feat(web): explain the blank WiFi signal in the network timeline

The timeline showed WiFi segments with an SSID and no signal, and an "Avg WiFi
signal" stat that simply vanished — on a location-gated device that reads as a
product defect rather than the Windows 24H2 gate that caused it.

No agent change was needed: buildSegments already merges every wifi_signal_info
into the WiFi segment covering its timestamp, so wifiDataLimitedReason rides in
with the sample that was already being read.

- NetSegment.dataLimitedReason, filled from the sample.
- Segments that never got a sample of their own (a mid-session reconnect emits
  no wifi_signal_info) inherit it: the gate is a device-level setting and cannot
  flip during an enrollment. A segment WITH a real reading is never overwritten
  — pinned by a test.
- Tooltip: "Signal: unavailable — Location services off on this device" where
  the percentage would be.
- Stats row: "Avg WiFi signal: n/a (Location services off)" instead of dropping
  the row.

network_state_change is deliberately left alone. That event has never carried
signalPercent or radioType — NetworkChangeDetector collects them into its
snapshot for change detection, but only before_/after_wifiSsid reaches the
payload — so there is no absent field there for a reason to explain, and the
SSID it does carry is unaffected by the gate. Adding it would ship a field
nothing reads.

Verified: web tsc + eslint (0 warnings) + vitest 893/893.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/agent/decision-engine.md

@@ -128,6 +128,15 @@ user-ESP Install-intent apps are still pending (IME logs "Completed user session
 *pass*, not once per session — sessions 14690fc2/6cb01530). The reducer stays free of
 app-pending guards; adapters sanitize evidence before it becomes a signal.
 
+**Zero user-targeted apps** (sessions 81daa77f/75d6ae8e): IME never writes its
+"Completed user session" line at all when the user has no assigned apps — its zero-app
+branch returns first — so fact 3 was unreachable by construction and every such device
+fell through to the backstop. `IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS` reads the line IME *does*
+write there and posts the same signal, guarded to the AccountSetup phase. The event
+carries an `evidence` field (`zero_user_apps_enumerated` vs `user_session_completed`)
+naming which observation carried the completion. See
+[zero-user-apps-completion-gate.md](zero-user-apps-completion-gate.md).
+
 ## Completion attempt sites and sequence
 
 Completion can be attempted from whichever fact arrives last: `HelloResolved`,
@@ -166,6 +175,11 @@ advisory backstop. All routes converge on `CompleteThroughFinalizingOrDefer`:
    scheduler contract) dead-ends as `realmjoin_timeout_stale_superseded_by_rearm`.
    The idle case (detected, no deployment activity ever) times out at 60 min
    unchanged, and phase 200/210 activity never extends.
+   A closed gate also outranks the 30-minute `AdvisoryCompletion` backstop: that
+   handler re-arms (trigger suffix `:CompletionGateHolding`) instead of failing while
+   the RealmJoin gate is closed *and* its own deadline is still armed, because the gate
+   carries a bounded resolution of its own. Before this, the shorter timer always won —
+   session 75d6ae8e was failed 2 min after its 25th successful RealmJoin package.
 2. `Finalizing` stage + ~5 s `FinalizingGrace` deadline.
 3. Grace fires → `Completed`, `EnrollmentComplete` outcome, `enrollment_complete`
    timeline event with full audit payload.

docs/agent/index.md

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ How the on-device agent works:
 * [Logs, Persistence & Crash Recovery](logs-and-persistence.md) - every persisted file and why it exists; signal log vs spool; snapshot/journal; the replay-based recovery flow and quarantine.
 * [Diagnostics Package](diagnostics-package.md) - what the diagnostics ZIP contains: the built-in section catalog shared with the portal (Shared `DiagnosticsBuiltInSections`, served by GET diagnostics/paths), the RealmJoin Watcher and Device Preparation collection gates, why built-ins bypass the configured-path guards, global ∪ tenant path dedup, caps and the package manifest.
 * [Hello Wizard Un-Skip](hello-wizard-unskip.md) - why a single "WHfB disabled" policy read never decides completion: the HelloWizardStarted signal (prevention + cure) and the HelloTracker confirmation second read.
+* [Zero User-Targeted Apps](zero-user-apps-completion-gate.md) - why a user with no targeted Intune apps starved every user-phase completion path (IME never writes its "Completed user session" line in the zero-app branch), and why a completion gate that is still holding the session must outrank the 30-minute backstop.
 * [Autopilot ZTD Diagnostics](autopilot-ztd-diagnostics.md) - Windows' own diagnostic surfaces for the profile-download flow: ModernDeployment event IDs (807/815/164/...), the Diagnostics\Autopilot registry key, deployment-service endpoints, and the known-issue error-code map.
 * [MDM Reboot Coalescing](mdm-reboot-coalescing.md) - attributing the mid-ESP coalesced reboot ("second sign-in") to the device-assigned policy URIs that forced it: aggregated 2800 observations (neutral, flush-time watermark) + ANALYZE-ESP-005 gated on an actually-observed reboot.
 * [Power-State Watcher](power-state-watcher.md) - live AC↔battery transitions and 50/30/15% downward threshold crossings via a WMI push subscription (no polling): power_state_change semantics (latch/debounce/cap, never armed without a battery) and the single-condition analyze rules ANALYZE-DEV-009/-010 on top.

docs/agent/wifi-ssid-location-gate.md

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+---
+type: Concept
+title: WiFi SSID and the Windows 24H2 Location Gate
+description: Why wifi_signal_info silently disappeared on Windows 11 24H2+ devices, why the netsh fallback could never fix it, and the tiered reader that restores the SSID from the SYSTEM context.
+resource: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/WifiInfoProvider.cs
+tags:
+  - agent
+  - interop
+  - wifi
+  - telemetry
+timestamp: 2026-08-26T14:05:00+02:00
+---
+
+# Summary
+
+The agent reports the enrollment WiFi as a `wifi_signal_info` event (SSID, signal, PHY, channel).
+On Windows 11 24H2 and later the event went missing on a large share of devices — no error, no
+partial payload, simply no event. The cause is a Windows privacy change, not a bug in the reader:
+**`WlanQueryInterface` with `wlan_intf_opcode_current_connection` is gated behind precise-location
+consent**, and the agent runs as SYSTEM in session 0 where that consent usually does not exist.
+
+The fix is a tiered reader ([WifiInfoProvider](../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/WifiInfoProvider.cs))
+whose middle tier uses the one SSID API Microsoft left ungated.
+
+# The Gate
+
+Microsoft restricted the Win32 WLAN APIs that expose BSSIDs, because nearby-BSSID lists are a
+precise-location oracle. Without consent these return `ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED` (5):
+
+* `WlanGetAvailableNetworkList`
+* `WlanGetNetworkBssList`
+* `WlanScan`
+* **`WlanQueryInterface` when `OpCode` is `wlan_intf_opcode_current_connection`** — the only opcode
+  the agent needs, and the one that carries SSID, signal quality, PHY type.
+
+Two properties of the gate decide the agent's fate:
+
+1. **The consent prompt only appears for a process running in the user's context and outside
+   `C:\Windows\System32`.** The agent is neither during ESP: it is SYSTEM, in session 0, before any
+   user has seen the OOBE privacy page. It is therefore denied *silently* — no prompt, no event
+   log, nothing that surfaces without asking the API for its return code.
+2. **Consent resolves per user hive, with the device-level setting as the floor.** An interactive
+   user typically has
+   `HKCU\...\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\location\NonPackaged\Value = Allow`
+   ("Let desktop apps access your location"). The SYSTEM account (`HKU\S-1-5-18`) normally has
+   **nothing** set there and falls back to
+   `HKLM\...\ConsentStore\location\Value`. Where that device-level value is `Deny`, SYSTEM is
+   denied even though the logged-on user on the very same machine reads the SSID fine.
+
+That asymmetry is why the failure looks random from the outside: it tracks the **image's
+device-level location setting**, which varies per fleet, not per hardware, driver, or language.
+
+# Why netsh Was Never the Answer
+
+`NetshWifiFallback` was added in 2026-07 on the theory that inbox `netsh` still reported the
+connection where the WLAN API did not, and it was later extended with localized label variants for
+every enrollment-geography language. Field data says otherwise: **`netsh wlan` hangs off the same
+location gate** ("Network shell commands need location permission to access WLAN information"), so
+it fails in lockstep with tier 1 rather than covering for it. In the reported session the agent
+build already contained the netsh fallback and still produced no event.
+
+Consequence for future work: **adding more netsh language labels cannot fix a missing SSID.** Every
+`wifi_signal_info` event that does exist carries a fully populated SSID — the failure is binary at
+the reader level, never a half-parsed or mis-decoded payload. A missing SSID is an access problem,
+not a parsing problem.
+
+# The Tiered Reader
+
+`WifiInfoProvider.TryRead` owns the order so the two collectors (`DeviceInfoCollector`,
+`NetworkChangeDetector`) cannot drift apart. First non-null wins:
+
+| # | Reader | Yields | Location-gated |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 1 | `WifiInfoReader` (native `wlanapi.dll`) | SSID, signal %, PHY, channel | yes |
+| 2 | `WinRtWifiSsidReader` (WinRT `GetConnectedSsid`) | SSID only | **no** |
+| 3 | `NetshWifiFallback` (process spawn, localized parse) | SSID, signal %, radio type, channel | yes |
+
+Tier 2 is Microsoft's own documented replacement for this exact scenario:
+`Windows.Networking.Connectivity.WlanConnectionProfileDetails.GetConnectedSsid()`. It is not part of
+the BSSID-bearing surface, so it needs no consent, and it has existed since Windows 10 1507.
+
+It is bound through the CLR's built-in WinRT projection with
+`Type.GetType("…, ContentType=WindowsRuntime")` — no NuGet package, no winmd reference, no csproj
+change — the same mechanism [OobeStateReader](../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/OobeStateReader.cs)
+already uses from the SYSTEM service context. Every step degrades to null rather than throwing,
+because the caller runs fire-and-forget inside `Task.Run`.
+
+# Telling the Operator
+
+A missing signal reading is indistinguishable from a bug unless the payload says why, and the
+device-level location setting is not something an admin would think to check. When tier 2 wins
+*and* the native tier reported `rc=5`, the `wifi_signal_info` payload therefore carries
+
+```
+wifiDataLimitedReason = "location_services_off"
+```
+
+and the event message gains `- signal unavailable, Location services off`, so the reason is visible
+in the timeline itself. The portal's WiFi card (`DeviceDetailsCard`) matches that literal and
+renders the explanation plus the Intune setting that fixes it. The value is a published contract —
+agent, portal and the MCP device-property catalog all match the same string.
+
+The claim is only made on observed evidence: any other native failure (no WLAN service, no
+connected interface) leaves the field null rather than blaming a privacy setting we did not
+measure. `WifiInfoProvider.IsLocationGateDenied` is the single predicate, pinned by tests at its
+boundaries (`rc=5` yes; `rc=50`, `rc=5023`, `rc=1062` no).
+
+The network timeline reads the same field. It needs no payload of its own: `buildSegments`
+already merges every `wifi_signal_info` into the WiFi segment covering its timestamp, so the
+reason rides in with the sample. A segment that never got a sample (a mid-session reconnect emits
+no `wifi_signal_info`) inherits it — the gate is a device-level setting and cannot flip during an
+enrollment — while a segment that *did* get a real reading is never overwritten. The segment
+tooltip then reads `Signal: unavailable - Location services off on this device` where the
+percentage would be, and the "Avg WiFi signal" stat says `n/a (Location services off)` instead of
+disappearing.
+
+`network_state_change` deliberately does NOT carry the reason: that event has never carried
+`signalPercent` or `radioType` at all (`NetworkChangeDetector` collects them into its snapshot for
+change detection but only `before_/after_wifiSsid` reaches the payload), so there is no absent
+field there for a reason to explain. Adding it would ship a field nothing reads. The SSID it does
+carry is unaffected by the gate.
+
+Fleet-wide the same field is queryable through
+`search_sessions(deviceProperties: { "wifi_signal_info.wifiDataLimitedReason": "location_services_off" })`,
+which sizes how much of a fleet is affected before anyone changes a policy.
+
+Tier 2 returns the SSID alone. Signal quality, PHY type and channel have no ungated source; they
+stay null when the native tier is denied. That is deliberate — deriving a percentage from
+`ConnectionProfile.GetSignalBars()` (0–5) would fabricate precision the API does not have.
+
+# Diagnostics
+
+The step-level native return codes were already collected, but they were logged with
+`_logger.Debug` — and the agent's default log level is `Info`, so the diagnostic built to explain
+this failure never reached a single field log. Both collectors now log at **Warning** when all tiers
+fail, which they only reach when the active NIC really is WiFi. A native `rc=5` is spelled out as
+`ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED` with the location-gate explanation, so the log line diagnoses itself:
+
+```
+EnrollmentTracker: no wifi_signal_info — no WiFi info from any reader — native: [<guid>]
+query(current_connection) rc=5; ; WinRT: no SSID; netsh: no parsable output. rc=5 is
+ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED — Windows 11 24H2+ gates the current-connection opcode (and netsh wlan)
+behind precise-location consent, which is off in this image; enable Location services to
+restore signal/PHY/channel.
+```
+
+# Evidence
+
+Session `7305e0ad` (HP EliteBook X Flip G1i, build 26200.9168, agent 2.0.1407, reported as
+`WIFI SSID fehlt`): `network_interface_info` shows the active NIC as `Intel(R) Wi-Fi 7 BE201`,
+`Wireless80211`, `connectionType=WiFi`, so the `isWifi` gate passed and collection ran — yet zero
+`wifi_signal_info` events across 214 events and 22 minutes, with the netsh fallback already shipped
+in that build.
+
+Fleet correlation over WiFi sessions from 2026-08-01 (n=276), share with a `wifi_signal_info` event:
+
+| OS build | WiFi sessions | with SSID |
+|---|---|---|
+| 22631 (23H2, pre-gate) | 3 | 100% |
+| 26100 (24H2) | 178 | 21% |
+| 26200 (25H2) | 95 | 45% |
+
+Within a single model the outcome splits by fleet, not by hardware — ThinkPad T14 Gen 6: 7/91;
+ThinkPad E14 Gen 7: 9/9 — which is what a per-image privacy setting looks like.
+
+Local verification (build 26220.9022): `HKLM\…\ConsentStore\location = Deny` while
+`HKCU\…\ConsentStore\location\NonPackaged = Allow`; the interactive user reads the SSID through
+both the native API and netsh, `HKU\S-1-5-18` has no consent value at all, and the WinRT chain
+resolves and returns the SSID under net48.
+
+# Operator Guidance
+
+A device that reports no SSID is not misconfigured for enrollment — only the telemetry field is
+missing. To get the full payload (signal, PHY, channel) back, the **device-level** location setting
+must be on: *Settings → Privacy & security → Location → Location services*, or via Intune
+(`Privacy/LetAppsAccessLocation`). Without it the SSID still arrives via tier 2.
+
+# Citations
+
+* [Changes to API behavior for Wi-Fi access and location](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/nativewifi/wi-fi-access-location-changes)
+* [WlanConnectionProfileDetails.GetConnectedSsid](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/uwp/api/windows.networking.connectivity.wlanconnectionprofiledetails.getconnectedssid)
+* [WifiInfoProvider.cs](../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/WifiInfoProvider.cs)
+* [WinRtWifiSsidReader.cs](../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/WinRtWifiSsidReader.cs)
+* [WifiInfoReader.cs](../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/WifiInfoReader.cs)
+* [NetshWifiFallback.cs](../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/NetshWifiFallback.cs)

docs/agent/zero-user-apps-completion-gate.md

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+---
+type: Concept
+title: Zero User-Targeted Apps — the starved user-phase completion gate
+description: Why a device with no user-targeted Intune apps could never satisfy the IME user-session gate, how that turned into a 30-minute esp_exit_without_completion_evidence false positive on a third of one tenant's enrollments, and the two fixes — reading the line IME actually writes in its zero-app branch, and refusing to fail a session while a completion gate is deliberately holding it.
+resource: /src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime
+tags:
+  - agent
+  - ime
+  - esp
+  - completion
+  - realmjoin
+  - false-positive
+timestamp: 2026-08-25
+---
+
+# Summary
+
+A Classic user-driven enrollment whose user has **zero targeted Intune Win32 apps** could not
+produce the evidence every user-phase completion path required. The session parked, and the
+30-minute `advisory_completion` backstop resolved it as
+`enrollment_failed: esp_exit_without_completion_evidence` — while the user was at a working
+desktop, Windows Hello was provisioned, and RealmJoin was still installing packages.
+
+One tenant hit this on **10 of 30 enrollments in a week**. Every one of them was a false
+positive; the devices were healthy in Intune and RealmJoin.
+
+# The starvation chain
+
+The IME writes `Completed user session N, userId: …` at the end of a user-session processing
+pass. `IME-USER-SESSION-COMPLETED` matches it and the adapter posts
+`ImeUserSessionCompleted`, which sets `DecisionState.ImeUserSessionCompletedUtc`.
+
+But the IME never reaches that statement when the user has no assigned apps. Decompiled IME
+`1.104.102.0`, `Win32AppPlugIn/ApplicationPoller.cs`:
+
+```csharp
+if (!appPolicies.Any())
+{
+    AppWorkloadLog.TraceInformation($"[Win32App] Get 0 apps for user session {user.RDSSessionId}, user id = {user.IntuneId}");
+    RegisterApplicationsInIfInESP(sender, user, delegate {
+        espLockInProcessor.AttemptToLockInApplications(user, new List<ProcessorSubgraph>());
+    });
+    continue;                       // skips the "Completed user session" statement below
+}
+```
+
+Identical shape in `1.97.107.0`, `1.83.107.0`, `1.80.132.0`. With that fact missing, every door
+out of the user phase is shut at once:
+
+| Path | Requirement | Why it is dead |
+|---|---|---|
+| `ShouldTransitionToAwaitingHello` arm A | `AccountSetupProvisioningSucceededUtc` | ESP registry froze at `AccountSetup: 1 of 5`; neither `categorySucceeded` nor the all-subcategories fallback can ever hold |
+| arm B | `SkipUserEsp` | Full ESP, not a skip-user flow |
+| arm C | `IsImeUserSessionGenuine` | needs the missing IME fact |
+| arm D | `EnrollmentMode.DevicePreparation` | Autopilot v1, not WDP |
+| `MaybeSynthesizeAccountSetupCompleteFromSettledUserApps` | `AreUserEspAppsSettled` | returned `false` on an empty app list |
+| `HandleAdvisoryCompletionDeadlineFired` conjunction | `imeUserSessionGenuine \|\| isObservationAdvisory` | both false |
+
+The last row is the one that produced the verdict: the backstop that exists to resolve a
+dead-end resolved it as a failure.
+
+`AreUserEspAppsSettled` deserves its own note. Its "at least one required app" rule is
+deliberately conservative — an empty list normally means *the phase just cleared* or *apps have
+not surfaced yet*. But it made **zero apps**, the most settled state possible, indistinguishable
+from *unknown*, and there was no evidence available to tell them apart.
+
+# Fix 1 — read the line IME does write
+
+`IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS` matches the zero-app line and routes it through the **same**
+`OnUserSessionCompleted` callback. Downstream this genuinely *is* a completed user session, so
+the adapter's pending-apps deferral and its fire-once flag apply unchanged.
+
+This is not a weakened gate — it is IME's own verdict. The zero-app branch locks the ESP in with
+an *empty* application list, and the sibling emit site in `AppWorkloadAbstraction.ExecuteUserCheckIn`
+returns `ProviderResult.ProvisioningComplete` straight after logging it. All three emit sites are
+user-session-scoped (`user.RDSSessionId`, `user.IntuneId`); none is device-scoped.
+
+Guards that stay in force:
+
+* **Phase guard** — the observation only fires while the tracker is in `AccountSetup`. Firing
+  earlier would burn the adapter's fire-once flag on a pre-sign-in (defaultuser0) timestamp that
+  `IsImeUserSessionGenuine` (`>= AccountSetupEnteredUtc`) can never accept. An observation made
+  before the phase was known is remembered and replayed on the transition into it, because IME
+  writes its check-in lines independently of when the agent first parses the phase marker.
+* **Engine guards unchanged** — arm C still requires a post-AccountSetup final ESP exit *and* a
+  DAD-validated real-user desktop.
+* `AreUserEspAppsSettled` returns `true` for an empty list **only** with this explicit
+  observation — never for a merely empty list.
+
+# Fix 2 — do not fail while a completion gate is holding
+
+An independent defect, and the decisive one for the affected tenant. `advisory_completion` runs
+for 30 minutes. The RealmJoin completion gate blocks completion until phase 110 and carries its
+*own* bounded resolution: 60 minutes from detection, re-armed on deployment activity, hard-capped
+at 4 hours. The shorter timer always won.
+
+Session `75d6ae8e` installed **25 RealmJoin packages successfully inside the window**, the last
+one 2 minutes before the failure, while the engine's own `completion_waiting` still read
+`waiting on: realmjoin_resolution`.
+
+`HandleAdvisoryCompletionDeadlineFired` now re-arms instead of failing when the RealmJoin gate is
+closed *and* its deadline is still armed, emitting `completion_waiting` with trigger
+`DeadlineFired:advisory_completion:CompletionGateHolding`.
+
+Convergence comes from the gate itself: `Resolved`, `FirstDeploymentIncomplete` and `Timeout` all
+set `RealmJoinFacts.Outcome`, which opens `RealmJoinGateOpen` and stops the guard applying.
+Requiring the gate's deadline to still be armed keeps a gate that can no longer resolve itself
+from parking the session; `AgentMaxLifetimeMinutes` bounds it regardless.
+
+# Timeline evidence
+
+`ime_user_session_completed` carries an `evidence` field so the basis of the verdict is legible
+without the diagnostics archive:
+
+* `user_session_completed` — IME wrote its completion line and no required app was pending.
+* `zero_user_apps_enumerated` — IME reported zero targeted apps; the user phase had nothing to
+  enforce.
+
+No new event type: the fact is the same, only the observation behind it differs.
+
+# Deployment
+
+The pattern ships through the config API and reaches existing agents without a rebuild; an agent
+that does not know the `userSessionZeroApps` action logs one Debug line and ignores it. The
+*behaviour* needs an agent release. Sessions already stamped `Failed` are not reclassified — the
+backend mirrors the agent verdict (`VerdictPaths.AgentFailed`) and has no independent judgement
+here by design.
+
+# Citations
+
+* `rules/ime-log-patterns/IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS.json`
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime/ImeLogTracker.Handlers.cs` — `HandleUserSessionZeroApps`, the phase replay in `HandleEspPhaseDetected`
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime/ImeLogTracker.cs` — `AreUserEspAppsSettled`
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/SignalAdapters/ImeLogTrackerAdapter.cs` — `EmitUserSessionCompleted`, evidence labels
+* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore/Engine/DecisionEngine.Edge.cs` — `HandleAdvisoryCompletionDeadlineFired`
+* [decision-engine.md](decision-engine.md), [post-reboot-completion-recovery.md](post-reboot-completion-recovery.md)

docs/backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md

@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ Enforcing immediately would be reckless: any device population whose certificate
 extension, or whose CA behaves differently (sovereign clouds), would be locked out at once. The
 rollout therefore has staged consequences.
 
-**Stage 1 — shadow (current).** `SecurityValidator.ObserveCertTenantBinding` evaluates the binding
+**Stage 1 — shadow (completed, kept as the measurement that justified stage 2).** `SecurityValidator.ObserveCertTenantBinding` evaluates the binding
 after certificate validation and logs the outcome. It returns `void`, changes no state, and swallows
 its own exceptions, so it cannot fail a request that would otherwise be accepted. The pure comparison
 lives in `CertTenantBinding.Evaluate`; the outcome codes (`Match`, `Mismatch`, `ExtensionMissing`,
@@ -102,14 +102,82 @@ is disabled), so a `Match` trace is dead code that silently costs the denominato
 deployment of this feature made exactly that mistake: it emitted zero rows across 32k requests,
 which is indistinguishable from the code never running.
 
-**Stage 2 — enforce.** Once telemetry shows the `ExtensionMissing` rate is negligible, `Mismatch`
-becomes a rejection. The decision that still has to be made is the policy for certificates without
-the extension: skip with a warning, or reject. Grep marker for every stage-2 site:
-`CERT-TENANT-BINDING-SHADOW`.
+**Stage 2 — enforced since 2026-08-25.** `Mismatch` returns 403 and is recorded through the shared
+`LogRequestRejection` path (`stage=certtenant`) so it lands in the same KQL raster as every other
+rejection reason. The switch was made against measured data: 35,684 requests across 32 tenants,
+every one a `Match`, with the Warning channel independently verified to be carrying other traffic so
+the zero could not be a telemetry artefact.
+
+The rule lives in one place, `CertTenantBinding.Rejects`, and only `Mismatch` blocks. Everything
+else means "cannot tell" and is deliberately tolerated:
+
+* `ExtensionMissing` — the sample only covers devices active in the measurement window, so older
+  certificates or a sovereign-cloud CA could still lack the extension. Rejecting on absence would
+  lock those devices out for something they cannot control. **This is the one to tighten later**,
+  once the `ExtensionMissing` rate is provably zero across a wider window; a test pins the current
+  tolerance so removing it has to be a deliberate decision rather than a drive-by edit.
+* `Unparseable` — a decoder or encoding surprise is our problem, not the device's.
+* `RequestTenantNotAGuid` — nothing to compare against, and such a request fails the tenant lookup
+  in §0 long before reaching this point.
+
+The evaluation fails open on its own exception: this gate exists to stop a cross-tenant certificate,
+and a defect on our side is not evidence of one. The 403 body deliberately does not echo which
+tenant the certificate belongs to — that pair is in the rejection log, not in the response.
+
+Grep marker for every site involved: `CERT-TENANT-BINDING`.
 
 The bootstrap-token path (`X-Bootstrap-Token`) bypasses certificate validation by design and is
 unaffected by either stage.
 
+**Stage 3 — device binding (Global-Admin-only preview).** Tenant binding proves the certificate was
+issued to this tenant; it does not prove the certificate belongs to a device the tenant still has.
+`IntuneDeviceBindingValidator` closes that by resolving the Intune managedDevice id from the
+certificate's Subject CN against the tenant's own `deviceManagement/managedDevices` inventory
+(point-GET on `managedDevices/{id}` — no OData filter to inject into, and a 404 is unambiguous).
+
+It is modelled on `CloudPcDeviceValidator` and shares its cache/retry/transient contract, with one
+important difference in how it is wired: the lookup is fire-and-forget, like the DevPrep
+association shadow, because a cold Graph round-trip can take seconds and must never sit in the
+agent's request path. That rules out the request-row dimension stage 1 uses — the row is written
+the moment the function returns, before the detached task finishes — so the outcome is logged at
+Warning instead. Volume stays bounded because only Global Admins can see the toggle
+(`user?.isGlobalAdmin === true`, the same gate as the DevPrep preview). Widening it beyond preview
+should move to an inline call plus a request dimension.
+
+Outcomes: `Match`, `NotFound`, `NoDeviceIdInCert`, `PermissionMissing`, `Transient`. Only
+`Transient` is retried and left uncached — a missing grant or a foreign device is a state, not an
+outage.
+
+Graph cost is not a concern, and that is measured rather than assumed: the first live enrollment
+produced **136 requests and exactly one Graph call**, because the 30-minute positive cache absorbs
+the rest. For comparison, the per-request Autopilot serial validator made 25 calls in the same
+window. Lengthening the positive TTL would buy nothing and would delay noticing a device that has
+been wiped or removed; shortening the 5-minute negative TTL matters more, since that is how quickly
+a device object appearing late is picked up.
+
+What the 136 requests *did* cost was log lines saying the same thing 136 times, so the shadow log is
+gated on `IntuneDeviceBindingResult.ServedFromCache`: one line per real Graph lookup. Cached repeats
+add nothing — the reported age just counts up mechanically from the same `enrolledDateTime`.
+Outcomes that are never cached (`Transient`, `NoDeviceIdInCert`) still log every time, which is the
+right behaviour for an anomaly.
+
+The open question this preview exists to answer is a race, not an attack: a device object can in
+principle appear in Intune *after* the agent's first call, and enforcing before that is understood
+would reject legitimate enrollments. Every result therefore carries `enrolledDateTime`, and the log
+line records `enrolledAgeSeconds` — a device whose object was created seconds before the request
+looks completely different from a certificate that never belonged to the tenant. Grep marker:
+`CERT-DEVICE-BINDING-SHADOW`.
+
+Enabling it needs the optional Graph permission `DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All`, granted
+per tenant with the customer script — it is not in the default-consent set:
+
+```powershell
+.\Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1 -ClientId "<client-id>" -Features IntuneDeviceBinding
+```
+
+`GraphFeatureCatalog` (feature `IntuneDeviceBinding`) and the script's catalog, `ValidateSet` and
+help block are pinned to each other by `GraphFeatureCatalogSyncTests`.
+
 # Examples
 
 Coverage — the question stage 2 depends on ("would enforcing lock anyone out?"):
@@ -138,6 +206,23 @@ that stage-2 enforcement would have to make a policy decision about. Note that t
 alone can never show `Match`, so it cannot tell "everything matched" apart from "nothing ran" —
 use the request-row query for that.
 
