feat(kms): add operation timeout and typed retry policy engine (#5472)

This commit is contained in:
Zhengchao An
2026-07-30 19:20:17 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent e86d4cb579
commit 6e5f330ff5
9 changed files with 735 additions and 12 deletions
Generated
+3
View File
@@ -9441,6 +9441,7 @@ name = "rustfs-kms"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
dependencies = [
"aes-gcm",
"anyhow",
"arc-swap",
"argon2",
"async-trait",
@@ -9455,6 +9456,7 @@ dependencies = [
"reqwest",
"rustfs-security-governance",
"rustfs-utils",
"rustify",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"sha2 0.11.0",
@@ -9463,6 +9465,7 @@ dependencies = [
"tempfile",
"thiserror 2.0.19",
"tokio",
"tokio-util",
"tracing",
"url",
"uuid",
+1
View File
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@ reed-solomon-simd = "3.1.0"
regex = { version = "1.13.1" }
rumqttc = { package = "rumqttc-next", version = "0.33.3" }
redis = { version = "1.5.0" }
rustify = { version = "0.7", default-features = false }
rustix = { version = "1.1.4" }
rust-embed = { version = "8.12.0" }
rustc-hash = { version = "2.1.3" }
+6
View File
@@ -65,11 +65,17 @@ rustfs-security-governance = { workspace = true }
# HTTP client for Vault
reqwest = { workspace = true }
vaultrs = { workspace = true }
# vaultrs surfaces transport-level failures as wrapped rustify errors; the
# operation policy needs the concrete type to classify them for retry decisions.
rustify = { workspace = true }
tokio-util = { workspace = true }
[dev-dependencies]
anyhow = { workspace = true }
insta = { workspace = true, features = ["yaml", "json"] }
tempfile = { workspace = true }
temp-env = { workspace = true }
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["test-util"] }
[features]
default = []
+15 -4
View File
@@ -68,10 +68,17 @@ struct VaultKeyData {
impl VaultKmsClient {
/// Create a new Vault KMS client
pub async fn new(config: VaultConfig) -> Result<Self> {
///
/// `attempt_timeout` caps every HTTP request issued through this client.
pub async fn new(config: VaultConfig, attempt_timeout: Duration) -> Result<Self> {
// Create client settings
let mut settings_builder = VaultClientSettingsBuilder::default();
settings_builder.address(&config.address);
// Defense in depth against stalled connections: vaultrs leaves the
// underlying reqwest client without any timeout by default, so a hung
// request would otherwise wait forever regardless of the
// operation-level retry policy.
settings_builder.timeout(Some(attempt_timeout));
// Set authentication token based on method
let token = match &config.auth_method {
@@ -607,7 +614,7 @@ impl VaultKmsBackend {
}
};
let client = VaultKmsClient::new(vault_config).await?;
let client = VaultKmsClient::new(vault_config, config.effective_timeout()).await?;
Ok(Self { client })
}
@@ -851,7 +858,9 @@ mod tests {
tls: None,
};
let client = VaultKmsClient::new(config).await.expect("Failed to create Vault client");
let client = VaultKmsClient::new(config, Duration::from_secs(30))
.await
.expect("Failed to create Vault client");
// Test key operations
let key_id = "test-key-vault";
@@ -906,7 +915,9 @@ mod tests {
// Regression: get_key_material previously "self-healed" a decrypt/length failure by
// minting a fresh random master key and overwriting the stored value — destroying the
// original key and making every DEK wrapped by it permanently undecryptable.
let client = VaultKmsClient::new(integration_vault_config()).await.expect("client");
let client = VaultKmsClient::new(integration_vault_config(), Duration::from_secs(30))
.await
.expect("client");
let key_id = format!("corrupt-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4());
client.create_key(&key_id, "AES_256", None).await.expect("create");
+14 -6
View File
@@ -138,9 +138,17 @@ pub struct VaultTransitKmsClient {
}
impl VaultTransitKmsClient {
pub async fn new(config: VaultTransitConfig) -> Result<Self> {
/// Create a new Vault Transit KMS client
///
/// `attempt_timeout` caps every HTTP request issued through this client.
