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Author SHA1 Message Date
Oliver Kieselbach 51f2dabc8c feat(web): explain the blank WiFi signal in the network timeline
The timeline showed WiFi segments with an SSID and no signal, and an "Avg WiFi
signal" stat that simply vanished — on a location-gated device that reads as a
product defect rather than the Windows 24H2 gate that caused it.

No agent change was needed: buildSegments already merges every wifi_signal_info
into the WiFi segment covering its timestamp, so wifiDataLimitedReason rides in
with the sample that was already being read.

- NetSegment.dataLimitedReason, filled from the sample.
- Segments that never got a sample of their own (a mid-session reconnect emits
  no wifi_signal_info) inherit it: the gate is a device-level setting and cannot
  flip during an enrollment. A segment WITH a real reading is never overwritten
  — pinned by a test.
- Tooltip: "Signal: unavailable — Location services off on this device" where
  the percentage would be.
- Stats row: "Avg WiFi signal: n/a (Location services off)" instead of dropping
  the row.

network_state_change is deliberately left alone. That event has never carried
signalPercent or radioType — NetworkChangeDetector collects them into its
snapshot for change detection, but only before_/after_wifiSsid reaches the
payload — so there is no absent field there for a reason to explain, and the
SSID it does carry is unaffected by the gate. Adding it would ship a field
nothing reads.

Verified: web tsc + eslint (0 warnings) + vitest 893/893.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 14:06:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0f9a77c848 feat(agent,web,mcp): surface the 24H2 location gate instead of only logging it
A missing WiFi signal reading is indistinguishable from a bug unless the payload
says why, and the device-level location setting is not something an admin would
think to check. Since 058248d9 the SSID survives the gate via the WinRT tier —
but signal, radio and channel silently vanish with no explanation anywhere.

When the WinRT tier wins AND the native tier reported rc=5, wifi_signal_info now
carries wifiDataLimitedReason = "location_services_off" and the event message
gains "— signal unavailable, Location services off", so the reason reads straight
off the timeline. The portal's WiFi card matches that literal and names the
Intune setting that restores the full payload.

The claim is evidence-only: any other native failure (no WLAN service, no
connected interface) leaves the field null rather than blaming a privacy setting
we did not observe. IsLocationGateDenied is the single predicate, pinned at its
boundaries (rc=5 yes; rc=50, rc=5023, rc=1062 no), and the literal is pinned as
the published agent/portal/MCP contract.

New wifi_signal_info group in the MCP DEVICE_PROPERTIES_CATALOG, so a fleet can
be sized before anyone changes a policy:
search_sessions(deviceProperties: {
  "wifi_signal_info.wifiDataLimitedReason": "location_services_off" })

Backend is untouched — the event payload is opaque DataJson with no projection.
network_state_change and the network timeline deliberately do not carry the
reason yet; that is a second payload plus web change for no extra insight.

Verified: build 0 warnings, agent suite 2553/2553, web tsc + eslint (0 warnings)
+ vitest 889/889, MCP tsc.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 13:58:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d89e3f0b48 fix(backend): cap vulnerability_report severity at Warning
A completed scan is a finding about the software inventory, not an
enrollment failure. Mapping the CVE risk onto Error/Critical made the
report read as a failed enrollment: the diagnosis page collected it as
failure evidence, MCP search lifted it on failure-intent queries, and the
timeline's Error filter filled up with clean sessions. critical/high now
map to Warning, everything else to Info; the CVE severity itself stays in
scan_summary and on the report panel's own scale.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 13:54:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 058248d95c fix(agent): read WiFi SSID via ungated WinRT API — 24H2 location gate
wifi_signal_info was missing on most Windows 11 24H2+ WiFi enrollments
(build 22631 3/3, 26100 37/178, 26200 43/95 over n=276 sessions since 08-01).
Not a parser or language problem: every event that exists carries a full SSID,
so the failure is binary at the reader level.

Since 24H2 Windows gates WlanQueryInterface with
wlan_intf_opcode_current_connection — the only opcode we use — behind
precise-location consent and returns ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED. The consent prompt
only fires for a process in the user's context outside System32, so the agent
(SYSTEM, session 0, before the OOBE privacy page) is denied silently, and it
resolves consent from the HKLM ConsentStore because the S-1-5-18 hive has none
— while the interactive user on the same machine reads the SSID fine via the
per-user NonPackaged value. That is why it tracks the image's location setting,
not hardware, driver or language.

netsh wlan hangs off the same gate, so the 2026-07 netsh fallback and its
multi-language labels never covered the case they were built for; more labels
cannot fix it.

- New WinRtWifiSsidReader: Microsoft's documented replacement
  WlanConnectionProfileDetails.GetConnectedSsid (ungated, SSID only), bound via
  the CLR WinRT projection — no winmd, no NuGet, no csproj change — the same
  mechanism OobeStateReader already uses from the SYSTEM context.
- New WifiInfoProvider owns the tier order (native -> WinRT -> netsh) that both
  collectors had duplicated.
- The step diagnostics added in 2026-07 were logged at Debug while the default
  level is Info, so they never reached a field log. The all-tiers-failed case is
  now a Warning that decodes rc=5 into the location-gate explanation.

Signal, PHY and channel have no ungated source and stay null on tier 2;
deriving a percentage from GetSignalBars would fabricate precision.

Verified: build 0 warnings, agent suite 2542/2542, interop struct sizes measured
live (532/604), and the full WinRT chain resolves and returns the SSID under
net48.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 13:27:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach aab0a0c52c feat(admin): make report ID one-click copyable in report details
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 12:45:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f22feb71ff feat(web): exclude events from the session timeline search
The timeline search box now tokenizes the query instead of treating it as a
single substring: terms are AND-ed and a leading minus hides its matches
(e.g. -app_install_progress), following the convention every other search box
uses. Quoting keeps a term literal, so an exit code like "-1" stays searchable.

The negation is decided at a token's first character, before a quote is
consumed, and terms match the same fields as the positive search (event type,
message, source) joined by a newline so a term can never match across a field
boundary. The event counter follows the search and an active exclusion is
named in a pill next to the severity filters.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 14:33:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c92fe7c2a0 commands: bump to 3061dca (cert tenant binding queries in backend-logs + session-debug) 2026-08-25 12:56:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b7cb75e442 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/Autopilot-Monitor 2026-08-25 12:50:12 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d6895f2c7e feat(security): enforce cert tenant binding — reject cross-tenant certificates
The Intune roots the chain is pinned to are shared by every Intune tenant, so
a valid certificate only ever proved "issued by Intune to someone". Tenant
scoping rested on the device serial, which is printed on the chassis. A
Mismatch now returns 403.

Switched on against measured data, not a hunch: 35,684 requests across 32
tenants since the shadow telemetry landed, every one a Match, with the
Warning channel independently verified to be carrying other traffic so the
zero could not be a telemetry artefact.

Only Mismatch blocks, and the rule lives in one function so "what rejects a
request" has a single answer. ExtensionMissing, Unparseable and
RequestTenantNotAGuid mean "cannot tell" and are tolerated: the sample only
covers devices active in the window, so an older certificate or a
sovereign-cloud CA could still lack the extension, and rejecting on absence
would lock those devices out for something outside their control.
ExtensionMissing is the candidate for later tightening and has its own test
pinning the tolerance, so removing it must be a decision.

Evaluation fails open on its own exception — a defect on our side is not
evidence of a cross-tenant certificate. The 403 body does not echo which
tenant the certificate belongs to; that pair goes to the rejection log.

Device binding (stage 3) is untouched: still shadow, still Global-Admin-only.

Backend 4638/4638, 0 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 12:45:21 +02:00
dependabot[bot] beac51720f build(deps): bump the web group (#135)
Bumps the web group in /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web with 4 updates: [next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js), [@next/bundle-analyzer](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/next-bundle-analyzer), [eslint-config-next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/eslint-config-next) and [vitest](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/tree/HEAD/packages/vitest).


Updates `next` from 16.3.1 to 16.3.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/compare/v16.3.1...v16.3.2)

Updates `@next/bundle-analyzer` from 16.3.1 to 16.3.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.2/packages/next-bundle-analyzer)

Updates `eslint-config-next` from 16.3.1 to 16.3.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.2/packages/eslint-config-next)

Updates `vitest` from 4.1.10 to 4.1.11
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/main/docs/releases.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commits/v4.1.11/packages/vitest)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: next
  dependency-version: 16.3.2
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@next/bundle-analyzer"
  dependency-version: 16.3.2
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: eslint-config-next
  dependency-version: 16.3.2
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: vitest
  dependency-version: 4.1.11
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-25 12:32:44 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 32268ba245 build(deps-dev): bump vitest (#134)
Bumps the mcp group in /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp with 1 update: [vitest](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/tree/HEAD/packages/vitest).


Updates `vitest` from 4.1.10 to 4.1.11
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/main/docs/releases.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commits/v4.1.11/packages/vitest)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: vitest
  dependency-version: 4.1.11
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-25 12:32:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c91d8d4501 fix(agent): complete enrollments with zero user-targeted apps instead of failing them
IME never writes its "Completed user session" line when the user has no
assigned Win32 apps - its zero-app branch returns before that statement
(ApplicationPoller.cs:713-721, identical in 1.80/1.83/1.97/1.104). So
ImeUserSessionCompletedUtc stayed null, every arm of
ShouldTransitionToAwaitingHello was unsatisfiable, and the 30-min
advisory_completion backstop resolved healthy enrollments as
esp_exit_without_completion_evidence. One tenant: 10 of 30 sessions in a week,
all false positives - DAD-validated desktop, Hello provisioned, RealmJoin still
installing. Every Succeeded session there carries ime_user_session_completed;
not one of the failed ones does.

IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS reads the line IME does write there and routes it
through the same OnUserSessionCompleted callback. That is IME's own verdict
rather than a weakened gate: the zero-app branch locks the ESP in with an empty
application list, and the sibling emit site returns ProvisioningComplete right
after logging it. Guarded to the AccountSetup phase so it cannot burn the
adapter fire-once flag on a pre-sign-in timestamp, and replayed on the phase
transition when the observation predates the phase marker. AreUserEspAppsSettled
accepts an empty app list only with that explicit observation, never on
emptiness alone.

Second, independent defect: advisory_completion (30 min) overran the RealmJoin
completion gate, which deliberately holds the session and carries its own
bounded resolution (60 min from detection, activity-extended, 4 h cap). One
session installed 25 RealmJoin packages inside the window, the last 2 min before
the failure, while completion_waiting still read "waiting on:
realmjoin_resolution". The handler now re-arms while that gate is closed and its
own deadline is still armed; convergence comes from the gate itself, which
always ends with an Outcome set.

ime_user_session_completed gains an evidence field (zero_user_apps_enumerated /
user_session_completed) - no new event type, so the Constants ->
resource-catalog -> shared-manifests triple stays untouched. The pattern ships
via the config API and reaches existing agents, where an unknown action is a
single Debug line; the behaviour needs the agent release.

Build 0 warnings. DecisionCore 558/558, V2.Core 2530/2530, Backend 4634/4634,
MCP event-types-drift 6/6.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 12:27:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach bf6850dedc perf(security): log DevPrep association shadow once per lookup, not per request
Same gate the cert-device-binding shadow got in 35a3ed0c, applied to its
sibling. Measured on the live enrollment: 263 identical shadow lines for one
device off a handful of Graph calls, because the cache answered nearly every
request and the log sat outside it.

DeviceAssociationResult.AsCacheHit() copies rather than marking the shared
cached instance, so the first real lookup is never mistaken for a cache hit
and dropped. Transient outcomes are not cached and keep logging every time.

Backend 4633/4633, 0 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 20:18:57 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 35a3ed0cfb perf(security): log device binding once per Graph lookup, not per request
Measured on the first live enrollment: 136 agent requests produced exactly
ONE Graph call, because the 30-minute positive cache absorbed the rest. So
the check is not a throttling risk (the per-request Autopilot serial
validator made 25 calls in the same window) and the positive TTL needs no
change — raising it would only delay noticing a wiped or removed device.

What the 136 requests did cost was 136 log lines all saying the same thing.
Gate the shadow log on ServedFromCache so it emits one line per real lookup.
Cached repeats carry no new information: the reported age just counts up
mechanically from the same enrolledDateTime. Outcomes that are never cached
(Transient, NoDeviceIdInCert) keep logging every time, which is what an
anomaly warrants.

AsCacheHit() copies rather than marking the shared cached instance, so the
first real lookup is never mistaken for a cache hit and dropped.

Backend 4631/4631, 0 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 19:18:37 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ea6a375c4b feat(security): cert-to-device binding, stage 3 GA-gated shadow
Tenant binding (stage 1) proves the client certificate was issued to this
tenant. It does not prove the certificate belongs to a device the tenant
still has: a cert lifted from a decommissioned machine keeps working.

IntuneDeviceBindingValidator resolves the Intune managedDevice id from the
certificate's Subject CN against the tenant's own managedDevices inventory.
Point-GET on managedDevices/{id} rather than an OData filter, so there is no
filter literal to inject into and a 404 is unambiguous. Cache/retry/transient
contract mirrors CloudPcDeviceValidator.

Shadow only, and visible only to Global Admins (same gate as the DevPrep
association preview) because the open question is a race, not an attack: a
device object can appear after the agent's first call. Every result carries
enrolledDateTime and the log line records enrolledAgeSeconds, so a device
created seconds before the request is distinguishable from a foreign cert.
Grep marker: CERT-DEVICE-BINDING-SHADOW.

The lookup is fire-and-forget like the DevPrep shadow so a cold Graph
round-trip never sits in the agent request path. That rules out stage 1's
request-row dimension (the row is written before the task finishes), hence
the Warning log; widening beyond preview should move to inline + dimension.

Needs DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All, granted per tenant via the
customer script as feature IntuneDeviceBinding. The script's catalog,
ValidateSet and help block stay pinned to GraphFeatureCatalog by
GraphFeatureCatalogSyncTests (extended with the help-block case).

Build 0 warnings, backend 4629/4629, web 874/874, tsc clean, eslint 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 18:26:33 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fb79c7711c fix(security): carry cert tenant binding on the request row, not a dead log line
Post-deploy verification of 249e39bc found zero AgentCertTenantBinding rows
across 32k agent requests. Cause: the Match outcome was emitted with
LogInformation, and worker-side ILogger below Warning never reaches App
Insights (provider default rule is Warning+, host forwarding of worker logs
is off). The bulk outcome was therefore invisible, which is indistinguishable
from the code never running — the shadow telemetry had no denominator.

Stamp every outcome onto the request row instead (FunctionContext.Items ->
RequestTelemetryMiddleware -> CertTenantBinding dimension). That row already
exists per request and is unsampled, so the denominator costs no extra
telemetry. Non-Match outcomes keep their Warning trace with full context.

FromCache existed only to sample the dead Match line and is removed with it.

Backend 4606/4606, 0 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 16:40:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 249e39bc68 feat(security): cert tenant binding, stage 1 shadow mode
A chain-valid Intune MDM certificate only proves "issued to some tenant" —
the pinned roots are shared by every Intune tenant. Tenant scoping rested
entirely on the device serial in the downstream validators, which is not a
secret. Bind the tenant stamped into the auth cert to the requested tenant.

The Entra tenant id sits in OID 1.2.840.113556.5.14 of the cert the agent
already presents for mTLS, so this needs no Graph call, no consent and no
agent release. Not 5.6 (Intune Account id, a different GUID) and not 5.4
(device id, stored as 16 bare bytes) — the decoder handles both encodings
and now lives once in Shared, used by agent and backend.

Stage 1 observes only: ObserveCertTenantBinding returns void and swallows
its own exceptions, so it cannot fail an otherwise valid request. Match is
logged only on cert-cache miss, keeping the denominator without per-request
volume. Grep marker for stage 2: CERT-TENANT-BINDING-SHADOW.

Backend 4604/4604, Agent V2.Core 2519/2519, 0 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 16:03:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6bd9139869 fix(agent): cert GUID parser accepts bare 16-byte extension values
Intune's MDM device cert stores the DeviceId in OID 1.2.840.113556.5.4 as a
bare 16-byte GUID with no ASN.1 wrapper, so the strict OCTET-STRING parser
bailed on the tag check and returned null. Verified against a live Intune
device cert: 5.4 is 16 raw bytes, while 5.6 / 5.11 / 5.14 carry the usual
04 10 wrapper.

- ParseGuidFromAsn1OctetString -> ParseGuidFromExtension (the old name no
  longer describes what it parses); both encodings now handled, with the
  shared LE-GUID construction pulled into ToGuid(). The forms cannot
  collide: a wrapped 16-byte GUID is always >= 18 bytes.
- Document the Intune MDM cert OID arc on the class: 5.4 DeviceId,
  5.6 Intune AccountId (NOT the Entra tenant), 5.14 Entra TenantId,
  5.11 undocumented GUID, 5.15/.16/.17/.18/.19/.23 INTEGER enums.
- 13 tests pinning both encodings plus the malformed-input rejections,
  including a bare GUID whose first byte is the 0x04 OCTET STRING tag.

No behaviour change for the MS-Organization-Access probe the agent uses;
TryGetTenantIdFromCert is untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 14:41:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 73373a2c9e feat(agent): compiled-in fallback rule catalogs for the no-config default
The built-in default config shipped empty ImeLogPatterns/GatherRules lists, so a
session that got neither a live fetch nor a cached config ran with the entire IME
tracking pipeline dead — no app installs, no script results, no health-script
compliance, no IME ESP-phase signals — although the agent binary carries all 37
action handlers. The scalar knobs never drift (shared AgentConfigResponse property
initializers are also the backend's fallbacks), but the catalogs cannot come from
initializers.

BuiltInConfigCatalog embeds the SAME CI-combined rules/dist artifacts the backend
embeds and serves (ime-log-patterns.json, gather-rules.json) and feeds the enabled
entries into CreateDefaultConfig. Single source by construction: each agent release
snapshots the catalog state of its own build, so the offline fallback can never
drift further than the running agent version itself. A live fetch (startup,
post-registration recovery, rotate_config) always wins. Fail-soft: a load error
degrades to the previous empty-list behaviour.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 12:14:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6d607c9045 fix(agent): network-link gate before initial config fetch + post-registration recovery
Root cause (tenant aebdce78 audit 2026-08-24, session ba828038): on boot-time
relaunches the agent starts before the Wi-Fi link is up. The Phase 4 config fetch
had no network gate (98f8114d only guarded Phase 6 registration), burned its
10/30/60s retry budget into a dead link and stranded the whole session on built-in
defaults (ConfigVersion=0) — up to ~50% of that tenant's sessions, with no
self-heal short of a manual rotate_config action. Not a version regression: rates
varied wildly per day within the same agent build; the failed requests never
reached the backend.

Two complementary layers:
- RemoteConfigService gates the initial fetch on the shared NetworkLinkWait poll
  (60s cap — longer than registration's 15s because the fetch runs first), so the
  retry budget starts on a live link. rotate_config stays ungated (latency-bound).
- Phase 6.5: after registration proves the backend reachable, TryRecoverConfigAsync
  refetches once and AgentRuntimeConfig.TryRecoverAfterRegistration re-applies the
  live config (same merge/integrity pipeline as Phase 4). LastFetch* keeps the
  original failure record; remote_config_fetch_failed reports it with a recovered
  flag at Info severity, agent_started flags remoteConfigRecovered.

Deliberately not re-run in recovery: kill-signal check (telemetry-channel control
signals cover post-registration kills) and endpoint migration (next start).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 11:53:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3af94d9dcd infra(telemetry): DCR also drops host-emitted successful SignalR dependencies
Live-verified after 0d5e2572 deploy: the worker filter removes every 404/412/409
and worker SignalR row, but the SignalR output-binding calls are emitted by the
host process (SDK rdddsc) and only reachable at ingestion.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 19:15:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0d5e2572aa perf(telemetry): one canonical request record; drop expected storage outcomes and SignalR success deps
- RequestTelemetryMiddleware: SamplingPercentage=100 per item (worker copy was
  adaptively sampled, ItemCount 2-5 on weekdays, despite host.json excludedTypes)
- StorageDependencyFilterProcessor: also drop 404/412/409 storage outcomes
  (InProc + HTTP shape) and successful *.service.signalr.net REST calls
- infra/appinsights-workspace-transforms.bicep: DCR dropping the host HTTP
  request duplicate at ingestion (timer/queue rows kept)
- docs/backend/telemetry-ingest-shaping.md; skills updated

Measured baseline 7d: ~1.3 GB/week removed, requests now 100% with tenant context.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 18:31:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 793e907e60 fix(cveindex): merge findings per CVE before upsert; bounded parallelism
One CVE commonly appears under many findings of the same report (e.g. one
RD CVE across 14 installed RD components). Each occurrence produced its own
concurrent upsert on the same PK/RK, so the stored SoftwareName/OverallRisk
was race-dependent. Collapse to one entity per CVE (highest CVSS wins,
IsKev OR-ed, OverallRisk max) and write with Parallel.ForEachAsync(8) and
per-entity fail-soft logging instead of Task.WhenAll + one outer catch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 17:52:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8e8bb66371 test(agent): thread-safe FakeSignalIngressSink (parked-tripwire CI flake)
Timer-thread Post() appended to a bare List while the test polled it in a
SpinWait foreach -> 'Collection was modified' (run 32644425162, no assert
text). Posted now returns a locked snapshot.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 16:28:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7e1389cf32 fix(ratelimit): keep history and lock in one cache entry; drop leaking per-key lock map
Both sliding-window limiters re-Set the cache entry without its eviction callback.
The replaced entry fired the callback asynchronously, removing the per-key lock while
a new one was already handed out, so two threads could mutate the same List under
different locks; the replacement entry never cleaned its lock, leaking one object per
key for the process lifetime.

The history now lives in a RequestBucket together with its own lock: same list ⇒ same
lock, no callback, no dictionary. Bucket creation is serialized (GetOrCreate is not
atomic) behind a lock-free TryGetValue fast path. The redundant re-Set is gone — the
lookup already refreshes the sliding expiration.

Concurrency tests (16 threads × 500 requests, one key) fail 3/3 on the old code and
pass on the new one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 16:26:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3a89319472 feat(telemetry): startup duration metrics for backend and MCP
StartupTelemetryService emits BackendStartupMs (process start ->
ApplicationStarted) and BackendTableInitMs as App Insights custom
metrics with version/commit/tableInitFullPass/instance dimensions;
TableStorageService exposes LastInitialization. MCP server writes one
{"type":"boot","readyMs"} stderr line per start next to the
tool_call lines so cold-start time is queryable as a trend.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 16:04:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b37e6f975c perf(startup): table schema sentinel gates CreateTableIfNotExists pass
Cold start point-reads a SHA-256 over TableNames.All stored in
AdminConfiguration/SchemaSentinel/tables instead of issuing 66
CreateTableIfNotExists calls. Missing/stale sentinel runs the full
idempotent pass once and rewrites it. SessionsIndex startup backfill
only after a full pass, behind a conditional-insert claim (one instance
under scale-out); IsSessionIndexEmptyAsync no longer treats errors as
empty. Daily maintenance runs IStorageInitializer.EnsureAllAsync to
repair out-of-band table deletions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 15:33:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach cacbd24667 feat(mcp): get_verdict_calibration response shaping (explicit nulls, minSharePct/top, omitted report)
Drop per-row window7/baseline28.sessions (duplicated trend denominators), make
reEnrollRatePct/lift always present with null = withheld, add minSharePct/top
tail trimming that never drops override-carrying rows and reports what was
omitted. Backend wire shape and admin page untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 12:51:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a157d98a40 fix(radar): verdict share regression only for backend-decided paths
First production pass alerted on agent:whiteglove_pending (two tenants in a
WhiteGlove rollout week) and agent:complete_soft (a Continue-Anyway tenant) —
customer workflow mix, not classifier drift. agent:* and register:* are now
ineligible for share_regression (still in the matrix and the silence group);
episodes opened by the broader gate re-arm on the next pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 12:32:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7fa50d09c1 perf(maintenance): one projected 35d Sessions scan shared by all rolling sweeps
The cross-tenant StartedAt-only date-range query is a full-table drain in
Table Storage; time attribution, device journeys, verdict calibration and the
calibration radar's tenant discovery each ran their own — four identical reads
per 2h tick. RunAllAsync / RunManualAsync now load the window once through
GetMaintenanceWindowSessionsAsync (MaintenanceSweepSessionProjection: the union
of the sweeps' columns, drops FailureSnapshotJson/geo/OS/diagnostics) and the
sweeps slice it by StartedAt. MaintenanceSweepProjectionEquivalenceTests pins
that every consumed field survives the projection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 12:19:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 94afc02e62 docs(okf): verdict calibration concept (VerdictPath, prior verdicts, aggregate, radar)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 11:40:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5e4c5e80be feat: verdict calibration drift radar (share / silence / evidence-gap) with ops events
Applies the rule-regression statistics (7d vs 28d, lift >=2, Wilson-separated,
small-n gates) to the verdict-calibration rows: per-path share regression,
sweep+maxlife silence-share regression (agent liveness signal) and an
absolute r6 evidence-gap gate. Episodes live in the notification tracker
(verdictcalibration|kind|path|status), fire one VerdictCalibrationDrift ops
event (operator-only, no tenant bell), re-arm under 1.5x / 15%, and surface as
alerts[] + a Drift pill in the calibration matrix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 11:39:06 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b535973531 feat: verdict calibration aggregate, GA endpoint, MCP tool and operator matrix
Daily (tenant x StartedAt date) buckets per verdict path: count, derived
attribution, 7-day re-enrollment proxy (eligible/re-enrolled), and the
correction stream attributed to the PRIOR path (admin / late completion /
other). Written by the 2h maintenance sweep after the device-journey pass,
180d retention, regenerable. Read via GET global/metrics/verdict-calibration
(GlobalReadOrAdmin, 7d-vs-28d share trend, rates withheld below n=20),
the get_verdict_calibration MCP tool, and the admin metrics section.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 11:22:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7e0c578a59 feat(backend): VerdictPath + PriorStatus/PriorVerdictPath on every session status write
Every status writer now declares the code path that produced the status
(VerdictPaths vocabulary, stamped for all statuses — unlike FailureSource
which is Failed-only), the timeout classifier returns its rule id, and a
write that overrides a prior verdict preserves it as PriorStatus/
PriorVerdictPath (admin mark, late completion, retro). Pre-instrumentation
rows derive a path read-side (VerdictPathDerivation, legacy:* when
ambiguous). Foundation for the verdict calibration aggregate + radar.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 11:06:37 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1257e0d195 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/Autopilot-Monitor 2026-08-23 09:57:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 98f8114d90 fix(classification): self-deploying profiles reconcile to Succeeded after Device Setup, never AwaitingUser
Kiosk tenant audit 2026-08-23: 836 of ~970 self-deploying sessions in one week
were parked AwaitingUser ("Account Setup 0/5") and graduated to Incomplete 51h
later although the devices were finished — the profile has no user phase, so the
classifier's rule 5 was asking for evidence that can never arrive.

- EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier: new rule 1c IsSelfDeployingProvisioned (profile flag +
  Device Setup all-succeeded + no explicit failure) => Succeeded reconcile with an
  honest reason; isSelfDeployingProfile passed by every caller (sweep stage 1+2,
  max-lifetime verdict, late-telemetry heal, legacy retro mode).
- MaintenanceService stage 1: TryReconcileSelfDeployingAsync gate before the Stalled
  marker (mirrors the WhiteGlove Part-2 gate), audit counter SessionsSelfDeployingReconciled.
- LegacyReclassificationService: new admin mode self_deploying_silent (heal-only,
  dry-run by default) + GetSelfDeployingSilentSessionsAsync for the existing backlog.
- Agent SessionRegistrationHelper: wait up to 15s for a network link and retry 6x
  (~62s) instead of 5x (~30s) so the BootTrigger relaunch on Wi-Fi no longer exits 7
  before the link is back (the mechanism that left these sessions silent).
- Tests: 6 classifier cases (gate, within/past grace, user-driven guard, failure,
  pre-Device-Setup), 2 registration tests; docs/backend/silent-session-classification.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 09:55:06 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7b3230d507 fix(web): mobile wrapping for App Details header, Software tables and SLA banner (#133) 2026-08-23 05:19:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 87b7a20223 fix(web): diagnostics path rows wrap the full path on narrow screens
Below `sm` the path owns the first line(s) and wraps in full (flex-wrap,
basis-full, break-all) with badges and controls flowing onto the next line —
a path truncated to "C:\…" is useless on a phone and a tooltip cannot be
hovered there. From `sm` up the row stays a single truncated line. The
"N file types" pill is shown on every width again now that the badge line
has room.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 04:30:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4c19be1de4 feat(web): drop Experimental/Pre-Release badges from Software Inventory & Vulnerability Analyzer
Settings section loses both pills; the vulnerability report footer keeps the
best-effort CVE matching note without the Experimental prefix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 04:26:55 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 93de130cd1 feat(diagnostics): built-in collection catalog visible in the portal, RealmJoin + Device Preparation sections gated
The diagnostics package's built-in collection is now ONE catalog in Shared
(DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.All): the agent iterates it when building the ZIP and
the backend serves the same list to the portal (GET /api/diagnostics/paths,
MemberRead), so what administrators see is exactly what the agent collects.

Agent
- New conditional sections: RealmJoin client/package/Chocolatey/per-user logs
  behind the tenant's RealmJoin Watcher toggle (mirrored onto
  AgentConfiguration.EnableRealmJoinWatcher by RemoteConfigMerger) and the Device
  Preparation bootstrapper event log behind the deterministic WDP marker (probe
  once per build, fail toward Classic). ZIP layout mirrors the disk
  (RealmJoinLogs/Windows|Choco|User). Every skip is a package-manifest line.
- Built-ins bypass DiagnosticsPathGuards by design (reviewed code); caps,
  reparse-point skip and evtx export still apply. No ConfigVersion bump.

Backend
- GET diagnostics/paths (MemberRead, JWT-scoped) with the catalog + global paths.
- MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths: global ∪ tenant dedup (trimmed, case-insensitive) —
  duplicates used to produce duplicate ZIP entry names.

Web
- Collapsed read-only built-in list (RealmJoin on/off in the tenant header,
  neutral in the Global-Admin view), one-line DiagnosticsPathRow for every entry,
  add-row above the lists; tenant context no longer fetches /api/global/config.

Tests: agent RealmJoin on/off, no user session, bootstrapper evtx, probe failure,
merger mirror; backend catalog invariants, payload shape, dedup, policy; web
builtInSectionDisplay. Docs: docs/agent/diagnostics-package.md (+index/log).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 04:09:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b8b95c7e76 refactor(web): move RealmJoin Watcher and Keep Awake from Agent Analyzers to Agent Settings
Both toggles gate collector hosts / device behavior, not IAgentAnalyzers, and
tenants looked for them under Agent Settings. RealmJoin Watcher now sits in the
Agent Collectors card, Keep Awake During User-ESP in Agent Parameters; OOBE
console detection stays with the security analyzers. Section ownership in
SECTION_FIELD_MAP and the per-section reset handlers follow, the Agent Settings
Save/Reset bar moves below both cards it saves, and the Analyzers sidebar
description names all four checks. Wire contract (AnalyzerConfiguration) and
agent are unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 04:06:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e57e081cec docs(web): Discord in notification-provider copy on about, privacy, settings and rule card
Privacy page last-updated bumped to 23 August 2026.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 02:47:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3a60186824 revert(email): drop the gradient slant row and corner cell — solid fallbacks made non-gradient clients worse
Back to the 838da4cc header: one facet gradient, three-row brand mark, 113px
band, clip-path edge for clients that support it. Clients without gradient
support get a flat band instead of band-coloured blocks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 02:30:40 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c35595503f feat(email): header slant and light corner facet without clip-path — gradients Outlook can draw
Row 1 keeps the single facet gradient and adds a top-right cell with its own
dark/light split (the corner facet); row 2 draws the slanted bottom edge as a
green/white gradient in three band-coloured cells. Pixel-measured against the
reference render: band boundaries identical.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 02:22:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 838da4cc8a fix(email): single Outlook-safe facet gradient, no bgcolor inside the brand mark
Outlook web/iOS render exactly one linear-gradient with hex colours and % stops
(multiple layers / rgba stops are dropped), and dark mode inverts cell
backgrounds but not border colours — the white cell in the mark became a black
bar. Facets are now one gradient (top-right light corner dropped), the mark's
middle row is a white-bordered div.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 02:11:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a9937e0f5d fix(email): brand mark as three non-overlapping rows — Outlook ignores negative margins
Triangle / white cell + triangle / triangle, no overlays, no transparent td
borders; matches the reference mark in a side-by-side zoom render.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 02:02:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1dc2cc9a54 fix(email): header rebuilt 1:1 from the approved banner — faceted gradients and four-edge brand mark
Verified side-by-side against the reference render (scratch header-render.html):
three layered half-plane gradients reproduce the light/dark facets, the mark is
a CSS trapezoid plus two green wedges for the slanted right edge and the
descending bottom edge. Still no images in the mail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 01:44:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach dd7ae299a8 fix(email): header restored to the approved rendering (e1de5a89 geometry)
112deg stripe gradient, 13/20/2 border-drawn mark, clip-path edge — the version
the user signed off on; later 'improvements' drifted from it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 01:23:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d96d10ccec fix(email): header matches the reference banner — mark 12/21/0 trapezoid, stripes thin/wide/thin in the proven 8-stop gradient form
Verified against the original SVG mark in a Chromium render; the gradient keeps
the exact stop count that rendered in Outlook earlier.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 01:05:12 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 457fff65f5 fix(email): brand mark back to the div border trick (Outlook paints transparent td borders white)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 00:56:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach dc45694611 docs(okf): email template overrides and image-free mail header
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 00:50:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7569061983 feat(admin): editable email templates — preview, test send and HTML override in Settings
- EmailTemplateService: override-or-built-in resolution per send (PreviewConfig
  table, partition EmailTemplates, 5-min cache, {{domainName}} placeholder,
  30k limit); send path fail-soft, admin read path strict
- GA endpoints global/email-templates/{kind} (GET/PUT/DELETE) and /test, which
  mails the effective template or an unsaved draft to the caller's tenant
  contact address
- portal: Settings → Email Templates with preview frame, test send, HTML editor
- mail header: brand mark drawn with CSS borders, no images left in the mails

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 00:50:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0f5e36db94 fix(email): exact brand mark as PNG again, stripes direction and widths match the reference
The CSS border trapezoid did not reproduce the mark's shape across clients; the
mark is brand identity, so it is the one image in the mail (empty alt). Stripes
now run top-left to bottom-right, thin/wide/thin as in the reference banner.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 00:40:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e1de5a8971 feat(email): image-free header — CSS stripes, slanted edge and border-drawn brand mark
Progressive enhancement: solid bgcolor band + text wordmark everywhere; the
brand mark is a CSS border trapezoid; diagonal stripes (linear-gradient) and the
slanted bottom edge (clip-path) render where supported and degrade to a flat
band elsewhere. No remote images left in either mail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 00:22:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a2d93e884c fix(email): native HTML header that survives blocked images
Solid bgcolor band with the wordmark as real text; only the 36px brand mark is
an image (empty alt). Replaces the full-width header PNG, which collapsed to a
bare green bar on clients that block remote images (iOS Mail).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 00:15:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 425229deee feat(email): branded header image, sign-in link, drop preview banner in welcome/farewell mails
- header is a hosted PNG (www/email/header.png, rendered from the brand mark +
  wordmark) on a solid bgcolor band; mail clients drop CSS gradients, which left
  the old header white
- welcome mail links "sign in" to the portal, active-development banner removed
- em dashes replaced with en dashes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 23:55:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8675e7ee06 feat(backend): provider-neutral EmailService on Mailchimp Transactional (Mandrill), replaces Resend
- EmailService + IEmailService: Mandrill messages/send via typed HttpClient with the
  Notification resilience policy; provider confined to one transport method and the
  Email:* settings (ApiKey, Endpoint, FromAddress, FromName). Resend NuGet dropped.
- open/click tracking explicitly off; sent/queued/scheduled = ok, rejected/invalid = warn
- callers (TenantApprovalService, PreviewWhitelistFunction) depend on IEmailService
- EmailServiceTests pin wire format, result semantics and fail-soft contract
- privacy page + OKF welcome-mail doc updated for the new sub-processor

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 23:26:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e857e99436 fix(web): list Generic JSON provider last in channel provider dropdown
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 21:54:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6435d5f290 feat(notifications): Discord webhook provider + HMAC signing for generic webhooks
Discord (provider 30) renders alerts as a single embed with Discord's
field/length caps; actions become markdown links since webhooks cannot
post buttons. Generic JSON channels gain an optional per-channel signing
secret: requests carry X-AutopilotMonitor-Timestamp and
X-AutopilotMonitor-Signature (sha256 hex HMAC over "{timestamp}.{body}"),
computed over the exact posted JSON with same-named custom headers
stripped first. Secret is redacted for readers and restored by channel
id on save; validation enforces 16-128 printable ASCII characters.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 21:09:12 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 445ce4e75b feat(backend): 30-day retention grace period on Pro downgrade
Retention was the only enforcement point that destroyed state on a
Pro -> Community downgrade: the 12-hourly sweep clamps to the Community
cap at read time and would immediately start hard-deleting the
90-365-day band (trial expiry identical, silently).

New policy: for 30 days after losing Pro
(FeatureEntitlementCatalog.RetentionDowngradeGraceDays) the Pro cap
keeps applying. Anchor model: ProDowngradedUtc (backend-only field,
patch-denied + revert-protected) stamped/cleared by the plan endpoint's
new pure ApplyPlanChanges core on EFFECTIVE-edition transitions (covers
explicitly ended trials; a planTier downgrade under an active trial
deliberately does not stamp); trial expiry anchors read-time via
TrialExpiresUtc. days<=0 (infinite) stays untouched.

Ops visibility: TenantPlanDowngraded (PATCH handler, new OpsEventService
dep) plus TenantRetentionGraceExpiring/Ended from the daily
TrialExpirySweep with the same stateless window mechanics, emitted only
when stored retention exceeds the Community cap; all dual-registered in
the web OPS_EVENT_TYPES catalog. Fanout now uses its _utcNow seam
instead of inline DateTime.UtcNow. OKF doc
backend/plan-downgrade-retention-grace.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 21:00:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4e54ffe4b4 feat(web): shared plan cards, public /plans and /buy pages
Community/Pro comparison cards extracted into a shared module
(components/plans: planData.ts as single copy source, PlanCards.tsx with
marketing/portal surfaces) so the portal Plan section and the new public
/plans page can never drift. Pro price is one constant (null renders
"Pricing - announced soon").

New public pages following the /help pattern: /plans (free-first
messaging, nav item "Plans") and /buy (direct purchase + Microsoft
Marketplace as coming-soon channels). Landing nav, footer, FinalCta and
get-started now link to /plans instead of the docs plans page; portal
Plan section links to /buy via absolute www URL. Purple utilities
neutralized inside .dark .landing-v2; sitemap/robots/lastmod cover
/plans, /buy and the previously missing /help.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 19:46:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 65d45a616e feat(web): Community Edition tag under navbar wordmark
Community tenants see a small "Community Edition" line under the brand
wordmark as a standing reminder (and nudge toward upgrade options); Pro
tenants (incl. trial) keep clean chrome. Label renders only after the
feature-flags fetch confirms the edition - no flash for Pro while loading.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 19:38:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4aa1f07fbb feat(web): green welcome accent + session-dismissable dev banner with telemetry
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 19:17:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ede616444a fix(web): honest skip/uninstall/pending semantics in Download/Install Progress
IME reports skips and uninstall enforcements through the same completed
events, so both panels counted them as successful installs/downloads and
their pills contradicted the app_tracking_summary headers (session 502274b4:
"2 of 8 installed" vs "6 completed").

- Install fold: app_install_completed with state Skipped -> Skipped;
  successful uninstall intent -> new terminal state Uninstalled with its own
  pill and neutral row badge; completed now counts only real installs.
- Download fold: rows are classified by observed byte activity, never by
  intent (Win32 uninstalls re-download the full package and stay visible
  with an Uninstall badge); 0-byte rows sit behind a "no download" toggle.
- Both panels render tracker-known pending apps (summary pendingNames)
  behind a "pending" toggle, so every "X of Y" header fully adds up.
- Headers wrap on narrow screens (flex-wrap + gap instead of space-x).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 18:42:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 61a359ee54 feat(web): public /help page for support channels
Adds www.autopilotmonitor.com/help as a mail-linkable page describing how
to get help: Report Session in the portal for session-specific problems,
GitHub Issues for everything else, LinkedIn for private contact, plus
self-service links (docs, FAQ, announcements, changelog) and the private
security-advisory path. Registered as public path in hostRouting (guard
test pinned) and linked from the site footer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 18:12:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach babc89c776 fix(backend): park silent WhiteGlove Part-2 sessions as AwaitingUser instead of Stalled
fairstone.ca analysis 2026-08-21: after the reseal-reboot technicians routinely
power devices off at the logon screen to box them. Both silence paths (2h
maintenance sweep, agent stall probe) then labeled the expected parking state
"Stalled - Agent silent", and stage 2 later reconciled it to Succeeded on the
Part-1 whiteglove_complete with a reason claiming Account Setup completed.

- EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier: shared pure gate IsWhiteGloveAwaitingUser
  (pre-provisioned + ResumedAt + Device Setup provisioned + zero user evidence
  since resume) with one canonical customer-facing reason; new rollup field
  HasEnrollmentComplete separates real completions from Part-1 whiteglove_complete
- ClassifyTimedOutSession: gated sessions are AwaitingUser within grace and
  reconcile past grace with an honest WhiteGlove reason; on resumed sessions
  whiteglove_complete no longer counts as terminal-complete evidence (rule 2),
  so partial user progress falls through to the honest AwaitingUser/Incomplete rules
- MaintenanceService stage 1 + session_stalled ingest mapping apply the same
  gate (fail-soft to Stalled); sweep audit now carries SessionsAwaitingUser
- Callsites (stage 2, max-lifetime verdict, late-telemetry reconcile, legacy
  reclassification) pass IsPreProvisioned/ResumedAt through

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 22:30:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a2f448cad0 fix(web): day-scale duration formatting in network timeline
fmtDuration rolls hours into days above 24h ("768d 8h" instead of
"18440h 58m") - minutes are noise at day scale. Surfaced by the first
fleet session with a CMOS clock years off (0bd4af1c, 2024 -> 2026 step);
also keeps the slanted clock-marker label inside its headroom. Test
pinned on the real fleet delta.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 21:05:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f15e115dea fix(sessions): backfilled system-timeline events no longer anchor StartedAt/duration
Field case d0c5b672: a pre-agent system_clock_changed event (backfilled from
the Windows event log with its original timestamp, ~14min before the first
real activity) became the partition's earliest row and re-anchored the
session's StartedAt, inflating the duration toward pre-enrollment OOBE idle
time. With the watcher's 24h backfill lookback, the 2h backward-shift guard
only caps this effect, it does not prevent it.

