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Author SHA1 Message Date
overtrue 195f19217f fix(ecstore): collapse ILM expiry worker env knobs to canonical name 2026-08-13 03:04:09 +08:00
houseme 59d8d93832 perf(ecstore): release PUT lock before old-data cleanup (#6023)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 17:40:32 +00:00
houseme 59494d5089 perf(get): reuse reader paths and lock namespaces (#6015)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 17:37:25 +00:00
houseme 019e80a218 fix(admin): report live bucket count during usage scan (#6014)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 17:32:05 +00:00
houseme 9546baf1ab perf(get): share metadata cache hits (#6010)
Keep fresh metadata fanout results owned while sharing cache-backed metadata through Arc, avoiding deep clones on eligible local cache hits without enabling unsafe distributed caching.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 16:53:06 +00:00
Zhengchao An 60d8e8a20b refactor(kms): consolidate encryption metadata key constants into their shared home (#5995)
The shared module rustfs_utils::http::object_encryption_keys is the single source of truth for encryption metadata key names, but three call sites still carried their own copies or bare literals: crates/kms/src/service.rs (two private constants plus four bare x-rustfs-encryption-* literals on both the write and read path), rustfs/src/app/select_object.rs (six SELECT_* copies), and rustfs/src/storage/options.rs (two private prefix copies now imported from header_compat). All values are unchanged, so the change is a compiler-verified rename.

The reader-only x-rustfs-internal-server-side-encryption- family gets a named constant with the verified judgment recorded on it: no writer emits these keys anywhere in the repo (the SSE writer persists the MinIO-branded keys verbatim for interop), the two comments claiming the dual-key invariant writes this twin were wrong and are corrected, and the defensive redaction/strip readers are kept because removing them is risk-asymmetric.

rustfs-kms's rustfs-utils dependency now declares the http feature it uses instead of relying on feature unification from sibling crates.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1775, rustfs/backlog#1562.
2026-08-12 16:37:38 +00:00
houseme 24ca61eb6e perf(get): include small objects in codec streaming (#6004)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 16:04:15 +00:00
houseme d92c563b9e perf(ecstore): keep decode scratch buffers inline (#6002)
Keep common shard-indexed decode scratch vectors inline while preserving heap fallback for larger supported erasure layouts. Consume scratch iterators directly at the stripe-state boundary to avoid reallocating.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 15:40:32 +00:00
Zhengchao An e087044658 test(e2e): fold nine identical POST-policy rejection tests into one table (#6000)
The nine *_missing_from_policy_conditions tests in multipart_auth_test.rs were literal-for-literal identical after normalization: policy pins bucket + key + content-length-range, the form smuggles one extra field the policy never declared, and the upload must be rejected with 403 AccessDenied naming the field. Each one started its own full server.

This adds the run_post_object_policy_case helper (parameterized by bucket, key, policy conditions, extra form fields, file body, and expected status/code/mention, with a per-case assertion prefix) and folds the nine tests into one table-driven test with nine rows. Every row keeps its original test's exact bucket, key, field name/value, body bytes, and expected error strings — including the two rows that asserted the stronger <Code>AccessDenied</Code> form — so no poison value is lost. The helper's signature is general enough for the policy_mismatch and sse-kms groups planned as PR2/PR3.

cargo nextest list now reports 103 tests for this module; the inventory row said 109 while the file actually held 111 before this change (stale by two), so the inventory is set to the measured 103 in the same diff per the issue's hard constraint.

Ref rustfs/backlog#1838 (PR1).
2026-08-12 15:27:06 +00:00
Zhengchao An 16d381fc0e ci(kms): add a nightly live-Vault lane and stop leaking behavior keys (#5999)
No workflow ever set RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN, so live_vault_backends() returned an empty set in every CI run and behavior_rotation.rs never asserted the working half of rotate/versioning; the #[ignore] live-Vault tests had never executed in CI either. nightly-gnu.yml gains a kms-vault-lane job (vault server -dev with KV2 + Transit, full rustfs-kms suite with the lane on, the dev-Vault ignored tests, and the AppRole live script) plus a separate kms-vault-ha-failover job for the three-node Raft failover script, isolated so an election-timing flake cannot mask the main lane's verdict. GitHub-hosted ubuntu-latest rather than the self-hosted fleet: the HA script needs Docker, and e2e-s3tests.yml's banner records how the heterogeneous sm-standard pods burned the last docker-dependent workflow.

The behavior harness now records every key TestKms::create_key mints and deletes them after each Vault-backed for_each_backend case, on a fresh manager over the same configuration with the immediate-deletion gate enabled for cleanup only. Transit needs the deletion issued twice (first call parks the key in PendingDeletion, the second destroys it); KV2 destroys on the first call. Verified against a real dev Vault: after a full suite run the server holds zero behavior-* keys.

Also fixes test_vault_cancel_key_deletion_persists_state, which was broken by construction — Default::default() never picks up the insecure-dev-defaults env override, so the HTTP dev Vault the test requires was always refused. It now declares development mode on the config, and passes.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1774, rustfs/backlog#1562.
2026-08-12 15:14:04 +00:00
Zhengchao An 1021d7228a fix(ecstore): scope UploadPart commit lock per part number (#5990)
put_object_part's commit phase held an exclusive write lock on the whole
upload_id_path namespace, so concurrent UploadPart commits for different
part numbers of one upload serialized behind a single lock and returned
503 once the 5s lock-acquire timeout elapsed.

Adopt MinIO's PutObjectPart lock scope: a shared read lock on the
uploadId namespace plus an exclusive write lock on
{upload_id_path}/part.{N}. Different part numbers now commit
concurrently; same-part retries still serialize (backlog#853);
complete/abort keep the uploadId write lock and still exclude every
in-flight part commit. The lock-loss fence covers both guards.

Fixes #5961
2026-08-12 14:37:22 +00:00
Zhengchao An 0a246e3736 test: assert real behavior in three assertion-less tests (#5993)
test_format_v1 (ecstore layout::format) only printed its results; the pinned v1 format.json literal never parsed at all because "this": null fails Uuid deserialization, and the Err was silently discarded. Fix the fixture to the real on-disk shape (MinIO and RustFS always write a concrete disk UUID there) and assert a serialize->parse roundtrip identity plus every pinned field of the literal.

test_console_cors_configuration discarded all four parse_cors_origins results; parse_cors_origins returns an opaque CorsLayer, so the test now drives real CORS preflight requests through an axum router and asserts the allow-origin outcomes: wildcard answers any origin with *, a configured list echoes listed origins and refuses unlisted ones, empty/unset configurations allow no cross-origin caller.

test_heal_channel_processor_new only constructed the processor; it now asserts the response channel accepts a send.

Ref rustfs/backlog#1836 (PR1).
2026-08-12 14:37:01 +00:00
Zhengchao An 380ed40b47 chore(rustfs): import canonical encryption header constants in select_object (#5998)
select_object.rs re-declared six interop header names as SELECT_* locals (five X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-* markers plus x-rustfs-encryption-key-id). The canonical owners live in rustfs-utils' object_encryption_keys module, which the rustfs crate already depends on with the full feature set. Import them under their canonical names and drop the local copies; SELECT_KMS_ARN_PREFIX stays local because no canonical owner exists for the KMS ARN prefix.

Values are byte-identical, so no behavior change.

Ref rustfs/backlog#1833 (PR3).
2026-08-12 22:21:31 +08:00
Zhengchao An 679ea238de chore(kms): import canonical internal encryption header constants (#5997)
kms/service.rs re-declared x-rustfs-encryption-key-id and x-rustfs-encryption-algorithm locally; the canonical owners live in rustfs-utils' object_encryption_keys module, which kms already transitively builds. Enable the http feature on the existing rustfs-utils dependency and import the two constants instead. The explanatory comment about why the algorithm header exists (SSE mode vs AEAD cipher round-trip) moves to the import site.

No dependency-graph change (cargo tree -p rustfs-kms is unchanged apart from the feature) and no behavior change: the imported values are byte-identical.

Ref rustfs/backlog#1833 (PR2).
2026-08-12 22:20:47 +08:00
Zhengchao An baadaccc30 docs(replication): register the http interop duplication and pin its wire values (#5996)
backlog#1833 PR1 prescribed deduplicating crates/replication/src/http.rs onto the canonical rustfs-utils http modules via a re-export facade. That plan conflicts with a standing architecture guard the issue's review missed: check_architecture_migration_rules.sh rejects any rustfs-utils import or dependency from the replication crate ("replication crate HTTP/helper contracts must not import or depend on rustfs-utils"), the same way it bans rustfs-filemeta and rustfs-storage-api — the wire-contract crate deliberately has zero internal dependencies.

So this lands the issue's fallback shape instead (the same bidirectional do-not-merge pattern the issue itself prescribes for the policy path.rs cluster): a module doc on replication/http.rs naming the canonical owners and the guard that forces the local copy, mirror notes on utils' metadata_compat.rs and header_compat.rs, and a new test pinning every duplicated constant to its literal wire value so the two copies cannot drift silently.

No production code changed.

Ref rustfs/backlog#1833 (PR1).
2026-08-12 22:20:11 +08:00
Zhengchao An 87d47a6e5d docs(kms): add rotation driver matrix and rotation-overdue alert (#5992)
Add a per-backend rotation-driver matrix to docs/operations/kms-backend-security.md: who performs the rotation on each backend (RustFS for Vault KV2, Vault's Transit engine for Transit, AWS RotateKeyOnDemand for AWS, nobody for Local/Static), how periodic rotation must be scheduled on each (external scheduler for KV2 by design, Vault auto_rotate_period for Transit, AWS-native automatic rotation for AWS since RotateKeyOnDemand carries a lifetime quota), the NIST SP 800-38D 2^32 random-nonce AES-GCM wrap ceiling that Local/Static can never reset, and a pre-rotation checklist referencing the existing upgrade-ordering hard constraint.

Add the KmsKeyRotationOverdue Prometheus rule on rustfs_kms_oldest_key_rotation_age_seconds (400-day conservative default, warning severity, no traffic guard because it is direct gauge state) and its runbook response procedure in docs/operations/kms-observability-runbook.md, following the existing per-alert format.

Sharpen the runbook's rotation-timestamp paragraph with verified per-backend behavior: only Vault KV2 persists rotated_at (stamped in the same check-and-set write that commits the rotation), while Transit and AWS key listings always report it absent, so on those backends the gauge measures key age and does not reset on rotation. Update Threshold calibration and Coverage gaps for the new rule.

Validated with promtool check rules (7 rules, SUCCESS) and scripts/check_doc_paths.sh.

Part of rustfs/backlog#1636 (PR-4).
2026-08-12 21:59:54 +08:00
Zhengchao An fba0b34f19 chore: remove commented-out test corpses (~330 lines) (#5994)
Deletes three blocks of commented-out code that can never be revived: seven dead tokio::tests plus ~20 commented use statements at the tail of ecstore's store/list_objects.rs test module (all hardcoded to a developer's personal machine path), the commented test_extract_claims in policy/utils.rs, and the commented-out pre-strum AdminAction enum draft in policy/action.rs (the live enum below it is untouched).

Also rewords two doc comments on the bucket-metadata inline-data interop test to drop the personal attribution while keeping the technical content, so the corpse check (rg weisd) now returns zero across the repo.

Ref rustfs/backlog#1836 (PR2).
2026-08-12 21:59:20 +08:00
Henry Guo c9eeb2fa8a feat(table-catalog): add atomic table rename (#5989)
Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-12 21:39:18 +08:00
Zhengchao An 2f83d6789b chore(rustfs): remove dead keystone shadow auth path (#5988) 2026-08-12 20:46:48 +08:00
Henry Guo 7a4a3d27c6 fix(heal): cancel cluster tasks from root stop (#5978)
Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-12 20:46:35 +08:00
Henry Guo 4c5e73b2f2 fix(scanner): defer cycles during data movement (#5970)
* fix(scanner): defer cycles during data movement

* fix(scanner): distinguish deferred scan cycles

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 20:46:06 +08:00
GatewayJ 4c44bc649a fix(admin): clarify invalid group name errors (#5986) 2026-08-12 20:44:35 +08:00
houseme 3b49842df0 perf(ecstore): reduce small PUT fixed costs (#5987) 2026-08-12 20:07:40 +08:00
houseme 848b330825 perf(ecstore): reduce inline GET fixed costs (#5985) 2026-08-12 19:29:46 +08:00
houseme 270a003c55 fix(ecstore): attribute internal metadata GET metrics (#5983) 2026-08-12 19:29:36 +08:00
Zhengchao An 8b57076194 chore(ecstore): remove dead MinIO-port client modules (~940 lines) (#5982)
Delete five zero-caller client modules (api_bucket_policy,
api_get_object_acl, api_get_object_attributes, api_get_object_file,
api_restore), the orphaned TransitionCore get/put_bucket_policy
wrappers, and the two constants only they consumed. Also removes two
unwrap() panics on remote-controlled data in api_get_object_acl.rs
(non-UTF-8 body, missing Owner ID). Tier warm-backend APIs untouched.

Ref: rustfs/backlog#1822 (T1)
2026-08-12 11:03:31 +00:00
Zhengchao An d31bd3cd10 fix(data-usage): make thin usage-cache types a read-only projection (#5981)
Delete the dead ecstore save_data_usage_cache and the thin
DataUsageCache::marshal_msg it was the only caller of, drop the
Serialize derive (and the dead DataUsageCacheStorage trait with its
save path) from the thin projection types so no write path can exist
outside the scanner's canonical map-encoded writer, and pin the
persisted .usage-cache.bin wire bytes with cross-crate fixture tests
on both the scanner writer and the thin reader.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1828 (T1-T3).
2026-08-12 09:09:09 +00:00
Zhengchao An 698ebdfb3f fix(ecstore): map disk-representable StorageError variants in reverse conversion (#5980)
The StorageError -> DiskError conversion dropped seven variants with
exact DiskError counterparts (FaultyRemoteDisk, DiskAccessDenied,
DriveIsRoot, IsNotRegular, VolumeNotEmpty, VolumeAccessDenied,
FileAccessDenied) into the DiskError::other fallback, degrading them to
an opaque Io error. Two of them sit on the quorum ignore-lists in
disk/error_reduce.rs, so a degraded instance would stop matching the
ignore list and count toward the dominant error in reduce_errs.

Also mirror the StorageError-side io::Error downdrill in
From<io::Error> for DiskError: recover a StorageError boxed through
From<StorageError> for io::Error instead of wrapping it as Io.

Add a round-trip identity test over every DiskError variant
(DiskError -> StorageError -> DiskError) and a boxed-StorageError
recovery test.
2026-08-12 08:43:04 +00:00
Henry Guo c7233d6624 fix(table-catalog): harden strong backing compatibility (#5941)
* fix(table-catalog): harden strong backing compatibility

* fix(table-catalog): close strong backing recovery gaps

* fix(table-catalog): harden strong backing recovery

* fix(table-catalog): repair strong backing CI failures

* fix(table-catalog): satisfy test clippy lint

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-12 16:28:56 +08:00
Zhengchao An 493a2cc1ba test(heal): strengthen replacement e2e evidence (#5956)
* test(heal): strengthen replacement e2e evidence

* test(heal): fix replacement e2e barriers

Accept the real post-fault scanner failure-to-idle sequence as the live disk loss barrier, and preserve the first definitive completed status while only resampling the physical census for premature-completion confirmation.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 08:14:52 +00:00
yanglongwei 3ebb426abe fix(s3): return InvalidArgument for mismatched ListMultipartUploads key-marker (#5914)
A key-marker that does not start with the request prefix is invalid input, not an unimplemented feature.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 07:43:03 +00:00
Zhengchao An 5aac224a97 docs: sync ARCHITECTURE.md structural inventory with measured state (#5977) 2026-08-12 15:31:04 +08:00
houseme 1b6ae33ce0 perf(get): trim direct-read metadata allocations (#5976)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 07:27:58 +00:00
Henry Guo 537d34b8cd fix(table-catalog): support apache-avro 0.22 (#5975)
fix(avro): support apache-avro 0.22

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-12 15:08:52 +08:00
GatewayJ 3fdf2964c8 perf(rpc): size remote shard read buffers (#5972) 2026-08-12 15:05:33 +08:00
houseme 2e5874f839 fix(get): give UringBackend the only fd cache for its disk (#5974)
fix(get): give UringBackend the only fd cache for its disk (#1801)

#1801 made `StdBackend::new` always build a descriptor cache. `UringBackend`
wraps a `StdBackend` (`inner`), so under io_uring a disk ended up with TWO
`FdCache`s: the wrapper's and the inner's. `UringBackend::pread_bytes`
delegates to `inner.pread_bytes` on four fallback paths (latch-off, O_DIRECT
unsupported / error, buffered-read error), which populated `inner.fd_cache` —
but `UringBackend`'s invalidation only touches its own cache, so the inner
cache was never invalidated. For up to `FD_CACHE_TTL` (5s) after a heal/rename/
delete, a fallback read could serve the pre-mutation inode: exactly the
stale-descriptor hazard `FdCache`'s generation guard exists to close
(rustfs/backlog#1176). It also double-counted `FD_CACHE_CAPACITY` (512 fds)
against `RLIMIT_NOFILE` per disk (backlog#1178).

Fix: `UringBackend` now constructs its inner `StdBackend` with the new
`StdBackend::new_without_fd_cache`, so the wrapper owns the only cache for the
disk. The inner backend opens per read on fallback, leaving nothing
unguarded. `StdBackend::new` (standalone default) is unchanged; a private
`build(root, build_fd_cache)` holds the shared construction.

- Default (non-io_uring) path: byte-for-byte unchanged.
- io_uring path: one cache per disk, fully covered by the wrapper's
  invalidation; halves the per-disk fd budget under `RLIMIT_NOFILE`.
- `RUSTFS_IO_URING_FD_CACHE` / `RUSTFS_LOCAL_FD_CACHE` semantics preserved.
- Regression test pins `new_without_fd_cache` -> no cache.

Found by a post-merge re-review of the Wave 1 GET PRs. cargo check/clippy
clean; Linux compile + the io_uring fd-cache suite deferred to CI.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 14:53:59 +08:00
houseme 5d05897ae0 docs(durability): document the new-bucket relaxed default (#5973)
docs(durability): document the new-bucket relaxed default (#1811)

#5971 seeds a `relaxed` durability override into newly created buckets'
metadata (rustfs/backlog#1811), but the operator guide still described the
default as `strict` with relaxed as opt-in, and never mentioned the new-bucket
seed or its `RUSTFS_NEW_BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE` knob. Document the behavior:

- intro notes new buckets default to `relaxed` (gradual migration; the
  process-wide default and pre-existing buckets stay `strict`);
- the Configuration block lists `RUSTFS_NEW_BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE`
  (relaxed|strict|none|inherit, default relaxed);
- a new "New-bucket default" subsection under per-bucket durability covers the
  seed semantics, the opt-out (`inherit` / `=strict`), fail-closed invalid
  values, and that existing buckets are never retroactively rewritten.

No code change.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 13:48:15 +08:00
houseme 6850482247 feat(ecstore): seed relaxed durability for new buckets (#5971) 2026-08-12 12:54:20 +08:00
houseme b00b7ab8f1 feat: add GET stream failure observability (#5967)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 03:32:17 +00:00
houseme 924958bab5 perf(get): slim metadata fanout allocations (#1803) (#5968)
Every GET fans out a `read_version` across all disks to resolve xl.meta. Each
fanout allocated an `Arc<ReadOptions>` (3 bools) plus four `Arc<String>`
(`Arc::new(x.to_string())` = two allocations each) and cloned them into every
spawned task. This trims the per-fanout allocation footprint.

- `ReadOptions` is three bools, so it is now `Copy`. The fanout drops the
  `Arc<ReadOptions>` and hands each spawned task a copy; the two pre-existing
  `ReadOptions::clone()` sites (set_disk/read.rs, set_disk/ops/heal.rs) stop
  cloning a `Copy` type.
- The four request strings use `Arc::<str>::from(&str)` (one allocation each)
  instead of `Arc::new(..to_string())` (string buffer + Arc = two each) — four
  fewer allocations per fanout, transparent to the `read_version(&str)` call.

Behavior is unchanged: the fanout still spawns one task per disk (the spawn is
deliberate — `read_version_call_counter_observes_spawned_fanout` verifies the
process-global counter observes every per-disk increment across workers), quorum
/ early-stop / full-wait semantics are untouched, and no result ordering or
error handling changed.

Two larger items from the audit are intentionally NOT in this PR:
- `tokio::spawn` -> `FuturesUnordered`: the spawn is a tested, deliberate
  design (cross-worker counter observation for #1309/#1314), and converting
  would also change panic isolation. Left as-is.
- `vec![FileInfo::default(); N]`: `FileInfo`'s empty containers (String /
  HashMap / Vec) do not allocate, so this is one `Vec` allocation, not the
  per-element allocation the audit implied — not a real hot spot.

`cargo fmt`, `cargo clippy -p rustfs-ecstore --lib` (0 warnings),
`cargo check --lib --tests`, and the 26 fanout / call-counter unit tests pass
on macOS (the change is fully cross-platform).

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 02:38:13 +00:00
houseme 968ec4a8be perf(get): enable inline direct-read by default + versioned buckets (#1802) (#5966)
A small object whose data shards are inlined in xl.meta can be reassembled
straight from the already-resolved metadata, skipping the Erasure reconstruct
pipeline. The fast path existed but was opt-in
(`RUSTFS_GET_SMALL_OBJECT_DIRECT_MEMORY`, default off), so every deployment
paid the full shard-read fan-out for eligible small GETs by default.

- Flip `DEFAULT_RUSTFS_GET_SMALL_OBJECT_DIRECT_MEMORY` to `true`. The path is
  correctness-neutral on a miss: `try_get_object_direct_data_shards_*` returns
  None when the inline reassembly cannot satisfy the read, and the GET then
  proceeds through the normal shard-read pipeline. The env stays as a kill
  switch (`=false` restores the legacy path).
- Drop the bucket-level `versioned` / `version_suspended` exclusions. The
  decision is made on `fi` — the already-resolved target version — so
  reassembling its inlined data is correct on a versioned bucket too. An
  explicit versionId GET still falls back (`opts.version_id`), and a
  delete-marker latest is still rejected. The two now-unused fallback reasons
  and their metric labels are removed.
- Tests updated: a versioned latest-version object is now eligible / `Use`
  (covers the newly allowed path); the removed reasons' label assertions are
  dropped.

cargo check --lib --tests and the direct_memory unit tests pass on macOS
(the change is fully cross-platform).

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 02:06:39 +00:00
houseme 8d34b4d101 perf(get): cache read descriptors in StdBackend (#1801) (#5965)
StdBackend opened, stat'd, and access-checked the shard file on every
positioned read, so each small-object GET paid N x (open + access + fstat)
syscalls even for hot shards. UringBackend already caches descriptors
behind a generation-guarded, rlimit-bounded moka cache with full
rename/delete/heal invalidation; StdBackend had no equivalent.

Port that cache to the default backend:

- StdBackend gains an `fd_cache: Option<FdCache>` (Linux only, mirroring
  UringBackend), built in `new()` behind `RUSTFS_LOCAL_FD_CACHE` (default
  on) and the same `rlimit_allows_fd_cache` guard.
- pread_bytes consults the cache on the buffered path: a hit reuses the
  descriptor via `dup` (one syscall, no path resolution or permission
  re-check) and skips volume access; a miss opens as before, snapshots the
  invalidation generation, and hands the freshly opened descriptor back
  for `insert_if_fresh`, which refuses to cache if a heal/delete bumped the
  generation mid-open (rustfs/backlog#1176). O_DIRECT reads keep opening
  their own aligned descriptors.
- The DirectReadCopy branch switches from seek+read_exact to
  `FileExt::read_exact_at`: a `dup`'d cached descriptor shares the source
  descriptor's open-file offset, so a positioned read (like the mmap path's
  offset argument) keeps concurrent cache hits on the same shard correct.
- The four `LocalIoBackend` invalidation methods now drop stale entries on
  StdBackend. LocalDisk already calls them on rename_data/rename_file/
  delete/delete_volume/close, so no new call sites are needed.
- Two tests mirror the io_uring ones: a heal rename must be hidden until
  invalidate_cached_fds_under runs, and a repeated read caches exactly one
  descriptor that prefix invalidation drops.

Behavior is byte-for-byte unchanged on a miss and on non-Linux; the cache
is auto-disabled only when RLIMIT_NOFILE is too low. macOS cargo check
--lib and --tests pass; Linux compile deferred to CI.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 01:38:07 +00:00
Zhengchao An 882ad4c113 fix: update s3s footprint baseline after table-catalog hardening (#5964) 2026-08-12 06:44:43 +08:00
GatewayJ e9728192e2 fix(select): enforce typed S3 Select error semantics (#5942)
* fix(select): enforce typed S3 Select error semantics

* fix(select): classify function argument planner errors

---------

Co-authored-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-11 23:59:38 +08:00
sass1997 a206a0779e fix(gateway): api flag https redirect (#5960)
* fix: add helm toggle to disable the http to https redirect

* docs: add documentation about new parameter
2026-08-11 21:30:38 +08:00
cxymds 6cce3d60bb fix(quota): reject oversized multipart completion (#5958)
* fix(quota): reject oversized multipart completion

* fix(arch): route quota test through app facade
2026-08-11 21:30:05 +08:00
cxymds 42433584ab perf(ecstore): bound strict inline commit syncs (#5931)
* perf(ecstore): bound strict inline commit syncs

* test(ecstore): fix admission assertion spelling

* fix(ecstore): address strict inline sync review

* test(ecstore): use io path for fsync hook

---------

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-11 21:05:27 +08:00
houseme ba6a0f25d9 perf(get): tune body stream buffers (#5959) 2026-08-11 20:48:03 +08:00
Henry Guo 5e3010c6b5 fix(table-catalog): harden commit publication (#5779)
* fix(table-catalog): harden commit publication

* fix(table-catalog): make commit replay deterministic

* test(table-catalog): cover denied commit object reads

* fix(table-catalog): guard ref commits and order publication locks

* fix(table-catalog): close commit publication race gaps

* fix(table-catalog): close publication review gaps

* fix(table-catalog): isolate blocked strong publications

* fix(table-catalog): scale and fence commit publication

* fix(table-catalog): close publication compatibility gaps

* fix(table-catalog): clarify compatibility cleanup marker

* fix(table-catalog): repair publication hardening checks

* fix(table-catalog): align commit tests with publication fences

* fix(table-catalog): bind authorization to request context

* refactor(table-catalog): reuse internal error mapping

* test(storage): install request context for tag conditions

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-11 19:36:46 +08:00
houseme bc888931fd fix(heal): quiet deferred replacement recovery logs (#5954)
Treat recovery-directory lookup on a replacement endpoint already deferred as replacement_path_unavailable as an expected debug diagnostic instead of a durable generation conflict.

Keep real survivor recovery conflicts and corrupt records on the existing warning/blocking path.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-11 09:35:06 +00:00
houseme 4ac7c56c89 test(heal): add privileged replacement rebuild e2e (#5918)
* test(heal): add privileged replacement rebuild e2e

Add ignored Linux-only 3x4 automatic replacement coverage for EC8+4 and EC6+6. The tests use real tmpfs mounts in an isolated mount namespace, wait for scanner-driven replacement recovery status, and verify the replacement target with per-version xl.meta and part.N physical census without invoking Admin deep heal.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(test): avoid unsafe in privileged replacement e2e

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): harden privileged replacement e2e

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): prove absent replacement recovery witness

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(e2e): prove absent replacement observation

Stop the target node before detaching the test mount so RustFS releases its mount lease instead of continuing to serve the old tmpfs through an open fd. Restart the node with the endpoint absent and wait for the scanner's real readiness rejection in that node's log.

Assert the absent window has no replacement intent, completion proof, checkpoint, healing marker, or Admin v4 durable record for the target before mounting the blank replacement and waiting for automatic recovery plus physical shard census.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(e2e): streamline cluster log capture

Move cluster-node log capture out of ClusterNode and into per-node cluster launch configuration so the privileged replacement E2E uses an explicit harness API instead of mutating node identity data.

Reuse the same stdout/stderr capture helper for single-node and cluster processes, and pin the per-node capture behavior with a focused common test.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(e2e): harden privileged replacement proof

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-11 16:31:32 +08:00
houseme ddacce6e75 perf(lock): bound distributed read lock fanout (#5952)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-11 08:21:04 +00:00
Zhengchao An 31cb720471 fix: exclude e2e_test from s3s footprint ratchet baseline (#5949) 2026-08-11 05:48:27 +00:00
唐小鸭 603bdea516 fix(site-replication): route state RMW through one locked transaction (#5882)
* test(site-replication): pin retry-event lost-update against locked RMW (red)

P1-15 (rustfs/backlog#1675 B2): the site-replication retry-event writers
(enqueue/dequeue, which hang off every hook broadcast path) perform a
load -> mutate -> persist without taking SITE_REPLICATION_STATE_LOCK, so
a single process can lose a concurrent lock-holding writer's update; the
service-side reload path is equally unlocked, and no writer holds a
distributed lock across the read-modify-write, so multi-node RMW loses
updates even where the process lock is held.

Red evidence (current main): replaying enqueue's exact three steps around
a completed mark_pending_rotation_peer_acked commit wipes the rotation
ack — the final state holds the retry event but not the ack.

* fix(site-replication): route state RMW through one locked transaction

P1-15 PR1 (rustfs/backlog#1675 B2). The site-replication state object
(config/site-replication/state.json, which also carries the retry-event
queue) was mutated through read-modify-write sequences with inconsistent
locking: the retry-event writers on every hook broadcast path and the
RPC-driven service reload took no lock at all (single-process lost
updates, pinned by the red commit), and no writer held a distributed lock
across the whole RMW (cross-node lost updates everywhere).

- New admin/site_replication_state module: the state transaction boundary
  `with_site_replication_state_lock[_on]` — process mutex plus the
  distributed config-object write lock (the pattern proven by the repair
  state), with the shared path constant. The process mutex is transitional
  until PR2 migrates the remaining ~26 call sites.
- handlers: typed `update_site_replication_state` (no-lock load /
  persist-or-clear inside the boundary; normalizes the peer map exactly
  once, retiring the double-clone/double-normalize persist path, P2-22).
  Migrated: retry-event enqueue (always-write), dequeue (lock-free probe,
  transaction on hit), mark_pending_rotation/remove_peer_acked.
- service reload: the tolerant byte-level read->normalize->save now runs
  inside the same boundary via no-lock IO — a cluster-wide reload fan-out
  can no longer overwrite a concurrent state writer. Normalization
  semantics untouched (all six service-side tests unchanged and green).
- Add/PeerJoin/Edit handlers release the state guard before their peer
  fan-out: the transport helpers' retry-event bookkeeping now re-enters
  the state transaction and must not nest inside the guard (the
  adversarial review caught this as a re-entrancy deadlock; the fix
  mirrors the Remove/Rotate handlers' existing scope). The Edit non-
  refresh branch commits before fanning out — the old fanout-first order
  recorded retry events pointing at a state the local site had not saved.
- ecstore: delete_config_no_lock (+ facade/bridge exports) so the clear
  half of persist-or-clear works under the held object lock.

Red -> green: the red commit pinned the deterministic lost-update
interleaving (stale retry-event persist wiping a committed rotation ack);
the test now drives the real functions concurrently for 8 rounds and
asserts every retry event and every ack survives. Full
handlers/service site-replication unit suites green (171 + 6); dual-node
site-replication e2e (state edit fresh/stale, object replication) green;
fmt / clippy / logging guardrails clean.

Adversarial review: one blocking finding (the re-entrancy deadlock above)
fixed and re-verified by a full second pass over all 30 lock sites and
the Add/Join/Edit call graphs. Non-blocking notes recorded for PR2:
mark_* now persists on miss (persist-or-clear semantics; a miss-skip
return is a cheap follow-up), Add still holds the guard across the peer
join probe (pre-existing availability debt), and a timeout-guarded
unreachable-peer regression test for the fan-out paths.

* fix(site-replication): keep the state mutex behind an owner helper

CI's architecture migration guard lists SITE_REPLICATION_STATE_LOCK as an
owner-local static, so it may not be `pub(crate)`. Keep it private to the
new module and let the not-yet-migrated RMW call sites take it through
`site_replication_state_process_guard()` — the sanctioned owner-helper
pattern; the helper disappears with the mutex in PR2.

* fix(site-replication): keep peer-edit delivery under the state guard

Review follow-up (#5882).

Releasing the guard before the fan-out (my deadlock fix) traded the
ordering the guard used to provide: edit A could commit and stall while
edit B committed and reached a peer first, then A arrived last and won.
The peer edit handler applies whatever arrives — it has no generation or
updated-at fence — and a successful stale delivery is not repaired by the
retry queue, so the sites diverge silently.

The fan-out is back under the guard. What actually could not run there is
the retry-event bookkeeping, which re-enters the state transaction, so the
edit branch now delivers with the plain transport and settles the retry
queue after the guard is released: successes dequeue, the first failure
enqueues and is returned. Ordering and bookkeeping both preserved. The add
handler keeps its peer-edit finalize fan-out under the guard for the same
reason and releases only before bootstrap/back-fill, which send bucket-ops
(not peer edits) through retry-event transports.

The concurrency test could not tell the two guards apart — both writers
took both locks, so it passed with either removed. Replaced by two tests
that isolate one guard each, both verified by mutation:

- a process-only legacy writer (the shape the not-yet-migrated call sites
  still use) racing the transaction: fails when the transaction stops
  taking the process mutex;
- two writers that bypass the process mutex, as separate nodes do, driving
  the production object-lock path (`with_site_replication_state_object_lock`
  factored out for exactly this): fails when the distributed lock is
  removed.

Verification: handlers 173 + service 6 unit tests green; site-replication
dual-node and three-node edit e2e green; arch/layer/logging guardrails,
fmt and clippy clean.

* fix(site-replication): fence peer-edit delivery by generation

Review follow-up on the two remaining holes in the edit path.

Ordering was only process-local. `SITE_REPLICATION_STATE_LOCK` is per
node, so holding it across the fan-out orders the edits ONE node accepts
and nothing else: two nodes of the same site can both commit and reach a
peer in the opposite order, and the peer edit handler applied whatever
arrived last. Each edit now takes a generation from
`SiteReplicationState::edit_generation`, allocated in the same commit as
the edit itself — i.e. under the distributed state-object lock, so two
nodes can never share one. The generation rides the peer-edit request as
query parameters and the receiver rejects (acks without applying) a
delivery at or below the mark it already applied for that origin site,
recording the mark in the same commit as the edit it fences. Peers that
predate the fence send no parameters and are applied as before.

Retry settlement could discard a newer failure. After the guard is
released, a success for edit A removed every retry event for
(peer, peer-edit): if edit B committed, failed its own delivery and
enqueued while A was in flight, A erased it — local state B, peer on A,
nothing queued to converge them. Settlement now only removes events whose
recorded generation is not newer than the one being settled, and a later
failure never lowers the fence. Broadcast paths carry no generation and
settle unconditionally as before; their events live under their own
paths and cannot collide with a peer-edit delivery.

A departed peer's mark is dropped on load: a site that leaves drops below
two peers, which clears its state object and restarts its counter at
zero, so a leftover mark would reject every edit it sends after it
rejoins.

Tests: two-node generation uniqueness (drop the object lock and the two
nodes collide), the receiver's staleness predicate and its wiring, the
settlement interleaving (drop the fence and B's retry is erased), and the
rejoin reset.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1675 (P1-15)
2026-08-11 13:41:28 +08:00
唐小鸭 a076ae4045 test(replication): pin the scanner existing-object compensation matrix (#5877)
P1-20 (rustfs/backlog#1675 B2, test-only). No prior test wrote objects
BEFORE the replication rule arrived, leaving the scanner's existing-object
resync pass — the only channel for such objects — without end-to-end
coverage, and the enqueue truth table partially unpinned at unit level.

e2e (both negative cells are contracts, asserted over multiple fast-scanner
cycles next to a replicated control key that proves the scanner and the
live path are running):
- test_scanner_compensates_existing_objects_across_write_paths: plain PUT,
  CopyObject and Snowball auto-extract products written pre-rule all
  converge via scanner compensation; a null-version object (PUT before the
  bucket became versioned) is pinned as never compensated (the scanner heal
  gate skips nil-version objects).
- test_scanner_never_compensates_when_existing_object_replication_disabled:
  ExistingObjectReplication=Disabled is a contract, not a delay — existing
  keys stay absent while post-rule writes replicate normally.

Unit truth-table pins (crates/replication):
- queue.rs: an empty replicate decision (Disabled existing-object, inbound
  REPLICA) skips heal queueing for every status; Completed without a resync
  decision skips.
- operation.rs: existing-object resync without a reset replicates exactly
  the never-replicated (Empty) objects.

Helper: put_bucket_replication_with_statuses parameterizes the previously
hardcoded ExistingObjectReplication status; the nextest count comments are
refreshed to the post-rebase totals.
2026-08-11 03:58:25 +00:00
houseme 8a8be12f0b perf(ecstore): raise replay cache auto capacity (#5946)
Increase the replay cache resource model so 16 CPU / 31-32 GiB field nodes auto-size to the 32M cap without an env override.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-11 11:37:58 +08:00
唐小鸭 2ecf6b4575 fix(replication): probe the version-identity contract in replication-check (#5881)
* test(replication): pin the version-fidelity probe contract (red)

P1-19 (rustfs/backlog#1675 B2): the supported replication contract is
targets that adopt the source version id — a target that mints its own ids
silently breaks every version-addressed operation that follows (version
deletes, heal re-drives never match), diverging the two sides with no
signal. replication-check already captures the probe PUT's response version
id but never compares it.

Red evidence (current main): against a FakeS3Target with
assign_own_version_ids enabled, ?replication-check returns Status "OK" —
the drift is invisible.

test_replication_check_flags_version_minting_target expects a
VersionFidelity phase that fails with the machine-readable code
BucketRemoteTargetVersionMismatch, skips the later mutation phases, and
still cleans up the probe via the version id the target actually assigned.

Test infra: FakeS3Target gains assign_own_version_ids (models a generic S3
service; validated-but-not-mirrored source version headers) and a
prefix+max-keys ListObjectVersions implementation (the probe key allocation
requires it); stored_versions accessor duplicated from the P1-21 branch
(identical code, resolves clean on merge).

* fix(replication): probe the version-identity contract in replication-check

P1-19 (rustfs/backlog#1675 B2, plan B). Replication only converges on
targets that adopt the source version id: version-addressed deletes and
heal re-drives address the source id, so a target that mints its own ids
silently diverges — nothing surfaced this. replication-check already
captured the probe PUT's response version id but never compared it.

- The probe PUT now carries the source version as `?versionId=` (the exact
  shape live replication uses since P0-5, and the only shape MinIO
  consumes; the internal source-version-id header alone would let the
  probe pass against targets the real data path drifts on). Reuses
  ecstore's append_version_id_query through the api facade.
- New VersionFidelity phase: the probe PUT's response version id must
  equal the sent source id. On mismatch the phase fails with the
  machine-readable extension key `"Code": "BucketRemoteTargetVersionMismatch"`
  (new optional Code field on phase statuses; Go decoders ignore unknown
  keys), the overall target fails, the later version-addressed mutation
  phases are skipped, and cleanup still removes the probe via the id the
  target actually assigned (with the existing list-based sweep as backstop
  when the target returns no version id at all).
- Runtime half: TargetClient::put_object now returns the assigned version
  id (mirroring remove_object), and the replication PUT path audits it —
  every drifting PUT increments
  rustfs_replication_version_identity_drift_total and the first drift per
  target ARN logs a structured warning pointing at ?replication-check.
  The drift judgment is a pure function with an exemption-matrix test
  (empty / literal "null" / nil-uuid sources carry no contract).
- docs/operations/replication-check.md documents the phase and the code.

Red -> green: test_replication_check_flags_version_minting_target (fake
target with assign_own_version_ids; on main the check reported Status
"OK"). The probe's query shape is pinned by a journal assertion (revert
of the query hunk alone fails it), probe-level unit tests cover the
mismatch/mirror matrix including cleanup addressing the minted id, and
the existing success e2e now asserts VersionFidelity OK against a RustFS
target. Adversarial review (seven roles): non-blocking; noted follow-ups
are the multipart runtime audit (the probe phase already pins the
contract) and per-target re-warning after reconfiguration.

* fix(e2e): stop the fake target self-deadlocking on version-id minting

The assign_own_version_ids flag was read with a fresh `lock(&self.store)`
inside two paths that already hold that guard — delete_object's
marker-creation branch and create_multipart_upload — and the store mutex
is not reentrant, so both hung forever (CI: the fake target's own
multipart and delete-marker tests ran >1560s until the job was
cancelled). Read the flag from the live guard instead.

The replication e2e paths did not catch this: a version-addressed purge
DELETE never mints an id, and the probe PUT reads the flag before taking
the guard.

* chore(test): refresh the nextest replication count invariant

The e2e-smoke/e2e-repl-nightly split comment is descriptive metadata
(authority: `cargo nextest list`); refresh it to this branch's
post-rebase total.
2026-08-11 03:04:05 +00:00
cxymds 2aa0148454 fix: report stalled object traffic as unready (#5936)
* fix: report stalled object traffic as unready

* fix: track fully received PUT storage progress
2026-08-11 10:55:22 +08:00
Xiaoyang Han 3289d40ce9 fix(ecstore): publish multipart parts on Windows (#5937)
* fix(ecstore): publish multipart parts on Windows

* test(ecstore): pin Windows multipart durability

---------

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-11 10:01:03 +08:00
cxymds 849837e262 fix(rpc): negotiate replay-safe mutation authentication (#5928)
* fix(rpc): negotiate replay-safe mutation auth

* fix(rpc): preserve strict legacy replay scope
2026-08-11 01:03:25 +00:00
Henry Guo 727a10e111 fix(scanner): skip disk inventory in scan spans (#5933)
Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-11 09:01:51 +08:00
houseme 3747d19ce5 perf(ecstore): hedge bounded GET metadata fanout (#5935)
Keep opt-in bounded GET data-read fanout from waiting on a single pending ReadVersion response when an unscheduled spare disk can satisfy quorum. Add a deterministic 2+2 regression that pauses the third scheduled metadata read and verifies the spare is started before returning.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 17:11:04 +00:00
houseme 1148e76279 test(ecstore): update prepared GET fanout default (#5932)
Assert the prepared GET metadata path keeps the default full data-read fanout after PR #5929 made bounded data-read fanout opt-in.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 15:38:37 +00:00
唐小鸭 320b788a50 test(admin): relax object-lambda SNI test timeout under full-suite load (#5923)
The SNI preservation test is the only object-lambda test doing a real
TLS handshake; the shared helper's 2s whole-request timeout turns
concurrent fsync-heavy TestECStoreEnv neighbors into a deterministic
TimedOut when the per-build nextest schedule overlaps them. The test
verifies SNI, not latency, so widen its budget to a still-bounded 30s.
2026-08-10 22:20:34 +08:00
唐小鸭 3c31eaf06f fix(replication): retry, persist and replay failed delete-marker purges (#5864)
* test(replication): pin delayed delete-marker purge failure handling (red)

P1-21 (rustfs/backlog#1675 B2): two failing e2e tests that pin the missing
failure handling of the delayed delete-marker purge:

- test_delayed_delete_marker_purge_retries_after_transient_target_failure:
  four scripted 503s outlast every existing channel (version-purge
  replication + its in-process MRF fast retries + the watcher's single
  attempt = 3 target DELETEs, all faulted in the recorded run); the
  replicated marker is stranded on the target forever.
- test_delayed_delete_marker_purge_exhaustion_persists_to_mrf_and_replays_on_restart:
  exhausted purge intents never reach the durable MRF journal, so a restart
  replays nothing (recorded run: 3 faulted attempts, zero post-restart).

Red-light evidence (current main):
- Test A: FAILED, journal shows 3x DeleteObject fault=Status(503), no clean
  attempt, target marker still present after 15s.
- Test B: FAILED after 468s, same 3 faulted attempts, no purge DELETE after
  restart, marker still present.

Test infra: FakeS3Target::stored_versions() exposes per-key version state so
purge tests assert target state instead of inferring it from the journal;
nextest count comments 36->38 nightly / 56->58 total.

* fix(replication): retry, persist and replay failed delete-marker purges

P1-21 (rustfs/backlog#1675 B2). The delayed delete-marker purge was
fire-and-forget: the target DELETE discarded its result (`let _ =`), a
missing target client was silently skipped, and nothing recorded the intent
— one transient target error stranded the replicated marker on the target
forever. Separately, `replicate_delete_with_outcome` held its outcome
hostage to `!requires_delayed_purge`, pinning every delete-marker MRF entry
to Missed so the durable backlog retained them permanently.

Changes:
- `replicate_delete_marker_purge_to_targets` now reports per-target
  results (warn + metrics on failure, including `target_client_missing`),
  supports retrying only the failed targets, and treats a target-side
  NoSuchKey/NoSuchVersion as purge success (strict-404 targets must not
  retain the intent forever).
- The delayed watcher (`watch_and_purge_source_delete_marker`) retries
  failed targets across its 5x1s watch window; on exhaustion it persists
  the purge intent to the durable MRF journal via the new
  `ReplicationPoolTrait::persist_mrf_entry` (journal-only on purpose: live
  re-dispatch would loop unboundedly against a down target). Intent entries
  are shaped as marker-creation deletes so replay funnels into the stale-
  marker branch.
- The stale-marker branch (source marker already gone) now purges the
  targets instead of silently returning success — closing a latent leak —
  and reports the purge result as the replay outcome. Heal callers retry
  for the full window (the startup MRF processor runs before target
  clients initialize); live callers attempt once and fall back to a fresh
  durable intent, so a down target cannot pin a replication worker.
- The outcome formula (extracted as `replicate_delete_outcome` and pinned
  by a unit test) no longer includes the delayed purge, so successfully
  replayed delete-marker entries are acknowledged instead of retained
  forever.

Verification: red -> green e2e pair (transient-failure retry; exhaustion ->
durable MRF -> restart replay -> second-restart zero-replay ack) plus unit
tests; `make pre-commit`, logging guardrails, clippy (ecstore + e2e_test)
all clean; full ecstore lib suite 3729 passed (3 pre-existing local-DNS
kubernetes endpoint failures reproduce without this change).

Adversarial validation (7 roles): no blocking findings after adding the
outcome-formula guard test. Known residuals recorded in the PR: watcher
shutdown window (intent not yet persisted), rolling-downgrade replay acks
without purging (equals pre-fix behavior), and replay falling back to the
source version id on targets that mint their own version ids (P1-19).

* chore(test): refresh the nextest replication count invariant

The e2e-smoke/e2e-repl-nightly split comment is descriptive metadata
(authority: `cargo nextest list`); refresh it to this branch's
post-rebase total.

* fix(replication): purge the marker version the target actually assigned

Review follow-up (#5864), two real defects:

- The delayed purge watcher was spawned with the pre-merge `dobj`, so the
  per-target marker version ids this round recorded were invisible to it.
  Against a target that mints its own ids the purge fell back to a
  source-derived id, the target answered the versioned DELETE with an
  idempotent 204, and that "success" cleared the retry set while the real
  marker stayed behind. The watcher now receives the merged replication
  state (`drs`), which folds this round's target-assigned ids in.
- A target whose recorded version metadata is inconsistent was skipped
  without entering `failed_arns`, so an empty result made both the watcher
  and the MRF replay treat a purge that issued no DELETE as successful and
  drop the intent. The refusal is now a per-target failure (own metric
  label): the leak stays visible and the intent is retained instead of
  being acknowledged. The version decision also moved ahead of the client
  lookup, so the refusal is decided from metadata alone.

Tests: a new e2e drives a fake target with `assign_own_version_ids`, which
ignores the forwarded source-version header for both objects and delete
markers, and asserts the replicated marker is really gone; a unit test
pins the corrupt-metadata refusal as a failed outcome without any target
client registered. The detached-watcher shutdown window is documented at
the watcher as a known non-durable window with the write-ahead follow-up
spelled out.
2026-08-10 22:16:21 +08:00
houseme fe2516ee86 perf(ecstore): keep bounded GET fanout opt-in (#5929)
Keep GET data-read metadata early-stop and bounded fanout behind explicit environment switches so the default path preserves full fanout read-failure tolerance.

Retain the focused opt-in A/B coverage and the invalid parity full-fanout guard for heterogeneous set layouts.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 22:15:34 +08:00
cxymds 7ca69eb39c fix: correct SNSD cluster diagnostics (#5930) 2026-08-10 20:32:01 +08:00
hector 95627cb601 fix: create config file before fpm RPM packaging (#5924)
The RPM build step fails because fpm's --config-files flag requires
/etc/default/rustfs to exist in the staging area, but unlike the DEB
build (which creates it in its package directory structure), the fpm
command has no prior step creating this file.

Create the config file in a temporary directory and pass it to fpm
via a source=dest mapping, matching the DEB build's behavior.
2026-08-10 08:15:15 +00:00
houseme d97e059c3c fix(iam): merge OIDC extra root CAs (#5915)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 15:24:52 +08:00
houseme d900e11a09 perf(ecstore): expose replay cache RPC sources (#5926)
Track accepted replay cache records by gRPC operation and split Lock/Unlock and ReadVersion methods out of grpc_other so hotpath validation can attribute nonce pressure without changing replay protection semantics.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 15:13:27 +08:00
houseme f1ff9a36bc test(heal): cover replacement terminal recovery (#5920)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 14:51:26 +08:00
houseme 276eea1fba test(heal): cover replacement target evidence failures (#5919)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 14:50:55 +08:00
houseme 88e285c523 perf(ecstore): gate bounded GET metadata fanout (#5917)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 05:20:21 +00:00
houseme 785ee719e7 feat(heal): aggregate replacement recovery status (#5916)
Add a replacement recovery peer RPC so Admin v4 can distinguish definitive cluster proofs from unsupported, unavailable, or conflicting peer state without extending the existing background heal v3/v1 status protocol.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 05:03:27 +00:00
Zhengchao An a8c15e90ec docs(agents): tighten production code growth rules (#5907) 2026-08-10 11:12:52 +08:00
hector 63b564d064 fix: prevent tilde expansion in DEB version substitution (#5913)
The DEB version substitution used ${VERSION/-/~} which caused bash
to expand ~ to $HOME (e.g. /home/runner), producing an invalid
version string like '1.0.0/home/runnerrc.1'.

Store ~ in a variable first to prevent tilde expansion.
2026-08-10 11:11:49 +08:00
GatewayJ d51191f81b build(deps): use RustFS s3s fork (#5901)
* build(deps): use RustFS s3s fork

* ci: allow RustFS s3s source

---------

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 02:45:49 +00:00
houseme 1aeb84dd6b feat(heal): expose replacement recovery status (#5912)
Add a v4 admin status endpoint for local durable automatic replacement recovery records without changing the v3 background heal status or peer v1 payloads.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 01:48:18 +00:00
houseme f17ea7f146 fix(heal): harden replacement rebuild tracking (#5892)
* fix(heal): gate auto replacement formatting

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): require replacement target outcomes

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): bind resumes to replacement targets

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): fence healing marker ownership

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): cover replacement target completion

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* docs(heal): clarify replacement recovery status

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): canonicalize replacement target checks

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): satisfy marker test module lint

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): scope automatic replacement format

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): require a mounted replacement target

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): avoid cloned ref slice in test

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): revalidate replacement before scanning

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): reset stale resume checkpoints

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): release scanner disk map before probing

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): persist replacement intent before format

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): fail closed on mountinfo read errors

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): fence replacement target identity

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): order replacement completion cleanup

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): atomically seal replacement completion

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): census replacement target shards

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): fence replacement recovery ownership

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): preserve replacement recovery anchors

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): satisfy replacement recovery lint gates

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): bind replacement identity to mount lease

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): cover durable replacement recovery states

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): validate persisted resume task identifiers

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): avoid blocking replacement marker CAS

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): report failed marker rollback

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): pin replacement resume schema compatibility

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): preserve durable recovery anchors

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): preserve public disk path semantics

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): use canonical replacement task ids

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): cover automatic replacement in 3x4 cluster

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): verify replacement target commits

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): persist replacement completion proof

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(heal): expose durable replacement status

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): bound durable replacement discovery

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): remove replacement readiness bypass

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): retry terminal replacement cleanup

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): isolate replacement intents from legacy resume

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): migrate legacy replacement intents at startup

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* style(heal): apply strict clippy fix

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): prioritize active replacement recovery state

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): bind readiness to the admitted mount lease

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): atomically publish replacement intents

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): isolate replacement recovery directory

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): tolerate an empty recovery directory

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* style(heal): remove redundant disk bytes conversion

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): reconcile proof-first replacement recovery

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): fence torn intent recovery

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): cover replacement migration conflicts

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): fence replacement lease mount identity

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): cover missing replacement path admission

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): reject conflicting legacy completion proof

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): fall back to proc mount identity

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(admin): expose replacement recovery status

Surface the local durable replacement recovery snapshot in the background heal status response so operators can tell whether replacement cleanup is definitive or still pending.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): keep replacement status compatible

Keep the existing background heal status response wire-compatible while retaining the Linux mount lease cleanup needed for the replacement recovery branch.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* style(ecstore): match linux mount lease formatting

Keep Linux rustfmt output stable for the replacement mount lease comparison.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): qualify mount lease test constant

Use the disk module path for the format config constant in the Linux mount lease regression test.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): keep procfd mount roots directory-safe

Use a procfd path with an explicit directory component so Unix directory guards can open the replacement mount lease root with O_NOFOLLOW while preserving handle-relative I/O semantics.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): delete empty leased buckets via dirfd

Use the held mount lease fd as the parent for non-force empty bucket deletion on Linux so procfd-rooted paths do not get rejected as BucketNotEmpty. Also make the download-part OpenOptions truncate behavior explicit and keep fsync test recording stable across procfd canonicalization.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): scan leased bucket paths for emptiness

Use the local disk I/O root for bucket emptiness probes before non-force bucket deletion and table-bucket metadata checks. This keeps validation on the same mount instance as the subsequent local disk delete path.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(ecstore): align lease path test probes

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): block unsafe replacement recovery restarts

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): defer blocked replacement candidates

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): retry transient replacement discovery

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): keep transient recovery errors retryable

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): block corrupt legacy replacement state

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): classify flat replacement intent corruption

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): keep transient resume loads retryable

Classify malformed legacy replacement state as blocking corruption while preserving disk and transient load failures for retry. This avoids permanently blocking replacement recovery on temporary storage errors.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): avoid latching transient legacy publishes

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): retry blocked legacy migrations

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): defer blocked startup recoveries

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): preserve disk sync limiter across lease roots

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 08:32:47 +08:00
houseme 10a1d6b6e6 perf(get): avoid zeroing response body chunks (#5905)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 06:43:35 +08:00
Zhengchao An be0cea83b7 test(ecstore): pin persisted metadata key literals and bucket config goldens (#5904) 2026-08-09 22:12:26 +00:00
houseme b4b891afad fix(ecstore): raise replay cache auto headroom (#5902)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 18:34:27 +00:00
唐小鸭 88756ea8e1 test(ecstore): decouple kubernetes endpoint tests from kernel hostname (#5900)
Three Kubernetes endpoint-identity tests read the real kernel hostname
and panicked when it is an IP literal (e.g. macOS without a static
HostName, where DHCP/reverse-DNS sets the kernel hostname to an address
like 192.168.1.11).

Add a cfg(test) override seam (force_kernel_hostname_for_test, mirroring
the existing force_local_host_resolution_timeout_for_test pattern) and
route the production read through kernel_hostname_for_endpoint_identity()
so the tests inject deterministic hostnames instead of depending on the
host environment. Production behavior is unchanged.
2026-08-09 17:05:18 +00:00
唐小鸭 6333f21a2e feat(replication): SSE-C ciphertext passthrough replication (#5898)
Complete the encrypted-object replication series (backlog#1783, PR-C of
3, after #5872 and #5885): SSE-C objects replicate as ciphertext
passthrough — the source holds no customer key, so the stored bytes and
their encryption metadata travel verbatim and the replica decrypts only
with the original customer key, single-part and multipart.

- Sender: SSE-C objects read raw (raw_data_movement_read), transfer at
  ciphertext size, and range multipart parts over stored part sizes.
- Receiver: authorized replication PUTs restore the stored SSE-C keys
  from the transport headers (exact lowercase forms - the read-path
  check is case-sensitive), set ObjectOptions.preserve_ciphertext, and
  skip compression, bucket-default SSE, and sse_encryption behind one
  restore-derived gate. Multipart uses an internal session marker to
  store parts verbatim and strips it on complete.
- Convergence: the replication HEAD sends
  x-rustfs-source-replication-check; the target authorizes it as
  ReplicateObjectAction and skips SSE-C read validation for that
  request only, so keyless convergence HEADs see etag/size/mtime
  instead of 400 and SSE-C replicas stop re-driving forever.
- e2e: SSE-C contract flips to a key-gated readable replica (no-key and
  wrong-key GETs fail - the direct silent-plaintext detector); new
  multipart passthrough contract with ETag/marker/stability assertions.
2026-08-09 23:53:04 +08:00
Henry Guo 942faefb25 fix(ecstore): anchor Windows rename publication (#5677)
* fix(ecstore): anchor Windows rename publication

* fix(ecstore): complete Windows rename confinement

* test(ecstore): retain Windows retry assertion path

* fix(ecstore): accept configured Windows root paths

* fix(ecstore): size Windows rename buffers correctly

* fix(ecstore): use native relative rename on Windows

* fix(ecstore): preserve Windows rename parent guards

* fix(ecstore): reuse guarded Windows rename trees

* fix(ecstore): compile Windows publication helpers

* fix(ecstore): preserve configured Windows disk roots

* fix(ecstore): flush Windows shards with write access

* fix(ecstore): stage Windows rollback backup replacement

* fix(ecstore): defer Windows staged file cleanup

* fix(ecstore): type Windows staged write result

* fix(ecstore): retry Windows sharing violations

* fix(ecstore): share Windows staged deletes

* fix(ecstore): split Windows staged publication handles

* fix(ecstore): close Windows staged writer before rename

* fix(ecstore): share Windows staged publication deletes

* fix(ecstore): allow guarded Windows child publication

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 22:56:37 +08:00
houseme 08de165358 perf(get): reduce response body chunk overhead (#5897) 2026-08-09 22:36:39 +08:00
Zhengchao An 1e6f5f1e35 test: promote passing S3 compatibility cases (#5895)
test: promote passing s3 compatibility cases
2026-08-09 21:58:17 +08:00
Zhengchao An 5513dc75ee docs: update security advisory lessons (#5896) 2026-08-09 21:57:56 +08:00
Ramakrishna Chilaka d7f014cf5f fix(docker): support TZ environment variable (#5891)
Install tzdata in both published runtime variants and verify IANA timezone resolution during image builds.

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-09 21:54:59 +08:00
cxymds 8f9633ee83 fix(rpc): negotiate authenticated file writes (#5880)
* fix(rpc): negotiate authenticated file writes

* fix(rpc): share capability probe failures

* test(rpc): cover dedicated capability route

* fix(rpc): satisfy capability cache lints

* fix(rpc): retry timed out capability probes

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 21:19:47 +08:00
cxymds 1be636b914 fix(replication): make resync recovery resilient (#5883)
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 19:42:06 +08:00
houseme ec7f5f7b7d perf(http): reduce tracing/logging hotpath overhead (#5893)
perf(http): reduce disabled tracing overhead

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 11:35:55 +00:00
唐小鸭 73e4ef4dd4 feat(replication): replicate managed-SSE objects via target re-encryption (#5885)
Open the managed-SSE replication gate (backlog#1783, PR-B of 3, after
#5872): the replication reader already decrypts through the injected
object-encryption resolver, so the source sends plaintext plus an
encryption intent header (AES256 / aws:kms, never the source key id) and
the target re-encrypts on its normal PUT path with its own KMS. No DEK
crosses sites.

- replication_put_object_options: fail closed only on Unsupported;
  insert the SSE intent after the strip loop.
- TargetClient::create_multipart_upload sends the full opts.header()
  set, fixing multipart replicas losing content-type/user metadata
  (plaintext included).
- Preserve source ETag and mtime on replicas (authorized replication
  only): receiver wires x-rustfs-source-etag into preserve_etag for PUT
  and CompleteMultipartUpload, resolve_complete_etag consumes it, and
  complete options carry source_etag/source_mtime (absent mtime
  degrades to epoch, not now_utc). Without this every replication HEAD
  comparison re-drives re-encrypted objects forever.
- e2e: managed SSE contracts flip to success on an independent-KMS
  dual-process pair (byte-identical plain GET proves target-owned
  envelopes; ETag/mtime preserved; version stable across scanner
  cycles; resync converges; multipart keeps structure and metadata);
  new target-without-KMS fail-closed contract; SSE-C stays FAILED.

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 10:21:35 +00:00
houseme a71726ef49 perf(get): reduce response write allocations (#5890)
Avoid cloning cache-served GET bodies, preserve downstream vectored writes through the GET close-detection wrapper, and remove per-stripe EC decode sidecar allocations.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 08:58:41 +00:00
houseme 27ecdb88b1 fix(admin): allow owner service account updates (#5889)
* fix(admin): allow owner service account updates

* test(admin): cover console admin update scope

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: ccccpj <ccccpj@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 08:46:27 +00:00
houseme 2c7d0fb2ce feat: add hotpath observability for S3 data paths (#5860) 2026-08-09 08:36:58 +00:00
houseme f72ad77aa4 fix(ecstore): use existing two-set test fixture (#5887)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 07:59:02 +00:00
Zhengchao An 255f3395bc fix(ecstore): rename stale two_set_test_sets references to make_local_two_set_sets (#5886) 2026-08-09 07:56:51 +00:00
Zhengchao An a07ad4a9ff test(replication): cover rule id byte limit (#5873) 2026-08-09 14:48:44 +08:00
唐小鸭 c619d8f2d6 fix(replication): persist REPLICA status on inbound replication writes (#5878) 2026-08-09 14:10:34 +08:00
Zhengchao An 6ce0961780 fix(policy): accept object lock mode condition (#5874) 2026-08-09 14:10:25 +08:00
terem42 578d02977e fix(heal): log the number of drives actually healed, not the drives consulted (#5871) 2026-08-09 14:10:11 +08:00
唐小鸭 eb377209c1 docs(ci): make e2e-replication-nightly test-count comments drift-resistant (#5866) 2026-08-09 14:09:44 +08:00
terem42 9c1c44807d fix(admin): answer background-heal/status partially when peers are unreachable (#5862) 2026-08-09 14:09:34 +08:00
GatewayJ 70deb3284b fix(select): pin object snapshot for query lifetime (#5835) 2026-08-09 14:08:53 +08:00
houseme b9d1ca3e4d chore(deps): update flake.lock (#5884) 2026-08-09 14:07:33 +08:00
cxymds 0cb9952aa0 fix(rpc): make authenticated file writes atomic (#5879) 2026-08-09 12:26:09 +08:00
cxymds 47369ff027 fix(heal): defer scoped repair on suspended pools (#5876) 2026-08-09 11:50:17 +08:00
唐小鸭 10c7476883 fix(replication): rebuild SSE metadata boundary for encrypted objects (#5872)
Groundwork for encrypted-object replication (backlog#1783, PR-A of 3):

- classify_replication_source_encryption: accept the AES256 marker that
  every stored SSE-C object carries; the SseC arm was unreachable.
- Fail closed on sealed material without an SSE marker (MinIO-written
  objects) instead of replicating ciphertext as plaintext.
- Replace the dead VALID_SSE_REPLICATION_HEADERS table with a transport
  map keyed by the metadata keys the SSE writer actually persists, shared
  via the new rustfs_utils::http::object_encryption_keys module.
- Structurally strip all encryption metadata from outbound replication
  (x-rustfs-encryption-* envelopes previously passed the filters).
- Skip decrypt_checksums for encrypted objects at the boundary so its
  is_multipart=false (a response-path contract) cannot misroute
  encrypted multipart objects once managed replication opens.
- Redact X-Rustfs-Replication-* SSE transport values in FileInfo Debug.

A reconciliation test pins that every key encryption_material_to_metadata
produces is either transport-mapped or stripped. All four SSE replication
e2e contracts still assert FAILED unchanged.
2026-08-09 03:05:11 +00:00
Heracles 9996d567d9 fix(build): support non-Linux Unix targets (illumos/Solaris/*BSD) (#5853)
* fix(build): support non-Linux Unix targets (illumos/Solaris/*BSD)

Two independent build-infrastructure blockers kept RustFS from building on
non-Linux Unix platforms. Neither touches runtime logic.

1. pulsar regenerates its protobuf bindings in build.rs on every build, which
   needs `protoc`. Platforms without a packaged protoc (illumos/Solaris/*BSD)
   now enable pulsar's `protobuf-src` feature via a cfg-gated dependency, which
   builds a vendored protoc from C++ sources. Mainstream targets keep the lean
   dependency and their existing system/CI protoc.

2. clocksource 0.8.3 (pulled in transitively by ratelimit 0.10) used the
   Linux-only `CLOCK_MONOTONIC_COARSE`. ratelimit 2.0 dropped the clocksource
   dependency entirely, so upgrading removes the portability problem at the
   root rather than patching clocksource. The bandwidth throttle's bulk
   `consume()` is rewritten onto ratelimit 2.0's `try_wait_n`, preserving the
   best-effort partial-consumption semantics.

Verified: cargo check + bandwidth monitor unit tests pass; cargo tree confirms
protobuf-src is enabled only for illumos/Solaris/*BSD and clocksource is gone
from the graph. The final illumos build must be confirmed on-platform.

Closes #3195

* fix(ecstore): guard ratelimit v2 capacity overflow

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(ecstore): avoid slow bandwidth reader timeout

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(targets): drop vendored pulsar protobuf build

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 10:07:00 +08:00
houseme 6106cd3772 chore(hotpath): add samply symbol summary tools (#5875)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 09:25:29 +08:00
cxymds 3b9c67e79b fix(rpc): authenticate internode put file bodies (#5868) 2026-08-09 08:05:16 +08:00
cxymds d36166ffb5 fix(ecstore): bound decommission listing retries (#5861) 2026-08-09 08:05:12 +08:00
cxymds 963a107b33 fix(ecstore): fence bucket memo on live lock loss (#5852) 2026-08-09 08:00:46 +08:00
cxymds 02b4e082e8 fix(get): pin resume reads to resolved version (#5859) 2026-08-09 07:48:51 +08:00
cxymds b4133d69e6 fix(heal): respect scoped object repair limits (#5855) 2026-08-09 07:23:16 +08:00
houseme 134081b27b chore(deps): fix cargo shear dependency metadata (#5854)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 15:52:00 +00:00
houseme 7217cccc91 fix: isolate ssh stdin in hotpath artifact collection (#5851)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 15:09:39 +00:00
houseme dafc922e72 chore: harden hotpath profiling artifact collection (#5848)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 13:32:29 +00:00
houseme 6fcf0d250e fix(admin): return upgrade-required for v4 fallback (#5847)
Return HTTP 426 for unmatched admin v4 routes so madmin-go v4 can downgrade to RustFS admin v3 handlers.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 21:26:33 +08:00
cxymds 65e55c0f8e fix(rebalance): fence batch delete source pools (#5846) 2026-08-08 21:14:26 +08:00
cxymds 8c75a3834a fix(rebalance): fence writer pool lookups (#5845) 2026-08-08 21:14:11 +08:00
houseme f96346124e fix(multipart): recover part transactions by write quorum (#5844)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 20:22:51 +08:00
cxymds a7de957eb8 fix(rebalance): fence peers before activation (#5842) 2026-08-08 11:55:50 +00:00
houseme c2e23411e8 test(filemeta): cover crc heal classification (#5841)
* fix(filemeta): classify xl.meta CRC mismatch as FileCorrupt so heal repairs it

A failed CRC means the metadata bytes on disk are not the bytes that were
written — bitrot. Raising it as Error::other() surfaces a generic Io error,
which should_heal_object_on_disk does not recognise as heal-worthy: the drive
is skipped, disks_to_heal_count stays 0, heal_object returns ok, and the
corrupted xl.meta is never rewritten — while the scanner re-submits the same
no-op heal every deep-scan cycle. An explicit admin deep heal fails the same
way, so no heal path repairs metadata bitrot, and every one of them reports
success.

check_xl2_v1 already classifies a short or wrong-magic header as FileCorrupt
for exactly this reason (#5716); this completes the pattern for the two CRC
sites. The existing From<rustfs_filemeta::Error> for DiskError conversion maps
the variant to DiskError::FileCorrupt, which the heal path already handles.
The previously silent is_indexed_meta site now logs the mismatch (structured
event shape) like unmarshal_msg does.

Regression test: corrupt one byte of a marshalled FileMeta and assert
unmarshal_msg reports FileCorrupt; fails on the previous code, which returned
Io(Other).

Verified end-to-end on a 3-node / 12-drive EC:4 cluster: xl.meta corrupted on
2 of 12 drives via dd, admin deep heal — before this change the heal returns
ok with the corruption intact and the scanner loops forever; with it, both
copies are rewritten (decode-identical to the healthy quorum), the object
reads back byte-correct, and a follow-up heal reports all twelve drives
clean.

* test(filemeta): cover crc heal classification

Add regression coverage for the indexed xl.meta CRC path and the metadata-heal decision that consumes FileCorrupt.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: terem42 <9478806+terem42@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 11:36:44 +00:00
GatewayJ 4a234c0fe3 fix(iam): stabilize OIDC provider ordering (#5832) 2026-08-08 19:29:04 +08:00
GatewayJ 1b1b217826 fix(iam): preserve OIDC outbound policy errors (#5762) 2026-08-08 19:28:47 +08:00
terem42 7e8b500420 fix(filemeta): classify xl.meta CRC mismatch as FileCorrupt so heal repairs it (#5838)
A failed CRC means the metadata bytes on disk are not the bytes that were
written — bitrot. Raising it as Error::other() surfaces a generic Io error,
which should_heal_object_on_disk does not recognise as heal-worthy: the drive
is skipped, disks_to_heal_count stays 0, heal_object returns ok, and the
corrupted xl.meta is never rewritten — while the scanner re-submits the same
no-op heal every deep-scan cycle. An explicit admin deep heal fails the same
way, so no heal path repairs metadata bitrot, and every one of them reports
success.

check_xl2_v1 already classifies a short or wrong-magic header as FileCorrupt
for exactly this reason (#5716); this completes the pattern for the two CRC
sites. The existing From<rustfs_filemeta::Error> for DiskError conversion maps
the variant to DiskError::FileCorrupt, which the heal path already handles.
The previously silent is_indexed_meta site now logs the mismatch (structured
event shape) like unmarshal_msg does.

Regression test: corrupt one byte of a marshalled FileMeta and assert
unmarshal_msg reports FileCorrupt; fails on the previous code, which returned
Io(Other).

Verified end-to-end on a 3-node / 12-drive EC:4 cluster: xl.meta corrupted on
2 of 12 drives via dd, admin deep heal — before this change the heal returns
ok with the corruption intact and the scanner loops forever; with it, both
copies are rewritten (decode-identical to the healthy quorum), the object
reads back byte-correct, and a follow-up heal reports all twelve drives
clean.
2026-08-08 18:48:18 +08:00
houseme e342457830 perf(filemeta): reduce meta object key allocations (#5836)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 17:23:08 +08:00
Zhengchao An 778f1dfa21 chore(release): bump version to 1.0.0-rc.1 (#5834)
* chore(release): prepare 1.0.0-rc.1

* chore(release): align release assets for 1.0.0-rc.1
2026-08-08 15:04:11 +08:00
houseme 7e9e4b67e5 fix(ecstore): raise replay cache auto capacity (#5833)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 14:13:34 +08:00
cxymds f5463f4aa8 fix(rebalance): defer changed source cleanup (#5829) 2026-08-08 10:45:34 +08:00
terem42 cb93ac5df1 fix(ecstore): purge the stale destination data dir on healing rename_data commits (#5822)
* fix(ecstore): purge the stale destination data dir on healing rename_data commits

Heal commits reuse the version's existing data_dir, so when repairing
in-place corruption (bitrot) the destination directory still exists and
holds the corrupt shard files. rename(2) cannot replace a non-empty
directory (EEXIST on XFS, ENOTEMPTY on ext4), so the commit failed on
every attempt — including all scheduler retries — and in-place bitrot was
detected and reconstructed but never repaired.

Purge the stale destination data dir (move_to_trash) before the commit
rename, for healing commits only: fresh PUTs mint a new data_dir and can
never collide, and a non-healing collision keeps failing loudly. Adds the
FileInfo::is_healing() reader for the marker set_healing() already writes.

* style(ecstore): emit the heal purge failure as a structured event

The new warning was the only sentence-style log in `rename_data`'s commit
path — it sat ten lines above `info!(event = EVENT_DISK_LOCAL_RENAME_REJECTED,
component = ..., subsystem = ...)` and interpolated its values into the
message instead of carrying them as fields, so it is invisible to any operator
query keyed on `event`.

Give it the shape the rest of the file uses: a named
`EVENT_DISK_LOCAL_HEAL_PURGE_FAILED`, `component`/`subsystem`, `dst_path` and
`error` as fields, and a short label as the message. Level stays `warn` — the
purge is best effort and the rename below fails closed — and the condition,
the branch, and the control flow are unchanged.

---------

Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 23:10:53 +00:00
Zhengchao An 96d24bc006 docs(agents): make the structured-logging rule reachable and enforceable (#5828)
The RustFS event shape (`event`/`component`/`subsystem`/`result` + context,
message last) is specified only in
`.agents/skills/rustfs-logging-governance/SKILL.md`, and nothing routes a
change to it:

- `AGENTS.md`, which is what an agent actually loads by default, never
  mentions logging. Its only related line is "log unknown fields at `warn`"
  under Serde Safety, which is about level, not shape.
- The skill's `description` says "use when editing or reviewing RustFS logs",
  so a bugfix that adds one log line in passing — how most new log sites enter
  this repo — never matches it.
- `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` is a blocklist: 500+ `rg -F` literals
  that retire log lines which already shipped. It cannot see a newly written
  one. For `crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs` the only check is that
  `#[tracing::instrument]` is TRACE-only; `warn!`/`info!` shape is unchecked.

PR #5822 landed `warn!("heal rename_data: purging ... {:?} failed: {}", ...)`
in `disk/local.rs` — sentence-style, no fields, directly beside `info!(event =
EVENT_DISK_LOCAL_RENAME_REJECTED, component = ..., subsystem = ...)` — with
every check green. That is the gap, not an authoring mistake.

Close all three:

- `AGENTS.md`: a Logging section stating the field shape, the level policy,
  the reuse-the-file's-constants rule, and that it applies to any `tracing`
  macro added in passing, not only to log-focused changes.
- Skill `description`: trigger on adding or editing any `tracing` macro,
  naming the single-line-added-in-passing case explicitly.
- Guardrail: assert the event shape positively on the already-governed disk
  files — `error!`/`warn!`/`info!` must open with fields or a `target:`, never
  a bare string. Commented-out macros are excluded; `debug!`/`trace!` stay out
  of scope as targeted diagnostics. Self-test fixtures cover both directions.