pub async fn new(config: VaultTransitConfig, attempt_timeout: Duration) -> Result<Self> {
let mut settings_builder = VaultClientSettingsBuilder::default();
settings_builder.address(&config.address);
// Defense in depth against stalled connections: vaultrs leaves the
// underlying reqwest client without any timeout by default, so a hung
// request would otherwise wait forever regardless of the
// operation-level retry policy.
settings_builder.timeout(Some(attempt_timeout));
let token = match &config.auth_method {
crate::config::VaultAuthMethod::Token { token } => token.clone(),
@@ -607,7 +615,7 @@ impl VaultTransitKmsBackend {
}
};
let client = VaultTransitKmsClient::new(vault_config).await?;
let client = VaultTransitKmsClient::new(vault_config, config.effective_timeout()).await?;
Ok(Self { client })
}
}
@@ -788,7 +796,7 @@ mod tests {
let config = test_vault_transit_config();
// --- First "process": create a key and disable it ---
let client1 = VaultTransitKmsClient::new(config.clone())
let client1 = VaultTransitKmsClient::new(config.clone(), Duration::from_secs(30))
.await
.expect("Failed to create VaultTransit client");
@@ -811,7 +819,7 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(info_after_disable.status, KeyStatus::Disabled, "key must be Disabled after disable_key");
// --- Simulate restart: create a brand new client with empty cache ---
let client2 = VaultTransitKmsClient::new(config)
let client2 = VaultTransitKmsClient::new(config, Duration::from_secs(30))
.await
.expect("Failed to create second VaultTransit client (restart simulation)");
@@ -841,7 +849,7 @@ mod tests {
async fn test_transit_pending_deletion_survives_restart_simulation() {
let config = test_vault_transit_config();
let client1 = VaultTransitKmsClient::new(config.clone())
let client1 = VaultTransitKmsClient::new(config.clone(), Duration::from_secs(30))
.await
.expect("Failed to create VaultTransit client");
@@ -865,7 +873,7 @@ mod tests {
"key must be PendingDeletion after schedule_key_deletion"
);
let client2 = VaultTransitKmsClient::new(config)
let client2 = VaultTransitKmsClient::new(config, Duration::from_secs(30))
.await
.expect("Failed to create second VaultTransit client (restart simulation)");
+69 -2
View File
@@ -32,6 +32,15 @@ pub const ENV_KMS_STATIC_SECRET_KEY_FILE: &str = "RUSTFS_KMS_STATIC_SECRET_KEY_F
pub const DEFAULT_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KV_MOUNT: &str = "secret";
pub const DEFAULT_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KEY_PREFIX: &str = "rustfs/kms/transit-metadata";
/// Upper bound applied to `KmsConfig::timeout` when deriving backend behavior.
///
/// Out-of-range values are clamped at use rather than rejected so existing
/// deployments with oversized settings keep starting after an upgrade.
pub(crate) const MAX_OPERATION_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(300);
/// Upper bound applied to `KmsConfig::retry_attempts` when deriving backend behavior.
pub(crate) const MAX_RETRY_ATTEMPTS: u32 = 10;
fn default_vault_transit_metadata_kv_mount() -> String {
DEFAULT_VAULT_TRANSIT_METADATA_KV_MOUNT.to_string()
}
@@ -117,9 +126,15 @@ pub struct KmsConfig {
/// Allow development-only insecure defaults such as plaintext local keys or HTTP Vault.
#[serde(default)]
pub allow_insecure_dev_defaults: bool,
/// Operation timeout
/// Timeout for a single backend attempt.
///
/// This bounds one outbound request, not the whole operation: the operation
/// policy owns the total deadline across retries. Values above 300 seconds
/// are clamped at use (see `KmsConfig::effective_timeout`).
pub timeout: Duration,
/// Number of retry attempts
/// Number of retry attempts.