SystemTimelineWatcher rows (clock steps, sleep episodes) are environment
observation, not enrollment activity, and are now excluded from all three
anchor derivations: the Events-table earliest-row probe (new
IsSessionAnchorEligible, probe scans past ineligible rows), the ingest
batch's EarliestEventTimestamp fold, and the web's client-side
enrollment-duration derivation. The events themselves stay on the timeline
unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 20:18:57 +02:00
286 changed files with 17438 additions and 2181 deletions
+14
View File
@@ -128,6 +128,15 @@ user-ESP Install-intent apps are still pending (IME logs "Completed user session
*pass*, not once per session — sessions 14690fc2/6cb01530). The reducer stays free of
app-pending guards; adapters sanitize evidence before it becomes a signal.
**Zero user-targeted apps** (sessions 81daa77f/75d6ae8e): IME never writes its
"Completed user session" line at all when the user has no assigned apps — its zero-app
branch returns first — so fact 3 was unreachable by construction and every such device
fell through to the backstop. `IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS` reads the line IME *does*
write there and posts the same signal, guarded to the AccountSetup phase. The event
carries an `evidence` field (`zero_user_apps_enumerated` vs `user_session_completed`)
naming which observation carried the completion. See
[zero-user-apps-completion-gate.md](zero-user-apps-completion-gate.md).
## Completion attempt sites and sequence
Completion can be attempted from whichever fact arrives last: `HelloResolved`,
@@ -166,6 +175,11 @@ advisory backstop. All routes converge on `CompleteThroughFinalizingOrDefer`:
scheduler contract) dead-ends as `realmjoin_timeout_stale_superseded_by_rearm`.
The idle case (detected, no deployment activity ever) times out at 60 min
unchanged, and phase 200/210 activity never extends.
A closed gate also outranks the 30-minute `AdvisoryCompletion` backstop: that
handler re-arms (trigger suffix `:CompletionGateHolding`) instead of failing while
the RealmJoin gate is closed *and* its own deadline is still armed, because the gate
carries a bounded resolution of its own. Before this, the shorter timer always won —
session 75d6ae8e was failed 2 min after its 25th successful RealmJoin package.
2. `Finalizing` stage + ~5 s `FinalizingGrace` deadline.
3. Grace fires → `Completed`, `EnrollmentComplete` outcome, `enrollment_complete`
timeline event with full audit payload.
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@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
---
type: concept
title: Diagnostics Package
description: What the agent's diagnostics ZIP contains and why — the built-in section catalog shared with the portal, the RealmJoin and Device Preparation collection gates, the configured-path guards, caps, and the package manifest.
resource: agent
tags: [diagnostics, realmjoin, device-preparation, guardrails, portal]
timestamp: 2026-08-23
---
# Schema
The diagnostics package is the agent's last-resort support artifact: a ZIP built in memory
by `DiagnosticsPackageService.BuildArchiveBytes` and uploaded through a short-lived SAS
URL at the end of a session, at the WhiteGlove seal (`Always` mode) or on a server-requested
on-demand collection ([server actions](../backend/server-actions-on-demand-diagnostics.md)).
## Archive layout
```
sessioninfo.txt session/tenant/device/outcome, hardware via WMI
<built-in sections> catalog order, see below
AdditionalLogs/<last folder>/ admin-configured paths (global ∪ tenant)
package-manifest.txt every packaging decision (always written)
_TRUNCATED.txt only when a cap skipped something
```
## The built-in catalog is the single source of truth
Everything the package collects **before** any configured path is data, not code paths:
`DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.All` in Shared (`Models/Diagnostics/DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.cs`).
The agent iterates it in order; the backend serves the same list to the portal
(`GET /api/diagnostics/paths`, MemberRead) so what administrators see is exactly what the
agent does. There is no second copy to drift.
| Id | ZIP folder | Source (unexpanded) | Patterns | Recursive | Condition |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| AgentLogs | `AgentLogs` | `%ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor\Logs` | log patterns | no | Always |
| ImeLogs | `ImeLogs` | `%ProgramData%\Microsoft\IntuneManagementExtension\Logs` | log patterns | no | Always |
| ImeBootstrapperEventLog | `ImeLogs` | `C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs` | `BootstrapperAgentServiceLogProvider.evtx` | no | DevicePreparation |
| AgentState | `AgentState` | `%ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor\State` | log patterns + `*.complete`, `*.marker` | yes | Always |
| AgentSpool | `AgentSpool` | `%ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor\Spool` | `*.jsonl`, `*.json` | no | Always |
| AgentMarkers | `AgentMarkers` | `%ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor` | `*.complete`, `*.marker` | no | Always |
| RealmJoinWindows | `RealmJoinLogs/Windows` | `C:\Windows\Logs` | `realmjoin*.log` | no | RealmJoinWatcher |
| RealmJoinPackages | `RealmJoinLogs/Windows/RealmJoin` | `C:\Windows\Logs\RealmJoin` | `*.log` | yes | RealmJoinWatcher |
| RealmJoinChoco | `RealmJoinLogs/Choco` | `%ProgramData%\RealmJoin\choco\logs` | `*.log` | yes | RealmJoinWatcher |
| RealmJoinUserTray | `RealmJoinLogs/User` | `%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\AppData\Local\RealmJoin` | `tray*.log` | no | RealmJoinWatcher |
| RealmJoinUserLogs | `RealmJoinLogs/User/Logs` | `%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\AppData\Local\RealmJoin\Logs` | `*.log` | yes | RealmJoinWatcher |
"Log patterns" = `*.log *.txt *.json *.jsonl *.etl *.evtx *.xml *.csv *.cab`. The five
`Always` sections are the historical layout (PR1-B forensics) and are lock-tested in order;
the RealmJoin ZIP layout mirrors the disk (`C:\Windows\Logs\{realmjoin*.log, RealmJoin\…}` →
`RealmJoinLogs/Windows/…`, `%LOCALAPPDATA%\RealmJoin\{tray*.log, Logs\…}` →
`RealmJoinLogs/User/…`), so a flat section and a tree section never produce the same entry
name. Two sections may share a ZIP folder only when they read different source folders
(`ImeLogs` + the bootstrapper evtx) — `(ZipFolder, SourceFolder)` pairs are unique.
### Conditions
`DiagnosticsSectionCondition` is evaluated by the agent (`IsSectionActive`, pure) against its
effective configuration and the enrollment scenario; unknown values fail closed.
* **RealmJoinWatcher** — the tenant's RealmJoin Watcher toggle
(`AnalyzerConfiguration.EnableRealmJoinWatcher`). The package service only sees
`AgentConfiguration`, so `RemoteConfigMerger` mirrors that one Analyzers knob onto
`AgentConfiguration.EnableRealmJoinWatcher` (the RealmJoin host keeps reading the remote
block). Deliberately NOT additionally gated on the compile-time `RealmJoinTrackingEnabled`
kill switch: if the live watcher is ever disabled, the logs become more useful, not less.
No ConfigVersion bump — no new wire field.
* **DevicePreparation** — `EnrollmentRegistryDetector.IsDeterministicDevicePreparation()`,
the same deterministic `DevicePreparation\BootstrapperAgent\ExecutionContext` marker every
other WDP gate keys on ([WDP scenario gates](wdp-scenario-gates.md)); CloudAssigned*
fallback rules count as Classic. The probe is a registry read, evaluated once per build
(`SCENARIO: devicePreparation=… realmJoinWatcher=…` in the manifest); a probe failure is
treated as Classic and logged — the evtx export is skipped, never the package. The channel
is exclusively locked while active, so the existing `wevtutil epl` export path
(`ResolveChannelForEvtxFile`, field case 2026-08-17) handles it.
Inactive sections are never silent: `BUILT-IN SKIPPED (RealmJoin Watcher disabled): <Id>`,
`BUILT-IN SKIPPED (not a Device Preparation enrollment): <Id>`,
`BUILT-IN SKIPPED (no user session for token): <Id> '<source>'` (the
`%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%` token resolves via `UserProfileResolver` only once an
interactive user exists — identical to configured paths). Active ones log
`BUILT-IN: <Id> -> folder='…' zip='…' recursive=…` followed by the per-pattern
`ADDED / NO MATCH / FOLDER MISSING` lines.
## Built-ins bypass the configured-path guards — on purpose
`DiagnosticsPathGuards` ([gather-rule guardrails](../rules/gather-rule-guardrails.md))
validates **admin-typed** paths: allowlisted prefixes, wildcard only in the last segment,
`C:\Users` blocked except the token's `AppData\Local|Roaming`. The catalog is reviewed code,
exactly like the five sections that never went through the guard before — and
`%ProgramData%\RealmJoin` is not on the allowlist at all. What does apply to every section:
the reparse-point skip (files and directories), the `.evtx` channel export, and the caps
(100 MB per file, 500 MB total, 5000 files) tracked globally across sections by
`BudgetTracker`, with every skip recorded in the manifest and `_TRUNCATED.txt`.
## Configured paths: global ∪ tenant
`GetAgentConfigFunction.MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths` sends global paths (Global Admin,
`AdminConfiguration.DiagnosticsGlobalLogPathsJson`) first, then tenant paths
(`TenantConfiguration.DiagnosticsLogPathsJson`), dropping blank entries and collapsing
duplicates (trimmed, case-insensitive) onto the first occurrence — a path present in both
lists used to produce duplicate ZIP entry names. The agent keys each entry's ZIP folder on
the last directory name (`AdditionalLogs/<folder>`), so two configured paths ending in a
same-named folder share one ZIP folder.
## Portal surfaces
* Global Admin → Settings → Diagnostics Log Paths: the built-in catalog (collapsed, read-only,
neutral condition pills) above the editable global list; add-row first.
* Tenant → Settings → Agent → Diagnostics Package: built-in catalog (header carries the
tenant's persisted RealmJoin Watcher state, RealmJoin rows show on/off), the global paths
read-only, then the tenant's own entries; every role with a tenant membership can read the
catalog (the route is MemberRead, JWT-scoped). One line per entry (`DiagnosticsPathRow`),
full values in tooltips.
## Test seams
* `DiagnosticsPackageService` internal ctor: the five historical folder overrides map onto
catalog ids; `sectionFolderOverrides` covers any other section; `devicePreparationProbe`
replaces the registry read (seam callers default to "not WDP", so existing rigs never touch
the registry). `UserProfileResolver.SetForTesting(path|null)` / `Reset()` drive the token.
* Catalog invariants live in the backend test project (`DiagnosticsBuiltInSectionsTests`),
because Shared has no test project.
# Examples
A RealmJoin tenant (watcher on) with a signed-in user: `RealmJoinLogs/Windows/realmjoin.log`,
`RealmJoinLogs/Windows/RealmJoin/Packages/<pkg>/<timestamp>_install.log`,
`RealmJoinLogs/Choco/<pkg>/<timestamp>_install.log`, `RealmJoinLogs/User/tray.log`,
`RealmJoinLogs/User/Logs/RjImeHost.log`. The same tenant's package collected before the
desktop: the two `User` sections appear as `BUILT-IN SKIPPED (no user session for token)`.
A Classic enrollment: `BUILT-IN SKIPPED (not a Device Preparation enrollment):
ImeBootstrapperEventLog`. A tenant that had added
`%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\AppData\Local\RealmJoin\Logs\*.log` manually keeps working — the
files simply appear twice (`AdditionalLogs/Logs/…` and `RealmJoinLogs/User/Logs/…`) until the
entry is removed.
# Citations
* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Models/Diagnostics/DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.cs` — the catalog
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Runtime/DiagnosticsPackageService.cs` — `BuildArchiveBytes`, `AddBuiltInSection`, `IsSectionActive`, caps, evtx export
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Configuration/RemoteConfigMerger.cs` — `EnableRealmJoinWatcher` mirror
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Diagnostics/GetDiagnosticsPathsFunction.cs` — `GET diagnostics/paths`
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Config/GetAgentConfigFunction.cs` — `MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths`
* `src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/components/diagnostics/` — `DiagnosticsPathRow`, `BuiltInSectionsList`, `builtInSectionDisplay`
* Tests: `DiagnosticsPackageServiceTests` (RealmJoin on/off, no user session, bootstrapper evtx, probe failure), `DiagnosticsBuiltInSectionsTests`, `GetDiagnosticsPathsPayloadTests`, `GetAgentConfigFunctionTests.MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths_*`
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@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ How the on-device agent works:
* [Runtime Overview](overview.md) - lifecycle (install → boot guards → runtime → termination), collector hosts, the single-rail event pipeline to the backend, config & kill switch, on-disk layout.
* [Decision Engine](decision-engine.md) - the pure-reducer state machine (DecisionCore): signals, state, effects, the A/B/C completion arms, invariants, threading.
* [Logs, Persistence & Crash Recovery](logs-and-persistence.md) - every persisted file and why it exists; signal log vs spool; snapshot/journal; the replay-based recovery flow and quarantine.
* [Diagnostics Package](diagnostics-package.md) - what the diagnostics ZIP contains: the built-in section catalog shared with the portal (Shared `DiagnosticsBuiltInSections`, served by GET diagnostics/paths), the RealmJoin Watcher and Device Preparation collection gates, why built-ins bypass the configured-path guards, global ∪ tenant path dedup, caps and the package manifest.
* [Hello Wizard Un-Skip](hello-wizard-unskip.md) - why a single "WHfB disabled" policy read never decides completion: the HelloWizardStarted signal (prevention + cure) and the HelloTracker confirmation second read.
* [Zero User-Targeted Apps](zero-user-apps-completion-gate.md) - why a user with no targeted Intune apps starved every user-phase completion path (IME never writes its "Completed user session" line in the zero-app branch), and why a completion gate that is still holding the session must outrank the 30-minute backstop.
* [Autopilot ZTD Diagnostics](autopilot-ztd-diagnostics.md) - Windows' own diagnostic surfaces for the profile-download flow: ModernDeployment event IDs (807/815/164/...), the Diagnostics\Autopilot registry key, deployment-service endpoints, and the known-issue error-code map.
* [MDM Reboot Coalescing](mdm-reboot-coalescing.md) - attributing the mid-ESP coalesced reboot ("second sign-in") to the device-assigned policy URIs that forced it: aggregated 2800 observations (neutral, flush-time watermark) + ANALYZE-ESP-005 gated on an actually-observed reboot.
* [Power-State Watcher](power-state-watcher.md) - live AC↔battery transitions and 50/30/15% downward threshold crossings via a WMI push subscription (no polling): power_state_change semantics (latch/debounce/cap, never armed without a battery) and the single-condition analyze rules ANALYZE-DEV-009/-010 on top.
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---
type: Concept
title: WiFi SSID and the Windows 24H2 Location Gate
description: Why wifi_signal_info silently disappeared on Windows 11 24H2+ devices, why the netsh fallback could never fix it, and the tiered reader that restores the SSID from the SYSTEM context.
resource: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/WifiInfoProvider.cs
tags:
- agent
- interop
- wifi
- telemetry
timestamp: 2026-08-26T14:05:00+02:00
---
# Summary
The agent reports the enrollment WiFi as a `wifi_signal_info` event (SSID, signal, PHY, channel).
On Windows 11 24H2 and later the event went missing on a large share of devices — no error, no
partial payload, simply no event. The cause is a Windows privacy change, not a bug in the reader:
**`WlanQueryInterface` with `wlan_intf_opcode_current_connection` is gated behind precise-location
consent**, and the agent runs as SYSTEM in session 0 where that consent usually does not exist.
The fix is a tiered reader ([WifiInfoProvider](../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/WifiInfoProvider.cs))
whose middle tier uses the one SSID API Microsoft left ungated.
# The Gate
Microsoft restricted the Win32 WLAN APIs that expose BSSIDs, because nearby-BSSID lists are a
precise-location oracle. Without consent these return `ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED` (5):
* `WlanGetAvailableNetworkList`
* `WlanGetNetworkBssList`
* `WlanScan`
* **`WlanQueryInterface` when `OpCode` is `wlan_intf_opcode_current_connection`** — the only opcode
the agent needs, and the one that carries SSID, signal quality, PHY type.
Two properties of the gate decide the agent's fate:
1. **The consent prompt only appears for a process running in the user's context and outside
`C:\Windows\System32`.** The agent is neither during ESP: it is SYSTEM, in session 0, before any
user has seen the OOBE privacy page. It is therefore denied *silently* — no prompt, no event
log, nothing that surfaces without asking the API for its return code.
2. **Consent resolves per user hive, with the device-level setting as the floor.** An interactive
user typically has
`HKCU\...\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\location\NonPackaged\Value = Allow`
("Let desktop apps access your location"). The SYSTEM account (`HKU\S-1-5-18`) normally has
**nothing** set there and falls back to
`HKLM\...\ConsentStore\location\Value`. Where that device-level value is `Deny`, SYSTEM is
denied even though the logged-on user on the very same machine reads the SSID fine.
That asymmetry is why the failure looks random from the outside: it tracks the **image's
device-level location setting**, which varies per fleet, not per hardware, driver, or language.
# Why netsh Was Never the Answer
`NetshWifiFallback` was added in 2026-07 on the theory that inbox `netsh` still reported the
connection where the WLAN API did not, and it was later extended with localized label variants for
every enrollment-geography language. Field data says otherwise: **`netsh wlan` hangs off the same
location gate** ("Network shell commands need location permission to access WLAN information"), so
it fails in lockstep with tier 1 rather than covering for it. In the reported session the agent
build already contained the netsh fallback and still produced no event.
Consequence for future work: **adding more netsh language labels cannot fix a missing SSID.** Every
`wifi_signal_info` event that does exist carries a fully populated SSID — the failure is binary at
the reader level, never a half-parsed or mis-decoded payload. A missing SSID is an access problem,
not a parsing problem.
# The Tiered Reader
`WifiInfoProvider.TryRead` owns the order so the two collectors (`DeviceInfoCollector`,
`NetworkChangeDetector`) cannot drift apart. First non-null wins:
| # | Reader | Yields | Location-gated |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `WifiInfoReader` (native `wlanapi.dll`) | SSID, signal %, PHY, channel | yes |
| 2 | `WinRtWifiSsidReader` (WinRT `GetConnectedSsid`) | SSID only | **no** |
| 3 | `NetshWifiFallback` (process spawn, localized parse) | SSID, signal %, radio type, channel | yes |
Tier 2 is Microsoft's own documented replacement for this exact scenario:
`Windows.Networking.Connectivity.WlanConnectionProfileDetails.GetConnectedSsid()`. It is not part of
the BSSID-bearing surface, so it needs no consent, and it has existed since Windows 10 1507.
It is bound through the CLR's built-in WinRT projection with
`Type.GetType("…, ContentType=WindowsRuntime")` — no NuGet package, no winmd reference, no csproj
change — the same mechanism [OobeStateReader](../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/OobeStateReader.cs)
already uses from the SYSTEM service context. Every step degrades to null rather than throwing,
because the caller runs fire-and-forget inside `Task.Run`.
# Telling the Operator
A missing signal reading is indistinguishable from a bug unless the payload says why, and the
device-level location setting is not something an admin would think to check. When tier 2 wins
*and* the native tier reported `rc=5`, the `wifi_signal_info` payload therefore carries
```
wifiDataLimitedReason = "location_services_off"
```
and the event message gains `- signal unavailable, Location services off`, so the reason is visible
in the timeline itself. The portal's WiFi card (`DeviceDetailsCard`) matches that literal and
renders the explanation plus the Intune setting that fixes it. The value is a published contract —
agent, portal and the MCP device-property catalog all match the same string.
The claim is only made on observed evidence: any other native failure (no WLAN service, no
connected interface) leaves the field null rather than blaming a privacy setting we did not
measure. `WifiInfoProvider.IsLocationGateDenied` is the single predicate, pinned by tests at its
boundaries (`rc=5` yes; `rc=50`, `rc=5023`, `rc=1062` no).
The network timeline reads the same field. It needs no payload of its own: `buildSegments`
already merges every `wifi_signal_info` into the WiFi segment covering its timestamp, so the
reason rides in with the sample. A segment that never got a sample (a mid-session reconnect emits
no `wifi_signal_info`) inherits it — the gate is a device-level setting and cannot flip during an
enrollment — while a segment that *did* get a real reading is never overwritten. The segment
tooltip then reads `Signal: unavailable - Location services off on this device` where the
percentage would be, and the "Avg WiFi signal" stat says `n/a (Location services off)` instead of
disappearing.
`network_state_change` deliberately does NOT carry the reason: that event has never carried
`signalPercent` or `radioType` at all (`NetworkChangeDetector` collects them into its snapshot for
change detection but only `before_/after_wifiSsid` reaches the payload), so there is no absent
field there for a reason to explain. Adding it would ship a field nothing reads. The SSID it does
carry is unaffected by the gate.
Fleet-wide the same field is queryable through
`search_sessions(deviceProperties: { "wifi_signal_info.wifiDataLimitedReason": "location_services_off" })`,
which sizes how much of a fleet is affected before anyone changes a policy.
Tier 2 returns the SSID alone. Signal quality, PHY type and channel have no ungated source; they
stay null when the native tier is denied. That is deliberate — deriving a percentage from
`ConnectionProfile.GetSignalBars()` (0–5) would fabricate precision the API does not have.
# Diagnostics
The step-level native return codes were already collected, but they were logged with
`_logger.Debug` — and the agent's default log level is `Info`, so the diagnostic built to explain
this failure never reached a single field log. Both collectors now log at **Warning** when all tiers
fail, which they only reach when the active NIC really is WiFi. A native `rc=5` is spelled out as
`ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED` with the location-gate explanation, so the log line diagnoses itself:
```
EnrollmentTracker: no wifi_signal_info — no WiFi info from any reader — native: [<guid>]
query(current_connection) rc=5; ; WinRT: no SSID; netsh: no parsable output. rc=5 is
ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED — Windows 11 24H2+ gates the current-connection opcode (and netsh wlan)
behind precise-location consent, which is off in this image; enable Location services to
restore signal/PHY/channel.
```
# Evidence
Session `7305e0ad` (HP EliteBook X Flip G1i, build 26200.9168, agent 2.0.1407, reported as
`WIFI SSID fehlt`): `network_interface_info` shows the active NIC as `Intel(R) Wi-Fi 7 BE201`,
`Wireless80211`, `connectionType=WiFi`, so the `isWifi` gate passed and collection ran — yet zero
`wifi_signal_info` events across 214 events and 22 minutes, with the netsh fallback already shipped
in that build.
Fleet correlation over WiFi sessions from 2026-08-01 (n=276), share with a `wifi_signal_info` event:
| OS build | WiFi sessions | with SSID |
|---|---|---|
| 22631 (23H2, pre-gate) | 3 | 100% |
| 26100 (24H2) | 178 | 21% |
| 26200 (25H2) | 95 | 45% |
Within a single model the outcome splits by fleet, not by hardware — ThinkPad T14 Gen 6: 7/91;
ThinkPad E14 Gen 7: 9/9 — which is what a per-image privacy setting looks like.
Local verification (build 26220.9022): `HKLM\…\ConsentStore\location = Deny` while
`HKCU\…\ConsentStore\location\NonPackaged = Allow`; the interactive user reads the SSID through
both the native API and netsh, `HKU\S-1-5-18` has no consent value at all, and the WinRT chain
resolves and returns the SSID under net48.
# Operator Guidance
A device that reports no SSID is not misconfigured for enrollment — only the telemetry field is
missing. To get the full payload (signal, PHY, channel) back, the **device-level** location setting
must be on: *Settings → Privacy & security → Location → Location services*, or via Intune
(`Privacy/LetAppsAccessLocation`). Without it the SSID still arrives via tier 2.
# Citations
* [Changes to API behavior for Wi-Fi access and location](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/nativewifi/wi-fi-access-location-changes)
* [WlanConnectionProfileDetails.GetConnectedSsid](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/uwp/api/windows.networking.connectivity.wlanconnectionprofiledetails.getconnectedssid)
* [WifiInfoProvider.cs](../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/WifiInfoProvider.cs)
* [WinRtWifiSsidReader.cs](../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/WinRtWifiSsidReader.cs)
* [WifiInfoReader.cs](../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/WifiInfoReader.cs)
* [NetshWifiFallback.cs](../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/NetshWifiFallback.cs)
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
---
type: Concept
title: Zero User-Targeted Apps — the starved user-phase completion gate
description: Why a device with no user-targeted Intune apps could never satisfy the IME user-session gate, how that turned into a 30-minute esp_exit_without_completion_evidence false positive on a third of one tenant's enrollments, and the two fixes — reading the line IME actually writes in its zero-app branch, and refusing to fail a session while a completion gate is deliberately holding it.
resource: /src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime
tags:
- agent
- ime
- esp
- completion
- realmjoin
- false-positive
timestamp: 2026-08-25
---
# Summary
A Classic user-driven enrollment whose user has **zero targeted Intune Win32 apps** could not
produce the evidence every user-phase completion path required. The session parked, and the
30-minute `advisory_completion` backstop resolved it as
`enrollment_failed: esp_exit_without_completion_evidence` — while the user was at a working
desktop, Windows Hello was provisioned, and RealmJoin was still installing packages.
One tenant hit this on **10 of 30 enrollments in a week**. Every one of them was a false
positive; the devices were healthy in Intune and RealmJoin.
# The starvation chain
The IME writes `Completed user session N, userId: …` at the end of a user-session processing
pass. `IME-USER-SESSION-COMPLETED` matches it and the adapter posts
`ImeUserSessionCompleted`, which sets `DecisionState.ImeUserSessionCompletedUtc`.
But the IME never reaches that statement when the user has no assigned apps. Decompiled IME
`1.104.102.0`, `Win32AppPlugIn/ApplicationPoller.cs`:
```csharp
if (!appPolicies.Any())
{
AppWorkloadLog.TraceInformation($"[Win32App] Get 0 apps for user session {user.RDSSessionId}, user id = {user.IntuneId}");
RegisterApplicationsInIfInESP(sender, user, delegate {
espLockInProcessor.AttemptToLockInApplications(user, new List<ProcessorSubgraph>());
});
continue; // skips the "Completed user session" statement below
}
```
Identical shape in `1.97.107.0`, `1.83.107.0`, `1.80.132.0`. With that fact missing, every door
out of the user phase is shut at once:
| Path | Requirement | Why it is dead |
|---|---|---|
| `ShouldTransitionToAwaitingHello` arm A | `AccountSetupProvisioningSucceededUtc` | ESP registry froze at `AccountSetup: 1 of 5`; neither `categorySucceeded` nor the all-subcategories fallback can ever hold |
| arm B | `SkipUserEsp` | Full ESP, not a skip-user flow |
| arm C | `IsImeUserSessionGenuine` | needs the missing IME fact |
| arm D | `EnrollmentMode.DevicePreparation` | Autopilot v1, not WDP |
| `MaybeSynthesizeAccountSetupCompleteFromSettledUserApps` | `AreUserEspAppsSettled` | returned `false` on an empty app list |
| `HandleAdvisoryCompletionDeadlineFired` conjunction | `imeUserSessionGenuine \|\| isObservationAdvisory` | both false |
The last row is the one that produced the verdict: the backstop that exists to resolve a
dead-end resolved it as a failure.
`AreUserEspAppsSettled` deserves its own note. Its "at least one required app" rule is
deliberately conservative — an empty list normally means *the phase just cleared* or *apps have
not surfaced yet*. But it made **zero apps**, the most settled state possible, indistinguishable
from *unknown*, and there was no evidence available to tell them apart.
# Fix 1 — read the line IME does write
`IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS` matches the zero-app line and routes it through the **same**
`OnUserSessionCompleted` callback. Downstream this genuinely *is* a completed user session, so
the adapter's pending-apps deferral and its fire-once flag apply unchanged.
This is not a weakened gate — it is IME's own verdict. The zero-app branch locks the ESP in with
an *empty* application list, and the sibling emit site in `AppWorkloadAbstraction.ExecuteUserCheckIn`
returns `ProviderResult.ProvisioningComplete` straight after logging it. All three emit sites are
user-session-scoped (`user.RDSSessionId`, `user.IntuneId`); none is device-scoped.
Guards that stay in force:
* **Phase guard** — the observation only fires while the tracker is in `AccountSetup`. Firing
earlier would burn the adapter's fire-once flag on a pre-sign-in (defaultuser0) timestamp that
`IsImeUserSessionGenuine` (`>= AccountSetupEnteredUtc`) can never accept. An observation made
before the phase was known is remembered and replayed on the transition into it, because IME
writes its check-in lines independently of when the agent first parses the phase marker.
* **Engine guards unchanged** — arm C still requires a post-AccountSetup final ESP exit *and* a
DAD-validated real-user desktop.
* `AreUserEspAppsSettled` returns `true` for an empty list **only** with this explicit
observation — never for a merely empty list.
# Fix 2 — do not fail while a completion gate is holding
An independent defect, and the decisive one for the affected tenant. `advisory_completion` runs
for 30 minutes. The RealmJoin completion gate blocks completion until phase 110 and carries its
*own* bounded resolution: 60 minutes from detection, re-armed on deployment activity, hard-capped
at 4 hours. The shorter timer always won.
Session `75d6ae8e` installed **25 RealmJoin packages successfully inside the window**, the last
one 2 minutes before the failure, while the engine's own `completion_waiting` still read
`waiting on: realmjoin_resolution`.
`HandleAdvisoryCompletionDeadlineFired` now re-arms instead of failing when the RealmJoin gate is
closed *and* its deadline is still armed, emitting `completion_waiting` with trigger
`DeadlineFired:advisory_completion:CompletionGateHolding`.
Convergence comes from the gate itself: `Resolved`, `FirstDeploymentIncomplete` and `Timeout` all
set `RealmJoinFacts.Outcome`, which opens `RealmJoinGateOpen` and stops the guard applying.
Requiring the gate's deadline to still be armed keeps a gate that can no longer resolve itself
from parking the session; `AgentMaxLifetimeMinutes` bounds it regardless.
# Timeline evidence
`ime_user_session_completed` carries an `evidence` field so the basis of the verdict is legible
without the diagnostics archive:
* `user_session_completed` — IME wrote its completion line and no required app was pending.
* `zero_user_apps_enumerated` — IME reported zero targeted apps; the user phase had nothing to
enforce.
No new event type: the fact is the same, only the observation behind it differs.
# Deployment
The pattern ships through the config API and reaches existing agents without a rebuild; an agent
that does not know the `userSessionZeroApps` action logs one Debug line and ignores it. The
*behaviour* needs an agent release. Sessions already stamped `Failed` are not reclassified — the
backend mirrors the agent verdict (`VerdictPaths.AgentFailed`) and has no independent judgement
here by design.
# Citations
* `rules/ime-log-patterns/IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS.json`
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime/ImeLogTracker.Handlers.cs` — `HandleUserSessionZeroApps`, the phase replay in `HandleEspPhaseDetected`
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime/ImeLogTracker.cs` — `AreUserEspAppsSettled`
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/SignalAdapters/ImeLogTrackerAdapter.cs` — `EmitUserSessionCompleted`, evidence labels
* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore/Engine/DecisionEngine.Edge.cs` — `HandleAdvisoryCompletionDeadlineFired`
* [decision-engine.md](decision-engine.md), [post-reboot-completion-recovery.md](post-reboot-completion-recovery.md)
+235
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@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
---
type: Concept
title: Client-Certificate Tenant Binding — Closing the Cross-Tenant Gap
description: Why a chain-valid Intune MDM certificate does not prove the caller belongs to the tenant it claims, which certificate extension carries the Entra tenant id (and which two look like it but do not), and the shadow-then-enforce rollout that measures field coverage before it can lock devices out.
resource: src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/CertTenantBinding.cs
tags:
- backend
- security
- authentication
- certificates
- intune
- multi-tenant
timestamp: 2026-08-24T00:00:00+02:00
---
# Problem
Agent requests authenticate with mTLS. `CertificateValidator` pins the chain to the embedded
Intune roots (`X509ChainTrustMode.CustomRootTrust`), checks the validity window and requires the
Client-Authentication EKU. All of that together proves exactly one thing: **the certificate was
issued by the Microsoft Intune MDM Device CA to some tenant**.
Those roots are shared by every Intune tenant on the planet. Nothing in the certificate stage ties
the caller to the tenant in the request. The tenant scoping came entirely from the downstream
device validators — the serial number must appear in that tenant's Autopilot / imported-device /
Cloud PC inventory. Device serial numbers are not secrets; they are printed on the chassis.
So the pre-existing attack was: enroll a device in your own Intune tenant, obtain a legitimate
device certificate, learn one serial number of the victim tenant, and submit telemetry as that
tenant. Certificate validation passes, device validation passes.
# Mechanism
The Intune MDM Device CA stamps the customer's identifiers into the leaf certificate. Since the
agent presents this certificate in the TLS handshake, its contents are proof of possession and the
backend can compare them against the requested tenant — no Graph call, no additional consent, and
nothing the agent has to send.
## Which extension carries what
Verified by decoding a real field certificate (issued 2026-05-08, `Functions.Tests/device-cert-sample.pem`):
| OID | Encoding | Content |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `1.2.840.113556.5.14` | nested OCTET STRING (`04 10` + 16 bytes) | **Entra tenant id** — the one to compare |
| `1.2.840.113556.5.6` | nested OCTET STRING (`04 10` + 16 bytes) | Intune **Account** id — a *different* GUID, never equal to the tenant id |
| `1.2.840.113556.5.4` | **16 raw bytes, no wrapper** | Intune device id, identical to the certificate's Subject CN |
Two traps are worth stating explicitly, because both cost real debugging time:
1. `…5.6` is widely described as "the tenant id (AccountID)". It is not the Entra tenant id.
Comparing it against the requested tenant would reject every request in production.
2. The encodings are not uniform. `…5.4` holds the GUID bare while the other two nest it in a
second OCTET STRING, so a decoder written against one shape silently fails on the other.
`MsDeviceCertificateOids.TryParseGuid` accepts both, and all GUIDs are Microsoft
little-endian (what `new Guid(byte[])` expects).
A 16-byte input is inherently ambiguous — it is indistinguishable from a truncated wrapper and is
always read as a bare GUID. That is harmless here: the value is only ever compared for equality
against a known tenant id, never trusted as a standalone claim.
## Where it is NOT
`EntraDeviceCertHelper` reads tenant and device ids from the **MS-Organization-Access** certificate
(`1.2.840.113556.1.5.284.*`). That certificate is not part of the authentication path at all — the
agent selects the Intune MDM certificate by exact issuer match (`CN=Microsoft Intune MDM Device CA`,
see `CertificateHelper.SelectMdmCertificate`) and the backend pins only the MDM chain. The Entra
certificate is used purely as a local fallback for `TenantIdResolver`; it never leaves the device.
Sending it in a header instead would prove nothing: only the certificate used in the TLS handshake
demonstrates possession of a private key. A certificate copied into a custom header can be replayed
by anyone who has seen it once.
# Rollout
Enforcing immediately would be reckless: any device population whose certificates predate the
extension, or whose CA behaves differently (sovereign clouds), would be locked out at once. The
rollout therefore has staged consequences.
**Stage 1 — shadow (completed, kept as the measurement that justified stage 2).** `SecurityValidator.ObserveCertTenantBinding` evaluates the binding
after certificate validation and logs the outcome. It returns `void`, changes no state, and swallows
its own exceptions, so it cannot fail a request that would otherwise be accepted. The pure comparison
lives in `CertTenantBinding.Evaluate`; the outcome codes (`Match`, `Mismatch`, `ExtensionMissing`,
`Unparseable`, `RequestTenantNotAGuid`) are stable and queried by exact match in KQL.
`WouldRejectUnderEnforcement` records what stage 2 *would* have done, so the telemetry can be read
without re-deriving the rule at query time.
The telemetry uses two carriers, because the numerator and the denominator have very different
costs and answer different questions:
* **Every** outcome, `Match` included, is stamped onto the request row as the `CertTenantBinding`
dimension — `SecurityValidator` writes it into `FunctionContext.Items`
(`CertTenantBinding.RequestItemKey`) and `RequestTelemetryMiddleware` copies it onto the
`RequestTelemetry` it already emits. That row exists per request and is unsampled, so the
denominator costs no additional telemetry at all.
* Outcomes that need an enforcement decision (mismatch, missing, undecodable) are **additionally**
logged at Warning with the full context — thumbprint, certificate tenant, session.
`Match` is deliberately not a trace line. Worker-side `LogInformation` never reaches App Insights
(the ApplicationInsightsLoggerProvider default rule is Warning+ and host-forwarding of worker logs
is disabled), so a `Match` trace is dead code that silently costs the denominator. The first
deployment of this feature made exactly that mistake: it emitted zero rows across 32k requests,
which is indistinguishable from the code never running.
**Stage 2 — enforced since 2026-08-25.** `Mismatch` returns 403 and is recorded through the shared
`LogRequestRejection` path (`stage=certtenant`) so it lands in the same KQL raster as every other
rejection reason. The switch was made against measured data: 35,684 requests across 32 tenants,
every one a `Match`, with the Warning channel independently verified to be carrying other traffic so
the zero could not be a telemetry artefact.
The rule lives in one place, `CertTenantBinding.Rejects`, and only `Mismatch` blocks. Everything
else means "cannot tell" and is deliberately tolerated:
* `ExtensionMissing` — the sample only covers devices active in the measurement window, so older
certificates or a sovereign-cloud CA could still lack the extension. Rejecting on absence would
lock those devices out for something they cannot control. **This is the one to tighten later**,
once the `ExtensionMissing` rate is provably zero across a wider window; a test pins the current
tolerance so removing it has to be a deliberate decision rather than a drive-by edit.
* `Unparseable` — a decoder or encoding surprise is our problem, not the device's.
* `RequestTenantNotAGuid` — nothing to compare against, and such a request fails the tenant lookup
in §0 long before reaching this point.
The evaluation fails open on its own exception: this gate exists to stop a cross-tenant certificate,
and a defect on our side is not evidence of one. The 403 body deliberately does not echo which
tenant the certificate belongs to — that pair is in the rejection log, not in the response.
Grep marker for every site involved: `CERT-TENANT-BINDING`.
The bootstrap-token path (`X-Bootstrap-Token`) bypasses certificate validation by design and is
unaffected by either stage.
**Stage 3 — device binding (Global-Admin-only preview).** Tenant binding proves the certificate was
issued to this tenant; it does not prove the certificate belongs to a device the tenant still has.
`IntuneDeviceBindingValidator` closes that by resolving the Intune managedDevice id from the
certificate's Subject CN against the tenant's own `deviceManagement/managedDevices` inventory
(point-GET on `managedDevices/{id}` — no OData filter to inject into, and a 404 is unambiguous).
It is modelled on `CloudPcDeviceValidator` and shares its cache/retry/transient contract, with one
important difference in how it is wired: the lookup is fire-and-forget, like the DevPrep
association shadow, because a cold Graph round-trip can take seconds and must never sit in the
agent's request path. That rules out the request-row dimension stage 1 uses — the row is written
the moment the function returns, before the detached task finishes — so the outcome is logged at
Warning instead. Volume stays bounded because only Global Admins can see the toggle
(`user?.isGlobalAdmin === true`, the same gate as the DevPrep preview). Widening it beyond preview
should move to an inline call plus a request dimension.
Outcomes: `Match`, `NotFound`, `NoDeviceIdInCert`, `PermissionMissing`, `Transient`. Only
`Transient` is retried and left uncached — a missing grant or a foreign device is a state, not an
outage.
Graph cost is not a concern, and that is measured rather than assumed: the first live enrollment
produced **136 requests and exactly one Graph call**, because the 30-minute positive cache absorbs
the rest. For comparison, the per-request Autopilot serial validator made 25 calls in the same
window. Lengthening the positive TTL would buy nothing and would delay noticing a device that has
been wiped or removed; shortening the 5-minute negative TTL matters more, since that is how quickly
a device object appearing late is picked up.
What the 136 requests *did* cost was log lines saying the same thing 136 times, so the shadow log is
gated on `IntuneDeviceBindingResult.ServedFromCache`: one line per real Graph lookup. Cached repeats
add nothing — the reported age just counts up mechanically from the same `enrolledDateTime`.
Outcomes that are never cached (`Transient`, `NoDeviceIdInCert`) still log every time, which is the
right behaviour for an anomaly.
The open question this preview exists to answer is a race, not an attack: a device object can in
principle appear in Intune *after* the agent's first call, and enforcing before that is understood
would reject legitimate enrollments. Every result therefore carries `enrolledDateTime`, and the log
line records `enrolledAgeSeconds` — a device whose object was created seconds before the request
looks completely different from a certificate that never belonged to the tenant. Grep marker:
`CERT-DEVICE-BINDING-SHADOW`.
Enabling it needs the optional Graph permission `DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All`, granted
per tenant with the customer script — it is not in the default-consent set:
```powershell
.\Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1 -ClientId "<client-id>" -Features IntuneDeviceBinding
```
`GraphFeatureCatalog` (feature `IntuneDeviceBinding`) and the script's catalog, `ValidateSet` and
help block are pinned to each other by `GraphFeatureCatalogSyncTests`.
# Examples
Coverage — the question stage 2 depends on ("would enforcing lock anyone out?"):
```kusto
requests
| where isnotempty(customDimensions.CertTenantBinding)
| summarize Requests = sum(itemCount)
by Outcome = tostring(customDimensions.CertTenantBinding),
Tenant = tostring(customDimensions.TenantId)
| order by Requests desc
```
Detail on the individually actionable ones:
```kusto
traces
| where message has "AgentCertTenantBinding"
| extend Outcome = tostring(customDimensions.Outcome),
Tenant = tostring(customDimensions.TenantId)
| summarize count() by Outcome, Tenant
```
Anything in `Mismatch` is a cross-tenant certificate; anything in `ExtensionMissing` is a device
that stage-2 enforcement would have to make a policy decision about. Note that the trace query
alone can never show `Match`, so it cannot tell "everything matched" apart from "nothing ran" —
use the request-row query for that.
Stage 3, including the enrollment-race measurement:
```kusto
traces
| where message has "AgentCertDeviceBinding"
| extend Outcome = tostring(customDimensions.Outcome),
AgeSecs = toint(customDimensions.EnrolledAgeSeconds)
| summarize Requests = count(),
MinAgeSecs = min(AgeSecs),
P05AgeSecs = percentile(AgeSecs, 5)
by Outcome
```
`NotFound` is the row that decides whether this can ever become a gate. A small `MinAgeSecs` on
`Match` means device objects are appearing only just in time — the race is real and enforcement
would need a grace path.
# Citations
* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Security/MsDeviceCertificateOids.cs` — OID catalog and the
shared ASN.1 GUID decoder (one implementation for agent and backend).
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/CertificateValidator.cs` — extension extraction
alongside chain validation, cached per thumbprint.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/CertTenantBinding.cs` — the pure comparison.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/SecurityValidator.cs` — shadow observation.
* [W365 Cloud PC Device Validation](cloudpc-device-validation.md) — the other consumer of this
certificate's identity fields (Subject CN = Intune device id).
+2 -1
View File
@@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ Durations shown for attempts are the sessions' authoritative `DurationSeconds` v
completed journeys, first-time-right count, attempt histogram, junk-serial exclusion
count, `JourneyVersion`. A journey buckets on the StartedAt date of its completing
success session (the platform's StartedAt-date convention; late terminals converge via
the sweep). All counts are **additive**, so a window rate is the ratio of summed daily
the sweep, which slices the tick's shared projected window scan — see
`time-attribution.md`). All counts are **additive**, so a window rate is the ratio of summed daily
rows — there is no rolling-window row (unlike the median-based time-attribution
aggregates, which cannot merge). 180-day retention. Rows exist below the ≥20 UI gate
on purpose (the UI needs the n for "insufficient data (n=…)").
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
---
type: concept
title: Plan Downgrade Policy & the Retention Grace Period
description: What happens when a tenant loses Pro (explicit downgrade or trial expiry) — every entitlement gates read-time and reversibly, except retention, which gets a 30-day grace before the Community cap starts hard-deleting; the anchor model, the ops events, and the deliberate non-grace of everything else.
resource: backend
tags: [plan, edition, downgrade, retention, grace-period, trial, entitlements]
timestamp: 2026-08-22
---
# Schema
## The downgrade model: gate, don't destroy
Edition is resolved at READ time (`FeatureEntitlementCatalog.ResolveEdition`): Pro ⇔
permanent tier `pro`/legacy `enterprise` OR an active trial. A plan mutation is a single
field write (`PATCH config/{tenantId}/plan`, GA-only) — there is no downgrade event
handler, no cascade. On Pro → Community every entitlement simply gates on the next read
(≤ ~5 min config cache):
* **Unrestricted Mode** — effective value flips false; the GA on-request flag and the
tenant toggle survive untouched (inert). Re-upgrade restores it verbatim.
* **Delegated (MSP) admin** — scope suppressed at the home-tenant gate
(`DelegatedAdminService.ApplyHomeTenantGateAsync`); grant rows / tenant groups /
assignments are never touched. Resurrects on re-upgrade.
* **OOBE bootstrap** — endpoints 403/404 unless the additive GA per-tenant flag
(`BootstrapTokenEnabled`) is set; `BootstrapSessions` rows are kept.
* **Rate limits / MCP quota** — pure computed-at-read floors/plan names.
**Retention is the one exception**: the retention sweep (12-hourly
`SessionDeletionMaintenance` → `SessionRetentionFanoutService`) hard-deletes sessions
older than `GetEffectiveRetentionDays` = `min(stored DataRetentionDays, edition cap)`.
Without protection, a downgrade (or trial expiry) with stored retention 365 would start
irreversibly cascade-deleting the 90–365-day band on the next tick.
## The retention grace period (30 days)
`FeatureEntitlementCatalog.RetentionDowngradeGraceDays = 30`. For 30 days after losing
Pro, `GetEffectiveRetentionDays` keeps clamping to the **Pro** cap (365); only after the
grace does the Community cap (90) bite. The stored `DataRetentionDays` is never rewritten.
`days <= 0` (GA-only "infinite") short-circuits before any cap — those tenants are never
swept, grace or not.
**Anchor** — "when was Pro lost" (`TenantEntitlementService.GetRetentionGraceEndUtc`,
returns null while effectively Pro; grace end = latest anchor + 30d):
* **Explicit downgrade**: `TenantConfiguration.ProDowngradedUtc` (backend-only field, no
agent ConfigVersion impact), maintained exclusively by the plan endpoint's pure mutation
core `PlanManagementFunction.ApplyPlanChanges`. Stamped when the EFFECTIVE edition
(before vs. after, same `nowUtc`) transitions Pro → Community — this covers both a
planTier downgrade and a GA explicitly ending a trial (`trialExpiresUtc: null`, where
the trial timestamp disappears and could not anchor). Cleared on any transition back to
effectively Pro (PATCH pro, trial grant, self-service trial start), so a re-upgrade also
resets the grace clock.
* **Trial expiry**: no write happens — the stored `TrialExpiresUtc` itself is the anchor
(read-time, like edition resolution). A planTier downgrade under a still-active trial
deliberately does NOT stamp: the edition is still Pro, and the later trial expiry
anchors the grace then.
The field is on the patch-endpoint `BaseDeniedFields` and `RevertProtectedFields` lists
(a config revert must not time-travel the anchor) and roundtrips the table-serialization
contract (Store+Map + roundtrip tests). Legacy rows read null → no anchor → no grace,
which is correct: no tenant had been downgraded before the feature existed.
## Ops visibility (dual-registered event types)
* `TenantPlanDowngraded` (Warning) — emitted by the PATCH handler on an effective
Pro→Community transition; carries `retentionGraceEndsUtc` + stored retention days. The
response body also returns `retentionGraceEndsUtc`.
* `TenantRetentionGraceExpiring` / `TenantRetentionGraceEnded` (Warning) — emitted by the
daily `TrialExpirySweepFunction` (03:30 UTC) with the same stateless window mechanics as
the trial events (≤3-day heads-up re-fired daily; ended once via the 24h look-back), and
ONLY when data is actually at risk: stored `DataRetentionDays` above the Community cap
(0 = infinite ⇒ never). Re-upgraded tenants go silent automatically (grace resolves null).
All three are registered in the web `OPS_EVENT_TYPES` catalog (OpsAlertRulesSection.tsx)
so Telegram alert rules can route them.
## Deliberate non-goals
* No grace for Unrestricted/MSP/bootstrap/limits — reversible gates need none.
* The retention WRITE cap (`TenantConfigValidation`) does not honor the grace: during the
grace a tenant admin cannot SET a value above the Community cap. The grace protects
existing data; new writes follow the new plan.
* The feature-flags endpoint keeps publishing the plain edition cap
(`retentionCapDays`) — it feeds the settings input maximum, which is the write cap.
# Citations
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TenantEntitlementService.cs` — grace + effective retention
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Config/PlanManagementFunction.cs` — `ApplyPlanChanges` anchor lifecycle
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Maintenance/TrialExpirySweepFunction.cs` — grace event windows
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/Deletion/SessionRetentionFanoutService.cs` — enforcement point
* Tests: `TenantEntitlementServiceTests`, `PlanManagementTransitionTests`, `TrialExpirySweepFunctionTests`, `SessionRetentionFanoutServiceTests`, `TenantConfigTableSerializationTests`
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
---
type: Concept
title: Silent-Session Classification (Sweep, Max-Lifetime, Retro-Reconcile)
description: How a session whose agent went silent gets its honest status — the two-stage maintenance sweep (2h Stalled marker, 5h timeout classification), the EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier rule order incl. the WhiteGlove Part-2 and self-deploying gates, which ingest paths share the classifier, and the admin retro-reconcile modes.
resource: src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.cs
tags:
- backend
- maintenance
- session-status
- classification
- whiteglove
- self-deploying
timestamp: 2026-08-23T18:00:00+02:00
---
# Silent-Session Classification
A session only ever becomes terminal through evidence. When the agent stops reporting
(power-off, reboot without relaunch, Wi-Fi never re-associating, max-lifetime watchdog),
the backend must decide the status from what it last saw — it never hard-fails a session
for being silent. One pure function holds that decision,
`EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ClassifyTimedOutSession`, and every silent-session path calls it
so a session gets the same verdict regardless of which path noticed the silence first.
# Schema
## Inputs (`EspProvisioningRollup` + session flags)
`ExtractRollup(events)` distills the event stream into facts: Device/Account Setup
subcategory counts (incl. the 30s fallback-confirmed messages), `HasExplicitFailure`,
`HasEnrollmentComplete` vs. `HasTerminalComplete` (the Part-1 `whiteglove_complete`),
`HasAgentEmergencyBreak`, `DesktopArrived`, `HelloResolved`, `HelloPolicyDisabled`,
`SkipUserEsp`, RealmJoin detection/resolution. Session-row flags are passed alongside:
`IsPreProvisioned` + `ResumedAt` (WhiteGlove Part 2) and `IsSelfDeployingProfile`
(registry-confirmed `CloudAssignedOobeConfig 0x20|0x40`, set at registration).
## Rule order (first match wins)
| # | Condition | Verdict |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | `HasExplicitFailure` | Failed |
| 1b | `IsWhiteGloveAwaitingUser`: pre-provisioned + resumed + Device Setup done + **no** user evidence since resume + no explicit failure/enrollment_complete | AwaitingUser within grace; Succeeded (honest WG reason) past grace |
| 1c | `IsSelfDeployingProvisioned`: self-deploying profile + Device Setup done + no explicit failure | **Succeeded** (reconcile) — no grace, no AwaitingUser: the profile has no user phase |
| 2 | Account Setup all-succeeded, or `enrollment_complete`, or `whiteglove_complete` on a **non-resumed** session | Succeeded |
| 3 | `HasAgentEmergencyBreak` | Incomplete immediately (agent self-destructed, nothing can arrive) |
| 4 | `DesktopArrived` + (Hello terminal, or Hello disabled + SkipUserEsp) | Succeeded (user provably finished) |
| 5 | Device Setup done | AwaitingUser within grace, Incomplete past grace |
| 6 | otherwise | Incomplete |
Grace = `ResolveGraceHours(SessionGraceHours, AbsoluteMaxSessionHours)` (~51h default),
measured from `ResumedAt ?? StartedAt`. Every Succeeded-reconcile reason carries the
silence-transparency clause (`AppendReconcileTiming`: last agent contact, silence, verdict time).
## Why rule 1c exists (kiosk tenant audit 2026-08-23)
On a self-deploying profile Device ESP all-succeeded IS the enrollment's end; the agent's
own SelfDeploying terminal only adds a 5-min confirmation window
(`DecisionEngine.SelfDeploying.s_deviceOnlyEspDetectionWindow`). Tenant `aebdce78` (school,
Wi-Fi ThinkBooks, a language-change app forcing a reboot right after Device ESP) lost that
window on 836 of ~970 sessions in one week: the agent died 0–4 min after
`DeviceSetup fallback_confirmed`, the reboot relaunch never registered (30s registration
budget on a Wi-Fi link still associating), and rule 5 labeled finished kiosks
"awaiting user / Account Setup 0/5" → Incomplete 51h later. Nobody signs in on these devices
(prepared during the holidays, boxed, in service) — AwaitingUser was factually wrong and
Incomplete turned a working rollout into a red wall. Other self-deploying tenants completed
normally in the same window, so this is a classification gap, not a profile-wide agent bug.
Agent-side companion fix: `SessionRegistrationHelper` now waits up to 15s for a network link
and retries 6× (~62s backoff) instead of 5× (~30s).
## Callers (all pass both gate inputs)
| Path | File | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Sweep stage 1 (2h agent-silent marker) | `MaintenanceService.MarkStalledSessionsAsTimedOutAsync` | Default: InProgress → Stalled. Gates run BEFORE the Stalled write: `TryMarkWhiteGloveAwaitingUserAsync` (AwaitingUser) and `TryReconcileSelfDeployingAsync` (Succeeded). Only flagged sessions pay the event read. |
| Sweep stage 2 (SessionTimeoutHours, 5h default) | same | InProgress/Stalled/AwaitingUser past the window and past the 2h silence cutoff → full classification; AwaitingUser within grace is skipped without an event read. |
| Agent max-lifetime (`enrollment_failed`/max_lifetime, `agent_shutting_down`/max_lifetime) | `EventIngestProcessor.ApplyMaxLifetimeVerdictAsync` | Watchdog = "agent stopped waiting", not a verdict; classified from evidence. Pending sessions exempt. |
| Late-telemetry reconcile | `EventIngestProcessor.TryLateTelemetryReconcileAsync` | Heal-only: applies a Succeeded verdict to Incomplete/AwaitingUser rows when straggler events arrive. |
| Agent stall probe (`session_stalled`) | `EventIngestProcessor.TryMapStallToWhiteGloveAwaitingUserAsync` | Only the WG gate (1b); a stall probe on a self-deploying device with Device Setup done means the agent is alive and something else blocks — stays Stalled. |
| Admin retro-reconcile | `LegacyReclassificationService` | Modes `legacy_timeouts`, `pending_orphans`, `self_deploying_silent` (Incomplete/AwaitingUser/Stalled rows with the profile flag, heal-only to Succeeded, admin-marked rows skipped). `POST /api/maintenance/reclassify-legacy?mode=…&dryRun=false&tenantId=…&maxSessions=…`, dry-run by default. |
## Known gap (decided, not built)
After max-lifetime the agent writes `enrollment-complete.marker` and self-destructs, so an
AwaitingUser verdict from that path can never heal — it is a 51h countdown to Incomplete.
The emergency-break path (rule 3) already terminalizes immediately; max-lifetime still goes
through the grace window by design ("user simply absent"). Revisit if customers read
AwaitingUser as "still possible".
# Examples
* Session `195593e2` (tenant aebdce78): `DeviceSetup 4/4` + `fallback_confirmed`, `AccountSetup 0/5`
(IME false positive), Hello disabled, SkipUser=True, silent after 13:01 → rule 1c →
Succeeded "self-deploying profile — Device Setup fully provisioned … agent went silent
before confirming completion. Agent last reported 2026-08-21 13:01 UTC …".
* Same event shape on a user-driven profile → rule 5 → AwaitingUser (within grace) /
Incomplete (past grace). Guarded by
`Classify_same_stream_without_self_deploying_flag_keeps_user_phase_verdicts`.
* fairstone WG Part 2 reseal-reboot, technician powers off at logon screen → rule 1b →
AwaitingUser; user unboxes days later → ingest completion heals to Succeeded.
# Citations
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.cs` — rollup + rule order, `IsWhiteGloveAwaitingUser`, `IsSelfDeployingProvisioned`, reason helpers.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/MaintenanceService.cs` — `MarkStalledSessionsAsTimedOutAsync`, `TryMarkWhiteGloveAwaitingUserAsync`, `TryReconcileSelfDeployingAsync`.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/EventIngestProcessor.Classification.cs` — max-lifetime verdict, late-telemetry reconcile, stall mapping.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/LegacyReclassificationService.cs`, `Functions/Admin/ReclassifyLegacySessionsFunction.cs` — retro modes.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableStorageService.Maintenance.cs` — `GetAgentSilentSessionsAsync`, `GetStalledSessionsAsync`, `GetSelfDeployingSilentSessionsAsync`.
* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Security/SessionRegistrationHelper.cs` — link wait + 6-attempt registration budget.
* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore/Engine/DecisionEngine.SelfDeploying.cs` — the agent-side 5-min SelfDeploying terminal window.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/EnrollmentTimeoutClassifierTests.cs` — rule coverage incl. the 2026-08-23 self-deploying block.
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---
type: Concept
title: Table Schema Sentinel (startup table initialization)
description: Why a cold start no longer issues one CreateTableIfNotExists per registered table - a hash over TableNames.All stored in AdminConfiguration gates the full pass, the SessionsIndex backfill only runs after a full pass and behind a conditional-insert claim, and daily maintenance repairs out-of-band deletions.
resource: /src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableStorageService.cs
tags:
- backend
- table-storage
- startup
- maintenance
timestamp: 2026-08-23
---
