* fix(hotpath): pin mimalloc allocator backend
* test(hotpath): verify mimalloc allocator backend
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* chore(hotpath): document unsafe allocator tests
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* feat(kms): record real cache hit, miss and eviction metrics (#5531)
* feat(kms): record real cache hit, miss and eviction metrics
The metadata cache reported (entry_count, 0) because moka exposes no hit
or miss counts, so the miss half of every cache report was a constant.
Track lookups and removals in the cache itself: hit/miss counters on the
lookup path, a moka eviction listener classifying removals by cause, and
an entry gauge refreshed whenever the entry set changes. The counters are
exported through the metrics facade under the rustfs_kms_ prefix with
static label values only, matching the operation-policy metrics, and are
also returned as a KmsCacheStats snapshot in place of the old tuple.
Cache semantics are unchanged: capacity, TTL and invalidation points are
the same, and remove now flushes pending maintenance so the gauge and the
removal notification describe the cache the caller sees.
Refs rustfs/backlog#1584
* fix(kms): report real cache counters through the admin status API
KmsStatusResponse.cache_stats mapped the old (entry_count, 0) tuple onto
hit_count and miss_count, so operators polling KMS status read the entry
count as a hit count and a miss count that was always zero.
Map the fields to the counters they claim to be, and add entry_count and
eviction_count as additive, defaulted fields so the entry number that
hit_count used to carry is still available.
Refs rustfs/backlog#1584
* fix(kms): refresh the cache entry gauge on lookup misses
The entry gauge was published only from the write paths, so an entry
dropped by TTL expiry left `rustfs_kms_metadata_cache_entries` reporting
a population that no longer existed until the next put, remove or clear.
A cache that goes quiet — entries ageing out with no further writes —
kept over-reporting indefinitely.
Republish the gauge from the lookup path when the lookup misses. A miss
is where expiry surfaces, and moka reaps expired entries in the
maintenance it runs during that same lookup, so the count read
afterwards reflects the reaping. Hits stay free of the extra work.
* docs(kms): correct the entry gauge convergence claim on the miss path
The comment on the miss-path gauge refresh said moka reaps expired
entries in the maintenance it runs on that same lookup. It does not:
`should_apply_reads` is gated on a full read log or an elapsed
housekeeping interval, so the removal that decrements `entry_count` and
reaches the eviction listener may land on a later lookup.
The behaviour and the test are unchanged — the gauge still converges,
and the test drives `run_pending_tasks` explicitly rather than riding on
that interval. Only the stated guarantee was wrong, so say interval
instead of same-lookup and record why forcing maintenance on the read
path was not the trade taken.
* chore(deps): refresh cargo dependencies
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
Add opt-in hotpath feature surfaces to every workspace crate and wire the root rustfs feature passthrough for function, allocation, and CPU profiling.
Add a focused set of function-level measurements for scanner, heal, lock, target replay, IAM, KMS, Keystone, trusted proxy, and capacity paths without adding request-scoped primitive wrappers.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* feat(kms): record operation metrics in the retry policy engine
Instrument policy::execute — the single choke point every outbound Vault
call and credential exchange already flows through — so no call site
needs its own instrumentation:
- rustfs_kms_backend_operations_total (counter): operation, op_class,
outcome (success / fatal / budget_exhausted / deadline_exceeded /
cancelled)
- rustfs_kms_backend_attempt_failures_total (counter): operation,
error_class (retryable_conn / retryable_status / fatal /
attempt_timeout)
- rustfs_kms_backend_operation_duration_seconds (histogram): wall-clock
duration including retries and backoff
- rustfs_kms_backend_operation_attempts (histogram): attempts used
Metric labels carry only static enum values (operation names, classes,
outcomes) — never key identifiers, key material, ciphertext, or tokens.
Emission goes through the process-global metrics facade recorder, the
same pattern the rest of the workspace uses, so no new wiring is needed
in rustfs/src.
Tests drive a paused-clock runtime under a thread-local debugging
recorder, so counts, attempts, and even the recorded (virtual-clock)
durations are asserted deterministically with zero real sleeps.
