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Author SHA1 Message Date
Oliver Kieselbach 483ec8b8e0 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-09-11 02:55:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 328446864a chore(submodule): todo for P5 of the IME overwrite fix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 02:53:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 106480ef52 fix(agent,rules): health-script lines never feed a platform-script slot — PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE deleted, HS-INVOCATION opens an unowned invocation in the IME log, the no-marker fallback stays within files platform runs open in (D-248)
Test-VM session 24dc69d1 (2.0.1459) had the overwrite geometry the result hold (D-247)
was built for, yet the hold never fired: "Powershell execution is done, exitCode = 0" —
written by IME's health-script worker (AgentCommon ScriptWorker) to both
IntuneManagementExtension.log and HealthScripts.log — was read as PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE and
attributed to the pending platform script c81b8053 1.2 s before its executor even started
(IME-log marker: the last PS-SCRIPT-GENERATED; HealthScripts.log: the no-marker fallback to
the last platform start). The completion went out at the result line with the foreign exit
code, and the run's own end block, recovered 150 ms later by the rewind, was dropped as
already emitted. Both codes were 0 by luck; a failing health script would have turned a
succeeded platform script into script_failed. The worker's launch line flipped the pending
script's context the same way (338d9434, twice in one run).

- rules: PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE deleted — the line is health-script-only (3 hits = 3 cycles,
  platform scripts never produce it), HS-EXITCODE already carries the value, and a line that
  lands inside a parallel platform run's window cannot be attributed by position.
  HS-INVOCATION (new): the worker's command line `"…\agentexecutor.exe"  -remediationScript`
  (identical from IME 1.104.102 to 1.105.152) as agentInvocationArgument of a non-powershell
  kind — the launch line it writes next stays with that invocation. Both take effect on the
  next reseed for every agent from 2.0.1458 on.
- tracker: a file without markers resolves to the platform run in flight only when a
  platform run has ever opened in that file (IntuneManagementExtension.log after a rollover,
  AgentExecutor.log); HealthScripts.log and the app logs never qualify. Test seams:
  ProcessLogMessageForTest takes the source file, ClearInvocationMarkersForTest.
- tests: ImeLogTrackerPlatformScriptContaminationTests +5 with the session's real lines —
  the worker's exit line pre-fills nothing, its launch line flips no context, HealthScripts.log
  lines resolve to no platform script, the context line after an IME-log rollover still finds
  the run in flight, and no shipped pattern reads the worker's exit line.
- rules/dist regenerated (node rules/scripts/combine.js); analyze-rules.json catches up with
  ANALYZE-OFFICE-001 1.1.1 (6657c6b9 was committed without its dist).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 02:52:43 +02:00
github-actions[bot] d3a45f958d chore: regenerate rules/dist + generated TS from individual files 2026-09-11 00:29:54 +00:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6657c6b9c0 fix(rules): ANALYZE-OFFICE-001 explains what the detector actually reports
office_install_failed is emitted only for an error code in the C2R INSTALL scenario; a window without on-disk proof ends silently. The old text described a StreamingFinished-based failure and attributed the early "done" of the built-in app type to IME, which never sees Office CSP installs. Text only, version 1.1.1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 02:28:12 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6c5e2fd921 chore(submodule): IME overwrite plan closed as RELEASED after the 2.0.1459 test-VM run
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 02:04:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 65842b87bf chore(submodule): todo for P4 of the IME overwrite fix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 01:34:01 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b323c52364 fix(agent): a platform script's IME result waits for its executor end block before the completion is emitted; a start line older than the emitted result never opens a new run (D-247)
The first agent with the ledger (2.0.1458, session e7f3c910) lost nothing — 16/16 results,
20/20 end blocks, 20 rewinds — yet 3 of 16 completions carried no exit code and one policy
got an agentexecutor_fallback duplicate. The IME result line reaches the tracker before the
AgentExecutor.log end block of the same run: always when the block was overwritten (the check
the result triggers recovers it one pass later), often without any overwrite (the
AgentExecutor.log read of a pass precedes the IME log read by tens of milliseconds while the
exit line and the result line are 8–30 ms apart), and whenever the poll loop stalls (2 s at
100 % VM CPU). Emitting at the result line dropped every recovered end block, and the late
start line reopened the slot, cleared the emitted-marker and the fallback emitted the same
run again 15 s later.

- CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResult (one core for the handler and the test seam) emits at
  the result line only when the slot has its exit code; otherwise the result stays on the
  slot (ResultObservedAtUtc, ResultPatternId, ResultHeldSinceUtc) and
  FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults — the former FlushStalePlatformScriptResults, still the
  home of the 15 s exit-code fallback — emits it at the end of the pass in which the exit
  code arrived (the block's output lines come with it), at shutdown, or after
  PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace (5 s, wall clock).
- The emitted-marker is a Dictionary keyed by policy id with the run's source timestamp
  (state file: PlatformScriptResultEmittedAt; the old list is read as MinValue). A start
  line strictly older than the emitted result is the late start line of that run: it owns
  the lines behind it in its file, opens no slot, emits no script_started. A start line at
  or after a held result closes the hold as the next run; a start line that meets a slot
  the result opened stamps StartedAtUtc.
- The adapter binds the completion to the result line (ResultObservedAtUtc, patternId =
  ResultPatternId) the way the fallback binds to the exit line, so a held emit keeps its
  timestamp, pattern and duration.
- Exit-code lines whose owner has no pending slot any more log why they are dropped;
  ApplyExitCode is shared by the handler and the test seam.
- Tests: ImeLogTrackerResultHoldTests (11) and ImeLogTrackerAdapterResultHoldTests (1); six
  existing cases that encoded the immediate emit without an exit code now flush explicitly.
  Agent suite 2933 green, solution build 0 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 01:33:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 321a6efc81 chore(submodule): P2 of the IME overwrite fix — plan, concept doc, todo
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 00:14:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5ecb2a998b feat(web,mcp): the IME overwrite counters surface — session page row "Overwritten log blocks recovered"; get_session_summary coverage carries overwriteRewinds/overwriteBytesReprocessed and a recovered-not-missing note, never a gap (D-246, P2)
The agent (v2.0.1458) counts the log blocks it re-read after a concurrent IME process had overwritten bytes behind its bookmark. The IME Tracker rows on the session page show the count and bytes as their own row, apart from Skipped work; the MCP coverage block adds both counters to sessionTotals and, when rewinds > 0, an imeTracker.note saying the script results and exit codes in those blocks are complete — no coverage.gaps line, no degraded flag, so an assistant does not read recovered data as a blind spot. Sessions from older agents carry neither key and show neither.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 00:14:55 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach bb6df93b51 chore(submodule): agent v2.0.1458 released
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 00:02:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 096a049deb chore(submodule): todo for the IME overwrite fix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 23:40:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b9caf524c3 chore(submodules): concept doc, D-246, plan and skill helper for the IME multi-writer overwrite fix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 23:40:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 197de1d718 fix(agent): the IME log tracker verifies and rewinds when a concurrent IME process overwrote bytes behind its bookmark; executor lines belong to the invocation at their file position (D-246)
IME's trace listener opens every log once per process with FileMode.Append and FileShare.ReadWrite
and writes at its own stream position afterwards. AgentExecutor.exe (two processes per user-context
script, one per detection script) has such a listener on AgentExecutor.log and on
IntuneManagementExtension.log, so a process that resumes logging after another one appended
overwrites those bytes: the final file holds the last writer, a byte-position tailer has read the
first version. Session 46749560 lost 6 of 16 platform-script results and 4 of 16 executor end
blocks with every tracker health counter at zero — results fell back to the exit code (one Success
where IME said Failed), one finished script stayed Incomplete. The agentexecutor_fallback results
in the fleet are this race, not late IME logging.

The tracker now keeps a fingerprint ledger of every entry it processed from the two multi-writer
files (FNV-1a 64 over the decoded bytes, one CmTraceEntryAssembler shared by the read loop and the
verification so entry boundaries are identical by construction), verifies it on every script end
signal, on a byte-budgeted cadence while an invocation is in flight (256 KB/s, at least 1 s
apart), in a 4 KB guard zone on every growth pass and on a fragment at the bookmark, and rewinds
to the first changed entry; entries whose (offset, hash) still read unchanged are skipped,
everything else is processed as backlog (never fresh, never a calibration anchor). The
policyId-less executor lines are owned by the nearest preceding invocation marker in their file
(PS-AGENT-ARG opens, PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START upgrades to the platform script, PS-AGENT-INVOCATION and
PS-AGENT-COMPLETED close) instead of a last-started pointer, so an end block a rewind uncovers
reaches its own script. Restart seeds the ledger from the 64 KB behind the persisted bookmark;
a rollover clears it. Four restart-safe counters (ime_overwrite_rewinds,
ime_overwrite_bytes_reprocessed, ime_verify_passes, ime_verified_bytes) ride agent_metrics_snapshot
and ime_pattern_hits — recovered data, not skipped work, no new event type.

Tests: ImeLogTrackerOverwriteRewindTests (15) drive the positional-overwrite write pattern against
both files, including the two field scenarios with the shipped patterns; agent suite 2921 green,
backend known-actions list extended for the two new patterns.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 23:40:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 18d4f08f2b chore(submodule): todo closed for the request-row marker (D-244)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 21:42:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ddf450d87d chore(submodule): plan request-row marker RELEASED (D-244)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 21:41:46 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e3b2113365 chore(submodules): import-session time shift, token, note and scrub semantics; demo import work files (D-242, D-245)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 21:13:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6a85f45604 backend: agent request rows carry the admitting device validator and the proven tenant (D-244)
SecurityValidator stamps ValidatedTenantId once the certificate tenant binding
(or the bootstrap token) proves the tenant, and DeviceValidation once the
device-validation chain has run: the admitting ValidatorType name, None for a
tenant without a validator, Transient for the 503, Rejected for the 403 of
stage device. RequestTelemetryMiddleware resolves the row's TenantId in one
place (policy tenant, proven tenant, then the X-Tenant-Id header only on the
routes that validate it) and copies DeviceValidation as a dimension.

Register, config and upload-url rows carried no TenantId before, so
tenant-filtered KQL missed exactly the calls that run the validation, and the
validators' success line is Information-level and never reaches App Insights.
Proving which validator admitted a device is now one query.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 19:48:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a2d1aedcad fix(web,mcp): a script still running when observation ends is Incomplete, not running forever (D-243)
Session 2ebcd480: the last platform script started 27 s after enrollment_complete and its
start line was the session's last event; two days later the Script Executions panel still
ticked "Running (175306s — stuck?)" in amber with "1 running" in the header. Same blind
spot as D-237, one panel over.

Web: applyObservationEnd in lib/scriptExecutions.ts marks a Running placeholder on a
terminal session as Incomplete (bounded by session.lastEventAt); the row stops ticking and
shows "Incomplete" in slate with the watched span as a lower bound, the header counts
"N incomplete" apart from running/succeeded/failed, and the card keeps its React key across
the live→terminal flip. No backend change: there is no per-script row, and the session
counters count finals only.

MCP: get_session_summary adds coverage.scripts.stillRunning and a coverage.gaps line for
terminal sessions, folded from script_started without a later result — the same rule as the
web placeholder.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 19:10:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e955faa97e Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-09-10 12:50:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2b755bf99a fix(deps): raise sharp override to ^0.35.4 in MCP and Web (GHSA-rgj7-g3m4-5g8c)
sharp < 0.35.4 bundles a libheif with GHSA-g89c-p67h-r497 and
GHSA-2jg2-4ch7-h545 (Dependabot alert #100, high). Both packages already
pinned sharp through an override; the floor moves to the patched release.
MCP pulls it via @huggingface/transformers, Web via next. Lockfile changes
are limited to sharp, its @img/* binaries and one @emnapi/runtime dedupe.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 12:43:27 +02:00
dependabot[bot] ce1162a055 chore(deps): bump the web-security group across 1 directory with 2 updates (#155)
Bumps the web-security group with 2 updates in the /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web directory: [js-yaml](https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml) and [sharp](https://github.com/lovell/sharp).


Updates `js-yaml` from 4.3.1 to 4.3.2
- [Changelog](https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/blob/4.3.2/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/compare/4.3.1...4.3.2)

Updates `sharp` from 0.35.3 to 0.35.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/lovell/sharp/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/lovell/sharp/compare/v0.35.3...v0.35.4)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: js-yaml
  dependency-version: 4.3.2
  dependency-type: indirect
  dependency-group: web-security
- dependency-name: sharp
  dependency-version: 0.35.4
  dependency-type: indirect
  dependency-group: web-security
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-10 12:10:17 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 447786b447 chore(deps): bump hono (#154)
Bumps the mcp-security group with 1 update in the /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp directory: [hono](https://github.com/honojs/hono).


Updates `hono` from 4.13.0 to 4.13.7
- [Release notes](https://github.com/honojs/hono/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/honojs/hono/compare/v4.13.0...v4.13.7)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: hono
  dependency-version: 4.13.7
  dependency-type: indirect
  dependency-group: mcp-security
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-10 12:01:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2b4dbe087a fix(web,backend): MCP Usage under a tenant override shows only that tenant (D-241 amended)
- GetMcpOrganizationUsageResponse.daily: charged requests per day inside the range from the same McpTenantUsage rows (BuildOrganizationDaily, MSP reads included); manifest + wire types regenerated (web + MCP copy); fold test
- Web: viewing another tenant no longer fetches the caller's own usage — no UPN, plan badge or own quota; the summary tiles and the daily chart come from the tenant's daily series. The own tenant stays the caller's usage page. Internal gitlink.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 03:38:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6804bcfd4e fix(web): Reporting — Global Admin banner and tenant selector in the page header, section control row back to its old layout
The reporting layout (ReportingSidebar) now owns the override-only scope, renders the banner above the header and the selector next to the title like Fleet Health, and hands the scope to the sections through ReportingScopeContext (one hook instance). Delegated callers get neither. Fixes the five-line wrap of the section control row on phones; internal gitlink.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 03:27:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d2221eb0b9 feat(web,backend): MCP Usage page follows the global-admin tenant selector for its organization cards (D-241)
- Backend: GET global/metrics/mcp-usage/organization?tenantId= (GlobalReadOrAdmin, TenantScoping.None on purpose — the route enumerates accounts, so the delegated path stays out; 400 without a GUID, no aggregate); GetMcpOrganizationUsageResponse carries `quota` (tenant plan + daily/monthly windows summed from the same McpTenantUsage rows); McpQuotaService.ResolveTenantPlanAsync with public TenantPlanLimits; two folds tests
- Web: TenantScopeSelector on /settings/reporting/mcp-usage (override-only, hidden for a delegated scope), scopedApi.mcpOrganizationUsage, Organization-quota card from the organization response (falls back to the caller's own node only on the own tenant), latest-wins fetch guard, wording follows the viewpoint
- Manifest + wire types regenerated (web + MCP copy); internal + skills gitlinks

Deploy order: Backend before Web — under a tenant override the page calls the new route.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 03:18:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9ac6de7c7d chore: bump internal gitlink (B-fes reworded to a measurement task)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 02:43:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f5613be495 fix(web): Network Timeline — more headroom above the phase lane so "Completed (timeout)" stays inside the drawing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 02:34:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 819b6c8e4f docs(mcp): correct the query_raw_events cap figure in the payload page-size rationale (250 KB, not 500 KB); internal gitlink
Comment-only. The 500 KB figure is query_table's cap; query_raw_events serializes under
MAX_RESULT_SIZE_CHARS.events = 250 KB. Live 2026-09-10: 100 app_install_failed rows = 193 KB.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 02:33:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9c1fb07f33 fix(web): Network Timeline — session link in portal green; Duration and Asleep tiles name the enrollment figure where the observed span differs
The band and its tiles cover the observed span (until the agent stopped); the
session page measures the enrollment (first activity event → verdict). The
tiles now carry that figure as a sub-line so both pages read the same two
numbers. enrollmentWindowOf in lib/standby.ts is the shared definition, used
by the session hook as well.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 02:28:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fa31872903 fix(agent,engine,web): keep the due time as the deadline stamp; draw timeout verdicts hollow in the Network Timeline (D-238 revised)
Revises 14b185db after the pre-release review. The fleet measurement (30 days,
all tenants) showed 87 of 821 sessions with a sleep episode had their verdict
inside the episode — 59 of them one tenant's self-deploying devices closed two
minutes before the device-only detection came due and reopened 5–7 days later.
Stamping the firing clock would have turned those outages into session
duration and pushed the tenant's mean duration from minutes to days.

- OnDeadlineFired posts OccurredAtUtc = DueAtUtc again; the due time stays in the
  payload and the two stale-fire guards keep reading it (any stamp stays safe).
- Network Timeline: a timeout verdict (helloOutcome timeout, device-only detection
  window) is drawn as a hollow marker "Completed (timeout)" with a legend line and a
  plain-language tooltip — a wait expired, nothing observed on the device; the
  Asleep block is never split at it. finalizing_grace alone is not an indicator.
- Session Info standby note clips to the two WhiteGlove spans when the card shows
  the combined WhiteGlove duration; the dedup key is consumed only by a usable
  observation (review findings).
- Stale comments describing the firing-clock contract corrected.

Tests: DeadlineFireTimeStampTests (reducer stays correct for any stamp),
EnrollmentOrchestratorTests (due-time stamp + payload), networkTimelineModel
timeout markers (3), standby windows, WhiteGlove windows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 01:55:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b08b79eafe test(mcp): revert_tenant_config backupId is required — schema and description pin (D-240 review)
Left out of e43d916c's explicit file list by mistake; part of the same change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 01:47:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e43d916c24 fix(mcp): spec gates, secret-safe error text, enforced response cap, payload-coupled pageSize, client cancellation (D-239, D-240)
Request gates: an Origin other than the server's own is refused with 403 before any token
work (spec MUST); a token the backend rejects is answered 401 + WWW-Authenticate
error="invalid_token" instead of a final 403. The auth.ts header now names the
backend-audience token forwarding as a deliberate deviation (D-239) instead of calling
it spec-conformant.

Secrets: the per-argument echo policy travels in the tool-call context, so toolError's
"Parameters used" block masks update_tenant_config.fields the same way the log line
does. revert_tenant_config requires backupId (a retried revert without one restored the
snapshot the previous revert had just created). /oauth/token relays Entra errors through
an allowlist (error, capped description, error_codes). OAuthStateSigningKey is required
in production (B-uba).

Results: toolResultText enforces the response cap — a page above it is refused with an
overflow answer naming the pageSize that fits (from this page's bytes per row), never
rows or a nextLink; the telemetry logs the size the page would have had (B-zhp).
query_raw_events with DataJson in the effective projection defaults to 50 rows and
refuses more than 100 before the backend runs (30-day measurement: p90 3.3 KB, outliers
21-29 KB per row) (B-s2y). The caller context carries the request's cancellation signal:
apiFetch, the retry wait and the timeout fallback stop when the client goes away, and the
tool_call line logs cancelled instead of an error.

Tests: 9 new files (origin guard both eras over HTTP, 401 + cancellation, apiFetch abort,
arg policy in error text, signing key, token error body, overflow, raw-events pageSize,
telemetry overflow/cancelled); vitest 844 green, tsc 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 01:47:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 14b185db35 fix(agent,engine,web): a deadline decision is stamped with the firing clock, never the due time (D-238)
A HelloSafety deadline due during Modern Standby fired after wake but was stamped
with its due time, so enrollment_complete and CompletedAt landed inside the sleep
window: the Network Timeline drew "Completed" in the middle of the Asleep block
and three views named three different standby durations.

- OnDeadlineFired posts OccurredAtUtc = FiredAtUtc and carries the due time under
  SignalPayloadKeys.DeadlineDueAtUtc; the stale-fire guards (RealmJoin re-arm,
  SelfDeploying guard C) identify the incarnation via DecisionEngine.DeadlineDueAtUtc,
  which falls back to the signal time for pre-key signal logs.
- SignalSerializer renders Date-tokenized payload strings as ISO-8601 round-trip text
  instead of the culture-formatted JValue.ToString() (a replayed deadlineDueAtUtc came
  back as "4/20/2026 9:55:00 AM").
- Web: the Session Info standby note is clipped to the same window as the duration
  next to it (lib/standby.ts) and printed with seconds, matching the attribution chip.

Tests: DeadlineFireTimeStampTests (late HelloSafety fire, guard C, RealmJoin re-arm,
helper fallback), SerializationTests date-like payload round-trip,
EnrollmentOrchestratorTests late fire, lib/__tests__/standby.test.ts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 01:05:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach baa51102fd feat(web,backend,mcp): app rows without a terminal state become Incomplete instead of running forever (D-237)
An app still installing when the session's observation ended has no terminal
event and never will. The session page ticked Date.now() - startedAt for it
("11h 39m" on a session that finished hours ago), and its AppInstallSummaries
row stayed InProgress forever - ranked behind failures in the app's session
list and counted in totalInstalls with no named bucket.

Web: applyObservationEnd marks such rows Incomplete once the session is
terminal (isTerminalStatus), bounded by session.lastEventAt; the panel shows a
slate Incomplete badge and the watched span as a lower bound, the "active"
pill excludes them, and the download panel carries the parallel flag. Covers
every historic session without a backfill.

Backend: CloseOpenAppInstallsForSessionAsync closes InProgress rows without a
CompletedAt as Incomplete - at the terminal seam, again on the ingest batch
that carries agent_shutting_down for a terminal session (rows opened after
the verdict), and from the 30-day sweep. The sticky-status reconcile keeps
Incomplete against a late progress-only batch and lets a real terminal win.
App metrics and app analytics disclose the bucket (incomplete,
totalIncomplete) outside the failure rate; manifest and wire types
regenerated.

MCP: get_session_summary coverage gains an apps block and a gaps line naming
the apps the agent's last app_tracking_summary still listed as installing or
downloading, terminal sessions only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 00:02:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5577f5e7e5 feat(rules): rule submissions — retention (withdrawn 30d, declined 90d), contact email, pending-first tenant list, operator hard delete (D-236 amended)
Closed submissions leave through the daily maintenance sweep (RuleSubmissionRetention, one place for rule and test); pending/approved/published never. The submit dialog takes an optional contact email (a UPN is not always a mailbox), stored for the reviewer and never published. The tenant list shows pending rows by default with the rest behind Show all, and the contribute button shows for every writer, also before the first custom rule exists. DELETE global/rule-submissions/{id} (GlobalAdminOnly, MCP delete_rule_submission) removes test/demo rows for operator and tenant alike. Bumps internal and .claude/commands gitlinks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 23:27:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 61892592e4 feat(rules): community rule submissions — submit custom rules from the portal, review via GA page or MCP, publish by repo commit + reseed (D-236)
Tenant admins submit references to their own gather/analyze rules; the server freezes the rule, records pre-flight findings and fire stats, and stores it under a 12-character id (RuleSubmissions, SessionReports layout). Attribution is the submitter's frozen choice (anonymous by default) and becomes the published author. Review (approve with reserved id / decline with comment) through /admin/reports/rule-submissions or the MCP tools list_rule_submissions, get_rule_submission, review_rule_submission, reseed_rules_from_github; published is derived from the global catalog, never stored. Analyze rules now get the same server-side author stamp as gather rules; ANALYZE-ID-001 carries author Community. Privacy page names the credit; bumps internal and .claude/commands gitlinks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 22:53:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1e2ca46946 chore: bump internal gitlink (ESP-004 released, B-kfu)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 17:40:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8224c8f1a8 fix(rules,engine,agent): ESP-004 gates on the esp_apps_timeout verdict; not_exists absence gate; Shell-Core failure inherits settle detail (D-234, D-235)
ANALYZE-ESP-004 fired on every ESP terminal failure of a Continue-anyway
profile and rendered the configured FirstSync limit as elapsed time — the
mayHaveContinuedAnyway flag only says the profile has the button. The rule
now requires the agent's own verdict (app_install_failed with
failureType=esp_apps_timeout), names that app via a same-event filter, reads
failedSubcategory from esp_failure_settle_started and words the limit as a
limit. Verified with test_analyze_rule: cb7036a6 fires, 683f1eff (0x80070652
after 19 min) stays silent.

Rule engine: not_exists with a dataField on event_type/event_data
conditions matches when no event of the type carries a non-empty value —
including an absent type — instead of being dead behind the fieldValue null
short-circuit. Schema and MCP authoring guide say so.

Agent: a Shell-Core 62407 failure that lands inside the provisioning
tracker's 30-s settle window (a third of all ESP terminal failures) now
inherits the pending errorCode / failedSubcategory / category /
likelyCulpritApps, so enrollment_failed, Sessions.FailureReason and the
termination-time app classification see the HRESULT the registry had
already named. failureType stays the Shell-Core value.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 17:20:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d7f39895f5 fix(web): omit the two default field values from the browser catalog (D-233)
The Entra family (D-231) pushed utils/error-codes.json to 123026 bytes against
the 120000-byte client-bundle budget, breaking the Web CI job.

Raising the cap would have been the wrong repair -- it was set three days ago
with the v2 catalog, and a guard that gets widened whenever content grows is not
a guard. The bytes were elsewhere: confidence "high" holds for 562 of 641 rows
and source "msdoc" for about half, ~19 KB of bundle spent repeating two
constants. The sync now omits them and errorCodeMap restores them while building
the map, so every consumer still sees a complete entry and errorCodeTooltip
renders exactly as before. 123026 -> 102399 bytes, cap unchanged, ~17 KB of
headroom left.

Dropping the fields outright was rejected: the tooltip renders both, so they are
provenance a customer sees. The vocabulary test now asserts on the resolved
entry via getErrorCodeEntry rather than the raw file -- a default changed on one
side only would otherwise make tooltips lie about provenance silently.
2026-09-09 15:26:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 790bd35385 small gather rule description change 2026-09-09 14:59:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 34c9fd42fe chore: bump internal and .claude/commands gitlinks
internal: D-231/D-232, the plan with its review, backlog B-y5d and B-s2y.
.claude/commands: the platform-health marker-catalog corrections from the
2026-09-09 health pass (weekday vs weekend ingest baseline, CAS retried scales
with load, WhatsNewNotificationSent is not proof of a run).
2026-09-09 14:55:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 19a336870c fix(mcp): put the catalog pointer on the parameter, not only the tool (D-232)
Seven of 44 tool errors in the 7-day telemetry were invented catalog values, and
in every case the tool description already said the right thing while the
parameter description was bare or contradicted it.

update_tenant_config is the clean proof: its description says "Call
get_tenant_config_schema FIRST", but the fields parameter said "Use
get_tenant_config for current values and exact field names" -- and over 30 days
the model called get_tenant_config 12 times and get_tenant_config_schema once.
The text next to the argument wins, and get_tenant_config cannot answer what it
was pointed at: it shows only the fields this tenant has set, with no type,
writability or nullability.

Also: get_session_events.eventType (event_types catalog, matching the pointer
search_sessions_by_event.eventType already carries), query_table (list_tables)
and test_analyze_rule.rule (rule_schemas, validate_rule first).
2026-09-09 14:55:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5ba5942d0b feat(error-codes): parse the Entra device-registration family (D-231)
The catalog held 2 of 607 entries in entra-join, while the 0x801Cxxxx DSREG
family is what an enrollment meets during hybrid join and the ESP account-setup
phase. The Windows Hello PIN error page is the only MS table that documents it;
both of its tables are now parsed, restricted to 0x801c* (607 -> 641 entries).

The block runs after PROSE_ENTRIES so the Autopilot-specific text for 0x801c03ea
keeps precedence over the generic one. The Mitigation column is not carried --
the catalog describes codes, it does not advise. A "SYMBOL: text" cell yields a
symbol (0x801c004d -> DSREG_NO_DEFAULT_ACCOUNT). The run fails below 30 keys,
because parseTables drops non-matching rows silently and a reshaped page would
otherwise look like a clean run.

decode() now strips zero-width and bidi marks: the page carries U+200B in one
hex cell and four description cells, JS \s does not match it, and such a hex
cell fails every ^0x...$ test. Placed in decode() rather than in the new source
so the next parsed page cannot walk into it -- regeneration shows 34 added,
0 changed.

0x801C044F, the zero-hit lookup that started this, is on none of the three MS
pages and deliberately stays unknown.
2026-09-09 14:55:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach aa20d9102c fix(backend): show the freshly published agent version, not the previous one (D-230)
The What's new panel prints "Latest agent version" under the release
entries, and the session list draws its outdated badges from the same
endpoint — but the value was cached 12h in each Function instance and 1h
in the browser, so the panel announced the previous release for up to 13h
and two instances could disagree.

- LatestVersionsService: TTL 12h -> 5 min; keep the last successful result
  and serve it when the blob read fails, so the shorter TTL cannot blank
  the version line on a transient hiccup (failure marker 5 min -> 1 min).
- GetLatestVersions: Cache-Control max-age 3600 -> 60.
- No refresh callback from build-agent.yml: the cache is per instance, a
  warm-up request would leave every other instance stale.

The origin is a ~200-byte no-cache blob behind the download alias that
Front Door does not cache, so a warm instance now reads it at most 12x/h.

Backend deploy (workflow_dispatch) pending — B-uq7.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 12:26:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 097be1700b chore: bump internal gitlink
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 12:10:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f1457d823d chore: bump .claude/commands gitlink 2026-09-09 12:02:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 12e66299e6 feat(rules): allow-list folders under the signed-in user's profile (D-228, D-229)
Gather rules and admin-configured diagnostics paths could never reach a
folder below a user profile. The %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token lifts the
C:\Users hard block for AppData\Local and AppData\Roaming, but lifting is
not admitting: the path then fell into filePrefixes, which is matched
literally against the already-expanded path, and the profile name is not
known when that list is authored. The exception only ever worked in
unrestricted mode, and no agent test passed a non-null userProfilePath.

D-228 introduces userProfileFilePrefixes, holding entries relative to the
profile root (AppData\Local\RealmJoin). Both guards resolve them against
the detected profile and match segment-bounded; entries that are rooted,
contain "..", or sit outside AppData\Local / AppData\Roaming are dropped at
load, so configuration can only narrow the hard block's exception, never
widen it. The allowlist is anchored to the detected profile, so a rule
cannot reach another user's AppData. The AppData subdirectory list existed
in both guard classes with the GatherRuleGuards copy unused; it is now one
list and DiagnosticsPathGuards delegates. filePrefixes additionally gains
C:\ProgramData\RealmJoin\choco\logs.

D-229 fixes the pre-flight validators, which must only ever reject what the
agent rejects:
- the portal returned "allowed" on the lifted hard block without consulting
  the allowlist, so a rule the agent refuses passed the enable gate and then
  failed silently on the device with a security_warning;
- the MCP validator offered logparser the diagnosticsPathPrefixes list that
  no collector consults (four paths reported allowed that the agent blocks);
- the MCP validator did not expand environment variables at all, reporting
  %ProgramData% targets as blocked although the device reads them.

Measured before changing the portal: no rule in any tenant used the token,
so nothing that was working gets disabled.

Verified: solution build 0 warnings, agent 2897 tests, web 1257 + tsc +
eslint 0, MCP 779, guardrails.json validates against its schema, rules/dist
regenerates without drift. The six new agent tests were green against the
unchanged guard first, which is what proves the exception was inert.

Takes effect on devices only after an agent release: guardrails.json is an
EmbeddedResource in the agent assembly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 11:54:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e9a01de9da chore: bump .claude/commands gitlink
Event reference in /ux-insights completed and live-verified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 10:06:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5f793ea01a chore: bump .claude/commands gitlink
Marker-catalog rows for the What's new panel events and the digest timer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 09:58:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e86f7efed3 feat(bootstrap): verify the publisher of the extracted agent binaries before --install (D-227)
The SHA-256 check proves the ZIP is the one version.json names, but that
manifest lives in the same container as the ZIP: it cannot outlive a
compromise of the download host. The expected publisher travels inside this
script, which the loader verified before running it, so the chain from the
file an administrator assigns to the process that starts is publisher-anchored
end to end.

Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 v2.4 -> v2.5:
- Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries checks every AutopilotMonitor.*.exe/.dll in the
  extracted payload for status Valid and the same subject pin the loader
  carries; the gate runs immediately before --install and throws on any
  rejection, exactly like the hash check.
- Third-party assemblies keep their own publisher's signature and are not
  checked: System.Management.Automation.dll ships unsigned, so a gate over all
  files would refuse the live payload.
- An extracted folder with no binary of ours is a rejection, not a pass.
- The SHA-256 manifest check is unchanged and still runs first: it proves the
  bytes, the signature proves the author.

Verified against the live payload 2.0.1454 (all five of our PEs Valid and
glueckkanja AG, gate passes); appending one byte to AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll
makes it reject. Pester 55/55.

The portal privacy and about pages carried the pre-signing wording and are
corrected in the same change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 23:11:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 78bfad0ec6 web: the portal What's new panel names the currently published agent version
A quiet third line in the panel header ("Latest agent version 2.0.1452",
faint, the number monospaced) reads from the existing config/latest-versions
endpoint. The monospaced string is the same one the session list shows in its
"Agent Version" column, so a reader can tell at a glance whether their fleet
runs the latest agent.

Portal and signed-in only: the endpoint is AuthenticatedUser, and the public
site has no session list to compare against. The gate sits on the mount of the
small component, so the landing page never even issues the request; a missing
version renders nothing.
2026-09-08 22:37:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f5efadfd07 ci: pin every third-party action to a commit SHA, gated and Dependabot-maintained (D-226)
A tag is a mutable pointer owned by the action's publisher. These jobs are not
ordinary CI: they hold the code-signing Key Vault token (D-223), the federated
storage credentials (D-222), and combine-rules.yml holds a contents:write token
that pushes to main. Whoever could repoint v7 would run code with all of that.

azure/login and Azure/functions-action were already pinned; the actions/* and
github/codeql-action references were not, on the usual argument that GitHub owns
them and shares the runner's trust boundary. That argument does not survive the
fact that they run in the same jobs as the signing identity. All seven are now
pinned by SHA with the version in a trailing comment -- the comment is what keeps
the line reviewable, and Dependabot rewrites both together.

action-pins.yml is the guard: pins nobody enforces rot, and no review reliably
catches one @v4 added to a 200-line workflow. It lives in its own workflow because
ci.yml deliberately ignores changes to the other workflow files, so a job placed
there would stay silent for exactly the commits it must inspect. Like CI it reports
rather than blocks -- main is unprotected; making it binding would mean adding it
as a required status check, which is a branch-protection decision.

Verified both directions: 49 references pass against the repo, and a fixture with
@v7, @main and a bare SHA fails with three annotations while the local reusable
workflow refs are skipped.

Two floating tool versions closed while here. wix went from the range 5.* to 5.0.2
-- it writes the bytes of the MSI customers install, where AzureSignTool only signs
them. ajv was the worse one: unpinned, and npm runs lifecycle scripts at install,
so a hijacked release would have executed with the push token before a single rule
was validated; now exact versions with --ignore-scripts.

Line endings: sed -i rewrote the workflow files as LF. Git normalises on commit, so
the content diff is unaffected and indexnow-notify.yml carries no change at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 22:14:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c26eca2f01 chore: bump internal gitlink
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 21:36:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9f1879a9f3 fix(agent): raise the captured script output cap from 2K to 8K
The portal showed the two-stage bootstrap output ending in ...[truncated]. That marker
comes from the agent, not from the web view: the stdout is cut at capture time, so no
amount of UI space brings the rest back.

Measured over 1,486 script outputs in the fleet (2026-08-25..09-08): median 39, p90 644,
max 1,501 chars, and the 2,048 cap had never been hit -- the maximum was our own
one-stage bootstrap. The loader preamble of ~460 chars pushed exactly that output over
the edge, i.e. this is a consequence of D-224 and it hit the one output an operator
actually reads.

8,192 covers the realistic worst case (download retries plus relax logging, ~2,700) and
stays 4x below the 32K-char Table Storage property limit that bounds the event
downstream. Other scripts are unaffected in practice: p90 is 644 chars.

Reaches the fleet with the next agent release.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 21:36:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c24c7bf7ef fix(publish): serve the customer scripts as a download, not as a web page
The blobs carry Content-Type: text/plain and no Content-Disposition, so every browser
renders them inline -- the documented "download the bootstrapper script" step turns into
"select this text and save it yourself", with whatever the editor then does to the line
endings and the signature block.

x-ms-blob-content-disposition makes the link a download in every browser, which is a
server-side fact rather than a per-browser hint in the docs. Command-line clients (the
loader, the MSI runner, curl) ignore the header, so nothing on the device path changes.

Metadata only: the script bytes are untouched, so no version bump and the bump guard
still sees the published copies as current.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 21:07:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5fac3d6004 Agent Host changes for agents/whats-new-notification-settings (#153) 2026-09-08 20:51:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7605d2e9f5 fix(loader): log the signer CN instead of the whole EV subject
The full subject of an EV certificate is a line of street address and registration
numbers and pushed the useful part of the log line off the screen. The CN answers the
question the log has to answer. The full subject is still logged in the one case where it
is the finding itself: a valid signature from a publisher that is not us.

Loader 1.1 -> 1.2; a Pester case pins the short form. Suite on PS 5.1: 45/45.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:49:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7bf5412d63 docs(mcp): teach the diag-zip map the loader log
bootstrap-loader.log is new with the two-stage bootstrap and told the diag tooling
nothing so far. Names which channel a device was assigned: the loader logs there when
assigned directly, and to bootstrap-msi.log when it runs from the MDM-LOB MSI.

Takes effect with the next MCP deploy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:47:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b53ceb1a7c chore: bump internal gitlink (MSI loader consolidation)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:47:01 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 647581b4ff refactor(msi): the MSI carries the shared stage-1 loader instead of its own downloader
Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1 and Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 had become the same script:
download the current installer, run it, log, always exit 0. The MSI copy additionally
downloaded and executed WITHOUT verifying what it got, which is exactly the gap the loader
was written to close. The MSI is now packaging only -- it installs and runs the same file
that is assigned directly in Intune, and both delivery channels get publisher verification
from one implementation.

Dropped from the MSI path: its own Deployed-marker check. That guard lives in stage 2 and
runs there anyway, so the only cost is one download on a device that is already deployed.

Kept: the log file name. bootstrap-msi.log is what the diagnostics tooling keys on to tell
the MDM-LOB channel apart from the Intune script channel, so the loader takes -LogFileName
(default bootstrap-loader.log) and the custom action passes bootstrap-msi.log. A Pester
test now pins that contract across the two files -- renaming the parameter on either side
would leave the MSI channel logging under the wrong name.

Package version 1.0.2 -> 1.1.0 so Intune LOB update detection sees the new payload, and a
new component GUID because the key path file changed.

Loader 1.0 -> 1.1. Bootstrap suite on Windows PowerShell 5.1: 44/44.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:41:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach db9b1995bc refactor: move the error-code generator from scripts/ to tools/ (D-225)
scripts/ at the repo root is the customer surface: everything under
Bootstrap/ and CustomerSetup/ is published to the download container by
Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1, Authenticode-signed and version-gated. The
error-code generator is a maintainer tool no workflow runs, so it diluted
that invariant. .github/scripts/ was not the alternative -- it holds only
helpers a workflow step invokes, and unlike guardrails-in-sync and
shared-manifests-in-sync the catalog has no CI drift gate (the generator
needs IME_ENUMS_JSON from operator tooling and live MS Learn fetches).

REPO_ROOT stays ../.. at the new depth, so only the documented path moved:
the generator header and README, the C# and TypeScript comments, the test
summary, and the description header of error-codes.json together with the
generator literal that emits it (the two must stay identical or the next
regeneration diffs). The web sync re-ran clean at 607 entries with no
change to utils/error-codes.json, which drops the header.
2026-09-08 20:35:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7563435837 feat(ci): Authenticode-sign the bootstrap MSI and the runner it embeds (D-223)
MSI carries an Authenticode signature like any PE, so the same identity and the same
ordering rules apply: signing identity logs in first and only for the Key Vault token,
the storage login stays last, and no environment: on the job.

The embedded Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1 is signed BEFORE wix build -- wix embeds the
file as it finds it, so signing afterwards would leave the copy inside the MSI unsigned,
and a device under an AllSigned policy needs the runner to carry its own signature.

The MSI is signed after the build and before the hash and the upload, then both files are
verified (Valid, timestamped, optional publisher pin) while nothing is published yet.
The provenance attestation now also skips runs that upload nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:34:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e39f2abb61 chore: bump internal gitlink (comment lesson)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 19:21:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 47dad7143f docs(ci): tighten the code-signing comments in build-agent
Public repo: keep the reasoning that a later change could break -- signing must precede
the release hashes, the job must never carry an environment, the timestamp is not
optional -- and drop the rest. Comments only, no behaviour change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 19:20:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d81f41dc72 chore: bump internal gitlink (D-223/D-224 plans and decisions)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:59:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach cc6be10532 fix(publish): read the signed bytes back as byte[], not as a wrapped Object[]
The ',' operator elsewhere in this file exists because PowerShell unrolls an array
RETURNED from a function; a property assignment does not unroll, so it wrapped the
byte[] in an Object[] of length 1 and the upload failed converting it back. Signing
itself was fine -- run 34253331703 signed all six scripts and uploaded none, so nothing
reached the download alias.

Added the invariant that would have caught it: signed bytes must be longer than the
unsigned form, since a signature only ever adds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:54:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0ac548bfce feat(bootstrap): two-stage loader and Authenticode-signed customer scripts (D-224)
Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 is the new stage 1 -- the file an administrator assigns in
Intune. It carries no enrollment logic: it downloads the published installer, verifies its
Authenticode signature, and runs it in the same process, passing through every remaining
argument. Assigning the installer directly stays supported and unchanged.

The point of the split is that the customer-held artifact stops changing. Today every
bootstrap change forces customers to replace their Intune copy, so the fleet runs a
distribution of script versions we do not control. It is also what makes script signing
worth doing: signing a file that gets swapped by hand each release is a one-off gain,
signing a loader that never changes is permanent.

The loader is deliberately minimal, because it is the one piece that cannot be fixed
remotely -- every guard placed in it would be frozen for years. All guards stay in stage 2.

Verification pins the certificate SUBJECT, never a thumbprint: certificates get renewed and
a deployed loader cannot be, so a thumbprint pin would strand the fleet at the next
renewal. A hash oracle was rejected for a different reason -- it would have to be fetched
from the same host as the script, so it could not survive a compromise of that host, while
the expected publisher travels inside the loader.

Fail-closed on verification, fail-soft on exit: nothing runs without a valid signature from
us (running unverified code as SYSTEM is the risk being removed here), but the loader still
exits 0, because a device without monitoring is acceptable and a failed enrollment step is
not. The accepted cost is that a device which can never fetch or verify stays silent.

Publisher changes:

- every published script is signed (loader, installer, both -Dev renders,
  Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent, Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn), and signing is the LAST
  transformation: it covers exactly the CRLF/UTF-8 bytes Get-PublishBytes produced, so
  nothing may normalise or re-encode them afterwards.
- signing is mandatory for a real publish. Only -DryRun may run unsigned, because the PR
  gate executes the publisher without any Azure login.
- comparisons against a published copy strip the signature block first. A timestamped
  signature differs on every run, so without stripping the version-bump guard and the
  drift check would report a change for every unchanged script.
- the bump guard became Assert-VersionBump and now covers the loader as well.
- version.json gains loaderVersion. Additive, no consumer yet: stage 2 is current by
  construction, so only stage 1's version says anything about a customer's Intune copy.
- -SignedOutputDir writes the exact uploaded bytes for the CI artifact, in a dry run too --
  that is how a signed script gets inspected before it reaches anyone.

publish-scripts.yml logs in with the signing identity first and only to fetch the Key Vault
token (azure/login sets the default az account and the storage login has to be the one that
stays), then publishes and offers the signed scripts as an artifact. build-agent.yml passes
the same parameters on a stable cutover.

Tests: 14 new Pester cases, including that a validly signed script from a FOREIGN publisher
is refused -- that is what an attacker with any code-signing certificate can produce. Full
bootstrap suite on Windows PowerShell 5.1: 43/43.