# Schema
## Problem
`TableInitializerService` (hosted service) called `InitializeTablesAsync` on every process start, which issued `CreateTableIfNotExistsAsync` for every entry of `Constants.TableNames.All` (66 at the time of writing, DoP 8). Each call is a Create POST whose 409 is swallowed - on Flex Consumption with frequent cold starts that was ~9 serial round-trip waves before the first request. It was followed by a SessionsIndex emptiness query whose *error* path returned "empty", so a transient storage error triggered a full Sessions scan with serial upserts - on every scaled-out instance at once.
## Sentinel
* Row `AdminConfiguration` / PK `SchemaSentinel` / RK `tables`, property `TableSchemaHash` (+ `TableCount`, `UpdatedUtc`).
* Value = `ComputeTableSchemaHash(TableNames.All)`: SHA-256 over the ordinal-sorted, newline-joined table names. Derived, never hand-maintained: adding a table to `TableNames.All` changes the hash by construction (`TableLifecycleBucketTests` already forces every constant into `All`).
* `InitializeTablesAsync` (returns `bool fullPassRan`):
1. Point-read the sentinel. Match -> mark initialized, **zero** table calls, return `false`.
2. Missing / stale / unreadable (fresh storage has no AdminConfiguration table yet) -> `EnsureAllTablesAsync` (the old full pass), then upsert the sentinel **only if no table failed**, return `true`. A failed pass leaves `_tablesInitialized = false`, so the next call retries.
* Scale-out: two instances that both see a stale sentinel both run the idempotent pass - harmless.
## SessionsIndex backfill
* Only evaluated when the full pass ran (`fullPassRan == true`): an empty index can only exist on fresh storage, which is exactly the case without a sentinel.
* `IsSessionIndexEmptyAsync` now returns `false` on error (skip), not `true`.
* `TryClaimSessionIndexBackfillAsync`: conditional `AddEntityAsync` on `SchemaSentinel` / `sessionIndexBackfill` - only the winner scans; 409 or any error -> skip. The manual maintenance backfill (`RunManualAsync`) remains the safety net.
## Known gap and repair
A table deleted out-of-band (cleanup skill, portal, tests) is not noticed at startup anymore. `IStorageInitializer.EnsureAllAsync` runs as the first step of the daily timer maintenance (`MaintenanceService.RunAllAsync`), recreating it within 24h. Storage helpers are fail-soft in the meantime.
## Measuring it
`StartupTelemetryService` (hosted service) emits two App Insights metrics on `IHostApplicationLifetime.ApplicationStarted` - i.e. after every hosted service finished `StartAsync`:
* `BackendStartupMs` - process start (`Process.StartTime`) to host ready; includes runtime, DI and all hosted services.
* `BackendTableInitMs` - the `InitializeTablesAsync` slice alone (`TableStorageService.LastInitialization`).
Dimensions: `version`, `commit`, `tableInitFullPass`, `instance`. Metrics bypass adaptive sampling and the worker log level, so they arrive even though Information traces do not. The MCP server logs the same idea as one `{"type":"boot","readyMs":…}` stderr line per start (ContainerAppConsoleLogs_CL, see `.claude/commands/mcp-telemetry.md`).
```kusto
customMetrics
| where name in ("BackendStartupMs", "BackendTableInitMs")
| summarize p50 = percentile(value, 50), p95 = percentile(value, 95), n = count()
by name, version = tostring(customDimensions.version), fullPass = tostring(customDimensions.tableInitFullPass)
```
# Examples
* Deploy that adds a table: first cold start after the deploy runs the full pass once (log: "Table schema sentinel missing or stale"), every later start logs "Table schema sentinel matches (...)".
* Fresh storage account: sentinel read throws TableNotFound -> full pass -> index empty -> one instance claims and backfills.
# Citations
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableStorageService.cs` - sentinel, `InitializeTablesAsync`, `EnsureAllTablesAsync`, `TryClaimSessionIndexBackfillAsync`
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableInitializerService.cs` - startup gating
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/MaintenanceService.cs` - daily `EnsureAllTablesAsync`
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/StartupTelemetryService.cs` - `BackendStartupMs` / `BackendTableInitMs`
* `src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/index.ts` - `{"type":"boot"}` line
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/TableSchemaSentinelTests.cs`, `StartupTelemetryServiceTests.cs`
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@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
---
type: Concept
title: Telemetry Ingest Shaping (App Insights / Log Analytics)
description: What the backend deliberately keeps out of Application Insights and why - one canonical request record (worker copy, per-item sampling bypass; host HTTP duplicate dropped by a workspace transformation), expected storage outcomes (404/412/409) and successful SignalR REST calls filtered in the worker, and the query rules that follow.
resource: /src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Telemetry/StorageDependencyFilterProcessor.cs
tags:
- backend
- telemetry
- application-insights
- cost
timestamp: 2026-08-23
---
# Telemetry Ingest Shaping
The backend is storage-I/O heavy and runs on the Functions isolated worker, which emits telemetry from TWO processes (host and worker). Left alone, Log Analytics ingestion is dominated by rows nobody reads. This document records what is removed, where, and what that means for queries.
# Schema
## Request telemetry — one canonical record
| Source | Emitted by | Content | Fate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Host HTTP request (`Properties.Source` empty, `Url` set) | Functions host process | Name, duration, status — no tenant/user/correlation | **Dropped at ingestion** by the workspace transformation on `AppRequests` (`infra/appinsights-workspace-transforms.bicep`) |
| Host non-HTTP invocation (`Url` empty) | Functions host process | Timer / queue executions | Kept (the worker middleware never sees them) |
| Worker request (`Properties.Source == 'WorkerMiddleware'`) | `RequestTelemetryMiddleware` | TenantId, UserId, UserRole, CorrelationId, ClientSource, McpToolName, HttpPath | **Kept, unsampled** — the canonical record |
Why two mechanisms:
* The host request item cannot be suppressed from worker code or from `host.json` (`Host.Results` controls log traces, not the request item; verified 2026-06-09). The only lever is a Log Analytics workspace transformation: `source | where tostring(Properties.Source) == 'WorkerMiddleware' or isempty(Url)`.
* `host.json` `samplingSettings.excludedTypes: "Request;Event"` only applies to the host process. The worker's `AddApplicationInsightsTelemetryWorkerService` runs its own adaptive sampling; before 2026-08-23 worker request rows carried `ItemCount` 2–5 on weekdays (≈30 % of individual requests missing, `count()` undercounting by the same share — `sum(ItemCount)` matched the host copy to 1.00 per day). Re-configuring the worker sampling chain did not take effect in the isolated worker (see the L4 note in `Program.cs`). The per-item opt-out does: the middleware sets `SamplingPercentage = 100` on its own `RequestTelemetry`, and the SDK sampling processor passes through every item whose sampling percentage is already set.
## Dependency telemetry — keep only signal
`StorageDependencyFilterProcessor` (worker pipeline) drops:
* successful Azure Storage calls (Table/Queue/Blob) in both shapes — the HTTP shape (`Azure table`, target `*.table.core.windows.net`) and the Azure SDK ActivitySource shape (`InProc | Microsoft.Tables`, `InProc | Microsoft.Storage`);
* storage calls with an **expected outcome**: `404` (point-read miss — EventTypeIndex, BlockedDevices lookups), `412` (ETag precondition), `409` (idempotent insert conflict). HTTP-shape rows carry the code in `ResultCode`; InProc rows only in `Properties["Error"]` (`Status: 404 (`). Before this filter these were 100 % of the remaining "failed" storage rows (~540 MB/week, two rows per call);
* successful Azure SignalR Service REST calls the worker makes itself (`*.service.signalr.net`).
The bulk of SignalR REST traffic (group add/remove per connection, ~470 MB/week) is emitted by the **host** process for the SignalR output binding (`SDKVersion rdddsc:*`) and never passes the worker pipeline — live-verified after the 2026-08-23 deploy (worker rows: 0, host rows: ~560/h). Those are removed by the second data flow of the same workspace transformation: `AppDependencies | where not(Success == true and Target endswith '.service.signalr.net')`.
Everything else passes: storage 429/5xx/auth/timeouts, failed SignalR calls, all HTTP/Graph/NVD/MSRC dependencies, the worker's own `InProc Invoke` span, and every non-dependency item.
## Measured baseline (7 days before the change, `_BilledSize`, `autopilotmonitor-api-eu`)
| Table | Rows | MB | After |
|---|---|---|---|
| AppDependencies | 976k | 1248 | ≈ 240 (SignalR + expected-outcome rows gone) |
| AppRequests host copy | 274k | 323 | ≈ 0 (only timer/queue rows) |
| AppRequests worker copy | 189k | 208 | ≈ 300 (now 100 % of requests) |
| AppTraces | 142k | 137 | unchanged |
| AppEvents | 6k | 4 | unchanged — not worth touching |
Net ≈ −1.3 GB/week with MORE usable data (every request now has tenant context).
# Examples
Counting requests (exact since 2026-08-23; for older data replace `count()` with `sum(itemCount)`):
```kql
requests
| where customDimensions.Source == 'WorkerMiddleware'
| summarize total=count(), failed=countif(success == false) by name
```
Real storage trouble only:
```kql
dependencies
| where type startswith 'InProc | Microsoft.Tables' or target endswith '.table.core.windows.net'
| summarize count() by resultCode, tostring(customDimensions.Error)
```
Post-deploy verification of the per-item sampling bypass (must be `ItemCount == 1` only):
```kql
AppRequests
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1h) and tostring(Properties.Source) == 'WorkerMiddleware'
| summarize rows=count() by ItemCount
```
# Citations
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Middleware/RequestTelemetryMiddleware.cs` — `SamplingPercentage = 100` before `TrackRequest`.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Telemetry/StorageDependencyFilterProcessor.cs` + `StorageDependencyFilterProcessorTests.cs` — the filter contract.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Program.cs` — the failed L4 worker-sampling attempt and why it must not be retried.
* `infra/appinsights-workspace-transforms.bicep` — the AppRequests transformation DCR, apply/verify/rollback commands.
* `.claude/commands/backend-logs.md`, `session-debug.md` — query conventions.
+46 -1
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ title: Tenant Activation & the Once-Only Welcome Mail
description: How a signup becomes an activated tenant (manual approve or auto-approve queue), and how the welcome mail is sent exactly once even though activation and the user-provided address race each other.
resource: backend
tags: [activation, auto-approve, welcome-email, preview-whitelist, race]
timestamp: 2026-08-02
timestamp: 2026-08-23
---
# Schema
@@ -58,6 +58,46 @@ The Global-Admin resend endpoint (`POST /api/preview/send-welcome-email/{tenantI
always sends (explicit intent) and consumes the marker best-effort so the automatic
paths never duplicate afterwards.
## Mail transport
Both transactional mails (welcome, post-offboarding farewell) go through the
provider-neutral `EmailService` (`IEmailService` for the welcome path,
`IOffboardFarewellEmailSender` for the farewell path). The provider is an implementation
detail confined to one private transport method plus the `Email:*` configuration
section — a provider swap must not rename classes, DI registrations or callers.
* Current provider: **Mailchimp Transactional (Mandrill)**, `POST {Email:Endpoint}`
(`messages/send`), API key in the JSON body, typed `HttpClient` with the shared
`ResiliencePolicies.Notification` retry policy (15 s timeout).
* Settings (App Settings use `Email__Key`): `Email:ApiKey` (required — empty means every
send is a logged no-op, never an error), `Email:Endpoint`, `Email:FromAddress`
(default `noreply@autopilotmonitor.com`), `Email:FromName` (default `Autopilot Monitor`).
* Result handling: per-recipient status `sent`/`queued`/`scheduled` = success;
`rejected`/`invalid` (with `reject_reason`), non-2xx or malformed bodies = warning.
Never throws — both callers rely on that fail-soft contract.
* `track_opens`/`track_clicks` are explicitly `false` and `auto_text` is `true`: the provider
receives only the recipient address and the tenant domain, which is exactly the claim on
the privacy page and the trust data-flows page. Changing tracking = changing those pages.
## Template overrides (operator-editable)
Global Admins can replace either HTML body without a deployment (portal: Settings →
Email Templates). `EmailTemplateService` resolves the body for every send: the stored
override wins, otherwise the built-in `EmailTemplates.*`. Overrides live in the
`PreviewConfig` table (partition `EmailTemplates`, row key `welcome` | `farewell`,
properties `Html`, `UpdatedBy`, `UpdatedUtc`), cached 5 minutes, invalidated on save/reset.
* The only placeholder is `{{domainName}}`; an empty domain renders as "your organization",
matching the built-ins. Subjects are not editable (pinned constants).
* Limit 30 000 characters (Table string property cap is 32K UTF-16 chars).
* The send path is fail-soft: a storage error falls back to the built-in body. The admin
read path is not — a broken store surfaces as an error instead of silently showing the
built-in.
* Endpoints (all GlobalAdminOnly): `GET|PUT|DELETE /api/global/email-templates/{kind}` and
`POST /api/global/email-templates/{kind}/test`. The test send goes to the caller's tenant
contact address (activation notification email → `ContactEmail` → caller UPN) with the
caller's tenant domain, optionally with an unsaved draft body; provider tag `test`.
# Examples
* Auto-approve wins the race: approve at T+64 s finds no address → logs "deferred to the
@@ -73,3 +113,8 @@ paths never duplicate afterwards.
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Rules/PreviewWhitelistFunction.cs` — save-path trigger, GA resend
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/DataAccess/TableStorage/TableConfigRepository.cs` — conditional inserts (approved / welcome-email-sent)
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/TenantApprovalServiceTests.cs` — ordering + dedup pins
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/EmailService.cs` — provider-neutral transport (Mandrill wire format, result handling, tracking off)
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/EmailServiceTests.cs` — wire-format, fail-soft and gate-ordering pins
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/EmailTemplateService.cs` — override resolution, placeholder rendering, cache
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Admin/EmailTemplatesFunction.cs` — GA endpoints (read / override / reset / test send)
* `src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/admin/settings/sections/SectionEmailTemplates.tsx` — portal editor, preview frame, test send
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@@ -105,6 +105,11 @@ the partition).
* Self-healing 30-day maintenance sweep (2h tick): backfills missing breakdowns, folds
late-terminating sessions into their StartedAt-date aggregates, and enforces version
purity — a stale-version row whose events aged out counts as missing, never mixed.
Reads the tick's **shared window scan** (`MaintenanceService.LoadSweepWindowSessionsAsync`,
one projected 35-day cross-tenant drain via `MaintenanceSweepSessionProjection` that
also feeds the device-journey and verdict-calibration sweeps) — the StartedAt-only
filter is a full-table read in Table Storage, so it is done once per tick, not once per
sweep; `MaintenanceSweepProjectionEquivalenceTests` pins the column set.
* `TimeAttributionAggregates` (PK = TenantId or `global`, RK = `{yyyy-MM-dd}|{class}` and
`rolling30|{class}`): per enrollment class (`user_driven`, `whiteglove`, `self_deploying`,
`device_preparation` — never mixed) median/p75/p90 per segment over the fixed six-segment
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@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
---
type: Concept
title: Verdict Calibration (classifier thermometer)
description: How every session status write declares its VerdictPath, how overriding a verdict preserves it as PriorStatus/PriorVerdictPath, how the daily calibration aggregate counts paths with the re-enrollment proxy and the correction stream, and how the drift radar (share / silence / evidence-gap) turns that into operator-only ops events.
resource: src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/MaintenanceService.VerdictCalibration.cs
tags:
- backend
- sessions
- classifier
- calibration
- regression-radar
timestamp: 2026-08-23T18:00:00+02:00
---
# Verdict Calibration (classifier thermometer)
A session's terminal status is written by ~20 code paths: the agent's own terminal events,
the silence classifier (`EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier`, rules 1–6) reached via the
maintenance sweep / the agent's max-lifetime shutdown / late-telemetry heal / retro
reclassification, the analyze-rule engine, admin marks and session superseding. Verdict
calibration makes every one of those paths **countable**, tracks how often a path's verdict
was later **overridden**, attaches the delayed **re-enrollment proxy**, and raises an
operator-only alarm when a path's share **drifts**. It is deterministic, fact-based tuning
input for the rules — explicitly not a learned model, and never a customer-facing feature.
# Schema
## VerdictPath on the session row
`SessionSummary.VerdictPath` (`VerdictPaths` vocabulary, `origin:detail`, append-only) is
stamped by **every** status write — `UpdateSessionStatusAsync` takes it as a required
parameter, `StoreSessionAsync` stamps `register:new` / `register:whiteglove_resume` and
preserves an existing path through the re-registration Replace, `SetSessionPreProvisionedAsync`
requires it whenever it writes a status. Unlike `FailureSource` (persisted only on `Failed`),
the path survives for Incomplete, AwaitingUser, Stalled and Pending.
| Origin | Paths |
| --- | --- |
| `agent` | `complete`, `complete_soft` (Continue-Anyway), `failed`, `esp_failure_fallback`, `gather_complete`, `whiteglove_pending`, `whiteglove_resumed`, `stall_probe`, `stall_heal` |
| `ingest` | `wg_awaiting` (stall probe mapped to WhiteGlove AwaitingUser) |
| `sweep` | `stalled`, `wg_awaiting`, `sd_reconcile`, `r{rule}` (stage-2 classifier) |
| `maxlife` / `late` / `retro` | `r{rule}` (classifier via max-lifetime shutdown / late-telemetry heal / retro reclassification); `retro:sd_reconcile`, `retro:superseded` |
| `register` | `new`, `whiteglove_resume`, `superseded` |
| `rule` | `rule:{ruleId}` (analyze rule with MarkSessionAsFailed) |
| `manual` | `failed`, `succeeded` |
| `legacy` | read-side derivation only (`legacy:{rule}` when the rule is recoverable from the reason literal, `legacy:unknown` otherwise) — never written |
Classifier rule ids (`ClassifierRules`): `r1`, `r1b_awaiting`, `r1b_succeeded`, `r1c`, `r2`,
`r3`, `r4`, `r5_awaiting`, `r5_incomplete`, `r6`. `ClassifyTimedOutSession` returns
`(Status, Reason, Rule)` so each `return` names its rule.
## PriorStatus / PriorVerdictPath — the correction stream
When a write replaces a prior **verdict** (existing status ∈ Succeeded/Failed/Incomplete/
AwaitingUser with a stamped path, incoming status different), the storage seam preserves the
pair (`TableStorageService.ComputePriorVerdict`, both the ETag path and the force path). A
stall marker healing to InProgress, a same-status refresh, or an unstamped legacy row never
sets it. Admin marks, late agent completions and retro reclassifications all flow through it.
## Read-side derivation for pre-instrumentation rows
`VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(session)` returns the stamped path verbatim, otherwise derives
from `AdminMarkedAction`, `FailureSource`, `ReconcileReason` and `FailureReason` using the
writers' fixed literals (classifier rule prefixes, the `max-lifetime watchdog` / `Retro-
reclassified` suffixes, `Rule: `, `Superseded by session`, `Late completion report received`).
Unambiguous rows get the real path (`agent:complete`, `manual:failed`, `rule:…`,
`maxlife:r6`), ambiguous-but-rule-known rows `legacy:{rule}`, the rest `legacy:unknown`. No
mass backfill: the aggregate counts derived rows with `DerivedCount` so the matrix shows
history while flagging its weaker evidence. Tests pin the literals against the classifier
output so a wording change fails loudly.
## Daily aggregate — `VerdictCalibrationAggregates`
PK = `TenantId` | `"global"`, RK = `yyyy-MM-dd` (session **StartedAt** date, like every daily
aggregate). `VerdictCalibrationDailyAggregate { Version, SessionCount, TerminalSessionCount,
Buckets[], ComputedAt }` with one bucket per (VerdictPath, Status):
| Field | Meaning |
| --- | --- |
| `Count` / `DerivedCount` | sessions currently on the path; of those, derived read-side |
| `Eligible7d` | terminal sessions whose end (`CompletedAt ?? LastEventAt ?? StartedAt`) lies ≥ 7 d before compute time |
| `ReEnrolled7d` | of the eligible: the device's `DeviceHistories` chain shows the next terminal session starting < 7 d after this one's end |
| `OverriddenByAdmin` / `OverriddenByLateCompletion` / `OverriddenOther` | sessions whose **PriorVerdictPath** is this bucket — attributed to the path that was overridden, so a bucket can carry overrides with `Count = 0` |
`MaintenanceService.SweepVerdictCalibrationAsync` (2-hourly, after the device-journey sweep
so the chains are fresh; manual maintenance parity; kill switch
`VerdictCalibrationSweepDisabled`) slices the tick's shared projected window scan
(`LoadSweepWindowSessionsAsync` — one 35-day cross-tenant drain feeds the time-attribution,
device-journey and calibration sweeps plus the radar's tenant discovery; the StartedAt-only
filter is a full-table read, so never per sweep), recomputes the rolling 30-day window whole (Replace),
deletes stale date rows it did not regenerate, and the unbounded-tables cleanup applies the
180-day retention. Sessions inside a deletion cascade are skipped; the table is regenerable
and is wiped with the tenant on offboarding.
## Read surfaces
* `GET global/metrics/verdict-calibration?days=&tenantId=` (GlobalReadOrAdmin,
TenantScoping.QueryParam; `VerdictCalibrationResponse.Build`): per path — count, share of
all window sessions, derived count, eligible/re-enrolled with `reEnrollRatePct` **null below
20 eligible**, the three override counters, a today-anchored 7d-vs-28d share trend
(`window7`, `baseline28`, `lift` null without baseline) — plus totals, the trend basis and
the active `alerts[]`. Empty but well-formed before the first sweep.
* MCP `get_verdict_calibration` (platform scope: GA + Global Reader). Same endpoint, LLM-shaped in
`verdict-calibration-shape.ts`: per-row `window7.sessions` / `baseline28.sessions` are dropped (the
denominators live once in `trend`), `reEnrollRatePct` / `lift` are always present (`null` = withheld),
and `minSharePct` / `top` trim the one-session tail — rows carrying overrides are never trimmed and
everything dropped is reported in `omitted`. The wire shape the admin page consumes is untouched.
* Portal: Global Admin → Metrics → Verdict Calibration (`/admin/metrics/verdict-calibration`):
matrix grouped by origin, status pill, `derived n` gray pill, trend glyph (arrow only from
5 window hits and lift ≥ 2 / ≤ 0.5), re-enrollment rate or `— (n=…)`, overrides
`admin / late / other`, `↑ Drift` pill on rows with an active episode, and the active
episodes list.
## Drift radar — `VerdictCalibrationRadar`
Same statistics as the [rule regression radar](rule-regression-radar.md) (7-day window vs the
prior 28 days, ≥ 5 window hits, ≥ 20 window sessions, lift ≥ 2, `MetricsMath.
RateIncreaseSeparated`), anchored on yesterday, over every partition with rows (each tenant
and `global`):
| Kind | Signal | Re-arm |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `share_regression` | one **backend-decided** path's share of all sessions doubled (`sweep`/`maxlife`/`late`/`retro`/`rule`/`manual`/`ingest`; `agent:*` and `register:*` mirror customer workflow mix — first prod pass fired on `agent:whiteglove_pending` rollout weeks — and `legacy:*` is derived, all excluded) | share < 1.5× baseline, the path stops occurring, or the path is no longer eligible |
| `silence_share_regression` | the `sweep:*` + `maxlife:*` share doubled — the backend had to decide more often because the agent went silent (a liveness signal, not a classifier one) | same |
| `evidence_gap` | absolute: `r6` (pure fallthrough) decides ≥ 20 % of the window's classifier verdicts, ≥ 20 verdicts | < 15 % or < 20 verdicts |
Episodes are tracker rows `verdictcalibration|{kind}|{path}|{status}` (register = `AddEntity`,
409 = already burning, fail-closed; refresh carries `FirstNotifiedAt`; 30-day tracker
retention re-arms long burners). A new episode fires **one** `VerdictCalibrationDrift` ops
event (category Maintenance, Warning; dual-registered in the web `OPS_EVENT_TYPES`) — there
is deliberately **no tenant bell**. Per-path findings on a tenant partition get the on-fire
dimension correlation (`RuleRegressionRadar.ComputeDimensionConcentration` over the window's
sessions whose derived path matches), reported with the shared wording contract "correlated,
not necessarily causal"; group kinds and the global partition carry no dimension claim.
Kill switch `VerdictCalibrationRadarDisabled`.
# Examples
* **Reading the thermometer (prod, 2026-08-23 hand analysis that motivated this):**
re-enrollment within 7 days after Succeeded 8.9 % (lab background), after Failed 24.3 %,
after Incomplete 10.6 % — Incomplete behaves like Succeeded, so rules 5/6 are probably too
cautious; the matrix now shows this per rule instead of per status.
* **Correction stream:** a session swept to `sweep:r5_incomplete`, later completed by the
agent → row `agent:complete` with `PriorVerdictPath = sweep:r5_incomplete`; the aggregate
increments `OverriddenByLateCompletion` on the `sweep:r5_incomplete / Incomplete` bucket.
Four admin marks since launch were invisible before — now each one counts against the path
it corrected.
* **Evidence gap:** a tenant whose agent build stopped emitting the Device Setup rollup line
drives its sweep verdicts into `r6`; the absolute gate fires at 20 % and names the
tenant — the fix is agent-side, the classifier is only the messenger.
# Citations
* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Models/VerdictPaths.cs` — vocabulary + `ClassifierRules`
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableStorageService.Sessions.cs` — `ComputePriorVerdict`, `ApplyVerdictPath`, re-registration preserve
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Helpers/VerdictPathDerivation.cs`
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/MaintenanceService.VerdictCalibration.cs` — sweep + `BuildVerdictCalibrationAggregates`
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Metrics/GetVerdictCalibrationFunction.cs`
* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Helpers/VerdictCalibrationRadar.cs`, `Services/MaintenanceService.VerdictCalibrationRadar.cs`
* `src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/tools/admin.ts` — `get_verdict_calibration`
* `src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/verdict-calibration-shape.ts` — LLM-facing response shaping (`minSharePct` / `top`, explicit nulls)
* `src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/admin/metrics/sections/SectionVerdictCalibration.tsx`
* Tests: `VerdictPathTests`, `VerdictCalibrationTests`, `VerdictCalibrationRadarTests`
* Related: [Silent-Session Classification](silent-session-classification.md), [Device Journeys](device-journeys.md), [Rule Regression Radar](rule-regression-radar.md)
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# Agent
* [V2 Agent](agent/index.md) - How the on-device agent works: [runtime overview](agent/overview.md), [decision engine](agent/decision-engine.md) (reducer, signals, completion arms), [logs & persistence](agent/logs-and-persistence.md) (signal log, snapshot, crash recovery), [Hello wizard un-skip](agent/hello-wizard-unskip.md) (why a single "WHfB disabled" read never decides completion), [Autopilot ZTD diagnostics](agent/autopilot-ztd-diagnostics.md) (event IDs, diagnostic registry, endpoints, error-code map).
* [V2 Agent](agent/index.md) - How the on-device agent works: [runtime overview](agent/overview.md), [decision engine](agent/decision-engine.md) (reducer, signals, completion arms), [logs & persistence](agent/logs-and-persistence.md) (signal log, snapshot, crash recovery), [diagnostics package](agent/diagnostics-package.md) (built-in section catalog shared with the portal, RealmJoin/Device Preparation collection gates, caps, manifest), [Hello wizard un-skip](agent/hello-wizard-unskip.md) (why a single "WHfB disabled" read never decides completion), [Autopilot ZTD diagnostics](agent/autopilot-ztd-diagnostics.md) (event IDs, diagnostic registry, endpoints, error-code map).
* [Build Counter Blob](agent/build-counter-blob.md) - How agent build numbers are minted: shared counter blob with ETag-CAS so local and CI builds never collide; CI additionally attests build provenance (Sigstore).
* [Agent Endpoint Migration](agent/endpoint-migration.md) - How the backend re-homes agents to a new API base URL via the config channel (backend move or per-tenant region move): live-fetch-only, allowlist-validated on both sides, one hop, kill wins.
* [Gather Rule Debug Log](agent/gather-rule-debug-log.md) - EnableGatherRuleDebugLog (ConfigVersion 36): the per-tenant local trace file that explains every gather-rule evaluation decision — scope skips, on_change suppression, empty collector results, logparser position/parse-mode outcomes — for rules that produce no timeline events.
* [MDM Reboot Coalescing](agent/mdm-reboot-coalescing.md) - Attributing the mid-ESP coalesced reboot ("second sign-in") to the device-assigned policy URIs that forced it: aggregated DM-Enterprise 2800 observations (neutral, flush-time watermark) + the ANALYZE-ESP-005 advisory gated on an actually-observed reboot.
* [ESP Completion Starvation — the sits-d Cloud-PC complex](agent/post-reboot-completion-recovery.md) - Why a SkipUser=true flow (no user ESP page → no Shell-Core 62407, no AccountSetup registry) left the completion gate satisfied but never evaluated — five Cloud PCs idled six hours at "waiting on: hello_resolution" — and the fix: the observed skip stands in for the final-exit evidence in the IME user-session completion attempt. Plus the two adjacent defects fixed alongside: the edge-only user-apps-settled synthesis (now level-triggered) and the never-wired Shell-Core restart replay (now Hello-wizard-only, with the reasoning why a replayed 62407 must never reach the reducer).
* [Zero User-Targeted Apps — the starved user-phase completion gate](agent/zero-user-apps-completion-gate.md) - Why a device with no user-targeted Intune apps could never satisfy the IME user-session gate — IME skips its "Completed user session" line entirely in the zero-app branch — turning the 30-minute completion backstop into `esp_exit_without_completion_evidence` on a third of one tenant's enrollments, with the user at the desktop and RealmJoin still installing. The two fixes: read the line IME does write (IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS), and never fail a session while a completion gate with its own armed deadline is deliberately holding it.
* [Secure Boot CA-2023 Detection](agent/secureboot-ca2023-detection.md) - Why ANALYZE-SEC-001 v3 reads the UEFI db/KEK variables directly instead of trusting the SecureBoot\Servicing registry, and how the one-sided uefiCa2023FirmwareConfirmed marker plus a not_exists precondition give absence-tolerant suppression across old and new agents.
* [Continue-Anyway Observation Mode](agent/continue-anyway-observation.md) - EnableEspContinueAnywayObservation (ConfigVersion 37, operator-set): Device-phase ESP terminal failures on Continue-Anyway profiles get a bounded 60-min observation instead of an immediate hard fail; the DAD-validated real-user desktop + Hello gate detect the true end, the session completes Succeeded + EspSoftFailure (amber "with issues" badge), expiry un-defangs to the original esp_terminal_failure.
* [CMTrace Time Resolution](agent/cmtrace-time-resolution.md) - Converting bias-less CMTrace local times to UTC without trusting any process's timezone belief: per-line self-anchoring on the 15-minute offset grid for provably fresh lines, uniform marked reader-zone fallback for backlog, and the provenance vocabulary (bias / line-anchored / reader-zone-fallback) that keeps every event re-derivable.
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com (separate repository).
* [System Timeline Watcher](agent/system-timeline-watcher.md) - Ground truth for two timeline blind spots from one System-channel EventLogWatcher with pre-agent backfill: system_clock_changed (Kernel-General 1 — oldTime/newTime/signed timeDeltaMs/reason/setting process; 2 s micro-slew floor, ≥5 min Warning+immediate) and system_sleep_episode (Power-Troubleshooter 1 sleep/hibernate + Kernel-Power 507 Modern Standby; authoritative enteredAt/exitedAt payload instants, 60 s Modern-Standby floor). Consumed by the TimeJumpBadge clock-set cause, the SessionInfoCard standby note, time-attribution SleepSpans (AttributionVersion 3) and ANALYZE-DEV-012.
* [DO GroupId Auto-Set](agent/do-group-id-auto-set.md) - EnableDoGroupIdAutoSet (ConfigVersion 40): the agent seeds the Delivery Optimization DOGroupId policy with a deterministic network-fingerprint GUID (default gateway IPv4 + SendARP MAC, RealmJoin-compatible byte layout) so same-network devices form one DO peering group during ESP; ownership-tracked via the StartupEventGate fingerprint, foreign DOGroupId/DOGroupIdSource policies always win, no random-GUID fallback.
* [ESP Policy-Provider Stall Detection](agent/esp-policy-provider-stall.md) - The EnrollmentStatusTracking CSP's no-timeout Setup/Apps wait is keyed to the Intune-registered "Sidecar" provider by NAME: co-management's "ConfigMgr" parks the user ESP at "Apps (Identifying)" for days even with TrackingPoliciesCreated=1 (issue #106); the always-on two-arm esp_policy_provider_stalled tripwire (provider_incomplete | sidecar_provider_missing) and the SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Autopilot gather-rule allowlist entry that surface it.
* [WiFi SSID and the Windows 24H2 Location Gate](agent/wifi-ssid-location-gate.md) - Why wifi_signal_info vanished on Windows 11 24H2+: WlanQueryInterface(wlan_intf_opcode_current_connection) is gated behind precise-location consent, the prompt only fires in a user context outside System32, and SYSTEM in session 0 falls back to the device-level ConsentStore value - so netsh (same gate) could never cover for it. The tiered WifiInfoProvider (native, then ungated WinRT GetConnectedSsid, then netsh), SSID-only semantics on tier 2, and the Warning-level rc=5 diagnostic that names the gate.
# Rules
@@ -45,14 +47,19 @@ https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com (separate repository).
# Backend
* [Telemetry Ingest Shaping](backend/telemetry-ingest-shaping.md) - One canonical App Insights request record (worker copy with tenant context, per-item sampling bypass; host HTTP duplicate dropped by a workspace transformation DCR), expected storage outcomes 404/412/409 and successful SignalR REST calls filtered in the worker, and the count()/sum(itemCount) query rules that follow.
* [Table Schema Sentinel](backend/table-schema-sentinel.md) - Startup no longer issues one CreateTableIfNotExists per table: a SHA-256 over TableNames.All in AdminConfiguration gates the full pass (derived, never hand-maintained), the SessionsIndex backfill runs only after a full pass behind a conditional-insert claim, and daily maintenance repairs out-of-band deletions.
* [Business Timestamps](backend/business-timestamps.md) - Why the Azure Tables system Timestamp is never authoritative (migrations reset it), and the OccurredUtc + RowKey-decode compensation for AuditLogs/OpsEvents/Events after the 2026-07-18 migration.
* [Send-Time Frame Separation](backend/send-time-frame-separation.md) - One device-clock send timestamp per upload batch (X-Send-Time-Utc → SentAt on Events) splits ReceivedAt − OccurredUtc into pure spool delay and pure device-vs-server clock offset; the clock_skew condition measures SentAt batches directly (spool-immune), the CMTrace tripwire deliberately stays on its differential math.
* [OOBE Bootstrap go-Code Flow](backend/oobe-bootstrap-go-flow.md) - The bootstrap short-code lifecycle (portal-created session → `irm go.autopilotmonitor.com/CODE | iex` at Shift+F10 → GetBootstrapScriptFunction), the always-HTTP-200 text/plain contract, the two-line injection defense (GUID/URL/expiry validator + single-quoted PS literals, golden-pinned against the legacy TS template), and the per-IP rate-limit story behind Front Door.
* [Silent-Session Classification](backend/silent-session-classification.md) - How a session whose agent went silent gets its honest status: the two-stage maintenance sweep (2h Stalled marker with the WhiteGlove Part-2 AwaitingUser gate and the self-deploying Succeeded gate, 5h timeout classification), the EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier rule order (explicit failure → WG Part 2 → self-deploying → completion evidence → emergency break → desktop+Hello → Device Setup/grace), the ingest paths sharing it (max-lifetime, late-telemetry heal, stall probe) and the admin retro-reconcile modes incl. self_deploying_silent.
* [Device Journeys & First-Time-Right](backend/device-journeys.md) - How a device's terminal enrollment attempts are grouped into journeys (trim+casefold device key with junk-serial exclusion, first-success end, 30-day gap, WhiteGlove = one attempt), the DeviceHistories chain with its tombstone-driven deleted-session pruning, the additive daily FTR aggregates, and the banner/fleet/MCP surfaces.
* [Enrollment Time Attribution](backend/time-attribution.md) - How a terminal session's authoritative wall clock (DurationSeconds, WhiteGlove pause excluded) is partitioned into named segments with an explicit unattributed remainder, ESP-blocking apps as positive evidence with "up to" what-if bounds, reboot spans from event gaps, and the breakdown/aggregate tables the sweep maintains.
* [Attempt-Scoped App Install Durations](backend/app-install-duration-attempt.md) - AppInstallSummary.DurationSeconds = status-defining (last) install attempt via the LastAttemptStartedAt max-fold anchor instead of the first-observation→last-terminal span that billed multi-pass IME gaps to trivial apps; InstallPassCount, the weaker-terminal guard, the radar's cutover gate, and time attribution's union-of-attempt-segments occupancy.
* [Rule Regression Radar](backend/rule-regression-radar.md) - How analyze-rule hit-rate regressions are detected (7-day window ≥2× the 28-day baseline with disjoint Wilson intervals), which suppressions keep the radar quiet (grace period, edit-in-window, kill switch), how alert episodes live in the ruleregression tracker keyspace with re-arm semantics, and the on-fire dimension correlation with its "correlated, not necessarily causal" wording contract.
* [Verdict Calibration](backend/verdict-calibration.md) - How every session status write declares its VerdictPath (origin:detail vocabulary incl. classifier rule ids), how overriding a verdict preserves PriorStatus/PriorVerdictPath as the correction stream, the daily per-path calibration aggregate with the 7-day re-enrollment proxy and read-side legacy derivation, the GA endpoint / MCP tool / admin matrix, and the drift radar (share, silence-share, r6 evidence gap) with its operator-only ops events.
* [App Version Duration Regression Radar](backend/app-version-regression-radar.md) - How app versions whose median install duration regressed vs. the previous version are detected (first-seen-ordered versions, median lift ≥2× plus a 5-minute absolute floor over measured installs only), how alert episodes live in the appversionregression tracker keyspace with drain/median re-arm semantics, and the bell/ops-event/analytics surfaces.
* [Plan Downgrade Policy & the Retention Grace Period](backend/plan-downgrade-retention-grace.md) - What happens when a tenant loses Pro: every entitlement gates read-time and reversibly ("gate, don't destroy"), except retention — a 30-day grace keeps the Pro cap before the Community cap starts hard-deleting; the ProDowngradedUtc/trial-expiry anchor model, the TenantPlanDowngraded/RetentionGrace* ops events, and the deliberate non-grace of everything else.
* [Tenant Activation & the Once-Only Welcome Mail](backend/tenant-activation-welcome-mail.md) - How a signup becomes an activated tenant (manual approve or the auto-approve queue), and the write-then-read + conditional-marker arbitration that sends the welcome mail exactly once even though activation and the user-typed notification address race each other.
* [W365 Cloud PC Device Validation](backend/cloudpc-device-validation.md) - Why Cloud PCs can never pass the Autopilot serial lookup, and the cert-CN-bound CloudPc fallback validator: Subject CN (= Intune device id) matched against the tenant's Graph virtualEndpoint/cloudPCs inventory — admits exactly the service-provisioned Cloud PCs, nothing else.
* [ServerActions & On-Demand Diagnostics](backend/server-actions-on-demand-diagnostics.md) - The queue-on-session, deliver-on-ingest action channel, the TenantAdminOrOperator tier with in-function per-type re-gating, the portal's Collect Logs flow (quick-config orders rotate_config before request_diagnostics), and the hosted-prefix sweep in the offboarding cascade.
@@ -71,6 +78,7 @@ https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com (separate repository).
# Security & Identity
* [MCP OAuth Flow](mcp-oauth-flow.md) - Who authenticates where when connecting an AI client to the MCP server; two identities, three parties plus Entra ID.
* [Client-Certificate Tenant Binding](backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md) - Why a chain-valid Intune MDM certificate only proves "issued to some tenant", which extension actually carries the Entra tenant id (`…5.14`) versus the two that look like it (`…5.6` Intune Account id, `…5.4` device id, different encodings), why the Entra join certificate is not part of the auth path, and the shadow-then-enforce rollout with its volume-controlled telemetry.
# Conventions for this bundle
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# Log
## 2026-08-26
* **Update**: `agent/wifi-ssid-location-gate.md` - the network timeline now explains its blank signal too, with no agent change: `buildSegments` already merges `wifi_signal_info` into the covering WiFi segment, so `wifiDataLimitedReason` rides in with the sample. Segments that never got a sample (a mid-session reconnect emits none) inherit it - the gate is a device-level setting and cannot flip mid-enrollment - while a segment with a real reading is never overwritten. Tooltip shows `Signal: unavailable - Location services off on this device`; the "Avg WiFi signal" stat reads `n/a (Location services off)` instead of vanishing. `network_state_change` is deliberately left alone: it has never carried `signalPercent` or `radioType` (only `before_/after_wifiSsid` reaches its payload), so there is no absent field there for a reason to explain, and the SSID it does carry is unaffected by the gate. Web-only change.
## 2026-08-26
* **Update**: `agent/wifi-ssid-location-gate.md` - the gate is now surfaced instead of only logged. When the WinRT tier wins and the native tier reported `rc=5`, `wifi_signal_info` carries `wifiDataLimitedReason = "location_services_off"` and the message gains `- signal unavailable, Location services off`, so the reason is readable straight from the timeline; the portal WiFi card (`DeviceDetailsCard`) matches that literal and names the Intune setting that restores the full payload. The claim is evidence-only - any other native failure leaves the field null rather than blaming a privacy setting, with `IsLocationGateDenied` pinned at its boundaries. New `wifi_signal_info` group in the MCP `DEVICE_PROPERTIES_CATALOG` so a fleet can be sized via `search_sessions` before any policy changes. Agent release + web deploy + MCP redeploy; backend untouched (the payload is opaque DataJson).
## 2026-08-26
* **New**: `agent/wifi-ssid-location-gate.md` - `wifi_signal_info` was missing on most Windows 11 24H2+ WiFi enrollments (build 22631 3/3, 26100 37/178, 26200 43/95 over n=276 sessions from 08-01). Not a parser or language problem: every event that exists carries a full SSID, so the failure is binary at the reader. Cause is the 24H2 location gate on `WlanQueryInterface` with `wlan_intf_opcode_current_connection` - the only opcode the agent uses - which returns `ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED`; the consent prompt only fires for a process in the user context outside `System32`, so the agent (SYSTEM, session 0, pre-privacy-page) is denied silently, and it resolves consent from the HKLM ConsentStore because the `S-1-5-18` hive has none - while the interactive user on the same box reads the SSID fine via the per-user NonPackaged value. `netsh wlan` hangs off the same gate, so the 2026-07 netsh fallback (and its multi-language labels) never covered the case it was built for; more labels cannot fix it. New `WinRtWifiSsidReader` uses the documented replacement `WlanConnectionProfileDetails.GetConnectedSsid` (ungated, SSID only), bound via the CLR WinRT projection with no winmd/NuGet like `OobeStateReader`; new `WifiInfoProvider` owns the tier order (native, WinRT, netsh) that both collectors had duplicated. The step diagnostics added in 2026-07 were logged at `Debug` while the default level is `Info`, so they never reached a field log - the all-tiers-failed case is now a Warning that decodes `rc=5` into the location-gate explanation. Agent-only change; needs an agent release.
## 2026-08-25
* **Update**: `backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md` — stage 2 enforced: `Mismatch` now returns 403 via `LogRequestRejection(stage=certtenant)`. Switched on against 35,684 requests / 32 tenants at 100 % `Match`, with the Warning channel verified to be carrying other traffic so the zero was not an artefact. The rule is one function (`CertTenantBinding.Rejects`) and only `Mismatch` blocks; `ExtensionMissing` / `Unparseable` / `RequestTenantNotAGuid` are tolerated on purpose (the first is the candidate for later tightening and has a test pinning the tolerance). Evaluation fails open on its own exception, and the 403 body does not echo the certificate's tenant. Device binding (stage 3) stays shadow + Global-Admin-only and is unaffected.
## 2026-08-25
* **New**: `agent/zero-user-apps-completion-gate.md` — a Classic enrollment whose user has zero targeted Intune Win32 apps could not produce the evidence any user-phase completion path required: IME's zero-app branch (`ApplicationPoller`, verified against decompiled 1.104.102.0 and three older builds) `continue`s before its `Completed user session` statement, so `ImeUserSessionCompletedUtc` stayed null, all four arms of `ShouldTransitionToAwaitingHello` were dead, and the 30-min `advisory_completion` backstop resolved the session as `esp_exit_without_completion_evidence` — with a DAD-validated desktop, Hello provisioned and RealmJoin still installing. One tenant: 10 of 30 enrollments in a week, all false positives. Two fixes. (1) New pattern `IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS` reads the line IME *does* write and routes it through the same `OnUserSessionCompleted` callback, guarded to the AccountSetup phase and replayed if the observation predates the phase marker; `AreUserEspAppsSettled` now accepts an empty app list only with that explicit observation. (2) `HandleAdvisoryCompletionDeadlineFired` re-arms instead of failing while the RealmJoin gate is closed and its own deadline is still armed — session 75d6ae8e installed 25 RealmJoin packages inside the window, the last 2 min before the failure. `ime_user_session_completed` gains an `evidence` field (`zero_user_apps_enumerated` / `user_session_completed`); no new event type. The pattern reaches existing agents via the config API (an unknown action is a Debug line), the behaviour needs an agent release.
## 2026-08-24
* **Change**: `DeviceAssociationValidator` / `SecurityValidator` — the DevPrep association shadow now logs one line per real Graph lookup instead of one per request (`DeviceAssociationResult.ServedFromCache`, `AsCacheHit()` copies rather than marking the shared cached instance), the same gate the cert-device-binding shadow uses. Measured: one enrollment produced 263 identical lines off a handful of calls. Status of that preview, for the record: the `/beta/deviceManagement/tenantAssociatedDevices` endpoint answers (6 calls, all HTTP 200, `transient=False`), but every result so far is `matched=False` from a single Autopilot **v1** device — which is the correct answer for a device that was never part of a Device Preparation policy. The matching itself is therefore still unproven, and the endpoint remains undocumented in both v1.0 and beta Graph reference, so it is not a basis for enforcement.
* **Update**: `backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md` — stage 3 verified live (`ea6a375`, gktatooine): 136 requests, all `Match`, device object ~72 s older than the session start, so no enrollment race in that run. Measured Graph cost: **1 call for 136 requests** (30 min positive cache), versus 25 for the per-request Autopilot validator — the positive TTL needs no change. The shadow log is now gated on `ServedFromCache` (one line per real lookup instead of per request); never-cached outcomes still log every time.
* **Update**: `backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md` — stage 3, the cert-to-device binding: new `IntuneDeviceBindingValidator` resolves the Subject-CN managedDevice id against the tenant's own `deviceManagement/managedDevices` (point-GET, no filter literal), modelled on `CloudPcDeviceValidator` and wired fire-and-forget like the DevPrep shadow so a cold Graph round-trip never enters the agent request path. New GA-only tenant toggle `ValidateIntuneDeviceBinding` (shadow — never touches `deviceValidated`), new optional Graph feature `IntuneDeviceBinding` → `DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All` in `GraphFeatureCatalog` + the customer grant script, and `enrolledAgeSeconds` on every log line so the enrollment race can be measured before this could ever become a gate. Grep marker: `CERT-DEVICE-BINDING-SHADOW`.
* **Update**: `backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md` — shadow telemetry moved off the dead `LogInformation` path: the `Match` outcome now rides on the request row as the `CertTenantBinding` dimension (`SecurityValidator` → `FunctionContext.Items` → `RequestTelemetryMiddleware`), which is unsampled and already exists per request, so the denominator costs nothing. Non-Match outcomes keep their Warning trace. Post-deploy verification of 249e39bc found zero rows across 32k requests — worker `LogInformation` never reaches App Insights (provider default rule Warning+), making "everything matched" indistinguishable from "never ran". `CertificateValidationResult.FromCache` removed with the sampling path it existed for.
* **New**: `backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md` — the agent's mTLS certificate chains to Microsoft's shared Intune roots, so certificate validation alone never proved tenant membership; tenant scoping rested entirely on the (non-secret) device serial in the downstream validators. The Intune MDM leaf carries the Entra tenant id in OID `1.2.840.113556.5.14` (nested OCTET STRING), which is NOT `…5.6` (Intune Account id, a different GUID) and NOT `…5.4` (device id, stored as 16 bare bytes) — all decoded by one shared `MsDeviceCertificateOids.TryParseGuid` now used by agent and backend. Stage 1 ships as shadow only: `CertTenantBinding.Evaluate` (pure) plus `SecurityValidator.ObserveCertTenantBinding` (returns void, swallows its own exceptions, cannot change an authorization outcome), with `Match` sampled via `CertificateValidationResult.FromCache` so the denominator survives without per-request volume. Grep marker for the stage-2 enforcement change: `CERT-TENANT-BINDING-SHADOW`.
## 2026-08-23
* **New**: `backend/telemetry-ingest-shaping.md` — `RequestTelemetryMiddleware` sets `SamplingPercentage=100` on its own item (worker request rows were adaptively sampled, ItemCount 2–5 on weekdays, despite host.json `excludedTypes`), the redundant host HTTP request copy is dropped by a workspace transformation DCR (`infra/appinsights-workspace-transforms.bicep`, timer/queue rows kept), and `StorageDependencyFilterProcessor` now also drops expected storage outcomes (404/412/409, both InProc and HTTP shapes) and successful SignalR REST calls; the host-emitted SignalR binding calls (bulk of the volume, SDK `rdddsc`) are dropped by a second `AppDependencies` flow in the same DCR. Measured ≈ −1.3 GB/week.
* **Update**: `backend/table-schema-sentinel.md` — "Measuring it": `StartupTelemetryService` emits `BackendStartupMs` (process start → ApplicationStarted) and `BackendTableInitMs` as App Insights custom metrics with version/commit/fullPass dimensions; the MCP server writes one `{"type":"boot","readyMs"}` stderr line per start (query in `.claude/commands/mcp-telemetry.md` §A2).
* **New**: `backend/table-schema-sentinel.md` — startup table initialization gated by a schema sentinel (SHA-256 over `TableNames.All` in `AdminConfiguration`/`SchemaSentinel`/`tables`): matching sentinel ⇒ zero `CreateTableIfNotExists` calls on a cold start, missing/stale ⇒ one full pass + sentinel rewrite. SessionsIndex startup backfill only after a full pass, `IsSessionIndexEmptyAsync` no longer treats errors as "empty", conditional-insert claim so one scaled-out instance backfills. Daily maintenance runs `IStorageInitializer.EnsureAllAsync` to repair out-of-band table deletions.
* **Update**: `backend/verdict-calibration.md` — MCP `get_verdict_calibration` response shaping: per-row trend denominators dropped, explicit nulls, `minSharePct` / `top` with an `omitted` report.
* **Update**: `backend/verdict-calibration.md` — share-regression radar restricted to backend-decided paths; agent-declared/registration paths (customer workflow mix) and derived legacy paths no longer alert, stale episodes re-arm themselves.
* **Update**: `backend/time-attribution.md`, `backend/device-journeys.md`, `backend/verdict-calibration.md` — the rolling maintenance sweeps (time attribution, device journeys, verdict calibration, calibration-radar discovery) now share ONE projected 35-day cross-tenant Sessions scan per tick (`LoadSweepWindowSessionsAsync` + `MaintenanceSweepSessionProjection`, pinned by `MaintenanceSweepProjectionEquivalenceTests`) instead of four full-table drains; each sweep slices its own window by StartedAt.
* **New**: `backend/verdict-calibration.md` — the classifier thermometer: every status write now stamps `VerdictPath` (required parameter on `UpdateSessionStatusAsync`; `EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier` returns its rule id), overriding a verdict preserves `PriorStatus`/`PriorVerdictPath`, `VerdictPathDerivation` attributes pre-instrumentation rows read-side (`legacy:*` when ambiguous). New daily aggregate `VerdictCalibrationAggregates` (per-path count/derived/eligible7d/reEnrolled7d/overridden-by-admin|late|other, sweep after the device-journey pass, 180d retention), `GET global/metrics/verdict-calibration`, MCP `get_verdict_calibration`, admin metrics section, and the `VerdictCalibrationRadar` (share / silence-share / r6 evidence-gap episodes in the tracker keyspace `verdictcalibration|`, `VerdictCalibrationDrift` ops event, no tenant bell).
* **New**: `backend/silent-session-classification.md` — one place for the silent-session verdict: `EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier` rule order incl. the new rule 1c `IsSelfDeployingProvisioned` (self-deploying profile + Device Setup all-succeeded + no explicit failure ⇒ Succeeded reconcile, no grace/AwaitingUser — kiosk tenant aebdce78 audit: 836 finished devices parked AwaitingUser/Incomplete), the sweep stage-1 gates (`TryMarkWhiteGloveAwaitingUserAsync`, new `TryReconcileSelfDeployingAsync`), the ingest callers (max-lifetime, late-telemetry heal, stall probe) and the new admin retro mode `self_deploying_silent` (`GetSelfDeployingSilentSessionsAsync`). Agent companion: `SessionRegistrationHelper` waits up to 15s for a network link and retries 6× (~62s) instead of 5× (~30s) so the reboot relaunch on Wi-Fi no longer exits 7 before the link is back.
* **New**: `agent/diagnostics-package.md` — the diagnostics ZIP's built-in collection is now ONE catalog in Shared (`DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.All`): the agent iterates it in order and the backend serves the same list to the portal (`GET diagnostics/paths`, MemberRead), so what administrators see is exactly what the agent collects. New conditional sections: RealmJoin client/package/Chocolatey/per-user logs behind the tenant's RealmJoin Watcher toggle (mirrored onto `AgentConfiguration.EnableRealmJoinWatcher` by the merger) and the Device Preparation bootstrapper event log behind the deterministic WDP marker (probe once per build, fail toward Classic); every skip is a manifest line. Built-ins bypass `DiagnosticsPathGuards` by design (reviewed code, `%ProgramData%\RealmJoin` is not allowlisted); caps/reparse/evtx export still apply. `MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths` dedups global ∪ tenant paths. Portal: collapsed read-only catalog + one-line rows in both cards, tenant context dropped the GA-only global fetch.
* **Update**: `rules/gather-rule-guardrails.md` — `DiagnosticsPathGuards` scope clarified: configured diagnostics paths only, never the built-in catalog.
* **Update**: `backend/tenant-activation-welcome-mail.md` — new "Template overrides" section: Global Admins can replace the welcome/farewell HTML in the portal (Settings → Email Templates); `EmailTemplateService` resolves override-or-built-in per send (PreviewConfig table, partition `EmailTemplates`, 5-min cache, `{{domainName}}` placeholder, 30k limit, fail-soft send path), GA endpoints `global/email-templates/{kind}` (+`/test` to the caller's tenant contact address). Also: the mail header is image-free (CSS-drawn brand mark, gradient stripes and clip-path edge as progressive enhancement).
## 2026-08-22
* **Update**: `backend/tenant-activation-welcome-mail.md` — new "Mail transport" section: transactional mail now goes through the provider-neutral `EmailService` (`IEmailService` + `IOffboardFarewellEmailSender`) with the provider confined to one private transport method and the `Email:*` settings (`ApiKey`, `Endpoint`, `FromAddress`, `FromName`); current provider Mailchimp Transactional (Mandrill) replacing Resend (NuGet dropped, typed `HttpClient` + `ResiliencePolicies.Notification`). Result-array semantics (`sent`/`queued`/`scheduled` ok, `rejected`/`invalid` warn), open/click tracking explicitly off because the privacy/trust claim depends on it.
* **New**: `backend/plan-downgrade-retention-grace.md` — plan downgrade policy: every Pro entitlement gates read-time and reversibly on downgrade ("gate, don't destroy"), except retention, which now gets a 30-day grace (`FeatureEntitlementCatalog.RetentionDowngradeGraceDays`) before the Community cap starts hard-deleting the 90–365-day band. Anchor model: `ProDowngradedUtc` stamped/cleared by the plan endpoint's pure `ApplyPlanChanges` core on EFFECTIVE-edition transitions (covers explicitly ended trials; planTier downgrade under an active trial deliberately doesn't stamp), trial expiry anchors read-time via `TrialExpiresUtc`. New Warning ops events `TenantPlanDowngraded` (PATCH handler) and `TenantRetentionGraceExpiring`/`TenantRetentionGraceEnded` (TrialExpirySweep window mechanics, only when stored retention exceeds the Community cap). Field is patch-denied + revert-protected; retention WRITE cap deliberately ignores the grace.
## 2026-08-21
* **New**: `agent/do-group-id-auto-set.md` — optional DO peering-group seed (`EnableDoGroupIdAutoSet`, default off, ConfigVersion 40): `DoGroupIdService` derives a deterministic GUID from the default gateway's IPv4 + SendARP MAC in RealmJoin's exact byte layout (cross-product peering) and writes `DOGroupId` in the 64-bit GPO Policies store with readback verification. Conservative by design: no random-GUID fallback (skip on missing gateway/MAC), `DOGroupIdSource`/MDM-managed values/foreign GPO values always win (skip reasons in the `do_group_id_auto_set` event), own stale values are recognized via the `written:<guid>` StartupEventGate fingerprint and updated after a gateway change. Gateway heuristic extracted into the shared `NetworkInterfaceLocator` (dedup of NetworkChangeDetector + DeviceInfoCollector copies).
+6
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ item in `AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.csproj`) and regenerated into the portal
| `IsCommandAllowed` | `allowedCommands` | **exact** match, trimmed — never prefix |
| `IsEventLogChannelAllowed` | `eventLogChannels` | prefix, boundary `/` or end |
`DiagnosticsPathGuards.IsDiagnosticsPathAllowed` (allowlist `diagnosticsPathPrefixes`, a C#
literal mirrored in the JSON) applies the same hard blocks and the same user-profile
exception to **admin-configured diagnostics paths** only. The diagnostics package's built-in
sections are reviewed code and never pass through it — see
[Diagnostics Package](../agent/diagnostics-package.md).
**Hard blocks live in code, not in the JSON**, so a parse error cannot lift them — on a
parse failure the allowlists fall back to empty and everything is blocked (fail-closed),
but the hard blocks must hold regardless of configuration:
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
// Autopilot-Monitor — Log Analytics workspace transformation (ingestion-time filter)
//
// Two ingestion-time filters. (2) Successful Azure SignalR REST dependencies emitted by the
// HOST process for the SignalR output binding (SDKVersion rdddsc:*) — the worker-side
// StorageDependencyFilterProcessor never sees those. Failed SignalR calls are kept.