Refs rustfs/backlog#1569 (part of rustfs/backlog#1562)
* test(kms): add Vault fault-injection matrix
Offline cases inject transport faults locally and are fully
deterministic: a refused connection is retried up to the configured
budget, and a stalled connection is cut off by the per-attempt timeout
instead of hanging. Ignored cases run against a real dev Vault
(RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_ADDR) and pin the fail-closed auth behavior: an
invalid token and a missing key each resolve in exactly one attempt.
Every case asserts through the policy metrics recorded by a
thread-local debugging recorder, which doubles as the request-count
assertion even against a real server. Throttling and recoverable 5xx
responses cannot be forced on a stock dev Vault; those paths stay
pinned by the scripted-Vault wiring tests and the engine tests.
Refs rustfs/backlog#1569 (part of rustfs/backlog#1562)
Add stable server labels to node-local Prometheus metrics and OTLP resource attributes so dashboards can distinguish per-node CPU, memory, host network, and internode traffic series.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* refactor(sse): decouple encryption from ecstore
* feat(kms): enhance KMS service manager with runtime state and persistence support
* feat(kms): add local key export functionality for SSE-S3 migration tests
* fix(kms): keep local key export narrowly scoped
* fix(sse): validate copy source customer algorithm
---------
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
peer_rest_recovery_probe_logs_keep_request_id_span_context failed ~10% of
`cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore --lib -- cluster::rpc::` runs with
left: "request-span", right: "recovery-monitor". The recovery-monitor
info_span! was evaluating to Span::none(), so the probe's log line landed
under the caller's span.
tracing caches each callsite's Interest in process-global state, and the
first thread to reach a callsite fixes that value. While at most one
dispatcher is registered, tracing-core takes a fast path that derives the
interest from the registering thread's own subscriber, and registration is
once-only (CAS). Under libtest a sibling test reaches recovery_monitor_span
via mark_offline_and_spawn_recovery from a thread with no subscriber, so
the interest is derived from NoSubscriber and cached as Interest::never()
for the whole process.
Add pin_callsite_interest_for_test(): registering a second, inert
dispatcher rebuilds every registered callsite's interest against the live
dispatcher set (repairing a poisoned value) and keeps tracing-core off the
single-dispatcher fast path (preventing new ones). This also covers the
production marked_suspect / recovery_monitor_started event callsites that
remote_disk_network_error_starts_recovery_monitor_with_request_context
asserts on.
rename_data_response_accepts_legacy_json_without_decode_error is a
separate root cause: it snapshots the process-global internode metrics and
asserts the decode-error counter did not move, which siblings that record
decode errors (or reset the counters) invalidate. Put the 11 tests that
observe those counters in one #[serial(internode_metrics)] group.
Both races are impossible under nextest, which runs each test in its own
process, so neither test belongs in the ecstore-serial-flaky test-group
(that serializes across process boundaries) nor in the ci-profile
quarantine (they never redden CI).
Verified: cluster::rpc:: subset 0/30 failures under libtest (was 3/30);
target test paired with its poisoner 0/30 (was 4/20); 5/5 clean under
nextest at 179/179.
* fix: keep hotpath gate csv paths clean
Redirect the enhanced bench driver's verbose output away from command substitution so run_hotpath_warp_ab.sh records only the candidate cell path before passing baseline_compare.csv files to the gate.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* perf(utils): reduce highway hash key setup
Cache the parsed HighwayHash keys as compile-time constants and add a criterion benchmark for the PUT hash hotpath.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Swift container and account metadata handlers cloned the cached
BucketMetadata, set the tagging fields, and called set_bucket_metadata,
which only updates the in-memory cache map. Nothing reached
.metadata.bin, so every Swift metadata POST was lost on restart and
silently overwritten by the next disk-truth reload (a peer
LoadBucketMetadata notification or the 15-minute refresh loop) — while
the client had already been told 2xx.
