTP/WebDAV, still pinned to --test-threads=1 by fixed
# ports; they join a scheduled lane once ci-6 randomises the ports (ci-7).
# * the 6 cluster suites that spin up a RustFSTestClusterEnvironment
# (cluster_concurrency, stale_multipart_cleanup_cluster,
# * the 7 cluster suites that spin up a RustFSTestClusterEnvironment
# (cluster_concurrency, cluster_multidrive_pool, stale_multipart_cleanup_cluster,
# namespace_lock_quorum, heal_erasure_disk_rebuild, admin_timeout_regression,
# object_lambda) — too heavy for the merge budget; they run in ci-7's
# nightly 4-node lane.
@@ -282,14 +286,8 @@ path = "junit.xml"
# ci-profile quarantine (docs/testing/README.md): every entry MUST cite one
# OPEN issue, and the fixing PR MUST delete the exclusion. The passing
# negative-path siblings of each family stay in as regression guards.
# * rustfs#4842 — extract/snowball expand pipeline 500s (mtime=0
# OffsetDateTime deserialization + same-path failures).
# * rustfs#4843 — over-limit archive entry paths hard-reject the whole
# archive even under ignore-errors semantics.
# * rustfs#4844 — anonymous POST-object with SSE-S3 / bucket-default SSE
# returns 500.
# * rustfs#4845 — 403 on allowed anonymous POST object-lock fields and on
# the list metadata=true extension.
# * rustfs#4846 — distributed-lock quorum tests misclassify as timeout
# under parallel load (multi-node in-process clusters; natural home is
# ci-7's nightly cluster lane).
@@ -297,15 +295,10 @@ path = "junit.xml"
default-filter = """
package(e2e_test)
& !test(/^protocols::/)
& !test(/^(admin_timeout_regression_test|cluster_concurrency_test|heal_erasure_disk_rebuild_test|namespace_lock_quorum_test|object_lambda_test|stale_multipart_cleanup_cluster_test)::/)
& !test(/^(admin_timeout_regression_test|cluster_concurrency_test|cluster_multidrive_pool_test|heal_erasure_disk_rebuild_test|namespace_lock_quorum_test|object_lambda_test|stale_multipart_cleanup_cluster_test)::/)
& !test(/^replication_extension_test::/)
& !test(/^multipart_auth_test::test_signed_put_object_extract_(accepts_compat_header|expands_tar_entries_with_prefix_headers|expands_tar_gz_archive|expands_tbz2_archive|expands_tgz_archive|expands_txz_archive|expands_tzst_archive|normalizes_prefix_header_value|preserves_directory_markers_by_default|preserves_object_lock_legal_hold|preserves_object_lock_retention|preserves_pax_metadata_and_version_id|preserves_request_metadata_on_extracted_objects|preserves_sse_c|preserves_sse_s3_and_redirect|preserves_storage_class|uses_bucket_default_sse_s3)$/)
& !test(/^snowball_auto_extract_test::tests::snowball_auto_extract_(prefers_exact_minio_prefix_over_suffix_fallback|supports_minio_prefix_and_directory_markers)$/)
& !test(/^multipart_auth_test::test_signed_put_object_extract_skips_invalid_entry_when_ignore_errors_enabled$/)
& !test(/^snowball_auto_extract_test::tests::snowball_auto_extract_(ignores_invalid_entries_when_requested|supports_standard_headers_with_combined_extract_options)$/)
& !test(/^multipart_auth_test::test_anonymous_post_object_(accepts_sse_s3|rejects_sse_s3_missing_from_policy_conditions|uses_bucket_default_sse_kms|uses_bucket_default_sse_s3)$/)
& !test(/^multipart_auth_test::test_anonymous_post_object_(accepts_object_lock_legal_hold_field|accepts_object_lock_retention_fields)$/)
& !test(/^list_object(s_v2|_versions)_metadata_extension_test::/)
& !test(/^reliant::lock::test_distributed_lock_(2_nodes_grpc_read_survives_failed_node|4_nodes_grpc_read_write_quorum_split_with_two_failed_nodes)$/)
"""
fail-fast = false
@@ -1744,7 +1744,7 @@
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"expr": "sum by (bucket) (rustfs_bucket_api_objects_total{job=~\"$job\", bucket=~\"$bucket\"})",
"expr": "max by (job, bucket) (rustfs_cluster_usage_buckets_objects_count{job=~\"$job\", bucket=~\"$bucket\"})",
"legendFormat": "{{bucket}}",
"range": true,
"refId": "A"
@@ -1844,7 +1844,7 @@
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"expr": "sum by (bucket) (rustfs_bucket_api_usage_bytes{job=~\"$job\", bucket=~\"$bucket\"})",
"expr": "max by (job, bucket) (rustfs_cluster_usage_buckets_total_bytes{job=~\"$job\", bucket=~\"$bucket\"})",
"legendFormat": "{{bucket}}",
"range": true,
"refId": "A"
@@ -11583,7 +11583,7 @@
"text": "All",
"value": "$__all"
},
"definition": "label_values(rustfs_bucket_api_objects_total,bucket)",
"definition": "label_values(rustfs_cluster_usage_buckets_objects_count,bucket)",
"includeAll": true,
"label": "Bucket",
"multi": true,
@@ -11591,7 +11591,7 @@
"options": [],
"query": {
"qryType": 1,
"query": "label_values(rustfs_bucket_api_objects_total,bucket)",
"query": "label_values(rustfs_cluster_usage_buckets_objects_count,bucket)",
"refId": "PrometheusVariableQueryEditor-VariableQuery"
},
"refresh": 2,
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ set -eu
ACCESS_KEY="${RUSTFS_SITE_REPL_ACCESS_KEY:-rustfsadmin}"
SECRET_KEY="${RUSTFS_SITE_REPL_SECRET_KEY:-rustfsadmin}"
BUCKET="${RUSTFS_SITE_REPL_FLOW_BUCKET:-site-repl-flow-check}"
DELETE_BUCKET="${RUSTFS_SITE_REPL_DELETE_BUCKET:-site-repl-delete-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)-$$}"
PREFIX="${RUSTFS_SITE_REPL_FLOW_PREFIX:-flow-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)}"
WAIT_ATTEMPTS="${RUSTFS_SITE_REPL_WAIT_ATTEMPTS:-90}"
WAIT_SLEEP_SECONDS="${RUSTFS_SITE_REPL_WAIT_SLEEP_SECONDS:-2}"
@@ -85,17 +86,39 @@ wait_for_object() {
wait_for_bucket() {
site="$1"
bucket="${2:-$BUCKET}"
attempt=1
while [ "$attempt" -le "$WAIT_ATTEMPTS" ]; do
if mc stat "$site/$BUCKET" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if mc stat "$site/$bucket" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
return 0
fi
sleep "$WAIT_SLEEP_SECONDS"
attempt=$((attempt + 1))
done
echo "bucket was not replicated in time: $site/$BUCKET" >&2
echo "bucket was not replicated in time: $site/$bucket" >&2
return 1
}
wait_for_bucket_delete() {
site="$1"
bucket="$2"
attempt=1
while [ "$attempt" -le "$WAIT_ATTEMPTS" ]; do
if result="$(mc stat --json "$site/$bucket" 2>&1)"; then
:
else
case "$result" in
*NoSuchBucket*) return 0 ;;
esac
fi
sleep "$WAIT_SLEEP_SECONDS"
attempt=$((attempt + 1))
done
echo "bucket deletion was not replicated in time: $site/$bucket" >&2
return 1
}
@@ -186,6 +209,20 @@ EOF
echo "verified replicated downloads for $object_name"
done
echo "creating empty bucket for replicated delete check: $DELETE_BUCKET"
mc mb "site1/$DELETE_BUCKET" >/dev/null
for site in site1 site2 site3; do
wait_for_bucket "$site" "$DELETE_BUCKET"
done
echo "deleting empty bucket on site1: $DELETE_BUCKET"
mc rb "site1/$DELETE_BUCKET" >/dev/null
for site in site1 site2 site3; do
wait_for_bucket_delete "$site" "$DELETE_BUCKET"
done
echo "site replication object flow check passed"
echo "bucket: $BUCKET"
echo "prefix: $PREFIX"
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+2 -2
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@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@
enabled: true
document:
version: v1
url: https://github.com/rustfs/cla/blob/main/cla/v1.md
version: v2
url: https://github.com/rustfs/cla/blob/main/cla/v2.md
signing:
mode: comment
+1 -1
View File
@@ -33,4 +33,4 @@ documentation impact. Use N/A when there is no expected impact.
---
Thank you for your contribution! Please ensure your PR follows the community standards ([CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md)). If this is your first contribution, review the [CLA document](https://github.com/rustfs/cla/blob/main/cla/v1.md) and sign it by commenting `I have read and agree to the CLA.` on the PR.
Thank you for your contribution! Please ensure your PR follows the community standards ([CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md)). If this is your first contribution, review the [CLA document](https://github.com/rustfs/cla/blob/main/cla/v2.md) and sign it by commenting `I have read and agree to the CLA.` on the PR.
+71 -5
View File
@@ -289,6 +289,7 @@ jobs:
local console_url
local console_sha256
local curl_auth_args=()
console_tag=""
if [[ "${{ matrix.platform }}" == "windows" ]]; then
curl_bin="curl.exe"
@@ -311,7 +312,7 @@ jobs:
"$curl_bin" "${curl_auth_args[@]}" --fail -L "$console_api" \
-o "$console_json" --retry 3 --retry-delay 5 --max-time 300 || return 1
read -r console_url console_sha256 < <("$python_bin" - "$console_json" <<'PY'
read -r console_tag console_url console_sha256 < <("$python_bin" - "$console_json" <<'PY'
import json
import re
import sys
@@ -319,6 +320,8 @@ jobs:
with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as handle:
release = json.load(handle)
tag = release.get("tag_name", "") or "unknown"
for asset in release.get("assets", []):
name = asset.get("name", "")
digest = asset.get("digest", "")
@@ -327,7 +330,7 @@ jobs:
sha256 = digest.split(":", 1)[1]
if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{64}", sha256):
raise SystemExit(f"console zip asset has invalid sha256 digest: {sha256}")
sys.stdout.buffer.write(f"{url} {sha256}\n".encode("utf-8"))
sys.stdout.buffer.write(f"{tag} {url} {sha256}\n".encode("utf-8"))
break
else:
raise SystemExit("no console zip asset with sha256 digest found")
@@ -339,6 +342,8 @@ jobs:
return 1
fi
echo "Console release: ${console_tag}"
echo "Downloading console asset: ${console_url}"
"$curl_bin" --fail -L "$console_url" -o console.zip --retry 3 --retry-delay 5 --max-time 300 || return 1
verify_sha256 "$console_sha256" console.zip || return 2
unzip -o console.zip -d ./rustfs/static || return 2
@@ -351,12 +356,19 @@ jobs:
rm -f console.zip console-release.json
if [[ "$status" -eq 2 ]]; then
echo "Console asset integrity verification failed" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "Warning: Failed to download verified console assets, continuing without them"
echo "// Static assets not available" > ./rustfs/static/empty.txt
echo "Failed to download verified console assets" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ ! -s ./rustfs/static/index.html ]]; then
echo "Console asset archive is missing static/index.html" >&2
exit 1
fi
asset_count=$(find ./rustfs/static -type f | wc -l | tr -d '[:space:]')
echo "Console assets ready: version=${console_tag:-unknown}, ${asset_count} files extracted to ./rustfs/static"
- name: Build RustFS
shell: bash
run: |
@@ -558,6 +570,60 @@ jobs:
echo "🔧 Build type: ${BUILD_TYPE}"
echo "📊 Version: ${VERSION}"
- name: Verify packaged console
if: matrix.target == 'x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu'
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
find_free_port() {
python3 - <<'PY'
import socket
with socket.socket() as sock:
sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
print(sock.getsockname()[1])
PY
}
package_dir="$(mktemp -d)"
data_dir="$(mktemp -d)"
log_file="${RUNNER_TEMP}/rustfs-console-smoke.log"
server_pid=""
trap '
if [[ -n "${server_pid:-}" ]]; then
kill "$server_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "$server_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
rm -rf "$package_dir" "$data_dir"
' EXIT
unzip -q "${{ steps.package.outputs.package_file }}" -d "$package_dir"
api_port="$(find_free_port)"
console_port="$(find_free_port)"
console_url="http://127.0.0.1:${console_port}/rustfs/console/"
"$package_dir/rustfs" server \
--address "127.0.0.1:${api_port}" \
--console-enable \
--console-address "127.0.0.1:${console_port}" \
--access-key console-smoke \
--secret-key console-smoke-secret \
"$data_dir" >"$log_file" 2>&1 &
server_pid=$!
for _ in {1..40}; do
response="$(curl --silent --output /dev/null --write-out '%{http_code} %{content_type}' "$console_url" || true)"
if [[ "$response" == 200\ text/html* ]]; then
exit 0
fi
sleep 0.25
done
echo "Console endpoint did not return 200 text/html: $response" >&2
cat "$log_file"
exit 1
- name: Upload to GitHub artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
with:
+18 -17
View File
@@ -167,6 +167,13 @@ jobs:
cargo nextest run --profile ci --all --exclude e2e_test
cargo test --all --doc
# rustfs/backlog#1289: fail if a seed rule's log anchor no longer exists
# verbatim in the source tree (log message drifted without updating the
# rule). Placed here where the workspace — including the la-dump-anchors
# bin — is already built by the clippy/test steps above.
- name: Check log-analyzer rule anchors
run: ./scripts/check_log_analyzer_rules.sh
- name: Upload test junit report
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
@@ -221,29 +228,23 @@ jobs:
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
# The #4877 restore self-deadlock is fixed in this PR, which re-enabled
# test_multipart_restore_preserves_parts_and_etag. The remaining exclusions
# each hit a DIFFERENT, independent issue (all tracked under
# rustfs/backlog#1148; they keep #[ignore] with a backlog reference):
# test_transition_and_restore_flows was re-enabled by rustfs/backlog#1303:
# its "missing xl.meta on disk2" was a test-util bug (open_disk hardcoded
# disk_index 0), not an EC metadata-distribution issue.
# restore_object_usecase_reports_ongoing_conflict_and_completion was
# re-enabled by backlog#1304 (restore accepts serialize on a short CAS
# guard; the copy-back no longer holds the #4877 whole-copy-back lock,
# so the mid-restore ongoing read and fast 409 rejection it asserts are
# the implemented contract). The remaining exclusions each hit a
# DIFFERENT, independent issue (all tracked under rustfs/backlog#1148;
# they keep #[ignore] with a backlog reference):
# - test_noncurrent_{expiry,transition}_still_works_after_immediate_compensation_transition:
# noncurrent transition/expiry after an immediate compensation transition.
# - test_transition_and_restore_flows: transition metadata is missing on
# one drive (assert_transition_meta_consistent: "missing xl.meta ... on
# disk2") - an EC metadata-distribution issue, not the restore lock.
# - test_restore_chain_local_read_expiry_keeps_remote_and_allows_re_restore:
# DeleteRestoredAction sets opts.transition.expire_restored, but no
# delete path reads that flag, so cleanup deletes the whole object
# instead of only the local restored copy (ObjectNotFound afterwards).
# The expire_restored delete semantics are unimplemented.
# - restore_object_usecase_reports_ongoing_conflict_and_completion: asserts
# a concurrent get_object_info observes ongoing-request=true mid-restore,
# which #4877's read-vs-restore serialization rules out (see backlog#1148
# ilm-8 criterion 1 - an API-semantics decision, not a bug).
- name: Run ignored ILM integration tests serially
run: |
cargo nextest run -j1 --run-ignored ignored-only \
-p rustfs-scanner -p rustfs \
-E '(binary(lifecycle_integration_test) or (package(rustfs) and test(lifecycle_transition_api_test))) and not (test(test_transition_and_restore_flows) or test(test_noncurrent_expiry_still_works_after_immediate_compensation_transition) or test(test_noncurrent_transition_still_works_after_immediate_compensation_transition) or test(restore_object_usecase_reports_ongoing_conflict_and_completion) or test(test_restore_chain_local_read_expiry_keeps_remote_and_allows_re_restore))'
-E '(binary(lifecycle_integration_test) or (package(rustfs) and test(lifecycle_transition_api_test))) and not (test(test_noncurrent_expiry_still_works_after_immediate_compensation_transition) or test(test_noncurrent_transition_still_works_after_immediate_compensation_transition))'
test-and-lint-rio-v2:
name: Test and Lint (rio-v2)
+26
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
name: Star History
on:
schedule:
- cron: "17 3 * * *"
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: write
concurrency:
group: star-history
cancel-in-progress: false
jobs:
update:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: overtrue/repo-visuals-action@72f34d24769ff5d341956da2f23952594ef2f1e2 # v1.3.0
with:
github-token: ${{ github.token }}
output-branch: star-history
output-path: .
chart-style: gradient
animate: "true"
contributors: "true"
+28 -15
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ If repo-level instructions conflict, follow the nearest file and keep behavior a
## Execution Discipline
- Read the relevant existing code, tests, and local guidance before changing behavior.
- Read the relevant existing code, tests, and local guidance before changing behavior. For new helpers or test setup, that read includes `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, and the touched crate's own `test_util`/fixtures (see Reuse Before You Write).
- State assumptions when they affect the implementation or verification path.
- If a task has multiple plausible interpretations, list the options briefly and choose the narrowest reasonable path; ask when the ambiguity would make the change risky.
- For multi-step work, keep the plan minimal and tied to verifiable outcomes.
@@ -41,14 +41,27 @@ If repo-level instructions conflict, follow the nearest file and keep behavior a
- Do not refactor existing code only to make it easier to unit test.
- Keep fixes narrowly aligned with the requested behavior; avoid semantic-adjacent rewrites while touching sensitive paths.
- Keep code elegant, concise, and direct. Prefer minimal, readable implementations over over-engineering and excessive abstraction. Use comments to clarify non-obvious intent and invariants, not to compensate for unclear code.
- Do not write comments that narrate what the next line does, restate a signature, or describe the change you just made — that commentary belongs in the PR description, not the code. Required invariant comments — lock ordering, `SAFETY`, unwrap justification, `#[allow(dead_code)]` rationale, `RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO` — are never narration.
- Mention unrelated issues when useful, but do not fix them as part of a narrow task.
## Constant and String Usage
## Reuse Before You Write
- Before introducing new string literals, search for existing constants/enums that already represent the same semantic value.
- Reuse existing constants for protocol labels, error identifiers, header keys, event names, metric names, command tags, and similar fixed tokens.
- If a new string is truly unique, define a local constant near related logic and avoid scattering the literal across multiple sites.
- When changing existing behavior, keep naming and format consistency by aligning with established project constants.
Search for an existing implementation before writing a new one; extend what exists instead of duplicating it:
- **Helpers and utilities** (path/string handling, hashing, retry, env parsing, IO wrappers): check `ls crates/utils/src` first — file names map to operations (`retry.rs`, `envs.rs`, `hash.rs`, `path.rs`, `string.rs`, `io.rs`) — plus `crates/common` (shared structures/globals), then `rg -i 'fn \w*<term>' crates/utils/src crates/common/src <touched-crate>/src` for signatures. Helpers are snake_case: a full-text single-word grep over a large crate drowns you and a multi-word phrase returns nothing. Reimplementing an existing workspace helper — or hand-rolling what `std`, `tokio`, or an existing workspace dependency already provides — is a review finding, not a style preference.
- **Reuse requires matching semantics, not a matching name**: before adopting a helper, check its normalization (`clean` resolves `.`/`..` — never apply it to raw S3 object keys), error type, backoff/deadline behavior, and durability gating against the call site. When semantics differ, a new narrowly-named helper with a comment naming the rejected lookalike is the correct outcome. The inverse also holds: workspace wrappers exist because raw `std`/`tokio` semantics were insufficient (durability gates, retries) — prefer the wrapper over the raw call.
- **Constants and fixed tokens** (protocol labels, error identifiers, header keys, event names, metric names, command tags): search for existing constants/enums that already represent the same semantic value and reuse them. If a value is truly new, define one local constant near related logic; never scatter the literal across sites. When changing existing behavior, align naming and format with the established constants.
- **Test scaffolding**: reuse existing test utilities and fixtures (the touched crate's own `test_util` module and `tests/fixtures`, or `crates/test-utils`) instead of writing new setup code — run `rg -l '<fn-under-test>' <crate>/src <crate>/tests` before writing a test. A new test must pin a failure mode no existing test covers. Near-duplicate means same code path AND same poison-value class: this repo's boundary companions (n==max vs max+1, absent vs empty vs nil UUID bytes, MetaObject vs MetaDeleteMarker) are distinct by definition and must all be written.
## Necessary Code Only
Net-new code — files, types, branches, comments — is cost to justify, not progress:
- Validate at the trust boundary — untrusted client input, bytes read from disk, RPC payloads, config (see Serde Safety and Cross-Cutting Domain Invariants) — then trust the type: do not re-check what the type system or a validated upstream layer already guarantees, and cite the establishing check (`file:line`) when the guarantee is not obvious.
- The exception is load-bearing: a value that crossed a persistence, RPC, or version boundary is never guaranteed by the code on the other side — a peer may be older or buggy, disk bytes may be corrupt — so the Cross-Cutting Domain Invariant patterns apply at every consumer, and re-checks immediately before a destructive action (delete, overwrite, quorum decision) stay. Deleting an existing guard is a behavior change requiring adversarial review, not cleanup.
- Every new branch needs a nameable trigger: a concrete input, state, or failure that reaches it — for boundary-crossing values, corrupt or stale persisted/peer data is always nameable. If you cannot name one, do not write the branch. If the case is truly unreachable, encode the invariant in the type; where that is impossible, return a typed internal error (fail closed). `debug_assert!` is acceptable only for pure internal arithmetic on values that never crossed a disk/RPC/config boundary — never as the sole guard on decoded or peer-supplied data.
- Never substitute a default where the value is required (e.g. `unwrap_or_default()` on metadata that must exist) — that converts corruption into a wrong answer. Return the typed error instead: explicit failure over implicit success.
- Attach error context once, at the layer where it is actionable: re-wrapping equivalent context at every hop is noise, and expanding a fallible chain into nested `match` blocks where `?` or a combinator suffices is a finding. Never add context by converting a typed error into a generic variant below an error-aggregation or quorum layer (`reduce_errs` classifies by variant equality) — context there belongs in a `tracing` event, not the error value.
## Sources of Truth
@@ -141,7 +154,7 @@ Pick the tier from the riskiest file touched; when in doubt, pick the higher.
- **Exempt:** docs/comments/instruction-only changes, formatting, typos with
no runtime surface. Skip this section.
- **Mechanical:** pure renames, file moves, test-only or tooling changes —
correctness adversary only.
correctness and simplicity adversaries only.
- **Standard (the default):** any change that affects behavior.
- **High risk:** touches locking, erasure coding, quorum/heal, replication,
multipart, RPC, lifecycle/tiering, metadata formats (`xl.meta`),
@@ -161,9 +174,8 @@ encode this repo's shipped bugs.
- **Correctness adversary** — construct a concrete input/state/interleaving
that yields wrong output, data loss, or a crash. Probe error paths and edge
values (empty, nil UUID, zero-length, quorum1, missing version). For code
diffs, a materially smaller or more idiomatic diff achieving the same
behavior is also a finding (see Change Style for Existing Logic).
values (empty, nil UUID, zero-length, quorum1, missing version).
- **Simplicity adversary** — same behavior, less code. Hunt the materially smaller or more idiomatic diff (see Change Style for Existing Logic, Reuse Before You Write, and Necessary Code Only): reimplemented workspace helpers, one-caller extractions, rewrites where an in-place edit suffices, defensive branches with no nameable trigger, redundant error wrapping, near-duplicate tests, narration comments. A smaller diff achieving identical behavior is a finding, reported with the concrete replacement; forced reuse of a helper with mismatched semantics is equally a finding.
- **Security reviewer** — authn/authz bypass, injection, secret leakage,
untrusted deserialization (see Serde Safety), path traversal, timing leaks.
- **Concurrency/durability reviewer** — lock ordering, races, cancellation,
@@ -179,11 +191,12 @@ encode this repo's shipped bugs.
wrong while all tests stay green — if one exists, coverage is insufficient.
A missing test is a finding, not a note.
Standard tier: correctness adversary + test-coverage skeptic, plus every
role whose domain the diff touches (async or shared-state code →
concurrency; parsing of untrusted input → security; public crate API shape
→ compatibility; per-request or per-object hot paths → performance).
High risk: all six roles.
Standard tier: correctness adversary + simplicity adversary + test-coverage
skeptic, plus every role whose domain the diff touches (async or
shared-state code → concurrency; parsing of untrusted input → security;
public crate API shape → compatibility; per-request or per-object hot paths
→ performance).
High risk: all seven roles.
### Protocol
+18 -117
View File
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ The repository is a Cargo workspace with a flat `crates/` layout:
```
rustfs/ # Workspace root (virtual manifest)
├── rustfs/ # Main binary + library crate (75K lines)
├── rustfs/ # Main binary + library crate
│ └── src/
│ ├── main.rs # Entry point, startup sequence
│ ├── lib.rs # Module tree root
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ rustfs/ # Workspace root (virtual manifest)
│ ├── config/ # CLI args, config parsing, workload profiles
│ └── ...
├── crates/ # library crates (authoritative list: Cargo.toml [workspace].members)
│ ├── ecstore/ # Erasure-coded storage engine (⚠️ 87K lines)
│ ├── ecstore/ # Erasure-coded storage engine
│ ├── rio/ # Reader I/O pipeline (encrypt, compress, hash)
│ ├── io-core/ # Zero-copy I/O, scheduling, buffer pool
│ ├── io-metrics/ # I/O metrics collection
@@ -83,124 +83,25 @@ A request flows **downward** through the layers. No layer should reach upward
### Crate Reference
> Depth levels, line counts, and crate counts in this section are a
> point-in-time snapshot and drift with refactors. Treat them as orders of
> magnitude; `Cargo.toml` and `cargo tree` are the source of truth.
Crates are organized in a dependency DAG with 9 depth levels (0 = leaf, 8 = top):
```
Depth 0 — LEAF (no internal deps):
appauth, checksums, config, credentials, crypto, io-metrics,
madmin, s3-common, workers, zip
Depth 1:
io-core (→ io-metrics)
policy (→ config, credentials, crypto)
utils (historical → config edge removed; now effectively leaf)
Depth 2:
concurrency, filemeta, keystone, kms, lock, obs,
signer, targets, trusted-proxies
Depth 3:
common (historical → filemeta/madmin edges removed; now effectively leaf)
Depth 4:
object-capacity, protos, rio
Depth 5 — CORE:
ecstore (16 internal deps, 11 dependents — the architectural heart)
Depth 6:
audit, heal, iam, metrics, notify, s3select-api, scanner
Depth 7:
object-io, protocols, s3select-query
Depth 8 — TOP:
rustfs (35 internal deps — the binary, depends on almost everything)
```
`Cargo.toml` is the authoritative workspace membership and `cargo tree` is the
authoritative dependency graph. This overview deliberately avoids line-count
and dependency-depth snapshots because both quickly become stale during
refactors.
#### By Domain
**Core Infrastructure:**
| Domain | Current workspace crates | Responsibility |
|--------|--------------------------|----------------|
| Foundation | `checksums`, `common`, `config`, `data-usage`, `utils` | Shared configuration, data-usage models, utilities, and checksums. |
| I/O and storage | `concurrency`, `ecstore`, `filemeta`, `heal`, `io-core`, `io-metrics`, `lifecycle`, `lock`, `object-capacity`, `object-data-cache`, `replication`, `rio`, `rio-v2`, `scanner`, `storage-api` | Erasure-coded object storage, metadata, recovery, lifecycle, replication, locking, cache, and I/O pipelines. |
| Security and identity | `credentials`, `crypto`, `iam`, `keystone`, `kms`, `policy`, `security-governance`, `signer`, `tls-runtime`, `trusted-proxies` | Credentials, authentication, authorization, encryption, key management, TLS, and security contracts. |
| Protocols and contracts | `extension-schema`, `madmin`, `protos`, `protocols`, `s3-ops`, `s3-types`, `s3select-api`, `s3select-query` | Admin, inter-node, S3, S3 Select, and optional protocol contracts. |
| Operations and integration | `audit`, `notify`, `obs`, `targets`, `zip` | Auditing, observability, event delivery, notification targets, and archive support. |
| Test support | `e2e_test`, `test-utils` | End-to-end validation and shared test bootstrap utilities. |
| Crate | Lines | Purpose |
|-------|-------|---------|
| `config` | 3.3K | Configuration types and environment parsing |
| `utils` | 8.7K | Pure utilities (paths, compression, network, retry) |
| `common` | 4.4K | Shared runtime state, globals, data usage types, metrics |
| `madmin` | 5.5K | Admin API request/response types |
**I/O Pipeline:**
| Crate | Lines | Purpose |
|-------|-------|---------|
| `io-core` | 6.5K | Zero-copy I/O, buffer pool, direct I/O, scheduling, backpressure |
| `io-metrics` | 4.5K | I/O operation metrics and counters |
| `rio` | 6.9K | Composable reader chain (encrypt → compress → hash → limit) |
| `object-io` | 2.4K | High-level object read/write using rio + ecstore |
| `concurrency` | 0.8K | Shared concurrency contract types: workload admission snapshots, worker-slot pool, policy types (runtime control lives in `rustfs/src/storage`) |
**Storage Engine:**
| Crate | Lines | Purpose |
|-------|-------|---------|
| `ecstore` | 87K | ⚠️ Erasure-coded storage: disks, pools, buckets, replication, lifecycle |
| `filemeta` | 10K | File/object metadata types and versioning |
| `checksums` | 732 | Checksum computation |
| `lock` | 7.1K | Distributed lock manager |
| `heal` | 5.9K | Data healing / bitrot repair |
| `scanner` | 5.4K | Background data usage scanner |
| `object-capacity` | 2.5K | Capacity tracking and management |
**Security & Auth:**
| Crate | Lines | Purpose |
|-------|-------|---------|
| `crypto` | 1.6K | Encryption primitives |
| `credentials` | 713 | Credential types (access key / secret key) |
| `signer` | 1.4K | S3 v4 request signing |
| `iam` | 9.0K | Identity and access management |
| `policy` | 8.8K | Policy engine (S3 bucket/IAM policies) |
| `kms` | 8.1K | Key management service integration |
| `keystone` | 1.9K | OpenStack Keystone auth |
| `appauth` | 143 | Application-level auth tokens |
**Protocol & API:**
| Crate | Lines | Purpose |
|-------|-------|---------|
| `protos` | 5.7K | Protobuf/gRPC definitions for inter-node RPC |
| `protocols` | 18K | FTP/FTPS, WebDAV, Swift API support |
| `s3-common` | 738 | Shared S3 types |
| `s3select-api` | 1.9K | S3 Select interface |
| `s3select-query` | 3.6K | S3 Select query engine |
**Observability:**
| Crate | Lines | Purpose |
|-------|-------|---------|
| `metrics` | 8.4K | Prometheus metric collectors |
| `io-metrics` | 4.5K | I/O-specific metrics |
| `obs` | 5.6K | OpenTelemetry tracing and telemetry |
| `audit` | 2.4K | Audit logging |
**Events:**
| Crate | Lines | Purpose |
|-------|-------|---------|
| `notify` | 5.5K | Event notification system |
| `targets` | 3.2K | Notification targets (Kafka, AMQP, webhook, etc.) |
**Other:**
| Crate | Lines | Purpose |
|-------|-------|---------|
| `trusted-proxies` | 4.0K | Trusted proxy / IP forwarding |
| `zip` | 986 | ZIP archive support for bulk downloads |
| `workers` | 136 | Simple worker abstraction |
The `rustfs` binary crate composes these libraries into the running server.
`ecstore` remains the storage engine at the architectural center; its internal
module split is tracked under `docs/architecture/`.
## Architecture Invariants
@@ -212,7 +113,7 @@ Depth 8 — TOP:
No upward imports.
2. **Leaf crates have zero internal dependencies.** `config`, `credentials`, `crypto`,
`io-metrics`, `madmin`, `s3-common` should depend only on external crates.
`io-metrics`, and `madmin` should depend only on external crates.
- ✅ RESOLVED: the historical `utils → config` and `common → filemeta`/`madmin`
edges were removed; do not reintroduce them (see Known Structural Issues).
+2
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
### Fixed
- **Helm Ingress**: `customAnnotations` are now merged with class-specific annotations (nginx/traefik) instead of being ignored when `ingress.className` is set.
- **Per-pool erasure parity**: Erasure parity (STANDARD and reduced-redundancy) is now resolved independently for every pool instead of reusing the first pool's value. A heterogeneous topology — for example a 4-drive pool plus a 2-drive pool created during expansion — previously inherited the first pool's parity and could resolve to zero data shards in the smaller pool, panicking Reed-Solomon construction on write. Automatic parity now resolves per pool (for example `2+2` in the 4-drive pool and `1+1` in the 2-drive pool). Fixes #4801.
### Added
- **NATS JetStream Publish Path**: Opt-in at-least-once delivery for the NATS notify and audit targets. A NATS Core publish flushes to the connection without awaiting a broker acknowledgement, so an event can be lost across a broker restart or a reconnect after the send queue has already cleared it. A queued event now clears only after the JetStream `PublishAck`, so bucket notifications survive those interruptions. Off by default and byte-identical to the NATS Core path when disabled.
@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
### Changed
- **HTTP Server Stack**: Integrated `KeystoneAuthLayer` middleware from `rustfs-keystone` crate into service stack (positioned after ReadinessGateLayer)
- **Storage-class validation on startup (upgrade note)**: A persisted explicit storage class (`RUSTFS_STORAGE_CLASS_STANDARD` / `RUSTFS_STORAGE_CLASS_RRS`, for example `EC:2`) is now validated against the actual per-pool drive counts at startup and rejected when a pool cannot satisfy it. This is fail-closed and correct, but a cluster that persisted a storage class larger than a small or heterogeneous pool can hold (for example `EC:2` alongside a 2-drive pool), which earlier releases accepted and silently resolved to an invalid layout, will now refuse to start after upgrade. To recover, unset `RUSTFS_STORAGE_CLASS_STANDARD` so the server derives a valid per-pool default automatically, or set it to a value every pool can satisfy.
- **IAMAuth**: Enhanced `get_secret_key()` to return empty secret for Keystone credentials (bypasses signature validation)
- **Auth Module**: Modified `check_key_valid()` to retrieve Keystone credentials from task-local storage and determine admin status
- **`StorageBackend` trait**: extended with multipart upload methods (`create_multipart_upload`, `upload_part`, `complete_multipart_upload`, `abort_multipart_upload`) plus `upload_part_copy`. Streaming-upload code path is now available to FTPS, WebDAV, and Swift drivers as well.
Generated
+432 -358
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+81 -97
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@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ members = [
"crates/lifecycle", # Lifecycle rule evaluation contracts
"crates/kms", # Key Management Service
"crates/lock", # Distributed locking implementation
"crates/log-analyzer", # Offline log fault-analysis core (rustfs diagnose)
"crates/madmin", # Management dashboard and admin API interface
"crates/notify", # Notification system for events
"crates/obs", # Observability utilities
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ edition = "2024"
license = "Apache-2.0"
repository = "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs"
rust-version = "1.96.0"
version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1"
version = "1.0.0-beta.11"
homepage = "https://rustfs.com"
description = "RustFS is a high-performance distributed object storage software built using Rust, one of the most popular languages worldwide. "
keywords = ["RustFS", "Minio", "object-storage", "filesystem", "s3"]
@@ -85,51 +86,52 @@ redundant_clone = "warn"
[workspace.dependencies]
# RustFS Internal Crates
rustfs = { path = "./rustfs", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-heal = { path = "crates/heal", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-audit = { path = "crates/audit", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-checksums = { path = "crates/checksums", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-common = { path = "crates/common", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-data-usage = { path = "crates/data-usage", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-config = { path = "./crates/config", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-concurrency = { path = "./crates/concurrency", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-credentials = { path = "crates/credentials", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-crypto = { path = "crates/crypto", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-ecstore = { path = "crates/ecstore", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-filemeta = { path = "crates/filemeta", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-iam = { path = "crates/iam", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-keystone = { path = "crates/keystone", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-lifecycle = { path = "crates/lifecycle", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-kms = { path = "crates/kms", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-lock = { path = "crates/lock", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-madmin = { path = "crates/madmin", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-notify = { path = "crates/notify", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-io-metrics = { path = "crates/io-metrics", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-io-core = { path = "crates/io-core", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-object-capacity = { path = "crates/object-capacity", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-object-data-cache = { path = "crates/object-data-cache", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-obs = { path = "crates/obs", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-policy = { path = "crates/policy", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-protos = { path = "crates/protos", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-protocols = { path = "crates/protocols", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-replication = { path = "crates/replication", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-rio = { path = "crates/rio", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-rio-v2 = { path = "crates/rio-v2", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-s3-types = { path = "crates/s3-types", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-s3-ops = { path = "crates/s3-ops", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-s3select-api = { path = "crates/s3select-api", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-s3select-query = { path = "crates/s3select-query", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-scanner = { path = "crates/scanner", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-security-governance = { path = "crates/security-governance", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-extension-schema = { path = "crates/extension-schema", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-signer = { path = "crates/signer", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-storage-api = { path = "crates/storage-api", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-trusted-proxies = { path = "crates/trusted-proxies", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-targets = { path = "crates/targets", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-test-utils = { path = "crates/test-utils", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-tls-runtime = { path = "crates/tls-runtime", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-utils = { path = "crates/utils", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs-zip = { path = "./crates/zip", version = "1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1" }
rustfs = { path = "./rustfs", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-heal = { path = "crates/heal", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-audit = { path = "crates/audit", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-checksums = { path = "crates/checksums", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-common = { path = "crates/common", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-data-usage = { path = "crates/data-usage", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-config = { path = "./crates/config", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-concurrency = { path = "./crates/concurrency", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-credentials = { path = "crates/credentials", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-crypto = { path = "crates/crypto", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-ecstore = { path = "crates/ecstore", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-filemeta = { path = "crates/filemeta", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-iam = { path = "crates/iam", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-keystone = { path = "crates/keystone", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-lifecycle = { path = "crates/lifecycle", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-kms = { path = "crates/kms", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-lock = { path = "crates/lock", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-madmin = { path = "crates/madmin", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-notify = { path = "crates/notify", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-io-metrics = { path = "crates/io-metrics", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-io-core = { path = "crates/io-core", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-object-capacity = { path = "crates/object-capacity", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-object-data-cache = { path = "crates/object-data-cache", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-log-analyzer = { path = "crates/log-analyzer", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-obs = { path = "crates/obs", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-policy = { path = "crates/policy", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-protos = { path = "crates/protos", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-protocols = { path = "crates/protocols", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-replication = { path = "crates/replication", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-rio = { path = "crates/rio", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-rio-v2 = { path = "crates/rio-v2", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-s3-types = { path = "crates/s3-types", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-s3-ops = { path = "crates/s3-ops", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-s3select-api = { path = "crates/s3select-api", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-s3select-query = { path = "crates/s3select-query", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-scanner = { path = "crates/scanner", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-security-governance = { path = "crates/security-governance", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-extension-schema = { path = "crates/extension-schema", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-signer = { path = "crates/signer", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-storage-api = { path = "crates/storage-api", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-trusted-proxies = { path = "crates/trusted-proxies", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-targets = { path = "crates/targets", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-test-utils = { path = "crates/test-utils", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-tls-runtime = { path = "crates/tls-runtime", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-utils = { path = "crates/utils", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
rustfs-zip = { path = "./crates/zip", version = "1.0.0-beta.11" }
# Async Runtime and Networking
async-channel = "2.5.0"
@@ -137,31 +139,31 @@ async_zip = { default-features = false, version = "0.0.18" }
mysql_async = { default-features = false, version = "0.37" }
async-compression = { version = "0.4.42" }
async-recursion = "1.1.1"
async-trait = "0.1.89"
async-nats = "0.49.1"
async-trait = "0.1.91"
async-nats = { version = "0.50.0", default-features = false }
axum = "0.8.9"
futures = "0.3.32"
futures-core = "0.3.32"
futures = "0.3.33"
futures-core = "0.3.33"
futures-lite = "2.6.1"
futures-util = "0.3.32"
futures-util = "0.3.33"
pollster = "1.0.1"
pulsar = { default-features = false, version = "6.8.0" }
lapin = { default-features = false, version = "4.10.0" }
hyper = { version = "1.10.1" }
hyper = { version = "1.11.0" }
hyper-rustls = { default-features = false, version = "0.27.9" }
hyper-util = { version = "0.1.20" }
http = "1.4.2"
http-body = "1.1.0"
http-body-util = "0.1.4"
minlz = "1.2.3"
reqwest = { default-features = false, version = "0.13.4" }
reqwest = "0.13.4"
rustfs-kafka-async = { version = "1.2.0" }
socket2 = { version = "0.6.5" }
tokio = { version = "1.52.3" }
tokio = { version = "1.53.1" }
tokio-rustls = { default-features = false, version = "0.26.4" }
tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.18" }
tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.19" }
tokio-test = "0.4.5"
tokio-util = { version = "0.7.18" }
tokio-util = { version = "0.7.19" }
tonic = { version = "0.14.6" }
tonic-prost = { version = "0.14.6" }
tonic-prost-build = { version = "0.14.6" }
@@ -179,8 +181,8 @@ prost = "0.14.4"
quick-xml = "0.41.0"
rmp = { version = "0.8.15" }
rmp-serde = { version = "1.3.1" }
serde = { version = "1.0.228" }
serde_json = { version = "1.0.150" }
serde = { version = "1.0.229" }
serde_json = { version = "1.0.151" }
serde_urlencoded = "0.7.1"
# Cryptography and Security
@@ -209,8 +211,8 @@ zeroize = { version = "1.9.0" }
# Time and Date
chrono = { version = "0.4.45" }
humantime = "2.4.0"
jiff = { version = "0.2.32" }
time = { version = "0.3.53" }
jiff = { version = "0.2.34" }
time = { version = "0.3.54" }
# Database
deadpool-postgres = { version = "0.14" }
@@ -218,21 +220,21 @@ tokio-postgres = { default-features = false, version = "0.7.18" }
tokio-postgres-rustls = "0.14.0"
# Utilities and Tools
anyhow = "1.0.103"
anyhow = "1.0.104"
arc-swap = "1.9.2"
astral-tokio-tar = "0.6.3"
astral-tokio-tar = "0.6.4"
atoi = "3.1.0"
atomic_enum = "0.3.0"
aws-config = { version = "1.9.0" }
aws-config = { version = "1.10.0" }
aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.0" }
aws-sdk-s3 = { default-features = false, version = "1.138.0" }
aws-sdk-s3 = { default-features = false, version = "1.139.0" }
aws-smithy-http-client = { default-features = false, version = "1.2.0" }
aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.13.0" }
aws-smithy-types = { version = "1.6.1" }
base64 = "0.22.1"
base64-simd = "0.8.0"
brotli = "8.0.4"
clap = { version = "4.6.2" }
clap = { version = "4.6.4" }
const-str = { version = "1.1.0" }
convert_case = "0.11.0"
criterion = { version = "0.8" }
@@ -242,10 +244,10 @@ crossbeam-deque = "0.8.7"
crossbeam-utils = "0.8.22"
datafusion = { default-features = false, git = "https://github.com/apache/datafusion.git", rev = "dae03ee062b2abf986de8df12ea82fb1578a2d99" }
derive_builder = "0.20.2"
enumset = "1.1.13"
enumset = "1.1.14"
faster-hex = "0.10.0"
flate2 = "1.1.9"
glob = "0.3.3"
glob = "0.3.4"
google-cloud-storage = "1.16.0"
google-cloud-auth = "1.14.0"
hashbrown = { version = "0.17.1" }
@@ -254,7 +256,7 @@ hex-simd = "0.8.0"
highway = { version = "1.3.0" }
ipnetwork = { version = "0.21.1" }
lazy_static = "1.5.0"
libc = "0.2.186"
libc = "0.2.189"
libsystemd = "0.7.2"
local-ip-address = "0.6.13"
memmap2 = "0.9.11"
@@ -277,15 +279,14 @@ rand = { version = "0.10.2" }
ratelimit = "0.10.1"
rayon = "1.12.0"
reed-solomon-erasure = { package = "rustfs-erasure-codec", version = "8.0.0" }
#reed-solomon-erasure = { version = "6.0", features = ["simd-accel"], git = "https://github.com/houseme/reed-solomon-erasure",rev = "main" }
reed-solomon-simd = "3.1.0"
regex = { version = "1.13.1" }
rumqttc = { package = "rumqttc-next", version = "0.33.2" }
redis = { version = "1.4.0" }
rumqttc = { package = "rumqttc-next", version = "0.33.3" }
redis = { version = "1.4.1" }
rustix = { version = "1.1.4" }
rust-embed = { version = "8.12.0" }
rustc-hash = { version = "2.1.3" }
s3s = { git = "https://github.com/s3s-project/s3s.git", rev = "ce69c3f10824535c7c24b2f71cdb2aaa4dffb5e0" }
s3s = { git = "https://github.com/s3s-project/s3s.git", rev = "a5471625975f5014f7b28eee7e4d801f1b32f529" }
serial_test = "3.5.0"
shadow-rs = { default-features = false, version = "2.0.0" }
siphasher = "1.0.3"
@@ -298,7 +299,7 @@ sysinfo = "0.39.6"
temp-env = "0.3.6"
tempfile = "3.27.0"
test-case = "3.3.1"
thiserror = "2.0.18"
thiserror = "2.0.19"
tracing = { version = "0.1.44" }
tracing-appender = "0.2.5"
tracing-error = "0.2.1"
@@ -309,9 +310,10 @@ url = "2.5.8"
urlencoding = "2.1.3"
uuid = { version = "1.24.0" }
vaultrs = { version = "0.8.0" }
tar = "0.4.46"
walkdir = "2.5.0"
windows = { version = "0.62.2" }
xxhash-rust = { version = "0.8.17" }
xxhash-rust = { version = "0.8.18" }
zip = "8.6.0"
zstd = "0.13.3"
@@ -324,22 +326,22 @@ opentelemetry-otlp = { version = "0.32.0" }
opentelemetry_sdk = { version = "0.32.1" }
opentelemetry-semantic-conventions = { version = "0.32.1" }
opentelemetry-stdout = { version = "0.32.0" }
pyroscope = { version = "2.1.0" }
pyroscope = { version = "2.1.1" }
# FTP and SFTP
libunftp = { version = "0.23.0" }
unftp-core = "0.1.0"
suppaftp = { version = "10.0.1" }
rcgen = "0.14.8"
russh = { version = "0.62.2" }
rcgen = { version = "0.14.8", default-features = false, features = ["aws_lc_rs", "crypto", "pem"] }
russh = { version = "0.62.3" }
russh-sftp = "2.3.0"
# WebDAV
dav-server = "0.11.0"
# Performance Analysis and Memory Profiling
mimalloc = "0.1"
hotpath = "0.21"
mimalloc = "0.1.52"
hotpath = "0.21.5"
# Snapshot testing for output format regression detection
insta = { version = "1.48" }
@@ -368,21 +370,3 @@ inherits = "release"
inherits = "release"
debug = true
strip = "none"
# Pin hyper to a revision that carries the HTTP/1 "flush buffered data before
# shutdown" fix (hyperium/hyper#4018, commit 72046cc7). This lands as a
# `[patch.crates-io]` entry — not on the `hyper` workspace dependency — so that
# every consumer in the tree, including the transitive `hyper-util` server path
# (`conn::auto` / `GracefulShutdown`) that actually drives our connections,
# resolves to the fixed hyper rather than the buggy crates.io copy.
#
# hyper <= 1.10.1 can call `poll_shutdown()` on the socket while response bytes
# are still buffered (a prior `poll_flush()` returned `Poll::Pending` and the
# result was discarded). A backpressured / slow-reading peer then receives a
# graceful FIN before the full Content-Length body is flushed, which standard S3
# clients (minio-go / warp) report as `unexpected EOF` on large-object GET under
# load. The fix is not in any crates.io release yet as of hyper 1.10.1; drop
# this patch once a released version (> 1.10.1) contains commit 72046cc7.
# See rustfs/backlog#1232.
[patch.crates-io]
hyper = { git = "https://github.com/hyperium/hyper.git", rev = "ccc1e850dc0cda3e71b0acd11f60ca3d48d09034" }
+5 -3
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
FROM alpine:3.23.4 AS build
FROM alpine:3.24.1 AS build
ARG TARGETARCH
ARG RELEASE=latest
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ RUN set -eux; \
rm -rf rustfs.zip /build/.tmp || true
FROM alpine:3.23.4
FROM alpine:3.24.1
ARG RELEASE=latest
ARG BUILD_DATE
@@ -88,7 +88,9 @@ LABEL name="RustFS" \
url="https://rustfs.com" \
license="Apache-2.0"
RUN apk update && \
# Upgrade base-image packages so published images pick up security fixes
# (e.g. openssl/libssl3 CVEs) without waiting for a new Alpine point release.
RUN apk upgrade --no-cache && \
apk add --no-cache ca-certificates coreutils curl
COPY --from=build /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/
+6 -3
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
FROM ubuntu:24.04 AS build
FROM ubuntu:26.04 AS build
ARG TARGETARCH
ARG RELEASE=latest
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ RUN set -eux; \
chmod +x /build/rustfs; \
rm -rf rustfs.zip /build/.tmp || true
FROM ubuntu:24.04
FROM ubuntu:26.04
ARG RELEASE=latest
ARG BUILD_DATE
@@ -93,7 +93,10 @@ LABEL name="RustFS" \
url="https://rustfs.com" \
license="Apache-2.0"
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
# Upgrade base-image packages so published images pick up security fixes
# (e.g. tar/gzip/perl CVEs) without waiting for a new Ubuntu point release.
RUN apt-get update && apt-get upgrade -y \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
ca-certificates \
curl \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+2 -1
View File
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ CMD ["cargo", "run", "--bin", "rustfs", "--"]
# -----------------------------
# Runtime stage (Ubuntu minimal)
# -----------------------------
FROM ubuntu:24.04
FROM ubuntu:26.04
ARG BUILD_DATE
ARG VCS_REF
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ LABEL name="RustFS (dev-local)" \
RUN set -eux; \
export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive; \
apt-get update; \
apt-get upgrade -y; \
apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
ca-certificates \
curl \
+13 -4
View File
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ chown -R 10001:10001 data logs
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:latest
# Using specific version
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-beta.11
```
If you use [podman](https://github.com/containers/podman) instead of docker, you can install the RustFS with the below command
@@ -218,7 +218,10 @@ For scanner pacing, cycle budgets, bitrot cadence, lifecycle transition status,
and single-node single-disk idle CPU tuning, see
[Scanner Runtime Controls](docs/operations/scanner-runtime-controls.md). For
repeatable scanner-pressure validation, see
[Scanner Benchmark Runbook](docs/operations/scanner-benchmark-runbook.md).
[Scanner Benchmark Runbook](docs/operations/scanner-benchmark-runbook.md). For
drive timeout knobs on slow storage — including the walk stall budget that
governs `ListObjects` on large prefixes — see
[Drive Timeout Tuning](docs/operations/drive-timeout-tuning.md).
### 5\. Nix Flake (Option 5)
@@ -335,12 +338,18 @@ If you have any questions or need assistance:
RustFS is a community-driven project, and we appreciate all contributions. Check out the [Contributors](https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/graphs/contributors) page to see the amazing people who have helped make RustFS better.
<a href="https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/graphs/contributors">
<img src="https://opencollective.com/rustfs/contributors.svg?width=890&limit=500&button=false" alt="Contributors" />
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rustfs/rustfs/star-history/contributors-dark.svg">
<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rustfs/rustfs/star-history/contributors-light.svg" alt="RustFS contributors">
</picture>
</a>
## Star History
[![Star History Chart](https://api.star-history.com/svg?repos=rustfs/rustfs&type=date&legend=top-left)](https://www.star-history.com/#rustfs/rustfs&type=date&legend=top-left)
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rustfs/rustfs/star-history/star-history-dark.svg">
<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rustfs/rustfs/star-history/star-history-light.svg" alt="RustFS star history chart">
</picture>
## License
+9 -3
View File
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ chown -R 10001:10001 data logs
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:latest
# 使用指定版本运行
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-beta.10-preview.1
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-beta.11
```
如果您通过绑定挂载启用 TLS 证书目录,也请用同样方式准备该目录:
@@ -247,12 +247,18 @@ rustfs --help
RustFS 是一个社区驱动的项目,我们感谢所有的贡献。请查看 [贡献者](https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/graphs/contributors) 页面,看看那些让 RustFS 变得更好的了不起的人们。
<a href="https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/graphs/contributors">
<img src="https://opencollective.com/rustfs/contributors.svg?width=890&limit=500&button=false" alt="Contributors" />
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rustfs/rustfs/star-history/contributors-dark.svg">
<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rustfs/rustfs/star-history/contributors-light.svg" alt="RustFS 贡献者">
</picture>
</a>
## Star 历史
[![Star History Chart](https://api.star-history.com/svg?repos=rustfs/rustfs&type=date&legend=top-left)](https://www.star-history.com/#rustfs/rustfs&type=date&legend=top-left)
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rustfs/rustfs/star-history/star-history-dark.svg">
<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rustfs/rustfs/star-history/star-history-light.svg" alt="RustFS Star 历史图表">
</picture>
## 许可证
+32 -3
View File
@@ -292,8 +292,8 @@ impl AuditPipeline {
}
pub async fn snapshot_target_health(&self) -> Vec<rustfs_targets::RuntimeTargetHealthSnapshot> {
let registry = self.registry.lock().await;
registry.runtime_manager().health_snapshots().await
let targets = self.registry.lock().await.list_target_values();
rustfs_targets::health_snapshots_for_targets(targets).await
}
}
@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ mod tests {
use rustfs_targets::target::{EntityTarget, QueuedPayload, QueuedPayloadMeta};
use rustfs_targets::{StoreError, Target, TargetError};
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
use tokio::sync::{Mutex, Notify};
/// Mock target whose `save()` outcome is fixed at construction so tests can
/// force full-success / full-failure / partial-failure fan-outs.
@@ -578,6 +578,7 @@ mod tests {
struct MockTarget {
id: TargetID,
fail: bool,
health_gate: Option<(Arc<Notify>, Arc<Notify>)>,
}
impl MockTarget {
@@ -585,8 +586,14 @@ mod tests {
Self {
id: TargetID::new(id.to_string(), "webhook".to_string()),
fail,
health_gate: None,
}
}
fn with_health_gate(mut self, started: Arc<Notify>, release: Arc<Notify>) -> Self {
self.health_gate = Some((started, release));
self
}
}
#[async_trait]
@@ -599,6 +606,10 @@ mod tests {
}
async fn is_active(&self) -> Result<bool, TargetError> {
if let Some((started, release)) = &self.health_gate {
started.notify_one();
release.notified().await;
}
Ok(true)
}
@@ -673,6 +684,24 @@ mod tests {
pipeline.dispatch(entry()).await.expect("no targets should return Ok");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn health_probe_does_not_hold_the_registry_lock() {
let started = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let release = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let pipeline = pipeline_with(vec![MockTarget::new("blocked", false).with_health_gate(started.clone(), release.clone())]);
let registry = Arc::clone(&pipeline.registry);
let snapshot_task = tokio::spawn(async move { pipeline.snapshot_target_health().await });
started.notified().await;
let guard = tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(1), registry.lock())
.await
.expect("network health probe must not retain the audit registry lock");
drop(guard);
release.notify_one();
assert_eq!(snapshot_task.await.expect("snapshot task should finish").len(), 1);
}
// backlog#962: dispatch_batch must mirror dispatch and propagate a
// whole-batch loss instead of returning Ok.
#[tokio::test]
+9
View File
@@ -54,6 +54,15 @@ pub async fn get_global_local_node_name() -> String {
GLOBAL_LOCAL_NODE_NAME.read().await.clone()
}
/// Read the local node name without waiting for initialization or a writer.
pub fn try_get_global_local_node_name() -> Option<String> {
GLOBAL_LOCAL_NODE_NAME
.try_read()
.ok()
.map(|name| name.clone())
.filter(|name| !name.is_empty())
}
/// Set the global RustFS initialization time to the current UTC time.
pub async fn set_global_init_time_now() {
let now = Utc::now();
+60 -8
View File
@@ -243,6 +243,19 @@ pub enum HealAdmissionResult {
Dropped(HealAdmissionDropReason),
}
/// Admission decision together with the canonical task identifier.
///
/// A merged request must return the identifier of the task that already owns
/// the work instead of exposing the discarded request identifier as a new
/// client token.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct HealAdmissionReceipt {
/// Admission decision for the submitted request.
pub result: HealAdmissionResult,
/// Canonical identifier of the accepted or merged task.
pub task_id: String,
}
impl HealAdmissionResult {
pub fn result_label(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
@@ -382,8 +395,25 @@ pub type HealChannelSender = mpsc::UnboundedSender<HealChannelCommand>;
/// Heal channel receiver
pub type HealChannelReceiver = mpsc::UnboundedReceiver<HealChannelCommand>;
/// Canonical-receipt start command kept separate from the legacy public enum.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct HealReceiptCommand {
/// Heal request to admit.
pub request: HealChannelRequest,
/// Completion channel for the admission receipt.
pub response_tx: oneshot::Sender<Result<HealAdmissionReceipt, String>>,
}
/// Canonical-receipt command receiver.
pub type HealReceiptReceiver = mpsc::UnboundedReceiver<HealReceiptCommand>;
struct HealChannelSenders {
command: HealChannelSender,
receipt: mpsc::UnboundedSender<HealReceiptCommand>,
}
/// Global heal channel sender
static GLOBAL_HEAL_CHANNEL_SENDER: OnceLock<HealChannelSender> = OnceLock::new();
static GLOBAL_HEAL_CHANNEL_SENDERS: OnceLock<HealChannelSenders> = OnceLock::new();
type HealResponseSender = broadcast::Sender<HealChannelResponse>;
@@ -392,17 +422,24 @@ static GLOBAL_HEAL_RESPONSE_SENDER: OnceLock<HealResponseSender> = OnceLock::new
/// Initialize global heal channel
pub fn init_heal_channel() -> Result<HealChannelReceiver, &'static str> {
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
if GLOBAL_HEAL_CHANNEL_SENDER.set(tx).is_ok() {
Ok(rx)
} else {
Err("Heal channel sender already initialized")
}
let (receiver, receipt_receiver) = init_heal_channels()?;
drop(receipt_receiver);
Ok(receiver)
}
/// Initialize the legacy command and canonical-receipt channels atomically.
pub fn init_heal_channels() -> Result<(HealChannelReceiver, HealReceiptReceiver), &'static str> {
let (command, command_receiver) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let (receipt, receipt_receiver) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
GLOBAL_HEAL_CHANNEL_SENDERS
.set(HealChannelSenders { command, receipt })
.map_err(|_| "Heal channel sender already initialized")?;
Ok((command_receiver, receipt_receiver))
}
/// Get global heal channel sender
pub fn get_heal_channel_sender() -> Option<&'static HealChannelSender> {
GLOBAL_HEAL_CHANNEL_SENDER.get()
GLOBAL_HEAL_CHANNEL_SENDERS.get().map(|senders| &senders.command)
}
/// Send heal command through global channel
@@ -436,6 +473,21 @@ pub fn subscribe_heal_responses() -> broadcast::Receiver<HealChannelResponse> {
heal_response_sender().subscribe()
}
/// Send heal start request and wait for structured admission feedback.
pub async fn send_heal_request_with_receipt(request: HealChannelRequest) -> Result<HealAdmissionReceipt, String> {
let (response_tx, response_rx) = oneshot::channel();
let senders = GLOBAL_HEAL_CHANNEL_SENDERS
.get()
.ok_or_else(|| "Heal channel not initialized".to_string())?;
senders
.receipt
.send(HealReceiptCommand { request, response_tx })
.map_err(|err| format!("Failed to send heal receipt command: {err}"))?;
response_rx
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to receive heal admission response: {e}"))?