Not covered: the MSI runner still downloads stage 2 without verifying it, and the customer
docs still describe the direct assignment only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:48:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9c1d0586ef ci: skip the provenance attestation on test runs of build-agent
A dispatch with upload_blob=false and create_release=false publishes nothing, so the
Sigstore attestation would write a permanent public transparency-log entry for bytes
nobody ever receives. The step now runs only when the run actually ships something.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:34:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 21ec5e4773 ci: Authenticode-sign the agent binaries before the release hashes are computed (D-223)
Every assembly we author -- AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe, AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe
and the three AutopilotMonitor.*.dll beside them -- is signed with AzureSignTool (pinned
7.0.1) against a certificate in the corporate code-signing Key Vault, SHA-256 file digest
plus an RFC-3161 timestamp. Third-party assemblies keep their own publisher's signature.

The position of the step is load-bearing: signing rewrites the PE file, so it has to run
before the staging copy, the ZIP and every SHA-256 in "Create release artifact". Those
hashes are the bootstrap's integrity oracle (version.json, AdminConfiguration) -- signing
after hashing would publish hashes that no downloaded file can ever match.

The signing identity is a SECOND federated principal in the same tenant and logs in FIRST,
only to fetch a Key Vault token; the storage login of D-222 follows and owns the az context
from there, because azure/login sets the default account and the last login wins. Both
federated credentials carry the subject repo:okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor:ref:refs/heads/main,
so this job must never be given a GitHub 'environment:' -- that rewrites the OIDC subject
claim and would break BOTH logins at once.

No unsigned fallback and no dispatch input to skip signing: a missing repository variable,
a Key Vault failure or a non-zero azuresigntool exit code fails the run before anything is
published. azuresigntool is a native tool, so $LASTEXITCODE is checked explicitly --
PowerShell does not throw on a non-zero exit, and a silently unsigned release is exactly
the outcome signing exists to prevent.

Verification runs against the STAGED bytes, not the build output: every AutopilotMonitor.*
PE in the ZIP must be Valid, must carry a timestamp (without one the signature dies with
the certificate) and all of them must share one signing certificate. Setting the optional
repository variable CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT additionally pins the publisher, so the gate
proves "signed by us" instead of "signed by someone trusted".

The build provenance attestation now covers the ZIP and both EXEs, so an extracted binary
can be verified without the ZIP. Authenticode and the attestation answer different
questions and both stay: who published this binary (offline, what Windows, SmartScreen and
WDAC evaluate) versus which build produced these exact bytes (gh attestation verify).

Not covered here: the customer bootstrap script (its signature block changes the published
bytes and must follow the dev render; see B-57c, the two-stage loader), the bootstrap MSI,
and the local build.ps1 path, which from now on produces unsigned bits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:20:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e4a5a6654d ci: workflows authorize Azure Storage with the federated identity, not SAS secrets (D-222)
Every storage write against autopilotmonitoreu -- build-counter CAS, agent ZIP and MSI,
version manifests, customer bootstrap scripts, the AdminConfiguration hash oracle -- now
rides on the existing federated credential (subject repo:.../ref:refs/heads/main) instead
of a long-lived SAS in repo secrets.

The REST calls themselves are unchanged: '?<sas>' became an Authorization header, so the
ETag-CAS of the counters, Content-MD5 and the no-cache contract survive verbatim. That is
also why this is not a rewrite onto 'az storage blob upload' -- it cannot express If-Match,
and two concurrent builds could then mint the same build number.

.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1 is the single place that knows the resource id,
the az invocation and the service version. x-ms-version is mandatory for Entra-authorized
requests (>= 2017-11-09) and for any Table request without a SAS; 2021-08-06 was verified
live against both the blob and the table endpoint of this account.

azure/login added to build-agent, build-msi, publish-scripts (plus id-token: write) and
deploy-web; deploy-backend and deploy-mcp already had it. Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1
-DryRun acquires NO token: the PR gate runs it without any Azure login, and that must
stay true.

The AdminConfiguration merge lost its "secret not configured" skip branch -- a failure
there now surfaces instead of silently leaving the hash oracle pointing at an older build.

AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN, AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN and AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN
are retired once the first runs are green. AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN stays: that
account lives in the pre-migration tenant, where this principal has no identity -- it dies
with the mirror, not before.