///
/// Values above 10 are clamped at use (see `KmsConfig::effective_retry_attempts`).
pub retry_attempts: u32,
/// Enable caching
pub enable_cache: bool,
@@ -536,6 +551,16 @@ impl KmsConfig {
self
}
/// Per-attempt timeout with the configured value clamped to the supported maximum.
pub(crate) fn effective_timeout(&self) -> Duration {
self.timeout.min(MAX_OPERATION_TIMEOUT)
}
/// Retry attempts with the configured value clamped to the supported maximum.
pub(crate) fn effective_retry_attempts(&self) -> u32 {
self.retry_attempts.min(MAX_RETRY_ATTEMPTS)
}
/// Validate the configuration
pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<()> {
// Validate timeout
@@ -548,6 +573,23 @@ impl KmsConfig {
return Err(KmsError::configuration_error("Retry attempts must be greater than 0"));
}
// Oversized values are clamped at use (not rejected) so pre-existing
// configurations cannot keep the service from starting after upgrade.
if self.timeout > MAX_OPERATION_TIMEOUT {
tracing::warn!(
configured_secs = self.timeout.as_secs(),
max_secs = MAX_OPERATION_TIMEOUT.as_secs(),
"KMS timeout exceeds the supported maximum; backend operations clamp it to the maximum"
);
}
if self.retry_attempts > MAX_RETRY_ATTEMPTS {
tracing::warn!(
configured = self.retry_attempts,
max = MAX_RETRY_ATTEMPTS,
"KMS retry_attempts exceeds the supported maximum; backend operations clamp it to the maximum"
);
}
// Validate backend-specific configuration
match &self.backend_config {
BackendConfig::Local(config) => {
@@ -855,6 +897,31 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(local_config.key_dir, temp_dir.path());
}
#[test]
fn test_oversized_timeout_and_retries_clamped_not_rejected() {
let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("Failed to create temp dir");
let config = KmsConfig {
timeout: Duration::from_secs(3_600),
retry_attempts: 50,
..KmsConfig::local(temp_dir.path().to_path_buf()).with_insecure_development_defaults()
};
// Out-of-range values must not keep the service from starting.
assert!(config.validate().is_ok());
assert_eq!(config.effective_timeout(), MAX_OPERATION_TIMEOUT);
assert_eq!(config.effective_retry_attempts(), MAX_RETRY_ATTEMPTS);
// In-range values pass through unchanged.
let config = KmsConfig {
timeout: Duration::from_secs(45),
retry_attempts: 5,
..config
};
assert!(config.validate().is_ok());
assert_eq!(config.effective_timeout(), Duration::from_secs(45));
assert_eq!(config.effective_retry_attempts(), 5);
}
#[test]
fn test_local_development_defaults_require_opt_in() {
let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("Failed to create temp dir");
+18
View File
@@ -90,6 +90,14 @@ pub enum KmsError {
/// Encryption context mismatch
#[error("Encryption context mismatch: {message}")]
ContextMismatch { message: String },
/// Backend operation exceeded its per-attempt timeout or total deadline
#[error("Operation timed out: {message}")]
OperationTimedOut { message: String },
/// Backend operation aborted by cancellation or shutdown
#[error("Operation cancelled: {message}")]
OperationCancelled { message: String },
}
impl KmsError {
@@ -187,6 +195,16 @@ impl KmsError {
pub fn context_mismatch<S: Into<String>>(message: S) -> Self {
Self::ContextMismatch { message: message.into() }
}
/// Create an operation timed out error
pub fn operation_timed_out<S: Into<String>>(message: S) -> Self {
Self::OperationTimedOut { message: message.into() }
}
/// Create an operation cancelled error
pub fn operation_cancelled<S: Into<String>>(message: S) -> Self {
Self::OperationCancelled { message: message.into() }
}
}
/// Convert from standard library errors
+4
View File
@@ -71,6 +71,10 @@ pub mod config;
mod encryption;
mod error;
pub mod manager;
// The executor is wired into the Vault backends in a follow-up change; until
// then the module is only exercised by its own tests.
#[allow(dead_code)]
mod policy;
pub mod service;
pub mod service_manager;
mod time_serde;
+605
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,605 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Operation execution policy for external KMS backend calls.
//!
//! Vault-backed operations leave the process boundary, so every call needs a
//! per-attempt timeout, a total operation deadline, and classification-driven
//! bounded retries. This module provides the engine only; the Vault backends
//! wire their call sites through [`execute`] in a follow-up change.