`crates/ecstore/src/disk/mod.rs` carried the one live violation in that file
set (`conv_part_err_to_int`), so it is converted here; the guardrail would
otherwise fail on an untouched file.

Verification:
- `./scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` — passes
- Negative control: re-inserting PR #5822's exact `warn!` line into
  `disk/local.rs` makes it exit 1 pointing at that line
- `cargo fmt -p rustfs-ecstore -- --check`, `cargo check -p rustfs-ecstore`
2026-08-07 23:05:57 +00:00
houseme 74c6c114b1 fix(rpc): skip batch read-version JSON for msgpack peers (#5825)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 23:03:22 +00:00
cxymds b301588248 fix(rebalance): drain entry tasks before listing retry (#5820)
* fix(rebalance): drain entry tasks before listing retry

* test(rebalance): satisfy clippy in retry regression
2026-08-08 05:50:47 +08:00
Sergei Nikolaev 601c766fca fix(table-catalog): fix object kind validation (#5784)
Signed-off-by: Sergei Nikolaev <kinolaev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 05:50:04 +08:00
cxymds 41e262cdab test(e2e): wait for authoritative quota usage (#5816) 2026-08-08 05:44:40 +08:00
cxymds 23fef384ce test(e2e): align backpressure assertion with recovery (#5815) 2026-08-08 05:44:25 +08:00
cxymds d7f1ba9ae7 test(ecstore): stabilize free-version enqueue retry (#5813) 2026-08-08 05:44:10 +08:00
cxymds a4712fae81 test(e2e): make scanner snapshot tests deterministic (#5812)
* test(e2e): configure scanner snapshot timing

* style(e2e): format scanner snapshot tests
2026-08-08 05:43:56 +08:00
cxymds 8201a74f7f feat(rpc): advertise cross-pool fence capability (#5809)
* feat(rpc): advertise cross-pool fence capability

* refactor(rpc): narrow fence capability surface

* fix(rpc): state fence compatibility removal condition
2026-08-08 05:43:26 +08:00
cxymds ce7ca4cbb8 fix(policy): support version ID condition keys (#5810) 2026-08-08 05:42:52 +08:00
唐小鸭 6633c80151 refactor(kms): close the low-severity follow-ups from the #5668 adversarial re-review (#5817)
* refactor(kms): share the DEK spec mapping and stop re-parsing opened envelopes

- generate_key_material is now the single spec->length mapping for every
  backend that mints DEKs itself; the inline copies in the Static and Local
  backends are gone, and ChaCha20 (32 bytes, same as AES_256) is accepted
  uniformly instead of only by Static.
- The pub(crate) client decrypt of the Local, Vault KV2 and Vault Transit
  backends returns (plaintext, master_key_id), so KmsBackend::decrypt no
  longer re-parses the envelope it just opened (one JSON parse per SSE GET
  instead of two, and unknown-field observability is no longer double-counted).
- Malformed-envelope parse failures now report CryptographicError("parse")
  on all backends; Local was the last one mapping them to SerializationError.
- The four KmsBackend::generate_data_key adapters take fields out of
  DataKeyInfo instead of cloning, dropping a redundant un-zeroized plaintext
  DEK copy and a full ciphertext clone per call; a missing plaintext now
  fails closed everywhere instead of returning an empty key on three of four
  backends.

* test(kms): pin legacy header fallback, stored-AAD, and decrypt key-id contracts

- a_legacy_aws_kms_object_without_the_cipher_header_still_opens rebuilds the
  true pre-internal-header shape (aws:kms mode + S3 key-id header, no
  x-rustfs-* headers) and asserts the fallback normalizes the cipher and
  re-projects it.
- a_rewritten_sse_c_context_header_fails_authentication is the SSE-C flank of
  the stored-AAD tamper check; metadata_without_stored_context_bytes_still_opens
  covers the derived-AAD path for both flavours and pins the seal side to the
  canonical bytes (mutation-verified).
- data_key_spec_controls_the_length_of_the_generated_key requires every
  backend in the matrix to honour all three specs, asserts the envelope
  records the requested spec, and round-trips each blob.
- corrupt_ciphertext_fails_cleanly pins unparseable ciphertext to
  CryptographicError instead of merely not-InternalError.
- Deleted the never-called assert_validation_error / assert_cryptographic_error
  helpers.
2026-08-08 05:41:50 +08:00
唐小鸭 a0a8eaa0f3 fix(storage): reserve internal encryption prefixes in user metadata (#5819)
The write-side filter is_reserved_user_metadata_key only namespaced
x-amz-, x-rustfs-internal- and x-minio-internal- keys, while the
read-side should_skip_object_metadata_key also strips
x-rustfs-encryption-* / x-minio-encryption-* as internal. A client PUT
of x-amz-meta-x-rustfs-encryption-algorithm therefore landed on disk as
the bare internal key x-rustfs-encryption-algorithm, which the KMS
headers_to_metadata path treats as the preferred cipher selector. Not
exploitable today (the production decrypt path discards the parsed
algorithm and FromStr rejects invalid values), but any future wiring of
headers_to_metadata into decryption would hand cipher choice to the
client.

Reserve both encryption prefixes on the write side so client-supplied
keys are namespaced under x-amz-meta- like other reserved keys, hoist
the prefix constants to module scope shared with the read-side skip
logic, and pin the attack form (header injection and CopyObject REPLACE
metadata), the bare-header form, and the legitimate server-written SSE
metadata flow with regression tests.
2026-08-08 05:41:38 +08:00
Zhengchao An 027456032f fix(ecstore): enforce the NAME_MAX segment budget on the write path too (#5826)
#5804 added the on-disk segment budget to check_bucket_and_object_names, but PUT validates through check_put_object_args, which has its own checks and never calls it. An over-NAME_MAX key therefore still reached the disk layer and came back to the client as ENAMETOOLONG → InternalError 500, exactly the behavior #5785 reported.

Caught by re-running the acceptance suite against the locked build 4b2d79f5d, which contains #5804: S3-003 still failed with a 512-byte key.

Multipart is unaffected — check_new_multipart_args and check_multipart_object_args both route through check_object_args → check_bucket_and_object_names, which already carries the budget.

Verification: new test pins the same boundaries on check_put_object_args (255 ok / 256 rejected, byte-based via CJK, multi-segment long keys ok, __XLDIR__ budget for directory keys); cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore --lib -- bucket::utils 17 passed; cargo clippy -p rustfs-ecstore --all-targets clean; make pre-commit green.
2026-08-08 05:30:15 +08:00
houseme 58c49672ca perf(ecstore): cache modern erasure codec construction (#5824)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 18:52:31 +00:00
houseme aa4de7b9d6 perf(utils): avoid metadata key lowercase allocation (#5823)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 18:39:09 +00:00
Zhengchao An 4b2d79f5d5 fix(admin): serve the usage a scan measured instead of blanking the whole snapshot (#5818)
* fix(admin): serve the usage a scan measured instead of blanking the whole snapshot

query_data_usage_info_with_store replaced the entire DataUsageInfo with the default empty shape whenever the persisted snapshot did not cover every currently listed bucket. A freshly created bucket is by definition absent from the last completed scan, so every bucket creation zeroed out usage reporting for the whole deployment until a cycle covered it (rustfs#5806).

Instrumented on a single node (fresh data dir, 10 PUTs into one new bucket, polling the admin API every second while watching the on-disk documents): the scanner persisted correct usage within ~6s — the authoritative document held scanner_cycle=2, objects_total_count=10 and the bucket's entry — while the API kept answering with a default-constructed DataUsageInfo (scanner_cycle: None) for roughly another minute.

Narrow the snapshot to what it measured instead of discarding it. Buckets the scan never reached stay absent from buckets_usage, which already means unknown on the wire and stays distinct from a present zero, and the response is marked usage_snapshot_converged = Some(false) so clients can tell it is not the whole namespace. The protections that motivated the blanking are kept: a structurally incomplete snapshot is still dropped, and so is one that measured nothing the namespace still contains. Buckets deleted since the scan are now dropped from the response rather than lingering.

The old data_usage_snapshot_covers_namespace predicate has no callers left and is removed along with the test that pinned its all-or-nothing behavior; the new test covers the partial, full, stale-bucket, incomplete and empty-namespace cases.

Verification: cargo test -p rustfs --lib -- admin_usecase (24 passed), cargo clippy -p rustfs --lib clean, make pre-commit green.

* fix(admin): drop the orphaned test attribute left by the removed coverage test

Removing data_usage_snapshot_covers_namespace's test left its #[test] behind, which then attached to the following test as a duplicate attribute. Local 'cargo clippy -p rustfs --lib' does not build the test target, so it only surfaced in CI's --all-targets lane.
2026-08-07 18:13:47 +00:00
houseme 96665f4de9 docs(runtime): document allocator reclaim runtime (#5800)
* docs(runtime): document allocator reclaim runtime

Explain allocator reclaim enablement, idle gating, controller status semantics, and cancellation behavior.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* upgrade version

* upgrade version

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 17:38:36 +00:00
Zhengchao An 05a5be51ce fix(scanner): retry a superseded usage snapshot in seconds, not a full cycle (#5814)
A superseded cycle is the expected outcome of the dirty-usage fast path, not a signal of pathological load: a write burst marks buckets dirty, the scanner wakes within milliseconds, and the still-landing writes then supersede the snapshot it just took. Charging that first race SUPERSEDED_RETRY_BASE_INTERVAL = 60s meant the burst surfaced in usage and quota accounting roughly two cycles late.

Measured on an idle single-node instance (fresh data dir, 10 PUTs, polling /rustfs/admin/v3/datausageinfo every 5s): the dirty-usage wake fires 0.3s after the PUTs, its cycle is superseded 0.2s later, and the retry was then scheduled 55.6s out; usage first became visible at t+120s. With the base at 5s the retry is scheduled 4.7s out and usage becomes visible at t+70s.

The exponential growth in retry_interval is what protects against a persistently hot bucket driving an unbroken full-scan loop, so the base does not need to be a whole cycle: 5s, 10s, 20s, 40s ... still reaches minute-scale backoff within a handful of consecutive supersedes and keeps the SUPERSEDED_RETRY_MAX_INTERVAL cap. A configured cycle shorter than the base still wins, since retrying faster than the operator's own cadence buys nothing.

Verification: cargo test -p rustfs-scanner --lib (444 passed) with the three superseded-backoff tests updated to the new schedule; make pre-commit green; end-to-end probe above.
2026-08-07 16:09:26 +00:00
houseme 5187f91997 fix(s3select): replace deprecated parquet reader (#5811)
Implement a local AsyncFileReader over DataFusion's object store re-export so Parquet metadata loading no longer uses the deprecated ParquetObjectReader adapter.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 16:00:58 +00:00
houseme 9d996b82a8 perf(storage): skip read-version JSON for bin peers (#5808)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 15:24:17 +00:00
Zhengchao An ab35681928 perf(ecstore): memoize bucket-incarnation fence validation under lifecycle read-lock coverage (#5782)
* perf(ecstore): memoize bucket-incarnation fence validation under lifecycle read-lock coverage

The PUT commit fence from #5648 validated the bucket incarnation with an uncached read (a distributed metadata-transaction read lock plus an EC quorum read of bucket metadata) on every PUT commit. Under 64-concurrency 4KiB PUT load this adds two quorum round-trips per PUT and the resulting lock-manager pressure produced ~1,000 client-visible 'Lock acquisition timeout' failures per 5-minute window (see rustfs/backlog#1776).

Memoize the validation per node while lifecycle read-lock coverage is continuous: bucket deletion/recreation requires the lifecycle WRITE lock, so while at least one read guard on this node has been held continuously the incarnation cannot have changed. The first fenced PUT in a coverage window performs the exact authoritative disk validation as before; overlapping PUTs reuse its result. The memo clears when the node's last guard drops or any guard observes a lost lock, so the next PUT revalidates from disk. Fence semantics are unchanged; only the redundant re-validations under continuous coverage are elided.

Also right-size the s3s footprint ratchet baselines: -1 s3_error! line from this change's error-path consolidation, and +1 s3s-importing file inherited from #5763 (crates/obs/src/telemetry/filter.rs) which landed on main without the baseline bump.

* fix(ecstore): carry the bucket fence registry through the rebalance test store

The rebalance entry test constructor landed on main after this branch was cut and needs the new field.
2026-08-07 15:05:48 +00:00
cxymds ba5641237c ci(e2e): stabilize full-gate tooling (#5805) 2026-08-07 15:04:33 +00:00
唐小鸭 3792fed827 fix(replication): madmin reset/diff wire compat and config validation (#5799)
* fix(admin): align replication-reset responses with madmin ResyncTargetsInfo shape

The replication-reset and replication-reset-status responses serialized
their shell as "Targets" and per-target fields in PascalCase, while
madmin-go ResyncTargetsInfo/ResyncTarget expect the "target" shell key
and lowercase field tags (arn/resetid/resyncStatus/replicationCount/
completedReplicationSize/failedReplicationCount/failedReplicationSize).
Go json decoding is case-insensitive per field, but Targets vs target,
Status vs resyncStatus and the size/count key names cannot match, so
mc replicate resync decoded empty results.

Rename the serde tags to the exact madmin wire shape, keep the
ResetBeforeDate/Error RustFS extension keys (unknown keys are ignored
by Go decoders), pin the shape with a snapshot unit test, and update
the e2e client DTO to decode the madmin shape.

* fix(admin): stream bare madmin DiffInfo documents from replication diff

POST /v3/replication/diff returned a single enveloped object
({Entries, IsTruncated, ScannedVersions}) while madmin-go
BucketReplicationDiff decodes the body with a json.Decoder loop over
bare DiffInfo documents. The envelope decoded as exactly one DiffInfo
with an empty object, so mc replicate diff printed a phantom empty row
instead of the real backlog.

Emit one DiffInfo JSON document per line by default, using the exact
madmin json tags (object/versionId/rStatus/deletemarker/lastModified;
Size stays as a RustFS extension key that Go decoders ignore). The
enveloped shape moves to the opt-in ?aggregate=true RustFS extension,
which remains the only carrier of scan-coverage metadata; a truncated
default-mode scan is surfaced via a warn tracing event instead of
in-stream. Pin both shapes with unit tests and tighten the e2e helper
to reject any envelope in the stream.

* feat(replication): validate replication config structure before persisting

PutBucketReplication accepted structurally invalid configurations that
MinIO's replication.Config.Validate rejects: empty or oversized rule
lists, duplicate or negative rule priorities, over-long rule IDs,
filters carrying more than one of Prefix/Tag/And, and delete marker
replication enabled on tag-filtered rules. Such configs persisted
silently and later produced undefined routing (e.g. ambiguous priority
ties) instead of failing the PUT.

Add validate_replication_config_structure as a pure function in
rustfs-replication (limits documented as constants), surface it through
the ecstore api facade, and run it first in the PUT capability gate so
defects are named before any metadata write. Missing Priority counts as
zero for the uniqueness check, matching Go's zero-value semantics. The
self-target rejection deliberately stays at set-remote-target, where the
endpoint is known; a config can never reference a self-pointing ARN.
Document the rule-level Destination.StorageClass contract (use the
remote target's storage_class instead) and renumber the acceptance
matrix e2e to unique priorities, which MinIO would also require.

* test(replication): pin duplicated wire types with boundary reconciliation tests

rustfs-filemeta (xl.meta disk format) and rustfs-replication (MRF/resync
persistence format) deliberately each own ReplicationStatusType,
VersionPurgeStatusType and ReplicationState; the boundary converts
between them via as_str(), whose From<&str> impls fall back to Empty on
unknown tokens — a variant added on one side silently degrades to Empty
on the other.

Add reconciliation tests in replication_filemeta_boundary: exhaustive
matches with no wildcard arm on both sides of both enums (a new variant
fails compilation until the mapping is reconsidered), string-token
round-trip asserts (a token the other side does not recognize fails
instead of quietly becoming Empty), and a full-field ReplicationState
round-trip. Cross-reference the tests from both type definitions.
Struct drift was already compile-guarded by the exhaustive struct
literals in the conversion functions.

* docs(replication): define split completion criteria and milestone sequence

The ecstore replication split plan had no completion measure — the
boundary scaffolding risked ossifying because nothing said when the
migration counts as done. Record the criteria in the module inventory:
done means the Required Contracts table's 'Current dependency to
remove' column is empty; the end state moves pool/resyncer/state into
crates/replication, with the boundary micro-files dissolving as code
crosses the crate line (batch-merging them beforehand is explicitly
rejected — the guard scripts anchor on their file names, so merging is
churn with zero functional gain; only datatypes.rs can retire early).

Sequence the remaining work as M2 (resyncer pure decision logic, after
the oversized function splits) → M3 (worker runtime, highest risk,
last) → M4 (retire boundaries and guard entries). Refresh the stale
first-step text — the event sink / runtime contracts already landed —
and update the split-plan status table accordingly.

* fix(replication): align structural validator with MinIO semantics after adversarial review

Three interop corrections found by adversarial review of the new
structural validator, plus review fallout fixes:

- Delete-marker replication is now rejected only for a direct Filter.Tag,
  not for tags inside Filter.And — MinIO's validator only inspects the
  direct tag, and mc replicate add --tags "k1=v1&k2=v2" (delete-marker
  replication on by default) puts multiple tags into And.Tags, so the
  stricter check rejected mc-generated configs MinIO accepts.
- Rule ID length is measured in bytes (Go len semantics), not chars —
  a 255-char multibyte ID must not round-trip into a config MinIO
  rejects.
- An empty <Tag/> element (no key) counts as absent, matching MinIO's
  Tag.IsEmpty(); console form serializers emit empty tags, which would
  otherwise trip the exactly-one-of and delete-marker checks.

Also: repair the store-uninitialized PUT test whose empty-rules fixture
now (correctly) fails structural validation before reaching the store
lookup; pin the previously untested startTime madmin key in the
reset-status shape test; and signal a truncated default-mode diff scan
via the x-rustfs-replication-diff-truncated response header — the bare
madmin stream has no envelope, so a truncated scan was otherwise
indistinguishable from a complete healthy one (madmin/mc ignore unknown
headers).

* test(e2e): activate SSE-S3 replication contract and pin resync fail-closed path

The SSE-S3 replication contract e2e was ignored under backlog#1291
(silent plaintext replication); the fail-closed gate in
replication_target_boundary.rs closed that hole, so the ignore reason
expired. Un-ignore the test — it now pins the current fail-closed
contract (FAILED status, failure event, readable encrypted source,
stable absence of all target versions), verified green.

Add test_bucket_replication_sse_s3_resync_stays_fail_closed: drives the
existing-object resync path (PUT ?replication-reset) over a FAILED
SSE-S3 object and asserts the resync generation reaches a terminal
state without ever materializing a target version, with the
stays-absent window also spanning fast-scanner heal cycles. The new
start_bucket_replication_reset helper doubles as the madmin
ResyncTargetsInfo shape assertion (target[0].arn/resetid) for the
reset-start response.

Refresh the stale nextest count commentary (the module is at 20 fast +
36 nightly = 56 tests by cargo nextest list; the SSE-S3-ignored note no
longer holds).
2026-08-07 22:30:12 +08:00
Zhengchao An 7553715f62 fix(admin): stop logging STS AssumeRole JWT claims (#5802) 2026-08-07 22:17:56 +08:00
Zhengchao An 766afe12fb fix(ecstore): reject over-NAME_MAX key segments up front; classify irreconcilable parity as corrupt metadata (#5804)
fix(ecstore): reject over-NAME_MAX object key segments up front and classify irreconcilable parity as corrupt metadata

Two defects found during release acceptance and the backlog#1776 investigation:

Object keys with any path segment longer than 255 bytes could never be stored (each segment maps to one on-disk directory entry), but the failure surfaced only when the disk layer hit ENAMETOOLONG, which leaked to clients as InternalError 500 (rustfs#5785). Validate the on-disk segment budget in check_bucket_and_object_names so such keys fail deterministically as ObjectNameInvalid (4xx) before any I/O. Directory-object keys (trailing '/') account for the __XLDIR__ suffix their final segment carries on disk.

object_quorum_from_meta conflated two very different no-quorum situations (rustfs#5801): stray or foreign metadata whose parity values are garbage produced the same retryable-looking ErasureReadQuorum (503) as a genuine partial outage, so clients retried unrecoverable reads and monitoring could not tell corruption from capacity loss. Now (a) parity counts outside [0, total_shards] are treated as invalid entries instead of being clamped to i32::MAX, which could poison common_parity's occurrence counting, and (b) when a full read quorum of disks answers but their parity values cannot be reconciled, the error is FileCorrupt — heal-actionable and non-retryable — while too-few-healthy-replies keeps returning ErasureReadQuorum.

Verification: 4 new unit tests (segment budget boundaries incl. byte-vs-char and __XLDIR__ budget; garbage parity sanitization; corrupt-vs-quorum classification), metadata::tests + utils::tests 62/62, set_disk+bucket suites 1214 passed with the single pre-existing heal_queue_marks_missing_versioning_state_as_missed cross-test flake also failing on a clean tree (not introduced here), clippy clean, make pre-commit green.
2026-08-07 22:13:54 +08:00
cxymds f5929a8305 fix(ecstore): preserve newer writes during data movement (#5798) 2026-08-07 12:30:09 +00:00
cxymds 2a44985037 fix(capacity): stop background schedulers on shutdown (#5797) 2026-08-07 19:02:42 +08:00
cxymds bd15dd5784 ci: install awscurl for full e2e tests (#5796) 2026-08-07 10:53:13 +00:00
DIO a5c8052163 fix(s3): resume in-flight GET streams after rebalance relocation (#5791)
* fix(s3): resume in-flight GET streams after rebalance relocation

* fix(s3): address GET resume review findings

---------

Co-authored-by: zhengsf <zhengsf@kaopucloud.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: 马登山 <cxymds@qq.com>
2026-08-07 17:59:44 +08:00
cxymds 58d4bdc79f fix(rebalance): commit stats after source cleanup (#5795) 2026-08-07 17:18:15 +08:00
唐小鸭 8d582a096c fix(replication): tolerate Go zero-value expiration and ignore latency in remote target requests (#5789)
* test(replication): accept real madmin marshal payload with zero-value expiration

* fix(replication): tolerate Go zero-value expiration and ignore latency in remote target requests
2026-08-07 15:22:07 +08:00
cxymds f5bf1fc313 fix(ecstore): fence data movement source cleanup (#5794) 2026-08-07 15:19:20 +08:00
唐小鸭 10abef4791 fix(ecstore): parse ARN region and id in display order (#5790)
* test(ecstore): pin ARN display/parse round-trip field order

* fix(ecstore): parse ARN region and id in display order
2026-08-07 11:57:08 +08:00
cxymds b7b571dfa4 fix(ecstore): bind multipart convergence heal versions (#5786) 2026-08-07 09:54:47 +08:00
cxymds dd2e0328fd fix(ci): ignore strings in s3s footprint ratchet (#5787) 2026-08-07 01:53:24 +00:00
cxymds fe91b75d65 fix(ecstore): heal partial ordinary puts (#5783) 2026-08-07 08:59:35 +08:00
anthonymartin 706a8b6061 fix(scanner): publish bounded observational usage (#5742)
* fix(scanner): publish bounded observational usage

* test(ci): serialize embedded integration ports

* test(cache): isolate generation-change timeout

* fix(scanner): address observational usage review

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Anthony Martin <949506+anthonymartin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 08:52:34 +08:00
houseme 83cdea1f18 feat(rpc): expose and auto-size replay cache capacity (#5781)
* feat(metrics): expose replay cache pressure

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(rpc): auto-size replay cache capacity

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(cache): split runtime memory feature

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 08:52:02 +08:00
anthonymartin 77f2b948c2 fix(capacity): back off timed-out scans (#5770)
* fix(capacity): back off timed-out scans

* fix(capacity): guard incomplete metadata baselines

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Anthony Martin <949506+anthonymartin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-06 15:56:45 +00:00
houseme 5e7e25b7d1 perf(metrics): count internode RPC auth failures (#5777)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-06 15:42:59 +00:00
Zhengchao An da82fd995e feat(kms): report which keys have outlived their rotation period (#5769)
rustfs/backlog#1636 rejected a built-in rotation scheduler: rotation is a policy decision with a per-backend cost and a hard upgrade-ordering constraint, and a server that rotated on its own would make that decision on an operator's behalf at a moment they did not choose. This is what that issue resolved to deliver instead — the signal, without the actuator.

RUSTFS_KMS_ROTATION_MAX_AGE_SECS names the period. Unset leaves the verdict unreported rather than assuming a policy, because how often keys must be rotated is a compliance decision and a built-in default would report keys as overdue against a rule nobody wrote; an unparsable value is refused the same way, loudly. Values below an hour are raised to it, since a threshold of seconds reports every key as overdue moments after it was rotated and teaches operators to ignore the signal.

KeyInfo gains rotation_due and rotation_due_reason, both additive on the wire and both filled in by the manager rather than by each backend, so no two backends can disagree about what overdue means. A backend that does not advertise rotation reports unsupported and is never reported as due — it must not be told to do something it cannot. A key with no recorded rotation is measured from creation, which is how long its material has actually been in use, and is distinguished from a stale rotation so an operator can tell "overdue again" from "never once". Ages are computed saturating, so a timestamp from a node running ahead cannot manufacture an overdue key.

The verdict is advisory in the strongest sense: nothing consults it before encrypting or decrypting, a key reported as due keeps serving traffic, and readiness is unaffected.

The single-key describe response deliberately does not carry the verdict. Its type records a creation date but no rotation timestamp, so a verdict computed there could not tell a key rotated last week from one never rotated, and reporting never_rotated for a key that was in fact rotated is worse than reporting nothing.

The wraps-based branch the issue also specifies is not implemented: it depends on the per-key wrap accounting that does not exist yet.
2026-08-06 15:13:01 +00:00
anthonymartin 656a2f14bf fix(logging): bound hot-path span amplification (#5763)
* fix(logging): bound hot-path span amplification

* refactor(logging): reuse HTTP log target constant

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Anthony Martin <949506+anthonymartin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-06 14:29:18 +00:00
GatewayJ 87d32a6207 fix(auth): align ListBuckets discovery with IAM policies (#5746) 2026-08-06 22:13:47 +08:00
cxymds 3bad829b9a test(heal): cover partial rename retry admission (#5772) 2026-08-06 22:13:29 +08:00
唐小鸭 434663f2aa fix(replication): report remote target latency as Go duration nanoseconds (#5771)
madmin-go decodes LatencyStat.curr/avg/max as Go time.Duration
(nanosecond integers), but the list-remote-targets admin response
serialized them via the persisted milliseconds encoding, so mc showed
latency values shrunk by 10^6 (e.g. 50ms rendered as 50ns).

Extend remote_target_admin_json — the same response-only re-encode
path already used for healthCheckDuration/totalDowntime — to emit the
latency stats as nanoseconds, leaving the persisted bucket-targets
wire format (milliseconds) untouched. list_targets overwrites latency
from live health stats before serialization, so the response path is
the single conversion point.

Found by the MinIO compatibility review (P2).
2026-08-06 22:13:17 +08:00
Henry Guo 5f6fb024cc feat(table-catalog): validate Iceberg metadata graphs (#5758)
* feat(table-catalog): validate Iceberg metadata graphs

* fix(table-catalog): scope Iceberg graph validation

* fix(table-catalog): preserve commit validation semantics

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-06 22:11:57 +08:00
Zhengchao An c1b8136f9a fix(kms): hold the Local key directory and its files owner-only (#5768)
The Local backend's durability argument rests on properties of the filesystem it runs on, and those properties were assumptions: the crate had no test touching symlinks, none asserting a published file's mode, and none on directory replacement or cross-device behavior. Writing that verification surfaced three gaps.

The key directory's own permissions were never set and never read. create_dir_all applies the process umask, which is 0 in a good many container images, and the platform picks the mode far more often than an operator does: kubelet creates an emptyDir 0777, several PVC provisioners mkdir -m 0777, a --tmpfs mount lands at 1777. Write access there is the power to delete a key, destroying every object it protects, or to plant a record for a key id that does not exist yet. The directory is now created 0700 through DirBuilder::mode, so intermediate components are covered and no create-then-chmod window exists, and anything wider is narrowed on every start and re-read to confirm it took. Narrowing rather than refusing matches what the observability stack already does with its own directory; refusing would turn each of those platform defaults into a server that will not start while leaving the exposure on disk. Only a directory this process cannot secure is fatal.

An unspecified file_permissions meant whatever the umask said. The field is optional in the persisted configuration and stays optional, but with it absent the entire mode-application block was skipped, so under a 0 umask master key records were published world-readable. Absent now resolves to owner-only inside the commit protocol rather than at each call site, so the backup restore path — which passed the unset value straight through and published a legacy cluster's restored records at 0644 — is covered by construction.

Startup left symlinked commit temps behind forever, because the orphan sweep required a regular file. The protocol only ever creates temps with create_new, so an entry wearing a temp name and any other file type is either its own leftover or something planted.

Eight tests pin the boundaries: that a requested mode survives the umask, that an absent one still resolves owner-only, that a directory at each mode a real platform produces is narrowed, that publishing replaces a symlink instead of writing through it on both the hard_link and rename paths, that a planted hard link cannot be adopted as a key record, that a symlinked commit temp is removed without harming the key it pointed at, and that commit temps never leave the destination's directory. A real cross-device operation and a directory swapped between rename and fsync cannot be verified without a second filesystem and directory file descriptors respectively; both are recorded in the operations documentation rather than left looking covered.
2026-08-06 22:02:18 +08:00
Zhengchao An aff3d4a39f test(admin): pin the KMS admin route contract as a snapshot (#5766)
Adding a KMS route already fails `route_registration_test`, and `route_policy` pins each route's action and risk with individual assertions, but nothing records the surface as a whole. A change to an existing route's action or risk therefore lands as an edited assertion rather than as a visible before/after — and these are the routes where that matters, since the action decides who may reach key material and the risk level decides which confirmations the route demands.

Every field is derived from ADMIN_ROUTE_POLICY_SPECS, so the snapshot cannot drift from the routing table; there is nothing to keep in sync by hand. A second test asserts the snapshot actually covers the surface it claims to: every listed route must be under /kms/ and must gate on a dedicated kms:* action, so a KMS route registered outside the policy table or falling back to a generic admin action cannot leave the snapshot green.

Per-key authorization scoping is deliberately not restated here. It is enforced and tested where it is implemented, by single_key_endpoints_reject_a_key_outside_the_policy_scope in handlers::kms_keys; a second hand-maintained list would be a claim nothing checks.
2026-08-06 22:01:45 +08:00
Zhengchao An 8003912bb1 fix(kms): report unreadable keys and bound list-keys page size (#5764)
A key that cannot be described was handled two incompatible ways. Vault KV2 swallowed every describe failure and dropped the key from the page, so a damaged or newer-format record silently disappeared from the operator's inventory and from the deletion sweep's census. Local failed the whole listing instead, so one bad record stopped every scheduled deletion on the node for as long as the damage lasted. Both force a per-key problem into a whole-page answer.

ListKeysResponse now carries unreadable_key_ids, and the backends that read local key records classify per-key failures in one place: KeyNotFound is a concurrent deletion and is skipped, a material-level error names the key on the page, and anything else fails the listing, because it says nothing about a particular key and reporting it as key damage would turn a backend outage into a false data-loss alarm. A listing that covered the entire key set and found nothing readable still fails, since an empty page there is indistinguishable from a deployment with no keys; the guard is scoped to a page with no successor so a damaged key can never strand the keys behind it. The deletion sweep destroys the expired keys it can read, counts the unreadable ones, and withholds its lifecycle gauges rather than publishing a census over a key set it did not fully see.

Vault Transit needs the same treatment and is easy to miss: its per-key metadata records live in KV2 too, so folding every non-404 failure into a backend error left its per-key classification unreachable and one metadata record written by a newer build still failed every listing on the node.

Vault KV2 record reads gain the typed errors this needs: an unparseable body is MaterialCorrupt and an absent data envelope is MaterialMissing, where both were previously indistinguishable from Vault being unreachable. Only the parse failure's category and position are reported, because serde's own message embeds the offending scalar and that message reaches a log line and an admin HTTP body.

The admin list handlers refuse a malformed limit with 400 instead of silently substituting the default page size, and every page is capped at 1000 where it is cut, so a single request can no longer fan out one metadata lookup per key without bound. The four operation-level KMS metrics gain a backend label, since operation names are shared across backends and a Transit latency regression was previously indistinguishable from an AWS one. The Static backend captures its reported creation date once instead of reading the clock on every describe and list. POST /kms/clear-cache gains a named response type with an unchanged wire shape.
2026-08-06 22:01:30 +08:00
唐小鸭 6303aa9a42 fix(site-replication): translate policy mapping userType at MinIO wire boundary (#5751)
* test(site-replication): pin MinIO IAMUserType wire semantics for policy mappings

Red tests for P0-4: MinIO peers send SRPolicyMapping.UserType using the
madmin IAMUserType table (unknown=-1, regUser=0, stsUser=1, svcUser=2),
while RustFS deserializes the field as u64 and decodes it with the
internal RPC table (None=0, Svc=1, Sts=2, Reg=3).

- userType -1 (MinIO group mappings) fails to deserialize, rejecting the
  whole IAM item: group mappings never sync from MinIO.
- stsUser=1 decodes as Svc, landing federated STS mappings under the
  wrong prefix and silently dropping their effect.

* fix(site-replication): translate policy mapping userType at MinIO wire boundary

SRPolicyMapping.userType travels on the wire using MinIO's IAMUserType
table (unknown=-1, regUser=0, stsUser=1, svcUser=2), but RustFS stored
the field as u64 and reused the internal RPC encoding
UserType::to_u64/from_u64 (None=0, Svc=1, Sts=2, Reg=3) at the site
replication boundary. Consequences: MinIO group mappings (userType -1)
failed to deserialize and the whole IAM item was rejected, and MinIO STS
mappings (1) were stored as service-account mappings, silently dropping
federated users' policies.

- Widen SRPolicyMapping.user_type and SRCredInfo.iam_user_type to i64 so
  MinIO's -1 deserializes.
- Add sr_wire_user_type / user_type_from_sr_wire in rustfs-iam as the
  dedicated SR wire codec: MinIO table on both directions, groups always
  encoded as 0, and wire value 3 kept forever as an alias for Reg so
  mappings from pre-fix RustFS peers still decode; unknown values fail
  closed.
- Route the SR inbound (apply_iam_item) and outbound
  (mapped_policy_to_sr_mapping, policy-mapping change hooks) paths
  through the codec.

The internal UserType::to_u64/from_u64 encoding is untouched: it is the
intra-cluster node RPC contract and changing it would break rolling
restarts. Outbound compatibility with old RustFS peers is preserved
because UserType::None and Reg share the users prefix in
get_mapped_policy_path, so wire 0 lands in the same location Reg=3 did.
2026-08-06 22:00:28 +08:00
houseme 4855095446 obs: mirror log attributes into loki lines (#5776)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-06 21:59:59 +08:00
houseme fc0de983d8 perf: add RPC auth profiling diagnostics (#5775)
perf: add rpc auth profiling diagnostics

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-06 21:33:17 +08:00
anthonymartin e26b869259 fix(ecstore): preserve checksums through write transforms (#5765)
* fix: preserve checksums through write transforms

* test(e2e): cover SSE-KMS multipart CRC32

---------

Co-authored-by: Anthony Martin <949506+anthonymartin@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-06 17:02:08 +08:00
Zhengchao An efd5481b35 fix(auth): log structured denial reasons for generic AccessDenied responses (#5761) 2026-08-06 02:45:54 +00:00
唐小鸭 dbf51117a1 fix(replication): schedule replication for CopyObject and snowball extracted objects (#5753)
* test(replication): expect CopyObject and snowball extract to schedule replication

Red-phase TDD tests for P0-6: CopyObject never consults the bucket
replication config (no pending stamp, no schedule, and the destination
inherits the source's stale replication status metadata wholesale), and
snowball auto-extract members are never scheduled either.

- usecase white-box: observe MUST_REPLICATE_OBJECT_CALLS for
  execute_copy_object (currently 0, must be 1) and
  execute_put_object_extract (currently 0, must be 2 for a two-member
  archive), plus stale replication-status metadata cleanup assertions
  (MinIO filterReplicationStatusMetadata parity).
- e2e: CopyObject destination and snowball-extracted members must appear
  on the remote replication target and reach COMPLETED on the source.

Red evidence (before fix):
  copy_object_computes_replication_decision_and_strips_stale_status
    assertion failed: left: 0, right: 1
  put_object_extract_computes_replication_decision_per_entry
    assertion failed: left: 0, right: 2

* fix(replication): schedule replication for CopyObject and snowball extracted objects

CopyObject and snowball auto-extract never consulted the bucket
replication config: no PENDING stamp, no post-commit schedule, and no
scanner-heal backstop (heal only re-drives Pending/Failed objects, and
these objects carried no status at all). Worse, the copy path cloned the
source metadata wholesale, so a destination object inherited the
source's replication bookkeeping and could present a fake
COMPLETED/REPLICA state.

Mirroring the PUT path (single immutable decision drives both the
pending metadata and the post-commit schedule, rustfs/backlog#1320):

- execute_copy_object: strip the source's replication status metadata
  (internal replication/replica status + timestamps under both
  compatibility prefixes, plus x-amz-replication-status) for
  non-inbound requests — MinIO filterReplicationStatusMetadata parity;
  the cleanup runs before the decision so an inherited REPLICA status
  cannot suppress it. Then compute must_replicate_object once, stamp
  PENDING when it replicates, and schedule after the copy commits and
  the self-copy lock guard is released. Inbound replica writes keep
  their authorized metadata and are declined inside
  must_replicate_object, so replicas are never re-scheduled outbound.

- execute_put_object_extract: same stamp + schedule per extracted
  member object (MinIO PutObjectExtract parity).

- execute_put_object dispatch: an authorized inbound replication PUT is
  stored verbatim instead of being re-dispatched into the extract path.
  Extracted members keep x-amz-meta-snowball-auto-extract in their user
  metadata and the replication client replays stored metadata as
  headers, so the target used to try to untar each member's own bytes,
  permanently failing replication for non-archive members (surfaced by
  the new snowball e2e test).

Green evidence:
- copy_object_computes_replication_decision_and_strips_stale_status,
  put_object_extract_computes_replication_decision_per_entry (red: 0
  decisions; green: 1 and 2), plus the existing PUT/object-lock
  decision-count tests stay green.
- e2e test_copy_object_replicates_to_target and
  test_snowball_extract_replicates_members_to_target pass against two
  live instances.
2026-08-06 08:46:39 +08:00
Zhengchao An 5e0fdaa247 fix(table-catalog): route read_bounded_json_body errors through ApiError to hold s3s ratchet (#5759)
The namespace REST contracts PR (#5745) added 7 new s3_error! invocations in
read_bounded_json_body, pushing the s3s footprint counter from 1687 to 1693
and violating the ratchet baseline.

Replace those calls with ApiError::invalid_request() (gateway-side error
abstraction, rustfs/backlog#1677 F1, rustfs/backlog#1733) and lower the
baseline from 1687 to 1686.

- Add ApiError::invalid_request(message) constructor to rustfs/src/error.rs
- Replace 7 s3_error! calls in read_bounded_json_body with S3Error::from(ApiError)
- Lower S3_ERROR_LINES_BASELINE from 1687 to 1686

Verification:
- make pre-commit: all guard scripts + fmt-check + quick-check passed
- make clippy-check: passed
- cargo test table_catalog + admin handler tests: 406/406 passed
- s3s-e2e: 27/27 passed
2026-08-06 00:34:46 +00:00
唐小鸭 923e35efa0 fix(site-replication): use MinIO-compatible sts-account IAM item type (#5750)
* test(site-replication): expect MinIO sts-account IAM item type

MinIO madmin-go replicates STS credentials with SRIAMItem type
"sts-account" (SRIAMItemSTSAcc), but RustFS emits and accepts only
"sts-credential", so cross-implementation STS replication fails in
both directions (MinIO returns errSRInvalidRequest, RustFS returns
NotImplemented).

Red-light tests:
- pin the outbound AssumeRole replication item type to "sts-account"
  (construction extracted into assume_role_site_replication_item so it
  is testable, behavior unchanged in this commit)
- update the federated identity replication item snapshot to
  "sts-account"
- inbound apply_iam_item must dispatch both "sts-account" and the
  legacy "sts-credential" alias to the STS arm instead of the
  unknown-type NotImplemented fallback

* fix(site-replication): use MinIO-compatible sts-account IAM item type

MinIO madmin-go replicates STS credentials with SRIAMItem type
"sts-account" (SRIAMItemSTSAcc). RustFS emitted "sts-credential" and
accepted only that value inbound, so STS credential replication with
MinIO peers failed in both directions: MinIO rejected RustFS items as
errSRInvalidRequest and RustFS answered MinIO items with
NotImplemented.

- define SR_IAM_ITEM_STS_ACC ("sts-account") and
  SR_IAM_ITEM_STS_ACC_LEGACY ("sts-credential") in rustfs-madmin
- emit "sts-account" from both outbound sites (AssumeRole hook and
  federated identity OIDC hook)
- accept both types inbound; the legacy alias remains permanently for
  mixed-version RustFS rolling upgrades

Token verification and the retry/event mechanism are unchanged.
2026-08-06 08:29:17 +08:00
唐小鸭 733c7b0f67 fix(replication): accept remote target healthCheckDuration nanoseconds (#5754)
* test(replication): accept madmin nanosecond healthCheckDuration payloads

Red-phase TDD tests for P0-7: mc 'replicate add' sends the madmin default
healthCheckDuration=60s as a Go time.Duration nanosecond integer
(60000000000), which RustFS currently rejects as an unsupported field and
would misread as seconds. Also pins the defensive seconds-or-nanos read
for persisted bucket-targets metadata and the capability contract listing
healthCheckDuration as writable.

Currently failing (red):
- remote_target_request_accepts_go_duration_wire_values
- remote_target_request_accepts_legacy_seconds_health_check
- remote_target_health_check_duration_is_declared_writable
- bucket_target_reads_go_nanosecond_durations_defensively
- runtime_capabilities_response_reports_missing_topology_before_storage_init

* fix(replication): accept remote target healthCheckDuration nanoseconds

mc 'replicate add' always sends the madmin default healthcheck-seconds=60
serialized as a Go time.Duration nanosecond integer (60000000000), so the
default mc link-creation path (and 'mc replicate update') failed with
InvalidRequest. Move healthCheckDuration from the unsupported to the
writable remote-target field list; the capability contract in the runtime
capabilities response follows the constants automatically.

Fix the unit mismatch in both directions:
- Request parsing and persisted bucket-targets reads decode the value
  defensively: below 10^7 it is legacy RustFS seconds, otherwise Go
  time.Duration nanoseconds (also covers MinIO-written metadata).
  totalDowntime shares the same wire shape and gets the same handling.
- The list-remote-targets admin response re-encodes only these two fields
  as nanoseconds via a dedicated serialization path, leaving the persisted
  seconds-based wire format untouched for existing readers.

The per-target health-check interval is accepted for mc compatibility but
not yet applied; the heartbeat keeps its global env-configured interval,
and the explicit 'healthcheck' update op stays rejected. disableProxy,
edge, and edgeSyncBeforeExpiry remain explicitly rejected.
2026-08-06 08:27:27 +08:00
唐小鸭 ead419451a fix(replication): send source versionId as query param to remote targets (#5752)
* test(replication): assert remote PUT and multipart initiate carry versionId query

* fix(replication): send source versionId as query param to remote targets
2026-08-06 08:27:23 +08:00
Henry Guo 7211f29498 feat(table-catalog): complete namespace REST contracts (#5745)
* feat(table-catalog): complete namespace REST contracts

* fix(table-catalog): simplify namespace existence guard

* fix(table-catalog): restore migration guard coverage

* fix(table-catalog): preserve encoded namespace segments

* fix(table-catalog): reject implicit namespace creates

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-05 21:07:30 +00:00
唐小鸭 04722caa04 fix(madmin): accept MinIO PascalCase SRInfo fields and nil-map nulls (#5749)
* test(madmin): add MinIO PascalCase SRInfo fixture coverage

* fix(madmin): accept MinIO PascalCase SRInfo fields via serde alias

* test(madmin): cover MinIO nil-map SRInfo JSON output

* fix(madmin): tolerate Go nil-map null in SRInfo deserialization
2026-08-06 04:18:05 +08:00
唐小鸭 066e952df1 fix(site-replication): send peer join to MinIO peer/join route with encrypted payload (#5748)
* test(site-replication): pin peer join wire path to MinIO peer/join route

MinIO only ever registered PUT /minio/admin/v3/site-replication/peer/join;
the /site-replication/join path never existed upstream. Flip the wire-path
and payload-encryption expectations to the real MinIO route. These tests
fail until the outbound rewrite is fixed.

* fix(site-replication): send peer join to MinIO peer/join route with encrypted payload

MinIO only registers PUT /minio/admin/v3/site-replication/peer/join; the
/site-replication/join path never existed upstream, so the outbound join
special-case rewrote requests to a 404 route. Drop the special case so
peer join falls into the generic /rustfs -> /minio prefix rewrite, and
move the payload-encryption predicate to the peer/join route (MinIO's
SRPeerJoin force-decrypts the request body).

MinIO also replies with an empty body on a successful join, which the
previous strict JSON parse rejected. Tolerate an empty/whitespace body by
synthesizing the peer identity from the add preflight metainfo
(deployment id) already fetched for the site.

Inbound dual-path registration (join and peer/join under both admin
prefixes) is intentionally unchanged for rolling upgrades from older
RustFS peers that still send the legacy outbound path.
2026-08-06 04:15:35 +08:00
唐小鸭 ea8dbf49a2 fix(auth): route ListBuckets denial through ApiError to hold s3s ratchet (#5755)
fix(auth): route ListBuckets auth denial through ApiError to keep s3s ratchet at baseline

PR #5726 added one s3_error! call in authorize_request while PR #5739 froze
the s3_error! line baseline at 1686 counted before that merge, so a clean
main-derived branch fails the s3s footprint ratchet with +1.

Replace the new macro call with ApiError::access_denied().into(), a small
constructor on the gateway-side error abstraction (rustfs/backlog#1677 F1,
rustfs/backlog#1733) instead of raising the baseline. The converted S3Error
carries the identical AccessDenied code and "Access Denied" message, and the
filtered ListBuckets fallback matches on the code only.
2026-08-06 03:22:28 +08:00
Zhengchao An 5f3bc617fe fix: bump s3_error! footprint baseline to 1687 for auth ListBuckets fix (#5747) 2026-08-06 00:05:01 +08:00
hector 6f10ca18a9 feat(ci): add DEB/RPM packaging workflow (#5738) 2026-08-05 16:19:42 +08:00
Zhengchao An 759ade4770 fix(auth): restore filtered ListBuckets fallback (#5726) 2026-08-05 15:21:51 +08:00
Zhengchao An db1daaece2 ci(scripts): add s3s footprint ratchet ahead of s3gate migration (#5739)
Freeze the direct s3s dependency surface with a lower-only ratchet so it
cannot grow while the s3gate/gateway migration shrinks it
(rustfs/backlog#1677 review finding F1; acceptance criteria in
rustfs/backlog#1733). Baselines verified on 2026-08-05: 236 files
importing s3s, 1686 s3_error! invocation lines. Wired into make
pre-commit / pre-pr / dev-check and the Quick Checks job in ci.yml and
its ci-docs-only.yml mirror.
2026-08-05 15:21:35 +08:00
houseme f0c4fbd28f chore(deps): refresh mimalloc revision (#5736)
* chore(deps): refresh mimalloc revision

Update mimalloc and libmimalloc-sys to the requested git revision after running the dependency refresh flow.

Keep ratelimit excluded while accepting compatible dependency updates from cargo update and cargo upgrade.

Harden all-feature test compilation by giving heavy integration test crates their own recursion limit and avoiding a cross-thread spawn for the embedded startup barrier future.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* upgrade version

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-05 04:46:13 +00:00
Zhengchao An 8550a8f9c3 refactor(ecstore): unify remaining heal logs to structured event style (#5720)
PR #5719 fixed the issue #5716 per-object heal log amplification (per-object statements demoted, heal spans forced to TRACE, raw metadata dumps banned by guardrail) and superseded the demotion originally proposed here. This PR now carries only the residual cleanup on top of it:

- Convert the remaining bare-field and format-arg heal logs in crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/heal.rs to the file's structured convention (event/component/subsystem + context fields): missing-object skip, disk-marked-for-healing, cannot-reconstruct errors, dangling-cleanup error, missing data_dir error, xl.meta regeneration warn, and orphan-reclaim failure warn.
- Demote the last remaining info! in the file — the per-set heal_format "set disk formats success, NoHealRequired" no-op message — to a structured debug! (error_count instead of a raw errs dump), and drop its whitelist exclusion in scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh so the no-INFO check for set-disk heal files is strict.

No control flow or behavior changes.
2026-08-05 03:54:27 +00:00
Zhengchao An 018f27d1cd test(ecstore): deflake multipart listing tests under plain cargo test (#5730)
Multipart upload ids embed the process-global deployment id at both create time and list time. Under plain cargo test (thread-parallel, shared process globals) a concurrently running test that re-initializes a store can swap the global between the two reads, making full-upload-id equality assertions fail spuriously (observed: core::sets::tests::list_multipart_uploads_merges_all_sets_without_pagination_loss failing when run concurrently with bucket::quota tests, passing in isolation).

Add a test-only upload_uuid_suffix helper next to deployment_upload_id and make the affected assertions compare only the decoded <uuid>x<timestamp> suffix. Where suffix normalization changes within-key ordering (base64 alphabet order is not byte order), both sides are sorted before comparison. nextest/CI is unaffected (process-per-test); this only hardens local plain cargo test runs.
2026-08-05 11:50:29 +08:00
Zhengchao An 6617708faa fix(ecstore): make local disk map initialization replace stale topology (#5734)
initialize_local_disk_maps appended pool entries to local_disk_set_drives and inserted into local_disk_map without ever clearing previous state. Every caller (both production startup entry points and all tests) passes the FULL topology, so re-initializing the same InstanceContext left the pool/set vectors sized for the stale topology and panicked with index-out-of-bounds for wider disk indices.

This surfaced as deterministic cross-test contamination under single-process cargo test: in crates/heal heal_b920_subquorum_union_test, a 4-disk test initialized pool 0 as [None; 4] on the process-level default context, and the two 8-disk tests then panicked at disk_idx 4. Each test passed alone, and CI never caught it because cargo nextest isolates every test in its own process.

Fix: clear both registries at the start of initialize_local_disk_maps so initialization is idempotent and last-topology-wins. Add a regression unit test in ecstore (process-isolation-proof, unlike the heal integration binary) that re-initializes the same context with a wider topology; it fails with the pre-fix code.
2026-08-05 11:50:11 +08:00
Zhengchao An f73054f6ad fix(s3): degrade multipart listings per upload instead of failing the bucket (#5721)
The multipart staging namespace is one flat set of sha256(bucket/object) directories shared by every bucket, and the cross-set listing rewrite reads every upload's metadata. Two shapes poisoned the whole ListMultipartUploads response with InternalError: Corrupted format: a healthy in-flight upload belonging to another bucket (its stored owner bucket fails the guard and fell into the corrupted-format arm), and a single upload directory whose xl.meta was torn by an unclean shutdown. Docker Distribution calls ListMultipartUploads on every PATCH/commit, so either shape broke OCI registry pushes entirely (issue #5716).

Foreign-bucket uploads are now skipped silently, and directories whose metadata is affirmatively corrupt at quorum are skipped with a debug log, while every other decode failure (quorum loss from offline disks, timeouts, transport errors) keeps failing the listing so clients retry instead of silently losing entries. The degrade-vs-propagate decision is a named corrupt-family classifier with a unit test pinning both sides. FileMeta::check_xl2_v1 now classifies a missing or wrong XL2 magic as FileCorrupt instead of an anonymous io error so damage is distinguishable from transient IO faults.

Refs #5716
2026-08-05 03:49:52 +00:00
Zhengchao An 8c9e884cf2 fix(ecstore): make inline-rollback reclamation file-precise to keep #5703's child-key safety (#5732)
#5724 reclaimed the synthetic inline-rollback dir after a committed rename with delete_data_dir(recursive: true), which has no notion of object metadata: for unversioned objects the synthetic UUID is a fixed, publicly-known constant, so object/<rollback-dir> can simultaneously be a legitimate child key's directory, and recursively deleting it reopens the authorization bypass #5703 closed (PutObject on K destroying K/<uuid> without DeleteObject permission).

Replace the recursive pass with a file-precise one: after quorum commit, delete exactly object/<rollback>/xl.meta.bkp with a non-recursive delete on every disk whose rollback dir is not also the cleanup dir. The parent-rmdir walk removes the dir only when the backup was its sole content, so the BucketNotEmpty leak fix is preserved (#5724's regression test passes unchanged) while a child key at the same path keeps its metadata. The undo path's restore_metadata_backup now also reclaims the emptied synthetic dir, mirroring restore_delete_rollback.
2026-08-05 03:32:41 +00:00
Zhengchao An 75d0c8d6b9 fix(quota): keep the degraded-baseline fallback off the write path's stack (#5728)
The fallback future embeds the whole snapshot loader, and every object write nests a quota check several futures deep, so inlining it grew each write's state machine by the loader's full size — the debug-build 2MiB worker-stack overflow class fixed for bucket-config writes in #5648. Box the fallback at its call site; the allocation only happens on the degraded path.
2026-08-05 03:02:33 +00:00
Zhengchao An d2e5346044 fix(heal): demote per-object heal logs and cap erasure-set failure warns (#5727)
fix(heal): demote per-object logs and cap erasure-set failure warns

Follow-up to rustfs/rustfs#5716. Per-object heal task kinds (Object/Metadata/MRF/ECDecode) queued by MRF/autoheal/scanner loops emitted info!/warn!/error! lines per object: task lifecycle (started/completed/timed_out/failed), the missing-object warn, queue admission full/drop/displacement warns, retry-admission decisions, and uncapped per-object warns in erasure-set sweeps.

Add a shared demote_to_debug_when! macro that keeps aggregate task kinds and admin/internal requests at operator-visible levels while demoting per-object occurrences to debug!, sample-cap the erasure-set transient_skip/failed warns per bucket via take_failure_log_sample (reusing the heal_bucket_objects precedent), demote the per-retry admission decision logs to debug! (covered by rustfs_heal_admission_total and the scheduler task_retrying/task_failed events), and record the previously unmetered duplicate-admission outcome.

Extend scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh with injection-verified regression guards and run it in both quick-checks jobs (ci.yml and its ci-docs-only.yml mirror).
2026-08-05 02:43:57 +00:00
Zhengchao An 204068e07e fix(targets): surface redacted construction error detail in target failures (#5729)
A failed target construction previously logged only reason=construction_failed and pushed an opaque "target construction failed" summary, discarding the underlying TargetError. Debugging rustfs#5115 showed the log repeated every 5s with no root cause, even though the error carried an actionable egress-policy rejection (RUSTFS_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS hint).

The Err branch now includes the error detail in both the error! log (detail field) and the returned failures summary. The detail is scrubbed against the instance's merged config via the loader's existing per-field redaction (secrets -> ***redacted***, endpoint URLs -> origin only, DSNs -> password masked) so credential-bearing values never reach logs or Admin-visible summaries.
2026-08-05 02:42:04 +00:00
anthonymartin ec135f8c4c fix(heal): bound per-object logging (#5719)
Co-authored-by: Anthony Martin <949506+anthonymartin@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-05 02:25:59 +00:00
Zhengchao An 5bd28048d5 fix(filemeta): redact sealed keys and elide inline data in FileInfo Debug (#5725)
FileInfo's derived Debug printed the full metadata map (including X-Rustfs/X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Sealed-Key and -Iv values, i.e. KEK-wrapped DEK ciphertext) and the full inline data bytes (plaintext user content for non-SSE small objects), so any whole-struct log dump such as the heal_object dumps leaked user data and sealed key material into logs.

Replace the derive with a manual Debug impl that redacts encryption metadata values (keys stay visible, values print as redacted with length) under both internal prefixes, and elides data/checksum bytes to a length summary. The exhaustive destructuring forces every future field through an explicit show/redact decision. starts_with_ignore_ascii_case is made pub in rustfs-utils for reuse.
2026-08-05 02:07:01 +00:00
Zhengchao An 53a8e02a08 fix(ecstore): reclaim synthetic inline-rollback dirs after rename commit (#5724)
#5703 split rollback state from old-data-dir cleanup so the synthetic inline-rollback dir is reported only as rollback_data_dir and never reclaimed as if it were a real data dir. But nothing reclaims it after a successful commit either: every overwrite of an inline version by a non-inline one leaves <object>/<rollback-dir>/xl.meta.bkp behind. The residue is not referenced by any version, so it survives object deletion and DeleteBucket fails with BucketNotEmpty forever — the mass teardown cascade currently failing the S3 Implemented Tests CI lane.

Reclaim the synthetic dirs in SetDisks::rename_data once the commit holds write quorum. The quorum-failure undo inside the same function is the only consumer of the backup, so its window is closed at that point. Best-effort with the same anti-misdelete posture as commit_rename_data_dir: never touch the just-committed data dir, and residue must not fail a durable write (backlog#898).
2026-08-05 02:04:46 +00:00
唐小鸭 15b9c1f4e3 fix(replication): make bucket replication rules editable from clients (#5715)
* fix(replication): accept explicit STANDARD destination storage class

The replication engine never reads Rule.Destination.StorageClass (replica
placement comes from the bucket-target config or the source object), yet the
validator rejected any config carrying the field. The console's add-rule form
always sends StorageClass=STANDARD, so every rule created through it failed
with InvalidRequest.

Tolerate exactly STANDARD as a no-op — semantically identical to omitting
the field — and keep rejecting every other value, which would be silently
ignored rather than honored. Document the deliberate omission from the
replication capability contract.

* feat(admin): support MinIO-style partial updates for set-remote-target

set-remote-target?update=true previously replaced every stored field and
required complete credentials in the body, so flipping a target's sync mode
from the console forced operators to re-enter the secret key, and real
mc replicate update bodies (madmin Clone() strips the secret) failed to
deserialize at all.

Adopt MinIO's TargetUpdateType contract: query params creds/sync/bandwidth/
path name the field groups to overlay onto the stored target, everything
else keeps its persisted value, and unsupported groups (proxy, healthcheck,
edge, edgeSyncBeforeExpiry) fail loudly. Credentials updates are skipped for
site-replication peer targets — probed by both scheme derivations of the
stored endpoint and the stored deployment id — because an operator never
knows the site replicator's credentials, and a body-supplied deployment id
is ignored on update since it anchors peer identity. madmin JSON aliases
(bandwidthlimit, storageclass, resetID, deploymentID, sessionToken) let mc
bodies parse under deny_unknown_fields.

e2e: cover a credential-free sync-only update preserving the stored
connection and the zero-ops no-op contract; align the missing-arn assertion
with the earlier validation error.

* chore(scripts): add two-site replication lab manager

site_replication_smoke.py spawns and manages two local rustfs processes,
pairs them via the site-replication admin API (idempotent), and verifies
bidirectional object replication. Subcommands: up/down/restart/status/logs/
smoke/info/remove/clean. Stdlib-only; requests are SigV4-signed the same
way as crates/e2e_test.

* chore(scripts): rename direction-suffixed payload variables for typos check

The typos linter reads the _ba suffix in payload_ba as a misspelling of
"by"; use payload_a_to_b / payload_b_to_a instead.

---------

Co-authored-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-05 01:50:31 +00:00
Zhengchao An 4042bc0a5e fix(quota): admit writes against a persisted usage baseline while authoritative usage is unavailable (#5722)
Upgrading from a pre-v2 release leaves only the legacy .usage.json snapshot, which has no completeness marker and is demoted to non-authoritative, so every write to a quota-enabled bucket failed closed with a retryable 503 until the scanner's first complete cycle persisted .usage.v2.json — a production outage on large namespaces (issue #5716).

Quota admission now degrades to the last persisted per-bucket size: normalize_loaded_data_usage returns the pre-discard bucket sizes, the TTL-bounded snapshot cache retains them (carried forward through failed refreshes), and QuotaChecker::get_real_time_usage falls back to that baseline when the authoritative caches miss. The baseline is static between snapshot loads, so hard-quota enforcement is advisory for the duration of the degraded window — strictly tighter than beta.11 (usage treated as 0) and strictly more available than a blanket 503. Buckets absent from every persisted snapshot still fail closed, and removing a bucket's usage from the backend purges the baseline so a recreated bucket cannot inherit the dead incarnation's size.

Refs #5716
2026-08-05 01:42:09 +00:00
Zhengchao An 4576c2e470 fix(iam): invalidate peer STS caches on revocation (#5718) 2026-08-05 01:17:36 +00:00
Zhengchao An 327fdd5fc2 fix(replication): report FAILED when replication put options cannot be built (#5717)
Both per-target replication methods assign the optimistic Completed status to rinfo before building put options, and the Err branch of replication_put_object_options returned rinfo unchanged. Since #5633 made the source encryption classification case-insensitive, managed SSE sources are rejected at this gate, and the rejection was reported as successful replication: the source object was marked COMPLETED, ObjectReplicationComplete was emitted, and nothing existed on the target.

Set replication_status = Failed (and record the error in the replicate_object branch) so the composite status, the OperationFailedReplication event, and MRF retries reflect the fail-closed outcome. This restores the contract pinned by test_bucket_replication_sse_kms_failure_contract, which timed out in the e2e-replication-nightly runs on 2026-08-03 and 2026-08-04.
2026-08-05 01:08:11 +00:00
houseme 16c2928965 refactor(metrics): migrate scanner report timestamps to jiff (#5710)
* refactor(metrics): migrate scanner report timestamps to jiff

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* refactor(madmin): migrate admin timestamps to jiff (#5712)

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* refactor(storage): migrate RPC DTO timestamps to jiff (#5713)

