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Author SHA1 Message Date
overtrue 195f19217f fix(ecstore): collapse ILM expiry worker env knobs to canonical name 2026-08-13 03:04:09 +08:00
houseme 59d8d93832 perf(ecstore): release PUT lock before old-data cleanup (#6023)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 17:40:32 +00:00
houseme 59494d5089 perf(get): reuse reader paths and lock namespaces (#6015)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 17:37:25 +00:00
houseme 019e80a218 fix(admin): report live bucket count during usage scan (#6014)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 17:32:05 +00:00
houseme 9546baf1ab perf(get): share metadata cache hits (#6010)
Keep fresh metadata fanout results owned while sharing cache-backed metadata through Arc, avoiding deep clones on eligible local cache hits without enabling unsafe distributed caching.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 16:53:06 +00:00
Zhengchao An 60d8e8a20b refactor(kms): consolidate encryption metadata key constants into their shared home (#5995)
The shared module rustfs_utils::http::object_encryption_keys is the single source of truth for encryption metadata key names, but three call sites still carried their own copies or bare literals: crates/kms/src/service.rs (two private constants plus four bare x-rustfs-encryption-* literals on both the write and read path), rustfs/src/app/select_object.rs (six SELECT_* copies), and rustfs/src/storage/options.rs (two private prefix copies now imported from header_compat). All values are unchanged, so the change is a compiler-verified rename.

The reader-only x-rustfs-internal-server-side-encryption- family gets a named constant with the verified judgment recorded on it: no writer emits these keys anywhere in the repo (the SSE writer persists the MinIO-branded keys verbatim for interop), the two comments claiming the dual-key invariant writes this twin were wrong and are corrected, and the defensive redaction/strip readers are kept because removing them is risk-asymmetric.

rustfs-kms's rustfs-utils dependency now declares the http feature it uses instead of relying on feature unification from sibling crates.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1775, rustfs/backlog#1562.
2026-08-12 16:37:38 +00:00
houseme 24ca61eb6e perf(get): include small objects in codec streaming (#6004)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 16:04:15 +00:00
houseme d92c563b9e perf(ecstore): keep decode scratch buffers inline (#6002)
Keep common shard-indexed decode scratch vectors inline while preserving heap fallback for larger supported erasure layouts. Consume scratch iterators directly at the stripe-state boundary to avoid reallocating.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 15:40:32 +00:00
Zhengchao An e087044658 test(e2e): fold nine identical POST-policy rejection tests into one table (#6000)
The nine *_missing_from_policy_conditions tests in multipart_auth_test.rs were literal-for-literal identical after normalization: policy pins bucket + key + content-length-range, the form smuggles one extra field the policy never declared, and the upload must be rejected with 403 AccessDenied naming the field. Each one started its own full server.

This adds the run_post_object_policy_case helper (parameterized by bucket, key, policy conditions, extra form fields, file body, and expected status/code/mention, with a per-case assertion prefix) and folds the nine tests into one table-driven test with nine rows. Every row keeps its original test's exact bucket, key, field name/value, body bytes, and expected error strings — including the two rows that asserted the stronger <Code>AccessDenied</Code> form — so no poison value is lost. The helper's signature is general enough for the policy_mismatch and sse-kms groups planned as PR2/PR3.

cargo nextest list now reports 103 tests for this module; the inventory row said 109 while the file actually held 111 before this change (stale by two), so the inventory is set to the measured 103 in the same diff per the issue's hard constraint.

Ref rustfs/backlog#1838 (PR1).
2026-08-12 15:27:06 +00:00
Zhengchao An 16d381fc0e ci(kms): add a nightly live-Vault lane and stop leaking behavior keys (#5999)
No workflow ever set RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN, so live_vault_backends() returned an empty set in every CI run and behavior_rotation.rs never asserted the working half of rotate/versioning; the #[ignore] live-Vault tests had never executed in CI either. nightly-gnu.yml gains a kms-vault-lane job (vault server -dev with KV2 + Transit, full rustfs-kms suite with the lane on, the dev-Vault ignored tests, and the AppRole live script) plus a separate kms-vault-ha-failover job for the three-node Raft failover script, isolated so an election-timing flake cannot mask the main lane's verdict. GitHub-hosted ubuntu-latest rather than the self-hosted fleet: the HA script needs Docker, and e2e-s3tests.yml's banner records how the heterogeneous sm-standard pods burned the last docker-dependent workflow.

The behavior harness now records every key TestKms::create_key mints and deletes them after each Vault-backed for_each_backend case, on a fresh manager over the same configuration with the immediate-deletion gate enabled for cleanup only. Transit needs the deletion issued twice (first call parks the key in PendingDeletion, the second destroys it); KV2 destroys on the first call. Verified against a real dev Vault: after a full suite run the server holds zero behavior-* keys.

Also fixes test_vault_cancel_key_deletion_persists_state, which was broken by construction — Default::default() never picks up the insecure-dev-defaults env override, so the HTTP dev Vault the test requires was always refused. It now declares development mode on the config, and passes.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1774, rustfs/backlog#1562.
2026-08-12 15:14:04 +00:00
Zhengchao An 1021d7228a fix(ecstore): scope UploadPart commit lock per part number (#5990)
put_object_part's commit phase held an exclusive write lock on the whole
upload_id_path namespace, so concurrent UploadPart commits for different
part numbers of one upload serialized behind a single lock and returned
503 once the 5s lock-acquire timeout elapsed.

Adopt MinIO's PutObjectPart lock scope: a shared read lock on the
uploadId namespace plus an exclusive write lock on
{upload_id_path}/part.{N}. Different part numbers now commit
concurrently; same-part retries still serialize (backlog#853);
complete/abort keep the uploadId write lock and still exclude every
in-flight part commit. The lock-loss fence covers both guards.

Fixes #5961
2026-08-12 14:37:22 +00:00
Zhengchao An 0a246e3736 test: assert real behavior in three assertion-less tests (#5993)
test_format_v1 (ecstore layout::format) only printed its results; the pinned v1 format.json literal never parsed at all because "this": null fails Uuid deserialization, and the Err was silently discarded. Fix the fixture to the real on-disk shape (MinIO and RustFS always write a concrete disk UUID there) and assert a serialize->parse roundtrip identity plus every pinned field of the literal.

test_console_cors_configuration discarded all four parse_cors_origins results; parse_cors_origins returns an opaque CorsLayer, so the test now drives real CORS preflight requests through an axum router and asserts the allow-origin outcomes: wildcard answers any origin with *, a configured list echoes listed origins and refuses unlisted ones, empty/unset configurations allow no cross-origin caller.

test_heal_channel_processor_new only constructed the processor; it now asserts the response channel accepts a send.

Ref rustfs/backlog#1836 (PR1).
2026-08-12 14:37:01 +00:00
Zhengchao An 380ed40b47 chore(rustfs): import canonical encryption header constants in select_object (#5998)
select_object.rs re-declared six interop header names as SELECT_* locals (five X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-* markers plus x-rustfs-encryption-key-id). The canonical owners live in rustfs-utils' object_encryption_keys module, which the rustfs crate already depends on with the full feature set. Import them under their canonical names and drop the local copies; SELECT_KMS_ARN_PREFIX stays local because no canonical owner exists for the KMS ARN prefix.

Values are byte-identical, so no behavior change.

Ref rustfs/backlog#1833 (PR3).
2026-08-12 22:21:31 +08:00
Zhengchao An 679ea238de chore(kms): import canonical internal encryption header constants (#5997)
kms/service.rs re-declared x-rustfs-encryption-key-id and x-rustfs-encryption-algorithm locally; the canonical owners live in rustfs-utils' object_encryption_keys module, which kms already transitively builds. Enable the http feature on the existing rustfs-utils dependency and import the two constants instead. The explanatory comment about why the algorithm header exists (SSE mode vs AEAD cipher round-trip) moves to the import site.

No dependency-graph change (cargo tree -p rustfs-kms is unchanged apart from the feature) and no behavior change: the imported values are byte-identical.

Ref rustfs/backlog#1833 (PR2).
2026-08-12 22:20:47 +08:00
Zhengchao An baadaccc30 docs(replication): register the http interop duplication and pin its wire values (#5996)
backlog#1833 PR1 prescribed deduplicating crates/replication/src/http.rs onto the canonical rustfs-utils http modules via a re-export facade. That plan conflicts with a standing architecture guard the issue's review missed: check_architecture_migration_rules.sh rejects any rustfs-utils import or dependency from the replication crate ("replication crate HTTP/helper contracts must not import or depend on rustfs-utils"), the same way it bans rustfs-filemeta and rustfs-storage-api — the wire-contract crate deliberately has zero internal dependencies.

So this lands the issue's fallback shape instead (the same bidirectional do-not-merge pattern the issue itself prescribes for the policy path.rs cluster): a module doc on replication/http.rs naming the canonical owners and the guard that forces the local copy, mirror notes on utils' metadata_compat.rs and header_compat.rs, and a new test pinning every duplicated constant to its literal wire value so the two copies cannot drift silently.

No production code changed.

Ref rustfs/backlog#1833 (PR1).
2026-08-12 22:20:11 +08:00
Zhengchao An 87d47a6e5d docs(kms): add rotation driver matrix and rotation-overdue alert (#5992)
Add a per-backend rotation-driver matrix to docs/operations/kms-backend-security.md: who performs the rotation on each backend (RustFS for Vault KV2, Vault's Transit engine for Transit, AWS RotateKeyOnDemand for AWS, nobody for Local/Static), how periodic rotation must be scheduled on each (external scheduler for KV2 by design, Vault auto_rotate_period for Transit, AWS-native automatic rotation for AWS since RotateKeyOnDemand carries a lifetime quota), the NIST SP 800-38D 2^32 random-nonce AES-GCM wrap ceiling that Local/Static can never reset, and a pre-rotation checklist referencing the existing upgrade-ordering hard constraint.

Add the KmsKeyRotationOverdue Prometheus rule on rustfs_kms_oldest_key_rotation_age_seconds (400-day conservative default, warning severity, no traffic guard because it is direct gauge state) and its runbook response procedure in docs/operations/kms-observability-runbook.md, following the existing per-alert format.

Sharpen the runbook's rotation-timestamp paragraph with verified per-backend behavior: only Vault KV2 persists rotated_at (stamped in the same check-and-set write that commits the rotation), while Transit and AWS key listings always report it absent, so on those backends the gauge measures key age and does not reset on rotation. Update Threshold calibration and Coverage gaps for the new rule.

Validated with promtool check rules (7 rules, SUCCESS) and scripts/check_doc_paths.sh.

Part of rustfs/backlog#1636 (PR-4).
2026-08-12 21:59:54 +08:00
Zhengchao An fba0b34f19 chore: remove commented-out test corpses (~330 lines) (#5994)
Deletes three blocks of commented-out code that can never be revived: seven dead tokio::tests plus ~20 commented use statements at the tail of ecstore's store/list_objects.rs test module (all hardcoded to a developer's personal machine path), the commented test_extract_claims in policy/utils.rs, and the commented-out pre-strum AdminAction enum draft in policy/action.rs (the live enum below it is untouched).

Also rewords two doc comments on the bucket-metadata inline-data interop test to drop the personal attribution while keeping the technical content, so the corpse check (rg weisd) now returns zero across the repo.

Ref rustfs/backlog#1836 (PR2).
2026-08-12 21:59:20 +08:00
Henry Guo c9eeb2fa8a feat(table-catalog): add atomic table rename (#5989)
Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-12 21:39:18 +08:00
Zhengchao An 2f83d6789b chore(rustfs): remove dead keystone shadow auth path (#5988) 2026-08-12 20:46:48 +08:00
Henry Guo 7a4a3d27c6 fix(heal): cancel cluster tasks from root stop (#5978)
Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-12 20:46:35 +08:00
Henry Guo 4c5e73b2f2 fix(scanner): defer cycles during data movement (#5970)
* fix(scanner): defer cycles during data movement

* fix(scanner): distinguish deferred scan cycles

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 20:46:06 +08:00
GatewayJ 4c44bc649a fix(admin): clarify invalid group name errors (#5986) 2026-08-12 20:44:35 +08:00
houseme 3b49842df0 perf(ecstore): reduce small PUT fixed costs (#5987) 2026-08-12 20:07:40 +08:00
houseme 848b330825 perf(ecstore): reduce inline GET fixed costs (#5985) 2026-08-12 19:29:46 +08:00
houseme 270a003c55 fix(ecstore): attribute internal metadata GET metrics (#5983) 2026-08-12 19:29:36 +08:00
Zhengchao An 8b57076194 chore(ecstore): remove dead MinIO-port client modules (~940 lines) (#5982)
Delete five zero-caller client modules (api_bucket_policy,
api_get_object_acl, api_get_object_attributes, api_get_object_file,
api_restore), the orphaned TransitionCore get/put_bucket_policy
wrappers, and the two constants only they consumed. Also removes two
unwrap() panics on remote-controlled data in api_get_object_acl.rs
(non-UTF-8 body, missing Owner ID). Tier warm-backend APIs untouched.

Ref: rustfs/backlog#1822 (T1)
2026-08-12 11:03:31 +00:00
Zhengchao An d31bd3cd10 fix(data-usage): make thin usage-cache types a read-only projection (#5981)
Delete the dead ecstore save_data_usage_cache and the thin
DataUsageCache::marshal_msg it was the only caller of, drop the
Serialize derive (and the dead DataUsageCacheStorage trait with its
save path) from the thin projection types so no write path can exist
outside the scanner's canonical map-encoded writer, and pin the
persisted .usage-cache.bin wire bytes with cross-crate fixture tests
on both the scanner writer and the thin reader.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1828 (T1-T3).
2026-08-12 09:09:09 +00:00
Zhengchao An 698ebdfb3f fix(ecstore): map disk-representable StorageError variants in reverse conversion (#5980)
The StorageError -> DiskError conversion dropped seven variants with
exact DiskError counterparts (FaultyRemoteDisk, DiskAccessDenied,
DriveIsRoot, IsNotRegular, VolumeNotEmpty, VolumeAccessDenied,
FileAccessDenied) into the DiskError::other fallback, degrading them to
an opaque Io error. Two of them sit on the quorum ignore-lists in
disk/error_reduce.rs, so a degraded instance would stop matching the
ignore list and count toward the dominant error in reduce_errs.

Also mirror the StorageError-side io::Error downdrill in
From<io::Error> for DiskError: recover a StorageError boxed through
From<StorageError> for io::Error instead of wrapping it as Io.

Add a round-trip identity test over every DiskError variant
(DiskError -> StorageError -> DiskError) and a boxed-StorageError
recovery test.
2026-08-12 08:43:04 +00:00
Henry Guo c7233d6624 fix(table-catalog): harden strong backing compatibility (#5941)
* fix(table-catalog): harden strong backing compatibility

* fix(table-catalog): close strong backing recovery gaps

* fix(table-catalog): harden strong backing recovery

* fix(table-catalog): repair strong backing CI failures

* fix(table-catalog): satisfy test clippy lint

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-12 16:28:56 +08:00
Zhengchao An 493a2cc1ba test(heal): strengthen replacement e2e evidence (#5956)
* test(heal): strengthen replacement e2e evidence

* test(heal): fix replacement e2e barriers

Accept the real post-fault scanner failure-to-idle sequence as the live disk loss barrier, and preserve the first definitive completed status while only resampling the physical census for premature-completion confirmation.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 08:14:52 +00:00
yanglongwei 3ebb426abe fix(s3): return InvalidArgument for mismatched ListMultipartUploads key-marker (#5914)
A key-marker that does not start with the request prefix is invalid input, not an unimplemented feature.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 07:43:03 +00:00
Zhengchao An 5aac224a97 docs: sync ARCHITECTURE.md structural inventory with measured state (#5977) 2026-08-12 15:31:04 +08:00
houseme 1b6ae33ce0 perf(get): trim direct-read metadata allocations (#5976)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 07:27:58 +00:00
Henry Guo 537d34b8cd fix(table-catalog): support apache-avro 0.22 (#5975)
fix(avro): support apache-avro 0.22

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-12 15:08:52 +08:00
GatewayJ 3fdf2964c8 perf(rpc): size remote shard read buffers (#5972) 2026-08-12 15:05:33 +08:00
houseme 2e5874f839 fix(get): give UringBackend the only fd cache for its disk (#5974)
fix(get): give UringBackend the only fd cache for its disk (#1801)

#1801 made `StdBackend::new` always build a descriptor cache. `UringBackend`
wraps a `StdBackend` (`inner`), so under io_uring a disk ended up with TWO
`FdCache`s: the wrapper's and the inner's. `UringBackend::pread_bytes`
delegates to `inner.pread_bytes` on four fallback paths (latch-off, O_DIRECT
unsupported / error, buffered-read error), which populated `inner.fd_cache` —
but `UringBackend`'s invalidation only touches its own cache, so the inner
cache was never invalidated. For up to `FD_CACHE_TTL` (5s) after a heal/rename/
delete, a fallback read could serve the pre-mutation inode: exactly the
stale-descriptor hazard `FdCache`'s generation guard exists to close
(rustfs/backlog#1176). It also double-counted `FD_CACHE_CAPACITY` (512 fds)
against `RLIMIT_NOFILE` per disk (backlog#1178).

Fix: `UringBackend` now constructs its inner `StdBackend` with the new
`StdBackend::new_without_fd_cache`, so the wrapper owns the only cache for the
disk. The inner backend opens per read on fallback, leaving nothing
unguarded. `StdBackend::new` (standalone default) is unchanged; a private
`build(root, build_fd_cache)` holds the shared construction.

- Default (non-io_uring) path: byte-for-byte unchanged.
- io_uring path: one cache per disk, fully covered by the wrapper's
  invalidation; halves the per-disk fd budget under `RLIMIT_NOFILE`.
- `RUSTFS_IO_URING_FD_CACHE` / `RUSTFS_LOCAL_FD_CACHE` semantics preserved.
- Regression test pins `new_without_fd_cache` -> no cache.

Found by a post-merge re-review of the Wave 1 GET PRs. cargo check/clippy
clean; Linux compile + the io_uring fd-cache suite deferred to CI.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 14:53:59 +08:00
houseme 5d05897ae0 docs(durability): document the new-bucket relaxed default (#5973)
docs(durability): document the new-bucket relaxed default (#1811)

#5971 seeds a `relaxed` durability override into newly created buckets'
metadata (rustfs/backlog#1811), but the operator guide still described the
default as `strict` with relaxed as opt-in, and never mentioned the new-bucket
seed or its `RUSTFS_NEW_BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE` knob. Document the behavior:

- intro notes new buckets default to `relaxed` (gradual migration; the
  process-wide default and pre-existing buckets stay `strict`);
- the Configuration block lists `RUSTFS_NEW_BUCKET_DURABILITY_MODE`
  (relaxed|strict|none|inherit, default relaxed);
- a new "New-bucket default" subsection under per-bucket durability covers the
  seed semantics, the opt-out (`inherit` / `=strict`), fail-closed invalid
  values, and that existing buckets are never retroactively rewritten.

No code change.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 13:48:15 +08:00
houseme 6850482247 feat(ecstore): seed relaxed durability for new buckets (#5971) 2026-08-12 12:54:20 +08:00
houseme b00b7ab8f1 feat: add GET stream failure observability (#5967)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 03:32:17 +00:00
houseme 924958bab5 perf(get): slim metadata fanout allocations (#1803) (#5968)
Every GET fans out a `read_version` across all disks to resolve xl.meta. Each
fanout allocated an `Arc<ReadOptions>` (3 bools) plus four `Arc<String>`
(`Arc::new(x.to_string())` = two allocations each) and cloned them into every
spawned task. This trims the per-fanout allocation footprint.

- `ReadOptions` is three bools, so it is now `Copy`. The fanout drops the
  `Arc<ReadOptions>` and hands each spawned task a copy; the two pre-existing
  `ReadOptions::clone()` sites (set_disk/read.rs, set_disk/ops/heal.rs) stop
  cloning a `Copy` type.
- The four request strings use `Arc::<str>::from(&str)` (one allocation each)
  instead of `Arc::new(..to_string())` (string buffer + Arc = two each) — four
  fewer allocations per fanout, transparent to the `read_version(&str)` call.

Behavior is unchanged: the fanout still spawns one task per disk (the spawn is
deliberate — `read_version_call_counter_observes_spawned_fanout` verifies the
process-global counter observes every per-disk increment across workers), quorum
/ early-stop / full-wait semantics are untouched, and no result ordering or
error handling changed.

Two larger items from the audit are intentionally NOT in this PR:
- `tokio::spawn` -> `FuturesUnordered`: the spawn is a tested, deliberate
  design (cross-worker counter observation for #1309/#1314), and converting
  would also change panic isolation. Left as-is.
- `vec![FileInfo::default(); N]`: `FileInfo`'s empty containers (String /
  HashMap / Vec) do not allocate, so this is one `Vec` allocation, not the
  per-element allocation the audit implied — not a real hot spot.

`cargo fmt`, `cargo clippy -p rustfs-ecstore --lib` (0 warnings),
`cargo check --lib --tests`, and the 26 fanout / call-counter unit tests pass
on macOS (the change is fully cross-platform).

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 02:38:13 +00:00
houseme 968ec4a8be perf(get): enable inline direct-read by default + versioned buckets (#1802) (#5966)
A small object whose data shards are inlined in xl.meta can be reassembled
straight from the already-resolved metadata, skipping the Erasure reconstruct
pipeline. The fast path existed but was opt-in
(`RUSTFS_GET_SMALL_OBJECT_DIRECT_MEMORY`, default off), so every deployment
paid the full shard-read fan-out for eligible small GETs by default.

- Flip `DEFAULT_RUSTFS_GET_SMALL_OBJECT_DIRECT_MEMORY` to `true`. The path is
  correctness-neutral on a miss: `try_get_object_direct_data_shards_*` returns
  None when the inline reassembly cannot satisfy the read, and the GET then
  proceeds through the normal shard-read pipeline. The env stays as a kill
  switch (`=false` restores the legacy path).
- Drop the bucket-level `versioned` / `version_suspended` exclusions. The
  decision is made on `fi` — the already-resolved target version — so
  reassembling its inlined data is correct on a versioned bucket too. An
  explicit versionId GET still falls back (`opts.version_id`), and a
  delete-marker latest is still rejected. The two now-unused fallback reasons
  and their metric labels are removed.
- Tests updated: a versioned latest-version object is now eligible / `Use`
  (covers the newly allowed path); the removed reasons' label assertions are
  dropped.

cargo check --lib --tests and the direct_memory unit tests pass on macOS
(the change is fully cross-platform).

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 02:06:39 +00:00
houseme 8d34b4d101 perf(get): cache read descriptors in StdBackend (#1801) (#5965)
StdBackend opened, stat'd, and access-checked the shard file on every
positioned read, so each small-object GET paid N x (open + access + fstat)
syscalls even for hot shards. UringBackend already caches descriptors
behind a generation-guarded, rlimit-bounded moka cache with full
rename/delete/heal invalidation; StdBackend had no equivalent.

Port that cache to the default backend:

- StdBackend gains an `fd_cache: Option<FdCache>` (Linux only, mirroring
  UringBackend), built in `new()` behind `RUSTFS_LOCAL_FD_CACHE` (default
  on) and the same `rlimit_allows_fd_cache` guard.
- pread_bytes consults the cache on the buffered path: a hit reuses the
  descriptor via `dup` (one syscall, no path resolution or permission
  re-check) and skips volume access; a miss opens as before, snapshots the
  invalidation generation, and hands the freshly opened descriptor back
  for `insert_if_fresh`, which refuses to cache if a heal/delete bumped the
  generation mid-open (rustfs/backlog#1176). O_DIRECT reads keep opening
  their own aligned descriptors.
- The DirectReadCopy branch switches from seek+read_exact to
  `FileExt::read_exact_at`: a `dup`'d cached descriptor shares the source
  descriptor's open-file offset, so a positioned read (like the mmap path's
  offset argument) keeps concurrent cache hits on the same shard correct.
- The four `LocalIoBackend` invalidation methods now drop stale entries on
  StdBackend. LocalDisk already calls them on rename_data/rename_file/
  delete/delete_volume/close, so no new call sites are needed.
- Two tests mirror the io_uring ones: a heal rename must be hidden until
  invalidate_cached_fds_under runs, and a repeated read caches exactly one
  descriptor that prefix invalidation drops.

Behavior is byte-for-byte unchanged on a miss and on non-Linux; the cache
is auto-disabled only when RLIMIT_NOFILE is too low. macOS cargo check
--lib and --tests pass; Linux compile deferred to CI.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-12 01:38:07 +00:00
Zhengchao An 882ad4c113 fix: update s3s footprint baseline after table-catalog hardening (#5964) 2026-08-12 06:44:43 +08:00
GatewayJ e9728192e2 fix(select): enforce typed S3 Select error semantics (#5942)
* fix(select): enforce typed S3 Select error semantics

* fix(select): classify function argument planner errors

---------

Co-authored-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-11 23:59:38 +08:00
sass1997 a206a0779e fix(gateway): api flag https redirect (#5960)
* fix: add helm toggle to disable the http to https redirect

* docs: add documentation about new parameter
2026-08-11 21:30:38 +08:00
cxymds 6cce3d60bb fix(quota): reject oversized multipart completion (#5958)
* fix(quota): reject oversized multipart completion

* fix(arch): route quota test through app facade
2026-08-11 21:30:05 +08:00
cxymds 42433584ab perf(ecstore): bound strict inline commit syncs (#5931)
* perf(ecstore): bound strict inline commit syncs

* test(ecstore): fix admission assertion spelling

* fix(ecstore): address strict inline sync review

* test(ecstore): use io path for fsync hook

---------

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-11 21:05:27 +08:00
houseme ba6a0f25d9 perf(get): tune body stream buffers (#5959) 2026-08-11 20:48:03 +08:00
Henry Guo 5e3010c6b5 fix(table-catalog): harden commit publication (#5779)
* fix(table-catalog): harden commit publication

* fix(table-catalog): make commit replay deterministic

* test(table-catalog): cover denied commit object reads

* fix(table-catalog): guard ref commits and order publication locks

* fix(table-catalog): close commit publication race gaps

* fix(table-catalog): close publication review gaps

* fix(table-catalog): isolate blocked strong publications

* fix(table-catalog): scale and fence commit publication

* fix(table-catalog): close publication compatibility gaps

* fix(table-catalog): clarify compatibility cleanup marker

* fix(table-catalog): repair publication hardening checks

* fix(table-catalog): align commit tests with publication fences

* fix(table-catalog): bind authorization to request context

* refactor(table-catalog): reuse internal error mapping

* test(storage): install request context for tag conditions

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-11 19:36:46 +08:00
houseme bc888931fd fix(heal): quiet deferred replacement recovery logs (#5954)
Treat recovery-directory lookup on a replacement endpoint already deferred as replacement_path_unavailable as an expected debug diagnostic instead of a durable generation conflict.

Keep real survivor recovery conflicts and corrupt records on the existing warning/blocking path.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-11 09:35:06 +00:00
houseme 4ac7c56c89 test(heal): add privileged replacement rebuild e2e (#5918)
* test(heal): add privileged replacement rebuild e2e

Add ignored Linux-only 3x4 automatic replacement coverage for EC8+4 and EC6+6. The tests use real tmpfs mounts in an isolated mount namespace, wait for scanner-driven replacement recovery status, and verify the replacement target with per-version xl.meta and part.N physical census without invoking Admin deep heal.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(test): avoid unsafe in privileged replacement e2e

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): harden privileged replacement e2e

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): prove absent replacement recovery witness

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(e2e): prove absent replacement observation

Stop the target node before detaching the test mount so RustFS releases its mount lease instead of continuing to serve the old tmpfs through an open fd. Restart the node with the endpoint absent and wait for the scanner's real readiness rejection in that node's log.

Assert the absent window has no replacement intent, completion proof, checkpoint, healing marker, or Admin v4 durable record for the target before mounting the blank replacement and waiting for automatic recovery plus physical shard census.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(e2e): streamline cluster log capture

Move cluster-node log capture out of ClusterNode and into per-node cluster launch configuration so the privileged replacement E2E uses an explicit harness API instead of mutating node identity data.

Reuse the same stdout/stderr capture helper for single-node and cluster processes, and pin the per-node capture behavior with a focused common test.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(e2e): harden privileged replacement proof

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-11 16:31:32 +08:00
houseme ddacce6e75 perf(lock): bound distributed read lock fanout (#5952)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-11 08:21:04 +00:00
Zhengchao An 31cb720471 fix: exclude e2e_test from s3s footprint ratchet baseline (#5949) 2026-08-11 05:48:27 +00:00
唐小鸭 603bdea516 fix(site-replication): route state RMW through one locked transaction (#5882)
* test(site-replication): pin retry-event lost-update against locked RMW (red)

P1-15 (rustfs/backlog#1675 B2): the site-replication retry-event writers
(enqueue/dequeue, which hang off every hook broadcast path) perform a
load -> mutate -> persist without taking SITE_REPLICATION_STATE_LOCK, so
a single process can lose a concurrent lock-holding writer's update; the
service-side reload path is equally unlocked, and no writer holds a
distributed lock across the read-modify-write, so multi-node RMW loses
updates even where the process lock is held.

Red evidence (current main): replaying enqueue's exact three steps around
a completed mark_pending_rotation_peer_acked commit wipes the rotation
ack — the final state holds the retry event but not the ack.

* fix(site-replication): route state RMW through one locked transaction

P1-15 PR1 (rustfs/backlog#1675 B2). The site-replication state object
(config/site-replication/state.json, which also carries the retry-event
queue) was mutated through read-modify-write sequences with inconsistent
locking: the retry-event writers on every hook broadcast path and the
RPC-driven service reload took no lock at all (single-process lost
updates, pinned by the red commit), and no writer held a distributed lock
across the whole RMW (cross-node lost updates everywhere).

- New admin/site_replication_state module: the state transaction boundary
  `with_site_replication_state_lock[_on]` — process mutex plus the
  distributed config-object write lock (the pattern proven by the repair
  state), with the shared path constant. The process mutex is transitional
  until PR2 migrates the remaining ~26 call sites.
- handlers: typed `update_site_replication_state` (no-lock load /
  persist-or-clear inside the boundary; normalizes the peer map exactly
  once, retiring the double-clone/double-normalize persist path, P2-22).
  Migrated: retry-event enqueue (always-write), dequeue (lock-free probe,
  transaction on hit), mark_pending_rotation/remove_peer_acked.
- service reload: the tolerant byte-level read->normalize->save now runs
  inside the same boundary via no-lock IO — a cluster-wide reload fan-out
  can no longer overwrite a concurrent state writer. Normalization
  semantics untouched (all six service-side tests unchanged and green).
- Add/PeerJoin/Edit handlers release the state guard before their peer
  fan-out: the transport helpers' retry-event bookkeeping now re-enters
  the state transaction and must not nest inside the guard (the
  adversarial review caught this as a re-entrancy deadlock; the fix
  mirrors the Remove/Rotate handlers' existing scope). The Edit non-
  refresh branch commits before fanning out — the old fanout-first order
  recorded retry events pointing at a state the local site had not saved.
- ecstore: delete_config_no_lock (+ facade/bridge exports) so the clear
  half of persist-or-clear works under the held object lock.

Red -> green: the red commit pinned the deterministic lost-update
interleaving (stale retry-event persist wiping a committed rotation ack);
the test now drives the real functions concurrently for 8 rounds and
asserts every retry event and every ack survives. Full
handlers/service site-replication unit suites green (171 + 6); dual-node
site-replication e2e (state edit fresh/stale, object replication) green;
fmt / clippy / logging guardrails clean.

Adversarial review: one blocking finding (the re-entrancy deadlock above)
fixed and re-verified by a full second pass over all 30 lock sites and
the Add/Join/Edit call graphs. Non-blocking notes recorded for PR2:
mark_* now persists on miss (persist-or-clear semantics; a miss-skip
return is a cheap follow-up), Add still holds the guard across the peer
join probe (pre-existing availability debt), and a timeout-guarded
unreachable-peer regression test for the fan-out paths.

* fix(site-replication): keep the state mutex behind an owner helper

CI's architecture migration guard lists SITE_REPLICATION_STATE_LOCK as an
owner-local static, so it may not be `pub(crate)`. Keep it private to the
new module and let the not-yet-migrated RMW call sites take it through
`site_replication_state_process_guard()` — the sanctioned owner-helper
pattern; the helper disappears with the mutex in PR2.

* fix(site-replication): keep peer-edit delivery under the state guard

Review follow-up (#5882).

Releasing the guard before the fan-out (my deadlock fix) traded the
ordering the guard used to provide: edit A could commit and stall while
edit B committed and reached a peer first, then A arrived last and won.
The peer edit handler applies whatever arrives — it has no generation or
updated-at fence — and a successful stale delivery is not repaired by the
retry queue, so the sites diverge silently.

The fan-out is back under the guard. What actually could not run there is
the retry-event bookkeeping, which re-enters the state transaction, so the
edit branch now delivers with the plain transport and settles the retry
queue after the guard is released: successes dequeue, the first failure
enqueues and is returned. Ordering and bookkeeping both preserved. The add
handler keeps its peer-edit finalize fan-out under the guard for the same
reason and releases only before bootstrap/back-fill, which send bucket-ops
(not peer edits) through retry-event transports.

The concurrency test could not tell the two guards apart — both writers
took both locks, so it passed with either removed. Replaced by two tests
that isolate one guard each, both verified by mutation:

- a process-only legacy writer (the shape the not-yet-migrated call sites
  still use) racing the transaction: fails when the transaction stops
  taking the process mutex;
- two writers that bypass the process mutex, as separate nodes do, driving
  the production object-lock path (`with_site_replication_state_object_lock`
  factored out for exactly this): fails when the distributed lock is
  removed.

Verification: handlers 173 + service 6 unit tests green; site-replication
dual-node and three-node edit e2e green; arch/layer/logging guardrails,
fmt and clippy clean.

* fix(site-replication): fence peer-edit delivery by generation

Review follow-up on the two remaining holes in the edit path.

Ordering was only process-local. `SITE_REPLICATION_STATE_LOCK` is per
node, so holding it across the fan-out orders the edits ONE node accepts
and nothing else: two nodes of the same site can both commit and reach a
peer in the opposite order, and the peer edit handler applied whatever
arrived last. Each edit now takes a generation from
`SiteReplicationState::edit_generation`, allocated in the same commit as
the edit itself — i.e. under the distributed state-object lock, so two
nodes can never share one. The generation rides the peer-edit request as
query parameters and the receiver rejects (acks without applying) a
delivery at or below the mark it already applied for that origin site,
recording the mark in the same commit as the edit it fences. Peers that
predate the fence send no parameters and are applied as before.

Retry settlement could discard a newer failure. After the guard is
released, a success for edit A removed every retry event for
(peer, peer-edit): if edit B committed, failed its own delivery and
enqueued while A was in flight, A erased it — local state B, peer on A,
nothing queued to converge them. Settlement now only removes events whose
recorded generation is not newer than the one being settled, and a later
failure never lowers the fence. Broadcast paths carry no generation and
settle unconditionally as before; their events live under their own
paths and cannot collide with a peer-edit delivery.

A departed peer's mark is dropped on load: a site that leaves drops below
two peers, which clears its state object and restarts its counter at
zero, so a leftover mark would reject every edit it sends after it
rejoins.

Tests: two-node generation uniqueness (drop the object lock and the two
nodes collide), the receiver's staleness predicate and its wiring, the
settlement interleaving (drop the fence and B's retry is erased), and the
rejoin reset.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1675 (P1-15)
2026-08-11 13:41:28 +08:00
唐小鸭 a076ae4045 test(replication): pin the scanner existing-object compensation matrix (#5877)
P1-20 (rustfs/backlog#1675 B2, test-only). No prior test wrote objects
BEFORE the replication rule arrived, leaving the scanner's existing-object
resync pass — the only channel for such objects — without end-to-end
coverage, and the enqueue truth table partially unpinned at unit level.

e2e (both negative cells are contracts, asserted over multiple fast-scanner
cycles next to a replicated control key that proves the scanner and the
live path are running):
- test_scanner_compensates_existing_objects_across_write_paths: plain PUT,
  CopyObject and Snowball auto-extract products written pre-rule all
  converge via scanner compensation; a null-version object (PUT before the
  bucket became versioned) is pinned as never compensated (the scanner heal
  gate skips nil-version objects).
- test_scanner_never_compensates_when_existing_object_replication_disabled:
  ExistingObjectReplication=Disabled is a contract, not a delay — existing
  keys stay absent while post-rule writes replicate normally.

Unit truth-table pins (crates/replication):
- queue.rs: an empty replicate decision (Disabled existing-object, inbound
  REPLICA) skips heal queueing for every status; Completed without a resync
  decision skips.
- operation.rs: existing-object resync without a reset replicates exactly
  the never-replicated (Empty) objects.

Helper: put_bucket_replication_with_statuses parameterizes the previously
hardcoded ExistingObjectReplication status; the nextest count comments are
refreshed to the post-rebase totals.
2026-08-11 03:58:25 +00:00
houseme 8a8be12f0b perf(ecstore): raise replay cache auto capacity (#5946)
Increase the replay cache resource model so 16 CPU / 31-32 GiB field nodes auto-size to the 32M cap without an env override.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-11 11:37:58 +08:00
唐小鸭 2ecf6b4575 fix(replication): probe the version-identity contract in replication-check (#5881)
* test(replication): pin the version-fidelity probe contract (red)

P1-19 (rustfs/backlog#1675 B2): the supported replication contract is
targets that adopt the source version id — a target that mints its own ids
silently breaks every version-addressed operation that follows (version
deletes, heal re-drives never match), diverging the two sides with no
signal. replication-check already captures the probe PUT's response version
id but never compares it.

Red evidence (current main): against a FakeS3Target with
assign_own_version_ids enabled, ?replication-check returns Status "OK" —
the drift is invisible.

test_replication_check_flags_version_minting_target expects a
VersionFidelity phase that fails with the machine-readable code
BucketRemoteTargetVersionMismatch, skips the later mutation phases, and
still cleans up the probe via the version id the target actually assigned.

Test infra: FakeS3Target gains assign_own_version_ids (models a generic S3
service; validated-but-not-mirrored source version headers) and a
prefix+max-keys ListObjectVersions implementation (the probe key allocation
requires it); stored_versions accessor duplicated from the P1-21 branch
(identical code, resolves clean on merge).

* fix(replication): probe the version-identity contract in replication-check

P1-19 (rustfs/backlog#1675 B2, plan B). Replication only converges on
targets that adopt the source version id: version-addressed deletes and
heal re-drives address the source id, so a target that mints its own ids
silently diverges — nothing surfaced this. replication-check already
captured the probe PUT's response version id but never compared it.

- The probe PUT now carries the source version as `?versionId=` (the exact
  shape live replication uses since P0-5, and the only shape MinIO
  consumes; the internal source-version-id header alone would let the
  probe pass against targets the real data path drifts on). Reuses
  ecstore's append_version_id_query through the api facade.
- New VersionFidelity phase: the probe PUT's response version id must
  equal the sent source id. On mismatch the phase fails with the
  machine-readable extension key `"Code": "BucketRemoteTargetVersionMismatch"`
  (new optional Code field on phase statuses; Go decoders ignore unknown
  keys), the overall target fails, the later version-addressed mutation
  phases are skipped, and cleanup still removes the probe via the id the
  target actually assigned (with the existing list-based sweep as backstop
  when the target returns no version id at all).
- Runtime half: TargetClient::put_object now returns the assigned version
  id (mirroring remove_object), and the replication PUT path audits it —
  every drifting PUT increments
  rustfs_replication_version_identity_drift_total and the first drift per
  target ARN logs a structured warning pointing at ?replication-check.
  The drift judgment is a pure function with an exemption-matrix test
  (empty / literal "null" / nil-uuid sources carry no contract).
- docs/operations/replication-check.md documents the phase and the code.

Red -> green: test_replication_check_flags_version_minting_target (fake
target with assign_own_version_ids; on main the check reported Status
"OK"). The probe's query shape is pinned by a journal assertion (revert
of the query hunk alone fails it), probe-level unit tests cover the
mismatch/mirror matrix including cleanup addressing the minted id, and
the existing success e2e now asserts VersionFidelity OK against a RustFS
target. Adversarial review (seven roles): non-blocking; noted follow-ups
are the multipart runtime audit (the probe phase already pins the
contract) and per-target re-warning after reconfiguration.

* fix(e2e): stop the fake target self-deadlocking on version-id minting

The assign_own_version_ids flag was read with a fresh `lock(&self.store)`
inside two paths that already hold that guard — delete_object's
marker-creation branch and create_multipart_upload — and the store mutex
is not reentrant, so both hung forever (CI: the fake target's own
multipart and delete-marker tests ran >1560s until the job was
cancelled). Read the flag from the live guard instead.

The replication e2e paths did not catch this: a version-addressed purge
DELETE never mints an id, and the probe PUT reads the flag before taking
the guard.

* chore(test): refresh the nextest replication count invariant

The e2e-smoke/e2e-repl-nightly split comment is descriptive metadata
(authority: `cargo nextest list`); refresh it to this branch's
post-rebase total.
2026-08-11 03:04:05 +00:00
cxymds 2aa0148454 fix: report stalled object traffic as unready (#5936)
* fix: report stalled object traffic as unready

* fix: track fully received PUT storage progress
2026-08-11 10:55:22 +08:00
Xiaoyang Han 3289d40ce9 fix(ecstore): publish multipart parts on Windows (#5937)
* fix(ecstore): publish multipart parts on Windows

* test(ecstore): pin Windows multipart durability

---------

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-11 10:01:03 +08:00
cxymds 849837e262 fix(rpc): negotiate replay-safe mutation authentication (#5928)
* fix(rpc): negotiate replay-safe mutation auth

* fix(rpc): preserve strict legacy replay scope
2026-08-11 01:03:25 +00:00
Henry Guo 727a10e111 fix(scanner): skip disk inventory in scan spans (#5933)
Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-11 09:01:51 +08:00
houseme 3747d19ce5 perf(ecstore): hedge bounded GET metadata fanout (#5935)
Keep opt-in bounded GET data-read fanout from waiting on a single pending ReadVersion response when an unscheduled spare disk can satisfy quorum. Add a deterministic 2+2 regression that pauses the third scheduled metadata read and verifies the spare is started before returning.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 17:11:04 +00:00
houseme 1148e76279 test(ecstore): update prepared GET fanout default (#5932)
Assert the prepared GET metadata path keeps the default full data-read fanout after PR #5929 made bounded data-read fanout opt-in.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 15:38:37 +00:00
唐小鸭 320b788a50 test(admin): relax object-lambda SNI test timeout under full-suite load (#5923)
The SNI preservation test is the only object-lambda test doing a real
TLS handshake; the shared helper's 2s whole-request timeout turns
concurrent fsync-heavy TestECStoreEnv neighbors into a deterministic
TimedOut when the per-build nextest schedule overlaps them. The test
verifies SNI, not latency, so widen its budget to a still-bounded 30s.
2026-08-10 22:20:34 +08:00
唐小鸭 3c31eaf06f fix(replication): retry, persist and replay failed delete-marker purges (#5864)
* test(replication): pin delayed delete-marker purge failure handling (red)

P1-21 (rustfs/backlog#1675 B2): two failing e2e tests that pin the missing
failure handling of the delayed delete-marker purge:

- test_delayed_delete_marker_purge_retries_after_transient_target_failure:
  four scripted 503s outlast every existing channel (version-purge
  replication + its in-process MRF fast retries + the watcher's single
  attempt = 3 target DELETEs, all faulted in the recorded run); the
  replicated marker is stranded on the target forever.
- test_delayed_delete_marker_purge_exhaustion_persists_to_mrf_and_replays_on_restart:
  exhausted purge intents never reach the durable MRF journal, so a restart
  replays nothing (recorded run: 3 faulted attempts, zero post-restart).

Red-light evidence (current main):
- Test A: FAILED, journal shows 3x DeleteObject fault=Status(503), no clean
  attempt, target marker still present after 15s.
- Test B: FAILED after 468s, same 3 faulted attempts, no purge DELETE after
  restart, marker still present.

Test infra: FakeS3Target::stored_versions() exposes per-key version state so
purge tests assert target state instead of inferring it from the journal;
nextest count comments 36->38 nightly / 56->58 total.

* fix(replication): retry, persist and replay failed delete-marker purges

P1-21 (rustfs/backlog#1675 B2). The delayed delete-marker purge was
fire-and-forget: the target DELETE discarded its result (`let _ =`), a
missing target client was silently skipped, and nothing recorded the intent
— one transient target error stranded the replicated marker on the target
forever. Separately, `replicate_delete_with_outcome` held its outcome
hostage to `!requires_delayed_purge`, pinning every delete-marker MRF entry
to Missed so the durable backlog retained them permanently.

Changes:
- `replicate_delete_marker_purge_to_targets` now reports per-target
  results (warn + metrics on failure, including `target_client_missing`),
  supports retrying only the failed targets, and treats a target-side
  NoSuchKey/NoSuchVersion as purge success (strict-404 targets must not
  retain the intent forever).
- The delayed watcher (`watch_and_purge_source_delete_marker`) retries
  failed targets across its 5x1s watch window; on exhaustion it persists
  the purge intent to the durable MRF journal via the new
  `ReplicationPoolTrait::persist_mrf_entry` (journal-only on purpose: live
  re-dispatch would loop unboundedly against a down target). Intent entries
  are shaped as marker-creation deletes so replay funnels into the stale-
  marker branch.
- The stale-marker branch (source marker already gone) now purges the
  targets instead of silently returning success — closing a latent leak —
  and reports the purge result as the replay outcome. Heal callers retry
  for the full window (the startup MRF processor runs before target
  clients initialize); live callers attempt once and fall back to a fresh
  durable intent, so a down target cannot pin a replication worker.
- The outcome formula (extracted as `replicate_delete_outcome` and pinned
  by a unit test) no longer includes the delayed purge, so successfully
  replayed delete-marker entries are acknowledged instead of retained
  forever.

Verification: red -> green e2e pair (transient-failure retry; exhaustion ->
durable MRF -> restart replay -> second-restart zero-replay ack) plus unit
tests; `make pre-commit`, logging guardrails, clippy (ecstore + e2e_test)
all clean; full ecstore lib suite 3729 passed (3 pre-existing local-DNS
kubernetes endpoint failures reproduce without this change).

Adversarial validation (7 roles): no blocking findings after adding the
outcome-formula guard test. Known residuals recorded in the PR: watcher
shutdown window (intent not yet persisted), rolling-downgrade replay acks
without purging (equals pre-fix behavior), and replay falling back to the
source version id on targets that mint their own version ids (P1-19).

* chore(test): refresh the nextest replication count invariant

The e2e-smoke/e2e-repl-nightly split comment is descriptive metadata
(authority: `cargo nextest list`); refresh it to this branch's
post-rebase total.

* fix(replication): purge the marker version the target actually assigned

Review follow-up (#5864), two real defects:

- The delayed purge watcher was spawned with the pre-merge `dobj`, so the
  per-target marker version ids this round recorded were invisible to it.
  Against a target that mints its own ids the purge fell back to a
  source-derived id, the target answered the versioned DELETE with an
  idempotent 204, and that "success" cleared the retry set while the real
  marker stayed behind. The watcher now receives the merged replication
  state (`drs`), which folds this round's target-assigned ids in.
- A target whose recorded version metadata is inconsistent was skipped
  without entering `failed_arns`, so an empty result made both the watcher
  and the MRF replay treat a purge that issued no DELETE as successful and
  drop the intent. The refusal is now a per-target failure (own metric
  label): the leak stays visible and the intent is retained instead of
  being acknowledged. The version decision also moved ahead of the client
  lookup, so the refusal is decided from metadata alone.

Tests: a new e2e drives a fake target with `assign_own_version_ids`, which
ignores the forwarded source-version header for both objects and delete
markers, and asserts the replicated marker is really gone; a unit test
pins the corrupt-metadata refusal as a failed outcome without any target
client registered. The detached-watcher shutdown window is documented at
the watcher as a known non-durable window with the write-ahead follow-up
spelled out.
2026-08-10 22:16:21 +08:00
houseme fe2516ee86 perf(ecstore): keep bounded GET fanout opt-in (#5929)
Keep GET data-read metadata early-stop and bounded fanout behind explicit environment switches so the default path preserves full fanout read-failure tolerance.

Retain the focused opt-in A/B coverage and the invalid parity full-fanout guard for heterogeneous set layouts.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 22:15:34 +08:00
cxymds 7ca69eb39c fix: correct SNSD cluster diagnostics (#5930) 2026-08-10 20:32:01 +08:00
hector 95627cb601 fix: create config file before fpm RPM packaging (#5924)
The RPM build step fails because fpm's --config-files flag requires
/etc/default/rustfs to exist in the staging area, but unlike the DEB
build (which creates it in its package directory structure), the fpm
command has no prior step creating this file.

Create the config file in a temporary directory and pass it to fpm
via a source=dest mapping, matching the DEB build's behavior.
2026-08-10 08:15:15 +00:00
houseme d97e059c3c fix(iam): merge OIDC extra root CAs (#5915)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 15:24:52 +08:00
houseme d900e11a09 perf(ecstore): expose replay cache RPC sources (#5926)
Track accepted replay cache records by gRPC operation and split Lock/Unlock and ReadVersion methods out of grpc_other so hotpath validation can attribute nonce pressure without changing replay protection semantics.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 15:13:27 +08:00
houseme f1ff9a36bc test(heal): cover replacement terminal recovery (#5920)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 14:51:26 +08:00
houseme 276eea1fba test(heal): cover replacement target evidence failures (#5919)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 14:50:55 +08:00
houseme 88e285c523 perf(ecstore): gate bounded GET metadata fanout (#5917)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 05:20:21 +00:00
houseme 785ee719e7 feat(heal): aggregate replacement recovery status (#5916)
Add a replacement recovery peer RPC so Admin v4 can distinguish definitive cluster proofs from unsupported, unavailable, or conflicting peer state without extending the existing background heal v3/v1 status protocol.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 05:03:27 +00:00
Zhengchao An a8c15e90ec docs(agents): tighten production code growth rules (#5907) 2026-08-10 11:12:52 +08:00
hector 63b564d064 fix: prevent tilde expansion in DEB version substitution (#5913)
The DEB version substitution used ${VERSION/-/~} which caused bash
to expand ~ to $HOME (e.g. /home/runner), producing an invalid
version string like '1.0.0/home/runnerrc.1'.

Store ~ in a variable first to prevent tilde expansion.
2026-08-10 11:11:49 +08:00
GatewayJ d51191f81b build(deps): use RustFS s3s fork (#5901)
* build(deps): use RustFS s3s fork

* ci: allow RustFS s3s source

---------

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 02:45:49 +00:00
houseme 1aeb84dd6b feat(heal): expose replacement recovery status (#5912)
Add a v4 admin status endpoint for local durable automatic replacement recovery records without changing the v3 background heal status or peer v1 payloads.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 01:48:18 +00:00
houseme f17ea7f146 fix(heal): harden replacement rebuild tracking (#5892)
* fix(heal): gate auto replacement formatting

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): require replacement target outcomes

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): bind resumes to replacement targets

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): fence healing marker ownership

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): cover replacement target completion

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* docs(heal): clarify replacement recovery status

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): canonicalize replacement target checks

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): satisfy marker test module lint

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): scope automatic replacement format

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): require a mounted replacement target

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): avoid cloned ref slice in test

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): revalidate replacement before scanning

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): reset stale resume checkpoints

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): release scanner disk map before probing

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): persist replacement intent before format

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): fail closed on mountinfo read errors

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): fence replacement target identity

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): order replacement completion cleanup

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): atomically seal replacement completion

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): census replacement target shards

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): fence replacement recovery ownership

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): preserve replacement recovery anchors

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): satisfy replacement recovery lint gates

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): bind replacement identity to mount lease

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): cover durable replacement recovery states

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): validate persisted resume task identifiers

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): avoid blocking replacement marker CAS

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): report failed marker rollback

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): pin replacement resume schema compatibility

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): preserve durable recovery anchors

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): preserve public disk path semantics

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): use canonical replacement task ids

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): cover automatic replacement in 3x4 cluster

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): verify replacement target commits

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): persist replacement completion proof

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(heal): expose durable replacement status

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): bound durable replacement discovery

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): remove replacement readiness bypass

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): retry terminal replacement cleanup

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): isolate replacement intents from legacy resume

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): migrate legacy replacement intents at startup

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* style(heal): apply strict clippy fix

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): prioritize active replacement recovery state

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): bind readiness to the admitted mount lease

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): atomically publish replacement intents

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): isolate replacement recovery directory

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): tolerate an empty recovery directory

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* style(heal): remove redundant disk bytes conversion

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): reconcile proof-first replacement recovery

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): fence torn intent recovery

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): cover replacement migration conflicts

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): fence replacement lease mount identity

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): cover missing replacement path admission

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): reject conflicting legacy completion proof

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): fall back to proc mount identity

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(admin): expose replacement recovery status

Surface the local durable replacement recovery snapshot in the background heal status response so operators can tell whether replacement cleanup is definitive or still pending.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): keep replacement status compatible

Keep the existing background heal status response wire-compatible while retaining the Linux mount lease cleanup needed for the replacement recovery branch.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* style(ecstore): match linux mount lease formatting

Keep Linux rustfmt output stable for the replacement mount lease comparison.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): qualify mount lease test constant

Use the disk module path for the format config constant in the Linux mount lease regression test.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): keep procfd mount roots directory-safe

Use a procfd path with an explicit directory component so Unix directory guards can open the replacement mount lease root with O_NOFOLLOW while preserving handle-relative I/O semantics.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): delete empty leased buckets via dirfd

Use the held mount lease fd as the parent for non-force empty bucket deletion on Linux so procfd-rooted paths do not get rejected as BucketNotEmpty. Also make the download-part OpenOptions truncate behavior explicit and keep fsync test recording stable across procfd canonicalization.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): scan leased bucket paths for emptiness

Use the local disk I/O root for bucket emptiness probes before non-force bucket deletion and table-bucket metadata checks. This keeps validation on the same mount instance as the subsequent local disk delete path.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(ecstore): align lease path test probes

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): block unsafe replacement recovery restarts

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): defer blocked replacement candidates

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): retry transient replacement discovery

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): keep transient recovery errors retryable

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): block corrupt legacy replacement state

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): classify flat replacement intent corruption

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): keep transient resume loads retryable

Classify malformed legacy replacement state as blocking corruption while preserving disk and transient load failures for retry. This avoids permanently blocking replacement recovery on temporary storage errors.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): avoid latching transient legacy publishes

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): retry blocked legacy migrations

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): defer blocked startup recoveries

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): preserve disk sync limiter across lease roots

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 08:32:47 +08:00
houseme 10a1d6b6e6 perf(get): avoid zeroing response body chunks (#5905)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 06:43:35 +08:00
Zhengchao An be0cea83b7 test(ecstore): pin persisted metadata key literals and bucket config goldens (#5904) 2026-08-09 22:12:26 +00:00
houseme b4b891afad fix(ecstore): raise replay cache auto headroom (#5902)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 18:34:27 +00:00
唐小鸭 88756ea8e1 test(ecstore): decouple kubernetes endpoint tests from kernel hostname (#5900)
Three Kubernetes endpoint-identity tests read the real kernel hostname
and panicked when it is an IP literal (e.g. macOS without a static
HostName, where DHCP/reverse-DNS sets the kernel hostname to an address
like 192.168.1.11).

Add a cfg(test) override seam (force_kernel_hostname_for_test, mirroring
the existing force_local_host_resolution_timeout_for_test pattern) and
route the production read through kernel_hostname_for_endpoint_identity()
so the tests inject deterministic hostnames instead of depending on the
host environment. Production behavior is unchanged.
2026-08-09 17:05:18 +00:00
唐小鸭 6333f21a2e feat(replication): SSE-C ciphertext passthrough replication (#5898)
Complete the encrypted-object replication series (backlog#1783, PR-C of
3, after #5872 and #5885): SSE-C objects replicate as ciphertext
passthrough — the source holds no customer key, so the stored bytes and
their encryption metadata travel verbatim and the replica decrypts only
with the original customer key, single-part and multipart.

- Sender: SSE-C objects read raw (raw_data_movement_read), transfer at
  ciphertext size, and range multipart parts over stored part sizes.
- Receiver: authorized replication PUTs restore the stored SSE-C keys
  from the transport headers (exact lowercase forms - the read-path
  check is case-sensitive), set ObjectOptions.preserve_ciphertext, and
  skip compression, bucket-default SSE, and sse_encryption behind one
  restore-derived gate. Multipart uses an internal session marker to
  store parts verbatim and strips it on complete.
- Convergence: the replication HEAD sends
  x-rustfs-source-replication-check; the target authorizes it as
  ReplicateObjectAction and skips SSE-C read validation for that
  request only, so keyless convergence HEADs see etag/size/mtime
  instead of 400 and SSE-C replicas stop re-driving forever.
- e2e: SSE-C contract flips to a key-gated readable replica (no-key and
  wrong-key GETs fail - the direct silent-plaintext detector); new
  multipart passthrough contract with ETag/marker/stability assertions.
2026-08-09 23:53:04 +08:00
Henry Guo 942faefb25 fix(ecstore): anchor Windows rename publication (#5677)
* fix(ecstore): anchor Windows rename publication

* fix(ecstore): complete Windows rename confinement

* test(ecstore): retain Windows retry assertion path

* fix(ecstore): accept configured Windows root paths

* fix(ecstore): size Windows rename buffers correctly

* fix(ecstore): use native relative rename on Windows

* fix(ecstore): preserve Windows rename parent guards

* fix(ecstore): reuse guarded Windows rename trees

* fix(ecstore): compile Windows publication helpers

* fix(ecstore): preserve configured Windows disk roots

* fix(ecstore): flush Windows shards with write access

* fix(ecstore): stage Windows rollback backup replacement

* fix(ecstore): defer Windows staged file cleanup

* fix(ecstore): type Windows staged write result

* fix(ecstore): retry Windows sharing violations

* fix(ecstore): share Windows staged deletes

* fix(ecstore): split Windows staged publication handles

* fix(ecstore): close Windows staged writer before rename

* fix(ecstore): share Windows staged publication deletes

* fix(ecstore): allow guarded Windows child publication

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 22:56:37 +08:00
houseme 08de165358 perf(get): reduce response body chunk overhead (#5897) 2026-08-09 22:36:39 +08:00
Zhengchao An 1e6f5f1e35 test: promote passing S3 compatibility cases (#5895)
test: promote passing s3 compatibility cases
2026-08-09 21:58:17 +08:00
Zhengchao An 5513dc75ee docs: update security advisory lessons (#5896) 2026-08-09 21:57:56 +08:00
Ramakrishna Chilaka d7f014cf5f fix(docker): support TZ environment variable (#5891)
Install tzdata in both published runtime variants and verify IANA timezone resolution during image builds.

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-09 21:54:59 +08:00
cxymds 8f9633ee83 fix(rpc): negotiate authenticated file writes (#5880)
* fix(rpc): negotiate authenticated file writes

* fix(rpc): share capability probe failures

* test(rpc): cover dedicated capability route

* fix(rpc): satisfy capability cache lints

* fix(rpc): retry timed out capability probes

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 21:19:47 +08:00
cxymds 1be636b914 fix(replication): make resync recovery resilient (#5883)
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 19:42:06 +08:00
houseme ec7f5f7b7d perf(http): reduce tracing/logging hotpath overhead (#5893)
perf(http): reduce disabled tracing overhead

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 11:35:55 +00:00
唐小鸭 73e4ef4dd4 feat(replication): replicate managed-SSE objects via target re-encryption (#5885)
Open the managed-SSE replication gate (backlog#1783, PR-B of 3, after
#5872): the replication reader already decrypts through the injected
object-encryption resolver, so the source sends plaintext plus an
encryption intent header (AES256 / aws:kms, never the source key id) and
the target re-encrypts on its normal PUT path with its own KMS. No DEK
crosses sites.

- replication_put_object_options: fail closed only on Unsupported;
  insert the SSE intent after the strip loop.
- TargetClient::create_multipart_upload sends the full opts.header()
  set, fixing multipart replicas losing content-type/user metadata
  (plaintext included).
- Preserve source ETag and mtime on replicas (authorized replication
  only): receiver wires x-rustfs-source-etag into preserve_etag for PUT
  and CompleteMultipartUpload, resolve_complete_etag consumes it, and
  complete options carry source_etag/source_mtime (absent mtime
  degrades to epoch, not now_utc). Without this every replication HEAD
  comparison re-drives re-encrypted objects forever.
- e2e: managed SSE contracts flip to success on an independent-KMS
  dual-process pair (byte-identical plain GET proves target-owned
  envelopes; ETag/mtime preserved; version stable across scanner
  cycles; resync converges; multipart keeps structure and metadata);
  new target-without-KMS fail-closed contract; SSE-C stays FAILED.

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 10:21:35 +00:00
houseme a71726ef49 perf(get): reduce response write allocations (#5890)
Avoid cloning cache-served GET bodies, preserve downstream vectored writes through the GET close-detection wrapper, and remove per-stripe EC decode sidecar allocations.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 08:58:41 +00:00
houseme 27ecdb88b1 fix(admin): allow owner service account updates (#5889)
* fix(admin): allow owner service account updates

* test(admin): cover console admin update scope

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: ccccpj <ccccpj@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 08:46:27 +00:00
houseme 2c7d0fb2ce feat: add hotpath observability for S3 data paths (#5860) 2026-08-09 08:36:58 +00:00
houseme f72ad77aa4 fix(ecstore): use existing two-set test fixture (#5887)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 07:59:02 +00:00
Zhengchao An 255f3395bc fix(ecstore): rename stale two_set_test_sets references to make_local_two_set_sets (#5886) 2026-08-09 07:56:51 +00:00
Zhengchao An a07ad4a9ff test(replication): cover rule id byte limit (#5873) 2026-08-09 14:48:44 +08:00
唐小鸭 c619d8f2d6 fix(replication): persist REPLICA status on inbound replication writes (#5878) 2026-08-09 14:10:34 +08:00
Zhengchao An 6ce0961780 fix(policy): accept object lock mode condition (#5874) 2026-08-09 14:10:25 +08:00
terem42 578d02977e fix(heal): log the number of drives actually healed, not the drives consulted (#5871) 2026-08-09 14:10:11 +08:00
唐小鸭 eb377209c1 docs(ci): make e2e-replication-nightly test-count comments drift-resistant (#5866) 2026-08-09 14:09:44 +08:00
terem42 9c1c44807d fix(admin): answer background-heal/status partially when peers are unreachable (#5862) 2026-08-09 14:09:34 +08:00
GatewayJ 70deb3284b fix(select): pin object snapshot for query lifetime (#5835) 2026-08-09 14:08:53 +08:00
houseme b9d1ca3e4d chore(deps): update flake.lock (#5884) 2026-08-09 14:07:33 +08:00
cxymds 0cb9952aa0 fix(rpc): make authenticated file writes atomic (#5879) 2026-08-09 12:26:09 +08:00
cxymds 47369ff027 fix(heal): defer scoped repair on suspended pools (#5876) 2026-08-09 11:50:17 +08:00
唐小鸭 10c7476883 fix(replication): rebuild SSE metadata boundary for encrypted objects (#5872)
Groundwork for encrypted-object replication (backlog#1783, PR-A of 3):

- classify_replication_source_encryption: accept the AES256 marker that
  every stored SSE-C object carries; the SseC arm was unreachable.
- Fail closed on sealed material without an SSE marker (MinIO-written
  objects) instead of replicating ciphertext as plaintext.
- Replace the dead VALID_SSE_REPLICATION_HEADERS table with a transport
  map keyed by the metadata keys the SSE writer actually persists, shared
  via the new rustfs_utils::http::object_encryption_keys module.
- Structurally strip all encryption metadata from outbound replication
  (x-rustfs-encryption-* envelopes previously passed the filters).
- Skip decrypt_checksums for encrypted objects at the boundary so its
  is_multipart=false (a response-path contract) cannot misroute
  encrypted multipart objects once managed replication opens.
- Redact X-Rustfs-Replication-* SSE transport values in FileInfo Debug.

A reconciliation test pins that every key encryption_material_to_metadata
produces is either transport-mapped or stripped. All four SSE replication
e2e contracts still assert FAILED unchanged.
2026-08-09 03:05:11 +00:00
Heracles 9996d567d9 fix(build): support non-Linux Unix targets (illumos/Solaris/*BSD) (#5853)
* fix(build): support non-Linux Unix targets (illumos/Solaris/*BSD)

Two independent build-infrastructure blockers kept RustFS from building on
non-Linux Unix platforms. Neither touches runtime logic.

1. pulsar regenerates its protobuf bindings in build.rs on every build, which
   needs `protoc`. Platforms without a packaged protoc (illumos/Solaris/*BSD)
   now enable pulsar's `protobuf-src` feature via a cfg-gated dependency, which
   builds a vendored protoc from C++ sources. Mainstream targets keep the lean
   dependency and their existing system/CI protoc.

2. clocksource 0.8.3 (pulled in transitively by ratelimit 0.10) used the
   Linux-only `CLOCK_MONOTONIC_COARSE`. ratelimit 2.0 dropped the clocksource
   dependency entirely, so upgrading removes the portability problem at the
   root rather than patching clocksource. The bandwidth throttle's bulk
   `consume()` is rewritten onto ratelimit 2.0's `try_wait_n`, preserving the
   best-effort partial-consumption semantics.

Verified: cargo check + bandwidth monitor unit tests pass; cargo tree confirms
protobuf-src is enabled only for illumos/Solaris/*BSD and clocksource is gone
from the graph. The final illumos build must be confirmed on-platform.

Closes #3195

* fix(ecstore): guard ratelimit v2 capacity overflow

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(ecstore): avoid slow bandwidth reader timeout

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(targets): drop vendored pulsar protobuf build

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 10:07:00 +08:00
houseme 6106cd3772 chore(hotpath): add samply symbol summary tools (#5875)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 09:25:29 +08:00
cxymds 3b9c67e79b fix(rpc): authenticate internode put file bodies (#5868) 2026-08-09 08:05:16 +08:00
cxymds d36166ffb5 fix(ecstore): bound decommission listing retries (#5861) 2026-08-09 08:05:12 +08:00
cxymds 963a107b33 fix(ecstore): fence bucket memo on live lock loss (#5852) 2026-08-09 08:00:46 +08:00
cxymds 02b4e082e8 fix(get): pin resume reads to resolved version (#5859) 2026-08-09 07:48:51 +08:00
cxymds b4133d69e6 fix(heal): respect scoped object repair limits (#5855) 2026-08-09 07:23:16 +08:00
houseme 134081b27b chore(deps): fix cargo shear dependency metadata (#5854)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 15:52:00 +00:00
houseme 7217cccc91 fix: isolate ssh stdin in hotpath artifact collection (#5851)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 15:09:39 +00:00
houseme dafc922e72 chore: harden hotpath profiling artifact collection (#5848)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 13:32:29 +00:00
houseme 6fcf0d250e fix(admin): return upgrade-required for v4 fallback (#5847)
Return HTTP 426 for unmatched admin v4 routes so madmin-go v4 can downgrade to RustFS admin v3 handlers.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 21:26:33 +08:00
cxymds 65e55c0f8e fix(rebalance): fence batch delete source pools (#5846) 2026-08-08 21:14:26 +08:00
cxymds 8c75a3834a fix(rebalance): fence writer pool lookups (#5845) 2026-08-08 21:14:11 +08:00
houseme f96346124e fix(multipart): recover part transactions by write quorum (#5844)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 20:22:51 +08:00
cxymds a7de957eb8 fix(rebalance): fence peers before activation (#5842) 2026-08-08 11:55:50 +00:00
houseme c2e23411e8 test(filemeta): cover crc heal classification (#5841)
* fix(filemeta): classify xl.meta CRC mismatch as FileCorrupt so heal repairs it

A failed CRC means the metadata bytes on disk are not the bytes that were
written — bitrot. Raising it as Error::other() surfaces a generic Io error,
which should_heal_object_on_disk does not recognise as heal-worthy: the drive
is skipped, disks_to_heal_count stays 0, heal_object returns ok, and the
corrupted xl.meta is never rewritten — while the scanner re-submits the same
no-op heal every deep-scan cycle. An explicit admin deep heal fails the same
way, so no heal path repairs metadata bitrot, and every one of them reports
success.

check_xl2_v1 already classifies a short or wrong-magic header as FileCorrupt
for exactly this reason (#5716); this completes the pattern for the two CRC
sites. The existing From<rustfs_filemeta::Error> for DiskError conversion maps
the variant to DiskError::FileCorrupt, which the heal path already handles.
The previously silent is_indexed_meta site now logs the mismatch (structured
event shape) like unmarshal_msg does.

Regression test: corrupt one byte of a marshalled FileMeta and assert
unmarshal_msg reports FileCorrupt; fails on the previous code, which returned
Io(Other).

Verified end-to-end on a 3-node / 12-drive EC:4 cluster: xl.meta corrupted on
2 of 12 drives via dd, admin deep heal — before this change the heal returns
ok with the corruption intact and the scanner loops forever; with it, both
copies are rewritten (decode-identical to the healthy quorum), the object
reads back byte-correct, and a follow-up heal reports all twelve drives
clean.

* test(filemeta): cover crc heal classification

Add regression coverage for the indexed xl.meta CRC path and the metadata-heal decision that consumes FileCorrupt.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: terem42 <9478806+terem42@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 11:36:44 +00:00
GatewayJ 4a234c0fe3 fix(iam): stabilize OIDC provider ordering (#5832) 2026-08-08 19:29:04 +08:00
GatewayJ 1b1b217826 fix(iam): preserve OIDC outbound policy errors (#5762) 2026-08-08 19:28:47 +08:00
terem42 7e8b500420 fix(filemeta): classify xl.meta CRC mismatch as FileCorrupt so heal repairs it (#5838)
A failed CRC means the metadata bytes on disk are not the bytes that were
written — bitrot. Raising it as Error::other() surfaces a generic Io error,
which should_heal_object_on_disk does not recognise as heal-worthy: the drive
is skipped, disks_to_heal_count stays 0, heal_object returns ok, and the
corrupted xl.meta is never rewritten — while the scanner re-submits the same
no-op heal every deep-scan cycle. An explicit admin deep heal fails the same
way, so no heal path repairs metadata bitrot, and every one of them reports
success.

check_xl2_v1 already classifies a short or wrong-magic header as FileCorrupt
for exactly this reason (#5716); this completes the pattern for the two CRC
sites. The existing From<rustfs_filemeta::Error> for DiskError conversion maps
the variant to DiskError::FileCorrupt, which the heal path already handles.
The previously silent is_indexed_meta site now logs the mismatch (structured
event shape) like unmarshal_msg does.

Regression test: corrupt one byte of a marshalled FileMeta and assert
unmarshal_msg reports FileCorrupt; fails on the previous code, which returned
Io(Other).

Verified end-to-end on a 3-node / 12-drive EC:4 cluster: xl.meta corrupted on
2 of 12 drives via dd, admin deep heal — before this change the heal returns
ok with the corruption intact and the scanner loops forever; with it, both
copies are rewritten (decode-identical to the healthy quorum), the object
reads back byte-correct, and a follow-up heal reports all twelve drives
clean.
2026-08-08 18:48:18 +08:00
houseme e342457830 perf(filemeta): reduce meta object key allocations (#5836)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 17:23:08 +08:00
Zhengchao An 778f1dfa21 chore(release): bump version to 1.0.0-rc.1 (#5834)
* chore(release): prepare 1.0.0-rc.1

* chore(release): align release assets for 1.0.0-rc.1
2026-08-08 15:04:11 +08:00
houseme 7e9e4b67e5 fix(ecstore): raise replay cache auto capacity (#5833)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 14:13:34 +08:00
cxymds f5463f4aa8 fix(rebalance): defer changed source cleanup (#5829) 2026-08-08 10:45:34 +08:00
terem42 cb93ac5df1 fix(ecstore): purge the stale destination data dir on healing rename_data commits (#5822)
* fix(ecstore): purge the stale destination data dir on healing rename_data commits

Heal commits reuse the version's existing data_dir, so when repairing
in-place corruption (bitrot) the destination directory still exists and
holds the corrupt shard files. rename(2) cannot replace a non-empty
directory (EEXIST on XFS, ENOTEMPTY on ext4), so the commit failed on
every attempt — including all scheduler retries — and in-place bitrot was
detected and reconstructed but never repaired.

Purge the stale destination data dir (move_to_trash) before the commit
rename, for healing commits only: fresh PUTs mint a new data_dir and can
never collide, and a non-healing collision keeps failing loudly. Adds the
FileInfo::is_healing() reader for the marker set_healing() already writes.

* style(ecstore): emit the heal purge failure as a structured event

The new warning was the only sentence-style log in `rename_data`'s commit
path — it sat ten lines above `info!(event = EVENT_DISK_LOCAL_RENAME_REJECTED,
component = ..., subsystem = ...)` and interpolated its values into the
message instead of carrying them as fields, so it is invisible to any operator
query keyed on `event`.

Give it the shape the rest of the file uses: a named
`EVENT_DISK_LOCAL_HEAL_PURGE_FAILED`, `component`/`subsystem`, `dst_path` and
`error` as fields, and a short label as the message. Level stays `warn` — the
purge is best effort and the rename below fails closed — and the condition,
the branch, and the control flow are unchanged.

---------

Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 23:10:53 +00:00
Zhengchao An 96d24bc006 docs(agents): make the structured-logging rule reachable and enforceable (#5828)
The RustFS event shape (`event`/`component`/`subsystem`/`result` + context,
message last) is specified only in
`.agents/skills/rustfs-logging-governance/SKILL.md`, and nothing routes a
change to it:

- `AGENTS.md`, which is what an agent actually loads by default, never
  mentions logging. Its only related line is "log unknown fields at `warn`"
  under Serde Safety, which is about level, not shape.
- The skill's `description` says "use when editing or reviewing RustFS logs",
  so a bugfix that adds one log line in passing — how most new log sites enter
  this repo — never matches it.
- `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` is a blocklist: 500+ `rg -F` literals
  that retire log lines which already shipped. It cannot see a newly written
  one. For `crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs` the only check is that
  `#[tracing::instrument]` is TRACE-only; `warn!`/`info!` shape is unchecked.

PR #5822 landed `warn!("heal rename_data: purging ... {:?} failed: {}", ...)`
in `disk/local.rs` — sentence-style, no fields, directly beside `info!(event =
EVENT_DISK_LOCAL_RENAME_REJECTED, component = ..., subsystem = ...)` — with
every check green. That is the gap, not an authoring mistake.

Close all three:

- `AGENTS.md`: a Logging section stating the field shape, the level policy,
  the reuse-the-file's-constants rule, and that it applies to any `tracing`
  macro added in passing, not only to log-focused changes.
- Skill `description`: trigger on adding or editing any `tracing` macro,
  naming the single-line-added-in-passing case explicitly.
- Guardrail: assert the event shape positively on the already-governed disk
  files — `error!`/`warn!`/`info!` must open with fields or a `target:`, never
  a bare string. Commented-out macros are excluded; `debug!`/`trace!` stay out
  of scope as targeted diagnostics. Self-test fixtures cover both directions.

`crates/ecstore/src/disk/mod.rs` carried the one live violation in that file
set (`conv_part_err_to_int`), so it is converted here; the guardrail would
otherwise fail on an untouched file.

Verification:
- `./scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` — passes
- Negative control: re-inserting PR #5822's exact `warn!` line into
  `disk/local.rs` makes it exit 1 pointing at that line
- `cargo fmt -p rustfs-ecstore -- --check`, `cargo check -p rustfs-ecstore`
2026-08-07 23:05:57 +00:00
houseme 74c6c114b1 fix(rpc): skip batch read-version JSON for msgpack peers (#5825)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 23:03:22 +00:00
cxymds b301588248 fix(rebalance): drain entry tasks before listing retry (#5820)
* fix(rebalance): drain entry tasks before listing retry

* test(rebalance): satisfy clippy in retry regression
2026-08-08 05:50:47 +08:00
Sergei Nikolaev 601c766fca fix(table-catalog): fix object kind validation (#5784)
Signed-off-by: Sergei Nikolaev <kinolaev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 05:50:04 +08:00
cxymds 41e262cdab test(e2e): wait for authoritative quota usage (#5816) 2026-08-08 05:44:40 +08:00
cxymds 23fef384ce test(e2e): align backpressure assertion with recovery (#5815) 2026-08-08 05:44:25 +08:00
cxymds d7f1ba9ae7 test(ecstore): stabilize free-version enqueue retry (#5813) 2026-08-08 05:44:10 +08:00
cxymds a4712fae81 test(e2e): make scanner snapshot tests deterministic (#5812)
* test(e2e): configure scanner snapshot timing

* style(e2e): format scanner snapshot tests
2026-08-08 05:43:56 +08:00
cxymds 8201a74f7f feat(rpc): advertise cross-pool fence capability (#5809)
* feat(rpc): advertise cross-pool fence capability

* refactor(rpc): narrow fence capability surface

* fix(rpc): state fence compatibility removal condition
2026-08-08 05:43:26 +08:00
cxymds ce7ca4cbb8 fix(policy): support version ID condition keys (#5810) 2026-08-08 05:42:52 +08:00
唐小鸭 6633c80151 refactor(kms): close the low-severity follow-ups from the #5668 adversarial re-review (#5817)
* refactor(kms): share the DEK spec mapping and stop re-parsing opened envelopes

- generate_key_material is now the single spec->length mapping for every
  backend that mints DEKs itself; the inline copies in the Static and Local
  backends are gone, and ChaCha20 (32 bytes, same as AES_256) is accepted
  uniformly instead of only by Static.
- The pub(crate) client decrypt of the Local, Vault KV2 and Vault Transit
  backends returns (plaintext, master_key_id), so KmsBackend::decrypt no
  longer re-parses the envelope it just opened (one JSON parse per SSE GET
  instead of two, and unknown-field observability is no longer double-counted).
- Malformed-envelope parse failures now report CryptographicError("parse")
  on all backends; Local was the last one mapping them to SerializationError.
- The four KmsBackend::generate_data_key adapters take fields out of
  DataKeyInfo instead of cloning, dropping a redundant un-zeroized plaintext
  DEK copy and a full ciphertext clone per call; a missing plaintext now
  fails closed everywhere instead of returning an empty key on three of four
  backends.

* test(kms): pin legacy header fallback, stored-AAD, and decrypt key-id contracts

- a_legacy_aws_kms_object_without_the_cipher_header_still_opens rebuilds the
  true pre-internal-header shape (aws:kms mode + S3 key-id header, no
  x-rustfs-* headers) and asserts the fallback normalizes the cipher and
  re-projects it.
- a_rewritten_sse_c_context_header_fails_authentication is the SSE-C flank of
  the stored-AAD tamper check; metadata_without_stored_context_bytes_still_opens
  covers the derived-AAD path for both flavours and pins the seal side to the
  canonical bytes (mutation-verified).
- data_key_spec_controls_the_length_of_the_generated_key requires every
  backend in the matrix to honour all three specs, asserts the envelope
  records the requested spec, and round-trips each blob.
- corrupt_ciphertext_fails_cleanly pins unparseable ciphertext to
  CryptographicError instead of merely not-InternalError.
- Deleted the never-called assert_validation_error / assert_cryptographic_error
  helpers.
2026-08-08 05:41:50 +08:00
唐小鸭 a0a8eaa0f3 fix(storage): reserve internal encryption prefixes in user metadata (#5819)
The write-side filter is_reserved_user_metadata_key only namespaced
x-amz-, x-rustfs-internal- and x-minio-internal- keys, while the
read-side should_skip_object_metadata_key also strips
x-rustfs-encryption-* / x-minio-encryption-* as internal. A client PUT
of x-amz-meta-x-rustfs-encryption-algorithm therefore landed on disk as
the bare internal key x-rustfs-encryption-algorithm, which the KMS
headers_to_metadata path treats as the preferred cipher selector. Not
exploitable today (the production decrypt path discards the parsed
algorithm and FromStr rejects invalid values), but any future wiring of
headers_to_metadata into decryption would hand cipher choice to the
client.

Reserve both encryption prefixes on the write side so client-supplied
keys are namespaced under x-amz-meta- like other reserved keys, hoist
the prefix constants to module scope shared with the read-side skip
logic, and pin the attack form (header injection and CopyObject REPLACE
metadata), the bare-header form, and the legitimate server-written SSE
metadata flow with regression tests.
2026-08-08 05:41:38 +08:00
Zhengchao An 027456032f fix(ecstore): enforce the NAME_MAX segment budget on the write path too (#5826)
#5804 added the on-disk segment budget to check_bucket_and_object_names, but PUT validates through check_put_object_args, which has its own checks and never calls it. An over-NAME_MAX key therefore still reached the disk layer and came back to the client as ENAMETOOLONG → InternalError 500, exactly the behavior #5785 reported.

Caught by re-running the acceptance suite against the locked build 4b2d79f5d, which contains #5804: S3-003 still failed with a 512-byte key.

Multipart is unaffected — check_new_multipart_args and check_multipart_object_args both route through check_object_args → check_bucket_and_object_names, which already carries the budget.

Verification: new test pins the same boundaries on check_put_object_args (255 ok / 256 rejected, byte-based via CJK, multi-segment long keys ok, __XLDIR__ budget for directory keys); cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore --lib -- bucket::utils 17 passed; cargo clippy -p rustfs-ecstore --all-targets clean; make pre-commit green.
2026-08-08 05:30:15 +08:00
houseme 58c49672ca perf(ecstore): cache modern erasure codec construction (#5824)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 18:52:31 +00:00
houseme aa4de7b9d6 perf(utils): avoid metadata key lowercase allocation (#5823)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 18:39:09 +00:00
Zhengchao An 4b2d79f5d5 fix(admin): serve the usage a scan measured instead of blanking the whole snapshot (#5818)
* fix(admin): serve the usage a scan measured instead of blanking the whole snapshot

query_data_usage_info_with_store replaced the entire DataUsageInfo with the default empty shape whenever the persisted snapshot did not cover every currently listed bucket. A freshly created bucket is by definition absent from the last completed scan, so every bucket creation zeroed out usage reporting for the whole deployment until a cycle covered it (rustfs#5806).

Instrumented on a single node (fresh data dir, 10 PUTs into one new bucket, polling the admin API every second while watching the on-disk documents): the scanner persisted correct usage within ~6s — the authoritative document held scanner_cycle=2, objects_total_count=10 and the bucket's entry — while the API kept answering with a default-constructed DataUsageInfo (scanner_cycle: None) for roughly another minute.

Narrow the snapshot to what it measured instead of discarding it. Buckets the scan never reached stay absent from buckets_usage, which already means unknown on the wire and stays distinct from a present zero, and the response is marked usage_snapshot_converged = Some(false) so clients can tell it is not the whole namespace. The protections that motivated the blanking are kept: a structurally incomplete snapshot is still dropped, and so is one that measured nothing the namespace still contains. Buckets deleted since the scan are now dropped from the response rather than lingering.

The old data_usage_snapshot_covers_namespace predicate has no callers left and is removed along with the test that pinned its all-or-nothing behavior; the new test covers the partial, full, stale-bucket, incomplete and empty-namespace cases.

Verification: cargo test -p rustfs --lib -- admin_usecase (24 passed), cargo clippy -p rustfs --lib clean, make pre-commit green.

* fix(admin): drop the orphaned test attribute left by the removed coverage test

Removing data_usage_snapshot_covers_namespace's test left its #[test] behind, which then attached to the following test as a duplicate attribute. Local 'cargo clippy -p rustfs --lib' does not build the test target, so it only surfaced in CI's --all-targets lane.
2026-08-07 18:13:47 +00:00
houseme 96665f4de9 docs(runtime): document allocator reclaim runtime (#5800)
* docs(runtime): document allocator reclaim runtime

Explain allocator reclaim enablement, idle gating, controller status semantics, and cancellation behavior.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* upgrade version

* upgrade version

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 17:38:36 +00:00
Zhengchao An 05a5be51ce fix(scanner): retry a superseded usage snapshot in seconds, not a full cycle (#5814)
A superseded cycle is the expected outcome of the dirty-usage fast path, not a signal of pathological load: a write burst marks buckets dirty, the scanner wakes within milliseconds, and the still-landing writes then supersede the snapshot it just took. Charging that first race SUPERSEDED_RETRY_BASE_INTERVAL = 60s meant the burst surfaced in usage and quota accounting roughly two cycles late.

Measured on an idle single-node instance (fresh data dir, 10 PUTs, polling /rustfs/admin/v3/datausageinfo every 5s): the dirty-usage wake fires 0.3s after the PUTs, its cycle is superseded 0.2s later, and the retry was then scheduled 55.6s out; usage first became visible at t+120s. With the base at 5s the retry is scheduled 4.7s out and usage becomes visible at t+70s.

The exponential growth in retry_interval is what protects against a persistently hot bucket driving an unbroken full-scan loop, so the base does not need to be a whole cycle: 5s, 10s, 20s, 40s ... still reaches minute-scale backoff within a handful of consecutive supersedes and keeps the SUPERSEDED_RETRY_MAX_INTERVAL cap. A configured cycle shorter than the base still wins, since retrying faster than the operator's own cadence buys nothing.

Verification: cargo test -p rustfs-scanner --lib (444 passed) with the three superseded-backoff tests updated to the new schedule; make pre-commit green; end-to-end probe above.
2026-08-07 16:09:26 +00:00
houseme 5187f91997 fix(s3select): replace deprecated parquet reader (#5811)
Implement a local AsyncFileReader over DataFusion's object store re-export so Parquet metadata loading no longer uses the deprecated ParquetObjectReader adapter.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 16:00:58 +00:00
houseme 9d996b82a8 perf(storage): skip read-version JSON for bin peers (#5808)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 15:24:17 +00:00
Zhengchao An ab35681928 perf(ecstore): memoize bucket-incarnation fence validation under lifecycle read-lock coverage (#5782)
* perf(ecstore): memoize bucket-incarnation fence validation under lifecycle read-lock coverage

The PUT commit fence from #5648 validated the bucket incarnation with an uncached read (a distributed metadata-transaction read lock plus an EC quorum read of bucket metadata) on every PUT commit. Under 64-concurrency 4KiB PUT load this adds two quorum round-trips per PUT and the resulting lock-manager pressure produced ~1,000 client-visible 'Lock acquisition timeout' failures per 5-minute window (see rustfs/backlog#1776).

Memoize the validation per node while lifecycle read-lock coverage is continuous: bucket deletion/recreation requires the lifecycle WRITE lock, so while at least one read guard on this node has been held continuously the incarnation cannot have changed. The first fenced PUT in a coverage window performs the exact authoritative disk validation as before; overlapping PUTs reuse its result. The memo clears when the node's last guard drops or any guard observes a lost lock, so the next PUT revalidates from disk. Fence semantics are unchanged; only the redundant re-validations under continuous coverage are elided.

Also right-size the s3s footprint ratchet baselines: -1 s3_error! line from this change's error-path consolidation, and +1 s3s-importing file inherited from #5763 (crates/obs/src/telemetry/filter.rs) which landed on main without the baseline bump.

* fix(ecstore): carry the bucket fence registry through the rebalance test store

The rebalance entry test constructor landed on main after this branch was cut and needs the new field.
2026-08-07 15:05:48 +00:00
cxymds ba5641237c ci(e2e): stabilize full-gate tooling (#5805) 2026-08-07 15:04:33 +00:00
唐小鸭 3792fed827 fix(replication): madmin reset/diff wire compat and config validation (#5799)
* fix(admin): align replication-reset responses with madmin ResyncTargetsInfo shape

The replication-reset and replication-reset-status responses serialized
their shell as "Targets" and per-target fields in PascalCase, while
madmin-go ResyncTargetsInfo/ResyncTarget expect the "target" shell key
and lowercase field tags (arn/resetid/resyncStatus/replicationCount/
completedReplicationSize/failedReplicationCount/failedReplicationSize).
Go json decoding is case-insensitive per field, but Targets vs target,
Status vs resyncStatus and the size/count key names cannot match, so
mc replicate resync decoded empty results.

Rename the serde tags to the exact madmin wire shape, keep the
ResetBeforeDate/Error RustFS extension keys (unknown keys are ignored
by Go decoders), pin the shape with a snapshot unit test, and update
the e2e client DTO to decode the madmin shape.

* fix(admin): stream bare madmin DiffInfo documents from replication diff

POST /v3/replication/diff returned a single enveloped object
({Entries, IsTruncated, ScannedVersions}) while madmin-go
BucketReplicationDiff decodes the body with a json.Decoder loop over
bare DiffInfo documents. The envelope decoded as exactly one DiffInfo
with an empty object, so mc replicate diff printed a phantom empty row
instead of the real backlog.