//!
//! Retry safety is driven by two orthogonal classifications:
//! - [`OpClass`] states whether replaying the operation is safe at all.
//! - [`ErrorClass`] states whether the observed failure is worth replaying.
//!
//! Mutating operations without an idempotency key or CAS precondition are never
//! retried automatically: a response lost after the server applied the write
//! would otherwise be replayed into duplicate side effects (extra key versions,
//! repeated deletes).
use std::future::Future;
use std::time::Duration;
use rand::{RngExt, SeedableRng, rngs::StdRng};
use tokio::time::Instant;
use tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken;
use crate::config::KmsConfig;
use crate::error::{KmsError, Result};
/// Default backoff cap before the first retry; doubles per retry.
const DEFAULT_BASE_BACKOFF: Duration = Duration::from_millis(100);
/// Default upper bound for a single backoff sleep.
const DEFAULT_MAX_BACKOFF: Duration = Duration::from_secs(2);
/// Replay safety of a backend operation.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) enum OpClass {
/// No persistent side effects (encrypt/decrypt/generate/describe/list/health);
/// safe to retry on any retryable failure.
ReadIdempotent,
/// External write without an idempotency key or CAS precondition
/// (create/rotate/delete/configure); executed at most once.
MutatingNonIdempotent,
/// Authentication exchange (login, token renewal); safe to resend.
Auth,
}
impl OpClass {
fn retryable(self) -> bool {
!matches!(self, OpClass::MutatingNonIdempotent)
}
}
/// Retry-relevant classification of a failed attempt.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) enum ErrorClass {
/// Connection-level failure (connect/send/response read); the server may or
/// may not have observed the request.
RetryableConn,
/// Retryable HTTP status: 429 throttling or a recoverable 5xx.
RetryableStatus,
/// Deterministic failure (auth, validation, not-found, malformed data);
/// retrying cannot help and may mask the real problem.
Fatal,
}
/// Classify a `vaultrs` client error for retry purposes.
///
/// Status codes are inspected both on `ClientError::APIError` (JSON error body)
/// and on a wrapped rustify `ServerResponseError` (non-JSON body, e.g. an HTML
/// page from an intermediate load balancer). Everything that is not throttling,
/// a recoverable 5xx, or a connection-level failure is fatal; in particular
/// 400/401/403/404 must never be retried.
pub(crate) fn classify_vaultrs(error: &vaultrs::error::ClientError) -> ErrorClass {
use rustify::errors::ClientError as RestError;
use vaultrs::error::ClientError;
match error {
ClientError::APIError { code, .. } => classify_status(*code),
ClientError::RestClientError { source } => match source {
RestError::ServerResponseError { code, .. } => classify_status(*code),
RestError::RequestError { .. } | RestError::ResponseError { .. } => ErrorClass::RetryableConn,
_ => ErrorClass::Fatal,
},
_ => ErrorClass::Fatal,
}
}
fn classify_status(code: u16) -> ErrorClass {
match code {
429 | 500 | 502 | 503 | 504 => ErrorClass::RetryableStatus,
_ => ErrorClass::Fatal,
}
}
/// Failure of a single attempt, carrying its retry classification.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct AttemptError {
pub(crate) class: ErrorClass,
pub(crate) error: KmsError,
}
/// Budgets applied by [`execute`].
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct RetryPolicy {
/// Upper bound for one backend attempt.
pub(crate) attempt_timeout: Duration,
/// Upper bound for the whole operation, including retries and backoff.
pub(crate) op_deadline: Duration,
/// Maximum attempts for retryable operation classes; non-idempotent
/// mutations always run exactly once regardless of this value.
pub(crate) max_attempts: u32,
/// Backoff cap before the first retry; doubles per retry.
pub(crate) base_backoff: Duration,
/// Upper bound for a single backoff sleep.
pub(crate) max_backoff: Duration,
}
impl RetryPolicy {
/// Derive the policy from the KMS configuration.