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 18:35:38 +00:00
453 changed files with 84670 additions and 10861 deletions
+16 -16
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
name: adversarial-validation
description: Execute the Adversarial Validation policy from the root AGENTS.md — run the seven reviewer roles (correctness, simplicity, security, concurrency/durability, compatibility, performance, test coverage) with RustFS-specific attack probes. Use on every behavior-affecting code change, bug fix, or design proposal before declaring it done.
description: Execute the Adversarial Validation policy from the root AGENTS.md — run the applicable reviewer roles with RustFS-specific attack probes. Use on every behavior-affecting code change, bug fix, design proposal, or agent-instruction change that alters execution before declaring it done.
---
# Adversarial Validation Playbooks
@@ -61,14 +61,15 @@ Null report example: "Attacked quorum-1 error reduction, exact max-keys listing
### Simplicity adversary
- Smaller-diff attack: rewrite the diff's change mentally (or actually, in scratch) as the minimal in-place edit and compare. Flag as findings: a helper function with exactly one caller introduced by this diff; a file rewrite where a 3-line edit inside the existing control flow suffices; reshaped control flow in init/locking/metadata/quorum paths beyond what the fix requires; new string literals duplicating existing constants (grep the token first); #[path] module inclusion. If the smaller diff achieves identical behavior, report it with the concrete replacement.
- Smaller-diff attack: inspect production growth separately from tests, fixtures, generated code, and documentation; test additions have no growth budget. Rewrite the production diff mentally (or in scratch) as the minimal equivalent edit. Report a finding only with a concrete smaller design that preserves correctness, compatibility, readability, and real boundaries; fewer lines alone are not evidence.
- Where: Any diff; extra scrutiny for crates/ecstore, crates/lock, rustfs/src/storage where 'preserve the existing control-flow shape' is an explicit rule
- Evidence: AGENTS.md 'Change Style for Existing Logic' (one-off helper ban, preserve control-flow shape in distributed/locking/metadata paths, no #[path]) and 'Reuse Before You Write' (constants clause); the Adversarial Validation roles list charters the simplicity adversary with exactly this attack.
- Reuse-and-necessity attack: for each new helper the diff introduces, run `ls crates/utils/src crates/common/src` and `rg -i 'fn \w*<term>'` over those dirs plus the touched crate (snake_case signatures — a full-text single-word grep drowns, a multi-word phrase returns nothing). A reimplementation of an existing workspace utility, or of plain std/tokio behavior no wrapper refines, is a finding — but so is forced reuse with mismatched semantics (normalization such as `clean` resolving `.`/`..` against raw S3 keys, error type, backoff, durability gating). For each new defensive branch, demand the nameable trigger and flag re-validation of what a validated upstream layer on the SAME path already guarantees — excluding the Cross-Cutting Domain Invariant patterns (nil/empty/absent UUID, dual metadata keys, unversioned-tier versionId) and re-checks before destructive actions, which are load-bearing even when redundant on the happy path. For each new test, flag near-duplicates pinning the same code path AND poison-value class as an existing test — boundary companions (n==max vs max+1, absent vs empty vs nil UUID, MetaObject vs MetaDeleteMarker) are never near-duplicates; the test-coverage skeptic playbook below mandates them.
- Where: Any diff adding helpers, branches on decoded/peer data, or tests; helper checks against crates/utils, crates/common, and the touched crate
- Evidence: AGENTS.md 'Change Style for Existing Logic' (conditional extraction rule, preserve sensitive control flow, canonical modules) and 'Reuse Before You Write'; the Adversarial Validation roles list charters this attack.
- Reuse-and-necessity attack: for each new helper, search `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, the touched crate, the likely domain owner, and relevant direct dependencies. A reimplementation is a finding, but forced reuse with mismatched normalization, error, backoff, or durability semantics is also a finding. Demand a nameable trigger for new defensive branches. Tests remain subject to validity and near-duplicate coverage review, never a size limit.
- Where: Any diff adding helpers, branches on decoded/peer data, or tests
- Evidence: AGENTS.md 'Reuse Before You Write' and 'Necessary Code Only'; GHSA-f4vq-9ffr-m8m3 (normalization-asymmetry traversal — why forced reuse of normalizing helpers on raw keys is itself an attack); docs/operations/tier-ilm-debugging.md nil-versionId incident (why boundary re-checks are load-bearing).
- Replacement-and-comment attack: when the diff introduces a replacement path or representation, trace all callers and flag a superseded in-scope path left behind without a compatibility requirement. Keep one canonical core behind compatibility adapters. Comments must state non-obvious invariants completely without narration or change history. Never demand unrelated deletion or trade away correctness, compatibility, or readability to reduce the diff.
Null report example: "Rewrote the diff as an in-place edit (no smaller equivalent exists), grepped both new helpers against crates/utils, crates/common, and the touched crate (no existing equivalent; call-site semantics checked), verified the two new defensive branches name concrete corrupt-input triggers, and checked the added tests against the existing suite (each pins a distinct poison-value class) — no break found."
Null report example: "Separated production growth from tests/docs, tested a smaller equivalent, checked helper reuse and superseded paths, and found no break."
### Security reviewer
@@ -195,9 +196,9 @@ Null report example: "Attacked dual-key metadata writes/removals against MinIO-o
### Performance reviewer
- For every `.clone()` the diff adds or moves onto a per-request/per-object path, open the cloned type and count heap fields (String, Vec, HashMap, Bytes). If >5 heap fields or it contains an EC block buffer, construct the cost: N concurrent PUTs x M objects -> N*M deep copies per second. Demand Arc-wrapping of heavy fields or pass-by-reference; also flag new `String` allocations in header/path/signature parsing where `&str`/`Cow<str>` suffices.
- For each `.clone()` or allocation added to a per-request/per-object path, identify the copied data and execution frequency. Report a finding only for a concrete repeated cost or benchmark regression. Recommend borrowing, moving, `Bytes`/`Arc`, `Cow`, or capacity reservation only when it reduces that cost without obscuring ownership or APIs.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/**, crates/ecstore/src/store*.rs, rustfs/src/storage/, crates/filemeta/, request handlers in rustfs/src/
- Evidence: crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md 'Allocation Discipline in Hot Paths' (no Clone on >5-heap-field structs, Arc for large buffers, &str/Cow for temporary computations); .agents/skills/rust-code-quality/SKILL.md ranks 'unnecessary clone in hot path' as P1 must-fix
- Evidence: crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md 'Allocation Discipline in Hot Paths'; .agents/skills/rust-code-quality/SKILL.md requires a concrete hot-path cost rather than a proxy metric
- For every new sync_all/sync_data/fdatasync/flush/File::sync call in the diff, trace the call chain to DurabilityMode / RUSTFS_DRIVE_SYNC_ENABLE resolution (crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs:291 DurabilityMode, :347 resolve_durability_mode) and to per-bucket durability overrides. Construct the run where the operator sets mode=none (or legacy RUSTFS_DRIVE_SYNC_ENABLE=false) and the new fsync still fires — that is an ungated durability cost and a regression on 4KiB writes.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs, crates/ecstore/src/bucket/durability.rs, crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/** (rename_data/commit paths), any crate doing tokio::fs or std::fs writes
- Evidence: #4221 fsync work caused a measured -10% 4KiB write regression (#814 investigation), later gated; durability modes added in eaff17cad (#4397), per-bucket tier overrides in 13e48d93a (#4407); 2df315baf (#4493) shows even ancestor-dir fsyncs are routed through the gate
@@ -230,12 +231,12 @@ Null report example: "Attacked the new rename_data commit-section work, durabili
### Test-coverage skeptic
- For every behavior claim in the PR description, revert that hunk (git stash / manual undo of the changed lines) and name the exact test (`cargo test -p <crate> <test_name>`) that fails. If no test fails on revert, the behavior is untested — file a finding, not a note. Especially verify the test exercises the REAL production call path, not a lookalike helper.
- For every testable behavior claim in the PR description, revert that hunk and name the focused test or executable check that detects the revert. If no reasonable check exists, require the reason and residual risk from the validation floor. Especially verify the check exercises the real production path, not a lookalike helper.
- Where: All crates; highest value in crates/ecstore, rustfs/src/storage, crates/heal
- Evidence: AGENTS.md exit criterion 'Every behavior change has a test that fails without it'. Real bug: PR #4220 (ghost-directory cleanup) merged with green tests but its fix never executed on the real delete path — required follow-up rustfs#4307, backlog#798 stayed OPEN. The tests exercised a path the production flow never took.
- Evidence: AGENTS.md testable-behavior exit criterion. Real bug: PR #4220 (ghost-directory cleanup) merged with green tests but its fix never executed on the real delete path — required follow-up rustfs#4307, backlog#798 stayed OPEN. The tests exercised a path the production flow never took.
- Read each added/modified test and confirm it asserts the real outcome (returned value, stored bytes, error variant), not merely 'call succeeded' or 'no panic'. Flag any test whose only observable is that the function returned, and any `assert!(result.is_err())` that never checks WHICH error. Then check: does the test prove the exploit/failure form is denied, or only that the intended form still works?
- Where: crates/e2e_test (security_boundary_test.rs pattern), and every #[cfg(test)] module in the diff
- Evidence: Commit dee8e4e63 (#4466) had to rewrite 277 lines of crates/e2e_test/src/security_boundary_test.rs because 'security boundary tests' passed without asserting real outcomes. .agents/skills/rust-code-quality/SKILL.md checklist: 'Every test function has at least one assert!'; .agents/skills/security-advisory-lessons/SKILL.md: 'Does the test prove the exploit form is denied, or only that the intended form still works?'
- Evidence: Commit dee8e4e63 (#4466) had to rewrite 277 lines of crates/e2e_test/src/security_boundary_test.rs because 'security boundary tests' passed without asserting real outcomes. .agents/skills/rust-code-quality/SKILL.md requires an observable failure criterion; .agents/skills/security-advisory-lessons/SKILL.md asks whether the exploit form is denied.
- When the diff adds a boolean/mode parameter or config flag, find the test that fails if the flag's effect is INVERTED inside the changed function. Tests that were mechanically updated to pass `false`/default at every call site assert nothing about the new behavior. Execute the check: flip the flag's branch in the source and confirm at least one test goes red for each branch.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ (e.g. build_codec_streaming_part_reader), any function gaining a parameter
- Evidence: Commit 05890d6e2 (#4573): PR #4560 added a 15th param allow_inplace_legacy_fallback; the arity tests were fixed by passing `false` everywhere — they assert Err outcomes independent of the flag, so the fallback behavior itself has no revert-detecting test at those sites.
@@ -260,7 +261,7 @@ Null report example: "Attacked the new rename_data commit-section work, durabili
- For any pagination/limit/truncation change, construct the exact-boundary test: result count == max (page exactly full), max+1, and a delimiter re-fold that lands precisely on the page boundary — assert both the item count AND the is_truncated/continuation marker. Off-by-one at the page boundary is a recurring shipped bug here.
- Where: crates/ecstore listing paths (list_objects, ListMultipartUploads, metacache), S3 handlers in rustfs/src/storage
- Evidence: Two shipped boundary bugs: fefa70b31 (#4447) ListMultipartUploads returned one upload past max-uploads; d91f4d455 (#4538) delimiter re-fold of a full page lost the truncation flag. Both survived existing tests because no test pinned n == max exactly.
- Green `cargo test -p <crate>` on the touched crate is not a coverage verdict for the diff's test code itself: run `cargo clippy --all-targets -p <crate>` and a workspace-wide test BUILD (`cargo check --workspace --all-targets` at minimum) before accepting the tests as evidence. Test-only code that doesn't compile workspace-wide or fails clippy has repeatedly broken main and masked whether tests ran at all.
- A green focused test is evidence only for the targets it builds. Follow the `AGENTS.md` validation tier: add package-scoped Clippy or broader test-target compilation only when changed targets, features, or dependents remain uncovered; do not require a workspace-wide build by default.
- Where: All crates; especially concurrent-branch merges into crates/ecstore
- Evidence: #4322 broke main because only cargo test ran (field_reassign_with_default is clippy-only). b06f3df6b (#4441) and 05890d6e2 (#4573): test code broke the workspace test build (E0061) on main after textually-clean merges, failing CI for every open PR.
@@ -271,7 +272,6 @@ Null report example: "Attacked revert-detection for all 3 claimed behaviors (eac
Probes are distilled from shipped bugs in git history (commit/PR references
above), GitHub security advisories (see the security-advisory-lessons
skill), scoped `AGENTS.md` rules, and invariants under `docs/architecture/`
and `docs/operations/`. Line numbers drift; when a cited location no longer
matches, trust the invariant and re-locate the code. When a new bug class
ships, add a probe with its evidence here rather than growing the policy
section in `AGENTS.md`.
and `docs/operations/`. Line numbers drift; re-locate the invariant. Merge
new incidents into an existing probe when they share a failure class; add a
new probe only for a distinct attack, rather than growing the root policy.
+7 -4
View File
@@ -24,15 +24,17 @@ Use this skill before `gh pr create`, before `gh pr edit`, or when reviewing whe
2. Inspect change scope
- Review the diff and summarize what changed.
- Inspect `git diff --stat` and `git diff --numstat`; assess production-code growth separately. Tests, fixtures, generated code, and documentation have no growth budget. Treat line counts as signals, not quotas.
- Call out unrelated edits, generated artifacts, logs, or secrets as blockers.
- Mark risky areas explicitly: auth, storage, config, network, migrations, breaking changes.
- Use the simplicity-adversary verdict instead of producing a per-symbol inventory. Block growth only when the review identifies duplication or gives a concrete smaller design that preserves correctness, compatibility, readability, and real boundaries.
- Confirm replacement implementations remove the superseded in-scope path or adapt compatibility at the boundary to one canonical core.
- Scan the diff for newly added string literals and confirm whether they duplicate values already defined as constants/enums/typed wrappers in the same module or shared modules.
- Treat introducing a new hardcoded literal where a project constant already exists as a likely regression risk; require either a refactor to reuse the constant or an explicit exception explanation in the PR body.
3. Verify readiness requirements
- Require `make pre-commit` before marking PRs ready when the diff changes Rust code, product behavior, CI behavior, runtime configuration, security-sensitive logic, migrations, storage, auth, networking, or other high-risk paths.
- For documentation-only, agent-instruction-only, or local developer-tooling-only changes, allow focused verification instead of `make pre-commit` when it directly validates the changed surface.
- For focused verification, explain why the full gate was not run and list the scope-specific commands in the PR body.
- Select checks from `AGENTS.md` "Verification Before PR" based on the final diff's risk tier. Do not replace a focused behavioral test with `make pre-commit`, or a required high-risk `make pre-pr` with a narrower gate.
- For focused verification, state why the selected tier is sufficient and list the scope-specific commands in the PR body.
- If `make` is unavailable, use the equivalent commands from `.config/make/`.
- Add scope-specific verification commands when the changed area needs more than the baseline.
- If required checks fail, stop and return `BLOCKED`.
@@ -81,13 +83,14 @@ Use this skill before `gh pr create`, before `gh pr edit`, or when reviewing whe
## Blocker rules
- Return `BLOCKED` if a code, behavior, CI, runtime configuration, security-sensitive, migration, storage, auth, networking, or other high-risk change has not passed `make pre-commit`.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the checks required by the `AGENTS.md` validation tier have not passed.
- Return `BLOCKED` if a documentation-only, agent-instruction-only, or local developer-tooling-only change lacks focused verification for the changed surface.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the diff contains unrelated changes that are not acknowledged.
- Return `BLOCKED` if required template sections are missing.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the title/body is not in English.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the title does not follow the repository's Conventional Commit rule.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the diff introduces string literals that should use existing constants but did not.
- Return `BLOCKED` for production-code growth only when the review identifies a duplicated or superseded implementation, or supplies a concrete smaller design with equivalent semantics. Fewer lines alone are not evidence.
## Reference
@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
- Confirm the branch is based on current `main`.
- Confirm the diff matches the stated scope.
- Confirm no secrets, logs, temp files, or unrelated refactors are included.
- Confirm `make pre-commit` passed for code, behavior, CI, runtime configuration, security-sensitive, migration, storage, auth, networking, or other high-risk changes.
- For documentation-only, agent-instruction-only, or local developer-tooling-only changes, confirm focused verification covered the changed surface and the PR body explains why the full gate was not run.
- Confirm the checks required by the `AGENTS.md` validation tier passed.
- For focused verification, confirm it covered the changed surface and the PR body explains why the selected tier is sufficient.
- Confirm extra verification commands are listed for risky changes.
- Confirm the PR title uses Conventional Commits and stays within 72 characters.
- Confirm the PR title does not use tool-specific prefixes such as `[codex]`.
+32 -32
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
name: rust-code-quality
description: Enforce Rust-specific code quality rules on every code change. Use before merge to catch unwrap abuse, silent truncation, unnecessary cloning, lock ordering violations, recursion risks, and error type anti-patterns.
description: Enforce Rust-specific code quality rules on every Rust change. Use before merge to catch unwrap abuse, silent truncation, unnecessary cloning, lock ordering violations, recursion risks, and error type anti-patterns.
---
# Rust Code Quality Gate
@@ -12,27 +12,29 @@ Use this skill on every Rust code change to enforce quality rules that `cargo cl
1. Identify changed `.rs` files.
2. Run automated checks on changed files.
3. Run manual review checklist on the diff.
4. Report findings; block merge if P0/P1 issues exist.
4. Resolve or rebut every finding with evidence; P0/P1 findings cannot be deferred.
## Automated Checks
Run these on every changed `.rs` file (excluding test modules):
Use these searches to find candidates in changed `.rs` files. Inspect syntax,
`#[cfg(test)]` scope, and the changed hunk before reporting a finding; text
filters do not reliably distinguish production code from tests.
```bash
# 1. unwrap/expect in production code
rg -n '\.unwrap\(\)|\.expect\(' <changed-files> | grep -v '#\[cfg(test)\]' | grep -v 'test' | grep -v 'bench'
# 1. unwrap/expect candidates
rg -n '\.unwrap\(\)|\.expect\(' <changed-files>
# 2. Silent type truncation via `as` cast
rg -n ' as (u8|u16|u32|u64|usize|i8|i16|i32|i64|isize)\b' <changed-files>
# 3. String as error type
rg -n 'Result<.*String>' <changed-files> | grep -v test
rg -n 'Result<.*String>' <changed-files>
# 4. Box<dyn Error> in public APIs
rg -n 'Box<dyn.*Error' <changed-files> | grep -v test
rg -n 'Box<dyn.*Error' <changed-files>
# 5. println/eprintln in production
rg -n 'println!\|eprintln!' <changed-files> | grep -v test
rg -n 'println!\|eprintln!' <changed-files>
# 6. Ordering::Relaxed usage (verify each is intentional)
rg -n 'Ordering::Relaxed' <changed-files>
@@ -46,37 +48,35 @@ rg -n 'unwrap_or_default\(\)|unwrap_or\(' <changed-files>
For every Rust code change, verify:
### Error Handling
- [ ] No `unwrap()` or `expect()` in production code without justification comment
- [ ] Every production `unwrap()` or `expect()` is infallible by type or a checked invariant; explain only non-obvious invariants, using an existing type, a useful `expect` message, or a concise comment
- [ ] No `Result<_, String>` in public API signatures
- [ ] No `Box<dyn Error>` in public trait/struct methods
- [ ] Public library APIs use domain errors unless deliberate error erasure at a boundary is part of the contract
- [ ] `Error::source()` is overridden when inner error is stored
- [ ] Error messages are actionable (what failed, with what input)
- [ ] Error messages are actionable without exposing secret input
### Type Safety
- [ ] No silent `as` truncation (negative→unsigned, large→small)
- [ ] `try_into()` or explicit clamping used for numeric conversions
- [ ] No `f64 as usize` without prior clamping
- [ ] Fallible numeric conversions use `TryFrom`/`try_into()` and return a typed error; clamp or saturate only when the domain explicitly requires it
- [ ] Floating-point to integer conversion validates finiteness, sign, and range before conversion
### Concurrency
- [ ] Lock acquisition order is documented when multiple locks are used, and matches every other call site taking any overlapping subset (ABBA check)
- [ ] No `tokio::sync` lock guard (read or write) held across `.await` without bounded hold time — long-lived read guards wedge writers (#4195)
- [ ] Concurrent counters use `compare_exchange` loops, not load-then-store
- [ ] Atomic read-modify-write uses the direct `fetch_*` operation when possible; use `compare_exchange` only for conditional updates
- [ ] `std::sync::Mutex` in async context is held only briefly, never across `.await`
### Memory and Performance
- [ ] No `.clone()` on structs with >5 heap-allocated fields in hot paths
- [ ] `HashMap::with_capacity()` / `Vec::with_capacity()` used when size is known
- [ ] Large buffers wrapped in `Arc` rather than cloned
- [ ] Temporary string computations use `&str` or `Cow<str>` instead of `String`
- [ ] On an identified hot path, report cloning or allocation only with a concrete per-request/per-object cost or benchmark signal
- [ ] Prefer borrowing, moving, `Bytes`/`Arc`, or capacity reservation only when it reduces that cost without obscuring ownership or APIs
### Recursion Safety
- [ ] Recursive functions have a depth limit or use iterative traversal
- [ ] Recursion over untrusted, persisted, or otherwise unbounded input has a depth limit or uses iterative traversal
- [ ] Tree/cache traversals handle corrupted/cyclic input safely
### Testing
- [ ] Every test function has at least one `assert!`
- [ ] Tests use `.expect("context")` not bare `.unwrap()`
- [ ] No `println!`/`eprintln!` in production code (use `tracing`)
- [ ] Tests have an observable failure criterion; delegated assertions, `#[should_panic]`, snapshot/property checks, and meaningful `Result` failures do not need a redundant `assert!`
- [ ] Use `expect` only when its message improves failure diagnosis; do not add boilerplate to self-evident test setup
- [ ] Test volume and line count are never treated as production-code growth
### Serde
- [ ] Structs from untrusted input have `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]`
@@ -88,18 +88,18 @@ For every Rust code change, verify:
- [ ] New string literals don't duplicate existing constants
### Reuse and Necessity
- [ ] No new helper duplicating an existing workspace utility (`crates/utils`, `crates/common`, the touched crate) or plain std/tokio behavior no wrapper refines; reused helpers match the call site's semantics (normalization, error type, backoff, durability gating)
- [ ] No new helper duplicates `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, the touched crate, the likely domain-owning crate, a relevant direct dependency, or plain std/tokio behavior; reused helpers match the call site's semantics
- [ ] No branch without a nameable concrete trigger; no re-validation of what a validated upstream layer on the same path already guarantees (Cross-Cutting Domain Invariant patterns and pre-destructive-action re-checks are load-bearing — keep them)
- [ ] Error context attached once where actionable, not re-wrapped at every hop; no typed→generic error conversion below aggregation/quorum layers
- [ ] No comments narrating the next line, restating a signature, or describing the change itself (invariant comments — lock ordering, `SAFETY`, unwrap justification — are not narration)
- [ ] Comments avoid narration and change history while completely stating non-obvious lock, `SAFETY`, durability, compatibility, and unwrap invariants
- [ ] No near-duplicate test pinning the same code path and poison-value class as an existing test (boundary companions — n==max vs max+1, absent/empty/nil UUID — are never near-duplicates)
## Severity Classification
- **P0 (Block merge)**: `unwrap()` in request hot path, silent truncation on user input, lock ordering violation, recursion without depth limit
- **P1 (Must fix)**: `Result<_, String>` in public API, unnecessary clone in hot path, `Box<dyn Error>` in trait method, `unwrap_or_default()` on a domain-required value (metadata, quorum, version id)
- **P2 (Should fix)**: Missing `assert!` in test, `println!` in production, missing `with_capacity`, new helper duplicating an existing workspace utility, defensive branch with no nameable trigger (corrupt or stale persisted/peer data is always a nameable trigger for boundary-crossing values), near-duplicate test, redundant error re-wrapping
- **P3 (Nice to fix)**: Naming convention violation, missing doc comment, `as_ptr()` vs `Arc::ptr_eq`, narrating comment
- **P0 (Block merge)**: demonstrated data loss, security breach, remote crash, or deadlock
- **P1 (Must fix)**: concrete correctness, compatibility, or material hot-path regression
- **P2 (Should fix)**: avoidable duplication or maintainability issue with a concrete simpler replacement
- **P3 (Nice to fix)**: local style or clarity issue with no behavioral risk
## Output Template
@@ -107,10 +107,10 @@ For every Rust code change, verify:
## Rust Code Quality Report
### Automated Scan
- unwrap/expect in production: N found
- as casts: N found
- String errors: N found
- println/eprintln: N found
- unwrap/expect candidates inspected: N
- numeric-cast candidates inspected: N
- error-type candidates inspected: N
- output-macro candidates inspected: N
### Findings
- [P1] `path:line` — description
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
# Rust Code Quality Checklist
Use this as a quick pre-merge checklist for every Rust code change.
## Critical (P0 — block merge)
| Check | Command |
|-------|---------|
| No `unwrap()` in request/storage hot path | `rg '\.unwrap\(\)' <files> \| grep -v test` |
| No `as` truncation on user input | `rg ' as (u32\|usize\|i32)' <files>` |
| Lock order consistent across call sites | Manual: trace all lock acquisitions |
| Recursive functions have depth limit | Manual: check for `max_depth` or iterative pattern |
| No `panic!`/`unwrap_or_else(panic!)` in production | `rg 'panic!\|unwrap_or_else.*panic' <files> \| grep -v test` |
## High (P1 — must fix)
| Check | Command |
|-------|---------|
| No `Result<_, String>` in public API | `rg 'Result<.*String>' <files> \| grep -v test` |
| No `Box<dyn Error>` in public trait | `rg 'Box<dyn.*Error' <files> \| grep -v test` |
| No unnecessary `.clone()` in hot path | Manual: check loops and per-request paths |
| `Error::source()` implemented when inner error stored | Manual: check `impl Error` |
| No `eprintln!`/`println!` in production | `rg 'println!\|eprintln!' <files> \| grep -v test` |
## Medium (P2 — should fix)
| Check | Command |
|-------|---------|
| Tests have assertions | Manual: check for `assert` in test functions |
| `HashMap`/`Vec` use `with_capacity` when size known | Manual: check `::new()` in loops |
| No `#![allow(dead_code)]` at crate root | `rg 'allow.dead_code' <files> \| grep 'lib.rs'` |
| Serde structs from untrusted input have `deny_unknown_fields` | Manual: check `#[derive(Deserialize)]` |
## Low (P3 — nice to fix)
| Check | Command |
|-------|---------|
| No camelCase statics | `rg 'static ref [a-z]' <files>` |
| `Arc::ptr_eq` instead of `as_ptr + ptr::eq` | `rg 'as_ptr\|ptr::eq' <files>` |
| Public functions have doc comments | `rg 'pub fn' <files> \| grep -v '///'` |
## Quick One-Liner
```bash
# Run all automated checks on changed files
CHANGED=$(git diff --name-only HEAD~1 -- '*.rs' | grep -v test | grep -v bench)
echo "=== unwrap/expect ===" && rg -c '\.unwrap\(\)|\.expect\(' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
echo "=== as casts ===" && rg -c ' as (u8|u16|u32|u64|usize|i8|i16|i32|i64|isize)\b' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
echo "=== String errors ===" && rg -c 'Result<.*String>' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
echo "=== println ===" && rg -c 'println!|eprintln!' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
echo "=== Ordering::Relaxed ===" && rg -c 'Ordering::Relaxed' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
```
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
name: rustfs-logging-governance
description: Standardize and review RustFS logging with structured `tracing` events, lower noise on hot paths, preserve security-sensitive diagnostics, and extend guardrails to prevent legacy logging patterns from returning. Use when editing or reviewing RustFS logs, startup/config diagnostics, cloud metadata logs, request validation logs, or `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh`.
description: Standardize and review RustFS logging with structured `tracing` events, lower noise on hot paths, preserve security-sensitive diagnostics, and extend guardrails to prevent legacy logging patterns from returning. Use whenever a change adds or edits any `tracing` macro call (`error!`/`warn!`/`info!`/`debug!`/`trace!`/`#[instrument]`) — including a single log line added in passing while fixing unrelated logic, which is how most new log sites enter the repo — and when reviewing RustFS logs, startup/config diagnostics, cloud metadata logs, request validation logs, or `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh`.
---
# RustFS Logging Governance
@@ -66,14 +66,23 @@ For the full pattern map, read [advisory-patterns.md](references/advisory-patter
### STS, OIDC, and federation flows
- Every STS endpoint must have an explicit authentication story: SigV4 where required, OIDC token verification for web identity, and role/session policy validation before issuing credentials.
- For web identity, the JWT is the credential; exemption from SigV4 is not itself an authentication bypass. Treat pre-verification claims only as untrusted routing hints, bound token size, normalize public failures, rate-limit discovery, and issue credentials only after signature, issuer, audience, and expiration checks.
- JWT session tokens must be signed and verified by a trusted issuer/key path, not by service-account-controlled material or a reused root secret.
- JWT verification must enforce required claims and expiration for every bearer token path; "allow missing exp" is never acceptable for user-presented credentials.
- Public OIDC bootstrap and callback routes must treat `Host`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, redirect targets, `state`, and callback parameters as untrusted; credential-bearing redirects require a configured, allowlisted origin.
- OIDC discovery and validation URLs are SSRF sinks. Resolve and classify hostnames at connection time, reject rebinding to loopback/private/link-local ranges, and do not rely on literal string checks.
### S3 copy, multipart, and presigned POST
### IAM policy conditions and plugins
- Treat request headers as attacker-controlled even after SigV4; callers sign their own spoofed headers. Do not merge them into server-derived condition keys such as identity, groups, version ID, signature version, JWT, or LDAP claims.
- Keep the condition-key namespace explicit. Reserved server-derived keys must reject or ignore colliding headers, while intentional request-header keys such as `s3:x-amz-*` remain available.
- Quantified IAM condition tests need partially overlapping multi-value sets. Fully contained and fully disjoint sets cannot distinguish `ForAllValues` from `ForAnyValue` bugs.
- External policy plugins must receive the same security context as built-in policy evaluation. If OPA or another plugin depends on existing object tags, load and pass `ExistingObjectTag/*` before the plugin decision.
### S3 object actions, copy, multipart, and presigned POST
- Version-aware object requests need version-aware actions. Explicit `versionId` reads and copy sources must authorize `s3:GetObjectVersion`, not only `s3:GetObject`.
- Multipart copy must enforce source `GetObject` and destination `PutObject` semantics equivalent to `CopyObject`, including copy-source and policy conditions.
- Do not let `CreateMultipartUpload`, `UploadPartCopy`, `CompleteMultipartUpload`, or `AbortMultipartUpload` return success without authorization.
- Fallbacks from version actions to non-version actions must still pass the same public-access-block, anonymous-deny, and post-authorization gates as a direct allow.
- Presigned POST policies are server-side contracts. Enforce `content-length-range`, key prefix, exact metadata/content-type, and all signed policy conditions.
### Protocol frontends and IAM parity
@@ -132,6 +141,11 @@ For the full pattern map, read [advisory-patterns.md](references/advisory-patter
- When touching reader/writer wrappers such as hashing, encryption, compression, or warp readers, verify wrapper order and inspect stored bytes in regression tests.
- Avoid helper shortcuts that unwrap nested readers and accidentally bypass encryption or integrity layers.
### Object Lock and retention invariants
- Object Lock state must fail closed when bucket metadata is unreadable, fabricated, or unparsable. Only a confirmed absence of Object Lock configuration may permit unprotected deletes or writes.
- Do not collapse metadata read faults, missing persisted metadata, parse failures, and genuinely absent Object Lock config into one "not configured" result.
- Retention enforcement must cover foreground deletes, batch deletes, force-delete helpers, default-retention materialization on PUT, lifecycle expiry, scanner sweeps, and all-versions expiry.
## Review Prompts
Use these prompts while reviewing a diff:
@@ -148,5 +162,9 @@ Use these prompts while reviewing a diff:
- Does this outbound validation path resolve attacker-supplied hostnames and reject private, loopback, link-local, and rebound addresses at the actual connection boundary?
- Is an archive entry, object key, or policy resource normalized differently between authorization and storage?
- Is the same operation implemented in multiple paths, such as `CopyObject` vs `UploadPartCopy`, and do all paths enforce the same security contract?
- Does an explicit object version, fallback action, or plugin authorization path pass through the same action and post-authorization gates as the direct S3 path?
- Can a caller-controlled header populate a condition key that should be derived only by the server?
- Do condition tests include partially overlapping multi-value inputs for quantified operators?
- Does unreadable bucket metadata make Object Lock or retention enforcement fail closed rather than disappear?
- Does a preview or browser-surface fix preserve the original security invariant when adding alternate viewers or file-type detection?
- Does the test prove the exploit form is denied, or only that the intended form still works?
@@ -35,12 +35,21 @@ Update this file only when an advisory adds or changes a reusable lesson, affect
### STS, OIDC, and federation flows
- `GHSA-5qfg-mf7r-jp3w` and `GHSA-3473-5353-xhwh`: `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` was reachable through unauthenticated `POST /` routing and could issue temporary credentials from crafted web identity input. Lesson: every STS route needs explicit SigV4 or trusted identity-provider validation before role assumption, and unauthenticated exemptions must be narrowed to the exact action with uniform failure responses.
- `GHSA-ccrv-v8v9-ch9q` and `GHSA-48rf-7j3q-3hfv`: service-account-controlled material could self-sign JWT session tokens with forged policy claims, and missing `exp` was accepted for service-account tokens. Lesson: session tokens must be signed by a trusted issuer/key path, enforce required claims and expiration, and reject self-signed or principal-controlled tokens.
- `GHSA-jxrr-r6pv-h958`: unsigned JWT issuer data was decoded before verification to select an OIDC provider, and distinguishable failures could expose provider configuration. Lesson: web-identity routing may be unauthenticated, but pre-verification claims are untrusted routing hints; bound and rate-limit the request, normalize public errors, and verify signature, issuer, audience, and expiration before issuing credentials.
- `GHSA-ccrv-v8v9-ch9q`, `GHSA-48rf-7j3q-3hfv`, and `GHSA-xvfh-7c9g-hpw2`: service-account-controlled material could self-sign JWT session tokens with forged policy claims, and missing `exp` was accepted for service-account tokens. Lesson: session tokens must be signed by a trusted issuer/key path, enforce required claims and expiration, and reject self-signed or principal-controlled tokens.
- `GHSA-9pjf-w3c2-m32r`, `GHSA-4x2q-cpx9-9h26`, and `GHSA-xvpm-p3f7-34c3`: public OIDC authorize/callback flows trusted request `Host` or forwarded scheme when building credential-bearing redirects. Lesson: OIDC redirects must use configured allowlisted origins and trusted-proxy handling; never derive the post-login credential destination from direct client headers.
- `GHSA-m479-9x88-94w6`, `GHSA-frwq-mfqx-83p8`, `GHSA-q9q8-rf9r-fg9f`, and `GHSA-j5c2-hhf7-6gf5`: OIDC validation accepted attacker-controlled discovery URLs because hostname checks rejected only literal forbidden IPs, allowing DNS rebinding SSRF. Lesson: outbound federation URL validation must resolve and classify hostnames at the connection boundary and reject loopback, private, link-local, and rebound addresses.
### S3 copy, multipart, and upload policy validation
### IAM policy conditions and external policy plugins
- `GHSA-6r96-hmgc-726c`: request headers collided with lowercase server-derived condition keys such as `userid`, `groups`, `versionid`, and JWT/LDAP claims. Lesson: never let caller-controlled headers append to or replace server-derived policy context; reserve trusted condition keys and keep intentional request-header keys separate.
- `GHSA-v9cp-qfw9-9pfp`: quantified negated string conditions applied negation after aggregation, transposing `ForAllValues` and `ForAnyValue` semantics. Lesson: push negation into the per-value predicate for quantified operators and test partially overlapping multi-value sets.
- `GHSA-5w8r-p896-6vq2`: OPA policy mode skipped `ExistingObjectTag/*` loading, so tagged objects looked untagged to external policies. Lesson: external authorization plugins need the same object-tag and request context as built-in policy evaluation before they decide.
### S3 object actions, copy, multipart, and upload policy validation
- `GHSA-3ppv-fx5m-m749`: explicit `versionId` reads and copy sources authorized `s3:GetObject` instead of `s3:GetObjectVersion`. Lesson: version-specific object access must select version-specific actions for direct reads, `CopyObject`, and `UploadPartCopy`, with tests proving the backend is not reached on denial.
- `GHSA-x298-9x87-fvjq`: anonymous `ListObjectVersions` fell back to `ListBucket` and returned before public-access-block gates. Lesson: compatibility fallbacks must converge on the same post-authorization checks as direct grants, especially `RestrictPublicBuckets` and anonymous data-plane denies.
- `GHSA-mx42-j6wv-px98`: `UploadPartCopy` missed source authorization and allowed cross-bucket object exfiltration. Lesson: multipart copy must enforce the same source and destination contract as `CopyObject`.
- `GHSA-wfxj-ph3v-7mjf`: `UploadPartCopy` checked source and destination independently but missed destination copy-source policy constraints. Lesson: source read and destination write checks are not sufficient when policy constrains allowed copy sources.
- `GHSA-w5fh-f8xh-5x3p`: presigned POST accepted uploads without enforcing signed policy conditions. Lesson: parse and enforce all POST policy constraints server-side, including size, key prefix, and content type.
@@ -59,7 +68,7 @@ Update this file only when an advisory adds or changes a reusable lesson, affect
### Secrets, defaults, and cryptographic misuse
- `GHSA-j59h-h7q5-q348`, `GHSA-3wm5-wpm5-hmfm`, `GHSA-6wc8-xm48-qhmx`, `GHSA-9gf3-jx4p-4xxf`, and `GHSA-63xc-c3w3-m2cf`: RustFS shipped known default root credentials that could authenticate to S3, admin APIs, IAM, KMS, console, and token-signing surfaces. Lesson: root credentials must be operator-provided or generated per install; known defaults and warnings are not acceptable for network-reachable deployments.
- `GHSA-j59h-h7q5-q348`, `GHSA-3wm5-wpm5-hmfm`, `GHSA-6wc8-xm48-qhmx`, `GHSA-9gf3-jx4p-4xxf`, `GHSA-63xc-c3w3-m2cf`, and `GHSA-ch63-6q4v-hwp5`: RustFS shipped known default root credentials that could authenticate to S3, admin APIs, IAM, KMS, console, and token-signing surfaces. Lesson: root credentials must be operator-provided or generated per install; known defaults and warnings are not acceptable for network-reachable deployments.
- `GHSA-h956-rh7x-ppgj`: gRPC used the hard-coded token `rustfs rpc` on both client and server. Lesson: source-visible shared tokens are authentication bypasses.
- `GHSA-r5qv-rc46-hv8q`: internode RPC HMAC secret fell back to the public default `rustfsadmin`. Lesson: RPC/internode auth must fail closed instead of silently using public defaults.
- `GHSA-75fx-qg6f-8rm7` and `GHSA-68cw-96m3-h2cf`: internode RPC secrets were derivable from known root credentials, making raw storage RPC signatures forgeable when explicit RPC secrets were unset. Lesson: RPC auth keys must be independent random secrets, never derived from S3 root credentials, and raw storage RPC should not share the public S3 listener without an internode-only boundary.
@@ -92,6 +101,10 @@ Update this file only when an advisory adds or changes a reusable lesson, affect
- `GHSA-xrrf-67jm-3c2r`: SSE metadata reported encryption while reader composition bypassed `EncryptReader` and stored plaintext. Lesson: test actual bytes on disk and wrapper order, not only API metadata.
### Object Lock and retention invariants
- `GHSA-j548-9grx-fh4f`: Object Lock enforcement treated unreadable, fabricated, or unparsable bucket metadata as absent configuration and allowed retained objects to be deleted or expired. Lesson: retention must fail closed unless Object Lock absence is authoritative, and every delete, lifecycle, scanner, force-delete, and default-retention path needs the same state distinction.
### Serde deserialization and input validation
- No `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]` found across the entire codebase. Lesson: all structs deserialized from untrusted input (S3 API XML/JSON, lifecycle rules, bucket policies, replication configs) should have `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]` to reject malformed or adversarial payloads.
@@ -107,11 +120,13 @@ Use these targeted searches when a diff touches security-sensitive code:
rg -n "validate_admin_request|check_permissions|AdminAction::|deny_only|is_allowed" rustfs crates
rg -n "authorize_operation|FtpsDriver|SftpDriver|RETR|MKD|SIZE|MDTM|CreateBucket|GetObject|HeadObject" crates/protocols rustfs
rg -n "UploadPartCopy|upload_part_copy|CompleteMultipart|PostObject|content-length-range|starts-with" rustfs crates
rg -n "ListBucketVersions|GetObjectVersion|versionId|VersionId|ExistingObjectTag|ForAllValues|ForAnyValue|POLICY_PLUGIN|opa" rustfs crates
rg -n "normalize_extract_entry_key|Snowball|auto-extract|PathBuf::join|canonicalize|\\.\\.|x-forwarded-for|x-real-ip|SourceIp" rustfs crates
rg -n "DEFAULT_SECRET|DEFAULT_ACCESS|TEST_PRIVATE_KEY|rustfs rpc|RUSTFS_RPC_SECRET" rustfs crates
rg -n "TONIC_RPC_PREFIX|verify_rpc_signature|check_auth|NodeServiceServer|x-rustfs-signature" rustfs crates
rg -n "debug!|trace!|info!|error!|\\?resp|\\?merged_config|session_token|secret_key" rustfs crates
rg -n "HashReader|EncryptReader|SSE|server-side encryption|Access-Control-Allow-Credentials|Origin" rustfs crates
rg -n "ObjectLock|object_lock|retention|COMPLIANCE|GOVERNANCE|delete_prefix|lifecycle|scanner" rustfs crates
rg -n "deny_unknown_fields|serde.default|as u32|as usize|as i32" rustfs crates
```
@@ -121,9 +136,12 @@ rg -n "deny_unknown_fields|serde.default|as u32|as usize|as i32" rustfs crates
- Protocol frontend authz fixes: include denied `RETR`, `SIZE`/`MDTM`, `MKD`, bucket probe, and sibling allowed-operation cases, and assert denied paths do not reach the storage backend.
- IAM fixes: include import/update/list service-account cases with attacker-controlled parent, claims, access key, secret key, and policy.
- Copy/upload fixes: include cross-bucket, cross-user, source-denied, destination-denied, copy-source-condition, and multipart completion cases.
- Version-action fixes: include historical UUID, explicit current version, `null`, range, partNumber, presigned, STS/session, service-account, anonymous bucket-policy, copy source, and multipart-copy source cases.
- Policy-condition fixes: include reserved-key header collisions, missing keys, partially overlapping multi-value sets, plugin mode, and built-in policy mode.
- Path fixes: include encoded traversal, absolute path, nested traversal, archive entries with `..`, valid object keys that resemble traversal text but should be rejected, and canonical bucket/prefix boundary checks.
- Logging fixes: assert redacted output for structs and response bodies that may contain credentials.
- IAM export fixes: assert exported archives omit plaintext user and service-account secrets unless the format deliberately encrypts or seals them.
- RPC auth fixes: include captured metadata replay across two concrete methods, stale timestamps, wrong path, wrong method surrogate, wrong secret, and valid same-method calls.
- Browser/CORS fixes: assert no credentials on reflected/default origins, correct behavior for explicit allowlists, and no same-origin script execution for previewed object content.
- SSE fixes: inspect stored bytes and verify API metadata, read-back behavior, and on-disk ciphertext together.
- Object Lock fixes: include unreadable metadata, fabricated metadata defaults, unparsable config, confirmed absent config, COMPLIANCE/GOVERNANCE retention, lifecycle expiry, scanner sweeps, and force-delete paths.
+5
View File
@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@ body-cache-whitelist-check: ## Check the body-cache eligibility gate stays a fai
@echo "🧱 Checking body-cache whitelist guard..."
./scripts/check_body_cache_whitelist.sh
.PHONY: s3s-footprint-check
s3s-footprint-check: ## Check the s3s dependency footprint ratchet stays frozen
@echo "📦 Checking s3s footprint ratchet..."
./scripts/check_s3s_footprint.sh
.PHONY: fips-wording-check
fips-wording-check: ## Check outward docs do not make unsupported FIPS claims
@echo "📣 Checking FIPS wording guard..."
+3 -3
View File
@@ -19,13 +19,13 @@ planning-docs-check: ## Check that no planning-type documents are committed
./scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh
.PHONY: pre-commit
pre-commit: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check fips-wording-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast pre-commit checks without clippy/full tests
pre-commit: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast pre-commit checks without clippy/full tests
@echo "✅ All pre-commit checks passed!"
.PHONY: pre-pr
pre-pr: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check fips-wording-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check log-analyzer-rules-check clippy-check test ## Run full pre-PR checks with clippy and tests
pre-pr: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check log-analyzer-rules-check clippy-check test ## Run full pre-PR checks with clippy and tests
@echo "✅ All pre-PR checks passed!"
.PHONY: dev-check
dev-check: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check fips-wording-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast local development checks
dev-check: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast local development checks
@echo "✅ Fast development checks passed!"
+1
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ TEST_THREADS ?= 1
script-tests: ## Run shell script tests
@echo "Running script tests..."
./scripts/test_build_rustfs_options.sh
./scripts/test_docker_runtime_timezone.sh
./scripts/test_entrypoint_credentials.sh
./scripts/test_internode_grpc_ab_bench.sh
./scripts/test_object_batch_bench_enhanced.sh
+53 -14
View File
@@ -29,10 +29,13 @@
[test-groups]
ecstore-serial-flaky = { max-threads = 1 }
embedded-test-ports = { max-threads = 1 }
e2e-vault = { max-threads = 1 }
# Reliability / fault-injection e2e tests each spawn a single-node 4-disk RustFS
# server and manipulate its disk directories at runtime (crates/e2e_test:
# reliability_disk_fault_test, degraded_read_eof_regression_test / dist-13). They
# reliability_disk_fault_test, degraded_read_eof_regression_test / dist-13, and
# replacement_privileged_e2e_test when explicitly run as root on Linux). They
# are correct in isolation but resource-heavy; serialize them under nextest's
# process boundary (serial_test's #[serial] does not cross it) so several 4-disk
# servers never run at once. ci-7's nightly picks these up via the e2e suite;
@@ -54,6 +57,20 @@ test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & test(/^set_disk::ops::multipart::tests::crash_consistency::/)'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# The production-handler relocation regression builds an isolated 8-disk,
# 2-pool store and commits a 72 MiB multipart object. Keep that cross-disk IO
# from overlapping the ecstore commit fixtures above.
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs) & test(execute_get_object_resumes_from_relocated_pool_without_splicing_body)'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# Embedded integration-test binaries discover an ephemeral port and release
# the probe listener before RustFS binds it. Serialize that cross-process
# TOCTOU window; retries would only hide real startup failures.
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs) & (binary(/^embedded.*_test$/) | binary(admin_diagnostic_capability_e2e))'
test-group = 'embedded-test-ports'
# Serialize the durable manual-transition checkpoint test across nextest's
# process boundary; it mutates bucket lifecycle metadata and is not quarantined.
[[profile.default.overrides]]
@@ -74,13 +91,19 @@ test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# e2e-reliability test-group note above). The matching ci-profile override is at
# the end of the file, after [profile.ci] is declared.
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^(reliability_disk_fault|degraded_read_eof_regression)_test::/)'
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^(reliability_disk_fault|degraded_read_eof_regression|replacement_privileged_e2e)_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-reliability'
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^inline_fast_path_cluster_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-inline-boundaries'
# Vault KMS tests share the fixed dev-server port 8200. serial_test's #[serial]
# does not cross nextest process boundaries, so keep these tests in one group.
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^kms::kms_vault_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-vault'
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ci profile — the strict CI gate (ci.yml `cargo nextest run --profile ci`)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -133,7 +156,7 @@ retries = 2
# quarantine: no retries, just single-threaded so several 4-disk servers never
# run concurrently when ci-7's nightly runs the full e2e suite.
[[profile.ci.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^(reliability_disk_fault|degraded_read_eof_regression)_test::/)'
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^(reliability_disk_fault|degraded_read_eof_regression|replacement_privileged_e2e)_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-reliability'
# Serialize the multipart crash-consistency scenarios under the ci profile too
@@ -143,6 +166,16 @@ test-group = 'e2e-reliability'
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & test(/^set_disk::ops::multipart::tests::crash_consistency::/)'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
[[profile.ci.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs) & test(execute_get_object_resumes_from_relocated_pool_without_splicing_body)'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# Match the default-profile embedded test isolation without quarantining or
# retrying failures in CI.
[[profile.ci.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs) & (binary(/^embedded.*_test$/) | binary(admin_diagnostic_capability_e2e))'
test-group = 'embedded-test-ports'
# Serialize the durable manual-transition checkpoint test under the ci profile
# too. No retries: failures stay visible.
[[profile.ci.overrides]]
@@ -186,7 +219,7 @@ test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# the nightly profile derives its set as "the replication module MINUS this
# allowlist", so any new replication test lands in nightly by default (never
# silently unrun) until it is explicitly blessed as fast here. Keep the two
# regexes byte-identical. Count invariant: 20 here + 28 nightly = 48 total
# regexes byte-identical. Count invariant: 20 here + 49 nightly = 69 total
# (authority: `cargo nextest list`; docs/testing/e2e-suite-inventory.md).
# HISTORY (2026-07-11): the 20 fast tests were briefly pulled out of this lane
# (#4724) because they set a loopback (127.0.0.1) replication target that the
@@ -222,7 +255,7 @@ test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
[profile.e2e-smoke]
default-filter = """
package(e2e_test) & (
test(/^(delete_marker_migration_semantics|version_id_regression|list_objects_v2_pagination|list_object_versions_regression|list_objects_duplicates|list_buckets_double_slash|leading_slash_key|special_chars|create_bucket_region|delete_objects_versioning|head_object_consistency|head_object_range|copy_object_metadata|copy_object_tagging|copy_source_invalid_date|content_encoding|multipart_storage_class|storage_class_capability|ssec_copy|anonymous_access|bucket_policy_check|presigned_negative|negative_sigv4|admin_auth|notification_webhook|tls_hot_reload|console_smoke|admin_iam_crud|admin_pools|sts_query_compat)_test::|^fake_s3_target::/)
test(/^(delete_marker_migration_semantics|version_id_regression|list_objects_v2_pagination|list_object_versions_regression|list_objects_duplicates|list_buckets_double_slash|list_buckets_auth|list_buckets_iam_filter|leading_slash_key|special_chars|create_bucket_region|delete_objects_versioning|head_object_consistency|head_object_range|copy_object_metadata|copy_object_tagging|copy_source_invalid_date|content_encoding|multipart_storage_class|storage_class_capability|ssec_copy|anonymous_access|bucket_policy_check|presigned_negative|negative_sigv4|admin_auth|notification_webhook|tls_hot_reload|console_smoke|admin_iam_crud|admin_pools|sts_query_compat)_test::|^fake_s3_target::/)
| test(/^replication_extension_test::(test_replication_check_succeeds_with_remote_target|test_replication_check_rejects_target_without_object_lock|test_set_remote_target_rejects_unversioned_source_bucket|test_replication_check_rejects_unversioned_source_bucket|test_replication_check_rejects_missing_replication_config|test_replication_check_rejects_invalid_bucket|test_set_remote_target_rejects_same_bucket_on_same_deployment|test_set_remote_target_rejects_unversioned_target_bucket|test_set_remote_target_update_requires_arn|test_set_remote_target_update_rejects_missing_target|test_set_remote_target_rejects_invalid_target_url|test_set_remote_target_rejects_self_signed_https_target_without_skip_tls_verify|test_set_remote_target_rejects_private_ca_https_target_without_ca_cert_pem|test_list_remote_targets_rejects_empty_bucket|test_list_remote_targets_rejects_invalid_bucket|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_missing_target|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_missing_arn|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_invalid_bucket|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_target_used_by_replication|test_delete_bucket_replication_removes_remote_target)$/)
| test(/^reliant::lifecycle::/)
| test(/^reliant::tiering::/)
@@ -248,10 +281,12 @@ slow-timeout = { period = "60s", terminate-after = 2, grace-period = "10s" }
# tests that are unfit for the per-PR e2e-smoke gate:
#
# * 2 remote-target TLS validation tests.
# * 12 bucket-replication data-plane/helper tests — they PUT/delete objects
# and poll until source and target converge; two replicate over HTTPS, two
# pin active SSE failure contracts, and one guards event/history observers.
# The SSE-S3 contract remains ignored under backlog#1291.
# * 15 bucket-replication data-plane/helper tests — they PUT/delete objects
# and poll until source and target converge; two replicate over HTTPS,
# six pin SSE replication contracts (managed SSE-S3/SSE-KMS re-encrypt on
# the target incl. multipart and the resync path, SSE-C and
# target-without-KMS stay fail-closed), and one guards event/history
# observers.
# * 12 `_real_dual_node` site-replication tests — each spawns TWO full rustfs
# servers and drives the cross-process site-replication control plane.
# * 1 `_real_three_node` site-replication test.
@@ -310,16 +345,16 @@ path = "junit.xml"
# object_lambda) — too heavy for the merge budget; they run in ci-7's
# nightly 4-node lane.
# * replication_extension_test — repl-1 already splits it into the PR
# `e2e-smoke` (20 fast) and `e2e-repl-nightly` (27 slow) lanes and reserves
# `e2e-smoke` (20 fast) and `e2e-repl-nightly` (49 slow) lanes and reserves
# it for those, so e2e-full does not double-run it.
# * #[ignore]d tests — nextest skips them by default (no --run-ignored); the
# manual-localhost:9000 reliant/policy tests are ci-13's migration.
#
# Each e2e test spawns its own single-node rustfs server on a random port with
# an isolated temp dir (crates/e2e_test/src/common.rs), so the set is
# parallel-safe — the same property e2e-smoke relies on. The exception is the
# 4-disk reliability / degraded-read fault-injection tests, serialized below
# (identical to the ci profile) so several 4-disk servers never run at once.
# parallel-safe — the same property e2e-smoke relies on. The exceptions are the
# 4-disk reliability / degraded-read fault-injection tests and the fixed-port
# Vault tests, both serialized below.
# KNOWN-FAILURE EXCLUSIONS (characterization run 29381309848, 2026-07-15:
# 341 ran / 32 failed on the suites' first automated run ever). Deterministic
# product failures cannot be quarantined away with retries, so each family is
@@ -349,9 +384,13 @@ path = "junit.xml"
# quarantine: no retries, just single-threaded so several 4-disk servers never
# run concurrently.
[[profile.e2e-full.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^(reliability_disk_fault|degraded_read_eof_regression)_test::/)'
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^(reliability_disk_fault|degraded_read_eof_regression|replacement_privileged_e2e)_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-reliability'
[[profile.e2e-full.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^inline_fast_path_cluster_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-inline-boundaries'
[[profile.e2e-full.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^kms::kms_vault_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-vault'
+15
View File
@@ -170,6 +170,10 @@ Important behavior notes:
- Logs and metrics usually appear during startup, so seeing those two signals
first is expected.
- The OpenTelemetry bridge sends `tracing` fields as log attributes. Loki stores
those attributes as structured metadata, and the Collector also mirrors the
common troubleshooting fields into the log line so simple line filters can
find them.
- Visible trace data usually requires real HTTP/S3/gRPC request traffic after
startup, because request-path spans are created on demand.
- `RUSTFS_OBS_LOGGER_LEVEL=info` keeps the top-level request span but filters
@@ -195,6 +199,17 @@ curl -I http://127.0.0.1:9000/health/ready
# Jaeger: http://localhost:16686
```
For a structured RustFS log such as an inter-node RPC authentication failure,
the Loki line now includes fields such as `event`, `component`, `subsystem`,
`failure_reason`, `rpc_service`, `rpc_method`, and `expected_audience`. Useful
LogQL checks:
```logql
{service_name="RustFS"} |= "RPC signature verification failed"
{service_name="RustFS"} |= "failure_reason="
{service_name="RustFS"} | failure_reason != ""
```
If logs and metrics are present but traces are sparse, the most common cause is
"no real request traffic yet" or "`info` level filtered nested spans", not an
OTLP routing failure.
+9
View File
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ RustFS 会自动在该基础 URL 后补全:
需要注意:
- 启动阶段通常会先看到日志和指标,因此“先有日志/指标、后有 trace”是正常现象。
- OpenTelemetry bridge 会把 `tracing` 字段作为日志 attributes 发送。Loki 会将这些 attributes 存为 structured metadata,同时 Collector 会把常用排障字段镜像进日志行,方便用简单的行内容过滤直接查到。
- 可见的 trace 数据通常依赖启动后的真实 HTTP/S3/gRPC 请求流量,因为请求路径上的 span 是按需创建的。
- `RUSTFS_OBS_LOGGER_LEVEL=info` 会保留顶层请求 span,但会过滤掉很多 `debug` 级别的嵌套 span。
如果 Tempo 或 Jaeger 中的 trace 看起来很稀疏,建议先改成 `RUSTFS_OBS_LOGGER_LEVEL=debug`,再判断是否是 collector 或 Tempo 问题。
@@ -192,6 +193,14 @@ curl -I http://127.0.0.1:9000/health/ready
# Jaeger: http://localhost:16686
```
对于 RustFS 结构化日志,例如节点间 RPC 鉴权失败,Loki 日志行现在会包含 `event``component``subsystem``failure_reason``rpc_service``rpc_method``expected_audience` 等字段。常用 LogQL 检查:
```logql
{service_name="RustFS"} |= "RPC signature verification failed"
{service_name="RustFS"} |= "failure_reason="
{service_name="RustFS"} | failure_reason != ""
```
如果日志和指标已经正常,但 trace 仍然稀疏,最常见的原因通常是
“还没有真实请求流量”或“`info` 级别过滤了嵌套 span”,而不是 OTLP 路由失败。
@@ -29,11 +29,27 @@ processors:
limit_mib: 1024
spike_limit_mib: 256
transform/logs:
error_mode: ignore
log_statements:
- context: log
statements:
- set(attributes["message"], body.string)
- set(attributes["log.body"], body.string)
- set(attributes["message"], body.string) where IsString(body)
- set(attributes["log.body"], body.string) where IsString(body)
- set(body, Concat([body, " event=", attributes["event"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["event"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " component=", attributes["component"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["component"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " subsystem=", attributes["subsystem"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["subsystem"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " state=", attributes["state"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["state"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " result=", attributes["result"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["result"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " reason=", attributes["reason"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["reason"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " failure_reason=", attributes["failure_reason"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["failure_reason"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " rpc_path=", attributes["rpc_path"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["rpc_path"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " rpc_service=", attributes["rpc_service"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["rpc_service"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " rpc_method=", attributes["rpc_method"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["rpc_method"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " expected_audience=", attributes["expected_audience"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["expected_audience"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " peer_addr=", attributes["peer_addr"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["peer_addr"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " replay_scope_bootstrap_allowed=", attributes["replay_scope_bootstrap_allowed"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["replay_scope_bootstrap_allowed"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " error=", attributes["error"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["error"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " exception_message=", attributes["exception.message"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["exception.message"] != nil
exporters:
otlp/tempo:
@@ -17,9 +17,11 @@
# =============================================================================
#
# Metric source: the KMS operation-policy choke point in
# crates/kms/src/policy.rs. All label values are bounded static strings
# (operation, op_class, outcome, error_class, backend, scope); key identifiers,
# key material, and tokens never appear in labels.
# crates/kms/src/policy.rs, except KmsKeyRotationOverdue, which reads the
# label-less key-lifecycle gauge published by the deletion worker's sweep
# (crates/kms/src/deletion_worker.rs). All label values are bounded static
# strings (operation, op_class, outcome, error_class, backend, scope); key
# identifiers, key material, and tokens never appear in labels.
#
# Response procedures: docs/operations/kms-observability-runbook.md
#
@@ -212,3 +214,38 @@ groups:
circuit_open until the half-open probe succeeds or returns
a non-retryable failure.
runbook_url: "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/blob/main/docs/operations/kms-observability-runbook.md#kmsbackendcircuitopen"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# 7. KmsKeyRotationOverdue
# The least recently rotated usable key has gone more than 400
# days without a rotation (measured from creation for keys with
# no recorded rotation). Direct gauge state published by the
# deletion worker's sweep, so no traffic guard applies; the
# one-hour hold only bridges scrape gaps. The worker runs only
# on backends with the schedule_deletion capability, so on the
# Static backend the series never exists and this alert cannot
# fire — that backend cannot rotate either; see the rotation
# driver matrix in docs/operations/kms-backend-security.md.
# Threshold: 400 days — conservative default sitting above a
# one-year rotation policy. Align it with the rotation period
# your compliance policy requires, and with
# RUSTFS_KMS_ROTATION_MAX_AGE_SECS so the per-key rotation_due
# verdict and this aggregate alert agree.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
- alert: KmsKeyRotationOverdue
expr: |
rustfs_kms_oldest_key_rotation_age_seconds > (400 * 86400)
for: 1h
labels:
severity: warning
component: kms
annotations:
summary: "Oldest KMS key unrotated for more than 400 days"
description: >-
The least recently rotated usable KMS key was last rotated
{{ $value | humanizeDuration }} ago (measured from creation
for keys with no recorded rotation). List keys through the
admin API and read rotation_due / rotation_due_reason for
the per-key verdict; an "unsupported" reason means the
backend cannot rotate at all.
runbook_url: "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/blob/main/docs/operations/kms-observability-runbook.md#kmskeyrotationoverdue"
+2 -2
View File
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ runs:
using: "composite"
steps:
# protobuf-compiler is deliberately absent: the setup-protoc step below
# installs 34.1 into the tool cache and prepends it to PATH, so the apt
# installs 35.1 into the tool cache and prepends it to PATH, so the apt
# build (older, and never version-matched) was shadowed on every run and
# simply never used.
- name: Install system dependencies (Ubuntu)
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ runs:
- name: Install protoc
uses: rustfs/setup-protoc@a3705324d8f9bf5b6c3573fb6cf8ae421db55dd6 # v3.0.1
with:
version: "34.1"
version: "35.1"
repo-token: ${{ github.token }}
- name: Install flatc
+6
View File
@@ -102,6 +102,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Check architecture migration rules
run: ./scripts/check_architecture_migration_rules.sh
- name: Check logging guardrails
run: ./scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh
- name: Check tokio io-uring feature guard
run: ./scripts/check_no_tokio_io_uring.sh
@@ -111,6 +114,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Check body-cache whitelist guard
run: ./scripts/check_body_cache_whitelist.sh
- name: Check s3s footprint ratchet
run: ./scripts/check_s3s_footprint.sh
- name: Check no planning docs committed
run: ./scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh
+32
View File
@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Check architecture migration rules
run: ./scripts/check_architecture_migration_rules.sh
- name: Check logging guardrails
run: ./scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh
- name: Check tokio io-uring feature guard
run: ./scripts/check_no_tokio_io_uring.sh
@@ -146,6 +149,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Check body-cache whitelist guard
run: ./scripts/check_body_cache_whitelist.sh
- name: Check s3s footprint ratchet
run: ./scripts/check_s3s_footprint.sh
- name: Check no planning docs committed
run: ./scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh
@@ -764,6 +770,32 @@ jobs:
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@ece7cb06caefa5fff74198d8649806c4678c61a1 # v6.3.0
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- name: Install awscurl
run: |
python3 -m pip install --user --upgrade pip "awscurl==0.44"
echo "AWSCURL_PATH=$HOME/.local/bin/awscurl" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Verify awscurl
run: test -x "$AWSCURL_PATH"
- name: Install Vault
run: |
VAULT_VERSION="1.17.6"
VAULT_ARCHIVE="vault_${VAULT_VERSION}_linux_amd64.zip"
curl -fsSLo "$RUNNER_TEMP/$VAULT_ARCHIVE" "https://releases.hashicorp.com/vault/${VAULT_VERSION}/${VAULT_ARCHIVE}"
echo "0cddc1fbbb88583b5ba5b845f9f8fae47c6fb39a6d48cd543c6ba6fd3ac1a669 $RUNNER_TEMP/$VAULT_ARCHIVE" | sha256sum --check --status
unzip -q "$RUNNER_TEMP/$VAULT_ARCHIVE" -d "$RUNNER_TEMP/vault-bin"
echo "RUSTFS_TEST_VAULT_BIN=$RUNNER_TEMP/vault-bin/vault" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Verify Vault
run: |
"$RUSTFS_TEST_VAULT_BIN" version
# Download after the cache restore so the freshly built binary from the
# build job always wins over anything restored into target/debug.
- name: Download debug binary
+14 -15
View File
@@ -14,25 +14,24 @@
# Nightly full replication e2e lane (backlog#1147 repl-1, deps: ci-4).
#
# The per-PR gate (ci.yml `e2e-tests` job, `--profile e2e-smoke`) runs the 20
# FAST replication tests. This scheduled lane runs the remaining 27
# heavier replication e2e tests that are unfit for a per-PR gate:
#
# * 2 remote-target TLS validation tests.
# * 12 bucket-replication data-plane/helper tests (PUT/delete + poll for
# convergence; two replicate over HTTPS, two pin active SSE failure
# contracts, and one guards event/history observers). The SSE-S3 contract
# remains ignored under backlog#1291.
# * 11 `_real_dual_node` site-replication tests (each spawns TWO rustfs
# servers and drives the cross-process site-replication control plane).
# * 1 `_real_three_node` site-replication test.
# * 1 `_real_single_node` service-account round-trip test.
# The per-PR gate (ci.yml `e2e-tests` job, `--profile e2e-smoke`) runs the
# FAST replication tests. This scheduled lane runs the remaining heavier
# replication e2e tests that are unfit for a per-PR gate: remote-target TLS
# validation, bucket-replication data-plane/helper tests (PUT/delete + poll
# for convergence, HTTPS targets, active SSE failure contracts, event/history
# observers), and the `_real_dual_node` / `_real_three_node` /
# `_real_single_node` site-replication tests that each spawn full rustfs
# server processes.
#
# The selection is the [profile.e2e-repl-nightly] default-filter in
# .config/nextest.toml — the single wiring mechanism (repl-1 / ci-4). Do NOT
# add ad-hoc cargo-test steps here; change the filterset instead.
# add ad-hoc cargo-test steps here; change the filterset instead. The
# authoritative membership and count come from
# `cargo nextest list -p e2e_test --profile e2e-repl-nightly`; the PR/nightly
# count invariant is maintained next to the filtersets in .config/nextest.toml
# (deliberately not duplicated here).
#
# Explicit division of labor: these 27 tests run ONLY here, never double-run
# Explicit division of labor: the nightly subset runs ONLY here, never double-run
# in ci-5's future e2e-full merge gate. TODO(ci-7): once the ci domain's
# consolidated scheduled e2e workflow exists, fold this interim repl-owned lane
# into it rather than growing a second scheduled entrypoint.
+139
View File
@@ -55,3 +55,142 @@ jobs:
- name: Build RustFS
run: cargo build --release --locked --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu -p rustfs --bins
# Live-Vault lane for the rustfs-kms suite (rustfs/backlog#1774).
#
# RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN is the single switch that adds the Vault KV2 and
# Vault Transit backends to every for_each_backend spec in
# crates/kms/tests/behavior_*.rs (see crates/kms/AGENTS.md). rotate and
# versioning are advertised only by the Vault backends, so without this lane
# no CI run ever asserts the working half of behavior_rotation.rs — a
# rotation that silently dropped historical key versions would stay green.
# The same lane runs the dev-Vault #[ignore] tests and the two self-hosting
# live scripts (AppRole login, three-node Raft leader failover).
#
# GitHub-hosted ubuntu-latest, deliberately not the self-hosted sm-standard
# fleet: the HA failover script needs a working Docker daemon, and the
# self-hosted fleet is heterogeneous — a docker-dependent workflow has been
# burned by it before (see the banner in e2e-s3tests.yml, rustfs/backlog#1149).
kms-vault-lane:
name: KMS live Vault lane
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 90
env:
FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
# Root token of the ephemeral loopback dev server. Not a secret: the
# server lives only for this job, listens on 127.0.0.1, and holds only
# keys the tests create. The literal value matters — the dev-Vault
# #[ignore] fixtures in crates/kms/src/backends/vault.rs hardcode it.
VAULT_LANE_TOKEN: dev-only-token
VAULT_LANE_ADDR: http://127.0.0.1:8200
# Keeps a runner-level proxy from swallowing the loopback dev-server
# traffic (see crates/kms/AGENTS.md). Actions env keys are
# case-insensitive, so only the uppercase form is set; reqwest reads
# either casing.
NO_PROXY: 127.0.0.1,localhost
steps:
- name: Checkout main branch
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
ref: main
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
# Dedicated key: rust-cache cannot tell runner images apart, so
# sharing a key with an sm-standard lane would let two different
# system images overwrite each other's artifacts (same reasoning as
# ci.yml's ci-uring lane). Saved from this nightly job itself so the
# next night starts warm.
cache-shared-key: kms-vault-lane
cache-save-if: 'true'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
install-test-tools: 'false'
- name: Install Vault CLI
run: |
set -euo pipefail
wget -qO- https://apt.releases.hashicorp.com/gpg | sudo gpg --dearmor -o /usr/share/keyrings/hashicorp-archive-keyring.gpg
echo "deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/hashicorp-archive-keyring.gpg] https://apt.releases.hashicorp.com $(lsb_release -cs) main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/hashicorp.list >/dev/null
sudo apt-get update -qq
sudo apt-get install -y -qq vault
vault version
- name: Start Vault dev server with KV2 and Transit engines
run: |
set -euo pipefail
nohup vault server -dev \
-dev-root-token-id="${VAULT_LANE_TOKEN}" \
-dev-listen-address=127.0.0.1:8200 >/tmp/vault-dev.log 2>&1 &
for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
if curl -fsS "${VAULT_LANE_ADDR}/v1/sys/health" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
break
fi
sleep 1
done
curl -fsS "${VAULT_LANE_ADDR}/v1/sys/health"
export VAULT_ADDR="${VAULT_LANE_ADDR}" VAULT_TOKEN="${VAULT_LANE_TOKEN}"
# Dev mode mounts KV v2 at secret/ by default; Transit is explicit.
# Prove both engines actually work rather than assuming the defaults.
vault secrets enable transit
vault kv put secret/rustfs-ci-lane-probe value=ok >/dev/null
vault kv get secret/rustfs-ci-lane-probe >/dev/null
vault write -f transit/keys/rustfs-ci-lane-probe >/dev/null
- name: Run rustfs-kms suite with the Vault lane on
env:
RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN: ${{ env.VAULT_LANE_TOKEN }}
RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDR: ${{ env.VAULT_LANE_ADDR }}
run: cargo test -p rustfs-kms --locked
- name: Run dev-Vault ignored tests
env:
RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN: ${{ env.VAULT_LANE_TOKEN }}
RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDR: ${{ env.VAULT_LANE_ADDR }}
# Filters select the dev-Vault-only #[ignore] tests. The AWS #[ignore]
# tests (backends::aws, service_manager) stay excluded — they need real
# AWS credentials and create billable keys. The AppRole and HA #[ignore]
# tests are excluded here because their own scripts below provision the
# Vault topology they need.
run: |
set -euo pipefail
cargo test -p rustfs-kms --locked --lib backends::contract_tests -- --ignored
cargo test -p rustfs-kms --locked --lib backends::vault -- --ignored
cargo test -p rustfs-kms --locked --test vault_fault_injection -- --ignored
- name: Run AppRole live checks (self-hosting ephemeral Vault)
run: bash scripts/test/vault_approle_kms_live.sh
- name: Show Vault dev server log on failure
if: failure()
run: tail -n 200 /tmp/vault-dev.log || true
# Three-node Raft leader failover (crates/kms/tests/vault_ha_failover_live.rs,
# first validated by rustfs/rustfs#5653). Its own job so an election-timing
# flake cannot mask the main lane's verdict, and vice versa. The script
# provisions and tears down its own Docker cluster.
kms-vault-ha-failover:
name: KMS Vault HA failover lane
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 60
env:
FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
NO_PROXY: 127.0.0.1,localhost
steps:
- name: Checkout main branch
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
ref: main
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
cache-shared-key: kms-vault-lane
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
install-test-tools: 'false'
- name: Run HA leader failover live checks (three-node Raft cluster in Docker)
run: bash scripts/test/vault_ha_kms_live.sh
+477
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,477 @@
# Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