+Stage 3, including the enrollment-race measurement:
+
+```kusto
+traces
+| where message has "AgentCertDeviceBinding"
+| extend Outcome  = tostring(customDimensions.Outcome),
+         AgeSecs  = toint(customDimensions.EnrolledAgeSeconds)
+| summarize Requests = count(),
+            MinAgeSecs = min(AgeSecs),
+            P05AgeSecs = percentile(AgeSecs, 5)
+    by Outcome
+```
+
+`NotFound` is the row that decides whether this can ever become a gate. A small `MinAgeSecs` on
+`Match` means device objects are appearing only just in time — the race is real and enforcement
+would need a grace path.
+
 # Citations
 
 * `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Security/MsDeviceCertificateOids.cs` — OID catalog and the

docs/index.md

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com (separate repository).
 * [Gather Rule Debug Log](agent/gather-rule-debug-log.md) - EnableGatherRuleDebugLog (ConfigVersion 36): the per-tenant local trace file that explains every gather-rule evaluation decision — scope skips, on_change suppression, empty collector results, logparser position/parse-mode outcomes — for rules that produce no timeline events.
 * [MDM Reboot Coalescing](agent/mdm-reboot-coalescing.md) - Attributing the mid-ESP coalesced reboot ("second sign-in") to the device-assigned policy URIs that forced it: aggregated DM-Enterprise 2800 observations (neutral, flush-time watermark) + the ANALYZE-ESP-005 advisory gated on an actually-observed reboot.
 * [ESP Completion Starvation — the sits-d Cloud-PC complex](agent/post-reboot-completion-recovery.md) - Why a SkipUser=true flow (no user ESP page → no Shell-Core 62407, no AccountSetup registry) left the completion gate satisfied but never evaluated — five Cloud PCs idled six hours at "waiting on: hello_resolution" — and the fix: the observed skip stands in for the final-exit evidence in the IME user-session completion attempt. Plus the two adjacent defects fixed alongside: the edge-only user-apps-settled synthesis (now level-triggered) and the never-wired Shell-Core restart replay (now Hello-wizard-only, with the reasoning why a replayed 62407 must never reach the reducer).
+* [Zero User-Targeted Apps — the starved user-phase completion gate](agent/zero-user-apps-completion-gate.md) - Why a device with no user-targeted Intune apps could never satisfy the IME user-session gate — IME skips its "Completed user session" line entirely in the zero-app branch — turning the 30-minute completion backstop into `esp_exit_without_completion_evidence` on a third of one tenant's enrollments, with the user at the desktop and RealmJoin still installing. The two fixes: read the line IME does write (IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS), and never fail a session while a completion gate with its own armed deadline is deliberately holding it.
 * [Secure Boot CA-2023 Detection](agent/secureboot-ca2023-detection.md) - Why ANALYZE-SEC-001 v3 reads the UEFI db/KEK variables directly instead of trusting the SecureBoot\Servicing registry, and how the one-sided uefiCa2023FirmwareConfirmed marker plus a not_exists precondition give absence-tolerant suppression across old and new agents.
 * [Continue-Anyway Observation Mode](agent/continue-anyway-observation.md) - EnableEspContinueAnywayObservation (ConfigVersion 37, operator-set): Device-phase ESP terminal failures on Continue-Anyway profiles get a bounded 60-min observation instead of an immediate hard fail; the DAD-validated real-user desktop + Hello gate detect the true end, the session completes Succeeded + EspSoftFailure (amber "with issues" badge), expiry un-defangs to the original esp_terminal_failure.
 * [CMTrace Time Resolution](agent/cmtrace-time-resolution.md) - Converting bias-less CMTrace local times to UTC without trusting any process's timezone belief: per-line self-anchoring on the 15-minute offset grid for provably fresh lines, uniform marked reader-zone fallback for backlog, and the provenance vocabulary (bias / line-anchored / reader-zone-fallback) that keeps every event re-derivable.
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com (separate repository).
 * [System Timeline Watcher](agent/system-timeline-watcher.md) - Ground truth for two timeline blind spots from one System-channel EventLogWatcher with pre-agent backfill: system_clock_changed (Kernel-General 1 — oldTime/newTime/signed timeDeltaMs/reason/setting process; 2 s micro-slew floor, ≥5 min Warning+immediate) and system_sleep_episode (Power-Troubleshooter 1 sleep/hibernate + Kernel-Power 507 Modern Standby; authoritative enteredAt/exitedAt payload instants, 60 s Modern-Standby floor). Consumed by the TimeJumpBadge clock-set cause, the SessionInfoCard standby note, time-attribution SleepSpans (AttributionVersion 3) and ANALYZE-DEV-012.
 * [DO GroupId Auto-Set](agent/do-group-id-auto-set.md) - EnableDoGroupIdAutoSet (ConfigVersion 40): the agent seeds the Delivery Optimization DOGroupId policy with a deterministic network-fingerprint GUID (default gateway IPv4 + SendARP MAC, RealmJoin-compatible byte layout) so same-network devices form one DO peering group during ESP; ownership-tracked via the StartupEventGate fingerprint, foreign DOGroupId/DOGroupIdSource policies always win, no random-GUID fallback.
 * [ESP Policy-Provider Stall Detection](agent/esp-policy-provider-stall.md) - The EnrollmentStatusTracking CSP's no-timeout Setup/Apps wait is keyed to the Intune-registered "Sidecar" provider by NAME: co-management's "ConfigMgr" parks the user ESP at "Apps (Identifying)" for days even with TrackingPoliciesCreated=1 (issue #106); the always-on two-arm esp_policy_provider_stalled tripwire (provider_incomplete | sidecar_provider_missing) and the SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Autopilot gather-rule allowlist entry that surface it.
+* [WiFi SSID and the Windows 24H2 Location Gate](agent/wifi-ssid-location-gate.md) - Why wifi_signal_info vanished on Windows 11 24H2+: WlanQueryInterface(wlan_intf_opcode_current_connection) is gated behind precise-location consent, the prompt only fires in a user context outside System32, and SYSTEM in session 0 falls back to the device-level ConsentStore value - so netsh (same gate) could never cover for it. The tiered WifiInfoProvider (native, then ungated WinRT GetConnectedSsid, then netsh), SSID-only semantics on tier 2, and the Warning-level rc=5 diagnostic that names the gate.
 
 # Rules
 

docs/log.md

@@ -1,7 +1,36 @@
 # Log
 
+## 2026-08-26
+
+* **Update**: `agent/wifi-ssid-location-gate.md` - the network timeline now explains its blank signal too, with no agent change: `buildSegments` already merges `wifi_signal_info` into the covering WiFi segment, so `wifiDataLimitedReason` rides in with the sample. Segments that never got a sample (a mid-session reconnect emits none) inherit it - the gate is a device-level setting and cannot flip mid-enrollment - while a segment with a real reading is never overwritten. Tooltip shows `Signal: unavailable - Location services off on this device`; the "Avg WiFi signal" stat reads `n/a (Location services off)` instead of vanishing. `network_state_change` is deliberately left alone: it has never carried `signalPercent` or `radioType` (only `before_/after_wifiSsid` reaches its payload), so there is no absent field there for a reason to explain, and the SSID it does carry is unaffected by the gate. Web-only change.
+
+
+## 2026-08-26
+
+* **Update**: `agent/wifi-ssid-location-gate.md` - the gate is now surfaced instead of only logged. When the WinRT tier wins and the native tier reported `rc=5`, `wifi_signal_info` carries `wifiDataLimitedReason = "location_services_off"` and the message gains `- signal unavailable, Location services off`, so the reason is readable straight from the timeline; the portal WiFi card (`DeviceDetailsCard`) matches that literal and names the Intune setting that restores the full payload. The claim is evidence-only - any other native failure leaves the field null rather than blaming a privacy setting, with `IsLocationGateDenied` pinned at its boundaries. New `wifi_signal_info` group in the MCP `DEVICE_PROPERTIES_CATALOG` so a fleet can be sized via `search_sessions` before any policy changes. Agent release + web deploy + MCP redeploy; backend untouched (the payload is opaque DataJson).
+
+
+## 2026-08-26
+
+* **New**: `agent/wifi-ssid-location-gate.md` - `wifi_signal_info` was missing on most Windows 11 24H2+ WiFi enrollments (build 22631 3/3, 26100 37/178, 26200 43/95 over n=276 sessions from 08-01). Not a parser or language problem: every event that exists carries a full SSID, so the failure is binary at the reader. Cause is the 24H2 location gate on `WlanQueryInterface` with `wlan_intf_opcode_current_connection` - the only opcode the agent uses - which returns `ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED`; the consent prompt only fires for a process in the user context outside `System32`, so the agent (SYSTEM, session 0, pre-privacy-page) is denied silently, and it resolves consent from the HKLM ConsentStore because the `S-1-5-18` hive has none - while the interactive user on the same box reads the SSID fine via the per-user NonPackaged value. `netsh wlan` hangs off the same gate, so the 2026-07 netsh fallback (and its multi-language labels) never covered the case it was built for; more labels cannot fix it. New `WinRtWifiSsidReader` uses the documented replacement `WlanConnectionProfileDetails.GetConnectedSsid` (ungated, SSID only), bound via the CLR WinRT projection with no winmd/NuGet like `OobeStateReader`; new `WifiInfoProvider` owns the tier order (native, WinRT, netsh) that both collectors had duplicated. The step diagnostics added in 2026-07 were logged at `Debug` while the default level is `Info`, so they never reached a field log - the all-tiers-failed case is now a Warning that decodes `rc=5` into the location-gate explanation. Agent-only change; needs an agent release.
+
+
+## 2026-08-25
+
+* **Update**: `backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md` — stage 2 enforced: `Mismatch` now returns 403 via `LogRequestRejection(stage=certtenant)`. Switched on against 35,684 requests / 32 tenants at 100 % `Match`, with the Warning channel verified to be carrying other traffic so the zero was not an artefact. The rule is one function (`CertTenantBinding.Rejects`) and only `Mismatch` blocks; `ExtensionMissing` / `Unparseable` / `RequestTenantNotAGuid` are tolerated on purpose (the first is the candidate for later tightening and has a test pinning the tolerance). Evaluation fails open on its own exception, and the 403 body does not echo the certificate's tenant. Device binding (stage 3) stays shadow + Global-Admin-only and is unaffected.
+
+## 2026-08-25
+
+* **New**: `agent/zero-user-apps-completion-gate.md` — a Classic enrollment whose user has zero targeted Intune Win32 apps could not produce the evidence any user-phase completion path required: IME's zero-app branch (`ApplicationPoller`, verified against decompiled 1.104.102.0 and three older builds) `continue`s before its `Completed user session` statement, so `ImeUserSessionCompletedUtc` stayed null, all four arms of `ShouldTransitionToAwaitingHello` were dead, and the 30-min `advisory_completion` backstop resolved the session as `esp_exit_without_completion_evidence` — with a DAD-validated desktop, Hello provisioned and RealmJoin still installing. One tenant: 10 of 30 enrollments in a week, all false positives. Two fixes. (1) New pattern `IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS` reads the line IME *does* write and routes it through the same `OnUserSessionCompleted` callback, guarded to the AccountSetup phase and replayed if the observation predates the phase marker; `AreUserEspAppsSettled` now accepts an empty app list only with that explicit observation. (2) `HandleAdvisoryCompletionDeadlineFired` re-arms instead of failing while the RealmJoin gate is closed and its own deadline is still armed — session 75d6ae8e installed 25 RealmJoin packages inside the window, the last 2 min before the failure. `ime_user_session_completed` gains an `evidence` field (`zero_user_apps_enumerated` / `user_session_completed`); no new event type. The pattern reaches existing agents via the config API (an unknown action is a Debug line), the behaviour needs an agent release.
+
 ## 2026-08-24
 
+* **Change**: `DeviceAssociationValidator` / `SecurityValidator` — the DevPrep association shadow now logs one line per real Graph lookup instead of one per request (`DeviceAssociationResult.ServedFromCache`, `AsCacheHit()` copies rather than marking the shared cached instance), the same gate the cert-device-binding shadow uses. Measured: one enrollment produced 263 identical lines off a handful of calls. Status of that preview, for the record: the `/beta/deviceManagement/tenantAssociatedDevices` endpoint answers (6 calls, all HTTP 200, `transient=False`), but every result so far is `matched=False` from a single Autopilot **v1** device — which is the correct answer for a device that was never part of a Device Preparation policy. The matching itself is therefore still unproven, and the endpoint remains undocumented in both v1.0 and beta Graph reference, so it is not a basis for enforcement.
+
+* **Update**: `backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md` — stage 3 verified live (`ea6a375`, gktatooine): 136 requests, all `Match`, device object ~72 s older than the session start, so no enrollment race in that run. Measured Graph cost: **1 call for 136 requests** (30 min positive cache), versus 25 for the per-request Autopilot validator — the positive TTL needs no change. The shadow log is now gated on `ServedFromCache` (one line per real lookup instead of per request); never-cached outcomes still log every time.
+
+* **Update**: `backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md` — stage 3, the cert-to-device binding: new `IntuneDeviceBindingValidator` resolves the Subject-CN managedDevice id against the tenant's own `deviceManagement/managedDevices` (point-GET, no filter literal), modelled on `CloudPcDeviceValidator` and wired fire-and-forget like the DevPrep shadow so a cold Graph round-trip never enters the agent request path. New GA-only tenant toggle `ValidateIntuneDeviceBinding` (shadow — never touches `deviceValidated`), new optional Graph feature `IntuneDeviceBinding` → `DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All` in `GraphFeatureCatalog` + the customer grant script, and `enrolledAgeSeconds` on every log line so the enrollment race can be measured before this could ever become a gate. Grep marker: `CERT-DEVICE-BINDING-SHADOW`.
+
 * **Update**: `backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md` — shadow telemetry moved off the dead `LogInformation` path: the `Match` outcome now rides on the request row as the `CertTenantBinding` dimension (`SecurityValidator` → `FunctionContext.Items` → `RequestTelemetryMiddleware`), which is unsampled and already exists per request, so the denominator costs nothing. Non-Match outcomes keep their Warning trace. Post-deploy verification of 249e39bc found zero rows across 32k requests — worker `LogInformation` never reaches App Insights (provider default rule Warning+), making "everything matched" indistinguishable from "never ran". `CertificateValidationResult.FromCache` removed with the sampling path it existed for.
 * **New**: `backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md` — the agent's mTLS certificate chains to Microsoft's shared Intune roots, so certificate validation alone never proved tenant membership; tenant scoping rested entirely on the (non-secret) device serial in the downstream validators. The Intune MDM leaf carries the Entra tenant id in OID `1.2.840.113556.5.14` (nested OCTET STRING), which is NOT `…5.6` (Intune Account id, a different GUID) and NOT `…5.4` (device id, stored as 16 bare bytes) — all decoded by one shared `MsDeviceCertificateOids.TryParseGuid` now used by agent and backend. Stage 1 ships as shadow only: `CertTenantBinding.Evaluate` (pure) plus `SecurityValidator.ObserveCertTenantBinding` (returns void, swallows its own exceptions, cannot change an authorization outcome), with `Match` sampled via `CertificateValidationResult.FromCache` so the denominator survives without per-request volume. Grep marker for the stage-2 enforcement change: `CERT-TENANT-BINDING-SHADOW`.
 

rules/dist/ime-log-patterns.json

@@ -675,6 +675,14 @@
       "description": "Detects when IME completes a user session, indicating enrollment has finished for that user.",
       "enabled": true
     },
+    {
+      "patternId": "IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS",
+      "category": "always",
+      "pattern": "\\[Win32App\\] Get 0 apps for user session (?<sessionId>\\d+), user id = (?<userId>[a-f0-9\\-]+)",
+      "action": "userSessionZeroApps",
+      "description": "Detects when IME enumerated a user session and found zero targeted Win32 apps. IME then skips its 'Completed user session' line entirely (the zero-app branch in ApplicationPoller continues before that log statement), so this line is the only evidence that user-phase enforcement finished on a device with no user-targeted apps. Treated as equivalent to a completed user session.",
+      "enabled": true
+    },
     {
       "patternId": "IME-WIN32-STATE-1",
       "category": "currentPhase",

rules/ime-log-patterns/IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "../schema/ime-log-pattern.schema.json",
+  "patternId": "IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS",
+  "category": "always",
+  "pattern": "\\[Win32App\\] Get 0 apps for user session (?<sessionId>\\d+), user id = (?<userId>[a-f0-9\\-]+)",
+  "action": "userSessionZeroApps",
+  "description": "Detects when IME enumerated a user session and found zero targeted Win32 apps. IME then skips its 'Completed user session' line entirely (the zero-app branch in ApplicationPoller continues before that log statement), so this line is the only evidence that user-phase enforcement finished on a device with no user-targeted apps. Treated as equivalent to a completed user session.",
+  "enabled": true
+}

rules/schema/ime-log-pattern.schema.json

@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
             "imeImpersonation",
             "imeTokenFailure",
             "enrollmentCompleted",
+            "userSessionZeroApps",
             "updateDoTelemetry",
             "scriptStarted",
             "scriptContext",

scripts/CustomerSetup/Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#Requires -Version 5.1
+#Requires -Version 5.1
 <#
 .SYNOPSIS
     Grants additional Microsoft Graph application permissions to the Autopilot Monitor
@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@
         (validates Windows 365 Cloud PCs against the tenant's Cloud PC inventory --
          Cloud PCs are never Autopilot-registered, so this enables agent monitoring
          of Cloud PC first-connect enrollment)
+      - IntuneDeviceBinding     -> DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All
+        (cert-to-device binding: verifies that the Intune device id carried in the
+         agent's client certificate is a device THIS tenant actually enrolled --
+         currently a Global-Admin-only preview that records telemetry and does not
+         block enrollment)
       - All                    -> every optional permission above, in one run
         (also works with -Revoke to remove all optional grants at once)
 
@@ -93,7 +98,7 @@ param(
     [string]$ClientId,
 
     [Parameter(Mandatory = $true, ParameterSetName = 'ByFeatures')]
-    [ValidateSet('All', 'ScriptDisplayNames', 'W365CloudPcValidation')]
+    [ValidateSet('All', 'ScriptDisplayNames', 'W365CloudPcValidation', 'IntuneDeviceBinding')]
     [string[]]$Features,
 
     [Parameter(Mandatory = $true, ParameterSetName = 'ByPermissions')]
@@ -116,6 +121,7 @@ $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
 $FeatureCatalog = @{
     'ScriptDisplayNames'    = @('DeviceManagementScripts.Read.All')
     'W365CloudPcValidation' = @('CloudPC.Read.All')
+    'IntuneDeviceBinding'   = @('DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All')
 }
 
 # Translate Features -> Permissions when caller used the high-level form.

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Ime/ImeLogTrackerZeroUserAppsTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Sessions 81daa77f / 75d6ae8e (2026-08-25) — zero user-targeted apps starved every
+    /// user-phase completion probe. The IME zero-app branch returns before it writes the
+    /// "Completed user session" line, so a device whose user has no targeted Win32 apps never
+    /// produced the evidence <c>IsImeUserSessionGenuine</c> requires, and the AdvisoryCompletion
+    /// window failed the enrollment 30 minutes later — with the user at the desktop, Hello
+    /// provisioned and RealmJoin still installing.
+    /// <para>
+    /// IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS reads the line IME does write in that branch and routes it
+    /// through the same <see cref="ImeLogTracker.OnUserSessionCompleted"/> callback.
+    /// </para>
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class ImeLogTrackerZeroUserAppsTests
+    {
+        // Mirrors rules/ime-log-patterns/IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS.json. The JSON itself is
+        // pinned against a real IME line by BuiltInRulesTests in the backend suite.
+        private const string ZeroAppsPattern =
+            @"\[Win32App\] Get 0 apps for user session (?<sessionId>\d+), user id = (?<userId>[a-f0-9\-]+)";
+
+        private const string EspPhasePattern =
+            @"\[Win32App\] (?:In|The) EspPhase: (?<espPhase>\w+)";
+
+        private const string ZeroAppsLine =
+            "[Win32App] Get 0 apps for user session 1, user id = 4a1ba5db-44ed-4e69-8477-47ed88e76020";
+
+        private static ImeLogTracker BuildTracker(TempDirectory tmp) =>
+            new ImeLogTracker(
+                logFolder: tmp.Path,
+                patterns: new List<ImeLogPattern>
+                {
+                    new ImeLogPattern
+                    {
+                        PatternId = "IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS",
+                        Category = "always",
+                        Pattern = ZeroAppsPattern,
+                        Action = "userSessionZeroApps",
+                    },
+                    new ImeLogPattern
+                    {
+                        PatternId = "IME-ESP-PHASE",
+                        Category = "always",
+                        Pattern = EspPhasePattern,
+                        Action = "espPhaseDetected",
+                    },
+                },
+                logger: new AgentLogger(tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info));
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ZeroApps_line_during_user_phase_fires_user_session_completed()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
+            var fired = 0;
+            tracker.OnUserSessionCompleted = () => fired++;
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
+
+            Assert.Equal(1, fired);
+            Assert.True(tracker.UserSessionZeroAppsObserved);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ZeroApps_line_before_user_phase_does_not_fire()
+        {
+            // Firing here would burn the adapter fire-once flag on a pre-sign-in timestamp that
+            // IsImeUserSessionGenuine (>= AccountSetupEnteredUtc) can never accept.
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
+            var fired = 0;
+            tracker.OnUserSessionCompleted = () => fired++;
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: DeviceSetup");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
+
+            Assert.Equal(0, fired);
+            Assert.True(tracker.UserSessionZeroAppsObserved);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ZeroApps_observed_early_is_replayed_on_the_user_phase_transition()
+        {
+            // IME writes its check-in lines independently of when the agent first parses the ESP
+            // phase marker, so the evidence can legitimately arrive first. Dropping it would
+            // leave a zero-app device with no completion evidence at all.
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
+            var fired = 0;
+            tracker.OnUserSessionCompleted = () => fired++;
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: DeviceSetup");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
+            Assert.Equal(0, fired);
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
+
+            Assert.Equal(1, fired);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Repeated_user_phase_matches_do_not_replay_again()
+        {
+            // IME re-emits the phase string as it re-evaluates app sets. Only a real transition
+            // replays; the adapter fire-once flag is the outer guard, but the tracker must not
+            // spam the callback either.
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
+            var fired = 0;
+            tracker.OnUserSessionCompleted = () => fired++;
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: DeviceSetup");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
+
+            Assert.Equal(1, fired);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Nonzero_app_count_lines_do_not_match_the_pattern()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
+            var fired = 0;
+            tracker.OnUserSessionCompleted = () => fired++;
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(
+                "[Win32App] Get 3 apps for user session 1, user id = 4a1ba5db-44ed-4e69-8477-47ed88e76020");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(
+                "[Win32App] Get 10 apps for user session 1, user id = 4a1ba5db-44ed-4e69-8477-47ed88e76020");
+
+            Assert.Equal(0, fired);
+            Assert.False(tracker.UserSessionZeroAppsObserved);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void AreUserEspAppsSettled_true_after_zero_apps_observation()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
+
+            Assert.True(tracker.AreUserEspAppsSettled());
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void AreUserEspAppsSettled_stays_false_on_an_empty_list_without_the_observation()
+        {
+            // Mutation proof for the branch above: an empty live list on its own still means
+            // "phase just cleared / apps not surfaced yet", never vacuously settled.
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
+
+            Assert.False(tracker.AreUserEspAppsSettled());
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void AreUserEspAppsSettled_false_outside_the_user_phase_even_after_the_observation()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: DeviceSetup");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
+
+            Assert.True(tracker.UserSessionZeroAppsObserved);
+            Assert.False(tracker.AreUserEspAppsSettled());
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void GetPendingRequiredUserEspInstallApps_is_empty_for_a_zero_app_user_session()
+        {
+            // The adapter deferral probe must not park the signal when there is nothing to wait
+            // for — otherwise the zero-app path would starve exactly like the old one.
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
+
+            Assert.Empty(tracker.GetPendingRequiredUserEspInstallApps());
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Interop/WifiInfoProviderTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+#nullable enable
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Interop;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Interop
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Tests for the tiered WiFi reader. The WLAN state of the test machine is unknown (CI
+    /// runners have no WLAN service, dev boxes may be on WiFi with or without location consent),
+    /// so the live path only pins the fail-soft contract. The diagnostics composer is pinned
+    /// exactly — it is the only field evidence for a missing wifi_signal_info event, and the
+    /// ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED hint is what tells an operator that Windows 11 24H2's location gate,
+    /// not the hardware, swallowed the SSID.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class WifiInfoProviderTests
+    {
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryRead_never_throws_and_reports_a_reason_when_it_yields_nothing()
+        {
+            var result = WifiInfoProvider.TryRead(null, out var diagnostics);
+
+            if (result == null)
+            {
+                Assert.False(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(diagnostics),
+                    "a null result must always explain itself — that string is the only field evidence");
+                Assert.Contains("native:", diagnostics);
+                Assert.Contains("WinRT:", diagnostics);
+                Assert.Contains("netsh:", diagnostics);
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                Assert.Null(diagnostics);
+                // Every tier either carries an SSID or was not supposed to return at all.
+                Assert.False(result.Ssid == null && result.SignalPercent == null
+                             && result.RadioType == null && result.Channel == null,
+                    "an all-null payload must surface as null, not as an empty connection");
+            }
+        }
+
+        // ----- BuildDiagnostics ---------------------------------------------
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildDiagnostics_names_every_tier()
+        {
+            var text = WifiInfoProvider.BuildDiagnostics(null, null);
+
+            Assert.Contains("no WiFi info from any reader", text);
+            Assert.Contains("native: no connected WLAN interface", text);
+            Assert.Contains("WinRT: no SSID", text);
+            Assert.Contains("netsh: no parsable output", text);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildDiagnostics_passes_through_tier_reasons()
+        {
+            var text = WifiInfoProvider.BuildDiagnostics("WlanOpenHandle rc=1062", "WinRT NetworkInformation unavailable");
+
+            Assert.Contains("native: WlanOpenHandle rc=1062", text);
+            Assert.Contains("WinRT: WinRT NetworkInformation unavailable", text);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildDiagnostics_explains_access_denied_as_the_location_gate()
+        {
+            var text = WifiInfoProvider.BuildDiagnostics(
+                "[1cbc79c3-2e31-468a-b949-17fafa6e23ed] query(current_connection) rc=5; ", null);
+
+            Assert.Contains("ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED", text);
+            Assert.Contains("24H2", text);
+            Assert.Contains("Location services", text);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildDiagnostics_explains_access_denied_without_a_trailing_separator()
+        {
+            var text = WifiInfoProvider.BuildDiagnostics("WlanOpenHandle rc=5", null);
+
+            Assert.Contains("ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED", text);
+        }
+
+        // ----- IsLocationGateDenied -----------------------------------------
+        //
+        // This predicate decides whether the wifi_signal_info payload claims
+        // "location_services_off" to the operator. A false positive blames a privacy setting
+        // that is actually fine, so the boundaries are pinned exactly.
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData("[guid] query(current_connection) rc=5; ")]
+        [InlineData("WlanOpenHandle rc=5")]
+        public void IsLocationGateDenied_true_only_for_error_access_denied(string nativeDiag)
+        {
+            Assert.True(WifiInfoProvider.IsLocationGateDenied(nativeDiag));
+        }
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData(null)]
+        [InlineData("")]
+        [InlineData("query(current_connection) rc=50; ")]
+        [InlineData("query(current_connection) rc=5023; ")]
+        [InlineData("WlanEnumInterfaces rc=1062")]
+        [InlineData("no WLAN interfaces")]
+        [InlineData("[guid] state=wlan_interface_state_disconnected; ")]
+        public void IsLocationGateDenied_false_for_every_other_reason(string? nativeDiag)
+        {
+            Assert.False(WifiInfoProvider.IsLocationGateDenied(nativeDiag));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void LocationServicesOff_literal_is_the_published_payload_contract()
+        {
+            // Matched verbatim by the portal's WiFi card (wifiDataLimitedReason) — renaming it
+            // silently drops the hint instead of breaking a build.
+            Assert.Equal("location_services_off", WifiInfoProvider.LocationServicesOff);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryRead_never_claims_the_location_gate_on_the_native_tier()
+        {
+            // The native tier only returns when it succeeded, so a full payload must never carry
+            // a "data limited" reason.
+            var result = WifiInfoProvider.TryRead(null, out _);
+
+            if (result?.SignalPercent != null)
+                Assert.Null(result.DataLimitedReason);
+        }
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData("query(current_connection) rc=50; ")]
+        [InlineData("query(current_connection) rc=5023; ")]
+        [InlineData("WlanEnumInterfaces rc=1062")]
+        [InlineData("[guid] state=wlan_interface_state_disconnected; ")]
+        public void BuildDiagnostics_does_not_blame_the_location_gate_for_other_codes(string nativeDiag)
+        {
+            var text = WifiInfoProvider.BuildDiagnostics(nativeDiag, null);
+
+            Assert.DoesNotContain("ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED", text);
+            Assert.Contains($"native: {nativeDiag}", text);
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Interop/WinRtWifiSsidReaderTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+#nullable enable
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Interop;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Interop
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Tests for the WinRT SSID reader. Its whole value is that it keeps working where the
+    /// native WLAN API is denied, so the contract that matters here is fail-soft resolution:
+    /// the type is bound by name at runtime (no winmd), and every step must degrade to null
+    /// with a reason instead of throwing — a throw would take the Task.Run collector down
+    /// silently, which is precisely the failure mode this tier exists to end.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class WinRtWifiSsidReaderTests
+    {
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryGetConnectedSsid_never_throws()
+        {
+            var ssid = WinRtWifiSsidReader.TryGetConnectedSsid(out var diagnostics);
+
+            if (ssid == null)
+                Assert.False(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(diagnostics), "a null SSID must carry a reason");
+            else
+                Assert.Null(diagnostics);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryGetConnectedSsid_never_returns_an_empty_ssid()
+        {
+            // An AP broadcasting an empty SSID must surface as null, never as "" — the caller
+            // maps a non-null SSID straight into the wifi_signal_info payload.
+            var ssid = WinRtWifiSsidReader.TryGetConnectedSsid(out _);
+
+            Assert.True(ssid == null || ssid.Length > 0);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryGetConnectedSsid_is_stable_across_calls()
+        {
+            // Reflection members are resolved once and cached; a second call must take the
+            // cached path and behave identically.
+            var first = WinRtWifiSsidReader.TryGetConnectedSsid(out _);
+            var second = WinRtWifiSsidReader.TryGetConnectedSsid(out _);
+
+            Assert.Equal(first, second);
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/SignalAdapters/ImeLogTrackerAdapterUserSessionGateTests.cs

@@ -163,5 +163,45 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.SignalAdapters
             Assert.Single(f.DecisionSignals(DecisionSignalKind.ImeUserSessionCompleted));
             Assert.Single(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.ImeUserSessionCompleted));
         }
+
+        // ==================================================== zero-app evidence label ====
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Zero_app_user_session_labels_the_evidence_on_signal_and_timeline()
+        {
+            // Sessions 81daa77f / 75d6ae8e: with no user-targeted apps IME never writes its
+            // "Completed user session" line at all, so the verdict rests on a different
+            // observation. Whoever reads the timeline later must be able to tell which.
+            using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture();
+            using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
+            f.Tracker.SeedCurrentPhaseForTesting("AccountSetup");
+            f.Tracker.SeedUserSessionZeroAppsForTesting();
+
+            adapter.TriggerUserSessionCompletedFromTest();
+
+            Assert.Single(f.DecisionSignals(DecisionSignalKind.ImeUserSessionCompleted));
+            var evt = Assert.Single(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.ImeUserSessionCompleted));
+            Assert.Equal(
+                ImeLogTrackerAdapter.EvidenceZeroUserApps,
+                evt.Payload!["evidence"]);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Ordinary_user_session_completion_keeps_the_default_evidence_label()
+        {
+            // Mutation proof for the branch above.
+            using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture();
+            using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
+            f.Tracker.SeedCurrentPhaseForTesting("AccountSetup");
+            AddApp(f.Tracker, "app-done", AppIntent.Install, AppInstallationState.Installed);
+
+            adapter.TriggerUserSessionCompletedFromTest();
+
+            var evt = Assert.Single(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.ImeUserSessionCompleted));
+            Assert.Equal(
+                ImeLogTrackerAdapter.EvidenceUserSessionCompleted,
+                evt.Payload!["evidence"]);
+        }
+
     }
 }