Emit one DiffInfo JSON document per line by default, using the exact
madmin json tags (object/versionId/rStatus/deletemarker/lastModified;
Size stays as a RustFS extension key that Go decoders ignore). The
enveloped shape moves to the opt-in ?aggregate=true RustFS extension,
which remains the only carrier of scan-coverage metadata; a truncated
default-mode scan is surfaced via a warn tracing event instead of
in-stream. Pin both shapes with unit tests and tighten the e2e helper
to reject any envelope in the stream.

* feat(replication): validate replication config structure before persisting

PutBucketReplication accepted structurally invalid configurations that
MinIO's replication.Config.Validate rejects: empty or oversized rule
lists, duplicate or negative rule priorities, over-long rule IDs,
filters carrying more than one of Prefix/Tag/And, and delete marker
replication enabled on tag-filtered rules. Such configs persisted
silently and later produced undefined routing (e.g. ambiguous priority
ties) instead of failing the PUT.

Add validate_replication_config_structure as a pure function in
rustfs-replication (limits documented as constants), surface it through
the ecstore api facade, and run it first in the PUT capability gate so
defects are named before any metadata write. Missing Priority counts as
zero for the uniqueness check, matching Go's zero-value semantics. The
self-target rejection deliberately stays at set-remote-target, where the
endpoint is known; a config can never reference a self-pointing ARN.
Document the rule-level Destination.StorageClass contract (use the
remote target's storage_class instead) and renumber the acceptance
matrix e2e to unique priorities, which MinIO would also require.

* test(replication): pin duplicated wire types with boundary reconciliation tests

rustfs-filemeta (xl.meta disk format) and rustfs-replication (MRF/resync
persistence format) deliberately each own ReplicationStatusType,
VersionPurgeStatusType and ReplicationState; the boundary converts
between them via as_str(), whose From<&str> impls fall back to Empty on
unknown tokens — a variant added on one side silently degrades to Empty
on the other.

Add reconciliation tests in replication_filemeta_boundary: exhaustive
matches with no wildcard arm on both sides of both enums (a new variant
fails compilation until the mapping is reconsidered), string-token
round-trip asserts (a token the other side does not recognize fails
instead of quietly becoming Empty), and a full-field ReplicationState
round-trip. Cross-reference the tests from both type definitions.
Struct drift was already compile-guarded by the exhaustive struct
literals in the conversion functions.

* docs(replication): define split completion criteria and milestone sequence

The ecstore replication split plan had no completion measure — the
boundary scaffolding risked ossifying because nothing said when the
migration counts as done. Record the criteria in the module inventory:
done means the Required Contracts table's 'Current dependency to
remove' column is empty; the end state moves pool/resyncer/state into
crates/replication, with the boundary micro-files dissolving as code
crosses the crate line (batch-merging them beforehand is explicitly
rejected — the guard scripts anchor on their file names, so merging is
churn with zero functional gain; only datatypes.rs can retire early).

Sequence the remaining work as M2 (resyncer pure decision logic, after
the oversized function splits) → M3 (worker runtime, highest risk,
last) → M4 (retire boundaries and guard entries). Refresh the stale
first-step text — the event sink / runtime contracts already landed —
and update the split-plan status table accordingly.

* fix(replication): align structural validator with MinIO semantics after adversarial review

Three interop corrections found by adversarial review of the new
structural validator, plus review fallout fixes:

- Delete-marker replication is now rejected only for a direct Filter.Tag,
  not for tags inside Filter.And — MinIO's validator only inspects the
  direct tag, and mc replicate add --tags "k1=v1&k2=v2" (delete-marker
  replication on by default) puts multiple tags into And.Tags, so the
  stricter check rejected mc-generated configs MinIO accepts.
- Rule ID length is measured in bytes (Go len semantics), not chars —
  a 255-char multibyte ID must not round-trip into a config MinIO
  rejects.
- An empty <Tag/> element (no key) counts as absent, matching MinIO's
  Tag.IsEmpty(); console form serializers emit empty tags, which would
  otherwise trip the exactly-one-of and delete-marker checks.

Also: repair the store-uninitialized PUT test whose empty-rules fixture
now (correctly) fails structural validation before reaching the store
lookup; pin the previously untested startTime madmin key in the
reset-status shape test; and signal a truncated default-mode diff scan
via the x-rustfs-replication-diff-truncated response header — the bare
madmin stream has no envelope, so a truncated scan was otherwise
indistinguishable from a complete healthy one (madmin/mc ignore unknown
headers).

* test(e2e): activate SSE-S3 replication contract and pin resync fail-closed path

The SSE-S3 replication contract e2e was ignored under backlog#1291
(silent plaintext replication); the fail-closed gate in
replication_target_boundary.rs closed that hole, so the ignore reason
expired. Un-ignore the test — it now pins the current fail-closed
contract (FAILED status, failure event, readable encrypted source,
stable absence of all target versions), verified green.

Add test_bucket_replication_sse_s3_resync_stays_fail_closed: drives the
existing-object resync path (PUT ?replication-reset) over a FAILED
SSE-S3 object and asserts the resync generation reaches a terminal
state without ever materializing a target version, with the
stays-absent window also spanning fast-scanner heal cycles. The new
start_bucket_replication_reset helper doubles as the madmin
ResyncTargetsInfo shape assertion (target[0].arn/resetid) for the
reset-start response.

Refresh the stale nextest count commentary (the module is at 20 fast +
36 nightly = 56 tests by cargo nextest list; the SSE-S3-ignored note no
longer holds).
2026-08-07 22:30:12 +08:00
Zhengchao An 7553715f62 fix(admin): stop logging STS AssumeRole JWT claims (#5802) 2026-08-07 22:17:56 +08:00
Zhengchao An 766afe12fb fix(ecstore): reject over-NAME_MAX key segments up front; classify irreconcilable parity as corrupt metadata (#5804)
fix(ecstore): reject over-NAME_MAX object key segments up front and classify irreconcilable parity as corrupt metadata

Two defects found during release acceptance and the backlog#1776 investigation:

Object keys with any path segment longer than 255 bytes could never be stored (each segment maps to one on-disk directory entry), but the failure surfaced only when the disk layer hit ENAMETOOLONG, which leaked to clients as InternalError 500 (rustfs#5785). Validate the on-disk segment budget in check_bucket_and_object_names so such keys fail deterministically as ObjectNameInvalid (4xx) before any I/O. Directory-object keys (trailing '/') account for the __XLDIR__ suffix their final segment carries on disk.

object_quorum_from_meta conflated two very different no-quorum situations (rustfs#5801): stray or foreign metadata whose parity values are garbage produced the same retryable-looking ErasureReadQuorum (503) as a genuine partial outage, so clients retried unrecoverable reads and monitoring could not tell corruption from capacity loss. Now (a) parity counts outside [0, total_shards] are treated as invalid entries instead of being clamped to i32::MAX, which could poison common_parity's occurrence counting, and (b) when a full read quorum of disks answers but their parity values cannot be reconciled, the error is FileCorrupt — heal-actionable and non-retryable — while too-few-healthy-replies keeps returning ErasureReadQuorum.

Verification: 4 new unit tests (segment budget boundaries incl. byte-vs-char and __XLDIR__ budget; garbage parity sanitization; corrupt-vs-quorum classification), metadata::tests + utils::tests 62/62, set_disk+bucket suites 1214 passed with the single pre-existing heal_queue_marks_missing_versioning_state_as_missed cross-test flake also failing on a clean tree (not introduced here), clippy clean, make pre-commit green.
2026-08-07 22:13:54 +08:00
cxymds f5929a8305 fix(ecstore): preserve newer writes during data movement (#5798) 2026-08-07 12:30:09 +00:00
cxymds 2a44985037 fix(capacity): stop background schedulers on shutdown (#5797) 2026-08-07 19:02:42 +08:00
cxymds bd15dd5784 ci: install awscurl for full e2e tests (#5796) 2026-08-07 10:53:13 +00:00
DIO a5c8052163 fix(s3): resume in-flight GET streams after rebalance relocation (#5791)
* fix(s3): resume in-flight GET streams after rebalance relocation

* fix(s3): address GET resume review findings

---------

Co-authored-by: zhengsf <zhengsf@kaopucloud.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: 马登山 <cxymds@qq.com>
2026-08-07 17:59:44 +08:00
cxymds 58d4bdc79f fix(rebalance): commit stats after source cleanup (#5795) 2026-08-07 17:18:15 +08:00
唐小鸭 8d582a096c fix(replication): tolerate Go zero-value expiration and ignore latency in remote target requests (#5789)
* test(replication): accept real madmin marshal payload with zero-value expiration

* fix(replication): tolerate Go zero-value expiration and ignore latency in remote target requests
2026-08-07 15:22:07 +08:00
cxymds f5bf1fc313 fix(ecstore): fence data movement source cleanup (#5794) 2026-08-07 15:19:20 +08:00
唐小鸭 10abef4791 fix(ecstore): parse ARN region and id in display order (#5790)
* test(ecstore): pin ARN display/parse round-trip field order

* fix(ecstore): parse ARN region and id in display order
2026-08-07 11:57:08 +08:00
cxymds b7b571dfa4 fix(ecstore): bind multipart convergence heal versions (#5786) 2026-08-07 09:54:47 +08:00
cxymds dd2e0328fd fix(ci): ignore strings in s3s footprint ratchet (#5787) 2026-08-07 01:53:24 +00:00
cxymds fe91b75d65 fix(ecstore): heal partial ordinary puts (#5783) 2026-08-07 08:59:35 +08:00
anthonymartin 706a8b6061 fix(scanner): publish bounded observational usage (#5742)
* fix(scanner): publish bounded observational usage

* test(ci): serialize embedded integration ports

* test(cache): isolate generation-change timeout

* fix(scanner): address observational usage review

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Anthony Martin <949506+anthonymartin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 08:52:34 +08:00
houseme 83cdea1f18 feat(rpc): expose and auto-size replay cache capacity (#5781)
* feat(metrics): expose replay cache pressure

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(rpc): auto-size replay cache capacity

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(cache): split runtime memory feature

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 08:52:02 +08:00
anthonymartin 77f2b948c2 fix(capacity): back off timed-out scans (#5770)
* fix(capacity): back off timed-out scans

* fix(capacity): guard incomplete metadata baselines

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Anthony Martin <949506+anthonymartin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-06 15:56:45 +00:00
houseme 5e7e25b7d1 perf(metrics): count internode RPC auth failures (#5777)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-06 15:42:59 +00:00
Zhengchao An da82fd995e feat(kms): report which keys have outlived their rotation period (#5769)
rustfs/backlog#1636 rejected a built-in rotation scheduler: rotation is a policy decision with a per-backend cost and a hard upgrade-ordering constraint, and a server that rotated on its own would make that decision on an operator's behalf at a moment they did not choose. This is what that issue resolved to deliver instead — the signal, without the actuator.

RUSTFS_KMS_ROTATION_MAX_AGE_SECS names the period. Unset leaves the verdict unreported rather than assuming a policy, because how often keys must be rotated is a compliance decision and a built-in default would report keys as overdue against a rule nobody wrote; an unparsable value is refused the same way, loudly. Values below an hour are raised to it, since a threshold of seconds reports every key as overdue moments after it was rotated and teaches operators to ignore the signal.

KeyInfo gains rotation_due and rotation_due_reason, both additive on the wire and both filled in by the manager rather than by each backend, so no two backends can disagree about what overdue means. A backend that does not advertise rotation reports unsupported and is never reported as due — it must not be told to do something it cannot. A key with no recorded rotation is measured from creation, which is how long its material has actually been in use, and is distinguished from a stale rotation so an operator can tell "overdue again" from "never once". Ages are computed saturating, so a timestamp from a node running ahead cannot manufacture an overdue key.

The verdict is advisory in the strongest sense: nothing consults it before encrypting or decrypting, a key reported as due keeps serving traffic, and readiness is unaffected.

The single-key describe response deliberately does not carry the verdict. Its type records a creation date but no rotation timestamp, so a verdict computed there could not tell a key rotated last week from one never rotated, and reporting never_rotated for a key that was in fact rotated is worse than reporting nothing.

The wraps-based branch the issue also specifies is not implemented: it depends on the per-key wrap accounting that does not exist yet.
2026-08-06 15:13:01 +00:00
anthonymartin 656a2f14bf fix(logging): bound hot-path span amplification (#5763)
* fix(logging): bound hot-path span amplification

* refactor(logging): reuse HTTP log target constant

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Anthony Martin <949506+anthonymartin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-06 14:29:18 +00:00
GatewayJ 87d32a6207 fix(auth): align ListBuckets discovery with IAM policies (#5746) 2026-08-06 22:13:47 +08:00
cxymds 3bad829b9a test(heal): cover partial rename retry admission (#5772) 2026-08-06 22:13:29 +08:00
唐小鸭 434663f2aa fix(replication): report remote target latency as Go duration nanoseconds (#5771)
madmin-go decodes LatencyStat.curr/avg/max as Go time.Duration
(nanosecond integers), but the list-remote-targets admin response
serialized them via the persisted milliseconds encoding, so mc showed
latency values shrunk by 10^6 (e.g. 50ms rendered as 50ns).

Extend remote_target_admin_json — the same response-only re-encode
path already used for healthCheckDuration/totalDowntime — to emit the
latency stats as nanoseconds, leaving the persisted bucket-targets
wire format (milliseconds) untouched. list_targets overwrites latency
from live health stats before serialization, so the response path is
the single conversion point.

Found by the MinIO compatibility review (P2).
2026-08-06 22:13:17 +08:00
Henry Guo 5f6fb024cc feat(table-catalog): validate Iceberg metadata graphs (#5758)
* feat(table-catalog): validate Iceberg metadata graphs

* fix(table-catalog): scope Iceberg graph validation

* fix(table-catalog): preserve commit validation semantics

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-06 22:11:57 +08:00
Zhengchao An c1b8136f9a fix(kms): hold the Local key directory and its files owner-only (#5768)
The Local backend's durability argument rests on properties of the filesystem it runs on, and those properties were assumptions: the crate had no test touching symlinks, none asserting a published file's mode, and none on directory replacement or cross-device behavior. Writing that verification surfaced three gaps.

The key directory's own permissions were never set and never read. create_dir_all applies the process umask, which is 0 in a good many container images, and the platform picks the mode far more often than an operator does: kubelet creates an emptyDir 0777, several PVC provisioners mkdir -m 0777, a --tmpfs mount lands at 1777. Write access there is the power to delete a key, destroying every object it protects, or to plant a record for a key id that does not exist yet. The directory is now created 0700 through DirBuilder::mode, so intermediate components are covered and no create-then-chmod window exists, and anything wider is narrowed on every start and re-read to confirm it took. Narrowing rather than refusing matches what the observability stack already does with its own directory; refusing would turn each of those platform defaults into a server that will not start while leaving the exposure on disk. Only a directory this process cannot secure is fatal.

An unspecified file_permissions meant whatever the umask said. The field is optional in the persisted configuration and stays optional, but with it absent the entire mode-application block was skipped, so under a 0 umask master key records were published world-readable. Absent now resolves to owner-only inside the commit protocol rather than at each call site, so the backup restore path — which passed the unset value straight through and published a legacy cluster's restored records at 0644 — is covered by construction.

Startup left symlinked commit temps behind forever, because the orphan sweep required a regular file. The protocol only ever creates temps with create_new, so an entry wearing a temp name and any other file type is either its own leftover or something planted.

Eight tests pin the boundaries: that a requested mode survives the umask, that an absent one still resolves owner-only, that a directory at each mode a real platform produces is narrowed, that publishing replaces a symlink instead of writing through it on both the hard_link and rename paths, that a planted hard link cannot be adopted as a key record, that a symlinked commit temp is removed without harming the key it pointed at, and that commit temps never leave the destination's directory. A real cross-device operation and a directory swapped between rename and fsync cannot be verified without a second filesystem and directory file descriptors respectively; both are recorded in the operations documentation rather than left looking covered.
2026-08-06 22:02:18 +08:00
Zhengchao An aff3d4a39f test(admin): pin the KMS admin route contract as a snapshot (#5766)
Adding a KMS route already fails `route_registration_test`, and `route_policy` pins each route's action and risk with individual assertions, but nothing records the surface as a whole. A change to an existing route's action or risk therefore lands as an edited assertion rather than as a visible before/after — and these are the routes where that matters, since the action decides who may reach key material and the risk level decides which confirmations the route demands.

Every field is derived from ADMIN_ROUTE_POLICY_SPECS, so the snapshot cannot drift from the routing table; there is nothing to keep in sync by hand. A second test asserts the snapshot actually covers the surface it claims to: every listed route must be under /kms/ and must gate on a dedicated kms:* action, so a KMS route registered outside the policy table or falling back to a generic admin action cannot leave the snapshot green.

Per-key authorization scoping is deliberately not restated here. It is enforced and tested where it is implemented, by single_key_endpoints_reject_a_key_outside_the_policy_scope in handlers::kms_keys; a second hand-maintained list would be a claim nothing checks.
2026-08-06 22:01:45 +08:00
Zhengchao An 8003912bb1 fix(kms): report unreadable keys and bound list-keys page size (#5764)
A key that cannot be described was handled two incompatible ways. Vault KV2 swallowed every describe failure and dropped the key from the page, so a damaged or newer-format record silently disappeared from the operator's inventory and from the deletion sweep's census. Local failed the whole listing instead, so one bad record stopped every scheduled deletion on the node for as long as the damage lasted. Both force a per-key problem into a whole-page answer.

ListKeysResponse now carries unreadable_key_ids, and the backends that read local key records classify per-key failures in one place: KeyNotFound is a concurrent deletion and is skipped, a material-level error names the key on the page, and anything else fails the listing, because it says nothing about a particular key and reporting it as key damage would turn a backend outage into a false data-loss alarm. A listing that covered the entire key set and found nothing readable still fails, since an empty page there is indistinguishable from a deployment with no keys; the guard is scoped to a page with no successor so a damaged key can never strand the keys behind it. The deletion sweep destroys the expired keys it can read, counts the unreadable ones, and withholds its lifecycle gauges rather than publishing a census over a key set it did not fully see.

Vault Transit needs the same treatment and is easy to miss: its per-key metadata records live in KV2 too, so folding every non-404 failure into a backend error left its per-key classification unreachable and one metadata record written by a newer build still failed every listing on the node.

Vault KV2 record reads gain the typed errors this needs: an unparseable body is MaterialCorrupt and an absent data envelope is MaterialMissing, where both were previously indistinguishable from Vault being unreachable. Only the parse failure's category and position are reported, because serde's own message embeds the offending scalar and that message reaches a log line and an admin HTTP body.

The admin list handlers refuse a malformed limit with 400 instead of silently substituting the default page size, and every page is capped at 1000 where it is cut, so a single request can no longer fan out one metadata lookup per key without bound. The four operation-level KMS metrics gain a backend label, since operation names are shared across backends and a Transit latency regression was previously indistinguishable from an AWS one. The Static backend captures its reported creation date once instead of reading the clock on every describe and list. POST /kms/clear-cache gains a named response type with an unchanged wire shape.
2026-08-06 22:01:30 +08:00
唐小鸭 6303aa9a42 fix(site-replication): translate policy mapping userType at MinIO wire boundary (#5751)
* test(site-replication): pin MinIO IAMUserType wire semantics for policy mappings

Red tests for P0-4: MinIO peers send SRPolicyMapping.UserType using the
madmin IAMUserType table (unknown=-1, regUser=0, stsUser=1, svcUser=2),
while RustFS deserializes the field as u64 and decodes it with the
internal RPC table (None=0, Svc=1, Sts=2, Reg=3).

- userType -1 (MinIO group mappings) fails to deserialize, rejecting the
  whole IAM item: group mappings never sync from MinIO.
- stsUser=1 decodes as Svc, landing federated STS mappings under the
  wrong prefix and silently dropping their effect.

* fix(site-replication): translate policy mapping userType at MinIO wire boundary

SRPolicyMapping.userType travels on the wire using MinIO's IAMUserType
table (unknown=-1, regUser=0, stsUser=1, svcUser=2), but RustFS stored
the field as u64 and reused the internal RPC encoding
UserType::to_u64/from_u64 (None=0, Svc=1, Sts=2, Reg=3) at the site
replication boundary. Consequences: MinIO group mappings (userType -1)
failed to deserialize and the whole IAM item was rejected, and MinIO STS
mappings (1) were stored as service-account mappings, silently dropping
federated users' policies.

- Widen SRPolicyMapping.user_type and SRCredInfo.iam_user_type to i64 so
  MinIO's -1 deserializes.
- Add sr_wire_user_type / user_type_from_sr_wire in rustfs-iam as the
  dedicated SR wire codec: MinIO table on both directions, groups always
  encoded as 0, and wire value 3 kept forever as an alias for Reg so
  mappings from pre-fix RustFS peers still decode; unknown values fail
  closed.
- Route the SR inbound (apply_iam_item) and outbound
  (mapped_policy_to_sr_mapping, policy-mapping change hooks) paths
  through the codec.

The internal UserType::to_u64/from_u64 encoding is untouched: it is the
intra-cluster node RPC contract and changing it would break rolling
restarts. Outbound compatibility with old RustFS peers is preserved
because UserType::None and Reg share the users prefix in
get_mapped_policy_path, so wire 0 lands in the same location Reg=3 did.
2026-08-06 22:00:28 +08:00
houseme 4855095446 obs: mirror log attributes into loki lines (#5776)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-06 21:59:59 +08:00
houseme fc0de983d8 perf: add RPC auth profiling diagnostics (#5775)
perf: add rpc auth profiling diagnostics

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-06 21:33:17 +08:00
anthonymartin e26b869259 fix(ecstore): preserve checksums through write transforms (#5765)
* fix: preserve checksums through write transforms

* test(e2e): cover SSE-KMS multipart CRC32

---------

Co-authored-by: Anthony Martin <949506+anthonymartin@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-06 17:02:08 +08:00
Zhengchao An efd5481b35 fix(auth): log structured denial reasons for generic AccessDenied responses (#5761) 2026-08-06 02:45:54 +00:00
唐小鸭 dbf51117a1 fix(replication): schedule replication for CopyObject and snowball extracted objects (#5753)
* test(replication): expect CopyObject and snowball extract to schedule replication

Red-phase TDD tests for P0-6: CopyObject never consults the bucket
replication config (no pending stamp, no schedule, and the destination
inherits the source's stale replication status metadata wholesale), and
snowball auto-extract members are never scheduled either.

- usecase white-box: observe MUST_REPLICATE_OBJECT_CALLS for
  execute_copy_object (currently 0, must be 1) and
  execute_put_object_extract (currently 0, must be 2 for a two-member
  archive), plus stale replication-status metadata cleanup assertions
  (MinIO filterReplicationStatusMetadata parity).
- e2e: CopyObject destination and snowball-extracted members must appear
  on the remote replication target and reach COMPLETED on the source.

Red evidence (before fix):
  copy_object_computes_replication_decision_and_strips_stale_status
    assertion failed: left: 0, right: 1
  put_object_extract_computes_replication_decision_per_entry
    assertion failed: left: 0, right: 2

* fix(replication): schedule replication for CopyObject and snowball extracted objects

CopyObject and snowball auto-extract never consulted the bucket
replication config: no PENDING stamp, no post-commit schedule, and no
scanner-heal backstop (heal only re-drives Pending/Failed objects, and
these objects carried no status at all). Worse, the copy path cloned the
source metadata wholesale, so a destination object inherited the
source's replication bookkeeping and could present a fake
COMPLETED/REPLICA state.

Mirroring the PUT path (single immutable decision drives both the
pending metadata and the post-commit schedule, rustfs/backlog#1320):

- execute_copy_object: strip the source's replication status metadata
  (internal replication/replica status + timestamps under both
  compatibility prefixes, plus x-amz-replication-status) for
  non-inbound requests — MinIO filterReplicationStatusMetadata parity;
  the cleanup runs before the decision so an inherited REPLICA status
  cannot suppress it. Then compute must_replicate_object once, stamp
  PENDING when it replicates, and schedule after the copy commits and
  the self-copy lock guard is released. Inbound replica writes keep
  their authorized metadata and are declined inside
  must_replicate_object, so replicas are never re-scheduled outbound.

- execute_put_object_extract: same stamp + schedule per extracted
  member object (MinIO PutObjectExtract parity).

- execute_put_object dispatch: an authorized inbound replication PUT is
  stored verbatim instead of being re-dispatched into the extract path.
  Extracted members keep x-amz-meta-snowball-auto-extract in their user
  metadata and the replication client replays stored metadata as
  headers, so the target used to try to untar each member's own bytes,
  permanently failing replication for non-archive members (surfaced by
  the new snowball e2e test).

Green evidence:
- copy_object_computes_replication_decision_and_strips_stale_status,
  put_object_extract_computes_replication_decision_per_entry (red: 0
  decisions; green: 1 and 2), plus the existing PUT/object-lock
  decision-count tests stay green.
- e2e test_copy_object_replicates_to_target and
  test_snowball_extract_replicates_members_to_target pass against two
  live instances.
2026-08-06 08:46:39 +08:00
Zhengchao An 5e0fdaa247 fix(table-catalog): route read_bounded_json_body errors through ApiError to hold s3s ratchet (#5759)
The namespace REST contracts PR (#5745) added 7 new s3_error! invocations in
read_bounded_json_body, pushing the s3s footprint counter from 1687 to 1693
and violating the ratchet baseline.

Replace those calls with ApiError::invalid_request() (gateway-side error
abstraction, rustfs/backlog#1677 F1, rustfs/backlog#1733) and lower the
baseline from 1687 to 1686.

- Add ApiError::invalid_request(message) constructor to rustfs/src/error.rs
- Replace 7 s3_error! calls in read_bounded_json_body with S3Error::from(ApiError)
- Lower S3_ERROR_LINES_BASELINE from 1687 to 1686

Verification:
- make pre-commit: all guard scripts + fmt-check + quick-check passed
- make clippy-check: passed
- cargo test table_catalog + admin handler tests: 406/406 passed
- s3s-e2e: 27/27 passed
2026-08-06 00:34:46 +00:00
唐小鸭 923e35efa0 fix(site-replication): use MinIO-compatible sts-account IAM item type (#5750)
* test(site-replication): expect MinIO sts-account IAM item type

MinIO madmin-go replicates STS credentials with SRIAMItem type
"sts-account" (SRIAMItemSTSAcc), but RustFS emits and accepts only
"sts-credential", so cross-implementation STS replication fails in
both directions (MinIO returns errSRInvalidRequest, RustFS returns
NotImplemented).

Red-light tests:
- pin the outbound AssumeRole replication item type to "sts-account"
  (construction extracted into assume_role_site_replication_item so it
  is testable, behavior unchanged in this commit)
- update the federated identity replication item snapshot to
  "sts-account"
- inbound apply_iam_item must dispatch both "sts-account" and the
  legacy "sts-credential" alias to the STS arm instead of the
  unknown-type NotImplemented fallback

* fix(site-replication): use MinIO-compatible sts-account IAM item type

MinIO madmin-go replicates STS credentials with SRIAMItem type
"sts-account" (SRIAMItemSTSAcc). RustFS emitted "sts-credential" and
accepted only that value inbound, so STS credential replication with
MinIO peers failed in both directions: MinIO rejected RustFS items as
errSRInvalidRequest and RustFS answered MinIO items with
NotImplemented.

- define SR_IAM_ITEM_STS_ACC ("sts-account") and
  SR_IAM_ITEM_STS_ACC_LEGACY ("sts-credential") in rustfs-madmin
- emit "sts-account" from both outbound sites (AssumeRole hook and
  federated identity OIDC hook)
- accept both types inbound; the legacy alias remains permanently for
  mixed-version RustFS rolling upgrades

Token verification and the retry/event mechanism are unchanged.
2026-08-06 08:29:17 +08:00
唐小鸭 733c7b0f67 fix(replication): accept remote target healthCheckDuration nanoseconds (#5754)
* test(replication): accept madmin nanosecond healthCheckDuration payloads

Red-phase TDD tests for P0-7: mc 'replicate add' sends the madmin default
healthCheckDuration=60s as a Go time.Duration nanosecond integer
(60000000000), which RustFS currently rejects as an unsupported field and
would misread as seconds. Also pins the defensive seconds-or-nanos read
for persisted bucket-targets metadata and the capability contract listing
healthCheckDuration as writable.

Currently failing (red):
- remote_target_request_accepts_go_duration_wire_values
- remote_target_request_accepts_legacy_seconds_health_check
- remote_target_health_check_duration_is_declared_writable
- bucket_target_reads_go_nanosecond_durations_defensively
- runtime_capabilities_response_reports_missing_topology_before_storage_init

* fix(replication): accept remote target healthCheckDuration nanoseconds

mc 'replicate add' always sends the madmin default healthcheck-seconds=60
serialized as a Go time.Duration nanosecond integer (60000000000), so the
default mc link-creation path (and 'mc replicate update') failed with
InvalidRequest. Move healthCheckDuration from the unsupported to the
writable remote-target field list; the capability contract in the runtime
capabilities response follows the constants automatically.

Fix the unit mismatch in both directions:
- Request parsing and persisted bucket-targets reads decode the value
  defensively: below 10^7 it is legacy RustFS seconds, otherwise Go
  time.Duration nanoseconds (also covers MinIO-written metadata).
  totalDowntime shares the same wire shape and gets the same handling.
- The list-remote-targets admin response re-encodes only these two fields
  as nanoseconds via a dedicated serialization path, leaving the persisted
  seconds-based wire format untouched for existing readers.

The per-target health-check interval is accepted for mc compatibility but
not yet applied; the heartbeat keeps its global env-configured interval,
and the explicit 'healthcheck' update op stays rejected. disableProxy,
edge, and edgeSyncBeforeExpiry remain explicitly rejected.
2026-08-06 08:27:27 +08:00
唐小鸭 ead419451a fix(replication): send source versionId as query param to remote targets (#5752)
* test(replication): assert remote PUT and multipart initiate carry versionId query

* fix(replication): send source versionId as query param to remote targets
2026-08-06 08:27:23 +08:00
Henry Guo 7211f29498 feat(table-catalog): complete namespace REST contracts (#5745)
* feat(table-catalog): complete namespace REST contracts

* fix(table-catalog): simplify namespace existence guard

* fix(table-catalog): restore migration guard coverage

* fix(table-catalog): preserve encoded namespace segments

* fix(table-catalog): reject implicit namespace creates

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-05 21:07:30 +00:00
唐小鸭 04722caa04 fix(madmin): accept MinIO PascalCase SRInfo fields and nil-map nulls (#5749)
* test(madmin): add MinIO PascalCase SRInfo fixture coverage

* fix(madmin): accept MinIO PascalCase SRInfo fields via serde alias

* test(madmin): cover MinIO nil-map SRInfo JSON output

* fix(madmin): tolerate Go nil-map null in SRInfo deserialization
2026-08-06 04:18:05 +08:00
唐小鸭 066e952df1 fix(site-replication): send peer join to MinIO peer/join route with encrypted payload (#5748)
* test(site-replication): pin peer join wire path to MinIO peer/join route

MinIO only ever registered PUT /minio/admin/v3/site-replication/peer/join;
the /site-replication/join path never existed upstream. Flip the wire-path
and payload-encryption expectations to the real MinIO route. These tests
fail until the outbound rewrite is fixed.

* fix(site-replication): send peer join to MinIO peer/join route with encrypted payload

MinIO only registers PUT /minio/admin/v3/site-replication/peer/join; the
/site-replication/join path never existed upstream, so the outbound join
special-case rewrote requests to a 404 route. Drop the special case so
peer join falls into the generic /rustfs -> /minio prefix rewrite, and
move the payload-encryption predicate to the peer/join route (MinIO's
SRPeerJoin force-decrypts the request body).

MinIO also replies with an empty body on a successful join, which the
previous strict JSON parse rejected. Tolerate an empty/whitespace body by
synthesizing the peer identity from the add preflight metainfo
(deployment id) already fetched for the site.

Inbound dual-path registration (join and peer/join under both admin
prefixes) is intentionally unchanged for rolling upgrades from older
RustFS peers that still send the legacy outbound path.
2026-08-06 04:15:35 +08:00
唐小鸭 ea8dbf49a2 fix(auth): route ListBuckets denial through ApiError to hold s3s ratchet (#5755)
fix(auth): route ListBuckets auth denial through ApiError to keep s3s ratchet at baseline

PR #5726 added one s3_error! call in authorize_request while PR #5739 froze
the s3_error! line baseline at 1686 counted before that merge, so a clean
main-derived branch fails the s3s footprint ratchet with +1.

Replace the new macro call with ApiError::access_denied().into(), a small
constructor on the gateway-side error abstraction (rustfs/backlog#1677 F1,
rustfs/backlog#1733) instead of raising the baseline. The converted S3Error
carries the identical AccessDenied code and "Access Denied" message, and the
filtered ListBuckets fallback matches on the code only.
2026-08-06 03:22:28 +08:00
Zhengchao An 5f3bc617fe fix: bump s3_error! footprint baseline to 1687 for auth ListBuckets fix (#5747) 2026-08-06 00:05:01 +08:00
hector 6f10ca18a9 feat(ci): add DEB/RPM packaging workflow (#5738) 2026-08-05 16:19:42 +08:00
Zhengchao An 759ade4770 fix(auth): restore filtered ListBuckets fallback (#5726) 2026-08-05 15:21:51 +08:00
Zhengchao An db1daaece2 ci(scripts): add s3s footprint ratchet ahead of s3gate migration (#5739)
Freeze the direct s3s dependency surface with a lower-only ratchet so it
cannot grow while the s3gate/gateway migration shrinks it
(rustfs/backlog#1677 review finding F1; acceptance criteria in
rustfs/backlog#1733). Baselines verified on 2026-08-05: 236 files
importing s3s, 1686 s3_error! invocation lines. Wired into make
pre-commit / pre-pr / dev-check and the Quick Checks job in ci.yml and
its ci-docs-only.yml mirror.
2026-08-05 15:21:35 +08:00
houseme f0c4fbd28f chore(deps): refresh mimalloc revision (#5736)
* chore(deps): refresh mimalloc revision

Update mimalloc and libmimalloc-sys to the requested git revision after running the dependency refresh flow.

Keep ratelimit excluded while accepting compatible dependency updates from cargo update and cargo upgrade.

Harden all-feature test compilation by giving heavy integration test crates their own recursion limit and avoiding a cross-thread spawn for the embedded startup barrier future.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* upgrade version

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-05 04:46:13 +00:00
Zhengchao An 8550a8f9c3 refactor(ecstore): unify remaining heal logs to structured event style (#5720)
PR #5719 fixed the issue #5716 per-object heal log amplification (per-object statements demoted, heal spans forced to TRACE, raw metadata dumps banned by guardrail) and superseded the demotion originally proposed here. This PR now carries only the residual cleanup on top of it:

- Convert the remaining bare-field and format-arg heal logs in crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/heal.rs to the file's structured convention (event/component/subsystem + context fields): missing-object skip, disk-marked-for-healing, cannot-reconstruct errors, dangling-cleanup error, missing data_dir error, xl.meta regeneration warn, and orphan-reclaim failure warn.
- Demote the last remaining info! in the file — the per-set heal_format "set disk formats success, NoHealRequired" no-op message — to a structured debug! (error_count instead of a raw errs dump), and drop its whitelist exclusion in scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh so the no-INFO check for set-disk heal files is strict.

No control flow or behavior changes.
2026-08-05 03:54:27 +00:00
Zhengchao An 018f27d1cd test(ecstore): deflake multipart listing tests under plain cargo test (#5730)
Multipart upload ids embed the process-global deployment id at both create time and list time. Under plain cargo test (thread-parallel, shared process globals) a concurrently running test that re-initializes a store can swap the global between the two reads, making full-upload-id equality assertions fail spuriously (observed: core::sets::tests::list_multipart_uploads_merges_all_sets_without_pagination_loss failing when run concurrently with bucket::quota tests, passing in isolation).

Add a test-only upload_uuid_suffix helper next to deployment_upload_id and make the affected assertions compare only the decoded <uuid>x<timestamp> suffix. Where suffix normalization changes within-key ordering (base64 alphabet order is not byte order), both sides are sorted before comparison. nextest/CI is unaffected (process-per-test); this only hardens local plain cargo test runs.
2026-08-05 11:50:29 +08:00
Zhengchao An 6617708faa fix(ecstore): make local disk map initialization replace stale topology (#5734)
initialize_local_disk_maps appended pool entries to local_disk_set_drives and inserted into local_disk_map without ever clearing previous state. Every caller (both production startup entry points and all tests) passes the FULL topology, so re-initializing the same InstanceContext left the pool/set vectors sized for the stale topology and panicked with index-out-of-bounds for wider disk indices.

This surfaced as deterministic cross-test contamination under single-process cargo test: in crates/heal heal_b920_subquorum_union_test, a 4-disk test initialized pool 0 as [None; 4] on the process-level default context, and the two 8-disk tests then panicked at disk_idx 4. Each test passed alone, and CI never caught it because cargo nextest isolates every test in its own process.

Fix: clear both registries at the start of initialize_local_disk_maps so initialization is idempotent and last-topology-wins. Add a regression unit test in ecstore (process-isolation-proof, unlike the heal integration binary) that re-initializes the same context with a wider topology; it fails with the pre-fix code.
2026-08-05 11:50:11 +08:00
Zhengchao An f73054f6ad fix(s3): degrade multipart listings per upload instead of failing the bucket (#5721)
The multipart staging namespace is one flat set of sha256(bucket/object) directories shared by every bucket, and the cross-set listing rewrite reads every upload's metadata. Two shapes poisoned the whole ListMultipartUploads response with InternalError: Corrupted format: a healthy in-flight upload belonging to another bucket (its stored owner bucket fails the guard and fell into the corrupted-format arm), and a single upload directory whose xl.meta was torn by an unclean shutdown. Docker Distribution calls ListMultipartUploads on every PATCH/commit, so either shape broke OCI registry pushes entirely (issue #5716).

Foreign-bucket uploads are now skipped silently, and directories whose metadata is affirmatively corrupt at quorum are skipped with a debug log, while every other decode failure (quorum loss from offline disks, timeouts, transport errors) keeps failing the listing so clients retry instead of silently losing entries. The degrade-vs-propagate decision is a named corrupt-family classifier with a unit test pinning both sides. FileMeta::check_xl2_v1 now classifies a missing or wrong XL2 magic as FileCorrupt instead of an anonymous io error so damage is distinguishable from transient IO faults.

Refs #5716
2026-08-05 03:49:52 +00:00
Zhengchao An 8c9e884cf2 fix(ecstore): make inline-rollback reclamation file-precise to keep #5703's child-key safety (#5732)
#5724 reclaimed the synthetic inline-rollback dir after a committed rename with delete_data_dir(recursive: true), which has no notion of object metadata: for unversioned objects the synthetic UUID is a fixed, publicly-known constant, so object/<rollback-dir> can simultaneously be a legitimate child key's directory, and recursively deleting it reopens the authorization bypass #5703 closed (PutObject on K destroying K/<uuid> without DeleteObject permission).

Replace the recursive pass with a file-precise one: after quorum commit, delete exactly object/<rollback>/xl.meta.bkp with a non-recursive delete on every disk whose rollback dir is not also the cleanup dir. The parent-rmdir walk removes the dir only when the backup was its sole content, so the BucketNotEmpty leak fix is preserved (#5724's regression test passes unchanged) while a child key at the same path keeps its metadata. The undo path's restore_metadata_backup now also reclaims the emptied synthetic dir, mirroring restore_delete_rollback.
2026-08-05 03:32:41 +00:00
Zhengchao An 75d0c8d6b9 fix(quota): keep the degraded-baseline fallback off the write path's stack (#5728)
The fallback future embeds the whole snapshot loader, and every object write nests a quota check several futures deep, so inlining it grew each write's state machine by the loader's full size — the debug-build 2MiB worker-stack overflow class fixed for bucket-config writes in #5648. Box the fallback at its call site; the allocation only happens on the degraded path.
2026-08-05 03:02:33 +00:00
Zhengchao An d2e5346044 fix(heal): demote per-object heal logs and cap erasure-set failure warns (#5727)
fix(heal): demote per-object logs and cap erasure-set failure warns

Follow-up to rustfs/rustfs#5716. Per-object heal task kinds (Object/Metadata/MRF/ECDecode) queued by MRF/autoheal/scanner loops emitted info!/warn!/error! lines per object: task lifecycle (started/completed/timed_out/failed), the missing-object warn, queue admission full/drop/displacement warns, retry-admission decisions, and uncapped per-object warns in erasure-set sweeps.

Add a shared demote_to_debug_when! macro that keeps aggregate task kinds and admin/internal requests at operator-visible levels while demoting per-object occurrences to debug!, sample-cap the erasure-set transient_skip/failed warns per bucket via take_failure_log_sample (reusing the heal_bucket_objects precedent), demote the per-retry admission decision logs to debug! (covered by rustfs_heal_admission_total and the scheduler task_retrying/task_failed events), and record the previously unmetered duplicate-admission outcome.

Extend scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh with injection-verified regression guards and run it in both quick-checks jobs (ci.yml and its ci-docs-only.yml mirror).
2026-08-05 02:43:57 +00:00
Zhengchao An 204068e07e fix(targets): surface redacted construction error detail in target failures (#5729)
A failed target construction previously logged only reason=construction_failed and pushed an opaque "target construction failed" summary, discarding the underlying TargetError. Debugging rustfs#5115 showed the log repeated every 5s with no root cause, even though the error carried an actionable egress-policy rejection (RUSTFS_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS hint).

The Err branch now includes the error detail in both the error! log (detail field) and the returned failures summary. The detail is scrubbed against the instance's merged config via the loader's existing per-field redaction (secrets -> ***redacted***, endpoint URLs -> origin only, DSNs -> password masked) so credential-bearing values never reach logs or Admin-visible summaries.
2026-08-05 02:42:04 +00:00
anthonymartin ec135f8c4c fix(heal): bound per-object logging (#5719)
Co-authored-by: Anthony Martin <949506+anthonymartin@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-05 02:25:59 +00:00
Zhengchao An 5bd28048d5 fix(filemeta): redact sealed keys and elide inline data in FileInfo Debug (#5725)
FileInfo's derived Debug printed the full metadata map (including X-Rustfs/X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Sealed-Key and -Iv values, i.e. KEK-wrapped DEK ciphertext) and the full inline data bytes (plaintext user content for non-SSE small objects), so any whole-struct log dump such as the heal_object dumps leaked user data and sealed key material into logs.

Replace the derive with a manual Debug impl that redacts encryption metadata values (keys stay visible, values print as redacted with length) under both internal prefixes, and elides data/checksum bytes to a length summary. The exhaustive destructuring forces every future field through an explicit show/redact decision. starts_with_ignore_ascii_case is made pub in rustfs-utils for reuse.
2026-08-05 02:07:01 +00:00
Zhengchao An 53a8e02a08 fix(ecstore): reclaim synthetic inline-rollback dirs after rename commit (#5724)
#5703 split rollback state from old-data-dir cleanup so the synthetic inline-rollback dir is reported only as rollback_data_dir and never reclaimed as if it were a real data dir. But nothing reclaims it after a successful commit either: every overwrite of an inline version by a non-inline one leaves <object>/<rollback-dir>/xl.meta.bkp behind. The residue is not referenced by any version, so it survives object deletion and DeleteBucket fails with BucketNotEmpty forever — the mass teardown cascade currently failing the S3 Implemented Tests CI lane.

Reclaim the synthetic dirs in SetDisks::rename_data once the commit holds write quorum. The quorum-failure undo inside the same function is the only consumer of the backup, so its window is closed at that point. Best-effort with the same anti-misdelete posture as commit_rename_data_dir: never touch the just-committed data dir, and residue must not fail a durable write (backlog#898).
2026-08-05 02:04:46 +00:00
唐小鸭 15b9c1f4e3 fix(replication): make bucket replication rules editable from clients (#5715)
* fix(replication): accept explicit STANDARD destination storage class

The replication engine never reads Rule.Destination.StorageClass (replica
placement comes from the bucket-target config or the source object), yet the
validator rejected any config carrying the field. The console's add-rule form
always sends StorageClass=STANDARD, so every rule created through it failed
with InvalidRequest.

Tolerate exactly STANDARD as a no-op — semantically identical to omitting
the field — and keep rejecting every other value, which would be silently
ignored rather than honored. Document the deliberate omission from the
replication capability contract.

* feat(admin): support MinIO-style partial updates for set-remote-target

set-remote-target?update=true previously replaced every stored field and
required complete credentials in the body, so flipping a target's sync mode
from the console forced operators to re-enter the secret key, and real
mc replicate update bodies (madmin Clone() strips the secret) failed to
deserialize at all.

Adopt MinIO's TargetUpdateType contract: query params creds/sync/bandwidth/
path name the field groups to overlay onto the stored target, everything
else keeps its persisted value, and unsupported groups (proxy, healthcheck,
edge, edgeSyncBeforeExpiry) fail loudly. Credentials updates are skipped for
site-replication peer targets — probed by both scheme derivations of the
stored endpoint and the stored deployment id — because an operator never
knows the site replicator's credentials, and a body-supplied deployment id
is ignored on update since it anchors peer identity. madmin JSON aliases
(bandwidthlimit, storageclass, resetID, deploymentID, sessionToken) let mc
bodies parse under deny_unknown_fields.

e2e: cover a credential-free sync-only update preserving the stored
connection and the zero-ops no-op contract; align the missing-arn assertion
with the earlier validation error.

* chore(scripts): add two-site replication lab manager

site_replication_smoke.py spawns and manages two local rustfs processes,
pairs them via the site-replication admin API (idempotent), and verifies
bidirectional object replication. Subcommands: up/down/restart/status/logs/
smoke/info/remove/clean. Stdlib-only; requests are SigV4-signed the same
way as crates/e2e_test.

* chore(scripts): rename direction-suffixed payload variables for typos check

The typos linter reads the _ba suffix in payload_ba as a misspelling of
"by"; use payload_a_to_b / payload_b_to_a instead.

---------

Co-authored-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-05 01:50:31 +00:00
Zhengchao An 4042bc0a5e fix(quota): admit writes against a persisted usage baseline while authoritative usage is unavailable (#5722)
Upgrading from a pre-v2 release leaves only the legacy .usage.json snapshot, which has no completeness marker and is demoted to non-authoritative, so every write to a quota-enabled bucket failed closed with a retryable 503 until the scanner's first complete cycle persisted .usage.v2.json — a production outage on large namespaces (issue #5716).

Quota admission now degrades to the last persisted per-bucket size: normalize_loaded_data_usage returns the pre-discard bucket sizes, the TTL-bounded snapshot cache retains them (carried forward through failed refreshes), and QuotaChecker::get_real_time_usage falls back to that baseline when the authoritative caches miss. The baseline is static between snapshot loads, so hard-quota enforcement is advisory for the duration of the degraded window — strictly tighter than beta.11 (usage treated as 0) and strictly more available than a blanket 503. Buckets absent from every persisted snapshot still fail closed, and removing a bucket's usage from the backend purges the baseline so a recreated bucket cannot inherit the dead incarnation's size.

Refs #5716
2026-08-05 01:42:09 +00:00
Zhengchao An 4576c2e470 fix(iam): invalidate peer STS caches on revocation (#5718) 2026-08-05 01:17:36 +00:00
Zhengchao An 327fdd5fc2 fix(replication): report FAILED when replication put options cannot be built (#5717)
Both per-target replication methods assign the optimistic Completed status to rinfo before building put options, and the Err branch of replication_put_object_options returned rinfo unchanged. Since #5633 made the source encryption classification case-insensitive, managed SSE sources are rejected at this gate, and the rejection was reported as successful replication: the source object was marked COMPLETED, ObjectReplicationComplete was emitted, and nothing existed on the target.

Set replication_status = Failed (and record the error in the replicate_object branch) so the composite status, the OperationFailedReplication event, and MRF retries reflect the fail-closed outcome. This restores the contract pinned by test_bucket_replication_sse_kms_failure_contract, which timed out in the e2e-replication-nightly runs on 2026-08-03 and 2026-08-04.
2026-08-05 01:08:11 +00:00
houseme 16c2928965 refactor(metrics): migrate scanner report timestamps to jiff (#5710)
* refactor(metrics): migrate scanner report timestamps to jiff

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* refactor(madmin): migrate admin timestamps to jiff (#5712)

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* refactor(storage): migrate RPC DTO timestamps to jiff (#5713)

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 18:35:38 +00:00
houseme 3dabac4a09 perf(observability): avoid cgroup path allocation (#5711)
* perf(observability): avoid cgroup path allocation

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(e2e): satisfy regression test clippy

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 17:47:07 +00:00
Zhengchao An 15c2bade5f fix(iam): disambiguate OIDC virtual parent IDs (#5700) 2026-08-04 23:21:36 +08:00
Zhengchao An 624a4ab837 test(e2e): add P0/P1 regression tests for recurring issue patterns (#5709)
Add 21 E2E regression tests across 7 new test files covering the most
frequently regressing issue patterns identified from 5600+ issues in
rustfs/rustfs. Each test references specific regression issue numbers
and validates the exact failure path that caused the regression.

Regression categories covered:
- P0: Event notification startup race (rustfs#5387, #5681, #5401)
- P0: Lifecycle/ILM rule persistence (rustfs#5407, #5167, #4963)
- P0: Delete consistency (rustfs#5375, #4978, #760)
- P1: Listing completeness (rustfs#4810, #5051, #3191)
- P1: Bucket statistics accuracy (rustfs#5615, #3898, #1012)
- P1: Distributed startup quorum (rustfs#5655, #2945)
- P1: Tier/scanner persistence (rustfs#5218, #5013)

Ref: https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/1670
2026-08-04 23:21:01 +08:00
lqb 4f43c0ca7e fix(compose): set log directory and wait for permission helper (#5646)
* Update docker-compose-simple.yml

Added RUSTFS_OBS_LOG_DIRECTORY=/app/logs in docker-compose-simple.yml

Signed-off-by: lqb <lqb@users.noreply.github.com>

* Added missing dependency to volume-permission-helper

Signed-off-by: lqb <lqb@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: lqb <lqb@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 23:20:55 +08:00
houseme 3405b4e980 perf(observability): avoid sampler stat allocations (#5708)
* perf(observability): avoid cgroup stat key allocations

Replace the memory.stat HashMap parser with a fixed-field parser so the memory observability sampler does not allocate String keys or hash every cgroup field on each interval.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* perf(observability): parse mimalloc stats without copying

Parse the mimalloc stats JSON while the mimalloc-owned buffer is still alive, then free it immediately. This avoids allocating an owned String on each allocator memory sample.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 23:20:49 +08:00
houseme 510b0350d6 refactor(time): migrate audit and notify timestamps to jiff (#5707)
* refactor(time): migrate audit and notify timestamps to jiff

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(ecstore): initialize heal walk decode error

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* refactor(targets): parse MySQL event time with jiff

Preserve MySQL DATETIME(6) wall-time formatting for RFC3339 eventTime values while removing the direct chrono dependency from rustfs-targets.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* chore(deps): prune unused workspace dependencies

Apply cargo shear --fix to remove unused path-clean and s3select-api tempfile entries after the scoped jiff migration.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(ecstore): remove duplicate heal walk decode error init

Remove the duplicate decode_error field from the heal walk test collector initializer so lib-test clippy compiles on CI.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* refactor(policy): emit OPA timestamps with jiff

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 23:20:44 +08:00
Zhengchao An b14805af47 fix(ci): block PR-controlled execution in performance A/B workflow (#5705)
fix(ci): block PR execution in performance workflow
2026-08-04 23:20:40 +08:00
Zhengchao An f3eba31aee fix(ecstore): retain namespace read locks for streaming GETs to prevent quota-bypass (#5699)
* fix(ecstore): retain locks for streaming GETs

* fix(rpc): keep disabled snapshot leases lint-clean
2026-08-04 23:20:35 +08:00
Zhengchao An 42af6e3b63 fix(ecstore): isolate inline rollback cleanup (#5703) 2026-08-04 23:20:29 +08:00
Zhengchao An a43267160d fix(auth): enforce object-lock actions for POST uploads (#5701) 2026-08-04 23:20:24 +08:00
Zhengchao An 2039ba5f65 fix(s3select): enforce SSE-KMS read authorization (#5698)
* fix(s3select): enforce SSE-KMS read authorization

* fix(app): route select SSE auth through facade
2026-08-04 23:20:19 +08:00
Zhengchao An 3a6f630ff1 fix(api): bound bucket rate limiter keys (#5706) 2026-08-04 15:13:25 +00:00
Zhengchao An 1695873e55 fix(auth): isolate embedded IAM contexts (#5704) 2026-08-04 23:12:35 +08:00
Zhengchao An c26419e357 fix(replication): restrict metadata replication targets (#5696) 2026-08-04 22:46:42 +08:00
Zhengchao An d401c65719 fix(policy): require unscoped KMS bundle grants (#5697) 2026-08-04 22:46:14 +08:00
cxymds eb87bb1faf fix(replication): harden resync and MRF recovery (#5694)
* fix(replication): harden resync and MRF recovery

* fix(replication): correct MRF validation regressions

* fix(replication): address CI validation failures

* fix(heal): initialize decode error in merge test
2026-08-04 13:40:50 +00:00
houseme 93fcd6b6b5 fix(observability): fallback mimalloc requested memory stats (#5695)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 21:10:29 +08:00
Zhengchao An c63dba7d3f fix(list): skip delete markers in single-object fast path for ListObjects (#5691) 2026-08-04 12:49:45 +00:00
cxymds 31959b90db fix(heal): harden resumable set repair failures (#5693)
* fix(heal): enforce resumable task control

* fix(ecstore): surface bucket and metadata heal errors

* chore: refresh guardrail path references

---------

Signed-off-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 12:35:58 +00:00
Zhengchao An 3c8bd5b929 fix(heal): surface stale versions from all disks during heal walk (#5692)
When a returning node carries a stale object version that was deleted on
the quorum, the heal disk-walk partial callback used `resolve_union`
which picks only one entry from divergent disk entries. The minority
version was never enumerated and therefore never cleaned up.

Replace `resolve_union` + `ingest` with a new `ingest_merged` that
collects all unique versions from every partial entry across disks,
deduplicating by (name, version_id). This ensures stale data on a
returning node is surfaced for healing and can be deleted as dangling.

Fixes #5029
2026-08-04 12:18:43 +00:00
Zhengchao An ec106548ba test(e2e): restore webhook redelivery regression coverage (#5690)
test(e2e): unquarantine webhook redelivery regression
2026-08-04 20:00:54 +08:00
Zhengchao An cfce7bd9b1 fix(filemeta): preserve FileInfo wire compatibility (#5689) 2026-08-04 09:25:28 +00:00
houseme b71483b1c8 fix(ecstore): split internal get metadata metrics (#5687)
Classify expected metadata-missing errors separately from unknown get pipeline failures and attribute internal meta-bucket reader failures to an internal_meta path instead of legacy_duplex.

This keeps scanner/data-usage metadata probes from polluting user GET/mixed failure attribution while preserving the existing read error behavior.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 08:37:09 +00:00
cxymds cebc28f678 fix(replication): fence MRF journal updates (#5686) 2026-08-04 11:49:16 +08:00
Henry Guo d6e11cf018 refactor(table-catalog): modularize catalog implementation (#5678)
* refactor(table-catalog): split catalog foundations

* refactor(table-catalog): split REST handler modules

* refactor(table-catalog): split domain and store modules

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-04 11:48:00 +08:00
Zhengchao An 71f2e7a209 fix(ecstore): treat transient network errors as unformatted during bootstrap (#5683)
When a fresh multi-node cluster starts, the first disk detects all disks
as unformatted and initializes the format. However, `should_init_erasure_disks`
and `quorum_unformatted_disks` only counted `UnformattedDisk` errors. Remote
peers that have not yet started their gRPC server return transient network
errors (connection refused, timeout) instead of `UnformattedDisk`, causing
the first disk to miss the "all unformatted" signal and creating a deadlock:
first disk retries endlessly while non-first disks wait for it.

Add `is_unformatted_or_transient_network` that treats transient network
errors as equivalent to `UnformattedDisk` for the bootstrap decision.
A remote disk that cannot be reached during fresh-cluster startup is
indistinguishable from an unformatted disk — the peer may simply not
have started its gRPC server yet.

Fixes #5655
2026-08-04 11:47:38 +08:00
Zhengchao An 1934cddd66 fix(ecstore): skip walkdir total timeout for listing operations (#5684)
Large buckets with millions of objects can take longer than the default
5-second walkdir timeout to produce the first page of listing results.
This causes timeouts in the web UI and mc CLI when opening or scanning
such buckets.

Skip the walkdir total timeout for S3 ListObjects operations when no
explicit walkdir_timeout is configured. The stall timeout (5s with no
forward progress) still protects against drives that stop responding.
This matches the scanner's existing behavior for the same reason.

Fixes #5647
2026-08-04 11:46:53 +08:00
Zhengchao An e08cf474db fix(audit): move audit init after IAM bootstrap to fix startup ordering (#5685)
Audit initialization requires the AppContext (server config + object
store) which is published by ensure_startup_after_iam inside
init_iam_runtime. Moving init_audit_runtime after init_iam_runtime
ensures the runtime sources are available when audit starts.

Fixes #5681

Co-authored-by: RustFS <hello@rustfs.com>
2026-08-04 11:45:48 +08:00
Zhengchao An 48c8d85f3b fix(ecstore): don't exclude pool when has_space_for is indeterminate (#5497) (#5682)
fix(ecstore): don't exclude pool when has_space_for is indeterminate

When `has_space_for` returns an error (not enough online disks to
reliably determine space), the old code treated this the same as
"definitely no space" via `unwrap_or_default()`, zeroing out the
pool's available capacity.  During pool decommission this creates a
false "Disk full" (500) for S3 PUT requests:

- Pool 0 (decommissioning) is correctly suspended → available = 0
- Pool 1 (active) has some disks whose disk_info call fails under
  heavy migration I/O → has_space_for returns Err → available forced
  to 0
- get_available_pool_idx sees total = 0 → returns None → DiskFull

Fix: distinguish Ok(false) (genuinely full) from Err (indeterminate).
On Err, log a warning and fall through to compute available space from
whatever disks did respond.  The actual write will enforce its own
quorum; a premature zero at the pool-selection layer is a false
rejection.

Closes #5497
2026-08-04 08:50:13 +08:00
cxymds 99701e9f52 fix(replication): fence journal snapshots with CAS (#5674) 2026-08-04 07:22:19 +08:00
Zhengchao An e64ed14fb0 fix(ecstore): address review comments for batch shard pread (#5680)
fix: address review comments for batch shard pread
2026-08-03 22:36:49 +00:00
cxymds cad0fd9b2f fix(replication): retain MRF failures during recovery (#5667)
* fix(replication): retain MRF failures during recovery

* fix(replication): harden MRF recovery retries

* fix(replication): preserve MRF recovery durability

* test(replication): assert MRF append entries explicitly

* fix(replication): detect committed MRF append retries

* fix(replication): tighten MRF persister recovery

* fix(replication): drain overflow after recovery shrink

* test(replication): avoid repeated MRF recovery decode

* test(replication): cover recovery overflow suffix

* fix(replication): gate MRF recovery flushes

* test(replication): satisfy MRF clippy checks

* fix(replication): drain closed MRF channels

---------

Co-authored-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 06:01:39 +08:00
rdiperri-wasabi de8cb5f26c perf(ecstore): batch local EC shard preads on GET (#5679)
Collapse per-shard blocking-pool round-trips into one spawn_blocking
pread batch when all online shards are local and mmap-read is enabled.

Co-authored-by: ba <ba@ubuntu-server.alpha30.bos16>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 05:53:22 +08:00
Zhengchao An 98d3619613 fix: address rc.1 release blockers (#5648)
* fix: address rc.1 release blockers

* fix: route release guards through architecture boundaries

* fix: close remaining rc.1 regression gaps

* refactor: group multipart listing options

* fix: resolve rc.1 CI regressions

* fix(ecstore): keep bucket-config writes off the caller's stack

A bucket-config write nests incarnation resolution (which can drive legacy
migration and a peer fan-out), a full metadata load, and `save` — itself an
object PUT that pulls in the whole erasure write path. Every request that
mutates bucket config is already several futures deep, so inlining all of
that into one state machine overflows the 2MiB worker stack in debug builds.

Two CI lanes aborted with SIGABRT on this:

  ILM Integration (serial)
    rustfs app::lifecycle_transition_api_test::
      compensation_driven_complete_multipart_upload_still_transitions
  Test and Lint (swift)
    rustfs-protocols::swift_metadata_persistence::
      swift_metadata_writes_are_durable

Neither test file is touched by this branch and both lanes are green on
main. Stack-pointer probing showed ~780KiB consumed between
`metadata_sys::update` and the config read alone, with single hops of
363KiB (`update` -> `acquire_config_write_guard_for_incarnation`), 125KiB
and 105KiB.

Box the deep sub-futures on both read-modify-write paths (`update` /
`update_checked` and `update_config_with` / `update_config_with_checked`)
so each guard's own state machine stays small. Behaviour is unchanged;
`update` -> guard drops to 253KiB and both tests pass on the default stack.

* fix(lifecycle): unbreak restore under the bucket generation fence

The ILM lane aborted on a stack overflow before reaching these, so they
were never reported; with that fixed, four restore tests fail. All four
are green on main and none of their test files are touched by this branch.

1. RestoreObject and ListMultipartUploads hard-required
   `opts.expected_bucket_incarnation_id`, but `apply_bucket_generation_guard`
   deliberately leaves it unset when no guard extension is present — only the
   S3 access layer installs one. Every direct caller therefore got
   `InternalError: ... bucket generation guard is missing`. Resolve the
   current generation instead, the way the copy path already does. The fence
   is unaffected: RestoreObject still re-reads the incarnation from disk and
   compares before admitting the restore, and the multipart listing is
   filtered by the value it resolves.

2. `restore_expiry_snapshot_matches` (new on this branch) rejected every
   restored-copy expiry whose `restore_expires` had not already elapsed.
   Whether the restored copy is due to expire is the ILM evaluator's
   decision, made when it emitted DeleteRestoredAction; re-deriving it in
   the set layer only adds a way for a legitimate action to be rejected.
   The stale-event risk it appears to guard is already covered by the
   surrounding snapshot match — a re-restore rewrites `restore_expires`,
   so a replayed event fails the equality check. Drop the clause; the
   fifteen identity clauses are unchanged.

Fixed:
  rustfs app::lifecycle_transition_api_test::
    restore_object_usecase_accepts_exactly_one_of_two_concurrent_restores
    restore_object_usecase_completes_suspended_null_version_in_place
    restore_object_usecase_reports_ongoing_conflict
  rustfs-scanner::lifecycle_integration_test serial_tests::
    test_restore_chain_local_read_expiry_keeps_remote_and_allows_re_restore

Verification: the CI ILM lane filter now runs 53/53 green locally.

* chore: address review follow-ups on this branch

Four items from the adversarial review that were still open.

- Restore the assertion `test_bucket_replication_replayed_delete_marker_
  preserves_source_mtime_without_source_restart` is named for. The branch
  had replaced the backlog#867 mtime check with `assert_replication_
  converged`, which any successful replication satisfies, and deleted the
  two helpers it needed — so the regression the test exists to catch would
  now pass. This matters here specifically because the branch changes the
  flag feeding `replication_delete_remove_options` and routes replay
  through a new file and ordering.

- Drop `read_config_no_lock_preserve_empty`: zero production callers (the
  one real consumer calls the `_with_metadata` variant directly). Its test
  stanza now exercises that variant, so the coverage moves to live code
  rather than being deleted.

- Revert the `bytesize` bump. It is a no-op: `Cargo.lock` already pinned
  2.7.0 before this branch and is untouched, so the caret range already
  resolved there. Nothing in the diff uses the crate.

- Split the AGENTS.md "Adversarial Validation" policy change out of this
  branch. The edit is defensible on its own, but it relaxes the review gate
  that this branch has to pass, so it should land as its own PR reviewed on
  its own merits rather than bundled with the change that benefits from it.
  The reverted hunks are unchanged and ready to re-apply.

Not changed, deliberately: the missing-sidecar path still fails closed.
`missing_bucket_incarnation_sidecar_for_new_metadata_fails_closed` pins
that on purpose, and serving a non-authoritative Object Lock state would
be the wrong trade. The residual concern stands and is recorded in review
— a crash between the two writes in `persist_new_and_set` leaves the
bucket unloadable until DeleteBucket+CreateBucket, and the repair branches
in `migrate_legacy_metadata` and `make_bucket` are unreachable dead code
for that case. Resolving it needs the read path and the (transaction-lock
holding) repair path to be separated, which is more than a follow-up edit.

* test(ci): serialize the new bucket-incarnation tests

The five tests this branch adds around the incarnation / lifecycle fence
drive `init_bucket_metadata_sys` and `bucket_metadata_sys_of` — process-global
OnceLock state that `serial_test`'s `#[serial]` cannot protect across
nextest's process boundary — and they delete+recreate buckets, the shape that
raced into InsufficientWriteQuorum in backlog#937.

Add them to the `ecstore-serial-flaky` group in both the default and ci
profiles (nextest evaluates a named profile's own overrides list, so the
ci mirror is required). Preventive serialization only, no retries.

Not a full fix for the review comment: `bucket_delete_waits_for_config_
mutation_fence` still proves liveness with a fixed 200ms sleep plus
`assert!(!delete.is_finished())`. Turning that into readiness polling needs
a production-side signal to wait on — asserting "still blocked" is inherently
a negative. Serializing the group removes the parallel-load pressure that
makes the window fragile; the sleep itself is left for a follow-up.

* test(ecstore): pin that a drained bucket is actually deletable

`DeleteBucket`'s emptiness check is `has_xlmeta_files`, a raw scan of the
bucket directory on local disks — not an S3-level listing. So "the client
drained the bucket" and "the bucket is deletable" are two different
contracts, and only the first one was covered.

That gap is what the `S3 Implemented Tests` lane is failing on: 219 cases,
all `BucketNotEmpty` on `nuke_prefixed_buckets`, with every test body
passing. The first one is `test_versioning_obj_suspend_versions`, reported
by pytest as PASSED followed by ERROR at teardown.

Add the missing assertion for the unversioned path: PUT, client DELETE,
then assert no `xl.meta` survives and `DeleteBucket` succeeds. It passes —
which is itself a result: the plain delete path leaves no residue, so the
s3-tests failure is not there.

The versioning-suspended path is the remaining suspect (the client DELETE
leaves a null delete marker, and draining means purging it by
`versionId=null`). It is not covered here: `BucketVersioningSys` resolves
through the ambient `get_bucket_metadata_sys()` OnceLock, which this unit
env cannot set, so the bucket never actually reports as suspended. That
repro belongs at the e2e layer where a real server owns the versioning
state.

* fix(ecstore): let an explicit null-version delete purge its delete marker

Root cause of the `S3 Implemented Tests` lane: 219 cases, all
`BucketNotEmpty` on `nuke_prefixed_buckets`, every test body passing.

On a versioning-suspended bucket a client DELETE leaves a null delete
marker — correct S3 semantics, and an `xl.meta` on disk. Draining the
bucket therefore means purging that marker as `?versionId=null`, which is
what `nuke_bucket` does before `DeleteBucket`. That purge was rejected:

    explicit null-version purge of the null delete marker must succeed,
    got [Some(MethodNotAllowed)]

so the marker survived, and `DeleteBucket`'s emptiness check — a raw
`has_xlmeta_files` scan of the bucket directory, not an S3 listing — kept
reporting the bucket as non-empty.

The two sides of the version comparison in the batch delete loop are in
different namespaces. `goi.version_id` is the client-facing identity, where
`from_file_info` synthesizes `Some(Uuid::nil())` for a null version on a
versioned *or versioning-suspended* bucket. `version_id` is the storage
identity, where `delete_file_info_version_id` maps an explicit
`?versionId=null` to `None`. Comparing them raw makes the purge look like a
version mismatch, so `explicit_delete_marker` is false and the
`MethodNotAllowed` from the lookup is recorded as a delete failure.

This only became reachable on this branch: previously `check_opts` did not
carry `dobj.version_id`, so `set_disk_delete_creates_delete_marker` was
true, `object_lock_check_required` was false, and the lookup that produces
`MethodNotAllowed` never ran. Adding the version id to `check_opts` lit up
a comparison that was already wrong.

Normalize both sides through `delete_file_info_version_id`.

The regression test injects a real Suspended bucket-config snapshot — the
delete path reads versioned/suspended from that snapshot, not from `opts`,
so without it `from_file_info` never synthesizes the null version id and
the branch is not reached. Mutation-checked: restoring the raw comparison
fails the test with the exact `MethodNotAllowed` above.

* fix(app): drop the now-needless struct update

Reverting `crates/replication` to main removed the extra `MrfReplicateEntry`
fields, so this literal specifies every field again and `..Default::default()`
trips `clippy::needless_update` under `-D warnings`.

Caught by CI, not locally: I had run `cargo check --workspace --all-targets`,
which does not see clippy-only lints. Ran `cargo clippy --workspace
--all-targets -- -D warnings` here — clean.

* test(e2e): assert the fresh-volume classification

four_node_empty_legacy_volumes_start_as_fresh only started the cluster and
listed buckets — no assertion, so any classification path that still permits
startup left it green without proving the pre-created empty `.minio.sys`
directories were treated as fresh volumes.

Pin what that classification actually leaves behind: no buckets adopted into
the namespace, `.rustfs.sys/format.json` written on every drive, and the empty
legacy directory left untouched rather than migrated into.

* fix(bucket): apply the requested Object Lock to existing buckets

Site replication replays make-with-versioning against the destination,
carrying the source's `lockEnabled`. When the destination bucket already
exists it takes `force_create`, and the whole option-application block was
gated on `confirmed_missing` — so the call returned success while the replica
stayed unlocked. Replicated versions could then be deleted without the
retention the source enforces.

Object Lock enable is one-way, so applying it to an existing bucket is safe:
move it out of the creation-only gate, keeping `created` and versioning-only
options creation-scoped as before.

An existing authoritative bucket takes the `cache_bucket_metadata_in` branch,
which only caches, so the enable would have been dropped on restart. Persist
instead when the enable actually changed something.

Mutation-checked: restoring the creation-only gate fails the new
`force_create_enables_object_lock_on_an_existing_bucket` with "Object Lock
must be enabled on the existing bucket".

cargo nextest run -p rustfs-ecstore --lib: 3633 passed.

* fix(ecstore): box the generation-checked config mutation paths too

The earlier stack fix boxed `update` and `delete`, but an authorized
bucket-config mutation carrying an incarnation takes `update_if_incarnation`
/ `delete_if_incarnation` instead — which were still inlining the whole
resolve/load/save chain into an already-deep request future. Same overflow,
sibling path.

* fix(restore): keep the nil-version normalization the strip removed

Reverting the replication subsystem to main took `set_disk/replication.rs`
with it, but one line in that file was this branch's own fix rather than
replication work:

    -  self.version_id.filter(|v| !v.is_nil()) == fi.version_id.filter(|v| !v.is_nil())
    +  self.version_id == fi.version_id

For a versioning-suspended object the expected version is `Some(Uuid::nil())`
while the read-back `FileInfo` carries `None`, so the raw compare reports
every suspended restore as "restored object changed before restore metadata
finalization" and the copy-back never commits. Same nil-vs-None mismatch as
the null delete-marker purge fixed earlier on this branch.

Caught by `Test and Lint (rio-v2)`, not by my local runs: the test lives in
`transition_commit_failure_tests`, gated behind `feature = "test-util"`, so
the 3633-test suite I had been running never included it. Re-ran with
`--features rio-v2,test-util`: 3722 passed.
2026-08-03 19:25:43 +00:00
Zhengchao An 5237a4465d feat(replication): purge delete markers by the target's own version id (#5676)
* feat(replication): purge delete markers by the target's own version id

When a delete marker is replicated, the target assigns it a version id. The
purge that follows derived one from the *source* uuid instead, which is only
correct when the target mirrors source version ids. A generic S3 target does
not: the derived id addresses a version that does not exist there, so the
purge is a no-op and the replica keeps a marker the source has already
removed. Same failure class as #4401.

Record the id the target reports and address it directly on purge.

Data path, all of it driven by the object's internal metadata rather than the
`ReplicationState` wire form, which encodes positionally and cannot carry a
map:

- `rustfs-utils`: the `replication-delete-marker-version-<arn>` key family,
  plus `strip_internal_prefix_preserving_case` — ARNs are case-sensitive and
  the existing `strip_internal_prefix` lowercases.
- `ReplicationState` gains the map and a `..._corrupt` flag, both
  `#[serde(skip)]`; `ReplicatedTargetInfo` carries the per-target id.
- `persist_target_delete_marker_versions` is merge-only. A delete arriving
  over internode RPC has an empty map, so treating it as authoritative would
  let a remote disk erase an id the local disk still holds.
- `delete_object_version` copies the map into `fi.metadata` before dispatch,
  so the durable carrier crosses the wire even though the field does not.
- The keys are folded into the quorum hash through their normalized form:
  the dual internal prefixes carrying one mapping share an identity, while a
  genuine disagreement between disks still shows up as a quorum difference.
- `corrupt` (the prefixes disagreed) fails closed: skip the purge and warn
  rather than guess an id and risk destroying a live version on the target.

Ported from the rc.1 branch, which cannot merge as a whole: its MRF replay
rewrite collides with #5659/#5671/#5672/#5673 and regressed
`MRF_PENDING_CAP`. main's MRF machinery is kept; only this capability moves
across. It touches no MRF code.

Two things did not survive the port, deliberately. The branch's
`missing_is_complete` purge regression does not exist here — it came from its
own HEAD-precheck rewrite, and main's simpler path never had it. And the
branch's `MrfReplicateEntry` ordering fields are MRF-redesign scope, left
behind.

Verification: cargo fmt --all --check, git diff --check,
cargo check --workspace --all-targets, and the suites for the four touched
crates — 4070 tests, 2 pre-existing failures unrelated to this change
(`system_resolver_negative_result_reaches_the_dns_allowlist`,
`test_resolve_domain_preserves_system_resolver_error_provenance`; both are
the sandbox DNS interception, they fail on a clean checkout too).

* fix(replication): keep the layer guard happy

scripts/check_architecture_migration_rules.sh matches on text, so the doc
comments naming `rustfs_filemeta::` read as a cross-layer dependency even
though nothing imports it. Reword them; the guard passes.

* fix(replication): make the target-version cap deterministic

Two defects in this PR, both found in review.

The cap was applied while iterating a `HashMap`, so *which* 1000 entries
survived depended on iteration order. Two disks decoding the same oversized
metadata could keep different subsets, hash differently, and lose quorum —
instead of both reporting the same corruption. Collect first, then truncate
in `BTreeMap` order, which is total and identical everywhere.

And `persist_target_delete_marker_versions` discarded the `corrupt` flag from
the RPC carrier, committing a delete-marker update that looked clean while the
exact remote marker identity was unknown. It now declines to merge a corrupt
carrier. Because the helper only ever inserts, declining leaves the durable
keys already on the object untouched, which is strictly safer than writing a
mapping we cannot trust.

Residual, stated rather than papered over: corruption confined to the RPC
carrier is not persisted as a sentinel, so a later reader of an object that
carried no durable keys still sees "legacy, no mapping" rather than "corrupt".
Persisting that would need a wire-format addition; the consumer already fails
closed on any corruption it can observe.

New test: `target_delete_marker_versions_cap_is_deterministic_across_decodes`
decodes the same 1050-entry map twice and asserts both the corrupt flag and
the retained subset agree.

* fix(replication): preserve multipart source mtime (#5669)

* fix(kms): repair unopenable ciphertext and cover the Vault backends (#5668)

* Add black-box behavior tests for KMS resilience and serialization

* fix(kms): repair unopenable ciphertext across backends

Black-box testing of the KMS crate surfaced several defects that make
encrypted data permanently unreadable.

Symmetric envelopes. The Local and Vault Transit backends returned raw
cipher output from `encrypt` while `decrypt` parsed a JSON envelope, so
anything sealed through the master-key path could never be opened again.
Local also discarded the AES-GCM nonce. Both now emit the same envelope
`decrypt` consumes, matching the Static backend.

Deterministic AAD. The object layer derived AEAD additional data by
serializing a `HashMap` directly. Iteration order differs per instance,
so a context rebuilt from storage produced different AAD bytes than the
one used to seal and the object stopped opening. Ordering by key removes
that dependency, matching the Static backend's existing `context_aad`.
Objects written with the default single-key context are unaffected,
since a one-entry map has only one serialization.

Cipher in the header projection. `metadata_to_headers` recorded the SSE
mode (`AES256` / `aws:kms`), which cannot represent ChaCha20-Poly1305,
so a ChaCha-sealed object came back claiming `aws:kms` and was opened
with the wrong cipher. The cipher now travels in
`x-rustfs-encryption-algorithm` — the header the storage layer already
reads but nothing ever wrote. Objects without it fall back as before.

Also: the Static backend ignored `key_spec` and always issued 256-bit
data keys; Local `list_keys` hardcoded `truncated: false`, ignored
`marker`, and paginated over unordered `read_dir`, so a paginating
client silently saw a partial key list; and Local and Vault KV2 reported
`key_id: "unknown"` from `decrypt` despite the envelope naming the
master key.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(kms): cover both Vault backends and key rotation

The behavior suite ran only against Local and Static, and its own harness
documented the gap: the Vault backends had no business-capability
coverage at all. Setting `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN` now adds Vault KV2 and
Vault Transit to every `for_each_backend` spec against a live server.
That lane is what surfaced the Transit envelope defect fixed in the
previous commit.

`rotate` and `versioning` are advertised only by the Vault backends, so
until now every capability-gated branch for them took the
`UnsupportedCapability` side and the working half was never asserted — a
rotation that dropped prior key versions would have gone green. The new
`behavior_rotation.rs` pins that half: material sealed before a rotation
still opens after it, repeated rotations accumulate versions rather than
overwriting a single spare, and the history survives a restart.

Two test defects fixed. `objects_round_trip_across_sizes_and_algorithms`
asserted a 1-byte object differs from its own ciphertext, which collides
once every 256 runs; the assertion now applies only where a collision is
not realistic, and small objects stay covered by the tag check and the
decrypt round-trip. `test_from_env_selects_token_file` depended on
`RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN` being absent from the caller's environment and
now clears it explicitly.

The snapshots directory was also removed from `.gitignore`: insta
snapshots are the assertions themselves, so leaving them untracked gives
CI nothing to compare against. Only `.snap.new` scratch files are
ignored now.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(kms): adapt behavior suite to current key APIs

Rebasing onto main brought four API changes the suite predates.

`DeleteKeyRequest` gained `confirm_key_id`, and immediate deletion is now
gated on the server's `allow_immediate_deletion`. Scheduled deletions pass
`None`; the four specs that destroy a key outright echo the key id back
and opt the harness config in, which is what the gate asks of a real
caller.

`LocalBackupExportRequest` gained `sanitized_config`. These specs cover
the key-material path, so they seal no configuration and pass `None`.

`KmsCacheStats` became a named struct with real hit, miss, and eviction
counters. `cache_stats_returns_an_entry_count_and_no_hit_or_miss_data`
existed to pin the old placeholder behavior — that the second tuple
element was always zero — which main has since fixed, so it is now
`cache_stats_reports_hits_and_misses_separately` and asserts the counters
actually move.

Starting the service provisions the reserved probe key, so it shows up in
listings and backup bundles. Exact-set assertions filter it through a new
`without_probe_key` helper rather than naming it, keeping those specs
about the keys they seeded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(kms): bind the AAD to the stored context bytes

Review caught that canonicalizing the AAD on decrypt breaks objects sealed
before canonicalization existed, and it was right. The AAD is the
*serialization* of the encryption context, and `x-rustfs-encryption-context`
stores that exact byte sequence: `encrypt_object` fed one `HashMap` to the
AEAD and then moved the same map into the metadata the header is written
from, so the stored string is byte-identical to the AAD the object was
sealed under. Those objects are therefore recoverable — but only while
nothing round-trips the value through a `HashMap` and re-serializes it.

Recomputing sorted AAD on decrypt would have turned a readable object into
a permanently unreadable one. The previous behavior was worse than the
first analysis credited: it did not merely fail intermittently, it made
the failure deterministic.

`EncryptionMetadata` now carries `context_aad`, the bytes the object was
actually sealed with. Encryption records what it fed the AEAD, the header
projection stores those bytes verbatim (and preserves a legacy ordering
across a re-projection rather than rewriting it into sorted form), and
`headers_to_metadata` carries the stored string through untouched. Both
decrypt paths, SSE-KMS and SSE-C, prefer it and fall back to canonical
serialization only when no stored serialization exists. Canonicalization
still applies to everything newly sealed, so the original ordering bug
cannot recur.

Two tests pin this: a legacy record whose sealed bytes are non-canonical
must survive a full header round trip unchanged, and a context header
rewritten to an equivalent-but-reordered serialization must fail
authentication rather than silently re-deriving a working AAD. Both were
mutation-checked against the reinstated bug on each side.

Also from review: the lifecycle churn test asserted only that every
request was accounted for, which holds whether the state gate exists or
not, so both branches are now pinned deterministically after the churn
(asserting `refused > 0` on the concurrent phase would only trade the hole
for a scheduling flake). And the Local and Vault KV2 envelopes compare
`encryption_context` without authenticating it — `DekCrypto` seals only
the plaintext — which is now documented at both sites; closing it needs a
versioned envelope, since existing ciphertext was sealed without AAD.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: ccccpj <ccccpj@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: 唐小鸭 <tangtang1251@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 17:11:27 +00:00
唐小鸭 62cc19e937 fix(kms): repair unopenable ciphertext and cover the Vault backends (#5668)
* Add black-box behavior tests for KMS resilience and serialization

* fix(kms): repair unopenable ciphertext across backends

Black-box testing of the KMS crate surfaced several defects that make
encrypted data permanently unreadable.

Symmetric envelopes. The Local and Vault Transit backends returned raw
cipher output from `encrypt` while `decrypt` parsed a JSON envelope, so
anything sealed through the master-key path could never be opened again.
Local also discarded the AES-GCM nonce. Both now emit the same envelope
`decrypt` consumes, matching the Static backend.

Deterministic AAD. The object layer derived AEAD additional data by
serializing a `HashMap` directly. Iteration order differs per instance,
so a context rebuilt from storage produced different AAD bytes than the
one used to seal and the object stopped opening. Ordering by key removes
that dependency, matching the Static backend's existing `context_aad`.
Objects written with the default single-key context are unaffected,
since a one-entry map has only one serialization.

Cipher in the header projection. `metadata_to_headers` recorded the SSE
mode (`AES256` / `aws:kms`), which cannot represent ChaCha20-Poly1305,
so a ChaCha-sealed object came back claiming `aws:kms` and was opened
with the wrong cipher. The cipher now travels in
`x-rustfs-encryption-algorithm` — the header the storage layer already
reads but nothing ever wrote. Objects without it fall back as before.

Also: the Static backend ignored `key_spec` and always issued 256-bit
data keys; Local `list_keys` hardcoded `truncated: false`, ignored
`marker`, and paginated over unordered `read_dir`, so a paginating
client silently saw a partial key list; and Local and Vault KV2 reported
`key_id: "unknown"` from `decrypt` despite the envelope naming the
master key.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(kms): cover both Vault backends and key rotation

The behavior suite ran only against Local and Static, and its own harness
documented the gap: the Vault backends had no business-capability
coverage at all. Setting `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN` now adds Vault KV2 and
Vault Transit to every `for_each_backend` spec against a live server.
That lane is what surfaced the Transit envelope defect fixed in the
previous commit.

`rotate` and `versioning` are advertised only by the Vault backends, so
until now every capability-gated branch for them took the
`UnsupportedCapability` side and the working half was never asserted — a
rotation that dropped prior key versions would have gone green. The new
`behavior_rotation.rs` pins that half: material sealed before a rotation
still opens after it, repeated rotations accumulate versions rather than
overwriting a single spare, and the history survives a restart.

Two test defects fixed. `objects_round_trip_across_sizes_and_algorithms`
asserted a 1-byte object differs from its own ciphertext, which collides
once every 256 runs; the assertion now applies only where a collision is
not realistic, and small objects stay covered by the tag check and the
decrypt round-trip. `test_from_env_selects_token_file` depended on
`RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN` being absent from the caller's environment and
now clears it explicitly.

The snapshots directory was also removed from `.gitignore`: insta
snapshots are the assertions themselves, so leaving them untracked gives
CI nothing to compare against. Only `.snap.new` scratch files are
ignored now.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(kms): adapt behavior suite to current key APIs

Rebasing onto main brought four API changes the suite predates.

`DeleteKeyRequest` gained `confirm_key_id`, and immediate deletion is now
gated on the server's `allow_immediate_deletion`. Scheduled deletions pass
`None`; the four specs that destroy a key outright echo the key id back
and opt the harness config in, which is what the gate asks of a real
caller.

`LocalBackupExportRequest` gained `sanitized_config`. These specs cover
the key-material path, so they seal no configuration and pass `None`.

`KmsCacheStats` became a named struct with real hit, miss, and eviction
counters. `cache_stats_returns_an_entry_count_and_no_hit_or_miss_data`
existed to pin the old placeholder behavior — that the second tuple
element was always zero — which main has since fixed, so it is now
`cache_stats_reports_hits_and_misses_separately` and asserts the counters
actually move.

Starting the service provisions the reserved probe key, so it shows up in
listings and backup bundles. Exact-set assertions filter it through a new
`without_probe_key` helper rather than naming it, keeping those specs
about the keys they seeded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(kms): bind the AAD to the stored context bytes

Review caught that canonicalizing the AAD on decrypt breaks objects sealed
before canonicalization existed, and it was right. The AAD is the
*serialization* of the encryption context, and `x-rustfs-encryption-context`
stores that exact byte sequence: `encrypt_object` fed one `HashMap` to the
AEAD and then moved the same map into the metadata the header is written
from, so the stored string is byte-identical to the AAD the object was
sealed under. Those objects are therefore recoverable — but only while
nothing round-trips the value through a `HashMap` and re-serializes it.

Recomputing sorted AAD on decrypt would have turned a readable object into
a permanently unreadable one. The previous behavior was worse than the
first analysis credited: it did not merely fail intermittently, it made
the failure deterministic.

`EncryptionMetadata` now carries `context_aad`, the bytes the object was
actually sealed with. Encryption records what it fed the AEAD, the header
projection stores those bytes verbatim (and preserves a legacy ordering
across a re-projection rather than rewriting it into sorted form), and
`headers_to_metadata` carries the stored string through untouched. Both
decrypt paths, SSE-KMS and SSE-C, prefer it and fall back to canonical
serialization only when no stored serialization exists. Canonicalization
still applies to everything newly sealed, so the original ordering bug
cannot recur.

Two tests pin this: a legacy record whose sealed bytes are non-canonical
must survive a full header round trip unchanged, and a context header
rewritten to an equivalent-but-reordered serialization must fail
authentication rather than silently re-deriving a working AAD. Both were
mutation-checked against the reinstated bug on each side.

Also from review: the lifecycle churn test asserted only that every
request was accounted for, which holds whether the state gate exists or
not, so both branches are now pinned deterministically after the churn
(asserting `refused > 0` on the concurrent phase would only trade the hole
for a scheduling flake). And the Local and Vault KV2 envelopes compare
`encryption_context` without authenticating it — `DekCrypto` seals only
the plaintext — which is now documented at both sites; closing it needs a
versioned envelope, since existing ciphertext was sealed without AAD.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 23:33:08 +08:00
ccccpj d8d22599fe fix(replication): preserve multipart source mtime (#5669) 2026-08-03 14:46:04 +00:00
cxymds ee55691f63 test(replication): add mixed-version MRF acceptance matrix (#5673)
* feat(replication): add dormant MRF v2 reader

* test(replication): add mixed-version reader acceptance
2026-08-03 22:09:59 +08:00
cxymds 3ce17cd7dd feat(replication): add dormant MRF v2 reader (#5672) 2026-08-03 22:09:33 +08:00
cxymds 4310850103 fix(replication): retain MRF entries until completion (#5671) 2026-08-03 22:09:24 +08:00
Miguel Amador acce8b2253 fix(lock): let waiters hear releases and let acquisition succeed past registered waiters (#5670)
* fix(lock): let waiters hear releases and let acquisition succeed past registered waiters

Same-key write contention scaled superlinearly with writer count: 8
concurrent conditional PUTs on one key cost ~340-460 ms, 16 cost ~700 ms,
32 cost ~5 s, against ~4 ms per uncontended write and ~10 ms actual lock
holds (measured via RUSTFS_OBJECT_LOCK_DIAG at 1 ms thresholds). Outcomes
were always correct; the cost was pure waiting.

Two coupled defects in fast_lock caused it:

1. The slow path's early retries slept without subscribing to anything.
   notify_writer()/notify_readers() are gated on the waiter counters,
   which a sleeper never increments, so a release during the backoff
   woke nobody. The lock sat free while every loser slept out its full
   backoff, and the ladder compounded: successive acquires landed at
   the cumulative ladder offsets (10+20+40+80+100... ms).