Route these writes through a new metadata_sys::update_config_with: a
read-modify-write that loads the on-disk metadata and persists the
result under the same write guard metadata_sys::update uses, so the
rewrite merges against disk truth instead of a possibly stale cache and
cannot clobber a concurrent update to another config file. Peers are
notified afterwards, matching the S3 config handlers.
Persisting these writes required hardening the paths that now produce
durable state:
- Account metadata writes validate account ownership. This metadata
holds the account's TempURL signing key, so an unauthenticated write
for someone else's account would have become a durable, cluster-wide
takeover of that account's pre-signed URLs. Reads stay open because
TempURL signature validation runs before credentials exist.
- disable_versioning verifies the container exists. Without it the
metadata loader's "no metadata on disk" default would be persisted,
creating an orphan metadata file and caching a fabricated default as
authoritative.
- Container and account metadata are size- and count-limited, reusing
the Swift limits object metadata already enforces; these tags land in
the bucket metadata file that every later config write rewrites whole.
- A rewrite refuses to run when the persisted tagging config is
unreadable, instead of merging onto an empty set and wiping the
container ACL and versioning tags. It reports 409 naming the remedy.
- Storage errors are logged in full and reported generically, since they
now carry real disk and quorum detail.
The tagging arm of BucketMetadata::update_config also clears the parsed
config, as the lifecycle arm does: parse_all_configs skips empty XML
rather than clearing, so a cleared config kept serving the old tags.
Tagging is serialized with the S3 XML serializer the loader can parse
back, not quick_xml, whose output was never round-trippable.
* fix(admin): bound IAM import archive expansion
MAX_IAM_IMPORT_SIZE caps the compressed upload at 10 MB, but every member of the
archive was then read with read_to_end into an unbounded Vec. Deflate ratios well
above 100:1 are easy to construct, so a small authorized upload could expand
without limit across the seven members ImportIam reads.
Add a shared expansion budget (MAX_IAM_IMPORT_EXPANDED_SIZE, 10x the compressed
cap) drawn down by every member, and route all seven reads through one helper
that reads a byte past the remaining budget to detect overrun. Sharing the budget
bounds the archive as a whole rather than letting each member spend the full
limit independently.
Covers R03-CAN-024 through R03-CAN-030 plus R04-CAN-077 (backlog #1471) — one
fix rather than seven, since all seven call sites were byte-identical.
* fix(kms): confine local key paths and refuse silent key replacement
Local KMS key identifiers arrive from request input — the `name` tag on CreateKey,
the `keyId` body field or query parameter on DeleteKey — and were joined onto
`key_dir` with no validation. An identifier such as `../../tmp/evil` escaped the
configured directory, making key creation a constrained arbitrary-file write and
`DeleteKey` with `force_immediate` a cross-directory delete.
Validate in `master_key_path` and make it fallible, so every filesystem path in
this backend inherits the guard: decode_stored_key, load_master_key,
save_master_key, create_key and delete_key all derive their paths there. The rule
is containment rather than a character allowlist, so identifiers already in use
keep resolving; only separators, NUL, absolute paths and non-single-component
forms are refused. Note `.` and `..` are contained rather than refused — the
`.key` suffix turns them into the ordinary filenames `..key` and `...key`.
Separately, `LocalKmsBackend::create_key` had no existence check, while the
sibling `KmsClient::create_key` has always had one. Since `save_master_key`
renames over its destination, creating a key under an existing name silently
replaced its material and destroyed the ability to decrypt everything wrapped
under it — and the backend path is the one the admin API uses. It now returns
KeyAlreadyExists, matching StaticKmsBackend.
Covers R03-CAN-072, R03-CAN-073 and R07-CAN-103 (backlog #1475). R03-CAN-073
needed no separate change: delete_key routes both its load and its remove_file
through master_key_path.