///
/// `timeout` and `retry_attempts` are taken with the config-level clamps
/// applied. The operation deadline covers the worst-case budget of all
/// attempts plus backoff, so it bounds runaway loops without cutting any
/// attempt short; an independently configurable deadline is left to the
/// admin-API follow-up.
pub(crate) fn from_config(config: &KmsConfig) -> Self {
let mut policy = Self {
attempt_timeout: config.effective_timeout(),
op_deadline: Duration::ZERO,
max_attempts: config.effective_retry_attempts(),
base_backoff: DEFAULT_BASE_BACKOFF,
max_backoff: DEFAULT_MAX_BACKOFF,
};
policy.op_deadline = policy.worst_case_budget();
policy
}
/// Total worst-case duration: every attempt hits `attempt_timeout` and
/// every backoff sleeps its full cap.
fn worst_case_budget(&self) -> Duration {
let attempts = self.max_attempts.max(1);
let mut budget = self.attempt_timeout.saturating_mul(attempts);
for completed in 1..attempts {
budget = budget.saturating_add(backoff_cap(self, completed));
}
budget
}
}
/// Exponential backoff cap after `completed_attempts` failed attempts.
fn backoff_cap(policy: &RetryPolicy, completed_attempts: u32) -> Duration {
let doublings = completed_attempts.saturating_sub(1).min(31);
policy.base_backoff.saturating_mul(1u32 << doublings).min(policy.max_backoff)
}
/// Equal jitter: sleep within `[cap / 2, cap]`, keeping at least half the cap
/// so backoff still backs off while decorrelating retry bursts.
fn equal_jitter(rng: &mut impl RngExt, cap: Duration) -> Duration {
let half = cap / 2;
let spread = u64::try_from(half.as_nanos()).unwrap_or(u64::MAX);
half + Duration::from_nanos(rng.random_range(0..=spread))
}
/// Run `attempt` under the policy.
///
/// Each attempt is bounded by `attempt_timeout` (further capped by whatever is
/// left of `op_deadline`), and retryable failures are replayed with exponential
/// backoff and jitter when the operation class allows it. Cancellation aborts
/// both in-flight attempts and backoff sleeps.
///
/// A timed-out attempt counts as a connection-class failure: the server may
/// have processed the request, which is exactly why non-idempotent mutations
/// are never replayed.
pub(crate) async fn execute<T, F, Fut>(
operation: &'static str,
class: OpClass,
policy: &RetryPolicy,
cancel: &CancellationToken,
attempt: F,
) -> Result<T>
where
F: FnMut() -> Fut,
Fut: Future<Output = std::result::Result<T, AttemptError>>,
{
// Seed an owned RNG up front: the thread-local RNG is not Send and must
// not be held across await points.
let mut rng = StdRng::from_rng(&mut rand::rng());
execute_with_jitter(operation, class, policy, cancel, move |cap| equal_jitter(&mut rng, cap), attempt).await
}
/// [`execute`] with an injectable jitter source so tests can pin deterministic
/// backoff durations instead of asserting around random sleeps.
pub(crate) async fn execute_with_jitter<T, F, Fut, J>(
operation: &'static str,
class: OpClass,
policy: &RetryPolicy,
cancel: &CancellationToken,
mut jitter: J,
mut attempt: F,
) -> Result<T>
where
F: FnMut() -> Fut,
Fut: Future<Output = std::result::Result<T, AttemptError>>,
J: FnMut(Duration) -> Duration,
{
let deadline = Instant::now() + policy.op_deadline;
let max_attempts = if class.retryable() { policy.max_attempts.max(1) } else { 1 };
let mut attempt_no = 0u32;
loop {
attempt_no += 1;
if cancel.is_cancelled() {
return Err(KmsError::operation_cancelled(format!(
"{operation} cancelled before attempt {attempt_no}"
)));
}
let remaining = deadline.saturating_duration_since(Instant::now());
if remaining.is_zero() {
return Err(KmsError::operation_timed_out(format!(
"{operation} exceeded operation deadline of {:?}",
policy.op_deadline
)));
}
let attempt_budget = policy.attempt_timeout.min(remaining);
let outcome = tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = cancel.cancelled() => {
return Err(KmsError::operation_cancelled(format!("{operation} cancelled during attempt {attempt_no}")));
}
outcome = tokio::time::timeout(attempt_budget, attempt()) => outcome,
};
let failure = match outcome {
Ok(Ok(value)) => return Ok(value),
Ok(Err(failure)) => failure,
Err(_) => AttemptError {
class: ErrorClass::RetryableConn,
error: KmsError::operation_timed_out(format!(
"{operation} attempt {attempt_no} timed out after {attempt_budget:?}"
)),
},
};
if failure.class == ErrorClass::Fatal || attempt_no >= max_attempts {
return Err(failure.error);
}
let backoff = jitter(backoff_cap(policy, attempt_no));
if backoff >= deadline.saturating_duration_since(Instant::now()) {
// Not enough deadline budget left for another attempt.