# Package Workflow - Build DEB/RPM packages
#
# This workflow builds DEB and RPM packages from pre-built Linux binaries
# and uploads them to Cloudflare R2.
#
# Trigger:
# - release published: automatically package when a GitHub release is published
# - workflow_dispatch: manual trigger with optional tag/run_id
#
# Flow:
# 1. Find the Build workflow run for the release tag
# 2. Download Linux binaries (x86_64-gnu, aarch64-gnu) from build artifacts
# 3. Build DEB packages for amd64 and arm64
# 4. Build RPM packages for x86_64 and aarch64
# 5. Upload all packages to Cloudflare R2
name: Package DEB/RPM
permissions:
contents: read
actions: read
on:
release:
types: [ published ]
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
tag:
description: "Release tag to package (e.g. 1.0.0-beta.12). Leave empty for latest main build."
required: false
type: string
build_run_id:
description: "Build workflow run ID (overrides tag lookup)"
required: false
type: string
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.release.tag_name || github.event.inputs.tag || github.run_id }}
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
# Resolve which build run to use and extract version info
resolve:
name: Resolve Build
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
outputs:
version: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.version }}
build_type: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.build_type }}
build_run_id: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.build_run_id }}
tag: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.tag }}
steps:
- name: Resolve build run
id: resolve
shell: bash
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
INPUT_TAG: ${{ github.event.inputs.tag }}
INPUT_RUN_ID: ${{ github.event.inputs.build_run_id }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# Determine tag
if [[ "${{ github.event_name }}" == "release" ]]; then
TAG="${{ github.event.release.tag_name }}"
elif [[ -n "$INPUT_TAG" ]]; then
TAG="$INPUT_TAG"
else
TAG=""
fi
echo "Tag: ${TAG:-<none>}"
# Determine build run ID
BUILD_RUN_ID=""
if [[ -n "$INPUT_RUN_ID" ]]; then
# Explicit run ID takes priority
BUILD_RUN_ID="$INPUT_RUN_ID"
echo "Using explicit build run ID: $BUILD_RUN_ID"
elif [[ -n "$TAG" ]]; then
# Find the build run that produced this tag
echo "Looking for build run for tag: $TAG"
BUILD_RUN_ID=$(gh api \
"repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/workflows/build.yml/runs?branch=${TAG}&status=success&per_page=1" \
--jq '.workflow_runs[0].id' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
if [[ -z "$BUILD_RUN_ID" || "$BUILD_RUN_ID" == "null" ]]; then
# Tag might not be a branch; try event=push with head_branch matching
BUILD_RUN_ID=$(gh api \
"repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/workflows/build.yml/runs?event=push&status=success&per_page=100" \
--jq ".workflow_runs[] | select(.head_branch == \"$TAG\") | .id" 2>/dev/null | head -1 || echo "")
fi
if [[ -z "$BUILD_RUN_ID" || "$BUILD_RUN_ID" == "null" ]]; then
echo "❌ No successful build run found for tag: $TAG"
exit 1
fi
echo "Found build run: $BUILD_RUN_ID"
else
# No tag — latest successful main build
echo "No tag specified, looking for latest main build"
BUILD_RUN_ID=$(gh api \
"repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/workflows/build.yml/runs?branch=main&status=success&per_page=1" \
--jq '.workflow_runs[0].id' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
if [[ -z "$BUILD_RUN_ID" || "$BUILD_RUN_ID" == "null" ]]; then
echo "❌ No successful main build found"
exit 1
fi
echo "Latest main build: $BUILD_RUN_ID"
fi
# Determine version and build type
if [[ -n "$TAG" ]]; then
VERSION="$TAG"
if [[ "$TAG" == *"-preview"* ]]; then
BUILD_TYPE="preview"
elif [[ "$TAG" == *"alpha"* || "$TAG" == *"beta"* || "$TAG" == *"rc"* ]]; then
BUILD_TYPE="prerelease"
else
BUILD_TYPE="release"
fi
else
SHORT_SHA=$(gh api "repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/runs/${BUILD_RUN_ID}" \
--jq '.head_sha' 2>/dev/null | head -c 7)
VERSION="dev-${SHORT_SHA}"
BUILD_TYPE="development"
fi
{
echo "version=$VERSION"
echo "build_type=$BUILD_TYPE"
echo "build_run_id=$BUILD_RUN_ID"
echo "tag=${TAG}"
} >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "📊 Resolved:"
echo " Version: $VERSION"
echo " Build type: $BUILD_TYPE"
echo " Build run ID: $BUILD_RUN_ID"
# Build DEB and RPM packages for each architecture
package:
name: Package (${{ matrix.arch }})
needs: resolve
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
include:
- arch: x86_64
deb_arch: amd64
rpm_arch: x86_64
artifact_name: "rustfs-linux-x86_64-gnu"
- arch: aarch64
deb_arch: arm64
rpm_arch: aarch64
artifact_name: "rustfs-linux-aarch64-gnu"
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Download binary artifact from build run
uses: actions/download-artifact@37930b1c2abaa49bbe596cd826c3c89aef350131 # v7
with:
pattern: ${{ matrix.artifact_name }}*
path: ./binary-artifact
run-id: ${{ needs.resolve.outputs.build_run_id }}
github-token: ${{ github.token }}
merge-multiple: true
- name: Extract binary
id: binary
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
ZIP_FILE=$(find ./binary-artifact -name "*.zip" -type f | head -1)
if [[ -z "$ZIP_FILE" ]]; then
echo "❌ No binary artifact found"
ls -la ./binary-artifact/ || true
exit 1
fi
echo "Found artifact: $ZIP_FILE"
mkdir -p ./bin
unzip -o "$ZIP_FILE" -d ./bin
if [[ ! -f ./bin/rustfs ]]; then
echo "❌ rustfs binary not found in archive"
exit 1
fi
chmod +x ./bin/rustfs
ls -lh ./bin/rustfs
echo "✅ Binary extracted"
- name: Build DEB package
id: deb
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
VERSION="${{ needs.resolve.outputs.version }}"
DEB_ARCH="${{ matrix.deb_arch }}"
# DEB version: replace - with ~ (1.0.0-beta.12 -> 1.0.0~beta.12)
# Use a variable for ~ to prevent tilde expansion by bash
TILDE='~'
DEB_VERSION="${VERSION/-/$TILDE}"
PKG_DIR="rustfs_${DEB_VERSION}_${DEB_ARCH}"
echo "Building DEB: ${PKG_DIR}.deb"
mkdir -p "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN"
mkdir -p "${PKG_DIR}/usr/bin"
mkdir -p "${PKG_DIR}/etc/default"
mkdir -p "${PKG_DIR}/lib/systemd/system"
mkdir -p "${PKG_DIR}/usr/share/doc/rustfs"
cp ./bin/rustfs "${PKG_DIR}/usr/bin/"
chmod 755 "${PKG_DIR}/usr/bin/rustfs"
cp deploy/build/rustfs.service "${PKG_DIR}/lib/systemd/system/"
cat > "${PKG_DIR}/etc/default/rustfs" << 'ENVEOF'
# RustFS Environment Configuration
# See https://rustfs.com/docs/ for more information
# RUSTFS_VOLUMES=""
# RUSTFS_ROOT_USER=""
# RUSTFS_ROOT_PASSWORD=""
ENVEOF
cat > "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/control" << EOF
Package: rustfs
Version: ${DEB_VERSION}
Section: utils
Priority: optional
Architecture: ${DEB_ARCH}
Depends: libc6 (>= 2.31)
Maintainer: RustFS Team <support@rustfs.com>
Description: High-performance distributed object storage
RustFS is a high-performance distributed object storage software
built using Rust. It is compatible with MinIO and S3 API.
Homepage: https://rustfs.com
EOF
cat > "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/postinst" << 'POSTINST'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
if ! getent passwd rustfs > /dev/null 2>&1; then
useradd -r -s /bin/false -d /opt/rustfs rustfs
fi
mkdir -p /opt/rustfs /data/rustfs /var/log/rustfs
chown rustfs:rustfs /opt/rustfs /data/rustfs /var/log/rustfs
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
systemctl daemon-reload
fi
echo "RustFS installed. Configure /etc/default/rustfs then: systemctl start rustfs"
POSTINST
chmod 755 "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/postinst"
cat > "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/prerm" << 'PRERM'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ] && systemctl is-active --quiet rustfs; then
systemctl stop rustfs
fi
PRERM
chmod 755 "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/prerm"
cat > "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/postrm" << 'POSTRM'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
systemctl daemon-reload
fi
POSTRM
chmod 755 "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/postrm"
cp LICENSE "${PKG_DIR}/usr/share/doc/rustfs/"
cp README.md "${PKG_DIR}/usr/share/doc/rustfs/"
fakeroot dpkg-deb --build "${PKG_DIR}"
DEB_FILE="${PKG_DIR}.deb"
ls -lh "$DEB_FILE"
echo "deb_file=$DEB_FILE" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "✅ DEB built: $DEB_FILE"
- name: Build RPM package
id: rpm
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
VERSION="${{ needs.resolve.outputs.version }}"
RPM_ARCH="${{ matrix.rpm_arch }}"
echo "Building RPM for ${RPM_ARCH}"
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y ruby ruby-dev build-essential
sudo gem install fpm
# Create config file for fpm (DEB build creates it in its package dir structure,
# but fpm needs the file to exist before packaging)
mkdir -p ./tmp-pkg/etc/default
cat > ./tmp-pkg/etc/default/rustfs << 'ENVEOF'
# RustFS Environment Configuration
# See https://rustfs.com/docs/ for more information
# RUSTFS_VOLUMES=""
# RUSTFS_ROOT_USER=""
# RUSTFS_ROOT_PASSWORD=""
ENVEOF
fpm -s dir -t rpm \
--name rustfs \
--version "$VERSION" \
--architecture "$RPM_ARCH" \
--depends "glibc >= 2.31" \
--maintainer "RustFS Team <support@rustfs.com>" \
--description "High-performance distributed object storage" \
--url "https://rustfs.com" \
--license "Apache-2.0" \
--after-install <(cat <<'POSTINST'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
if ! getent passwd rustfs > /dev/null 2>&1; then
useradd -r -s /bin/false -d /opt/rustfs rustfs
fi
mkdir -p /opt/rustfs /data/rustfs /var/log/rustfs
chown rustfs:rustfs /opt/rustfs /data/rustfs /var/log/rustfs
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
systemctl daemon-reload
fi
POSTINST
) \
--before-remove <(cat <<'PRERM'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ] && systemctl is-active --quiet rustfs; then
systemctl stop rustfs
fi
PRERM
) \
--after-remove <(cat <<'POSTRM'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
systemctl daemon-reload
fi
POSTRM
) \
--config-files /etc/default/rustfs \
./bin/rustfs=/usr/bin/rustfs \
./tmp-pkg/etc/default/rustfs=/etc/default/rustfs \
deploy/build/rustfs.service=/lib/systemd/system/rustfs.service \
LICENSE=/usr/share/doc/rustfs/LICENSE \
README.md=/usr/share/doc/rustfs/README.md
RPM_FILE=$(ls -1 rustfs-*.rpm 2>/dev/null | head -1)
if [[ -z "$RPM_FILE" ]]; then
echo "❌ RPM build failed"
exit 1
fi
ls -lh "$RPM_FILE"
echo "rpm_file=$RPM_FILE" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "✅ RPM built: $RPM_FILE"
- name: Upload packages to artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
with:
name: packages-${{ matrix.arch }}
path: |
*.deb
*.rpm
retention-days: 30
- name: Upload packages to Cloudflare R2
if: env.R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID != ''
env:
R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
R2_ENDPOINT: ${{ secrets.R2_ENDPOINT }}
R2_BUCKET: ${{ secrets.R2_BUCKET }}
AWS_EC2_METADATA_DISABLED: true
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [[ -z "$R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID" || -z "$R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY" || -z "$R2_ENDPOINT" || -z "$R2_BUCKET" ]]; then
echo "⚠️ R2 credentials missing, skipping upload"
exit 0
fi
if ! command -v aws >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y awscli
fi
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="$R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID"
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="$R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"
export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION="auto"
BUILD_TYPE="${{ needs.resolve.outputs.build_type }}"
if [[ "$BUILD_TYPE" == "development" ]]; then
R2_PREFIX="artifacts/rustfs/packages/dev"
else
R2_PREFIX="artifacts/rustfs/packages/release"
fi
R2_PATH="s3://${R2_BUCKET}/${R2_PREFIX}/"
echo "📤 Uploading to $R2_PATH"
DEB_FILE="${{ steps.deb.outputs.deb_file }}"
RPM_FILE="${{ steps.rpm.outputs.rpm_file }}"
for f in "$DEB_FILE" "$RPM_FILE"; do
if [[ -n "$f" && -f "$f" ]]; then
echo "Uploading: $f"
aws s3 cp "$f" "$R2_PATH" --endpoint-url "$R2_ENDPOINT" --only-show-errors
fi
done
echo "✅ Upload complete"
# Also upload as latest for release/prerelease
if [[ "$BUILD_TYPE" == "release" || "$BUILD_TYPE" == "prerelease" ]]; then
LATEST_PATH="s3://${R2_BUCKET}/artifacts/rustfs/packages/latest/"
for f in "$DEB_FILE" "$RPM_FILE"; do
if [[ -n "$f" && -f "$f" ]]; then
echo "Uploading latest: $(basename "$f")"
aws s3 cp "$f" "$LATEST_PATH" --endpoint-url "$R2_ENDPOINT" --only-show-errors
fi
done
echo "✅ Latest packages updated"
fi
# Summary
summary:
name: Summary
needs: [ resolve, package ]
if: always()
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
- name: Print summary
shell: bash
run: |
echo "## 📦 Package Summary" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "| Item | Value |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "|------|-------|" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "| Version | \`${{ needs.resolve.outputs.version }}\` |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "| Build Type | ${{ needs.resolve.outputs.build_type }} |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "| Build Run | #${{ needs.resolve.outputs.build_run_id }} |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "| Package Status | ${{ needs.package.result }} |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
+4
View File
@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ jobs:
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
install-test-tools: 'false'
- name: Check production Windows dependencies
shell: pwsh
run: cargo check -p rustfs-ecstore --lib
- name: Test guarded rename publication
shell: pwsh
run: cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore --lib rename_all_ -- --nocapture
+41 -15
View File
@@ -51,26 +51,25 @@ If repo-level instructions conflict, follow the nearest file and keep behavior a
## Change Style for Existing Logic
- Prefer direct, local code over extracting one-off helpers.
- Extract a helper only when logic is reused or the extraction materially clarifies a non-trivial flow.
- Start with the smallest direct, local edit. Add production files, types, traits, helpers, wrappers, or abstraction layers only when current behavior requires them. Extraction must remove present duplication, enforce a real boundary, or materially clarify a non-trivial flow; anticipated reuse is not enough.
- Use Rust's default module file layout (`mod foo;` with `foo.rs` or `foo/mod.rs`/`foo/*.rs`).
Avoid `#[path = "..."]` for module inclusion; move files into the canonical module tree instead.
If an unavoidable generated-code, FFI, or test-fixture exception remains, keep it local and document why the canonical layout cannot work.
- Solve only the requested problem; do not add speculative features, configurability, or adjacent improvements.
- Prefer editing existing code over rewriting files or reshaping unrelated logic.
- Modify only what is required and remove only artifacts introduced by your own changes.
- Modify only what is required. Remove any in-scope path or representation superseded by the change. If compatibility or rollback requires retention, adapt at the boundary to one canonical core and follow the repository's `RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO` removal policy; never delete unrelated code merely to improve addition/deletion statistics.
- Preserve the existing control-flow and logic shape when fixing bugs or addressing review comments, especially in init, distributed coordination, locking, metadata, and concurrency paths.
- Do not refactor existing code only to make it easier to unit test.
- Keep fixes narrowly aligned with the requested behavior; avoid semantic-adjacent rewrites while touching sensitive paths.
- Keep code elegant, concise, and direct. Prefer minimal, readable implementations over over-engineering and excessive abstraction. Use comments to clarify non-obvious intent and invariants, not to compensate for unclear code.
- Do not write comments that narrate what the next line does, restate a signature, or describe the change you just made — that commentary belongs in the PR description, not the code. Required invariant comments — lock ordering, `SAFETY`, unwrap justification, `#[allow(dead_code)]` rationale, `RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO` — are never narration.
- Keep code elegant, concise, and direct. Prefer the smallest readable design and existing abstractions over parallel managers, factories, adapters, or wrappers added only to make the design look extensible.
- Comments state non-obvious reasons, assumptions, and invariants in the shortest complete form. Their length follows the invariant's complexity: `SAFETY`, lock ordering, durability, and compatibility contracts may need a short list of conditions. Never narrate the next line, restate a signature, or record change history; move durable design rationale to architecture or operations documentation.
- Mention unrelated issues when useful, but do not fix them as part of a narrow task.
## Reuse Before You Write
Search for an existing implementation before writing a new one; extend what exists instead of duplicating it:
- **Helpers and utilities** (path/string handling, hashing, retry, env parsing, IO wrappers): check `ls crates/utils/src` first — file names map to operations (`retry.rs`, `envs.rs`, `hash.rs`, `path.rs`, `string.rs`, `io.rs`) — plus `crates/common` (shared structures/globals), then `rg -i 'fn \w*<term>' crates/utils/src crates/common/src <touched-crate>/src` for signatures. Helpers are snake_case: a full-text single-word grep over a large crate drowns you and a multi-word phrase returns nothing. Reimplementing an existing workspace helper — or hand-rolling what `std`, `tokio`, or an existing workspace dependency already provides — is a review finding, not a style preference.
- **Helpers and utilities** (path/string handling, hashing, retry, env parsing, IO wrappers): check `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, the touched crate, the likely domain-owning crate, and relevant direct workspace dependencies from `Cargo.toml`. Search snake_case signatures with a focused term. Reimplementing an existing workspace helper — or hand-rolling what `std`, `tokio`, or an existing dependency already provides — is a review finding, not a style preference.
- **Reuse requires matching semantics, not a matching name**: before adopting a helper, check its normalization (`clean` resolves `.`/`..` — never apply it to raw S3 object keys), error type, backoff/deadline behavior, and durability gating against the call site. When semantics differ, a new narrowly-named helper with a comment naming the rejected lookalike is the correct outcome. The inverse also holds: workspace wrappers exist because raw `std`/`tokio` semantics were insufficient (durability gates, retries) — prefer the wrapper over the raw call.
- **Constants and fixed tokens** (protocol labels, error identifiers, header keys, event names, metric names, command tags): search for existing constants/enums that already represent the same semantic value and reuse them. If a value is truly new, define one local constant near related logic; never scatter the literal across sites. When changing existing behavior, align naming and format with the established constants.
- **Test scaffolding**: reuse existing test utilities and fixtures (the touched crate's own `test_util` module and `tests/fixtures`, or `crates/test-utils`) instead of writing new setup code — run `rg -l '<fn-under-test>' <crate>/src <crate>/tests` before writing a test. A new test must pin a failure mode no existing test covers. Near-duplicate means same code path AND same poison-value class: this repo's boundary companions (n==max vs max+1, absent vs empty vs nil UUID bytes, MetaObject vs MetaDeleteMarker) are distinct by definition and must all be written.
@@ -79,6 +78,7 @@ Search for an existing implementation before writing a new one; extend what exis
Net-new code — files, types, branches, comments — is cost to justify, not progress:
- Inspect production-code additions separately. Tests, fixtures, generated code, and documentation do not count as production-code growth. Line counts are signals, not quotas: new production structures must map to a current requirement, and a blocker requires a concrete smaller design that preserves correctness, compatibility, readability, and real boundaries.
- Validate at the trust boundary — untrusted client input, bytes read from disk, RPC payloads, config (see Serde Safety and Cross-Cutting Domain Invariants) — then trust the type: do not re-check what the type system or a validated upstream layer already guarantees, and cite the establishing check (`file:line`) when the guarantee is not obvious.
- The exception is load-bearing: a value that crossed a persistence, RPC, or version boundary is never guaranteed by the code on the other side — a peer may be older or buggy, disk bytes may be corrupt — so the Cross-Cutting Domain Invariant patterns apply at every consumer, and re-checks immediately before a destructive action (delete, overwrite, quorum decision) stay. Deleting an existing guard is a behavior change requiring adversarial review, not cleanup.
- Every new branch needs a nameable trigger: a concrete input, state, or failure that reaches it — for boundary-crossing values, corrupt or stale persisted/peer data is always nameable. If you cannot name one, do not write the branch. If the case is truly unreachable, encode the invariant in the type; where that is impossible, return a typed internal error (fail closed). `debug_assert!` is acceptable only for pure internal arithmetic on values that never crossed a disk/RPC/config boundary — never as the sole guard on decoded or peer-supplied data.
@@ -218,9 +218,10 @@ not to bless it.
Pick the tier from the riskiest file touched; when in doubt, pick the higher.
- **Exempt:** docs/comments/instruction-only changes, formatting, typos with
no runtime surface. Skip this section.
- **Mechanical:** pure renames, file moves, test-only or tooling changes
- **Exempt:** docs/comments, formatting, and typos that cannot affect runtime,
builds, tests, or agent execution. Skip this section.
- **Mechanical:** pure renames, file moves, test-only or tooling changes, and
agent-instruction changes that alter execution —
correctness and simplicity adversaries only.
- **Standard (the default):** any change that affects behavior.
- **High risk:** touches locking, erasure coding, quorum/heal, replication,
@@ -242,7 +243,7 @@ encode this repo's shipped bugs.
- **Correctness adversary** — construct a concrete input/state/interleaving
that yields wrong output, data loss, or a crash. Probe error paths and edge
values (empty, nil UUID, zero-length, quorum1, missing version).
- **Simplicity adversary** — same behavior, less code. Hunt the materially smaller or more idiomatic diff (see Change Style for Existing Logic, Reuse Before You Write, and Necessary Code Only): reimplemented workspace helpers, one-caller extractions, rewrites where an in-place edit suffices, defensive branches with no nameable trigger, redundant error wrapping, near-duplicate tests, narration comments. A smaller diff achieving identical behavior is a finding, reported with the concrete replacement; forced reuse of a helper with mismatched semantics is equally a finding.
- **Simplicity adversary** — same behavior, less code. Hunt reimplemented helpers, rewrites where an in-place edit suffices, speculative abstractions, defensive branches with no nameable trigger, redundant error wrapping, near-duplicate tests, and narration comments. A one-caller helper is a finding only when it merely forwards or splits a short linear flow without adding domain naming, boundary isolation, an invariant, or useful error context. Report a concrete smaller replacement; fewer lines alone are not evidence.
- **Security reviewer** — authn/authz bypass, injection, secret leakage,
untrusted deserialization (see Serde Safety), path traversal, timing leaks.
- **Concurrency/durability reviewer** — lock ordering, races, cancellation,
@@ -253,10 +254,11 @@ encode this repo's shipped bugs.
time across IO, sync or CPU-heavy work on async runtime threads, added
fsync/flush outside the durability gate, hot-path logging noise. A
measurable regression on a per-request or per-object path is a finding.
- **Test-coverage skeptic** — for each claimed behavior, name the test that
fails if the change is reverted; then name a changed line that could be
wrong while all tests stay green — if one exists, coverage is insufficient.
A missing test is a finding, not a note.
- **Test-coverage skeptic** — for each testable behavior claim, name the test
or executable check that detects a revert; then name a changed line that
could be wrong while all checks stay green. If a focused check is not
reasonable, require the reason and residual risk from the validation floor.
Test additions have no line-count or growth budget.
Standard tier: correctness adversary + simplicity adversary + test-coverage
skeptic, plus every role whose domain the diff touches (async or
@@ -282,7 +284,9 @@ High risk: all seven roles.
- Every applicable role has run; every finding is fixed or rebutted with
evidence.
- Every behavior change has a test that fails without it.
- Every testable behavior change has a focused regression check. Exceptions
follow the validation floor and state why a check is impractical and what
risk remains.
- The Verification Before PR gates pass — adversarial review supplements
those gates, never replaces them.
- High risk only: record a one-line verdict per role in the PR description.
@@ -322,6 +326,28 @@ High risk: all seven roles.
- Use environment variables or vault tooling for sensitive configuration.
- For localhost-sensitive tests, verify proxy settings to avoid traffic leakage.
## Logging
Applies to **every** `tracing` macro you add or edit, including a single line
added in passing while fixing something else — not only to log-focused changes.
- Fields first, message second: `event`, `component`, `subsystem`,
`result`/`state`, then key context. The message is a short label, not a
sentence with values interpolated into it.
- Reuse the existing `EVENT_*` / `LOG_COMPONENT_*` / `LOG_SUBSYSTEM_*`
constants of the module you are editing; match the shape of the log sites
already in that file rather than introducing a second style next to them.
- Level policy: `error` for behavior/security-affecting failures, `warn` for
degraded or fallback paths, `info` for low-frequency lifecycle, `debug` for
targeted diagnostics, `trace` for hot paths. Per-object and per-request
success paths are `trace`.
- Never log secrets, tokens, credential payloads, or merged config dumps.
- `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` enforces a subset of this on the files
it lists; passing it is a floor, not evidence the log matches the house style.
See `.agents/skills/rustfs-logging-governance/SKILL.md` for the full event
model, level policy, and guardrail-update checklist.
## Tools
### xl.meta decode tool Quick Use
+64 -20
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# ARCHITECTURE.md
> Last updated: 2026-07-02 · Revision: 2
> Last updated: 2026-08-12 · Revision: 3
>
> This document describes the high-level architecture of RustFS.
> If you want to familiarize yourself with the code base, you are in the right place!
@@ -119,19 +119,44 @@ module split is tracked under `docs/architecture/`.
3. **Each type has exactly one definition.** Types shared across crates must be defined
in one crate and re-exported or imported by others.
- ⚠️ VIOLATED: `ReplicationStats` (4 copies), `LastMinuteLatency` (3 copies),
`BackpressureConfig` (3 copies), `DataUsageInfo` (2 copies).
- ⚠️ VIOLATED: `ReplicationStats` names three unrelated types
(`crates/data-usage/src/data_usage.rs`,
`crates/obs/src/metrics/collectors/replication.rs`,
`crates/ecstore/src/bucket/replication/replication_state.rs`) — a naming
collision, not copies; renaming is tracked in rustfs/backlog#1847.
- `LastMinuteLatency` has two deliberately different implementations: the
per-second bucketed accumulator in `crates/common/src/last_minute.rs` and
the in-memory endpoint-health sample tracker in
`crates/ecstore/src/bucket/bucket_target_sys.rs` (its doc comment explains
why it stays local).
- ✅ RESOLVED: `BackpressureConfig` and `DataUsageInfo` each have exactly one
definition (`crates/io-core/src/backpressure.rs`,
`crates/data-usage/src/data_usage.rs`). A zero-consumer
`BackpressureSettings` copy lingers in `crates/io-metrics/src/config.rs`;
its removal is tracked in rustfs/backlog#1833.
4. **ecstore does not know about HTTP or S3 protocol details.** It operates on
storage-level abstractions (objects, buckets, disks, pools).
- ⚠️ VIOLATED: 58 files under `crates/ecstore/src` reference `s3s`
(`rg -l 's3s' crates/ecstore/src | wc -l`), `crates/ecstore/src/client/`
is a ~9.4K-line embedded S3 HTTP client, and `crates/ecstore/Cargo.toml`
depends on `s3s`, `http`, `hyper`/`hyper-util`/`hyper-rustls`, and
`reqwest`. Target state: the engine's need to act as an S3 client
(tiering, replication targets) is served by an extracted client crate,
and ecstore holds no wire or DTO types.
5. **The `rustfs` binary crate is the only place that wires everything together.**
Individual crates should be testable in isolation.
6. **Error types use `thiserror` with descriptive names** (e.g., `StorageError`,
not bare `Error`).
- ⚠️ VIOLATED: 6 crates use `pub enum Error`; 2 crates use `snafu`;
`heal` use `anyhow` in library code.
- ✅ RESOLVED (strategy): `snafu` is gone from source
(`rg -l snafu crates/ rustfs/` is empty) and library code no longer uses
`anyhow` (remaining hits are test code and the `e2e_test` crate; `heal`
uses `thiserror`).
- ⚠️ VIOLATED (naming): 6 crates still export a bare `pub enum Error`:
`crypto`, `filemeta`, `heal`, `iam`, `policy`, and `replication`
(`src/resync.rs`) — all `thiserror`-derived.
## Known Structural Issues
@@ -140,13 +165,25 @@ module split is tracked under `docs/architecture/`.
### Critical
- **common/scanner code duplication (~3K lines).** `scanner` depends on `common`
but maintains its own copies of `DataUsageInfo`, `LastMinuteLatency`, and related
types instead of importing them.
- **scanner/data-usage duplicate `.usage-cache.bin` serialization types.** The
original finding ("common/scanner code duplication, ~3K lines") is resolved:
`scanner` imports the shared data-usage types from `rustfs-data-usage` (see
the `pub use rustfs_data_usage::…` re-exports at the top of
`crates/scanner/src/data_usage_define.rs`). What remains: `scanner` and
`data-usage` each hold their own serialization types for the scanner cache
file (`DataUsageCacheInfo`/`DataUsageEntryInfo` in
`crates/scanner/src/data_usage_define.rs` vs
`DataUsageCacheInfo`/`DataUsageEntry` in
`crates/data-usage/src/data_usage.rs`); convergence is tracked in
rustfs/backlog#1828.
- **ecstore is a monolith (87K lines, 163 files).** It contains disk management,
bucket management, erasure coding, replication, lifecycle, RPC, and configuration
— all in one crate. It should be decomposed along its existing subdirectories.
- **ecstore is a monolith (265 files, ~288K lines — roughly half is inline
`#[cfg(test)]` code).** Measured with
`find crates/ecstore/src -name '*.rs' | xargs wc -l`. It contains disk
management, bucket management, erasure coding, replication, lifecycle, RPC,
and configuration — all in one crate. It should be decomposed along its
existing subdirectories; the split plan lives in
[docs/architecture/ecstore-module-split-plan.md](docs/architecture/ecstore-module-split-plan.md).
### High
@@ -154,19 +191,26 @@ module split is tracked under `docs/architecture/`.
`common → filemeta/madmin` edges must stay removed so leaf/helper crates do
not regain upward dependencies.
- **Three-layer BackpressureConfig/DeadlockConfig duplication** across io-core,
concurrency, and `rustfs/src/storage`. Storage policies now expose and consume
explicit projections into the concurrency/io-core policy shapes, and workload
- **Three-layer backpressure/deadlock policy bridging** across io-core,
concurrency, and `rustfs/src/storage`. The config types are no longer
duplicated (`BackpressureConfig` and `DeadlockDetectorConfig` are each
defined once, in io-core). Storage policies expose and consume explicit
projections into the concurrency/io-core policy shapes, and workload
admission snapshots are composed through provider registries; later work
should use those bridges before deleting compatibility wrappers.
### Medium
- **Inconsistent error handling.** Three strategies (thiserror/snafu/anyhow) and
mixed naming (bare `Error` vs descriptive names).
- **Bare `Error` naming.** Error-handling strategy has converged on `thiserror`
(no `snafu`, no `anyhow` in library code); the remaining inconsistency is the
bare `pub enum Error` naming in the 6 crates listed under Invariant 6.
- **Ambiguous common vs utils boundary.** Both described as "utilities and data
structures." Need clear ownership rules.
- **`common` is mostly parked domain code, not shared utilities.** Of its
6,724 lines, ~83% is scanner/heal domain code stranded there to break
dependency cycles (`metrics.rs`, ~4,810 lines of scanner-domain metrics;
`heal_channel.rs`, ~776 lines of heal-domain channel types). The
"common vs utils" naming ambiguity is secondary to moving that code to its
domain owners.
## Cross-Cutting Concerns
@@ -232,7 +276,7 @@ The binary (`main.rs`) boots in this order:
```
┌─────────┐
│ rustfs │ (binary + lib, 75K lines)
│ rustfs │ (binary + lib)
│ main │
└────┬────┘
@@ -255,7 +299,7 @@ The binary (`main.rs`) boots in this order:
│ │ │
┌─────▼──────┐ ┌──────▼──────┐ ┌──────▼──────┐
│ ecstore │ │ rio │ │ io-core │
(87K,core) │ │ (readers) │ │ (zero-copy) │
(core) │ │ (readers) │ │ (zero-copy) │
└─────┬──────┘ └─────────────┘ └─────────────┘
┌─────┬──┼──┬─────┬──────┐
Generated
+530 -452
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+68 -68
View File
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ edition = "2024"
license = "Apache-2.0"
repository = "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs"
rust-version = "1.97.1"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
version = "1.0.0-rc.1"
homepage = "https://rustfs.com"
description = "RustFS is a high-performance distributed object storage software built using Rust, one of the most popular languages worldwide. "
keywords = ["RustFS", "Minio", "object-storage", "filesystem", "s3"]
@@ -86,52 +86,52 @@ redundant_clone = "warn"
[workspace.dependencies]
# RustFS Internal Crates
rustfs = { path = "./rustfs", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-heal = { path = "crates/heal", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-audit = { path = "crates/audit", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-checksums = { path = "crates/checksums", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-common = { path = "crates/common", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-data-usage = { path = "crates/data-usage", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-config = { path = "./crates/config", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-concurrency = { path = "./crates/concurrency", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-credentials = { path = "crates/credentials", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-crypto = { path = "crates/crypto", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-ecstore = { path = "crates/ecstore", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-filemeta = { path = "crates/filemeta", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-iam = { path = "crates/iam", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-keystone = { path = "crates/keystone", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-lifecycle = { path = "crates/lifecycle", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-kms = { path = "crates/kms", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-lock = { path = "crates/lock", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-madmin = { path = "crates/madmin", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-notify = { path = "crates/notify", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-io-metrics = { path = "crates/io-metrics", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-io-core = { path = "crates/io-core", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-object-capacity = { path = "crates/object-capacity", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-object-data-cache = { path = "crates/object-data-cache", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-log-analyzer = { path = "crates/log-analyzer", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-obs = { path = "crates/obs", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-policy = { path = "crates/policy", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-protos = { path = "crates/protos", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-protocols = { path = "crates/protocols", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-replication = { path = "crates/replication", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-rio = { path = "crates/rio", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-rio-v2 = { path = "crates/rio-v2", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-s3-types = { path = "crates/s3-types", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-s3-ops = { path = "crates/s3-ops", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-s3select-api = { path = "crates/s3select-api", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-s3select-query = { path = "crates/s3select-query", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-scanner = { path = "crates/scanner", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-security-governance = { path = "crates/security-governance", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-extension-schema = { path = "crates/extension-schema", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-signer = { path = "crates/signer", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-storage-api = { path = "crates/storage-api", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-trusted-proxies = { path = "crates/trusted-proxies", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-targets = { path = "crates/targets", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-test-utils = { path = "crates/test-utils", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-tls-runtime = { path = "crates/tls-runtime", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-utils = { path = "crates/utils", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-zip = { path = "./crates/zip", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs = { path = "./rustfs", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-heal = { path = "crates/heal", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-audit = { path = "crates/audit", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-checksums = { path = "crates/checksums", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-common = { path = "crates/common", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-data-usage = { path = "crates/data-usage", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-config = { path = "./crates/config", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-concurrency = { path = "./crates/concurrency", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-credentials = { path = "crates/credentials", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-crypto = { path = "crates/crypto", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-ecstore = { path = "crates/ecstore", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-filemeta = { path = "crates/filemeta", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-iam = { path = "crates/iam", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-keystone = { path = "crates/keystone", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-lifecycle = { path = "crates/lifecycle", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-kms = { path = "crates/kms", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-lock = { path = "crates/lock", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-madmin = { path = "crates/madmin", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-notify = { path = "crates/notify", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-io-metrics = { path = "crates/io-metrics", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-io-core = { path = "crates/io-core", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-object-capacity = { path = "crates/object-capacity", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-object-data-cache = { path = "crates/object-data-cache", version = "1.0.0-rc.1", default-features = false }
rustfs-log-analyzer = { path = "crates/log-analyzer", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-obs = { path = "crates/obs", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-policy = { path = "crates/policy", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-protos = { path = "crates/protos", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-protocols = { path = "crates/protocols", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-replication = { path = "crates/replication", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-rio = { path = "crates/rio", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-rio-v2 = { path = "crates/rio-v2", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-s3-types = { path = "crates/s3-types", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-s3-ops = { path = "crates/s3-ops", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-s3select-api = { path = "crates/s3select-api", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-s3select-query = { path = "crates/s3select-query", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-scanner = { path = "crates/scanner", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-security-governance = { path = "crates/security-governance", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-extension-schema = { path = "crates/extension-schema", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-signer = { path = "crates/signer", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-storage-api = { path = "crates/storage-api", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-trusted-proxies = { path = "crates/trusted-proxies", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-targets = { path = "crates/targets", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-test-utils = { path = "crates/test-utils", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-tls-runtime = { path = "crates/tls-runtime", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-utils = { path = "crates/utils", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-zip = { path = "./crates/zip", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
# Async Runtime and Networking
async-channel = "2.5.0"
@@ -139,13 +139,13 @@ async_zip = { default-features = false, version = "0.0.18" }
mysql_async = { default-features = false, version = "0.37" }
async-compression = { version = "0.4.43" }
async-recursion = "1.1.1"
async-trait = "0.1.91"
async-trait = "0.1.92"
async-nats = { version = "0.50.0", default-features = false }
axum = "0.8.9"
futures = "0.3.33"
futures-core = "0.3.33"
futures = "0.3.34"
futures-core = "0.3.34"
futures-lite = "2.6.1"
futures-util = "0.3.33"
futures-util = "0.3.34"
pollster = "1.0.1"
pulsar = { default-features = false, version = "6.8.0" }
lapin = { default-features = false, version = "4.10.0" }
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ tower = { version = "0.5.3" }
tower-http = { version = "0.7.0" }
# Serialization and Data Formats
apache-avro = "0.21.0"
apache-avro = "0.22.0"
bytes = { version = "1.12.1" }
bytesize = "2.7.0"
byteorder = "1.5.0"
@@ -228,15 +228,15 @@ atomic_enum = "0.3.0"
aws-config = { version = "1.10.1" }
aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.0" }
aws-sdk-kms = { default-features = false, version = "1.114.0" }
aws-sdk-s3 = { default-features = false, version = "1.140.0" }
aws-sdk-s3 = { default-features = false, version = "1.141.0" }
aws-sdk-sts = { default-features = false, version = "1.110.0" }
aws-smithy-http-client = { default-features = false, version = "1.2.0" }
aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.14.0" }
aws-smithy-types = { version = "1.6.1" }
base64 = "0.23.0"
base64 = "0.23.1"
base64-simd = "0.8.0"
brotli = "8.0.4"
clap = { version = "4.6.5" }
clap = { version = "4.6.6" }
const-str = { version = "1.1.0" }
convert_case = "0.11.0"
criterion = { version = "0.8" }
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ crossbeam-queue = "0.3.13"
crossbeam-channel = "0.5.16"
crossbeam-deque = "0.8.7"
crossbeam-utils = "0.8.22"
datafusion = { default-features = false, git = "https://github.com/apache/datafusion.git", rev = "dae03ee062b2abf986de8df12ea82fb1578a2d99" }
datafusion = { default-features = false, git = "https://github.com/apache/datafusion.git", rev = "e08aed1e5de41dcf81d529140dae07723b942a5e" }
#datafusion = { default-features = false, version = "54.1.0" }
derive_builder = "0.20.2"
enumset = "1.1.14"
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ lz4 = "1.28.1"
matchit = "0.9.2"
md-5 = "0.11.0"
mime_guess = "2.0.5"
moka = { version = "0.12.15" }
moka = { version = "0.12.16" }
netif = "0.1.6"
num_cpus = { version = "1.17.0" }
nvml-wrapper = "0.12.1"
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ percent-encoding = "2.3.2"
pin-project-lite = "0.2.17"
pretty_assertions = "1.4.1"
rand = { version = "0.10.2" }
ratelimit = "0.10.1"
ratelimit = "2.0.0"
rayon = "1.12.0"
reed-solomon-erasure = { package = "rustfs-erasure-codec", version = "8.0.2" }
reed-solomon-simd = "3.1.0"
@@ -289,12 +289,12 @@ rustify = { version = "0.7", default-features = false }
rustix = { version = "1.1.4" }
rust-embed = { version = "8.12.0" }
rustc-hash = { version = "2.1.3" }
s3s = { git = "https://github.com/cxymds/s3s.git", rev = "fe3941d91fa1c69956f209a9145995c9f0235bff" }
s3s = { git = "https://github.com/rustfs/s3s.git", rev = "d7028511a53f69d41ed3c69f36899f9b1aede647" }
serial_test = "4.0.1"
shadow-rs = { default-features = false, version = "2.0.0" }
siphasher = "1.0.3"
smallvec = { version = "1.15.2" }
smartstring = "1.0.1"
compact_str = "0.10.0"
snap = "1.1.2"
starshard = { version = "2.2.2" }
strum = { version = "0.28.0" }
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ sysinfo = "0.39.6"
temp-env = "0.3.6"
tempfile = "3.27.0"
test-case = "3.3.1"
thiserror = "2.0.19"
thiserror = "2.0.20"
tracing = { version = "0.1.44" }
tracing-appender = "0.2.5"
tracing-core = "0.1.36"
@@ -339,22 +339,22 @@ pyroscope = { version = "2.1.1" }
libunftp = { version = "0.23.0" }
unftp-core = "0.1.0"
suppaftp = { version = "10.0.1" }
rcgen = { version = "0.14.8", default-features = false, features = ["aws_lc_rs", "crypto", "pem"] }
russh = { version = "0.62.5" }
russh-sftp = "2.3.0"
rcgen = { version = "0.14.9", default-features = false, features = ["aws_lc_rs", "crypto", "pem"] }
russh = { version = "0.62.6" }
russh-sftp = "2.4.0"
# WebDAV
dav-server = "0.11.0"
# Performance Analysis and Memory Profiling
mimalloc = { version = "0.1.52", git = "https://github.com/xonatius/mimalloc_rust.git", rev = "1cdadea43e9c5a0f054b65be21200ce580e4eb13" }
libmimalloc-sys = { version = "0.1.49", git = "https://github.com/xonatius/mimalloc_rust.git", rev = "1cdadea43e9c5a0f054b65be21200ce580e4eb13", features = ["extended"] }
hotpath = { version = "0.23.0", default-features = false }
mimalloc = { version = "0.1.52", git = "https://github.com/xonatius/mimalloc_rust.git", rev = "ce6338661179c8be22e516b00af7483f151485a7" }
libmimalloc-sys = { version = "0.1.49", git = "https://github.com/xonatius/mimalloc_rust.git", rev = "ce6338661179c8be22e516b00af7483f151485a7", features = ["extended"] }
hotpath = { version = "0.23.2", default-features = false }
# Snapshot testing for output format regression detection
insta = { version = "1.48" }
[workspace.metadata.cargo-shear]
ignored = ["rustfs"]
ignored = ["hotpath", "rustfs"]
[profile.dev]
# Full debuginfo roughly doubles compile+link time and produces multi-GB
+6 -1
View File
@@ -91,7 +91,12 @@ LABEL name="RustFS" \
# Upgrade base-image packages so published images pick up security fixes
# (e.g. openssl/libssl3 CVEs) without waiting for a new Alpine point release.
RUN apk upgrade --no-cache && \
apk add --no-cache ca-certificates coreutils curl
apk add --no-cache \
ca-certificates \
coreutils \
curl \
tzdata \
&& test "$(TZ=Asia/Kolkata date +%z)" = "+0530"
COPY --from=build /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/
COPY --from=build /build/rustfs /usr/bin/rustfs
+3 -1
View File
@@ -96,9 +96,11 @@ LABEL name="RustFS" \
# Upgrade base-image packages so published images pick up security fixes
# (e.g. tar/gzip/perl CVEs) without waiting for a new Ubuntu point release.
RUN apt-get update && apt-get upgrade -y \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
&& DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
ca-certificates \
curl \
tzdata \
&& test "$(TZ=Asia/Kolkata date +%z)" = "+0530" \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
COPY --from=build /build/rustfs /usr/bin/rustfs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ chown -R 10001:10001 data logs
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:latest
# Using specific version
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-beta.12
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-rc.1
```
If you use [podman](https://github.com/containers/podman) instead of docker, you can install the RustFS with the below command
+1 -1
View File
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ chown -R 10001:10001 data logs
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:latest
# 使用指定版本运行
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-beta.12
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-rc.1
```
如果您通过绑定挂载启用 TLS 证书目录,也请用同样方式准备该目录:
+4
View File
@@ -39,11 +39,15 @@ tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["fs", "rt-multi-thread"] }
tonic = { workspace = true, features = ["gzip", "deflate"] }
uuid = { workspace = true, features = ["v4", "fast-rng", "macro-diagnostics"] }
chrono = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
jiff = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
metrics = { workspace = true }
serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
rmp-serde = { workspace = true }
s3s = { workspace = true, features = ["minio"] }
tracing = { workspace = true }
[dev-dependencies]
serde_json = { workspace = true }
[lib]
doctest = false
+1
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ pub mod heal_channel;
pub mod last_minute;
pub mod metrics;
mod readiness;
pub mod table_catalog;
pub use globals::*;
pub use readiness::{GlobalReadiness, SystemStage};
+97 -16
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
use crate::heal_channel::HealScanMode;
use crate::last_minute::{AccElem, LastMinuteLatency};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use jiff::Timestamp;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::{
collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap},
@@ -669,7 +670,7 @@ impl LockedLastMinuteLatency {
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
struct CurrentPathState {
path: String,
updated_at: DateTime<Utc>,
updated_at: Timestamp,
}
struct CurrentPathTracker {
@@ -678,10 +679,10 @@ struct CurrentPathTracker {
impl CurrentPathTracker {
fn new(initial_path: String) -> Self {
Self::new_at(initial_path, Utc::now())
Self::new_at(initial_path, Timestamp::now())
}
fn new_at(initial_path: String, updated_at: DateTime<Utc>) -> Self {
fn new_at(initial_path: String, updated_at: Timestamp) -> Self {
Self {
state: Arc::new(RwLock::new(CurrentPathState {
path: initial_path,
@@ -693,7 +694,7 @@ impl CurrentPathTracker {
async fn update_path(&self, path: String) {
let mut state = self.state.write().await;
state.path = path;
state.updated_at = Utc::now();
state.updated_at = Timestamp::now();
}
async fn get_state(&self) -> CurrentPathState {
@@ -701,6 +702,36 @@ impl CurrentPathTracker {
}
}
fn chrono_to_jiff_timestamp(dt: DateTime<Utc>) -> Timestamp {
let seconds = dt.timestamp();
let nanoseconds = match i32::try_from(dt.timestamp_subsec_nanos()) {
Ok(nanoseconds) => nanoseconds,
Err(_) => {
return if seconds < 0 { Timestamp::MIN } else { Timestamp::MAX };
}
};
match Timestamp::new(seconds, nanoseconds) {
Ok(timestamp) => timestamp,
Err(_) => {
if seconds < 0 {
Timestamp::MIN
} else {
Timestamp::MAX
}
}
}
}
fn timestamp_elapsed_seconds_since(now: Timestamp, earlier: Timestamp) -> u64 {
let duration = now.duration_since(earlier);
if duration.is_negative() {
return 0;
}
u64::try_from(duration.as_secs()).map_or(u64::MAX, |seconds| seconds)
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default)]
struct ScannerDiskBucketScanState {
concurrency_limit: u64,
@@ -884,11 +915,13 @@ const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_SUCCESS: u8 = 1;
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_ERROR: u8 = 2;
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_PARTIAL: u8 = 3;
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_SUPERSEDED: u8 = 4;
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_DEFERRED: u8 = 5;
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_UNKNOWN_LABEL: &str = "unknown";
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_SUCCESS_LABEL: &str = "success";
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_ERROR_LABEL: &str = "error";
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_PARTIAL_LABEL: &str = "partial";
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_SUPERSEDED_LABEL: &str = "superseded";
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_DEFERRED_LABEL: &str = "deferred";
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ScanCyclePartialReason {
@@ -1166,12 +1199,12 @@ pub struct ScannerLastMinute {
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ScannerMetricsReport {
pub collected_at: DateTime<Utc>,
pub collected_at: Timestamp,
pub current_cycle: u64,
#[serde(default)]
pub current_cycle_active: bool,
pub current_started: DateTime<Utc>,
pub cycles_completed_at: Vec<DateTime<Utc>>,
pub current_started: Timestamp,
pub cycles_completed_at: Vec<Timestamp>,
pub ongoing_buckets: usize,
#[serde(default)]
pub active_scan_paths: usize,
@@ -1393,6 +1426,7 @@ fn scan_cycle_result_label(result: u8) -> &'static str {
SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_ERROR => SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_ERROR_LABEL,
SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_PARTIAL => SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_PARTIAL_LABEL,
SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_SUPERSEDED => SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_SUPERSEDED_LABEL,
SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_DEFERRED => SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_DEFERRED_LABEL,
_ => SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_UNKNOWN_LABEL,
}
}
@@ -1721,6 +1755,11 @@ pub fn emit_scan_cycle_superseded(duration: Duration) {
metrics::counter!(OTEL_SCANNER_CYCLES, "result" => SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_SUPERSEDED_LABEL).increment(1);
}
pub fn emit_scan_cycle_deferred(duration: Duration) {
global_metrics().record_scan_cycle_deferred(duration);
metrics::counter!(OTEL_SCANNER_CYCLES, "result" => SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_DEFERRED_LABEL).increment(1);
}
pub fn emit_scan_bucket_drive_complete(success: bool, bucket: &str, disk: &str, duration: Duration) {
let result = if success { "success" } else { "error" };
global_metrics().record_scanner_bucket_drive_result(bucket, disk, result);
@@ -2518,6 +2557,17 @@ impl Metrics {
.store(duration_millis_saturated(duration), Ordering::Relaxed);
}
pub fn record_scan_cycle_deferred(&self, duration: Duration) {
self.record_scanner_cycle_end_time();
self.last_scan_cycle_result
.store(SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_DEFERRED, Ordering::Relaxed);
self.last_scan_cycle_partial_reason
.store(ScanCyclePartialReason::Unknown as u8, Ordering::Relaxed);
self.last_scan_cycle_partial_source.store(0, Ordering::Relaxed);
self.last_scan_cycle_duration_millis
.store(duration_millis_saturated(duration), Ordering::Relaxed);
}
pub fn record_scan_cycle_partial(&self, duration: Duration, reason: ScanCyclePartialReason) {
self.record_scan_cycle_partial_with_source(duration, reason, None);
}
@@ -2988,8 +3038,8 @@ impl Metrics {
let cycle = self.cycle_info.read().await;
let has_cycle = if let Some(cycle) = cycle.as_ref() {
m.current_cycle = cycle.current;
m.cycles_completed_at = cycle.cycle_completed.clone();
m.current_started = cycle.started;
m.cycles_completed_at = cycle.cycle_completed.iter().copied().map(chrono_to_jiff_timestamp).collect();
m.current_started = chrono_to_jiff_timestamp(cycle.started);
true
} else {
false
@@ -3024,15 +3074,15 @@ impl Metrics {
};
if !has_cycle && let Some(init_time) = crate::get_global_init_time().await {
m.current_started = init_time;
m.current_started = chrono_to_jiff_timestamp(init_time);
}
m.collected_at = Utc::now();
m.collected_at = Timestamp::now();
let current_path_snapshots = self.current_path_snapshots().await;
m.active_scan_paths = current_path_snapshots.len();
m.oldest_active_path_age_seconds = current_path_snapshots
.iter()
.map(|(_, state)| m.collected_at.signed_duration_since(state.updated_at).num_seconds().max(0) as u64)
.map(|(_, state)| timestamp_elapsed_seconds_since(m.collected_at, state.updated_at))
.max()
.unwrap_or_default();
m.active_paths = current_path_snapshots
@@ -3308,6 +3358,22 @@ impl Drop for CloseDiskGuard {
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn scanner_metrics_report_timestamps_serialize_as_rfc3339_utc() {
let report = ScannerMetricsReport {
collected_at: Timestamp::constant(1_700_000_000, 123_456_000),
current_started: Timestamp::constant(1_699_999_940, 0),
cycles_completed_at: vec![Timestamp::constant(1_700_000_060, 987_654_000)],
..Default::default()
};
let value = serde_json::to_value(&report).expect("scanner metrics report should serialize");
assert_eq!(value["collected_at"].as_str(), Some("2023-11-14T22:13:20.123456Z"));
assert_eq!(value["current_started"].as_str(), Some("2023-11-14T22:12:20Z"));
assert_eq!(value["cycles_completed_at"][0].as_str(), Some("2023-11-14T22:14:20.987654Z"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn close_disk_guard_runs_cleanup_when_an_early_return_drops_it() {
let (closed_tx, closed_rx) = tokio::sync::oneshot::channel();
@@ -3366,7 +3432,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn report_counts_active_scan_paths() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
let updated_at = Utc::now() - chrono::Duration::seconds(12);
let updated_at = Timestamp::now() - jiff::SignedDuration::from_secs(12);
metrics.current_paths.write().await.insert(
"disk-a".to_string(),
Arc::new(CurrentPathTracker::new_at("bucket-a".to_string(), updated_at)),
@@ -3388,7 +3454,7 @@ mod tests {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
let tracker = Arc::new(CurrentPathTracker::new_at(
"bucket-a".to_string(),
Utc::now() - chrono::Duration::hours(1),
Timestamp::now() - jiff::SignedDuration::from_secs(60 * 60),
));
metrics
.current_paths
@@ -4161,7 +4227,7 @@ mod tests {
let report = metrics.report().await;
*crate::globals::GLOBAL_INIT_TIME.write().await = previous_init_time;
assert_eq!(report.current_started, cycle_started);
assert_eq!(report.current_started, chrono_to_jiff_timestamp(cycle_started));
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -4217,6 +4283,21 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(report.partial_cycles, 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn report_tracks_deferred_cycle_without_failed_increment() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
metrics.record_scan_cycle_deferred(Duration::from_millis(250));
let report = metrics.report().await;
assert_eq!(report.last_cycle_result, SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_DEFERRED_LABEL);
assert_eq!(report.last_cycle_result_code, u64::from(SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_DEFERRED));
assert_eq!(report.last_cycle_duration_seconds, 0.25);
assert_eq!(report.failed_cycles, 0);
assert_eq!(report.superseded_cycles, 0);
assert_eq!(report.partial_cycles, 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn report_tracks_successful_scan_cycle_without_failed_increment() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
@@ -4584,7 +4665,7 @@ mod tests {
let active = metrics.report().await;
assert!(active.current_cycle_active);
assert_eq!(active.current_cycle, 12);
assert_eq!(active.current_started, cycle_started);
assert_eq!(active.current_started, chrono_to_jiff_timestamp(cycle_started));
let idle_cycle = CurrentCycle {
current: 0,
+17
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
/// Cross-crate lock identity used to fence table-bucket publication against
/// object mutations that bypass the S3 request authorization layer.
pub const TABLE_BUCKET_PUBLICATION_LOCK_PATH: &str = ".rustfs-table/warehouses/default/publication.lock";
+8
View File
@@ -97,6 +97,14 @@ Current guidance:
- enables minimal payload mode for GET health responses (`status`, `ready` only).
- `RUSTFS_HEALTH_READINESS_CACHE_TTL_MS`
- TTL for readiness cache evaluation.
- `RUSTFS_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_ENABLE`
- withdraws readiness when bounded object read/write stages stop completing while requests remain active.
- default is `true`.
- `RUSTFS_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_TIMEOUT_MS`
- maximum time without completion in a bounded object stage before readiness is withdrawn.
- default is `30000`; `0` uses the default.
- the effective value is at least 5 seconds longer than `RUSTFS_OBJECT_LOCK_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT`.
- this readiness SLO is independent of disk read/write failure deadlines and may withdraw traffic before those deadlines expire.
- `RUSTFS_HEALTH_COMPAT_BUSY_CHECK_ENABLE`
- enables busy protection behavior for health probes.
- default is `false`.
+13
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,19 @@ pub const DEFAULT_HEALTH_ENDPOINT_ENABLE: bool = true;
pub const ENV_HEALTH_READINESS_CACHE_TTL_MS: &str = "RUSTFS_HEALTH_READINESS_CACHE_TTL_MS";
pub const DEFAULT_HEALTH_READINESS_CACHE_TTL_MS: u64 = 1000;
/// Enable readiness withdrawal when bounded object read/write stages stop
/// completing while requests remain active.
pub const ENV_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_ENABLE: &str = "RUSTFS_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_ENABLE";
pub const DEFAULT_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_ENABLE: bool = true;
/// Requested time without completion in a bounded object stage before local
/// readiness is withdrawn (milliseconds). A value of `0` uses the default;
/// runtime adds a safety floor based on the object-lock acquisition timeout.
pub const ENV_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_TIMEOUT_MS: &str = "RUSTFS_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_TIMEOUT_MS";
pub const DEFAULT_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 30_000;
/// Additional time beyond the configured object-lock acquisition deadline.
pub const HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_LOCK_MARGIN_MS: u64 = 5_000;
/// Timeout for cluster health readiness collectors (milliseconds).
/// This bounds expensive storage and lock quorum checks used by cluster probes.
pub const ENV_HEALTH_CLUSTER_TIMEOUT_MS: &str = "RUSTFS_HEALTH_CLUSTER_TIMEOUT_MS";
+3 -4
View File
@@ -177,10 +177,9 @@ const _: () = assert!(!DEFAULT_INTERNODE_RPC_REPLAY_SCOPE_STRICT);
///
/// The cache retains each nonce for the ~10-minute signature freshness envelope. Once peers use
/// replay-scoped v3 authentication, every authenticated RPC consumes one entry, so the steady
/// state holds roughly `authenticated RPC RPS x 601s` entries. The default sustains about 1,700
/// authenticated RPCs per second (about 120 MiB worst case, allocated only under sustained load);
/// operators must size it for the node's aggregate peak RPC rate before enabling strict replay
/// scope. Overflow fails closed — legitimate signed traffic is the only thing that can fill the
/// state holds roughly `authenticated RPC RPS x 601s` entries. This default is the minimum floor:
/// explicit operator values and resource-aware auto sizing both clamp upward to at least this
/// value. Overflow fails closed — legitimate signed traffic is the only thing that can fill the
/// cache (replays are rejected before insertion, and an attacker cannot mint valid nonces without
/// the shared secret) — and increments
/// `rustfs_system_network_internode_replay_cache_overflow_total`, so a sustained non-zero overflow
+2
View File
@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ pub const ENV_TEST_IAM_FAIL_INIT_ATTEMPTS: &str = "RUSTFS_TEST_IAM_FAIL_INIT_ATT
pub const ENV_TEST_IAM_RETRY_INTERVAL_MS: &str = "RUSTFS_TEST_IAM_RETRY_INTERVAL_MS";
/// Runtime env var controlling the transition worker count.
pub const ENV_TRANSITION_WORKERS: &str = "RUSTFS_MAX_TRANSITION_WORKERS";
/// Runtime env var controlling the expiry worker count.
pub const ENV_MAX_EXPIRY_WORKERS: &str = "RUSTFS_MAX_EXPIRY_WORKERS";
/// Runtime env var controlling the absolute maximum transition workers.
pub const ENV_TRANSITION_WORKERS_ABSOLUTE_MAX: &str = "RUSTFS_ABSOLUTE_MAX_WORKERS";
/// Runtime env var controlling the transition queue capacity.
+5
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ pub const ENV_TRUST_SYSTEM_CA: &str = "RUSTFS_TRUST_SYSTEM_CA";
/// To change this behavior, set the environment variable RUSTFS_TRUST_SYSTEM_CA=1
pub const DEFAULT_TRUST_SYSTEM_CA: bool = false;
/// Environment variable for an extra outbound root CA certificate bundle.
/// Use this to trust an internal CA for outbound HTTPS clients without replacing
/// the default operating-system/web PKI roots via SSL_CERT_FILE.
pub const ENV_RUSTFS_EXTRA_CA_CERT: &str = "RUSTFS_EXTRA_CA_CERT";
/// Environment variable to trust leaf certificates as CA
/// When set to "1", RustFS will treat leaf certificates as CA certificates for trust validation.
/// By default, this is disabled.
-1
View File
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ hotpath-cpu = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-cpu", "rustfs-filemeta/hotpath-cpu"]
hotpath.workspace = true
serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
rmp-serde = { workspace = true }
async-trait = { workspace = true }
rustfs-filemeta = { workspace = true }
[lib]
+234 -25
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ pub const USAGE_LAST_UPDATE_FUTURE_TOLERANCE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5 *
/// Keeping the existing object name preserves rolling-upgrade and rollback
/// compatibility without allowing an ambiguous snapshot to become authoritative.
pub const DATA_USAGE_OBJECT_NAME: &str = ".usage.v2.json";
/// Latest structurally complete scanner observation. Unlike
/// [`DATA_USAGE_OBJECT_NAME`], this object is never authoritative for quota
/// admission because namespace activity may have raced the scan.
pub const DATA_USAGE_OBSERVED_OBJECT_NAME: &str = ".usage.observed.json";
/// Usage snapshot written by scanner implementations predating distributed
/// leadership fencing. It is read only when neither authoritative snapshot
@@ -218,6 +222,20 @@ pub struct DataUsageInfo {
/// explicit entry for every bucket, including confirmed-empty buckets.
#[serde(default)]
pub usage_snapshot_complete: bool,
/// Whether no namespace activity or dirty-usage generation changed while
/// the coordinated snapshot was being produced.
///
/// `false` still describes a structurally complete, useful point-in-time
/// usage view, but follow-up scanner work remains pending. `None` is kept
/// for snapshots written before this status became observable.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub usage_snapshot_converged: Option<bool>,
/// Identity of the authoritative snapshot from which a nonconverged
/// observation started. Admin readers require an exact match before using
/// the observation, so bucket namespace mutations fence old observations
/// without relying on synchronized clocks.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline: Option<DataUsageSnapshotIdentity>,
/// Deprecated kept here for backward compatibility reasons
pub bucket_sizes: HashMap<String, u64>,
/// Per-disk snapshot information when available
@@ -225,6 +243,59 @@ pub struct DataUsageInfo {
pub disk_usage_status: Vec<DiskUsageStatus>,
}
/// Stable identity fields changed by both coordinated scanner publication and
/// backward-compatible bucket namespace cleanup.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct DataUsageSnapshotIdentity {
pub last_update: Option<SystemTime>,
pub scanner_cycle: Option<u64>,
pub scanner_epoch: Option<u64>,
}
impl DataUsageInfo {
pub fn snapshot_identity(&self) -> DataUsageSnapshotIdentity {
DataUsageSnapshotIdentity {
last_update: self.last_update,
scanner_cycle: self.scanner_cycle,
scanner_epoch: self.scanner_epoch,
}
}
}
/// Return whether `candidate` was produced after `baseline`.
///
/// New coordinated snapshots are ordered by leadership epoch and scanner
/// cycle. The timestamp fallback preserves ordering for legacy snapshots that
/// predate those fields.
pub fn data_usage_snapshot_is_newer(candidate: &DataUsageInfo, baseline: &DataUsageInfo) -> bool {
match (
candidate.scanner_epoch.zip(candidate.scanner_cycle),
baseline.scanner_epoch.zip(baseline.scanner_cycle),
) {
(Some(candidate), Some(baseline)) => candidate > baseline,
(Some(_), None) => true,
(None, Some(_)) => false,
(None, None) => match (candidate.last_update, baseline.last_update) {
(Some(candidate), Some(baseline)) => candidate > baseline,
(Some(_), None) => true,
(None, Some(_) | None) => false,
},
}
}
/// Return whether a nonconverged observation may safely supersede the admin
/// view of `authoritative`.
///
/// The exact baseline identity is independent of clock ordering. Older binaries
/// already advance the authoritative timestamp when deleting a bucket, so a
/// rollback delete/recreate fences the previous bucket incarnation too.
pub fn observed_data_usage_is_newer(observed: &DataUsageInfo, authoritative: &DataUsageInfo) -> bool {
observed.usage_snapshot_converged == Some(false)
&& observed.is_complete_bucket_usage_snapshot()
&& observed.usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline.as_ref() == Some(&authoritative.snapshot_identity())
&& data_usage_snapshot_is_newer(observed, authoritative)
}
/// Metadata describing the status of a disk-level data usage snapshot.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct DiskUsageStatus {
@@ -775,8 +846,15 @@ impl DataUsageEntry {
}
}
/// Data usage cache info
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
/// Read-only projection of the scanner's `.usage-cache.bin` info block.
///
/// The canonical wire format is written by the hand-written map-encoded
/// `Serialize` on the scanner-side `DataUsageCacheInfo`
/// (`crates/scanner/src/data_usage_define.rs`), which carries 16 fields.
/// This type decodes only the shared subset and is deliberately not
/// `Serialize`: a derived (array) encoding of this 6-field subset would
/// corrupt the cache for scanner readers, so no write path may exist here.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Deserialize)]
pub struct DataUsageCacheInfo {
pub name: String,
pub next_cycle: u64,
@@ -792,8 +870,12 @@ pub struct DataUsageCacheInfo {
pub snapshot_complete: bool,
}
/// Data usage cache
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
/// Read-only projection of a scanner-written `.usage-cache.bin` file.
///
/// The scanner-side `DataUsageCache` (`crates/scanner/src/data_usage_define.rs`)
/// owns the persisted format; this type only decodes it (see
/// [`DataUsageCacheInfo`]) and must never grow a serialization path.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Deserialize)]
pub struct DataUsageCache {
pub info: DataUsageCacheInfo,
pub cache: HashMap<String, DataUsageEntry>,
@@ -1115,31 +1197,10 @@ impl DataUsageCache {
}
}
pub fn marshal_msg(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let mut buf = Vec::new();
self.serialize(&mut rmp_serde::Serializer::new(&mut buf))?;
Ok(buf)
}
pub fn unmarshal(buf: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let t: Self = rmp_serde::from_slice(buf)?;
Ok(t)
}
// Note: load and save methods are storage-specific and should be implemented
// in the ecstore crate where storage access is available
}
/// Trait for storage-specific operations on DataUsageCache
#[async_trait::async_trait]
pub trait DataUsageCacheStorage {
/// Load data usage cache from backend storage
async fn load(store: &dyn std::any::Any, name: &str) -> Result<Self, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>
where
Self: Sized;
/// Save data usage cache to backend storage
async fn save(&self, name: &str) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>;
}
// Helper structs and functions for cache operations
@@ -1761,6 +1822,82 @@ mod tests {
assert!(decoded.all_tier_stats.is_none());
}
/// Scanner-written `.usage-cache.bin` bytes: a 2-element array of the
/// canonical 16-field map-encoded info block and one map-encoded entry.
/// Captured from the canonical writer's `marshal_msg` — see
/// `usage_cache_wire_format_is_pinned` in
/// `crates/scanner/src/data_usage_define.rs`, which pins these exact
/// bytes and documents regeneration. Hardcoded here because a
/// dev-dependency on rustfs-scanner would pull the whole ecstore tree
/// into this crate's test build, and a fixture generated at test runtime
/// could not detect writer drift anyway.
const SCANNER_USAGE_CACHE_WIRE_FIXTURE: &[u8] = &[
0x92, 0xde, 0x00, 0x10, 0xa4, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x65, 0xab, 0x77, 0x69, 0x72, 0x65, 0x2d, 0x62, 0x75, 0x63, 0x6b, 0x65,
0x74, 0xaa, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x78, 0x74, 0x5f, 0x63, 0x79, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x07, 0xac, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x61, 0x64, 0x65, 0x72,
0x5f, 0x65, 0x70, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x68, 0x09, 0xab, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x5f, 0x75, 0x70, 0x64, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x92,
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0x81, 0xa4, 0x57, 0x41, 0x52, 0x4d, 0x93, 0xcd, 0x08, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01,
];
#[test]
fn thin_usage_cache_decodes_scanner_wire_fixture() {
let decoded =
DataUsageCache::unmarshal(SCANNER_USAGE_CACHE_WIRE_FIXTURE).expect("thin projection decodes a scanner-written cache");
// The six fields shared with the scanner's 16-field info block; the
// remaining ten (lifecycle, replication, checkpoint, heals, ...) must
// be skipped, not error.
assert_eq!(decoded.info.name, "wire-bucket");
assert_eq!(decoded.info.next_cycle, 7);
assert_eq!(
decoded.info.last_update,
Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(1_700_000_000))
);
assert!(decoded.info.skip_healing);
assert_eq!(decoded.info.failed_objects.get("wire-bucket/lost"), Some(&11));
assert!(decoded.info.snapshot_complete);
// Entries use the shared canonical map-encoded type end to end.
let entry = decoded.cache.get("wire-bucket").expect("fixture entry decodes");
assert_eq!(entry.size, 4096);
assert_eq!(entry.objects, 3);
assert_eq!(entry.versions, 5);
assert_eq!(entry.delete_markers, 1);
assert!(entry.compacted);
assert_eq!(entry.failed_objects, 2);
assert_eq!(
entry.all_tier_stats.as_ref().and_then(|tiers| tiers.tiers.get("WARM")),
Some(&TierStats {
total_size: 2048,
num_versions: 2,
num_objects: 1,
})
);
}
#[test]
fn hash_path_uses_portable_slash_semantics() {
for (input, expected) in [
@@ -1783,6 +1920,8 @@ mod tests {
let current = DataUsageInfo {
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH),
usage_snapshot_complete: true,
usage_snapshot_converged: Some(false),
usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline: Some(DataUsageSnapshotIdentity::default()),
..Default::default()
};
let encoded = rmp_serde::to_vec_named(&current).expect("encode current data usage snapshot");
@@ -1790,6 +1929,76 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(legacy.buckets_count, 0);
assert!(current.is_complete_bucket_usage_snapshot());
assert_eq!(current.usage_snapshot_converged, Some(false));
}
#[test]
fn convergence_marker_defaults_to_unknown_for_older_snapshots() {
let encoded = rmp_serde::to_vec_named(&DataUsageInfo {
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH),
usage_snapshot_complete: true,
..Default::default()
})
.expect("encode pre-convergence data usage snapshot");
let decoded: DataUsageInfo = rmp_serde::from_slice(&encoded).expect("decode older data usage snapshot");
assert!(decoded.is_complete_bucket_usage_snapshot());
assert_eq!(decoded.usage_snapshot_converged, None);
}
#[test]
fn observation_selection_is_clock_independent_and_baseline_fenced() {
let mut authoritative = DataUsageInfo {
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(600)),
scanner_epoch: Some(7),
scanner_cycle: Some(10),
usage_snapshot_complete: true,
..Default::default()
};
let observed = DataUsageInfo {
// A newer leader may have a slower wall clock.
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(300)),
scanner_epoch: Some(8),
scanner_cycle: Some(1),
usage_snapshot_complete: true,
usage_snapshot_converged: Some(false),
usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline: Some(authoritative.snapshot_identity()),
..Default::default()
};
assert!(observed_data_usage_is_newer(&observed, &authoritative));
authoritative.last_update = Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(601));
assert!(
!observed_data_usage_is_newer(&observed, &authoritative),
"an old-binary namespace mutation must fence the prior bucket incarnation regardless of clock skew"
);
}
#[test]
fn observation_selection_requires_nonconverged_complete_newer_data() {
let authoritative = DataUsageInfo {
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH),
scanner_epoch: Some(2),
scanner_cycle: Some(10),
usage_snapshot_complete: true,
..Default::default()
};
let baseline = Some(authoritative.snapshot_identity());
let candidate = |epoch, cycle, converged, complete| DataUsageInfo {
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(1)),
scanner_epoch: Some(epoch),
scanner_cycle: Some(cycle),
usage_snapshot_complete: complete,
usage_snapshot_converged: converged,
usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline: baseline,
..Default::default()
};
assert!(observed_data_usage_is_newer(&candidate(2, 11, Some(false), true), &authoritative));
assert!(!observed_data_usage_is_newer(&candidate(2, 9, Some(false), true), &authoritative));
assert!(!observed_data_usage_is_newer(&candidate(2, 11, Some(true), true), &authoritative));
assert!(!observed_data_usage_is_newer(&candidate(2, 11, Some(false), false), &authoritative));
}
#[test]
+259 -1
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,9 @@
//! Later batches tracked on backlog#1154: config get/set, info, pools status,
//! group lifecycle, import/export IAM.
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_ok, admin_request, init_logging};
use crate::common::{
RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_ok, admin_request, admin_request_with_session_token, build_test_sts_client, init_logging,
};
use aws_sdk_s3::config::{Credentials, Region};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::{Client, Config};
@@ -87,6 +89,262 @@ fn bucket_rw_policy(bucket: &str) -> String {
.to_string()
}
async fn create_user_with_service_account_update_policy(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
user: &str,
secret: &str,
policy: &str,
) -> TestResult {
admin_ok(
env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={user}"),
Some(serde_json::json!({ "secretKey": secret, "status": "enabled" }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={policy}"),
Some(
serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["admin:UpdateServiceAccount"]
},
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["sts:AssumeRole"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"]
}
]
})
.to_string(),
),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
env,
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/idp/builtin/policy/attach",
Some(serde_json::json!({ "policies": [policy], "user": user }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn create_service_account_for(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
parent: &str,
) -> Result<(String, String), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let response = admin_ok(
env,
http::Method::PUT,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/add-service-accounts",
Some(serde_json::json!({ "targetUser": parent }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
let response: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&response)?;
let access_key = response["credentials"]["accessKey"]
.as_str()
.ok_or("service account response should contain credentials.accessKey")?
.to_owned();
let secret_key = response["credentials"]["secretKey"]