* fix(swift): bound SLO manifest reads to the 2 MiB manifest limit
The three Swift SLO handlers that load a stored manifest (handle_slo_get,
handle_slo_get_manifest, handle_slo_delete) read the `<object>.slo-manifest`
object to EOF with AsyncReadExt::read_to_end. That key is predictable and
writable through the ordinary object PUT path, so a tenant can replace the
manifest with an arbitrarily large object and then make the server allocate
its full size on every SLO GET, multipart-manifest=get, or
multipart-manifest=delete request - a memory amplification bounded only by
the stored object size (CWE-400 / CWE-770). The 2 MiB manifest limit that
handle_slo_put enforces was not applied on the read side.
Introduce MAX_SLO_MANIFEST_SIZE (the existing 2 MiB PUT limit, now a named
constant) and a shared read_manifest_bytes helper that reads through a
`take(limit + 1)` and rejects anything larger, so an oversized manifest is
refused instead of being buffered first. All three call sites go through the
helper. handle_slo_put now checks the size before parsing the JSON.
Regression tests: test_read_manifest_bytes_rejects_oversized_manifest and
test_read_manifest_bytes_stops_reading_oversized_manifest (which asserts the
reader is not consumed past the limit), plus a boundary test that a manifest
at exactly 2 MiB is still accepted.
* fix(protocols): authorize every object in FTPS/WebDAV recursive deletes
The FTPS and WebDAV gateways authorized only the container before a
recursive delete and then destroyed everything inside it without a
further check:
- FTPS RMD (and DELE on a bucket path ending in '/') cleared
s3:DeleteBucket, then delete_bucket_recursively listed the bucket and
deleted every object.
- WebDAV DELETE on a bucket did the same via its own
delete_bucket_recursively.
- WebDAV DELETE on a directory cleared s3:DeleteObject for the directory
marker key ("dir/") only, then listed that prefix and deleted every
child under it.
A principal holding s3:DeleteBucket (or s3:DeleteObject on a single
marker key) could therefore erase objects it had no s3:DeleteObject
permission for, and the operation reported success.
Deletion stays recursive - that is the expected behaviour for these
protocols - but each object now clears s3:DeleteObject on its own key
before it is removed, and the enumeration clears s3:ListBucket. A denial
aborts the whole operation with access denied rather than being skipped,
so the caller can never be told the delete succeeded while objects were
left behind or removed without authorization.
The test double gained shared-state cloning, delete_object/delete_bucket
call logs, and list/delete queue helpers so the regression tests can
observe that nothing is deleted once a deny lands.
* fix(server,ecstore): bound TLS handshakes and remote volume RPC waits
Three call sites let an unauthenticated client or a misbehaving peer hold
server resources with no deadline.
TLS listener (R03-CAN-035): process_connection awaited
`acceptor.accept(socket)` with no bound. A client that opens a TCP
connection and never finishes the handshake parks a Tokio task and a socket
forever, and the connection cap (RUSTFS_API_MAX_CONNECTIONS) is unlimited by
default, so nothing else sheds it. The handshake now runs under
accept_tls_with_deadline(), reusing the existing HTTP/1 header-read budget —
the established slow-client bound for the pre-request phase — and the
expiry is recorded through the same log/metric path as a handshake error,
under a new TIMEOUT failure kind.
Remote disk RPCs (R03-CAN-049, R03-CAN-050): list_volumes and delete_volume
passed Duration::ZERO, which execute_with_timeout treats as "no deadline",
so a peer that accepts the request and never answers stalls the coordinator
(and, for delete_volume, the bucket-deletion workflow). Both now pass
get_max_timeout_duration(), matching every sibling method in the file.
Regression tests: a silent TLS peer must be shed by the handshake deadline;
list_volumes/delete_volume against a peer that completes the TCP connect and
then goes silent must fail with DiskError::Timeout instead of hanging.
* fix(security): stop leaking signed headers and bound OIDC/KMS credentials
Three independent hygiene fixes found by the security review.
R03-CAN-018 (crates/signer): try_get_canonical_headers and get_signed_headers
logged the complete header map at DEBUG before signing. Runtime callers pass
session credentials and SSE-C key material through these headers, so anyone
able to raise the log level (or read DEBUG logs) recovered
X-Amz-Security-Token and SSE-C keys verbatim. The statements were debugging
leftovers with no operational value and are deleted rather than redacted.