}
/// Send heal start request and wait for structured admission feedback.
pub async fn send_heal_request_with_admission(request: HealChannelRequest) -> Result<HealAdmissionResult, String> {
let (response_tx, response_rx) = oneshot::channel();
+46
View File
@@ -2434,6 +2434,18 @@ impl Metrics {
self.current_scan_cycle_work_active.store(false, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
pub fn current_scan_cycle_has_unresolved_heal_work(&self) -> bool {
if !self.current_scan_cycle_work_active.load(Ordering::Relaxed) {
return false;
}
let source_work = self.scanner_source_work_since(&self.current_scan_cycle_source_work_start_values());
[ScannerWorkSource::Heal, ScannerWorkSource::Bitrot]
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|source| source_work.get(source.index()))
.any(|work| work.queued > 0 || work.skipped > 0 || work.failed > 0 || work.missed > 0)
}
fn scan_cycle_work_snapshot(&self) -> ScanCycleWorkSnapshot {
ScanCycleWorkSnapshot {
objects_scanned: self.lifetime(Metric::ScanObject),
@@ -3361,6 +3373,40 @@ mod tests {
metrics.finish_scan_cycle_work(start);
}
#[test]
fn unresolved_heal_work_only_reflects_the_active_cycle() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
assert!(!metrics.current_scan_cycle_has_unresolved_heal_work());
let start = metrics.start_scan_cycle_work();
metrics.record_scanner_source_missed(ScannerWorkSource::Heal, 1);
assert!(metrics.current_scan_cycle_has_unresolved_heal_work());
metrics.finish_scan_cycle_work(start);
assert!(!metrics.current_scan_cycle_has_unresolved_heal_work());
let start = metrics.start_scan_cycle_work();
metrics.record_scanner_source_queued(ScannerWorkSource::Heal, 1);
assert!(metrics.current_scan_cycle_has_unresolved_heal_work());
metrics.finish_scan_cycle_work(start);
let start = metrics.start_scan_cycle_work();
metrics.record_scanner_source_work(
ScannerWorkSource::Bitrot,
ScannerSourceWorkUpdate {
skipped: 1,
..Default::default()
},
);
assert!(metrics.current_scan_cycle_has_unresolved_heal_work());
metrics.finish_scan_cycle_work(start);
let start = metrics.start_scan_cycle_work();
metrics.record_scanner_source_failed(ScannerWorkSource::Bitrot, 1);
assert!(metrics.current_scan_cycle_has_unresolved_heal_work());
metrics.finish_scan_cycle_work(start);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn report_marks_transition_failures_as_blocked_lifecycle_control() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
+40
View File
@@ -50,3 +50,43 @@ pub const ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_BURST: &str = "RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BURST";
/// Default for `RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BURST` (`0` = same as RPM).
pub const DEFAULT_API_RATE_LIMIT_BURST: u32 = 0;
/// Sustained S3 API request budget per addressed bucket, in requests per
/// minute — a collective ceiling shared by all clients of that bucket.
///
/// Complements the per-client-IP dimension: it protects the server from one
/// hot bucket regardless of how many client IPs the traffic comes from. `0`
/// disables the bucket dimension. Requires `RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE`.
/// Environment variable: RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_RPM
/// Example: RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_RPM=60000
pub const ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_RPM: &str = "RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_RPM";
/// Default for `RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_RPM` (`0` = dimension disabled).
pub const DEFAULT_API_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_RPM: u32 = 0;
/// Burst capacity per bucket (maximum tokens in the bucket-dimension bucket).
///
/// `0` means "same as `RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_RPM`".
/// Environment variable: RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_BURST
/// Example: RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_BURST=2000
pub const ENV_API_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_BURST: &str = "RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_BURST";
/// Default for `RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_BURST` (`0` = same as bucket RPM).
pub const DEFAULT_API_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_BURST: u32 = 0;
/// Maximum concurrently served connections on the main API listener.
///
/// `0` (the default) means unlimited. When set, the accept loop stops
/// accepting once the cap is reached and lets the kernel backlog absorb
/// bursts, releasing capacity as connections close. This bounds file
/// descriptor and memory usage under a connection flood.
///
/// The cap covers everything on the main listener — S3, admin, console,
/// and internode gRPC — so size it well above peer-node count plus the
/// expected client concurrency.
/// Environment variable: RUSTFS_API_MAX_CONNECTIONS
/// Example: RUSTFS_API_MAX_CONNECTIONS=10000
pub const ENV_API_MAX_CONNECTIONS: &str = "RUSTFS_API_MAX_CONNECTIONS";
/// Default for `RUSTFS_API_MAX_CONNECTIONS` (`0` = unlimited).
pub const DEFAULT_API_MAX_CONNECTIONS: usize = 0;
+5
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,11 @@ pub const DEFAULT_DRIVE_WALKDIR_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 5;
pub const ENV_DRIVE_WALKDIR_STALL_TIMEOUT_SECS: &str = "RUSTFS_DRIVE_WALKDIR_STALL_TIMEOUT_SECS";
pub const DEFAULT_DRIVE_WALKDIR_STALL_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 5;
/// Maximum time the metacache merge consumer waits for the next visible
/// `walk_dir()` entry from a reader before detaching it from the merge.
pub const ENV_DRIVE_WALKDIR_PEEK_TIMEOUT_SECS: &str = "RUSTFS_DRIVE_WALKDIR_PEEK_TIMEOUT_SECS";
pub const DEFAULT_DRIVE_WALKDIR_PEEK_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 10;
/// Interval in seconds between active health probes for local and remote drives.
pub const ENV_DRIVE_ACTIVE_CHECK_INTERVAL_SECS: &str = "RUSTFS_DRIVE_ACTIVE_CHECK_INTERVAL_SECS";
pub const DEFAULT_DRIVE_ACTIVE_CHECK_INTERVAL_SECS: u64 = 15;
+58 -4
View File
@@ -73,15 +73,36 @@ pub const DEFAULT_OBJECT_MAX_CONCURRENT_DISK_READS: usize = 64;
/// - Example: `export RUSTFS_OBJECT_DISK_PERMIT_WAIT_TIMEOUT=5`
pub const ENV_OBJECT_DISK_PERMIT_WAIT_TIMEOUT: &str = "RUSTFS_OBJECT_DISK_PERMIT_WAIT_TIMEOUT";
/// Maximum time a GET request waits for a disk read permit (seconds).
/// Maximum time a GET request waits for a primary disk read permit (seconds).
///
/// Permits are held for the whole response body transfer, so slow clients can
/// occupy all of them while the disks sit idle. Instead of stalling until the
/// request-level timeout fires, a GET that waits longer than this proceeds
/// without a permit (degraded pass-through) and the bypass is counted in
/// metrics/logs. Set to 0 to wait indefinitely (previous behavior).
/// request-level timeout fires, a GET that waits longer than this falls through
/// to a bounded degraded admission lane; if that lane is also full the request
/// is rejected with `SlowDown`/503 rather than proceeding without any permit.
/// Set to 0 to wait on the primary lane indefinitely (never degrade or reject).
pub const DEFAULT_OBJECT_DISK_PERMIT_WAIT_TIMEOUT: u64 = 5;
/// Environment variable for the bounded degraded disk-read admission lane size.
/// - Purpose: Cap how many GETs may proceed after the primary disk-read permit
/// pool is saturated, giving a hard upper bound on concurrent disk-active
/// reads (primary cap + degraded cap) instead of an unbounded pass-through.
/// - Unit: request count (usize). `0` means "mirror the primary cap", so the
/// absolute hard cap defaults to twice the primary disk-read cap.
/// - Example: `export RUSTFS_OBJECT_DISK_DEGRADED_READ_CAP=16`
pub const ENV_OBJECT_DISK_DEGRADED_READ_CAP: &str = "RUSTFS_OBJECT_DISK_DEGRADED_READ_CAP";
/// Size of the bounded degraded disk-read admission lane.
///
/// When the primary disk-read permit pool is saturated and a GET exceeds
/// [`DEFAULT_OBJECT_DISK_PERMIT_WAIT_TIMEOUT`], it may take one permit from this
/// bounded overflow lane instead of reading without any admission token. The
/// total number of GETs performing disk-active reads is therefore hard-capped at
/// `primary_cap + degraded_cap`; beyond that a GET is rejected with `SlowDown`.
/// The default `0` mirrors the primary cap, so the hard cap is twice the primary
/// disk-read concurrency.
pub const DEFAULT_OBJECT_DISK_DEGRADED_READ_CAP: usize = 0;
/// Skip bitrot hash verification on GetObject reads.
///
/// When enabled, GetObject reads skip the per-shard hash
@@ -128,6 +149,39 @@ pub const ENV_OBJECT_DISK_READ_TIMEOUT: &str = "RUSTFS_OBJECT_DISK_READ_TIMEOUT"
/// Default disk read timeout in seconds.
pub const DEFAULT_OBJECT_DISK_READ_TIMEOUT: u64 = 10;
/// Environment variable for the per-shard erasure write stall timeout (seconds).
///
/// A single shard write (or shard-writer shutdown) that makes no forward
/// progress for longer than this budget is failed and its disk is dropped
/// before commit, so a black-hole peer that accepts the connection but never
/// drains the body cannot pin an otherwise-healthy write quorum forever
/// (see `MultiWriter` in `erasure/coding/encode.rs`). The budget is re-armed on
/// every shard write, so it bounds a *stall* rather than the total transfer
/// time of a large object.
///
/// Unit: seconds (u64). `0` disables the stall deadline (previous behavior:
/// wait indefinitely). Default: 30 seconds.
pub const ENV_OBJECT_DISK_WRITE_STALL_TIMEOUT: &str = "RUSTFS_OBJECT_DISK_WRITE_STALL_TIMEOUT";
/// Default per-shard erasure write stall timeout in seconds.
pub const DEFAULT_OBJECT_DISK_WRITE_STALL_TIMEOUT: u64 = 30;
/// Environment variable for the absolute per-object erasure write cap (seconds).
///
/// Optional administrator backstop against a "slow-drip" peer that produces
/// just enough forward progress to reset the per-shard stall timeout on every
/// block while never converging. When set, the shard writers for one object are
/// engaged for at most this long in aggregate before a stalled writer is failed
/// and dropped. It is disabled by default because a legitimate large upload
/// over a slow-but-honest link must not be killed on total time alone; the
/// per-shard stall timeout is the primary guarantee.
///
/// Unit: seconds (u64). `0` (default) disables the absolute cap.
pub const ENV_OBJECT_DISK_WRITE_ABSOLUTE_CAP: &str = "RUSTFS_OBJECT_DISK_WRITE_ABSOLUTE_CAP";
/// Default absolute per-object erasure write cap in seconds (`0` = disabled).
pub const DEFAULT_OBJECT_DISK_WRITE_ABSOLUTE_CAP: u64 = 0;
/// Environment variable for minimum GetObject timeout in seconds.
///
/// When dynamic timeout calculation is enabled, this is the minimum timeout
+30
View File
@@ -56,3 +56,33 @@ pub const DEFAULT_OBJECT_MMAP_READ_ENABLE: bool = true;
///
/// Prefer [`DEFAULT_OBJECT_MMAP_READ_ENABLE`].
pub const DEFAULT_OBJECT_ZERO_COPY_ENABLE: bool = DEFAULT_OBJECT_MMAP_READ_ENABLE;
/// Environment variable capping the byte length a single mmap-copy read may
/// materialize in memory.
///
/// The mmap-copy read path returns the whole requested range as one owned
/// allocation before the first byte is served. GET/heal shard reads request
/// the entire part span in one call, so for a large single-part object
/// (e.g. a multi-gigabyte non-multipart upload) an uncapped mmap-copy read
/// allocates the whole shard in memory — stalling first-byte latency past the
/// disk-read timeout and OOM-killing memory-limited deployments
/// (<https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/issues/5123>). Reads longer than this
/// cap fall back to the bounded streaming reader instead.
///
/// - Purpose: Bound per-shard-read memory for mmap-based reads
/// - Acceptable values: byte count as an unsigned integer; `0` disables
/// mmap-copy for all non-empty reads (every read streams)
/// - Example: `export RUSTFS_OBJECT_MMAP_READ_MAX_LENGTH=8388608`
pub const ENV_OBJECT_MMAP_READ_MAX_LENGTH: &str = "RUSTFS_OBJECT_MMAP_READ_MAX_LENGTH";
/// Default mmap-copy read length cap: 32 MiB per shard read.
///
/// Large enough that typical multipart part shards (parts up to a few hundred
/// megabytes across the erasure set) keep the mmap fast path, small enough
/// that whole-part reads of huge single-part objects stream instead of
/// materializing gigabytes per shard.
///
/// The cap bounds memory per shard reader, so a single part read can still
/// materialize up to `data_shards x cap` bytes; raising the cap raises that
/// per-request bound proportionally.
pub const DEFAULT_OBJECT_MMAP_READ_MAX_LENGTH: usize = 32 * 1024 * 1024;
+12 -18
View File
@@ -260,13 +260,10 @@ fn resolve_rpc_secret(env_secret: Option<&str>, global_access: Option<&str>, glo
match (global_access, global_secret) {
(Some(access_key), Some(secret_key)) => {
// Fail closed: never derive the RPC secret while the default secret
// key is in effect. The derivation uses `secret_key` as the HMAC key,
// so a public default secret yields a publicly computable RPC secret
// that any network peer can use to forge internode RPC signatures.
// Operators running with default credentials must configure
// RUSTFS_RPC_SECRET (or set a non-default RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY) instead.
if secret_key.trim() == DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY {
// Fail closed when either half of the active credential pair still
// uses the public default. Operators must configure both custom
// credentials or provide RUSTFS_RPC_SECRET explicitly.
if access_key.trim() == DEFAULT_ACCESS_KEY || secret_key.trim() == DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY {
return None;
}
derive_rpc_secret(access_key, secret_key)
@@ -589,18 +586,11 @@ mod tests {
fn test_resolve_rpc_secret_rejects_default_credentials_for_derivation() {
assert!(resolve_rpc_secret(None, None, None).is_none());
// Fail closed: the default secret key must not yield a derivable RPC
// secret, otherwise the derived value is publicly computable and any
// network peer can forge internode RPC signatures.
// Fail closed when either half of the credential pair uses the public
// default.
assert!(resolve_rpc_secret(None, Some(DEFAULT_ACCESS_KEY), Some(DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY)).is_none());
// A default access key paired with a non-default secret key is still
// safe to derive: the HMAC key (the secret key) is not public.
let expected = derive_rpc_secret(DEFAULT_ACCESS_KEY, "custom-global-secret").expect("secret should derive");
assert_eq!(
resolve_rpc_secret(None, Some(DEFAULT_ACCESS_KEY), Some("custom-global-secret")).as_deref(),
Some(expected.as_str())
);
assert!(resolve_rpc_secret(None, Some(DEFAULT_ACCESS_KEY), Some("custom-global-secret")).is_none());
assert!(resolve_rpc_secret(None, Some("custom-access"), Some(DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY)).is_none());
assert!(resolve_rpc_secret(Some(DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY), Some("custom-access"), Some("custom-global-secret")).is_none());
}
@@ -635,6 +625,10 @@ mod tests {
resolve_rpc_secret(Some("custom-rpc-secret"), None, None).as_deref(),
Some("custom-rpc-secret")
);
assert_eq!(
resolve_rpc_secret(Some("custom-rpc-secret"), Some(DEFAULT_ACCESS_KEY), Some(DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY)).as_deref(),
Some("custom-rpc-secret")
);
let expected = derive_rpc_secret("custom-access", "custom-global-secret").expect("secret should derive");
assert_eq!(
resolve_rpc_secret(None, Some("custom-access"), Some("custom-global-secret")).as_deref(),
+35 -1
View File
@@ -18,9 +18,27 @@ use std::{
collections::{HashMap, HashSet},
hash::{DefaultHasher, Hash, Hasher},
path::Path,
time::SystemTime,
time::{Duration, SystemTime},
};
/// Maximum amount a persisted `last_update` may lead the local wall clock before the
/// persisted timestamp is treated as untrustworthy.
///
/// Invariant: the "skip stale usage update" monotonicity check (incoming `last_update`
/// <= existing `last_update` => skip persisting) is only valid while the existing
/// timestamp could plausibly have been produced by a healthy clock. If the on-disk
/// snapshot is future-dated beyond this tolerance (NTP step-back, or scanner
/// leadership moving to a node with a slower clock), the comparison would skip every
/// save forever and freeze admin usage stats; callers must bypass the skip instead.
pub const USAGE_LAST_UPDATE_FUTURE_TOLERANCE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5 * 60);
/// Returns true when `existing_last_update` is ahead of `now` by more than
/// [`USAGE_LAST_UPDATE_FUTURE_TOLERANCE`], i.e. the persisted timestamp cannot be
/// trusted for staleness comparisons and a fresh snapshot save must be allowed.
pub fn usage_last_update_is_untrusted_future(existing_last_update: SystemTime, now: SystemTime) -> bool {
existing_last_update > now + USAGE_LAST_UPDATE_FUTURE_TOLERANCE
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Default, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
pub struct TierStats {
pub total_size: u64,
@@ -1297,6 +1315,22 @@ pub struct CompressionTotalInfo {
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_usage_last_update_future_tolerance_boundary() {
let now = SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(1_000_000);
// Within tolerance (including the exact boundary) the timestamp is trusted.
assert!(!usage_last_update_is_untrusted_future(now, now));
assert!(!usage_last_update_is_untrusted_future(now - Duration::from_secs(60), now));
assert!(!usage_last_update_is_untrusted_future(now + USAGE_LAST_UPDATE_FUTURE_TOLERANCE, now));
// Beyond tolerance the persisted timestamp is untrustworthy.
assert!(usage_last_update_is_untrusted_future(
now + USAGE_LAST_UPDATE_FUTURE_TOLERANCE + Duration::from_secs(1),
now
));
}
#[test]
fn test_data_usage_info_creation() {
let mut info = DataUsageInfo::new();
+2 -1
View File
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ rustfs-config = { workspace = true, features = ["constants"] }
rustfs-ecstore.workspace = true
rustfs-data-usage.workspace = true
rustfs-rio.workspace = true
rustfs-utils = { workspace = true, features = ["egress"] }
flatbuffers.workspace = true
futures.workspace = true
rustfs-lock.workspace = true
@@ -57,7 +58,7 @@ http.workspace = true
http-body-util.workspace = true
hyper = { workspace = true, features = ["http2", "http1", "server"] }
hyper-util = { workspace = true, features = ["tokio", "server-auto", "server-graceful", "tracing"] }
reqwest = { workspace = true, default-features = false, features = ["rustls", "charset", "http2", "system-proxy", "stream", "json", "multipart"] }
reqwest = { workspace = true, features = ["json", "multipart", "stream"] }
rustfs-signer.workspace = true
tracing = { workspace = true }
tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true, features = ["env-filter", "time"] }
+79
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
// Copyright 2026 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging, local_http_client};
use http::header::HOST;
use reqwest::StatusCode;
use rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD;
use rustfs_signer::sign_v4;
use s3s::Body;
use serde::Deserialize;
use std::error::Error;
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
struct PoolListItem {
id: usize,
cmdline: String,
status: String,
}
async fn signed_admin_get(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, path: &str) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let url = format!("{}{path}", env.url);
let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("admin URL missing authority")?.to_string();
let request = http::Request::builder()
.method(http::Method::GET)
.uri(uri)
.header(HOST, authority)
.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD)
.body(Body::empty())?;
let signed = sign_v4(request, 0, &env.access_key, &env.secret_key, "", "us-east-1");
let mut request = local_http_client().get(&url);
for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
request = request.header(name, value);
}
Ok(request.send().await?)
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn single_drive_pools_list_succeeds_without_enabling_decommission_status() -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let response = signed_admin_get(&env, "/rustfs/admin/v3/pools/list").await?;
let status = response.status();
let body = response.bytes().await?;
assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::OK, "pools list failed: {}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&body));
let pools: Vec<PoolListItem> = serde_json::from_slice(&body)?;
assert_eq!(pools.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(pools[0].id, 0);
assert_eq!(pools[0].cmdline, env.temp_dir);
assert_eq!(pools[0].status, "active");
let response = signed_admin_get(&env, "/rustfs/admin/v3/decommission/status").await?;
let status = response.status();
let body = response.text().await?;
assert_eq!(
status,
StatusCode::NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
"decommission status changed for a single pool: {body}"
);
assert!(body.contains("NotImplemented"), "unexpected decommission error body: {body}");
Ok(())
}
@@ -86,6 +86,52 @@ async fn api_rate_limit_enforces_429_with_retry_after_when_enabled() -> TestResu
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn api_rate_limit_bucket_dimension_throttles_per_bucket() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
// Bucket dimension only: the readiness-poll ListBuckets calls hit "/"
// (no bucket) and therefore do not consume any budget.
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(
vec![],
&[
("RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLE", "true"),
("RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_RPM", "60"),
("RUSTFS_API_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_BURST", "5"),
],
)
.await?;
let client = local_http_client();
// Unauthenticated GETs are still counted arrivals (403, not 429, while
// within budget); the sixth rapid hit on the same bucket must throttle.
let mut throttled = false;
for i in 0..6 {
let response = client.get(format!("{}/hot-bucket/object-{i}", env.url)).send().await?;
if response.status() == reqwest::StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS {
throttled = true;
assert!(
response.headers().contains_key(reqwest::header::RETRY_AFTER),
"bucket-dimension 429 must carry Retry-After"
);
break;
}
}
assert!(throttled, "6 rapid requests against burst 5 must trip the bucket dimension");
// A different bucket has its own budget.
let other = client.get(format!("{}/cold-bucket/object", env.url)).send().await?;
assert_ne!(
other.status(),
reqwest::StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
"an unrelated bucket must not be throttled"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn api_rate_limit_stays_inert_by_default() -> TestResult {
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Smoke tests for the multi-drive / multi-pool cluster harness.
//!
//! These belong to the nightly 4-node cluster lane (they spin up real RustFS
//! processes, so they are excluded from the merge-gate `e2e-full` profile in
//! `.config/nextest.toml`). They assert that:
//!
//! * `drivesPerNode > 1` produces a bootable single-pool cluster whose
//! `RUSTFS_VOLUMES` string enumerates every drive, and that a PUT/GET
//! round-trips through the multi-drive erasure layout.
//! * A two-pool topology (one node per pool, `drivesPerNode` drives each) boots
//! with the ellipses `RUSTFS_VOLUMES` form and round-trips a PUT/GET.
//!
//! Readiness is established by the harness's `start()` handshake (TCP reachability
//! plus an S3 `ListBuckets` poll) — there are no fixed sleeps.
//!
//! Out of scope for this block (tracked separately): network fault injection
//! (toxiproxy / socket proxy) and 5GiB large-object budgets.
use crate::common::{ClusterTopology, RustFSTestClusterEnvironment};
use serial_test::serial;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>;
const BUCKET: &str = "cluster-multidrive-pool-bucket";
/// PUT an object then GET it back and assert the bytes round-trip.
async fn put_get_roundtrip(cluster: &RustFSTestClusterEnvironment, key: &str, payload: &[u8]) -> TestResult {
let writer = cluster.create_s3_client(0)?;
writer
.put_object()
.bucket(BUCKET)
.key(key)
.body(bytes::Bytes::copy_from_slice(payload).into())
.send()
.await?;
// Read back from the last node to exercise the cross-node/cross-pool path.
let reader = cluster.create_s3_client(cluster.nodes.len() - 1)?;
let got = reader.get_object().bucket(BUCKET).key(key).send().await?;
let body = got.body.collect().await?.into_bytes();
assert_eq!(body.as_ref(), payload, "round-tripped object bytes must match");
Ok(())
}
/// 4 nodes x 2 drives, single pool: the multi-drive layout boots and round-trips.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn cluster_multidrive_single_pool_smoke() -> TestResult {
crate::common::init_logging();
let mut cluster = RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::with_topology(ClusterTopology::single_pool_multidrive(4, 2)).await?;
// The single-pool multi-drive layout must list every (node, drive) endpoint
// explicitly (8 endpoints, no ellipses) so the server keeps one legacy pool.
let volumes = cluster.rustfs_volumes_arg();
assert_eq!(volumes.split(' ').count(), 8, "expected 8 explicit endpoints, got: {volumes}");
assert!(!volumes.contains('{'), "single-pool layout must not use ellipses: {volumes}");
cluster.start().await?;
cluster.create_test_bucket(BUCKET).await?;
let payload = vec![0xA5u8; 512 * 1024];
put_get_roundtrip(&cluster, "multidrive/object", &payload).await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Two single-node pools, 2 drives each: the multi-pool layout boots and
/// round-trips. Every pool is a distinct erasure pool (`pool_idx` 0 and 1).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn cluster_two_pool_smoke() -> TestResult {
crate::common::init_logging();
let mut cluster =
RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::with_topology(ClusterTopology::per_node_pools(2, vec![vec![0], vec![1]])).await?;
// The two-pool layout must emit one ellipses argument per pool.
let volumes = cluster.rustfs_volumes_arg();
let args: Vec<&str> = volumes.split(' ').collect();
assert_eq!(args.len(), 2, "expected two pool arguments, got: {volumes}");
assert!(
args.iter().all(|a| a.contains("/drive{0...1}")),
"each pool arg must use the drive ellipses form: {volumes}"
);
assert_eq!(cluster.nodes[0].pool_idx, 0);
assert_eq!(cluster.nodes[1].pool_idx, 1);
cluster.start().await?;
cluster.create_test_bucket(BUCKET).await?;
let payload = vec![0x5Au8; 256 * 1024];
put_get_roundtrip(&cluster, "twopool/object", &payload).await?;
Ok(())
}
+381 -17
View File
@@ -717,15 +717,166 @@ pub async fn awscurl_delete(
execute_awscurl(url, "DELETE", None, access_key, secret_key).await
}
/// Cluster topology declaration for a `RustFSTestClusterEnvironment`.
///
/// Describes how many nodes to launch, how many data drives each node exposes,
/// and how those nodes are grouped into erasure pools. The topology drives both
/// on-disk directory creation and the `RUSTFS_VOLUMES` string assembled for the
/// node processes.
///
/// # Single-host expressibility constraints
///
/// The harness runs every node on `127.0.0.1` with a distinct port, so the
/// `RUSTFS_VOLUMES` string can only use the two forms the server parser accepts
/// on a single machine (verified against `ecstore` `DisksLayout::from_volumes`):
///
/// * **Single pool** — every `(node, drive)` endpoint listed explicitly, no
/// ellipses. This is the legacy form and yields exactly one pool spanning all
/// nodes and drives (`DistErasure`). Any `drives_per_node >= 1` works.
/// * **Multiple pools** — one ellipses arg per pool. A pool argument is a single
/// URL template, so it can enumerate several drives on *one* host but cannot
/// enumerate multiple distinct-port hosts. A pool that spanned two localhost
/// nodes would need a host ellipses (`127.0.0.1:900{0...1}`), which forces the
/// *same* on-disk path across those ports and collides physically. Therefore
/// every pool in a multi-pool topology owns exactly one node. In addition, the
/// parser rejects a single-drive ellipses pool (`drive{0...0}`), so a
/// multi-pool topology requires `drives_per_node >= 2`.
///
/// Genuine multi-node pools (a pool striped across several hosts) require real
/// multi-host infrastructure and are deferred to the nightly cluster CI lane
/// (backlog #1313 / #1314); they are intentionally not expressible here.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct ClusterTopology {
/// Number of node processes to launch.
pub node_count: usize,
/// Number of independent data drives (directories) each node exposes.
pub drives_per_node: usize,
/// Pool membership as a list of node-index groups. An empty vector means a
/// single pool spanning every node.
pub pools: Vec<Vec<usize>>,
}
impl ClusterTopology {
/// Single pool, one drive per node — identical to the historical
/// `RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::new` layout.
pub fn single_pool(node_count: usize) -> Self {
Self {
node_count,
drives_per_node: 1,
pools: Vec::new(),
}
}
/// Single pool with `drives_per_node` drives on every node. The pool spans
/// all nodes and all drives (one `DistErasure` pool).
pub fn single_pool_multidrive(node_count: usize, drives_per_node: usize) -> Self {
Self {
node_count,
drives_per_node,
pools: Vec::new(),
}
}
/// Multi-pool topology where every pool owns exactly one node. `pools` lists
/// the node index backing each pool (e.g. `vec![vec![0], vec![1]]` for a
/// two-pool cluster). Requires `drives_per_node >= 2` (see the type-level
/// note on single-host expressibility).
pub fn per_node_pools(drives_per_node: usize, pools: Vec<Vec<usize>>) -> Self {
let node_count = pools.iter().flatten().copied().max().map(|m| m + 1).unwrap_or(0);
Self {
node_count,
drives_per_node,
pools,
}
}
/// Normalized pool membership: an empty `pools` becomes a single pool over
/// all node indices.
fn normalized_pools(&self) -> Vec<Vec<usize>> {
if self.pools.is_empty() {
vec![(0..self.node_count).collect()]
} else {
self.pools.clone()
}
}
/// Validate that the topology is expressible on a single localhost machine.
fn validate(&self) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
if self.node_count == 0 {
return Err("Node count must be greater than zero".into());
}
if self.drives_per_node == 0 {
return Err("drives_per_node must be greater than zero".into());
}
let pools = self.normalized_pools();
// Every referenced node index must be in range.
for (pool_idx, nodes) in pools.iter().enumerate() {
if nodes.is_empty() {
return Err(format!("pool {pool_idx} has no nodes").into());
}
for &n in nodes {
if n >= self.node_count {
return Err(format!("pool {pool_idx} references node {n} but node_count is {}", self.node_count).into());
}
}
}
// Each node must belong to exactly one pool.
let mut seen = vec![0usize; self.node_count];
for nodes in &pools {
for &n in nodes {
seen[n] += 1;
}
}
for (n, count) in seen.iter().enumerate() {
match count {
0 => return Err(format!("node {n} is not assigned to any pool").into()),
1 => {}
_ => return Err(format!("node {n} is assigned to more than one pool").into()),
}
}
// Multi-pool constraints imposed by the single-host RUSTFS_VOLUMES syntax.
if pools.len() > 1 {
if self.drives_per_node < 2 {
return Err(
"multi-pool topology requires drives_per_node >= 2 (the server parser rejects a single-drive ellipses pool)"
.into(),
);
}
for (pool_idx, nodes) in pools.iter().enumerate() {
if nodes.len() != 1 {
return Err(format!(
"pool {pool_idx} spans {} nodes; a pool striped across multiple localhost nodes is not expressible (needs host ellipses, which collides on shared paths). Use one node per pool, or the nightly multi-host lane (backlog #1313/#1314).",
nodes.len()
)
.into());
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
}
/// Represents a single RustFS server instance in a test cluster.
///
/// Each `ClusterNode` tracks the node's network address, base URL for
/// S3-compatible requests, on-disk data directory, and the underlying
/// S3-compatible requests, on-disk data directories, and the underlying
/// child process handle when the node is running.
pub struct ClusterNode {
pub address: String,
pub url: String,
/// Primary data directory for the node. For single-drive nodes this is the
/// node's only drive; for multi-drive nodes it is the first drive. Kept as a
/// stable field so existing single-drive tests continue to compile.
pub data_dir: String,
/// All data drives exposed by this node (`data_dirs[0] == data_dir`).
pub data_dirs: Vec<String>,
/// Index of the pool this node belongs to.
pub pool_idx: usize,
pub process: Option<Child>,
}
@@ -741,6 +892,7 @@ pub struct RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
pub access_key: String,
pub secret_key: String,
pub extra_env: Vec<(String, String)>,
pub topology: ClusterTopology,
}
impl RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
@@ -762,34 +914,83 @@ impl RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
/// * `Err(Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>)` - An error if any step fails, such as temporary
/// directory creation failure or available port lookup failure.
pub async fn new(node_count: usize) -> Result<Self, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
if node_count == 0 {
return Err("Node count must be greater than zero".into());
}
Self::with_topology(ClusterTopology::single_pool(node_count)).await
}
/// Create a RustFS test cluster environment from an explicit topology.
///
/// Allocates a unique temporary root directory, an available TCP port per
/// node, and one data directory per drive. The topology is validated up front
/// (node/pool assignment, single-host multi-pool constraints); node processes
/// are not started at this stage.
///
/// When the topology exposes more than one local drive on a node (multi-drive
/// or multi-pool layouts), `RUSTFS_UNSAFE_BYPASS_DISK_CHECK=true` is added to
/// every node's environment: those drives live on the same temp filesystem, so
/// the server's distinct-physical-disk safety check would otherwise reject
/// startup. Single-drive single-pool clusters keep the historical environment
/// unchanged.
pub async fn with_topology(topology: ClusterTopology) -> Result<Self, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
topology.validate()?;
let temp_dir = format!("/tmp/rustfs_cluster_test_{}", Uuid::new_v4());
fs::create_dir_all(&temp_dir).await?;
let mut nodes = Vec::with_capacity(node_count);
for i in 0..node_count {
// Map every node to its owning pool index.
let pools = topology.normalized_pools();
let mut pool_of_node = vec![0usize; topology.node_count];
for (pool_idx, nodes) in pools.iter().enumerate() {
for &n in nodes {
pool_of_node[n] = pool_idx;
}
}
let multidrive = topology.drives_per_node > 1;
let mut nodes = Vec::with_capacity(topology.node_count);
for (i, &pool_idx) in pool_of_node.iter().enumerate() {
let port = RustFSTestEnvironment::find_available_port().await?;
let address = format!("127.0.0.1:{}", port);
let url = format!("http://{}", address);
let data_dir = format!("{}/node{}", temp_dir, i);
fs::create_dir_all(&data_dir).await?;
// Single-drive nodes keep the historical `{temp}/node{i}` path so
// existing tests (and their on-disk assertions) are unaffected.
// Multi-drive nodes nest one `drive{d}` directory per drive so the
// ellipses form `drive{0...N-1}` can address them.
let data_dirs: Vec<String> = if multidrive {
(0..topology.drives_per_node)
.map(|d| format!("{}/node{}/drive{}", temp_dir, i, d))
.collect()
} else {
vec![format!("{}/node{}", temp_dir, i)]
};
for dir in &data_dirs {
fs::create_dir_all(dir).await?;
}
nodes.push(ClusterNode {
address,
url,
data_dir,
data_dir: data_dirs[0].clone(),
data_dirs,
pool_idx,
process: None,
});
}
let mut extra_env = Vec::new();
extra_env.push(("RUSTFS_RPC_SECRET".to_string(), String::new()));
if multidrive {
extra_env.push(("RUSTFS_UNSAFE_BYPASS_DISK_CHECK".to_string(), "true".to_string()));
}
Ok(Self {
nodes,
temp_dir,
access_key: DEFAULT_ACCESS_KEY.to_string(),
secret_key: DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY.to_string(),
extra_env: Vec::new(),
access_key: "rustfs-cluster-test-access".to_string(),
secret_key: "rustfs-cluster-test-secret".to_string(),
extra_env,
topology,
})
}
@@ -809,14 +1010,51 @@ impl RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
Ok(())
}
/// Build the volumes argument string for RustFS binary (internal helper method).
/// Build the `RUSTFS_VOLUMES` argument string for the cluster's topology.
///
/// Concatenates the address and data directory of all cluster nodes into a single string
/// used as the `RUSTFS_VOLUMES` environment variable for RustFS node processes.
/// * **Single pool** — every `(node, drive)` endpoint is listed explicitly and
/// space-joined. With no ellipses the server parser collapses them into one
/// legacy pool spanning all nodes and drives.
/// * **Multiple pools** — each pool (exactly one node) contributes one ellipses
/// argument `http://<addr><node-base>/drive{0...N-1}`; the space-separated
/// arguments become one pool each.
///
/// The server splits `RUSTFS_VOLUMES` on spaces (`value_delimiter = ' '`), which
/// this assembly matches, and the resulting layout is verified against the
/// `ecstore` parser in the unit tests below.
/// Public view of the assembled `RUSTFS_VOLUMES` string, so tests can assert
/// the pool/drive layout without starting node processes.
pub fn rustfs_volumes_arg(&self) -> String {
self.build_volumes_arg()
}
fn build_volumes_arg(&self) -> String {
self.nodes
let pools = self.topology.normalized_pools();
if pools.len() <= 1 {
// Single pool: explicit enumeration of every drive on every node.
return self
.nodes
.iter()
.flat_map(|n| n.data_dirs.iter().map(move |dir| format!("http://{}{}", n.address, dir)))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(" ");
}
// Multi-pool: one ellipses argument per single-node pool. The drive
// directories are `<temp>/node{i}/drive{0..N-1}`, so the ellipses base is
// the shared parent of the node's drives.
pools
.iter()
.map(|n| format!("http://{}{}", n.address, n.data_dir))
.map(|nodes| {
let node = &self.nodes[nodes[0]];
let base = node
.data_dirs
.first()
.and_then(|d| d.rsplit_once('/').map(|(parent, _)| parent))
.unwrap_or(&node.data_dir);
format!("http://{}{}/drive{{0...{}}}", node.address, base, self.topology.drives_per_node - 1)
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(" ")
}
@@ -1091,4 +1329,130 @@ mod tests {
stdfs::remove_file(stamp_path).ok();
}
/// Build a cluster environment struct in-memory (no ports, no processes) so
/// that `build_volumes_arg` can be exercised as a pure string builder. Node
/// directories mirror what `with_topology` would create for the topology.
fn fake_cluster(topology: ClusterTopology) -> RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
let temp_dir = "/tmp/rustfs_cluster_test_FAKE".to_string();
let pools = topology.normalized_pools();
let mut pool_of_node = vec![0usize; topology.node_count];
for (pool_idx, nodes) in pools.iter().enumerate() {
for &n in nodes {
pool_of_node[n] = pool_idx;
}
}
let multidrive = topology.drives_per_node > 1;
let nodes = (0..topology.node_count)
.map(|i| {
let address = format!("127.0.0.1:{}", 9000 + i);
let data_dirs: Vec<String> = if multidrive {
(0..topology.drives_per_node)
.map(|d| format!("{}/node{}/drive{}", temp_dir, i, d))
.collect()
} else {
vec![format!("{}/node{}", temp_dir, i)]
};
ClusterNode {
url: format!("http://{}", address),
address,
data_dir: data_dirs[0].clone(),
data_dirs,
pool_idx: pool_of_node[i],
process: None,
}
})
.collect();
RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
nodes,
temp_dir,
access_key: DEFAULT_ACCESS_KEY.to_string(),
secret_key: DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY.to_string(),
extra_env: Vec::new(),
topology,
}
}
#[test]
fn volumes_single_pool_single_drive_is_backward_compatible() {
// The historical layout: one explicit endpoint per node, space-joined,
// no ellipses, no `drive` sub-directory.
let env = fake_cluster(ClusterTopology::single_pool(4));
assert_eq!(
env.build_volumes_arg(),
"http://127.0.0.1:9000/tmp/rustfs_cluster_test_FAKE/node0 \
http://127.0.0.1:9001/tmp/rustfs_cluster_test_FAKE/node1 \
http://127.0.0.1:9002/tmp/rustfs_cluster_test_FAKE/node2 \
http://127.0.0.1:9003/tmp/rustfs_cluster_test_FAKE/node3"
);
}
#[test]
fn volumes_single_pool_multidrive_enumerates_every_drive() {
// 4 nodes x 2 drives -> 8 explicit endpoints, one legacy pool. No
// ellipses, so the server parser keeps this as a single DistErasure pool.
let env = fake_cluster(ClusterTopology::single_pool_multidrive(4, 2));
let expected = (0..4)
.flat_map(|i| {
(0..2).map(move |d| format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}/tmp/rustfs_cluster_test_FAKE/node{}/drive{}", 9000 + i, i, d))
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(" ");
assert_eq!(env.build_volumes_arg(), expected);
assert_eq!(env.build_volumes_arg().split(' ').count(), 8);
}
#[test]
fn volumes_two_pool_uses_one_ellipses_arg_per_pool() {
// Two single-node pools, 2 drives each -> two ellipses arguments. The
// server parser treats each space-separated ellipses arg as its own pool.
let env = fake_cluster(ClusterTopology::per_node_pools(2, vec![vec![0], vec![1]]));
assert_eq!(
env.build_volumes_arg(),
"http://127.0.0.1:9000/tmp/rustfs_cluster_test_FAKE/node0/drive{0...1} \
http://127.0.0.1:9001/tmp/rustfs_cluster_test_FAKE/node1/drive{0...1}"
);
}
#[test]
fn topology_rejects_multi_node_pool() {
// A pool striped across two localhost nodes is not expressible.
let err = ClusterTopology::per_node_pools(2, vec![vec![0, 1], vec![2, 3]])
.validate()
.unwrap_err()
.to_string();
assert!(err.contains("not expressible"), "unexpected error: {err}");
}
#[test]
fn topology_rejects_single_drive_multi_pool() {
// The server parser rejects a single-drive ellipses pool (`drive{0...0}`).
let err = ClusterTopology::per_node_pools(1, vec![vec![0], vec![1]])
.validate()
.unwrap_err()
.to_string();
assert!(err.contains("drives_per_node >= 2"), "unexpected error: {err}");
}
#[test]
fn topology_rejects_unassigned_and_duplicated_nodes() {
// Node 2 is never assigned to a pool.
let mut t = ClusterTopology::single_pool_multidrive(3, 2);
t.pools = vec![vec![0], vec![1]];
assert!(t.validate().unwrap_err().to_string().contains("not assigned"));
// Node 0 assigned twice.
let mut t = ClusterTopology::single_pool_multidrive(2, 2);
t.pools = vec![vec![0], vec![0]];
assert!(t.validate().unwrap_err().to_string().contains("more than one pool"));
}
#[test]
fn topology_single_pool_accepts_any_drive_count() {
assert!(ClusterTopology::single_pool(4).validate().is_ok());
assert!(ClusterTopology::single_pool_multidrive(4, 4).validate().is_ok());
assert!(ClusterTopology::single_pool_multidrive(1, 1).validate().is_ok());
}
}
+127
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! E2E coverage for the opt-in global connection cap on the main API listener
//! (backlog#1191 follow-up, `RUSTFS_API_MAX_CONNECTIONS`): permits must be
//! released when connections close (no leak), and the cap must actually bound
//! concurrency — a queued connection is served only after a held one closes.
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging};
use serial_test::serial;
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
use tokio::net::TcpStream;
use tokio::time::timeout;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>;
/// Open a TCP connection and write one unauthenticated `GET /` (any response,
/// e.g. 403, proves the connection was accepted and served).
async fn open_and_request(addr: &str, connection: &str) -> std::io::Result<TcpStream> {
let mut stream = TcpStream::connect(addr).await?;
let request = format!("GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {addr}\r\nConnection: {connection}\r\n\r\n");
stream.write_all(request.as_bytes()).await?;
Ok(stream)
}
/// Read until the response head is complete, or `None` on timeout/close —
/// a `None` on an open socket means the connection sits unaccepted in the
/// kernel backlog behind the cap.
async fn read_response_head(stream: &mut TcpStream, dur: Duration) -> Option<String> {
let deadline = tokio::time::Instant::now() + dur;
let mut buf = vec![0u8; 4096];
let mut collected = String::new();
loop {
let remaining = deadline.checked_duration_since(tokio::time::Instant::now())?;
match timeout(remaining, stream.read(&mut buf)).await {
Ok(Ok(0)) | Ok(Err(_)) | Err(_) => return None,
Ok(Ok(n)) => {
collected.push_str(&String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf[..n]));
if collected.contains("\r\n\r\n") {
return Some(collected);
}
}
}
}
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn connection_cap_releases_permits_on_close() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_API_MAX_CONNECTIONS", "2")])
.await?;
// Ten sequential connections against cap 2: if permits leaked, the third
// request would already hang in the backlog and time out.
for i in 0..10 {
let mut stream = open_and_request(&env.address, "close").await?;
let head = read_response_head(&mut stream, Duration::from_secs(10))
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("request {i} got no response — a connection permit leaked"));
assert!(head.starts_with("HTTP/1.1"), "request {i} unexpected response: {head}");
}
Ok(())
}
/// Open a TCP connection and send an INCOMPLETE request head. Once accepted
/// it pins a connection permit: hyper waits for the rest of the head (75s
/// default header timeout) until we close the socket.
async fn open_and_stall(addr: &str) -> std::io::Result<TcpStream> {
let mut stream = TcpStream::connect(addr).await?;
stream
.write_all(format!("GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {addr}\r\n").as_bytes())
.await?;
Ok(stream)
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn connection_cap_blocks_excess_connections_until_permits_free() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_API_MAX_CONNECTIONS", "2")])
.await?;
// Let the readiness poller's pooled connection close and free its permit.
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
// Two stalled connections saturate cap 2 (a served-and-closed connection
// would release its permit immediately, so stalling is what makes the
// occupancy deterministic).
let stalled_a = open_and_stall(&env.address).await?;
let stalled_b = open_and_stall(&env.address).await?;
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(300)).await;
// A complete request now sits in the kernel backlog: connect() succeeds
// but no permit is available, so no response arrives.
let mut blocked = open_and_request(&env.address, "close").await?;
assert!(
read_response_head(&mut blocked, Duration::from_secs(3)).await.is_none(),
"cap 2 with two stalled connections must leave the third unserved"
);
// Dropping the stalled connections releases their permits (hyper sees
// EOF while reading the head); the queued request's bytes already sit in
// the socket buffer, so it must now be accepted and served.
drop(stalled_a);
drop(stalled_b);
let head = read_response_head(&mut blocked, Duration::from_secs(10))
.await
.expect("queued connection must be served after permits are released");
assert!(head.starts_with("HTTP/1.1"), "unexpected response: {head}");
Ok(())
}
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression test for Issue #4996: CopyObject must return the destination object's
//! checksum in `CopyObjectResult` and persist it so a later checksum-mode HEAD/GET
//! returns the same value. Covers both the requested-algorithm case (compute fresh)
//! and the no-algorithm case (preserve the source object's existing checksum).
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{BucketVersioningStatus, ChecksumAlgorithm, ChecksumMode, VersioningConfiguration};
use base64::Engine as _;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64;
use serial_test::serial;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use tracing::info;
async fn create_versioned_bucket(client: &aws_sdk_s3::Client, bucket: &str) {
client
.create_bucket()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("Failed to create bucket");
client
.put_bucket_versioning()
.bucket(bucket)
.versioning_configuration(
VersioningConfiguration::builder()
.status(BucketVersioningStatus::Enabled)
.build(),
)
.send()
.await
.expect("Failed to enable versioning");
}
/// Requested algorithm: a CopyObject asking for SHA256 must compute it over the copied
/// bytes, return it in `CopyObjectResult.ChecksumSHA256`, and persist it so a checksum-mode
/// HEAD on the destination returns the identical value.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_copy_with_checksum_algorithm_returns_and_persists_sha256() {
init_logging();
info!("Issue #4996: CopyObject with ChecksumAlgorithm=SHA256 must return and persist the checksum");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("Failed to create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await.expect("Failed to start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let src_bucket = "copy-checksum-req-src";
let dst_bucket = "copy-checksum-req-dst";
let src_key = "objects/source.bin";
let dst_key = "objects/dest.bin";
create_versioned_bucket(&client, src_bucket).await;
create_versioned_bucket(&client, dst_bucket).await;
let content = b"deterministic synthetic payload for copy-object checksum #4996";
let expected_sha256 = BASE64.encode(Sha256::digest(content));
client
.put_object()
.bucket(src_bucket)
.key(src_key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(content))
.send()
.await
.expect("PUT source failed");
let copy_out = client
.copy_object()
.bucket(dst_bucket)
.key(dst_key)
.copy_source(format!("{src_bucket}/{src_key}"))
.checksum_algorithm(ChecksumAlgorithm::Sha256)
.send()
.await
.expect("CopyObject with ChecksumAlgorithm must succeed");
// (3) The response must carry the freshly computed SHA-256 of the copied bytes.
let result = copy_out
.copy_object_result()
.expect("issue #4996: CopyObject must return a CopyObjectResult");
assert_eq!(
result.checksum_sha256(),
Some(expected_sha256.as_str()),
"issue #4996: CopyObjectResult.ChecksumSHA256 must equal the SHA-256 of the copied bytes"
);
// (4) A checksum-mode HEAD on the destination must return the same SHA-256.
let head = client
.head_object()
.bucket(dst_bucket)
.key(dst_key)
.checksum_mode(ChecksumMode::Enabled)
.send()
.await
.expect("HEAD destination failed");
assert_eq!(
head.checksum_sha256(),
Some(expected_sha256.as_str()),
"issue #4996: destination checksum-mode HEAD must return the same SHA-256 the copy reported"
);
env.stop_server();
}
/// No algorithm requested: when the source object already carries a checksum, the copy must
/// preserve it on the destination (AWS default), visible via a checksum-mode HEAD.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_copy_without_algorithm_preserves_source_checksum() {
init_logging();
info!("Issue #4996: CopyObject without ChecksumAlgorithm must preserve the source object's checksum");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("Failed to create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await.expect("Failed to start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let src_bucket = "copy-checksum-preserve-src";
let dst_bucket = "copy-checksum-preserve-dst";
let src_key = "objects/source.bin";
let dst_key = "objects/dest.bin";
create_versioned_bucket(&client, src_bucket).await;
create_versioned_bucket(&client, dst_bucket).await;
let content = b"another deterministic payload whose source checksum must survive the copy";
let expected_sha256 = BASE64.encode(Sha256::digest(content));
// Store the source WITH a SHA-256 checksum so it has one to preserve.
let put_src = client
.put_object()
.bucket(src_bucket)
.key(src_key)
.checksum_algorithm(ChecksumAlgorithm::Sha256)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(content))
.send()
.await
.expect("PUT source with checksum failed");
assert_eq!(
put_src.checksum_sha256(),
Some(expected_sha256.as_str()),
"source PUT must report the SHA-256 it stored"
);
// Copy WITHOUT specifying a checksum algorithm.
let copy_out = client
.copy_object()
.bucket(dst_bucket)
.key(dst_key)
.copy_source(format!("{src_bucket}/{src_key}"))
.send()
.await
.expect("CopyObject without ChecksumAlgorithm must succeed");
// The response should echo the preserved source checksum.
let result = copy_out
.copy_object_result()
.expect("issue #4996: CopyObject must return a CopyObjectResult");
assert_eq!(
result.checksum_sha256(),
Some(expected_sha256.as_str()),
"issue #4996: a no-algorithm copy must preserve and report the source object's SHA-256"
);
// And a checksum-mode HEAD on the destination must return that same preserved SHA-256.
let head = client
.head_object()
.bucket(dst_bucket)
.key(dst_key)
.checksum_mode(ChecksumMode::Enabled)
.send()
.await
.expect("HEAD destination failed");
assert_eq!(
head.checksum_sha256(),
Some(expected_sha256.as_str()),
"issue #4996: destination checksum-mode HEAD must return the preserved source SHA-256"
);
env.stop_server();
}
/// Requested algorithm differs from the source's: a source stored with SHA256, copied while
/// requesting CRC32, must return/persist the freshly computed CRC32 and must NOT carry the
/// source's SHA256 through. Guards the request-over-source precedence and the destination's
/// checksum-not-inherited path, and exercises the CRC32 code path (a different branch of
/// ChecksumType::from_string than SHA256).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_copy_requested_algorithm_overrides_source_checksum() {
init_logging();
info!("Issue #4996: a requested CopyObject checksum algorithm must override the source object's algorithm");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("Failed to create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await.expect("Failed to start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let src_bucket = "copy-checksum-override-src";
let dst_bucket = "copy-checksum-override-dst";
let src_key = "objects/source.bin";
let ref_key = "objects/reference-crc32.bin";
let dst_key = "objects/dest.bin";
create_versioned_bucket(&client, src_bucket).await;
create_versioned_bucket(&client, dst_bucket).await;
let content = b"payload whose copy must be re-checksummed with a different algorithm";
let expected_sha256 = BASE64.encode(Sha256::digest(content));
// Source is stored WITH a SHA-256 checksum.
client
.put_object()
.bucket(src_bucket)
.key(src_key)
.checksum_algorithm(ChecksumAlgorithm::Sha256)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(content))
.send()
.await
.expect("PUT source with SHA256 failed");
// Establish the canonical CRC32 the server computes for this content via a reference PUT,
// so the copy's CRC32 can be asserted against an exact server-computed value.
let ref_put = client
.put_object()
.bucket(src_bucket)
.key(ref_key)
.checksum_algorithm(ChecksumAlgorithm::Crc32)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(content))
.send()
.await
.expect("reference PUT with CRC32 failed");
let expected_crc32 = ref_put
.checksum_crc32()
.expect("reference PUT must report a CRC32")
.to_string();
// Copy the SHA256 source while requesting CRC32.
let copy_out = client
.copy_object()
.bucket(dst_bucket)
.key(dst_key)
.copy_source(format!("{src_bucket}/{src_key}"))
.checksum_algorithm(ChecksumAlgorithm::Crc32)
.send()
.await
.expect("CopyObject requesting a different algorithm must succeed");
let result = copy_out
.copy_object_result()
.expect("issue #4996: CopyObject must return a CopyObjectResult");
// The requested CRC32 must be computed and returned.
assert_eq!(
result.checksum_crc32(),
Some(expected_crc32.as_str()),
"issue #4996: a requested CRC32 must be computed fresh over the copied bytes"
);
// The source's SHA256 must NOT leak through — the requested algorithm wins.
assert_eq!(
result.checksum_sha256(),
None,
"issue #4996: the source object's SHA256 must not be inherited when a different algorithm is requested"
);
assert_ne!(
result.checksum_crc32(),
Some(expected_sha256.as_str()),
"sanity: CRC32 field must not carry the SHA256 value"
);
// The destination must persist CRC32 (and only CRC32) for a checksum-mode HEAD.
let head = client
.head_object()
.bucket(dst_bucket)
.key(dst_key)
.checksum_mode(ChecksumMode::Enabled)
.send()
.await
.expect("HEAD destination failed");
assert_eq!(
head.checksum_crc32(),
Some(expected_crc32.as_str()),
"issue #4996: destination checksum-mode HEAD must return the requested CRC32"
);
assert_eq!(
head.checksum_sha256(),
None,
"issue #4996: destination must not report the source's SHA256 after an override copy"
);
env.stop_server();
}
}
@@ -160,4 +160,146 @@ mod tests {
env.stop_server();
}
/// Regression test for Issue #4976: a versioned-source CopyObject must echo the exact source
/// version copied via `x-amz-copy-source-version-id` (SDK `CopySourceVersionId`), kept distinct
/// from the newly created destination `x-amz-version-id`.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_copy_of_non_latest_source_version_returns_copy_source_version_id() {
init_logging();
info!("Issue #4976: versioned CopyObject must return x-amz-copy-source-version-id for the exact source version");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("Failed to create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await.expect("Failed to start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let src_bucket = "copy-source-version-header-src";
let dst_bucket = "copy-source-version-header-dst";
let src_key = "reports/quarantined.bin";
let dst_key = "reports/promoted.bin";
for bucket in [src_bucket, dst_bucket] {
client
.create_bucket()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("Failed to create bucket");
client
.put_bucket_versioning()
.bucket(bucket)
.versioning_configuration(
VersioningConfiguration::builder()
.status(BucketVersioningStatus::Enabled)
.build(),
)
.send()
.await
.expect("Failed to enable versioning");
}
// Source version 1: the exact (non-latest) version we will copy.
let v1_content = b"quarantined payload -- source version one (target of the copy)";
let put_v1 = client
.put_object()
.bucket(src_bucket)
.key(src_key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(v1_content))
.send()
.await
.expect("PUT source v1 failed");
let v1_id = put_v1.version_id().expect("source v1 must have a version id").to_string();
// Source version 2: becomes the latest, so v1 is deliberately NOT the current version.
let v2_content = b"quarantined payload -- source version two (now current, must be ignored)";
let put_v2 = client
.put_object()
.bucket(src_bucket)
.key(src_key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(v2_content))
.send()
.await
.expect("PUT source v2 failed");
let v2_id = put_v2.version_id().expect("source v2 must have a version id").to_string();
assert_ne!(v1_id, v2_id, "the two source puts must produce distinct versions");
// Copy the exact NON-LATEST source version into the destination bucket.
let copy_out = client
.copy_object()
.bucket(dst_bucket)
.key(dst_key)
.copy_source(format!("{src_bucket}/{src_key}?versionId={v1_id}"))
.send()
.await
.expect("CopyObject of a versioned source must succeed");
// (3) The response must echo the exact source version copied.
let copy_source_version_id = copy_out
.copy_source_version_id()
.expect("issue #4976: response must include x-amz-copy-source-version-id for a versioned source");
assert_eq!(
copy_source_version_id, v1_id,
"x-amz-copy-source-version-id must equal the exact source version requested, not the latest source version"
);
assert_ne!(
copy_source_version_id, v2_id,
"x-amz-copy-source-version-id must not be the latest source version"
);
// (4) The destination header must identify a distinct, newly created version.
let dst_version_id = copy_out
.version_id()
.expect("destination copy must create a new version id")
.to_string();
assert!(!dst_version_id.is_empty(), "destination version id must be present");
assert_ne!(dst_version_id, v1_id, "destination version must be distinct from the source version");
assert_ne!(
dst_version_id, v2_id,
"destination version must be distinct from the source latest version"
);
// (5) The destination must hold the exact bytes/size of the copied (v1) source version.
let head = client
.head_object()
.bucket(dst_bucket)
.key(dst_key)
.send()
.await
.expect("HEAD destination failed");
assert_eq!(
head.content_length(),
Some(v1_content.len() as i64),
"destination size must equal the copied source version (v1)"
);
let get_dst = client
.get_object()
.bucket(dst_bucket)
.key(dst_key)
.version_id(&dst_version_id)
.send()
.await
.expect("GET destination failed");
let dst_body = get_dst.body.collect().await.expect("collect destination body").into_bytes();
assert_eq!(
dst_body.as_ref(),
v1_content,
"destination bytes must exactly equal the copied source version (v1), not the latest (v2)"
);
// (6) The source version copied from must remain present and independently readable.
let get_src_v1 = client
.get_object()
.bucket(src_bucket)
.key(src_key)
.version_id(&v1_id)
.send()
.await
.expect("GET source v1 failed after copy");
let src_v1_body = get_src_v1.body.collect().await.expect("collect source v1 body").into_bytes();
assert_eq!(src_v1_body.as_ref(), v1_content, "source v1 must remain intact after the copy");
env.stop_server();
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
# Programmable fake S3 target
This module is the shared failure-injection boundary for replication end-to-end tests. It runs an in-process, path-style S3 endpoint backed by `s3s`; no production crate depends on it.
`FakeS3Target::start()` creates the listener. Add target buckets with `create_bucket`, point a RustFS remote target at `address()`, use `FAKE_ACCESS_KEY` / `FAKE_SECRET_KEY`, then enqueue per-operation faults with `inject`. Faults for one operation are consumed in FIFO order and do not consume faults queued for another operation. A fault is consumed only after `s3s` verifies the full request signature, so anonymous, other-access-key, and bad-signature traffic cannot disturb a script.