.as_str()
.ok_or("service account response should contain credentials.secretKey")?
.to_owned();
Ok((access_key, secret_key))
}
async fn assert_admin_status(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
credentials: (&str, &str, Option<&str>),
path: &str,
body: String,
expected: StatusCode,
context: &str,
) -> TestResult {
let (access_key, secret_key, session_token) = credentials;
let (status, response) =
admin_request_with_session_token(&env.url, http::Method::POST, path, Some(body), access_key, secret_key, session_token)
.await?;
assert_eq!(status, expected, "{context}: got {status}: {response}");
if expected == StatusCode::FORBIDDEN {
assert!(response.contains("AccessDenied"), "{context}: expected AccessDenied body, got {response}");
}
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_update_service_account_enforces_owner_and_parent_scope() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let parent = "updateparent";
let parent_secret = "updateparentsecret";
let outsider = "updateoutsider";
let outsider_secret = "updateoutsidersecret";
let ordinary = "updateordinary";
let ordinary_secret = "updateordinarysecret";
create_user_with_service_account_update_policy(&env, parent, parent_secret, "update-parent-policy").await?;
create_user_with_service_account_update_policy(&env, outsider, outsider_secret, "update-outsider-policy").await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/idp/builtin/policy/attach",
Some(serde_json::json!({ "policies": ["consoleAdmin"], "user": outsider }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={ordinary}"),
Some(serde_json::json!({ "secretKey": ordinary_secret, "status": "enabled" }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
let (target_access_key, _) = create_service_account_for(&env, parent).await?;
let target_path = format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey={target_access_key}");
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(&env.access_key, &env.secret_key, None),
&target_path,
serde_json::json!({}).to_string(),
StatusCode::NO_CONTENT,
"root no-op update across parents must succeed",
)
.await?;
let custom_policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:GetObject"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::update-scope/*"]
}]
});
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(&env.access_key, &env.secret_key, None),
&target_path,
serde_json::json!({ "newPolicy": custom_policy }).to_string(),
StatusCode::NO_CONTENT,
"root implied-to-custom update across parents must succeed",
)
.await?;
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(parent, parent_secret, None),
&target_path,
serde_json::json!({ "newDescription": "updated by parent" }).to_string(),
StatusCode::NO_CONTENT,
"parent with UpdateServiceAccount may update its own service account",
)
.await?;
let takeover = serde_json::json!({
"newSecretKey": "cross-parent-takeover-secret",
"newDescription": "cross-parent takeover"
})
.to_string();
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(ordinary, ordinary_secret, None),
&target_path,
takeover.clone(),
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"ordinary user must not update another parent's service account",
)
.await?;
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(outsider, outsider_secret, None),
&target_path,
takeover.clone(),
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"non-owner consoleAdmin must not update across parents",
)
.await?;
let (derived_access_key, derived_secret_key) = create_service_account_for(&env, outsider).await?;
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(&derived_access_key, &derived_secret_key, None),
&target_path,
takeover.clone(),
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"service-account credential must not update across parents",
)
.await?;
let assumed = build_test_sts_client(&env.url, outsider, outsider_secret, None, "e2e-admin-update-service-account")
.assume_role()
.role_arn("arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/update-service-account")
.role_session_name("update-service-account-scope")
.send()
.await?;
let temporary = assumed
.credentials()
.ok_or("AssumeRole response should contain credentials")?;
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(temporary.access_key_id(), temporary.secret_access_key(), Some(temporary.session_token())),
&target_path,
takeover,
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"temporary credential must not update across parents",
)
.await?;
let info = admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::GET,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/info-service-account?accessKey={target_access_key}"),
None,
)
.await?;
let info: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&info)?;
assert_eq!(
info["impliedPolicy"].as_bool(),
Some(false),
"root update must replace the implied policy with a custom policy"
);
assert!(
info["policy"].as_str().is_some_and(|policy| policy.contains("s3:GetObject")),
"custom policy must round-trip through the handler: {info}"
);
assert_eq!(
info["description"].as_str(),
Some("updated by parent"),
"denied takeover attempts must not mutate target"
);
let (missing_status, missing_body) = admin_request(
&env.url,
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey=missing-service-account",
Some(serde_json::json!({}).to_string()),
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await?;
assert_eq!(missing_status, StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "missing target must fail closed: {missing_body}");
assert!(
missing_body.contains("NoSuchResource"),
"missing target must preserve the lookup error: {missing_body}"
);
env.stop_server();
Ok(())
}
/// Full user -> policy -> service-account lifecycle, proving each management
/// call takes effect on the data plane, not just that the endpoint answers 200.
#[tokio::test]
+83 -105
View File
@@ -16,91 +16,17 @@
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging};
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging, signed_s3_request};
use aws_sdk_s3::error::ProvideErrorMetadata;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{
AccelerateConfiguration, BucketAccelerateStatus, BucketLoggingStatus, IndexDocument, LoggingEnabled, Payer,
RequestPaymentConfiguration, WebsiteConfiguration,
};
use http::Method;
use http::header::CONTENT_TYPE;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::process::Command;
use tracing::info;
fn awscurl_binary_path() -> PathBuf {
std::env::var_os("AWSCURL_PATH")
.map(PathBuf::from)
.unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("awscurl"))
}
fn awscurl_available() -> bool {
Command::new(awscurl_binary_path()).arg("--version").output().is_ok()
}
fn execute_s3_awscurl(
method: &str,
url: &str,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
) -> Result<String, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let output = Command::new(awscurl_binary_path())
.args([
"--service",
"s3",
"--region",
"us-east-1",
"--access_key",
access_key,
"--secret_key",
secret_key,
"-i",
"-X",
method,
url,
])
.output()?;
if !output.status.success() {
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
return Err(format!("awscurl failed: stderr='{stderr}', stdout='{stdout}'").into());
}
Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).to_string())
}
fn parse_status(raw: &str) -> Option<u16> {
raw.lines()
.filter_map(|line| {
if line.starts_with("HTTP/") {
line.split_whitespace().nth(1)?.parse::<u16>().ok()
} else {
None
}
})
.next_back()
}
fn parse_body(raw: &str) -> String {
if let Some(pos) = raw.rfind("\r\n\r\n") {
return raw[pos + 4..].to_string();
}
if let Some(pos) = raw.rfind("\n\n") {
return raw[pos + 2..].to_string();
}
String::new()
}
fn parse_headers(raw: &str) -> String {
let start = raw.rfind("HTTP/").unwrap_or(0);
let tail = &raw[start..];
if let Some(pos) = tail.find("\r\n\r\n") {
return tail[..pos].to_string();
}
if let Some(pos) = tail.find("\n\n") {
return tail[..pos].to_string();
}
tail.to_string()
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_dummy_bucket_compatibility_endpoints() {
@@ -470,10 +396,6 @@ mod tests {
async fn test_dummy_bucket_endpoints_http_contracts() {
init_logging();
info!("Starting test: dummy-compat bucket API HTTP contracts");
if !awscurl_available() {
info!("Skipping test_dummy_bucket_endpoints_http_contracts: awscurl binary not found");
return;
}
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("Failed to create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await.expect("Failed to start RustFS");
@@ -488,56 +410,112 @@ mod tests {
.await
.expect("Failed to create bucket");
let logging_raw = execute_s3_awscurl("GET", &format!("{}/{bucket}?logging=", env.url), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key)
.expect("GetBucketLogging HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(parse_status(&logging_raw), Some(200), "GetBucketLogging should return 200");
let logging_body = parse_body(&logging_raw);
let logging_response = signed_s3_request(
Method::GET,
&format!("{}/{bucket}?logging=", env.url),
None,
None,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await
.expect("GetBucketLogging HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(logging_response.status(), 200, "GetBucketLogging should return 200");
let logging_body = logging_response
.text()
.await
.expect("Failed to read GetBucketLogging response body");
assert!(
logging_body.contains("<BucketLoggingStatus"),
"GetBucketLogging response should contain BucketLoggingStatus XML, got: {logging_body}"
);
let accel_raw = execute_s3_awscurl("GET", &format!("{}/{bucket}?accelerate=", env.url), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key)
.expect("GetBucketAccelerateConfiguration HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(parse_status(&accel_raw), Some(200), "GetBucketAccelerateConfiguration should return 200");
let accel_body = parse_body(&accel_raw);
let accel_response = signed_s3_request(
Method::GET,
&format!("{}/{bucket}?accelerate=", env.url),
None,
None,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await
.expect("GetBucketAccelerateConfiguration HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(accel_response.status(), 200, "GetBucketAccelerateConfiguration should return 200");
let accel_body = accel_response
.text()
.await
.expect("Failed to read GetBucketAccelerateConfiguration response body");
assert!(
accel_body.contains("<AccelerateConfiguration"),
"GetBucketAccelerateConfiguration response should contain AccelerateConfiguration XML, got: {accel_body}"
);
let payment_raw =
execute_s3_awscurl("GET", &format!("{}/{bucket}?requestPayment=", env.url), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key)
.expect("GetBucketRequestPayment HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(parse_status(&payment_raw), Some(200), "GetBucketRequestPayment should return 200");
let payment_body = parse_body(&payment_raw);
let payment_response = signed_s3_request(
Method::GET,
&format!("{}/{bucket}?requestPayment=", env.url),
None,
None,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await
.expect("GetBucketRequestPayment HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(payment_response.status(), 200, "GetBucketRequestPayment should return 200");
let payment_body = payment_response
.text()
.await
.expect("Failed to read GetBucketRequestPayment response body");
assert!(
payment_body.contains("<Payer>BucketOwner</Payer>"),
"GetBucketRequestPayment should return BucketOwner payer, got: {payment_body}"
);
let website_raw = execute_s3_awscurl("GET", &format!("{}/{bucket}?website=", env.url), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key)
.expect("GetBucketWebsite HTTP request failed");
let website_response = signed_s3_request(
Method::GET,
&format!("{}/{bucket}?website=", env.url),
None,
None,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await
.expect("GetBucketWebsite HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(
parse_status(&website_raw),
Some(404),
website_response.status(),
404,
"GetBucketWebsite should return 404 when website config is absent"
);
let website_content_type = parse_headers(&website_raw).to_ascii_lowercase();
let website_content_type = website_response
.headers()
.get(CONTENT_TYPE)
.expect("GetBucketWebsite response should include Content-Type")
.to_str()
.expect("GetBucketWebsite Content-Type should be valid ASCII")
.to_ascii_lowercase();
assert!(
website_content_type.contains("content-type:") && website_content_type.contains("xml"),
website_content_type.contains("xml"),
"GetBucketWebsite error response should be XML, got content-type: {website_content_type}"
);
let website_body = parse_body(&website_raw);
let website_body = website_response
.text()
.await
.expect("Failed to read GetBucketWebsite response body");
assert!(
website_body.contains("<Code>NoSuchWebsiteConfiguration</Code>"),
"GetBucketWebsite should return NoSuchWebsiteConfiguration code, got: {website_body}"
);
let delete_raw =
execute_s3_awscurl("DELETE", &format!("{}/{bucket}?website=", env.url), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key)
.expect("DeleteBucketWebsite HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(parse_status(&delete_raw), Some(204), "DeleteBucketWebsite should return 204");
let delete_response = signed_s3_request(
Method::DELETE,
&format!("{}/{bucket}?website=", env.url),
None,
None,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await
.expect("DeleteBucketWebsite HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(delete_response.status(), 204, "DeleteBucketWebsite should return 204");
env.stop_server();
}
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, awscurl_get, init_logging};
use crate::common::{FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV, RustFSTestEnvironment, awscurl_get, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{BucketVersioningStatus, VersioningConfiguration};
use rustfs_data_usage::DataUsageInfo;
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ mod tests {
info!("RT-09: bucket object count updates after PUT");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV)
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
@@ -88,12 +88,21 @@ mod tests {
// Wait for scanner to process (up to 90 seconds)
let mut found_nonzero = false;
let mut last_query_error = None;
for attempt in 0..18 {
sleep(Duration::from_secs(5)).await;
if let Ok(usage) = get_data_usage(&env).await
&& let Some(bucket_usage) = usage.buckets_usage.get(bucket)
{
let usage = match get_data_usage(&env).await {
Ok(usage) => {
last_query_error = None;
usage
}
Err(err) => {
last_query_error = Some(err.to_string());
continue;
}
};
if let Some(bucket_usage) = usage.buckets_usage.get(bucket) {
info!(" attempt {attempt}: objectsCount = {}", bucket_usage.objects_count);
if bucket_usage.objects_count >= 10 {
found_nonzero = true;
@@ -104,7 +113,8 @@ mod tests {
assert!(
found_nonzero,
"RT-09 FAIL: bucket object count did not update after PUT 10 objects (regression: stats stuck at 0)"
"RT-09 FAIL: bucket object count did not update after PUT 10 objects (regression: stats stuck at 0); last query error: {}",
last_query_error.as_deref().unwrap_or("none")
);
info!("RT-09 PASS: bucket object count updates after PUT");
@@ -122,7 +132,7 @@ mod tests {
info!("RT-09b: bucket object count updates after DELETE");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV)
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
@@ -143,6 +153,22 @@ mod tests {
.expect("put object");
}
let mut found_nonzero = false;
for attempt in 0..18 {
sleep(Duration::from_secs(5)).await;
if let Ok(usage) = get_data_usage(&env).await
&& let Some(bucket_usage) = usage.buckets_usage.get(bucket)
{
info!(" baseline attempt {attempt}: objectsCount = {}", bucket_usage.objects_count);
if bucket_usage.objects_count >= 5 {
found_nonzero = true;
break;
}
}
}
assert!(found_nonzero, "RT-09b setup failed: scanner did not observe the 5 uploaded objects");
// Delete all objects
for i in 0..5 {
client
@@ -156,12 +182,21 @@ mod tests {
// Wait for scanner to update stats (up to 90 seconds)
let mut found_zero = false;
let mut last_query_error = None;
for attempt in 0..18 {
sleep(Duration::from_secs(5)).await;
if let Ok(usage) = get_data_usage(&env).await
&& let Some(bucket_usage) = usage.buckets_usage.get(bucket)
{
let usage = match get_data_usage(&env).await {
Ok(usage) => {
last_query_error = None;
usage
}
Err(err) => {
last_query_error = Some(err.to_string());
continue;
}
};
if let Some(bucket_usage) = usage.buckets_usage.get(bucket) {
info!(" attempt {attempt}: objectsCount = {}", bucket_usage.objects_count);
if bucket_usage.objects_count == 0 {
found_zero = true;
@@ -172,7 +207,8 @@ mod tests {
assert!(
found_zero,
"RT-09b FAIL: bucket object count did not update to 0 after deleting all objects (regression rustfs#5615)"
"RT-09b FAIL: bucket object count did not update to 0 after deleting all objects (regression rustfs#5615); last query error: {}",
last_query_error.as_deref().unwrap_or("none")
);
info!("RT-09b PASS: bucket object count updates to 0 after DELETE");
+185
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ use http::header::{CONTENT_TYPE, HOST};
use rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD;
use rustfs_signer::sign_v4;
use s3s::Body;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet};
use std::error::Error;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use tracing::info;
@@ -48,6 +50,62 @@ use walkdir::WalkDir;
type ChaosResult<T> = Result<T, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
/// Physical `xl.meta` and shard-file census for one object version on one disk.
///
/// A successful S3 GET only proves that a quorum can serve an object. Replacement
/// tests need this lower-level record to prove that the rebuilt target holds the
/// `xl.meta` selected for a specific version and every `part.N` it declares.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
pub(crate) struct VersionShardCensus {
pub version_id: Option<String>,
pub has_xl_meta: bool,
pub data_dir: Option<String>,
pub erasure_index: Option<usize>,
pub expected_part_numbers: BTreeSet<usize>,
pub present_part_fingerprints: BTreeMap<usize, PartShardFingerprint>,
pub inline_data_fingerprint: Option<PartShardFingerprint>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
pub(crate) struct PartShardFingerprint {
pub size: u64,
pub sha256: String,
}
impl VersionShardCensus {
pub(crate) fn is_complete(&self) -> bool {
self.has_xl_meta
&& self.expected_part_numbers.len() == self.present_part_fingerprints.len()
&& self
.expected_part_numbers
.iter()
.all(|part_number| self.present_part_fingerprints.contains_key(part_number))
}
pub(crate) fn matches_manifest(&self, manifest: &Self) -> bool {
self.version_id == manifest.version_id
&& self.is_complete()
&& manifest.is_complete()
&& self.data_dir == manifest.data_dir
&& self.erasure_index == manifest.erasure_index
&& self.expected_part_numbers == manifest.expected_part_numbers
&& self.present_part_fingerprints == manifest.present_part_fingerprints
&& self.inline_data_fingerprint == manifest.inline_data_fingerprint
}
}
fn sha256_hex(data: &[u8]) -> String {
let digest = Sha256::digest(data);
digest.iter().map(|byte| format!("{byte:02x}")).collect()
}
fn shard_fingerprint(data: &[u8]) -> ChaosResult<PartShardFingerprint> {
Ok(PartShardFingerprint {
size: u64::try_from(data.len())?,
sha256: sha256_hex(data),
})
}
/// Single-node RustFS server with `disk_count` local volume directories that
/// can be faulted individually while the server is running.
pub struct DiskFaultHarness {
@@ -219,6 +277,93 @@ impl DiskFaultHarness {
pub fn object_metadata_exists_on_disk(&self, disk_index: usize, bucket: &str, key: &str) -> bool {
self.disks[disk_index].join(bucket).join(key).join("xl.meta").is_file()
}
/// Census the physical files selected by `version_id` on one disk.
///
/// Missing metadata and missing shard files are represented in the returned
/// census rather than as an error so callers can poll replacement progress.
/// Invalid metadata or an unknown requested version remains an error: treating
/// either as an incomplete rebuild would hide corruption or a wrong-version
/// recovery result.
pub(crate) fn census_object_version(
&self,
disk_index: usize,
bucket: &str,
key: &str,
version_id: Option<&str>,
) -> ChaosResult<VersionShardCensus> {
census_object_version_on_disk(&self.disks[disk_index], bucket, key, version_id)
}
}
/// Census one physical object version without requiring a single-node harness.
/// Cluster replacement tests use the same evidence as the disk-fault tests.
pub(crate) fn census_object_version_on_disk(
disk: &Path,
bucket: &str,
key: &str,
version_id: Option<&str>,
) -> ChaosResult<VersionShardCensus> {
let version_id = version_id.map(str::to_owned);
let object_dir = disk.join(bucket).join(key);
let meta_path = object_dir.join("xl.meta");
if !meta_path.is_file() {
return Ok(VersionShardCensus {
version_id,
has_xl_meta: false,
data_dir: None,
erasure_index: None,
expected_part_numbers: BTreeSet::new(),
present_part_fingerprints: BTreeMap::new(),
inline_data_fingerprint: None,
});
}
let metadata = rustfs_filemeta::FileMeta::load(&std::fs::read(&meta_path)?)?;
let file_info = metadata.into_fileinfo(bucket, key, version_id.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(), true, false, true)?;
let expected_part_numbers = if file_info.inline_data() {
BTreeSet::new()
} else {
file_info.parts.iter().map(|part| part.number).collect()
};
let data_dir = file_info.data_dir.map(|id| id.to_string());
let erasure_index = Some(file_info.erasure.index);
let inline_data_fingerprint = file_info.data.as_deref().map(shard_fingerprint).transpose()?;
let part_dir = data_dir.as_ref().map_or_else(|| object_dir.clone(), |id| object_dir.join(id));
let present_part_fingerprints = match std::fs::read_dir(&part_dir) {
Ok(entries) => {
let mut fingerprints = BTreeMap::new();
for entry in entries {
let entry = entry?;
if !entry.file_type()?.is_file() {
continue;
}
let file_name = entry.file_name();
let Some(part_number) = file_name
.to_str()
.and_then(|name| name.strip_prefix("part."))
.and_then(|number| number.parse::<usize>().ok())
else {
continue;
};
let data = std::fs::read(entry.path())?;
fingerprints.insert(part_number, shard_fingerprint(&data)?);
}
fingerprints
}
Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => BTreeMap::new(),
Err(error) => return Err(error.into()),
};
Ok(VersionShardCensus {
version_id,
has_xl_meta: true,
data_dir,
erasure_index,
expected_part_numbers,
present_part_fingerprints,
inline_data_fingerprint,
})
}
/// `POST` a signed (SigV4, service `s3`) admin request without relying on the
@@ -257,3 +402,43 @@ pub async fn signed_admin_post(url: &str, body: Option<&str>, access_key: &str,
Ok(body)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn complete_census() -> VersionShardCensus {
VersionShardCensus {
version_id: Some("version".to_string()),
has_xl_meta: true,
data_dir: Some("data-dir".to_string()),
erasure_index: Some(3),
expected_part_numbers: BTreeSet::from([1]),
present_part_fingerprints: BTreeMap::from([(1, shard_fingerprint(b"part").unwrap())]),
inline_data_fingerprint: None,
}
}
#[test]
fn shard_fingerprint_uses_physical_length_and_sha256() {
assert_eq!(
shard_fingerprint(b"abc").unwrap(),
PartShardFingerprint {
size: 3,
sha256: "ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad".to_string(),
}
);
}
#[test]
fn manifest_requires_matching_inline_payload() {
let mut expected = complete_census();
expected.expected_part_numbers.clear();
expected.present_part_fingerprints.clear();
expected.inline_data_fingerprint = Some(shard_fingerprint(b"expected").unwrap());
let mut changed = expected.clone();
changed.inline_data_fingerprint = Some(shard_fingerprint(b"changed").unwrap());
assert!(expected.matches_manifest(&expected));
assert!(!changed.matches_manifest(&expected));
}
}
+151 -32
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ use walkdir::WalkDir;
pub const DEFAULT_ACCESS_KEY: &str = "rustfsadmin";
pub const DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY: &str = "rustfsadmin";
pub const ENV_RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES: &str = "RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES";
pub(crate) const FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV: &[(&str, &str)] =
&[("RUSTFS_SCANNER_CYCLE", "1"), ("RUSTFS_SCANNER_START_DELAY_SECS", "0")];
pub const TEST_BUCKET: &str = "e2e-test-bucket";
const RUSTFS_FULL_FEATURE: &str = "full";
@@ -65,8 +67,24 @@ fn configured_capture_log_path(temp_dir: &str) -> Option<String> {
capture_log_path(Path::new(&log_dir), temp_dir).map(|path| path.to_string_lossy().into_owned())
}
fn build_test_s3_config(endpoint_url: &str, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str, provider_name: &'static str) -> Config {
let credentials = Credentials::new(access_key, secret_key, None, None, provider_name);
fn capture_command_logs(command: &mut Command, log_path: Option<&str>) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let Some(log_path) = log_path else {
return Ok(());
};
let file = stdfs::OpenOptions::new().create(true).append(true).open(log_path)?;
let stderr_file = file.try_clone()?;
command.stdout(Stdio::from(file)).stderr(Stdio::from(stderr_file));
Ok(())
}
pub(crate) fn build_test_s3_config(
endpoint_url: &str,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
session_token: Option<&str>,
provider_name: &'static str,
) -> Config {
let credentials = Credentials::new(access_key, secret_key, session_token.map(str::to_owned), None, provider_name);
let mut config = Config::builder()
.credentials_provider(credentials)
.region(Region::new("us-east-1"))
@@ -81,6 +99,33 @@ fn build_test_s3_config(endpoint_url: &str, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str,
config.build()
}
pub(crate) fn build_test_sts_client(
endpoint_url: &str,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
session_token: Option<&str>,
provider_name: &'static str,
) -> aws_sdk_sts::Client {
let mut config = aws_sdk_sts::Config::builder()
.credentials_provider(aws_sdk_sts::config::Credentials::new(
access_key,
secret_key,
session_token.map(str::to_owned),
None,
provider_name,
))
.region(aws_sdk_sts::config::Region::new("us-east-1"))
.endpoint_url(endpoint_url)
.retry_config(aws_sdk_sts::config::retry::RetryConfig::standard().with_max_attempts(1))
.behavior_version_latest();
if endpoint_url.starts_with("http://") {
config = config.http_client(SmithyHttpClientBuilder::new().build_http());
}
aws_sdk_sts::Client::from_conf(config.build())
}
pub fn workspace_root() -> PathBuf {
let mut path = PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"));
path.pop(); // e2e_test
@@ -95,6 +140,57 @@ pub fn local_http_client() -> HttpClient {
.expect("failed to build local reqwest client")
}
pub(crate) async fn signed_s3_request(
method: http::Method,
url: &str,
body: Option<String>,
content_type: Option<&str>,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
signed_s3_request_with_session_token(method, url, body, content_type, access_key, secret_key, None).await
}
async fn signed_s3_request_with_session_token(
method: http::Method,
url: &str,
body: Option<String>,
content_type: Option<&str>,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
session_token: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("S3 URL missing authority")?.to_string();
let mut request = http::Request::builder()
.method(method.clone())
.uri(uri)
.header(HOST, authority)
.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
if let Some(content_type) = content_type {
request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
}
let content_length = i64::try_from(body.as_ref().map_or(0, String::len)).map_err(|_| "S3 request body is too large")?;
let signed = sign_v4(
request.body(Body::empty())?,
content_length,
access_key,
secret_key,
session_token.unwrap_or_default(),
"us-east-1",
);
let mut request = local_http_client().request(method, url);
for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
request = request.header(name, value);
}
if let Some(body) = body {
request = request.body(body);
}
Ok(request.send().await?)
}
/// Signs and sends an admin HTTP request with the given credentials.
pub(crate) async fn admin_request(
base_url: &str,
@@ -103,30 +199,23 @@ pub(crate) async fn admin_request(
body: Option<String>,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
) -> Result<(StatusCode, String), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
admin_request_with_session_token(base_url, method, path_and_query, body, access_key, secret_key, None).await
}
pub(crate) async fn admin_request_with_session_token(
base_url: &str,
method: http::Method,
path_and_query: &str,
body: Option<String>,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
session_token: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<(StatusCode, String), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let url = format!("{base_url}{path_and_query}");
let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("admin URL missing authority")?.to_string();
let mut request = http::Request::builder()
.method(method.clone())
.uri(uri)
.header(HOST, authority)
.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
if body.is_some() {
request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json");
}
let content_length = i64::try_from(body.as_ref().map_or(0, String::len)).map_err(|_| "admin request body is too large")?;
let signed = sign_v4(request.body(Body::empty())?, content_length, access_key, secret_key, "", "us-east-1");
let mut request = local_http_client().request(method, &url);
for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
request = request.header(name, value);
}
if let Some(body) = body {
request = request.body(body);
}
let response = request.send().await?;
let content_type = body.as_ref().map(|_| "application/json");
let response =
signed_s3_request_with_session_token(method, &url, body, content_type, access_key, secret_key, session_token).await?;
let status = response.status();
let body = response.text().await?;
Ok((status, body))
@@ -478,13 +567,7 @@ impl RustFSTestEnvironment {
for (key, value) in extra_env {
command.env(key, value);
}
// Optionally capture the child's stdout+stderr to a file so the test can
// grep server logs (e.g. to confirm which GET reader path was taken).
if let Some(log_path) = &self.capture_log_path {
let file = stdfs::OpenOptions::new().create(true).append(true).open(log_path)?;
let stderr_file = file.try_clone()?;
command.stdout(Stdio::from(file)).stderr(Stdio::from(stderr_file));
}
capture_command_logs(&mut command, self.capture_log_path.as_deref())?;
let process = command.args(&args).spawn()?;
self.process = Some(process);
@@ -564,7 +647,12 @@ impl RustFSTestEnvironment {
/// Create an AWS S3 client configured for this RustFS instance
pub fn create_s3_client(&self) -> Client {
Client::from_conf(build_test_s3_config(&self.url, &self.access_key, &self.secret_key, "e2e-test"))
self.create_s3_client_with_credentials(&self.access_key, &self.secret_key)
}
/// Create an AWS S3 client with explicit credentials for this RustFS instance.
pub fn create_s3_client_with_credentials(&self, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str) -> Client {
Client::from_conf(build_test_s3_config(&self.url, access_key, secret_key, None, "e2e-test"))
}
/// Create test bucket
@@ -967,6 +1055,7 @@ pub struct RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
pub secret_key: String,
pub extra_env: Vec<(String, String)>,
pub node_extra_env: Vec<Vec<(String, String)>>,
pub node_capture_log_paths: Vec<Option<String>>,
pub topology: ClusterTopology,
}
@@ -1066,6 +1155,7 @@ impl RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
secret_key: "rustfs-cluster-test-secret".to_string(),
extra_env,
node_extra_env: vec![Vec::new(); topology.node_count],
node_capture_log_paths: vec![None; topology.node_count],
topology,
})
}
@@ -1095,6 +1185,20 @@ impl RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
Ok(())
}
/// Capture stdout+stderr for a single cluster node process.
pub fn set_node_capture_log_path<P>(
&mut self,
node_idx: usize,
path: P,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>
where
P: Into<String>,
{
self.ensure_node_index(node_idx)?;
self.node_capture_log_paths[node_idx] = Some(path.into());
Ok(())
}
fn ensure_node_index(&self, node_idx: usize) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
if node_idx >= self.nodes.len() {
return Err(format!("node_idx {node_idx} is invalid").into());
@@ -1184,6 +1288,7 @@ impl RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
for (key, value) in &self.node_extra_env[i] {
command.env(key, value);
}
capture_command_logs(&mut command, self.node_capture_log_paths[i].as_deref())?;
let process = command.current_dir(&node.data_dir).spawn()?;
@@ -1210,6 +1315,7 @@ impl RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
let binary_path = rustfs_binary_path();
let volumes_arg = self.build_volumes_arg();
let log_path = self.node_capture_log_paths[node_idx].clone();
let node = &mut self.nodes[node_idx];
info!("Starting cluster node {} on {}", node_idx, node.address);
@@ -1228,6 +1334,7 @@ impl RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
for (key, value) in &self.node_extra_env[node_idx] {
command.env(key, value);
}
capture_command_logs(&mut command, log_path.as_deref())?;
let process = command.current_dir(&node.data_dir).spawn()?;
node.process = Some(process);
@@ -1296,6 +1403,7 @@ impl RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
&self.nodes[node_idx].url,
&self.access_key,
&self.secret_key,
None,
"cluster-test",
)))
}
@@ -1478,6 +1586,7 @@ mod tests {
secret_key: DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY.to_string(),
extra_env: Vec::new(),
node_extra_env: vec![Vec::new(); topology.node_count],
node_capture_log_paths: vec![None; topology.node_count],
topology,
}
}
@@ -1573,6 +1682,16 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[test]
fn cluster_node_log_capture_supports_per_node_paths() {
let mut env = fake_cluster(ClusterTopology::single_pool(3));
env.set_node_capture_log_path(1, "/tmp/node1.log").unwrap();
assert_eq!(env.node_capture_log_paths[0], None);
assert_eq!(env.node_capture_log_paths[1], Some("/tmp/node1.log".to_string()));
assert_eq!(env.node_capture_log_paths[2], None);
assert!(env.set_node_capture_log_path(3, "/tmp/invalid.log").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn cluster_node_env_rejects_invalid_index() {
let mut env = fake_cluster(ClusterTopology::single_pool(4));
+28 -12
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ use rustfs_data_usage::DataUsageInfo;
use serial_test::serial;
use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep};
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, TEST_BUCKET, awscurl_get, init_logging};
use crate::common::{FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV, RustFSTestEnvironment, TEST_BUCKET, awscurl_get, init_logging};
async fn get_data_usage_info(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment) -> Result<DataUsageInfo, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/datausageinfo", env.url);
@@ -35,16 +35,26 @@ where
F: FnMut(&DataUsageInfo) -> bool,
{
let mut last_usage = DataUsageInfo::default();
let mut last_query_error = None;
for _ in 0..45 {
let usage = get_data_usage_info(env).await?;
if usage.buckets_usage.contains_key(bucket) && predicate(&usage) {
return Ok(usage);
match get_data_usage_info(env).await {
Ok(usage) => {
last_query_error = None;
if usage.buckets_usage.contains_key(bucket) && predicate(&usage) {
return Ok(usage);
}
last_usage = usage;
}
Err(err) => last_query_error = Some(err.to_string()),
}
last_usage = usage;
sleep(Duration::from_secs(2)).await;
}
Err(format!("bucket usage did not converge for {bucket}; last usage: {last_usage:?}").into())
Err(format!(
"bucket usage did not converge for {bucket}; last usage: {last_usage:?}; last query error: {}",
last_query_error.as_deref().unwrap_or("none")
)
.into())
}
/// Regression test for data usage accuracy (issue #1012).
@@ -56,7 +66,7 @@ async fn data_usage_reports_all_objects() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Erro
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV).await?;
let client = env.create_s3_client();
@@ -74,8 +84,14 @@ async fn data_usage_reports_all_objects() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Erro
.await?;
}
// Query admin data usage API
let usage = get_data_usage_info(&env).await?;
let usage = wait_for_bucket_usage(&env, TEST_BUCKET, |usage| {
usage
.buckets_usage
.get(TEST_BUCKET)
.map(|bucket_usage| usage.objects_total_count >= 1000 && bucket_usage.objects_count >= 1000)
.unwrap_or(false)
})
.await?;
// Assert total object count and per-bucket count are not truncated
let bucket_usage = usage
@@ -108,7 +124,7 @@ async fn data_usage_reports_versioned_objects_and_delete_markers() -> Result<(),
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV).await?;
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "data-usage-versioned";
@@ -184,8 +200,8 @@ async fn data_usage_reports_versioned_objects_and_delete_markers() -> Result<(),
assert_eq!(usage.versions_total_count, 3, "total version count should match bucket usage");
assert_eq!(usage.delete_markers_total_count, 1, "total delete marker count should match bucket usage");
env.stop_server();
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
env.restart_server_preserving_data(vec![], FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV)
.await?;
let restarted_usage = wait_for_bucket_usage(&env, bucket, |usage| {
usage
+210 -27
View File
@@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ use s3s::access::{S3Access, S3AccessContext};
use s3s::auth::SimpleAuth;
use s3s::dto::{
AbortMultipartUploadInput, AbortMultipartUploadOutput, CompleteMultipartUploadInput, CompleteMultipartUploadOutput,
CreateMultipartUploadInput, CreateMultipartUploadOutput, DeleteObjectInput, DeleteObjectOutput, ETag,
CreateMultipartUploadInput, CreateMultipartUploadOutput, DeleteMarkerEntry, DeleteObjectInput, DeleteObjectOutput, ETag,
GetBucketVersioningInput, GetBucketVersioningOutput, GetObjectInput, GetObjectOutput, HeadBucketInput, HeadBucketOutput,
HeadObjectInput, HeadObjectOutput, PutObjectInput, PutObjectOutput, StreamingBlob, Timestamp, TimestampFormat,
UploadPartInput, UploadPartOutput,
HeadObjectInput, HeadObjectOutput, ListObjectVersionsInput, ListObjectVersionsOutput, ObjectVersionId, PutObjectInput,
PutObjectOutput, StreamingBlob, Timestamp, TimestampFormat, UploadPartInput, UploadPartOutput,
};
use s3s::service::{S3Service, S3ServiceBuilder};
use s3s::validation::{AwsNameValidation, NameValidation};
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ pub enum Operation {
GetObject,
HeadObject,
DeleteObject,
ListObjectVersions,
CreateMultipartUpload,
UploadPart,
CompleteMultipartUpload,
@@ -109,6 +110,8 @@ pub enum FaultAction {
/// already have buffered the rest of the current frame; the journal reports
/// the threshold, and the backend never receives or stores the request.
DisconnectAfterBytes(usize),
/// Apply the request, then close the connection before returning its response.
DisconnectAfterResponse,
/// Drain a request body in fixed-size slices, sleeping after every slice.
SlowDrain { chunk_bytes: usize, delay: Duration },
/// Store the request normally but replace the response ETag.
@@ -134,12 +137,15 @@ pub struct RequestRecord {
#[derive(Default)]
struct ControlState {
scripts: HashMap<Operation, VecDeque<FaultAction>>,
keyed_scripts: HashMap<(Operation, String), VecDeque<FaultAction>>,
requests: VecDeque<RequestRecord>,
next_sequence: u64,
}
#[derive(Default)]
struct StoreState {
assign_own_version_ids: bool,
assign_own_multipart_version_ids: bool,
buckets: HashMap<String, BucketState>,
uploads: HashMap<String, MultipartState>,
total_bytes: usize,
@@ -352,25 +358,60 @@ impl FakeS3Target {
state.buckets.entry(bucket).or_default();
}
/// Remove all retained object versions while preserving the bucket.
pub fn clear_bucket_objects(&self, bucket: &str) {
let mut state = lock(&self.backend.store);
let (removed_versions, removed_bytes) = state
.buckets
.get_mut(bucket)
.expect("fake target bucket must exist")
.objects
.drain()
.flat_map(|(_, versions)| versions)
.fold((0usize, 0usize), |(count, bytes), version| (count + 1, bytes + version.body.len()));
state.total_versions = state
.total_versions
.checked_sub(removed_versions)
.expect("fake target version accounting must not underflow");
state.total_bytes = state
.total_bytes
.checked_sub(removed_bytes)
.expect("fake target byte accounting must not underflow");
}
pub fn has_object(&self, bucket: &str, key: &str) -> bool {
lock(&self.backend.store)
.buckets
.get(bucket)
.and_then(|bucket| bucket.objects.get(key))
.and_then(|versions| versions.last())
.is_some_and(|version| !version.delete_marker)
}
/// Make the target mint its own version ids instead of mirroring the
/// forwarded source version id — models a generic S3 service.
pub fn assign_own_version_ids(&self, enabled: bool) {
lock(&self.backend.store).assign_own_version_ids = enabled;
}
/// Mint own version ids for the multipart path only — models a target
/// that adopts PutObject version ids but not CreateMultipartUpload ones.
pub fn assign_own_multipart_version_ids(&self, enabled: bool) {
lock(&self.backend.store).assign_own_multipart_version_ids = enabled;
}
pub fn active_multipart_upload_count(&self) -> usize {
lock(&self.backend.store).uploads.len()
}
/// Queue `times` copies of a fault for one operation.
pub fn inject(&self, operation: Operation, action: FaultAction, times: usize) {
if times == 0 {
return;
}
if let FaultAction::SlowDrain { chunk_bytes: 0, .. } = action {
panic!("slow-drain chunk size must be non-zero");
}
match &action {
FaultAction::Delay(duration) if *duration > MAX_FAULT_DURATION => {
panic!("fault delay must not exceed 30 seconds");
}
FaultAction::SlowDrain { delay, .. } if *delay >= MAX_FAULT_DURATION => {
panic!("slow-drain slice delay must be below 30 seconds");
}
_ => {}
}
validate_fault_action(&action);
let mut state = lock(&self.control);
let queued = state.scripts.values().map(VecDeque::len).sum::<usize>();
let queued = queued_fault_count(&state);
if queued.checked_add(times).is_none_or(|total| total > MAX_SCRIPTED_FAULTS) {
panic!("fake target queues at most 4096 scripted faults");
}
@@ -381,8 +422,28 @@ impl FakeS3Target {
.extend(std::iter::repeat_n(action, times));
}
/// Queue faults for one exact object key without affecting concurrent requests.
pub fn inject_for_key(&self, operation: Operation, key: impl Into<String>, action: FaultAction, times: usize) {
if times == 0 {
return;
}
validate_fault_action(&action);
let mut state = lock(&self.control);
let queued = queued_fault_count(&state);
if queued.checked_add(times).is_none_or(|total| total > MAX_SCRIPTED_FAULTS) {
panic!("fake target queues at most 4096 scripted faults");
}
state
.keyed_scripts
.entry((operation, key.into()))
.or_default()
.extend(std::iter::repeat_n(action, times));
}
pub fn clear_faults(&self) {
lock(&self.control).scripts.clear();
let mut state = lock(&self.control);
state.scripts.clear();
state.keyed_scripts.clear();
}
pub fn requests(&self) -> Vec<RequestRecord> {
@@ -393,6 +454,25 @@ impl FakeS3Target {
lock(&self.control).requests.drain(..).collect()
}
/// Stored versions for one key as `(version_id, is_delete_marker)`, oldest
/// first. Empty when the bucket or key does not exist. Lets purge tests
/// assert on the target's actual state instead of inferring it from the
/// request journal (a versioned DELETE is a silent no-op for missing ids).
pub fn stored_versions(&self, bucket: &str, key: &str) -> Vec<(String, bool)> {
let state = lock(&self.backend.store);
state
.buckets
.get(bucket)
.and_then(|bucket_state| bucket_state.objects.get(key))
.map(|versions| {
versions
.iter()
.map(|version| (version.version_id.clone(), version.delete_marker))
.collect()
})
.unwrap_or_default()
}
pub async fn shutdown(mut self) {
let _ = self.shutdown.send(true);
if let Some(task) = self.task.take() {
@@ -420,6 +500,25 @@ fn lock<T>(mutex: &Mutex<T>) -> MutexGuard<'_, T> {
mutex.lock().unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner)
}
fn validate_fault_action(action: &FaultAction) {
if let FaultAction::SlowDrain { chunk_bytes: 0, .. } = action {
panic!("slow-drain chunk size must be non-zero");
}
match action {
FaultAction::Delay(duration) if *duration > MAX_FAULT_DURATION => {
panic!("fault delay must not exceed 30 seconds");
}
FaultAction::SlowDrain { delay, .. } if *delay >= MAX_FAULT_DURATION => {
panic!("slow-drain slice delay must be below 30 seconds");
}
_ => {}
}
}
fn queued_fault_count(state: &ControlState) -> usize {
state.scripts.values().map(VecDeque::len).sum::<usize>() + state.keyed_scripts.values().map(VecDeque::len).sum::<usize>()
}
#[async_trait]
impl S3Access for FaultAccess {
async fn check(&self, context: &mut S3AccessContext<'_>) -> S3Result<()> {
@@ -492,7 +591,12 @@ fn record_request(
content_length: Option<u64>,
) -> Option<RequestFault> {
let mut state = lock(control);
let action = state.scripts.get_mut(&operation).and_then(VecDeque::pop_front);
let action = parsed
.key
.as_ref()
.and_then(|key| state.keyed_scripts.get_mut(&(operation, key.clone())))
.and_then(VecDeque::pop_front)
.or_else(|| state.scripts.get_mut(&operation).and_then(VecDeque::pop_front));
state.next_sequence += 1;
let sequence = state.next_sequence;
if state.requests.len() == MAX_REQUEST_RECORDS {
@@ -569,12 +673,14 @@ fn parse_request(method: &Method, uri: &Uri) -> ParsedRequest {
let operation = match (method, key.is_some()) {
(&Method::HEAD, false) => Operation::HeadBucket,
(&Method::GET, false) if query.contains_key("versioning") => Operation::GetBucketVersioning,
(&Method::GET, false) if query.contains_key("versions") => Operation::ListObjectVersions,
(&Method::PUT, true) if upload_id.is_some() && part_number.is_some() => Operation::UploadPart,
(&Method::PUT, true) if upload_id.is_some() || query.contains_key("partNumber") => Operation::Unknown,
(&Method::POST, true) if query.contains_key("uploads") => Operation::CreateMultipartUpload,
(&Method::POST, true) if upload_id.is_some() => Operation::CompleteMultipartUpload,
(&Method::DELETE, true) if upload_id.is_some() => Operation::AbortMultipartUpload,
(&Method::PUT, true) if only_query_keys(&[]) => Operation::PutObject,
// A replication PUT addresses the source version via `?versionId=`.
(&Method::PUT, true) if only_query_keys(&["versionId"]) => Operation::PutObject,
(&Method::GET, true) if only_query_keys(&["versionId"]) => Operation::GetObject,
(&Method::HEAD, true) if only_query_keys(&["versionId"]) => Operation::HeadObject,
(&Method::DELETE, true) if only_query_keys(&["versionId"]) => Operation::DeleteObject,
@@ -624,10 +730,17 @@ fn validate_retained_identifier(value: String, field: &str) -> S3Result<String>
}
}
fn new_version_id(headers: &HeaderMap) -> S3Result<String> {
/// `assign_own` models a target that mints its own version ids (a generic S3
/// service): the forwarded source-version-id header is validated but NOT
/// mirrored into the stored version.
fn new_version_id(headers: &HeaderMap, assign_own: bool) -> S3Result<String> {
let Some(value) = header_value(headers, &SOURCE_VERSION_ID_HEADERS) else {
return Ok(Uuid::new_v4().to_string());
};
if assign_own {
validate_retained_identifier(value.trim().to_owned(), "source version ID")?;
return Ok(Uuid::new_v4().to_string());
}
let value = validate_retained_identifier(value.trim().to_owned(), "source version ID")?;
let version_id = Uuid::parse_str(&value).map_err(|_| s3s::s3_error!(InvalidArgument, "source version ID must be a UUID"))?;
Ok(version_id.to_string())
@@ -712,7 +825,10 @@ async fn apply_non_body_fault(fault: Option<&RequestFault>, control: &Mutex<Cont
update_consumed(control, fault.expect("matched fault").sequence, 0);
Err(scripted_disconnect_error())
}
Some(FaultAction::SlowDrain { .. }) | Some(FaultAction::WrongEtag) | None => Ok(()),
Some(FaultAction::SlowDrain { .. })
| Some(FaultAction::WrongEtag)
| Some(FaultAction::DisconnectAfterResponse)
| None => Ok(()),
}
}
@@ -753,7 +869,7 @@ async fn collect_stream(
Some(FaultAction::SlowDrain { chunk_bytes, delay }) => {
return collect_stream_slow(body, capacity, *chunk_bytes, *delay).await;
}
Some(FaultAction::WrongEtag) | None => {}
Some(FaultAction::WrongEtag) | Some(FaultAction::DisconnectAfterResponse) | None => {}
}
let mut output = BytesMut::with_capacity(capacity);
@@ -815,6 +931,9 @@ fn apply_response_fault<T>(mut response: S3Response<T>, fault: Option<&RequestFa
if fault.is_some_and(|fault| fault.action == FaultAction::WrongEtag) {
response.headers.insert(ETAG, HeaderValue::from_static(WRONG_ETAG));
}
if fault.is_some_and(|fault| fault.action == FaultAction::DisconnectAfterResponse) {
response.headers.insert(DISCONNECT_HEADER, HeaderValue::from_static("true"));
}
response
}
@@ -1003,6 +1122,63 @@ impl S3 for FakeBackend {
))
}
/// Prefix + max-keys subset only — enough for the replication-check probe
/// key allocation. No pagination markers or delimiter folding.
async fn list_object_versions(
&self,
req: S3Request<ListObjectVersionsInput>,
) -> S3Result<S3Response<ListObjectVersionsOutput>> {
let fault = request_fault(&req);
apply_non_body_fault(fault.as_ref(), &self.control).await?;
let state = lock(&self.store);
let Some(bucket_state) = state.buckets.get(&req.input.bucket) else {
return Err(s3s::s3_error!(NoSuchBucket, "bucket does not exist"));
};
let prefix = req.input.prefix.as_deref().unwrap_or_default();
let max_keys = req.input.max_keys.unwrap_or(1000).max(0) as usize;
let mut keys: Vec<&String> = bucket_state.objects.keys().filter(|key| key.starts_with(prefix)).collect();
keys.sort();
let mut versions = Vec::new();
let mut delete_markers = Vec::new();
'keys: for key in keys {
for version in bucket_state.objects[key].iter().rev() {
if versions.len() + delete_markers.len() >= max_keys {
break 'keys;
}
if version.delete_marker {
delete_markers.push(DeleteMarkerEntry {
key: Some(key.clone()),
version_id: Some(ObjectVersionId::from(version.version_id.clone())),
last_modified: Some(version.last_modified.clone()),
..Default::default()
});
} else {
versions.push(s3s::dto::ObjectVersion {
key: Some(key.clone()),
version_id: Some(ObjectVersionId::from(version.version_id.clone())),
last_modified: Some(version.last_modified.clone()),
e_tag: Some(ETag::Strong(version.e_tag.clone())),
size: Some(version.body.len() as i64),
..Default::default()
});
}
}
}
drop(state);
Ok(apply_response_fault(
S3Response::new(ListObjectVersionsOutput {
name: Some(req.input.bucket),
versions: Some(versions),
delete_markers: Some(delete_markers),
..Default::default()
}),
fault.as_ref(),
))
}
async fn put_object(&self, req: S3Request<PutObjectInput>) -> S3Result<S3Response<PutObjectOutput>> {
let fault = request_fault(&req);
let _body_permit = timeout(MAX_FAULT_DURATION, Arc::clone(&self.body_limit).acquire_owned())
@@ -1013,7 +1189,8 @@ impl S3 for FakeBackend {
let input = req.input;
let body = collect_stream(input.body, input.content_length, fault.as_ref(), &self.control).await?;
validate_stored_metadata(&input.content_type, &input.metadata)?;
let version_id = new_version_id(&headers)?;
let assign_own = lock(&self.store).assign_own_version_ids;
let version_id = new_version_id(&headers, assign_own)?;
let e_tag = match source_etag(&headers)? {
Some(value) => value,
None => {
@@ -1056,7 +1233,7 @@ impl S3 for FakeBackend {
content_type: version.content_type,
metadata: version.metadata,
e_tag: Some(ETag::Strong(version.e_tag)),
last_modified: Some(version.last_modified),
last_modified: Some(version.last_modified.clone()),
version_id: Some(version.version_id),
..Default::default()
}),
@@ -1078,7 +1255,7 @@ impl S3 for FakeBackend {
content_type: version.content_type,
metadata: version.metadata,
e_tag: Some(ETag::Strong(version.e_tag)),
last_modified: Some(version.last_modified),
last_modified: Some(version.last_modified.clone()),
version_id: Some(version.version_id),
..Default::default()
}),
@@ -1147,7 +1324,9 @@ impl S3 for FakeBackend {
));
}
let version_id = new_version_id(&headers)?;
// `state` is the live store guard: read the flag from it. Re-locking
// would self-deadlock (the store mutex is not reentrant).
let version_id = new_version_id(&headers, state.assign_own_version_ids)?;
upsert_version(
&mut state,
&input.bucket,
@@ -1187,12 +1366,16 @@ impl S3 for FakeBackend {
ensure_upload_budget(&state)?;
validate_stored_metadata(&input.content_type, &input.metadata)?;
let upload_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
// Read the flag before the mutable borrow of `state.uploads` below
// (and never re-lock the store: the mutex is not reentrant).
let mint_own = state.assign_own_version_ids || state.assign_own_multipart_version_ids;
let version_id = new_version_id(&headers, mint_own)?;
state.uploads.insert(
upload_id.clone(),
MultipartState {
bucket: input.bucket.clone(),
key: input.key.clone(),
version_id: new_version_id(&headers)?,
version_id,
content_type: input.content_type,
metadata: input.metadata,
parts: BTreeMap::new(),
@@ -189,8 +189,6 @@ mod tests {
("RUSTFS_GET_CODEC_STREAMING_ROLLOUT_PCT", "100"),
("RUSTFS_GET_CODEC_STREAMING_BODY_COMPAT_CONFIRMED", "true"),
("RUSTFS_GET_CODEC_STREAMING_HEADER_COMPAT_CONFIRMED", "true"),
// Lower the min-size floor so every non-inline object below is eligible.
("RUSTFS_GET_CODEC_STREAMING_MIN_SIZE", "4096"),
// Route multipart objects through per-part codec streaming too.
("RUSTFS_GET_CODEC_STREAMING_MULTIPART_ENABLE", "true"),
// Lock optimization is on by default, but pin it so the gate's
@@ -315,6 +313,13 @@ mod tests {
},
payload(64 * 1024, 2),
),
(
Shape {
key: "small-non-inline-256kib-plus",
expect_large: true,
},
payload(256 * 1024 + 1, 6),
),
(
Shape {
key: "mid-1_5mib",
+51 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
//! E2E tests for group management (fixes #2028).
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, awscurl_delete, awscurl_get, awscurl_put, init_logging};
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_request, awscurl_delete, awscurl_get, awscurl_put, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::config::{Credentials, Region};
use aws_sdk_s3::{Client, Config};
use serial_test::serial;
@@ -32,6 +32,56 @@ fn create_user_s3_client(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, access_key: &str, secret_k
Client::from_conf(config)
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
async fn update_group_members_rejects_invalid_new_group_names() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let invalid_groups = [
("test group", "group name contains whitespace"),
("test=group", "group name contains reserved characters =,"),
("test,group", "group name contains reserved characters =,"),
];
for (group, expected_message) in invalid_groups {
let body = serde_json::json!({
"group": group,
"members": [],
"isRemove": false,
"groupStatus": "enabled"
})
.to_string();
let (status, response_body) = admin_request(
&env.url,
http::Method::PUT,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/update-group-members",
Some(body),
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await?;
assert_eq!(
status,
reqwest::StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
"invalid group {group:?} must return HTTP 400, body: {response_body}"
);
assert!(
response_body.contains("<Code>InvalidArgument</Code>"),
"invalid group {group:?} must return InvalidArgument, body: {response_body}"
);
assert!(
response_body.contains(&format!("<Message>{expected_message}</Message>")),
"invalid group {group:?} returned an unexpected message: {response_body}"
);
}
env.stop_server();
Ok(())
}
/// Test that deleting a group with members fails, and deleting an empty group succeeds.
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
#[serial]
@@ -431,4 +431,104 @@ mod tests {
)
.into())
}
/// Issue #5850: `background-heal/status` must answer while a peer is down.
///
/// Exercises the production path in `read_cluster_heal_status` end to end,
/// which the unit tests around `merge_peer_heal_statuses` cannot: with one
/// node stopped, the endpoint must return 200 with
/// `clusterStatusComplete: false` and an explicit `degraded` (or, when
/// heal work is known active, `active`) state — never the previous
/// cluster-wide 500 — and must return to a complete, non-degraded answer
/// once the node rejoins. Reverting either all-or-nothing gate (the
/// topology early-return or the merge hard-fail) turns the down-window
/// response into a 500 and fails this test.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_background_heal_status_degrades_while_peer_down_and_recovers_after_rejoin()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
info!("Issue #5850: background-heal/status must degrade, not 500, while a peer is down");
let mut cluster = RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::new(4).await?;
cluster.set_env("RUSTFS_UNSAFE_BYPASS_DISK_CHECK", "true");
cluster.start().await?;
let status_url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/background-heal/status", cluster.nodes[0].url);
// Owned copies: the closure must not borrow `cluster`, which
// stop_node/start_node need mutably between polls.
let access_key = cluster.access_key.clone();
let secret_key = cluster.secret_key.clone();
let fetch_status = || async {
let body = signed_admin_post(&status_url, None, &access_key, &secret_key).await?;
let json: serde_json::Value =
serde_json::from_str(&body).map_err(|err| format!("heal status response is not JSON ({err}): {body}"))?;
Ok::<serde_json::Value, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>(json)
};
// Healthy cluster: the answer must be definitive. Poll briefly — the
// peer grid may still be settling right after start().
let mut healthy = fetch_status().await?;
for _ in 0..30 {
if healthy["clusterStatusComplete"] == serde_json::Value::Bool(true) {
break;
}
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
healthy = fetch_status().await?;
}
assert_eq!(
healthy["clusterStatusComplete"],
serde_json::Value::Bool(true),
"healthy cluster should report a complete heal status: {healthy}"
);
cluster.stop_node(1)?;
// While the peer is down every response must stay 200 (signed_admin_post
// fails on any non-2xx, so the old 500 fails the test immediately) and
// must degrade to an explicitly-partial answer. The peer query timeout
// is 5 s, so a couple of polls are enough for the dead peer to surface.
let mut degraded = serde_json::Value::Null;
for _ in 0..30 {
degraded = fetch_status().await?;
if degraded["clusterStatusComplete"] == serde_json::Value::Bool(false) {
break;
}
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
assert_eq!(
degraded["clusterStatusComplete"],
serde_json::Value::Bool(false),
"heal status must mark itself partial while a peer is down: {degraded}"
);
let state = degraded["state"].as_str().unwrap_or_default();
assert!(
state == "degraded" || state == "active",
"a partial answer must be labeled degraded (or active for known work), got {state:?}: {degraded}"
);
cluster.start_node(1).await?;
// After the rejoin the endpoint must return to a definitive answer.
let mut recovered = serde_json::Value::Null;
for _ in 0..60 {
recovered = fetch_status().await?;
if recovered["clusterStatusComplete"] == serde_json::Value::Bool(true) {
break;
}
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
assert_eq!(
recovered["clusterStatusComplete"],
serde_json::Value::Bool(true),
"heal status should be complete again after the node rejoined: {recovered}"
);
assert_ne!(
recovered["state"].as_str().unwrap_or_default(),
"degraded",
"a complete answer must not be labeled degraded: {recovered}"
);
Ok(())
}
}
@@ -2211,11 +2211,6 @@ async fn four_node_manual_transition_distributed_admission_conflict_reports_stat
"queue_snapshot.{field} must be readable in terminal status: {terminal}"
);
}
assert!(
cold_tier_object_count(&cold_client).await? < 64,
"queue pressure should leave at least one object untransitioned"
);
Ok(())
}
@@ -21,9 +21,12 @@
use super::common::LocalKMSTestEnvironment;
use crate::common::{TEST_BUCKET, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{
ServerSideEncryption, ServerSideEncryptionByDefault, ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration, ServerSideEncryptionRule,
ChecksumAlgorithm, ChecksumMode, CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart, ServerSideEncryption,
ServerSideEncryptionByDefault, ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration, ServerSideEncryptionRule,
};
use rustfs_rio::{Checksum, ChecksumType};
use serial_test::serial;
use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
@@ -273,7 +276,7 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_sse_kms_put_object() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::err
/// Test 3: When bucket is configured with default encryption, create_multipart_upload should inherit the configuration
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
async fn test_bucket_default_sse_kms_multipart_crc32() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
info!("Testing bucket default encryption impact on create_multipart_upload");
@@ -309,15 +312,16 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
.await
.expect("Failed to set bucket encryption");
// Step 2: Create multipart upload (without specifying encryption parameters)
info!("Creating multipart upload (without specifying encryption parameters, should use bucket default configuration)");
let test_key = "test-multipart-bucket-default.txt";
// Step 2: Declare CRC32 without specifying encryption parameters. The AWS SDK
// calculates each UploadPart checksum and sends it as a flexible checksum.
info!("Creating CRC32 multipart upload that should use bucket default encryption");
let test_key = "test-multipart-bucket-default-crc32.bin";
let create_multipart_response = s3_client
.create_multipart_upload()
.bucket(TEST_BUCKET)
.key(test_key)
// Note: No encryption parameters specified here, should use bucket default configuration
.checksum_algorithm(ChecksumAlgorithm::Crc32)
.send()
.await
.expect("Failed to create multipart upload");
@@ -343,28 +347,61 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
"create_multipart_upload response should contain correct KMS key ID"
);
// Step 3: Upload a part and complete multipart upload
info!("Uploading part and completing multipart upload");
let test_data = b"test-multipart-bucket-default-encryption-data";
// Step 3: Upload two parts. The first is exactly the S3 minimum size so this
// follows the same managed SSE-KMS multipart path as issue #5756.
const PART_SIZE: usize = 5 * 1024 * 1024;
let part1: Vec<u8> = (0..PART_SIZE).map(|i| (i % 251) as u8).collect();
let part2: Vec<u8> = (0..1024 * 1024).map(|i| ((i + 17) % 251) as u8).collect();
let expected_body: Vec<u8> = part1.iter().chain(&part2).copied().collect();
// Upload part 1
let upload_part_response = s3_client
.upload_part()
.bucket(TEST_BUCKET)
.key(test_key)
.upload_id(upload_id)
.part_number(1)
.body(test_data.to_vec().into())
.send()
.await
.expect("Failed to upload part");
let upload_part = |part_number: i32, body: Vec<u8>| {
s3_client
.upload_part()
.bucket(TEST_BUCKET)
.key(test_key)
.upload_id(upload_id)
.part_number(part_number)
.checksum_algorithm(ChecksumAlgorithm::Crc32)
.body(ByteStream::from(body))
.send()
};
let etag = upload_part_response.e_tag().unwrap().to_string();
let expected_part1_crc32 = Checksum::new_from_data(ChecksumType::CRC32, &part1)
.expect("calculate part 1 CRC32")
.encoded;
let upload1 = upload_part(1, part1).await.expect("Failed to upload part 1 with CRC32");
assert_eq!(
upload1.checksum_crc32(),
Some(expected_part1_crc32.as_str()),
"UploadPart must return the CRC32 calculated over plaintext"
);
let expected_part2_crc32 = Checksum::new_from_data(ChecksumType::CRC32, &part2)
.expect("calculate part 2 CRC32")
.encoded;
let upload2 = upload_part(2, part2).await.expect("Failed to upload part 2 with CRC32");
assert_eq!(
upload2.checksum_crc32(),
Some(expected_part2_crc32.as_str()),
"UploadPart must return the CRC32 calculated over plaintext"
);
// Complete multipart upload
let completed_part = aws_sdk_s3::types::CompletedPart::builder()
.part_number(1)
.e_tag(&etag)
let completed_upload = CompletedMultipartUpload::builder()
.parts(
CompletedPart::builder()
.part_number(1)
.e_tag(upload1.e_tag().expect("No ETag for part 1"))
.checksum_crc32(upload1.checksum_crc32().expect("No CRC32 for part 1"))
.build(),
)
.parts(
CompletedPart::builder()
.part_number(2)
.e_tag(upload2.e_tag().expect("No ETag for part 2"))
.checksum_crc32(upload2.checksum_crc32().expect("No CRC32 for part 2"))
.build(),
)
.build();
let complete_multipart_response = s3_client
@@ -372,11 +409,7 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
.bucket(TEST_BUCKET)
.key(test_key)
.upload_id(upload_id)
.multipart_upload(
aws_sdk_s3::types::CompletedMultipartUpload::builder()
.parts(completed_part)
.build(),
)
.multipart_upload(completed_upload)
.send()
.await
.expect("Failed to complete multipart upload");
@@ -400,6 +433,7 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
.get_object()
.bucket(TEST_BUCKET)
.key(test_key)
.checksum_mode(ChecksumMode::Enabled)
.send()
.await
.expect("Failed to get object");
@@ -410,6 +444,13 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
Some(&ServerSideEncryption::AwsKms),
"Final object should contain SSE-KMS encryption information"
);
if let Some(completed_crc32) = complete_multipart_response.checksum_crc32() {
assert_eq!(
get_response.checksum_crc32(),
Some(completed_crc32),
"GetObject should return the persisted composite CRC32 when completion reports it"
);
}
// Verify data integrity
let downloaded_data = get_response
@@ -418,7 +459,11 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
.await
.expect("Failed to collect body")
.into_bytes();
assert_eq!(&downloaded_data[..], test_data, "Downloaded data should match original data");
assert_eq!(
downloaded_data.as_ref(),
expected_body.as_slice(),
"Downloaded data should match the uploaded multipart body"
);
// Cleanup is handled automatically when the test environment is dropped
info!("Test passed: bucket default encryption correctly applied to multipart upload");
+12
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ pub mod fault_proxy;
#[cfg(test)]
mod reliability_disk_fault_test;
// Privileged Linux-only 3x4 replacement rebuild proof for rustfs#5869/#1791.
#[cfg(all(test, target_os = "linux"))]
mod replacement_privileged_e2e_test;
// dist-13 (backlog#1150/#1155): e2e regression net proving a large-object
// degraded EC read never returns a silently truncated body (rustfs#4594/#4560/#4585).
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -290,6 +294,14 @@ mod overwrite_cleanup_regression_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod list_buckets_double_slash_test;
// Regression coverage for bucket-scoped ListBuckets authorization fallback.
#[cfg(test)]
mod list_buckets_auth_test;
// ListBuckets visibility follows IAM authorization, not bucket policy.
#[cfg(test)]
mod list_buckets_iam_filter_test;
// Regression test for backlog#629(b): region-aware CreateBucket SigV4.
#[cfg(test)]
mod create_bucket_region_test;
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
// Copyright 2026 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression coverage for the MinIO-compatible filtered ListBuckets fallback.
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_ok, init_logging};
use std::error::Error;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
#[tokio::test]
async fn bucket_scoped_policy_returns_only_authorized_bucket() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let root_client = env.create_s3_client();
let allowed_bucket = "list-buckets-authorized";
let hidden_bucket = "list-buckets-hidden";
let user = "listbucketsuser";
let secret = "listbucketssecret";
let policy = "list-buckets-scoped";
root_client.create_bucket().bucket(allowed_bucket).send().await?;
root_client.create_bucket().bucket(hidden_bucket).send().await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={policy}"),
Some(
serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:*"],
"Resource": [
format!("arn:aws:s3:::{allowed_bucket}"),
format!("arn:aws:s3:::{allowed_bucket}/*")
]
}]
})
.to_string(),
),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={user}"),
Some(serde_json::json!({ "secretKey": secret, "status": "enabled" }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/idp/builtin/policy/attach",
Some(serde_json::json!({ "policies": [policy], "user": user }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
let client = env.create_s3_client_with_credentials(user, secret);
// Capture ListBuckets first so the direct-access control cannot warm bucket metadata and mask the regression.
let listed = client.list_buckets().send().await;
client.list_objects_v2().bucket(allowed_bucket).send().await?;
let listed = listed?;
let names = listed
.buckets()
.iter()
.filter_map(|bucket| bucket.name().map(ToOwned::to_owned))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
assert_eq!(names, vec![allowed_bucket]);
Ok(())
}
@@ -0,0 +1,459 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_ok, build_test_s3_config, build_test_sts_client, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
use aws_sdk_s3::error::ProvideErrorMetadata;
use serial_test::serial;
use tokio::time::{Duration, Instant};
fn user_client(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str, session_token: Option<&str>) -> Client {
Client::from_conf(build_test_s3_config(
&env.url,
access_key,
secret_key,
session_token,
"list-buckets-iam-filter",
))
}
fn bucket_names(buckets: &[aws_sdk_s3::types::Bucket]) -> Vec<String> {
let mut names = buckets
.iter()
.filter_map(|bucket| bucket.name().map(str::to_owned))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
names.sort();
names
}
async fn create_user(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let body = serde_json::json!({ "secretKey": secret_key, "status": "enabled" }).to_string();
admin_ok(
env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={access_key}"),
Some(body),
)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn create_service_account(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
target_user: &str,
policy: Option<&serde_json::Value>,
) -> Result<(String, String), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let request = match policy {
Some(policy) => serde_json::json!({ "targetUser": target_user, "policy": policy }),
None => serde_json::json!({ "targetUser": target_user }),
};
let response = admin_ok(env, http::Method::PUT, "/rustfs/admin/v3/add-service-accounts", Some(request.to_string())).await?;
let response: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&response)?;
let access_key = response["credentials"]["accessKey"]
.as_str()
.ok_or("service account response should contain credentials.accessKey")?
.to_owned();
let secret_key = response["credentials"]["secretKey"]
.as_str()
.ok_or("service account response should contain credentials.secretKey")?
.to_owned();
Ok((access_key, secret_key))
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn list_buckets_filters_with_iam_bucket_resources() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.capture_log_path = Some(format!("{}/server.log", env.temp_dir));
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUST_LOG", "rustfs=debug,rustfs_notify=debug")])
.await?;
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
for bucket in [
"benchmark-artifacts",
"benchmark-denied",
"benchmark-location-only",
"benchmark-test1",
"testuser1-artifacts",
] {
admin_client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
}
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(admin_client.list_buckets().send().await?.buckets()),
vec![
"benchmark-artifacts",
"benchmark-denied",
"benchmark-location-only",
"benchmark-test1",
"testuser1-artifacts"
]
);
let access_key = "benchmark";
let secret_key = "benchmark-secret-1234567890";
create_user(&env, access_key, secret_key).await?;
let policy_name = "benchmark-bucket-prefix";
let policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:*"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-*", "arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-*/*"],
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"s3:prefix": [""],
"s3:delimiter": ["/"]
}
}
},
{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket", "s3:GetBucketLocation"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-denied"]
},
{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-location-only"]
},
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["sts:AssumeRole"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"]
}
]
})
.to_string();
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={policy_name}"),
Some(policy),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/set-user-or-group-policy?policyName={policy_name}&userOrGroup={access_key}&isGroup=false"),
Some(String::new()),
)
.await?;
let bucket_policy_allow = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": { "AWS": [access_key] },
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::testuser1-artifacts"]
}]
})
.to_string();
admin_client
.put_bucket_policy()
.bucket("testuser1-artifacts")
.policy(bucket_policy_allow)
.send()
.await?;
let bucket_policy_deny = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Principal": { "AWS": [access_key] },
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket", "s3:GetBucketLocation"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-artifacts"]
}]
})
.to_string();
admin_client
.put_bucket_policy()
.bucket("benchmark-artifacts")
.policy(bucket_policy_deny)
.send()
.await?;
let benchmark_client = user_client(&env, access_key, secret_key, None);
benchmark_client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket("testuser1-artifacts")
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(benchmark_client.list_buckets().send().await?.buckets()),
vec!["benchmark-artifacts", "benchmark-location-only", "benchmark-test1"]
);
let log_path = env.capture_log_path.as_deref().expect("server log path should be configured");
let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5);
let audit_log = loop {
let audit_log = tokio::fs::read_to_string(log_path).await?;
if [
"iam_implicit_deny",
"s3_authorization_denied",
"ListAllMyBucketsAction",
"benchmark",
"DEBUG",
]
.iter()
.all(|field| audit_log.contains(field))
|| Instant::now() >= deadline
{
break audit_log;
}
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
};
assert_eq!(audit_log.matches("iam_implicit_deny").count(), 1, "{audit_log}");
for field in ["s3_authorization_denied", "ListAllMyBucketsAction", "benchmark", "DEBUG"] {
assert!(audit_log.contains(field), "missing {field} in {audit_log}");
}
let denied_access_key = "no-bucket-access";
let denied_secret_key = "no-bucket-access-secret-1234567890";
create_user(&env, denied_access_key, denied_secret_key).await?;
let denied = user_client(&env, denied_access_key, denied_secret_key, None)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await
.expect_err("a user without IAM bucket permissions must be denied");
assert_eq!(denied.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code), Some("AccessDenied"));
let put_only_policy_name = "put-only-no-bucket-discovery";
let put_only_policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:PutObject"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-*/*"]
}]
})
.to_string();
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={put_only_policy_name}"),
Some(put_only_policy),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!(
"/rustfs/admin/v3/set-user-or-group-policy?policyName={put_only_policy_name}&userOrGroup={denied_access_key}&isGroup=false"
),
Some(String::new()),
)
.await?;
let denied = user_client(&env, denied_access_key, denied_secret_key, None)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await
.expect_err("an unrelated IAM action must not reveal bucket names");
assert_eq!(denied.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code), Some("AccessDenied"));
let list_all_policy_name = "list-all-buckets";
let list_all_policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:ListAllMyBuckets"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"]
}]
})
.to_string();
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={list_all_policy_name}"),
Some(list_all_policy),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!(
"/rustfs/admin/v3/set-user-or-group-policy?policyName={list_all_policy_name}&userOrGroup={denied_access_key}&isGroup=false"
),
Some(String::new()),
)
.await?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(
user_client(&env, denied_access_key, denied_secret_key, None)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?
.buckets()
),
vec![
"benchmark-artifacts",
"benchmark-denied",
"benchmark-location-only",
"benchmark-test1",
"testuser1-artifacts"
]
);
let group_user = "benchmark-group-user";
let group_secret = "benchmark-group-secret-1234567890";
let group_name = "benchmark-group";
create_user(&env, group_user, group_secret).await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/update-group-members",
Some(
serde_json::json!({
"group": group_name,
"members": [group_user],
"isRemove": false,
"groupStatus": "enabled"
})
.to_string(),
),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/set-user-or-group-policy?policyName={policy_name}&userOrGroup={group_name}&isGroup=true"),
Some(String::new()),
)
.await?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(
user_client(&env, group_user, group_secret, None)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?
.buckets()
),
vec!["benchmark-artifacts", "benchmark-location-only", "benchmark-test1"]
);
let (service_access_key, service_secret_key) = create_service_account(&env, group_user, None).await?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(
user_client(&env, &service_access_key, &service_secret_key, None)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?
.buckets()
),
vec!["benchmark-artifacts", "benchmark-location-only", "benchmark-test1"]
);
let service_account_policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket", "s3:GetBucketLocation"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-test1"],
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"s3:prefix": [""],
"s3:delimiter": ["/"]
}
}
}]
});
let (restricted_service_access_key, restricted_service_secret_key) =
create_service_account(&env, group_user, Some(&service_account_policy)).await?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(
user_client(&env, &restricted_service_access_key, &restricted_service_secret_key, None,)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?
.buckets()
),
vec!["benchmark-test1"]
);
let sts_client = build_test_sts_client(&env.url, group_user, group_secret, None, "list-buckets-iam-filter-sts");
let inherited = sts_client
.assume_role()
.role_arn("arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/list-buckets")
.role_session_name("list-buckets-iam-filter-inherited")
.send()
.await?;
let inherited = inherited
.credentials()
.ok_or("AssumeRole response should contain inherited temporary credentials")?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(
user_client(
&env,
inherited.access_key_id(),
inherited.secret_access_key(),
Some(inherited.session_token()),
)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?
.buckets()
),
vec!["benchmark-artifacts", "benchmark-location-only", "benchmark-test1"]
);
let session_policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket", "s3:GetBucketLocation"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-test1"],
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"s3:prefix": [""],
"s3:delimiter": ["/"]
}
}
}]
})
.to_string();
let assumed = sts_client
.assume_role()
.role_arn("arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/list-buckets")
.role_session_name("list-buckets-iam-filter")
.policy(session_policy)
.send()
.await?;
let temporary = assumed
.credentials()
.ok_or("AssumeRole response should contain temporary credentials")?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(
user_client(
&env,
temporary.access_key_id(),
temporary.secret_access_key(),
Some(temporary.session_token()),
)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?
.buckets()
),
vec!["benchmark-test1"]
);
Ok(())
}
+226 -480
View File
@@ -285,6 +285,198 @@ async fn allow_anonymous_put_object(
Ok(())
}
/// One rejected POST Object upload driven end-to-end (backlog#1838): starts a
/// fresh server, allows anonymous PutObject on `bucket`, posts an anonymous
/// POST Object form whose policy carries `policy_conditions` and whose form
/// carries `form_fields` on top of the mandatory key+policy fields, then
/// asserts the expected status, error code, and lowercase-body mention.
/// `case` prefixes every assertion message so a failing table row is
/// identifiable at a glance.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
async fn run_post_object_policy_case(
bucket: &str,
object_key: &str,
policy_conditions: Vec<serde_json::Value>,
form_fields: &[(&str, &str)],
file_body: &[u8],
expected_status: reqwest::StatusCode,
expected_code: &str,
expected_mention: &str,
case: &str,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
admin_client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
allow_anonymous_put_object(&admin_client, bucket).await?;
let policy = encode_post_policy(policy_conditions);
let mut post_form = reqwest::multipart::Form::new()