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime/ImeLogTracker.Handlers.cs

@@ -1042,6 +1042,56 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
         /// </summary>
         internal string LastEspPhaseDetected => _lastEspPhaseDetected;
 
+        /// <summary>
+        /// True while the user-scope ESP phase is the tracker's current phase. Every user-phase
+        /// probe and the zero-apps evidence gate on this — outside AccountSetup the IME lines
+        /// belong to the device phase or the pre-sign-in (defaultuser0) frame.
+        /// </summary>
+        private bool IsUserEspPhaseActive =>
+            string.Equals(_lastEspPhaseDetected, "AccountSetup", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// True once IME reported zero targeted Win32 apps for a user session while the user ESP
+        /// phase was active. Read by the adapter to label the evidence behind
+        /// <c>ime_user_session_completed</c>.
+        /// </summary>
+        internal bool UserSessionZeroAppsObserved => _userSessionZeroAppsObserved;
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS: IME enumerated the user session and found no targeted
+        /// Win32 apps. Its zero-app branch then <c>continue</c>s past the "Completed user
+        /// session" log statement, so this line is the only completion evidence such a device
+        /// ever produces — and IME itself treats the same condition as finished
+        /// (<c>ProviderResult.ProvisioningComplete</c> in the user check-in path, and an ESP
+        /// lock-in with an empty application list in the poller path).
+        /// <para>
+        /// Deliberately routed through <see cref="OnUserSessionCompleted"/> rather than a
+        /// separate callback: downstream this IS a completed user session, and the adapter's
+        /// pending-apps deferral plus its fire-once flag then apply unchanged.
+        /// </para>
+        /// <para>
+        /// Phase guard: firing before AccountSetup would burn the adapter's fire-once flag on a
+        /// pre-sign-in timestamp that <c>IsImeUserSessionGenuine</c> can never accept. The
+        /// observation is remembered instead and replayed by
+        /// <see cref="HandleEspPhaseDetected"/> on the transition into the user phase.
+        /// </para>
+        /// </summary>
+        private void HandleUserSessionZeroApps()
+        {
+            _userSessionZeroAppsObserved = true;
+
+            if (!IsUserEspPhaseActive)
+            {
+                _logger.Debug(
+                    "ImeLogTracker: zero-app user session observed before the user ESP phase " +
+                    $"(current phase: {_lastEspPhaseDetected ?? "(none)"}) - deferring until AccountSetup");
+                return;
+            }
+
+            _logger.Info("ImeLogTracker: user session enumerated with zero targeted apps - treating as user session completed");
+            OnUserSessionCompleted?.Invoke();
+        }
+
         private void HandleEspPhaseDetected(string espPhaseString)
         {
             // Validate phase and get its ordinal for forward-only enforcement
@@ -1120,6 +1170,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
             ActivatePatterns(logPhaseIsCurrentPhase);
 
             OnEspPhaseChanged?.Invoke(espPhaseString);
+
+            // Replay a zero-app user session observed before this phase was known. IME logs its
+            // check-in lines independently of when the agent first parses the ESP phase marker,
+            // so the evidence can legitimately arrive first; without this the only completion
+            // evidence a zero-app device produces would be dropped on the floor.
+            if (isFirstOrChangedPhase && IsUserEspPhaseActive && _userSessionZeroAppsObserved)
+            {
+                _logger.Info("ImeLogTracker: replaying zero-app user session evidence observed before the user ESP phase");
+                OnUserSessionCompleted?.Invoke();
+            }
         }
 
         private void HandleEspTrackStatus(Match match)

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime/ImeLogTracker.LogProcessing.cs

@@ -387,6 +387,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
                         OnUserSessionCompleted?.Invoke();
                         break;
 
+                    case "usersessionzeroapps":
+                        // IME found no targeted user apps — its zero-app branch skips the
+                        // "Completed user session" line, so this is the equivalent evidence.
+                        HandleUserSessionZeroApps();
+                        break;
+
                     case "updatestateinstalled":
                         if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(id))
                             UpdateStateWithCallback(id, AppInstallationState.Installed);

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime/ImeLogTracker.cs

@@ -129,6 +129,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
         private CancellationTokenSource _cts;
         private bool _allAppsCompletedFired;
 
+        // Sticky: IME enumerated a user session and reported ZERO targeted Win32 apps
+        // (IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS). IME's zero-app branch returns before it writes the
+        // "Completed user session" line, so on a device with no user-targeted apps that line
+        // never appears and every user-phase completion probe would starve forever. This flag
+        // IS the user-phase completion evidence for that shape. Set only while the user ESP
+        // phase is active, or replayed on the transition into it.
+        private bool _userSessionZeroAppsObserved;
+
         // State persistence: saves tracker state to disk so agent restart continues
         // from the exact log position without re-parsing or re-building ignore lists.
         private readonly ImeTrackerStatePersistence _statePersistence;
@@ -341,6 +349,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
             _lastEspPhaseDetected = phaseName;
         }
 
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Test-only seam: marks the zero-targeted-apps user session as observed without driving
+        /// the IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS pattern through a log line. The pattern-to-flag path
+        /// itself is covered end-to-end by <c>ImeLogTrackerZeroUserAppsTests</c>.
+        /// </summary>
+        internal void SeedUserSessionZeroAppsForTesting()
+        {
+            _userSessionZeroAppsObserved = true;
+        }
+
         /// <summary>
         /// Returns a deduped union of phase-snapshotted apps plus the live
         /// <see cref="PackageStates"/> (current phase). Live entries win on Id collision.
@@ -395,11 +413,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
         {
             try
             {
-                if (!string.Equals(_lastEspPhaseDetected, "AccountSetup", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
+                if (!IsUserEspPhaseActive)
                     return false;
 
                 var apps = new List<AppPackageState>(_packageStates);
-                if (apps.Count == 0) return false;
+
+                // Zero user-targeted apps is the MOST settled state there is, but the
+                // conservative "at least one required app" rule below reads it as "not
+                // settled" and starves the AccountSetup synthesis. Only an explicit IME
+                // observation lifts that — never a merely empty list, which also means
+                // "phase just cleared" or "apps not surfaced yet".
+                if (apps.Count == 0)
+                    return _userSessionZeroAppsObserved;
 
                 var sawRequired = false;
                 foreach (var pkg in apps)
@@ -746,6 +771,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
             _currentPhaseOrder = state.CurrentPhaseOrder;
             _lastEspPhaseDetected = state.LastEspPhaseDetected;
             _allAppsCompletedFired = state.AllAppsCompletedFired;
+            _userSessionZeroAppsObserved = state.UserSessionZeroAppsObserved;
             _logPhaseIsCurrentPhase = state.LogPhaseIsCurrentPhase;
 
             // Restore seen app IDs
@@ -861,6 +887,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
                 CurrentPhaseOrder = _currentPhaseOrder,
                 LastEspPhaseDetected = _lastEspPhaseDetected,
                 AllAppsCompletedFired = _allAppsCompletedFired,
+                UserSessionZeroAppsObserved = _userSessionZeroAppsObserved,
                 LogPhaseIsCurrentPhase = _logPhaseIsCurrentPhase,
                 SeenAppIds = _seenAppIds.ToList(),
                 IgnoreList = _packageStates.IgnoreList.ToList(),

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime/ImeTrackerStatePersistence.cs

@@ -109,6 +109,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
         public int CurrentPhaseOrder { get; set; }
         public string LastEspPhaseDetected { get; set; }
         public bool AllAppsCompletedFired { get; set; }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// IME reported zero targeted Win32 apps for a user session. Absent in state files
+        /// written before this field existed — deserializing to false there is correct: the
+        /// tracker simply re-observes the line on the next IME check-in.
+        /// </summary>
+        public bool UserSessionZeroAppsObserved { get; set; }
         public bool LogPhaseIsCurrentPhase { get; set; }
         public List<string> SeenAppIds { get; set; }
         public List<string> IgnoreList { get; set; }

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/WifiInfoProvider.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+using System;
+using System.Text;
+using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Interop
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// The single entry point every collector uses to read the current WiFi connection. Owns the
+    /// tier order so the two callers (<c>DeviceInfoCollector</c>, <c>NetworkChangeDetector</c>)
+    /// cannot drift apart:
+    /// <list type="number">
+    /// <item><see cref="WifiInfoReader"/> — native WLAN API. Full payload (SSID, signal, PHY,
+    /// channel), but Windows 11 24H2+ requires precise-location consent for it.</item>
+    /// <item><see cref="WinRtWifiSsidReader"/> — WinRT <c>GetConnectedSsid</c>. SSID only, but
+    /// NOT location-gated; this is the tier that carries 24H2+ devices whose image has location
+    /// services off (the common OOBE case — see that class for the mechanism).</item>
+    /// <item><see cref="NetshWifiFallback"/> — process spawn, localized output parsing. Last
+    /// resort: it hangs off the same location gate as tier 1, so it only helps when the native
+    /// API failed for an unrelated reason.</item>
+    /// </list>
+    /// Never throws. Returns null when the device has no readable WiFi connection.
+    /// </summary>
+    internal static class WifiInfoProvider
+    {
+        /// <summary>
+        /// <see cref="WifiConnectionInfo.DataLimitedReason"/> value for a payload cut down to the
+        /// SSID by the Windows 11 24H2 location gate. Travels verbatim into the
+        /// <c>wifi_signal_info</c> payload as <c>wifiDataLimitedReason</c> and is matched by the
+        /// portal's WiFi card — a published contract, so do not rename it.
+        /// </summary>
+        internal const string LocationServicesOff = "location_services_off";
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// True when the native tier reported <c>ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED</c> — "rc=5" but not
+        /// "rc=50"/"rc=5023"; the diagnostics string ends the code with ';' or end-of-line.
+        /// That is the 24H2 location gate, not a driver or hardware fault.
+        /// Internal for direct unit-testing via InternalsVisibleTo.
+        /// </summary>
+        internal static bool IsLocationGateDenied(string nativeDiag)
+            => !string.IsNullOrEmpty(nativeDiag) && Regex.IsMatch(nativeDiag, @"rc=5(?!\d)");
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Reads the current WiFi connection, walking the tiers until one yields something.
+        /// <paramref name="preferredInterfaceId"/> is the adapter GUID from
+        /// <c>NetworkInterface.Id</c> (tier 1 only). <paramref name="diagnostics"/> is null on
+        /// success and otherwise explains what every tier reported — log it at Warning: this is
+        /// the only field evidence for a missing <c>wifi_signal_info</c> event.
+        /// </summary>
+        internal static WifiConnectionInfo TryRead(Guid? preferredInterfaceId, out string diagnostics)
+        {
+            var native = WifiInfoReader.TryGetCurrentConnection(preferredInterfaceId, out var nativeDiag);
+            if (native != null)
+            {
+                diagnostics = null;
+                return native;
+            }
+
+            var ssid = WinRtWifiSsidReader.TryGetConnectedSsid(out var winRtDiag);
+            if (ssid != null)
+            {
+                diagnostics = null;
+                return new WifiConnectionInfo
+                {
+                    Ssid = ssid,
+                    // Only claim the location gate when the native tier actually said so. Any
+                    // other native failure (no WLAN service, no connected interface) leaves this
+                    // null rather than blaming a setting we did not observe.
+                    DataLimitedReason = IsLocationGateDenied(nativeDiag) ? LocationServicesOff : null,
+                };
+            }
+
+            var netsh = NetshWifiFallback.TryRead();
+            if (netsh != null)
+            {
+                diagnostics = null;
+                return netsh;
+            }
+
+            diagnostics = BuildDiagnostics(nativeDiag, winRtDiag);
+            return null;
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Composes the all-tiers-failed message. A native <c>rc=5</c> (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) is
+        /// spelled out: that is the 24H2 location gate, not a driver or hardware fault, and it
+        /// takes the netsh tier down with it — without this hint the log reads like a mystery.
+        /// Internal for direct unit-testing via InternalsVisibleTo.
+        /// </summary>
+        internal static string BuildDiagnostics(string nativeDiag, string winRtDiag)
+        {
+            var text = new StringBuilder("no WiFi info from any reader");
+            text.Append(" — native: ").Append(string.IsNullOrEmpty(nativeDiag) ? "no connected WLAN interface" : nativeDiag);
+            text.Append("; WinRT: ").Append(string.IsNullOrEmpty(winRtDiag) ? "no SSID" : winRtDiag);
+            text.Append("; netsh: no parsable output");
+
+            if (IsLocationGateDenied(nativeDiag))
+            {
+                text.Append(". rc=5 is ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED — Windows 11 24H2+ gates the current-connection "
+                          + "opcode (and netsh wlan) behind precise-location consent, which is off in this image; "
+                          + "enable Location services to restore signal/PHY/channel.");
+            }
+
+            return text.ToString();
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/WifiInfoReader.cs

@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Interop
 
         /// <summary>
         /// Signal quality 0–100 (same semantics as the netsh "Signal" percentage). Always set
-        /// on the native WLAN API path; null only when the netsh fallback could not parse it.
+        /// on the native WLAN API path; null when the netsh fallback could not parse it, and
+        /// always null on the WinRT tier (<see cref="WinRtWifiSsidReader"/> yields SSID only).
         /// </summary>
         public int? SignalPercent { get; internal set; }
 
@@ -24,6 +25,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Interop
 
         /// <summary>Current 802.11 channel number; null when the channel query fails.</summary>
         public int? Channel { get; internal set; }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Why the payload is incomplete, when that is known — currently only
+        /// <c>location_services_off</c>: the SSID came from the ungated WinRT tier because the
+        /// native API was denied by the Windows 11 24H2 location gate, so signal, PHY and
+        /// channel have no source. Null whenever the reason is unknown; never a guess.
+        /// </summary>
+        public string DataLimitedReason { get; internal set; }
     }
 
     /// <summary>

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/WinRtWifiSsidReader.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+using System;
+using System.Collections;
+using System.Reflection;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Interop
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Reads the SSID of the current WLAN connection via WinRT
+    /// <c>Windows.Networking.Connectivity.WlanConnectionProfileDetails.GetConnectedSsid</c>.
+    /// <para>
+    /// <b>Why this exists.</b> Windows 11 24H2 put the native WLAN API behind precise-location
+    /// consent: <c>WlanQueryInterface</c> with <c>wlan_intf_opcode_current_connection</c> — the
+    /// exact opcode <see cref="WifiInfoReader"/> needs — returns <c>ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED</c>
+    /// without it, and <c>netsh wlan</c> is gated by the same rule, so
+    /// <see cref="NetshWifiFallback"/> fails in lockstep. The consent prompt only appears for
+    /// processes in the user's context outside <c>C:\Windows\System32</c>, so the agent — SYSTEM,
+    /// during OOBE, before the user ever sees the privacy page — is denied silently. Microsoft
+    /// names <c>GetConnectedSsid</c> as the replacement for exactly this case; it is not
+    /// location-gated.
+    /// </para>
+    /// <para>
+    /// Resolved through the CLR's built-in WinRT projection — no NuGet package, no winmd
+    /// reference — the same mechanism <see cref="OobeStateReader"/> uses (validated from the
+    /// SYSTEM service context). Available since Windows 10 1507. SSID only: signal quality,
+    /// PHY type and channel have no ungated source, so they stay null on this path.
+    /// </para>
+    /// </summary>
+    internal static class WinRtWifiSsidReader
+    {
+        // Resolved once per process. Benign race: concurrent first calls resolve the same
+        // members and the assignments are idempotent — no lock needed.
+        private static MethodInfo _getInternetConnectionProfile;
+        private static MethodInfo _getConnectionProfiles;
+        private static bool _initTried;
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Returns the SSID of the connected WLAN, or null when the device is not on WiFi, the
+        /// WinRT contract is unavailable, or any part of the read fails. Never throws.
+        /// <paramref name="diagnostics"/> carries the reason when the result is null.
+        /// </summary>
+        internal static string TryGetConnectedSsid(out string diagnostics)
+        {
+            try
+            {
+                EnsureInitialized();
+
+                if (_getInternetConnectionProfile == null)
+                {
+                    diagnostics = "WinRT NetworkInformation unavailable";
+                    return null;
+                }
+
+                // The internet-bearing profile is the one the device is actually enrolling over.
+                var ssid = ReadSsid(_getInternetConnectionProfile.Invoke(null, null));
+                if (ssid != null)
+                {
+                    diagnostics = null;
+                    return ssid;
+                }
+
+                // No internet profile (captive portal, limited connectivity) or it is not WLAN —
+                // fall back to the first connected profile that carries WLAN details.
+                ssid = ScanConnectionProfiles();
+                diagnostics = ssid == null ? "no connected WLAN profile" : null;
+                return ssid;
+            }
+            catch (Exception ex)
+            {
+                diagnostics = $"WinRT exception {ex.GetType().Name}: {ex.Message}";
+                return null;
+            }
+        }
+
+        private static void EnsureInitialized()
+        {
+            if (_initTried) return;
+
+            var type = Type.GetType(
+                "Windows.Networking.Connectivity.NetworkInformation, Windows.Networking.Connectivity, ContentType=WindowsRuntime",
+                throwOnError: false);
+
+            _getInternetConnectionProfile = type?.GetMethod(
+                "GetInternetConnectionProfile", BindingFlags.Public | BindingFlags.Static, null, Type.EmptyTypes, null);
+            _getConnectionProfiles = type?.GetMethod(
+                "GetConnectionProfiles", BindingFlags.Public | BindingFlags.Static, null, Type.EmptyTypes, null);
+
+            _initTried = true;
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Walks every known connection profile and returns the SSID of the first one that is
+        /// both connected and WLAN. Returns null when none qualifies.
+        /// </summary>
+        private static string ScanConnectionProfiles()
+        {
+            if (_getConnectionProfiles == null)
+                return null;
+
+            if (!(_getConnectionProfiles.Invoke(null, null) is IEnumerable profiles))
+                return null;
+
+            foreach (var profile in profiles)
+            {
+                if (!IsConnected(profile))
+                    continue;
+
+                var ssid = ReadSsid(profile);
+                if (ssid != null)
+                    return ssid;
+            }
+
+            return null;
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// <c>ConnectionProfile.GetNetworkConnectivityLevel() != NetworkConnectivityLevel.None</c>.
+        /// A profile the device is not currently on would otherwise leak a stale SSID.
+        /// Unreadable level counts as not connected.
+        /// </summary>
+        private static bool IsConnected(object profile)
+        {
+            var level = profile?.GetType()
+                .GetMethod("GetNetworkConnectivityLevel", BindingFlags.Public | BindingFlags.Instance, null, Type.EmptyTypes, null)
+                ?.Invoke(profile, null);
+
+            return level != null && Convert.ToInt32(level) != 0; // NetworkConnectivityLevel.None
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// <c>ConnectionProfile.WlanConnectionProfileDetails.GetConnectedSsid()</c>, or null when
+        /// the profile is not a WLAN profile or the SSID is empty (hidden network).
+        /// </summary>
+        private static string ReadSsid(object profile)
+        {
+            var details = profile?.GetType()
+                .GetProperty("WlanConnectionProfileDetails", BindingFlags.Public | BindingFlags.Instance)
+                ?.GetValue(profile);
+
+            var ssid = details?.GetType()
+                .GetMethod("GetConnectedSsid", BindingFlags.Public | BindingFlags.Instance, null, Type.EmptyTypes, null)
+                ?.Invoke(details, null) as string;
+
+            return string.IsNullOrEmpty(ssid) ? null : ssid;
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Telemetry/DeviceInfo/DeviceInfoCollector.NetworkAndSecurity.cs

@@ -926,22 +926,23 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.DeviceInfo
             Monitoring.NetworkInterfaceLocator.FindActiveNetworkInterface();
 
         /// <summary>
-        /// Collects WiFi signal info via the native WLAN API (<see cref="WifiInfoReader"/>,
-        /// language-neutral, no process spawn) and emits a separate wifi_signal_info event.
-        /// Designed to run as fire-and-forget via Task.Run — never blocks other collection.
-        /// VMs without WiFi service simply get no event.
+        /// Collects WiFi signal info via <see cref="WifiInfoProvider"/> (native WLAN API → WinRT
+        /// SSID → netsh, all language-neutral bar the last) and emits a separate
+        /// wifi_signal_info event. Designed to run as fire-and-forget via Task.Run — never blocks
+        /// other collection. VMs without WiFi service simply get no event.
         /// </summary>
         private void CollectWiFiSignalInfo(Guid? interfaceGuid)
         {
             try
             {
-                var wifi = WifiInfoReader.TryGetCurrentConnection(interfaceGuid, out var wifiDiag);
+                var wifi = WifiInfoProvider.TryRead(interfaceGuid, out var wifiDiag);
                 if (wifi == null)
                 {
-                    _logger.Debug($"EnrollmentTracker: native WLAN API returned no WiFi info ({wifiDiag ?? "no connected WLAN interface"}) — trying netsh fallback");
-                    wifi = NetshWifiFallback.TryRead();
-                    if (wifi == null)
-                        return;
+                    // Warning, not Debug: the caller only reaches here when the active NIC IS
+                    // WiFi, so a silent miss is a real gap — and Debug is off at the default
+                    // log level, which is what made this invisible in the field.
+                    _logger.Warning($"EnrollmentTracker: no wifi_signal_info — {wifiDiag}");
+                    return;
                 }
 
                 var data = new Dictionary<string, object>();
@@ -953,12 +954,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.DeviceInfo
                     data["wifiRadioType"] = wifi.RadioType;
                 if (wifi.Channel.HasValue)
                     data["wifiChannel"] = wifi.Channel.Value;
+                if (wifi.DataLimitedReason != null)
+                    data["wifiDataLimitedReason"] = wifi.DataLimitedReason;
 
                 var message = wifi.Ssid != null ? $"WiFi: {wifi.Ssid}" : "WiFi signal info";
                 if (wifi.SignalPercent.HasValue)
                     message += $", Signal: {wifi.SignalPercent.Value}%";
                 if (wifi.RadioType != null)
                     message += $" ({wifi.RadioType})";
+                // Say it in the timeline too — a missing signal reads like a bug otherwise, and
+                // this is the only place an admin ever learns that a privacy setting caused it.
+                if (wifi.DataLimitedReason == WifiInfoProvider.LocationServicesOff)
+                    message += " — signal unavailable, Location services off";
 
                 EmitDeviceInfoEvent(Constants.EventTypes.WifiSignalInfo, message, data);
             }

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Telemetry/Periodic/NetworkChangeDetector.cs

@@ -390,23 +390,20 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Periodic
         }
 
         /// <summary>
-        /// Collects WiFi SSID, signal, and radio type via the native WLAN API
-        /// (<see cref="WifiInfoReader"/> — language-neutral, no process spawn).
-        /// Synchronous — needed before emitting the event.
+        /// Collects WiFi SSID, signal, and radio type via <see cref="WifiInfoProvider"/>
+        /// (native WLAN API → WinRT SSID → netsh). Synchronous — needed before emitting the event.
         /// </summary>
         private (string ssid, int? signal, string radioType) CollectWiFiInfo(Guid? interfaceGuid)
         {
             try
             {
-                var wifi = WifiInfoReader.TryGetCurrentConnection(interfaceGuid, out var wifiDiag);
-                if (wifi == null)
-                {
-                    _logger.Debug($"NetworkChangeDetector: native WLAN API returned no WiFi info ({wifiDiag ?? "no connected WLAN interface"}) — trying netsh fallback");
-                    wifi = NetshWifiFallback.TryRead();
-                }
-
+                var wifi = WifiInfoProvider.TryRead(interfaceGuid, out var wifiDiag);
                 if (wifi != null)
                     return (wifi.Ssid, wifi.SignalPercent, wifi.RadioType);
+
+                // Warning, not Debug: reached only when the active NIC IS WiFi, and Debug is off
+                // at the default log level — which is what hid this failure in the field.
+                _logger.Warning($"NetworkChangeDetector: no WiFi info for the active WLAN adapter — {wifiDiag}");
             }
             catch (Exception ex)
             {

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/SignalAdapters/ImeLogTrackerAdapter.cs

@@ -56,6 +56,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters
     {
         private const string SourceLabel = "ImeLogTracker";
 
+        /// <summary>Timeline label: IME wrote its "Completed user session" line and no required user-scope app was pending.</summary>
+        internal const string EvidenceUserSessionCompleted = "user_session_completed";
+
+        /// <summary>Timeline label: IME reported zero targeted apps for the user session, so it never wrote a
+        /// "Completed user session" line at all. The user phase had nothing to enforce.</summary>
+        internal const string EvidenceZeroUserApps = "zero_user_apps_enumerated";
+
         private readonly ImeLogTracker _tracker;
         private readonly ISignalIngressSink _ingress;
         private readonly IClock _clock;
@@ -591,9 +598,24 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters
 
             var now = ResolveOccurredAt(out var derivedFromClock, out var rawSourceTs);
 
+            // Which observation carried the completion. The zero-app variant matters to whoever
+            // reads the timeline later: the verdict then rests on IME reporting that this user
+            // had no targeted apps at all, not on watching enforcement finish.
+            var zeroApps = _tracker.UserSessionZeroAppsObserved;
+            var evidenceLabel = zeroApps ? EvidenceZeroUserApps : EvidenceUserSessionCompleted;
+            var summary = zeroApps
+                ? "IME enumerated the user session with zero targeted apps"
+                : "IME user session completed (no required user-scope apps pending)";
+            var message = zeroApps
+                ? "IME enumerated the user session with zero targeted apps - no user-phase enforcement to wait for"
+                : "IME user session completed";
+
             var derivationInputs = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.Ordinal)
             {
-                ["detectionSource"] = "IME log pattern (UserSessionCompleted)",
+                ["detectionSource"] = zeroApps
+                    ? "IME log pattern (UserSessionZeroApps)"
+                    : "IME log pattern (UserSessionCompleted)",
+                ["evidence"] = evidenceLabel,
             };
             TagDerivedTimestamp(derivationInputs, derivedFromClock, rawSourceTs);
 
@@ -604,12 +626,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters
                 evidence: new Evidence(
                     kind: EvidenceKind.Derived,
                     identifier: "ime-log-tracker-v1",
-                    summary: "IME user session completed (no required user-scope apps pending)",
+                    summary: summary,
                     derivationInputs: derivationInputs));
 
             var data = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.Ordinal)
             {
                 ["detectedAt"] = now.ToString("o"),
+                ["evidence"] = evidenceLabel,
             };
             var patternId = _tracker.LastMatchedPatternId;
             if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(patternId))
@@ -619,12 +642,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters
             _post.Emit(
                 eventType: SharedEventTypes.ImeUserSessionCompleted,
                 source: SourceLabel,
-                message: "IME user session completed",
+                message: message,
                 data: data,
                 occurredAtUtc: now);
 
             // PR3-D4: terminal-ish lifecycle marker — INFO so it's visible at the default level.
-            _logger?.Info($"ImeAdapter: user session completed -> posting ImeUserSessionCompleted (patternId={patternId ?? "(none)"})");
+            _logger?.Info($"ImeAdapter: user session completed ({evidenceLabel}) -> posting ImeUserSessionCompleted (patternId={patternId ?? "(none)"})");
         }
 