Supported data operations are HeadBucket, GetBucketVersioning, PUT/GET/HEAD/DELETE Object, and create/upload/complete/abort multipart upload. `create_bucket` models general-purpose buckets in S3's shared global namespace; account-regional namespace buckets and their `-an` names are intentionally out of scope. Buckets are versioned: PUT creates a version, DELETE without `versionId` creates a delete marker, and DELETE with `versionId` removes exactly that version. Internal source version IDs must be UUIDs and are stored canonically. Source mtime is honored only for source-replication PUT/DELETE requests; absent or invalid values use receipt time, matching RustFS, while multipart completion always uses receipt time. Replicated versions are ordered newest-first by source mtime so late older versions and delete markers do not become current. Equal mtimes prefer objects over delete markers, then canonical UUID order; RustFS's internal FileMeta signature tie-break is intentionally out of scope because it is not part of the target S3 protocol. Multipart part numbers follow S3's `1..=10000` range, and every completed part except the final part must be at least 5 MiB.
Fault actions cover HTTP 401/403/503 responses, pre-dispatch delay, connection abort when a logical request-body threshold is reached, streaming slow drain, and a deliberately wrong response ETag (including multipart-complete XML). `requests()` returns the ordered, credential-free request journal for assertions.
The listener is loopback-only. It admits at most 64 active connections and two concurrently buffered request bodies; authenticated multipart-complete XML collection and assembly take both body permits. Keep-alive is disabled, request-header reads are bounded to 30 seconds, a parsed request is bounded to 65 seconds, and the complete connection lifetime is bounded to 100 seconds. It retains at most 256 buckets, 4,096 journal entries, 4,096 scripted faults, 4,096 object versions, 256 multipart uploads, and 10,000 multipart parts. Retained identifiers are capped at 1 KiB, user metadata at 2 KiB, and content type at 1 KiB. A PUT or uploaded part is capped at 64 MiB; a completed multipart object and all stored object/part data are capped at 128 MiB. Body drain, body-permit waits, delay, and slow-drain execution are bounded to 30 seconds; each slow-drain slice delay must be below that bound.
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+498
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,498 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! In-process, socket-level network fault-injection proxy for black-box
//! cluster E2E tests (backlog#1325 network fault-injection block).
//!
//! `FaultProxy` binds a TCP listener on a random local port, forwards every
//! accepted connection to a fixed target address, and lets a test flip the
//! forwarding behaviour at runtime. It is the black-box counterpart to the
//! in-process white-box hooks (rename barrier, disk call counters): those
//! `#[cfg(test)]` primitives cannot reach across the process boundary into a
//! spawned RustFS server, whereas this proxy sits on the wire between two
//! nodes and needs no cooperation from the peer.
//!
//! Service targets:
//! - **#1312 / #1319** lock-plane one-way partition and accept-then-blackhole
//! peer: run a node's lock/RPC port through the proxy, then
//! [`FaultMode::Partition`] one direction (data plane stays reachable via a
//! separate direct port) or [`FaultMode::Blackhole`] the whole connection.
//! - **#1327** cross-process replay / tamper harness: the proxy is the wire
//! seam a replay/tamper filter can later hook into.
//!
//! Supported fault modes:
//! - [`FaultMode::Pass`]: transparent byte forwarding (round-trip identical).
//! - [`FaultMode::Latency`]: delay every forwarded chunk by a fixed duration.
//! - [`FaultMode::Blackhole`]: accept the connection but forward nothing in
//! either direction and never respond (models an accepted-then-dead peer);
//! the client observes a read timeout, the proxy never panics.
//! - [`FaultMode::Partition`]: block exactly one direction while the other
//! keeps flowing (models a lock-RPC one-way partition with a live data
//! plane).
//!
//! Wiring this into the cluster harness ("expose node port N through a proxy")
//! is intentionally left as a follow-up: the harness multi-drive / 2-pool
//! changes land separately (rustfs#4937), so this block ships the proxy tool
//! plus its local self-tests against a loopback echo server and stays
//! independent of that harness work.
//!
//! # Example
//!
//! ```ignore
//! let proxy = FaultProxy::start(target_addr).await?;
//! let via = proxy.local_addr(); // point the client here instead of `target_addr`
//! proxy.set_mode(FaultMode::Latency(Duration::from_millis(50)));
//! // ... exercise the client ...
//! proxy.set_mode(FaultMode::Partition(Direction::ClientToServer));
//! // ... assert the blocked direction is dead ...
//! proxy.shutdown().await; // releases the listener port
//! ```
use std::io;
use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr};
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
use tokio::net::{TcpListener, TcpStream};
use tokio::sync::watch;
use tokio::task::JoinHandle;
/// A single logical direction of a proxied connection.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Direction {
/// Bytes travelling from the connecting client towards the target server
/// (the forward / request path).
ClientToServer,
/// Bytes travelling from the target server back to the client (the return
/// / response path).
ServerToClient,
}
/// Runtime-switchable forwarding behaviour of a [`FaultProxy`].
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum FaultMode {
/// Forward bytes transparently in both directions.
Pass,
/// Forward bytes in both directions, but delay every chunk by this
/// duration before it is written onward.
Latency(Duration),
/// Accept connections but forward nothing in either direction and never
/// respond. Bytes read from either side are drained and discarded so the
/// proxy never blocks or panics; the peer simply never hears back.
Blackhole,
/// Block exactly one direction (drop its bytes) while the other direction
/// keeps forwarding normally.
Partition(Direction),
}
/// An async TCP proxy that forwards a random local port to a fixed target and
/// can inject network faults at runtime.
///
/// The proxy owns a background accept loop; each accepted connection is
/// handled by its own task pair (one per direction). [`FaultProxy::shutdown`]
/// stops the accept loop and drops the listener, releasing the bound port.
pub struct FaultProxy {
listen_addr: SocketAddr,
target: SocketAddr,
mode_tx: watch::Sender<FaultMode>,
shutdown_tx: watch::Sender<bool>,
accept_task: JoinHandle<()>,
}
impl FaultProxy {
/// Bind a listener on `127.0.0.1:0` and start forwarding accepted
/// connections to `target`. Starts in [`FaultMode::Pass`].
pub async fn start(target: SocketAddr) -> io::Result<Self> {
let listener = TcpListener::bind((Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, 0)).await?;
let listen_addr = listener.local_addr()?;
let (mode_tx, mode_rx) = watch::channel(FaultMode::Pass);
let (shutdown_tx, shutdown_rx) = watch::channel(false);
let accept_task = tokio::spawn(accept_loop(listener, target, mode_rx, shutdown_rx));
Ok(Self {
listen_addr,
target,
mode_tx,
shutdown_tx,
accept_task,
})
}
/// Local address the proxy is listening on. Point clients here instead of
/// the real target to route their traffic through the proxy.
pub fn local_addr(&self) -> SocketAddr {
self.listen_addr
}
/// The fixed target address every connection is forwarded to.
pub fn target_addr(&self) -> SocketAddr {
self.target
}
/// The mode currently in effect.
pub fn mode(&self) -> FaultMode {
*self.mode_tx.borrow()
}
/// Switch the fault mode at runtime. Takes effect on the next chunk read by
/// each direction of every live and future connection.
pub fn set_mode(&self, mode: FaultMode) {
// A send only fails if every receiver has dropped, i.e. the accept loop
// and all connections have already ended; there is nothing to steer.
let _ = self.mode_tx.send(mode);
}
/// Stop the accept loop, signal live connections to wind down, and drop the
/// listener so the bound port is released. Awaits the accept loop so the
/// port is free once this returns.
pub async fn shutdown(self) {
let _ = self.shutdown_tx.send(true);
let _ = self.accept_task.await;
}
}
/// Accept loop: takes new connections until shutdown is signalled, then returns
/// (dropping `listener`, which releases the port).
async fn accept_loop(
listener: TcpListener,
target: SocketAddr,
mode_rx: watch::Receiver<FaultMode>,
mut shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
) {
loop {
tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = shutdown_rx.changed() => {
if *shutdown_rx.borrow() {
break;
}
}
accepted = listener.accept() => {
match accepted {
Ok((client, _peer)) => {
tokio::spawn(handle_connection(
client,
target,
mode_rx.clone(),
shutdown_rx.clone(),
));
}
// A transient accept error should not tear the proxy down.
Err(_) => continue,
}
}
}
}
}
/// Bridge one accepted client connection to a fresh connection to the target,
/// running an independent pump per direction.
async fn handle_connection(
client: TcpStream,
target: SocketAddr,
mode_rx: watch::Receiver<FaultMode>,
shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
) {
let server = match TcpStream::connect(target).await {
Ok(s) => s,
// Target unreachable: nothing to bridge; drop the client.
Err(_) => return,
};
let (client_rd, client_wr) = client.into_split();
let (server_rd, server_wr) = server.into_split();
let up = tokio::spawn(pump(
Direction::ClientToServer,
client_rd,
server_wr,
mode_rx.clone(),
shutdown_rx.clone(),
));
let down = tokio::spawn(pump(Direction::ServerToClient, server_rd, client_wr, mode_rx, shutdown_rx));
let _ = up.await;
let _ = down.await;
}
/// Copy bytes from `from` to `to` for a single direction, applying the current
/// [`FaultMode`]. Returns when the source hits EOF/error, a write fails, or
/// shutdown is signalled.
async fn pump<R, W>(
dir: Direction,
mut from: R,
mut to: W,
mut mode_rx: watch::Receiver<FaultMode>,
mut shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
) where
R: AsyncReadExt + Unpin,
W: AsyncWriteExt + Unpin,
{
let mut buf = vec![0u8; 16 * 1024];
loop {
let n = tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = shutdown_rx.changed() => break,
read = from.read(&mut buf) => match read {
Ok(0) => break, // clean EOF
Ok(n) => n,
Err(_) => break, // reset / error: end this direction
},
};
// Snapshot the mode without holding the borrow across an await.
let mode = *mode_rx.borrow_and_update();
match mode {
// Whole connection is a black hole: drain and drop.
FaultMode::Blackhole => continue,
// This direction is partitioned off: drop its bytes; the peer keeps
// reading nothing while the other direction may still flow.
FaultMode::Partition(blocked) if blocked == dir => continue,
FaultMode::Latency(delay) => {
tokio::time::sleep(delay).await;
if to.write_all(&buf[..n]).await.is_err() {
break;
}
if to.flush().await.is_err() {
break;
}
}
FaultMode::Pass | FaultMode::Partition(_) => {
if to.write_all(&buf[..n]).await.is_err() {
break;
}
if to.flush().await.is_err() {
break;
}
}
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Instant;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
/// A loopback echo server that records every byte it receives, so tests can
/// distinguish "the server never got it" (client->server blocked) from "the
/// server got it but the reply never came back" (server->client blocked).
struct EchoServer {
addr: SocketAddr,
received: Arc<Mutex<Vec<u8>>>,
_task: JoinHandle<()>,
}
impl EchoServer {
async fn start() -> io::Result<Self> {
let listener = TcpListener::bind((Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, 0)).await?;
let addr = listener.local_addr()?;
let received = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
let received_task = received.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
let Ok((mut sock, _)) = listener.accept().await else {
break;
};
let received_conn = received_task.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut buf = vec![0u8; 16 * 1024];
loop {
match sock.read(&mut buf).await {
Ok(0) | Err(_) => break,
Ok(n) => {
received_conn.lock().await.extend_from_slice(&buf[..n]);
if sock.write_all(&buf[..n]).await.is_err() {
break;
}
let _ = sock.flush().await;
}
}
}
});
}
});
Ok(Self {
addr,
received,
_task: task,
})
}
async fn received(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.received.lock().await.clone()
}
}
/// Write `payload`, then try to read up to `want` bytes with a deadline.
/// Returns the bytes actually received before the timeout (possibly empty).
async fn write_then_read(stream: &mut TcpStream, payload: &[u8], want: usize, timeout: Duration) -> Vec<u8> {
stream.write_all(payload).await.expect("client write");
stream.flush().await.expect("client flush");
let mut out = Vec::new();
let mut buf = vec![0u8; want.max(1)];
let deadline = tokio::time::Instant::now() + timeout;
while out.len() < want {
let remaining = deadline.saturating_duration_since(tokio::time::Instant::now());
if remaining.is_zero() {
break;
}
match tokio::time::timeout(remaining, stream.read(&mut buf)).await {
Ok(Ok(0)) => break, // peer closed
Ok(Ok(n)) => out.extend_from_slice(&buf[..n]),
Ok(Err(_)) => break, // connection error
Err(_) => break, // read timed out
}
}
out
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn pass_mode_round_trips_bytes() {
let echo = EchoServer::start().await.unwrap();
let proxy = FaultProxy::start(echo.addr).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(proxy.mode(), FaultMode::Pass);
let mut client = TcpStream::connect(proxy.local_addr()).await.unwrap();
let payload = b"hello-fault-proxy";
let got = write_then_read(&mut client, payload, payload.len(), Duration::from_secs(5)).await;
assert_eq!(got, payload, "pass mode must forward bytes unchanged");
assert_eq!(echo.received().await, payload, "server must have received the bytes");
proxy.shutdown().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn latency_mode_delays_forwarding() {
// Loose lower bound only: sleep() guarantees *at least* the delay, so
// the assertion cannot flake on a slow machine, and we never assert an
// upper bound.
let delay = Duration::from_millis(200);
let echo = EchoServer::start().await.unwrap();
let proxy = FaultProxy::start(echo.addr).await.unwrap();
proxy.set_mode(FaultMode::Latency(delay));
let mut client = TcpStream::connect(proxy.local_addr()).await.unwrap();
let payload = b"delayed";
let start = Instant::now();
let got = write_then_read(&mut client, payload, payload.len(), Duration::from_secs(5)).await;
let elapsed = start.elapsed();
assert_eq!(got, payload, "latency mode must still deliver the bytes");
// One delay on the request path plus one on the echo return path: the
// round trip must exceed at least a single configured delay.
assert!(elapsed >= delay, "round trip {elapsed:?} shorter than configured delay {delay:?}");
proxy.shutdown().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn blackhole_mode_yields_no_response_and_no_panic() {
let echo = EchoServer::start().await.unwrap();
let proxy = FaultProxy::start(echo.addr).await.unwrap();
proxy.set_mode(FaultMode::Blackhole);
let mut client = TcpStream::connect(proxy.local_addr()).await.unwrap();
let got = write_then_read(&mut client, b"into-the-void", 1, Duration::from_millis(300)).await;
assert!(got.is_empty(), "blackhole mode must not return any bytes, got {got:?}");
assert!(echo.received().await.is_empty(), "blackhole must not forward to the server");
// Proxy is still alive and steerable after a blackholed connection.
proxy.set_mode(FaultMode::Pass);
proxy.shutdown().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn partition_client_to_server_blocks_request_path() {
let echo = EchoServer::start().await.unwrap();
let proxy = FaultProxy::start(echo.addr).await.unwrap();
proxy.set_mode(FaultMode::Partition(Direction::ClientToServer));
let mut client = TcpStream::connect(proxy.local_addr()).await.unwrap();
let got = write_then_read(&mut client, b"blocked-request", 1, Duration::from_millis(300)).await;
assert!(got.is_empty(), "client->server partition must yield no echo");
assert!(
echo.received().await.is_empty(),
"client->server partition must stop bytes from reaching the server"
);
proxy.shutdown().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn partition_server_to_client_blocks_only_return_path() {
let echo = EchoServer::start().await.unwrap();
let proxy = FaultProxy::start(echo.addr).await.unwrap();
proxy.set_mode(FaultMode::Partition(Direction::ServerToClient));
let mut client = TcpStream::connect(proxy.local_addr()).await.unwrap();
let payload = b"one-way";
let got = write_then_read(&mut client, payload, 1, Duration::from_millis(300)).await;
// Client hears nothing back...
assert!(got.is_empty(), "server->client partition must block the reply");
// ...but the request path is live, so the server did receive the bytes.
// Poll briefly to avoid racing the forward direction.
let mut server_saw = Vec::new();
for _ in 0..30 {
server_saw = echo.received().await;
if !server_saw.is_empty() {
break;
}
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
}
assert_eq!(server_saw, payload, "server->client partition must leave the request path intact");
proxy.shutdown().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn set_mode_switches_behaviour_at_runtime() {
let echo = EchoServer::start().await.unwrap();
let proxy = FaultProxy::start(echo.addr).await.unwrap();
// Start passing: first exchange round-trips.
let mut client = TcpStream::connect(proxy.local_addr()).await.unwrap();
let first = write_then_read(&mut client, b"first", 5, Duration::from_secs(5)).await;
assert_eq!(first, b"first", "initial pass exchange must round-trip");
// Flip to blackhole on the same live connection: the next write gets no reply.
proxy.set_mode(FaultMode::Blackhole);
let second = write_then_read(&mut client, b"second", 1, Duration::from_millis(300)).await;
assert!(second.is_empty(), "after switching to blackhole the live connection must go silent");
proxy.shutdown().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn shutdown_releases_the_listener_port() {
let echo = EchoServer::start().await.unwrap();
let proxy = FaultProxy::start(echo.addr).await.unwrap();
let addr = proxy.local_addr();
proxy.shutdown().await;
// The port must be free to bind again once shutdown returns.
let rebind = TcpListener::bind(addr).await;
assert!(rebind.is_ok(), "shutdown must release the listener port {addr}");
}
}
+26
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,18 @@ pub mod common;
#[cfg(test)]
pub mod chaos;
// Programmable S3 target for replication failure-path tests (backlog#1147 repl-8).
#[cfg(test)]
pub mod fake_s3_target;
// Socket-level network fault-injection proxy for black-box cluster tests
// (backlog#1325 network fault-injection block): latency / blackhole / one-way
// partition on the wire between nodes. Serves #1312/#1319 (lock-plane one-way
// partition, accept-then-blackhole peer) and #1327 (cross-process replay/tamper
// seam); cluster-harness wiring is a follow-up (rustfs#4937).
#[cfg(test)]
pub mod fault_proxy;
// Reliability tests built on the fault-injection harness
#[cfg(test)]
mod reliability_disk_fault_test;
@@ -71,6 +83,10 @@ mod security_boundary_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod api_rate_limit_test;
// Opt-in global connection cap on the main listener (backlog#1191 follow-up)
#[cfg(test)]
mod connection_cap_test;
// Admin authorization gate: non-admin denial + root-credential lifecycle (backlog#1151 sec-4)
#[cfg(test)]
mod admin_auth_test;
@@ -147,6 +163,10 @@ mod object_lock;
#[cfg(test)]
mod cluster_concurrency_test;
// Multi-drive (drivesPerNode) and 2-pool cluster harness smoke tests
#[cfg(test)]
mod cluster_multidrive_pool_test;
// PutObject / MultipartUpload with checksum (Content-MD5, x-amz-checksum-*)
#[cfg(test)]
mod checksum_upload_test;
@@ -170,6 +190,9 @@ mod copy_object_metadata_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod copy_object_version_restore_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod copy_object_checksum_test;
// S3 dummy-compat bucket API tests
#[cfg(test)]
mod bucket_logging_test;
@@ -219,6 +242,9 @@ mod console_smoke_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod admin_iam_crud_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod admin_pools_test;
// Replication extension end-to-end regression tests
#[cfg(test)]
mod replication_extension_test;
+52 -14
View File
@@ -53,6 +53,17 @@ fn sse_customer_key_md5_base64(key: &str) -> String {
base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(md5::compute(key).0)
}
/// Env var consumed by the local SSE-S3 DEK provider when KMS is not configured.
///
/// Since rustfs#3564 the server fails closed on managed SSE (SSE-S3 or
/// bucket-default encryption) unless KMS is configured or this master key is
/// provided, so tests exercising managed SSE on a bare server must seed it.
const LOCAL_SSE_MASTER_KEY_ENV: &str = "RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY";
fn local_sse_master_key_value() -> String {
base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode([0x42u8; 32])
}
async fn make_tar(files: &[(&str, &[u8])], dirs: &[&str]) -> Vec<u8> {
let buf = Cursor::new(Vec::new());
let mut builder = tokio_tar::Builder::new(buf);
@@ -105,7 +116,11 @@ async fn make_tar_with_pax_entry(path: &str, data: &[u8], mtime: Option<u64>, pa
pax_payload.extend(build_pax_record(key, value));
}
let mut pax_header = tokio_tar::Header::new_gnu();
// Pax extension entries must carry a POSIX ustar header — this is what real
// tar writers emit, and the server-side reader rejects an XHeader typeflag on
// GNU-format headers ("extension typeflag is not permitted on an unrecognized
// header").
let mut pax_header = tokio_tar::Header::new_ustar();
pax_header.set_entry_type(tokio_tar::EntryType::XHeader);
pax_header.set_size(pax_payload.len() as u64);
pax_header.set_mode(0o644);
@@ -926,7 +941,9 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_accepts_sse_s3() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let master_key = local_sse_master_key_value();
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[(LOCAL_SSE_MASTER_KEY_ENV, master_key.as_str())])
.await?;
let bucket = "anon-post-sse-s3";
let object_key = "post-sse-s3-object.txt";
@@ -982,7 +999,9 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_uses_bucket_default_sse_s3() -> Result<(), B
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let master_key = local_sse_master_key_value();
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[(LOCAL_SSE_MASTER_KEY_ENV, master_key.as_str())])
.await?;
let bucket = "anon-post-default-sse-s3";
let object_key = "post-default-sse-s3-object.txt";
@@ -1053,7 +1072,9 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_uses_bucket_default_sse_kms() -> Result<(),
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let master_key = local_sse_master_key_value();
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[(LOCAL_SSE_MASTER_KEY_ENV, master_key.as_str())])
.await?;
let bucket = "anon-post-default-sse-kms";
let object_key = "post-default-sse-kms-object.txt";
@@ -1172,15 +1193,24 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_sse_s3_policy_mismatch() -> Result<(
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_sse_s3_missing_from_policy_conditions()
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_accepts_sse_s3_missing_from_policy_conditions()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
// MinIO-compatible POST-policy validation (s3s-project/s3s#608) exempts the
// x-amz-server-side-encryption* form fields from the "every form field must
// appear in the policy conditions" rule, so an SSE-S3 field that the policy
// does not mention is accepted and encryption is applied. When the policy
// does cover the field, a value mismatch is still rejected — see
// test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_sse_s3_policy_mismatch.
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let master_key = local_sse_master_key_value();
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[(LOCAL_SSE_MASTER_KEY_ENV, master_key.as_str())])
.await?;
let bucket = "anon-post-sse-s3-missing";
let object_key = "post-sse-s3-missing-object.txt";
let expected_body = b"post-sse-s3-missing".to_vec();
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
admin_client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
@@ -1198,7 +1228,7 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_sse_s3_missing_from_policy_condition
.text("x-amz-server-side-encryption", "AES256")
.part(
"file",
reqwest::multipart::Part::bytes(b"post-sse-s3-missing".to_vec())
reqwest::multipart::Part::bytes(expected_body.clone())
.file_name("upload.txt")
.mime_str("text/plain")?,
);
@@ -1212,11 +1242,15 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_sse_s3_missing_from_policy_condition
let status = post_resp.status();
let response_body = post_resp.text().await?;
assert_eq!(status, reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
assert!(
response_body.contains("<Code>AccessDenied</Code>"),
"response should contain AccessDenied code, got: {response_body}"
);
assert_eq!(status, reqwest::StatusCode::NO_CONTENT);
assert!(response_body.is_empty(), "204 response should not contain a body, got: {response_body}");
let head = admin_client.head_object().bucket(bucket).key(object_key).send().await?;
assert_eq!(head.server_side_encryption().map(|value| value.as_str()), Some("AES256"));
let uploaded = admin_client.get_object().bucket(bucket).key(object_key).send().await?;
let uploaded = uploaded.body.collect().await?.into_bytes();
assert_eq!(uploaded.as_ref(), expected_body.as_slice());
Ok(())
}
@@ -5041,7 +5075,9 @@ async fn test_signed_put_object_extract_preserves_sse_s3_and_redirect() -> Resul
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let sse_master_key = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode([0x42u8; 32]);
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY", sse_master_key.as_str())])
.await?;
let bucket = "signed-extract-sse-s3-redirect";
let archive_key = "encrypted-metadata.tar";
@@ -5318,7 +5354,9 @@ async fn test_signed_put_object_extract_uses_bucket_default_sse_s3() -> Result<(
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let sse_master_key = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode([0x42u8; 32]);
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY", sse_master_key.as_str())])
.await?;
let bucket = "signed-extract-default-sse-s3";
let archive_key = "default-encryption.tar";
+292 -16
View File
@@ -39,10 +39,17 @@ use local_ip_address::local_ip;
use reqwest::StatusCode;
use rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD;
use rustfs_signer::sign_v4;
use rustfs_utils::egress::ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS;
use s3s::Body;
use serde_json::Value;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::error::Error;
use std::path::Path;
use std::sync::{
Arc, Once,
atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering},
};
use std::thread;
use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
use tokio::net::TcpListener;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
@@ -64,6 +71,11 @@ fn target_arn(target_name: &str) -> String {
format!("arn:rustfs:sqs:{NOTIFY_REGION}:{target_name}:webhook")
}
fn endpoint_origin(endpoint: &str) -> Result<String, BoxError> {
let parsed = reqwest::Url::parse(endpoint)?;
Ok(parsed.origin().ascii_serialization())
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// In-test HTTP event receiver
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -147,7 +159,175 @@ async fn spawn_event_collector() -> Result<(String, mpsc::UnboundedReceiver<Valu
let endpoint_ip = local_ip()?;
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let handle = serve_event_collector(listener, tx);
Ok((format!("http://{endpoint_ip}.nip.io:{port}/events"), rx, handle))
Ok((format!("http://{}/events", std::net::SocketAddr::new(endpoint_ip, port)), rx, handle))
}
struct HttpsEventCollector {
endpoint: String,
running: Arc<AtomicBool>,
handle: Option<thread::JoinHandle<()>>,
events: mpsc::UnboundedReceiver<Value>,
}
impl HttpsEventCollector {
fn endpoint(&self) -> &str {
&self.endpoint
}
fn events_mut(&mut self) -> &mut mpsc::UnboundedReceiver<Value> {
&mut self.events
}
fn shutdown(&mut self) -> TestResult {
self.running.store(false, Ordering::Relaxed);
if let Ok(parsed) = self.endpoint.parse::<reqwest::Url>()
&& let Some(port) = parsed.port()
{
let _ = std::net::TcpStream::connect(("127.0.0.1", port));
}
if let Some(handle) = self.handle.take() {
handle.join().map_err(|_| "https event collector thread panicked")?;
}
Ok(())
}
}
impl Drop for HttpsEventCollector {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let _ = self.shutdown();
}
}
fn spawn_https_event_collector(ca_path: &Path) -> Result<HttpsEventCollector, BoxError> {
use rustls::{
ServerConfig,
pki_types::{PrivateKeyDer, PrivatePkcs8KeyDer},
};
use std::io::ErrorKind;
use std::net::TcpListener as StdTcpListener;
static INSTALL_CRYPTO_PROVIDER: Once = Once::new();
INSTALL_CRYPTO_PROVIDER.call_once(|| {
let _ = rustls::crypto::aws_lc_rs::default_provider().install_default();
});
let listener = StdTcpListener::bind("0.0.0.0:0")?;
listener.set_nonblocking(true)?;
let addr = listener.local_addr()?;
let endpoint_ip = local_ip()?;
let endpoint_host = endpoint_ip.to_string();
let rcgen::CertifiedKey { cert, signing_key } = rcgen::generate_simple_self_signed(vec![endpoint_host])?;
std::fs::write(ca_path, cert.pem())?;
let cert_chain = vec![cert.der().clone()];
let key_der = PrivateKeyDer::Pkcs8(PrivatePkcs8KeyDer::from(signing_key.serialize_der()));
let server_config = Arc::new(
ServerConfig::builder()
.with_no_client_auth()
.with_single_cert(cert_chain, key_der)?,
);
let running = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(true));
let server_running = Arc::clone(&running);
let (tx, events) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let handle = thread::spawn(move || {
let mut connections = Vec::new();
while server_running.load(Ordering::Relaxed) {
match listener.accept() {
Ok((stream, _)) => {
let config = Arc::clone(&server_config);
let tx = tx.clone();
connections.push(thread::spawn(move || {
let _ = handle_https_request(stream, config, tx);
}));
}
Err(err) if err.kind() == ErrorKind::WouldBlock => thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)),
Err(_) => break,
}
}
for connection in connections {
let _ = connection.join();
}
});
Ok(HttpsEventCollector {
endpoint: format!("https://{}/events", std::net::SocketAddr::new(endpoint_ip, addr.port())),
running,
handle: Some(handle),
events,
})
}
fn read_sync_http_message<R: std::io::Read>(stream: &mut R) -> Result<(String, Vec<u8>), BoxError> {
let mut buffer = Vec::new();
let mut chunk = [0_u8; 4096];
let header_end = loop {
let read = stream.read(&mut chunk)?;
if read == 0 {
return Err("connection closed before request headers were complete".into());
}
buffer.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..read]);
if let Some(pos) = buffer.windows(4).position(|window| window == b"\r\n\r\n") {
break pos;
}
};
let header_text = std::str::from_utf8(&buffer[..header_end])?;
let mut lines = header_text.split("\r\n");
let method = lines
.next()
.and_then(|line| line.split_whitespace().next())
.ok_or("missing request method")?
.to_string();
let mut content_length = 0usize;
for line in lines {
if let Some((name, value)) = line.split_once(':')
&& name.trim().eq_ignore_ascii_case("content-length")
{
content_length = value.trim().parse()?;
}
}
let body_offset = header_end + 4;
while buffer.len().saturating_sub(body_offset) < content_length {
let read = stream.read(&mut chunk)?;
if read == 0 {
return Err("connection closed before request body was complete".into());
}
buffer.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..read]);
}
Ok((method, buffer[body_offset..body_offset + content_length].to_vec()))
}
fn handle_https_request(
stream: std::net::TcpStream,
server_config: Arc<rustls::ServerConfig>,
tx: mpsc::UnboundedSender<Value>,
) -> Result<(), BoxError> {
use std::io::Write;
stream.set_nonblocking(false)?;
stream.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(5)))?;
stream.set_write_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(5)))?;
let connection = rustls::ServerConnection::new(server_config)?;
let mut tls_stream = rustls::StreamOwned::new(connection, stream);
let (method, body) = read_sync_http_message(&mut tls_stream)?;
let response = "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\ncontent-length: 0\r\nconnection: close\r\n\r\n";
tls_stream.write_all(response.as_bytes())?;
tls_stream.flush()?;
tls_stream.conn.send_close_notify();
while tls_stream.conn.wants_write() {
tls_stream.conn.write_tls(&mut tls_stream.sock)?;
}
let _ = tls_stream.sock.shutdown(std::net::Shutdown::Write);
if method == "POST"
&& !body.is_empty()
&& let Ok(event) = serde_json::from_slice(&body)
{
let _ = tx.send(event);
}
Ok(())
}
/// Decoded object key of the first record in an event envelope.
@@ -284,13 +464,24 @@ async fn enable_notify_module(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment) -> TestResult {
/// Registers a webhook notification target with a persistent queue directory, so
/// delivery goes through the durable store-and-forward path.
async fn configure_webhook_target(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, target_name: &str, endpoint: &str) -> TestResult {
configure_webhook_target_with_key_values(env, target_name, vec![("endpoint", endpoint.to_string())]).await
}
async fn configure_webhook_target_with_key_values(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
target_name: &str,
mut key_values: Vec<(&str, String)>,
) -> TestResult {
let queue_dir = format!("{}/notify-queue-{target_name}", env.temp_dir);
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&queue_dir).await?;
if !key_values.iter().any(|(key, _)| *key == "queue_dir") {
key_values.push(("queue_dir", queue_dir));
}
let payload = serde_json::json!({
"key_values": [
{ "key": "endpoint", "value": endpoint },
{ "key": "queue_dir", "value": queue_dir },
]
"key_values": key_values
.into_iter()
.map(|(key, value)| serde_json::json!({ "key": key, "value": value }))
.collect::<Vec<_>>(),
});
let url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/target/notify_webhook/{target_name}", env.url);
let response = signed_admin_request(env, http::Method::PUT, &url, Some(payload.to_string().into_bytes())).await?;
@@ -321,6 +512,31 @@ async fn wait_for_target_registered(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, target_name: &s
Err(format!("target {target_name} was not registered in admin ARNs").into())
}
async fn wait_for_target_online(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, target_name: &str) -> TestResult {
let url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/target/list", env.url);
for _ in 0..40 {
let response = signed_admin_request(env, http::Method::GET, &url, None).await?;
if response.status() == StatusCode::OK {
let body: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&response.bytes().await?)?;
if body["notify_enabled"].as_bool() != Some(true) {
return Err(format!("admin target list did not report notify_enabled=true: {body}").into());
}
let listed = body["notification_endpoints"].as_array().is_some_and(|endpoints| {
endpoints.iter().any(|endpoint| {
endpoint["account_id"].as_str() == Some(target_name)
&& endpoint["service"].as_str() == Some("webhook")
&& endpoint["status"].as_str() == Some("online")
})
});
if listed {
return Ok(());
}
}
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(250)).await;
}
Err(format!("target {target_name} did not become online in admin targets").into())
}
/// Binds a bucket to a webhook target for ObjectCreated:*/ObjectRemoved:* events,
/// filtered to `prefix` + `suffix`.
async fn put_notification_config(client: &Client, bucket: &str, target_name: &str, prefix: &str, suffix: &str) -> TestResult {
@@ -367,6 +583,62 @@ fn trimmed_etag(value: Option<&str>) -> Option<String> {
// Tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Regression for rustfs#5052: with the notify module enabled through
/// RUSTFS_NOTIFY_ENABLE, an HTTPS webhook using a configured CA must become
/// online and receive a real S3 event POST.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_https_webhook_target_delivers_event_with_notify_env_enabled() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
let ca_path = Path::new(&env.temp_dir).join("https-webhook-ca.pem");
let mut collector = spawn_https_event_collector(&ca_path)?;
let allowed_origin = endpoint_origin(collector.endpoint())?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(
vec![],
&[
("RUSTFS_NOTIFY_ENABLE", "true"),
(ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS, allowed_origin.as_str()),
],
)
.await?;
let target = "peri1https";
let bucket = "peri1-https-events";
let key = "uploads/https.dat";
let client = env.create_s3_client();
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
configure_webhook_target_with_key_values(
&env,
target,
vec![
("endpoint", collector.endpoint().to_string()),
("client_ca", ca_path.to_string_lossy().into_owned()),
],
)
.await?;
wait_for_target_online(&env, target).await?;
wait_for_target_registered(&env, target).await?;
put_notification_config(&client, bucket, target, "uploads/", ".dat").await?;
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"https webhook event body"))
.send()
.await?;
let event = wait_for_event(collector.events_mut(), key, "s3:ObjectCreated:", Duration::from_secs(20)).await?;
assert_eq!(event["EventName"].as_str(), Some("s3:ObjectCreated:Put"));
assert_eq!(event["Records"][0]["s3"]["bucket"]["name"].as_str(), Some(bucket));
assert_eq!(event_key(&event).as_deref(), Some(key));
env.stop_server();
collector.shutdown()?;
Ok(())
}
/// PUT / multipart-complete / DELETE each deliver one event with correct fields,
/// and the prefix/suffix filter drops non-matching keys.
#[tokio::test]
@@ -375,9 +647,11 @@ async fn test_webhook_event_delivery_and_filtering() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let (endpoint, mut rx, handle) = spawn_event_collector().await?;
let allowed_origin = endpoint_origin(&endpoint)?;
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[(ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS, allowed_origin.as_str())])
.await?;
enable_notify_module(&env).await?;
let bucket = "peri1-events";
@@ -529,15 +803,6 @@ async fn test_webhook_event_delivery_and_filtering() -> TestResult {
async fn test_webhook_redelivers_event_after_target_recovers() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
enable_notify_module(&env).await?;
let bucket = "peri1-redeliver";
let target = "peri1redeliver";
let client = env.create_s3_client();
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
// Configure the target while its endpoint is reachable so activation and
// ARN registration complete deterministically. Registering against a dead
// endpoint stalls behind the reachability probe's timeout and flakes the
@@ -546,10 +811,21 @@ async fn test_webhook_redelivers_event_after_target_recovers() -> TestResult {
let listener = TcpListener::bind("0.0.0.0:0").await?;
let port = listener.local_addr()?.port();
let endpoint_ip = local_ip()?;
let endpoint = format!("http://{endpoint_ip}.nip.io:{port}/events");
let endpoint = format!("http://{}/events", std::net::SocketAddr::new(endpoint_ip, port));
let allowed_origin = endpoint_origin(&endpoint)?;
let (setup_tx, _setup_rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let setup_handle = serve_event_collector(listener, setup_tx);
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[(ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS, allowed_origin.as_str())])
.await?;
enable_notify_module(&env).await?;
let bucket = "peri1-redeliver";
let target = "peri1redeliver";
let client = env.create_s3_client();
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
configure_webhook_target(&env, target, &endpoint).await?;
wait_for_target_registered(&env, target).await?;
put_notification_config(&client, bucket, target, "uploads/", ".dat").await?;
+52 -19
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ use http::header::{CONTENT_TYPE, HOST};
use reqwest::StatusCode;
use rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD;
use rustfs_signer::{pre_sign_v4, sign_v4};
use rustfs_utils::egress::ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS;
use s3s::Body;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ fn find_header_terminator(buf: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
async fn read_http_request(
stream: &mut tokio::net::TcpStream,
) -> Result<(HashMap<String, String>, Vec<u8>), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
) -> Result<(String, HashMap<String, String>, Vec<u8>), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let mut buffer = Vec::new();
let mut chunk = [0_u8; 4096];
@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ async fn read_http_request(
let header_bytes = &buffer[..header_end];
let header_text = std::str::from_utf8(header_bytes)?;
let mut lines = header_text.split("\r\n");
let _request_line = lines.next().ok_or("missing request line")?;
let request_line = lines.next().ok_or("missing request line")?.to_string();
let mut headers = HashMap::new();
for line in lines {
if line.is_empty() {
@@ -79,8 +80,9 @@ async fn read_http_request(
let content_length = headers
.get("content-length")
.ok_or("missing content-length header")?
.parse::<usize>()?;
.map(|value| value.parse::<usize>())
.transpose()?
.unwrap_or_default();
let body_offset = header_end + 4;
while buffer.len().saturating_sub(body_offset) < content_length {
let read = stream.read(&mut chunk).await?;
@@ -90,7 +92,7 @@ async fn read_http_request(
buffer.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..read]);
}
Ok((headers, buffer[body_offset..body_offset + content_length].to_vec()))
Ok((request_line, headers, buffer[body_offset..body_offset + content_length].to_vec()))
}
async fn spawn_object_lambda_webhook_server() -> Result<
@@ -130,9 +132,17 @@ async fn spawn_object_lambda_webhook_server_with_response(
let handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().await?;
let Ok(Ok((headers, body))) = timeout(Duration::from_secs(2), read_http_request(&mut stream)).await else {
let Ok(Ok((request_line, headers, body))) = timeout(Duration::from_secs(2), read_http_request(&mut stream)).await
else {
continue;
};
if request_line == "HEAD / HTTP/1.1" {
stream
.write_all(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\ncontent-length: 0\r\nconnection: close\r\n\r\n")
.await?;
stream.shutdown().await?;
continue;
}
let payload: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body)?;
let output_route = payload["getObjectContext"]["outputRoute"]
@@ -412,9 +422,33 @@ async fn wait_for_target_absence(
Err(format!("target {target_name} remained visible in admin APIs; targets={last_targets}, arns={last_arns:?}").into())
}
async fn restart_rustfs_server(env: &mut RustFSTestEnvironment) -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
fn endpoint_origin(endpoint: &str) -> Result<String, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
Ok(reqwest::Url::parse(endpoint)?.origin().ascii_serialization())
}
async fn start_rustfs_server_for_endpoint(
env: &mut RustFSTestEnvironment,
endpoint: &str,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let origin = endpoint_origin(endpoint)?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(
vec![],
&[
(ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS, origin.as_str()),
("RUSTFS_NOTIFY_ENABLE", "true"),
],
)
.await
}
async fn restart_rustfs_server(env: &mut RustFSTestEnvironment, endpoint: &str) -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let origin = endpoint_origin(endpoint)?;
env.stop_server();
env.start_rustfs_server_without_cleanup(vec![]).await
env.start_rustfs_server_without_cleanup_with_env(&[
(ENV_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS, origin.as_str()),
("RUSTFS_NOTIFY_ENABLE", "true"),
])
.await
}
async fn spawn_http_origin_probe_server() -> Result<
@@ -521,7 +555,7 @@ async fn test_notification_target_persists_across_restart_and_delete() -> Result
let (webhook_url, _request_rx, webhook_handle) = spawn_object_lambda_webhook_server().await?;
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
start_rustfs_server_for_endpoint(&mut env, &webhook_url).await?;
let target_name = "restart-target";
configure_webhook_target(&env, target_name, &webhook_url, "secret-token").await?;
@@ -535,7 +569,7 @@ async fn test_notification_target_persists_across_restart_and_delete() -> Result
"target ARN missing after initial configure: {visible_arns:?}"
);
restart_rustfs_server(&mut env).await?;
restart_rustfs_server(&mut env, &webhook_url).await?;
let (targets_after_restart, arns_after_restart) = wait_for_target_visibility(&env, target_name).await?;
assert!(notification_target_is_listed(&targets_after_restart, target_name));
@@ -556,7 +590,7 @@ async fn test_notification_target_persists_across_restart_and_delete() -> Result
"target ARN still visible after delete: {arns_after_delete:?}"
);
restart_rustfs_server(&mut env).await?;
restart_rustfs_server(&mut env, &webhook_url).await?;
let (targets_after_delete_restart, arns_after_delete_restart) = wait_for_target_absence(&env, target_name).await?;
assert!(!notification_target_is_listed(&targets_after_delete_restart, target_name));
@@ -581,8 +615,7 @@ async fn test_notification_target_with_path_is_online_via_transport_probe() -> R
let (webhook_url, mut probe_rx, probe_handle) = spawn_http_origin_probe_server().await?;
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_NOTIFY_ENABLE", "true")])
.await?;
start_rustfs_server_for_endpoint(&mut env, &webhook_url).await?;
let target_name = "path-probe";
configure_webhook_target(&env, target_name, &webhook_url, "secret-token").await?;
@@ -615,7 +648,7 @@ async fn test_get_object_lambda_accepts_presigned_requests() -> Result<(), Box<d
let (webhook_url, request_rx, webhook_handle) = spawn_object_lambda_webhook_server().await?;
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
start_rustfs_server_for_endpoint(&mut env, &webhook_url).await?;
let bucket = "object-lambda-e2e-presigned";
let key = "input.txt";
@@ -656,7 +689,7 @@ async fn test_get_object_lambda_accepts_named_webhook_target_arn() -> Result<(),
let (webhook_url, request_rx, webhook_handle) = spawn_object_lambda_webhook_server().await?;
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
start_rustfs_server_for_endpoint(&mut env, &webhook_url).await?;
let bucket = "object-lambda-e2e-named-target";
let key = "input.txt";
@@ -696,7 +729,7 @@ async fn test_get_object_lambda_invokes_runtime_webhook_target() -> Result<(), B
let (webhook_url, request_rx, webhook_handle) = spawn_object_lambda_webhook_server().await?;
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
start_rustfs_server_for_endpoint(&mut env, &webhook_url).await?;
let bucket = "object-lambda-e2e";
let key = "input.txt";
@@ -777,7 +810,7 @@ async fn test_get_object_lambda_passthroughs_non_success_webhook_response() -> R
.await?;
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
start_rustfs_server_for_endpoint(&mut env, &webhook_url).await?;
let bucket = "object-lambda-e2e-failure";
let key = "input.txt";
@@ -832,7 +865,7 @@ async fn test_get_object_lambda_rejects_success_response_without_auth_headers()
.await?;
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
start_rustfs_server_for_endpoint(&mut env, &webhook_url).await?;
let bucket = "object-lambda-e2e-missing-auth";
let key = "input.txt";
@@ -879,7 +912,7 @@ async fn test_get_object_lambda_rejects_success_response_with_mismatched_auth_he
.await?;
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
start_rustfs_server_for_endpoint(&mut env, &webhook_url).await?;
let bucket = "object-lambda-e2e-mismatched-auth";
let key = "input.txt";
+58
View File
@@ -277,6 +277,64 @@ mod integration_tests {
Ok(())
}
/// backlog#1336 regression: a PUT that merely declares `Content-Encoding: aws-chunked`
/// (no SigV4 streaming payload, so no `x-amz-decoded-content-length`) carries an unframed
/// body whose wire Content-Length is the real object size. Quota admission must use that
/// length — with and without a hard quota configured — instead of rejecting the request
/// with 400 UnexpectedContent, and an over-quota aws-chunked PUT must still get the quota
/// rejection.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_quota_admission_aws_chunked_declared_encoding() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
if skip_without_awscurl() {
return Ok(());
}
let env = QuotaTestEnv::new().await?;
env.create_bucket().await?;
let put_aws_chunked = |key: &'static str, size_bytes: usize| {
env.client
.put_object()
.bucket(&env.bucket_name)
.key(key)
.content_encoding("aws-chunked")
.body(aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream::from(vec![0u8; size_bytes]))
.send()
};
// No quota configured: the declared aws-chunked PUT must be admitted.
put_aws_chunked("no-quota.bin", 512)
.await
.expect("declared aws-chunked PUT without quota must succeed");
assert!(env.object_exists("no-quota.bin").await?);
// Hard quota configured: a within-quota declared aws-chunked PUT is admitted
// against its wire Content-Length.
env.set_bucket_quota(4 * 1024).await?;
put_aws_chunked("within-quota.bin", 1024)
.await
.expect("declared aws-chunked PUT within quota must succeed");
assert!(env.object_exists("within-quota.bin").await?);
// An over-quota declared aws-chunked PUT is rejected by quota admission —
// not with UnexpectedContent.
let err = put_aws_chunked("over-quota.bin", 16 * 1024)
.await
.expect_err("declared aws-chunked PUT over quota must be rejected");
let err_debug = format!("{err:?}");
assert!(
!err_debug.contains("UnexpectedContent"),
"over-quota rejection must be the quota error, not UnexpectedContent: {err_debug}"
);
assert!(!env.object_exists("over-quota.bin").await?);
env.clear_bucket_quota().await?;
env.cleanup_bucket().await?;
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_quota_update_and_clear() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
@@ -798,6 +798,13 @@ impl NodeService for MinimalLockNodeService {
Err(Status::unimplemented("lock-only test server"))
}
async fn scanner_activity(
&self,
_request: Request<rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::ScannerActivityRequest>,
) -> Result<Response<rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::ScannerActivityResponse>, Status> {
Err(Status::unimplemented("lock-only test server"))
}
async fn background_heal_status(
&self,
_request: Request<rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::BackgroundHealStatusRequest>,
+1 -1
View File
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ const TIER_NAME: &str = "COLDTIER";
const TIER_BUCKET: &str = "ilm7-cold-tier";
const TIER_PREFIX: &str = "tiered";
const SOURCE_BUCKET: &str = "ilm7-hot";
const OBJECT_KEY: &str = "tier/report.bin";
const OBJECT_KEY: &str = "tier/鲁A12345/report.bin";
const CONTENT_TYPE: &str = "application/x-ilm7";
const USER_META_KEY: &str = "ilm7-origin";
const USER_META_VAL: &str = "hermetic-transition";
+104 -40
View File
@@ -1331,6 +1331,42 @@ async fn assert_managed_sse_replication_fails_explicitly(label: &str, kms: bool)
Ok(())
}
async fn wait_for_source_delete_marker_replication_failed(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
bucket: &str,
key: &str,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let deadline = tokio::time::Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(30);
let url = format!(
"{}/rustfs/admin/v3/replication/diff?bucket={}&prefix={}",
env.url,
urlencoding::encode(bucket),
urlencoding::encode(key)
);
loop {
let response = signed_request(http::Method::POST, &url, &env.access_key, &env.secret_key, None, None).await?;
if response.status() != StatusCode::OK {
return Err(format!("replication diff failed with status {}", response.status()).into());
}
let diff: serde_json::Value = response.json().await?;
let failed = diff["Entries"].as_array().is_some_and(|entries| {
entries.iter().any(|entry| {
entry["Object"].as_str() == Some(key)
&& entry["IsDeleteMarker"].as_bool() == Some(true)
&& entry["ReplicationStatus"].as_str() == Some("FAILED")
})
});
if failed {
return Ok(());
}
if tokio::time::Instant::now() >= deadline {
return Err(format!("source delete marker {key} never reported FAILED; last diff={diff}").into());
}
sleep(Duration::from_millis(200)).await;
}
}
/// Return the `LastModified` of the (single) delete marker for `key`, if present.
async fn delete_marker_last_modified(
client: &Client,
@@ -1935,7 +1971,10 @@ async fn wait_for_site_replication_enabled(
) -> Result<SiteReplicationInfo, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
for _ in 0..40 {
let info = site_replication_info(env).await?;
if info.enabled && info.sites.len() == expected_sites {
if info.enabled
&& info.sites.len() == expected_sites
&& info.sites.iter().all(|peer| peer.sync_state == SyncStatus::Enable)
{
return Ok(info);
}
sleep(Duration::from_millis(250)).await;
@@ -3691,23 +3730,9 @@ async fn test_bucket_replication_replays_failed_entries_after_source_restart() -
Ok(())
}
/// backlog#1147 repl-5, scenario (c) — replayed delete marker keeps the source
/// mtime (mirrors backlog#867).
///
/// A delete marker is created while the target is down; the source is then
/// restarted (data preserved) and the target brought back, so the marker
/// replicates through the failure-replay path. The replayed marker must carry
/// the SOURCE's `LastModified`, not the replay time. A deliberate gap before
/// recovery makes any regression (replay-time stamping) obvious.
///
/// The source restart is load-bearing, not just paranoia: on a live
/// (never-restarted) source, the failed delete-marker replication wedges the
/// per-object `/[replicate]/<key>` namespace lock and the marker never
/// replicates even after the target recovers — tracked as backlog#1278. Once
/// that is fixed, a restart-free variant of this scenario should be added.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_bucket_replication_replayed_delete_marker_preserves_source_mtime() -> TestResult {
async fn test_bucket_replication_replayed_delete_marker_preserves_source_mtime_without_source_restart() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut source_env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
@@ -3759,13 +3784,11 @@ async fn test_bucket_replication_replayed_delete_marker_preserves_source_mtime()
.await?
.ok_or("source has no delete marker after DELETE")?;
wait_for_source_delete_marker_replication_failed(&source_env, source_bucket, object_key).await?;
// Widen the gap so a replay-time-stamping regression is unmistakable.
sleep(Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
// Restart the source (see the doc comment: live-source replay is wedged by
// backlog#1278), then bring the target back; the restarted source's scanner
// heal pass replays the failed delete marker.
source_env.restart_server_preserving_data(vec![], &source_env_vars).await?;
target_env.restart_server_preserving_data(vec![], &[]).await?;
let target_mtime = wait_for_target_delete_marker(&target_client, target_bucket, object_key).await?;
@@ -4025,17 +4048,23 @@ async fn test_site_replication_allows_private_ca_https_with_ca_cert_pem_real_dua
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_site_replication_resync_start_cancel_restart_real_dual_node() -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
async fn test_site_replication_resync_lifecycle_survives_real_server_restart() -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let resync_process_env = [
("RUSTFS_REPLICATION_ALLOW_LOOPBACK_TARGET", "true"),
// Verbose server logging can block startup when this focused test is run
// through a captured test process rather than nextest.