Requires on the SP: Storage Blob Data Contributor on the containers 'agent' and 'versions',
Storage Table Data Contributor on the table 'AdminConfiguration'. Granted 2026-09-08.
2026-09-08 17:38:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 01bc35aa97 new ordering for What's new section 2026-09-08 15:48:28 +02:00
255 changed files with 15589 additions and 1591 deletions
+4
View File
@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ updates:
- dependency-name: '*'
update-types: ['version-update:semver-major']
# Every action is referenced by commit SHA with the version in a trailing comment;
# action-pins.yml fails any workflow change that reintroduces a mutable tag. Dependabot
# is what keeps those pins current: it rewrites the SHA and the comment together, so the
# pins are reviewed in a PR instead of drifting silently or being bumped by hand.
- package-ecosystem: github-actions
directory: /
schedule:
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Returns the request headers that authorize an Azure Storage REST call with Microsoft Entra.
.DESCRIPTION
One place for the storage OAuth contract shared by every publisher in this repo -- the
agent ZIP and MSI, the customer bootstrap scripts, the version manifests and the build
counters. Resource id, the az invocation, the service version and the failure message
live here so they cannot drift between call sites.
Identity comes from whatever `az login` established: the federated GitHub OIDC principal
in CI (azure/login, subject repo:okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor:ref:refs/heads/main), the
operator's own account for the local build. No secret is read, stored or passed around.
x-ms-version is MANDATORY here, not decoration: Entra-authorized requests are rejected
below 2017-11-09, and Table requests without a SAS must carry the header at all. 2021-08-06
is old enough to be deployed in every region and new enough for everything we send.
Callers merge the result into their own headers -- `$auth + @{ ... }` yields a new
hashtable per request, so nothing is shared across uploads:
$auth = & "$PSScriptRoot/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1"
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($auth + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob' }) -Body $bytes
Acquire once per step and reuse: every call shells out to az (~1s) and the token is valid
for the lifetime of a job.
.OUTPUTS
[hashtable] Authorization + x-ms-version.
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param()
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
# The data-plane resource, not management.azure.com -- a management token is accepted by
# neither the blob nor the table endpoint.
$token = az account get-access-token --resource https://storage.azure.com --query accessToken -o tsv 2>$null
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw ('Could not acquire an Azure Storage token. In CI this means the azure/login step ' +
'is missing or its federated credential does not cover this ref; locally, run ' +
'`az login`. A token alone is not enough: the principal also needs Storage Blob ' +
'Data Contributor on the container it writes, and Storage Table Data Contributor ' +
'on the table -- a missing role shows up later as HTTP 403 AuthorizationPermissionMismatch.')
}
return @{
'Authorization' = "Bearer $token"
'x-ms-version' = '2021-08-06'
}
+263 -67
View File
@@ -12,52 +12,78 @@
lands a consistent set (ZIP + manifest + scripts).
Both callers run the same code. The scripts on the download alias are the live
copy the WDP bootstrap MSI (Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1) downloads on every
enrolling device, so "current" is a correctness property, not cosmetics.
copy the stage-1 loader downloads on every enrolling device, whether it came from
Intune or from the bootstrap MSI, so "current" is a correctness property, not
cosmetics.
Steps, in order:
1. Parse $ScriptVersion from the bootstrap source.
2. Render the -Dev variant by literal substitution of the two URL/manifest
1. Parse $ScriptVersion from the loader and the bootstrap source.
2. Render the -Dev variants by literal substitution of the URL/manifest
defaults. A missing anchor is a hard failure -- a silently un-substituted
dev script would point the dev fleet at the stable agent.
3. Version-bump guard: if the published bootstrap differs from the source
but carries the same $ScriptVersion, abort. Otherwise the docs badge,
3. Version-bump guard: if a published script differs from its source but
carries the same $ScriptVersion, abort. Otherwise the docs badge,
version.json.bootstrapVersion and the portal's "your script is outdated"
hint would all keep asserting a version that is no longer what ships.
4. Upload every script blob with Cache-Control: no-cache (they rotate in
4. Build the publish set (loader, bootstrap, both dev renders, the extras).
5. Authenticode-sign every script (see -SigningToken). Signing is the LAST
transformation: it covers the exact CRLF/UTF-8 bytes that get uploaded,
and nothing may touch them afterwards or the signature breaks.
6. Upload every script blob with Cache-Control: no-cache (they rotate in
place), mirrored fail-soft to the legacy account.
5. Reconcile the two version oracles: version.json.bootstrapVersion
(read-modify-write under If-Match, so a concurrent agent release cannot
lose its agent fields) and AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion.
6. Verify through the alias -- re-download each blob and compare SHA-256.
7. Reconcile the version oracles: version.json.bootstrapVersion and
.loaderVersion (read-modify-write under If-Match, so a concurrent agent
release cannot lose its agent fields) and
AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion.
8. Verify through the alias -- re-download each blob and compare SHA-256.
.PARAMETER SasToken
Container SAS for the eu storage account with write permission. Leading '?' tolerated.
Comparisons against a published script always strip its signature block first
(Get-ComparableText). A signature carries a timestamp, so signed bytes differ on
every run; without stripping, the bump guard and the drift check would report a
change for every unchanged script.
.PARAMETER LegacySasToken
Container SAS for the legacy account. Optional -- a mirror failure warns, never fails.
.PARAMETER TableSasToken
Table SAS for AdminConfiguration. Optional -- omitted or 'XXX' skips the oracle update.
The legacy account lives in a different tenant, so the ambient Entra identity cannot
reach it; this is the only credential the publisher still takes.
.PARAMETER RepoRoot
Repository root. Defaults to the parent of .github/scripts.
.PARAMETER DryRun
Run every check and render, upload nothing.
Run every check and render, upload nothing. A dry run signs when a token is supplied
and skips signing when it is not: the PR gate runs this without any Azure login.
.PARAMETER SigningToken
Azure Key Vault access token for AzureSignTool. MANDATORY for a real publish -- an
unsigned customer script is not something this repo publishes. Together with
-KeyVaultUrl and -CertificateName.
.PARAMETER ExpectedPublisher
Optional -like pattern the signer subject must match after signing. Pins the publisher
instead of accepting any trusted signature; the loader on the device pins the same way.
.PARAMETER SignedOutputDir
Optional directory that receives a copy of every published file exactly as uploaded.
Used by CI to offer the signed scripts as a build artifact for local inspection.
.EXAMPLE
./Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 -DryRun
.EXAMPLE
./Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 -SasToken $env:SAS -TableSasToken $env:TABLE_SAS
./Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 -LegacySasToken $env:LEGACY_SAS -SigningToken $env:AKV_TOKEN `
-KeyVaultUrl $env:KV_URL -CertificateName $env:CERT
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[string]$SasToken,
[string]$LegacySasToken,
[string]$TableSasToken,
[string]$RepoRoot,
[string]$SigningToken,
[string]$KeyVaultUrl,
[string]$CertificateName,
[string]$TimestampUrl = 'http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com',
[string]$ExpectedPublisher,
[string]$SignedOutputDir,
[switch]$DryRun
)
@@ -66,9 +92,6 @@ $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
if (-not $RepoRoot) {
$RepoRoot = (Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '../..')).Path
}
if (-not $DryRun -and [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($SasToken)) {
throw 'SasToken is required unless -DryRun is used.'
}
$ContainerUrl = 'https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent'
$LegacyContainerUrl = 'https://autopilotmonitor.blob.core.windows.net/agent'
@@ -78,8 +101,23 @@ $TableUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.table.core.windows.net/AdminCo
$BootstrapSource = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'scripts/Bootstrap/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$BootstrapBlob = 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$DevBlob = 'Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1'
# Stage 1. Assigned in Intune once, and embedded in the bootstrap MSI; it downloads the
# bootstrap above on every device and verifies its publisher before running it.
$LoaderSource = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'scripts/Bootstrap/Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$LoaderBlob = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$LoaderDevBlob = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1'
$ScriptContentType = 'text/plain; charset=utf-8'
$SigningEnabled = -not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($SigningToken)
if (-not $DryRun -and -not $SigningEnabled) {
throw ('Publishing requires -SigningToken (plus -KeyVaultUrl and -CertificateName): the ' +
'loader on every device verifies the publisher of what it downloads, so an unsigned ' +
'script would be rejected in the field. Only -DryRun may run without signing.')
}
if ($SigningEnabled -and ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($KeyVaultUrl) -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($CertificateName))) {
throw '-SigningToken needs -KeyVaultUrl and -CertificateName.'
}
function Get-HttpStatus {
param($ErrorRecord)
if ($ErrorRecord.Exception.PSObject.Properties['Response'] -and $ErrorRecord.Exception.Response) {
@@ -125,6 +163,132 @@ function Get-PublishBytes {
return ,(New-Object System.Text.UTF8Encoding $false).GetBytes($normalised)
}
# A PowerShell signature is appended as a comment block at the end of the file, so the
# published bytes are "source + signature". Everything that compares a published script to
# its source has to cut that block off first -- the signature carries a timestamp and is
# therefore different on every publish, while the script above it is unchanged.
function Remove-SignatureBlock {
param([string]$Text)
$marker = '# SIG # Begin signature block'
$index = $Text.IndexOf($marker)
if ($index -lt 0) { return $Text }
return $Text.Substring(0, $index)
}
# Comparison form: no signature, LF, no trailing blank lines. Used for "is the published
# copy still this source" -- never for what gets uploaded.
function Get-ComparableText {
param([string]$Text)
return (Remove-SignatureBlock $Text).Replace("`r`n", "`n").TrimEnd("`n")
}
# Signs the publish set in place: each item's bytes are written to a work directory, signed
# there, verified, and read back as the bytes that will be uploaded. Signing has to be the
# last transformation -- the signature covers exactly these bytes, so nothing may normalise
# or re-encode them afterwards.
function Set-PublishSetSignature {
param([object[]]$Items, [string]$WorkDir)
if (-not (Get-Command azuresigntool -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)) {
throw "azuresigntool is not on PATH. Install it with: dotnet tool install --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1"
}
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $WorkDir | Out-Null
$paths = @()
foreach ($item in $Items) {
$path = Join-Path $WorkDir $item.BlobName
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($path, [byte[]]$item.Bytes)
$paths += $path
}
Write-Host "Signing $($paths.Count) script(s) with certificate '$CertificateName'..."
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url $KeyVaultUrl `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken $SigningToken `
--azure-key-vault-certificate $CertificateName `
--timestamp-rfc3161 $TimestampUrl `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor bootstrap' `
--description-url 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com' `
$paths
# Native tool: PowerShell does not throw on a non-zero exit, and an unnoticed signing
# failure would publish unsigned scripts that every loader in the field then rejects.
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE -- nothing was uploaded."
}
foreach ($item in $Items) {
$path = Join-Path $WorkDir $item.BlobName
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $path
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
throw "Signature on $($item.BlobName) is '$($sig.Status)', expected 'Valid'."
}
# Without a timestamp the signature dies with the certificate, and these scripts sit
# on customer devices far longer than a certificate lifetime.
if (-not $sig.TimeStamperCertificate) {
throw "Signature on $($item.BlobName) carries no timestamp."
}
if ($ExpectedPublisher -and $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -notlike $ExpectedPublisher) {
throw "$($item.BlobName) was signed by '$($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)', expected '$ExpectedPublisher'."
}
# Plain assignment, NO comma operator: the ',' elsewhere in this file exists because
# PowerShell unrolls an array RETURNED from a function, which is not what a property
# assignment does -- here it would wrap the byte[] in an Object[] of length 1 and the
# upload would fail converting it back.
$signedBytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($path)
if ($signedBytes.Length -le $item.Bytes.Length) {
throw ("Signed $($item.BlobName) is $($signedBytes.Length) bytes but the unsigned form " +
"was $($item.Bytes.Length) -- a signature only ever adds bytes, so this is a " +
'read-back bug, not a signing result.')
}
$item.Bytes = $signedBytes
Write-Host " signed $($item.BlobName) ($($signedBytes.Length) bytes, signer $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject.Split(',')[0]))"
}
}
# Aborts when a published script changed behaviour without a version bump. Consumers act on
# the version (docs badge, version.json, the portal's outdated-script hint), so an unchanged
# version has to mean unchanged behaviour.
function Assert-VersionBump {
param(
[string]$BlobName,
[string]$SourceContent,
[string]$SourceOrigin,
[string]$SourceVersion
)
$publishedBytes = Get-PublishedBytes "$AliasUrl/$BlobName"
if ($null -eq $publishedBytes) {
Write-Host "No published $BlobName yet -- version-bump guard skipped (first publish)"
return
}
$publishedText = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($publishedBytes)
if ((Get-ComparableText $publishedText) -eq (Get-ComparableText $SourceContent)) {
Write-Host "Published $BlobName is already this source (signature block aside)"
return
}
$publishedVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $publishedText -Origin "$AliasUrl/$BlobName" -Optional
if ($null -eq $publishedVersion) {
Write-Host "::warning::The published $BlobName is not a readable script (no ScriptVersion found). Republishing over it."
} elseif ($publishedVersion -ne $SourceVersion) {
Write-Host "Version bump: $publishedVersion -> $SourceVersion ($BlobName)"
} elseif ((Get-CodeFingerprint -Text (Remove-SignatureBlock $publishedText) -Origin "$AliasUrl/$BlobName") -eq
(Get-CodeFingerprint -Text $SourceContent -Origin $SourceOrigin)) {
# Comments, typos in comments, reflow -- nothing a consumer of the version can act on.
Write-Host "::warning::$BlobName changed in comments or formatting only; publishing under the unchanged version $SourceVersion."
} else {
throw ("Version-bump guard: $BlobName changed behaviour but ScriptVersion is still $SourceVersion. " +
"Bump it in $SourceOrigin -- the docs badge, version.json and the " +
'portal outdated-script hint all read that value, and customers decide from it whether ' +
'to re-upload their Intune copy. Comment-only and formatting changes do not need a bump.')
}
}
function Get-BootstrapScriptVersion {
param([string]$Content, [string]$Origin, [switch]$Optional)
if ($Content -match '\$ScriptVersion\s*=\s*"([\d\.\-a-zA-Z]+)"') { return $Matches[1] }
@@ -152,12 +316,16 @@ function Get-CodeFingerprint {
return (($tokens | Where-Object { $ignored -notcontains $_.Kind.ToString() } | ForEach-Object { $_.Text }) -join "`n")
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. source
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. sources
$sourceContent = Get-Content $BootstrapSource -Raw
$sourceBytes = Get-PublishBytes $sourceContent
$scriptVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $sourceContent -Origin $BootstrapSource
Write-Host "Bootstrap script version: $scriptVersion"
$loaderContent = Get-Content $LoaderSource -Raw
$loaderVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $loaderContent -Origin $LoaderSource
Write-Host "Loader script version: $loaderVersion"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 2. dev render
$stableUrlLiteral = '$AgentDownloadUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip"'
$devUrlLiteral = '$AgentDownloadUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Agent-dev.zip"'
@@ -170,33 +338,21 @@ if ($sourceContent.IndexOf($stableUrlLiteral) -lt 0 -or $sourceContent.IndexOf($
$devContent = $sourceContent.Replace($stableUrlLiteral, $devUrlLiteral).Replace($stableManLiteral, $devManLiteral)
Write-Host "Rendered $DevBlob (dev agent URL + version-dev.json)"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 3. bump guard
$publishedBytes = Get-PublishedBytes "$AliasUrl/$BootstrapBlob"
if ($null -eq $publishedBytes) {
Write-Host 'No published bootstrap yet -- version-bump guard skipped (first publish)'
} elseif ((Get-Sha256 $publishedBytes) -eq (Get-Sha256 $sourceBytes)) {
Write-Host 'Published bootstrap is already byte-identical to the source'
} else {
$publishedText = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($publishedBytes)
$publishedVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $publishedText -Origin "$AliasUrl/$BootstrapBlob" -Optional
# The dev loader must fetch the dev bootstrap, or a dev device would run the stable chain.
$stableLoaderLiteral = '$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"'
$devLoaderLiteral = '$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1"'
if ($null -eq $publishedVersion) {
Write-Host "::warning::The published $BootstrapBlob is not a readable bootstrap script (no ScriptVersion found). Republishing over it."
} elseif ($publishedVersion -ne $scriptVersion) {
Write-Host "Version bump: $publishedVersion -> $scriptVersion"
} elseif ((Get-CodeFingerprint -Text $publishedText -Origin "$AliasUrl/$BootstrapBlob") -eq
(Get-CodeFingerprint -Text $sourceContent -Origin $BootstrapSource)) {
# Comments, typos in comments, reflow -- nothing a consumer of the version can act on.
Write-Host "::warning::$BootstrapBlob changed in comments or formatting only; publishing under the unchanged version $scriptVersion."
} else {
throw ("Version-bump guard: $BootstrapBlob changed behaviour but ScriptVersion is still $scriptVersion. " +
"Bump it in $BootstrapSource -- the docs badge, version.json.bootstrapVersion and the " +
'portal outdated-script hint all read that value, and customers decide from it whether ' +
'to re-upload their Intune copy. Comment-only and formatting changes do not need a bump.')
}
if ($loaderContent.IndexOf($stableLoaderLiteral) -lt 0) {
throw "Loader dev-render: anchor literal missing in $LoaderSource"
}
$devLoaderContent = $loaderContent.Replace($stableLoaderLiteral, $devLoaderLiteral)
Write-Host "Rendered $LoaderDevBlob (points at $DevBlob)"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 4. upload
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 3. bump guards
Assert-VersionBump -BlobName $BootstrapBlob -SourceContent $sourceContent -SourceOrigin $BootstrapSource -SourceVersion $scriptVersion
Assert-VersionBump -BlobName $LoaderBlob -SourceContent $loaderContent -SourceOrigin $LoaderSource -SourceVersion $loaderVersion
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 4. publish set
# Sources beyond the bootstrap pair, read straight from the repo.
$extraSources = @(
@{ Path = 'scripts/Bootstrap/Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent.ps1'; BlobName = 'Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent.ps1' }
@@ -206,20 +362,38 @@ $extraSources = @(
# Uninstall-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 is deliberately NOT published: nothing links it, and
# an unauthenticated uninstall script on the public download host is not a feature.
# Text is the unsigned publish form and stays the reference for every comparison against a
# published copy; Bytes is what goes on the wire and carries the signature after step 4.
$publishSet = [System.Collections.Generic.List[object]]::new()
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $BootstrapBlob; Bytes = $sourceBytes })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $DevBlob; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devContent) })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $LoaderBlob; Text = $loaderContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $loaderContent) })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $LoaderDevBlob; Text = $devLoaderContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devLoaderContent) })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $BootstrapBlob; Text = $sourceContent; Bytes = $sourceBytes })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $DevBlob; Text = $devContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devContent) })
foreach ($extra in $extraSources) {
$extraPath = Join-Path $RepoRoot $extra.Path
if (-not (Test-Path $extraPath)) {
throw "Publish source missing: $extraPath"
}
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $extra.BlobName; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes (Get-Content $extraPath -Raw)) })
$extraText = Get-Content $extraPath -Raw
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $extra.BlobName; Text = $extraText; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $extraText) })
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 5. sign
# After this point the bytes are final. Normalising, re-encoding or rewriting a line ending
# would invalidate the signature, and the device-side loader would refuse the script.
if ($SigningEnabled) {
Set-PublishSetSignature -Items $publishSet -WorkDir (Join-Path ([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath()) "apm-publish-$PID")
} else {
Write-Host '::warning::No signing token supplied -- dry run continues with unsigned scripts.'
}
$legacySas = if ($LegacySasToken) { $LegacySasToken.TrimStart('?') } else { '' }
$writeSas = if ($SasToken) { $SasToken.TrimStart('?') } else { '' }
# Acquired lazily: a dry run must stay runnable without any Azure login -- the PR gate
# (bootstrap-script-gates.yml) executes this script with -DryRun and never logs in.
$authHeaders = if ($DryRun) { $null } else { & (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1') }
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 6. upload
foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
# Explicit type, not a convenience: an Object[] body is uploaded as space-separated
# decimals rather than raw bytes, and every hash check still passes because [byte[]]
@@ -227,11 +401,21 @@ foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
[byte[]]$bytes = $item.Bytes
$item | Add-Member -NotePropertyName Sha256 -NotePropertyValue (Get-Sha256 $bytes) -Force
# Exactly the bytes that go on the wire, for the CI artifact. Written in a dry run too:
# that is the run an operator uses to inspect a signed script before it is published.
if ($SignedOutputDir) {
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $SignedOutputDir | Out-Null
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes((Join-Path $SignedOutputDir $item.BlobName), $bytes)
}
if ($DryRun) {
# Doubles as a drift check: says per blob whether the alias already serves this source.
# Doubles as a drift check: says per blob whether the alias already serves this
# source. Compared as text without the signature block -- signed bytes differ on
# every run, so a byte comparison would report drift for every unchanged script.
$served = Get-PublishedBytes "$AliasUrl/$($item.BlobName)"
$state = if ($null -eq $served) { 'MISSING on the alias' }
elseif ((Get-Sha256 $served) -eq $item.Sha256) { 'already current' }
elseif ((Get-ComparableText ([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($served))) -eq
(Get-ComparableText $item.Text)) { 'already current' }
else { 'STALE on the alias' }
Write-Host " [dry-run] $($item.BlobName) ($($bytes.Length) bytes, sha256 $($item.Sha256)) -- $state"
continue
@@ -241,8 +425,18 @@ foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
# with Front Door. Route caching is disabled there, but a stale script paired with a
# fresh manifest would fail the bootstrap SHA check -- this keeps that class of bug
# impossible even if caching is ever re-enabled.
$headers = @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'Content-Type' = $ScriptContentType; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$ContainerUrl/$($item.BlobName)?$writeSas" -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body $bytes | Out-Null
#
# Content-Disposition: without it a text/plain blob opens as a web page in every
# browser, and the documented "download the script" step silently becomes "copy this
# text". The header makes the link a download everywhere, and command-line clients
# (the loader, the MSI, curl) ignore it.
$headers = @{
'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'
'Content-Type' = $ScriptContentType
'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache'
'x-ms-blob-content-disposition' = ('attachment; filename="{0}"' -f $item.BlobName)
}
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$ContainerUrl/$($item.BlobName)" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $headers) -Body $bytes | Out-Null
# Read straight back from the blob (authoritative, no CDN in the way) before touching the
# mirror or the next file. The alias verification at the end would catch a bad body too,
@@ -266,7 +460,7 @@ foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
}
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 5. version oracles
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 7. version oracles
# version.json is the agent manifest; only bootstrapVersion belongs to us. Read from the
# blob (not the alias) for an authoritative ETag, write back under If-Match so a concurrent
# agent release cannot lose its version/sha256 fields.
@@ -278,11 +472,15 @@ if (-not $DryRun) {
} else { [string]$manifestResp.Content }
$manifest = $manifestRaw | ConvertFrom-Json
if ($manifest.bootstrapVersion -eq $scriptVersion) {
Write-Host "version.json already reports bootstrapVersion $scriptVersion"
if ($manifest.bootstrapVersion -eq $scriptVersion -and $manifest.loaderVersion -eq $loaderVersion) {
Write-Host "version.json already reports bootstrapVersion $scriptVersion and loaderVersion $loaderVersion"
} else {
$etag = '"' + ([string]($manifestResp.Headers['ETag'] | Select-Object -First 1)).Trim('"') + '"'
$manifest | Add-Member -NotePropertyName 'bootstrapVersion' -NotePropertyValue $scriptVersion -Force
# Additive: no consumer reads loaderVersion yet. It exists so support can tell
# which stage-1 file a device was assigned -- stage 2 is always current by
# construction, so its version says nothing about the customer's Intune copy.
$manifest | Add-Member -NotePropertyName 'loaderVersion' -NotePropertyValue $loaderVersion -Force
$body = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(($manifest | ConvertTo-Json -Compress))
$manifestHeaders = @{
'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'
@@ -290,8 +488,8 @@ if (-not $DryRun) {
'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache'
'If-Match' = $etag
}
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$ContainerUrl/version.json?$writeSas" -Method Put -Headers $manifestHeaders -Body $body | Out-Null
Write-Host "version.json bootstrapVersion -> $scriptVersion (agent fields untouched)"
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$ContainerUrl/version.json" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $manifestHeaders) -Body $body | Out-Null
Write-Host "version.json bootstrapVersion -> $scriptVersion, loaderVersion -> $loaderVersion (agent fields untouched)"
if ($legacySas) {
try {
@@ -310,11 +508,8 @@ if (-not $DryRun) {
}
}
$tableSas = if ($TableSasToken) { $TableSasToken.TrimStart('?') } else { '' }
if ($DryRun) {
Write-Host " [dry-run] would set AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion"
} elseif ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($tableSas) -or $tableSas -eq 'XXX') {
Write-Host 'SKIPPED: AdminConfiguration update -- set AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN to enable the portal version oracle'
} else {
$tableHeaders = @{
'Content-Type' = 'application/json'
@@ -322,11 +517,11 @@ if ($DryRun) {
'If-Match' = '*'
}
$tableBody = @{ LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion } | ConvertTo-Json
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$TableUrl`?$tableSas" -Method Merge -Headers $tableHeaders -Body $tableBody | Out-Null
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $TableUrl -Method Merge -Headers ($authHeaders + $tableHeaders) -Body $tableBody | Out-Null
Write-Host "AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion"
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 6. verify via alias
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 8. verify via alias
if (-not $DryRun) {
$pending = [System.Collections.ArrayList]::new()
$publishSet | ForEach-Object { [void]$pending.Add($_) }
@@ -358,7 +553,8 @@ if ($env:GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY) {
$summary = @(
"### Bootstrap scripts: $mode",
'',
"Bootstrap script version: **$scriptVersion**",
"Loader script version: **$loaderVersion** | Bootstrap script version: **$scriptVersion**",
"Signed: **$(if ($SigningEnabled) { "yes, certificate '$CertificateName'" } else { 'NO (unsigned dry run)' })**",
''
) + ($publishSet | ForEach-Object { "- $($_.BlobName) -- sha256 $($_.Sha256)" })
($summary -join [Environment]::NewLine) | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY -Append -Encoding utf8
+8 -11
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@
A failed build burns a number, which is harmless -- uniqueness matters,
density does not.
The blob is public-read; only the write needs the container SAS.
The blob is public-read; only the write needs authorization, and that comes from the
ambient Entra identity (see Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1) -- no secret is passed in.
Why a counter and not the published version manifest: manifests are written
on publish, not on build (the agent writes version.json only for stable
@@ -20,10 +21,7 @@
overwrite each other's versioned artifact.
.PARAMETER CounterUrl
Full URL of the counter blob, without SAS.
.PARAMETER SasToken
Container SAS with create+write permission. A leading '?' is tolerated.
Full URL of the counter blob.
.PARAMETER Override
Explicit build number instead of counter+1. If it is not greater than the
@@ -37,20 +35,19 @@
[int] the reserved build number. Progress goes to the host, not the pipeline.
.EXAMPLE
$n = ./Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $url -SasToken $sas
$n = ./Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $url
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$CounterUrl,
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$SasToken,
[int]$Override = 0,
[int]$MaxAttempts = 5
)
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
# Tolerate both secret formats ("sp=cw&..." and "?sp=cw&...").
$writeUrl = $CounterUrl + '?' + $SasToken.TrimStart('?')
# The write is Entra-authorized; the read below stays anonymous (public container).
$authHeaders = & (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1')
function Get-HttpStatus {
param($ErrorRecord)
@@ -85,8 +82,8 @@ for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le $MaxAttempts; $attempt++) {
$target = if ($Override -gt 0) { $Override } else { $counter.Value + 1 }
try {
$headers = @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'If-Match' = $counter.ETag }
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $writeUrl -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body "$target" -ContentType 'text/plain' | Out-Null
$headers = $authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'If-Match' = $counter.ETag }
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $CounterUrl -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body "$target" -ContentType 'text/plain' | Out-Null
Write-Host " Reserved build number $target (CAS write ok, attempt $attempt)"
return $target
} catch {
+70
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
name: Action Pin Gate
# Every third-party action must be referenced by a full commit SHA, never by a tag.
# Tags are mutable: whoever controls an action repository can repoint v4 at new code,
# and that code runs inside jobs that hold the code-signing identity, the storage
# credentials and a token that can push to main. A SHA is the only reference an
# upstream owner cannot change under us.
#
# Lives in its own workflow rather than in ci.yml: CI deliberately ignores changes to
# the other workflow files, so a guard placed there would stay silent for exactly the
# commits it needs to inspect.
#
# Like CI, this reports rather than blocks: main is deliberately unprotected, so a red
# run is a signal to act on, not a merge barrier. Making it binding means adding
# 'Verify action pins' as a required status check -- a branch-protection decision, not
# something this file can assert.
#
# The pins are not maintained by hand — .github/dependabot.yml opens a monthly grouped
# PR that rewrites both the SHA and the trailing version comment. The comment is
# therefore required too: it is what makes a pinned line reviewable.
on:
push:
branches: [main]
paths: ['.github/workflows/**']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['.github/workflows/**']
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
verify-pins:
name: Verify action pins
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- name: Every third-party action is pinned to a SHA
run: |
set -uo pipefail
failed=0
while IFS=: read -r file line ref; do
# Reusable workflows from this repository move with the commit that calls
# them, so there is nothing to pin.
case "$ref" in ./*) continue ;; esac
if [[ "$ref" =~ ^[^@]+@[0-9a-f]{40}[[:space:]]+#[[:space:]]*[^[:space:]] ]]; then
printf 'ok %s:%s %s\n' "$file" "$line" "$ref"
continue
fi
if [[ "$ref" =~ ^[^@]+@[0-9a-f]{40}[[:space:]]*$ ]]; then
echo "::error file=$file,line=$line::Pinned but the version comment is missing: '$ref'. Write 'owner/action@<sha> # vN' so the line stays reviewable."
else
echo "::error file=$file,line=$line::Action '$ref' is not pinned to a commit SHA. Tags are mutable -- resolve it with: gh api repos/<owner>/<action>/git/ref/tags/<tag>"
fi
failed=1
# -H is load-bearing: with a single matching file grep omits the name, the
# fields shift by one and every diagnostic points at nothing.
done < <(grep -nHE '^[[:space:]]*(-[[:space:]]+)?uses:' .github/workflows/*.yml \
| sed -E 's/^([^:]+):([0-9]+):[[:space:]]*(-[[:space:]]+)?uses:[[:space:]]*/\1:\2:/')
if [ "$failed" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "::error::Unpinned action references found -- fix them before this reaches main."
exit 1
fi
echo "All action references are pinned to commit SHAs."
+1 -1
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ jobs:
name: Bootstrap guard tests (PS 5.1)
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- name: Install Pester 5+
shell: powershell
+177 -24
View File
@@ -57,6 +57,13 @@ env:
VERSIONED_ZIP: AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v2.zip
STABLE_ZIP: AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip
STABLE_MANIFEST: version.json
# Authenticode via Azure Key Vault; identity and vault come from repository variables.
# CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT is optional and pins the publisher in the verify step.
CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME }}
CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL }}
CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT }}
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL: http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com
jobs:
build:
@@ -65,14 +72,66 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v7
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
# Every released build is signed; a missing variable stops the run before a build
# number is burnt.
- name: Check code-signing configuration
shell: pwsh
run: |
foreach ($name in 'CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID', 'CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME', 'CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL') {
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace([Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable($name))) {
throw "Repository variable $name is not set. Every released build must be Authenticode-signed."
}
}
Write-Host "Code-signing configuration present (certificate '$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME')"
# Logs in FIRST and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account, so the storage login below has to be the last one. Both federated credentials
# are bound to the ref, so this job must never be given an `environment:` -- that would
# change the OIDC subject claim and break both logins.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ env.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
allow-no-subscriptions: true
- name: Acquire Key Vault token for signing
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$token = az account get-access-token --scope https://vault.azure.net/.default --query accessToken --output tsv
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw "Could not acquire a Key Vault token for the code-signing identity."
}
Write-Host "::add-mask::$token"
"CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN=$token" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
# Every storage write below (counter blob, agent ZIP, manifests, AdminConfiguration)
# is authorized by this federated identity -- no SAS secret. One login covers the whole
# job: the federated credential is bound to the ref, and a release run takes ~2 minutes,
# well inside the token lifetime. Only the legacy mirror still needs a SAS: that account
# lives in the pre-migration tenant, where this principal has no identity.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# SDK 10 = single build toolchain (parity with local build.ps1 / global.json).
- name: Setup .NET
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
# Version pinned; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK above.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
# Build numbers come from the shared counter blob -- one counter and one
# implementation for CI and the local build (.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1).
# Reserve-before-build with ETag-CAS: concurrent builds can never mint the same
@@ -85,7 +144,6 @@ jobs:
# build_number could otherwise break out of the quotes and run arbitrary code.
env:
BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE: ${{ inputs.build_number }}
AGENT_SAS_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}
run: |
$override = 0
if ($env:BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE -ne '') {
@@ -96,7 +154,7 @@ jobs:
}
$counterUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent/buildcounter-v$($env:LINE_MAJOR).txt"
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $counterUrl -SasToken $env:AGENT_SAS_TOKEN -Override $override
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $counterUrl -Override $override
$csproj = Get-Content $env:CSPROJ_PATH -Raw
if ($csproj -match '<VersionPrefix>(\d+\.\d+)</VersionPrefix>') {
@@ -129,6 +187,47 @@ jobs:
- name: Run Agent unit tests
run: dotnet test ${{ env.TEST_PROJECT }} --configuration Release --no-restore --verbosity quiet
# Authenticode over everything we author; third-party assemblies keep their own signature.
#
# THE POSITION IS LOAD-BEARING: signing rewrites the PE file, so it must run before the
# ZIP and every SHA-256 in the next step -- those hashes are the bootstrap's integrity
# oracle, and hashes taken before signing match no downloaded file.
#
# $LASTEXITCODE is checked explicitly: PowerShell does not throw on a native non-zero exit.
- name: Sign agent binaries (Authenticode)
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$targets = @()
$targets += Get-ChildItem -Path "$env:AGENT_OUTPUT/*" -Include 'AutopilotMonitor.*.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.*.dll' -File
$targets += Get-ChildItem -Path "$env:DIALOG_OUTPUT/AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe" -File
if (-not ($targets | Where-Object Name -eq 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')) {
throw "AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe not found in $env:AGENT_OUTPUT -- nothing to sign."
}
if (-not ($targets | Where-Object Name -eq 'AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe')) {
throw "AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe not found in $env:DIALOG_OUTPUT -- nothing to sign."
}
$targets | ForEach-Object { Write-Host "Signing $($_.Name)" }
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
--azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description "Autopilot Monitor Agent" `
--description-url "https://www.autopilotmonitor.com" `
($targets | ForEach-Object { $_.FullName })
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE -- aborting before anything is published."
}
- name: Create release artifact
id: artifact
shell: pwsh
@@ -219,12 +318,57 @@ jobs:
"sha256=$sha256Hash" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
"exe_sha256=$exeSha256Hash" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
# Verified against the STAGING copy -- the exact bytes that ship. The invariant is "every
# AutopilotMonitor PE in the ZIP is signed", so a project added later cannot ride along
# unsigned. A missing timestamp fails too: without it the signature dies with the cert.
- name: Verify Authenticode signatures
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$files = Get-ChildItem -Path "staging/agent/*" -Include 'AutopilotMonitor.*.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.*.dll' -File
if ($files.Count -lt 2) {
throw "Expected signed binaries in staging/agent, found $($files.Count)."
}
$failed = $false
$thumbprints = @{}
foreach ($file in $files) {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $file.FullName
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::Signature status is '$($sig.Status)' -- expected 'Valid'."
$failed = $true
continue
}
if (-not $sig.TimeStamperCertificate) {
Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::Signature carries no RFC-3161 timestamp -- it would expire with the certificate."
$failed = $true
continue
}
if (-not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) -and
$sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -notlike $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) {
Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::Signed by '$($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)', expected '$env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT'."
$failed = $true
continue
}
$thumbprints[$sig.SignerCertificate.Thumbprint] = $true
Write-Host "$($file.Name): Valid, timestamped $($sig.TimeStamperCertificate.Subject.Split(',')[0]), signer $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)"
}
if ($thumbprints.Count -gt 1) {
Write-Host "::error::Staged binaries carry $($thumbprints.Count) different signing certificates -- expected exactly one."
$failed = $true
}
if ($failed) {
throw "Signature verification failed. Nothing was published."
}
Write-Host "All $($files.Count) binaries signed with certificate $($thumbprints.Keys -join ', ')"
- name: Upload to Azure Blob Storage
if: inputs.upload_blob
shell: pwsh
run: |
$containerUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent"
$sasToken = "${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}".TrimStart('?')
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
# Legacy mirror (transition until customers moved to the download.-alias):
# blobs are ALSO pushed to the old account so the bootstrap URL baked into
# customers' Intune scripts keeps serving current bits. Fail-soft -- a
@@ -234,7 +378,6 @@ jobs:
function Send-Blob {
param([string]$Local, [string]$BlobName, [string]$ContentType)
$url = "$containerUrl/$BlobName`?$sasToken"
$bytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($Local)
# no-cache on EVERY blob: they all rotate in place (even the per-line ZIP is
# overwritten each build), and the download alias fronts them with Front Door.
@@ -248,7 +391,7 @@ jobs:
$md5.Dispose()
}
Write-Host "Uploading $BlobName ($([math]::Round($bytes.Length / 1MB, 2)) MB)..."
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body $bytes
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$containerUrl/$BlobName" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $headers) -Body $bytes
Write-Host " uploaded $BlobName"
if (-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($legacySasToken)) {
try {
@@ -274,56 +417,66 @@ jobs:
# to main, so a release lands a set that is consistent with what is already live
# (dev render, version-bump guard, bootstrapVersion oracles, alias verification).
# Runs AFTER version.json so its bootstrapVersion read sees this build's manifest.
# Signed with the same identity: the device-side loader verifies the publisher
# of what it downloads, and the publisher refuses to upload unsigned scripts.
./.github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 `
-SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-LegacySasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-TableSasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN }}'
-SigningToken $env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN `
-KeyVaultUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL `
-CertificateName $env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME `
-TimestampUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL `
-ExpectedPublisher $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT
}
# Update AdminConfiguration LatestAgentV2* -- ONLY on stable cutover. The hash-oracle
# must never point at a build that is not actually in the stable namespace.
# LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion is NOT set here: it belongs to the script publisher
# above, which also owns it on script-only pushes. One writer per field.
$tableSasToken = "${{ secrets.AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN }}".TrimStart('?')
if ('${{ inputs.publish_as_stable }}' -ne 'true') {
Write-Host "SKIPPED: AdminConfiguration update (versioned-only run -- stable namespace unchanged)"
} elseif ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($tableSasToken) -or $tableSasToken -eq "XXX") {
Write-Host "SKIPPED: Table SAS token not configured -- set AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN secret to enable backend hash-oracle"
} else {
$sha256 = "${{ steps.artifact.outputs.sha256 }}"
$exeSha256 = "${{ steps.artifact.outputs.exe_sha256 }}"
$agentVersion = "${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}"
$tableUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.table.core.windows.net/AdminConfiguration(PartitionKey='GlobalConfig',RowKey='config')?$tableSasToken"
$tableUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.table.core.windows.net/AdminConfiguration(PartitionKey='GlobalConfig',RowKey='config')"
$tableBody = @{
LatestAgentV2Version = $agentVersion
LatestAgentV2Sha256 = $sha256
LatestAgentV2ExeSha256 = $exeSha256
}
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $tableUrl -Method Merge -Headers @{
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $tableUrl -Method Merge -Headers ($authHeaders + @{
"Content-Type" = "application/json"
"Accept" = "application/json;odata=nometadata"
"If-Match" = "*"
} -Body ($tableBody | ConvertTo-Json)
}) -Body ($tableBody | ConvertTo-Json)
Write-Host "AdminConfiguration updated: V2 version=$agentVersion, sha256=$sha256, exeSha256=$exeSha256"
}
# Sigstore keyless provenance: binds the ZIP digest to this workflow run (repo, ref,
# commit, workflow file) in a public transparency log. The digest covers the identical
# Sigstore keyless provenance: binds the artifact digests to this workflow run (repo, ref,
# commit, workflow file) in a public transparency log. The digests cover the identical
# bytes uploaded to blob (versioned AND stable), so one attestation covers all copies.
# Verify: gh attestation verify <zip> --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
- name: Attest build provenance (ZIP)
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v4
# Complements Authenticode rather than replacing it: the signature says who published a
# binary, the attestation which build produced these exact bytes. Both EXEs are subjects
# of their own so an extracted binary can be verified without the ZIP.
# Verify: gh attestation verify <file> --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
# Skipped on runs that publish nothing -- no log entry for bytes nobody receives.
- name: Attest build provenance
if: inputs.upload_blob || inputs.create_release
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@4d101475d8b20a2381f78447822ac1eab6504dd8 # v4
with:
subject-path: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
subject-path: |
${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
staging/agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe
staging/agent/AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe
- name: Upload build artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
path: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
- name: Upload version metadata
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: version-metadata
path: ${{ env.MANIFEST_NAME }}
@@ -356,7 +509,7 @@ jobs:
- **Published as stable:** ${{ inputs.publish_as_stable }}
### Provenance
This ZIP carries a [GitHub Artifact Attestation](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/attestations) (Sigstore keyless). Verify:
The executables are Authenticode-signed and timestamped. The ZIP and both executables carry a [GitHub Artifact Attestation](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/attestations) (Sigstore keyless). Verify:
```
gh attestation verify AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}.zip --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
```
+126 -16
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
name: Build & Publish Bootstrap MSI
# Thin MDM LOB delivery vehicle for WDP (Autopilot v2) — see
# src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi/Package.wxs. The MSI carries no bootstrap
# logic (only the runner script that downloads the CURRENT server-hosted
# Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1), so it is rebuilt rarely: only when the runner script
# or the WiX package changes. Version lives in Package.wxs — bump it there before
# dispatching so Intune LOB update detection sees a new ProductVersion.
# src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi/Package.wxs. The MSI is packaging only: it
# carries the SAME stage-1 loader that is assigned directly in Intune, so it is rebuilt
# rarely — only when that loader or the WiX package changes. Version lives in Package.wxs
# — bump it there before dispatching so Intune LOB update detection sees a new
# ProductVersion.
on:
workflow_dispatch:
@@ -23,8 +23,15 @@ permissions:
env:
MSI_PROJECT_DIR: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi
RUNNER_SCRIPT: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi/Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1
RUNNER_SCRIPT: scripts/Bootstrap/Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1
STABLE_MSI: AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap.msi
# Authenticode via Azure Key Vault; identity and vault come from repository variables.
# CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT is optional and pins the publisher in the verify steps.
CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME }}
CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL }}
CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT }}
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL: http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com
jobs:
build:
@@ -33,10 +40,12 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v7
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
# The runner executes as SYSTEM on every enrolling device — a parse error or
# The loader executes as SYSTEM on every enrolling device — a parse error or
# non-ASCII mojibake (PS 5.1 codepage roulette) must fail the build, not the fleet.
# bootstrap-script-gates.yml runs the same checks plus Pester on pushes; this job
# stands on its own because it can be dispatched at any time.
- name: Validate runner script (parse + ASCII-only)
shell: pwsh
run: |
@@ -62,8 +71,77 @@ jobs:
Write-Host "MSI version (from Package.wxs): $version"
"version=$version" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
# Every published MSI is signed; a missing variable stops the run before the build.
- name: Check code-signing configuration
shell: pwsh
run: |
foreach ($name in 'CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID', 'CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME', 'CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL') {
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace([Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable($name))) {
throw "Repository variable $name is not set. Every published MSI must be Authenticode-signed."
}
}
# Logs in FIRST and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account, so the storage login below has to be the last one. Both federated credentials
# are bound to the ref, so this job must never be given an `environment:` -- that would
# change the OIDC subject claim and break both logins.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ env.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
allow-no-subscriptions: true
- name: Acquire Key Vault token for signing
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$token = az account get-access-token --scope https://vault.azure.net/.default --query accessToken --output tsv
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw "Could not acquire a Key Vault token for the code-signing identity."
}
Write-Host "::add-mask::$token"
"CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN=$token" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
# The blob upload below is authorized by this federated identity, not by a SAS.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# Exact version, not a "5.*" range: wix writes the bytes of the MSI that customers
# install, so a compromised or simply broken point release must not flow into a build
# unnoticed. Bumping is a reviewed commit.
- name: Install WiX toolset
run: dotnet tool install --global wix --version "5.*"
run: dotnet tool install --global wix --version 5.0.2
# Version pinned; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
# BEFORE the build: wix embeds the file as it finds it, so a loader signed afterwards
# would leave the copy inside the MSI unsigned. Devices under an AllSigned policy need
# the embedded loader to carry a signature of its own.
- name: Sign bootstrap loader (Authenticode)
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
--azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor bootstrap runner' `
--description-url 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com' `
$env:RUNNER_SCRIPT
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE" }
- name: Build MSI
shell: pwsh
@@ -75,16 +153,46 @@ jobs:
wix build Package.wxs -arch x64 -o $out
Pop-Location
if (-not (Test-Path $env:STABLE_MSI)) { Write-Error "wix build produced no MSI"; exit 1 }
$sha256 = (Get-FileHash $env:STABLE_MSI -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()
Write-Host "Built $env:STABLE_MSI ($([math]::Round((Get-Item $env:STABLE_MSI).Length / 1KB)) KB)"
Write-Host "SHA-256: $sha256"
# Signing rewrites the MSI, so it runs before the hash and the upload. A missing
# timestamp fails the run: without it the signature dies with the certificate.
- name: Sign MSI (Authenticode)
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
--azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap' `
--description-url 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com' `
$env:STABLE_MSI
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE" }
# The MSI and the loader it carries -- verified here, before anything is published.
foreach ($file in @($env:STABLE_MSI, $env:RUNNER_SCRIPT)) {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $file
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') { throw "Signature on $file is '$($sig.Status)', expected 'Valid'." }
if (-not $sig.TimeStamperCertificate) { throw "Signature on $file carries no timestamp." }
if ($env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT -and $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -notlike $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) {
throw "$file was signed by '$($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)', expected '$env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT'."
}
Write-Host "$file : Valid, timestamped, signer $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject.Split(',')[0])"
}
Write-Host "SHA-256: $((Get-FileHash $env:STABLE_MSI -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant())"
- name: Upload to Azure Blob Storage
if: inputs.upload_blob
shell: pwsh
run: |
$containerUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent"
$sasToken = "${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}".TrimStart('?')
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$version = "${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}"
# Same Send-Blob contract as build-agent.yml: no-cache on every blob because the
@@ -102,7 +210,7 @@ jobs:
$headers["Content-MD5"] = [Convert]::ToBase64String($md5.ComputeHash($bytes))
$md5.Dispose()
Write-Host "Uploading $BlobName ($([math]::Round($bytes.Length / 1KB)) KB)..."
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$containerUrl/$BlobName`?$sasToken" -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body $bytes
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$containerUrl/$BlobName" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $headers) -Body $bytes
Write-Host " uploaded $BlobName"
}
@@ -125,15 +233,17 @@ jobs:
}
Write-Host "Alias verified: https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/$env:STABLE_MSI ($remoteSize bytes)"
# Sigstore keyless provenance, same as the agent ZIP. Verify:
# Sigstore keyless provenance, same as the agent ZIP; covers the signed bytes. Skipped
# on runs that publish nothing -- no log entry for bytes nobody receives. Verify:
# gh attestation verify AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap.msi --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
- name: Attest build provenance (MSI)
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v4
if: inputs.upload_blob
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@4d101475d8b20a2381f78447822ac1eab6504dd8 # v4
with:
subject-path: ${{ env.STABLE_MSI }}
- name: Upload build artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
path: ${{ env.STABLE_MSI }}
+13 -11
View File
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ on:
# Every other workflow: nothing here builds or tests anything CI covers. paths-ignore
# cannot negate, so they are listed one by one; ci.yml itself stays out of the list
# so a change to CI runs CI. A new workflow file is opt-in — add it here too.
- '.github/workflows/action-pins.yml'
- '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-agent.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-msi.yml'
@@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ on:
# Every other workflow: nothing here builds or tests anything CI covers. paths-ignore
# cannot negate, so they are listed one by one; ci.yml itself stays out of the list
# so a change to CI runs CI. A new workflow file is opt-in — add it here too.
- '.github/workflows/action-pins.yml'
- '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-agent.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-msi.yml'
@@ -94,9 +96,9 @@ jobs:
# windows-latest is required: the agent test projects target net48.
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
@@ -125,9 +127,9 @@ jobs:
run:
working-directory: src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
cache: npm
@@ -159,9 +161,9 @@ jobs:
run:
working-directory: src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
cache: npm
@@ -179,7 +181,7 @@ jobs:
# (run 31252869254). Persist the model across runs instead; HF_CACHE_DIR
# is honored by vector-search-provider.ts.
- name: Cache embedding model
uses: actions/cache@v6
uses: actions/cache@55cc8345863c7cc4c66a329aec7e433d2d1c52a9 # v6
with:
path: ${{ github.workspace }}/.hf-cache
key: hf-model-Xenova-all-MiniLM-L6-v2
@@ -193,9 +195,9 @@ jobs:
name: Generated guardrails match rules/guardrails.json
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
@@ -214,9 +216,9 @@ jobs:
name: Generated wire types match shared-manifests.json
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
+4 -4
View File
@@ -102,15 +102,15 @@ jobs:
build-mode: none
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
if: matrix.language == 'csharp'
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
- name: Initialize CodeQL
uses: github/codeql-action/init@v4.37.9
uses: github/codeql-action/init@cdf488f595d80d6e07e03d4674febd5ab45fa938 # v4.37.9
with:
languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
build-mode: ${{ matrix.build-mode }}
@@ -121,6 +121,6 @@ jobs:
run: dotnet build AutopilotMonitor.sln --configuration Release
- name: Analyze
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v4.37.9
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@cdf488f595d80d6e07e03d4674febd5ab45fa938 # v4.37.9
with:
category: /language:${{ matrix.language }}
+6 -3
View File
@@ -24,14 +24,17 @@ jobs:
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
# Exact versions and no lifecycle scripts: this job holds contents:write and pushes to
# main, so an install-time script from a hijacked package would run with a token that
# can rewrite the repository. ajv is pure JS and needs no install hooks.
- name: Install ajv-cli
run: npm install -g ajv-cli ajv-formats
run: npm install -g --ignore-scripts ajv-cli@5.0.0 ajv-formats@3.0.1
- name: Validate Gather Rules
run: |
+6 -6
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ jobs:
name: Build and Deploy Backend
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ jobs:
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
- name: Setup .NET 10
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ jobs:
id: version
shell: pwsh
run: |
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.txt" -SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.txt"
$csproj = Get-Content ${{ env.CSPROJ_PATH }} -Raw
if ($csproj -notmatch '<VersionPrefix>(\d+\.\d+)</VersionPrefix>') {
@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ jobs:
runId = '${{ github.run_id }}'
} | ConvertTo-Json
$sas = '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'.TrimStart('?')
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.json?$sas"
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.json"
# no-cache: rotating pointer, must never be served stale by any fronting cache.
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' } -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }) -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Write-Host "Published versions/backend.json"
Write-Host $manifest
+6 -6
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
name: Build and Deploy MCP Server
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
# The published customer documentation lives in its own PUBLIC repo and is
# baked into the image as the search_docs corpus (see the Dockerfile). No
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ jobs:
# re-run actually rolls a new revision). /health reports the SHA captured
# below so that staleness is checkable.
- name: Check out documentation bundle
uses: actions/checkout@v7
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
repository: autopilotmonitor/autopilotmonitor-docs
path: mcp-docs
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ jobs:
id: version
shell: pwsh
run: |
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.txt" -SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.txt"
$pkgVersion = (Get-Content ${{ env.PACKAGE_JSON }} -Raw | ConvertFrom-Json).version
$prefix = ($pkgVersion -split '\.')[0..1] -join '.'
@@ -144,9 +144,9 @@ jobs:
docsCommit = '${{ steps.docs.outputs.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7)
} | ConvertTo-Json
$sas = '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'.TrimStart('?')
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.json?$sas"
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.json"
# no-cache: rotating pointer, must never be served stale by any fronting cache.
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' } -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }) -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Write-Host "Published versions/mcp.json"
Write-Host $manifest
+17 -8
View File
@@ -35,11 +35,20 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Build and Deploy Job
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
lfs: false
fetch-depth: 0 # Full history needed for git-based sitemap lastmod dates
# Only the version manifest at the very end needs Azure; logging in here rather than
# next to that step keeps a credential problem from surfacing after a live deploy.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# The customer docs repo is the single source of the "What's new" panel: the prebuild
# step (scripts/whats-new/build-whats-new.js) turns changelog/*.md into
# public/whats-new.json and dates every bullet via git blame — hence the full history.
@@ -47,7 +56,7 @@ jobs:
# workflow runs again (push under src/Web/** or a manual dispatch); versions/web.json
# records which docs commit is live.
- name: Check out documentation bundle
uses: actions/checkout@v7
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
repository: autopilotmonitor/autopilotmonitor-docs
path: whats-new-docs
@@ -57,7 +66,7 @@ jobs:
id: docs
run: echo "sha=$(git -C whats-new-docs rev-parse HEAD)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
cache: npm
@@ -105,12 +114,12 @@ jobs:
# commit, workflow file) in a public transparency log.
# Verify: gh attestation verify portal-<sha>.tar.gz --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
- name: Attest build provenance (portal export)
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v4
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@4d101475d8b20a2381f78447822ac1eab6504dd8 # v4
with:
subject-path: ${{ steps.package.outputs.archive }}
- name: Upload build artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: portal-${{ github.sha }}
path: ${{ steps.package.outputs.archive }}
@@ -169,9 +178,9 @@ jobs:
docsCommit = '${{ steps.docs.outputs.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7)
} | ConvertTo-Json
$sas = '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'.TrimStart('?')
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/web.json?$sas"
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/web.json"
# no-cache: rotating pointer, must never be served stale by any fronting cache.
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' } -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }) -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Write-Host "Published versions/web.json"
Write-Host $manifest
+81 -3
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ on:
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # OIDC federated login for the storage writes (secret-less)
# Shared with build-agent.yml: a script publish and an agent release both touch
# version.json, and the bootstrapVersion read-modify-write must not interleave with the
@@ -34,6 +35,16 @@ concurrency:
group: agent-blob-publish
cancel-in-progress: false
# Authenticode for the customer scripts. Same identity and same repository variables as
# build-agent.yml -- the loader on every device pins this publisher, so the two must not
# drift apart.
env:
CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME }}
CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL }}
CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT }}
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL: http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com
jobs:
gates:
uses: ./.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml
@@ -43,14 +54,81 @@ jobs:
needs: gates
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- name: Check code-signing configuration
shell: pwsh
run: |
foreach ($name in 'CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID', 'CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME', 'CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL') {
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace([Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable($name))) {
throw "Repository variable $name is not set. Published customer scripts must be signed."
}
}
# First, and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account and the storage login below has to be the one that stays. See D-223 --
# both federated credentials are bound to the ref, so this job must never carry a
# GitHub `environment:`.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ env.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
allow-no-subscriptions: true
- name: Acquire Key Vault token for signing
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$token = az account get-access-token --scope https://vault.azure.net/.default --query accessToken --output tsv
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw "Could not acquire a Key Vault token for the code-signing identity."
}
Write-Host "::add-mask::$token"
"CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN=$token" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
# Authorizes the eu blob writes and the AdminConfiguration merge. The gates job above
# runs the same publisher with -DryRun and deliberately without a login -- a dry run
# must never need Azure credentials.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# Version pinned so a new or compromised NuGet release cannot flow into signing
# unreviewed; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK
# preinstalled on the runner.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
- name: Publish bootstrap + customer scripts
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$dryRun = '${{ inputs.dry_run }}' -eq 'true'
./.github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 `
-SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-LegacySasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-TableSasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-SigningToken $env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN `
-KeyVaultUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL `
-CertificateName $env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME `
-TimestampUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL `
-ExpectedPublisher $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT `
-SignedOutputDir "$env:RUNNER_TEMP/signed-scripts" `
-DryRun:$dryRun
# The exact bytes that were (or, on a dry run, would have been) uploaded. A dry-run
# dispatch is therefore the way to inspect a signed script locally before it reaches
# a single customer. Kept on failure too: a failed alias verification is precisely
# when someone wants to look at the file.
- name: Upload signed scripts
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: signed-scripts
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/signed-scripts
if-no-files-found: ignore
+1 -1
Submodule infra updated: 2c2687b6ab...742249e7e3
+31 -19
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-ESP-004",
"title": "ESP Timeout with 'Continue Anyway' (Soft Failure)",
"description": "Detects an ESP terminal failure on a profile that allows 'Continue anyway'. The enrollment is reported as failed, but the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop — a soft failure rather than an unusable device.",
"title": "ESP Gave Up on a Blocking App with 'Continue Anyway' (Soft Failure)",
"description": "Detects an ESP terminal failure where the ESP gave up while a blocking app was still installing (the agent's own esp_apps_timeout verdict — no per-app HRESULT was reported) on a profile that allows 'Continue anyway'. The enrollment is reported as failed, but the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop — a soft failure rather than an unusable device. An ESP failure that carries a specific error code (a failed installer, a detection mismatch) is a different case and stays with the rule that explains that code.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "esp",
"version": "1.0.1",
"version": "1.1.0",
"enabled": true,
"baseConfidence": 80,
"conditions": [
@@ -26,6 +26,27 @@
"value": "true",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "esp_gave_up_on_app",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "failureType",
"operator": "equals",
"value": "esp_apps_timeout",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "appName",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "appName",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"filterField": "failureType",
"filterOperator": "equals",
"filterValue": "esp_apps_timeout",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes",
"source": "event_type",
@@ -38,34 +59,25 @@
{
"signal": "failedSubcategory",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "enrollment_failed",
"eventType": "esp_failure_settle_started",
"dataField": "failedSubcategory",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "appName",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "appName",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{ "signal": "appName", "condition": "exists", "weight": 10 }
{ "signal": "failedSubcategory", "condition": "exists", "weight": 10 }
],
"explanation": "This enrollment was reported as **failed** because the Enrollment Status Page reached its configured terminal timeout (`{{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min`) before all blocking items finished. The ESP profile, however, allows **'Continue anyway'** — so the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop with a working, though not fully provisioned, device.\n\nThe agent only observes the ESP terminal failure on the device side; it cannot see what the user did after the failure screen. Treat this as a **soft failure**: the device may well be in productive use, while at least one blocking item (`{{failedSubcategory}}` subcategory / app `{{appName}}`) did not complete inside the ESP window.\n\nA cluster of these across a tenant almost always points at one slow blocking app holding the whole fleet at the ESP timeout wall, not at broken devices. Any field still shown as a literal `{{…}}` placeholder was simply not recorded for this session (e.g. a certificate-only failure has no failed app).",
"explanation": "This enrollment was reported as **failed** because the Enrollment Status Page gave up while the blocking app **{{appName}}** was still installing — the agent recorded no per-app error code, only that the app never finished inside the ESP window (the profile's configured limit is `{{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min`; the ESP may have stopped earlier than that). The ESP profile, however, allows **'Continue anyway'** — so the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop with a working, though not fully provisioned, device.\n\nThe agent only observes the ESP terminal failure on the device side; it cannot see what the user did after the failure screen. Treat this as a **soft failure**: the device may well be in productive use, while the `{{failedSubcategory}}` subcategory did not complete inside the ESP window.\n\nA cluster of these across a tenant almost always points at one slow blocking app holding the whole fleet at the ESP limit, not at broken devices. This rule deliberately stays silent when the failed app reported a specific error code — a failed installer or a detection mismatch is explained by the rule for that code, and 'Continue anyway' does not make it a timing problem. Any field still shown as a literal `{{…}}` placeholder was simply not recorded for this session.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Relieve ESP pressure so enrollments finish inside the window",
"steps": [
"Identify the slow blocking app (`{{appName}}`) and either remove it from the ESP 'block device use until these required apps are installed' list, or raise the ESP installation timeout (currently {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min).",
"If the app legitimately needs longer than the ESP allows, make it non-blocking and let it install after the desktop arrives.",
"Verify the app's detection rule matches after install — an app that installs but fails detection times out the ESP on every device (see ANALYZE-APP-013).",
"If a subcategory such as Certificates is reported under '{{failedSubcategory}}', confirm the certificate/connector actually delivers — 'Continue anyway' hides a missing certificate, it does not fix it."
"Look at how long `{{appName}}` takes on a device that completes: if it legitimately needs longer than the ESP allows, make it non-blocking (remove it from 'block device use until these required apps are installed') and let it install after the desktop arrives.",
"If the app must stay blocking, raise the ESP setting 'Show error when installation takes longer than' (configured at {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min) — a limit, not a target; it only helps when the app reliably finishes within the new value.",
"Check the app's dependencies and install order: a blocking app waiting on a large dependency download (Delivery Optimization, proxy throughput) is the usual reason it never finishes in time.",
"If the ESP reported a non-Apps subcategory under '{{failedSubcategory}}', confirm the certificate/connector actually delivers — 'Continue anyway' hides a missing certificate, it does not fix it."
]
}
],
+1
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects when a certificate with the configured subject is missing from the local machine personal store (LocalMachine\\My). Requires the gather rule GATHER-ID-002 (machine cert store inventory) to be enabled — the check runs against its gather_machine_cert_store output. A missing certificate may indicate that MDM enrollment certificate provisioning or SCEP certificate deployment failed.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "identity",
"author": "Community",
"isCommunity": true,
"enabled": false,
"evaluateOn": [
+4 -4
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
"$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-OFFICE-001",
"title": "Microsoft 365 Apps Install Failed",
"description": "Detects when the Microsoft 365 Apps (Office Click-to-Run) background install did not reach completion. The V2 OfficeInstallDetector watches the C2R client directly (registry + process) and emits office_install_failed when the install scenario was abandoned (worker gone and streaming never finished) or a C2R failure code was observed. This catches Office failures that the Intune integrated app type hides, because IME reports the app done within 1-2 minutes while C2R keeps installing in the background.",
"description": "Detects when the Microsoft 365 Apps (Office Click-to-Run) install failed. The V2 OfficeInstallDetector watches the C2R client directly (registry, Delivery Optimization, process) and emits office_install_failed when the C2R INSTALL scenario records an error code. Completion is proven by the core Office binaries on disk; an install window that closes without that proof ends silently, never as a failure. This catches Office failures the deployment status hides: the Intune built-in app type is marked done once the configuration is delivered, and a Win32 or RealmJoin package once its installer exits, while C2R keeps installing in the background.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.1.1",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -39,12 +39,12 @@
}
],
"confidenceThreshold": 40,
"explanation": "The Microsoft 365 Apps (Office Click-to-Run) install did not finish.\n\nThe OfficeInstallDetector watches the C2R client directly and reports the real background install lifecycle. The Intune \"integrated\" Microsoft 365 Apps app type only pushes the configuration XML and starts the C2R bootstrapper, so IME marks the app done within 1-2 minutes while C2R keeps streaming and laying down the product for several more minutes. This event means C2R activity ended (the OfficeC2RClient worker exited and the install scenario cleared) without the StreamingFinished flag being set, or a C2R failure code was observed.\n\nReview the office_install_failed event payload: `products`, `channel`, `phase`, `streamingFinished`, `errorCode` (best-effort — may be empty) and `durationSeconds`.",
"explanation": "The Microsoft 365 Apps (Office Click-to-Run) install failed.\n\nThe OfficeInstallDetector watches the C2R client directly and reports the real install lifecycle, however it was started. The Intune built-in Microsoft 365 Apps app type delivers the configuration through the Office CSP and lets the device start C2R; a Win32 or RealmJoin package runs the Office Deployment Tool. Either way the deployment is marked done before C2R has finished laying down the product. This event means C2R recorded an error code in its INSTALL scenario before the core Office apps were on disk.\n\nReview the office_install_failed event payload: `products`, `channel`, `errorCode`, `errorSource` (the C2R registry value that carried the code) and `durationSeconds`.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Investigate the Office C2R install failure",
"steps": [
"Open the office_install_failed event and review products, channel, phase, streamingFinished and errorCode",
"Open the office_install_failed event and review products, channel, errorCode and errorSource",
"Check the Click-to-Run logs on the device (%windir%\\Temp and %temp%, files named <MachineName>-yyyymmdd-nnnn.log) for the failing operation",
"Verify the device had network reachability to the Office CDN / Microsoft Connected Cache during the enrollment window",
"Confirm the Intune Microsoft 365 Apps app configuration (products, channel, architecture) matches what the device can install",
+36 -23
View File
@@ -2496,11 +2496,11 @@
},
{
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-ESP-004",
"title": "ESP Timeout with 'Continue Anyway' (Soft Failure)",
"description": "Detects an ESP terminal failure on a profile that allows 'Continue anyway'. The enrollment is reported as failed, but the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop — a soft failure rather than an unusable device.",
"title": "ESP Gave Up on a Blocking App with 'Continue Anyway' (Soft Failure)",
"description": "Detects an ESP terminal failure where the ESP gave up while a blocking app was still installing (the agent's own esp_apps_timeout verdict — no per-app HRESULT was reported) on a profile that allows 'Continue anyway'. The enrollment is reported as failed, but the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop — a soft failure rather than an unusable device. An ESP failure that carries a specific error code (a failed installer, a detection mismatch) is a different case and stays with the rule that explains that code.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "esp",
"version": "1.0.1",
"version": "1.1.0",
"enabled": true,
"baseConfidence": 80,
"conditions": [
@@ -2521,6 +2521,27 @@
"value": "true",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "esp_gave_up_on_app",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "failureType",
"operator": "equals",
"value": "esp_apps_timeout",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "appName",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "appName",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"filterField": "failureType",
"filterOperator": "equals",
"filterValue": "esp_apps_timeout",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes",
"source": "event_type",
@@ -2533,38 +2554,29 @@
{
"signal": "failedSubcategory",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "enrollment_failed",
"eventType": "esp_failure_settle_started",
"dataField": "failedSubcategory",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "appName",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "appName",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{
"signal": "appName",
"signal": "failedSubcategory",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 10
}
],
"explanation": "This enrollment was reported as **failed** because the Enrollment Status Page reached its configured terminal timeout (`{{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min`) before all blocking items finished. The ESP profile, however, allows **'Continue anyway'** — so the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop with a working, though not fully provisioned, device.\n\nThe agent only observes the ESP terminal failure on the device side; it cannot see what the user did after the failure screen. Treat this as a **soft failure**: the device may well be in productive use, while at least one blocking item (`{{failedSubcategory}}` subcategory / app `{{appName}}`) did not complete inside the ESP window.\n\nA cluster of these across a tenant almost always points at one slow blocking app holding the whole fleet at the ESP timeout wall, not at broken devices. Any field still shown as a literal `{{…}}` placeholder was simply not recorded for this session (e.g. a certificate-only failure has no failed app).",
"explanation": "This enrollment was reported as **failed** because the Enrollment Status Page gave up while the blocking app **{{appName}}** was still installing — the agent recorded no per-app error code, only that the app never finished inside the ESP window (the profile's configured limit is `{{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min`; the ESP may have stopped earlier than that). The ESP profile, however, allows **'Continue anyway'** — so the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop with a working, though not fully provisioned, device.\n\nThe agent only observes the ESP terminal failure on the device side; it cannot see what the user did after the failure screen. Treat this as a **soft failure**: the device may well be in productive use, while the `{{failedSubcategory}}` subcategory did not complete inside the ESP window.\n\nA cluster of these across a tenant almost always points at one slow blocking app holding the whole fleet at the ESP limit, not at broken devices. This rule deliberately stays silent when the failed app reported a specific error code — a failed installer or a detection mismatch is explained by the rule for that code, and 'Continue anyway' does not make it a timing problem. Any field still shown as a literal `{{…}}` placeholder was simply not recorded for this session.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Relieve ESP pressure so enrollments finish inside the window",
"steps": [
"Identify the slow blocking app (`{{appName}}`) and either remove it from the ESP 'block device use until these required apps are installed' list, or raise the ESP installation timeout (currently {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min).",
"If the app legitimately needs longer than the ESP allows, make it non-blocking and let it install after the desktop arrives.",
"Verify the app's detection rule matches after install — an app that installs but fails detection times out the ESP on every device (see ANALYZE-APP-013).",
"If a subcategory such as Certificates is reported under '{{failedSubcategory}}', confirm the certificate/connector actually delivers — 'Continue anyway' hides a missing certificate, it does not fix it."
"Look at how long `{{appName}}` takes on a device that completes: if it legitimately needs longer than the ESP allows, make it non-blocking (remove it from 'block device use until these required apps are installed') and let it install after the desktop arrives.",
"If the app must stay blocking, raise the ESP setting 'Show error when installation takes longer than' (configured at {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min) — a limit, not a target; it only helps when the app reliably finishes within the new value.",
"Check the app's dependencies and install order: a blocking app waiting on a large dependency download (Delivery Optimization, proxy throughput) is the usual reason it never finishes in time.",
"If the ESP reported a non-Apps subcategory under '{{failedSubcategory}}', confirm the certificate/connector actually delivers — 'Continue anyway' hides a missing certificate, it does not fix it."
]
}
],
@@ -2794,6 +2806,7 @@
"description": "Detects when a certificate with the configured subject is missing from the local machine personal store (LocalMachine\\My). Requires the gather rule GATHER-ID-002 (machine cert store inventory) to be enabled — the check runs against its gather_machine_cert_store output. A missing certificate may indicate that MDM enrollment certificate provisioning or SCEP certificate deployment failed.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "identity",
"author": "Community",
"isCommunity": true,
"enabled": false,
"evaluateOn": [
@@ -3233,10 +3246,10 @@
{
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-OFFICE-001",
"title": "Microsoft 365 Apps Install Failed",
"description": "Detects when the Microsoft 365 Apps (Office Click-to-Run) background install did not reach completion. The V2 OfficeInstallDetector watches the C2R client directly (registry + process) and emits office_install_failed when the install scenario was abandoned (worker gone and streaming never finished) or a C2R failure code was observed. This catches Office failures that the Intune integrated app type hides, because IME reports the app done within 1-2 minutes while C2R keeps installing in the background.",
"description": "Detects when the Microsoft 365 Apps (Office Click-to-Run) install failed. The V2 OfficeInstallDetector watches the C2R client directly (registry, Delivery Optimization, process) and emits office_install_failed when the C2R INSTALL scenario records an error code. Completion is proven by the core Office binaries on disk; an install window that closes without that proof ends silently, never as a failure. This catches Office failures the deployment status hides: the Intune built-in app type is marked done once the configuration is delivered, and a Win32 or RealmJoin package once its installer exits, while C2R keeps installing in the background.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.1.1",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -3270,12 +3283,12 @@
}
],
"confidenceThreshold": 40,
"explanation": "The Microsoft 365 Apps (Office Click-to-Run) install did not finish.\n\nThe OfficeInstallDetector watches the C2R client directly and reports the real background install lifecycle. The Intune \"integrated\" Microsoft 365 Apps app type only pushes the configuration XML and starts the C2R bootstrapper, so IME marks the app done within 1-2 minutes while C2R keeps streaming and laying down the product for several more minutes. This event means C2R activity ended (the OfficeC2RClient worker exited and the install scenario cleared) without the StreamingFinished flag being set, or a C2R failure code was observed.\n\nReview the office_install_failed event payload: `products`, `channel`, `phase`, `streamingFinished`, `errorCode` (best-effort — may be empty) and `durationSeconds`.",
"explanation": "The Microsoft 365 Apps (Office Click-to-Run) install failed.\n\nThe OfficeInstallDetector watches the C2R client directly and reports the real install lifecycle, however it was started. The Intune built-in Microsoft 365 Apps app type delivers the configuration through the Office CSP and lets the device start C2R; a Win32 or RealmJoin package runs the Office Deployment Tool. Either way the deployment is marked done before C2R has finished laying down the product. This event means C2R recorded an error code in its INSTALL scenario before the core Office apps were on disk.\n\nReview the office_install_failed event payload: `products`, `channel`, `errorCode`, `errorSource` (the C2R registry value that carried the code) and `durationSeconds`.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Investigate the Office C2R install failure",
"steps": [
"Open the office_install_failed event and review products, channel, phase, streamingFinished and errorCode",
"Open the office_install_failed event and review products, channel, errorCode and errorSource",
"Check the Click-to-Run logs on the device (%windir%\\Temp and %temp%, files named <MachineName>-yyyymmdd-nnnn.log) for the failing operation",
"Verify the device had network reachability to the Office CDN / Microsoft Connected Cache during the enrollment window",
"Confirm the Intune Microsoft 365 Apps app configuration (products, channel, architecture) matches what the device can install",
+24 -8
View File
@@ -34,6 +34,14 @@
"description": "Captures the exit code of a health-script execution. Feeds the early-signal slot consumed by HS-COMPLIANCE so the user sees the real exit code (not just the inferred 0/1) before HS-NEW-RESULT arrives.",
"enabled": true
},
{
"patternId": "HS-INVOCATION",
"category": "always",
"pattern": "^\"[^\"]{0,260}\\\\agentexecutor\\.exe\"\\s+-(?<kind>remediationScript)\\s",
"action": "agentInvocationArgument",
"description": "The IME service's command line for a health-script executor, written by the health-script worker to IntuneManagementExtension.log and HealthScripts.log right before 'Launch powershell executor in ... session'. Opens an invocation that owns nothing, so the launch line the same worker writes next never sets the context of the platform script whose run is in flight in the IME log. The platform-script command line ('-powershell') does not match.",
"enabled": true
},
{
"patternId": "HS-NEW-RESULT",
"category": "always",
@@ -646,6 +654,22 @@
"description": "Detects WinGet app installation progress with Operation Phase = Installing (format variant 2).",
"enabled": true
},
{
"patternId": "PS-AGENT-ARG",
"category": "always",
"pattern": "^Adding argument (?<kind>[A-Za-z0-9]+) with value ",
"action": "agentInvocationArgument",
"description": "The first argument line of every AgentExecutor.exe invocation (powershell, remediationScript, detectionScript, requirementScript, ...). Opens the invocation that owns the policyId-less exit/output lines following it in AgentExecutor.log; PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START upgrades a powershell invocation to its platform script. Also keeps the tracker's overwrite check active while the invocation runs.",
"enabled": true
},
{
"patternId": "PS-AGENT-COMPLETED",
"category": "always",
"pattern": "^Agent executor completed\\.",
"action": "agentExecutorCompleted",
"description": "Last line of an AgentExecutor.exe invocation. Closes the invocation's ownership of the exit/output lines in AgentExecutor.log and triggers the tracker's overwrite check: the executor wrote its end block at its own stream position, which may lie behind the tracker's bookmark when another process appended meanwhile.",
"enabled": true
},
{
"patternId": "PS-AGENT-ERROR",
"category": "always",
@@ -708,14 +732,6 @@
"description": "Captures whether a PowerShell script runs in machine (System) or user session context.",
"enabled": true
},
{
"patternId": "PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE",
"category": "always",
"pattern": "^Powershell execution is done, exitCode = (?<exitCode>-?\\d+)",
"action": "scriptExitCode",
"description": "Captures the PowerShell exit code when script execution completes in the IME log.",
"enabled": true
},
{
"patternId": "PS-SCRIPT-GENERATED",
"category": "always",
+5 -1
View File
@@ -94,7 +94,11 @@
"C:\\Windows\\Panther",
"C:\\Windows\\SetupDiag",
"C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\DiagnosticLogCSP",
"C:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\ReportingEvents.log"
"C:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\ReportingEvents.log",
"C:\\ProgramData\\RealmJoin\\choco\\logs"
],
"userProfileFilePrefixes": [
"AppData\\Local\\RealmJoin"
],
"wmiQueryPrefixes": [
"SELECT * FROM Win32_OperatingSystem",
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/ime-log-pattern.schema.json",
"patternId": "HS-INVOCATION",
"category": "always",
"pattern": "^\"[^\"]{0,260}\\\\agentexecutor\\.exe\"\\s+-(?<kind>remediationScript)\\s",
"action": "agentInvocationArgument",
"description": "The IME service's command line for a health-script executor, written by the health-script worker to IntuneManagementExtension.log and HealthScripts.log right before 'Launch powershell executor in ... session'. Opens an invocation that owns nothing, so the launch line the same worker writes next never sets the context of the platform script whose run is in flight in the IME log. The platform-script command line ('-powershell') does not match.",
"enabled": true
}
+9
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/ime-log-pattern.schema.json",
"patternId": "PS-AGENT-ARG",
"category": "always",
"pattern": "^Adding argument (?<kind>[A-Za-z0-9]+) with value ",
"action": "agentInvocationArgument",
"description": "The first argument line of every AgentExecutor.exe invocation (powershell, remediationScript, detectionScript, requirementScript, ...). Opens the invocation that owns the policyId-less exit/output lines following it in AgentExecutor.log; PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START upgrades a powershell invocation to its platform script. Also keeps the tracker's overwrite check active while the invocation runs.",
"enabled": true
}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/ime-log-pattern.schema.json",
"patternId": "PS-AGENT-COMPLETED",
"category": "always",
"pattern": "^Agent executor completed\\.",
"action": "agentExecutorCompleted",
"description": "Last line of an AgentExecutor.exe invocation. Closes the invocation's ownership of the exit/output lines in AgentExecutor.log and triggers the tracker's overwrite check: the executor wrote its end block at its own stream position, which may lie behind the tracker's bookmark when another process appended meanwhile.",
"enabled": true
}
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/ime-log-pattern.schema.json",
"patternId": "PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE",
"category": "always",
"pattern": "^Powershell execution is done, exitCode = (?<exitCode>-?\\d+)",
"action": "scriptExitCode",
"description": "Captures the PowerShell exit code when script execution completes in the IME log.",
"enabled": true
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@
},
"operator": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Comparison operator.",
"description": "Comparison operator. exists/not_exists with a dataField test whether ANY event of the type carries a non-empty value at that field: not_exists matches when no event does — including when the event type is absent altogether — so a rule can gate on a missing field (e.g. an ESP failure without an HRESULT). Without a dataField they test only the presence of the event type.",
"enum": ["equals", "not_equals", "contains", "not_contains", "regex", "not_regex", "gt", "lt", "gte", "lte", "exists", "not_exists", "count_gte", "count_per_group_gte", "in", "not_in"]
},
"value": {
+10
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,16 @@
"$schema": { "type": "string" },
"registryPrefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/categorizedList" },
"filePrefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
"userProfileFilePrefixes": {
"description": "Folders under the signed-in user's profile that file collectors and diagnostics paths may read, RELATIVE to the profile root (e.g. \"AppData\\\\Local\\\\Vendor\"). Resolved against %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% at match time. Entries outside AppData\\Local / AppData\\Roaming are dropped at load: the C:\\Users hard block never admits them, so this list can only ever narrow what the block's exception already permits.",
"type": "array",
"items": {
"allOf": [
{ "$ref": "#/$defs/safeString" },
{ "pattern": "^AppData\\\\(Local|Roaming)(\\\\|$)" }
]
}
},
"wmiQueryPrefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
"eventLogChannels": { "$ref": "#/$defs/categorizedList" },
"blockedEventLogChannels": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
+2
View File
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@
"scriptOutput",
"scriptCompleted",
"resetPlatformScriptContext",
"agentInvocationArgument",
"agentExecutorCompleted",
"healthScriptResult",
"healthScriptDetectionResult",
"captureExitCode",
+8
View File
@@ -208,6 +208,14 @@ export const ALLOWED_FILE_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = [
${flatArray(guardrails.filePrefixes)}
];
// Folders under the signed-in user's profile, RELATIVE to the profile root. The agent
// resolves %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% at runtime; the portal validates against a placeholder
// profile. These cannot live in ALLOWED_FILE_PREFIXES — that list is matched literally
// against the already-expanded path, where the user name is unknown at authoring time.
export const USER_PROFILE_FILE_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = [
${flatArray(guardrails.userProfileFilePrefixes ?? [])}
];
export const ALLOWED_WMI_QUERY_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = [
${flatArray(guardrails.wmiQueryPrefixes)}
];
@@ -14,6 +14,22 @@
BeforeAll {
. (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')
function New-FakeSignature {
param([string]$Status, [string]$Subject)
$cert = if ($Subject) {
[pscustomobject]@{ Subject = $Subject; Thumbprint = '0123456789ABCDEF' }
} else { $null }
return [pscustomobject]@{ Status = $Status; SignerCertificate = $cert }
}
function New-FakePayload {
param([string[]]$Files)
$dir = Join-Path $TestDrive ([guid]::NewGuid().ToString())
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $dir -Force | Out-Null
foreach ($f in $Files) { Set-Content -Path (Join-Path $dir $f) -Value 'x' }
return $dir
}
function New-FakeProfile {
param([string]$Name, [double]$AgeMinutes)
$p = Join-Path $TestDrive $Name
@@ -305,3 +321,93 @@ Describe 'logging purity' {
Get-Content $LogFile -Raw | Should -Match 'SKIP: Agent was previously deployed'
}
}
Describe 'Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries' {
# The publisher gate on the extracted payload. What matters is the DECISION: which
# payload is accepted, which is refused, and which files are looked at at all.
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Log { }
$script:ours = 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE'
}
It 'accepts a payload where every binary of ours is validly signed by us' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject $script:ours }
Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
}
It 'checks the binaries we author and leaves third-party assemblies alone' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @(
'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe',
'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe.config',
'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll',
'Newtonsoft.Json.dll',
'System.Management.Automation.dll'
)
$script:checked = @()
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature {
$script:checked += (Split-Path $FilePath -Leaf)
New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject $script:ours
}
Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
$script:checked | Should -Be @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll')
}
It 'refuses an unsigned agent executable' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'NotSigned' -Subject $null }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses a tampered binary (hash mismatch)' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'HashMismatch' -Subject $script:ours }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses a signature whose chain does not validate' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'UnknownError' -Subject $script:ours }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses a validly signed binary from a different publisher' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=Somebody Else, O=Somebody Else Ltd, C=US' }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses the whole payload when a single DLL of ours is swapped' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature {
if ((Split-Path $FilePath -Leaf) -eq 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll') {
New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=Somebody Else, O=Somebody Else Ltd, C=US'
} else {
New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject $script:ours
}
}
$rejected = Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir
$rejected.Count | Should -Be 1
$rejected[0] | Should -BeLike 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll*'
}
It 'refuses when the signature check itself throws' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { throw 'access denied' }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses an empty payload instead of passing it' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('Newtonsoft.Json.dll')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject $script:ours }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
}
Describe 'publisher pin' {
It 'pins the expected publisher by subject, not by thumbprint' {
$ExpectedPublisher | Should -Be '*O=glueckkanja AG*'
$ExpectedPublisher | Should -Not -Match '^[0-9A-Fa-f]{40}$'
}
}
+78 -3
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,9 @@
2. Downloads the monitoring agent ZIP from Azure Blob Storage
3. Verifies integrity via SHA-256 hash from the version manifest (mandatory)
4. Extracts the agent into %ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor\Agent
5. Runs the agent in --install mode (registers Scheduled Task, spawns the runtime)
6. Verifies the runtime process actually launched
5. Verifies the Authenticode signature and publisher of every binary we author
6. Runs the agent in --install mode (registers Scheduled Task, spawns the runtime)
7. Verifies the runtime process actually launched
Agent self-destructs when enrollment completes.
Relax flow (guards 2+3): a real user profile (or a real LastLoggedOnUser)
@@ -76,6 +77,11 @@
PowerShell 5.1 (IME) reads scripts without BOM as ANSI, corrupting multi-byte chars.
.CHANGELOG
2026-09-08 v2.5 Publisher gate: every AutopilotMonitor binary in the extracted
payload must carry a valid Authenticode signature from the
expected publisher before --install runs. The SHA-256 manifest
check stays and is unchanged; it proves the bytes, the signature
proves the author.
2026-08-08 v2.3 Windows 365 Cloud PC support: a positively identified Cloud PC
(Windows365 registry key AND CloudManagedDesktopExtension
service) now triggers the guard 2+3 relax alongside OOBE
@@ -128,7 +134,12 @@ param(
)
# Script version (bump on meaningful changes; see .CHANGELOG above)
$ScriptVersion = "2.4"
$ScriptVersion = "2.5"
# The publisher every binary we author must carry. A -like pattern on the subject, NOT a
# thumbprint: certificates are renewed, deployed copies of this script are not. Same value
# the loader pins for this script.
$ExpectedPublisher = "*O=glueckkanja AG*"
# Configuration - Everything in ProgramData for easy cleanup
$AgentBasePath = "$env:ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor"
@@ -329,6 +340,56 @@ function Get-BootstrapDecision {
return [pscustomobject]@{ Install = $true; ReasonCode = $null; RelaxActive = $relax.Active }
}
# Returns the list of reasons why the extracted payload is not ours; an empty result means
# every binary we author carries a valid Authenticode signature from the expected publisher.
# Third-party assemblies keep their own publisher's signature and are not checked here.
# Any error is a rejection: an unreadable signature is an unverified binary.
function Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries {
param([string]$Path)
$rejected = @()
$ourBinaries = @(
Get-ChildItem -Path $Path -Filter 'AutopilotMonitor.*' -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.Extension -in @('.exe', '.dll') }
)
# An empty set is a rejection, not a pass: it means the extraction produced nothing we
# recognise, and the alternative would be a gate that silently approves an empty folder.
# The comma keeps a single rejection an ARRAY: PowerShell unrolls a one-element result to
# a bare string, and the caller reads .Count and indexes into it.
if ($ourBinaries.Count -eq 0) {
return , @("no AutopilotMonitor binaries found in $Path")
}
foreach ($binary in $ourBinaries) {
try {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $binary.FullName -ErrorAction Stop
}
catch {
$rejected += "$($binary.Name): signature check failed to run ($($_.Exception.Message))"
continue
}
if ($null -eq $sig) {
$rejected += "$($binary.Name): signature check returned nothing"
continue
}
$subject = if ($sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject } else { '<unsigned>' }
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
$rejected += "$($binary.Name): signature status $($sig.Status)"
continue
}
if ($subject -notlike $ExpectedPublisher) {
$rejected += "$($binary.Name): unexpected publisher $subject"
continue
}
}
return , $rejected
}
# Main bootstrap flow. Only invoked when the script is run directly (see entry guard
# at the bottom); never on dot-source.
function Invoke-Bootstrap {
@@ -445,6 +506,20 @@ function Invoke-Bootstrap {
}
}
# Publisher gate. The SHA-256 above proves the ZIP is the one the manifest names, but
# that manifest lives in the same container as the ZIP and cannot outlive a compromise
# of the download host. The expected publisher travels inside THIS script, which the
# loader verified before running it, so the chain from the file an administrator
# assigns to the process that starts here stays publisher-anchored end to end.
# Fail-closed, exactly like the hash check: running unverified code as SYSTEM is the
# risk being removed.
Write-Log "Verifying Authenticode signatures of the agent binaries..."
$unverified = Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $AgentBinPath
if ($unverified.Count -gt 0) {
throw "Authenticode verification FAILED ($($unverified -join '; ')). Refusing to run an agent that is not signed by the expected publisher."
}
Write-Log "Authenticode verification passed (publisher pin: $ExpectedPublisher)"
Write-Log "Calling agent install mode (--install)..."
& $agentExePath --install
$installExitCode = $LASTEXITCODE
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
# Pester tests (Pester 5+) for the stage-1 loader Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1.
#
# The script under test is dot-sourced; its entry guard prevents the loader from
# executing, so loading it here is side-effect free. Network and signature checks
# are mocked -- what is verified is the DECISION: what does the loader accept, what
# does it refuse, and how often does it retry.
#
# Run under Windows PowerShell 5.1 to match the IME runtime:
# powershell.exe -NoProfile -Command "& { $c = New-PesterConfiguration; $c.Run.Path = 'scripts\Bootstrap'; $c.Output.Verbosity = 'Detailed'; Invoke-Pester -Configuration $c }"
#
# This file MUST remain pure ASCII (PS 5.1 reads BOM-less files as ANSI).
BeforeAll {
. (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')
function New-FakeSignature {
param([string]$Status, [string]$Subject)
$cert = if ($Subject) {
[pscustomobject]@{ Subject = $Subject; Thumbprint = '0123456789ABCDEF' }
} else { $null }
return [pscustomobject]@{ Status = $Status; SignerCertificate = $cert }
}
}
Describe 'Test-BootstrapSignature' {
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Log { }
}
It 'accepts a valid signature from the expected publisher' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
}
# An EV subject is a line of street address and registration numbers; the log gets the CN.
It 'logs the signer CN, not the whole subject' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature {
New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, L=Offenbach am Main, C=DE, SERIALNUMBER=HRB 12381'
}
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Write-Log -ParameterFilter { $Message -eq 'Signature status: Valid. Signer: glueckkanja AG' }
}
It 'refuses an unsigned script' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'NotSigned' -Subject $null }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'refuses a tampered script (hash mismatch)' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'HashMismatch' -Subject 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'refuses a signature whose chain does not validate' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'UnknownError' -Subject 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
# The whole point of the pinned publisher: a validly signed script from someone else
# is exactly what an attacker with any code-signing certificate can produce.
It 'refuses a valid signature from a different publisher' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=Somebody Else, O=Somebody Else Ltd, C=US' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'refuses when the signature check itself fails' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { throw 'file not found' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
}
Describe 'Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript' {
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Log { }
Mock Start-Sleep { }
Mock Invoke-WebRequest { }
}
It 'returns after the first attempt when the download verifies' {
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $true }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 1 -Exactly
}
It 'gives up after three attempts when verification keeps failing' {
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $false }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 3 -Exactly
}
# A truncated or proxy-mangled body fails verification, so the retry has to cover the
# download AND the check, not just the transport.
It 'retries a failed verification and accepts a later attempt' {
$script:calls = 0
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $script:calls++; return ($script:calls -ge 2) }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 2 -Exactly
}
It 'retries a transport failure' {
$script:downloads = 0
Mock Invoke-WebRequest { $script:downloads++; if ($script:downloads -eq 1) { throw 'connection reset' } }
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $true }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 2 -Exactly
}
It 'never executes anything when no attempt verifies' {
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $false }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
}
Describe 'publish contract' {
BeforeAll {
$script:loaderText = Get-Content (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1') -Raw
}
# Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 renders the -Dev loader by substituting this exact
# literal and fails the publish when it is gone. Catching that here means the PR fails
# instead of the publish.
It 'carries the dev-render anchor the publisher substitutes' {
$anchor = '$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"'
$script:loaderText.Contains($anchor) | Should -BeTrue
}
# The publisher parses this to write version.json.loaderVersion and to run the
# version-bump guard.
It 'declares a parsable ScriptVersion' {