2. try_acquire_exclusive demanded the entire packed state word be zero,
   including the readers_waiting/writers_waiting counter bits. A lock
   with registered waiters could be acquired by no one - including the
   waiters themselves, each blocked by the others' registration - so
   contended acquisition only succeeded in windows where every waiter
   happened to be unregistered. This is also why (1) could not be fixed
   by simply registering the sleepers: registration alone deadlocks
   acquisition until the acquire deadline. try_acquire_shared already
   masks correctly and preserves the counter bits in its CAS; the
   exclusive path now mirrors it.

The fix: mask the acquisition CAS to ownership bits only (writer flag,
active readers), and turn the early-retry sleep into a notification wait
bounded by the same backoff, so a release wakes a waiter immediately
while the bound still protects against lost or stolen wakeups exactly as
NOTIFY_WAIT_CAP does for the post-retry wait.

With both changes, 8 concurrent same-key CAS writers resolve in 17-29 ms
(was 340-460 ms) and 32 resolve in 20-53 ms (was ~5 s), with per-racer
cost now decreasing in N. Outcomes remain exactly one winner, N-1
precondition failures, zero errors at every width. cargo test -p
rustfs-lock passes 113/113 at pristine-parity runtime, including
test_concurrent_write_lock_contention, which previously only passed
because sleepers were invisible to it.

* test(lock): pin both halves of the waiter-starvation fix

The fix commit touched only production files, so reverting either half
left the suite green: test_concurrent_write_lock_contention only waits
for five writers to finish and never asserts that acquisition happens
before the backoff ladder runs out.

Three tests, one per revert:

* exclusive_acquisition_ignores_registered_waiters (state.rs) - a free
  lock with registered waiters must be acquirable, and the CAS must
  preserve the counters. Fails against the all-zero `expected`.

* early_retry_registers_as_waiter (shard.rs) - a waiter in the
  early-retry backoff must appear in the writer waiter count within the
  ~750ms early-retry phase, since notify_writer/notify_readers are gated
  on those counters. Fails against a bare `sleep`, which registers
  nowhere.

* contended_writers_drain_promptly_after_release (tests.rs) - 16 same-key
  writers, all registered behind one holder, must drain within 1s of the
  release rather than sit out their 5s acquire deadlines. Fails against
  the all-zero `expected` end to end.

Wakeup latency is deliberately not asserted anywhere. NOTIFY_POOL is a
process-global of 128 Notify slots shared by every lock, so a waiter in
a concurrently-running test can consume another's notify_one and push it
to the end of its rung: a 24-key latency probe measured ~150us in
isolation and ~92ms - a full unexpired rung - alongside the existing
64-key missed-wakeup test. That is the stolen wakeup NOTIFY_WAIT_CAP
already exists to bound, and it makes any in-suite latency budget flaky.

cargo test -p rustfs-lock: 116/116.

Signed-off-by: Miguel Amador <miguel@amador.one>

---------

Signed-off-by: Miguel Amador <miguel@amador.one>
2026-08-03 22:08:48 +08:00
ccccpj e20892ace9 fix(helm): exclude external hosts from mTLS certificate (#5666) 2026-08-03 22:01:39 +08:00
cxymds accc906b33 fix(replication): fence force-delete journal updates (#5661)
* feat(replication): add conditional config store APIs

* fix(replication): fence force-delete journal updates

* fix(replication): retry durable force-delete commits

* test(replication): fence lost force-delete journal leases

* fix(replication): bound force-delete journal retries
2026-08-03 22:00:49 +08:00
Zhengchao An 975003d60a fix(s3): stop authorizing DeleteBucketWebsite with a read action (#5665)
`delete_bucket_website` authorized through `s3:GetBucketPolicy` while
`put_bucket_website` used `s3:PutBucketPolicy`. The handler is a real
mutation — `rustfs/src/storage/ecfs.rs` calls
`delete_bucket_metadata_config(bucket, BUCKET_WEBSITE_CONFIG)`, permanently
removing the persisted website configuration.

So a principal holding only

    {"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetBucketPolicy"],
     "Resource":"arn:aws:s3:::victim"}

— an ordinary read-only "may read my bucket policy" grant — could send
`DELETE /victim?website` and destroy the configuration. On a bucket whose
policy grants that to `Principal: "*"`, it is reachable anonymously.

AWS treats this as its own permission: "This DELETE action requires the
S3:DeleteBucketWebsite permission." RustFS has no dedicated
`s3:PutBucketWebsite` / `s3:DeleteBucketWebsite` action, so this keeps the
existing bucket-config convention (`s3:PutBucketPolicy`, the same one
`put_bucket_request_payment` and `put_bucket_accelerate_configuration` use)
rather than adding actions, which would silently invalidate deployed
policies that already grant website writes.

Rather than correcting one constant, both handlers now route through a
single `bucket_website_config_authorize_action()`, so the read/write pair
cannot drift apart again.

Swept the rest of the surface while here: `delete_bucket_website` was the
only mutation handler authorizing through a Get*/List* action.
`delete_bucket_ownership_controls`, `put_bucket_ownership_controls` and
`put_bucket_metrics_configuration` return `Ok(())` with no authorization,
but none of them is implemented outside the access hook, so there is no
operation to authorize — left alone.

Adding a dedicated `s3:DeleteBucketWebsite` for full AWS parity is a
separate change with a policy-compatibility impact; noted, not done here.

Verification: cargo fmt --all --check, git diff --check,
cargo check -p rustfs --all-targets, cargo clippy -p rustfs --all-targets
(clean), and the new regression test. Mutation-checked: restoring
`GetBucketPolicyAction` turns
`bucket_website_config_never_authorizes_through_a_read_action` red.
2026-08-03 16:11:52 +08:00
Henry Guo b563230782 fix(ecstore): allow Windows renames under guarded parents (#5663)
Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-03 16:11:37 +08:00
cxymds 9b4a73f315 fix(replication): harden MRF replay durability (#5659)
* feat(replication): add MRF envelope capabilities

* fix(replication): retain failed MRF replay entries

* fix(replication): retain transient MRF source failures

* fix(replication): address MRF durability review feedback

* fix(replication): preserve MRF recovery handoff

* fix(replication): harden MRF recovery handoff
2026-08-03 15:35:00 +08:00
houseme 371a3529e5 chore(deps): refresh hotpath allocator support (#5660)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-03 06:52:44 +00:00
houseme a8574d0104 fix(metrics): close dimension review gaps (#5656)
* fix(metrics): close dimension review gaps

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(metrics): cover dimension review gaps

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(metrics): cover failed disk info UUID fallback

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-03 04:12:31 +00:00
Zhengchao An 2fb88d2c60 test(ci): serialize cross-node metadata writes (#5654) 2026-08-03 02:00:43 +00:00
cxymds 380ec74ece fix(replication): persist force-delete handoff state (#5641)
* fix(replication): persist force-delete handoff state

* fix(arch): route force-delete config access through boundary

* style: format force-delete imports

---------

Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-03 01:44:28 +00:00
houseme 035ce5d784 feat(obs): add bounded metrics dimensions (#5645)
* feat(obs): add drive topology detail metrics

Expose additive drive info, topology, state, and per-drive API metrics while preserving the existing drive metric label sets.

Backlog: rustfs/backlog#1655

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(obs): preserve suspect drive runtime state

Keep suspect as a bounded drive runtime state and avoid all-zero runtime_state samples for that storage health state.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(obs): skip unknown drive inode samples

Avoid exporting zero inode gauges for missing or stale drive snapshots and ignore zero-count API latency buckets.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(obs): add scanner source work detail metrics

Expose additive scanner source and cycle work metrics with bounded server/source/state labels while leaving the existing aggregate scanner metrics unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(obs): add ilm action detail metrics

Expose additive ILM action/state task metrics with a server label while preserving the existing aggregate ILM series.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(obs): add delivery target server metrics

Expose additive audit and notification delivery target metrics with server labels and extend removed-target tombstones for the server-aware series.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(obs): add replication target flow metrics

Expose additive bucket replication target sent and failed-flow metrics while preserving existing bucket aggregates and target backlog series.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(obs): add request server metrics

Expose additive API request metrics with server labels while preserving the existing request and traffic metric label sets.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* style(obs): apply rustfmt to metrics changes

Apply rustfmt output to the metrics dimension changes without altering behavior.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* style(obs): reuse audit target label constant

Use the exported audit target_id label constant for legacy audit target metrics.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(obs): populate drive disk metrics

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(obs): add scanner bucket drive result metrics

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(obs): add replication proxy server metrics

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(obs): address metric liveness review

Use checked division for drive API latency aggregation and keep recovered drive, scanner current-cycle, replication flow, audit target, and notification target series from retaining stale values.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(obs): address metric dimension review

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(obs): address additional metric review

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(obs): count drive calls at start

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(obs): address metrics dimension review

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(metrics): address dimension review gaps

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(metrics): address scanner review follow-ups

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(metrics): address runtime review follow-ups

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(metrics): reduce disk metric contention

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(metrics): address runtime review follow-ups

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(metrics): retire stale dimension series

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-03 09:03:34 +08:00
cxymds 988cd8adbb fix(ci): keep PR e2e smoke lane from timing out (#5649)
fix(ci): prevent e2e smoke lane timeout
2026-08-03 06:13:46 +08:00
Zhengchao An 9dd0461f3e test(kms): exercise real Vault Raft failover (#5653) 2026-08-03 05:25:23 +08:00
Zhengchao An fbb6cebeb4 feat(kms): bound backend concurrency and failures (#5651) 2026-08-02 18:24:26 +00:00
cxymds 2ce670837c fix(ecstore): make transitioned deletes durable (#5644)
* fix(ecstore): make transitioned deletes durable

* fix(ecstore): journal force deletes

* fix(ecstore): journal force deletes
2026-08-02 18:00:11 +00:00
Zhengchao An 8a65017f36 fix(kms): bound persisted format parsing (#5652)
fix(kms): harden persisted format compatibility
2026-08-02 17:53:01 +00:00
Zhengchao An 3a5b6eb11d test(kms): verify AppRole against live Vault (#5650)
* test(kms): add ignored Vault AppRole live harness

* test(kms): tighten Vault AppRole live contract
2026-08-02 17:25:49 +00:00
Zhengchao An 0800f74874 fix(kms): version local key records safely (#5638) 2026-08-02 16:30:23 +00:00
cxymds a918f1a48a fix(replication): snapshot existing object admission targets (#5634) 2026-08-03 00:13:32 +08:00
cxymds ec67884f8d fix(replication): preserve durable MRF delete admission (#5643) 2026-08-02 23:53:53 +08:00
Henry Guo e5cfa8e375 feat(table-catalog): paginate Iceberg REST listings (#5466)
* feat(table-catalog): paginate Iceberg REST listings

* test(table-catalog): remove redundant token clones

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-02 15:27:15 +00:00
cxymds 1fdcbd9225 fix(replication): fail closed on destination encryption (#5633)
* fix(replication): fail closed on destination encryption

* test(replication): avoid Debug bound in encryption assertion
2026-08-02 22:54:51 +08:00
cxymds 114b2420a2 feat(admin): expose versioned replication capabilities (#5631)
* feat(admin): expose replication capabilities

* fix(admin): route replication capabilities through facades
2026-08-02 22:54:38 +08:00
Zhengchao An 52c70738eb fix(kms): cover concurrent Vault KV2 rotation races (#5632)
* fix(kms): handle concurrent Vault KV2 baseline races

* test(kms): keep concurrent rotation regression fail-closed
2026-08-02 22:53:40 +08:00
Zhengchao An 60ee86c835 test(kms): pin AWS timeout and contract divergence (#5636) 2026-08-02 22:52:54 +08:00
Zhengchao An 5206c82423 ci: require MinIO interop reader matrix (#5640) 2026-08-02 22:34:19 +08:00
cxymds 00324e6936 test(e2e): add replication acceptance matrix (#5642) 2026-08-02 22:34:00 +08:00
GatewayJ 6028dad2f4 test(iam): freeze OIDC federation behavior (#5627) 2026-08-02 22:33:20 +08:00
Zhengchao An 54d8c02a2f fix(targets): explain webhook outbound allowlist failures (#5616) 2026-08-02 22:33:05 +08:00
唐小鸭 3f716746cf fix(replication): honor target TLS in health checks (#5613) 2026-08-02 22:32:56 +08:00
cxymds 779b5a49ea fix(replication): propagate metadata changes (#5635)
Preserve metadata replication operations in the durable MRF and route tagging, retention, and legal-hold updates through the existing full-object replication transport. Keep ACL propagation outside the contract because the current object model has no durable object ACL state.

Refs #1616
2026-08-02 13:50:24 +00:00
cxymds 2cc7443067 feat(replication): bound DeleteObjects queue admission (#5637)
feat(replication): batch DeleteObjects queue admission
2026-08-02 21:06:54 +08:00
cxymds 378c9ba67f fix(replication): enforce bucket write contract (#5629) 2026-08-02 11:51:47 +00:00
Zhengchao An 4473c548be test(admin): audit KMS deletion guard outcomes (#5628) 2026-08-02 11:39:37 +00:00
cxymds ac63808d3c fix(replication): make sync delivery target-granular (#5630) 2026-08-02 11:31:13 +00:00
cxymds 2cdba03dee fix(authz): gate replication-only PUT headers (#5625) 2026-08-02 19:28:54 +08:00
cxymds 885096d1de fix(replication): reject unsupported target options (#5622) 2026-08-02 19:28:30 +08:00
cxymds 921ddef2c7 fix(lifecycle): bind delete replication admission (#5621) 2026-08-02 19:27:39 +08:00
Zhengchao An f1a4588326 docs(kms): record CLI and console admin handoff matrix (#5639)
docs(kms): record client admin API handoff matrix
2026-08-02 19:27:19 +08:00
Zhengchao An 2698a03582 test(kms): pin admin KMS response shapes where they are served (#5626)
The snapshots in crates/kms/src/api_types.rs pinned DeleteKeyResponse,
ListKeysResponse, DescribeKeyResponse and CancelKeyDeletionResponse, none
of which is serialized by any handler: those endpoints answer with
DeleteKmsKeyResponse and siblings in rustfs/src/admin/handlers/kms_keys.rs,
separate types carrying different fields. A breaking change to an admin
response could not fail them. Tag, untag and update-description had the
same gap, where the handler discards the kms-side response and serves its
own KmsKeyMetadataResponse.

Pin the shapes in the crate that produces them, and delete the four kms
mirrors. They were never in the pub use api_types list, had no
constructors and no callers, and only looked live because those snapshots
named them.

Keep the api_types snapshots that pin something real: configure, start,
stop and status are served verbatim by kms_dynamic, and the tag family
are live ObjectEncryptionService return types whose snapshots pin this
crate's public API rather than a wire shape.
2026-08-02 11:20:17 +00:00
Zhengchao An b1ddda3bb2 fix(sse): rewrite data when a same-key copy changes encryption (#5618)
A same-name CopyObject marks the operation `metadata_only`, which lets the
store layer rewrite `xl.meta` in place and leave the data blocks untouched.
The handler independently strips the source encryption metadata and calls
`sse_encryption`, which mints a *fresh* DEK. On an unversioned bucket both
happen at once, so the object ends up with a new DEK sitting beside ciphertext
sealed under the old one, and can never be decrypted again.

The mirror case is silent: an encrypted source copied without any destination
SSE keeps its ciphertext while losing the key metadata, so GET returns raw
ciphertext as if it were plaintext, with HTTP 200 and no error anywhere.

Keep `metadata_only` off whenever either side of the copy is encrypted, so the
store layer performs a full read/write rewrite through `put_object`. This is
the same resolution the versioned historical-restore path already uses for
this risk (issue #4238), and it matches MinIO's
`isSourceEncrypted || isTargetEncrypted -> metadataOnly = false` guard in
CopyObjectHandler.

The target half of the predicate deliberately tests `effective_sse` rather
than the request headers MinIO inspects: `effective_sse` also resolves the
bucket default-encryption rule, and `sse_encryption` mints a DEK from that
resolved value. A header-only check would miss a same-key copy performed under
a bucket default rule. The source half reuses `ObjectInfo::is_encrypted` so a
future encryption flavour is covered here as soon as it is recognised there.

Versioned buckets were already safe: that path falls through to `put_object`
regardless of `metadata_only`. RestoreObject also sets `metadata_only` but
only appends restore keys and never re-derives a DEK, so it is unaffected.
2026-08-02 11:00:52 +00:00
Zhengchao An da531c8a97 docs(kms): guard outward FIPS wording (#5624) 2026-08-02 18:50:54 +08:00
Zhengchao An 40cd10c1d0 fix(scanner): surface per-tier usage in the data-usage snapshot (#5623)
SizeSummary::tier_stats was populated for every scanned object but
apply_scanner_size_summary dropped it, so per-tier usage never reached
DataUsageInfo. Wire it through the same merge chain repl_target_stats
already uses, up to DataUsageInfo::tier_stats.

DataUsageEntry used the derived MessagePack encoding, which serialises
structs as arrays: appending a field turns the whole cache into a decode
error for older readers, so mixed-version nodes would invalidate each
other's cache every scan cycle. Give it the same hand-written
map-encoded Serialize DataUsageCacheInfo already carries, and record the
invariant in AGENTS.md.

Widen TierStats counters from i32 to u64 so a tier past 2^31 versions
cannot make checked_merge reject an entire usage snapshot, and drop the
duplicate TierStats/AllTierStats definitions in the scanner crate in
favour of the data-usage ones.
2026-08-02 10:46:36 +00:00
Zhengchao An f440a14e53 fix(admin): preflight webhook outbound policy (#5619) 2026-08-02 18:31:52 +08:00
Zhengchao An c104ba23d4 chore(kms): remove dead key-management types from api_types (#5620) 2026-08-02 10:09:37 +00:00
cxymds 7463655ae1 fix(authz): preserve direct delete usecase callers (#5614)
* fix(authz): preserve direct delete usecase callers

* test(ilm): provide owner context for forced deletes
2026-08-02 17:01:32 +08:00
Zhengchao An 93b38b3fbd fix(lifecycle): count the first transition sample for each tier (#5612) 2026-08-02 15:35:12 +08:00
cxymds f00f5fe776 fix(authz): restrict recursive force-delete scope (#5610) 2026-08-02 06:30:36 +00:00
Henry Guo 6eddc04b0a fix(scanner): bound corrupt metadata traversal (#5609) 2026-08-02 06:07:06 +00:00
houseme 3d59c90371 chore(deps): update flake.lock (#5611) 2026-08-02 14:05:02 +08:00
Zhengchao An 2bf2ce1ff2 feat(admin): apply the requested key listing filters (#5608) 2026-08-02 14:03:57 +08:00
Zhengchao An bd834297da feat(kms): add the data key rewrap primitive (#5607)
* feat(kms): add data key rewrap and wrapping inspection primitives

Rewrap re-protects an existing data key envelope with the master key's
current version without touching the data key itself, which is the
precondition for ever retiring an older version: until every envelope a
version wrapped has been moved off it, destroying that version orphans
every object whose data key it wrapped.

Adds KmsBackend::rewrap_data_key and its read-only counterpart
describe_data_key_wrapping, both gated by a new BackendCapabilities::rewrap
flag and defaulting to UnsupportedCapability. Vault KV2 unwraps with the
frozen version record that wrapped the envelope and re-wraps with the
current material; Vault Transit uses the native transit/rewrap endpoint so
the data key never enters this process.

No read or write path changes: nothing calls these yet.

* test(kms): cover the rewrap primitive against a scripted Vault

* fix(kms): resolve both key materials before the data key is unwrapped

Keeps every fallible step out of the window in which the plaintext data
key exists, so no error path can drop it without zeroizing it first.
2026-08-02 05:51:12 +00:00
Zhengchao An c147afd19c fix(kms): fail closed on Local key records that cannot be interpreted (#5606)
* fix(kms): fail closed on Local key records this build cannot interpret

The Local backend's protection marker is the only version discriminator its
key records have, and three readers walked past it.

`ensure_missing_salt_can_be_generated` skipped every record it could not read
or parse, so a directory whose protection state is unknown still got a fresh
salt published before startup validation failed. That write is the
irreversible step: the next startup finds a salt file, never re-enters the
guard, and the evidence that the real salt was lost is gone. Every record the
guard now rejects already failed startup key validation a few lines later, so
no directory that initializes today stops initializing.

Backup export and restore folded an unknown marker into "material corrupt" /
"bundle corrupted". The record is intact and a newer build reads it fine, so
the operator response is a version change, not a disaster recovery. Both now
classify the marker before their schema parse, sharing one probe with the
backend reader.

`list_keys` dropped any record it could not decode from the page. Concurrent
removal stays a skip; anything else fails the listing rather than answering
"these are your keys" with a set that silently omits one.

* test(kms): cover every fail-closed path around the Local protection marker

Each test fails on the pre-fix code in the way the fix is about: the salt
cases because a replacement salt is published before startup validation
fails, the export and restore cases because the verdict comes back as
corruption, and the listing case because the record is edited out of the page.

The restore commit marker's unknown-version branch had no test at all,
unlike its Vault counterpart; it is now driven from the decoder, from the
restore entry point, and from backend startup.

Also states the widened salt guard in the Local backend operations doc,
including the operator recovery path for an unrecognized record.

* fix(kms): say 'not a readable JSON object' when the marker probe cannot parse

The probe now fails on any input that is not a JSON object, not only on
malformed JSON, so the message must cover both.

* test(kms): assert the salt file before the error variant

The replacement salt is written before the error the guard reports, so the
file assertion is the one that fails on a regression.

* test(kms): guard the new backup error variant's display string
2026-08-02 05:43:38 +00:00
Zhengchao An 9644064e57 docs(kms): define the bulk object rekey job contract (#5605)
* docs(kms): add the object-side bulk rekey job contract

Define the design contract for the bulk DEK re-wrap job before any of it is
built: work unit granularity, idempotency model, failure semantics, the
exclusion list, the metadata write constraints, and the ownership model.

The job re-wraps envelopes only and never rewrites object bodies, and it
never destroys a superseded key version: a half-finished run is a fully
serviceable state precisely because the old version still decrypts, so
folding destruction into the job would turn a resumable action into
irreversible loss on partial failure.

Records two positions that diverge from the originating request. Pause is
not provided; cancel plus cursor restart plus rate control covers what pause
is actually asked for, and none of the seven existing long-job frameworks
has a pause state. And the KEK version a given envelope was sealed under is
not observable today, from object metadata or from the decrypt response, so
recognizing the target state requires the re-wrap primitive to record a
version witness - stated here as the one interface both sides must agree on.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1642 (part of rustfs/backlog#1562)

* docs(kms): correct how the wrapping KEK version is recovered

The first draft claimed the wrapping KEK version was not observable at all,
and built the idempotent-skip and completion-evidence conclusions on that.
It is observable for every backend that rotates, so that framing was wrong.

The sealed blob under x-rustfs-encryption-key is the base64 of the backend
ciphertext, which is DataKeyEnvelope JSON; the read path in sse.rs already
discriminates on it via is_data_key_envelope. Vault KV2 records the version
in the envelope's master_key_version, and Transit leaves that field None on
purpose because its ciphertext self-describes as vault:vN:. Local and Static
hardcode None because neither rotates. Only AWS is genuinely opaque.

So the skip is achievable, and the honest statement is its cost: a base64
decode plus a JSON parse per scanned work unit, which belongs in the rate
budget. AWS becomes a scope-admission refusal instead of a silent
every-object rewrite on re-run.

Two traps replace the old over-broad claim. A bare None means three
different things across backends, so version extraction must be dispatched
by backend. And Local omits the version precisely because rotation is
rejected there, which couples it to backlog#1565: whichever change gives
Local a rotation history must start recording the version in the same
change, or Local joins AWS in the unreadable column.

The requirement left on the re-wrap primitive shrinks accordingly, from
"record a version" to exposing one backend-dispatched accessor and
reporting "already at target state" as a distinct outcome.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1642 (part of rustfs/backlog#1562)
2026-08-02 13:03:47 +08:00
cxymds c1955a8498 fix(replication): harden live delete admission (#5599) 2026-08-02 12:52:11 +08:00
Zhengchao An f34aba1be7 refactor(kms): drop the dead duplicate api_types::DeleteKeyRequest (#5601)
api_types carried a second DeleteKeyRequest that nothing referenced: it is
absent from the lib.rs re-export list, so rustfs_kms::DeleteKeyRequest has
always resolved to types::DeleteKeyRequest through `pub use types::*`, and
the admin handler builds the real type via `use rustfs_kms::types::*`.

The copy had also drifted apart from the type it shadowed. It still called
force_immediate "for development/testing only" and described the 7-30 day
window as advisory, and it never gained the confirm_key_id field that the
immediate-deletion gate now requires. A caller that reached into api_types
and deserialized into it would silently drop confirm_key_id.

api_types::DeleteKeyResponse stays: it is live, pinned by the
kms_management_responses_have_stable_json_shapes snapshot alongside the
list/describe/cancel response shapes, and it mirrors the admin wire
response rather than duplicating types::DeleteKeyResponse, whose fields
differ. Its doc comment now records why no request twin sits beside it.
2026-08-02 12:43:06 +08:00
Zhengchao An 34f1d2c0cd docs: state that MinIO-encrypted objects do not migrate (#5600)
* docs: state that MinIO-encrypted objects are not readable by RustFS

Operators evaluating a MinIO migration had no warning that objects MinIO
wrote with SSE-S3, SSE-KMS, or SSE-C cannot be read back. The container
formats interoperate, so the limitation is easy to discover only after
the data has moved.

Document the limitation where a migration decision is actually made:

- minio-file-format-compat.md gains Part C, covering which object classes
  transfer, the three seams that block each SSE mode with file:line
  evidence, the reverse direction, and the current workarounds. It also
  records that the `rio-v2` MinIO sealed-key parser does not close the
  gap: the feature is absent from released artifacts, and the managed-SSE
  detection gate is not feature-gated and returns before the parser runs.
- kms-backend-security.md gains an operator-facing warning next to the
  backend comparison table, since configuring the static backend with
  MinIO's key material looks like it should work and does not.
- s3-compatibility-matrix.md scopes its SSE row to RustFS's own
  round-trip.

The read path treats an undetected MinIO-encrypted object as unencrypted
rather than failing, so all three notes tell operators to verify migrated
objects by content instead of by status code.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1638.

* docs: correct the failure mode for MinIO-encrypted objects

The read path does fail closed; the earlier text claimed ciphertext was
served as plaintext. MinIO's internal headers mark the object encrypted,
so the reader refuses when no material resolves. What is actually wrong
is the diagnosis: the refusal surfaces as a 500 InternalError.
2026-08-02 11:30:53 +08:00
Zhengchao An 8bb147cb70 docs(kms): drop claims about an interface that no longer exists (#5602)
docs(kms): correct the KV2 at-rest boundary and rotation rejection claims

The Vault KV2 section claimed the backend reports its confidentiality
boundary as `at_rest_protection: vault-kv2-acl` through `backend_info`.
That accessor, the `BackendInfo` type and its assertion test were removed
in rustfs/rustfs#5501, and no replacement reports the boundary. State
instead that the boundary is documented only, that `kms/status` exposes a
capability matrix covering supported operations rather than key-material
location, and that the backup manifest's `at_rest_protection` field is a
bundle declaration rather than a backend self-report.

The rotation section named `InvalidOperation` as the error Local and
Static return. Neither advertises `rotate`, so the product path falls to
the shared `KmsBackend` default and returns `UnsupportedCapability`;
`InvalidOperation` survives only in a test-only client helper.
2026-08-02 03:28:15 +00:00
Zhengchao An 8e3e552576 fix(s3): strip every encryption marker from a copy destination (#5597)
fix(sse): strip inherited SSE key-id and algorithm on copy

strip_managed_encryption_metadata cleared the MinIO spellings of the
managed-SSE key id and seal algorithm but not their RustFS-native
counterparts, so a CopyObject destination kept the source object's
x-rustfs-encryption-key-id and x-rustfs-encryption-algorithm.

When the destination resolves to no server-side encryption, nothing
rewrites those keys. is_object_encryption_marker treats any remaining
x-rustfs-encryption-* key as proof the payload is encrypted, so the
plaintext destination reports ObjectInfo::is_encrypted, the reader takes
its encrypted branch, and the read fails closed with "encrypted object
metadata is incomplete" because the actual key material was stripped.

Add both constants to the strip list so a destination inherits no
encryption marker it has no material for.
2026-08-02 10:27:23 +08:00
Zhengchao An 557a616ae6 feat(kms): report the configuration references that block a key deletion (#5598)
* feat(kms): report configuration references that block a key deletion

Adds a KeyImpactReport that states which configuration still points at a
key, how exhaustively the sources were read, and which sources were not
consulted at all. The report deliberately carries no in-use or
safe-to-delete claim: it covers the configuration layer only, so an empty
reference list means nothing was found in the scanned sources, never that
the key is unreferenced.

Immediate deletion destroys key material without ever reaching the
deletion worker, so it never passed the worker's reference gate. The
manager now consults the same checker on that path and refuses with a
typed KeyStillReferenced error. This only ever adds a refusal; the
scheduled deletion path and the worker's blocking behaviour are
unchanged.

* test(kms): cover the immediate-deletion reference refusal

* feat(kms): surface configuration references on the admin key endpoints

DeleteKey and DescribeKey now return an impact section listing the
configuration that points at the key, so an operator scheduling a
deletion sees what will refuse to destroy the material instead of
learning it from a server-side log once the window has run out.

The section is reported, never acted on: scheduling still succeeds while
references exist, and the deletion worker's gate remains the only thing
that decides whether material is destroyed. An immediate deletion that
the manager refuses for an outstanding reference now answers 409.

* test(kms): pin the impact wire shape and the unreferenced force-delete path

* fix(kms): make the DescribeKey impact section opt-in

Collecting the section lists every bucket, and DescribeKey is polled, so
carrying that fan-out on the default read path trades a hot path's cost
for a diagnostic. It is now collected only for impact=true; without the
parameter the endpoint does exactly the work it did before and returns
no impact field.

A value that is neither true nor false is refused rather than read as
off, so a typo cannot answer a request for the section with a response
that merely lacks one. DeleteKey still reports unconditionally: that is
the request whose consequences the caller cannot otherwise see, and it
is not polled.

* fix(kms): box the query-parse refusal now that responses carry impact

The delete response grew an impact section, which pushed it past the
size clippy accepts inline in a Result. It is a full response body
rather than an error code, so it is boxed at the one place that returns
it as an error; the wire shape and the public field type are unchanged.
2026-08-02 08:37:37 +08:00
Zhengchao An a29ae4e5cd fix(kms): persist and report the Vault KV2 key rotation timestamp (#5594)
* fix(kms): persist and report the Vault KV2 key rotation timestamp

The rotation-age gauge reads KeyInfo::rotated_at and falls back to
created_at when it is absent. The KV2 backend never persisted a rotation
time and hardcoded None in describe_key, so a key rotated many times and
a key that was never rotated reported the same age.

Record the rotation time on the same check-and-set write that switches
the current version, and report the stored value from describe_key and
from the recovered-create path. Records written before the field existed
keep deserializing and stay unstamped: no timestamp is invented for a
rotation this node cannot vouch for.

* test(kms): cover Vault KV2 rotation timestamp persistence and legacy records
2026-08-02 05:31:51 +08:00
Zhengchao An da6fc5314d docs(kms): correct the static backend's MinIO compatibility claim (#5596)
* docs(kms): correct the static backend's MinIO compatibility claim

`StaticConfig` claimed the backend derives DEKs via "HMAC-SHA256 +
AES-256-GCM, matching the MinIO builtin/static KMS wire format". Neither
half holds: the configured key is used directly as the AES-256-GCM key
with no derivation step, and wrapped DEKs are serialized as RustFS's own
`DataKeyEnvelope` JSON. MinIO's KMS ciphertext uses a different shape,
which `is_data_key_envelope` explicitly classifies as foreign (see the
`minio_legacy` case in encryption/dek.rs).

The claim as written tells a migrating operator that MinIO-written
ciphertext will open here, which it will not. Restate what the backend
actually does and point at rustfs/backlog#1638 for the real interop work.

Also refresh the neighbouring ciphertext-format note in static_kms.rs,
which still described a raw `ciphertext || nonce` layout that the JSON
envelope replaced.

* ci(minio-interop): fix the dead test selector and guard against empty runs

The job selected its tests with `-p rustfs-ecstore -E
'binary(minio_generated_read_test)'`. #5435 moved those reader tests from
crates/ecstore/tests/minio_generated_read_test.rs into the `rustfs` crate
as a `#[cfg(test)] mod`, which removed that test binary; the selector has
selected zero interop tests since. Point it at the tests where they now
live, verified locally:

  cargo nextest list --run-ignored all -p rustfs --features rio-v2 \
    -E 'test(minio_generated_read_test::)'   # 4 tests, was 0

Add a guard step in front of the run. The old `binary(...)` form happened
to fail loudly once its binary disappeared, but the name-based form that
replaces it is a valid filterset even when it matches nothing, so a later
rename would silently reduce this job to a pass that asserts nothing. The
guard counts the selection and fails with an explicit reason; the count
comes from `filter-match.status`, since the JSON's top-level `test-count`
is the package total and ignores `-E`. `--no-tests=fail` on the run step
covers the same case if the guard is ever dropped.

Also record in the header what this job does and does not prove: MinIO
wrapped-DEK envelopes are still rejected by both envelope parsers, and
that work is tracked in rustfs/backlog#1638.
2026-08-02 05:31:30 +08:00
Zhengchao An a12043f49f fix(kms): page key listings so the deletion sweep sees every key (#5595)
* fix(kms): page the Local key listing so the deletion sweep sees every key

The Local backend answered every ListKeys with the first `limit` entries of
`read_dir` and a hardcoded `truncated: false`, so the deletion sweep ended
after one page: on a deployment with more keys than a page, expired key
material past the first page was never destroyed, and the lifecycle gauges
published that partial page as if it were the whole key set.

Listing now orders the key set by identifier and pages through it, with the
marker as an exclusive lower bound on the identifier rather than an index, so
a key added or removed between pages — including the marker key, which the
sweep itself destroys — cannot make the listing skip keys or restart. Only the
page is read from disk, so a list costs the requested limit rather than the
size of the key set.

The pagination arithmetic lives in a shared helper so the other self-paging
backends can adopt the same semantics, and the sweep now stops instead of
re-listing when a backend hands back the cursor it was just given.

* fix(kms): give ListKeys a defined zero-limit and cursor contract

`GET /rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys?limit=0` reached the Vault KV2 and Vault
Transit backends as a page size of zero, where the page arithmetic indexed the
element before an empty page and aborted the request. Both backends also
resolved the marker by searching for it in the key list, so a marker naming a
key that had since been removed silently restarted the listing from the
beginning instead of resuming after it.

All four self-paging backends now share one contract: a zero limit is answered
as an empty, non-truncated page without reaching the backend at all, and the
marker is an exclusive lower bound on the key identifier rather than a position
in the list. The Vault backends read metadata only for the page they return,
so a list costs the requested limit instead of the whole key set, and KV2 now
applies the usage and status filters it previously accepted and ignored.
2026-08-02 05:27:46 +08:00
Zhengchao An a6599dbc32 docs(kms): correct the claim that rotation is not admin-reachable (#5593) 2026-08-02 04:18:43 +08:00
Zhengchao An 7528a0b916 feat(kms): accept the AWS backend through KMS configuration (#5592)
* feat(kms): accept the AWS backend through KMS configuration

The AWS KMS backend could be constructed but not selected: the admin
configure API had no AWS variant and startup rejected the backend name.

The configure request pins the region rather than defaulting it, because
that configuration is persisted once and replayed on every node: leaving
the region to each node's ambient provider chain would let nodes address
different regions, and therefore different keys, while reporting an
identical configuration. The request accepts no credential fields, so
credentials stay with the aws-config provider chain on each node, and
`deny_unknown_fields` refuses attempts to submit them anyway.

* test(kms): cover AWS backend selection through the service manager

An end-to-end check that an admin configure request selects the AWS
backend, builds a client, and passes the startup health check. Marked
#[ignore]: it needs real AWS credentials, though it creates no key and
is therefore not billable on its own.
2026-08-02 03:58:20 +08:00
Zhengchao An 105af08a10 test(kms): cover decryption of pre-rotation envelopes offline (#5591)
* test(kms): cover KV2 decrypt of pre-rotation envelopes offline

The forward half of the rotation contract - an envelope written before a
rotation still decrypts after it - was only exercised by the #[ignore]
live-Vault tests, so CI never verified it. The offline layer only had the
negative cases (a regressed version pointer must fail closed).

Drive encrypt -> rotate -> decrypt over the scripted Vault responder,
folding what each rotation writes back into the served state so the
material the decrypt resolves is the material the rotation persisted.
Also cover two consecutive rotations and pin that new envelopes carry the
rotated version.

* test(kms): cover Transit decrypt of pre-rotation data keys offline

Vault owns the transit crypto, so the offline responder cannot prove the
round trip - that stays in the #[ignore] live test. What it can pin is the
client-side wiring: after a rotation records the version bump, decrypting
a data key generated before it must forward the historical vault:v1:
ciphertext to Vault byte for byte and return the material Vault hands
back.
2026-08-02 03:50:12 +08:00
Zhengchao An f1a85c6a93 fix(admin): refuse immediate KMS key deletion through the query string (#5589)
fix(admin): retire the query-string form of immediate KMS key deletion

Immediate deletion destroys master key material outright, and every
object encrypted under that key becomes permanently unreadable. The
delete endpoint accepted that request as a query parameter, which is the
form most easily issued by accident and the one that made the waiting
window bypassable.

The query string can now only schedule a deletion: `force_immediate`
with any value other than `false`, or a `confirm_key_id` parameter, is
refused with 400 rather than downgraded to a scheduled deletion, so a
caller cannot read the answer as "destroyed". The JSON body form is
unchanged and remains the single way to reach the service gate that
enforces the server opt-in and the echoed confirmation.

Classify the route accordingly: `RouteRiskLevel` gains `Critical` for
routes whose worst case is permanent loss of user data, and the KMS key
deletion route is the only member, pinned in both directions by a matrix
test. Endpoint-level coverage for the 7-30 day window bound is added for
every configured backend.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1585 (part of rustfs/backlog#1562)
2026-08-02 03:46:11 +08:00
Zhengchao An 3cfe867dff feat(kms): add a disaster-recovery drill harness for KMS backups (#5587)
* feat(kms): add a disaster-recovery drill harness for the Local backend

Rehearse the full backup/restore loop offline and return machine-readable
evidence: seed a sandbox deployment, seal sample objects through the
production encryption path, export a bundle, destroy the persistence layer,
preflight, restore, and decrypt every pre-disaster object again.

The evidence records the measured recovery point (one key is written past the
snapshot fence and must stay unrecoverable), the recovery time by phase, the
manifest digest before and after, and whether the restore treated its bundle
as read-only.

* test(kms): drill the Local disaster matrix and the interrupted cutover

Runs the harness against total key-directory loss, salt loss, and a torn key
record, asserting every pre-disaster object decrypts again while work past the
snapshot fence stays lost. Two further legs crash a restore exactly at its
commit point and prove the published marker names the bundle and the files it
still owes, then that re-running rolls forward and aborting rolls back.

The Vault leg needs a real server and is ignored by default: a Vault bundle
never carries the non-exportable Transit root, so what it drills is the
refusal to proceed before the operator has restored it natively.

* feat(kms): add an operator entry point for the disaster-recovery drill

Runs one rehearsal from environment configuration and writes the evidence
bundle, exiting non-zero on a failed verdict so a scheduled drill fails its
job instead of filing a bad report. It reads the same backup-KEK variables as
the admin backup API: drilling with the KEK real bundles are sealed under is
what proves that KEK is still retrievable.

* docs(kms): add the disaster-recovery drill runbook

Documents the procedure the harness automates: what a drill measures and why
the object probe rather than the manifest digest is the acceptance criterion,
the per-backend responsibility split, the disaster matrix, how to read the
evidence bundle, the two interrupted-cutover outcomes, and the Vault variant
whose cryptographic root comes back through Vault's own flow.

* chore(typos): accept RTO as a disaster-recovery term
2026-08-01 19:38:20 +00:00
Zhengchao An fc3896f479 feat(policy): add built-in KMS role policies and a negative authorization matrix (#5588)
* feat(policy): add built-in KMS role policies

KMSKeyAdministrator, KMSKeyUser and KMSAuditor ship as canned identity
policies so operators can express KMS role separation without hand-writing
the resource grammar. They grant only kms actions, so they compose with an
existing data-plane policy, and none of them confers kms:Configure,
kms:ServiceControl, kms:ClearCache, kms:Backup or kms:Restore.

* docs(kms): document per-key KMS authorization and the role templates

* test(kms): add an end-to-end negative authorization matrix

Covers the admin and SSE-KMS planes for a wrong identity, a wrong key, a
wrong action and an explicit Deny, each preceded by a positive control so a
denial cannot be an unpropagated policy. SSE-S3 and unencrypted objects are
asserted to stay exempt.

* test(replication): pin the SSE-KMS contract with per-key authorization on

The replication worker carries no request identity, so it must stay exempt
from SSE-KMS key authorization. Running the existing contract with the
switch enabled makes a regression in that exemption visible here.
2026-08-01 19:33:33 +00:00
Zhengchao An 6d8c19e71c docs(kms): correct operator claims that later changes invalidated (#5590)
* docs(kms): describe KMS configuration convergence as implemented

* docs(kms): document the landed KMS metric families and narrow the gaps list

* docs(kms): state that no request field sets the cache metrics switch

* docs(kms): correct the describe_key cache divergence bound
2026-08-02 03:17:29 +08:00
houseme fbec33bd29 Expose target-scoped durable MRF backlog metrics (#5584)
* feat(replication): expose target durable mrf backlog

Add target ARN attribution to durable MRF entries and surface target-scoped durable backlog metrics without changing existing bucket-only metric labels.

Keep legacy MRF files bucket-only by defaulting missing targetARNs to an empty list, and expose target snapshots through an additive API so existing DurableMrfBacklogSummary callers remain source-compatible.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(replication): expose runtime target backlog (#5586)

Track runtime replication backlog by target ARN for regular, large, delete, and MRF admission paths while preserving the existing bucket-level backlog semantics.

Add target-scoped current backlog metrics and merge them with durable target backlog snapshots for observability.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-01 17:31:50 +00:00
GatewayJ 4c83bff81c fix(s3select): support two-byte CSV record delimiters (#5565) 2026-08-01 17:08:31 +00:00
GatewayJ 51f9d1b74f fix(s3select): guarantee terminal event delivery (#5563) 2026-08-02 00:53:04 +08:00
houseme ed02899d31 test(perf): cover ABBA evidence binding matrix (#5585)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-01 15:58:32 +00:00
Zhengchao An 81fc61db41 feat(admin): expose KMS key description and tag endpoints (#5575)
* feat(kms): add admin endpoints for key description and tag updates

Wire the KMS key metadata updates landed at the service layer to the admin
API: POST /v3/kms/keys/{update-description,tag,untag}. Each endpoint gates on
a dedicated KMS action scoped to the key its body names, records a handler-owned
audit entry for both the authorization denial and the outcome, and maps a
backend that cannot update key metadata to 501 rather than 404.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1586 (part of rustfs/backlog#1562)

* fix(admin): audit metadata attempts refused by an unavailable KMS

* test(admin): register the new KMS metadata routes in the matrix
2026-08-01 15:57:26 +00:00
houseme a08fb56607 test(perf): strengthen HotPath evidence contracts (#5581)
* test(perf): mark nonformal ABBA artifacts

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(io-metrics): lock disabled EC stage accounting

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-01 15:07:17 +00:00
唐小鸭 c8016cbcdb fix(replication): enforce bucket replication switches (#5449)
* fix(replication): enforce bucket replication switches

* fix(replication): satisfy delete admission clippy lint

* fix(replication): restore MinIO tag filter behavior

---------

Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
2026-08-01 15:03:57 +00:00
Zhengchao An 56a7e3b707 chore(s3-types): guard the EventName mask bit budget (#5582)
EventName::mask() turns a leaf variant's discriminant `v` into
`1 << (v - 1)`, so the enum can hold at most 64 variants in total —
compound "All" variants included, since they consume discriminants
even though they own no bit and push every later leaf further up the
range. The last variant is KmsServiceStopped at 61, leaving 3 slots.

Past the budget, `1u64 << (v - 1)` shifts by 64 or more: debug builds
panic with a shift overflow, release builds silently mask the shift
amount down and hand back a bit that already belongs to another event.
Either failure surfaces far from the line that added the variant.

The existing test_mask_bit_budget_is_not_exhausted only bounds the
events listed in the test-local ALL_EVENT_NAMES, so a variant nobody
remembered to list went unchecked. Add three layers instead:

- A const assertion on LAST_EVENT_NAME_VALUE, anchored on the last
  variant, that fails `cargo build` once the discriminant passes 64.
- An exhaustive-match tripwire next to ALL_EVENT_NAMES, so adding a
  variant breaks compilation with a non-exhaustive-patterns error that
  points at the budget notes.
- Tests pinning that discriminants stay dense and fully listed, that
  every leaf mask is non-zero and owns a unique bit (catching the
  release-mode wrapped-shift collision), and that the last variant
  still lands inside the u64.

Document the budget and the three guards on mask() so the next person
adding an event sees the remaining headroom.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1572
2026-08-01 14:49:16 +00:00
Zhengchao An f2d09d1426 feat(admin): expose KMS backup and restore behind explicit guards (#5579)
* feat(kms): add backup and restore admin API

Wires the merged KMS backup contract, Local export and Local restore into
the admin API: export a sealed bundle, run a zero-write restore preflight,
execute a confirmed restore, roll an interrupted restore back, and report
subsystem readiness.

- Dedicated kms:Backup / kms:Restore actions, recorded in the admin route
  matrix. Neither is reachable through any other KMS action.
- Restore requires two independent confirmations: an echo of the bundle
  manifest's backup id, and an explicitly named conflict policy (the
  default never writes).
- The backup KEK comes from the environment and is refused when it reuses
  a secret of the configured backend, compared both as the literal value
  and as raw key bytes.
- No endpoint accepts a path: bundles are addressed by a validated name
  under a configured root, and the restore target is always the server's
  own configured key directory.
- Bundles now carry a sanitized configuration artifact built as an
  allowlist projection, so a future backend credential field cannot leak
  into a bundle by default. Restore verifies it and never applies it.
- Audit entries go through the existing KMS admin wiring and carry
  identifiers only.

* test(kms): pin the backup admin API gates

Fixes the test KEK to a real 32-byte value and drives the export refusal
from the configured backend rather than from the handle that happens to
be available, so a Local handle cannot export on behalf of a backend
whose material RustFS does not own.
2026-08-01 14:31:25 +00:00
Zhengchao An 02aa383598 fix(kms): refuse to rotate a Vault key whose baseline version was erased (#5578)
`VaultKeyData::baseline_version` pins the master key version that every
pre-versioning DEK envelope (one with no `master_key_version`) resolves to.
Builds released before versioned rotation do not know the field, and every KV2
lifecycle write — enable, disable, schedule/cancel deletion, tag, untag —
rewrites the whole record, so a single lifecycle call from an older node during
a rolling upgrade silently drops the baseline. Serde attributes cannot prevent
this: the code doing the dropping already shipped.

The loss is only latent until the next rotation. With the baseline gone,
rotation takes the first-rotation path again and freezes a *new* baseline at the
current version, so every legacy envelope permanently resolves to material that
never wrapped it. That is the point of no return, and it is the one this commit
blocks: rotation now lists the key's immutable version records first and refuses
when records exist while the record carries no baseline. Those two are created
by the same commit, so the combination can only mean the baseline was erased
afterwards. The refusal is decided from reads alone, before any write, and names
the version to restore — the oldest recorded version *is* the lost baseline,
since version records start at the baseline the first rotation froze.

Reads are diagnosed rather than blocked. A version-less envelope on a key with
no baseline resolves to the current version, which AES-256-GCM refuses to
unwrap when it is the wrong one, so no wrong plaintext can be returned. Only
after that failure does decrypt list the version records and re-report the
failure as the lost baseline. Refusing up front on the same evidence would break
reads that work today: an older node writes version-less envelopes wrapped with
whatever material is current, and those still decrypt. This also keeps the extra
listing off every read of pre-versioning data.

Self-healing (writing back `baseline_version = min(recorded)`) is deliberately
not done: during the mixed-version window that caused the loss, an older node
can erase it again on the next lifecycle call, so healing would mask an
unfinished upgrade instead of surfacing it. Moving the baseline to a KV path
older builds cannot rewrite is the real fix and is scheduled for GA.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1581 (part of rustfs/backlog#1562)
2026-08-01 14:02:52 +00:00
Zhengchao An 860ad68afd feat(sse): attach KMS attribution to S3 audit entries (#5577)
feat(kms): attach the SSE data-plane KMS summary to S3 audit entries
2026-08-01 13:58:30 +00:00
Zhengchao An 95e96e1bd5 docs(agents): require worktree and disk hygiene (#5580)
* docs(agents): require worktree and disk hygiene

* docs(agents): add PR lifecycle monitoring
2026-08-01 21:52:05 +08:00
GatewayJ 816849a8ee fix(s3select): cancel queries after client disconnect (#5560) 2026-08-01 13:38:30 +00:00
Zhengchao An 5ef5eb8ea9 ci: add nightly GNU build (#5576) 2026-08-01 21:30:21 +08:00
Zhengchao An ad721bff42 fix(kms): honour the configured metadata cache TTL and metrics switch (#5569)
* fix(kms): honour the configured metadata cache TTL and metrics switch

KmsManager::new built the KmsCache from cache_config.max_keys alone, so
cache_config.ttl was dead configuration: every deployment ran the
hardcoded 300s window whatever the admin configure API was given, while
CacheSummary and the KMS config endpoint reported the configured value
back. cache_config.enable_metrics was never read anywhere.

Build the cache from the whole CacheConfig. The documented default is
reconciled down to the 300s the cache has always used rather than up to
the advertised 3600s, and now lives in one place (DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL)
instead of being duplicated across the four configure-request
converters, so the default path behaves exactly as before.

Behaviour change: a deployment configured through the admin API already
has ttl 3600 persisted, because the old converters wrote that default
into the stored config, so its describe_key staleness window widens from
an effective 300s to the 3600s it asked for. No cryptographic or
authorization path widens - encrypt, decrypt and generate_data_key go
straight to the backend and never read this cache. The Vault Transit
backend's own metadata cache, which does gate crypto through
ensure_key_state_allows, stays fixed at 300s and is now documented as
deliberately not operator-tunable.

The configured duration now reaches moka's builder, which panics above
1000 years, so CacheConfig::effective_ttl clamps to a 24h maximum the
way effective_timeout already clamps its own, and validate rejects a
zero TTL beside the existing max_keys check. Both config summaries and
the KMS config endpoint report the effective value, so the admin API
cannot advertise a lifetime the cache does not honour.

enable_metrics gates publication of the rustfs_kms_metadata_cache_*
families only; the counters behind the admin status API keep running
either way. No configure-request field sets it yet.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1584

* docs(kms): state why the Transit metadata TTL is not bound to the default

The comment claimed the constant matches config::DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL, which
reads as an invariant the code does not enforce. Say plainly that the
equality is a coincidence rather than a contract, and why binding the two
would be wrong: this cache gates crypto through ensure_key_state_allows,
so a later change to the operator-facing describe-cache default must not
be able to widen its staleness window.
2026-08-01 13:27:33 +00:00
houseme 29dedcc7fd fix(obs): retire replication backlog metric series (#5574)
Emit zero tombstones for removed bucket-level replication backlog series and retire the corresponding metric descriptors after the configured tombstone window, matching the existing replication bandwidth lifecycle.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-01 13:21:41 +00:00
houseme 749cb2c1a1 perf: harden HotPath closure evidence (#5573)
* test(ecstore): cover raw shard write errors

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* perf(ecstore): track encode payload stage peaks

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(perf): harden formal warp ABBA evidence

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-01 21:16:31 +08:00
houseme eb4f2d61ad test(replication): distinguish backlog from failed counters (#5570)
test(replication): distinguish backlog from failures

Extend the replication backlog e2e to assert that historical failed counters can remain non-zero after recovery while current backlog and MRF pending gauges settle to zero.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-01 12:36:14 +00:00
Zhengchao An 3c00ad6048 fix(kms): make the deletion waiting window non-bypassable (#5535) 2026-08-01 12:23:28 +00:00
Zhengchao An 85bc0d3ce2 ci: let the CARGO_BUILD_JOBS experiment collect samples on demand (#5572)
Gate 2 in rustfs/backlog#1601 needs ten terminal Test and Lint samples at 3.
Push alone cannot supply them: this workflow cancels superseded runs on main,
and only 4 of the last 20 push-triggered Test and Lint jobs reached a terminal
state — 15 were cancelled. At that rate ten samples take roughly fifty merges,
so the experiment would sit open for days while the branch it measures keeps
moving.

The concurrency group is scoped by event_name, so a dispatched run has its own
group and is not cancelled by merge traffic. Including workflow_dispatch in the
raised value makes the sample collectable deliberately rather than by waiting
for pushes to survive.

PRs still get 2. The merge path is untouched.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1598, rustfs/backlog#1601
2026-08-01 20:19:38 +08:00
Zhengchao An b8d2f1c84c feat(kms): orchestrate and verify Vault-backed restores (#5549) 2026-08-01 12:18:11 +00:00
Zhengchao An 59f69fbfb5 ci: raise CARGO_BUILD_JOBS to 3 on main pushes as a measured experiment (#5571)
The #5394 mitigation set it to 2 on the belief that three concurrent workspace
test links saturate the runner's overlay I/O. The sampler's cgroup v2 readings
show the pod has 14 CPUs and 28GB with a 2.1GB peak, so 2 throttles compilation
to a seventh of what is available and memory was never the constraint. The label
name sm-standard-4 had led everyone, including that mitigation and every
description written during this series, to assume four cores.

Raised to 3 for push events only. PRs keep 2, so the merge path is untouched
while the experiment runs.

Baseline over 17 non-cancelled samples at 2: median nextest/clippy step ratio
1.95, spread 1.85-2.06. Judging by that ratio rather than absolute wall clock is
what makes the signal usable — clippy runs on the same node at the same time and
is check-only for workspace members, so it never links the ~100 test binaries
this limit throttles, making it a control arm rather than a second measurement.

The criterion is the ratio dropping at least 10%, below about 1.76, with no 75m
timeout and no run showing three consecutive samples of rustc, collect2 or
rust-lld in D state. If it does not drop, the conclusion is that this limit is
not the bottleneck: fix it back at 2 and record the experiment. That is a
result, not a failure.

Kept at step level deliberately. rust-cache hashes CARGO/CC/CFLAGS/CXX/CMAKE/RUST
prefixed variables from process.env into its key, so promoting this to job level
would rotate every cache key on this lane.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1598, rustfs/backlog#1601
2026-08-01 20:00:31 +08:00
Zhengchao An be7ba1bba9 ci: make the cache size report readable from the API (#5568)
The figures went only to $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY, which renders in the UI but
never appears in the job log — and the REST API exposes the log, not the
summary. So the one number the cache-all-crates decision rests on could not be
fetched by the script that needed it. Print to stdout as well, between markers,
and keep the summary rendering.
2026-08-01 19:23:42 +08:00
GatewayJ 6363263f09 fix(s3select): parse JSON source paths from SQL AST (#5559) 2026-08-01 11:20:33 +00:00
GatewayJ 533896d045 fix(s3select): honor custom CSV record delimiters (#5558) 2026-08-01 11:18:04 +00:00
Zhengchao An 0bf077f918 ci: stop main pushes from starving dispatched Cache Warm runs (#5567)
Cache Warm used one concurrency group for every trigger. GitHub keeps one
running plus one pending run per group, so a manually dispatched run sat as
pending until the next merge displaced and cancelled it — observed three times
in a row. That made the --timings gate in rustfs/backlog#1601 impossible to
trigger while main was busy, which is precisely when someone wants to measure.

Scoping the group by event lets the push and dispatch paths queue independently.
Neither gains cancel-in-progress, so a burst of merges still collapses into
"current run finishes, newest queued run follows".

The two paths can now overlap and race to save the same key. That is benign:
the loser finds the key already present and skips, and both builds produce the
same artifacts from the same commit.
2026-08-01 19:16:32 +08:00
GatewayJ 284faec03f fix(s3select): preserve ScanRange across file partitions (#5562) 2026-08-01 19:15:51 +08:00
Zhengchao An bfec547d36 feat(health): drive KMS readiness from the probe status (#5552)
* feat(health): drive KMS readiness from the probe status

Readiness reported the KMS ready on the service status bit alone, which says
the manager started, not that the backend can still serve a request. Consume
the background probe snapshot instead: a running service is withdrawn only
when a fresh snapshot shows failures at the threshold.

The readiness path stays free of backend calls — it reads the lock-free
snapshot — so a struggling KMS cannot be amplified into probe traffic of its
own. Everything the probe cannot speak to (no worker, no completed round,
a snapshot older than three probe intervals) leaves the previous status-bit
verdict standing, and the check remains off by default.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1584 (part of rustfs/backlog#1562)

* test(health): pin the readiness default at compile time
2026-08-01 19:15:12 +08:00
Zhengchao An 0bd53becb5 feat(admin): emit KMS management audit events (#5554)
* feat(s3-types): add KMS service-control audit events

Configuration changes and service start/stop are management-plane actions
with no event name of their own, so they could not reach the audit
pipeline at all. Append three variants for them, following the existing
rule that KMS events are audit-only and live outside the `s3:` namespace,
so no bucket notification selector can expand to them.

* feat(admin): audit KMS management operations

Every KMS admin endpoint now builds an OperationContext from the
authenticated caller and hands it to the KMS layer, so the record the
manager already produces carries the principal, source address and
canonical request id instead of the internal placeholder.

A new adapter maps those records onto the server's existing AuditEntry
format and installs itself as the KMS audit sink at service assembly, so
KMS activity reaches the targets a deployment already operates. The
handlers emit directly for what the KMS layer cannot see: a request the
authorization gate rejects, and the endpoints with no context-aware KMS
entry point (data-key derivation and service control).

Only the failure class is recorded, never the error message, and the new
module joins the logging guardrail's checked files alongside the handlers
it serves.
2026-08-01 19:14:31 +08:00
houseme da389c0e21 fix(replication): harden backlog observability (#5564)
Add RAII guards for replication runtime backlog tickets so active worker and queue counters unwind on every terminal path.

Expose node-local MRF pending, dropped, missed, and flush-failure metrics through the bucket replication Prometheus collector while keeping the existing current backlog and durable MRF gauges additive.

Update durable MRF summary maintenance to aggregate incrementally during the persister loop, avoiding repeated full-entry scans on each successful flush.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-01 11:12:58 +00:00
Zhengchao An b7805caa58 ci: stop archiving every dependency's unpacked source in each cache (#5566)
The four consolidated ci keys plus the build keys still do not fit the
repository's fixed 10GB Actions cache quota, so LRU keeps evicting them:
measured demand is ci-dev 2331MB + ci-feat-proto 2310MB + ci-feat-rio 1951MB +
ci-uring 1317MB + two build legs at ~1429MB + cargo-deny 844MB, and main pushes
add two more build legs. That is roughly 14.4GB against 10.24GB. The symptom is
misleading: Cache Warm reports every job successful and the restores log "full
match: true", yet ci-feat-rio and ci-uring disappear from the cache list between
runs.

cache-all-crates was the wrong default for this repository. With it set to true,
rust-cache's cleanup returns before pruning ~/.cargo/registry/src and its config
archives the whole registry, so every cache carried the unpacked source tree of
every dependency — not, as the name suggests, just a few extra crates.

Setting it to false is rust-cache's own default and loses no coverage: the
package set comes from `cargo metadata --all-features`, a strict superset of any
single lane's feature closure; -sys crates are explicitly exempt from pruning,
since their source timestamps would otherwise trigger rebuilds; and everything
pruned is re-unpacked from the .crate files still in registry/cache, whose
mtimes crates.io normalises, so cargo fingerprints stay valid.

Applied to the setup composite and to audit.yml's own rust-cache. Cache Warm
now also reports the sizes of registry/src, registry/cache, registry/index,
~/.cargo/git and target/ to the step summary, immediately before rust-cache's
post step archives them, so the size of the effect is measured rather than
assumed.

The new sizes only appear once the cache key next rotates, since rust-cache
skips the save entirely on an exact key hit. Deliberately not forcing that by
bumping prefix-key: it would invalidate every family at once and produce a
repository-wide cold build.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1598, rustfs/backlog#1600
2026-08-01 18:57:23 +08:00
Zhengchao An b0bb0bbd3a test(e2e): classify failed lock nodes as quorum loss (#5513) 2026-08-01 18:56:57 +08:00
GatewayJ bc41e567a5 fix(oidc): warn on request-header redirect fallback (#5561)
* fix(oidc): warn on request-header redirect fallback

* test(oidc): cover startup warning publication
2026-08-01 18:10:37 +08:00
houseme d5c6ba99d5 fix(ecstore): harden HotPath profiling boundaries (#5555)
* test(hotpath): gate mimalloc heap test by platform

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): attribute HotPath CPU measurements to impls

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(ecstore): trace raw shard I/O with HotPath

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(obs): redact profiler and OPA endpoint diagnostics

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): settle encoded queue accounting

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): abort encoder producer on cancellation

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-01 08:49:48 +00:00
houseme 62d44d10b8 Expose replication backlog gauges (#5557)
* fix(replication): count backlog at queue admission

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(obs): expose bucket replication backlog gauges

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(obs): report recent backlog from queued work

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(obs): preserve legacy backlog metric semantics

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(obs): expose durable MRF backlog gauges

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(obs): cover replication backlog metric scope

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(obs): keep backlog metrics API-compatible

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* refactor(obs): streamline replication backlog metrics

Keep MRF backlog accounting and OBS metric collection on a single, cheaper path.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(kms): update aws capability snapshot

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-01 08:48:45 +00:00
houseme 8218248000 fix(hotpath): pin mimalloc allocator backend (#5550)
* fix(hotpath): pin mimalloc allocator backend

* test(hotpath): verify mimalloc allocator backend

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* chore(hotpath): document unsafe allocator tests

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(kms): record real cache hit, miss and eviction metrics (#5531)

* feat(kms): record real cache hit, miss and eviction metrics

The metadata cache reported (entry_count, 0) because moka exposes no hit
or miss counts, so the miss half of every cache report was a constant.

Track lookups and removals in the cache itself: hit/miss counters on the
lookup path, a moka eviction listener classifying removals by cause, and
an entry gauge refreshed whenever the entry set changes. The counters are
exported through the metrics facade under the rustfs_kms_ prefix with
static label values only, matching the operation-policy metrics, and are
also returned as a KmsCacheStats snapshot in place of the old tuple.

Cache semantics are unchanged: capacity, TTL and invalidation points are
the same, and remove now flushes pending maintenance so the gauge and the
removal notification describe the cache the caller sees.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1584

* fix(kms): report real cache counters through the admin status API

KmsStatusResponse.cache_stats mapped the old (entry_count, 0) tuple onto
hit_count and miss_count, so operators polling KMS status read the entry
count as a hit count and a miss count that was always zero.

Map the fields to the counters they claim to be, and add entry_count and
eviction_count as additive, defaulted fields so the entry number that
hit_count used to carry is still available.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1584

* fix(kms): refresh the cache entry gauge on lookup misses

The entry gauge was published only from the write paths, so an entry
dropped by TTL expiry left `rustfs_kms_metadata_cache_entries` reporting
a population that no longer existed until the next put, remove or clear.
A cache that goes quiet — entries ageing out with no further writes —
kept over-reporting indefinitely.

Republish the gauge from the lookup path when the lookup misses. A miss
is where expiry surfaces, and moka reaps expired entries in the
maintenance it runs during that same lookup, so the count read
afterwards reflects the reaping. Hits stay free of the extra work.

* docs(kms): correct the entry gauge convergence claim on the miss path

The comment on the miss-path gauge refresh said moka reaps expired
entries in the maintenance it runs on that same lookup. It does not:
`should_apply_reads` is gated on a full read log or an elapsed
housekeeping interval, so the removal that decrements `entry_count` and
reaches the eviction listener may land on a later lookup.

The behaviour and the test are unchanged — the gauge still converges,
and the test drives `run_pending_tasks` explicitly rather than riding on
that interval. Only the stated guarantee was wrong, so say interval
instead of same-lookup and record why forcing maintenance on the read
path was not the trade taken.

* chore(deps): refresh cargo dependencies

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-01 07:04:54 +00:00
Zhengchao An fd36bdfb1a feat(kms): allow key description and tag updates (#5546) 2026-08-01 06:32:47 +00:00
Zhengchao An 322ce21b9a feat(kms): add an AWS KMS backend (#5553) 2026-08-01 06:07:32 +00:00
Zhengchao An 35e4415ed9 feat(kms): expose key lifecycle and Vault credential gauges (#5542)
* feat(kms): observe key lifecycle from the deletion sweep

The sweep already pages through the whole key set, so the lifecycle
gauges come out of the pages it has in hand: no extra backend call is
made for them. It publishes the number of keys awaiting their deletion
deadline, the number of tombstones an interrupted removal left behind,
and how long ago the least recently rotated usable key was rotated
(counting from creation for keys that were never rotated), plus a
per-outcome counter of what the sweep acted on.

Every gauge is a label-less aggregate: a per-key label would carry key
identifiers into the metric stream and grow the series count with the
key set, so "this key is overdue for rotation" stays a threshold for an
alerting rule to apply to the aggregate. Keys the sweep destroys drop
out of the census, and a sweep that could not finish listing leaves the
gauges at their last complete values rather than understating them.

* feat(kms): expose Vault token TTL and fail-closed state as gauges

The renewal loop already tracks token expiry, so it now publishes the
seconds left on the active Vault token and whether the provider is
refusing to serve it. The fail-closed gauge re-evaluates the very gate
`VaultCredentialProvider::current` applies, so what operators see and
what the request path does cannot drift apart.

Both waits in the loop republish on a bounded cadence, so a scrape
landing between refresh cycles never reads a TTL frozen at the last
refresh or a fail-closed state that flipped after it. That costs a timer
and no Vault traffic, and the request path stays free of metric work.
Renewal successes and failures already land in the auth operation
counters, so nothing is double-counted here. Neither gauge carries a
label: the address, mount, auth path and token are all off limits as
label values, and there is one generation to describe.
2026-08-01 13:52:43 +08:00
Zhengchao An 4e34f97dd7 feat(kms): converge KMS configuration across nodes after a runtime change (#5551) 2026-08-01 05:41:02 +00:00
Zhengchao An 782c78e0ef feat(sse): enforce per-key KMS authorization on the SSE-KMS data path (#5538) 2026-08-01 05:25:18 +00:00
Zhengchao An 8387528c9b feat(kms): record real cache hit, miss and eviction metrics (#5531)
* feat(kms): record real cache hit, miss and eviction metrics

The metadata cache reported (entry_count, 0) because moka exposes no hit
or miss counts, so the miss half of every cache report was a constant.

Track lookups and removals in the cache itself: hit/miss counters on the
lookup path, a moka eviction listener classifying removals by cause, and
an entry gauge refreshed whenever the entry set changes. The counters are
exported through the metrics facade under the rustfs_kms_ prefix with
static label values only, matching the operation-policy metrics, and are
also returned as a KmsCacheStats snapshot in place of the old tuple.

Cache semantics are unchanged: capacity, TTL and invalidation points are
the same, and remove now flushes pending maintenance so the gauge and the
removal notification describe the cache the caller sees.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1584

* fix(kms): report real cache counters through the admin status API

KmsStatusResponse.cache_stats mapped the old (entry_count, 0) tuple onto
hit_count and miss_count, so operators polling KMS status read the entry
count as a hit count and a miss count that was always zero.

Map the fields to the counters they claim to be, and add entry_count and
eviction_count as additive, defaulted fields so the entry number that
hit_count used to carry is still available.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1584

* fix(kms): refresh the cache entry gauge on lookup misses

The entry gauge was published only from the write paths, so an entry
dropped by TTL expiry left `rustfs_kms_metadata_cache_entries` reporting
a population that no longer existed until the next put, remove or clear.
A cache that goes quiet — entries ageing out with no further writes —
kept over-reporting indefinitely.

Republish the gauge from the lookup path when the lookup misses. A miss
is where expiry surfaces, and moka reaps expired entries in the
maintenance it runs during that same lookup, so the count read
afterwards reflects the reaping. Hits stay free of the extra work.

* docs(kms): correct the entry gauge convergence claim on the miss path

The comment on the miss-path gauge refresh said moka reaps expired
entries in the maintenance it runs on that same lookup. It does not:
`should_apply_reads` is gated on a full read log or an elapsed
housekeeping interval, so the removal that decrements `entry_count` and
reaches the eviction listener may land on a later lookup.

The behaviour and the test are unchanged — the gauge still converges,
and the test drives `run_pending_tasks` explicitly rather than riding on
that interval. Only the stated guarantee was wrong, so say interval
instead of same-lookup and record why forcing maintenance on the read
path was not the trade taken.
2026-08-01 05:19:25 +00:00
Zhengchao An 4ce0e280f2 feat(kms): add a synthetic encrypt-decrypt probe worker (#5543) 2026-08-01 12:30:35 +08:00
Zhengchao An 793c193a6b feat(admin): scope KMS admin authorization to the target key (#5533) 2026-08-01 04:18:52 +00:00
Zhengchao An 5a6e850c67 feat(kms): wire OperationContext into an audit event contract (#5534) 2026-08-01 04:12:00 +00:00
Zhengchao An 2d8ad5caee ci: drop cla.yml to least privilege (#5548) 2026-08-01 12:00:46 +08:00
GatewayJ 3d4f4bb86d fix(sts): align AssumeRole authorization (#5281)
* fix(sts): align AssumeRole authorization with MinIO

* test(sts): cover AssumeRole OPA contract

* fix(iam): fail closed on unresolved policies

* fix(iam): fail closed while OPA initializes

---------

Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-01 11:48:58 +08:00
Zhengchao An 2b31bda6d1 ci: clear the checkout token in every job that does not push (#5547)
actions/checkout writes its token into .git/config as an http extraheader,
where it stays for the rest of the job. That matters more here than usual:
pull_request jobs run on self-hosted runners and execute the PR's own build.rs,
proc-macros and tests, any of which can read that file. Test and Lint holds
actions: write on top of that, so its token can cancel runs and delete the
Actions caches the whole pipeline now depends on — it was given
persist-credentials: false when that permission was added, and this extends the
same treatment to the other 45 checkouts.

Two are exempt because the token IS the credential the job needs.
helm-package's publish job pushes to rustfs/helm with it; clearing it would
break chart publishing. nix-flake-update is exempt pending verification: it
passes FLAKE_UPDATE_TOKEN to create-pull-request directly rather than reusing
.git/config, so it very likely does not need persistence, but that is unproven
and a broken weekly bot is not worth the guess. Both carry a
persist-credentials-exempt comment saying which.

scripts/security/check_persist_credentials.sh requires every checkout to either
clear its credentials or carry that comment, so the decision stays visible in
review rather than being an omission nobody notices.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1598, rustfs/backlog#1602
2026-08-01 11:48:47 +08:00
Zhengchao An 68e344bf03 fix(scanner): remove total timeout from heal walks (#5502)
Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
2026-08-01 03:47:42 +00:00
Zhengchao An 48c2fcb62b ci: add an opt-in cargo --timings run to decide the sccache question (#5545)
sccache can only cache compilation units whose --emit includes link. That
covers workspace rlibs and nothing else: clippy is metadata-only, and the ~100
test binaries, the rustfs bin and every build script invoke the system linker.
So the headline claim that started this — s3select-query costing 17m13s inside
a 19m32s nextest build — does not by itself justify sccache, because cargo
prints "Compiling" when a crate starts and never when it finishes: that number
is the whole compilation tail, not one crate.

Adding --timings behind a workflow_dispatch input on Cache Warm answers it with
data instead. Read two shares off the report: workspace lib codegen against the
whole build, and s3select-query's own rlib. The plan in rustfs/backlog#1601
adopts sccache only above 50% and 25%; if linking dominates instead, the answer
is mold/lld plus split-debuginfo, which is precisely the region sccache cannot
reach.

Off by default: it doubles the ci-dev build, and this only needs running once
per question. Nothing about the normal warm path changes.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1598, rustfs/backlog#1601
2026-08-01 11:36:48 +08:00
Zhengchao An 428fde069d ci: drop the docker layer cache and stop installing unused tooling (#5544)
Two cleanups, neither changing what is built or published.

docker.yml loses its type=gha layer cache. The image build compiles nothing —
it downloads a release zip and runs apk/apt — so the cache could only save the
minute or two those take, against a real correctness problem: with
RELEASE=latest the binary URL is resolved by curl inside a RUN layer, and the
layer key does not include what it resolved to. A rebuild at the same RELEASE
value (a dispatch with version=latest, or a re-run of the same version) would
hit the old layer and ship the previous release's binary. mode=max also drew on
the same repo-wide 10GB Actions cache quota the Rust lanes are contending for.

Only RELEASE is passed as a build-arg now; it is the sole one the Dockerfiles
declare besides TARGETARCH. BUILDTIME, VERSION, BUILD_TYPE, REVISION and CHANNEL
were read by no stage, and BUILDTIME's $(date ...) was a literal string in the
YAML block rather than a substitution. The DOCKER_CHANNEL computation that fed
CHANNEL evaluated to "release" down every branch and is gone with it. BUILD_DATE
and VCS_REF stay unset even though the Dockerfiles declare them: supplying them
would change the published image labels.

The setup composite stops installing tools its callers do not use. protobuf-
compiler comes out of the apt list entirely — setup-protoc installs 34.1 into
the tool cache and prepends it to PATH, so the apt build was shadowed on every
run and never used; the same duplicate install is removed from the io_uring lane.
musl-tools, zip and unzip move behind install-build-packaging-tools, off for the
CI and coverage lanes and left on for build.yml, whose native musl leg needs
musl-gcc and whose packaging steps need zip. cargo-nextest and the
rustfmt/clippy components move behind install-test-tools, off only for build.yml,
which runs no tests and no lints; coverage and the nightly replication lane keep
them because both invoke nextest.

The action's github-token input is deleted along with its 20 call sites. Its
runs block never referenced it — setup-protoc uses github.token directly — so it
was 20 places handing a token to something that ignored it.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1598, rustfs/backlog#1600, rustfs/backlog#1603
2026-08-01 11:35:34 +08:00
Zhengchao An 364168c0ba docs(kms): record the compliance position and mixed-version constraints (#5541)
* docs(kms): record the cryptographic compliance position

RustFS links no FIPS-validated cryptographic module: the rustls provider is
the ordinary aws-lc-rs build, and every data-path AEAD is RustCrypto. The
crypto crate's default-on `fips` feature only selects PBKDF2+AES-GCM over
Argon2id, with the same RustCrypto implementations behind both branches, so
it cannot support a validation claim either.

Document that status, the terminology rules for external material, the real
semantics of the `fips` feature with a rename direction, the cost of the
three routes to a stronger position, and the sequencing rules for retiring an
algorithm.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1587 (part of rustfs/backlog#1562)

* docs(kms): document the mixed-version cluster constraints

Collect the cross-version constraints that landed with versioned rotation and
the check-and-set lifecycle work: which persisted formats decode both ways,
which guarantees only hold once every node is upgraded, how long nodes can
disagree on lifecycle state, and that reconfigure is persisted cluster-wide
but applied only on the node that handled it.

Adds the recommended rolling-upgrade sequence and the list of operations to
avoid while two builds are running.

Refs rustfs/backlog#1581 (part of rustfs/backlog#1562)
2026-08-01 11:34:04 +08:00
Zhengchao An 3f4f31129e ci: narrow the io_uring lane and make the sampler attributable (#5540)
Two independent changes to the Test and Lint area.

The io_uring lane compiled 7 integration binaries to run none of their tests.
Job log 91309868055 shows the lib target reporting "18 passed; 3453 filtered
out" while every binary under crates/ecstore/tests/ reported "running 0 tests".
Adding --lib drops them from the build without changing the selected set.

The `uring_` filter itself must not be touched. libtest matches on substring, so
it also selects names containing `during_` — 6 of the 18 selected tests are such
incidental matches, and narrowing the filter to `io_uring` would silently drop
them. scripts/check_uring_lane_lib_only.sh asserts the precondition --lib
depends on: no test function whose name contains `uring_` may live under
crates/ecstore/tests/. A count floor would not do, because the dangerous case —
someone adding a matching test there — leaves the lib count unchanged and CI
green.

The resource sampler was measuring the wrong machine. The runners are ARC pods,
so /proc/loadavg, /proc/pressure/*, `free` and `df` are node-level and include
every other runner pod on the same Kubernetes node: one sample reported loadavg
6.67 with 832 threads node-wide while `ps` inside the pod showed about 10
processes. Judging a CARGO_BUILD_JOBS change on those numbers cannot work.

The sampler moves to scripts/ci/resource_sampler.sh and now records
/sys/fs/cgroup cpu.max, memory.max, memory.peak and the cpu/io/memory pressure
files, which are this pod's own. The node-level readings stay — co-tenancy is a
real cause of stalls, and a 9m57s plain `git checkout` was traced to it — but
are labelled NODE-LEVEL so nobody reads them as this job's load. Phase markers
are written on start, and clippy is now sampled too: it is the natural control
arm for a CARGO_BUILD_JOBS experiment, since --all-targets is check-only for
workspace members and never links the ~100 test binaries the limit throttles.

No numbers are changed in this commit. CARGO_BUILD_JOBS stays at 2 until there
is attributable data to change it on.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1598, rustfs/backlog#1601
2026-08-01 11:32:00 +08:00
Zhengchao An 6c99d4fe22 ci: stop the weekly flake.lock bot from running the whole pipeline (#5539)
nix-flake-update opens a PR every Sunday that changes flake.lock and nothing
else. flake.lock is consumed only by Nix packaging — cargo never reads it — yet
it was in no paths filter, so each of those PRs ran the full Continuous
Integration pipeline and the merge then ran Build and Release too. Added to all
four lists that have to agree: ci.yml's push and pull_request paths-ignore,
build.yml's push paths-ignore, and ci-docs-only.yml's paths.

The cron stays. flake.lock still has consumers — anyone running `nix build` or
`nix develop` — so stopping the updates would remove the workflow's output, not
just its CI cost.

Those four lists drifting is a silent failure, so scripts/check_ci_paths_sync.sh
now asserts the pair that matters: ci.yml's pull_request paths-ignore must equal
ci-docs-only.yml's paths. An entry present only in the first means a PR touching
those files triggers neither workflow, nobody reports "Test and Lint" or "Quick
Checks", and the PR waits on a required check forever. It also asserts both
companion job names still exist, since renaming one produces the same hang. The
push list is not compared: no required check is reported for push events.

Also in this cleanup:

- nix-flake-update's GITHUB_TOKEN drops to contents: read. The branch push and
  the pull request are both made by update-flake-lock with the
  FLAKE_UPDATE_TOKEN PAT, so the write scopes were an unused repo-write
  credential on an unattended weekly job.
- build.yml's build_docker dispatch input is documented as advisory. docker.yml
  triggers on workflow_run and requires the triggering event to be a tag push,
  so a manual dispatch never reaches it whatever this input says.
- The nine disabled workflow files get a banner saying so. Their
  disabled_manually state lives in GitHub's UI and is invisible when reading the
  file, which has already misled one audit into treating dead workflows as live.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1598, rustfs/backlog#1603
2026-08-01 11:28:14 +08:00
Zhengchao An f5348d5cc4 fix(ecstore): settle lease-deferred data-dir deletes before bucket removal (#5516)
A streaming GET holds snapshot leases on the object's data directories,
and DeleteObjects defers their physical cleanup until the leases are
released. A DeleteBucket issued inside that window passes the xl.meta
emptiness check but fails closed in the non-force delete_volume tree
removal on the leftover part files, returning BucketNotEmpty for a
logically empty bucket.

This is what intermittently failed the s3tests
test_encryption_sse_c_multipart_bad_download teardown in CI: the test
never reads its 30MiB GET body, so the server-side stream (and its
leases) stays alive until the connection drops, racing the teardown's
DeleteObjects + DeleteBucket sequence. With the body held open the
failure reproduces 5/5 locally; after this change it passes 20/20, and
the real s3-tests case passes 20 consecutive runs.

delete_volume now executes the registry-tracked pending deferred
deletions for the volume before removing the directory tree. Only data
dirs whose logical delete already committed are touched; unknown files
still fail closed with VolumeNotEmpty.
2026-08-01 03:26:58 +00:00
Zhengchao An e2b2bdcc34 ci: bound every job's runtime and stop pasting inputs into shell (#5537)
Three hardening changes with no effect on what any workflow produces.

Declare timeout-minutes on the 25 jobs that lacked it. GitHub's default is 360
minutes, and this repository has a history of runners stalling intermittently
(#5394) plus a measured 9m57s plain `git checkout` under node-level I/O
contention, so one wedged job could hold a runner for six hours out of a pool of
roughly 15-21. Budgets follow what the jobs actually do: 10 minutes for
echo-only and guard-script jobs, 30 for anything calling the GitHub API,
uploading release assets or pushing over the network.
scripts/security/check_job_timeouts.sh keeps it that way, checking only jobs
that declare runs-on so reusable-workflow callers are not flagged.

Pass workflow inputs and workflow_run fields through env instead of `${{ }}`
interpolation in run blocks. A git ref name may contain `$(...)` — any string
without a space is a legal tag — and interpolation pastes it into the script
where bash evaluates it. The worst instance was helm-package's final commit
message: it is built from the triggering tag name inside the job that holds the
cross-repository push token with rustfs/helm already checked out. Also converted
in build.yml, docker.yml and performance-ab.yml; the last is currently disabled,
but a disabled workflow can be re-enabled. Not touched: helm-package's
`contains(head_branch, '.')` tag test, since GitHub expressions have no regex
and this repository's tags carry no `v` prefix, so rewriting the condition would
change which builds publish a chart.

Give audit.yml a scheduled-failure alert and run it daily. A scheduled
cargo-deny failure usually means the dependency tree just matched a newly
published RustSec advisory — the most important signal this workflow produces,
and until now it was visible only to whoever happened to open the Actions tab.
coverage.yml and e2e-replication-nightly.yml already use this ci-8 mechanism.
The cron moves from weekly to daily so a new advisory against an unchanged tree
surfaces within a day instead of seven; the check list is untouched, since
splitting it into a light daily run and a weekly full run would create runs
where sources, bans and licenses go unverified.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1598, rustfs/backlog#1602
2026-08-01 11:25:26 +08:00
houseme b965bd6eef fix(storage): harden scanner and recovery edge cases (#5521)
* fix(ecstore): handle benign listing and GET disconnects

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(scanner): scope cache locks by set

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(kms): stabilize Vault transport retry coverage

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(scanner): fence scoped cache locks by protocol

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(ecstore): stabilize topology DNS fallback coverage

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(kms): remove stale local export test import

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-01 03:25:13 +00:00
Zhengchao An 1524ed891f ci: write the Rust caches from a workflow that is not cancelled (#5536)
#5532 consolidated ci.yml's nine cache sites into four keys with one writer
each, but the writers never run to completion: ci.yml cancels superseded runs
on main, and merges land far faster than its 70-minute pipeline. Measured over
15 consecutive main pushes — 12 cancelled, 2 failed, 0 succeeded. A cancelled
run never reaches rust-cache's post step (cache-on-failure does not cover
cancellation), so nothing was being saved and every PR paid a cold restore:
11.8-20.9 minutes of "Setup Rust environment" against 0.7-3.4 warm.

Move cache writing into its own workflow whose concurrency group does not
cancel in progress, and make every lane in ci.yml a pure reader. ci.yml keeps
cancelling superseded runs, which is correct — nobody needs test results for a
commit that is already three merges behind — while the caches still get
written.

Not simply disabling cancel-in-progress for main pushes in ci.yml: that would
run several full pipelines concurrently on a 15-21 runner self-hosted pool that
is already the bottleneck, which is the opposite of the goal. GitHub keeps at
most one running plus one pending run per concurrency group, so the new
workflow collapses a burst of merges into "current finishes, newest queued
follows" and occupies one runner at a time.

The warm builds are supersets of what the reading lanes compile, because a
reader restores only what the writer saved: --all-targets for the test binaries
nextest builds (including e2e_test, which test-and-lint excludes), plus the
e2e-test-hooks and rio-v2 feature combinations, whose different feature
resolution yields a different -Cmetadata. The ci-dev build carries the same
CARGO_BUILD_JOBS limit ci.yml puts on nextest, since it links the same ~100
test binaries and three concurrent links can wedge Cargo (#5394). ci-uring is
warmed on ubuntu-latest to match its reader: rust-cache's key covers runner.os
and arch but not the runner label or image.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1598, rustfs/backlog#1600
2026-08-01 11:20:02 +08:00
Zhengchao An 7354a5663d ci: fit the Rust caches back inside the 10GB quota (#5532)
The repository has 18 rust-cache families of 1.2-3.1GB each against GitHub's
fixed 10GB per-repo quota. Measured usage sat at 9.72GB, 9.96GB and 11.63GB on
three samples, so LRU eviction is continuous and the main lanes lose: ci-test
and ci-e2e were repeatedly absent from the surviving entries. That is what
makes "Setup Rust environment" bimodal — 0.7-3.4 minutes warm against
11.8-20.9 minutes cold.

Four changes, all cache-only. No job builds or tests anything different.

Collapse ci.yml's nine cache sites into four keys, each with exactly one
writer: ci-dev (test-and-lint writes; ILM, debug-binary, e2e-tests and e2e-full
read), ci-feat-rio (rio-v2 lint writes, its debug-binary reads), ci-feat-proto
(the swift leg writes for both protocol legs), and ci-uring, which stays alone.
e2e-full is easy to miss here: it already shared ci-e2e with e2e-tests and both
saved, so without an explicit 'false' it would have become a second unnamed
writer of ci-dev. rio/swift/sftp are deliberately NOT merged — measured at
2365/2307/1200MB they are not near-identical, and none is a superset of the
others.

Give each writer a superset warm-up on main. A writer's own steps are not
automatically a superset of its readers': clippy emits metadata only, the
nextest pass excludes e2e_test, and no lint lane enables e2e-test-hooks, whose
different feature resolution yields a different -Cmetadata. Without these
builds the readers would restore a cache missing precisely what they need.
Guarded to main, so the PR critical path is unaffected.

Stop writing tag-scoped caches in build.yml. A cache saved on refs/tags/X can
only be restored by a re-run of that same tag, so each release cycle wrote up
to 12 unreadable 1-2GB entries that evicted the hot lanes. Tag builds still
restore the main-scoped cache. The one real cost is that re-running a failed
leg of the same tag now falls back to main's cache.

Flip the composite action's cache-save-if default to 'false' and make the input
mandatory in practice. audit.yml was relying on the old "true" default: every
PR touching Cargo.toml or Cargo.lock saved a second, PR-scoped copy (~843MB
measured, job 91048468127) that pushed main-scoped lanes out of the quota. The
fail-safe direction is a cold cache, not a stolen quota slice.
scripts/security/check_cache_save_if.sh now asserts every call site states it,
wired into audit.yml next to the existing pin check.

While there, cargo-deny stops pulling the full setup composite. It compiles
nothing, so apt, protoc, flatc and nextest were pure overhead — but it does run
cargo metadata, and Cargo.toml pins datafusion and s3s as git dependencies that
must be materialised into ~/.cargo/git, so the cache itself stays.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1598, rustfs/backlog#1600
2026-08-01 11:06:31 +08:00
Zhengchao An 790bdc0e63 ci: gate the seven expensive jobs on Quick Checks (#5529)
* ci: stop running expensive jobs that cannot inform the result

Three independent fixes that all avoid burning self-hosted runners on work
whose outcome is already determined. None of them changes what is tested.

- ci-docs-only: add a "Quick Checks" companion job. It is a prerequisite for
  gating ci.yml's expensive jobs behind quick-checks (rustfs/backlog#1599):
  once "Quick Checks" is a required check, a docs-only PR would otherwise wait
  on it forever. The steps are a byte-identical copy of ci.yml's quick-checks
  rather than an `echo`, so that on a mixed PR the two same-named check runs
  execute the same commands against the same merge ref and cannot disagree —
  GitHub has no written contract for how it picks between same-named required
  check runs, and the real job only takes 45-51s, leaving no timing margin to
  rely on.

- ci: guard uring-integration with the same `closed` check every other job
  already has. The pull_request trigger includes `closed` only so the
  concurrency group cancels in-flight runs; this job had no guard and no
  `needs`, so every closed or merged PR ran the full io_uring suite (4m17s,
  7m19s and 7m31s on runs 30678272341, 30678117601 and 30662728539).