.text("key", object_key.to_string())
.text("policy", policy);
for (name, value) in form_fields {
post_form = post_form.text(name.to_string(), value.to_string());
}
let post_form = post_form.part(
"file",
reqwest::multipart::Part::bytes(file_body.to_vec())
.file_name("upload.txt")
.mime_str("text/plain")?,
);
let post_resp = local_http_client()
.post(format!("{}/{}", env.url, bucket))
.multipart(post_form)
.send()
.await?;
let status = post_resp.status();
let response_body = post_resp.text().await?;
let response_body_lower = response_body.to_ascii_lowercase();
assert_eq!(status, expected_status, "[{case}] unexpected status, body: {response_body}");
assert!(
response_body.contains(expected_code),
"[{case}] response should contain {expected_code}, got: {response_body}"
);
assert!(
response_body_lower.contains(expected_mention),
"[{case}] response should mention {expected_mention}, got: {response_body}"
);
Ok(())
}
/// Table-driven fold of the nine `*_missing_from_policy_conditions` POST
/// Object tests (backlog#1838 PR1). Every row keeps its original test's exact
/// bucket, key, form field, file body, and expected error strings; the shared
/// shape is: policy pins bucket + key + content-length-range only, the form
/// smuggles one extra field the policy never declared, and the upload must be
/// rejected with 403 AccessDenied naming the offending field.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_fields_missing_from_policy_conditions()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
// (case, bucket, object_key, form field, file body, expected code, expected mention)
type Case = (
&'static str,
&'static str,
&'static str,
(&'static str, &'static str),
&'static [u8],
&'static str,
&'static str,
);
let cases: &[Case] = &[
(
"cache-control",
"anon-post-policy-cache-control-missing",
"uploads/cache-control-missing.txt",
("Cache-Control", "max-age=60"),
b"post-policy-cache-control-missing",
"AccessDenied",
"cache-control",
),
(
"content-language",
"anon-post-policy-content-language-missing",
"uploads/content-language-missing.txt",
("Content-Language", "en-US"),
b"post-policy-content-language-missing",
"AccessDenied",
"content-language",
),
(
"content-encoding",
"anon-post-policy-content-encoding-missing",
"uploads/content-encoding-missing.txt",
("Content-Encoding", "gzip"),
b"post-policy-content-encoding-missing",
"AccessDenied",
"content-encoding",
),
(
"website-redirect-location",
"anon-post-policy-website-redirect-missing",
"uploads/website-redirect-missing.txt",
("x-amz-website-redirect-location", "/docs/landing.html"),
b"post-policy-website-redirect-missing",
"AccessDenied",
"x-amz-website-redirect-location",
),
(
"expires",
"anon-post-policy-expires-missing",
"uploads/expires-missing-object.txt",
("Expires", "Wed, 21 Oct 2037 07:28:00 GMT"),
b"post-policy-expires-missing",
"AccessDenied",
"expires",
),
(
"tagging",
"anon-post-policy-tagging-missing",
"uploads/tagging-missing-object.txt",
("x-amz-tagging", "project=alpha&env=test"),
b"post-policy-tagging-missing",
"AccessDenied",
"x-amz-tagging",
),
(
"metadata",
"anon-post-policy-meta-reject",
"uploads/meta-reject-object.txt",
("x-amz-meta-project", "alpha-demo"),
b"post-policy-body",
"<Code>AccessDenied</Code>",
"x-amz-meta-project",
),
(
"metadata-new-key",
"anon-post-policy-meta-name-missing",
"uploads/meta-name-missing.txt",
("x-amz-meta-name", "demo-name"),
b"post-policy-meta-name-missing",
"<Code>AccessDenied</Code>",
"x-amz-meta-name",
),
(
"content-type",
"anon-post-policy-content-type-missing",
"uploads/content-type-missing.txt",
("Content-Type", "text/plain"),
b"post-policy-content-type-missing",
"AccessDenied",
"content-type",
),
];
for (case, bucket, object_key, form_field, file_body, expected_code, expected_mention) in cases {
run_post_object_policy_case(
bucket,
object_key,
vec![
serde_json::json!({ "bucket": bucket }),
serde_json::json!({ "key": object_key }),
serde_json::json!(["content-length-range", 0, 1024]),
],
&[*form_field],
file_body,
reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
expected_code,
expected_mention,
case,
)
.await?;
}
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_multipart_control_apis_require_auth() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
@@ -2869,59 +3061,6 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_cache_control_policy_mismatch() -> R
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_cache_control_missing_from_policy_conditions()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let bucket = "anon-post-policy-cache-control-missing";
let object_key = "uploads/cache-control-missing.txt";
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
admin_client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
allow_anonymous_put_object(&admin_client, bucket).await?;
let policy = encode_post_policy(vec![
serde_json::json!({ "bucket": bucket }),
serde_json::json!({ "key": object_key }),
serde_json::json!(["content-length-range", 0, 1024]),
]);
let post_form = reqwest::multipart::Form::new()
.text("key", object_key.to_string())
.text("policy", policy)
.text("Cache-Control", "max-age=60")
.part(
"file",
reqwest::multipart::Part::bytes(b"post-policy-cache-control-missing".to_vec())
.file_name("upload.txt")
.mime_str("text/plain")?,
);
let post_resp = local_http_client()
.post(format!("{}/{}", env.url, bucket))
.multipart(post_form)
.send()
.await?;
let status = post_resp.status();
let response_body = post_resp.text().await?;
let response_body_lower = response_body.to_ascii_lowercase();
assert_eq!(status, reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
assert!(response_body.contains("AccessDenied"));
assert!(
response_body_lower.contains("cache-control"),
"response should mention cache-control, got: {response_body}"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_accepts_content_language_field_exact_policy_match()
@@ -3034,59 +3173,6 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_content_language_policy_mismatch()
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_content_language_missing_from_policy_conditions()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let bucket = "anon-post-policy-content-language-missing";
let object_key = "uploads/content-language-missing.txt";
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
admin_client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
allow_anonymous_put_object(&admin_client, bucket).await?;
let policy = encode_post_policy(vec![
serde_json::json!({ "bucket": bucket }),
serde_json::json!({ "key": object_key }),
serde_json::json!(["content-length-range", 0, 1024]),
]);
let post_form = reqwest::multipart::Form::new()
.text("key", object_key.to_string())
.text("policy", policy)
.text("Content-Language", "en-US")
.part(
"file",
reqwest::multipart::Part::bytes(b"post-policy-content-language-missing".to_vec())
.file_name("upload.txt")
.mime_str("text/plain")?,
);
let post_resp = local_http_client()
.post(format!("{}/{}", env.url, bucket))
.multipart(post_form)
.send()
.await?;
let status = post_resp.status();
let response_body = post_resp.text().await?;
let response_body_lower = response_body.to_ascii_lowercase();
assert_eq!(status, reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
assert!(response_body.contains("AccessDenied"));
assert!(
response_body_lower.contains("content-language"),
"response should mention content-language, got: {response_body}"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_accepts_content_encoding_field_exact_policy_match()
@@ -3199,59 +3285,6 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_content_encoding_policy_mismatch()
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_content_encoding_missing_from_policy_conditions()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let bucket = "anon-post-policy-content-encoding-missing";
let object_key = "uploads/content-encoding-missing.txt";
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
admin_client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
allow_anonymous_put_object(&admin_client, bucket).await?;
let policy = encode_post_policy(vec![
serde_json::json!({ "bucket": bucket }),
serde_json::json!({ "key": object_key }),
serde_json::json!(["content-length-range", 0, 1024]),
]);
let post_form = reqwest::multipart::Form::new()
.text("key", object_key.to_string())
.text("policy", policy)
.text("Content-Encoding", "gzip")
.part(
"file",
reqwest::multipart::Part::bytes(b"post-policy-content-encoding-missing".to_vec())
.file_name("upload.txt")
.mime_str("text/plain")?,
);
let post_resp = local_http_client()
.post(format!("{}/{}", env.url, bucket))
.multipart(post_form)
.send()
.await?;
let status = post_resp.status();
let response_body = post_resp.text().await?;
let response_body_lower = response_body.to_ascii_lowercase();
assert_eq!(status, reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
assert!(response_body.contains("AccessDenied"));
assert!(
response_body_lower.contains("content-encoding"),
"response should mention content-encoding, got: {response_body}"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_accepts_website_redirect_location_exact_policy_match()
@@ -3310,59 +3343,6 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_accepts_website_redirect_location_exact_poli
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_website_redirect_location_missing_from_policy_conditions()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let bucket = "anon-post-policy-website-redirect-missing";
let object_key = "uploads/website-redirect-missing.txt";
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
admin_client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
allow_anonymous_put_object(&admin_client, bucket).await?;
let policy = encode_post_policy(vec![
serde_json::json!({ "bucket": bucket }),
serde_json::json!({ "key": object_key }),
serde_json::json!(["content-length-range", 0, 1024]),
]);
let post_form = reqwest::multipart::Form::new()
.text("key", object_key.to_string())
.text("policy", policy)
.text("x-amz-website-redirect-location", "/docs/landing.html")
.part(
"file",
reqwest::multipart::Part::bytes(b"post-policy-website-redirect-missing".to_vec())
.file_name("upload.txt")
.mime_str("text/plain")?,
);
let post_resp = local_http_client()
.post(format!("{}/{}", env.url, bucket))
.multipart(post_form)
.send()
.await?;
let status = post_resp.status();
let response_body = post_resp.text().await?;
let response_body_lower = response_body.to_ascii_lowercase();
assert_eq!(status, reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
assert!(response_body.contains("AccessDenied"));
assert!(
response_body_lower.contains("x-amz-website-redirect-location"),
"response should mention x-amz-website-redirect-location, got: {response_body}"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_website_redirect_location_policy_mismatch()
@@ -3529,59 +3509,6 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_expires_field_policy_mismatch() -> R
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_expires_field_missing_from_policy_conditions()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let bucket = "anon-post-policy-expires-missing";
let object_key = "uploads/expires-missing-object.txt";
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
admin_client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
allow_anonymous_put_object(&admin_client, bucket).await?;
let policy = encode_post_policy(vec![
serde_json::json!({ "bucket": bucket }),
serde_json::json!({ "key": object_key }),
serde_json::json!(["content-length-range", 0, 1024]),
]);
let post_form = reqwest::multipart::Form::new()
.text("key", object_key.to_string())
.text("policy", policy)
.text("Expires", "Wed, 21 Oct 2037 07:28:00 GMT")
.part(
"file",
reqwest::multipart::Part::bytes(b"post-policy-expires-missing".to_vec())
.file_name("upload.txt")
.mime_str("text/plain")?,
);
let post_resp = local_http_client()
.post(format!("{}/{}", env.url, bucket))
.multipart(post_form)
.send()
.await?;
let status = post_resp.status();
let response_body = post_resp.text().await?;
let response_body_lower = response_body.to_ascii_lowercase();
assert_eq!(status, reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
assert!(response_body.contains("AccessDenied"));
assert!(
response_body_lower.contains("expires"),
"response should mention Expires, got: {response_body}"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_object_lock_retention_without_permission()
@@ -4110,115 +4037,6 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_tagging_field_policy_mismatch() -> R
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_tagging_field_missing_from_policy_conditions()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let bucket = "anon-post-policy-tagging-missing";
let object_key = "uploads/tagging-missing-object.txt";
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
admin_client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
allow_anonymous_put_object(&admin_client, bucket).await?;
let policy = encode_post_policy(vec![
serde_json::json!({ "bucket": bucket }),
serde_json::json!({ "key": object_key }),
serde_json::json!(["content-length-range", 0, 1024]),
]);
let post_form = reqwest::multipart::Form::new()
.text("key", object_key.to_string())
.text("policy", policy)
.text("x-amz-tagging", "project=alpha&env=test")
.part(
"file",
reqwest::multipart::Part::bytes(b"post-policy-tagging-missing".to_vec())
.file_name("upload.txt")
.mime_str("text/plain")?,
);
let post_resp = local_http_client()
.post(format!("{}/{}", env.url, bucket))
.multipart(post_form)
.send()
.await?;
let status = post_resp.status();
let response_body = post_resp.text().await?;
let response_body_lower = response_body.to_ascii_lowercase();
assert_eq!(status, reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
assert!(response_body.contains("AccessDenied"));
assert!(
response_body_lower.contains("x-amz-tagging"),
"response should mention x-amz-tagging, got: {response_body}"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_metadata_field_missing_from_policy_conditions()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let bucket = "anon-post-policy-meta-reject";
let object_key = "uploads/meta-reject-object.txt";
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
admin_client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
allow_anonymous_put_object(&admin_client, bucket).await?;
let policy = encode_post_policy(vec![
serde_json::json!({ "bucket": bucket }),
serde_json::json!({ "key": object_key }),
serde_json::json!(["content-length-range", 0, 1024]),
]);
let post_form = reqwest::multipart::Form::new()
.text("key", object_key.to_string())
.text("policy", policy)
.text("x-amz-meta-project", "alpha-demo")
.part(
"file",
reqwest::multipart::Part::bytes(b"post-policy-body".to_vec())
.file_name("upload.txt")
.mime_str("text/plain")?,
);
let post_resp = local_http_client()
.post(format!("{}/{}", env.url, bucket))
.multipart(post_form)
.send()
.await?;
let status = post_resp.status();
let response_body = post_resp.text().await?;
let response_body_lower = response_body.to_ascii_lowercase();
assert_eq!(status, reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
assert!(
response_body.contains("<Code>AccessDenied</Code>"),
"response should contain AccessDenied code, got: {response_body}"
);
assert!(
response_body_lower.contains("x-amz-meta-project"),
"response should mention the missing metadata field, got: {response_body}"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_metadata_field_exact_policy_mismatch()
@@ -4388,59 +4206,6 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_allows_x_ignore_fields_outside_policy_condit
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_metadata_field_missing_from_policy_conditions_for_new_key()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let bucket = "anon-post-policy-meta-name-missing";
let object_key = "uploads/meta-name-missing.txt";
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
admin_client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
allow_anonymous_put_object(&admin_client, bucket).await?;
let policy = encode_post_policy(vec![
serde_json::json!({ "bucket": bucket }),
serde_json::json!({ "key": object_key }),
serde_json::json!(["content-length-range", 0, 1024]),
]);
let post_form = reqwest::multipart::Form::new()
.text("key", object_key.to_string())
.text("policy", policy)
.text("x-amz-meta-name", "demo-name")
.part(
"file",
reqwest::multipart::Part::bytes(b"post-policy-meta-name-missing".to_vec())
.file_name("upload.txt")
.mime_str("text/plain")?,
);
let post_resp = local_http_client()
.post(format!("{}/{}", env.url, bucket))
.multipart(post_form)
.send()
.await?;
let status = post_resp.status();
let response_body = post_resp.text().await?;
let response_body_lower = response_body.to_ascii_lowercase();
assert_eq!(status, reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
assert!(response_body.contains("<Code>AccessDenied</Code>"));
assert!(
response_body_lower.contains("x-amz-meta-name"),
"response should mention x-amz-meta-name, got: {response_body}"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_metadata_uuid_exact_policy_mismatch()
@@ -4876,59 +4641,6 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_content_type_policy_mismatch() -> Re
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_content_type_missing_from_policy_conditions()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let bucket = "anon-post-policy-content-type-missing";
let object_key = "uploads/content-type-missing.txt";
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
admin_client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
allow_anonymous_put_object(&admin_client, bucket).await?;
let policy = encode_post_policy(vec![
serde_json::json!({ "bucket": bucket }),
serde_json::json!({ "key": object_key }),
serde_json::json!(["content-length-range", 0, 1024]),
]);
let post_form = reqwest::multipart::Form::new()
.text("key", object_key.to_string())
.text("policy", policy)
.text("Content-Type", "text/plain")
.part(
"file",
reqwest::multipart::Part::bytes(b"post-policy-content-type-missing".to_vec())
.file_name("upload.txt")
.mime_str("text/plain")?,
);
let post_resp = local_http_client()
.post(format!("{}/{}", env.url, bucket))
.multipart(post_form)
.send()
.await?;
let status = post_resp.status();
let response_body = post_resp.text().await?;
let response_body_lower = response_body.to_ascii_lowercase();
assert_eq!(status, reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
assert!(response_body.contains("AccessDenied"));
assert!(
response_body_lower.contains("content-type"),
"response should mention content-type, got: {response_body}"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_signed_put_object_extract_expands_tar_entries_with_prefix_headers()
@@ -6028,6 +5740,33 @@ async fn test_signed_put_object_extract_authorizes_each_pax_privilege_and_retent
}
let version_condition_client = restricted_user_client(&env, version_condition_user, version_condition_secret);
let mismatching_version_pax = HashMap::from([("minio.versionId", Uuid::new_v4().to_string())]);
let archive = make_tar_with_pax_entry("version-mismatch-entry.txt", b"must-not-write", None, &mismatching_version_pax).await;
let err = version_condition_client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("version-mismatch.tar")
.body(ByteStream::from(archive))
.customize()
.mutate_request(|req| {
req.headers_mut().insert("x-amz-meta-snowball-auto-extract", "true");
})
.send()
.await
.expect_err("a mismatching PAX version ID must fail the replication condition");
assert_eq!(err.as_service_error().and_then(|error| error.meta().code()), Some("AccessDenied"));
let err = admin_client
.head_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("version-mismatch-entry.txt")
.send()
.await
.expect_err("a denied PAX entry must not be written");
assert!(matches!(
err.as_service_error().and_then(|error| error.meta().code()),
Some("NoSuchKey" | "NotFound")
));
let matching_version_pax = HashMap::from([("minio.versionId", conditional_version_id)]);
let archive = make_tar_with_pax_entry("condition-entry.txt", b"condition-body", None, &matching_version_pax).await;
version_condition_client
@@ -6041,6 +5780,13 @@ async fn test_signed_put_object_extract_authorizes_each_pax_privilege_and_retent
})
.send()
.await?;
let stored = admin_client
.get_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("condition-entry.txt")
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(stored.body.collect().await?.into_bytes().as_ref(), b"condition-body");
let pax_context_client = restricted_user_client(&env, pax_context_user, pax_context_secret);
let tag_pax = HashMap::from([("minio.metadata.x-amz-tagging", "classification=public".to_string())]);
+49 -15
View File
@@ -12,9 +12,11 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, awscurl_delete, awscurl_get, awscurl_post, awscurl_put, init_logging};
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_request, awscurl_delete, awscurl_get, awscurl_post, awscurl_put, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
use http::{Method, StatusCode};
use serial_test::serial;
use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep, timeout};
use tracing::{debug, info};
fn skip_without_awscurl() -> bool {
@@ -37,7 +39,8 @@ impl QuotaTestEnv {
pub async fn new() -> Result<Self, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let bucket_name = format!("quota-test-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4());
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_SCANNER_CYCLE", "1"), ("RUSTFS_SCANNER_START_DELAY_SECS", "0")])
.await?;
let client = env.create_s3_client();
Ok(Self {
@@ -67,18 +70,7 @@ impl QuotaTestEnv {
}
pub async fn set_bucket_quota(&self, quota_bytes: u64) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/quota/{}", self.env.url, self.bucket_name);
let quota_config = serde_json::json!({
"quota": quota_bytes,
"quota_type": "HARD"
});
let response = awscurl_put(&url, &quota_config.to_string(), &self.env.access_key, &self.env.secret_key).await?;
if response.contains("error") {
Err(format!("Failed to set quota: {}", response).into())
} else {
Ok(())
}
self.set_bucket_quota_for(&self.bucket_name, quota_bytes).await
}
pub async fn get_bucket_quota(&self) -> Result<Option<u64>, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
@@ -178,6 +170,29 @@ impl QuotaTestEnv {
bucket: &str,
quota_bytes: u64,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let stats_path = format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/quota-stats/{bucket}");
let readiness = async {
loop {
let (status, response) =
admin_request(&self.env.url, Method::GET, &stats_path, None, &self.env.access_key, &self.env.secret_key)
.await?;
if status.is_success() {
return Ok::<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>(());
}
if status != StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE {
return Err(format!("quota usage readiness failed for {bucket}: {status} {response}").into());
}
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
};
match timeout(Duration::from_secs(30), readiness).await {
Ok(result) => result?,
Err(_) => {
return Err(format!("quota usage did not become authoritative for {bucket} within 30 seconds").into());
}
}
let url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/quota/{}", self.env.url, bucket);
let quota_config = serde_json::json!({
"quota": quota_bytes,
@@ -237,6 +252,7 @@ impl QuotaTestEnv {
#[cfg(test)]
mod integration_tests {
use super::*;
use aws_sdk_s3::error::ProvideErrorMetadata;
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
@@ -948,9 +964,27 @@ mod integration_tests {
.send()
.await;
assert!(complete_result.is_err());
let complete_error = complete_result.expect_err("multipart completion above quota must be rejected");
assert_eq!(complete_error.as_service_error().and_then(|error| error.code()), Some("InvalidRequest"));
assert!(!env.object_exists("over_quota.txt").await?);
let staged_parts = env
.client
.list_parts()
.bucket(&env.bucket_name)
.key("over_quota.txt")
.upload_id(upload_id2)
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(staged_parts.parts().len(), 2, "quota rejection must preserve the multipart upload");
env.client
.abort_multipart_upload()
.bucket(&env.bucket_name)
.key("over_quota.txt")
.upload_id(upload_id2)
.send()
.await?;
env.cleanup_bucket().await?;
Ok(())
@@ -22,15 +22,16 @@
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::chaos::{DiskFaultHarness, signed_admin_post};
use crate::chaos::{DiskFaultHarness, VersionShardCensus, signed_admin_post};
use crate::common::init_logging;
use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart};
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{BucketVersioningStatus, CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart, VersioningConfiguration};
use serial_test::serial;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::collections::HashSet;
use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep, timeout};
use std::error::Error;
use tokio::time::{Duration, Instant, interval, timeout};
use tracing::info;
const GET_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
@@ -271,12 +272,17 @@ mod tests {
put_and_record(&client, bucket, "heal/nested/large.bin", payload(2 * 1024 * 1024, 34), &mut manifest).await?;
verify_manifest(&client, bucket, &manifest, "baseline before disk replacement").await?;
for (key, _) in &manifest {
assert!(
harness.object_metadata_exists_on_disk(0, bucket, key),
"disk0 should hold xl.meta for {key} before replacement"
);
}
let manifest_keys = manifest.iter().map(|(key, _)| key.clone()).collect::<Vec<_>>();
let target_manifest: Vec<(String, VersionShardCensus)> = manifest_keys
.iter()
.map(|key| {
let census = harness.census_object_version(0, bucket, key, None)?;
if !census.is_complete() {
return Err(format!("disk 0 has incomplete physical census for {key}: {census:?}").into());
}
Ok((key.clone(), census))
})
.collect::<Result<_, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>>()?;
harness.kill_server();
harness.replace_disk_with_empty(0)?;
@@ -287,21 +293,179 @@ mod tests {
signed_admin_post(&heal_url, Some(heal_body), &harness.env.access_key, &harness.env.secret_key).await?;
let client = harness.env.create_s3_client();
let mut remaining: HashSet<String> = manifest.iter().map(|(key, _)| key.clone()).collect();
let mut remaining: HashSet<String> = manifest_keys.iter().cloned().collect();
let heal_timeout_secs = std::env::var("RUSTFS_RELIABILITY_HEAL_TIMEOUT_SECS")
.ok()
.and_then(|value| value.parse::<u64>().ok())
.unwrap_or(120);
let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(heal_timeout_secs);
let mut retry = interval(Duration::from_secs(1));
for _ in 0..heal_timeout_secs {
remaining.retain(|key| !harness.object_metadata_exists_on_disk(0, bucket, key));
loop {
remaining.retain(|key| {
let expected = target_manifest
.iter()
.find(|(manifest_key, _)| manifest_key == key)
.map(|(_, manifest)| manifest)
.expect("every key has a physical manifest");
harness
.census_object_version(0, bucket, key, None)
.map(|census| !census.matches_manifest(expected))
.unwrap_or(true)
});
if remaining.is_empty() {
verify_manifest(&client, bucket, &manifest, "after fresh-disk heal completed").await?;
return Ok(());
}
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
if Instant::now() >= deadline {
break;
}
retry.tick().await;
}
Err(format!("fresh-disk heal did not rebuild {remaining:?} on the replaced disk within {heal_timeout_secs}s").into())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_versioned_shard_census_selects_each_version_data_dir() -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
info!("Reliability: physical shard census selects the requested object version");
let mut harness = DiskFaultHarness::new(4).await?;
harness.start_server().await?;
let client = harness.env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "reliability-versioned-census";
let key = "versions/large.bin";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
client
.put_bucket_versioning()
.bucket(bucket)
.versioning_configuration(
VersioningConfiguration::builder()
.status(BucketVersioningStatus::Enabled)
.build(),
)
.send()
.await?;
let first_inline = client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("versions/inline.bin")
.body(ByteStream::from(payload(8 * 1024, 40)))
.send()
.await?;
let first_inline_version = first_inline
.version_id()
.ok_or("first inline PUT did not return a version ID")?;
let second_inline = client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("versions/inline.bin")
.body(ByteStream::from(payload(8 * 1024, 41)))
.send()
.await?;
let second_inline_version = second_inline
.version_id()
.ok_or("second inline PUT did not return a version ID")?;
let first = client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.body(ByteStream::from(payload(128 * 1024, 41)))
.send()
.await?;
let first_version = first.version_id().ok_or("first PUT did not return a version ID")?;
let second = client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.body(ByteStream::from(payload(3 * 1024 * 1024, 42)))
.send()
.await?;
let second_version = second.version_id().ok_or("second PUT did not return a version ID")?;
let delete = client.delete_object().bucket(bucket).key(key).send().await?;
let delete_version = delete.version_id().ok_or("delete marker did not return a version ID")?;
let first_inline_census = harness.census_object_version(0, bucket, "versions/inline.bin", Some(first_inline_version))?;
let second_inline_census =
harness.census_object_version(0, bucket, "versions/inline.bin", Some(second_inline_version))?;
let first_census = harness.census_object_version(0, bucket, key, Some(first_version))?;
let first_other_disk_census = harness.census_object_version(1, bucket, key, Some(first_version))?;
let second_census = harness.census_object_version(0, bucket, key, Some(second_version))?;
let delete_census = harness.census_object_version(0, bucket, key, Some(delete_version))?;
assert!(
first_inline_census.is_complete() && second_inline_census.is_complete(),
"inline version physical census is incomplete: first={first_inline_census:?} second={second_inline_census:?}"
);
assert!(
first_inline_census.present_part_fingerprints.is_empty() && second_inline_census.present_part_fingerprints.is_empty(),
"inline versions must not select external shard files: first={first_inline_census:?} second={second_inline_census:?}"
);
assert!(
first_inline_census.inline_data_fingerprint.is_some() && second_inline_census.inline_data_fingerprint.is_some(),
"inline versions must fingerprint payload bytes stored in xl.meta"
);
assert_ne!(
first_inline_census.inline_data_fingerprint, second_inline_census.inline_data_fingerprint,
"same-size inline versions with different payloads must retain distinct xl.meta fingerprints"
);
assert!(
first_census.is_complete(),
"first version physical census is incomplete: {first_census:?}"
);
assert!(
second_census.is_complete(),
"second version physical census is incomplete: {second_census:?}"
);
assert!(
first_other_disk_census.is_complete(),
"first version physical census on the second disk is incomplete: {first_other_disk_census:?}"
);
assert_ne!(
first_census.erasure_index, first_other_disk_census.erasure_index,
"physical census must preserve each disk's erasure index"
);
assert_ne!(
first_census.data_dir, second_census.data_dir,
"distinct object versions must select distinct physical data directories"
);
assert_eq!(
first_census.expected_part_numbers, second_census.expected_part_numbers,
"same single-part shape should expose the same part numbers"
);
let first_part = first_census
.present_part_fingerprints
.values()
.next()
.ok_or("first version did not expose a physical part fingerprint")?;
let second_part = second_census
.present_part_fingerprints
.values()
.next()
.ok_or("second version did not expose a physical part fingerprint")?;
assert_ne!(
first_part.size, second_part.size,
"different shard lengths must retain their physical sizes"
);
assert_ne!(
first_part.sha256, second_part.sha256,
"different shard contents must retain their physical hashes"
);
assert!(
delete_census.is_complete(),
"delete marker physical census is incomplete: {delete_census:?}"
);
assert!(
delete_census.expected_part_numbers.is_empty(),
"delete marker must not declare object shards: {delete_census:?}"
);
assert!(
delete_census.present_part_fingerprints.is_empty(),
"delete marker must not select stale object shards: {delete_census:?}"
);
Ok(())
}
}
@@ -848,6 +848,13 @@ impl NodeService for MinimalLockNodeService {
Err(Status::unimplemented("lock-only test server"))
}
async fn replacement_recovery_status(
&self,
_request: Request<rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::ReplacementRecoveryStatusRequest>,
) -> Result<Response<rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::ReplacementRecoveryStatusResponse>, Status> {
Err(Status::unimplemented("lock-only test server"))
}
async fn get_metacache_listing(
&self,
_request: Request<rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::GetMetacacheListingRequest>,
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+189 -68
View File
@@ -12,13 +12,10 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_ok, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_sts::config::retry::RetryConfig;
use aws_sdk_sts::config::{Credentials, Region};
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_ok, build_test_s3_config, build_test_sts_client, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_sts::Client;
use aws_sdk_sts::error::ProvideErrorMetadata;
use aws_sdk_sts::operation::RequestId;
use aws_sdk_sts::{Client, Config};
use aws_smithy_http_client::Builder as SmithyHttpClientBuilder;
use bytes::Bytes;
use http::header::{AUTHORIZATION, CONTENT_TYPE};
use http::{Request, Response};
@@ -32,9 +29,8 @@ use serial_test::serial;
use std::collections::BTreeSet;
use std::convert::Infallible;
use std::error::Error;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::net::TcpListener;
use tokio::sync::{Notify, mpsc};
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tokio::task::{JoinHandle, JoinSet};
use tokio::time::{Duration, timeout};
@@ -43,22 +39,7 @@ type TestResult = Result<(), BoxError>;
const OPA_AUTH_TOKEN: &str = "sts-opa-token";
fn sts_client(url: &str, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str, session_token: Option<&str>) -> Client {
let mut config = Config::builder()
.credentials_provider(Credentials::new(
access_key,
secret_key,
session_token.map(str::to_owned),
None,
"e2e-sts-query-compat",
))
.region(Region::new("us-east-1"))
.endpoint_url(url)
.retry_config(RetryConfig::standard().with_max_attempts(1))
.behavior_version_latest();
if url.starts_with("http://") {
config = config.http_client(SmithyHttpClientBuilder::new().build_http());
}
Client::from_conf(config.build())
build_test_sts_client(url, access_key, secret_key, session_token, "e2e-sts-query-compat")
}
async fn create_root_service_account(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment) -> Result<(String, String), BoxError> {
@@ -145,6 +126,52 @@ async fn assert_access_denied(client: &Client, context: &str) -> TestResult {
Ok(())
}
async fn assert_list_buckets_access_denied(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
context: &str,
) -> TestResult {
let error = aws_sdk_s3::Client::from_conf(build_test_s3_config(
&env.url,
access_key,
secret_key,
None,
"e2e-list-buckets-opa-unavailable",
))
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await
.expect_err("ListBuckets must be denied while OPA is unavailable");
let service_error = error
.as_service_error()
.ok_or_else(|| format!("{context} should deserialize as an S3 service error: {error:?}"))?;
assert_eq!(error.raw_response().map(|response| response.status().as_u16()), Some(403));
assert_eq!(service_error.code(), Some("AccessDenied"));
Ok(())
}
async fn assert_opa_unavailable_denies_sts_and_list_buckets(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, context: &str) -> TestResult {
let user = "opaunavailable";
let secret = "stsOpaUnavailableSecret123";
create_user_with_policy(
env,
user,
secret,
"sts-opa-unavailable-local-policy",
serde_json::json!([{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:ListAllMyBuckets"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"],
}]),
)
.await?;
assert_access_denied(&sts_client(&env.url, user, secret, None), context).await?;
assert_list_buckets_access_denied(env, user, secret, context).await
}
async fn handle_opa_request(
request: Request<Incoming>,
requests: mpsc::UnboundedSender<Value>,
@@ -186,12 +213,15 @@ async fn handle_opa_request(
};
if payload.is_none() {
let _ = validation_started.send(());
if let OpaValidationMode::DelayedUnavailable(release) = validation_mode {
release.notified().await;
return Ok(Response::builder()
.status(503)
.body(Full::new(Bytes::new()))
.expect("static OPA unavailable response must be valid"));
match validation_mode {
OpaValidationMode::Blocked => std::future::pending::<()>().await,
OpaValidationMode::Unavailable => {
return Ok(Response::builder()
.status(503)
.body(Full::new(Bytes::new()))
.expect("static OPA unavailable response must be valid"));
}
OpaValidationMode::Ready => {}
}
}
let allow = match payload.as_ref().and_then(|value| value.pointer("/input/identity/account")) {
@@ -201,6 +231,25 @@ async fn handle_opa_request(
.and_then(Value::as_bool)
.unwrap_or(false),
Some(Value::String(account)) if account == "opadeny" => false,
Some(Value::String(account))
if account == "opaunavailable" && matches!(validation_mode, OpaValidationMode::Unavailable) =>
{
true
}
Some(Value::String(account)) if account == "opalistbuckets" => {
let action = payload
.as_ref()
.and_then(|value| value.pointer("/input/action"))
.and_then(Value::as_str);
let bucket = payload
.as_ref()
.and_then(|value| value.pointer("/input/resource/bucket"))
.and_then(Value::as_str);
matches!(
(action, bucket),
(Some("s3:ListBucket"), Some("opa-list-visible")) | (Some("s3:GetBucketLocation"), Some("opa-list-location"))
)
}
None => true,
_ => false,
};
@@ -215,17 +264,17 @@ async fn handle_opa_request(
.expect("static OPA response must be valid"))
}
#[derive(Clone)]
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
enum OpaValidationMode {
Ready,
DelayedUnavailable(Arc<Notify>),
Blocked,
Unavailable,
}
struct OpaMock {
url: String,
requests: mpsc::UnboundedReceiver<Value>,
validation_started: mpsc::UnboundedReceiver<()>,
validation_release: Option<Arc<Notify>>,
task: JoinHandle<()>,
}
@@ -234,9 +283,8 @@ impl OpaMock {
Self::start_with_mode(OpaValidationMode::Ready, Some(OPA_AUTH_TOKEN)).await
}
async fn start_delayed_unavailable() -> Result<Self, BoxError> {
let release = Arc::new(Notify::new());
Self::start_with_mode(OpaValidationMode::DelayedUnavailable(release), None).await
async fn start_blocked() -> Result<Self, BoxError> {
Self::start_with_mode(OpaValidationMode::Blocked, None).await
}
async fn start_with_mode(validation_mode: OpaValidationMode, auth_token: Option<&str>) -> Result<Self, BoxError> {
@@ -245,10 +293,6 @@ impl OpaMock {
let (requests_tx, requests) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let (validation_started_tx, validation_started) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let expected_authorization = auth_token.map(|token| format!("Bearer {token}"));
let validation_release = match &validation_mode {
OpaValidationMode::Ready => None,
OpaValidationMode::DelayedUnavailable(release) => Some(Arc::clone(release)),
};
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut connections = JoinSet::new();
loop {
@@ -257,7 +301,7 @@ impl OpaMock {
let Ok((stream, _)) = accepted else { break };
let requests = requests_tx.clone();
let validation_started = validation_started_tx.clone();
let validation_mode = validation_mode.clone();
let validation_mode = validation_mode;
let expected_authorization = expected_authorization.clone();
connections.spawn(async move {
let handler = service_fn(move |request| {
@@ -265,7 +309,7 @@ impl OpaMock {
request,
requests.clone(),
validation_started.clone(),
validation_mode.clone(),
validation_mode,
expected_authorization.clone(),
)
});
@@ -282,7 +326,6 @@ impl OpaMock {
url,
requests,
validation_started,
validation_release,
task,
})
}
@@ -298,12 +341,6 @@ impl OpaMock {
.await?
.ok_or_else(|| "OPA validation channel closed".into())
}
fn release_validation(&self) {
if let Some(release) = &self.validation_release {
release.notify_one();
}
}
}
impl Drop for OpaMock {
@@ -523,35 +560,119 @@ async fn test_sts_assume_role_opa_contract() -> TestResult {
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_sts_assume_role_fails_closed_while_opa_is_unavailable() -> TestResult {
async fn test_list_buckets_opa_contract() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut opa = OpaMock::start_delayed_unavailable().await?;
let mut opa = OpaMock::start().await?;
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(
vec![],
&[
("RUSTFS_POLICY_PLUGIN_URL", opa.url.as_str()),
("RUSTFS_POLICY_PLUGIN_AUTH_TOKEN", OPA_AUTH_TOKEN),
],
)
.await?;
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
for bucket in ["opa-list-hidden", "opa-list-location", "opa-list-visible"] {
admin_client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
}
let user = "opalistbuckets";
let secret = "opaListBucketsSecret123";
create_user(&env, user, secret).await?;
let output = aws_sdk_s3::Client::from_conf(build_test_s3_config(&env.url, user, secret, None, "e2e-list-buckets-opa"))
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?;
let mut names = output
.buckets()
.iter()
.filter_map(|bucket| bucket.name().map(str::to_owned))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
names.sort();
assert_eq!(names, ["opa-list-location", "opa-list-visible"]);
let mut evaluations = BTreeSet::new();
for _ in 0..6 {
let request = opa.next_request().await?;
assert_eq!(request.pointer("/input/identity/account").and_then(Value::as_str), Some(user));
assert_eq!(request.pointer("/input/context/deny_only").and_then(Value::as_bool), Some(false));
let action = request
.pointer("/input/action")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.ok_or("OPA ListBuckets input should include action")?;
let bucket = request
.pointer("/input/resource/bucket")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.ok_or("OPA ListBuckets input should include resource.bucket")?;
if bucket.is_empty() {
assert_eq!(action, "s3:ListAllMyBuckets");
assert!(request.pointer("/input/context/conditions/prefix").is_none());
assert!(request.pointer("/input/context/conditions/delimiter").is_none());
} else {
let expected_arn = format!("arn:aws:s3:::{bucket}");
assert_eq!(request.pointer("/input/context/conditions/prefix"), Some(&serde_json::json!([""])));
assert_eq!(request.pointer("/input/context/conditions/delimiter"), Some(&serde_json::json!(["/"])));
assert_eq!(
request.pointer("/input/resource/arn").and_then(Value::as_str),
Some(expected_arn.as_str())
);
}
evaluations.insert((action.to_owned(), bucket.to_owned()));
}
assert_eq!(
evaluations,
BTreeSet::from([
("s3:GetBucketLocation".to_owned(), "opa-list-hidden".to_owned()),
("s3:GetBucketLocation".to_owned(), "opa-list-location".to_owned()),
("s3:ListAllMyBuckets".to_owned(), String::new()),
("s3:ListBucket".to_owned(), "opa-list-hidden".to_owned()),
("s3:ListBucket".to_owned(), "opa-list-location".to_owned()),
("s3:ListBucket".to_owned(), "opa-list-visible".to_owned()),
])
);
assert!(
matches!(opa.requests.try_recv(), Err(mpsc::error::TryRecvError::Empty)),
"ListBuckets should not make redundant OPA evaluations"
);
env.stop_server();
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_sts_and_list_buckets_fail_closed_while_opa_is_initializing() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut opa = OpaMock::start_blocked().await?;
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_POLICY_PLUGIN_URL", opa.url.as_str())])
.await?;
opa.wait_for_validation().await?;
let user = "opaunavailable";
let secret = "stsOpaUnavailableSecret123";
create_user_with_policy(
&env,
user,
secret,
"sts-opa-unavailable-local-policy",
serde_json::json!([{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:ListAllMyBuckets"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"],
}]),
)
.await?;
assert_opa_unavailable_denies_sts_and_list_buckets(&env, "configured OPA initialization").await?;
assert_access_denied(&sts_client(&env.url, user, secret, None), "configured OPA initialization").await?;
env.stop_server();
Ok(())
}
opa.release_validation();
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(200)).await;
assert_access_denied(&sts_client(&env.url, user, secret, None), "configured OPA validation failure").await?;
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_sts_and_list_buckets_fail_closed_after_opa_validation_failure() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut opa = OpaMock::start_with_mode(OpaValidationMode::Unavailable, None).await?;
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_POLICY_PLUGIN_URL", opa.url.as_str())])
.await?;
opa.wait_for_validation().await?;
assert_opa_unavailable_denies_sts_and_list_buckets(&env, "configured OPA validation failure").await?;
env.stop_server();
Ok(())
+16 -1
View File
@@ -144,11 +144,13 @@ rustfs-lifecycle.workspace = true
rustfs-s3-types = { workspace = true }
rustfs-data-usage.workspace = true
rustfs-object-capacity.workspace = true
rustfs-object-data-cache = { workspace = true, features = ["runtime-memory"] }
arc-swap.workspace = true
async-trait.workspace = true
bytes = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
byteorder = { workspace = true }
chrono = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
jiff = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
glob = { workspace = true }
thiserror.workspace = true
flatbuffers.workspace = true
@@ -179,6 +181,7 @@ path-absolutize = { workspace = true }
rmp.workspace = true
rmp-serde.workspace = true
tokio-util = { workspace = true, features = ["io", "compat"] }
tokio-stream = { workspace = true, features = ["sync"] }
base64 = { workspace = true }
hmac = { workspace = true }
sha1 = { workspace = true }
@@ -237,7 +240,19 @@ rustfs-uring = "0.2.1"
[target.'cfg(windows)'.dependencies]
winapi-util.workspace = true
windows-sys = { workspace = true, features = ["Win32_Foundation", "Win32_Storage_FileSystem"] }
windows-sys = { workspace = true, features = [
"Wdk_Foundation",
"Wdk_Storage_FileSystem",
"Win32_Foundation",
"Win32_Security",
"Win32_Storage_FileSystem",
"Win32_System_IO",
"Win32_System_SystemServices",
"Win32_System_WindowsProgramming",
] }
[target.'cfg(windows)'.dev-dependencies]
windows-sys = { workspace = true, features = ["Win32_System_Ioctl"] }
[dev-dependencies]
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["rt-multi-thread", "macros", "test-util", "fs"] }
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ fn build_non_inline_writers(config: &BenchConfig) -> Vec<Option<BitrotWriterWrap
fn bench_single_block_non_inline_fast_path(c: &mut Criterion) {
let configs = vec![
BenchConfig::new(4 * 1024, 4, 2, 128 * 1024),
BenchConfig::new(16 * 1024, 4, 2, 128 * 1024),
BenchConfig::new(64 * 1024, 4, 2, 128 * 1024),
BenchConfig::new(128 * 1024, 4, 2, 128 * 1024),
];
@@ -112,7 +113,12 @@ fn bench_single_block_non_inline_fast_path(c: &mut Criterion) {
rt.block_on(async {
erasure
.clone()
.encode_single_block_non_inline(reader, &mut writers, config.data_shards)
.encode_single_block_non_inline_with_size_hint(
reader,
&mut writers,
config.data_shards,
config.payload_size,
)
.await
.expect("single block candidate benchmark");
});
+44 -25
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ pub mod bucket {
pub mod bucket_target_sys {
pub use crate::bucket::bucket_target_sys::{
AdvancedPutOptions, BucketTargetError, BucketTargetSys, PutObjectOptions, RemoveObjectOptions, S3ClientError,
TargetClient,
TargetClient, append_version_id_query,
};
}
@@ -185,19 +185,19 @@ pub mod bucket {
MustReplicateOptions, ObjectOpts, REMOTE_TARGET_CAPABILITY_CONTRACT_VERSION, REMOTE_TARGET_UNSUPPORTED_FIELDS,
REMOTE_TARGET_WRITABLE_FIELDS, REPLICATE_INCOMING_DELETE, REPLICATION_CAPABILITY_CONTRACT_VERSION,
REPLICATION_READ_ONLY_HISTORICAL_FIELDS, REPLICATION_WRITABLE_FIELDS, ReplicateDecision, ReplicateObjectInfo,
ReplicationBatchAdmission, ReplicationConfig, ReplicationConfigurationExt, ReplicationDeleteScheduleInput,
ReplicationDeleteStateSource, ReplicationHealQueueResult, ReplicationObjectBridge, ReplicationObjectIO,
ReplicationOperation, ReplicationPoolTrait, ReplicationPriority, ReplicationQueueAdmission, ReplicationScannerBridge,
ReplicationState, ReplicationStats, ReplicationStatusType, ReplicationStorage, ReplicationTargetValidationError,
ReplicationType, ResyncOpts, ResyncStatusType, RuntimeReplicationTargetBacklog, TargetReplicationResyncStatus,
VersionPurgeStatusType, commit_force_delete_intent, complete_force_delete_intent,
ReplicationBatchAdmission, ReplicationConfig, ReplicationConfigStructureError, ReplicationConfigurationExt,
ReplicationDeleteScheduleInput, ReplicationDeleteStateSource, ReplicationHealQueueResult, ReplicationObjectBridge,
ReplicationObjectIO, ReplicationOperation, ReplicationPoolTrait, ReplicationPriority, ReplicationQueueAdmission,
ReplicationScannerBridge, ReplicationState, ReplicationStats, ReplicationStatusType, ReplicationStorage,
ReplicationTargetValidationError, ReplicationType, ResyncOpts, ResyncStatusType, RuntimeReplicationTargetBacklog,
TargetReplicationResyncStatus, VersionPurgeStatusType, commit_force_delete_intent, complete_force_delete_intent,
delete_replication_state_from_config, delete_replication_version_id, get_global_replication_pool,
get_global_replication_stats, init_background_replication, invalid_replication_config_status_field,
persist_force_delete_intent, read_durable_mrf_backlog, replication_state_to_filemeta, replication_status_to_filemeta,
replication_statuses_map, replication_target_arns, resync_start_conflict_id, should_remove_replication_target,
should_schedule_delete_replication, should_use_existing_delete_replication_info,
should_use_existing_delete_replication_source, unsupported_replication_config_field,
validate_replication_config_target_arns, version_purge_status_to_filemeta,
validate_replication_config_structure, validate_replication_config_target_arns, version_purge_status_to_filemeta,
};
}
@@ -206,7 +206,9 @@ pub mod bucket {
}
pub mod target {
pub use crate::bucket::target::{ARN, BucketTarget, BucketTargetType, BucketTargets, Credentials, LatencyStat};
pub use crate::bucket::target::{
ARN, BucketTarget, BucketTargetType, BucketTargets, Credentials, LatencyStat, duration_from_secs_or_nanos,
};
}
pub mod utils {
@@ -279,7 +281,7 @@ pub mod config {
pub mod com {
pub use crate::config::com::{
COMMA_SEPARATED_LISTS, CONFIG_PREFIX, ENV_CONFIG_RECOVER_ON_CORRUPTION, STORAGE_CLASS_SUB_SYS,
ServerConfigCorruptError, ServerConfigSaveResult, ServerConfigSnapshot, delete_config,
ServerConfigCorruptError, ServerConfigSaveResult, ServerConfigSnapshot, delete_config, delete_config_no_lock,
is_server_config_corrupt_error, lookup_configs, read_config, read_config_no_lock, read_config_with_metadata,
read_config_without_migrate, read_config_without_migrate_no_lock, read_existing_server_config_no_lock,
read_server_config_snapshot, save_config, save_config_no_lock, save_config_with_opts, save_server_config,
@@ -306,9 +308,12 @@ pub mod config {
}
pub mod data_usage {
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
pub use crate::data_usage::seed_bucket_usage_memory_for_test;
pub use crate::data_usage::{
DATA_USAGE_CACHE_NAME, apply_bucket_usage_memory_overlay, compute_bucket_usage,
init_compression_total_memory_from_backend, invalidate_data_usage_snapshot_cache, live_bucket_usage_computations,
init_compression_total_memory_from_backend, invalidate_admin_data_usage_snapshot_cache,
invalidate_data_usage_snapshot_cache, live_bucket_usage_computations, load_admin_data_usage_from_backend_cached,
load_compression_total_from_memory, load_data_usage_from_backend, load_data_usage_from_backend_cached,
record_bucket_delete_marker_memory, record_bucket_object_delete_memory, record_bucket_object_version_write_memory,
record_bucket_object_write_memory, record_bucket_object_write_unknown_previous_memory, record_compression_total_memory,
@@ -323,8 +328,8 @@ pub mod disk {
pub use crate::disk::local::ScanGuard;
pub use crate::disk::{
BATCH_READ_VERSION_MAX_ITEMS, BUCKET_META_PREFIX, BatchReadVersionItem, BatchReadVersionReq, BatchReadVersionResp,
CheckPartsResp, DeleteOptions, Disk, DiskAPI, DiskInfo, DiskInfoOptions, DiskLocation, DiskOption, DiskStore,
FileInfoVersions, FileReader, FileWriter, HEALING_MARKER_PATH, NsScannerOpenRequest, OldCurrentSize,
CheckPartsResp, ConditionalFileUpdate, DeleteOptions, Disk, DiskAPI, DiskInfo, DiskInfoOptions, DiskLocation, DiskOption,
DiskStore, FileInfoVersions, FileReader, FileWriter, HEALING_MARKER_PATH, NsScannerOpenRequest, OldCurrentSize,
PartTransactionAction, RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, ReadMultipleReq, ReadMultipleResp, ReadOptions, RenameDataResp,
STORAGE_FORMAT_FILE, SnapshotLeaseToken, UpdateMetadataOpts, VolumeInfo, WalkDirOptions, new_disk,
validate_batch_read_version_item_count,
@@ -406,12 +411,15 @@ pub mod object {
pub use crate::object_api::{
BLOCK_SIZE_V2, ERASURE_ALGORITHM, EncryptionResolutionError, EncryptionResolutionErrorKind, GetObjectBodyCacheHook,
GetObjectBodyCacheHookLookup, GetObjectBodySource, GetObjectReader, NamespaceLockFence, ObjectEncryptionResolver,
ObjectInfo, ObjectLockConfigSnapshot, ObjectMutationHook, ObjectOptions, PutObjReader, RangedDecompressReader,
ReadEncryptionMaterial, ReadEncryptionMode, ReadEncryptionRequest, StreamConsumer, get_object_body_cache_plaintext_len,
lookup_get_object_body_cache_hook, register_get_object_body_cache_hook, register_object_mutation_hook,
unregister_get_object_body_cache_hook, unregister_object_mutation_hook,
ObjectInfo, ObjectLockConfigSnapshot, ObjectMutationHook, ObjectOptions, PutObjReader, QuotaAdmission,
RangedDecompressReader, ReadEncryptionMaterial, ReadEncryptionMode, ReadEncryptionRequest, StreamConsumer,
get_object_body_cache_plaintext_len, lookup_get_object_body_cache_hook, register_get_object_body_cache_hook,
register_object_mutation_hook, unregister_get_object_body_cache_hook, unregister_object_mutation_hook,
};
pub use crate::store::{
PrepareSelectObjectSnapshotError, PreparedGetObjectReader, SelectObjectSnapshot, SelectObjectSnapshotReadError,
SnapshotConsistencyError,
};
pub use crate::store::PreparedGetObjectReader;
}
pub mod rebalance {
@@ -433,18 +441,29 @@ pub mod rpc {
pub use crate::cluster::rpc::{
AuthenticatedChannel, KMS_SIGNAL_SUBSYSTEM, LocalPeerS3Client, PEER_RESTDRY_RUN, PEER_RESTSIGNAL, PEER_RESTSUB_SYS,
PeerRestClient, PeerS3Client, S3PeerSys, SERVICE_SIGNAL_REFRESH_CONFIG, SERVICE_SIGNAL_RELOAD_DYNAMIC,
ScannerBucketListing, ScannerPeerActivity, TONIC_RPC_PREFIX, TonicInterceptor, gen_signature_headers,
gen_tonic_replay_scope_headers, gen_tonic_signature_headers, gen_tonic_signature_interceptor,
node_service_time_out_client, node_service_time_out_client_no_auth, normalize_tonic_rpc_audience,
set_tonic_canonical_body_digest, sign_ns_scanner_capability, sign_tonic_rpc_response_proof, tonic_boot_epoch_challenge,
tonic_boot_epoch_response_headers, verify_rpc_signature, verify_tonic_boot_epoch_response,
verify_tonic_canonical_body_digest, verify_tonic_mutation_body_digest, verify_tonic_rpc_response_proof,
verify_tonic_rpc_signature, verify_tonic_rpc_signature_with_bootstrap,
ScannerBucketListing, ScannerPeerActivity, TONIC_RPC_PREFIX, TonicInterceptor, build_put_file_auth_trailer,
check_and_record_signed_rpc_nonce, gen_signature_headers, gen_tonic_replay_scope_headers, gen_tonic_signature_headers,
gen_tonic_signature_interceptor, node_service_time_out_client, node_service_time_out_client_no_auth,
normalize_tonic_rpc_audience, set_tonic_canonical_body_digest, sign_ns_scanner_capability, sign_put_file_capability,
sign_tonic_rpc_response_proof, tonic_boot_epoch_challenge, tonic_boot_epoch_response_headers,
tonic_rpc_auth_failure_reason, verify_put_file_auth_trailer, verify_put_file_capability, verify_rpc_signature,
verify_tonic_boot_epoch_response, verify_tonic_canonical_body_digest, verify_tonic_mutation_body_digest,
verify_tonic_rpc_response_proof, verify_tonic_rpc_signature, verify_tonic_rpc_signature_with_bootstrap,
};
}
pub mod set_disk {
pub use crate::set_disk::{DEFAULT_READ_BUFFER_SIZE, SetDisks, get_lock_acquire_timeout, is_valid_storage_class};
/// Return the canonical object-metadata identity used for read-quorum grouping.
pub fn file_info_quorum_hash(meta: &rustfs_filemeta::FileInfo) -> [u8; 32] {
crate::set_disk::SetDisks::file_info_quorum_hash(meta)
}
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
pub mod test_util {
pub use crate::set_disk::{PutObjectCommitBarrier, PutObjectCommitPause};
}
}
pub mod store_list {
+101 -25
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
// limitations under the License.
use crate::bucket::bandwidth::reader::BucketOptions;
use ratelimit::{Error as RatelimitError, Ratelimiter};
use ratelimit::{Clock, Error as RatelimitError, Ratelimiter};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
@@ -24,6 +24,33 @@ use tracing::warn;
/// BETA_BUCKET is the weight used to calculate exponential moving average
const BETA_BUCKET: f64 = 0.1;
// ratelimit 2.0 stores tokens at six decimal places. Above this limit its
// scaled capacity and token-cost calculations saturate instead of preserving
// the configured bandwidth.
const MAX_RATELIMIT_TOKENS: i64 = 18_446_744_073_709;
fn consume_tokens<C: Clock>(limiter: &Ratelimiter<C>, n: u64) -> (u64, f64, u64) {
if n == 0 {
return (0, limiter.rate() as f64, 0);
}
let mut consumed = 0u64;
// Consuming one token also refills the bucket based on elapsed time, so
// the subsequent `available()` read reflects freshly accrued tokens.
if limiter.try_wait().is_ok() {
consumed = 1;
}
let available = limiter.available();
let to_consume = n - consumed;
let batch = to_consume.min(available);
if batch > 0 && limiter.try_wait_n(batch).is_ok() {
consumed += batch;
}
let deficit = n.saturating_sub(consumed);
let rate = limiter.rate() as f64;
(deficit, rate, consumed)
}
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct BucketThrottle {
limiter: Arc<Mutex<Ratelimiter>>,
@@ -34,9 +61,9 @@ impl BucketThrottle {
fn new(node_bandwidth_per_sec: i64) -> Result<Self, RatelimitError> {
let node_bandwidth_per_sec = node_bandwidth_per_sec.max(1);
let amount = node_bandwidth_per_sec as u64;
let limiter_inner = Ratelimiter::builder(amount, Duration::from_secs(1))
.max_tokens(amount)
.build()?;
// ratelimit 2.0's builder takes a per-second rate; the refill period
// defaults to one second, so `amount` tokens accrue per second.
let limiter_inner = Ratelimiter::builder(amount).max_tokens(amount).build()?;
Ok(Self {
limiter: Arc::new(Mutex::new(limiter_inner)),
node_bandwidth_per_sec,
@@ -47,32 +74,21 @@ impl BucketThrottle {
self.limiter.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()).max_tokens()
}
/// The ratelimit crate (0.10.0) does not provide a bulk token consumption API.
/// try_wait() first to consume 1 token AND trigger the internal refill
/// mechanism (tokens are only refilled during try_wait/wait calls).
/// directly adjust available tokens via set_available() to consume the remaining amount.
/// Best-effort bulk token consumption: consume up to `n` tokens and report
/// how many were taken plus any shortfall.
///
/// `try_wait_n` on the ratelimit crate is all-or-nothing, so we cannot ask
/// for `n` directly and still consume a partial amount. Instead we take one
/// token first (which also triggers the internal time-based refill), read
/// the now-current available count, and consume `min(remaining, available)`
/// in a single `try_wait_n` call — that batch never exceeds `available`, so
/// it always succeeds.
pub(crate) fn consume(&self, n: u64) -> (u64, f64, u64) {
let guard = self.limiter.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| {
warn!("bucket throttle mutex poisoned, recovering");
e.into_inner()
});
if n == 0 {
return (0, guard.rate(), 0);
}
let mut consumed = 0u64;
if guard.try_wait().is_ok() {
consumed = 1;
}
let available = guard.available();
let to_consume = n - consumed;
let batch = to_consume.min(available);
if batch > 0 {
let _ = guard.set_available(available - batch);
consumed += batch;
}
let deficit = n.saturating_sub(consumed);
let rate = guard.rate();
(deficit, rate, consumed)
consume_tokens(&guard, n)
}
}
@@ -329,6 +345,16 @@ impl Monitor {
"bandwidth limit too small for cluster size, per-node limit will clamp to 1 byte/s"
);
}
if limit_bytes > MAX_RATELIMIT_TOKENS {
warn!(
bucket = bucket,
arn = arn,
limit_bytes = limit_bytes,
max_limit_bytes = MAX_RATELIMIT_TOKENS,
"bandwidth limit exceeds ratelimiter capacity, throttling disabled for this target"
);
return;
}
let opts = BucketOptions {
name: bucket.to_string(),
replication_arn: arn.to_string(),
@@ -375,6 +401,30 @@ mod tests {
use super::*;
use std::panic::{AssertUnwindSafe, catch_unwind};
#[derive(Clone)]
struct TestClock {
elapsed_ns: Arc<AtomicU64>,
}
impl TestClock {
fn new() -> Self {
Self {
elapsed_ns: Arc::new(AtomicU64::new(0)),
}
}
fn advance(&self, duration: Duration) {
let elapsed_ns = u64::try_from(duration.as_nanos()).unwrap_or(u64::MAX);
self.elapsed_ns.fetch_add(elapsed_ns, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
}
impl Clock for TestClock {
fn elapsed(&self) -> Duration {
Duration::from_nanos(self.elapsed_ns.load(Ordering::Relaxed))
}
}
#[test]
fn test_set_and_get_throttle_with_node_split() {
let monitor = Monitor::new(4);
@@ -426,6 +476,15 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!monitor.is_throttled("b1", "arn1"));
}
#[test]
fn test_set_bandwidth_limit_rejects_unrepresentable_rate() {
let monitor = Monitor::new(1);
monitor.set_bandwidth_limit("b1", "arn1", MAX_RATELIMIT_TOKENS + 1);
assert!(!monitor.is_throttled("b1", "arn1"));
}
#[test]
fn test_consume_returns_deficit_when_tokens_exhausted() {
let throttle = BucketThrottle::new(100).expect("test");
@@ -436,6 +495,23 @@ mod tests {
assert!(rate > 0.0);
}
#[test]
fn test_consume_refills_continuously() {
let clock = TestClock::new();
let limiter = Ratelimiter::with_clock(100, clock.clone());
assert_eq!(consume_tokens(&limiter, 100), (100, 100.0, 0));
clock.advance(Duration::from_millis(250));
assert_eq!(consume_tokens(&limiter, 100), (75, 100.0, 25));
clock.advance(Duration::from_millis(250));
assert_eq!(consume_tokens(&limiter, 100), (75, 100.0, 25));
clock.advance(Duration::from_millis(500));
assert_eq!(consume_tokens(&limiter, 100), (50, 100.0, 50));
}
#[test]
fn test_consume_no_deficit_when_tokens_sufficient() {
let throttle = BucketThrottle::new(10000).expect("test");
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_monitored_reader_header_size_accounting() {
let monitor = Monitor::new(1);
monitor.set_bandwidth_limit("b1", "arn1", 100);
monitor.set_bandwidth_limit("b1", "arn1", 1_000_000_000);
let data = vec![0u8; 200];
let inner = TestAsyncReader::new(&data);
+154 -9
View File
@@ -1424,6 +1424,37 @@ fn resolve_delete_api_version_id(version_id: Option<String>, opts: &RemoveObject
}
}
/// Resolve the S3 `versionId` query parameter for a replication PUT /
/// CreateMultipartUpload against a remote target.
///
/// MinIO reads the replicated version only from the query string
/// (`putOptsFromReq`); the internal `x-*-source-version-id` headers do not
/// exist there, so without the query a MinIO target mints fresh version ids
/// and the deployments drift apart. RustFS represents the null version
/// internally as the nil UUID while the S3 API addresses it as the literal
/// "null" (the delete path already maps it via `target_delete_version_id`),
/// and an empty id means the source object carries no version: send no query
/// so an unversioned target stays valid.
fn resolve_put_api_version_id(source_version_id: &str) -> Option<&str> {
if source_version_id.is_empty() {
None
} else if Uuid::parse_str(source_version_id).is_ok_and(|uuid| uuid.is_nil()) {
Some(rustfs_filemeta::NULL_VERSION_ID)
} else {
Some(source_version_id)
}
}
/// Append `versionId=<id>` to an already-built request URI. aws-sdk-s3's
/// `PutObjectInput` / `CreateMultipartUploadInput` expose no version id
/// member, so the query is spliced in via `map_request`, which runs at
/// `modify_before_signing`: the parameter becomes part of the SigV4 canonical
/// request.
pub fn append_version_id_query(uri: &str, version_id: &str) -> String {
let separator = if uri.contains('?') { '&' } else { '?' };
format!("{uri}{separator}versionId={}", urlencoding::encode(version_id))
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct AdvancedPutOptions {
pub source_version_id: String,
@@ -1801,12 +1832,27 @@ impl TargetClient {
object: &str,
version_id: Option<String>,
) -> Result<HeadObjectOutput, SdkError<HeadObjectError>> {
// Announce the replication check so a RustFS target returns SSE-C
// object metadata (etag/size) without the customer key the replication
// worker cannot hold; otherwise SSE-C replicas never converge on HEAD.
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
insert_header(&mut headers, SUFFIX_SOURCE_REPLICATION_CHECK, "true");
match self
.client
.head_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(object)
.set_version_id(version_id)
.customize()
.map_request(move |mut req| {
for (k, v) in headers.clone().into_iter() {
if let Some(key_str) = k.map(|k| k.as_str().to_string()) {
let value_str = v.to_str().unwrap_or("").to_string();
req.headers_mut().insert(key_str, value_str);
}
}
Result::<_, std::convert::Infallible>::Ok(req)
})
.send()
.await
{
@@ -1815,6 +1861,9 @@ impl TargetClient {
}
}
/// On success returns the version id the target assigned (from
/// `x-amz-version-id`), letting callers audit the version-identity
/// contract — a target that adopts the source version echoes it back.
pub async fn put_object(
&self,
bucket: &str,
@@ -1822,7 +1871,7 @@ impl TargetClient {
size: i64,
body: ByteStream,
opts: &PutObjectOptions,
) -> Result<(), S3ClientError> {
) -> Result<Option<String>, S3ClientError> {
let mut headers = opts.header();
let builder = self.client.put_object();
@@ -1831,6 +1880,7 @@ impl TargetClient {
if !version_id.is_empty() {
insert_header(&mut headers, SUFFIX_SOURCE_VERSION_ID, &version_id);
}
let api_version_id = resolve_put_api_version_id(&version_id).map(ToOwned::to_owned);
match builder
.bucket(bucket)
@@ -1845,13 +1895,18 @@ impl TargetClient {
req.headers_mut().insert(key_str, value_str);
}
}
if let Some(version_id) = &api_version_id {
let uri = append_version_id_query(req.uri(), version_id);
req.set_uri(uri)
.map_err(aws_smithy_types::error::operation::BuildError::other)?;
}
Result::<_, aws_smithy_types::error::operation::BuildError>::Ok(req)
})
.send()
.await
{
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
Ok(output) => Ok(output.version_id().map(ToOwned::to_owned)),
Err(e) => match e {
SdkError::ServiceError(service_err) => {
let err = service_err.into_err();
@@ -1885,14 +1940,14 @@ impl TargetClient {
object: &str,
opts: &PutObjectOptions,
) -> Result<String, S3ClientError> {
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
// Object metadata belongs to CreateMultipartUpload in S3 semantics;
// building only the source-version headers here used to drop user
// metadata, content-type, and the SSE intent for multipart replicas.
let headers = opts.header();
let version_id = opts.internal.source_version_id.clone();
if !version_id.is_empty() {
insert_header(&mut headers, SUFFIX_SOURCE_VERSION_ID, &version_id);
}
if opts.internal.replication_request {
insert_header(&mut headers, SUFFIX_SOURCE_REPLICATION_REQUEST, "true");
}
// The remote version of a multipart replication is decided at initiate
// time; CompleteMultipartUpload does not read a versionId.
let api_version_id = resolve_put_api_version_id(&version_id).map(ToOwned::to_owned);
match self
.client
@@ -1907,6 +1962,11 @@ impl TargetClient {
req.headers_mut().insert(key_str, value_str);
}
}
if let Some(version_id) = &api_version_id {
let uri = append_version_id_query(req.uri(), version_id);
req.set_uri(uri)
.map_err(aws_smithy_types::error::operation::BuildError::other)?;
}
Result::<_, aws_smithy_types::error::operation::BuildError>::Ok(req)
})
.send()
@@ -2679,6 +2739,91 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn put_object_sends_source_version_id_query_to_target() {
// MinIO reads the replicated version only from the `versionId` query
// parameter (its receive path ignores the x-*-source-version-id
// headers), so the query must carry the source version: a real UUID
// as-is, the internal nil-UUID null-version representation as the
// literal "null", and no query at all when the source object has no
// version (P0-5 RustFS->MinIO version drift).
let (client, request_uris) = recording_target_client();
let version_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
let nil_version = Uuid::nil().to_string();
for source_version in [version_id.as_str(), nil_version.as_str(), ""] {
let mut opts = PutObjectOptions::default();
opts.internal.source_version_id = source_version.to_string();
opts.internal.replication_request = true;
client
.put_object("target-bucket", "object", 4, ByteStream::from_static(b"data"), &opts)
.await
.expect("recorded put_object should succeed");
}
let request_uris = request_uris.lock().expect("recorded request lock should not be poisoned");
assert_eq!(request_uris.len(), 3);
assert!(
request_uris[0].contains(&format!("versionId={version_id}")),
"replication put_object must carry the source version as a versionId query: {}",
request_uris[0]
);
assert!(
request_uris[1].contains("versionId=null"),
"a nil-UUID (null) source version must be sent as the literal null: {}",
request_uris[1]
);
assert!(
!request_uris[2].contains("versionId="),
"put_object without a source version must omit the versionId query: {}",
request_uris[2]
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn create_multipart_upload_sends_source_version_id_query_to_target() {
// The remote version of a multipart replication is decided at initiate
// time: CreateMultipartUpload must carry the source version in the
// `versionId` query (CompleteMultipartUpload does not read one).
let (client, request_uris) = recording_target_client();
let version_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
let nil_version = Uuid::nil().to_string();
for source_version in [version_id.as_str(), nil_version.as_str()] {
let mut opts = PutObjectOptions::default();
opts.internal.source_version_id = source_version.to_string();
opts.internal.replication_request = true;
let _ = client.create_multipart_upload("target-bucket", "object", &opts).await;
}
let request_uris = request_uris.lock().expect("recorded request lock should not be poisoned");
assert_eq!(request_uris.len(), 2);
assert!(
request_uris[0].contains(&format!("versionId={version_id}")),
"replication create_multipart_upload must carry the source version as a versionId query: {}",
request_uris[0]
);
assert!(
request_uris[1].contains("versionId=null"),
"a nil-UUID (null) source version must be sent as the literal null: {}",
request_uris[1]
);
}
#[test]
fn put_object_headers_keep_source_version_id_for_legacy_receivers() {
// Older RustFS receivers have no versionId query support and fall back
// to the internal source-version-id headers (rolling-upgrade path);
// the query addition must never remove them.
let mut opts = PutObjectOptions::default();
let version_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
opts.internal.source_version_id = version_id.clone();
assert_eq!(
rustfs_utils::http::get_header(&opts.header(), SUFFIX_SOURCE_VERSION_ID).as_deref(),
Some(version_id.as_str()),
"replication put requests must keep the internal source-version-id headers"
);
}
#[test]
fn put_object_headers_include_non_empty_source_etag_only() {
let mut opts = PutObjectOptions::default();
+60
View File
@@ -64,10 +64,41 @@ impl BucketDurabilityConfig {
}
}
/// Default durability tier seeded into a newly created bucket's metadata
/// (rustfs/backlog#1811). `relaxed` aligns new buckets with MinIO's default
/// posture: object data is still fdatasynced, while xl.meta and directory-entry
/// fsyncs follow the relaxed durability gate.
pub const ENV_NEW_BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE: &str = "RUSTFS_NEW_BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE";
pub const DEFAULT_NEW_BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE: &str = BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE_RELAXED;
/// The `durability.json` bytes to seed into a freshly created bucket's metadata.
/// Empty means "no override" (the bucket then follows the global
/// `RUSTFS_DURABILITY_MODE`); otherwise the serialized chosen tier. Operators
/// can set `inherit` to disable the new-bucket override. Invalid values also
/// fail closed to inherit the global mode instead of seeding a surprising tier.
pub fn new_bucket_durability_config_json() -> Vec<u8> {
let raw = std::env::var(ENV_NEW_BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE).unwrap_or_else(|_| DEFAULT_NEW_BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE.to_string());
let mode = raw.trim();
if mode.eq_ignore_ascii_case("inherit") || mode.is_empty() || !BucketDurabilityConfig::is_valid_mode(mode) {
return Vec::new();
}
serde_json::to_vec(&BucketDurabilityConfig::new(mode)).expect("BucketDurabilityConfig serialization cannot fail")
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn new_bucket_seeded_mode() -> Option<String> {
let json = new_bucket_durability_config_json();
if json.is_empty() {
return None;
}
serde_json::from_slice::<BucketDurabilityConfig>(&json)
.expect("new-bucket durability config must serialize")
.normalized_mode()
}
#[test]
fn valid_modes_are_recognized() {
assert!(BucketDurabilityConfig::is_valid_mode("strict"));
@@ -99,4 +130,33 @@ mod tests {
let empty: BucketDurabilityConfig = serde_json::from_slice(b"{}").expect("deserialize empty");
assert_eq!(empty.normalized_mode(), None);
}
#[test]
fn new_bucket_default_seeds_relaxed_when_unset() {
temp_env::with_var_unset(ENV_NEW_BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE, || {
assert_eq!(new_bucket_seeded_mode().as_deref(), Some(BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE_RELAXED));
});
}
#[test]
fn new_bucket_default_honors_explicit_tiers() {
for mode in [
BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE_STRICT,
BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE_RELAXED,
BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE_NONE,
] {
temp_env::with_var(ENV_NEW_BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE, Some(mode), || {
assert_eq!(new_bucket_seeded_mode().as_deref(), Some(mode));
});
}
}
#[test]
fn new_bucket_default_can_inherit_global_mode() {
for mode in ["inherit", "", "bogus"] {
temp_env::with_var(ENV_NEW_BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE, Some(mode), || {
assert_eq!(new_bucket_seeded_mode(), None);
});
}
}
}
@@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ use rustfs_common::metrics::{
};
use rustfs_config::{
DEFAULT_TRANSITION_QUEUE_CAPACITY, DEFAULT_TRANSITION_QUEUE_SEND_TIMEOUT_MS, DEFAULT_TRANSITION_WORKERS_ABSOLUTE_MAX,
DEFAULT_TRANSITION_WORKERS_CAP, ENV_TRANSITION_QUEUE_CAPACITY, ENV_TRANSITION_QUEUE_SEND_TIMEOUT_MS, ENV_TRANSITION_WORKERS,
ENV_TRANSITION_WORKERS_ABSOLUTE_MAX,
DEFAULT_TRANSITION_WORKERS_CAP, ENV_MAX_EXPIRY_WORKERS, ENV_TRANSITION_QUEUE_CAPACITY, ENV_TRANSITION_QUEUE_SEND_TIMEOUT_MS,
ENV_TRANSITION_WORKERS, ENV_TRANSITION_WORKERS_ABSOLUTE_MAX,
};
use rustfs_data_usage::TierStats;
use rustfs_filemeta::{
@@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ const TIER_FREE_VERSION_RECOVERY_MAX_IDLE_INTERVAL: StdDuration = StdDuration::f
const TIER_FREE_VERSION_RECOVERY_JITTER_PERCENT: u64 = 10;
const DATE_EXPIRY_EXISTING_OBJECTS_GRACE_SECS: i64 = 5;
const EXPIRY_WORKER_QUEUE_CAPACITY: usize = 1000;
/// Maximum expiry workers used as a local fallback when runtime env is unset.
const DEFAULT_EXPIRY_WORKERS_CAP: usize = 16;
const DEFAULT_MANUAL_TRANSITION_JOB_RECOVERY_LIMIT: usize = 100;
// Phase 5 (backlog#939): lifecycle expiry/transition state moved into the
@@ -204,6 +206,15 @@ fn resolve_transition_queue_send_timeout() -> StdDuration {
)
}
fn resolve_expiry_worker_count() -> usize {
let fallback = std::cmp::min(num_cpus::get(), DEFAULT_EXPIRY_WORKERS_CAP);
env::var(ENV_MAX_EXPIRY_WORKERS)
.ok()
.and_then(|value| value.parse::<usize>().ok())
.filter(|value| *value > 0)
.unwrap_or(fallback)
}
fn is_immediate_transition_source(src: &LcEventSrc) -> bool {
matches!(
src,
@@ -2017,17 +2028,7 @@ fn is_slow_down(err: &Error) -> bool {
}
pub async fn init_background_expiry(api: Arc<ECStore>) {
let mut workers = get_env_usize("RUSTFS_MAX_EXPIRY_WORKERS", std::cmp::min(num_cpus::get(), 16));
//globalILMConfig.getExpirationWorkers()
if let Ok(env_expiration_workers) = env::var("_RUSTFS_ILM_EXPIRATION_WORKERS")
&& let Ok(num_expirations) = env_expiration_workers.parse::<usize>()
{
workers = num_expirations;
}
if workers == 0 {
workers = get_env_usize("RUSTFS_DEFAULT_EXPIRY_WORKERS", 8);
}
let workers = resolve_expiry_worker_count();
ExpiryState::resize_workers(workers, api.clone()).await;
let _ = spawn_tier_free_version_recovery_once(api.clone(), &TIER_FREE_VERSION_RECOVERY_STARTED);
@@ -3318,6 +3319,9 @@ pub async fn enqueue_immediate_expiry(oi: &ObjectInfo, src: LcEventSrc) {
return;
}
};
if configs.table_bucket_enabled {
return;
}
let Some(lifecycle) = configs.lifecycle else {
return;
};
@@ -3978,6 +3982,9 @@ async fn enqueue_expiry_for_existing_object_group(
pub async fn enqueue_expiry_for_existing_objects(api: Arc<ECStore>, bucket: &str) -> Result<(), Error> {
let configs = metadata_boundary::get_expiry_configs(&api, bucket).await?;
if configs.table_bucket_enabled {
return Ok(());
}
let Some(lc) = configs.lifecycle else {
return Ok(());
};
@@ -4194,12 +4201,16 @@ pub async fn expire_transitioned_object(
_src: &LcEventSrc,
bucket_incarnation_id: Uuid,
) -> Result<ObjectInfo, std::io::Error> {
let publication_guard = lifecycle_expiry_publication_guard(&api, oi, bucket_incarnation_id)
.await
.ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("lifecycle expiry is not allowed for this bucket"))?;
let snapshot = lifecycle_delete_config_snapshot(&api, oi)
.await
.map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
let (versioned, version_suspended) = snapshot.versioning_config().delete_state(&oi.name);
let mut opts = transitioned_object_delete_opts(oi, lc_event.action, versioned, version_suspended, bucket_incarnation_id)
.map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
opts.add_namespace_lock_guard(&publication_guard);
opts.delete_replication_config_snapshot = Some(Arc::new(snapshot));
//let tags = LcAuditEvent::new(src, lcEvent).Tags();
if lc_event.action.delete_restored() {
@@ -4789,6 +4800,43 @@ pub async fn apply_transition_rule(event: &lifecycle::Event, src: &LcEventSrc, o
.await
}
async fn lifecycle_expiry_publication_guard(
api: &ECStore,
oi: &ObjectInfo,
bucket_incarnation_id: Uuid,
) -> Option<rustfs_lock::NamespaceLockGuard> {
let result = async {
let lock = api
.new_ns_lock(&oi.bucket, rustfs_common::table_catalog::TABLE_BUCKET_PUBLICATION_LOCK_PATH)
.await?;
let guard = lock.get_read_lock(get_lock_acquire_timeout()).await.map_err(Error::other)?;
if guard.is_lock_lost() {
return Err(Error::other("table-bucket publication lock was lost before lifecycle delete admission"));
}
if !metadata_boundary::lifecycle_expiry_allowed(api, &oi.bucket, bucket_incarnation_id).await? {
return Ok(None);
}
Ok(Some(guard))
}
.await;
match result {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(err) => {
warn!(
event = EVENT_LIFECYCLE_DELETE_FAILED,
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_LIFECYCLE,
bucket = %oi.bucket,
object = %oi.name,
operation = "authorize_lifecycle_expiry",
error = %err,
"Lifecycle delete admission failed"
);
None
}
}
}
pub async fn apply_expiry_on_transitioned_object(
api: Arc<ECStore>,
oi: &ObjectInfo,
@@ -4812,6 +4860,9 @@ pub async fn apply_expiry_on_non_transitioned_objects(
_src: &LcEventSrc,
bucket_incarnation_id: Uuid,
) -> bool {
let Some(publication_guard) = lifecycle_expiry_publication_guard(&api, oi, bucket_incarnation_id).await else {
return false;
};
let snapshot = match lifecycle_delete_config_snapshot(&api, oi).await {
Ok(snapshot) => snapshot,
Err(err) => {
@@ -4837,6 +4888,7 @@ pub async fn apply_expiry_on_non_transitioned_objects(
expected_bucket_incarnation_id: Some(bucket_incarnation_id),
..Default::default()
};
opts.add_namespace_lock_guard(&publication_guard);
if lc_event.action.delete_versioned() {
opts.version_id = oi.version_id.map(|v| v.to_string());
@@ -5024,26 +5076,27 @@ pub async fn apply_lifecycle_action(event: &lifecycle::Event, src: &LcEventSrc,
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{
DATE_EXPIRY_EXISTING_OBJECTS_GRACE_SECS, DEFAULT_TRANSITION_QUEUE_CAPACITY, DEFAULT_TRANSITION_WORKERS_ABSOLUTE_MAX,
DEFAULT_TRANSITION_WORKERS_CAP, EVENT_LIFECYCLE_EVALUATION_FAILED, EVENT_LIFECYCLE_EXPIRED_DETECTED,
EVENT_LIFECYCLE_NOT_ENQUEUED, ExpiryState, ExpiryTask, FreeVersionTask, ManualTransitionJobRecoveryOutcome,
ManualTransitionQueueSnapshot, ManualTransitionRunOptions, ManualTransitionRunReport, StaleMultipartUploadCandidate,
TIER_FREE_VERSION_RECOVERY_BASE_INTERVAL, TIER_FREE_VERSION_RECOVERY_MAX_IDLE_INTERVAL, TRANSITION_COMPLETE,
TierFreeVersionRecoverySchedule, TransitionEnqueueOutcome, TransitionState, TransitionedObject, VersionReplicationScan,