$script:loaderText -match '\$ScriptVersion\s*=\s*"([\d\.\-a-zA-Z]+)"' | Should -BeTrue
}
It 'pins the expected publisher by subject, not by thumbprint' {
$script:loaderText -match '\$ExpectedPublisher\s*=\s*"\*O=' | Should -BeTrue
}
# The bootstrap MSI installs this same file and runs it with -LogFileName so the delivery
# channel stays visible in a diagnostics package. Renaming the parameter on either side
# would leave the MSI channel silently logging under the wrong name.
It 'keeps the -LogFileName contract the bootstrap MSI relies on' {
$script:loaderText -match '\[string\]\$LogFileName' | Should -BeTrue
$wxs = Get-Content (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '..\..\src\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi\Package.wxs') -Raw
$wxs.Contains('[INSTALLFOLDER]Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1') | Should -BeTrue
$wxs.Contains('-LogFileName bootstrap-msi.log') | Should -BeTrue
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Stage 1 of the Autopilot Monitor bootstrap: fetches the current installer and runs it.
.DESCRIPTION
This is the file an administrator assigns in Intune, and the same file the bootstrap MSI
installs and runs -- one implementation for both delivery channels; the MSI is only the
packaging. It carries no enrollment logic at all: it downloads the published
Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1, proves that it was signed by Autopilot Monitor, and runs it
in this process.
Why two stages: the installer holds every guard, relax rule and download path, and those
change. Whoever assigns the installer directly has to replace their Intune copy each
time; whoever assigns this loader never does, because the part that changes lives on the
server. Assigning the installer directly stays supported and unchanged.
This file is deliberately boring. It is the one piece that cannot be fixed remotely, so
it does the least it can: download, verify, invoke, log.
Verification is by Authenticode publisher, not by hash. A hash oracle would have to be
fetched from the same host as the script itself, so it could not survive a compromise of
that host, while the expected publisher below travels with this file. It pins the
certificate SUBJECT and not a thumbprint, so a certificate renewal does not brick a
loader that is already deployed on devices.
Fail-soft: the loader always exits 0 and never throws into the caller. A device that
cannot reach the download endpoint is a device without monitoring, never a failed
enrollment step. Verification failures are the same: nothing runs, and the reason is in
the log. Refusing to execute unverified code as SYSTEM is the point of this file.
This file MUST remain pure ASCII (PS 5.1 reads BOM-less files as ANSI).
.PARAMETER BootstrapUrl
Installer URL. Defaults to the published stable installer; the -Dev variant of this
loader is rendered from that default at publish time.
.PARAMETER LogFileName
Log file inside the agent log directory. The MSI channel passes bootstrap-msi.log so the
delivery channel stays visible in a diagnostics package; the diag tooling keys on these
names, so do not rename them.
.PARAMETER BootstrapArguments
Everything else is passed through to the installer unchanged, so any parameter the
installer accepts can be set here without this file knowing about it.
.EXAMPLE
.\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1
.EXAMPLE
.\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 24
.NOTES
Author : Oliver Kieselbach (autopilotmonitor.com)
Runtime : Windows PowerShell 5.1, SYSTEM context, during Autopilot enrollment
.CHANGELOG
2026-09-08 v1.2 Log the signer CN instead of the full EV subject; the full subject is
logged only when the publisher is why a script was rejected.
2026-09-08 v1.1 Also used by the bootstrap MSI, which replaced its own copy of this
logic; -LogFileName keeps the channel visible in diagnostics.
2026-09-08 v1.0 Initial version: two-stage bootstrap, publisher-pinned verification.
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false)]
[string]$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1",
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false)]
[ValidatePattern('^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$')]
[string]$LogFileName = "bootstrap-loader.log",
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false, ValueFromRemainingArguments = $true)]
[string[]]$BootstrapArguments
)
# Script version (bump on meaningful changes; see .CHANGELOG above)
$ScriptVersion = "1.2"
# The publisher every downloaded stage-2 script must carry. A -like pattern on the subject,
# NOT a thumbprint: certificates are renewed, deployed loaders are not.
$ExpectedPublisher = "*O=glueckkanja AG*"
$LoaderBasePath = "$env:ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor"
$LoaderLogPath = "$LoaderBasePath\Logs"
$LogFile = "$LoaderLogPath\$LogFileName"
$BootstrapPath = "$LoaderBasePath\Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"
$DownloadAttempts = 3
$RetryDelaySeconds = 10
# Write-Host as well as the file: the Intune script output is what an administrator sees in
# the portal, the file is what a support case reads.
function Write-Log {
param([string]$Message)
$timestamp = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
$logMessage = "[$timestamp] $Message"
Write-Host $logMessage
Add-Content -Path $LogFile -Value $logMessage -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}
# True only when the file is signed, the signature validates against the machine's trust
# chain, and the signer is us. Any error is a false -- an unreadable signature is an
# unverified script.
function Test-BootstrapSignature {
param([string]$Path)
try {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $Path -ErrorAction Stop
}
catch {
Write-Log "Signature check failed to run: $($_.Exception.Message)"
return $false
}
if ($null -eq $sig) {
Write-Log "Signature check returned nothing."
return $false
}
# The full subject of an EV certificate is a line of street address and registration
# numbers. The CN answers the only question the log has to answer; the full subject is
# logged when it is the reason for a rejection.
$subject = if ($sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject } else { "<unsigned>" }
$signer = if ($subject -match 'CN=([^,]+)') { $Matches[1] } else { $subject }
Write-Log "Signature status: $($sig.Status). Signer: $signer"
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
Write-Log "REJECTED: expected signature status 'Valid'."
return $false
}
if ($subject -notlike $ExpectedPublisher) {
Write-Log "REJECTED: signer does not match the expected publisher. Full subject: $subject"
return $false
}
Write-Log "Signature accepted (thumbprint $($sig.SignerCertificate.Thumbprint))."
return $true
}
# Downloads the installer and returns $true once a downloaded copy passes verification.
# Verification lives inside the retry loop on purpose: a truncated or proxy-mangled body
# fails the signature check, and that is worth another attempt.
function Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript {
param([string]$Url, [string]$Destination)
for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le $DownloadAttempts; $attempt++) {
try {
Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt/$DownloadAttempts from $Url"
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $Url -OutFile $Destination -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 60 -ErrorAction Stop
if (Test-BootstrapSignature -Path $Destination) {
return $true
}
}
catch {
Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
if ($attempt -lt $DownloadAttempts) {
Start-Sleep -Seconds $RetryDelaySeconds
}
}
return $false
}
# Main flow. Only invoked when the script is run directly (see entry guard at the bottom),
# so the Pester suite can dot-source this file without bootstrapping anything.
function Start-BootstrapLoader {
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $LoaderLogPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null
Write-Log "=== Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v$ScriptVersion started (user=$env:USERNAME, pid=$PID) ==="
# PS 5.1 on an OOBE device still defaults to TLS 1.0 for this process.
try {
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol -bor [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
}
catch {
Write-Log "INFO: could not raise the TLS protocol: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
if (-not (Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url $BootstrapUrl -Destination $BootstrapPath)) {
Write-Log "No verified installer available after $DownloadAttempts attempt(s). Nothing was executed."
return
}
Write-Log "Executing $BootstrapPath"
# Same process, so the execution policy this loader runs under applies to stage 2 as
# well and no second policy decision can strand the installer. Splatting an array of
# remaining arguments keeps this file free of any knowledge about the installer's
# parameters.
$arguments = @()
if ($BootstrapArguments) { $arguments = $BootstrapArguments }
try {
& $BootstrapPath @arguments
Write-Log "Installer finished (exit code $LASTEXITCODE)."
}
catch {
Write-Log "Installer threw: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
}
# Entry guard: dot-sourcing (Pester) loads the functions without running the loader.
if ($MyInvocation.InvocationName -ne '.') {
try {
Start-BootstrapLoader
}
catch {
# Nothing above should throw; if it does, it must not become a failed Intune script.
Write-Log "Loader failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
exit 0
}
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring
{
/// <summary>
/// Session 683f1eff — a Shell-Core 62407 failure (<c>WhiteGlove_Failed</c>) arrived four
/// seconds into the provisioning tracker's 30-s settle window and terminalised the session
/// with nothing but its failure type: the HRESULT (0x80070652) and the failed subcategory
/// (Apps) the registry had already named never reached the terminal event, the backend
/// FailureReason or the termination-time app classification. The coordinator now inherits
/// the pending settle detail onto the Shell-Core args and records the terminal-failure
/// snapshot from it.
/// </summary>
public sealed class EspAndHelloTrackerShellCoreFailureInheritanceTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Fixed = new DateTime(2026, 9, 8, 18, 11, 6, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private sealed class Fixture : IDisposable
{
public TempDirectory Tmp { get; } = new TempDirectory();
public AgentLogger Logger { get; }
public FakeSignalIngressSink Ingress { get; } = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
public FakeSignalIngressSink TrackerPostSink { get; } = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
public VirtualClock Clock { get; } = new VirtualClock(Fixed);
public List<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs> Forwarded { get; } = new List<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs>();
public Fixture() { Logger = new AgentLogger(Tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Debug); }
public EspAndHelloTracker BuildCoordinator(Func<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs?> pendingProbe)
{
var coordinator = new EspAndHelloTracker(
sessionId: "S1",
tenantId: "T1",
post: new InformationalEventPost(TrackerPostSink, Clock),
logger: Logger,
skipConfigProbe: () => ((bool?)false, (bool?)false),
accountSetupActivityProbe: () => false,
pendingEspFailureProbe: pendingProbe);
coordinator.EspFailureDetected += (_, args) => Forwarded.Add(args);
return coordinator;
}
public FakeSignalIngressSink.PostedSignal TerminalSignal() =>
Assert.Single(Ingress.Posted, p => p.Kind == DecisionSignalKind.EspTerminalFailure);
public void Dispose() { Tmp.Dispose(); }
}
private static EspFailureDetectedEventArgs PendingAppsFailure() => new EspFailureDetectedEventArgs(
failureType: "Provisioning_DeviceSetup_Apps_Failed",
errorCode: "0x80070652",
failedSubcategory: "Apps",
category: "DeviceSetup",
likelyCulpritApps: new[] { "ESP Finalizer US" });
[Fact]
public void ShellCore_failure_inside_the_settle_window_inherits_the_registry_detail()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var coordinator = f.BuildCoordinator(PendingAppsFailure);
using var adapter = new EspAndHelloTrackerAdapter(coordinator, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
coordinator.TriggerShellCoreEspFailureForTest("WhiteGlove_Failed");
var args = Assert.Single(f.Forwarded);
Assert.Equal("WhiteGlove_Failed", args.FailureType); // the signal that terminalised
Assert.Equal("0x80070652", args.ErrorCode);
Assert.Equal("Apps", args.FailedSubcategory);
Assert.Equal("DeviceSetup", args.Category);
Assert.Equal(new[] { "ESP Finalizer US" }, args.LikelyCulpritApps);
// Wire-through: the EspTerminalFailure signal payload carries the detail the
// DecisionEngine copies onto enrollment_failed.
var signal = f.TerminalSignal();
Assert.Equal("WhiteGlove_Failed", signal.Payload!["failureType"]);
Assert.Equal("0x80070652", signal.Payload["errorCode"]);
Assert.Equal("Apps", signal.Payload["failedSubcategory"]);
Assert.Equal("DeviceSetup", signal.Payload["category"]);
Assert.Equal("ESP Finalizer US", signal.Payload["likelyCulpritApps"]);
// Termination-time classification reads the same context.
Assert.NotNull(coordinator.LastEspTerminalFailure);
Assert.Equal("0x80070652", coordinator.LastEspTerminalFailure.ErrorCode);
Assert.True(coordinator.LastEspTerminalFailure.IsAppsSubcategory);
}
[Fact]
public void ShellCore_failure_without_a_pending_window_stays_bare()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var coordinator = f.BuildCoordinator(() => null);
using var adapter = new EspAndHelloTrackerAdapter(coordinator, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
coordinator.TriggerShellCoreEspFailureForTest("ESPProgress_Timeout");
var args = Assert.Single(f.Forwarded);
Assert.Equal("ESPProgress_Timeout", args.FailureType);
Assert.Null(args.ErrorCode);
Assert.Null(args.FailedSubcategory);
Assert.Null(args.Category);
Assert.Empty(args.LikelyCulpritApps);
Assert.Null(coordinator.LastEspTerminalFailure);
var signal = f.TerminalSignal();
Assert.False(signal.Payload!.ContainsKey("errorCode"));
Assert.False(signal.Payload.ContainsKey("failedSubcategory"));
}
[Fact]
public void A_throwing_probe_degrades_to_the_bare_failure()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var coordinator = f.BuildCoordinator(() => throw new InvalidOperationException("probe"));
coordinator.TriggerShellCoreEspFailureForTest("WhiteGlove_Failed");
var args = Assert.Single(f.Forwarded);
Assert.Equal("WhiteGlove_Failed", args.FailureType);
Assert.Null(args.ErrorCode);
}
}
}
@@ -456,5 +456,124 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Gather
SingleSecurityWarning();
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------
// %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% exception (userProfilePath overload)
//
// The token lifts the C:\Users hard block for AppData\Local and
// AppData\Roaming — and nothing more. The allowlist still decides,
// which is what the cases below pin down: the exception is a gate the
// allowlist has to open, never an allowance of its own.
// -------------------------------------------------------------------
private const string TestProfile = @"C:\Users\TestUser";
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AppDataPath_WithoutAllowlistEntry_IsStillBlocked()
{
// The lifted hard block alone admits nothing: without a matching
// userProfileFilePrefixes entry the path falls through to the
// allowlist and is refused there.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\UnlistedVendor\app.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_OutsideAppData_IsBlockedByTheHardBlock()
{
foreach (var target in new[] { @"\Desktop\secret.txt", @"\Documents\notes.txt", @"\ntuser.dat" })
{
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + target, unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_NullProfile_KeepsTheUsersHardBlock()
{
// No interactive user detected — the exception cannot apply and the
// path stays under the plain C:\Users block.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
@"C:\Users\TestUser\AppData\Local\UnlistedVendor\app.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: null));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_TraversalOutOfAppData_IsBlocked()
{
// Spelling Documents as a traversal out of AppData must not survive
// Path.GetFullPath normalisation.
const string traversal = @"C:\Users\TestUser\AppData\Local\..\..\Documents\secret.txt";
Assert.Equal(@"C:\Users\TestUser\Documents\secret.txt", Path.GetFullPath(traversal));
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
traversal, unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_ForeignProfile_IsBlockedEvenUnderAppData()
{
// The exception is scoped to the DETECTED profile — a rule must not
// reach a second user's AppData by spelling the path out.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
@"C:\Users\OtherUser\AppData\Local\UnlistedVendor\app.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AllowlistedVendorFolder_IsAllowed()
{
// AppData\Local\RealmJoin is on userProfileFilePrefixes: the file itself, a
// subfolder below it, and the folder itself all pass.
foreach (var target in new[] { @"\tray.log", @"\Logs\rj.log", "" })
{
Assert.True(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\RealmJoin" + target,
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile),
$"expected allowed: ...\\RealmJoin{target}");
}
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_SiblingOfAnAllowlistedVendorFolder_IsBlocked()
{
// Segment-bounded: "RealmJoin" must not admit "RealmJoinSomethingElse".
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\RealmJoinSomethingElse\tray.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AllowlistedVendorFolder_InAForeignProfile_IsBlocked()
{
// The allowlist is anchored to the DETECTED profile, not to C:\Users\*.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
@"C:\Users\OtherUser\AppData\Local\RealmJoin\tray.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AllowlistedVendorFolder_WithoutADetectedUser_IsBlocked()
{
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
@"C:\Users\TestUser\AppData\Local\RealmJoin\tray.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: null));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AppDataPath_IsAllowedInUnrestrictedMode()
{
// Where the exception does bite today: unrestricted mode returns
// before the allowlist, so the lifted hard block is the whole story.
Assert.True(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\UnlistedVendor\app.log",
unrestrictedMode: true, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
// ...but only under AppData — Documents stays blocked even there.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\Documents\secret.txt",
unrestrictedMode: true, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using System.Linq;
using System.Text;
using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Newtonsoft.Json;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
{
/// <summary>
/// Session 46749560: IME's trace listener writes every log through one FileMode.Append
/// stream per process, so a process that resumes logging after another one appended
/// overwrites those bytes at its own stale position. The tracker had read the first version
/// and never saw the second — 6 of 16 script results and 4 of 16 executor end blocks were
/// lost while the final files looked intact. These tests drive that exact write pattern
/// (positional overwrite behind the bookmark) against the two multi-writer logs and pin the
/// contract: unchanged bytes never rewind, changed bytes are processed exactly once, and the
/// executor lines a rewind uncovers belong to the invocation that owns their file position.
/// </summary>
public sealed class ImeLogTrackerOverwriteRewindTests
{
private static readonly DateTime T0 = new DateTime(2026, 9, 10, 19, 30, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private static List<ImeLogPattern> MarkerPatterns() => new List<ImeLogPattern>
{
new ImeLogPattern
{
PatternId = "T-MARK", Category = "always", Enabled = true,
Pattern = @"^marker (?<n>\d+)", Action = "noop",
Parameters = new Dictionary<string, string>(),
},
};
private static readonly string[] ScriptPatternIds =
{
"PS-AGENT-INVOCATION", "PS-AGENT-ARG", "PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START", "PS-AGENT-EXITCODE",
"PS-AGENT-OUTPUT", "PS-AGENT-COMPLETED", "PS-SCRIPT-GENERATED", "PS-SCRIPT-CONTEXT", "PS-SCRIPT-RESULT",
};
/// <summary>The shipped pattern JSON — the same source combine.js embeds — so the contract is the real one.</summary>
private static List<ImeLogPattern> ScriptPatterns()
{
DirectoryInfo? dir = new DirectoryInfo(AppContext.BaseDirectory);
string? patternDir = null;
while (dir != null)
{
var candidate = Path.Combine(dir.FullName, "rules", "ime-log-patterns");
if (Directory.Exists(candidate)) { patternDir = candidate; break; }
dir = dir.Parent;
}
Assert.NotNull(patternDir);
var byId = new Dictionary<string, ImeLogPattern>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
foreach (var file in Directory.GetFiles(patternDir, "*.json"))
{
var pattern = JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<ImeLogPattern>(File.ReadAllText(file));
if (pattern?.PatternId != null) byId[pattern.PatternId] = pattern;
}
return ScriptPatternIds.Select(id =>
{
Assert.True(byId.TryGetValue(id, out var p), $"Shipped IME pattern '{id}' not found under {patternDir}.");
return p!;
}).ToList();
}
private static string Entry(string message, string thread = "1")
=> $"<![LOG[{message}]LOG]!><time=\"12:00:00.0000000\" date=\"9-10-2026\" component=\"X\" context=\"\" type=\"1\" thread=\"{thread}\" file=\"\">\r\n";
private const string PlatformId = "d39eeef3-e88e-41a0-82d7-5e28ee7b5acf";
private const string PlatformStartLine =
@"Adding argument powershell with value C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Scripts\73d664e4-0886-4a73-b745-c694da45ddb4_d39eeef3-e88e-41a0-82d7-5e28ee7b5acf.ps1 to the named argument list.";
private const string DetectionStartLine =
@"Adding argument detectionScript with value C:\Windows\IMECache\DetectionScripts\App_cc46aa62-e93a-41a1-bdd0-44f57e92a66d.ps1 to the named argument list.";
private const string GeneratedLine =
@"Script file C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Scripts\73d664e4-0886-4a73-b745-c694da45ddb4_d39eeef3-e88e-41a0-82d7-5e28ee7b5acf.ps1 is generated.";
private const string ResultLine =
"[PowerShell] User Id = 73d664e4-0886-4a73-b745-c694da45ddb4, Policy id = " + PlatformId + ", policy result = Success";
private sealed class Harness : IDisposable
{
private readonly TempDirectory _tmp = new TempDirectory();
private readonly string _matchLog;
private readonly List<ImeLogPattern> _patterns;
public ImeLogTracker Tracker { get; private set; }
public DateTime Now { get; set; } = T0;
public string LogName { get; }
public string LogPath => Path.Combine(_tmp.Path, LogName);
public string StateDir { get; }
public List<ScriptExecutionState> Completed { get; } = new List<ScriptExecutionState>();
public Harness(string logName, List<ImeLogPattern> patterns)
{
LogName = logName;
_patterns = patterns;
var logDir = Path.Combine(_tmp.Path, "agent");
Directory.CreateDirectory(logDir);
_matchLog = Path.Combine(logDir, "ime-pattern-matches.log");
StateDir = Path.Combine(_tmp.Path, "state");
Tracker = Build();
}
private ImeLogTracker Build()
{
var t = new ImeLogTracker(_tmp.Path, _patterns, new AgentLogger(Path.Combine(_tmp.Path, "agent"), AgentLogLevel.Debug),
matchLogPath: _matchLog, stateDirectory: StateDir);
t.UtcNowProvider = () => Now;
t.OnScriptCompleted = s => Completed.Add(s);
return t;
}
/// <summary>Agent restart: dispose, rebuild over the same state directory, restore the bookmark.</summary>
public void Restart()
{
Tracker.SaveStateForTest();
Tracker.Dispose();
Tracker = Build();
Tracker.LoadStateForTest();
}
public void Append(string text) => File.AppendAllText(LogPath, text, new UTF8Encoding(false));
/// <summary>What IME's stale writer does: write at its own position, over whatever is there.</summary>
public void Overwrite(long offset, string text)
{
using (var fs = new FileStream(LogPath, FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Write, FileShare.ReadWrite))
{
fs.Seek(offset, SeekOrigin.Begin);
var bytes = new UTF8Encoding(false).GetBytes(text);
fs.Write(bytes, 0, bytes.Length);
}
}
public long Length => new FileInfo(LogPath).Length;
public Task Pass(CancellationToken token = default) => Tracker.CheckLogFilesAsync(token);
/// <summary>Marker numbers matched so far, in match order.</summary>
public List<int> Matched()
{
if (!File.Exists(_matchLog)) return new List<int>();
return File.ReadAllLines(_matchLog)
.Select(l => Regex.Match(l, @"\[T-MARK\] <!\[LOG\[marker (\d+)"))
.Where(m => m.Success).Select(m => int.Parse(m.Groups[1].Value)).ToList();
}
public ImeTrackerHealth Health => Tracker.GetHealthSnapshot();
public void Dispose()
{
Tracker.Dispose();
_tmp.Dispose();
}
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// Marker-level contract on AgentExecutor.log
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
[Fact]
public async Task Unchanged_bytes_never_rewind_however_often_they_are_verified()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("marker 1") + "<![LOG[marker 2\nsecond line\n]LOG]!><time=\"12:00:00.0000000\" date=\"9-10-2026\" component=\"X\" context=\"\" type=\"1\" thread=\"1\" file=\"\">\r\n" + Entry("marker 3"));
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3 }, h.Matched());
for (var i = 0; i < 5; i++)
{
h.Tracker.RequestOverwriteCheckForTest();
h.Now = h.Now.AddSeconds(2);
await h.Pass();
}
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(0, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
Assert.Equal(5, h.Health.VerifyPasses);
Assert.Equal(3, h.Tracker.LedgerEntryCountForTest("AgentExecutor.log"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Non_multi_writer_files_keep_no_ledger_and_are_never_verified()
{
using var h = new Harness("AppWorkload.log", MarkerPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("marker 1") + Entry("marker 2"));
await h.Pass();
h.Tracker.RequestOverwriteCheckForTest();
h.Now = h.Now.AddSeconds(2);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(0, h.Tracker.LedgerEntryCountForTest("AppWorkload.log"));
Assert.Equal(0, h.Health.VerifyPasses);
Assert.Equal(0, h.Health.VerifiedBytes);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Block_written_over_read_bytes_is_processed_once_and_the_surviving_tail_is_not_repeated()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
var one = Entry("marker 1");
h.Append(one + Entry("marker 2") + Entry("marker 3"));
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3 }, h.Matched());
// A stale writer lays two entries over the first two (same length: marker 3 survives
// intact at its old offset). No growth, no fragment — only the end signal finds it.
h.Overwrite(0, Entry("marker 7") + Entry("marker 8"));
Assert.Equal(3 * one.Length, h.Length);
h.Tracker.RequestOverwriteCheckForTest();
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
Assert.Equal(3 * one.Length, h.Health.OverwriteBytesReprocessed);
Assert.Equal(3, h.Tracker.LedgerEntryCountForTest("AgentExecutor.log"));
// Nothing left to find.
h.Tracker.RequestOverwriteCheckForTest();
h.Now = h.Now.AddSeconds(2);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Block_that_cuts_an_old_entry_leaves_a_fragment_that_is_never_matched()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("marker 1") + Entry("marker 2") + Entry("marker 3"));
await h.Pass();
// Longer than two old entries, shorter than three: the tail of marker 3's line survives
// as a fragment behind the new block.
h.Overwrite(0, Entry("marker 7") + Entry("marker 8 is a little longer"));
h.Tracker.RequestOverwriteCheckForTest();
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Guard_zone_catches_a_short_block_when_the_file_grows_without_any_signal()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("marker 1") + Entry("marker 2") + Entry("marker 3"));
await h.Pass();
// Same-length replacement of marker 1 (no fragment), then an ordinary append by
// another writer: the growth pass re-checks the last 4 KB and finds the change.
h.Overwrite(0, Entry("marker 7"));
h.Append(Entry("marker 4"));
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3, 7, 4 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.VerifyPasses); // the full check that follows a guard hit
Assert.True(h.Health.VerifiedBytes > 0);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Guard_hit_rewinds_to_the_true_start_of_the_block_not_the_guard_zone()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
// ~6 KB of entries so the guard zone covers only the last few.
var sb = new StringBuilder();
for (var i = 1; i <= 60; i++) sb.Append(Entry($"marker {i}"));
h.Append(sb.ToString());
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(60, h.Matched().Count);
// A block over everything plus one more entry: the guard sees a change at its
// zone start, the full check must place the rewind at offset 0.
var block = new StringBuilder();
for (var i = 101; i <= 161; i++) block.Append(Entry($"marker {i}"));
h.Overwrite(0, block.ToString());
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
var matched = h.Matched();
Assert.Equal(60 + 61, matched.Count);
Assert.Equal(Enumerable.Range(101, 61), matched.Skip(60));
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Fragment_at_the_bookmark_triggers_the_check_when_no_ledger_entry_starts_in_the_guard_zone()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
var one = Entry("marker 1");
var big = Entry("marker 2 " + new string('x', 6000));
h.Append(one + big);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2 }, h.Matched());
// The 6 KB entry is the last ledger entry and starts before the 4 KB guard zone, so
// the guard has nothing to check. The stale writer's block is longer than that entry:
// the pass after it starts mid-line — a fragment — and must not match it raw.
h.Overwrite(one.Length, Entry("marker 7 " + new string('y', 3000)) + Entry("marker 8 " + new string('z', 3100)));
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2 }, h.Matched());
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 7, 8 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Hidden_block_is_found_by_the_cadence_while_a_script_is_in_flight_and_the_cadence_is_throttled()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("marker 1") + Entry("marker 2") + Entry("marker 3"));
await h.Pass();
// A platform script is pending → contention. First pass in contention verifies at once.
h.Tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("policyX", exitCode: null, exitObservedAtUtc: null, startedAtUtc: T0);
h.Now = T0.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.VerifyPasses);
// Same-length replacement, no growth, no signal: only the cadence can find it —
// and not before a second has passed since the last verification.
h.Overwrite(0, Entry("marker 7"));
h.Now = T0.AddMilliseconds(500);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.VerifyPasses);
h.Now = T0.AddMilliseconds(1200);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3, 7 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(2, h.Health.VerifyPasses);
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Without_contention_or_signal_nothing_is_verified()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("marker 1") + Entry("marker 2"));
await h.Pass();
for (var i = 0; i < 20; i++)
{
h.Now = h.Now.AddSeconds(1);
await h.Pass();
}
Assert.Equal(0, h.Health.VerifyPasses);
Assert.Equal(0, h.Health.VerifiedBytes);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Restart_seeds_the_ledger_so_an_overwrite_after_the_restart_is_still_found()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("marker 1") + Entry("marker 2") + Entry("marker 3"));
await h.Pass();
h.Restart();
Assert.Equal(0, h.Tracker.LedgerEntryCountForTest("AgentExecutor.log"));
// First pass after the restart: nothing new to read, but the ledger is seeded from
// the bytes behind the persisted bookmark.
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(3, h.Tracker.LedgerEntryCountForTest("AgentExecutor.log"));
h.Overwrite(0, Entry("marker 7"));
h.Tracker.RequestOverwriteCheckForTest();
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3, 7 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
// The counter is part of the persisted health.
h.Restart();
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Rollover_clears_the_ledger_and_the_new_file_is_read_without_a_false_rewind()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("marker 1") + Entry("marker 2") + Entry("marker 3"));
await h.Pass();
File.WriteAllText(h.LogPath, Entry("marker 7") + Entry("marker 8"), new UTF8Encoding(false));
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 }, h.Matched());
h.Tracker.RequestOverwriteCheckForTest();
h.Now = h.Now.AddSeconds(2);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(0, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
Assert.Equal(2, h.Tracker.LedgerEntryCountForTest("AgentExecutor.log"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Cancelled_pass_does_not_lose_a_pending_check()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("marker 1") + Entry("marker 2") + Entry("marker 3"));
await h.Pass();
h.Overwrite(0, Entry("marker 7") + Entry("marker 8"));
h.Tracker.RequestOverwriteCheckForTest();
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
using (var cts = new CancellationTokenSource())
{
cts.Cancel();
await h.Pass(cts.Token);
}
// The cancelled pass touched nothing after the rewind; the next one reads it all.
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 }, h.Matched());
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// The field scenario with the shipped patterns
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
[Fact]
public async Task Executor_end_block_written_over_a_detection_invocation_belongs_to_its_own_script()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", ScriptPatterns());
// Executor E starts its platform script and waits for PowerShell.
h.Append(Entry("ExecutorLog AgentExecutor gets invoked") + Entry(PlatformStartLine) + Entry("[Executor] created powershell with process id 12708"));
await h.Pass();
var executorPosition = h.Length;
// Detection executor D appends its whole run while E waits — the tracker reads it.
var detectionBlock = Entry("ExecutorLog AgentExecutor gets invoked") + Entry(DetectionStartLine)
+ Entry("Powershell exit code is 3") + Entry("write output done. output = detected nothing, error = ")
+ Entry("Agent executor completed.") + Entry(@"Writing result: False to resultFilePath: C:\x\App_cc46aa62.txt");
h.Append(detectionBlock);
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
// E ends: its end block lands at its own stale position, over D's lines.
var endBlock = Entry("Powershell exit code is 0") + Entry("write output done. output = Hello from E, error = ") + Entry("Agent executor completed.");
Assert.True(endBlock.Length < detectionBlock.Length);
h.Overwrite(executorPosition, endBlock);
// Nothing visible signalled the end; the cadence (E is pending) finds the block.
h.Now = h.Now.AddSeconds(1.5);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
// IME's result line (in the other file) completes the script with E's own data.
h.Tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ResultLine);
var script = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Equal(PlatformId, script.PolicyId);
Assert.Equal("Success", script.Result);
Assert.Equal("ime_policy_result", script.ResultSource);
Assert.Equal(0, script.ExitCode);
Assert.Equal("Hello from E", script.Stdout);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Detection_exit_lines_read_before_the_overwrite_never_reach_the_platform_script()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", ScriptPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("ExecutorLog AgentExecutor gets invoked") + Entry(PlatformStartLine) + Entry("[Executor] created powershell with process id 1"));
await h.Pass();
h.Append(Entry("ExecutorLog AgentExecutor gets invoked") + Entry(DetectionStartLine)
+ Entry("Powershell exit code is 3") + Entry("write output done. output = detected nothing, error = ") + Entry("Agent executor completed."));
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
// The platform result arrives without any end block ever becoming visible: held for
// the grace, then emitted — the detection's exit code 3 must not stand in.
h.Tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ResultLine);
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
h.Now = h.Now.Add(ImeLogTracker.PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace);
h.Tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(h.Now);
var script = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Equal("Success", script.Result);
Assert.Null(script.ExitCode);
Assert.Null(script.Stdout);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Ime_result_line_hidden_by_an_executor_start_line_is_recovered_from_the_ime_log()
{
using var h = new Harness("IntuneManagementExtension.log", ScriptPatterns());
h.Append(Entry(GeneratedLine, "17") + Entry("Launch powershell executor in user session", "17") + Entry("process id = 10608", "17"));
await h.Pass();
var servicePosition = h.Length;
// The executor process appends its telemetry start line at the true end of file.
h.Append(Entry("[Telemetry] Telemetry is enabled. Starting mananger...", "1"));
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
// The service's first write after the script wait lands at ITS position — over the
// executor's line; the block is longer, so the pass sees a fragment at the bookmark.
h.Overwrite(servicePosition, Entry("Execution is done, collecting result", "17") + Entry(ResultLine, "17") + Entry("[PowerShell] Success, Result details length: 315", "17"));
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
// Recovered on the IME side alone (this harness has no AgentExecutor.log): held for
// the end block, emitted without an exit code after the grace.
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
h.Now = h.Now.Add(ImeLogTracker.PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace);
h.Tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(h.Now);
var script = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Equal(PlatformId, script.PolicyId);
Assert.Equal("Success", script.Result);
Assert.Equal("ime_policy_result", script.ResultSource);
Assert.Equal("User", script.RunContext);
}
}
}
@@ -36,8 +36,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
// silently passing against a stale inline copy.
private static readonly string[] RequiredPatternIds =
{
"PS-AGENT-INVOCATION", "PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START", "PS-AGENT-EXITCODE",
"PS-AGENT-OUTPUT", "PS-SCRIPT-RESULT",
"PS-AGENT-INVOCATION", "PS-AGENT-ARG", "PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START", "PS-AGENT-EXITCODE",
"PS-AGENT-OUTPUT", "PS-AGENT-COMPLETED", "PS-SCRIPT-GENERATED", "PS-SCRIPT-CONTEXT",
"PS-SCRIPT-RESULT", "HS-INVOCATION",
};
private static List<ImeLogPattern> ScriptPatterns()
@@ -83,6 +84,24 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
private const string RemediationStartLine =
@"Adding argument remediationScript with value C:\Windows\IMECache\HealthScripts\446f0450-d0ee-404c-8dc0-a74123bde31f_1\detect.ps1 to the named argument list.";
private const string ImeLog = "IntuneManagementExtension.log";
private const string HealthLog = "HealthScripts.log";
private const string ExecutorLog = "AgentExecutor.log";
private const string PlatformGeneratedLine =
@"Script file C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Scripts\00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000_c3e0124c-4936-4bfd-afcc-c7fe1d84d104.ps1 is generated";
private static readonly string PlatformResultLine =
$"[PowerShell] User Id = 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000, Policy id = {PlatformId}, policy result = Success";
// The health-script worker (IME AgentCommon ScriptWorker) writes its command line, the launch
// line and the exit line to IntuneManagementExtension.log AND HealthScripts.log — session
// 24dc69d1 (IME 1.105.152.0), where the exit line pre-filled a pending platform script's exit
// code and the launch line its context.
private const string HealthScriptCommandLine =
@"""C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\agentexecutor.exe"" -remediationScript """"C:\WINDOWS\IMECache\HealthScripts\446f0450-d0ee-404c-8dc0-a74123bde31f_1\detect.ps1"""" ""C:\WINDOWS\IMECache\HealthScripts\446f0450-d0ee-404c-8dc0-a74123bde31f_1\detect.ps1.result"" 60";
private const string HealthScriptExitLine = "Powershell execution is done, exitCode = 5";
private static ImeLogTracker BuildTracker(TempDirectory tmp, out List<ScriptExecutionState> emitted)
{
var captured = new List<ScriptExecutionState>();
@@ -111,9 +130,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("Powershell exit code is 0");
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("write output done. output = [Compliant] No Classic Teams found, error = ");
// Authoritative IME result for the PLATFORM script (keyed by policyId).
// Authoritative IME result for the PLATFORM script (keyed by policyId). Its own end
// block never comes here, so the result is held until the shutdown flush — which must
// not pick up the remediation's exit/output either.
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(
$"[PowerShell] User Id = 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000, Policy id = {PlatformId}, policy result = Failed");
Assert.Empty(emitted);
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(System.DateTime.UtcNow, force: true);
var script = Assert.Single(emitted);
Assert.Equal(PlatformId, script.PolicyId);
@@ -145,5 +168,100 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
Assert.Equal(0, script.ExitCode);
Assert.Equal("Hello from c3e0124c", script.Stdout);
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// Health-script lines never feed a platform slot (session 24dc69d1)
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
[Fact]
public void No_shipped_pattern_reads_the_health_script_workers_exit_line()
{
// "Powershell execution is done, exitCode = N" is the health-script worker's line only;
// as PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE (no scriptType) it pre-filled the exit code of whichever platform
// script was pending, which then emitted without waiting for its own end block.
foreach (var file in Directory.GetFiles(FindRulesPatternDir(), "*.json"))
{
var pattern = JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<ImeLogPattern>(File.ReadAllText(file))!;
Assert.False(System.Text.RegularExpressions.Regex.IsMatch(HealthScriptExitLine, pattern.Pattern),
$"{pattern.PatternId} matches the health-script worker's exit line");
}
}
[Fact]
public void Health_script_exit_line_in_the_ime_log_never_pre_fills_the_platform_slot()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp, out var emitted);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(PlatformGeneratedLine, sourceFileName: ImeLog);
// A health script that ran in parallel finishes: its exit line lands inside the platform
// run's window (c81b8053 had "exit code 0" before its executor even started).
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(HealthScriptExitLine, sourceFileName: ImeLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(PlatformResultLine, sourceFileName: ImeLog);
// No exit code of its own → held for the end block, never emitted with the health script's 5.
Assert.Empty(emitted);
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(DateTime.UtcNow, force: true);
var script = Assert.Single(emitted);
Assert.Null(script.ExitCode);
Assert.Equal("Success", script.Result);
}
[Fact]
public void Health_script_launch_line_in_the_ime_log_does_not_flip_the_platform_context()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp, out var emitted);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(PlatformGeneratedLine, sourceFileName: ImeLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("Launch powershell executor in user session", sourceFileName: ImeLog);
// The health-script worker launches its executor while the platform script runs: its
// command line opens an invocation that owns nothing, so its launch line stays there.
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(HealthScriptCommandLine, sourceFileName: ImeLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("Launch powershell executor in machine session", sourceFileName: ImeLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(PlatformResultLine, sourceFileName: ImeLog);
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(DateTime.UtcNow, force: true);
var script = Assert.Single(emitted);
Assert.Equal("User", script.RunContext);
}
[Fact]
public void Lines_from_the_health_scripts_log_never_resolve_to_a_platform_script()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp, out var emitted);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("ExecutorLog AgentExecutor gets invoked", sourceFileName: ExecutorLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(PlatformStartLine, sourceFileName: ExecutorLog);
// HealthScripts.log never carries a platform marker — the run in flight is not the
// fallback owner of the lines there.
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("Launch powershell executor in machine session", sourceFileName: HealthLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(PlatformResultLine, sourceFileName: ImeLog);
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(DateTime.UtcNow, force: true);
var script = Assert.Single(emitted);
Assert.Null(script.RunContext);
}
[Fact]
public void Context_line_after_an_ime_log_rollover_still_finds_the_run_in_flight()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp, out var emitted);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(PlatformGeneratedLine, sourceFileName: ImeLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("ExecutorLog AgentExecutor gets invoked", sourceFileName: ExecutorLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(PlatformStartLine, sourceFileName: ExecutorLog);
// IME rolls the log over between its two lines: the fresh file has no markers, but
// platform runs open there — the run in flight still owns the context line.
tracker.ClearInvocationMarkersForTest(ImeLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("Launch powershell executor in user session", sourceFileName: ImeLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(PlatformResultLine, sourceFileName: ImeLog);
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(DateTime.UtcNow, force: true);
var script = Assert.Single(emitted);
Assert.Equal("User", script.RunContext);
}
}
}
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("dece354a", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: observedAt, stdout: "Script start.\nScript end.");
// Well past the grace window — should emit.
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
var script = Assert.Single(emitted);
Assert.Equal("dece354a", script.PolicyId);
@@ -60,11 +60,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("60b43a2e", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: observedAt);
// Inside the grace window — IME might still log its result; do not emit yet.
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(5));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(5));
Assert.Empty(emitted);
// Past the grace window — emit.
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
Assert.Single(emitted);
}
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("846cea22", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: observedAt);
// Shutdown flush right after exit — grace not elapsed, but force emits anyway.
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(1), force: true);
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(1), force: true);
Assert.Single(emitted);
}
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("bad5c0de", exitCode: 1, exitObservedAtUtc: observedAt);
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
var script = Assert.Single(emitted);
Assert.Equal(1, script.ExitCode);
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
// Started but no exit code yet → still running, must not be emitted even on force flush.
tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("running", exitCode: null, exitObservedAtUtc: null);
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(DateTime.UtcNow, force: true);
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(DateTime.UtcNow, force: true);
Assert.Empty(emitted);
}
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
var observedAt = new DateTime(2026, 6, 19, 12, 59, 4, DateTimeKind.Utc);
tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("dece354a", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: observedAt);
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
Assert.Single(emitted);
// IME finally logs its PS-SCRIPT-RESULT line — must NOT produce a second event.
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
var observedAt = new DateTime(2026, 6, 19, 12, 59, 4, DateTimeKind.Utc);
tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("dece354a", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: observedAt);
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
// The exit-observed timestamp must travel on the emitted state so the adapter can bind
// the event to it instead of an unrelated "last matched" line parsed during the grace.
@@ -156,14 +156,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
// Run 1 of policy X — fallback emits.
tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("policyX", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: firstRun);
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(firstRun.AddSeconds(20));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(firstRun.AddSeconds(20));
Assert.Single(emitted);
// Run 2 of the SAME policy later in the same agent lifetime (IME re-evaluation / retry)
// must NOT be deduped away — the fresh start clears the prior emitted-marker.
var secondRun = firstRun.AddMinutes(30);
tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("policyX", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: secondRun);
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(secondRun.AddSeconds(20));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(secondRun.AddSeconds(20));
Assert.Equal(2, emitted.Count);
}
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
Assert.Equal("ime_policy_result", script.ResultSource);
// Later fallback pass must find nothing pending → no duplicate.
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
Assert.Single(emitted);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
{
/// <summary>
/// The IME result waits for its executor end block (session e7f3c910): PS-SCRIPT-RESULT can
/// reach the tracker before the AgentExecutor.log end block of the same run — an overwritten
/// block is recovered one pass after the result that triggers the ledger check, the
/// AgentExecutor.log read of a pass may precede the exit line by milliseconds, or the poll
/// loop stalled. Emitting at once lost the exit code and, when the late start line reopened
/// the slot, produced a fallback duplicate 15 s later.
/// </summary>
public sealed class ImeLogTrackerResultHoldTests
{
private static readonly DateTime T0 = new DateTime(2026, 9, 10, 22, 13, 35, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private sealed class Harness : IDisposable
{
private readonly TempDirectory _tmp = new TempDirectory();
public ImeLogTracker Tracker { get; private set; }
public DateTime Now { get; set; } = T0;
public List<ScriptExecutionState> Completed { get; } = new List<ScriptExecutionState>();
public List<ScriptStartedInfo> Started { get; } = new List<ScriptStartedInfo>();
public Harness() { Tracker = Build(); }
private ImeLogTracker Build()
{
var t = new ImeLogTracker(_tmp.Path, new List<ImeLogPattern>(), new AgentLogger(_tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info), stateDirectory: _tmp.Path);
t.UtcNowProvider = () => Now;
t.OnScriptCompleted = s => Completed.Add(s);
t.OnScriptStarted = s => Started.Add(s);
return t;
}
/// <summary>Agent restart over the same state directory.</summary>
public void Restart()
{
Tracker.SaveStateForTest();
Tracker.Dispose();
Tracker = Build();
Tracker.LoadStateForTest();
}
/// <summary>A start line (IME "Script file … is generated" or the executor's argument line) with its source timestamp.</summary>
public void Start(string id, DateTime lineTs)
{
Tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = lineTs;
Tracker.NextTestEntry();
Tracker.HandlePlatformScriptStarted(id);
}
public void Result(string id, DateTime lineTs, string result = "Success")
=> Tracker.CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting(id, result, lineTs);
public void Exit(string id, DateTime lineTs, int exitCode = 0)
=> Tracker.RecordPlatformScriptExitCodeForTesting(id, exitCode, lineTs);
/// <summary>The end-of-pass flush at the harness clock.</summary>
public void Flush(bool force = false) => Tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(Now, force);
public void Dispose()
{
Tracker.Dispose();
_tmp.Dispose();
}
}
[Fact]
public void Result_before_the_end_block_is_held_and_emits_once_with_the_exit_code()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("376ee51a", T0);
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2);
h.Result("376ee51a", T0.AddSeconds(2));
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2.1);
h.Flush();
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
// The end block surfaces on the next pass (ledger rewind or plain read lag).
h.Exit("376ee51a", T0.AddSeconds(1.99));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2.2);
h.Flush();
var script = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Equal(0, script.ExitCode);
Assert.Equal("Success", script.Result);
Assert.Equal("ime_policy_result", script.ResultSource);
Assert.Equal(T0.AddSeconds(2), script.ResultObservedAtUtc);
Assert.Equal("PS-SCRIPT-RESULT", script.ResultPatternId);
Assert.Equal(T0, script.StartedAtUtc);
// Nothing fires twice: later passes, a repeated result line, the 15 s fallback window.
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(30);
h.Flush();
h.Result("376ee51a", T0.AddSeconds(2));
Assert.Single(h.Completed);
}
[Fact]
public void Result_with_the_end_block_already_read_emits_at_once()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("847da54e", T0);
h.Exit("847da54e", T0.AddSeconds(2.3));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2.31);
h.Result("847da54e", T0.AddSeconds(2.31));
var script = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Equal(0, script.ExitCode);
Assert.Null(script.ResultHeldSinceUtc);
Assert.Equal(T0.AddSeconds(2.31), script.ResultObservedAtUtc);
}
[Fact]
public void Held_result_emits_without_exit_code_after_the_grace()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("784fcaf5", T0);
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2);
h.Result("784fcaf5", T0.AddSeconds(2));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2).Add(ImeLogTracker.PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace).AddMilliseconds(-100);
h.Flush();
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2).Add(ImeLogTracker.PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace);
h.Flush();
var script = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Null(script.ExitCode);
Assert.Equal("Success", script.Result);
Assert.Equal("ime_policy_result", script.ResultSource);
// An exit line surfacing after the emit is dropped — no second event, no fallback.
h.Exit("784fcaf5", T0.AddSeconds(1.99));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(40);
h.Flush();
Assert.Single(h.Completed);
}
[Fact]
public void Shutdown_flush_emits_a_held_result_at_once()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("a52e4f47", T0);
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2);
h.Result("a52e4f47", T0.AddSeconds(2), "Failed");
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
h.Flush(force: true);
var script = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Equal("Failed", script.Result);
Assert.Null(script.ExitCode);
}
[Fact]
public void Late_start_line_of_an_emitted_run_opens_no_new_run()
{
// Session e7f3c910, 376ee51a: the result was emitted, THEN the executor's start and
// exit lines of the same run were read (a 2 s poll stall) — the start opened a second
// slot and the exit code became a fallback duplicate 15 s later.
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("376ee51a", T0);
h.Exit("376ee51a", T0.AddSeconds(1.99));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2);
h.Result("376ee51a", T0.AddSeconds(2));
Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Single(h.Started);
h.Start("376ee51a", T0.AddMilliseconds(300));
Assert.Single(h.Started);
h.Exit("376ee51a", T0.AddSeconds(1.99));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(30);
h.Flush();
Assert.Single(h.Completed);
}
[Fact]
public void Start_line_newer_than_the_emitted_result_is_the_next_run()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("338d9434", T0);
h.Exit("338d9434", T0.AddSeconds(1));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(1);
h.Result("338d9434", T0.AddSeconds(1));
Assert.Single(h.Completed);
// IME re-runs the policy after the user signed in.
h.Start("338d9434", T0.AddMinutes(7));
Assert.Equal(2, h.Started.Count);
h.Exit("338d9434", T0.AddMinutes(7).AddSeconds(3));
h.Now = T0.AddMinutes(7).AddSeconds(3);
h.Result("338d9434", T0.AddMinutes(7).AddSeconds(3));
Assert.Equal(2, h.Completed.Count);
Assert.Equal(T0.AddMinutes(7), h.Completed[1].StartedAtUtc);
}
[Fact]
public void Newer_start_line_closes_a_held_result_and_starts_the_next_run()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("c81b8053", T0);
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2);
h.Result("c81b8053", T0.AddSeconds(2));
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
// The end block never surfaced before the policy ran again.
h.Start("c81b8053", T0.AddSeconds(4));
var first = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Null(first.ExitCode);
Assert.Equal(T0, first.StartedAtUtc);
Assert.Equal(2, h.Started.Count);