- ci: gate s3-lifecycle-behavior-tests on e2e-tests, matching
  s3-implemented-tests. Both lanes only download the prebuilt debug binary, and
  s3-implemented-tests already finishes later, so a green PR's wall clock is
  unchanged; a red one stops holding a sm-standard-4 for up to 30 minutes.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1598, rustfs/backlog#1599

* ci: gate the seven expensive jobs on Quick Checks

Every expensive job started in parallel with quick-checks, so a formatting or
architecture-guard failure still paid for the full pipeline. On run
30673292690 Quick Checks failed after 0.8 minutes and the run went on to burn
424.5 runner-minutes — 99.8% of it after the gate had already failed. The
self-hosted pool is 15-21 ARC runners and one full PR run needs about seven
sm-standard-4 concurrently, so those minutes come straight out of other PRs'
queue time (six runs measured 72-488 minutes queued).

quick-checks itself is compile-free and takes 45-51s, so a passing PR pays
about a minute of extra critical path.

REQUIRES the branch ruleset to list "Quick Checks" as a required check BEFORE
this merges. Adding `needs` gives these jobs a `skipped` conclusion for the
first time, and GitHub treats a skipped required check as satisfied — with
required_approving_review_count=0, a failing quick-checks would otherwise let
a broken PR merge. Ordering is tracked in rustfs/backlog#1599.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1598, rustfs/backlog#1599

* ci: stop a PR run once Test and Lint has failed (#5530)

On run 30674613104 the e2e, ILM and sftp lanes had all failed while Test and
Lint and the rio-v2 variant kept running past 70 minutes. The run's verdict was
settled; the remaining lanes were spending sm-standard-4 time on a result
nobody could act on, and with one full PR run needing about seven of those
runners, that time comes out of other PRs' queue time.

Two mechanisms, both scoped to pull_request so main pushes, the merge queue and
the weekly schedule keep the full failure signal:

- test-and-lint-protocols: fail-fast on PRs, so one failing protocol leg stops
  its sibling. This is the only part that also covers fork PRs, since it needs
  no token.
- test-and-lint: on failure, cancel the run through the REST API.

Only test-and-lint may cancel. The lanes that are not required checks
(protocols, ILM, e2e, s3-tests) must never hold that power: a flake in one of
them would turn the required "Test and Lint" into `cancelled`, which blocks the
merge. A maintainer can merge today with sftp red, and that has to stay true.

The cancel step uses curl, not `gh`: every existing `gh` call in this repo runs
on ubuntu-latest, and the sm-standard-* images are custom and trimmed, so `gh`
is not known to exist there. Fork PRs are excluded by an explicit condition
rather than left to fail, since their GITHUB_TOKEN is forced read-only and
job-level permissions cannot raise it.

Job-level permissions must list contents: read alongside actions: write —
job-level permissions replace the workflow block instead of merging with it,
and dropping contents would break this job's checkout and the repo-token the
setup action passes to setup-protoc. Because that token can now cancel runs and
delete Actions caches, the checkout also sets persist-credentials: false so a
PR's own build.rs or proc-macro cannot read it back out of .git/config.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1598, rustfs/backlog#1599

* ci: correct the companion-workflow comments

Addresses review feedback on #5528, which merged before these fixes were
pushed.

The ci-docs-only header claimed the ruleset already requires "Quick Checks".
It does not — that ruleset change is a separate step, and this file's whole
purpose is to land first so that change does not strand docs-only PRs. Say
what is true today.

Also move the byte-identical requirement onto ci.yml's quick-checks job, which
is the more likely edit site, instead of pointing at a comment that was not
there.
2026-08-01 10:57:02 +08:00
Zhengchao An 707d062174 ci: stop running expensive jobs that cannot inform the result (#5528)
Three independent fixes that all avoid burning self-hosted runners on work
whose outcome is already determined. None of them changes what is tested.

- ci-docs-only: add a "Quick Checks" companion job. It is a prerequisite for
  gating ci.yml's expensive jobs behind quick-checks (rustfs/backlog#1599):
  once "Quick Checks" is a required check, a docs-only PR would otherwise wait
  on it forever. The steps are a byte-identical copy of ci.yml's quick-checks
  rather than an `echo`, so that on a mixed PR the two same-named check runs
  execute the same commands against the same merge ref and cannot disagree —
  GitHub has no written contract for how it picks between same-named required
  check runs, and the real job only takes 45-51s, leaving no timing margin to
  rely on.

- ci: guard uring-integration with the same `closed` check every other job
  already has. The pull_request trigger includes `closed` only so the
  concurrency group cancels in-flight runs; this job had no guard and no
  `needs`, so every closed or merged PR ran the full io_uring suite (4m17s,
  7m19s and 7m31s on runs 30678272341, 30678117601 and 30662728539).

- ci: gate s3-lifecycle-behavior-tests on e2e-tests, matching
  s3-implemented-tests. Both lanes only download the prebuilt debug binary, and
  s3-implemented-tests already finishes later, so a green PR's wall clock is
  unchanged; a red one stops holding a sm-standard-4 for up to 30 minutes.

Refs: rustfs/backlog#1598, rustfs/backlog#1599
2026-08-01 10:49:19 +08:00
houseme 4b6b6f14bd feat(hotpath): use mimalloc in inner counting allocator (#5523)
* feat(hotpath): use mimalloc in counting allocator