// (1) Drops the redundant HOST-side HTTP request record from AppRequests so that exactly one
// canonical request row remains: the worker-side copy emitted by RequestTelemetryMiddleware
// (Properties.Source == 'WorkerMiddleware', carries TenantId/UserId/CorrelationId and is
// sampling-exempt per item). Non-HTTP host invocations (timer/queue triggers) have an empty
// Url and are kept — the worker middleware never sees them.
//
// Why ingestion-time: the host request item is emitted by the Functions host process and
// cannot be suppressed from worker code or host.json (verified 2026-06-09, see Program.cs).
// Live numbers 2026-08-23 (7d): host copy 274k rows / 323 MB, worker copy 189k rows / 208 MB.
//
// Cost note: transformation filtering is free up to 50% of the table's incoming volume; the
// portion beyond that (here ~11% of AppRequests) is billed at the (cheap) data-processing rate.
//
// Apply (two steps; the link is a CLI update = GET+PUT, which keeps retention/SKU intact):
// az deployment group create -g rg-autopilotmonitor-prd-gwc \
// --template-file infra/appinsights-workspace-transforms.bicep \
// --query properties.outputs.dcrId.value -o tsv
// az monitor log-analytics workspace update -g rg-autopilotmonitor-prd-gwc -n AutopilotMonitor \
// --data-collection-rule <dcrId-from-above>
//
// Verify after ~20 min (ingestion latency):
// AppRequests | where TimeGenerated > ago(15m) | where AppRoleName == 'autopilotmonitor-api-eu'
// | summarize rows=count() by source=tostring(Properties.Source), hasUrl=isnotempty(Url)
// → only (WorkerMiddleware, true) and ('', false) buckets remain.
//
// Rollback: az monitor log-analytics workspace update -g <rg> -n AutopilotMonitor
// --set properties.defaultDataCollectionRuleResourceId=null (then delete the DCR)
@description('Log Analytics workspace that backs the workspace-based Application Insights resources.')
param workspaceName string = 'AutopilotMonitor'
param location string = resourceGroup().location
resource workspace 'Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces@2023-09-01' existing = {
name: workspaceName
}
resource transforms 'Microsoft.Insights/dataCollectionRules@2023-03-11' = {
name: 'dcr-autopilotmonitor-ws-transforms'
location: location
kind: 'WorkspaceTransforms'
properties: {
description: 'AppRequests: keep the enriched worker request record (Properties.Source == WorkerMiddleware) and non-HTTP host invocations (empty Url); drop the host HTTP duplicate.'
destinations: {
logAnalytics: [
{
workspaceResourceId: workspace.id
name: 'ws'
}
]
}
dataFlows: [
{
streams: [ 'Microsoft-Table-AppRequests' ]
destinations: [ 'ws' ]
transformKql: 'source | where tostring(Properties.Source) == \'WorkerMiddleware\' or isempty(Url)'
}
{
// Successful Azure SignalR REST calls (group add/remove per connection) are emitted by
// the HOST process for the SignalR output binding (SDKVersion rdddsc:*), so the worker's
// StorageDependencyFilterProcessor never sees them. Failed SignalR calls are kept.
streams: [ 'Microsoft-Table-AppDependencies' ]
destinations: [ 'ws' ]
transformKql: 'source | where not(Success == true and Target endswith \'.service.signalr.net\')'
}
]
}
}
// A workspace has exactly one transformation DCR, activated by linking it as the workspace's
// defaultDataCollectionRuleResourceId — deliberately NOT modelled here (see Apply above).
output dcrId string = transforms.id
+8
View File
@@ -675,6 +675,14 @@
"description": "Detects when IME completes a user session, indicating enrollment has finished for that user.",
"enabled": true
},
{
"patternId": "IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS",
"category": "always",
"pattern": "\\[Win32App\\] Get 0 apps for user session (?<sessionId>\\d+), user id = (?<userId>[a-f0-9\\-]+)",
"action": "userSessionZeroApps",
"description": "Detects when IME enumerated a user session and found zero targeted Win32 apps. IME then skips its 'Completed user session' line entirely (the zero-app branch in ApplicationPoller continues before that log statement), so this line is the only evidence that user-phase enforcement finished on a device with no user-targeted apps. Treated as equivalent to a completed user session.",
"enabled": true
},
{
"patternId": "IME-WIN32-STATE-1",
"category": "currentPhase",
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/ime-log-pattern.schema.json",
"patternId": "IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS",
"category": "always",
"pattern": "\\[Win32App\\] Get 0 apps for user session (?<sessionId>\\d+), user id = (?<userId>[a-f0-9\\-]+)",
"action": "userSessionZeroApps",
"description": "Detects when IME enumerated a user session and found zero targeted Win32 apps. IME then skips its 'Completed user session' line entirely (the zero-app branch in ApplicationPoller continues before that log statement), so this line is the only evidence that user-phase enforcement finished on a device with no user-targeted apps. Treated as equivalent to a completed user session.",
"enabled": true
}
+1
View File
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
"imeImpersonation",
"imeTokenFailure",
"enrollmentCompleted",
"userSessionZeroApps",
"updateDoTelemetry",
"scriptStarted",
"scriptContext",
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
#Requires -Version 5.1
#Requires -Version 5.1
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Grants additional Microsoft Graph application permissions to the Autopilot Monitor
@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@
(validates Windows 365 Cloud PCs against the tenant's Cloud PC inventory --
Cloud PCs are never Autopilot-registered, so this enables agent monitoring
of Cloud PC first-connect enrollment)
- IntuneDeviceBinding -> DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All
(cert-to-device binding: verifies that the Intune device id carried in the
agent's client certificate is a device THIS tenant actually enrolled --
currently a Global-Admin-only preview that records telemetry and does not
block enrollment)
- All -> every optional permission above, in one run
(also works with -Revoke to remove all optional grants at once)
@@ -93,7 +98,7 @@ param(
[string]$ClientId,
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true, ParameterSetName = 'ByFeatures')]
[ValidateSet('All', 'ScriptDisplayNames', 'W365CloudPcValidation')]
[ValidateSet('All', 'ScriptDisplayNames', 'W365CloudPcValidation', 'IntuneDeviceBinding')]
[string[]]$Features,
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true, ParameterSetName = 'ByPermissions')]
@@ -116,6 +121,7 @@ $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$FeatureCatalog = @{
'ScriptDisplayNames' = @('DeviceManagementScripts.Read.All')
'W365CloudPcValidation' = @('CloudPC.Read.All')
'IntuneDeviceBinding' = @('DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All')
}
# Translate Features -> Permissions when caller used the high-level form.
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
using System.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
{
/// <summary>
/// Pins the compiled-in fallback rule catalogs (<see cref="BuiltInConfigCatalog"/>):
/// the agent embeds the SAME CI-combined rules/dist artifacts the backend serves, so a
/// no-config/no-cache session still runs full IME tracking. These tests guard the
/// embedding + deserialization end-to-end — a broken LogicalName, a moved resource or a
/// shape change in the combined JSON must fail HERE, not silently strip the fallback
/// back down to zero patterns in the field.
/// </summary>
public class BuiltInConfigCatalogTests
{
[Fact]
public void ImeLogPatterns_LoadFromEmbeddedCatalog_EnabledOnly()
{
var patterns = BuiltInConfigCatalog.GetEnabledImeLogPatterns(logger: null);
Assert.NotEmpty(patterns);
Assert.All(patterns, p =>
{
Assert.True(p.Enabled);
Assert.False(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(p.PatternId));
Assert.False(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(p.Pattern));
Assert.False(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(p.Action));
Assert.False(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(p.Category));
});
Assert.Equal(patterns.Count, patterns.Select(p => p.PatternId).Distinct().Count());
}
[Fact]
public void ImeLogPatterns_CarryCoreTrackingActions()
{
// The app-tracking backbone: without these two actions the ImeLogTracker cannot
// attribute installs to apps or follow ESP phases. Their presence proves the
// deserialization actually populated the action field (a shape drift in the
// combined JSON would otherwise still pass the structural checks above).
var actions = BuiltInConfigCatalog.GetEnabledImeLogPatterns(logger: null)
.Select(p => p.Action).ToHashSet();
Assert.Contains("setCurrentApp", actions);
Assert.Contains("espPhaseDetected", actions);
}
[Fact]
public void GatherRules_LoadFromEmbeddedCatalog_EnabledOnly()
{
// The built-in gather-rule catalog ships mostly disabled rules — only the
// default-enabled ones may reach the fallback config.
var rules = BuiltInConfigCatalog.GetEnabledGatherRules(logger: null);
Assert.All(rules, r =>
{
Assert.True(r.Enabled);
Assert.False(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(r.RuleId));
});
}
}
}
@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
// Merge reads two Collectors knobs (AgentMaxLifetimeMinutes, HelloWaitTimeoutSeconds);
// the remaining CollectorConfiguration flags flow untouched to DefaultComponentFactory.
nameof(AgentConfigResponse.Collectors),
// Merge reads one Analyzers knob (EnableRealmJoinWatcher → diagnostics RealmJoin sections);
// the remaining flags flow untouched to DefaultComponentFactory + AgentAnalyzerManager.
nameof(AgentConfigResponse.Analyzers),
};
/// <summary>
@@ -70,8 +73,6 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
nameof(AgentConfigResponse.ImeLogPatterns),
// Passed by AgentRuntimeHost into IComponentFactory.CreateCollectorHosts → ImeLogHost sealing re-emit.
nameof(AgentConfigResponse.WhiteGloveSealingPatternIds),
// Consumed by DefaultComponentFactory (RealmJoin/KeepAwake/ConsoleBypass host gates) + AgentAnalyzerManager.
nameof(AgentConfigResponse.Analyzers),
// Self-update ZIP integrity second trust channel — BinaryIntegrityVerifier / Program update path.
nameof(AgentConfigResponse.LatestAgentSha256),
// Running-EXE integrity verification — BinaryIntegrityVerifier post-config check.
@@ -368,6 +368,33 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
Assert.Equal(30, agent.HelloWaitTimeoutSeconds);
}
[Fact]
public void Merge_mirrors_analyzers_realmjoin_watcher_onto_agent_config()
{
// The diagnostics package gates its RealmJoin sections on this flag but never
// sees the remote response — the merger carries the one Analyzers knob over.
var agent = NewAgentConfig();
var remote = FullRemote();
remote.Analyzers = new AnalyzerConfiguration { EnableRealmJoinWatcher = true };
RemoteConfigMerger.Merge(agent, remote);
Assert.True(agent.EnableRealmJoinWatcher);
}
[Fact]
public void Merge_clears_realmjoin_watcher_when_remote_analyzers_missing()
{
var agent = NewAgentConfig();
agent.EnableRealmJoinWatcher = true; // stale cached true must not survive
var remote = FullRemote();
remote.Analyzers = null!;
RemoteConfigMerger.Merge(agent, remote);
Assert.False(agent.EnableRealmJoinWatcher);
}
[Fact]
public void Merge_replaces_diagnostics_log_paths_with_empty_list_when_remote_null()
{
@@ -114,6 +114,22 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
Assert.Equal(1, svc.LastFetchAttempts);
}
[Fact]
public async Task FetchConfig_DefaultsFallback_CarriesBuiltInCatalogs()
{
// A no-config/no-cache session must still get the compiled-in rule catalogs —
// an empty ImeLogPatterns list kills the entire IME tracking pipeline (the
// pre-catalog behaviour this pins against regressing to).
var svc = NewService(BackendBehaviour.AlwaysTransientFailure);
var result = await svc.FetchConfigAsync(retryOnTransientErrors: true);
Assert.Equal(0, result.ConfigVersion);
Assert.NotEmpty(result.ImeLogPatterns);
Assert.All(result.ImeLogPatterns, p => Assert.True(p.Enabled));
Assert.All(result.GatherRules, r => Assert.True(r.Enabled));
}
[Fact]
public async Task FetchConfig_EmptyResponse_TreatedAsTransient()
{
@@ -128,6 +144,94 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
Assert.Equal(4, svc.LastFetchAttempts);
}
// ── Network-link gate (tenant aebdce78 audit 2026-08-24) ────────────
[Fact]
public async Task FetchConfig_InitialFetch_WaitsForNetworkLink()
{
// The initial startup fetch must gate on the link-level signal so the retry
// budget isn't burned into a NIC that is provably still down (agent relaunched
// at boot, Wi-Fi still associating).
var svc = NewService(BackendBehaviour.SuccessImmediately);
await svc.FetchConfigAsync(retryOnTransientErrors: true);
Assert.Equal(1, svc.NetworkLinkWaits);
}
[Fact]
public async Task FetchConfig_RotatePath_SkipsNetworkLinkGate()
{
// rotate_config runs mid-session on a proven link and must stay latency-bounded.
var svc = NewService(BackendBehaviour.SuccessImmediately);
await svc.FetchConfigAsync(retryOnTransientErrors: false);
Assert.Equal(0, svc.NetworkLinkWaits);
}
// ── Post-registration recovery ──────────────────────────────────────
[Fact]
public async Task TryRecover_AfterFailedFetch_AppliesLiveConfig_KeepsFailureRecord()
{
// The core self-heal contract: registration proved the backend reachable, the
// recovery swaps in the live config — but the LastFetch* observability keeps
// describing the failed startup fetch so the wire event can report both.
var svc = NewService(BackendBehaviour.FailAllThenSucceed);
await svc.FetchConfigAsync(retryOnTransientErrors: true);
Assert.Equal(RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.UsedDefaults, svc.LastFetchOutcome);
var recovered = await svc.TryRecoverConfigAsync();
Assert.NotNull(recovered);
Assert.Equal(42, recovered.ConfigVersion);
Assert.Equal(42, svc.CurrentConfig.ConfigVersion);
Assert.True(svc.RecoveredAfterFetchFailure);
// Startup-failure record intact:
Assert.Equal(RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.UsedDefaults, svc.LastFetchOutcome);
Assert.Equal(1 + RemoteConfigService.InitialFetchRetryBackoff.Length, svc.LastFetchAttempts);
Assert.Equal(nameof(HttpRequestException), svc.LastFetchFailureType);
}
[Fact]
public async Task TryRecover_AfterSuccessfulFetch_IsNoOp()
{
var svc = NewService(BackendBehaviour.SuccessImmediately);
await svc.FetchConfigAsync(retryOnTransientErrors: true);
var recovered = await svc.TryRecoverConfigAsync();
Assert.Null(recovered);
Assert.False(svc.RecoveredAfterFetchFailure);
}
[Fact]
public async Task TryRecover_BeforeAnyFetch_IsNoOp()
{
var svc = NewService(BackendBehaviour.SuccessImmediately);
var recovered = await svc.TryRecoverConfigAsync();
Assert.Null(recovered);
Assert.False(svc.RecoveredAfterFetchFailure);
}
[Fact]
public async Task TryRecover_WhenBackendStillFailing_KeepsFallback_NeverThrows()
{
var svc = NewService(BackendBehaviour.AlwaysTransientFailure);
var fallback = await svc.FetchConfigAsync(retryOnTransientErrors: true);
Assert.Equal(0, fallback.ConfigVersion);
var recovered = await svc.TryRecoverConfigAsync();
Assert.Null(recovered);
Assert.False(svc.RecoveredAfterFetchFailure);
Assert.Equal(0, svc.CurrentConfig.ConfigVersion); // fallback config untouched
Assert.Equal(RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.UsedDefaults, svc.LastFetchOutcome);
}
// ── Outcome state defaults ──────────────────────────────────────────
[Fact]
@@ -145,6 +249,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
SuccessImmediately,
AlwaysTransientFailure,
FailTwiceThenSucceed,
/// <summary>All 4 initial attempts fail; the NEXT call (the recovery fetch) succeeds.</summary>
FailAllThenSucceed,
AlwaysAuthFailure401,
AlwaysReturnNull,
}
@@ -177,6 +283,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
_behaviour = behaviour;
}
/// <summary>Number of times the network-link gate seam was awaited.</summary>
public int NetworkLinkWaits { get; private set; }
protected override Task<AgentConfigResponse> CallBackendAsync()
{
_calls++;
@@ -188,6 +297,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
if (_calls < 3)
throw new HttpRequestException("simulated cold-start timeout");
return Task.FromResult(new AgentConfigResponse { ConfigVersion = 42 });
case BackendBehaviour.FailAllThenSucceed:
if (_calls <= 1 + RemoteConfigService.InitialFetchRetryBackoff.Length)
throw new HttpRequestException("simulated dead network link");
return Task.FromResult(new AgentConfigResponse { ConfigVersion = 42 });
case BackendBehaviour.AlwaysTransientFailure:
throw new HttpRequestException("simulated network failure");
case BackendBehaviour.AlwaysAuthFailure401:
@@ -202,6 +315,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
// Zero-delay so the suite finishes in ms instead of the live 10/30/60 s schedule.
protected override Task DelayBetweenAttemptsAsync(TimeSpan delay) => Task.CompletedTask;
// Record + skip the real link poll so the suite is deterministic on offline CI.
protected override Task WaitForNetworkLinkAsync()
{
NetworkLinkWaits++;
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
// In-memory + per-instance cache so a prior test's successful fetch can't
// bleed into a later test that expects UsedDefaults.
private AgentConfigResponse? _cached;
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
using System.Collections.Generic;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
{
/// <summary>
/// Sessions 81daa77f / 75d6ae8e (2026-08-25) — zero user-targeted apps starved every
/// user-phase completion probe. The IME zero-app branch returns before it writes the
/// "Completed user session" line, so a device whose user has no targeted Win32 apps never
/// produced the evidence <c>IsImeUserSessionGenuine</c> requires, and the AdvisoryCompletion
/// window failed the enrollment 30 minutes later — with the user at the desktop, Hello
/// provisioned and RealmJoin still installing.
/// <para>
/// IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS reads the line IME does write in that branch and routes it
/// through the same <see cref="ImeLogTracker.OnUserSessionCompleted"/> callback.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
public sealed class ImeLogTrackerZeroUserAppsTests
{
// Mirrors rules/ime-log-patterns/IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS.json. The JSON itself is
// pinned against a real IME line by BuiltInRulesTests in the backend suite.
private const string ZeroAppsPattern =
@"\[Win32App\] Get 0 apps for user session (?<sessionId>\d+), user id = (?<userId>[a-f0-9\-]+)";
private const string EspPhasePattern =
@"\[Win32App\] (?:In|The) EspPhase: (?<espPhase>\w+)";
private const string ZeroAppsLine =
"[Win32App] Get 0 apps for user session 1, user id = 4a1ba5db-44ed-4e69-8477-47ed88e76020";
private static ImeLogTracker BuildTracker(TempDirectory tmp) =>
new ImeLogTracker(
logFolder: tmp.Path,
patterns: new List<ImeLogPattern>
{
new ImeLogPattern
{
PatternId = "IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS",
Category = "always",
Pattern = ZeroAppsPattern,
Action = "userSessionZeroApps",
},
new ImeLogPattern
{
PatternId = "IME-ESP-PHASE",
Category = "always",
Pattern = EspPhasePattern,
Action = "espPhaseDetected",
},
},
logger: new AgentLogger(tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info));
[Fact]
public void ZeroApps_line_during_user_phase_fires_user_session_completed()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
var fired = 0;
tracker.OnUserSessionCompleted = () => fired++;
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
Assert.Equal(1, fired);
Assert.True(tracker.UserSessionZeroAppsObserved);
}
[Fact]
public void ZeroApps_line_before_user_phase_does_not_fire()
{
// Firing here would burn the adapter fire-once flag on a pre-sign-in timestamp that
// IsImeUserSessionGenuine (>= AccountSetupEnteredUtc) can never accept.
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
var fired = 0;
tracker.OnUserSessionCompleted = () => fired++;
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: DeviceSetup");
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
Assert.Equal(0, fired);
Assert.True(tracker.UserSessionZeroAppsObserved);
}
[Fact]
public void ZeroApps_observed_early_is_replayed_on_the_user_phase_transition()
{
// IME writes its check-in lines independently of when the agent first parses the ESP
// phase marker, so the evidence can legitimately arrive first. Dropping it would
// leave a zero-app device with no completion evidence at all.
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
var fired = 0;
tracker.OnUserSessionCompleted = () => fired++;
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: DeviceSetup");
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
Assert.Equal(0, fired);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
Assert.Equal(1, fired);
}
[Fact]
public void Repeated_user_phase_matches_do_not_replay_again()
{
// IME re-emits the phase string as it re-evaluates app sets. Only a real transition
// replays; the adapter fire-once flag is the outer guard, but the tracker must not
// spam the callback either.
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
var fired = 0;
tracker.OnUserSessionCompleted = () => fired++;
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: DeviceSetup");
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
Assert.Equal(1, fired);
}
[Fact]
public void Nonzero_app_count_lines_do_not_match_the_pattern()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
var fired = 0;
tracker.OnUserSessionCompleted = () => fired++;
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(
"[Win32App] Get 3 apps for user session 1, user id = 4a1ba5db-44ed-4e69-8477-47ed88e76020");
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(
"[Win32App] Get 10 apps for user session 1, user id = 4a1ba5db-44ed-4e69-8477-47ed88e76020");
Assert.Equal(0, fired);
Assert.False(tracker.UserSessionZeroAppsObserved);
}
[Fact]
public void AreUserEspAppsSettled_true_after_zero_apps_observation()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
Assert.True(tracker.AreUserEspAppsSettled());
}
[Fact]
public void AreUserEspAppsSettled_stays_false_on_an_empty_list_without_the_observation()
{
// Mutation proof for the branch above: an empty live list on its own still means
// "phase just cleared / apps not surfaced yet", never vacuously settled.
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
Assert.False(tracker.AreUserEspAppsSettled());
}
[Fact]
public void AreUserEspAppsSettled_false_outside_the_user_phase_even_after_the_observation()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: DeviceSetup");
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
Assert.True(tracker.UserSessionZeroAppsObserved);
Assert.False(tracker.AreUserEspAppsSettled());
}
[Fact]
public void GetPendingRequiredUserEspInstallApps_is_empty_for_a_zero_app_user_session()
{
// The adapter deferral probe must not park the signal when there is nothing to wait
// for — otherwise the zero-app path would starve exactly like the old one.
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
Assert.Empty(tracker.GetPendingRequiredUserEspInstallApps());
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
#nullable enable
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Interop;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Interop
{
/// <summary>
/// Tests for the tiered WiFi reader. The WLAN state of the test machine is unknown (CI
/// runners have no WLAN service, dev boxes may be on WiFi with or without location consent),
/// so the live path only pins the fail-soft contract. The diagnostics composer is pinned
/// exactly — it is the only field evidence for a missing wifi_signal_info event, and the
/// ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED hint is what tells an operator that Windows 11 24H2's location gate,
/// not the hardware, swallowed the SSID.
/// </summary>
public sealed class WifiInfoProviderTests
{
[Fact]
public void TryRead_never_throws_and_reports_a_reason_when_it_yields_nothing()
{
var result = WifiInfoProvider.TryRead(null, out var diagnostics);
if (result == null)
{
Assert.False(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(diagnostics),
"a null result must always explain itself — that string is the only field evidence");
Assert.Contains("native:", diagnostics);
Assert.Contains("WinRT:", diagnostics);
Assert.Contains("netsh:", diagnostics);
}
else
{
Assert.Null(diagnostics);
// Every tier either carries an SSID or was not supposed to return at all.
Assert.False(result.Ssid == null && result.SignalPercent == null
&& result.RadioType == null && result.Channel == null,
"an all-null payload must surface as null, not as an empty connection");
}
}
// ----- BuildDiagnostics ---------------------------------------------
[Fact]
public void BuildDiagnostics_names_every_tier()
{
var text = WifiInfoProvider.BuildDiagnostics(null, null);
Assert.Contains("no WiFi info from any reader", text);
Assert.Contains("native: no connected WLAN interface", text);
Assert.Contains("WinRT: no SSID", text);
Assert.Contains("netsh: no parsable output", text);
}
[Fact]
public void BuildDiagnostics_passes_through_tier_reasons()
{
var text = WifiInfoProvider.BuildDiagnostics("WlanOpenHandle rc=1062", "WinRT NetworkInformation unavailable");
Assert.Contains("native: WlanOpenHandle rc=1062", text);
Assert.Contains("WinRT: WinRT NetworkInformation unavailable", text);
}
[Fact]
public void BuildDiagnostics_explains_access_denied_as_the_location_gate()
{
var text = WifiInfoProvider.BuildDiagnostics(
"[1cbc79c3-2e31-468a-b949-17fafa6e23ed] query(current_connection) rc=5; ", null);
Assert.Contains("ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED", text);
Assert.Contains("24H2", text);
Assert.Contains("Location services", text);
}
[Fact]
public void BuildDiagnostics_explains_access_denied_without_a_trailing_separator()
{
var text = WifiInfoProvider.BuildDiagnostics("WlanOpenHandle rc=5", null);
Assert.Contains("ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED", text);
}
// ----- IsLocationGateDenied -----------------------------------------
//
// This predicate decides whether the wifi_signal_info payload claims
// "location_services_off" to the operator. A false positive blames a privacy setting
// that is actually fine, so the boundaries are pinned exactly.
[Theory]
[InlineData("[guid] query(current_connection) rc=5; ")]
[InlineData("WlanOpenHandle rc=5")]
public void IsLocationGateDenied_true_only_for_error_access_denied(string nativeDiag)
{
Assert.True(WifiInfoProvider.IsLocationGateDenied(nativeDiag));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(null)]
[InlineData("")]
[InlineData("query(current_connection) rc=50; ")]
[InlineData("query(current_connection) rc=5023; ")]
[InlineData("WlanEnumInterfaces rc=1062")]
[InlineData("no WLAN interfaces")]
[InlineData("[guid] state=wlan_interface_state_disconnected; ")]
public void IsLocationGateDenied_false_for_every_other_reason(string? nativeDiag)
{
Assert.False(WifiInfoProvider.IsLocationGateDenied(nativeDiag));
}
[Fact]
public void LocationServicesOff_literal_is_the_published_payload_contract()
{
// Matched verbatim by the portal's WiFi card (wifiDataLimitedReason) — renaming it
// silently drops the hint instead of breaking a build.
Assert.Equal("location_services_off", WifiInfoProvider.LocationServicesOff);
}
[Fact]
public void TryRead_never_claims_the_location_gate_on_the_native_tier()
{
// The native tier only returns when it succeeded, so a full payload must never carry
// a "data limited" reason.
var result = WifiInfoProvider.TryRead(null, out _);
if (result?.SignalPercent != null)
Assert.Null(result.DataLimitedReason);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("query(current_connection) rc=50; ")]
[InlineData("query(current_connection) rc=5023; ")]
[InlineData("WlanEnumInterfaces rc=1062")]
[InlineData("[guid] state=wlan_interface_state_disconnected; ")]
public void BuildDiagnostics_does_not_blame_the_location_gate_for_other_codes(string nativeDiag)
{
var text = WifiInfoProvider.BuildDiagnostics(nativeDiag, null);
Assert.DoesNotContain("ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED", text);
Assert.Contains($"native: {nativeDiag}", text);
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
#nullable enable
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Interop;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Interop
{
/// <summary>
/// Tests for the WinRT SSID reader. Its whole value is that it keeps working where the
/// native WLAN API is denied, so the contract that matters here is fail-soft resolution:
/// the type is bound by name at runtime (no winmd), and every step must degrade to null
/// with a reason instead of throwing — a throw would take the Task.Run collector down
/// silently, which is precisely the failure mode this tier exists to end.
/// </summary>
public sealed class WinRtWifiSsidReaderTests
{
[Fact]
public void TryGetConnectedSsid_never_throws()
{
var ssid = WinRtWifiSsidReader.TryGetConnectedSsid(out var diagnostics);
if (ssid == null)
Assert.False(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(diagnostics), "a null SSID must carry a reason");
else
Assert.Null(diagnostics);
}
[Fact]
public void TryGetConnectedSsid_never_returns_an_empty_ssid()
{
// An AP broadcasting an empty SSID must surface as null, never as "" — the caller
// maps a non-null SSID straight into the wifi_signal_info payload.
var ssid = WinRtWifiSsidReader.TryGetConnectedSsid(out _);
Assert.True(ssid == null || ssid.Length > 0);
}
[Fact]
public void TryGetConnectedSsid_is_stable_across_calls()
{
// Reflection members are resolved once and cached; a second call must take the
// cached path and behave identically.
var first = WinRtWifiSsidReader.TryGetConnectedSsid(out _);
var second = WinRtWifiSsidReader.TryGetConnectedSsid(out _);
Assert.Equal(first, second);
}
}
}
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
#nullable enable
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using System.IO.Compression;
using System.Linq;
using System.Text;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport;
@@ -46,7 +48,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
Directory.CreateDirectory(SpoolFolder);
}
public DiagnosticsPackageService Build(System.Action<AgentConfiguration>? mutateConfig = null)
public DiagnosticsPackageService Build(
System.Action<AgentConfiguration>? mutateConfig = null,
IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string>? sectionFolderOverrides = null,
System.Func<bool>? devicePreparationProbe = null)
{
// BackendApiClient is required by the public ctor but BuildArchiveBytes
// never touches it — construct with a throwaway HttpClient. Tests only
@@ -71,7 +76,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
imeLogFolderOverride: ImeTmp.Path,
agentStateFolderOverride: StateFolder,
agentSpoolFolderOverride: SpoolFolder,
agentDataFolderOverride: DataFolder);
agentDataFolderOverride: DataFolder,
sectionFolderOverrides: sectionFolderOverrides,
devicePreparationProbe: devicePreparationProbe);
}
public void Dispose()
@@ -287,6 +294,185 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
Assert.DoesNotContain(entries, e => e.StartsWith("AgentSpool/"));
}
// ===================================================== built-in catalog gates ====
// The RealmJoin sections ride behind the tenant's RealmJoin Watcher toggle, the
// Device Preparation bootstrapper event log behind the deterministic WDP marker.
// Every conditional section is skipped WITH a manifest line, never silently.
/// <summary>RealmJoin system-side folders redirected to temp (user-side goes via UserProfileResolver).</summary>
private sealed class RealmJoinRig : System.IDisposable
{
public TempDirectory WindowsLogs { get; } = new TempDirectory();
public TempDirectory Choco { get; } = new TempDirectory();
public TempDirectory UserProfile { get; } = new TempDirectory();
public string PackagesFolder => Path.Combine(WindowsLogs.Path, "RealmJoin");
public RealmJoinRig()
{
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(WindowsLogs.Path, "realmjoin.log"), "rj");
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(WindowsLogs.Path, "realmjoin2.log"), "rj2");
var pkg = Path.Combine(PackagesFolder, "Packages", "generic-7zip");
Directory.CreateDirectory(pkg);
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(pkg, "install.log"), "pkg");
var choco = Path.Combine(Choco.Path, "generic-7zip");
Directory.CreateDirectory(choco);
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(choco, "2026-06-30_install.log"), "choco");
var userRj = Path.Combine(UserProfile.Path, "AppData", "Local", "RealmJoin");
Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.Combine(userRj, "Logs", "generic-office"));
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(userRj, "tray.log"), "tray");
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(userRj, "config.pjson"), "not a log");
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(userRj, "Logs", "RjImeHost.log"), "host");
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(userRj, "Logs", "generic-office", "usersettings.log"), "pkg-user");
}
public IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string> Overrides => new Dictionary<string, string>
{
["RealmJoinWindows"] = WindowsLogs.Path,
["RealmJoinPackages"] = PackagesFolder,
["RealmJoinChoco"] = Choco.Path,
};
public void Dispose()
{
WindowsLogs.Dispose();
Choco.Dispose();
UserProfile.Dispose();
}
}
[Fact]
public void BuildArchiveBytes_skips_realmjoin_sections_when_watcher_disabled()
{
using var rig = new Rig();
using var rj = new RealmJoinRig();
UserProfileResolver.SetForTesting(rj.UserProfile.Path);
try
{
var bytes = rig.Build(sectionFolderOverrides: rj.Overrides).BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: true);
var entries = ZipEntryNames(bytes);
Assert.DoesNotContain(entries, e => e.StartsWith("RealmJoinLogs/"));
var manifest = ReadZipEntryText(bytes, "package-manifest.txt")!;
Assert.Contains("SCENARIO: devicePreparation=False realmJoinWatcher=False", manifest);
Assert.Contains("BUILT-IN SKIPPED (RealmJoin Watcher disabled): RealmJoinWindows", manifest);
Assert.Contains("BUILT-IN SKIPPED (RealmJoin Watcher disabled): RealmJoinUserLogs", manifest);
}
finally
{
UserProfileResolver.Reset();
}
}
[Fact]
public void BuildArchiveBytes_includes_realmjoin_sections_when_watcher_enabled()
{
using var rig = new Rig();
using var rj = new RealmJoinRig();
UserProfileResolver.SetForTesting(rj.UserProfile.Path);
try
{
var bytes = rig.Build(cfg => cfg.EnableRealmJoinWatcher = true, rj.Overrides)
.BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: false);
var entries = ZipEntryNames(bytes);
// ZIP layout mirrors the disk layout: flat client logs + package tree under
// Windows/, tray logs + per-user Logs tree under User/.
Assert.Contains("RealmJoinLogs/Windows/realmjoin.log", entries);
Assert.Contains("RealmJoinLogs/Windows/realmjoin2.log", entries);
Assert.Contains("RealmJoinLogs/Windows/RealmJoin/Packages/generic-7zip/install.log", entries);
Assert.Contains("RealmJoinLogs/Choco/generic-7zip/2026-06-30_install.log", entries);
Assert.Contains("RealmJoinLogs/User/tray.log", entries);
Assert.Contains("RealmJoinLogs/User/Logs/RjImeHost.log", entries);
Assert.Contains("RealmJoinLogs/User/Logs/generic-office/usersettings.log", entries);
// Only tray*.log is collected from the user RealmJoin root — config stays out.
Assert.DoesNotContain(entries, e => e.EndsWith("config.pjson"));
var manifest = ReadZipEntryText(bytes, "package-manifest.txt")!;
Assert.Contains("BUILT-IN: RealmJoinUserLogs -> folder=", manifest);
Assert.DoesNotContain("BUILT-IN SKIPPED (RealmJoin Watcher disabled)", manifest);
}
finally
{
UserProfileResolver.Reset();
}
}
[Fact]
public void BuildArchiveBytes_skips_realmjoin_user_sections_without_user_session()
{
using var rig = new Rig();
using var rj = new RealmJoinRig();
// Token present, no interactive user detected → user-profile sections skip with a
// manifest line; the system-side sections are unaffected.
UserProfileResolver.SetForTesting(null!);
try
{
var bytes = rig.Build(cfg => cfg.EnableRealmJoinWatcher = true, rj.Overrides)
.BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: true);
var entries = ZipEntryNames(bytes);
Assert.Contains("RealmJoinLogs/Windows/realmjoin.log", entries);
Assert.DoesNotContain(entries, e => e.StartsWith("RealmJoinLogs/User"));
var manifest = ReadZipEntryText(bytes, "package-manifest.txt")!;
Assert.Contains("BUILT-IN SKIPPED (no user session for token): RealmJoinUserTray", manifest);
Assert.Contains("BUILT-IN SKIPPED (no user session for token): RealmJoinUserLogs", manifest);
}
finally
{
UserProfileResolver.Reset();
}
}
[Fact]
public void BuildArchiveBytes_collects_bootstrapper_event_log_only_on_device_preparation()
{
using var rig = new Rig();
using var winevt = new TempDirectory();
// Synthetic evtx: no registered channel claims the file, so the export falls
// back to a raw copy — the point here is the scenario gate, not wevtutil.
File.WriteAllBytes(Path.Combine(winevt.Path, "BootstrapperAgentServiceLogProvider.evtx"), new byte[] { 1, 2, 3 });
var overrides = new Dictionary<string, string> { ["ImeBootstrapperEventLog"] = winevt.Path };
var classic = rig.Build(sectionFolderOverrides: overrides, devicePreparationProbe: () => false)
.BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: true);
Assert.DoesNotContain("ImeLogs/BootstrapperAgentServiceLogProvider.evtx", ZipEntryNames(classic));
Assert.Contains("BUILT-IN SKIPPED (not a Device Preparation enrollment): ImeBootstrapperEventLog",
ReadZipEntryText(classic, "package-manifest.txt"));
var wdp = rig.Build(sectionFolderOverrides: overrides, devicePreparationProbe: () => true)
.BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: true);
Assert.Contains("ImeLogs/BootstrapperAgentServiceLogProvider.evtx", ZipEntryNames(wdp));
Assert.Contains("SCENARIO: devicePreparation=True", ReadZipEntryText(wdp, "package-manifest.txt"));
}
[Fact]
public void BuildArchiveBytes_treats_failing_device_preparation_probe_as_classic()
{
using var rig = new Rig();
var bytes = rig.Build(devicePreparationProbe: () => throw new System.InvalidOperationException("registry boom"))
.BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: true);
var manifest = ReadZipEntryText(bytes, "package-manifest.txt")!;
Assert.Contains("SCENARIO PROBE FAILED (treated as Classic): registry boom", manifest);
Assert.Contains("BUILT-IN SKIPPED (not a Device Preparation enrollment): ImeBootstrapperEventLog", manifest);
Assert.Contains("sessioninfo.txt", ZipEntryNames(bytes)); // archive still built
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(DiagnosticsSectionCondition.Always, false, false, true)]
[InlineData(DiagnosticsSectionCondition.RealmJoinWatcher, false, true, false)]
[InlineData(DiagnosticsSectionCondition.RealmJoinWatcher, true, false, true)]
[InlineData(DiagnosticsSectionCondition.DevicePreparation, true, false, false)]
[InlineData(DiagnosticsSectionCondition.DevicePreparation, false, true, true)]
[InlineData((DiagnosticsSectionCondition)999, true, true, false)]
public void IsSectionActive_gates_on_condition(DiagnosticsSectionCondition condition, bool watcher, bool wdp, bool expected)
{
var section = new DiagnosticsBuiltInSection("X", "X", @"C:\X", new[] { "*.log" }, false, "x", condition);
var cfg = Cfg();
cfg.EnableRealmJoinWatcher = watcher;
Assert.Equal(expected, DiagnosticsPackageService.IsSectionActive(section, cfg, wdp));
}
private static string[] ZipEntryNames(byte[] zipBytes)
{
using var ms = new MemoryStream(zipBytes);
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
@@ -11,8 +12,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
internal sealed class FakeSignalIngressSink : ISignalIngressSink
{
private readonly List<PostedSignal> _posted = new List<PostedSignal>();
private readonly object _gate = new object();
public IReadOnlyList<PostedSignal> Posted => _posted;
/// <summary>
/// Snapshot, not the live list: producers post from timer / worker threads (e.g. the
/// parked-dwell tripwire) while tests poll this in a SpinWait loop. Enumerating the live
/// list across an Add throws "Collection was modified" — a rare CI-only failure
/// (run 32644425162) with no assertion text.
/// </summary>
public IReadOnlyList<PostedSignal> Posted
{
get { lock (_gate) return _posted.ToArray(); }
}
/// <summary>When non-null, <see cref="Post"/> throws instead of capturing.</summary>
public Exception? ThrowOnPost { get; set; }
@@ -27,7 +38,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
object? typedPayload = null)
{
if (ThrowOnPost != null) throw ThrowOnPost;
_posted.Add(new PostedSignal(kind, occurredAtUtc, sourceOrigin, evidence, payload, kindSchemaVersion, typedPayload));
lock (_gate)
_posted.Add(new PostedSignal(kind, occurredAtUtc, sourceOrigin, evidence, payload, kindSchemaVersion, typedPayload));
}
internal sealed class PostedSignal
@@ -182,6 +182,73 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
Assert.Equal("FromCache", data["outcome"]);
}
// ── Post-registration recovery (Phase 6.5, tenant aebdce78 audit 2026-08-24) ─
[Fact]
public void EmitFetchFailedIfAny_AfterRecovery_MarksRecoveredAndDemotesToInfo()
{
using var rig = new EmitterRig();
// Startup fetch failed (network link not up yet), then the post-registration
// recovery fetched ConfigVersion 39. The event must keep the original failure
// details AND mark the heal.
rig.RemoteConfig.SetFakeOutcome(
RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.UsedDefaults,
configVersion: 39, // CurrentConfig now holds the recovered config
attempts: 4,
failureType: "HttpRequestException",
failureMessage: "simulated dead network link",
recovered: true);
LifecycleEmitters.EmitRemoteConfigFetchFailedIfAny(
rig.Post, rig.AgentConfig, rig.RemoteConfig, rig.Logger);
var data = AssertSingleEmit(rig.Sink, expectedEventType: "remote_config_fetch_failed");
Assert.Equal("UsedDefaults", data["outcome"]); // startup failure record intact
Assert.Equal(4, data["attempts"]);
Assert.Equal(true, data["recovered"]);
Assert.Equal(39, data["recoveredConfigVersion"]);
Assert.Equal(nameof(EventSeverity.Info), rig.Sink.Posted[0].Payload!["severity"]);
}
[Fact]
public void EmitFetchFailedIfAny_WithoutRecovery_StaysWarning()
{
using var rig = new EmitterRig();
rig.RemoteConfig.SetFakeOutcome(
RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.UsedDefaults,
configVersion: 0,
attempts: 4,
failureType: "HttpRequestException",
failureMessage: "still down");
LifecycleEmitters.EmitRemoteConfigFetchFailedIfAny(
rig.Post, rig.AgentConfig, rig.RemoteConfig, rig.Logger);
var data = AssertSingleEmit(rig.Sink, expectedEventType: "remote_config_fetch_failed");
Assert.False(data.ContainsKey("recovered"));
Assert.False(data.ContainsKey("recoveredConfigVersion"));
Assert.Equal(nameof(EventSeverity.Warning), rig.Sink.Posted[0].Payload!["severity"]);
}
[Fact]
public void EmitAgentStarted_AfterRecovery_FlagsLiveConfig()
{
using var rig = new EmitterRig();
rig.RemoteConfig.SetFakeOutcome(
RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.UsedDefaults,
configVersion: 39,
recovered: true);
LifecycleEmitters.EmitAgentStarted(
rig.Post, rig.AgentConfig, rig.PreviousExit, "2.0.806", rig.RemoteConfig, rig.Logger);
var data = AssertSingleEmit(rig.Sink, expectedEventType: "agent_started");
Assert.Equal(39, data["configVersion"]);
Assert.Equal(true, data["remoteConfigFetched"]); // running on a live-fetched config
Assert.Equal("UsedDefaults", data["remoteConfigOutcome"]); // startup outcome stays honest
Assert.Equal(true, data["remoteConfigRecovered"]);
}
// ── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
private static Dictionary<string, object> AssertSingleEmit(
@@ -258,8 +325,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
int attempts = 1,
string? failureType = null,
string? failureMessage = null,
int? authStatusCode = null)
int? authStatusCode = null,
bool recovered = false)
{
typeof(RemoteConfigService).GetProperty(nameof(RecoveredAfterFetchFailure))?.SetValue(this, recovered);
// CurrentConfig is set via the protected SetConfig path — easiest:
// a real FetchConfigAsync replacement that just stashes a canned config.
typeof(RemoteConfigService).GetMethod("SetConfig",
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
using System;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
{
/// <summary>
/// Pins <see cref="EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension"/>, the pure byte-level part of the
/// cert probe. Both encodings Microsoft actually ships are covered: the ASN.1 OCTET STRING wrapper
/// used by the MS-Organization-Access TenantId/DeviceId extensions (and Intune's
/// <c>1.2.840.113556.5.6</c> / <c>5.14</c>), and the BARE 16-byte payload used by Intune's DeviceId
/// extension <c>1.2.840.113556.5.4</c> — the latter was silently returning <c>null</c> before.
/// The store-iteration shell around it needs a real machine cert store and is not unit-tested.
/// </summary>
public sealed class EntraDeviceCertHelperParseTests
{
// Synthetic — never a real tenant/device id. ToByteArray() gives the MS little-endian layout
// that both cert encodings carry, so every expectation below is derived, not hand-transcribed.
private static readonly Guid Sample = new Guid("11223344-5566-7788-99aa-bbccddeeff00");
private static byte[] Wrap(byte[] payload, params byte[] header)
{
var buf = new byte[header.Length + payload.Length];
Buffer.BlockCopy(header, 0, buf, 0, header.Length);
Buffer.BlockCopy(payload, 0, buf, header.Length, payload.Length);
return buf;
}
[Fact]
public void OctetString_ShortForm_Parses()
{
var raw = Wrap(Sample.ToByteArray(), 0x04, 0x10);
Assert.Equal(Sample, EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(raw));
}
[Fact]
public void OctetString_LongForm_Parses()
{
var raw = Wrap(Sample.ToByteArray(), 0x04, 0x81, 0x10);
Assert.Equal(Sample, EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(raw));
}
/// <summary>
/// The regression this class exists for: Intune's <c>1.2.840.113556.5.4</c> extension value is
/// exactly 16 bytes with no <c>04 10</c> prefix, so the strict OCTET-STRING parser bailed on the
/// tag check and the DeviceId was unreadable.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void BareSixteenBytes_Parses()
{
var raw = Sample.ToByteArray();
Assert.Equal(Sample, EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(raw));
}
/// <summary>
/// A bare GUID may legitimately start with 0x04 (the OCTET STRING tag). That must not be
/// mistaken for a wrapper: a wrapped 16-byte GUID is always >= 18 bytes, so the two forms are
/// disjoint by length and the bare path has to win here.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void BareSixteenBytes_StartingWithOctetStringTag_StillParses()
{
var guid = new Guid("aabbcc04-0110-4020-8030-405060708090");
var raw = guid.ToByteArray();
Assert.Equal(0x04, raw[0]); // guard: the byte layout really does start with the ASN.1 tag
Assert.Equal(16, raw.Length);
Assert.Equal(guid, EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(raw));
}
[Fact]
public void OctetString_IsLittleEndianMsLayout()
{
// 04 10 + the canonical MS binary layout of {11223344-...} => first group byte-reversed.
var raw = new byte[]
{
0x04, 0x10,
0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11,
0x66, 0x55,
0x88, 0x77,
0x99, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF, 0x00
};
Assert.Equal(Sample, EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(raw));
}
[Fact]
public void Null_ReturnsNull()
{
Assert.Null(EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(null));
}
[Fact]
public void Empty_ReturnsNull()
{
Assert.Null(EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(new byte[0]));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(15)]
[InlineData(17)]
public void BarePayload_OfWrongLength_ReturnsNull(int length)
{
var raw = new byte[length];
for (var i = 0; i < length; i++) raw[i] = (byte)(0x40 + i); // no 0x04 tag, no valid wrapper
Assert.Null(EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(raw));
}
[Fact]
public void NonOctetStringTag_ReturnsNull()
{
// e.g. Intune's 1.2.840.113556.5.15 => ASN.1 INTEGER 2.
Assert.Null(EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(new byte[] { 0x02, 0x01, 0x02 }));
}
[Fact]
public void OctetString_WithNonGuidContentLength_ReturnsNull()
{
var raw = Wrap(new byte[8], 0x04, 0x08);
Assert.Null(EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(raw));
}
[Fact]
public void OctetString_TruncatedContent_ReturnsNull()
{
// Declares 16 content bytes but only carries 10.
var raw = Wrap(new byte[10], 0x04, 0x10);
Assert.Null(EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(raw));
}
[Fact]
public void OctetString_LongFormWithOversizedLengthHeader_ReturnsNull()
{
// 0x85 => 5 length bytes, above the 4 the parser accepts.
var raw = Wrap(Sample.ToByteArray(), 0x04, 0x85, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10);
Assert.Null(EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(raw));
}
}
}
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
}
[Fact]
public async Task Fails_after_five_exceptions_without_auth_error()
public async Task Fails_after_six_exceptions_without_auth_error()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var logger = NewLogger(tmp);
@@ -111,8 +111,50 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
backoffDelay: _ => Task.CompletedTask);
Assert.Equal(SessionRegistrationOutcome.Failed, result.Outcome);
Assert.Equal(5, apiClient.CallCount);
Assert.Contains("transient attempt 5", result.ErrorMessage);
Assert.Equal(6, apiClient.CallCount);
Assert.Contains("transient attempt 6", result.ErrorMessage);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Waits_for_network_link_before_first_attempt()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var logger = NewLogger(tmp);
var config = NewConfig();
var order = new System.Collections.Generic.List<string>();
var apiClient = new FakeApiClient(_ =>
{
order.Add("register");
return new RegisterSessionResponse { Success = true, SessionId = config.SessionId };
});
var result = await SessionRegistrationHelper.RegisterWithRetryAsync(
apiClient, config, agentVersion: "0.0.0", logger: logger,
backoffDelay: _ => Task.CompletedTask,
networkLinkWait: _ => { order.Add("link-wait"); return Task.CompletedTask; });
Assert.Equal(SessionRegistrationOutcome.Succeeded, result.Outcome);
Assert.Equal(new[] { "link-wait", "register" }, order);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Network_link_wait_failure_does_not_block_registration()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var logger = NewLogger(tmp);
var config = NewConfig();
var apiClient = new FakeApiClient(_ =>
new RegisterSessionResponse { Success = true, SessionId = config.SessionId });
var result = await SessionRegistrationHelper.RegisterWithRetryAsync(
apiClient, config, agentVersion: "0.0.0", logger: logger,
backoffDelay: _ => Task.CompletedTask,
networkLinkWait: _ => throw new InvalidOperationException("probe broken"));
Assert.Equal(SessionRegistrationOutcome.Succeeded, result.Outcome);
Assert.Equal(1, apiClient.CallCount);
}
[Fact]
@@ -163,5 +163,45 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.SignalAdapters
Assert.Single(f.DecisionSignals(DecisionSignalKind.ImeUserSessionCompleted));
Assert.Single(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.ImeUserSessionCompleted));
}
// ==================================================== zero-app evidence label ====
[Fact]
public void Zero_app_user_session_labels_the_evidence_on_signal_and_timeline()
{
// Sessions 81daa77f / 75d6ae8e: with no user-targeted apps IME never writes its
// "Completed user session" line at all, so the verdict rests on a different
// observation. Whoever reads the timeline later must be able to tell which.
using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture();
using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
f.Tracker.SeedCurrentPhaseForTesting("AccountSetup");
f.Tracker.SeedUserSessionZeroAppsForTesting();
adapter.TriggerUserSessionCompletedFromTest();
Assert.Single(f.DecisionSignals(DecisionSignalKind.ImeUserSessionCompleted));
var evt = Assert.Single(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.ImeUserSessionCompleted));
Assert.Equal(
ImeLogTrackerAdapter.EvidenceZeroUserApps,
evt.Payload!["evidence"]);
}
[Fact]
public void Ordinary_user_session_completion_keeps_the_default_evidence_label()
{
// Mutation proof for the branch above.
using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture();
using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
f.Tracker.SeedCurrentPhaseForTesting("AccountSetup");
AddApp(f.Tracker, "app-done", AppIntent.Install, AppInstallationState.Installed);
adapter.TriggerUserSessionCompletedFromTest();
var evt = Assert.Single(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.ImeUserSessionCompleted));
Assert.Equal(
ImeLogTrackerAdapter.EvidenceUserSessionCompleted,
evt.Payload!["evidence"]);
}
}
}
@@ -52,6 +52,11 @@
carries the V2 assembly namespace so GatherRuleGuards locates it under
"AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Resources.guardrails.json". -->
<EmbeddedResource Include="..\..\..\rules\guardrails.json" LogicalName="AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Resources.guardrails.json" />
<!-- Built-in fallback rule catalogs (BuiltInConfigCatalog): the SAME CI-combined
rules/dist artifacts the backend embeds and serves. Snapshotted per agent build so
the no-config/no-cache fallback still runs full IME tracking instead of nothing. -->
<EmbeddedResource Include="..\..\..\rules\dist\ime-log-patterns.json" LogicalName="AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Resources.ime-log-patterns.json" />
<EmbeddedResource Include="..\..\..\rules\dist\gather-rules.json" LogicalName="AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Resources.gather-rules.json" />
</ItemGroup>
<ItemGroup>
@@ -262,6 +262,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
/// </summary>
public bool UnrestrictedMode { get; set; } = false;
/// <summary>
/// Mirror of <c>AnalyzerConfiguration.EnableRealmJoinWatcher</c> (remote, per tenant).
/// Gates the RealmJoin built-in sections of the diagnostics package — the package
/// service only sees this configuration, not the remote response. The RealmJoin host
/// itself keeps reading the remote Analyzers block. Default: false.
/// </summary>
public bool EnableRealmJoinWatcher { get; set; } = false;
/// <summary>
/// Sanitized command-line arguments for the agent_started event.
/// Secrets (e.g. bootstrap token) are redacted before assignment.
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using System.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Newtonsoft.Json;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
{
/// <summary>
/// Compiled-in fallback copies of the global rule catalogs, embedded from the same
/// CI-generated <c>rules/dist</c> artifacts the backend seeds and serves — single
/// source by construction: each agent release snapshots the catalog state of its own
/// build, so the offline fallback can never drift further than the running agent
/// version itself (no manually maintained default to forget).
/// <para>
/// Consumed only by <see cref="RemoteConfigService"/>'s built-in default config,
/// i.e. when a session has NO live config and NO cache. Before this existed, that
/// path shipped an empty <c>ImeLogPatterns</c> list, which left the entire IME
/// tracking pipeline (app installs, platform/remediation scripts, health-script
/// compliance, IME ESP-phase signals) dead for the whole session — the core of
/// enrollment monitoring. A live fetch (startup, post-registration recovery or
/// rotate_config) always wins over this catalog.
/// </para>
/// Fail-soft: any load/parse error returns an empty list (the pre-catalog behaviour).
/// </summary>
internal static class BuiltInConfigCatalog
{
/// <summary>Enabled built-in IME log patterns from the embedded catalog.</summary>
public static List<ImeLogPattern> GetEnabledImeLogPatterns(AgentLogger logger)
=> LoadEnabled<ImeLogPattern>("ime-log-patterns.json", p => p.Enabled, logger);
/// <summary>Enabled built-in gather rules from the embedded catalog.</summary>
public static List<GatherRule> GetEnabledGatherRules(AgentLogger logger)
=> LoadEnabled<GatherRule>("gather-rules.json", r => r.Enabled, logger);
private static List<T> LoadEnabled<T>(string name, Func<T, bool> isEnabled, AgentLogger logger)
{
try
{
var assembly = typeof(BuiltInConfigCatalog).Assembly;
using (var stream = assembly.GetManifestResourceStream(
"AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Resources." + name))
{
if (stream == null)
{
logger?.Warning($"Built-in config catalog resource '{name}' not found — fallback runs without it.");
return new List<T>();
}
using (var reader = new StreamReader(stream))
{
var wrapper = JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<RulesFile<T>>(reader.ReadToEnd());
var all = wrapper?.Rules ?? new List<T>();
return all.Where(isEnabled).ToList();
}
}
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
logger?.Warning($"Built-in config catalog '{name}' failed to load ({ex.Message}) — fallback runs without it.");
return new List<T>();
}
}
/// <summary>Shape of the CI-combined catalog files: <c>{ "rules": [...] }</c>.</summary>
private sealed class RulesFile<T>
{
[JsonProperty("rules")]
public List<T> Rules { get; set; }
}
}
}
@@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
agentConfig.DiagnosticsUploadEnabled = remoteConfig.DiagnosticsUploadEnabled;
agentConfig.DiagnosticsUploadMode = remoteConfig.DiagnosticsUploadMode;
agentConfig.DiagnosticsLogPaths = remoteConfig.DiagnosticsLogPaths ?? new List<DiagnosticsLogPath>();
// The diagnostics package gates its RealmJoin sections on the tenant's watcher
// toggle but never sees the remote response — mirror the one Analyzers knob here.
// The remaining Analyzers flags flow untouched to DefaultComponentFactory.
agentConfig.EnableRealmJoinWatcher = remoteConfig.Analyzers?.EnableRealmJoinWatcher ?? false;
agentConfig.SendTraceEvents = remoteConfig.SendTraceEvents;
@@ -42,6 +42,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
TimeSpan.FromSeconds(60),
};
/// <summary>
/// Upper bound for the pre-fetch network-link wait on the initial startup fetch.
/// Deliberately longer than the registration gate's 15s: the fetch runs FIRST after a
/// boot-time relaunch, when Wi-Fi may still be associating (802.1X, OOBE), and a fetch
/// burned into a dead link strands the whole session on built-in defaults — tenant aebdce78
/// audit 2026-08-24: ~50% of sessions lost their tenant config exactly this way.
/// </summary>
internal static readonly TimeSpan InitialFetchNetworkLinkWaitMax = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(60);
/// <summary>
/// Gets the current configuration (thread-safe)
/// </summary>
@@ -76,6 +85,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
/// <summary>HTTP status for auth failures (401/403), null otherwise.</summary>
public int? LastFetchAuthStatusCode { get; private set; }
/// <summary>
/// True once <see cref="TryRecoverConfigAsync"/> replaced a failed startup fetch with a
/// live config. The <c>LastFetch*</c> properties intentionally keep describing the failed
/// startup fetch so the wire event can report both the original failure and the recovery.
/// </summary>
public bool RecoveredAfterFetchFailure { get; private set; }
public RemoteConfigService(BackendApiClient apiClient, string tenantId, AgentLogger logger, EmergencyReporter emergencyReporter = null, DistressReporter distressReporter = null, AuthFailureTracker authFailureTracker = null)
{
_apiClient = apiClient ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(apiClient));
@@ -116,6 +132,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
LastFetchFailureMessage = null;
LastFetchAuthStatusCode = null;
// Initial startup fetch only: give a still-associating NIC a chance to come up
// before the first attempt. Without this the retry budget (10/30/60s) is burned
// into a provably dead link — the agent starts at boot, Wi-Fi associates minutes
// later, and the session runs on defaults although the backend was never the
// problem. The rotate_config path (retryOnTransientErrors:false) runs mid-session
// on a proven link and must stay latency-bounded, so it skips the gate.
if (retryOnTransientErrors)
{
try { await WaitForNetworkLinkAsync().ConfigureAwait(false); }
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Debug($"Pre-fetch network wait failed ({ex.Message}) — fetching anyway."); }
}
var maxAttempts = retryOnTransientErrors ? InitialFetchRetryBackoff.Length + 1 : 1;
Exception lastException = null;
@@ -203,14 +231,63 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
return cached;
}
// Fall back to defaults
_logger.Info("No cached config available, using defaults (all optional collectors disabled)");
// Fall back to built-in defaults (collector/analyzer defaults from the shared
// model initializers + the compiled-in rule catalogs).
var defaults = CreateDefaultConfig();
_logger.Info($"No cached config available, using built-in defaults (ConfigVersion=0, " +
$"{defaults.ImeLogPatterns?.Count ?? 0} built-in IME patterns, " +
$"{defaults.GatherRules?.Count ?? 0} built-in gather rules)");
SetConfig(defaults);
LastFetchOutcome = RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.UsedDefaults;
return defaults;
}
/// <summary>
/// Single-attempt recovery fetch for a session whose startup fetch failed. Called right
/// after session registration succeeded — registration proves the backend is reachable,
/// so the config that Phase 4 could not get is one cheap call away instead of the whole
/// session being stranded on cache/defaults (only a manual <c>rotate_config</c> action
/// could rescue it before this existed).
/// <para>
/// Unlike <see cref="FetchConfigAsync"/> this does NOT reset the <c>LastFetch*</c>
/// observability state — those keep describing the failed startup fetch so
/// <c>remote_config_fetch_failed</c> can report the original failure AND the recovery.
/// Returns the recovered config, or null when there is nothing to recover (startup fetch
/// succeeded / never ran) or the recovery attempt itself failed. Never throws.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
public async Task<AgentConfigResponse> TryRecoverConfigAsync()
{
if (LastFetchOutcome != RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.FromCache &&
LastFetchOutcome != RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.UsedDefaults)
return null;
try
{
_logger.Info("Retrying remote config fetch after successful session registration...");
var config = await CallBackendAsync().ConfigureAwait(false);
if (config == null)
{
_logger.Warning("Config recovery fetch returned empty response — keeping fallback config.");
return null;
}
_logger.Info($"Remote config recovered: ConfigVersion={config.ConfigVersion}, " +