cleanup_empty_multipart_sha_dirs_on_local_disks, cleanup_stale_multipart_uploads_once_at,
DATE_EXPIRY_EXISTING_OBJECTS_GRACE_SECS, DEFAULT_EXPIRY_WORKERS_CAP, DEFAULT_TRANSITION_QUEUE_CAPACITY,
DEFAULT_TRANSITION_WORKERS_ABSOLUTE_MAX, DEFAULT_TRANSITION_WORKERS_CAP, EVENT_LIFECYCLE_EVALUATION_FAILED,
EVENT_LIFECYCLE_EXPIRED_DETECTED, EVENT_LIFECYCLE_NOT_ENQUEUED, ExpiryState, ExpiryTask, FreeVersionTask,
ManualTransitionJobRecoveryOutcome, ManualTransitionQueueSnapshot, ManualTransitionRunOptions, ManualTransitionRunReport,
StaleMultipartUploadCandidate, TIER_FREE_VERSION_RECOVERY_BASE_INTERVAL, TIER_FREE_VERSION_RECOVERY_MAX_IDLE_INTERVAL,
TRANSITION_COMPLETE, TierFreeVersionRecoverySchedule, TransitionEnqueueOutcome, TransitionState, TransitionedObject,
VersionReplicationScan, cleanup_empty_multipart_sha_dirs_on_local_disks, cleanup_stale_multipart_uploads_once_at,
enqueue_recovered_free_version_with_state, enqueue_transition_for_existing_objects_scoped,
enqueue_transition_with_lifecycle, enqueue_transition_with_lifecycle_report, eval_action_from_lifecycle,
jitter_tier_free_version_recovery_delay, lifecycle_action_blocked_by_replication,
get_lock_acquire_timeout, jitter_tier_free_version_recovery_delay, lifecycle_action_blocked_by_replication,
lifecycle_delete_all_versions_replication_scan, lifecycle_deleted_object, lifecycle_replication_blocks_action,
lifecycle_rule_has_date_expiration, manual_transition_duration_elapsed, manual_transition_has_more_after_limit,
manual_transition_recovery_progress_sink, manual_transition_version_marker, manual_transition_worker_failure_reason,
mark_delete_opts_skip_decommissioned_on_remote_success, merge_stale_multipart_candidate,
persist_manual_transition_job_progress, persist_manual_transition_page_checkpoint, recover_manual_transition_job,
recover_manual_transition_jobs, resolve_tier_free_version_recovery_enabled, resolve_transition_queue_capacity,
resolve_transition_queue_send_timeout, resolve_transition_worker_count, resolve_transition_workers_absolute_max,
run_tier_free_version_recovery_loop, select_restore_s3_location, set_lifecycle_observability_observer,
set_recovered_free_version_enqueue_observer, should_defer_date_expiry_for_recent_config_update,
transitioned_cleanup_tuple, transitioned_object_delete_opts, wait_for_tier_free_version_recovery,
recover_manual_transition_jobs, resolve_expiry_worker_count, resolve_tier_free_version_recovery_enabled,
resolve_transition_queue_capacity, resolve_transition_queue_send_timeout, resolve_transition_worker_count,
resolve_transition_workers_absolute_max, run_tier_free_version_recovery_loop, select_restore_s3_location,
set_lifecycle_observability_observer, set_recovered_free_version_enqueue_observer,
should_defer_date_expiry_for_recent_config_update, transitioned_cleanup_tuple, transitioned_object_delete_opts,
wait_for_tier_free_version_recovery,
};
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
use super::{delete_free_version_remote_object_then, encode_dir_object, get_transitioned_object_reader_with_tier_manager};
@@ -5090,7 +5143,6 @@ mod tests {
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
use crate::services::tier::warm_backend::WarmBackend as _;
use crate::set_disk::{RUSTFS_MULTIPART_BUCKET_KEY, RUSTFS_MULTIPART_OBJECT_KEY};
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
use crate::storage_api_contracts::namespace::NamespaceLocking as _;
use crate::storage_api_contracts::{
bucket::{BucketOperations, BucketOptions, DeleteBucketOptions, MakeBucketOptions},
@@ -5105,7 +5157,7 @@ mod tests {
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
use http::HeaderMap;
use rustfs_common::metrics::{IlmAction, global_metrics};
use rustfs_config::ENV_TRANSITION_WORKERS_ABSOLUTE_MAX;
use rustfs_config::{ENV_MAX_EXPIRY_WORKERS, ENV_TRANSITION_WORKERS_ABSOLUTE_MAX};
use rustfs_data_usage::TierStats;
use rustfs_filemeta::{FileInfo, FileMeta};
use s3s::dto::{
@@ -7357,6 +7409,76 @@ mod tests {
});
}
// SAFETY: this helper is only used from `#[serial]` tests and those tests run under a
// single-thread runtime (`worker_threads = 1`), so no concurrent reader/writer can access
// process environment while `env::set_var`/`env::remove_var` is active.
#[allow(unsafe_code)]
fn with_expiry_worker_env<F>(value: Option<&str>, test_fn: F)
where
F: FnOnce(),
{
let original = env::var_os(ENV_MAX_EXPIRY_WORKERS);
match value {
Some(value) => unsafe {
env::set_var(ENV_MAX_EXPIRY_WORKERS, value);
},
None => unsafe {
env::remove_var(ENV_MAX_EXPIRY_WORKERS);
},
}
let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(test_fn));
match original {
Some(value) => unsafe {
env::set_var(ENV_MAX_EXPIRY_WORKERS, value);
},
None => unsafe {
env::remove_var(ENV_MAX_EXPIRY_WORKERS);
},
}
if let Err(e) = result {
std::panic::resume_unwind(e);
}
}
#[test]
#[serial]
fn resolve_expiry_worker_count_uses_fallback_when_env_missing() {
with_expiry_worker_env(None, || {
let fallback = std::cmp::min(num_cpus::get(), DEFAULT_EXPIRY_WORKERS_CAP);
assert_eq!(resolve_expiry_worker_count(), fallback);
});
}
#[test]
#[serial]
fn resolve_expiry_worker_count_honors_positive_env_value() {
with_expiry_worker_env(Some("6"), || {
assert_eq!(resolve_expiry_worker_count(), 6);
});
}
#[test]
#[serial]
fn resolve_expiry_worker_count_falls_back_for_zero_value() {
with_expiry_worker_env(Some("0"), || {
let fallback = std::cmp::min(num_cpus::get(), DEFAULT_EXPIRY_WORKERS_CAP);
assert_eq!(resolve_expiry_worker_count(), fallback);
});
}
#[test]
#[serial]
fn resolve_expiry_worker_count_falls_back_for_invalid_value() {
with_expiry_worker_env(Some("not-a-number"), || {
let fallback = std::cmp::min(num_cpus::get(), DEFAULT_EXPIRY_WORKERS_CAP);
assert_eq!(resolve_expiry_worker_count(), fallback);
});
}
#[test]
#[serial]
fn resolve_transition_queue_capacity_uses_default_when_env_missing() {
@@ -10319,6 +10441,85 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn queued_lifecycle_expiry_does_not_delete_from_table_bucket() {
let (_disk_paths, ecstore) = setup_test_env().await;
let bucket = format!("table-bucket-lifecycle-{}", Uuid::new_v4().simple());
let object = "tables/table-id/data/part-00001.parquet";
create_test_bucket(&ecstore, &bucket).await;
let mut reader = PutObjReader::from_vec(b"referenced table data".to_vec());
let object_info = ecstore
.put_object(&bucket, object, &mut reader, &ObjectOptions::default())
.await
.expect("table data object should be created");
let publication_lock = ecstore
.new_ns_lock(&bucket, rustfs_common::table_catalog::TABLE_BUCKET_PUBLICATION_LOCK_PATH)
.await
.expect("table-bucket publication lock should be created");
let enable_guard = publication_lock
.get_write_lock(get_lock_acquire_timeout())
.await
.expect("table-bucket enablement should acquire the publication lock");
let expiry_store = ecstore.clone();
let expiry_object = object_info.clone();
let (expiry_started_tx, expiry_started_rx) = tokio::sync::oneshot::channel();
let mut expiry = tokio::spawn(async move {
let event = crate::bucket::lifecycle::lifecycle::Event {
action: IlmAction::DeleteAction,
..Default::default()
};
let bucket_incarnation_id = expiry_store
.bucket_incarnation_id_from_disk(&expiry_object.bucket)
.await
.expect("bucket incarnation should be available");
expiry_started_tx.send(()).expect("lifecycle expiry start should be observed");
super::apply_expiry_on_non_transitioned_objects(
expiry_store,
&expiry_object,
&event,
&LcEventSrc::Scanner,
bucket_incarnation_id,
)
.await
});
expiry_started_rx.await.expect("lifecycle expiry should start");
assert!(
tokio::time::timeout(StdDuration::from_millis(100), &mut expiry)
.await
.is_err(),
"queued lifecycle expiry must wait for table-bucket enablement"
);
let sys = metadata_sys::bucket_metadata_sys_of(&ecstore.ctx).expect("metadata system should be initialized");
let sys = sys.read().await.clone();
let mut metadata = (*sys.get(&bucket).await.expect("bucket metadata should exist")).clone();
metadata.table_bucket_config_json = br#"{"enabled":true}"#.to_vec();
sys.persist_and_set(metadata)
.await
.expect("table bucket marker should be persisted");
sys.reload_from_store(&bucket)
.await
.expect("table bucket marker should become authoritative");
drop(enable_guard);
assert!(
!tokio::time::timeout(StdDuration::from_secs(2), expiry)
.await
.expect("queued lifecycle expiry should resume after enablement")
.expect("queued lifecycle expiry task should join"),
"a queued lifecycle task must be rejected after the bucket becomes table-enabled"
);
assert!(
ecstore
.get_object_info(&bucket, object, &ObjectOptions::default())
.await
.is_ok(),
"table data must remain readable after lifecycle admission rejects the delete"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn existing_object_lifecycle_skips_current_expiration_for_explicit_legal_hold() {
let lc = latest_expiration_lifecycle();
@@ -10774,7 +10975,18 @@ mod tests {
#[serial]
async fn tier_free_version_recovery_real_enqueue_failure_retries_same_object() {
let (disk_paths, ecstore) = setup_test_env().await;
let bucket = format!("recovery-enqueue-failure-{}", Uuid::new_v4());
let object = "free-version-b";
let start_marker = "free-version-a0";
create_test_bucket(&ecstore, &bucket).await;
seed_recoverable_free_version(&disk_paths, &bucket, object, None, None).await;
let runtime_state = install_unconsumed_runtime_expiry_worker(&ecstore, 1).await;
let recovery_rx = {
let state = runtime_state.read().await;
Arc::clone(&state.tasks_rx[0])
};
let mut recovery_rx = recovery_rx.lock().await;
assert!(
super::enqueue_recovered_free_version(ObjectInfo {
bucket: "prefill".to_string(),
@@ -10784,20 +10996,29 @@ mod tests {
.await,
"the production recovery queue should accept its first task"
);
let bucket = format!("recovery-enqueue-failure-{}", Uuid::new_v4());
let object = "free-version";
create_test_bucket(&ecstore, &bucket).await;
seed_recoverable_free_version(&disk_paths, &bucket, object, None, None).await;
let first = recover_tier_free_versions_with_cancel(Arc::clone(&ecstore), 1, None, None, CancellationToken::new())
.await
.expect("queue failure should return retry markers");
let first = recover_tier_free_versions_with_cancel(
Arc::clone(&ecstore),
1,
Some(bucket.clone()),
Some(start_marker.to_string()),
CancellationToken::new(),
)
.await
.expect("queue failure should return retry markers");
assert_eq!(first.scanned, 1);
assert_eq!(first.enqueued, 0);
assert_eq!(first.failed, 1);
assert!(first.truncated);
assert_eq!(first.next_bucket_marker.as_deref(), Some(bucket.as_str()));
assert!(first.next_object_marker.is_none());
assert_eq!(first.next_object_marker.as_deref(), Some(start_marker));
drop(
recovery_rx
.try_recv()
.expect("the failed recovery attempt must leave the prefilled task queued")
.expect("the prefilled recovery queue entry should contain a task"),
);
let retried = recover_tier_free_versions_with_cancel(
Arc::clone(&ecstore),
@@ -10809,7 +11030,19 @@ mod tests {
.await
.expect("retry markers should revisit the failed free version");
assert_eq!(retried.scanned, 1);
assert_eq!(retried.failed, 1);
assert_eq!(retried.enqueued, 1);
assert_eq!(retried.failed, 0);
let retried_task = recovery_rx
.try_recv()
.expect("the retry should enqueue the recovered free-version task")
.expect("the recovered queue entry should contain a task");
let retried_task = retried_task
.as_any()
.downcast_ref::<FreeVersionTask>()
.expect("the recovered queue entry should be a free-version task");
assert_eq!(retried_task.0.bucket, bucket);
assert_eq!(retried_task.0.name, object);
remove_seeded_free_version(&disk_paths, &bucket, object).await;
ecstore
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ use s3s::dto::{BucketLifecycleConfiguration, ObjectLockConfiguration};
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::bucket::metadata::BucketMetadata;
use crate::bucket::metadata_sys::{self, ObjectLockConfigState};
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
@@ -26,16 +27,37 @@ pub(crate) struct LifecycleExpiryConfigs {
pub(crate) lifecycle: Option<Arc<BucketLifecycleConfiguration>>,
pub(crate) object_lock: Option<Arc<ObjectLockConfiguration>>,
pub(crate) bucket_incarnation_id: Uuid,
pub(crate) table_bucket_enabled: bool,
}
pub(crate) async fn get_expiry_configs(api: &crate::store::ECStore, bucket: &str) -> Result<LifecycleExpiryConfigs> {
let bucket_incarnation_id = api.bucket_incarnation_id_from_disk(bucket).await?;
async fn get_authoritative_metadata(
api: &crate::store::ECStore,
bucket: &str,
bucket_incarnation_id: Uuid,
) -> Result<Arc<BucketMetadata>> {
let sys = metadata_sys::bucket_metadata_sys_of(&api.ctx)?;
let sys = sys.read().await.clone();
let metadata = sys.get_authoritative_metadata(bucket).await?;
if !metadata.bucket_incarnation_sidecar || metadata.bucket_incarnation_id != bucket_incarnation_id {
return Err(Error::other(format!("bucket lifecycle metadata is not authoritative: {bucket}")));
}
Ok(metadata)
}
pub(crate) async fn lifecycle_expiry_allowed(
api: &crate::store::ECStore,
bucket: &str,
bucket_incarnation_id: Uuid,
) -> Result<bool> {
Ok(!get_authoritative_metadata(api, bucket, bucket_incarnation_id)
.await?
.table_bucket_enabled())
}
pub(crate) async fn get_expiry_configs(api: &crate::store::ECStore, bucket: &str) -> Result<LifecycleExpiryConfigs> {
let bucket_incarnation_id = api.bucket_incarnation_id_from_disk(bucket).await?;
let metadata = get_authoritative_metadata(api, bucket, bucket_incarnation_id).await?;
let table_bucket_enabled = metadata.table_bucket_enabled();
let lifecycle = if metadata.lifecycle_config.is_none() && !metadata.lifecycle_config_xml.is_empty() {
return Err(Error::other("persisted bucket lifecycle configuration is invalid"));
@@ -51,6 +73,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn get_expiry_configs(api: &crate::store::ECStore, bucket: &str
lifecycle: None,
object_lock: None,
bucket_incarnation_id,
table_bucket_enabled,
});
}
let object_lock = match metadata_sys::object_lock_config_state_from_authoritative_metadata(&metadata)? {
@@ -65,6 +88,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn get_expiry_configs(api: &crate::store::ECStore, bucket: &str
lifecycle,
object_lock,
bucket_incarnation_id,
table_bucket_enabled,
})
}
@@ -125,6 +149,7 @@ mod tests {
let lifecycle = lifecycle_config();
metadata.lifecycle_config_xml = crate::bucket::utils::serialize(&lifecycle).unwrap();
metadata.lifecycle_config = Some(lifecycle);
metadata.table_bucket_config_json = br#"{"enabled":true}"#.to_vec();
metadata_sys::set_new_bucket_metadata_in(&store_a.ctx, metadata)
.await
.unwrap();
@@ -132,7 +157,14 @@ mod tests {
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(get_expiry_configs(&store_a, bucket).await.unwrap().lifecycle.is_some());
let configs = get_expiry_configs(&store_a, bucket).await.unwrap();
assert!(configs.lifecycle.is_some());
assert!(configs.table_bucket_enabled);
assert!(
!lifecycle_expiry_allowed(&store_a, bucket, configs.bucket_incarnation_id)
.await
.unwrap()
);
assert!(get_expiry_configs(&store_b, bucket).await.unwrap().lifecycle.is_none());
}
}
+48 -2
View File
@@ -425,6 +425,15 @@ impl BucketMetadata {
}
}
/// Metadata for a physically new user bucket. Existing or fabricated legacy
/// metadata must use [`Self::new`] so upgrades do not rewrite their
/// durability posture.
pub fn new_with_default_durability(name: &str) -> Self {
let mut metadata = Self::new(name);
metadata.durability_config_json = super::durability::new_bucket_durability_config_json();
metadata
}
pub fn save_file_path(&self) -> String {
format!("{}/{}/{}", BUCKET_META_PREFIX, self.name.as_str(), BUCKET_METADATA_FILE)
}
@@ -1302,7 +1311,7 @@ mod test {
assert!(bm.object_locking(), "object lock active via parsed config");
}
/// backlog#580: KNOWN GAP (weisd 2026-03-06 "inline_data 前缀不同"). RustFS's
/// backlog#580: KNOWN GAP (flagged 2026-03-06: "inline_data 前缀不同"). RustFS's
/// inline-data extraction does not yet recover the object body from a
/// MinIO-written bucket-metadata object: `into_fileinfo(read_data=true).data`
/// returns bytes that are not the `.metadata.bin` blob (no `format|version`
@@ -1310,7 +1319,7 @@ mod test {
/// inline-data framing is handled on the read path.
/// backlog#580: prove RustFS reads a MinIO-written **inlined** bucket-metadata
/// object end-to-end. MinIO stores inline data as `[bitrot hash][object body]`
/// (the "`inline_data` 前缀不同" that weisd flagged on 2026-03-06 is that
/// (the "`inline_data` 前缀不同" gap flagged on 2026-03-06 is that
/// bitrot prefix, not a format incompatibility). Running the raw inline shard
/// through RustFS's `BitrotReader` with the default `HighwayHash256S` must
/// verify the checksum and yield the exact `.metadata.bin` blob.
@@ -1378,6 +1387,43 @@ mod test {
assert_ne!(old.bucket_incarnation_id, new.bucket_incarnation_id);
}
#[test]
fn regular_bucket_metadata_constructor_does_not_seed_durability() {
temp_env::with_var_unset(crate::bucket::durability::ENV_NEW_BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE, || {
let metadata = BucketMetadata::new("legacy-or-fabricated");
assert!(metadata.durability_config_json.is_empty());
assert!(metadata.durability_config().is_none());
});
}
#[test]
fn new_bucket_metadata_constructor_seeds_default_durability() {
temp_env::with_var_unset(crate::bucket::durability::ENV_NEW_BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE, || {
let metadata = BucketMetadata::new_with_default_durability("new-user-bucket");
assert_eq!(
metadata.durability_config().and_then(|cfg| cfg.normalized_mode()).as_deref(),
Some(crate::bucket::durability::BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE_RELAXED)
);
let encoded = metadata.marshal_msg().expect("marshal metadata");
let decoded = BucketMetadata::unmarshal(&encoded).expect("unmarshal metadata");
assert_eq!(decoded.durability_config_json, metadata.durability_config_json);
assert_eq!(
decoded.durability_config().and_then(|cfg| cfg.normalized_mode()).as_deref(),
Some(crate::bucket::durability::BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE_RELAXED)
);
});
}
#[test]
fn new_bucket_metadata_constructor_can_inherit_global_durability() {
temp_env::with_var(crate::bucket::durability::ENV_NEW_BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE, Some("inherit"), || {
let metadata = BucketMetadata::new_with_default_durability("strict-fleet-new-bucket");
assert!(metadata.durability_config_json.is_empty());
assert!(metadata.durability_config().is_none());
});
}
#[test]
fn site_replication_config_updates_cannot_replace_bucket_incarnation() {
let mut metadata = BucketMetadata::new("site-replication-update");
+16
View File
@@ -288,6 +288,13 @@ pub(crate) fn bucket_metadata_sys_of(ctx: &crate::runtime::instance::InstanceCon
get_bucket_metadata_sys()
}
pub(crate) fn require_bucket_metadata_sys_in(
ctx: &crate::runtime::instance::InstanceContext,
) -> Result<Arc<RwLock<BucketMetadataSys>>> {
ctx.bucket_metadata_sys()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other("bucket metadata sys not initialized for this instance"))
}
pub(crate) async fn object_store_in(ctx: &crate::runtime::instance::InstanceContext) -> Result<Arc<ECStore>> {
let sys = bucket_metadata_sys_of(ctx)?;
Ok(sys.read().await.api.clone())
@@ -376,6 +383,15 @@ pub async fn update(bucket: &str, config_file: &str, data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Of
Box::pin(update_with_sys(get_bucket_metadata_sys()?, bucket, config_file, data)).await
}
pub(crate) async fn update_in(
ctx: &crate::runtime::instance::InstanceContext,
bucket: &str,
config_file: &str,
data: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<OffsetDateTime> {
Box::pin(update_with_sys(require_bucket_metadata_sys_in(ctx)?, bucket, config_file, data)).await
}
pub async fn delete(bucket: &str, config_file: &str) -> Result<OffsetDateTime> {
delete_with_sys(get_bucket_metadata_sys()?, bucket, config_file).await
}
@@ -200,6 +200,29 @@ mod tests {
assert!(retention.retain_until_date.is_some());
}
/// backlog#1733 g-key-002: the persisted literal keys must still be read
/// through the current header constants, or WORM metadata fails open.
#[test]
fn persisted_compliance_lock_metadata_remains_effective() {
let mut meta = HashMap::new();
meta.insert("x-amz-object-lock-mode".to_string(), "COMPLIANCE".to_string());
meta.insert("x-amz-object-lock-retain-until-date".to_string(), "9999-01-01T00:00:00Z".to_string());
meta.insert("x-amz-object-lock-legal-hold".to_string(), "ON".to_string());
let retention = get_object_retention_meta(&meta);
assert_eq!(
retention.mode.as_ref().map(|mode| mode.as_str()),
Some(ObjectLockRetentionMode::COMPLIANCE)
);
assert!(retention.retain_until_date.is_some(), "persisted retention date must remain readable");
let legal_hold = get_object_legalhold_meta(&meta);
assert_eq!(
legal_hold.status.as_ref().map(|status| status.as_str()),
Some(ObjectLockLegalHoldStatus::ON)
);
}
#[test]
fn test_get_object_legalhold_meta_empty() {
let meta = HashMap::new();
+5
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
use super::metadata_sys::get_bucket_metadata_sys;
use crate::error::{Result, StorageError};
use crate::store::ECStore;
use rustfs_policy::policy::{BucketPolicy, BucketPolicyArgs};
pub struct PolicySys {}
@@ -27,6 +28,10 @@ impl PolicySys {
Self::is_allowed_with_policy(args, Self::get(args.bucket).await).await
}
pub async fn try_is_allowed_for_store(store: &ECStore, args: &BucketPolicyArgs<'_>) -> Result<bool> {
Self::is_allowed_with_policy(args, store.get_bucket_policy(args.bucket).await.map(|(policy, _)| policy)).await
}
async fn is_allowed_with_policy(args: &BucketPolicyArgs<'_>, policy: Result<BucketPolicy>) -> Result<bool> {
match policy {
Ok(policy) => Ok(policy.is_allowed(args).await),
+100 -5
View File
@@ -198,11 +198,36 @@ impl QuotaChecker {
}
pub async fn get_real_time_usage(&self, bucket: &str) -> Result<u64, QuotaError> {
get_bucket_usage_memory(bucket)
.await
.ok_or_else(|| QuotaError::UsageUnavailable {
bucket: bucket.to_string(),
})
if let Some(usage) = get_bucket_usage_memory(bucket).await {
return Ok(usage);
}
// Degraded window (issue #5716): with no authoritative usage — most
// prominently after upgrading from a pre-v2 release, whose legacy
// `.usage.json` is demoted to non-authoritative until the scanner's
// first complete cycle persists `.usage.v2.json` — failing closed
// turned every write to a quota-enabled bucket into a retryable 503
// for the whole window. Quota admission instead degrades to the last
// persisted per-bucket size. That baseline is static between snapshot
// loads (live writes do not advance it), so hard-quota enforcement is
// advisory for the duration of the window: the overrun is bounded by
// the writes issued before the next complete scanner cycle. Buckets
// with no persisted baseline anywhere keep failing closed.
let store = self.metadata_sys.read().await.object_store();
// Box the fallback: it embeds the whole snapshot-load future, and every
// object write nests a quota check several futures deep, so keeping it
// inline would grow each write's state machine by the loader's full
// size — the debug-build 2MiB worker-stack overflow class fixed for
// bucket-config writes in #5648. The allocation only happens on the
// degraded path; the authoritative fast path returns above.
if let Some(baseline) = Box::pin(crate::data_usage::lookup_degraded_bucket_usage_baseline(store, bucket)).await {
debug!(bucket, baseline, "Bucket quota admission using degraded persisted usage baseline");
return Ok(baseline);
}
Err(QuotaError::UsageUnavailable {
bucket: bucket.to_string(),
})
}
}
@@ -232,6 +257,76 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(result.quota_limit, None);
}
/// Regression (issue #5716): an upgrade from a pre-v2 release leaves only
/// the legacy `.usage.json` snapshot, which has no completeness marker and
/// is demoted to non-authoritative, and the scanner's first complete cycle
/// can be a long way off. Quota admission must degrade to that persisted
/// baseline instead of failing every write to a quota-enabled bucket with
/// a retryable 503 for the whole window.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn quota_admission_falls_back_to_legacy_snapshot_baseline() {
let (_dirs, ecstore) = isolated_store_over_temp_disks().await;
let sys = Arc::new(RwLock::new(BucketMetadataSys::new(ecstore.clone())));
let checker = QuotaChecker::new(sys);
let bucket = format!("quota-legacy-{}", Uuid::new_v4().simple());
let mut legacy = rustfs_data_usage::DataUsageInfo {
last_update: Some(std::time::SystemTime::now()),
buckets_count: 1,
..Default::default()
};
legacy.buckets_usage.insert(
bucket.clone(),
rustfs_data_usage::BucketUsageInfo {
size: 1_234,
..Default::default()
},
);
legacy.bucket_sizes.insert(bucket.clone(), 1_234);
// usage_snapshot_complete stays false: pre-v2 snapshots do not carry
// the field at all, so they always deserialize as incomplete.
let legacy_path = format!("{}/{}", crate::disk::BUCKET_META_PREFIX, rustfs_data_usage::LEGACY_DATA_USAGE_OBJECT_NAME);
crate::config::com::save_config(
ecstore.clone(),
&legacy_path,
serde_json::to_vec(&legacy).expect("legacy snapshot should encode"),
)
.await
.expect("legacy snapshot fixture should be stored");
crate::data_usage::invalidate_data_usage_snapshot_cache().await;
let usage = checker
.get_real_time_usage(&bucket)
.await
.expect("quota admission must degrade to the persisted legacy baseline");
assert_eq!(usage, 1_234);
// A bucket absent from every persisted snapshot still has no grounded
// baseline and must keep failing closed.
let unknown = format!("quota-unknown-{}", Uuid::new_v4().simple());
assert!(matches!(
checker.get_real_time_usage(&unknown).await,
Err(QuotaError::UsageUnavailable { .. })
));
// Deleting the bucket's usage from the backend must purge the
// baseline: a recreated bucket may not inherit the dead incarnation's
// size, so with no persisted trace left it fails closed again.
crate::data_usage::remove_bucket_usage_from_backend(ecstore.clone(), &bucket)
.await
.expect("bucket usage removal should succeed");
assert!(matches!(
checker.get_real_time_usage(&bucket).await,
Err(QuotaError::UsageUnavailable { .. })
));
crate::data_usage::prepare_bucket_usage_for_namespace_change(&bucket, None)
.await
.expect("test usage cache cleanup should succeed");
crate::data_usage::invalidate_data_usage_snapshot_cache().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn quota_usage_rejects_an_unknown_mutation_baseline() {
@@ -100,11 +100,41 @@ paths.
behind the ECStore replication facade; only `rustfs/src/app/storage_api.rs`
may retain direct object/delete replication helper calls.
## First Code-Bearing Step
## Completion Criteria
Start with `ReplicationRuntime` or `ReplicationEventSink`. Both can be added as
narrow internal contracts while keeping current queue, MRF, resync, and target
behavior unchanged. Do not start with a crate move.
The split is complete when the "Current dependency to remove" column in the
Required Contracts table above is empty: every row is either deleted because
the dependency is gone, or reduced to "none". No other signal — file count,
boundary count, line count — measures completion.
Target end state:
- `replication_pool.rs`, `replication_resyncer.rs`, and `replication_state.rs`
move into `crates/replication` behind the contracts above;
- the `*_boundary.rs` and `*_bridge.rs` micro-files dissolve naturally as the
code they fence moves across the crate boundary. They are the mechanical
seams of the migration ratchet — the architecture guard scripts anchor on
their file names — so batch-merging them beforehand is explicitly rejected:
it forces synchronized guard-script/mod/import churn with zero functional
gain;
- the only module that can retire early is `datatypes.rs`: delete it once its
facade consumers import the resync status enums through `rustfs-replication`
directly.
## Milestones
| Milestone | Scope | Status |
|---|---|---|
| M0 | Record the completion criteria and end state (this section). | Done |
| M1 | Contract extraction: resync/queue/stats/object-decision/filemeta/storage wire contracts owned by `crates/replication`; ECStore imports concentrated in `*_boundary.rs`; event sink and runtime access behind local contracts. | Done — see Required Contracts |
| M2 | Move resyncer pure decision logic (no IO) into `crates/replication`. | Pending; sequence after splitting the oversized resyncer/pool functions (`resync_bucket`, `replicate_all`, `start_mrf_processor`) so moves stay mechanical |
| M3 | Move the worker runtime (`replication_pool.rs`, the IO paths of `replication_resyncer.rs`, `replication_state.rs`) once the contract traits are stable. Highest-risk step of the whole plan; do it last. | Pending |
| M4 | Retire the boundary modules together with their guard-script entries; delete `datatypes.rs`. | Pending |
The original first code-bearing step (narrow `ReplicationEventSink` /
`ReplicationRuntime` contracts) has landed — `replication_event_sink.rs`
exists and runtime access goes through local boundary aliases — so new work
starts from M2.
Current compatibility guard: `crates/ecstore/tests/replication_facade_compat_test.rs`
keeps the ECStore replication facade types covered while architecture rules
+3 -3
View File
@@ -47,9 +47,9 @@ pub use datatypes::ResyncStatusType;
pub use replication_config_boundary::{
ObjectOpts, REMOTE_TARGET_CAPABILITY_CONTRACT_VERSION, REMOTE_TARGET_UNSUPPORTED_FIELDS, REMOTE_TARGET_WRITABLE_FIELDS,
REPLICATION_CAPABILITY_CONTRACT_VERSION, REPLICATION_READ_ONLY_HISTORICAL_FIELDS, REPLICATION_WRITABLE_FIELDS,
ReplicationConfigurationExt, ReplicationTargetValidationError, invalid_replication_config_status_field,
replication_target_arns, should_remove_replication_target, unsupported_replication_config_field,
validate_replication_config_target_arns,
ReplicationConfigStructureError, ReplicationConfigurationExt, ReplicationTargetValidationError,
invalid_replication_config_status_field, replication_target_arns, should_remove_replication_target,
unsupported_replication_config_field, validate_replication_config_structure, validate_replication_config_target_arns,
};
pub(crate) use replication_filemeta_boundary::version_purge_statuses_map;
pub use replication_filemeta_boundary::{
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
pub use rustfs_replication::{
ObjectOpts, REMOTE_TARGET_CAPABILITY_CONTRACT_VERSION, REMOTE_TARGET_UNSUPPORTED_FIELDS, REMOTE_TARGET_WRITABLE_FIELDS,
REPLICATION_CAPABILITY_CONTRACT_VERSION, REPLICATION_READ_ONLY_HISTORICAL_FIELDS, REPLICATION_WRITABLE_FIELDS,
ReplicationConfigurationExt, ReplicationRuleExt, ReplicationTargetValidationError, invalid_replication_config_status_field,
replication_target_arns, should_remove_replication_target, unsupported_replication_config_field,
validate_replication_config_target_arns,
ReplicationConfigStructureError, ReplicationConfigurationExt, ReplicationRuleExt, ReplicationTargetValidationError,
invalid_replication_config_status_field, replication_target_arns, should_remove_replication_target,
unsupported_replication_config_field, validate_replication_config_structure, validate_replication_config_target_arns,
};
@@ -89,3 +89,116 @@ pub fn replication_state_to_filemeta(state: &ReplicationState) -> rustfs_filemet
target_delete_marker_version_ids_corrupt: state.target_delete_marker_version_ids_corrupt,
}
}
// Reconciliation tests for the deliberately duplicated wire types.
//
// `rustfs-filemeta` (xl.meta disk format) and `rustfs-replication` (MRF/resync
// persistence format) each own a copy of `ReplicationStatusType`,
// `VersionPurgeStatusType` and `ReplicationState`; the conversions above hop
// between them via `as_str()`, whose `From<&str>` impls fall back to `Empty`
// on any unknown token. That fallback silently degrades data the moment one
// side gains a variant the other lacks, so these tests pin the two sides
// together:
//
// - the `match` statements are exhaustive with no `_` arm — adding a variant
// on either side fails compilation here until the mapping is reconsidered;
// - the round-trips assert the string token survives both directions — a
// variant whose token the other side does not recognize fails the assert
// instead of quietly becoming `Empty`.
//
// Struct-shaped drift on `ReplicationState` is already compile-guarded by the
// exhaustive struct literals in the two conversion functions above; the
// round-trip test below additionally pins value fidelity for every field.
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use std::collections::HashMap;
#[test]
fn replication_status_variants_round_trip_across_boundary() {
use rustfs_replication::ReplicationStatusType as Repl;
let all = [
Repl::Pending,
Repl::Completed,
Repl::CompletedLegacy,
Repl::Failed,
Repl::Replica,
Repl::Empty,
];
for status in all {
// Exhaustive on the replication side: a new variant breaks this match.
match status {
Repl::Pending | Repl::Completed | Repl::CompletedLegacy | Repl::Failed | Repl::Replica | Repl::Empty => {}
}
let filemeta = replication_status_to_filemeta(status.clone());
assert_eq!(
filemeta.as_str(),
status.as_str(),
"replication->filemeta conversion must not degrade {status:?} (unknown tokens fall back to Empty)"
);
assert_eq!(replication_status_from_filemeta(filemeta), status);
}
// Exhaustive on the filemeta side: a new variant breaks this match.
fn _filemeta_side_is_covered(status: rustfs_filemeta::ReplicationStatusType) {
use rustfs_filemeta::ReplicationStatusType as Meta;
match status {
Meta::Pending | Meta::Completed | Meta::CompletedLegacy | Meta::Failed | Meta::Replica | Meta::Empty => {}
}
}
}
#[test]
fn version_purge_status_variants_round_trip_across_boundary() {
use rustfs_replication::VersionPurgeStatusType as Repl;
let all = [Repl::Pending, Repl::Complete, Repl::Failed, Repl::Empty];
for status in all {
// Exhaustive on the replication side: a new variant breaks this match.
match status {
Repl::Pending | Repl::Complete | Repl::Failed | Repl::Empty => {}
}
let filemeta = version_purge_status_to_filemeta(status.clone());
assert_eq!(
filemeta.as_str(),
status.as_str(),
"replication->filemeta conversion must not degrade {status:?} (unknown tokens fall back to Empty)"
);
assert_eq!(version_purge_status_from_filemeta(filemeta), status);
}
// Exhaustive on the filemeta side: a new variant breaks this match.
fn _filemeta_side_is_covered(status: rustfs_filemeta::VersionPurgeStatusType) {
use rustfs_filemeta::VersionPurgeStatusType as Meta;
match status {
Meta::Pending | Meta::Complete | Meta::Failed | Meta::Empty => {}
}
}
}
#[test]
fn replication_state_round_trips_every_field_across_boundary() {
let timestamp = time::OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(1_700_000_000).expect("valid timestamp");
let state = ReplicationState {
replica_timestamp: Some(timestamp),
replica_status: ReplicationStatusType::Replica,
delete_marker: true,
replication_timestamp: Some(timestamp),
replication_status_internal: Some("arn:a=PENDING;".to_string()),
version_purge_status_internal: Some("arn:a=FAILED;".to_string()),
replicate_decision_str: "arn:a=true;false;;".to_string(),
targets: HashMap::from([
("arn:a".to_string(), ReplicationStatusType::Completed),
("arn:b".to_string(), ReplicationStatusType::Failed),
]),
purge_targets: HashMap::from([("arn:a".to_string(), VersionPurgeStatusType::Pending)]),
reset_statuses_map: HashMap::from([("reset-arn:a".to_string(), "reset-id;ts".to_string())]),
target_delete_marker_version_ids: HashMap::from([("arn:a".to_string(), "version-1".to_string())]),
target_delete_marker_version_ids_corrupt: true,
};
let round_tripped = replication_state_from_filemeta(&replication_state_to_filemeta(&state));
assert_eq!(round_tripped, state);
}
}
@@ -710,8 +710,8 @@ pub struct ReplicationPool<S: ReplicationStorage> {
mrf_save_tx: Sender<MrfReplicateEntry>,
mrf_save_rx: Mutex<Option<Receiver<MrfReplicateEntry>>>,
// Control channels
mrf_worker_kill_tx: Sender<()>,
// MRF worker lifecycle
mrf_worker_cancellations: Mutex<Vec<CancellationToken>>,
mrf_stop_tx: Sender<()>,
// Worker size tracking
@@ -734,7 +734,6 @@ impl<S: ReplicationStorage> ReplicationPool<S> {
// Create MRF channels
let (mrf_replica_tx, mrf_replica_rx) = mpsc::channel(100000);
let (mrf_save_tx, mrf_save_rx) = mpsc::channel(100000);
let (mrf_worker_kill_tx, _mrf_worker_kill_rx) = mpsc::channel(worker_counts.mrf_workers);
let (mrf_stop_tx, _mrf_stop_rx) = mpsc::channel(1);
let pool = Arc::new(Self {
@@ -752,7 +751,7 @@ impl<S: ReplicationStorage> ReplicationPool<S> {
mrf_replica_rx: Arc::new(Mutex::new(mrf_replica_rx)),
mrf_save_tx,
mrf_save_rx: Mutex::new(Some(mrf_save_rx)),
mrf_worker_kill_tx,
mrf_worker_cancellations: Mutex::new(Vec::with_capacity(worker_counts.mrf_workers)),
mrf_stop_tx,
mrf_worker_size: AtomicI32::new(0),
task_handles: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
@@ -896,12 +895,12 @@ impl<S: ReplicationStorage> ReplicationPool<S> {
/// Resizes the failed workers pool
pub async fn resize_failed_workers(&self, n: i32) {
// Spawn workers up to n. Each worker shares the receiver via Arc<Mutex<...>>.
// The mutex is held only while calling recv() — released before processing — so
// all workers process entries concurrently (the dequeue step is serialised but
// the replication I/O is not).
while self.mrf_worker_size.load(Ordering::SeqCst) < n {
self.mrf_worker_size.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
let target = mrf_worker_size_to_count(n);
let mut cancellations = self.mrf_worker_cancellations.lock().await;
while cancellations.len() < target {
let cancellation = CancellationToken::new();
cancellations.push(cancellation.clone());
let active_counter = self.active_mrf_workers.clone();
let stats = self.stats.clone();
@@ -910,7 +909,18 @@ impl<S: ReplicationStorage> ReplicationPool<S> {
let handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
let operation = { mrf_rx.lock().await.recv().await };
let operation = tokio::select! {
biased;
operation = async {
let mut receiver = mrf_rx.lock().await;
tokio::select! {
biased;
operation = receiver.recv() => operation,
_ = cancellation.cancelled() => None,
}
} => operation,
_ = cancellation.cancelled() => break,
};
let Some(operation) = operation else { break };
let _active = ActiveWorkerGuard::new(active_counter.clone());
@@ -920,11 +930,13 @@ impl<S: ReplicationStorage> ReplicationPool<S> {
self.task_handles.lock().await.push(handle);
}
// Remove workers if needed
while self.mrf_worker_size.load(Ordering::SeqCst) > n {
self.mrf_worker_size.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
let _ = self.mrf_worker_kill_tx.try_send(());
while cancellations.len() > target {
if let Some(cancellation) = cancellations.pop() {
cancellation.cancel();
}
}
self.mrf_worker_size.store(n.max(0), Ordering::SeqCst);
}
/// Resizes worker priority and counts
@@ -2555,6 +2567,12 @@ pub trait ReplicationPoolTrait: std::fmt::Debug {
async fn queue_replica_task(&self, ri: ReplicateObjectInfo) -> ReplicationQueueAdmission;
async fn queue_replica_delete_task(&self, ri: DeletedObjectReplicationInfo) -> ReplicationQueueAdmission;
async fn queue_replica_delete_batch(&self, deletes: &[DeletedObjectReplicationInfo]) -> ReplicationBatchAdmission;
/// Persist one entry straight to the durable MRF journal, bypassing the
/// live worker queues. For failures whose source state is already gone —
/// e.g. exhausted delete-marker purges — where only a startup replay can
/// retry, and live re-dispatch would loop unboundedly against a down
/// target.
async fn persist_mrf_entry(&self, entry: MrfReplicateEntry) -> ReplicationQueueAdmission;
async fn resize(&self, priority: ReplicationPriority, max_workers: usize, max_l_workers: usize);
async fn get_bucket_resync_status(&self, bucket: &str) -> Result<BucketReplicationResyncStatus, EcstoreError>;
async fn cancel_bucket_resync(&self, opts: ResyncOpts) -> Result<(), EcstoreError>;
@@ -2595,6 +2613,10 @@ impl<S: ReplicationStorage> ReplicationPoolTrait for ReplicationPool<S> {
self.queue_replica_delete_batch(deletes).await
}
async fn persist_mrf_entry(&self, entry: MrfReplicateEntry) -> ReplicationQueueAdmission {
self.queue_mrf_save_admission(entry, "delete_marker_purge").await
}
async fn resize(&self, priority: ReplicationPriority, max_workers: usize, max_l_workers: usize) {
self.resize(priority, max_workers, max_l_workers).await;
}
@@ -3350,7 +3372,6 @@ mod tests {
) -> Arc<ReplicationPool<LoadResyncNodeStore>> {
let (mrf_replica_tx, mrf_replica_rx) = mpsc::channel(1);
let (mrf_save_tx, mrf_save_rx) = mpsc::channel(mrf_save_capacity);
let (mrf_worker_kill_tx, _) = mpsc::channel(1);
let (mrf_stop_tx, _) = mpsc::channel(1);
Arc::new(ReplicationPool {
@@ -3368,7 +3389,7 @@ mod tests {
mrf_replica_rx: Arc::new(Mutex::new(mrf_replica_rx)),
mrf_save_tx,
mrf_save_rx: Mutex::new(Some(mrf_save_rx)),
mrf_worker_kill_tx,
mrf_worker_cancellations: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
mrf_stop_tx,
mrf_worker_size: AtomicI32::new(0),
task_handles: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
@@ -3971,6 +3992,54 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn resize_failed_workers_cancels_idle_workers() {
let shared = empty_resync_shared_state();
let pool = new_test_replication_pool(Arc::new(LoadResyncNodeStore::new("mrf-resize", shared))).await;
pool.resize_failed_workers(4).await;
assert_eq!(pool.mrf_worker_cancellations.lock().await.len(), 4);
assert_eq!(pool.mrf_worker_size.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 4);
pool.resize_failed_workers(1).await;
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(10), async {
loop {
let finished = pool
.task_handles
.lock()
.await
.iter()
.filter(|handle| handle.is_finished())
.count();
if finished == 3 {
break;
}
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
}
})
.await
.expect("canceled MRF workers should exit while the shared queue is idle");
assert_eq!(pool.mrf_worker_cancellations.lock().await.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(pool.mrf_worker_size.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn resize_failed_workers_is_idempotent_across_growth_and_shrink() {
let shared = empty_resync_shared_state();
let pool = new_test_replication_pool(Arc::new(LoadResyncNodeStore::new("mrf-resize-repeat", shared))).await;
for target in [2, 4, 1, 4, 4] {
pool.resize_failed_workers(target).await;
assert_eq!(
pool.mrf_worker_cancellations.lock().await.len(),
usize::try_from(target).expect("test worker count should fit usize")
);
assert_eq!(pool.mrf_worker_size.load(Ordering::SeqCst), target);
}
}
#[test]
fn replicate_object_info_from_object_info_preserves_ssec_checksum() {
let checksum = bytes::Bytes::from_static(b"ssec-checksum");
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ use rustfs_utils::http::{
AMZ_STORAGE_CLASS, AMZ_TAG_COUNT, CACHE_CONTROL, CONTENT_DISPOSITION, CONTENT_ENCODING, CONTENT_LANGUAGE, CONTENT_TYPE,
HeaderExt as _, SUFFIX_OBJECTLOCK_LEGALHOLD_TIMESTAMP, SUFFIX_OBJECTLOCK_RETENTION_TIMESTAMP,
SUFFIX_REPLICATION_ACTUAL_OBJECT_SIZE, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_SSEC_CRC, SUFFIX_TAGGING_TIMESTAMP, get_str, insert_header_map,
is_internal_key,
is_internal_key, is_object_encryption_marker, is_replication_stripped_encryption_key, ssec_replication_transport_header,
};
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use time::format_description::well_known::Rfc3339;
@@ -62,24 +62,6 @@ static STANDARD_HEADERS: &[&str] = &[
AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION,
];
static VALID_SSE_REPLICATION_HEADERS: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
(
"X-Rustfs-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Sealed-Key",
"X-Rustfs-Replication-Server-Side-Encryption-Sealed-Key",
),
(
"X-Rustfs-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Seal-Algorithm",
"X-Rustfs-Replication-Server-Side-Encryption-Seal-Algorithm",
),
(
"X-Rustfs-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Iv",
"X-Rustfs-Replication-Server-Side-Encryption-Iv",
),
("X-Rustfs-Internal-Encrypted-Multipart", "X-Rustfs-Replication-Encrypted-Multipart"),
("X-Rustfs-Internal-Actual-Object-Size", "X-Rustfs-Replication-Actual-Object-Size"),
];
const ERR_REPLICATION_MANAGED_SSE_UNSUPPORTED: &str = "managed SSE replication requires target encryption support";
const ERR_REPLICATION_ENCRYPTION_METADATA_UNSUPPORTED: &str = "replication source contains unsupported encryption metadata";
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
@@ -105,15 +87,29 @@ fn classify_replication_source_encryption(metadata: &HashMap<String, String>) ->
let kms_context = metadata_value(metadata, AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_KMS_CONTEXT);
if is_ssec {
return if sse.is_some() || kms_key_id.is_some() || kms_context.is_some() {
ReplicationSourceEncryption::Unsupported
} else {
// Stored SSE-C objects always carry x-amz-server-side-encryption=AES256
// alongside the customer-algorithm key; only KMS evidence marks a
// mixed, unsupported state.
let sse_compatible = sse.map(str::trim).is_none_or(|value| value.eq_ignore_ascii_case("AES256"));
return if sse_compatible && kms_key_id.is_none() && kms_context.is_none() {
ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseC
} else {
ReplicationSourceEncryption::Unsupported
};
}
match sse.map(str::trim) {
None if kms_key_id.is_none() && kms_context.is_none() => ReplicationSourceEncryption::Plaintext,
None if kms_key_id.is_none() && kms_context.is_none() => {
// Sealed material without any recognizable SSE marker (e.g. an
// object written by MinIO, which does not persist the x-amz SSE
// intent header) must fail closed: replicating it as plaintext
// ships ciphertext the target can never decrypt.
if metadata.keys().any(|key| is_object_encryption_marker(key)) {
ReplicationSourceEncryption::Unsupported
} else {
ReplicationSourceEncryption::Plaintext
}
}
Some(value) if value.eq_ignore_ascii_case("AES256") && kms_key_id.is_none() && kms_context.is_none() => {
ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseS3
}
@@ -163,28 +159,38 @@ pub(crate) fn replication_put_object_options(sc: &str, object_info: &ObjectInfo)
let source_encryption = classify_replication_source_encryption(&object_info.user_defined);
let is_ssec = matches!(source_encryption, ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseC);
match source_encryption {
ReplicationSourceEncryption::Plaintext | ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseC => {}
ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseS3 | ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseKms => {
return Err(Error::other(ERR_REPLICATION_MANAGED_SSE_UNSUPPORTED));
}
ReplicationSourceEncryption::Unsupported => {
return Err(Error::other(ERR_REPLICATION_ENCRYPTION_METADATA_UNSUPPORTED));
}
if matches!(source_encryption, ReplicationSourceEncryption::Unsupported) {
return Err(Error::other(ERR_REPLICATION_ENCRYPTION_METADATA_UNSUPPORTED));
}
for (key, value) in object_info.user_defined.iter() {
let has_valid_sse_header = valid_sse_replication_header(key).is_some();
if (!is_ssec || !has_valid_sse_header) && (is_internal_key(key) || is_standard_header(key)) {
if is_ssec && let Some(transport_header) = ssec_replication_transport_header(key) {
meta.insert(transport_header.to_string(), value.to_string());
continue;
}
if let Some(replication_header) = valid_sse_replication_header(key) {
meta.insert(replication_header.to_string(), value.to_string());
} else {
meta.insert(key.to_string(), value.to_string());
// Encryption metadata that is not remapped for SSE-C passthrough must
// never leave the source site: envelopes and intent headers are only
// meaningful to the source KMS.
if is_replication_stripped_encryption_key(key) {
continue;
}
if is_internal_key(key) || is_standard_header(key) {
continue;
}
meta.insert(key.to_string(), value.to_string());
}
// Managed SSE replicates as plaintext (the replication reader decrypts via
// the object-encryption resolver) and re-encrypts on the target with the
// target's own KMS. Send only the encryption intent — never the source
// key id, whose meaning is local to the source site's KMS.
if matches!(source_encryption, ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseS3) {
meta.insert(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION.to_string(), "AES256".to_string());
} else if matches!(source_encryption, ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseKms) {
meta.insert(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION.to_string(), "aws:kms".to_string());
}
let mut is_multipart = object_info.is_multipart();
@@ -195,6 +201,11 @@ pub(crate) fn replication_put_object_options(sc: &str, object_info: &ObjectInfo)
if is_ssec {
let encoded = BASE64_STANDARD.encode(checksum_data);
insert_header_map(&mut meta, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_SSEC_CRC, encoded);
} else if object_info.is_encrypted() {
// Encrypted checksums cannot be exposed as plaintext headers, and
// decrypt_checksums reports is_multipart=false for them (a value
// the response path relies on). Keep the object's own multipart
// flag so encrypted objects stay on the multipart route.
} else {
let (checksum_meta, is_mp) = object_info.decrypt_checksums(0, &HeaderMap::new())?;
is_multipart = is_mp;
@@ -394,13 +405,22 @@ pub(crate) fn replication_force_delete_remove_options() -> RemoveObjectOptions {
}
}
pub(crate) fn replication_complete_multipart_options(actual_size: String) -> PutObjectOptions {
pub(crate) fn replication_complete_multipart_options(
actual_size: String,
source_etag: String,
source_mtime: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
) -> PutObjectOptions {
let mut user_metadata = HashMap::new();
insert_header_map(&mut user_metadata, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_ACTUAL_OBJECT_SIZE, actual_size);
PutObjectOptions {
user_metadata,
internal: AdvancedPutOptions {
source_etag,
// AdvancedPutOptions::default() stamps now_utc(); an absent source
// mtime must degrade to epoch so header() suppresses the header
// instead of asserting the replication time as the object's mtime.
source_mtime: source_mtime.unwrap_or(OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH),
replication_status: ReplicationStatusType::Replica,
replication_request: true,
..Default::default()
@@ -413,20 +433,14 @@ fn is_standard_header(key: &str) -> bool {
STANDARD_HEADERS.iter().any(|header| header.eq_ignore_ascii_case(key))
}
fn valid_sse_replication_header(key: &str) -> Option<&str> {
VALID_SSE_REPLICATION_HEADERS
.iter()
.find(|(internal, _)| key.eq_ignore_ascii_case(internal))
.map(|(_, replication)| *replication)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use aws_smithy_types::DateTime;
use rustfs_replication::content_matches_by_etag;
use rustfs_utils::http::{
SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_ACTUAL_OBJECT_SIZE, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_SSEC_CRC, get_header_map,
SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER, SSEC_KEY_MD5_HEADER, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_ACTUAL_OBJECT_SIZE, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_SSEC_CRC,
get_header_map,
};
use std::sync::Arc;
use time::Duration;
@@ -571,7 +585,21 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn replication_complete_multipart_options_sets_actual_size() {
let options = replication_complete_multipart_options("1024".to_string());
let source_mtime = OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(1_716_170_000).expect("valid test timestamp");
let options = replication_complete_multipart_options(
"1024".to_string(),
"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef-3".to_string(),
Some(source_mtime),
);
assert_eq!(options.internal.source_etag, "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef-3");
assert_eq!(options.internal.source_mtime, source_mtime);
// Absent source mtime must degrade to epoch (header suppressed), not
// the AdvancedPutOptions default of now_utc() — that default would
// stamp the replication time as the replica's mtime and break the
// multipart HEAD convergence.
let options_no_mtime = replication_complete_multipart_options("1024".to_string(), String::new(), None);
assert_eq!(options_no_mtime.internal.source_mtime.unix_timestamp(), 0);
assert_eq!(
get_header_map(&options.user_metadata, SUFFIX_REPLICATION_ACTUAL_OBJECT_SIZE).as_deref(),
@@ -583,11 +611,29 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn replication_put_options_filter_and_map_metadata() {
use rustfs_utils::http::object_encryption_keys::{
INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM_HEADER, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER,
MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_MULTIPART_HEADER, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_SSEC_SEALED_KEY_HEADER,
REPLICATION_ENCRYPTED_MULTIPART_HEADER, REPLICATION_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER, REPLICATION_SSE_IV_HEADER,
REPLICATION_SSE_SEAL_ALGORITHM_HEADER, REPLICATION_SSE_SEALED_KEY_HEADER, REPLICATION_SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER,
REPLICATION_SSEC_KEY_MD5_HEADER, REPLICATION_SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER, SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER,
};
// The stored shape of a real SSE-C object: SSE marker plus customer
// material, per encryption_material_to_metadata. Every transport-table
// source key is present so each mapping is pinned individually.
let mut metadata = HashMap::new();
metadata.insert(CONTENT_TYPE.to_string(), "text/plain".to_string());
metadata.insert("x-user-meta".to_string(), "value".to_string());
metadata.insert(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION.to_string(), "AES256".to_string());
metadata.insert(SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER.to_string(), "AES256".to_string());
metadata.insert("X-Rustfs-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Sealed-Key".to_string(), "sealed".to_string());
metadata.insert(SSEC_KEY_MD5_HEADER.to_string(), "md5-value".to_string());
metadata.insert(SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER.to_string(), "1024".to_string());
metadata.insert(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER.to_string(), "iv-direct".to_string());
metadata.insert(MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER.to_string(), "iv-minio".to_string());
metadata.insert(MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM_HEADER.to_string(), "DAREv2-HMAC-SHA256".to_string());
metadata.insert(MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_SSEC_SEALED_KEY_HEADER.to_string(), "sealed".to_string());
metadata.insert(MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_MULTIPART_HEADER.to_string(), "true".to_string());
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(metadata),
@@ -605,12 +651,40 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!is_multipart);
assert_eq!(options.user_metadata.get("x-user-meta"), Some(&"value".to_string()));
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(CONTENT_TYPE));
// Every stored SSE-C material key is remapped onto its transport name.
assert_eq!(options.user_metadata.get(REPLICATION_SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER), Some(&"AES256".to_string()));
assert_eq!(options.user_metadata.get(REPLICATION_SSEC_KEY_MD5_HEADER), Some(&"md5-value".to_string()));
assert_eq!(
options
.user_metadata
.get("X-Rustfs-Replication-Server-Side-Encryption-Sealed-Key"),
Some(&"sealed".to_string())
options.user_metadata.get(REPLICATION_SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER),
Some(&"1024".to_string())
);
assert_eq!(
options.user_metadata.get(REPLICATION_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER),
Some(&"iv-direct".to_string())
);
assert_eq!(options.user_metadata.get(REPLICATION_SSE_IV_HEADER), Some(&"iv-minio".to_string()));
assert_eq!(
options.user_metadata.get(REPLICATION_SSE_SEAL_ALGORITHM_HEADER),
Some(&"DAREv2-HMAC-SHA256".to_string())
);
assert_eq!(options.user_metadata.get(REPLICATION_SSE_SEALED_KEY_HEADER), Some(&"sealed".to_string()));
assert_eq!(
options.user_metadata.get(REPLICATION_ENCRYPTED_MULTIPART_HEADER),
Some(&"true".to_string())
);
// The stored keys themselves and the SSE intent header must not leave
// the source verbatim.
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION));
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER));
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER));
assert!(
!options
.user_metadata
.contains_key(MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_SSEC_SEALED_KEY_HEADER)
);
assert_eq!(options.content_type, "text/plain");
assert_eq!(options.content_encoding, "gzip");
assert_eq!(options.user_tags.get("env"), Some(&"prod".to_string()));
@@ -620,6 +694,68 @@ mod tests {
assert!(options.internal.replication_request);
}
#[test]
fn replication_put_options_strip_encryption_metadata_from_plaintext_objects() {
use rustfs_utils::http::object_encryption_keys::{INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER, SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER};
// Migration leftovers: original-size metadata is not an encryption
// marker (older plaintext objects can retain it), so the object still
// classifies as plaintext — but the keys must be stripped, never
// forwarded as plain user metadata (backlog#1783 D2). The SSE-C
// original-size key is also a transport-table source key, so this
// doubles as the guard for the is_ssec gate: without SSE-C
// classification it must be stripped, not remapped.
let metadata = HashMap::from([
("x-user-meta".to_string(), "value".to_string()),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER.to_string(), "1024".to_string()),
(SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER.to_string(), "1024".to_string()),
]);
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(metadata),
..Default::default()
};
let (options, _) = replication_put_object_options("", &object_info).expect("build put options");
assert_eq!(options.user_metadata.get("x-user-meta"), Some(&"value".to_string()));
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER));
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(SSEC_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER));
assert!(
!options
.user_metadata
.keys()
.any(|key| key.to_ascii_lowercase().starts_with("x-rustfs-replication-")),
"non-SSE-C objects must never emit SSE replication transport keys"
);
}
#[test]
fn replication_put_options_fail_closed_on_sealed_material_without_sse_marker() {
use rustfs_utils::http::object_encryption_keys::{
INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_SSEC_SEALED_KEY_HEADER,
};
// Sealed material without a recognizable SSE marker (MinIO-written
// objects, or corrupted metadata) must fail closed instead of
// replicating ciphertext as a plaintext object.
for sealed_key in [
INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER,
MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_SSEC_SEALED_KEY_HEADER,
] {
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(HashMap::from([(sealed_key.to_string(), "sealed-envelope".to_string())])),
..Default::default()
};
let err = match replication_put_object_options("", &object_info) {
Ok(_) => panic!("sealed material without an SSE marker must fail closed ({sealed_key})"),
Err(err) => err,
};
assert!(err.to_string().contains(ERR_REPLICATION_ENCRYPTION_METADATA_UNSUPPORTED));
assert!(!err.to_string().contains("sealed-envelope"));
}
}
#[test]
fn replication_put_options_adds_ssec_checksum_metadata() {
let metadata = HashMap::from([(SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER.to_string(), "AES256".to_string())]);
@@ -658,6 +794,30 @@ mod tests {
classify_replication_source_encryption(&HashMap::from([(SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER.to_string(), "AES256".to_string())])),
ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseC
);
// Real stored SSE-C objects carry the AES256 SSE marker alongside the
// customer algorithm (encryption_material_to_metadata writes both).
assert_eq!(
classify_replication_source_encryption(&HashMap::from([
(SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER.to_string(), "AES256".to_string()),
("x-amz-server-side-encryption".to_string(), "AES256".to_string()),
])),
ReplicationSourceEncryption::SseC
);
// SSE-C material mixed with KMS evidence stays unsupported.
assert_eq!(
classify_replication_source_encryption(&HashMap::from([
(SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER.to_string(), "AES256".to_string()),
(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_KMS_ID.to_string(), "key-1".to_string()),
])),
ReplicationSourceEncryption::Unsupported
);
assert_eq!(
classify_replication_source_encryption(&HashMap::from([
(SSEC_ALGORITHM_HEADER.to_string(), "AES256".to_string()),
("x-amz-server-side-encryption".to_string(), "aws:kms".to_string()),
])),
ReplicationSourceEncryption::Unsupported
);
assert_eq!(
classify_replication_source_encryption(&HashMap::from([(
"x-amz-server-side-encryption".to_string(),
@@ -675,36 +835,75 @@ mod tests {
}
#[test]
fn replication_put_options_rejects_sse_s3_until_target_encryption_is_supported() {
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(HashMap::from([(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION.to_string(), "AES256".to_string())])),
..Default::default()
fn replication_put_options_sends_sse_s3_intent_without_source_material() {
use rustfs_utils::http::object_encryption_keys::{
INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM_HEADER, INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER, INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER,
INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID_HEADER, INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER,
};
let err = match replication_put_object_options("", &object_info) {
Ok(_) => panic!("SSE-S3 replication should fail closed until target encryption headers are supported"),
Err(err) => err,
};
assert!(err.to_string().contains(ERR_REPLICATION_MANAGED_SSE_UNSUPPORTED));
}
#[test]
fn replication_put_options_rejects_sse_kms_until_target_encryption_is_supported() {
// The stored shape of a managed SSE-S3 object per
// encryption_material_to_metadata: SSE marker plus envelope material.
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(HashMap::from([
(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION.to_string(), "aws:kms".to_string()),
(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_KMS_ID.to_string(), "key-1".to_string()),
(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION.to_string(), "AES256".to_string()),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID_HEADER.to_string(), "default".to_string()),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER.to_string(), "sealed-envelope".to_string()),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER.to_string(), "iv".to_string()),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM_HEADER.to_string(), "AES256-GCM".to_string()),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_ORIGINAL_SIZE_HEADER.to_string(), "1024".to_string()),
("x-user-meta".to_string(), "value".to_string()),
])),
..Default::default()
};
let err = match replication_put_object_options("", &object_info) {
Ok(_) => panic!("SSE-KMS replication should fail closed until target encryption headers are supported"),
Err(err) => err,
let (options, _) = replication_put_object_options("", &object_info).expect("managed SSE-S3 must build put options");
assert_eq!(options.user_metadata.get(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION), Some(&"AES256".to_string()));
assert_eq!(options.user_metadata.get("x-user-meta"), Some(&"value".to_string()));
// No envelope material and no key id may leave the source.
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER));
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID_HEADER));
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_IV_HEADER));
assert!(
!options.user_metadata.values().any(|value| value.contains("sealed-envelope")),
"source envelope material must never leave the source site"
);
}
#[test]
fn replication_put_options_sends_sse_kms_intent_without_source_key_id() {
use rustfs_utils::http::object_encryption_keys::{
INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER, MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KMS_CONTEXT_HEADER,
};
assert!(err.to_string().contains(ERR_REPLICATION_MANAGED_SSE_UNSUPPORTED));
let object_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(HashMap::from([
(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION.to_string(), "aws:kms".to_string()),
(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_KMS_ID.to_string(), "source-key-1".to_string()),
(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER.to_string(), "sealed-envelope".to_string()),
(MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KMS_CONTEXT_HEADER.to_string(), "ctx".to_string()),
])),
..Default::default()
};
let (options, _) = replication_put_object_options("", &object_info).expect("managed SSE-KMS must build put options");
// Intent only: the target encrypts with its own default KMS key.
assert_eq!(options.user_metadata.get(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION), Some(&"aws:kms".to_string()));
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(AMZ_SERVER_SIDE_ENCRYPTION_KMS_ID));
assert!(!options.user_metadata.contains_key(INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER));
assert!(
!options
.user_metadata
.contains_key(MINIO_INTERNAL_ENCRYPTION_KMS_CONTEXT_HEADER)
);
assert!(
!options
.user_metadata
.values()
.any(|value| value.contains("sealed-envelope") || value.contains("source-key-1")),
"source KMS identifiers and envelopes must never leave the source site"
);
}
#[test]
+50 -2
View File
@@ -56,11 +56,59 @@ impl FromStr for ARN {
if parts.len() != 6 {
return Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput, "Invalid ARN format"));
}
// Display emits `arn:rustfs:{type}:{region}:{id}:{bucket}`; read the
// segments back in the same order so parse(display(a)) == a.
Ok(ARN {
arn_type: BucketTargetType::from_str(parts[2]).unwrap_or_default(),
id: parts[3].to_string(),
region: parts[4].to_string(),
region: parts[3].to_string(),
id: parts[4].to_string(),
bucket: parts[5].to_string(),
})
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// Display emits `arn:rustfs:{type}:{region}:{id}:{bucket}` (madmin layout);
/// FromStr must read the same positions back so parse(display(a)) == a.
#[test]
fn from_str_round_trips_display_with_region_and_id() {
let arn = ARN::new(
BucketTargetType::ReplicationService,
"depl-123".to_string(),
"us-east-1".to_string(),
"bucket-a".to_string(),
);
let parsed = ARN::from_str(&arn.to_string()).expect("display output must parse");
assert_eq!(parsed.arn_type, arn.arn_type);
assert_eq!(parsed.region, arn.region, "region must survive display->parse round-trip");
assert_eq!(parsed.id, arn.id, "id must survive display->parse round-trip");
assert_eq!(parsed.bucket, arn.bucket);
}
#[test]
fn from_str_reads_region_then_id_in_display_order() {
let parsed = ARN::from_str("arn:rustfs:replication:us-east-1:depl-123:bucket-a").expect("valid ARN must parse");
assert_eq!(parsed.arn_type, BucketTargetType::ReplicationService);
assert_eq!(parsed.region, "us-east-1");
assert_eq!(parsed.id, "depl-123");
assert_eq!(parsed.bucket, "bucket-a");
}
/// RustFS commonly generates ARNs with an empty region:
/// `arn:rustfs:replication::<deployment_id>:<bucket>`.
#[test]
fn from_str_handles_empty_region_segment() {
let parsed = ARN::from_str("arn:rustfs:replication::depl-123:bucket-a").expect("valid ARN must parse");
assert_eq!(parsed.arn_type, BucketTargetType::ReplicationService);
assert_eq!(parsed.region, "", "region segment is empty in this form");
assert_eq!(parsed.id, "depl-123");
assert_eq!(parsed.bucket, "bucket-a");
}
}
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
// limitations under the License.
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
use jiff::Timestamp;
use rmp_serde::Serializer as rmpSerializer;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::{
@@ -32,7 +33,7 @@ pub struct Credentials {
#[serde(rename = "secretKey")]
pub secret_key: String,
pub session_token: Option<String>,
pub expiration: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
pub expiration: Option<Timestamp>,
}
impl Credentials {
@@ -93,6 +94,21 @@ mod duration_milliseconds {
}
}
/// Defensive decode for the two integer wire encodings of these duration
/// fields: RustFS persists (and legacy RustFS clients sent) plain seconds,
/// while Go `time.Duration` JSON — madmin/mc requests and MinIO-written
/// bucket-targets metadata — is nanoseconds. No meaningful interval lies
/// between 10^7 seconds (~115 days) and 10^7 nanoseconds (10ms), so the
/// magnitude disambiguates the unit.
pub fn duration_from_secs_or_nanos(value: u64) -> Duration {
const NANOS_THRESHOLD: u64 = 10_000_000;
if value < NANOS_THRESHOLD {
Duration::from_secs(value)
} else {
Duration::from_nanos(value)
}
}
mod duration_seconds {
use serde::{Deserialize, Deserializer, Serializer};
use std::time::Duration;
@@ -108,8 +124,8 @@ mod duration_seconds {
where
D: Deserializer<'de>,
{
let secs = u64::deserialize(deserializer)?;
Ok(Duration::from_secs(secs))
let value = u64::deserialize(deserializer)?;
Ok(super::duration_from_secs_or_nanos(value))
}
}
@@ -408,7 +424,11 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(credentials.access_key, "test-access-key");
assert_eq!(credentials.secret_key, "test-secret-key");
assert_eq!(credentials.session_token, Some("test-session-token".to_string()));
assert!(credentials.expiration.is_some());
assert_eq!(
serde_json::to_value(credentials.expiration.expect("expiration should parse"))
.expect("expiration should serialize to JSON"),
serde_json::json!("2024-12-31T23:59:59Z")
);
// Verify latency statistics
assert_eq!(target.latency.curr, Duration::from_millis(100));
@@ -484,6 +504,29 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(original.offline_count, deserialized.offline_count);
}
#[test]
fn bucket_target_reads_go_nanosecond_durations_defensively() {
// MinIO-written bucket-targets metadata and madmin clients encode
// these fields as Go `time.Duration` nanoseconds; RustFS has always
// persisted seconds. Both encodings must decode to the same interval.
let target: BucketTarget = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
"endpoint": "localhost:9000",
"targetbucket": "target",
"type": "replication",
"healthCheckDuration": 60_000_000_000u64,
"totalDowntime": 90_000_000_000u64
}))
.expect("nanosecond durations should deserialize");
assert_eq!(target.health_check_duration, Duration::from_secs(60));
assert_eq!(target.total_downtime, Duration::from_secs(90));
// The persisted wire format stays seconds for existing RustFS readers.
let value = serde_json::to_value(&target).expect("target should serialize");
assert_eq!(value["healthCheckDuration"], 60);
assert_eq!(value["totalDowntime"], 90);
}
#[test]
fn test_bucket_target_debug_redacts_credentials() {
let target = BucketTarget {
@@ -562,12 +605,15 @@ mod tests {
.and_then(|credentials| credentials.session_token.as_deref()),
Some("legacy-session-token")
);
assert!(
assert_eq!(
target
.credentials
.as_ref()
.and_then(|credentials| credentials.expiration)
.is_some()
.map(serde_json::to_value)
.transpose()
.expect("expiration should serialize to JSON"),
Some(serde_json::json!("2024-12-31T23:59:59Z"))
);
}
@@ -609,7 +655,11 @@ mod tests {
credentials.session_token,
Some("AQoEXAMPLEH4aoAH0gNCAPyJxz4BlCFFxWNE1OPTgk5TthT".to_string())
);
assert!(credentials.expiration.is_some());
assert_eq!(
serde_json::to_value(credentials.expiration.expect("expiration should parse"))
.expect("expiration should serialize to JSON"),
serde_json::json!("2024-12-31T23:59:59Z")
);
}
#[test]
+94
View File
@@ -269,6 +269,32 @@ pub fn check_del_obj_args(bucket: &str, object: &str) -> Result<()> {
check_bucket_and_object_names(bucket, object)
}
/// Filesystem `NAME_MAX`: every object-key path segment becomes one on-disk
/// directory entry, so a longer segment can never be stored and previously
/// escaped as an `ENAMETOOLONG` io error → `InternalError` 500 (rustfs#5785).
const MAX_OBJECT_KEY_SEGMENT_BYTES: usize = 255;
/// Reject object keys whose on-disk directory names would exceed `NAME_MAX`.
///
/// Middle segments map to their raw bytes; the final segment of a
/// directory-object key (trailing `/`) is stored with the `__XLDIR__` suffix
/// appended, shrinking its budget accordingly.
fn object_key_segments_fit_on_disk(object: &str) -> bool {
let trailing_dir = object.ends_with('/');
let segments: Vec<&str> = object.split('/').collect();
let last_nonempty = segments.iter().rposition(|s| !s.is_empty());
for (index, segment) in segments.iter().enumerate() {
let mut budget = MAX_OBJECT_KEY_SEGMENT_BYTES;
if trailing_dir && Some(index) == last_nonempty {
budget = budget.saturating_sub(rustfs_utils::path::GLOBAL_DIR_SUFFIX.len());
}
if segment.len() > budget {
return false;
}
}
true
}
pub fn check_bucket_and_object_names(bucket: &str, object: &str) -> Result<()> {
if !is_meta_bucketname(bucket) && check_valid_bucket_name_strict(bucket).is_err() {
return Err(StorageError::BucketNameInvalid(bucket.to_string()));
@@ -282,6 +308,10 @@ pub fn check_bucket_and_object_names(bucket: &str, object: &str) -> Result<()> {
return Err(StorageError::ObjectNameInvalid(bucket.to_string(), object.to_string()));
}
if !object_key_segments_fit_on_disk(object) {
return Err(StorageError::ObjectNameInvalid(bucket.to_string(), object.to_string()));
}
// if cfg!(target_os = "windows") && object.contains('\\') {
// return Err(StorageError::ObjectNameInvalid(bucket.to_string(), object.to_string()));
// }
@@ -379,6 +409,14 @@ pub fn check_put_object_args(bucket: &str, object: &str) -> Result<()> {
return Err(StorageError::ObjectNameInvalid(bucket.to_string(), object.to_string()));
}
// The write path validates arguments here rather than through
// check_bucket_and_object_names, so the on-disk segment budget has to be
// enforced in both places or an over-NAME_MAX key still reaches the disk
// layer and escapes as ENAMETOOLONG → InternalError 500 (rustfs#5785).
if !object_key_segments_fit_on_disk(object) {
return Err(StorageError::ObjectNameInvalid(bucket.to_string(), object.to_string()));
}
Ok(())
}
@@ -387,6 +425,62 @@ mod tests {
use super::*;
use proptest::prelude::*;
/// rustfs#5785: keys whose path segments exceed the on-disk NAME_MAX
/// budget must be rejected up front as ObjectNameInvalid (4xx), not leak
/// ENAMETOOLONG as InternalError 500 from the disk layer.
#[test]
fn object_key_segment_name_max_budget() {
// 255-byte single segment: exactly at the on-disk limit.
assert!(check_bucket_and_object_names("bucket", &"a".repeat(255)).is_ok());
// 256 bytes: one over.
assert!(matches!(
check_bucket_and_object_names("bucket", &"a".repeat(256)),
Err(StorageError::ObjectNameInvalid(_, _))
));
// Long keys are fine as long as every segment fits.
let segmented = ["b".repeat(200), "c".repeat(200), "d".repeat(200)].join("/");
assert!(check_bucket_and_object_names("bucket", &segmented).is_ok());
// The budget counts bytes, not characters (100 CJK chars = 300 bytes).
assert!(matches!(
check_bucket_and_object_names("bucket", &"".repeat(100)),
Err(StorageError::ObjectNameInvalid(_, _))
));
assert!(check_bucket_and_object_names("bucket", &"".repeat(85)).is_ok());
// Directory-object keys spend GLOBAL_DIR_SUFFIX bytes of the final
// segment's budget on the on-disk __XLDIR__ encoding.
let dir_budget = 255 - rustfs_utils::path::GLOBAL_DIR_SUFFIX.len();
assert!(check_bucket_and_object_names("bucket", &format!("{}/", "e".repeat(dir_budget))).is_ok());
assert!(matches!(
check_bucket_and_object_names("bucket", &format!("{}/", "e".repeat(dir_budget + 1))),
Err(StorageError::ObjectNameInvalid(_, _))
));
}
/// rustfs#5785 follow-up: the write path validates through
/// check_put_object_args, not check_bucket_and_object_names, so the same
/// budget has to hold there — otherwise an over-NAME_MAX PUT still reached
/// the disk layer and came back as InternalError 500.
#[test]
fn put_object_args_enforce_the_same_segment_budget() {
assert!(check_put_object_args("bucket", &"a".repeat(255)).is_ok());
assert!(matches!(
check_put_object_args("bucket", &"a".repeat(256)),
Err(StorageError::ObjectNameInvalid(_, _))
));
assert!(matches!(
check_put_object_args("bucket", &"\u{4e2d}".repeat(100)),
Err(StorageError::ObjectNameInvalid(_, _))
));
let segmented = ["b".repeat(200), "c".repeat(200), "d".repeat(200)].join("/");
assert!(check_put_object_args("bucket", &segmented).is_ok());
let dir_budget = 255 - rustfs_utils::path::GLOBAL_DIR_SUFFIX.len();
assert!(check_put_object_args("bucket", &format!("{}/", "e".repeat(dir_budget))).is_ok());
assert!(matches!(
check_put_object_args("bucket", &format!("{}/", "e".repeat(dir_budget + 1))),
Err(StorageError::ObjectNameInvalid(_, _))
));
}
// Test validation functions
#[test]
fn test_is_valid_object_name() {
@@ -1,171 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
#![allow(unused_imports)]
#![allow(unused_variables)]
#![allow(unused_mut)]
#![allow(unused_assignments)]
#![allow(unused_must_use)]
#![allow(clippy::all)]
use http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode};
use http_body_util::BodyExt;
use hyper::body::Body;
use hyper::body::Bytes;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use crate::client::{
api_error_response::http_resp_to_error_response,
transition_api::{ReaderImpl, RequestMetadata, TransitionClient},
};
use rustfs_utils::hash::EMPTY_STRING_SHA256_HASH;
impl TransitionClient {
pub async fn set_bucket_policy(&self, bucket_name: &str, policy: &str) -> Result<(), std::io::Error> {
if policy == "" {
return self.remove_bucket_policy(bucket_name).await;
}
self.put_bucket_policy(bucket_name, policy).await
}
pub async fn put_bucket_policy(&self, bucket_name: &str, policy: &str) -> Result<(), std::io::Error> {
let mut url_values = HashMap::new();
url_values.insert("policy".to_string(), "".to_string());
let mut req_metadata = RequestMetadata {
bucket_name: bucket_name.to_string(),
query_values: url_values,
content_body: ReaderImpl::Body(Bytes::from(policy.as_bytes().to_vec())),
content_length: policy.len() as i64,
object_name: "".to_string(),
custom_header: HeaderMap::new(),
content_md5_base64: "".to_string(),
content_sha256_hex: "".to_string(),
stream_sha256: false,
trailer: HeaderMap::new(),
pre_sign_url: Default::default(),
add_crc: Default::default(),
extra_pre_sign_header: Default::default(),
bucket_location: Default::default(),
expires: Default::default(),
};
let resp = self.execute_method(http::Method::PUT, &mut req_metadata).await?;
//defer closeResponse(resp)
let resp_status = resp.status();
let h = resp.headers().clone();
//if resp != nil {
if resp_status != StatusCode::NO_CONTENT && resp.status() != StatusCode::OK {
return Err(std::io::Error::other(http_resp_to_error_response(
resp_status,
&h,
vec![],
bucket_name,
"",
)));
}
//}
Ok(())
}
pub async fn remove_bucket_policy(&self, bucket_name: &str) -> Result<(), std::io::Error> {
let mut url_values = HashMap::new();
url_values.insert("policy".to_string(), "".to_string());
let resp = self
.execute_method(
http::Method::DELETE,
&mut RequestMetadata {
bucket_name: bucket_name.to_string(),
query_values: url_values,
content_sha256_hex: EMPTY_STRING_SHA256_HASH.to_string(),
object_name: "".to_string(),
custom_header: HeaderMap::new(),
content_body: ReaderImpl::Body(Bytes::new()),
content_length: 0,
content_md5_base64: "".to_string(),
stream_sha256: false,
trailer: HeaderMap::new(),
pre_sign_url: Default::default(),
add_crc: Default::default(),
extra_pre_sign_header: Default::default(),
bucket_location: Default::default(),
expires: Default::default(),
},
)
.await?;
//defer closeResponse(resp)
let resp_status = resp.status();
let h = resp.headers().clone();
if resp_status != StatusCode::NO_CONTENT {
return Err(std::io::Error::other(http_resp_to_error_response(
resp_status,
&h,
vec![],
bucket_name,
"",
)));
}
Ok(())
}
pub async fn get_bucket_policy(&self, bucket_name: &str) -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
let bucket_policy = self.get_bucket_policy_inner(bucket_name).await?;
Ok(bucket_policy)
}
pub async fn get_bucket_policy_inner(&self, bucket_name: &str) -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
let mut url_values = HashMap::new();
url_values.insert("policy".to_string(), "".to_string());
let resp = self
.execute_method(
http::Method::GET,
&mut RequestMetadata {
bucket_name: bucket_name.to_string(),
query_values: url_values,
content_sha256_hex: EMPTY_STRING_SHA256_HASH.to_string(),
object_name: "".to_string(),
custom_header: HeaderMap::new(),
content_body: ReaderImpl::Body(Bytes::new()),
content_length: 0,
content_md5_base64: "".to_string(),
stream_sha256: false,
trailer: HeaderMap::new(),
pre_sign_url: Default::default(),
add_crc: Default::default(),
extra_pre_sign_header: Default::default(),
bucket_location: Default::default(),
expires: Default::default(),
},
)
.await?;
let mut body_vec = Vec::new();
let mut body = resp.into_body();
while let Some(frame) = body.frame().await {
let frame = frame.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, e.to_string()))?;
if let Some(data) = frame.data_ref() {
body_vec.extend_from_slice(data);
}
}
let policy = String::from_utf8_lossy(&body_vec).to_string();
Ok(policy)
}
}
@@ -1,199 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
#![allow(unused_imports)]
#![allow(unused_variables)]
#![allow(unused_mut)]
#![allow(unused_assignments)]
#![allow(unused_must_use)]
#![allow(clippy::all)]
use crate::client::{
api_error_response::http_resp_to_error_response,
api_get_options::GetObjectOptions,