h.Exit("c81b8053", T0.AddSeconds(6));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(6);
h.Result("c81b8053", T0.AddSeconds(6));
Assert.Equal(2, h.Completed.Count);
Assert.Equal(0, h.Completed[1].ExitCode);
Assert.Equal(T0.AddSeconds(4), h.Completed[1].StartedAtUtc);
}
[Fact]
public void Result_without_a_start_takes_the_recovered_start_line_and_end_block()
{
// Both the start block and the end block were hidden when the result arrived; the
// ledger rewind the result triggers brings both back on the next pass.
using var h = new Harness();
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2);
h.Result("d39eeef3", T0.AddSeconds(2));
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
h.Start("d39eeef3", T0);
Assert.Empty(h.Started);
h.Exit("d39eeef3", T0.AddSeconds(1.99));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2.2);
h.Flush();
var script = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Equal(T0, script.StartedAtUtc);
Assert.Equal(0, script.ExitCode);
}
[Fact]
public void Held_result_survives_a_restart()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("832e27bc", T0);
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2);
h.Result("832e27bc", T0.AddSeconds(2));
h.Restart();
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
h.Exit("832e27bc", T0.AddSeconds(1.99));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2.5);
h.Flush();
var script = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Equal(0, script.ExitCode);
Assert.Equal(T0.AddSeconds(2), script.ResultObservedAtUtc);
Assert.Equal("PS-SCRIPT-RESULT", script.ResultPatternId);
}
[Fact]
public void Emitted_marker_keeps_the_run_timestamp_across_a_restart()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("89b3cbcd", T0);
h.Exit("89b3cbcd", T0.AddSeconds(1));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(1);
h.Result("89b3cbcd", T0.AddSeconds(1));
h.Restart();
h.Start("89b3cbcd", T0.AddMilliseconds(500)); // late line of the emitted run
Assert.Single(h.Started);
h.Start("89b3cbcd", T0.AddMinutes(5)); // the next run
Assert.Equal(2, h.Started.Count);
}
[Fact]
public void Marker_list_from_an_older_state_file_still_dedups()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var persistence = new ImeTrackerStatePersistence(tmp.Path, new AgentLogger(tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info));
persistence.Save(new ImeTrackerStateData { PlatformScriptResultEmitted = new List<string> { "policyZ" } });
var completed = new List<ScriptExecutionState>();
var started = new List<ScriptStartedInfo>();
var tracker = new ImeLogTracker(tmp.Path, new List<ImeLogPattern>(), new AgentLogger(tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info), stateDirectory: tmp.Path);
tracker.OnScriptCompleted = s => completed.Add(s);
tracker.OnScriptStarted = s => started.Add(s);
tracker.LoadStateForTest();
tracker.CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting("policyZ", "Success", T0);
Assert.Empty(completed);
// Without a timestamp on the marker every start line is a new run, as before.
tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = T0;
tracker.HandlePlatformScriptStarted("policyZ");
Assert.Single(started);
}
}
}
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
// Run 1: exit code seen, shutdown force-flush emits the fallback completion.
var tracker1 = BuildTracker(tmp, out var emitted1);
tracker1.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("policyA", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: observedAt);
tracker1.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(1), force: true);
tracker1.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(1), force: true);
Assert.Single(emitted1);
tracker1.SaveStateForTest();
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
// Restarted tracker continues the grace window instead of dropping the script.
var tracker2 = BuildTracker(tmp, out var emitted2);
tracker2.LoadStateForTest();
tracker2.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
tracker2.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
var script = Assert.Single(emitted2);
Assert.Equal("policyB", script.PolicyId);
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
var tracker1 = BuildTracker(tmp, out _);
tracker1.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("policyC", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: observedAt);
tracker1.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(1), force: true);
tracker1.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(1), force: true);
tracker1.SaveStateForTest();
// Restart, then a genuine RE-RUN of the same policy (fresh start clears the marker).
@@ -109,8 +109,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp, out var emitted);
tracker.LoadStateForTest(); // must not throw
// Degrades to pre-fix behavior: no markers restored, normal emission works.
// Degrades to pre-fix behavior: no markers restored, normal emission works (the
// result waits for its end block until the shutdown flush).
tracker.CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting("policyD", "Success");
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(DateTime.UtcNow, force: true);
Assert.Single(emitted);
}
@@ -128,8 +130,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
tracker.CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting("policyE", "Failed", run2Start.AddMinutes(-5));
Assert.Empty(emitted);
// Run 2's own result (newer than its start) still emits normally.
// Run 2's own result (newer than its start) still emits normally — held for the end
// block until the shutdown flush, since none is seeded here.
tracker.CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting("policyE", "Success", run2Start.AddMinutes(2));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(run2Start.AddMinutes(2), force: true);
var script = Assert.Single(emitted);
Assert.Equal("Success", script.Result);
Assert.Equal(run2Start, script.StartedAtUtc);
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
using System;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.SystemSignals
{
/// <summary>
/// <see cref="ProvisioningStatusTracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs"/> exposes the registry
/// failure detail while its settle window is open and nothing once the window has fired —
/// the coordinator reads it when a Shell-Core failure terminalises first (session 683f1eff).
/// </summary>
public sealed class ProvisioningStatusTrackerPendingFailureTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Fixed = new DateTime(2026, 9, 8, 18, 11, 2, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private const string InProgressJson = @"{
""categorySucceeded"": null,
""AppsSubcategory"": {""subcategoryState"":""inProgress"",""subcategoryStatusText"":""Apps (Working)""}
}";
private const string AppsFailedJson = @"{
""categorySucceeded"": null,
""AppsSubcategory"": {""subcategoryState"":""failed"",""subcategoryStatusText"":""Apps (0x80070652)""}
}";
private sealed class Fixture : IDisposable
{
public TempDirectory Tmp { get; } = new TempDirectory();
public ProvisioningStatusTracker Tracker { get; }
public Fixture()
{
var post = new InformationalEventPost(new FakeSignalIngressSink(), new VirtualClock(Fixed));
var logger = new AgentLogger(Tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info);
Tracker = new ProvisioningStatusTracker(
sessionId: "S1",
tenantId: "T1",
post: post,
logger: logger,
appxScanner: new FakeAppxDeploymentFailureScanner(),
backgroundDispatcher: action => action());
}
public void Dispose()
{
Tracker.Dispose();
Tmp.Dispose();
}
}
[Fact]
public void Nothing_pending_before_any_failure()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
Assert.Null(f.Tracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs());
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", InProgressJson);
Assert.Null(f.Tracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs());
}
[Fact]
public void Armed_settle_window_exposes_the_registry_detail()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", InProgressJson);
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", AppsFailedJson);
var pending = f.Tracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs();
Assert.NotNull(pending);
Assert.Equal("Provisioning_DeviceSetup_Apps_Failed", pending!.FailureType);
Assert.Equal("0x80070652", pending.ErrorCode);
Assert.Equal("Apps", pending.FailedSubcategory);
Assert.Equal("DeviceSetup", pending.Category);
}
[Fact]
public void Expired_settle_window_leaves_nothing_pending()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", InProgressJson);
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", AppsFailedJson);
f.Tracker.TriggerSettleTimerForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status");
Assert.Null(f.Tracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs());
}
}
}
@@ -56,6 +56,31 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
LoadEmbeddedGuardrails()["maxCommandLength"]!.Value<int>());
}
[Fact]
public void User_profile_prefixes_are_all_accepted_by_the_loader()
{
// The loader drops entries outside AppData\Local / AppData\Roaming (the hard block
// would never release them anyway). A dropped entry is invisible at runtime — it
// just never matches — so a typo in the JSON must fail here instead.
var json = LoadEmbeddedGuardrails()["userProfileFilePrefixes"]?.ToObject<string[]>()
?? new string[0];
Assert.Equal(
json.Select(p => p.Trim().TrimEnd('\\')).OrderBy(p => p),
GatherRuleGuards.AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes.OrderBy(p => p));
}
[Fact]
public void User_profile_prefixes_stay_under_the_hard_blocks_exception()
{
Assert.All(
GatherRuleGuards.AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes,
prefix => Assert.Contains(
GatherRuleGuards.AllowedUserProfileSubdirs,
subdir => prefix.StartsWith(subdir, System.StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(prefix.Length == subdir.Length || prefix[subdir.Length] == '\\')));
}
[Fact]
public void Blocked_event_log_channels_match_code_constants()
{
@@ -265,6 +265,42 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
sut.Stop();
}
[Fact]
public void Deadline_fired_late_keeps_the_due_time_as_stamp_and_carries_it_in_the_payload()
{
// A deadline that was due while the device slept (or the agent was down) fires only
// afterwards. The signal keeps the due time as OccurredAtUtc (D-238: the outage must not
// become session duration) and repeats it in the payload so the stale-fire guards
// identify the incarnation independently of the stamp.
using var rig = new EnrollmentOrchestratorRig(At);
var sut = rig.Build();
sut.Start();
var dueAt = At.AddMinutes(-5);
var scheduler = GetScheduler(sut);
scheduler.Schedule(new ActiveDeadline(
name: "hello_safety",
dueAtUtc: dueAt,
firesSignalKind: DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired,
firesPayload: new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline] = "hello_safety" }));
var signalLog = GetSignalLog(sut);
Assert.True(SpinWait.SpinUntil(() => ContainsDeadlineFired(signalLog), 3000));
DecisionSignal? fired = null;
foreach (var sig in signalLog.ReadAll())
{
if (sig.Kind == DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired) { fired = sig; break; }
}
Assert.NotNull(fired);
Assert.Equal(dueAt, fired!.OccurredAtUtc);
Assert.NotNull(fired.Payload);
Assert.Equal("hello_safety", fired.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline]);
Assert.Equal(dueAt.ToString("O"), fired.Payload[SignalPayloadKeys.DeadlineDueAtUtc]);
sut.Stop();
}
// ========================================================================= Quarantine
[Fact]
@@ -247,6 +247,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.SignalAdapters
f.Tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = ClockNow;
f.Tracker.CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting("beef7777", "Success", ClockNow);
// No end block is seeded — the held result goes out with the shutdown flush.
f.Tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(f.Clock.UtcNow, force: true);
var info = f.InfoEvent(SharedEventTypes.ScriptCompleted);
// Without the hardening the slot kept the 7-day-old start: the duration would have
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
using System;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using SharedEventTypes = AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Constants.EventTypes;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.SignalAdapters
{
/// <summary>
/// A held platform-script completion (IME result read before the executor end block) is
/// emitted at the end of a later pass, when the tracker's "last matched" line is an unrelated
/// one — the event stays bound to the result line's timestamp and pattern.
/// </summary>
public sealed class ImeLogTrackerAdapterResultHoldTests
{
private static readonly DateTime ClockNow = new DateTime(2026, 9, 10, 22, 13, 40, DateTimeKind.Utc);
[Fact]
public void Held_completion_is_bound_to_the_result_line_not_to_the_last_matched_one()
{
using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture(ClockNow);
using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
var startTs = ClockNow.AddSeconds(-95);
var resultTs = ClockNow.AddSeconds(-3);
f.Tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = startTs;
f.Tracker.HandlePlatformScriptStarted("376ee51a");
f.Tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = resultTs;
f.Tracker.LastMatchedPatternId = "PS-SCRIPT-RESULT";
f.Tracker.CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting("376ee51a", "Success", resultTs);
Assert.Empty(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.ScriptCompleted));
// Other lines were matched before the end block was read and the pass ended.
f.Tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = ClockNow.AddSeconds(-1);
f.Tracker.LastMatchedPatternId = "IME-DOWNLOADING";
f.Tracker.RecordPlatformScriptExitCodeForTesting("376ee51a", 0, resultTs.AddMilliseconds(-8));
f.Tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(f.Clock.UtcNow);
var info = f.InfoEvent(SharedEventTypes.ScriptCompleted);
Assert.Equal(resultTs, info.OccurredAtUtc);
Assert.Equal("PS-SCRIPT-RESULT", info.Payload!["patternId"]);
Assert.Equal("0", info.Payload["exitCode"]);
Assert.Equal("ime_policy_result", info.Payload["resultSource"]);
Assert.Equal("92.00", info.Payload["durationSeconds"]);
}
}
}
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
private readonly Stream _stream;
private readonly int _maxLineBytes;
private readonly bool _hashLines;
private readonly byte[] _readBuffer = new byte[ReadBufferSize];
private int _readPos;
private int _readLen;
@@ -41,21 +42,32 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
private byte[] _line = new byte[4096];
private int _lineLen;
private ulong _lineHash;
/// <param name="stream">Seekable stream positioned at the first byte to read.</param>
/// <param name="maxLineBytes">Upper bound of bytes kept per line; the remainder is discarded.</param>
public BoundedLineReader(Stream stream, int maxLineBytes)
/// <param name="hashLines">Fingerprint the raw bytes of every line (<see cref="LastLineHash"/>) — the
/// tracker's byte ledger needs it for multi-writer files only.</param>
public BoundedLineReader(Stream stream, int maxLineBytes, bool hashLines = false)
{
if (stream == null) throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(stream));
if (maxLineBytes <= 0) throw new ArgumentOutOfRangeException(nameof(maxLineBytes));
_stream = stream;
_maxLineBytes = maxLineBytes;
_hashLines = hashLines;
_readBufferFileOffset = stream.Position;
}
/// <summary>Cap in bytes applied to every line.</summary>
public int MaxLineBytes => _maxLineBytes;
/// <summary>
/// FNV-1a 64 over the bytes the most recently returned line was decoded from (BOM and
/// line terminator excluded; the capped prefix of a truncated line). Zero unless the
/// reader was created with hashing on.
/// </summary>
public ulong LastLineHash => _lineHash;
/// <summary>Absolute file offset of the next unread byte (exact — no decoder read-ahead).</summary>
public long Position => _readBufferFileOffset + _readPos;
@@ -78,6 +90,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
LastLineTerminated = false;
LastLineTruncated = false;
_lineLen = 0;
_lineHash = _hashLines ? Fnv1a64.OffsetBasis : 0UL;
var sawAnyByte = false;
while (true)
@@ -154,6 +167,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// tail (and thus any CR) discarded, so the check is skipped there.
if (LastLineTerminated && !LastLineTruncated && len > 0 && _line[start + len - 1] == (byte)'\r')
len--;
if (_hashLines)
{
// Fingerprint exactly the bytes the string is decoded from, so a tail that was
// first read unterminated and later gained its CRLF hashes the same.
var h = Fnv1a64.OffsetBasis;
var end = start + len;
for (var i = start; i < end; i++)
h = (h ^ _line[i]) * Fnv1a64.Prime;
_lineHash = h;
}
return len == 0 ? string.Empty : Encoding.UTF8.GetString(_line, start, len);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
using System.Text;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
{
/// <summary>FNV-1a 64-bit — the entry fingerprint used by the tracker's byte ledger.</summary>
internal static class Fnv1a64
{
public const ulong OffsetBasis = 14695981039346656037UL;
public const ulong Prime = 1099511628211UL;
public static ulong Fold(ulong hash, ulong value) => (hash ^ value) * Prime;
}
/// <summary>One assembled CMTrace entry: its byte range in the file, the fingerprint of those bytes and the text.</summary>
internal struct AssembledEntry
{
public long Offset;
public int Length;
public ulong Hash;
public string Text;
}
/// <summary>
/// Turns physical lines into CMTrace entries: a line is one entry, unless it opens
/// <c>&lt;![LOG[</c> without its <c>]LOG]!&gt;</c> close — then the continuation lines up to the
/// closing one belong to it. Oversized lines and capped entries are dropped together with
/// their remaining continuation lines, so no fragment is ever matched as an entry.
/// <para>
/// The read loop and the ledger verification (<c>ImeLogTracker.Overwrite.cs</c>) both feed
/// this class, which is what makes their entry boundaries — and therefore the fingerprints
/// they compare — identical by construction.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
internal sealed class CmTraceEntryAssembler
{
public enum Outcome
{
/// <summary>The line was absorbed into an open multiline entry.</summary>
Buffered,
/// <summary>An entry is complete.</summary>
Entry,
/// <summary>A line over the byte cap was dropped (its entry with it).</summary>
OversizedDropped,
/// <summary>An open multiline entry hit the line/char cap and was dropped.</summary>
CapDropped,
/// <summary>A continuation line of a dropped entry was skipped.</summary>
Skipped,
}
private const string LogOpen = "<![LOG[";
private const string LogClose = "]LOG]!>";
private readonly int _maxLines;
private readonly int _maxChars;
private StringBuilder _buffer;
private int _lineCount;
private long _entryStart;
private ulong _entryHash;
private bool _skippingDroppedEntry;
public CmTraceEntryAssembler(int maxMultiLineBufferLines, int maxEntryBytes)
{
_maxLines = maxMultiLineBufferLines;
_maxChars = maxEntryBytes;
}
/// <summary>True while a multiline entry is being assembled.</summary>
public bool HasOpenEntry => _buffer != null;
/// <summary>File offset of the open multiline entry (valid while <see cref="HasOpenEntry"/>).</summary>
public long OpenEntryStart => _entryStart;
/// <summary>Line count of the entry dropped by the last <see cref="Outcome.CapDropped"/>.</summary>
public int DroppedLines { get; private set; }
/// <summary>Char count of the entry dropped by the last <see cref="Outcome.CapDropped"/>.</summary>
public int DroppedChars { get; private set; }
/// <summary>
/// Feeds one physical line. <paramref name="lineStart"/> / <paramref name="positionAfter"/>
/// are the line's file offsets (start, next unread byte), <paramref name="lineHash"/> the
/// reader's raw-byte fingerprint of the line.
/// </summary>
public Outcome Feed(string line, long lineStart, long positionAfter, bool truncated, ulong lineHash, out AssembledEntry entry)
{
entry = default(AssembledEntry);
if (truncated)
{
// The capped prefix only tells whether the line opened an entry whose remaining
// lines must be skipped rather than matched as raw text.
if (_buffer != null)
{
_buffer = null;
_lineCount = 0;
_skippingDroppedEntry = true;
}
else if (line.StartsWith(LogOpen) && !line.Contains(LogClose))
{
_skippingDroppedEntry = true;
}
return Outcome.OversizedDropped;
}
if (_skippingDroppedEntry)
{
// A line opening a new entry ends the skip and is processed itself — checked
// BEFORE the close-tag test, because a complete single-line entry contains both.
if (line.StartsWith(LogOpen))
_skippingDroppedEntry = false;
else
{
if (line.Contains(LogClose)) _skippingDroppedEntry = false;
return Outcome.Skipped;
}
}
if (_buffer != null)
{
_buffer.Append('\n').Append(line);
_lineCount++;
_entryHash = Fnv1a64.Fold(_entryHash, lineHash);
if (line.Contains(LogClose))
{
entry = new AssembledEntry
{
Offset = _entryStart,
Length = (int)(positionAfter - _entryStart),
Hash = _entryHash,
Text = _buffer.ToString(),
};
_buffer = null;
_lineCount = 0;
return Outcome.Entry;
}
if (_lineCount >= _maxLines || _buffer.Length >= _maxChars)
{
DroppedLines = _lineCount;
DroppedChars = _buffer.Length;
_buffer = null;
_lineCount = 0;
_skippingDroppedEntry = true;
return Outcome.CapDropped;
}
return Outcome.Buffered;
}
if (line.StartsWith(LogOpen) && !line.Contains(LogClose))
{
_buffer = new StringBuilder(line);
_lineCount = 1;
_entryStart = lineStart;
_entryHash = lineHash;
return Outcome.Buffered;
}
entry = new AssembledEntry
{
Offset = lineStart,
Length = (int)(positionAfter - lineStart),
Hash = lineHash,
Text = line,
};
return Outcome.Entry;
}
}
}
@@ -222,20 +222,6 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// PowerShell script tracking handlers
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// Returns the current platform-script accumulator, or null when no platform script is active.
// Health-script (remediation) state is no longer tracked line-by-line — the HS-NEW-RESULT
// pattern delivers the full pre-detection / remediation / post-detection JSON in one shot
// via HandleHealthScriptResult. The platform branch keeps its line-by-line accumulator
// because PS-* patterns (PS-SCRIPT-CONTEXT / PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE / PS-AGENT-OUTPUT / …) still
// arrive across multiple log lines.
private ScriptExecutionState GetCurrentPlatformScript()
{
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId) &&
_pendingPlatformScripts.TryGetValue(_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId, out var state))
return state;
return null;
}
private void HandleScriptStarted(Match match, Dictionary<string, string> parameters)
{
var id = match.Groups["id"]?.Value;
@@ -282,27 +268,59 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// a regex Match).
internal void HandlePlatformScriptStarted(string id, string source = null)
{
// Stale-slot hardening (session eaf3d8c4): a replayed start line from a previous
// enrollment whose matching result never appeared (script was mid-run when that
// enrollment ended) leaves a pending slot with a days-old StartedAtUtc. When the
// same policy genuinely re-runs now, the fresh start must begin a NEW execution —
// otherwise the ancient start pairs with the fresh completion and the duration
// lies. > 24 h mirrors the adapter's source-timestamp staleness clamp.
var currentStartTs = LastMatchedLogTimestamp ?? DateTime.UtcNow;
if (_pendingPlatformScripts.TryGetValue(id, out var pendingSlot)
&& pendingSlot.StartedAtUtc.HasValue
&& currentStartTs - pendingSlot.StartedAtUtc.Value > TimeSpan.FromHours(24))
var currentStartTs = LastMatchedLogTimestamp ?? UtcNowProvider();
// A start line older than the result this policy already emitted is the late start
// line of THAT run: its AgentExecutor block surfaced after the IME result — the two
// files are read in turn (AgentExecutor.log first, but a script's exit line and IME's
// result line are 8–30 ms apart), a ledger rewind recovered the block, or the poll
// loop stalled (session e7f3c910: the late line opened a second slot, cleared the
// emitted-marker and turned the exit code that followed into a fallback duplicate
// 15 s later). It owns the lines behind it in its file and opens nothing. Strictly
// older: a start line at the result's own timestamp is the next run (source lines
// never tie; a low-resolution clock in a test may).
if (_platformScriptResultEmitted.TryGetValue(id, out var emittedResultTs) && currentStartTs < emittedResultTs)
{
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: discarding stale pending platform-script slot for {id} (started {pendingSlot.StartedAtUtc:o})");
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(id);
RecordInvocationMarker(id, isClose: false);
NoteInvocationActivity();
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: platform script start line for {id} (source: {source ?? "ime"}) predates its emitted result — late line of that run, not a new one");
return;
}
if (_pendingPlatformScripts.TryGetValue(id, out var pendingSlot))
{
if (pendingSlot.StartedAtUtc.HasValue && currentStartTs - pendingSlot.StartedAtUtc.Value > TimeSpan.FromHours(24))
{
// Stale-slot hardening (session eaf3d8c4): a replayed start line from a previous
// enrollment whose matching result never appeared (script was mid-run when that
// enrollment ended) leaves a pending slot with a days-old StartedAtUtc. When the
// same policy genuinely re-runs now, the fresh start must begin a NEW execution —
// otherwise the ancient start pairs with the fresh completion and the duration
// lies. > 24 h mirrors the adapter's source-timestamp staleness clamp.
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: discarding stale pending platform-script slot for {id} (started {pendingSlot.StartedAtUtc:o})");
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(id);
}
else if (pendingSlot.Result != null && pendingSlot.ResultObservedAtUtc.HasValue && currentStartTs >= pendingSlot.ResultObservedAtUtc.Value)
{
// The held run is over — a start line at or after its result is the next run.
// Emit what the held run has; its end block did not surface in time.
EmitPlatformScriptResult(pendingSlot, "the next run of this policy started");
}
else if (!pendingSlot.StartedAtUtc.HasValue)
{
// The slot was opened by its result while the start block was still hidden;
// the recovered start line dates the run.
pendingSlot.StartedAtUtc = currentStartTs;
_stateDirty = true;
}
}
if (!_pendingPlatformScripts.ContainsKey(id))
{
// A fresh start for this policy (no pending entry) begins a NEW execution.
// Clear any emitted-marker from a prior run so IME re-evaluations / retries of
// the same platform-script policy within one agent lifetime are not silently
// deduped away. Within a single run the start always precedes exit/result, so
// this never clears the current run's own marker.
// deduped away. A start line of the emitted run itself never reaches this point
// (the guard above), so this never clears the current run's own marker.
_platformScriptResultEmitted.Remove(id);
_pendingPlatformScripts[id] = new ScriptExecutionState
{
@@ -320,7 +338,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
try { OnScriptStarted?.Invoke(new ScriptStartedInfo { PolicyId = id, ScriptType = "platform" }); }
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Warning($"ImeLogTracker: OnScriptStarted handler threw: {ex.Message}"); }
}
_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId = id;
RecordInvocationMarker(id, isClose: false);
NoteInvocationActivity();
// Started lines fire twice per script (agentexecutor + ime source) and carry no
// outcome — the matching `platform script completed` line below carries result+exit
// and stays on Info. Keep starts on Debug so Info reflects script outcomes only.
@@ -329,42 +348,55 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// Routes line-by-line script-data handlers (context / exitCode / output) to the right
// accumulator based on the pattern's scriptType parameter. Health-script lines feed the
// single-slot _pendingHealthScript; platform-script lines feed _pendingPlatformScripts.
// single-slot _pendingHealthScript (the HS-NEW-RESULT JSON delivers the full cycle in one
// shot; the slot only enriches the early HS-COMPLIANCE signal). Platform-script lines feed
// _pendingPlatformScripts, and the slot that owns a line is decided by file position (see
// ImeLogTracker.Overwrite.cs), never by which script happened to start last.
private ScriptExecutionState GetCurrentScriptForLineUpdate(Dictionary<string, string> parameters)
=> GetCurrentScriptForLineUpdate(parameters, out _);
// ownerPolicyId names the platform script that owns the line by file position even when
// its pending slot is gone (the completion was already emitted); null for health-script
// lines and for lines no platform invocation owns.
private ScriptExecutionState GetCurrentScriptForLineUpdate(Dictionary<string, string> parameters, out string ownerPolicyId)
{
var scriptType = parameters != null && parameters.TryGetValue("scriptType", out var st) ? st : null;
return string.Equals(scriptType, "remediation", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
? _pendingHealthScript
: GetCurrentPlatformScript();
if (string.Equals(scriptType, "remediation", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
ownerPolicyId = null;
return _pendingHealthScript;
}
return ResolvePlatformScriptForCurrentEntry(out ownerPolicyId);
}
// Session 6b4993e5 fix — platform-script stdout/exit cross-contamination.
//
// AgentExecutor.exe hosts BOTH platform scripts (…\Policies\Scripts\<id>.ps1) and
// proactive-remediation scripts (…\IMECache\HealthScripts\<id>\detect.ps1), and writes
// their lines interleaved into the shared AgentExecutor.log. The policyId-less
// PS-AGENT-EXITCODE ("Powershell exit code is N") and PS-AGENT-OUTPUT ("write output
// done. output = …") lines are routed to whichever platform script
// _lastPlatformScriptPolicyId points at. A remediation invocation's start
// ("Adding argument remediationScript …") does NOT match PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START, so it
// never moves the pointer — its exit/output then bleed into the last-started PLATFORM
// script's slot (observed: platform c3e0124c emitted result=Failed but with exit 0 +
// stdout "[Compliant] No Classic Teams found" — the Teams remediation's output).
//
// Each AgentExecutor process logs "ExecutorLog AgentExecutor gets invoked" first, so a
// new banner means the previous invocation's line-capture context is over. Clearing the
// pointer here scopes line-capture to a single invocation: the immediately following
// "Adding argument powershell …\Policies\Scripts\<id>.ps1" (PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START)
// re-establishes it for a platform invocation, while a remediation invocation leaves it
// null so its exit/output are dropped (the remediation's authoritative data still
// arrives via HS-NEW-RESULT). The platform script's final result is unaffected — it is
// keyed by policyId via PS-SCRIPT-RESULT, not by this pointer.
private void HandleAgentExecutorInvocationBoundary()
// AgentExecutor.exe hosts platform scripts (…\Policies\Scripts\<id>.ps1) as well as
// detection, requirement and proactive-remediation scripts, and its policyId-less
// PS-AGENT-EXITCODE / PS-AGENT-OUTPUT lines belong to whichever invocation owns that
// file position. The banner closes the previous invocation; the argument line that
// follows opens the next one — as a platform script when PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START matched
// it, otherwise as an invocation whose exit/output are not captured (a remediation's
// authoritative data arrives via HS-NEW-RESULT; session 6b4993e5 saw its output bleed
// into a platform slot). "Agent executor completed" closes the invocation again.
private void HandleAgentExecutorInvocation()
{
if (_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId == null) return;
_logger.Debug(
$"ImeLogTracker: AgentExecutor invocation boundary — clearing platform-script line-capture pointer (was {_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId}).");
_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId = null;
RecordInvocationMarker(null, isClose: true);
NoteInvocationActivity();
}
private void HandleAgentInvocationArgument(string kind)
{
RecordInvocationMarker(null, isClose: false);
NoteInvocationActivity();
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(kind) && !string.Equals(kind, "powershell", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: AgentExecutor invocation of kind '{kind}' — exit/output lines not captured as a platform script");
}
private void HandleAgentExecutorCompleted()
{
RecordInvocationMarker(null, isClose: true);
// The end block was written at the executor's own stream position — if that lay
// behind the bookmark, the ledger check on the next pass finds it.
RequestOverwriteCheck();
}
private void HandleScriptContext(Match match, Dictionary<string, string> parameters)
@@ -372,6 +404,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
var context = match.Groups["context"]?.Value;
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(context)) return;
NoteInvocationActivity();
var runContext = string.Equals(context, "machine", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) ? "System" : "User";
var script = GetCurrentScriptForLineUpdate(parameters);
if (script != null)
@@ -386,18 +419,27 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
var exitCodeStr = match.Groups["exitCode"]?.Value;
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(exitCodeStr) || !int.TryParse(exitCodeStr, out var exitCode)) return;
var script = GetCurrentScriptForLineUpdate(parameters);
var script = GetCurrentScriptForLineUpdate(parameters, out var ownerPolicyId);
if (script != null)
{
script.ExitCode = exitCode;
// Stamp when we learned the script's exit code so the deadline-based fallback
// (FlushStalePlatformScriptResults) can fire if IME never logs its authoritative
// PS-SCRIPT-RESULT line in time. Prefer the source CMTrace timestamp (already
// UTC-normalized by the parser) so replayed log content is dated correctly.
if (string.Equals(script.ScriptType, "platform", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
script.ExitObservedAtUtc = LastMatchedLogTimestamp ?? DateTime.UtcNow;
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: script exit code {exitCode} for {script.PolicyId}");
}
ApplyExitCode(script, exitCode, LastMatchedLogTimestamp ?? UtcNowProvider());
else if (ownerPolicyId != null)
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: exit code {exitCode} belongs to platform script {ownerPolicyId}, whose completion was already emitted — dropped");
// An exit code means the executor just wrote its end block and IME is about to
// write the result — both land at a stale stream position when another process
// appended meanwhile. Check the ledgers on the next pass.
RequestOverwriteCheck();
}
private void ApplyExitCode(ScriptExecutionState script, int exitCode, DateTime observedAtUtc)
{
script.ExitCode = exitCode;
// Stamp when we learned the script's exit code so the deadline-based fallback
// (FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults) can fire if IME never logs its authoritative
// PS-SCRIPT-RESULT line in time. Prefer the source CMTrace timestamp (already
// UTC-normalized by the parser) so replayed log content is dated correctly.
if (string.Equals(script.ScriptType, "platform", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
script.ExitObservedAtUtc = observedAtUtc;
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: script exit code {exitCode} for {script.PolicyId}");
}
private void HandleScriptOutput(Match match, Dictionary<string, string> parameters)
@@ -446,22 +488,36 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(id)) return;
// Dedup: the deadline-based fallback (FlushStalePlatformScriptResults) may already have
CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResult(id, result, LastMatchedLogTimestamp, LastMatchedPatternId);
}
/// <summary>
/// The authoritative IME <c>PS-SCRIPT-RESULT</c> line of a platform script. Emits at once
/// when the executor end block (exit code, output) has been read already — the normal
/// order of the two files — and otherwise holds the completion: the end block reaches the
/// tracker after the result whenever a concurrent writer overwrote it (the check this
/// result triggers recovers it one pass later), when the AgentExecutor.log read of a pass
/// simply preceded the exit line by a few milliseconds, or when the poll loop stalled.
/// Emitting immediately lost the exit code in all three cases and, once the late start
/// line reopened the slot, produced a fallback duplicate (session e7f3c910).
/// <see cref="FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults"/> emits the held completion.
/// </summary>
internal void CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResult(string policyId, string result, DateTime? resultLineTimestampUtc, string patternId)
{
// Dedup: the deadline-based fallback (FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults) may already have
// emitted this script from its AgentExecutor exit code because IME's authoritative
// PS-SCRIPT-RESULT line arrived late. The fallback carries the same exit code + stdout,
// so re-emitting here would duplicate the timeline entry and inflate counts. Drop the
// now-redundant pending entry and skip.
if (_platformScriptResultEmitted.Contains(id))
if (_platformScriptResultEmitted.ContainsKey(policyId))
{
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: platform script {id} PS-SCRIPT-RESULT arrived after fallback emit — skipping duplicate");
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(id);
if (string.Equals(_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId, id, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId = null;
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: platform script {policyId} PS-SCRIPT-RESULT arrived after fallback emit — skipping duplicate");
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(policyId);
return;
}
// Merge with pending AgentExecutor data if available
if (_pendingPlatformScripts.TryGetValue(id, out var script))
if (_pendingPlatformScripts.TryGetValue(policyId, out var script))
{
// Stale-result guard: on an intra-lifetime re-run of the same policy, run 1's
// late PS-SCRIPT-RESULT can arrive after run 2's start line already created a
@@ -471,10 +527,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// line in the source log, so a result older than the pending slot's start
// belongs to a previous run — drop it and keep the live slot intact.
if (script.StartedAtUtc.HasValue
&& LastMatchedLogTimestamp.HasValue
&& LastMatchedLogTimestamp.Value < script.StartedAtUtc.Value)
&& resultLineTimestampUtc.HasValue
&& resultLineTimestampUtc.Value < script.StartedAtUtc.Value)
{
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: platform script {id} result predates the current run's start — stale result from a previous run, skipping");
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: platform script {policyId} result predates the current run's start — stale result from a previous run, skipping");
return;
}
}
@@ -482,70 +538,111 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
{
script = new ScriptExecutionState
{
PolicyId = id,
PolicyId = policyId,
ScriptType = "platform"
};
_pendingPlatformScripts[policyId] = script;
}
script.Result = result;
script.ResultSource = "ime_policy_result";
_logger.Info($"ImeLogTracker: platform script completed: {id}, result={result}, exit={script.ExitCode}");
EmitScriptEvent(script);
_platformScriptResultEmitted.Add(id);
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(id);
script.ResultObservedAtUtc = resultLineTimestampUtc ?? UtcNowProvider();
script.ResultPatternId = patternId;
_stateDirty = true;
if (script.ExitCode.HasValue)
{
EmitPlatformScriptResult(script);
}
else
{
script.ResultHeldSinceUtc = UtcNowProvider();
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: platform script {policyId} result={result} seen before its executor end block — holding the completion up to {PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace.TotalSeconds:F0}s for the exit code");
}
// The result block is IME's first write after the script wait — the executor's end
// block in the other file may have landed behind the bookmark at the same time.
RequestOverwriteCheck();
}
/// <summary>
/// The one emit path for platform-script completions (IME result, held result, exit-code
/// fallback): event, emitted-marker with the run's source timestamp, slot closed.
/// </summary>
private void EmitPlatformScriptResult(ScriptExecutionState script, string note = null)
{
_logger.Info($"ImeLogTracker: platform script completed: {script.PolicyId}, result={script.Result}, exit={script.ExitCode}{(note != null ? $" ({note})" : string.Empty)}");
EmitScriptEvent(script);
_platformScriptResultEmitted[script.PolicyId] = script.ResultObservedAtUtc ?? script.ExitObservedAtUtc ?? UtcNowProvider();
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(script.PolicyId);
_stateDirty = true;
if (string.Equals(_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId, id, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId = null;
}
/// <summary>
/// Grace period after a platform script's AgentExecutor exit code is observed before
/// <see cref="FlushStalePlatformScriptResults"/> emits a completion from that exit code.
/// IME logs its authoritative <c>PS-SCRIPT-RESULT</c> line within ~1 s of exit on healthy
/// reporting cycles, so 15 s lets the normal path win virtually always — the fallback is a
/// true safety net for the case where IME has not flushed its batch-send to the Microsoft
/// service before the (often short) Autopilot enrollment ends and the agent terminates.
/// <see cref="FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults"/> emits a completion from that exit code.
/// IME logs its authoritative <c>PS-SCRIPT-RESULT</c> line within ~1 s of exit; when it
/// is missing after 15 s it was hidden by a concurrent writer (the ledger check in
/// <c>ImeLogTracker.Overwrite.cs</c> recovers that line) or the enrollment ended before
/// IME wrote it — this fallback is the safety net for the remaining cases.
/// </summary>
private static readonly TimeSpan PlatformScriptResultGrace = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(15);
/// <summary>
/// Policy IDs of platform scripts already emitted (via either the authoritative
/// PS-SCRIPT-RESULT path or the exit-code fallback). Guards against double emission when
/// both fire for the same script.
/// How long an IME result waits for the executor end block of its run before the
/// completion goes out without an exit code. An overwritten end block surfaces on the
/// pass after the result (100 ms, the result triggers the ledger check); a stalled poll
/// loop was measured at 2 s (session e7f3c910, VM at 100 % CPU). Well below the 15 s
/// exit-code fallback, and the event keeps the result line's timestamp — only its
/// delivery waits.
/// </summary>
private readonly HashSet<string> _platformScriptResultEmitted =
new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
internal static readonly TimeSpan PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5);
/// <summary>
/// Emits a <c>script_completed</c>/<c>script_failed</c> for every pending platform script
/// that has a known AgentExecutor exit code but whose IME <c>PS-SCRIPT-RESULT</c> line has
/// not arrived within <see cref="PlatformScriptResultGrace"/>. Without this, scripts that
/// completed shortly before the agent terminates are silently dropped (the
/// <c>_pendingPlatformScripts</c> buffer is neither persisted nor flushed on dispose), so a
/// device that ran N platform scripts could surface only the long-running one that happened
/// to get its IME result logged in time. Result is derived from the exit code (0 → Success,
/// else Failed) and tagged <c>resultSource=agentexecutor_fallback</c> so the data is honest
/// about its provenance.
/// <para>
/// Runs on the single-threaded polling loop (no locking needed, same as the handlers).
/// <paramref name="force"/> bypasses the grace check for the final pass on shutdown.
/// </para>
/// Platform scripts already emitted (via the authoritative PS-SCRIPT-RESULT path or the
/// exit-code fallback), keyed by policy id with the source timestamp of the emitted run
/// (the result line, or the exit line for a fallback emit). Guards against double emission
/// when both paths fire for the same script, and tells a late start line of the emitted
/// run from the start of the next run.
/// </summary>
internal void FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(DateTime nowUtc, bool force = false)
private readonly Dictionary<string, DateTime> _platformScriptResultEmitted =
new Dictionary<string, DateTime>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
/// <summary>
/// End-of-pass emit for pending platform scripts, two cases:
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item>A held IME result (<see cref="ScriptExecutionState.ResultHeldSinceUtc"/>) goes
/// out once its executor end block has been read — the block arrives within one pass, so
/// stdout/stderr are in by now — or after <see cref="PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace"/>.</item>
/// <item>A script with a known AgentExecutor exit code but no IME <c>PS-SCRIPT-RESULT</c>
/// line within <see cref="PlatformScriptResultGrace"/> is emitted from the exit code
/// (0 → Success, else Failed), tagged <c>resultSource=agentexecutor_fallback</c> so the
/// data is honest about its provenance. Without this, scripts that completed shortly
/// before the agent terminates were silently dropped.</item>
/// </list>
/// Runs on the single-threaded polling loop (no locking needed, same as the handlers).
/// <paramref name="force"/> bypasses both grace checks for the final pass on shutdown.
/// </summary>
internal void FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(DateTime nowUtc, bool force = false)
{
if (_pendingPlatformScripts.Count == 0) return;
List<string> toRemove = null;
foreach (var kv in _pendingPlatformScripts)
var fallbackEmitted = false;
foreach (var script in _pendingPlatformScripts.Values.ToList())
{
var script = kv.Value;
// Already emitted by the authoritative path — just drop the stale buffer entry.
if (_platformScriptResultEmitted.Contains(script.PolicyId))
if (_platformScriptResultEmitted.ContainsKey(script.PolicyId))
{
(toRemove ??= new List<string>()).Add(kv.Key);
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(script.PolicyId);
_stateDirty = true;
continue;
}
if (script.Result != null)
{
if (script.ExitCode.HasValue)
EmitPlatformScriptResult(script, "executor end block read after the result");
else if (force || !script.ResultHeldSinceUtc.HasValue || nowUtc - script.ResultHeldSinceUtc.Value >= PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace)
EmitPlatformScriptResult(script, $"no executor end block within {PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace.TotalSeconds:F0}s{(force ? ", shutdown flush" : string.Empty)}");
continue;
}
@@ -560,30 +657,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
script.Result = script.ExitCode.Value == 0 ? "Success" : "Failed";
script.ResultSource = "agentexecutor_fallback";
_logger.Info(
$"ImeLogTracker: platform script {script.PolicyId} result not seen within " +
$"{PlatformScriptResultGrace.TotalSeconds:F0}s{(force ? " (shutdown flush)" : "")} — " +
$"emitting from AgentExecutor exit code {script.ExitCode.Value} (fallback)");
EmitScriptEvent(script);
_platformScriptResultEmitted.Add(script.PolicyId);
(toRemove ??= new List<string>()).Add(kv.Key);
EmitPlatformScriptResult(script,
$"result not seen within {PlatformScriptResultGrace.TotalSeconds:F0}s{(force ? ", shutdown flush" : string.Empty)} — emitted from AgentExecutor exit code {script.ExitCode.Value} (fallback)");
fallbackEmitted = true;
}
if (toRemove != null)
{
// The flush can fire on a quiet polling cycle (grace expiry with no new log
// lines), where nothing else marks state dirty — the emitted-markers must reach
// the state file before a restart or the restarted tracker re-emits (H1).
_stateDirty = true;
foreach (var key in toRemove)
{
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(key);
if (string.Equals(_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId, key, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId = null;
}
}
// The fallback is an end signal like the others: the result line it stood in for
// may sit overwritten behind the bookmark of the other file.
if (fallbackEmitted) RequestOverwriteCheck();
}
/// <summary>Test seam: inject a pending platform script as if AgentExecutor.log had reported
@@ -602,49 +683,26 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
Stdout = stdout,
StartedAtUtc = startedAtUtc,
};
_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId = policyId;
NextTestEntry();
RecordInvocationMarker(policyId, isClose: false);
}
/// <summary>Test seam: simulate the authoritative IME PS-SCRIPT-RESULT path for a platform
/// script (same code as <see cref="HandleScriptCompleted"/> minus regex extraction).
/// <paramref name="resultLineTimestampUtc"/> stands in for the CMTrace timestamp of the
/// PS-SCRIPT-RESULT line (production reads it via <see cref="LastMatchedLogTimestamp"/>).</summary>
/// <summary>Test seam: the authoritative IME PS-SCRIPT-RESULT path for a platform script
/// (the production handler minus regex extraction). <paramref name="resultLineTimestampUtc"/>
/// stands in for the CMTrace timestamp of the PS-SCRIPT-RESULT line (production reads it
/// via <see cref="LastMatchedLogTimestamp"/>, the fallback here).</summary>
internal void CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting(string policyId, string result, DateTime? resultLineTimestampUtc = null)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(policyId)) return;
CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResult(policyId, result, resultLineTimestampUtc ?? LastMatchedLogTimestamp, "PS-SCRIPT-RESULT");
}
if (_platformScriptResultEmitted.Contains(policyId))
{
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(policyId);
if (string.Equals(_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId, policyId, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId = null;
return;
}
/// <summary>Test seam: the AgentExecutor exit-code line of a pending platform script (the
/// production handler minus regex extraction and positional ownership).</summary>
internal void RecordPlatformScriptExitCodeForTesting(string policyId, int exitCode, DateTime observedAtUtc)
{
if (_pendingPlatformScripts.TryGetValue(policyId, out var script))
{
// Mirror of HandleScriptCompleted's stale-result guard: a result older than the
// pending slot's start belongs to a previous run of the same policy.
if (script.StartedAtUtc.HasValue
&& resultLineTimestampUtc.HasValue
&& resultLineTimestampUtc.Value < script.StartedAtUtc.Value)
{
return;
}
}
else
{
script = new ScriptExecutionState { PolicyId = policyId, ScriptType = "platform" };
}
script.Result = result;
script.ResultSource = "ime_policy_result";
EmitScriptEvent(script);
_platformScriptResultEmitted.Add(policyId);
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(policyId);
if (string.Equals(_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId, policyId, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId = null;
_stateDirty = true;
ApplyExitCode(script, exitCode, observedAtUtc);
}
/// <summary>
@@ -794,6 +852,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
return;
}
HandleHealthScriptResultJson(json);
// A remediation executor just ended too — its end block may sit behind the bookmark.
RequestOverwriteCheck();
}
/// <summary>
@@ -78,243 +78,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
try
{
var fileInfo = new FileInfo(filePath);
if (!fileInfo.Exists) continue;
// Captured BEFORE MarkChecked below stamps this pass. Growth measured
// against a previously observed state is what makes this pass's lines valid
// "written now" anchors — for the per-file measurement AND per-line anchoring.
var hadPreviousObservation = _positionTracker.HasSeen(filePath);
var lastCheckedUtc = _positionTracker.GetLastCheckedUtc(filePath);
var passNowUtc = UtcNowProvider();
var startPos = _positionTracker.GetSafePosition(filePath, fileInfo.Length);
// Every look counts, including "no new data" and an empty first sight: the
// NEXT pass's freshness window is measured from here. Restored bookmarks
// deliberately carry no LastCheckedUtc — the first pass after a restart reads
// downtime backlog and must never count as fresh.
_positionTracker.MarkChecked(filePath, passNowUtc);
if (startPos >= fileInfo.Length)
{
// M2: guard the interpolated string so it isn't built every 100 ms tick
// (per file) when Trace is off — which is the production default (Info).
if (_logger.LogLevel >= AgentLogLevel.Trace)
_logger.Trace($"ImeLogTracker: {Path.GetFileName(filePath)} — no new data (pos={startPos}, size={fileInfo.Length})");
continue;
}
if (_logger.LogLevel >= AgentLogLevel.Trace)
_logger.Trace($"ImeLogTracker: reading {Path.GetFileName(filePath)} from pos {startPos} (size={fileInfo.Length}, delta={fileInfo.Length - startPos})");
_currentSourceFileName = Path.GetFileName(filePath);
_currentPassLinesAreFresh = hadPreviousObservation
&& lastCheckedUtc > DateTime.MinValue
&& (passNowUtc - lastCheckedUtc) <= FreshLineMaxAge;
// Newest bias-less line of this pass — the calibration anchor. Bias-carrying
// lines are skipped: they already state the writer's offset, so they need no
// measurement and must not overwrite one.
CmTraceLogEntry calibrationAnchor = null;
using (var stream = new FileStream(filePath, FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read, FileShare.ReadWrite))
{
stream.Seek(startPos, SeekOrigin.Begin);
var reader = new BoundedLineReader(stream, MaxEntryBytes);
var stats = new PassStats();
// Buffer for multiline CMTrace entries (e.g. AgentExecutor.log
// "write output done. output = ..." spans many lines)
StringBuilder multiLineBuffer = null;
int multiLineCount = 0;
// Set after a capped entry is dropped: its remaining physical lines
// are skipped instead of being matched as raw text, until the entry
// closes or a new entry begins (so no real entry is lost).
bool skippingDroppedEntry = false;
// File offset where the entry currently being assembled/processed
// begins — the bookmark to fall back to when that entry is NOT
// consumed (cancellation, or a held-back unterminated tail).
long entryStart = startPos;
// Where the next pass resumes. EOF unless an entry is left unconsumed.
long resumePos;
while (true)
{
// CancellationToken.None: cancellation is honoured by the explicit
// check below (exact bookmark) rather than by an exception out of
// the read, which the poll loop would log as an error.
var line = await reader.ReadLineAsync(CancellationToken.None);
if (line == null)
{
// EOF. An in-flight multiline entry here is an entry the writer
// has not finished — hold it back (see HoldBackTail) instead of
// dropping it and raw-matching its remaining lines next pass.
if (multiLineBuffer != null && HoldBackTail(filePath, entryStart, fileInfo.Length, passNowUtc))
{
_heldTailCount++;
resumePos = entryStart;
break;
}
resumePos = reader.Position;
break;
}
if (token.IsCancellationRequested)
{
// Exact bookmark: nothing of this line (or of the multiline
// entry it belongs to) has been handled.
resumePos = multiLineBuffer != null ? entryStart : reader.LastLineStart;
break;
}
if (multiLineBuffer == null)
entryStart = reader.LastLineStart;
_linesRead++;
// A physical line over the cap is never matched: its captures would be
// cut and the regexes would run over attacker-sized input. The capped
// prefix is enough to tell whether it opened an entry whose remaining
// lines must be skipped rather than raw-matched.
if (reader.LastLineTruncated)
{
stats.OversizedLines++;
_oversizedLines++;
if (multiLineBuffer != null)
{
multiLineBuffer = null;
multiLineCount = 0;
skippingDroppedEntry = true;
}
else if (line.StartsWith("<![LOG[") && !line.Contains("]LOG]!>"))
{
skippingDroppedEntry = true;
}
continue;
}
if (!reader.LastLineTerminated && multiLineBuffer == null
&& HoldBackTail(filePath, reader.LastLineStart, fileInfo.Length, passNowUtc))
{
// Unterminated single line at EOF: the writer is mid-line.
_heldTailCount++;
resumePos = reader.LastLineStart;
break;
}
if (skippingDroppedEntry)
{
// A line opening a new entry ends the skip and is processed
// itself — checked BEFORE the close-tag test, because a complete
// single-line entry contains both and must not be consumed as
// the dropped entry's close.
if (line.StartsWith("<![LOG["))
skippingDroppedEntry = false;
else
{
if (line.Contains("]LOG]!>")) skippingDroppedEntry = false;
continue;
}
}
// --- Multiline CMTrace buffering ---
// CMTrace entries: <![LOG[message]LOG]!><time=...>
// When message contains newlines, the entry spans multiple lines.
// We buffer until we find the closing ]LOG]!> tag.
if (multiLineBuffer != null)
{
// Continuing a multiline entry
multiLineBuffer.Append('\n').Append(line);
multiLineCount++;
if (line.Contains("]LOG]!>"))
{
// Entry complete — use the assembled line
line = multiLineBuffer.ToString();
multiLineBuffer = null;
multiLineCount = 0;
}
else if (multiLineCount >= MaxMultiLineBufferLines || multiLineBuffer.Length >= MaxEntryBytes)
{
// Safety limit — discard to bound memory and parser work. Warning
// (not Debug) so a capped entry is visible in the client log at the
// default level: a real IME entry this large would be news.
_logger.Warning($"ImeLogTracker: discarding multiline CMTrace buffer in {Path.GetFileName(filePath)} after {multiLineCount} lines / {multiLineBuffer.Length} chars (cap {MaxMultiLineBufferLines} lines / {MaxEntryBytes} chars) — entry dropped");
multiLineBuffer = null;
multiLineCount = 0;
skippingDroppedEntry = true;
continue;
}
else
{
// Still accumulating — read next line
continue;
}
}
else if (line.StartsWith("<![LOG[") && !line.Contains("]LOG]!>"))
{
// Start of a multiline CMTrace entry
multiLineBuffer = new StringBuilder(line);
multiLineCount = 1;
continue;
}
// --- Normal processing (single-line or completed multiline) ---
CmTraceLogEntry entry;
string messageToMatch;
_currentEntryOffset = entryStart;
if (CmTraceLogParser.TryParseLine(line, out entry))