* fix(hotpath): adapt mimalloc for allocation counting

---------

Co-authored-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-01 10:43:52 +08:00
727 changed files with 200276 additions and 48671 deletions
+16 -16
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
name: adversarial-validation
description: Execute the Adversarial Validation policy from the root AGENTS.md — run the seven reviewer roles (correctness, simplicity, security, concurrency/durability, compatibility, performance, test coverage) with RustFS-specific attack probes. Use on every behavior-affecting code change, bug fix, or design proposal before declaring it done.
description: Execute the Adversarial Validation policy from the root AGENTS.md — run the applicable reviewer roles with RustFS-specific attack probes. Use on every behavior-affecting code change, bug fix, design proposal, or agent-instruction change that alters execution before declaring it done.
---
# Adversarial Validation Playbooks
@@ -61,14 +61,15 @@ Null report example: "Attacked quorum-1 error reduction, exact max-keys listing
### Simplicity adversary
- Smaller-diff attack: rewrite the diff's change mentally (or actually, in scratch) as the minimal in-place edit and compare. Flag as findings: a helper function with exactly one caller introduced by this diff; a file rewrite where a 3-line edit inside the existing control flow suffices; reshaped control flow in init/locking/metadata/quorum paths beyond what the fix requires; new string literals duplicating existing constants (grep the token first); #[path] module inclusion. If the smaller diff achieves identical behavior, report it with the concrete replacement.
- Smaller-diff attack: inspect production growth separately from tests, fixtures, generated code, and documentation; test additions have no growth budget. Rewrite the production diff mentally (or in scratch) as the minimal equivalent edit. Report a finding only with a concrete smaller design that preserves correctness, compatibility, readability, and real boundaries; fewer lines alone are not evidence.
- Where: Any diff; extra scrutiny for crates/ecstore, crates/lock, rustfs/src/storage where 'preserve the existing control-flow shape' is an explicit rule
- Evidence: AGENTS.md 'Change Style for Existing Logic' (one-off helper ban, preserve control-flow shape in distributed/locking/metadata paths, no #[path]) and 'Reuse Before You Write' (constants clause); the Adversarial Validation roles list charters the simplicity adversary with exactly this attack.
- Reuse-and-necessity attack: for each new helper the diff introduces, run `ls crates/utils/src crates/common/src` and `rg -i 'fn \w*<term>'` over those dirs plus the touched crate (snake_case signatures — a full-text single-word grep drowns, a multi-word phrase returns nothing). A reimplementation of an existing workspace utility, or of plain std/tokio behavior no wrapper refines, is a finding — but so is forced reuse with mismatched semantics (normalization such as `clean` resolving `.`/`..` against raw S3 keys, error type, backoff, durability gating). For each new defensive branch, demand the nameable trigger and flag re-validation of what a validated upstream layer on the SAME path already guarantees — excluding the Cross-Cutting Domain Invariant patterns (nil/empty/absent UUID, dual metadata keys, unversioned-tier versionId) and re-checks before destructive actions, which are load-bearing even when redundant on the happy path. For each new test, flag near-duplicates pinning the same code path AND poison-value class as an existing test — boundary companions (n==max vs max+1, absent vs empty vs nil UUID, MetaObject vs MetaDeleteMarker) are never near-duplicates; the test-coverage skeptic playbook below mandates them.
- Where: Any diff adding helpers, branches on decoded/peer data, or tests; helper checks against crates/utils, crates/common, and the touched crate
- Evidence: AGENTS.md 'Change Style for Existing Logic' (conditional extraction rule, preserve sensitive control flow, canonical modules) and 'Reuse Before You Write'; the Adversarial Validation roles list charters this attack.
- Reuse-and-necessity attack: for each new helper, search `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, the touched crate, the likely domain owner, and relevant direct dependencies. A reimplementation is a finding, but forced reuse with mismatched normalization, error, backoff, or durability semantics is also a finding. Demand a nameable trigger for new defensive branches. Tests remain subject to validity and near-duplicate coverage review, never a size limit.
- Where: Any diff adding helpers, branches on decoded/peer data, or tests
- Evidence: AGENTS.md 'Reuse Before You Write' and 'Necessary Code Only'; GHSA-f4vq-9ffr-m8m3 (normalization-asymmetry traversal — why forced reuse of normalizing helpers on raw keys is itself an attack); docs/operations/tier-ilm-debugging.md nil-versionId incident (why boundary re-checks are load-bearing).
- Replacement-and-comment attack: when the diff introduces a replacement path or representation, trace all callers and flag a superseded in-scope path left behind without a compatibility requirement. Keep one canonical core behind compatibility adapters. Comments must state non-obvious invariants completely without narration or change history. Never demand unrelated deletion or trade away correctness, compatibility, or readability to reduce the diff.
Null report example: "Rewrote the diff as an in-place edit (no smaller equivalent exists), grepped both new helpers against crates/utils, crates/common, and the touched crate (no existing equivalent; call-site semantics checked), verified the two new defensive branches name concrete corrupt-input triggers, and checked the added tests against the existing suite (each pins a distinct poison-value class) — no break found."
Null report example: "Separated production growth from tests/docs, tested a smaller equivalent, checked helper reuse and superseded paths, and found no break."
### Security reviewer
@@ -195,9 +196,9 @@ Null report example: "Attacked dual-key metadata writes/removals against MinIO-o
### Performance reviewer
- For every `.clone()` the diff adds or moves onto a per-request/per-object path, open the cloned type and count heap fields (String, Vec, HashMap, Bytes). If >5 heap fields or it contains an EC block buffer, construct the cost: N concurrent PUTs x M objects -> N*M deep copies per second. Demand Arc-wrapping of heavy fields or pass-by-reference; also flag new `String` allocations in header/path/signature parsing where `&str`/`Cow<str>` suffices.
- For each `.clone()` or allocation added to a per-request/per-object path, identify the copied data and execution frequency. Report a finding only for a concrete repeated cost or benchmark regression. Recommend borrowing, moving, `Bytes`/`Arc`, `Cow`, or capacity reservation only when it reduces that cost without obscuring ownership or APIs.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/**, crates/ecstore/src/store*.rs, rustfs/src/storage/, crates/filemeta/, request handlers in rustfs/src/
- Evidence: crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md 'Allocation Discipline in Hot Paths' (no Clone on >5-heap-field structs, Arc for large buffers, &str/Cow for temporary computations); .agents/skills/rust-code-quality/SKILL.md ranks 'unnecessary clone in hot path' as P1 must-fix
- Evidence: crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md 'Allocation Discipline in Hot Paths'; .agents/skills/rust-code-quality/SKILL.md requires a concrete hot-path cost rather than a proxy metric
- For every new sync_all/sync_data/fdatasync/flush/File::sync call in the diff, trace the call chain to DurabilityMode / RUSTFS_DRIVE_SYNC_ENABLE resolution (crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs:291 DurabilityMode, :347 resolve_durability_mode) and to per-bucket durability overrides. Construct the run where the operator sets mode=none (or legacy RUSTFS_DRIVE_SYNC_ENABLE=false) and the new fsync still fires — that is an ungated durability cost and a regression on 4KiB writes.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs, crates/ecstore/src/bucket/durability.rs, crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/** (rename_data/commit paths), any crate doing tokio::fs or std::fs writes
- Evidence: #4221 fsync work caused a measured -10% 4KiB write regression (#814 investigation), later gated; durability modes added in eaff17cad (#4397), per-bucket tier overrides in 13e48d93a (#4407); 2df315baf (#4493) shows even ancestor-dir fsyncs are routed through the gate
@@ -230,12 +231,12 @@ Null report example: "Attacked the new rename_data commit-section work, durabili
### Test-coverage skeptic
- For every behavior claim in the PR description, revert that hunk (git stash / manual undo of the changed lines) and name the exact test (`cargo test -p <crate> <test_name>`) that fails. If no test fails on revert, the behavior is untested — file a finding, not a note. Especially verify the test exercises the REAL production call path, not a lookalike helper.
- For every testable behavior claim in the PR description, revert that hunk and name the focused test or executable check that detects the revert. If no reasonable check exists, require the reason and residual risk from the validation floor. Especially verify the check exercises the real production path, not a lookalike helper.
- Where: All crates; highest value in crates/ecstore, rustfs/src/storage, crates/heal
- Evidence: AGENTS.md exit criterion 'Every behavior change has a test that fails without it'. Real bug: PR #4220 (ghost-directory cleanup) merged with green tests but its fix never executed on the real delete path — required follow-up rustfs#4307, backlog#798 stayed OPEN. The tests exercised a path the production flow never took.
- Evidence: AGENTS.md testable-behavior exit criterion. Real bug: PR #4220 (ghost-directory cleanup) merged with green tests but its fix never executed on the real delete path — required follow-up rustfs#4307, backlog#798 stayed OPEN. The tests exercised a path the production flow never took.
- Read each added/modified test and confirm it asserts the real outcome (returned value, stored bytes, error variant), not merely 'call succeeded' or 'no panic'. Flag any test whose only observable is that the function returned, and any `assert!(result.is_err())` that never checks WHICH error. Then check: does the test prove the exploit/failure form is denied, or only that the intended form still works?
- Where: crates/e2e_test (security_boundary_test.rs pattern), and every #[cfg(test)] module in the diff
- Evidence: Commit dee8e4e63 (#4466) had to rewrite 277 lines of crates/e2e_test/src/security_boundary_test.rs because 'security boundary tests' passed without asserting real outcomes. .agents/skills/rust-code-quality/SKILL.md checklist: 'Every test function has at least one assert!'; .agents/skills/security-advisory-lessons/SKILL.md: 'Does the test prove the exploit form is denied, or only that the intended form still works?'
- Evidence: Commit dee8e4e63 (#4466) had to rewrite 277 lines of crates/e2e_test/src/security_boundary_test.rs because 'security boundary tests' passed without asserting real outcomes. .agents/skills/rust-code-quality/SKILL.md requires an observable failure criterion; .agents/skills/security-advisory-lessons/SKILL.md asks whether the exploit form is denied.
- When the diff adds a boolean/mode parameter or config flag, find the test that fails if the flag's effect is INVERTED inside the changed function. Tests that were mechanically updated to pass `false`/default at every call site assert nothing about the new behavior. Execute the check: flip the flag's branch in the source and confirm at least one test goes red for each branch.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ (e.g. build_codec_streaming_part_reader), any function gaining a parameter
- Evidence: Commit 05890d6e2 (#4573): PR #4560 added a 15th param allow_inplace_legacy_fallback; the arity tests were fixed by passing `false` everywhere — they assert Err outcomes independent of the flag, so the fallback behavior itself has no revert-detecting test at those sites.
@@ -260,7 +261,7 @@ Null report example: "Attacked the new rename_data commit-section work, durabili
- For any pagination/limit/truncation change, construct the exact-boundary test: result count == max (page exactly full), max+1, and a delimiter re-fold that lands precisely on the page boundary — assert both the item count AND the is_truncated/continuation marker. Off-by-one at the page boundary is a recurring shipped bug here.
- Where: crates/ecstore listing paths (list_objects, ListMultipartUploads, metacache), S3 handlers in rustfs/src/storage
- Evidence: Two shipped boundary bugs: fefa70b31 (#4447) ListMultipartUploads returned one upload past max-uploads; d91f4d455 (#4538) delimiter re-fold of a full page lost the truncation flag. Both survived existing tests because no test pinned n == max exactly.
- Green `cargo test -p <crate>` on the touched crate is not a coverage verdict for the diff's test code itself: run `cargo clippy --all-targets -p <crate>` and a workspace-wide test BUILD (`cargo check --workspace --all-targets` at minimum) before accepting the tests as evidence. Test-only code that doesn't compile workspace-wide or fails clippy has repeatedly broken main and masked whether tests ran at all.
- A green focused test is evidence only for the targets it builds. Follow the `AGENTS.md` validation tier: add package-scoped Clippy or broader test-target compilation only when changed targets, features, or dependents remain uncovered; do not require a workspace-wide build by default.
- Where: All crates; especially concurrent-branch merges into crates/ecstore
- Evidence: #4322 broke main because only cargo test ran (field_reassign_with_default is clippy-only). b06f3df6b (#4441) and 05890d6e2 (#4573): test code broke the workspace test build (E0061) on main after textually-clean merges, failing CI for every open PR.
@@ -271,7 +272,6 @@ Null report example: "Attacked revert-detection for all 3 claimed behaviors (eac
Probes are distilled from shipped bugs in git history (commit/PR references
above), GitHub security advisories (see the security-advisory-lessons
skill), scoped `AGENTS.md` rules, and invariants under `docs/architecture/`
and `docs/operations/`. Line numbers drift; when a cited location no longer
matches, trust the invariant and re-locate the code. When a new bug class
ships, add a probe with its evidence here rather than growing the policy
section in `AGENTS.md`.
and `docs/operations/`. Line numbers drift; re-locate the invariant. Merge
new incidents into an existing probe when they share a failure class; add a
new probe only for a distinct attack, rather than growing the root policy.
+7 -4
View File
@@ -24,15 +24,17 @@ Use this skill before `gh pr create`, before `gh pr edit`, or when reviewing whe
2. Inspect change scope
- Review the diff and summarize what changed.
- Inspect `git diff --stat` and `git diff --numstat`; assess production-code growth separately. Tests, fixtures, generated code, and documentation have no growth budget. Treat line counts as signals, not quotas.
- Call out unrelated edits, generated artifacts, logs, or secrets as blockers.
- Mark risky areas explicitly: auth, storage, config, network, migrations, breaking changes.
- Use the simplicity-adversary verdict instead of producing a per-symbol inventory. Block growth only when the review identifies duplication or gives a concrete smaller design that preserves correctness, compatibility, readability, and real boundaries.
- Confirm replacement implementations remove the superseded in-scope path or adapt compatibility at the boundary to one canonical core.
- Scan the diff for newly added string literals and confirm whether they duplicate values already defined as constants/enums/typed wrappers in the same module or shared modules.
- Treat introducing a new hardcoded literal where a project constant already exists as a likely regression risk; require either a refactor to reuse the constant or an explicit exception explanation in the PR body.
3. Verify readiness requirements
- Require `make pre-commit` before marking PRs ready when the diff changes Rust code, product behavior, CI behavior, runtime configuration, security-sensitive logic, migrations, storage, auth, networking, or other high-risk paths.
- For documentation-only, agent-instruction-only, or local developer-tooling-only changes, allow focused verification instead of `make pre-commit` when it directly validates the changed surface.
- For focused verification, explain why the full gate was not run and list the scope-specific commands in the PR body.
- Select checks from `AGENTS.md` "Verification Before PR" based on the final diff's risk tier. Do not replace a focused behavioral test with `make pre-commit`, or a required high-risk `make pre-pr` with a narrower gate.
- For focused verification, state why the selected tier is sufficient and list the scope-specific commands in the PR body.
- If `make` is unavailable, use the equivalent commands from `.config/make/`.
- Add scope-specific verification commands when the changed area needs more than the baseline.
- If required checks fail, stop and return `BLOCKED`.
@@ -81,13 +83,14 @@ Use this skill before `gh pr create`, before `gh pr edit`, or when reviewing whe
## Blocker rules
- Return `BLOCKED` if a code, behavior, CI, runtime configuration, security-sensitive, migration, storage, auth, networking, or other high-risk change has not passed `make pre-commit`.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the checks required by the `AGENTS.md` validation tier have not passed.
- Return `BLOCKED` if a documentation-only, agent-instruction-only, or local developer-tooling-only change lacks focused verification for the changed surface.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the diff contains unrelated changes that are not acknowledged.
- Return `BLOCKED` if required template sections are missing.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the title/body is not in English.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the title does not follow the repository's Conventional Commit rule.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the diff introduces string literals that should use existing constants but did not.
- Return `BLOCKED` for production-code growth only when the review identifies a duplicated or superseded implementation, or supplies a concrete smaller design with equivalent semantics. Fewer lines alone are not evidence.
## Reference
@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
- Confirm the branch is based on current `main`.
- Confirm the diff matches the stated scope.
- Confirm no secrets, logs, temp files, or unrelated refactors are included.
- Confirm `make pre-commit` passed for code, behavior, CI, runtime configuration, security-sensitive, migration, storage, auth, networking, or other high-risk changes.
- For documentation-only, agent-instruction-only, or local developer-tooling-only changes, confirm focused verification covered the changed surface and the PR body explains why the full gate was not run.
- Confirm the checks required by the `AGENTS.md` validation tier passed.
- For focused verification, confirm it covered the changed surface and the PR body explains why the selected tier is sufficient.
- Confirm extra verification commands are listed for risky changes.
- Confirm the PR title uses Conventional Commits and stays within 72 characters.
- Confirm the PR title does not use tool-specific prefixes such as `[codex]`.
+32 -32
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
name: rust-code-quality
description: Enforce Rust-specific code quality rules on every code change. Use before merge to catch unwrap abuse, silent truncation, unnecessary cloning, lock ordering violations, recursion risks, and error type anti-patterns.
description: Enforce Rust-specific code quality rules on every Rust change. Use before merge to catch unwrap abuse, silent truncation, unnecessary cloning, lock ordering violations, recursion risks, and error type anti-patterns.
---
# Rust Code Quality Gate
@@ -12,27 +12,29 @@ Use this skill on every Rust code change to enforce quality rules that `cargo cl
1. Identify changed `.rs` files.
2. Run automated checks on changed files.
3. Run manual review checklist on the diff.
4. Report findings; block merge if P0/P1 issues exist.
4. Resolve or rebut every finding with evidence; P0/P1 findings cannot be deferred.
## Automated Checks
Run these on every changed `.rs` file (excluding test modules):
Use these searches to find candidates in changed `.rs` files. Inspect syntax,
`#[cfg(test)]` scope, and the changed hunk before reporting a finding; text
filters do not reliably distinguish production code from tests.
```bash
# 1. unwrap/expect in production code
rg -n '\.unwrap\(\)|\.expect\(' <changed-files> | grep -v '#\[cfg(test)\]' | grep -v 'test' | grep -v 'bench'
# 1. unwrap/expect candidates
rg -n '\.unwrap\(\)|\.expect\(' <changed-files>
# 2. Silent type truncation via `as` cast
rg -n ' as (u8|u16|u32|u64|usize|i8|i16|i32|i64|isize)\b' <changed-files>
# 3. String as error type
rg -n 'Result<.*String>' <changed-files> | grep -v test
rg -n 'Result<.*String>' <changed-files>
# 4. Box<dyn Error> in public APIs
rg -n 'Box<dyn.*Error' <changed-files> | grep -v test
rg -n 'Box<dyn.*Error' <changed-files>
# 5. println/eprintln in production
rg -n 'println!\|eprintln!' <changed-files> | grep -v test
rg -n 'println!\|eprintln!' <changed-files>
# 6. Ordering::Relaxed usage (verify each is intentional)
rg -n 'Ordering::Relaxed' <changed-files>
@@ -46,37 +48,35 @@ rg -n 'unwrap_or_default\(\)|unwrap_or\(' <changed-files>
For every Rust code change, verify:
### Error Handling
- [ ] No `unwrap()` or `expect()` in production code without justification comment
- [ ] Every production `unwrap()` or `expect()` is infallible by type or a checked invariant; explain only non-obvious invariants, using an existing type, a useful `expect` message, or a concise comment
- [ ] No `Result<_, String>` in public API signatures
- [ ] No `Box<dyn Error>` in public trait/struct methods
- [ ] Public library APIs use domain errors unless deliberate error erasure at a boundary is part of the contract
- [ ] `Error::source()` is overridden when inner error is stored
- [ ] Error messages are actionable (what failed, with what input)
- [ ] Error messages are actionable without exposing secret input
### Type Safety
- [ ] No silent `as` truncation (negative→unsigned, large→small)
- [ ] `try_into()` or explicit clamping used for numeric conversions
- [ ] No `f64 as usize` without prior clamping
- [ ] Fallible numeric conversions use `TryFrom`/`try_into()` and return a typed error; clamp or saturate only when the domain explicitly requires it
- [ ] Floating-point to integer conversion validates finiteness, sign, and range before conversion
### Concurrency
- [ ] Lock acquisition order is documented when multiple locks are used, and matches every other call site taking any overlapping subset (ABBA check)
- [ ] No `tokio::sync` lock guard (read or write) held across `.await` without bounded hold time — long-lived read guards wedge writers (#4195)
- [ ] Concurrent counters use `compare_exchange` loops, not load-then-store
- [ ] Atomic read-modify-write uses the direct `fetch_*` operation when possible; use `compare_exchange` only for conditional updates
- [ ] `std::sync::Mutex` in async context is held only briefly, never across `.await`
### Memory and Performance
- [ ] No `.clone()` on structs with >5 heap-allocated fields in hot paths
- [ ] `HashMap::with_capacity()` / `Vec::with_capacity()` used when size is known
- [ ] Large buffers wrapped in `Arc` rather than cloned
- [ ] Temporary string computations use `&str` or `Cow<str>` instead of `String`
- [ ] On an identified hot path, report cloning or allocation only with a concrete per-request/per-object cost or benchmark signal
- [ ] Prefer borrowing, moving, `Bytes`/`Arc`, or capacity reservation only when it reduces that cost without obscuring ownership or APIs
### Recursion Safety
- [ ] Recursive functions have a depth limit or use iterative traversal
- [ ] Recursion over untrusted, persisted, or otherwise unbounded input has a depth limit or uses iterative traversal
- [ ] Tree/cache traversals handle corrupted/cyclic input safely
### Testing
- [ ] Every test function has at least one `assert!`
- [ ] Tests use `.expect("context")` not bare `.unwrap()`
- [ ] No `println!`/`eprintln!` in production code (use `tracing`)
- [ ] Tests have an observable failure criterion; delegated assertions, `#[should_panic]`, snapshot/property checks, and meaningful `Result` failures do not need a redundant `assert!`
- [ ] Use `expect` only when its message improves failure diagnosis; do not add boilerplate to self-evident test setup
- [ ] Test volume and line count are never treated as production-code growth
### Serde
- [ ] Structs from untrusted input have `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]`
@@ -88,18 +88,18 @@ For every Rust code change, verify:
- [ ] New string literals don't duplicate existing constants
### Reuse and Necessity
- [ ] No new helper duplicating an existing workspace utility (`crates/utils`, `crates/common`, the touched crate) or plain std/tokio behavior no wrapper refines; reused helpers match the call site's semantics (normalization, error type, backoff, durability gating)
- [ ] No new helper duplicates `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, the touched crate, the likely domain-owning crate, a relevant direct dependency, or plain std/tokio behavior; reused helpers match the call site's semantics
- [ ] No branch without a nameable concrete trigger; no re-validation of what a validated upstream layer on the same path already guarantees (Cross-Cutting Domain Invariant patterns and pre-destructive-action re-checks are load-bearing — keep them)
- [ ] Error context attached once where actionable, not re-wrapped at every hop; no typed→generic error conversion below aggregation/quorum layers
- [ ] No comments narrating the next line, restating a signature, or describing the change itself (invariant comments — lock ordering, `SAFETY`, unwrap justification — are not narration)
- [ ] Comments avoid narration and change history while completely stating non-obvious lock, `SAFETY`, durability, compatibility, and unwrap invariants
- [ ] No near-duplicate test pinning the same code path and poison-value class as an existing test (boundary companions — n==max vs max+1, absent/empty/nil UUID — are never near-duplicates)
## Severity Classification
- **P0 (Block merge)**: `unwrap()` in request hot path, silent truncation on user input, lock ordering violation, recursion without depth limit
- **P1 (Must fix)**: `Result<_, String>` in public API, unnecessary clone in hot path, `Box<dyn Error>` in trait method, `unwrap_or_default()` on a domain-required value (metadata, quorum, version id)
- **P2 (Should fix)**: Missing `assert!` in test, `println!` in production, missing `with_capacity`, new helper duplicating an existing workspace utility, defensive branch with no nameable trigger (corrupt or stale persisted/peer data is always a nameable trigger for boundary-crossing values), near-duplicate test, redundant error re-wrapping
- **P3 (Nice to fix)**: Naming convention violation, missing doc comment, `as_ptr()` vs `Arc::ptr_eq`, narrating comment
- **P0 (Block merge)**: demonstrated data loss, security breach, remote crash, or deadlock
- **P1 (Must fix)**: concrete correctness, compatibility, or material hot-path regression
- **P2 (Should fix)**: avoidable duplication or maintainability issue with a concrete simpler replacement
- **P3 (Nice to fix)**: local style or clarity issue with no behavioral risk
## Output Template
@@ -107,10 +107,10 @@ For every Rust code change, verify:
## Rust Code Quality Report
### Automated Scan
- unwrap/expect in production: N found
- as casts: N found
- String errors: N found
- println/eprintln: N found
- unwrap/expect candidates inspected: N
- numeric-cast candidates inspected: N
- error-type candidates inspected: N
- output-macro candidates inspected: N
### Findings
- [P1] `path:line` — description
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
# Rust Code Quality Checklist
Use this as a quick pre-merge checklist for every Rust code change.
## Critical (P0 — block merge)
| Check | Command |
|-------|---------|
| No `unwrap()` in request/storage hot path | `rg '\.unwrap\(\)' <files> \| grep -v test` |
| No `as` truncation on user input | `rg ' as (u32\|usize\|i32)' <files>` |
| Lock order consistent across call sites | Manual: trace all lock acquisitions |
| Recursive functions have depth limit | Manual: check for `max_depth` or iterative pattern |
| No `panic!`/`unwrap_or_else(panic!)` in production | `rg 'panic!\|unwrap_or_else.*panic' <files> \| grep -v test` |
## High (P1 — must fix)
| Check | Command |
|-------|---------|
| No `Result<_, String>` in public API | `rg 'Result<.*String>' <files> \| grep -v test` |
| No `Box<dyn Error>` in public trait | `rg 'Box<dyn.*Error' <files> \| grep -v test` |
| No unnecessary `.clone()` in hot path | Manual: check loops and per-request paths |
| `Error::source()` implemented when inner error stored | Manual: check `impl Error` |
| No `eprintln!`/`println!` in production | `rg 'println!\|eprintln!' <files> \| grep -v test` |
## Medium (P2 — should fix)
| Check | Command |
|-------|---------|
| Tests have assertions | Manual: check for `assert` in test functions |
| `HashMap`/`Vec` use `with_capacity` when size known | Manual: check `::new()` in loops |
| No `#![allow(dead_code)]` at crate root | `rg 'allow.dead_code' <files> \| grep 'lib.rs'` |
| Serde structs from untrusted input have `deny_unknown_fields` | Manual: check `#[derive(Deserialize)]` |
## Low (P3 — nice to fix)
| Check | Command |
|-------|---------|
| No camelCase statics | `rg 'static ref [a-z]' <files>` |
| `Arc::ptr_eq` instead of `as_ptr + ptr::eq` | `rg 'as_ptr\|ptr::eq' <files>` |
| Public functions have doc comments | `rg 'pub fn' <files> \| grep -v '///'` |
## Quick One-Liner
```bash
# Run all automated checks on changed files
CHANGED=$(git diff --name-only HEAD~1 -- '*.rs' | grep -v test | grep -v bench)
echo "=== unwrap/expect ===" && rg -c '\.unwrap\(\)|\.expect\(' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
echo "=== as casts ===" && rg -c ' as (u8|u16|u32|u64|usize|i8|i16|i32|i64|isize)\b' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
echo "=== String errors ===" && rg -c 'Result<.*String>' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
echo "=== println ===" && rg -c 'println!|eprintln!' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
echo "=== Ordering::Relaxed ===" && rg -c 'Ordering::Relaxed' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
```
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
name: rustfs-logging-governance
description: Standardize and review RustFS logging with structured `tracing` events, lower noise on hot paths, preserve security-sensitive diagnostics, and extend guardrails to prevent legacy logging patterns from returning. Use when editing or reviewing RustFS logs, startup/config diagnostics, cloud metadata logs, request validation logs, or `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh`.
description: Standardize and review RustFS logging with structured `tracing` events, lower noise on hot paths, preserve security-sensitive diagnostics, and extend guardrails to prevent legacy logging patterns from returning. Use whenever a change adds or edits any `tracing` macro call (`error!`/`warn!`/`info!`/`debug!`/`trace!`/`#[instrument]`) — including a single log line added in passing while fixing unrelated logic, which is how most new log sites enter the repo — and when reviewing RustFS logs, startup/config diagnostics, cloud metadata logs, request validation logs, or `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh`.
---
# RustFS Logging Governance
@@ -66,14 +66,23 @@ For the full pattern map, read [advisory-patterns.md](references/advisory-patter
### STS, OIDC, and federation flows
- Every STS endpoint must have an explicit authentication story: SigV4 where required, OIDC token verification for web identity, and role/session policy validation before issuing credentials.
- For web identity, the JWT is the credential; exemption from SigV4 is not itself an authentication bypass. Treat pre-verification claims only as untrusted routing hints, bound token size, normalize public failures, rate-limit discovery, and issue credentials only after signature, issuer, audience, and expiration checks.
- JWT session tokens must be signed and verified by a trusted issuer/key path, not by service-account-controlled material or a reused root secret.
- JWT verification must enforce required claims and expiration for every bearer token path; "allow missing exp" is never acceptable for user-presented credentials.
- Public OIDC bootstrap and callback routes must treat `Host`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, redirect targets, `state`, and callback parameters as untrusted; credential-bearing redirects require a configured, allowlisted origin.
- OIDC discovery and validation URLs are SSRF sinks. Resolve and classify hostnames at connection time, reject rebinding to loopback/private/link-local ranges, and do not rely on literal string checks.
### S3 copy, multipart, and presigned POST
### IAM policy conditions and plugins
- Treat request headers as attacker-controlled even after SigV4; callers sign their own spoofed headers. Do not merge them into server-derived condition keys such as identity, groups, version ID, signature version, JWT, or LDAP claims.
- Keep the condition-key namespace explicit. Reserved server-derived keys must reject or ignore colliding headers, while intentional request-header keys such as `s3:x-amz-*` remain available.
- Quantified IAM condition tests need partially overlapping multi-value sets. Fully contained and fully disjoint sets cannot distinguish `ForAllValues` from `ForAnyValue` bugs.
- External policy plugins must receive the same security context as built-in policy evaluation. If OPA or another plugin depends on existing object tags, load and pass `ExistingObjectTag/*` before the plugin decision.
### S3 object actions, copy, multipart, and presigned POST
- Version-aware object requests need version-aware actions. Explicit `versionId` reads and copy sources must authorize `s3:GetObjectVersion`, not only `s3:GetObject`.
- Multipart copy must enforce source `GetObject` and destination `PutObject` semantics equivalent to `CopyObject`, including copy-source and policy conditions.
- Do not let `CreateMultipartUpload`, `UploadPartCopy`, `CompleteMultipartUpload`, or `AbortMultipartUpload` return success without authorization.
- Fallbacks from version actions to non-version actions must still pass the same public-access-block, anonymous-deny, and post-authorization gates as a direct allow.
- Presigned POST policies are server-side contracts. Enforce `content-length-range`, key prefix, exact metadata/content-type, and all signed policy conditions.
### Protocol frontends and IAM parity
@@ -132,6 +141,11 @@ For the full pattern map, read [advisory-patterns.md](references/advisory-patter
- When touching reader/writer wrappers such as hashing, encryption, compression, or warp readers, verify wrapper order and inspect stored bytes in regression tests.
- Avoid helper shortcuts that unwrap nested readers and accidentally bypass encryption or integrity layers.
### Object Lock and retention invariants
- Object Lock state must fail closed when bucket metadata is unreadable, fabricated, or unparsable. Only a confirmed absence of Object Lock configuration may permit unprotected deletes or writes.
- Do not collapse metadata read faults, missing persisted metadata, parse failures, and genuinely absent Object Lock config into one "not configured" result.
- Retention enforcement must cover foreground deletes, batch deletes, force-delete helpers, default-retention materialization on PUT, lifecycle expiry, scanner sweeps, and all-versions expiry.
## Review Prompts
Use these prompts while reviewing a diff:
@@ -148,5 +162,9 @@ Use these prompts while reviewing a diff:
- Does this outbound validation path resolve attacker-supplied hostnames and reject private, loopback, link-local, and rebound addresses at the actual connection boundary?
- Is an archive entry, object key, or policy resource normalized differently between authorization and storage?
- Is the same operation implemented in multiple paths, such as `CopyObject` vs `UploadPartCopy`, and do all paths enforce the same security contract?
- Does an explicit object version, fallback action, or plugin authorization path pass through the same action and post-authorization gates as the direct S3 path?
- Can a caller-controlled header populate a condition key that should be derived only by the server?
- Do condition tests include partially overlapping multi-value inputs for quantified operators?
- Does unreadable bucket metadata make Object Lock or retention enforcement fail closed rather than disappear?
- Does a preview or browser-surface fix preserve the original security invariant when adding alternate viewers or file-type detection?
- Does the test prove the exploit form is denied, or only that the intended form still works?
@@ -35,12 +35,21 @@ Update this file only when an advisory adds or changes a reusable lesson, affect
### STS, OIDC, and federation flows
- `GHSA-5qfg-mf7r-jp3w` and `GHSA-3473-5353-xhwh`: `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` was reachable through unauthenticated `POST /` routing and could issue temporary credentials from crafted web identity input. Lesson: every STS route needs explicit SigV4 or trusted identity-provider validation before role assumption, and unauthenticated exemptions must be narrowed to the exact action with uniform failure responses.
- `GHSA-ccrv-v8v9-ch9q` and `GHSA-48rf-7j3q-3hfv`: service-account-controlled material could self-sign JWT session tokens with forged policy claims, and missing `exp` was accepted for service-account tokens. Lesson: session tokens must be signed by a trusted issuer/key path, enforce required claims and expiration, and reject self-signed or principal-controlled tokens.
- `GHSA-jxrr-r6pv-h958`: unsigned JWT issuer data was decoded before verification to select an OIDC provider, and distinguishable failures could expose provider configuration. Lesson: web-identity routing may be unauthenticated, but pre-verification claims are untrusted routing hints; bound and rate-limit the request, normalize public errors, and verify signature, issuer, audience, and expiration before issuing credentials.
- `GHSA-ccrv-v8v9-ch9q`, `GHSA-48rf-7j3q-3hfv`, and `GHSA-xvfh-7c9g-hpw2`: service-account-controlled material could self-sign JWT session tokens with forged policy claims, and missing `exp` was accepted for service-account tokens. Lesson: session tokens must be signed by a trusted issuer/key path, enforce required claims and expiration, and reject self-signed or principal-controlled tokens.
- `GHSA-9pjf-w3c2-m32r`, `GHSA-4x2q-cpx9-9h26`, and `GHSA-xvpm-p3f7-34c3`: public OIDC authorize/callback flows trusted request `Host` or forwarded scheme when building credential-bearing redirects. Lesson: OIDC redirects must use configured allowlisted origins and trusted-proxy handling; never derive the post-login credential destination from direct client headers.
- `GHSA-m479-9x88-94w6`, `GHSA-frwq-mfqx-83p8`, `GHSA-q9q8-rf9r-fg9f`, and `GHSA-j5c2-hhf7-6gf5`: OIDC validation accepted attacker-controlled discovery URLs because hostname checks rejected only literal forbidden IPs, allowing DNS rebinding SSRF. Lesson: outbound federation URL validation must resolve and classify hostnames at the connection boundary and reject loopback, private, link-local, and rebound addresses.
### S3 copy, multipart, and upload policy validation
### IAM policy conditions and external policy plugins
- `GHSA-6r96-hmgc-726c`: request headers collided with lowercase server-derived condition keys such as `userid`, `groups`, `versionid`, and JWT/LDAP claims. Lesson: never let caller-controlled headers append to or replace server-derived policy context; reserve trusted condition keys and keep intentional request-header keys separate.
- `GHSA-v9cp-qfw9-9pfp`: quantified negated string conditions applied negation after aggregation, transposing `ForAllValues` and `ForAnyValue` semantics. Lesson: push negation into the per-value predicate for quantified operators and test partially overlapping multi-value sets.
- `GHSA-5w8r-p896-6vq2`: OPA policy mode skipped `ExistingObjectTag/*` loading, so tagged objects looked untagged to external policies. Lesson: external authorization plugins need the same object-tag and request context as built-in policy evaluation before they decide.
### S3 object actions, copy, multipart, and upload policy validation
- `GHSA-3ppv-fx5m-m749`: explicit `versionId` reads and copy sources authorized `s3:GetObject` instead of `s3:GetObjectVersion`. Lesson: version-specific object access must select version-specific actions for direct reads, `CopyObject`, and `UploadPartCopy`, with tests proving the backend is not reached on denial.
- `GHSA-x298-9x87-fvjq`: anonymous `ListObjectVersions` fell back to `ListBucket` and returned before public-access-block gates. Lesson: compatibility fallbacks must converge on the same post-authorization checks as direct grants, especially `RestrictPublicBuckets` and anonymous data-plane denies.
- `GHSA-mx42-j6wv-px98`: `UploadPartCopy` missed source authorization and allowed cross-bucket object exfiltration. Lesson: multipart copy must enforce the same source and destination contract as `CopyObject`.
- `GHSA-wfxj-ph3v-7mjf`: `UploadPartCopy` checked source and destination independently but missed destination copy-source policy constraints. Lesson: source read and destination write checks are not sufficient when policy constrains allowed copy sources.
- `GHSA-w5fh-f8xh-5x3p`: presigned POST accepted uploads without enforcing signed policy conditions. Lesson: parse and enforce all POST policy constraints server-side, including size, key prefix, and content type.
@@ -59,7 +68,7 @@ Update this file only when an advisory adds or changes a reusable lesson, affect
### Secrets, defaults, and cryptographic misuse
- `GHSA-j59h-h7q5-q348`, `GHSA-3wm5-wpm5-hmfm`, `GHSA-6wc8-xm48-qhmx`, `GHSA-9gf3-jx4p-4xxf`, and `GHSA-63xc-c3w3-m2cf`: RustFS shipped known default root credentials that could authenticate to S3, admin APIs, IAM, KMS, console, and token-signing surfaces. Lesson: root credentials must be operator-provided or generated per install; known defaults and warnings are not acceptable for network-reachable deployments.
- `GHSA-j59h-h7q5-q348`, `GHSA-3wm5-wpm5-hmfm`, `GHSA-6wc8-xm48-qhmx`, `GHSA-9gf3-jx4p-4xxf`, `GHSA-63xc-c3w3-m2cf`, and `GHSA-ch63-6q4v-hwp5`: RustFS shipped known default root credentials that could authenticate to S3, admin APIs, IAM, KMS, console, and token-signing surfaces. Lesson: root credentials must be operator-provided or generated per install; known defaults and warnings are not acceptable for network-reachable deployments.
- `GHSA-h956-rh7x-ppgj`: gRPC used the hard-coded token `rustfs rpc` on both client and server. Lesson: source-visible shared tokens are authentication bypasses.
- `GHSA-r5qv-rc46-hv8q`: internode RPC HMAC secret fell back to the public default `rustfsadmin`. Lesson: RPC/internode auth must fail closed instead of silently using public defaults.
- `GHSA-75fx-qg6f-8rm7` and `GHSA-68cw-96m3-h2cf`: internode RPC secrets were derivable from known root credentials, making raw storage RPC signatures forgeable when explicit RPC secrets were unset. Lesson: RPC auth keys must be independent random secrets, never derived from S3 root credentials, and raw storage RPC should not share the public S3 listener without an internode-only boundary.
@@ -92,6 +101,10 @@ Update this file only when an advisory adds or changes a reusable lesson, affect
- `GHSA-xrrf-67jm-3c2r`: SSE metadata reported encryption while reader composition bypassed `EncryptReader` and stored plaintext. Lesson: test actual bytes on disk and wrapper order, not only API metadata.
### Object Lock and retention invariants
- `GHSA-j548-9grx-fh4f`: Object Lock enforcement treated unreadable, fabricated, or unparsable bucket metadata as absent configuration and allowed retained objects to be deleted or expired. Lesson: retention must fail closed unless Object Lock absence is authoritative, and every delete, lifecycle, scanner, force-delete, and default-retention path needs the same state distinction.
### Serde deserialization and input validation
- No `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]` found across the entire codebase. Lesson: all structs deserialized from untrusted input (S3 API XML/JSON, lifecycle rules, bucket policies, replication configs) should have `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]` to reject malformed or adversarial payloads.
@@ -107,11 +120,13 @@ Use these targeted searches when a diff touches security-sensitive code:
rg -n "validate_admin_request|check_permissions|AdminAction::|deny_only|is_allowed" rustfs crates
rg -n "authorize_operation|FtpsDriver|SftpDriver|RETR|MKD|SIZE|MDTM|CreateBucket|GetObject|HeadObject" crates/protocols rustfs
rg -n "UploadPartCopy|upload_part_copy|CompleteMultipart|PostObject|content-length-range|starts-with" rustfs crates
rg -n "ListBucketVersions|GetObjectVersion|versionId|VersionId|ExistingObjectTag|ForAllValues|ForAnyValue|POLICY_PLUGIN|opa" rustfs crates
rg -n "normalize_extract_entry_key|Snowball|auto-extract|PathBuf::join|canonicalize|\\.\\.|x-forwarded-for|x-real-ip|SourceIp" rustfs crates
rg -n "DEFAULT_SECRET|DEFAULT_ACCESS|TEST_PRIVATE_KEY|rustfs rpc|RUSTFS_RPC_SECRET" rustfs crates
rg -n "TONIC_RPC_PREFIX|verify_rpc_signature|check_auth|NodeServiceServer|x-rustfs-signature" rustfs crates
rg -n "debug!|trace!|info!|error!|\\?resp|\\?merged_config|session_token|secret_key" rustfs crates
rg -n "HashReader|EncryptReader|SSE|server-side encryption|Access-Control-Allow-Credentials|Origin" rustfs crates
rg -n "ObjectLock|object_lock|retention|COMPLIANCE|GOVERNANCE|delete_prefix|lifecycle|scanner" rustfs crates
rg -n "deny_unknown_fields|serde.default|as u32|as usize|as i32" rustfs crates
```
@@ -121,9 +136,12 @@ rg -n "deny_unknown_fields|serde.default|as u32|as usize|as i32" rustfs crates
- Protocol frontend authz fixes: include denied `RETR`, `SIZE`/`MDTM`, `MKD`, bucket probe, and sibling allowed-operation cases, and assert denied paths do not reach the storage backend.
- IAM fixes: include import/update/list service-account cases with attacker-controlled parent, claims, access key, secret key, and policy.
- Copy/upload fixes: include cross-bucket, cross-user, source-denied, destination-denied, copy-source-condition, and multipart completion cases.
- Version-action fixes: include historical UUID, explicit current version, `null`, range, partNumber, presigned, STS/session, service-account, anonymous bucket-policy, copy source, and multipart-copy source cases.
- Policy-condition fixes: include reserved-key header collisions, missing keys, partially overlapping multi-value sets, plugin mode, and built-in policy mode.
- Path fixes: include encoded traversal, absolute path, nested traversal, archive entries with `..`, valid object keys that resemble traversal text but should be rejected, and canonical bucket/prefix boundary checks.
- Logging fixes: assert redacted output for structs and response bodies that may contain credentials.
- IAM export fixes: assert exported archives omit plaintext user and service-account secrets unless the format deliberately encrypts or seals them.
- RPC auth fixes: include captured metadata replay across two concrete methods, stale timestamps, wrong path, wrong method surrogate, wrong secret, and valid same-method calls.
- Browser/CORS fixes: assert no credentials on reflected/default origins, correct behavior for explicit allowlists, and no same-origin script execution for previewed object content.
- SSE fixes: inspect stored bytes and verify API metadata, read-back behavior, and on-disk ciphertext together.
- Object Lock fixes: include unreadable metadata, fabricated metadata defaults, unparsable config, confirmed absent config, COMPLIANCE/GOVERNANCE retention, lifecycle expiry, scanner sweeps, and force-delete paths.
+10
View File
@@ -60,6 +60,16 @@ body-cache-whitelist-check: ## Check the body-cache eligibility gate stays a fai
@echo "🧱 Checking body-cache whitelist guard..."
./scripts/check_body_cache_whitelist.sh
.PHONY: s3s-footprint-check
s3s-footprint-check: ## Check the s3s dependency footprint ratchet stays frozen
@echo "📦 Checking s3s footprint ratchet..."
./scripts/check_s3s_footprint.sh
.PHONY: fips-wording-check
fips-wording-check: ## Check outward docs do not make unsupported FIPS claims
@echo "📣 Checking FIPS wording guard..."
./scripts/check_fips_wording.sh
.PHONY: log-analyzer-rules-check
log-analyzer-rules-check: core-deps ## Check log-analyzer rule anchors still exist verbatim in source
@echo "🩺 Checking log-analyzer rule anchors..."
+3 -3
View File
@@ -19,13 +19,13 @@ planning-docs-check: ## Check that no planning-type documents are committed
./scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh
.PHONY: pre-commit
pre-commit: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast pre-commit checks without clippy/full tests
pre-commit: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast pre-commit checks without clippy/full tests
@echo "✅ All pre-commit checks passed!"
.PHONY: pre-pr
pre-pr: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check log-analyzer-rules-check clippy-check test ## Run full pre-PR checks with clippy and tests
pre-pr: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check log-analyzer-rules-check clippy-check test ## Run full pre-PR checks with clippy and tests
@echo "✅ All pre-PR checks passed!"
.PHONY: dev-check
dev-check: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast local development checks
dev-check: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast local development checks
@echo "✅ Fast development checks passed!"
+3
View File
@@ -25,9 +25,12 @@ TEST_THREADS ?= 1
script-tests: ## Run shell script tests
@echo "Running script tests..."
./scripts/test_build_rustfs_options.sh
./scripts/test_docker_runtime_timezone.sh
./scripts/test_entrypoint_credentials.sh
./scripts/test_internode_grpc_ab_bench.sh
./scripts/test_object_batch_bench_enhanced.sh
./scripts/test_hotpath_warp_ab_gate.sh
./scripts/test_hotpath_warp_abba.sh
./scripts/test_exact_1mib_handoff_abba.sh
./scripts/test_pinned_paired_abba_bench.sh
./scripts/test_manual_transition_runbooks.sh
+85 -21
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
# * bucket_lifecycle_ops::tests::concurrent_resend_same_part_commits_one_generation
# uses the shared multipart fixture and a deterministic uploadId-lock
# handoff, so it must not overlap another process mutating that fixture.
# * bucket::metadata_sys::tests::concurrent_config_writes_from_separate_nodes_do_not_lose_writes
# uses the shared transaction lock and must not overlap other ecstore tests.
#
# serial_test's #[serial] attribute does NOT serialize these across runs:
# nextest executes each test in its own process, where the in-process
@@ -27,10 +29,13 @@
[test-groups]
ecstore-serial-flaky = { max-threads = 1 }
embedded-test-ports = { max-threads = 1 }
e2e-vault = { max-threads = 1 }
# Reliability / fault-injection e2e tests each spawn a single-node 4-disk RustFS
# server and manipulate its disk directories at runtime (crates/e2e_test:
# reliability_disk_fault_test, degraded_read_eof_regression_test / dist-13). They
# reliability_disk_fault_test, degraded_read_eof_regression_test / dist-13, and
# replacement_privileged_e2e_test when explicitly run as root on Linux). They
# are correct in isolation but resource-heavy; serialize them under nextest's
# process boundary (serial_test's #[serial] does not cross it) so several 4-disk
# servers never run at once. ci-7's nightly picks these up via the e2e suite;
@@ -40,7 +45,7 @@ e2e-inline-boundaries = { max-threads = 1 }
# --- default profile (local): serialize the flaky groups, never retry --------
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & (test(concurrent_resend_same_part_commits_one_generation) | test(/^store::bucket::tests::bucket_delete_(mark_delete|purge_removes|default_s3_delete)/))'
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & (test(concurrent_resend_same_part_commits_one_generation) | test(concurrent_config_writes_from_separate_nodes_do_not_lose_writes) | test(/^store::bucket::tests::bucket_delete_(mark_delete|purge_removes|default_s3_delete)/))'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# Serialize the multipart crash-consistency scenarios (dist-2, backlog#1150):
@@ -52,23 +57,53 @@ test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & test(/^set_disk::ops::multipart::tests::crash_consistency::/)'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# The production-handler relocation regression builds an isolated 8-disk,
# 2-pool store and commits a 72 MiB multipart object. Keep that cross-disk IO
# from overlapping the ecstore commit fixtures above.
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs) & test(execute_get_object_resumes_from_relocated_pool_without_splicing_body)'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# Embedded integration-test binaries discover an ephemeral port and release
# the probe listener before RustFS binds it. Serialize that cross-process
# TOCTOU window; retries would only hide real startup failures.
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs) & (binary(/^embedded.*_test$/) | binary(admin_diagnostic_capability_e2e))'
test-group = 'embedded-test-ports'
# Serialize the durable manual-transition checkpoint test across nextest's
# process boundary; it mutates bucket lifecycle metadata and is not quarantined.
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & test(manual_transition_page_checkpoint_persists_durable_job_progress)'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# Serialize the bucket-incarnation / lifecycle-fence tests. They drive
# init_bucket_metadata_sys and bucket_metadata_sys_of, i.e. process-global
# OnceLock state that serial_test's #[serial] cannot protect across nextest's
# process boundary, and they delete+recreate buckets — the same shape that
# raced into InsufficientWriteQuorum in backlog#937. Preventive only, no
# retries. The matching ci-profile override is after [profile.ci].
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & (test(bucket_delete_waits_for_config_mutation_fence) | test(stale_config_request_cannot_mutate_a_recreated_bucket) | test(disk_incarnation_read_detects_stale_cache_until_peer_reload) | test(lifecycle_expiry_fails_closed_on_corrupt_object_lock_metadata) | test(expiry_configs_are_resolved_from_the_owning_store))'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# Serialize the 4-disk reliability / degraded-read e2e tests (see the
# e2e-reliability test-group note above). The matching ci-profile override is at
# the end of the file, after [profile.ci] is declared.
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^(reliability_disk_fault|degraded_read_eof_regression)_test::/)'
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^(reliability_disk_fault|degraded_read_eof_regression|replacement_privileged_e2e)_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-reliability'
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^inline_fast_path_cluster_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-inline-boundaries'
# Vault KMS tests share the fixed dev-server port 8200. serial_test's #[serial]
# does not cross nextest process boundaries, so keep these tests in one group.
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^kms::kms_vault_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-vault'
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ci profile — the strict CI gate (ci.yml `cargo nextest run --profile ci`)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -104,9 +139,9 @@ filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & test(/^store::bucket::tests::bucket_delete_(
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
retries = 2
# Keep the deterministic multipart handoff isolated across nextest processes.
# Keep deterministic ECStore write handoffs isolated across nextest processes.
[[profile.ci.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & test(concurrent_resend_same_part_commits_one_generation)'
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & (test(concurrent_resend_same_part_commits_one_generation) | test(concurrent_config_writes_from_separate_nodes_do_not_lose_writes))'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# QUARANTINE: OPEN rustfs#4690 — walk_dir stall-budget accounting test depends
@@ -121,7 +156,7 @@ retries = 2
# quarantine: no retries, just single-threaded so several 4-disk servers never
# run concurrently when ci-7's nightly runs the full e2e suite.
[[profile.ci.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^(reliability_disk_fault|degraded_read_eof_regression)_test::/)'
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^(reliability_disk_fault|degraded_read_eof_regression|replacement_privileged_e2e)_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-reliability'
# Serialize the multipart crash-consistency scenarios under the ci profile too
@@ -131,12 +166,28 @@ test-group = 'e2e-reliability'
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & test(/^set_disk::ops::multipart::tests::crash_consistency::/)'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
[[profile.ci.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs) & test(execute_get_object_resumes_from_relocated_pool_without_splicing_body)'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# Match the default-profile embedded test isolation without quarantining or
# retrying failures in CI.
[[profile.ci.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs) & (binary(/^embedded.*_test$/) | binary(admin_diagnostic_capability_e2e))'
test-group = 'embedded-test-ports'
# Serialize the durable manual-transition checkpoint test under the ci profile
# too. No retries: failures stay visible.
[[profile.ci.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & test(manual_transition_page_checkpoint_persists_durable_job_progress)'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# Serialize the bucket-incarnation / lifecycle-fence tests under the ci profile
# too (see the matching default-profile override near the top). No retries.
[[profile.ci.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & (test(bucket_delete_waits_for_config_mutation_fence) | test(stale_config_request_cannot_mutate_a_recreated_bucket) | test(disk_incarnation_read_detects_stale_cache_until_peer_reload) | test(lifecycle_expiry_fails_closed_on_corrupt_object_lock_metadata) | test(expiry_configs_are_resolved_from_the_owning_store))'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# e2e-smoke profile — PR smoke subset of the e2e_test crate (backlog#1149 ci-4)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -168,7 +219,7 @@ test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# the nightly profile derives its set as "the replication module MINUS this
# allowlist", so any new replication test lands in nightly by default (never
# silently unrun) until it is explicitly blessed as fast here. Keep the two
# regexes byte-identical. Count invariant: 20 here + 28 nightly = 48 total
# regexes byte-identical. Count invariant: 20 here + 49 nightly = 69 total
# (authority: `cargo nextest list`; docs/testing/e2e-suite-inventory.md).
# HISTORY (2026-07-11): the 20 fast tests were briefly pulled out of this lane
# (#4724) because they set a loopback (127.0.0.1) replication target that the
@@ -204,7 +255,7 @@ test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
[profile.e2e-smoke]
default-filter = """
package(e2e_test) & (
test(/^(delete_marker_migration_semantics|version_id_regression|list_objects_v2_pagination|list_object_versions_regression|list_objects_duplicates|list_buckets_double_slash|leading_slash_key|special_chars|create_bucket_region|delete_objects_versioning|head_object_consistency|head_object_range|copy_object_metadata|copy_object_tagging|copy_source_invalid_date|content_encoding|multipart_storage_class|storage_class_capability|ssec_copy|anonymous_access|bucket_policy_check|presigned_negative|negative_sigv4|admin_auth|notification_webhook|tls_hot_reload|console_smoke|admin_iam_crud|admin_pools|sts_query_compat)_test::|^fake_s3_target::/)
test(/^(delete_marker_migration_semantics|version_id_regression|list_objects_v2_pagination|list_object_versions_regression|list_objects_duplicates|list_buckets_double_slash|list_buckets_auth|list_buckets_iam_filter|leading_slash_key|special_chars|create_bucket_region|delete_objects_versioning|head_object_consistency|head_object_range|copy_object_metadata|copy_object_tagging|copy_source_invalid_date|content_encoding|multipart_storage_class|storage_class_capability|ssec_copy|anonymous_access|bucket_policy_check|presigned_negative|negative_sigv4|admin_auth|notification_webhook|tls_hot_reload|console_smoke|admin_iam_crud|admin_pools|sts_query_compat)_test::|^fake_s3_target::/)
| test(/^replication_extension_test::(test_replication_check_succeeds_with_remote_target|test_replication_check_rejects_target_without_object_lock|test_set_remote_target_rejects_unversioned_source_bucket|test_replication_check_rejects_unversioned_source_bucket|test_replication_check_rejects_missing_replication_config|test_replication_check_rejects_invalid_bucket|test_set_remote_target_rejects_same_bucket_on_same_deployment|test_set_remote_target_rejects_unversioned_target_bucket|test_set_remote_target_update_requires_arn|test_set_remote_target_update_rejects_missing_target|test_set_remote_target_rejects_invalid_target_url|test_set_remote_target_rejects_self_signed_https_target_without_skip_tls_verify|test_set_remote_target_rejects_private_ca_https_target_without_ca_cert_pem|test_list_remote_targets_rejects_empty_bucket|test_list_remote_targets_rejects_invalid_bucket|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_missing_target|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_missing_arn|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_invalid_bucket|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_target_used_by_replication|test_delete_bucket_replication_removes_remote_target)$/)
| test(/^reliant::lifecycle::/)
| test(/^reliant::tiering::/)
@@ -212,6 +263,17 @@ default-filter = """
"""
fail-fast = false
[profile.e2e-smoke.junit]
path = "junit.xml"
# The pagination boundary cases can stall when a server/listing regression
# prevents the continuation request from completing. Keep the timeout scoped
# to those known failure modes so legitimate lifecycle/tiering waits retain
# their test-level timing budget.
[[profile.e2e-smoke.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^list_objects_v2_pagination_test::tests::(test_list_objects_v2_delimiter_small_page_traverses_all|test_list_objects_v2_max_keys_above_limit_returns_token|test_list_objects_v2_maxkeys_above_limit_with_delimiter)$/)'
slow-timeout = { period = "60s", terminate-after = 2, grace-period = "10s" }
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# e2e-repl-nightly profile — scheduled full replication e2e lane (repl-1)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -219,10 +281,12 @@ fail-fast = false
# tests that are unfit for the per-PR e2e-smoke gate:
#
# * 2 remote-target TLS validation tests.
# * 12 bucket-replication data-plane/helper tests — they PUT/delete objects
# and poll until source and target converge; two replicate over HTTPS, two
# pin active SSE failure contracts, and one guards event/history observers.
# The SSE-S3 contract remains ignored under backlog#1291.
# * 15 bucket-replication data-plane/helper tests — they PUT/delete objects
# and poll until source and target converge; two replicate over HTTPS,
# six pin SSE replication contracts (managed SSE-S3/SSE-KMS re-encrypt on
# the target incl. multipart and the resync path, SSE-C and
# target-without-KMS stay fail-closed), and one guards event/history
# observers.
# * 12 `_real_dual_node` site-replication tests — each spawns TWO full rustfs
# servers and drives the cross-process site-replication control plane.
# * 1 `_real_three_node` site-replication test.
@@ -281,16 +345,16 @@ path = "junit.xml"
# object_lambda) — too heavy for the merge budget; they run in ci-7's
# nightly 4-node lane.
# * replication_extension_test — repl-1 already splits it into the PR
# `e2e-smoke` (20 fast) and `e2e-repl-nightly` (27 slow) lanes and reserves
# `e2e-smoke` (20 fast) and `e2e-repl-nightly` (49 slow) lanes and reserves
# it for those, so e2e-full does not double-run it.
# * #[ignore]d tests — nextest skips them by default (no --run-ignored); the
# manual-localhost:9000 reliant/policy tests are ci-13's migration.
#
# Each e2e test spawns its own single-node rustfs server on a random port with
# an isolated temp dir (crates/e2e_test/src/common.rs), so the set is
# parallel-safe — the same property e2e-smoke relies on. The exception is the
# 4-disk reliability / degraded-read fault-injection tests, serialized below
# (identical to the ci profile) so several 4-disk servers never run at once.
# parallel-safe — the same property e2e-smoke relies on. The exceptions are the
# 4-disk reliability / degraded-read fault-injection tests and the fixed-port
# Vault tests, both serialized below.
# KNOWN-FAILURE EXCLUSIONS (characterization run 29381309848, 2026-07-15:
# 341 ran / 32 failed on the suites' first automated run ever). Deterministic
# product failures cannot be quarantined away with retries, so each family is
@@ -300,9 +364,6 @@ path = "junit.xml"
# negative-path siblings of each family stay in as regression guards.
# * rustfs#4843 — over-limit archive entry paths hard-reject the whole
# archive even under ignore-errors semantics.
# * rustfs#4846 — distributed-lock quorum tests misclassify as timeout
# under parallel load (multi-node in-process clusters; natural home is
# ci-7's nightly cluster lane).
[profile.e2e-full]
default-filter = """
package(e2e_test)
@@ -311,7 +372,6 @@ default-filter = """
& !test(/^replication_extension_test::/)
& !test(/^multipart_auth_test::test_signed_put_object_extract_skips_invalid_entry_when_ignore_errors_enabled$/)
& !test(/^snowball_auto_extract_test::tests::snowball_auto_extract_(ignores_invalid_entries_when_requested|supports_standard_headers_with_combined_extract_options)$/)
& !test(/^reliant::lock::test_distributed_lock_(2_nodes_grpc_read_survives_failed_node|4_nodes_grpc_read_write_quorum_split_with_two_failed_nodes)$/)
"""
fail-fast = false
@@ -324,9 +384,13 @@ path = "junit.xml"
# quarantine: no retries, just single-threaded so several 4-disk servers never
# run concurrently.
[[profile.e2e-full.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^(reliability_disk_fault|degraded_read_eof_regression)_test::/)'
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^(reliability_disk_fault|degraded_read_eof_regression|replacement_privileged_e2e)_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-reliability'
[[profile.e2e-full.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^inline_fast_path_cluster_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-inline-boundaries'
[[profile.e2e-full.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^kms::kms_vault_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-vault'
+15
View File
@@ -170,6 +170,10 @@ Important behavior notes:
- Logs and metrics usually appear during startup, so seeing those two signals
first is expected.
- The OpenTelemetry bridge sends `tracing` fields as log attributes. Loki stores
those attributes as structured metadata, and the Collector also mirrors the
common troubleshooting fields into the log line so simple line filters can
find them.
- Visible trace data usually requires real HTTP/S3/gRPC request traffic after
startup, because request-path spans are created on demand.
- `RUSTFS_OBS_LOGGER_LEVEL=info` keeps the top-level request span but filters
@@ -195,6 +199,17 @@ curl -I http://127.0.0.1:9000/health/ready
# Jaeger: http://localhost:16686
```
For a structured RustFS log such as an inter-node RPC authentication failure,
the Loki line now includes fields such as `event`, `component`, `subsystem`,
`failure_reason`, `rpc_service`, `rpc_method`, and `expected_audience`. Useful
LogQL checks:
```logql
{service_name="RustFS"} |= "RPC signature verification failed"
{service_name="RustFS"} |= "failure_reason="
{service_name="RustFS"} | failure_reason != ""
```
If logs and metrics are present but traces are sparse, the most common cause is
"no real request traffic yet" or "`info` level filtered nested spans", not an
OTLP routing failure.
+9
View File
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ RustFS 会自动在该基础 URL 后补全:
需要注意:
- 启动阶段通常会先看到日志和指标,因此“先有日志/指标、后有 trace”是正常现象。
- OpenTelemetry bridge 会把 `tracing` 字段作为日志 attributes 发送。Loki 会将这些 attributes 存为 structured metadata,同时 Collector 会把常用排障字段镜像进日志行,方便用简单的行内容过滤直接查到。
- 可见的 trace 数据通常依赖启动后的真实 HTTP/S3/gRPC 请求流量,因为请求路径上的 span 是按需创建的。
- `RUSTFS_OBS_LOGGER_LEVEL=info` 会保留顶层请求 span,但会过滤掉很多 `debug` 级别的嵌套 span。
如果 Tempo 或 Jaeger 中的 trace 看起来很稀疏,建议先改成 `RUSTFS_OBS_LOGGER_LEVEL=debug`,再判断是否是 collector 或 Tempo 问题。
@@ -192,6 +193,14 @@ curl -I http://127.0.0.1:9000/health/ready
# Jaeger: http://localhost:16686
```
对于 RustFS 结构化日志,例如节点间 RPC 鉴权失败,Loki 日志行现在会包含 `event``component``subsystem``failure_reason``rpc_service``rpc_method``expected_audience` 等字段。常用 LogQL 检查:
```logql
{service_name="RustFS"} |= "RPC signature verification failed"
{service_name="RustFS"} |= "failure_reason="
{service_name="RustFS"} | failure_reason != ""
```
如果日志和指标已经正常,但 trace 仍然稀疏,最常见的原因通常是
“还没有真实请求流量”或“`info` 级别过滤了嵌套 span”,而不是 OTLP 路由失败。
@@ -11500,6 +11500,831 @@
],
"title": "Compression Operations Rate",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"collapsed": false,
"gridPos": {
"h": 1,
"w": 24,
"x": 0,
"y": 332
},
"id": 531,
"panels": [],
"title": "Metrics Dimensions Drilldown",
"type": "row"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {
"color": {
"mode": "palette-classic"
},
"custom": {
"axisBorderShow": false,
"axisCenteredZero": false,
"axisColorMode": "text",
"axisLabel": "",
"axisPlacement": "auto",
"barAlignment": 0,
"barWidthFactor": 0.6,
"drawStyle": "line",
"fillOpacity": 10,
"gradientMode": "none",
"hideFrom": {
"legend": false,
"tooltip": false,
"viz": false
},
"insertNulls": false,
"lineInterpolation": "smooth",
"lineWidth": 1,
"pointSize": 5,
"scaleDistribution": {
"type": "linear"
},
"showPoints": "never",
"showValues": false,
"spanNulls": false,
"stacking": {
"group": "A",
"mode": "none"
},
"thresholdsStyle": {
"mode": "off"
}
},
"mappings": [],
"thresholds": {
"mode": "absolute",
"steps": [
{
"color": "green",
"value": 0
}
]
},
"unit": "ops"
},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {
"h": 8,
"w": 12,
"x": 0,
"y": 333
},
"id": 532,
"options": {
"legend": {
"calcs": [
"lastNotNull",
"max"
],
"displayMode": "table",
"placement": "right",
"showLegend": true
},
"tooltip": {
"hideZeros": false,
"mode": "multi",
"sort": "desc"
}
},
"pluginVersion": "12.3.2",
"targets": [
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "A",
"expr": "sum by (server, name, type) (rate(rustfs_api_requests_requests_total_by_server{job=~\"$job\",server=~\"$server\",name=~\"$api\"}[$__rate_interval]))",
"legendFormat": "{{server}} | {{name}} | {{type}}"
}
],
"title": "API Requests by Server and API",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {
"color": {
"mode": "palette-classic"
},
"custom": {
"axisBorderShow": false,
"axisCenteredZero": false,
"axisColorMode": "text",
"axisLabel": "",
"axisPlacement": "auto",
"barAlignment": 0,
"barWidthFactor": 0.6,
"drawStyle": "line",
"fillOpacity": 10,
"gradientMode": "none",
"hideFrom": {
"legend": false,
"tooltip": false,
"viz": false
},
"insertNulls": false,
"lineInterpolation": "smooth",
"lineWidth": 1,
"pointSize": 5,
"scaleDistribution": {
"type": "linear"
},
"showPoints": "never",
"showValues": false,
"spanNulls": false,
"stacking": {
"group": "A",
"mode": "none"
},
"thresholdsStyle": {
"mode": "off"
}
},
"mappings": [],
"thresholds": {
"mode": "absolute",
"steps": [
{
"color": "green",
"value": 0
}
]
},
"unit": "s"
},
"overrides": [
{
"matcher": {
"id": "byFrameRefID",
"options": "A"
},
"properties": [
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"range": true,
"refId": "A",
"expr": "max by (server, drive, pool_index, set_index, drive_index, state) (rustfs_system_drive_runtime_state{job=~\"$job\",server=~\"$server\",drive=~\"$drive\"})",
"legendFormat": "{{server}} | {{drive}} | p{{pool_index}}/s{{set_index}}/d{{drive_index}} | {{state}}"
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"uid": "${datasource}"
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"expr": "max by (server, drive, pool_index, set_index, drive_index) (rustfs_system_drive_offline_duration_seconds{job=~\"$job\",server=~\"$server\",drive=~\"$drive\"})",
"legendFormat": "{{server}} | {{drive}} | offline seconds"
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],
"title": "Drive Runtime State and Offline Duration",
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"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
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"legendFormat": "{{server}} | {{drive}} | p{{pool_index}}/s{{set_index}}/d{{drive_index}} | {{api}}"
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],
"title": "Drive API Calls by Operation",
"type": "timeseries"
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"legendFormat": "{{server}} | {{source}} | {{state}}"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "B",
"expr": "sum by (server, cycle_scope, source, state) (rustfs_scanner_cycle_source_work{job=~\"$job\",server=~\"$server\",source=~\"$scanner_source\"})",
"legendFormat": "{{server}} | {{cycle_scope}} | {{source}} | {{state}}"
}
],
"title": "Scanner Source Work by Server",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"fieldConfig": {
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"mappings": [],
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"steps": [
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{
"matcher": {
"id": "byFrameRefID",
"options": "B"
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"uid": "${datasource}"
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"refId": "A",
"expr": "sum by (server, bucket, drive, result) (rate(rustfs_scanner_bucket_drive_result_total{job=~\"$job\",server=~\"$server\",bucket=~\"$bucket\",drive=~\"$drive\",result=~\"$scanner_result\"}[$__rate_interval]))",
"legendFormat": "{{server}} | {{bucket}} | {{drive}} | {{result}}"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "B",
"expr": "sum by (server, cycle_scope, bucket, drive, result) (rustfs_scanner_cycle_bucket_drive_result{job=~\"$job\",server=~\"$server\",bucket=~\"$bucket\",drive=~\"$drive\",result=~\"$scanner_result\"})",
"legendFormat": "{{server}} | {{cycle_scope}} | {{bucket}} | {{drive}} | {{result}}"
}
],
"title": "Scanner Bucket Drive Results",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
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"matcher": {
"id": "byFrameRefID",
"options": "B"
},
"properties": [
{
"id": "unit",
"value": "Bps"
}
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"w": 12,
"x": 12,
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"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
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"refId": "A",
"expr": "sum by (bucket, target_arn) (rate(rustfs_bucket_replication_target_sent_count{job=~\"$job\",bucket=~\"$bucket\",target_arn=~\"$target_arn\"}[$__rate_interval]))",
"legendFormat": "sent objects | {{bucket}} | {{target_arn}}"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "B",
"expr": "sum by (bucket, target_arn) (rate(rustfs_bucket_replication_target_sent_bytes{job=~\"$job\",bucket=~\"$bucket\",target_arn=~\"$target_arn\"}[$__rate_interval]))",
"legendFormat": "sent bytes | {{bucket}} | {{target_arn}}"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "C",
"expr": "sum by (bucket, target_arn) (rate(rustfs_bucket_replication_target_total_failed_count{job=~\"$job\",bucket=~\"$bucket\",target_arn=~\"$target_arn\"}[$__rate_interval]))",
"legendFormat": "failed objects | {{bucket}} | {{target_arn}}"
}
],
"title": "Bucket Replication Target Flow",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {
"color": {
"mode": "palette-classic"
},
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"axisCenteredZero": false,
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"barWidthFactor": 0.6,
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"scaleDistribution": {
"type": "linear"
},
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"mode": "none"
},
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}
},
"mappings": [],
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"mode": "absolute",
"steps": [
{
"color": "green",
"value": 0
}
]
},
"unit": "short"
},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {
"h": 8,
"w": 12,
"x": 0,
"y": 357
},
"id": 538,
"options": {
"legend": {
"calcs": [
"lastNotNull",
"max"
],
"displayMode": "table",
"placement": "right",
"showLegend": true
},
"tooltip": {
"hideZeros": false,
"mode": "multi",
"sort": "desc"
}
},
"pluginVersion": "12.3.2",
"targets": [
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "A",
"expr": "max by (server, target_id) (rustfs_audit_target_queue_length_by_server{job=~\"$job\",server=~\"$server\"})",
"legendFormat": "audit queue | {{server}} | {{target_id}}"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "B",
"expr": "max by (server, action, state) (rustfs_ilm_action_tasks{job=~\"$job\",server=~\"$server\"})",
"legendFormat": "ilm | {{server}} | {{action}} | {{state}}"
}
],
"title": "Audit and ILM by Server",
"type": "timeseries"
}
],
"preload": false,
@@ -11551,6 +12376,32 @@
"sort": 1,
"type": "query"
},
{
"allValue": ".*",
"current": {
"text": "All",
"value": "$__all"
},
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"definition": "label_values(rustfs_system_drive_api_calls_total,api)",
"includeAll": true,
"label": "Drive API",
"multi": true,
"name": "drive_api",
"options": [],
"query": {
"qryType": 1,
"query": "label_values(rustfs_system_drive_api_calls_total,api)",
"refId": "PrometheusVariableQueryEditor-drive_api"
},
"refresh": 2,
"regex": "",
"sort": 1,
"type": "query"
},
{
"allValue": ".*",
"current": {
@@ -11670,6 +12521,136 @@
"regex": "",
"sort": 1,
"type": "query"
},
{
"allValue": ".*",
"current": {
"text": "All",
"value": "$__all"
},
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"definition": "label_values(rustfs_api_requests_requests_total_by_server,server)",
"includeAll": true,
"label": "Server",
"multi": true,
"name": "server",
"options": [],
"query": {
"qryType": 1,
"query": "label_values(rustfs_api_requests_requests_total_by_server,server)",
"refId": "PrometheusVariableQueryEditor-server"
},
"refresh": 2,
"regex": "",
"sort": 1,
"type": "query"
},
{
"allValue": ".*",
"current": {
"text": "All",
"value": "$__all"
},
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"definition": "label_values(rustfs_api_requests_requests_total_by_server,name)",
"includeAll": true,
"label": "API",
"multi": true,
"name": "api",
"options": [],
"query": {
"qryType": 1,
"query": "label_values(rustfs_api_requests_requests_total_by_server,name)",
"refId": "PrometheusVariableQueryEditor-api"
},
"refresh": 2,
"regex": "",
"sort": 1,
"type": "query"
},
{
"allValue": ".*",
"current": {
"text": "All",
"value": "$__all"
},
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"definition": "label_values({__name__=\"rustfs_bucket_replication_target_sent_count\",bucket=~\"$bucket\"},target_arn)",
"includeAll": true,
"label": "Target ARN",
"multi": true,
"name": "target_arn",
"options": [],
"query": {
"qryType": 1,
"query": "label_values({__name__=\"rustfs_bucket_replication_target_sent_count\",bucket=~\"$bucket\"},target_arn)",
"refId": "PrometheusVariableQueryEditor-target_arn"
},
"refresh": 2,
"regex": "",
"sort": 1,
"type": "query"
},
{
"allValue": ".*",
"current": {
"text": "All",
"value": "$__all"
},
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"definition": "label_values(rustfs_scanner_source_work_total,source)",
"includeAll": true,
"label": "Scanner Source",
"multi": true,
"name": "scanner_source",
"options": [],
"query": {
"qryType": 1,
"query": "label_values(rustfs_scanner_source_work_total,source)",
"refId": "PrometheusVariableQueryEditor-scanner_source"
},
"refresh": 2,
"regex": "",
"sort": 1,
"type": "query"
},
{
"allValue": ".*",
"current": {
"text": "All",
"value": "$__all"
},
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"definition": "label_values(rustfs_scanner_bucket_drive_result_total,result)",
"includeAll": true,
"label": "Scanner Result",
"multi": true,
"name": "scanner_result",
"options": [],
"query": {
"qryType": 1,
"query": "label_values(rustfs_scanner_bucket_drive_result_total,result)",
"refId": "PrometheusVariableQueryEditor-scanner_result"
},
"refresh": 2,
"regex": "",
"sort": 1,
"type": "query"
}
]
},
@@ -29,11 +29,27 @@ processors:
limit_mib: 1024
spike_limit_mib: 256
transform/logs:
error_mode: ignore
log_statements:
- context: log
statements:
- set(attributes["message"], body.string)
- set(attributes["log.body"], body.string)
- set(attributes["message"], body.string) where IsString(body)
- set(attributes["log.body"], body.string) where IsString(body)
- set(body, Concat([body, " event=", attributes["event"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["event"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " component=", attributes["component"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["component"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " subsystem=", attributes["subsystem"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["subsystem"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " state=", attributes["state"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["state"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " result=", attributes["result"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["result"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " reason=", attributes["reason"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["reason"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " failure_reason=", attributes["failure_reason"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["failure_reason"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " rpc_path=", attributes["rpc_path"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["rpc_path"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " rpc_service=", attributes["rpc_service"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["rpc_service"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " rpc_method=", attributes["rpc_method"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["rpc_method"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " expected_audience=", attributes["expected_audience"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["expected_audience"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " peer_addr=", attributes["peer_addr"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["peer_addr"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " replay_scope_bootstrap_allowed=", attributes["replay_scope_bootstrap_allowed"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["replay_scope_bootstrap_allowed"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " error=", attributes["error"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["error"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " exception_message=", attributes["exception.message"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["exception.message"] != nil
exporters:
otlp/tempo:
@@ -17,9 +17,11 @@
# =============================================================================
#
# Metric source: the KMS operation-policy choke point in
# crates/kms/src/policy.rs. All label values are static enum strings
# (operation, op_class, outcome, error_class); key identifiers, key material,
# and tokens never appear in labels.
# crates/kms/src/policy.rs, except KmsKeyRotationOverdue, which reads the
# label-less key-lifecycle gauge published by the deletion worker's sweep
# (crates/kms/src/deletion_worker.rs). All label values are bounded static
# strings (operation, op_class, outcome, error_class, backend, scope); key
# identifiers, key material, and tokens never appear in labels.
#
# Response procedures: docs/operations/kms-observability-runbook.md
#
@@ -70,8 +72,9 @@ groups:
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# 2. KmsBackendHighErrorRate
# Sustained share of operations terminating without success
# (fatal, budget_exhausted, deadline_exceeded). The cancelled
# outcome is excluded because shutdowns legitimately produce it.
# (fatal, budget/deadline exhaustion, admission backpressure,
# or an open circuit). The cancelled outcome is excluded because
# shutdowns legitimately produce it.
# The traffic guard keeps a single failure on a near-idle
# cluster from firing the alert.
# Threshold: 5% for 10m — conservative default, calibrate
@@ -94,9 +97,11 @@ groups:
summary: "KMS backend non-success ratio above 5% for 10m"
description: >-
{{ $value | humanizePercentage }} of KMS backend operations
are terminating in fatal, budget_exhausted, or
deadline_exceeded. Object encryption and decryption paths
depending on the KMS are degraded or failing.
are terminating in fatal, budget_exhausted,
deadline_exceeded, backpressure_timeout,
backpressure_rejected, or circuit_open. Object encryption
and decryption paths depending on the KMS are degraded or
failing.
runbook_url: "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/blob/main/docs/operations/kms-observability-runbook.md#kmsbackendhigherrorrate"
# ==========================================================================
@@ -186,3 +191,61 @@ groups:
Retryable failures are outlasting the retry budget, so
callers are seeing hard failures.
runbook_url: "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/blob/main/docs/operations/kms-observability-runbook.md#kmsbackendretrybudgetexhausted"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# 6. KmsBackendCircuitOpen
# Direct circuit-state signal, independent of operation traffic.
# A transient open can recover on its first half-open probe; alert
# only when the circuit remains open or half-open for one minute.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
- alert: KmsBackendCircuitOpen
expr: |
rustfs_kms_backend_circuit_open > 0
for: 1m
labels:
severity: warning
component: kms
annotations:
summary: "KMS backend circuit open ({{ $labels.backend }}/{{ $labels.scope }})"
description: >-
The KMS backend circuit for {{ $labels.backend }} scope
{{ $labels.scope }} has remained open or half-open for one
minute. Operations in this scope can terminate as
circuit_open until the half-open probe succeeds or returns
a non-retryable failure.
runbook_url: "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/blob/main/docs/operations/kms-observability-runbook.md#kmsbackendcircuitopen"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# 7. KmsKeyRotationOverdue
# The least recently rotated usable key has gone more than 400
# days without a rotation (measured from creation for keys with
# no recorded rotation). Direct gauge state published by the
# deletion worker's sweep, so no traffic guard applies; the
# one-hour hold only bridges scrape gaps. The worker runs only
# on backends with the schedule_deletion capability, so on the
# Static backend the series never exists and this alert cannot
# fire — that backend cannot rotate either; see the rotation
# driver matrix in docs/operations/kms-backend-security.md.
# Threshold: 400 days — conservative default sitting above a
# one-year rotation policy. Align it with the rotation period
# your compliance policy requires, and with
# RUSTFS_KMS_ROTATION_MAX_AGE_SECS so the per-key rotation_due
# verdict and this aggregate alert agree.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
- alert: KmsKeyRotationOverdue
expr: |
rustfs_kms_oldest_key_rotation_age_seconds > (400 * 86400)
for: 1h
labels:
severity: warning
component: kms
annotations:
summary: "Oldest KMS key unrotated for more than 400 days"
description: >-
The least recently rotated usable KMS key was last rotated
{{ $value | humanizeDuration }} ago (measured from creation
for keys with no recorded rotation). List keys through the
admin API and read rotation_due / rotation_due_reason for
the per-key verdict; an "unsupported" reason means the
backend cannot rotate at all.
runbook_url: "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/blob/main/docs/operations/kms-observability-runbook.md#kmskeyrotationoverdue"
+44 -13
View File
@@ -25,9 +25,13 @@ inputs:
required: false
default: "rustfs-deps"
cache-save-if:
description: "Condition for saving cache"
description: >-
Whether to save the cache. The fail-safe default is 'false': a caller that
wants to populate a cache must opt in explicitly, so a forgotten input
costs a cold cache (minutes) rather than silently consuming the
repository-wide 10GB Actions cache quota and evicting other lanes.
required: false
default: "true"
default: "false"
install-cross-tools:
description: "Install cross-compilation tools"
required: false
@@ -36,33 +40,48 @@ inputs:
description: "Target architecture to add"
required: false
default: ""
github-token:
description: "GitHub token for API access"
install-build-packaging-tools:
description: >-
Install musl-tools/zip/unzip, needed for musl linking and release
packaging. Off for CI test lanes, which use none of them.
required: false
default: ""
default: "true"
install-test-tools:
description: >-
Install cargo-nextest and the rustfmt/clippy components. Off for release
and audit lanes, which run no tests and no lints.
required: false
default: "true"
runs:
using: "composite"
steps:
# protobuf-compiler is deliberately absent: the setup-protoc step below
# installs 35.1 into the tool cache and prepends it to PATH, so the apt
# build (older, and never version-matched) was shadowed on every run and
# simply never used.
- name: Install system dependencies (Ubuntu)
if: runner.os == 'Linux'
shell: bash
run: |
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y \
musl-tools \
build-essential \
pkg-config \
libssl-dev \
ripgrep \
unzip \
zip \
protobuf-compiler
ripgrep
# musl-gcc is needed by the native musl release leg, and zip/unzip by the
# release packaging steps. No CI test lane touches any of them.
- name: Install packaging and cross-linking dependencies (Ubuntu)
if: runner.os == 'Linux' && inputs.install-build-packaging-tools == 'true'
shell: bash
run: sudo apt-get install -y musl-tools zip unzip
- name: Install protoc
uses: rustfs/setup-protoc@a3705324d8f9bf5b6c3573fb6cf8ae421db55dd6 # v3.0.1
with:
version: "34.1"
version: "35.1"
repo-token: ${{ github.token }}
- name: Install flatc
@@ -75,7 +94,7 @@ runs:
with:
toolchain: ${{ inputs.rust-version }}
targets: ${{ inputs.target }}
components: rustfmt, clippy
components: ${{ inputs.install-test-tools == 'true' && 'rustfmt, clippy' || '' }}
- name: Install Zig
if: inputs.install-cross-tools == 'true'
@@ -86,12 +105,24 @@ runs:
uses: taiki-e/install-action@a21ae4029b089b9ddc45704028756f51ab8abe48 # cargo-zigbuild
- name: Install cargo-nextest
if: inputs.install-test-tools == 'true'
uses: taiki-e/install-action@96c7780c1d8a2b8723e12031def873a434d39d8d # nextest
- name: Setup Rust cache
uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@e18b497796c12c097a38f9edb9d0641fb99eee32 # v2
with:
cache-all-crates: true
# false is rust-cache's own default. With true, cleanup.ts returns
# *before* pruning ~/.cargo/registry/src, and config.ts archives the
# whole registry — so every cache carried the unpacked source tree of
# every dependency, not just "a few extra crates".
#
# No coverage is lost: getPackages runs `cargo metadata --all-features`,
# a strict superset of any single lane's feature closure, and -sys crates
# are explicitly exempted from pruning (their src timestamps would
# otherwise trigger rebuilds). Anything pruned is re-unpacked from the
# .crate files still in registry/cache, whose mtimes crates.io
# normalises, so cargo fingerprints stay valid.
cache-all-crates: false
cache-on-failure: true
shared-key: ${{ inputs.cache-shared-key }}
save-if: ${{ inputs.cache-save-if }}
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ jobs:
name: Cancel Closed PR Runs
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.action == 'closed'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- name: Explain cancellation run
run: echo "PR closed; this run only cancels older runs in the same concurrency group."
@@ -45,8 +46,11 @@ jobs:
name: Architecture Migration Rules
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.action != 'closed'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Install ripgrep
run: |
+76 -5
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ on:
- '.github/actions/**'
- '.github/workflows/**'
- 'scripts/release/create_or_update_release.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_performance_ab_workflow.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_preview_release_workflow.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_workflow_pins.sh'
pull_request:
@@ -36,10 +37,16 @@ on:
- '.github/actions/**'
- '.github/workflows/**'
- 'scripts/release/create_or_update_release.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_performance_ab_workflow.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_preview_release_workflow.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_workflow_pins.sh'
schedule:
- cron: '0 3 * * 0' # Weekly on Sunday 03:00 UTC (staggered after the midnight ci/build crons)
# Daily, not weekly. This schedule exists to catch RustSec advisories
# published against an unchanged dependency tree; at weekly cadence a new
# advisory could sit unnoticed for seven days. The check list is unchanged —
# splitting it into a light daily advisories-only run and a weekly full run
# would create runs where sources/bans/licenses go unverified.
- cron: '0 3 * * *' # Daily 03:00 UTC (staggered after the midnight ci/build crons)
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
@@ -59,6 +66,7 @@ jobs:
name: Cancel Closed PR Runs
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.action == 'closed'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- name: Explain cancellation run
run: echo "PR closed; this run only cancels older runs in the same concurrency group."
@@ -74,11 +82,32 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
cache-shared-key: rustfs-cargo-deny
persist-credentials: false
# cargo-deny compiles nothing, so the full setup composite (apt packages,
# protoc, flatc, nextest, rustfmt/clippy) was pure overhead here. It does
# still need a real cargo: `cargo deny check` runs `cargo metadata`, and
# Cargo.toml pins datafusion and s3s as git dependencies, which must be
# materialised into ~/.cargo/git — a cold clone is hundreds of MB, so the
# cache stays.
- name: Install Rust toolchain
uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@29eef336d9b2848a0b548edc03f92a220660cdb8 # stable
# Was relying on the composite's default, which used to be "true": every
# PR touching Cargo.toml/Cargo.lock saved a second, PR-scoped copy of this
# cache and pushed the main-scoped lanes out of the 10GB quota. The
# default is now "false", but state it explicitly — see
# scripts/security/check_cache_save_if.sh.
- name: Setup Rust cache
uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@e18b497796c12c097a38f9edb9d0641fb99eee32 # v2
with:
# Same reasoning as the setup composite: true archives every
# dependency's unpacked source tree.
cache-all-crates: false
cache-on-failure: true
shared-key: rustfs-cargo-deny
save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
- name: Install cargo-deny
uses: taiki-e/install-action@bffeee26d4db9be238a4ea78d8826604ebcb594d # v2
@@ -96,16 +125,31 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Report unpinned GitHub Actions
run: ./scripts/security/check_workflow_pins.sh --enforce
- name: Check setup cache-save-if is explicit
run: ./scripts/security/check_cache_save_if.sh
- name: Check every job declares a timeout
run: ./scripts/security/check_job_timeouts.sh
- name: Check checkouts clear their credentials
run: ./scripts/security/check_persist_credentials.sh
- name: Check preview release workflow policy
run: ./scripts/security/check_preview_release_workflow.sh
- name: Check performance A/B workflow trust boundary
run: ./scripts/security/check_performance_ab_workflow.sh
dependency-review:
name: Dependency Review
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.action != 'closed'
permissions:
contents: read
@@ -113,6 +157,8 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Dependency Review
uses: actions/dependency-review-action@a1d282b36b6f3519aa1f3fc636f609c47dddb294 # v5
@@ -125,3 +171,28 @@ jobs:
# conscious re-review of the license/provenance claim (backlog#1181).
allow-dependencies-licenses: pkg:cargo/rustfs-uring@0.1.0
comment-summary-in-pr: always
alert-on-failure:
name: Alert on scheduled failure
# dependency-review is deliberately excluded: it only runs on pull_request,
# so it can never contribute a failure to a scheduled run.
needs: [cargo-deny, workflow-pin-report]
# A scheduled cargo-deny failure usually means the dependency tree just
# matched a newly published advisory — the single most important signal this
# workflow produces, and until now it was only visible to whoever happened to
# open the Actions tab. Same ci-8 mechanism coverage.yml and
# e2e-replication-nightly.yml already use.
if: always() && github.event_name == 'schedule' && contains(needs.*.result, 'failure')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
permissions:
contents: read
issues: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Open or update failure-tracking issue
uses: ./.github/actions/schedule-failure-issue
with:
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+40 -5
View File
@@ -50,12 +50,18 @@ on:
- "**/*.svg"
- ".gitignore"
- ".dockerignore"
- "flake.lock"
schedule:
- cron: "0 1 * * 0" # Weekly on Sunday 01:00 UTC (staggered after the ci.yml midnight cron)
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
build_docker:
description: "Build and push Docker images after binary build"
# Advisory only. docker.yml triggers on workflow_run and its job-level
# condition requires the triggering event to be a tag push, so a manual
# dispatch of this workflow never produces images regardless of this
# value. Kept because the summary step reports it; wiring it up would
# mean teaching docker.yml's version parser a second event shape.
description: "Build and push Docker images after binary build (ignored: dispatch runs never reach docker.yml)"
required: false
default: true
type: boolean
@@ -83,6 +89,7 @@ jobs:
build-check:
name: Build Strategy Check
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
outputs:
should_build: ${{ steps.check.outputs.should_build }}
build_type: ${{ steps.check.outputs.build_type }}
@@ -92,6 +99,8 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Determine build strategy
id: check
@@ -164,6 +173,7 @@ jobs:
name: Prepare Platform Matrix
needs: build-check
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
outputs:
matrix: ${{ steps.select.outputs.matrix }}
selected: ${{ steps.select.outputs.selected }}
@@ -171,10 +181,14 @@ jobs:
- name: Select target platforms
id: select
shell: bash
env:
# via env, not interpolation: a dispatch input is free-form text and
# would otherwise be pasted into the script for bash to evaluate.
RAW_PLATFORMS: ${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && github.event.inputs.platforms || 'all' }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
selected="${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && github.event.inputs.platforms || 'all' }}"
selected="$RAW_PLATFORMS"
selected="$(echo "${selected}" | tr -d '[:space:]')"
if [[ -z "${selected}" ]]; then
selected="all"
@@ -245,6 +259,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Setup Rust environment
@@ -253,9 +268,17 @@ jobs:
rust-version: stable
target: ${{ matrix.target }}
cache-shared-key: build-${{ matrix.target }}
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' || startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') }}
# main only. A cache saved on refs/tags/X is scoped to that tag: no
# other tag, no main run and no PR can restore it, so every release
# cycle wrote up to 12 entries of 1-2GB (preview tag plus final tag,
# six legs each) that nobody could read, evicting the hot lanes from
# the repo-wide 10GB quota. Tag builds still restore the main-scoped
# cache, since default-branch caches are readable from every ref.
# The one real cost: re-running a failed leg of the same tag no longer
# finds that tag's own warm cache and falls back to main's.
cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
install-cross-tools: ${{ matrix.cross }}
install-test-tools: 'false'
- name: Download static console assets
shell: bash
@@ -702,9 +725,14 @@ jobs:
needs: [ build-check, build-rustfs ]
if: always() && needs.build-check.outputs.should_build == 'true'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- name: Build completion summary
shell: bash
env:
# dispatch input via env: free-form text must not be pasted into the
# script for bash to evaluate.
INPUT_BUILD_DOCKER: ${{ github.event.inputs.build_docker }}
run: |
BUILD_TYPE="${{ needs.build-check.outputs.build_type }}"
VERSION="${{ needs.build-check.outputs.version }}"
@@ -746,7 +774,7 @@ jobs:
echo "🐳 Docker Images:"
if [[ "$BUILD_TYPE" == "preview" ]]; then
echo "⏭️ Preview tags do not publish Docker images"
elif [[ "${{ github.event.inputs.build_docker }}" == "false" ]]; then
elif [[ "$INPUT_BUILD_DOCKER" == "false" ]]; then
echo "⏭️ Docker image build was skipped (binary only build)"
elif [[ "$BUILD_STATUS" == "success" ]]; then
echo "🔄 Docker images will be built and pushed automatically via workflow_run event"
@@ -760,6 +788,7 @@ jobs:
needs: [ build-check, build-rustfs ]
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') && (needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'preview' || needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'release' || needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'prerelease')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
permissions:
contents: write
outputs:
@@ -769,6 +798,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Create GitHub Release
@@ -819,12 +849,15 @@ jobs:
needs: [ build-check, build-rustfs, create-release ]
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') && (needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'preview' || needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'release' || needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'prerelease')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
permissions:
contents: write
actions: read
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Download all build artifacts
uses: actions/download-artifact@37930b1c2abaa49bbe596cd826c3c89aef350131 # v7
@@ -910,6 +943,7 @@ jobs:
needs: [ build-check, publish-release ]
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') && (needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'release' || needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'prerelease')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
steps:
- name: Update latest.json
env:
@@ -969,6 +1003,7 @@ jobs:
needs: [ build-check, create-release, upload-release-assets ]
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') && (needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'preview' || needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'release' || needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'prerelease')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
+265
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
# Copyright 2026 RustFS Team
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
# Sole writer of the Rust dependency caches that ci.yml restores.
#
# Why this is a separate workflow rather than steps inside ci.yml: ci.yml's
# concurrency group cancels in-progress runs on main pushes, and merges land far
# faster than its 70-minute pipeline. Measured over 15 consecutive main pushes:
# 12 cancelled, 2 failed, 0 succeeded. A cancelled run never reaches
# Swatinem/rust-cache's post step (cache-on-failure does not cover cancellation),
# so the writer lanes were saving nothing and every PR paid a cold restore —
# 11.8-20.9 minutes of "Setup Rust environment" against 0.7-3.4 warm.
#
# Splitting cache writing out of the test pipeline lets ci.yml keep cancelling
# superseded runs (which is correct — nobody needs test results for a commit
# that is already three merges behind) while the caches still get written.
#
# The group below deliberately does NOT cancel in progress; see the comment on
# it for how that bounds concurrency and why it is scoped by event.
#
# Each job below owns exactly one shared-key and is the only place that sets
# cache-save-if to anything but 'false' for it; every lane in ci.yml reads.
# scripts/security/check_cache_save_if.sh keeps the declarations explicit.
#
# The builds are supersets of what the reading lanes compile, because a reader
# restores only what the writer saved. Feature resolution matters here: a lane
# built with e2e-test-hooks resolves dependency features differently, which
# changes -Cmetadata, so the plain build does not cover it. See
# rustfs/backlog#1600.
name: Cache Warm
on:
push:
branches: [ main ]
# Mirrors ci.yml's push paths-ignore: if a commit cannot change what ci.yml
# compiles, it cannot change what ci.yml needs restored either.
paths-ignore:
- "**.md"
- "docs/**"
- "deploy/**"
- "scripts/dev_*.sh"
- "scripts/probe.sh"
- "LICENSE*"
- ".gitignore"
- ".dockerignore"
- "README*"
- "**/*.png"
- "**/*.jpg"
- "**/*.svg"
- ".github/workflows/build.yml"
- ".github/workflows/docker.yml"
- ".github/workflows/audit.yml"
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
emit_timings:
description: >-
Also emit cargo --timings for the ci-dev build and upload it. Used to
decide whether sccache is worth adopting (rustfs/backlog#1601 gate).
required: false
default: false
type: boolean
permissions:
contents: read
# Scoped by event. A push run and a dispatch run do not compete: GitHub keeps
# one running plus one pending per group, so with a single shared group a
# manually dispatched run was displaced as pending by the next merge and
# cancelled — observed three times in a row, which made the --timings gate in
# rustfs/backlog#1601 effectively impossible to trigger while main was busy.
#
# Still no cancel-in-progress: a burst of merges collapses into "current run
# finishes, newest queued run follows" rather than a pile-up, which is what
# bounds this workflow to one self-hosted runner per event type.
#
# The two paths can now overlap and race to save the same key. That is benign:
# the loser finds the key already present and skips, and both builds produce the
# same artifacts from the same commit.
concurrency:
group: cache-warm-${{ github.event_name }}
cancel-in-progress: false
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
jobs:
# Readers: test-and-lint, test-ilm-integration-serial, build-rustfs-debug-binary,
# e2e-tests, e2e-full.
warm-ci-dev:
name: Warm ci-dev
runs-on: sm-standard-4
timeout-minutes: 90
env:
FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: ci-dev
cache-save-if: 'true'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
# rustfs/backlog#1601 gate. sccache can only cache compilation units whose
# --emit includes link, so it covers workspace rlibs and nothing else:
# clippy is metadata-only, and the ~100 test binaries, the rustfs bin and
# every build script invoke the system linker. Before spending a bucket,
# credentials and a supply-chain boundary on it, measure how much of the
# build is actually rlib codegen.
#
# Read from the report: workspace lib codegen as a share of the build, and
# s3select-query's own rlib as a share. The plan adopts sccache only above
# 50% and 25% respectively; if linking dominates instead, the answer is
# mold/lld plus split-debuginfo, which is exactly the part sccache cannot
# touch. Off by default — this doubles the ci-dev build.
- name: Build ci-dev superset (with --timings)
if: inputs.emit_timings
env:
CARGO_BUILD_JOBS: "2"
run: cargo build --workspace --all-targets --timings
- name: Upload cargo timings report
if: inputs.emit_timings
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
with:
name: cargo-timings-ci-dev
path: target/cargo-timings/
retention-days: 30
if-no-files-found: error
# --all-targets covers the test binaries nextest builds, including
# e2e_test, which test-and-lint's own run excludes. The second build adds
# the e2e-test-hooks feature resolution that build-rustfs-debug-binary uses
# and that no lint lane enables.
- name: Build ci-dev superset
env:
# Same limit ci.yml puts on its nextest step: this builds the same
# ~100 workspace test binaries, and three concurrent links saturate the
# self-hosted runner's overlay I/O and can wedge Cargo (#5394).
CARGO_BUILD_JOBS: "2"
run: |
cargo build --workspace --all-targets
cargo build -p rustfs --bins --features e2e-test-hooks
# Runs before rust-cache's post step, so these are the sizes it is about
# to archive. Reported so the cache-all-crates decision stays evidence-led:
# registry/src is what that flag prunes, registry/cache is what the pruned
# sources are re-unpacked from. See rustfs/backlog#1600.
- name: Report cache input sizes
if: always()
run: |
# tee, not a plain redirect: sent only to $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY these
# numbers are readable in the UI but absent from the job log, and the
# REST API exposes the log, not the summary — which made the figures
# unreachable for exactly the scripted comparison they exist for.
sizes="$(du -sh ~/.cargo/registry/src ~/.cargo/registry/cache \
~/.cargo/registry/index ~/.cargo/git target 2>/dev/null || true)"
echo "cache-input-sizes-begin"
printf '%s\n' "$sizes"
echo "cache-input-sizes-end"
{
echo "### Cache input sizes (ci-dev)"
echo '```'
printf '%s\n' "$sizes"
echo '```'
} >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
# Readers: test-and-lint-rio-v2, build-rustfs-debug-binary-rio-v2.
warm-ci-feat-rio:
name: Warm ci-feat-rio
runs-on: sm-standard-4
timeout-minutes: 90
env:
FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: ci-feat-rio
cache-save-if: 'true'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
- name: Build ci-feat-rio superset
run: |
cargo build -p rustfs -p rustfs-ecstore --all-targets --features rio-v2
cargo build -p rustfs --bins --features rio-v2,e2e-test-hooks
# Readers: the swift and sftp legs of test-and-lint-protocols. Built in
# sequence rather than as `--features swift,sftp`, which is a combination no
# lane actually compiles; running both leaves the union in target/.
warm-ci-feat-proto:
name: Warm ci-feat-proto
runs-on: sm-standard-4
timeout-minutes: 90
env:
FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: ci-feat-proto
cache-save-if: 'true'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
- name: Build ci-feat-proto superset
run: |
cargo build -p rustfs -p rustfs-protocols --all-targets --features swift
cargo build -p rustfs -p rustfs-protocols --all-targets --features sftp
# Reader: uring-integration. Runs on ubuntu-latest to match it: rust-cache's
# key covers runner.os and arch but not the runner label or image, so a cache
# written on sm-standard-4 would be restored by the hosted runner as if it
# belonged to it.
warm-ci-uring:
name: Warm ci-uring
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 60
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: ci-uring
cache-save-if: 'true'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
- name: Install build dependencies
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y protobuf-compiler
- name: Build ci-uring superset
run: cargo build -p rustfs-ecstore --all-targets
+19 -2
View File
@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@
# https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/defining-the-mergeability-of-pull-requests/troubleshooting-required-status-checks#handling-skipped-but-required-checks
#
# "Quick Checks" is mirrored here ahead of the ruleset change that will make it
# required too (rustfs/backlog#1599). It is not required yet, so today this job
# is inert; adding it first is what lets that ruleset change land without
# required too (rustfs/backlog#1599). Until that change lands this job is
# inert; mirroring it first is what lets the ruleset change happen without
# stranding docs-only PRs on a check nobody reports.
#
# Keep the paths list below in sync with the pull_request paths-ignore list
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ on:
- ".github/workflows/build.yml"
- ".github/workflows/docker.yml"
- ".github/workflows/audit.yml"
- "flake.lock"
permissions:
contents: read
@@ -78,6 +79,8 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Install ripgrep
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y ripgrep
@@ -99,6 +102,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Check architecture migration rules
run: ./scripts/check_architecture_migration_rules.sh
- name: Check logging guardrails
run: ./scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh
- name: Check tokio io-uring feature guard
run: ./scripts/check_no_tokio_io_uring.sh
@@ -108,9 +114,18 @@ jobs:
- name: Check body-cache whitelist guard
run: ./scripts/check_body_cache_whitelist.sh
- name: Check s3s footprint ratchet
run: ./scripts/check_s3s_footprint.sh
- name: Check no planning docs committed
run: ./scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh
- name: Check CI paths stay in sync
run: ./scripts/check_ci_paths_sync.sh
- name: Check io_uring lane --lib precondition
run: ./scripts/check_uring_lane_lib_only.sh
test-and-lint:
name: Test and Lint
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
@@ -118,6 +133,8 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
# Docs-only PRs skip the full code CI, but they are exactly where a
# planning-type document could be slipped in (git add -f bypasses
+265 -72
View File
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ on:
- ".github/workflows/build.yml"
- ".github/workflows/docker.yml"
- ".github/workflows/audit.yml"
- "flake.lock"
pull_request:
types: [ opened, synchronize, reopened, closed ]
branches: [ main ]
@@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ on:
- ".github/workflows/build.yml"
- ".github/workflows/docker.yml"
- ".github/workflows/audit.yml"
- "flake.lock"
merge_group:
types: [ checks_requested ]
schedule:
@@ -81,6 +83,7 @@ jobs:
name: Cancel Closed PR Runs
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.action == 'closed'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- name: Explain cancellation run
run: echo "PR closed; this run only cancels older runs in the same concurrency group."
@@ -89,8 +92,11 @@ jobs:
name: Typos
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.action != 'closed'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Typos check with custom config file
uses: crate-ci/typos@37bb98842b0d8c4ffebdb75301a13db0267cef89 # master
@@ -108,6 +114,8 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Install ripgrep
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y ripgrep
@@ -129,6 +137,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Check architecture migration rules
run: ./scripts/check_architecture_migration_rules.sh
- name: Check logging guardrails
run: ./scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh
- name: Check tokio io-uring feature guard
run: ./scripts/check_no_tokio_io_uring.sh
@@ -138,27 +149,54 @@ jobs:
- name: Check body-cache whitelist guard
run: ./scripts/check_body_cache_whitelist.sh
- name: Check s3s footprint ratchet
run: ./scripts/check_s3s_footprint.sh
- name: Check no planning docs committed
run: ./scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh
- name: Check CI paths stay in sync
run: ./scripts/check_ci_paths_sync.sh
- name: Check io_uring lane --lib precondition
run: ./scripts/check_uring_lane_lib_only.sh
test-and-lint:
name: Test and Lint
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.action != 'closed'
needs: [ quick-checks ]
runs-on: sm-standard-4
timeout-minutes: 90
# Both lines are required. Job-level `permissions` replaces the workflow
# block rather than merging with it, so declaring only `actions: write`
# would drop `contents: read` and break this job's checkout and the
# repo-token the setup action hands to setup-protoc.
permissions:
contents: read
actions: write
env:
FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
# This job's token can cancel runs and delete Actions caches. Checkout
# otherwise writes it into .git/config, where a PR's own build.rs or
# proc-macro could read it back out.
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: ci-test
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
# Every lane in this workflow reads its cache and none writes it.
# cache-warm.yml is the sole writer for all four keys: this workflow
# cancels superseded runs on main, and a cancelled run never reaches
# rust-cache's post step, so writing from here saved nothing (12 of 15
# consecutive main-push runs were cancelled). See rustfs/backlog#1600.
cache-shared-key: ci-dev
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
- name: Prepare test evidence
run: |
@@ -173,43 +211,54 @@ jobs:
# Clippy runs before the test pass: lint failures are the most common
# CI-only breakage and should surface in minutes, not after 20+ minutes
# of tests.
# Sampled too: clippy is the natural control arm for any CARGO_BUILD_JOBS
# experiment, since --all-targets is check-only for workspace members and
# never links the ~100 test binaries the limit exists to throttle.
- name: Run clippy lints
run: cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
run: |
./scripts/ci/resource_sampler.sh start clippy
trap './scripts/ci/resource_sampler.sh stop' EXIT
cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
- name: Run nextest tests
env:
# Three concurrent workspace test links saturate the self-hosted
# runner's overlay I/O and can wedge Cargo until the 75m timeout.
CARGO_BUILD_JOBS: "2"
# #5394 mitigation, now under a measured experiment (backlog#1601).
#
# 2 was chosen when three concurrent workspace test links were believed
# to saturate the runner's overlay I/O and wedge Cargo until the 75m
# timeout. cgroup v2 readings from the sampler show the pod actually
# has 14 CPUs and 28GB (peak use 2.1GB), so 2 throttles compilation to
# a seventh of what is available and memory was never the constraint —
# the label name "sm-standard-4" had led everyone, including the
# original mitigation, to assume 4 cores.
#
# Raised to 3 on main pushes and manual dispatches; PRs keep 2 so the
# merge path is untouched while the experiment runs.
#
# Dispatch is included because push alone cannot supply the samples:
# this workflow cancels superseded runs on main, and only 4 of the last
# 20 push-triggered Test and Lint jobs reached a terminal state — at
# that rate ten samples would take roughly fifty merges. The
# concurrency group is scoped by event_name, so a dispatched run has
# its own group and is not cancelled by merge traffic, which makes the
# sample collectable on demand rather than by waiting.
#
# Baseline over 17 samples at 2:
# median nextest/clippy step ratio 1.95, spread 1.85-2.06. The gate-2
# criterion is that ratio dropping at least 10% (below ~1.76) with no
# 75m timeout and no run showing three consecutive samples of
# rustc/collect2/rust-lld in D state. If it does not, the conclusion is
# "this limit is not the bottleneck" — fix it back at 2 and record the
# experiment, which is a result, not a failure.
#
# Must stay step-level: rust-cache hashes CARGO/CC/CFLAGS/CXX/CMAKE/RUST
# prefixed variables from process.env into the cache key, so promoting
# this to job level would rotate every key on this lane.
CARGO_BUILD_JOBS: ${{ (github.event_name == 'push' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch') && '3' || '2' }}
run: |
mkdir -p artifacts/test-and-lint
# Evidence sampler for issue #5394: the post-mortem pgrep below runs
# only after `timeout` has already TERM'd the whole cargo process
# group, so it cannot name a wedged process. Sample system and
# process state every 60s instead; the last samples before the
# timeout show what was stuck (rustc, linker, build script, memory
# pressure, ...). The log rides along in the existing artifact.
(
while true; do
{
echo "=== $(date --utc --iso-8601=seconds)"
echo "--- load"; cat /proc/loadavg
echo "--- psi"; grep -H . /proc/pressure/* 2>/dev/null || true
echo "--- mem"; free -m
echo "--- disk"; df -h / /home/runner 2>/dev/null || df -h /
echo "--- top-rss"
ps -eo pid,ppid,stat,etime,rss,pcpu,args --sort=-rss | head -15
echo "--- build/test processes"
ps -eo pid,ppid,stat,etime,rss,pcpu,args | grep -E '[c]argo|[r]ustc|[n]extest|[c]ollect2|rust-ll[d]|[b]uild-script|deps[/]' || true
echo "--- d-state (uninterruptible IO)"
ps -eo pid,stat,etime,args | awk 'NR > 1 && $2 ~ /D/' || true
echo
} >> artifacts/test-and-lint/sampler.log 2>&1 || true
sleep 60
done
) &
sampler_pid=$!