transition_api::{ObjectInfo, ReaderImpl, RequestMetadata, TransitionClient},
};
use bytes::Bytes;
use http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue};
use http_body_util::BodyExt;
use rustfs_config::MAX_S3_CLIENT_RESPONSE_SIZE;
use rustfs_utils::EMPTY_STRING_SHA256_HASH;
use s3s::dto::Owner;
use std::collections::HashMap;
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct Grantee {
pub id: String,
pub display_name: String,
pub uri: String,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct Grant {
pub grantee: Grantee,
pub permission: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Default, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct AccessControlList {
pub grant: Vec<Grant>,
pub permission: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Default, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct AccessControlPolicy {
#[serde(skip)]
owner: Owner,
pub access_control_list: AccessControlList,
}
impl TransitionClient {
pub async fn get_object_acl(&self, bucket_name: &str, object_name: &str) -> Result<ObjectInfo, std::io::Error> {
let mut url_values = HashMap::new();
url_values.insert("acl".to_string(), "".to_string());
let mut resp = self
.execute_method(
http::Method::GET,
&mut RequestMetadata {
bucket_name: bucket_name.to_string(),
object_name: object_name.to_string(),
query_values: url_values,
custom_header: HeaderMap::new(),
content_sha256_hex: EMPTY_STRING_SHA256_HASH.to_string(),
content_body: ReaderImpl::Body(Bytes::new()),
content_length: 0,
content_md5_base64: "".to_string(),
stream_sha256: false,
trailer: HeaderMap::new(),
pre_sign_url: Default::default(),
add_crc: Default::default(),
extra_pre_sign_header: Default::default(),
bucket_location: Default::default(),
expires: Default::default(),
},
)
.await?;
let resp_status = resp.status();
let h = resp.headers().clone();
let mut body_vec = Vec::new();
let mut body = resp.into_body();
while let Some(frame) = body.frame().await {
let frame = frame.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, e.to_string()))?;
if let Some(data) = frame.data_ref() {
body_vec.extend_from_slice(data);
}
}
if resp_status != http::StatusCode::OK {
return Err(std::io::Error::other(http_resp_to_error_response(
resp_status,
&h,
body_vec,
bucket_name,
object_name,
)));
}
let mut res = match quick_xml::de::from_str::<AccessControlPolicy>(&String::from_utf8(body_vec).unwrap()) {
Ok(result) => result,
Err(err) => {
return Err(std::io::Error::other(err.to_string()));
}
};
let mut obj_info = self
.stat_object(bucket_name, object_name, &GetObjectOptions::default())
.await?;
obj_info.owner.display_name = res.owner.display_name.clone();
obj_info.owner.id = res.owner.id.clone();
//obj_info.grant.extend(res.access_control_list.grant);
let canned_acl = get_canned_acl(&res);
if canned_acl != "" {
obj_info
.metadata
.insert("X-Amz-Acl", HeaderValue::from_str(&canned_acl).unwrap());
return Ok(obj_info);
}
let grant_acl = get_amz_grant_acl(&res);
/*for (k, v) in grant_acl {
obj_info.metadata.insert(HeaderName::from_bytes(k.as_bytes()).unwrap(), HeaderValue::from_str(&v.to_string()).unwrap());
}*/
Ok(obj_info)
}
}
fn get_canned_acl(ac_policy: &AccessControlPolicy) -> String {
let grants = ac_policy.access_control_list.grant.clone();
if grants.len() == 1 {
if grants[0].grantee.uri == "" && grants[0].permission == "FULL_CONTROL" {
return "private".to_string();
}
} else if grants.len() == 2 {
for g in grants {
if g.grantee.uri == "http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers" && &g.permission == "READ" {
return "authenticated-read".to_string();
}
if g.grantee.uri == "http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers" && &g.permission == "READ" {
return "public-read".to_string();
}
if g.permission == "READ" && g.grantee.id == ac_policy.owner.id.clone().unwrap() {
return "bucket-owner-read".to_string();
}
}
} else if grants.len() == 3 {
for g in grants {
if g.grantee.uri == "http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers" && g.permission == "WRITE" {
return "public-read-write".to_string();
}
}
}
"".to_string()
}
pub fn get_amz_grant_acl(ac_policy: &AccessControlPolicy) -> HashMap<String, Vec<String>> {
let grants = ac_policy.access_control_list.grant.clone();
let mut res = HashMap::<String, Vec<String>>::new();
for g in grants {
let mut id = "id=".to_string();
id.push_str(&g.grantee.id);
let permission: &str = &g.permission;
match permission {
"READ" => {
res.entry("X-Amz-Grant-Read".to_string()).or_insert(vec![]).push(id);
}
"WRITE" => {
res.entry("X-Amz-Grant-Write".to_string()).or_insert(vec![]).push(id);
}
"READ_ACP" => {
res.entry("X-Amz-Grant-Read-Acp".to_string()).or_insert(vec![]).push(id);
}
"WRITE_ACP" => {
res.entry("X-Amz-Grant-Write-Acp".to_string()).or_insert(vec![]).push(id);
}
"FULL_CONTROL" => {
res.entry("X-Amz-Grant-Full-Control".to_string()).or_insert(vec![]).push(id);
}
_ => (),
}
}
res
}
@@ -1,266 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
#![allow(unused_imports)]
#![allow(unused_variables)]
#![allow(unused_mut)]
#![allow(unused_assignments)]
#![allow(unused_must_use)]
#![allow(clippy::all)]
use http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use crate::client::constants::{GET_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES_MAX_PARTS, GET_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES_TAGS, ISO8601_DATEFORMAT};
use crate::client::{
api_get_object_acl::AccessControlPolicy,
transition_api::{ReaderImpl, RequestMetadata, TransitionClient},
};
use http_body_util::BodyExt;
use hyper::body::Body;
use hyper::body::Bytes;
use hyper::body::Incoming;
use rustfs_config::MAX_S3_CLIENT_RESPONSE_SIZE;
use rustfs_utils::EMPTY_STRING_SHA256_HASH;
use s3s::header::{X_AMZ_MAX_PARTS, X_AMZ_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES, X_AMZ_PART_NUMBER_MARKER, X_AMZ_VERSION_ID};
pub struct ObjectAttributesOptions {
pub max_parts: i64,
pub version_id: String,
pub part_number_marker: i64,
//server_side_encryption: encrypt::ServerSide,
}
pub struct ObjectAttributes {
pub version_id: String,
pub last_modified: OffsetDateTime,
pub object_attributes_response: ObjectAttributesResponse,
}
impl ObjectAttributes {
fn new() -> Self {
Self {
version_id: "".to_string(),
last_modified: OffsetDateTime::now_utc(),
object_attributes_response: ObjectAttributesResponse::new(),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Default, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct Checksum {
checksum_crc32: String,
checksum_crc32c: String,
checksum_sha1: String,
checksum_sha256: String,
}
impl Checksum {
fn new() -> Self {
Self {
checksum_crc32: "".to_string(),
checksum_crc32c: "".to_string(),
checksum_sha1: "".to_string(),
checksum_sha256: "".to_string(),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Default, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct ObjectParts {
pub parts_count: i64,
pub part_number_marker: i64,
pub next_part_number_marker: i64,
pub max_parts: i64,
is_truncated: bool,
parts: Vec<ObjectAttributePart>,
}
impl ObjectParts {
fn new() -> Self {
Self {
parts_count: 0,
part_number_marker: 0,
next_part_number_marker: 0,
max_parts: 0,
is_truncated: false,
parts: Vec::new(),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Default, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct ObjectAttributesResponse {
pub etag: String,
pub storage_class: String,
pub object_size: i64,
pub checksum: Checksum,
pub object_parts: ObjectParts,
}
impl ObjectAttributesResponse {
fn new() -> Self {
Self {
etag: "".to_string(),
storage_class: "".to_string(),
object_size: 0,
checksum: Checksum::new(),
object_parts: ObjectParts::new(),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Default, serde::Deserialize)]
struct ObjectAttributePart {
checksum_crc32: String,
checksum_crc32c: String,
checksum_sha1: String,
checksum_sha256: String,
part_number: i64,
size: i64,
}
impl ObjectAttributes {
pub async fn parse_response(&mut self, h: &HeaderMap, body_vec: Vec<u8>) -> Result<(), std::io::Error> {
let last_modified = h
.get("Last-Modified")
.ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("missing Last-Modified header"))?
.to_str()
.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::other(format!("invalid Last-Modified header: {e}")))?;
let mod_time = OffsetDateTime::parse(last_modified, ISO8601_DATEFORMAT)
.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::other(format!("invalid Last-Modified date: {e}")))?;
self.last_modified = mod_time;
let version_id = h
.get(X_AMZ_VERSION_ID)
.ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("missing version ID header"))?
.to_str()
.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::other(format!("invalid version ID header: {e}")))?;
self.version_id = version_id.to_string();
let body_str = String::from_utf8(body_vec).map_err(|e| std::io::Error::other(format!("invalid UTF-8 body: {e}")))?;
let mut response = match quick_xml::de::from_str::<ObjectAttributesResponse>(&body_str) {
Ok(result) => result,
Err(err) => {
return Err(std::io::Error::other(err.to_string()));
}
};
self.object_attributes_response = response;
Ok(())
}
}
impl TransitionClient {
pub async fn get_object_attributes(
&self,
bucket_name: &str,
object_name: &str,
opts: ObjectAttributesOptions,
) -> Result<ObjectAttributes, std::io::Error> {
let mut url_values = HashMap::new();
url_values.insert("attributes".to_string(), "".to_string());
if opts.version_id != "" {
url_values.insert("versionId".to_string(), opts.version_id);
}
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
headers.insert(
X_AMZ_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES,
HeaderValue::from_str(GET_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES_TAGS).expect("valid header value"),
);
if opts.part_number_marker > 0 {
headers.insert(
X_AMZ_PART_NUMBER_MARKER,
HeaderValue::from_str(&opts.part_number_marker.to_string()).expect("valid header value"),
);
}
if opts.max_parts > 0 {
headers.insert(
X_AMZ_MAX_PARTS,
HeaderValue::from_str(&opts.max_parts.to_string()).expect("valid header value"),
);
} else {
headers.insert(
X_AMZ_MAX_PARTS,
HeaderValue::from_str(&GET_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES_MAX_PARTS.to_string()).expect("valid header value"),
);
}
/*if opts.server_side_encryption.is_some() {
opts.server_side_encryption.Marshal(headers);
}*/
let mut resp = self
.execute_method(
http::Method::HEAD,
&mut RequestMetadata {
bucket_name: bucket_name.to_string(),
object_name: object_name.to_string(),
query_values: url_values,
custom_header: headers,
content_sha256_hex: EMPTY_STRING_SHA256_HASH.to_string(),
content_md5_base64: "".to_string(),
content_body: ReaderImpl::Body(Bytes::new()),
content_length: 0,
stream_sha256: false,
trailer: HeaderMap::new(),
pre_sign_url: Default::default(),
add_crc: Default::default(),
extra_pre_sign_header: Default::default(),
bucket_location: Default::default(),
expires: Default::default(),
},
)
.await?;
let resp_status = resp.status();
let h = resp.headers().clone();
let has_etag = h.get("ETag").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()).unwrap_or("");
if !has_etag.is_empty() {
return Err(std::io::Error::other(
"get_object_attributes is not supported by the current endpoint version",
));
}
let mut body_vec = Vec::new();
let mut body = resp.into_body();
while let Some(frame) = body.frame().await {
let frame = frame.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, e.to_string()))?;
if let Some(data) = frame.data_ref() {
body_vec.extend_from_slice(data);
}
}
if resp_status != http::StatusCode::OK {
let err_body =
String::from_utf8(body_vec).map_err(|e| std::io::Error::other(format!("invalid UTF-8 error body: {e}")))?;
let mut er = match quick_xml::de::from_str::<AccessControlPolicy>(&err_body) {
Ok(result) => result,
Err(err) => {
return Err(std::io::Error::other(err.to_string()));
}
};
return Err(std::io::Error::other(er.access_control_list.permission));
}
let mut oa = ObjectAttributes::new();
oa.parse_response(&h, body_vec).await?;
Ok(oa)
}
}
@@ -1,159 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use std::io;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
#[cfg(not(windows))]
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
use tokio::fs::{self, OpenOptions};
use tokio::io::{AsyncSeekExt, AsyncWriteExt, SeekFrom};
use crate::client::{
api_error_response::err_invalid_argument, api_get_options::GetObjectOptions, transition_api::TransitionClient,
};
async fn prepare_download_target(file_path: &Path) -> io::Result<()> {
match fs::metadata(file_path).await {
Ok(metadata) if metadata.is_dir() => {
return Err(io::Error::other(err_invalid_argument("filename is a directory.")));
}
Ok(_) => {}
Err(err) if err.kind() == io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {}
Err(err) => return Err(err),
}
if let Some(parent) = file_path.parent()
&& !parent.as_os_str().is_empty()
{
fs::create_dir_all(parent).await?;
#[cfg(not(windows))]
{
let mut permissions = fs::metadata(parent).await?.permissions();
permissions.set_mode(0o700);
fs::set_permissions(parent, permissions).await?;
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn build_part_path(file_path: &Path) -> PathBuf {
PathBuf::from(format!("{}.part.rustfs", file_path.display()))
}
async fn open_download_part_file(file_part_path: &Path) -> io::Result<tokio::fs::File> {
let mut options = OpenOptions::new();
options.create(true).read(true).write(true);
#[cfg(not(windows))]
options.mode(0o600);
options.open(file_part_path).await
}
async fn cleanup_part_file(file_part_path: &Path) {
let _ = fs::remove_file(file_part_path).await;
}
impl TransitionClient {
pub async fn fget_object(
&self,
bucket_name: &str,
object_name: &str,
file_path: &str,
mut opts: GetObjectOptions,
) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
let file_path = Path::new(file_path);
prepare_download_target(file_path).await?;
let file_part_path = build_part_path(file_path);
let mut file_part = open_download_part_file(&file_part_path).await?;
let existing_len = file_part.metadata().await?.len();
if existing_len > 0 {
opts.set_range(existing_len as i64, 0)?;
file_part.seek(SeekFrom::Start(existing_len)).await?;
}
let (_object_info, _headers, mut object_reader) = self.get_object_inner(bucket_name, object_name, &opts).await?;
if let Err(err) = tokio::io::copy(&mut object_reader, &mut file_part).await {
cleanup_part_file(&file_part_path).await;
return Err(err);
}
if let Err(err) = file_part.flush().await {
cleanup_part_file(&file_part_path).await;
return Err(err);
}
drop(file_part);
if let Err(err) = fs::rename(&file_part_path, file_path).await {
cleanup_part_file(&file_part_path).await;
return Err(err);
}
Ok(())
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use tempfile::tempdir;
#[tokio::test]
async fn prepare_download_target_allows_missing_file_and_creates_parent_dirs() {
let dir = tempdir().expect("temp dir");
let target = dir.path().join("nested").join("object.bin");
prepare_download_target(&target)
.await
.expect("missing target should be accepted");
assert!(target.parent().expect("parent").exists(), "parent directory should be created");
assert!(
fs::metadata(&target).await.is_err(),
"preparing the target should not create the final file eagerly"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn prepare_download_target_rejects_directory_paths() {
let dir = tempdir().expect("temp dir");
let target_dir = dir.path().join("download-dir");
fs::create_dir_all(&target_dir).await.expect("target dir");
let err = prepare_download_target(&target_dir)
.await
.expect_err("directory targets must be rejected");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("directory"), "unexpected error for directory target: {err}");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn open_download_part_file_creates_part_file() {
let dir = tempdir().expect("temp dir");
let target = dir.path().join("object.bin");
let part_path = build_part_path(&target);
let file = open_download_part_file(&part_path)
.await
.expect("part file should be created");
drop(file);
assert!(part_path.exists(), "part file should exist after creation");
}
}
-134
View File
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
#![allow(unused_imports)]
#![allow(unused_variables)]
#![allow(unused_mut)]
#![allow(unused_assignments)]
#![allow(unused_must_use)]
#![allow(clippy::all)]
use crate::client::{
api_error_response::{err_invalid_argument, http_resp_to_error_response},
api_get_object_acl::AccessControlList,
api_get_options::GetObjectOptions,
transition_api::{ObjectInfo, ReadCloser, ReaderImpl, RequestMetadata, TransitionClient, to_object_info},
};
use http::HeaderMap;
use http_body_util::BodyExt;
use hyper::body::Body;
use hyper::body::Bytes;
use s3s::dto::RestoreRequest;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::io::Cursor;
use tokio::io::BufReader;
const TIER_STANDARD: &str = "Standard";
const TIER_BULK: &str = "Bulk";
const TIER_EXPEDITED: &str = "Expedited";
#[derive(Debug, Default, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct Encryption {
pub encryption_type: String,
pub kms_context: String,
pub kms_key_id: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Default, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct MetadataEntry {
pub name: String,
pub value: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Default, serde::Serialize)]
pub struct S3 {
pub access_control_list: AccessControlList,
pub bucket_name: String,
pub prefix: String,
pub canned_acl: String,
pub encryption: Encryption,
pub storage_class: String,
//tagging: Tags,
pub user_metadata: MetadataEntry,
}
impl TransitionClient {
pub async fn restore_object(
&self,
bucket_name: &str,
object_name: &str,
version_id: &str,
restore_req: &RestoreRequest,
) -> Result<(), std::io::Error> {
/*let restore_request = match quick_xml::se::to_string(restore_req) {
Ok(buf) => buf,
Err(e) => {
return Err(std::io::Error::other(e));
}
};*/
let restore_request = "".to_string();
let restore_request_bytes = restore_request.as_bytes().to_vec();
let mut url_values = HashMap::new();
url_values.insert("restore".to_string(), "".to_string());
if version_id != "" {
url_values.insert("versionId".to_string(), version_id.to_string());
}
let restore_request_buffer = Bytes::from(restore_request_bytes.clone());
let resp = self
.execute_method(
http::Method::HEAD,
&mut RequestMetadata {
bucket_name: bucket_name.to_string(),
object_name: object_name.to_string(),
query_values: url_values,
custom_header: HeaderMap::new(),
content_sha256_hex: "".to_string(), //sum_sha256_hex(&restore_request_bytes),
content_md5_base64: "".to_string(), //sum_md5_base64(&restore_request_bytes),
content_body: ReaderImpl::Body(restore_request_buffer),
content_length: restore_request_bytes.len() as i64,
stream_sha256: false,
trailer: HeaderMap::new(),
pre_sign_url: Default::default(),
add_crc: Default::default(),
extra_pre_sign_header: Default::default(),
bucket_location: Default::default(),
expires: Default::default(),
},
)
.await?;
let resp_status = resp.status();
let h = resp.headers().clone();
let mut body_vec = Vec::new();
let mut body = resp.into_body();
while let Some(frame) = body.frame().await {
let frame = frame.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, e.to_string()))?;
if let Some(data) = frame.data_ref() {
body_vec.extend_from_slice(data);
}
}
if resp_status != http::StatusCode::ACCEPTED && resp_status != http::StatusCode::OK {
return Err(std::io::Error::other(http_resp_to_error_response(
resp_status,
&h,
body_vec,
bucket_name,
"",
)));
}
Ok(())
}
}
-3
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,3 @@ pub const TOTAL_WORKERS: i64 = 4;
pub const SIGN_V4_ALGORITHM: &str = "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256";
pub const ISO8601_DATEFORMAT: &[FormatItem<'_>] =
format_description!("[year]-[month]-[day]T[hour]:[minute]:[second].[subsecond]Z");
pub const GET_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES_TAGS: &str = "ETag,Checksum,StorageClass,ObjectSize,ObjectParts";
pub const GET_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES_MAX_PARTS: i64 = 1000;
-5
View File
@@ -16,12 +16,8 @@
#![allow(dead_code)]
pub mod admin_handler_utils;
pub mod api_bucket_policy;
pub mod api_error_response;
pub mod api_get_object;
pub mod api_get_object_acl;
pub mod api_get_object_attributes;
pub mod api_get_object_file;
pub mod api_get_options;
pub mod api_list;
pub mod api_put_object;
@@ -29,7 +25,6 @@ pub mod api_put_object_common;
pub mod api_put_object_multipart;
pub mod api_put_object_streaming;
pub mod api_remove;
pub mod api_restore;
pub mod api_s3_datatypes;
pub mod api_stat;
pub mod bucket_cache;
@@ -1006,16 +1006,6 @@ impl TransitionCore {
client.abort_multipart_upload(bucket_name, object, upload_id).await
}
pub async fn get_bucket_policy(&self, bucket_name: &str) -> Result<String, std::io::Error> {
let client = self.0.clone();
client.get_bucket_policy(bucket_name).await
}
pub async fn put_bucket_policy(&self, bucket_name: &str, bucket_policy: &str) -> Result<(), std::io::Error> {
let client = self.0.clone();
client.put_bucket_policy(bucket_name, bucket_policy).await
}
pub async fn get_object(
&self,
bucket_name: &str,
+631 -47
View File
@@ -15,12 +15,12 @@
#[cfg(test)]
use crate::cluster::rpc::http_auth::RPC_REPLAY_SCOPE_VERSION_HEADER;
use crate::cluster::rpc::http_auth::{
RPC_AUTH_VERSION_HEADER, RPC_AUTH_VERSION_V2, RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_CHALLENGE_HEADER, RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_HEADER,
RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_PROOF_HEADER, RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER, TIMESTAMP_HEADER,
};
use crate::cluster::rpc::{
gen_tonic_replay_scope_headers, gen_tonic_signature_headers, normalize_tonic_rpc_audience, verify_tonic_boot_epoch_response,
AuthenticatedPeerReplayCapabilities, RPC_AUTH_VERSION_HEADER, RPC_AUTH_VERSION_V2, RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_CHALLENGE_HEADER,
RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER, RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_HEADER, RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_PROOF_HEADER,
RollingMutationBodyDigest, TIMESTAMP_HEADER, internode_rpc_body_digest_strict,
verify_tonic_peer_replay_capabilities_response,
};
use crate::cluster::rpc::{gen_tonic_replay_scope_headers, gen_tonic_signature_headers, normalize_tonic_rpc_audience};
#[cfg(test)]
use crate::cluster::rpc::{tonic_boot_epoch_challenge, tonic_boot_epoch_response_headers};
use crate::disk::error::{DiskError, Error as DiskErrorType, RpcStatusError};
@@ -233,7 +233,22 @@ pub struct ReplayScopeChannel<S> {
/// The channel type used by internode clients after v2 authentication and replay-scope handling.
pub type AuthenticatedChannel = ReplayScopeChannel<Channel>;
static PEER_BOOT_EPOCHS: LazyLock<Mutex<HashMap<String, Uuid>>> = LazyLock::new(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
enum PeerReplayCapability {
Capable { boot_epoch: Uuid },
Revoked,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default, Eq, PartialEq)]
struct PeerReplayState {
boot_epoch: Option<Uuid>,
cache_capability: Option<PeerReplayCapability>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
struct PeerReplayStateSnapshot(PeerReplayState);
static PEER_REPLAY_STATES: LazyLock<Mutex<HashMap<String, PeerReplayState>>> = LazyLock::new(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
impl<S> ReplayScopeChannel<S> {
fn new(inner: S, audience: Option<String>) -> Self {
@@ -241,13 +256,67 @@ impl<S> ReplayScopeChannel<S> {
}
}
fn cached_peer_boot_epoch(audience: &str) -> Option<Uuid> {
PEER_BOOT_EPOCHS.lock().ok().and_then(|epochs| epochs.get(audience).copied())
fn peer_replay_state(audience: &str) -> PeerReplayState {
PEER_REPLAY_STATES
.lock()
.ok()
.and_then(|states| states.get(audience).copied())
.unwrap_or_default()
}
fn remember_peer_boot_epoch(audience: String, epoch: Uuid) {
if let Ok(mut epochs) = PEER_BOOT_EPOCHS.lock() {
epochs.insert(audience, epoch);
fn apply_peer_replay_response(
audience: String,
sent_state: PeerReplayState,
response: std::io::Result<AuthenticatedPeerReplayCapabilities>,
) {
if let Ok(mut states) = PEER_REPLAY_STATES.lock() {
let current_state = states.get(&audience).copied().unwrap_or_default();
let mut next_state = current_state;
if let Ok(response) = &response
&& sent_state.boot_epoch == current_state.boot_epoch
{
next_state.boot_epoch = Some(response.boot_epoch);
}
if sent_state.boot_epoch == current_state.boot_epoch {
let response_capability = response
.as_ref()
.ok()
.filter(|response| response.dynamic_replay_cache)
.map(|response| response.boot_epoch);
match (sent_state.cache_capability, current_state.cache_capability, response_capability) {
(None, None, Some(boot_epoch))
| (Some(PeerReplayCapability::Revoked), Some(PeerReplayCapability::Revoked), Some(boot_epoch)) => {
next_state.cache_capability = Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable { boot_epoch });
}
(
Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable {
boot_epoch: sent_boot_epoch,
}),
Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable {
boot_epoch: current_boot_epoch,
}),
Some(response_boot_epoch),
) if sent_boot_epoch == current_boot_epoch => {
next_state.cache_capability = Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable {
boot_epoch: response_boot_epoch,
});
}
(
Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable {
boot_epoch: sent_boot_epoch,
}),
Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable {
boot_epoch: current_boot_epoch,
}),
None,
) if sent_boot_epoch == current_boot_epoch => {
next_state.cache_capability = Some(PeerReplayCapability::Revoked);
}
_ => {}
}
}
states.insert(audience, next_state);
}
}
@@ -276,6 +345,11 @@ where
== Some(RPC_AUTH_VERSION_V2)
});
let challenge = authenticated.then(Uuid::new_v4);
let sent_state = request
.extensions()
.get::<PeerReplayStateSnapshot>()
.map(|snapshot| snapshot.0)
.unwrap_or_default();
if let (Some(audience), Some(challenge)) = (self.audience.as_deref(), challenge) {
// The challenge is independently HMAC-authenticated by the response proof. It is not
// part of v2 so old peers ignore it, while a new peer can safely advertise its epoch.
@@ -284,7 +358,7 @@ where
challenge.to_string().parse().expect("UUID must be a valid header value"),
);
if let (Some(boot_epoch), Some(timestamp), Some(content_sha256)) = (
cached_peer_boot_epoch(audience),
sent_state.boot_epoch,
request.headers().get(TIMESTAMP_HEADER).and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
request
.headers()
@@ -303,16 +377,21 @@ where
Box::pin(async move {
let response = future.await?;
if let (Some(audience), Some(challenge)) = (audience, challenge) {
match verify_tonic_boot_epoch_response(&audience, challenge, response.headers()) {
Ok(epoch) => remember_peer_boot_epoch(audience, epoch),
Err(error)
if response.headers().contains_key(RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_HEADER)
|| response.headers().contains_key(RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_PROOF_HEADER) =>
{
debug!(error = %error, "peer boot epoch response proof was rejected")
}
Err(_) => {}
let response_state = verify_tonic_peer_replay_capabilities_response(&audience, challenge, response.headers());
if let Err(error) = &response_state
&& (response.headers().contains_key(RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_HEADER)
|| response.headers().contains_key(RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_PROOF_HEADER))
{
debug!(
event = "internode_rpc_capability_proof_rejected",
component = "ecstore",
subsystem = "rpc_client",
result = "rejected",
error = %error,
"internode RPC capability proof rejected"
)
}
apply_peer_replay_response(audience, sent_state, response_state);
}
Ok(response)
})
@@ -321,6 +400,7 @@ where
pub struct TonicSignatureInterceptor {
audience: Option<String>,
body_digest_strict: bool,
}
impl tonic::service::Interceptor for TonicSignatureInterceptor {
@@ -337,9 +417,31 @@ impl tonic::service::Interceptor for TonicSignatureInterceptor {
.metadata()
.get(RPC_CONTENT_SHA256_HEADER)
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok());
// RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO(disk-mutation-body-digest): use cache-free v2 for peers without an authenticated boot epoch. Remove after every supported peer advertises the authenticated dynamic replay-cache capability and body-digest strict mode is the default.
// beta.11 verifies v2 body digests but stores their nonces in a fixed-size cache.
let rolling_mutation = req.extensions().get::<RollingMutationBodyDigest>().is_some();
let peer_state = PEER_REPLAY_STATES
.lock()
.map_err(|_| tonic::Status::unauthenticated("RPC peer capability state unavailable"))?
.get(audience)
.copied()
.unwrap_or_default();
let content_sha256 = if content_sha256.is_some() {
if peer_state.cache_capability == Some(PeerReplayCapability::Revoked) {
return Err(tonic::Status::unauthenticated("RPC peer replay capability changed"));
}
if rolling_mutation && !self.body_digest_strict && peer_state.boot_epoch.is_none() {
None
} else {
content_sha256
}
} else {
content_sha256
};
let headers = gen_tonic_signature_headers(audience, method.service(), method.method(), content_sha256)
.map_err(|_| tonic::Status::unauthenticated("No valid auth token"))?;
req.metadata_mut().as_mut().extend(headers);
req.extensions_mut().insert(PeerReplayStateSnapshot(peer_state));
inject_trace_context_into_metadata(req.metadata_mut());
inject_request_id_into_metadata(req.metadata_mut());
Ok(req)
@@ -347,7 +449,10 @@ impl tonic::service::Interceptor for TonicSignatureInterceptor {
}
pub fn gen_tonic_signature_interceptor() -> TonicSignatureInterceptor {
TonicSignatureInterceptor { audience: None }
TonicSignatureInterceptor {
audience: None,
body_digest_strict: internode_rpc_body_digest_strict(),
}
}
pub struct NoOpInterceptor;
@@ -409,6 +514,7 @@ mod tests {
#[derive(Clone)]
struct EpochProofService {
audience: String,
include_capability: bool,
seen_headers: std::sync::Arc<Mutex<Vec<http::HeaderMap>>>,
}
@@ -430,29 +536,97 @@ mod tests {
.expect("client challenge must be syntactically valid")
.expect("authenticated client request must carry a boot epoch challenge");
let mut response = HttpResponse::new(());
response.headers_mut().extend(
tonic_boot_epoch_response_headers(&self.audience, challenge)
.expect("test server must be able to sign an epoch proof"),
);
let mut headers = tonic_boot_epoch_response_headers(&self.audience, challenge)
.expect("test server must be able to sign an epoch proof");
if !self.include_capability {
headers.remove(RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_HEADER);
headers.remove(RPC_REPLAY_CACHE_CAPABILITY_PROOF_HEADER);
}
response.headers_mut().extend(headers);
std::future::ready(Ok(response))
}
}
#[derive(Clone)]
struct MissingProofService;
impl Service<HttpRequest<()>> for MissingProofService {
type Response = HttpResponse<()>;
type Error = std::convert::Infallible;
type Future = std::future::Ready<Result<Self::Response, Self::Error>>;
fn poll_ready(&mut self, _cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<Result<(), Self::Error>> {
Poll::Ready(Ok(()))
}
fn call(&mut self, _request: HttpRequest<()>) -> Self::Future {
std::future::ready(Ok(HttpResponse::new(())))
}
}
fn ensure_test_rpc_secret() {
runtime_sources::ensure_test_rpc_secret();
}
fn test_request() -> tonic::Request<()> {
test_request_for("Ping")
}
fn test_request_for(method: &'static str) -> tonic::Request<()> {
let mut request = tonic::Request::new(());
request
.extensions_mut()
.insert(tonic::GrpcMethod::new("node_service.NodeService", "Ping"));
.insert(tonic::GrpcMethod::new("node_service.NodeService", method));
request
}
fn test_interceptor() -> TonicSignatureInterceptor {
test_interceptor_for("node-a:9000", false)
}
fn test_interceptor_for(audience: &str, body_digest_strict: bool) -> TonicSignatureInterceptor {
TonicSignatureInterceptor {
audience: Some("node-a:9000".to_string()),
audience: Some(audience.to_string()),
body_digest_strict,
}
}
fn clear_peer_capability(audience: &str) {
PEER_REPLAY_STATES
.lock()
.expect("peer capability cache lock must not be poisoned")
.remove(audience);
}
fn rolling_mutation_request(method: &'static str) -> tonic::Request<()> {
let mut request = tonic::Request::new(rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::GenerallyLockRequest {
args: "canonical mutation request".to_string(),
});
request
.extensions_mut()
.insert(tonic::GrpcMethod::new("node_service.NodeService", method));
crate::cluster::rpc::set_tonic_rolling_mutation_body_digest(&mut request).expect("test mutation digest must be attached");
request.map(|_| ())
}
fn replay_scope_request(audience: &str, method: &'static str) -> HttpRequest<()> {
let mut request = HttpRequest::builder()
.uri(format!("/node_service.NodeService/{method}"))
.body(())
.expect("test RPC request must build");
request.headers_mut().extend(
gen_tonic_signature_headers(audience, "node_service.NodeService", method, None).expect("v2 test headers must mint"),
);
request
.extensions_mut()
.insert(PeerReplayStateSnapshot(peer_replay_state(audience)));
request
}
fn authenticated_peer_response(boot_epoch: Uuid, dynamic_replay_cache: bool) -> AuthenticatedPeerReplayCapabilities {
AuthenticatedPeerReplayCapabilities {
boot_epoch,
dynamic_replay_cache,
}
}
@@ -567,6 +741,431 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[test]
fn unknown_peer_mutations_use_cache_free_unsigned_v2() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let audience = "legacy-body-digest-client-test:9000";
clear_peer_capability(audience);
let mut interceptor = test_interceptor_for(audience, false);
for method in ["Lock", "WriteAll"] {
let request = interceptor
.call(rolling_mutation_request(method))
.expect("interceptor call should succeed");
assert_eq!(
request
.metadata()
.get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
Some("UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD")
);
assert_eq!(
request
.metadata()
.get("x-rustfs-rpc-nonce")
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
Some("unsigned")
);
assert!(
crate::cluster::rpc::verify_tonic_rpc_signature(
audience,
&format!("/node_service.NodeService/{method}"),
request.metadata().as_ref(),
)
.is_ok(),
"the cache-free request must retain valid audience- and method-bound v2 authentication"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn unknown_peer_exact_body_contract_remains_body_bound() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let audience = "exact-body-contract-client-test:9000";
clear_peer_capability(audience);
let mut interceptor = test_interceptor_for(audience, false);
let mut request = test_request_for("ScannerActivity");
crate::cluster::rpc::set_tonic_canonical_body_digest(&mut request, b"exact scanner activity body")
.expect("test exact body digest must be attached");
let expected_digest = request
.metadata()
.get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
.expect("test request must carry its digest")
.to_string();
let request = interceptor.call(request).expect("interceptor call should succeed");
assert_eq!(
request
.metadata()
.get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
Some(expected_digest.as_str())
);
assert!(
crate::cluster::rpc::verify_tonic_rpc_signature(
audience,
"/node_service.NodeService/ScannerActivity",
request.metadata().as_ref(),
)
.is_ok()
);
}
#[test]
fn unknown_peer_iam_mutation_helper_remains_body_bound() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let audience = "exact-iam-mutation-client-test:9000";
clear_peer_capability(audience);
let mut interceptor = test_interceptor_for(audience, false);
let mut request = tonic::Request::new(rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::DeleteUserRequest {
access_key: "target-access-key".to_string(),
});
request
.extensions_mut()
.insert(tonic::GrpcMethod::new("node_service.NodeService", "DeleteUser"));
crate::cluster::rpc::set_tonic_mutation_body_digest(&mut request).expect("test IAM mutation digest must be attached");
let request = request.map(|_| ());
let expected_digest = request
.metadata()
.get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
.expect("test IAM mutation must carry its digest")
.to_string();
let request = interceptor.call(request).expect("interceptor call should succeed");
assert_eq!(
request
.metadata()
.get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
Some(expected_digest.as_str())
);
assert!(
crate::cluster::rpc::verify_tonic_rpc_signature(
audience,
"/node_service.NodeService/DeleteUser",
request.metadata().as_ref(),
)
.is_ok(),
"IAM mutations must remain body-bound before capability discovery"
);
}
#[test]
fn authenticated_replay_cache_capability_enables_body_binding() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let audience = "body-digest-capable-client-test:9000";
clear_peer_capability(audience);
let seen_headers = std::sync::Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
let service = EpochProofService {
audience: audience.to_string(),
include_capability: true,
seen_headers,
};
let mut channel = ReplayScopeChannel::new(service, Some(audience.to_string()));
futures::executor::block_on(channel.call(replay_scope_request(audience, "Ping")))
.expect("authenticated capability probe must complete");
let mut interceptor = test_interceptor_for(audience, false);
let request = rolling_mutation_request("Lock");
let expected_digest = request
.metadata()
.get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
.expect("test mutation must carry its digest")
.to_string();
let request = interceptor.call(request).expect("interceptor call should succeed");
assert_eq!(
request
.metadata()
.get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
Some(expected_digest.as_str())
);
let nonce = request
.metadata()
.get("x-rustfs-rpc-nonce")
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|value| Uuid::parse_str(value).ok())
.expect("capable peer body-bound mutation must carry a UUID nonce");
assert!(!nonce.is_nil());
assert!(
crate::cluster::rpc::verify_tonic_rpc_signature(
audience,
"/node_service.NodeService/Lock",
request.metadata().as_ref(),
)
.is_ok(),
"the body-bound request must retain valid audience- and method-bound v2 authentication"
);
clear_peer_capability(audience);
}
#[test]
fn invalid_capability_proof_does_not_enable_body_binding() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let audience = "invalid-capability-client-test:9000";
clear_peer_capability(audience);
let service = EpochProofService {
audience: "wrong-capability-audience:9000".to_string(),
include_capability: true,
seen_headers: std::sync::Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
};
let mut channel = ReplayScopeChannel::new(service, Some(audience.to_string()));
futures::executor::block_on(channel.call(replay_scope_request(audience, "Ping")))
.expect("invalid capability response must still complete");
let mut interceptor = test_interceptor_for(audience, false);
let request = interceptor
.call(rolling_mutation_request("Lock"))
.expect("legacy-compatible mutation must still be signed");
assert_eq!(
request
.metadata()
.get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
Some("UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD")
);
}
#[test]
fn legacy_boot_proof_keeps_mutations_body_bound_and_enables_non_ping_v3() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let audience = "legacy-boot-proof-client-test:9000";
clear_peer_capability(audience);
let seen_headers = std::sync::Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
let service = EpochProofService {
audience: audience.to_string(),
include_capability: false,
seen_headers: seen_headers.clone(),
};
let mut channel = ReplayScopeChannel::new(service, Some(audience.to_string()));
futures::executor::block_on(channel.call(replay_scope_request(audience, "Ping")))
.expect("legacy boot proof response must complete");
let state = peer_replay_state(audience);
assert!(state.boot_epoch.is_some(), "authenticated legacy proof must enable replay-scoped v3");
assert_eq!(state.cache_capability, None);
let mut interceptor = test_interceptor_for(audience, false);
let request = rolling_mutation_request("Lock");
let expected_digest = request
.metadata()
.get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
.expect("test mutation must carry its digest")
.to_string();
let request = interceptor.call(request).expect("legacy-compatible mutation must be signed");
assert_eq!(
request
.metadata()
.get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
Some(expected_digest.as_str())
);
let (metadata, extensions, body) = request.into_parts();
let mut request = HttpRequest::new(body);
*request.uri_mut() = "/node_service.NodeService/Lock".parse().expect("test RPC URI must parse");
*request.headers_mut() = metadata.into_headers();
*request.extensions_mut() = extensions;
futures::executor::block_on(channel.call(request)).expect("legacy strict-compatible lock request must complete");
let headers = seen_headers.lock().expect("test header capture lock must not be poisoned");
assert!(
headers[1].contains_key(RPC_REPLAY_SCOPE_VERSION_HEADER),
"authenticated legacy boot proof must enable v3 on a non-Ping request"
);
}
#[test]
fn reordered_capability_responses_cannot_undo_newer_state() {
let audience = "reordered-capability-client-test:9000";
let epoch_one = Uuid::new_v4();
let epoch_two = Uuid::new_v4();
clear_peer_capability(audience);
let unknown = PeerReplayState::default();
apply_peer_replay_response(audience.to_string(), unknown, Ok(authenticated_peer_response(epoch_one, true)));
apply_peer_replay_response(audience.to_string(), unknown, Err(std::io::Error::other("delayed legacy response")));
let epoch_one_state = PeerReplayState {
boot_epoch: Some(epoch_one),
cache_capability: Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable { boot_epoch: epoch_one }),
};
assert_eq!(peer_replay_state(audience), epoch_one_state);
apply_peer_replay_response(audience.to_string(), epoch_one_state, Err(std::io::Error::other("rollback response")));
apply_peer_replay_response(audience.to_string(), epoch_one_state, Ok(authenticated_peer_response(epoch_one, true)));
assert_eq!(
peer_replay_state(audience),
PeerReplayState {
boot_epoch: Some(epoch_one),
cache_capability: Some(PeerReplayCapability::Revoked),
}
);
let revoked = peer_replay_state(audience);
apply_peer_replay_response(audience.to_string(), revoked, Ok(authenticated_peer_response(epoch_two, true)));
apply_peer_replay_response(audience.to_string(), epoch_one_state, Ok(authenticated_peer_response(epoch_one, true)));
assert_eq!(
peer_replay_state(audience),
PeerReplayState {
boot_epoch: Some(epoch_two),
cache_capability: Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable { boot_epoch: epoch_two }),
}
);
clear_peer_capability(audience);
}
#[test]
fn stale_capability_response_cannot_cross_a_new_boot_epoch() {
let audience = "cross-epoch-capability-client-test:9000";
let epoch_one = Uuid::new_v4();
let epoch_two = Uuid::new_v4();
let epoch_three = Uuid::new_v4();
clear_peer_capability(audience);
let revoked_epoch_one = PeerReplayState {
boot_epoch: Some(epoch_one),
cache_capability: Some(PeerReplayCapability::Revoked),
};
PEER_REPLAY_STATES
.lock()
.expect("peer replay state lock must not be poisoned")
.insert(audience.to_string(), revoked_epoch_one);
apply_peer_replay_response(
audience.to_string(),
revoked_epoch_one,
Ok(authenticated_peer_response(epoch_three, false)),
);
apply_peer_replay_response(audience.to_string(), revoked_epoch_one, Ok(authenticated_peer_response(epoch_two, true)));
assert_eq!(
peer_replay_state(audience),
PeerReplayState {
boot_epoch: Some(epoch_three),
cache_capability: Some(PeerReplayCapability::Revoked),
},
"a stale dynamic-cache proof must not cross a newer authenticated boot epoch"
);
clear_peer_capability(audience);
}
#[test]
fn interceptor_snapshot_prevents_delayed_legacy_response_from_revoking_capability() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let audience = "capability-snapshot-client-test:9000";
clear_peer_capability(audience);
let boot_epoch = Uuid::new_v4();
let mut interceptor = test_interceptor_for(audience, false);
let request = interceptor
.call(rolling_mutation_request("Lock"))
.expect("legacy-compatible request must pass the interceptor");
assert_eq!(
request
.extensions()
.get::<PeerReplayStateSnapshot>()
.map(|snapshot| snapshot.0),
Some(PeerReplayState::default()),
"interceptor must preserve its unknown-state admission snapshot"
);
let capable_state = PeerReplayState {
boot_epoch: Some(boot_epoch),
cache_capability: Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable { boot_epoch }),
};
PEER_REPLAY_STATES
.lock()
.expect("peer capability cache lock must not be poisoned")
.insert(audience.to_string(), capable_state);
let (metadata, extensions, body) = request.into_parts();
let mut request = HttpRequest::new(body);
*request.uri_mut() = "/node_service.NodeService/Lock".parse().expect("test RPC URI must parse");
*request.headers_mut() = metadata.into_headers();
*request.extensions_mut() = extensions;
let mut channel = ReplayScopeChannel::new(MissingProofService, Some(audience.to_string()));
futures::executor::block_on(channel.call(request)).expect("in-flight request response must complete");
assert_eq!(peer_replay_state(audience), capable_state);
clear_peer_capability(audience);
}
#[test]
fn strict_mode_keeps_unknown_peer_mutations_body_bound() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let audience = "strict-body-digest-client-test:9000";
clear_peer_capability(audience);
let mut interceptor = test_interceptor_for(audience, true);
let request = rolling_mutation_request("WriteAll");
let expected_digest = request
.metadata()
.get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
.expect("test mutation must carry its digest")
.to_string();
let request = interceptor.call(request).expect("interceptor call should succeed");
assert_eq!(
request
.metadata()
.get("x-rustfs-content-sha256")
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok()),
Some(expected_digest.as_str())
);
let nonce = request
.metadata()
.get("x-rustfs-rpc-nonce")
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|value| Uuid::parse_str(value).ok())
.expect("strict body-bound mutation must carry a UUID nonce");
assert!(!nonce.is_nil());
assert!(
crate::cluster::rpc::verify_tonic_rpc_signature(
audience,
"/node_service.NodeService/WriteAll",
request.metadata().as_ref(),
)
.is_ok()
);
}
#[test]
fn missing_capability_after_pin_fails_closed() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let audience = "revoked-capability-client-test:9000";
let boot_epoch = Uuid::new_v4();
PEER_REPLAY_STATES
.lock()
.expect("peer capability cache lock must not be poisoned")
.insert(
audience.to_string(),
PeerReplayState {
boot_epoch: Some(boot_epoch),
cache_capability: Some(PeerReplayCapability::Capable { boot_epoch }),
},
);
let mut channel = ReplayScopeChannel::new(MissingProofService, Some(audience.to_string()));
futures::executor::block_on(channel.call(replay_scope_request(audience, "Ping")))
.expect("legacy response must complete before capability rejection");
let mut interceptor = test_interceptor_for(audience, false);
let error = interceptor
.call(rolling_mutation_request("Lock"))
.expect_err("a peer that loses its pinned capability must fail closed");
assert_eq!(error.code(), tonic::Code::Unauthenticated);
assert_eq!(error.message(), "RPC peer replay capability changed");
clear_peer_capability(audience);
}
#[test]
fn test_signature_interceptor_binds_audience_from_peer_uri() {
let interceptor = TonicInterceptor::Signature(gen_tonic_signature_interceptor())
@@ -583,27 +1182,15 @@ mod tests {
fn replay_scope_channel_uses_epoch_proof_before_sending_v3() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let audience = "replay-scope-client-test:9000";
PEER_BOOT_EPOCHS
.lock()
.expect("peer epoch cache lock must not be poisoned")
.remove(audience);
clear_peer_capability(audience);
let seen_headers = std::sync::Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
let service = EpochProofService {
audience: audience.to_string(),
include_capability: true,
seen_headers: seen_headers.clone(),
};
let mut channel = ReplayScopeChannel::new(service, Some(audience.to_string()));
let make_request = || {
let mut request = HttpRequest::builder()
.uri("/node_service.NodeService/Ping")
.body(())
.expect("test RPC request must build");
request.headers_mut().extend(
gen_tonic_signature_headers(audience, "node_service.NodeService", "Ping", None)
.expect("v2 test headers must mint"),
);
request
};
let make_request = || replay_scope_request(audience, "Ping");
futures::executor::block_on(channel.call(make_request())).expect("first request must complete");
futures::executor::block_on(channel.call(make_request())).expect("second request must complete");
@@ -619,10 +1206,7 @@ mod tests {
headers[1].contains_key(RPC_REPLAY_SCOPE_VERSION_HEADER),
"the second request must carry the replay-scoped v3 signature"
);
PEER_BOOT_EPOCHS
.lock()
.expect("peer epoch cache lock must not be poisoned")
.remove(audience);
clear_peer_capability(audience);
}
#[test]
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -12,13 +12,17 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use crate::cluster::rpc::{build_auth_headers, verify_ns_scanner_capability};
use crate::cluster::rpc::{
build_auth_headers, build_put_file_auth_trailer, verify_ns_scanner_capability, verify_put_file_capability,
};
use crate::disk::error::{Error, Result};
use crate::disk::{FileReader, FileWriter};
use crate::storage_api_contracts::internode::{
NS_SCANNER_BODY_SHA256_QUERY, NS_SCANNER_CAPABILITY_CHALLENGE_QUERY, NS_SCANNER_CYCLE_QUERY, NS_SCANNER_LEADER_EPOCH_QUERY,
NS_SCANNER_PROTOCOL_VERSION, NS_SCANNER_PROTOCOL_VERSION_QUERY, NS_SCANNER_REQUEST_ID_QUERY, NS_SCANNER_SERVER_EPOCH_QUERY,
NS_SCANNER_SESSION_ID_QUERY, NS_SCANNER_SESSION_SEQUENCE_QUERY, NsScannerCapabilityResponse, WALK_DIR_BODY_SHA256_QUERY,
NS_SCANNER_SESSION_ID_QUERY, NS_SCANNER_SESSION_SEQUENCE_QUERY, NsScannerCapabilityResponse, PUT_FILE_AUTH_QUERY,
PUT_FILE_AUTH_V1, PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_CHALLENGE_QUERY, PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_QUERY, PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_VERSION,
PUT_FILE_NONCE_QUERY, PUT_FILE_SERVER_EPOCH_QUERY, PutFileCapabilityResponse, WALK_DIR_BODY_SHA256_QUERY,
WALK_DIR_STREAM_COMPLETION_QUERY, WALK_DIR_STREAM_COMPLETION_V1,
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
@@ -29,18 +33,29 @@ use rustfs_config::{
};
use rustfs_rio::{HttpReader, HttpWriter};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::sync::{Arc, OnceLock};
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::io::AsyncReadExt;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::future::Future;
use std::pin::Pin;
use std::sync::{Arc, LazyLock, OnceLock};
use std::task::{Context, Poll};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWrite};
use tokio::sync::OnceCell;
use uuid::Uuid;
static INTERNODE_DATA_TRANSPORT: OnceLock<std::result::Result<Arc<dyn InternodeDataTransport>, String>> = OnceLock::new();
const READ_FILE_STREAM_PATH: &str = "/rustfs/rpc/read_file_stream";
const PUT_FILE_STREAM_PATH: &str = "/rustfs/rpc/put_file_stream";
const PUT_FILE_AUTH_STREAM_PATH: &str = "/rustfs/rpc/put_file_stream_v1";
const PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_PATH: &str = "/rustfs/rpc/put_file_capability";
const WALK_DIR_PATH: &str = "/rustfs/rpc/walk_dir";
const NS_SCANNER_PATH: &str = "/rustfs/rpc/ns_scanner";
const NS_SCANNER_MAX_CAPABILITY_RESPONSE_SIZE: usize = 1024;
const PUT_FILE_MAX_CAPABILITY_RESPONSE_SIZE: usize = 1024;
const PUT_FILE_LEGACY_CAPABILITY_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
const PUT_FILE_V1_CAPABILITY_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
const PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_PROBE_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
const CONTENT_TYPE_JSON: &str = "application/json";
const CONTENT_TYPE_MSGPACK: &str = "application/msgpack";
@@ -51,6 +66,73 @@ fn unsupported_transport_message(transport: &str) -> String {
)
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
enum PutFileCapabilityState {
LegacyUntil(Instant),
V1 { server_epoch: Uuid, revalidate_after: Instant },
}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct PutFileCapabilityProbeFailure(Error);
impl PutFileCapabilityProbeFailure {
fn to_error(&self) -> Error {
match &self.0 {
Error::Io(error) => rustfs_rio::clone_internode_http_io_error(error)
.map(Error::Io)
.unwrap_or_else(|| self.0.clone()),
_ => self.0.clone(),
}
}
}
type PutFileCapabilityProbeOutcome = std::result::Result<Option<Uuid>, PutFileCapabilityProbeFailure>;
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
struct PutFileCapabilityFlight {
generation: u64,
v1_was_pinned: bool,
outcome: Arc<OnceCell<PutFileCapabilityProbeOutcome>>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct PutFileCapabilityCacheState {
cached: Option<PutFileCapabilityState>,
generation: u64,
in_flight: Option<PutFileCapabilityFlight>,
}
type PutFileCapabilityCacheEntry = Arc<tokio::sync::RwLock<PutFileCapabilityCacheState>>;
static PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_CACHE: LazyLock<parking_lot::RwLock<HashMap<String, PutFileCapabilityCacheEntry>>> =
LazyLock::new(|| parking_lot::RwLock::new(HashMap::new()));
fn put_file_capability_cache_entry(endpoint: &str) -> PutFileCapabilityCacheEntry {
if let Some(entry) = PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_CACHE.read().get(endpoint).cloned() {
return entry;
}
PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_CACHE
.write()
.entry(endpoint.to_owned())
.or_insert_with(|| Arc::new(tokio::sync::RwLock::new(PutFileCapabilityCacheState::default())))
.clone()
}
fn fresh_put_file_capability(state: Option<PutFileCapabilityState>, now: Instant) -> Option<Option<Uuid>> {
match state {
Some(PutFileCapabilityState::V1 {
server_epoch,
revalidate_after,
}) if now < revalidate_after => Some(Some(server_epoch)),
Some(PutFileCapabilityState::LegacyUntil(expires_at)) if now < expires_at => Some(None),
Some(PutFileCapabilityState::V1 { .. }) | Some(PutFileCapabilityState::LegacyUntil(_)) | None => None,
}
}
fn put_file_capability_status_is_legacy(status: u16) -> bool {
status == 404
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Eq, PartialEq)]
pub struct InternodeDataTransportCapabilities {
/// Backend can open a streaming remote disk reader.
@@ -166,10 +248,16 @@ impl InternodeDataTransport for TcpHttpInternodeDataTransport {
}
async fn open_write(&self, request: WriteStreamRequest) -> Result<FileWriter> {
let url = build_put_file_stream_url(&request);
let server_epoch = self.put_file_auth_capability(&request.endpoint).await?;
let nonce = server_epoch.map(|_| Uuid::new_v4());
let url = build_put_file_stream_url(&request, nonce.zip(server_epoch));
let mut headers = json_headers();
build_auth_headers(&url, &Method::PUT, &mut headers)?;
Ok(Box::new(HttpWriter::new(url, Method::PUT, headers).await?))
let writer = HttpWriter::new(url.clone(), Method::PUT, headers).await?;
match nonce {
Some(nonce) => Ok(Box::new(PutFileAuthWriter::new(writer, url, nonce))),
None => Ok(Box::new(writer)),
}
}
async fn open_walk_dir(&self, request: WalkDirStreamRequest) -> Result<FileReader> {
@@ -223,6 +311,134 @@ impl InternodeDataTransport for TcpHttpInternodeDataTransport {
}
}
impl TcpHttpInternodeDataTransport {
async fn put_file_auth_capability(&self, endpoint: &str) -> Result<Option<Uuid>> {
resolve_put_file_auth_capability(endpoint, || async {
tokio::time::timeout(PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_PROBE_TIMEOUT, self.probe_put_file_auth(endpoint))
.await
.map_err(|_| {
Error::from(rustfs_rio::internode_http_timeout_error(
&Method::GET,
&format!("{endpoint}{PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_PATH}"),
))
})?
})
.await
}
async fn probe_put_file_auth(&self, endpoint: &str) -> Result<Option<Uuid>> {
let challenge = Uuid::new_v4();
let url = build_put_file_capability_url(endpoint, challenge);
let mut headers = msgpack_headers();
build_auth_headers(&url, &Method::GET, &mut headers)?;
let reader = match HttpReader::new(url, Method::GET, headers, None).await {
Ok(reader) => reader,
Err(err) => {
let err = Error::from(err);
if matches!(
err.internode_http_error_kind(),
Some(rustfs_rio::InternodeHttpErrorKind::HttpStatus(status))
if put_file_capability_status_is_legacy(status.as_u16())
) {
return Ok(None);
}
return Err(err);
}
};
let mut body = Vec::new();
reader
.take(u64::try_from(PUT_FILE_MAX_CAPABILITY_RESPONSE_SIZE + 1).unwrap_or(u64::MAX))
.read_to_end(&mut body)
.await?;
Ok(Some(verify_put_file_capability_response(challenge, &body)?))
}
}
async fn resolve_put_file_auth_capability<F, Fut>(endpoint: &str, probe: F) -> Result<Option<Uuid>>
where
F: FnOnce() -> Fut,
Fut: Future<Output = Result<Option<Uuid>>>,
{
let entry = put_file_capability_cache_entry(endpoint);
{
let state = entry.read().await;
if let Some(cached) = fresh_put_file_capability(state.cached, Instant::now()) {
return Ok(cached);
}
}
let flight = {
let mut state = entry.write().await;
if let Some(cached) = fresh_put_file_capability(state.cached, Instant::now()) {
return Ok(cached);
}
if let Some(flight) = state.in_flight.clone() {
flight
} else {
state.generation = state
.generation
.checked_add(1)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other("put_file capability probe generation exhausted"))?;
let flight = PutFileCapabilityFlight {
generation: state.generation,
v1_was_pinned: matches!(state.cached, Some(PutFileCapabilityState::V1 { .. })),
outcome: Arc::new(OnceCell::new()),
};
state.in_flight = Some(flight.clone());
flight
}
};
let outcome = flight
.outcome
.get_or_init(|| async { probe().await.map_err(PutFileCapabilityProbeFailure) })
.await;
{
let mut state = entry.write().await;
let is_current_flight = state
.in_flight
.as_ref()
.is_some_and(|current| current.generation == flight.generation && Arc::ptr_eq(&current.outcome, &flight.outcome));
if is_current_flight {
match outcome {
Ok(Some(server_epoch)) => {
state.cached = Some(PutFileCapabilityState::V1 {
server_epoch: *server_epoch,
revalidate_after: Instant::now() + PUT_FILE_V1_CAPABILITY_TTL,
});
}
Ok(None) if !flight.v1_was_pinned => {
state.cached = Some(PutFileCapabilityState::LegacyUntil(Instant::now() + PUT_FILE_LEGACY_CAPABILITY_TTL));
}
Ok(None) | Err(_) => {}
}
state.in_flight = None;
}
}
match outcome {
Ok(Some(server_epoch)) => Ok(Some(*server_epoch)),
Ok(None) if flight.v1_was_pinned => Err(Error::other("remote put_file capability downgrade rejected")),
Ok(None) => Ok(None),
Err(failure) => Err(failure.to_error()),
}
}
fn verify_put_file_capability_response(challenge: Uuid, body: &[u8]) -> Result<Uuid> {
if body.is_empty() || body.len() > PUT_FILE_MAX_CAPABILITY_RESPONSE_SIZE {
return Err(Error::other("invalid remote put_file capability response size"));
}
let response: PutFileCapabilityResponse =
rmp_serde::from_slice(body).map_err(|_| Error::other("invalid remote put_file capability response"))?;
if response.version != PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_VERSION || response.server_epoch.is_nil() {
return Err(Error::other("incompatible remote put_file capability response"));
}
verify_put_file_capability(challenge, response.server_epoch, response.version, &response.proof)
.map_err(|err| Error::other(format!("remote put_file capability authentication failed: {err}")))?;
Ok(response.server_epoch)
}
fn build_read_file_stream_url(request: &ReadStreamRequest) -> String {
format!(
"{}{}?disk={}&volume={}&path={}&offset={}&length={}",
@@ -236,19 +452,133 @@ fn build_read_file_stream_url(request: &ReadStreamRequest) -> String {
)
}
fn build_put_file_stream_url(request: &WriteStreamRequest) -> String {
format!(
fn build_put_file_stream_url(request: &WriteStreamRequest, auth_scope: Option<(Uuid, Uuid)>) -> String {
let stream_path = if auth_scope.is_some() {
PUT_FILE_AUTH_STREAM_PATH
} else {
PUT_FILE_STREAM_PATH
};
let mut url = format!(
"{}{}?disk={}&volume={}&path={}&append={}&size={}",
request.endpoint,
PUT_FILE_STREAM_PATH,
stream_path,
urlencoding::encode(&request.disk),
urlencoding::encode(&request.volume),
urlencoding::encode(&request.path),
request.append,
request.size
);
if let Some((nonce, server_epoch)) = auth_scope {
url.push_str(&format!(
"&{}={}&{}={}&{}={}",
PUT_FILE_AUTH_QUERY, PUT_FILE_AUTH_V1, PUT_FILE_NONCE_QUERY, nonce, PUT_FILE_SERVER_EPOCH_QUERY, server_epoch
));
}
url
}
fn build_put_file_capability_url(endpoint: &str, challenge: Uuid) -> String {
format!(
"{}{}?{}={}&{}={}",
endpoint,
PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_PATH,
PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_QUERY,
PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_VERSION,
PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_CHALLENGE_QUERY,
challenge
)
}
struct PutFileAuthWriter<W> {
inner: W,
url: String,
nonce: Uuid,
hasher: Sha256,
trailer: Option<Vec<u8>>,
trailer_offset: usize,
}
impl<W> PutFileAuthWriter<W> {
fn new(inner: W, url: String, nonce: Uuid) -> Self {
Self {
inner,
url,
nonce,
hasher: Sha256::new(),
trailer: None,
trailer_offset: 0,
}
}
fn ensure_trailer(&mut self) -> std::io::Result<()> {
if self.trailer.is_some() {
return Ok(());
}
let digest = hex_simd::encode_to_string(self.hasher.clone().finalize(), hex_simd::AsciiCase::Lower);
self.trailer = Some(build_put_file_auth_trailer(&self.url, &Method::PUT, self.nonce, &digest)?);
Ok(())
}
fn poll_write_trailer(&mut self, cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<std::io::Result<()>>
where
W: AsyncWrite + Unpin,
{
self.ensure_trailer()?;
let Some(trailer) = self.trailer.as_ref() else {
return Poll::Ready(Err(std::io::Error::other("put_file auth trailer missing")));
};
while self.trailer_offset < trailer.len() {
let written = match Pin::new(&mut self.inner).poll_write(cx, &trailer[self.trailer_offset..]) {
Poll::Ready(Ok(0)) => {
return Poll::Ready(Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::WriteZero,
"failed to write put_file auth trailer",
)));
}
Poll::Ready(Ok(written)) => written,
Poll::Ready(Err(err)) => return Poll::Ready(Err(err)),
Poll::Pending => return Poll::Pending,
};
self.trailer_offset += written;
}
Poll::Ready(Ok(()))
}
}
impl<W> AsyncWrite for PutFileAuthWriter<W>
where
W: AsyncWrite + Unpin,
{
fn poll_write(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>, buf: &[u8]) -> Poll<std::io::Result<usize>> {
if self.trailer.is_some() {
return Poll::Ready(Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe,
"cannot write after put_file auth trailer",
)));
}
match Pin::new(&mut self.inner).poll_write(cx, buf) {
Poll::Ready(Ok(written)) => {
self.hasher.update(&buf[..written]);
Poll::Ready(Ok(written))
}
other => other,
}
}
fn poll_flush(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<std::io::Result<()>> {
Pin::new(&mut self.inner).poll_flush(cx)
}
fn poll_shutdown(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<std::io::Result<()>> {
match self.poll_write_trailer(cx) {
Poll::Ready(Ok(())) => {}
Poll::Ready(Err(err)) => return Poll::Ready(Err(err)),
Poll::Pending => return Poll::Pending,
}
Pin::new(&mut self.inner).poll_shutdown(cx)
}
}
fn build_walk_dir_url(request: &WalkDirStreamRequest) -> String {
let body_sha256 = hex_simd::encode_to_string(Sha256::digest(&request.body), hex_simd::AsciiCase::Lower);
format!(
@@ -348,6 +678,28 @@ pub fn build_internode_data_transport_from_env() -> Result<Arc<dyn InternodeData
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use tokio::sync::{Barrier, Notify};
async fn wait_for_capability_flight_waiters(entry: &PutFileCapabilityCacheEntry, waiters: usize) {
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), async {
loop {
let strong_count = entry
.read()
.await
.in_flight
.as_ref()
.map(|flight| Arc::strong_count(&flight.outcome))
.unwrap_or_default();
if strong_count > waiters {
return;
}
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
}
})
.await
.expect("capability callers should join the in-flight probe");
}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct LegacyTestTransport;
@@ -455,14 +807,17 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn put_file_stream_url_encodes_query_values() {
let url = build_put_file_stream_url(&WriteStreamRequest {
endpoint: "http://node1:9000".to_string(),
disk: "http://node1:9000/data/rustfs0".to_string(),
volume: "bucket".to_string(),
path: "object/part.1".to_string(),
append: false,
size: 4096,
});
let url = build_put_file_stream_url(
&WriteStreamRequest {
endpoint: "http://node1:9000".to_string(),
disk: "http://node1:9000/data/rustfs0".to_string(),
volume: "bucket".to_string(),
path: "object/part.1".to_string(),
append: false,
size: 4096,
},
None,
);
assert_eq!(
url,
@@ -470,6 +825,450 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[test]
fn put_file_stream_url_advertises_auth_nonce_when_enabled() {
let nonce = Uuid::parse_str("11111111-2222-4333-8444-555555555555").expect("nonce");
let server_epoch = Uuid::parse_str("aaaaaaaa-bbbb-4ccc-8ddd-eeeeeeeeeeee").expect("server epoch");
let url = build_put_file_stream_url(
&WriteStreamRequest {
endpoint: "http://node1:9000".to_string(),
disk: "http://node1:9000/data/rustfs0".to_string(),
volume: "bucket".to_string(),
path: "object/part.1".to_string(),
append: false,
size: 4096,
},
Some((nonce, server_epoch)),
);
assert_eq!(
url,
concat!(
"http://node1:9000/rustfs/rpc/put_file_stream_v1?disk=http%3A%2F%2Fnode1%3A9000%2Fdata%2Frustfs0",
"&volume=bucket&path=object%2Fpart.1&append=false&size=4096",
"&put_file_auth=digest-trailer-v1&put_file_nonce=11111111-2222-4333-8444-555555555555",
"&put_file_server_epoch=aaaaaaaa-bbbb-4ccc-8ddd-eeeeeeeeeeee"
)
);
}
#[test]
fn put_file_capability_url_binds_version_and_challenge() {
let challenge = Uuid::parse_str("11111111-2222-4333-8444-555555555555").expect("challenge");
assert_eq!(
build_put_file_capability_url("http://node1:9000", challenge),
concat!(
"http://node1:9000/rustfs/rpc/put_file_capability?put_file_capability=1",
"&put_file_challenge=11111111-2222-4333-8444-555555555555"
)
);
}
#[test]
fn put_file_capability_legacy_statuses_are_exact() {
assert!(put_file_capability_status_is_legacy(404));
for status in [200, 400, 401, 403, 405, 408, 426, 429, 500, 503] {
assert!(!put_file_capability_status_is_legacy(status));
}
}
#[test]
fn put_file_capability_timeout_is_retryable() {
let error = Error::from(rustfs_rio::internode_http_timeout_error(
&Method::GET,
"http://node:9000/rustfs/rpc/put_file_capability",
));
assert_eq!(
error.internode_http_error_kind(),
Some(rustfs_rio::InternodeHttpErrorKind::ConnectTimeout)
);
assert!(error.is_retryable_internode_write_failure());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn put_file_capability_cache_pins_v1_and_honors_live_legacy_ttl() {
let transport = TcpHttpInternodeDataTransport;
let v1_endpoint = format!("http://v1-{}.invalid", Uuid::new_v4());
let v1_entry = put_file_capability_cache_entry(&v1_endpoint);
let server_epoch = Uuid::new_v4();
v1_entry.write().await.cached = Some(PutFileCapabilityState::V1 {
server_epoch,
revalidate_after: Instant::now() + PUT_FILE_V1_CAPABILITY_TTL,
});
assert_eq!(
transport.put_file_auth_capability(&v1_endpoint).await.expect("v1 cache"),
Some(server_epoch)
);
let cache_probe_called = AtomicBool::new(false);
assert_eq!(
resolve_put_file_auth_capability(&v1_endpoint, || async {
cache_probe_called.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
Ok(None)
})
.await
.expect("live v1 cache"),
Some(server_epoch)
);
assert!(!cache_probe_called.load(Ordering::SeqCst));
v1_entry.write().await.cached = Some(PutFileCapabilityState::V1 {
server_epoch,
revalidate_after: Instant::now(),
});
assert!(
resolve_put_file_auth_capability(&v1_endpoint, || async { Ok(None) })
.await
.is_err()
);
let replacement_epoch = Uuid::new_v4();
assert_eq!(
resolve_put_file_auth_capability(&v1_endpoint, || async { Ok(Some(replacement_epoch)) })
.await
.expect("authenticated replacement should refresh the epoch"),
Some(replacement_epoch)
);
let legacy_endpoint = format!("http://legacy-{}.invalid", Uuid::new_v4());
let legacy_entry = put_file_capability_cache_entry(&legacy_endpoint);
legacy_entry.write().await.cached =
Some(PutFileCapabilityState::LegacyUntil(Instant::now() + PUT_FILE_LEGACY_CAPABILITY_TTL));
assert!(
transport
.put_file_auth_capability(&legacy_endpoint)
.await
.expect("legacy cache")
.is_none()
);
let expired_endpoint = format!("http://expired-legacy-{}.invalid", Uuid::new_v4());
let expired_entry = put_file_capability_cache_entry(&expired_endpoint);
expired_entry.write().await.cached = Some(PutFileCapabilityState::LegacyUntil(Instant::now()));
let reprobed = std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool::new(false);
assert_eq!(
resolve_put_file_auth_capability(&expired_endpoint, || async {
reprobed.store(true, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
Ok(Some(server_epoch))
})
.await
.expect("expired legacy cache should reprobe"),
Some(server_epoch)
);
assert!(reprobed.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn legacy_put_file_capability_omits_the_auth_trailer_protocol() {
let endpoint = format!("http://legacy-selection-{}.invalid", Uuid::new_v4());
let server_epoch = resolve_put_file_auth_capability(&endpoint, || async { Ok(None) })
.await
.expect("legacy capability result");
let auth_scope = server_epoch.map(|epoch| (Uuid::new_v4(), epoch));
let url = build_put_file_stream_url(
&WriteStreamRequest {
endpoint,
disk: "http://node1:9000/data/rustfs0".to_string(),
volume: "bucket".to_string(),
path: "object/part.1".to_string(),
append: false,
size: 4096,
},
auth_scope,
);
assert!(auth_scope.is_none());
assert!(!url.contains(PUT_FILE_AUTH_QUERY));
assert!(!url.contains(PUT_FILE_NONCE_QUERY));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn put_file_capability_probe_is_singleflight_per_endpoint() {
let endpoint = format!("http://singleflight-{}.invalid", Uuid::new_v4());
let entry = put_file_capability_cache_entry(&endpoint);
let calls = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
let release = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let start = Arc::new(Barrier::new(65));
let mut tasks = Vec::with_capacity(64);
for _ in 0..64 {
let endpoint = endpoint.clone();
let calls = Arc::clone(&calls);
let release = Arc::clone(&release);
let start = Arc::clone(&start);
tasks.push(tokio::spawn(async move {
start.wait().await;
resolve_put_file_auth_capability(&endpoint, || async move {
calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
release.notified().await;
Err(Error::from(rustfs_rio::new_test_internode_http_io_error(
rustfs_rio::InternodeHttpErrorKind::ConnectionRefused,
)))
})
.await
}));
}
start.wait().await;
wait_for_capability_flight_waiters(&entry, 64).await;
assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
release.notify_waiters();
let results = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(1), futures::future::join_all(tasks))
.await
.expect("all callers should finish within one probe window");
for result in results {
let error = result.expect("capability task should finish").expect_err("probe should fail");
assert_eq!(
error.internode_http_error_kind(),
Some(rustfs_rio::InternodeHttpErrorKind::ConnectionRefused)
);
assert!(error.is_retryable_internode_write_failure());
}
assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn put_file_capability_probe_recovers_when_initializer_is_cancelled() {
let endpoint = format!("http://cancelled-singleflight-{}.invalid", Uuid::new_v4());
let entry = put_file_capability_cache_entry(&endpoint);
let calls = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
let initializer_started = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let never_release = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let first = {
let endpoint = endpoint.clone();
let calls = Arc::clone(&calls);
let initializer_started = Arc::clone(&initializer_started);
let never_release = Arc::clone(&never_release);
tokio::spawn(async move {
resolve_put_file_auth_capability(&endpoint, || async move {
calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
initializer_started.notify_one();
never_release.notified().await;
Ok(Some(Uuid::new_v4()))
})
.await
})
};
initializer_started.notified().await;
let replacement_epoch = Uuid::new_v4();
let second = {
let endpoint = endpoint.clone();
let calls = Arc::clone(&calls);
tokio::spawn(async move {
resolve_put_file_auth_capability(&endpoint, || async move {
calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
Ok(Some(replacement_epoch))
})
.await
})
};
wait_for_capability_flight_waiters(&entry, 2).await;
first.abort();
assert!(first.await.expect_err("initializer should be cancelled").is_cancelled());
assert_eq!(
second.await.expect("waiter should finish").expect("waiter should take over"),
Some(replacement_epoch)
);
assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 2);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn put_file_capability_probe_recovers_after_all_callers_cancel() {
let endpoint = format!("http://all-cancelled-{}.invalid", Uuid::new_v4());
let entry = put_file_capability_cache_entry(&endpoint);
let calls = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
let initializer_started = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let never_release = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let first = {
let endpoint = endpoint.clone();
let calls = Arc::clone(&calls);
let initializer_started = Arc::clone(&initializer_started);
let never_release = Arc::clone(&never_release);
tokio::spawn(async move {
resolve_put_file_auth_capability(&endpoint, || async move {
calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
initializer_started.notify_one();
never_release.notified().await;
Ok(None)
})
.await
})
};
initializer_started.notified().await;
let second = {
let endpoint = endpoint.clone();
let calls = Arc::clone(&calls);
tokio::spawn(async move {
resolve_put_file_auth_capability(&endpoint, || async move {
calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
Ok(None)
})
.await
})
};
wait_for_capability_flight_waiters(&entry, 2).await;
first.abort();
second.abort();
assert!(first.await.expect_err("initializer should be cancelled").is_cancelled());
assert!(second.await.expect_err("waiter should be cancelled").is_cancelled());
let server_epoch = Uuid::new_v4();
assert_eq!(
resolve_put_file_auth_capability(&endpoint, || async {
calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
Ok(Some(server_epoch))
})
.await
.expect("later caller should initialize the abandoned flight"),
Some(server_epoch)
);
assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 2);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn put_file_capability_failed_wave_can_retry_immediately() {
let endpoint = format!("http://retry-after-failure-{}.invalid", Uuid::new_v4());
let first = resolve_put_file_auth_capability(&endpoint, || async { Err(Error::Timeout) }).await;
assert!(matches!(first, Err(Error::Timeout)));
let server_epoch = Uuid::new_v4();
assert_eq!(
resolve_put_file_auth_capability(&endpoint, || async { Ok(Some(server_epoch)) })
.await
.expect("new request should reprobe"),
Some(server_epoch)
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn put_file_capability_probes_different_endpoints_in_parallel() {
let first_endpoint = format!("http://parallel-a-{}.invalid", Uuid::new_v4());
let second_endpoint = format!("http://parallel-b-{}.invalid", Uuid::new_v4());
let probes_started = Arc::new(Barrier::new(2));
let first_barrier = Arc::clone(&probes_started);
let second_barrier = Arc::clone(&probes_started);
let results = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), async {
tokio::join!(
resolve_put_file_auth_capability(&first_endpoint, || async move {
first_barrier.wait().await;
Ok(None)
}),
resolve_put_file_auth_capability(&second_endpoint, || async move {
second_barrier.wait().await;
Ok(None)
})
)
})
.await
.expect("different endpoints should not serialize");
assert!(results.0.expect("first result").is_none());
assert!(results.1.expect("second result").is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn stale_put_file_capability_flight_cannot_overwrite_newer_state() {
let endpoint = format!("http://stale-flight-{}.invalid", Uuid::new_v4());
let entry = put_file_capability_cache_entry(&endpoint);
let probe_started = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let release = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let stale_epoch = Uuid::new_v4();
let newer_epoch = Uuid::new_v4();
let task = {
let endpoint = endpoint.clone();
let probe_started = Arc::clone(&probe_started);
let release = Arc::clone(&release);
tokio::spawn(async move {
resolve_put_file_auth_capability(&endpoint, || async move {
probe_started.notify_one();
release.notified().await;
Ok(Some(stale_epoch))
})
.await
})
};
probe_started.notified().await;
{
let mut state = entry.write().await;
state.generation = state.generation.checked_add(1).expect("test generation should advance");
state.cached = Some(PutFileCapabilityState::V1 {
server_epoch: newer_epoch,
revalidate_after: Instant::now() + PUT_FILE_V1_CAPABILITY_TTL,
});
state.in_flight = None;
}
release.notify_one();
assert_eq!(
task.await.expect("stale task should finish").expect("stale probe result"),
Some(stale_epoch)
);
assert_eq!(
fresh_put_file_capability(entry.read().await.cached, Instant::now()),
Some(Some(newer_epoch))
);
}
#[test]
fn put_file_capability_response_fails_closed_on_malformed_or_unbound_data() {
let _ = rustfs_credentials::set_global_rpc_secret("put-file-capability-response-test-secret".to_string());
let challenge = Uuid::parse_str("11111111-2222-4333-8444-555555555555").expect("challenge");
let server_epoch = Uuid::parse_str("aaaaaaaa-bbbb-4ccc-8ddd-eeeeeeeeeeee").expect("server epoch");
let proof = crate::cluster::rpc::sign_put_file_capability(challenge, server_epoch, PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_VERSION)
.expect("proof should build");
let response = PutFileCapabilityResponse {
version: PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_VERSION,
server_epoch,
proof,
};
let body = rmp_serde::to_vec_named(&response).expect("response should encode");
assert_eq!(
verify_put_file_capability_response(challenge, &body).expect("response should verify"),
server_epoch
);
assert!(verify_put_file_capability_response(Uuid::new_v4(), &body).is_err());
assert!(verify_put_file_capability_response(challenge, &body[..body.len() - 1]).is_err());
assert!(verify_put_file_capability_response(challenge, &[]).is_err());
assert!(verify_put_file_capability_response(challenge, &vec![0_u8; PUT_FILE_MAX_CAPABILITY_RESPONSE_SIZE + 1]).is_err());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn put_file_auth_writer_appends_trailer_on_shutdown() {
use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
let _ = rustfs_credentials::set_global_rpc_secret("put-file-auth-writer-test-secret".to_string());
let nonce = Uuid::parse_str("11111111-2222-4333-8444-555555555555").expect("nonce");
let url = concat!(
"http://node1:9000/rustfs/rpc/put_file_stream?disk=disk-a&volume=bucket&path=object%2Fpart.1",
"&append=false&size=11&put_file_auth=digest-trailer-v1&put_file_nonce=11111111-2222-4333-8444-555555555555"
)
.to_string();
let mut sink = Vec::new();
{
let mut writer = PutFileAuthWriter::new(&mut sink, url.clone(), nonce);
writer.write_all(b"hello world").await.expect("body write should succeed");
writer.shutdown().await.expect("shutdown should append auth trailer");
let err = writer
.write_all(b"!")
.await
.expect_err("post-trailer writes must be rejected");
assert_eq!(err.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe);
}
assert_eq!(&sink[..11], b"hello world");
let trailer = &sink[11..];
let expected_digest = hex_simd::encode_to_string(Sha256::digest(b"hello world"), hex_simd::AsciiCase::Lower);
let verified = crate::cluster::rpc::verify_put_file_auth_trailer(&url, &Method::PUT, nonce, trailer)
.expect("emitted trailer should verify");
assert_eq!(verified, expected_digest);
}
#[test]
fn walk_dir_url_encodes_disk_ref() {
let url = build_walk_dir_url(&WalkDirStreamRequest {
+6 -4
View File
@@ -32,10 +32,12 @@ pub use client::{
// Re-exported through `api::rpc`; not every item is consumed inside this crate.
#[allow(unused_imports)]
pub use http_auth::{
TONIC_RPC_PREFIX, build_auth_headers, gen_signature_headers, gen_tonic_replay_scope_headers, gen_tonic_signature_headers,
normalize_tonic_rpc_audience, set_tonic_canonical_body_digest, set_tonic_mutation_body_digest, sign_ns_scanner_capability,
sign_tonic_rpc_response_proof, tonic_boot_epoch_challenge, tonic_boot_epoch_response_headers, verify_ns_scanner_capability,
verify_rpc_signature, verify_tonic_boot_epoch_response, verify_tonic_canonical_body_digest,
TONIC_RPC_PREFIX, build_auth_headers, build_put_file_auth_trailer, check_and_record_signed_rpc_nonce, gen_signature_headers,
gen_tonic_replay_scope_headers, gen_tonic_signature_headers, normalize_tonic_rpc_audience, set_tonic_canonical_body_digest,
set_tonic_mutation_body_digest, set_tonic_rolling_canonical_body_digest, set_tonic_rolling_mutation_body_digest,
sign_ns_scanner_capability, sign_put_file_capability, sign_tonic_rpc_response_proof, tonic_boot_epoch_challenge,
tonic_boot_epoch_response_headers, tonic_rpc_auth_failure_reason, verify_ns_scanner_capability, verify_put_file_auth_trailer,
verify_put_file_capability, verify_rpc_signature, verify_tonic_boot_epoch_response, verify_tonic_canonical_body_digest,
verify_tonic_mutation_body_digest, verify_tonic_rpc_response_proof, verify_tonic_rpc_signature,
verify_tonic_rpc_signature_with_bootstrap,
};

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