{
messageToMatch = entry.Message;
if (entry.HasTimestamp && !entry.BiasMinutes.HasValue)
calibrationAnchor = entry;
}
else
{
// Non-CMTrace line - match raw
messageToMatch = line;
entry = null;
}
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(messageToMatch)) continue;
// Simulation mode delay
if (SimulationMode && entry != null)
{
await ApplySimulationDelay(ResolveEntryUtc(entry), token);
}
MatchLine(filePath, line, messageToMatch, entry, stats);
}
ClearHeldTailIfConsumed(filePath, resumePos);
_positionTracker.SetPosition(filePath, resumePos);
_stateDirty = true;
backlogBytes += Math.Max(0, fileInfo.Length - resumePos);
// One line per pass and file, never per hostile line: the counters are
// the operator's only trace that matching was skipped or cut short.
if (stats.RegexTimeouts > 0 || stats.BudgetBreaks > 0 || stats.OversizedLines > 0)
{
_logger.Warning(
$"ImeLogTracker: {Path.GetFileName(filePath)} pass skipped work — " +
$"oversizedLines={stats.OversizedLines} (cap {MaxEntryBytes} bytes), " +
$"regexTimeouts={stats.RegexTimeouts}, lineBudgetBreaks={stats.BudgetBreaks}" +
(stats.FirstSkippedPatternId != null ? $", firstSkippedPattern={stats.FirstSkippedPatternId}" : string.Empty));
RaiseTrackerDegradedOnce(Path.GetFileName(filePath), stats.FirstSkippedPatternId);
}
// Calibrate AFTER the pass: this pass's lines were resolved with the
// offset established previously, at most one poll (100 ms) old. Buffering
// the pass to calibrate first is not an option — the first pass of
// AppWorkload.log can be hundreds of MB. The cost is a warm-up of one
// growing pass, during which lines fall back to the reader zone and are
// flagged as such.
if (hadPreviousObservation && calibrationAnchor != null)
CalibrateFrom(_currentSourceFileName, Path.GetFileName(filePath), calibrationAnchor);
_currentEntryOffset = -1;
}
backlogBytes += await ProcessFileAsync(filePath, token);
}
catch (FileNotFoundException) { }
catch (IOException ex)
@@ -330,6 +94,246 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
}
}
/// <summary>
/// One pass over one file: the bytes behind the bookmark, on a multi-writer file preceded
/// by the overwrite check that may move the bookmark back first (see
/// <c>ImeLogTracker.Overwrite.cs</c>). Returns the file's remaining backlog in bytes.
/// </summary>
private async Task<long> ProcessFileAsync(string filePath, CancellationToken token)
{
var fileInfo = new FileInfo(filePath);
if (!fileInfo.Exists) return 0;
// Captured BEFORE MarkChecked below stamps this pass. Growth measured
// against a previously observed state is what makes this pass's lines valid
// "written now" anchors — for the per-file measurement AND per-line anchoring.
var hadPreviousObservation = _positionTracker.HasSeen(filePath);
var lastCheckedUtc = _positionTracker.GetLastCheckedUtc(filePath);
var passNowUtc = UtcNowProvider();
var startPos = _positionTracker.GetSafePosition(filePath, fileInfo.Length);
// Every look counts, including "no new data" and an empty first sight: the
// NEXT pass's freshness window is measured from here. Restored bookmarks
// deliberately carry no LastCheckedUtc — the first pass after a restart reads
// downtime backlog and must never count as fresh.
_positionTracker.MarkChecked(filePath, passNowUtc);
var fileName = Path.GetFileName(filePath);
var ledger = IsMultiWriterLogFile(fileName) ? GetLedger(fileName) : null;
// Set by a rewind: entries that still read unchanged behind the old bookmark are
// skipped, and nothing below the old bookmark is fresh or a calibration anchor.
HashSet<LedgerEntry> rewoundEntries = null;
long oldBookmark = -1;
if (ledger != null)
{
var rewindTo = await PrepareLedgerAsync(filePath, fileName, ledger, startPos, passNowUtc, token);
if (rewindTo >= 0)
{
rewoundEntries = ApplyRewind(filePath, fileName, ledger, rewindTo, startPos);
oldBookmark = startPos;
startPos = rewindTo;
}
}
if (startPos >= fileInfo.Length)
{
// M2: guard the interpolated string so it isn't built every 100 ms tick
// (per file) when Trace is off — which is the production default (Info).
if (_logger.LogLevel >= AgentLogLevel.Trace)
_logger.Trace($"ImeLogTracker: {fileName} — no new data (pos={startPos}, size={fileInfo.Length})");
return 0;
}
if (_logger.LogLevel >= AgentLogLevel.Trace)
_logger.Trace($"ImeLogTracker: reading {fileName} from pos {startPos} (size={fileInfo.Length}, delta={fileInfo.Length - startPos})");
_currentSourceFileName = fileName;
var passLinesAreFresh = hadPreviousObservation
&& lastCheckedUtc > DateTime.MinValue
&& (passNowUtc - lastCheckedUtc) <= FreshLineMaxAge;
_currentPassLinesAreFresh = passLinesAreFresh;
// Newest bias-less line of this pass — the calibration anchor. Bias-carrying
// lines are skipped: they already state the writer's offset, so they need no
// measurement and must not overwrite one.
CmTraceLogEntry calibrationAnchor = null;
using (var stream = new FileStream(filePath, FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read, FileShare.ReadWrite))
{
// Guard zone: the file grew and is open anyway — re-check the entries just behind
// the bookmark, where a stale writer's block lands when it is short.
if (ledger != null && rewoundEntries == null && ledger.Entries.Count > 0)
{
var guardFrom = ledger.OffsetOfEntryAtOrAfter(startPos - OverwriteGuardBytes);
if (guardFrom >= 0 && guardFrom < startPos)
{
var divergence = await FindOverwriteAsync(stream, ledger, guardFrom, startPos, token);
_verifiedBytes += startPos - guardFrom;
if (divergence >= 0)
{
// The guard saw only the tail of the ledger; the block may start earlier.
var earliest = await FindOverwriteAsync(stream, ledger, ledger.StartOffset, startPos, token);
_verifiedBytes += startPos - ledger.StartOffset;
_verifyPasses++;
if (earliest >= 0) divergence = earliest;
rewoundEntries = ApplyRewind(filePath, fileName, ledger, divergence, startPos);
oldBookmark = startPos;
startPos = divergence;
}
}
}
stream.Seek(startPos, SeekOrigin.Begin);
var reader = new BoundedLineReader(stream, MaxEntryBytes, hashLines: ledger != null);
var assembler = new CmTraceEntryAssembler(MaxMultiLineBufferLines, MaxEntryBytes);
var stats = new PassStats();
var firstEntry = true;
// Where the next pass resumes. EOF unless an entry is left unconsumed.
long resumePos;
while (true)
{
// CancellationToken.None: cancellation is honoured by the explicit
// check below (exact bookmark) rather than by an exception out of
// the read, which the poll loop would log as an error.
var line = await reader.ReadLineAsync(CancellationToken.None);
if (line == null)
{
// EOF. An in-flight multiline entry here is an entry the writer
// has not finished — hold it back (see HoldBackTail) instead of
// dropping it and raw-matching its remaining lines next pass.
if (assembler.HasOpenEntry && HoldBackTail(filePath, assembler.OpenEntryStart, fileInfo.Length, passNowUtc))
{
_heldTailCount++;
resumePos = assembler.OpenEntryStart;
break;
}
resumePos = reader.Position;
break;
}
if (token.IsCancellationRequested)
{
// Exact bookmark: nothing of this line (or of the multiline
// entry it belongs to) has been handled.
resumePos = assembler.HasOpenEntry ? assembler.OpenEntryStart : reader.LastLineStart;
break;
}
_linesRead++;
if (!reader.LastLineTruncated && !reader.LastLineTerminated && !assembler.HasOpenEntry
&& HoldBackTail(filePath, reader.LastLineStart, fileInfo.Length, passNowUtc))
{
// Unterminated single line at EOF: the writer is mid-line.
_heldTailCount++;
resumePos = reader.LastLineStart;
break;
}
AssembledEntry entry;
var outcome = assembler.Feed(line, reader.LastLineStart, reader.Position, reader.LastLineTruncated, reader.LastLineHash, out entry);
if (outcome == CmTraceEntryAssembler.Outcome.OversizedDropped)
{
// A physical line over the cap is never matched: its captures would be
// cut and the regexes would run over attacker-sized input.
stats.OversizedLines++;
_oversizedLines++;
continue;
}
if (outcome == CmTraceEntryAssembler.Outcome.CapDropped)
{
// Warning (not Debug) so a capped entry is visible in the client log at the
// default level: a real IME entry this large would be news.
_logger.Warning($"ImeLogTracker: discarding multiline CMTrace buffer in {fileName} after {assembler.DroppedLines} lines / {assembler.DroppedChars} chars (cap {MaxMultiLineBufferLines} lines / {MaxEntryBytes} chars) — entry dropped");
continue;
}
if (outcome != CmTraceEntryAssembler.Outcome.Entry) continue;
if (firstEntry)
{
firstEntry = false;
// A fragment right at the bookmark of a multi-writer file (the previous
// entry ended exactly here, this one does not open an entry) is the tail of
// a block a stale writer laid over already-read bytes: verify before reading on.
if (ledger != null && rewoundEntries == null && entry.Offset == ledger.EndOffset
&& ledger.LastFragmentOffset != entry.Offset && !entry.Text.StartsWith("<![LOG["))
{
ledger.VerifyRequested = true;
ledger.LastFragmentOffset = entry.Offset;
resumePos = entry.Offset;
break;
}
}
if (ledger != null) ledger.Record(entry);
if (rewoundEntries != null && rewoundEntries.Contains(new LedgerEntry { Offset = entry.Offset, Hash = entry.Hash }))
continue; // unchanged behind the old bookmark — processed before the rewind
_currentPassLinesAreFresh = passLinesAreFresh && entry.Offset >= oldBookmark;
// --- Normal processing (single-line or completed multiline) ---
CmTraceLogEntry parsed;
string messageToMatch;
_currentEntryOffset = entry.Offset;
if (CmTraceLogParser.TryParseLine(entry.Text, out parsed))
{
messageToMatch = parsed.Message;
if (parsed.HasTimestamp && !parsed.BiasMinutes.HasValue && entry.Offset >= oldBookmark)
calibrationAnchor = parsed;
}
else
{
// Non-CMTrace line - match raw
messageToMatch = entry.Text;
parsed = null;
}
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(messageToMatch)) continue;
// Simulation mode delay
if (SimulationMode && parsed != null)
{
await ApplySimulationDelay(ResolveEntryUtc(parsed), token);
}
MatchLine(filePath, entry.Text, messageToMatch, parsed, stats);
}
ClearHeldTailIfConsumed(filePath, resumePos);
_positionTracker.SetPosition(filePath, resumePos);
_stateDirty = true;
if (ledger != null) ledger.TrimBelow(RetentionFloor(fileName, resumePos));
// One line per pass and file, never per hostile line: the counters are
// the operator's only trace that matching was skipped or cut short.
if (stats.RegexTimeouts > 0 || stats.BudgetBreaks > 0 || stats.OversizedLines > 0)
{
_logger.Warning(
$"ImeLogTracker: {fileName} pass skipped work — " +
$"oversizedLines={stats.OversizedLines} (cap {MaxEntryBytes} bytes), " +
$"regexTimeouts={stats.RegexTimeouts}, lineBudgetBreaks={stats.BudgetBreaks}" +
(stats.FirstSkippedPatternId != null ? $", firstSkippedPattern={stats.FirstSkippedPatternId}" : string.Empty));
RaiseTrackerDegradedOnce(fileName, stats.FirstSkippedPatternId);
}
// Calibrate AFTER the pass: this pass's lines were resolved with the
// offset established previously, at most one poll (100 ms) old. Buffering
// the pass to calibrate first is not an option — the first pass of
// AppWorkload.log can be hundreds of MB. The cost is a warm-up of one
// growing pass, during which lines fall back to the reader zone and are
// flagged as such.
if (hadPreviousObservation && calibrationAnchor != null)
CalibrateFrom(_currentSourceFileName, fileName, calibrationAnchor);
_currentEntryOffset = -1;
return Math.Max(0, fileInfo.Length - resumePos);
}
}
private sealed class PassStats
{
public int RegexTimeouts;
@@ -828,10 +832,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
break;
case "resetplatformscriptcontext":
// Session 6b4993e5 fix: a fresh AgentExecutor invocation banner
// ("ExecutorLog AgentExecutor gets invoked") ends the previous
// invocation's line-capture context. See HandleAgentExecutorInvocationBoundary.
HandleAgentExecutorInvocationBoundary();
// "ExecutorLog AgentExecutor gets invoked": a new process — the executor
// lines that follow belong to its own argument line, never to the
// previous invocation (session 6b4993e5).
HandleAgentExecutorInvocation();
break;
case "agentinvocationargument":
HandleAgentInvocationArgument(match.Groups["kind"]?.Value);
break;
case "agentexecutorcompleted":
HandleAgentExecutorCompleted();
break;
case "healthscriptresult":
@@ -859,11 +871,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
/// <c>_activePatterns</c> → <see cref="HandlePatternMatch"/>). Lets unit tests drive the
/// script / app handlers deterministically without writing CMTrace files or spinning the
/// poller. <paramref name="sourceTimestampUtc"/> populates the entry timestamp some
/// handlers read via <see cref="LastMatchedLogTimestamp"/>.
/// handlers read via <see cref="LastMatchedLogTimestamp"/>. <paramref name="sourceFileName"/>
/// names the log the line comes from — positional ownership is per file — and stays in
/// effect for later calls; omitted, the line lands in the test file.
/// </summary>
internal void ProcessLogMessageForTest(string message, DateTime? sourceTimestampUtc = null)
internal void ProcessLogMessageForTest(string message, DateTime? sourceTimestampUtc = null, string sourceFileName = null)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(message)) return;
if (sourceFileName != null) _currentSourceFileName = sourceFileName;
NextTestEntry();
// The test seam hands in an already-resolved UTC instant, so it takes the same route a
// writer-declared bias does: TimestampUtc set, no zone left to guess.
var entry = sourceTimestampUtc.HasValue
@@ -0,0 +1,490 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
{
/// <summary>
/// Partial: overwrite-aware tailing of the two IME logs that several processes append to.
/// <para>
/// IME's trace listener opens each log once per process with FileMode.Append and
/// FileShare.ReadWrite and writes at its own stream position afterwards. AgentExecutor.exe
/// (two processes per user-context script, one per detection or remediation script) has such
/// a listener on AgentExecutor.log AND on IntuneManagementExtension.log. Whenever one process
/// resumes writing after another one appended, it overwrites those bytes: the final file
/// holds the last writer, while a tailer that trusts its bookmark read the first version and
/// never sees the second (session 46749560: 6 of 16 script results, 4 of 16 exit blocks).
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// So the bytes behind the bookmark are not immutable. The tracker keeps a fingerprint ledger
/// of every entry it read from these files, re-verifies it while script invocations are in
/// flight or right after a signal that a stale writer just wrote, and on the first changed
/// entry rewinds the bookmark — processing only entries it has not processed before.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
public partial class ImeLogTracker
{
/// <summary>Live logs with more than one writing process; archived rotations are closed files.</summary>
internal static readonly string[] MultiWriterLogFiles = { "AgentExecutor.log", "IntuneManagementExtension.log" };
/// <summary>Ledger depth behind the bookmark while no script is in flight.</summary>
internal const int LedgerRetentionBytes = 1024 * 1024;
/// <summary>Hard cap on the ledger depth, whatever is in flight.</summary>
internal const int LedgerMaxBytes = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
/// <summary>Entries this close to the bookmark are re-checked on every pass that found growth (the file is open anyway).</summary>
internal const int OverwriteGuardBytes = 4 * 1024;
/// <summary>After a restart the ledger is seeded from this many bytes before the persisted bookmark.</summary>
internal const int RestartSeedBytes = 64 * 1024;
/// <summary>Verification work per second while in contention — a deep ledger is checked less often, never skipped.</summary>
internal const long VerifyBudgetBytesPerSecond = 256 * 1024;
internal static readonly TimeSpan VerifyMinInterval = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1);
/// <summary>How long an observed invocation keeps the files in contention on its own (detection executors have no pending slot).</summary>
internal static readonly TimeSpan InvocationContentionWindow = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(120);
/// <summary>A pending script older than this no longer holds the files in contention.</summary>
internal static readonly TimeSpan MaxPendingScriptContention = TimeSpan.FromHours(2);
private const int MaxInvocationMarkersPerFile = 512;
private const string TestSourceFileName = "TEST.log";
private const string LogOpenTag = "<![LOG[";
/// <summary>One processed entry: where it starts, how far it reaches, what its bytes hashed to.</summary>
internal struct LedgerEntry : IEquatable<LedgerEntry>
{
public long Offset;
public int Length;
public ulong Hash;
// Identity is (offset, hash): a tail first read unterminated and later completed
// keeps its hash but grows by its terminator.
public bool Equals(LedgerEntry other) => Offset == other.Offset && Hash == other.Hash;
public override bool Equals(object obj) => obj is LedgerEntry other && Equals(other);
public override int GetHashCode() => unchecked(((int)Offset * 397) ^ (int)Hash ^ (int)(Hash >> 32));
}
internal sealed class FileLedger
{
public readonly List<LedgerEntry> Entries = new List<LedgerEntry>();
public bool VerifyRequested;
public DateTime NextCadenceVerifyUtc = DateTime.MinValue;
public long LastFragmentOffset = -1;
public bool Seeded;
public bool RewindLogged;
public long StartOffset => Entries.Count > 0 ? Entries[0].Offset : -1;
public long EndOffset => Entries.Count > 0 ? Entries[Entries.Count - 1].Offset + Entries[Entries.Count - 1].Length : -1;
public int IndexOfFirstAtOrAfter(long offset)
{
int lo = 0, hi = Entries.Count;
while (lo < hi)
{
var mid = (lo + hi) >> 1;
if (Entries[mid].Offset < offset) lo = mid + 1; else hi = mid;
}
return lo;
}
/// <summary>Entry offset at or after <paramref name="offset"/>, or -1.</summary>
public long OffsetOfEntryAtOrAfter(long offset)
{
var idx = IndexOfFirstAtOrAfter(offset);
return idx < Entries.Count ? Entries[idx].Offset : -1;
}
public void Record(AssembledEntry e)
{
var idx = IndexOfFirstAtOrAfter(e.Offset);
if (idx < Entries.Count) Entries.RemoveRange(idx, Entries.Count - idx);
Entries.Add(new LedgerEntry { Offset = e.Offset, Length = e.Length, Hash = e.Hash });
}
/// <summary>Drops everything from <paramref name="offset"/> on and returns it — the entries a rewind must not process twice.</summary>
public HashSet<LedgerEntry> TruncateFrom(long offset)
{
var idx = IndexOfFirstAtOrAfter(offset);
var removed = new HashSet<LedgerEntry>();
for (var i = idx; i < Entries.Count; i++) removed.Add(Entries[i]);
if (idx < Entries.Count) Entries.RemoveRange(idx, Entries.Count - idx);
return removed;
}
public void TrimBelow(long floor)
{
var idx = IndexOfFirstAtOrAfter(floor);
if (idx > 0) Entries.RemoveRange(0, idx);
}
public void Clear()
{
Entries.Clear();
LastFragmentOffset = -1;
}
}
// Keyed by file name (unique within the log folder). Poll thread only.
private readonly Dictionary<string, FileLedger> _ledgers = new Dictionary<string, FileLedger>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private DateTime _contentionUntilUtc = DateTime.MinValue;
// Cumulative, restart-safe like the other health counters.
private long _overwriteRewinds;
private long _overwriteBytesReprocessed;
private long _verifyPasses;
private long _verifiedBytes;
internal static bool IsMultiWriterLogFile(string fileName)
{
foreach (var f in MultiWriterLogFiles)
if (string.Equals(f, fileName, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)) return true;
return false;
}
private FileLedger GetLedger(string fileName)
{
FileLedger ledger;
if (!_ledgers.TryGetValue(fileName, out ledger))
{
ledger = new FileLedger();
_ledgers[fileName] = ledger;
}
return ledger;
}
/// <summary>A stale writer writes exactly when its script ends: every end signal asks both files for a check on the next pass.</summary>
private void RequestOverwriteCheck()
{
foreach (var ledger in _ledgers.Values) ledger.VerifyRequested = true;
}
private void NoteInvocationActivity()
{
_contentionUntilUtc = UtcNowProvider() + InvocationContentionWindow;
}
private bool InContention(DateTime nowUtc)
{
if (nowUtc < _contentionUntilUtc || _pendingHealthScript != null) return true;
foreach (var script in _pendingPlatformScripts.Values)
{
if (script.Result != null) continue;
if (!script.StartedAtUtc.HasValue || nowUtc - script.StartedAtUtc.Value < MaxPendingScriptContention) return true;
}
return false;
}
/// <summary>
/// Runs before a multi-writer file is read: rollover reset, restart seeding, then the
/// overwrite check when one is due. Returns the offset to rewind to, or -1.
/// </summary>
private async Task<long> PrepareLedgerAsync(string filePath, string fileName, FileLedger ledger, long bookmark, DateTime nowUtc, CancellationToken token)
{
if (ledger.Entries.Count > 0 && bookmark < ledger.EndOffset)
{
// The bookmark moved below what was read: the file was replaced (rollover).
ledger.Clear();
InvalidateInvocationMarkersFrom(fileName, 0);
}
if (!ledger.Seeded)
{
ledger.Seeded = true;
if (ledger.Entries.Count == 0 && bookmark > 0)
await SeedLedgerAsync(filePath, ledger, bookmark, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
var due = ledger.VerifyRequested || (InContention(nowUtc) && nowUtc >= ledger.NextCadenceVerifyUtc);
if (!due || ledger.Entries.Count == 0) return -1;
var from = ledger.StartOffset;
var bytes = bookmark - from;
if (bytes <= 0)
{
ledger.VerifyRequested = false;
return -1;
}
long divergence;
using (var stream = new FileStream(filePath, FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read, FileShare.ReadWrite))
divergence = await FindOverwriteAsync(stream, ledger, from, bookmark, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (token.IsCancellationRequested) return -1;
ledger.VerifyRequested = false;
var paceSeconds = Math.Max(VerifyMinInterval.TotalSeconds, (double)bytes / VerifyBudgetBytesPerSecond);
ledger.NextCadenceVerifyUtc = nowUtc.AddSeconds(paceSeconds);
_verifyPasses++;
_verifiedBytes += bytes;
return divergence;
}
/// <summary>
/// Re-reads [fromOffset, toOffset) with the read loop's assembler and compares against the
/// ledger. Returns the offset of the first entry whose bytes changed — a ledger entry not
/// reproduced, or an entry the ledger never had — or -1 when everything reads as before.
/// </summary>
private async Task<long> FindOverwriteAsync(FileStream stream, FileLedger ledger, long fromOffset, long toOffset, CancellationToken token)
{
var entries = ledger.Entries;
var idx = ledger.IndexOfFirstAtOrAfter(fromOffset);
if (idx >= entries.Count) return -1;
stream.Seek(entries[idx].Offset, SeekOrigin.Begin);
var reader = new BoundedLineReader(stream, MaxEntryBytes, hashLines: true);
var assembler = new CmTraceEntryAssembler(MaxMultiLineBufferLines, MaxEntryBytes);
while (reader.Position < toOffset)
{
var line = await reader.ReadLineAsync(CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (line == null) break;
if (token.IsCancellationRequested) return -1;
AssembledEntry e;
if (assembler.Feed(line, reader.LastLineStart, reader.Position, reader.LastLineTruncated, reader.LastLineHash, out e)
!= CmTraceEntryAssembler.Outcome.Entry)
continue;
if (e.Offset >= toOffset) break;
if (idx < entries.Count && entries[idx].Offset < e.Offset) return entries[idx].Offset;
if (idx < entries.Count && entries[idx].Offset == e.Offset)
{
if (entries[idx].Hash != e.Hash) return e.Offset;
idx++;
continue;
}
return e.Offset; // an entry the ledger never had: the bytes changed here
}
return idx < entries.Count && entries[idx].Offset < toOffset ? entries[idx].Offset : -1;
}
/// <summary>After a restart the ledger is empty: fingerprint the entries just behind the persisted bookmark without processing them.</summary>
private async Task SeedLedgerAsync(string filePath, FileLedger ledger, long bookmark, CancellationToken token)
{
var from = Math.Max(0, bookmark - RestartSeedBytes);
using (var stream = new FileStream(filePath, FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read, FileShare.ReadWrite))
{
stream.Seek(from, SeekOrigin.Begin);
var reader = new BoundedLineReader(stream, MaxEntryBytes, hashLines: true);
var assembler = new CmTraceEntryAssembler(MaxMultiLineBufferLines, MaxEntryBytes);
var aligned = from == 0;
while (reader.Position < bookmark)
{
var line = await reader.ReadLineAsync(CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (line == null || token.IsCancellationRequested) break;
if (!aligned)
{
// The seek may have landed mid-entry: wait for an entry boundary.
if (!line.StartsWith(LogOpenTag)) continue;
aligned = true;
}
AssembledEntry e;
if (assembler.Feed(line, reader.LastLineStart, reader.Position, reader.LastLineTruncated, reader.LastLineHash, out e)
== CmTraceEntryAssembler.Outcome.Entry
&& e.Offset + e.Length <= bookmark)
ledger.Record(e);
}
}
}
/// <summary>Moves the bookmark back to the first changed entry; returns the entries to skip if they still read unchanged behind it.</summary>
private HashSet<LedgerEntry> ApplyRewind(string filePath, string fileName, FileLedger ledger, long rewindTo, long bookmark)
{
var removed = ledger.TruncateFrom(rewindTo);
_positionTracker.SetPosition(filePath, rewindTo);
_heldTails.Remove(filePath);
InvalidateInvocationMarkersFrom(fileName, rewindTo);
_overwriteRewinds++;
_overwriteBytesReprocessed += bookmark - rewindTo;
var message = $"ImeLogTracker: {fileName} changed behind the bookmark at offset {rewindTo} " +
$"(a concurrent writer overwrote already-read bytes) — rewinding {bookmark - rewindTo} bytes";
if (!ledger.RewindLogged)
{
ledger.RewindLogged = true;
_logger.Info(message);
}
else
{
_logger.Debug(message);
}
return removed;
}
private long RetentionFloor(string fileName, long bookmark)
{
var floor = bookmark - LedgerRetentionBytes;
var oldest = OldestPendingScriptMarkerOffset(fileName);
if (oldest >= 0 && oldest < floor) floor = oldest;
var hardFloor = bookmark - LedgerMaxBytes;
return floor < hardFloor ? hardFloor : floor;
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// Invocation markers: who owns the policyId-less executor lines at a file position
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// AgentExecutor.log carries "Powershell exit code is N" / "write output done" without a
// policy id. Their owner is decided by FILE POSITION, not by the order lines were read:
// an executor writes its end block at its own stream position, i.e. directly after its
// own start block in the final bytes, so the nearest preceding invocation marker names
// it — and stays right after a rewind re-reads that region. A marker is a platform start
// (policy id), some other invocation (detection, remediation, requirement: null) or a
// close ("gets invoked" banner, "Agent executor completed").
private sealed class InvocationMarker
{
public long Offset;
public string PolicyId;
public bool IsClose;
}
private readonly Dictionary<string, List<InvocationMarker>> _invocationMarkers =
new Dictionary<string, List<InvocationMarker>>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private InvocationMarker _lastPlatformMarker;
// Files a platform run has opened in (PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START in AgentExecutor.log,
// PS-SCRIPT-GENERATED in IntuneManagementExtension.log). Survives a rollover of the
// file's markers: the fallback below is meant for exactly that file.
private readonly HashSet<string> _platformMarkerFiles = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private long _testEntryOrdinal;
private void RecordInvocationMarker(string policyId, bool isClose)
{
if (_currentEntryOffset < 0) return;
var file = _currentSourceFileName ?? TestSourceFileName;
List<InvocationMarker> list;
if (!_invocationMarkers.TryGetValue(file, out list))
{
list = new List<InvocationMarker>();
_invocationMarkers[file] = list;
}
if (list.Count > 0 && list[list.Count - 1].Offset == _currentEntryOffset)
{
// Two patterns on one line: the platform start outranks the generic argument line.
var last = list[list.Count - 1];
if (!isClose && policyId != null)
{
last.PolicyId = policyId;
last.IsClose = false;
_lastPlatformMarker = last;
_platformMarkerFiles.Add(file);
}
return;
}
if (list.Count >= MaxInvocationMarkersPerFile) list.RemoveAt(0);
var marker = new InvocationMarker { Offset = _currentEntryOffset, PolicyId = policyId, IsClose = isClose };
list.Add(marker);
if (!isClose && policyId != null)
{
_lastPlatformMarker = marker;
_platformMarkerFiles.Add(file);
}
}
/// <summary>
/// The pending platform script that owns the entry being processed, or null.
/// <paramref name="ownerPolicyId"/> names the owning platform script even when its slot is
/// gone (completion already emitted); null when no platform invocation owns the entry.
/// </summary>
private ScriptExecutionState ResolvePlatformScriptForCurrentEntry(out string ownerPolicyId)
{
ownerPolicyId = null;
var file = _currentSourceFileName ?? TestSourceFileName;
InvocationMarker marker = null;
List<InvocationMarker> list = null;
if (_currentEntryOffset >= 0 && _invocationMarkers.TryGetValue(file, out list))
{
for (var i = list.Count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
if (list[i].Offset <= _currentEntryOffset)
{
marker = list[i];
break;
}
}
}
// A file without any marker resolves to the platform run in flight only when platform
// runs open in that file at all — IntuneManagementExtension.log right after a rollover
// cleared its markers, AgentExecutor.log likewise. HealthScripts.log and the app logs
// never carry a platform marker: their launch and exit lines belong to health scripts
// and detection scripts, never to the platform script that happens to be pending
// (session 24dc69d1: the health-script worker's exit line pre-filled a platform slot's
// exit code, its launch line the slot's context).
if (marker == null && (list == null || list.Count == 0) && _platformMarkerFiles.Contains(file)) marker = _lastPlatformMarker;
if (marker == null || marker.IsClose || marker.PolicyId == null) return null;
ownerPolicyId = marker.PolicyId;
ScriptExecutionState state;
return _pendingPlatformScripts.TryGetValue(marker.PolicyId, out state) ? state : null;
}
private void InvalidateInvocationMarkersFrom(string fileName, long offset)
{
List<InvocationMarker> list;
if (!_invocationMarkers.TryGetValue(fileName, out list) || list.Count == 0) return;
var removedLast = false;
for (var i = list.Count - 1; i >= 0 && list[i].Offset >= offset; i--)
{
if (ReferenceEquals(list[i], _lastPlatformMarker)) removedLast = true;
list.RemoveAt(i);
}
if (removedLast)
{
_lastPlatformMarker = null;
for (var i = list.Count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
if (!list[i].IsClose && list[i].PolicyId != null)
{
_lastPlatformMarker = list[i];
break;
}
}
}
}
private long OldestPendingScriptMarkerOffset(string fileName)
{
List<InvocationMarker> list;
if (!_invocationMarkers.TryGetValue(fileName, out list)) return -1;
long oldest = -1;
foreach (var marker in list)
{
if (marker.IsClose || marker.PolicyId == null || !_pendingPlatformScripts.ContainsKey(marker.PolicyId)) continue;
if (oldest < 0 || marker.Offset < oldest) oldest = marker.Offset;
}
return oldest;
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test seams
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
/// <summary>Same effect as an end signal: both multi-writer ledgers are verified on the next pass.</summary>
internal void RequestOverwriteCheckForTest() => RequestOverwriteCheck();
/// <summary>What a rollover of the file does to its invocation markers.</summary>
internal void ClearInvocationMarkersForTest(string fileName) => InvalidateInvocationMarkersFrom(fileName, 0);
internal int LedgerEntryCountForTest(string fileName)
{
FileLedger ledger;
return _ledgers.TryGetValue(fileName, out ledger) ? ledger.Entries.Count : 0;
}
/// <summary>Gives a seam-fed message a file position of its own so positional attribution behaves like in a real pass.</summary>
internal void NextTestEntry()
{
if (_currentSourceFileName == null) _currentSourceFileName = TestSourceFileName;
_currentEntryOffset = ++_testEntryOrdinal * 4096;
}
}
}
@@ -181,7 +181,6 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// arrive across multiple log entries and IME may interleave platform scripts).
private readonly Dictionary<string, ScriptExecutionState> _pendingPlatformScripts =
new Dictionary<string, ScriptExecutionState>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private string _lastPlatformScriptPolicyId;
// Health-script (remediation) line-by-line accumulator — single slot because IME
// executes health scripts SEQUENTIALLY within a session (verified across multiple
@@ -223,7 +222,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
return true;
}
private const int MaxScriptOutputLength = 2048;
// Script stdout kept per event. Measured over 1,486 script outputs in the fleet
// (2026-08-25..09-08): median 39, p90 644, max 1,501 chars -- the maximum being our own
// one-stage bootstrap, and nothing ever hit the previous 2,048 cap. The two-stage
// bootstrap then added a ~460-char loader preamble to that maximum and started
// truncating the one output an operator actually reads. 8,192 leaves room for the
// realistic worst case (download retries plus relax logging, ~2,700) and stays 4x below
// the 32K-char Table Storage property limit that bounds the event downstream. Growth
// driver is the number of log lines the bootstrap chain writes, so re-measure before
// adding a chatty step rather than raising this again.
private const int MaxScriptOutputLength = 8192;
private const int MaxMultiLineBufferLines = 100;
// Size cap for ONE entry — a single physical line (enforced by BoundedLineReader before
// the line is materialized) and an assembled multiline entry alike. Any process able to
@@ -358,6 +366,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
FilesTailed = _filesTailed,
BacklogBytes = _backlogBytes,
ImeAgentVersion = _imeAgentVersionSeen,
OverwriteRewinds = _overwriteRewinds,
OverwriteBytesReprocessed = _overwriteBytesReprocessed,
VerifyPasses = _verifyPasses,
VerifiedBytes = _verifiedBytes,
PatternHits = new Dictionary<string, int>(_patternHits, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase),
};
}
@@ -944,11 +956,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
{
await CheckLogFilesAsync(token);
// Safety net: emit completions for platform scripts whose AgentExecutor
// exit code we already have but whose authoritative IME PS-SCRIPT-RESULT
// line never arrived within the grace period. Runs on this same loop
// Platform-script completions that wait for the other file: an IME result
// held for its executor end block, and the exit-code fallback for a
// result IME never logged within the grace period. Runs on this same loop
// thread (no locking) so it observes the buffer right after parsing.
FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(DateTime.UtcNow);
FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(UtcNowProvider());
// Token-failure grace window: fires only when the failure stayed
// unresolved (no IME-TOKEN-SUCCESS) for the whole window. Runs after
@@ -976,10 +988,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
try { await Task.Delay(_pollingIntervalMs, token); } catch (OperationCanceledException) { break; }
}
// Final pass: force-flush any platform script that completed within the last grace
// window before shutdown (exit code known, IME result still pending). Best-effort —
// emits only while callbacks are still wired (i.e. the adapter hasn't been disposed).
try { FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(DateTime.UtcNow, force: true); }
// Final pass: force-flush any platform script still waiting for the other file
// (a held IME result, or an exit code whose IME result is still pending).
// Best-effort — emits only while callbacks are still wired (i.e. the adapter
// hasn't been disposed).
try { FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(UtcNowProvider(), force: true); }
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Warning($"ImeLogTracker: shutdown script flush failed: {ex.Message}"); }
// Final state save on shutdown
@@ -1091,10 +1104,17 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// (the in-memory marker set started empty). Old state files have null here —
// degrades to the pre-fix behavior, no crash.
_platformScriptResultEmitted.Clear();
if (state.PlatformScriptResultEmitted != null)
if (state.PlatformScriptResultEmittedAt != null)
{
foreach (var kv in state.PlatformScriptResultEmittedAt)
_platformScriptResultEmitted[kv.Key] = kv.Value;
}
else if (state.PlatformScriptResultEmitted != null)
{
// State files from before the marker carried the run's timestamp: the dedup
// works as before, the late-start-line guard never fires for these runs.
foreach (var id in state.PlatformScriptResultEmitted)
_platformScriptResultEmitted.Add(id);
_platformScriptResultEmitted[id] = DateTime.MinValue;
}
_pendingPlatformScripts.Clear();
@@ -1131,6 +1151,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
HealthScriptResultParseFailures = state.Health.HealthScriptResultParseFailures;
_imeAgentVersionSeen = state.Health.ImeAgentVersion;
_trackerDegradedFired = state.Health.TrackerDegradedFired;
_overwriteRewinds = state.Health.OverwriteRewinds;
_overwriteBytesReprocessed = state.Health.OverwriteBytesReprocessed;
_verifyPasses = state.Health.VerifyPasses;
_verifiedBytes = state.Health.VerifiedBytes;
}
if (state.PatternHits != null)
{
@@ -1181,7 +1205,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// H1 (delta review 2026-07-02): platform-script dedup markers + pending buffer
// must survive restarts — see the LoadState comment for the duplicate scenario.
PlatformScriptResultEmitted = _platformScriptResultEmitted.ToList(),
PlatformScriptResultEmittedAt = new Dictionary<string, DateTime>(_platformScriptResultEmitted, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase),
PendingPlatformScripts = _pendingPlatformScripts.Values.ToList(),
ScriptTimeoutSuspectedPosted = _scriptTimeoutSuspectedPosted.ToList(),
};
@@ -1200,6 +1224,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
HealthScriptResultParseFailures = HealthScriptResultParseFailures,
ImeAgentVersion = _imeAgentVersionSeen,
TrackerDegradedFired = _trackerDegradedFired,
OverwriteRewinds = _overwriteRewinds,
OverwriteBytesReprocessed = _overwriteBytesReprocessed,
VerifyPasses = _verifyPasses,
VerifiedBytes = _verifiedBytes,
};
state.PatternHits = new Dictionary<string, int>(_patternHits, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
@@ -46,6 +46,23 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
/// <summary>IME version as logged by IME itself ("Agent version is: …"), null until seen.</summary>
public string ImeAgentVersion { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Times the bookmark of a multi-writer log (AgentExecutor.log, IntuneManagementExtension.log)
/// was moved back because bytes behind it had been overwritten by a concurrent IME
/// process. Expected nonzero whenever user-context scripts or detection scripts ran —
/// recovered data, not skipped work.
/// </summary>
public long OverwriteRewinds { get; set; }
/// <summary>Bytes re-read by those rewinds (only entries that changed are processed again).</summary>
public long OverwriteBytesReprocessed { get; set; }
/// <summary>Full ledger verifications run (cadence while scripts are in flight, end signals, fragments).</summary>
public long VerifyPasses { get; set; }
/// <summary>Bytes re-read for verification, guard-zone checks included — the cost of the overwrite detection.</summary>
public long VerifiedBytes { get; set; }
/// <summary>Match count per enabled pattern ID — every enabled pattern is present, zeros included.</summary>
public IReadOnlyDictionary<string, int> PatternHits { get; set; }
@@ -142,7 +142,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// continues its grace window after the restart instead of being silently dropped.
// ScriptExecutionState is a plain DTO, serialized directly (no mapping layer needed).
// All three are null on state files from before this fix — LoadState treats null as empty.
// Read-only migration input: state files written before the marker carried the run's
// source timestamp (agents up to 2.0.1458). Never written any more.
[JsonProperty(NullValueHandling = NullValueHandling.Ignore)]
public List<string> PlatformScriptResultEmitted { get; set; }
// Policy id → source timestamp of the emitted run (its result line; the exit line for a
// fallback emit): the dedup marker plus the reference that tells a late start line of
// that run from the start of the next one.
public Dictionary<string, DateTime> PlatformScriptResultEmittedAt { get; set; }
public List<ScriptExecutionState> PendingPlatformScripts { get; set; }
public List<string> ScriptTimeoutSuspectedPosted { get; set; }
@@ -165,6 +172,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
public int HealthScriptResultParseFailures { get; set; }
public string ImeAgentVersion { get; set; }
public bool TrackerDegradedFired { get; set; }
// Overwrite detection counters (null-defaulting on older state files).
public long OverwriteRewinds { get; set; }
public long OverwriteBytesReprocessed { get; set; }
public long VerifyPasses { get; set; }
public long VerifiedBytes { get; set; }
}
public class PackageStateData
@@ -61,11 +61,34 @@ public class ScriptExecutionState
/// <summary>
/// UTC timestamp at which the AgentExecutor.log exit-code line for this platform script was
/// observed. Drives the deadline check in
/// <see cref="ImeLogTracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults"/> — set only on the platform path
/// <see cref="ImeLogTracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults"/> — set only on the platform path
/// (PS-AGENT exit code); null until an exit code is seen.
/// </summary>
public System.DateTime? ExitObservedAtUtc { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Source (CMTrace) timestamp of the IME <c>PS-SCRIPT-RESULT</c> line that delivered
/// <see cref="Result"/> (platform scripts, <c>ime_policy_result</c> only). The emitted event is
/// bound to it — the emit may happen passes later (see <see cref="ResultHeldSinceUtc"/>), when
/// the tracker's "last matched" line is an unrelated one. Also the reference a later start line
/// of the same policy is compared against: a start older than the emitted result is the late
/// start line of that run, not a new run.
/// </summary>
public System.DateTime? ResultObservedAtUtc { get; set; }
/// <summary>Pattern id of the line that delivered <see cref="Result"/> (surfaced as <c>patternId</c> on the event).</summary>
public string ResultPatternId { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Wall-clock time (agent UTC) at which the IME result was seen while the executor end block
/// (exit code, stdout, stderr) had not been read yet. The tracker holds the emit until the end
/// block arrives — an overwritten block surfaces one pass later through the ledger rewind that
/// the result itself triggers, and the AgentExecutor.log read can simply lag behind the IME log
/// read — or until <c>ImeLogTracker.PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace</c> elapsed. Null when the
/// result was not held.
/// </summary>
public System.DateTime? ResultHeldSinceUtc { get; set; }
/// <summary>"True" or "False" compliance result (remediation detection / post-detection only).</summary>
public string ComplianceResult { get; set; }
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
private readonly Func<bool> _userEspAppsSettledProbe;
private readonly Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> _starvedUserEspAppsProbe;
private readonly Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> _packageStatesProbe;
// Session 683f1eff: registry failure detail still sitting in an open settle window,
// consulted when a Shell-Core failure terminalises first (see OnShellCoreEspFailureDetected).
private readonly Func<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs> _pendingEspFailureProbe;
// Session caa6cf50 gate-starvation fix (2026-06-11) — fire-once guard for the
// user-ESP-apps-settled AccountSetup synthesis (see MaybeSynthesizeAccountSetupComplete).
@@ -174,8 +177,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
/// late "Installing-→-Error" promotion can classify the failure correctly
/// AND refuse to promote when the failure originated outside the Apps
/// subcategory (a non-Apps HRESULT does not describe per-app outcome).
/// Null when no HRESULT-carrying ESP failure has fired (or all observed
/// failures came from ShellCoreTracker, which has no HRESULT surface).
/// Null when no registry-derived failure detail has been observed — neither from
/// a settle window that expired nor from one a Shell-Core failure inherited.
/// </summary>
public Termination.EspTerminalFailureSnapshot LastEspTerminalFailure { get; private set; }
@@ -243,7 +246,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
Func<bool> accountSetupActivityProbe = null,
Func<bool> userEspAppsSettledProbe = null,
Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> starvedUserEspAppsProbe = null,
Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> packageStatesProbe = null)
Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> packageStatesProbe = null,
Func<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs> pendingEspFailureProbe = null)
{
_sessionId = sessionId ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(sessionId));
_tenantId = tenantId ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(tenantId));
@@ -277,6 +281,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
// provisioning tracker name not-completed apps on an Apps-subcategory failure.
_packageStatesProbe = packageStatesProbe
?? (() => Array.Empty<Ime.AppPackageState>());
// Test seam: defaults to the provisioning tracker's open settle window (null when
// none is armed or the tracker is not running, e.g. Device Preparation).
_pendingEspFailureProbe = pendingEspFailureProbe
?? (() => _provisioningTracker?.TryGetPendingFailureArgs());
}
/// <summary>
@@ -658,6 +666,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
internal void TriggerEspExitedForTest(DateTime occurredAtUtc) =>
OnEspExited(this, new EspExitedEventArgs(occurredAtUtc));
// Test seam for a Shell-Core 62407 failure — drives the coordinator forwarder including
// the pending-settle inheritance, without a real ShellCoreTracker.
internal void TriggerShellCoreEspFailureForTest(string failureType) =>
OnShellCoreEspFailureDetected(this, failureType);
// Test seam for HelloWizardStarted — same contract as TriggerEspExitedForTest.
internal void TriggerHelloWizardStartedForTest(DateTime occurredAtUtc) =>
OnHelloWizardStarted(this, new HelloWizardStartedEventArgs(occurredAtUtc));
@@ -673,33 +686,56 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
// Forwarder for ShellCoreTracker (event-log-derived ESP failures, e.g. Shell-Core 62407
// failure descriptions). Source-event timestamp is mirrored so the adapter can stamp the
// DecisionSignal with the historical instant on backfill. ShellCoreTracker has no HRESULT
// surface, so only FailureType is set on the args.
// surface; the registry detail is inherited from an open settle window (see below).
private void OnShellCoreEspFailureDetected(object sender, string failureType)
{
LastEventOccurredAtUtc = (sender as ShellCoreTracker)?.LastEventOccurredAtUtc;
try
{
EspFailureDetected?.Invoke(this, new EspFailureDetectedEventArgs(failureType));
EspFailureDetected?.Invoke(this, BuildShellCoreFailureArgs(failureType));
}
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Error($"Error forwarding ShellCore EspFailureDetected for '{failureType}'", ex); }
finally { LastEventOccurredAtUtc = null; }
}
// Forwarder for ProvisioningStatusTracker (registry-derived ESP failures). Args carry the
// full failure detail (FailureType, ErrorCode, FailedSubcategory, Category) extracted
// from the failed subcategory's statusText. Provisioning has no source-event timestamp
// surfaced today, so the adapter falls back to clock.
private void OnProvisioningEspFailureDetected(object sender, EspFailureDetectedEventArgs args)
// Session 683f1eff: the Shell-Core 62407 failure usually lands INSIDE the provisioning
// tracker's 30-s settle window — after the registry named the failed subcategory and its
// HRESULT, before the settle timer would have forwarded them. The engine terminalises on
// the first EspTerminalFailure and the agent stops seconds later, so whatever this signal
// carries is all the terminal event, the backend FailureReason and the termination-time
// app classification ever see (a third of all ESP terminal failures took this path). The
// pending detail is inherited here; FailureType stays the Shell-Core value because that
// is the signal that actually terminalised.
private EspFailureDetectedEventArgs BuildShellCoreFailureArgs(string failureType)
{
EspFailureDetectedEventArgs pending = null;
try { pending = _pendingEspFailureProbe(); }
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Warning($"EspAndHelloTracker: pending ESP failure probe threw: {ex.Message}"); }
if (pending == null)
return new EspFailureDetectedEventArgs(failureType);
RecordTerminalFailureSnapshot(pending);
_logger.Info(
$"EspAndHelloTracker: Shell-Core failure '{failureType}' inherits the pending provisioning failure detail " +
$"(category={pending.Category ?? "n/a"}, failedSubcategory={pending.FailedSubcategory ?? "n/a"}, " +
$"errorCode={pending.ErrorCode ?? "n/a"})");
return new EspFailureDetectedEventArgs(
failureType,
errorCode: pending.ErrorCode,
failedSubcategory: pending.FailedSubcategory,
category: pending.Category,
likelyCulpritApps: pending.LikelyCulpritApps);
}
// Session 080edee9 follow-up + Codex review (P2/P3) — snapshot the full failure context
// (HRESULT + failedSubcategory + category) so EnrollmentTerminationHandler can read it on
// the terminal-failure pathway. Only update when the args carry at least one of the three
// fields, so a bare Shell-Core failure cannot wipe out the registry snapshot. Deliberately
// NOT gated on ErrorCode alone — a non-Apps subcategory failure without HRESULT is still
// useful for downstream "should we promote?" gating.
private void RecordTerminalFailureSnapshot(EspFailureDetectedEventArgs args)
{
LastEventOccurredAtUtc = null;
// Session 080edee9 follow-up + Codex review (P2/P3) — snapshot the full
// failure context (HRESULT + failedSubcategory + category) before
// forwarding so EnrollmentTerminationHandler can read it on the terminal-
// failure pathway. Only update when the args carry at least one of the
// three fields, so a later ShellCore-derived failure (which has none of
// them) cannot wipe out the registry snapshot. We deliberately do NOT
// gate on ErrorCode alone — a non-Apps subcategory failure without
// HRESULT is still useful for downstream "should we promote?" gating.
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(args?.ErrorCode)
|| !string.IsNullOrEmpty(args?.FailedSubcategory)
|| !string.IsNullOrEmpty(args?.Category))
@@ -709,6 +745,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
failedSubcategory: args.FailedSubcategory,
category: args.Category);
}
}
// Forwarder for ProvisioningStatusTracker (registry-derived ESP failures). Args carry the
// full failure detail (FailureType, ErrorCode, FailedSubcategory, Category) extracted
// from the failed subcategory's statusText. Provisioning has no source-event timestamp
// surfaced today, so the adapter falls back to clock.
private void OnProvisioningEspFailureDetected(object sender, EspFailureDetectedEventArgs args)
{
LastEventOccurredAtUtc = null;
RecordTerminalFailureSnapshot(args);
try
{
EspFailureDetected?.Invoke(this, args);
@@ -80,6 +80,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
"AccountSetupCategory.Status"
};
// Order in which TryGetPendingFailureArgs resolves concurrently armed settle windows.
private static readonly string[] PendingFailurePreference =
{
"DeviceSetupCategory.Status",
"AccountSetupCategory.Status",
"DevicePreparationCategory.Status"
};
private readonly AgentLogger _logger;
private readonly string _sessionId;
private readonly string _tenantId;
@@ -1711,6 +1719,29 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
internal void TriggerSettleTimerForTest(string categoryName)
=> OnProvisioningFailureSettleExpired(categoryName);
/// <summary>
/// The registry-derived failure detail of a settle window that is still open (armed,
/// not yet expired or retracted) — null when none is pending. Read by the coordinator
/// when a Shell-Core 62407 failure arrives inside the window, so the terminal signal
/// inherits HRESULT / failed subcategory / category instead of racing them away
/// (session 683f1eff). Windows fail one category at a time, but should two be armed
/// the device-phase category wins: it is the one the ESP page reports.
/// </summary>
internal EspFailureDetectedEventArgs TryGetPendingFailureArgs()
{
lock (_stateLock)
{
if (_provisioningFailureSettleArgs == null || _provisioningFailureSettleArgs.Count == 0)
return null;
foreach (var category in PendingFailurePreference)
{
if (_provisioningFailureSettleArgs.TryGetValue(category, out var args) && args != null)
return args;
}
return null;
}
}
private bool HasCategorySucceededChanged(string categoryName, bool? newValue)
{
if (!_lastCategorySucceeded.TryGetValue(categoryName, out var oldValue))
@@ -70,12 +70,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
@"C:\Windows\System32\config", // SAM, SECURITY, SYSTEM hives
};
// Allowed subdirectories under a user profile (used with %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token)
private static readonly string[] AllowedUserProfileSubdirs = new[]
{
@"AppData\Local",
@"AppData\Roaming",
};
// The allowed user-profile subdirectories and the vendor allowlist under them live in
// GatherRuleGuards, which owns the embedded guardrails.json — one copy for both guards.
/// <summary>
/// Returns true if the given path is allowed for diagnostics collection.
@@ -135,7 +131,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
(normalizedDir.Length == BlockedUsersPrefix.Length ||
normalizedDir[BlockedUsersPrefix.Length] == Path.DirectorySeparatorChar))
{
if (!IsUserProfileSubpathAllowed(normalizedDir, userProfilePath))
if (!GatherRuleGuards.IsUserProfileSubpathAllowed(normalizedDir, userProfilePath))
return false;
}
@@ -169,7 +165,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
}
}
return false;
// Vendor folders under the signed-in user's profile — same allowlist the file
// collectors use, since it answers the same question: which folders below a
// profile carry enrollment-relevant logs rather than the user's own data.
return GatherRuleGuards.IsUserProfilePathOnAllowlist(normalizedDir, userProfilePath);
}
catch
{
@@ -178,38 +177,6 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Returns true if the normalized path falls under one of the allowed subdirectories
/// of the detected user profile (AppData\Local, AppData\Roaming).
/// Only applies when %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% was used to resolve the path.
/// </summary>
internal static bool IsUserProfileSubpathAllowed(string normalizedPath, string userProfilePath)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(userProfilePath))
return false;
try
{
var normalizedProfile = Path.GetFullPath(userProfilePath);
foreach (var subdir in AllowedUserProfileSubdirs)
{
var allowedPrefix = Path.GetFullPath(Path.Combine(normalizedProfile, subdir));
if (normalizedPath.StartsWith(allowedPrefix, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(normalizedPath.Length == allowedPrefix.Length ||
normalizedPath[allowedPrefix.Length] == Path.DirectorySeparatorChar))
{
return true;
}
}
}
catch
{
// Path normalization failure — deny
}
return false;
}
/// <summary>
/// Checks whether any component of the path (directories or file) is a symlink,
/// junction, or other reparse point. Returns true if a reparse point is detected.
@@ -32,6 +32,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
public static readonly IReadOnlyList<string> AllowedRegistryPrefixes;
public static readonly IReadOnlyList<string> AllowedFilePrefixes;
/// <summary>
/// Folders under the signed-in user's profile that file collectors and
/// admin-configured diagnostics paths may read, RELATIVE to the profile root
/// (e.g. <c>AppData\Local\Vendor</c>). Resolved against the path
/// %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% produced, at match time — the profile name is not
/// known when the list is authored, which is why these entries cannot live in
/// <see cref="AllowedFilePrefixes"/> (matched literally against the expanded path).
/// </summary>
public static readonly IReadOnlyList<string> AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes;
public static readonly IReadOnlyList<string> AllowedWmiQueryPrefixes;
public static readonly IReadOnlyCollection<string> AllowedCommands;
public static readonly IReadOnlyList<string> AllowedEventLogChannels;
@@ -63,8 +73,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
Path.GetFullPath(@"C:\Windows\System32\config"), // SAM, SECURITY, SYSTEM hives
};
// Allowed subdirectories under a user profile (used with %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token)
private static readonly string[] AllowedUserProfileSubdirs = new[]
// The only subdirectories of a user profile the C:\Users hard block will ever
// release (used with %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%). Single copy for both guards —
// DiagnosticsPathGuards delegates here.
internal static readonly string[] AllowedUserProfileSubdirs = new[]
{
@"AppData\Local",
@"AppData\Roaming",
@@ -118,6 +130,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
AllowedRegistryPrefixes = FlattenCategorized(obj, "registryPrefixes", "prefixes");
AllowedFilePrefixes = obj["filePrefixes"]?.ToObject<List<string>>() ?? new List<string>();
AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes = LoadUserProfilePrefixes(obj);
AllowedWmiQueryPrefixes = obj["wmiQueryPrefixes"]?.ToObject<List<string>>() ?? new List<string>();
var commands = FlattenCategorized(obj, "allowedCommands", "commands");
@@ -136,6 +149,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
AllowedRegistryPrefixes = new List<string>();
AllowedFilePrefixes = new List<string>();
AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes = new List<string>();
AllowedWmiQueryPrefixes = new List<string>();
AllowedCommands = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
AllowedEventLogChannels = new List<string>();
@@ -143,6 +157,43 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