trap 'kill "${sampler_pid}" 2>/dev/null || true' EXIT
./scripts/ci/resource_sampler.sh start nextest
trap './scripts/ci/resource_sampler.sh stop' EXIT
set +e
NEXTEST_HIDE_PROGRESS_BAR=1 timeout --verbose --signal=TERM --kill-after=30s 75m \
cargo nextest run --profile ci --all --exclude e2e_test \
@@ -281,6 +330,50 @@ jobs:
- name: Run rebalance/decommission migration proofs
run: ./scripts/check_migration_gate_count.sh
# Early stop. Once this job has failed the PR cannot merge, so the sibling
# lanes are burning runners on a result nobody can act on: on run
# 30674613104 three lanes had already failed while Test and Lint and the
# rio-v2 variant kept going past 70 minutes.
#
# Only this job may cancel. The lanes that are NOT required checks
# (protocols, ILM, e2e, s3-tests) must never hold that power: a flake in
# one of them would turn the required "Test and Lint" into `cancelled`,
# which blocks the merge. Today a maintainer can merge with sftp red, and
# that has to stay true.
#
# These steps run last so the `if: always()` artifact upload above still
# captures logs and diagnostics before the run goes away.
- name: Annotate early-stop reason
if: failure() && github.event_name == 'pull_request'
run: |
{
echo "## CI early-stop"
echo "Job \`${GITHUB_JOB}\` (Test and Lint) failed; cancelling run ${GITHUB_RUN_ID} to free runners."
echo "Sibling jobs showing **cancelled** were stopped by this job, not by their own failure."
} >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
# curl rather than `gh`: every existing `gh` call in this repo runs on
# ubuntu-latest, and the sm-standard-* images are custom and trimmed (they
# ship no C toolchain, see the e2e job below), so `gh` is not known to
# exist here.
#
# Fork PRs are excluded explicitly instead of relying on the error path:
# their GITHUB_TOKEN is forced read-only and job-level permissions cannot
# raise it, so the call would always 403. Skipping keeps their logs clean.
- name: Cancel run on failure (same-repo PR only)
if: >-
failure() && github.event_name == 'pull_request'
&& github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository
continue-on-error: true
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
curl -fsS -X POST \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GH_TOKEN}" \
-H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
-H "X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28" \
"${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/actions/runs/${GITHUB_RUN_ID}/cancel" || true
# Dedicated serial lane for the ILM / lifecycle integration tests. These tests
# drive the object layer through process-global singletons (the GLOBAL_ENV
# ECStore, the global tier-config manager, background-expiry workers) and bind
@@ -294,6 +387,7 @@ jobs:
test-ilm-integration-serial:
name: ILM Integration (serial)
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.action != 'closed'
needs: [ quick-checks ]
runs-on: sm-standard-4
timeout-minutes: 45
env:
@@ -301,14 +395,16 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: ci-ilm-serial
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
cache-shared-key: ci-dev
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
# test_transition_and_restore_flows was re-enabled by rustfs/backlog#1303:
# its "missing xl.meta on disk2" was a test-util bug (open_disk hardcoded
@@ -331,6 +427,7 @@ jobs:
test-and-lint-rio-v2:
name: Test and Lint (rio-v2)
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.action != 'closed'
needs: [ quick-checks ]
runs-on: sm-standard-4
timeout-minutes: 60
env:
@@ -338,14 +435,16 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: ci-test-rio-v2
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
cache-shared-key: ci-feat-rio
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
- name: Run rio-v2 clippy lints
run: cargo clippy -p rustfs -p rustfs-ecstore --all-targets --features rio-v2 -- -D warnings
@@ -358,10 +457,17 @@ jobs:
test-and-lint-protocols:
name: "Test and Lint (${{ matrix.features.name }})"
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.action != 'closed'
needs: [ quick-checks ]
runs-on: sm-standard-4
timeout-minutes: 60
strategy:
fail-fast: false
# On a PR, one failing protocol leg is enough to know the PR is not ready,
# so stop the sibling leg instead of paying another ~40 minutes for it.
# Everywhere else (main pushes, the merge queue, the weekly schedule) keep
# the full signal: there we want to know whether swift AND sftp are broken,
# not just whichever failed first. This is the only part of the early-stop
# work that also covers fork PRs, since it needs no token.
fail-fast: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
matrix:
features:
- name: swift
@@ -373,14 +479,16 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: ci-test-${{ matrix.features.name }}
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
cache-shared-key: ci-feat-proto
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
- name: Run clippy with ${{ matrix.features.name }}
run: |
@@ -393,6 +501,7 @@ jobs:
build-rustfs-debug-binary:
name: Build RustFS Debug Binary
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.action != 'closed'
needs: [ quick-checks ]
runs-on: sm-standard-4
timeout-minutes: 30
env:
@@ -400,14 +509,16 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: ci-rustfs-debug-binary
cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
cache-shared-key: ci-dev
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
- name: Build debug binary
run: cargo build -p rustfs --bins --features e2e-test-hooks
@@ -423,6 +534,7 @@ jobs:
build-rustfs-debug-binary-rio-v2:
name: Build RustFS Debug Binary (rio-v2)
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.action != 'closed'
needs: [ quick-checks ]
runs-on: sm-standard-4
timeout-minutes: 30
env:
@@ -430,14 +542,16 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: ci-rustfs-debug-binary-rio-v2
cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
cache-shared-key: ci-feat-rio
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
- name: Build debug binary with rio-v2
run: cargo build -p rustfs --bins --features rio-v2,e2e-test-hooks
@@ -459,6 +573,7 @@ jobs:
# suite (measured 4m17s / 7m19s / 7m31s on runs 30678272341 / 30678117601 /
# 30662728539) and kept the cancellation run in progress for minutes.
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.action != 'closed'
needs: [ quick-checks ]
# GitHub-hosted ubuntu-latest runs a recent kernel with io_uring and, unlike
# a container, applies no seccomp filter that would block io_uring_setup — so
# the probe succeeds and the tests exercise the real UringBackend/FdCache/
@@ -469,17 +584,24 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
# Keeps its own key rather than joining ci-dev. rust-cache's key is
# built from runner.os/arch plus rustc and lockfile fingerprints — it
# does NOT include the runner label or image. ubuntu-latest and
# sm-standard-4 are therefore indistinguishable to it, so sharing a key
# would let two different system images overwrite each other's
# artifacts, and would make a 2-core hosted runner unpack ci-dev's ~3GB
# instead of this lane's ~1.3GB. cache-warm.yml warms this key on
# ubuntu-latest for the same reason.
cache-shared-key: ci-uring
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
- name: Install build dependencies
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y protobuf-compiler
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
# ext4 supports O_DIRECT; the runner's default TMPDIR may sit on tmpfs or
# overlayfs, where open(O_DIRECT) returns EINVAL/EOPNOTSUPP and the native
@@ -506,7 +628,17 @@ jobs:
RUSTFS_IO_URING_READ_ENABLE: "true"
RUSTFS_URING_TESTS_MUST_RUN: "1"
TMPDIR: /mnt/rustfs-odirect
run: cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore uring_ -- --test-threads=1 --nocapture
# --lib narrows what gets compiled, not what gets run: every selected
# test lives in the lib target. The 7 integration binaries under
# crates/ecstore/tests/ each reported "running 0 tests" here, so they
# were compiled and linked for nothing.
#
# The `uring_` filter must stay exactly as it is. libtest matches on
# substring, so it also selects names containing `during_` — 6 of the 18
# selected tests are such incidental matches. Narrowing the filter to
# `io_uring` would silently drop them, which is a coverage change.
# scripts/check_uring_lane_lib_only.sh guards the --lib precondition.
run: cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore --lib uring_ -- --test-threads=1 --nocapture
e2e-tests:
name: End-to-End Tests
@@ -516,6 +648,8 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
# Full setup with dependency caching: the smoke-suite step below
# compiles the e2e_test crate, which pulls in most of the workspace.
@@ -524,9 +658,9 @@ jobs:
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: ci-e2e
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
cache-shared-key: ci-dev
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
# Download after the cache restore so the freshly built binary from the
# build job always wins over anything restored into target/debug.
@@ -539,15 +673,17 @@ jobs:
- name: Make binary executable
run: chmod +x ./target/debug/rustfs
# Guard the security negative-auth smoke subset (backlog#1151 sec-5)
# against a rename or deletion silently dropping it out of the e2e-smoke
# filter. The script lists what the profile selects and fails if the count
# of security auth-rejection tests falls below the committed floor in
# .config/security-smoke-floor.txt (infra-12 count-floor mechanism). Run
# before the smoke suite so a thinned gate fails fast; the `nextest list`
# here compiles the e2e_test binaries the run below reuses.
- name: Check security smoke subset count floor
run: ./scripts/check_security_smoke_count.sh check
# Build the e2e test graph once. The archive is reused by the security
# count-floor check and the smoke run below, avoiding a second compile of
# the same e2e_test target on cold runners (backlog#1645).
- name: Archive e2e smoke test binaries
env:
NEXTEST_ARCHIVE: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-smoke.tar.zst
NEXTEST_LISTING: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-smoke-list.json
run: |
cargo nextest archive --profile e2e-smoke -p e2e_test --archive-file "${NEXTEST_ARCHIVE}"
cargo nextest list --profile e2e-smoke --archive-file "${NEXTEST_ARCHIVE}" --message-format json > "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
./scripts/check_security_smoke_count.sh check "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
# PR smoke subset of the in-repo e2e suite (backlog#1149 ci-4). The
# profile.e2e-smoke default-filter in .config/nextest.toml is the single
@@ -555,7 +691,30 @@ jobs:
# adding new e2e jobs here. Each test spawns its own rustfs server on a
# random port and reuses the downloaded debug binary above.
- name: Run e2e smoke suite
run: cargo nextest run --profile e2e-smoke -p e2e_test
env:
NEXTEST_ARCHIVE: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-smoke.tar.zst
RUSTFS_E2E_LOG_DIR: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-smoke-logs
run: |
cargo nextest run --profile e2e-smoke --archive-file "${NEXTEST_ARCHIVE}" \
--status-level all --final-status-level all --failure-output final
- name: Upload e2e smoke diagnostics
if: failure()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
with:
name: e2e-smoke-diagnostics-${{ github.run_number }}
path: |
${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-smoke-logs/
${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-smoke-list.json
if-no-files-found: warn
- name: Upload e2e smoke JUnit report
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
with:
name: e2e-smoke-junit-${{ github.run_number }}
path: target/nextest/e2e-smoke/junit.xml
if-no-files-found: warn
- name: Install s3s-e2e test tool
uses: taiki-e/cache-cargo-install-action@7447f04c51f2ba27ca35e7f1e28fab848c5b3ba7 # v2
@@ -600,14 +759,42 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: ci-e2e
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
cache-shared-key: ci-dev
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@ece7cb06caefa5fff74198d8649806c4678c61a1 # v6.3.0
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- name: Install awscurl
run: |
python3 -m pip install --user --upgrade pip "awscurl==0.44"
echo "AWSCURL_PATH=$HOME/.local/bin/awscurl" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Verify awscurl
run: test -x "$AWSCURL_PATH"
- name: Install Vault
run: |
VAULT_VERSION="1.17.6"
VAULT_ARCHIVE="vault_${VAULT_VERSION}_linux_amd64.zip"
curl -fsSLo "$RUNNER_TEMP/$VAULT_ARCHIVE" "https://releases.hashicorp.com/vault/${VAULT_VERSION}/${VAULT_ARCHIVE}"
echo "0cddc1fbbb88583b5ba5b845f9f8fae47c6fb39a6d48cd543c6ba6fd3ac1a669 $RUNNER_TEMP/$VAULT_ARCHIVE" | sha256sum --check --status
unzip -q "$RUNNER_TEMP/$VAULT_ARCHIVE" -d "$RUNNER_TEMP/vault-bin"
echo "RUSTFS_TEST_VAULT_BIN=$RUNNER_TEMP/vault-bin/vault" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Verify Vault
run: |
"$RUSTFS_TEST_VAULT_BIN" version
# Download after the cache restore so the freshly built binary from the
# build job always wins over anything restored into target/debug.
@@ -643,6 +830,8 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Clean up previous test run
run: |
@@ -697,6 +886,8 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Download debug binary
uses: actions/download-artifact@37930b1c2abaa49bbe596cd826c3c89aef350131 # v7
@@ -769,6 +960,8 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Download debug binary
uses: actions/download-artifact@37930b1c2abaa49bbe596cd826c3c89aef350131 # v7
+23 -4
View File
@@ -22,11 +22,18 @@ on:
issue_comment:
types: [created, edited]
# Least privilege at the top, widened per job below. This workflow runs on
# pull_request_target and issue_comment, so it holds full secrets on every fork
# PR and on any comment anyone writes — the one place in this repository where a
# compromised action would be handed a repo-write token. It does not check out
# or execute PR code, so there is no pwn-request path today, but the blast
# radius should not depend on that staying true.
#
# contents: write in particular was never used: the signature records are
# written to rustfs/cla through the scoped app token created below, and nothing
# here writes to this repository's contents.
permissions:
contents: write
pull-requests: write
issues: write
checks: write
contents: read
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.issue.number || github.ref }}
@@ -36,14 +43,26 @@ jobs:
cancel-closed-pr-runs:
name: Cancel Closed PR Runs
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' && github.event.action == 'closed'
# Echoes one line; the run exists only so the concurrency group cancels the
# in-flight run of a closed PR.
permissions: {}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- name: Explain cancellation run
run: echo "PR closed; this run only cancels older runs in the same concurrency group."
cla:
if: ${{ (github.event_name != 'issue_comment' || github.event.issue.pull_request) && (github.event_name != 'pull_request_target' || github.event.action != 'closed') }}
# checks: write reports the merge-queue check run; pull-requests and issues
# let cla-bot comment and label. contents stays read — see the note above.
permissions:
contents: read
checks: write
issues: write
pull-requests: write
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
steps:
- name: Report CLA result for merge queue
if: github.event_name == 'merge_group'
+5 -1
View File
@@ -62,14 +62,16 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: ci-coverage
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
- name: Install cargo-llvm-cov
uses: taiki-e/install-action@bffeee26d4db9be238a4ea78d8826604ebcb594d # v2
@@ -116,6 +118,8 @@ jobs:
issues: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Open or update failure-tracking issue
uses: ./.github/actions/schedule-failure-issue
with:
+34 -20
View File
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ jobs:
github.event.workflow_run.head_branch != 'main' &&
!contains(github.event.workflow_run.head_branch, '-preview'))
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
outputs:
should_build: ${{ steps.check.outputs.should_build }}
should_push: ${{ steps.check.outputs.should_push }}
@@ -97,11 +98,18 @@ jobs:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
# For workflow_run events, checkout the specific commit that triggered the workflow
ref: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_sha || github.sha }}
- name: Check build conditions
id: check
env:
# dispatch inputs via env, not `${{ }}` interpolation: they are
# free-form strings and would otherwise be evaluated by bash.
INPUT_VERSION: ${{ github.event.inputs.version }}
INPUT_PUSH_IMAGES: ${{ github.event.inputs.push_images }}
INPUT_FORCE_REBUILD: ${{ github.event.inputs.force_rebuild }}
run: |
should_build=false
should_push=false
@@ -202,9 +210,9 @@ jobs:
elif [[ "${{ github.event_name }}" == "workflow_dispatch" ]]; then
# Manual trigger
input_version="${{ github.event.inputs.version }}"
input_version="$INPUT_VERSION"
version="${input_version}"
should_push="${{ github.event.inputs.push_images }}"
should_push="$INPUT_PUSH_IMAGES"
should_build=true
# Get short SHA
@@ -212,7 +220,7 @@ jobs:
echo "🎯 Manual Docker build triggered:"
echo " 📋 Requested version: $input_version"
echo " 🔧 Force rebuild: ${{ github.event.inputs.force_rebuild }}"
echo " 🔧 Force rebuild: $INPUT_FORCE_REBUILD"
echo " 🚀 Push images: $should_push"
case "$input_version" in
@@ -298,6 +306,8 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Login to Docker Hub
uses: docker/login-action@c94ce9fb468520275223c153574b00df6fe4bcc9 # v3
@@ -333,32 +343,28 @@ jobs:
CREATE_LATEST="${{ needs.build-check.outputs.create_latest }}"
VARIANT_SUFFIX="${{ matrix.suffix }}"
# Convert version format for Dockerfile compatibility
# Convert version format for Dockerfile compatibility. The former
# DOCKER_CHANNEL was "release" down every branch and was passed as a
# build-arg no Dockerfile declares, so it is gone.
case "$VERSION" in
"latest")
# For stable latest, use RELEASE=latest + release CHANNEL
DOCKER_RELEASE="latest"
DOCKER_CHANNEL="release"
;;
v*)
# For versioned releases (v1.0.0), remove 'v' prefix for Dockerfile
DOCKER_RELEASE="${VERSION#v}"
DOCKER_CHANNEL="release"
;;
*)
# For other versions, pass as-is
DOCKER_RELEASE="${VERSION}"
DOCKER_CHANNEL="release"
;;
esac
echo "docker_release=$DOCKER_RELEASE" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "docker_channel=$DOCKER_CHANNEL" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "🐳 Docker build parameters:"
echo " - Original version: $VERSION"
echo " - Docker RELEASE: $DOCKER_RELEASE"
echo " - Docker CHANNEL: $DOCKER_CHANNEL"
# Generate tags based on build type
# Only support release and prerelease builds (no development builds)
@@ -412,18 +418,24 @@ jobs:
push: ${{ needs.build-check.outputs.should_push == 'true' }}
tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
cache-from: |
type=gha,scope=docker-${{ matrix.variant }}
cache-to: |
type=gha,mode=max,scope=docker-${{ matrix.variant }}
# No layer cache. This build compiles nothing — it downloads a
# release zip and runs apk/apt — so the cache could only save the
# minute or two those take, while creating a correctness problem: with
# RELEASE=latest the binary URL is resolved by curl *inside* a RUN
# layer, and the layer key does not include what that resolved to. A
# rebuild at the same RELEASE value (dispatch with version=latest, or
# a re-run of the same version) would hit the old layer and ship the
# previous release's binary. mode=max also consumed the same 10GB
# Actions cache quota the Rust lanes are fighting over.
#
# Only RELEASE is passed: it is the sole build-arg the Dockerfiles
# declare besides TARGETARCH. BUILDTIME, VERSION, BUILD_TYPE, REVISION
# and CHANNEL were never read by any stage (and BUILDTIME's $(date ...)
# was a literal here, not a shell substitution). BUILD_DATE and VCS_REF
# are declared by the Dockerfiles but deliberately left unset —
# supplying them would change the published image labels.
build-args: |
BUILDTIME=$(date -u +'%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')
VERSION=${{ needs.build-check.outputs.version }}
BUILD_TYPE=${{ needs.build-check.outputs.build_type }}
REVISION=${{ github.sha }}
RELEASE=${{ steps.meta.outputs.docker_release }}
CHANNEL=${{ steps.meta.outputs.docker_channel }}
BUILDKIT_INLINE_CACHE=1
provenance: true
sbom: true
# Add retry mechanism by splitting the build process
@@ -439,6 +451,7 @@ jobs:
needs: [ build-check, build-docker ]
if: needs.build-check.outputs.should_build == 'true' && needs.build-check.outputs.should_push == 'true'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write
@@ -493,6 +506,7 @@ jobs:
needs: [ build-check, build-docker ]
if: always() && needs.build-check.outputs.should_build == 'true'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- name: Docker build completion summary
run: |
+19 -16
View File
@@ -14,25 +14,24 @@
# Nightly full replication e2e lane (backlog#1147 repl-1, deps: ci-4).
#
# The per-PR gate (ci.yml `e2e-tests` job, `--profile e2e-smoke`) runs the 20
# FAST replication tests. This scheduled lane runs the remaining 27
# heavier replication e2e tests that are unfit for a per-PR gate:
#
# * 2 remote-target TLS validation tests.
# * 12 bucket-replication data-plane/helper tests (PUT/delete + poll for
# convergence; two replicate over HTTPS, two pin active SSE failure
# contracts, and one guards event/history observers). The SSE-S3 contract
# remains ignored under backlog#1291.
# * 11 `_real_dual_node` site-replication tests (each spawns TWO rustfs
# servers and drives the cross-process site-replication control plane).
# * 1 `_real_three_node` site-replication test.
# * 1 `_real_single_node` service-account round-trip test.
# The per-PR gate (ci.yml `e2e-tests` job, `--profile e2e-smoke`) runs the
# FAST replication tests. This scheduled lane runs the remaining heavier
# replication e2e tests that are unfit for a per-PR gate: remote-target TLS
# validation, bucket-replication data-plane/helper tests (PUT/delete + poll
# for convergence, HTTPS targets, active SSE failure contracts, event/history
# observers), and the `_real_dual_node` / `_real_three_node` /
# `_real_single_node` site-replication tests that each spawn full rustfs
# server processes.
#
# The selection is the [profile.e2e-repl-nightly] default-filter in
# .config/nextest.toml — the single wiring mechanism (repl-1 / ci-4). Do NOT
# add ad-hoc cargo-test steps here; change the filterset instead.
# add ad-hoc cargo-test steps here; change the filterset instead. The
# authoritative membership and count come from
# `cargo nextest list -p e2e_test --profile e2e-repl-nightly`; the PR/nightly
# count invariant is maintained next to the filtersets in .config/nextest.toml
# (deliberately not duplicated here).
#
# Explicit division of labor: these 27 tests run ONLY here, never double-run
# Explicit division of labor: the nightly subset runs ONLY here, never double-run
# in ci-5's future e2e-full merge gate. TODO(ci-7): once the ci domain's
# consolidated scheduled e2e workflow exists, fold this interim repl-owned lane
# into it rather than growing a second scheduled entrypoint.
@@ -64,14 +63,16 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: ci-e2e-repl
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
# awscurl lets the STS dual-node test actually exercise its path. Without
# it the test skips gracefully with a visible log line
@@ -124,6 +125,8 @@ jobs:
issues: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Open or update failure-tracking issue
uses: ./.github/actions/schedule-failure-issue
with:
+11
View File
@@ -45,6 +45,13 @@
# The PR gate (ci.yml s3-implemented-tests) is unaffected: it avoids Docker
# via DEPLOY_MODE=binary and defers all pip setup to run.sh's self-bootstrap.
# DISABLED. This workflow is switched off in the repository's Actions settings
# (state: disabled_manually) and does not run on any trigger, including its cron
# and workflow_dispatch. That state lives in GitHub's UI and is invisible when
# reading this file, which has already misled at least one audit — hence this
# banner. Re-enabling is a UI action; anyone doing so should first check that the
# workflow still matches the current CI layout. See rustfs/backlog#1603.
#
name: e2e-s3tests
on:
@@ -135,6 +142,8 @@ jobs:
TEST_MODE: ${{ matrix.test-mode }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
# Provision Python explicitly rather than trusting the runner image to
# ship a working pip (ci-1: a bare python3 without pip is what broke the
@@ -354,6 +363,8 @@ jobs:
issues: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Open or update failure-tracking issue
uses: ./.github/actions/schedule-failure-issue
with:
+16 -1
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,13 @@
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
# DISABLED. This workflow is switched off in the repository's Actions settings
# (state: disabled_manually) and does not run on any trigger, including its cron
# and workflow_dispatch. That state lives in GitHub's UI and is invisible when
# reading this file, which has already misled at least one audit — hence this
# banner. Re-enabling is a UI action; anyone doing so should first check that the
# workflow still matches the current CI layout. See rustfs/backlog#1603.
#
name: Fuzz
on:
@@ -59,6 +66,7 @@ jobs:
name: Cancel Closed PR Runs
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.action == 'closed'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- name: Explain cancellation run
run: echo "PR closed; this run only cancels older runs in the same concurrency group."
@@ -79,13 +87,14 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: nightly
cache-shared-key: fuzz-${{ hashFiles('fuzz/Cargo.lock') }}
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' || github.event_name == 'schedule' }}
- name: Install cargo-fuzz
@@ -145,6 +154,8 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Download prebuilt fuzz binaries
uses: actions/download-artifact@37930b1c2abaa49bbe596cd826c3c89aef350131 # v7
@@ -200,6 +211,8 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Download prebuilt fuzz binaries
uses: actions/download-artifact@37930b1c2abaa49bbe596cd826c3c89aef350131 # v7
@@ -247,6 +260,8 @@ jobs:
issues: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Open or update failure-tracking issue
uses: ./.github/actions/schedule-failure-issue
with:
+32 -7
View File
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ permissions:
jobs:
build-helm-package:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
if: |
(github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && !contains(github.event.inputs.version, '-preview')) ||
(
@@ -49,16 +50,26 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout helm chart repo
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
# Both inputs reach the shell through env rather than `${{ }}`
# interpolation. A git ref name may contain `$(...)` — anything without a
# space is a legal tag — and interpolation pastes it into the script
# verbatim, where bash would run it. Reading "$RAW_INPUT" instead makes it
# data.
- name: Normalize release version
id: version
env:
RAW_INPUT: ${{ github.event.inputs.version }}
RAW_BRANCH: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}
run: |
set -eux
if [ "${{ github.event_name }}" = "workflow_dispatch" ]; then
RAW="${{ github.event.inputs.version }}"
RAW="$RAW_INPUT"
else
RAW="${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}"
RAW="$RAW_BRANCH"
fi
case "$RAW" in
@@ -73,10 +84,13 @@ jobs:
./scripts/helm_chart_version.sh "$RAW_TAG"
- name: Replace chart version and app version
env:
CHART_VERSION: ${{ steps.version.outputs.chart_version }}
APP_VERSION: ${{ steps.version.outputs.app_version }}
run: |
set -eux
sed -i -E 's/^version:.*/version: "${{ steps.version.outputs.chart_version }}"/' helm/rustfs/Chart.yaml
sed -i -E 's/^appVersion:.*/appVersion: "${{ steps.version.outputs.app_version }}"/' helm/rustfs/Chart.yaml
sed -i -E "s/^version:.*/version: \"${CHART_VERSION}\"/" helm/rustfs/Chart.yaml
sed -i -E "s/^appVersion:.*/appVersion: \"${APP_VERSION}\"/" helm/rustfs/Chart.yaml
- name: Set up Helm
uses: azure/setup-helm@b9e51907a09c216f16ebe8536097933489208112 # v4.3.0
@@ -101,6 +115,7 @@ jobs:
publish-helm-package:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
needs: [ build-helm-package ]
if: needs.build-helm-package.result == 'success'
@@ -108,6 +123,8 @@ jobs:
- name: Checkout helm package repo
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
# persist-credentials-exempt: this checkout's token IS the push credential —
# the job git-pushes to rustfs/helm below. Clearing it breaks chart publishing.
repository: rustfs/helm
token: ${{ secrets.RUSTFS_HELM_PACKAGE }}
@@ -123,11 +140,19 @@ jobs:
- name: Generate index
run: helm repo index . --url https://charts.rustfs.com
# app_version is derived from the triggering tag name, and this job holds
# the cross-repository push token with rustfs/helm already checked out —
# the worst place in the repo to paste an attacker-influenced string into
# a shell line. Passed through env so bash treats it as data.
- name: Push helm package and index file
env:
GIT_USERNAME: ${{ secrets.USERNAME }}
GIT_EMAIL: ${{ secrets.EMAIL_ADDRESS }}
APP_VERSION: ${{ needs.build-helm-package.outputs.app_version }}
run: |
set -eux
git config --global user.name "${{ secrets.USERNAME }}"
git config --global user.email "${{ secrets.EMAIL_ADDRESS }}"
git config --global user.name "${GIT_USERNAME}"
git config --global user.email "${GIT_EMAIL}"
git add .
git commit -m "Update rustfs helm package with ${{ needs.build-helm-package.outputs.app_version }}." || echo "No changes to commit"
git commit -m "Update rustfs helm package with ${APP_VERSION}." || echo "No changes to commit"
git push origin main
+8
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@@ -12,6 +12,13 @@
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
# DISABLED. This workflow is switched off in the repository's Actions settings
# (state: disabled_manually) and does not run on any trigger, including its cron
# and workflow_dispatch. That state lives in GitHub's UI and is invisible when
# reading this file, which has already misled at least one audit — hence this
# banner. Re-enabling is a UI action; anyone doing so should first check that the
# workflow still matches the current CI layout. See rustfs/backlog#1603.
#
name: "issue-translator"
on:
issue_comment:
@@ -26,6 +33,7 @@ permissions:
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: usthe/issues-translate-action@b41f55ddc81d7d54bd542a4f289fe28ec081898e # v2.7
with:
+58 -5
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@@ -18,11 +18,25 @@
# This is NOT a PR gate. The fixtures are real MinIO backend trees generated on
# the fly (they are gitignored, never committed), so the job regenerates them
# each run with Docker and then runs the `#[ignore]` reader tests in
# crates/ecstore/tests/minio_generated_read_test.rs.
# rustfs/src/storage/minio_generated_read_test.rs.
#
# Scope: end-to-end MinIO-to-RustFS SSE interop is NOT implemented yet. Both
# envelope parsers reject MinIO's own wrapped-DEK shape — see
# `is_data_key_envelope` in crates/kms/src/encryption/dek.rs and the
# `deny_unknown_fields` `LocalSseDekEnvelope` in rustfs/src/storage/sse.rs — and
# closing that gap is tracked in rustfs/backlog#1638. Treat this job as the
# harness for #1638, not as standing evidence that a MinIO migration reads back.
#
# Runner: GitHub-hosted `ubuntu-latest`. It reliably ships Docker + Python,
# unlike the self-hosted fleet, whose pods drift in Docker/pip availability
# (see the infra note in e2e-s3tests.yml). Nightly + manual only.
# DISABLED. This workflow is switched off in the repository's Actions settings
# (state: disabled_manually) and does not run on any trigger, including its cron
# and workflow_dispatch. That state lives in GitHub's UI and is invisible when
# reading this file, which has already misled at least one audit — hence this
# banner. Re-enabling is a UI action; anyone doing so should first check that the
# workflow still matches the current CI layout. See rustfs/backlog#1603.
#
name: minio-interop
on:
@@ -48,23 +62,62 @@ jobs:
env:
# Fixed 32-byte test KMS key baked into the fixture lab; not a secret.
RUSTFS_MINIO_STATIC_KMS_KEY_B64: IyqsU3kMFloCNup4BsZtf/rmfHVcTgznO2F25CkEH1g=
# Single definition of "the interop tests", shared by the guard step and
# the run step so the two cannot drift apart.
#
# These used to live in crates/ecstore/tests/minio_generated_read_test.rs
# and were selected with `-p rustfs-ecstore -E
# 'binary(minio_generated_read_test)'`. #5435 moved them into the `rustfs`
# crate as a `#[cfg(test)] mod`, which deleted that test binary; the
# selector was never updated and has selected zero interop tests ever
# since (cargo-nextest 0.9.140 now rejects it outright: "operator didn't
# match any binary names", exit 94).
INTEROP_PACKAGE: rustfs
INTEROP_FEATURES: rio-v2
INTEROP_FILTER: "test(minio_generated_read_test::)"
INTEROP_REQUIRED_TESTS: '["reads_minio_generated_sse_s3_multipart_fixture", "reads_minio_generated_sse_kms_multipart_fixture", "rejects_minio_generated_sse_s3_fixture_with_wrong_kms_key", "rejects_minio_generated_sse_s3_fixture_with_truncated_ciphertext"]'
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: ci-minio-interop
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
- name: Generate real MinIO fixtures via Docker
run: bash crates/rio-v2/tests/minio_fixture_lab/capture_via_docker.sh
# `binary(...)` at least dies loudly when nothing matches, but `test(...)`
# is a perfectly valid filterset that matches zero tests, so the next
# rename or module move would leave this job selecting nothing and
# reporting success without executing a single interop assertion. Count
# the selection and require every core reader test, while allowing new
# reader cases to be added without changing this guard.
#
# Count only `filter-match.status == "matches"`: the top-level
# `test-count` in the JSON is the package total and ignores `-E` entirely.
- name: Assert the interop selector still matches tests
run: |
set -euo pipefail
selection="$(cargo nextest list --run-ignored ignored-only \
-p "$INTEROP_PACKAGE" --features "$INTEROP_FEATURES" \
-E "$INTEROP_FILTER" --message-format json \
| python3 -c 'import json,os,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); required=json.loads(os.environ["INTEROP_REQUIRED_TESTS"]); matched=[name for suite in d.get("rust-suites", {}).values() for name,test in suite.get("testcases", {}).items() if test.get("filter-match", {}).get("status") == "matches"]; missing=[test for test in required if not any(name.endswith("minio_generated_read_test::" + test) for name in matched)]; print(len(matched)); print(",".join(missing))')"
count="$(printf '%s\n' "$selection" | sed -n '1p')"
missing="$(printf '%s\n' "$selection" | sed -n '2p')"
echo "interop tests selected: ${count}"
if [ -n "${missing}" ]; then
echo "::error::Selector '${INTEROP_FILTER}' in package '${INTEROP_PACKAGE}' is missing required tests: ${missing}. The MinIO interop reader tests have moved or been renamed; fix the selector instead of running an incomplete matrix. Context: rustfs/backlog#1638."
exit 1
fi
- name: Run MinIO interop reader tests
run: |
cargo nextest run --run-ignored ignored-only \
-p rustfs-ecstore --features rio-v2 \
-E 'binary(minio_generated_read_test)'
cargo nextest run --run-ignored ignored-only --no-tests=fail \
-p "$INTEROP_PACKAGE" --features "$INTEROP_FEATURES" \
-E "$INTEROP_FILTER"
+11
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@@ -45,6 +45,13 @@
# docker-capable self-hosted `dind-sm-standard-2` label was the alternative but
# has fewer cores and reintroduces fleet-state risk for no reliability gain.
# DISABLED. This workflow is switched off in the repository's Actions settings
# (state: disabled_manually) and does not run on any trigger, including its cron
# and workflow_dispatch. That state lives in GitHub's UI and is invisible when
# reading this file, which has already misled at least one audit — hence this
# banner. Re-enabling is a UI action; anyone doing so should first check that the
# workflow still matches the current CI layout. See rustfs/backlog#1603.
#
name: mint
on:
@@ -118,6 +125,8 @@ jobs:
timeout-minutes: 120
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Enable buildx
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@8d2750c68a42422c14e847fe6c8ac0403b4cbd6f # v3
@@ -263,6 +272,8 @@ jobs:
issues: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Open or update failure-tracking issue
uses: ./.github/actions/schedule-failure-issue
with:
+196
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@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
# Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
name: Nightly GNU Build
on:
schedule:
- cron: "0 0 * * *"
timezone: "Asia/Shanghai"
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: nightly-gnu-build-main-${{ github.event_name }}
cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' }}
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
RUST_BACKTRACE: 1
jobs:
build:
name: Build x86_64 GNU
runs-on: sm-standard-2
timeout-minutes: 150
env:
FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
steps:
- name: Checkout main branch
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
ref: main
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
cache-shared-key: build-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
install-test-tools: 'false'
- name: Build RustFS
run: cargo build --release --locked --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu -p rustfs --bins
# Live-Vault lane for the rustfs-kms suite (rustfs/backlog#1774).
#
# RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN is the single switch that adds the Vault KV2 and
# Vault Transit backends to every for_each_backend spec in
# crates/kms/tests/behavior_*.rs (see crates/kms/AGENTS.md). rotate and
# versioning are advertised only by the Vault backends, so without this lane
# no CI run ever asserts the working half of behavior_rotation.rs — a
# rotation that silently dropped historical key versions would stay green.
# The same lane runs the dev-Vault #[ignore] tests and the two self-hosting
# live scripts (AppRole login, three-node Raft leader failover).
#
# GitHub-hosted ubuntu-latest, deliberately not the self-hosted sm-standard
# fleet: the HA failover script needs a working Docker daemon, and the
# self-hosted fleet is heterogeneous — a docker-dependent workflow has been
# burned by it before (see the banner in e2e-s3tests.yml, rustfs/backlog#1149).
kms-vault-lane:
name: KMS live Vault lane
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 90
env:
FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
# Root token of the ephemeral loopback dev server. Not a secret: the
# server lives only for this job, listens on 127.0.0.1, and holds only
# keys the tests create. The literal value matters — the dev-Vault
# #[ignore] fixtures in crates/kms/src/backends/vault.rs hardcode it.
VAULT_LANE_TOKEN: dev-only-token
VAULT_LANE_ADDR: http://127.0.0.1:8200
# Keeps a runner-level proxy from swallowing the loopback dev-server
# traffic (see crates/kms/AGENTS.md). Actions env keys are
# case-insensitive, so only the uppercase form is set; reqwest reads
# either casing.
NO_PROXY: 127.0.0.1,localhost
steps:
- name: Checkout main branch
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
ref: main
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
# Dedicated key: rust-cache cannot tell runner images apart, so
# sharing a key with an sm-standard lane would let two different
# system images overwrite each other's artifacts (same reasoning as
# ci.yml's ci-uring lane). Saved from this nightly job itself so the
# next night starts warm.
cache-shared-key: kms-vault-lane
cache-save-if: 'true'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
install-test-tools: 'false'
- name: Install Vault CLI
run: |
set -euo pipefail
wget -qO- https://apt.releases.hashicorp.com/gpg | sudo gpg --dearmor -o /usr/share/keyrings/hashicorp-archive-keyring.gpg
echo "deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/hashicorp-archive-keyring.gpg] https://apt.releases.hashicorp.com $(lsb_release -cs) main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/hashicorp.list >/dev/null
sudo apt-get update -qq
sudo apt-get install -y -qq vault
vault version
- name: Start Vault dev server with KV2 and Transit engines
run: |
set -euo pipefail
nohup vault server -dev \
-dev-root-token-id="${VAULT_LANE_TOKEN}" \
-dev-listen-address=127.0.0.1:8200 >/tmp/vault-dev.log 2>&1 &
for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
if curl -fsS "${VAULT_LANE_ADDR}/v1/sys/health" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
break
fi
sleep 1
done
curl -fsS "${VAULT_LANE_ADDR}/v1/sys/health"
export VAULT_ADDR="${VAULT_LANE_ADDR}" VAULT_TOKEN="${VAULT_LANE_TOKEN}"
# Dev mode mounts KV v2 at secret/ by default; Transit is explicit.
# Prove both engines actually work rather than assuming the defaults.
vault secrets enable transit
vault kv put secret/rustfs-ci-lane-probe value=ok >/dev/null
vault kv get secret/rustfs-ci-lane-probe >/dev/null
vault write -f transit/keys/rustfs-ci-lane-probe >/dev/null
- name: Run rustfs-kms suite with the Vault lane on
env:
RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN: ${{ env.VAULT_LANE_TOKEN }}
RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDR: ${{ env.VAULT_LANE_ADDR }}
run: cargo test -p rustfs-kms --locked
- name: Run dev-Vault ignored tests
env:
RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN: ${{ env.VAULT_LANE_TOKEN }}
RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDR: ${{ env.VAULT_LANE_ADDR }}
# Filters select the dev-Vault-only #[ignore] tests. The AWS #[ignore]
# tests (backends::aws, service_manager) stay excluded — they need real
# AWS credentials and create billable keys. The AppRole and HA #[ignore]
# tests are excluded here because their own scripts below provision the
# Vault topology they need.
run: |
set -euo pipefail
cargo test -p rustfs-kms --locked --lib backends::contract_tests -- --ignored
cargo test -p rustfs-kms --locked --lib backends::vault -- --ignored
cargo test -p rustfs-kms --locked --test vault_fault_injection -- --ignored
- name: Run AppRole live checks (self-hosting ephemeral Vault)
run: bash scripts/test/vault_approle_kms_live.sh
- name: Show Vault dev server log on failure
if: failure()
run: tail -n 200 /tmp/vault-dev.log || true
# Three-node Raft leader failover (crates/kms/tests/vault_ha_failover_live.rs,
# first validated by rustfs/rustfs#5653). Its own job so an election-timing
# flake cannot mask the main lane's verdict, and vice versa. The script
# provisions and tears down its own Docker cluster.
kms-vault-ha-failover:
name: KMS Vault HA failover lane
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 60
env:
FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
NO_PROXY: 127.0.0.1,localhost
steps:
- name: Checkout main branch
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
ref: main
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
cache-shared-key: kms-vault-lane
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
install-test-tools: 'false'
- name: Run HA leader failover live checks (three-node Raft cluster in Docker)
run: bash scripts/test/vault_ha_kms_live.sh
+9 -2
View File
@@ -19,9 +19,12 @@ on:
schedule:
- cron: '0 5 * * 0' # Weekly on Sunday 05:00 UTC (staggered after the midnight ci/build crons)
# GITHUB_TOKEN only needs to read the repository here: the branch push and the
# pull request are both created by update-flake-lock using the
# FLAKE_UPDATE_TOKEN PAT below, not by this token. Leaving write on it hands a
# repo-write credential to an unattended weekly job that does not use it.
permissions:
contents: write
pull-requests: write
contents: read
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
@@ -37,6 +40,10 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
# persist-credentials-exempt: update-flake-lock pushes the branch and opens
# the PR. It passes FLAKE_UPDATE_TOKEN to create-pull-request itself rather
# than reusing .git/config, but that is unverified — exempt until a
# workflow_dispatch run confirms it (rustfs/backlog#1602).
- name: Install Nix
uses: DeterminateSystems/determinate-nix-action@629b284231c2a82554b724e357e47fc6020833c8 # v3
+10
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,13 @@
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
# DISABLED. This workflow is switched off in the repository's Actions settings
# (state: disabled_manually) and does not run on any trigger, including its cron
# and workflow_dispatch. That state lives in GitHub's UI and is invisible when
# reading this file, which has already misled at least one audit — hence this
# banner. Re-enabling is a UI action; anyone doing so should first check that the
# workflow still matches the current CI layout. See rustfs/backlog#1603.
#
name: Nix CI
on:
@@ -46,6 +53,7 @@ jobs:
name: Cancel Closed PR Runs
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.action == 'closed'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- name: Explain cancellation run
run: echo "PR closed; this run only cancels older runs in the same concurrency group."
@@ -63,6 +71,8 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Install Nix
uses: DeterminateSystems/determinate-nix-action@4eea0b33e3d1f02ecfe37cf16e7204c424009606 # v3.21.0
+477
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@@ -0,0 +1,477 @@
# Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
# Package Workflow - Build DEB/RPM packages
#
# This workflow builds DEB and RPM packages from pre-built Linux binaries
# and uploads them to Cloudflare R2.
#
# Trigger:
# - release published: automatically package when a GitHub release is published
# - workflow_dispatch: manual trigger with optional tag/run_id
#
# Flow:
# 1. Find the Build workflow run for the release tag
# 2. Download Linux binaries (x86_64-gnu, aarch64-gnu) from build artifacts
# 3. Build DEB packages for amd64 and arm64
# 4. Build RPM packages for x86_64 and aarch64
# 5. Upload all packages to Cloudflare R2
name: Package DEB/RPM
permissions:
contents: read
actions: read
on:
release:
types: [ published ]
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
tag:
description: "Release tag to package (e.g. 1.0.0-beta.12). Leave empty for latest main build."
required: false
type: string
build_run_id:
description: "Build workflow run ID (overrides tag lookup)"
required: false
type: string
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.release.tag_name || github.event.inputs.tag || github.run_id }}
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
# Resolve which build run to use and extract version info
resolve:
name: Resolve Build
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
outputs:
version: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.version }}
build_type: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.build_type }}
build_run_id: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.build_run_id }}
tag: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.tag }}
steps:
- name: Resolve build run
id: resolve
shell: bash
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
INPUT_TAG: ${{ github.event.inputs.tag }}
INPUT_RUN_ID: ${{ github.event.inputs.build_run_id }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# Determine tag
if [[ "${{ github.event_name }}" == "release" ]]; then
TAG="${{ github.event.release.tag_name }}"
elif [[ -n "$INPUT_TAG" ]]; then
TAG="$INPUT_TAG"
else
TAG=""
fi
echo "Tag: ${TAG:-<none>}"
# Determine build run ID
BUILD_RUN_ID=""
if [[ -n "$INPUT_RUN_ID" ]]; then
# Explicit run ID takes priority
BUILD_RUN_ID="$INPUT_RUN_ID"
echo "Using explicit build run ID: $BUILD_RUN_ID"
elif [[ -n "$TAG" ]]; then
# Find the build run that produced this tag
echo "Looking for build run for tag: $TAG"
BUILD_RUN_ID=$(gh api \
"repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/workflows/build.yml/runs?branch=${TAG}&status=success&per_page=1" \
--jq '.workflow_runs[0].id' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
if [[ -z "$BUILD_RUN_ID" || "$BUILD_RUN_ID" == "null" ]]; then
# Tag might not be a branch; try event=push with head_branch matching
BUILD_RUN_ID=$(gh api \
"repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/workflows/build.yml/runs?event=push&status=success&per_page=100" \
--jq ".workflow_runs[] | select(.head_branch == \"$TAG\") | .id" 2>/dev/null | head -1 || echo "")
fi
if [[ -z "$BUILD_RUN_ID" || "$BUILD_RUN_ID" == "null" ]]; then
echo "❌ No successful build run found for tag: $TAG"
exit 1
fi
echo "Found build run: $BUILD_RUN_ID"
else
# No tag — latest successful main build
echo "No tag specified, looking for latest main build"
BUILD_RUN_ID=$(gh api \
"repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/workflows/build.yml/runs?branch=main&status=success&per_page=1" \
--jq '.workflow_runs[0].id' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
if [[ -z "$BUILD_RUN_ID" || "$BUILD_RUN_ID" == "null" ]]; then
echo "❌ No successful main build found"
exit 1
fi
echo "Latest main build: $BUILD_RUN_ID"
fi
# Determine version and build type
if [[ -n "$TAG" ]]; then
VERSION="$TAG"
if [[ "$TAG" == *"-preview"* ]]; then
BUILD_TYPE="preview"
elif [[ "$TAG" == *"alpha"* || "$TAG" == *"beta"* || "$TAG" == *"rc"* ]]; then
BUILD_TYPE="prerelease"
else
BUILD_TYPE="release"
fi
else
SHORT_SHA=$(gh api "repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/runs/${BUILD_RUN_ID}" \
--jq '.head_sha' 2>/dev/null | head -c 7)
VERSION="dev-${SHORT_SHA}"
BUILD_TYPE="development"
fi
{
echo "version=$VERSION"
echo "build_type=$BUILD_TYPE"
echo "build_run_id=$BUILD_RUN_ID"
echo "tag=${TAG}"
} >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "📊 Resolved:"
echo " Version: $VERSION"
echo " Build type: $BUILD_TYPE"
echo " Build run ID: $BUILD_RUN_ID"
# Build DEB and RPM packages for each architecture
package:
name: Package (${{ matrix.arch }})
needs: resolve
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
include:
- arch: x86_64
deb_arch: amd64
rpm_arch: x86_64
artifact_name: "rustfs-linux-x86_64-gnu"
- arch: aarch64
deb_arch: arm64
rpm_arch: aarch64
artifact_name: "rustfs-linux-aarch64-gnu"
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Download binary artifact from build run
uses: actions/download-artifact@37930b1c2abaa49bbe596cd826c3c89aef350131 # v7
with:
pattern: ${{ matrix.artifact_name }}*
path: ./binary-artifact
run-id: ${{ needs.resolve.outputs.build_run_id }}
github-token: ${{ github.token }}
merge-multiple: true
- name: Extract binary
id: binary
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
ZIP_FILE=$(find ./binary-artifact -name "*.zip" -type f | head -1)
if [[ -z "$ZIP_FILE" ]]; then
echo "❌ No binary artifact found"
ls -la ./binary-artifact/ || true
exit 1
fi
echo "Found artifact: $ZIP_FILE"
mkdir -p ./bin
unzip -o "$ZIP_FILE" -d ./bin
if [[ ! -f ./bin/rustfs ]]; then
echo "❌ rustfs binary not found in archive"
exit 1
fi
chmod +x ./bin/rustfs
ls -lh ./bin/rustfs
echo "✅ Binary extracted"
- name: Build DEB package
id: deb
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
VERSION="${{ needs.resolve.outputs.version }}"
DEB_ARCH="${{ matrix.deb_arch }}"
# DEB version: replace - with ~ (1.0.0-beta.12 -> 1.0.0~beta.12)
# Use a variable for ~ to prevent tilde expansion by bash
TILDE='~'
DEB_VERSION="${VERSION/-/$TILDE}"
PKG_DIR="rustfs_${DEB_VERSION}_${DEB_ARCH}"
echo "Building DEB: ${PKG_DIR}.deb"
mkdir -p "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN"
mkdir -p "${PKG_DIR}/usr/bin"
mkdir -p "${PKG_DIR}/etc/default"
mkdir -p "${PKG_DIR}/lib/systemd/system"
mkdir -p "${PKG_DIR}/usr/share/doc/rustfs"
cp ./bin/rustfs "${PKG_DIR}/usr/bin/"
chmod 755 "${PKG_DIR}/usr/bin/rustfs"
cp deploy/build/rustfs.service "${PKG_DIR}/lib/systemd/system/"
cat > "${PKG_DIR}/etc/default/rustfs" << 'ENVEOF'
# RustFS Environment Configuration
# See https://rustfs.com/docs/ for more information
# RUSTFS_VOLUMES=""
# RUSTFS_ROOT_USER=""
# RUSTFS_ROOT_PASSWORD=""
ENVEOF
cat > "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/control" << EOF
Package: rustfs
Version: ${DEB_VERSION}
Section: utils
Priority: optional
Architecture: ${DEB_ARCH}
Depends: libc6 (>= 2.31)
Maintainer: RustFS Team <support@rustfs.com>
Description: High-performance distributed object storage
RustFS is a high-performance distributed object storage software
built using Rust. It is compatible with MinIO and S3 API.
Homepage: https://rustfs.com
EOF
cat > "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/postinst" << 'POSTINST'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
if ! getent passwd rustfs > /dev/null 2>&1; then
useradd -r -s /bin/false -d /opt/rustfs rustfs
fi
mkdir -p /opt/rustfs /data/rustfs /var/log/rustfs
chown rustfs:rustfs /opt/rustfs /data/rustfs /var/log/rustfs
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
systemctl daemon-reload
fi
echo "RustFS installed. Configure /etc/default/rustfs then: systemctl start rustfs"
POSTINST
chmod 755 "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/postinst"
cat > "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/prerm" << 'PRERM'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ] && systemctl is-active --quiet rustfs; then
systemctl stop rustfs
fi
PRERM
chmod 755 "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/prerm"
cat > "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/postrm" << 'POSTRM'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
systemctl daemon-reload
fi
POSTRM
chmod 755 "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/postrm"
cp LICENSE "${PKG_DIR}/usr/share/doc/rustfs/"
cp README.md "${PKG_DIR}/usr/share/doc/rustfs/"
fakeroot dpkg-deb --build "${PKG_DIR}"
DEB_FILE="${PKG_DIR}.deb"
ls -lh "$DEB_FILE"
echo "deb_file=$DEB_FILE" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "✅ DEB built: $DEB_FILE"
- name: Build RPM package
id: rpm
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
VERSION="${{ needs.resolve.outputs.version }}"
RPM_ARCH="${{ matrix.rpm_arch }}"
echo "Building RPM for ${RPM_ARCH}"
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y ruby ruby-dev build-essential
sudo gem install fpm
# Create config file for fpm (DEB build creates it in its package dir structure,
# but fpm needs the file to exist before packaging)
mkdir -p ./tmp-pkg/etc/default
cat > ./tmp-pkg/etc/default/rustfs << 'ENVEOF'
# RustFS Environment Configuration
# See https://rustfs.com/docs/ for more information
# RUSTFS_VOLUMES=""
# RUSTFS_ROOT_USER=""
# RUSTFS_ROOT_PASSWORD=""
ENVEOF
fpm -s dir -t rpm \
--name rustfs \
--version "$VERSION" \
--architecture "$RPM_ARCH" \
--depends "glibc >= 2.31" \
--maintainer "RustFS Team <support@rustfs.com>" \
--description "High-performance distributed object storage" \
--url "https://rustfs.com" \
--license "Apache-2.0" \
--after-install <(cat <<'POSTINST'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
if ! getent passwd rustfs > /dev/null 2>&1; then
useradd -r -s /bin/false -d /opt/rustfs rustfs
fi
mkdir -p /opt/rustfs /data/rustfs /var/log/rustfs
chown rustfs:rustfs /opt/rustfs /data/rustfs /var/log/rustfs
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
systemctl daemon-reload
fi
POSTINST
) \
--before-remove <(cat <<'PRERM'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ] && systemctl is-active --quiet rustfs; then
systemctl stop rustfs
fi
PRERM
) \
--after-remove <(cat <<'POSTRM'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
systemctl daemon-reload
fi
POSTRM
) \
--config-files /etc/default/rustfs \
./bin/rustfs=/usr/bin/rustfs \
./tmp-pkg/etc/default/rustfs=/etc/default/rustfs \
deploy/build/rustfs.service=/lib/systemd/system/rustfs.service \
LICENSE=/usr/share/doc/rustfs/LICENSE \
README.md=/usr/share/doc/rustfs/README.md
RPM_FILE=$(ls -1 rustfs-*.rpm 2>/dev/null | head -1)
if [[ -z "$RPM_FILE" ]]; then
echo "❌ RPM build failed"
exit 1
fi
ls -lh "$RPM_FILE"
echo "rpm_file=$RPM_FILE" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "✅ RPM built: $RPM_FILE"
- name: Upload packages to artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
with:
name: packages-${{ matrix.arch }}
path: |
*.deb
*.rpm
retention-days: 30
- name: Upload packages to Cloudflare R2
if: env.R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID != ''
env:
R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
R2_ENDPOINT: ${{ secrets.R2_ENDPOINT }}
R2_BUCKET: ${{ secrets.R2_BUCKET }}
AWS_EC2_METADATA_DISABLED: true
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [[ -z "$R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID" || -z "$R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY" || -z "$R2_ENDPOINT" || -z "$R2_BUCKET" ]]; then
echo "⚠️ R2 credentials missing, skipping upload"
exit 0
fi
if ! command -v aws >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y awscli
fi
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="$R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID"
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="$R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"
export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION="auto"
BUILD_TYPE="${{ needs.resolve.outputs.build_type }}"
if [[ "$BUILD_TYPE" == "development" ]]; then
R2_PREFIX="artifacts/rustfs/packages/dev"
else
R2_PREFIX="artifacts/rustfs/packages/release"
fi
R2_PATH="s3://${R2_BUCKET}/${R2_PREFIX}/"
echo "📤 Uploading to $R2_PATH"
DEB_FILE="${{ steps.deb.outputs.deb_file }}"
RPM_FILE="${{ steps.rpm.outputs.rpm_file }}"
for f in "$DEB_FILE" "$RPM_FILE"; do
if [[ -n "$f" && -f "$f" ]]; then
echo "Uploading: $f"
aws s3 cp "$f" "$R2_PATH" --endpoint-url "$R2_ENDPOINT" --only-show-errors
fi
done
echo "✅ Upload complete"
# Also upload as latest for release/prerelease
if [[ "$BUILD_TYPE" == "release" || "$BUILD_TYPE" == "prerelease" ]]; then
LATEST_PATH="s3://${R2_BUCKET}/artifacts/rustfs/packages/latest/"
for f in "$DEB_FILE" "$RPM_FILE"; do
if [[ -n "$f" && -f "$f" ]]; then
echo "Uploading latest: $(basename "$f")"
aws s3 cp "$f" "$LATEST_PATH" --endpoint-url "$R2_ENDPOINT" --only-show-errors
fi
done
echo "✅ Latest packages updated"
fi
# Summary
summary:
name: Summary
needs: [ resolve, package ]
if: always()
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
- name: Print summary
shell: bash
run: |
echo "## 📦 Package Summary" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "| Item | Value |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "|------|-------|" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "| Version | \`${{ needs.resolve.outputs.version }}\` |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "| Build Type | ${{ needs.resolve.outputs.build_type }} |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "| Build Run | #${{ needs.resolve.outputs.build_run_id }} |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "| Package Status | ${{ needs.package.result }} |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
+85 -72
View File
@@ -17,11 +17,18 @@
# Two entry points, honestly scoped:
# * schedule (nightly, on main): post-merge detection — catches a regression
# within 24h of landing, not before merge.
# * pull_request labeled `perf-ab`: opt-in pre-merge gate for a specific PR.
# The `perf-deliberate-tradeoff` label runs the gate with --allow-regression so
# a deliberate correctness cost (e.g. the #4221 fsync durability fix) is
# recorded but does not block (rustfs/backlog#935 correction 1).
# * workflow_dispatch: an explicitly selected trusted ref.
# The dispatch input can run the gate with --allow-regression so a deliberate
# correctness cost (e.g. the #4221 fsync durability fix) is recorded, not
# blocked (rustfs/backlog#935 correction 1).
# DISABLED. This workflow is switched off in the repository's Actions settings
# (state: disabled_manually) and does not run on any trigger, including its cron
# and workflow_dispatch. That state lives in GitHub's UI and is invisible when
# reading this file, which has already misled at least one audit — hence this
# banner. Re-enabling is a UI action; anyone doing so should first check that the
# workflow still matches the current CI layout. See rustfs/backlog#1603.
#
name: Performance A/B
on:
@@ -39,8 +46,6 @@ on:
required: false
default: false
type: boolean
pull_request:
types: [labeled, synchronize, reopened]
push:
# Every main commit pre-builds and caches its release binary (perf-3) so the
# nightly A/B restores a ready baseline instead of paying the double build.
@@ -48,14 +53,6 @@ on:
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
# Per-PR: a new push cancels the previous (up to 90-minute) A/B run instead of
# stacking them. Nightly schedule and manual dispatch get a unique group and
# always run to completion.
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.run_id }}
cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
@@ -63,8 +60,8 @@ env:
jobs:
# perf-3: on every push to main, build the release binary once and cache it
# keyed by commit SHA (rustfs-baseline-<sha>). The nightly A/B (and, later, the
# perf-7 PR gate) restore this instead of paying the ~32min-per-side source
# keyed by commit SHA (rustfs-baseline-<sha>). The warp-ab measurements
# restore this instead of paying the ~32min-per-side source
# build. That double build is what pushed the expanded 24-cell nightly past its
# ceiling — 2026-07-11..07-14 all cancelled on the 120min timeout. Incremental
# builds off the shared cargo cache keep each push cheap, and building on the
@@ -92,6 +89,8 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
@@ -99,7 +98,6 @@ jobs:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: warp-ab-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Build release rustfs
run: cargo build --release --bin rustfs
@@ -118,17 +116,11 @@ jobs:
warp-ab:
name: Warp A/B budget gate
# Always run on schedule / manual dispatch. Opt-in on PRs: only when the
# `perf-ab` label is present, and for `labeled` events only when the label
# being added is `perf-ab` itself (adding an unrelated label to an opted-in
# PR must not re-run the gate). Never on push — that event only feeds
# build-baseline-cache above.
# Always run on schedule / manual dispatch. Never on push — that event only
# feeds build-baseline-cache above.
if: >-
github.event_name == 'schedule' ||
github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' ||
(github.event_name == 'pull_request' &&
contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'perf-ab') &&
(github.event.action != 'labeled' || github.event.label.name == 'perf-ab'))
github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'
runs-on: sm-standard-2
# With perf-3's cached baseline binary the common (cache-hit) nightly is
# measurement-only and finishes well under 50min. This ceiling stays
@@ -142,6 +134,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
fetch-depth: 0 # baseline is built from origin/main
- name: Setup Rust environment
@@ -150,7 +143,6 @@ jobs:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: warp-ab-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
cache-save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Install warp
run: |
@@ -162,13 +154,11 @@ jobs:
- name: Decide exemption
id: exempt
env:
INPUT_ALLOW_REGRESSION: ${{ github.event.inputs.allow_regression }}
run: |
allow="false"
if [[ "${{ github.event_name }}" == "pull_request" ]] \
&& ${{ contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'perf-deliberate-tradeoff') }}; then
allow="true"
fi
if [[ "${{ github.event.inputs.allow_regression }}" == "true" ]]; then
if [[ "$INPUT_ALLOW_REGRESSION" == "true" ]]; then
allow="true"
fi
echo "allow_regression=$allow" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
@@ -215,8 +205,34 @@ jobs:
cp target/release/rustfs baseline-bin/rustfs
echo "built=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Build baseline on cache miss (different candidate)
id: baseline_build
if: >-
steps.baseline_cache.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' &&
steps.commits.outputs.baseline_sha != steps.commits.outputs.candidate_sha
run: |
set -euo pipefail
baseline_root="$RUNNER_TEMP/rustfs-baseline-${{ github.run_id }}"
baseline_target="$RUNNER_TEMP/rustfs-baseline-target-${{ github.run_id }}"
git worktree add --detach "$baseline_root" "${{ steps.commits.outputs.baseline_sha }}"
cargo build --release --manifest-path "$baseline_root/Cargo.toml" --bin rustfs --target-dir "$baseline_target"
mkdir -p baseline-bin
cp "$baseline_target/release/rustfs" baseline-bin/rustfs
git worktree remove --force "$baseline_root"
echo "built=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Build candidate binary
id: candidate_build
if: steps.commits.outputs.baseline_sha != steps.commits.outputs.candidate_sha
run: |
set -euo pipefail
cargo build --release --bin rustfs
mkdir -p candidate-bin
cp target/release/rustfs candidate-bin/rustfs
echo "built=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Save self-healed baseline to cache
if: steps.selfheal.outputs.built == 'true'
if: steps.selfheal.outputs.built == 'true' || steps.baseline_build.outputs.built == 'true'
uses: actions/cache/save@55cc8345863c7cc4c66a329aec7e433d2d1c52a9 # v6
with:
path: baseline-bin/rustfs
@@ -224,62 +240,66 @@ jobs:
- name: Run warp A/B and gate
id: ab
env:
INPUT_DURATION: ${{ github.event.inputs.duration }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# Budget note: with perf-3's cached baseline the nightly does no source
# build on a cache hit, so the wall-clock is dominated by the short warp
# matrix — duration/rounds/cooldown are kept small to fit all 24 cells
# (6 workloads x 2 phases x 2 drive-sync) rather than dropping cells.
# The formal runner executes A1 baseline -> B1 candidate -> B2 candidate
# -> A2 baseline for each workload and drive-sync cell. It requires three
# rounds per leg to emit tail latency and error-rate evidence.
# --health-timeout 180 outlasts the server's own 120s startup-readiness
# budget, which the rig's previous 60s health poll undershot (the first
# two nightly failures). perf-6 recalibrates these once the noise study
# lands.
duration="${{ github.event.inputs.duration || '12s' }}"
duration="${INPUT_DURATION:-12s}"
baseline_sha="${{ steps.commits.outputs.baseline_sha }}"
candidate_sha="${{ steps.commits.outputs.candidate_sha }}"
baseline_hit="${{ steps.baseline_cache.outputs.cache-hit }}"
selfheal_built="${{ steps.selfheal.outputs.built }}"
baseline_built="${{ steps.baseline_build.outputs.built }}"
candidate_built="${{ steps.candidate_build.outputs.built }}"
args=(--duration "$duration" --rounds 2 --cooldown 5 --health-timeout 180)
args=(--duration "$duration" --rounds 3 --cooldown 5 --health-timeout 180 --baseline-revision "$baseline_sha" --candidate-revision "$candidate_sha")
if [[ "$baseline_hit" == "true" || "$selfheal_built" == "true" ]]; then
if [[ "$baseline_hit" == "true" || "$selfheal_built" == "true" || "$baseline_built" == "true" ]]; then
chmod +x baseline-bin/rustfs
base_bin="$PWD/baseline-bin/rustfs"
args+=(--baseline-bin "$base_bin")
if [[ "$baseline_hit" == "true" ]]; then
base_src="actions-cache (rustfs-baseline-$baseline_sha)"
else
elif [[ "$selfheal_built" == "true" ]]; then
base_src="source build (cache self-heal, saved as rustfs-baseline-$baseline_sha)"
else
base_src="isolated origin/main source build (saved as rustfs-baseline-$baseline_sha)"
fi
if [[ "$candidate_sha" == "$baseline_sha" ]]; then
# Nightly on main: the candidate is the same commit as the baseline,
# so reuse the one binary for both phases and skip all builds.
args+=(--candidate-bin "$base_bin" --skip-build)
args+=(--candidate-bin "$base_bin")
cand_src="same binary as baseline (same commit)"
else
elif [[ "$candidate_built" == "true" ]]; then
chmod +x candidate-bin/rustfs
args+=(--candidate-bin "$PWD/candidate-bin/rustfs")
cand_src="source build of the checked-out ref"
else
echo "::error::candidate binary was not built" >&2
exit 2
fi
else
# Cache miss with candidate != baseline (opt-in PR gate only): fall
# back to the source double-build. With the post-#4806 LTO profile
# this will overrun the job budget and alert; rerun once the push
# cache build for origin/main has completed, or wait for perf-7's
# merge-base caching.
args+=(--baseline-ref origin/main)
base_src="source build of origin/main (cache miss)"
cand_src="source build of the checked-out ref"
echo "::error::baseline binary was not restored or built" >&2
exit 2
fi
args+=(--provenance-note "baseline commit: $baseline_sha - $base_src")
args+=(--provenance-note "candidate commit: $candidate_sha - $cand_src")
echo "baseline binary: $base_src"
echo "candidate binary: $cand_src"
if [[ "${{ steps.exempt.outputs.allow_regression }}" == "true" ]]; then
args+=(--allow-regression --exemption-reason "labeled perf-deliberate-tradeoff / dispatch override")
args+=(--allow-regression --exemption-reason "workflow dispatch override")
fi
# Do not let a gate FAIL abort the job here; capture status and surface
# it after the PR comment is posted.
# it after the step summary is written.
set +e
bash scripts/run_hotpath_warp_ab.sh "${args[@]}"
bash scripts/run_hotpath_warp_abba.sh "${args[@]}"
echo "status=$?" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
set -e
# Locate the newest run dir + gate.md for the summary/comment/artifact
@@ -287,10 +307,10 @@ jobs:
# holds server-logs/ for diagnosis.
# Run dirs are UTC-timestamp names (no special chars); ls is safe here.
# shellcheck disable=SC2012
run_dir="$(ls -td target/hotpath-ab/*/ 2>/dev/null | head -n1 || true)"
run_dir="$(ls -td target/hotpath-abba/*/ 2>/dev/null | head -n1 || true)"
echo "run_dir=${run_dir%/}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# shellcheck disable=SC2012
gate_md="$(ls -t target/hotpath-ab/*/gate.md 2>/dev/null | head -n1 || true)"
gate_md="$(ls -t target/hotpath-abba/*/candidate_gate.md 2>/dev/null | head -n1 || true)"
echo "gate_md=$gate_md" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Upload A/B results
@@ -298,10 +318,10 @@ jobs:
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
with:
name: hotpath-warp-ab-${{ github.run_number }}
# Includes per-cell median_summary.csv / baseline_compare.csv, gate.md,
# Includes per-cell median_summary.csv / baseline_compare.csv, both gates,
# and server-logs/ (rustfs.log + startup env per phase) so a failed run
# is diagnosable. Short retention: this is churny nightly debug data.
path: target/hotpath-ab/
path: target/hotpath-abba/
if-no-files-found: warn
retention-days: 14
@@ -342,13 +362,6 @@ jobs:
fi
} >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
- name: Comment gate result on PR
if: always() && github.event_name == 'pull_request' && steps.ab.outputs.gate_md != ''
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
gh pr comment "${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}" --body-file "${{ steps.ab.outputs.gate_md }}"
# Scheduled failure alerting is handled by the alert-on-failure job below
# (perf-2 consuming ci-8's schedule-failure-issue composite action).
@@ -357,7 +370,7 @@ jobs:
run: |
status="${{ steps.ab.outputs.status }}"
if [[ "$status" != "0" ]]; then
echo "::error::warp A/B budget gate failed (exit $status). See the step summary / PR comment / gate.md artifact." >&2
echo "::error::warp A/B budget gate failed (exit $status). See the step summary / gate.md artifact." >&2
exit "$status"
fi
echo "warp A/B budget gate passed."
@@ -367,14 +380,12 @@ jobs:
needs: [warp-ab]
# `always()` is required: without it this job is skipped when a needed
# job fails. Alerts only for scheduled (nightly) runs (backlog#1149
# ci-8); PR and manual dispatch failures are already watched by a human.
# ci-8); manual dispatch failures are already watched by a human.
# `cancelled` is included alongside `failure` on purpose: a job that hits
# timeout-minutes ends as `cancelled`, and the 2026-07-11..07-14 nightly
# timeouts went silent precisely because the guard was failure-only. The
# composite action already reports cancelled/timed-out jobs in the issue
# body. (Scheduled runs get a unique concurrency group with
# cancel-in-progress off, so a cancellation here means a timeout/manual
# abort, never a superseding run.)
# body.
if: >-
always() && github.event_name == 'schedule' &&
(contains(needs.*.result, 'failure') || contains(needs.*.result, 'cancelled'))
@@ -385,6 +396,8 @@ jobs:
issues: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Open or update failure-tracking issue
uses: ./.github/actions/schedule-failure-issue
with:
+81
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
# Copyright 2026 RustFS Team
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
# Asserts that the self-hosted runners are still ephemeral — one job per pod.
#
# This repository is public and its pull_request jobs run on those runners,
# executing the PR's own build.rs, proc-macros and tests. The only thing keeping
# that code from reaching a later job is that each ARC pod handles exactly one
# job and is then destroyed. That guarantee lives in the ARC scale-set
# configuration, outside this repository, where it can be changed without any PR
# — so it is asserted here from the outside, against real run data, instead of
# being assumed.
#
# Monthly rather than per-PR: the property changes only when someone
# reconfigures the scale set, and the check costs a few dozen API calls.
# See docs/ci/runners.md and rustfs/backlog#1602.
name: Runner Hygiene
on:
schedule:
- cron: "0 6 1 * *" # Monthly, 1st at 06:00 UTC (after the daily audit cron)
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: runner-hygiene
cancel-in-progress: false
jobs:
check-ephemerality:
name: Check runner ephemerality
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
# Exit 2 (inconclusive / broken) is deliberately not a pass: a window
# where every sm-* job was still queued would otherwise look identical to
# a clean bill of health.
- name: Assert one job per self-hosted runner
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: ./scripts/ci/check_runner_ephemerality.sh 40
alert-on-failure:
name: Alert on scheduled failure
needs: [check-ephemerality]
# Same ci-8 mechanism as coverage.yml, audit.yml and the nightly lanes:
# scheduled runs file a tracking issue, manual dispatch stays quiet so
# debugging never produces a spurious alert.
if: always() && github.event_name == 'schedule' && contains(needs.*.result, 'failure')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
permissions:
contents: read
issues: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Open or update failure-tracking issue
uses: ./.github/actions/schedule-failure-issue
with:
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
@@ -24,6 +24,13 @@
# The run itself is expected to end red (the forced failure); only the
# alert-on-failure job result matters.
# DISABLED. This workflow is switched off in the repository's Actions settings
# (state: disabled_manually) and does not run on any trigger, including its cron
# and workflow_dispatch. That state lives in GitHub's UI and is invisible when
# reading this file, which has already misled at least one audit — hence this
# banner. Re-enabling is a UI action; anyone doing so should first check that the
# workflow still matches the current CI layout. See rustfs/backlog#1603.
#
name: Schedule Failure Alert Drill
on:
@@ -56,6 +63,8 @@ jobs:
issues: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Open or update failure-tracking issue
uses: ./.github/actions/schedule-failure-issue
with:
+8
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@@ -12,6 +12,13 @@
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
# DISABLED. This workflow is switched off in the repository's Actions settings
# (state: disabled_manually) and does not run on any trigger, including its cron
# and workflow_dispatch. That state lives in GitHub's UI and is invisible when
# reading this file, which has already misled at least one audit — hence this
# banner. Re-enabling is a UI action; anyone doing so should first check that the
# workflow still matches the current CI layout. See rustfs/backlog#1603.
#
name: "Mark stale issues"
on:
schedule:
@@ -20,6 +27,7 @@ on:
jobs:
stale:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
steps:
- uses: actions/stale@5bef64f19d7facfb25b37b414482c7164d639639 # v9
with:
+1
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ concurrency:
jobs:
update:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: overtrue/repo-visuals-action@72f34d24769ff5d341956da2f23952594ef2f1e2 # v1.3.0
with:
+90
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@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
# Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
name: Windows Filesystem Tests
on:
push:
branches: [ main ]
paths:
- "crates/ecstore/src/disk/**"
- "crates/ecstore/src/store/init_format.rs"
- "crates/ecstore/Cargo.toml"
- "Cargo.toml"
- "Cargo.lock"
- ".github/actions/setup/**"
- ".github/workflows/windows-filesystem.yml"
pull_request:
branches: [ main ]
paths:
- "crates/ecstore/src/disk/**"
- "crates/ecstore/src/store/init_format.rs"
- "crates/ecstore/Cargo.toml"
- "Cargo.toml"
- "Cargo.lock"
- ".github/actions/setup/**"
- ".github/workflows/windows-filesystem.yml"
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
RUST_BACKTRACE: 1
jobs:
rename-safety:
name: Rename Safety
runs-on: windows-latest
timeout-minutes: 60
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: build-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
install-test-tools: 'false'
- name: Check production Windows dependencies
shell: pwsh
run: cargo check -p rustfs-ecstore --lib
- name: Test guarded rename publication
shell: pwsh
run: cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore --lib rename_all_ -- --nocapture
- name: Test Windows handle guards
shell: pwsh
run: cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore --lib windows_ -- --nocapture
- name: Test startup temporary-directory cleanup
shell: pwsh
run: cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore --lib cleanup_tmp_on_startup_ -- --nocapture
- name: Test fresh format publication
shell: pwsh
run: cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore --lib fresh_format_load_initializes_all_disks -- --nocapture
+4
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@@ -83,3 +83,7 @@ worktrees/*
# Local AI-agent review artifacts (omo evidence dumps)
.omo/
# insta scratch files; the accepted .snap files ARE the assertions and are committed
*.snap.new
*.pending-snap
+116
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@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
---
name: issue-triage
description: Triage a GitHub issue — determine if it is already fixed, needs implementation, or should be closed. Searches related commits and PRs, verifies implementation status, and posts a triage comment or closes the issue. Use when the user provides an issue URL and asks whether it can be closed or needs work.
---
# Issue Triage
Use this skill when the user provides a GitHub issue URL and asks "can this be closed?", "is this already implemented?", "check completion status", or similar triage questions.
## Workflow
### 1. Fetch issue context
```bash
gh issue view <N> --repo <owner/repo> --json title,body,state,comments,labels,updatedAt
```
Read the issue body to understand what was requested. Extract:
- The specific feature/fix/behavior described.
- Any linked PRs or commits mentioned in the body or comments.
- Any checklist items or sub-issues.
### 2. Search for related work
Search git history for commits referencing the issue:
```bash
git log --oneline --all --grep="<N>" | head -30
```
Search for related PRs:
```bash
gh pr list --search "fixes #<N> OR closes #<N> OR #<N>" --state all --json number,title,state,mergedAt
```
If the issue mentions specific PRs, check their status:
```bash
gh pr view <PR_N> --json state,mergedAt,title
```
### 3. Verify implementation
For each linked or related PR that is merged, verify the fix is actually present on the current main branch:
```bash
git log --oneline main | grep -i "<keyword>"
# or
git log --oneline main --grep="<PR_N>"
```
If the issue describes a specific defect, check the relevant code to confirm the fix is in place:
```bash
grep -n "<pattern>" crates/<relevant>/src/<file>.rs
```
For issues with checklists, verify each item individually. If sub-items are tracked as separate issues, check those too:
```bash
gh issue view <SUB_N> --repo <owner/repo> --json state
```
### 4. Determine verdict
- **All items fixed and merged**: Close with a summary comment listing what was fixed and which PRs.
- **Some items fixed, some remaining**: Comment with status of each item. Do not close.
- **Not yet implemented**: Comment with a summary of what remains. Do not close.
- **Superseded or no longer relevant**: Close with explanation.
### 5. Take action
Close with comment:
```bash
gh issue close <N> --repo <owner/repo> --comment "<body>"
```
Comment without closing:
```bash
gh issue comment <N> --repo <owner/repo> --body-file /tmp/triage.md
```
Update issue labels if needed:
```bash
gh issue edit <N> --repo <owner/repo> --add-label "completed" --remove-label "needs-triage"
```
Always use `--body-file` for multiline content, never inline `--body`.
### 6. Handle multi-issue batches
When the user asks to check multiple issues (e.g., "check all issues by user X" or "scan backlog for closable issues"):
1. List the issues: `gh issue list --repo <repo> --author <user> --state open --json number,title,updatedAt`
2. For each issue, run steps 1-5 above.
3. Report a summary table of all triaged issues with verdicts.
## Output format
### Issue Triage: #<N> — <title>
**State**: OPEN / CLOSED
**Linked PRs**: <list with merge status>
#### Assessment
<what was requested vs what is implemented>
#### Verdict
- Close — all items resolved by <PR list>
- Keep open — <remaining items>
- Not started — <what needs to be done>
#### Action taken
- Closed with comment / Commented / No action
## Notes
- The user may ask in Chinese ("是否可以关闭", "检查完成情况"); respond in the same language.
- When closing, always include a summary of what was fixed and which PRs resolved it — this creates a useful audit trail.
- For issues in `rustfs/backlog`, use `--repo rustfs/backlog`.
- For issues in `rustfs/rustfs`, use `--repo rustfs/rustfs`.
- If the issue has sub-issues (GitHub sub-issues API), check each one's state before declaring the parent complete.
+147
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@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
---
name: pr-review
description: Review a GitHub PR end-to-end from a URL or number — fetch metadata, inspect the diff, run multi-role adversarial review, check CI status, and post the review comment. Use when the user provides a PR link and asks to review it.
---
# PR Review
Use this skill when the user provides a GitHub PR URL or number and asks to review it. This covers the full review lifecycle: data gathering, code review, CI verification, and posting the result.
## Prerequisites
- Read `AGENTS.md` for the repository's adversarial validation policy and change-style rules.
- The `adversarial-validation` skill handles the review role playbooks; this skill orchestrates the workflow around it.
## Workflow
### 1. Gather PR context
```bash
gh pr view <N> --json title,author,state,body,additions,deletions,changedFiles,commits,baseRefName,headRefName
gh pr diff <N> --name-only
```
Read the PR body and linked issues to understand the change's purpose. If the PR references an issue, fetch that too:
```bash
gh issue view <ISSUE> --json title,body,state
```
### 2. Fetch the diff and classify the change
```bash
git fetch origin pull/<N>/head:pr-<N>
git diff main...pr-<N> --stat
```
Classify the change by risk tier (per AGENTS.md):
- **Exempt**: docs/comments/instruction-only, formatting, typos.
- **Mechanical**: renames, file moves, test-only or tooling changes.
- **Standard** (default): any behavior change.
- **High risk**: locking, erasure coding, quorum/heal, replication, multipart, RPC, lifecycle/tiering, metadata formats, persistence/fsync, IAM/KMS/auth, on-disk/on-wire formats, S3 API-visible behavior.
### 3. Cluster changed files and delegate review
Group the changed files into logical clusters (by crate or functional area). For each cluster, spawn a subagent with a focused review prompt that includes:
- The cluster's changed files and their diffs.
- The applicable adversarial role probes (from the `adversarial-validation` skill).
- The repository's AGENTS.md rules relevant to that domain.
For standard-tier changes: correctness adversary + simplicity adversary + test-coverage skeptic, plus every role whose domain the diff touches.
For high-risk changes: run all seven roles.
Each subagent must produce findings (concrete failure scenario with file:line) or a null report ("attacked X, Y, Z — no break found").
### 4. Check CI status
```bash
gh pr checks <N>
```
If any checks fail, investigate:
```bash
gh run view --log-failed --job=<JOB_ID>
```
Determine whether failures are pre-existing (on main), flaky, or caused by the PR.
### 5. Synthesize findings
Combine all subagent findings into a structured review:
- **Summary**: one-paragraph overview of the change and overall assessment.
- **Findings**: each finding with severity (critical/major/minor/nit), file:line, concrete failure scenario, and suggested fix.
- **CI status**: pass/fail with notes on any failures.
- **Verdict**: APPROVE, REQUEST_CHANGES, or COMMENT.
### 6. Post the review
Write the review body to a temp file and post via CLI:
```bash
# Request changes
gh pr review <N> --request-changes --body-file /tmp/pr_review.md
# Approve
gh pr review <N> --approve --body-file /tmp/pr_review.md
# Comment only (no verdict)
gh pr review <N> --comment --body-file /tmp/pr_review.md
```
For inline comments on specific lines, use the GitHub API:
```bash
cat > /tmp/pr_review.json <<'EOF'
{
"body": "review body",
"event": "REQUEST_CHANGES",
"comments": [
{
"path": "crates/foo/src/bar.rs",
"line": 42,
"body": "finding description"
}
]
}
EOF
gh api --method POST /repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/<N>/reviews --input /tmp/pr_review.json
```
Always use `--body-file` or `--input`, never inline multiline `--body`.
### 7. Handle follow-up
If the review requests changes:
- Monitor for new commits: `gh pr view <N> --json commits`
- Re-review changed files only: `git diff pr-<N>..origin/pull/<N>/head`
- Update the review when findings are addressed.
If CI was failing due to pre-existing main breakage:
- Comment on the PR noting the failure is pre-existing.
- Suggest updating the branch: `gh pr update-branch <N>`
## Output format
### PR Review: #<N> — <title>
**Author**: <author>
**Risk tier**: exempt | mechanical | standard | high-risk
**Changed files**: <count> across <cluster count> clusters
#### Summary
<one-paragraph overview>
#### Findings
| Severity | Location | Finding |
|----------|----------|---------|
| critical | file:line | concrete failure scenario |
#### CI Status
- All checks pass / Failing: <details>
#### Verdict
APPROVE / REQUEST_CHANGES / COMMENT
## Notes
- The user may ask for review in Chinese; respond in the same language but keep the review body in English per AGENTS.md rules.
- When the user asks for "多角色对抗 review", run the full adversarial validation protocol — this skill's step 3 covers that.
- If the PR is from a fork, check `maintainerCanModify` before attempting to push fixes.
- For very large PRs (>50 files), cluster aggressively and delegate in parallel to keep review time reasonable.
+62 -15
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,22 @@ If repo-level instructions conflict, follow the nearest file and keep behavior a
- Avoid redundant file reads, repeated commands, and unnecessary exploratory work once enough context is available.
- A good result is a minimal diff with clear assumptions, no over-engineering, and independent verification that survives Adversarial Validation (below).
## Worktree and Disk Hygiene
- Unless the requester explicitly says otherwise, treat every new implementation task as isolated work: fetch the latest `origin/main`, confirm the requested change is not already present there, and create a dedicated feature branch and worktree from that exact upstream commit before editing. Do not implement new work directly in the primary checkout or reuse a worktree from another task.
- Check available disk space before creating the worktree or starting dependency downloads, builds, tests, coverage, or other artifact-heavy commands. For long-running or artifact-heavy work, re-check disk usage at natural phase boundaries and before broad validation; if remaining space may not safely accommodate the next command, stop and reclaim task-owned artifacts before continuing.
- Keep cleanup scoped and safe: remove generated build/test/coverage artifacts and temporary files created by the task when they are no longer needed, and never delete another task's worktree or uncommitted files. Prefer shared dependency caches where supported instead of duplicating large artifacts across worktrees.
- At handoff, report the disk-space checks, cleanup performed, and any retained worktree or artifacts with the reason they are still needed.
## PR Lifecycle Monitoring
- Creating or updating a PR is not the terminal state. Unless the requester explicitly limits the task to PR creation, monitor the PR through its terminal state: merged, closed, or explicitly handed off because progress requires user or maintainer action.
- While the task is active, monitor CI/check runs, review decisions and unresolved threads, mergeability and conflicts, and unexpected head/base changes. Prefer event-driven or bounded waits provided by the current environment over frequent polling; report only state changes, actionable failures, or meaningful prolonged delays.
- Investigate every failing check and review comment before changing code. Fix failures attributable to the task, run the verification required for the new diff, push the update, respond to or resolve the corresponding review threads, and resume monitoring. Do not weaken checks, dismiss valid feedback, or retry flaky failures merely to obtain a green result.
- Treat opening, green CI, approval, and mergeability as intermediate states. Never merge without the required reviewer approval or explicit authority. If progress depends on credentials, infrastructure, a maintainer decision, or another external action, report the exact blocker and the evidence already collected.
- If the current execution environment cannot remain active until the next PR event, use a supported automation, monitor, or thread wakeup when available and within scope. Otherwise leave an explicit handoff containing the PR, current state, next event to observe, and pending cleanup; do not imply that background monitoring exists when none is scheduled.
- After observing a merge, verify the commits are preserved on the upstream base, ensure the worktree is clean, remove the dedicated worktree, prune stale worktree metadata, and delete the local task branch when it is no longer in use. For a closed or abandoned PR, preserve any unmerged work unless deletion was explicitly authorized. Do not delete remote branches unless explicitly requested or repository automation owns that cleanup.
## Autonomy and Approval Boundaries
- Inquiry tasks (answer, explain, review, diagnose, plan): report findings; do not change files unless a fix is explicitly requested.
@@ -35,26 +51,25 @@ If repo-level instructions conflict, follow the nearest file and keep behavior a
## Change Style for Existing Logic
- Prefer direct, local code over extracting one-off helpers.
- Extract a helper only when logic is reused or the extraction materially clarifies a non-trivial flow.
- Start with the smallest direct, local edit. Add production files, types, traits, helpers, wrappers, or abstraction layers only when current behavior requires them. Extraction must remove present duplication, enforce a real boundary, or materially clarify a non-trivial flow; anticipated reuse is not enough.
- Use Rust's default module file layout (`mod foo;` with `foo.rs` or `foo/mod.rs`/`foo/*.rs`).
Avoid `#[path = "..."]` for module inclusion; move files into the canonical module tree instead.
If an unavoidable generated-code, FFI, or test-fixture exception remains, keep it local and document why the canonical layout cannot work.
- Solve only the requested problem; do not add speculative features, configurability, or adjacent improvements.
- Prefer editing existing code over rewriting files or reshaping unrelated logic.
- Modify only what is required and remove only artifacts introduced by your own changes.
- Modify only what is required. Remove any in-scope path or representation superseded by the change. If compatibility or rollback requires retention, adapt at the boundary to one canonical core and follow the repository's `RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO` removal policy; never delete unrelated code merely to improve addition/deletion statistics.
- Preserve the existing control-flow and logic shape when fixing bugs or addressing review comments, especially in init, distributed coordination, locking, metadata, and concurrency paths.
- Do not refactor existing code only to make it easier to unit test.
- Keep fixes narrowly aligned with the requested behavior; avoid semantic-adjacent rewrites while touching sensitive paths.
- Keep code elegant, concise, and direct. Prefer minimal, readable implementations over over-engineering and excessive abstraction. Use comments to clarify non-obvious intent and invariants, not to compensate for unclear code.
- Do not write comments that narrate what the next line does, restate a signature, or describe the change you just made — that commentary belongs in the PR description, not the code. Required invariant comments — lock ordering, `SAFETY`, unwrap justification, `#[allow(dead_code)]` rationale, `RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO` — are never narration.
- Keep code elegant, concise, and direct. Prefer the smallest readable design and existing abstractions over parallel managers, factories, adapters, or wrappers added only to make the design look extensible.
- Comments state non-obvious reasons, assumptions, and invariants in the shortest complete form. Their length follows the invariant's complexity: `SAFETY`, lock ordering, durability, and compatibility contracts may need a short list of conditions. Never narrate the next line, restate a signature, or record change history; move durable design rationale to architecture or operations documentation.
- Mention unrelated issues when useful, but do not fix them as part of a narrow task.
## Reuse Before You Write
Search for an existing implementation before writing a new one; extend what exists instead of duplicating it:
- **Helpers and utilities** (path/string handling, hashing, retry, env parsing, IO wrappers): check `ls crates/utils/src` first — file names map to operations (`retry.rs`, `envs.rs`, `hash.rs`, `path.rs`, `string.rs`, `io.rs`) — plus `crates/common` (shared structures/globals), then `rg -i 'fn \w*<term>' crates/utils/src crates/common/src <touched-crate>/src` for signatures. Helpers are snake_case: a full-text single-word grep over a large crate drowns you and a multi-word phrase returns nothing. Reimplementing an existing workspace helper — or hand-rolling what `std`, `tokio`, or an existing workspace dependency already provides — is a review finding, not a style preference.
- **Helpers and utilities** (path/string handling, hashing, retry, env parsing, IO wrappers): check `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, the touched crate, the likely domain-owning crate, and relevant direct workspace dependencies from `Cargo.toml`. Search snake_case signatures with a focused term. Reimplementing an existing workspace helper — or hand-rolling what `std`, `tokio`, or an existing dependency already provides — is a review finding, not a style preference.
- **Reuse requires matching semantics, not a matching name**: before adopting a helper, check its normalization (`clean` resolves `.`/`..` — never apply it to raw S3 object keys), error type, backoff/deadline behavior, and durability gating against the call site. When semantics differ, a new narrowly-named helper with a comment naming the rejected lookalike is the correct outcome. The inverse also holds: workspace wrappers exist because raw `std`/`tokio` semantics were insufficient (durability gates, retries) — prefer the wrapper over the raw call.
- **Constants and fixed tokens** (protocol labels, error identifiers, header keys, event names, metric names, command tags): search for existing constants/enums that already represent the same semantic value and reuse them. If a value is truly new, define one local constant near related logic; never scatter the literal across sites. When changing existing behavior, align naming and format with the established constants.
- **Test scaffolding**: reuse existing test utilities and fixtures (the touched crate's own `test_util` module and `tests/fixtures`, or `crates/test-utils`) instead of writing new setup code — run `rg -l '<fn-under-test>' <crate>/src <crate>/tests` before writing a test. A new test must pin a failure mode no existing test covers. Near-duplicate means same code path AND same poison-value class: this repo's boundary companions (n==max vs max+1, absent vs empty vs nil UUID bytes, MetaObject vs MetaDeleteMarker) are distinct by definition and must all be written.
@@ -63,6 +78,7 @@ Search for an existing implementation before writing a new one; extend what exis
Net-new code — files, types, branches, comments — is cost to justify, not progress:
- Inspect production-code additions separately. Tests, fixtures, generated code, and documentation do not count as production-code growth. Line counts are signals, not quotas: new production structures must map to a current requirement, and a blocker requires a concrete smaller design that preserves correctness, compatibility, readability, and real boundaries.
- Validate at the trust boundary — untrusted client input, bytes read from disk, RPC payloads, config (see Serde Safety and Cross-Cutting Domain Invariants) — then trust the type: do not re-check what the type system or a validated upstream layer already guarantees, and cite the establishing check (`file:line`) when the guarantee is not obvious.
- The exception is load-bearing: a value that crossed a persistence, RPC, or version boundary is never guaranteed by the code on the other side — a peer may be older or buggy, disk bytes may be corrupt — so the Cross-Cutting Domain Invariant patterns apply at every consumer, and re-checks immediately before a destructive action (delete, overwrite, quorum decision) stay. Deleting an existing guard is a behavior change requiring adversarial review, not cleanup.
- Every new branch needs a nameable trigger: a concrete input, state, or failure that reaches it — for boundary-crossing values, corrupt or stale persisted/peer data is always nameable. If you cannot name one, do not write the branch. If the case is truly unreachable, encode the invariant in the type; where that is impossible, return a typed internal error (fail closed). `debug_assert!` is acceptable only for pure internal arithmetic on values that never crossed a disk/RPC/config boundary — never as the sole guard on decoded or peer-supplied data.
@@ -202,9 +218,10 @@ not to bless it.
Pick the tier from the riskiest file touched; when in doubt, pick the higher.
- **Exempt:** docs/comments/instruction-only changes, formatting, typos with
no runtime surface. Skip this section.
- **Mechanical:** pure renames, file moves, test-only or tooling changes
- **Exempt:** docs/comments, formatting, and typos that cannot affect runtime,
builds, tests, or agent execution. Skip this section.
- **Mechanical:** pure renames, file moves, test-only or tooling changes, and
agent-instruction changes that alter execution —
correctness and simplicity adversaries only.
- **Standard (the default):** any change that affects behavior.
- **High risk:** touches locking, erasure coding, quorum/heal, replication,
@@ -226,7 +243,7 @@ encode this repo's shipped bugs.
- **Correctness adversary** — construct a concrete input/state/interleaving
that yields wrong output, data loss, or a crash. Probe error paths and edge
values (empty, nil UUID, zero-length, quorum1, missing version).
- **Simplicity adversary** — same behavior, less code. Hunt the materially smaller or more idiomatic diff (see Change Style for Existing Logic, Reuse Before You Write, and Necessary Code Only): reimplemented workspace helpers, one-caller extractions, rewrites where an in-place edit suffices, defensive branches with no nameable trigger, redundant error wrapping, near-duplicate tests, narration comments. A smaller diff achieving identical behavior is a finding, reported with the concrete replacement; forced reuse of a helper with mismatched semantics is equally a finding.
- **Simplicity adversary** — same behavior, less code. Hunt reimplemented helpers, rewrites where an in-place edit suffices, speculative abstractions, defensive branches with no nameable trigger, redundant error wrapping, near-duplicate tests, and narration comments. A one-caller helper is a finding only when it merely forwards or splits a short linear flow without adding domain naming, boundary isolation, an invariant, or useful error context. Report a concrete smaller replacement; fewer lines alone are not evidence.
- **Security reviewer** — authn/authz bypass, injection, secret leakage,
untrusted deserialization (see Serde Safety), path traversal, timing leaks.
- **Concurrency/durability reviewer** — lock ordering, races, cancellation,
@@ -237,10 +254,11 @@ encode this repo's shipped bugs.
time across IO, sync or CPU-heavy work on async runtime threads, added
fsync/flush outside the durability gate, hot-path logging noise. A
measurable regression on a per-request or per-object path is a finding.
- **Test-coverage skeptic** — for each claimed behavior, name the test that
fails if the change is reverted; then name a changed line that could be
wrong while all tests stay green — if one exists, coverage is insufficient.
A missing test is a finding, not a note.
- **Test-coverage skeptic** — for each testable behavior claim, name the test
or executable check that detects a revert; then name a changed line that
could be wrong while all checks stay green. If a focused check is not
reasonable, require the reason and residual risk from the validation floor.
Test additions have no line-count or growth budget.
Standard tier: correctness adversary + simplicity adversary + test-coverage
skeptic, plus every role whose domain the diff touches (async or
@@ -266,7 +284,9 @@ High risk: all seven roles.
- Every applicable role has run; every finding is fixed or rebutted with
evidence.
- Every behavior change has a test that fails without it.
- Every testable behavior change has a focused regression check. Exceptions
follow the validation floor and state why a check is impractical and what
risk remains.
- The Verification Before PR gates pass — adversarial review supplements
those gates, never replaces them.
- High risk only: record a one-line verdict per role in the PR description.
@@ -306,6 +326,28 @@ High risk: all seven roles.
- Use environment variables or vault tooling for sensitive configuration.
- For localhost-sensitive tests, verify proxy settings to avoid traffic leakage.
## Logging
Applies to **every** `tracing` macro you add or edit, including a single line
added in passing while fixing something else — not only to log-focused changes.
- Fields first, message second: `event`, `component`, `subsystem`,
`result`/`state`, then key context. The message is a short label, not a
sentence with values interpolated into it.
- Reuse the existing `EVENT_*` / `LOG_COMPONENT_*` / `LOG_SUBSYSTEM_*`
constants of the module you are editing; match the shape of the log sites
already in that file rather than introducing a second style next to them.
- Level policy: `error` for behavior/security-affecting failures, `warn` for
degraded or fallback paths, `info` for low-frequency lifecycle, `debug` for
targeted diagnostics, `trace` for hot paths. Per-object and per-request
success paths are `trace`.
- Never log secrets, tokens, credential payloads, or merged config dumps.
- `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` enforces a subset of this on the files
it lists; passing it is a floor, not evidence the log matches the house style.
See `.agents/skills/rustfs-logging-governance/SKILL.md` for the full event
model, level policy, and guardrail-update checklist.
## Tools
### xl.meta decode tool Quick Use
@@ -331,6 +373,11 @@ cargo run -p rustfs-filemeta --example dump_fileinfo -- "/path/to/file/xl.meta"
absent, empty, and nil all mean "no value", never `Uuid::nil()`.
- A remote-tier version of `None`/`""` means the tier bucket is unversioned:
send **no** `versionId` on tier GET/DELETE.
- Structs persisted in the scanner data-usage cache (`DataUsageCacheInfo`,
`DataUsageEntry`) carry a hand-written map-encoded `Serialize`. MessagePack
encodes derived structs as arrays, where an appended field makes the whole
cache a decode error for older readers — keep new fields `#[serde(default)]`
and keep the map encoding rather than reverting to `derive(Serialize)`.
## Naming Conventions
+64 -20
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# ARCHITECTURE.md
> Last updated: 2026-07-02 · Revision: 2
> Last updated: 2026-08-12 · Revision: 3
>
> This document describes the high-level architecture of RustFS.
> If you want to familiarize yourself with the code base, you are in the right place!
@@ -119,19 +119,44 @@ module split is tracked under `docs/architecture/`.
3. **Each type has exactly one definition.** Types shared across crates must be defined
in one crate and re-exported or imported by others.
- ⚠️ VIOLATED: `ReplicationStats` (4 copies), `LastMinuteLatency` (3 copies),
`BackpressureConfig` (3 copies), `DataUsageInfo` (2 copies).
- ⚠️ VIOLATED: `ReplicationStats` names three unrelated types
(`crates/data-usage/src/data_usage.rs`,
`crates/obs/src/metrics/collectors/replication.rs`,
`crates/ecstore/src/bucket/replication/replication_state.rs`) — a naming
collision, not copies; renaming is tracked in rustfs/backlog#1847.
- `LastMinuteLatency` has two deliberately different implementations: the
per-second bucketed accumulator in `crates/common/src/last_minute.rs` and
the in-memory endpoint-health sample tracker in
`crates/ecstore/src/bucket/bucket_target_sys.rs` (its doc comment explains
why it stays local).
- ✅ RESOLVED: `BackpressureConfig` and `DataUsageInfo` each have exactly one
definition (`crates/io-core/src/backpressure.rs`,
`crates/data-usage/src/data_usage.rs`). A zero-consumer
`BackpressureSettings` copy lingers in `crates/io-metrics/src/config.rs`;
its removal is tracked in rustfs/backlog#1833.
4. **ecstore does not know about HTTP or S3 protocol details.** It operates on
storage-level abstractions (objects, buckets, disks, pools).
- ⚠️ VIOLATED: 58 files under `crates/ecstore/src` reference `s3s`
(`rg -l 's3s' crates/ecstore/src | wc -l`), `crates/ecstore/src/client/`
is a ~9.4K-line embedded S3 HTTP client, and `crates/ecstore/Cargo.toml`
depends on `s3s`, `http`, `hyper`/`hyper-util`/`hyper-rustls`, and
`reqwest`. Target state: the engine's need to act as an S3 client
(tiering, replication targets) is served by an extracted client crate,
and ecstore holds no wire or DTO types.
5. **The `rustfs` binary crate is the only place that wires everything together.**
Individual crates should be testable in isolation.
6. **Error types use `thiserror` with descriptive names** (e.g., `StorageError`,
not bare `Error`).
- ⚠️ VIOLATED: 6 crates use `pub enum Error`; 2 crates use `snafu`;
`heal` use `anyhow` in library code.
- ✅ RESOLVED (strategy): `snafu` is gone from source
(`rg -l snafu crates/ rustfs/` is empty) and library code no longer uses
`anyhow` (remaining hits are test code and the `e2e_test` crate; `heal`
uses `thiserror`).
- ⚠️ VIOLATED (naming): 6 crates still export a bare `pub enum Error`:
`crypto`, `filemeta`, `heal`, `iam`, `policy`, and `replication`
(`src/resync.rs`) — all `thiserror`-derived.
## Known Structural Issues
@@ -140,13 +165,25 @@ module split is tracked under `docs/architecture/`.
### Critical
- **common/scanner code duplication (~3K lines).** `scanner` depends on `common`
but maintains its own copies of `DataUsageInfo`, `LastMinuteLatency`, and related
types instead of importing them.
- **scanner/data-usage duplicate `.usage-cache.bin` serialization types.** The
original finding ("common/scanner code duplication, ~3K lines") is resolved:
`scanner` imports the shared data-usage types from `rustfs-data-usage` (see
the `pub use rustfs_data_usage::…` re-exports at the top of
`crates/scanner/src/data_usage_define.rs`). What remains: `scanner` and
`data-usage` each hold their own serialization types for the scanner cache
file (`DataUsageCacheInfo`/`DataUsageEntryInfo` in
`crates/scanner/src/data_usage_define.rs` vs
`DataUsageCacheInfo`/`DataUsageEntry` in
`crates/data-usage/src/data_usage.rs`); convergence is tracked in
rustfs/backlog#1828.
- **ecstore is a monolith (87K lines, 163 files).** It contains disk management,
bucket management, erasure coding, replication, lifecycle, RPC, and configuration
— all in one crate. It should be decomposed along its existing subdirectories.
- **ecstore is a monolith (265 files, ~288K lines — roughly half is inline
`#[cfg(test)]` code).** Measured with
`find crates/ecstore/src -name '*.rs' | xargs wc -l`. It contains disk
management, bucket management, erasure coding, replication, lifecycle, RPC,
and configuration — all in one crate. It should be decomposed along its
existing subdirectories; the split plan lives in
[docs/architecture/ecstore-module-split-plan.md](docs/architecture/ecstore-module-split-plan.md).
### High
@@ -154,19 +191,26 @@ module split is tracked under `docs/architecture/`.
`common → filemeta/madmin` edges must stay removed so leaf/helper crates do
not regain upward dependencies.
- **Three-layer BackpressureConfig/DeadlockConfig duplication** across io-core,
concurrency, and `rustfs/src/storage`. Storage policies now expose and consume
explicit projections into the concurrency/io-core policy shapes, and workload
- **Three-layer backpressure/deadlock policy bridging** across io-core,
concurrency, and `rustfs/src/storage`. The config types are no longer
duplicated (`BackpressureConfig` and `DeadlockDetectorConfig` are each
defined once, in io-core). Storage policies expose and consume explicit
projections into the concurrency/io-core policy shapes, and workload
admission snapshots are composed through provider registries; later work
should use those bridges before deleting compatibility wrappers.
### Medium
- **Inconsistent error handling.** Three strategies (thiserror/snafu/anyhow) and
mixed naming (bare `Error` vs descriptive names).
- **Bare `Error` naming.** Error-handling strategy has converged on `thiserror`
(no `snafu`, no `anyhow` in library code); the remaining inconsistency is the
bare `pub enum Error` naming in the 6 crates listed under Invariant 6.
- **Ambiguous common vs utils boundary.** Both described as "utilities and data
structures." Need clear ownership rules.
- **`common` is mostly parked domain code, not shared utilities.** Of its
6,724 lines, ~83% is scanner/heal domain code stranded there to break
dependency cycles (`metrics.rs`, ~4,810 lines of scanner-domain metrics;
`heal_channel.rs`, ~776 lines of heal-domain channel types). The
"common vs utils" naming ambiguity is secondary to moving that code to its
domain owners.
## Cross-Cutting Concerns
@@ -232,7 +276,7 @@ The binary (`main.rs`) boots in this order:
```
┌─────────┐
│ rustfs │ (binary + lib, 75K lines)
│ rustfs │ (binary + lib)
│ main │
└────┬────┘
@@ -255,7 +299,7 @@ The binary (`main.rs`) boots in this order:
│ │ │
┌─────▼──────┐ ┌──────▼──────┐ ┌──────▼──────┐
│ ecstore │ │ rio │ │ io-core │
(87K,core) │ │ (readers) │ │ (zero-copy) │
(core) │ │ (readers) │ │ (zero-copy) │
└─────┬──────┘ └─────────────┘ └─────────────┘
┌─────┬──┼──┬─────┬──────┐
Generated
+688 -493
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+71 -70
View File
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ edition = "2024"
license = "Apache-2.0"
repository = "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs"
rust-version = "1.97.1"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
version = "1.0.0-rc.1"
homepage = "https://rustfs.com"
description = "RustFS is a high-performance distributed object storage software built using Rust, one of the most popular languages worldwide. "
keywords = ["RustFS", "Minio", "object-storage", "filesystem", "s3"]
@@ -86,52 +86,52 @@ redundant_clone = "warn"
[workspace.dependencies]
# RustFS Internal Crates
rustfs = { path = "./rustfs", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-heal = { path = "crates/heal", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-audit = { path = "crates/audit", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-checksums = { path = "crates/checksums", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-common = { path = "crates/common", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-data-usage = { path = "crates/data-usage", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-config = { path = "./crates/config", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-concurrency = { path = "./crates/concurrency", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-credentials = { path = "crates/credentials", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-crypto = { path = "crates/crypto", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-ecstore = { path = "crates/ecstore", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-filemeta = { path = "crates/filemeta", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-iam = { path = "crates/iam", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-keystone = { path = "crates/keystone", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-lifecycle = { path = "crates/lifecycle", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-kms = { path = "crates/kms", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-lock = { path = "crates/lock", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-madmin = { path = "crates/madmin", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-notify = { path = "crates/notify", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-io-metrics = { path = "crates/io-metrics", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-io-core = { path = "crates/io-core", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-object-capacity = { path = "crates/object-capacity", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-object-data-cache = { path = "crates/object-data-cache", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-log-analyzer = { path = "crates/log-analyzer", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-obs = { path = "crates/obs", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-policy = { path = "crates/policy", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-protos = { path = "crates/protos", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-protocols = { path = "crates/protocols", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-replication = { path = "crates/replication", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-rio = { path = "crates/rio", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-rio-v2 = { path = "crates/rio-v2", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-s3-types = { path = "crates/s3-types", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-s3-ops = { path = "crates/s3-ops", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-s3select-api = { path = "crates/s3select-api", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-s3select-query = { path = "crates/s3select-query", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-scanner = { path = "crates/scanner", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-security-governance = { path = "crates/security-governance", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-extension-schema = { path = "crates/extension-schema", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-signer = { path = "crates/signer", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-storage-api = { path = "crates/storage-api", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-trusted-proxies = { path = "crates/trusted-proxies", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-targets = { path = "crates/targets", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-test-utils = { path = "crates/test-utils", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-tls-runtime = { path = "crates/tls-runtime", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-utils = { path = "crates/utils", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-zip = { path = "./crates/zip", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs = { path = "./rustfs", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-heal = { path = "crates/heal", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-audit = { path = "crates/audit", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-checksums = { path = "crates/checksums", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-common = { path = "crates/common", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-data-usage = { path = "crates/data-usage", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-config = { path = "./crates/config", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-concurrency = { path = "./crates/concurrency", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-credentials = { path = "crates/credentials", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-crypto = { path = "crates/crypto", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-ecstore = { path = "crates/ecstore", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-filemeta = { path = "crates/filemeta", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-iam = { path = "crates/iam", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-keystone = { path = "crates/keystone", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-lifecycle = { path = "crates/lifecycle", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-kms = { path = "crates/kms", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-lock = { path = "crates/lock", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-madmin = { path = "crates/madmin", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-notify = { path = "crates/notify", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-io-metrics = { path = "crates/io-metrics", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-io-core = { path = "crates/io-core", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-object-capacity = { path = "crates/object-capacity", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-object-data-cache = { path = "crates/object-data-cache", version = "1.0.0-rc.1", default-features = false }
rustfs-log-analyzer = { path = "crates/log-analyzer", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-obs = { path = "crates/obs", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-policy = { path = "crates/policy", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-protos = { path = "crates/protos", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-protocols = { path = "crates/protocols", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-replication = { path = "crates/replication", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-rio = { path = "crates/rio", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-rio-v2 = { path = "crates/rio-v2", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-s3-types = { path = "crates/s3-types", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-s3-ops = { path = "crates/s3-ops", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-s3select-api = { path = "crates/s3select-api", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-s3select-query = { path = "crates/s3select-query", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-scanner = { path = "crates/scanner", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-security-governance = { path = "crates/security-governance", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-extension-schema = { path = "crates/extension-schema", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-signer = { path = "crates/signer", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-storage-api = { path = "crates/storage-api", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-trusted-proxies = { path = "crates/trusted-proxies", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-targets = { path = "crates/targets", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-test-utils = { path = "crates/test-utils", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-tls-runtime = { path = "crates/tls-runtime", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-utils = { path = "crates/utils", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-zip = { path = "./crates/zip", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
# Async Runtime and Networking
async-channel = "2.5.0"
@@ -139,13 +139,13 @@ async_zip = { default-features = false, version = "0.0.18" }
mysql_async = { default-features = false, version = "0.37" }
async-compression = { version = "0.4.43" }
async-recursion = "1.1.1"
async-trait = "0.1.91"
async-trait = "0.1.92"
async-nats = { version = "0.50.0", default-features = false }
axum = "0.8.9"
futures = "0.3.33"
futures-core = "0.3.33"
futures = "0.3.34"
futures-core = "0.3.34"
futures-lite = "2.6.1"
futures-util = "0.3.33"