         /// <summary>

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests/AdvisoryCompletionGateHoldingTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+using System;
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using System.Linq;
+using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
+using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
+using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.State;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Sessions 81daa77f / 75d6ae8e (2026-08-25) — the 30-min <c>advisory_completion</c> window
+    /// overran a completion gate that was deliberately holding the session. The RealmJoin gate
+    /// blocks completion until phase 110 and carries its own bounded resolution (60 min from
+    /// detection, re-armed on deployment activity, hard-capped at 4 h), so on every device whose
+    /// first deployment outlives 30 minutes the enrollment was failed while the engine own
+    /// <c>completion_waiting</c> still read "waiting on: realmjoin_resolution". 75d6ae8e
+    /// installed 25 RealmJoin packages successfully inside the window, the last one 2 min before
+    /// the failure; the customer tenant hit this on 10 of 30 enrollments in one week.
+    /// <para>
+    /// The guard re-arms while the gate holds. Convergence comes from the gate itself: Resolved,
+    /// FirstDeploymentIncomplete and Timeout all set <c>RealmJoinFacts.Outcome</c>, which opens
+    /// <c>RealmJoinGateOpen</c> and stops the guard applying.
+    /// </para>
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class AdvisoryCompletionGateHoldingTests
+    {
+        private static readonly DateTime T0 = new DateTime(2026, 8, 25, 6, 10, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
+
+        private static DecisionSignal MakeSignal(
+            long ordinal,
+            DecisionSignalKind kind,
+            DateTime occurredAtUtc,
+            IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string>? payload = null)
+        {
+            return new DecisionSignal(
+                sessionSignalOrdinal: ordinal,
+                sessionTraceOrdinal: ordinal,
+                kind: kind,
+                kindSchemaVersion: 1,
+                occurredAtUtc: occurredAtUtc,
+                sourceOrigin: "test",
+                evidence: new Evidence(EvidenceKind.Synthetic, $"{kind}-{ordinal}", "test"),
+                payload: payload);
+        }
+
+        private static DecisionSignal DeadlineFired(long ordinal, DateTime occurredAtUtc, string deadlineName) =>
+            MakeSignal(ordinal, DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired, occurredAtUtc,
+                new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline] = deadlineName });
+
+        private static ActiveDeadline? FindDeadline(DecisionState state, string name) =>
+            state.Deadlines.FirstOrDefault(d => d.Name == name);
+
+        private static DecisionEffect SingleTimelineEffect(DecisionStep step, string eventType) =>
+            step.Effects.Single(e =>
+                e.Kind == DecisionEffectKind.EmitEventTimelineEntry
+                && e.Parameters != null
+                && e.Parameters.TryGetValue("eventType", out var et)
+                && et == eventType);
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Replays the shape both field sessions shared: Classic user-driven, full ESP, Hello
+        /// policy enabled, AccountSetup entered, then a guard-blocked post-AccountSetup ESP exit
+        /// (Shell-Core 62407, "Exiting page normally", errorCode 0) that arms the 30-min window.
+        /// The ESP registry froze at "1 of 5" and the device had zero user-targeted Intune apps,
+        /// so no arm of ShouldTransitionToAwaitingHello could ever open.
+        /// </summary>
+        private static DecisionState SetupEspExitDeadEnd(DecisionEngine engine)
+        {
+            var state = DecisionState.CreateInitial("sess-81daa77f", "tenant-81daa77f", T0);
+            state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(0, DecisionSignalKind.SessionStarted, T0)).NewState;
+            state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
+                5, DecisionSignalKind.EspConfigDetected, T0.AddMinutes(1),
+                new Dictionary<string, string>
+                {
+                    [SignalPayloadKeys.SkipUserEsp] = "false",
+                    [SignalPayloadKeys.SkipDeviceEsp] = "false",
+                    [SignalPayloadKeys.EspAllowContinueAnyway] = "false",
+                })).NewState;
+            state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
+                10, DecisionSignalKind.EspPhaseChanged, T0.AddMinutes(2),
+                new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.EspPhase] = "DeviceSetup" })).NewState;
+            state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
+                20, DecisionSignalKind.EspPhaseChanged, T0.AddMinutes(2.5),
+                new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.EspPhase] = "AccountSetup" })).NewState;
+
+            // Guard-blocked post-AccountSetup exit — arms advisory_completion at exit + 30 min.
+            state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(30, DecisionSignalKind.EspExiting, T0.AddMinutes(3))).NewState;
+            Assert.NotNull(FindDeadline(state, DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion));
+            Assert.Null(state.Outcome);
+            return state;
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>Desktop (DAD-validated real user), RealmJoin detected, Hello provisioned.</summary>
+        private static DecisionState AddDesktopRealmJoinAndHello(DecisionEngine engine, DecisionState state)
+        {
+            state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(40, DecisionSignalKind.DesktopArrived, T0.AddMinutes(3.5))).NewState;
+            state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
+                50, DecisionSignalKind.RealmJoinDetected, T0.AddMinutes(6),
+                new Dictionary<string, string> { [DecisionEngine.RealmJoinPayloadKeys.DeploymentPhase] = "0" })).NewState;
+            state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
+                60, DecisionSignalKind.HelloResolved, T0.AddMinutes(14),
+                new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.HelloOutcome] = "Success" })).NewState;
+            return state;
+        }
+
+        // ==================================================== the gate-holding guard ====
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void DeadlineFired_WhileRealmJoinGateHolds_RearmsInsteadOfFailing()
+        {
+            var engine = new DecisionEngine();
+            var state = SetupEspExitDeadEnd(engine);
+            state = AddDesktopRealmJoinAndHello(engine, state);
+
+            // Preconditions: the gate is closed and owns an armed deadline of its own.
+            Assert.False(DecisionEngine.RealmJoinGateOpen(state));
+            Assert.NotNull(FindDeadline(state, DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout));
+
+            var fireAt = T0.AddMinutes(33);
+            var step = engine.Reduce(state, DeadlineFired(70, fireAt, DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion));
+
+            Assert.True(step.Transition.Taken);
+            Assert.Null(step.NewState.Outcome);
+            Assert.NotEqual(SessionStage.Failed, step.NewState.Stage);
+
+            var rearmed = FindDeadline(step.NewState, DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion);
+            Assert.NotNull(rearmed);
+            Assert.Equal(fireAt.AddMinutes(30), rearmed!.DueAtUtc);
+
+            var schedule = step.Effects.Single(e => e.Kind == DecisionEffectKind.ScheduleDeadline);
+            Assert.Equal(DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion, schedule.Deadline!.Name);
+
+            var waiting = SingleTimelineEffect(step, "completion_waiting");
+            Assert.Contains("CompletionGateHolding", waiting.Parameters!["trigger"]);
+            Assert.Contains("realmjoin_resolution", waiting.Parameters!["missingPrerequisites"]);
+            Assert.Equal(rearmed.DueAtUtc.ToString("o"), waiting.Parameters!["resolutionDeadlineDueAtUtc"]);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Session81daa77f_RealmJoinResolvesAfterTheWindow_CompletesInsteadOfFailing()
+        {
+            // End-to-end proof against the real field shape: before this guard the session was
+            // stamped Failed at exit+30 min with esp_exit_without_completion_evidence, 34 min
+            // before the RealmJoin gate would have released it.
+            var engine = new DecisionEngine();
+            var state = SetupEspExitDeadEnd(engine);
+            state = AddDesktopRealmJoinAndHello(engine, state);
+
+            var fired = engine.Reduce(state, DeadlineFired(70, T0.AddMinutes(33), DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion));
+            Assert.Null(fired.NewState.Outcome);
+
+            // RealmJoin reaches phase 110 — the gate opens and the session completes.
+            var resolved = engine.Reduce(fired.NewState, MakeSignal(
+                80, DecisionSignalKind.RealmJoinResolved, T0.AddMinutes(50),
+                new Dictionary<string, string> { [DecisionEngine.RealmJoinPayloadKeys.DeploymentPhase] = "110" }));
+
+            Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Finalizing, resolved.NewState.Stage);
+            Assert.Equal("Resolved", resolved.NewState.RealmJoinFacts.Outcome!.Value);
+
+            var grace = FindDeadline(resolved.NewState, DeadlineNames.FinalizingGrace);
+            Assert.NotNull(grace);
+            var completed = engine.Reduce(resolved.NewState,
+                DeadlineFired(90, grace!.DueAtUtc, DeadlineNames.FinalizingGrace));
+            Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Completed, completed.NewState.Stage);
+            Assert.Equal(SessionOutcome.EnrollmentComplete, completed.NewState.Outcome);
+        }
+
+        // ============================================================== convergence ====
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void DeadlineFired_AfterTheGateOpened_ResolvesNormallyAgain()
+        {
+            // Convergence proof: the guard is not an escape hatch. Once RealmJoin timed out the
+            // gate is open, the guard stops applying, and a session with no completion evidence
+            // fails exactly as before.
+            var engine = new DecisionEngine();
+            var state = SetupEspExitDeadEnd(engine);
+            state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(
+                50, DecisionSignalKind.RealmJoinDetected, T0.AddMinutes(6),
+                new Dictionary<string, string> { [DecisionEngine.RealmJoinPayloadKeys.DeploymentPhase] = "0" })).NewState;
+
+            var rjDeadline = FindDeadline(state, DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout);
+            Assert.NotNull(rjDeadline);
+            state = engine.Reduce(state,
+                DeadlineFired(60, rjDeadline!.DueAtUtc, DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout)).NewState;
+
+            Assert.True(DecisionEngine.RealmJoinGateOpen(state));
+            Assert.Null(FindDeadline(state, DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout));
+
+            // No desktop, no Hello, no IME evidence — the genuine dead-end shape.
+            var step = engine.Reduce(state,
+                DeadlineFired(70, T0.AddMinutes(80), DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion));
+
+            Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Failed, step.NewState.Stage);
+            Assert.Equal(SessionOutcome.EnrollmentFailed, step.NewState.Outcome);
+            var failed = SingleTimelineEffect(step, "enrollment_failed");
+            Assert.Equal("esp_exit_without_completion_evidence", failed.Parameters!["reason"]);
+        }
+
+        // =========================================================== mutation proofs ====
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void DeadlineFired_WithoutRealmJoin_StillFails()
+        {
+            // The guard must key on an actually-held gate, never on the absence of evidence.
+            var engine = new DecisionEngine();
+            var state = SetupEspExitDeadEnd(engine);
+
+            var step = engine.Reduce(state,
+                DeadlineFired(70, T0.AddMinutes(33), DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion));
+
+            Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Failed, step.NewState.Stage);
+            Assert.Equal(SessionOutcome.EnrollmentFailed, step.NewState.Outcome);
+            var failed = SingleTimelineEffect(step, "enrollment_failed");
+            Assert.Equal("esp_exit_without_completion_evidence", failed.Parameters!["reason"]);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void DeadlineFired_GateClosedButItsDeadlineNoLongerArmed_StillFails()
+        {
+            // A gate that can no longer resolve itself must not park the session forever. The
+            // hand-built state drops only the RealmJoin deadline, leaving the gate closed.
+            var engine = new DecisionEngine();
+            var state = SetupEspExitDeadEnd(engine);
+            state = AddDesktopRealmJoinAndHello(engine, state);
+
+            var builder = state.ToBuilder();
+            builder.CancelDeadline(DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout);
+            state = builder.Build();
+
+            Assert.False(DecisionEngine.RealmJoinGateOpen(state));
+            Assert.Null(FindDeadline(state, DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout));
+
+            var step = engine.Reduce(state,
+                DeadlineFired(70, T0.AddMinutes(33), DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion));
+
+            Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Failed, step.NewState.Stage);
+            Assert.Equal(SessionOutcome.EnrollmentFailed, step.NewState.Outcome);
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/BuiltInRulesTests.cs

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
 
@@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ public class BuiltInRulesTests
             "policiesDiscovered", "ignoreCompletedApp", "imeAgentVersion",
             "espTrackStatus", "updateName", "updateWin32AppState",
             "cancelStuckAndSetCurrent", "imeSessionChange", "imeImpersonation", "imeTokenFailure",
-            "enrollmentCompleted", "updateDoTelemetry", "scriptStarted",
+            "enrollmentCompleted", "userSessionZeroApps", "updateDoTelemetry", "scriptStarted",
             "scriptContext", "scriptExitCode", "scriptOutput", "scriptCompleted",
             "resetPlatformScriptContext",
             "healthScriptResult", "healthScriptDetectionResult",
@@ -201,4 +202,38 @@ public class BuiltInRulesTests
                 $"Pattern {pattern.PatternId} has invalid category '{pattern.Category}'");
         }
     }
+
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Sessions 81daa77f / 75d6ae8e (2026-08-25). IME writes this line and then returns before
+    /// its "Completed user session" statement, so on a device with no user-targeted Win32 apps
+    /// it is the ONLY evidence that user-phase enforcement finished. The exact wording is
+    /// pinned here against the real IME line (verified against decompiled IME 1.104.102.0,
+    /// ApplicationPoller and AppWorkloadAbstraction) because a silent drift would bring back
+    /// the 30-min esp_exit_without_completion_evidence false positive with no test failing.
+    /// </summary>
+    [Fact]
+    public void BuiltInImeLogPatterns_ZeroUserAppsPattern_MatchesTheRealImeLine()
+    {
+        var pattern = Assert.Single(
+            BuiltInImeLogPatterns.GetAll(),
+            p => p.PatternId == "IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS");
+
+        Assert.Equal("userSessionZeroApps", pattern.Action);
+        Assert.Equal("always", pattern.Category);
+
+        var regex = new Regex(pattern.Pattern, RegexOptions.CultureInvariant);
+
+        var real = "[Win32App] Get 0 apps for user session 1, user id = 4a1ba5db-44ed-4e69-8477-47ed88e76020";
+        var match = regex.Match(real);
+        Assert.True(match.Success, "zero-app user session line must match");
+        Assert.Equal("1", match.Groups["sessionId"].Value);
+        Assert.Equal("4a1ba5db-44ed-4e69-8477-47ed88e76020", match.Groups["userId"].Value);
+
+        // Must not swallow a session that DOES have apps — that would fabricate completion
+        // evidence while enforcement is still running.
+        Assert.DoesNotMatch(regex,
+            "[Win32App] Get 3 apps for user session 1, user id = 4a1ba5db-44ed-4e69-8477-47ed88e76020");
+        Assert.DoesNotMatch(regex,
+            "[Win32App] Get 10 apps for user session 1, user id = 4a1ba5db-44ed-4e69-8477-47ed88e76020");
+    }
 }

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/CertTenantBindingTests.cs

@@ -13,18 +13,21 @@ using Moq;
 namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
 
 /// <summary>
-/// CERT-TENANT-BINDING-SHADOW — stage 1 coverage.
+/// CERT-TENANT-BINDING — enforced since 2026-08-25.
 ///
 /// The agent authenticates with the Intune MDM device certificate, whose chain is pinned to
 /// Microsoft's Intune roots. Those roots are shared by every Intune tenant, so a valid chain alone
 /// does not prove the caller belongs to the tenant it claims. The CA stamps the Entra tenant id
 /// into OID 1.2.840.113556.5.14, which lets the backend bind the two.
 ///
-/// These tests pin three things:
+/// These tests pin four things:
 ///   - the tenant id is actually extracted from a REAL field certificate (not a synthetic fixture),
+///     because if Microsoft ever changes that stamp, enforcement locks out the whole fleet,
 ///   - the pure comparison covers every outcome the telemetry can report,
-///   - shadow mode observes without deciding: a cross-tenant certificate must still pass the
-///     certificate stage in stage 1, or we would be enforcing before we measured.
+///   - the enforcement rule rejects Mismatch and ONLY Mismatch — ExtensionMissing is tolerated on
+///     purpose, and that tolerance has its own test so removing it has to be a decision,
+///   - a rejected request still carries its telemetry and does not leak the certificate's tenant
+///     back to the caller.
 /// </summary>
 public class CertTenantBindingTests
 {
@@ -200,13 +203,58 @@ public class CertTenantBindingTests
         Assert.False(CertTenantBinding.WouldRejectUnderEnforcement(outcome));
     }
 
-    // ---------------------------------------------------------------- shadow mode
+    // ---------------------------------------------------------------- enforcement rule
 
     [Fact]
-    public async Task ValidateRequestAsync_ForeignTenantCert_IsObservedButNotRejected()
+    public void Rejects_OnlyMismatch()
     {
-        // Stage 1 contract: a cross-tenant certificate is logged and still passes the certificate
-        // stage. If this test ever fails, enforcement was switched on without the telemetry review.
+        // Mismatch is the only outcome that is evidence of a foreign certificate. The rest mean
+        // "cannot tell", and rejecting on those would cost legitimate devices their enrollment for
+        // something outside their control.
+        Assert.True(CertTenantBinding.Rejects(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Mismatch));
+
+        Assert.False(CertTenantBinding.Rejects(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Match));
+        Assert.False(CertTenantBinding.Rejects(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.ExtensionMissing));
+        Assert.False(CertTenantBinding.Rejects(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Unparseable));
+        Assert.False(CertTenantBinding.Rejects(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.RequestTenantNotAGuid));
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Rejects_ExtensionMissingIsDeliberatelyTolerated()
+    {
+        // Pinned on its own because it is the one that is expected to tighten later: certificates
+        // predating the extension, or a sovereign-cloud CA, must not be locked out today. Changing
+        // this is a decision, and this test is where that decision has to be made explicitly.
+        Assert.False(CertTenantBinding.Rejects(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.ExtensionMissing));
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Rejects_AgreesWithTheTelemetryField()
+    {
+        // WouldRejectUnderEnforcement is what the log line reports. If the two ever diverge, the
+        // telemetry stops describing what actually happened.
+        foreach (var outcome in new[]
+                 {
+                     CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Match,
+                     CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Mismatch,
+                     CertTenantBinding.Outcome.ExtensionMissing,
+                     CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Unparseable,
+                     CertTenantBinding.Outcome.RequestTenantNotAGuid,
+                 })
+        {
+            Assert.Equal(CertTenantBinding.Rejects(outcome),
+                         CertTenantBinding.WouldRejectUnderEnforcement(outcome));
+        }
+    }
+
+    // ---------------------------------------------------------------- end-to-end
+
+    [Fact]
+    public async Task ValidateRequestAsync_ForeignTenantCert_IsRejected()
+    {
+        // The attack this whole feature exists for: a valid Intune certificate from the attacker's
+        // own tenant, replayed against a victim tenant whose device serial they know. Serials are
+        // printed on the chassis, so before this gate that was the entire barrier.
         var logger = new CapturingLogger();
         var validator = BuildValidator(logger);
 
@@ -214,16 +262,40 @@ public class CertTenantBindingTests
             BuildRequestWithCert(SampleCertBase64()),
             tenantId: "aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee");
 
-        // Deliberately accepted: stage 1 measures, it does not enforce. This assertion is the one
-        // that must be inverted (to a 403) when stage 2 turns enforcement on.
-        Assert.True(result.IsValid, $"Shadow mode changed the outcome: {result.ErrorMessage} / {result.Details}");
-        Assert.NotEqual(HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized, result.StatusCode);
+        Assert.False(result.IsValid);
+        Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.Forbidden, result.StatusCode);
+
+        // The response must not reveal which tenant the certificate actually belongs to.
+        Assert.DoesNotContain(SampleCertTenantId.ToString(), result.Details ?? "", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
+        Assert.DoesNotContain(SampleCertTenantId.ToString(), result.ErrorMessage ?? "", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
 
         var observed = Assert.Single(logger.Entries, e => e.Message.Contains("AgentCertTenantBinding"));
         Assert.Equal(LogLevel.Warning, observed.Level);
         Assert.Contains(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Mismatch, observed.Message);
-        Assert.Contains("enforced=False", observed.Message);
+        Assert.Contains("enforced=True", observed.Message);
         Assert.Contains("wouldReject=True", observed.Message);
+
+        // The rejection must also land in the shared rejection log, so it shows up in the same KQL
+        // raster as every other reason a request was turned away.
+        Assert.Contains(logger.Entries, e => e.Message.Contains("AgentRequestRejected")
+                                             && e.Message.Contains("stage=certtenant"));
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public async Task ValidateRequestAsync_MismatchStillStampsTheRequestRow()
+    {
+        // Enforcement must not cost us the telemetry: a blocked request is exactly the one an
+        // operator will go looking for afterwards.
+        var items = new Dictionary<object, object>();
+        var validator = BuildValidator(new CapturingLogger());
+
+        await validator.ValidateRequestAsync(
+            BuildRequestWithCert(SampleCertBase64(), items),
+            tenantId: "aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee");
+
+        Assert.Equal(
+            CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Mismatch,
+            Assert.Contains(CertTenantBinding.RequestItemKey, items));
     }
 
     [Fact]

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/DeviceAssociationValidatorTests.cs

@@ -127,4 +127,47 @@ public class DeviceAssociationValidatorTests
         Assert.True(result.IsValid);
     }
 
+    [Fact]
+    public void AsCacheHit_FlagsTheCopyAndLeavesTheCachedInstanceAlone()
+    {
+        // The cached instance is shared across every request for that serial. Marking it in place
+        // would make the first (real) lookup look cached too, and the shadow log gate would then
+        // drop the one line per lookup that carries the finding.
+        var cached = new DeviceAssociationResult
+        {
+            IsValid = true,
+            SerialNumber = Serial,
+            AssociationState = "preassociated",
+            DevicePreparationPolicyId = "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555",
+            AssignedToUserPrincipalName = "someone@example.invalid",
+            ManagedDeviceId = "66666666-7777-8888-9999-000000000000",
+        };
+
+        var hit = cached.AsCacheHit();
+
+        Assert.True(hit.ServedFromCache);
+        Assert.False(cached.ServedFromCache);
+        Assert.NotSame(cached, hit);
+
+        // Every field the shadow log reports must survive the copy.
+        Assert.Equal(cached.IsValid, hit.IsValid);
+        Assert.Equal(cached.IsTransient, hit.IsTransient);
+        Assert.Equal(cached.SerialNumber, hit.SerialNumber);
+        Assert.Equal(cached.AssociationState, hit.AssociationState);
+        Assert.Equal(cached.DevicePreparationPolicyId, hit.DevicePreparationPolicyId);
+        Assert.Equal(cached.AssignedToUserPrincipalName, hit.AssignedToUserPrincipalName);
+        Assert.Equal(cached.ManagedDeviceId, hit.ManagedDeviceId);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void FreshlyParsedResult_IsNotFlaggedAsCached()
+    {
+        // A result straight from a Graph response must be loggable — that is the one line per lookup.
+        var body = $@"{{""value"":[{{""serialNumber"":""{Serial}"",""associationState"":""preassociated""}}]}}";
+
+        var result = DeviceAssociationValidator.ParseTenantAssociatedDevicesResponse(body, Serial);
+
+        Assert.False(result.ServedFromCache);
+    }
+
 }

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/GraphFeatureCatalogSyncTests.cs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
+using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.Graph;
 
 namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
@@ -63,6 +63,18 @@ public class GraphFeatureCatalogSyncTests
             scriptFeatures.Where(f => f != "All").OrderBy(f => f, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
     }
 
+    [Fact]
+    public void GrantScript_Help_DocumentsEveryFeature()
+    {
+        // The -Features help block is how an admin discovers what they can grant. A feature that
+        // is grantable but undocumented effectively does not exist for them.
+        var script = ReadGrantScript();
+        var help = script.Substring(0, script.IndexOf("$FeatureCatalog", StringComparison.Ordinal));
+
+        foreach (var feature in GraphFeatureCatalog.Features)
+            Assert.Contains(feature, help, StringComparison.Ordinal);
+    }
+
     private static string ReadGrantScript()
     {
         var path = Path.Combine(FindRepoRoot(), "scripts", "CustomerSetup", "Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1");

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/IntuneDeviceBindingValidatorTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
+
+/// <summary>
+/// Tests for <see cref="IntuneDeviceBindingValidator"/> — the pure pieces: the managedDevice
+/// JSON-to-DTO mapping (incl. the exact-match guard on the returned id), the enrolledDateTime
+/// parsing that the enrollment-race measurement depends on, and the cache key shape.
+/// The HTTP/cache/retry resilience mirrors <see cref="CloudPcDeviceValidator"/> 1:1.
+/// </summary>
+public class IntuneDeviceBindingValidatorTests
+{
+    private const string TenantId = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111";
+    private const string DeviceId = "07bc0167-9061-43b7-b243-0bb6aeda736e";
+
+    // -- BuildCacheKey --
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void BuildCacheKey_StableShape()
+    {
+        var key = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.BuildCacheKey(TenantId, DeviceId);
+        Assert.Equal($"intune-device-binding:{TenantId}:{DeviceId}", key);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void BuildCacheKey_DistinctFromOtherValidatorKeys()
+    {
+        // A shared prefix would let a positive hit in one validator satisfy a lookup in another.
+        var key = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.BuildCacheKey(TenantId, DeviceId);
+        Assert.StartsWith("intune-device-binding:", key);
+        Assert.DoesNotContain("cloudpc", key);
+        Assert.DoesNotContain("autopilot", key);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void BuildCacheKey_IsTenantScoped()
+    {
+        // The whole point of the check is that the same device id must not resolve across
+        // tenants — a tenant-blind cache key would defeat it.
+        var a = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.BuildCacheKey(TenantId, DeviceId);
+        var b = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.BuildCacheKey("22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222", DeviceId);
+        Assert.NotEqual(a, b);
+    }
+
+    // -- ParseManagedDeviceResponse --
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Parse_MatchingDevice_ReturnsMatchWithDiagnostics()
+    {
+        var body = $$"""
+        {
+          "id": "{{DeviceId}}",
+          "deviceName": "TEST-DEVICE-01",
+          "enrolledDateTime": "2026-08-24T15:20:00Z",
+          "azureADDeviceId": "aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee",
+          "managementState": "managed"
+        }
+        """;
+
+        var result = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.ParseManagedDeviceResponse(body, DeviceId);
+
+        Assert.Equal(IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.Match, result.Outcome);
+        Assert.True(result.IsValid);
+        Assert.False(result.IsTransient);
+        Assert.Equal("TEST-DEVICE-01", result.DeviceName);
+        Assert.Equal("managed", result.ManagementState);
+        Assert.Equal(
+            new DateTimeOffset(2026, 8, 24, 15, 20, 0, TimeSpan.Zero),
+            result.EnrolledDateTime);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Parse_DifferentIdInBody_IsNotAMatch()
+    {
+        // Guards against a redirected or widened lookup being taken as confirmation of the id
+        // we actually asked about.
+        var body = """
+        { "id": "99999999-9999-9999-9999-999999999999", "deviceName": "OTHER" }
+        """;
+
+        var result = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.ParseManagedDeviceResponse(body, DeviceId);
+
+        Assert.Equal(IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.NotFound, result.Outcome);
+        Assert.False(result.IsValid);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Parse_IdCasingDiffers_StillMatches()
+    {
+        // Graph echoes GUIDs lowercase, but casing must never decide a security outcome.
+        var body = $$"""
+        { "id": "{{DeviceId.ToUpperInvariant()}}", "deviceName": "TEST-DEVICE-01" }
+        """;
+
+        var result = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.ParseManagedDeviceResponse(body, DeviceId);
+
+        Assert.Equal(IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.Match, result.Outcome);
+    }
+
+    [Theory]
+    [InlineData("")]
+    [InlineData("not json at all")]
+    [InlineData("{}")]
+    [InlineData("""{ "id": "" }""")]
+    [InlineData("""{ "deviceName": "no id field" }""")]
+    public void Parse_MalformedOrEmpty_IsNotFoundNotAnException(string body)
+    {
+        var result = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.ParseManagedDeviceResponse(body, DeviceId);
+
+        Assert.Equal(IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.NotFound, result.Outcome);
+        Assert.Equal(DeviceId, result.IntuneDeviceId);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Parse_MissingEnrolledDateTime_LeavesItNull()
+    {
+        var body = $$"""
+        { "id": "{{DeviceId}}", "deviceName": "TEST-DEVICE-01" }
+        """;
+
+        var result = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.ParseManagedDeviceResponse(body, DeviceId);
+
+        Assert.Equal(IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.Match, result.Outcome);
+        Assert.Null(result.EnrolledDateTime);
+    }
+
+    // -- ParseEnrolledDateTime --
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void ParseEnrolledDateTime_IntuneZeroDate_IsAbsenceNotADate()
+    {
+        // Intune returns 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z when it has no enrollment timestamp. Treating that
+        // as a real date would report an object age of ~2000 years and poison the race analysis.
+        Assert.Null(IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.ParseEnrolledDateTime("0001-01-01T00:00:00Z"));
+    }
+
+    [Theory]
+    [InlineData(null)]
+    [InlineData("")]
+    [InlineData("   ")]
+    [InlineData("not-a-date")]
+    public void ParseEnrolledDateTime_UnusableInput_IsNull(string? raw)
+    {
+        Assert.Null(IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.ParseEnrolledDateTime(raw));
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void ParseEnrolledDateTime_NormalizesToUtc()
+    {
+        // A device object created minutes ago is the signature of an enrollment race, so the
+        // instant has to be comparable regardless of the offset Graph reports it in.
+        var parsed = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.ParseEnrolledDateTime("2026-08-24T17:20:00+02:00");
+
+        Assert.NotNull(parsed);
+        Assert.Equal(TimeSpan.Zero, parsed!.Value.Offset);
+        Assert.Equal(new DateTimeOffset(2026, 8, 24, 15, 20, 0, TimeSpan.Zero), parsed.Value);
+    }
+
+    // -- result semantics --
+
+    [Theory]
+    [InlineData(IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.NotFound)]
+    [InlineData(IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.NoDeviceIdInCert)]
+    [InlineData(IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.PermissionMissing)]
+    public void DefinitiveNegatives_AreNotTransient(IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome outcome)
+    {
+        // Only Transient may be retried / left uncached. A missing grant or a foreign device is a
+        // state, not an outage — retrying cannot change either.
+        var result = new IntuneDeviceBindingResult { Outcome = outcome };
+
+        Assert.False(result.IsTransient);
+        Assert.False(result.IsValid);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void AsCacheHit_FlagsTheCopyAndLeavesTheCachedInstanceAlone()
+    {
+        // The cached instance is shared across every request for that device. Marking it in place
+        // would make the first (real) lookup look cached too, and the log gate would then drop the
+        // one line per lookup we actually want to keep.
+        var cached = new IntuneDeviceBindingResult
+        {
+            Outcome = IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.Match,
+            IntuneDeviceId = DeviceId,
+            DeviceName = "TEST-DEVICE-01",
+            EnrolledDateTime = new DateTimeOffset(2026, 8, 24, 16, 51, 0, TimeSpan.Zero),
+        };
+
+        var hit = cached.AsCacheHit();
+
+        Assert.True(hit.ServedFromCache);
+        Assert.False(cached.ServedFromCache);
+        Assert.NotSame(cached, hit);
+
+        // Everything the log line reports must survive the copy.
+        Assert.Equal(cached.Outcome, hit.Outcome);
+        Assert.Equal(cached.IntuneDeviceId, hit.IntuneDeviceId);
+        Assert.Equal(cached.DeviceName, hit.DeviceName);
+        Assert.Equal(cached.EnrolledDateTime, hit.EnrolledDateTime);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void FreshResult_IsNotFlaggedAsCached()
+    {
+        // A freshly parsed Graph response must be loggable — that is the one line per lookup.
+        var body = $$"""
+        { "id": "{{DeviceId}}", "deviceName": "TEST-DEVICE-01" }
+        """;
+
+        var result = IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.ParseManagedDeviceResponse(body, DeviceId);
+
+        Assert.False(result.ServedFromCache);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void TransientOutcome_IsNeitherValidNorDefinitive()
+    {
+        var result = new IntuneDeviceBindingResult { Outcome = IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.Transient };
+
+        Assert.True(result.IsTransient);
+        Assert.False(result.IsValid);
+    }
+}

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/VulnerabilityReportEventSequenceTests.cs

@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ public class VulnerabilityReportEventSequenceTests
         Assert.Equal("vulnerability_report", evt.EventType);
         Assert.Equal(AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Constants.EventTypes.VulnerabilityReport, evt.EventType);
         Assert.Equal("VulnerabilityCorrelationService", evt.Source);
-        Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Error, evt.Severity); // risk=high → Error
+        Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Warning, evt.Severity); // risk=high → Warning (severity is capped)
         // Non-phase event: must stay Unknown so the UI timeline doesn't render a phantom phase boundary.
         Assert.Equal(EnrollmentPhase.Unknown, evt.Phase);
         Assert.Equal(NowUtc, evt.Timestamp);
@@ -127,6 +127,35 @@ public class VulnerabilityReportEventSequenceTests
         Assert.IsType<Dictionary<string, object>>(evt.Data["scan_summary"]);
     }
 
+    [Theory]
+    // The scan reports on the software inventory, not on the enrollment: a finding is never an
+    // enrollment failure, so severity is capped at Warning. Error/Critical would put the report
+    // into the diagnosis page's failure evidence and into MCP's failure-intent ranking.
+    [InlineData("critical", EventSeverity.Warning)]
+    [InlineData("high",     EventSeverity.Warning)]
+    [InlineData("medium",   EventSeverity.Info)]
+    [InlineData("low",      EventSeverity.Info)]
+    [InlineData("none",     EventSeverity.Info)]
+    [InlineData("HIGH",     EventSeverity.Warning)]  // case-insensitive
+    [InlineData("",         EventSeverity.Info)]
+    public void Severity_IsCappedAtWarning(string risk, EventSeverity expected)
+    {
+        var evt = Build(null, new List<EnrollmentEvent>(), Report(risk));
+
+        Assert.Equal(expected, evt.Severity);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void Severity_IsInfo_WhenRiskIsMissing()
+    {
+        var report = new Dictionary<string, object>
+        {
+            ["scan_summary"] = new Dictionary<string, object>(),
+        };
+
+        Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Info, Build(null, new List<EnrollmentEvent>(), report).Severity);
+    }
+
     [Fact]
     public void Data_Phase_CarriesTheLabel()
     {