$"GatherRules={config.GatherRules?.Count ?? 0}");
LogCollectorSettings(config.Collectors);
SetConfig(config);
CacheConfig(config);
_authFailureTracker?.RecordSuccess();
RecoveredAfterFetchFailure = true;
return config;
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
_logger.Warning($"Config recovery fetch failed ({ex.Message}) — keeping fallback config.");
return null;
}
}
private void SetConfig(AgentConfigResponse config)
{
lock (_configLock)
@@ -319,6 +396,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
private AgentConfigResponse CreateDefaultConfig()
{
// Everything not set here falls to the shared AgentConfigResponse property
// initializers — the same values the backend uses as its `??` fallbacks, so the
// scalar knobs cannot drift. The rule catalogs are the one thing initializers
// cannot supply: without them the whole IME tracking pipeline is dead, so they
// come from the compiled-in snapshot of the served catalogs (BuiltInConfigCatalog).
return new AgentConfigResponse
{
ConfigVersion = 0,
@@ -330,8 +412,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
EnableGatherRuleDebugLog = false,
EnableEspContinueAnywayObservation = false,
Collectors = CollectorConfiguration.CreateDefault(),
GatherRules = new System.Collections.Generic.List<GatherRule>(),
ImeLogPatterns = new System.Collections.Generic.List<ImeLogPattern>()
GatherRules = BuiltInConfigCatalog.GetEnabledGatherRules(_logger),
ImeLogPatterns = BuiltInConfigCatalog.GetEnabledImeLogPatterns(_logger)
};
}
@@ -358,6 +440,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
protected virtual Task DelayBetweenAttemptsAsync(TimeSpan delay)
=> Task.Delay(delay);
/// <summary>
/// Awaits the pre-fetch network-link gate (initial startup fetch only). Production
/// polls the link-level signal via <see cref="NetworkLinkWait"/> bounded by
/// <see cref="InitialFetchNetworkLinkWaitMax"/>; tests subclass to record the call
/// and return immediately.
/// </summary>
protected virtual Task WaitForNetworkLinkAsync()
=> NetworkLinkWait.WaitAsync(_logger, InitialFetchNetworkLinkWaitMax, "Remote config fetch");
public void Dispose()
{
// Nothing to dispose
@@ -1042,6 +1042,56 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
/// </summary>
internal string LastEspPhaseDetected => _lastEspPhaseDetected;
/// <summary>
/// True while the user-scope ESP phase is the tracker's current phase. Every user-phase
/// probe and the zero-apps evidence gate on this — outside AccountSetup the IME lines
/// belong to the device phase or the pre-sign-in (defaultuser0) frame.
/// </summary>
private bool IsUserEspPhaseActive =>
string.Equals(_lastEspPhaseDetected, "AccountSetup", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
/// <summary>
/// True once IME reported zero targeted Win32 apps for a user session while the user ESP
/// phase was active. Read by the adapter to label the evidence behind
/// <c>ime_user_session_completed</c>.
/// </summary>
internal bool UserSessionZeroAppsObserved => _userSessionZeroAppsObserved;
/// <summary>
/// IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS: IME enumerated the user session and found no targeted
/// Win32 apps. Its zero-app branch then <c>continue</c>s past the "Completed user
/// session" log statement, so this line is the only completion evidence such a device
/// ever produces — and IME itself treats the same condition as finished
/// (<c>ProviderResult.ProvisioningComplete</c> in the user check-in path, and an ESP
/// lock-in with an empty application list in the poller path).
/// <para>
/// Deliberately routed through <see cref="OnUserSessionCompleted"/> rather than a
/// separate callback: downstream this IS a completed user session, and the adapter's
/// pending-apps deferral plus its fire-once flag then apply unchanged.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Phase guard: firing before AccountSetup would burn the adapter's fire-once flag on a
/// pre-sign-in timestamp that <c>IsImeUserSessionGenuine</c> can never accept. The
/// observation is remembered instead and replayed by
/// <see cref="HandleEspPhaseDetected"/> on the transition into the user phase.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
private void HandleUserSessionZeroApps()
{
_userSessionZeroAppsObserved = true;
if (!IsUserEspPhaseActive)
{
_logger.Debug(
"ImeLogTracker: zero-app user session observed before the user ESP phase " +
$"(current phase: {_lastEspPhaseDetected ?? "(none)"}) - deferring until AccountSetup");
return;
}
_logger.Info("ImeLogTracker: user session enumerated with zero targeted apps - treating as user session completed");
OnUserSessionCompleted?.Invoke();
}
private void HandleEspPhaseDetected(string espPhaseString)
{
// Validate phase and get its ordinal for forward-only enforcement
@@ -1120,6 +1170,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
ActivatePatterns(logPhaseIsCurrentPhase);
OnEspPhaseChanged?.Invoke(espPhaseString);
// Replay a zero-app user session observed before this phase was known. IME logs its
// check-in lines independently of when the agent first parses the ESP phase marker,
// so the evidence can legitimately arrive first; without this the only completion
// evidence a zero-app device produces would be dropped on the floor.
if (isFirstOrChangedPhase && IsUserEspPhaseActive && _userSessionZeroAppsObserved)
{
_logger.Info("ImeLogTracker: replaying zero-app user session evidence observed before the user ESP phase");
OnUserSessionCompleted?.Invoke();
}
}
private void HandleEspTrackStatus(Match match)
@@ -387,6 +387,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
OnUserSessionCompleted?.Invoke();
break;
case "usersessionzeroapps":
// IME found no targeted user apps — its zero-app branch skips the
// "Completed user session" line, so this is the equivalent evidence.
HandleUserSessionZeroApps();
break;
case "updatestateinstalled":
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(id))
UpdateStateWithCallback(id, AppInstallationState.Installed);
@@ -129,6 +129,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
private CancellationTokenSource _cts;
private bool _allAppsCompletedFired;
// Sticky: IME enumerated a user session and reported ZERO targeted Win32 apps
// (IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS). IME's zero-app branch returns before it writes the
// "Completed user session" line, so on a device with no user-targeted apps that line
// never appears and every user-phase completion probe would starve forever. This flag
// IS the user-phase completion evidence for that shape. Set only while the user ESP
// phase is active, or replayed on the transition into it.
private bool _userSessionZeroAppsObserved;
// State persistence: saves tracker state to disk so agent restart continues
// from the exact log position without re-parsing or re-building ignore lists.
private readonly ImeTrackerStatePersistence _statePersistence;
@@ -341,6 +349,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
_lastEspPhaseDetected = phaseName;
}
/// <summary>
/// Test-only seam: marks the zero-targeted-apps user session as observed without driving
/// the IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS pattern through a log line. The pattern-to-flag path
/// itself is covered end-to-end by <c>ImeLogTrackerZeroUserAppsTests</c>.
/// </summary>
internal void SeedUserSessionZeroAppsForTesting()
{
_userSessionZeroAppsObserved = true;
}
/// <summary>
/// Returns a deduped union of phase-snapshotted apps plus the live
/// <see cref="PackageStates"/> (current phase). Live entries win on Id collision.
@@ -395,11 +413,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
{
try
{
if (!string.Equals(_lastEspPhaseDetected, "AccountSetup", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
if (!IsUserEspPhaseActive)
return false;
var apps = new List<AppPackageState>(_packageStates);
if (apps.Count == 0) return false;
// Zero user-targeted apps is the MOST settled state there is, but the
// conservative "at least one required app" rule below reads it as "not
// settled" and starves the AccountSetup synthesis. Only an explicit IME
// observation lifts that — never a merely empty list, which also means
// "phase just cleared" or "apps not surfaced yet".
if (apps.Count == 0)
return _userSessionZeroAppsObserved;
var sawRequired = false;
foreach (var pkg in apps)
@@ -746,6 +771,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
_currentPhaseOrder = state.CurrentPhaseOrder;
_lastEspPhaseDetected = state.LastEspPhaseDetected;
_allAppsCompletedFired = state.AllAppsCompletedFired;
_userSessionZeroAppsObserved = state.UserSessionZeroAppsObserved;
_logPhaseIsCurrentPhase = state.LogPhaseIsCurrentPhase;
// Restore seen app IDs
@@ -861,6 +887,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
CurrentPhaseOrder = _currentPhaseOrder,
LastEspPhaseDetected = _lastEspPhaseDetected,
AllAppsCompletedFired = _allAppsCompletedFired,
UserSessionZeroAppsObserved = _userSessionZeroAppsObserved,
LogPhaseIsCurrentPhase = _logPhaseIsCurrentPhase,
SeenAppIds = _seenAppIds.ToList(),
IgnoreList = _packageStates.IgnoreList.ToList(),
@@ -109,6 +109,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
public int CurrentPhaseOrder { get; set; }
public string LastEspPhaseDetected { get; set; }
public bool AllAppsCompletedFired { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// IME reported zero targeted Win32 apps for a user session. Absent in state files
/// written before this field existed — deserializing to false there is correct: the
/// tracker simply re-observes the line on the next IME check-in.
/// </summary>
public bool UserSessionZeroAppsObserved { get; set; }
public bool LogPhaseIsCurrentPhase { get; set; }
public List<string> SeenAppIds { get; set; }
public List<string> IgnoreList { get; set; }
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
using System;
using System.Text;
using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Interop
{
/// <summary>
/// The single entry point every collector uses to read the current WiFi connection. Owns the
/// tier order so the two callers (<c>DeviceInfoCollector</c>, <c>NetworkChangeDetector</c>)
/// cannot drift apart:
/// <list type="number">
/// <item><see cref="WifiInfoReader"/> — native WLAN API. Full payload (SSID, signal, PHY,
/// channel), but Windows 11 24H2+ requires precise-location consent for it.</item>
/// <item><see cref="WinRtWifiSsidReader"/> — WinRT <c>GetConnectedSsid</c>. SSID only, but
/// NOT location-gated; this is the tier that carries 24H2+ devices whose image has location
/// services off (the common OOBE case — see that class for the mechanism).</item>
/// <item><see cref="NetshWifiFallback"/> — process spawn, localized output parsing. Last
/// resort: it hangs off the same location gate as tier 1, so it only helps when the native
/// API failed for an unrelated reason.</item>
/// </list>
/// Never throws. Returns null when the device has no readable WiFi connection.
/// </summary>
internal static class WifiInfoProvider
{
/// <summary>
/// <see cref="WifiConnectionInfo.DataLimitedReason"/> value for a payload cut down to the
/// SSID by the Windows 11 24H2 location gate. Travels verbatim into the
/// <c>wifi_signal_info</c> payload as <c>wifiDataLimitedReason</c> and is matched by the
/// portal's WiFi card — a published contract, so do not rename it.
/// </summary>
internal const string LocationServicesOff = "location_services_off";
/// <summary>
/// True when the native tier reported <c>ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED</c> — "rc=5" but not
/// "rc=50"/"rc=5023"; the diagnostics string ends the code with ';' or end-of-line.
/// That is the 24H2 location gate, not a driver or hardware fault.
/// Internal for direct unit-testing via InternalsVisibleTo.
/// </summary>
internal static bool IsLocationGateDenied(string nativeDiag)
=> !string.IsNullOrEmpty(nativeDiag) && Regex.IsMatch(nativeDiag, @"rc=5(?!\d)");
/// <summary>
/// Reads the current WiFi connection, walking the tiers until one yields something.
/// <paramref name="preferredInterfaceId"/> is the adapter GUID from
/// <c>NetworkInterface.Id</c> (tier 1 only). <paramref name="diagnostics"/> is null on
/// success and otherwise explains what every tier reported — log it at Warning: this is
/// the only field evidence for a missing <c>wifi_signal_info</c> event.
/// </summary>
internal static WifiConnectionInfo TryRead(Guid? preferredInterfaceId, out string diagnostics)
{
var native = WifiInfoReader.TryGetCurrentConnection(preferredInterfaceId, out var nativeDiag);
if (native != null)
{
diagnostics = null;
return native;
}
var ssid = WinRtWifiSsidReader.TryGetConnectedSsid(out var winRtDiag);
if (ssid != null)
{
diagnostics = null;
return new WifiConnectionInfo
{
Ssid = ssid,
// Only claim the location gate when the native tier actually said so. Any
// other native failure (no WLAN service, no connected interface) leaves this
// null rather than blaming a setting we did not observe.
DataLimitedReason = IsLocationGateDenied(nativeDiag) ? LocationServicesOff : null,
};
}
var netsh = NetshWifiFallback.TryRead();
if (netsh != null)
{
diagnostics = null;
return netsh;
}
diagnostics = BuildDiagnostics(nativeDiag, winRtDiag);
return null;
}
/// <summary>
/// Composes the all-tiers-failed message. A native <c>rc=5</c> (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) is
/// spelled out: that is the 24H2 location gate, not a driver or hardware fault, and it
/// takes the netsh tier down with it — without this hint the log reads like a mystery.
/// Internal for direct unit-testing via InternalsVisibleTo.
/// </summary>
internal static string BuildDiagnostics(string nativeDiag, string winRtDiag)
{
var text = new StringBuilder("no WiFi info from any reader");
text.Append(" — native: ").Append(string.IsNullOrEmpty(nativeDiag) ? "no connected WLAN interface" : nativeDiag);
text.Append("; WinRT: ").Append(string.IsNullOrEmpty(winRtDiag) ? "no SSID" : winRtDiag);
text.Append("; netsh: no parsable output");
if (IsLocationGateDenied(nativeDiag))
{
text.Append(". rc=5 is ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED — Windows 11 24H2+ gates the current-connection "
+ "opcode (and netsh wlan) behind precise-location consent, which is off in this image; "
+ "enable Location services to restore signal/PHY/channel.");
}
return text.ToString();
}
}
}
@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Interop
/// <summary>
/// Signal quality 0–100 (same semantics as the netsh "Signal" percentage). Always set
/// on the native WLAN API path; null only when the netsh fallback could not parse it.
/// on the native WLAN API path; null when the netsh fallback could not parse it, and
/// always null on the WinRT tier (<see cref="WinRtWifiSsidReader"/> yields SSID only).
/// </summary>
public int? SignalPercent { get; internal set; }
@@ -24,6 +25,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Interop
/// <summary>Current 802.11 channel number; null when the channel query fails.</summary>
public int? Channel { get; internal set; }
/// <summary>
/// Why the payload is incomplete, when that is known — currently only
/// <c>location_services_off</c>: the SSID came from the ungated WinRT tier because the
/// native API was denied by the Windows 11 24H2 location gate, so signal, PHY and
/// channel have no source. Null whenever the reason is unknown; never a guess.
/// </summary>
public string DataLimitedReason { get; internal set; }
}
/// <summary>
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
using System;
using System.Collections;
using System.Reflection;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Interop
{
/// <summary>
/// Reads the SSID of the current WLAN connection via WinRT
/// <c>Windows.Networking.Connectivity.WlanConnectionProfileDetails.GetConnectedSsid</c>.
/// <para>
/// <b>Why this exists.</b> Windows 11 24H2 put the native WLAN API behind precise-location
/// consent: <c>WlanQueryInterface</c> with <c>wlan_intf_opcode_current_connection</c> — the
/// exact opcode <see cref="WifiInfoReader"/> needs — returns <c>ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED</c>
/// without it, and <c>netsh wlan</c> is gated by the same rule, so
/// <see cref="NetshWifiFallback"/> fails in lockstep. The consent prompt only appears for
/// processes in the user's context outside <c>C:\Windows\System32</c>, so the agent — SYSTEM,
/// during OOBE, before the user ever sees the privacy page — is denied silently. Microsoft
/// names <c>GetConnectedSsid</c> as the replacement for exactly this case; it is not
/// location-gated.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Resolved through the CLR's built-in WinRT projection — no NuGet package, no winmd
/// reference — the same mechanism <see cref="OobeStateReader"/> uses (validated from the
/// SYSTEM service context). Available since Windows 10 1507. SSID only: signal quality,
/// PHY type and channel have no ungated source, so they stay null on this path.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
internal static class WinRtWifiSsidReader
{
// Resolved once per process. Benign race: concurrent first calls resolve the same
// members and the assignments are idempotent — no lock needed.
private static MethodInfo _getInternetConnectionProfile;
private static MethodInfo _getConnectionProfiles;
private static bool _initTried;
/// <summary>
/// Returns the SSID of the connected WLAN, or null when the device is not on WiFi, the
/// WinRT contract is unavailable, or any part of the read fails. Never throws.
/// <paramref name="diagnostics"/> carries the reason when the result is null.
/// </summary>
internal static string TryGetConnectedSsid(out string diagnostics)
{
try
{
EnsureInitialized();
if (_getInternetConnectionProfile == null)
{
diagnostics = "WinRT NetworkInformation unavailable";
return null;
}
// The internet-bearing profile is the one the device is actually enrolling over.
var ssid = ReadSsid(_getInternetConnectionProfile.Invoke(null, null));
if (ssid != null)
{
diagnostics = null;
return ssid;
}
// No internet profile (captive portal, limited connectivity) or it is not WLAN —
// fall back to the first connected profile that carries WLAN details.
ssid = ScanConnectionProfiles();
diagnostics = ssid == null ? "no connected WLAN profile" : null;
return ssid;
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
diagnostics = $"WinRT exception {ex.GetType().Name}: {ex.Message}";
return null;
}
}
private static void EnsureInitialized()
{
if (_initTried) return;
var type = Type.GetType(
"Windows.Networking.Connectivity.NetworkInformation, Windows.Networking.Connectivity, ContentType=WindowsRuntime",
throwOnError: false);
_getInternetConnectionProfile = type?.GetMethod(
"GetInternetConnectionProfile", BindingFlags.Public | BindingFlags.Static, null, Type.EmptyTypes, null);
_getConnectionProfiles = type?.GetMethod(
"GetConnectionProfiles", BindingFlags.Public | BindingFlags.Static, null, Type.EmptyTypes, null);
_initTried = true;
}
/// <summary>
/// Walks every known connection profile and returns the SSID of the first one that is
/// both connected and WLAN. Returns null when none qualifies.
/// </summary>
private static string ScanConnectionProfiles()
{
if (_getConnectionProfiles == null)
return null;
if (!(_getConnectionProfiles.Invoke(null, null) is IEnumerable profiles))
return null;
foreach (var profile in profiles)
{
if (!IsConnected(profile))
continue;
var ssid = ReadSsid(profile);
if (ssid != null)
return ssid;
}
return null;
}
/// <summary>
/// <c>ConnectionProfile.GetNetworkConnectivityLevel() != NetworkConnectivityLevel.None</c>.
/// A profile the device is not currently on would otherwise leak a stale SSID.
/// Unreadable level counts as not connected.
/// </summary>
private static bool IsConnected(object profile)
{
var level = profile?.GetType()
.GetMethod("GetNetworkConnectivityLevel", BindingFlags.Public | BindingFlags.Instance, null, Type.EmptyTypes, null)
?.Invoke(profile, null);
return level != null && Convert.ToInt32(level) != 0; // NetworkConnectivityLevel.None
}
/// <summary>
/// <c>ConnectionProfile.WlanConnectionProfileDetails.GetConnectedSsid()</c>, or null when
/// the profile is not a WLAN profile or the SSID is empty (hidden network).
/// </summary>
private static string ReadSsid(object profile)
{
var details = profile?.GetType()
.GetProperty("WlanConnectionProfileDetails", BindingFlags.Public | BindingFlags.Instance)
?.GetValue(profile);
var ssid = details?.GetType()
.GetMethod("GetConnectedSsid", BindingFlags.Public | BindingFlags.Instance, null, Type.EmptyTypes, null)
?.Invoke(details, null) as string;
return string.IsNullOrEmpty(ssid) ? null : ssid;
}
}
}
@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.DeviceInfo;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals;
@@ -124,62 +126,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
}
}
private readonly string _imeLogFolder;
private readonly string _agentLogFolder;
private readonly string _agentStateFolder;
private readonly string _agentSpoolFolder;
private readonly string _agentDataFolder;
// Built-in sections come from the Shared catalog (DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.All) — the
// same list the backend serves to the portal, so what administrators see is exactly
// what this service collects. Test seam: section id → folder; production leaves the
// map empty and every section resolves from the catalog's (unexpanded) source folder.
private readonly IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string> _sectionFolderOverrides;
private static readonly string DefaultImeLogFolder =
Environment.ExpandEnvironmentVariables(@"%ProgramData%\Microsoft\IntuneManagementExtension\Logs");
private static readonly string DefaultAgentLogFolder =
Environment.ExpandEnvironmentVariables(Constants.LogDirectory);
private static readonly string DefaultAgentStateFolder =
Environment.ExpandEnvironmentVariables(Constants.StateDirectory);
private static readonly string DefaultAgentSpoolFolder =
Environment.ExpandEnvironmentVariables(Constants.SpoolDirectory);
private static readonly string DefaultAgentDataFolder =
Environment.ExpandEnvironmentVariables(@"%ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor");
/// <summary>
/// File extensions collected from built-in log folders (Agent + IME).
/// Covers standard logs, structured data, traces, event logs, and diagnostics archives.
/// </summary>
private static readonly string[] LogFilePatterns = new[]
{
"*.log", "*.txt", "*.json", "*.jsonl",
"*.etl", "*.evtx", "*.xml", "*.csv", "*.cab"
};
/// <summary>
/// Patterns collected from the agent state folder. Adds completion markers on top of
/// the standard log patterns so files like <c>enrollment-complete.marker</c> and
/// <c>whiteglove-backfill-state.json</c> reach the diagnostics archive.
/// </summary>
private static readonly string[] StateFilePatterns = new[]
{
"*.log", "*.txt", "*.json", "*.jsonl",
"*.etl", "*.evtx", "*.xml", "*.csv", "*.cab",
"*.complete", "*.marker"
};
/// <summary>
/// Marker patterns from the top-level data directory. Kept tight on purpose: only
/// completion/exit markers, no session.id / bootstrap.json (those are config, not
/// forensic state).
/// </summary>
private static readonly string[] RootMarkerPatterns = new[] { "*.complete", "*.marker" };
/// <summary>
/// Telemetry spool: only the JSON-shaped files. The spool folder may also contain
/// quarantine subfolders, so subfolders are excluded to keep the archive focused
/// on what is actually pending upload.
/// </summary>
private static readonly string[] SpoolFilePatterns = new[] { "*.jsonl", "*.json" };
// Scenario oracle for DiagnosticsSectionCondition.DevicePreparation. Production reads
// the deterministic WDP registry marker (the same gate every other WDP switch uses);
// tests inject a constant so they never touch the registry.
private readonly Func<bool> _devicePreparationProbe;
public DiagnosticsPackageService(AgentConfiguration configuration, AgentLogger logger, BackendApiClient apiClient)
: this(configuration, logger, apiClient, null, null, null, null, null)
@@ -188,7 +144,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
// Test seam: allows xUnit fixtures to redirect log/state/spool/data folders to a
// temp dir without touching real %ProgramData% paths. Production callers always go
// through the public ctor.
// through the public ctor. The five named overrides map onto the catalog's section
// ids; sectionFolderOverrides covers every other section (RealmJoin*, ImeBootstrapper…).
internal DiagnosticsPackageService(
AgentConfiguration configuration,
AgentLogger logger,
@@ -197,18 +154,38 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
string imeLogFolderOverride,
string agentStateFolderOverride,
string agentSpoolFolderOverride,
string agentDataFolderOverride)
string agentDataFolderOverride,
IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string> sectionFolderOverrides = null,
Func<bool> devicePreparationProbe = null)
{
_configuration = configuration;
_logger = logger;
_apiClient = apiClient;
_httpClient = new HttpClient { Timeout = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5) };
_agentLogFolder = agentLogFolderOverride ?? DefaultAgentLogFolder;
_imeLogFolder = imeLogFolderOverride ?? DefaultImeLogFolder;
_agentStateFolder = agentStateFolderOverride ?? DefaultAgentStateFolder;
_agentSpoolFolder = agentSpoolFolderOverride ?? DefaultAgentSpoolFolder;
_agentDataFolder = agentDataFolderOverride ?? DefaultAgentDataFolder;
var overrides = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.Ordinal);
void Map(string sectionId, string folder)
{
if (folder != null) overrides[sectionId] = folder;
}
Map("AgentLogs", agentLogFolderOverride);
Map("ImeLogs", imeLogFolderOverride);
Map("AgentState", agentStateFolderOverride);
Map("AgentSpool", agentSpoolFolderOverride);
Map("AgentMarkers", agentDataFolderOverride);
if (sectionFolderOverrides != null)
{
foreach (var kv in sectionFolderOverrides)
overrides[kv.Key] = kv.Value;
}
_sectionFolderOverrides = overrides;
// Tests that pass folder overrides but no probe must stay registry-free: a seam
// caller gets "not WDP" by default, the production ctor gets the real marker.
_devicePreparationProbe = devicePreparationProbe
?? (overrides.Count == 0
? (Func<bool>)EnrollmentRegistryDetector.IsDeterministicDevicePreparation
: () => false);
}
/// <summary>
@@ -370,33 +347,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
// 1. sessioninfo.txt — informational metadata, not subject to caps.
AddSessionInfo(archive, enrollmentSucceeded);
// 2. Agent logs
foreach (var pattern in LogFilePatterns)
AddLogFiles(archive, _agentLogFolder, "AgentLogs", pattern, tracker);
// 2. Built-in sections — ONE catalog shared with the backend (the portal
// shows exactly this list): agent logs, IME logs (+ the Device Preparation
// bootstrapper event log on WDP), agent state (recursive: `.quarantine`
// and `.part1-<utc>/` buckets ride along), telemetry spool, top-level
// markers, and the RealmJoin logs behind the tenant's watcher toggle.
// The scenario probe is a registry read — evaluate it once per build.
var isDevicePreparation = ProbeDevicePreparation();
ManifestLine($"SCENARIO: devicePreparation={isDevicePreparation} realmJoinWatcher={_configuration.EnableRealmJoinWatcher}");
foreach (var section in DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.All)
AddBuiltInSection(archive, section, tracker, isDevicePreparation);
// 3. IME logs (all relevant files in the IME log folder)
foreach (var pattern in LogFilePatterns)
AddLogFiles(archive, _imeLogFolder, "ImeLogs", pattern, tracker);
// 4. Agent state: snapshot, journal, signal-log, ime-tracker-state,
// enrollment-complete.marker, final-status.json, whiteglove-backfill-state.json.
// Recursive to include `.quarantine` subfolders AND `.part1-<utc>/` buckets
// that StateArchiver creates on WG Part-2 boot — both ride along under
// AgentState/ via the same recursive walk.
foreach (var pattern in StateFilePatterns)
AddLogFiles(archive, _agentStateFolder, "AgentState", pattern, tracker, includeSubfolders: true);
// 5. Telemetry spool — pending uploads + upload cursor (forensic: what didn't ship?)
foreach (var pattern in SpoolFilePatterns)
AddLogFiles(archive, _agentSpoolFolder, "AgentSpool", pattern, tracker, includeSubfolders: false);
// 6. Top-level markers (whiteglove.complete, clean-exit marker) — Part-1/Part-2
// bridge + ghost-restart guard. Top-directory only to avoid re-zipping
// State/Spool/Logs/Agent which already have their own sections.
foreach (var pattern in RootMarkerPatterns)
AddLogFiles(archive, _agentDataFolder, "AgentMarkers", pattern, tracker, includeSubfolders: false);
// 7. Configured additional log paths (global + tenant, validated by guards)
// 3. Configured additional log paths (global + tenant, validated by guards)
foreach (var entry in _configuration.DiagnosticsLogPaths ?? new System.Collections.Generic.List<Shared.Models.DiagnosticsLogPath>())
{
// Resolve %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token and get profile path for guard exception
@@ -447,6 +409,81 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
}
}
private bool ProbeDevicePreparation()
{
try
{
return _devicePreparationProbe();
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
// Fail toward Classic like every other WDP gate: the evtx export is skipped,
// never the whole package.
_logger.Warning($"Device Preparation probe failed — treating as Classic: {ex.Message}");
ManifestLine($"SCENARIO PROBE FAILED (treated as Classic): {ex.Message}");
return false;
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Pure gate: is this built-in section collected under the given configuration and
/// enrollment scenario? Unknown conditions (a newer Shared catalog than this agent)
/// fail closed.
/// </summary>
internal static bool IsSectionActive(DiagnosticsBuiltInSection section, AgentConfiguration configuration, bool isDevicePreparation)
{
switch (section.Condition)
{
case DiagnosticsSectionCondition.Always:
return true;
case DiagnosticsSectionCondition.RealmJoinWatcher:
return configuration.EnableRealmJoinWatcher;
case DiagnosticsSectionCondition.DevicePreparation:
return isDevicePreparation;
default:
return false;
}
}
private static string DescribeInactiveCondition(DiagnosticsSectionCondition condition)
{
switch (condition)
{
case DiagnosticsSectionCondition.RealmJoinWatcher:
return "RealmJoin Watcher disabled";
case DiagnosticsSectionCondition.DevicePreparation:
return "not a Device Preparation enrollment";
default:
return $"unknown condition {condition}";
}
}
private void AddBuiltInSection(ZipArchive archive, DiagnosticsBuiltInSection section, BudgetTracker tracker, bool isDevicePreparation)
{
if (!IsSectionActive(section, _configuration, isDevicePreparation))
{
ManifestLine($"BUILT-IN SKIPPED ({DescribeInactiveCondition(section.Condition)}): {section.Id}");
return;
}
// Override (test seam) or catalog source folder with %ProgramData% /
// %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% expanded; null means the token is present but no
// interactive user has been detected yet — same skip as configured paths.
var folder = _sectionFolderOverrides.TryGetValue(section.Id, out var overrideFolder)
? overrideFolder
: UserProfileResolver.ExpandCustomTokens(section.SourceFolder);
if (folder == null)
{
_logger.Warning($"Built-in diagnostics section skipped (no user session for token): {section.Id}");
ManifestLine($"BUILT-IN SKIPPED (no user session for token): {section.Id} '{section.SourceFolder}'");
return;
}
ManifestLine($"BUILT-IN: {section.Id} -> folder='{folder}' zip='{section.ZipFolder}' recursive={section.IncludeSubfolders}");
foreach (var pattern in section.Patterns)
AddLogFiles(archive, folder, section.ZipFolder, pattern, tracker, section.IncludeSubfolders);
}
private void AddSessionInfo(ZipArchive archive, bool? enrollmentSucceeded)
{
var sb = new StringBuilder();
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
/// </summary>
public static class UserProfileResolver
{
public const string Token = "%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%";
// Spelled once, in Shared: the built-in diagnostics catalog uses the same token.
public const string Token = Shared.Models.DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.UserProfileToken;
private static readonly object Lock = new object();
private static bool _resolved;
@@ -926,22 +926,23 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.DeviceInfo
Monitoring.NetworkInterfaceLocator.FindActiveNetworkInterface();
/// <summary>
/// Collects WiFi signal info via the native WLAN API (<see cref="WifiInfoReader"/>,
/// language-neutral, no process spawn) and emits a separate wifi_signal_info event.
/// Designed to run as fire-and-forget via Task.Run — never blocks other collection.
/// VMs without WiFi service simply get no event.
/// Collects WiFi signal info via <see cref="WifiInfoProvider"/> (native WLAN API → WinRT
/// SSID → netsh, all language-neutral bar the last) and emits a separate
/// wifi_signal_info event. Designed to run as fire-and-forget via Task.Run — never blocks
/// other collection. VMs without WiFi service simply get no event.
/// </summary>
private void CollectWiFiSignalInfo(Guid? interfaceGuid)
{
try
{
var wifi = WifiInfoReader.TryGetCurrentConnection(interfaceGuid, out var wifiDiag);
var wifi = WifiInfoProvider.TryRead(interfaceGuid, out var wifiDiag);
if (wifi == null)
{
_logger.Debug($"EnrollmentTracker: native WLAN API returned no WiFi info ({wifiDiag ?? "no connected WLAN interface"}) — trying netsh fallback");
wifi = NetshWifiFallback.TryRead();
if (wifi == null)
return;
// Warning, not Debug: the caller only reaches here when the active NIC IS
// WiFi, so a silent miss is a real gap — and Debug is off at the default
// log level, which is what made this invisible in the field.
_logger.Warning($"EnrollmentTracker: no wifi_signal_info — {wifiDiag}");
return;
}
var data = new Dictionary<string, object>();
@@ -953,12 +954,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.DeviceInfo
data["wifiRadioType"] = wifi.RadioType;
if (wifi.Channel.HasValue)
data["wifiChannel"] = wifi.Channel.Value;
if (wifi.DataLimitedReason != null)
data["wifiDataLimitedReason"] = wifi.DataLimitedReason;
var message = wifi.Ssid != null ? $"WiFi: {wifi.Ssid}" : "WiFi signal info";
if (wifi.SignalPercent.HasValue)
message += $", Signal: {wifi.SignalPercent.Value}%";
if (wifi.RadioType != null)
message += $" ({wifi.RadioType})";
// Say it in the timeline too — a missing signal reads like a bug otherwise, and
// this is the only place an admin ever learns that a privacy setting caused it.
if (wifi.DataLimitedReason == WifiInfoProvider.LocationServicesOff)
message += " — signal unavailable, Location services off";
EmitDeviceInfoEvent(Constants.EventTypes.WifiSignalInfo, message, data);
}
@@ -390,23 +390,20 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Periodic
}
/// <summary>
/// Collects WiFi SSID, signal, and radio type via the native WLAN API
/// (<see cref="WifiInfoReader"/> — language-neutral, no process spawn).
/// Synchronous — needed before emitting the event.
/// Collects WiFi SSID, signal, and radio type via <see cref="WifiInfoProvider"/>
/// (native WLAN API → WinRT SSID → netsh). Synchronous — needed before emitting the event.
/// </summary>
private (string ssid, int? signal, string radioType) CollectWiFiInfo(Guid? interfaceGuid)
{
try
{
var wifi = WifiInfoReader.TryGetCurrentConnection(interfaceGuid, out var wifiDiag);
if (wifi == null)
{
_logger.Debug($"NetworkChangeDetector: native WLAN API returned no WiFi info ({wifiDiag ?? "no connected WLAN interface"}) — trying netsh fallback");
wifi = NetshWifiFallback.TryRead();
}
var wifi = WifiInfoProvider.TryRead(interfaceGuid, out var wifiDiag);
if (wifi != null)
return (wifi.Ssid, wifi.SignalPercent, wifi.RadioType);
// Warning, not Debug: reached only when the active NIC IS WiFi, and Debug is off
// at the default log level — which is what hid this failure in the field.
_logger.Warning($"NetworkChangeDetector: no WiFi info for the active WLAN adapter — {wifiDiag}");
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
using System;
using System.Net.NetworkInformation;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport
{
/// <summary>
/// Boot-time NIC grace shared by every first-contact backend call (remote-config fetch,
/// session registration, emergency-break reporter pattern): polls the cheap link-level
/// signal once per second for at most <paramref name="maxWait"/>. It cannot prove backend
/// reachability — the callers' retry loops handle that — it only keeps retry budgets from
/// being burned into a link that is provably still down (BootTrigger relaunch after a
/// mid-enrollment reboot, Wi-Fi still associating; tenant aebdce78 audits 2026-08-23/24).
/// Free on the normal path — a live link returns immediately. Probe errors end the wait,
/// never the caller's operation.
/// </summary>
internal static class NetworkLinkWait
{
internal static async Task WaitAsync(AgentLogger logger, TimeSpan maxWait, string context)
{
if (NetworkInterface.GetIsNetworkAvailable()) return;
logger?.Info($"{context}: no network link yet — waiting up to {maxWait.TotalSeconds:F0}s.");
var deadline = DateTime.UtcNow + maxWait;
while (DateTime.UtcNow < deadline)
{
await Task.Delay(1000).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (NetworkInterface.GetIsNetworkAvailable())
{
logger?.Info($"{context}: network link is up.");
return;
}
}
logger?.Warning($"{context}: still no network link after {maxWait.TotalSeconds:F0}s — attempting anyway.");
}
}
}
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ using System;
using System.Linq;
using System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Security;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security
{
@@ -23,6 +24,24 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security
/// <item><description><c>1.2.840.113556.1.5.284.2</c> → DeviceId (same encoding)</description></item>
/// </list>
/// <para>
/// The sibling <c>Microsoft Intune MDM Device CA</c> client cert (the one the agent authenticates
/// with, see <see cref="CertificateHelper"/>) carries a DIFFERENT OID arc that identifies the same
/// device from Intune's side. Observed on a live Intune-enrolled Windows 11 device:
/// </para>
/// <list type="table">
/// <listheader><term>OID</term><description>Meaning / encoding</description></listheader>
/// <item><term><c>1.2.840.113556.5.4</c></term><description>Intune DeviceId — BARE 16-byte GUID, no ASN.1 wrapper. Equals the cert's Subject CN.</description></item>
/// <item><term><c>1.2.840.113556.5.6</c></term><description>Intune AccountId (the Intune tenant account, NOT the Entra TenantId) — OCTET STRING GUID.</description></item>
/// <item><term><c>1.2.840.113556.5.14</c></term><description>Entra TenantId — OCTET STRING GUID. This is the one to compare against an Entra tenant id.</description></item>
/// <item><term><c>1.2.840.113556.5.11</c></term><description>Further GUID, OCTET STRING; semantics not documented by Microsoft and not verified here.</description></item>
/// <item><term><c>1.2.840.113556.5.15/.16/.17/.18/.19/.23</c></term><description>ASN.1 INTEGER enums (platform / enrollment flavour); semantics undocumented.</description></item>
/// </list>
/// <para>
/// The bare-GUID encoding of <c>1.2.840.113556.5.4</c> is why
/// <see cref="ParseGuidFromExtension"/> accepts an unwrapped 16-byte payload as well —
/// a strict OCTET-STRING parser silently returns <c>null</c> for that extension.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// All probes are best-effort: never throw, return <c>null</c> on miss, log a Warning
/// with the specific failure reason (no matching cert / extension missing / ASN.1
/// parse failed) so the agent log explains why the fallback didn't help.
@@ -31,8 +50,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security
public static class EntraDeviceCertHelper
{
public const string MsOrganizationAccessIssuer = "MS-Organization-Access";
public const string TenantIdOid = "1.2.840.113556.1.5.284.5";
public const string DeviceIdOid = "1.2.840.113556.1.5.284.2";
public const string TenantIdOid = MsDeviceCertificateOids.EntraJoinCertTenantIdOid;
public const string DeviceIdOid = MsDeviceCertificateOids.EntraJoinCertDeviceIdOid;
/// <summary>
/// Reads the Entra TenantId from the MS-Organization-Access device cert.
@@ -88,7 +107,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security
continue;
}
var guid = ParseGuidFromAsn1OctetString(ext.RawData);
var guid = ParseGuidFromExtension(ext.RawData);
if (guid != null)
{
logger?.Info(
@@ -98,7 +117,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security
}
logger?.Warning(
$"EntraDeviceCertHelper: failed to parse {label} ASN.1 OCTET STRING in cert thumbprint={cert.Thumbprint} " +
$"EntraDeviceCertHelper: failed to parse {label} GUID extension in cert thumbprint={cert.Thumbprint} " +
$"(raw {ext.RawData.Length} bytes); trying next candidate.");
}
@@ -116,46 +135,27 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security
/// <summary>
/// Parses a 16-byte MS-format binary GUID (little-endian for the first three groups,
/// per <see cref="Guid(byte[])"/>) wrapped in an ASN.1 OCTET STRING. Handles both
/// short-form (<c>04 10 ...</c>) and long-form (<c>04 81 10 ...</c>) length encoding.
/// per <see cref="Guid(byte[])"/>) out of a certificate extension's raw value.
/// Two encodings are accepted, because Microsoft uses both:
/// <list type="number">
/// <item><description>Wrapped in an ASN.1 OCTET STRING — short-form (<c>04 10 ...</c>) or
/// long-form (<c>04 81 10 ...</c>) length. Used by the MS-Organization-Access TenantId/DeviceId
/// extensions and by the Intune <c>…5.6</c> / <c>…5.14</c> extensions.</description></item>
/// <item><description>A bare, unwrapped 16-byte payload. Used by the Intune DeviceId extension
/// <c>1.2.840.113556.5.4</c> — verified against a live Intune MDM device cert, whose raw value is
/// exactly 16 bytes with no <c>04 10</c> prefix.</description></item>
/// </list>
/// A valid OCTET-STRING wrapper around 16 bytes is at least 18 bytes long, so the two forms
/// never collide for well-formed input. A 16-byte value is always read as the bare form —
/// a truncated wrapper of exactly that length is indistinguishable from it.
/// Returns <c>null</c> on any structural mismatch — never throws.
/// <para>
/// The decoding itself lives in <see cref="MsDeviceCertificateOids.TryParseGuid"/> so the agent
/// and the backend's client-cert tenant binding share one implementation; this stays as the
/// agent-side nullable-returning façade.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
public static Guid? ParseGuidFromAsn1OctetString(byte[] raw)
{
if (raw == null || raw.Length < 2) return null;
// ASN.1 OCTET STRING tag.
if (raw[0] != 0x04) return null;
int contentStart;
int contentLen;
if (raw[1] < 0x80)
{
// short-form length
contentLen = raw[1];
contentStart = 2;
}
else
{
// long-form length: lower 7 bits = number of following length bytes.
int numLenBytes = raw[1] & 0x7F;
if (numLenBytes < 1 || numLenBytes > 4 || raw.Length < 2 + numLenBytes) return null;
contentLen = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < numLenBytes; i++)
contentLen = (contentLen << 8) | raw[2 + i];
contentStart = 2 + numLenBytes;
}
if (contentLen != 16 || contentStart + 16 > raw.Length) return null;
var guidBytes = new byte[16];
Buffer.BlockCopy(raw, contentStart, guidBytes, 0, 16);
try { return new Guid(guidBytes); }
catch { return null; }
}
public static Guid? ParseGuidFromExtension(byte[] raw) =>
MsDeviceCertificateOids.TryParseGuid(raw, out var value) ? value : (Guid?)null;
}
}
@@ -19,7 +19,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security
/// <b>Retry contract (V1 <c>MonitoringService.RegisterSessionAsync</c>):</b>
/// </para>
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item>5 attempts total; between attempts <c>2^attempt</c> seconds (2s, 4s, 8s, 16s).</item>
/// <item>Boot-time NIC grace before the first attempt: when no network link is up yet
/// (BootTrigger relaunch after a mid-enrollment reboot, Wi-Fi still associating) wait
/// up to <see cref="NetworkLinkWaitMax"/> for the link-level signal. Best-effort and
/// free on the normal path — a live link returns immediately.</item>
/// <item>6 attempts total; between attempts <c>2^attempt</c> seconds (2s, 4s, 8s, 16s, 32s —
/// ~62 s of backoff). The original V1 budget of 5 attempts / ~30 s was too short for the
/// reboot-relaunch on Wi-Fi kiosks: the relaunched agent gave up and exited 7 before
/// the network came back, leaving the session silent forever (tenant aebdce78,
/// 2026-08-23 audit). A relaunch that misses here is lost — nothing retries later.</item>
/// <item>On <c>response.Success == true</c> → stop immediately.</item>
/// <item>On <see cref="BackendAuthException"/> (401/403) → report to the
/// <see cref="AuthFailureTracker"/> (which fires the first-failure distress + may trip
@@ -37,16 +45,23 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security
/// </summary>
public static class SessionRegistrationHelper
{
private const int MaxAttempts = 5;
private const int MaxAttempts = 6;
/// <summary>Upper bound for the pre-registration link wait (see class remarks).</summary>
internal static readonly TimeSpan NetworkLinkWaitMax = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(15);
/// <summary>
/// Executes the 5-retry register-session handshake against the backend. Returns the
/// Executes the retrying register-session handshake against the backend. Returns the
/// response + classified outcome. Never throws.
/// </summary>
/// <param name="backoffDelay">
/// Optional delay-provider used by tests to avoid real-time waits. Production callers
/// pass <c>null</c> → V1 parity <c>Task.Delay(2^attempt * 1000)</c> between attempts.
/// </param>
/// <param name="networkLinkWait">
/// Optional pre-registration link wait used by tests. Production callers pass
/// <c>null</c> → <see cref="WaitForNetworkLinkAsync"/> (bounded by <see cref="NetworkLinkWaitMax"/>).
/// </param>
public static async Task<SessionRegistrationResult> RegisterWithRetryAsync(
BackendApiClient apiClient,
AgentConfiguration agentConfig,
@@ -56,14 +71,19 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security
EmergencyReporter emergencyReporter = null,
Func<int, Task> backoffDelay = null,
Func<Exception, Task> onTerminalTransportFailure = null,
(string Manufacturer, string Model, string SerialNumber)? deviceHardware = null)
(string Manufacturer, string Model, string SerialNumber)? deviceHardware = null,
Func<AgentLogger, Task> networkLinkWait = null)
{
if (apiClient == null) throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(apiClient));
if (agentConfig == null) throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(agentConfig));
if (logger == null) throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(logger));
backoffDelay ??= DefaultBackoffDelay;
networkLinkWait ??= WaitForNetworkLinkAsync;
var registration = BuildRegistration(agentConfig, agentVersion, deviceHardware);
try { await networkLinkWait(logger).ConfigureAwait(false); }
catch (Exception ex) { logger.Debug($"Pre-registration network wait failed ({ex.Message}) — registering anyway."); }
string lastError = null;
Exception lastException = null;
@@ -113,7 +133,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security
if (attempt < MaxAttempts)
{
var delaySeconds = (int)Math.Pow(2, attempt); // 2, 4, 8, 16
var delaySeconds = (int)Math.Pow(2, attempt); // 2, 4, 8, 16, 32
logger.Info($"Retrying session registration in {delaySeconds}s");
await backoffDelay(attempt).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
@@ -143,6 +163,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security
private static Task DefaultBackoffDelay(int attempt)
=> Task.Delay(((int)Math.Pow(2, attempt)) * 1000);
/// <summary>
/// Boot-time NIC grace before the first registration attempt — shared polling loop in
/// <see cref="NetworkLinkWait"/>, bounded by <see cref="NetworkLinkWaitMax"/>. Probe
/// errors end the wait, never the registration.
/// </summary>
internal static Task WaitForNetworkLinkAsync(AgentLogger logger)
=> NetworkLinkWait.WaitAsync(logger, NetworkLinkWaitMax, "Session registration");
private static SessionRegistration BuildRegistration(
AgentConfiguration agentConfig,
string agentVersion,
@@ -194,7 +222,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security
/// <summary>401/403 from the backend — cert/token rejected. No retry was attempted.</summary>
AuthFailed = 1,
/// <summary>All 5 attempts failed with non-auth errors (network, 5xx, malformed response).</summary>
/// <summary>All attempts failed with non-auth errors (network, 5xx, malformed response).</summary>
Failed = 2,
}
@@ -56,6 +56,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters
{
private const string SourceLabel = "ImeLogTracker";
/// <summary>Timeline label: IME wrote its "Completed user session" line and no required user-scope app was pending.</summary>
internal const string EvidenceUserSessionCompleted = "user_session_completed";
/// <summary>Timeline label: IME reported zero targeted apps for the user session, so it never wrote a
/// "Completed user session" line at all. The user phase had nothing to enforce.</summary>
internal const string EvidenceZeroUserApps = "zero_user_apps_enumerated";
private readonly ImeLogTracker _tracker;
private readonly ISignalIngressSink _ingress;
private readonly IClock _clock;
@@ -591,9 +598,24 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters
var now = ResolveOccurredAt(out var derivedFromClock, out var rawSourceTs);
// Which observation carried the completion. The zero-app variant matters to whoever
// reads the timeline later: the verdict then rests on IME reporting that this user
// had no targeted apps at all, not on watching enforcement finish.
var zeroApps = _tracker.UserSessionZeroAppsObserved;
var evidenceLabel = zeroApps ? EvidenceZeroUserApps : EvidenceUserSessionCompleted;
var summary = zeroApps
? "IME enumerated the user session with zero targeted apps"
: "IME user session completed (no required user-scope apps pending)";
var message = zeroApps
? "IME enumerated the user session with zero targeted apps - no user-phase enforcement to wait for"
: "IME user session completed";
var derivationInputs = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.Ordinal)
{
["detectionSource"] = "IME log pattern (UserSessionCompleted)",
["detectionSource"] = zeroApps
? "IME log pattern (UserSessionZeroApps)"
: "IME log pattern (UserSessionCompleted)",
["evidence"] = evidenceLabel,
};
TagDerivedTimestamp(derivationInputs, derivedFromClock, rawSourceTs);
@@ -604,12 +626,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters
evidence: new Evidence(
kind: EvidenceKind.Derived,
identifier: "ime-log-tracker-v1",
summary: "IME user session completed (no required user-scope apps pending)",
summary: summary,
derivationInputs: derivationInputs));
var data = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.Ordinal)
{
["detectedAt"] = now.ToString("o"),
["evidence"] = evidenceLabel,
};
var patternId = _tracker.LastMatchedPatternId;
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(patternId))
@@ -619,12 +642,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters
_post.Emit(
eventType: SharedEventTypes.ImeUserSessionCompleted,
source: SourceLabel,
message: "IME user session completed",
message: message,
data: data,
occurredAtUtc: now);
// PR3-D4: terminal-ish lifecycle marker — INFO so it's visible at the default level.
_logger?.Info($"ImeAdapter: user session completed -> posting ImeUserSessionCompleted (patternId={patternId ?? "(none)"})");
_logger?.Info($"ImeAdapter: user session completed ({evidenceLabel}) -> posting ImeUserSessionCompleted (patternId={patternId ?? "(none)"})");
}
/// <summary>
@@ -274,6 +274,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2
{
return registration.ExitCode;
}
// Phase 6.5 (config self-heal): when the Phase 4 fetch ran before the network link
// was up, registration has just proven the backend reachable — retry the fetch once
// so the session runs on the live tenant config instead of cache/defaults.
// See AgentRuntimeConfig.TryRecoverAfterRegistration for what is deliberately
// NOT re-run here (kill-signal check, endpoint migration).
Runtime.AgentRuntimeConfig.TryRecoverAfterRegistration(
bootstrap.AgentConfig, auth, runtimeConfig, GetAgentVersion(), consoleMode, logger);
// Phase 7+8 (orchestrator + shutdown lifecycle + onIngressReady wiring +
// initial signal posts + analyzer/probes startup + shutdown.Wait + finally)
// is encapsulated in AgentRuntimeHost. See Runtime/AgentRuntimeHost.cs.
@@ -69,6 +69,63 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime
}
}
var configMergeResult = ApplyFetchedConfig(agentConfig, remoteConfig, auth, agentVersion, consoleMode, logger);
return new RuntimeConfigBundle(remoteConfigService, remoteConfig, configMergeResult, pendingMigrationTarget: null);
}
/// <summary>
/// Phase 6.5 — config self-heal. When the Phase 4 fetch ran before the network link was
/// up (agent relaunched at boot, Wi-Fi still associating — tenant aebdce78 audit 2026-08-24:
/// ~50% of sessions ran on ConfigVersion=0 exactly this way), a successful session
/// registration has just proven the backend reachable. Retry the fetch once and apply
/// the live tenant config instead of stranding the whole session on cache/defaults.
/// <para>
/// Deliberately NOT re-run here: the kill-signal check (post-registration kills arrive
/// via the telemetry-channel control signals on every upload response) and endpoint
/// migration (registration already succeeded against the current base URL; a migration
/// signal is honoured at the next agent start). Never throws — recovery is strictly
/// best-effort on top of an already-degraded-but-working fallback.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
public static void TryRecoverAfterRegistration(
AgentConfiguration agentConfig,
BackendAuthBundle auth,
RuntimeConfigBundle bundle,
string agentVersion,
bool consoleMode,
AgentLogger logger)
{
try
{
var service = bundle?.RemoteConfigService;
if (service == null) return;
var recovered = service.TryRecoverConfigAsync().GetAwaiter().GetResult();
if (recovered == null) return;
var mergeResult = ApplyFetchedConfig(agentConfig, recovered, auth, agentVersion, consoleMode, logger);
bundle.ApplyRecovered(recovered, mergeResult);
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
logger.Warning($"Post-registration config recovery failed: {ex.Message}");
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Applies a live-fetched config to the runtime: merge, tracker ceilings, log level,
/// integrity SHA + check, bootstrap-config cleanup. Shared by the Phase 4 startup path
/// and the post-registration recovery path so both apply identical semantics.
/// </summary>
private static RemoteConfigMergeResult ApplyFetchedConfig(
AgentConfiguration agentConfig,
AgentConfigResponse remoteConfig,
BackendAuthBundle auth,
string agentVersion,
bool consoleMode,
AgentLogger logger)
{
// Project remote tenant-controlled knobs onto the runtime AgentConfiguration so that
// downstream consumers (CleanupService, SummaryDialogLauncher, StartupEnvironmentProbes,
// DiagnosticsPackageService, EnrollmentTerminationHandler, the logger, the watchdog)
@@ -91,7 +148,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime
TryCleanupBootstrapConfig(agentConfig, agentVersion, logger);
return new RuntimeConfigBundle(remoteConfigService, remoteConfig, configMergeResult, pendingMigrationTarget: null);
return configMergeResult;
}
/// <summary>
@@ -175,10 +232,21 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime
internal sealed class RuntimeConfigBundle
{
public RemoteConfigService RemoteConfigService { get; }
public AgentConfigResponse RemoteConfig { get; }
public RemoteConfigMergeResult MergeResult { get; }
public AgentConfigResponse RemoteConfig { get; private set; }
public RemoteConfigMergeResult MergeResult { get; private set; }
public string PendingMigrationTarget { get; }
/// <summary>
/// Swaps in the config recovered by <see cref="AgentRuntimeConfig.TryRecoverAfterRegistration"/>
/// so Phase 7+8 (orchestrator, collectors, gather rules, IME patterns, the
/// unrestricted-mode audit) run on the live tenant config instead of the fallback.
/// </summary>
public void ApplyRecovered(AgentConfigResponse recoveredConfig, RemoteConfigMergeResult mergeResult)
{
RemoteConfig = recoveredConfig;
MergeResult = mergeResult;
}
public RuntimeConfigBundle(
RemoteConfigService remoteConfigService,
AgentConfigResponse remoteConfig,
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime
{
/// <summary>
/// Phase 6 of <see cref="Program"/>'s <c>RunAgent</c>: blocking
/// <c>POST /api/agent/register-session</c> with 5-retry exponential backoff before the
/// <c>POST /api/agent/register-session</c> with link-wait + 6-retry exponential backoff before the
/// orchestrator starts. V1 parity (MonitoringService.RegisterSessionAsync) — without
/// this call the backend's Sessions table never gets a row for this session, so
/// <c>IncrementSessionEventCountAsync</c> / <c>UpdateSessionStatusAsync</c> silently
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime
// prior to this, ConfigVersion=0 was only deducible by inferring from
// the absence of tenant-controlled knobs in the DataJson.
var outcome = remoteConfigService?.LastFetchOutcome ?? RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.NotAttempted;
var recovered = remoteConfigService?.RecoveredAfterFetchFailure == true;
var configVersion = remoteConfigService?.CurrentConfig?.ConfigVersion ?? 0;
var data = new Dictionary<string, object>
@@ -66,8 +67,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime
{ "diagnosticsUploadMode", agentConfig.DiagnosticsUploadMode ?? "Off" },
{ "previousExitType", previousExit?.ExitType ?? "unknown" },
{ "unrestrictedMode", agentConfig.UnrestrictedMode },
// remoteConfigFetched answers "is the agent running on a live-fetched
// config" — true also when the post-registration recovery replaced a
// failed startup fetch (remoteConfigOutcome then still names the startup
// failure; remoteConfigRecovered marks the heal).
{ "configVersion", configVersion },
{ "remoteConfigFetched", outcome == RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.Succeeded },
{ "remoteConfigFetched", outcome == RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.Succeeded || recovered },
{ "remoteConfigOutcome", outcome.ToString() },
// WinRT OOBE state sampled at this start. Together with previousExitType
// this makes late starts provable: "completed" on a first_run means OOBE
@@ -75,6 +80,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime
{ "oobeStateAtAgentStart", OobeStateReader.Read() },
};
if (recovered)
data["remoteConfigRecovered"] = true;
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(previousExit?.CrashExceptionType))
data["previousCrashException"] = previousExit.CrashExceptionType;
@@ -135,12 +143,25 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime
? $"Remote config fetch failed after {remoteConfigService.LastFetchAttempts} attempt(s); using cached config."
: $"Remote config fetch failed after {remoteConfigService.LastFetchAttempts} attempt(s); running with built-in defaults (ConfigVersion=0).";
// Post-registration recovery (Phase 6.5) replaced the fallback with a live
// fetch before this emitter ran: keep the failure details (the network-late
// condition is worth surfacing) but mark the heal and demote to Info — the
// session is NOT degraded.
var recovered = remoteConfigService.RecoveredAfterFetchFailure;
if (recovered)
{
var recoveredVersion = remoteConfigService.CurrentConfig?.ConfigVersion ?? 0;
data["recovered"] = true;
data["recoveredConfigVersion"] = recoveredVersion;
msg += $" Recovered after session registration (ConfigVersion={recoveredVersion}).";
}
post.Emit(new EnrollmentEvent
{
SessionId = agentConfig.SessionId,
TenantId = agentConfig.TenantId,
EventType = SharedConstants.EventTypes.RemoteConfigFetchFailed,
Severity = EventSeverity.Warning,
Severity = recovered ? EventSeverity.Info : EventSeverity.Warning,
Source = "Agent",
Phase = EnrollmentPhase.Unknown,
Message = msg,
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.State;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests
{
/// <summary>
/// Sessions 81daa77f / 75d6ae8e (2026-08-25) — the 30-min <c>advisory_completion</c> window
/// overran a completion gate that was deliberately holding the session. The RealmJoin gate
/// blocks completion until phase 110 and carries its own bounded resolution (60 min from
/// detection, re-armed on deployment activity, hard-capped at 4 h), so on every device whose
/// first deployment outlives 30 minutes the enrollment was failed while the engine own
/// <c>completion_waiting</c> still read "waiting on: realmjoin_resolution". 75d6ae8e
/// installed 25 RealmJoin packages successfully inside the window, the last one 2 min before
/// the failure; the customer tenant hit this on 10 of 30 enrollments in one week.
/// <para>
/// The guard re-arms while the gate holds. Convergence comes from the gate itself: Resolved,
/// FirstDeploymentIncomplete and Timeout all set <c>RealmJoinFacts.Outcome</c>, which opens
/// <c>RealmJoinGateOpen</c> and stops the guard applying.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
public sealed class AdvisoryCompletionGateHoldingTests
{
private static readonly DateTime T0 = new DateTime(2026, 8, 25, 6, 10, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private static DecisionSignal MakeSignal(
long ordinal,
DecisionSignalKind kind,
DateTime occurredAtUtc,
IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string>? payload = null)
{
return new DecisionSignal(
sessionSignalOrdinal: ordinal,
sessionTraceOrdinal: ordinal,
kind: kind,
kindSchemaVersion: 1,
occurredAtUtc: occurredAtUtc,
sourceOrigin: "test",
evidence: new Evidence(EvidenceKind.Synthetic, $"{kind}-{ordinal}", "test"),
payload: payload);
}
private static DecisionSignal DeadlineFired(long ordinal, DateTime occurredAtUtc, string deadlineName) =>
MakeSignal(ordinal, DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired, occurredAtUtc,
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline] = deadlineName });
private static ActiveDeadline? FindDeadline(DecisionState state, string name) =>
state.Deadlines.FirstOrDefault(d => d.Name == name);
private static DecisionEffect SingleTimelineEffect(DecisionStep step, string eventType) =>
step.Effects.Single(e =>
e.Kind == DecisionEffectKind.EmitEventTimelineEntry
&& e.Parameters != null
&& e.Parameters.TryGetValue("eventType", out var et)
&& et == eventType);
/// <summary>
/// Replays the shape both field sessions shared: Classic user-driven, full ESP, Hello