return Err(failure.error);
}
tracing::warn!(
operation,
attempt = attempt_no,
error_class = ?failure.class,
backoff = ?backoff,
"KMS backend attempt failed with a retryable error; backing off before retry"
);
tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = cancel.cancelled() => {
return Err(KmsError::operation_cancelled(format!("{operation} cancelled during retry backoff")));
}
_ = tokio::time::sleep(backoff) => {}
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU32, Ordering};
type AttemptResult<T> = std::result::Result<T, AttemptError>;
fn policy_of(attempt_timeout_ms: u64, op_deadline_ms: u64, max_attempts: u32, base_ms: u64, max_ms: u64) -> RetryPolicy {
RetryPolicy {
attempt_timeout: Duration::from_millis(attempt_timeout_ms),
op_deadline: Duration::from_millis(op_deadline_ms),
max_attempts,
base_backoff: Duration::from_millis(base_ms),
max_backoff: Duration::from_millis(max_ms),
}
}
/// Deterministic jitter: always sleep the full backoff cap.
fn full_jitter(cap: Duration) -> Duration {
cap
}
fn retryable_conn_error() -> AttemptError {
AttemptError {
class: ErrorClass::RetryableConn,
error: KmsError::backend_error("connection reset by peer"),
}
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn hung_attempt_fails_within_attempt_timeout() {
let policy = policy_of(5_000, 60_000, 1, 100, 2_000);
let cancel = CancellationToken::new();
let started = Instant::now();
let result: Result<()> = execute_with_jitter("encrypt", OpClass::ReadIdempotent, &policy, &cancel, full_jitter, || {
std::future::pending::<AttemptResult<()>>()
})
.await;
assert!(matches!(result, Err(KmsError::OperationTimedOut { .. })), "got {result:?}");
assert_eq!(started.elapsed(), Duration::from_millis(5_000));
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn retryable_status_retries_until_success() {
let policy = policy_of(1_000, 60_000, 3, 100, 2_000);
let cancel = CancellationToken::new();
let calls = Arc::new(AtomicU32::new(0));
let calls_in_attempt = calls.clone();
let started = Instant::now();
let result =
execute_with_jitter("generate_data_key", OpClass::ReadIdempotent, &policy, &cancel, full_jitter, move || {
let calls = calls_in_attempt.clone();
async move {
if calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst) < 2 {
Err(AttemptError {
class: ErrorClass::RetryableStatus,
error: KmsError::backend_error("throttled (429)"),
})
} else {
Ok(7u32)
}
}
})
.await;
assert_eq!(result.expect("retries within budget must succeed"), 7);
assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 3);
// Full-cap backoff: 100ms after attempt 1, 200ms after attempt 2.