("RUST_LOG", "error"),
];
let mut source_env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
source_env
.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], LOOPBACK_REPLICATION_TARGET_ENV)
.await?;
source_env.capture_log_path = Some(format!("{}/server.log", source_env.temp_dir));
source_env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &resync_process_env).await?;
let mut target_env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
target_env.capture_log_path = Some(format!("{}/server.log", target_env.temp_dir));
target_env
.start_rustfs_server_without_cleanup_with_env(LOOPBACK_REPLICATION_TARGET_ENV)
.start_rustfs_server_without_cleanup_with_env(&resync_process_env)
.await?;
let source_bucket = "site-repl-resync-src";
@@ -4083,12 +4112,12 @@ async fn test_site_replication_resync_start_cancel_restart_real_dual_node() -> R
wait_for_bucket_on_target(&source_client, source_bucket).await?;
let target_arn = wait_for_remote_target_arn(&source_env, source_bucket).await?;
for idx in 0..32 {
for idx in 0..96 {
source_client
.put_object()
.bucket(source_bucket)
.key(format!("resync-object-{idx:02}"))
.body(ByteStream::from(vec![b'x'; 256 * 1024]))
.body(ByteStream::from(vec![b'x'; 512 * 1024]))
.send()
.await?;
}
@@ -4096,18 +4125,31 @@ async fn test_site_replication_resync_start_cancel_restart_real_dual_node() -> R
let started = site_replication_resync_op(&source_env, "start", &remote_peer).await?;
assert_eq!(started.status, "success", "unexpected start result: {:?}", started);
assert!(
started
.buckets
.iter()
.any(|bucket| bucket.bucket == source_bucket && matches!(bucket.status.as_str(), "started" | "success")),
started.buckets.iter().any(|bucket| {
bucket.bucket == source_bucket && matches!(bucket.status.as_str(), "started" | "running" | "completed" | "success")
}),
"source bucket start status missing: {:?}",
started
);
assert!(!started.resync_id.is_empty(), "start response omitted the resync id: {:?}", started);
let started_reset_id = started.resync_id.clone();
assert!(
matches!(started.state.as_str(), "pending" | "running"),
"the fixture must keep the first generation active long enough to test duplicate start: {:?}",
started
);
let duplicate_err = site_replication_resync_op(&source_env, "start", &remote_peer)
.await
.expect_err("duplicate start must be rejected while a generation is active");
assert!(
duplicate_err.to_string().contains("already active"),
"unexpected duplicate start error: {duplicate_err}"
);
let canceled = site_replication_resync_op(&source_env, "cancel", &remote_peer).await?;
assert_eq!(canceled.status, "success", "unexpected cancel result: {:?}", canceled);
assert_eq!(canceled.state, "canceled");
assert!(
canceled
.buckets
@@ -4116,34 +4158,56 @@ async fn test_site_replication_resync_start_cancel_restart_real_dual_node() -> R
"source bucket cancel status missing: {:?}",
canceled
);
let canceled_again = site_replication_resync_op(&source_env, "cancel", &remote_peer).await?;
assert_eq!(canceled_again.resync_id, canceled.resync_id, "repeated cancel must be idempotent");
assert_eq!(canceled_again.state, "canceled");
let canceled_target =
wait_for_replication_reset_target(&source_env, source_bucket, &target_arn, |target| target.status == "Canceled").await?;
assert_eq!(canceled_target.status, "Canceled");
assert_eq!(canceled_target.reset_id, started_reset_id);
let restarted = site_replication_resync_op(&source_env, "start", &remote_peer).await?;
assert_eq!(restarted.status, "success", "unexpected restart result: {:?}", restarted);
assert_ne!(restarted.resync_id, started_reset_id);
assert!(
matches!(restarted.state.as_str(), "pending" | "running"),
"the second generation must be active before the process restart: {:?}",
restarted
.buckets
.iter()
.any(|bucket| bucket.bucket == source_bucket && matches!(bucket.status.as_str(), "started" | "success")),
"source bucket restart status missing: {:?}",
restarted
);
let restarted_reset_id = restarted.resync_id.clone();
source_env.restart_server_preserving_data(vec![], &resync_process_env).await?;
wait_for_site_replication_enabled(&source_env, 2).await?;
let after_restart = site_replication_resync_op(&source_env, "status", &remote_peer).await?;
assert_eq!(
after_restart.resync_id, restarted_reset_id,
"server restart changed the durable resync id"
);
assert_eq!(after_restart.generation, restarted.generation);
assert_eq!(after_restart.created_at, restarted.created_at);
assert!(
matches!(after_restart.state.as_str(), "pending" | "running" | "completed" | "failed"),
"unexpected recovered lifecycle state: {:?}",
after_restart
);
assert!(
after_restart.buckets.iter().any(|bucket| bucket.bucket == source_bucket),
"durable status lost the source bucket after restart: {:?}",
after_restart
);
let restart_snapshot = get_replication_reset_status(&source_env, source_bucket, &target_arn).await?;
let restarted_target = wait_for_replication_reset_target(&source_env, source_bucket, &target_arn, |target| {
!target.reset_id.is_empty() && target.reset_id != started_reset_id
target.reset_id == restarted_reset_id
})
.await
.map_err(|err| {
format!(
"restart ids: start={} restart={} snapshot={:?}; {err}",
started_reset_id, restarted.resync_id, restart_snapshot.targets
started_reset_id, restarted_reset_id, restart_snapshot.targets
)
})?;
assert_ne!(restarted_target.reset_id, started_reset_id);
assert_eq!(restarted_target.reset_id, restarted_reset_id);
Ok(())
}
+2 -1
View File
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ rustfs-kms.workspace = true
rustfs-s3-types = { workspace = true }
rustfs-data-usage.workspace = true
rustfs-object-capacity.workspace = true
arc-swap.workspace = true
async-trait.workspace = true
bytes = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
byteorder = { workspace = true }
@@ -122,7 +123,7 @@ libc.workspace = true
# (backlog#1178); "fs" comes from the workspace default.
rustix = { workspace = true, features = ["process", "fs"] }
rustfs-madmin.workspace = true
reqwest = { workspace = true, default-features = false, features = ["rustls", "http2", "system-proxy"] }
reqwest = { workspace = true }
aes-gcm = { workspace = true, features = ["rand_core"] }
chacha20poly1305.workspace = true
aws-sdk-s3 = { workspace = true, default-features = false, features = ["sigv4a", "default-https-client", "rt-tokio"] }
+41 -19
View File
@@ -67,7 +67,11 @@ pub mod bucket {
}
pub mod tier_delete_journal {
pub use crate::bucket::lifecycle::tier_delete_journal::persist_tier_delete_journal_entry;
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
pub use crate::bucket::lifecycle::tier_delete_journal::recover_tier_delete_journal_entries;
pub use crate::bucket::lifecycle::tier_delete_journal::{
persist_tier_delete_journal_entry, record_tier_delete_journal_backend_identity,
};
}
pub mod tier_last_day_stats {
@@ -134,7 +138,7 @@ pub mod bucket {
}
pub mod quota {
pub use crate::bucket::quota::{BucketQuota, QuotaError, QuotaOperation};
pub use crate::bucket::quota::{BucketQuota, QuotaCheckResult, QuotaError, QuotaOperation};
pub mod checker {
pub use crate::bucket::quota::checker::QuotaChecker;
@@ -237,8 +241,10 @@ pub mod config {
pub use crate::config::com::{
COMMA_SEPARATED_LISTS, CONFIG_PREFIX, ENV_CONFIG_RECOVER_ON_CORRUPTION, STORAGE_CLASS_SUB_SYS,
ServerConfigCorruptError, delete_config, is_server_config_corrupt_error, lookup_configs, read_config,
read_config_no_lock, read_config_with_metadata, read_config_without_migrate, save_config, save_config_with_opts,
save_server_config, try_migrate_server_config,
read_config_no_lock, read_config_with_metadata, read_config_without_migrate, read_config_without_migrate_no_lock,
read_existing_server_config_no_lock, save_config, save_config_no_lock, save_config_with_opts, save_server_config,
save_server_config_no_lock, try_migrate_server_config, with_config_object_read_lock, with_config_object_write_lock,
with_server_config_read_lock, with_server_config_write_lock,
};
}
@@ -247,7 +253,8 @@ pub mod config {
CLASS_RRS, CLASS_STANDARD, Config, DEEP_ARCHIVE, DEFAULT_INLINE_BLOCK, DEFAULT_KVS, DEFAULT_RRS_PARITY,
EXPRESS_ONEZONE, GLACIER, GLACIER_IR, INLINE_BLOCK, INLINE_BLOCK_ENV, INTELLIGENT_TIERING, MIN_PARITY_DRIVES,
ONEZONE_IA, OPTIMIZE, OPTIMIZE_ENV, OUTPOSTS, RRS, RRS_ENV, SCHEME_PREFIX, SNOW, STANDARD, STANDARD_ENV, STANDARD_IA,
StorageClass, default_parity_count, lookup_config, parse_storage_class, validate_parity, validate_parity_inner,
StorageClass, default_parity_count, lookup_config, lookup_config_for_pools, parse_storage_class, validate_parity,
validate_parity_inner,
};
}
@@ -258,12 +265,14 @@ pub mod config {
pub mod data_usage {
pub use crate::data_usage::{
DATA_USAGE_CACHE_NAME, apply_bucket_usage_memory_overlay, init_compression_total_memory_from_backend,
load_compression_total_from_memory, load_data_usage_from_backend, record_bucket_delete_marker_memory,
DATA_USAGE_CACHE_NAME, apply_bucket_usage_memory_overlay, compute_bucket_usage,
init_compression_total_memory_from_backend, live_bucket_usage_computations, load_compression_total_from_memory,
load_data_usage_from_backend, load_data_usage_from_backend_cached, record_bucket_delete_marker_memory,
record_bucket_object_delete_memory, record_bucket_object_version_write_memory, record_bucket_object_write_memory,
record_bucket_object_write_unknown_previous_memory, record_compression_total_memory,
refresh_bucket_usage_from_object_layer, refresh_versioned_bucket_usage_from_object_layer,
remove_bucket_usage_from_backend, replace_bucket_usage_memory_from_info, store_compression_total_in_backend,
store_data_usage_in_backend,
};
}
@@ -308,8 +317,8 @@ pub mod error {
pub mod erasure {
pub use crate::erasure::coding::{
BitrotReader, BitrotWriter, BitrotWriterWrapper, CustomWriter, Erasure, ReedSolomonEncoder, calc_shard_size,
calc_shard_size_legacy,
BitrotReader, BitrotWriter, BitrotWriterWrapper, CustomWriter, Erasure, ErasureConstructionError, ReedSolomonEncoder,
calc_shard_size, calc_shard_size_legacy,
};
}
@@ -351,9 +360,12 @@ pub mod notification {
pub mod object {
pub use crate::object_api::{
BLOCK_SIZE_V2, ERASURE_ALGORITHM, GetObjectBodyCacheHook, GetObjectReader, ObjectInfo, ObjectMutationHook, ObjectOptions,
PutObjReader, RangedDecompressReader, StreamConsumer, register_get_object_body_cache_hook, register_object_mutation_hook,
BLOCK_SIZE_V2, ERASURE_ALGORITHM, GetObjectBodyCacheHook, GetObjectBodyCacheHookLookup, GetObjectBodySource,
GetObjectReader, ObjectInfo, ObjectMutationHook, ObjectOptions, PutObjReader, RangedDecompressReader, StreamConsumer,
get_object_body_cache_plaintext_len, lookup_get_object_body_cache_hook, register_get_object_body_cache_hook,
register_object_mutation_hook, unregister_get_object_body_cache_hook, unregister_object_mutation_hook,
};
pub use crate::store::PreparedGetObjectReader;
}
pub mod rebalance {
@@ -373,9 +385,12 @@ pub mod rio {
pub mod rpc {
pub use crate::cluster::rpc::{
LocalPeerS3Client, PEER_RESTSIGNAL, PEER_RESTSUB_SYS, PeerRestClient, PeerS3Client, SERVICE_SIGNAL_REFRESH_CONFIG,
SERVICE_SIGNAL_RELOAD_DYNAMIC, TONIC_RPC_PREFIX, TonicInterceptor, gen_tonic_signature_interceptor,
node_service_time_out_client, node_service_time_out_client_no_auth, verify_rpc_signature,
LocalPeerS3Client, PEER_RESTDRY_RUN, PEER_RESTSIGNAL, PEER_RESTSUB_SYS, PeerRestClient, PeerS3Client,
SERVICE_SIGNAL_REFRESH_CONFIG, SERVICE_SIGNAL_RELOAD_DYNAMIC, ScannerPeerActivity, TONIC_RPC_PREFIX, TonicInterceptor,
gen_signature_headers, gen_tonic_signature_headers, gen_tonic_signature_interceptor, node_service_time_out_client,
node_service_time_out_client_no_auth, normalize_tonic_rpc_audience, set_tonic_canonical_body_digest,
sign_tonic_rpc_response_proof, verify_rpc_signature, verify_tonic_canonical_body_digest, verify_tonic_rpc_response_proof,
verify_tonic_rpc_signature,
};
}
@@ -402,7 +417,7 @@ pub mod tier {
pub use crate::services::tier::tier::{
ERR_TIER_BACKEND_IN_USE, ERR_TIER_BACKEND_NOT_EMPTY, ERR_TIER_INVALID_CONFIG, ERR_TIER_MISSING_CREDENTIALS,
ERR_TIER_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED, TIER_CONFIG_FILE, TIER_CONFIG_FORMAT, TIER_CONFIG_V1, TIER_CONFIG_VERSION, TierConfigMgr,
is_err_config_not_found, try_migrate_tiering_config,
TierConfigUpdateError, is_err_config_not_found, try_migrate_tiering_config,
};
}
@@ -413,7 +428,7 @@ pub mod tier {
pub mod tier_config {
pub use crate::services::tier::tier_config::{
ServicePrincipalAuth, TierAliyun, TierAzure, TierConfig, TierGCS, TierHuaweicloud, TierMinIO, TierR2, TierRustFS,
TierS3, TierTencent, TierType,
TierS3, TierTencent, TierType, TierWasabi,
};
}
@@ -424,6 +439,13 @@ pub mod tier {
};
}
pub mod tier_mutation_peer {
pub use crate::services::tier::tier_mutation_peer::{
MAX_TIER_MUTATION_PEER_COMMIT_ETAG_SIZE, TierMutationPeerError, TierMutationPeerOutcome, TierMutationPeerResult,
TierMutationPeerState, handle_tier_mutation_peer_request,
};
}
pub mod warm_backend {
pub use crate::services::tier::warm_backend::{
WarmBackend, WarmBackendGetOpts, WarmBackendImpl, build_transition_put_options, check_warm_backend, new_warm_backend,
@@ -433,9 +455,9 @@ pub mod tier {
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
pub mod test_util {
pub use crate::services::tier::test_util::{
FaultConfig, MockStoredObject, MockWarmBackend, MockWarmOp, TransitionMeta, assert_transition_meta_consistent,
free_version_count, read_transition_meta, register_mock_tier, register_mock_tier_backend,
wait_for_free_version_absence,
FaultConfig, MockStoredObject, MockWarmBackend, MockWarmOp, TransitionCleanupStoreBarrier, TransitionMeta,
assert_transition_meta_consistent, free_version_count, read_transition_meta, register_mock_tier,
register_mock_tier_backend, wait_for_free_version_absence,
};
}
}
+13 -1
View File
@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ pub struct BucketTargetSys {
pub hc_client: Arc<HttpClient>,
pub a_mutex: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, ArnErrs>>>,
pub arn_errs_map: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, ArnErrs>>>,
heartbeat_started: OnceLock<()>,
}
impl BucketTargetSys {
@@ -295,9 +296,20 @@ impl BucketTargetSys {
hc_client: Arc::new(HttpClient::new()),
a_mutex: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
arn_errs_map: Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashMap::new())),
heartbeat_started: OnceLock::new(),
}
}
pub(crate) fn start_heartbeat(&'static self) {
if self.heartbeat_started.set(()).is_err() {
return;
}
tokio::spawn(async move {
self.heartbeat().await;
});
}
pub async fn is_offline(&self, url: &Url) -> bool {
let key = endpoint_health_key(url);
{
@@ -367,7 +379,7 @@ impl BucketTargetSys {
async fn check_endpoint_health(&self, endpoint: &str, scheme: &str) -> bool {
let scheme = if scheme.is_empty() { "https" } else { scheme };
let url = format!("{scheme}://{endpoint}/");
match self.hc_client.head(url).timeout(Duration::from_secs(3)).send().await {
match self.hc_client.get(url).timeout(Duration::from_secs(3)).send().await {
Ok(response) => response.status().as_u16() < 500,
Err(_) => false,
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -28,3 +28,4 @@ pub mod tier_delete_journal;
pub mod tier_free_version_recovery;
pub mod tier_last_day_stats;
pub mod tier_sweeper;
pub mod transition_transaction;
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::{future::Future, sync::Arc, time::Duration};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
@@ -20,10 +20,11 @@ use tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken;
use tracing::{debug, warn};
use crate::bucket::lifecycle::config_boundary;
use crate::bucket::lifecycle::tier_sweeper::{Jentry, delete_object_from_remote_tier_idempotent};
use crate::bucket::lifecycle::tier_sweeper::{Jentry, delete_object_from_remote_tier_idempotent_with_manager_and_identity};
use crate::disk::RUSTFS_META_BUCKET;
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
use crate::object_api::{GetObjectReader, ObjectInfo, ObjectOptions, PutObjReader};
use crate::services::tier::tier::tier_destination_id_from_metadata;
use crate::storage_api_contracts::{
list::ListOperations as _,
object::{DeletedObject, ObjectIO, ObjectOperations, ObjectToDelete},
@@ -37,8 +38,11 @@ const LOG_SUBSYSTEM_LIFECYCLE: &str = "lifecycle";
const EVENT_LIFECYCLE_TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL: &str = "lifecycle_tier_delete_journal";
pub const DEFAULT_TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_RECOVERY_LIMIT: usize = 1_000;
const TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_PREFIX: &str = "ilm/tier-delete-journal/";
const TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_RECOVERY_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
const TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_RECOVERY_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(300);
const TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_VERSION: u8 = 2;
const TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_EXACT_VERSION: u8 = 3;
pub(crate) const TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_PREFIX: &str = "ilm/tier-delete-journal/";
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
@@ -47,22 +51,31 @@ struct PersistedTierDeleteJournalEntry {
obj_name: String,
version_id: String,
tier_name: String,
#[serde(default)]
backend_identity: Option<[u8; 32]>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
version_id_exact: Option<bool>,
}
impl PersistedTierDeleteJournalEntry {
fn from_jentry(je: &Jentry) -> Self {
Self {
version: TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_VERSION,
version: if je.version_id_exact {
TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_EXACT_VERSION
} else if je.backend_identity.is_some() {
TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_VERSION
} else {
1
},
obj_name: je.obj_name.clone(),
version_id: je.version_id.clone(),
tier_name: je.tier_name.clone(),
backend_identity: je.backend_identity,
version_id_exact: je.version_id_exact.then_some(true),
}
}
fn into_jentry(self) -> Result<Jentry> {
if self.version != TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_VERSION {
return Err(Error::other(format!("unsupported tier delete journal version {}", self.version)));
}
// Empty `version_id` is a legal sentinel for objects transitioned to an
// unversioned remote tier (see CLAUDE.md: a tier version of `None`/`""`
// means the tier bucket is unversioned, so the remote delete is issued
@@ -71,10 +84,40 @@ impl PersistedTierDeleteJournalEntry {
if self.obj_name.is_empty() || self.tier_name.is_empty() {
return Err(Error::other("tier delete journal entry is incomplete"));
}
if self.version != TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_EXACT_VERSION && self.version_id_exact.unwrap_or(false) {
return Err(Error::other(
"legacy tier delete journal entry has an unsupported exact version constraint",
));
}
let (backend_identity, version_id_exact) = match self.version {
1 => (None, false),
TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_VERSION => (
Some(
self.backend_identity
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other("tier delete journal v2 entry is missing its backend identity"))?,
),
false,
),
TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_EXACT_VERSION => {
if self.version_id.is_empty() || self.version_id_exact != Some(true) {
return Err(Error::other("tier delete journal v3 entry is missing its exact version constraint"));
}
(
Some(
self.backend_identity
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other("tier delete journal v3 entry is missing its backend identity"))?,
),
true,
)
}
version => return Err(Error::other(format!("unsupported tier delete journal version {version}"))),
};
Ok(Jentry {
obj_name: self.obj_name,
version_id: self.version_id,
tier_name: self.tier_name,
backend_identity,
version_id_exact,
})
}
}
@@ -95,23 +138,41 @@ pub(crate) fn tier_delete_journal_object_name(je: &Jentry) -> String {
hasher.update(je.obj_name.as_bytes());
hasher.update([0]);
hasher.update(je.version_id.as_bytes());
if let Some(backend_identity) = je.backend_identity {
hasher.update([0]);
hasher.update(backend_identity);
}
if je.version_id_exact {
hasher.update([0]);
hasher.update(b"exact-version-id");
}
format!(
"{TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_PREFIX}{}.json",
rustfs_utils::crypto::hex(hasher.finalize().as_slice())
)
}
fn decode_tier_delete_journal_entry(data: &[u8]) -> Result<Jentry> {
pub(crate) fn decode_tier_delete_journal_entry(data: &[u8]) -> Result<Jentry> {
let persisted: PersistedTierDeleteJournalEntry =
serde_json::from_slice(data).map_err(|err| Error::other(format!("decode tier delete journal failed: {err}")))?;
persisted.into_jentry()
}
fn encode_tier_delete_journal_entry(je: &Jentry) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
pub(crate) fn encode_tier_delete_journal_entry(je: &Jentry) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
serde_json::to_vec(&PersistedTierDeleteJournalEntry::from_jentry(je))
.map_err(|err| Error::other(format!("encode tier delete journal failed: {err}")))
}
pub fn record_tier_delete_journal_backend_identity(
je: &mut Jentry,
metadata: &std::collections::HashMap<String, String>,
) -> std::io::Result<()> {
if let Some(identity) = tier_destination_id_from_metadata(metadata)? {
je.backend_identity = Some(identity);
}
Ok(())
}
pub async fn persist_tier_delete_journal_entry<S>(api: Arc<S>, je: &Jentry) -> std::io::Result<()>
where
S: ObjectIO<
@@ -148,7 +209,18 @@ where
}
pub async fn process_tier_delete_journal_entry(api: Arc<ECStore>, je: &Jentry) -> std::io::Result<()> {
delete_object_from_remote_tier_idempotent(&je.obj_name, &je.version_id, &je.tier_name).await?;
let backend_identity = je
.backend_identity
.ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("legacy tier delete journal has no durable backend identity"))?;
delete_object_from_remote_tier_idempotent_with_manager_and_identity(
&je.obj_name,
&je.version_id,
&je.tier_name,
backend_identity,
&api.tier_config_mgr(),
je.version_id_exact,
)
.await?;
remove_tier_delete_journal_entry(api, je).await
}
@@ -218,6 +290,21 @@ pub async fn recover_tier_delete_journal_entries(
}
};
if je.backend_identity.is_none() {
stats.failed += 1;
warn!(
event = EVENT_LIFECYCLE_TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL,
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_LIFECYCLE,
journal_object = %object.name,
remote_object = %je.obj_name,
remote_version_id = %je.version_id,
tier = %je.tier_name,
"Legacy tier delete journal entry has no durable backend identity and will be retained"
);
continue;
}
match process_tier_delete_journal_entry(api.clone(), &je).await {
Ok(()) => stats.deleted += 1,
Err(err) => {
@@ -241,16 +328,33 @@ pub async fn recover_tier_delete_journal_entries(
}
pub async fn run_tier_delete_journal_recovery_loop(api: Arc<ECStore>, cancel_token: CancellationToken) {
let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(std::time::Duration::from_secs(60));
let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_RECOVERY_INTERVAL);
interval.set_missed_tick_behavior(tokio::time::MissedTickBehavior::Delay);
let mut marker: Option<String> = None;
loop {
#[cfg(test)]
tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = cancel_token.cancelled() => return,
_ = interval.tick() => {}
_ = interval.tick() => {},
_ = api.ctx.wait_for_tier_delete_journal_recovery() => {},
}
#[cfg(not(test))]
tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = cancel_token.cancelled() => return,
_ = interval.tick() => {},
}
match recover_tier_delete_journal_entries(api.clone(), DEFAULT_TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_RECOVERY_LIMIT, marker.clone()).await {
let recovery =
recover_tier_delete_journal_entries(api.clone(), DEFAULT_TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_RECOVERY_LIMIT, marker.clone());
let Some(result) =
await_tier_delete_journal_recovery(&cancel_token, TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_RECOVERY_TIMEOUT, recovery).await
else {
return;
};
match result {
Ok(stats) => {
marker = stats.next_marker;
debug!(
@@ -279,16 +383,44 @@ pub async fn run_tier_delete_journal_recovery_loop(api: Arc<ECStore>, cancel_tok
}
}
async fn await_tier_delete_journal_recovery<T, F>(
cancel_token: &CancellationToken,
timeout: Duration,
recovery: F,
) -> Option<Result<T>>
where
F: Future<Output = Result<T>>,
{
tokio::select! {
_ = cancel_token.cancelled() => None,
result = tokio::time::timeout(timeout, recovery) => Some(match result {
Ok(result) => result,
Err(_) => Err(Error::other(format!(
"tier delete journal recovery timed out after {} seconds",
timeout.as_secs()
))),
}),
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{decode_tier_delete_journal_entry, encode_tier_delete_journal_entry, tier_delete_journal_object_name};
use super::{
TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_EXACT_VERSION, await_tier_delete_journal_recovery, decode_tier_delete_journal_entry,
encode_tier_delete_journal_entry, record_tier_delete_journal_backend_identity, tier_delete_journal_object_name,
};
use crate::bucket::lifecycle::tier_sweeper::Jentry;
use crate::error::Result;
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken;
fn journal_entry() -> Jentry {
Jentry {
obj_name: "remote/object".to_string(),
version_id: "remote-version".to_string(),
tier_name: "WARM".to_string(),
backend_identity: Some([7; 32]),
version_id_exact: false,
}
}
@@ -302,6 +434,83 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(decoded.obj_name, je.obj_name);
assert_eq!(decoded.version_id, je.version_id);
assert_eq!(decoded.tier_name, je.tier_name);
assert_eq!(decoded.backend_identity, je.backend_identity);
assert_eq!(decoded.version_id_exact, je.version_id_exact);
}
#[test]
fn tier_delete_journal_roundtrips_exact_put_response_constraint() {
let mut exact = journal_entry();
exact.version_id = uuid::Uuid::nil().to_string();
exact.version_id_exact = true;
let mut normalized = exact.clone();
normalized.version_id_exact = false;
let encoded = encode_tier_delete_journal_entry(&exact).expect("exact journal entry should encode");
let persisted: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&encoded).expect("exact journal JSON should decode");
let decoded = decode_tier_delete_journal_entry(&encoded).expect("exact journal entry should decode");
assert_eq!(persisted["version"], TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_EXACT_VERSION);
assert_eq!(persisted["version_id_exact"], true);
assert!(decoded.version_id_exact);
assert_ne!(tier_delete_journal_object_name(&exact), tier_delete_journal_object_name(&normalized));
}
#[test]
fn tier_delete_journal_rejects_invalid_exact_version_constraints() {
let identity = vec![7_u8; 32];
let invalid = [
serde_json::json!({
"version": 1,
"obj_name": "remote/object",
"version_id": "exact-version",
"tier_name": "WARM",
"version_id_exact": true,
}),
serde_json::json!({
"version": 2,
"obj_name": "remote/object",
"version_id": "exact-version",
"tier_name": "WARM",
"backend_identity": identity,
"version_id_exact": true,
}),
serde_json::json!({
"version": TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_EXACT_VERSION,
"obj_name": "remote/object",
"version_id": "",
"tier_name": "WARM",
"backend_identity": identity,
"version_id_exact": true,
}),
serde_json::json!({
"version": TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_EXACT_VERSION,
"obj_name": "remote/object",
"version_id": "exact-version",
"tier_name": "WARM",
"backend_identity": identity,
}),
serde_json::json!({
"version": TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_EXACT_VERSION,
"obj_name": "remote/object",
"version_id": "exact-version",
"tier_name": "WARM",
"backend_identity": identity,
"version_id_exact": false,
}),
serde_json::json!({
"version": TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_EXACT_VERSION,
"obj_name": "remote/object",
"version_id": "exact-version",
"tier_name": "WARM",
"version_id_exact": true,
}),
];
for persisted in invalid {
let encoded = serde_json::to_vec(&persisted).expect("invalid journal fixture should encode");
decode_tier_delete_journal_entry(&encoded).expect_err("invalid exact journal constraint must fail closed");
}
}
#[test]
@@ -317,6 +526,63 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!first.contains("remote/object"));
}
#[test]
fn tier_delete_journal_paths_separate_legacy_and_backend_identities() {
let mut legacy = journal_entry();
legacy.backend_identity = None;
let mut backend_a = journal_entry();
backend_a.backend_identity = Some([1; 32]);
let mut backend_b = journal_entry();
backend_b.backend_identity = Some([2; 32]);
assert_eq!(
tier_delete_journal_object_name(&legacy),
"ilm/tier-delete-journal/5ba6a7eb6338412b771613a6845a42ae5b8e26b5d201323eb01b38c5b42ff300.json"
);
assert_ne!(tier_delete_journal_object_name(&legacy), tier_delete_journal_object_name(&backend_a));
assert_ne!(tier_delete_journal_object_name(&backend_a), tier_delete_journal_object_name(&backend_b));
}
#[test]
fn tier_delete_journal_v2_requires_backend_identity() {
let payload = br#"{"version":2,"obj_name":"remote/object","version_id":"v1","tier_name":"WARM"}"#;
let err = decode_tier_delete_journal_entry(payload).expect_err("v2 entry without identity must fail closed");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("backend identity"));
}
#[test]
fn tier_delete_journal_uses_persisted_transition_destination_identity() {
let mut je = journal_entry();
je.backend_identity = None;
let identity = [9_u8; 32];
let mut metadata = std::collections::HashMap::new();
rustfs_utils::http::metadata_compat::insert_str(
&mut metadata,
rustfs_utils::http::metadata_compat::SUFFIX_TRANSITION_TIER_DESTINATION_ID,
rustfs_utils::crypto::hex(identity),
);
record_tier_delete_journal_backend_identity(&mut je, &metadata).expect("persisted transition identity should decode");
let encoded = encode_tier_delete_journal_entry(&je).expect("identity-bound journal should encode");
let decoded = decode_tier_delete_journal_entry(&encoded).expect("identity-bound journal should decode");
assert_eq!(decoded.backend_identity, Some(identity));
}
#[test]
fn tier_delete_journal_without_transition_identity_stays_legacy() {
let mut je = journal_entry();
je.backend_identity = None;
let encoded = encode_tier_delete_journal_entry(&je).expect("legacy journal should remain encodable");
let persisted: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&encoded).expect("journal JSON should decode");
assert_eq!(persisted["version"], 1);
assert!(persisted["backend_identity"].is_null());
}
#[test]
fn tier_delete_journal_rejects_incomplete_entry() {
let payload = br#"{"version":1,"obj_name":"","version_id":"v1","tier_name":"WARM"}"#;
@@ -339,6 +605,7 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(decoded.obj_name, "remote/object");
assert!(decoded.version_id.is_empty());
assert_eq!(decoded.tier_name, "WARM");
assert_eq!(decoded.backend_identity, None);
}
#[test]
@@ -360,4 +627,29 @@ mod tests {
assert!(err.to_string().contains("decode tier delete journal failed"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn tier_delete_journal_recovery_has_a_hard_outer_timeout() {
let result = await_tier_delete_journal_recovery(
&CancellationToken::new(),
Duration::from_millis(10),
std::future::pending::<Result<()>>(),
)
.await
.expect("an elapsed timeout should return a recovery error")
.expect_err("a permanently pending recovery must time out");
assert!(result.to_string().contains("recovery timed out"), "{result}");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn tier_delete_journal_recovery_drops_in_flight_work_on_shutdown() {
let cancel = CancellationToken::new();
cancel.cancel();
let result =
await_tier_delete_journal_recovery(&cancel, Duration::from_secs(30), std::future::pending::<Result<()>>()).await;
assert!(result.is_none(), "shutdown must cancel the in-flight recovery future");
}
}
@@ -13,11 +13,14 @@
// limitations under the License.
use std::sync::Arc;
#[cfg(test)]
use std::sync::Mutex;
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken;
use crate::bucket::lifecycle::bucket_lifecycle_ops::enqueue_recovered_free_version;
use crate::disk::RUSTFS_META_BUCKET;
use crate::error::Result;
use crate::object_api::ObjectInfo;
@@ -31,10 +34,78 @@ use rustfs_filemeta::FileInfo;
pub const DEFAULT_FREE_VERSION_RECOVERY_LIMIT: usize = 1_000;
const DEFAULT_FREE_VERSION_RECOVERY_SCAN_LIMIT: usize = 10_000;
const BACKGROUND_WALKDIR_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
#[cfg(not(test))]
const BACKGROUND_WALK_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
#[cfg(test)]
const BACKGROUND_WALK_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_millis(100);
type ObjectInfoOrErr = StorageObjectInfoOrErr<ObjectInfo, crate::error::Error>;
type WalkOptions = StorageWalkOptions<fn(&FileInfo) -> bool>;
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) enum RecoveryWalkTestAction {
SendItemsThenError(Vec<ObjectInfo>, crate::error::Error),
SendItemsThenHang(Vec<ObjectInfo>, Arc<tokio::sync::Notify>),
SendItemsUntilReceiverCloses(Arc<tokio::sync::Notify>),
ReturnError(crate::error::Error),
WaitForCancellation(Arc<tokio::sync::Notify>),
}
#[cfg(test)]
type RecoveryWalkTestHook = Box<dyn Fn(&str) -> Option<RecoveryWalkTestAction> + Send + Sync>;
#[cfg(test)]
static RECOVERY_WALK_TEST_HOOK: Mutex<Option<RecoveryWalkTestHook>> = Mutex::new(None);
#[cfg(test)]
static RECOVERY_BUCKET_LIST_WAIT_HOOK: Mutex<Option<Arc<tokio::sync::Notify>>> = Mutex::new(None);
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) struct RecoveryWalkHookGuard;
#[cfg(test)]
impl Drop for RecoveryWalkHookGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let mut hook = RECOVERY_WALK_TEST_HOOK
.lock()
.expect("recovery walk test hook lock should not poison");
*hook = None;
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) fn set_recovery_walk_test_hook(
hook_fn: impl Fn(&str) -> Option<RecoveryWalkTestAction> + Send + Sync + 'static,
) -> RecoveryWalkHookGuard {
let mut hook = RECOVERY_WALK_TEST_HOOK
.lock()
.expect("recovery walk test hook lock should not poison");
*hook = Some(Box::new(hook_fn));
RecoveryWalkHookGuard
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) struct RecoveryBucketListWaitHookGuard;
#[cfg(test)]
impl Drop for RecoveryBucketListWaitHookGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let mut hook = RECOVERY_BUCKET_LIST_WAIT_HOOK
.lock()
.expect("recovery bucket-list test hook lock should not poison");
*hook = None;
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) fn set_recovery_bucket_list_wait_hook(started: Arc<tokio::sync::Notify>) -> RecoveryBucketListWaitHookGuard {
let mut hook = RECOVERY_BUCKET_LIST_WAIT_HOOK
.lock()
.expect("recovery bucket-list test hook lock should not poison");
*hook = Some(started);
RecoveryBucketListWaitHookGuard
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct FreeVersionRecoveryStats {
pub scanned: usize,
@@ -68,12 +139,22 @@ pub async fn recover_tier_free_versions(
limit: usize,
bucket_marker: Option<String>,
object_marker: Option<String>,
) -> Result<FreeVersionRecoveryStats> {
recover_tier_free_versions_with_cancel(api, limit, bucket_marker, object_marker, CancellationToken::new()).await
}
pub(super) async fn recover_tier_free_versions_with_cancel(
api: Arc<ECStore>,
limit: usize,
bucket_marker: Option<String>,
object_marker: Option<String>,
cancel_token: CancellationToken,
) -> Result<FreeVersionRecoveryStats> {
if limit == 0 {
return Err(std::io::Error::other("free-version recovery limit must be greater than zero").into());
}
let page = list_tier_free_versions(api, limit, bucket_marker.clone(), object_marker.clone()).await?;
let page = list_tier_free_versions(api, limit, bucket_marker.clone(), object_marker.clone(), cancel_token.clone()).await?;
let mut stats = FreeVersionRecoveryStats {
scanned: 0,
enqueued: 0,
@@ -87,8 +168,11 @@ pub async fn recover_tier_free_versions(
let mut retry_cursor = RetryCursor::new(bucket_marker, object_marker);
for oi in page.items {
if cancel_token.is_cancelled() {
return Err(tier_free_version_recovery_cancelled());
}
retry_cursor.visit(&oi);
if !record_recovered_free_version_enqueue(&mut stats, queue_recovered_free_version(oi).await) {
if !record_recovered_free_version_enqueue(&mut stats, enqueue_recovered_free_version(oi).await) {
let (bucket_marker, object_marker) = retry_cursor.retry_markers();
stats.truncated = true;
stats.next_bucket_marker = bucket_marker;
@@ -100,6 +184,18 @@ pub async fn recover_tier_free_versions(
Ok(stats)
}
fn tier_free_version_recovery_cancelled() -> crate::error::Error {
std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Interrupted, "tier free-version recovery cancelled").into()
}
fn tier_free_version_recovery_walk_shutdown_timed_out() -> crate::error::Error {
std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut,
"tier free-version recovery walk did not stop after cancellation",
)
.into()
}
fn record_recovered_free_version_enqueue(stats: &mut FreeVersionRecoveryStats, queued: bool) -> bool {
stats.scanned += 1;
if queued {
@@ -111,10 +207,6 @@ fn record_recovered_free_version_enqueue(stats: &mut FreeVersionRecoveryStats, q
}
}
async fn queue_recovered_free_version(oi: ObjectInfo) -> bool {
crate::bucket::lifecycle::bucket_lifecycle_ops::enqueue_recovered_free_version(oi).await
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct RetryCursor {
input_bucket_marker: Option<String>,
@@ -160,11 +252,12 @@ impl RetryCursor {
}
}
async fn list_tier_free_versions(
pub(super) async fn list_tier_free_versions(
api: Arc<ECStore>,
limit: usize,
bucket_marker: Option<String>,
object_marker: Option<String>,
cancel_token: CancellationToken,
) -> Result<FreeVersionRecoveryPage> {
let mut page = FreeVersionRecoveryPage {
items: Vec::new(),
@@ -179,21 +272,42 @@ async fn list_tier_free_versions(
return Ok(page);
}
let buckets = api.list_bucket(&BucketOptions::default()).await?;
let bucket_options = BucketOptions::default();
let list_buckets = async {
#[cfg(test)]
let wait_hook = RECOVERY_BUCKET_LIST_WAIT_HOOK
.lock()
.expect("recovery bucket-list test hook lock should not poison")
.clone();
#[cfg(test)]
if let Some(started) = wait_hook {
started.notify_one();
std::future::pending::<()>().await;
}
api.list_bucket(&bucket_options).await
};
tokio::pin!(list_buckets);
let buckets = tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = cancel_token.cancelled() => return Err(tier_free_version_recovery_cancelled()),
result = &mut list_buckets => result?,
};
let mut bucket_seen = bucket_marker.is_none();
let mut truncated_after: Option<RecoveryCursor> = None;
let walk_scan_limit = recovery_walk_scan_limit(limit);
for bucket in buckets {
if cancel_token.is_cancelled() {
return Err(tier_free_version_recovery_cancelled());
}
if bucket.name == RUSTFS_META_BUCKET {
continue;
}
if !bucket_seen {
if bucket_marker.as_deref() == Some(bucket.name.as_str()) {
bucket_seen = true;
} else {
if bucket_marker.as_deref().is_some_and(|marker| bucket.name.as_str() < marker) {
continue;
}
bucket_seen = true;
}
page.buckets_scanned += 1;
@@ -204,16 +318,94 @@ async fn list_tier_free_versions(
};
let (tx, mut rx) = mpsc::channel::<ObjectInfoOrErr>(100);
let cancel = CancellationToken::new();
let cancel = cancel_token.child_token();
let mut draining_after_truncation = false;
let mut drain_deadline = None;
let mut last_seen_object: Option<String> = None;
let mut scanned_objects = 0usize;
let walk = tokio::spawn({
let mut walk = tokio::spawn({
let api = api.clone();
let bucket_name = bucket.name.clone();
let object_marker = bucket_object_marker.clone();
let cancel = cancel.clone();
async move {
#[cfg(test)]
let test_action = {
let hook = RECOVERY_WALK_TEST_HOOK
.lock()
.expect("recovery walk test hook lock should not poison");
hook.as_ref().and_then(|hook| hook(&bucket_name))
};
#[cfg(test)]
if let Some(action) = test_action {
match action {
RecoveryWalkTestAction::SendItemsThenError(items, err) => {
for item in items {
if tx
.send(ObjectInfoOrErr {
item: Some(item),
err: None,
})
.await
.is_err()
{
return Ok(());
}
}
let _ = tx
.send(ObjectInfoOrErr {
item: None,
err: Some(err),
})
.await;
return Ok(());
}
RecoveryWalkTestAction::SendItemsThenHang(items, started) => {
for item in items {
if tx
.send(ObjectInfoOrErr {
item: Some(item),
err: None,
})
.await
.is_err()
{
return Ok(());
}
}
started.notify_one();
return std::future::pending().await;
}
RecoveryWalkTestAction::SendItemsUntilReceiverCloses(started) => {
started.notify_one();
let mut index = 0usize;
loop {
if tx
.send(ObjectInfoOrErr {
item: Some(ObjectInfo {
bucket: bucket_name.clone(),
name: format!("nonrecoverable-{index:08}"),
..Default::default()
}),
err: None,
})
.await
.is_err()
{
return Ok(());
}
index = index.saturating_add(1);
}
}
RecoveryWalkTestAction::ReturnError(err) => return Err(err),
RecoveryWalkTestAction::WaitForCancellation(started) => {
started.notify_one();
cancel.cancelled().await;
return Err(tier_free_version_recovery_cancelled());
}
}
}
api.walk(
cancel,
&bucket_name,
@@ -231,47 +423,88 @@ async fn list_tier_free_versions(
}
});
while let Some(item) = rx.recv().await {
let mut receive_error = None;
loop {
let item = tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = cancel_token.cancelled() => {
cancel.cancel();
receive_error = Some(tier_free_version_recovery_cancelled());
break;
}
_ = async {
if let Some(deadline) = drain_deadline {
tokio::time::sleep_until(deadline).await;
} else {
std::future::pending::<()>().await;
}
}, if drain_deadline.is_some() => {
receive_error = Some(tier_free_version_recovery_walk_shutdown_timed_out());
break;
}
item = rx.recv() => match item {
Some(item) => item,
None => break,
},
};
page.scanned_entries += 1;
if draining_after_truncation {
continue;
}
if let Some(err) = item.err {
cancel.cancel();
walk.await.map_err(|err| std::io::Error::other(err.to_string()))??;
return Err(err);
receive_error = Some(err);
break;
}
if draining_after_truncation {
continue;
}
let Some(oi) = item.item else {
continue;
};
record_scanned_object(&mut last_seen_object, &mut scanned_objects, &oi.name);
if let Some(cursor) = &truncated_after
&& cursor.object != oi.name
&& (cursor.bucket.as_str() != bucket.name.as_str() || cursor.object.as_str() != oi.name.as_str())
{
page.truncated = true;
cancel.cancel();
draining_after_truncation = true;
drain_deadline = Some(tokio::time::Instant::now() + BACKGROUND_WALK_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT);
continue;
}
if is_recoverable_tier_free_version(&oi) {
let cursor = RecoveryCursor {
let current_cursor = RecoveryCursor {
bucket: bucket.name.clone(),
object: oi.name.clone(),
};
page.items.push(oi);
page.next_bucket_marker = Some(cursor.bucket.clone());
page.next_object_marker = Some(cursor.object.clone());
page.next_bucket_marker = Some(current_cursor.bucket.clone());
page.next_object_marker = Some(current_cursor.object.clone());
if page.items.len() >= limit && truncated_after.is_none() {
truncated_after = Some(cursor);
truncated_after = Some(current_cursor);
}
}
}
walk.await.map_err(|err| std::io::Error::other(err.to_string()))??;
drop(rx);
let walk_shutdown_timeout = drain_deadline
.map(|deadline| deadline.saturating_duration_since(tokio::time::Instant::now()))
.unwrap_or(BACKGROUND_WALK_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT);
let walk_result = match tokio::time::timeout(walk_shutdown_timeout, &mut walk).await {
Ok(result) => result.map_err(|err| std::io::Error::other(err.to_string()))?,
Err(_) => {
walk.abort();
let _ = walk.await;
if let Some(err) = receive_error {
return Err(err);
}
return Err(tier_free_version_recovery_walk_shutdown_timed_out());
}
};
if let Some(err) = receive_error {
return Err(err);
}
walk_result?;
mark_scan_truncated_if_needed(&mut page, scanned_objects, walk_scan_limit, &bucket.name, last_seen_object.as_deref());
if page.truncated {
page.next_bucket_marker = Some(bucket.name.clone());
break;
}
}
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ use crate::bucket::lifecycle::bucket_lifecycle_ops::ExpiryOp;
use crate::bucket::lifecycle::lifecycle::{self, ObjectOpts};
use crate::bucket::lifecycle::tier_delete_journal::persist_tier_delete_journal_entry;
use crate::client::signer_error::error_chain_contains_signer_header_marker;
use crate::services::tier::tier::{TierConfigMgr, TierDestinationId, TierOperationLease};
use crate::storage_api_contracts::lifecycle::TransitionedObject;
use crate::store::ECStore;
use rustfs_utils::get_env_usize;
@@ -247,6 +248,8 @@ impl ObjSweeper {
obj_name: self.remote_object.clone(),
version_id: self.transition_version_id.clone(),
tier_name: self.transition_tier.clone(),
backend_identity: None,
version_id_exact: false,
});
}
None
@@ -281,6 +284,8 @@ pub struct Jentry {
pub(crate) obj_name: String,
pub(crate) version_id: String,
pub(crate) tier_name: String,
pub(crate) backend_identity: Option<TierDestinationId>,
pub(crate) version_id_exact: bool,
}
impl ExpiryOp for Jentry {
@@ -312,6 +317,30 @@ async fn delete_object_from_remote_tier_raw(obj_name: &str, rv_id: &str, tier_na
return result;
}
let tier_config_mgr = runtime_sources::tier_config_mgr_handle();
delete_object_from_remote_tier_raw_with_manager(obj_name, rv_id, tier_name, &tier_config_mgr).await
}
async fn delete_object_from_remote_tier_raw_with_manager(
obj_name: &str,
rv_id: &str,
tier_name: &str,
tier_config_mgr: &Arc<tokio::sync::RwLock<TierConfigMgr>>,
) -> Result<(), std::io::Error> {
let lease = TierConfigMgr::acquire_operation_lease(&tier_config_mgr, tier_name)
.await
.map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
delete_object_from_remote_tier_raw_with_lease(obj_name, rv_id, &lease, false).await
}
async fn delete_object_from_remote_tier_raw_with_lease(
obj_name: &str,
rv_id: &str,
lease: &TierOperationLease,
version_id_exact: bool,
) -> Result<(), std::io::Error> {
lease.validate_remote_version_id(rv_id)?;
if remote_delete_breaker_is_open(Instant::now()).await {
metrics::counter!(METRIC_DELETE_REMOTE_BREAKER_TOTAL).increment(1);
return Err(std::io::Error::other(ERR_REMOTE_DELETE_BREAKER_OPEN));
@@ -323,13 +352,11 @@ async fn delete_object_from_remote_tier_raw(obj_name: &str, rv_id: &str, tier_na
.map_err(|_| std::io::Error::other(ERR_REMOTE_DELETE_LIMITER_CLOSED))?;
let _inflight = RemoteDeleteInflightGuard::new();
let tier_config_mgr = runtime_sources::tier_config_mgr_handle();
let mut config_mgr = tier_config_mgr.write().await;
let w = match config_mgr.get_driver(tier_name).await {
Ok(w) => w,
Err(e) => return Err(std::io::Error::other(e)),
};
w.remove(obj_name, rv_id).await
if version_id_exact {
lease.remove_exact(obj_name, rv_id).await
} else {
lease.remove(obj_name, rv_id).await
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -341,6 +368,30 @@ fn run_remote_tier_delete_test_hook(obj_name: &str, rv_id: &str, tier_name: &str
.map(|hook| hook(obj_name, rv_id, tier_name))
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) struct RemoteTierDeleteHookGuard;
#[cfg(test)]
impl Drop for RemoteTierDeleteHookGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let mut hook = REMOTE_TIER_DELETE_TEST_HOOK
.lock()
.expect("remote tier delete test hook lock should not poison");
*hook = None;
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) fn set_remote_tier_delete_test_hook(
hook_fn: impl Fn(&str, &str, &str) -> std::io::Result<()> + Send + Sync + 'static,
) -> RemoteTierDeleteHookGuard {
let mut hook = REMOTE_TIER_DELETE_TEST_HOOK
.lock()
.expect("remote tier delete test hook lock should not poison");
*hook = Some(Box::new(hook_fn));
RemoteTierDeleteHookGuard
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum RemoteTierDeleteOutcome {
Deleted,
@@ -364,6 +415,38 @@ pub async fn delete_object_from_remote_tier_idempotent(
}
}
pub(crate) async fn delete_object_from_remote_tier_idempotent_with_manager_and_identity(
obj_name: &str,
rv_id: &str,
tier_name: &str,
backend_identity: TierDestinationId,
tier_config_mgr: &Arc<tokio::sync::RwLock<TierConfigMgr>>,
version_id_exact: bool,
) -> Result<RemoteTierDeleteOutcome, std::io::Error> {
let lease = TierConfigMgr::acquire_operation_lease_for_backend_identity(tier_config_mgr, tier_name, backend_identity)
.await
.map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
delete_object_from_remote_tier_with_lease_idempotent(obj_name, rv_id, &lease, version_id_exact).await
}
pub(crate) async fn delete_object_from_remote_tier_with_lease_idempotent(
obj_name: &str,
rv_id: &str,
lease: &TierOperationLease,
version_id_exact: bool,
) -> Result<RemoteTierDeleteOutcome, std::io::Error> {
match delete_object_from_remote_tier_raw_with_lease(obj_name, rv_id, lease, version_id_exact).await {
Ok(()) => Ok(RemoteTierDeleteOutcome::Deleted),
Err(err) if is_remote_tier_not_found_error(&err) => Ok(RemoteTierDeleteOutcome::AlreadyRemoved),
Err(err) => {
if should_record_remote_delete_failure(&err) {
record_remote_delete_failure(&err, Instant::now()).await;
}
Err(err)
}
}
}
pub(crate) fn is_remote_tier_not_found_error(err: &std::io::Error) -> bool {
let message = err.to_string();
message.contains("NoSuchKey")
@@ -401,6 +484,8 @@ pub fn transitioned_force_delete_journal_entry(transitioned: &TransitionedObject
obj_name: transitioned.name.clone(),
version_id: transitioned.version_id.clone(),
tier_name: transitioned.tier.clone(),
backend_identity: None,
version_id_exact: false,
})
}
@@ -409,34 +494,14 @@ mod test {
use crate::client::signer_error::invalid_utf8_header_error;
use super::{
ERR_REMOTE_DELETE_BREAKER_OPEN, ERR_REMOTE_DELETE_LIMITER_CLOSED, REMOTE_TIER_DELETE_TEST_HOOK, RemoteDeleteBreaker,
RemoteTierDeleteOutcome, delete_object_from_remote_tier_idempotent, is_remote_tier_not_found_error,
is_signer_header_error, should_record_remote_delete_failure,
ERR_REMOTE_DELETE_BREAKER_OPEN, ERR_REMOTE_DELETE_LIMITER_CLOSED, RemoteDeleteBreaker, RemoteTierDeleteOutcome,
delete_object_from_remote_tier_idempotent, delete_object_from_remote_tier_idempotent_with_manager_and_identity,
is_remote_tier_not_found_error, is_signer_header_error, set_remote_tier_delete_test_hook,
should_record_remote_delete_failure,
};
use std::io::{Error, ErrorKind};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
struct RemoteTierDeleteHookGuard;
impl Drop for RemoteTierDeleteHookGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let mut hook = REMOTE_TIER_DELETE_TEST_HOOK
.lock()
.expect("remote tier delete test hook lock should not poison");
*hook = None;
}
}
fn set_remote_tier_delete_test_hook(
hook_fn: impl Fn(&str, &str, &str) -> std::io::Result<()> + Send + Sync + 'static,
) -> RemoteTierDeleteHookGuard {
let mut hook = REMOTE_TIER_DELETE_TEST_HOOK
.lock()
.expect("remote tier delete test hook lock should not poison");
*hook = Some(Box::new(hook_fn));
RemoteTierDeleteHookGuard
}
#[test]
fn signer_header_error_detection_matches_utf8_failures() {
let err = Error::new(
@@ -506,6 +571,99 @@ mod test {
assert!(err.to_string().contains("driver not found"));
}
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
#[tokio::test]
async fn journal_delete_rejects_backend_identity_mismatch() {
let manager = crate::services::tier::tier::TierConfigMgr::new();
crate::services::tier::test_util::register_mock_tier(&manager, "WARM").await;
let lease = crate::services::tier::tier::TierConfigMgr::acquire_operation_lease(&manager, "WARM")
.await
.expect("test tier lease should be available");
let mut mismatched = lease.backend_identity();
mismatched[0] ^= 1;
drop(lease);
let err = delete_object_from_remote_tier_idempotent_with_manager_and_identity(
"remote/object",
"remote-version",
"WARM",
mismatched,
&manager,
false,
)
.await
.expect_err("journal recovery must fail closed when the tier name was rebound");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("identity no longer matches"));
}
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
#[tokio::test]
async fn journal_delete_dispatches_an_exact_version_constraint() {
let manager = crate::services::tier::tier::TierConfigMgr::new();
let backend = crate::services::tier::test_util::register_mock_tier(&manager, "WARM").await;
let lease = crate::services::tier::tier::TierConfigMgr::acquire_operation_lease(&manager, "WARM")
.await
.expect("test tier lease should be available");
let identity = lease.backend_identity();
drop(lease);
let outcome = delete_object_from_remote_tier_idempotent_with_manager_and_identity(
"remote/object",
"exact-version",
"WARM",
identity,
&manager,
true,
)
.await
.expect("an exact journal delete should reach the backend");
assert_eq!(outcome, RemoteTierDeleteOutcome::Deleted);
assert_eq!(backend.exact_remove_count(), 1);
assert_eq!(backend.remove_count().await, 1);
}
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
#[tokio::test]
async fn journal_delete_rejects_nonempty_remote_version_before_backend_io() {
let manager = crate::services::tier::tier::TierConfigMgr::new();
let backend = crate::services::tier::test_util::register_mock_tier(&manager, "WARM").await;
let lease = crate::services::tier::tier::TierConfigMgr::acquire_operation_lease(&manager, "WARM")
.await
.expect("test tier lease should be available");
let identity = lease.backend_identity();
drop(lease);
backend.set_reject_non_empty_remote_versions(true);
let err = delete_object_from_remote_tier_idempotent_with_manager_and_identity(
"remote/object",
"remote-version",
"WARM",
identity,
&manager,
true,
)
.await
.expect_err("a provider that rejects a versioned delete must fail before remote IO");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("requires an unversioned remote object"));
assert_eq!(backend.remove_count().await, 0);
delete_object_from_remote_tier_idempotent_with_manager_and_identity(
"remote/object",
"",
"WARM",
identity,
&manager,
false,
)
.await
.expect("unversioned remote delete should continue without a version ID");
assert_eq!(backend.remove_versions().await, vec![("remote/object".to_string(), String::new())]);
}
#[test]
fn breaker_opens_at_threshold_and_recovers_after_window() {
let mut breaker = RemoteDeleteBreaker::new(3, Duration::from_secs(30));
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -412,6 +412,10 @@ impl BucketMetadataSys {
}
}
pub(crate) fn object_store(&self) -> Arc<ECStore> {
self.api.clone()
}
pub async fn init(&mut self, buckets: Vec<String>) {
let _ = self.init_internal(buckets).await;
}
+39 -4
View File
@@ -183,6 +183,16 @@ pub fn is_valid_object_name(object: &str) -> bool {
is_valid_object_prefix(object)
}
/// Client-facing reason attached to rejections of object keys that Win32/NTFS
/// cannot represent as file paths (issue #3299). Deployments on Linux/macOS
/// accept the full S3 key character set.
pub const WINDOWS_RESERVED_CHARACTERS_REASON: &str =
"object key contains characters unsupported on Windows hosts (one of ':', '*', '?', '\"', '|', '<', '>')";
/// Client-facing reason for path segments Windows can store but not address
/// afterwards (issue #3449): trailing dot/space or reserved DOS device names.
pub const WINDOWS_RESERVED_SEGMENT_REASON: &str = "object key contains a path segment unsupported on Windows hosts (trailing dot or space, or a reserved device name such as NUL/CON/COM1)";
/// Reserved DOS device names that shadow regular files on Windows, even when
/// an extension is appended (e.g. `NUL.txt` resolves to the `NUL` device).
const WINDOWS_RESERVED_NAMES: &[&str] = &[
@@ -226,13 +236,21 @@ pub fn check_object_name_for_length_and_slash(bucket: &str, object: &str) -> Res
|| object.contains('>')
// || object.contains('\\')
{
return Err(StorageError::ObjectNameInvalid(bucket.to_owned(), object.to_owned()));
return Err(StorageError::InvalidArgument(
bucket.to_owned(),
object.to_owned(),
WINDOWS_RESERVED_CHARACTERS_REASON.to_owned(),
));
}
// Reject names that NTFS would happily create but the Win32 path
// layer cannot read back (os error 3), e.g. `baddir.` or `NUL.txt`.
if object_name_has_windows_incompatible_segment(object) {
return Err(StorageError::ObjectNameInvalid(bucket.to_owned(), object.to_owned()));
return Err(StorageError::InvalidArgument(
bucket.to_owned(),
object.to_owned(),
WINDOWS_RESERVED_SEGMENT_REASON.to_owned(),
));
}
}
@@ -537,8 +555,8 @@ mod tests {
let result = check_object_name_for_length_and_slash("test-bucket", object);
if cfg!(target_os = "windows") {
assert!(
matches!(result, Err(StorageError::ObjectNameInvalid(..))),
"object name must be rejected on Windows: {object:?}"
matches!(&result, Err(StorageError::InvalidArgument(_, _, reason)) if reason == WINDOWS_RESERVED_SEGMENT_REASON),
"object name must be rejected on Windows with a descriptive reason: {object:?}, got {result:?}"
);
} else {
assert!(result.is_ok(), "object name must remain valid on non-Windows: {object:?}");
@@ -554,6 +572,23 @@ mod tests {
}
}
#[test]
fn test_check_object_name_windows_reserved_characters() {
// Keys containing Win32-reserved characters are rejected on Windows
// with a descriptive reason (issue #3299); valid elsewhere.
for object in ["path/*sUt*mykey", "a:b", "what?", "pipe|name", "quote\"d", "lt<gt>"] {
let result = check_object_name_for_length_and_slash("test-bucket", object);
if cfg!(target_os = "windows") {
assert!(
matches!(&result, Err(StorageError::InvalidArgument(_, _, reason)) if reason == WINDOWS_RESERVED_CHARACTERS_REASON),
"object name must be rejected on Windows with a descriptive reason: {object:?}, got {result:?}"
);
} else {
assert!(result.is_ok(), "object name must remain valid on non-Windows: {object:?}");
}
}
}
#[test]
fn test_check_bucket_and_object_names() {
// Valid names
+150 -47
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use crate::disk::disk_store::get_drive_walkdir_stall_timeout;
use crate::disk::disk_store::{get_drive_walkdir_peek_timeout, get_drive_walkdir_stall_timeout};
use crate::disk::error::DiskError;
use crate::disk::{self, DiskAPI, DiskStore, WalkDirOptions};
use metrics::counter;
@@ -124,6 +124,24 @@ fn classify_listing_quorum_failure(errors: &[DiskError]) -> DiskError {
DiskError::ErasureReadQuorum
}
/// Returns true when a metacache listing missed quorum purely because the
/// volume or path is absent on a quorum of drives, i.e. every recorded failure
/// is [`DiskError::VolumeNotFound`] or [`DiskError::FileNotFound`].
///
/// This is a benign, expected outcome: the caller is handed
/// `VolumeNotFound`/`FileNotFound` and decides how to react. The most common
/// trigger is a startup race where the system bucket has not yet been created
/// on every drive when an early reader (e.g. the IAM config loader) lists it.
/// It must be distinguished from a listing that failed for a real reason (I/O,
/// timeout, corruption) so the former is not surfaced at `error`. See
/// rustfs/rustfs#5076.
fn is_benign_not_found_listing_failure(errors: &[DiskError]) -> bool {
!errors.is_empty()
&& errors
.iter()
.all(|err| matches!(err, DiskError::VolumeNotFound | DiskError::FileNotFound))
}
struct PublishedBytesWriter<W> {
inner: W,
published: bool,
@@ -175,6 +193,10 @@ pub(crate) enum TestReaderBehavior {
ProducerError(DiskError),
PrimaryErrorThenFallback(DiskError),
PartialThenTimeout(Vec<MetaCacheEntry>),
DelayedEntries {
delay: Duration,
entries: Vec<MetaCacheEntry>,
},
}
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -339,6 +361,13 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
drop(out);
Some(err)
}
TestReaderBehavior::DelayedEntries { delay, entries } => {
tokio::time::sleep(delay).await;
let mut out = rustfs_filemeta::MetacacheWriter::new(&mut wr);
out.write(&entries).await.expect("delayed test entries should be written");
out.close().await.expect("delayed test entries should close");
return Ok(());
}
}
} else {
None
@@ -473,6 +502,17 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
record_producer_error(&producer_errs_clone, disk_idx, &err);
return Err(err);
}
TestReaderBehavior::DelayedEntries { delay, entries } => {
tokio::time::sleep(delay).await;
let mut out = rustfs_filemeta::MetacacheWriter::new(&mut wr);
out.write(&entries)
.await
.expect("delayed test fallback entries should be written");
out.close().await.expect("delayed test fallback entries should close");
need_fallback = false;
last_err = None;
continue;
}
}
}
@@ -609,47 +649,23 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
// Consumer-side peek timeout, and a caveat worth understanding
// (rustfs/backlog#1217).
//
// This budget is the SAME SOURCE and SAME VALUE as the producer-side
// walk stall budget: both default to `walkdir_stall_timeout` and fall
// back to `get_drive_walkdir_stall_timeout()` (5s). But the two measure
// different things:
// This budget must not be stricter than the producer-side walk stall
// budget. The two measure different things:
// * producer stall: bounds a single drive READ inside the walk (see
// `with_walk_stall_deadline` in `disk/local.rs`);
// * this consumer peek: bounds the interval between two ADJACENT
// entries arriving from a drive's reader (`peek_with_timeout`).
//
// Because they are coupled to the same value, the consumer cannot wait
// meaningfully longer for the next entry than the producer is allowed to
// spend producing one. When a drive walks a region dense with
// non-listable internal items (many entries the producer filters out
// before emitting the next visible one), a HEALTHY drive can take longer
// than one budget to hand the consumer its next entry. The consumer then
// classifies it as `PeekOutcome::TimedOut` and DETACHES that reader (it
// is replaced by a drained duplex below), dropping a good drive from the
// merge. That caps the "large prefix always succeeds" guarantee: a wide
// enough non-listable stretch can knock healthy drives out of quorum.
//
// This is left documented, not decoupled. Giving the consumer peek an
// independent, strictly-larger budget would reduce these false detaches,
// but it also delays detaching a genuinely dead drive by the same amount
// and shifts listing tail-latency semantics; that trade-off wants soak
// data before it changes the default, so it is deferred to a follow-up.
// The constraint for any such change: the consumer peek must be >= the
// producer stall (never stricter), so it can never declare a drive
// stalled before the producer itself would have failed.
let peek_timeout = opts
.walkdir_stall_timeout
.or({
#[cfg(test)]
{
opts.peek_timeout
}
#[cfg(not(test))]
{
None
}
})
.unwrap_or_else(get_drive_walkdir_stall_timeout);
// A drive can spend one stall budget walking a dense non-listable region
// before it can publish the next visible entry. Use an independent,
// profile-aware consumer budget so the merge does not detach that reader
// before the producer itself would have failed.
let producer_stall_timeout = opts.walkdir_stall_timeout.unwrap_or_else(get_drive_walkdir_stall_timeout);
let configured_peek_timeout = get_drive_walkdir_peek_timeout().max(producer_stall_timeout);
#[cfg(not(test))]
let peek_timeout = configured_peek_timeout;
#[cfg(test)]
let peek_timeout = opts.peek_timeout.unwrap_or(configured_peek_timeout);
let mut errs: Vec<Option<DiskError>> = Vec::with_capacity(readers.len());
for _ in 0..readers.len() {
errs.push(None);
@@ -842,17 +858,38 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
_ => {}
});
error!(
event = EVENT_METACACHE_LISTING,
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_METACACHE,
bucket = %opts.bucket,
path = %opts.path,
state = "quorum_failed",
error = %combined_err.join(", "),
"Metacache listing quorum failed"
);
let failures = errs.iter().flatten().cloned().collect::<Vec<_>>();
// A listing that misses quorum purely because the volume/path is
// absent on a quorum of drives is benign and expected — the caller
// receives VolumeNotFound/FileNotFound and decides how to react.