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/DataAccess/TableStorage/TableConfigRepository.cs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-using System;
+using System;
 using System.Collections.Generic;
 using System.Linq;
 using System.Text.Json;
@@ -652,6 +652,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.DataAccess.TableStorage
                 { "ValidateCorporateIdentifier", config.ValidateCorporateIdentifier },
                 { "ValidateDeviceAssociation", config.ValidateDeviceAssociation },
                 { "ValidateCloudPcDevice", config.ValidateCloudPcDevice },
+                { "ValidateIntuneDeviceBinding", config.ValidateIntuneDeviceBinding },
                 { "AllowInsecureAgentRequests", config.AllowInsecureAgentRequests },
                 { "DataRetentionDays", config.DataRetentionDays },
                 { "SessionTimeoutHours", config.SessionTimeoutHours },
@@ -757,6 +758,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.DataAccess.TableStorage
                 ValidateCorporateIdentifier = entity.GetBoolean("ValidateCorporateIdentifier") ?? false,
                 ValidateDeviceAssociation = entity.GetBoolean("ValidateDeviceAssociation") ?? false,
                 ValidateCloudPcDevice = entity.GetBoolean("ValidateCloudPcDevice") ?? false,
+                ValidateIntuneDeviceBinding = entity.GetBoolean("ValidateIntuneDeviceBinding") ?? false,
                 AllowInsecureAgentRequests = entity.GetBoolean("AllowInsecureAgentRequests") ?? false,
                 DataRetentionDays = entity.GetInt32("DataRetentionDays") ?? 90,
                 SessionTimeoutHours = entity.GetInt32("SessionTimeoutHours") ?? 5,

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Config/GetAgentConfigFunction.cs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-using System.Linq;
+using System.Linq;
 using System.Net;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Config
         private readonly CorporateIdentifierValidator _corporateIdentifierValidator;
         private readonly DeviceAssociationValidator _deviceAssociationValidator;
         private readonly CloudPcDeviceValidator _cloudPcDeviceValidator;
+        private readonly IntuneDeviceBindingValidator _intuneDeviceBindingValidator;
         private readonly BootstrapSessionService _bootstrapSessionService;
         private readonly KillSwitchEvaluator _killSwitchEvaluator;
 
@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Config
             CorporateIdentifierValidator corporateIdentifierValidator,
             DeviceAssociationValidator deviceAssociationValidator,
             CloudPcDeviceValidator cloudPcDeviceValidator,
+            IntuneDeviceBindingValidator intuneDeviceBindingValidator,
             BootstrapSessionService bootstrapSessionService,
             KillSwitchEvaluator killSwitchEvaluator)
         {
@@ -53,6 +55,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Config
             _corporateIdentifierValidator = corporateIdentifierValidator;
             _deviceAssociationValidator = deviceAssociationValidator;
             _cloudPcDeviceValidator = cloudPcDeviceValidator;
+            _intuneDeviceBindingValidator = intuneDeviceBindingValidator;
             _bootstrapSessionService = bootstrapSessionService;
             _killSwitchEvaluator = killSwitchEvaluator;
         }
@@ -88,7 +91,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Config
                     _logger,
                     bootstrapSessionService: _bootstrapSessionService,
                     deviceAssociationValidator: _deviceAssociationValidator,
-                    cloudPcDeviceValidator: _cloudPcDeviceValidator
+                    cloudPcDeviceValidator: _cloudPcDeviceValidator,
+                    intuneDeviceBindingValidator: _intuneDeviceBindingValidator
                 );
 
                 if (errorResponse != null)

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Diagnostics/GetDiagnosticsUploadUrlFunction.cs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-using System.Net;
+using System.Net;
 using System.Web;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Diagnostics
         private readonly CorporateIdentifierValidator _corporateIdentifierValidator;
         private readonly DeviceAssociationValidator _deviceAssociationValidator;
         private readonly CloudPcDeviceValidator _cloudPcDeviceValidator;
+        private readonly IntuneDeviceBindingValidator _intuneDeviceBindingValidator;
         private readonly BootstrapSessionService _bootstrapSessionService;
         private readonly HostedDiagnosticsBlobService _hostedDiagnostics;
 
@@ -65,6 +66,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Diagnostics
             CorporateIdentifierValidator corporateIdentifierValidator,
             DeviceAssociationValidator deviceAssociationValidator,
             CloudPcDeviceValidator cloudPcDeviceValidator,
+            IntuneDeviceBindingValidator intuneDeviceBindingValidator,
             BootstrapSessionService bootstrapSessionService,
             HostedDiagnosticsBlobService hostedDiagnostics)
         {
@@ -76,6 +78,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Diagnostics
             _corporateIdentifierValidator = corporateIdentifierValidator;
             _deviceAssociationValidator = deviceAssociationValidator;
             _cloudPcDeviceValidator = cloudPcDeviceValidator;
+            _intuneDeviceBindingValidator = intuneDeviceBindingValidator;
             _bootstrapSessionService = bootstrapSessionService;
             _hostedDiagnostics = hostedDiagnostics;
         }
@@ -127,7 +130,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Diagnostics
                     _logger,
                     bootstrapSessionService: _bootstrapSessionService,
                     deviceAssociationValidator: _deviceAssociationValidator,
-                    cloudPcDeviceValidator: _cloudPcDeviceValidator
+                    cloudPcDeviceValidator: _cloudPcDeviceValidator,
+                    intuneDeviceBindingValidator: _intuneDeviceBindingValidator
                 );
 
                 if (errorResponse != null)

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Ingest/IngestTelemetryFunction.cs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-using System.IO;
+using System.IO;
 using System.Net;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Helpers;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security;
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Ingest
         private readonly CorporateIdentifierValidator _corporateIdentifierValidator;
         private readonly DeviceAssociationValidator _deviceAssociationValidator;
         private readonly CloudPcDeviceValidator _cloudPcDeviceValidator;
+        private readonly IntuneDeviceBindingValidator _intuneDeviceBindingValidator;
         private readonly BootstrapSessionService _bootstrapSessionService;
         private readonly KillSwitchEvaluator _killSwitchEvaluator;
         private readonly SessionDeletionGuard _deletionGuard;
@@ -69,6 +70,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Ingest
             CorporateIdentifierValidator corporateIdentifierValidator,
             DeviceAssociationValidator deviceAssociationValidator,
             CloudPcDeviceValidator cloudPcDeviceValidator,
+            IntuneDeviceBindingValidator intuneDeviceBindingValidator,
             BootstrapSessionService bootstrapSessionService,
             KillSwitchEvaluator killSwitchEvaluator,
             SessionDeletionGuard deletionGuard)
@@ -86,6 +88,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Ingest
             _corporateIdentifierValidator = corporateIdentifierValidator;
             _deviceAssociationValidator = deviceAssociationValidator;
             _cloudPcDeviceValidator = cloudPcDeviceValidator;
+            _intuneDeviceBindingValidator = intuneDeviceBindingValidator;
             _bootstrapSessionService = bootstrapSessionService;
             _killSwitchEvaluator = killSwitchEvaluator;
             _deletionGuard = deletionGuard;
@@ -116,7 +119,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Ingest
                     _logger,
                     bootstrapSessionService: _bootstrapSessionService,
                     deviceAssociationValidator: _deviceAssociationValidator,
-                    cloudPcDeviceValidator: _cloudPcDeviceValidator);
+                    cloudPcDeviceValidator: _cloudPcDeviceValidator,
+                    intuneDeviceBindingValidator: _intuneDeviceBindingValidator);
 
                 if (errorResponse != null) return AsOutput(errorResponse);
 

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Ingest/ReportAgentErrorFunction.cs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-using System;
+using System;
 using System.Collections.Generic;
 using System.Linq;
 using System.Net;
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Ingest
         private readonly CorporateIdentifierValidator _corporateIdentifierValidator;
         private readonly DeviceAssociationValidator _deviceAssociationValidator;
         private readonly CloudPcDeviceValidator _cloudPcDeviceValidator;
+        private readonly IntuneDeviceBindingValidator _intuneDeviceBindingValidator;
         private readonly TelemetryClient _telemetryClient;
         private readonly BootstrapSessionService _bootstrapSessionService;
         private readonly ISessionRepository _sessionRepo;
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Ingest
             CorporateIdentifierValidator corporateIdentifierValidator,
             DeviceAssociationValidator deviceAssociationValidator,
             CloudPcDeviceValidator cloudPcDeviceValidator,
+            IntuneDeviceBindingValidator intuneDeviceBindingValidator,
             TelemetryClient telemetryClient,
             BootstrapSessionService bootstrapSessionService,
             ISessionRepository sessionRepo,
@@ -62,6 +64,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Ingest
             _corporateIdentifierValidator = corporateIdentifierValidator;
             _deviceAssociationValidator = deviceAssociationValidator;
             _cloudPcDeviceValidator = cloudPcDeviceValidator;
+            _intuneDeviceBindingValidator = intuneDeviceBindingValidator;
             _telemetryClient = telemetryClient;
             _bootstrapSessionService = bootstrapSessionService;
             _sessionRepo = sessionRepo;
@@ -98,7 +101,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Ingest
                     _logger,
                     bootstrapSessionService: _bootstrapSessionService,
                     deviceAssociationValidator: _deviceAssociationValidator,
-                    cloudPcDeviceValidator: _cloudPcDeviceValidator
+                    cloudPcDeviceValidator: _cloudPcDeviceValidator,
+                    intuneDeviceBindingValidator: _intuneDeviceBindingValidator
                 );
 
                 if (errorResponse != null)

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Sessions/RegisterSessionFunction.cs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
 using System.Net;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Helpers;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security;
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Sessions
         private readonly CorporateIdentifierValidator _corporateIdentifierValidator;
         private readonly DeviceAssociationValidator _deviceAssociationValidator;
         private readonly CloudPcDeviceValidator _cloudPcDeviceValidator;
+        private readonly IntuneDeviceBindingValidator _intuneDeviceBindingValidator;
         private readonly BootstrapSessionService _bootstrapSessionService;
         private readonly WebhookNotificationService _webhookNotificationService;
         private readonly SessionDeletionGuard _deletionGuard;
@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Sessions
             CorporateIdentifierValidator corporateIdentifierValidator,
             DeviceAssociationValidator deviceAssociationValidator,
             CloudPcDeviceValidator cloudPcDeviceValidator,
+            IntuneDeviceBindingValidator intuneDeviceBindingValidator,
             BootstrapSessionService bootstrapSessionService,
             WebhookNotificationService webhookNotificationService,
             SessionDeletionGuard deletionGuard)
@@ -62,6 +64,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Sessions
             _corporateIdentifierValidator = corporateIdentifierValidator;
             _deviceAssociationValidator = deviceAssociationValidator;
             _cloudPcDeviceValidator = cloudPcDeviceValidator;
+            _intuneDeviceBindingValidator = intuneDeviceBindingValidator;
             _bootstrapSessionService = bootstrapSessionService;
             _webhookNotificationService = webhookNotificationService;
             _deletionGuard = deletionGuard;
@@ -106,7 +109,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Sessions
                     registration.SessionId,
                     bootstrapSessionService: _bootstrapSessionService,
                     deviceAssociationValidator: _deviceAssociationValidator,
-                    cloudPcDeviceValidator: _cloudPcDeviceValidator
+                    cloudPcDeviceValidator: _cloudPcDeviceValidator,
+                    intuneDeviceBindingValidator: _intuneDeviceBindingValidator
                 );
 
                 if (errorResponse2 != null)

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Program.cs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-using System.IO.Compression;
+using System.IO.Compression;
 using System.Text.Json;
 using System.Text.Json.Serialization;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.DataAccess;
@@ -424,6 +424,7 @@ builder.Services.AddSingleton<AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security.AutopilotDevic
 builder.Services.AddSingleton<AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security.CorporateIdentifierValidator>();
 builder.Services.AddSingleton<AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security.DeviceAssociationValidator>();
 builder.Services.AddSingleton<AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security.CloudPcDeviceValidator>();
+builder.Services.AddSingleton<AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security.IntuneDeviceBindingValidator>();
 
 // Graph add-on permission detection + script display-name resolution.
 // Detector parses the `roles` claim of the SP access token; Resolver fetches

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/CertTenantBinding.cs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-using System;
+using System;
 
 namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security
 {
@@ -14,10 +14,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security
     /// </para>
     /// </summary>
     /// <remarks>
-    /// SHADOW MODE (stage 1): the outcome is observed and logged only — it never changes an
-    /// authorization decision. Enforcement is stage 2, once telemetry shows how many field
-    /// certificates actually carry the extension. Grep marker for the stage-2 change:
-    /// <c>CERT-TENANT-BINDING-SHADOW</c>.
+    /// ENFORCED since 2026-08-25 (stage 2): a <see cref="Outcome.Mismatch"/> is rejected with 403.
+    /// It shipped as shadow-only first and was switched on against measured data — 35,684 requests
+    /// across 32 tenants, every one of them a Match, with the Warning channel verified to be
+    /// carrying other traffic so the zero was not a telemetry artefact.
+    /// <para>
+    /// <see cref="Rejects"/> is the whole rule and the only thing that blocks; the outcome is still
+    /// recorded on every request. Grep marker for the sites involved:
+    /// <c>CERT-TENANT-BINDING</c>.
+    /// </para>
     /// </remarks>
     public static class CertTenantBinding
     {
@@ -83,11 +88,36 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security
         }
 
         /// <summary>
-        /// Whether an outcome would block the request once stage-2 enforcement is switched on.
-        /// Nothing consumes this for authorization yet — it exists so the shadow telemetry can be
-        /// read as "would this have been rejected?" without re-deriving the rule at query time.
+        /// Whether an outcome blocks the request. This is the enforcement rule, in one place.
         /// </summary>
-        public static bool WouldRejectUnderEnforcement(string outcome) =>
-            outcome == Outcome.Mismatch;
+        /// <remarks>
+        /// Only <see cref="Outcome.Mismatch"/> rejects, and only Mismatch is actual evidence of the
+        /// attack: a certificate the Intune CA issued to a different tenant than the one the request
+        /// claims. Everything else means "cannot tell" and must not cost a legitimate device its
+        /// enrollment:
+        /// <list type="bullet">
+        /// <item><description><see cref="Outcome.ExtensionMissing"/> — the certificate carries no
+        /// tenant stamp. Measured at 0 of 35,684 requests across 32 tenants before enforcement was
+        /// switched on, but that sample only covers devices that were active in the window; older
+        /// certificates or a sovereign-cloud CA could still lack it. Rejecting on absence would lock
+        /// those devices out for something they cannot control.
+        /// <para>
+        /// FUTURE TIGHTENING: once the fleet is provably all-5.14 (watch the ExtensionMissing rate
+        /// in the telemetry below), this can become a rejection too. That is a deliberate follow-up
+        /// decision, not an oversight.
+        /// </para></description></item>
+        /// <item><description><see cref="Outcome.Unparseable"/> — extension present but undecodable.
+        /// Same reasoning: a decoder or encoding surprise is our problem, not the device's.</description></item>
+        /// <item><description><see cref="Outcome.RequestTenantNotAGuid"/> — nothing to compare
+        /// against. A non-GUID tenant fails the tenant lookup in §0 long before this point anyway.</description></item>
+        /// </list>
+        /// </remarks>
+        public static bool Rejects(string outcome) => outcome == Outcome.Mismatch;
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Retained name for the telemetry field that records what the rule decided. Identical to
+        /// <see cref="Rejects"/> — kept so KQL written during the shadow phase keeps working.
+        /// </summary>
+        public static bool WouldRejectUnderEnforcement(string outcome) => Rejects(outcome);
     }
 }

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/DeviceAssociationResult.cs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-using System;
+using System;
 
 namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security
 {
@@ -55,5 +55,32 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security
         public string? ManagedDeviceId { get; set; }
 
         public string? ErrorMessage { get; set; }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// True when this result came from the in-memory cache rather than a fresh Graph lookup.
+        /// The shadow log uses it to emit one line per real lookup instead of one per request:
+        /// a single enrollment produced 263 identical lines off a handful of Graph calls.
+        /// </summary>
+        public bool ServedFromCache { get; set; }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Copy of this result marked as a cache hit, so the shared cached instance is never
+        /// mutated by a caller.
+        /// </summary>
+        internal DeviceAssociationResult AsCacheHit() => new()
+        {
+            IsValid = IsValid,
+            IsTransient = IsTransient,
+            SerialNumber = SerialNumber,
+            AssociationState = AssociationState,
+            DevicePreparationPolicyId = DevicePreparationPolicyId,
+            PreAssociatedByUserPrincipalName = PreAssociatedByUserPrincipalName,
+            AssignedToUserPrincipalName = AssignedToUserPrincipalName,
+            PreAssociationDateTime = PreAssociationDateTime,
+            AssociationDateTime = AssociationDateTime,
+            ManagedDeviceId = ManagedDeviceId,
+            ErrorMessage = ErrorMessage,
+            ServedFromCache = true
+        };
     }
 }

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/DeviceAssociationValidator.cs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
 using System;
 using System.Linq;
 using System.Net.Http;
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security
 
             if (_cache.TryGetValue(cacheKey, out DeviceAssociationResult? cached) && cached != null)
             {
-                return cached;
+                return cached.AsCacheHit();
             }
 
             const int maxAttempts = 2;

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/IntuneDeviceBindingValidator.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
+using System;
+using System.Net.Http.Headers;
+using System.Threading.Tasks;
+using Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory;
+using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
+using Newtonsoft.Json;
+using Newtonsoft.Json.Linq;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Binds the agent's client certificate to a device object that actually exists in the tenant
+    /// the request claims: the certificate's Subject CN carries the Intune managedDevice id, and
+    /// this validator looks exactly that id up in the tenant's own
+    /// <c>deviceManagement/managedDevices</c> inventory.
+    /// <para>
+    /// <see cref="CertTenantBinding"/> already proves the certificate was issued to this tenant.
+    /// This adds the second half: that the specific device is still one of the tenant's enrolled
+    /// devices, so a certificate lifted from a decommissioned or wiped machine no longer resolves.
+    /// </para>
+    /// </summary>
+    /// <remarks>
+    /// Built as a near-sibling of <see cref="CloudPcDeviceValidator"/> — same DI dependencies and
+    /// the same cache/retry/transient contract (30 min positive, 5 min negative, 2 attempts with a
+    /// 2s back-off, transient on Graph 5xx / token failure / exception). Two deliberate differences:
+    /// <list type="bullet">
+    /// <item><description>A point-GET on <c>managedDevices/{id}</c> rather than an OData
+    /// <c>$filter</c>. There is no filter literal to inject into, and a 404 is an unambiguous
+    /// "not this tenant's device".</description></item>
+    /// <item><description><see cref="IntuneDeviceBindingResult.EnrolledDateTime"/> is carried out
+    /// so callers can record how old the device object was at request time. That is the open
+    /// question this check must answer before it could ever gate enrollment: a device whose object
+    /// appears only after the agent's first call is a race, not an attack.</description></item>
+    /// </list>
+    /// SHADOW ONLY (stage 3): nothing consumes the result for an authorization decision. Grep
+    /// marker for the enforcement change: <c>CERT-DEVICE-BINDING-SHADOW</c>.
+    /// </remarks>
+    public class IntuneDeviceBindingValidator
+    {
+        private static readonly TimeSpan PositiveCacheTtl = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(30);
+        private static readonly TimeSpan NegativeCacheTtl = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5);
+
+        private readonly ILogger<IntuneDeviceBindingValidator> _logger;
+        private readonly IHttpClientFactory _httpClientFactory;
+        private readonly IMemoryCache _cache;
+        private readonly GraphTokenService _graphTokenService;
+
+        public IntuneDeviceBindingValidator(
+            ILogger<IntuneDeviceBindingValidator> logger,
+            IHttpClientFactory httpClientFactory,
+            IMemoryCache cache,
+            GraphTokenService graphTokenService)
+        {
+            _logger = logger;
+            _httpClientFactory = httpClientFactory;
+            _cache = cache;
+            _graphTokenService = graphTokenService;
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Resolves the Intune device id (from the client certificate's Subject CN) against the
+        /// tenant's managedDevices inventory. Never throws.
+        /// </summary>
+        public async Task<IntuneDeviceBindingResult> ValidateAsync(
+            string tenantId,
+            string? intuneDeviceId,
+            string? sessionId = null)
+        {
+            // The id becomes a URL path segment. The strict GUID gate keeps it from being anything
+            // else - the same rule the rest of the security path applies.
+            if (!SecurityValidator.IsValidGuid(intuneDeviceId))
+            {
+                return new IntuneDeviceBindingResult
+                {
+                    Outcome = IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.NoDeviceIdInCert,
+                    ErrorMessage = "Certificate subject does not carry a valid Intune device id"
+                };
+            }
+
+            var normalizedId = intuneDeviceId!.Trim().ToLowerInvariant();
+            var cacheKey = BuildCacheKey(tenantId, normalizedId);
+
+            if (_cache.TryGetValue(cacheKey, out IntuneDeviceBindingResult? cached) && cached != null)
+                return cached.AsCacheHit();
+
+            const int maxAttempts = 2;
+            IntuneDeviceBindingResult? lastTransient = null;
+
+            for (int attempt = 1; attempt <= maxAttempts; attempt++)
+            {
+                var result = await TryValidateViaGraphAsync(tenantId, normalizedId, sessionId, cacheKey, attempt);
+
+                if (!result.IsTransient)
+                    return result;
+
+                lastTransient = result;
+                if (attempt < maxAttempts)
+                {
+                    _logger.LogWarning(
+                        "Intune device binding transient failure for tenant {TenantId}, deviceId {IntuneDeviceId} (attempt {Attempt}/{MaxAttempts}). Retrying...",
+                        tenantId, normalizedId, attempt, maxAttempts);
+                    await Task.Delay(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2));
+                }
+            }
+
+            return lastTransient!;
+        }
+
+        private async Task<IntuneDeviceBindingResult> TryValidateViaGraphAsync(
+            string tenantId, string normalizedId, string? sessionId, string cacheKey, int attempt)
+        {
+            try
+            {
+                var tokenResult = await _graphTokenService.GetAccessTokenAsync(tenantId);
+                if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(tokenResult.AccessToken))
+                {
+                    return new IntuneDeviceBindingResult
+                    {
+                        Outcome = IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.Transient,
+                        IntuneDeviceId = normalizedId,
+                        ErrorMessage = "Graph access token could not be acquired"
+                    };
+                }
+
+                var graphClient = _httpClientFactory.CreateClient();
+                graphClient.DefaultRequestHeaders.Authorization = new AuthenticationHeaderValue("Bearer", tokenResult.AccessToken);
+
+                // Point-GET: normalizedId passed the GUID gate, so the path segment is safe.
+                var graphUrl = $"{Constants.GraphBaseUrl}/v1.0/deviceManagement/managedDevices/{normalizedId}"
+                               + "?$select=id,deviceName,enrolledDateTime,azureADDeviceId,managementState";
+
+                var response = await graphClient.GetAsync(graphUrl);
+                var responseBody = await response.Content.ReadAsStringAsync();
+
+                if (response.StatusCode == System.Net.HttpStatusCode.NotFound)
+                {
+                    // Definitive: this tenant has no managedDevice with that id. Either the device
+                    // belongs elsewhere, or its object has not appeared yet - the race this shadow
+                    // pass exists to measure.
+                    return CacheAndReturn(cacheKey, new IntuneDeviceBindingResult
+                    {
+                        Outcome = IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.NotFound,
+                        IntuneDeviceId = normalizedId,
+                        ErrorMessage = $"Device '{normalizedId}' is not an enrolled Intune device in this tenant"
+                    }, isPositive: false);
+                }
+
+                if (response.StatusCode == System.Net.HttpStatusCode.Forbidden)
+                {
+                    // Configuration state, not an outage: retrying cannot fix a missing grant.
+                    // Cached briefly so a fresh grant is picked up quickly.
+                    return CacheAndReturn(cacheKey, new IntuneDeviceBindingResult
+                    {
+                        Outcome = IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.PermissionMissing,
+                        IntuneDeviceId = normalizedId,
+                        ErrorMessage = "Managed device lookup not permitted - grant the optional 'IntuneDeviceBinding' Graph feature (DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All)"
+                    }, isPositive: false);
+                }
+
+                if (!response.IsSuccessStatusCode)
+                {
+                    _logger.LogWarning(
+                        "Intune device binding Graph query failed for tenant {TenantId} (attempt {Attempt}). Status: {StatusCode}. Body: {ResponseBody}",
+                        tenantId, attempt, (int)response.StatusCode, responseBody);
+
+                    return new IntuneDeviceBindingResult
+                    {
+                        Outcome = IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.Transient,
+                        IntuneDeviceId = normalizedId,
+                        ErrorMessage = $"Graph query failed with status {(int)response.StatusCode}"
+                    };
+                }
+
+                var result = ParseManagedDeviceResponse(responseBody, normalizedId);
+                return CacheAndReturn(cacheKey, result, isPositive: result.IsValid);
+            }
+            catch (Exception ex)
+            {
+                _logger.LogError(
+                    ex,
+                    "Error during Intune device binding for tenant {TenantId}, session {SessionId}, deviceId {IntuneDeviceId} (attempt {Attempt})",
+                    tenantId, sessionId ?? "<none>", normalizedId, attempt);
+
+                return new IntuneDeviceBindingResult
+                {
+                    Outcome = IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.Transient,
+                    IntuneDeviceId = normalizedId,
+                    ErrorMessage = $"Error during Intune device binding: {ex.Message}"
+                };
+            }
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Pure-function: maps a <c>managedDevices/{id}</c> Graph response body to a result.
+        /// Re-checks the returned <c>id</c> so a redirected or widened lookup can never produce a
+        /// false positive.
+        /// </summary>
+        internal static IntuneDeviceBindingResult ParseManagedDeviceResponse(string responseBody, string normalizedId)
+        {
+            var notFound = new IntuneDeviceBindingResult
+            {
+                Outcome = IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.NotFound,
+                IntuneDeviceId = normalizedId,
+                ErrorMessage = $"Device '{normalizedId}' is not an enrolled Intune device in this tenant"
+            };
+
+            JObject? device;
+            try
+            {
+                device = JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<JObject>(responseBody);
+            }
+            catch (JsonException)
+            {
+                return notFound;
+            }
+
+            var returnedId = device?["id"]?.ToString()?.Trim();
+            if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(returnedId) ||
+                !string.Equals(returnedId, normalizedId, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
+            {
+                return notFound;
+            }
+
+            return new IntuneDeviceBindingResult
+            {
+                Outcome = IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.Match,
+                IntuneDeviceId = normalizedId,
+                DeviceName = device?["deviceName"]?.ToString(),
+                AzureAdDeviceId = device?["azureADDeviceId"]?.ToString(),
+                ManagementState = device?["managementState"]?.ToString(),
+                EnrolledDateTime = ParseEnrolledDateTime(device?["enrolledDateTime"]?.ToString())
+            };
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Parses Graph's <c>enrolledDateTime</c>. Intune returns <c>0001-01-01T00:00:00Z</c> for
+        /// devices it has no enrollment timestamp for; that is absence, not a date, so it maps to
+        /// <c>null</c> rather than a bogus age of two thousand years.
+        /// </summary>
+        internal static DateTimeOffset? ParseEnrolledDateTime(string? raw)
+        {
+            if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(raw)) return null;
+
+            if (!DateTimeOffset.TryParse(
+                    raw,
+                    System.Globalization.CultureInfo.InvariantCulture,
+                    System.Globalization.DateTimeStyles.AdjustToUniversal
+                        | System.Globalization.DateTimeStyles.AssumeUniversal,
+                    out var parsed))
+            {
+                return null;
+            }
+
+            return parsed.Year <= 1 ? null : parsed;
+        }
+
+        internal static string BuildCacheKey(string tenantId, string intuneDeviceId)
+            => $"intune-device-binding:{tenantId}:{intuneDeviceId}";
+
+        private IntuneDeviceBindingResult CacheAndReturn(
+            string cacheKey, IntuneDeviceBindingResult result, bool isPositive)
+        {
+            _cache.Set(cacheKey, result, new MemoryCacheEntryOptions
+            {
+                AbsoluteExpirationRelativeToNow = isPositive ? PositiveCacheTtl : NegativeCacheTtl
+            });
+            return result;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Stable outcome codes for the device-binding check. Emitted verbatim in the
+    /// <c>AgentCertDeviceBinding</c> log and as the <c>CertDeviceBinding</c> request dimension —
+    /// operators match on them in KQL, so keep the names stable.
+    /// </summary>
+    public enum IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome
+    {
+        /// <summary>Device id from the certificate resolves to a managedDevice in this tenant.</summary>
+        Match = 0,
+
+        /// <summary>No managedDevice with that id in this tenant (foreign device, or not yet created).</summary>
+        NotFound = 1,
+
+        /// <summary>Certificate subject carried no usable Intune device id.</summary>
+        NoDeviceIdInCert = 2,
+
+        /// <summary>DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All not granted in this tenant.</summary>
+        PermissionMissing = 3,
+
+        /// <summary>Graph outage, token failure or exception — says nothing about the device.</summary>
+        Transient = 4
+    }
+
+    public class IntuneDeviceBindingResult
+    {
+        public IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome Outcome { get; set; }
+
+        /// <summary>True only for <see cref="IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.Match"/>.</summary>
+        public bool IsValid => Outcome == IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.Match;
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// True when the failure says nothing about the device (Graph error, token issue).
+        /// Transient results are never cached.
+        /// </summary>
+        public bool IsTransient => Outcome == IntuneDeviceBindingOutcome.Transient;
+
+        /// <summary>Intune device id taken from the client certificate's Subject CN.</summary>
+        public string? IntuneDeviceId { get; set; }
+
+        /// <summary>Intune device name — diagnostic only, never a gate.</summary>
+        public string? DeviceName { get; set; }
+
+        /// <summary>Entra device id of the same device, if Intune knows one — diagnostic only.</summary>
+        public string? AzureAdDeviceId { get; set; }
+
+        /// <summary>Intune management state — diagnostic only.</summary>
+        public string? ManagementState { get; set; }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// When Intune recorded the enrollment. The age of this value at request time is what
+        /// tells a genuine race (object created seconds ago) apart from a foreign certificate.
+        /// </summary>
+        public DateTimeOffset? EnrolledDateTime { get; set; }
+
+        public string? ErrorMessage { get; set; }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// True when this result came from the in-memory cache rather than a fresh Graph lookup.
+        /// Callers use it to log once per real lookup instead of once per request: a single
+        /// enrollment produced 136 requests but only one Graph call, so logging per request said
+        /// the same thing 136 times.
+        /// </summary>
+        public bool ServedFromCache { get; set; }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Copy of this result marked as a cache hit, so the shared cached instance is never
+        /// mutated by a caller.
+        /// </summary>
+        internal IntuneDeviceBindingResult AsCacheHit() => new()
+        {
+            Outcome = Outcome,
+            IntuneDeviceId = IntuneDeviceId,
+            DeviceName = DeviceName,
+            AzureAdDeviceId = AzureAdDeviceId,
+            ManagementState = ManagementState,
+            EnrolledDateTime = EnrolledDateTime,
+            ErrorMessage = ErrorMessage,
+            ServedFromCache = true
+        };
+    }
+}