futures-util = "0.3.34"
pollster = "1.0.1"
pulsar = { default-features = false, version = "6.8.0" }
lapin = { default-features = false, version = "4.10.0" }
@@ -171,9 +171,9 @@ tower = { version = "0.5.3" }
tower-http = { version = "0.7.0" }
# Serialization and Data Formats
apache-avro = "0.21.0"
apache-avro = "0.22.0"
bytes = { version = "1.12.1" }
bytesize = "2.4.2"
bytesize = "2.7.0"
byteorder = "1.5.0"
flatbuffers = "25.12.19"
form_urlencoded = "1.2.2"
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ zeroize = { version = "1.9.0" }
chrono = { version = "0.4.45" }
humantime = "2.4.0"
jiff = { version = "0.2.35" }
time = { version = "0.3.54" }
time = { version = "0.3.55" }
# Database
deadpool-postgres = { version = "0.14" }
@@ -227,15 +227,16 @@ atoi = "3.1.0"
atomic_enum = "0.3.0"
aws-config = { version = "1.10.1" }
aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.0" }
aws-sdk-s3 = { default-features = false, version = "1.140.0" }
aws-sdk-kms = { default-features = false, version = "1.114.0" }
aws-sdk-s3 = { default-features = false, version = "1.141.0" }
aws-sdk-sts = { default-features = false, version = "1.110.0" }
aws-smithy-http-client = { default-features = false, version = "1.2.0" }
aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.14.0" }
aws-smithy-types = { version = "1.6.1" }
base64 = "0.23.0"
base64 = "0.23.1"
base64-simd = "0.8.0"
brotli = "8.0.4"
clap = { version = "4.6.4" }
clap = { version = "4.6.6" }
const-str = { version = "1.1.0" }
convert_case = "0.11.0"
criterion = { version = "0.8" }
@@ -243,7 +244,7 @@ crossbeam-queue = "0.3.13"
crossbeam-channel = "0.5.16"
crossbeam-deque = "0.8.7"
crossbeam-utils = "0.8.22"
datafusion = { default-features = false, git = "https://github.com/apache/datafusion.git", rev = "dae03ee062b2abf986de8df12ea82fb1578a2d99" }
datafusion = { default-features = false, git = "https://github.com/apache/datafusion.git", rev = "e08aed1e5de41dcf81d529140dae07723b942a5e" }
#datafusion = { default-features = false, version = "54.1.0" }
derive_builder = "0.20.2"
enumset = "1.1.14"
@@ -267,18 +268,17 @@ lz4 = "1.28.1"
matchit = "0.9.2"
md-5 = "0.11.0"
mime_guess = "2.0.5"
moka = { version = "0.12.15" }
moka = { version = "0.12.16" }
netif = "0.1.6"
num_cpus = { version = "1.17.0" }
nvml-wrapper = "0.12.1"
parking_lot = "0.12.5"
path-absolutize = "4.0.1"
path-clean = "1.0.1"
percent-encoding = "2.3.2"
pin-project-lite = "0.2.17"
pretty_assertions = "1.4.1"
rand = { version = "0.10.2" }
ratelimit = "0.10.1"
ratelimit = "2.0.0"
rayon = "1.12.0"
reed-solomon-erasure = { package = "rustfs-erasure-codec", version = "8.0.2" }
reed-solomon-simd = "3.1.0"
@@ -289,12 +289,12 @@ rustify = { version = "0.7", default-features = false }
rustix = { version = "1.1.4" }
rust-embed = { version = "8.12.0" }
rustc-hash = { version = "2.1.3" }
s3s = { git = "https://github.com/cxymds/s3s.git", rev = "fe3941d91fa1c69956f209a9145995c9f0235bff" }
s3s = { git = "https://github.com/rustfs/s3s.git", rev = "d7028511a53f69d41ed3c69f36899f9b1aede647" }
serial_test = "4.0.1"
shadow-rs = { default-features = false, version = "2.0.0" }
siphasher = "1.0.3"
smallvec = { version = "1.15.2" }
smartstring = "1.0.1"
compact_str = "0.10.0"
snap = "1.1.2"
starshard = { version = "2.2.2" }
strum = { version = "0.28.0" }
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ sysinfo = "0.39.6"
temp-env = "0.3.6"
tempfile = "3.27.0"
test-case = "3.3.1"
thiserror = "2.0.19"
thiserror = "2.0.20"
tracing = { version = "0.1.44" }
tracing-appender = "0.2.5"
tracing-core = "0.1.36"
@@ -339,21 +339,22 @@ pyroscope = { version = "2.1.1" }
libunftp = { version = "0.23.0" }
unftp-core = "0.1.0"
suppaftp = { version = "10.0.1" }
rcgen = { version = "0.14.8", default-features = false, features = ["aws_lc_rs", "crypto", "pem"] }
russh = { version = "0.62.4" }
russh-sftp = "2.3.0"
rcgen = { version = "0.14.9", default-features = false, features = ["aws_lc_rs", "crypto", "pem"] }
russh = { version = "0.62.6" }
russh-sftp = "2.4.0"
# WebDAV
dav-server = "0.11.0"
# Performance Analysis and Memory Profiling
mimalloc = "0.1.52"
hotpath = { version = "0.22.0", default-features = false }
mimalloc = { version = "0.1.52", git = "https://github.com/xonatius/mimalloc_rust.git", rev = "ce6338661179c8be22e516b00af7483f151485a7" }
libmimalloc-sys = { version = "0.1.49", git = "https://github.com/xonatius/mimalloc_rust.git", rev = "ce6338661179c8be22e516b00af7483f151485a7", features = ["extended"] }
hotpath = { version = "0.23.2", default-features = false }
# Snapshot testing for output format regression detection
insta = { version = "1.48" }
[workspace.metadata.cargo-shear]
ignored = ["rustfs"]
ignored = ["hotpath", "rustfs"]
[profile.dev]
# Full debuginfo roughly doubles compile+link time and produces multi-GB
+6 -1
View File
@@ -91,7 +91,12 @@ LABEL name="RustFS" \
# Upgrade base-image packages so published images pick up security fixes
# (e.g. openssl/libssl3 CVEs) without waiting for a new Alpine point release.
RUN apk upgrade --no-cache && \
apk add --no-cache ca-certificates coreutils curl
apk add --no-cache \
ca-certificates \
coreutils \
curl \
tzdata \
&& test "$(TZ=Asia/Kolkata date +%z)" = "+0530"
COPY --from=build /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/
COPY --from=build /build/rustfs /usr/bin/rustfs
+3 -1
View File
@@ -96,9 +96,11 @@ LABEL name="RustFS" \
# Upgrade base-image packages so published images pick up security fixes
# (e.g. tar/gzip/perl CVEs) without waiting for a new Ubuntu point release.
RUN apt-get update && apt-get upgrade -y \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
&& DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
ca-certificates \
curl \
tzdata \
&& test "$(TZ=Asia/Kolkata date +%z)" = "+0530" \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
COPY --from=build /build/rustfs /usr/bin/rustfs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ chown -R 10001:10001 data logs
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:latest
# Using specific version
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-beta.12
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-rc.1
```
If you use [podman](https://github.com/containers/podman) instead of docker, you can install the RustFS with the below command
+1 -1
View File
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ chown -R 10001:10001 data logs
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:latest
# 使用指定版本运行
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-beta.12
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-rc.1
```
如果您通过绑定挂载启用 TLS 证书目录,也请用同样方式准备该目录:
+3
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ consts = "consts"
Hashi = "Hashi" # HashiCorp
# Accept alternate spelling used in parser/XML comments.
unparseable = "unparseable"
# Disaster-recovery objectives: recovery time and recovery point.
RTO = "RTO"
rto = "rto"
[files]
extend-exclude = []
+1 -1
View File
@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ hotpath.workspace = true
rustfs-targets = { workspace = true }
rustfs-config = { workspace = true, features = ["audit", "server-config-model"] }
rustfs-s3-types = { workspace = true }
chrono = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
const-str = { workspace = true, features = ["std", "proc"] }
futures = { workspace = true }
hashbrown = { workspace = true, features = ["serde", "rayon"] }
jiff = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
metrics = { workspace = true }
serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = { workspace = true, features = ["raw_value"] }
+24 -5
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use hashbrown::HashMap;
use jiff::Timestamp;
use rustfs_s3_types::EventName;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use serde_json::Value;
@@ -151,8 +151,8 @@ pub struct AuditEntry {
pub deployment_id: Option<String>,
#[serde(rename = "siteName", skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub site_name: Option<String>,
#[serde(with = "chrono::serde::ts_milliseconds")]
pub time: DateTime<Utc>,
#[serde(with = "jiff::fmt::serde::timestamp::millisecond::required")]
pub time: Timestamp,
pub event: EventName,
#[serde(rename = "type", skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub entry_type: Option<String>,
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ impl AuditEntryBuilder {
pub fn new(version: impl Into<String>, event: EventName, trigger: impl Into<String>, api: ApiDetails) -> Self {
Self(AuditEntry {
version: version.into(),
time: Utc::now(),
time: Timestamp::now(),
event,
trigger: trigger.into(),
api,
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ impl AuditEntryBuilder {
self
}
pub fn time(mut self, time: DateTime<Utc>) -> Self {
pub fn time(mut self, time: Timestamp) -> Self {
self.0.time = time;
self
}
@@ -342,4 +342,23 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(value["requestID"], Value::String("req-audit-123".to_string()));
assert!(value.get("request_id").is_none(), "historical audit contract must not expose request_id");
}
#[test]
fn audit_entry_time_serializes_as_epoch_milliseconds() {
let entry = AuditEntryBuilder::new(
"1",
EventName::ObjectCreatedPut,
"s3",
ApiDetailsBuilder::new()
.name("PutObject")
.status("OK")
.status_code(200)
.build(),
)
.time(Timestamp::from_millisecond(1_711_423_698_870).expect("timestamp should be valid"))
.build();
let value = serde_json::to_value(entry).expect("audit entry should serialize");
assert_eq!(value["time"], Value::Number(1_711_423_698_870_i64.into()));
}
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ async fn test_audit_log_dispatch_performance() {
return; // Alternatively: assert!(false, "AuditSystem failed to start");
}
use chrono::Utc;
use jiff::Timestamp;
use rustfs_targets::EventName;
use serde_json::json;
use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ async fn test_audit_log_dispatch_performance() {
version: "1".to_string(),
deployment_id: Some(format!("test-deployment-{id}")),
site_name: Some("test-site".to_string()),
time: Utc::now(),
time: Timestamp::now(),
event: EventName::ObjectCreatedPut,
entry_type: Some("object".to_string()),
trigger: "api".to_string(),
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ fn test_performance_requirements() {
for i in 0..3000 {
// Simulate event name parsing and processing
let _event_id = format!("s3:ObjectCreated:Put_{i}");
let _timestamp = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
let _timestamp = jiff::Timestamp::now().to_string();
// Simulate basic audit entry creation overhead
let _entry_size = 512; // bytes
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ fn create_sample_audit_entry() -> AuditEntry {
}
fn create_sample_audit_entry_with_id(id: u32) -> AuditEntry {
use chrono::Utc;
use jiff::Timestamp;
use rustfs_targets::EventName;
use serde_json::json;
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ fn create_sample_audit_entry_with_id(id: u32) -> AuditEntry {
version: "1".to_string(),
deployment_id: Some(format!("test-deployment-{id}")),
site_name: Some("test-site".to_string()),
time: Utc::now(),
time: Timestamp::now(),
event: EventName::ObjectCreatedPut,
entry_type: Some("object".to_string()),
trigger: "api".to_string(),
+4
View File
@@ -39,11 +39,15 @@ tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["fs", "rt-multi-thread"] }
tonic = { workspace = true, features = ["gzip", "deflate"] }
uuid = { workspace = true, features = ["v4", "fast-rng", "macro-diagnostics"] }
chrono = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
jiff = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
metrics = { workspace = true }
serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
rmp-serde = { workspace = true }
s3s = { workspace = true, features = ["minio"] }
tracing = { workspace = true }
[dev-dependencies]
serde_json = { workspace = true }
[lib]
doctest = false
+4
View File
@@ -356,6 +356,8 @@ pub struct HealChannelRequest {
pub recursive: Option<bool>,
/// Whether to dry run
pub dry_run: Option<bool>,
/// Whether to skip namespace locking
pub no_lock: Option<bool>,
/// Timeout in seconds (optional)
pub timeout_seconds: Option<u64>,
/// Origin of the request for operational status and queue accounting
@@ -560,6 +562,7 @@ pub fn create_heal_request(
update_parity: None,
recursive: None,
dry_run: None,
no_lock: None,
timeout_seconds: None,
source: HealRequestSource::Internal,
disk: None,
@@ -718,6 +721,7 @@ pub async fn send_heal_disk(set_disk_id: String, priority: Option<HealChannelPri
update_parity: None,
recursive: None,
dry_run: None,
no_lock: None,
timeout_seconds: None,
source: HealRequestSource::AutoHeal,
};
+1
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ pub mod heal_channel;
pub mod last_minute;
pub mod metrics;
mod readiness;
pub mod table_catalog;
pub use globals::*;
pub use readiness::{GlobalReadiness, SystemStage};
+472 -30
View File
@@ -15,9 +15,10 @@
use crate::heal_channel::HealScanMode;
use crate::last_minute::{AccElem, LastMinuteLatency};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use jiff::Timestamp;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::{
collections::HashMap,
collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap},
fmt::Display,
future::Future,
pin::Pin,
@@ -669,7 +670,7 @@ impl LockedLastMinuteLatency {
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
struct CurrentPathState {
path: String,
updated_at: DateTime<Utc>,
updated_at: Timestamp,
}
struct CurrentPathTracker {
@@ -678,10 +679,10 @@ struct CurrentPathTracker {
impl CurrentPathTracker {
fn new(initial_path: String) -> Self {
Self::new_at(initial_path, Utc::now())
Self::new_at(initial_path, Timestamp::now())
}
fn new_at(initial_path: String, updated_at: DateTime<Utc>) -> Self {
fn new_at(initial_path: String, updated_at: Timestamp) -> Self {
Self {
state: Arc::new(RwLock::new(CurrentPathState {
path: initial_path,
@@ -693,7 +694,7 @@ impl CurrentPathTracker {
async fn update_path(&self, path: String) {
let mut state = self.state.write().await;
state.path = path;
state.updated_at = Utc::now();
state.updated_at = Timestamp::now();
}
async fn get_state(&self) -> CurrentPathState {
@@ -701,6 +702,36 @@ impl CurrentPathTracker {
}
}
fn chrono_to_jiff_timestamp(dt: DateTime<Utc>) -> Timestamp {
let seconds = dt.timestamp();
let nanoseconds = match i32::try_from(dt.timestamp_subsec_nanos()) {
Ok(nanoseconds) => nanoseconds,
Err(_) => {
return if seconds < 0 { Timestamp::MIN } else { Timestamp::MAX };
}
};
match Timestamp::new(seconds, nanoseconds) {
Ok(timestamp) => timestamp,
Err(_) => {
if seconds < 0 {
Timestamp::MIN
} else {
Timestamp::MAX
}
}
}
}
fn timestamp_elapsed_seconds_since(now: Timestamp, earlier: Timestamp) -> u64 {
let duration = now.duration_since(earlier);
if duration.is_negative() {
return 0;
}
u64::try_from(duration.as_secs()).map_or(u64::MAX, |seconds| seconds)
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default)]
struct ScannerDiskBucketScanState {
concurrency_limit: u64,
@@ -708,6 +739,48 @@ struct ScannerDiskBucketScanState {
active: u64,
}
type ScannerDiskBucketScanKey = (String, String);
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ScannerDiskBucketScanSnapshot {
pub pool: String,
pub set: String,
pub concurrency_limit: u64,
pub queued: u64,
pub active: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
struct ScannerBucketDriveResultKey {
bucket: String,
drive: String,
result: String,
}
impl ScannerBucketDriveResultKey {
fn new(bucket: impl Into<String>, drive: impl Into<String>, result: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
Self {
bucket: bucket.into(),
drive: drive.into(),
result: result.into(),
}
}
}
const MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS: usize = 4096;
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct ScannerBucketDriveResults {
counts: HashMap<ScannerBucketDriveResultKey, ScannerBucketDriveResultValue>,
eviction_index: BTreeSet<(u64, ScannerBucketDriveResultKey)>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
struct ScannerBucketDriveResultValue {
count: u64,
last_seen: u64,
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Metrics
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -738,7 +811,11 @@ pub struct Metrics {
scanner_set_scan_concurrency_limit: AtomicU64,
scanner_set_scans_queued: AtomicU64,
scanner_set_scans_active: AtomicU64,
scanner_disk_bucket_scan_states: Mutex<HashMap<String, ScannerDiskBucketScanState>>,
scanner_disk_bucket_scan_states: Mutex<HashMap<ScannerDiskBucketScanKey, ScannerDiskBucketScanState>>,
scanner_bucket_drive_results: Mutex<ScannerBucketDriveResults>,
scanner_bucket_drive_result_clock: AtomicU64,
current_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results_start: Mutex<HashMap<ScannerBucketDriveResultKey, u64>>,
last_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results: Mutex<Vec<ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot>>,
scanner_leader_lock_state: RwLock<String>,
scanner_leader_lock_held: AtomicBool,
scanner_leader_lock_last_error: RwLock<String>,
@@ -838,11 +915,13 @@ const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_SUCCESS: u8 = 1;
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_ERROR: u8 = 2;
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_PARTIAL: u8 = 3;
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_SUPERSEDED: u8 = 4;
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_DEFERRED: u8 = 5;
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_UNKNOWN_LABEL: &str = "unknown";
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_SUCCESS_LABEL: &str = "success";
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_ERROR_LABEL: &str = "error";
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_PARTIAL_LABEL: &str = "partial";
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_SUPERSEDED_LABEL: &str = "superseded";
const SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_DEFERRED_LABEL: &str = "deferred";
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ScanCyclePartialReason {
@@ -958,6 +1037,14 @@ pub struct ScannerSourceWorkSnapshot {
pub missed: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot {
pub bucket: String,
pub drive: String,
pub result: String,
pub count: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ScannerReplicationRepairSnapshot {
pub source: String,
@@ -1112,12 +1199,12 @@ pub struct ScannerLastMinute {
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ScannerMetricsReport {
pub collected_at: DateTime<Utc>,
pub collected_at: Timestamp,
pub current_cycle: u64,
#[serde(default)]
pub current_cycle_active: bool,
pub current_started: DateTime<Utc>,
pub cycles_completed_at: Vec<DateTime<Utc>>,
pub current_started: Timestamp,
pub cycles_completed_at: Vec<Timestamp>,
pub ongoing_buckets: usize,
#[serde(default)]
pub active_scan_paths: usize,
@@ -1290,6 +1377,18 @@ pub struct ScannerMetricsReport {
pub partial_cycles: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ScannerRuntimeDetailsReport {
#[serde(default)]
pub disk_bucket_scan_states: Vec<ScannerDiskBucketScanSnapshot>,
#[serde(default)]
pub bucket_drive_results: Vec<ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot>,
#[serde(default)]
pub current_cycle_bucket_drive_results: Vec<ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot>,
#[serde(default)]
pub last_cycle_bucket_drive_results: Vec<ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot>,
}
impl CurrentCycle {
pub fn unmarshal(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
*self = rmp_serde::from_slice(buf)?;
@@ -1327,6 +1426,7 @@ fn scan_cycle_result_label(result: u8) -> &'static str {
SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_ERROR => SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_ERROR_LABEL,
SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_PARTIAL => SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_PARTIAL_LABEL,
SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_SUPERSEDED => SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_SUPERSEDED_LABEL,
SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_DEFERRED => SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_DEFERRED_LABEL,
_ => SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_UNKNOWN_LABEL,
}
}
@@ -1655,8 +1755,14 @@ pub fn emit_scan_cycle_superseded(duration: Duration) {
metrics::counter!(OTEL_SCANNER_CYCLES, "result" => SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_SUPERSEDED_LABEL).increment(1);
}
pub fn emit_scan_cycle_deferred(duration: Duration) {
global_metrics().record_scan_cycle_deferred(duration);
metrics::counter!(OTEL_SCANNER_CYCLES, "result" => SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_DEFERRED_LABEL).increment(1);
}
pub fn emit_scan_bucket_drive_complete(success: bool, bucket: &str, disk: &str, duration: Duration) {
let result = if success { "success" } else { "error" };
global_metrics().record_scanner_bucket_drive_result(bucket, disk, result);
metrics::counter!(
OTEL_SCANNER_BUCKETS_SCANNED,
"result" => result,
@@ -1673,6 +1779,7 @@ pub fn emit_scan_bucket_drive_complete(success: bool, bucket: &str, disk: &str,
}
pub fn emit_scan_bucket_drive_partial(bucket: &str, disk: &str, duration: Duration) {
global_metrics().record_scanner_bucket_drive_result(bucket, disk, SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_PARTIAL_LABEL);
metrics::counter!(
OTEL_SCANNER_BUCKETS_SCANNED,
"result" => SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_PARTIAL_LABEL,
@@ -1723,6 +1830,10 @@ impl Metrics {
scanner_set_scans_queued: AtomicU64::new(0),
scanner_set_scans_active: AtomicU64::new(0),
scanner_disk_bucket_scan_states: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
scanner_bucket_drive_results: Mutex::new(ScannerBucketDriveResults::default()),
scanner_bucket_drive_result_clock: AtomicU64::new(0),
current_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results_start: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
last_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
scanner_leader_lock_state: RwLock::new("unknown".to_string()),
scanner_leader_lock_held: AtomicBool::new(false),
scanner_leader_lock_last_error: RwLock::new(String::new()),
@@ -2293,7 +2404,7 @@ impl Metrics {
queued: Option<usize>,
active: Option<usize>,
) {
let key = format!("{pool}/{set}");
let key = (pool.to_string(), set.to_string());
let mut states = self
.scanner_disk_bucket_scan_states
.lock()
@@ -2310,6 +2421,41 @@ impl Metrics {
}
}
pub fn record_scanner_bucket_drive_result(&self, bucket: &str, drive: &str, result: &str) {
if bucket.is_empty() || drive.is_empty() || result.is_empty() {
return;
}
let key = ScannerBucketDriveResultKey::new(bucket, drive, result);
let mut results = self
.scanner_bucket_drive_results
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner());
let last_seen = self.scanner_bucket_drive_result_clock.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
if let Some(previous_last_seen) = results.counts.get_mut(&key).map(|value| {
let previous_last_seen = value.last_seen;
value.count = value.count.saturating_add(1);
value.last_seen = last_seen;
previous_last_seen
}) {
results.eviction_index.remove(&(previous_last_seen, key.clone()));
results.eviction_index.insert((last_seen, key));
return;
}
if results.counts.len() >= MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS
&& let Some((_, stale_key)) = results.eviction_index.pop_first()
{
results.counts.remove(&stale_key);
}
if results.counts.len() < MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS {
results
.counts
.insert(key.clone(), ScannerBucketDriveResultValue { count: 1, last_seen });
results.eviction_index.insert((last_seen, key));
}
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// Read-side helpers
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -2411,6 +2557,17 @@ impl Metrics {
.store(duration_millis_saturated(duration), Ordering::Relaxed);
}
pub fn record_scan_cycle_deferred(&self, duration: Duration) {
self.record_scanner_cycle_end_time();
self.last_scan_cycle_result
.store(SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_DEFERRED, Ordering::Relaxed);
self.last_scan_cycle_partial_reason
.store(ScanCyclePartialReason::Unknown as u8, Ordering::Relaxed);
self.last_scan_cycle_partial_source.store(0, Ordering::Relaxed);
self.last_scan_cycle_duration_millis
.store(duration_millis_saturated(duration), Ordering::Relaxed);
}
pub fn record_scan_cycle_partial(&self, duration: Duration, reason: ScanCyclePartialReason) {
self.record_scan_cycle_partial_with_source(duration, reason, None);
}
@@ -2481,6 +2638,11 @@ impl Metrics {
&self.current_scan_cycle_replication_repair_work_start,
&replication_repair_snapshot,
);
let bucket_drive_results = self.scanner_bucket_drive_result_counts();
match self.current_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results_start.lock() {
Ok(mut start) => *start = bucket_drive_results,
Err(poisoned) => *poisoned.into_inner() = bucket_drive_results,
}
self.current_scan_cycle_work_active.store(true, Ordering::Release);
snapshot
}
@@ -2493,6 +2655,11 @@ impl Metrics {
self.record_scan_cycle_work(work);
self.record_scan_cycle_source_work(&source_work);
self.record_scan_cycle_replication_repair_work(&replication_repair_work);
let bucket_drive_results = self.current_cycle_bucket_drive_result_snapshots();
match self.last_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results.lock() {
Ok(mut last) => *last = bucket_drive_results,
Err(poisoned) => *poisoned.into_inner() = bucket_drive_results,
}
self.current_scan_cycle_work_active.store(false, Ordering::Release);
}
@@ -2576,6 +2743,105 @@ impl Metrics {
}
}
fn scanner_bucket_drive_result_counts(&self) -> HashMap<ScannerBucketDriveResultKey, u64> {
self.scanner_bucket_drive_results
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner())
.counts
.iter()
.map(|(key, value)| (key.clone(), value.count))
.collect()
}
fn scanner_bucket_drive_result_snapshots(
counts: impl IntoIterator<Item = (ScannerBucketDriveResultKey, u64)>,
) -> Vec<ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot> {
let mut snapshots = counts
.into_iter()
.filter(|(_, count)| *count > 0)
.map(|(key, count)| ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot {
bucket: key.bucket,
drive: key.drive,
result: key.result,
count,
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
snapshots.sort_by(|left, right| {
left.bucket
.cmp(&right.bucket)
.then_with(|| left.drive.cmp(&right.drive))
.then_with(|| left.result.cmp(&right.result))
});
snapshots
}
fn scanner_bucket_drive_result_counter_snapshots(&self) -> Vec<ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot> {
Self::scanner_bucket_drive_result_snapshots(self.scanner_bucket_drive_result_counts())
}
fn current_cycle_bucket_drive_result_snapshots(&self) -> Vec<ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot> {
let current = self.scanner_bucket_drive_result_counts();
let start = self
.current_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results_start
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner())
.clone();
Self::scanner_bucket_drive_result_snapshots(current.into_iter().filter_map(|(key, count)| {
let delta = count.saturating_sub(start.get(&key).copied().unwrap_or_default());
(delta > 0).then_some((key, delta))
}))
}
pub fn scanner_runtime_details_report(&self) -> ScannerRuntimeDetailsReport {
self.scanner_runtime_details_report_for_active(self.current_scan_cycle_work_active.load(Ordering::Acquire))
}
fn scanner_runtime_details_report_for_active(&self, current_cycle_active: bool) -> ScannerRuntimeDetailsReport {
let current_cycle_bucket_drive_results = if current_cycle_active {
self.current_cycle_bucket_drive_result_snapshots()
} else {
Vec::new()
};
ScannerRuntimeDetailsReport {
disk_bucket_scan_states: self.scanner_disk_bucket_scan_state_snapshots(),
bucket_drive_results: self.scanner_bucket_drive_result_counter_snapshots(),
current_cycle_bucket_drive_results,
last_cycle_bucket_drive_results: self
.last_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner())
.clone(),
}
}
fn scanner_disk_bucket_scan_state_snapshots(&self) -> Vec<ScannerDiskBucketScanSnapshot> {
let mut disk_bucket_scan_states = match self.scanner_disk_bucket_scan_states.lock() {
Ok(states) => states
.iter()
.map(|((pool, set), state)| ScannerDiskBucketScanSnapshot {
pool: pool.clone(),
set: set.clone(),
concurrency_limit: state.concurrency_limit,
queued: state.queued,
active: state.active,
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>(),
Err(poisoned) => poisoned
.into_inner()
.iter()
.map(|((pool, set), state)| ScannerDiskBucketScanSnapshot {
pool: pool.clone(),
set: set.clone(),
concurrency_limit: state.concurrency_limit,
queued: state.queued,
active: state.active,
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>(),
};
disk_bucket_scan_states.sort_by(|left, right| left.pool.cmp(&right.pool).then_with(|| left.set.cmp(&right.set)));
disk_bucket_scan_states
}
fn scanner_source_work_values(&self) -> Vec<ScannerSourceWorkValues> {
ScannerWorkSource::all()
.iter()
@@ -2761,20 +3027,26 @@ impl Metrics {
/// Build a full metrics report snapshot.
pub async fn report(&self) -> ScannerMetricsReport {
self.report_with_runtime_details().await.0
}
pub async fn report_with_runtime_details(&self) -> (ScannerMetricsReport, ScannerRuntimeDetailsReport) {
let mut m = ScannerMetricsReport::default();
let runtime_details;
let has_cycle = {
let cycle = self.cycle_info.read().await;
let has_cycle = if let Some(cycle) = cycle.as_ref() {
m.current_cycle = cycle.current;
m.cycles_completed_at = cycle.cycle_completed.clone();
m.current_started = cycle.started;
m.cycles_completed_at = cycle.cycle_completed.iter().copied().map(chrono_to_jiff_timestamp).collect();
m.current_started = chrono_to_jiff_timestamp(cycle.started);
true
} else {
false
};
m.current_cycle_active = self.current_scan_cycle_work_active.load(Ordering::Acquire);
if m.current_cycle_active {
// Keep cycle_info before cycle-baseline locks so active scrapes cannot mix two cycle identities.
let current_work = self.scan_cycle_work_since(self.current_scan_cycle_work_start());
let current_source_work = self.scanner_source_work_since(&self.current_scan_cycle_source_work_start_values());
let current_replication_repair_work =
@@ -2797,19 +3069,20 @@ impl Metrics {
m.current_cycle_replication_repair =
self.scanner_replication_repair_work_snapshots(&current_replication_repair_work);
}
runtime_details = self.scanner_runtime_details_report_for_active(m.current_cycle_active);
has_cycle
};
if !has_cycle && let Some(init_time) = crate::get_global_init_time().await {
m.current_started = init_time;
m.current_started = chrono_to_jiff_timestamp(init_time);
}
m.collected_at = Utc::now();
m.collected_at = Timestamp::now();
let current_path_snapshots = self.current_path_snapshots().await;
m.active_scan_paths = current_path_snapshots.len();
m.oldest_active_path_age_seconds = current_path_snapshots
.iter()
.map(|(_, state)| m.collected_at.signed_duration_since(state.updated_at).num_seconds().max(0) as u64)
.map(|(_, state)| timestamp_elapsed_seconds_since(m.collected_at, state.updated_at))
.max()
.unwrap_or_default();
m.active_paths = current_path_snapshots
@@ -2826,15 +3099,11 @@ impl Metrics {
m.current_set_scan_concurrency_limit = self.scanner_set_scan_concurrency_limit.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
m.current_set_scans_queued = self.scanner_set_scans_queued.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
m.current_set_scans_active = self.scanner_set_scans_active.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
let disk_bucket_scan_states = self.scanner_disk_bucket_scan_state_snapshots();
let (disk_scan_concurrency_limit, disk_bucket_scans_queued, disk_bucket_scans_active) =
match self.scanner_disk_bucket_scan_states.lock() {
Ok(states) => states.values().fold((0, 0, 0), |acc, state| {
(acc.0 + state.concurrency_limit, acc.1 + state.queued, acc.2 + state.active)
}),
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner().values().fold((0, 0, 0), |acc, state| {
(acc.0 + state.concurrency_limit, acc.1 + state.queued, acc.2 + state.active)
}),
};
disk_bucket_scan_states.iter().fold((0, 0, 0), |acc, state| {
(acc.0 + state.concurrency_limit, acc.1 + state.queued, acc.2 + state.active)
});
m.current_disk_scan_concurrency_limit = disk_scan_concurrency_limit;
m.current_disk_bucket_scans_queued = disk_bucket_scans_queued;
m.current_disk_bucket_scans_active = disk_bucket_scans_active;
@@ -3003,7 +3272,7 @@ impl Metrics {
m.pacing_pressure = scanner_pacing_pressure(&m);
m.maintenance_control = scanner_maintenance_control(&m);
m
(m, runtime_details)
}
}
@@ -3089,6 +3358,22 @@ impl Drop for CloseDiskGuard {
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn scanner_metrics_report_timestamps_serialize_as_rfc3339_utc() {
let report = ScannerMetricsReport {
collected_at: Timestamp::constant(1_700_000_000, 123_456_000),
current_started: Timestamp::constant(1_699_999_940, 0),
cycles_completed_at: vec![Timestamp::constant(1_700_000_060, 987_654_000)],
..Default::default()
};
let value = serde_json::to_value(&report).expect("scanner metrics report should serialize");
assert_eq!(value["collected_at"].as_str(), Some("2023-11-14T22:13:20.123456Z"));
assert_eq!(value["current_started"].as_str(), Some("2023-11-14T22:12:20Z"));
assert_eq!(value["cycles_completed_at"][0].as_str(), Some("2023-11-14T22:14:20.987654Z"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn close_disk_guard_runs_cleanup_when_an_early_return_drops_it() {
let (closed_tx, closed_rx) = tokio::sync::oneshot::channel();
@@ -3147,7 +3432,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn report_counts_active_scan_paths() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
let updated_at = Utc::now() - chrono::Duration::seconds(12);
let updated_at = Timestamp::now() - jiff::SignedDuration::from_secs(12);
metrics.current_paths.write().await.insert(
"disk-a".to_string(),
Arc::new(CurrentPathTracker::new_at("bucket-a".to_string(), updated_at)),
@@ -3169,7 +3454,7 @@ mod tests {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
let tracker = Arc::new(CurrentPathTracker::new_at(
"bucket-a".to_string(),
Utc::now() - chrono::Duration::hours(1),
Timestamp::now() - jiff::SignedDuration::from_secs(60 * 60),
));
metrics
.current_paths
@@ -3942,7 +4227,7 @@ mod tests {
let report = metrics.report().await;
*crate::globals::GLOBAL_INIT_TIME.write().await = previous_init_time;
assert_eq!(report.current_started, cycle_started);
assert_eq!(report.current_started, chrono_to_jiff_timestamp(cycle_started));
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -3998,6 +4283,21 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(report.partial_cycles, 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn report_tracks_deferred_cycle_without_failed_increment() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
metrics.record_scan_cycle_deferred(Duration::from_millis(250));
let report = metrics.report().await;
assert_eq!(report.last_cycle_result, SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_DEFERRED_LABEL);
assert_eq!(report.last_cycle_result_code, u64::from(SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_DEFERRED));
assert_eq!(report.last_cycle_duration_seconds, 0.25);
assert_eq!(report.failed_cycles, 0);
assert_eq!(report.superseded_cycles, 0);
assert_eq!(report.partial_cycles, 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn report_tracks_successful_scan_cycle_without_failed_increment() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
@@ -4100,6 +4400,137 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(report.life_time_ops.get("scan_bucket_drive_failure"), Some(&1));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn report_includes_structured_bucket_drive_results() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result("photos", "/data1", "success");
let cycle_start = metrics.start_scan_cycle_work();
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result("photos", "/data1", "partial");
let active_report = metrics.scanner_runtime_details_report();
assert_eq!(
active_report.current_cycle_bucket_drive_results,
vec![ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot {
bucket: "photos".to_string(),
drive: "/data1".to_string(),
result: "partial".to_string(),
count: 1,
}]
);
metrics.finish_scan_cycle_work(cycle_start);
let report = metrics.scanner_runtime_details_report();
assert_eq!(
report.bucket_drive_results,
vec![
ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot {
bucket: "photos".to_string(),
drive: "/data1".to_string(),
result: "partial".to_string(),
count: 1,
},
ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot {
bucket: "photos".to_string(),
drive: "/data1".to_string(),
result: "success".to_string(),
count: 1,
},
]
);
assert!(report.current_cycle_bucket_drive_results.is_empty());
assert_eq!(
report.last_cycle_bucket_drive_results,
vec![ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot {
bucket: "photos".to_string(),
drive: "/data1".to_string(),
result: "partial".to_string(),
count: 1,
}]
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn scanner_bucket_drive_results_are_bounded() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
for index in 0..MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS {
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result(&format!("bucket-{index}"), "/data1", "success");
}
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result("overflow", "/data1", "success");
let report = metrics.scanner_runtime_details_report();
assert_eq!(report.bucket_drive_results.len(), MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS);
assert!(
report
.bucket_drive_results
.iter()
.any(|snapshot| snapshot.bucket == "overflow")
);
assert!(
report
.bucket_drive_results
.iter()
.all(|snapshot| snapshot.bucket != "bucket-0")
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn scanner_bucket_drive_result_eviction_keeps_recent_keys() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
for index in 0..MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS {
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result(&format!("bucket-{index}"), "/data1", "success");
}
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result("bucket-0", "/data1", "success");
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result("overflow", "/data1", "success");
let report = metrics.scanner_runtime_details_report();
assert_eq!(report.bucket_drive_results.len(), MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS);
assert!(
report
.bucket_drive_results
.iter()
.any(|snapshot| snapshot.bucket == "bucket-0" && snapshot.count == 2)
);
assert!(
report
.bucket_drive_results
.iter()
.all(|snapshot| snapshot.bucket != "bucket-1")
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn scanner_bucket_drive_result_eviction_survives_full_refresh() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
for index in 0..MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS {
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result(&format!("bucket-{index}"), "/data1", "success");
}
for index in 0..MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS {
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result(&format!("bucket-{index}"), "/data1", "success");
}
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result("overflow", "/data1", "success");
let report = metrics.scanner_runtime_details_report();
assert_eq!(report.bucket_drive_results.len(), MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS);
assert!(
report
.bucket_drive_results
.iter()
.any(|snapshot| snapshot.bucket == "overflow")
);
assert!(
report
.bucket_drive_results
.iter()
.all(|snapshot| snapshot.bucket != "bucket-0")
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn report_includes_usage_freshness_status() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
@@ -4234,7 +4665,7 @@ mod tests {
let active = metrics.report().await;
assert!(active.current_cycle_active);
assert_eq!(active.current_cycle, 12);
assert_eq!(active.current_started, cycle_started);
assert_eq!(active.current_started, chrono_to_jiff_timestamp(cycle_started));
let idle_cycle = CurrentCycle {
current: 0,
@@ -4265,9 +4696,10 @@ mod tests {
};
let cycle_ten_start = metrics.start_scan_cycle_work_with_cycle(cycle_ten.clone()).await;
metrics.operations[Metric::ScanObject as usize].store(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result("cycle-ten", "/data1", "partial");
let paths = metrics.current_paths.write().await;
let mut report = Box::pin(metrics.report());
let mut report = Box::pin(metrics.report_with_runtime_details());
let waker = std::task::Waker::noop();
let mut context = std::task::Context::from_waker(waker);
assert!(report.as_mut().poll(&mut context).is_pending());
@@ -4284,12 +4716,22 @@ mod tests {
})
.await;
metrics.operations[Metric::ScanObject as usize].store(101, Ordering::Relaxed);
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result("cycle-eleven", "/data1", "partial");
drop(paths);
let snapshot = report.await;
let (snapshot, runtime_details) = report.await;
assert_eq!(snapshot.current_cycle, 10);
assert_eq!(snapshot.current_cycle_objects_scanned, 1);
assert_eq!(
runtime_details.current_cycle_bucket_drive_results,
vec![ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot {
bucket: "cycle-ten".to_string(),
drive: "/data1".to_string(),
result: "partial".to_string(),
count: 1,
}]
);
metrics
.finish_scan_cycle_work_with_cycle(cycle_eleven_start, CurrentCycle::default())
+17
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
/// Cross-crate lock identity used to fence table-bucket publication against
/// object mutations that bypass the S3 request authorization layer.
pub const TABLE_BUCKET_PUBLICATION_LOCK_PATH: &str = ".rustfs-table/warehouses/default/publication.lock";
+8
View File
@@ -97,6 +97,14 @@ Current guidance:
- enables minimal payload mode for GET health responses (`status`, `ready` only).
- `RUSTFS_HEALTH_READINESS_CACHE_TTL_MS`
- TTL for readiness cache evaluation.
- `RUSTFS_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_ENABLE`
- withdraws readiness when bounded object read/write stages stop completing while requests remain active.
- default is `true`.
- `RUSTFS_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_TIMEOUT_MS`
- maximum time without completion in a bounded object stage before readiness is withdrawn.
- default is `30000`; `0` uses the default.
- the effective value is at least 5 seconds longer than `RUSTFS_OBJECT_LOCK_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT`.
- this readiness SLO is independent of disk read/write failure deadlines and may withdraw traffic before those deadlines expire.
- `RUSTFS_HEALTH_COMPAT_BUSY_CHECK_ENABLE`
- enables busy protection behavior for health probes.
- default is `false`.
+13
View File
@@ -230,6 +230,19 @@ pub const ENV_RUSTFS_KMS_ENABLE: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_ENABLE";
/// Default value: false
pub const DEFAULT_KMS_ENABLE: bool = false;
/// Environment variable enabling per-key KMS authorization on the SSE-KMS data path.
///
/// When enabled, an SSE-KMS write additionally requires `kms:GenerateDataKey` and an
/// SSE-KMS read additionally requires `kms:Decrypt` on the resolved key, evaluated as
/// the requesting identity. SSE-S3 and SSE-C are unaffected.
pub const ENV_RUSTFS_KMS_ENFORCE_SSE_KEY_POLICY: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_ENFORCE_SSE_KEY_POLICY";
/// Default per-key KMS authorization mode for the SSE-KMS data path.
///
/// Off for now so deployments whose identity policies only grant s3 actions keep
/// working; the default flips to on in a later release.
pub const DEFAULT_KMS_ENFORCE_SSE_KEY_POLICY: bool = false;
/// Environment variable for server KMS backend.
pub const ENV_RUSTFS_KMS_BACKEND: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_BACKEND";
+13
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,19 @@ pub const DEFAULT_HEALTH_ENDPOINT_ENABLE: bool = true;
pub const ENV_HEALTH_READINESS_CACHE_TTL_MS: &str = "RUSTFS_HEALTH_READINESS_CACHE_TTL_MS";
pub const DEFAULT_HEALTH_READINESS_CACHE_TTL_MS: u64 = 1000;
/// Enable readiness withdrawal when bounded object read/write stages stop
/// completing while requests remain active.
pub const ENV_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_ENABLE: &str = "RUSTFS_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_ENABLE";
pub const DEFAULT_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_ENABLE: bool = true;
/// Requested time without completion in a bounded object stage before local
/// readiness is withdrawn (milliseconds). A value of `0` uses the default;
/// runtime adds a safety floor based on the object-lock acquisition timeout.
pub const ENV_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_TIMEOUT_MS: &str = "RUSTFS_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_TIMEOUT_MS";
pub const DEFAULT_HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 30_000;
/// Additional time beyond the configured object-lock acquisition deadline.
pub const HEALTH_OBJECT_PROGRESS_LOCK_MARGIN_MS: u64 = 5_000;
/// Timeout for cluster health readiness collectors (milliseconds).
/// This bounds expensive storage and lock quorum checks used by cluster probes.
pub const ENV_HEALTH_CLUSTER_TIMEOUT_MS: &str = "RUSTFS_HEALTH_CLUSTER_TIMEOUT_MS";
+3 -4
View File
@@ -177,10 +177,9 @@ const _: () = assert!(!DEFAULT_INTERNODE_RPC_REPLAY_SCOPE_STRICT);
///
/// The cache retains each nonce for the ~10-minute signature freshness envelope. Once peers use
/// replay-scoped v3 authentication, every authenticated RPC consumes one entry, so the steady
/// state holds roughly `authenticated RPC RPS x 601s` entries. The default sustains about 1,700
/// authenticated RPCs per second (about 120 MiB worst case, allocated only under sustained load);
/// operators must size it for the node's aggregate peak RPC rate before enabling strict replay
/// scope. Overflow fails closed — legitimate signed traffic is the only thing that can fill the
/// state holds roughly `authenticated RPC RPS x 601s` entries. This default is the minimum floor:
/// explicit operator values and resource-aware auto sizing both clamp upward to at least this
/// value. Overflow fails closed — legitimate signed traffic is the only thing that can fill the
/// cache (replays are rejected before insertion, and an attacker cannot mint valid nonces without
/// the shared secret) — and increments
/// `rustfs_system_network_internode_replay_cache_overflow_total`, so a sustained non-zero overflow
+2
View File
@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ pub const ENV_TEST_IAM_FAIL_INIT_ATTEMPTS: &str = "RUSTFS_TEST_IAM_FAIL_INIT_ATT
pub const ENV_TEST_IAM_RETRY_INTERVAL_MS: &str = "RUSTFS_TEST_IAM_RETRY_INTERVAL_MS";
/// Runtime env var controlling the transition worker count.
pub const ENV_TRANSITION_WORKERS: &str = "RUSTFS_MAX_TRANSITION_WORKERS";
/// Runtime env var controlling the expiry worker count.
pub const ENV_MAX_EXPIRY_WORKERS: &str = "RUSTFS_MAX_EXPIRY_WORKERS";
/// Runtime env var controlling the absolute maximum transition workers.
pub const ENV_TRANSITION_WORKERS_ABSOLUTE_MAX: &str = "RUSTFS_ABSOLUTE_MAX_WORKERS";
/// Runtime env var controlling the transition queue capacity.
+5
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ pub const ENV_TRUST_SYSTEM_CA: &str = "RUSTFS_TRUST_SYSTEM_CA";
/// To change this behavior, set the environment variable RUSTFS_TRUST_SYSTEM_CA=1
pub const DEFAULT_TRUST_SYSTEM_CA: bool = false;
/// Environment variable for an extra outbound root CA certificate bundle.
/// Use this to trust an internal CA for outbound HTTPS clients without replacing
/// the default operating-system/web PKI roots via SSL_CERT_FILE.
pub const ENV_RUSTFS_EXTRA_CA_CERT: &str = "RUSTFS_EXTRA_CA_CERT";
/// Environment variable to trust leaf certificates as CA
/// When set to "1", RustFS will treat leaf certificates as CA certificates for trust validation.
/// By default, this is disabled.
-1
View File
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ hotpath-cpu = ["hotpath", "hotpath/hotpath-cpu", "rustfs-filemeta/hotpath-cpu"]
hotpath.workspace = true
serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
rmp-serde = { workspace = true }
async-trait = { workspace = true }
rustfs-filemeta = { workspace = true }
[lib]
+537 -54
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize, ser::SerializeMap as _};
use std::{
collections::{HashMap, HashSet},
hash::{DefaultHasher, Hash, Hasher},
@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ pub const USAGE_LAST_UPDATE_FUTURE_TOLERANCE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5 *
/// Keeping the existing object name preserves rolling-upgrade and rollback
/// compatibility without allowing an ambiguous snapshot to become authoritative.
pub const DATA_USAGE_OBJECT_NAME: &str = ".usage.v2.json";
/// Latest structurally complete scanner observation. Unlike
/// [`DATA_USAGE_OBJECT_NAME`], this object is never authoritative for quota
/// admission because namespace activity may have raced the scan.
pub const DATA_USAGE_OBSERVED_OBJECT_NAME: &str = ".usage.observed.json";
/// Usage snapshot written by scanner implementations predating distributed
/// leadership fencing. It is read only when neither authoritative snapshot
@@ -51,24 +55,36 @@ pub fn usage_last_update_is_untrusted_future(existing_last_update: SystemTime, n
existing_last_update > now + USAGE_LAST_UPDATE_FUTURE_TOLERANCE
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Default, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Default, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct TierStats {
pub total_size: u64,
pub num_versions: i32,
pub num_objects: i32,
pub num_versions: u64,
pub num_objects: u64,
}
impl TierStats {
pub fn add(&self, u: &TierStats) -> TierStats {
TierStats {
total_size: self.total_size + u.total_size,
num_versions: self.num_versions + u.num_versions,
num_objects: self.num_objects + u.num_objects,
total_size: self.total_size.saturating_add(u.total_size),
num_versions: self.num_versions.saturating_add(u.num_versions),
num_objects: self.num_objects.saturating_add(u.num_objects),
}
}
/// True when [`TierStats::add`] would report the exact sum instead of saturating.
pub fn fits_add(&self, u: &TierStats) -> bool {
self.total_size.checked_add(u.total_size).is_some()
&& self.num_versions.checked_add(u.num_versions).is_some()
&& self.num_objects.checked_add(u.num_objects).is_some()
}
/// True when this tier contributed nothing, i.e. merging it is a no-op.
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.total_size == 0 && self.num_versions == 0 && self.num_objects == 0
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AllTierStats {
pub tiers: HashMap<String, TierStats>,
}
@@ -78,31 +94,35 @@ impl AllTierStats {
Self { tiers: HashMap::new() }
}
pub fn add_sizes(&mut self, tiers: HashMap<String, TierStats>) {
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.tiers.is_empty()
}
/// Folds a scan summary's per-tier map in.
///
/// Scanners seed the map with a zeroed entry for every configured tier, so
/// empty contributions are skipped to keep the persisted cache from growing
/// one key per tier on every folder that never held tiered data.
pub fn add_sizes(&mut self, tiers: &HashMap<String, TierStats>) {
for (tier, st) in tiers {
self.tiers
.insert(tier.clone(), self.tiers.get(&tier).copied().unwrap_or_default().add(&st));
if st.is_empty() {
continue;
}
let entry = self.tiers.entry(tier.clone()).or_default();
*entry = entry.add(st);
}
}
pub fn merge(&mut self, other: AllTierStats) {
for (tier, st) in other.tiers {
self.tiers
.insert(tier.clone(), self.tiers.get(&tier).copied().unwrap_or_default().add(&st));
}
pub fn merge(&mut self, other: &AllTierStats) {
self.add_sizes(&other.tiers);
}
pub fn populate_stats(&self, stats: &mut HashMap<String, TierStats>) {
for (tier, st) in &self.tiers {
stats.insert(
tier.clone(),
TierStats {
total_size: st.total_size,
num_versions: st.num_versions,
num_objects: st.num_objects,
},
);
}
/// True when [`AllTierStats::merge`] would report exact sums for every tier.
pub fn fits_merge(&self, other: &AllTierStats) -> bool {
other
.tiers
.iter()
.all(|(tier, right)| self.tiers.get(tier).is_none_or(|left| left.fits_add(right)))
}
}
@@ -183,6 +203,14 @@ pub struct DataUsageInfo {
pub objects_total_size: u64,
/// Replication info across all buckets
pub replication_info: HashMap<String, BucketTargetUsageInfo>,
/// Usage per storage class and remote tier across all buckets.
///
/// Absent on snapshots written before per-tier accounting was published,
/// and on clusters with no remote tier configured: the scanner classifies
/// objects by tier (including `STANDARD`/`REDUCED_REDUNDANCY`) only once a
/// tier exists, so an absent value means "not accounted", never "zero".
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub tier_stats: Option<AllTierStats>,
/// Total number of buckets in this cluster
pub buckets_count: u64,
@@ -194,6 +222,20 @@ pub struct DataUsageInfo {
/// explicit entry for every bucket, including confirmed-empty buckets.
#[serde(default)]
pub usage_snapshot_complete: bool,
/// Whether no namespace activity or dirty-usage generation changed while
/// the coordinated snapshot was being produced.
///
/// `false` still describes a structurally complete, useful point-in-time
/// usage view, but follow-up scanner work remains pending. `None` is kept
/// for snapshots written before this status became observable.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub usage_snapshot_converged: Option<bool>,
/// Identity of the authoritative snapshot from which a nonconverged
/// observation started. Admin readers require an exact match before using
/// the observation, so bucket namespace mutations fence old observations
/// without relying on synchronized clocks.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline: Option<DataUsageSnapshotIdentity>,
/// Deprecated kept here for backward compatibility reasons
pub bucket_sizes: HashMap<String, u64>,
/// Per-disk snapshot information when available
@@ -201,6 +243,59 @@ pub struct DataUsageInfo {
pub disk_usage_status: Vec<DiskUsageStatus>,
}
/// Stable identity fields changed by both coordinated scanner publication and
/// backward-compatible bucket namespace cleanup.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct DataUsageSnapshotIdentity {
pub last_update: Option<SystemTime>,
pub scanner_cycle: Option<u64>,
pub scanner_epoch: Option<u64>,
}
impl DataUsageInfo {
pub fn snapshot_identity(&self) -> DataUsageSnapshotIdentity {
DataUsageSnapshotIdentity {
last_update: self.last_update,
scanner_cycle: self.scanner_cycle,
scanner_epoch: self.scanner_epoch,
}
}
}
/// Return whether `candidate` was produced after `baseline`.
///
/// New coordinated snapshots are ordered by leadership epoch and scanner
/// cycle. The timestamp fallback preserves ordering for legacy snapshots that
/// predate those fields.
pub fn data_usage_snapshot_is_newer(candidate: &DataUsageInfo, baseline: &DataUsageInfo) -> bool {
match (
candidate.scanner_epoch.zip(candidate.scanner_cycle),
baseline.scanner_epoch.zip(baseline.scanner_cycle),
) {
(Some(candidate), Some(baseline)) => candidate > baseline,
(Some(_), None) => true,
(None, Some(_)) => false,
(None, None) => match (candidate.last_update, baseline.last_update) {
(Some(candidate), Some(baseline)) => candidate > baseline,
(Some(_), None) => true,
(None, Some(_) | None) => false,
},
}
}
/// Return whether a nonconverged observation may safely supersede the admin
/// view of `authoritative`.
///
/// The exact baseline identity is independent of clock ordering. Older binaries
/// already advance the authoritative timestamp when deleting a bucket, so a
/// rollback delete/recreate fences the previous bucket incarnation too.
pub fn observed_data_usage_is_newer(observed: &DataUsageInfo, authoritative: &DataUsageInfo) -> bool {
observed.usage_snapshot_converged == Some(false)
&& observed.is_complete_bucket_usage_snapshot()
&& observed.usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline.as_ref() == Some(&authoritative.snapshot_identity())
&& data_usage_snapshot_is_newer(observed, authoritative)
}
/// Metadata describing the status of a disk-level data usage snapshot.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct DiskUsageStatus {
@@ -562,7 +657,7 @@ impl ReplicationAllStats {
}
/// Data usage cache entry
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Deserialize)]
pub struct DataUsageEntry {
pub children: DataUsageHashMap,
// These fields do not include any children.
@@ -577,6 +672,34 @@ pub struct DataUsageEntry {
/// Number of objects that failed to scan (e.g., IO errors)
#[serde(default)]
pub failed_objects: usize,
/// Per-tier usage contributed by this entry, present only once a scan
/// observed tier-classified objects.
#[serde(default)]
pub all_tier_stats: Option<AllTierStats>,
}
impl Serialize for DataUsageEntry {
fn serialize<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
where
S: serde::Serializer,
{
// Keep entries map-encoded so older readers can ignore fields appended
// by newer scanner versions during rolling upgrades. The derived
// (array) encoding made any appended field a decode error for them.
let mut state = serializer.serialize_map(Some(11))?;
state.serialize_entry("children", &self.children)?;
state.serialize_entry("size", &self.size)?;
state.serialize_entry("objects", &self.objects)?;
state.serialize_entry("versions", &self.versions)?;
state.serialize_entry("delete_markers", &self.delete_markers)?;
state.serialize_entry("obj_sizes", &self.obj_sizes)?;
state.serialize_entry("obj_versions", &self.obj_versions)?;
state.serialize_entry("replication_stats", &self.replication_stats)?;
state.serialize_entry("compacted", &self.compacted)?;
state.serialize_entry("failed_objects", &self.failed_objects)?;
state.serialize_entry("all_tier_stats", &self.all_tier_stats)?;
state.end()
}
}
impl DataUsageEntry {
@@ -635,10 +758,22 @@ impl DataUsageEntry {
}
}
if let Some(o_tiers) = other.all_tier_stats.as_ref().filter(|tiers| !tiers.is_empty()) {
self.all_tier_stats.get_or_insert_with(AllTierStats::new).merge(o_tiers);
}
self.obj_sizes.merge_from(&other.obj_sizes);
self.obj_versions.merge_from(&other.obj_versions);
}
/// Folds a scan summary's per-tier map into this entry.
pub fn add_tier_sizes(&mut self, tiers: &HashMap<String, TierStats>) {
if tiers.values().all(TierStats::is_empty) {
return;
}
self.all_tier_stats.get_or_insert_with(AllTierStats::new).add_sizes(tiers);
}
pub fn checked_merge(&mut self, other: &DataUsageEntry) -> bool {
let scalar_counts_fit = self.objects.checked_add(other.objects).is_some()
&& self.versions.checked_add(other.versions).is_some()
@@ -698,7 +833,12 @@ impl DataUsageEntry {
}
};
if !scalar_counts_fit || !histograms_fit || !replication_fits {
let tier_stats_fit = match (&self.all_tier_stats, &other.all_tier_stats) {
(_, None) | (None, Some(_)) => true,
(Some(left), Some(right)) => left.fits_merge(right),
};
if !scalar_counts_fit || !histograms_fit || !replication_fits || !tier_stats_fit {
return false;
}
self.merge(other);
@@ -706,8 +846,15 @@ impl DataUsageEntry {
}
}
/// Data usage cache info
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
/// Read-only projection of the scanner's `.usage-cache.bin` info block.
///
/// The canonical wire format is written by the hand-written map-encoded
/// `Serialize` on the scanner-side `DataUsageCacheInfo`
/// (`crates/scanner/src/data_usage_define.rs`), which carries 16 fields.
/// This type decodes only the shared subset and is deliberately not
/// `Serialize`: a derived (array) encoding of this 6-field subset would
/// corrupt the cache for scanner readers, so no write path may exist here.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Deserialize)]
pub struct DataUsageCacheInfo {
pub name: String,
pub next_cycle: u64,
@@ -723,8 +870,12 @@ pub struct DataUsageCacheInfo {
pub snapshot_complete: bool,
}
/// Data usage cache
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
/// Read-only projection of a scanner-written `.usage-cache.bin` file.
///
/// The scanner-side `DataUsageCache` (`crates/scanner/src/data_usage_define.rs`)
/// owns the persisted format; this type only decodes it (see
/// [`DataUsageCacheInfo`]) and must never grow a serialization path.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Deserialize)]
pub struct DataUsageCache {
pub info: DataUsageCacheInfo,
pub cache: HashMap<String, DataUsageEntry>,
@@ -1038,6 +1189,7 @@ impl DataUsageCache {
versions_total_count: flat.versions as u64,
delete_markers_total_count: flat.delete_markers as u64,
objects_total_size: flat.size as u64,
tier_stats: flat.all_tier_stats.filter(|tiers| !tiers.is_empty()),
buckets_count: u64::try_from(buckets.len()).unwrap_or(u64::MAX),
buckets_usage,
usage_snapshot_complete: self.info.snapshot_complete,
@@ -1045,31 +1197,10 @@ impl DataUsageCache {
}
}
pub fn marshal_msg(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let mut buf = Vec::new();
self.serialize(&mut rmp_serde::Serializer::new(&mut buf))?;
Ok(buf)
}
pub fn unmarshal(buf: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let t: Self = rmp_serde::from_slice(buf)?;
Ok(t)
}
// Note: load and save methods are storage-specific and should be implemented
// in the ecstore crate where storage access is available
}
/// Trait for storage-specific operations on DataUsageCache
#[async_trait::async_trait]
pub trait DataUsageCacheStorage {
/// Load data usage cache from backend storage
async fn load(store: &dyn std::any::Any, name: &str) -> Result<Self, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>
where
Self: Sized;
/// Save data usage cache to backend storage
async fn save(&self, name: &str) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>;
}
// Helper structs and functions for cache operations
@@ -1525,6 +1656,248 @@ mod tests {
buckets_count: u64,
}
fn tier_entry(tier: &str, stats: TierStats) -> DataUsageEntry {
let mut entry = DataUsageEntry::default();
entry.add_tier_sizes(&HashMap::from([(tier.to_string(), stats)]));
entry
}
#[test]
fn tier_stats_survive_entry_merge() {
let mut left = tier_entry(
"WARM",
TierStats {
total_size: 10,
num_versions: 2,
num_objects: 1,
},
);
let mut right = tier_entry(
"WARM",
TierStats {
total_size: 5,
num_versions: 1,
num_objects: 1,
},
);
right.add_tier_sizes(&HashMap::from([(
"COLD".to_string(),
TierStats {
total_size: 7,
num_versions: 1,
num_objects: 0,
},
)]));
assert!(left.checked_merge(&right), "merging exact tier totals must be accepted");
let tiers = &left.all_tier_stats.expect("merged entry keeps tier stats").tiers;
assert_eq!(
tiers.get("WARM"),
Some(&TierStats {
total_size: 15,
num_versions: 3,
num_objects: 2,
})
);
assert_eq!(
tiers.get("COLD"),
Some(&TierStats {
total_size: 7,
num_versions: 1,
num_objects: 0,
})
);
}
#[test]
fn tier_stats_merge_into_an_untiered_entry() {
let mut left = DataUsageEntry::default();
let right = tier_entry(
"WARM",
TierStats {
total_size: 10,
num_versions: 1,
num_objects: 1,
},
);
assert!(left.checked_merge(&right));
assert_eq!(
left.all_tier_stats.expect("tier stats adopted from the merged entry").tiers["WARM"],
TierStats {
total_size: 10,
num_versions: 1,
num_objects: 1,
}
);
}
#[test]
fn checked_merge_rejects_overflowing_tier_totals() {
let mut left = tier_entry(
"WARM",
TierStats {
total_size: u64::MAX,
num_versions: 1,
num_objects: 1,
},
);
let right = tier_entry(
"WARM",
TierStats {
total_size: 1,
num_versions: 1,
num_objects: 1,
},
);
assert!(!left.checked_merge(&right), "saturating tier totals must not be published");
assert_eq!(left.all_tier_stats.expect("left is untouched").tiers["WARM"].total_size, u64::MAX);
}
/// Entry shape released before per-tier accounting, using the derived
/// (array) encoding those writers produced.
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct LegacyEntry {
children: DataUsageHashMap,
size: usize,
objects: usize,
versions: usize,
delete_markers: usize,
obj_sizes: SizeHistogram,
obj_versions: VersionsHistogram,
replication_stats: Option<ReplicationAllStats>,
compacted: bool,
#[serde(default)]
failed_objects: usize,
}
#[test]
fn entries_are_map_encoded_so_appended_fields_stay_readable() {
// A derived (array) encoding turns every appended field into a decode
// error for readers built before it existed, which would cost a mixed
// -version cluster its whole scan cache. Entries must stay map-encoded.
let current = tier_entry(
"WARM",
TierStats {
total_size: 3,
num_versions: 1,
num_objects: 1,
},
);
let mut encoded = Vec::new();
current
.serialize(&mut rmp_serde::Serializer::new(&mut encoded))
.expect("encode current entry");
let legacy: LegacyEntry = rmp_serde::from_slice(&encoded).expect("legacy reader should ignore the appended field");
assert_eq!(legacy.objects, 0);
}
#[test]
fn legacy_array_encoded_entries_still_load() {
let legacy = LegacyEntry {
children: DataUsageHashMap::default(),
size: 12,
objects: 3,
versions: 4,
delete_markers: 1,
obj_sizes: SizeHistogram::default(),
obj_versions: VersionsHistogram::default(),
replication_stats: None,
compacted: false,
failed_objects: 2,
};
let mut encoded = Vec::new();
legacy
.serialize(&mut rmp_serde::Serializer::new(&mut encoded))
.expect("encode legacy entry");
let decoded: DataUsageEntry = rmp_serde::from_slice(&encoded).expect("current reader should default the missing field");
assert_eq!(decoded.size, 12);
assert_eq!(decoded.failed_objects, 2);
assert!(decoded.all_tier_stats.is_none());
}
/// Scanner-written `.usage-cache.bin` bytes: a 2-element array of the
/// canonical 16-field map-encoded info block and one map-encoded entry.
/// Captured from the canonical writer's `marshal_msg` — see
/// `usage_cache_wire_format_is_pinned` in
/// `crates/scanner/src/data_usage_define.rs`, which pins these exact
/// bytes and documents regeneration. Hardcoded here because a
/// dev-dependency on rustfs-scanner would pull the whole ecstore tree
/// into this crate's test build, and a fixture generated at test runtime
/// could not detect writer drift anyway.
const SCANNER_USAGE_CACHE_WIRE_FIXTURE: &[u8] = &[
0x92, 0xde, 0x00, 0x10, 0xa4, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x65, 0xab, 0x77, 0x69, 0x72, 0x65, 0x2d, 0x62, 0x75, 0x63, 0x6b, 0x65,
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0x73, 0x69, 0x7a, 0x65, 0x73, 0x9b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xac, 0x6f, 0x62,
0x6a, 0x5f, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x73, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x97, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xb1, 0x72,
0x65, 0x70, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x5f, 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x73, 0xc0, 0xa9, 0x63, 0x6f,
0x6d, 0x70, 0x61, 0x63, 0x74, 0x65, 0x64, 0xc3, 0xae, 0x66, 0x61, 0x69, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x64, 0x5f, 0x6f, 0x62, 0x6a, 0x65,
0x63, 0x74, 0x73, 0x02, 0xae, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x5f, 0x74, 0x69, 0x65, 0x72, 0x5f, 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x73, 0x91,
0x81, 0xa4, 0x57, 0x41, 0x52, 0x4d, 0x93, 0xcd, 0x08, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01,
];
#[test]
fn thin_usage_cache_decodes_scanner_wire_fixture() {
let decoded =
DataUsageCache::unmarshal(SCANNER_USAGE_CACHE_WIRE_FIXTURE).expect("thin projection decodes a scanner-written cache");
// The six fields shared with the scanner's 16-field info block; the
// remaining ten (lifecycle, replication, checkpoint, heals, ...) must
// be skipped, not error.
assert_eq!(decoded.info.name, "wire-bucket");
assert_eq!(decoded.info.next_cycle, 7);
assert_eq!(
decoded.info.last_update,
Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(1_700_000_000))
);
assert!(decoded.info.skip_healing);
assert_eq!(decoded.info.failed_objects.get("wire-bucket/lost"), Some(&11));
assert!(decoded.info.snapshot_complete);
// Entries use the shared canonical map-encoded type end to end.
let entry = decoded.cache.get("wire-bucket").expect("fixture entry decodes");
assert_eq!(entry.size, 4096);
assert_eq!(entry.objects, 3);
assert_eq!(entry.versions, 5);
assert_eq!(entry.delete_markers, 1);
assert!(entry.compacted);
assert_eq!(entry.failed_objects, 2);
assert_eq!(
entry.all_tier_stats.as_ref().and_then(|tiers| tiers.tiers.get("WARM")),
Some(&TierStats {
total_size: 2048,
num_versions: 2,
num_objects: 1,
})
);
}
#[test]
fn hash_path_uses_portable_slash_semantics() {
for (input, expected) in [
@@ -1547,6 +1920,8 @@ mod tests {
let current = DataUsageInfo {
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH),
usage_snapshot_complete: true,
usage_snapshot_converged: Some(false),
usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline: Some(DataUsageSnapshotIdentity::default()),
..Default::default()
};
let encoded = rmp_serde::to_vec_named(&current).expect("encode current data usage snapshot");
@@ -1554,6 +1929,76 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(legacy.buckets_count, 0);
assert!(current.is_complete_bucket_usage_snapshot());
assert_eq!(current.usage_snapshot_converged, Some(false));
}
#[test]
fn convergence_marker_defaults_to_unknown_for_older_snapshots() {
let encoded = rmp_serde::to_vec_named(&DataUsageInfo {
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH),
usage_snapshot_complete: true,
..Default::default()
})
.expect("encode pre-convergence data usage snapshot");
let decoded: DataUsageInfo = rmp_serde::from_slice(&encoded).expect("decode older data usage snapshot");
assert!(decoded.is_complete_bucket_usage_snapshot());
assert_eq!(decoded.usage_snapshot_converged, None);
}
#[test]
fn observation_selection_is_clock_independent_and_baseline_fenced() {
let mut authoritative = DataUsageInfo {
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(600)),
scanner_epoch: Some(7),
scanner_cycle: Some(10),
usage_snapshot_complete: true,
..Default::default()
};
let observed = DataUsageInfo {
// A newer leader may have a slower wall clock.
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(300)),
scanner_epoch: Some(8),
scanner_cycle: Some(1),
usage_snapshot_complete: true,
usage_snapshot_converged: Some(false),
usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline: Some(authoritative.snapshot_identity()),
..Default::default()
};
assert!(observed_data_usage_is_newer(&observed, &authoritative));
authoritative.last_update = Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(601));
assert!(
!observed_data_usage_is_newer(&observed, &authoritative),
"an old-binary namespace mutation must fence the prior bucket incarnation regardless of clock skew"
);
}
#[test]
fn observation_selection_requires_nonconverged_complete_newer_data() {
let authoritative = DataUsageInfo {
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH),
scanner_epoch: Some(2),
scanner_cycle: Some(10),
usage_snapshot_complete: true,
..Default::default()
};
let baseline = Some(authoritative.snapshot_identity());
let candidate = |epoch, cycle, converged, complete| DataUsageInfo {
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(1)),
scanner_epoch: Some(epoch),
scanner_cycle: Some(cycle),
usage_snapshot_complete: complete,
usage_snapshot_converged: converged,
usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline: baseline,
..Default::default()
};
assert!(observed_data_usage_is_newer(&candidate(2, 11, Some(false), true), &authoritative));
assert!(!observed_data_usage_is_newer(&candidate(2, 9, Some(false), true), &authoritative));
assert!(!observed_data_usage_is_newer(&candidate(2, 11, Some(true), true), &authoritative));
assert!(!observed_data_usage_is_newer(&candidate(2, 11, Some(false), false), &authoritative));
}
#[test]
@@ -1901,6 +2346,44 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(info.buckets_count, 2);
assert!(info.buckets_usage.is_empty());
assert_eq!(info.objects_total_count, 3);
assert!(info.tier_stats.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_dui_reports_tier_usage_from_the_flattened_tree() {
let root_hash = hash_path("root");
let bucket_hash = hash_path("bucket-a");
let mut cache = DataUsageCache {
info: DataUsageCacheInfo {
name: "root".to_string(),
..Default::default()
},
..Default::default()
};
cache.replace_hashed(&root_hash, &None, &DataUsageEntry::default());
cache.replace_hashed(
&bucket_hash,
&Some(root_hash),
&tier_entry(
"WARM",
TierStats {
total_size: 40,
num_versions: 2,
num_objects: 2,
},
),
);
let info = cache.dui("root", &["bucket-a".to_string()]);
assert_eq!(
info.tier_stats.expect("child tier usage should roll up to the root").tiers["WARM"],
TierStats {
total_size: 40,
num_versions: 2,
num_objects: 2,
}
);
}
#[test]
+259 -60
View File
@@ -26,75 +26,18 @@
//! Later batches tracked on backlog#1154: config get/set, info, pools status,
//! group lifecycle, import/export IAM.
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging, local_http_client};
use crate::common::{
RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_ok, admin_request, admin_request_with_session_token, build_test_sts_client, init_logging,
};
use aws_sdk_s3::config::{Credentials, Region};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::{Client, Config};
use http::header::{CONTENT_TYPE, HOST};
use reqwest::StatusCode;
use rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD;
use rustfs_signer::sign_v4;
use s3s::Body;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::error::Error;
use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep};
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
type BoxError = Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>;
/// Signs and sends an admin HTTP request with the given credential, returning
/// status and body. Native `/rustfs/admin/v3` requests and responses are plain
/// JSON (the MinIO-compat encryption applies only to `/minio/admin/v3` paths).
async fn admin_request(
base_url: &str,
method: http::Method,
path_and_query: &str,
body: Option<String>,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
) -> Result<(StatusCode, String), BoxError> {
let url = format!("{base_url}{path_and_query}");
let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("admin URL missing authority")?.to_string();
let mut builder = http::Request::builder()
.method(method.clone())
.uri(uri)
.header(HOST, authority)
.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
if body.is_some() {
builder = builder.header(CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json");
}
let content_len = body.as_ref().map(|b| b.len() as i64).unwrap_or_default();
let signed = sign_v4(builder.body(Body::empty())?, content_len, access_key, secret_key, "", "us-east-1");
let reqwest_method = reqwest::Method::from_bytes(method.as_str().as_bytes())?;
let mut request = local_http_client().request(reqwest_method, &url);
for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
request = request.header(name, value);
}
if let Some(body) = body {
request = request.body(body);
}
let response = request.send().await?;
let status = response.status();
let text = response.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
Ok((status, text))
}
/// Root-credential admin request that must succeed; returns the response body.
async fn admin_ok(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
method: http::Method,
path_and_query: &str,
body: Option<String>,
) -> Result<String, BoxError> {
let (status, text) = admin_request(&env.url, method.clone(), path_and_query, body, &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
if !status.is_success() {
return Err(format!("{method} {path_and_query} failed: {status} {text}").into());
}
Ok(text)
}
fn build_s3_client(url: &str, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str) -> Client {
let config = Config::builder()
@@ -146,6 +89,262 @@ fn bucket_rw_policy(bucket: &str) -> String {
.to_string()
}
async fn create_user_with_service_account_update_policy(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
user: &str,
secret: &str,
policy: &str,
) -> TestResult {
admin_ok(
env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={user}"),
Some(serde_json::json!({ "secretKey": secret, "status": "enabled" }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={policy}"),
Some(
serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["admin:UpdateServiceAccount"]
},
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["sts:AssumeRole"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"]
}
]
})
.to_string(),
),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
env,
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/idp/builtin/policy/attach",
Some(serde_json::json!({ "policies": [policy], "user": user }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn create_service_account_for(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
parent: &str,
) -> Result<(String, String), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let response = admin_ok(
env,
http::Method::PUT,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/add-service-accounts",
Some(serde_json::json!({ "targetUser": parent }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
let response: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&response)?;
let access_key = response["credentials"]["accessKey"]
.as_str()
.ok_or("service account response should contain credentials.accessKey")?
.to_owned();
let secret_key = response["credentials"]["secretKey"]
.as_str()
.ok_or("service account response should contain credentials.secretKey")?
.to_owned();
Ok((access_key, secret_key))
}
async fn assert_admin_status(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
credentials: (&str, &str, Option<&str>),
path: &str,
body: String,
expected: StatusCode,
context: &str,
) -> TestResult {
let (access_key, secret_key, session_token) = credentials;
let (status, response) =
admin_request_with_session_token(&env.url, http::Method::POST, path, Some(body), access_key, secret_key, session_token)
.await?;
assert_eq!(status, expected, "{context}: got {status}: {response}");
if expected == StatusCode::FORBIDDEN {
assert!(response.contains("AccessDenied"), "{context}: expected AccessDenied body, got {response}");
}
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_update_service_account_enforces_owner_and_parent_scope() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let parent = "updateparent";
let parent_secret = "updateparentsecret";
let outsider = "updateoutsider";
let outsider_secret = "updateoutsidersecret";
let ordinary = "updateordinary";
let ordinary_secret = "updateordinarysecret";
create_user_with_service_account_update_policy(&env, parent, parent_secret, "update-parent-policy").await?;
create_user_with_service_account_update_policy(&env, outsider, outsider_secret, "update-outsider-policy").await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/idp/builtin/policy/attach",
Some(serde_json::json!({ "policies": ["consoleAdmin"], "user": outsider }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={ordinary}"),
Some(serde_json::json!({ "secretKey": ordinary_secret, "status": "enabled" }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
let (target_access_key, _) = create_service_account_for(&env, parent).await?;
let target_path = format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey={target_access_key}");
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(&env.access_key, &env.secret_key, None),
&target_path,
serde_json::json!({}).to_string(),
StatusCode::NO_CONTENT,
"root no-op update across parents must succeed",
)
.await?;
let custom_policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:GetObject"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::update-scope/*"]
}]
});
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(&env.access_key, &env.secret_key, None),
&target_path,
serde_json::json!({ "newPolicy": custom_policy }).to_string(),
StatusCode::NO_CONTENT,
"root implied-to-custom update across parents must succeed",
)
.await?;
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(parent, parent_secret, None),
&target_path,
serde_json::json!({ "newDescription": "updated by parent" }).to_string(),
StatusCode::NO_CONTENT,
"parent with UpdateServiceAccount may update its own service account",
)
.await?;
let takeover = serde_json::json!({
"newSecretKey": "cross-parent-takeover-secret",
"newDescription": "cross-parent takeover"
})
.to_string();
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(ordinary, ordinary_secret, None),
&target_path,
takeover.clone(),
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"ordinary user must not update another parent's service account",
)
.await?;
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(outsider, outsider_secret, None),
&target_path,
takeover.clone(),
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"non-owner consoleAdmin must not update across parents",
)
.await?;
let (derived_access_key, derived_secret_key) = create_service_account_for(&env, outsider).await?;
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(&derived_access_key, &derived_secret_key, None),
&target_path,
takeover.clone(),
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"service-account credential must not update across parents",
)
.await?;
let assumed = build_test_sts_client(&env.url, outsider, outsider_secret, None, "e2e-admin-update-service-account")
.assume_role()
.role_arn("arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/update-service-account")
.role_session_name("update-service-account-scope")
.send()
.await?;
let temporary = assumed
.credentials()
.ok_or("AssumeRole response should contain credentials")?;
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(temporary.access_key_id(), temporary.secret_access_key(), Some(temporary.session_token())),
&target_path,
takeover,
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"temporary credential must not update across parents",
)
.await?;
let info = admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::GET,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/info-service-account?accessKey={target_access_key}"),
None,
)
.await?;
let info: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&info)?;
assert_eq!(
info["impliedPolicy"].as_bool(),
Some(false),
"root update must replace the implied policy with a custom policy"
);
assert!(
info["policy"].as_str().is_some_and(|policy| policy.contains("s3:GetObject")),
"custom policy must round-trip through the handler: {info}"
);
assert_eq!(
info["description"].as_str(),
Some("updated by parent"),
"denied takeover attempts must not mutate target"
);
let (missing_status, missing_body) = admin_request(
&env.url,
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey=missing-service-account",
Some(serde_json::json!({}).to_string()),
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await?;
assert_eq!(missing_status, StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "missing target must fail closed: {missing_body}");
assert!(
missing_body.contains("NoSuchResource"),
"missing target must preserve the lookup error: {missing_body}"
);
env.stop_server();
Ok(())
}
/// Full user -> policy -> service-account lifecycle, proving each management
/// call takes effect on the data plane, not just that the endpoint answers 200.
#[tokio::test]
+83 -105
View File
@@ -16,91 +16,17 @@
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging};
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging, signed_s3_request};
use aws_sdk_s3::error::ProvideErrorMetadata;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{
AccelerateConfiguration, BucketAccelerateStatus, BucketLoggingStatus, IndexDocument, LoggingEnabled, Payer,
RequestPaymentConfiguration, WebsiteConfiguration,
};
use http::Method;
use http::header::CONTENT_TYPE;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::process::Command;
use tracing::info;
fn awscurl_binary_path() -> PathBuf {
std::env::var_os("AWSCURL_PATH")
.map(PathBuf::from)
.unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("awscurl"))
}
fn awscurl_available() -> bool {
Command::new(awscurl_binary_path()).arg("--version").output().is_ok()
}
fn execute_s3_awscurl(
method: &str,
url: &str,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
) -> Result<String, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let output = Command::new(awscurl_binary_path())
.args([
"--service",
"s3",
"--region",
"us-east-1",
"--access_key",
access_key,
"--secret_key",
secret_key,
"-i",
"-X",
method,
url,
])
.output()?;
if !output.status.success() {
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
return Err(format!("awscurl failed: stderr='{stderr}', stdout='{stdout}'").into());
}
Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).to_string())
}
fn parse_status(raw: &str) -> Option<u16> {
raw.lines()
.filter_map(|line| {
if line.starts_with("HTTP/") {
line.split_whitespace().nth(1)?.parse::<u16>().ok()
} else {
None
}
})
.next_back()
}
fn parse_body(raw: &str) -> String {
if let Some(pos) = raw.rfind("\r\n\r\n") {
return raw[pos + 4..].to_string();
}
if let Some(pos) = raw.rfind("\n\n") {
return raw[pos + 2..].to_string();
}
String::new()
}
fn parse_headers(raw: &str) -> String {
let start = raw.rfind("HTTP/").unwrap_or(0);
let tail = &raw[start..];
if let Some(pos) = tail.find("\r\n\r\n") {
return tail[..pos].to_string();
}
if let Some(pos) = tail.find("\n\n") {
return tail[..pos].to_string();
}
tail.to_string()
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_dummy_bucket_compatibility_endpoints() {
@@ -470,10 +396,6 @@ mod tests {
async fn test_dummy_bucket_endpoints_http_contracts() {
init_logging();
info!("Starting test: dummy-compat bucket API HTTP contracts");
if !awscurl_available() {
info!("Skipping test_dummy_bucket_endpoints_http_contracts: awscurl binary not found");
return;
}
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("Failed to create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await.expect("Failed to start RustFS");
@@ -488,56 +410,112 @@ mod tests {
.await
.expect("Failed to create bucket");
let logging_raw = execute_s3_awscurl("GET", &format!("{}/{bucket}?logging=", env.url), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key)
.expect("GetBucketLogging HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(parse_status(&logging_raw), Some(200), "GetBucketLogging should return 200");
let logging_body = parse_body(&logging_raw);
let logging_response = signed_s3_request(
Method::GET,
&format!("{}/{bucket}?logging=", env.url),
None,
None,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await
.expect("GetBucketLogging HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(logging_response.status(), 200, "GetBucketLogging should return 200");
let logging_body = logging_response
.text()
.await
.expect("Failed to read GetBucketLogging response body");
assert!(
logging_body.contains("<BucketLoggingStatus"),
"GetBucketLogging response should contain BucketLoggingStatus XML, got: {logging_body}"
);
let accel_raw = execute_s3_awscurl("GET", &format!("{}/{bucket}?accelerate=", env.url), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key)
.expect("GetBucketAccelerateConfiguration HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(parse_status(&accel_raw), Some(200), "GetBucketAccelerateConfiguration should return 200");
let accel_body = parse_body(&accel_raw);
let accel_response = signed_s3_request(
Method::GET,
&format!("{}/{bucket}?accelerate=", env.url),
None,
None,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await
.expect("GetBucketAccelerateConfiguration HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(accel_response.status(), 200, "GetBucketAccelerateConfiguration should return 200");
let accel_body = accel_response
.text()
.await
.expect("Failed to read GetBucketAccelerateConfiguration response body");
assert!(
accel_body.contains("<AccelerateConfiguration"),
"GetBucketAccelerateConfiguration response should contain AccelerateConfiguration XML, got: {accel_body}"
);
let payment_raw =
execute_s3_awscurl("GET", &format!("{}/{bucket}?requestPayment=", env.url), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key)
.expect("GetBucketRequestPayment HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(parse_status(&payment_raw), Some(200), "GetBucketRequestPayment should return 200");
let payment_body = parse_body(&payment_raw);
let payment_response = signed_s3_request(
Method::GET,
&format!("{}/{bucket}?requestPayment=", env.url),
None,
None,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await
.expect("GetBucketRequestPayment HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(payment_response.status(), 200, "GetBucketRequestPayment should return 200");
let payment_body = payment_response
.text()
.await
.expect("Failed to read GetBucketRequestPayment response body");
assert!(
payment_body.contains("<Payer>BucketOwner</Payer>"),
"GetBucketRequestPayment should return BucketOwner payer, got: {payment_body}"
);
let website_raw = execute_s3_awscurl("GET", &format!("{}/{bucket}?website=", env.url), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key)
.expect("GetBucketWebsite HTTP request failed");
let website_response = signed_s3_request(
Method::GET,
&format!("{}/{bucket}?website=", env.url),
None,
None,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await
.expect("GetBucketWebsite HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(
parse_status(&website_raw),
Some(404),
website_response.status(),
404,
"GetBucketWebsite should return 404 when website config is absent"
);
let website_content_type = parse_headers(&website_raw).to_ascii_lowercase();
let website_content_type = website_response
.headers()
.get(CONTENT_TYPE)
.expect("GetBucketWebsite response should include Content-Type")
.to_str()
.expect("GetBucketWebsite Content-Type should be valid ASCII")
.to_ascii_lowercase();
assert!(
website_content_type.contains("content-type:") && website_content_type.contains("xml"),
website_content_type.contains("xml"),
"GetBucketWebsite error response should be XML, got content-type: {website_content_type}"
);
let website_body = parse_body(&website_raw);
let website_body = website_response
.text()
.await
.expect("Failed to read GetBucketWebsite response body");
assert!(
website_body.contains("<Code>NoSuchWebsiteConfiguration</Code>"),
"GetBucketWebsite should return NoSuchWebsiteConfiguration code, got: {website_body}"
);
let delete_raw =
execute_s3_awscurl("DELETE", &format!("{}/{bucket}?website=", env.url), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key)
.expect("DeleteBucketWebsite HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(parse_status(&delete_raw), Some(204), "DeleteBucketWebsite should return 204");
let delete_response = signed_s3_request(
Method::DELETE,
&format!("{}/{bucket}?website=", env.url),
None,
None,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await
.expect("DeleteBucketWebsite HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(delete_response.status(), 204, "DeleteBucketWebsite should return 204");
env.stop_server();
}
@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression tests for bucket statistics and data usage accuracy.
//!
//! Covers the recurring pattern where bucket statistics (object count, size)
//! show stale/incorrect values, remain at 0, or oscillate between complete,
//! partial, and zero. This has regressed 10+ times.
//!
//! ## Regression Issues
//!
//! - rustfs#5615: bucket statistics remain unchanged after data expiration
//! - rustfs#5008: Admin usage reports only one pool
//! - rustfs#5116: Admin usage reports stale 0/0 for non-empty bucket after upgrade
//! - rustfs#5055: console object count and size still loading
//! - rustfs#5010: Storage usage info changed abnormally
//! - rustfs#3662: Incorrect bucket, object count and size
//! - rustfs#3898: DataUsageInfo undercounts versioned bucket versions
//! - rustfs#1012: Object count in the console doesn't change
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV, RustFSTestEnvironment, awscurl_get, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{BucketVersioningStatus, VersioningConfiguration};
use rustfs_data_usage::DataUsageInfo;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::error::Error;
use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep};
use tracing::info;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
async fn get_data_usage(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment) -> Result<DataUsageInfo, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/datausageinfo", env.url);
let resp = awscurl_get(&url, &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
Ok(serde_json::from_str(&resp)?)
}
/// RT-09: Verify bucket object count updates after PUT.
///
/// Regression pattern: bucket stats remain at 0 after objects are uploaded
/// (rustfs#5055, rustfs#1012).
///
/// Steps:
/// 1. Create a bucket
/// 2. Upload 10 objects
/// 3. Query admin data usage API
/// 4. Verify object count > 0
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_bucket_object_count_updates_after_put() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-09: bucket object count updates after PUT");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV)
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt09-stats-put";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Upload 10 objects
for i in 0..10 {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(format!("stat-obj-{i:04}.txt"))
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"statistical data"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
}
// Wait for scanner to process (up to 90 seconds)
let mut found_nonzero = false;
let mut last_query_error = None;
for attempt in 0..18 {
sleep(Duration::from_secs(5)).await;
let usage = match get_data_usage(&env).await {
Ok(usage) => {
last_query_error = None;
usage
}
Err(err) => {
last_query_error = Some(err.to_string());
continue;
}
};
if let Some(bucket_usage) = usage.buckets_usage.get(bucket) {
info!(" attempt {attempt}: objectsCount = {}", bucket_usage.objects_count);
if bucket_usage.objects_count >= 10 {
found_nonzero = true;
break;
}
}
}
assert!(
found_nonzero,
"RT-09 FAIL: bucket object count did not update after PUT 10 objects (regression: stats stuck at 0); last query error: {}",
last_query_error.as_deref().unwrap_or("none")
);
info!("RT-09 PASS: bucket object count updates after PUT");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-09b: Verify bucket stats update after DELETE.
///
/// Regression pattern: stats remain unchanged after objects are deleted
/// (rustfs#5615).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_bucket_object_count_updates_after_delete() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-09b: bucket object count updates after DELETE");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV)
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt09b-stats-delete";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Upload 5 objects
for i in 0..5 {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(format!("del-stat-{i}.txt"))
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"data"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
}
let mut found_nonzero = false;
for attempt in 0..18 {
sleep(Duration::from_secs(5)).await;
if let Ok(usage) = get_data_usage(&env).await
&& let Some(bucket_usage) = usage.buckets_usage.get(bucket)
{
info!(" baseline attempt {attempt}: objectsCount = {}", bucket_usage.objects_count);
if bucket_usage.objects_count >= 5 {
found_nonzero = true;
break;
}
}
}
assert!(found_nonzero, "RT-09b setup failed: scanner did not observe the 5 uploaded objects");
// Delete all objects
for i in 0..5 {
client
.delete_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(format!("del-stat-{i}.txt"))
.send()
.await
.expect("delete object");
}
// Wait for scanner to update stats (up to 90 seconds)
let mut found_zero = false;
let mut last_query_error = None;
for attempt in 0..18 {
sleep(Duration::from_secs(5)).await;
let usage = match get_data_usage(&env).await {
Ok(usage) => {
last_query_error = None;
usage
}
Err(err) => {
last_query_error = Some(err.to_string());
continue;
}
};
if let Some(bucket_usage) = usage.buckets_usage.get(bucket) {
info!(" attempt {attempt}: objectsCount = {}", bucket_usage.objects_count);
if bucket_usage.objects_count == 0 {
found_zero = true;
break;
}
}
}
assert!(
found_zero,
"RT-09b FAIL: bucket object count did not update to 0 after deleting all objects (regression rustfs#5615); last query error: {}",
last_query_error.as_deref().unwrap_or("none")
);
info!("RT-09b PASS: bucket object count updates to 0 after DELETE");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-09c: Verify versioned bucket stats count all versions.
///
/// Regression pattern: DataUsageInfo undercounts versioned bucket versions
/// and delete markers (rustfs#3898).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_versioned_bucket_stats_count_all_versions() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-09c: versioned bucket stats count all versions");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt09c-versioned-stats";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
client
.put_bucket_versioning()
.bucket(bucket)
.versioning_configuration(
VersioningConfiguration::builder()
.status(BucketVersioningStatus::Enabled)
.build(),
)
.send()
.await
.expect("enable versioning");
// Create 3 versions of the same object
for i in 0..3 {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("multi-version.txt")
.body(ByteStream::from(format!("version-{i}").into_bytes()))
.send()
.await
.expect("put version");
}
// Create a delete marker
client
.delete_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("multi-version.txt")
.send()
.await
.expect("create delete marker");
// Verify versions via API (immediate, no scanner wait)
let versions = client
.list_object_versions()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list versions");
assert_eq!(
versions.versions().len(),
3,
"RT-09c FAIL: expected 3 versions, found {}",
versions.versions().len()
);
assert_eq!(
versions.delete_markers().len(),
1,
"RT-09c FAIL: expected 1 delete marker, found {}",
versions.delete_markers().len()
);
info!("RT-09c PASS: versioned bucket correctly tracks all versions and delete markers");
Ok(())
}
}
+185
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ use http::header::{CONTENT_TYPE, HOST};
use rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD;
use rustfs_signer::sign_v4;
use s3s::Body;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet};
use std::error::Error;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use tracing::info;
@@ -48,6 +50,62 @@ use walkdir::WalkDir;
type ChaosResult<T> = Result<T, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
/// Physical `xl.meta` and shard-file census for one object version on one disk.
///
/// A successful S3 GET only proves that a quorum can serve an object. Replacement
/// tests need this lower-level record to prove that the rebuilt target holds the
/// `xl.meta` selected for a specific version and every `part.N` it declares.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
pub(crate) struct VersionShardCensus {
pub version_id: Option<String>,
pub has_xl_meta: bool,
pub data_dir: Option<String>,
pub erasure_index: Option<usize>,
pub expected_part_numbers: BTreeSet<usize>,
pub present_part_fingerprints: BTreeMap<usize, PartShardFingerprint>,
pub inline_data_fingerprint: Option<PartShardFingerprint>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
pub(crate) struct PartShardFingerprint {
pub size: u64,
pub sha256: String,
}
impl VersionShardCensus {
pub(crate) fn is_complete(&self) -> bool {
self.has_xl_meta
&& self.expected_part_numbers.len() == self.present_part_fingerprints.len()
&& self
.expected_part_numbers
.iter()
.all(|part_number| self.present_part_fingerprints.contains_key(part_number))
}
pub(crate) fn matches_manifest(&self, manifest: &Self) -> bool {
self.version_id == manifest.version_id
&& self.is_complete()
&& manifest.is_complete()
&& self.data_dir == manifest.data_dir
&& self.erasure_index == manifest.erasure_index
&& self.expected_part_numbers == manifest.expected_part_numbers
&& self.present_part_fingerprints == manifest.present_part_fingerprints
&& self.inline_data_fingerprint == manifest.inline_data_fingerprint
}
}
fn sha256_hex(data: &[u8]) -> String {
let digest = Sha256::digest(data);
digest.iter().map(|byte| format!("{byte:02x}")).collect()
}
fn shard_fingerprint(data: &[u8]) -> ChaosResult<PartShardFingerprint> {
Ok(PartShardFingerprint {
size: u64::try_from(data.len())?,
sha256: sha256_hex(data),
})
}
/// Single-node RustFS server with `disk_count` local volume directories that
/// can be faulted individually while the server is running.
pub struct DiskFaultHarness {
@@ -219,6 +277,93 @@ impl DiskFaultHarness {
pub fn object_metadata_exists_on_disk(&self, disk_index: usize, bucket: &str, key: &str) -> bool {
self.disks[disk_index].join(bucket).join(key).join("xl.meta").is_file()
}
/// Census the physical files selected by `version_id` on one disk.
///
/// Missing metadata and missing shard files are represented in the returned
/// census rather than as an error so callers can poll replacement progress.
/// Invalid metadata or an unknown requested version remains an error: treating
/// either as an incomplete rebuild would hide corruption or a wrong-version
/// recovery result.
pub(crate) fn census_object_version(
&self,
disk_index: usize,
bucket: &str,
key: &str,
version_id: Option<&str>,
) -> ChaosResult<VersionShardCensus> {
census_object_version_on_disk(&self.disks[disk_index], bucket, key, version_id)
}
}
/// Census one physical object version without requiring a single-node harness.
/// Cluster replacement tests use the same evidence as the disk-fault tests.
pub(crate) fn census_object_version_on_disk(
disk: &Path,
bucket: &str,
key: &str,
version_id: Option<&str>,
) -> ChaosResult<VersionShardCensus> {
let version_id = version_id.map(str::to_owned);
let object_dir = disk.join(bucket).join(key);
let meta_path = object_dir.join("xl.meta");
if !meta_path.is_file() {
return Ok(VersionShardCensus {
version_id,
has_xl_meta: false,
data_dir: None,
erasure_index: None,
expected_part_numbers: BTreeSet::new(),
present_part_fingerprints: BTreeMap::new(),
inline_data_fingerprint: None,
});
}
let metadata = rustfs_filemeta::FileMeta::load(&std::fs::read(&meta_path)?)?;
let file_info = metadata.into_fileinfo(bucket, key, version_id.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(), true, false, true)?;
let expected_part_numbers = if file_info.inline_data() {
BTreeSet::new()
} else {
file_info.parts.iter().map(|part| part.number).collect()
};
let data_dir = file_info.data_dir.map(|id| id.to_string());
let erasure_index = Some(file_info.erasure.index);
let inline_data_fingerprint = file_info.data.as_deref().map(shard_fingerprint).transpose()?;
let part_dir = data_dir.as_ref().map_or_else(|| object_dir.clone(), |id| object_dir.join(id));
let present_part_fingerprints = match std::fs::read_dir(&part_dir) {
Ok(entries) => {
let mut fingerprints = BTreeMap::new();
for entry in entries {
let entry = entry?;
if !entry.file_type()?.is_file() {
continue;
}
let file_name = entry.file_name();
let Some(part_number) = file_name
.to_str()
.and_then(|name| name.strip_prefix("part."))
.and_then(|number| number.parse::<usize>().ok())
else {
continue;
};
let data = std::fs::read(entry.path())?;
fingerprints.insert(part_number, shard_fingerprint(&data)?);
}
fingerprints
}
Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => BTreeMap::new(),
Err(error) => return Err(error.into()),
};
Ok(VersionShardCensus {
version_id,
has_xl_meta: true,
data_dir,
erasure_index,
expected_part_numbers,
present_part_fingerprints,
inline_data_fingerprint,
})
}
/// `POST` a signed (SigV4, service `s3`) admin request without relying on the
@@ -257,3 +402,43 @@ pub async fn signed_admin_post(url: &str, body: Option<&str>, access_key: &str,
Ok(body)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn complete_census() -> VersionShardCensus {
VersionShardCensus {
version_id: Some("version".to_string()),
has_xl_meta: true,
data_dir: Some("data-dir".to_string()),
erasure_index: Some(3),
expected_part_numbers: BTreeSet::from([1]),
present_part_fingerprints: BTreeMap::from([(1, shard_fingerprint(b"part").unwrap())]),
inline_data_fingerprint: None,
}
}
#[test]
fn shard_fingerprint_uses_physical_length_and_sha256() {
assert_eq!(
shard_fingerprint(b"abc").unwrap(),
PartShardFingerprint {
size: 3,
sha256: "ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad".to_string(),
}
);
}
#[test]
fn manifest_requires_matching_inline_payload() {
let mut expected = complete_census();
expected.expected_part_numbers.clear();
expected.present_part_fingerprints.clear();
expected.inline_data_fingerprint = Some(shard_fingerprint(b"expected").unwrap());
let mut changed = expected.clone();
changed.inline_data_fingerprint = Some(shard_fingerprint(b"changed").unwrap());
assert!(expected.matches_manifest(&expected));
assert!(!changed.matches_manifest(&expected));
}
}
+213 -12
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,12 @@
use aws_sdk_s3::config::{Credentials, Region};
use aws_sdk_s3::{Client, Config};
use aws_smithy_http_client::Builder as SmithyHttpClientBuilder;
use http::header::{CONTENT_TYPE, HOST};
use reqwest::Client as HttpClient;
use reqwest::StatusCode;
use rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD;
use rustfs_signer::sign_v4;
use s3s::Body;
use std::ffi::OsStr;
use std::fs as stdfs;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
@@ -42,11 +47,44 @@ use walkdir::WalkDir;
pub const DEFAULT_ACCESS_KEY: &str = "rustfsadmin";
pub const DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY: &str = "rustfsadmin";
pub const ENV_RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES: &str = "RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES";
pub(crate) const FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV: &[(&str, &str)] =
&[("RUSTFS_SCANNER_CYCLE", "1"), ("RUSTFS_SCANNER_START_DELAY_SECS", "0")];
pub const TEST_BUCKET: &str = "e2e-test-bucket";
const RUSTFS_FULL_FEATURE: &str = "full";
fn build_test_s3_config(endpoint_url: &str, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str, provider_name: &'static str) -> Config {
let credentials = Credentials::new(access_key, secret_key, None, None, provider_name);
fn capture_log_path(log_dir: &Path, temp_dir: &str) -> Option<PathBuf> {
let temp_name = Path::new(temp_dir).file_name()?.to_string_lossy();
Some(log_dir.join(format!("{temp_name}.log")))
}
fn configured_capture_log_path(temp_dir: &str) -> Option<String> {
let log_dir = std::env::var_os("RUSTFS_E2E_LOG_DIR")?;
if stdfs::create_dir_all(&log_dir).is_err() {
warn!(?log_dir, "failed to create configured E2E server log directory");
return None;
}
capture_log_path(Path::new(&log_dir), temp_dir).map(|path| path.to_string_lossy().into_owned())
}
fn capture_command_logs(command: &mut Command, log_path: Option<&str>) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let Some(log_path) = log_path else {
return Ok(());
};
let file = stdfs::OpenOptions::new().create(true).append(true).open(log_path)?;
let stderr_file = file.try_clone()?;
command.stdout(Stdio::from(file)).stderr(Stdio::from(stderr_file));
Ok(())
}
pub(crate) fn build_test_s3_config(
endpoint_url: &str,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
session_token: Option<&str>,
provider_name: &'static str,
) -> Config {
let credentials = Credentials::new(access_key, secret_key, session_token.map(str::to_owned), None, provider_name);
let mut config = Config::builder()
.credentials_provider(credentials)
.region(Region::new("us-east-1"))
@@ -61,6 +99,33 @@ fn build_test_s3_config(endpoint_url: &str, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str,
config.build()
}
pub(crate) fn build_test_sts_client(
endpoint_url: &str,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
session_token: Option<&str>,
provider_name: &'static str,
) -> aws_sdk_sts::Client {
let mut config = aws_sdk_sts::Config::builder()
.credentials_provider(aws_sdk_sts::config::Credentials::new(
access_key,
secret_key,
session_token.map(str::to_owned),
None,
provider_name,
))
.region(aws_sdk_sts::config::Region::new("us-east-1"))
.endpoint_url(endpoint_url)
.retry_config(aws_sdk_sts::config::retry::RetryConfig::standard().with_max_attempts(1))
.behavior_version_latest();
if endpoint_url.starts_with("http://") {
config = config.http_client(SmithyHttpClientBuilder::new().build_http());
}
aws_sdk_sts::Client::from_conf(config.build())
}
pub fn workspace_root() -> PathBuf {
let mut path = PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"));
path.pop(); // e2e_test
@@ -75,6 +140,102 @@ pub fn local_http_client() -> HttpClient {
.expect("failed to build local reqwest client")
}
pub(crate) async fn signed_s3_request(
method: http::Method,
url: &str,
body: Option<String>,
content_type: Option<&str>,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
signed_s3_request_with_session_token(method, url, body, content_type, access_key, secret_key, None).await
}
async fn signed_s3_request_with_session_token(
method: http::Method,
url: &str,
body: Option<String>,
content_type: Option<&str>,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
session_token: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("S3 URL missing authority")?.to_string();
let mut request = http::Request::builder()
.method(method.clone())
.uri(uri)
.header(HOST, authority)
.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
if let Some(content_type) = content_type {
request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
}
let content_length = i64::try_from(body.as_ref().map_or(0, String::len)).map_err(|_| "S3 request body is too large")?;
let signed = sign_v4(
request.body(Body::empty())?,
content_length,
access_key,
secret_key,
session_token.unwrap_or_default(),
"us-east-1",
);
let mut request = local_http_client().request(method, url);
for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
request = request.header(name, value);
}
if let Some(body) = body {
request = request.body(body);
}
Ok(request.send().await?)
}
/// Signs and sends an admin HTTP request with the given credentials.
pub(crate) async fn admin_request(
base_url: &str,
method: http::Method,
path_and_query: &str,
body: Option<String>,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
) -> Result<(StatusCode, String), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
admin_request_with_session_token(base_url, method, path_and_query, body, access_key, secret_key, None).await
}
pub(crate) async fn admin_request_with_session_token(
base_url: &str,
method: http::Method,
path_and_query: &str,
body: Option<String>,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
session_token: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<(StatusCode, String), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let url = format!("{base_url}{path_and_query}");
let content_type = body.as_ref().map(|_| "application/json");
let response =
signed_s3_request_with_session_token(method, &url, body, content_type, access_key, secret_key, session_token).await?;
let status = response.status();
let body = response.text().await?;
Ok((status, body))
}
/// Sends a root-credential admin request and returns its successful response body.
pub(crate) async fn admin_ok(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
method: http::Method,
path_and_query: &str,
body: Option<String>,
) -> Result<String, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let (status, response_body) =
admin_request(&env.url, method.clone(), path_and_query, body, &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
if !status.is_success() {
return Err(format!("{method} {path_and_query} failed: {status} {response_body}").into());
}
Ok(response_body)
}
/// Resolve the RustFS binary relative to the workspace.
pub fn rustfs_binary_path() -> PathBuf {
rustfs_binary_path_with_features(requested_rustfs_build_features().as_deref())
@@ -304,6 +465,7 @@ impl RustFSTestEnvironment {
pub async fn new() -> Result<Self, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let temp_dir = format!("/tmp/rustfs_e2e_test_{}", Uuid::new_v4());
fs::create_dir_all(&temp_dir).await?;
let capture_log_path = configured_capture_log_path(&temp_dir);
// Use a unique port for each test environment
let port = Self::find_available_port().await?;
@@ -317,7 +479,7 @@ impl RustFSTestEnvironment {
access_key: DEFAULT_ACCESS_KEY.to_string(),
secret_key: DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY.to_string(),
process: None,
capture_log_path: None,
capture_log_path,
})
}
@@ -325,6 +487,7 @@ impl RustFSTestEnvironment {
pub async fn with_address(address: &str) -> Result<Self, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let temp_dir = format!("/tmp/rustfs_e2e_test_{}", Uuid::new_v4());
fs::create_dir_all(&temp_dir).await?;
let capture_log_path = configured_capture_log_path(&temp_dir);
let url = format!("http://{address}");
@@ -335,7 +498,7 @@ impl RustFSTestEnvironment {
access_key: DEFAULT_ACCESS_KEY.to_string(),
secret_key: DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY.to_string(),
process: None,
capture_log_path: None,
capture_log_path,
})
}
@@ -404,13 +567,7 @@ impl RustFSTestEnvironment {
for (key, value) in extra_env {
command.env(key, value);
}
// Optionally capture the child's stdout+stderr to a file so the test can
// grep server logs (e.g. to confirm which GET reader path was taken).
if let Some(log_path) = &self.capture_log_path {
let file = stdfs::OpenOptions::new().create(true).append(true).open(log_path)?;
let stderr_file = file.try_clone()?;
command.stdout(Stdio::from(file)).stderr(Stdio::from(stderr_file));
}
capture_command_logs(&mut command, self.capture_log_path.as_deref())?;
let process = command.args(&args).spawn()?;
self.process = Some(process);
@@ -490,7 +647,12 @@ impl RustFSTestEnvironment {
/// Create an AWS S3 client configured for this RustFS instance
pub fn create_s3_client(&self) -> Client {
Client::from_conf(build_test_s3_config(&self.url, &self.access_key, &self.secret_key, "e2e-test"))
self.create_s3_client_with_credentials(&self.access_key, &self.secret_key)
}
/// Create an AWS S3 client with explicit credentials for this RustFS instance.
pub fn create_s3_client_with_credentials(&self, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str) -> Client {
Client::from_conf(build_test_s3_config(&self.url, access_key, secret_key, None, "e2e-test"))
}
/// Create test bucket
@@ -893,6 +1055,7 @@ pub struct RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
pub secret_key: String,
pub extra_env: Vec<(String, String)>,
pub node_extra_env: Vec<Vec<(String, String)>>,
pub node_capture_log_paths: Vec<Option<String>>,
pub topology: ClusterTopology,
}
@@ -992,6 +1155,7 @@ impl RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
secret_key: "rustfs-cluster-test-secret".to_string(),
extra_env,
node_extra_env: vec![Vec::new(); topology.node_count],
node_capture_log_paths: vec![None; topology.node_count],
topology,
})
}
@@ -1021,6 +1185,20 @@ impl RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
Ok(())
}
/// Capture stdout+stderr for a single cluster node process.
pub fn set_node_capture_log_path<P>(
&mut self,
node_idx: usize,
path: P,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>
where
P: Into<String>,
{
self.ensure_node_index(node_idx)?;
self.node_capture_log_paths[node_idx] = Some(path.into());
Ok(())
}
fn ensure_node_index(&self, node_idx: usize) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
if node_idx >= self.nodes.len() {
return Err(format!("node_idx {node_idx} is invalid").into());
@@ -1110,6 +1288,7 @@ impl RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
for (key, value) in &self.node_extra_env[i] {
command.env(key, value);
}
capture_command_logs(&mut command, self.node_capture_log_paths[i].as_deref())?;
let process = command.current_dir(&node.data_dir).spawn()?;
@@ -1136,6 +1315,7 @@ impl RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
let binary_path = rustfs_binary_path();
let volumes_arg = self.build_volumes_arg();
let log_path = self.node_capture_log_paths[node_idx].clone();
let node = &mut self.nodes[node_idx];
info!("Starting cluster node {} on {}", node_idx, node.address);
@@ -1154,6 +1334,7 @@ impl RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
for (key, value) in &self.node_extra_env[node_idx] {
command.env(key, value);
}
capture_command_logs(&mut command, log_path.as_deref())?;
let process = command.current_dir(&node.data_dir).spawn()?;
node.process = Some(process);
@@ -1222,6 +1403,7 @@ impl RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
&self.nodes[node_idx].url,
&self.access_key,
&self.secret_key,
None,
"cluster-test",
)))
}
@@ -1335,6 +1517,14 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(normalize_rustfs_build_features(" , "), None);
}
#[test]
fn capture_log_path_uses_temp_directory_basename() {
assert_eq!(
capture_log_path(Path::new("/tmp/e2e-logs"), "/tmp/rustfs_e2e_test_abc"),
Some(PathBuf::from("/tmp/e2e-logs/rustfs_e2e_test_abc.log"))
);
}
#[test]
fn full_feature_enables_any_required_feature() {
assert!(rustfs_build_feature_enabled(Some("full"), "sftp"));
@@ -1396,6 +1586,7 @@ mod tests {
secret_key: DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY.to_string(),
extra_env: Vec::new(),
node_extra_env: vec![Vec::new(); topology.node_count],
node_capture_log_paths: vec![None; topology.node_count],
topology,
}
}
@@ -1491,6 +1682,16 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[test]
fn cluster_node_log_capture_supports_per_node_paths() {
let mut env = fake_cluster(ClusterTopology::single_pool(3));
env.set_node_capture_log_path(1, "/tmp/node1.log").unwrap();
assert_eq!(env.node_capture_log_paths[0], None);
assert_eq!(env.node_capture_log_paths[1], Some("/tmp/node1.log".to_string()));
assert_eq!(env.node_capture_log_paths[2], None);
assert!(env.set_node_capture_log_path(3, "/tmp/invalid.log").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn cluster_node_env_rejects_invalid_index() {
let mut env = fake_cluster(ClusterTopology::single_pool(4));
+28 -12
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ use rustfs_data_usage::DataUsageInfo;
use serial_test::serial;
use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep};
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, TEST_BUCKET, awscurl_get, init_logging};
use crate::common::{FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV, RustFSTestEnvironment, TEST_BUCKET, awscurl_get, init_logging};
async fn get_data_usage_info(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment) -> Result<DataUsageInfo, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/datausageinfo", env.url);
@@ -35,16 +35,26 @@ where
F: FnMut(&DataUsageInfo) -> bool,
{
let mut last_usage = DataUsageInfo::default();
let mut last_query_error = None;
for _ in 0..45 {
let usage = get_data_usage_info(env).await?;
if usage.buckets_usage.contains_key(bucket) && predicate(&usage) {
return Ok(usage);
match get_data_usage_info(env).await {
Ok(usage) => {
last_query_error = None;
if usage.buckets_usage.contains_key(bucket) && predicate(&usage) {
return Ok(usage);
}
last_usage = usage;
}
Err(err) => last_query_error = Some(err.to_string()),
}
last_usage = usage;
sleep(Duration::from_secs(2)).await;
}
Err(format!("bucket usage did not converge for {bucket}; last usage: {last_usage:?}").into())
Err(format!(
"bucket usage did not converge for {bucket}; last usage: {last_usage:?}; last query error: {}",
last_query_error.as_deref().unwrap_or("none")
)
.into())
}
/// Regression test for data usage accuracy (issue #1012).
@@ -56,7 +66,7 @@ async fn data_usage_reports_all_objects() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Erro
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV).await?;
let client = env.create_s3_client();
@@ -74,8 +84,14 @@ async fn data_usage_reports_all_objects() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Erro
.await?;
}
// Query admin data usage API
let usage = get_data_usage_info(&env).await?;
let usage = wait_for_bucket_usage(&env, TEST_BUCKET, |usage| {
usage
.buckets_usage
.get(TEST_BUCKET)
.map(|bucket_usage| usage.objects_total_count >= 1000 && bucket_usage.objects_count >= 1000)
.unwrap_or(false)
})
.await?;
// Assert total object count and per-bucket count are not truncated
let bucket_usage = usage
@@ -108,7 +124,7 @@ async fn data_usage_reports_versioned_objects_and_delete_markers() -> Result<(),
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV).await?;
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "data-usage-versioned";
@@ -184,8 +200,8 @@ async fn data_usage_reports_versioned_objects_and_delete_markers() -> Result<(),
assert_eq!(usage.versions_total_count, 3, "total version count should match bucket usage");
assert_eq!(usage.delete_markers_total_count, 1, "total delete marker count should match bucket usage");
env.stop_server();
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
env.restart_server_preserving_data(vec![], FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV)
.await?;
let restarted_usage = wait_for_bucket_usage(&env, bucket, |usage| {
usage
@@ -0,0 +1,445 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression tests for object delete operations.
//!
//! Covers the recurring pattern where DELETE succeeds at the API level but the
//! object remains visible in LIST, or deleted objects reappear after restart,
//! or versioned delete operations fail with FileAccessDenied.
//! This has regressed 15+ times across the entire release history.
//!
//! ## Regression Issues
//!
//! - rustfs#5375: delete object in a bucket list api also exist this object
//! - rustfs#5349: The deleted bucket was rebuilt after some time
//! - rustfs#5339: data not delete in Object Lock bucket
//! - rustfs#5029: Node Does Not Remove Files After Reconnect to Cluster
//! - rustfs#4978: DELETE fails with InternalError/FileAccessDenied on beta 10
//! - rustfs#760: Cannot delete a versioned bucket
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{BucketVersioningStatus, Delete, ObjectIdentifier, VersioningConfiguration};
use serial_test::serial;
use std::error::Error;
use tracing::info;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
/// RT-05: Verify DELETE → LIST → HEAD consistency.
///
/// Regression pattern: DELETE returns 200 but the object remains in LIST.
/// Covers rustfs#5375.
///
/// Steps:
/// 1. Create a bucket and upload an object
/// 2. Verify the object is in LIST
/// 3. DELETE the object
/// 4. Verify the object is NOT in LIST
/// 5. Verify HEAD returns 404
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_delete_removes_object_from_list() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-05: delete removes object from list");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt05-delete-consistency";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Upload an object
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("to-delete.txt")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"will be deleted"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
// Verify it appears in LIST
let list = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list objects before delete");
assert!(
list.contents()
.iter()
.map(|o| o.key().unwrap_or(""))
.any(|key| key == "to-delete.txt"),
"RT-05 FAIL: object not in LIST before delete"
);
// DELETE
client
.delete_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("to-delete.txt")
.send()
.await
.expect("delete object");
// Verify NOT in LIST
let list = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list objects after delete");
assert!(
!list
.contents()
.iter()
.map(|o| o.key().unwrap_or(""))
.any(|key| key == "to-delete.txt"),
"RT-05 FAIL: deleted object still in LIST (regression rustfs#5375)"
);
// Verify HEAD returns 404
let head = client.head_object().bucket(bucket).key("to-delete.txt").send().await;
assert!(head.is_err(), "RT-05 FAIL: HEAD on deleted object should return error, got success");
info!("RT-05 PASS: delete correctly removes object from LIST and HEAD");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-05c: Verify batch delete (DeleteObjects) consistency.
///
/// Regression pattern: batch delete returns success but some objects
/// remain in LIST.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_batch_delete_removes_all_objects() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-05c: batch delete removes all objects");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt05c-batch-delete";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Upload multiple objects
let keys: Vec<String> = (0..5).map(|i| format!("batch-{i:04}.txt")).collect();
for key in &keys {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"batch-delete-me"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
}
// Verify all in LIST
let list = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list before batch delete");
assert_eq!(
list.contents().len(),
5,
"RT-05c FAIL: expected 5 objects before batch delete, found {}",
list.contents().len()
);
// Batch delete
let objects: Vec<ObjectIdentifier> = keys
.iter()
.map(|k| ObjectIdentifier::builder().key(k).build().expect("build object id"))
.collect();
client
.delete_objects()
.bucket(bucket)
.delete(Delete::builder().set_objects(Some(objects)).build().expect("build delete"))
.send()
.await
.expect("batch delete");
// Verify all removed
let list = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list after batch delete");
assert!(
list.contents().is_empty(),
"RT-05c FAIL: {} objects remain after batch delete (regression: delete objects not fully applied)",
list.contents().len()
);
info!("RT-05c PASS: batch delete removes all objects");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-05d: Verify versioned delete → permanent delete → object gone.
///
/// Covers the pattern where permanent deletion of a specific version
/// fails with FileAccessDenied (rustfs#4978).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_versioned_permanent_delete() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-05d: versioned permanent delete");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt05d-permanent-delete";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
client
.put_bucket_versioning()
.bucket(bucket)
.versioning_configuration(
VersioningConfiguration::builder()
.status(BucketVersioningStatus::Enabled)
.build(),
)
.send()
.await
.expect("enable versioning");
// Upload a single object (single version)
let put_resp = client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("single-version.txt")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"to-be-permanently-deleted"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
let version_id = put_resp.version_id().expect("version ID should be present").to_string();
// Permanently delete the specific version (rustfs#4978: FileAccessDenied)
client
.delete_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("single-version.txt")
.version_id(&version_id)
.send()
.await
.expect("permanent delete should succeed (regression rustfs#4978)");
// Verify the object is completely gone
let versions = client
.list_object_versions()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list versions");
assert!(
versions.versions().is_empty(),
"RT-05d FAIL: version still present after permanent delete"
);
info!("RT-05d PASS: versioned permanent delete succeeds");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-05e: Verify delete marker + version history interaction.
///
/// Covers the pattern where creating a delete marker and then listing
/// versions shows incorrect state (rustfs#760).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_versioned_delete_marker_and_list_consistency() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-05e: versioned delete marker and list consistency");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt05e-dm-consistency";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
client
.put_bucket_versioning()
.bucket(bucket)
.versioning_configuration(
VersioningConfiguration::builder()
.status(BucketVersioningStatus::Enabled)
.build(),
)
.send()
.await
.expect("enable versioning");
// Create 3 versions
for i in 0..3 {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("history.txt")
.body(ByteStream::from(format!("v{i}").into_bytes()))
.send()
.await
.expect("put version");
}
// Create a delete marker
let del = client
.delete_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("history.txt")
.send()
.await
.expect("delete (create marker)");
assert!(del.delete_marker().unwrap_or(false), "RT-05e FAIL: should have created a delete marker");
// ListObjectVersions should show 3 versions + 1 delete marker
let versions = client
.list_object_versions()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list versions");
assert_eq!(
versions.versions().len(),
3,
"RT-05e FAIL: expected 3 versions, found {}",
versions.versions().len()
);
assert_eq!(
versions.delete_markers().len(),
1,
"RT-05e FAIL: expected 1 delete marker, found {}",
versions.delete_markers().len()
);
// Now delete the delete marker (restore the object)
let dm_version = &versions.delete_markers()[0];
client
.delete_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("history.txt")
.version_id(dm_version.version_id().expect("dm version id"))
.send()
.await
.expect("delete delete-marker");
// HEAD should succeed now (latest version is accessible)
let head = client.head_object().bucket(bucket).key("history.txt").send().await;
assert!(head.is_ok(), "RT-05e FAIL: HEAD should succeed after removing delete marker");
info!("RT-05e PASS: versioned delete marker and list consistency");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-05f: Verify object deletion does not leave orphan data on disk.
///
/// Regression pattern: after delete, the object data files remain on disk
/// (rustfs#5029: Node Does Not Remove Files After Reconnect).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_delete_removes_object_head_returns_404() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-05f: delete → HEAD 404 consistency");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt05f-delete-head";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Upload, delete, verify HEAD returns 404
let keys = vec!["small.txt", "medium.txt", "with-slash.txt", "special+chars.txt"];
for key in &keys {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(*key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"delete-me"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
}
for key in &keys {
client
.delete_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(*key)
.send()
.await
.expect("delete object");
}
// All HEAD requests should return 404
for key in &keys {
let head = client.head_object().bucket(bucket).key(*key).send().await;
assert!(head.is_err(), "RT-05f FAIL: HEAD on deleted key '{key}' should return error");
}
// LIST should be empty
let list = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list after all deletes");
assert!(
list.contents().is_empty(),
"RT-05f FAIL: {} objects remain after deleting all",
list.contents().len()
);
info!("RT-05f PASS: all deleted objects return 404 on HEAD");
Ok(())
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression tests for distributed cluster startup and quorum.
//!
//! Covers the recurring pattern where multi-node clusters fail to start due to
//! lock quorum issues, DNS resolution delays, or erasure quorum deadlocks.
//! This has regressed 7+ times.
//!
//! ## Regression Issues
//!
//! - rustfs#5416: RustFS cannot cold-start with 2/3 quorum when Pod DNS missing
//! - rustfs#2945: Distributed mode fails on K8s: erasure quorum deadlock
//! - rustfs#2794: distributed deployment does not become ready
//! - rustfs#2601: fresh pod immediately enters FaultyDisk state
//! - rustfs#4040: Distributed startup can fail lock quorum before AppContext initializes
//! - rustfs#5655: fix(ecstore): bootstrap fresh four-node clusters reliably
//! - rustfs#4954: S3/health endpoint unavailability after multi-pool scale-up
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{RustFSTestClusterEnvironment, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::error::Error;
use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep};
use tracing::info;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
/// RT-10: Verify 4-node cluster starts successfully and all nodes are ready.
///
/// Regression pattern: distributed startup fails with quorum deadlock or
/// lock acquisition timeout (rustfs#2945, rustfs#5655).
///
/// Steps:
/// 1. Create a 4-node cluster
/// 2. Start all nodes simultaneously
/// 3. Verify all nodes report healthy
/// 4. Verify S3 operations work through any node
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_four_node_cluster_startup_and_health() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-10: 4-node cluster startup and health");
let mut cluster = RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::new(4).await.expect("create 4-node cluster");
cluster.start().await.expect("start 4-node cluster");
// Create a bucket and verify it's accessible from all nodes
cluster
.create_test_bucket("rt10-startup")
.await
.expect("create bucket on cluster");
let clients = cluster.create_all_clients().expect("create per-node clients");
// Verify S3 operations work from every node
for (i, client) in clients.iter().enumerate() {
client
.put_object()
.bucket("rt10-startup")
.key(format!("from-node-{i}.txt"))
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"hello from node"))
.send()
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("PUT from node {i} failed: {e}"));
}
// Verify all objects are visible from node 0
let list = clients[0]
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket("rt10-startup")
.send()
.await
.expect("list objects from node 0");
assert_eq!(
list.contents().len(),
4,
"RT-10 FAIL: expected 4 objects (one per node), found {}",
list.contents().len()
);
info!("RT-10 PASS: 4-node cluster starts and serves S3 from all nodes");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-10b: Verify cluster handles node restart gracefully.
///
/// Regression pattern: after a node restart, it cannot rejoin the cluster
/// or enters a faulty state (rustfs#2601).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_cluster_survives_node_restart() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-10b: cluster survives node restart");
let mut cluster = RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::new(4).await.expect("create 4-node cluster");
cluster.start().await.expect("start cluster");
cluster.create_test_bucket("rt10b-restart").await.expect("create bucket");
// Write data
let clients = cluster.create_all_clients()?;
clients[0]
.put_object()
.bucket("rt10b-restart")
.key("before-restart.txt")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"persistent data"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object before restart");
// Stop node 3
cluster.stop_node(3).expect("stop node 3");
sleep(Duration::from_secs(2)).await;
// Verify cluster still works with 3/4 nodes (quorum)
clients[0]
.put_object()
.bucket("rt10b-restart")
.key("during-offline.txt")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"written while node 3 down"))
.send()
.await
.expect("PUT should succeed with 3/4 nodes");
// Restart node 3
cluster.start_node(3).await.expect("restart node 3");
// Wait for node to rejoin
sleep(Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
// Verify the restarted node can serve reads
let list = clients[3]
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket("rt10b-restart")
.send()
.await
.expect("list from restarted node");
assert!(
list.contents().len() >= 2,
"RT-10b FAIL: restarted node sees {} objects, expected >= 2",
list.contents().len()
);
info!("RT-10b PASS: cluster survives and recovers from node restart");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-10c: Verify bucket creation persists across all nodes.
///
/// Regression pattern: bucket metadata is not replicated to all nodes,
/// causing NoSuchBucket errors on some nodes (rustfs#3191).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_bucket_visible_from_all_nodes() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-10c: bucket visible from all nodes");
let mut cluster = RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::new(4).await.expect("create 4-node cluster");
cluster.start().await.expect("start cluster");
cluster
.create_test_bucket("rt10c-bucket-visibility")
.await
.expect("create bucket");
let clients = cluster.create_all_clients()?;
// Verify the bucket is visible from every node
for (i, client) in clients.iter().enumerate() {
let resp = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket("rt10c-bucket-visibility")
.send()
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("list from node {i} failed (NoSuchBucket?): {e}"));
assert!(resp.contents().is_empty(), "RT-10c: fresh bucket should be empty on node {i}");
}
info!("RT-10c PASS: bucket visible from all 4 nodes");
Ok(())
}
}
+210 -27
View File
@@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ use s3s::access::{S3Access, S3AccessContext};
use s3s::auth::SimpleAuth;
use s3s::dto::{
AbortMultipartUploadInput, AbortMultipartUploadOutput, CompleteMultipartUploadInput, CompleteMultipartUploadOutput,
CreateMultipartUploadInput, CreateMultipartUploadOutput, DeleteObjectInput, DeleteObjectOutput, ETag,
CreateMultipartUploadInput, CreateMultipartUploadOutput, DeleteMarkerEntry, DeleteObjectInput, DeleteObjectOutput, ETag,
GetBucketVersioningInput, GetBucketVersioningOutput, GetObjectInput, GetObjectOutput, HeadBucketInput, HeadBucketOutput,
HeadObjectInput, HeadObjectOutput, PutObjectInput, PutObjectOutput, StreamingBlob, Timestamp, TimestampFormat,
UploadPartInput, UploadPartOutput,
HeadObjectInput, HeadObjectOutput, ListObjectVersionsInput, ListObjectVersionsOutput, ObjectVersionId, PutObjectInput,
PutObjectOutput, StreamingBlob, Timestamp, TimestampFormat, UploadPartInput, UploadPartOutput,
};
use s3s::service::{S3Service, S3ServiceBuilder};
use s3s::validation::{AwsNameValidation, NameValidation};
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ pub enum Operation {
GetObject,
HeadObject,
DeleteObject,
ListObjectVersions,
CreateMultipartUpload,
UploadPart,
CompleteMultipartUpload,
@@ -109,6 +110,8 @@ pub enum FaultAction {
/// already have buffered the rest of the current frame; the journal reports
/// the threshold, and the backend never receives or stores the request.
DisconnectAfterBytes(usize),
/// Apply the request, then close the connection before returning its response.
DisconnectAfterResponse,
/// Drain a request body in fixed-size slices, sleeping after every slice.
SlowDrain { chunk_bytes: usize, delay: Duration },
/// Store the request normally but replace the response ETag.
@@ -134,12 +137,15 @@ pub struct RequestRecord {
#[derive(Default)]
struct ControlState {
scripts: HashMap<Operation, VecDeque<FaultAction>>,
keyed_scripts: HashMap<(Operation, String), VecDeque<FaultAction>>,
requests: VecDeque<RequestRecord>,
next_sequence: u64,
}
#[derive(Default)]
struct StoreState {
assign_own_version_ids: bool,
assign_own_multipart_version_ids: bool,
buckets: HashMap<String, BucketState>,
uploads: HashMap<String, MultipartState>,
total_bytes: usize,
@@ -352,25 +358,60 @@ impl FakeS3Target {
state.buckets.entry(bucket).or_default();
}
/// Remove all retained object versions while preserving the bucket.
pub fn clear_bucket_objects(&self, bucket: &str) {
let mut state = lock(&self.backend.store);
let (removed_versions, removed_bytes) = state
.buckets
.get_mut(bucket)
.expect("fake target bucket must exist")
.objects
.drain()
.flat_map(|(_, versions)| versions)
.fold((0usize, 0usize), |(count, bytes), version| (count + 1, bytes + version.body.len()));
state.total_versions = state
.total_versions
.checked_sub(removed_versions)
.expect("fake target version accounting must not underflow");
state.total_bytes = state
.total_bytes
.checked_sub(removed_bytes)
.expect("fake target byte accounting must not underflow");
}
pub fn has_object(&self, bucket: &str, key: &str) -> bool {
lock(&self.backend.store)
.buckets
.get(bucket)
.and_then(|bucket| bucket.objects.get(key))
.and_then(|versions| versions.last())
.is_some_and(|version| !version.delete_marker)
}
/// Make the target mint its own version ids instead of mirroring the
/// forwarded source version id — models a generic S3 service.
pub fn assign_own_version_ids(&self, enabled: bool) {
lock(&self.backend.store).assign_own_version_ids = enabled;
}
/// Mint own version ids for the multipart path only — models a target
/// that adopts PutObject version ids but not CreateMultipartUpload ones.
pub fn assign_own_multipart_version_ids(&self, enabled: bool) {
lock(&self.backend.store).assign_own_multipart_version_ids = enabled;
}
pub fn active_multipart_upload_count(&self) -> usize {
lock(&self.backend.store).uploads.len()
}
/// Queue `times` copies of a fault for one operation.
pub fn inject(&self, operation: Operation, action: FaultAction, times: usize) {
if times == 0 {
return;
}
if let FaultAction::SlowDrain { chunk_bytes: 0, .. } = action {
panic!("slow-drain chunk size must be non-zero");
}
match &action {
FaultAction::Delay(duration) if *duration > MAX_FAULT_DURATION => {
panic!("fault delay must not exceed 30 seconds");
}
FaultAction::SlowDrain { delay, .. } if *delay >= MAX_FAULT_DURATION => {
panic!("slow-drain slice delay must be below 30 seconds");
}
_ => {}
}
validate_fault_action(&action);
let mut state = lock(&self.control);
let queued = state.scripts.values().map(VecDeque::len).sum::<usize>();
let queued = queued_fault_count(&state);
if queued.checked_add(times).is_none_or(|total| total > MAX_SCRIPTED_FAULTS) {
panic!("fake target queues at most 4096 scripted faults");
}
@@ -381,8 +422,28 @@ impl FakeS3Target {
.extend(std::iter::repeat_n(action, times));
}
/// Queue faults for one exact object key without affecting concurrent requests.
pub fn inject_for_key(&self, operation: Operation, key: impl Into<String>, action: FaultAction, times: usize) {
if times == 0 {
return;
}
validate_fault_action(&action);
let mut state = lock(&self.control);
let queued = queued_fault_count(&state);
if queued.checked_add(times).is_none_or(|total| total > MAX_SCRIPTED_FAULTS) {
panic!("fake target queues at most 4096 scripted faults");
}
state
.keyed_scripts
.entry((operation, key.into()))
.or_default()
.extend(std::iter::repeat_n(action, times));
}
pub fn clear_faults(&self) {
lock(&self.control).scripts.clear();
let mut state = lock(&self.control);
state.scripts.clear();
state.keyed_scripts.clear();
}
pub fn requests(&self) -> Vec<RequestRecord> {
@@ -393,6 +454,25 @@ impl FakeS3Target {
lock(&self.control).requests.drain(..).collect()
}
/// Stored versions for one key as `(version_id, is_delete_marker)`, oldest
/// first. Empty when the bucket or key does not exist. Lets purge tests
/// assert on the target's actual state instead of inferring it from the
/// request journal (a versioned DELETE is a silent no-op for missing ids).
pub fn stored_versions(&self, bucket: &str, key: &str) -> Vec<(String, bool)> {
let state = lock(&self.backend.store);
state
.buckets
.get(bucket)
.and_then(|bucket_state| bucket_state.objects.get(key))
.map(|versions| {
versions
.iter()
.map(|version| (version.version_id.clone(), version.delete_marker))
.collect()
})
.unwrap_or_default()
}
pub async fn shutdown(mut self) {
let _ = self.shutdown.send(true);
if let Some(task) = self.task.take() {
@@ -420,6 +500,25 @@ fn lock<T>(mutex: &Mutex<T>) -> MutexGuard<'_, T> {
mutex.lock().unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner)
}
fn validate_fault_action(action: &FaultAction) {
if let FaultAction::SlowDrain { chunk_bytes: 0, .. } = action {
panic!("slow-drain chunk size must be non-zero");
}
match action {
FaultAction::Delay(duration) if *duration > MAX_FAULT_DURATION => {
panic!("fault delay must not exceed 30 seconds");
}
FaultAction::SlowDrain { delay, .. } if *delay >= MAX_FAULT_DURATION => {
panic!("slow-drain slice delay must be below 30 seconds");
}
_ => {}
}
}
fn queued_fault_count(state: &ControlState) -> usize {
state.scripts.values().map(VecDeque::len).sum::<usize>() + state.keyed_scripts.values().map(VecDeque::len).sum::<usize>()
}
#[async_trait]
impl S3Access for FaultAccess {
async fn check(&self, context: &mut S3AccessContext<'_>) -> S3Result<()> {
@@ -492,7 +591,12 @@ fn record_request(
content_length: Option<u64>,
) -> Option<RequestFault> {
let mut state = lock(control);
let action = state.scripts.get_mut(&operation).and_then(VecDeque::pop_front);
let action = parsed
.key
.as_ref()
.and_then(|key| state.keyed_scripts.get_mut(&(operation, key.clone())))
.and_then(VecDeque::pop_front)
.or_else(|| state.scripts.get_mut(&operation).and_then(VecDeque::pop_front));
state.next_sequence += 1;
let sequence = state.next_sequence;
if state.requests.len() == MAX_REQUEST_RECORDS {
@@ -569,12 +673,14 @@ fn parse_request(method: &Method, uri: &Uri) -> ParsedRequest {
let operation = match (method, key.is_some()) {
(&Method::HEAD, false) => Operation::HeadBucket,
(&Method::GET, false) if query.contains_key("versioning") => Operation::GetBucketVersioning,
(&Method::GET, false) if query.contains_key("versions") => Operation::ListObjectVersions,
(&Method::PUT, true) if upload_id.is_some() && part_number.is_some() => Operation::UploadPart,
(&Method::PUT, true) if upload_id.is_some() || query.contains_key("partNumber") => Operation::Unknown,
(&Method::POST, true) if query.contains_key("uploads") => Operation::CreateMultipartUpload,
(&Method::POST, true) if upload_id.is_some() => Operation::CompleteMultipartUpload,
(&Method::DELETE, true) if upload_id.is_some() => Operation::AbortMultipartUpload,
(&Method::PUT, true) if only_query_keys(&[]) => Operation::PutObject,
// A replication PUT addresses the source version via `?versionId=`.
(&Method::PUT, true) if only_query_keys(&["versionId"]) => Operation::PutObject,
(&Method::GET, true) if only_query_keys(&["versionId"]) => Operation::GetObject,
(&Method::HEAD, true) if only_query_keys(&["versionId"]) => Operation::HeadObject,
(&Method::DELETE, true) if only_query_keys(&["versionId"]) => Operation::DeleteObject,
@@ -624,10 +730,17 @@ fn validate_retained_identifier(value: String, field: &str) -> S3Result<String>
}
}
fn new_version_id(headers: &HeaderMap) -> S3Result<String> {
/// `assign_own` models a target that mints its own version ids (a generic S3
/// service): the forwarded source-version-id header is validated but NOT
/// mirrored into the stored version.
fn new_version_id(headers: &HeaderMap, assign_own: bool) -> S3Result<String> {
let Some(value) = header_value(headers, &SOURCE_VERSION_ID_HEADERS) else {
return Ok(Uuid::new_v4().to_string());
};
if assign_own {
validate_retained_identifier(value.trim().to_owned(), "source version ID")?;
return Ok(Uuid::new_v4().to_string());
}
let value = validate_retained_identifier(value.trim().to_owned(), "source version ID")?;
let version_id = Uuid::parse_str(&value).map_err(|_| s3s::s3_error!(InvalidArgument, "source version ID must be a UUID"))?;
Ok(version_id.to_string())
@@ -712,7 +825,10 @@ async fn apply_non_body_fault(fault: Option<&RequestFault>, control: &Mutex<Cont
update_consumed(control, fault.expect("matched fault").sequence, 0);
Err(scripted_disconnect_error())
}
Some(FaultAction::SlowDrain { .. }) | Some(FaultAction::WrongEtag) | None => Ok(()),
Some(FaultAction::SlowDrain { .. })
| Some(FaultAction::WrongEtag)
| Some(FaultAction::DisconnectAfterResponse)
| None => Ok(()),
}
}
@@ -753,7 +869,7 @@ async fn collect_stream(
Some(FaultAction::SlowDrain { chunk_bytes, delay }) => {
return collect_stream_slow(body, capacity, *chunk_bytes, *delay).await;
}
Some(FaultAction::WrongEtag) | None => {}
Some(FaultAction::WrongEtag) | Some(FaultAction::DisconnectAfterResponse) | None => {}
}
let mut output = BytesMut::with_capacity(capacity);
@@ -815,6 +931,9 @@ fn apply_response_fault<T>(mut response: S3Response<T>, fault: Option<&RequestFa
if fault.is_some_and(|fault| fault.action == FaultAction::WrongEtag) {
response.headers.insert(ETAG, HeaderValue::from_static(WRONG_ETAG));
}
if fault.is_some_and(|fault| fault.action == FaultAction::DisconnectAfterResponse) {
response.headers.insert(DISCONNECT_HEADER, HeaderValue::from_static("true"));
}
response
}
@@ -1003,6 +1122,63 @@ impl S3 for FakeBackend {
))
}
/// Prefix + max-keys subset only — enough for the replication-check probe
/// key allocation. No pagination markers or delimiter folding.
async fn list_object_versions(
&self,
req: S3Request<ListObjectVersionsInput>,
) -> S3Result<S3Response<ListObjectVersionsOutput>> {
let fault = request_fault(&req);
apply_non_body_fault(fault.as_ref(), &self.control).await?;
let state = lock(&self.store);
let Some(bucket_state) = state.buckets.get(&req.input.bucket) else {
return Err(s3s::s3_error!(NoSuchBucket, "bucket does not exist"));
};
let prefix = req.input.prefix.as_deref().unwrap_or_default();
let max_keys = req.input.max_keys.unwrap_or(1000).max(0) as usize;
let mut keys: Vec<&String> = bucket_state.objects.keys().filter(|key| key.starts_with(prefix)).collect();
keys.sort();
let mut versions = Vec::new();
let mut delete_markers = Vec::new();
'keys: for key in keys {
for version in bucket_state.objects[key].iter().rev() {
if versions.len() + delete_markers.len() >= max_keys {
break 'keys;
}
if version.delete_marker {
delete_markers.push(DeleteMarkerEntry {
key: Some(key.clone()),
version_id: Some(ObjectVersionId::from(version.version_id.clone())),
last_modified: Some(version.last_modified.clone()),
..Default::default()
});
} else {
versions.push(s3s::dto::ObjectVersion {
key: Some(key.clone()),
version_id: Some(ObjectVersionId::from(version.version_id.clone())),
last_modified: Some(version.last_modified.clone()),
e_tag: Some(ETag::Strong(version.e_tag.clone())),
size: Some(version.body.len() as i64),
..Default::default()
});
}
}
}
drop(state);
Ok(apply_response_fault(
S3Response::new(ListObjectVersionsOutput {
name: Some(req.input.bucket),
versions: Some(versions),
delete_markers: Some(delete_markers),
..Default::default()
}),
fault.as_ref(),
))
}
async fn put_object(&self, req: S3Request<PutObjectInput>) -> S3Result<S3Response<PutObjectOutput>> {
let fault = request_fault(&req);
let _body_permit = timeout(MAX_FAULT_DURATION, Arc::clone(&self.body_limit).acquire_owned())
@@ -1013,7 +1189,8 @@ impl S3 for FakeBackend {
let input = req.input;
let body = collect_stream(input.body, input.content_length, fault.as_ref(), &self.control).await?;
validate_stored_metadata(&input.content_type, &input.metadata)?;
let version_id = new_version_id(&headers)?;
let assign_own = lock(&self.store).assign_own_version_ids;
let version_id = new_version_id(&headers, assign_own)?;
let e_tag = match source_etag(&headers)? {
Some(value) => value,
None => {
@@ -1056,7 +1233,7 @@ impl S3 for FakeBackend {
content_type: version.content_type,
metadata: version.metadata,
e_tag: Some(ETag::Strong(version.e_tag)),
last_modified: Some(version.last_modified),
last_modified: Some(version.last_modified.clone()),
version_id: Some(version.version_id),
..Default::default()
}),
@@ -1078,7 +1255,7 @@ impl S3 for FakeBackend {
content_type: version.content_type,
metadata: version.metadata,
e_tag: Some(ETag::Strong(version.e_tag)),
last_modified: Some(version.last_modified),
last_modified: Some(version.last_modified.clone()),
version_id: Some(version.version_id),
..Default::default()
}),
@@ -1147,7 +1324,9 @@ impl S3 for FakeBackend {
));
}
let version_id = new_version_id(&headers)?;
// `state` is the live store guard: read the flag from it. Re-locking
// would self-deadlock (the store mutex is not reentrant).
let version_id = new_version_id(&headers, state.assign_own_version_ids)?;
upsert_version(
&mut state,
&input.bucket,
@@ -1187,12 +1366,16 @@ impl S3 for FakeBackend {
ensure_upload_budget(&state)?;
validate_stored_metadata(&input.content_type, &input.metadata)?;
let upload_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
// Read the flag before the mutable borrow of `state.uploads` below
// (and never re-lock the store: the mutex is not reentrant).
let mint_own = state.assign_own_version_ids || state.assign_own_multipart_version_ids;
let version_id = new_version_id(&headers, mint_own)?;
state.uploads.insert(
upload_id.clone(),
MultipartState {
bucket: input.bucket.clone(),
key: input.key.clone(),
version_id: new_version_id(&headers)?,
version_id,
content_type: input.content_type,
metadata: input.metadata,
parts: BTreeMap::new(),
@@ -189,8 +189,6 @@ mod tests {
("RUSTFS_GET_CODEC_STREAMING_ROLLOUT_PCT", "100"),
("RUSTFS_GET_CODEC_STREAMING_BODY_COMPAT_CONFIRMED", "true"),
("RUSTFS_GET_CODEC_STREAMING_HEADER_COMPAT_CONFIRMED", "true"),
// Lower the min-size floor so every non-inline object below is eligible.
("RUSTFS_GET_CODEC_STREAMING_MIN_SIZE", "4096"),
// Route multipart objects through per-part codec streaming too.
("RUSTFS_GET_CODEC_STREAMING_MULTIPART_ENABLE", "true"),
// Lock optimization is on by default, but pin it so the gate's
@@ -315,6 +313,13 @@ mod tests {
},
payload(64 * 1024, 2),
),
(
Shape {
key: "small-non-inline-256kib-plus",
expect_large: true,
},
payload(256 * 1024 + 1, 6),
),
(
Shape {
key: "mid-1_5mib",
+51 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
//! E2E tests for group management (fixes #2028).
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, awscurl_delete, awscurl_get, awscurl_put, init_logging};
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_request, awscurl_delete, awscurl_get, awscurl_put, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::config::{Credentials, Region};
use aws_sdk_s3::{Client, Config};
use serial_test::serial;
@@ -32,6 +32,56 @@ fn create_user_s3_client(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, access_key: &str, secret_k
Client::from_conf(config)
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
async fn update_group_members_rejects_invalid_new_group_names() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let invalid_groups = [
("test group", "group name contains whitespace"),
("test=group", "group name contains reserved characters =,"),
("test,group", "group name contains reserved characters =,"),
];
for (group, expected_message) in invalid_groups {
let body = serde_json::json!({
"group": group,
"members": [],
"isRemove": false,
"groupStatus": "enabled"
})
.to_string();
let (status, response_body) = admin_request(
&env.url,
http::Method::PUT,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/update-group-members",
Some(body),
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await?;
assert_eq!(
status,
reqwest::StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
"invalid group {group:?} must return HTTP 400, body: {response_body}"
);
assert!(
response_body.contains("<Code>InvalidArgument</Code>"),
"invalid group {group:?} must return InvalidArgument, body: {response_body}"
);
assert!(
response_body.contains(&format!("<Message>{expected_message}</Message>")),
"invalid group {group:?} returned an unexpected message: {response_body}"
);
}
env.stop_server();
Ok(())
}
/// Test that deleting a group with members fails, and deleting an empty group succeeds.
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
#[serial]
@@ -431,4 +431,104 @@ mod tests {
)
.into())
}
/// Issue #5850: `background-heal/status` must answer while a peer is down.
///
/// Exercises the production path in `read_cluster_heal_status` end to end,
/// which the unit tests around `merge_peer_heal_statuses` cannot: with one
/// node stopped, the endpoint must return 200 with
/// `clusterStatusComplete: false` and an explicit `degraded` (or, when
/// heal work is known active, `active`) state — never the previous
/// cluster-wide 500 — and must return to a complete, non-degraded answer
/// once the node rejoins. Reverting either all-or-nothing gate (the
/// topology early-return or the merge hard-fail) turns the down-window
/// response into a 500 and fails this test.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_background_heal_status_degrades_while_peer_down_and_recovers_after_rejoin()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
info!("Issue #5850: background-heal/status must degrade, not 500, while a peer is down");
let mut cluster = RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::new(4).await?;
cluster.set_env("RUSTFS_UNSAFE_BYPASS_DISK_CHECK", "true");
cluster.start().await?;
let status_url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/background-heal/status", cluster.nodes[0].url);
// Owned copies: the closure must not borrow `cluster`, which
// stop_node/start_node need mutably between polls.
let access_key = cluster.access_key.clone();
let secret_key = cluster.secret_key.clone();
let fetch_status = || async {
let body = signed_admin_post(&status_url, None, &access_key, &secret_key).await?;
let json: serde_json::Value =
serde_json::from_str(&body).map_err(|err| format!("heal status response is not JSON ({err}): {body}"))?;
Ok::<serde_json::Value, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>(json)
};
// Healthy cluster: the answer must be definitive. Poll briefly — the
// peer grid may still be settling right after start().
let mut healthy = fetch_status().await?;
for _ in 0..30 {
if healthy["clusterStatusComplete"] == serde_json::Value::Bool(true) {
break;
}
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
healthy = fetch_status().await?;
}
assert_eq!(
healthy["clusterStatusComplete"],
serde_json::Value::Bool(true),
"healthy cluster should report a complete heal status: {healthy}"
);
cluster.stop_node(1)?;
// While the peer is down every response must stay 200 (signed_admin_post
// fails on any non-2xx, so the old 500 fails the test immediately) and
// must degrade to an explicitly-partial answer. The peer query timeout
// is 5 s, so a couple of polls are enough for the dead peer to surface.
let mut degraded = serde_json::Value::Null;
for _ in 0..30 {
degraded = fetch_status().await?;
if degraded["clusterStatusComplete"] == serde_json::Value::Bool(false) {
break;
}
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
assert_eq!(
degraded["clusterStatusComplete"],
serde_json::Value::Bool(false),
"heal status must mark itself partial while a peer is down: {degraded}"
);
let state = degraded["state"].as_str().unwrap_or_default();
assert!(
state == "degraded" || state == "active",
"a partial answer must be labeled degraded (or active for known work), got {state:?}: {degraded}"
);
cluster.start_node(1).await?;
// After the rejoin the endpoint must return to a definitive answer.
let mut recovered = serde_json::Value::Null;
for _ in 0..60 {
recovered = fetch_status().await?;
if recovered["clusterStatusComplete"] == serde_json::Value::Bool(true) {
break;
}
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
assert_eq!(
recovered["clusterStatusComplete"],
serde_json::Value::Bool(true),
"heal status should be complete again after the node rejoined: {recovered}"
);
assert_ne!(
recovered["state"].as_str().unwrap_or_default(),
"degraded",
"a complete answer must not be labeled degraded: {recovered}"
);
Ok(())
}
}
@@ -1687,6 +1687,44 @@ async fn four_node_inline_storage_and_get_boundaries() -> TestResult {
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn four_node_empty_legacy_volumes_start_as_fresh() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut cluster = RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::new(4).await?;
for data_dir in cluster.nodes.iter().flat_map(|node| &node.data_dirs) {
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(Path::new(data_dir).join(".minio.sys")).await?;
}
cluster.start().await?;
// Starting is not the assertion. The regression is that an empty legacy
// `.minio.sys` must be classified as a *fresh* volume, not as an existing
// MinIO deployment to adopt or migrate. Pin what that classification leaves
// on disk and in the namespace.
let buckets = cluster.create_s3_client(0)?.list_buckets().send().await?;
assert!(
buckets.buckets().is_empty(),
"a fresh classification must not adopt buckets from the pre-existing directories, got {:?}",
buckets.buckets().iter().filter_map(|b| b.name()).collect::<Vec<_>>()
);
for data_dir in cluster.nodes.iter().flat_map(|node| &node.data_dirs) {
assert!(
Path::new(data_dir).join(".rustfs.sys").join("format.json").is_file(),
"each drive must be formatted as fresh: {data_dir} has no .rustfs.sys/format.json"
);
let mut legacy = tokio::fs::read_dir(Path::new(data_dir).join(".minio.sys")).await?;
assert!(
legacy.next_entry().await?.is_none(),
"the empty legacy directory must be left untouched, not migrated into: {data_dir}"
);
}
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn four_node_inline_fallback_controls() -> TestResult {
@@ -2173,11 +2211,6 @@ async fn four_node_manual_transition_distributed_admission_conflict_reports_stat
"queue_snapshot.{field} must be readable in terminal status: {terminal}"
);
}
assert!(
cold_tier_object_count(&cold_client).await? < 64,
"queue pressure should leave at least one object untransitioned"
);
Ok(())
}
@@ -21,9 +21,12 @@
use super::common::LocalKMSTestEnvironment;
use crate::common::{TEST_BUCKET, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{
ServerSideEncryption, ServerSideEncryptionByDefault, ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration, ServerSideEncryptionRule,
ChecksumAlgorithm, ChecksumMode, CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart, ServerSideEncryption,
ServerSideEncryptionByDefault, ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration, ServerSideEncryptionRule,
};
use rustfs_rio::{Checksum, ChecksumType};
use serial_test::serial;
use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
@@ -273,7 +276,7 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_sse_kms_put_object() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::err
/// Test 3: When bucket is configured with default encryption, create_multipart_upload should inherit the configuration
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
async fn test_bucket_default_sse_kms_multipart_crc32() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
info!("Testing bucket default encryption impact on create_multipart_upload");
@@ -309,15 +312,16 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
.await
.expect("Failed to set bucket encryption");
// Step 2: Create multipart upload (without specifying encryption parameters)
info!("Creating multipart upload (without specifying encryption parameters, should use bucket default configuration)");
let test_key = "test-multipart-bucket-default.txt";
// Step 2: Declare CRC32 without specifying encryption parameters. The AWS SDK
// calculates each UploadPart checksum and sends it as a flexible checksum.
info!("Creating CRC32 multipart upload that should use bucket default encryption");
let test_key = "test-multipart-bucket-default-crc32.bin";
let create_multipart_response = s3_client
.create_multipart_upload()
.bucket(TEST_BUCKET)
.key(test_key)
// Note: No encryption parameters specified here, should use bucket default configuration
.checksum_algorithm(ChecksumAlgorithm::Crc32)
.send()
.await
.expect("Failed to create multipart upload");
@@ -343,28 +347,61 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
"create_multipart_upload response should contain correct KMS key ID"
);
// Step 3: Upload a part and complete multipart upload
info!("Uploading part and completing multipart upload");
let test_data = b"test-multipart-bucket-default-encryption-data";
// Step 3: Upload two parts. The first is exactly the S3 minimum size so this
// follows the same managed SSE-KMS multipart path as issue #5756.
const PART_SIZE: usize = 5 * 1024 * 1024;
let part1: Vec<u8> = (0..PART_SIZE).map(|i| (i % 251) as u8).collect();
let part2: Vec<u8> = (0..1024 * 1024).map(|i| ((i + 17) % 251) as u8).collect();
let expected_body: Vec<u8> = part1.iter().chain(&part2).copied().collect();
// Upload part 1
let upload_part_response = s3_client
.upload_part()
.bucket(TEST_BUCKET)
.key(test_key)
.upload_id(upload_id)
.part_number(1)
.body(test_data.to_vec().into())
.send()
.await
.expect("Failed to upload part");
let upload_part = |part_number: i32, body: Vec<u8>| {
s3_client
.upload_part()
.bucket(TEST_BUCKET)
.key(test_key)
.upload_id(upload_id)
.part_number(part_number)
.checksum_algorithm(ChecksumAlgorithm::Crc32)
.body(ByteStream::from(body))
.send()
};
let etag = upload_part_response.e_tag().unwrap().to_string();
let expected_part1_crc32 = Checksum::new_from_data(ChecksumType::CRC32, &part1)
.expect("calculate part 1 CRC32")
.encoded;
let upload1 = upload_part(1, part1).await.expect("Failed to upload part 1 with CRC32");
assert_eq!(
upload1.checksum_crc32(),
Some(expected_part1_crc32.as_str()),
"UploadPart must return the CRC32 calculated over plaintext"
);
let expected_part2_crc32 = Checksum::new_from_data(ChecksumType::CRC32, &part2)
.expect("calculate part 2 CRC32")
.encoded;
let upload2 = upload_part(2, part2).await.expect("Failed to upload part 2 with CRC32");
assert_eq!(
upload2.checksum_crc32(),
Some(expected_part2_crc32.as_str()),
"UploadPart must return the CRC32 calculated over plaintext"
);
// Complete multipart upload
let completed_part = aws_sdk_s3::types::CompletedPart::builder()
.part_number(1)
.e_tag(&etag)
let completed_upload = CompletedMultipartUpload::builder()
.parts(
CompletedPart::builder()
.part_number(1)
.e_tag(upload1.e_tag().expect("No ETag for part 1"))
.checksum_crc32(upload1.checksum_crc32().expect("No CRC32 for part 1"))
.build(),
)
.parts(
CompletedPart::builder()
.part_number(2)
.e_tag(upload2.e_tag().expect("No ETag for part 2"))
.checksum_crc32(upload2.checksum_crc32().expect("No CRC32 for part 2"))
.build(),
)
.build();
let complete_multipart_response = s3_client
@@ -372,11 +409,7 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
.bucket(TEST_BUCKET)
.key(test_key)
.upload_id(upload_id)
.multipart_upload(
aws_sdk_s3::types::CompletedMultipartUpload::builder()
.parts(completed_part)
.build(),
)
.multipart_upload(completed_upload)
.send()
.await
.expect("Failed to complete multipart upload");
@@ -400,6 +433,7 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
.get_object()
.bucket(TEST_BUCKET)
.key(test_key)
.checksum_mode(ChecksumMode::Enabled)
.send()
.await
.expect("Failed to get object");
@@ -410,6 +444,13 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
Some(&ServerSideEncryption::AwsKms),
"Final object should contain SSE-KMS encryption information"
);
if let Some(completed_crc32) = complete_multipart_response.checksum_crc32() {
assert_eq!(
get_response.checksum_crc32(),
Some(completed_crc32),
"GetObject should return the persisted composite CRC32 when completion reports it"
);
}
// Verify data integrity
let downloaded_data = get_response
@@ -418,7 +459,11 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
.await
.expect("Failed to collect body")
.into_bytes();
assert_eq!(&downloaded_data[..], test_data, "Downloaded data should match original data");
assert_eq!(
downloaded_data.as_ref(),
expected_body.as_slice(),
"Downloaded data should match the uploaded multipart body"
);
// Cleanup is handled automatically when the test environment is dropped
info!("Test passed: bucket default encryption correctly applied to multipart upload");
@@ -126,7 +126,55 @@ async fn assert_key_deletion_lifecycle(base_url: &str, access_key: &str, secret_
assert_eq!(cancelled["success"], true);
assert_eq!(cancelled["key_metadata"]["key_state"], "Enabled");
let removed = kms_admin_request(
// A window outside 7-30 days is refused at the endpoint, whatever the
// backend: the bound is enforced once in the service, so no backend can
// stretch or skip it (rustfs/backlog#1585).
for days in [6, 31] {
let refused = kms_admin_request(
base_url,
http::Method::DELETE,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/delete",
Some(
&serde_json::json!({
"key_id": key_id,
"pending_window_in_days": days
})
.to_string(),
),
access_key,
secret_key,
)
.await
.err()
.ok_or_else(|| format!("a {days}-day deletion window must be refused"))?;
assert!(
refused.to_string().contains("400 Bad Request"),
"a {days}-day deletion window must report a client error: {refused}"
);
}
// Immediate deletion is no longer reachable through the query string, so it
// fails before the service gate is even consulted.
let refused = kms_admin_request(
base_url,
http::Method::DELETE,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/delete?keyId={key_id}&force_immediate=true"),
None,
access_key,
secret_key,
)
.await
.err()
.ok_or("immediate KMS key deletion must not be reachable through the query string")?;
assert!(
refused.to_string().contains("400 Bad Request"),
"a query-string immediate deletion must report a client error: {refused}"
);
// A default server refuses to skip the waiting window (rustfs/backlog#1585):
// immediate deletion is unrecoverable and takes every object encrypted under
// the key with it, so the endpoint must reject it rather than honour it.
let refused = kms_admin_request(
base_url,
http::Method::DELETE,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/delete",
@@ -140,37 +188,49 @@ async fn assert_key_deletion_lifecycle(base_url: &str, access_key: &str, secret_
access_key,
secret_key,
)
.await?;
let removed: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&removed)?;
assert_eq!(removed["success"], true);
.await
.err()
.ok_or("immediate KMS key deletion must be refused on a default server")?;
assert!(
refused.to_string().contains("400 Bad Request"),
"refused immediate deletion must report a client error: {refused}"
);
let listed =
kms_admin_request(base_url, http::Method::GET, "/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys", None, access_key, secret_key).await?;
let listed: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&listed)?;
assert_eq!(listed["success"], true);
let keys = listed["keys"]
.as_array()
.ok_or("list KMS keys response omitted keys after deletion")?;
if let Some(key) = keys.iter().find(|key| key["key_id"] == key_id) {
assert_eq!(key["status"], "PendingDeletion", "a retained force-deleted key must be pending deletion");
let removed = kms_admin_request(
base_url,
http::Method::DELETE,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/delete",
Some(
&serde_json::json!({
"key_id": key_id,
"force_immediate": true
})
.to_string(),
),
access_key,
secret_key,
)
.await?;
let removed: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&removed)?;
assert_eq!(removed["success"], true);
}
// The refused requests left the key alone, so the window-bounded path still
// has something to schedule.
let described = kms_admin_request(
base_url,
http::Method::GET,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/{key_id}"),
None,
access_key,
secret_key,
)
.await?;
let described: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&described)?;
assert_eq!(
described["key_metadata"]["key_state"], "Enabled",
"a refused immediate deletion must leave the key usable"
);
let rescheduled = kms_admin_request(
base_url,
http::Method::DELETE,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/delete",
Some(
&serde_json::json!({
"key_id": key_id,
"pending_window_in_days": 7
})
.to_string(),
),
access_key,
secret_key,
)
.await?;
let rescheduled: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&rescheduled)?;
assert_eq!(rescheduled["success"], true);
assert!(rescheduled["deletion_date"].is_string());
let listed =
kms_admin_request(base_url, http::Method::GET, "/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys", None, access_key, secret_key).await?;
@@ -179,10 +239,11 @@ async fn assert_key_deletion_lifecycle(base_url: &str, access_key: &str, secret_
let keys = listed["keys"]
.as_array()
.ok_or("final list KMS keys response omitted keys after deletion")?;
assert!(
keys.iter().all(|key| key["key_id"] != key_id),
"force-deleted KMS key must no longer appear in list"
);
let key = keys
.iter()
.find(|key| key["key_id"] == key_id)
.ok_or("a key awaiting its deletion window must still be listed")?;
assert_eq!(key["status"], "PendingDeletion", "a scheduled key must be pending deletion");
Ok(())
}
@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression test: a same-key CopyObject that only rewrites metadata must never re-key a
//! managed-SSE (SSE-S3 / SSE-KMS) object.
//!
//! On an **unversioned** bucket the handler marks a same-name copy `metadata_only`, and the
//! store layer then updates `xl.meta` in place without touching the data blocks. The handler
//! nevertheless strips the source encryption metadata and generates a *fresh* DEK for the
//! destination. Combining the two writes "new DEK + old ciphertext": the object is permanently
//! undecryptable. The fix forces a full data rewrite whenever the copy re-derives managed
//! encryption material, so the stored bytes always match the key metadata beside them.
//!
//! Companion to `copy_object_version_restore_sse_test` (issue #4238), which pins the same
//! invariant for the versioned historical-restore path.
use super::common::{LocalKMSTestEnvironment, create_key_with_specific_id};
use crate::common::init_logging;
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{
MetadataDirective, ServerSideEncryption, ServerSideEncryptionByDefault, ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration,
ServerSideEncryptionRule,
};
use serial_test::serial;
use tracing::info;
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_metadata_replace_self_copy_of_sse_object_stays_decryptable() {
init_logging();
info!("same-key CopyObject with REPLACE metadata must not re-key an SSE-S3 object");
let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("failed to create local KMS env");
let default_key_id = "rustfs-e2e-test-default-key";
let keys_dir = kms_env.kms_keys_dir.clone();
create_key_with_specific_id(&keys_dir, default_key_id)
.await
.expect("failed to create local KMS key");
kms_env
.base_env
.start_rustfs_server_with_env(
vec![
"--kms-enable",
"--kms-backend",
"local",
"--kms-key-dir",
&keys_dir,
"--kms-default-key-id",
default_key_id,
],
&[("RUSTFS_KMS_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV_DEFAULTS", "true")],
)
.await
.expect("failed to start RustFS with local KMS");
tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
let client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
// Deliberately an UNVERSIONED bucket: that is the branch where the store layer can service
// the self-copy as a pure metadata update.
let bucket = "copy-object-self-copy-sse-test";
let key = "secrets/report.txt";
client
.create_bucket()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("failed to create bucket");
// Content long enough that a truncated/garbled decrypt cannot coincidentally match.
let content = b"encrypted payload that must survive a metadata-only self copy -- 0123456789";
let put = client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.content_type("text/plain; charset=utf-8")
.metadata("stage", "before")
.server_side_encryption(ServerSideEncryption::Aes256)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(content))
.send()
.await
.expect("PUT failed");
assert_eq!(put.server_side_encryption(), Some(&ServerSideEncryption::Aes256));
// Copy the object onto itself, replacing user metadata. This is the `mc cp --attr` /
// "edit metadata in place" shape that AWS supports on an existing object.
let copy_out = client
.copy_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.copy_source(format!("{bucket}/{key}"))
.metadata_directive(MetadataDirective::Replace)
.content_type("text/plain; charset=utf-8")
.metadata("stage", "after")
.server_side_encryption(ServerSideEncryption::Aes256)
.send()
.await
.expect("same-key CopyObject with REPLACE metadata must succeed");
assert_eq!(copy_out.server_side_encryption(), Some(&ServerSideEncryption::Aes256));
// The object must still decrypt to the original plaintext. Before the fix the stored
// ciphertext was left untouched while the metadata carried a brand-new DEK, so this GET
// either failed outright or returned garbage.
let get = client
.get_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.send()
.await
.expect("GET after self-copy failed: the object was re-keyed without rewriting the ciphertext");
assert_eq!(get.server_side_encryption(), Some(&ServerSideEncryption::Aes256));
assert_eq!(
get.metadata().and_then(|m| m.get("stage")),
Some(&"after".to_string()),
"REPLACE metadata must take effect"
);
let body = get.body.collect().await.expect("collect body").into_bytes();
assert_eq!(
body.as_ref(),
content,
"object must still decrypt to the original plaintext after a metadata-only self copy"
);
kms_env.base_env.stop_server();
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_metadata_replace_self_copy_dropping_sse_rewrites_plaintext() {
init_logging();
info!("same-key CopyObject that drops SSE must rewrite the data, not orphan the ciphertext");
let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("failed to create local KMS env");
let default_key_id = "rustfs-e2e-test-default-key";
let keys_dir = kms_env.kms_keys_dir.clone();
create_key_with_specific_id(&keys_dir, default_key_id)
.await
.expect("failed to create local KMS key");
kms_env
.base_env
.start_rustfs_server_with_env(
vec![
"--kms-enable",
"--kms-backend",
"local",
"--kms-key-dir",
&keys_dir,
"--kms-default-key-id",
default_key_id,
],
&[("RUSTFS_KMS_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV_DEFAULTS", "true")],
)
.await
.expect("failed to start RustFS with local KMS");
tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
let client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
// Unversioned, and deliberately WITHOUT a bucket default-encryption rule, so the copy below
// resolves to "no destination encryption".
let bucket = "copy-object-self-copy-drop-sse-test";
let key = "secrets/report.txt";
client
.create_bucket()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("failed to create bucket");
let content = b"encrypted payload whose ciphertext must not survive as bogus plaintext -- 0123456789";
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.metadata("stage", "before")
.server_side_encryption(ServerSideEncryption::Aes256)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(content))
.send()
.await
.expect("PUT failed");
// Self-copy with REPLACE and no SSE header. Per AWS semantics the destination ends up
// unencrypted. The dangerous outcome is the silent one: the handler strips the source key
// metadata while a metadata-only copy leaves the ciphertext in place, so a later GET would
// hand back raw ciphertext as if it were plaintext — corruption with no error anywhere.
client
.copy_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.copy_source(format!("{bucket}/{key}"))
.metadata_directive(MetadataDirective::Replace)
.metadata("stage", "after")
.send()
.await
.expect("same-key CopyObject dropping SSE must succeed");
let get = client
.get_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.send()
.await
.expect("GET after self-copy failed");
assert_eq!(
get.server_side_encryption(),
None,
"destination must be unencrypted once the copy drops SSE"
);
assert_eq!(
get.metadata().and_then(|m| m.get("stage")),
Some(&"after".to_string()),
"REPLACE metadata must take effect"
);
let body = get.body.collect().await.expect("collect body").into_bytes();
assert_eq!(
body.as_ref(),
content,
"object must read back as the original plaintext, not the orphaned ciphertext"
);
kms_env.base_env.stop_server();
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_metadata_replace_self_copy_under_bucket_default_sse_stays_decryptable() {
init_logging();
info!("bucket default encryption must also keep a same-key copy off the metadata-only path");
let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("failed to create local KMS env");
let default_key_id = "rustfs-e2e-test-default-key";
let keys_dir = kms_env.kms_keys_dir.clone();
create_key_with_specific_id(&keys_dir, default_key_id)
.await
.expect("failed to create local KMS key");
kms_env
.base_env
.start_rustfs_server_with_env(
vec![
"--kms-enable",
"--kms-backend",
"local",
"--kms-key-dir",
&keys_dir,
"--kms-default-key-id",
default_key_id,
],
&[("RUSTFS_KMS_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV_DEFAULTS", "true")],
)
.await
.expect("failed to start RustFS with local KMS");
tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
let client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "copy-object-self-copy-bucket-default-sse-test";
let key = "secrets/report.txt";
client
.create_bucket()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("failed to create bucket");
// Store the object as PLAINTEXT first: no SSE header and no bucket default rule yet. This is
// what makes the case sharp — at copy time the source metadata carries no encryption markers,
// so the source-side half of the guard cannot fire.
let content = b"plaintext payload that must not be orphaned under a new DEK -- 0123456789";
let put = client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.metadata("stage", "before")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(content))
.send()
.await
.expect("PUT failed");
assert_eq!(put.server_side_encryption(), None, "the object must start out unencrypted");
// Only NOW enable bucket default encryption. The destination's encryption therefore comes
// from the bucket rule and from nowhere else: the source is unencrypted and the copy request
// carries no SSE header. A guard that only inspects request headers (MinIO decides
// `isTargetEncrypted` from `crypto.S3.IsRequested(r.Header)`) would let this through, yet
// `sse_encryption` still mints a fresh DEK from the resolved bucket default — which is why
// the guard keys off the *effective* encryption rather than the requested one.
let encryption_config = ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration::builder()
.rules(
ServerSideEncryptionRule::builder()
.apply_server_side_encryption_by_default(
ServerSideEncryptionByDefault::builder()
.sse_algorithm(ServerSideEncryption::Aes256)
.build()
.unwrap(),
)
.build(),
)
.build()
.unwrap();
client
.put_bucket_encryption()
.bucket(bucket)
.server_side_encryption_configuration(encryption_config)
.send()
.await
.expect("failed to set bucket default encryption");
// No SSE header on the copy — the bucket default alone drives the destination encryption.
client
.copy_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.copy_source(format!("{bucket}/{key}"))
.metadata_directive(MetadataDirective::Replace)
.metadata("stage", "after")
.send()
.await
.expect("same-key CopyObject under bucket default encryption must succeed");
let get = client
.get_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.send()
.await
.expect("GET after self-copy failed: the object was re-keyed without rewriting the ciphertext");
assert_eq!(get.server_side_encryption(), Some(&ServerSideEncryption::Aes256));
assert_eq!(
get.metadata().and_then(|m| m.get("stage")),
Some(&"after".to_string()),
"REPLACE metadata must take effect"
);
let body = get.body.collect().await.expect("collect body").into_bytes();
assert_eq!(
body.as_ref(),
content,
"object must still decrypt to the original plaintext after a metadata-only self copy"
);
kms_env.base_env.stop_server();
}
@@ -0,0 +1,483 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Negative authorization matrix for per-key KMS access control.
//!
//! Every case here is an end-to-end denial that the pre-`kms` resource server
//! allowed, so a regression that reopens one of them fails this file rather than
//! only a unit test. The matrix varies one dimension at a time:
//!
//! - **wrong identity**: a caller holding S3 rights but no `kms` grant at all
//! - **wrong key**: a caller scoped to key A naming key B
//! - **wrong action**: a caller holding `kms:GenerateDataKey` but not `kms:Decrypt`
//! (and, on the admin plane, `kms:DisableKey` but not `kms:RotateKey`)
//! - **wrong context**: an explicit `Deny` beating a wildcard `Allow`, and SSE-S3
//! staying exempt from `kms` authorization
//!
//! Each matrix opens with a positive control. Without it a denial proves nothing:
//! an identity whose policy has not propagated yet is denied everything.
use super::common::{LocalKMSTestEnvironment, create_key_with_specific_id};
use crate::common::{admin_ok, admin_request, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
use aws_sdk_s3::config::{Config, Credentials, Region};
use aws_sdk_s3::error::ProvideErrorMetadata;
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::ServerSideEncryption;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::time::Duration;
use tracing::info;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>;
const ALLOWED_KEY: &str = "kms-matrix-allowed-key";
const OTHER_KEY: &str = "kms-matrix-other-key";
const BUCKET: &str = "kms-authz-matrix";
const SECRET: &str = "kms-matrix-secret";
const PAYLOAD: &[u8] = b"kms authorization matrix payload";
/// How long an identity change may take to reach the request path.
const IAM_PROPAGATION: Duration = Duration::from_secs(20);
fn s3_client(url: &str, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str) -> Client {
let config = Config::builder()
.credentials_provider(Credentials::new(access_key, secret_key, None, None, "kms-authz-matrix"))
.region(Region::new("us-east-1"))
.endpoint_url(url)
.force_path_style(true)
.behavior_version_latest()
.build();
Client::from_conf(config)
}
/// Start a server whose SSE-KMS data path authorizes against the named key.
///
/// The enforcement switch defaults to off for compatibility, so it has to be set
/// explicitly; without it every negative case below would silently pass as an allow.
async fn start_enforcing_server(env: &mut LocalKMSTestEnvironment, extra_env: &[(&str, &str)]) -> TestResult {
create_key_with_specific_id(&env.kms_keys_dir, ALLOWED_KEY).await?;
create_key_with_specific_id(&env.kms_keys_dir, OTHER_KEY).await?;
let key_dir = env.kms_keys_dir.clone();
let args = vec![
"--kms-enable",
"--kms-backend",
"local",
"--kms-key-dir",
key_dir.as_str(),
"--kms-default-key-id",
ALLOWED_KEY,
];
let mut envs = vec![("RUSTFS_KMS_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV_DEFAULTS", "true")];
envs.extend_from_slice(extra_env);
env.base_env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(args, &envs).await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Create `user` with `policy_document` attached under a canned policy of the same name.
async fn provision_user(env: &LocalKMSTestEnvironment, user: &str, policy_document: &str) -> TestResult {
admin_ok(
&env.base_env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={user}"),
Some(policy_document.to_string()),
)
.await?;
provision_user_with_policy(env, user, user).await
}
/// Create `user` and attach an existing policy (built-in or canned) by name.
async fn provision_user_with_policy(env: &LocalKMSTestEnvironment, user: &str, policy_name: &str) -> TestResult {
admin_ok(
&env.base_env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={user}"),
Some(serde_json::json!({ "secretKey": SECRET, "status": "enabled" }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env.base_env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/set-user-or-group-policy?policyName={policy_name}&userOrGroup={user}&isGroup=false"),
None,
)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
/// The S3 half of every data-path policy below: full object access, no KMS grant.
fn s3_full_access_statement() -> serde_json::Value {
serde_json::json!({
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:*"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"]
})
}
fn policy_document(statements: Vec<serde_json::Value>) -> String {
serde_json::json!({ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": statements }).to_string()
}
async fn put_sse_kms(client: &Client, key: &str, kms_key_id: &str) -> Result<(), aws_sdk_s3::Error> {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(BUCKET)
.key(key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(PAYLOAD))
.server_side_encryption(ServerSideEncryption::AwsKms)
.ssekms_key_id(kms_key_id)
.send()
.await
.map(|_| ())
.map_err(aws_sdk_s3::Error::from)
}
/// Assert the operation failed with `AccessDenied` rather than any other error.
///
/// A bare `is_err` would also accept `KMSKeyDisabled` or an internal error, which
/// would hide both a leak of key state and an outage masquerading as a denial.
fn assert_access_denied<T: std::fmt::Debug>(result: Result<T, aws_sdk_s3::Error>, what: &str) {
let error = result.expect_err(&format!("{what} must be denied"));
assert_eq!(error.code(), Some("AccessDenied"), "{what} must fail with AccessDenied: {error:?}");
}
/// Retry an SSE-KMS write until the identity's policy has reached the request path.
async fn wait_for_sse_kms_write(client: &Client, key: &str, kms_key_id: &str) -> TestResult {
let deadline = tokio::time::Instant::now() + IAM_PROPAGATION;
loop {
match put_sse_kms(client, key, kms_key_id).await {
Ok(()) => return Ok(()),
Err(error) if tokio::time::Instant::now() >= deadline => {
return Err(format!("positive control never became authorized: {error:?}").into());
}
Err(_) => tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(500)).await,
}
}
}
/// Retry an admin call until it stops returning 403, i.e. the policy is live.
async fn wait_for_admin_success(
env: &LocalKMSTestEnvironment,
user: &str,
method: http::Method,
path: &str,
body: Option<String>,
) -> TestResult {
let deadline = tokio::time::Instant::now() + IAM_PROPAGATION;
loop {
let (status, response) = admin_request(&env.base_env.url, method.clone(), path, body.clone(), user, SECRET).await?;
if status.is_success() {
return Ok(());
}
if tokio::time::Instant::now() >= deadline {
return Err(format!("positive control never became authorized: {method} {path} -> {status} {response}").into());
}
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(500)).await;
}
}
async fn assert_admin_denied(
env: &LocalKMSTestEnvironment,
user: &str,
method: http::Method,
path: &str,
body: Option<String>,
what: &str,
) -> TestResult {
let (status, response) = admin_request(&env.base_env.url, method, path, body, user, SECRET).await?;
assert_eq!(status.as_u16(), 403, "{what} must be denied, got {status}: {response}");
assert!(response.contains("AccessDenied"), "{what} must carry AccessDenied: {response}");
Ok(())
}
fn disable_body(key_id: &str) -> String {
serde_json::json!({ "key_id": key_id }).to_string()
}
/// Data-path matrix: SSE-KMS writes and reads are authorized against the resolved key.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn sse_kms_per_key_authorization_negative_matrix() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
start_enforcing_server(&mut env, &[("RUSTFS_KMS_ENFORCE_SSE_KEY_POLICY", "true")]).await?;
env.base_env.create_test_bucket(BUCKET).await?;
// Scoped to ALLOWED_KEY only.
provision_user(
&env,
"kmsmatrixscoped",
&policy_document(vec![
s3_full_access_statement(),
serde_json::json!({
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["kms:GenerateDataKey", "kms:Decrypt"],
"Resource": [format!("arn:aws:kms:::key/{ALLOWED_KEY}")]
}),
]),
)
.await?;
// S3 rights only: the identity shape that existed before per-key authorization.
provision_user(&env, "kmsmatrixs3only", &policy_document(vec![s3_full_access_statement()])).await?;
// May wrap a data key but may never unwrap one.
provision_user(
&env,
"kmsmatrixwriter",
&policy_document(vec![
s3_full_access_statement(),
serde_json::json!({
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["kms:GenerateDataKey"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:kms:::*"]
}),
]),
)
.await?;
// Wildcard allow, explicit deny on one key.
provision_user(
&env,
"kmsmatrixdenied",
&policy_document(vec![
s3_full_access_statement(),
serde_json::json!({
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["kms:*"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:kms:::*"]
}),
serde_json::json!({
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": ["kms:*"],
"Resource": [format!("arn:aws:kms:::key/{OTHER_KEY}")]
}),
]),
)
.await?;
let scoped = s3_client(&env.base_env.url, "kmsmatrixscoped", SECRET);
let s3_only = s3_client(&env.base_env.url, "kmsmatrixs3only", SECRET);
let writer = s3_client(&env.base_env.url, "kmsmatrixwriter", SECRET);
let denied = s3_client(&env.base_env.url, "kmsmatrixdenied", SECRET);
// --- positive control -----------------------------------------------------
wait_for_sse_kms_write(&scoped, "scoped/allowed", ALLOWED_KEY).await?;
let read = scoped.get_object().bucket(BUCKET).key("scoped/allowed").send().await?;
assert_eq!(read.body.collect().await?.into_bytes().as_ref(), PAYLOAD);
info!("positive control: scoped identity may write and read under its own key");
// --- wrong key ------------------------------------------------------------
assert_access_denied(
put_sse_kms(&scoped, "scoped/other", OTHER_KEY).await,
"SSE-KMS write under a key outside the identity's scope",
);
// --- wrong identity -------------------------------------------------------
assert_access_denied(
put_sse_kms(&s3_only, "s3only/allowed", ALLOWED_KEY).await,
"SSE-KMS write by an identity holding no kms grant",
);
// The object the scoped identity wrote is readable by its owner only.
assert_access_denied(
s3_only
.get_object()
.bucket(BUCKET)
.key("scoped/allowed")
.send()
.await
.map(|_| ())
.map_err(aws_sdk_s3::Error::from),
"SSE-KMS read by an identity holding no kms grant",
);
// --- wrong action ---------------------------------------------------------
wait_for_sse_kms_write(&writer, "writer/allowed", ALLOWED_KEY).await?;
assert_access_denied(
writer
.get_object()
.bucket(BUCKET)
.key("writer/allowed")
.send()
.await
.map(|_| ())
.map_err(aws_sdk_s3::Error::from),
"SSE-KMS read by an identity holding kms:GenerateDataKey but not kms:Decrypt",
);
// --- wrong context: explicit Deny beats a wildcard Allow -------------------
wait_for_sse_kms_write(&denied, "denied/allowed", ALLOWED_KEY).await?;
assert_access_denied(
put_sse_kms(&denied, "denied/other", OTHER_KEY).await,
"SSE-KMS write under a key covered by an explicit Deny",
);
// --- wrong context: SSE-S3 is out of scope --------------------------------
// SSE-S3 wraps its data key with a server-owned key the caller never names, so
// it must stay reachable for an identity with no kms grant at all.
s3_only
.put_object()
.bucket(BUCKET)
.key("s3only/sse-s3")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(PAYLOAD))
.server_side_encryption(ServerSideEncryption::Aes256)
.send()
.await?;
let sse_s3_read = s3_only.get_object().bucket(BUCKET).key("s3only/sse-s3").send().await?;
assert_eq!(sse_s3_read.body.collect().await?.into_bytes().as_ref(), PAYLOAD);
// ... and so must an unencrypted object.
s3_only
.put_object()
.bucket(BUCKET)
.key("s3only/plain")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(PAYLOAD))
.send()
.await?;
s3_only.get_object().bucket(BUCKET).key("s3only/plain").send().await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Admin-plane matrix: KMS key endpoints are authorized against the key they name.
///
/// Runs without the SSE enforcement switch: admin scoping is unconditional, and
/// leaving the switch off proves the two planes are independent.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn kms_admin_per_key_authorization_negative_matrix() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
start_enforcing_server(&mut env, &[]).await?;
// Built-in role templates, attached by name.
provision_user_with_policy(&env, "kmsmatrixkeyadmin", "KMSKeyAdministrator").await?;
provision_user_with_policy(&env, "kmsmatrixauditor", "KMSAuditor").await?;
// A narrowed copy of the administrator template, scoped to one key.
provision_user(
&env,
"kmsmatrixscopedadmin",
&policy_document(vec![serde_json::json!({
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["kms:DisableKey", "kms:EnableKey"],
"Resource": [format!("arn:aws:kms:::key/{ALLOWED_KEY}")]
})]),
)
.await?;
// --- positive control -----------------------------------------------------
wait_for_admin_success(
&env,
"kmsmatrixkeyadmin",
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/disable",
Some(disable_body(OTHER_KEY)),
)
.await?;
admin_request(
&env.base_env.url,
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/enable",
Some(disable_body(OTHER_KEY)),
"kmsmatrixkeyadmin",
SECRET,
)
.await?;
// --- wrong action: the administrator template withholds service-wide powers -
assert_admin_denied(
&env,
"kmsmatrixkeyadmin",
http::Method::GET,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/config",
None,
"KMSKeyAdministrator reading the KMS backend configuration (kms:Configure)",
)
.await?;
assert_admin_denied(
&env,
"kmsmatrixkeyadmin",
http::Method::GET,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/backup",
None,
"KMSKeyAdministrator exporting a backup bundle (kms:Backup)",
)
.await?;
// Separation of duties: managing a key never implies using it.
assert_admin_denied(
&env,
"kmsmatrixkeyadmin",
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/generate-data-key",
Some(serde_json::json!({ "key_id": ALLOWED_KEY }).to_string()),
"KMSKeyAdministrator generating a data key (kms:GenerateDataKey)",
)
.await?;
// --- wrong action: the auditor template is read-only ----------------------
wait_for_admin_success(&env, "kmsmatrixauditor", http::Method::GET, "/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys", None).await?;
assert_admin_denied(
&env,
"kmsmatrixauditor",
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/disable",
Some(disable_body(ALLOWED_KEY)),
"KMSAuditor disabling a key (kms:DisableKey)",
)
.await?;
// --- wrong key ------------------------------------------------------------
wait_for_admin_success(
&env,
"kmsmatrixscopedadmin",
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/disable",
Some(disable_body(ALLOWED_KEY)),
)
.await?;
assert_admin_denied(
&env,
"kmsmatrixscopedadmin",
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/disable",
Some(disable_body(OTHER_KEY)),
"key-scoped administrator disabling a key outside its scope",
)
.await?;
// --- wrong action, same key ----------------------------------------------
assert_admin_denied(
&env,
"kmsmatrixscopedadmin",
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/rotate",
Some(disable_body(ALLOWED_KEY)),
"key-scoped administrator rotating a key it may only enable and disable",
)
.await?;
// --- wrong identity -------------------------------------------------------
provision_user(&env, "kmsmatrixnokms", &policy_document(vec![s3_full_access_statement()])).await?;
assert_admin_denied(
&env,
"kmsmatrixnokms",
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/disable",
Some(disable_body(ALLOWED_KEY)),
"identity holding no kms grant disabling a key",
)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
+34 -15
View File
@@ -417,6 +417,22 @@ async fn test_vault_kms_key_crud(
info!("✅ Read: Successfully listed keys, found test key");
// A waiting window outside 7-30 days is refused at the endpoint for this
// backend too: the bound is enforced once in the service (rustfs/backlog#1585).
for days in [6, 31] {
let window_error = crate::common::execute_awscurl(
&format!("{base_url}/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/delete?keyId={key_id}&pending_window_in_days={days}"),
"DELETE",
None,
access_key,
secret_key,
)
.await
.err()
.ok_or_else(|| format!("A {days}-day deletion window must be refused"))?;
info!("✅ Delete window {} correctly refused: {}", days, window_error);
}
// Delete
let delete_response = crate::common::execute_awscurl(
&format!("{base_url}/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/delete?keyId={key_id}"),
@@ -449,29 +465,32 @@ async fn test_vault_kms_key_crud(
info!("✅ Delete verification: Key state correctly changed to: {}", key_state);
// Force Delete - Force immediate deletion for PendingDeletion key
let force_delete_response = crate::common::execute_awscurl(
// Force Delete - the query string can no longer ask for immediate deletion,
// and a default server refuses it in any case (rustfs/backlog#1585):
// destroying the key material immediately would take every object encrypted
// under the key with it.
let force_delete_error = crate::common::execute_awscurl(
&format!("{base_url}/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/delete?keyId={key_id}&force_immediate=true"),
"DELETE",
None,
access_key,
secret_key,
)
.await?;
.await
.expect_err("Immediate KMS key deletion must be refused on a default server");
info!("✅ Force Delete: correctly refused for key {}: {}", key_id, force_delete_error);
// Parse and validate the force delete response
let force_delete_result: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&force_delete_response)?;
assert_eq!(force_delete_result["success"], true, "Force delete operation must return success=true");
info!("✅ Force Delete: Successfully force deleted key: {}", key_id);
// The refused request must leave the key exactly as it was: still present,
// still pending deletion, still recoverable through cancel-deletion.
let describe_after_refusal =
crate::common::awscurl_get(&format!("{base_url}/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/{key_id}"), access_key, secret_key).await?;
let describe_after_refusal: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&describe_after_refusal)?;
assert_eq!(
describe_after_refusal["key_metadata"]["key_state"], "PendingDeletion",
"A refused immediate deletion must leave the key pending deletion"
);
// Verify key no longer exists after force deletion (should return error)
let describe_force_deleted_result =
crate::common::awscurl_get(&format!("{base_url}/rustfs/admin/v3/kms/keys/{key_id}"), access_key, secret_key).await;
// After force deletion, key should not be found (GET should fail)
assert!(describe_force_deleted_result.is_err(), "Force deleted key should not be found");
info!("✅ Force Delete verification: Key was permanently deleted and is no longer accessible");
info!("✅ Force Delete verification: Key survived the refused immediate deletion");
info!("Vault KMS key CRUD operations completed successfully");
Ok(())
+6
View File
@@ -48,8 +48,14 @@ mod bucket_default_encryption_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod encryption_metadata_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod copy_object_self_copy_sse_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod copy_object_version_restore_sse_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod configured_roundtrip_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod kms_authorization_negative_matrix_test;
+40
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ pub mod fault_proxy;
#[cfg(test)]
mod reliability_disk_fault_test;
// Privileged Linux-only 3x4 replacement rebuild proof for rustfs#5869/#1791.
#[cfg(all(test, target_os = "linux"))]
mod replacement_privileged_e2e_test;
// dist-13 (backlog#1150/#1155): e2e regression net proving a large-object
// degraded EC read never returns a silently truncated body (rustfs#4594/#4560/#4585).
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -290,6 +294,14 @@ mod overwrite_cleanup_regression_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod list_buckets_double_slash_test;
// Regression coverage for bucket-scoped ListBuckets authorization fallback.
#[cfg(test)]
mod list_buckets_auth_test;
// ListBuckets visibility follows IAM authorization, not bucket policy.
#[cfg(test)]
mod list_buckets_iam_filter_test;
// Regression test for backlog#629(b): region-aware CreateBucket SigV4.
#[cfg(test)]
mod create_bucket_region_test;
@@ -298,4 +310,32 @@ mod create_bucket_region_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod copy_source_invalid_date_test;
// P0 regression: event notification startup race (rustfs#5387, #5681, #5401, #5183, #5115, #4796)
#[cfg(test)]
mod notification_startup_regression_test;
// P0 regression: lifecycle/ILM object expiration (rustfs#5407, #5167, #4963, #5615, #4879)
#[cfg(test)]
mod lifecycle_regression_test;
// P0 regression: delete operations consistency (rustfs#5375, #5349, #5339, #5029, #4978, #760)
#[cfg(test)]
mod delete_regression_test;
// P1 regression: listing/metacache completeness (rustfs#5166, #5156, #5051, #4810, #4648, #3191)
#[cfg(test)]
mod listing_regression_test;
// P1 regression: bucket statistics accuracy (rustfs#5615, #5008, #5116, #5055, #3898, #1012)
#[cfg(test)]
mod bucket_stats_regression_test;
// P1 regression: distributed startup/quorum (rustfs#5416, #2945, #2794, #2601, #4040, #5655)
#[cfg(test)]
mod distributed_startup_regression_test;
// P1 regression: tier/ILM transition (rustfs#5218, #5130, #5011, #4826, #5024)
#[cfg(test)]
mod tier_transition_regression_test;
pub mod tls_gen;
@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression tests for lifecycle/ILM object expiration and transition.
//!
//! Covers the recurring pattern where ILM expiration rules do not actually
//! delete objects, or lifecycle rule parameters are silently corrupted.
//! This has regressed 6+ times.
//!
//! ## Regression Issues
//!
//! - rustfs#5407: lifecycle not delete any bucket object
//! - rustfs#5167: lifecycle not delete object
//! - rustfs#4963: lifecycle rule 3 days → effective value 0 days
//! - rustfs#5615: bucket statistics remain unchanged after data expiration
//! - rustfs#4879: ILM serial lane: restore transition never completes
//! - rustfs#5442: Uncheck of Replicate Delete still deletes the file
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{
BucketLifecycleConfiguration, BucketVersioningStatus, ExpirationStatus, LifecycleExpiration, LifecycleRule,
LifecycleRuleFilter, NoncurrentVersionExpiration, VersioningConfiguration,
};
use serial_test::serial;
use std::error::Error;
use tracing::info;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
async fn setup_versioned_bucket(client: &Client, bucket: &str) -> TestResult {
client
.create_bucket()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("create bucket: {e}"))?;
client
.put_bucket_versioning()
.bucket(bucket)
.versioning_configuration(
VersioningConfiguration::builder()
.status(BucketVersioningStatus::Enabled)
.build(),
)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("enable versioning: {e}"))?;
Ok(())
}
/// RT-03: Verify that a lifecycle expiration rule actually deletes objects.
///
/// Regression pattern: lifecycle rules are accepted but the scanner never
/// processes them, leaving expired objects in place.
///
/// Steps:
/// 1. Create a versioned bucket
/// 2. Upload several objects
/// 3. Apply a lifecycle rule with 1-day expiration
/// 4. Wait for the scanner to process
/// 5. Verify objects are still present (they shouldn't expire yet — 1 day)
/// 6. Verify the lifecycle rule was persisted correctly (not corrupted to 0 days)
///
/// This tests the rule persistence path (rustfs#4963: 3 days → 0 days).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_lifecycle_expiration_rule_persists_correctly() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-03: lifecycle expiration rule persists correctly");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt03-lifecycle-persist";
setup_versioned_bucket(&client, bucket).await?;
// Apply a lifecycle rule with 1-day expiration on a prefix
let rule = LifecycleRule::builder()
.id("expire-after-1-day")
.status(ExpirationStatus::Enabled)
.filter(LifecycleRuleFilter::builder().prefix("logs/").build())
.expiration(LifecycleExpiration::builder().days(1).build())
.build()
.expect("build lifecycle rule");
client
.put_bucket_lifecycle_configuration()
.bucket(bucket)
.lifecycle_configuration(
BucketLifecycleConfiguration::builder()
.rules(rule)
.build()
.expect("build lifecycle config"),
)
.send()
.await
.expect("put lifecycle configuration");
// Read back and verify the rule was not corrupted (rustfs#4963: days → 0)
let resp = client
.get_bucket_lifecycle_configuration()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("get lifecycle configuration");
let rules = resp.rules();
assert_eq!(rules.len(), 1, "RT-03 FAIL: expected exactly 1 lifecycle rule");
let retrieved = &rules[0];
assert_eq!(retrieved.id(), Some("expire-after-1-day"), "RT-03 FAIL: rule ID mismatch");
assert_eq!(retrieved.status(), &ExpirationStatus::Enabled, "RT-03 FAIL: rule should be Enabled");
let exp = retrieved.expiration().expect("expiration should be set");
assert_eq!(
exp.days(),
Some(1),
"RT-03 FAIL: expiration days corrupted (regression rustfs#4963: expected 1, got {:?})",
exp.days()
);
info!("RT-03 PASS: lifecycle expiration rule persists correctly");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-03b: Verify lifecycle rule with noncurrent version expiration.
///
/// Covers the pattern where noncurrent version expiration rules are
/// accepted but old versions are never cleaned up.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_lifecycle_noncurrent_version_expiration_rule_persists() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-03b: noncurrent version expiration rule persists");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt03b-noncurrent-expire";
setup_versioned_bucket(&client, bucket).await?;
// Create multiple versions of the same object
for i in 0..3 {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("versioned-obj.txt")
.body(ByteStream::from(format!("version-{i}").into_bytes()))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object version");
}
// Verify we have 3 versions
let versions = client
.list_object_versions()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list versions");
let count = versions.versions().len();
assert_eq!(count, 3, "RT-03b FAIL: expected 3 versions, found {count}");
// Apply noncurrent version expiration rule
let rule = LifecycleRule::builder()
.id("expire-noncurrent-after-1-day")
.status(ExpirationStatus::Enabled)
.filter(LifecycleRuleFilter::builder().prefix("").build())
.noncurrent_version_expiration(NoncurrentVersionExpiration::builder().noncurrent_days(1).build())
.build()
.expect("build lifecycle rule");
client
.put_bucket_lifecycle_configuration()
.bucket(bucket)
.lifecycle_configuration(
BucketLifecycleConfiguration::builder()
.rules(rule)
.build()
.expect("build lifecycle config"),
)
.send()
.await
.expect("put lifecycle configuration");
// Read back and verify
let resp = client
.get_bucket_lifecycle_configuration()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("get lifecycle configuration");
let rules = resp.rules();
assert_eq!(rules.len(), 1, "RT-03b FAIL: expected 1 rule");
let nc_exp = rules[0]
.noncurrent_version_expiration()
.expect("noncurrent expiration should be set");
assert_eq!(nc_exp.noncurrent_days(), Some(1), "RT-03b FAIL: noncurrent days corrupted");
info!("RT-03b PASS: noncurrent version expiration rule persists correctly");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-04: Verify lifecycle rule with prefix filter persists after restart.
///
/// Covers the pattern where lifecycle rules are accepted but silently lost
/// after restart. Transition rules require a configured remote tier
/// (tested in reliant/tiering.rs), so this test uses expiration only.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_lifecycle_prefix_rule_persists() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-04: lifecycle prefix rule persists");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt04-lifecycle-prefix";
setup_versioned_bucket(&client, bucket).await?;
let rule = LifecycleRule::builder()
.id("expire-archive-after-7-days")
.status(ExpirationStatus::Enabled)
.filter(LifecycleRuleFilter::builder().prefix("archive/").build())
.expiration(LifecycleExpiration::builder().days(7).build())
.build()
.expect("build lifecycle rule");
client
.put_bucket_lifecycle_configuration()
.bucket(bucket)
.lifecycle_configuration(
BucketLifecycleConfiguration::builder()
.rules(rule)
.build()
.expect("build lifecycle config"),
)
.send()
.await
.expect("put lifecycle configuration");
// Restart server
env.restart_server_preserving_data(vec![], &[]).await.expect("restart RustFS");
// Verify the rule survived restart
let resp = client
.get_bucket_lifecycle_configuration()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("get lifecycle after restart");
let rules = resp.rules();
assert_eq!(rules.len(), 1, "RT-04 FAIL: expected 1 rule after restart");
let exp = rules[0].expiration().expect("expiration should be set");
assert_eq!(exp.days(), Some(7), "RT-04 FAIL: expiration days corrupted after restart");
info!("RT-04 PASS: lifecycle prefix rule persists after restart");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-05b: Verify delete marker creation in versioned bucket.
///
/// Regression pattern: DELETE on a versioned object fails or does not
/// create a delete marker, or the delete marker is not visible in LIST.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_delete_marker_creation_and_visibility() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-05b: delete marker creation and visibility");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt05b-delete-marker";
setup_versioned_bucket(&client, bucket).await?;
// Put an object
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("marker-test.txt")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"to-be-deleted"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
// Delete without specifying versionId → should create a delete marker
let del_resp = client
.delete_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("marker-test.txt")
.send()
.await
.expect("delete object");
// The response should indicate a delete marker was created
assert!(
del_resp.delete_marker().unwrap_or(false),
"RT-05b FAIL: DELETE on versioned object did not create a delete marker"
);
// ListObjectVersions should show both the original version and the delete marker
let versions = client
.list_object_versions()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list versions");
let delete_markers: Vec<_> = versions
.delete_markers()
.iter()
.filter(|dm| dm.key() == Some("marker-test.txt"))
.collect();
assert_eq!(
delete_markers.len(),
1,
"RT-05b FAIL: expected 1 delete marker, found {}",
delete_markers.len()
);
info!("RT-05b PASS: delete marker created and visible");
Ok(())
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
// Copyright 2026 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression coverage for the MinIO-compatible filtered ListBuckets fallback.
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_ok, init_logging};
use std::error::Error;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
#[tokio::test]
async fn bucket_scoped_policy_returns_only_authorized_bucket() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let root_client = env.create_s3_client();
let allowed_bucket = "list-buckets-authorized";
let hidden_bucket = "list-buckets-hidden";
let user = "listbucketsuser";
let secret = "listbucketssecret";
let policy = "list-buckets-scoped";
root_client.create_bucket().bucket(allowed_bucket).send().await?;
root_client.create_bucket().bucket(hidden_bucket).send().await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={policy}"),
Some(
serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:*"],
"Resource": [
format!("arn:aws:s3:::{allowed_bucket}"),
format!("arn:aws:s3:::{allowed_bucket}/*")
]
}]
})
.to_string(),
),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={user}"),
Some(serde_json::json!({ "secretKey": secret, "status": "enabled" }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/idp/builtin/policy/attach",
Some(serde_json::json!({ "policies": [policy], "user": user }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
let client = env.create_s3_client_with_credentials(user, secret);
// Capture ListBuckets first so the direct-access control cannot warm bucket metadata and mask the regression.
let listed = client.list_buckets().send().await;
client.list_objects_v2().bucket(allowed_bucket).send().await?;
let listed = listed?;
let names = listed
.buckets()
.iter()
.filter_map(|bucket| bucket.name().map(ToOwned::to_owned))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
assert_eq!(names, vec![allowed_bucket]);
Ok(())
}
@@ -0,0 +1,459 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_ok, build_test_s3_config, build_test_sts_client, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
use aws_sdk_s3::error::ProvideErrorMetadata;
use serial_test::serial;
use tokio::time::{Duration, Instant};
fn user_client(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str, session_token: Option<&str>) -> Client {
Client::from_conf(build_test_s3_config(
&env.url,
access_key,
secret_key,
session_token,
"list-buckets-iam-filter",
))
}
fn bucket_names(buckets: &[aws_sdk_s3::types::Bucket]) -> Vec<String> {
let mut names = buckets
.iter()
.filter_map(|bucket| bucket.name().map(str::to_owned))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
names.sort();
names
}
async fn create_user(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let body = serde_json::json!({ "secretKey": secret_key, "status": "enabled" }).to_string();
admin_ok(
env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={access_key}"),
Some(body),
)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn create_service_account(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
target_user: &str,
policy: Option<&serde_json::Value>,
) -> Result<(String, String), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let request = match policy {
Some(policy) => serde_json::json!({ "targetUser": target_user, "policy": policy }),
None => serde_json::json!({ "targetUser": target_user }),
};
let response = admin_ok(env, http::Method::PUT, "/rustfs/admin/v3/add-service-accounts", Some(request.to_string())).await?;
let response: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&response)?;
let access_key = response["credentials"]["accessKey"]
.as_str()
.ok_or("service account response should contain credentials.accessKey")?
.to_owned();
let secret_key = response["credentials"]["secretKey"]
.as_str()
.ok_or("service account response should contain credentials.secretKey")?
.to_owned();
Ok((access_key, secret_key))
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn list_buckets_filters_with_iam_bucket_resources() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.capture_log_path = Some(format!("{}/server.log", env.temp_dir));
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUST_LOG", "rustfs=debug,rustfs_notify=debug")])
.await?;
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
for bucket in [
"benchmark-artifacts",
"benchmark-denied",
"benchmark-location-only",
"benchmark-test1",
"testuser1-artifacts",
] {
admin_client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
}
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(admin_client.list_buckets().send().await?.buckets()),
vec![
"benchmark-artifacts",
"benchmark-denied",
"benchmark-location-only",
"benchmark-test1",
"testuser1-artifacts"
]
);
let access_key = "benchmark";
let secret_key = "benchmark-secret-1234567890";
create_user(&env, access_key, secret_key).await?;
let policy_name = "benchmark-bucket-prefix";
let policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:*"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-*", "arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-*/*"],
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"s3:prefix": [""],
"s3:delimiter": ["/"]
}
}
},
{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket", "s3:GetBucketLocation"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-denied"]
},
{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-location-only"]
},
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["sts:AssumeRole"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"]
}
]
})
.to_string();
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={policy_name}"),
Some(policy),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/set-user-or-group-policy?policyName={policy_name}&userOrGroup={access_key}&isGroup=false"),
Some(String::new()),
)
.await?;
let bucket_policy_allow = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": { "AWS": [access_key] },
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::testuser1-artifacts"]
}]
})
.to_string();
admin_client
.put_bucket_policy()
.bucket("testuser1-artifacts")
.policy(bucket_policy_allow)
.send()
.await?;
let bucket_policy_deny = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Principal": { "AWS": [access_key] },
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket", "s3:GetBucketLocation"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-artifacts"]
}]
})
.to_string();
admin_client
.put_bucket_policy()
.bucket("benchmark-artifacts")
.policy(bucket_policy_deny)
.send()
.await?;
let benchmark_client = user_client(&env, access_key, secret_key, None);
benchmark_client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket("testuser1-artifacts")
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(benchmark_client.list_buckets().send().await?.buckets()),
vec!["benchmark-artifacts", "benchmark-location-only", "benchmark-test1"]
);
let log_path = env.capture_log_path.as_deref().expect("server log path should be configured");
let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5);
let audit_log = loop {
let audit_log = tokio::fs::read_to_string(log_path).await?;
if [
"iam_implicit_deny",
"s3_authorization_denied",
"ListAllMyBucketsAction",
"benchmark",
"DEBUG",
]
.iter()
.all(|field| audit_log.contains(field))
|| Instant::now() >= deadline
{
break audit_log;
}
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
};
assert_eq!(audit_log.matches("iam_implicit_deny").count(), 1, "{audit_log}");
for field in ["s3_authorization_denied", "ListAllMyBucketsAction", "benchmark", "DEBUG"] {
assert!(audit_log.contains(field), "missing {field} in {audit_log}");
}
let denied_access_key = "no-bucket-access";
let denied_secret_key = "no-bucket-access-secret-1234567890";
create_user(&env, denied_access_key, denied_secret_key).await?;
let denied = user_client(&env, denied_access_key, denied_secret_key, None)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await
.expect_err("a user without IAM bucket permissions must be denied");
assert_eq!(denied.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code), Some("AccessDenied"));
let put_only_policy_name = "put-only-no-bucket-discovery";
let put_only_policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:PutObject"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-*/*"]
}]
})
.to_string();
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={put_only_policy_name}"),
Some(put_only_policy),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!(
"/rustfs/admin/v3/set-user-or-group-policy?policyName={put_only_policy_name}&userOrGroup={denied_access_key}&isGroup=false"
),
Some(String::new()),
)
.await?;
let denied = user_client(&env, denied_access_key, denied_secret_key, None)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await
.expect_err("an unrelated IAM action must not reveal bucket names");
assert_eq!(denied.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code), Some("AccessDenied"));
let list_all_policy_name = "list-all-buckets";
let list_all_policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:ListAllMyBuckets"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"]
}]
})
.to_string();
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={list_all_policy_name}"),
Some(list_all_policy),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!(
"/rustfs/admin/v3/set-user-or-group-policy?policyName={list_all_policy_name}&userOrGroup={denied_access_key}&isGroup=false"
),
Some(String::new()),
)
.await?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(
user_client(&env, denied_access_key, denied_secret_key, None)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?
.buckets()
),
vec![
"benchmark-artifacts",
"benchmark-denied",
"benchmark-location-only",
"benchmark-test1",
"testuser1-artifacts"
]
);
let group_user = "benchmark-group-user";
let group_secret = "benchmark-group-secret-1234567890";
let group_name = "benchmark-group";
create_user(&env, group_user, group_secret).await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/update-group-members",
Some(
serde_json::json!({
"group": group_name,
"members": [group_user],
"isRemove": false,
"groupStatus": "enabled"
})
.to_string(),
),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/set-user-or-group-policy?policyName={policy_name}&userOrGroup={group_name}&isGroup=true"),
Some(String::new()),
)
.await?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(
user_client(&env, group_user, group_secret, None)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?
.buckets()
),
vec!["benchmark-artifacts", "benchmark-location-only", "benchmark-test1"]
);
let (service_access_key, service_secret_key) = create_service_account(&env, group_user, None).await?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(
user_client(&env, &service_access_key, &service_secret_key, None)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?
.buckets()
),
vec!["benchmark-artifacts", "benchmark-location-only", "benchmark-test1"]
);
let service_account_policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket", "s3:GetBucketLocation"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-test1"],
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"s3:prefix": [""],
"s3:delimiter": ["/"]
}
}
}]
});
let (restricted_service_access_key, restricted_service_secret_key) =
create_service_account(&env, group_user, Some(&service_account_policy)).await?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(
user_client(&env, &restricted_service_access_key, &restricted_service_secret_key, None,)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?
.buckets()
),
vec!["benchmark-test1"]
);
let sts_client = build_test_sts_client(&env.url, group_user, group_secret, None, "list-buckets-iam-filter-sts");
let inherited = sts_client
.assume_role()
.role_arn("arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/list-buckets")
.role_session_name("list-buckets-iam-filter-inherited")
.send()
.await?;
let inherited = inherited
.credentials()
.ok_or("AssumeRole response should contain inherited temporary credentials")?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(
user_client(
&env,
inherited.access_key_id(),
inherited.secret_access_key(),
Some(inherited.session_token()),
)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?
.buckets()
),
vec!["benchmark-artifacts", "benchmark-location-only", "benchmark-test1"]
);
let session_policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket", "s3:GetBucketLocation"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-test1"],
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"s3:prefix": [""],
"s3:delimiter": ["/"]
}
}
}]
})
.to_string();
let assumed = sts_client
.assume_role()
.role_arn("arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/list-buckets")
.role_session_name("list-buckets-iam-filter")
.policy(session_policy)
.send()
.await?;
let temporary = assumed
.credentials()
.ok_or("AssumeRole response should contain temporary credentials")?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(
user_client(
&env,
temporary.access_key_id(),
temporary.secret_access_key(),
Some(temporary.session_token()),
)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?
.buckets()
),
vec!["benchmark-test1"]
);
Ok(())
}
@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression tests for object listing and metacache consistency.
//!
//! Covers the recurring pattern where ListObjectsV2 returns incomplete results,
//! silently truncates with IsTruncated=false, or corrupts the metadata cache.
//! This has regressed 8+ times.
//!
//! ## Regression Issues
//!
//! - rustfs#5166: Metacache listing quorum failed timeout after cluster startup
//! - rustfs#5156: Metacache producer failed
//! - rustfs#5051: ListObjectsV2 returns empty results for shallow prefixes
//! - rustfs#4810: walk_dir timeout silently truncates listings (200, IsTruncated=false)
//! - rustfs#4648: Object listing oscillates between complete, partial, and zero
//! - rustfs#3191: ListObjectsV2 timeout corrupts metadata cache → NoSuchBucket
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::error::Error;
use tracing::info;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
/// RT-06: Verify ListObjectsV2 pagination completeness for medium-sized bucket.
///
/// Regression pattern: listing returns 200 with IsTruncated=false but
/// misses objects (rustfs#4810: walk_dir timeout truncation).
///
/// Steps:
/// 1. Upload 100 objects with known keys
/// 2. List all objects via pagination (max_keys=10)
/// 3. Verify all 100 keys are returned exactly once
/// 4. Verify no duplicates or skipped keys
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_list_objects_v2_completeness_100_objects() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-06: listing completeness with 100 objects");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt06-list-completeness";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Upload 100 objects
let expected_keys: Vec<String> = (0..100).map(|i| format!("obj-{i:04}.txt")).collect();
for key in &expected_keys {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"data"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
}
// Paginate through all objects (small page size to force multiple pages)
let mut all_keys: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
let mut continuation_token: Option<String> = None;
loop {
let mut req = client.list_objects_v2().bucket(bucket).max_keys(10);
if let Some(ref token) = continuation_token {
req = req.continuation_token(token);
}
let resp = req.send().await.expect("list objects page");
for obj in resp.contents() {
all_keys.push(obj.key().unwrap_or("").to_string());
}
if !resp.is_truncated().unwrap_or(false) {
break;
}
continuation_token = resp.next_continuation_token().map(|s| s.to_string());
}
// Verify completeness and uniqueness
let unique_keys: HashSet<&str> = all_keys.iter().map(|s| s.as_str()).collect();
assert_eq!(
all_keys.len(),
100,
"RT-06 FAIL: expected 100 objects, listed {} (regression: walk_dir truncation)",
all_keys.len()
);
assert_eq!(
unique_keys.len(),
100,
"RT-06 FAIL: found {} unique keys but listed {} total (duplicates!)",
unique_keys.len(),
all_keys.len()
);
for key in &expected_keys {
assert!(
unique_keys.contains(key.as_str()),
"RT-06 FAIL: key '{key}' missing from listing (regression rustfs#4810)"
);
}
info!("RT-06 PASS: all 100 objects listed completely and uniquely");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-06b: Verify listing with prefix filter returns correct subset.
///
/// Regression pattern: prefix filter returns empty or includes wrong keys
/// (rustfs#5051: empty results for shallow prefixes).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_list_objects_v2_prefix_filter_correctness() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-06b: prefix filter correctness");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt06b-prefix-filter";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Upload objects with different prefixes
for i in 0..5 {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(format!("logs/app-{i:04}.log"))
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"log data"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put log object");
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(format!("data/file-{i:04}.csv"))
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"csv data"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put data object");
}
// List with prefix "logs/" — should return exactly 5
let resp = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.prefix("logs/")
.send()
.await
.expect("list with prefix");
assert_eq!(
resp.contents().len(),
5,
"RT-06b FAIL: expected 5 objects with prefix 'logs/', found {} (regression rustfs#5051)",
resp.contents().len()
);
for obj in resp.contents() {
assert!(
obj.key().unwrap_or("").starts_with("logs/"),
"RT-06b FAIL: object '{}' does not match prefix 'logs/'",
obj.key().unwrap_or("?")
);
}
// List with prefix "data/" — should return exactly 5
let resp = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.prefix("data/")
.send()
.await
.expect("list with data/ prefix");
assert_eq!(
resp.contents().len(),
5,
"RT-06b FAIL: expected 5 objects with prefix 'data/', found {}",
resp.contents().len()
);
// List with prefix "nonexistent/" — should return 0
let resp = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.prefix("nonexistent/")
.send()
.await
.expect("list with nonexistent prefix");
assert!(
resp.contents().is_empty(),
"RT-06b FAIL: expected 0 objects with prefix 'nonexistent/', found {}",
resp.contents().len()
);
info!("RT-06b PASS: prefix filter returns correct subset");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-06c: Verify listing with delimiter and CommonPrefixes.
///
/// Regression pattern: delimiter handling produces incorrect CommonPrefixes
/// or misses objects at the delimiter boundary.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_list_objects_v2_delimiter_common_prefixes() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-06c: delimiter and CommonPrefixes");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt06c-delimiter";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Create a hierarchical structure
let keys = vec!["a.txt", "dir1/b.txt", "dir1/sub1/c.txt", "dir1/sub2/d.txt", "dir2/e.txt"];
for key in &keys {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(*key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"content"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
}
// List with delimiter "/" at root level
let resp = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.delimiter("/")
.send()
.await
.expect("list with delimiter");
// Should have 1 object (a.txt) and 2 common prefixes (dir1/, dir2/)
let contents: Vec<_> = resp.contents().iter().map(|o| o.key().unwrap_or("")).collect();
let prefixes: Vec<_> = resp.common_prefixes().iter().map(|p| p.prefix().unwrap_or("")).collect();
assert!(contents.contains(&"a.txt"), "RT-06c FAIL: root object 'a.txt' missing from listing");
assert_eq!(contents.len(), 1, "RT-06c FAIL: expected 1 root-level object, found {}", contents.len());
assert_eq!(prefixes.len(), 2, "RT-06c FAIL: expected 2 common prefixes, found {:?}", prefixes);
assert!(prefixes.contains(&"dir1/"), "RT-06c FAIL: 'dir1/' missing from CommonPrefixes");
assert!(prefixes.contains(&"dir2/"), "RT-06c FAIL: 'dir2/' missing from CommonPrefixes");
info!("RT-06c PASS: delimiter and CommonPrefixes correct");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-06d: Verify listing returns correct IsTruncated flag.
///
/// Regression pattern: IsTruncated=false when there are more objects
/// (rustfs#4810: walk_dir timeout truncation with false IsTruncated).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_list_objects_v2_is_truncated_correctness() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-06d: IsTruncated correctness");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt06d-truncated";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Upload 15 objects
for i in 0..15 {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(format!("item-{i:04}.txt"))
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"data"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
}
// List with max_keys=5 — should be truncated
let resp = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.max_keys(5)
.send()
.await
.expect("list with max_keys=5");
assert!(
resp.is_truncated().unwrap_or(false),
"RT-06d FAIL: IsTruncated should be true with 15 objects and max_keys=5"
);
assert_eq!(resp.contents().len(), 5, "RT-06d FAIL: expected 5 objects in first page");
assert!(
resp.next_continuation_token().is_some(),
"RT-06d FAIL: NextContinuationToken should be present when truncated"
);
// List with max_keys=100 — should NOT be truncated
let resp = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.max_keys(100)
.send()
.await
.expect("list with max_keys=100");
assert!(
!resp.is_truncated().unwrap_or(false),
"RT-06d FAIL: IsTruncated should be false with 15 objects and max_keys=100"
);
assert_eq!(resp.contents().len(), 15, "RT-06d FAIL: expected 15 objects with max_keys=100");
info!("RT-06d PASS: IsTruncated flag is correct");
Ok(())
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression tests for the event notification startup race.
//!
//! Covers the recurring pattern where webhook/audit targets fail to load at boot
//! due to startup ordering (notification runtime starts before server config is
//! loaded). This has regressed 9+ times across beta.3 ~ beta.12.
//!
//! ## Regression Issues
//!
//! - rustfs#5387: webhook notifications broken again in beta.9+
//! - rustfs#5681: Audit webhook targets are not loaded at boot
//! - rustfs#5401: Event Destinations broken again
//! - rustfs#5183: Audit webhooks stay offline after restart
//! - rustfs#5115: init_event_notifier loses startup race against server config load
//! - rustfs#4796: Pulsar event destinations offline after restart
//! - rustfs#5428: MQTT bucket notifications stop on restarted cluster node
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{BucketVersioningStatus, VersioningConfiguration};
use serial_test::serial;
use std::error::Error;
use tracing::info;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
/// RT-01: Verify that the notification runtime initializes correctly at boot.
///
/// Regression pattern: notification runtime initializes before server config
/// is fully loaded, causing webhook targets to never come online.
///
/// This test verifies the startup ordering by checking that the server
/// starts successfully with notification enabled and can serve S3 requests.
/// A full webhook delivery test is in notification_webhook_test.rs.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_notification_enabled_server_starts_cleanly() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-01: notification enabled server starts cleanly");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false"), ("RUSTFS_NOTIFY_ENABLE", "true")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS with notifications enabled");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt01-notify-startup";
// Server should be healthy and able to serve S3 requests
client
.create_bucket()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("create bucket with notifications enabled");
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("test.txt")
.body(aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream::from_static(b"test"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object with notifications enabled");
info!("RT-01 PASS: notification enabled server starts and serves S3");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-02: Verify notification config persists after server restart.
///
/// Regression pattern: after a node restart, notification targets stay
/// offline permanently because the config is not re-loaded.
///
/// Steps:
/// 1. Start server with notification enabled
/// 2. Create bucket and configure notification
/// 3. Restart server
/// 4. Verify notification config still exists
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_notification_config_survives_restart() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-02: notification config survives restart");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false"), ("RUSTFS_NOTIFY_ENABLE", "true")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt02-notify-restart";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Enable versioning (required for notification configuration)
client
.put_bucket_versioning()
.bucket(bucket)
.versioning_configuration(
VersioningConfiguration::builder()
.status(BucketVersioningStatus::Enabled)
.build(),
)
.send()
.await
.expect("enable versioning");
// Note: We can't fully test notification config persistence without a
// configured target. But we verify the server restarts cleanly with
// notification enabled, which is the core regression scenario.
env.restart_server_preserving_data(vec![], &[])
.await
.expect("restart RustFS with notifications enabled");
// Verify bucket still exists and is accessible after restart
let list = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list objects after restart");
assert!(list.contents().is_empty(), "RT-02: bucket should be empty after restart");
// Verify we can still write objects (notification runtime initialized)
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("after-restart.txt")
.body(aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream::from_static(b"post-restart"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object after restart — notification runtime must be initialized");
info!("RT-02 PASS: server with notifications survives restart");
Ok(())
}
}
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
//! * PUT / multipart-complete / DeleteObject / DeleteObjects each deliver one event with the correct
//! eventName, bucket, key, versionId and eTag.
//! * prefix/suffix filters drop non-matching keys (rule-engine gate).
//! * an event queued while the target endpoint is unreachable is redelivered
//! * an event queued while the target endpoint rejects delivery is redelivered
//! from the on-disk store once the endpoint recovers (store-and-forward).
//! * responseElements and the S3 response use the canonical request ID while
//! requestParameters preserve a conflicting client-supplied value.
@@ -897,11 +897,10 @@ async fn test_webhook_event_delivery_and_filtering() -> TestResult {
Ok(())
}
/// An event queued while the target endpoint is unreachable survives on the
/// An event queued while the target endpoint rejects delivery survives on the
/// durable store and is redelivered once the endpoint comes back.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
#[ignore = "FAILING deterministically on main since it landed (#4821): the target is created but never appears in /rustfs/admin/v3/target/arns, so wait_for_target_registered times out. Quarantined per the flake policy; remove with the fix for rustfs#4852"]
async fn test_webhook_redelivers_event_after_target_recovers() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
@@ -932,28 +931,55 @@ async fn test_webhook_redelivers_event_after_target_recovers() -> TestResult {
wait_for_target_registered(&env, target).await?;
put_notification_config(&client, bucket, target, "uploads/", ".dat").await?;
// Take the endpoint down (drops the listener, so connections are refused —
// a retryable NotConnected), then PUT: the event cannot be delivered and
// must survive on the durable queue store.
// Replace the healthy setup listener with one that rejects the first POST.
// Waiting for that response below proves the queued event reached a failed
// delivery attempt before the endpoint recovers.
setup_handle.abort();
let _ = setup_handle.await;
let listener = TcpListener::bind(("0.0.0.0", port)).await?;
let key = "uploads/redeliver.dat";
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"queued while target down"))
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"queued while target rejects"))
.send()
.await?;
// Hold the endpoint down long enough for at least one replay attempt to
// fail (the replay worker scans the store every 500ms), so recovery below
// exercises real redelivery rather than a first-attempt success.
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(2)).await;
let mut failure_handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().await?;
let (method, _) = timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), read_http_message(&mut stream)).await??;
if method == "HEAD" {
stream
.write_all(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\ncontent-length: 0\r\nconnection: close\r\n\r\n")
.await?;
stream.shutdown().await?;
continue;
}
if method == "POST" {
stream
.write_all(b"HTTP/1.1 503 Service Unavailable\r\ncontent-length: 0\r\nconnection: close\r\n\r\n")
.await?;
stream.shutdown().await?;
return Ok::<(), BoxError>(());
}
}
});
// Bring the endpoint back on the same port; the replay worker retries with
// exponential backoff and delivers the queued event.
let rejected = match timeout(Duration::from_secs(20), &mut failure_handle).await {
Ok(rejected) => rejected,
Err(_) => {
failure_handle.abort();
let _ = failure_handle.await;
return Err("webhook replay did not reach the rejecting endpoint".into());
}
};
rejected??;
// Bring the endpoint back on the same port; the replay worker rescans the
// durable queue and delivers the retained event.
let listener = TcpListener::bind(("0.0.0.0", port)).await?;
let (tx, mut rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let handle = serve_event_collector(listener, tx);

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