// The common trigger is a startup race where the system bucket is
// not yet created on every drive when an early reader (e.g. the IAM
// config loader) lists it, so surfacing it at `error` is misleading
// noise (rustfs/rustfs#5076). Keep `error` for listings that failed
// for a real reason (I/O, timeout, corruption).
if is_benign_not_found_listing_failure(&failures) {
debug!(
event = EVENT_METACACHE_LISTING,
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_METACACHE,
bucket = %opts.bucket,
path = %opts.path,
state = "quorum_not_found",
error = %combined_err.join(", "),
"Metacache listing quorum not reached (volume/path absent)"
);
} else {
error!(
event = EVENT_METACACHE_LISTING,
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_METACACHE,
bucket = %opts.bucket,
path = %opts.path,
state = "quorum_failed",
error = %combined_err.join(", "),
"Metacache listing quorum failed"
);
}
return Err(classify_listing_quorum_failure(&failures));
}
@@ -1039,6 +1076,21 @@ mod tests {
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use uuid::Uuid;
#[test]
fn benign_not_found_listing_failure_detection() {
// Pure not-found quorum misses are benign (the volume/path simply does
// not exist on a quorum of drives) and must not be logged at ERROR.
assert!(is_benign_not_found_listing_failure(&[DiskError::VolumeNotFound]));
assert!(is_benign_not_found_listing_failure(
&[DiskError::VolumeNotFound, DiskError::FileNotFound,]
));
// No recorded failure is not a not-found case.
assert!(!is_benign_not_found_listing_failure(&[]));
// Any real error must keep the failure at ERROR severity.
assert!(!is_benign_not_found_listing_failure(&[DiskError::VolumeNotFound, DiskError::Timeout,]));
assert!(!is_benign_not_found_listing_failure(&[DiskError::DiskNotFound]));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn list_path_raw_empty_disks_returns_read_quorum() {
let err = list_path_raw(CancellationToken::new(), ListPathRawOptions::default())
@@ -1246,6 +1298,57 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(err, DiskError::Timeout);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn list_path_raw_waits_past_producer_stall_for_slow_progressing_reader() {
let entry = MetaCacheEntry {
name: "bucket/visible-object".to_string(),
metadata: vec![1, 2, 3],
cached: None,
reusable: false,
};
let seen = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
let seen_clone = seen.clone();
timeout(
Duration::from_secs(1),
list_path_raw(
CancellationToken::new(),
ListPathRawOptions {
disks: vec![None, None],
min_disks: 2,
walkdir_stall_timeout: Some(Duration::from_millis(20)),
test_reader_behaviors: vec![
TestReaderBehavior::DelayedEntries {
delay: Duration::from_millis(60),
entries: vec![entry.clone()],
},
TestReaderBehavior::Entries(vec![entry]),
],
partial: Some(Box::new(move |entries: MetaCacheEntries, _: &[Option<DiskError>]| {
let seen = seen_clone.clone();
Box::pin(async move {
let mut names = entries.0.iter().flatten().map(|entry| entry.name.as_str());
if let (Some(first), Some(second), None) = (names.next(), names.next(), names.next())
&& first == second
{
seen.lock().expect("seen mutex poisoned").push(first.to_owned());
}
})
})),
..Default::default()
},
),
)
.await
.expect("slow-progressing reader should complete inside the consumer peek budget")
.expect("slow-progressing reader should not be detached by the producer stall budget");
assert_eq!(
seen.lock().expect("seen mutex poisoned").as_slice(),
&["bucket/visible-object".to_string()]
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn list_path_raw_prefers_timeout_for_mixed_errors_beyond_quorum_budget() {
let err = list_path_raw(
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ pub fn http_resp_to_error_response(
object_name: &str,
) -> ErrorResponse {
let err_body = String::from_utf8_lossy(&b).to_string();
if h.is_empty() || resp_status.is_client_error() || resp_status.is_server_error() {
if h.is_empty() || !(resp_status.is_client_error() || resp_status.is_server_error()) {
return ErrorResponse {
status_code: resp_status,
code: S3ErrorCode::ResponseInterrupted,
@@ -329,4 +329,21 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(value["RequestId"], Value::String("req-xml-123".to_string()));
assert!(value.get("request_id").is_none(), "external error contract must not expose request_id");
}
#[test]
fn parses_s3_error_code_from_client_error_response() {
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
headers.insert("x-amz-request-id", "request-id".parse().expect("request ID header should parse"));
let response = http_resp_to_error_response(
StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
&headers,
b"<Error><Code>NoSuchVersion</Code><Message>remote detail</Message></Error>".to_vec(),
"bucket",
"object",
);
assert_eq!(response.code, S3ErrorCode::NoSuchVersion);
assert_eq!(response.status_code, StatusCode::NOT_FOUND);
}
}
+3 -2
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ use tokio_util::io::StreamReader;
use crate::client::{
api_error_response::err_invalid_argument,
api_get_options::GetObjectOptions,
transition_api::{ObjectInfo, ReadCloser, ReaderImpl, RequestMetadata, TransitionClient, to_object_info},
transition_api::{ObjectInfo, ReadCloser, ReaderImpl, RequestMetadata, TransitionClient, to_object_info_for_provider},
};
use futures_util::StreamExt;
use http_body_util::BodyExt;
@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ impl TransitionClient {
)
.await?;
let object_stat = to_object_info(bucket_name, object_name, resp.headers())?;
let object_stat =
to_object_info_for_provider(bucket_name, object_name, resp.headers(), self.provider_version_capabilities())?;
let h = resp.headers().clone();
+121 -77
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use crate::client::{
ListBucketResult, ListBucketV2Result, ListMultipartUploadsResult, ListObjectPartsResult, ListVersionsResult, ObjectPart,
},
credentials,
transition_api::{ReaderImpl, RequestMetadata, TransitionClient},
transition_api::{ReaderImpl, RequestMetadata, TransitionClient, collect_response_body},
};
use crate::storage_api_contracts::bucket::BucketInfo;
use http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode};
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ impl TransitionClient {
url_values.insert("max-keys".to_string(), max_keys.to_string());
}
let mut resp = self
let resp = self
.execute_method(
http::Method::GET,
&mut RequestMetadata {
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ impl TransitionClient {
Ok(list_bucket_result)
}
pub fn list_object_versions_query(
pub async fn list_object_versions_query(
&self,
bucket_name: &str,
opts: &ListObjectsOptions,
@@ -172,93 +172,88 @@ impl TransitionClient {
version_id_marker: &str,
delimiter: &str,
) -> Result<ListVersionsResult, std::io::Error> {
/*if err := s3utils.CheckValidBucketName(bucketName); err != nil {
return ListVersionsResult{}, err
let mut url_values = HashMap::new();
url_values.insert("versions".to_string(), "".to_string());
url_values.insert("prefix".to_string(), opts.prefix.clone());
url_values.insert("delimiter".to_string(), delimiter.to_string());
url_values.insert("encoding-type".to_string(), "url".to_string());
if !key_marker.is_empty() {
url_values.insert("key-marker".to_string(), key_marker.to_string());
}
if err := s3utils.CheckValidObjectNamePrefix(opts.Prefix); err != nil {
return ListVersionsResult{}, err
}
urlValues := make(url.Values)
urlValues.Set("versions", "")
urlValues.Set("prefix", opts.Prefix)
urlValues.Set("delimiter", delimiter)
if keyMarker != "" {
urlValues.Set("key-marker", keyMarker)
}
if opts.max_keys > 0 {
urlValues.Set("max-keys", fmt.Sprintf("%d", opts.max_keys))
url_values.insert("max-keys".to_string(), opts.max_keys.to_string());
}
if !version_id_marker.is_empty() {
url_values.insert("version-id-marker".to_string(), version_id_marker.to_string());
}
if opts.with_metadata {
url_values.insert("metadata".to_string(), "true".to_string());
}
if versionIDMarker != "" {
urlValues.Set("version-id-marker", versionIDMarker)
let mut resp = self
.execute_method(
http::Method::GET,
&mut RequestMetadata {
bucket_name: bucket_name.to_string(),
object_name: "".to_string(),
query_values: url_values,
content_sha256_hex: EMPTY_STRING_SHA256_HASH.to_string(),
custom_header: opts.headers.clone(),
content_body: ReaderImpl::Body(Bytes::new()),
content_length: 0,
content_md5_base64: "".to_string(),
stream_sha256: false,
trailer: HeaderMap::new(),
pre_sign_url: Default::default(),
add_crc: Default::default(),
extra_pre_sign_header: Default::default(),
bucket_location: Default::default(),
expires: Default::default(),
},
)
.await?;
let resp_status = resp.status();
let headers = resp.headers().clone();
let body = collect_response_body(resp.into_body(), MAX_S3_CLIENT_RESPONSE_SIZE).await?;
if resp_status != StatusCode::OK {
return Err(std::io::Error::other(http_resp_to_error_response(
resp_status,
&headers,
body,
bucket_name,
"",
)));
}
if opts.WithMetadata {
urlValues.Set("metadata", "true")
let mut versions = quick_xml::de::from_reader::<_, ListVersionsResult>(body.as_slice())
.map_err(|err| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, err))?;
for version in &mut versions.versions {
version.key = decode_s3_name(&version.key, &versions.encoding_type)?;
}
for marker in &mut versions.delete_markers {
marker.key = decode_s3_name(&marker.key, &versions.encoding_type)?;
}
for prefix in &mut versions.common_prefixes {
prefix.prefix = decode_s3_name(&prefix.prefix, &versions.encoding_type)?;
}
if !versions.next_key_marker.is_empty() {
versions.next_key_marker = decode_s3_name(&versions.next_key_marker, &versions.encoding_type)?;
}
urlValues.Set("encoding-type", "url")
let resp = self.executeMethod(http::Method::GET, &mut RequestMetadata{
bucketName: bucketName,
queryValues: urlValues,
contentSHA256Hex: emptySHA256Hex,
customHeader: opts.headers,
}).await?;
defer closeResponse(resp)
if err != nil {
return ListVersionsResult{}, err
}
if resp != nil {
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return ListVersionsResult{}, httpRespToErrorResponse(resp, bucketName, "")
}
}
listObjectVersionsOutput := ListVersionsResult{}
err = xml_decoder(resp.Body, &listObjectVersionsOutput)
if err != nil {
return ListVersionsResult{}, err
}
for i, obj := range listObjectVersionsOutput.Versions {
listObjectVersionsOutput.Versions[i].Key, err = decode_s3_name(obj.Key, listObjectVersionsOutput.EncodingType)
if err != nil {
return listObjectVersionsOutput, err
}
}
for i, obj := range listObjectVersionsOutput.CommonPrefixes {
listObjectVersionsOutput.CommonPrefixes[i].Prefix, err = decode_s3_name(obj.Prefix, listObjectVersionsOutput.EncodingType)
if err != nil {
return listObjectVersionsOutput, err
}
}
if listObjectVersionsOutput.NextKeyMarker != "" {
listObjectVersionsOutput.NextKeyMarker, err = decode_s3_name(listObjectVersionsOutput.NextKeyMarker, listObjectVersionsOutput.EncodingType)
if err != nil {
return listObjectVersionsOutput, err
}
}
Ok(listObjectVersionsOutput)*/
Err(std::io::Error::new(
ErrorKind::Unsupported,
credentials::ErrorResponse {
if versions.is_truncated && versions.next_key_marker.is_empty() {
return Err(std::io::Error::other(credentials::ErrorResponse {
sts_error: credentials::STSError {
r#type: "".to_string(),
code: "NotImplemented".to_string(),
message: format!("list_object_versions_query is not implemented for bucket {bucket_name}"),
message: "Truncated ListObjectVersions response should have next key marker set".to_string(),
},
request_id: "".to_string(),
},
))
}));
}
Ok(versions)
}
pub fn list_objects_query(
@@ -364,6 +359,7 @@ impl TransitionClient {
}
}
#[derive(Default)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub struct ListObjectsOptions {
reverse_versions: bool,
@@ -431,3 +427,51 @@ fn decode_s3_name(name: &str, encoding_type: &str) -> Result<String, std::io::Er
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn list_versions_xml_preserves_versions_and_delete_markers() {
let xml = br#"
<ListVersionsResult xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/">
<Name>tier-bucket</Name>
<Prefix>archive/object</Prefix>
<KeyMarker></KeyMarker>
<VersionIdMarker></VersionIdMarker>
<MaxKeys>2</MaxKeys>
<IsTruncated>true</IsTruncated>
<NextKeyMarker>archive/object</NextKeyMarker>
<NextVersionIdMarker>version-a</NextVersionIdMarker>
<Version>
<Key>archive/object</Key>
<VersionId>version-a</VersionId>
<IsLatest>true</IsLatest>
<LastModified>2026-07-22T00:00:00Z</LastModified>
<ETag>&quot;etag-a&quot;</ETag>
<Size>5</Size>
<StorageClass>STANDARD</StorageClass>
</Version>
<DeleteMarker>
<Key>archive/object</Key>
<VersionId>marker-a</VersionId>
<IsLatest>false</IsLatest>
<LastModified>2026-07-22T00:00:01Z</LastModified>
</DeleteMarker>
</ListVersionsResult>
"#;
let parsed =
quick_xml::de::from_reader::<_, ListVersionsResult>(xml.as_slice()).expect("ListObjectVersions XML should parse");
assert!(parsed.is_truncated);
assert_eq!(parsed.next_key_marker, "archive/object");
assert_eq!(parsed.next_version_id_marker, "version-a");
assert_eq!(parsed.versions.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(parsed.versions[0].key, "archive/object");
assert_eq!(parsed.versions[0].version_id, "version-a");
assert_eq!(parsed.delete_markers.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(parsed.delete_markers[0].version_id, "marker-a");
}
}
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ use crate::client::{
transition_api::{ReaderImpl, RequestMetadata, TransitionClient, UploadInfo},
};
use rustfs_utils::path::trim_etag;
use s3s::header::{X_AMZ_EXPIRATION, X_AMZ_VERSION_ID};
use s3s::header::X_AMZ_EXPIRATION;
impl TransitionClient {
pub async fn put_object_multipart(
@@ -417,11 +417,7 @@ impl TransitionClient {
bucket: complete_multipart_upload_result.bucket,
key: complete_multipart_upload_result.key,
etag: trim_etag(&complete_multipart_upload_result.etag),
version_id: if let Some(h_x_amz_version_id) = h.get(X_AMZ_VERSION_ID) {
h_x_amz_version_id.to_str().unwrap_or("").to_string()
} else {
"".to_string()
},
version_id: self.raw_version_id(&h)?.unwrap_or_default().to_string(),
location: complete_multipart_upload_result.location,
expiration: exp_time,
expiration_rule_id: rule_id,
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ use crate::client::{
use crate::client::utils::base64_encode;
use rustfs_utils::path::trim_etag;
use s3s::header::{X_AMZ_EXPIRATION, X_AMZ_VERSION_ID};
use s3s::header::X_AMZ_EXPIRATION;
/// Read exactly `want` bytes for a single multipart part, or fewer if the reader
/// reaches EOF first. Advances the reader so the next call returns the following
@@ -567,11 +567,7 @@ impl TransitionClient {
key: object_name.to_string(),
etag: trim_etag(h.get("ETag").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()).unwrap_or("")),
version_id: if let Some(h_x_amz_version_id) = h.get(X_AMZ_VERSION_ID) {
h_x_amz_version_id.to_str().unwrap_or("").to_string()
} else {
"".to_string()
},
version_id: self.raw_version_id(h)?.unwrap_or_default().to_string(),
size,
expiration: exp_time,
expiration_rule_id: rule_id,
+1 -6
View File
@@ -201,12 +201,7 @@ impl TransitionClient {
object_name: object_name.to_string(),
object_version_id: opts.version_id,
delete_marker: resp.headers().get(X_AMZ_DELETE_MARKER).map_or(false, |v| v == "true"),
delete_marker_version_id: resp
.headers()
.get(X_AMZ_VERSION_ID)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.unwrap_or_default()
.to_string(),
delete_marker_version_id: self.raw_version_id(resp.headers())?.unwrap_or_default().to_string(),
..Default::default()
})
}
+28 -24
View File
@@ -55,34 +55,38 @@ pub struct ListBucketV2Result {
pub start_after: String,
}
#[allow(dead_code)]
#[derive(Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(default, rename_all = "PascalCase")]
pub struct Version {
etag: String,
is_latest: bool,
key: String,
last_modified: OffsetDateTime,
owner: Owner,
size: i64,
storage_class: String,
version_id: String,
user_metadata: HashMap<String, String>,
user_tags: HashMap<String, String>,
is_delete_marker: bool,
#[serde(rename = "ETag")]
pub etag: String,
pub is_latest: bool,
pub key: String,
pub size: i64,
pub storage_class: String,
pub version_id: String,
pub user_metadata: HashMap<String, String>,
pub user_tags: HashMap<String, String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(default, rename_all = "PascalCase")]
pub struct ListVersionsResult {
versions: Vec<Version>,
common_prefixes: Vec<CommonPrefix>,
name: String,
prefix: String,
delimiter: String,
max_keys: i64,
encoding_type: String,
is_truncated: bool,
key_marker: String,
version_id_marker: String,
next_key_marker: String,
next_version_id_marker: String,
#[serde(rename = "Version")]
pub versions: Vec<Version>,
#[serde(rename = "DeleteMarker")]
pub delete_markers: Vec<Version>,
pub common_prefixes: Vec<CommonPrefix>,
pub name: String,
pub prefix: String,
pub delimiter: String,
pub max_keys: i64,
pub encoding_type: String,
pub is_truncated: bool,
pub key_marker: String,
pub version_id_marker: String,
pub next_key_marker: String,
pub next_version_id_marker: String,
}
pub struct ListBucketResult {
+132 -25
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
#![allow(unused_must_use)]
#![allow(clippy::all)]
use http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue};
use http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue, StatusCode};
use http_body_util::BodyExt;
use hyper::body::Body;
use hyper::body::Bytes;
@@ -31,13 +31,62 @@ use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::client::{
api_error_response::{ErrorResponse, err_invalid_argument, http_resp_to_error_response},
api_get_options::GetObjectOptions,
transition_api::{ObjectInfo, ReadCloser, ReaderImpl, RequestMetadata, TransitionClient, to_object_info},
transition_api::{
ObjectInfo, ReadCloser, ReaderImpl, RequestMetadata, TransitionClient, collect_response_body, to_object_info_for_provider,
},
};
use s3s::{
dto::VersioningConfiguration,
dto::{BucketVersioningStatus, MFADelete, VersioningConfiguration},
header::{X_AMZ_DELETE_MARKER, X_AMZ_VERSION_ID},
};
const S3_XML_NAMESPACE: &str = "http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/";
#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
struct StrictVersioningConfiguration {
#[serde(rename = "@xmlns")]
namespace: Option<String>,
#[serde(rename = "MfaDelete")]
mfa_delete: Option<String>,
#[serde(rename = "Status")]
status: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
enum StrictVersioningResponse {
VersioningConfiguration(StrictVersioningConfiguration),
}
fn parse_bucket_versioning_response(
status: StatusCode,
headers: &HeaderMap,
body: Vec<u8>,
bucket_name: &str,
) -> Result<VersioningConfiguration, std::io::Error> {
if status != StatusCode::OK {
return Err(std::io::Error::other(http_resp_to_error_response(status, headers, body, bucket_name, "")));
}
let StrictVersioningResponse::VersioningConfiguration(parsed) =
quick_xml::de::from_reader(body.as_slice()).map_err(|err| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, err))?;
if parsed
.namespace
.as_deref()
.is_some_and(|namespace| namespace != S3_XML_NAMESPACE)
{
return Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
"unexpected GetBucketVersioning XML namespace",
));
}
Ok(VersioningConfiguration {
mfa_delete: parsed.mfa_delete.map(MFADelete::from),
status: parsed.status.map(BucketVersioningStatus::from),
..Default::default()
})
}
impl TransitionClient {
pub async fn bucket_exists(&self, bucket_name: &str) -> Result<bool, std::io::Error> {
let resp = self
@@ -123,19 +172,8 @@ impl TransitionClient {
let resp_status = resp.status();
let h = resp.headers().clone();
let mut body_vec = Vec::new();
let mut body = resp.into_body();
while let Some(frame) = body.frame().await {
let frame = frame.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, e.to_string()))?;
if let Some(data) = frame.data_ref() {
body_vec.extend_from_slice(data);
}
}
let resperr = http_resp_to_error_response(resp_status, &h, body_vec, bucket_name, "");
warn!("get bucket versioning, resperr: {:?}", resperr);
Ok(VersioningConfiguration::default())
let body_vec = collect_response_body(resp.into_body(), rustfs_config::MAX_S3_CLIENT_RESPONSE_SIZE).await?;
parse_bucket_versioning_response(resp_status, &h, body_vec, bucket_name)
}
Err(err) => Err(std::io::Error::other(err)),
@@ -206,20 +244,20 @@ impl TransitionClient {
..Default::default()
};
return Ok(ObjectInfo {
version_id: h
.get(X_AMZ_VERSION_ID)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|s| Uuid::from_str(s).ok()),
version_id: self
.raw_version_id(h)?
.and_then(|s| Uuid::from_str(s).ok())
.filter(|v| !v.is_nil()),
is_delete_marker: delete_marker,
..Default::default()
});
//err_resp
}
return Ok(ObjectInfo {
version_id: h
.get(X_AMZ_VERSION_ID)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|s| Uuid::from_str(s).ok()),
version_id: self
.raw_version_id(h)?
.and_then(|s| Uuid::from_str(s).ok())
.filter(|v| !v.is_nil()),
is_delete_marker: delete_marker,
replication_ready: replication_ready,
..Default::default()
@@ -227,7 +265,7 @@ impl TransitionClient {
//http_resp_to_error_response(resp, bucket_name, object_name)
}
Ok(to_object_info(bucket_name, object_name, h).expect("operation should succeed"))
to_object_info_for_provider(bucket_name, object_name, h, self.provider_version_capabilities())
}
Err(err) => {
return Err(std::io::Error::other(err));
@@ -235,3 +273,72 @@ impl TransitionClient {
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::parse_bucket_versioning_response;
use http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode};
use s3s::dto::BucketVersioningStatus;
#[test]
fn parses_bucket_versioning_statuses_mfa_delete_and_unversioned_state() {
for (xml, expected) in [
(
br#"<VersioningConfiguration xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/"><Status>Enabled</Status></VersioningConfiguration>"#
.as_slice(),
Some(BucketVersioningStatus::ENABLED),
),
(
br#"<VersioningConfiguration xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/"><Status>Suspended</Status></VersioningConfiguration>"#
.as_slice(),
Some(BucketVersioningStatus::SUSPENDED),
),
(
br#"<VersioningConfiguration xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/"/>"#.as_slice(),
None,
),
] {
let config = parse_bucket_versioning_response(StatusCode::OK, &HeaderMap::new(), xml.to_vec(), "tier-bucket")
.expect("valid GetBucketVersioning response should parse");
assert_eq!(config.status.as_ref().map(|status| status.as_str()), expected);
}
let config = parse_bucket_versioning_response(
StatusCode::OK,
&HeaderMap::new(),
br#"<VersioningConfiguration><MfaDelete>Enabled</MfaDelete></VersioningConfiguration>"#.to_vec(),
"tier-bucket",
)
.expect("valid MfaDelete should parse");
assert_eq!(config.mfa_delete.as_ref().map(|status| status.as_str()), Some("Enabled"));
}
#[test]
fn rejects_non_ok_and_malformed_bucket_versioning_responses() {
let valid = br#"<VersioningConfiguration><Status>Enabled</Status></VersioningConfiguration>"#.to_vec();
for status in [StatusCode::NO_CONTENT, StatusCode::PARTIAL_CONTENT] {
let status_err = parse_bucket_versioning_response(status, &HeaderMap::new(), valid.clone(), "tier-bucket")
.expect_err("GetBucketVersioning must return exactly HTTP 200");
assert_eq!(status_err.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::Other);
}
let parse_err = parse_bucket_versioning_response(
StatusCode::OK,
&HeaderMap::new(),
b"<VersioningConfiguration>".to_vec(),
"tier-bucket",
)
.expect_err("malformed GetBucketVersioning XML must fail closed");
assert_eq!(parse_err.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData);
for xml in [
b"<VersioningConfiguration><Statuz>Enabled</Statuz></VersioningConfiguration>".as_slice(),
b"<WrongRoot><Status>Enabled</Status></WrongRoot>".as_slice(),
b"<VersioningConfiguration xmlns=\"https://example.invalid\"/>".as_slice(),
] {
let strict_err = parse_bucket_versioning_response(StatusCode::OK, &HeaderMap::new(), xml.to_vec(), "tier-bucket")
.expect_err("unknown GetBucketVersioning XML must fail closed");
assert_eq!(strict_err.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData);
}
}
}
+1
View File
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ pub mod constants;
pub mod credentials;
pub mod object_api_utils;
pub mod object_handlers_common;
pub(crate) mod provider_versions;
pub(crate) mod runtime_sources;
pub mod signer_error;
pub mod transition_api;
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use std::io::{Error, ErrorKind};
use http::HeaderMap;
const X_AMZ_VERSION_ID: &str = "x-amz-version-id";
const X_OSS_VERSION_ID: &str = "x-oss-version-id";
const X_COS_VERSION_ID: &str = "x-cos-version-id";
const X_OBS_VERSION_ID: &str = "x-obs-version-id";
const MAX_REMOTE_VERSION_ID_LEN: usize = 1024;
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
pub(crate) enum BucketVersioningState {
Unknown,
Disabled,
Suspended,
Enabled,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
pub(crate) enum RemoteVersion {
Unknown,
Disabled,
SuspendedNull,
Exact(String),
}
impl RemoteVersion {
pub(crate) fn exact_id(&self) -> Option<&str> {
match self {
Self::SuspendedNull => Some("null"),
Self::Exact(version_id) => Some(version_id),
Self::Unknown | Self::Disabled => None,
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
pub(crate) struct ProviderVersionCapabilities {
raw_version_header: Option<&'static str>,
pub(crate) exact_get_delete: bool,
}
impl ProviderVersionCapabilities {
pub(crate) fn for_tier_type(tier_type: &str) -> Self {
if tier_type.eq_ignore_ascii_case("s3")
|| tier_type.eq_ignore_ascii_case("rustfs")
|| tier_type.eq_ignore_ascii_case("minio")
|| tier_type.eq_ignore_ascii_case("r2")
|| tier_type.eq_ignore_ascii_case("wasabi")
{
Self {
raw_version_header: Some(X_AMZ_VERSION_ID),
exact_get_delete: true,
}
} else if tier_type.eq_ignore_ascii_case("aliyun") {
Self {
raw_version_header: Some(X_OSS_VERSION_ID),
exact_get_delete: true,
}
} else if tier_type.eq_ignore_ascii_case("tencent") {
Self {
raw_version_header: Some(X_COS_VERSION_ID),
exact_get_delete: true,
}
} else if tier_type.eq_ignore_ascii_case("huaweicloud") {
Self {
raw_version_header: Some(X_OBS_VERSION_ID),
exact_get_delete: true,
}
} else {
Self {
raw_version_header: None,
exact_get_delete: false,
}
}
}
pub(crate) fn raw_version_id(self, headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result<Option<&str>, Error> {
let Some(header_name) = self.raw_version_header else {
return Ok(None);
};
let Some(value) = headers.get(header_name) else {
return Ok(None);
};
let value = value
.to_str()
.map_err(|_| Error::new(ErrorKind::InvalidData, "remote object version id is not valid ASCII"))?;
validate_remote_version_id(value)?;
Ok(Some(value))
}
pub(crate) fn remote_version(self, headers: &HeaderMap, versioning: BucketVersioningState) -> Result<RemoteVersion, Error> {
let Some(value) = self.raw_version_id(headers)? else {
return Ok(match versioning {
BucketVersioningState::Disabled => RemoteVersion::Disabled,
BucketVersioningState::Unknown | BucketVersioningState::Suspended | BucketVersioningState::Enabled => {
RemoteVersion::Unknown
}
});
};
if value == "null" {
return Ok(RemoteVersion::SuspendedNull);
}
Ok(RemoteVersion::Exact(value.to_string()))
}
}
fn validate_remote_version_id(version_id: &str) -> Result<(), Error> {
if version_id.is_empty() {
return Err(Error::new(
ErrorKind::InvalidData,
"remote tier returned an empty object version id header",
));
}
if version_id.len() > MAX_REMOTE_VERSION_ID_LEN {
return Err(Error::new(
ErrorKind::InvalidData,
"remote tier returned an oversized object version id header",
));
}
if version_id.chars().any(char::is_control) {
return Err(Error::new(
ErrorKind::InvalidData,
"remote tier returned an object version id containing control characters",
));
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{BucketVersioningState, ProviderVersionCapabilities, RemoteVersion};
use http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue};
#[test]
fn provider_version_header_matrix_preserves_opaque_versions() {
for (tier_type, header_name) in [
("s3", "x-amz-version-id"),
("S3", "x-amz-version-id"),
("rustfs", "x-amz-version-id"),
("RustFS", "x-amz-version-id"),
("minio", "x-amz-version-id"),
("MinIO", "x-amz-version-id"),
("r2", "x-amz-version-id"),
("R2", "x-amz-version-id"),
("wasabi", "x-amz-version-id"),
("Wasabi", "x-amz-version-id"),
("aliyun", "x-oss-version-id"),
("Aliyun", "x-oss-version-id"),
("tencent", "x-cos-version-id"),
("Tencent", "x-cos-version-id"),
("huaweicloud", "x-obs-version-id"),
("Huaweicloud", "x-obs-version-id"),
] {
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
headers.insert(header_name, HeaderValue::from_static("opaque.version_01"));
let capabilities = ProviderVersionCapabilities::for_tier_type(tier_type);
assert_eq!(capabilities.raw_version_id(&headers).expect("raw version"), Some("opaque.version_01"));
assert_eq!(
capabilities
.remote_version(&headers, BucketVersioningState::Enabled)
.expect("remote version"),
RemoteVersion::Exact("opaque.version_01".to_string())
);
}
}
#[test]
fn provider_version_header_matrix_does_not_cross_read_sibling_headers() {
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
headers.insert("x-amz-version-id", HeaderValue::from_static("aws-version"));
headers.insert("x-cos-version-id", HeaderValue::from_static("cos-version"));
assert_eq!(
ProviderVersionCapabilities::for_tier_type("s3")
.raw_version_id(&headers)
.expect("aws raw version"),
Some("aws-version")
);
assert_eq!(
ProviderVersionCapabilities::for_tier_type("tencent")
.raw_version_id(&headers)
.expect("cos raw version"),
Some("cos-version")
);
}
#[test]
fn provider_version_missing_header_is_unknown_until_bucket_state_is_known() {
let headers = HeaderMap::new();
let capabilities = ProviderVersionCapabilities::for_tier_type("aliyun");
assert_eq!(
capabilities
.remote_version(&headers, BucketVersioningState::Unknown)
.expect("unknown versioning"),
RemoteVersion::Unknown
);
assert_eq!(
capabilities
.remote_version(&headers, BucketVersioningState::Disabled)
.expect("disabled versioning"),
RemoteVersion::Disabled
);
}
#[test]
fn provider_version_rejects_empty_or_oversized_headers() {
let oversized = "v".repeat(1025);
for bad in ["", oversized.as_str()] {
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
headers.insert("x-oss-version-id", HeaderValue::from_str(bad).expect("test header value"));
assert!(
ProviderVersionCapabilities::for_tier_type("aliyun")
.raw_version_id(&headers)
.is_err()
);
}
}
}
+183 -63
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ use crate::client::{
},
constants::{UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD, UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD_TRAILER},
credentials::{CredContext, Credentials, SignatureType, Static},
provider_versions::{BucketVersioningState, ProviderVersionCapabilities},
signer_error,
};
use crate::{client::checksum::ChecksumMode, object_api::GetObjectReader};
@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ use http::{
request::{Builder, Request},
};
use http_body::Body;
use http_body_util::BodyExt;
use http_body_util::{BodyExt, LengthLimitError, Limited};
use hyper::body::Bytes;
use hyper::body::Incoming;
use hyper_rustls::{ConfigBuilderExt, HttpsConnector};
@@ -54,9 +55,7 @@ use rustfs_rio::HashReader;
use rustfs_utils::HashAlgorithm;
use rustfs_utils::{
net::get_endpoint_url,
retry::{
DEFAULT_RETRY_CAP, DEFAULT_RETRY_UNIT, MAX_JITTER, MAX_RETRY, RetryTimer, is_http_status_retryable, is_s3code_retryable,
},
retry::{DEFAULT_RETRY_CAP, DEFAULT_RETRY_UNIT, MAX_JITTER, MAX_RETRY, RetryTimer},
};
use rustls_pki_types::PrivateKeyDer;
use rustls_pki_types::pem::PemObject;
@@ -81,9 +80,25 @@ use url::{Url, form_urlencoded};
use uuid::Uuid;
const C_USER_AGENT: &str = "RustFS (linux; x86)";
pub(crate) const MAX_S3_ERROR_RESPONSE_SIZE: usize = 64 * 1024;
const SUCCESS_STATUS: [StatusCode; 3] = [StatusCode::OK, StatusCode::NO_CONTENT, StatusCode::PARTIAL_CONTENT];
pub(crate) async fn collect_response_body<B>(body: B, limit: usize) -> Result<Vec<u8>, std::io::Error>
where
B: Body<Data = Bytes>,
B::Error: Into<Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>,
{
let body = Limited::new(body, limit).collect().await.map_err(|err| {
if err.is::<LengthLimitError>() {
std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "remote tier response body exceeds limit")
} else {
std::io::Error::other(err)
}
})?;
Ok(body.to_bytes().to_vec())
}
const C_UNKNOWN: i32 = -1;
const C_OFFLINE: i32 = 0;
const C_ONLINE: i32 = 1;
@@ -92,9 +107,18 @@ fn invalid_utf8_header_error(scope: &str, header_name: &str) -> std::io::Error {
signer_error::invalid_utf8_header_error(scope, header_name)
}
fn validate_header_values(headers: &HeaderMap, scope: &str) -> Result<(), std::io::Error> {
fn validate_header_values(headers: &HeaderMap, scope: &str, signer_type: &SignatureType) -> Result<(), std::io::Error> {
for (name, value) in headers {
value.to_str().map_err(|_| invalid_utf8_header_error(scope, name.as_str()))?;
if signer_type == &SignatureType::SignatureV2 {
// The SigV2 canonicalizer only supports visible ASCII values. Keep rejecting
// non-ASCII here so it cannot silently omit a value that is sent on the wire.
value.to_str().map_err(|_| invalid_utf8_header_error(scope, name.as_str()))?;
} else {
let value = std::str::from_utf8(value.as_bytes()).map_err(|_| invalid_utf8_header_error(scope, name.as_str()))?;
if value.chars().any(|ch| !ch.is_ascii() && ch.is_whitespace()) {
return Err(invalid_utf8_header_error(scope, name.as_str()));
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
@@ -300,6 +324,14 @@ impl TransitionClient {
self.endpoint_url.clone()
}
pub(crate) fn provider_version_capabilities(&self) -> ProviderVersionCapabilities {
ProviderVersionCapabilities::for_tier_type(&self.tier_type)
}
pub(crate) fn raw_version_id<'a>(&self, headers: &'a HeaderMap) -> Result<Option<&'a str>, std::io::Error> {
self.provider_version_capabilities().raw_version_id(headers)
}
fn trace_errors_only_off(&self) {
if let Ok(mut trace_errors_only) = self.trace_errors_only.lock() {
*trace_errors_only = false;
@@ -379,20 +411,17 @@ impl TransitionClient {
pub async fn doit(&self, req: Request<s3s::Body>) -> Result<Response<Incoming>, std::io::Error> {
let req_method;
let req_uri;
let req_headers;
let resp;
let http_client = self.http_client.clone();
{
req_method = req.method().clone();
req_uri = req.uri().clone();
req_headers = req.headers().clone();
debug!("endpoint_url: {}", self.endpoint_url.as_str().to_string());
resp = http_client.request(req);
}
let resp = resp.await;
debug!("http_client url: {} {}", req_method, req_uri);
debug!("http_client headers: {:?}", req_headers);
if let Err(err) = resp {
error!("http_client call error: {:?}", err);
return Err(std::io::Error::other(err));
@@ -402,28 +431,23 @@ impl TransitionClient {
Ok(r) => r,
Err(_) => return Err(std::io::Error::other("Unexpected error in response")),
};
debug!("http_resp: {:?}", resp);
debug!(status = %resp.status(), "remote tier response received");
//let b = resp.body_mut().store_all_unlimited().await.unwrap().to_vec();
//debug!("http_resp_body: {}", String::from_utf8(b).unwrap());
//if self.is_trace_enabled && !(self.trace_errors_only && resp.status() == StatusCode::OK) {
if !resp.status().is_success() {
//self.dump_http(&cloned_req, &resp)?;
let mut body_vec = Vec::new();
let mut body = resp.into_body();
while let Some(frame) = body.frame().await {
let frame = frame.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, e.to_string()))?;
if let Some(data) = frame.data_ref() {
body_vec.extend_from_slice(data);
}
}
let body_str = String::from_utf8_lossy(&body_vec);
warn!("err_body: {}", body_str);
Err(std::io::Error::other(format!("http_client call error: {}", body_str)))
} else {
Ok(resp)
let status = resp.status();
let request_id = resp
.headers()
.get("x-amz-request-id")
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
.unwrap_or_default()
.to_string();
warn!(status = %status, request_id, "remote tier request rejected");
}
Ok(resp)
}
pub async fn execute_method(
@@ -465,17 +489,22 @@ impl TransitionClient {
let resp_status = resp.status();
let h = resp.headers().clone();
let mut body_vec = Vec::new();
let mut body = resp.into_body();
while let Some(frame) = body.frame().await {
let frame = frame.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, e.to_string()))?;
if let Some(data) = frame.data_ref() {
body_vec.extend_from_slice(data);
}
}
let mut err_response =
http_resp_to_error_response(resp_status, &h, body_vec.clone(), &metadata.bucket_name, &metadata.object_name);
err_response.message = format!("remote tier error: {}", err_response.message);
let body_vec = collect_response_body(resp.into_body(), MAX_S3_ERROR_RESPONSE_SIZE).await?;
let parsed_error =
http_resp_to_error_response(resp_status, &h, body_vec, &metadata.bucket_name, &metadata.object_name);
let routing_region = parsed_error.region;
let code = match parsed_error.code {
S3ErrorCode::Custom(_) => S3ErrorCode::ResponseInterrupted,
code => code,
};
let err_response = ErrorResponse {
status_code: resp_status,
message: format!("remote tier request failed with status {resp_status}: {}", code.as_str()),
code,
bucket_name: metadata.bucket_name.clone(),
key: metadata.object_name.clone(),
..Default::default()
};
if self.region == "" {
return match err_response.code {
@@ -484,20 +513,20 @@ impl TransitionClient {
Err(std::io::Error::other(err_response))
}
S3ErrorCode::AccessDenied => {
if err_response.region == "" {
if routing_region.is_empty() {
return Err(std::io::Error::other(err_response));
}
if metadata.bucket_name != "" {
if let Ok(mut bucket_loc_cache) = self.bucket_loc_cache.lock() {
if let Some(location) = bucket_loc_cache.get(&metadata.bucket_name) {
if location != err_response.region {
bucket_loc_cache.set(&metadata.bucket_name, &err_response.region);
if location != routing_region {
bucket_loc_cache.set(&metadata.bucket_name, &routing_region);
//continue;
}
}
}
} else if err_response.region != metadata.bucket_location {
metadata.bucket_location = err_response.region.clone();
} else if routing_region != metadata.bucket_location {
metadata.bucket_location = routing_region;
//continue;
}
Err(std::io::Error::other(err_response))
@@ -508,18 +537,10 @@ impl TransitionClient {
};
}
if is_s3code_retryable(err_response.code.as_str()) {
continue;
}
if is_http_status_retryable(&resp_status) {
continue;
}
break;
return Err(std::io::Error::other(err_response));
}
Err(std::io::Error::other("resp err"))
Err(std::io::Error::other("remote tier request did not produce a response"))
}
async fn new_request(
@@ -586,7 +607,7 @@ impl TransitionClient {
)));
}
if let Some(extra_headers) = metadata.extra_pre_sign_header.as_ref() {
validate_header_values(extra_headers, "presign extra header")?;
validate_header_values(extra_headers, "presign extra header", &signer_type)?;
let headers = req.headers_mut();
for (k, v) in extra_headers {
headers.insert(k, v.clone());
@@ -611,7 +632,7 @@ impl TransitionClient {
}
self.set_user_agent(&mut req);
validate_header_values(&metadata.custom_header, "request custom header")?;
validate_header_values(&metadata.custom_header, "request custom header", &signer_type)?;
for (k, v) in metadata.custom_header.clone() {
if let Some(key) = k {
@@ -1144,6 +1165,15 @@ impl Default for UploadInfo {
/// This function parses various S3 response headers to construct an ObjectInfo struct
/// containing metadata about an S3 object.
pub fn to_object_info(bucket_name: &str, object_name: &str, h: &HeaderMap) -> Result<ObjectInfo, std::io::Error> {
to_object_info_for_provider(bucket_name, object_name, h, ProviderVersionCapabilities::for_tier_type("s3"))
}
pub(crate) fn to_object_info_for_provider(
bucket_name: &str,
object_name: &str,
h: &HeaderMap,
version_capabilities: ProviderVersionCapabilities,
) -> Result<ObjectInfo, std::io::Error> {
// Helper function to get header value as string
let get_header = |name: &str| -> String { h.get(name).and_then(|val| val.to_str().ok()).unwrap_or("").to_string() };
@@ -1261,14 +1291,11 @@ pub fn to_object_info(bucket_name: &str, object_name: &str, h: &HeaderMap) -> Re
};
// Extract version ID
let version_id = {
let version_id_str = get_header("x-amz-version-id");
if !version_id_str.is_empty() {
Some(Uuid::parse_str(&version_id_str).unwrap_or_else(|_| Uuid::nil()))
} else {
None
}
};
let version_id = version_capabilities
.remote_version(h, BucketVersioningState::Unknown)?
.exact_id()
.and_then(|version_id| Uuid::parse_str(version_id).ok())
.filter(|version_id| !version_id.is_nil());
// Check if it's a delete marker
let is_delete_marker = get_header("x-amz-delete-marker") == "true";
@@ -1383,8 +1410,43 @@ pub struct CreateBucketConfiguration {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{build_tls_config, signer_error_to_io_error, validate_header_values, with_rustls_init_guard};
use super::{
MAX_S3_CLIENT_RESPONSE_SIZE, MAX_S3_ERROR_RESPONSE_SIZE, SignatureType, build_tls_config, collect_response_body,
signer_error_to_io_error, to_object_info_for_provider, validate_header_values, with_rustls_init_guard,
};
use crate::client::provider_versions::ProviderVersionCapabilities;
use http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue};
use http_body_util::Full;
use hyper::body::Bytes;
use uuid::Uuid;
#[tokio::test]
async fn response_body_limit_rejects_the_first_byte_past_the_boundary() {
let exact = collect_response_body(
Full::new(Bytes::from(vec![0_u8; MAX_S3_CLIENT_RESPONSE_SIZE])),
MAX_S3_CLIENT_RESPONSE_SIZE,
)
.await
.expect("a response exactly at the limit should be accepted");
assert_eq!(exact.len(), MAX_S3_CLIENT_RESPONSE_SIZE);
let err = collect_response_body(
Full::new(Bytes::from(vec![0_u8; MAX_S3_CLIENT_RESPONSE_SIZE + 1])),
MAX_S3_CLIENT_RESPONSE_SIZE,
)
.await
.expect_err("oversized remote response must fail closed");
assert_eq!(err.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData);
let err = collect_response_body(
Full::new(Bytes::from(vec![0_u8; MAX_S3_ERROR_RESPONSE_SIZE + 1])),
MAX_S3_ERROR_RESPONSE_SIZE,
)
.await
.expect_err("oversized S3 error response must use the smaller error limit");
assert_eq!(err.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData);
}
#[test]
fn rustls_guard_converts_panics_to_io_errors() {
@@ -1427,11 +1489,34 @@ mod tests {
HeaderValue::from_bytes(&[0xFF]).expect("invalid utf8 bytes should be accepted by HeaderValue"),
);
let err =
validate_header_values(&headers, "request custom header").expect_err("invalid header value should fail validation");
let err = validate_header_values(&headers, "request custom header", &SignatureType::SignatureV4)
.expect_err("invalid header value should fail validation");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("x-amz-meta-invalid"));
}
#[test]
fn validate_header_values_accepts_utf8_for_v4_but_not_v2() {
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
headers.insert(
"x-amz-meta-name",
HeaderValue::from_bytes("20260715/鲁A12345/object".as_bytes()).expect("valid utf8 metadata header"),
);
assert!(validate_header_values(&headers, "request custom header", &SignatureType::SignatureV4).is_ok());
assert!(validate_header_values(&headers, "request custom header", &SignatureType::SignatureV2).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn validate_header_values_rejects_non_ascii_whitespace_for_v4() {
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
headers.insert(
"x-amz-meta-name",
HeaderValue::from_bytes("tier/a\u{00a0}b/object".as_bytes()).expect("valid utf8 metadata header"),
);
assert!(validate_header_values(&headers, "request custom header", &SignatureType::SignatureV4).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn signer_error_mapping_preserves_header_name() {
let err = signer_error_to_io_error(
@@ -1443,4 +1528,39 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(err.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput);
assert!(err.to_string().contains("x-amz-meta-invalid"));
}
#[test]
fn object_info_uses_provider_version_header_without_uuid_coercion() {
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
headers.insert("x-cos-version-id", HeaderValue::from_static("opaque.version_01"));
let info =
to_object_info_for_provider("bucket", "object", &headers, ProviderVersionCapabilities::for_tier_type("tencent"))
.expect("opaque provider version should parse");
assert_eq!(info.version_id, None);
assert_eq!(
info.metadata.get("x-cos-version-id").and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
Some("opaque.version_01")
);
}
#[test]
fn object_info_keeps_s3_uuid_version_id_and_filters_nil() {
let version_id = Uuid::new_v4();
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
headers.insert(
"x-amz-version-id",
HeaderValue::from_str(&version_id.to_string()).expect("uuid header should be valid"),
);
let info = to_object_info_for_provider("bucket", "object", &headers, ProviderVersionCapabilities::for_tier_type("s3"))
.expect("s3 uuid version should parse");
assert_eq!(info.version_id, Some(version_id));
headers.insert("x-amz-version-id", HeaderValue::from_static("00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"));
let info = to_object_info_for_provider("bucket", "object", &headers, ProviderVersionCapabilities::for_tier_type("s3"))
.expect("nil s3 uuid version should parse");
assert_eq!(info.version_id, None);
}
}
+62 -7
View File
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ const FAILURE_DOMAIN_NOT_REPORTED: &str = "failure domain labels not reported by
const NUMA_NOT_WIRED: &str = "NUMA topology not wired into runtime";
const PROFILING_NOT_WIRED: &str = "profiling capability not wired into ECStore";
const PEER_HEALTH_NOT_REPORTED: &str = "peer health not reported by endpoints";
const PEER_HEALTH_LOCAL_NODE: &str = "local node does not require peer health probing";
const PEER_HEALTH_REACHABLE: &str = "peer marked reachable by internode health tracker";
const PEER_HEALTH_UNREACHABLE: &str = "peer marked unreachable by internode health tracker";
const CONTROL_RPC_SEPARATED: &str = "control RPC remains on the gRPC control plane";
const DATA_STREAM_RPC_SEPARATED: &str = "remote disk data streams remain on the internode data transport";
@@ -341,12 +344,24 @@ pub fn peer_health_snapshot_from_membership(membership: &ClusterMembershipSnapsh
.map(|node| ClusterPeerHealth {
node_id: node.node_id.clone(),
is_local: node.is_local,
status: CapabilityStatus::unknown().with_reason(PEER_HEALTH_NOT_REPORTED),
status: peer_health_status_for_node(node),
})
.collect(),
}
}
fn peer_health_status_for_node(node: &ClusterNodeMembership) -> CapabilityStatus {
if node.is_local {
return CapabilityStatus::supported().with_reason(PEER_HEALTH_LOCAL_NODE);
}
match rustfs_io_metrics::internode_metrics::cluster_peer_observed_online_status(&node.grid_host) {
Some(true) => CapabilityStatus::supported().with_reason(PEER_HEALTH_REACHABLE),
Some(false) => CapabilityStatus::unknown().with_reason(PEER_HEALTH_UNREACHABLE),
None => CapabilityStatus::disabled().with_reason(PEER_HEALTH_NOT_REPORTED),
}
}
pub fn rpc_boundary_snapshot() -> ClusterRpcBoundarySnapshot {
ClusterRpcBoundarySnapshot {
control_channels: ["metadata", "lock", "health", "administrative"]
@@ -498,6 +513,7 @@ mod tests {
use std::collections::BTreeSet;
use crate::layout::endpoints::{Endpoints, PoolEndpoints};
use crate::storage_api_contracts::topology::CapabilityState;
#[test]
fn topology_snapshot_maps_endpoint_sets_without_local_paths() {
@@ -588,16 +604,55 @@ mod tests {
}
#[test]
fn peer_health_snapshot_reports_static_unknown_status() {
let membership = membership_snapshot_from_endpoint_pools(&sample_url_endpoint_pools());
fn peer_health_snapshot_reports_observed_peer_status() {
let online_host = "http://cluster-control-plane-peer-online-test:9000";
let offline_host = "http://cluster-control-plane-peer-offline-test:9000";
rustfs_io_metrics::internode_metrics::record_peer_reachable(online_host);
rustfs_io_metrics::internode_metrics::record_peer_unreachable(offline_host, 1);
let membership = ClusterMembershipSnapshot {
nodes: vec![
ClusterNodeMembership {
node_id: LOCAL_NODE_ID.to_string(),
grid_host: String::new(),
is_local: true,
pools: vec![0],
},
ClusterNodeMembership {
node_id: "cluster-control-plane-peer-online-test:9000".to_string(),
grid_host: online_host.to_string(),
is_local: false,
pools: vec![0],
},
ClusterNodeMembership {
node_id: "cluster-control-plane-peer-offline-test:9000".to_string(),
grid_host: offline_host.to_string(),
is_local: false,
pools: vec![0],
},
ClusterNodeMembership {
node_id: "cluster-control-plane-peer-unknown-test:9000".to_string(),
grid_host: "http://cluster-control-plane-peer-unknown-test:9000".to_string(),
is_local: false,
pools: vec![0],
},
],
drives: Vec::new(),
};
let snapshot = peer_health_snapshot_from_membership(&membership);
assert_eq!(snapshot.peers.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(snapshot.peers[0].node_id, "node1.example:9000");
assert_eq!(snapshot.peers.len(), 4);
assert_eq!(snapshot.peers[0].node_id, LOCAL_NODE_ID);
assert!(snapshot.peers[0].is_local);
assert_eq!(snapshot.peers[0].status.reason.as_deref(), Some(PEER_HEALTH_NOT_REPORTED));
assert_eq!(snapshot.peers[1].node_id, "node2.example:9000");
assert!(snapshot.peers[0].status.state.is_supported());
assert_eq!(snapshot.peers[0].status.reason.as_deref(), Some(PEER_HEALTH_LOCAL_NODE));
assert_eq!(snapshot.peers[1].node_id, "cluster-control-plane-peer-online-test:9000");
assert!(!snapshot.peers[1].is_local);
assert!(snapshot.peers[1].status.state.is_supported());
assert_eq!(snapshot.peers[1].status.reason.as_deref(), Some(PEER_HEALTH_REACHABLE));
assert_eq!(snapshot.peers[2].status.reason.as_deref(), Some(PEER_HEALTH_UNREACHABLE));
assert!(!snapshot.peers[2].status.state.is_supported());
assert_eq!(snapshot.peers[3].status.reason.as_deref(), Some(PEER_HEALTH_NOT_REPORTED));
assert_eq!(snapshot.peers[3].status.state, CapabilityState::Disabled);
}
#[test]
+127 -12
View File
@@ -12,12 +12,17 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use crate::cluster::rpc::{TONIC_RPC_PREFIX, gen_signature_headers};
use crate::cluster::rpc::http_auth::RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER;
use crate::cluster::rpc::{gen_tonic_signature_headers, normalize_tonic_rpc_audience};
use crate::disk::error::{DiskError, Error as DiskErrorType};
use crate::runtime::sources as runtime_sources;
use http::Method;
use http::Uri;
use rustfs_protos::{
ChannelClass, create_new_channel, get_channel_for_class, proto_gen::node_service::node_service_client::NodeServiceClient,
ChannelClass, create_new_channel, get_channel_for_class,
proto_gen::node_service::{
heal_control_service_client::HealControlServiceClient, node_service_client::NodeServiceClient,
tier_mutation_control_service_client::TierMutationControlServiceClient,
},
};
use std::{error::Error, io::ErrorKind};
use tonic::{service::interceptor::InterceptedService, transport::Channel};
@@ -36,6 +41,36 @@ pub async fn node_service_time_out_client(
node_service_time_out_client_for_class(addr, interceptor, ChannelClass::Control).await
}
pub async fn heal_control_time_out_client(
addr: &str,
interceptor: TonicInterceptor,
) -> Result<HealControlServiceClient<InterceptedService<Channel, TonicInterceptor>>, Box<dyn Error>> {
let interceptor = interceptor.with_rpc_audience(addr)?;
let channel = match runtime_sources::cached_node_channel(addr).await {
Some(channel) => channel,
None => create_new_channel(addr).await?,
};
let max_message_size = rustfs_protos::HEAL_CONTROL_RPC_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE;
Ok(HealControlServiceClient::with_interceptor(channel, interceptor)
.max_decoding_message_size(max_message_size)
.max_encoding_message_size(max_message_size))
}
pub async fn tier_mutation_control_time_out_client(
addr: &str,
interceptor: TonicInterceptor,
) -> Result<TierMutationControlServiceClient<InterceptedService<Channel, TonicInterceptor>>, Box<dyn Error>> {
let interceptor = interceptor.with_rpc_audience(addr)?;
let channel = match runtime_sources::cached_node_channel(addr).await {
Some(channel) => channel,
None => create_new_channel(addr).await?,
};
let max_message_size = rustfs_protos::TIER_MUTATION_RPC_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE;
Ok(TierMutationControlServiceClient::with_interceptor(channel, interceptor)
.max_decoding_message_size(max_message_size)
.max_encoding_message_size(max_message_size))
}
/// Build a `NodeServiceClient` bound to the [`ChannelClass`]-appropriate channel for `addr`.
///
/// Bulk `bytes`-carrying RPCs (ReadAll/WriteAll/ReadMultiple/BatchReadVersion) pass
@@ -47,6 +82,7 @@ pub async fn node_service_time_out_client_for_class(
interceptor: TonicInterceptor,
class: ChannelClass,
) -> Result<NodeServiceClient<InterceptedService<Channel, TonicInterceptor>>, Box<dyn Error>> {
let interceptor = interceptor.with_rpc_audience(addr)?;
let channel = match class {
ChannelClass::Control => match runtime_sources::cached_node_channel(addr).await {
Some(channel) => {
@@ -111,11 +147,25 @@ pub(crate) fn is_network_like_disk_error(err: &DiskErrorType) -> bool {
}
}
pub struct TonicSignatureInterceptor;
pub struct TonicSignatureInterceptor {
audience: Option<String>,
}
impl tonic::service::Interceptor for TonicSignatureInterceptor {
fn call(&mut self, mut req: tonic::Request<()>) -> Result<tonic::Request<()>, tonic::Status> {
let headers = gen_signature_headers(TONIC_RPC_PREFIX, &Method::GET)
let method = req
.extensions()
.get::<tonic::GrpcMethod<'_>>()
.ok_or_else(|| tonic::Status::unauthenticated("Missing gRPC method metadata"))?;
let audience = self
.audience
.as_deref()
.ok_or_else(|| tonic::Status::unauthenticated("Missing gRPC audience"))?;
let content_sha256 = req
.metadata()
.get(RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER)
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok());
let headers = gen_tonic_signature_headers(audience, method.service(), method.method(), content_sha256)
.map_err(|_| tonic::Status::unauthenticated("No valid auth token"))?;
req.metadata_mut().as_mut().extend(headers);
inject_trace_context_into_metadata(req.metadata_mut());
@@ -125,7 +175,7 @@ impl tonic::service::Interceptor for TonicSignatureInterceptor {
}
pub fn gen_tonic_signature_interceptor() -> TonicSignatureInterceptor {
TonicSignatureInterceptor
TonicSignatureInterceptor { audience: None }
}
pub struct NoOpInterceptor;
@@ -141,6 +191,22 @@ pub enum TonicInterceptor {
NoOp(NoOpInterceptor),
}
impl TonicInterceptor {
fn with_rpc_audience(mut self, addr: &str) -> std::io::Result<Self> {
if let Self::Signature(interceptor) = &mut self {
let uri = addr
.parse::<Uri>()
.map_err(|_| std::io::Error::other("Invalid gRPC peer URI"))?;
let audience = uri
.authority()
.map(|authority| normalize_tonic_rpc_audience(authority.as_str()))
.ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("Missing gRPC peer authority"))?;
interceptor.audience = Some(audience?);
}
Ok(self)
}
}
impl tonic::service::Interceptor for TonicInterceptor {
fn call(&mut self, req: tonic::Request<()>) -> Result<tonic::Request<()>, tonic::Status> {
match self {
@@ -165,6 +231,20 @@ mod tests {
runtime_sources::ensure_test_rpc_secret();
}
fn test_request() -> tonic::Request<()> {
let mut request = tonic::Request::new(());
request
.extensions_mut()
.insert(tonic::GrpcMethod::new("node_service.NodeService", "Ping"));
request
}
fn test_interceptor() -> TonicSignatureInterceptor {
TonicSignatureInterceptor {
audience: Some("node-a:9000".to_string()),
}
}
fn with_trace_parent<F>(trace_id_hex: &str, f: F)
where
F: FnOnce(),
@@ -192,20 +272,55 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn test_signature_interceptor_keeps_auth_headers() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let mut interceptor = TonicSignatureInterceptor;
let req = tonic::Request::new(());
let mut interceptor = test_interceptor();
let req = test_request();
let req = interceptor.call(req).expect("interceptor call should succeed");
assert!(req.metadata().contains_key("x-rustfs-signature"));
assert!(req.metadata().contains_key("x-rustfs-timestamp"));
assert!(req.metadata().contains_key("x-rustfs-rpc-signature-v2"));
assert!(req.metadata().contains_key("x-rustfs-rpc-nonce"));
assert!(
crate::cluster::rpc::verify_tonic_rpc_signature(
"node-a:9000",
"/node_service.NodeService/Ping",
req.metadata().as_ref(),
)
.is_ok(),
"interceptor signature should bind the configured peer audience and generated method"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_signature_interceptor_binds_audience_from_peer_uri() {
let interceptor = TonicInterceptor::Signature(gen_tonic_signature_interceptor())
.with_rpc_audience("http://node-a:9000")
.expect("peer URI should provide an audience");
let TonicInterceptor::Signature(interceptor) = interceptor else {
panic!("signature interceptor variant should be preserved");
};
assert_eq!(interceptor.audience.as_deref(), Some("node-a:9000"));
}
#[test]
fn test_signature_interceptor_requires_generated_method_metadata() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let mut interceptor = test_interceptor();
let error = interceptor
.call(tonic::Request::new(()))
.expect_err("requests without an exact generated method must fail closed");
assert_eq!(error.code(), tonic::Code::Unauthenticated);
assert_eq!(error.message(), "Missing gRPC method metadata");
}
#[test]
fn test_signature_interceptor_may_inject_request_id() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let mut interceptor = TonicSignatureInterceptor;
let req = tonic::Request::new(());
let mut interceptor = test_interceptor();
let req = test_request();
let span = tracing::info_span!("grpc-rpc-test-span");
let _guard = span.enter();
@@ -219,8 +334,8 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn test_signature_interceptor_injects_traceparent_metadata() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let mut interceptor = TonicSignatureInterceptor;
let req = tonic::Request::new(());
let mut interceptor = test_interceptor();
let req = test_request();
with_trace_parent("4bf92f3577b34da6a3ce929d0e0e4736", || {
let req = interceptor.call(req).expect("interceptor call should succeed");
+563 -11
View File
@@ -19,8 +19,9 @@
//! GHSA-r5qv-rc46-hv8q (internode RPC authentication must fail closed, fixed in
//! rustfs/rustfs#4402) is anchored by the `ghsa_r5qv_*` tests in the module
//! below, plus the broader negative-signature suite. The advisory class is: a
//! node must never accept an RPC whose auth is missing, malformed, replayed, or
//! signed with the default/empty shared secret. See
//! node must never accept an RPC whose auth is missing, malformed, or signed
//! with the default/empty shared secret. Body-bound v2 requests additionally
//! receive process-local replay protection. See
//! `docs/testing/security-regressions.md` for the full advisory -> test map.
//!