/// policy enabled, AccountSetup entered, then a guard-blocked post-AccountSetup ESP exit
/// (Shell-Core 62407, "Exiting page normally", errorCode 0) that arms the 30-min window.
/// The ESP registry froze at "1 of 5" and the device had zero user-targeted Intune apps,
/// so no arm of ShouldTransitionToAwaitingHello could ever open.
/// </summary>
private static DecisionState SetupEspExitDeadEnd(DecisionEngine engine)
{
var state = DecisionState.CreateInitial("sess-81daa77f", "tenant-81daa77f", T0);
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(0, DecisionSignalKind.SessionStarted, T0)).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
5, DecisionSignalKind.EspConfigDetected, T0.AddMinutes(1),
new Dictionary<string, string>
{
[SignalPayloadKeys.SkipUserEsp] = "false",
[SignalPayloadKeys.SkipDeviceEsp] = "false",
[SignalPayloadKeys.EspAllowContinueAnyway] = "false",
})).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
10, DecisionSignalKind.EspPhaseChanged, T0.AddMinutes(2),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.EspPhase] = "DeviceSetup" })).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
20, DecisionSignalKind.EspPhaseChanged, T0.AddMinutes(2.5),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.EspPhase] = "AccountSetup" })).NewState;
// Guard-blocked post-AccountSetup exit — arms advisory_completion at exit + 30 min.
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(30, DecisionSignalKind.EspExiting, T0.AddMinutes(3))).NewState;
Assert.NotNull(FindDeadline(state, DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion));
Assert.Null(state.Outcome);
return state;
}
/// <summary>Desktop (DAD-validated real user), RealmJoin detected, Hello provisioned.</summary>
private static DecisionState AddDesktopRealmJoinAndHello(DecisionEngine engine, DecisionState state)
{
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(40, DecisionSignalKind.DesktopArrived, T0.AddMinutes(3.5))).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
50, DecisionSignalKind.RealmJoinDetected, T0.AddMinutes(6),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [DecisionEngine.RealmJoinPayloadKeys.DeploymentPhase] = "0" })).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
60, DecisionSignalKind.HelloResolved, T0.AddMinutes(14),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.HelloOutcome] = "Success" })).NewState;
return state;
}
// ==================================================== the gate-holding guard ====
[Fact]
public void DeadlineFired_WhileRealmJoinGateHolds_RearmsInsteadOfFailing()
{
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = SetupEspExitDeadEnd(engine);
state = AddDesktopRealmJoinAndHello(engine, state);
// Preconditions: the gate is closed and owns an armed deadline of its own.
Assert.False(DecisionEngine.RealmJoinGateOpen(state));
Assert.NotNull(FindDeadline(state, DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout));
var fireAt = T0.AddMinutes(33);
var step = engine.Reduce(state, DeadlineFired(70, fireAt, DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion));
Assert.True(step.Transition.Taken);
Assert.Null(step.NewState.Outcome);
Assert.NotEqual(SessionStage.Failed, step.NewState.Stage);
var rearmed = FindDeadline(step.NewState, DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion);
Assert.NotNull(rearmed);
Assert.Equal(fireAt.AddMinutes(30), rearmed!.DueAtUtc);
var schedule = step.Effects.Single(e => e.Kind == DecisionEffectKind.ScheduleDeadline);
Assert.Equal(DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion, schedule.Deadline!.Name);
var waiting = SingleTimelineEffect(step, "completion_waiting");
Assert.Contains("CompletionGateHolding", waiting.Parameters!["trigger"]);
Assert.Contains("realmjoin_resolution", waiting.Parameters!["missingPrerequisites"]);
Assert.Equal(rearmed.DueAtUtc.ToString("o"), waiting.Parameters!["resolutionDeadlineDueAtUtc"]);
}
[Fact]
public void Session81daa77f_RealmJoinResolvesAfterTheWindow_CompletesInsteadOfFailing()
{
// End-to-end proof against the real field shape: before this guard the session was
// stamped Failed at exit+30 min with esp_exit_without_completion_evidence, 34 min
// before the RealmJoin gate would have released it.
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = SetupEspExitDeadEnd(engine);
state = AddDesktopRealmJoinAndHello(engine, state);
var fired = engine.Reduce(state, DeadlineFired(70, T0.AddMinutes(33), DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion));
Assert.Null(fired.NewState.Outcome);
// RealmJoin reaches phase 110 — the gate opens and the session completes.
var resolved = engine.Reduce(fired.NewState, MakeSignal(
80, DecisionSignalKind.RealmJoinResolved, T0.AddMinutes(50),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [DecisionEngine.RealmJoinPayloadKeys.DeploymentPhase] = "110" }));
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Finalizing, resolved.NewState.Stage);
Assert.Equal("Resolved", resolved.NewState.RealmJoinFacts.Outcome!.Value);
var grace = FindDeadline(resolved.NewState, DeadlineNames.FinalizingGrace);
Assert.NotNull(grace);
var completed = engine.Reduce(resolved.NewState,
DeadlineFired(90, grace!.DueAtUtc, DeadlineNames.FinalizingGrace));
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Completed, completed.NewState.Stage);
Assert.Equal(SessionOutcome.EnrollmentComplete, completed.NewState.Outcome);
}
// ============================================================== convergence ====
[Fact]
public void DeadlineFired_AfterTheGateOpened_ResolvesNormallyAgain()
{
// Convergence proof: the guard is not an escape hatch. Once RealmJoin timed out the
// gate is open, the guard stops applying, and a session with no completion evidence
// fails exactly as before.
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = SetupEspExitDeadEnd(engine);
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
50, DecisionSignalKind.RealmJoinDetected, T0.AddMinutes(6),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [DecisionEngine.RealmJoinPayloadKeys.DeploymentPhase] = "0" })).NewState;
var rjDeadline = FindDeadline(state, DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout);
Assert.NotNull(rjDeadline);
state = engine.Reduce(state,
DeadlineFired(60, rjDeadline!.DueAtUtc, DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout)).NewState;
Assert.True(DecisionEngine.RealmJoinGateOpen(state));
Assert.Null(FindDeadline(state, DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout));
// No desktop, no Hello, no IME evidence — the genuine dead-end shape.
var step = engine.Reduce(state,
DeadlineFired(70, T0.AddMinutes(80), DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion));
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Failed, step.NewState.Stage);
Assert.Equal(SessionOutcome.EnrollmentFailed, step.NewState.Outcome);
var failed = SingleTimelineEffect(step, "enrollment_failed");
Assert.Equal("esp_exit_without_completion_evidence", failed.Parameters!["reason"]);
}
// =========================================================== mutation proofs ====
[Fact]
public void DeadlineFired_WithoutRealmJoin_StillFails()
{
// The guard must key on an actually-held gate, never on the absence of evidence.
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = SetupEspExitDeadEnd(engine);
var step = engine.Reduce(state,
DeadlineFired(70, T0.AddMinutes(33), DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion));
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Failed, step.NewState.Stage);
Assert.Equal(SessionOutcome.EnrollmentFailed, step.NewState.Outcome);
var failed = SingleTimelineEffect(step, "enrollment_failed");
Assert.Equal("esp_exit_without_completion_evidence", failed.Parameters!["reason"]);
}
[Fact]
public void DeadlineFired_GateClosedButItsDeadlineNoLongerArmed_StillFails()
{
// A gate that can no longer resolve itself must not park the session forever. The
// hand-built state drops only the RealmJoin deadline, leaving the gate closed.
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = SetupEspExitDeadEnd(engine);
state = AddDesktopRealmJoinAndHello(engine, state);
var builder = state.ToBuilder();
builder.CancelDeadline(DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout);
state = builder.Build();
Assert.False(DecisionEngine.RealmJoinGateOpen(state));
Assert.Null(FindDeadline(state, DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout));
var step = engine.Reduce(state,
DeadlineFired(70, T0.AddMinutes(33), DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion));
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Failed, step.NewState.Stage);
Assert.Equal(SessionOutcome.EnrollmentFailed, step.NewState.Outcome);
}
}
}
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
@@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ public class BuiltInRulesTests
"policiesDiscovered", "ignoreCompletedApp", "imeAgentVersion",
"espTrackStatus", "updateName", "updateWin32AppState",
"cancelStuckAndSetCurrent", "imeSessionChange", "imeImpersonation", "imeTokenFailure",
"enrollmentCompleted", "updateDoTelemetry", "scriptStarted",
"enrollmentCompleted", "userSessionZeroApps", "updateDoTelemetry", "scriptStarted",
"scriptContext", "scriptExitCode", "scriptOutput", "scriptCompleted",
"resetPlatformScriptContext",
"healthScriptResult", "healthScriptDetectionResult",
@@ -201,4 +202,38 @@ public class BuiltInRulesTests
$"Pattern {pattern.PatternId} has invalid category '{pattern.Category}'");
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Sessions 81daa77f / 75d6ae8e (2026-08-25). IME writes this line and then returns before
/// its "Completed user session" statement, so on a device with no user-targeted Win32 apps
/// it is the ONLY evidence that user-phase enforcement finished. The exact wording is
/// pinned here against the real IME line (verified against decompiled IME 1.104.102.0,
/// ApplicationPoller and AppWorkloadAbstraction) because a silent drift would bring back
/// the 30-min esp_exit_without_completion_evidence false positive with no test failing.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void BuiltInImeLogPatterns_ZeroUserAppsPattern_MatchesTheRealImeLine()
{
var pattern = Assert.Single(
BuiltInImeLogPatterns.GetAll(),
p => p.PatternId == "IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS");
Assert.Equal("userSessionZeroApps", pattern.Action);
Assert.Equal("always", pattern.Category);
var regex = new Regex(pattern.Pattern, RegexOptions.CultureInvariant);
var real = "[Win32App] Get 0 apps for user session 1, user id = 4a1ba5db-44ed-4e69-8477-47ed88e76020";
var match = regex.Match(real);
Assert.True(match.Success, "zero-app user session line must match");
Assert.Equal("1", match.Groups["sessionId"].Value);
Assert.Equal("4a1ba5db-44ed-4e69-8477-47ed88e76020", match.Groups["userId"].Value);
// Must not swallow a session that DOES have apps — that would fabricate completion
// evidence while enforcement is still running.
Assert.DoesNotMatch(regex,
"[Win32App] Get 3 apps for user session 1, user id = 4a1ba5db-44ed-4e69-8477-47ed88e76020");
Assert.DoesNotMatch(regex,
"[Win32App] Get 10 apps for user session 1, user id = 4a1ba5db-44ed-4e69-8477-47ed88e76020");
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
using System.Net;
using System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.DataAccess;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Security;
using Microsoft.Azure.Functions.Worker.Http;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Moq;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// CERT-TENANT-BINDING — enforced since 2026-08-25.
///
/// The agent authenticates with the Intune MDM device certificate, whose chain is pinned to
/// Microsoft's Intune roots. Those roots are shared by every Intune tenant, so a valid chain alone
/// does not prove the caller belongs to the tenant it claims. The CA stamps the Entra tenant id
/// into OID 1.2.840.113556.5.14, which lets the backend bind the two.
///
/// These tests pin four things:
/// - the tenant id is actually extracted from a REAL field certificate (not a synthetic fixture),
/// because if Microsoft ever changes that stamp, enforcement locks out the whole fleet,
/// - the pure comparison covers every outcome the telemetry can report,
/// - the enforcement rule rejects Mismatch and ONLY Mismatch — ExtensionMissing is tolerated on
/// purpose, and that tolerance has its own test so removing it has to be a decision,
/// - a rejected request still carries its telemetry and does not leak the certificate's tenant
/// back to the caller.
/// </summary>
public class CertTenantBindingTests
{
private const string DeviceSamplePem = "device-cert-sample.pem";
/// <summary>
/// Tenant stamped into <c>device-cert-sample.pem</c> by the Intune MDM Device CA. The sample is
/// a public-key-only cert from an internal test device; the GUID is the test tenant's own id.
/// </summary>
private static readonly Guid SampleCertTenantId = Guid.Parse("b54dc1af-5320-4f60-b5d4-821e0cf2a359");
private static string SampleCertBase64()
{
var assemblyDir = Path.GetDirectoryName(typeof(CertTenantBindingTests).Assembly.Location)!;
var pem = File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(assemblyDir, DeviceSamplePem));
using var cert = X509Certificate2.CreateFromPem(pem);
return Convert.ToBase64String(cert.Export(X509ContentType.Cert));
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- extraction
[Fact]
public void ValidateCertificate_RealIntuneCert_ExtractsEntraTenantId()
{
// The load-bearing test for the whole feature: if Microsoft ever stops stamping OID
// 1.2.840.113556.5.14, or changes its encoding, enforcement would lock every device out.
var result = CertificateValidator.ValidateCertificate(SampleCertBase64());
Assert.True(result.IsValid, $"Real device cert rejected: {result.ErrorMessage}");
Assert.Equal(CertTenantIdStatus.Present, result.CertTenantIdStatus);
Assert.Equal(SampleCertTenantId, result.CertTenantId);
}
[Fact]
public void ValidateCertificate_CachedResult_KeepsTenantId()
{
// The tenant id is a pure function of the cert and is cached with the validation result,
// so a cache hit must not silently drop it and turn every repeat request into
// ExtensionMissing.
var b64 = SampleCertBase64();
_ = CertificateValidator.ValidateCertificate(b64);
var second = CertificateValidator.ValidateCertificate(b64);
Assert.True(second.IsValid);
Assert.Equal(CertTenantIdStatus.Present, second.CertTenantIdStatus);
Assert.Equal(SampleCertTenantId, second.CertTenantId);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- encoding
[Fact]
public void TryParseGuid_PinsRealFieldEncodings()
{
// Exact bytes lifted from the sample cert. OID 5.14 nests the GUID in an OCTET STRING,
// OID 5.4 stores the 16 bytes bare — both shapes must decode, and both are little-endian.
var wrapped = Convert.FromHexString("0410afc14db52053604fb5d4821e0cf2a359");
var bare = Convert.FromHexString("6701bc076190b743b2430bb6aeda736e");
Assert.True(MsDeviceCertificateOids.TryParseGuid(wrapped, out var tenantId));
Assert.Equal(SampleCertTenantId, tenantId);
Assert.True(MsDeviceCertificateOids.TryParseGuid(bare, out var deviceId));
// The Intune device id is also the certificate's Subject CN.
Assert.Equal(Guid.Parse("07bc0167-9061-43b7-b243-0bb6aeda736e"), deviceId);
}
[Fact]
public void TryParseGuid_AccountIdOidIsNotTheTenantId()
{
// Guards the mistake this feature was nearly built on: OID 5.6 carries the Intune ACCOUNT
// id, a different GUID. Comparing it against the tenant id would reject every request.
var accountIdExt = Convert.FromHexString("04103d85dede74e26b409d0d46b6fe65b440");
Assert.True(MsDeviceCertificateOids.TryParseGuid(accountIdExt, out var accountId));
Assert.NotEqual(SampleCertTenantId, accountId);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("")] // empty
[InlineData("0400")] // OCTET STRING, zero length
[InlineData("020102")] // not an OCTET STRING
[InlineData("0411afc14db52053604fb5d4821e0cf2a35900")] // wrapper claims 17 bytes
[InlineData("0410afc14db52053604fb5d4821e0cf2a3")] // wrapper claims 16, only 15 present
public void TryParseGuid_RejectsMalformed(string hex)
{
Assert.False(MsDeviceCertificateOids.TryParseGuid(Convert.FromHexString(hex), out _));
}
[Fact]
public void TryParseGuid_AnySixteenBytesDecodeAsBareGuid()
{
// Documents a deliberate limit rather than a gap: the bare form (OID 5.4) is exactly 16
// bytes with no tag, so a 16-byte input is indistinguishable from a truncated wrapper and
// is always read as a GUID. Harmless here — the value is only ever compared for equality
// against a known tenant id, never trusted as a claim in its own right.
Assert.True(MsDeviceCertificateOids.TryParseGuid(
Convert.FromHexString("0410afc14db52053604fb5d4821e0cf2"), out _));
}
[Fact]
public void TryParseGuid_RejectsNull()
{
Assert.False(MsDeviceCertificateOids.TryParseGuid(null!, out _));
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- comparison
[Fact]
public void Evaluate_MatchingTenant_ReturnsMatch()
{
var outcome = CertTenantBinding.Evaluate(
SampleCertTenantId, CertTenantIdStatus.Present, SampleCertTenantId.ToString());
Assert.Equal(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Match, outcome);
Assert.False(CertTenantBinding.WouldRejectUnderEnforcement(outcome));
}
[Fact]
public void Evaluate_MatchingTenant_IsCaseInsensitive()
{
// Tenant ids travel as strings in headers/routes and casing must not decide access.
var outcome = CertTenantBinding.Evaluate(
SampleCertTenantId, CertTenantIdStatus.Present, SampleCertTenantId.ToString().ToUpperInvariant());
Assert.Equal(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Match, outcome);
}
[Fact]
public void Evaluate_ForeignTenantCert_ReturnsMismatch()
{
// The attack this feature exists for: a valid Intune cert from the attacker's own tenant,
// replayed against a victim tenant whose device serial the attacker knows.
var outcome = CertTenantBinding.Evaluate(
SampleCertTenantId, CertTenantIdStatus.Present, "aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee");
Assert.Equal(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Mismatch, outcome);
Assert.True(CertTenantBinding.WouldRejectUnderEnforcement(outcome));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(CertTenantIdStatus.ExtensionMissing, CertTenantBinding.Outcome.ExtensionMissing)]
[InlineData(CertTenantIdStatus.Unparseable, CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Unparseable)]
public void Evaluate_UndecodableCert_ReportsWhyWithoutClaimingMismatch(
CertTenantIdStatus status, string expected)
{
// These must stay distinguishable from Mismatch: they measure rollout readiness
// (how many field certs can be enforced against), not an attack.
var outcome = CertTenantBinding.Evaluate(null, status, SampleCertTenantId.ToString());
Assert.Equal(expected, outcome);
Assert.False(CertTenantBinding.WouldRejectUnderEnforcement(outcome));
}
[Fact]
public void Evaluate_PresentButNullGuid_FallsBackToExtensionMissing()
{
var outcome = CertTenantBinding.Evaluate(null, CertTenantIdStatus.Present, SampleCertTenantId.ToString());
Assert.Equal(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.ExtensionMissing, outcome);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(null)]
[InlineData("")]
[InlineData("not-a-guid")]
public void Evaluate_NonGuidRequestTenant_IsReportedSeparately(string? requestedTenantId)
{
var outcome = CertTenantBinding.Evaluate(
SampleCertTenantId, CertTenantIdStatus.Present, requestedTenantId);
Assert.Equal(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.RequestTenantNotAGuid, outcome);
Assert.False(CertTenantBinding.WouldRejectUnderEnforcement(outcome));
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- enforcement rule
[Fact]
public void Rejects_OnlyMismatch()
{
// Mismatch is the only outcome that is evidence of a foreign certificate. The rest mean
// "cannot tell", and rejecting on those would cost legitimate devices their enrollment for
// something outside their control.
Assert.True(CertTenantBinding.Rejects(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Mismatch));
Assert.False(CertTenantBinding.Rejects(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Match));
Assert.False(CertTenantBinding.Rejects(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.ExtensionMissing));
Assert.False(CertTenantBinding.Rejects(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Unparseable));
Assert.False(CertTenantBinding.Rejects(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.RequestTenantNotAGuid));
}
[Fact]
public void Rejects_ExtensionMissingIsDeliberatelyTolerated()
{
// Pinned on its own because it is the one that is expected to tighten later: certificates
// predating the extension, or a sovereign-cloud CA, must not be locked out today. Changing
// this is a decision, and this test is where that decision has to be made explicitly.
Assert.False(CertTenantBinding.Rejects(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.ExtensionMissing));
}
[Fact]
public void Rejects_AgreesWithTheTelemetryField()
{
// WouldRejectUnderEnforcement is what the log line reports. If the two ever diverge, the
// telemetry stops describing what actually happened.
foreach (var outcome in new[]
{
CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Match,
CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Mismatch,
CertTenantBinding.Outcome.ExtensionMissing,
CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Unparseable,
CertTenantBinding.Outcome.RequestTenantNotAGuid,
})
{
Assert.Equal(CertTenantBinding.Rejects(outcome),
CertTenantBinding.WouldRejectUnderEnforcement(outcome));
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- end-to-end
[Fact]
public async Task ValidateRequestAsync_ForeignTenantCert_IsRejected()
{
// The attack this whole feature exists for: a valid Intune certificate from the attacker's
// own tenant, replayed against a victim tenant whose device serial they know. Serials are
// printed on the chassis, so before this gate that was the entire barrier.
var logger = new CapturingLogger();
var validator = BuildValidator(logger);
var result = await validator.ValidateRequestAsync(
BuildRequestWithCert(SampleCertBase64()),
tenantId: "aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee");
Assert.False(result.IsValid);
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.Forbidden, result.StatusCode);
// The response must not reveal which tenant the certificate actually belongs to.
Assert.DoesNotContain(SampleCertTenantId.ToString(), result.Details ?? "", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
Assert.DoesNotContain(SampleCertTenantId.ToString(), result.ErrorMessage ?? "", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
var observed = Assert.Single(logger.Entries, e => e.Message.Contains("AgentCertTenantBinding"));
Assert.Equal(LogLevel.Warning, observed.Level);
Assert.Contains(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Mismatch, observed.Message);
Assert.Contains("enforced=True", observed.Message);
Assert.Contains("wouldReject=True", observed.Message);
// The rejection must also land in the shared rejection log, so it shows up in the same KQL
// raster as every other reason a request was turned away.
Assert.Contains(logger.Entries, e => e.Message.Contains("AgentRequestRejected")
&& e.Message.Contains("stage=certtenant"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task ValidateRequestAsync_MismatchStillStampsTheRequestRow()
{
// Enforcement must not cost us the telemetry: a blocked request is exactly the one an
// operator will go looking for afterwards.
var items = new Dictionary<object, object>();
var validator = BuildValidator(new CapturingLogger());
await validator.ValidateRequestAsync(
BuildRequestWithCert(SampleCertBase64(), items),
tenantId: "aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee");
Assert.Equal(
CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Mismatch,
Assert.Contains(CertTenantBinding.RequestItemKey, items));
}
[Fact]
public async Task ValidateRequestAsync_MatchingTenantCert_IsAccepted()
{
var logger = new CapturingLogger();
var validator = BuildValidator(logger);
var result = await validator.ValidateRequestAsync(
BuildRequestWithCert(SampleCertBase64()),
tenantId: SampleCertTenantId.ToString());
Assert.True(result.IsValid, $"Matching-tenant request rejected: {result.ErrorMessage}");
// Match is deliberately NOT a trace line — worker-side LogInformation never reaches App
// Insights, so a Match trace would be dead code that silently costs us the denominator.
Assert.DoesNotContain(logger.Entries, e => e.Message.Contains("AgentCertTenantBinding"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task ValidateRequestAsync_StampsOutcomeOnTheRequestRow()
{
// The denominator lives here: RequestTelemetryMiddleware copies this item onto the request
// row, which already exists per request and is unsampled. Without it, "Match" is invisible
// and the shadow telemetry cannot say how often the binding held.
var items = new Dictionary<object, object>();
var validator = BuildValidator(new CapturingLogger());
var result = await validator.ValidateRequestAsync(
BuildRequestWithCert(SampleCertBase64(), items),
tenantId: SampleCertTenantId.ToString());
Assert.True(result.IsValid, $"Matching-tenant request rejected: {result.ErrorMessage}");
Assert.Equal(
CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Match,
Assert.Contains(CertTenantBinding.RequestItemKey, items));
}
[Fact]
public async Task ValidateRequestAsync_StampsMismatchOnTheRequestRowToo()
{
var items = new Dictionary<object, object>();
var validator = BuildValidator(new CapturingLogger());
await validator.ValidateRequestAsync(
BuildRequestWithCert(SampleCertBase64(), items),
tenantId: "aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee");
Assert.Equal(
CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Mismatch,
Assert.Contains(CertTenantBinding.RequestItemKey, items));
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- harness
private static SecurityValidator BuildValidator(ILogger logger)
{
var configRepo = Mock.Of<IConfigRepository>();
var cache = new MemoryCache(new MemoryCacheOptions());
// AllowInsecureAgentRequests clears the "at least one device validator" gate so the request
// reaches — and passes — the certificate stage without needing Graph mocks.
var config = new TenantConfiguration
{
AllowInsecureAgentRequests = true,
ManufacturerWhitelist = "*",
ModelWhitelist = "*",
};
var configServiceMock = new Mock<TenantConfigurationService>(
configRepo, Mock.Of<ILogger<TenantConfigurationService>>(), cache)
{ CallBase = false };
configServiceMock
.Setup(x => x.TryGetConfigurationAsync(It.IsAny<string>()))
.ReturnsAsync((config, true));
var adminConfigServiceMock = new Mock<AdminConfigurationService>(
configRepo, Mock.Of<ILogger<AdminConfigurationService>>(), cache)
{ CallBase = false };
adminConfigServiceMock
.Setup(x => x.GetConfigurationAsync())
.ReturnsAsync(new AdminConfiguration());
return new SecurityValidator(
configService: configServiceMock.Object,
adminConfigService: adminConfigServiceMock.Object,
rateLimitService: new RateLimitService(cache, Mock.Of<ILogger<RateLimitService>>()),
autopilotDeviceValidator: null!,
corporateIdentifierValidator: null!,
logger: logger,
bootstrapSessionService: null,
deviceAssociationValidator: null);
}
private static HttpRequestData BuildRequestWithCert(
string certBase64,
IDictionary<object, object>? items = null)
{
var contextMock = new Mock<Microsoft.Azure.Functions.Worker.FunctionContext>();
contextMock.SetupGet(c => c.Items).Returns(items ?? new Dictionary<object, object>());
var reqMock = new Mock<HttpRequestData>(contextMock.Object);
var headers = new HttpHeadersCollection
{
{ "X-ARR-ClientCert", certBase64 },
// The hardware whitelist stage runs after the certificate stage and rejects requests
// with no hardware headers, which would mask what these tests are actually asserting.
{ "X-Device-Manufacturer", "Contoso" },
{ "X-Device-Model", "TestBook" },
{ "X-Device-SerialNumber", "TESTSERIAL01" },
};
reqMock.SetupGet(r => r.Headers).Returns(headers);
reqMock.SetupGet(r => r.Url).Returns(new Uri("https://example.invalid/api/telemetry"));
return reqMock.Object;
}
private sealed record LogEntry(LogLevel Level, string Message);
private sealed class CapturingLogger : ILogger
{
public List<LogEntry> Entries { get; } = new();
public IDisposable? BeginScope<TState>(TState state) where TState : notnull => null;
public bool IsEnabled(LogLevel logLevel) => true;
public void Log<TState>(LogLevel logLevel, EventId eventId, TState state, Exception? exception,
Func<TState, Exception?, string> formatter)
=> Entries.Add(new LogEntry(logLevel, formatter(state, exception)));
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// <see cref="TableStorageService.BuildCveIndexEntities"/> collapses report findings to one
/// CveIndex entity per CVE. Production reports routinely list the same CVE under many
/// findings (one RD CVE across 14 installed RD components), which previously produced
/// 14 concurrent upserts racing on the same PK/RK.
/// </summary>
public class CveIndexEntityMergeTests
{
private const string Tenant = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111";
private const string Session = "22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222";
private static Dictionary<string, object> Finding(string software, string risk, params Dictionary<string, object>[] vulns)
=> new()
{
["softwareName"] = software,
["riskLevel"] = risk,
["vulnerabilities"] = vulns.ToList(),
};
private static Dictionary<string, object> Vuln(string cve, double score, string severity, bool kev = false)
=> new()
{
["cveId"] = cve,
["cvssScore"] = score,
["cvssSeverity"] = severity,
["isKev"] = kev,
};
[Fact]
public void SameCveAcrossManyFindings_CollapsesToOneEntity()
{
var findings = Enumerable.Range(0, 14)
.Select(i => Finding($"RD Component {i}", "high", Vuln("CVE-2025-29966", 8.8, "HIGH")))
.ToList();
var entities = TableStorageService.BuildCveIndexEntities(Tenant, Session, findings);
var e = Assert.Single(entities);
Assert.Equal($"{Tenant}_CVE-2025-29966", e.PartitionKey);
Assert.Equal(Session, e.RowKey);
Assert.Equal("RD Component 0", e.GetString("SoftwareName")); // tie keeps report order
}
[Fact]
public void Merge_HighestScoreWins_KevOrs_RiskMaxes()
{
var findings = new List<Dictionary<string, object>>
{
Finding("App A", "medium", Vuln("CVE-1", 5.0, "MEDIUM", kev: true)),
Finding("App B", "critical", Vuln("CVE-1", 9.1, "CRITICAL")),
Finding("App C", "low", Vuln("CVE-1", 3.0, "LOW")),
};
var e = Assert.Single(TableStorageService.BuildCveIndexEntities(Tenant, Session, findings));
Assert.Equal(9.1, e.GetDouble("CvssScore"));
Assert.Equal("CRITICAL", e.GetString("CvssSeverity"));
Assert.Equal("App B", e.GetString("SoftwareName"));
Assert.True(e.GetBoolean("IsKev"));
Assert.Equal("critical", e.GetString("OverallRisk"));
}
[Fact]
public void DistinctCves_StayDistinct_AndInvalidEntriesAreSkipped()
{
var findings = new List<Dictionary<string, object>>
{
Finding("App A", "high", Vuln("CVE-1", 7.0, "HIGH"), Vuln("CVE-2", 6.0, "MEDIUM")),
Finding("App B", "high", new Dictionary<string, object> { ["cvssScore"] = 9.0 }), // no cveId
new() { ["softwareName"] = "No vulns" },
};
var entities = TableStorageService.BuildCveIndexEntities(Tenant, Session, findings);
Assert.Equal(2, entities.Count);
Assert.Contains(entities, x => x.GetString("CveId") == "CVE-1");
Assert.Contains(entities, x => x.GetString("CveId") == "CVE-2");
}
[Fact]
public void CveIdComparison_IsCaseInsensitive()
{
var findings = new List<Dictionary<string, object>>
{
Finding("A", "high", Vuln("CVE-2024-1", 7.0, "HIGH")),
Finding("B", "high", Vuln("cve-2024-1", 7.0, "HIGH")),
};
Assert.Single(TableStorageService.BuildCveIndexEntities(Tenant, Session, findings));
}
}
@@ -127,4 +127,47 @@ public class DeviceAssociationValidatorTests
Assert.True(result.IsValid);
}
[Fact]
public void AsCacheHit_FlagsTheCopyAndLeavesTheCachedInstanceAlone()
{
// The cached instance is shared across every request for that serial. Marking it in place
// would make the first (real) lookup look cached too, and the shadow log gate would then
// drop the one line per lookup that carries the finding.
var cached = new DeviceAssociationResult
{
IsValid = true,
SerialNumber = Serial,
AssociationState = "preassociated",
DevicePreparationPolicyId = "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555",
AssignedToUserPrincipalName = "someone@example.invalid",
ManagedDeviceId = "66666666-7777-8888-9999-000000000000",
};
var hit = cached.AsCacheHit();
Assert.True(hit.ServedFromCache);
Assert.False(cached.ServedFromCache);
Assert.NotSame(cached, hit);
// Every field the shadow log reports must survive the copy.
Assert.Equal(cached.IsValid, hit.IsValid);
Assert.Equal(cached.IsTransient, hit.IsTransient);
Assert.Equal(cached.SerialNumber, hit.SerialNumber);
Assert.Equal(cached.AssociationState, hit.AssociationState);
Assert.Equal(cached.DevicePreparationPolicyId, hit.DevicePreparationPolicyId);
Assert.Equal(cached.AssignedToUserPrincipalName, hit.AssignedToUserPrincipalName);
Assert.Equal(cached.ManagedDeviceId, hit.ManagedDeviceId);
}
[Fact]
public void FreshlyParsedResult_IsNotFlaggedAsCached()
{
// A result straight from a Graph response must be loggable — that is the one line per lookup.
var body = $@"{{""value"":[{{""serialNumber"":""{Serial}"",""associationState"":""preassociated""}}]}}";
var result = DeviceAssociationValidator.ParseTenantAssociatedDevicesResponse(body, Serial);
Assert.False(result.ServedFromCache);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Invariants of the built-in diagnostics catalog (<see cref="DiagnosticsBuiltInSections"/>).
/// Shared has no test project, so the catalog is pinned here: the agent iterates it to build the
/// archive and the backend serves it to the portal, so a malformed entry would either break
/// collection on every device or mislead every administrator reading the list.
/// </summary>
public class DiagnosticsBuiltInSectionsTests
{
[Fact]
public void SectionIds_AreUnique()
{
var ids = DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.All.Select(s => s.Id).ToArray();
Assert.Equal(ids.Length, ids.Distinct(StringComparer.Ordinal).Count());
}
[Fact]
public void ZipFolderAndSourceFolderPairs_AreUnique()
{
// Two sections may share a ZIP folder (ImeLogs + the bootstrapper evtx) only when they
// read from different source folders — the same (zip, source) pair would double-add
// every file under duplicate entry names.
var pairs = DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.All
.Select(s => $"{s.ZipFolder}|{s.SourceFolder}".ToLowerInvariant())
.ToArray();
Assert.Equal(pairs.Length, pairs.Distinct().Count());
}
[Fact]
public void AlwaysSections_KeepHistoricalArchiveLayoutAndOrder()
{
// Archive-layout lock: these five sections (and their order) are what every diagnostics
// ZIP has carried since the PR1-B forensics work; tooling and support habits rely on it.
var always = DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.All
.Where(s => s.Condition == DiagnosticsSectionCondition.Always)
.Select(s => s.Id)
.ToArray();
Assert.Equal(new[] { "AgentLogs", "ImeLogs", "AgentState", "AgentSpool", "AgentMarkers" }, always);
}
[Fact]
public void ConditionalSections_CarryTheExpectedGate()
{
foreach (var section in DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.All)
{
if (section.Id.StartsWith("RealmJoin", StringComparison.Ordinal))
Assert.Equal(DiagnosticsSectionCondition.RealmJoinWatcher, section.Condition);
if (section.Id == "ImeBootstrapperEventLog")
Assert.Equal(DiagnosticsSectionCondition.DevicePreparation, section.Condition);
}
Assert.Contains(DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.All, s => s.Id == "ImeBootstrapperEventLog");
Assert.Equal(5, DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.All.Count(s => s.Condition == DiagnosticsSectionCondition.RealmJoinWatcher));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfileTokenSections_AreNeverAlwaysOn()
{
// The token resolves only once an interactive user exists; an Always section reading
// from the user profile would be skipped on every pre-desktop package and mislead the
// portal's "collected by every agent" wording.
var tokenSections = DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.All
.Where(s => s.SourceFolder.Contains(DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.UserProfileToken, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
.ToArray();
Assert.NotEmpty(tokenSections);
Assert.All(tokenSections, s => Assert.NotEqual(DiagnosticsSectionCondition.Always, s.Condition));
}
[Fact]
public void Patterns_AreFileNamesWithoutPathSeparators()
{
Assert.All(DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.All, s =>
{
Assert.NotEmpty(s.Patterns);
Assert.All(s.Patterns, p =>
{
Assert.False(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(p));
Assert.DoesNotContain('\\', p);
Assert.DoesNotContain('/', p);
});
Assert.False(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(s.Description));
Assert.False(s.ZipFolder.StartsWith("/") || s.ZipFolder.EndsWith("/"));
Assert.DoesNotContain('\\', s.ZipFolder);
});
}
[Fact]
public void NoBuiltInSection_UsesTheConfiguredPathsZipFolder()
{
// AdditionalLogs/<folder> is reserved for admin-configured entries.
Assert.All(DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.All,
s => Assert.False(s.ZipFolder.StartsWith("AdditionalLogs", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)));
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
using System.Text.Json;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.Notifications;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.Notifications;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Discord embed rendering: payload shape, color mapping, and the Discord embed limits
/// (25 fields, 256/1024 name/value, 4096 description, 6000 total).
/// </summary>
public class DiscordRendererTests
{
private static JsonElement RenderEmbed(NotificationAlert alert)
{
var json = new DiscordRenderer().RenderToJson(alert);
var doc = JsonDocument.Parse(json);
var embeds = doc.RootElement.GetProperty("embeds");
Assert.Equal(1, embeds.GetArrayLength());
return embeds[0];
}
[Fact]
public void RendersSingleEmbed_WithTitleColorFieldsAndLinks()
{
var alert = new NotificationAlert
{
Title = "Enrollment Succeeded",
Summary = "Enrollment Succeeded: DESK-001",
Severity = NotificationSeverity.Success,
ThemeColor = "00B050",
Facts = { new NotificationFact { Name = "Device", Value = "DESK-001" } },
Sections = { new NotificationSection { Title = "Details", Text = "All apps installed." } },
Actions = { new NotificationAction { Type = "openUrl", Title = "Open session", Url = "https://portal.example.com/sessions/abc" } },
};
var embed = RenderEmbed(alert);
Assert.Equal("✅ Enrollment Succeeded", embed.GetProperty("title").GetString());
Assert.Equal(0x00B050, embed.GetProperty("color").GetInt32());
var description = embed.GetProperty("description").GetString()!;
Assert.StartsWith("Enrollment Succeeded: DESK-001", description);
Assert.Contains("**Details**\nAll apps installed.", description);
// Webhooks cannot post buttons — actions become markdown links.
Assert.Contains("[Open session](https://portal.example.com/sessions/abc)", description);
var fields = embed.GetProperty("fields");
Assert.Equal(1, fields.GetArrayLength());
Assert.Equal("Device", fields[0].GetProperty("name").GetString());
Assert.Equal("DESK-001", fields[0].GetProperty("value").GetString());
Assert.True(fields[0].GetProperty("inline").GetBoolean());
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(NotificationSeverity.Success, 0x2ECC71)]
[InlineData(NotificationSeverity.Error, 0xE74C3C)]
[InlineData(NotificationSeverity.Warning, 0xF1C40F)]
[InlineData(NotificationSeverity.Info, 0x3498DB)]
public void Color_FallsBackToSeverity_WhenThemeColorMissingOrInvalid(NotificationSeverity severity, int expected)
{
foreach (var themeColor in new[] { "", "not-hex" })
{
var embed = RenderEmbed(new NotificationAlert { Title = "T", Severity = severity, ThemeColor = themeColor });
Assert.Equal(expected, embed.GetProperty("color").GetInt32());
}
}
[Fact]
public void Fields_CappedAt25_AndEmptyFactsSkipped()
{
var alert = new NotificationAlert { Title = "T", Summary = "S" };
alert.Facts.Add(new NotificationFact { Name = "", Value = "dropped" });
alert.Facts.Add(new NotificationFact { Name = "dropped", Value = " " });
for (var i = 0; i < 30; i++)
alert.Facts.Add(new NotificationFact { Name = $"f{i}", Value = "v" });
var fields = RenderEmbed(alert).GetProperty("fields");
Assert.Equal(25, fields.GetArrayLength());
Assert.Equal("f0", fields[0].GetProperty("name").GetString()); // empty facts skipped, not counted
}
[Fact]
public void FieldValue_TruncatedTo1024_WithEllipsis()
{
var alert = new NotificationAlert { Title = "T" };
alert.Facts.Add(new NotificationFact { Name = "long", Value = new string('x', 2000) });
var value = RenderEmbed(alert).GetProperty("fields")[0].GetProperty("value").GetString()!;
Assert.Equal(1024, value.Length);
Assert.EndsWith("…", value);
}
[Fact]
public void TotalEmbedLength_CappedAt6000_ByDroppingTrailingFields()
{
var alert = new NotificationAlert { Title = "T", Summary = "S" };
for (var i = 0; i < 25; i++)
alert.Facts.Add(new NotificationFact { Name = $"f{i}", Value = new string('v', 1000) });
var embed = RenderEmbed(alert);
var fields = embed.GetProperty("fields");
var total = embed.GetProperty("title").GetString()!.Length
+ embed.GetProperty("description").GetString()!.Length;
for (var i = 0; i < fields.GetArrayLength(); i++)
total += fields[i].GetProperty("name").GetString()!.Length + fields[i].GetProperty("value").GetString()!.Length;
Assert.True(fields.GetArrayLength() < 25);
Assert.True(total <= 6000);
Assert.Equal("f0", fields[0].GetProperty("name").GetString()); // leading fields kept
}
[Fact]
public void EmptyDescription_Omitted_AndProviderTypeIsDiscord()
{
var embed = RenderEmbed(new NotificationAlert { Title = "T", Severity = NotificationSeverity.Info });
Assert.False(embed.TryGetProperty("description", out _));
Assert.False(embed.TryGetProperty("fields", out _));
Assert.Equal(WebhookProviderType.Discord, new DiscordRenderer().ProviderType);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Http;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Coverage for the provider-neutral <see cref="EmailService"/> (welcome + farewell mails).
/// The provider HTTP call is driven through a stub handler, so the Mandrill wire format,
/// the result-array interpretation and the fail-soft contract are pinned without network.
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item>Neither send method ever throws — not on a missing key, missing recipient,
/// HTTP 500, a rejected recipient, nor a malformed body.</item>
/// <item>Gate ordering: missing-key short-circuits before missing-recipient.</item>
/// <item>Tracking is off on the wire (trust-page claim: provider receives only the
/// recipient address and tenant domain).</item>
/// <item>The farewell template is final: no [DRAFT]/placeholder residue, domain is
/// interpolated, empty domain falls back to "your organization".</item>
/// </list>
/// </summary>
public sealed class EmailServiceTests
{
private const string TenantId = "88888888-8888-8888-8888-888888888888";
// ----- configuration gates -----
[Fact]
public async Task SendAsync_EmptyApiKey_NoOps_AndLogsMissingKeyDebugLine()
{
var (sut, handler, logger) = Build(apiKey: "");
await sut.SendAsync("ops@contoso.invalid", "contoso.invalid", TenantId, CancellationToken.None);
Assert.Equal(0, handler.CallCount);
Assert.Contains(logger.Entries,
e => e.Level == LogLevel.Debug && e.Message.Contains("Email:ApiKey not configured"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task SendAsync_EmptyRecipient_NoOps_AndLogsMissingEmailDebugLine()
{
var (sut, handler, logger) = Build(apiKey: "any-non-empty-key");
await sut.SendAsync("", "contoso.invalid", TenantId);
Assert.Equal(0, handler.CallCount);
Assert.Contains(logger.Entries,
e => e.Level == LogLevel.Debug && e.Message.Contains("No notification email captured"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task SendAsync_EmptyApiKey_ShortCircuitsBeforeRecipientCheck()
{
// Pins the gate ordering: missing-key > missing-email. Both are empty here; only
// the key line must show up.
var (sut, _, logger) = Build(apiKey: "");
await sut.SendAsync("", "contoso.invalid", TenantId);
Assert.Contains(logger.Entries,
e => e.Level == LogLevel.Debug && e.Message.Contains("Email:ApiKey not configured"));
Assert.DoesNotContain(logger.Entries,
e => e.Message.Contains("No notification email captured"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task SendPreviewApprovedEmailAsync_EmptyApiKey_NoOps()
{
var (sut, handler, logger) = Build(apiKey: "");
await sut.SendPreviewApprovedEmailAsync("it@contoso.invalid", "contoso.invalid");
Assert.Equal(0, handler.CallCount);
Assert.Contains(logger.Entries,
e => e.Level == LogLevel.Debug && e.Message.Contains("Email:ApiKey not configured"));
}
// ----- wire format -----
[Fact]
public async Task SendPreviewApprovedEmailAsync_PostsMandrillPayload_WithTrackingOff()
{
var (sut, handler, logger) = Build(apiKey: "md-test-key");
await sut.SendPreviewApprovedEmailAsync("it@contoso.invalid", "contoso.invalid");
Assert.Equal(1, handler.CallCount);
Assert.Equal(HttpMethod.Post, handler.LastRequest!.Method);
Assert.Equal(EmailService.DefaultEndpoint, handler.LastRequest.RequestUri!.ToString());
using var doc = JsonDocument.Parse(handler.LastBody!);
var root = doc.RootElement;
Assert.Equal("md-test-key", root.GetProperty("key").GetString());
var message = root.GetProperty("message");
Assert.Equal(EmailService.DefaultFromAddress, message.GetProperty("from_email").GetString());
Assert.Equal(EmailService.DefaultFromName, message.GetProperty("from_name").GetString());
Assert.Equal("it@contoso.invalid", message.GetProperty("to")[0].GetProperty("email").GetString());
Assert.Equal("to", message.GetProperty("to")[0].GetProperty("type").GetString());
Assert.Equal(EmailTemplates.PreviewApprovedSubject, message.GetProperty("subject").GetString());
Assert.Contains("contoso.invalid", message.GetProperty("html").GetString());
Assert.True(message.GetProperty("auto_text").GetBoolean());
Assert.False(message.GetProperty("track_opens").GetBoolean());
Assert.False(message.GetProperty("track_clicks").GetBoolean());
Assert.Equal("welcome", message.GetProperty("tags")[0].GetString());
Assert.Contains(logger.Entries,
e => e.Level == LogLevel.Information && e.Message.Contains("Preview approval email sent"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task SendAsync_UsesFarewellTemplate_AndFarewellTag()
{
var (sut, handler, logger) = Build(apiKey: "md-test-key");
await sut.SendAsync("ops@contoso.invalid", "contoso.invalid", TenantId);
using var doc = JsonDocument.Parse(handler.LastBody!);
var message = doc.RootElement.GetProperty("message");
Assert.Equal(EmailTemplates.OffboardingFarewellSubject, message.GetProperty("subject").GetString());
Assert.Equal("offboarding-farewell", message.GetProperty("tags")[0].GetString());
Assert.Contains(logger.Entries,
e => e.Level == LogLevel.Information && e.Message.Contains("Offboard farewell email sent"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task ConfiguredEndpointAndSender_OverrideDefaults()
{
var (sut, handler, _) = Build(apiKey: "md-test-key", extra: new Dictionary<string, string?>
{
["Email:Endpoint"] = "https://mail.example.invalid/send",
["Email:FromAddress"] = "hello@example.invalid",
["Email:FromName"] = "Example Sender",
});
await sut.SendPreviewApprovedEmailAsync("it@contoso.invalid", "contoso.invalid");
Assert.Equal("https://mail.example.invalid/send", handler.LastRequest!.RequestUri!.ToString());
using var doc = JsonDocument.Parse(handler.LastBody!);
var message = doc.RootElement.GetProperty("message");
Assert.Equal("hello@example.invalid", message.GetProperty("from_email").GetString());
Assert.Equal("Example Sender", message.GetProperty("from_name").GetString());
}
// ----- provider responses / fail-soft -----
[Fact]
public async Task ProviderHttpError_DoesNotThrow_AndLogsWarning_WithoutSuccessLine()
{
var (sut, _, logger) = Build(apiKey: "md-test-key",
responder: _ => Json(HttpStatusCode.InternalServerError,
"{\"status\":\"error\",\"code\":-1,\"name\":\"Invalid_Key\",\"message\":\"Invalid API key\"}"));
await sut.SendAsync("ops@contoso.invalid", "contoso.invalid", TenantId);
Assert.Contains(logger.Entries,
e => e.Level == LogLevel.Warning && e.Message.Contains("500") && e.Message.Contains("Invalid_Key"));
Assert.DoesNotContain(logger.Entries, e => e.Level == LogLevel.Information);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ProviderRejectsRecipient_LogsWarningWithReason_WithoutSuccessLine()
{
var (sut, _, logger) = Build(apiKey: "md-test-key",
responder: _ => Json(HttpStatusCode.OK,
"[{\"email\":\"ops@contoso.invalid\",\"status\":\"rejected\",\"reject_reason\":\"hard-bounce\",\"_id\":\"abc\"}]"));
await sut.SendAsync("ops@contoso.invalid", "contoso.invalid", TenantId);
Assert.Contains(logger.Entries,
e => e.Level == LogLevel.Warning && e.Message.Contains("rejected") && e.Message.Contains("hard-bounce"));
Assert.DoesNotContain(logger.Entries, e => e.Level == LogLevel.Information);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("sent")]
[InlineData("queued")]
[InlineData("scheduled")]
public async Task ProviderAcceptedStatuses_CountAsSuccess(string status)
{
var (sut, _, logger) = Build(apiKey: "md-test-key",
responder: _ => Json(HttpStatusCode.OK,
$"[{{\"email\":\"ops@contoso.invalid\",\"status\":\"{status}\",\"_id\":\"abc\"}}]"));
await sut.SendAsync("ops@contoso.invalid", "contoso.invalid", TenantId);
Assert.Contains(logger.Entries, e => e.Level == LogLevel.Information);
Assert.DoesNotContain(logger.Entries, e => e.Level == LogLevel.Warning);
}
[Fact]
public async Task MalformedProviderBody_DoesNotThrow_AndLogsWarning()
{
var (sut, _, logger) = Build(apiKey: "md-test-key",
responder: _ => Json(HttpStatusCode.OK, "not json"));
await sut.SendAsync("ops@contoso.invalid", "contoso.invalid", TenantId);
Assert.Contains(logger.Entries, e => e.Level == LogLevel.Warning);
Assert.DoesNotContain(logger.Entries, e => e.Level == LogLevel.Information);
}
[Fact]
public async Task TransportException_DoesNotThrow_AndLogsWarning()
{
var (sut, _, logger) = Build(apiKey: "md-test-key",
responder: _ => throw new HttpRequestException("simulated provider outage"));
await sut.SendPreviewApprovedEmailAsync("it@contoso.invalid", "contoso.invalid");
Assert.Contains(logger.Entries,
e => e.Level == LogLevel.Warning && e.Message.Contains("Failed to send welcome mail"));
}
// ----- templates -----
[Fact]
public void FarewellTemplate_IsFinal_NoDraftResidue()
{
Assert.DoesNotContain("DRAFT", EmailTemplates.OffboardingFarewellSubject);
var html = EmailTemplates.GetOffboardingFarewellHtml("contoso.invalid");
Assert.DoesNotContain("DRAFT", html);
Assert.DoesNotContain("TEMPLATE NOT FINALISED", html);
Assert.DoesNotContain("TODO", html);
}
[Fact]
public void FarewellTemplate_InterpolatesDomain_AndLinksFeedbackChannels()
{
var html = EmailTemplates.GetOffboardingFarewellHtml("contoso.invalid");
Assert.Contains("contoso.invalid", html);
// The mail is sent from a noreply address after portal access is gone, so the
// feedback pointers must be external channels the recipient can actually reach.
Assert.Contains("https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/issues", html);
Assert.Contains("linkedin.com", html);
}
[Fact]
public void FarewellTemplate_EmptyDomain_FallsBackToGenericLabel()
{
var html = EmailTemplates.GetOffboardingFarewellHtml("");
Assert.Contains("your organization", html);
}
// ----- harness -----
private static HttpResponseMessage Json(HttpStatusCode status, string body)
=> new(status) { Content = new StringContent(body, System.Text.Encoding.UTF8, "application/json") };
private static (EmailService sut, StubHandler handler, CapturingLogger<EmailService> logger) Build(
string apiKey,
Dictionary<string, string?>? extra = null,
System.Func<HttpRequestMessage, HttpResponseMessage>? responder = null)
{
var settings = new Dictionary<string, string?> { ["Email:ApiKey"] = apiKey };
if (extra is not null)
foreach (var kv in extra) settings[kv.Key] = kv.Value;
var config = new ConfigurationBuilder().AddInMemoryCollection(settings).Build();
var handler = new StubHandler();
if (responder is not null) handler.Responder = responder;
var logger = new CapturingLogger<EmailService>();
var templates = new EmailTemplateService(
Moq.Mock.Of<AutopilotMonitor.Shared.DataAccess.IConfigRepository>(),
new Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory.MemoryCache(new Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory.MemoryCacheOptions()),
Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions.NullLogger<EmailTemplateService>.Instance);
var sut = new EmailService(new HttpClient(handler, disposeHandler: false), config, templates, logger);
return (sut, handler, logger);
}
private sealed class StubHandler : HttpMessageHandler
{
public int CallCount { get; private set; }
public HttpRequestMessage? LastRequest { get; private set; }
public string? LastBody { get; private set; }
public System.Func<HttpRequestMessage, HttpResponseMessage> Responder { get; set; } = _ =>
Json(HttpStatusCode.OK, "[{\"email\":\"x@y.invalid\",\"status\":\"sent\",\"_id\":\"abc\"}]");
protected override async Task<HttpResponseMessage> SendAsync(HttpRequestMessage request, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
CallCount++;
LastRequest = request;
LastBody = request.Content is null ? null : await request.Content.ReadAsStringAsync(cancellationToken);
return Responder(request);
}
}
private sealed class CapturingLogger<T> : ILogger<T>
{
public readonly List<(LogLevel Level, string Message)> Entries = new();
public IDisposable BeginScope<TState>(TState state) where TState : notnull => NullScope.Instance;
public bool IsEnabled(LogLevel logLevel) => true;
public void Log<TState>(
LogLevel logLevel, EventId eventId, TState state, System.Exception? exception,
System.Func<TState, System.Exception?, string> formatter)
{
Entries.Add((logLevel, formatter(state, exception)));
}
private sealed class NullScope : IDisposable
{
public static readonly NullScope Instance = new();
public void Dispose() { }
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.DataAccess;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Moq;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Pins the operator-override layer over the built-in transactional templates:
/// override wins when stored, built-in otherwise; placeholder rendering matches the
/// built-ins' empty-domain fallback; the send path is fail-soft on storage errors while the
/// admin path is not; save validates and invalidates the cache; reset is idempotent.
/// </summary>
public sealed class EmailTemplateServiceTests
{
[Fact]
public async Task NoOverride_ReturnsBuiltIn_Rendered()
{
var (sut, _) = Build();
var html = await sut.GetHtmlAsync(EmailTemplateKind.Welcome, "contoso.invalid");
Assert.Equal(EmailTemplates.GetPreviewApprovedHtml("contoso.invalid"), html);
Assert.DoesNotContain(EmailTemplateService.DomainPlaceholder, html);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Override_WinsAndRendersPlaceholder()
{
var (sut, repo) = Build();
repo.Setup(r => r.GetEmailTemplateOverrideAsync("farewell"))
.ReturnsAsync(new EmailTemplateOverride { Kind = "farewell", Html = "<p>Bye {{domainName}}</p>" });
var html = await sut.GetHtmlAsync(EmailTemplateKind.Farewell, "contoso.invalid");
Assert.Equal("<p>Bye contoso.invalid</p>", html);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Override_EmptyDomain_FallsBackToGenericLabel_LikeBuiltIn()
{
var (sut, repo) = Build();
repo.Setup(r => r.GetEmailTemplateOverrideAsync("welcome"))
.ReturnsAsync(new EmailTemplateOverride { Kind = "welcome", Html = "Hi {{domainName}}" });
Assert.Equal("Hi your organization", await sut.GetHtmlAsync(EmailTemplateKind.Welcome, ""));
}
[Fact]
public async Task StorageError_SendPath_FallsBackToBuiltIn_AdminPath_Throws()
{
var (sut, repo) = Build();
repo.Setup(r => r.GetEmailTemplateOverrideAsync(It.IsAny<string>()))
.ThrowsAsync(new System.InvalidOperationException("storage down"));
var html = await sut.GetHtmlAsync(EmailTemplateKind.Welcome, "contoso.invalid");
Assert.Contains("contoso.invalid", html);
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<System.InvalidOperationException>(() => sut.GetOverrideAsync(EmailTemplateKind.Welcome));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Save_Validates_ThenInvalidatesCache()
{
var (sut, repo) = Build();
repo.Setup(r => r.GetEmailTemplateOverrideAsync("welcome")).ReturnsAsync((EmailTemplateOverride?)null);
// warm the cache with "no override"
Assert.Null(await sut.GetOverrideAsync(EmailTemplateKind.Welcome));
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<System.ArgumentException>(() => sut.SaveOverrideAsync(EmailTemplateKind.Welcome, " ", "ga@contoso.invalid"));
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<System.ArgumentException>(() =>
sut.SaveOverrideAsync(EmailTemplateKind.Welcome, new string('x', EmailTemplateService.MaxHtmlLength + 1), "ga@contoso.invalid"));
repo.Verify(r => r.SaveEmailTemplateOverrideAsync(It.IsAny<EmailTemplateOverride>()), Times.Never);
EmailTemplateOverride? stored = null;
repo.Setup(r => r.SaveEmailTemplateOverrideAsync(It.IsAny<EmailTemplateOverride>()))
.Callback<EmailTemplateOverride>(e => stored = e).Returns(Task.CompletedTask);
repo.Setup(r => r.GetEmailTemplateOverrideAsync("welcome")).ReturnsAsync(() => stored);
var saved = await sut.SaveOverrideAsync(EmailTemplateKind.Welcome, "<p>{{domainName}}</p>", "ga@contoso.invalid");
Assert.Equal("welcome", saved.Kind);
Assert.Equal("ga@contoso.invalid", saved.UpdatedBy);
// cache was invalidated: the next read sees the stored override, not the cached null
Assert.NotNull(await sut.GetOverrideAsync(EmailTemplateKind.Welcome));
Assert.Equal("<p>contoso.invalid</p>", await sut.GetHtmlAsync(EmailTemplateKind.Welcome, "contoso.invalid"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Delete_ClearsCache_ReturnsToBuiltIn()
{
var (sut, repo) = Build();
var stored = new EmailTemplateOverride { Kind = "farewell", Html = "custom {{domainName}}" };
repo.Setup(r => r.GetEmailTemplateOverrideAsync("farewell")).ReturnsAsync(() => stored);
Assert.Equal("custom contoso.invalid", await sut.GetHtmlAsync(EmailTemplateKind.Farewell, "contoso.invalid"));
repo.Setup(r => r.DeleteEmailTemplateOverrideAsync("farewell")).Callback(() => stored = null!).Returns(Task.CompletedTask);
await sut.DeleteOverrideAsync(EmailTemplateKind.Farewell, "ga@contoso.invalid");
Assert.Equal(EmailTemplates.GetOffboardingFarewellHtml("contoso.invalid"),
await sut.GetHtmlAsync(EmailTemplateKind.Farewell, "contoso.invalid"));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("welcome", true)]
[InlineData("Farewell", true)]
[InlineData("invoice", false)]
[InlineData(null, false)]
public void TryParseKind_AcceptsOnlyKnownKinds(string? value, bool expected)
=> Assert.Equal(expected, EmailTemplateService.TryParseKind(value, out _));
[Fact]
public void BuiltInRaw_ContainsPlaceholder_ForBothKinds()
{
Assert.Contains(EmailTemplateService.DomainPlaceholder, EmailTemplateService.BuiltInRaw(EmailTemplateKind.Welcome));
Assert.Contains(EmailTemplateService.DomainPlaceholder, EmailTemplateService.BuiltInRaw(EmailTemplateKind.Farewell));
}
private static (EmailTemplateService sut, Mock<IConfigRepository> repo) Build()
{
var repo = new Mock<IConfigRepository>(MockBehavior.Loose);
var sut = new EmailTemplateService(repo.Object, new MemoryCache(new MemoryCacheOptions()), NullLogger<EmailTemplateService>.Instance);
return (sut, repo);
}
}
@@ -191,6 +191,21 @@ public class EndpointPolicyCatalogCompletenessTests
Assert.Equal(EndpointPolicy.GlobalAdminOnly, reseed.Policy);
}
/// <summary>
/// The built-in diagnostics catalog + global paths are platform-wide, secret-free data that
/// every settings viewer needs (what is collected from the tenant's devices). Member tier,
/// JWT-scoped — an upgrade to a global tier would hide it from tenant admins again.
/// </summary>
[Fact]
public void DiagnosticsPaths_IsMemberReadJwtScoped()
{
var entry = EndpointAccessPolicyCatalog.FindPolicy("GET", "/api/diagnostics/paths");
Assert.NotNull(entry);
Assert.Equal(EndpointPolicy.MemberRead, entry.Policy);
Assert.Equal(TenantScoping.Jwt, entry.TenantScoping);
}
/// <summary>
/// Unregistered routes must return null (fail-closed).
/// </summary>
@@ -163,6 +163,12 @@ public class EnrollmentTimeoutClassifierTests
// -------- ClassifyTimedOutSession --------
private static (SessionStatus, string) Classify(IReadOnlyList<EnrollmentEvent> events, double hoursSinceStart = 6, int grace = 72)
{
var (status, reason, _) = ClassifyWithRule(events, hoursSinceStart, grace);
return (status, reason);
}
private static (SessionStatus, string, string) ClassifyWithRule(IReadOnlyList<EnrollmentEvent> events, double hoursSinceStart = 6, int grace = 72)
{
var rollup = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ExtractRollup(events);
var now = Start.AddHours(hoursSinceStart);
@@ -220,7 +226,7 @@ public class EnrollmentTimeoutClassifierTests
Esp(DeviceSetup44), Esp(AccountSetup15),
Evt("desktop_arrived"), Evt("hello_provisioning_completed"), Evt("realmjoin_detected"),
});
var (status, reason) = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ClassifyTimedOutSession(
var (status, reason, _) = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ClassifyTimedOutSession(
rollup, Start, now, graceHours: 72, lastEventAtUtc: lastEvent);
Assert.Equal(SessionStatus.Succeeded, status);
@@ -471,4 +477,230 @@ public class EnrollmentTimeoutClassifierTests
Assert.NotEqual(SessionStatus.Failed, status);
}
}
// -------- WhiteGlove Part-2 awaiting-user gate (fairstone.ca analysis 2026-08-21) --------
private static readonly DateTime Resumed = Start.AddMinutes(20);
private static (SessionStatus, string) ClassifyWhiteGlove(
IReadOnlyList<EnrollmentEvent> events, double hoursSinceStart = 6, int grace = 51)
{
var rollup = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ExtractRollup(events);
var now = Start.AddHours(hoursSinceStart);
var (status, reason, _) = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ClassifyTimedOutSession(
rollup, Start, now, grace, isPreProvisioned: true, resumedAt: Resumed);
return (status, reason);
}
/// <summary>The fairstone event shape: Part 1 sealed, Part 2 resumed, nobody signed in.</summary>
private static EnrollmentEvent[] WgParkedEvents() => new[]
{
Esp(DeviceSetup44), Evt("whiteglove_complete"), Esp(AccountSetup05),
};
[Fact]
public void ExtractRollup_separates_enrollment_complete_from_whiteglove_complete()
{
var wgOnly = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ExtractRollup(new[] { Evt("whiteglove_complete") });