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/SecurityValidationExtensions.cs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-using System;
+using System;
 using System.Net;
 using System.Threading.Tasks;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
@@ -34,9 +34,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security
             string? sessionId = null,
             BootstrapSessionService? bootstrapSessionService = null,
             DeviceAssociationValidator? deviceAssociationValidator = null,
-            CloudPcDeviceValidator? cloudPcDeviceValidator = null)
+            CloudPcDeviceValidator? cloudPcDeviceValidator = null,
+            IntuneDeviceBindingValidator? intuneDeviceBindingValidator = null)
         {
-            var validator = new SecurityValidator(configService, adminConfigService, rateLimitService, autopilotDeviceValidator, corporateIdentifierValidator, logger, bootstrapSessionService, deviceAssociationValidator, cloudPcDeviceValidator);
+            var validator = new SecurityValidator(configService, adminConfigService, rateLimitService, autopilotDeviceValidator, corporateIdentifierValidator, logger, bootstrapSessionService, deviceAssociationValidator, cloudPcDeviceValidator, intuneDeviceBindingValidator);
             var validation = await validator.ValidateRequestAsync(req, tenantId, sessionId);
 
             if (!validation.IsValid)

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/SecurityValidator.cs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-using System;
+using System;
 using System.Linq;
 using System.Net;
 using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security
         private readonly CorporateIdentifierValidator _corporateIdentifierValidator;
         private readonly DeviceAssociationValidator? _deviceAssociationValidator;
         private readonly CloudPcDeviceValidator? _cloudPcDeviceValidator;
+        private readonly IntuneDeviceBindingValidator? _intuneDeviceBindingValidator;
         private readonly BootstrapSessionService? _bootstrapSessionService;
         private readonly ILogger _logger;
 
@@ -60,7 +61,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security
             ILogger logger,
             BootstrapSessionService? bootstrapSessionService = null,
             DeviceAssociationValidator? deviceAssociationValidator = null,
-            CloudPcDeviceValidator? cloudPcDeviceValidator = null)
+            CloudPcDeviceValidator? cloudPcDeviceValidator = null,
+            IntuneDeviceBindingValidator? intuneDeviceBindingValidator = null)
         {
             _configService = configService;
             _adminConfigService = adminConfigService;
@@ -69,6 +71,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security
             _corporateIdentifierValidator = corporateIdentifierValidator;
             _deviceAssociationValidator = deviceAssociationValidator;
             _cloudPcDeviceValidator = cloudPcDeviceValidator;
+            _intuneDeviceBindingValidator = intuneDeviceBindingValidator;
             _bootstrapSessionService = bootstrapSessionService;
             _logger = logger;
         }
@@ -275,11 +278,29 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security
                 };
             }
 
-            // 1b. CERT-TENANT-BINDING-SHADOW — observe only, never decide.
-            // The cert chain is pinned to Microsoft's Intune roots, which every Intune tenant shares,
-            // so a valid cert alone does not prove the caller belongs to THIS tenant. Stage 1 measures
-            // how reliably the certificate's own tenant stamp matches before stage 2 enforces it.
-            ObserveCertTenantBinding(certValidation, tenantId, req, sessionId);
+            // 1b. CERT-TENANT-BINDING — the certificate must belong to THIS tenant.
+            // The chain is pinned to Microsoft's Intune roots, which every Intune tenant shares, so a
+            // valid cert alone only proves "issued to some tenant". Without this gate an attacker
+            // with their own Intune tenant and a known serial number of the victim tenant walks
+            // straight through, because device serials are printed on the chassis.
+            var certTenantOutcome = EvaluateCertTenantBinding(certValidation, tenantId, req, sessionId);
+            if (CertTenantBinding.Rejects(certTenantOutcome))
+            {
+                LogRequestRejection("certtenant", tenantId, req, sessionId,
+                    extraReason: $"certificate belongs to tenant {certValidation.CertTenantId}",
+                    thumbprint: certValidation.Thumbprint);
+
+                return new SecurityValidationResult
+                {
+                    IsValid = false,
+                    StatusCode = HttpStatusCode.Forbidden,
+                    ErrorMessage = "Certificate does not belong to this tenant",
+                    // Deliberately does not echo which tenant the certificate belongs to: that is
+                    // the caller's own value on a genuine mismatch, and telling an attacker how the
+                    // comparison landed helps them. The full pair is in the rejection log.
+                    Details = "The client certificate was issued to a different Microsoft Entra tenant than this request targets."
+                };
+            }
 
             // 2. Check rate limit (DoS protection)
             // Effective limit = per-tenant override if set, otherwise the global default.
@@ -450,6 +471,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security
                     try
                     {
                         var devPrepResult = await validator.LookupAsync(capturedTenant, capturedSerial, capturedSession);
+
+                        // One line per real Graph lookup, not per request — the same gate the
+                        // cert-device-binding shadow uses. Measured 2026-08-24: a single enrollment
+                        // produced 263 identical lines because the cache answered nearly every
+                        // request. Uncached outcomes (transient failures) still log every time.
+                        if (devPrepResult.ServedFromCache)
+                            return;
+
                         logger.LogWarning(
                             "DevPrep association lookup (shadow) for tenant {TenantId}, session {SessionId}, serial {SerialNumber}: matched={Matched}, transient={Transient}, state={State}, policy={PolicyId}",
                             capturedTenant, capturedSession ?? "<none>", capturedSerial,
@@ -463,6 +492,69 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security
                 });
             }
 
+            // 6. CERT-DEVICE-BINDING-SHADOW - cert-to-device binding (Global-Admin-only preview).
+            // Stage 1 (CertTenantBinding) proves the certificate was issued to THIS tenant; this
+            // proves the specific device is one the tenant actually enrolled, so a certificate
+            // lifted from a decommissioned machine stops resolving. Observation only: it never
+            // touches deviceValidated or the returned result.
+            //
+            // Fire-and-forget for the same reason as the DevPrep lookup above - a cold Graph
+            // round-trip can take seconds and must never sit in the agent's request path. That
+            // rules out the request-row dimension stage 1 uses (the row is written the moment the
+            // function returns, before this task finishes), so the outcome is logged at Warning
+            // like the DevPrep shadow. Volume is bounded: only Global Admins can enable the
+            // toggle. Widening it beyond preview should move to an inline call plus the
+            // CertTenantBinding-style request dimension.
+            if (config.ValidateIntuneDeviceBinding && _intuneDeviceBindingValidator != null)
+            {
+                var bindingValidator = _intuneDeviceBindingValidator;
+                var bindingTenant = tenantId;
+                var bindingSession = sessionId;
+                var bindingSubject = certValidation.Subject;
+                var bindingThumbprint = certValidation.Thumbprint;
+                var bindingLogger = _logger;
+
+                _ = Task.Run(async () =>
+                {
+                    try
+                    {
+                        TryGetIntuneDeviceIdFromCertSubject(bindingSubject, out var certDeviceId);
+                        var binding = await bindingValidator.ValidateAsync(bindingTenant, certDeviceId, bindingSession);
+
+                        // One line per real Graph lookup, not per request. Measured on the first
+                        // live enrollment: 136 requests produced exactly ONE Graph call (the 30 min
+                        // positive cache did its job), so per-request logging repeated the same
+                        // finding 136 times. Cached repeats add nothing - the age just counts up
+                        // mechanically from the same enrolledDateTime. Uncached outcomes
+                        // (Transient, NoDeviceIdInCert) still log every time, which is what we want
+                        // for anomalies.
+                        if (binding.ServedFromCache)
+                            return;
+
+                        // Age of the device object at request time: the discriminator between a
+                        // genuine enrollment race (object created moments ago, or not yet) and a
+                        // certificate that never belonged to this tenant.
+                        var enrolledAgeSeconds = binding.EnrolledDateTime.HasValue
+                            ? (long)Math.Round((DateTimeOffset.UtcNow - binding.EnrolledDateTime.Value).TotalSeconds)
+                            : -1;
+
+                        bindingLogger.LogWarning(
+                            "AgentCertDeviceBinding outcome={Outcome} enforced={Enforced} tenant={TenantId} "
+                            + "certDeviceId={CertDeviceId} device={DeviceName} enrolledAgeSeconds={EnrolledAgeSeconds} "
+                            + "mgmtState={ManagementState} thumbprint={Thumbprint} session={SessionId} detail={Detail}",
+                            binding.Outcome, false, bindingTenant,
+                            certDeviceId ?? "n/a", binding.DeviceName ?? "n/a", enrolledAgeSeconds,
+                            binding.ManagementState ?? "n/a", bindingThumbprint ?? "n/a",
+                            bindingSession ?? "n/a", binding.ErrorMessage ?? "n/a");
+                    }
+                    catch (Exception ex)
+                    {
+                        bindingLogger.LogWarning(ex,
+                            "AgentCertDeviceBinding (shadow) failed for tenant {TenantId} - ignored.", bindingTenant);
+                    }
+                });
+            }
+
             // All checks passed
             return new SecurityValidationResult
             {
@@ -521,10 +613,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security
         }
 
         /// <summary>
-        /// CERT-TENANT-BINDING-SHADOW — stage 1 observability for the client-certificate tenant
-        /// binding. Evaluates whether the tenant stamped into the agent's certificate matches the
-        /// tenant the request claims, and logs the outcome. It deliberately returns nothing and
-        /// changes no state: enforcement is stage 2, after this telemetry shows the miss rate.
+        /// CERT-TENANT-BINDING — evaluates whether the tenant stamped into the agent's certificate
+        /// matches the tenant the request claims, records the outcome, and returns it so the caller
+        /// can enforce. The enforcement rule itself lives in <see cref="CertTenantBinding.Rejects"/>,
+        /// not here, so "what blocks a request" is answerable from one place.
         /// </summary>
         /// <remarks>
         /// Two carriers, because they answer different questions and have different costs:
@@ -539,15 +631,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security
         /// thumbprint, cert tenant, session — because each one is individually actionable.</description></item>
         /// </list>
         /// </remarks>
-        private void ObserveCertTenantBinding(
+        private string EvaluateCertTenantBinding(
             CertificateValidationResult certValidation,
             string tenantId,
             HttpRequestData req,
             string? sessionId)
         {
+            var outcome = CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Match;
             try
             {
-                var outcome = CertTenantBinding.Evaluate(
+                outcome = CertTenantBinding.Evaluate(
                     certValidation.CertTenantId,
                     certValidation.CertTenantIdStatus,
                     tenantId);
@@ -559,7 +652,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security
 
                 // Everything below is the detail record for outcomes someone has to act on.
                 if (outcome == CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Match)
-                    return;
+                    return outcome;
 
                 var agentVersion = req.Headers.Contains("X-Agent-Version")
                     ? req.Headers.GetValues("X-Agent-Version").FirstOrDefault() ?? "n/a"
@@ -576,15 +669,19 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security
                 var wouldReject = CertTenantBinding.WouldRejectUnderEnforcement(outcome);
 
                 _logger.LogWarning(template,
-                    outcome, false, wouldReject, tenantId, certTenant, certValidation.CertTenantIdStatus,
+                    outcome, true, wouldReject, tenantId, certTenant, certValidation.CertTenantIdStatus,
                     certValidation.Thumbprint ?? "n/a", sessionId ?? "n/a", agentVersion);
             }
             catch (Exception ex)
             {
-                // Shadow-mode observability must never be able to fail a request that would
-                // otherwise have been accepted.
-                _logger.LogWarning(ex, "AgentCertTenantBinding observation failed for tenant {TenantId}", tenantId);
+                // Fail open on our own bug. This gate exists to stop a cross-tenant certificate, and
+                // an exception in the evaluation is not evidence of one - turning it into a rejection
+                // would take the whole fleet down over a defect on our side.
+                _logger.LogWarning(ex, "AgentCertTenantBinding evaluation failed for tenant {TenantId} - request allowed", tenantId);
+                return CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Match;
             }
+
+            return outcome;
         }
 
         /// <summary>

src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/Vulnerability/VulnerabilityCorrelateHandler.cs

@@ -541,12 +541,26 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.Vulnerability
             string.Equals(phase, "user_enrollment", StringComparison.Ordinal)
             || string.Equals(phase, "both", StringComparison.Ordinal);
 
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Maps the scan's overall CVE risk onto the event severity, capped at
+        /// <see cref="EventSeverity.Warning"/>.
+        /// <para>
+        /// <b>Why the cap:</b> <c>EventSeverity</c> on the timeline states how badly the
+        /// <i>enrollment</i> went, not how severe a CVE is. A completed scan is a finding about
+        /// the software inventory — nothing failed. Emitting Error/Critical made the report read
+        /// as an enrollment failure: the diagnosis page collects Error/Critical events as failure
+        /// evidence, MCP search lifts high-severity events on failure-intent queries, and the
+        /// timeline's Error filter — the one used to hunt for problems — filled up with clean
+        /// sessions. The CVE severity itself is not lost: it rides in <c>scan_summary</c>
+        /// (<c>overall_risk</c>, <c>critical_cves</c>, …) and the report panel renders it on its
+        /// own colour scale. Warning keeps the report visible without claiming a failure.
+        /// </para>
+        /// </summary>
         private static EventSeverity MapVulnerabilityRiskToSeverity(string? overallRisk) =>
             (overallRisk ?? string.Empty).ToLowerInvariant() switch
             {
-                "critical" => EventSeverity.Critical,
-                "high"     => EventSeverity.Error,
-                "medium"   => EventSeverity.Warning,
+                "critical" => EventSeverity.Warning,
+                "high"     => EventSeverity.Warning,
                 _          => EventSeverity.Info,
             };
     }

src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/package-lock.json

@@ -26,46 +26,12 @@
         "@types/node": "^22.20.1",
         "tsx": "^4.23.12",
         "typescript": "^5.0.0",
-        "vitest": "^4.1.10"
+        "vitest": "^4.1.11"
       },
       "engines": {
         "node": ">=22"
       }
     },
-    "node_modules/@emnapi/core": {
-      "version": "1.11.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@emnapi/core/-/core-1.11.1.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-RSvbQmHzdKzNsLYa/wHrbc3KN4sYLKAdPZxqiM2HATqv/SBk2/ENSHpvXGaLOMcsAyz0poEGqkmmKYG3OWiJEQ==",
-      "dev": true,
-      "license": "MIT",
-      "optional": true,
-      "dependencies": {
-        "@emnapi/wasi-threads": "1.2.2",
-        "tslib": "^2.4.0"
-      }
-    },
-    "node_modules/@emnapi/runtime": {
-      "version": "1.11.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@emnapi/runtime/-/runtime-1.11.1.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-vgj7R3y3Wgx24IQaGPA/R6YFXLHVMOZ0uVEyIQPaWs+rd1AzfEMXlAC22FYwO1XkKR6NPsq7mUandH8oIRdZFw==",
-      "dev": true,
-      "license": "MIT",
-      "optional": true,
-      "dependencies": {
-        "tslib": "^2.4.0"
-      }
-    },
-    "node_modules/@emnapi/wasi-threads": {
-      "version": "1.2.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@emnapi/wasi-threads/-/wasi-threads-1.2.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-c95qOXkHdydNKhscBTebqEC1CVAZpyqOfVfBzQ1qgzyl3gfeldUjIggDbIZgDKsHLgnsM+igH7TJ/eAasaVuMA==",
-      "dev": true,
-      "license": "MIT",
-      "optional": true,
-      "dependencies": {
-        "tslib": "^2.4.0"
-      }
-    },
     "node_modules/@esbuild/aix-ppc64": {
       "version": "0.28.1",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@esbuild/aix-ppc64/-/aix-ppc64-0.28.1.tgz",
@@ -1110,29 +1076,10 @@
         }
       }
     },
-    "node_modules/@napi-rs/wasm-runtime": {
-      "version": "1.1.6",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@napi-rs/wasm-runtime/-/wasm-runtime-1.1.6.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-ZLv/JdUfkvOy9eCnnBaGfiO+XimbjebAeO+MRQqD/B+FR1tnRN0tpKSJHRbE8sFfS6aqsXZ67TQjfwfsxULVbg==",
-      "dev": true,
-      "license": "MIT",
-      "optional": true,
-      "dependencies": {
-        "@tybys/wasm-util": "^0.10.3"
-      },
-      "funding": {
-        "type": "github",
-        "url": "https://github.com/sponsors/Brooooooklyn"
-      },
-      "peerDependencies": {
-        "@emnapi/core": "^1.7.1",
-        "@emnapi/runtime": "^1.7.1"
-      }
-    },
     "node_modules/@oxc-project/types": {
-      "version": "0.139.0",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@oxc-project/types/-/types-0.139.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-r9gHphtCs+1M7J0pw6Sn/hh/Wpa/iQrOOkrNAlVLF/gHq+/CJmHIWKKUUhdWjcD6CIa8idarspCsASiXCXvFUw==",
+      "version": "0.146.0",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@oxc-project/types/-/types-0.146.0.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-XC0QsnnhVe7sLIWmYmdPw7x5P0h4W8vUU3Nv1ySgWXtvCz8NizoAEpGXA0sOYoJQV2Rl13LgURAHQ5cI5ILCSA==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "funding": {
@@ -1196,10 +1143,27 @@
       "integrity": "sha512-oOAWABowe8EAbMyWKM0tYDKi8Yaox52D+HWZhAIJqQXbqe0xI/GV7FhLWqlEKreMkfDjshR5FKgi3mnle0h6Eg==",
       "license": "BSD-3-Clause"
     },
+    "node_modules/@rolldown/binding-android-arm-eabi": {
+      "version": "1.2.5",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@rolldown/binding-android-arm-eabi/-/binding-android-arm-eabi-1.2.5.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-DLe/i+l8ynIBY7XEQ191TeZvCoowIGa18R+dIV30GW7DiOtp74i/xX8hs8GUjW5ARV7VZuie3d6AumSmCwbeRA==",
+      "cpu": [
+        "arm"
+      ],
+      "dev": true,
+      "license": "MIT",
+      "optional": true,
+      "os": [
+        "android"
+      ],
+      "engines": {
+        "node": "^20.19.0 || >=22.12.0"
+      }
+    },
     "node_modules/@rolldown/binding-android-arm64": {
-      "version": "1.1.5",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@rolldown/binding-android-arm64/-/binding-android-arm64-1.1.5.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-lZg8fqIv2v7FF237bwMgzGZEJvGL79/s5knJ/i6FmsGF4XXlzccZ4jb+TrFIxtSSxFtIpdsgrPZeMk1I9AFcyQ==",
+      "version": "1.2.5",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@rolldown/binding-android-arm64/-/binding-android-arm64-1.2.5.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-zXcwKlQApYAOELHd8PwKDFkagYF9Wy4e0RJ+0qnzl9Pjnpj75TEG8ufv40p2J7kCEfwZAsNiuzRIyNNMWT38ig==",
       "cpu": [
         "arm64"
       ],
@@ -1214,9 +1178,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@rolldown/binding-darwin-arm64": {
-      "version": "1.1.5",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@rolldown/binding-darwin-arm64/-/binding-darwin-arm64-1.1.5.tgz",
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         "x64"
       ],
       "dev": true,
+      "libc": [
+        "glibc"
+      ],
       "license": "MPL-2.0",
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
@@ -2891,6 +2852,9 @@
         "x64"
       ],
       "dev": true,
+      "libc": [
+        "musl"
+      ],
       "license": "MPL-2.0",
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
@@ -3057,9 +3021,9 @@
       "license": "MIT"
     },
     "node_modules/nanoid": {
-      "version": "3.3.16",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/nanoid/-/nanoid-3.3.16.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-bzlKTyNJ7+LdGIIwy8ijFpIqEQIvafahV7eYykJ8Cvh42EdJeODoJ6gUJXpQJvej1BddH8OqTXZNE/KfbWAu8Q==",
+      "version": "3.3.18",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/nanoid/-/nanoid-3.3.18.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-DTg4MJbGMWkfi6VZFdNt2/caMbQy4Ou+Op/hJQvGEWcnVfoA1QA+xzRKAzw9jD6+GVOOeYr/mIcuDSdug6F6+w==",
       "dev": true,
       "funding": [
         {
@@ -3269,9 +3233,9 @@
       "license": "MIT"
     },
     "node_modules/postcss": {
-      "version": "8.5.25",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/postcss/-/postcss-8.5.25.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-DTPx3RWSSnWyzLxQnlH0rJP+EW5ekl16ZU4/psbIhA0e53kJfdgaN5vKM+xP7yJtXVu+nfdVFmlgFDEKAe4Pyw==",
+      "version": "8.5.26",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/postcss/-/postcss-8.5.26.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-u82N74LFzG8ca+dD8puPnplTXoGH4fTPpVGuIbt36G3qvNlkvfD0lEAZSxaly3KX8TS/L1A1gsCEmvKmBcVbkQ==",
       "dev": true,
       "funding": [
         {
@@ -3289,7 +3253,7 @@
       ],
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
-        "nanoid": "^3.3.16",
+        "nanoid": "^3.3.17",
         "picocolors": "^1.1.1",
         "source-map-js": "^1.2.1"
       },
@@ -3399,13 +3363,13 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/rolldown": {
-      "version": "1.1.5",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/rolldown/-/rolldown-1.1.5.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-t9z29cJjXf/vxQ8dyhCSpt6H6aSwHTk8cT5I3iy6SMXuFpk5mB6PL6XfC8PCwrPTx93udwKUm9HRteAlTGBLiA==",
+      "version": "1.2.5",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/rolldown/-/rolldown-1.2.5.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-VD2IE5PUG4Oj8zz2VGykiYd5wbnjdIiSsNQb8Qu5B+noEp+A78mu2iVvpp27g8es14Tk9rofNs5Tku9iQCS4fA==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
-        "@oxc-project/types": "=0.139.0",
+        "@oxc-project/types": "=0.146.0",
         "@rolldown/pluginutils": "^1.0.0"
       },
       "bin": {
@@ -3415,21 +3379,21 @@
         "node": "^20.19.0 || >=22.12.0"
       },
       "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@rolldown/binding-android-arm64": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-darwin-arm64": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-darwin-x64": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-freebsd-x64": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-arm-gnueabihf": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-arm64-gnu": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-arm64-musl": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-ppc64-gnu": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-s390x-gnu": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-x64-gnu": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-x64-musl": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-openharmony-arm64": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-wasm32-wasi": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-win32-arm64-msvc": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-win32-x64-msvc": "1.1.5"
+        "@rolldown/binding-android-arm-eabi": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-android-arm64": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-darwin-arm64": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-darwin-x64": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-freebsd-x64": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-arm-gnueabihf": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-arm64-gnu": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-arm64-musl": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-ppc64-gnu": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-s390x-gnu": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-x64-gnu": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-x64-musl": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-openharmony-arm64": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-win32-arm64-msvc": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-win32-x64-msvc": "1.2.5"
       }
     },
     "node_modules/router": {
@@ -3797,9 +3761,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/tinyrainbow": {
-      "version": "3.1.0",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/tinyrainbow/-/tinyrainbow-3.1.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-Bf+ILmBgretUrdJxzXM0SgXLZ3XfiaUuOj/IKQHuTXip+05Xn+uyEYdVg0kYDipTBcLrCVyUzAPz7QmArb0mmw==",
+      "version": "3.1.1",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/tinyrainbow/-/tinyrainbow-3.1.1.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-yau8yJdTt989Mm0Bd/236QnzEiPf2xLLTqUZRUJOo/3CB078LSwzei343DgtJVmfJKJE3TMINY1u42SQsP6mXw==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "engines": {
@@ -3923,16 +3887,16 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/vite": {
-      "version": "8.1.5",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/vite/-/vite-8.1.5.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-7ULLwsCdYx/nRyrpiEwvqb5TFHrMVZyBt+rg/OAXT7rgj/z+DtTDyKFeLAdDkubDVDKD8jOsndmy7m55XcfUsw==",
+      "version": "8.2.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/vite/-/vite-8.2.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-cFKLV/PRgAUlIRm5WjMjJ86jrftzpqcgH+Us+DS8mI3CDNiH30Whrz8uHL3+MOLPAgqbMBAqWdAHAphOAM+z/Q==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
-        "lightningcss": "^1.32.0",
+        "lightningcss": "^1.33.0",
         "picomatch": "^4.0.5",
-        "postcss": "^8.5.17",
-        "rolldown": "~1.1.5",
+        "postcss": "^8.5.26",
+        "rolldown": "~1.2.4",
         "tinyglobby": "^0.2.17"
       },
       "bin": {
@@ -3949,7 +3913,7 @@
       },
       "peerDependencies": {
         "@types/node": "^20.19.0 || >=22.12.0",
-        "@vitejs/devtools": "^0.3.0",
+        "@vitejs/devtools": "^0.4.0 || ^0.5.0",
         "esbuild": "^0.27.0 || ^0.28.0",
         "jiti": ">=1.21.0",
         "less": "^4.0.0",
@@ -4001,19 +3965,19 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/vitest": {
-      "version": "4.1.10",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/vitest/-/vitest-4.1.10.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-R9jUTe5S4Qb0HCd4TNqpC7oGcrMssMRGXLW80ubjWsW9VH5GF8y1Y0SFLY9AbqSk6nt0PnOx4H4WNJYZ13GUPw==",
+      "version": "4.1.11",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/vitest/-/vitest-4.1.11.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-fhACrNXUidIbGSBr5FlbuBkO7VWC1ZyLl0DO4CU2DrQoAPxX84Ysxs+HeGQpii5lZWV1Q4gBZTTu49mF+A6Edw==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
-        "@vitest/expect": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/mocker": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/pretty-format": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/runner": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/snapshot": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/spy": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/utils": "4.1.10",
+        "@vitest/expect": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/mocker": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/pretty-format": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/runner": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/snapshot": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/spy": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/utils": "4.1.11",
         "es-module-lexer": "^2.0.0",
         "expect-type": "^1.3.0",
         "magic-string": "^0.30.21",
@@ -4041,12 +4005,12 @@
         "@edge-runtime/vm": "*",
         "@opentelemetry/api": "^1.9.0",
         "@types/node": "^20.0.0 || ^22.0.0 || >=24.0.0",
-        "@vitest/browser-playwright": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/browser-preview": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/browser-webdriverio": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/coverage-istanbul": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/coverage-v8": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/ui": "4.1.10",
+        "@vitest/browser-playwright": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/browser-preview": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/browser-webdriverio": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/coverage-istanbul": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/coverage-v8": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/ui": "4.1.11",
         "happy-dom": "*",
         "jsdom": "*",
         "vite": "^6.0.0 || ^7.0.0 || ^8.0.0"

src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/package.json

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
     "@types/node": "^22.20.1",
     "tsx": "^4.23.12",
     "typescript": "^5.0.0",
-    "vitest": "^4.1.10"
+    "vitest": "^4.1.11"
   },
   "overrides": {
     "sharp": "^0.35.0",

src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/resource-catalog.ts

@@ -312,6 +312,17 @@ export const DEVICE_PROPERTIES_CATALOG = {
     'network_interface_info.adapterName': { type: 'string', description: 'Network adapter name' },
     'network_interface_info.macAddress': { type: 'string', description: 'MAC address of active adapter' },
   },
+  wifi_signal_info: {
+    'wifi_signal_info.wifiSsid': { type: 'string', description: 'SSID of the WiFi network the device enrolled over' },
+    'wifi_signal_info.wifiSignalPercent': { type: 'number', description: 'WiFi signal quality 0-100. Use <=N to find weak-signal enrollments (e.g. "<=40")' },
+    'wifi_signal_info.wifiRadioType': { type: 'string', description: 'PHY generation, e.g. "802.11ac", "802.11ax", "802.11be"' },
+    'wifi_signal_info.wifiChannel': { type: 'number', description: '802.11 channel number' },
+    'wifi_signal_info.wifiDataLimitedReason': {
+      type: 'string',
+      description:
+        'Why the WiFi payload is SSID-only. Currently one value: "location_services_off" — Windows 11 24H2+ gates the native WLAN API behind precise-location consent, which is off in that device image, so signal/radio/channel could not be read. Filter on it to size how much of a fleet is affected.',
+    },
+  },
   aad_join_status: {
     'aad_join_status.joinType': { type: 'string', description: 'Azure AD join type' },
     'aad_join_status.tenantId': { type: 'string', description: 'Entra ID tenant' },

src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore/Engine/DecisionEngine.Edge.cs

@@ -431,6 +431,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine
         internal static bool HasAdvisoryCompletionDeadline(DecisionState state)
             => FindAdvisoryCompletionDeadline(state) != null;
 
+        /// <summary>True when a deadline with the given name is currently armed.</summary>
+        internal static bool HasDeadline(DecisionState state, string name)
+        {
+            foreach (var d in state.Deadlines)
+            {
+                if (d.Name == name) return true;
+            }
+            return false;
+        }
+
         /// <summary>The armed <see cref="DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion"/> deadline, or null.</summary>
         internal static ActiveDeadline? FindAdvisoryCompletionDeadline(DecisionState state)
         {
@@ -912,6 +922,61 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine
                 return new DecisionStep(neverObservedState, neverObservedTransition, neverObservedEffects.ToArray());
             }
 