//! Advisory: <https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/security/advisories/GHSA-r5qv-rc46-hv8q>
@@ -29,23 +30,90 @@ use crate::cluster::rpc::context_propagation::{inject_request_id_into_http_heade
use base64::Engine as _;
use base64::engine::general_purpose;
use hmac::{Hmac, KeyInit, Mac};
use http::uri::Authority;
use http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue, Method, Uri};
#[cfg(test)]
use rustfs_credentials::{DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY, RPC_SECRET_REQUIRED_MESSAGE};
use rustfs_credentials::{RPC_SECRET_REQUIRED_OPERATOR_MESSAGE, try_get_rpc_token};
use sha2::Digest as _;
use sha2::Sha256;
use std::sync::Once;
use std::collections::{HashSet, VecDeque};
use std::sync::{LazyLock, Mutex, Once};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use tracing::error;
use uuid::Uuid;
type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
const SIGNATURE_HEADER: &str = "x-rustfs-signature";
const TIMESTAMP_HEADER: &str = "x-rustfs-timestamp";
const RPC_AUTH_VERSION_HEADER: &str = "x-rustfs-rpc-auth-version";
const RPC_SIGNATURE_V2_HEADER: &str = "x-rustfs-rpc-signature-v2";
const RPC_NONCE_HEADER: &str = "x-rustfs-rpc-nonce";
pub(crate) const RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER: &str = "x-rustfs-content-sha256";
const RPC_AUTH_VERSION_V2: &str = "2";
const RPC_RESPONSE_PROOF_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"rustfs-rpc-response-proof-v1\0";
const UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD: &str = "UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD";
const UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD_NONCE: &str = "unsigned";
const SIGNATURE_VALID_DURATION: i64 = 300; // 5 minutes
const REPLAY_CACHE_RETENTION: Duration = Duration::from_secs(601);
const MAX_REPLAY_PROTECTED_NONCES: usize = 65_536;
pub const TONIC_RPC_PREFIX: &str = "/node_service.NodeService";
static RPC_SECRET_RESOLUTION_LOG_ONCE: Once = Once::new();
#[derive(Default)]
struct RpcNonceCache {
nonces: HashSet<Uuid>,
expirations: VecDeque<(Instant, i64, Uuid)>,
max_wall_time: i64,
}
impl RpcNonceCache {
fn remove_expired(&mut self, now: Instant, wall_time: i64) {
while matches!(
self.expirations.front(),
Some((expires_at, valid_until, _)) if *expires_at < now && *valid_until < wall_time
) {
let Some((_, _, nonce)) = self.expirations.pop_front() else {
break;
};
self.nonces.remove(&nonce);
}
}
fn check_and_record(
&mut self,
nonce: Uuid,
signed_at: i64,
now: Instant,
wall_time: i64,
expires_at: Instant,
capacity: usize,
) -> std::io::Result<()> {
self.max_wall_time = self.max_wall_time.max(wall_time);
if self.max_wall_time.saturating_sub(signed_at) > SIGNATURE_VALID_DURATION {
return Err(std::io::Error::other("RPC request timestamp expired after clock regression"));
}
self.remove_expired(now, self.max_wall_time);
if self.nonces.contains(&nonce) {
return Err(std::io::Error::other("RPC request replay detected"));
}
if self.nonces.len() >= capacity {
return Err(std::io::Error::other("RPC replay cache capacity exceeded"));
}
self.nonces.insert(nonce);
self.expirations
.push_back((expires_at, signed_at.saturating_add(SIGNATURE_VALID_DURATION), nonce));
Ok(())
}
}
// This cache is a process-local wire-replay defense only. Mutation handlers
// still need a stable operation ID and coordinator-owned idempotency across
// retries, node failover, and restart.
static LOCAL_RPC_NONCE_CACHE: LazyLock<Mutex<RpcNonceCache>> = LazyLock::new(|| Mutex::new(RpcNonceCache::default()));
/// Get the shared secret for HMAC signing
#[cfg(test)]
fn resolve_shared_secret(env_secret: Option<&str>, global_secret: Option<&str>) -> std::io::Result<String> {
@@ -71,6 +139,30 @@ fn get_shared_secret() -> std::io::Result<String> {
})
}
fn rpc_response_proof_mac(canonical_body: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<HmacSha256> {
let secret = get_shared_secret()?;
let mut mac =
<HmacSha256 as KeyInit>::new_from_slice(secret.as_bytes()).map_err(|_| std::io::Error::other("Invalid RPC HMAC key"))?;
mac.update(RPC_RESPONSE_PROOF_DOMAIN);
mac.update(
&u64::try_from(canonical_body.len())
.map_err(|_| std::io::Error::other("RPC response proof length cannot be represented"))?
.to_be_bytes(),
);
mac.update(canonical_body);
Ok(mac)
}
pub fn sign_tonic_rpc_response_proof(canonical_body: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
Ok(rpc_response_proof_mac(canonical_body)?.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec())
}
pub fn verify_tonic_rpc_response_proof(canonical_body: &[u8], proof: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
rpc_response_proof_mac(canonical_body)?
.verify_slice(proof)
.map_err(|_| std::io::Error::other("Invalid RPC response proof"))
}
/// Build the canonical payload covered by the RPC HMAC.
fn signature_payload(url: &str, method: &Method, timestamp: i64) -> String {
let uri: Uri = url.parse().expect("Invalid URL");
@@ -109,6 +201,96 @@ fn verify_signature(secret: &str, url: &str, method: &Method, timestamp: i64, si
mac.verify_slice(&signature).is_ok()
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
struct SignatureV2Scope<'a> {
audience: &'a str,
service: &'a str,
rpc_method: &'a str,
timestamp: &'a str,
nonce: &'a str,
content_sha256: &'a str,
}
fn update_signature_v2(mac: &mut HmacSha256, scope: SignatureV2Scope<'_>) {
for part in [
b"rustfs-rpc-auth-v2|".as_slice(),
scope.audience.as_bytes(),
b"|/",
scope.service.as_bytes(),
b"/",
scope.rpc_method.as_bytes(),
b"|POST|",
scope.timestamp.as_bytes(),
b"|",
scope.nonce.as_bytes(),
b"|",
scope.content_sha256.as_bytes(),
] {
mac.update(part);
}
}
fn generate_signature_v2(secret: &str, scope: SignatureV2Scope<'_>) -> std::io::Result<String> {
let mut mac =
<HmacSha256 as KeyInit>::new_from_slice(secret.as_bytes()).map_err(|_| std::io::Error::other("Invalid RPC HMAC key"))?;
update_signature_v2(&mut mac, scope);
Ok(general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(mac.finalize().into_bytes()))
}
fn verify_signature_v2(secret: &str, scope: SignatureV2Scope<'_>, signature: &str) -> bool {
let Ok(signature) = general_purpose::STANDARD.decode(signature) else {
return false;
};
let Ok(mut mac) = <HmacSha256 as KeyInit>::new_from_slice(secret.as_bytes()) else {
return false;
};
update_signature_v2(&mut mac, scope);
mac.verify_slice(&signature).is_ok()
}
fn valid_content_sha256(value: &str) -> bool {
value == UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD
|| (value.len() == 64
&& value
.bytes()
.all(|byte| byte.is_ascii_digit() || (b'a'..=b'f').contains(&byte)))
}
fn header_value(value: &str, name: &str) -> std::io::Result<HeaderValue> {
HeaderValue::from_str(value).map_err(|_| std::io::Error::other(format!("Invalid {name} header value")))
}
pub fn normalize_tonic_rpc_audience(value: &str) -> std::io::Result<String> {
let authority = value
.parse::<Authority>()
.map_err(|_| std::io::Error::other("Invalid gRPC peer authority"))?;
Ok(authority.as_str().to_ascii_lowercase())
}
fn check_timestamp(timestamp: i64) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let current_time = OffsetDateTime::now_utc().unix_timestamp();
if current_time.saturating_sub(timestamp) > SIGNATURE_VALID_DURATION
|| timestamp.saturating_sub(current_time) > SIGNATURE_VALID_DURATION
{
return Err(std::io::Error::other("Request timestamp expired"));
}
Ok(())
}
fn check_and_record_nonce(nonce: Uuid, signed_at: i64) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let wall_time = OffsetDateTime::now_utc().unix_timestamp();
let mut cache = LOCAL_RPC_NONCE_CACHE
.lock()
.map_err(|_| std::io::Error::other("RPC replay cache unavailable"))?;
// Take the monotonic timestamp after acquiring the lock so expiration
// entries remain ordered by the same serialization point as insertion.
let now = Instant::now();
let expires_at = now
.checked_add(REPLAY_CACHE_RETENTION)
.ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("RPC replay expiry overflow"))?;
cache.check_and_record(nonce, signed_at, now, wall_time, expires_at, MAX_REPLAY_PROTECTED_NONCES)
}
/// Build headers with authentication signature
pub fn build_auth_headers(url: &str, method: &Method, headers: &mut HeaderMap) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let auth_headers = gen_signature_headers(url, method)?;
@@ -135,6 +317,184 @@ pub fn gen_signature_headers(url: &str, method: &Method) -> std::io::Result<Head
Ok(headers)
}
/// Generate rolling-upgrade-safe gRPC auth metadata.
///
/// The legacy signature remains present for old servers. New servers prefer the
/// v2 signature and bind it to the destination authority and exact generated
/// gRPC method. A versioned canonical mutation payload can opt into the
/// additional body-digest capability.
pub fn gen_tonic_signature_headers(
audience: &str,
service: &str,
rpc_method: &str,
content_sha256: Option<&str>,
) -> std::io::Result<HeaderMap> {
if audience.is_empty() || service.is_empty() || rpc_method.is_empty() || service.contains('/') || rpc_method.contains('/') {
return Err(std::io::Error::other("Invalid RPC v2 signing scope"));
}
let content_sha256 = content_sha256.unwrap_or(UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
if !valid_content_sha256(content_sha256) {
return Err(std::io::Error::other("Invalid RPC content SHA-256"));
}
let secret = get_shared_secret()?;
let timestamp = OffsetDateTime::now_utc().unix_timestamp();
let timestamp_header = timestamp.to_string();
let body_nonce = (content_sha256 != UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD).then(|| Uuid::new_v4().to_string());
let nonce = body_nonce.as_deref().unwrap_or(UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD_NONCE);
let legacy_signature = generate_signature(&secret, TONIC_RPC_PREFIX, &Method::GET, timestamp);
let signature_v2 = generate_signature_v2(
&secret,
SignatureV2Scope {
audience,
service,
rpc_method,
timestamp: &timestamp_header,
nonce,
content_sha256,
},
)?;
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
headers.insert(SIGNATURE_HEADER, header_value(&legacy_signature, SIGNATURE_HEADER)?);
headers.insert(TIMESTAMP_HEADER, header_value(&timestamp_header, TIMESTAMP_HEADER)?);
headers.insert(RPC_AUTH_VERSION_HEADER, HeaderValue::from_static(RPC_AUTH_VERSION_V2));
headers.insert(RPC_SIGNATURE_V2_HEADER, header_value(&signature_v2, RPC_SIGNATURE_V2_HEADER)?);
headers.insert(RPC_NONCE_HEADER, header_value(nonce, RPC_NONCE_HEADER)?);
headers.insert(RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER, header_value(content_sha256, RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER)?);
Ok(headers)
}
/// Bind a mutation to a versioned, deterministic canonical payload.
///
/// Do not pass a protobuf re-encoding here: unknown fields and map ordering are
/// not a stable mixed-version contract.
pub fn set_tonic_canonical_body_digest<T>(request: &mut tonic::Request<T>, canonical_body: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let digest = hex_simd::encode_to_string(Sha256::digest(canonical_body), hex_simd::AsciiCase::Lower);
request
.metadata_mut()
.as_mut()
.insert(RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER, header_value(&digest, RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER)?);
Ok(())
}
pub fn verify_tonic_canonical_body_digest<T>(request: &tonic::Request<T>, canonical_body: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let version = request
.metadata()
.get(RPC_AUTH_VERSION_HEADER)
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok());
if version != Some(RPC_AUTH_VERSION_V2) {
return Err(std::io::Error::other("RPC mutation requires v2 authentication"));
}
let expected = request
.metadata()
.get(RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER)
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
.ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("Missing RPC content SHA-256"))?;
if expected == UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD || !valid_content_sha256(expected) {
return Err(std::io::Error::other("RPC body is not bound to the signature"));
}
let actual = hex_simd::encode_to_string(Sha256::digest(canonical_body), hex_simd::AsciiCase::Lower);
if actual != expected {
return Err(std::io::Error::other("RPC content SHA-256 mismatch"));
}
Ok(())
}
fn has_v2_auth_headers(headers: &HeaderMap) -> bool {
[
RPC_AUTH_VERSION_HEADER,
RPC_SIGNATURE_V2_HEADER,
RPC_NONCE_HEADER,
RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER,
]
.iter()
.any(|name| headers.contains_key(*name))
}
/// Verify gRPC authentication, preferring v2 without downgrade on malformed v2 metadata.
pub fn verify_tonic_rpc_signature(audience: &str, path: &str, headers: &HeaderMap) -> std::io::Result<()> {
if !has_v2_auth_headers(headers) {
// RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO(heal-rpc-auth-v2): accept old peers during rolling upgrades. Remove after the minimum
// supported RustFS peer version sends v2 authentication on every internode gRPC request.
return verify_rpc_signature(TONIC_RPC_PREFIX, &Method::GET, headers);
}
let path = path
.strip_prefix('/')
.ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("Invalid RPC request path"))?;
let (service, rpc_method) = path
.split_once('/')
.filter(|(service, rpc_method)| !service.is_empty() && !rpc_method.is_empty() && !rpc_method.contains('/'))
.ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("Invalid RPC request path"))?;
if audience.is_empty() {
return Err(std::io::Error::other("Missing RPC audience"));
}
let version = headers
.get(RPC_AUTH_VERSION_HEADER)
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
.ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("Missing RPC auth version"))?;
if version != RPC_AUTH_VERSION_V2 {
return Err(std::io::Error::other("Unsupported RPC auth version"));
}
let signature = headers
.get(RPC_SIGNATURE_V2_HEADER)
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
.ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("Missing RPC v2 signature"))?;
let timestamp_header = headers
.get(TIMESTAMP_HEADER)
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
.ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("Missing timestamp header"))?;
let timestamp = timestamp_header
.parse::<i64>()
.map_err(|_| std::io::Error::other("Invalid timestamp format"))?;
check_timestamp(timestamp)?;
let nonce = headers
.get(RPC_NONCE_HEADER)
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
.ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("Missing RPC nonce"))?;
let content_sha256 = headers
.get(RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER)
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
.ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("Missing RPC content SHA-256"))?;
if !valid_content_sha256(content_sha256) {
return Err(std::io::Error::other("Invalid RPC content SHA-256"));
}
let parsed_nonce = if content_sha256 == UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD {
if nonce != UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD_NONCE {
return Err(std::io::Error::other("Invalid unsigned RPC nonce"));
}
None
} else {
let parsed_nonce = Uuid::parse_str(nonce).map_err(|_| std::io::Error::other("Invalid RPC nonce"))?;
if parsed_nonce.is_nil() {
return Err(std::io::Error::other("Invalid RPC nonce"));
}
Some(parsed_nonce)
};
let secret = get_shared_secret()?;
if !verify_signature_v2(
&secret,
SignatureV2Scope {
audience,
service,
rpc_method,
timestamp: timestamp_header,
nonce,
content_sha256,
},
signature,
) {
return Err(std::io::Error::other("Invalid RPC v2 signature"));
}
if let Some(nonce) = parsed_nonce {
check_and_record_nonce(nonce, timestamp)?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Verify the request signature for RPC requests
pub fn verify_rpc_signature(url: &str, method: &Method, headers: &HeaderMap) -> std::io::Result<()> {
// Get signature from header
@@ -153,14 +513,7 @@ pub fn verify_rpc_signature(url: &str, method: &Method, headers: &HeaderMap) ->
.parse()
.map_err(|_| std::io::Error::other("Invalid timestamp format"))?;
// Check timestamp validity (prevent replay attacks)
let current_time = OffsetDateTime::now_utc().unix_timestamp();
if current_time.saturating_sub(timestamp) > SIGNATURE_VALID_DURATION
|| timestamp.saturating_sub(current_time) > SIGNATURE_VALID_DURATION
{
return Err(std::io::Error::other("Request timestamp expired"));
}
check_timestamp(timestamp)?;
// Verify signature with constant-time HMAC comparison.
let secret = get_shared_secret()?;
@@ -707,4 +1060,203 @@ mod tests {
assert!(result.is_ok(), "Round-trip test failed for {method} {url}");
}
}
#[test]
fn tonic_v2_signature_is_bound_to_exact_method() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let headers = gen_tonic_signature_headers("node-a:9000", "node_service.NodeService", "Ping", None)
.expect("tonic auth headers should build");
assert!(verify_tonic_rpc_signature("node-a:9000", "/node_service.NodeService/Ping", &headers).is_ok());
let error = verify_tonic_rpc_signature("node-a:9000", "/node_service.NodeService/SignalService", &headers)
.expect_err("signature replayed to a different method must fail");
assert_eq!(error.to_string(), "Invalid RPC v2 signature");
}
#[test]
fn tonic_v2_signature_is_bound_to_exact_service() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let headers = gen_tonic_signature_headers("node-a:9000", "node_service.NodeService", "Ping", None)
.expect("tonic auth headers should build");
let error = verify_tonic_rpc_signature("node-a:9000", "/other.NodeService/Ping", &headers)
.expect_err("signature replayed to a different service must fail");
assert_eq!(error.to_string(), "Invalid RPC v2 signature");
}
#[test]
fn tonic_v2_signature_is_bound_to_destination_audience() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let headers = gen_tonic_signature_headers("node-a:9000", "node_service.NodeService", "Ping", None)
.expect("tonic auth headers should build");
let error = verify_tonic_rpc_signature("node-b:9000", "/node_service.NodeService/Ping", &headers)
.expect_err("signature replayed to a different node must fail");
assert_eq!(error.to_string(), "Invalid RPC v2 signature");
}
#[test]
fn malformed_v2_auth_does_not_downgrade_to_valid_legacy_signature() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let mut headers = gen_tonic_signature_headers("node-a:9000", "node_service.NodeService", "Ping", None)
.expect("tonic auth headers should build");
headers.insert(RPC_SIGNATURE_V2_HEADER, HeaderValue::from_static("invalid"));
assert!(
verify_rpc_signature(TONIC_RPC_PREFIX, &Method::GET, &headers).is_ok(),
"the compatibility signature should remain valid for old servers"
);
let error = verify_tonic_rpc_signature("node-a:9000", "/node_service.NodeService/Ping", &headers)
.expect_err("new servers must not downgrade malformed v2 auth");
assert_eq!(error.to_string(), "Invalid RPC v2 signature");
}
#[test]
fn legacy_tonic_signature_remains_accepted_during_rolling_upgrade() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let headers = gen_signature_headers(TONIC_RPC_PREFIX, &Method::GET).expect("legacy auth headers should build");
assert!(verify_tonic_rpc_signature("node-a:9000", "/node_service.NodeService/Ping", &headers).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn body_bound_tonic_request_rejects_replay_and_body_tampering() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let body = b"heal-control-request";
let mut request = tonic::Request::new(());
set_tonic_canonical_body_digest(&mut request, body).expect("canonical body digest should be attached");
let content_sha256 = request
.metadata()
.get(RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER)
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok());
let headers =
gen_tonic_signature_headers("node-a:9000", "node_service.HealControlService", "HealControl", content_sha256)
.expect("body-bound auth headers should build");
request.metadata_mut().as_mut().extend(headers.clone());
assert!(verify_tonic_rpc_signature("node-a:9000", "/node_service.HealControlService/HealControl", &headers).is_ok());
let replay = verify_tonic_rpc_signature("node-a:9000", "/node_service.HealControlService/HealControl", &headers)
.expect_err("reusing a body-bound nonce must fail");
assert_eq!(replay.to_string(), "RPC request replay detected");
assert!(verify_tonic_canonical_body_digest(&request, body).is_ok());
let tampered = verify_tonic_canonical_body_digest(&request, b"different-body")
.expect_err("a different canonical request body must fail");
assert_eq!(tampered.to_string(), "RPC content SHA-256 mismatch");
}
#[test]
fn tier_mutation_rpc_contract_requires_method_bound_v2_body_digest() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let mutation_id = uuid::uuid!("12345678-1234-5678-9abc-def012345678");
let body = rustfs_protos::canonical_tier_mutation_rpc_body(
rustfs_protos::TIER_MUTATION_RPC_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
rustfs_protos::TierMutationRpcPhase::Prepare,
mutation_id,
b"canonical-tier-mutation-prepare",
)
.expect("small tier mutation body should encode");
let mut request = tonic::Request::new(());
set_tonic_canonical_body_digest(&mut request, &body).expect("canonical body digest should be attached");
let content_sha256 = request
.metadata()
.get(RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER)
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok());
let headers = gen_tonic_signature_headers(
"node-a:9000",
"node_service.TierMutationControlService",
"PrepareTierMutation",
content_sha256,
)
.expect("body-bound tier mutation auth headers should build");
request.metadata_mut().as_mut().extend(headers.clone());
assert!(
verify_tonic_rpc_signature("node-a:9000", "/node_service.TierMutationControlService/PrepareTierMutation", &headers)
.is_ok(),
"tier mutation RPC signature must bind destination, service, method, nonce, and body digest"
);
let method_replay =
verify_tonic_rpc_signature("node-a:9000", "/node_service.TierMutationControlService/CommitTierMutation", &headers)
.expect_err("prepare auth must not replay to commit");
assert_eq!(method_replay.to_string(), "Invalid RPC v2 signature");
let service_replay = verify_tonic_rpc_signature("node-a:9000", "/node_service.NodeService/PrepareTierMutation", &headers)
.expect_err("tier mutation auth must not replay to the legacy node service path");
assert_eq!(service_replay.to_string(), "Invalid RPC v2 signature");
let tampered_body = rustfs_protos::canonical_tier_mutation_rpc_body(
rustfs_protos::TIER_MUTATION_RPC_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
rustfs_protos::TierMutationRpcPhase::Commit,
mutation_id,
b"canonical-tier-mutation-prepare",
)
.expect("small tier mutation body should encode");
let tampered =
verify_tonic_canonical_body_digest(&request, &tampered_body).expect_err("commit body must not match prepare digest");
assert_eq!(tampered.to_string(), "RPC content SHA-256 mismatch");
}
#[test]
fn partial_v2_metadata_fails_closed() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let mut headers = gen_signature_headers(TONIC_RPC_PREFIX, &Method::GET).expect("legacy auth headers should build");
headers.insert(RPC_AUTH_VERSION_HEADER, HeaderValue::from_static(RPC_AUTH_VERSION_V2));
let error = verify_tonic_rpc_signature("node-a:9000", "/node_service.NodeService/Ping", &headers)
.expect_err("partial v2 metadata must not fall back to legacy auth");
assert_eq!(error.to_string(), "Missing RPC v2 signature");
}
#[test]
fn canonical_mutation_digest_rejects_legacy_only_auth() {
let mut request = tonic::Request::new(());
set_tonic_canonical_body_digest(&mut request, b"heal-control-v1\0start").expect("canonical digest should be attached");
let error = verify_tonic_canonical_body_digest(&request, b"heal-control-v1\0start")
.expect_err("mutation body verification must also require v2 auth");
assert_eq!(error.to_string(), "RPC mutation requires v2 authentication");
}
#[test]
fn nonce_cache_expires_by_monotonic_deadline_and_fails_closed_at_capacity() {
let now = Instant::now();
let expiry = now.checked_add(REPLAY_CACHE_RETENTION).expect("test expiry should fit");
let after_expiry = expiry.checked_add(Duration::from_secs(1)).expect("test expiry should fit");
let nonce_a = Uuid::new_v4();
let nonce_b = Uuid::new_v4();
let mut cache = RpcNonceCache::default();
cache
.check_and_record(nonce_a, 100, now, 100, expiry, 1)
.expect("first nonce should be recorded");
let capacity = cache
.check_and_record(nonce_b, 100, now, 100, expiry, 1)
.expect_err("a full replay cache must fail closed");
assert_eq!(capacity.to_string(), "RPC replay cache capacity exceeded");
cache
.check_and_record(nonce_b, 702, after_expiry, 702, after_expiry, 1)
.expect("expired nonce should release capacity");
assert!(!cache.nonces.contains(&nonce_a));
assert!(cache.nonces.contains(&nonce_b));
}
#[test]
fn nonce_cache_rejects_replay_after_wall_clock_regression() {
let now = Instant::now();
let expiry = now.checked_add(REPLAY_CACHE_RETENTION).expect("test expiry should fit");
let after_expiry = expiry.checked_add(Duration::from_secs(1)).expect("test expiry should fit");
let nonce = Uuid::new_v4();
let mut cache = RpcNonceCache::default();
cache
.check_and_record(nonce, 1_000, now, 1_000, expiry, 2)
.expect("first nonce should be recorded");
let replay = cache
.check_and_record(nonce, 1_000, after_expiry, 900, after_expiry, 2)
.expect_err("wall clock regression must not make an old signature reusable");
assert_eq!(replay.to_string(), "RPC request replay detected");
let stale = cache
.check_and_record(Uuid::new_v4(), 600, after_expiry, 900, after_expiry, 2)
.expect_err("the monotonic wall-clock high-water mark must fail closed");
assert_eq!(stale.to_string(), "RPC request timestamp expired after clock regression");
}
}
+7 -2
View File
@@ -28,12 +28,17 @@ pub(crate) use background_monitor::spawn_background_monitor;
pub use client::{
TonicInterceptor, gen_tonic_signature_interceptor, node_service_time_out_client, node_service_time_out_client_no_auth,
};
pub use http_auth::{TONIC_RPC_PREFIX, build_auth_headers, gen_signature_headers, verify_rpc_signature};
pub use http_auth::{
TONIC_RPC_PREFIX, build_auth_headers, gen_signature_headers, gen_tonic_signature_headers, normalize_tonic_rpc_audience,
set_tonic_canonical_body_digest, sign_tonic_rpc_response_proof, verify_rpc_signature, verify_tonic_canonical_body_digest,
verify_tonic_rpc_response_proof, verify_tonic_rpc_signature,
};
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) use internode_data_transport::TcpHttpInternodeDataTransport;
pub use internode_data_transport::build_internode_data_transport_from_env;
pub use peer_rest_client::{
PEER_RESTSIGNAL, PEER_RESTSUB_SYS, PeerRestClient, SERVICE_SIGNAL_REFRESH_CONFIG, SERVICE_SIGNAL_RELOAD_DYNAMIC,
PEER_RESTDRY_RUN, PEER_RESTSIGNAL, PEER_RESTSUB_SYS, PeerRestClient, SERVICE_SIGNAL_REFRESH_CONFIG,
SERVICE_SIGNAL_RELOAD_DYNAMIC, ScannerPeerActivity,
};
pub(crate) use peer_s3_client::heal_bucket_local_on_disks;
pub use peer_s3_client::{LocalPeerS3Client, PeerS3Client, S3PeerSys};
@@ -12,7 +12,11 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use crate::cluster::rpc::client::{TonicInterceptor, gen_tonic_signature_interceptor, node_service_time_out_client};
use crate::cluster::rpc::client::{
TonicInterceptor, gen_tonic_signature_interceptor, heal_control_time_out_client, node_service_time_out_client,
tier_mutation_control_time_out_client,
};
use crate::cluster::rpc::{set_tonic_canonical_body_digest, verify_tonic_rpc_response_proof};
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
use crate::{
disk::disk_store::{get_drive_active_check_interval, get_drive_active_check_timeout},
@@ -20,6 +24,7 @@ use crate::{
runtime::sources as runtime_sources,
services::metrics_realtime::{CollectMetricsOpts, MetricType},
};
use bytes::Bytes;
use rmp_serde::{Deserializer, Serializer};
use rustfs_madmin::{
ServerProperties,
@@ -27,17 +32,19 @@ use rustfs_madmin::{
metrics::RealtimeMetrics,
net::NetInfo,
};
use rustfs_protos::evict_failed_connection;
use rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::{
CancelDecommissionRequest, ClearDecommissionRequest, DeleteBucketMetadataRequest, DeletePolicyRequest,
DeleteServiceAccountRequest, DeleteUserRequest, GetCpusRequest, GetLiveEventsRequest, GetMemInfoRequest, GetMetricsRequest,
GetNetInfoRequest, GetOsInfoRequest, GetPartitionsRequest, GetProcInfoRequest, GetSeLinuxInfoRequest, GetSysConfigRequest,
GetSysErrorsRequest, LoadBucketMetadataRequest, LoadGroupRequest, LoadPolicyMappingRequest, LoadPolicyRequest,
LoadRebalanceMetaRequest, LoadServiceAccountRequest, LoadTransitionTierConfigRequest, LoadUserRequest,
LocalStorageInfoRequest, Mss, ReloadPoolMetaRequest, ReloadSiteReplicationConfigRequest, ServerInfoRequest,
SignalServiceRequest, StartDecommissionRequest, StartProfilingRequest, StopRebalanceRequest,
node_service_client::NodeServiceClient,
BackgroundHealStatusRequest, CancelDecommissionRequest, ClearDecommissionRequest, DeleteBucketMetadataRequest,
DeletePolicyRequest, DeleteServiceAccountRequest, DeleteUserRequest, GetCpusRequest, GetLiveEventsRequest, GetMemInfoRequest,
GetMetricsRequest, GetNetInfoRequest, GetOsInfoRequest, GetPartitionsRequest, GetProcInfoRequest, GetSeLinuxInfoRequest,
GetSysConfigRequest, GetSysErrorsRequest, HealControlRequest, LoadBucketMetadataRequest, LoadGroupRequest,
LoadPolicyMappingRequest, LoadPolicyRequest, LoadRebalanceMetaRequest, LoadServiceAccountRequest,
LoadTransitionTierConfigRequest, LoadUserRequest, LocalStorageInfoRequest, Mss, ReloadPoolMetaRequest,
ReloadSiteReplicationConfigRequest, ScannerActivityRequest, ScannerActivityResponse, ServerInfoRequest, SignalServiceRequest,
StartDecommissionRequest, StartProfilingRequest, StopRebalanceRequest, TierMutationAbortRequest, TierMutationCommitRequest,
TierMutationControlResponse, TierMutationPeerState, TierMutationPrepareRequest, node_service_client::NodeServiceClient,
tier_mutation_control_service_client::TierMutationControlServiceClient,
};
use rustfs_protos::{TierMutationRpcPhase, evict_failed_connection};
use rustfs_utils::XHost;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize as _};
use std::{
@@ -54,14 +61,53 @@ use tonic::Request;
use tonic::service::interceptor::InterceptedService;
use tonic::transport::Channel;
use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
use uuid::Uuid;
pub const PEER_RESTSIGNAL: &str = "signal";
pub const PEER_RESTSUB_SYS: &str = "sub-sys";
pub const PEER_RESTDRY_RUN: &str = "dry-run";
pub const SERVICE_SIGNAL_REFRESH_CONFIG: u64 = 1;
pub const SERVICE_SIGNAL_RELOAD_DYNAMIC: u64 = 2;
const BACKGROUND_HEAL_STATUS_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE: usize = 64 * 1024;
const HEAL_CONTROL_FINGERPRINT_MAX_SIZE: usize = 256;
const HEAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD_MAX_SIZE: usize = 64 * 1024;
const PEER_REST_RECOVERY_MAX_ATTEMPTS: u32 = 60;
const PEER_REST_RECOVERY_MAX_BACKOFF: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
const SCANNER_ACTIVITY_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE: usize = 1024;
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ScannerPeerActivity {
pub instance_id: String,
pub namespace_generation: u64,
pub maintenance_generation: u64,
}
fn decode_scanner_activity(response: ScannerActivityResponse) -> Result<ScannerPeerActivity> {
let instance_id = response.instance_id;
if instance_id.len() != 32
|| !instance_id
.as_bytes()
.iter()
.all(|byte| byte.is_ascii_digit() || (b'a'..=b'f').contains(byte))
{
return Err(Error::other("peer returned an invalid scanner activity instance ID"));
}
Ok(ScannerPeerActivity {
instance_id,
namespace_generation: response.namespace_generation,
maintenance_generation: response.maintenance_generation,
})
}
fn validate_heal_control_capability_proof(canonical_ack: &[u8], proof: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
verify_tonic_rpc_response_proof(canonical_ack, proof)
.map_err(|_| Error::other("peer returned an invalid heal control capability proof"))
}
fn validate_heal_control_response_proof(canonical_response: &[u8], proof: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
verify_tonic_rpc_response_proof(canonical_response, proof)
.map_err(|_| Error::other("peer returned an invalid heal control response proof"))
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct PeerLiveEventsBatch {
@@ -78,6 +124,82 @@ pub struct PeerRestClient {
recovery_running: Arc<AtomicBool>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum PeerTierMutationState {
Prepared,
Committed,
Aborted,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct PeerTierMutationOutcome {
pub state: PeerTierMutationState,
pub applied: bool,
}
fn validate_tier_mutation_response_proof(
version: u32,
phase: TierMutationRpcPhase,
mutation_id: Uuid,
canonical_payload: &[u8],
response: &TierMutationControlResponse,
) -> Result<()> {
let canonical_response =
rustfs_protos::canonical_tier_mutation_rpc_response_body(rustfs_protos::TierMutationRpcResponseProofInput {
version,
phase,
mutation_id,
canonical_payload,
success: response.success,
state: response.state,
applied: response.applied,
error_info: response.error_info.as_deref(),
})
.map_err(|_| Error::other("tier mutation response length cannot be represented"))?;
verify_tonic_rpc_response_proof(&canonical_response, &response.response_proof)
.map_err(|_| Error::other("peer returned an invalid tier mutation response proof"))
}
fn decode_tier_mutation_peer_state(state: i32) -> Result<PeerTierMutationState> {
match TierMutationPeerState::try_from(state).map_err(|_| Error::other("peer returned an invalid tier mutation state"))? {
TierMutationPeerState::Prepared => Ok(PeerTierMutationState::Prepared),
TierMutationPeerState::Committed => Ok(PeerTierMutationState::Committed),
TierMutationPeerState::Aborted => Ok(PeerTierMutationState::Aborted),
TierMutationPeerState::Unspecified => Err(Error::other("peer returned an unspecified tier mutation state")),
}
}
fn validate_tier_mutation_payload_len(phase: TierMutationRpcPhase, payload_len: usize) -> Result<()> {
let limit = match phase {
TierMutationRpcPhase::Prepare => rustfs_protos::TIER_MUTATION_RPC_MAX_PREPARE_PAYLOAD_SIZE,
TierMutationRpcPhase::Commit => rustfs_protos::TIER_MUTATION_RPC_MAX_COMMIT_PAYLOAD_SIZE,
TierMutationRpcPhase::Abort => {
if payload_len == 0 {
return Ok(());
}
return Err(Error::other("tier mutation abort payload must be empty"));
}
_ => return Err(Error::other("tier mutation rpc phase is unsupported")),
};
if payload_len > limit {
return Err(Error::other("tier mutation payload exceeds size limit"));
}
Ok(())
}
fn tier_mutation_phase_label(phase: TierMutationRpcPhase) -> &'static str {
match phase {
TierMutationRpcPhase::Prepare => "prepare",
TierMutationRpcPhase::Commit => "commit",
TierMutationRpcPhase::Abort => "abort",
_ => "unknown",
}
}
fn tier_mutation_control_status_error(phase: TierMutationRpcPhase, status: tonic::Status) -> Error {
Error::other(format!("peer tier mutation {} RPC failed: {status}", tier_mutation_phase_label(phase)))
}
impl PeerRestClient {
fn recovery_monitor_span(grid_host: &str) -> tracing::Span {
tracing::info_span!(
@@ -97,31 +219,62 @@ impl PeerRestClient {
recovery_running: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
}
}
pub async fn new_clients(eps: EndpointServerPools) -> (Vec<Option<Self>>, Vec<Option<Self>>) {
if !runtime_sources::setup_is_dist_erasure().await {
return (Vec::new(), Vec::new());
}
let eps = eps.clone();
let hosts = eps.hosts_sorted();
let mut remote = Vec::with_capacity(hosts.len());
let mut all = vec![None; hosts.len()];
for (i, hs_host) in hosts.iter().enumerate() {
if let Some(host) = hs_host
&& let Some(grid_host) = eps.find_grid_hosts_from_peer(host)
{
let client = PeerRestClient::new(host.clone(), grid_host);
fn build_clients_from_slots(
slots: Vec<(String, Option<String>, bool)>,
) -> (Vec<Option<Self>>, Vec<Option<Self>>, Vec<String>) {
let mut remote = Vec::with_capacity(slots.len().saturating_sub(1));
let mut all = vec![None; slots.len()];
let mut remote_topology_hosts = Vec::with_capacity(slots.len().saturating_sub(1));
all[i] = Some(client.clone());
remote.push(Some(client));
for (idx, (peer_host_port, grid_host, is_local)) in slots.into_iter().enumerate() {
if is_local {
continue;
}
let client = match grid_host {
Some(grid_host) => match XHost::try_from(peer_host_port.clone()) {
Ok(host) => Some(PeerRestClient::new(host, grid_host)),
Err(err) => {
warn!(peer = %peer_host_port, "Xhost parse failed while constructing peer client: {err:?}");
None
}
},
None => {
warn!(peer = %peer_host_port, "grid host is missing while constructing peer client");
None
}
};
all[idx] = client.clone();
remote.push(client);
remote_topology_hosts.push(peer_host_port);
}
(remote, all, remote_topology_hosts)
}
pub async fn new_clients(eps: EndpointServerPools) -> (Vec<Option<Self>>, Vec<Option<Self>>) {
let (remote, all, _) = Self::new_clients_with_topology(eps).await;
(remote, all)
}
pub async fn new_clients_with_topology(eps: EndpointServerPools) -> (Vec<Option<Self>>, Vec<Option<Self>>, Vec<String>) {
if !runtime_sources::setup_is_dist_erasure().await {
return (Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
}
let (remote, all, remote_topology_hosts) = Self::build_clients_from_slots(eps.peer_grid_host_slots_sorted());
if all.len() != remote.len() + 1 {
warn!("Expected number of all hosts ({}) to be remote +1 ({})", all.len(), remote.len());
warn!(
all_hosts = all.len(),
remote_slots = remote.len(),
"Expected number of all hosts to be remote slots + local node"
);
}
(remote, all)
(remote, all, remote_topology_hosts)
}
pub async fn get_client(&self) -> Result<NodeServiceClient<InterceptedService<Channel, TonicInterceptor>>> {
@@ -141,6 +294,48 @@ impl PeerRestClient {
})
}
async fn get_heal_control_client(
&self,
) -> Result<
rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::heal_control_service_client::HealControlServiceClient<
InterceptedService<Channel, TonicInterceptor>,
>,
> {
if self.offline.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
self.mark_offline_and_spawn_recovery();
return Err(Error::other(format!("peer {} is temporarily offline", self.grid_host)));
}
heal_control_time_out_client(&self.grid_host, TonicInterceptor::Signature(gen_tonic_signature_interceptor()))
.await
.map_err(|err| {
let storage_err = Error::other(format!("can not get heal control client, err: {err}"));
if Self::is_network_like_error(&storage_err) {
self.mark_offline_and_spawn_recovery();
}
storage_err
})
}
async fn get_tier_mutation_control_client(
&self,
) -> Result<TierMutationControlServiceClient<InterceptedService<Channel, TonicInterceptor>>> {
if self.offline.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
self.mark_offline_and_spawn_recovery();
return Err(Error::other(format!("peer {} is temporarily offline", self.grid_host)));
}
tier_mutation_control_time_out_client(&self.grid_host, TonicInterceptor::Signature(gen_tonic_signature_interceptor()))
.await
.map_err(|err| {
let storage_err = Error::other(format!("can not get tier mutation control client, err: {err}"));
if Self::is_network_like_error(&storage_err) {
self.mark_offline_and_spawn_recovery();
}
storage_err
})
}
/// Evict the connection to this peer from the global cache.
/// This should be called when communication with this peer fails.
pub async fn evict_connection(&self) {
@@ -639,12 +834,208 @@ impl PeerRestClient {
Err(Error::NotImplemented)
}
pub async fn load_bucket_metadata(&self, bucket: &str) -> Result<()> {
pub async fn background_heal_status(&self) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> {
self.finalize_result(
async {
let mut client = self
.get_client()
.await?
.max_decoding_message_size(BACKGROUND_HEAL_STATUS_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE);
let response = match client
.background_heal_status(Request::new(BackgroundHealStatusRequest::default()))
.await
{
Ok(response) => response.into_inner(),
Err(status) if status.code() == tonic::Code::Unimplemented => {
// RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO(heal-status-rpc-v1): accept old peers without node heal snapshots. Remove after the minimum supported RustFS peer version implements BackgroundHealStatus.
return Ok(None);
}
Err(status) => return Err(status.into()),
};
if !response.success {
return Err(Error::other(
response
.error_info
.unwrap_or_else(|| "peer background heal status failed without an error".to_string()),
));
}
Ok(Some(response.bg_heal_state.to_vec()))
}
.await,
)
.await
}
pub async fn prepare_tier_mutation(&self, mutation_id: Uuid, canonical_payload: Bytes) -> Result<PeerTierMutationOutcome> {
self.tier_mutation_control(TierMutationRpcPhase::Prepare, mutation_id, canonical_payload)
.await
}
pub async fn commit_tier_mutation(&self, mutation_id: Uuid, canonical_payload: Bytes) -> Result<PeerTierMutationOutcome> {
self.tier_mutation_control(TierMutationRpcPhase::Commit, mutation_id, canonical_payload)
.await
}
pub async fn abort_tier_mutation(&self, mutation_id: Uuid) -> Result<PeerTierMutationOutcome> {
self.tier_mutation_control(TierMutationRpcPhase::Abort, mutation_id, Bytes::new())
.await
}
async fn tier_mutation_control(
&self,
phase: TierMutationRpcPhase,
mutation_id: Uuid,
canonical_payload: Bytes,
) -> Result<PeerTierMutationOutcome> {
validate_tier_mutation_payload_len(phase, canonical_payload.len())?;
let version = rustfs_protos::TIER_MUTATION_RPC_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
self.finalize_result(
async {
let mut client = self
.get_tier_mutation_control_client()
.await?
.max_encoding_message_size(rustfs_protos::TIER_MUTATION_RPC_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE)
.max_decoding_message_size(rustfs_protos::TIER_MUTATION_RPC_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE);
let canonical_body =
rustfs_protos::canonical_tier_mutation_rpc_body(version, phase, mutation_id, canonical_payload.as_ref())
.map_err(|_| Error::other("tier mutation request length cannot be represented"))?;
let mutation_id_text = mutation_id.to_string();
let response = match phase {
TierMutationRpcPhase::Prepare => {
let mut request = Request::new(TierMutationPrepareRequest {
version,
mutation_id: mutation_id_text.clone(),
canonical_payload: canonical_payload.clone(),
});
set_tonic_canonical_body_digest(&mut request, &canonical_body)?;
client
.prepare_tier_mutation(request)
.await
.map_err(|status| tier_mutation_control_status_error(phase, status))?
.into_inner()
}
TierMutationRpcPhase::Commit => {
let mut request = Request::new(TierMutationCommitRequest {
version,
mutation_id: mutation_id_text.clone(),
canonical_payload: canonical_payload.clone(),
});
set_tonic_canonical_body_digest(&mut request, &canonical_body)?;
client
.commit_tier_mutation(request)
.await
.map_err(|status| tier_mutation_control_status_error(phase, status))?
.into_inner()
}
TierMutationRpcPhase::Abort => {
let mut request = Request::new(TierMutationAbortRequest {
version,
mutation_id: mutation_id_text,
canonical_payload: canonical_payload.clone(),
});
set_tonic_canonical_body_digest(&mut request, &canonical_body)?;
client
.abort_tier_mutation(request)
.await
.map_err(|status| tier_mutation_control_status_error(phase, status))?
.into_inner()
}
_ => return Err(Error::other("tier mutation rpc phase is unsupported")),
};
validate_tier_mutation_response_proof(version, phase, mutation_id, &canonical_payload, &response)?;
if !response.success {
return Err(Error::other(
response
.error_info
.unwrap_or_else(|| "peer tier mutation failed without an error".to_string()),
));
}
let state = decode_tier_mutation_peer_state(response.state)?;
Ok(PeerTierMutationOutcome {
state,
applied: response.applied,
})
}
.await,
)
.await
}
pub async fn heal_control(&self, version: u32, topology_fingerprint: String, command: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
if topology_fingerprint.len() > HEAL_CONTROL_FINGERPRINT_MAX_SIZE {
return Err(Error::other("heal control topology fingerprint exceeds size limit"));
}
if command.len() > HEAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD_MAX_SIZE {
return Err(Error::other("heal control command exceeds size limit"));
}
let capability_probe = rustfs_protos::is_heal_control_capability_probe(&command);
self.finalize_result(
async {
let mut client = self
.get_heal_control_client()
.await?
.max_encoding_message_size(rustfs_protos::HEAL_CONTROL_RPC_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE)
.max_decoding_message_size(rustfs_protos::HEAL_CONTROL_RPC_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE);
let canonical_body = rustfs_protos::canonical_heal_control_request_body(version, &topology_fingerprint, &command)
.map_err(|_| Error::other("heal control request length cannot be represented"))?;
let mut request = Request::new(HealControlRequest {
version,
topology_fingerprint: topology_fingerprint.clone(),
command: command.clone().into(),
});
request.set_timeout(rustfs_protos::heal_control_execution_timeout());
set_tonic_canonical_body_digest(&mut request, &canonical_body)?;
let response = client.heal_control(request).await?.into_inner();
if !response.success {
return Err(Error::other(
response
.error_info
.unwrap_or_else(|| "peer heal control failed without an error".to_string()),
));
}
if !capability_probe {
let canonical_response = rustfs_protos::canonical_heal_control_response_body(
version,
&topology_fingerprint,
&command,
&response.result,
)
.map_err(|_| Error::other("heal control response length cannot be represented"))?;
validate_heal_control_response_proof(&canonical_response, &response.response_proof)?;
}
Ok(response.result.to_vec())
}
.await,
)
.await
}
/// Confirms that a peer supports the current heal-control coordination
/// contract and has the same storage
/// topology. Every non-success response is an error so old or divergent
/// peers cannot be mistaken for compatible ones.
pub async fn probe_heal_control(&self, topology_fingerprint: String) -> Result<()> {
let nonce = uuid::Uuid::new_v4();
let probe = rustfs_protos::heal_control_capability_probe(nonce.as_bytes());
let canonical_ack = rustfs_protos::canonical_heal_control_capability_ack(
rustfs_protos::HEAL_CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
&topology_fingerprint,
&probe,
)
.map_err(|_| Error::other("heal control capability acknowledgement length cannot be represented"))?;
let proof = self
.heal_control(rustfs_protos::HEAL_CONTROL_PROTOCOL_VERSION, topology_fingerprint, probe)
.await?;
validate_heal_control_capability_proof(&canonical_ack, &proof)
}
pub async fn load_bucket_metadata(&self, bucket: &str, scanner_maintenance_change: bool) -> Result<()> {
self.finalize_result(
async {
let mut client = self.get_client().await?;
let request = Request::new(LoadBucketMetadataRequest {
bucket: bucket.to_string(),
scanner_maintenance_change,
});
let response = client.load_bucket_metadata(request).await?.into_inner();
@@ -908,6 +1299,25 @@ impl PeerRestClient {
.await
}
pub async fn scanner_activity(&self) -> Result<ScannerPeerActivity> {
self.finalize_result(
async {
let mut client = self
.get_client()
.await?
.max_decoding_message_size(SCANNER_ACTIVITY_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE)
.max_encoding_message_size(SCANNER_ACTIVITY_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE);
let response = client
.scanner_activity(Request::new(ScannerActivityRequest {}))
.await?
.into_inner();
decode_scanner_activity(response)
}
.await,
)
.await
}
pub async fn get_metacache_listing(&self) -> Result<()> {
warn!("get_metacache_listing is not implemented in PeerRestClient");
Err(Error::NotImplemented)
@@ -1157,6 +1567,78 @@ mod tests {
)
}
#[test]
fn build_clients_from_slots_preserves_missing_remote_topology_slots() {
let slots = vec![
("127.0.0.1:9000".to_string(), None, true),
("127.0.0.1:9001".to_string(), Some("http://127.0.0.1:9001".to_string()), false),
("127.0.0.1:notaport".to_string(), Some("http://127.0.0.1:notaport".to_string()), false),
("127.0.0.1:9003".to_string(), None, false),
];
let (remote, all, remote_topology_hosts) = PeerRestClient::build_clients_from_slots(slots);
assert_eq!(remote.len(), 3, "local node is excluded but remote slots are not compacted away");
assert_eq!(all.len(), 4, "all slots preserve the sorted cluster topology shape");
assert_eq!(
remote_topology_hosts,
vec![
"127.0.0.1:9001".to_string(),
"127.0.0.1:notaport".to_string(),
"127.0.0.1:9003".to_string()
]
);
assert!(remote[0].is_some(), "valid remote peer should get a client");
assert!(remote[1].is_none(), "unparseable remote peer should remain observable as a missing slot");
assert!(remote[2].is_none(), "missing grid host should remain observable as a missing slot");
assert!(all[0].is_none(), "local node is represented by the local server_info row");
assert!(all[1].is_some());
assert!(all[2].is_none());
assert!(all[3].is_none());
}
#[test]
fn scanner_activity_requires_restart_safe_peer_identity() {
let missing_instance = ScannerActivityResponse {
instance_id: String::new(),
namespace_generation: 7,
maintenance_generation: 3,
};
assert!(
decode_scanner_activity(missing_instance)
.expect_err("an empty instance ID is not restart safe")
.to_string()
.contains("instance ID")
);
let malformed_instance = ScannerActivityResponse {
instance_id: "ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123456789".to_string(),
namespace_generation: 7,
maintenance_generation: 3,
};
assert!(
decode_scanner_activity(malformed_instance)
.expect_err("activity instance IDs must use the canonical lowercase hex form")
.to_string()
.contains("instance ID")
);
let activity = decode_scanner_activity(ScannerActivityResponse {
instance_id: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef".to_string(),
namespace_generation: 7,
maintenance_generation: 3,
})
.expect("complete activity responses should be accepted");
assert_eq!(
activity,
ScannerPeerActivity {
instance_id: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef".to_string(),
namespace_generation: 7,
maintenance_generation: 3,
}
);
}
#[test]
fn peer_rest_client_marks_network_like_errors() {
assert!(PeerRestClient::is_network_like_error(&Error::other("transport error")));
@@ -1177,6 +1659,230 @@ mod tests {
assert!(err.to_string().contains("temporarily offline"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn peer_rest_client_rejects_oversized_heal_control_before_dialing() {
let client = test_peer_client();
let err = client
.heal_control(1, "fingerprint".to_string(), vec![0; HEAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD_MAX_SIZE + 1])
.await
.expect_err("oversized heal control payload must fail locally");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("exceeds size limit"));
assert!(!client.offline.load(Ordering::Acquire));
}
#[test]
fn heal_control_capability_proof_must_authenticate_exact_ack() {
runtime_sources::ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let proof = crate::cluster::rpc::sign_tonic_rpc_response_proof(b"expected").expect("test proof should sign");
assert!(validate_heal_control_capability_proof(b"expected", &proof).is_ok());
let err = validate_heal_control_capability_proof(b"different", &proof)
.expect_err("a proof for a different acknowledgement must fail closed");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("invalid heal control capability proof"));
}
#[test]
fn heal_control_response_proof_binds_command_and_result() {
runtime_sources::ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let canonical = rustfs_protos::canonical_heal_control_response_body(2, "fingerprint", b"query", b"result")
.expect("small response should encode");
let proof = crate::cluster::rpc::sign_tonic_rpc_response_proof(&canonical).expect("test proof should sign");
assert!(validate_heal_control_response_proof(&canonical, &proof).is_ok());
for tampered in [
rustfs_protos::canonical_heal_control_response_body(2, "fingerprint", b"cancel", b"result").unwrap(),
rustfs_protos::canonical_heal_control_response_body(2, "fingerprint", b"query", b"tampered").unwrap(),
] {
let err = validate_heal_control_response_proof(&tampered, &proof)
.expect_err("proof must not authenticate a different command or result");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("invalid heal control response proof"));
}
}
struct TierMutationResponseFixture<'a> {
version: u32,
phase: TierMutationRpcPhase,
mutation_id: Uuid,
canonical_payload: &'a [u8],
success: bool,
state: i32,
applied: bool,
error_info: Option<&'a str>,
}
fn signed_tier_mutation_response(input: TierMutationResponseFixture<'_>) -> TierMutationControlResponse {
let canonical =
rustfs_protos::canonical_tier_mutation_rpc_response_body(rustfs_protos::TierMutationRpcResponseProofInput {
version: input.version,
phase: input.phase,
mutation_id: input.mutation_id,
canonical_payload: input.canonical_payload,
success: input.success,
state: input.state,
applied: input.applied,
error_info: input.error_info,
})
.expect("small tier mutation response should encode");
let response_proof =
crate::cluster::rpc::sign_tonic_rpc_response_proof(&canonical).expect("tier mutation response should sign");
TierMutationControlResponse {
success: input.success,
state: input.state,
applied: input.applied,
error_info: input.error_info.map(str::to_string),
response_proof: response_proof.into(),
}
}
#[test]
fn tier_mutation_response_proof_binds_phase_payload_state_and_error() {
runtime_sources::ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let mutation_id = Uuid::new_v4();
let payload = b"tier-mutation-prepare";
let response = signed_tier_mutation_response(TierMutationResponseFixture {
version: rustfs_protos::TIER_MUTATION_RPC_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
phase: TierMutationRpcPhase::Prepare,
mutation_id,
canonical_payload: payload,
success: true,
state: TierMutationPeerState::Prepared as i32,
applied: true,
error_info: None,
});
validate_tier_mutation_response_proof(
rustfs_protos::TIER_MUTATION_RPC_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
TierMutationRpcPhase::Prepare,
mutation_id,
payload,
&response,
)
.expect("matching tier mutation response proof should verify");
for tampered in [
TierMutationControlResponse {
success: false,
error_info: Some("peer failed".to_string()),
..response.clone()
},
TierMutationControlResponse {
state: TierMutationPeerState::Committed as i32,
..response.clone()
},
TierMutationControlResponse {
applied: false,
..response.clone()
},
] {
let err = validate_tier_mutation_response_proof(
rustfs_protos::TIER_MUTATION_RPC_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
TierMutationRpcPhase::Prepare,
mutation_id,
payload,
&tampered,
)
.expect_err("tampered tier mutation response proof must fail");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("invalid tier mutation response proof"));
}
let err = validate_tier_mutation_response_proof(
rustfs_protos::TIER_MUTATION_RPC_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
TierMutationRpcPhase::Commit,
mutation_id,
payload,
&response,
)
.expect_err("response proof must bind request phase");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("invalid tier mutation response proof"));
}
#[test]
fn tier_mutation_peer_state_decode_fails_closed() {
assert_eq!(
decode_tier_mutation_peer_state(TierMutationPeerState::Prepared as i32).expect("prepared state should decode"),
PeerTierMutationState::Prepared
);
assert_eq!(
decode_tier_mutation_peer_state(TierMutationPeerState::Committed as i32).expect("committed state should decode"),
PeerTierMutationState::Committed
);
assert_eq!(
decode_tier_mutation_peer_state(TierMutationPeerState::Aborted as i32).expect("aborted state should decode"),
PeerTierMutationState::Aborted
);
assert!(decode_tier_mutation_peer_state(TierMutationPeerState::Unspecified as i32).is_err());
assert!(decode_tier_mutation_peer_state(99).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn tier_mutation_payload_guard_rejects_invalid_lengths() {
validate_tier_mutation_payload_len(
TierMutationRpcPhase::Prepare,
rustfs_protos::TIER_MUTATION_RPC_MAX_PREPARE_PAYLOAD_SIZE,
)
.expect("max prepare payload should fit");
assert!(
validate_tier_mutation_payload_len(
TierMutationRpcPhase::Prepare,
rustfs_protos::TIER_MUTATION_RPC_MAX_PREPARE_PAYLOAD_SIZE + 1,
)
.is_err()
);
validate_tier_mutation_payload_len(
TierMutationRpcPhase::Commit,
rustfs_protos::TIER_MUTATION_RPC_MAX_COMMIT_PAYLOAD_SIZE,
)
.expect("max commit payload should fit");
assert!(
validate_tier_mutation_payload_len(
TierMutationRpcPhase::Commit,
rustfs_protos::TIER_MUTATION_RPC_MAX_COMMIT_PAYLOAD_SIZE + 1,
)
.is_err()
);
validate_tier_mutation_payload_len(TierMutationRpcPhase::Abort, 0).expect("empty abort payload should fit");
assert!(validate_tier_mutation_payload_len(TierMutationRpcPhase::Abort, 1).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn tier_mutation_rpc_status_matrix_fails_closed_for_old_or_unresponsive_peers() {
for (phase, label) in [
(TierMutationRpcPhase::Prepare, "prepare"),
(TierMutationRpcPhase::Commit, "commit"),
(TierMutationRpcPhase::Abort, "abort"),
] {
for status in [
tonic::Status::unimplemented("old peer has no tier mutation control service"),
tonic::Status::deadline_exceeded("peer tier mutation control timed out"),
tonic::Status::unavailable("peer tier mutation control unavailable"),
] {
let err = tier_mutation_control_status_error(phase, status);
let rendered = err.to_string();
assert!(rendered.contains(&format!("peer tier mutation {label} RPC failed")), "{rendered}");
assert!(
rendered.contains("old peer")
|| rendered.contains("timed out")
|| rendered.contains("unavailable")
|| rendered.contains("Unavailable"),
"{rendered}"
);
}
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn peer_rest_client_rejects_oversized_tier_prepare_before_dialing() {
let client = test_peer_client();
let err = client
.prepare_tier_mutation(
Uuid::new_v4(),
Bytes::from(vec![0; rustfs_protos::TIER_MUTATION_RPC_MAX_PREPARE_PAYLOAD_SIZE + 1]),
)
.await
.expect_err("oversized tier prepare should fail before dialing");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("tier mutation payload exceeds size limit"));
assert!(!client.offline.load(Ordering::Acquire));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn peer_rest_client_prepare_retry_clears_offline_gate() {
// finalize_result sets the offline gate on a network error; without
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ use crate::disk::{DiskAPI, DiskStore, disk_store::get_max_timeout_duration};
use crate::runtime::instance::{InstanceContext, bootstrap_ctx};
use crate::runtime::sources as runtime_sources;
use crate::storage_api_contracts::bucket::{BucketInfo, BucketOptions, DeleteBucketOptions, MakeBucketOptions};
use crate::store::utils::is_reserved_or_invalid_bucket;
use crate::store::{has_xlmeta_files, utils::is_reserved_or_invalid_bucket};
use crate::{
disk::{
self, VolumeInfo,
@@ -614,13 +614,24 @@ impl PeerS3Client for LocalPeerS3Client {
return Err(Error::ErasureWriteQuorum);
}
let force = if opts.force_if_empty && !opts.force {
for disk in local_disks.iter() {
if has_xlmeta_files(&disk.path().join(bucket)).await.map_err(Error::Io)? {
return Err(Error::VolumeNotEmpty);
}
}
true
} else {
opts.force
};
let mut futures = Vec::with_capacity(local_disks.len());
for disk in local_disks.iter() {
// Non-force delete refuses a non-empty bucket (VolumeNotEmpty), which
// the recreate loop below turns into BucketNotEmpty; only an explicit
// force delete removes recursively (backlog#799 B1).
futures.push(disk.delete_volume(bucket, opts.force));
futures.push(disk.delete_volume(bucket, force));
}
let results = join_all(futures).await;
@@ -988,13 +999,15 @@ impl PeerS3Client for RemotePeerS3Client {
.await
}
async fn delete_bucket(&self, bucket: &str, _opts: &DeleteBucketOptions) -> Result<()> {
async fn delete_bucket(&self, bucket: &str, opts: &DeleteBucketOptions) -> Result<()> {
self.execute_with_timeout(
|| async {
let options = serde_json::to_string(opts)?;
let mut client = self.get_client().await?;
let request = Request::new(DeleteBucketRequest {
bucket: bucket.to_string(),
options,
});
let response = client.delete_bucket(request).await?.into_inner();
if !response.success {
+52 -1
View File
@@ -1129,6 +1129,9 @@ fn decode_batch_read_version_response_items(
let resp = decode_msgpack_or_json::<BatchReadVersionResp>(buf, "", "BatchReadVersionResp").map_err(|err| {
Error::other(format!("decode BatchReadVersionResp msgpack item {index} from {endpoint} failed: {err}"))
})?;
if resp.success {
validate_decoded_file_info(&resp.file_info)?;
}
batch_read_version_resps.push(resp);
}
return Ok(batch_read_version_resps);
@@ -1143,12 +1146,19 @@ fn decode_batch_read_version_response_items(
let resp = serde_json::from_str::<BatchReadVersionResp>(json_str).map_err(|err| {
Error::other(format!("decode BatchReadVersionResp json item {index} from {endpoint} failed: {err}"))
})?;
if resp.success {
validate_decoded_file_info(&resp.file_info)?;
}
batch_read_version_resps.push(resp);
}
Ok(batch_read_version_resps)
}
fn validate_decoded_file_info(file_info: &FileInfo) -> Result<()> {
file_info.validate_for_metadata_read().map_err(Into::into)
}
#[async_trait::async_trait]
impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
#[tracing::instrument(level = "trace", skip_all)]
@@ -1825,6 +1835,7 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
}
let file_info = decode_msgpack_or_json::<FileInfo>(&response.file_info_bin, &response.file_info, "FileInfo")?;
validate_decoded_file_info(&file_info)?;
Ok(file_info)
},
@@ -2712,6 +2723,25 @@ mod tests {
static INIT: Once = Once::new();
#[test]
fn decoded_remote_metadata_rejects_default_like_delete_marker() {
let forged = FileInfo {
deleted: true,
..Default::default()
};
assert!(matches!(validate_decoded_file_info(&forged), Err(DiskError::FileCorrupt)));
let marker = FileInfo {
volume: "bucket".to_string(),
name: "object".to_string(),
version_id: Some(Uuid::new_v4()),
deleted: true,
mod_time: Some(::time::OffsetDateTime::now_utc()),
..Default::default()
};
validate_decoded_file_info(&marker).expect("canonical remote delete marker should validate");
}
#[derive(Clone, Default)]
struct CapturedLogs {
buffer: Arc<Mutex<Vec<u8>>>,
@@ -3021,17 +3051,19 @@ mod tests {
}
fn sample_batch_read_version_resp(index: usize, path: &str, success: bool) -> BatchReadVersionResp {
let mut file_info = FileInfo::new(path, 1, 0);
file_info.erasure.index = 1;
BatchReadVersionResp {
index,
path: path.to_string(),
version_id: "version-a".to_string(),
success,
file_info,
error: if success {
String::new()
} else {
"file version not found".to_string()
},
..Default::default()
}
}
@@ -3055,6 +3087,25 @@ mod tests {
assert!(decoded[0].success);
}
#[test]
fn batch_read_version_response_rejects_invalid_success_metadata() {
let endpoint = sample_remote_endpoint();
let mut response_item = sample_batch_read_version_resp(0, "invalid-object", true);
response_item.file_info.erasure.data_blocks = 0;
response_item.file_info.erasure.parity_blocks = 2;
let response = BatchReadVersionResponse {
success: true,
batch_read_version_resps: Vec::new(),
batch_read_version_resps_bin: vec![encode_msgpack(&response_item).expect("msgpack response should encode").into()],
error: None,
};
let err = decode_batch_read_version_response_items(response, &endpoint)
.expect_err("successful remote response with invalid metadata must fail closed");
assert_eq!(err, DiskError::FileCorrupt);
}
#[test]
fn batch_read_version_response_decode_reports_corrupt_msgpack_item() {
let endpoint = sample_remote_endpoint();
+385 -37
View File
@@ -17,12 +17,15 @@ use crate::disk::{MIGRATING_META_BUCKET, RUSTFS_META_BUCKET};
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
use crate::object_api::{GetObjectReader, ObjectInfo, ObjectOptions, PutObjReader};
use crate::runtime::sources as runtime_sources;
use crate::set_disk::get_lock_acquire_timeout;
use crate::storage_api_contracts::{
admin::StorageAdminApi,
heal::HealOperations,
namespace::NamespaceLocking,
object::{DeletedObject, EcstoreObjectIO, ObjectIO, ObjectOperations, ObjectToDelete},
range::HTTPRangeSpec,
};
use crate::store::ECStore;
use http::HeaderMap;
use rustfs_common::heal_channel::{HealOpts, HealScanMode};
use rustfs_config::audit::{
@@ -45,10 +48,94 @@ use serde_json::{Map, Value};
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use std::sync::LazyLock;
use std::sync::{Arc, RwLock};
use tokio::sync::RwLock as AsyncRwLock;
use tracing::{debug, error, info, instrument, warn};
pub const CONFIG_PREFIX: &str = "config";
const CONFIG_FILE: &str = "config.json";
const SERVER_CONFIG_OBJECT: &str = "config/config.json";
// Server-config lock order: SERVER_CONFIG_LOCK -> distributed namespace lock
// for SERVER_CONFIG_OBJECT. Readers and writers must never reverse this order.
static SERVER_CONFIG_LOCK: LazyLock<AsyncRwLock<()>> = LazyLock::new(|| AsyncRwLock::new(()));
fn config_task_join_error(operation: &'static str, error: tokio::task::JoinError) -> Error {
let outcome = if error.is_cancelled() { "cancelled" } else { "panicked" };
Error::other(format!("{operation} task {outcome}"))
}
/// Runs one complete server-config transaction while holding both the local
/// process guard and the distributed namespace write lock for `config.json`.