Assert.True(wgOnly.HasTerminalComplete);
Assert.False(wgOnly.HasEnrollmentComplete);
var real = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ExtractRollup(new[] { Evt("enrollment_complete") });
Assert.True(real.HasTerminalComplete);
Assert.True(real.HasEnrollmentComplete);
}
[Fact]
public void WhiteGloveGate_requires_preprovisioned_and_resume_and_device_setup()
{
var parked = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ExtractRollup(WgParkedEvents());
Assert.True(EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.IsWhiteGloveAwaitingUser(parked, true, Resumed));
Assert.False(EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.IsWhiteGloveAwaitingUser(parked, false, Resumed));
Assert.False(EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.IsWhiteGloveAwaitingUser(parked, true, null));
// Powered off before Device Setup ever provisioned → not the parking state.
var early = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ExtractRollup(new[]
{
Esp("ESP provisioning status: DeviceSetup — 3 of 4 subcategories completed"),
});
Assert.False(EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.IsWhiteGloveAwaitingUser(early, true, Resumed));
}
[Fact]
public void WhiteGloveGate_any_user_evidence_or_terminal_disarms_it()
{
foreach (var evidence in new[]
{
Esp(AccountSetup15), // Account Setup progressed → user was there
Evt("desktop_arrived"), // real-user desktop
Evt("hello_provisioning_completed"), // positive Hello terminal
Evt("enrollment_complete"), // real completion
Evt("enrollment_failed"), // explicit failure
})
{
var rollup = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ExtractRollup(new[]
{
Esp(DeviceSetup44), Evt("whiteglove_complete"), Esp(AccountSetup05), evidence,
});
Assert.False(EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.IsWhiteGloveAwaitingUser(rollup, true, Resumed));
}
}
[Fact]
public void Classify_whiteglove_part2_parked_within_grace_is_AwaitingUser()
{
// The fairstone shape: technician powers the device off at the logon screen minutes
// after the reseal-reboot. Part-1 whiteglove_complete must NOT reconcile to Succeeded.
var (status, reason) = ClassifyWhiteGlove(WgParkedEvents(), hoursSinceStart: 6);
Assert.Equal(SessionStatus.AwaitingUser, status);
Assert.Contains("sealed or powered off awaiting the end user", reason);
Assert.Contains("(Account Setup 0/5)", reason);
}
[Fact]
public void Classify_whiteglove_part2_parked_past_grace_reconciles_with_honest_reason()
{
var (status, reason) = ClassifyWhiteGlove(WgParkedEvents(), hoursSinceStart: 60, grace: 51);
Assert.Equal(SessionStatus.Succeeded, status);
Assert.Contains("pre-provisioning (WhiteGlove Part 1) completed", reason);
Assert.DoesNotContain("Account Setup completed", reason);
}
[Fact]
public void Classify_whiteglove_part2_with_partial_user_progress_is_not_reconciled_on_part1_evidence()
{
// User signed in and Account Setup progressed to 1/5, then silence. The Part-1
// whiteglove_complete previously reconciled this to Succeeded claiming "Account Setup
// completed" — on a resumed session only a real enrollment_complete proves the outcome,
// so this honest shape falls through to the AwaitingUser/Incomplete rules.
var events = new[]
{
Esp(DeviceSetup44), Evt("whiteglove_complete"), Esp(AccountSetup15),
};
var (withinGrace, _) = ClassifyWhiteGlove(events, hoursSinceStart: 6);
Assert.Equal(SessionStatus.AwaitingUser, withinGrace);
var (pastGrace, reason) = ClassifyWhiteGlove(events, hoursSinceStart: 60, grace: 51);
Assert.Equal(SessionStatus.Incomplete, pastGrace);
Assert.Contains("1/5", reason);
}
[Fact]
public void Classify_whiteglove_part2_with_desktop_and_hello_still_reconciles_via_user_evidence()
{
// Both Classic completion prerequisites in → the user provably finished; the
// user-completed reconcile (rule 4) owns this, not the parking gate.
var (status, reason) = ClassifyWhiteGlove(new[]
{
Esp(DeviceSetup44), Evt("whiteglove_complete"), Esp(AccountSetup15),
Evt("desktop_arrived"), Evt("hello_provisioning_completed"),
}, hoursSinceStart: 6);
Assert.Equal(SessionStatus.Succeeded, status);
Assert.Contains("user completed setup", reason);
}
[Fact]
public void Classify_whiteglove_part2_real_enrollment_complete_still_reconciles_to_Succeeded()
{
var (status, _) = ClassifyWhiteGlove(new[]
{
Esp(DeviceSetup44), Evt("whiteglove_complete"), Esp(AccountSetup05), Evt("enrollment_complete"),
}, hoursSinceStart: 6);
Assert.Equal(SessionStatus.Succeeded, status);
}
[Fact]
public void Classify_unresumed_session_keeps_terminal_complete_reconcile()
{
// No resumedAt (plain sessions, or a sealed Part 1 whose Pending write was lost):
// whiteglove_complete keeps reconciling to Succeeded exactly as before.
var rollup = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ExtractRollup(new[]
{
Esp(DeviceSetup44), Evt("whiteglove_complete"), Esp(AccountSetup05),
});
var (status, _, _) = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ClassifyTimedOutSession(
rollup, Start, Start.AddHours(6), 51, isPreProvisioned: true, resumedAt: null);
Assert.Equal(SessionStatus.Succeeded, status);
}
// -------- Self-deploying profile gate (kiosk tenant aebdce78, audit 2026-08-23) --------
private static (SessionStatus, string) ClassifySelfDeploying(
IReadOnlyList<EnrollmentEvent> events, double hoursSinceStart = 3, int grace = 51)
{
var rollup = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ExtractRollup(events);
var (status, reason, _) = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ClassifyTimedOutSession(
rollup, Start, Start.AddHours(hoursSinceStart), grace,
lastEventAtUtc: Start.AddMinutes(4), isSelfDeployingProfile: true);
return (status, reason);
}
// Session 195593e2 replay: DeviceSetup 4/4 (fallback-confirmed), AccountSetup registry
// at 0/5 (the IME false positive — user ESP never runs on this profile), Hello disabled,
// SkipUser=True, then silence after the post-ESP reboot. No user will ever sign in.
private static readonly EnrollmentEvent[] KioskSilentStream =
{
Esp(DeviceSetup44), Esp(AccountSetup05), Esp(DeviceSetupFallback),
HelloPolicy(enabled: false), EspConfig(skipUser: true),
};
[Fact]
public void IsSelfDeployingProvisioned_requires_flag_device_setup_and_no_failure()
{
var provisioned = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ExtractRollup(KioskSilentStream);
Assert.True(EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.IsSelfDeployingProvisioned(provisioned, isSelfDeployingProfile: true));
Assert.False(EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.IsSelfDeployingProvisioned(provisioned, isSelfDeployingProfile: false));
var beforeDeviceSetup = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ExtractRollup(new[] { Esp(AccountSetup05) });
Assert.False(EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.IsSelfDeployingProvisioned(beforeDeviceSetup, isSelfDeployingProfile: true));
var failed = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ExtractRollup(new[] { Esp(DeviceSetup44), Evt("enrollment_failed") });
Assert.False(EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.IsSelfDeployingProvisioned(failed, isSelfDeployingProfile: true));
}
[Fact]
public void Classify_self_deploying_silent_after_device_setup_reconciles_to_Succeeded_within_grace()
{
var (status, reason) = ClassifySelfDeploying(KioskSilentStream, hoursSinceStart: 3);
Assert.Equal(SessionStatus.Succeeded, status);
Assert.Contains("self-deploying profile", reason);
Assert.Contains("no user / Account Setup phase", reason);
Assert.Contains("Agent last reported 2026-07-06 15:04 UTC", reason);
Assert.DoesNotContain("Account Setup completed", reason);
}
[Fact]
public void Classify_self_deploying_silent_after_device_setup_reconciles_to_Succeeded_past_grace()
{
// Grace is a user-phase concept; it does not apply when there is no user phase.
var (status, _) = ClassifySelfDeploying(KioskSilentStream, hoursSinceStart: 60, grace: 51);
Assert.Equal(SessionStatus.Succeeded, status);
}
[Fact]
public void Classify_same_stream_without_self_deploying_flag_keeps_user_phase_verdicts()
{
// Guard against the gate leaking into user-driven sessions: the identical event shape
// on a user-driven profile is still "awaiting user" within grace / Incomplete past it.
var rollup = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ExtractRollup(KioskSilentStream);
var (within, _, _) = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ClassifyTimedOutSession(rollup, Start, Start.AddHours(3), 51);
var (past, _, _) = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ClassifyTimedOutSession(rollup, Start, Start.AddHours(60), 51);
Assert.Equal(SessionStatus.AwaitingUser, within);
Assert.Equal(SessionStatus.Incomplete, past);
}
[Fact]
public void Classify_self_deploying_explicit_failure_stays_Failed()
{
var (status, _) = ClassifySelfDeploying(new[] { Esp(DeviceSetup44), Evt("enrollment_failed") });
Assert.Equal(SessionStatus.Failed, status);
}
[Fact]
public void Classify_self_deploying_silent_before_device_setup_is_Incomplete()
{
// The profile flag alone proves nothing — Device ESP must have finished.
var (status, _) = ClassifySelfDeploying(new[] { Esp(AccountSetup05), Evt("agent_started") });
Assert.Equal(SessionStatus.Incomplete, status);
}
}
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Config;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
@@ -32,6 +33,44 @@ public class GetAgentConfigFunctionTests
Assert.Equal(expectedMajor, actual);
}
// ── MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths — global ∪ tenant without duplicate ZIP entries ──────────
private static DiagnosticsLogPath P(string path, string description = "") =>
new() { Path = path, Description = description };
[Fact]
public void MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths_GlobalFirst_OrderPreserved_DuplicatesDroppedCaseInsensitively()
{
var global = new[] { P(@"C:\Windows\Panther\setupact.log", "global"), P(@"C:\Windows\Logs\DISM\dism.log") };
var tenant = new[]
{
P(@"c:\windows\panther\SETUPACT.LOG", "tenant copy"), // same path, different case → dropped
P(@" C:\Windows\Logs\DISM\dism.log "), // trimmed duplicate → dropped
P(@"C:\Windows\SetupDiag\*.log", "tenant"),
};
var merged = GetAgentConfigFunction.MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths(global, tenant);
Assert.Equal(new[]
{
@"C:\Windows\Panther\setupact.log",
@"C:\Windows\Logs\DISM\dism.log",
@"C:\Windows\SetupDiag\*.log",
}, merged.Select(p => p.Path));
Assert.Equal("global", merged[0].Description); // first occurrence (global) wins
}
[Fact]
public void MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths_DropsBlankEntries()
{
var merged = GetAgentConfigFunction.MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths(
new[] { P(""), P(" "), P(@"C:\Install\Log\*.log") },
new DiagnosticsLogPath[] { null!, P(@"C:\Install\Log\*.log") });
Assert.Single(merged);
Assert.Equal(@"C:\Install\Log\*.log", merged[0].Path);
}
[Theory]
// CustomerSas: gated on the per-tenant SAS URL being present.
[InlineData("https://acct.blob.core.windows.net/c?sv=...", "CustomerSas", true)]
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
using System.Text.Json;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Diagnostics;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Wire shape of <c>GET /api/diagnostics/paths</c> (<see cref="GetDiagnosticsPathsFunction.BuildPayload"/>).
/// The route is MemberRead, so the field set is locked: the payload must stay "what is
/// collected" — never grow admin-only config.
/// </summary>
public class GetDiagnosticsPathsPayloadTests
{
// Mirrors the worker's serializer (Program.cs: PropertyNamingPolicy = CamelCase) so the
// nested DiagnosticsLogPath class serializes the way the portal actually receives it.
private static readonly JsonSerializerOptions WorkerJson = new() { PropertyNamingPolicy = JsonNamingPolicy.CamelCase };
private static JsonElement Serialize(AdminConfiguration config)
{
var json = JsonSerializer.Serialize(GetDiagnosticsPathsFunction.BuildPayload(config), WorkerJson);
return JsonDocument.Parse(json).RootElement;
}
[Fact]
public void Payload_HasExactlyBuiltInAndGlobalPaths()
{
var element = Serialize(new AdminConfiguration());
var fieldNames = element.EnumerateObject().Select(p => p.Name).OrderBy(n => n).ToArray();
Assert.Equal(new[] { "builtIn", "globalPaths" }, fieldNames);
Assert.Equal(JsonValueKind.Array, element.GetProperty("globalPaths").ValueKind);
Assert.Equal(0, element.GetProperty("globalPaths").GetArrayLength());
}
[Fact]
public void BuiltIn_MirrorsTheCatalog_WithConditionAsName()
{
var builtIn = Serialize(new AdminConfiguration()).GetProperty("builtIn");
Assert.Equal(DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.All.Count, builtIn.GetArrayLength());
var first = builtIn[0];
Assert.Equal("AgentLogs", first.GetProperty("id").GetString());
Assert.Equal("AgentLogs", first.GetProperty("zipFolder").GetString());
Assert.Equal(AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Constants.LogDirectory, first.GetProperty("sourceFolder").GetString());
Assert.Equal(DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.LogFilePatterns.Length, first.GetProperty("patterns").GetArrayLength());
Assert.False(first.GetProperty("includeSubfolders").GetBoolean());
Assert.Equal("Always", first.GetProperty("condition").GetString());
var conditions = builtIn.EnumerateArray().Select(s => s.GetProperty("condition").GetString()).ToArray();
Assert.Contains("RealmJoinWatcher", conditions);
Assert.Contains("DevicePreparation", conditions);
Assert.All(conditions, c => Assert.False(int.TryParse(c, out _), "condition must serialize as the enum name"));
}
[Fact]
public void GlobalPaths_RoundTripTheStoredJson()
{
var config = new AdminConfiguration
{
DiagnosticsGlobalLogPathsJson =
"[{\"path\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\Panther\\\\setupact.log\",\"description\":\"Setup\",\"isBuiltIn\":true,\"includeSubfolders\":false}]",
};
var globalPaths = Serialize(config).GetProperty("globalPaths");
Assert.Equal(1, globalPaths.GetArrayLength());
Assert.Equal(@"C:\Windows\Panther\setupact.log", globalPaths[0].GetProperty("path").GetString());
Assert.Equal("Setup", globalPaths[0].GetProperty("description").GetString());
}
}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.Graph;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
@@ -63,6 +63,18 @@ public class GraphFeatureCatalogSyncTests
scriptFeatures.Where(f => f != "All").OrderBy(f => f, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
}
[Fact]
public void GrantScript_Help_DocumentsEveryFeature()
{
// The -Features help block is how an admin discovers what they can grant. A feature that
// is grantable but undocumented effectively does not exist for them.
var script = ReadGrantScript();
var help = script.Substring(0, script.IndexOf("$FeatureCatalog", StringComparison.Ordinal));
foreach (var feature in GraphFeatureCatalog.Features)
Assert.Contains(feature, help, StringComparison.Ordinal);
}
private static string ReadGrantScript()
{
var path = Path.Combine(FindRepoRoot(), "scripts", "CustomerSetup", "Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1");
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Tests for <see cref="IntuneDeviceBindingValidator"/> — the pure pieces: the managedDevice
/// JSON-to-DTO mapping (incl. the exact-match guard on the returned id), the enrolledDateTime
/// parsing that the enrollment-race measurement depends on, and the cache key shape.
/// The HTTP/cache/retry resilience mirrors <see cref="CloudPcDeviceValidator"/> 1:1.
/// </summary>
public class IntuneDeviceBindingValidatorTests
{
private const string TenantId = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111";
private const string DeviceId = "07bc0167-9061-43b7-b243-0bb6aeda736e";
// -- BuildCacheKey --
[Fact]
public void BuildCacheKey_StableShape()
{
var key = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.BuildCacheKey(TenantId, DeviceId);
Assert.Equal($"intune-device-binding:{TenantId}:{DeviceId}", key);
}
[Fact]
public void BuildCacheKey_DistinctFromOtherValidatorKeys()
{
// A shared prefix would let a positive hit in one validator satisfy a lookup in another.
var key = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.BuildCacheKey(TenantId, DeviceId);
Assert.StartsWith("intune-device-binding:", key);
Assert.DoesNotContain("cloudpc", key);
Assert.DoesNotContain("autopilot", key);
}
[Fact]
public void BuildCacheKey_IsTenantScoped()
{
// The whole point of the check is that the same device id must not resolve across
// tenants — a tenant-blind cache key would defeat it.
var a = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.BuildCacheKey(TenantId, DeviceId);
var b = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.BuildCacheKey("22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222", DeviceId);
Assert.NotEqual(a, b);
}
// -- ParseManagedDeviceResponse --
[Fact]
public void Parse_MatchingDevice_ReturnsMatchWithDiagnostics()
{
var body = $$"""
{
"id": "{{DeviceId}}",
"deviceName": "TEST-DEVICE-01",
"enrolledDateTime": "2026-08-24T15:20:00Z",
"azureADDeviceId": "aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee",
"managementState": "managed"
}
""";
var result = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.ParseManagedDeviceResponse(body, DeviceId);
Assert.Equal(IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.Match, result.Outcome);
Assert.True(result.IsValid);
Assert.False(result.IsTransient);
Assert.Equal("TEST-DEVICE-01", result.DeviceName);
Assert.Equal("managed", result.ManagementState);
Assert.Equal(
new DateTimeOffset(2026, 8, 24, 15, 20, 0, TimeSpan.Zero),
result.EnrolledDateTime);
}
[Fact]
public void Parse_DifferentIdInBody_IsNotAMatch()
{
// Guards against a redirected or widened lookup being taken as confirmation of the id
// we actually asked about.
var body = """
{ "id": "99999999-9999-9999-9999-999999999999", "deviceName": "OTHER" }
""";
var result = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.ParseManagedDeviceResponse(body, DeviceId);
Assert.Equal(IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.NotFound, result.Outcome);
Assert.False(result.IsValid);
}
[Fact]
public void Parse_IdCasingDiffers_StillMatches()
{
// Graph echoes GUIDs lowercase, but casing must never decide a security outcome.
var body = $$"""
{ "id": "{{DeviceId.ToUpperInvariant()}}", "deviceName": "TEST-DEVICE-01" }
""";
var result = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.ParseManagedDeviceResponse(body, DeviceId);
Assert.Equal(IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.Match, result.Outcome);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("")]
[InlineData("not json at all")]
[InlineData("{}")]
[InlineData("""{ "id": "" }""")]
[InlineData("""{ "deviceName": "no id field" }""")]
public void Parse_MalformedOrEmpty_IsNotFoundNotAnException(string body)
{
var result = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.ParseManagedDeviceResponse(body, DeviceId);
Assert.Equal(IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.NotFound, result.Outcome);
Assert.Equal(DeviceId, result.IntuneDeviceId);
}
[Fact]
public void Parse_MissingEnrolledDateTime_LeavesItNull()
{
var body = $$"""
{ "id": "{{DeviceId}}", "deviceName": "TEST-DEVICE-01" }
""";
var result = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.ParseManagedDeviceResponse(body, DeviceId);
Assert.Equal(IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.Match, result.Outcome);
Assert.Null(result.EnrolledDateTime);
}
// -- ParseEnrolledDateTime --
[Fact]
public void ParseEnrolledDateTime_IntuneZeroDate_IsAbsenceNotADate()
{
// Intune returns 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z when it has no enrollment timestamp. Treating that
// as a real date would report an object age of ~2000 years and poison the race analysis.
Assert.Null(IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.ParseEnrolledDateTime("0001-01-01T00:00:00Z"));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(null)]
[InlineData("")]
[InlineData(" ")]
[InlineData("not-a-date")]
public void ParseEnrolledDateTime_UnusableInput_IsNull(string? raw)
{
Assert.Null(IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.ParseEnrolledDateTime(raw));
}
[Fact]
public void ParseEnrolledDateTime_NormalizesToUtc()
{
// A device object created minutes ago is the signature of an enrollment race, so the
// instant has to be comparable regardless of the offset Graph reports it in.
var parsed = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.ParseEnrolledDateTime("2026-08-24T17:20:00+02:00");
Assert.NotNull(parsed);
Assert.Equal(TimeSpan.Zero, parsed!.Value.Offset);
Assert.Equal(new DateTimeOffset(2026, 8, 24, 15, 20, 0, TimeSpan.Zero), parsed.Value);
}
// -- result semantics --
[Theory]
[InlineData(IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.NotFound)]
[InlineData(IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.NoDeviceIdInCert)]
[InlineData(IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.PermissionMissing)]
public void DefinitiveNegatives_AreNotTransient(IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome outcome)
{
// Only Transient may be retried / left uncached. A missing grant or a foreign device is a
// state, not an outage — retrying cannot change either.
var result = new IntuneDeviceBindingResult { Outcome = outcome };
Assert.False(result.IsTransient);
Assert.False(result.IsValid);
}
[Fact]
public void AsCacheHit_FlagsTheCopyAndLeavesTheCachedInstanceAlone()
{
// The cached instance is shared across every request for that device. Marking it in place
// would make the first (real) lookup look cached too, and the log gate would then drop the
// one line per lookup we actually want to keep.
var cached = new IntuneDeviceBindingResult
{
Outcome = IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.Match,
IntuneDeviceId = DeviceId,
DeviceName = "TEST-DEVICE-01",
EnrolledDateTime = new DateTimeOffset(2026, 8, 24, 16, 51, 0, TimeSpan.Zero),
};
var hit = cached.AsCacheHit();
Assert.True(hit.ServedFromCache);
Assert.False(cached.ServedFromCache);
Assert.NotSame(cached, hit);
// Everything the log line reports must survive the copy.
Assert.Equal(cached.Outcome, hit.Outcome);
Assert.Equal(cached.IntuneDeviceId, hit.IntuneDeviceId);
Assert.Equal(cached.DeviceName, hit.DeviceName);
Assert.Equal(cached.EnrolledDateTime, hit.EnrolledDateTime);
}
[Fact]
public void FreshResult_IsNotFlaggedAsCached()
{
// A freshly parsed Graph response must be loggable — that is the one line per lookup.
var body = $$"""
{ "id": "{{DeviceId}}", "deviceName": "TEST-DEVICE-01" }
""";
var result = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.ParseManagedDeviceResponse(body, DeviceId);
Assert.False(result.ServedFromCache);
}
[Fact]
public void TransientOutcome_IsNeitherValidNorDefinitive()
{
var result = new IntuneDeviceBindingResult { Outcome = IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.Transient };
Assert.True(result.IsTransient);
Assert.False(result.IsValid);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using Azure.Data.Tables;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Helpers;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Moq;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Pins that the ONE projected window scan the maintenance tick shares across its rolling
/// sweeps (<c>GetMaintenanceWindowSessionsAsync</c> / <c>MaintenanceSweepSessionProjection</c>)
/// carries every field the time-attribution, device-journey and verdict-calibration sweeps
/// read. In Azure Table Storage a <c>$select</c> returns ONLY the listed properties, so the
/// projected row here is built from the production array — dropping a column there fails the
/// sweep that consumes it. Mirrors <see cref="UsageMetricsProjectionEquivalenceTests"/>.
/// </summary>
public class MaintenanceSweepProjectionEquivalenceTests
{
private const string TenantId = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000abc";
private static readonly DateTime Started = new(2026, 8, 10, 9, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private static readonly TableStorageService Sut =
new(new Mock<TableServiceClient>().Object, NullLogger<TableStorageService>.Instance);
/// <summary>Full wide Sessions row with every column the sweeps read set to a distinct non-default value, plus noise.</summary>
private static TableEntity FullRow() => new(TenantId, "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111")
{
["Status"] = "Succeeded",
["StartedAt"] = new DateTimeOffset(Started),
["CompletedAt"] = new DateTimeOffset(Started.AddHours(1)),
["LastEventAt"] = new DateTimeOffset(Started.AddHours(2)),
["DurationSeconds"] = 3600,
["EventCount"] = 321,
["DeletionState"] = "None",
["SerialNumber"] = "SN-1234",
["Manufacturer"] = "Contoso",
["Model"] = "Model-X",
["EnrollmentType"] = "v2",
["IsPreProvisioned"] = true,
["IsSelfDeployingProfile"] = true,
["IsUserDriven"] = false,
["ResumedAt"] = new DateTimeOffset(Started.AddMinutes(30)),
["AdminMarkedAction"] = "Succeeded",
["VerdictPath"] = "manual:succeeded",
["PriorStatus"] = "Incomplete",
["PriorVerdictPath"] = "sweep:r6",
["FailureReason"] = "No Device Setup completion or explicit failure signal observed before timeout",
["ReconcileReason"] = "Reconciled at timeout: user completed setup (desktop + Windows Hello)",
["FailureSource"] = "manual",
["EspSoftFailure"] = true,
// Noise the sweeps never read — present on the wide row, dropped by the projection.
["DeviceName"] = "PC-FULL",
["OsName"] = "Windows 11",
["OsBuild"] = "26200.1234",
["GeoCountry"] = "DE",
["AgentVersion"] = "2.9.0",
["DiagnosticsBlobName"] = "diag.zip",
["FailureSnapshotJson"] = "{\"big\":\"" + new string('x', 2000) + "\"}",
};
private static TableEntity Project(TableEntity full)
{
var keep = new HashSet<string>(TableStorageService.MaintenanceSweepSessionProjection, StringComparer.Ordinal);
var projected = new TableEntity(full.PartitionKey, full.RowKey);
foreach (var kv in full)
{
if (keep.Contains(kv.Key)) projected[kv.Key] = kv.Value;
}
return projected;
}
[Fact]
public void Projection_drops_the_wide_columns()
{
var projected = Project(FullRow());
Assert.False(projected.ContainsKey("FailureSnapshotJson"));
Assert.False(projected.ContainsKey("GeoCountry"));
Assert.False(projected.ContainsKey("OsBuild"));
Assert.True(projected.Count < FullRow().Count);
}
[Fact]
public void Every_field_the_sweeps_read_survives_the_projection()
{
var full = Sut.MapToSessionSummary(FullRow());
var proj = Sut.MapToSessionSummary(Project(FullRow()));
// Shared / structural
Assert.Equal(full.TenantId, proj.TenantId);
Assert.Equal(full.SessionId, proj.SessionId);
Assert.Equal(full.Status, proj.Status);
Assert.Equal(full.StartedAt, proj.StartedAt);
Assert.Equal(full.CompletedAt, proj.CompletedAt);
Assert.Equal(full.DeletionState, proj.DeletionState);
// Time attribution: Status/DurationSeconds/DeletionState/EventCount + enrollment class
Assert.Equal(full.DurationSeconds, proj.DurationSeconds);
Assert.Equal(full.EventCount, proj.EventCount);
Assert.Equal(TimeAttributionCalculator.GetEnrollmentClass(full), TimeAttributionCalculator.GetEnrollmentClass(proj));
// Device journeys: BuildSessionRef + BuildDeviceHistoryRow display fields
Assert.Equal(full.SerialNumber, proj.SerialNumber);
Assert.Equal(full.Manufacturer, proj.Manufacturer);
Assert.Equal(full.Model, proj.Model);
Assert.Equal(full.EnrollmentType, proj.EnrollmentType);
Assert.Equal(full.IsPreProvisioned, proj.IsPreProvisioned);
Assert.Equal(full.AdminMarkedAction, proj.AdminMarkedAction);
var refFull = DeviceJourneyCalculator.BuildSessionRef(full)!;
var refProj = DeviceJourneyCalculator.BuildSessionRef(proj)!;
Assert.Equal(System.Text.Json.JsonSerializer.Serialize(refFull), System.Text.Json.JsonSerializer.Serialize(refProj));
// Verdict calibration: attribution + legacy derivation inputs + proxy timestamps
Assert.Equal(full.LastEventAt, proj.LastEventAt);
Assert.Equal(full.VerdictPath, proj.VerdictPath);
Assert.Equal(full.PriorStatus, proj.PriorStatus);
Assert.Equal(full.PriorVerdictPath, proj.PriorVerdictPath);
Assert.Equal(full.FailureReason, proj.FailureReason);
Assert.Equal(full.ReconcileReason, proj.ReconcileReason);
Assert.Equal(full.FailureSource, proj.FailureSource);
Assert.Equal(full.EspSoftFailure, proj.EspSoftFailure);
Assert.Equal(VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(full), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(proj));
// Unstamped variant exercises the derivation on the projected inputs.
var unstampedFull = FullRow(); unstampedFull.Remove("VerdictPath"); unstampedFull.Remove("AdminMarkedAction"); unstampedFull.Remove("FailureSource");
Assert.Equal(VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Sut.MapToSessionSummary(unstampedFull)),
VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Sut.MapToSessionSummary(Project(unstampedFull))));
}
[Fact]
public void Aggregation_cores_produce_identical_rows_from_the_projected_scan()
{
var now = new DateTime(2026, 8, 23, 12, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var fullList = new List<SessionSummary> { Sut.MapToSessionSummary(FullRow()) };
var projList = new List<SessionSummary> { Sut.MapToSessionSummary(Project(FullRow())) };
var histories = new Dictionary<string, List<DeviceHistory>>();
var a = MaintenanceService.BuildVerdictCalibrationAggregates(fullList, histories, now);
var b = MaintenanceService.BuildVerdictCalibrationAggregates(projList, histories, now);
Assert.Equal(System.Text.Json.JsonSerializer.Serialize(a), System.Text.Json.JsonSerializer.Serialize(b));
}
[Fact]
public void SliceSweepWindow_keeps_sessions_from_the_window_start()
{
var window = new List<SessionSummary>
{
new() { SessionId = "old", StartedAt = Started.AddDays(-40) },
new() { SessionId = "edge", StartedAt = Started },
new() { SessionId = "new", StartedAt = Started.AddDays(1) },
};
var sliced = MaintenanceService.SliceSweepWindow(window, Started);
Assert.Equal(new[] { "edge", "new" }, sliced.Select(s => s.SessionId));
}
[Fact]
public void Shared_window_covers_every_sweeps_horizon()
{
// 7d window + 28d baseline anchored on yesterday = 35 days back ≥ the 30-day rolling sweeps.
Assert.Equal(35, MaintenanceService.SweepWindowDays);
Assert.True(MaintenanceService.SweepWindowDays >= 30);
}
}
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Config;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Helpers;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.Notifications;
@@ -64,6 +65,17 @@ public class NotificationChannelsTests
Assert.Empty(slack.GetCustomHeaders());
}
[Fact]
public void GetSigningSecret_OnlyForGenericJson()
{
var secret = "0123456789abcdef";
Assert.Equal(secret, new NotificationChannel { Id = "g", ProviderType = 20, SigningSecret = secret }.GetSigningSecret());
Assert.Null(new NotificationChannel { Id = "s", ProviderType = 10, SigningSecret = secret }.GetSigningSecret());
Assert.Null(new NotificationChannel { Id = "d", ProviderType = 30, SigningSecret = secret }.GetSigningSecret());
Assert.Null(new NotificationChannel { Id = "w", ProviderType = 20, SigningSecret = " " }.GetSigningSecret());
Assert.Null(new NotificationChannel { Id = "n", ProviderType = 20 }.GetSigningSecret());
}
// ── Legacy synthesis (GetNotificationChannels) ────────────────────────
[Fact]
@@ -141,7 +153,7 @@ public class NotificationChannelsTests
var cfg = new TenantConfiguration
{
NotificationChannelsJson = "[" +
ChannelJson("ch-1", extra: ",\"customHeadersJson\":\"{\\\"X-Api-Key\\\":\\\"k\\\"}\"") + "," +
ChannelJson("ch-1", extra: ",\"customHeadersJson\":\"{\\\"X-Api-Key\\\":\\\"k\\\"}\",\"signingSecret\":\"0123456789abcdef\"") + "," +
ChannelJson("ch-2", providerType: 10, url: "https://slack.example/h") + "]",
};
@@ -151,8 +163,10 @@ public class NotificationChannelsTests
Assert.Equal("ch-1", redacted[0].Id); // structure visible
Assert.Equal(Constants.RedactedSecretPlaceholder, redacted[0].Url); // secrets masked
Assert.Equal(Constants.RedactedSecretPlaceholder, redacted[0].CustomHeadersJson);
Assert.Equal(Constants.RedactedSecretPlaceholder, redacted[0].SigningSecret);
Assert.Equal(Constants.RedactedSecretPlaceholder, redacted[1].Url);
Assert.Null(redacted[1].CustomHeadersJson); // unset stays unset
Assert.Null(redacted[1].SigningSecret);
}
[Fact]
@@ -169,7 +183,7 @@ public class NotificationChannelsTests
{
NotificationChannelsJson = "[" +
ChannelJson("ch-1", url: "https://real.example/hook",
extra: ",\"customHeadersJson\":\"{\\\"X-Api-Key\\\":\\\"real\\\"}\"") + "]",
extra: ",\"customHeadersJson\":\"{\\\"X-Api-Key\\\":\\\"real\\\"}\",\"signingSecret\":\"real-secret-0123\"") + "]",
};
// Round-trip the redacted view back onto a save (defense-in-depth path).
@@ -179,6 +193,7 @@ public class NotificationChannelsTests
var ch = Assert.Single(NotificationChannel.ParseList(incoming.NotificationChannelsJson));
Assert.Equal("https://real.example/hook", ch.Url);
Assert.Equal("{\"X-Api-Key\":\"real\"}", ch.CustomHeadersJson);
Assert.Equal("real-secret-0123", ch.SigningSecret);
}
[Fact]
@@ -244,4 +259,40 @@ public class NotificationChannelsTests
Assert.NotNull(error);
Assert.Contains("headers", error);
}
// ── Signing-secret validation ─────────────────────────────────────────
[Theory]
[InlineData(null)]
[InlineData("")]
[InlineData(" ")]
[InlineData("0123456789abcdef")] // 16 chars (minimum)
public void ValidateWebhookSigningSecret_AcceptsAbsentOrValid(string? secret)
{
Assert.Null(TenantConfigValidation.ValidateWebhookSigningSecret(secret));
// 128 chars (maximum) and a typical generated 64-char hex secret
Assert.Null(TenantConfigValidation.ValidateWebhookSigningSecret(new string('a', 128)));
Assert.Null(TenantConfigValidation.ValidateWebhookSigningSecret(new string('f', 64)));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("short-15-chars.")] // below minimum
[InlineData("has a space in the middle!")] // whitespace
[InlineData("line\nbreak-0123456789")] // control char
[InlineData("umlauts-äöü-0123456789")] // non-ASCII
[InlineData("***REDACTED***")] // unrestored sentinel (too short anyway)
public void ValidateWebhookSigningSecret_RejectsInvalid(string secret)
{
Assert.NotNull(TenantConfigValidation.ValidateWebhookSigningSecret(secret));
Assert.NotNull(TenantConfigValidation.ValidateWebhookSigningSecret(new string('a', 129)));
}
[Fact]
public void ValidateNotificationChannels_RejectsBadPerChannelSigningSecret()
{
var json = "[" + ChannelJson("ch-1", extra: ",\"signingSecret\":\"too-short\"") + "]";
var error = UpdateTenantConfigurationFunction.ValidateNotificationChannels(json);
Assert.NotNull(error);
Assert.Contains("signing secret", error);
}
}
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests.Offboarding;
/// <summary>
/// Test double for <see cref="IOffboardFarewellEmailSender"/>. Records every invocation so
/// the handler-side tests can assert "did the farewell send fire after History → Completed?"
/// without booting the real Resend client. Default = silent noop; set <see cref="ThrowOnSend"/>
/// without booting the real mail provider client. Default = silent noop; set <see cref="ThrowOnSend"/>
/// to simulate downstream failures and prove the handler's fail-soft contract.
/// </summary>
internal sealed class FakeOffboardFarewellEmailSender : IOffboardFarewellEmailSender
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ public class TenantOffboardingHandlerOrderingTests
public async Task PostDrain_FarewellEmail_Skipped_WhenNotificationEmailNull()
{
// Tenants that never set a preview-notification email get null capture; the handler
// skip-gates the send so no Resend call is even attempted.
// skip-gates the send so no provider call is even attempted.
var harness = Harness.New();
Assert.Null(harness.Repo.History[HistoryRowKey].NotificationEmail);
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ public class TenantOffboardingHandlerOrderingTests
public async Task PostDrain_FarewellEmail_Skipped_WhenNotificationEmailWhitespace()
{
// Defensive: legacy History rows may have a non-null empty/whitespace value. Treat
// these as "no email captured" so we never call Resend with a useless string.
// these as "no email captured" so we never call the mail provider with a useless string.
var harness = Harness.New();
harness.Repo.History[HistoryRowKey].NotificationEmail = " ";
@@ -248,11 +248,11 @@ public class TenantOffboardingHandlerOrderingTests
[Fact]
public async Task PostDrain_FarewellEmail_SenderThrows_HandlerSurvives_HistoryStillCompleted()
{
// The send is best-effort. A Resend outage / template bug / serializer crash must
// The send is best-effort. A mail-provider outage / template bug / serializer crash must
// NOT propagate to the queue worker — that would re-poison a Completed offboard.
var harness = Harness.New();
harness.Repo.History[HistoryRowKey].NotificationEmail = "ops@contoso.invalid";
harness.FarewellEmail.ThrowOnSend = new InvalidOperationException("simulated Resend outage");
harness.FarewellEmail.ThrowOnSend = new InvalidOperationException("simulated mail-provider outage");
await harness.Sut.HandleAsync(harness.Envelope());
@@ -112,9 +112,11 @@ public class OffboardingSessionEnumeratorTests
public Task<List<SessionSummary>> GetSessionsOlderThanAsync(string tenantId, DateTime cutoffDate, int maxResults = int.MaxValue, bool excludeInFlightDeletions = false) => throw new NotImplementedException();
public Task<List<SessionSummary>> GetSessionsByDateRangeAsync(DateTime startDate, DateTime endDate, string? tenantId = null) => throw new NotImplementedException();
public Task<List<SessionSummary>> GetUsageWindowSessionsAsync(DateTime startDate, DateTime endDate, string? tenantId = null) => throw new NotImplementedException();
public Task<List<SessionSummary>> GetMaintenanceWindowSessionsAsync(DateTime startDate, DateTime endDate) => throw new NotImplementedException();
public Task<List<SessionSummary>> GetGeoWindowSessionsAsync(DateTime startDate, DateTime endDate, string? tenantId = null) => throw new NotImplementedException();
public Task<List<SessionSummary>> GetStalledSessionsAsync(string tenantId, DateTime cutoffTime) => throw new NotImplementedException();
public Task<List<SessionSummary>> GetLegacyTimeoutFailedSessionsAsync(string tenantId, int maxResults) => throw new NotImplementedException();
public Task<List<SessionSummary>> GetSelfDeployingSilentSessionsAsync(string tenantId, int maxResults) => throw new NotImplementedException();
public Task<List<SessionSummary>> GetSessionsLeanAsync(string tenantId) => throw new NotImplementedException();
public Task<List<SessionSummary>> GetAgentSilentSessionsAsync(string tenantId, DateTime silenceCutoff, DateTime hardCutoff) => throw new NotImplementedException();
public Task<List<string>> GetAllTenantIdsAsync() => throw new NotImplementedException();
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Config;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Tests for <see cref="PlanManagementFunction.ApplyPlanChanges"/> — the pure mutation core
/// of the PATCH plan endpoint. Pins the retention-grace anchor lifecycle: an EFFECTIVE
/// Pro→Community transition stamps <see cref="TenantConfiguration.ProDowngradedUtc"/>, any
/// effectively-Pro outcome clears it, and a planTier downgrade under an active trial does
/// NOT stamp (the edition is still Pro — the later trial expiry is the anchor then).
/// </summary>
public class PlanManagementTransitionTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Now = new(2026, 8, 22, 12, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private const string Caller = "ga@operator.example";
private static (TenantEdition Before, TenantEdition After, Dictionary<string, string> Changes) Apply(
TenantConfiguration config, string? planTier = null, bool trialProvided = false, DateTime? trialExpiresUtc = null)
{
var changes = new Dictionary<string, string>();
var (before, after) = PlanManagementFunction.ApplyPlanChanges(
config, planTier, trialProvided, trialExpiresUtc, Caller, Now, changes);
return (before, after, changes);
}
[Fact]
public void Downgrade_ProToCommunity_StampsAnchorAndRecordsChange()
{
var config = new TenantConfiguration { TenantId = "t1", PlanTier = "pro" };
var (before, after, changes) = Apply(config, planTier: "community");
Assert.Equal(TenantEdition.Pro, before);
Assert.Equal(TenantEdition.Community, after);
Assert.Equal(Now, config.ProDowngradedUtc);
Assert.True(changes.ContainsKey("ProDowngradedUtc"));
Assert.True(changes.ContainsKey("PlanTier"));
}
[Fact]
public void Upgrade_CommunityToPro_ClearsAnchor()
{
var config = new TenantConfiguration
{
TenantId = "t1",
PlanTier = "community",
ProDowngradedUtc = Now.AddDays(-10)
};
var (_, after, changes) = Apply(config, planTier: "pro");
Assert.Equal(TenantEdition.Pro, after);
Assert.Null(config.ProDowngradedUtc);
Assert.True(changes.ContainsKey("ProDowngradedUtc"));
}
[Fact]
public void Downgrade_WithActiveTrial_DoesNotStamp_EditionStaysPro()
{
// planTier drops but the trial keeps the EFFECTIVE edition Pro: no anchor now —
// the trial's own expiry timestamp anchors the grace later, read-time.
var config = new TenantConfiguration
{
TenantId = "t1",
PlanTier = "pro",
TrialExpiresUtc = Now.AddDays(5)
};
var (before, after, changes) = Apply(config, planTier: "community");
Assert.Equal(TenantEdition.Pro, before);
Assert.Equal(TenantEdition.Pro, after);
Assert.Null(config.ProDowngradedUtc);
Assert.False(changes.ContainsKey("ProDowngradedUtc"));
}
[Fact]
public void EndingTrialExplicitly_StampsAnchor()
{
// GA sets trialExpiresUtc: null on a trial-Pro tenant — TrialExpiresUtc is gone, so
// WITHOUT the explicit stamp the grace would have no anchor at all.
var config = new TenantConfiguration
{
TenantId = "t1",
PlanTier = "free",
TrialExpiresUtc = Now.AddDays(5)
};
var (before, after, _) = Apply(config, trialProvided: true, trialExpiresUtc: null);
Assert.Equal(TenantEdition.Pro, before);
Assert.Equal(TenantEdition.Community, after);
Assert.Equal(Now, config.ProDowngradedUtc);
Assert.Null(config.TrialExpiresUtc);
}
[Fact]
public void GrantingTrial_ToDowngradedTenant_ClearsAnchor()
{
var config = new TenantConfiguration
{
TenantId = "t1",
PlanTier = "community",
ProDowngradedUtc = Now.AddDays(-10)
};
var (_, after, _) = Apply(config, trialProvided: true, trialExpiresUtc: Now.AddDays(30));
Assert.Equal(TenantEdition.Pro, after);
Assert.Null(config.ProDowngradedUtc);
Assert.Equal(Caller, config.TrialGrantedBy);
}
[Fact]
public void NoOpPatch_SameTier_RecordsNothing()
{
var config = new TenantConfiguration { TenantId = "t1", PlanTier = "community" };
var (before, after, changes) = Apply(config, planTier: "community");
Assert.Equal(TenantEdition.Community, before);
Assert.Equal(TenantEdition.Community, after);
Assert.Empty(changes);
Assert.Null(config.ProDowngradedUtc);
}
[Fact]
public void RepeatedDowngradeAfterReUpgrade_RestampsWithNewTimestamp()
{
var config = new TenantConfiguration { TenantId = "t1", PlanTier = "pro" };
Apply(config, planTier: "community");
Assert.Equal(Now, config.ProDowngradedUtc);
Apply(config, planTier: "pro");
Assert.Null(config.ProDowngradedUtc);
var changes = new Dictionary<string, string>();
var later = Now.AddDays(40);
PlanManagementFunction.ApplyPlanChanges(config, "community", false, null, Caller, later, changes);
Assert.Equal(later, config.ProDowngradedUtc);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
using System.Collections.Concurrent;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Both sliding-window limiters keep the request history and its lock in one cache entry.
/// Previously the entry was re-Set without its eviction callback, which (a) leaked per-key lock
/// objects and (b) let two threads mutate the same List under different locks. These tests hammer
/// one key from many threads: the count of allowed requests must be exactly the limit and nothing
/// may throw (a List mutated concurrently throws InvalidOperationException or corrupts Count).
/// </summary>
public class RateLimitServiceConcurrencyTests
{
private const int Threads = 16;
private const int RequestsPerThread = 500;
[Fact]
public void CheckRateLimit_ManyThreadsSameKey_AllowsExactlyTheLimit()
{
var sut = new RateLimitService(new MemoryCache(new MemoryCacheOptions()), NullLogger<RateLimitService>.Instance);
const int limit = 1000;
var allowed = 0;
var errors = new ConcurrentBag<Exception>();
RunInParallel(() =>
{
try
{
if (sut.CheckRateLimit("thumb-shared", limit).IsAllowed)
Interlocked.Increment(ref allowed);
}
catch (Exception ex) { errors.Add(ex); }
});
Assert.Empty(errors);
Assert.Equal(limit, allowed);
Assert.False(sut.CheckRateLimit("thumb-shared", limit).IsAllowed);
}
[Fact]
public void DistressCheck_ManyThreadsSameIp_AllowsExactlyTheIpLimit()
{
var sut = new DistressRateLimitService(new MemoryCache(new MemoryCacheOptions()), NullLogger<DistressRateLimitService>.Instance);
var allowed = 0;
var errors = new ConcurrentBag<Exception>();
RunInParallel(() =>
{
try
{
if (sut.Check("10.0.0.9", "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890").IsAllowed)
Interlocked.Increment(ref allowed);
}
catch (Exception ex) { errors.Add(ex); }
});
Assert.Empty(errors);
Assert.Equal(5, allowed); // MaxPerIp
}
private static void RunInParallel(Action body)
{
using var gate = new ManualResetEventSlim(false);
var tasks = Enumerable.Range(0, Threads).Select(_ => Task.Run(() =>
{
gate.Wait();
for (var i = 0; i < RequestsPerThread; i++) body();
})).ToArray();
gate.Set();
Task.WaitAll(tasks);
}
}
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Coverage for the post-offboarding farewell-email send path. The actual Resend HTTP
/// call is not exercised here — every test drives one of the no-op gates. Pins:
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item><see cref="ResendEmailService.SendAsync"/> never throws — not when the API key
/// is empty and not when the recipient is missing. The handler's fail-soft
/// try/catch is a belt; this is the suspenders.</item>
/// <item>Gate ordering: missing-key short-circuits before missing-recipient.</item>
/// <item>The farewell template is final: no [DRAFT]/placeholder residue, domain is
/// interpolated, empty domain falls back to "your organization".</item>
/// </list>
/// </summary>
public sealed class ResendEmailServiceTests
{
[Fact]
public async Task SendAsync_EmptyApiKey_NoOps_AndLogsMissingKeyDebugLine()
{
var logger = new CapturingLogger<ResendEmailService>();
var sut = Build(apiKey: "", logger);
await sut.SendAsync(
toEmail: "ops@contoso.invalid",
domainName: "contoso.invalid",
tenantId: "88888888-8888-8888-8888-888888888888",
ct: CancellationToken.None);
Assert.Contains(logger.Entries,
e => e.Level == LogLevel.Debug && e.Message.Contains("RESEND_API_KEY not configured"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task SendAsync_EmptyRecipient_NoOps_AndLogsMissingEmailDebugLine()
{
var logger = new CapturingLogger<ResendEmailService>();
var sut = Build(apiKey: "any-non-empty-key", logger);
await sut.SendAsync(
toEmail: "",
domainName: "contoso.invalid",
tenantId: "88888888-8888-8888-8888-888888888888");
Assert.Contains(logger.Entries,
e => e.Level == LogLevel.Debug && e.Message.Contains("No notification email captured"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task SendAsync_EmptyApiKey_ShortCircuitsBeforeRecipientCheck()
{
// Pins the gate ordering: missing-key > missing-email. Both are empty here; only
// the key line must show up.
var logger = new CapturingLogger<ResendEmailService>();
var sut = Build(apiKey: "", logger);
await sut.SendAsync(
toEmail: "",
domainName: "contoso.invalid",
tenantId: "88888888-8888-8888-8888-888888888888");
Assert.Contains(logger.Entries,
e => e.Level == LogLevel.Debug && e.Message.Contains("RESEND_API_KEY not configured"));
Assert.DoesNotContain(logger.Entries,
e => e.Message.Contains("No notification email captured"));
}
[Fact]
public void FarewellTemplate_IsFinal_NoDraftResidue()
{
Assert.DoesNotContain("DRAFT", EmailTemplates.OffboardingFarewellSubject);
var html = EmailTemplates.GetOffboardingFarewellHtml("contoso.invalid");
Assert.DoesNotContain("DRAFT", html);
Assert.DoesNotContain("TEMPLATE NOT FINALISED", html);
Assert.DoesNotContain("TODO", html);
}
[Fact]
public void FarewellTemplate_InterpolatesDomain_AndLinksFeedbackChannels()
{
var html = EmailTemplates.GetOffboardingFarewellHtml("contoso.invalid");
Assert.Contains("contoso.invalid", html);
// The mail is sent from a noreply address after portal access is gone, so the
// feedback pointers must be external channels the recipient can actually reach.
Assert.Contains("https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/issues", html);
Assert.Contains("linkedin.com", html);
}
[Fact]
public void FarewellTemplate_EmptyDomain_FallsBackToGenericLabel()
{
var html = EmailTemplates.GetOffboardingFarewellHtml("");
Assert.Contains("your organization", html);
}
private static ResendEmailService Build(string apiKey, ILogger<ResendEmailService> logger)
{
var config = new ConfigurationBuilder()
.AddInMemoryCollection(new Dictionary<string, string?>
{
["RESEND_API_KEY"] = apiKey,
})
.Build();
return new ResendEmailService(config, logger);
}
private sealed class CapturingLogger<T> : ILogger<T>
{
public readonly List<(LogLevel Level, string Message)> Entries = new();
public IDisposable BeginScope<TState>(TState state) where TState : notnull => NullScope.Instance;
public bool IsEnabled(LogLevel logLevel) => true;
public void Log<TState>(
LogLevel logLevel, EventId eventId, TState state, System.Exception? exception,
System.Func<TState, System.Exception?, string> formatter)
{
Entries.Add((logLevel, formatter(state, exception)));
}
private sealed class NullScope : IDisposable
{
public static readonly NullScope Instance = new();
public void Dispose() { }
}
}
}
@@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ public class SessionIndexFieldManifestTests
["ValidatedBy"] = "AutopilotV1",
["FailureSnapshotJson"] = "{\"x\":1}",
["AdminMarkedAction"] = "failed",
["VerdictPath"] = "sweep:r5_incomplete",
["PriorStatus"] = "Incomplete",
["PriorVerdictPath"] = "maxlife:r6",
["DurationSeconds"] = 360,
["DiagnosticsBlobName"] = "diag-0001.zip",
["DiagnosticsBlobDestination"] = "Hosted",
@@ -331,8 +331,9 @@ public class SessionRetentionFanoutServiceTests
var baseTime = new DateTime(2026, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var deadline = baseTime.AddMinutes(50);
var clockCalls = 0;
// Call sequence: tenant-A boundary (1), session s0 (2), session s1 (3), session s2 (4 → past deadline).
var harness = new Harness(utcNow: () => ++clockCalls >= 4 ? deadline.AddMinutes(1) : baseTime);
// Call sequence: tenant-A boundary (1), retention resolution (2), session s0 (3),
// session s1 (4), session s2 (5 → past deadline).
var harness = new Harness(utcNow: () => ++clockCalls >= 5 ? deadline.AddMinutes(1) : baseTime);
var sessions = new List<SessionSummary>();
for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++) sessions.Add(Summary(TenantA, $"s{i}"));
@@ -388,6 +389,38 @@ public class SessionRetentionFanoutServiceTests
};
}
// =========================================== Retention downgrade grace ====
[Fact]
public async Task Tenant_InRetentionGrace_KeepsProCutoff()
{
// Downgraded 10 days ago, stored retention 365: the grace keeps the Pro cap, so the
// cutoff must be now-365d — NOT now-90d (which would enqueue the 90–365d band).
var now = new DateTime(2026, 8, 22, 12, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var harness = new Harness(utcNow: () => now);
harness.WithTenant("t1", retentionDays: 365, sessions: Array.Empty<SessionSummary>(),
planTier: "community", proDowngradedUtc: now.AddDays(-10));
await harness.RunAsync();
harness.MaintenanceRepo.Verify(m => m.GetSessionsOlderThanAsync(
"t1", now.AddDays(-365), It.IsAny<int>(), It.IsAny<bool>()), Times.Once);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Tenant_AfterRetentionGrace_CommunityCutoffApplies()
{
var now = new DateTime(2026, 8, 22, 12, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var harness = new Harness(utcNow: () => now);
harness.WithTenant("t1", retentionDays: 365, sessions: Array.Empty<SessionSummary>(),
planTier: "community", proDowngradedUtc: now.AddDays(-31));
await harness.RunAsync();
harness.MaintenanceRepo.Verify(m => m.GetSessionsOlderThanAsync(
"t1", now.AddDays(-90), It.IsAny<int>(), It.IsAny<bool>()), Times.Once);
}
// ============================================================ Harness ====
private sealed class Harness
@@ -450,11 +483,18 @@ public class SessionRetentionFanoutServiceTests
return result;
}
public void WithTenant(string tenantId, int retentionDays, SessionSummary[] sessions, string planTier = "free")
public void WithTenant(string tenantId, int retentionDays, SessionSummary[] sessions, string planTier = "free",
DateTime? proDowngradedUtc = null)
{
_tenantIds.Add(tenantId);
TenantConfig.Setup(t => t.GetConfigurationAsync(tenantId))
.ReturnsAsync(new TenantConfiguration { TenantId = tenantId, DataRetentionDays = retentionDays, PlanTier = planTier });
.ReturnsAsync(new TenantConfiguration
{
TenantId = tenantId,
DataRetentionDays = retentionDays,
PlanTier = planTier,
ProDowngradedUtc = proDowngradedUtc,
});
MaintenanceRepo.Setup(m => m.GetSessionsOlderThanAsync(tenantId, It.IsAny<DateTime>(), It.IsAny<int>(), It.IsAny<bool>()))
.ReturnsAsync(new List<SessionSummary>(WithTenantId(tenantId, sessions)));
}
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ public class SessionStartedAtBackwardShiftGuardTests
var harness = new Harness(SessionRow(), earliestStoredEvent: poisoned);
var ok = await harness.Sut.UpdateSessionStatusAsync(
TenantId, SessionId, SessionStatus.Pending,
TenantId, SessionId, SessionStatus.Pending, VerdictPaths.AgentWhiteGlovePending,
earliestEventTimestamp: poisoned, latestEventTimestamp: lastEvent);
Assert.True(ok);
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ public class SessionStartedAtBackwardShiftGuardTests
var harness = new Harness(SessionRow(), earliestStoredEvent: earliest);
var ok = await harness.Sut.UpdateSessionStatusAsync(
TenantId, SessionId, SessionStatus.Pending,
TenantId, SessionId, SessionStatus.Pending, VerdictPaths.AgentWhiteGlovePending,
latestEventTimestamp: lastEvent);
Assert.True(ok);
@@ -101,6 +101,52 @@ public class SessionStartedAtBackwardShiftGuardTests
Assert.Equal((int)(lastEvent - earliest).TotalSeconds, harness.Written!.GetInt32("DurationSeconds"));
}
// =========================== system-timeline rows are not session anchors ====
[Fact]
public void IsSessionAnchorEligible_excludes_system_timeline_watcher_rows()
{
Assert.False(TableStorageService.IsSessionAnchorEligible(
new TableEntity("p", "r") { ["Source"] = "SystemTimelineWatcher" }));
Assert.True(TableStorageService.IsSessionAnchorEligible(
new TableEntity("p", "r") { ["Source"] = "ImeLogTracker" }));
Assert.True(TableStorageService.IsSessionAnchorEligible(
new TableEntity("p", "r"))); // legacy row without Source projection
}
[Fact]
public async Task Pending_duration_skips_backfilled_system_timeline_row_and_anchors_on_activity()
{
// Field case d0c5b672: a pre-agent system_clock_changed event (backfilled from the
// Windows event log, original timestamp ~14min before the first real activity) was
// the partition's earliest row and re-anchored StartedAt. The probe must skip
// SystemTimelineWatcher rows and anchor on the first activity event instead —
// even when the watcher row sits well inside the 2h plausibility window.
var clockEventAt = StartedAt.AddMinutes(-90);
var firstActivity = StartedAt.AddMinutes(-5);
var lastEvent = StartedAt.AddMinutes(70);
var harness = new Harness(SessionRow(), eventRows: new[]
{
EventRow(clockEventAt, sequence: 18, source: "SystemTimelineWatcher"),
EventRow(firstActivity, sequence: 2, source: "ImeLogTracker"),
});
var ok = await harness.Sut.UpdateSessionStatusAsync(
TenantId, SessionId, SessionStatus.Pending, VerdictPaths.AgentWhiteGlovePending,
latestEventTimestamp: lastEvent);
Assert.True(ok);
Assert.NotNull(harness.Written);
Assert.Equal((int)(lastEvent - firstActivity).TotalSeconds, harness.Written!.GetInt32("DurationSeconds"));
}
private static TableEntity EventRow(DateTime occurredUtc, int sequence, string source) =>
new($"{TenantId}_{SessionId}", $"{occurredUtc:yyyyMMddHHmmssfff}_{sequence:D10}")
{
["OccurredUtc"] = new DateTimeOffset(occurredUtc),
["Source"] = source,
};
// ============================================================ Harness ====
private static TableEntity SessionRow()
@@ -126,7 +172,7 @@ public class SessionStartedAtBackwardShiftGuardTests
public TableStorageService Sut { get; }
public TableEntity? Written { get; private set; }
public Harness(TableEntity existing, DateTime? earliestStoredEvent = null)
public Harness(TableEntity existing, DateTime? earliestStoredEvent = null, TableEntity[]? eventRows = null)
{
var sessions = new Mock<TableClient>();
@@ -150,7 +196,7 @@ public class SessionStartedAtBackwardShiftGuardTests
});
var events = new Mock<TableClient>();
var eventRows = earliestStoredEvent.HasValue
var servedRows = eventRows ?? (earliestStoredEvent.HasValue
? new[]
{
new TableEntity($"{TenantId}_{SessionId}", $"{earliestStoredEvent.Value:yyyyMMddHHmmssfff}_0000000001")
@@ -158,12 +204,12 @@ public class SessionStartedAtBackwardShiftGuardTests
["OccurredUtc"] = new DateTimeOffset(earliestStoredEvent.Value),
},
}
: Array.Empty<TableEntity>();
: Array.Empty<TableEntity>());
events.Setup(t => t.QueryAsync<TableEntity>(
It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<int?>(), It.IsAny<IEnumerable<string>>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.Returns(AsyncPageable<TableEntity>.FromPages(new[]
{
Page<TableEntity>.FromValues(eventRows, null, new Mock<Response>().Object),
Page<TableEntity>.FromValues(servedRows, null, new Mock<Response>().Object),
}));
var serviceClient = new Mock<TableServiceClient>();
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using Azure;
using Azure.Data.Tables;
using Azure.Data.Tables.Models;
using Microsoft.ApplicationInsights;
using Microsoft.ApplicationInsights.Channel;
using Microsoft.ApplicationInsights.DataContracts;
using Microsoft.ApplicationInsights.Extensibility;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Moq;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests
{
public class StartupTelemetryServiceTests
{
private sealed class CapturingChannel : ITelemetryChannel
{
public List<ITelemetry> Items { get; } = new();
public bool? DeveloperMode { get; set; }
public string EndpointAddress { get; set; } = "";
public void Send(ITelemetry item) => Items.Add(item);
public void Flush() { }
public void Dispose() { }
}
private sealed class Lifetime : IHostApplicationLifetime
{
private readonly CancellationTokenSource _started = new();
public CancellationToken ApplicationStarted => _started.Token;
public CancellationToken ApplicationStopping => CancellationToken.None;
public CancellationToken ApplicationStopped => CancellationToken.None;
public void StopApplication() { }
public void FireStarted() => _started.Cancel();
}
[Fact]
public async Task ApplicationStarted_EmitsStartupAndTableInitMetrics()
{
var channel = new CapturingChannel();
var telemetry = new TelemetryClient(new TelemetryConfiguration { TelemetryChannel = channel, ConnectionString = "InstrumentationKey=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000" });
// Table storage: unreadable sentinel → full pass → FullPassRan = true.
var service = new Mock<TableServiceClient>();
var admin = new Mock<TableClient>();
service.Setup(s => s.GetTableClient(It.IsAny<string>())).Returns(admin.Object);
admin.Setup(c => c.GetEntityIfExistsAsync<TableEntity>(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<IEnumerable<string>>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.ThrowsAsync(new RequestFailedException(404, "TableNotFound"));
admin.Setup(c => c.UpsertEntityAsync(It.IsAny<TableEntity>(), It.IsAny<TableUpdateMode>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.ReturnsAsync(Mock.Of<Response>());
service.Setup(s => s.CreateTableIfNotExistsAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.ReturnsAsync(Response.FromValue(new TableItem("x"), Mock.Of<Response>()));
var storage = new TableStorageService(service.Object, NullLogger<TableStorageService>.Instance);
await storage.InitializeTablesAsync();
var lifetime = new Lifetime();
var sut = new StartupTelemetryService(lifetime, telemetry, storage, new BackendBuildInfo(), NullLogger<StartupTelemetryService>.Instance);
await sut.StartAsync(CancellationToken.None);
Assert.Empty(channel.Items);
lifetime.FireStarted();
var metrics = channel.Items.ConvertAll(i => (MetricTelemetry)i);
Assert.Equal(2, metrics.Count);
var startup = metrics.Find(m => m.Name == StartupTelemetryService.StartupMetricName)!;
var tableInit = metrics.Find(m => m.Name == StartupTelemetryService.TableInitMetricName)!;
Assert.True(startup.Sum > 0);
Assert.True(tableInit.Sum >= 0);
Assert.Equal("True", startup.Properties["tableInitFullPass"]);
Assert.False(string.IsNullOrEmpty(startup.Properties["version"]));
Assert.True(startup.Sum >= tableInit.Sum);
}
}
}
@@ -48,11 +48,74 @@ public class StorageDependencyFilterProcessorTests
Assert.Empty(next.Received);
}
[Fact]
public void FailedStorageDependency_IsKept()
[Theory]
[InlineData("429")]
[InlineData("500")]
[InlineData("503")]
[InlineData("403")]
[InlineData("")] // unknown outcome (timeout/network) — keep
public void FailedStorageDependency_IsKept(string resultCode)
{
var (processor, next) = Build();
var dep = Dep("myacct.queue.core.windows.net", success: false);
dep.ResultCode = resultCode;
processor.Process(dep);
Assert.Same(dep, Assert.Single(next.Received));
}
// Expected outcomes (point-read miss, ETag precondition, insert conflict) are normal control
// flow — live-verified as 100% of the remaining "failed" storage rows. Dropped.
[Theory]
[InlineData("404")]
[InlineData("412")]
[InlineData("409")]
public void ExpectedStorageOutcome_HttpShape_IsDropped(string resultCode)
{
var (processor, next) = Build();
var dep = Dep("myacct.table.core.windows.net", success: false);
dep.ResultCode = resultCode;
processor.Process(dep);
Assert.Empty(next.Received);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("Azure.RequestFailedException: The specified resource does not exist.\nRequestId:x\nStatus: 404 (Not Found)\nErrorCode: ResourceNotFound")]
[InlineData("Azure.RequestFailedException: The update condition specified in the request was not satisfied.\nStatus: 412 (Precondition Failed)\nErrorCode: UpdateConditionNotSatisfied")]
[InlineData("Azure.RequestFailedException: The specified entity already exists.\nStatus: 409 (Conflict)\nErrorCode: EntityAlreadyExists")]
public void ExpectedStorageOutcome_InProcShape_IsDropped(string error)
{
// InProc spans have no ResultCode — only the exception text in Properties["Error"].
var (processor, next) = Build();
var dep = Dep(target: "TableClient.GetEntity", success: false, type: "InProc | Microsoft.Tables");
dep.Properties["Error"] = error;
processor.Process(dep);
Assert.Empty(next.Received);
}
[Fact]
public void ThrottledInProcStorageDependency_IsKept()
{
var (processor, next) = Build();