assert_eq!(started.elapsed(), Duration::from_millis(300));
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn fatal_error_is_not_retried() {
let policy = policy_of(1_000, 60_000, 5, 100, 2_000);
let cancel = CancellationToken::new();
let calls = Arc::new(AtomicU32::new(0));
let calls_in_attempt = calls.clone();
let started = Instant::now();
let result: Result<()> =
execute_with_jitter("decrypt", OpClass::ReadIdempotent, &policy, &cancel, full_jitter, move || {
let calls = calls_in_attempt.clone();
async move {
calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
Err(AttemptError {
class: ErrorClass::Fatal,
error: KmsError::access_denied("permission denied (403)"),
})
}
})
.await;
assert!(matches!(result, Err(KmsError::AccessDenied { .. })), "got {result:?}");
assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
assert_eq!(started.elapsed(), Duration::ZERO);
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn mutating_non_idempotent_runs_exactly_once() {
let policy = policy_of(1_000, 60_000, 5, 100, 2_000);
let cancel = CancellationToken::new();
let calls = Arc::new(AtomicU32::new(0));
let calls_in_attempt = calls.clone();
let result: Result<()> =
execute_with_jitter("rotate_key", OpClass::MutatingNonIdempotent, &policy, &cancel, full_jitter, move || {
let calls = calls_in_attempt.clone();
async move {
calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
Err(retryable_conn_error())
}
})
.await;
// Even a retryable failure must not replay a non-idempotent mutation.
assert!(matches!(result, Err(KmsError::BackendError { .. })), "got {result:?}");
assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn cancel_aborts_backoff_immediately() {
// Long backoff (10s cap) so a prompt return can only come from cancellation.
let policy = policy_of(1_000, 600_000, 5, 10_000, 10_000);
let cancel = CancellationToken::new();
let canceller = cancel.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(500)).await;
canceller.cancel();
});
let calls = Arc::new(AtomicU32::new(0));
let calls_in_attempt = calls.clone();
let started = Instant::now();
let result: Result<()> =
execute_with_jitter("decrypt", OpClass::ReadIdempotent, &policy, &cancel, full_jitter, move || {
let calls = calls_in_attempt.clone();
async move {
calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
Err(retryable_conn_error())
}
})
.await;
assert!(matches!(result, Err(KmsError::OperationCancelled { .. })), "got {result:?}");
assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
assert_eq!(started.elapsed(), Duration::from_millis(500));
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn cancelled_token_short_circuits_before_first_attempt() {
let policy = policy_of(1_000, 60_000, 5, 100, 2_000);
let cancel = CancellationToken::new();
cancel.cancel();
let calls = Arc::new(AtomicU32::new(0));
let calls_in_attempt = calls.clone();
let result: Result<()> =
execute_with_jitter("list_keys", OpClass::ReadIdempotent, &policy, &cancel, full_jitter, move || {
let calls = calls_in_attempt.clone();
async move {
calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
Ok(())
}
})
.await;
assert!(matches!(result, Err(KmsError::OperationCancelled { .. })), "got {result:?}");
assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0);
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn total_duration_never_exceeds_deadline() {
// Worst case without a deadline would be 5 * 10s + backoff; the 25s
// deadline must cut both the attempt count and the final attempt short.
let policy = policy_of(10_000, 25_000, 5, 100, 2_000);
let cancel = CancellationToken::new();
let calls = Arc::new(AtomicU32::new(0));
let calls_in_attempt = calls.clone();
let started = Instant::now();
let result: Result<()> =
execute_with_jitter("describe_key", OpClass::ReadIdempotent, &policy, &cancel, full_jitter, move || {
calls_in_attempt.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
std::future::pending::<AttemptResult<()>>()
})
.await;
assert!(matches!(result, Err(KmsError::OperationTimedOut { .. })), "got {result:?}");
// attempt 1: 10s + 100ms backoff; attempt 2: 10s + 200ms backoff;
// attempt 3 runs with the residual 4.7s budget, then the deadline is
// exhausted and no further backoff or attempt happens.
assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 3);
assert_eq!(started.elapsed(), Duration::from_millis(25_000));
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn default_jitter_stays_within_equal_jitter_bounds() {
let policy = policy_of(1_000, 60_000, 3, 100, 2_000);
let cancel = CancellationToken::new();
let calls = Arc::new(AtomicU32::new(0));
let calls_in_attempt = calls.clone();
let started = Instant::now();
let result = execute("health_check", OpClass::ReadIdempotent, &policy, &cancel, move || {
let calls = calls_in_attempt.clone();
async move {
if calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst) < 2 {
Err(retryable_conn_error())
} else {
Ok(())
}
}
})
.await;
result.expect("retries within budget must succeed");
let elapsed = started.elapsed();
// Equal jitter sleeps within [cap / 2, cap]; caps are 100ms then 200ms.