/// The operation must use the corresponding no-lock read/save functions.
pub async fn with_server_config_write_lock<F, Fut, T>(store: Arc<ECStore>, operation: F) -> Result<T>
where
F: FnOnce() -> Fut + Send + 'static,
Fut: std::future::Future<Output = T> + Send + 'static,
T: Send + 'static,
{
tokio::spawn(async move {
// Lock order: SERVER_CONFIG_LOCK -> namespace write lock.
let _local_guard = SERVER_CONFIG_LOCK.write().await;
let namespace_lock = store.new_ns_lock(RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, SERVER_CONFIG_OBJECT).await?;
let _write_guard = namespace_lock.get_write_lock(get_lock_acquire_timeout()).await?;
Ok(operation().await)
})
.await
.map_err(|error| config_task_join_error("server config write", error))?
}
/// Reads and synchronously publishes one server-config snapshot while holding
/// a shared namespace lock. Concurrent peer reloads may proceed together, but
/// no writer can interleave between the snapshot read and generation accept.
pub async fn with_server_config_read_lock<F, Fut, T>(store: Arc<ECStore>, operation: F) -> Result<T>
where
F: FnOnce() -> Fut + Send + 'static,
Fut: std::future::Future<Output = T> + Send + 'static,
T: Send + 'static,
{
tokio::spawn(async move {
// Lock order: SERVER_CONFIG_LOCK -> namespace read lock.
let _local_guard = SERVER_CONFIG_LOCK.read().await;
let namespace_lock = store.new_ns_lock(RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, SERVER_CONFIG_OBJECT).await?;
let _read_guard = namespace_lock.get_read_lock(get_lock_acquire_timeout()).await?;
Ok(operation().await)
})
.await
.map_err(|error| config_task_join_error("server config read", error))?
}
/// Runs a cancellation-safe transaction under the distributed write lock for
/// one metadata config object. The operation must use no-lock object I/O.
pub async fn with_config_object_write_lock<F, Fut, T>(store: Arc<ECStore>, object: String, operation: F) -> Result<T>
where
F: FnOnce() -> Fut + Send + 'static,
Fut: std::future::Future<Output = T> + Send + 'static,
T: Send + 'static,
{
tokio::spawn(async move {
let namespace_lock = store.new_ns_lock(RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, &object).await?;
let _write_guard = namespace_lock.get_write_lock(get_lock_acquire_timeout()).await?;
Ok(operation().await)
})
.await
.map_err(|error| config_task_join_error("config object write", error))?
}
/// Runs one read-and-publish transaction under the distributed read lock for
/// a metadata config object. The operation must use no-lock object I/O.
pub async fn with_config_object_read_lock<F, Fut, T>(store: Arc<ECStore>, object: String, operation: F) -> Result<T>
where
F: FnOnce() -> Fut + Send + 'static,
Fut: std::future::Future<Output = T> + Send + 'static,
T: Send + 'static,
{
tokio::spawn(async move {
let namespace_lock = store.new_ns_lock(RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, &object).await?;
let _read_guard = namespace_lock.get_read_lock(get_lock_acquire_timeout()).await?;
Ok(operation().await)
})
.await
.map_err(|error| config_task_join_error("config object read", error))?
}
/// Environment variable gating the startup fallback to the default server
/// config when the persisted `config.json` object is corrupt beyond repair
@@ -279,6 +366,17 @@ where
Ok(data)
}
/// Read an existing config object without treating an empty payload as absent.
/// Callers that validate their own payload format need to distinguish corruption
/// from `ConfigNotFound`.
pub(crate) async fn read_config_preserve_empty<S>(api: Arc<S>, file: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>>
where
S: EcstoreObjectIO,
{
let (data, _obj) = read_config_with_metadata_inner(api, file, &ObjectOptions::default(), true).await?;
Ok(data)
}
pub async fn read_config_no_lock<S>(api: Arc<S>, file: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>>
where
S: ObjectIO<
@@ -304,6 +402,26 @@ where
}
pub async fn read_config_with_metadata<S>(api: Arc<S>, file: &str, opts: &ObjectOptions) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, ObjectInfo)>
where
S: ObjectIO<
Error = Error,
RangeSpec = HTTPRangeSpec,
HeaderMap = HeaderMap,
ObjectOptions = ObjectOptions,
ObjectInfo = ObjectInfo,
GetObjectReader = GetObjectReader,
PutObjectReader = PutObjReader,
>,
{
read_config_with_metadata_inner(api, file, opts, false).await
}
async fn read_config_with_metadata_inner<S>(
api: Arc<S>,
file: &str,
opts: &ObjectOptions,
preserve_empty: bool,
) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, ObjectInfo)>
where
S: ObjectIO<
Error = Error,
@@ -330,7 +448,7 @@ where
let data = rd.read_all().await?;
if data.is_empty() {
if data.is_empty() && !preserve_empty {
return Err(Error::ConfigNotFound);
}
@@ -362,6 +480,31 @@ where
.await
}
pub async fn save_config_no_lock<S>(api: Arc<S>, file: &str, data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<()>
where
S: ObjectIO<
Error = Error,
RangeSpec = HTTPRangeSpec,
HeaderMap = HeaderMap,
ObjectOptions = ObjectOptions,
ObjectInfo = ObjectInfo,
GetObjectReader = GetObjectReader,
PutObjectReader = PutObjReader,
>,
{
save_config_with_opts(
api,
file,
data,
&ObjectOptions {
max_parity: true,
no_lock: true,
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
}
#[instrument(skip(api))]
pub async fn delete_config<S>(api: Arc<S>, file: &str) -> Result<()>
where
@@ -425,15 +568,23 @@ async fn new_and_save_server_config<S>(api: Arc<S>) -> Result<Config>
where
S: EcstoreObjectIO + StorageAdminApi,
{
let mut cfg = new_server_config();
lookup_configs(&mut cfg, api.clone()).await;
let cfg = new_server_config();
save_server_config(api, &cfg).await?;
Ok(cfg)
}
async fn new_and_save_server_config_no_lock<S>(api: Arc<S>) -> Result<Config>
where
S: EcstoreObjectIO + StorageAdminApi,
{
let cfg = new_server_config();
save_server_config_no_lock(api, &cfg).await?;
Ok(cfg)
}
fn get_config_file() -> String {
format!("{CONFIG_PREFIX}{SLASH_SEPARATOR}{CONFIG_FILE}")
SERVER_CONFIG_OBJECT.to_string()
}
fn storage_class_kvs_mut(cfg: &mut Config) -> &mut KVS {
@@ -1237,17 +1388,19 @@ where
}
/// Handle the situation where the configuration file does not exist, create and save a new configuration
async fn handle_missing_config<S>(api: Arc<S>, context: &str) -> Result<Config>
async fn handle_missing_config<S>(api: Arc<S>, context: &str, namespace_lock_held: bool) -> Result<Config>
where
S: EcstoreObjectIO + StorageAdminApi,
{
warn!("Configuration not found ({}): Start initializing new configuration", context);
let cfg = if runtime_sources::first_cluster_node_is_local().await {
new_and_save_server_config(api.clone()).await?
if namespace_lock_held {
new_and_save_server_config_no_lock(api.clone()).await?
} else {
new_and_save_server_config(api.clone()).await?
}
} else {
let mut cfg = new_server_config();
lookup_configs(&mut cfg, api).await;
cfg
new_server_config()
};
warn!("Configuration initialization complete ({})", context);
Ok(cfg)
@@ -1260,6 +1413,46 @@ fn handle_config_read_error(err: Error, file_path: &str) -> Result<Config> {
}
pub async fn read_config_without_migrate<S>(api: Arc<S>) -> Result<Config>
where
S: ObjectIO<
Error = Error,
RangeSpec = HTTPRangeSpec,
HeaderMap = HeaderMap,
ObjectOptions = ObjectOptions,
ObjectInfo = ObjectInfo,
GetObjectReader = GetObjectReader,
PutObjectReader = PutObjReader,
> + StorageAdminApi,
{
read_config_without_migrate_inner(api, false).await
}
/// Reads the server config while an upper layer holds the namespace write lock
/// for [`SERVER_CONFIG_OBJECT`]. Missing-config initialization uses the matching
/// no-lock save path and therefore cannot recursively acquire the same lock.
pub async fn read_config_without_migrate_no_lock<S>(api: Arc<S>) -> Result<Config>
where
S: ObjectIO<
Error = Error,
RangeSpec = HTTPRangeSpec,
HeaderMap = HeaderMap,
ObjectOptions = ObjectOptions,
ObjectInfo = ObjectInfo,
GetObjectReader = GetObjectReader,
PutObjectReader = PutObjReader,
> + StorageAdminApi,
{
read_config_without_migrate_inner(api, true).await
}
/// Reads an already-initialized server config while a caller owns a namespace
/// read lock. This never initializes or migrates a missing object.
pub async fn read_existing_server_config_no_lock(api: Arc<ECStore>) -> Result<Config> {
let data = read_config_no_lock(api, SERVER_CONFIG_OBJECT).await?;
Ok(decode_persisted_server_config(&data)?.merge())
}
async fn read_config_without_migrate_inner<S>(api: Arc<S>, namespace_lock_held: bool) -> Result<Config>
where
S: ObjectIO<
Error = Error,
@@ -1275,13 +1468,13 @@ where
// Try to read the configuration file
match read_config_no_lock(api.clone(), &config_file).await {
Ok(data) => read_server_config(api, &data).await,
Err(Error::ConfigNotFound) => handle_missing_config(api, "Read the main configuration").await,
Ok(data) => read_server_config(api, &data, namespace_lock_held).await,
Err(Error::ConfigNotFound) => handle_missing_config(api, "Read the main configuration", namespace_lock_held).await,
Err(err) => handle_config_read_error(err, &config_file),
}
}
async fn read_server_config<S>(api: Arc<S>, data: &[u8]) -> Result<Config>
async fn read_server_config<S>(api: Arc<S>, data: &[u8], namespace_lock_held: bool) -> Result<Config>
where
S: EcstoreObjectIO + StorageAdminApi,
{
@@ -1296,7 +1489,9 @@ where
let cfg = decode_persisted_server_config(&cfg_data)?;
return Ok(cfg.merge());
}
Err(Error::ConfigNotFound) => return handle_missing_config(api, "Read alternate configuration").await,
Err(Error::ConfigNotFound) => {
return handle_missing_config(api, "Read alternate configuration", namespace_lock_held).await;
}
Err(err) => return handle_config_read_error(err, &config_file),
}
}
@@ -1506,6 +1701,38 @@ fn fallback_server_config_after_corruption(err: Error, config_file: &str, recove
}
pub async fn save_server_config<S>(api: Arc<S>, cfg: &Config) -> Result<()>
where
S: ObjectIO<
Error = Error,
RangeSpec = HTTPRangeSpec,
HeaderMap = HeaderMap,
ObjectOptions = ObjectOptions,
ObjectInfo = ObjectInfo,
GetObjectReader = GetObjectReader,
PutObjectReader = PutObjReader,
>,
{
save_server_config_inner(api, cfg, false).await
}
/// Saves the server config while an upper layer holds the namespace write
/// lock for [`SERVER_CONFIG_OBJECT`].
pub async fn save_server_config_no_lock<S>(api: Arc<S>, cfg: &Config) -> Result<()>
where
S: ObjectIO<
Error = Error,
RangeSpec = HTTPRangeSpec,
HeaderMap = HeaderMap,
ObjectOptions = ObjectOptions,
ObjectInfo = ObjectInfo,
GetObjectReader = GetObjectReader,
PutObjectReader = PutObjReader,
>,
{
save_server_config_inner(api, cfg, true).await
}
async fn save_server_config_inner<S>(api: Arc<S>, cfg: &Config, no_lock: bool) -> Result<()>
where
S: ObjectIO<
Error = Error,
@@ -1518,7 +1745,11 @@ where
>,
{
let config_file = get_config_file();
let existing = match read_config(api.clone(), &config_file).await {
let existing = match if no_lock {
read_config_no_lock(api.clone(), &config_file).await
} else {
read_config(api.clone(), &config_file).await
} {
Ok(v) => Some(v),
Err(Error::ConfigNotFound) => None,
Err(err) => {
@@ -1542,17 +1773,28 @@ where
return Ok(());
}
save_config(api, &config_file, data).await
if no_lock {
save_config_with_opts(
api,
&config_file,
data,
&ObjectOptions {
max_parity: true,
no_lock: true,
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
} else {
save_config(api, &config_file, data).await
}
}
pub async fn lookup_configs<S>(cfg: &mut Config, api: Arc<S>)
pub async fn lookup_configs<S>(cfg: &mut Config, api: Arc<S>) -> Result<()>
where
S: StorageAdminApi,
{
// TODO: from etcd
if let Err(err) = apply_dynamic_config(cfg, api).await {
error!("apply_dynamic_config err {:?}", &err);
}
apply_dynamic_config(cfg, api).await
}
async fn apply_dynamic_config<S>(cfg: &mut Config, api: Arc<S>) -> Result<()>
@@ -1569,24 +1811,34 @@ where
async fn apply_dynamic_config_for_sub_sys<S>(cfg: &mut Config, api: Arc<S>, subsys: &str) -> Result<()>
where
S: StorageAdminApi,
{
apply_dynamic_config_for_sub_sys_with(
cfg,
api,
subsys,
storageclass::lookup_config_for_pools,
runtime_sources::set_storage_class_config,
)
.await
}
async fn apply_dynamic_config_for_sub_sys_with<S, R, F>(
cfg: &mut Config,
api: Arc<S>,
subsys: &str,
resolve_storage_class: R,
publish_storage_class: F,
) -> Result<()>
where
S: StorageAdminApi,
R: FnOnce(&KVS, &[usize]) -> Result<storageclass::Config>,
F: FnOnce(storageclass::Config),
{
let set_drive_counts = StorageAdminApi::set_drive_counts(api.as_ref());
if subsys == STORAGE_CLASS_SUB_SYS {
let kvs = cfg.get_value(STORAGE_CLASS_SUB_SYS, DEFAULT_DELIMITER).unwrap_or_default();
for (i, count) in set_drive_counts.iter().enumerate() {
match storageclass::lookup_config(&kvs, *count) {
Ok(res) => {
if i == 0 {
runtime_sources::set_storage_class_config(res);
}
}
Err(err) => {
error!("init storage class err:{:?}", &err);
break;
}
}
}
let candidate = resolve_storage_class(&kvs, &set_drive_counts)?;
publish_storage_class(candidate);
}
Ok(())
@@ -1595,7 +1847,8 @@ where
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{
configs_semantically_equal, decode_server_config_blob, encode_server_config_blob, is_standard_object_server_config,
apply_dynamic_config_for_sub_sys_with, config_task_join_error, configs_semantically_equal, decode_server_config_blob,
encode_server_config_blob, is_standard_object_server_config, lookup_configs, read_config, read_config_preserve_empty,
read_config_with_metadata, storage_class_kvs_mut,
};
use crate::config::{audit, notify, oidc};
@@ -1616,6 +1869,17 @@ mod tests {
use rustfs_config::{
DEFAULT_DELIMITER, ENABLE_KEY, EnableState, MYSQL_DSN_STRING, MYSQL_MAX_OPEN_CONNECTIONS, MYSQL_QUEUE_DIR, MYSQL_TABLE,
};
#[tokio::test]
async fn config_task_join_error_does_not_expose_panic_payload() {
let join_error = tokio::spawn(async { panic!("do-not-expose-payload") })
.await
.expect_err("test task should panic");
let rendered = config_task_join_error("server config write", join_error).to_string();
assert!(rendered.contains("panicked"));
assert!(!rendered.contains("do-not-expose-payload"));
}
use rustfs_lock::client::LockClient;
use rustfs_lock::client::local::LocalClient;
use rustfs_lock::{LockError, LockInfo, LockResponse, LockStats};
@@ -2977,6 +3241,7 @@ mod tests {
state: Mutex<RecoveryReadState>,
heal_replacement: Option<Vec<u8>>,
heal_calls: AtomicUsize,
drive_counts: Vec<usize>,
}
impl RecoveryMockStore {
@@ -2985,8 +3250,14 @@ mod tests {
state: Mutex::new(state),
heal_replacement,
heal_calls: AtomicUsize::new(0),
drive_counts: vec![2],
}
}
fn with_drive_counts(mut self, drive_counts: Vec<usize>) -> Self {
self.drive_counts = drive_counts;
self
}
}
struct ServerConfigDecryptHookGuard {
@@ -3059,6 +3330,21 @@ mod tests {
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn read_config_preserve_empty_distinguishes_empty_object() {
let store = Arc::new(RecoveryMockStore::new(RecoveryReadState::Blob(Vec::new()), None));
let err = read_config(store.clone(), "config/empty.json")
.await
.expect_err("the existing config contract treats empty objects as missing");
assert!(matches!(err, Error::ConfigNotFound));
let data = read_config_preserve_empty(store, "config/empty.json")
.await
.expect("payload-validating callers must observe the empty object");
assert!(data.is_empty());
}
#[async_trait::async_trait]
impl StorageAdminApi for RecoveryMockStore {
type BackendInfo = rustfs_madmin::BackendInfo;
@@ -3086,7 +3372,7 @@ mod tests {
}
fn set_drive_counts(&self) -> Vec<usize> {
vec![2]
self.drive_counts.clone()
}
}
@@ -3127,6 +3413,68 @@ mod tests {
}
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial(storage_class_env)]
async fn invalid_later_pool_does_not_partially_publish_storage_class() {
temp_env::async_with_vars(
[
(crate::config::storageclass::STANDARD_ENV, None::<&str>),
(crate::config::storageclass::RRS_ENV, None::<&str>),
(crate::config::storageclass::OPTIMIZE_ENV, None::<&str>),
(crate::config::storageclass::INLINE_BLOCK_ENV, None::<&str>),
],
async {
let mut cfg = Config::new();
storage_class_kvs_mut(&mut cfg)
.insert(crate::config::storageclass::CLASS_STANDARD.to_string(), "EC:2".to_string());
let store =
Arc::new(RecoveryMockStore::new(RecoveryReadState::Blob(Vec::new()), None).with_drive_counts(vec![4, 2]));
let result = lookup_configs(&mut cfg, store.clone()).await;
assert!(result.is_err(), "public lookup entry must propagate an invalid later pool");
let mut publish_count = 0;
let result = apply_dynamic_config_for_sub_sys_with(
&mut cfg,
store,
STORAGE_CLASS_SUB_SYS,
crate::config::storageclass::lookup_config_for_pools_without_env,
|_| {
publish_count += 1;
},
)
.await;
assert!(result.is_err(), "invalid later pool must fail the complete candidate");
assert_eq!(publish_count, 0, "failed reload must not publish any candidate");
},
)
.await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn dynamic_storage_class_publishes_one_multi_pool_snapshot() {
let mut cfg = Config::new();
let store = Arc::new(RecoveryMockStore::new(RecoveryReadState::Blob(Vec::new()), None).with_drive_counts(vec![4, 2]));
let mut published = None;
let result = apply_dynamic_config_for_sub_sys_with(
&mut cfg,
store,
STORAGE_CLASS_SUB_SYS,
crate::config::storageclass::lookup_config_for_pools_without_env,
|candidate| {
published = Some(candidate);
},
)
.await;
result.expect("valid multi-pool candidate should publish");
assert_eq!(
published.and_then(|cfg| cfg.parities_for_sc(crate::config::storageclass::STANDARD)),
Some(vec![2, 1])
);
}
fn encrypted_current_server_config_blob() -> Vec<u8> {
let mut cfg = Config::new();
let kvs = storage_class_kvs_mut(&mut cfg);
+163 -7
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ pub mod storageclass;
use crate::error::Result;
use crate::store::ECStore;
use arc_swap::ArcSwap;
use com::{STORAGE_CLASS_SUB_SYS, lookup_configs, read_config_without_migrate_with_recovery};
use rustfs_config::HEAL_SUB_SYS;
use rustfs_config::audit::{
@@ -39,11 +40,12 @@ use rustfs_config::notify::{
use rustfs_config::oidc::IDENTITY_OPENID_SUB_SYS;
use rustfs_config::server_config::{register_default_kvs, set_global_server_config};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::LazyLock;
use std::sync::{Arc, RwLock};
use tracing::warn;
pub static GLOBAL_STORAGE_CLASS: LazyLock<RwLock<storageclass::Config>> =
LazyLock::new(|| RwLock::new(storageclass::Config::default()));
pub static GLOBAL_STORAGE_CLASS: LazyLock<ArcSwap<storageclass::Config>> =
LazyLock::new(|| ArcSwap::from_pointee(storageclass::Config::default()));
pub static GLOBAL_CONFIG_SYS: LazyLock<ConfigSys> = LazyLock::new(ConfigSys::new);
pub static RUSTFS_CONFIG_PREFIX: &str = "config";
@@ -63,7 +65,7 @@ impl ConfigSys {
pub async fn init(&self, api: Arc<ECStore>) -> Result<()> {
let mut cfg = read_config_without_migrate_with_recovery(api.clone()).await?;
lookup_configs(&mut cfg, api).await;
lookup_configs(&mut cfg, api).await?;
set_global_server_config(cfg);
@@ -72,12 +74,166 @@ impl ConfigSys {
}
pub fn get_global_storage_class() -> Option<storageclass::Config> {
GLOBAL_STORAGE_CLASS.read().ok().map(|guard| (*guard).clone())
Some(GLOBAL_STORAGE_CLASS.load().as_ref().clone())
}
pub(crate) fn get_global_storage_class_snapshot() -> Arc<storageclass::Config> {
GLOBAL_STORAGE_CLASS.load_full()
}
fn publish_storage_class_config(target: &ArcSwap<storageclass::Config>, cfg: storageclass::Config) {
let cfg = Arc::new(cfg);
target.store(cfg.clone());
for (pool_index, drives_per_set) in cfg.automatic_zero_parity_pools() {
warn!(
event = "storage_class_zero_redundancy",
component = "ecstore",
subsystem = "storage_class",
state = "degraded",
pool_index,
drives_per_set,
parity = 0,
"automatic storage class has no parity"
);
}
}
pub fn set_global_storage_class(cfg: storageclass::Config) {
if let Ok(mut guard) = GLOBAL_STORAGE_CLASS.write() {
*guard = cfg;
publish_storage_class_config(&GLOBAL_STORAGE_CLASS, cfg);
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod storage_class_publish_tests {
use super::publish_storage_class_config;
use crate::config::storageclass::{self, CLASS_STANDARD, STANDARD, lookup_config_for_pools_without_env};
use arc_swap::ArcSwap;
use rustfs_config::server_config::KVS;
use std::io::{self, Write};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use tracing_subscriber::fmt::MakeWriter;
#[derive(Clone, Default)]
struct CapturedLogs {
output: Arc<Mutex<Vec<u8>>>,
published: Option<Arc<ArcSwap<storageclass::Config>>>,
}
struct CapturedWriter(CapturedLogs);
impl Write for CapturedWriter {
fn write(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> io::Result<usize> {
if let Some(published) = &self.0.published {
assert_eq!(
published.load_full().parities_for_sc(STANDARD),
Some(vec![2, 0]),
"warning must be emitted after the new snapshot is visible"
);
}
self.0.output.lock().expect("log buffer lock poisoned").extend_from_slice(buf);
Ok(buf.len())
}
fn flush(&mut self) -> io::Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
}
impl<'a> MakeWriter<'a> for CapturedLogs {
type Writer = CapturedWriter;
fn make_writer(&'a self) -> Self::Writer {
CapturedWriter(self.clone())
}
}
impl CapturedLogs {
fn observing(published: Arc<ArcSwap<storageclass::Config>>) -> Self {
Self {
published: Some(published),
..Default::default()
}
}
fn output(&self) -> String {
String::from_utf8(self.output.lock().expect("log buffer lock poisoned").clone()).expect("logs should be UTF-8")
}
}
#[test]
fn automatic_single_disk_publish_emits_structured_warning() {
let cfg = lookup_config_for_pools_without_env(&KVS::new(), &[4, 1]).expect("automatic config should resolve");
let target = Arc::new(ArcSwap::from_pointee(Default::default()));
let logs = CapturedLogs::observing(target.clone());
let subscriber = tracing_subscriber::fmt().json().with_writer(logs.clone()).finish();
tracing::subscriber::with_default(subscriber, || publish_storage_class_config(&target, cfg));
assert_eq!(target.load_full().parities_for_sc(STANDARD), Some(vec![2, 0]));
let output = logs.output();
assert_eq!(
output.matches("storage_class_zero_redundancy").count(),
1,
"unexpected warning count: {output}"
);
assert!(output.contains("\"level\":\"WARN\""), "unexpected warning level: {output}");
assert!(output.contains("\"pool_index\":1"), "missing pool index: {output}");
assert!(output.contains("\"drives_per_set\":1"), "missing drive count: {output}");
assert!(output.contains("\"parity\":0"), "missing parity: {output}");
}
#[test]
fn explicit_zero_parity_publish_does_not_emit_automatic_warning() {
let mut kvs = KVS::new();
kvs.insert(CLASS_STANDARD.to_string(), "EC:0".to_string());
let cfg = lookup_config_for_pools_without_env(&kvs, &[1]).expect("explicit EC:0 should resolve");
let target = ArcSwap::from_pointee(Default::default());
let logs = CapturedLogs::default();
let subscriber = tracing_subscriber::fmt().json().with_writer(logs.clone()).finish();
tracing::subscriber::with_default(subscriber, || publish_storage_class_config(&target, cfg));
assert_eq!(target.load_full().parities_for_sc(STANDARD), Some(vec![0]));
assert!(!logs.output().contains("storage_class_zero_redundancy"));
}
#[test]
fn storage_class_arc_swap_never_exposes_mixed_pool_state() {
let automatic = lookup_config_for_pools_without_env(&KVS::new(), &[4, 6]).expect("automatic config should resolve");
let mut kvs = KVS::new();
kvs.insert(CLASS_STANDARD.to_string(), "EC:1".to_string());
let explicit = lookup_config_for_pools_without_env(&kvs, &[4, 6]).expect("explicit config should resolve");
let target = Arc::new(ArcSwap::from_pointee(automatic.clone()));
let old_snapshot = target.load_full();
let writer_target = target.clone();
let writer = std::thread::spawn(move || {
for index in 0..2_000 {
let next = if index % 2 == 0 { automatic.clone() } else { explicit.clone() };
writer_target.store(Arc::new(next));
}
});
let readers: Vec<_> = (0..4)
.map(|_| {
let reader_target = target.clone();
std::thread::spawn(move || {
for _ in 0..2_000 {
let pair = reader_target
.load_full()
.parities_for_sc(STANDARD)
.expect("published config must have pool topology");
assert!(pair == [2, 3] || pair == [1, 1], "mixed pool snapshot: {pair:?}");
}
})
})
.collect();
writer.join().expect("writer thread should complete");
for reader in readers {
reader.join().expect("reader thread should complete");
}
assert_eq!(old_snapshot.parities_for_sc(STANDARD), Some(vec![2, 3]));
}
}
+427 -94
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
use rustfs_config::server_config::{KV, KVS};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::env;
use std::env::{self, VarError};
use std::sync::LazyLock;
use tracing::warn;
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ pub const MIN_PARITY_DRIVES: usize = 0;
// Default RRS parity is always minimum parity.
pub const DEFAULT_RRS_PARITY: usize = 1;
const DEFAULT_RRS_STORAGE_CLASS: &str = "EC:1";
const ZERO_SET_DRIVE_COUNT_ERROR: &str = "set drive count must be greater than zero";
pub static DEFAULT_INLINE_BLOCK: usize = 128 * 1024;
@@ -81,7 +83,7 @@ pub static DEFAULT_KVS: LazyLock<KVS> = LazyLock::new(|| {
},
KV {
key: CLASS_RRS.to_owned(),
value: "EC:1".to_owned(),
value: DEFAULT_RRS_STORAGE_CLASS.to_owned(),
hidden_if_empty: false,
},
KV {
@@ -105,6 +107,13 @@ pub struct StorageClass {
parity: usize,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
struct PoolParity {
drives_per_set: usize,
parity: usize,
automatic: bool,
}
// Config storage class configuration
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Default, Clone)]
pub struct Config {
@@ -113,37 +122,89 @@ pub struct Config {
optimize: Option<String>,
inline_block: usize,
initialized: bool,
#[serde(skip)]
standard_parities: Vec<PoolParity>,
#[serde(skip)]
rrs_parities: Vec<PoolParity>,
}
impl Config {
pub fn get_parity_for_sc(&self, sc: &str) -> Option<usize> {
fn storage_class(&self, sc: &str) -> (&StorageClass, &[PoolParity]) {
match sc.trim() {
RRS => {
if self.initialized {
Some(self.rrs.parity)
} else {
None
}
}
// All these storage classes use standard parity configuration
STANDARD | DEEP_ARCHIVE | EXPRESS_ONEZONE | GLACIER | GLACIER_IR | INTELLIGENT_TIERING | ONEZONE_IA | OUTPOSTS
| SNOW | STANDARD_IA => {
if self.initialized {
Some(self.standard.parity)
} else {
None
}
}
_ => {
if self.initialized {
Some(self.standard.parity)
} else {
None
}
}
RRS => (&self.rrs, &self.rrs_parities),
_ => (&self.standard, &self.standard_parities),
}
}
pub(crate) fn is_initialized(&self) -> bool {
self.initialized
}
pub fn get_parity_for_sc(&self, sc: &str) -> Option<usize> {
if !self.initialized {
return None;
}
let (storage_class, pools) = self.storage_class(sc);
let Some(first) = pools.first() else {
return Some(storage_class.parity);
};
pools.iter().all(|pool| pool.parity == first.parity).then_some(first.parity)
}
/// Returns the resolved parity for a pool topology.
///
/// A topology-bound lookup fails closed for unknown drive counts and for
/// deserialized legacy configurations that have no pool topology. Legacy
/// callers retain scalar compatibility through [`Self::get_parity_for_sc`].
pub(crate) fn parity_for_sc(&self, sc: &str, drives_per_set: usize) -> Option<usize> {
if !self.initialized {
return None;
}
let (_, pools) = self.storage_class(sc);
pools
.iter()
.find(|pool| pool.drives_per_set == drives_per_set)
.map(|pool| pool.parity)
}
pub(crate) fn parity_for_pool(&self, sc: &str, pool_index: usize, drives_per_set: usize) -> Option<usize> {
if !self.initialized {
return None;
}
let (_, pools) = self.storage_class(sc);
pools
.get(pool_index)
.filter(|pool| pool.drives_per_set == drives_per_set)
.map(|pool| pool.parity)
}
pub fn parities_for_sc(&self, sc: &str) -> Option<Vec<usize>> {
if !self.initialized {
return None;
}
let (_, pools) = self.storage_class(sc);
if pools.is_empty() {
return None;
}
Some(pools.iter().map(|pool| pool.parity).collect())
}
pub(crate) fn automatic_zero_parity_pools(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = (usize, usize)> + '_ {
self.standard_parities
.iter()
.enumerate()
.filter(|(_, pool)| pool.automatic && pool.parity == 0)
.map(|(pool_index, pool)| (pool_index, pool.drives_per_set))
}
pub fn should_inline(&self, shard_size: i64, versioned: bool) -> bool {
if shard_size < 0 {
return false;
@@ -180,74 +241,175 @@ impl Config {
}
}
pub fn lookup_config(kvs: &KVS, set_drive_count: usize) -> Result<Config> {
let standard = {
let ssc_str = {
if let Ok(ssc_str) = env::var(STANDARD_ENV) {
ssc_str
} else {
kvs.get(CLASS_STANDARD)
}
};
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct StorageClassEnvOverrides {
standard: Option<String>,
rrs: Option<String>,
optimize: Option<String>,
inline_block: Option<String>,
}
if !ssc_str.is_empty() {
parse_storage_class(&ssc_str)?
} else {
StorageClass {
parity: default_parity_count(set_drive_count),
}
}
};
impl StorageClassEnvOverrides {
fn from_process() -> Result<Self> {
Ok(Self {
standard: read_optional_env(STANDARD_ENV)?,
rrs: read_optional_env(RRS_ENV)?,
optimize: read_optional_env(OPTIMIZE_ENV)?,
inline_block: read_optional_env(INLINE_BLOCK_ENV)?,
})
}
}
let rrs = {
let ssc_str = {
if let Ok(ssc_str) = env::var(RRS_ENV) {
ssc_str
} else {
kvs.get(CLASS_RRS)
}
};
fn read_optional_env(name: &str) -> Result<Option<String>> {
parse_optional_env(name, env::var(name))
}
if !ssc_str.is_empty() {
parse_storage_class(&ssc_str)?
} else {
StorageClass {
parity: { if set_drive_count == 1 { 0 } else { DEFAULT_RRS_PARITY } },
}
}
};
fn parse_optional_env(name: &str, value: std::result::Result<String, VarError>) -> Result<Option<String>> {
match value {
Ok(value) => Ok(Some(value)),
Err(VarError::NotPresent) => Ok(None),
Err(VarError::NotUnicode(_)) => Err(Error::other(format!("{name} contains non-Unicode data"))),
}
}
validate_parity_inner(standard.parity, rrs.parity, set_drive_count)?;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
enum ParityPolicy {
AutomaticStandard,
LegacyRrs,
Explicit(usize),
}
let optimize = { env::var(OPTIMIZE_ENV).ok() };
let inline_block = {
if let Ok(ev) = env::var(INLINE_BLOCK_ENV) {
if let Ok(block) = ev.parse::<bytesize::ByteSize>() {
if block.as_u64() as usize > DEFAULT_INLINE_BLOCK {
warn!(
"inline block value bigger than recommended max of 128KiB -> {}, performance may degrade for PUT please benchmark the changes",
block
);
impl ParityPolicy {
fn resolve(self, drives_per_set: usize) -> usize {
match self {
Self::AutomaticStandard => default_parity_count(drives_per_set),
Self::LegacyRrs => {
if drives_per_set == 1 {
0
} else {
DEFAULT_RRS_PARITY
}
block.as_u64() as usize
} else {
return Err(Error::other(format!("parse {INLINE_BLOCK_ENV} format failed")));
}
} else {
DEFAULT_INLINE_BLOCK
Self::Explicit(parity) => parity,
}
}
}
fn standard_policy(kvs: &KVS, value: Option<String>) -> Result<ParityPolicy> {
match value {
Some(value) if value.is_empty() => Ok(ParityPolicy::AutomaticStandard),
Some(value) => Ok(ParityPolicy::Explicit(parse_storage_class(&value)?.parity)),
None => {
let value = kvs.get(CLASS_STANDARD);
if value.is_empty() {
Ok(ParityPolicy::AutomaticStandard)
} else {
Ok(ParityPolicy::Explicit(parse_storage_class(&value)?.parity))
}
}
}
}
fn rrs_policy(kvs: &KVS, value: Option<String>) -> Result<ParityPolicy> {
match value {
Some(value) if value.is_empty() => Ok(ParityPolicy::LegacyRrs),
Some(value) => Ok(ParityPolicy::Explicit(parse_storage_class(&value)?.parity)),
None => {
let value = kvs.get(CLASS_RRS);
if value.is_empty() || value == DEFAULT_RRS_STORAGE_CLASS {
Ok(ParityPolicy::LegacyRrs)
} else {
Ok(ParityPolicy::Explicit(parse_storage_class(&value)?.parity))
}
}
}
}
pub fn lookup_config_for_pools(kvs: &KVS, set_drive_counts: &[usize]) -> Result<Config> {
lookup_config_for_pools_with_env(kvs, set_drive_counts, StorageClassEnvOverrides::from_process()?)
}
fn lookup_config_for_pools_with_env(
kvs: &KVS,
set_drive_counts: &[usize],
overrides: StorageClassEnvOverrides,
) -> Result<Config> {
if set_drive_counts.is_empty() {
return Err(Error::other("storage class requires at least one pool"));
}
let standard_policy = standard_policy(kvs, overrides.standard)?;
let rrs_policy = rrs_policy(kvs, overrides.rrs)?;
let mut standard_parities = Vec::with_capacity(set_drive_counts.len());
let mut rrs_parities = Vec::with_capacity(set_drive_counts.len());
for (pool_index, &drives_per_set) in set_drive_counts.iter().enumerate() {
let standard_parity = standard_policy.resolve(drives_per_set);
let rrs_parity = rrs_policy.resolve(drives_per_set);
validate_parity_inner(standard_parity, rrs_parity, drives_per_set).map_err(|err| {
Error::other(format!(
"storage class validation failed for pool {pool_index} ({drives_per_set} drives): {err}"
))
})?;
standard_parities.push(PoolParity {
drives_per_set,
parity: standard_parity,
automatic: matches!(standard_policy, ParityPolicy::AutomaticStandard),
});
rrs_parities.push(PoolParity {
drives_per_set,
parity: rrs_parity,
automatic: matches!(rrs_policy, ParityPolicy::LegacyRrs),
});
}
let optimize = overrides.optimize;
let inline_block = if let Some(value) = overrides.inline_block {
let block = value
.parse::<bytesize::ByteSize>()
.map_err(|_| Error::other(format!("parse {INLINE_BLOCK_ENV} format failed")))?;
let inline_block = usize::try_from(block.as_u64())
.map_err(|_| Error::other(format!("{INLINE_BLOCK_ENV} exceeds the platform size limit")))?;
if inline_block > DEFAULT_INLINE_BLOCK {
warn!(
event = "storage_class_inline_block_large",
component = "ecstore",
subsystem = "storage_class",
state = "configured",
inline_block,
recommended_max = DEFAULT_INLINE_BLOCK,
"storage class inline block exceeds recommendation"
);
}
inline_block
} else {
DEFAULT_INLINE_BLOCK
};
Ok(Config {
standard,
rrs,
standard: StorageClass {
parity: standard_parities[0].parity,
},
rrs: StorageClass {
parity: rrs_parities[0].parity,
},
optimize,
inline_block,
initialized: true,
standard_parities,
rrs_parities,
})
}
pub fn lookup_config(kvs: &KVS, set_drive_count: usize) -> Result<Config> {
lookup_config_for_pools(kvs, &[set_drive_count])
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn lookup_config_for_pools_without_env(kvs: &KVS, set_drive_counts: &[usize]) -> Result<Config> {
lookup_config_for_pools_with_env(kvs, set_drive_counts, StorageClassEnvOverrides::default())
}
pub fn parse_storage_class(env: &str) -> Result<StorageClass> {
let s: Vec<&str> = env.split(':').collect();
@@ -281,6 +443,10 @@ pub fn validate_parity(ss_parity: usize, set_drive_count: usize) -> Result<()> {
// )));
// }
if set_drive_count == 0 {
return Err(Error::other(ZERO_SET_DRIVE_COUNT_ERROR));
}
if ss_parity > set_drive_count / 2 {
return Err(Error::other(format!(
"parity {} should be less than or equal to {}",
@@ -310,22 +476,24 @@ pub fn validate_parity_inner(ss_parity: usize, rrs_parity: usize, set_drive_coun
// )));
// }
if set_drive_count > 2 {
if ss_parity > set_drive_count / 2 {
return Err(Error::other(format!(
"Standard storage class parity {} should be less than or equal to {}",
ss_parity,
set_drive_count / 2
)));
}
if set_drive_count == 0 {
return Err(Error::other(ZERO_SET_DRIVE_COUNT_ERROR));
}
if rrs_parity > set_drive_count / 2 {
return Err(Error::other(format!(
"Reduced redundancy storage class parity {} should be less than or equal to {}",
rrs_parity,
set_drive_count / 2
)));
}
if ss_parity > set_drive_count / 2 {
return Err(Error::other(format!(
"Standard storage class parity {} should be less than or equal to {}",
ss_parity,
set_drive_count / 2
)));
}
if rrs_parity > set_drive_count / 2 {
return Err(Error::other(format!(
"Reduced redundancy storage class parity {} should be less than or equal to {}",
rrs_parity,
set_drive_count / 2
)));
}
if ss_parity > 0 && rrs_parity > 0 && ss_parity < rrs_parity {
@@ -340,6 +508,171 @@ pub fn validate_parity_inner(ss_parity: usize, rrs_parity: usize, set_drive_coun
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn no_env_overrides() -> StorageClassEnvOverrides {
StorageClassEnvOverrides::default()
}
#[test]
fn automatic_parity_is_resolved_per_pool() {
let cfg = lookup_config_for_pools_with_env(&KVS::new(), &[4, 2], no_env_overrides())
.expect("automatic storage class should support heterogeneous pools");
assert_eq!(cfg.parity_for_sc(STANDARD, 4), Some(2));
assert_eq!(cfg.parity_for_sc(STANDARD, 2), Some(1));
assert_eq!(cfg.parity_for_sc(RRS, 4), Some(1));
assert_eq!(cfg.parity_for_sc(RRS, 2), Some(1));
assert_eq!(cfg.get_parity_for_sc(STANDARD), None, "heterogeneous parity has no truthful scalar");
let cfg = lookup_config_for_pools_with_env(&KVS::new(), &[4, 6], no_env_overrides())
.expect("automatic parity should be valid for both pools");
assert_eq!(cfg.parity_for_sc(STANDARD, 4), Some(2));
assert_eq!(cfg.parity_for_sc(STANDARD, 6), Some(3));
}
#[test]
fn automatic_single_disk_pool_uses_zero_parity() {
let cfg = lookup_config_for_pools_with_env(&KVS::new(), &[4, 1], no_env_overrides())
.expect("automatic single-disk storage should remain supported");
assert_eq!(cfg.parity_for_sc(STANDARD, 4), Some(2));
assert_eq!(cfg.parity_for_sc(STANDARD, 1), Some(0));
assert_eq!(cfg.parity_for_sc(RRS, 1), Some(0));
}
#[test]
fn explicit_standard_parity_is_validated_against_every_pool() {
let mut kvs = KVS::new();
kvs.insert(CLASS_STANDARD.to_string(), "EC:2".to_string());
let err = lookup_config_for_pools_with_env(&kvs, &[4, 2], no_env_overrides())
.expect_err("EC:2 must be rejected by the two-drive pool");
assert!(
err.to_string().contains("pool 1") && err.to_string().contains("2 drives"),
"error must identify the rejecting pool: {err}"
);
kvs.insert(CLASS_STANDARD.to_string(), "EC:1".to_string());
let cfg = lookup_config_for_pools_with_env(&kvs, &[4, 2], no_env_overrides()).expect("EC:1 is valid for both pools");
assert_eq!(cfg.parity_for_sc(STANDARD, 4), Some(1));
assert_eq!(cfg.parity_for_sc(STANDARD, 2), Some(1));
assert_eq!(cfg.get_parity_for_sc(STANDARD), Some(1));
}
#[test]
fn environment_rrs_value_is_explicit_but_persisted_default_is_legacy() {
let persisted_default = lookup_config_for_pools_with_env(&DEFAULT_KVS, &[1], no_env_overrides())
.expect("persisted default RRS EC:1 should retain single-disk compatibility");
assert_eq!(persisted_default.parity_for_sc(RRS, 1), Some(0));
let env = StorageClassEnvOverrides {
rrs: Some("EC:1".to_string()),
..Default::default()
};
let err = lookup_config_for_pools_with_env(&DEFAULT_KVS, &[1], env)
.expect_err("environment RRS EC:1 is explicit and must fail on a single disk");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("pool 0") && err.to_string().contains("1 drives"));
}
#[test]
fn explicit_environment_standard_parity_is_not_clamped() {
let env = StorageClassEnvOverrides {
standard: Some("EC:2".to_string()),
..Default::default()
};
let err = lookup_config_for_pools_with_env(&KVS::new(), &[4, 2], env)
.expect_err("explicit environment parity must not be clamped for a smaller pool");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("pool 1") && err.to_string().contains("2 drives"));
}
#[test]
fn empty_environment_values_retain_automatic_semantics() {
let mut kvs = KVS::new();
kvs.insert(CLASS_STANDARD.to_string(), "EC:2".to_string());
kvs.insert(CLASS_RRS.to_string(), "EC:2".to_string());
let env = StorageClassEnvOverrides {
standard: Some(String::new()),
rrs: Some(String::new()),
..Default::default()
};
let cfg = lookup_config_for_pools_with_env(&kvs, &[4, 2], env)
.expect("empty environment values should override persisted parity with automatic defaults");
assert_eq!(cfg.parities_for_sc(STANDARD), Some(vec![2, 1]));
assert_eq!(cfg.parities_for_sc(RRS), Some(vec![1, 1]));
}
#[test]
fn explicit_zero_parity_is_not_reported_as_automatic() {
let env = StorageClassEnvOverrides {
standard: Some("EC:0".to_string()),
..Default::default()
};
let cfg = lookup_config_for_pools_with_env(&KVS::new(), &[1], env)
.expect("explicit zero parity should remain valid for a single-drive pool");
assert_eq!(cfg.parities_for_sc(STANDARD), Some(vec![0]));
assert_eq!(cfg.automatic_zero_parity_pools().count(), 0);
}
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn non_unicode_environment_value_fails_closed() {
use std::ffi::OsString;
use std::os::unix::ffi::OsStringExt;
let err = parse_optional_env(STANDARD_ENV, Err(VarError::NotUnicode(OsString::from_vec(vec![0xff]))))
.expect_err("non-Unicode parity must fail closed");
assert!(err.to_string().contains(STANDARD_ENV));
}
#[test]
fn environment_standard_override_can_rescue_persisted_config() {
let mut kvs = KVS::new();
kvs.insert(CLASS_STANDARD.to_string(), "EC:2".to_string());
let env = StorageClassEnvOverrides {
standard: Some("EC:1".to_string()),
..Default::default()
};
let cfg = lookup_config_for_pools_with_env(&kvs, &[4, 2], env)
.expect("environment override should replace the persisted parity before validation");
assert_eq!(cfg.parity_for_pool(STANDARD, 0, 4), Some(1));
assert_eq!(cfg.parity_for_pool(STANDARD, 1, 2), Some(1));
}
#[test]
fn invalid_or_unknown_pool_topology_fails_closed() {
assert!(lookup_config_for_pools_with_env(&KVS::new(), &[], no_env_overrides()).is_err());
let err = lookup_config_for_pools_with_env(&KVS::new(), &[4, 0], no_env_overrides())
.expect_err("zero-drive pools must be rejected");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("pool 1") && err.to_string().contains("0 drives"));
let cfg =
lookup_config_for_pools_with_env(&KVS::new(), &[4, 2], no_env_overrides()).expect("valid topology should resolve");
assert_eq!(cfg.parity_for_pool(STANDARD, 2, 6), None);
assert_eq!(cfg.parity_for_pool(STANDARD, 1, 6), None);
assert_eq!(cfg.parity_for_pool(STANDARD, 0, 2), None);
assert_eq!(cfg.parity_for_pool(STANDARD, 1, 4), None);
assert_eq!(cfg.parity_for_sc(STANDARD, 6), None);
}
#[test]
fn resolved_pool_state_is_not_serialized() {
let cfg =
lookup_config_for_pools_with_env(&KVS::new(), &[4, 2], no_env_overrides()).expect("valid topology should resolve");
let encoded = serde_json::to_string(&cfg).expect("config should serialize");
assert!(!encoded.contains("standard_parities"));
assert!(!encoded.contains("rrs_parities"));
let decoded: Config = serde_json::from_str(&encoded).expect("legacy scalar config should deserialize");
assert_eq!(decoded.get_parity_for_sc(STANDARD), Some(2));
assert_eq!(decoded.parity_for_pool(STANDARD, 0, 4), None);
assert_eq!(decoded.parity_for_sc(STANDARD, 4), None);
assert_eq!(decoded.parities_for_sc(STANDARD), None);
assert!(validate_parity(0, 0).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn lookup_config_reads_rrs_from_class_rrs_key() {
// Regression: kvs.get(RRS) used RRS="REDUCED_REDUNDANCY" instead of
@@ -348,7 +681,7 @@ mod tests {
kvs.insert(CLASS_STANDARD.to_string(), "EC:4".to_string());
kvs.insert(CLASS_RRS.to_string(), "EC:2".to_string());
let cfg = lookup_config(&kvs, 8).expect("lookup should succeed");
let cfg = lookup_config_for_pools_without_env(&kvs, &[8]).expect("lookup should succeed");
assert_eq!(cfg.standard.parity, 4, "standard parity should be 4");
assert_eq!(cfg.rrs.parity, 2, "rrs parity should be 2");
}
@@ -360,7 +693,7 @@ mod tests {
kvs.insert(CLASS_STANDARD.to_string(), "EC:4".to_string());
kvs.insert(RRS.to_string(), "EC:2".to_string());
let cfg = lookup_config(&kvs, 8).expect("lookup should succeed");
let cfg = lookup_config_for_pools_without_env(&kvs, &[8]).expect("lookup should succeed");
assert_eq!(cfg.standard.parity, 4);
assert_eq!(
cfg.rrs.parity, DEFAULT_RRS_PARITY,
+34 -19
View File
@@ -87,50 +87,57 @@ mod capacity_dedup_tests {
}
#[test]
fn test_four_disk_erasure_coding() {
// 4-disk erasure coding: 2 data disks + 2 parity disks
fn test_four_node_ec_2_2_reports_stable_usable_capacity() {
const TIB: u64 = 1 << 40;
const DISK_TOTAL: u64 = 2 * TIB;
const DISK_FREE: u64 = TIB / 5;
let disks = vec![
rustfs_madmin::Disk {
endpoint: "node1".to_string(),
drive_path: "/mnt/disk1".to_string(),
drive_path: "/media/rustfs-01".to_string(),
pool_index: 0,
set_index: 0,
disk_index: 0,
total_space: 1_000_000_000_000, // 1TB
available_space: 250_000_000_000,
total_space: DISK_TOTAL,
available_space: DISK_FREE,
used_space: DISK_TOTAL - DISK_FREE,
state: "ok".to_string(),
..Default::default()
},
rustfs_madmin::Disk {
endpoint: "node1".to_string(),
drive_path: "/mnt/disk2".to_string(),
endpoint: "node2".to_string(),
drive_path: "/media/rustfs-01".to_string(),
pool_index: 0,
set_index: 0,
disk_index: 1,
total_space: 1_000_000_000_000,
available_space: 250_000_000_000,
total_space: DISK_TOTAL,
available_space: DISK_FREE,
used_space: DISK_TOTAL - DISK_FREE,
state: "ok".to_string(),
..Default::default()
},
rustfs_madmin::Disk {
endpoint: "node1".to_string(),
drive_path: "/mnt/disk3".to_string(),
endpoint: "node3".to_string(),
drive_path: "/media/rustfs-01".to_string(),
pool_index: 0,
set_index: 0,
disk_index: 2,
total_space: 1_000_000_000_000,
available_space: 250_000_000_000,
total_space: DISK_TOTAL,
available_space: DISK_FREE,
used_space: DISK_TOTAL - DISK_FREE,
state: "ok".to_string(),
..Default::default()
},
rustfs_madmin::Disk {
endpoint: "node1".to_string(),
drive_path: "/mnt/disk4".to_string(),
endpoint: "node4".to_string(),
drive_path: "/media/rustfs-01".to_string(),
pool_index: 0,
set_index: 0,
disk_index: 3,
total_space: 1_000_000_000_000,
available_space: 250_000_000_000,
total_space: DISK_TOTAL,
available_space: DISK_FREE,
used_space: DISK_TOTAL - DISK_FREE,
state: "ok".to_string(),
..Default::default()
},
@@ -146,9 +153,17 @@ mod capacity_dedup_tests {
};
let total = get_total_usable_capacity(&disks, &info);
let free = get_total_usable_capacity_free(&disks, &info);
let used = total.saturating_sub(free);
let expected_total = usize::try_from(4 * TIB).expect("4 TiB must fit the supported platform's usize");
let expected_free = usize::try_from(2 * DISK_FREE).expect("usable free capacity must fit usize");
let single_node_used = usize::try_from(DISK_TOTAL - DISK_FREE).expect("single-node used capacity must fit usize");
// Only count data disks (disk_index < 2)
assert_eq!(total, 2_000_000_000_000, "Should count only data disks (2 × 1TB)");
assert_eq!(total, expected_total, "usable total must count the two data disks");
assert_eq!(free, expected_free, "usable free must count the two data disks");
assert_eq!(used, 2 * single_node_used, "usable used must be approximately 3.6 TiB");
assert_ne!(used, single_node_used, "used must not collapse to one node's approximately 1.8 TiB");
assert_ne!(used, 4 * single_node_used, "used must not report the approximately 7.2 TiB raw aggregate");
}
#[test]
+26 -1
View File
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ use crate::{
object_api::{GetObjectReader, ObjectInfo, ObjectOptions, PutObjReader},
runtime::instance::{InstanceContext, bootstrap_ctx},
runtime::sources as runtime_sources,
set_disk::SetDisks,
set_disk::{PreparedGetObjectMetadata, SetDisks},
store::init_format::{check_format_erasure_values, get_format_erasure_in_quorum, load_format_erasure_all, save_format_file},
};
use futures::{
@@ -403,6 +403,31 @@ impl crate::storage_api_contracts::object::ObjectIO for Sets {
}
impl Sets {
pub(crate) async fn prepare_get_object_reader_metadata(
&self,
bucket: &str,
object: &str,
opts: &ObjectOptions,
) -> Result<PreparedGetObjectMetadata> {
self.get_disks_by_key(object)
.prepare_get_object_metadata(bucket, object, opts)
.await
}
pub(crate) async fn get_object_reader_with_prepared_metadata(
&self,
bucket: &str,
object: &str,
range: Option<HTTPRangeSpec>,
headers: HeaderMap,
opts: &ObjectOptions,
metadata: PreparedGetObjectMetadata,
) -> Result<GetObjectReader> {
self.get_disks_by_key(object)
.get_object_reader_with_prepared_metadata(bucket, object, range, headers, opts, metadata)
.await
}
/// `put_object` plus the rename_data old-size backfill
/// (rustfs/backlog#1009); see `SetDisks::put_object_with_old_current_size`.
pub async fn put_object_with_old_current_size(
+511 -50
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use crate::storage_api_contracts::{
};
use crate::{
bucket::{metadata_sys::get_replication_config, versioning::VersioningApi as _, versioning_sys::BucketVersioningSys},
config::com::read_config,
config::com::{read_config, read_config_preserve_empty},
disk::DiskAPI,
error::{Error, classify_system_path_failure_reason},
object_api::ObjectInfo,
@@ -41,7 +41,10 @@ use rustfs_utils::path::SLASH_SEPARATOR;
use std::{
collections::{HashMap, HashSet, hash_map::Entry},
future::Future,
sync::{Arc, LazyLock, OnceLock},
sync::{
Arc, LazyLock, OnceLock,
atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering},
},
time::{Duration, SystemTime},
};
use tokio::fs;
@@ -76,6 +79,67 @@ static USAGE_MEMORY_CACHE: OnceLock<UsageMemoryCache> = OnceLock::new();
static USAGE_CACHE_UPDATING: OnceLock<CacheUpdating> = OnceLock::new();
static LIVE_BUCKET_USAGE_CACHE: OnceLock<LiveBucketUsageCache> = OnceLock::new();
/// Cached copy of the last persisted data usage snapshot, served to admin
/// endpoints for up to `DATA_USAGE_CACHE_TTL_SECS` between backend reads.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
struct CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
info: Option<DataUsageInfo>,
loaded_at: tokio::time::Instant,
}
impl CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
fn result(&self) -> Result<DataUsageInfo, Error> {
self.info
.clone()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other("data usage snapshot load recently failed"))
}
}
fn fresh_cached_data_usage_snapshot(
cache: &Option<CachedDataUsageSnapshot>,
now: tokio::time::Instant,
ttl: Duration,
) -> Option<Result<DataUsageInfo, Error>> {
cache
.as_ref()
.filter(|cached| now.duration_since(cached.loaded_at) < ttl)
.map(CachedDataUsageSnapshot::result)
}
fn cache_data_usage_snapshot_result(
cache: &mut Option<CachedDataUsageSnapshot>,
result: Result<DataUsageInfo, Error>,
loaded_at: tokio::time::Instant,
) -> Result<DataUsageInfo, Error> {
match result {
Ok(info) => {
*cache = Some(CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
info: Some(info.clone()),
loaded_at,
});
Ok(info)
}
Err(e) => {
*cache = Some(CachedDataUsageSnapshot { info: None, loaded_at });
Err(e)
}
}
}
type DataUsageSnapshotCache = Arc<RwLock<Option<CachedDataUsageSnapshot>>>;
static DATA_USAGE_SNAPSHOT_CACHE: OnceLock<DataUsageSnapshotCache> = OnceLock::new();
// Always-on revert detector for rustfs/backlog#1306: one relaxed increment per
// full-bucket version listing is negligible and lets tests prove that admin
// request paths never trigger live listings.
static LIVE_BUCKET_USAGE_COMPUTATIONS: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0);
/// Number of live full-bucket usage computations performed by this process.
pub fn live_bucket_usage_computations() -> u64 {
LIVE_BUCKET_USAGE_COMPUTATIONS.load(Ordering::Relaxed)
}
/// Deferred persist thresholds for compression totals: persist after this many
/// operations recorded, but no more often than the min interval.
const COMPRESSION_PERSIST_BATCH_SIZE: u64 = 100;
@@ -115,6 +179,10 @@ fn cache_updating() -> &'static CacheUpdating {
USAGE_CACHE_UPDATING.get_or_init(|| Arc::new(RwLock::new(false)))
}
fn data_usage_snapshot_cache() -> &'static DataUsageSnapshotCache {
DATA_USAGE_SNAPSHOT_CACHE.get_or_init(|| Arc::new(RwLock::new(None)))
}
fn live_bucket_usage_cache() -> &'static LiveBucketUsageCache {
LIVE_BUCKET_USAGE_CACHE.get_or_init(|| {
moka::future::Cache::builder()
@@ -135,6 +203,7 @@ lazy_static::lazy_static! {
SLASH_SEPARATOR,
DATA_USAGE_OBJ_NAME
);
static ref DATA_USAGE_OBJ_BACKUP_PATH: String = format!("{}.bkp", DATA_USAGE_OBJ_NAME_PATH.as_str());
pub static ref DATA_USAGE_BLOOM_NAME_PATH: String = format!("{}{}{}",
crate::disk::BUCKET_META_PREFIX,
SLASH_SEPARATOR,
@@ -147,18 +216,56 @@ lazy_static::lazy_static! {
);
}
/// Decide whether an incoming usage snapshot must be skipped as stale, given the local
/// wall clock `now`. Mirrors `stale_data_usage_update_reason` in
/// `crates/scanner/src/scanner.rs` — keep the two consistent.