var dep = Dep(target: "TableClient.SubmitTransaction", success: false, type: "InProc | Microsoft.Tables");
dep.Properties["Error"] = "Azure.RequestFailedException: Too many requests.\nStatus: 429 (Too Many Requests)\nErrorCode: ServerBusy";
processor.Process(dep);
Assert.Same(dep, Assert.Single(next.Received));
}
[Fact]
public void SuccessfulSignalRRestCall_IsDropped()
{
var (processor, next) = Build();
processor.Process(Dep("autopilotmonitor-eu.service.signalr.net", success: true, data: "POST /api/hubs/autopilotmonitor/groups/t-x/connections/y", type: "HTTP"));
Assert.Empty(next.Received);
}
[Fact]
public void FailedSignalRRestCall_IsKept()
{
var (processor, next) = Build();
var dep = Dep("autopilotmonitor-eu.service.signalr.net", success: false, type: "HTTP");
dep.ResultCode = "500";
processor.Process(dep);
Assert.Same(dep, Assert.Single(next.Received));
}
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
using System;
using System.Linq;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using Azure;
using Azure.Data.Tables;
using Azure.Data.Tables.Models;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Moq;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests
{
/// <summary>
/// Startup table initialization is gated by a schema sentinel (hash over TableNames.All)
/// stored in AdminConfiguration: a matching sentinel means zero CreateTableIfNotExists
/// calls on a cold start; anything else runs the full idempotent pass and rewrites it.
/// </summary>
public class TableSchemaSentinelTests
{
private sealed class Harness
{
public Mock<TableServiceClient> Service { get; } = new();
public Mock<TableClient> AdminConfig { get; } = new();
public TableEntity? UpsertedSentinel { get; private set; }
public int CreateCalls;
public Harness()
{
Service.Setup(s => s.GetTableClient(Constants.TableNames.AdminConfiguration)).Returns(AdminConfig.Object);
Service.Setup(s => s.CreateTableIfNotExistsAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.Returns<string, CancellationToken>((_, _) =>
{
Interlocked.Increment(ref CreateCalls);
return Task.FromResult(Response.FromValue(new TableItem("x"), Mock.Of<Response>()));
});
AdminConfig.Setup(c => c.UpsertEntityAsync(It.IsAny<TableEntity>(), It.IsAny<TableUpdateMode>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.Callback<ITableEntity, TableUpdateMode, CancellationToken>((e, _, _) => UpsertedSentinel = (TableEntity)e)
.ReturnsAsync(Mock.Of<Response>());
}
public void SentinelReturns(string? hash)
{
var response = new Mock<NullableResponse<TableEntity>>();
response.SetupGet(r => r.HasValue).Returns(hash != null);
if (hash != null)
{
response.SetupGet(r => r.Value).Returns(new TableEntity(
TableStorageService.SchemaSentinelPartitionKey, TableStorageService.SchemaSentinelRowKey)
{
[TableStorageService.SchemaSentinelHashProperty] = hash
});
}
AdminConfig.Setup(c => c.GetEntityIfExistsAsync<TableEntity>(
TableStorageService.SchemaSentinelPartitionKey, TableStorageService.SchemaSentinelRowKey,
It.IsAny<System.Collections.Generic.IEnumerable<string>>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.ReturnsAsync(response.Object);
}
public void SentinelThrows()
{
AdminConfig.Setup(c => c.GetEntityIfExistsAsync<TableEntity>(
It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(),
It.IsAny<System.Collections.Generic.IEnumerable<string>>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.ThrowsAsync(new RequestFailedException(404, "TableNotFound"));
}
public TableStorageService Build() => new(Service.Object, NullLogger<TableStorageService>.Instance);
}
private static string CurrentHash => TableStorageService.ComputeTableSchemaHash(Constants.TableNames.All);
[Fact]
public void Hash_IsOrderIndependent_AndChangesWhenTableAdded()
{
var a = TableStorageService.ComputeTableSchemaHash(new[] { "B", "A" });
var b = TableStorageService.ComputeTableSchemaHash(new[] { "A", "B" });
var c = TableStorageService.ComputeTableSchemaHash(new[] { "A", "B", "C" });
Assert.Equal(a, b);
Assert.NotEqual(a, c);
Assert.Equal(64, a.Length);
}
[Fact]
public async Task MatchingSentinel_SkipsTableCreation()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.SentinelReturns(CurrentHash);
var fullPass = await h.Build().InitializeTablesAsync();
Assert.False(fullPass);
Assert.Equal(0, h.CreateCalls);
Assert.Null(h.UpsertedSentinel);
}
[Fact]
public async Task StaleSentinel_RunsFullPass_AndRewritesSentinel()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.SentinelReturns("STALE");
var fullPass = await h.Build().InitializeTablesAsync();
Assert.True(fullPass);
Assert.Equal(Constants.TableNames.All.Length, h.CreateCalls);
Assert.NotNull(h.UpsertedSentinel);
Assert.Equal(CurrentHash, h.UpsertedSentinel!.GetString(TableStorageService.SchemaSentinelHashProperty));
}
[Fact]
public async Task MissingSentinel_RunsFullPass()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.SentinelReturns(null);
Assert.True(await h.Build().InitializeTablesAsync());
Assert.Equal(Constants.TableNames.All.Length, h.CreateCalls);
}
[Fact]
public async Task UnreadableSentinel_FreshStorage_RunsFullPass()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.SentinelThrows();
Assert.True(await h.Build().InitializeTablesAsync());
Assert.Equal(Constants.TableNames.All.Length, h.CreateCalls);
Assert.NotNull(h.UpsertedSentinel);
}
[Fact]
public async Task FailedTableCreate_DoesNotWriteSentinel_AndRetriesNextCall()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.SentinelReturns(null);
var failing = Constants.TableNames.All.First();
h.Service.Setup(s => s.CreateTableIfNotExistsAsync(failing, It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.ThrowsAsync(new RequestFailedException(500, "boom"));
var svc = h.Build();
Assert.True(await svc.InitializeTablesAsync());
Assert.Null(h.UpsertedSentinel);
// Not marked initialized → a second call runs the pass again instead of short-circuiting.
var before = h.CreateCalls;
Assert.True(await svc.InitializeTablesAsync());
Assert.True(h.CreateCalls > before);
}
[Fact]
public async Task SecondCallAfterSuccess_IsNoOp()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.SentinelReturns(null);
var svc = h.Build();
await svc.InitializeTablesAsync();
var calls = h.CreateCalls;
Assert.False(await svc.InitializeTablesAsync());
Assert.Equal(calls, h.CreateCalls);
}
[Fact]
public async Task BackfillClaim_WinnerTrue_LoserFalse()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.AdminConfig.SetupSequence(c => c.AddEntityAsync(It.IsAny<TableEntity>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.ReturnsAsync(Mock.Of<Response>())
.ThrowsAsync(new RequestFailedException(409, "EntityAlreadyExists"));
var svc = h.Build();
Assert.True(await svc.TryClaimSessionIndexBackfillAsync());
Assert.False(await svc.TryClaimSessionIndexBackfillAsync());
}
}
}
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ public class TenantApprovalServiceTests
private readonly Mock<PreviewWhitelistService> _previewMock;
private readonly Mock<TenantConfigurationService> _tenantConfigMock;
private readonly Mock<ResendEmailService> _resendMock;
private readonly Mock<IEmailService> _emailMock;
private readonly TenantApprovalService _sut;
public TenantApprovalServiceTests()
@@ -37,9 +37,10 @@ public class TenantApprovalServiceTests
configRepo, cache, NullLogger<PreviewWhitelistService>.Instance, _tenantConfigMock.Object)
{ CallBase = false };
_resendMock = new Mock<ResendEmailService>(
Mock.Of<Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.IConfiguration>(),
NullLogger<ResendEmailService>.Instance);
_emailMock = new Mock<IEmailService>();
_emailMock.Setup(x => x.SendPreviewApprovedEmailAsync(
It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()))
.Returns(Task.CompletedTask);
_sut = new TenantApprovalService(
NullLogger<TenantApprovalService>.Instance,
@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ public class TenantApprovalServiceTests
_tenantConfigMock.Object,
new Mock<TenantAdminsService>(
Mock.Of<IAdminRepository>(), cache, NullLogger<TenantAdminsService>.Instance).Object,
_resendMock.Object);
_emailMock.Object);
}
[Fact]
@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ public class TenantApprovalServiceTests
Assert.False(sent);
_previewMock.Verify(x => x.TryMarkWelcomeEmailSentAsync(It.IsAny<string>()), Times.Never);
_resendMock.Verify(x => x.SendPreviewApprovedEmailAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>()), Times.Never);
_emailMock.Verify(x => x.SendPreviewApprovedEmailAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()), Times.Never);
}
[Fact]
@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ public class TenantApprovalServiceTests
var sent = await _sut.TrySendWelcomeEmailAsync(TenantId);
Assert.True(sent);
_resendMock.Verify(x => x.SendPreviewApprovedEmailAsync("it@contoso.com", "contoso.com"), Times.Once);
_emailMock.Verify(x => x.SendPreviewApprovedEmailAsync("it@contoso.com", "contoso.com", It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()), Times.Once);
}
[Fact]
@@ -121,7 +122,7 @@ public class TenantApprovalServiceTests
var sent = await _sut.TrySendWelcomeEmailAsync(TenantId);
Assert.False(sent);
_resendMock.Verify(x => x.SendPreviewApprovedEmailAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>()), Times.Never);
_emailMock.Verify(x => x.SendPreviewApprovedEmailAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()), Times.Never);
}
[Fact]
@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ public class TenantApprovalServiceTests
var sent = await _sut.TrySendWelcomeEmailAsync(TenantId);
Assert.False(sent);
_resendMock.Verify(x => x.SendPreviewApprovedEmailAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>()), Times.Never);
_emailMock.Verify(x => x.SendPreviewApprovedEmailAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()), Times.Never);
}
[Fact]
@@ -151,6 +152,6 @@ public class TenantApprovalServiceTests
var newlyApproved = await _sut.ApproveWithSideEffectsAsync(TenantId, ApprovedBy);
Assert.True(newlyApproved);
_resendMock.Verify(x => x.SendPreviewApprovedEmailAsync("it@contoso.com", It.IsAny<string>()), Times.Once);
_emailMock.Verify(x => x.SendPreviewApprovedEmailAsync("it@contoso.com", It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<CancellationToken>()), Times.Once);
}
}
@@ -50,9 +50,7 @@ public class TenantAutoApproveHandlerTests
_tenantConfigMock.Object,
new Mock<TenantAdminsService>(
Mock.Of<IAdminRepository>(), cache, NullLogger<TenantAdminsService>.Instance).Object,
new Mock<ResendEmailService>(
Mock.Of<Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.IConfiguration>(),
NullLogger<ResendEmailService>.Instance).Object)
Mock.Of<IEmailService>())
{ CallBase = false };
var opsRepo = new Mock<IOpsEventRepository>();
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ public class TenantConfigTableSerializationTests
{
var expires = new DateTime(2026, 8, 6, 10, 30, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var started = new DateTime(2026, 7, 7, 10, 30, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var downgraded = new DateTime(2026, 8, 10, 8, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var config = new TenantConfiguration
{
TenantId = TenantId,
@@ -29,7 +30,8 @@ public class TenantConfigTableSerializationTests
TrialExpiresUtc = expires,
TrialStartedUtc = started,
TrialConsumed = true,
TrialGrantedBy = "alice@contoso.com"
TrialGrantedBy = "alice@contoso.com",
ProDowngradedUtc = downgraded
};
var entity = TableConfigRepository.ConvertToTenantTableEntity(config);
@@ -40,6 +42,7 @@ public class TenantConfigTableSerializationTests
Assert.Equal(started, mapped.TrialStartedUtc);
Assert.True(mapped.TrialConsumed);
Assert.Equal("alice@contoso.com", mapped.TrialGrantedBy);
Assert.Equal(downgraded, mapped.ProDowngradedUtc);
}
[Fact]
@@ -59,6 +62,7 @@ public class TenantConfigTableSerializationTests
Assert.Null(mapped.TrialStartedUtc);
Assert.False(mapped.TrialConsumed);
Assert.Null(mapped.TrialGrantedBy);
Assert.Null(mapped.ProDowngradedUtc);
}
[Fact]
@@ -77,6 +81,7 @@ public class TenantConfigTableSerializationTests
Assert.Null(mapped.TrialExpiresUtc);
Assert.False(mapped.TrialConsumed);
Assert.Null(mapped.TrialGrantedBy);
Assert.Null(mapped.ProDowngradedUtc); // pre-grace row: no anchor, no grace
}
[Fact]
@@ -194,8 +194,10 @@ public class TenantEntitlementServiceTests
}
[Fact]
public void GetEffectiveRetentionDays_TrialExpiry_DegradesCapFrom365To90()
public void GetEffectiveRetentionDays_TrialExpiry_ProCapHoldsThroughGrace_ThenDegradesTo90()
{
// Trial expiry is a downgrade: the Pro cap keeps applying for the 30-day retention
// grace (anchor = TrialExpiresUtc, no write involved), THEN the Community cap bites.
var config = new TenantConfiguration
{
TenantId = TenantId,
@@ -204,6 +206,93 @@ public class TenantEntitlementServiceTests
TrialExpiresUtc = Now.AddDays(1)
};
Assert.Equal(365, TenantEntitlementService.GetEffectiveRetentionDays(config, Now));
Assert.Equal(90, TenantEntitlementService.GetEffectiveRetentionDays(config, Now.AddDays(2)));
// 1 day after expiry: inside the grace — still the Pro cap.
Assert.Equal(365, TenantEntitlementService.GetEffectiveRetentionDays(config, Now.AddDays(2)));
// 31 days after expiry: grace over — Community cap enforced.
Assert.Equal(90, TenantEntitlementService.GetEffectiveRetentionDays(config, Now.AddDays(32)));
}
// ── Retention downgrade grace (GetRetentionGraceEndUtc + cap interplay) ──────
[Fact]
public void GetRetentionGraceEndUtc_ProTenant_ReturnsNull()
{
var config = new TenantConfiguration
{
TenantId = TenantId,
PlanTier = "pro",
ProDowngradedUtc = Now.AddDays(-5) // stale leftover must not matter while Pro
};
Assert.Null(TenantEntitlementService.GetRetentionGraceEndUtc(config, Now));
}
[Fact]
public void GetRetentionGraceEndUtc_NeverLostPro_ReturnsNull()
{
var config = new TenantConfiguration { TenantId = TenantId, PlanTier = "free" };
Assert.Null(TenantEntitlementService.GetRetentionGraceEndUtc(config, Now));
}
[Fact]
public void GetRetentionGraceEndUtc_ExplicitDowngrade_AnchorPlusGraceDays()
{
var downgraded = Now.AddDays(-10);
var config = new TenantConfiguration
{
TenantId = TenantId,
PlanTier = "community",
ProDowngradedUtc = downgraded
};
Assert.Equal(
downgraded.AddDays(FeatureEntitlementCatalog.RetentionDowngradeGraceDays),
TenantEntitlementService.GetRetentionGraceEndUtc(config, Now));
}
[Fact]
public void GetRetentionGraceEndUtc_LatestAnchorWins()
{
// Downgrade, re-granted trial, trial expired again: the LATER trial expiry anchors.
var config = new TenantConfiguration
{
TenantId = TenantId,
PlanTier = "community",
ProDowngradedUtc = Now.AddDays(-20),
TrialExpiresUtc = Now.AddDays(-3)
};
Assert.Equal(
Now.AddDays(-3).AddDays(FeatureEntitlementCatalog.RetentionDowngradeGraceDays),
TenantEntitlementService.GetRetentionGraceEndUtc(config, Now));
}
[Fact]
public void GetEffectiveRetentionDays_ExplicitDowngrade_ProCapDuringGrace_CommunityCapAfter()
{
var config = new TenantConfiguration
{
TenantId = TenantId,
PlanTier = "community",
DataRetentionDays = 365,
ProDowngradedUtc = Now
};
Assert.Equal(365, TenantEntitlementService.GetEffectiveRetentionDays(config, Now.AddDays(29)));
Assert.Equal(90, TenantEntitlementService.GetEffectiveRetentionDays(config, Now.AddDays(31)));
}
[Fact]
public void GetEffectiveRetentionDays_GraceDoesNotRaiseAnythingElse()
{
// 0 (infinite) passes through untouched, and a stored value below the Community cap
// is unaffected — the grace only swaps which CAP clamps.
var zero = new TenantConfiguration
{
TenantId = TenantId, PlanTier = "community", DataRetentionDays = 0, ProDowngradedUtc = Now
};
Assert.Equal(0, TenantEntitlementService.GetEffectiveRetentionDays(zero, Now.AddDays(5)));
var below = new TenantConfiguration
{
TenantId = TenantId, PlanTier = "community", DataRetentionDays = 60, ProDowngradedUtc = Now
};
Assert.Equal(60, TenantEntitlementService.GetEffectiveRetentionDays(below, Now.AddDays(5)));
}
}
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ public class TrialExpirySweepFunctionTests
private static readonly DateTime Now = new(2026, 7, 7, 3, 30, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private static TenantConfiguration Tenant(
string id, DateTime? trialExpiresUtc, string planTier = "free", string domain = "contoso.com") => new()
string id, DateTime? trialExpiresUtc, string planTier = "free", string domain = "contoso.com",
int retentionDays = 90, DateTime? proDowngradedUtc = null) => new()
{
TenantId = id,
DomainName = domain,
@@ -28,6 +29,8 @@ public class TrialExpirySweepFunctionTests
PlanTier = planTier,
TrialExpiresUtc = trialExpiresUtc,
TrialConsumed = trialExpiresUtc.HasValue,
DataRetentionDays = retentionDays,
ProDowngradedUtc = proDowngradedUtc,
};
private static (TrialExpirySweepFunction Sut, List<OpsEventEntry> Events) Build(params TenantConfiguration[] configs)
@@ -150,6 +153,88 @@ public class TrialExpirySweepFunctionTests
Assert.Equal(2, events.Count);
}
// ── Retention downgrade grace events ─────────────────────────────────────────
[Fact]
public async Task GraceEndingSoon_WithDataAtRisk_EmitsGraceExpiring()
{
// Downgraded 28 days ago with stored retention 365: grace ends in 2 days.
var (sut, events) = Build(Tenant("t1", null, planTier: "community",
retentionDays: 365, proDowngradedUtc: Now.AddDays(-28)));
var result = await sut.RunCoreAsync(CancellationToken.None);
Assert.Equal(1, result.GraceExpiringEmitted);
var e = Assert.Single(events);
Assert.Equal("TenantRetentionGraceExpiring", e.EventType);
Assert.Equal(OpsEventSeverity.Warning, e.Severity);
Assert.Contains("2 day", e.Message);
}
[Fact]
public async Task GraceEndedWithinLookBack_EmitsGraceEnded_OlderStaysSilent()
{
var (sut, events) = Build(
// Grace ended 12h ago → emit once.
Tenant("just-ended", null, planTier: "community",
retentionDays: 365, proDowngradedUtc: Now.AddDays(-30).AddHours(-12)),
// Grace ended 3 days ago → reported by a previous run, silent.
Tenant("long-ended", null, planTier: "community",
retentionDays: 365, proDowngradedUtc: Now.AddDays(-33)));
var result = await sut.RunCoreAsync(CancellationToken.None);
Assert.Equal(1, result.GraceEndedEmitted);
var e = Assert.Single(events);
Assert.Equal("TenantRetentionGraceEnded", e.EventType);
Assert.Equal("just-ended", e.TenantId);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Grace_NoDataAtRisk_StaysSilent()
{
var (sut, events) = Build(
// Stored retention at the Community cap — nothing to lose.
Tenant("at-cap", null, planTier: "community",
retentionDays: 90, proDowngradedUtc: Now.AddDays(-29)),
// 0 = infinite escape hatch — the fanout never deletes, no warning needed.
Tenant("infinite", null, planTier: "community",
retentionDays: 0, proDowngradedUtc: Now.AddDays(-29)));
var result = await sut.RunCoreAsync(CancellationToken.None);
Assert.Equal(0, result.GraceExpiringEmitted);
Assert.Equal(0, result.GraceEndedEmitted);
Assert.Empty(events);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Grace_ReUpgradedTenant_StaysSilent()
{
// Back on Pro: GetRetentionGraceEndUtc returns null even with a stale anchor.
var (sut, events) = Build(Tenant("t1", null, planTier: "pro",
retentionDays: 365, proDowngradedUtc: Now.AddDays(-29)));
var result = await sut.RunCoreAsync(CancellationToken.None);
Assert.Equal(0, result.GraceExpiringEmitted);
Assert.Empty(events);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ExpiredTrial_WithDataAtRisk_GetsBothTrialExpiredAndLaterGraceEvents()
{
// The trial-expiry anchor drives the grace window too: expired 2h ago fires
// TenantTrialExpired now; 28 days later the same tenant enters the grace heads-up.
var (sut, events) = Build(Tenant("t1", Now.AddHours(-2), retentionDays: 365));
var result = await sut.RunCoreAsync(CancellationToken.None);
Assert.Equal(1, result.ExpiredEmitted);
Assert.Equal(0, result.GraceExpiringEmitted); // grace end is ~30d out — beyond heads-up
Assert.Single(events);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ConfigLoadFailure_ReturnsEmptyResult_NeverThrows()
{
@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using System.Text.Json;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.DataAccess.TableStorage;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Helpers;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Verdict-calibration drift radar (docs/backend/verdict-calibration.md): the three finding
/// kinds, the small-n / lift / Wilson gates, re-arm, and the tracker round-trip.
/// </summary>
public class VerdictCalibrationRadarTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Target = new(2026, 8, 22, 0, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
/// <summary>35 daily rows ending on Target; per-day buckets chosen by window/baseline membership.</summary>
private static List<VerdictCalibrationDailyAggregate> Horizon(
Func<bool, (string Path, string Status, int Count)[]> bucketsFor, int sessionsPerDay = 20)
{
var rows = new List<VerdictCalibrationDailyAggregate>();
for (var i = 34; i >= 0; i--)
{
var inWindow = i < 7;
var date = Target.AddDays(-i);
rows.Add(new VerdictCalibrationDailyAggregate
{
TenantId = "t", Date = date.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd"), SessionCount = sessionsPerDay, TerminalSessionCount = sessionsPerDay,
Buckets = bucketsFor(inWindow).Select(b => new VerdictCalibrationBucket { VerdictPath = b.Path, Status = b.Status, Count = b.Count }).ToList(),
});
}
return rows;
}
[Fact]
public void Share_regression_fires_on_a_doubled_separated_share()
{
// baseline: 1/20 per day (5%), window: 4/20 per day (20%) → lift 4, clearly separated
var rows = Horizon(w => new[] { ("sweep:r5_incomplete", "Incomplete", w ? 4 : 1), ("agent:complete", "Succeeded", w ? 16 : 19) });
var findings = VerdictCalibrationRadar.Evaluate(rows, Target);
var f = Assert.Single(findings, x => x.Kind == VerdictCalibrationAlertKinds.ShareRegression);
Assert.Equal("sweep:r5_incomplete", f.VerdictPath);
Assert.Equal("Incomplete", f.Status);
Assert.Equal(28, f.WindowHitCount);
Assert.Equal(140, f.WindowSessionCount);
Assert.Equal(28, f.BaselineHitCount);
Assert.Equal(560, f.BaselineSessionCount);
Assert.Equal(20.0, f.WindowRatePct);
Assert.Equal(5.0, f.BaselineRatePct);
Assert.Equal(4.0, f.Lift);
Assert.Equal("2026-08-16", f.WindowStartDate);
Assert.Equal("2026-08-22", f.WindowEndDate);
// sweep:* is also the silence group → silence share doubled as well
Assert.Contains(findings, x => x.Kind == VerdictCalibrationAlertKinds.SilenceShareRegression && x.VerdictPath == VerdictCalibrationRadar.SilenceGroupPath);
}
[Fact]
public void Share_regression_is_suppressed_below_lift_two_or_without_separation()
{
// 5% → 8%: lift 1.6 — under the gate
var mild = Horizon(w => new[] { ("agent:failed", "Failed", w ? 2 : 1), ("agent:complete", "Succeeded", w ? 18 : 19) }, sessionsPerDay: 20);
Assert.DoesNotContain(VerdictCalibrationRadar.Evaluate(mild, Target), f => f.Kind == VerdictCalibrationAlertKinds.ShareRegression);
// tiny n: 1/2 per day in window vs 0/2 baseline — lift infinite but Wilson intervals overlap / hits < 5
var tiny = Horizon(w => new[] { ("agent:failed", "Failed", w ? 1 : 0), ("agent:complete", "Succeeded", w ? 1 : 2) }, sessionsPerDay: 2);
Assert.Empty(VerdictCalibrationRadar.Evaluate(tiny, Target));
}
[Fact]
public void Agent_and_registration_paths_never_share_alert_but_still_feed_the_silence_group()
{
// Workflow mix, not classifier drift: a WhiteGlove rollout week doubles the pending share.
var wg = Horizon(w => new[] { ("agent:whiteglove_pending", "Pending", w ? 6 : 1), ("agent:complete", "Succeeded", w ? 14 : 19) });
Assert.DoesNotContain(VerdictCalibrationRadar.Evaluate(wg, Target), f => f.Kind == VerdictCalibrationAlertKinds.ShareRegression);
var reg = Horizon(w => new[] { ("register:superseded", "Incomplete", w ? 6 : 1), ("agent:complete", "Succeeded", w ? 14 : 19) });
Assert.DoesNotContain(VerdictCalibrationRadar.Evaluate(reg, Target), f => f.Kind == VerdictCalibrationAlertKinds.ShareRegression);
// Backend-decided paths stay eligible.
Assert.True(VerdictCalibrationRadar.IsShareRegressionEligible("sweep:r6"));
Assert.True(VerdictCalibrationRadar.IsShareRegressionEligible("rule:ANALYZE-ESP-001"));
Assert.True(VerdictCalibrationRadar.IsShareRegressionEligible("manual:failed"));
Assert.False(VerdictCalibrationRadar.IsShareRegressionEligible("agent:complete_soft"));
// An episode opened by the earlier, broader gate re-arms on the next pass regardless of numbers.
var stale = new VerdictCalibrationAlert { Kind = VerdictCalibrationAlertKinds.ShareRegression, VerdictPath = "agent:whiteglove_pending", Status = "Pending" };
Assert.True(VerdictCalibrationRadar.ShouldReArm(stale, wg, Target));
}
[Fact]
public void Derived_legacy_paths_never_alert()
{
var rows = Horizon(w => new[] { ("legacy:r6", "Incomplete", w ? 10 : 1), ("agent:complete", "Succeeded", w ? 10 : 19) });
Assert.DoesNotContain(VerdictCalibrationRadar.Evaluate(rows, Target), f => f.Kind == VerdictCalibrationAlertKinds.ShareRegression);
}
[Fact]
public void Evidence_gap_fires_on_r6_share_and_ignores_non_rule_sweep_paths()
{
// classifier verdicts in window: r6 5/day + r5 15/day = 140; r6 share 25% → fires. sweep:stalled is not a rule verdict.
var rows = Horizon(w => new[]
{
("sweep:r6", "Incomplete", 5), ("sweep:r5_incomplete", "Incomplete", 15), ("sweep:stalled", "Stalled", 30),
}, sessionsPerDay: 50);
var f = Assert.Single(VerdictCalibrationRadar.Evaluate(rows, Target), x => x.Kind == VerdictCalibrationAlertKinds.EvidenceGap);
Assert.Equal(VerdictCalibrationRadar.EvidenceGapPath, f.VerdictPath);
Assert.Equal(35, f.WindowHitCount);
Assert.Equal(140, f.WindowSessionCount);
Assert.Equal(25.0, f.WindowRatePct);
Assert.Null(f.Lift);
}
[Fact]
public void Evidence_gap_needs_twenty_classifier_verdicts()
{
var rows = Horizon(w => new[] { ("sweep:r6", "Incomplete", w ? 2 : 0), ("agent:complete", "Succeeded", 18) });
Assert.DoesNotContain(VerdictCalibrationRadar.Evaluate(rows, Target), f => f.Kind == VerdictCalibrationAlertKinds.EvidenceGap);
}
[Fact]
public void ReArm_when_share_falls_under_one_point_five_or_path_stops()
{
var alert = new VerdictCalibrationAlert { Kind = VerdictCalibrationAlertKinds.ShareRegression, VerdictPath = "sweep:r6", Status = "Incomplete" };
var stillHigh = Horizon(w => new[] { ("sweep:r6", "Incomplete", w ? 4 : 1), ("agent:complete", "Succeeded", w ? 16 : 19) });
Assert.False(VerdictCalibrationRadar.ShouldReArm(alert, stillHigh, Target));
var elevatedButUnderGate = Horizon(w => new[] { ("sweep:r6", "Incomplete", w ? 2 : 1), ("agent:complete", "Succeeded", w ? 18 : 19) }, sessionsPerDay: 20);
// 10% vs 5% = 2.0× — still at/above 1.5× → keep
Assert.False(VerdictCalibrationRadar.ShouldReArm(alert, elevatedButUnderGate, Target));
var back = Horizon(w => new[] { ("sweep:r6", "Incomplete", 1), ("agent:complete", "Succeeded", 19) });
Assert.True(VerdictCalibrationRadar.ShouldReArm(alert, back, Target));
var gone = Horizon(w => new[] { ("sweep:r6", "Incomplete", w ? 0 : 1), ("agent:complete", "Succeeded", w ? 20 : 19) });
Assert.True(VerdictCalibrationRadar.ShouldReArm(alert, gone, Target));
}
[Fact]
public void Evidence_gap_rearms_under_fifteen_percent()
{
var alert = new VerdictCalibrationAlert { Kind = VerdictCalibrationAlertKinds.EvidenceGap, VerdictPath = "r6", Status = "*" };
var still = Horizon(w => new[] { ("sweep:r6", "Incomplete", 4), ("sweep:r5_incomplete", "Incomplete", 16) });
Assert.False(VerdictCalibrationRadar.ShouldReArm(alert, still, Target)); // 20%
var between = Horizon(w => new[] { ("sweep:r6", "Incomplete", 17), ("sweep:r5_incomplete", "Incomplete", 83) }, sessionsPerDay: 100);
Assert.False(VerdictCalibrationRadar.ShouldReArm(alert, between, Target)); // 17%
var low = Horizon(w => new[] { ("sweep:r6", "Incomplete", 1), ("sweep:r5_incomplete", "Incomplete", 19) });
Assert.True(VerdictCalibrationRadar.ShouldReArm(alert, low, Target)); // 5%
}
[Fact]
public void CurrentSums_follow_the_alert_kind()
{
var rows = Horizon(w => new[] { ("sweep:r6", "Incomplete", 2), ("maxlife:r3", "Incomplete", 1), ("agent:complete", "Succeeded", 17) });
var share = VerdictCalibrationRadar.CurrentSums(new VerdictCalibrationAlert { Kind = VerdictCalibrationAlertKinds.ShareRegression, VerdictPath = "sweep:r6", Status = "Incomplete" }, rows, Target);
Assert.Equal((14, 140, 56, 560), share);
var silence = VerdictCalibrationRadar.CurrentSums(new VerdictCalibrationAlert { Kind = VerdictCalibrationAlertKinds.SilenceShareRegression }, rows, Target);
Assert.Equal((21, 140, 84, 560), silence);
var gap = VerdictCalibrationRadar.CurrentSums(new VerdictCalibrationAlert { Kind = VerdictCalibrationAlertKinds.EvidenceGap }, rows, Target);
Assert.Equal((14, 21, 56, 84), gap);
}
[Fact]
public void Rows_outside_the_horizon_are_ignored()
{
var rows = Horizon(w => new[] { ("agent:complete", "Succeeded", 20) });
rows.Add(new VerdictCalibrationDailyAggregate { TenantId = "t", Date = "2026-08-23", SessionCount = 1000, Buckets = { new VerdictCalibrationBucket { VerdictPath = "sweep:r6", Status = "Incomplete", Count = 1000 } } });
rows.Add(new VerdictCalibrationDailyAggregate { TenantId = "t", Date = "2026-07-01", SessionCount = 1000, Buckets = { new VerdictCalibrationBucket { VerdictPath = "sweep:r6", Status = "Incomplete", Count = 1000 } } });
Assert.Empty(VerdictCalibrationRadar.Evaluate(rows, Target));
}
// ---- tracker round-trip ----
[Fact]
public void Alert_round_trips_through_the_tracker_entity()
{
var alert = new VerdictCalibrationAlert
{
TenantId = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111", Kind = VerdictCalibrationAlertKinds.ShareRegression,
VerdictPath = "rule:ANALYZE-ESP-001", Status = "Failed",
WindowHitCount = 7, WindowSessionCount = 40, BaselineHitCount = 3, BaselineSessionCount = 160,
WindowRatePct = 17.5, BaselineRatePct = 1.9, Lift = 9.3, WindowStartDate = "2026-08-16", WindowEndDate = "2026-08-22",
Dimension = new RuleRegressionDimension { Dimension = "osBuild", Value = "26200.1234", HitCount = 6, HitSharePct = 85.7, AllSharePct = 20.0, Lift = 4.3 },
FirstNotifiedAt = new DateTime(2026, 8, 20, 6, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc), LastEvaluatedAt = new DateTime(2026, 8, 23, 6, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc),
};
var entity = TableHardwareRejectionNotificationTracker.BuildVerdictCalibrationEntity(alert.TenantId, alert);
Assert.Equal("verdictcalibration|share_regression|rule:analyze-esp-001|failed", entity.RowKey);
Assert.Equal(alert.TenantId, entity.PartitionKey);
var back = TableHardwareRejectionNotificationTracker.MapToVerdictCalibrationAlert(entity);
Assert.Equal(JsonSerializer.Serialize(alert), JsonSerializer.Serialize(back));
// Tri-states: no lift / no dimension → absent columns → null on read, never 0 / a guessed dimension.
var bare = new VerdictCalibrationAlert
{
TenantId = alert.TenantId, Kind = VerdictCalibrationAlertKinds.EvidenceGap, VerdictPath = "r6", Status = "*",
FirstNotifiedAt = alert.FirstNotifiedAt, LastEvaluatedAt = alert.LastEvaluatedAt,
};
var bareBack = TableHardwareRejectionNotificationTracker.MapToVerdictCalibrationAlert(
TableHardwareRejectionNotificationTracker.BuildVerdictCalibrationEntity(bare.TenantId, bare));
Assert.Null(bareBack.Lift);
Assert.Null(bareBack.Dimension);
Assert.Equal("verdictcalibration|evidence_gap|r6|*", TableHardwareRejectionNotificationTracker.BuildVerdictCalibrationRowKey(bare.Kind, bare.VerdictPath, bare.Status));
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using System.Text.Json;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Metrics;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Verdict calibration aggregate (docs/backend/verdict-calibration.md): the pure bucketing core,
/// the persistence round-trip and the matrix arithmetic of the read endpoint.
/// </summary>
public class VerdictCalibrationTests
{
private const string TenantA = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111";
private const string TenantB = "22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222";
private static readonly DateTime Now = new(2026, 8, 23, 12, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private static SessionSummary Session(string tenant, string id, SessionStatus status, DateTime started,
string? path = null, string? priorPath = null, string? priorStatus = null, string? adminMarked = null,
DateTime? completed = null, string serial = "SN-1", string? failureReason = null, string? reconcileReason = null) => new()
{
TenantId = tenant, SessionId = id, SerialNumber = serial, Status = status, StartedAt = started,
CompletedAt = completed, VerdictPath = path, PriorVerdictPath = priorPath, PriorStatus = priorStatus,
AdminMarkedAction = adminMarked, FailureReason = failureReason ?? string.Empty,
ReconcileReason = reconcileReason ?? string.Empty, FailureSource = string.Empty,
};
private static DeviceHistory History(string tenant, string serial, params (string Id, DateTime Started, DateTime? Completed, string Status)[] refs) => new()
{
TenantId = tenant, SerialKey = serial.ToLowerInvariant(), SerialNumber = serial,
Chain = refs.Select(r => new DeviceSessionRef { SessionId = r.Id, StartedAt = r.Started, CompletedAt = r.Completed, Status = r.Status }).ToList(),
};
private static VerdictCalibrationBucket Bucket(VerdictCalibrationDailyAggregate row, string path, string status)
=> Assert.Single(row.Buckets, b => b.VerdictPath == path && b.Status == status);
// ---- BuildVerdictCalibrationAggregates ----
[Fact]
public void Buckets_by_tenant_date_path_and_status_with_global_mirror()
{
var d1 = new DateTime(2026, 8, 10, 9, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var sessions = new List<SessionSummary>
{
Session(TenantA, "a1", SessionStatus.Succeeded, d1, path: "agent:complete", completed: d1.AddHours(1)),
Session(TenantA, "a2", SessionStatus.Succeeded, d1.AddHours(2), path: "agent:complete", completed: d1.AddHours(3)),
Session(TenantA, "a3", SessionStatus.Incomplete, d1, path: "sweep:r6", completed: d1.AddHours(6)),
Session(TenantA, "a4", SessionStatus.Stalled, d1.AddDays(1), path: "sweep:stalled"),
Session(TenantB, "b1", SessionStatus.Failed, d1, path: "agent:failed", completed: d1.AddHours(1)),
};
var rows = MaintenanceService.BuildVerdictCalibrationAggregates(sessions, new Dictionary<string, List<DeviceHistory>>(), Now);
var a10 = Assert.Single(rows, r => r.TenantId == TenantA && r.Date == "2026-08-10");
Assert.Equal(3, a10.SessionCount);
Assert.Equal(3, a10.TerminalSessionCount);
Assert.Equal(2, Bucket(a10, "agent:complete", "Succeeded").Count);
Assert.Equal(1, Bucket(a10, "sweep:r6", "Incomplete").Count);
var a11 = Assert.Single(rows, r => r.TenantId == TenantA && r.Date == "2026-08-11");
Assert.Equal(1, a11.SessionCount);
Assert.Equal(0, a11.TerminalSessionCount); // Stalled is not terminal
Assert.Equal(1, Bucket(a11, "sweep:stalled", "Stalled").Count);
var g10 = Assert.Single(rows, r => r.TenantId == "global" && r.Date == "2026-08-10");
Assert.Equal(4, g10.SessionCount);
Assert.Equal(1, Bucket(g10, "agent:failed", "Failed").Count);
Assert.Equal(VerdictCalibrationDailyAggregate.CurrentVersion, g10.Version);
Assert.Equal(Now, g10.ComputedAt);
// Deterministic ordering: rows by tenant then date, buckets by path then status.
Assert.Equal(rows.Select(r => (r.TenantId, r.Date)).OrderBy(k => k.TenantId, StringComparer.Ordinal).ThenBy(k => k.Date, StringComparer.Ordinal), rows.Select(r => (r.TenantId, r.Date)));
Assert.Equal(a10.Buckets.Select(b => b.VerdictPath).OrderBy(p => p, StringComparer.Ordinal), a10.Buckets.Select(b => b.VerdictPath));
}
[Fact]
public void Unstamped_rows_are_derived_and_counted_as_derived()
{
var d = new DateTime(2026, 8, 10, 9, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var sessions = new List<SessionSummary>
{
Session(TenantA, "a1", SessionStatus.Succeeded, d, path: null, completed: d.AddHours(1)), // legacy agent completion
Session(TenantA, "a2", SessionStatus.Incomplete, d, path: null, completed: d.AddHours(5),
failureReason: "No Device Setup completion or explicit failure signal observed before timeout"),
Session(TenantA, "a3", SessionStatus.Succeeded, d, path: "agent:complete", completed: d.AddHours(1)),
};
var row = MaintenanceService.BuildVerdictCalibrationAggregates(sessions, new Dictionary<string, List<DeviceHistory>>(), Now)
.Single(r => r.TenantId == TenantA);
var complete = Bucket(row, "agent:complete", "Succeeded");
Assert.Equal(2, complete.Count);
Assert.Equal(1, complete.DerivedCount);
var r6 = Bucket(row, "legacy:r6", "Incomplete");
Assert.Equal(1, r6.Count);
Assert.Equal(1, r6.DerivedCount);
}
[Fact]
public void Overrides_are_attributed_to_the_prior_path()
{
var d = new DateTime(2026, 8, 10, 9, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var sessions = new List<SessionSummary>
{
// sweep said Incomplete, agent later completed → late completion against sweep:r5_incomplete
Session(TenantA, "a1", SessionStatus.Succeeded, d, path: "agent:complete", priorPath: "sweep:r5_incomplete", priorStatus: "Incomplete", completed: d.AddHours(1)),
// admin flipped an agent success to Failed
Session(TenantA, "a2", SessionStatus.Failed, d, path: "manual:failed", priorPath: "agent:complete", priorStatus: "Succeeded", adminMarked: "Failed", completed: d.AddHours(1)),
// retro reclassification Failed → Incomplete
Session(TenantA, "a3", SessionStatus.Incomplete, d, path: "retro:r6", priorPath: "agent:failed", priorStatus: "Failed", completed: d.AddHours(1)),
// admin mark to Succeeded counts as admin, not late completion
Session(TenantA, "a4", SessionStatus.Succeeded, d, path: "manual:succeeded", priorPath: "sweep:r6", priorStatus: "Incomplete", adminMarked: "Succeeded", completed: d.AddHours(1)),
};
var row = MaintenanceService.BuildVerdictCalibrationAggregates(sessions, new Dictionary<string, List<DeviceHistory>>(), Now)
.Single(r => r.TenantId == TenantA);
var priorSweep = Bucket(row, "sweep:r5_incomplete", "Incomplete");
Assert.Equal(0, priorSweep.Count); // nobody is on it any more
Assert.Equal(1, priorSweep.OverriddenByLateCompletion);
var priorAgent = Bucket(row, "agent:complete", "Succeeded");
Assert.Equal(1, priorAgent.Count); // a1 is on it now
Assert.Equal(1, priorAgent.OverriddenByAdmin); // a2 used to be
Assert.Equal(1, Bucket(row, "agent:failed", "Failed").OverriddenOther);
Assert.Equal(1, Bucket(row, "sweep:r6", "Incomplete").OverriddenByAdmin);
Assert.Equal(0, Bucket(row, "manual:succeeded", "Succeeded").OverriddenByAdmin);
}
[Fact]
public void ReEnrollment_proxy_counts_only_eligible_terminal_sessions()
{
var old = Now.AddDays(-20);
var young = Now.AddDays(-2);
var sessions = new List<SessionSummary>
{
// old, re-enrolled 3 days later → eligible + re-enrolled
Session(TenantA, "a1", SessionStatus.Incomplete, old, path: "sweep:r6", completed: old.AddHours(5), serial: "SN-A"),
// old, next attempt 10 days later → eligible, not re-enrolled
Session(TenantA, "a2", SessionStatus.Failed, old, path: "agent:failed", completed: old.AddHours(1), serial: "SN-B"),
// old, no next attempt → eligible, not re-enrolled
Session(TenantA, "a3", SessionStatus.Succeeded, old, path: "agent:complete", completed: old.AddHours(1), serial: "SN-C"),
// too young to judge → not eligible even though the chain shows a follow-up
Session(TenantA, "a4", SessionStatus.Failed, young, path: "agent:failed", completed: young.AddHours(1), serial: "SN-D"),
// non-terminal → never eligible
Session(TenantA, "a5", SessionStatus.AwaitingUser, old, path: "sweep:r5_awaiting", serial: "SN-E"),
};
var histories = new Dictionary<string, List<DeviceHistory>>
{
[TenantA] = new()
{
History(TenantA, "SN-A", ("a1", old, old.AddHours(5), "Incomplete"), ("x1", old.AddDays(3), old.AddDays(3).AddHours(1), "Succeeded")),
History(TenantA, "SN-B", ("a2", old, old.AddHours(1), "Failed"), ("x2", old.AddDays(10), null, "Succeeded")),
History(TenantA, "SN-C", ("a3", old, old.AddHours(1), "Succeeded")),
History(TenantA, "SN-D", ("a4", young, young.AddHours(1), "Failed"), ("x4", young.AddHours(2), null, "Succeeded")),
},
};
var rows = MaintenanceService.BuildVerdictCalibrationAggregates(sessions, histories, Now);
var oldRow = rows.Single(r => r.TenantId == TenantA && r.Date == old.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd"));
var r6 = Bucket(oldRow, "sweep:r6", "Incomplete");
Assert.Equal((1, 1), (r6.Eligible7d, r6.ReEnrolled7d));
var failed = Bucket(oldRow, "agent:failed", "Failed");
Assert.Equal((1, 0), (failed.Eligible7d, failed.ReEnrolled7d));
var complete = Bucket(oldRow, "agent:complete", "Succeeded");
Assert.Equal((1, 0), (complete.Eligible7d, complete.ReEnrolled7d));
var awaiting = Bucket(oldRow, "sweep:r5_awaiting", "AwaitingUser");
Assert.Equal((0, 0), (awaiting.Eligible7d, awaiting.ReEnrolled7d));
var youngRow = rows.Single(r => r.TenantId == TenantA && r.Date == young.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd"));
var youngFailed = Bucket(youngRow, "agent:failed", "Failed");
Assert.Equal((0, 0), (youngFailed.Eligible7d, youngFailed.ReEnrolled7d));
}
[Fact]
public void Sessions_inside_a_deletion_cascade_are_skipped()
{
var d = new DateTime(2026, 8, 10, 9, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var deleting = Session(TenantA, "a1", SessionStatus.Succeeded, d, path: "agent:complete");
deleting.DeletionState = "Pending";
var rows = MaintenanceService.BuildVerdictCalibrationAggregates(new[] { deleting }, new Dictionary<string, List<DeviceHistory>>(), Now);
Assert.Empty(rows);
}
// ---- Persistence round-trip ----
[Fact]
public void Aggregate_round_trips_through_the_table_entity()
{
var aggregate = new VerdictCalibrationDailyAggregate
{
TenantId = TenantA, Date = "2026-08-10", Version = 1, SessionCount = 5, TerminalSessionCount = 4, ComputedAt = Now,
Buckets =
{
new VerdictCalibrationBucket { VerdictPath = "agent:complete", Status = "Succeeded", Count = 3, DerivedCount = 1, Eligible7d = 3, ReEnrolled7d = 1, OverriddenByAdmin = 1, OverriddenByLateCompletion = 0, OverriddenOther = 2 },
new VerdictCalibrationBucket { VerdictPath = "sweep:r6", Status = "Incomplete", Count = 1 },
},
};
var entity = TableStorageService.BuildVerdictCalibrationAggregateEntity(aggregate);
Assert.Equal(TenantA, entity.PartitionKey);
Assert.Equal("2026-08-10", entity.RowKey);
var back = TableStorageService.MapToVerdictCalibrationAggregate(entity);
Assert.Equal(JsonSerializer.Serialize(aggregate), JsonSerializer.Serialize(back));
}
// ---- Response builder ----
private static VerdictCalibrationDailyAggregate Day(string tenant, DateTime date, int sessions, params (string Path, string Status, int Count)[] buckets) => new()
{
TenantId = tenant, Date = date.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd"), SessionCount = sessions, TerminalSessionCount = sessions, Version = 1, ComputedAt = Now,
Buckets = buckets.Select(b => new VerdictCalibrationBucket { VerdictPath = b.Path, Status = b.Status, Count = b.Count, Eligible7d = b.Count, ReEnrolled7d = b.Count / 5 }).ToList(),
};
// Same naming policy as the worker host (Program.cs: camelCase) so the assertions pin the wire shape.
private static readonly JsonSerializerOptions Wire = new() { PropertyNamingPolicy = JsonNamingPolicy.CamelCase };
private static JsonElement BuildJson(IReadOnlyList<VerdictCalibrationDailyAggregate> daily, DateTime today, int days)
=> JsonSerializer.SerializeToElement(VerdictCalibrationResponse.Build(daily, "global", today, days), Wire);
[Fact]
public void Response_sums_the_window_and_computes_share_rate_and_trend()
{
var today = new DateTime(2026, 8, 23, 0, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var daily = new List<VerdictCalibrationDailyAggregate>();
// 35 days: baseline days carry 10 sessions (1 sweep:r6), the last 7 days carry 10 sessions (3 sweep:r6) → share 10% → 30%, lift 3.0
for (var i = 34; i >= 0; i--)
{
var date = today.AddDays(-i);
var r6 = i < 7 ? 3 : 1;
daily.Add(Day("global", date, 10, ("agent:complete", "Succeeded", 10 - r6), ("sweep:r6", "Incomplete", r6)));
}
var json = BuildJson(daily, today, days: 30);
Assert.True(json.GetProperty("success").GetBoolean());
Assert.Equal(30, json.GetProperty("windowDays").GetInt32());
Assert.Equal(300, json.GetProperty("totals").GetProperty("sessions").GetInt32());
Assert.Equal(30, json.GetProperty("totals").GetProperty("days").GetInt32());
var paths = json.GetProperty("paths").EnumerateArray().ToList();
var r6Row = paths.Single(p => p.GetProperty("verdictPath").GetString() == "sweep:r6");
Assert.Equal(7 * 3 + 23 * 1, r6Row.GetProperty("count").GetInt32());
Assert.Equal(Math.Round(100.0 * 44 / 300, 1), r6Row.GetProperty("sharePct").GetDouble());
Assert.Equal(30.0, r6Row.GetProperty("window7").GetProperty("sharePct").GetDouble());
Assert.Equal(10.0, r6Row.GetProperty("baseline28").GetProperty("sharePct").GetDouble());
Assert.Equal(3.0, r6Row.GetProperty("lift").GetDouble());
// Eligible 44 ≥ 20 → rate stated; ReEnrolled7d = count/5 per day → 7*0 + 23*0 = 0 → 0%
Assert.Equal(0.0, r6Row.GetProperty("reEnrollRatePct").GetDouble());
// Sorted by count desc → agent:complete first.
Assert.Equal("agent:complete", paths[0].GetProperty("verdictPath").GetString());
}
[Fact]
public void Response_withholds_rate_below_twenty_eligible_and_lift_without_baseline()
{
var today = new DateTime(2026, 8, 23, 0, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var daily = new List<VerdictCalibrationDailyAggregate>
{
Day("global", today, 5, ("maxlife:r3", "Incomplete", 5)),
};
var json = BuildJson(daily, today, days: 7);
var row = json.GetProperty("paths").EnumerateArray().Single();
Assert.Equal(JsonValueKind.Null, row.GetProperty("reEnrollRatePct").ValueKind);
Assert.Equal(JsonValueKind.Null, row.GetProperty("lift").ValueKind); // no baseline rows → never invented
Assert.Equal(100.0, row.GetProperty("sharePct").GetDouble());
}
[Fact]
public void Response_keeps_a_zero_count_bucket_that_carries_overrides()
{
var today = new DateTime(2026, 8, 23, 0, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var day = Day("global", today, 1, ("agent:complete", "Succeeded", 1));
day.Buckets.Add(new VerdictCalibrationBucket { VerdictPath = "sweep:r5_incomplete", Status = "Incomplete", Count = 0, OverriddenByLateCompletion = 1 });
var json = BuildJson(new[] { day }, today, days: 7);
var rows = json.GetProperty("paths").EnumerateArray().ToList();
var prior = rows.Single(p => p.GetProperty("verdictPath").GetString() == "sweep:r5_incomplete");
Assert.Equal(0, prior.GetProperty("count").GetInt32());
Assert.Equal(1, prior.GetProperty("overriddenByLateCompletion").GetInt32());
}
[Fact]
public void Response_is_empty_but_well_formed_before_the_first_sweep()
{
var json = BuildJson(Array.Empty<VerdictCalibrationDailyAggregate>(), new DateTime(2026, 8, 23), 30);
Assert.True(json.GetProperty("success").GetBoolean());
Assert.Empty(json.GetProperty("paths").EnumerateArray());
Assert.Equal(0, json.GetProperty("totals").GetProperty("sessions").GetInt32());
Assert.Equal(JsonValueKind.Null, json.GetProperty("computedAt").ValueKind);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(null, 30)]
[InlineData("abc", 30)]
[InlineData("0", 1)]
[InlineData("500", 180)]
[InlineData("14", 14)]
public void ClampDays_bounds_the_window(string? raw, int expected)
=> Assert.Equal(expected, VerdictCalibrationResponse.ClampDays(raw));
}
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Helpers;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Verdict calibration instrumentation (docs/backend/verdict-calibration.md): every status write
/// declares its origin, overriding a prior verdict preserves it, the classifier names the rule
/// behind each verdict, and pre-instrumentation rows derive an honest path from their literals.
/// </summary>
public class VerdictPathTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Start = new(2026, 8, 20, 8, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
// ---- ComputePriorVerdict: the correction stream ----
[Theory]
[InlineData("Succeeded", "agent:complete", "Failed", true)] // admin mark over an agent success
[InlineData("Incomplete", "sweep:r5_incomplete", "Succeeded", true)] // late agent completion upgrades a sweep verdict
[InlineData("AwaitingUser", "sweep:r5_awaiting", "Incomplete", true)] // grace expired
[InlineData("Failed", "agent:failed", "Incomplete", true)] // retro reclassification
[InlineData("Stalled", "sweep:stalled", "InProgress", false)] // stall heal is not a correction
[InlineData("Stalled", "sweep:stalled", "Succeeded", false)]
[InlineData("InProgress", "register:new", "Succeeded", false)]
[InlineData("Pending", "agent:whiteglove_pending", "InProgress", false)]
[InlineData("AwaitingUser", "sweep:wg_awaiting", "AwaitingUser", false)] // same-status refresh keeps the original prior
public void Prior_is_preserved_only_when_a_verdict_is_overridden(string existing, string existingPath, string incoming, bool expectPrior)
{
var prior = TableStorageService.ComputePriorVerdict(existing, existingPath, Enum.Parse<SessionStatus>(incoming));
if (expectPrior)
{
Assert.NotNull(prior);
Assert.Equal(existing, prior!.Value.PriorStatus);
Assert.Equal(existingPath, prior.Value.PriorVerdictPath);
}
else
{
Assert.Null(prior);
}
}
[Fact]
public void Prior_needs_a_stamped_path_on_the_existing_row()
{
// Pre-instrumentation rows carry no path — there is nothing trustworthy to preserve.
Assert.Null(TableStorageService.ComputePriorVerdict("Incomplete", null, SessionStatus.Succeeded));
Assert.Null(TableStorageService.ComputePriorVerdict("Incomplete", "", SessionStatus.Succeeded));
Assert.Null(TableStorageService.ComputePriorVerdict(null, "sweep:r6", SessionStatus.Succeeded));
}
// ---- VerdictPaths vocabulary ----
[Fact]
public void Compose_and_Origin_round_trip()
{
var path = VerdictPaths.Compose(VerdictPaths.OriginSweep, ClassifierRules.R5DeviceSetupIncomplete);
Assert.Equal("sweep:r5_incomplete", path);
Assert.Equal("sweep", VerdictPaths.Origin(path));
Assert.True(VerdictPaths.IsClassifierPath(path));
Assert.True(VerdictPaths.IsClassifierPath("maxlife:r1"));
Assert.True(VerdictPaths.IsClassifierPath("late:r4"));
Assert.True(VerdictPaths.IsClassifierPath("retro:r6"));
Assert.False(VerdictPaths.IsClassifierPath(VerdictPaths.AgentComplete));
Assert.False(VerdictPaths.IsClassifierPath(VerdictPaths.SweepStalled));
Assert.False(VerdictPaths.IsClassifierPath(VerdictPaths.RetroSuperseded));
Assert.False(VerdictPaths.IsClassifierPath("legacy:r6"));
Assert.False(VerdictPaths.IsClassifierPath(VerdictPaths.ManualFailed));
Assert.Throws<ArgumentException>(() => VerdictPaths.Compose("", "r1"));
Assert.Throws<ArgumentException>(() => VerdictPaths.Compose("sweep", " "));
}
// ---- Classifier: every return names its rule ----
private static EnrollmentEvent Evt(string type, string? message = null) => new()
{
EventType = type, Timestamp = Start, Source = "test", Message = message ?? type,
};
private static EnrollmentEvent Esp(string message) => Evt("esp_provisioning_status", message);
private const string DeviceSetup44 = "ESP provisioning status: DeviceSetup — 4 of 4 subcategories completed";
private const string AccountSetup55 = "ESP provisioning status: AccountSetup — 5 of 5 subcategories completed";
private const string AccountSetup15 = "ESP provisioning status: AccountSetup — 1 of 5 subcategories completed";
private static string RuleOf(IReadOnlyList<EnrollmentEvent> events, double hours = 6, int grace = 72,
bool preProvisioned = false, DateTime? resumedAt = null, bool selfDeploying = false)
{
var rollup = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ExtractRollup(events);
var (_, _, rule) = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ClassifyTimedOutSession(
rollup, Start, Start.AddHours(hours), grace, isPreProvisioned: preProvisioned,
resumedAt: resumedAt, isSelfDeployingProfile: selfDeploying);
return rule;
}
[Fact]
public void Classifier_returns_the_rule_id_behind_each_verdict()
{
Assert.Equal(ClassifierRules.R1ExplicitFailure, RuleOf(new[] { Evt("enrollment_failed") }));
Assert.Equal(ClassifierRules.R1bWhiteGloveAwaiting, RuleOf(
new[] { Esp(DeviceSetup44), Evt("whiteglove_complete") }, hours: 6, grace: 51, preProvisioned: true, resumedAt: Start.AddHours(1)));
Assert.Equal(ClassifierRules.R1bWhiteGloveSucceeded, RuleOf(
new[] { Esp(DeviceSetup44), Evt("whiteglove_complete") }, hours: 60, grace: 51, preProvisioned: true, resumedAt: Start.AddHours(1)));
Assert.Equal(ClassifierRules.R1cSelfDeploying, RuleOf(new[] { Esp(DeviceSetup44) }, selfDeploying: true));
Assert.Equal(ClassifierRules.R2AccountSetupComplete, RuleOf(new[] { Esp(DeviceSetup44), Esp(AccountSetup55) }));
Assert.Equal(ClassifierRules.R3EmergencyBreak, RuleOf(new[] { Esp(DeviceSetup44), Evt("agent_emergency_break") }));
Assert.Equal(ClassifierRules.R4DesktopHello, RuleOf(new[] { Esp(DeviceSetup44), Evt("desktop_arrived"), Evt("hello_provisioning_completed") }));
Assert.Equal(ClassifierRules.R5DeviceSetupAwaiting, RuleOf(new[] { Esp(DeviceSetup44), Esp(AccountSetup15) }, hours: 6, grace: 72));
Assert.Equal(ClassifierRules.R5DeviceSetupIncomplete, RuleOf(new[] { Esp(DeviceSetup44), Esp(AccountSetup15) }, hours: 80, grace: 72));
Assert.Equal(ClassifierRules.R6Fallthrough, RuleOf(Array.Empty<EnrollmentEvent>()));
}
// ---- Derivation for pre-instrumentation rows ----
private static SessionSummary Row(SessionStatus status, string? failureReason = null, string? reconcileReason = null,
string? failureSource = null, string? adminMarked = null, bool soft = false, string? verdictPath = null) => new()
{
SessionId = "s", TenantId = "t", Status = status,
FailureReason = failureReason ?? string.Empty, ReconcileReason = reconcileReason ?? string.Empty,
FailureSource = failureSource ?? string.Empty, AdminMarkedAction = adminMarked, EspSoftFailure = soft,
VerdictPath = verdictPath,
};
private static string Classified(IReadOnlyList<EnrollmentEvent> events, double hours = 80, int grace = 72, bool selfDeploying = false)
{
var rollup = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ExtractRollup(events);
var (_, reason, _) = EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ClassifyTimedOutSession(
rollup, Start, Start.AddHours(hours), grace, isSelfDeployingProfile: selfDeploying);
return reason;
}
[Fact]
public void Stamped_rows_are_returned_verbatim()
{
var (path, derived) = VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Incomplete, failureReason: "anything", verdictPath: "sweep:r6"));
Assert.Equal("sweep:r6", path);
Assert.False(derived);
}
[Fact]
public void Derivation_uses_the_real_classifier_literals()
{
// Reasons come straight from the classifier so a wording change there surfaces here.
Assert.Equal(("legacy:r6", true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Incomplete,
failureReason: Classified(Array.Empty<EnrollmentEvent>()))));
Assert.Equal(("legacy:r5_incomplete", true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Incomplete,
failureReason: Classified(new[] { Esp(DeviceSetup44), Esp(AccountSetup15) }))));
Assert.Equal(("legacy:r5_awaiting", true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.AwaitingUser,
failureReason: Classified(new[] { Esp(DeviceSetup44), Esp(AccountSetup15) }, hours: 6))));
Assert.Equal(("legacy:r3", true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Incomplete,
failureReason: Classified(new[] { Esp(DeviceSetup44), Evt("agent_emergency_break") }))));
Assert.Equal(("legacy:r2", true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Succeeded,
reconcileReason: Classified(new[] { Esp(DeviceSetup44), Esp(AccountSetup55) }))));
Assert.Equal(("legacy:r4", true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Succeeded,
reconcileReason: Classified(new[] { Esp(DeviceSetup44), Evt("desktop_arrived"), Evt("hello_provisioning_completed") }))));
Assert.Equal(("legacy:r1c", true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Succeeded,
reconcileReason: Classified(new[] { Esp(DeviceSetup44) }, selfDeploying: true))));
Assert.Equal(("legacy:r1", true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Failed,
failureReason: Classified(new[] { Evt("enrollment_failed") }))));
}
[Fact]
public void Derivation_recovers_the_origin_from_writer_suffixes()
{
var r6 = Classified(Array.Empty<EnrollmentEvent>());
Assert.Equal(("maxlife:r6", true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Incomplete,
failureReason: r6 + " Verdict triggered by the agent's max-lifetime watchdog shutdown.")));
Assert.Equal(("retro:r6", true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Incomplete,
failureReason: r6 + " Retro-reclassified from the legacy blanket timeout verdict.")));
}
[Fact]
public void Derivation_attributes_unambiguous_non_classifier_paths()
{
Assert.Equal((VerdictPaths.ManualFailed, true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Failed,
failureReason: "Manually marked as failed by administrator", failureSource: "manual", adminMarked: "Failed")));
Assert.Equal((VerdictPaths.ManualSucceeded, true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Succeeded, adminMarked: "Succeeded")));
Assert.Equal(("rule:ANALYZE-ESP-001", true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Failed,
failureReason: "Rule: ESP timeout", failureSource: "rule:ANALYZE-ESP-001")));
Assert.Equal((VerdictPaths.AgentComplete, true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Succeeded)));
Assert.Equal((VerdictPaths.AgentComplete, true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Succeeded,
reconcileReason: "Late completion report received — upgraded prior 'Incomplete' verdict")));
Assert.Equal((VerdictPaths.AgentCompleteSoft, true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Succeeded, soft: true)));
Assert.Equal((VerdictPaths.AgentFailed, true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Failed, failureReason: "ESP timeout (0x800705B4)")));
Assert.Equal((VerdictPaths.AgentEspFailureFallback, true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Failed, failureReason: "ESP failure (backend fallback)")));
Assert.Equal((VerdictPaths.SweepStalled, true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Stalled, failureReason: "Agent silent for 130min (detected by maintenance sweep)")));
Assert.Equal((VerdictPaths.AgentStallProbe, true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Stalled, failureReason: "Agent reported stall after 60min without progress (stall_probe)")));
Assert.Equal(("legacy:superseded", true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Incomplete, failureReason: "Superseded by session abc: re-registered")));
Assert.Equal((VerdictPaths.AgentWhiteGlovePending, true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Pending)));
}
[Fact]
public void Derivation_never_invents_a_path()
{
Assert.Equal((VerdictPaths.LegacyUnknown, true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Failed, failureReason: "Session timed out after 5 hours (started at 2026-01-01 UTC)")));
Assert.Equal((VerdictPaths.LegacyUnknown, true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Incomplete)));
Assert.Equal((VerdictPaths.LegacyUnknown, true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.InProgress)));
Assert.Equal((VerdictPaths.LegacyUnknown, true), VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(Row(SessionStatus.Succeeded, reconcileReason: "Some future wording")));
}
}
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ public class VulnerabilityReportEventSequenceTests
Assert.Equal("vulnerability_report", evt.EventType);
Assert.Equal(AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Constants.EventTypes.VulnerabilityReport, evt.EventType);
Assert.Equal("VulnerabilityCorrelationService", evt.Source);
Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Error, evt.Severity); // risk=high → Error
Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Warning, evt.Severity); // risk=high → Warning (severity is capped)
// Non-phase event: must stay Unknown so the UI timeline doesn't render a phantom phase boundary.
Assert.Equal(EnrollmentPhase.Unknown, evt.Phase);
Assert.Equal(NowUtc, evt.Timestamp);
@@ -127,6 +127,35 @@ public class VulnerabilityReportEventSequenceTests
Assert.IsType<Dictionary<string, object>>(evt.Data["scan_summary"]);
}
[Theory]
// The scan reports on the software inventory, not on the enrollment: a finding is never an
// enrollment failure, so severity is capped at Warning. Error/Critical would put the report
// into the diagnosis page's failure evidence and into MCP's failure-intent ranking.
[InlineData("critical", EventSeverity.Warning)]
[InlineData("high", EventSeverity.Warning)]
[InlineData("medium", EventSeverity.Info)]
[InlineData("low", EventSeverity.Info)]
[InlineData("none", EventSeverity.Info)]
[InlineData("HIGH", EventSeverity.Warning)] // case-insensitive
[InlineData("", EventSeverity.Info)]
public void Severity_IsCappedAtWarning(string risk, EventSeverity expected)
{
var evt = Build(null, new List<EnrollmentEvent>(), Report(risk));
Assert.Equal(expected, evt.Severity);
}
[Fact]
public void Severity_IsInfo_WhenRiskIsMissing()
{
var report = new Dictionary<string, object>
{
["scan_summary"] = new Dictionary<string, object>(),
};
Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Info, Build(null, new List<EnrollmentEvent>(), report).Severity);
}
[Fact]
public void Data_Phase_CarriesTheLabel()
{
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.Notifications;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// HMAC request-signature scheme for generic JSON webhooks: known-vector stability (the
/// scheme is a published contract receivers implement against), determinism, and
/// secret/message sensitivity.
/// </summary>
public class WebhookSignatureTests
{
[Fact]
public void ComputeSignature_MatchesKnownVector()
{
// Independently computed: HMACSHA256("whsec_test_0123456789abcdef", "1700000000.{"a":1}")
var signature = WebhookSignatureCalculator.ComputeSignature(
"whsec_test_0123456789abcdef", "1700000000", "{\"a\":1}");
Assert.Equal("sha256=07728d7e7b1736bac3de36a46c9bc0b660d59aa4a6f251544124fede1dc42a6c", signature);
}
[Fact]
public void ComputeSignature_IsDeterministic_AndSensitiveToEveryInput()
{
var baseline = WebhookSignatureCalculator.ComputeSignature("secret-0123456789", "1700000000", "{}");
Assert.Equal(baseline, WebhookSignatureCalculator.ComputeSignature("secret-0123456789", "1700000000", "{}"));
Assert.NotEqual(baseline, WebhookSignatureCalculator.ComputeSignature("secret-0123456789X", "1700000000", "{}"));
Assert.NotEqual(baseline, WebhookSignatureCalculator.ComputeSignature("secret-0123456789", "1700000001", "{}"));
Assert.NotEqual(baseline, WebhookSignatureCalculator.ComputeSignature("secret-0123456789", "1700000000", "{ }"));
}
[Fact]
public void HeaderNames_AreTheDocumentedContract()
{
Assert.Equal("X-AutopilotMonitor-Timestamp", WebhookSignatureCalculator.TimestampHeader);
Assert.Equal("X-AutopilotMonitor-Signature", WebhookSignatureCalculator.SignatureHeader);
}
}
@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.Identity.Web" Version="4.3.0" />
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer" Version="10.0.10" />
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.Extensions.Http.Polly" Version="8.0.25" />
<PackageReference Include="Resend" Version="0.2.1" />
</ItemGroup>
<ItemGroup>

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