assert!(
elapsed >= Duration::from_millis(150) && elapsed <= Duration::from_millis(300),
"elapsed {elapsed:?} outside equal-jitter bounds"
);
}
#[test]
fn equal_jitter_is_seed_deterministic_and_bounded() {
let caps = [Duration::from_millis(100), Duration::from_millis(250), Duration::from_secs(2)];
let mut first = StdRng::seed_from_u64(1569);
let mut second = StdRng::seed_from_u64(1569);
for cap in caps {
let a = equal_jitter(&mut first, cap);
let b = equal_jitter(&mut second, cap);
assert_eq!(a, b, "same seed must yield the same jitter sequence");
assert!(a >= cap / 2 && a <= cap, "jitter {a:?} outside [{:?}, {cap:?}]", cap / 2);
}
}
#[test]
fn backoff_caps_double_up_to_max() {
let policy = policy_of(1_000, 60_000, 6, 100, 700);
let caps: Vec<Duration> = (1..=5).map(|completed| backoff_cap(&policy, completed)).collect();
assert_eq!(
caps,
vec![
Duration::from_millis(100),
Duration::from_millis(200),
Duration::from_millis(400),
Duration::from_millis(700),
Duration::from_millis(700),
]
);
}
#[test]
fn retry_policy_from_config_applies_clamps() {
let config = KmsConfig {
timeout: Duration::from_secs(3_600),
retry_attempts: 50,
..KmsConfig::default()
};
let policy = RetryPolicy::from_config(&config);
assert_eq!(policy.attempt_timeout, Duration::from_secs(300));
assert_eq!(policy.max_attempts, 10);
// The deadline must cover the full worst case so it never cuts a
// policy-conformant operation short.
assert!(policy.op_deadline >= policy.attempt_timeout.saturating_mul(policy.max_attempts));
let in_range = KmsConfig::default();
let policy = RetryPolicy::from_config(&in_range);
assert_eq!(policy.attempt_timeout, in_range.timeout);
assert_eq!(policy.max_attempts, in_range.retry_attempts);
}
#[test]
fn classify_vaultrs_matrix() {
use rustify::errors::ClientError as RestError;
use vaultrs::error::ClientError;
let api = |code: u16| ClientError::APIError { code, errors: vec![] };
for code in [429u16, 500, 502, 503, 504] {
assert_eq!(classify_vaultrs(&api(code)), ErrorClass::RetryableStatus, "status {code}");
}
for code in [400u16, 401, 403, 404, 405, 412, 501] {
assert_eq!(classify_vaultrs(&api(code)), ErrorClass::Fatal, "status {code}");
}
// Status errors whose body could not be parsed stay wrapped in the
// rustify error; classification must still see the code.
let raw_status = |code: u16| ClientError::RestClientError {
source: RestError::ServerResponseError { code, content: None },
};
assert_eq!(classify_vaultrs(&raw_status(503)), ErrorClass::RetryableStatus);
assert_eq!(classify_vaultrs(&raw_status(403)), ErrorClass::Fatal);
let send_failure = ClientError::RestClientError {
source: RestError::RequestError {
source: anyhow::anyhow!("connection refused"),
url: "http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/sys/health".to_string(),
method: "GET".to_string(),
},
};
assert_eq!(classify_vaultrs(&send_failure), ErrorClass::RetryableConn);
let read_failure = ClientError::RestClientError {
source: RestError::ResponseError {
source: anyhow::anyhow!("connection reset by peer"),
},
};
assert_eq!(classify_vaultrs(&read_failure), ErrorClass::RetryableConn);
let malformed = ClientError::JsonParseError {
source: serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>("{").expect_err("truncated JSON must not parse"),
};
assert_eq!(classify_vaultrs(&malformed), ErrorClass::Fatal);
assert_eq!(classify_vaultrs(&ClientError::ResponseEmptyError), ErrorClass::Fatal);
assert_eq!(classify_vaultrs(&ClientError::InvalidLoginMethodError), ErrorClass::Fatal);
}
}