///
/// If the persisted `existing.last_update` is future-dated beyond
/// [`rustfs_data_usage::USAGE_LAST_UPDATE_FUTURE_TOLERANCE`] (clock step-back or a
/// slower-clock scanner leader), it is untrustworthy: the save is allowed so usage
/// stats cannot freeze forever.
fn stale_data_usage_persist_reason(incoming: &DataUsageInfo, existing: &DataUsageInfo, now: SystemTime) -> Option<&'static str> {
match (incoming.last_update, existing.last_update) {
(Some(new_ts), Some(existing_ts))
if new_ts <= existing_ts && !rustfs_data_usage::usage_last_update_is_untrusted_future(existing_ts, now) =>
{
Some("older_or_equal_last_update")
}
_ => None,
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum UsageSnapshotSource {
Primary,
Backup,
Missing,
}
fn stale_data_usage_persist_reason_for_source(
incoming: &DataUsageInfo,
existing: &DataUsageInfo,
source: UsageSnapshotSource,
now: SystemTime,
) -> Option<&'static str> {
let reason = stale_data_usage_persist_reason(incoming, existing, now);
if source == UsageSnapshotSource::Backup && incoming.last_update == existing.last_update {
None
} else {
reason
}
}
/// Store data usage info to backend storage
#[instrument(skip(store))]
pub async fn store_data_usage_in_backend(data_usage_info: DataUsageInfo, store: Arc<ECStore>) -> Result<(), Error> {
// Prevent older data from overwriting newer persisted stats
if let Ok(buf) = read_config(store.clone(), &DATA_USAGE_OBJ_NAME_PATH).await
&& let Ok(existing) = serde_json::from_slice::<DataUsageInfo>(&buf)
&& let (Some(new_ts), Some(existing_ts)) = (data_usage_info.last_update, existing.last_update)
&& new_ts <= existing_ts
if let Ok((existing, source)) = load_data_usage_snapshot(store.clone()).await
&& let Some(reason) = stale_data_usage_persist_reason_for_source(&data_usage_info, &existing, source, SystemTime::now())
{
info!(
"Skip persisting data usage: incoming last_update {:?} <= existing {:?}",
new_ts, existing_ts
"Skip persisting data usage ({reason}): incoming last_update {:?} <= existing {:?}",
data_usage_info.last_update, existing.last_update
);
return Ok(());
}
@@ -175,6 +282,12 @@ async fn save_data_usage_in_backend(data_usage_info: DataUsageInfo, store: Arc<E
.await
.map_err(Error::other)?;
// Invalidate the cached snapshot so readers observe the new save on their
// next request instead of waiting out the remaining TTL. The next cached
// read reloads through `load_data_usage_from_backend`, keeping its
// backward-compatibility post-processing.
*data_usage_snapshot_cache().write().await = None;
Ok(())
}
@@ -224,8 +337,8 @@ pub async fn remove_bucket_usage_from_backend(store: Arc<ECStore>, bucket: &str)
live_bucket_usage_cache().invalidate(bucket).await;
clear_bucket_usage_memory(bucket).await;
let data_usage_info = load_data_usage_from_backend(store.clone()).await?;
let existing = load_data_usage_from_backend(store.clone()).await.ok();
let data_usage_info = load_primary_data_usage_from_backend(store.clone()).await?;
let existing = load_primary_data_usage_from_backend(store.clone()).await.ok();
if let Some(data_usage_info) = merge_bucket_usage_removal(data_usage_info, existing, bucket) {
save_data_usage_in_backend(data_usage_info, store).await?;
@@ -234,47 +347,123 @@ pub async fn remove_bucket_usage_from_backend(store: Arc<ECStore>, bucket: &str)
Ok(())
}
fn record_usage_snapshot_failure(operation: &'static str, object: &str, e: &Error) {
let reason = classify_system_path_failure_reason(e);
record_system_path_failure("data_usage", operation, reason);
error!(
event = "data_usage_snapshot_load_failed",
component = "ecstore",
subsystem = "data_usage",
state = "read_failed",
operation,
reason,
object = %object,
error = %e,
"data usage snapshot load failed"
);
}
fn record_usage_snapshot_decode_failure(operation: &'static str, object: &str, e: &Error) {
const REASON: &str = "decode_error";
record_system_path_failure("data_usage", operation, REASON);
error!(
event = "data_usage_snapshot_load_failed",
component = "ecstore",
subsystem = "data_usage",
state = "decode_failed",
operation,
reason = REASON,
object = %object,
error = %e,
"data usage snapshot load failed"
);
}
fn parse_usage_snapshot(buf: &[u8]) -> Result<DataUsageInfo, Error> {
serde_json::from_slice(buf).map_err(|e| {
Error::other(format!(
"Failed to deserialize data usage info: {:?} at line {} column {}",
e.classify(),
e.line(),
e.column()
))
})
}
/// Decide which usage snapshot to serve: the primary `.usage.json` or its
/// `.bkp` backup. The backup future is polled only when the primary is unusable,
/// so the healthy path performs a single read.
///
/// `Ok(DataUsageInfo::default())` is returned only when BOTH the primary and
/// the backup are `ConfigNotFound` — a genuine "no snapshot yet". A real
/// primary failure with a missing backup propagates as an error instead of
/// being rendered as confirmed all-zero stats.
async fn resolve_loaded_snapshot_with_source(
primary: Result<Vec<u8>, Error>,
backup: impl Future<Output = Result<Vec<u8>, Error>>,
) -> Result<(DataUsageInfo, UsageSnapshotSource), Error> {
let primary_failure = match primary {
Ok(buf) => match parse_usage_snapshot(&buf) {
Ok(info) => return Ok((info, UsageSnapshotSource::Primary)),
Err(e) => {
record_usage_snapshot_decode_failure("parse_primary", DATA_USAGE_OBJ_NAME_PATH.as_str(), &e);
e
}
},
Err(e) => {
if e != Error::ConfigNotFound {
record_usage_snapshot_failure("read_primary", DATA_USAGE_OBJ_NAME_PATH.as_str(), &e);
}
e
}
};
match backup.await {
Ok(buf) => match parse_usage_snapshot(&buf) {
Ok(info) => Ok((info, UsageSnapshotSource::Backup)),
Err(e) => {
record_usage_snapshot_decode_failure("parse_backup", &DATA_USAGE_OBJ_BACKUP_PATH, &e);
Err(e)
}
},
Err(Error::ConfigNotFound) if primary_failure == Error::ConfigNotFound => {
Ok((DataUsageInfo::default(), UsageSnapshotSource::Missing))
}
Err(Error::ConfigNotFound) => Err(primary_failure),
Err(e) => {
record_usage_snapshot_failure("read_backup", &DATA_USAGE_OBJ_BACKUP_PATH, &e);
Err(e)
}
}
}
async fn resolve_loaded_snapshot(
primary: Result<Vec<u8>, Error>,
backup: impl Future<Output = Result<Vec<u8>, Error>>,
) -> Result<DataUsageInfo, Error> {
Ok(resolve_loaded_snapshot_with_source(primary, backup).await?.0)
}
async fn load_data_usage_snapshot(store: Arc<ECStore>) -> Result<(DataUsageInfo, UsageSnapshotSource), Error> {
let primary = read_config_preserve_empty(store.clone(), &DATA_USAGE_OBJ_NAME_PATH).await;
resolve_loaded_snapshot_with_source(
primary,
async move { read_config_preserve_empty(store, &DATA_USAGE_OBJ_BACKUP_PATH).await },
)
.await
}
async fn load_primary_data_usage_from_backend(store: Arc<ECStore>) -> Result<DataUsageInfo, Error> {
let buf = read_config_preserve_empty(store, &DATA_USAGE_OBJ_NAME_PATH).await?;
Ok(normalize_loaded_data_usage(parse_usage_snapshot(&buf)?).await)
}
/// Load data usage info from backend storage
#[instrument(skip(store))]
pub async fn load_data_usage_from_backend(store: Arc<ECStore>) -> Result<DataUsageInfo, Error> {
let buf: Vec<u8> = match read_config(store.clone(), &DATA_USAGE_OBJ_NAME_PATH).await {
Ok(data) => data,
Err(e) => {
let reason = classify_system_path_failure_reason(&e);
record_system_path_failure("data_usage", "read_primary", reason);
error!(
path_kind = "data_usage",
operation = "read_primary",
reason,
object = %DATA_USAGE_OBJ_NAME_PATH.as_str(),
error = %e,
"system path read failed"
);
match read_config(store.clone(), format!("{}.bkp", DATA_USAGE_OBJ_NAME_PATH.as_str()).as_str()).await {
Ok(data) => data,
Err(e) => {
if e == Error::ConfigNotFound {
return Ok(DataUsageInfo::default());
}
let reason = classify_system_path_failure_reason(&e);
record_system_path_failure("data_usage", "read_backup", reason);
error!(
path_kind = "data_usage",
operation = "read_backup",
reason,
object = %format!("{}.bkp", DATA_USAGE_OBJ_NAME_PATH.as_str()),
error = %e,
"system path read failed"
);
return Err(Error::other(e));
}
}
}
};
let mut data_usage_info: DataUsageInfo =
serde_json::from_slice(&buf).map_err(|e| Error::other(format!("Failed to deserialize data usage info: {e}")))?;
Ok(normalize_loaded_data_usage(load_data_usage_snapshot(store).await?.0).await)
}
async fn normalize_loaded_data_usage(mut data_usage_info: DataUsageInfo) -> DataUsageInfo {
info!("Loaded data usage info from backend with {} buckets", data_usage_info.buckets_count);
// Handle backward compatibility
@@ -325,7 +514,34 @@ pub async fn load_data_usage_from_backend(store: Arc<ECStore>) -> Result<DataUsa
}
}
Ok(data_usage_info)
data_usage_info
}
/// Load the persisted data usage snapshot through a small in-process cache.
///
/// Admin read endpoints call this on every request; the cache bounds backend
/// reads (and the associated JSON parse and INFO log) to once per
/// `DATA_USAGE_CACHE_TTL_SECS` per process. `save_data_usage_in_backend`
/// invalidates the cache so a fresh scanner save is visible immediately.
pub async fn load_data_usage_from_backend_cached(store: Arc<ECStore>) -> Result<DataUsageInfo, Error> {
let ttl = Duration::from_secs(DATA_USAGE_CACHE_TTL_SECS);
{
let cache = data_usage_snapshot_cache().read().await;
if let Some(result) = fresh_cached_data_usage_snapshot(&cache, tokio::time::Instant::now(), ttl) {
return result;
}
}
// Re-check under the write lock so concurrent expirations trigger a single
// backend read instead of a stampede.
let mut cache = data_usage_snapshot_cache().write().await;
if let Some(result) = fresh_cached_data_usage_snapshot(&cache, tokio::time::Instant::now(), ttl) {
return result;
}
let result = load_data_usage_from_backend(store).await;
cache_data_usage_snapshot_result(&mut cache, result, tokio::time::Instant::now())
}
/// Aggregate usage information from local disk snapshots.
@@ -530,6 +746,7 @@ impl BucketUsageAccumulator {
type UsageVersionPage = StorageListObjectVersionsInfo<ObjectInfo>;
pub async fn compute_bucket_usage(store: Arc<ECStore>, bucket_name: &str) -> Result<BucketUsageInfo, Error> {
LIVE_BUCKET_USAGE_COMPUTATIONS.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
let bucket = bucket_name.to_string();
compute_bucket_usage_with_pages(bucket_name, move |marker, version_marker| {
let store = Arc::clone(&store);
@@ -923,7 +1140,7 @@ async fn update_usage_cache_if_needed() {
let updating_clone = (*cache_updating()).clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
if let Some(store) = runtime_sources::object_store_handle()
&& let Ok(data_usage_info) = load_data_usage_from_backend(store.clone()).await
&& let Ok(data_usage_info) = load_data_usage_from_backend(store).await
{
replace_bucket_usage_memory_from_info(&data_usage_info).await;
}
@@ -947,7 +1164,7 @@ async fn update_usage_cache_if_needed() {
drop(updating);
if let Some(store) = runtime_sources::object_store_handle()
&& let Ok(data_usage_info) = load_data_usage_from_backend(store.clone()).await
&& let Ok(data_usage_info) = load_data_usage_from_backend(store).await
{
replace_bucket_usage_memory_from_info(&data_usage_info).await;
}
@@ -1372,6 +1589,250 @@ mod tests {
info
}
fn usage_with_last_update(last_update: Option<SystemTime>) -> DataUsageInfo {
DataUsageInfo {
last_update,
..Default::default()
}
}
#[test]
fn stale_data_usage_persist_reason_allows_newer_incoming() {
let now = SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(1_000_000);
let incoming = usage_with_last_update(Some(now));
let existing = usage_with_last_update(Some(now - Duration::from_secs(60)));
assert_eq!(stale_data_usage_persist_reason(&incoming, &existing, now), None);
}
#[test]
fn stale_data_usage_persist_reason_skips_older_or_equal_incoming() {
let now = SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(1_000_000);
let existing = usage_with_last_update(Some(now - Duration::from_secs(60)));
let older = usage_with_last_update(Some(now - Duration::from_secs(120)));
assert_eq!(
stale_data_usage_persist_reason(&older, &existing, now),
Some("older_or_equal_last_update")
);
let equal = usage_with_last_update(existing.last_update);
assert_eq!(
stale_data_usage_persist_reason(&equal, &existing, now),
Some("older_or_equal_last_update")
);
}
#[test]
fn stale_data_usage_persist_reason_allows_save_when_existing_is_future_dated() {
// Existing snapshot timestamp beyond the clock tolerance is untrustworthy
// (clock step-back / slower-clock leader): the save must be allowed even
// though incoming <= existing, otherwise usage stats freeze forever.
let now = SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(1_000_000);
let existing =
usage_with_last_update(Some(now + rustfs_data_usage::USAGE_LAST_UPDATE_FUTURE_TOLERANCE + Duration::from_secs(1)));
let incoming = usage_with_last_update(Some(now));
assert_eq!(stale_data_usage_persist_reason(&incoming, &existing, now), None);
}
#[test]
fn stale_data_usage_persist_reason_skips_at_exact_tolerance_boundary() {
// Exactly at now + tolerance is still within the trusted window.
let now = SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(1_000_000);
let existing = usage_with_last_update(Some(now + rustfs_data_usage::USAGE_LAST_UPDATE_FUTURE_TOLERANCE));
let incoming = usage_with_last_update(Some(now));
assert_eq!(
stale_data_usage_persist_reason(&incoming, &existing, now),
Some("older_or_equal_last_update")
);
}
#[test]
fn stale_data_usage_persist_reason_preserves_none_handling() {
// This call site (unlike the scanner sibling) allows saves when either
// timestamp is missing — pin that behavior.
let now = SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(1_000_000);
let incoming_none = usage_with_last_update(None);
let existing_some = usage_with_last_update(Some(now - Duration::from_secs(60)));
assert_eq!(stale_data_usage_persist_reason(&incoming_none, &existing_some, now), None);
let incoming_some = usage_with_last_update(Some(now));
let existing_none = usage_with_last_update(None);
assert_eq!(stale_data_usage_persist_reason(&incoming_some, &existing_none, now), None);
let both_none = usage_with_last_update(None);
assert_eq!(stale_data_usage_persist_reason(&both_none, &usage_with_last_update(None), now), None);
}
#[test]
fn backup_stale_guard_allows_equal_snapshot_to_repair_primary() {
let now = SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(1_000_000);
let existing = usage_with_last_update(Some(now - Duration::from_secs(60)));
let equal = usage_with_last_update(existing.last_update);
let older = usage_with_last_update(Some(now - Duration::from_secs(120)));
assert_eq!(
stale_data_usage_persist_reason_for_source(&equal, &existing, UsageSnapshotSource::Backup, now),
None
);
assert_eq!(
stale_data_usage_persist_reason_for_source(&older, &existing, UsageSnapshotSource::Backup, now),
Some("older_or_equal_last_update")
);
}
fn snapshot_bytes(bucket: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
let info = data_usage_info_for_test(bucket, 3, 42, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH);
serde_json::to_vec(&info).expect("test snapshot must serialize")
}
#[test]
fn data_usage_backup_path_appends_suffix_to_primary() {
assert_eq!(DATA_USAGE_OBJ_BACKUP_PATH.as_str(), format!("{}.bkp", DATA_USAGE_OBJ_NAME_PATH.as_str()));
}
fn assert_snapshot_bucket(info: &DataUsageInfo, bucket: &str) {
assert!(
info.buckets_usage.contains_key(bucket),
"expected snapshot for bucket {bucket}, got buckets {:?}",
info.buckets_usage.keys().collect::<Vec<_>>()
);
}
#[test]
fn parse_snapshot_error_does_not_include_payload_value() {
let err =
parse_usage_snapshot(br#"{"buckets_count":"secret-marker"}"#).expect_err("an invalid field type must fail decoding");
assert!(!err.to_string().contains("secret-marker"));
}
#[test]
fn cached_snapshot_failure_is_reused_until_ttl_expires() {
let loaded_at = tokio::time::Instant::now();
let mut cache = None;
let first = cache_data_usage_snapshot_result(&mut cache, Err(Error::ErasureReadQuorum), loaded_at);
assert!(matches!(first, Err(Error::ErasureReadQuorum)));
let cached = fresh_cached_data_usage_snapshot(&cache, loaded_at + Duration::from_secs(1), Duration::from_secs(30))
.expect("the failed load must remain cached within the TTL");
assert!(cached.is_err());
assert!(fresh_cached_data_usage_snapshot(&cache, loaded_at + Duration::from_secs(30), Duration::from_secs(30)).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn cached_snapshot_success_is_reused_until_ttl_expires() {
let loaded_at = tokio::time::Instant::now();
let expected = data_usage_info_for_test("bucket", 3, 42, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH);
let mut cache = None;
let first =
cache_data_usage_snapshot_result(&mut cache, Ok(expected), loaded_at).expect("successful load must be returned");
assert_snapshot_bucket(&first, "bucket");
let cached = fresh_cached_data_usage_snapshot(&cache, loaded_at + Duration::from_secs(1), Duration::from_secs(30))
.expect("successful load must remain cached within the TTL")
.expect("cached success must remain successful");
assert_snapshot_bucket(&cached, "bucket");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn resolve_snapshot_primary_ok_is_used_without_backup_read() {
let backup_read = Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool::new(false));
let backup_read_probe = Arc::clone(&backup_read);
let info = resolve_loaded_snapshot(Ok(snapshot_bytes("primary-bucket")), async move {
backup_read_probe.store(true, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
Ok(snapshot_bytes("backup-bucket"))
})
.await
.expect("healthy primary snapshot must load");
assert_snapshot_bucket(&info, "primary-bucket");
assert!(
!backup_read.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst),
"backup must not be read when the primary parses"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn resolve_snapshot_primary_corrupt_falls_back_to_backup() {
let (info, source) =
resolve_loaded_snapshot_with_source(Ok(b"{not json".to_vec()), async { Ok(snapshot_bytes("backup-bucket")) })
.await
.expect("backup snapshot must be served when the primary is corrupt");
assert_snapshot_bucket(&info, "backup-bucket");
assert_eq!(source, UsageSnapshotSource::Backup);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn resolve_snapshot_primary_corrupt_backup_corrupt_is_error() {
let err = resolve_loaded_snapshot(Ok(b"{not json".to_vec()), async { Ok(b"also not json".to_vec()) })
.await
.expect_err("two corrupt snapshots must not produce stats");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("deserialize"), "unexpected error: {err}");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn resolve_snapshot_primary_corrupt_backup_missing_is_error() {
let err = resolve_loaded_snapshot(Ok(b"{not json".to_vec()), async { Err(Error::ConfigNotFound) })
.await
.expect_err("a corrupt primary without a backup must not produce stats");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("deserialize"), "unexpected error: {err}");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn resolve_snapshot_primary_empty_backup_missing_is_error() {
let err = resolve_loaded_snapshot(Ok(Vec::new()), async { Err(Error::ConfigNotFound) })
.await
.expect_err("an empty primary object is corrupt, not an absent snapshot");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("deserialize"), "unexpected error: {err}");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn resolve_snapshot_primary_read_error_falls_back_to_backup() {
let info = resolve_loaded_snapshot(Err(Error::ErasureReadQuorum), async { Ok(snapshot_bytes("backup-bucket")) })
.await
.expect("backup snapshot must be served when the primary read fails");
assert_snapshot_bucket(&info, "backup-bucket");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn resolve_snapshot_primary_real_error_backup_missing_is_error_not_zeros() {
let err = resolve_loaded_snapshot(Err(Error::ErasureReadQuorum), async { Err(Error::ConfigNotFound) })
.await
.expect_err("primary corruption must not be rendered as all-zero stats");
assert!(matches!(err, Error::ErasureReadQuorum), "unexpected error: {err}");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn resolve_snapshot_primary_missing_uses_backup() {
let info = resolve_loaded_snapshot(Err(Error::ConfigNotFound), async { Ok(snapshot_bytes("backup-bucket")) })
.await
.expect("an existing backup must be used when the primary is missing");
assert_snapshot_bucket(&info, "backup-bucket");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn resolve_snapshot_backup_read_error_is_preserved() {
let err = resolve_loaded_snapshot(Err(Error::ConfigNotFound), async { Err(Error::ErasureReadQuorum) })
.await
.expect_err("a backup read failure must be returned");
assert!(matches!(err, Error::ErasureReadQuorum), "unexpected error: {err}");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn resolve_snapshot_both_missing_is_default() {
let info = resolve_loaded_snapshot(Err(Error::ConfigNotFound), async { Err(Error::ConfigNotFound) })
.await
.expect("no snapshot yet must resolve to empty stats");
assert_eq!(info.buckets_count, 0);
assert!(info.buckets_usage.is_empty());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn compute_usage_preserves_same_object_across_1000_entry_page_boundary() {
let first_page = UsageVersionPage {
@@ -13,9 +13,13 @@
// limitations under the License.
use crate::cluster::rpc::{TonicInterceptor, gen_tonic_signature_interceptor, node_service_time_out_client};
use crate::data_usage::{DATA_USAGE_CACHE_NAME, DATA_USAGE_ROOT, load_data_usage_from_backend};
use crate::data_usage::{DATA_USAGE_CACHE_NAME, DATA_USAGE_ROOT, load_data_usage_from_backend_cached};
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
use crate::{disk::endpoint::Endpoint, runtime::sources as runtime_sources};
use crate::{
disk::endpoint::{Endpoint, EndpointType},
layout::endpoints::EndpointServerPools,
runtime::sources as runtime_sources,
};
use crate::data_usage::load_data_usage_cache;
use crate::storage_api_contracts::admin::StorageAdminApi;
@@ -42,6 +46,33 @@ use shadow_rs::shadow;
shadow!(build);
const SERVER_PING_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(1);
const DATA_USAGE_UNAVAILABLE_ERROR: &str = "data usage snapshot unavailable";
fn apply_data_usage_result(
result: Result<rustfs_data_usage::DataUsageInfo>,
buckets: &mut rustfs_madmin::Buckets,
objects: &mut rustfs_madmin::Objects,
versions: &mut rustfs_madmin::Versions,
delete_markers: &mut rustfs_madmin::DeleteMarkers,
usage: &mut rustfs_madmin::Usage,
) {
match result {
Ok(info) => {
buckets.count = info.buckets_count;
objects.count = info.objects_total_count;
versions.count = info.versions_total_count;
delete_markers.count = info.delete_markers_total_count;
usage.size = info.objects_total_size;
}
Err(_) => {
buckets.error = Some(DATA_USAGE_UNAVAILABLE_ERROR.to_string());
objects.error = Some(DATA_USAGE_UNAVAILABLE_ERROR.to_string());
versions.error = Some(DATA_USAGE_UNAVAILABLE_ERROR.to_string());
delete_markers.error = Some(DATA_USAGE_UNAVAILABLE_ERROR.to_string());
usage.error = Some(DATA_USAGE_UNAVAILABLE_ERROR.to_string());
}
}
}
// pub const ITEM_OFFLINE: &str = "offline";
// pub const ITEM_INITIALIZING: &str = "initializing";
@@ -246,22 +277,14 @@ pub async fn get_server_info(get_pools: bool) -> InfoMessage {
if let Some(store) = runtime_sources::object_store_handle() {
mode = ITEM_ONLINE;
match load_data_usage_from_backend(store.clone()).await {
Ok(res) => {
buckets.count = res.buckets_count;
objects.count = res.objects_total_count;
versions.count = res.versions_total_count;
delete_markers.count = res.delete_markers_total_count;
usage.size = res.objects_total_size;
}
Err(err) => {
buckets.error = Some(err.to_string());
objects.error = Some(err.to_string());
versions.error = Some(err.to_string());
delete_markers.error = Some(err.to_string());
usage.error = Some(err.to_string());
}
}
apply_data_usage_result(
load_data_usage_from_backend_cached(store.clone()).await,
&mut buckets,
&mut objects,
&mut versions,
&mut delete_markers,
&mut usage,
);
let after3 = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
@@ -272,6 +295,20 @@ pub async fn get_server_info(get_pools: bool) -> InfoMessage {
let after4 = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
warn!("backend_info end {:?}", after4 - after3);
if let Some(endpoints) = runtime_sources::endpoint_pools() {
let (added, report) = reconcile_servers_with_endpoint_topology(&mut servers, &endpoints);
if added > 0 || !report.is_complete() {
warn!(
event = "admin_v3_info_topology_incomplete",
synthesized_servers = added,
expected_drives = report.expected_drives,
observed_drives = report.observed_drives,
missing_drives = report.missing_drive_ids.len(),
duplicate_drives = report.duplicate_drive_ids.len(),
"admin v3 server_info reconciled endpoint topology before computing backend counters"
);
}
}
let mut all_disks: Vec<Disk> = Vec::new();
for server in servers.iter() {
@@ -378,6 +415,228 @@ fn get_online_offline_disks_stats(disks_info: &[Disk]) -> (BackendDisks, Backend
(BackendDisks(online_disks), BackendDisks(offline_disks), BackendDisks(unknown_disks))
}
#[derive(Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct TopologyCompletenessReport {
expected_drives: usize,
observed_drives: usize,
missing_drive_ids: Vec<TopologyDriveKey>,
duplicate_drive_ids: Vec<TopologyDriveKey>,
}
impl TopologyCompletenessReport {
fn is_complete(&self) -> bool {
self.expected_drives == self.observed_drives && self.missing_drive_ids.is_empty() && self.duplicate_drive_ids.is_empty()
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct TopologyMember {
display_endpoint: String,
disks: Vec<Disk>,
drive_keys: Vec<TopologyDriveKey>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord)]
struct TopologyDriveKey {
pool_index: i32,
set_index: i32,
disk_index: i32,
member_index: usize,
}
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct EndpointTopology {
members: Vec<TopologyMember>,
aliases: HashMap<String, usize>,
expected_drive_ids: HashSet<TopologyDriveKey>,
}
impl EndpointTopology {
fn from_endpoint_pools(endpoints: &EndpointServerPools) -> Self {
let mut topology = Self::default();
let mut by_host_port = HashMap::new();
let mut display_aliases: HashMap<String, Option<usize>> = HashMap::new();
for pool in endpoints.as_ref() {
for ep in pool.endpoints.as_ref() {
if ep.get_type() != EndpointType::Url {
continue;
}
let host_port = ep.host_port();
if host_port.is_empty() {
continue;
}
let member_index = match by_host_port.get(&host_port).copied() {
Some(index) => index,
None => {
let display_endpoint = ep.url.host_str().map(str::to_owned).unwrap_or_else(|| host_port.clone());
let index = topology.members.len();
topology.members.push(TopologyMember {
display_endpoint,
disks: Vec::new(),
drive_keys: Vec::new(),
});
by_host_port.insert(host_port.clone(), index);
index
}
};
topology.aliases.entry(host_port.clone()).or_insert(member_index);
topology.aliases.entry(ep.to_string()).or_insert(member_index);
if let Some(display_endpoint) = ep.url.host_str() {
match display_aliases.entry(display_endpoint.to_owned()) {
std::collections::hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
entry.insert(Some(member_index));
}
std::collections::hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
if entry.get().is_some_and(|index| index != member_index) {
entry.insert(None);
}
}
}
}
let drive_key = TopologyDriveKey {
pool_index: ep.pool_idx,
set_index: ep.set_idx,
disk_index: ep.disk_idx,
member_index,
};
topology.expected_drive_ids.insert(drive_key.clone());
topology.members[member_index].drive_keys.push(drive_key);
topology.members[member_index].disks.push(Disk {
endpoint: ep.to_string(),
state: ITEM_UNKNOWN.to_string(),
pool_index: ep.pool_idx,
set_index: ep.set_idx,
disk_index: ep.disk_idx,
..Default::default()
});
}
}
for (display_endpoint, member_index) in display_aliases {
if let Some(member_index) = member_index {
topology.aliases.entry(display_endpoint).or_insert(member_index);
}
}
topology
}
fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.members.is_empty()
}
fn observe_servers(&self, servers: &[ServerProperties]) -> (Vec<bool>, HashMap<TopologyDriveKey, usize>) {
let mut observed_members = vec![false; self.members.len()];
let mut observed_drive_counts = HashMap::with_capacity(self.expected_drive_ids.len());
for server in servers {
if let Some(member_index) = self.member_index_from_endpoint(&server.endpoint) {
observed_members[member_index] = true;
}
for disk in &server.disks {
if let Some(member_index) = self.member_index_from_endpoint(&disk.endpoint) {
observed_members[member_index] = true;
let drive_key = TopologyDriveKey {
pool_index: disk.pool_index,
set_index: disk.set_index,
disk_index: disk.disk_index,
member_index,
};
if self.expected_drive_ids.contains(&drive_key) {
*observed_drive_counts.entry(drive_key).or_insert(0) += 1;
}
}
}
}
(observed_members, observed_drive_counts)
}
fn member_index_from_endpoint(&self, endpoint: &str) -> Option<usize> {
if let Some(index) = self.aliases.get(endpoint) {
return Some(*index);
}
Endpoint::try_from(endpoint)
.ok()
.and_then(|ep| self.aliases.get(&ep.host_port()).copied())
}
fn report_from_counts(&self, observed_drive_counts: HashMap<TopologyDriveKey, usize>) -> TopologyCompletenessReport {
let mut missing_drive_ids = Vec::new();
let mut duplicate_drive_ids = Vec::new();
for id in &self.expected_drive_ids {
match observed_drive_counts.get(id).copied().unwrap_or(0) {
0 => missing_drive_ids.push(id.clone()),
1 => {}
_ => duplicate_drive_ids.push(id.clone()),
}
}
missing_drive_ids.sort();
duplicate_drive_ids.sort();
TopologyCompletenessReport {
expected_drives: self.expected_drive_ids.len(),
observed_drives: observed_drive_counts.values().sum(),
missing_drive_ids,
duplicate_drive_ids,
}
}
}
fn reconcile_servers_with_endpoint_topology(
servers: &mut Vec<ServerProperties>,
endpoints: &EndpointServerPools,
) -> (usize, TopologyCompletenessReport) {
let topology = EndpointTopology::from_endpoint_pools(endpoints);
if topology.is_empty() {
return (0, TopologyCompletenessReport::default());
}
let (observed_members, mut observed_drive_counts) = topology.observe_servers(servers);
let mut missing: Vec<_> = topology
.members
.iter()
.enumerate()
.filter(|(index, _)| !observed_members[*index])
.map(|(_, member)| {
for drive_key in &member.drive_keys {
*observed_drive_counts.entry(drive_key.clone()).or_insert(0) += 1;
}
ServerProperties {
endpoint: member.display_endpoint.clone(),
state: ITEM_UNKNOWN.to_string(),
disks: member.disks.clone(),
..Default::default()
}
})
.collect();
missing.sort_by(|a, b| a.endpoint.cmp(&b.endpoint));
let added = missing.len();
servers.extend(missing);
let report = topology.report_from_counts(observed_drive_counts);
(added, report)
}
fn server_topology_completeness_report(
servers: &[ServerProperties],
endpoints: &EndpointServerPools,
) -> TopologyCompletenessReport {
let topology = EndpointTopology::from_endpoint_pools(endpoints);
if topology.is_empty() {
return TopologyCompletenessReport::default();
}
let (_, observed_drive_counts) = topology.observe_servers(servers);
topology.report_from_counts(observed_drive_counts)
}
async fn get_pools_info(all_disks: &[Disk]) -> Result<HashMap<i32, HashMap<i32, ErasureSetInfo>>> {
let Some(store) = runtime_sources::object_store_handle() else {
return Err(Error::other("ServerNotInitialized"));
@@ -430,10 +689,17 @@ pub fn get_commit_id() -> String {
mod tests {
use serial_test::serial;
use crate::layout::{
endpoint::Endpoint,
endpoints::{EndpointServerPools, Endpoints, PoolEndpoints},
};
use crate::runtime::sources as runtime_sources;
use rustfs_madmin::{Disk, ITEM_OFFLINE, ITEM_UNKNOWN};
use rustfs_madmin::{Disk, ITEM_OFFLINE, ITEM_ONLINE, ITEM_UNKNOWN, ServerProperties};
use super::{get_local_server_property, get_online_offline_disks_stats, get_server_info};
use super::{
DATA_USAGE_UNAVAILABLE_ERROR, apply_data_usage_result, get_local_server_property, get_online_offline_disks_stats,
get_server_info, reconcile_servers_with_endpoint_topology, server_topology_completeness_report,
};
fn disk_with_state(endpoint: &str, state: &str) -> Disk {
Disk {
@@ -443,6 +709,50 @@ mod tests {
}
}
fn topology_endpoint(host: &str, pool_index: usize, set_index: usize, disk_index: usize) -> Endpoint {
topology_endpoint_url(format!("http://{host}:9000/data{disk_index}").as_str(), pool_index, set_index, disk_index)
}
fn topology_endpoint_url(url: &str, pool_index: usize, set_index: usize, disk_index: usize) -> Endpoint {
let mut endpoint = Endpoint::try_from(url).expect("URL endpoint should parse");
endpoint.set_pool_index(pool_index);
endpoint.set_set_index(set_index);
endpoint.set_disk_index(disk_index);
endpoint
}
fn topology_with_hosts(hosts: &[&str]) -> EndpointServerPools {
let endpoints: Vec<Endpoint> = hosts
.iter()
.enumerate()
.map(|(disk_index, host)| topology_endpoint(host, 0, 0, disk_index))
.collect();
EndpointServerPools::from(vec![PoolEndpoints {
legacy: false,
set_count: 1,
drives_per_set: hosts.len(),
endpoints: Endpoints::from(endpoints),
cmd_line: String::new(),
platform: String::new(),
}])
}
fn server_with_disk(host: &str, disk_index: i32, state: &str) -> ServerProperties {
ServerProperties {
endpoint: host.to_string(),
state: ITEM_ONLINE.to_string(),
disks: vec![Disk {
endpoint: format!("http://{host}:9000/data{disk_index}"),
state: state.to_string(),
pool_index: 0,
set_index: 0,
disk_index,
..Default::default()
}],
..Default::default()
}
}
#[test]
fn disk_stats_split_unknown_into_its_own_bucket() {
// A member whose properties RPC could not be answered contributes
@@ -471,6 +781,142 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[test]
fn topology_reconcile_synthesizes_missing_member_as_unknown() {
let endpoints = topology_with_hosts(&["rustfs-1", "rustfs-2", "rustfs-3", "rustfs-4"]);
let mut servers = vec![
server_with_disk("rustfs-1", 0, "ok"),
server_with_disk("rustfs-2", 1, "ok"),
server_with_disk("rustfs-3", 2, "ok"),
];
let (added, report) = reconcile_servers_with_endpoint_topology(&mut servers, &endpoints);
let (_, _, unknown) =
get_online_offline_disks_stats(&servers.iter().flat_map(|server| server.disks.clone()).collect::<Vec<_>>());
assert_eq!(added, 1, "the missing fourth topology member must be synthesized");
assert!(report.is_complete(), "synthesized drives should complete the topology report");
assert_eq!(servers.len(), 4, "v3 server list must preserve topology membership length");
let synthesized = servers
.iter()
.find(|server| server.endpoint == "rustfs-4")
.expect("missing member should be present");
assert_eq!(synthesized.state, ITEM_UNKNOWN);
assert_eq!(synthesized.disks.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(synthesized.disks[0].endpoint, "http://rustfs-4:9000/data3");
assert_eq!(synthesized.disks[0].disk_index, 3);
assert_eq!(unknown.sum(), 1, "the synthesized drive must land in unknownDisks");
}
#[test]
fn topology_reconcile_does_not_duplicate_existing_synthesized_rows() {
let endpoints = topology_with_hosts(&["rustfs-1", "rustfs-2"]);
let mut servers = vec![
server_with_disk("rustfs-1", 0, "ok"),
server_with_disk("rustfs-2", 1, ITEM_UNKNOWN),
];
servers[1].state = ITEM_UNKNOWN.to_string();
let (added, report) = reconcile_servers_with_endpoint_topology(&mut servers, &endpoints);
assert_eq!(
added, 0,
"an existing unknown/degraded/offline row with topology drives already represents the member"
);
assert!(report.is_complete(), "existing synthesized rows should already complete the topology");
assert_eq!(servers.len(), 2);
}
#[test]
fn topology_reconcile_does_not_over_match_ambiguous_host_only_aliases() {
let endpoints = EndpointServerPools::from(vec![PoolEndpoints {
legacy: false,
set_count: 1,
drives_per_set: 2,
endpoints: Endpoints::from(vec![
topology_endpoint_url("http://rustfs-1:9000/data0", 0, 0, 0),
topology_endpoint_url("http://rustfs-1:9001/data1", 0, 0, 1),
]),
cmd_line: String::new(),
platform: String::new(),
}]);
let mut servers = vec![server_with_disk("rustfs-1", 0, "ok")];
let (added, report) = reconcile_servers_with_endpoint_topology(&mut servers, &endpoints);
assert_eq!(added, 1, "host-only aliases are ambiguous when one host has multiple topology ports");
assert!(report.is_complete());
assert!(
servers
.iter()
.any(|server| server.disks.iter().any(|disk| disk.endpoint == "http://rustfs-1:9001/data1")),
"the second host:port member should be synthesized from exact topology"
);
}
#[test]
fn topology_report_detects_duplicate_drive_identity_with_balanced_total() {
let endpoints = topology_with_hosts(&["rustfs-1", "rustfs-2"]);
let servers = vec![server_with_disk("rustfs-1", 0, "ok"), server_with_disk("rustfs-1", 0, "ok")];
let report = server_topology_completeness_report(&servers, &endpoints);
assert_eq!(report.expected_drives, 2);
assert_eq!(report.observed_drives, 2, "a plain total-count check would look balanced");
assert_eq!(report.missing_drive_ids.len(), 1, "rustfs-2's drive identity is absent");
assert_eq!(report.duplicate_drive_ids.len(), 1, "rustfs-1's drive identity is duplicated");
assert!(!report.is_complete());
}
#[test]
fn data_usage_errors_are_sanitized_in_server_info() {
let mut buckets = rustfs_madmin::Buckets::default();
let mut objects = rustfs_madmin::Objects::default();
let mut versions = rustfs_madmin::Versions::default();
let mut delete_markers = rustfs_madmin::DeleteMarkers::default();
let mut usage = rustfs_madmin::Usage::default();
apply_data_usage_result(
Err(crate::error::Error::other("sensitive disk path")),
&mut buckets,
&mut objects,
&mut versions,
&mut delete_markers,
&mut usage,
);
assert_eq!(buckets.error.as_deref(), Some(DATA_USAGE_UNAVAILABLE_ERROR));
assert_eq!(objects.error.as_deref(), Some(DATA_USAGE_UNAVAILABLE_ERROR));
assert_eq!(versions.error.as_deref(), Some(DATA_USAGE_UNAVAILABLE_ERROR));
assert_eq!(delete_markers.error.as_deref(), Some(DATA_USAGE_UNAVAILABLE_ERROR));
assert_eq!(usage.error.as_deref(), Some(DATA_USAGE_UNAVAILABLE_ERROR));
}
#[test]
fn data_usage_counts_are_mapped_into_server_info() {
let mut buckets = rustfs_madmin::Buckets::default();
let mut objects = rustfs_madmin::Objects::default();
let mut versions = rustfs_madmin::Versions::default();
let mut delete_markers = rustfs_madmin::DeleteMarkers::default();
let mut usage = rustfs_madmin::Usage::default();
let info = rustfs_data_usage::DataUsageInfo {
buckets_count: 2,
objects_total_count: 3,
versions_total_count: 4,
delete_markers_total_count: 5,
objects_total_size: 6,
..Default::default()
};
apply_data_usage_result(Ok(info), &mut buckets, &mut objects, &mut versions, &mut delete_markers, &mut usage);
assert_eq!(buckets.count, 2);
assert_eq!(objects.count, 3);
assert_eq!(versions.count, 4);
assert_eq!(delete_markers.count, 5);
assert_eq!(usage.size, 6);
}
#[serial]
#[tokio::test]
async fn server_info_includes_global_deployment_id() {
+2
View File
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ pub(crate) const GET_METADATA_CACHE_REASON_NOT_FOUND_OR_EXPIRED: &str = "not_fou
pub(crate) const GET_METADATA_CACHE_REASON_NOT_READ_DATA: &str = "not_read_data";
pub(crate) const GET_METADATA_CACHE_REASON_PART_NUMBER: &str = "part_number";
pub(crate) const GET_METADATA_CACHE_REASON_RAW_DATA_MOVEMENT_READ: &str = "raw_data_movement_read";
pub(crate) const GET_METADATA_CACHE_REASON_STALE_PUBLICATION: &str = "stale_publication";
pub(crate) const GET_METADATA_CACHE_REASON_USABLE: &str = "usable";
pub(crate) const GET_METADATA_CACHE_REASON_VERSION_ID: &str = "version_id";
pub(crate) const GET_METADATA_CACHE_REASON_VERSION_SUSPENDED: &str = "version_suspended";
@@ -386,6 +387,7 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(GET_METADATA_CACHE_REASON_NOT_READ_DATA, "not_read_data");
assert_eq!(GET_METADATA_CACHE_REASON_PART_NUMBER, "part_number");
assert_eq!(GET_METADATA_CACHE_REASON_RAW_DATA_MOVEMENT_READ, "raw_data_movement_read");
assert_eq!(GET_METADATA_CACHE_REASON_STALE_PUBLICATION, "stale_publication");
assert_eq!(GET_METADATA_CACHE_REASON_USABLE, "usable");
assert_eq!(GET_METADATA_CACHE_REASON_VERSION_ID, "version_id");
assert_eq!(GET_METADATA_CACHE_REASON_VERSION_SUSPENDED, "version_suspended");
+115
View File
@@ -209,6 +209,16 @@ pub fn get_drive_walkdir_stall_timeout() -> Duration {
)
}
pub fn get_drive_walkdir_peek_timeout() -> Duration {
let stall_timeout = get_drive_walkdir_stall_timeout();
let configured = get_drive_timeout_duration(
rustfs_config::ENV_DRIVE_WALKDIR_PEEK_TIMEOUT_SECS,
rustfs_config::DEFAULT_DRIVE_WALKDIR_PEEK_TIMEOUT_SECS,
Some(rustfs_config::DRIVE_TIMEOUT_PROFILE_HIGH_LATENCY_SECS.saturating_mul(2)),
);
configured.max(stall_timeout)
}
pub fn get_object_disk_read_timeout() -> Duration {
get_drive_timeout_duration(
rustfs_config::ENV_OBJECT_DISK_READ_TIMEOUT,
@@ -217,6 +227,27 @@ pub fn get_object_disk_read_timeout() -> Duration {
)
}
/// Per-shard erasure write stall budget: a shard write (or shutdown) that makes
/// no forward progress for this long is failed and its disk dropped before
/// commit. Re-armed on every shard write, so it bounds a stall rather than the
/// whole transfer. `0` disables the deadline (wait indefinitely).
pub fn get_object_disk_write_stall_timeout() -> Duration {
Duration::from_secs(rustfs_utils::get_env_u64(
rustfs_config::ENV_OBJECT_DISK_WRITE_STALL_TIMEOUT,
rustfs_config::DEFAULT_OBJECT_DISK_WRITE_STALL_TIMEOUT,
))
}
/// Optional absolute per-object erasure write cap (administrator slow-drip
/// backstop). `0` (default) disables the cap; the per-shard stall timeout is the
/// primary guarantee.
pub fn get_object_disk_write_absolute_cap() -> Duration {
Duration::from_secs(rustfs_utils::get_env_u64(
rustfs_config::ENV_OBJECT_DISK_WRITE_ABSOLUTE_CAP,
rustfs_config::DEFAULT_OBJECT_DISK_WRITE_ABSOLUTE_CAP,
))
}
pub fn get_drive_active_check_interval() -> Duration {
Duration::from_secs(rustfs_utils::get_env_u64(
rustfs_config::ENV_DRIVE_ACTIVE_CHECK_INTERVAL_SECS,
@@ -1635,6 +1666,64 @@ mod tests {
});
}
#[test]
fn drive_walkdir_peek_timeout_uses_wider_default_when_unset() {
temp_env::with_var_unset(rustfs_config::ENV_DRIVE_WALKDIR_PEEK_TIMEOUT_SECS, || {
temp_env::with_var_unset(rustfs_config::ENV_DRIVE_WALKDIR_STALL_TIMEOUT_SECS, || {
temp_env::with_var_unset(rustfs_config::ENV_DRIVE_MAX_TIMEOUT_DURATION, || {
temp_env::with_var_unset(rustfs_config::ENV_DRIVE_TIMEOUT_PROFILE, || {
assert_eq!(
get_drive_walkdir_peek_timeout(),
Duration::from_secs(rustfs_config::DEFAULT_DRIVE_WALKDIR_PEEK_TIMEOUT_SECS)
);
});
});
});
});
}
#[test]
fn drive_walkdir_peek_timeout_is_never_stricter_than_stall_timeout() {
temp_env::with_var(rustfs_config::ENV_DRIVE_WALKDIR_PEEK_TIMEOUT_SECS, Some("3"), || {
temp_env::with_var(rustfs_config::ENV_DRIVE_WALKDIR_STALL_TIMEOUT_SECS, Some("13"), || {
temp_env::with_var_unset(rustfs_config::ENV_DRIVE_MAX_TIMEOUT_DURATION, || {
assert_eq!(get_drive_walkdir_peek_timeout(), Duration::from_secs(13));
});
});
});
}
#[test]
fn drive_walkdir_peek_timeout_prefers_canonical_over_legacy() {
temp_env::with_var(rustfs_config::ENV_DRIVE_WALKDIR_PEEK_TIMEOUT_SECS, Some("23"), || {
temp_env::with_var(rustfs_config::ENV_DRIVE_MAX_TIMEOUT_DURATION, Some("17"), || {
temp_env::with_var_unset(rustfs_config::ENV_DRIVE_WALKDIR_STALL_TIMEOUT_SECS, || {
assert_eq!(get_drive_walkdir_peek_timeout(), Duration::from_secs(23));
});
});
});
}
#[test]
fn drive_walkdir_peek_timeout_uses_high_latency_profile_default() {
temp_env::with_var_unset(rustfs_config::ENV_DRIVE_WALKDIR_PEEK_TIMEOUT_SECS, || {
temp_env::with_var_unset(rustfs_config::ENV_DRIVE_WALKDIR_STALL_TIMEOUT_SECS, || {
temp_env::with_var_unset(rustfs_config::ENV_DRIVE_MAX_TIMEOUT_DURATION, || {
temp_env::with_var(
rustfs_config::ENV_DRIVE_TIMEOUT_PROFILE,
Some(rustfs_config::DRIVE_TIMEOUT_PROFILE_HIGH_LATENCY),
|| {
assert_eq!(
get_drive_walkdir_peek_timeout(),
Duration::from_secs(rustfs_config::DRIVE_TIMEOUT_PROFILE_HIGH_LATENCY_SECS * 2)
);
},
);
});
});
});
}
#[test]
fn drive_walkdir_timeout_prefers_canonical_over_legacy() {
temp_env::with_var(rustfs_config::ENV_DRIVE_WALKDIR_TIMEOUT_SECS, Some("11"), || {
@@ -1653,6 +1742,32 @@ mod tests {
});
}
#[test]
fn object_disk_write_stall_timeout_default_and_override() {
temp_env::with_var_unset(rustfs_config::ENV_OBJECT_DISK_WRITE_STALL_TIMEOUT, || {
assert_eq!(
get_object_disk_write_stall_timeout(),
Duration::from_secs(rustfs_config::DEFAULT_OBJECT_DISK_WRITE_STALL_TIMEOUT)
);
});
temp_env::with_var(rustfs_config::ENV_OBJECT_DISK_WRITE_STALL_TIMEOUT, Some("9"), || {
assert_eq!(get_object_disk_write_stall_timeout(), Duration::from_secs(9));
});
temp_env::with_var(rustfs_config::ENV_OBJECT_DISK_WRITE_STALL_TIMEOUT, Some("0"), || {
assert!(get_object_disk_write_stall_timeout().is_zero(), "0 disables the stall deadline");
});
}
#[test]
fn object_disk_write_absolute_cap_defaults_disabled() {
temp_env::with_var_unset(rustfs_config::ENV_OBJECT_DISK_WRITE_ABSOLUTE_CAP, || {
assert!(get_object_disk_write_absolute_cap().is_zero(), "absolute cap is disabled by default");
});
temp_env::with_var(rustfs_config::ENV_OBJECT_DISK_WRITE_ABSOLUTE_CAP, Some("120"), || {
assert_eq!(get_object_disk_write_absolute_cap(), Duration::from_secs(120));
});
}
#[test]
fn object_disk_read_timeout_uses_default_when_unset() {
temp_env::with_var_unset(rustfs_config::ENV_OBJECT_DISK_READ_TIMEOUT, || {
+27 -1
View File
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ pub enum DiskError {
ErasureReadQuorum,
#[error("io error {0}")]
Io(io::Error),
Io(#[source] io::Error),
#[error("source stalled")]
SourceStalled,
@@ -153,6 +153,12 @@ pub enum DiskError {
InvalidPath,
}
impl From<crate::erasure::coding::ErasureConstructionError> for DiskError {
fn from(error: crate::erasure::coding::ErasureConstructionError) -> Self {
Self::Io(error.into_io_error())
}
}
impl DiskError {
pub fn other<E>(error: E) -> Self
where
@@ -601,6 +607,26 @@ mod tests {
use super::*;
use std::collections::HashMap;
#[test]
fn other_preserves_erasure_construction_source_chain() {
use crate::erasure::coding::ErasureConstructionError;
use std::error::Error as _;
let error = DiskError::from(ErasureConstructionError::ModernEncoder {
source: reed_solomon_erasure::Error::TooManyShards,
});
let io_source = error.source().expect("DiskError::Io must expose its io::Error source");
assert!(io_source.is::<io::Error>());
let construction_source = io_source
.source()
.expect("io::Error must expose the erasure construction error");
assert!(construction_source.is::<ErasureConstructionError>());
let encoder_source = construction_source
.source()
.expect("construction error must expose the encoder error");
assert!(encoder_source.is::<reed_solomon_erasure::Error>());
}
#[test]
fn test_disk_error_variants() {
let errors = vec![
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+84
View File
@@ -645,6 +645,34 @@ pub fn file_exists(path: impl AsRef<Path>) -> bool {
std::fs::metadata(path.as_ref()).map(|_| true).unwrap_or(false)
}
/// Whether an [`io::Error`] means "the directory is not empty".
///
/// POSIX lets `rmdir`/`rename` report a non-empty directory as either
/// `ENOTEMPTY` or `EEXIST`. Linux uses `ENOTEMPTY` (which Rust surfaces as
/// [`io::ErrorKind::DirectoryNotEmpty`]); illumos/Solaris return `EEXIST`
/// (errno 17), which Rust surfaces as [`io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists`] and
/// which the `DirectoryNotEmpty` kind therefore never catches. Matching only on
/// the kind silently misclassifies the Solaris case as a hard failure, so
/// callers that must treat a still-populated directory as benign (deleting the
/// object metadata while a rollback-staging dir remains, non-force
/// `DeleteBucket` on a populated bucket) have to test the raw errno as well.
/// Mirrors MinIO's `isSysErrNotEmpty`.
pub fn is_dir_not_empty_error(err: &io::Error) -> bool {
// Linux/Windows: ENOTEMPTY / ERROR_DIR_NOT_EMPTY -> DirectoryNotEmpty.
if err.kind() == io::ErrorKind::DirectoryNotEmpty {
return true;
}
// illumos/Solaris report a non-empty `rmdir`/`rename` as EEXIST (errno 17),
// which Rust surfaces as `AlreadyExists` (so the `DirectoryNotEmpty` kind
// never catches it). Confirm against the raw errno directly so the
// classification holds regardless of how the platform std maps it.
#[cfg(unix)]
if matches!(err.raw_os_error(), Some(libc::ENOTEMPTY) | Some(libc::EEXIST)) {
return true;
}
false
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
@@ -809,6 +837,62 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!should_retry_rename(&denied, 1));
}
#[test]
fn is_dir_not_empty_error_recognizes_directory_not_empty_kind() {
let err = io::Error::from(io::ErrorKind::DirectoryNotEmpty);
assert!(is_dir_not_empty_error(&err));
}
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn is_dir_not_empty_error_recognizes_raw_enotempty() {
// Linux/BSD/macOS non-empty rmdir/rename errno.
let err = io::Error::from_raw_os_error(libc::ENOTEMPTY);
assert!(is_dir_not_empty_error(&err));
}
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn is_dir_not_empty_error_recognizes_solaris_eexist() {
// illumos/Solaris report a non-empty rmdir/rename as EEXIST, which Rust
// surfaces as `AlreadyExists` (never `DirectoryNotEmpty`). This is the
// core of rustfs/rustfs#4978: matching only the kind misclassified this
// benign condition as a hard failure.
let err = io::Error::from_raw_os_error(libc::EEXIST);
assert_eq!(err.kind(), io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists);
assert!(is_dir_not_empty_error(&err));
}
#[test]
fn is_dir_not_empty_error_rejects_unrelated_errors() {
assert!(!is_dir_not_empty_error(&io::Error::from(io::ErrorKind::NotFound)));
assert!(!is_dir_not_empty_error(&io::Error::from(io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied)));
#[cfg(unix)]
{
assert!(!is_dir_not_empty_error(&io::Error::from_raw_os_error(libc::EACCES)));
assert!(!is_dir_not_empty_error(&io::Error::from_raw_os_error(libc::ENOENT)));
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn is_dir_not_empty_error_matches_real_non_empty_rmdir() {
// Validate against the host's actual errno, whatever it is: Linux/macOS
// return ENOTEMPTY, illumos/Solaris return EEXIST. The removal must be
// classified as "not empty" on every platform.
let temp_dir = tempdir().expect("create temp dir");
let populated = temp_dir.path().join("populated");
std::fs::create_dir(&populated).expect("create dir");
std::fs::write(populated.join("child"), b"x").expect("write child");
let err = std::fs::remove_dir(&populated).expect_err("non-empty rmdir must fail");
assert!(
is_dir_not_empty_error(&err),
"non-empty rmdir must classify as not-empty, got kind {:?} errno {:?}",
err.kind(),
err.raw_os_error()
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn rename_all_moves_existing_directory_tree() {
// Guards the rename_data commit path, which funnels through

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