+            // Completion-gate guard (sessions 81daa77f / 75d6ae8e, 2026-08-25) — a completion
+            // gate that is deliberately holding this session must not be overrun by this
+            // window. The RealmJoin gate blocks completion until phase 110, and it carries its
+            // own bounded resolution: 60 min from detection, re-armed on deployment activity,
+            // hard-capped at 4 h. This 30-min window is simply shorter, so on every device
+            // whose RealmJoin first deployment outlives it the session was failed while the
+            // engine's own `completion_waiting` still read "waiting on: realmjoin_resolution"
+            // — 75d6ae8e installed 25 RealmJoin packages successfully inside the window, the
+            // last one 2 min before the failure. Re-arm and let the gate's own deadline decide.
+            //
+            // Convergent: the gate resolves itself either way (Resolved / FirstDeploymentIncomplete
+            // / Timeout all set RealmJoinFacts.Outcome, which opens RealmJoinGateOpen), after
+            // which this guard stops applying and the next fire resolves the session normally.
+            // Requiring the gate's deadline to still be armed keeps a gate that can no longer
+            // resolve itself from parking the session forever; AgentMaxLifetimeMinutes bounds
+            // it regardless.
+            if (!RealmJoinGateOpen(state) && HasDeadline(state, DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout))
+            {
+                var gateRearmedDeadline = BuildAdvisoryCompletionDeadline(state, signal);
+                builder.AddDeadline(gateRearmedDeadline);
+
+                var gateTrigger = $"DeadlineFired:{DeadlineNames.AdvisoryCompletion}:CompletionGateHolding";
+                var gateRearmedState = builder.Build();
+                var gateRearmedTransition = BuildTakenTransition(
+                    before: state,
+                    signal: signal,
+                    toStage: state.Stage,
+                    nextStepIndex: nextStep,
+                    trigger: gateTrigger);
+
+                // Same deliberate dedupe bypass as the enforcement-progress re-arm: the missing
+                // set is unchanged since arming, but the new due-time is exactly what an
+                // operator debugging the session needs. Bounded to one per window.
+                var gateRearmedEffects = new[]
+                {
+                    new DecisionEffect(DecisionEffectKind.ScheduleDeadline, deadline: gateRearmedDeadline),
+                    new DecisionEffect(
+                        DecisionEffectKind.EmitEventTimelineEntry,
+                        parameters: new Dictionary<string, string>
+                        {
+                            ["eventType"] = SharedConstants.EventTypes.CompletionWaiting,
+                            ["source"] = "DecisionEngine",
+                            ["severity"] = "Info",
+                            ["immediateUpload"] = "false",
+                            ["message"] = "Completion resolution window re-armed: a completion gate is still holding the session",
+                            ["missingPrerequisites"] = string.Join(",", BuildMissingCompletionPrerequisites(state)),
+                            ["trigger"] = gateTrigger,
+                            ["stage"] = state.Stage.ToString(),
+                            ["resolutionDeadlineDueAtUtc"] = gateRearmedDeadline.DueAtUtc.ToString("o"),
+                        }),
+                };
+
+                return new DecisionStep(gateRearmedState, gateRearmedTransition, gateRearmedEffects);
+            }
+
             // Conjunction not met — the session is failed. The two arming variants carry
             // distinct context (see method doc): the advisory variant un-defangs the original
             // ESP failure; the esp-exit variant never had an ESP failure, so it gets its own

src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Models/Config/TenantConfiguration.cs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-using System;
+using System;
 using System.Collections.Generic;
 using System.Linq;
 using System.Text.Json;
@@ -226,6 +226,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models
         /// </summary>
         public bool ValidateCloudPcDevice { get; set; } = false;
 
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Cert-to-device binding check (Global-Admin-only preview, SHADOW mode).
+        /// Resolves the Intune managedDevice id carried in the agent client certificate's Subject
+        /// CN against this tenant's own managedDevices inventory, proving the certificate belongs
+        /// to a device the tenant actually enrolled. The result is recorded as telemetry only and
+        /// never blocks enrollment, because a device object can in principle appear later than the
+        /// agent's first call - measuring that race is the point of the shadow pass. Requires the
+        /// optional Graph permission DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All (feature
+        /// "IntuneDeviceBinding" in the grant script).
+        /// </summary>
+        public bool ValidateIntuneDeviceBinding { get; set; } = false;
+
         /// <summary>
         /// Emergency bypass for agent security gate (Global Admin use only).
         /// If true, agent requests are accepted even when ValidateAutopilotDevice is false.

src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Models/Graph/GraphAppPermissions.cs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-namespace AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.Graph
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.Graph
 {
     /// <summary>
     /// Constant catalog of Microsoft Graph application permission names referenced by the
@@ -26,6 +26,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.Graph
         /// <summary>Read Intune managed apps (future use — Win32 app display names not yet covered).</summary>
         public const string DeviceManagementAppsReadAll = "DeviceManagementApps.Read.All";
 
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Read Intune managed device objects (<c>deviceManagement/managedDevices</c>). Optional
+        /// add-on permission backing the Intune device-binding check, which verifies that the
+        /// managedDevice id carried in the agent's client certificate actually exists in the
+        /// tenant it claims. Not part of the default-consent set — must be granted per tenant.
+        /// </summary>
+        public const string DeviceManagementManagedDevicesReadAll = "DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All";
+
         /// <summary>
         /// Read Windows 365 Cloud PC objects (<c>virtualEndpoint/cloudPCs</c>). Optional add-on
         /// permission backing the W365 Cloud PC device validator — Cloud PCs are never

src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Models/Graph/GraphFeatureCatalog.cs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-using System;
+using System;
 using System.Collections.Generic;
 
 namespace AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.Graph
@@ -17,12 +17,19 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.Graph
         /// <summary>Validates Windows 365 Cloud PCs via the service-side Cloud PC inventory (cert-CN bound).</summary>
         public const string FeatureW365CloudPcValidation = "W365CloudPcValidation";
 
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Verifies that the Intune managedDevice id carried in the agent's client certificate
+        /// actually exists in the tenant the request claims (cert-to-device binding).
+        /// </summary>
+        public const string FeatureIntuneDeviceBinding = "IntuneDeviceBinding";
+
         // Backed by a plain dictionary (netstandard2.0 + C# 9, no Immutable types).
         private static readonly Dictionary<string, string[]> _byFeature
             = new Dictionary<string, string[]>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
             {
                 [FeatureScriptDisplayNames] = new[] { GraphAppPermissions.DeviceManagementScriptsReadAll },
                 [FeatureW365CloudPcValidation] = new[] { GraphAppPermissions.CloudPCReadAll },
+                [FeatureIntuneDeviceBinding] = new[] { GraphAppPermissions.DeviceManagementManagedDevicesReadAll },
             };
 
         /// <summary>All registered feature identifiers.</summary>

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/admin/components/SessionReportsSection.tsx

@@ -538,9 +538,12 @@ function SessionReportsSectionInner({
             <div className="p-6">
               <div className="flex items-center justify-between mb-4">
                 <h3 className="text-lg font-semibold text-gray-900 dark:text-gray-100">Report Details</h3>
-                <span className="inline-flex items-center px-2 py-0.5 rounded text-xs font-medium bg-purple-100 text-purple-800 dark:bg-purple-900/40 dark:text-purple-300">
-                  {selectedReport.reportId}
-                </span>
+                <div className="flex items-center">
+                  <span className="inline-flex items-center px-2 py-0.5 rounded text-xs font-medium bg-purple-100 text-purple-800 dark:bg-purple-900/40 dark:text-purple-300">
+                    {selectedReport.reportId}
+                  </span>
+                  <CopyButton value={selectedReport.reportId} />
+                </div>
               </div>
 
               <dl className="space-y-3 text-sm">

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/sessions/components/DeviceDetailsCard.tsx

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ interface OsInfoData { [key: string]: unknown; osVersion?: string; displayVersio
 interface NetworkAdaptersData { [key: string]: unknown; adapters?: unknown[] }
 interface DnsConfigData { [key: string]: unknown; dnsEntries?: unknown[] }
 interface NetworkInterfaceInfoData { [key: string]: unknown; status?: string; connectionType?: string; adapterDescription?: string; linkSpeedMbps?: number; gateways?: string }
-interface WifiSignalInfoData { [key: string]: unknown; wifiSsid?: string; wifiSignalPercent?: number; wifiRadioType?: string; wifiChannel?: number }
+interface WifiSignalInfoData { [key: string]: unknown; wifiSsid?: string; wifiSignalPercent?: number; wifiRadioType?: string; wifiChannel?: number; wifiDataLimitedReason?: string }
 interface ProxyConfigData { [key: string]: unknown; proxyType?: string; type?: string; proxyServer?: string; autoConfigUrl?: string; winHttpProxy?: string }
 interface AutopilotProfileData { [key: string]: unknown; PolicyDownloadDate?: string; AutopilotCreationDate?: string; autopilotModeLabel?: string; domainJoinMethodLabel?: string }
 interface ImeVersionData { [key: string]: unknown; version?: string; agentVersion?: string }
@@ -330,6 +330,11 @@ export default function DeviceDetailsCard({ events, latestAgentVersion, session
                     )}
                     {wifiSignalInfo.wifiRadioType && <DetailRow label="Radio" value={wifiSignalInfo.wifiRadioType} />}
                     {wifiSignalInfo.wifiChannel !== undefined && <DetailRow label="Channel" value={`${wifiSignalInfo.wifiChannel}`} />}
+                    {wifiSignalInfo.wifiDataLimitedReason === "location_services_off" && (
+                      <div className="mt-2 text-xs text-gray-500">
+                        {"Signal, radio and channel are unavailable because Location services are off on this device. Since Windows 11 24H2 those Wi-Fi details require location access, and the agent runs as SYSTEM with no way to ask for it. The SSID is unaffected. To collect the full details, enable Location services via Intune (Privacy → Let Apps Access Location → Force Allow)."}
+                      </div>
+                    )}
                   </div>
                 )}
 

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/sessions/components/EventTimeline.tsx

@@ -3,10 +3,16 @@
 import { useState, useMemo } from "react";
 import { EnrollmentEvent, Session } from "@/types";
 import { normalizeEventDataForDisplay, shortenBuildHashInMessage } from "../utils/eventHelpers";
+import { buildEventSearchMatcher, parseEventSearchQuery } from "../utils/eventSearchQuery";
 import { getEnrichedOrLookup, formatErrorCode, type ErrorCodeEntry } from "@/utils/errorCodeMap";
 import { readTimeProvenance, classifyTimeJump, readClockChangeDeltaMs } from "@/lib/timeProvenance";
 import { formatDuration, formatUtcOffset } from "@/lib/formatting";
 
+const SEARCH_SYNTAX_HINT =
+  "Searches event type, message and source. Several terms are combined with AND. " +
+  "A leading minus hides matches, e.g. -app_install_progress. " +
+  'Quote a term to take it literally, e.g. "-1".';
+
 interface EventTimelineProps {
   filteredEvents: EnrollmentEvent[];
   events: EnrollmentEvent[];
@@ -60,14 +66,16 @@ export default function EventTimeline({
   const [searchQuery, setSearchQuery] = useState("");
   const [rawMode, setRawMode] = useState(false);
 
-  const matchesSearch = useMemo(() => {
-    if (!searchQuery.trim()) return null;
-    const q = searchQuery.toLowerCase();
-    return (event: EnrollmentEvent) =>
-      event.eventType?.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||
-      event.message?.toLowerCase().includes(q) ||
-      event.source?.toLowerCase().includes(q);
-  }, [searchQuery]);
+  // Terms are AND-ed, a leading minus excludes — see utils/eventSearchQuery.ts.
+  const matchesSearch = useMemo(() => buildEventSearchMatcher(searchQuery), [searchQuery]);
+  const excludedTerms = useMemo(() => parseEventSearchQuery(searchQuery).exclude, [searchQuery]);
+
+  // The counter has to follow the search, otherwise excluding event types leaves it
+  // reporting a number of rows the timeline no longer shows.
+  const searchVisibleCount = useMemo(
+    () => (matchesSearch ? filteredEvents.filter(matchesSearch).length : filteredEvents.length),
+    [filteredEvents, matchesSearch],
+  );
 
   const sortedBySequence = useMemo(() => {
     let filtered = events.filter(e => severityFilters.has(e.severity));
@@ -102,7 +110,8 @@ export default function EventTimeline({
             type="text"
             value={searchQuery}
             onChange={(e) => setSearchQuery(e.target.value)}
-            placeholder="Search events..."
+            placeholder="Search or -exclude..."
+            title={SEARCH_SYNTAX_HINT}
             className="w-full pl-7 pr-7 py-1 text-xs border border-gray-300 rounded-full focus:outline-none focus:ring-1 focus:ring-green-500 focus:border-green-500"
           />
           {searchQuery && (
@@ -139,7 +148,15 @@ export default function EventTimeline({
               </button>
             );
           })}
-          <span className="text-xs text-gray-400">({filteredEvents.length}/{events.length})</span>
+          <span className="text-xs text-gray-400">({searchVisibleCount}/{events.length})</span>
+          {excludedTerms.length > 0 && (
+            <span
+              className="px-2 py-0.5 text-xs font-medium rounded-full bg-gray-100 border border-gray-300 text-gray-600 max-w-[16rem] truncate"
+              title={`Events matching ${excludedTerms.map(t => `"${t}"`).join(", ")} are hidden.`}
+            >
+              hiding {excludedTerms.join(", ")}
+            </span>
+          )}
           <div className="flex gap-1.5 ml-auto items-center">
             <button
               onClick={() => setRawMode(!rawMode)}

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/sessions/network-timeline/NetworkBand.tsx

@@ -209,6 +209,9 @@ export default function NetworkBand({ model }: { model: NetworkModel }) {
                     Signal: {seg.signalPercent}%{seg.radioType ? ` (${seg.radioType})` : ''}
                   </div>
                 )}
+                {seg.signalPercent == null && seg.dataLimitedReason === 'location_services_off' && (
+                  <div>{'Signal: unavailable — Location services off on this device'}</div>
+                )}
                 {seg.adapterDescription && <div>{seg.adapterDescription}</div>}
                 {seg.kind === 'asleep' && (
                   <div>

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/sessions/network-timeline/__tests__/networkTimelineModel.test.ts

@@ -199,3 +199,78 @@ describe('hotspot confidence', () => {
     expect(ssidOnly.confident).toBe(true);
   });
 });
+
+describe('location-gated WiFi payloads', () => {
+  it('carries the reason onto the segment that saw the sample', () => {
+    const model = buildNetworkModel(session, [
+        wifiInfo(1, 0),
+        ev(2, 'wifi_signal_info', 1 * MIN, {
+          wifiSsid: 'CorpNet',
+          wifiDataLimitedReason: 'location_services_off',
+        }),
+      ev(99, 'log_entry', 30 * MIN),
+    ])!;
+
+    const wifi = model.segments.filter((s) => s.kind === 'wifi');
+    expect(wifi.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    expect(wifi[0].ssid).toBe('CorpNet');
+    expect(wifi[0].signalPercent).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(wifi[0].dataLimitedReason).toBe('location_services_off');
+  });
+
+  it('extends the reason to WiFi segments that never got their own sample', () => {
+    // A mid-session reconnect opens a new segment but emits no wifi_signal_info of its
+    // own. The gate is a device setting and cannot flip mid-enrollment, so the later
+    // segment must explain its blank signal too.
+    const model = buildNetworkModel(session, [
+        wifiInfo(1, 0),
+        ev(2, 'wifi_signal_info', 1 * MIN, {
+          wifiSsid: 'CorpNet',
+          wifiDataLimitedReason: 'location_services_off',
+        }),
+        ev(3, 'network_state_change', 5 * MIN, {
+          hasNetwork: true,
+          after_connectionType: 'WiFi',
+          after_wifiSsid: 'GuestNet',
+          after_gateway: '10.0.1.1',
+        }),
+      ev(99, 'log_entry', 30 * MIN),
+    ])!;
+
+    const wifi = model.segments.filter((s) => s.kind === 'wifi');
+    expect(wifi.length).toBe(2);
+    expect(wifi.every((s) => s.dataLimitedReason === 'location_services_off')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('never claims the gate when a signal reading actually arrived', () => {
+    const model = buildNetworkModel(session, [
+        wifiInfo(1, 0),
+        ev(2, 'wifi_signal_info', 1 * MIN, { wifiSsid: 'CorpNet', wifiSignalPercent: 80 }),
+      ev(99, 'log_entry', 30 * MIN),
+    ])!;
+
+    for (const seg of model.segments) expect(seg.dataLimitedReason).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('leaves a segment with its own reading untouched when another was gated', () => {
+    // Defensive: the session-wide fill must only touch segments WITHOUT a reading.
+    const model = buildNetworkModel(session, [
+        wifiInfo(1, 0),
+        ev(2, 'wifi_signal_info', 1 * MIN, { wifiSsid: 'CorpNet', wifiSignalPercent: 74 }),
+        ev(3, 'network_state_change', 5 * MIN, {
+          hasNetwork: true,
+          after_connectionType: 'WiFi',
+          after_wifiSsid: 'GuestNet',
+          after_gateway: '10.0.1.1',
+        }),
+        ev(4, 'wifi_signal_info', 6 * MIN, {
+          wifiSsid: 'GuestNet',
+          wifiDataLimitedReason: 'location_services_off',
+        }),
+      ev(99, 'log_entry', 30 * MIN),
+    ])!;
+
+    const withReading = model.segments.find((s) => s.signalPercent === 74);
+    expect(withReading?.dataLimitedReason).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/sessions/network-timeline/networkTimelineModel.ts

@@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ export interface NetSegment {
   adapterDescription?: string;
   signalPercent?: number;
   radioType?: string;
+  /**
+   * Why signal/radio are absent, when the agent could tell — currently only
+   * 'location_services_off' (Windows 11 24H2+ gates the native WLAN API behind
+   * precise-location consent). Set from wifi_signal_info; never guessed.
+   */
+  dataLimitedReason?: string;
   hotspot?: HotspotHint;
   /** 'asleep' segments only: sleep/hibernate/modern_standby + wake details. */
   sleepKind?: string;
@@ -252,6 +258,18 @@ export function buildSegments(events: EnrollmentEvent[], t0: number, t1: number)
     if (!seg.ssid && str(data.wifiSsid)) seg.ssid = str(data.wifiSsid);
     if (typeof data.wifiSignalPercent === 'number') seg.signalPercent = data.wifiSignalPercent;
     if (str(data.wifiRadioType)) seg.radioType = str(data.wifiRadioType);
+    if (str(data.wifiDataLimitedReason)) seg.dataLimitedReason = str(data.wifiDataLimitedReason);
+  }
+
+  // The location gate is a device-level setting, not a per-connection one: it cannot flip
+  // during an enrollment. So once any sample reports it, WiFi segments that never got a
+  // sample of their own (a mid-session reconnect emits no wifi_signal_info) carry the same
+  // explanation instead of showing an unexplained blank where the signal belongs.
+  const observedLimit = segs.find((s) => s.dataLimitedReason)?.dataLimitedReason;
+  if (observedLimit) {
+    for (const seg of segs) {
+      if (seg.kind === 'wifi' && seg.signalPercent == null) seg.dataLimitedReason = observedLimit;
+    }
   }
 
   // Infer missing SSIDs from a sibling WiFi segment on the same gateway

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/sessions/network-timeline/page.tsx

@@ -168,7 +168,13 @@ function StatsRow({ model }: { model: NetworkModel }) {
   ];
   if (model.asleepMs > 0) items.push({ label: 'Asleep total', value: fmtDuration(model.asleepMs) });
   if (model.clockChangeCount > 0) items.push({ label: 'Clock changes', value: String(model.clockChangeCount) });
-  if (avgSignal != null) items.push({ label: 'Avg WiFi signal', value: `${avgSignal}%` });
+  if (avgSignal != null) {
+    items.push({ label: 'Avg WiFi signal', value: `${avgSignal}%` });
+  } else if (model.segments.some((s) => s.dataLimitedReason === 'location_services_off')) {
+    // Say why the stat is empty. Otherwise a fleet-wide blank reads as a product defect
+    // rather than the Windows 24H2 location gate that actually caused it.
+    items.push({ label: 'Avg WiFi signal', value: 'n/a (Location services off)' });
+  }
   if (lastCheck)
     items.push({
       label: 'Last connectivity check',

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/sessions/utils/__tests__/eventSearchQuery.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
+import {
+  buildEventSearchMatcher,
+  parseEventSearchQuery,
+  type EventSearchFields,
+} from "../eventSearchQuery";
+
+const ev = (eventType: string, message = "", source = "Agent"): EventSearchFields => ({
+  eventType,
+  message,
+  source,
+});
+
+const timeline: EventSearchFields[] = [
+  ev("app_install_started", "Installing Contoso Reader"),
+  ev("app_install_progress", "Downloading 42%"),
+  ev("app_install_completed", "Contoso Reader installed"),
+  ev("esp_provisioning_status", "DeviceSetup: Apps 3/7"),
+  ev("enrollment_failed", "Apps failed with exit code -1", "DecisionEngine"),
+];
+
+const visible = (query: string) => {
+  const matcher = buildEventSearchMatcher(query);
+  const rows = matcher ? timeline.filter(matcher) : timeline;
+  return rows.map(e => e.eventType);
+};
+
+describe("parseEventSearchQuery", () => {
+  it("splits whitespace-separated terms and lowercases them", () => {
+    expect(parseEventSearchQuery("ESP Provisioning")).toEqual({
+      include: ["esp", "provisioning"],
+      exclude: [],
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("reads a leading minus as an exclusion", () => {
+    expect(parseEventSearchQuery("error -app_install_progress -perf")).toEqual({
+      include: ["error"],
+      exclude: ["app_install_progress", "perf"],
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("keeps a quoted minus literal — otherwise an exit code could not be searched", () => {
+    expect(parseEventSearchQuery('"-1"')).toEqual({ include: ["-1"], exclude: [] });
+  });
+
+  it("excludes a quoted phrase as one term", () => {
+    expect(parseEventSearchQuery('-"exit code 1"')).toEqual({
+      include: [],
+      exclude: ["exit code 1"],
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("drops a lone minus so the timeline does not blank out mid-typing", () => {
+    expect(parseEventSearchQuery("-")).toEqual({ include: [], exclude: [] });
+  });
+
+  it("de-duplicates repeated terms", () => {
+    expect(parseEventSearchQuery("app app -perf -perf")).toEqual({
+      include: ["app"],
+      exclude: ["perf"],
+    });
+  });
+});
+
+describe("buildEventSearchMatcher", () => {
+  it("returns null when there is nothing to filter on", () => {
+    expect(buildEventSearchMatcher("")).toBeNull();
+    expect(buildEventSearchMatcher("   ")).toBeNull();
+    expect(buildEventSearchMatcher("-")).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("matches event type, message and source", () => {
+    const matcher = buildEventSearchMatcher("decisionengine")!;
+    expect(timeline.filter(matcher).map(e => e.eventType)).toEqual(["enrollment_failed"]);
+    expect(visible("contoso")).toEqual(["app_install_started", "app_install_completed"]);
+  });
+
+  it("hides every match of an excluded term", () => {
+    expect(visible("-app_install_progress")).toEqual([
+      "app_install_started",
+      "app_install_completed",
+      "esp_provisioning_status",
+      "enrollment_failed",
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("treats a partial type name as a prefix filter over the whole family", () => {
+    expect(visible("-app_install")).toEqual(["esp_provisioning_status", "enrollment_failed"]);
+  });
+
+  it("combines a search term with exclusions", () => {
+    expect(visible("apps -esp")).toEqual(["enrollment_failed"]);
+  });
+
+  it("ANDs multiple search terms across different fields", () => {
+    expect(visible("app_install contoso")).toEqual([
+      "app_install_started",
+      "app_install_completed",
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("never matches a term across a field boundary", () => {
+    // "started" ends eventType, "Installing" opens message — a naive concatenation
+    // would let the joined string match.
+    expect(visible("startedinstalling")).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("is case-insensitive on both sides", () => {
+    expect(visible("-APP_INSTALL_PROGRESS")).not.toContain("app_install_progress");
+  });
+
+  it("lets an exclusion win over a search term that also matches", () => {
+    expect(visible("app_install -progress")).toEqual([
+      "app_install_started",
+      "app_install_completed",
+    ]);
+  });
+});

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/sessions/utils/eventSearchQuery.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+// Search syntax for the Event Timeline search box.
+//
+// Follows the convention every search box shares (Google, GitHub, Gmail, Jira):
+// whitespace-separated terms are AND-ed, a leading minus turns a term into an
+// exclusion. Both sides match the same fields — eventType, message, source — so
+// `-x` is exactly the negation of searching for `x`, with no second rule to learn.
+//
+//   error                    events matching "error"
+//   esp provisioning         events matching BOTH terms (in any of the three fields)
+//   -app_install_progress    everything EXCEPT matches of that term
+//   error -heartbeat         combined
+//   "-1"                     quoted: a literal minus, not an exclusion
+//   -"exit code 1"           excludes the whole phrase
+//
+// Matching is case-insensitive substring, so a partial type name such as
+// `-app_install` hides every app_install_* event.
+
+/** The fields a search term is matched against. Structural subset of EnrollmentEvent. */
+export interface EventSearchFields {
+  eventType?: string | null;
+  message?: string | null;
+  source?: string | null;
+}
+
+export interface ParsedEventSearchQuery {
+  /** Terms that must all match. Lowercased. */
+  include: string[];
+  /** Terms that must not match. Lowercased. */
+  exclude: string[];
+}
+
+interface Token {
+  text: string;
+  negated: boolean;
+}
+
+// Hand-rolled so a quote can protect a leading minus: the negation is decided at
+// the first character of a token, before any quote is consumed, which makes `"-1"`
+// a literal search term while `-"foo bar"` excludes the phrase.
+function tokenize(query: string): Token[] {
+  const tokens: Token[] = [];
+  let current: Token | null = null;
+  let inQuotes = false;
+
+  const flush = () => {
+    if (current && current.text !== "") tokens.push(current);
+    current = null;
+  };
+
+  for (const ch of query) {
+    if (!inQuotes && /\s/.test(ch)) {
+      flush();
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (ch === '"') {
+      current ??= { text: "", negated: false };
+      inQuotes = !inQuotes;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (current === null) {
+      // First character of a token: a bare minus opens an exclusion.
+      if (ch === "-") {
+        current = { text: "", negated: true };
+        continue;
+      }
+      current = { text: "", negated: false };
+    }
+    current.text += ch;
+  }
+  flush();
+
+  return tokens;
+}
+
+export function parseEventSearchQuery(query: string): ParsedEventSearchQuery {
+  const include: string[] = [];
+  const exclude: string[] = [];
+
+  for (const token of tokenize(query)) {
+    const text = token.text.toLowerCase();
+    const target = token.negated ? exclude : include;
+    if (!target.includes(text)) target.push(text);
+  }
+
+  return { include, exclude };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Predicate for the parsed query, or null when the query carries no filter at all
+ * (empty, whitespace, or a lone minus while the user is still typing) — callers use
+ * null to skip filtering entirely rather than filtering with an always-true predicate.
+ */
+export function buildEventSearchMatcher(
+  query: string,
+): ((event: EventSearchFields) => boolean) | null {
+  const { include, exclude } = parseEventSearchQuery(query);
+  if (include.length === 0 && exclude.length === 0) return null;
+
+  return (event: EventSearchFields) => {
+    // Newline-joined so a term can never match across a field boundary, while a
+    // multi-term query is still free to satisfy its terms from different fields.
+    const haystack = `${event.eventType ?? ""}\n${event.message ?? ""}\n${event.source ?? ""}`.toLowerCase();
+    return include.every(t => haystack.includes(t)) && !exclude.some(t => haystack.includes(t));
+  };
+}

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/settings/TenantConfigContext.tsx

@@ -133,11 +133,14 @@ interface TenantConfigContextValue {
   handleToggleDeviceAssociationValidation: (newValue: boolean) => Promise<void>;
   validateCloudPcDevice: boolean;
   setValidateCloudPcDevice: (v: boolean) => void;
+  validateIntuneDeviceBinding: boolean;
+  setValidateIntuneDeviceBinding: (v: boolean) => void;
   /**
    * Toggle + persist W365 Cloud PC validation in one shot. No consent flow — the backing
    * CloudPC.Read.All permission is granted via the Optional Graph capabilities add-on script.
    */
   handleToggleCloudPcValidation: (newValue: boolean) => Promise<void>;
+  handleToggleIntuneDeviceBinding: (newValue: boolean) => Promise<void>;
   /**
    * Persist a validation-gate change immediately. The validation section has NO save bar —
    * every gate change that doesn't run the consent flow (disable, and enabling the second
@@ -394,6 +397,7 @@ export function TenantConfigProvider({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }
   const [validateCorporateIdentifier, setValidateCorporateIdentifier] = useState(false);
   const [validateDeviceAssociation, setValidateDeviceAssociation] = useState(false);
   const [validateCloudPcDevice, setValidateCloudPcDevice] = useState(false);
+  const [validateIntuneDeviceBinding, setValidateIntuneDeviceBinding] = useState(false);
   const [dataRetentionDays, setDataRetentionDays] = useState(90);
   const [sessionTimeoutHours, setSessionTimeoutHours] = useState(5);
 
@@ -535,6 +539,7 @@ export function TenantConfigProvider({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }
         setValidateCorporateIdentifier(data.validateCorporateIdentifier ?? false);
         setValidateDeviceAssociation(data.validateDeviceAssociation ?? false);
         setValidateCloudPcDevice(data.validateCloudPcDevice ?? false);
+        setValidateIntuneDeviceBinding(data.validateIntuneDeviceBinding ?? false);
         setDataRetentionDays(data.dataRetentionDays ?? 90);
         setSessionTimeoutHours(data.sessionTimeoutHours ?? 5);
         setEnablePerformanceCollector(data.enablePerformanceCollector ?? true);
@@ -703,7 +708,7 @@ export function TenantConfigProvider({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }
   // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
   // Save configuration (shared by all sections)
   // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
-  const saveConfiguration = useCallback(async (sectionName: SettingsSectionName, overrides?: { validateAutopilotDevice?: boolean; validateCorporateIdentifier?: boolean; validateDeviceAssociation?: boolean; validateCloudPcDevice?: boolean; unrestrictedMode?: boolean }): Promise<boolean> => {
+  const saveConfiguration = useCallback(async (sectionName: SettingsSectionName, overrides?: { validateAutopilotDevice?: boolean; validateCorporateIdentifier?: boolean; validateDeviceAssociation?: boolean; validateCloudPcDevice?: boolean; validateIntuneDeviceBinding?: boolean; unrestrictedMode?: boolean }): Promise<boolean> => {
     // Read-only viewers (Operators) have no save affordances; this guard covers any path
     // that still reaches a save (the backend would 403 the PATCH regardless).
     if (!tenantId || !config || !canEditConfig) return false;
@@ -717,6 +722,7 @@ export function TenantConfigProvider({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }
       const corporateIdentifierValidationValue = overrides?.validateCorporateIdentifier ?? validateCorporateIdentifier;
       const deviceAssociationValidationValue = overrides?.validateDeviceAssociation ?? validateDeviceAssociation;
       const cloudPcValidationValue = overrides?.validateCloudPcDevice ?? validateCloudPcDevice;
+      const intuneDeviceBindingValue = overrides?.validateIntuneDeviceBinding ?? validateIntuneDeviceBinding;
       const unrestrictedModeValue = overrides?.unrestrictedMode ?? unrestrictedMode;
 
       const updatedConfig: TenantConfiguration = {
@@ -728,6 +734,7 @@ export function TenantConfigProvider({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }
         validateCorporateIdentifier: corporateIdentifierValidationValue,
         validateDeviceAssociation: deviceAssociationValidationValue,
         validateCloudPcDevice: cloudPcValidationValue,
+        validateIntuneDeviceBinding: intuneDeviceBindingValue,
         dataRetentionDays,
         sessionTimeoutHours,
         enablePerformanceCollector,
@@ -822,6 +829,7 @@ export function TenantConfigProvider({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }
       setValidateCorporateIdentifier(persisted.validateCorporateIdentifier ?? false);
       setValidateDeviceAssociation(persisted.validateDeviceAssociation ?? false);
       setValidateCloudPcDevice(persisted.validateCloudPcDevice ?? false);
+      setValidateIntuneDeviceBinding(persisted.validateIntuneDeviceBinding ?? false);
       setUnrestrictedMode(persisted.unrestrictedMode ?? false);
       trackEvent("settings_saved", { section: sectionName, fieldCount: Object.keys(patchFields).length });
       setSuccessMessage("Configuration saved successfully!");
@@ -841,7 +849,7 @@ export function TenantConfigProvider({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }
     }
   }, [
     tenantId, config, canEditConfig, getAccessToken, addNotification,
-    manufacturerWhitelist, modelWhitelist, webhookNotifyOnHardwareRejection, validateAutopilotDevice, validateCorporateIdentifier, validateDeviceAssociation, validateCloudPcDevice,
+    manufacturerWhitelist, modelWhitelist, webhookNotifyOnHardwareRejection, validateAutopilotDevice, validateCorporateIdentifier, validateDeviceAssociation, validateCloudPcDevice, validateIntuneDeviceBinding,
     dataRetentionDays, sessionTimeoutHours, enablePerformanceCollector, performanceCollectorInterval,
     helloWaitTimeoutSeconds, selfDestructOnComplete, keepLogFile, rebootOnComplete, rebootDelaySeconds,
     contactEmail, enableGeoLocation, enableTimezoneAutoSet, enableDoGroupIdAutoSet, enableImeMatchLog, enableGatherRuleDebugLog, logLevel, showScriptOutput, showEnrollmentSummary,
@@ -1333,6 +1341,17 @@ export function TenantConfigProvider({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }
     await saveConfiguration("autopilotValidation", { validateCloudPcDevice: newValue });
   }, [saveConfiguration]);
 