R03-CAN-014 (crates/iam): the OIDC HTTP adapter buffered provider responses
with an unbounded Response::bytes(), so a configured, compromised or
attacker-pointed IdP endpoint could stream an arbitrarily large or endless
body into memory (the ValidateOidcConfig admin handler lets a ServerInfo
caller choose the endpoint). Responses are now read incrementally and fail
closed past MAX_OIDC_RESPONSE_SIZE, and the already SSRF-hardened client
builder gains request and connect timeouts so a stalled provider cannot pin
the calling task indefinitely.
R07-CAN-105 (helm): the Vault KMS token was serialized into the chart
ConfigMap, exposing it to every subject allowed to get ConfigMaps in the
namespace. It now renders into a dedicated Secret that the Deployment and
StatefulSet consume via envFrom; the Secret is separate from the main
credentials Secret so it also works when secret.existingSecret is set.
Regression tests:
- rustfs-signer: signing_never_logs_signed_header_material
- rustfs-iam: oidc_response_body_past_the_limit_is_rejected,
oidc_response_body_at_the_limit_is_accepted
- scripts/test_helm_templates.sh: KMS token must never render in plaintext
* fix(webdav): enforce body limit, request timeout and connection cap
The configured WebDAV maximum body size was enforced from Content-Length, so a
chunked request declared no length and bypassed it entirely. The configured
request timeout was never applied to the connection at all, and the accept loop
spawned a task per connection with no bound, so an unauthenticated client could
hold resources indefinitely and in unbounded number.
Enforce the limit on bytes actually read rather than the declared length, apply
the configured timeout to the request, and bound accepted connections with a new
RUSTFS_WEBDAV_MAX_CONNECTIONS (default 1024) surfaced in the config report.
Covers R03-CAN-051, R03-CAN-052, R03-CAN-067, R04-CAN-089, R05-CAN-094 and
R05-CAN-097 (backlog #1471, #1474).
* fix(security): stop STS credentials from crossing the parent trust boundary
Two related credential-boundary holes let a short-lived STS credential act
with the full, unrestricted authority of the long-term user it was minted
from.
AddUser (R03-CAN-021, CWE-269/863): should_check_deny_only relaxes the admin
policy check to deny-only when a Console/STS session targets the IAM user it
represents. Nothing then stopped that session from calling AddUser with its
own parent's access key, so the handler wrote an attacker-chosen secret key
and status over the parent's stored Credentials via create_user ->
save_user_identity. A session that expires in minutes became permanent
control of the account. AddUser now rejects any temp or service-account
requester whose resolved parent equals the target access key, resolving the
parent the same way should_check_deny_only does (parent_user field, else the
JWT `parent` claim, since some stores persist the parent only in the token).
FTPS/SFTP/WebDAV password auth (R04-CAN-086, CWE-287/862): these protocols
looked the access key up with check_key, which falls back to the STS account
cache, and then compared only the stored secret. An STS access key plus
secret therefore authenticated with no session token presented and no
session-policy claims applied - the holder got the parent's full permissions.
Password authentication now rejects temporary credentials before the secret
comparison. The discriminator is is_temp() && !is_service_account(), the same
one IamCache::update_user_with_claims uses to route an identity into the STS
cache, so service accounts - which resolve policy from stored IAM state
rather than a client-presented token - keep working over these protocols.
Regression tests cover both predicates and pin the guards to their call
sites so neither can be dropped without a test failure.
Cache the internode msgpack-only env gate after the first read so metadata RPC send paths avoid repeated environment parsing. Keep a reset hook for tests that intentionally change the env in-process.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Update selected workspace dependencies and lockfile entries.
Keep async-nats and rcgen on explicit feature sets while preserving the RustFS targets and TLS test surfaces.
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* chore(deps): refresh workspace dependencies
Refresh compatible workspace dependencies while preserving the requested
version pins. Update async-nats and Hyper, and replace the temporary Hyper
Git patch with the released crate.
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
* chore(deps): bump hotpath to 0.21.5
Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
houseme