+  /**
+   * Toggle the cert-to-device binding check (Global-Admin-only preview). No consent flow -
+   * DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All is an Optional Graph capabilities add-on granted
+   * with the script; without it the backend records "PermissionMissing" and nothing else, and
+   * because the check runs in shadow mode it never affects an enrollment either way.
+   */
+  const handleToggleIntuneDeviceBinding = useCallback(async (newValue: boolean) => {
+    setValidateIntuneDeviceBinding(newValue);
+    await saveConfiguration("autopilotValidation", { validateIntuneDeviceBinding: newValue });
+  }, [saveConfiguration]);
+
   // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
   // Admin management handlers
   // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -1660,7 +1679,9 @@ export function TenantConfigProvider({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }
       validateDeviceAssociation, setValidateDeviceAssociation,
       handleToggleDeviceAssociationValidation,
       validateCloudPcDevice, setValidateCloudPcDevice,
+      validateIntuneDeviceBinding, setValidateIntuneDeviceBinding,
       handleToggleCloudPcValidation,
+      handleToggleIntuneDeviceBinding,
       saveValidationGate,
       autopilotConsentInProgress, beginDeviceValidationConsentFlow, detectExistingAccess,
 
@@ -1767,6 +1788,7 @@ export function TenantConfigProvider({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }
     editionInfo, startingTrial, startTrial, appHomingFunnelActive, homingFlipped,
     validateAutopilotDevice, validateCorporateIdentifier, validateDeviceAssociation,
     handleToggleDeviceAssociationValidation, validateCloudPcDevice, handleToggleCloudPcValidation,
+    validateIntuneDeviceBinding, handleToggleIntuneDeviceBinding,
     saveValidationGate, autopilotConsentInProgress, beginDeviceValidationConsentFlow, detectExistingAccess,
     manufacturerWhitelist, modelWhitelist, effectiveHwRejectionNotify, setHwRejectionNotifyWriteThrough,
     handleSaveHardwareWhitelist, handleResetHardwareWhitelist,

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/settings/__tests__/sectionFieldMap.test.ts

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ const EXPECTED_OWNED_FIELDS = [
   "manufacturerWhitelist", "modelWhitelist", "webhookNotifyOnHardwareRejection",
   // autopilotValidation
   "validateAutopilotDevice", "validateCorporateIdentifier", "validateDeviceAssociation", "validateCloudPcDevice",
+  "validateIntuneDeviceBinding",
   // notifications
   "notificationChannelsJson",
   // slaTargets

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/settings/components/AutopilotValidationSection.tsx

@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@ interface AutopilotValidationSectionProps {
   onToggleDeviceAssociation?: (newValue: boolean) => void | Promise<void>;
   /** Render the DevPrep Device Association toggle. Gated to Global Admins by the parent. */
   showDeviceAssociationToggle?: boolean;
+  /** Cert-to-device binding - Global-Admin-only preview. Provided when `showIntuneDeviceBindingToggle=true`. */
+  validateIntuneDeviceBinding?: boolean;
+  onToggleIntuneDeviceBinding?: (v: boolean) => void | Promise<void>;
+  showIntuneDeviceBindingToggle?: boolean;
   /** Windows 365 Cloud PC validation — fallback gate for Cloud PCs (never Autopilot-registered). */
   validateCloudPcDevice?: boolean;
   /** Toggle + persist Cloud PC validation in one shot (permission comes via the Optional Graph capabilities add-on, no consent dialog). */
@@ -35,6 +39,9 @@ export default function AutopilotValidationSection({
   validateDeviceAssociation = false,
   onToggleDeviceAssociation,
   showDeviceAssociationToggle = false,
+  validateIntuneDeviceBinding = false,
+  onToggleIntuneDeviceBinding,
+  showIntuneDeviceBindingToggle = false,
   validateCloudPcDevice = false,
   onToggleCloudPc,
   autopilotConsentInProgress,
@@ -237,6 +244,35 @@ export default function AutopilotValidationSection({
           </div>
         )}
 
+        {/* Cert-to-device binding - GA-gated preview, shadow-mode (no enrollment block) */}
+        {showIntuneDeviceBindingToggle && onToggleIntuneDeviceBinding && (
+          <div className="border-t border-gray-100 pt-5 space-y-3" data-testid="intune-device-binding-toggle">
+            <div className="flex items-center gap-2">
+              <p className="text-sm font-semibold text-gray-700 tracking-wide">Certificate Device Binding</p>
+              <span className="inline-flex items-center px-2 py-0.5 rounded-full text-[10px] font-semibold uppercase tracking-wider bg-purple-100 text-purple-800">
+                Preview · GA only
+              </span>
+            </div>
+            <label className="flex items-start justify-between gap-4">
+              <div>
+                <p className="text-sm font-medium text-gray-900">Enable Intune Device Binding Validation</p>
+                <p className="text-sm text-gray-500">
+                  Checks that the Intune device id in the agent{"'"}s client certificate belongs to a device this tenant actually enrolled. Currently runs in <strong>shadow mode</strong> - the result is recorded as telemetry only and does NOT block enrollment. Requires the optional <strong>DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All</strong> permission - grant the{" "}
+                  <strong>IntuneDeviceBinding</strong> add-on under <em>Optional Graph capabilities</em>.
+                </p>
+              </div>
+              <button
+                onClick={() => { void onToggleIntuneDeviceBinding(!validateIntuneDeviceBinding); }}
+                disabled={saving}
+                aria-label="Toggle Intune device binding validation"
+                className={`relative inline-flex h-6 w-11 shrink-0 items-center rounded-full transition-colors disabled:opacity-60 disabled:cursor-not-allowed ${validateIntuneDeviceBinding ? 'bg-emerald-500' : 'bg-gray-300'}`}
+              >
+                <span className={`inline-block h-4 w-4 transform rounded-full bg-white transition-transform ${validateIntuneDeviceBinding ? 'translate-x-6' : 'translate-x-1'}`} />
+              </button>
+            </label>
+          </div>
+        )}
+
         <div className="bg-amber-50 border border-amber-200 rounded-lg p-3">
           <p className="text-sm text-amber-900">
             <strong>Important:</strong>{" "}

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/settings/sectionFieldMap.ts

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ export const SECTION_FIELD_MAP = {
       "validateCorporateIdentifier",
       "validateDeviceAssociation",
       "validateCloudPcDevice",
+      "validateIntuneDeviceBinding",
     ],
   },
   notifications: {

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/settings/tenant/sections/SectionAutopilotValidation.tsx

@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ export function SectionAutopilotValidation() {
     validateDeviceAssociation,
     handleToggleDeviceAssociationValidation,
     validateCloudPcDevice,
+    validateIntuneDeviceBinding,
+    handleToggleIntuneDeviceBinding,
     handleToggleCloudPcValidation,
     saveValidationGate,
     autopilotConsentInProgress, savingSection,
@@ -42,6 +44,9 @@ export function SectionAutopilotValidation() {
   // to the web test setup (vitest.config.ts currently only matches *.test.ts, no JSX).
   // Tracked in memory/project_devprep_followups.md.
   const showDeviceAssociationToggle = user?.isGlobalAdmin === true;
+  // Same GA gate as the DevPrep preview: only the operator can turn the binding check on
+  // while its enrollment-race behaviour is still being measured.
+  const showIntuneDeviceBindingToggle = user?.isGlobalAdmin === true;
 
   // Dual app-reg window: tenants homed on the previous app registration (homedAppClientId
   // null/absent) keep working unchanged — this is a purely informational nudge, part of the
@@ -145,6 +150,9 @@ export function SectionAutopilotValidation() {
         onToggleDeviceAssociation={handleToggleDeviceAssociationValidation}
         showDeviceAssociationToggle={showDeviceAssociationToggle}
         validateCloudPcDevice={validateCloudPcDevice}
+        validateIntuneDeviceBinding={validateIntuneDeviceBinding}
+        onToggleIntuneDeviceBinding={handleToggleIntuneDeviceBinding}
+        showIntuneDeviceBindingToggle={showIntuneDeviceBindingToggle}
         onToggleCloudPc={handleToggleCloudPcValidation}
         autopilotConsentInProgress={autopilotConsentInProgress}
         saving={savingSection === "autopilotValidation"}

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/settings/types.ts

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ export interface TenantConfiguration {
    * permission ("W365CloudPcValidation" in Optional Graph capabilities).
    */
   validateCloudPcDevice?: boolean;
+  validateIntuneDeviceBinding?: boolean;
   allowInsecureAgentRequests?: boolean;
   /**
    * Dual app-reg window: client id of the Entra app registration this tenant is homed on.

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/package-lock.json

@@ -18,25 +18,25 @@
         "fflate": "^0.8.3",
         "jspdf": "^4.2.1",
         "leaflet": "^1.9.4",
-        "next": "^16.3.1",
+        "next": "^16.3.2",
         "react": "^19.2.8",
         "react-dom": "^19.2.8",
         "react-leaflet": "^5.0.0",
         "recharts": "^2.15.4"
       },
       "devDependencies": {
-        "@next/bundle-analyzer": "^16.3.1",
+        "@next/bundle-analyzer": "^16.3.2",
         "@types/dagre": "^0.7.54",
         "@types/node": "^22.20.1",
         "@types/react": "^19",
         "@types/react-dom": "^19",
         "autoprefixer": "^10.5.4",
         "eslint": "^9.39.5",
-        "eslint-config-next": "^16.3.1",
+        "eslint-config-next": "^16.3.2",
         "postcss": "^8.5.12",
         "tailwindcss": "^3.4.17",
         "typescript": "^5.7.3",
-        "vitest": "^4.1.10"
+        "vitest": "^4.1.11"
       },
       "engines": {
         "node": "22.x"
@@ -1359,9 +1359,9 @@
       "license": "MIT"
     },
     "node_modules/@next/bundle-analyzer": {
-      "version": "16.3.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/bundle-analyzer/-/bundle-analyzer-16.3.1.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-/6XQeYPHM6jF1gTeJ82Mu6yXOHQIFVxzAn3DkPtHDp5v6SDXoCicBMTHloN+2h4WKFCQujSLCgLZHItJ3jN1uw==",
+      "version": "16.3.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/bundle-analyzer/-/bundle-analyzer-16.3.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-1WSK3fjvlZzA3cpP6XsM9JW2/LDWWlldlYN5sL/h2kvAQCu2KeXLxNkqfI/0ac+ikOYFzWuuBpL9O0Cu3mrfww==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
@@ -1369,15 +1369,15 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@next/env": {
-      "version": "16.3.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/env/-/env-16.3.1.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-35G3xwkQUb2oETSDjFXGrVugknoayLFBh7vSE+yAcl9IP2zT9wyGwq7297AYHR11kJld807t5f8AJBs6WBzXsQ==",
+      "version": "16.3.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/env/-/env-16.3.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-8k4YoG8cM7LWlkfzGNYCRBbFNlernLiMw4s0btVl+CmmWqn3VpYypA72/5Feb1UWdxe6tHqr5KHP4p4Y4m9luA==",
       "license": "MIT"
     },
     "node_modules/@next/eslint-plugin-next": {
-      "version": "16.3.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/eslint-plugin-next/-/eslint-plugin-next-16.3.1.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-B4SznlXwVpaLDa7Tbi6zLuueria2d/PmFDhXyDymPGrk2r1n/RMJmcn5FZq1L64k+Jsyte1lKvOr7lP9Xo80mQ==",
+      "version": "16.3.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/eslint-plugin-next/-/eslint-plugin-next-16.3.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-z+HW1cZgt8QhByw8p2EbxF94AImgsKIYUbtSkA7Zld2T9yrKAlys4jNOcAOCtv6csX2CoA/5qCVyesL5pHmJ0A==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
@@ -1386,9 +1386,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@next/swc-darwin-arm64": {
-      "version": "16.3.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/swc-darwin-arm64/-/swc-darwin-arm64-16.3.1.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-ABMIu2zQ7cnNIHm5ivKGwZwUrm0pAai3yiJ/gK/rF1c1VP9UOnj7XECbMKFdVKp9I9eMYq9NoDs1WXOoowxzJw==",
+      "version": "16.3.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/swc-darwin-arm64/-/swc-darwin-arm64-16.3.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-ib5Llm93YCKoKWDh6ZaHq6QWTuOZ2bRkSnUwMmX8dsRIOkBNL1vVlSiUKSfixPL9SSh9pvukzqajk/klkn5vqg==",
       "cpu": [
         "arm64"
       ],
@@ -1402,9 +1402,9 @@
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     },
     "node_modules/@next/swc-darwin-x64": {
-      "version": "16.3.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/swc-darwin-x64/-/swc-darwin-x64-16.3.1.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-gNG21e/UnrroeScbY/QndUEdl0mF1FRibW7BBeYUz/5ABCepjqDdEdgr592vpzMtCn/m7FTjYq3TN4TpyDnutw==",
+      "version": "16.3.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/swc-darwin-x64/-/swc-darwin-x64-16.3.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-qd98fX2+I5nYJDioW2o7nSjoxM5KvWdeDefM80igia4+C/qSIEhH4MhTE+hO/7qKM7W37/Mq+dOWp8UePSyLHw==",
       "cpu": [
         "x64"
       ],
@@ -1418,12 +1418,15 @@
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-      "version": "16.3.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/swc-linux-arm64-gnu/-/swc-linux-arm64-gnu-16.3.1.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-6B6Lw016iwNUQuaJoraMMTLh6TwHzFUtxipSScD1F3YyymcrRWkobodRS2ftIOkF5vrs4zNlyUrTC5YZQ9Lz5w==",
+      "version": "16.3.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/swc-linux-arm64-gnu/-/swc-linux-arm64-gnu-16.3.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-vqsgb6FAOzcrCccsLXiKtAy5t8EzO+uOazuFaSkQxeY0tNONG3vpHYy8pyBafcI5SNFPTeyard6yTr6SzNGo2A==",
       "cpu": [
         "arm64"
       ],
+      "libc": [
+        "glibc"
+      ],
       "license": "MIT",
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
@@ -1434,12 +1437,15 @@
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     },
     "node_modules/@next/swc-linux-arm64-musl": {
-      "version": "16.3.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/swc-linux-arm64-musl/-/swc-linux-arm64-musl-16.3.1.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-JUiPXZKK9wOhjf4MgDiH29GZLxfqOesbLtHq2pDxwH/WwscTRV2ToymnOTh1egzaZf0ueUf8T2+CeYTGHjW0Iw==",
+      "version": "16.3.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/swc-linux-arm64-musl/-/swc-linux-arm64-musl-16.3.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-xIe1eujfHUB2XcxHGddxJyu6TJRPjC5NpIkQYB/32ESkt5VkQyIAjmLRS38c+s6QY+qjtY/4KarVDzXRuD7lZQ==",
       "cpu": [
         "arm64"
       ],
+      "libc": [
+        "musl"
+      ],
       "license": "MIT",
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
@@ -1450,12 +1456,15 @@
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     "node_modules/@next/swc-linux-x64-gnu": {
-      "version": "16.3.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/swc-linux-x64-gnu/-/swc-linux-x64-gnu-16.3.1.tgz",
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+      "version": "16.3.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/swc-linux-x64-gnu/-/swc-linux-x64-gnu-16.3.2.tgz",
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       "cpu": [
         "x64"
       ],
+      "libc": [
+        "glibc"
+      ],
       "license": "MIT",
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
@@ -1466,12 +1475,15 @@
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     "node_modules/@next/swc-linux-x64-musl": {
-      "version": "16.3.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/swc-linux-x64-musl/-/swc-linux-x64-musl-16.3.1.tgz",
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+      "version": "16.3.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/swc-linux-x64-musl/-/swc-linux-x64-musl-16.3.2.tgz",
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       "cpu": [
         "x64"
       ],
+      "libc": [
+        "musl"
+      ],
       "license": "MIT",
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
@@ -1482,9 +1494,9 @@
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     "node_modules/@next/swc-win32-arm64-msvc": {
-      "version": "16.3.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/swc-win32-arm64-msvc/-/swc-win32-arm64-msvc-16.3.1.tgz",
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+      "version": "16.3.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/swc-win32-arm64-msvc/-/swc-win32-arm64-msvc-16.3.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-rVtmnNpBYIosDnKD/96dKxFsJnwnn1WRGG/HioSe8XCm2ksSHNrd2R6+hSjvTBxeMNhJ9pYeu/90cWB1nQLuNA==",
       "cpu": [
         "arm64"
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@@ -1554,9 +1566,9 @@
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     "node_modules/@oxc-project/types": {
-      "version": "0.139.0",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@oxc-project/types/-/types-0.139.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-r9gHphtCs+1M7J0pw6Sn/hh/Wpa/iQrOOkrNAlVLF/gHq+/CJmHIWKKUUhdWjcD6CIa8idarspCsASiXCXvFUw==",
+      "version": "0.146.0",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@oxc-project/types/-/types-0.146.0.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-XC0QsnnhVe7sLIWmYmdPw7x5P0h4W8vUU3Nv1ySgWXtvCz8NizoAEpGXA0sOYoJQV2Rl13LgURAHQ5cI5ILCSA==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "funding": {
@@ -1581,10 +1593,27 @@
         "react-dom": "^19.0.0"
       }
     },
+    "node_modules/@rolldown/binding-android-arm-eabi": {
+      "version": "1.2.5",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@rolldown/binding-android-arm-eabi/-/binding-android-arm-eabi-1.2.5.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-DLe/i+l8ynIBY7XEQ191TeZvCoowIGa18R+dIV30GW7DiOtp74i/xX8hs8GUjW5ARV7VZuie3d6AumSmCwbeRA==",
+      "cpu": [
+        "arm"
+      ],
+      "dev": true,
+      "license": "MIT",
+      "optional": true,
+      "os": [
+        "android"
+      ],
+      "engines": {
+        "node": "^20.19.0 || >=22.12.0"
+      }
+    },
     "node_modules/@rolldown/binding-android-arm64": {
-      "version": "1.1.5",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@rolldown/binding-android-arm64/-/binding-android-arm64-1.1.5.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-lZg8fqIv2v7FF237bwMgzGZEJvGL79/s5knJ/i6FmsGF4XXlzccZ4jb+TrFIxtSSxFtIpdsgrPZeMk1I9AFcyQ==",
+      "version": "1.2.5",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@rolldown/binding-android-arm64/-/binding-android-arm64-1.2.5.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-zXcwKlQApYAOELHd8PwKDFkagYF9Wy4e0RJ+0qnzl9Pjnpj75TEG8ufv40p2J7kCEfwZAsNiuzRIyNNMWT38ig==",
       "cpu": [
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@@ -1599,9 +1628,9 @@
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-      "version": "1.1.5",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@rolldown/binding-darwin-arm64/-/binding-darwin-arm64-1.1.5.tgz",
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+      "version": "1.2.5",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@rolldown/binding-darwin-arm64/-/binding-darwin-arm64-1.2.5.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-dK4QakI42nzWgJT5sm4y4y/O//D4OxM75/cH28RLV+nzIN9AY+YsbuUVrUTjlLjXR6vpyxFbSsbmNuJ6BP9sww==",
       "cpu": [
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       ],
@@ -1616,9 +1645,9 @@
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-      "version": "1.1.5",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@rolldown/binding-darwin-x64/-/binding-darwin-x64-1.1.5.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-Tm+gbfC0aHu1tBA/JvKQh32S0K6YgCHkiAF4/W6xX0K0RmNuc94VeK419dJoE65R5aRxmo+noZQSWrAMF6yb6g==",
+      "version": "1.2.5",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@rolldown/binding-darwin-x64/-/binding-darwin-x64-1.2.5.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-fqSALaUu1Wjd1nK2uW2kJDWdLCc8lx1IcY+MTY26Aurfdx19anlzhqXOgCFbBFQnlFDTn4TC1/7Nz4Bl2mLP3A==",
       "cpu": [
         "x64"
       ],
@@ -1633,9 +1662,9 @@
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+      "version": "1.2.5",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@rolldown/binding-freebsd-x64/-/binding-freebsd-x64-1.2.5.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-/vCnNxlkxs9tKxNDcyWUePpJ/PgTzxIaVhoM5SmG8UV+GR/IcPam4VYxi7GIMo7PSDuNqlJqvprqii9NqqVCMw==",
       "cpu": [
         "x64"
       ],
@@ -1650,9 +1679,9 @@
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     "node_modules/@rolldown/binding-linux-arm-gnueabihf": {
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-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@rolldown/binding-linux-arm-gnueabihf/-/binding-linux-arm-gnueabihf-1.1.5.tgz",
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+      "version": "1.2.5",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@rolldown/binding-linux-arm-gnueabihf/-/binding-linux-arm-gnueabihf-1.2.5.tgz",
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       "cpu": [
         "arm"
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@@ -1667,13 +1696,16 @@
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         "sharp": "^0.35.3"
       },
       "peerDependencies": {
@@ -6483,9 +6504,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/next/node_modules/@next/swc-win32-x64-msvc": {
-      "version": "16.3.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/swc-win32-x64-msvc/-/swc-win32-x64-msvc-16.3.1.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-d/k+PpAriUPaeMJJOG7HUSdqfEX46FEPWU1p3/nm2ACmXhj9hFEWdFODUBIpkuijXYkfL90qZzTqVPRp4BW/hw==",
+      "version": "16.3.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@next/swc-win32-x64-msvc/-/swc-win32-x64-msvc-16.3.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-H4Y2o2/JcHu8LtwzD5CXfHhwxwz8gfsx2HXDEw46Mtev5xHnEmB7HNtZtmriw5ReUOjRtcDqo7XSbU01FT9NlA==",
       "cpu": [
         "x64"
       ],
@@ -7372,13 +7393,13 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/rolldown": {
-      "version": "1.1.5",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/rolldown/-/rolldown-1.1.5.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-t9z29cJjXf/vxQ8dyhCSpt6H6aSwHTk8cT5I3iy6SMXuFpk5mB6PL6XfC8PCwrPTx93udwKUm9HRteAlTGBLiA==",
+      "version": "1.2.5",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/rolldown/-/rolldown-1.2.5.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-VD2IE5PUG4Oj8zz2VGykiYd5wbnjdIiSsNQb8Qu5B+noEp+A78mu2iVvpp27g8es14Tk9rofNs5Tku9iQCS4fA==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
-        "@oxc-project/types": "=0.139.0",
+        "@oxc-project/types": "=0.146.0",
         "@rolldown/pluginutils": "^1.0.0"
       },
       "bin": {
@@ -7388,21 +7409,21 @@
         "node": "^20.19.0 || >=22.12.0"
       },
       "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@rolldown/binding-android-arm64": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-darwin-arm64": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-darwin-x64": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-freebsd-x64": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-arm-gnueabihf": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-arm64-gnu": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-arm64-musl": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-ppc64-gnu": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-s390x-gnu": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-x64-gnu": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-x64-musl": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-openharmony-arm64": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-wasm32-wasi": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-win32-arm64-msvc": "1.1.5",
-        "@rolldown/binding-win32-x64-msvc": "1.1.5"
+        "@rolldown/binding-android-arm-eabi": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-android-arm64": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-darwin-arm64": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-darwin-x64": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-freebsd-x64": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-arm-gnueabihf": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-arm64-gnu": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-arm64-musl": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-ppc64-gnu": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-s390x-gnu": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-x64-gnu": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-x64-musl": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-openharmony-arm64": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-win32-arm64-msvc": "1.2.5",
+        "@rolldown/binding-win32-x64-msvc": "1.2.5"
       }
     },
     "node_modules/run-parallel": {
@@ -8174,9 +8195,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/tinyrainbow": {
-      "version": "3.1.0",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/tinyrainbow/-/tinyrainbow-3.1.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-Bf+ILmBgretUrdJxzXM0SgXLZ3XfiaUuOj/IKQHuTXip+05Xn+uyEYdVg0kYDipTBcLrCVyUzAPz7QmArb0mmw==",
+      "version": "3.1.1",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/tinyrainbow/-/tinyrainbow-3.1.1.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-yau8yJdTt989Mm0Bd/236QnzEiPf2xLLTqUZRUJOo/3CB078LSwzei343DgtJVmfJKJE3TMINY1u42SQsP6mXw==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "engines": {
@@ -8565,16 +8586,16 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/vite": {
-      "version": "8.1.5",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/vite/-/vite-8.1.5.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-7ULLwsCdYx/nRyrpiEwvqb5TFHrMVZyBt+rg/OAXT7rgj/z+DtTDyKFeLAdDkubDVDKD8jOsndmy7m55XcfUsw==",
+      "version": "8.2.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/vite/-/vite-8.2.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-cFKLV/PRgAUlIRm5WjMjJ86jrftzpqcgH+Us+DS8mI3CDNiH30Whrz8uHL3+MOLPAgqbMBAqWdAHAphOAM+z/Q==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
-        "lightningcss": "^1.32.0",
+        "lightningcss": "^1.33.0",
         "picomatch": "^4.0.5",
-        "postcss": "^8.5.17",
-        "rolldown": "~1.1.5",
+        "postcss": "^8.5.26",
+        "rolldown": "~1.2.4",
         "tinyglobby": "^0.2.17"
       },
       "bin": {
@@ -8591,7 +8612,7 @@
       },
       "peerDependencies": {
         "@types/node": "^20.19.0 || >=22.12.0",
-        "@vitejs/devtools": "^0.3.0",
+        "@vitejs/devtools": "^0.4.0 || ^0.5.0",
         "esbuild": "^0.27.0 || ^0.28.0",
         "jiti": ">=1.21.0",
         "less": "^4.0.0",
@@ -8656,19 +8677,19 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/vitest": {
-      "version": "4.1.10",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/vitest/-/vitest-4.1.10.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-R9jUTe5S4Qb0HCd4TNqpC7oGcrMssMRGXLW80ubjWsW9VH5GF8y1Y0SFLY9AbqSk6nt0PnOx4H4WNJYZ13GUPw==",
+      "version": "4.1.11",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/vitest/-/vitest-4.1.11.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-fhACrNXUidIbGSBr5FlbuBkO7VWC1ZyLl0DO4CU2DrQoAPxX84Ysxs+HeGQpii5lZWV1Q4gBZTTu49mF+A6Edw==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
-        "@vitest/expect": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/mocker": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/pretty-format": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/runner": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/snapshot": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/spy": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/utils": "4.1.10",
+        "@vitest/expect": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/mocker": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/pretty-format": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/runner": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/snapshot": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/spy": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/utils": "4.1.11",
         "es-module-lexer": "^2.0.0",
         "expect-type": "^1.3.0",
         "magic-string": "^0.30.21",
@@ -8696,12 +8717,12 @@
         "@edge-runtime/vm": "*",
         "@opentelemetry/api": "^1.9.0",
         "@types/node": "^20.0.0 || ^22.0.0 || >=24.0.0",
-        "@vitest/browser-playwright": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/browser-preview": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/browser-webdriverio": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/coverage-istanbul": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/coverage-v8": "4.1.10",
-        "@vitest/ui": "4.1.10",
+        "@vitest/browser-playwright": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/browser-preview": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/browser-webdriverio": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/coverage-istanbul": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/coverage-v8": "4.1.11",
+        "@vitest/ui": "4.1.11",
         "happy-dom": "*",
         "jsdom": "*",
         "vite": "^6.0.0 || ^7.0.0 || ^8.0.0"

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/package.json

@@ -25,25 +25,25 @@
     "fflate": "^0.8.3",
     "jspdf": "^4.2.1",
     "leaflet": "^1.9.4",
-    "next": "^16.3.1",
+    "next": "^16.3.2",
     "react": "^19.2.8",
     "react-dom": "^19.2.8",
     "react-leaflet": "^5.0.0",
     "recharts": "^2.15.4"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
-    "@next/bundle-analyzer": "^16.3.1",
+    "@next/bundle-analyzer": "^16.3.2",
     "@types/dagre": "^0.7.54",
     "@types/node": "^22.20.1",
     "@types/react": "^19",
     "@types/react-dom": "^19",
     "autoprefixer": "^10.5.4",
     "eslint": "^9.39.5",
-    "eslint-config-next": "^16.3.1",
+    "eslint-config-next": "^16.3.2",
     "postcss": "^8.5.12",
     "tailwindcss": "^3.4.17",
     "typescript": "^5.7.3",
-    "vitest": "^4.1.10"
+    "vitest": "^4.1.11"
   },
   "optionalDependencies": {
     "@next/swc-win32-x64-msvc": "npm:null@*"

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/utils/shared-manifests.generated.ts

@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ export const SHARED_MANIFEST = {
       "validateCorporateIdentifier",
       "validateDeviceAssociation",
       "validateCloudPcDevice",
+      "validateIntuneDeviceBinding",
       "allowInsecureAgentRequests",
       "dataRetentionDays",
       "sessionTimeoutHours",

src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/utils/shared-manifests.json

@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
       "validateCorporateIdentifier",
       "validateDeviceAssociation",
       "validateCloudPcDevice",
+      "validateIntuneDeviceBinding",
       "allowInsecureAgentRequests",
       "dataRetentionDays",
       "sessionTimeoutHours",