ResidualWmiPrefixes = new List<string>();
}
/// <summary>
/// Reads <c>userProfileFilePrefixes</c> and drops every entry that is rooted, carries a
/// traversal, or does not sit under one of <see cref="AllowedUserProfileSubdirs"/>.
/// The C:\Users hard block releases nothing outside AppData, so such an entry could only
/// ever be dead text — dropping it at load keeps the list honest instead of silently
/// ineffective, and no configuration can widen the hard block's exception.
/// </summary>
private static List<string> LoadUserProfilePrefixes(JObject obj)
{
var raw = obj["userProfileFilePrefixes"]?.ToObject<List<string>>() ?? new List<string>();
var result = new List<string>();
foreach (var entry in raw)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(entry))
continue;
var trimmed = entry.Trim().TrimEnd('\\');
if (Path.IsPathRooted(trimmed))
continue;
if (trimmed.IndexOf("..", StringComparison.Ordinal) >= 0)
continue;
foreach (var subdir in AllowedUserProfileSubdirs)
{
if (trimmed.StartsWith(subdir, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(trimmed.Length == subdir.Length || trimmed[subdir.Length] == '\\'))
{
result.Add(trimmed);
break;
}
}
}
return result;
}
private static void DeriveWmiClassAllowlist(
IReadOnlyList<string> entries,
out HashSet<string> classes,
@@ -265,12 +316,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
// C:\Users block always applies (even in unrestricted mode)
// Exception: paths under <userProfilePath>\AppData\Local or AppData\Roaming
// are allowed when the %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token was used.
// are allowed when the %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token was used. The exception
// only LIFTS the block — in restricted mode the allowlist below still decides.
if (normalizedPath.StartsWith(BlockedUsersPrefix, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(normalizedPath.Length == BlockedUsersPrefix.Length ||
normalizedPath[BlockedUsersPrefix.Length] == Path.DirectorySeparatorChar))
{
if (!DiagnosticsPathGuards.IsUserProfileSubpathAllowed(normalizedPath, userProfilePath))
if (!IsUserProfileSubpathAllowed(normalizedPath, userProfilePath))
return false;
}
@@ -288,9 +340,61 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
if (unrestrictedMode)
return true;
return AllowedFilePrefixes.Any(prefix =>
if (AllowedFilePrefixes.Any(prefix =>
normalizedPath.StartsWith(prefix, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(normalizedPath.Length == prefix.Length || normalizedPath[prefix.Length] == '\\'));
(normalizedPath.Length == prefix.Length || normalizedPath[prefix.Length] == '\\')))
{
return true;
}
// Vendor folders under the signed-in user's profile. Only reachable when the rule
// spelled %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% and the resolver found an interactive user —
// a null profile denies, so a machine with nobody signed in cannot widen anything.
return IsUserProfilePathOnAllowlist(normalizedPath, userProfilePath);
}
/// <summary>
/// True when the normalized path sits under one of <see cref="AllowedUserProfileSubdirs"/>
/// of the detected user profile. This is the C:\Users hard block's only exception; it
/// releases the block and nothing else. A null profile denies.
/// </summary>
internal static bool IsUserProfileSubpathAllowed(string normalizedPath, string userProfilePath)
=> AllowedUserProfileSubdirs.Any(subdir =>
MatchesProfileRelativePrefix(normalizedPath, userProfilePath, subdir));
/// <summary>
/// True when the normalized path is admitted by an entry of
/// <see cref="AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes"/> under the detected user profile.
/// </summary>
internal static bool IsUserProfilePathOnAllowlist(string normalizedPath, string userProfilePath)
=> AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes.Any(prefix =>
MatchesProfileRelativePrefix(normalizedPath, userProfilePath, prefix));
/// <summary>
/// Segment-bounded match of <paramref name="normalizedPath"/> against
/// &lt;profile&gt;\&lt;relativePrefix&gt;. Both sides go through Path.GetFullPath, so a
/// traversal spelled into either one cannot slip past the boundary check.
/// </summary>
private static bool MatchesProfileRelativePrefix(
string normalizedPath, string userProfilePath, string relativePrefix)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(normalizedPath) || string.IsNullOrEmpty(userProfilePath))
return false;
try
{
var allowedPrefix = Path.GetFullPath(
Path.Combine(Path.GetFullPath(userProfilePath), relativePrefix));
return normalizedPath.StartsWith(allowedPrefix, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(normalizedPath.Length == allowedPrefix.Length ||
normalizedPath[allowedPrefix.Length] == Path.DirectorySeparatorChar);
}
catch
{
// Path normalization failure — deny.
return false;
}
}
/// <summary>
@@ -209,6 +209,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Periodic
data["ime_line_budget_breaks"] = health.BudgetBreaks;
data["ime_held_tails"] = health.HeldTails;
data["ime_unanchored_patterns"] = health.UnanchoredPatterns;
data["ime_overwrite_rewinds"] = health.OverwriteRewinds;
data["ime_overwrite_bytes_reprocessed"] = health.OverwriteBytesReprocessed;
data["ime_verify_passes"] = health.VerifyPasses;
data["ime_verified_bytes"] = health.VerifiedBytes;
}
}
catch (Exception ex)
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
/// <para>
/// The orchestrator consumes this event and translates it into a synthetic
/// <c>DeadlineFired</c>-<see cref="AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals.DecisionSignal"/>
/// whose <c>OccurredAtUtc</c> equals the deadline's <see cref="ActiveDeadline.DueAtUtc"/>,
/// not the wall-clock firing time — so replay stays deterministic even if the agent
/// restarts long after the deadline has passed.
/// whose <c>OccurredAtUtc</c> equals the deadline's <see cref="ActiveDeadline.DueAtUtc"/>
/// (the policy instant the wait expired), with the due time repeated in the payload. The
/// firing clock is deliberately NOT the stamp: a timer due during Modern Standby or a
/// reboot fires only afterwards, and the outage would otherwise become session duration
/// (D-238).
/// </para>
/// </summary>
public sealed class DeadlineFiredEventArgs : EventArgs
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
#nullable enable
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Globalization;
using System.IO;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
@@ -1159,7 +1160,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
var evidence = new Evidence(
kind: EvidenceKind.Synthetic,
identifier: e.Deadline.Name,
summary: $"deadline '{e.Deadline.Name}' fired at {e.Deadline.DueAtUtc:O}");
summary: $"deadline '{e.Deadline.Name}' due {e.Deadline.DueAtUtc:O} fired at {e.FiredAtUtc:O}");
// The reducer reads the deadline name under SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline
// (see HandleDeadlineFiredV1 in DecisionEngine.Shared). Forward the
@@ -1180,7 +1181,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
payload[SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline] = e.Deadline.Name;
}
// OccurredAtUtc = DueAtUtc (not firedAt) — replay-determinism per DeadlineFiredEventArgs doc.
// OccurredAtUtc = DueAtUtc, not the firing clock (D-238). Every effect of the
// resulting step (phase_transition, enrollment_complete) is stamped with the signal
// time; a timer that came due during Modern Standby or a reboot fires only afterwards,
// and the firing clock would make the verdict — and the session duration — grow by
// the whole outage (measured: days for devices closed right after provisioning).
// The due time also travels in the payload so the stale-fire guards identify the
// deadline incarnation independently of the stamp.
payload[SignalPayloadKeys.DeadlineDueAtUtc] = e.Deadline.DueAtUtc.ToString("O", CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
_ingress.Post(
kind: DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired,
occurredAtUtc: e.Deadline.DueAtUtc,
@@ -39,7 +39,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
/// <summary>
/// Wird vom Timer-Thread geraised, wenn ein Deadline fällig wird. Subscriber
/// ist typischerweise der Orchestrator, der daraus ein synthetisches
/// <c>DeadlineFired</c>-Signal mit <c>OccurredAtUtc = deadline.DueAtUtc</c> erzeugt.
/// <c>DeadlineFired</c>-Signal mit <c>OccurredAtUtc = deadline.DueAtUtc</c> erzeugt; die
/// Fälligkeit reist zusätzlich im Payload (<c>SignalPayloadKeys.DeadlineDueAtUtc</c>).
/// </summary>
event EventHandler<DeadlineFiredEventArgs>? Fired;
@@ -1254,23 +1254,25 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(script.Stdout)) data["stdout"] = script.Stdout!;
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(script.Stderr)) data["stderr"] = script.Stderr!;
// The exit-code fallback emits asynchronously to log parsing, so the tracker's
// "last matched" pattern/timestamp belong to an unrelated later line. Bind the event to
// the script's own exit-observed timestamp and omit the misleading patternId instead.
// A platform-script completion is bound to the script's own line, not to the tracker's
// "last matched" one: the exit-code fallback emits a grace period after its exit line,
// and an IME result held for its executor end block emits at the end of a later pass —
// by then LastMatched* name an unrelated line. The fallback carries no patternId (no
// line delivered its result). Health scripts carry neither stamp and stay on the last
// matched line, which IS their result line.
var isFallback = string.Equals(script.ResultSource, "agentexecutor_fallback", StringComparison.Ordinal);
if (!isFallback)
{
var patternId = _tracker.LastMatchedPatternId;
var patternId = script.ResultPatternId ?? _tracker.LastMatchedPatternId;
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(patternId)) data["patternId"] = patternId!;
}
bool derivedFromClock;
DateTime? rawSourceTs;
DateTime now;
if (isFallback && script.ExitObservedAtUtc.HasValue)
now = ResolveOccurredAt(script.ExitObservedAtUtc, out derivedFromClock, out rawSourceTs);
else
now = ResolveOccurredAt(out derivedFromClock, out rawSourceTs);
var sourceTs = isFallback ? script.ExitObservedAtUtc : script.ResultObservedAtUtc;
var now = sourceTs.HasValue
? ResolveOccurredAt(sourceTs, out derivedFromClock, out rawSourceTs)
: ResolveOccurredAt(out derivedFromClock, out rawSourceTs);
// Historic replay (a previous enrollment's log) — do not emit at all. The early
// return also skips MaybeEmitBootstrapDetected / MaybeEmitScriptTimeoutSuspected,
@@ -584,6 +584,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Termination
["heldTails"] = health.HeldTails,
["unanchoredPatterns"] = health.UnanchoredPatterns,
["hsParseFailures"] = health.HealthScriptResultParseFailures,
["overwriteRewinds"] = health.OverwriteRewinds,
["overwriteBytesReprocessed"] = health.OverwriteBytesReprocessed,
["verifyPasses"] = health.VerifyPasses,
["verifiedBytes"] = health.VerifiedBytes,
["agentVersion"] = _agentVersion ?? string.Empty,
};
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(health.ImeAgentVersion))
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
# Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1 - thin runner embedded in the Bootstrap MSI.
#
# The MSI is only a delivery vehicle (MDM LOB channel installs earlier than the IME
# script/app batches during Autopilot Device Preparation). This runner downloads the
# CURRENT Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 from the download endpoint and executes it, so
# every piece of real bootstrap logic (guards, relax rules, agent download) stays
# server-updatable without re-shipping the MSI.
#
# Fail-soft by design: the runner always exits 0 so a transient network failure never
# marks the LOB install as failed; diagnostics go to bootstrap-msi.log.
# ASCII only - no special characters in this file.
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$baseDir = Join-Path $env:ProgramData 'AutopilotMonitor'
$logDir = Join-Path $baseDir 'Logs'
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $logDir | Out-Null
$log = Join-Path $logDir 'bootstrap-msi.log'
function Write-Log([string]$message) {
Add-Content -Path $log -Value ("[{0}] {1}" -f (Get-Date -Format 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss'), $message)
}
try {
Write-Log "MSI bootstrap runner started (user=$env:USERNAME, pid=$PID)."
if (Test-Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor\Deployed') {
Write-Log 'Deployed marker present - skipping, another channel already installed the agent.'
exit 0
}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
$url = 'https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$dest = Join-Path $baseDir 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le 3; $attempt++) {
try {
Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri $url -OutFile $dest
break
} catch {
Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt failed: $_"
if ($attempt -eq 3) { throw }
Start-Sleep -Seconds 10
}
}
Write-Log "Bootstrap script downloaded to $dest - executing."
# PS 5.1 file redirection (*>>) writes UTF-16LE, which garbles a log otherwise
# written via Add-Content (ANSI). Route through Add-Content for one encoding.
& $dest *>&1 | ForEach-Object { $_.ToString() } | Add-Content -Path $log
Write-Log "Bootstrap script finished (exit code $LASTEXITCODE)."
exit 0
} catch {
Write-Log ("MSI bootstrap runner failed: " + ($_ | Out-String))
exit 0
}
@@ -4,16 +4,19 @@
LOB MSIs are installed by the OMA-DM stack (EnterpriseDesktopAppManagement CSP) during
the first MDM sync, i.e. BEFORE/parallel to the Device Preparation SLDM app batch -
earlier than any IME-delivered script (Batch 2) or Win32 app can run. The MSI itself
carries no bootstrap logic: it installs one runner script and executes it once. The
runner downloads the CURRENT server-hosted Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1, keeping all
real logic updatable without re-shipping the MSI.
carries no bootstrap logic and no downloader of its own: it installs the SAME stage-1
loader that is assigned directly in Intune (scripts/Bootstrap/Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1)
and runs it once. The loader downloads the current server-hosted
Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 and verifies its publisher before executing it, so all real
logic stays updatable without re-shipping the MSI, and both delivery channels share one
implementation.
Build: wix build Package.wxs -arch x64 -o bin\AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap.msi
-->
<Wix xmlns="http://wixtoolset.org/schemas/v4/wxs">
<Package Name="Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap"
Manufacturer="Autopilot Monitor"
Version="1.0.2"
Version="1.1.0"
UpgradeCode="1fbe5515-d346-445c-b8b8-14ee79f97522"
Scope="perMachine"
Compressed="yes">
@@ -28,8 +31,13 @@
</StandardDirectory>
<ComponentGroup Id="MainComponents" Directory="INSTALLFOLDER">
<Component Id="RunnerScript" Guid="8c8e8962-719f-458b-b291-dd99d3f1dc30">
<File Id="RunnerPs1" Source="Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1" KeyPath="yes" />
<!-- Source is relative to the build working directory (the project dir), not to this
file. New component GUID because the key path changed. -->
<Component Id="RunnerScript" Guid="A972F561-01B5-400A-8C2A-47D12BA97DCA">
<File Id="RunnerPs1"
Source="..\..\..\scripts\Bootstrap\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"
Name="Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"
KeyPath="yes" />
</Component>
</ComponentGroup>
@@ -38,11 +46,12 @@
</Feature>
<!-- Deferred + no-impersonate: runs as SYSTEM after files land. Return=ignore keeps
the LOB install green even if the runner hits a transient error (the runner is
additionally fail-soft itself); diagnostics live in bootstrap-msi.log. -->
the LOB install green even if the loader hits a transient error (the loader is
additionally fail-soft itself). -LogFileName keeps this channel distinguishable in
a diagnostics package; the diag tooling keys on that name. -->
<CustomAction Id="RunBootstrap"
Directory="INSTALLFOLDER"
ExeCommand="&quot;[System64Folder]WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe&quot; -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File &quot;[INSTALLFOLDER]Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1&quot;"
ExeCommand="&quot;[System64Folder]WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe&quot; -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File &quot;[INSTALLFOLDER]Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1&quot; -LogFileName bootstrap-msi.log"
Execute="deferred"
Impersonate="no"
Return="ignore" />
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Globalization;
using System.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.State;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests
{
/// <summary>
/// The reducer identifies a deadline incarnation through the due time carried in the
/// payload (<see cref="SignalPayloadKeys.DeadlineDueAtUtc"/>), never through the signal
/// time: the host stamps <c>DeadlineFired</c> with the due time (D-238), but the guards
/// must stay correct for any stamp — a late fire after Modern Standby or a restart, a
/// replayed signal, or a future switch to the firing clock. Without the key they fall back
/// to the signal time (pre-key signal logs, where the two were equal by contract).
/// </summary>
public sealed class DeadlineFireTimeStampTests
{
private static readonly DateTime T0 = new DateTime(2026, 9, 9, 6, 31, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private static DecisionSignal MakeSignal(
long ordinal,
DecisionSignalKind kind,
DateTime occurredAtUtc,
IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string>? payload = null) =>
new DecisionSignal(
sessionSignalOrdinal: ordinal,
sessionTraceOrdinal: ordinal,
kind: kind,
kindSchemaVersion: 1,
occurredAtUtc: occurredAtUtc,
sourceOrigin: "test",
evidence: new Evidence(EvidenceKind.Synthetic, $"t-{kind}-{ordinal}", $"synthetic {kind}"),
payload: payload);
/// <summary>What the host posts: name plus due time, OccurredAtUtc = firing clock.</summary>
private static Dictionary<string, string> FiredPayload(string deadlineName, DateTime dueAtUtc) =>
new Dictionary<string, string>
{
[SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline] = deadlineName,
[SignalPayloadKeys.DeadlineDueAtUtc] = dueAtUtc.ToString("O", CultureInfo.InvariantCulture),
};
// ============================================================== helper
[Fact]
public void DeadlineDueAtUtc_reads_the_payload_and_falls_back_to_the_signal_time()
{
var due = T0.AddMinutes(5);
var fired = T0.AddMinutes(9);
var withKey = MakeSignal(1, DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired, fired, FiredPayload(DeadlineNames.HelloSafety, due));
Assert.Equal(due, DecisionEngine.DeadlineDueAtUtc(withKey));
Assert.Equal(DateTimeKind.Utc, DecisionEngine.DeadlineDueAtUtc(withKey).Kind);
var withoutKey = MakeSignal(2, DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired, fired,
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline] = DeadlineNames.HelloSafety });
Assert.Equal(fired, DecisionEngine.DeadlineDueAtUtc(withoutKey));
var garbage = MakeSignal(3, DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired, fired,
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.DeadlineDueAtUtc] = "not-a-time" });
Assert.Equal(fired, DecisionEngine.DeadlineDueAtUtc(garbage));
}
// ============================================================== Classic: standby at the Hello prompt
[Fact]
public void Late_HelloSafety_fire_stamps_the_resolution_and_the_grace_window_from_the_firing_clock()
{
// Session ac5660b8 shape: ESP exits, the user leaves the device at the Hello prompt, it
// enters Modern Standby, HelloSafety is due during the sleep and fires ~3 min late after
// wake. Fed with the firing clock as signal time, the reducer must stamp the Hello
// timeout fact, the Finalizing step and the FinalizingGrace due time from that time —
// the stamp policy is the host's choice (D-238), the reducer follows the signal.
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = DecisionState.CreateInitial("sess-standby", "tenant", T0);
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(0, DecisionSignalKind.SessionStarted, T0)).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(1, DecisionSignalKind.EspPhaseChanged, T0.AddMinutes(1),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.EspPhase] = "AccountSetup" })).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(2, DecisionSignalKind.AccountSetupProvisioningComplete, T0.AddMinutes(2))).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(3, DecisionSignalKind.DesktopArrived, T0.AddMinutes(3))).NewState;
var espExit = T0.AddMinutes(6).AddSeconds(50.2144855);
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(4, DecisionSignalKind.EspExiting, espExit)).NewState;
var helloSafety = Assert.Single(state.Deadlines, d => d.Name == DeadlineNames.HelloSafety);
Assert.Equal(espExit.AddSeconds(300), helloSafety.DueAtUtc);
// Timer fires after wake, 2m 54s past due.
var firedAt = helloSafety.DueAtUtc.AddSeconds(174);
var finalizing = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(5, DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired, firedAt,
FiredPayload(DeadlineNames.HelloSafety, helloSafety.DueAtUtc)));
Assert.True(finalizing.Transition.Taken);
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Finalizing, finalizing.NewState.Stage);
Assert.Equal("Timeout", finalizing.NewState.HelloOutcome!.Value);
Assert.Equal(firedAt, finalizing.NewState.HelloResolvedUtc!.Value);
var grace = Assert.Single(finalizing.NewState.Deadlines, d => d.Name == DeadlineNames.FinalizingGrace);
Assert.Equal(firedAt.AddSeconds(5), grace.DueAtUtc);
// The chained grace fires on time and completes; nothing carries the old due time.
var completed = engine.Reduce(finalizing.NewState, MakeSignal(6, DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired, grace.DueAtUtc,
FiredPayload(DeadlineNames.FinalizingGrace, grace.DueAtUtc)));
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Completed, completed.NewState.Stage);
Assert.Equal(SessionOutcome.EnrollmentComplete, completed.NewState.Outcome);
Assert.Contains(completed.Effects, e =>
e.Kind == DecisionEffectKind.EmitEventTimelineEntry
&& e.Parameters != null
&& e.Parameters.TryGetValue("eventType", out var et) && et == "enrollment_complete");
}
// ============================================================== SelfDeploying guard C
[Fact]
public void SelfDeploying_guard_C_matches_the_incarnation_by_payload_due_time_not_by_firing_clock()
{
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = DecisionState.CreateInitial("sd-late", "t", T0);
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(0, DecisionSignalKind.SessionStarted, T0)).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(1, DecisionSignalKind.EspPhaseChanged, T0.AddMinutes(1),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.EspPhase] = "DeviceSetup" })).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(2, DecisionSignalKind.DeviceSetupProvisioningComplete, T0.AddMinutes(3))).NewState;
var armed = Assert.Single(state.Deadlines, d => d.Name == DeadlineNames.DeviceOnlyEspDetection);
Assert.Equal(T0.AddMinutes(8), armed.DueAtUtc);
// A stale fire of an OLDER incarnation (due T+5) arriving late: dead-end, deadline kept.
var stale = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(3, DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired, T0.AddMinutes(12),
FiredPayload(DeadlineNames.DeviceOnlyEspDetection, T0.AddMinutes(5))));
Assert.False(stale.Transition.Taken);
Assert.Equal("device_only_esp_detection_stale_due_at_mismatch", stale.Transition.DeadEndReason);
Assert.Single(stale.NewState.Deadlines, d => d.Name == DeadlineNames.DeviceOnlyEspDetection);
// The real fire, 4 min late (standby), carries the armed due time: terminal.
var real = engine.Reduce(stale.NewState, MakeSignal(4, DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired, T0.AddMinutes(12),
FiredPayload(DeadlineNames.DeviceOnlyEspDetection, armed.DueAtUtc)));
Assert.True(real.Transition.Taken);
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Completed, real.NewState.Stage);
}
// ============================================================== RealmJoin re-arm guard
[Fact]
public void RealmJoin_rearm_guard_compares_the_payload_due_time_not_the_firing_clock()
{
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = DecisionState.CreateInitial("rj-late", "t", T0);
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(0, DecisionSignalKind.SessionStarted, T0)).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(1, DecisionSignalKind.EspPhaseChanged, T0.AddMinutes(1),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.EspPhase] = "DeviceSetup" })).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(2, DecisionSignalKind.EspPhaseChanged, T0.AddMinutes(2),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.EspPhase] = "AccountSetup" })).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(3, DecisionSignalKind.EspExiting, T0.AddMinutes(3))).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(4, DecisionSignalKind.HelloResolved, T0.AddMinutes(4),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.HelloOutcome] = "Success" })).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(5, DecisionSignalKind.RealmJoinDetected, T0.AddMinutes(5),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [DecisionEngine.RealmJoinPayloadKeys.DeploymentPhase] = "100" })).NewState;
state = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(6, DecisionSignalKind.DesktopArrived, T0.AddMinutes(6))).NewState;
var first = Assert.Single(state.Deadlines, d => d.Name == DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout);
// Simulate the activity-based re-arm: the armed incarnation is now due later.
var rearmedDue = first.DueAtUtc.AddMinutes(25);
var rearmed = state.ToBuilder()
.CancelDeadline(DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout)
.AddDeadline(new ActiveDeadline(
name: DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout,
dueAtUtc: rearmedDue,
firesSignalKind: DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired,
firesPayload: new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline] = DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout }))
.Build();
// The OLD incarnation's fire arrives late — after the re-armed due time on the clock.
// Only the payload due time identifies it as superseded.
var firedAt = rearmedDue.AddMinutes(1);
var stale = engine.Reduce(rearmed, MakeSignal(7, DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired, firedAt,
FiredPayload(DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout, first.DueAtUtc)));
Assert.False(stale.Transition.Taken);
Assert.Equal("realmjoin_timeout_stale_superseded_by_rearm", stale.Transition.DeadEndReason);
Assert.Null(stale.NewState.RealmJoinFacts.Outcome);
// The re-armed incarnation's own fire, same firing clock: timeout is applied.
var real = engine.Reduce(stale.NewState, MakeSignal(8, DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired, firedAt,
FiredPayload(DeadlineNames.RealmJoinTimeout, rearmedDue)));
Assert.True(real.Transition.Taken);
Assert.Equal("Timeout", real.NewState.RealmJoinFacts.Outcome!.Value);
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.Finalizing, real.NewState.Stage);
}
}
}
@@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests
var deadline = Assert.Single(signalStep.NewState.Deadlines, d => d.Name == DeadlineNames.DeviceOnlyEspDetection);
Assert.Equal(T0.AddMinutes(7), deadline.DueAtUtc);
// DeadlineFired (OccurredAtUtc = DueAtUtc per scheduler contract) → terminal.
// DeadlineFired at the due time (no payload due key → helper falls back to the signal time) → terminal.
var step = engine.Reduce(signalStep.NewState, MakeSignal(3, DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired, T0.AddMinutes(7),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline] = DeadlineNames.DeviceOnlyEspDetection }));
@@ -443,8 +443,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests
{
// Cancel-then-rearm race: old deadline (DueAt=T+8) fires queued; before processing,
// DeviceSetupProvisioningComplete arrives (signal at T+10) → cancel+rearm to DueAt=T+15.
// The queued OLD fire (OccurredAtUtc=T+8) arrives. Guard C must dead-end WITHOUT
// cancelling the new deadline.
// The queued OLD fire arrives carrying its due time T+8 (no payload key here, so the
// helper falls back to the signal time). Guard C must dead-end WITHOUT cancelling the
// new deadline.
var engine = new DecisionEngine();
var state = PrimeDeviceSetup(engine, DecisionState.CreateInitial("sd-11", "t", T0));
@@ -467,7 +468,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests
firesPayload: new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline] = DeadlineNames.DeviceOnlyEspDetection }));
state = rearmedBuilder.Build();
// OLD queued fire arrives with OccurredAtUtc=T+8 — mismatches new deadline at T+15.
// OLD queued fire arrives with due time T+8 — mismatches the new deadline at T+15.
var step = engine.Reduce(state, MakeSignal(99, DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired, T0.AddMinutes(8),
new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline] = DeadlineNames.DeviceOnlyEspDetection }));
@@ -54,6 +54,37 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests
Assert.Equal("AccountSetup", roundtripped.Payload!["phase"]);
}
[Fact]
public void SignalSerializer_roundtrip_keeps_date_like_payload_strings_verbatim()
{
// The shared reader tokenizes ISO-8601 strings as dates; the string dictionaries must
// still come back as the round-trip text the writer produced, never culture-formatted
// (the DeadlineFired due time is parsed back with the "o" format on replay).
var due = new DateTime(2026, 4, 20, 9, 55, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var original = new DecisionSignal(
sessionSignalOrdinal: 7,
sessionTraceOrdinal: 7,
kind: DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired,
kindSchemaVersion: 1,
occurredAtUtc: due.AddMinutes(5),
sourceOrigin: "DeadlineScheduler",
evidence: new Evidence(
kind: EvidenceKind.Synthetic,
identifier: "hello_safety",
summary: "deadline fired",
derivationInputs: new Dictionary<string, string> { ["armedAt"] = "2026-04-20T09:50:00.0000000Z" }),
payload: new Dictionary<string, string>
{
["deadline"] = "hello_safety",
["deadlineDueAtUtc"] = due.ToString("O"),
});
var roundtripped = SignalSerializer.Deserialize(SignalSerializer.Serialize(original));
Assert.Equal("2026-04-20T09:55:00.0000000Z", roundtripped.Payload!["deadlineDueAtUtc"]);
Assert.Equal("2026-04-20T09:50:00.0000000Z", roundtripped.Evidence.DerivationInputs!["armedAt"]);
}
[Fact]
public void SignalSerializer_Deserialize_MissingEvidence_throws()
{
@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
using System.Net;
using System.Security.Claims;
using System.Text;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Rules;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Helpers;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.DataAccess;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Azure.Core.Serialization;
using Microsoft.Azure.Functions.Worker;
using Microsoft.Azure.Functions.Worker.Http;
using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Moq;
using Newtonsoft.Json;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Analyze twin of <see cref="GatherRulesFunctionAuthorEndpointTests"/>: the rule Author is
/// stamped from the caller's JWT on create, on a PUT-upsert of an unknown rule and on the
/// template copy, and a true update keeps the original creator over editor and body.
/// Before this pin, custom analyze rules were created as "Autopilot Monitor" and the edit
/// path let the browser choose the author.
/// </summary>
public class AnalyzeRulesFunctionAuthorEndpointTests
{
private const string TenantId = "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890";
private const string RuleId = "ANALYZE-CUSTOM-777";
private const string TemplateRuleId = "ANALYZE-SEC-004";
private sealed class FakeHttpResponseData : HttpResponseData
{
public FakeHttpResponseData(FunctionContext context) : base(context) { }
public override HttpStatusCode StatusCode { get; set; } = HttpStatusCode.OK;
public override HttpHeadersCollection Headers { get; set; } = new();
public override Stream Body { get; set; } = new MemoryStream();
public override HttpCookies Cookies { get; } = new Mock<HttpCookies>().Object;
}
private static FunctionContext BuildContext(ClaimsPrincipal? principal)
{
var services = new ServiceCollection();
services.AddOptions();
services.Configure<WorkerOptions>(o => o.Serializer =
new JsonObjectSerializer(ApiJsonOptions.Create()));
var provider = services.BuildServiceProvider();
var items = new Dictionary<object, object>();
if (principal != null)
{
items["ClaimsPrincipal"] = principal;
}
var context = new Mock<FunctionContext>();
context.SetupGet(c => c.Items).Returns(items);
context.SetupGet(c => c.InstanceServices).Returns(provider);
return context.Object;
}
private static HttpRequestData BuildRequest(ClaimsPrincipal? principal, object body)
{
var context = BuildContext(principal);
var req = new Mock<HttpRequestData>(context);
req.SetupGet(r => r.Headers).Returns(new HttpHeadersCollection());
req.SetupGet(r => r.Body).Returns(
new MemoryStream(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(JsonConvert.SerializeObject(body))));
req.Setup(r => r.CreateResponse()).Returns(() => new FakeHttpResponseData(context));
return req.Object;
}
private static ClaimsPrincipal Principal(params (string Type, string Value)[] claims)
=> new(new ClaimsIdentity(claims.Select(c => new Claim(c.Type, c.Value)), "TestAuth"));
private static ClaimsPrincipal AlicePrincipal()
=> Principal(("tid", TenantId), ("name", "Alice Admin"), ("upn", "alice@contoso.com"));
private static (AnalyzeRulesFunction function, List<AnalyzeRule> stored) BuildFunction(
AnalyzeRule? existingTenantRule = null, AnalyzeRule? globalRule = null)
{
var repo = new Mock<IRuleRepository>(MockBehavior.Loose);
var stored = new List<AnalyzeRule>();
repo.Setup(r => r.AnalyzeRuleExistsAsync(It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<string>())).ReturnsAsync(false);
repo.Setup(r => r.GetAnalyzeRulesAsync("global")).ReturnsAsync(
globalRule == null ? new List<AnalyzeRule>() : new List<AnalyzeRule> { globalRule });
repo.Setup(r => r.GetAnalyzeRulesAsync(TenantId)).ReturnsAsync(
existingTenantRule == null ? new List<AnalyzeRule>() : new List<AnalyzeRule> { existingTenantRule });
repo.Setup(r => r.GetRuleStatesAsync(TenantId)).ReturnsAsync(new Dictionary<string, RuleState>());
repo.Setup(r => r.StoreRuleStateAsync(TenantId, It.IsAny<string>(), It.IsAny<RuleState>())).ReturnsAsync(true);
repo.Setup(r => r.StoreAnalyzeRuleAsync(It.IsAny<AnalyzeRule>(), TenantId))
.Callback<AnalyzeRule, string>((rule, _) => stored.Add(rule))
.ReturnsAsync(true);
var service = new AnalyzeRuleService(repo.Object, NullLogger<AnalyzeRuleService>.Instance);
return (new AnalyzeRulesFunction(NullLogger<AnalyzeRulesFunction>.Instance, service), stored);
}
private static AnalyzeRule SpoofedPayload() => new()
{
RuleId = RuleId,
Title = "Proxy PAC unreachable",
Description = "Custom",
Severity = "warning",
Category = "network",
Explanation = "The PAC file could not be fetched.",
IsBuiltIn = false,
IsCommunity = false,
Enabled = true,
Author = "Spoofed Author",
Conditions = new List<RuleCondition>
{
new() { Signal = "pac_failed", Source = "event_type", EventType = "network_pac_failed", Required = true }
},
};
[Fact]
public async Task CreateRule_stamps_author_from_jwt_not_from_body()
{
var (function, stored) = BuildFunction();
var req = BuildRequest(AlicePrincipal(), SpoofedPayload());
var response = await function.CreateRule(req);
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.Created, response.StatusCode);
var written = Assert.Single(stored);
Assert.Equal("Alice Admin", written.Author);
}
[Fact]
public async Task CreateRule_falls_back_to_product_name_without_identifying_claims()
{
var (function, stored) = BuildFunction();
var req = BuildRequest(Principal(("tid", TenantId)), SpoofedPayload());
var response = await function.CreateRule(req);
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.Created, response.StatusCode);
var written = Assert.Single(stored);
Assert.Equal("Autopilot Monitor", written.Author);
}
[Fact]
public async Task UpdateRule_upsert_of_unknown_rule_stamps_author_from_jwt()
{
var (function, stored) = BuildFunction(existingTenantRule: null);
var req = BuildRequest(AlicePrincipal(), SpoofedPayload());
var response = await function.UpdateRule(req, RuleId);
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.OK, response.StatusCode);
var written = Assert.Single(stored);
Assert.Equal("Alice Admin", written.Author);
}
[Fact]
public async Task UpdateRule_true_update_keeps_original_author_over_editor_and_body()
{
var existing = SpoofedPayload();
existing.Author = "Original Creator";
existing.CreatedAt = new DateTime(2026, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var (function, stored) = BuildFunction(existing);
var req = BuildRequest(
Principal(("tid", TenantId), ("name", "Bob Editor")), SpoofedPayload());
var response = await function.UpdateRule(req, RuleId);
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.OK, response.StatusCode);
var written = Assert.Single(stored);
Assert.Equal("Original Creator", written.Author);
Assert.Equal(existing.CreatedAt, written.CreatedAt);
}
[Fact]
public async Task CreateFromTemplate_stamps_the_copying_admin_not_the_template_author()
{
var template = new AnalyzeRule
{
RuleId = TemplateRuleId,
Title = "AutoLogon enabled for an unexpected user",
Description = "Template",
Severity = "warning",
Category = "security",
Explanation = "Template",
IsBuiltIn = true,
Author = "Autopilot Monitor",
Conditions = new List<RuleCondition>
{
new() { Signal = "autologon", Source = "event_type", EventType = "autologon_analysis", Operator = "equals", Value = "PLACEHOLDER", Required = true }
},
TemplateVariables = new List<TemplateVariable>
{
new() { Name = "allowed", Label = "Allowed", ConditionIndex = 0, Field = "value" }
},
};
var (function, stored) = BuildFunction(globalRule: template);
var req = BuildRequest(AlicePrincipal(), new { variables = new Dictionary<string, string> { ["allowed"] = "KIOSK-1" } });
var response = await function.CreateFromTemplate(req, TemplateRuleId);
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.Created, response.StatusCode);
var written = Assert.Single(stored);
Assert.Equal("Alice Admin", written.Author);
Assert.Equal(TemplateRuleId, written.DerivedFromTemplateRuleId);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
using Azure.Data.Tables;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Helpers;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Observation-end closure of app rows: a row still InProgress when the session's observation
/// ended becomes "Incomplete" (terminal, non-failure, outcome unknown). Pins the pure per-row
/// predicate behind <see cref="TableStorageService.CloseOpenAppInstallsForSessionAsync"/> and
/// the disclosed bucket in the app-metrics payload.
/// </summary>
public class AppInstallIncompleteCloseTests
{
private static TableEntity Row(string? status, DateTimeOffset? completedAt = null)
{
var row = new TableEntity("tenant", "session_App");
if (status != null) row["Status"] = status;
if (completedAt.HasValue) row["CompletedAt"] = completedAt.Value;
return row;
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("InProgress")]
[InlineData("")]
[InlineData(null)]
public void ShouldClose_OpenRow(string? status)
=> Assert.True(TableStorageService.ShouldCloseAsIncomplete(Row(status)));
[Theory]
[InlineData("Succeeded")]
[InlineData("Failed")]
[InlineData("Incomplete")]
public void ShouldClose_LeavesTerminalRowsAlone(string status)
=> Assert.False(TableStorageService.ShouldCloseAsIncomplete(Row(status)));
[Fact]
public void ShouldClose_NeverClosesARowWithAnEnd()
{
// Out-of-order arrival can leave a CompletedAt on a row whose status batch is late —
// an end is an end.
Assert.False(TableStorageService.ShouldCloseAsIncomplete(Row("InProgress", DateTimeOffset.UtcNow)));
}
[Fact]
public void AppMetrics_DisclosesIncompleteOutsideTheRate()
{
var payload = MetricsMath.BuildAppMetricsPayload(new[]
{
new AppInstallSummary { AppName = "App", Status = "Succeeded", TerminalState = "Installed", DurationSeconds = 30 },
new AppInstallSummary { AppName = "App", Status = "Failed", TerminalState = "Error", DurationSeconds = 30 },
new AppInstallSummary { AppName = "App", Status = "Incomplete" },
});
var group = Assert.Single(payload.TopFailingApps);
Assert.Equal(3, group.TotalInstalls);
Assert.Equal(1, group.Incomplete);
Assert.Equal(50.0, group.FailureRate);
Assert.Equal(1, payload.TotalIncomplete);
}
}
@@ -155,6 +155,30 @@ public class AppInstallTerminalStateAndReconcileTests
Assert.Equal("Succeeded", summary.Status);
}
[Fact]
public void Reconcile_IncompleteIsSticky_AgainstLateProgressBatch()
{
// Closed by the observation-end step; a straggling started/progress batch must not reopen it.
var existing = new TableEntity("tenant", "session_App") { ["Status"] = "Incomplete" };
var summary = new AppInstallSummary { AppName = "App", Status = "InProgress", StartedAt = T0 };
TableStorageService.ReconcileAppInstallSummaryWithExisting(summary, existing);
Assert.Equal("Incomplete", summary.Status);
}
[Fact]
public void Reconcile_RealTerminalOverridesIncomplete()
{
// The completion arrived after the close step: real evidence beats the hedge.
var existing = new TableEntity("tenant", "session_App") { ["Status"] = "Incomplete" };
var summary = new AppInstallSummary { AppName = "App", Status = "Succeeded", StartedAt = T0 };
TableStorageService.ReconcileAppInstallSummaryWithExisting(summary, existing);
Assert.Equal("Succeeded", summary.Status);
}
[Fact]
public void Reconcile_Q4Guard_DoesNotFireWithoutStoredCompletedAt()
{
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ public class BuiltInRulesTests
"cancelStuckAndSetCurrent", "imeSessionChange", "imeImpersonation", "imeTokenFailure",
"enrollmentCompleted", "userSessionZeroApps", "updateDoTelemetry", "scriptStarted",
"scriptContext", "scriptExitCode", "scriptOutput", "scriptCompleted",
"resetPlatformScriptContext",
"resetPlatformScriptContext", "agentInvocationArgument", "agentExecutorCompleted",
"healthScriptResult", "healthScriptDetectionResult",
"captureExitCode", "captureHResult",
"captureAppVersion", "captureAppTypeWinGet", "captureAppTypeMsi",
@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ public class CertTenantBindingTests
/// Tenant stamped into <c>device-cert-sample.pem</c> by the Intune MDM Device CA. The sample is
/// a public-key-only cert from an internal test device; the GUID is the test tenant's own id.
/// </summary>
private static readonly Guid SampleCertTenantId = Guid.Parse("b54dc1af-5320-4f60-b5d4-821e0cf2a359");
internal static readonly Guid SampleCertTenantId = Guid.Parse("b54dc1af-5320-4f60-b5d4-821e0cf2a359");
private static string SampleCertBase64()
internal static string SampleCertBase64()
{
var assemblyDir = Path.GetDirectoryName(typeof(CertTenantBindingTests).Assembly.Location)!;
var pem = File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(assemblyDir, DeviceSamplePem));
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ public class CertTenantBindingTests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- harness
private static SecurityValidator BuildValidator(ILogger logger)
internal static SecurityValidator BuildValidator(ILogger logger)
{
var configRepo = Mock.Of<IConfigRepository>();
var cache = new MemoryCache(new MemoryCacheOptions());
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ public class CertTenantBindingTests
deviceAssociationValidator: null);
}
private static HttpRequestData BuildRequestWithCert(
internal static HttpRequestData BuildRequestWithCert(
string certBase64,
IDictionary<object, object>? items = null)
{
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Tests for <see cref="LatestVersionsService"/> — the 12h-cached reader for the
/// Tests for <see cref="LatestVersionsService"/> — the short-TTL reader for the
/// public <c>version.json</c> blob. Verifies cache hit/miss, forceRefresh bypass,
/// and failure fallback without hammering the blob on every call.
/// </summary>
@@ -140,6 +140,28 @@ public class LatestVersionsServiceTests
Assert.Equal(1, handler.CallCount);
}
[Fact]
public async Task GetAsync_HttpFailure_AfterSuccess_ServesLastKnownGood()
{
var (svc, handler, _) = Create();
await svc.GetAsync(forceRefresh: false, CancellationToken.None);
handler.Responder = _ => new HttpResponseMessage(HttpStatusCode.InternalServerError);
// The refresh fails, but the version line must not blank out: the last good
// value stands until the blob answers again.
var afterFailure = await svc.GetAsync(forceRefresh: true, CancellationToken.None);
Assert.NotNull(afterFailure);
Assert.Equal("1.0.706", afterFailure!.AgentVersion);
Assert.True(afterFailure.FromCache);
// ...and it is what the short failure cache serves to the next callers, too.
var next = await svc.GetAsync(forceRefresh: false, CancellationToken.None);
Assert.Equal("1.0.706", next!.AgentVersion);
Assert.Equal(2, handler.CallCount);
}
[Fact]
public async Task GetAsync_MalformedJson_ReturnsNull()
{
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Metrics;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.DataAccess;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Tests for the pure fold behind GET metrics/mcp-usage/organization: one item per account, the
/// delegated (MSP) marker from the row's home tenant, and the three windows (today / month / range).
/// Tests for the pure folds behind GET metrics/mcp-usage/organization (and its global twin): one item per
/// account, the delegated (MSP) marker from the row's home tenant, the three windows (today / month / range),
/// and the tenant's organization windows over every account.
/// </summary>
public class McpOrganizationUsageAggregationTests
{
@@ -86,6 +88,57 @@ public class McpOrganizationUsageAggregationTests
Assert.Equal(newer, items[1].LastRequestAt);
}
[Fact]
public void OrganizationQuota_SumsTodayAndMonthOverEveryAccount_AndCarriesTheTenantLimits()
{
var rows = new[]
{
Row(Member, "20260815", 100), // last month: neither window
Row(Member, "20260901", 20), // month
Row(Member, "20260902", 2), // today + month
Row(MspAdmin, "20260902", 5, home: MspHome), // delegated reads count against the same windows
Row(Member, "20260903", 7), // read window past today (range only)
};
var quota = McpUsageMetricsFunction.BuildOrganizationQuota(
rows, new McpQuotaService.TenantPlanLimits("pro", 1500, 15000), "20260902", "20260901");
Assert.Equal("pro", quota.TenantPlan);
Assert.Equal(1500, quota.DailyLimit);
Assert.Equal(15000, quota.MonthlyLimit);
Assert.Equal(7, quota.DailyUsed);
Assert.Equal(27, quota.MonthlyUsed);
}
[Fact]
public void OrganizationDaily_SumsEveryAccountPerDay_InsideTheRange_OldestFirst()
{
var rows = new[]
{
Row(Member, "20260815", 100), // before the range
Row(Member, "20260902", 2),
Row(MspAdmin, "20260902", 5, home: MspHome), // same day, delegated — one bar
Row(Member, "20260901", 20),
Row(Member, "20260903", 7), // after the range (read window)
};
var daily = McpUsageMetricsFunction.BuildOrganizationDaily(rows, "20260901", "20260902");
Assert.Equal(new[] { ("20260901", 20L), ("20260902", 7L) }, daily.Select(d => (d.Date, d.Requests)));
}
[Fact]
public void OrganizationQuota_LiftedWindows_StillReportTheCounters()
{
var quota = McpUsageMetricsFunction.BuildOrganizationQuota(
new[] { Row(Member, "20260902", 3) }, new McpQuotaService.TenantPlanLimits("pro", 0, 0), "20260902", "20260901");
Assert.Equal(0, quota.DailyLimit);
Assert.Equal(0, quota.MonthlyLimit);
Assert.Equal(3, quota.DailyUsed);
Assert.Equal(3, quota.MonthlyUsed);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("2026-09-02", "20260902")]
[InlineData("20260902", "20260902")]
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Middleware;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Moq;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// The agent security gate stamps two dimensions onto the request row through
/// <c>FunctionContext.Items</c>: the tenant it proved (<c>ValidatedTenantId</c>) and the outcome of
/// the device-validation chain (<c>DeviceValidation</c>). These tests pin
/// - that a request which passes the gate carries both, and one rejected before the chain
/// carries neither (a rejected certificate must not attribute the row to the claimed tenant),
/// - that the middleware takes the proven tenant before the <c>X-Tenant-Id</c> header and never
/// takes the header on a route that does not validate it — register and config take the tenant
/// from body/query, so a client-sent header there is attacker-controlled.
/// </summary>
public class RequestRowMarkersTests
{
private const string RegisterPath = "/api/agent/register-session";
private const string ConfigPath = "/api/agent/config";
private const string TelemetryPath = "/api/agent/telemetry";
private const string OtherTenant = "aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee";
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- validator stamps
[Fact]
public async Task ValidateRequest_PassingTheGate_StampsProvenTenantAndDeviceValidation()
{
var items = new Dictionary<object, object>();
var validator = CertTenantBindingTests.BuildValidator(Mock.Of<ILogger>());
var tenantId = CertTenantBindingTests.SampleCertTenantId.ToString();
var result = await validator.ValidateRequestAsync(
CertTenantBindingTests.BuildRequestWithCert(CertTenantBindingTests.SampleCertBase64(), items),
tenantId);
Assert.True(result.IsValid);
Assert.Equal(tenantId, Assert.Contains(RequestRowMarkers.ValidatedTenantKey, items));
// The harness runs the tenant without a device validator (AllowInsecureAgentRequests).
Assert.Equal(RequestRowMarkers.DeviceValidation.None, Assert.Contains(RequestRowMarkers.DeviceValidationKey, items));
}
[Fact]
public async Task ValidateRequest_CertificateOfAnotherTenant_StampsNeither()
{
var items = new Dictionary<object, object>();
var validator = CertTenantBindingTests.BuildValidator(Mock.Of<ILogger>());
var result = await validator.ValidateRequestAsync(
CertTenantBindingTests.BuildRequestWithCert(CertTenantBindingTests.SampleCertBase64(), items),
tenantId: OtherTenant);
Assert.False(result.IsValid);
// The row must not be attributed to the tenant the caller merely claimed …
Assert.DoesNotContain(RequestRowMarkers.ValidatedTenantKey, items);
// … and the device chain never ran, so there is no outcome to report.
Assert.DoesNotContain(RequestRowMarkers.DeviceValidationKey, items);
// The binding outcome itself still rides along (denominator for the cert-tenant telemetry).
Assert.Equal(CertTenantBinding.Outcome.Mismatch, Assert.Contains(CertTenantBinding.RequestItemKey, items));
}
[Fact]
public void DeviceValidationValue_IsTheValidatorName_AndNoneForUnknown()
{
Assert.Equal("None", RequestRowMarkers.DeviceValidationValue(ValidatorType.Unknown));
foreach (var validator in Enum.GetValues<ValidatorType>().Where(v => v != ValidatorType.Unknown))
Assert.Equal(validator.ToString(), RequestRowMarkers.DeviceValidationValue(validator));
// The three non-validator values must never collide with a validator name.
var validatorNames = Enum.GetNames<ValidatorType>();
Assert.DoesNotContain(RequestRowMarkers.DeviceValidation.None, validatorNames);
Assert.DoesNotContain(RequestRowMarkers.DeviceValidation.Transient, validatorNames);
Assert.DoesNotContain(RequestRowMarkers.DeviceValidation.Rejected, validatorNames);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- middleware attribution
[Fact]
public void ResolveTenantId_PolicyTenantWins()
{
var items = new Dictionary<object, object> { [RequestRowMarkers.ValidatedTenantKey] = OtherTenant };
Assert.Equal("policy-tenant", RequestTelemetryMiddleware.ResolveTenantId("policy-tenant", items, RegisterPath, OtherTenant));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(RegisterPath)]
[InlineData(ConfigPath)]
[InlineData(TelemetryPath)]
public void ResolveTenantId_ProvenTenantBeatsTheHeaderOnEveryRoute(string path)
{
var proven = CertTenantBindingTests.SampleCertTenantId.ToString();
var items = new Dictionary<object, object> { [RequestRowMarkers.ValidatedTenantKey] = proven };
Assert.Equal(proven, RequestTelemetryMiddleware.ResolveTenantId(null, items, path, OtherTenant));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(RegisterPath)]
[InlineData(ConfigPath)]
[InlineData("/api/agent/upload-url")]
[InlineData("/api/bootstrap/register-session")]
public void ResolveTenantId_HeaderIsIgnoredOnRoutesThatDoNotValidateIt(string path)
{
// Without a stamp from the validator (the request never passed the gate) a client-sent
// header must not attribute the row to any tenant.
Assert.Null(RequestTelemetryMiddleware.ResolveTenantId(null, new Dictionary<object, object>(), path, OtherTenant));
}
[Fact]
public void ResolveTenantId_HeaderIsHonoredOnlyOnTrustedRoutes_AndOnlyAsGuid()
{
var none = new Dictionary<object, object>();
Assert.Equal(OtherTenant, RequestTelemetryMiddleware.ResolveTenantId(null, none, TelemetryPath, OtherTenant));
Assert.Equal(OtherTenant, RequestTelemetryMiddleware.ResolveTenantId(null, none, "/api/agent/distress", OtherTenant));
Assert.Null(RequestTelemetryMiddleware.ResolveTenantId(null, none, TelemetryPath, "not-a-guid"));
Assert.Null(RequestTelemetryMiddleware.ResolveTenantId(null, none, TelemetryPath, null));
}
}
@@ -7,19 +7,21 @@ using Moq;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Pins ANALYZE-ESP-004 ("ESP Timeout with 'Continue Anyway' — Soft Failure").
/// Pins ANALYZE-ESP-004 ("ESP Gave Up on a Blocking App with 'Continue Anyway' — Soft Failure").
///
/// Background (tenant c9787ba2, session cb7036a6): a slow blocking app (Encompass
/// Hybrid Installer) does not finish inside the 30-min Device-ESP window, so the ESP
/// fails terminally in DeviceSetup. The profile allows "Continue anyway", so the user
/// most likely dismissed the failure screen and reached the desktop — but the agent
/// only ever sees the terminal failure and the session is recorded as Failed. The
/// DecisionEngine already stamps the enrollment_failed event with
/// <c>mayHaveContinuedAnyway=true</c>; this rule turns that into a customer-visible
/// "soft failure" advisory with the root-cause remediation.
/// only ever sees the terminal failure and the session is recorded as Failed.
///
/// The rule keys ONLY on <c>mayHaveContinuedAnyway==true</c> (set exclusively on the
/// ESP terminal-failure path), so an ordinary hard failure must not trip it.
/// The rule needs THREE facts: the terminal enrollment_failed, the DecisionEngine's
/// <c>mayHaveContinuedAnyway=true</c> stamp (profile allows the button), and the agent's own
/// timeout verdict — an app_install_failed promoted with <c>failureType=esp_apps_timeout</c>
/// (ESP gave up while the app was still installing, no per-app HRESULT). Session 683f1eff:
/// an ESP failure with a real HRESULT (0x80070652, installer collision) on a Continue-anyway
/// profile fired the rule and rendered the configured 90-min limit as if it had elapsed —
/// the continue-anyway flag alone proves nothing about timing.
/// </summary>
public class RuleEngineEspSoftFailureTests
{
@@ -37,8 +39,9 @@ public class RuleEngineEspSoftFailureTests
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent>
{
SettleStartedEvent(errorCode: null),
EnrollmentFailedEvent(mayHaveContinuedAnyway: "true"),
AppInstallFailed(),
AppInstallFailed(failureType: "esp_apps_timeout"),
};
var outcome = await RunAsync(rule, events);
@@ -47,13 +50,15 @@ public class RuleEngineEspSoftFailureTests
Assert.Equal("ANALYZE-ESP-004", result.RuleId);
Assert.Equal("warning", result.Severity);
// Required gate matched on the continue-anyway flag.
// Required gates: the continue-anyway flag AND the agent's timeout verdict.
var gate = AsDict(result.MatchedConditions["may_have_continued"]);
Assert.Equal("true", AsString(gate["value"]));
var verdict = AsDict(result.MatchedConditions["esp_gave_up_on_app"]);
Assert.Equal("esp_apps_timeout", AsString(verdict["value"]));
// Interpolation material for the explanation / remediation templates is present:
// {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}}, {{failedSubcategory}} (from enrollment_failed)
// and {{appName}} (from app_install_failed).
// Interpolation material: {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} (enrollment_failed),
// {{failedSubcategory}} (esp_failure_settle_started — the terminal event drops it when
// the Shell-Core failure wins the race) and {{appName}} (the promoted app).
var timeout = AsDict(result.MatchedConditions["espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes"]);
Assert.Equal("30", AsString(timeout["value"]));
@@ -65,6 +70,48 @@ public class RuleEngineEspSoftFailureTests
Assert.Equal(FailedAppName, AsString(failedApp["value"]));
}
[Fact]
public async Task ANALYZE_ESP_004_stays_silent_on_a_hard_failure_with_continue_anyway()
{
// Session 683f1eff: continue-anyway profile, but the ESP failed on a real installer
// error (0x80070652 / MSI 1618) after 19 minutes. The failed app carries no
// esp_apps_timeout verdict — the rule must not turn an installer collision into
// "the ESP reached its 90-min timeout".
var rule = BuiltInAnalyzeRules.GetAll().First(r => r.RuleId == "ANALYZE-ESP-004");
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent>
{
SettleStartedEvent(errorCode: "0x80070652"),
EnrollmentFailedEvent(mayHaveContinuedAnyway: "true"),
AppInstallFailed(failureType: null, exitCodeClass: "Retry"),
};
var outcome = await RunAsync(rule, events);
Assert.Empty(outcome.Results);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ANALYZE_ESP_004_names_the_timed_out_app_not_another_failed_one()
{
// Two failed apps: one hard installer failure earlier in the run, one promoted
// esp_apps_timeout at the terminal. {{appName}} must be the timed-out app.
var rule = BuiltInAnalyzeRules.GetAll().First(r => r.RuleId == "ANALYZE-ESP-004");
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent>
{
AppInstallFailed(failureType: null, exitCodeClass: "Failed", appName: "Contoso Agent", sequence: 100),
SettleStartedEvent(errorCode: null),
EnrollmentFailedEvent(mayHaveContinuedAnyway: "true"),
AppInstallFailed(failureType: "esp_apps_timeout"),
};
var outcome = await RunAsync(rule, events);
var result = Assert.Single(outcome.Results);
var failedApp = AsDict(result.MatchedConditions["appName"]);
Assert.Equal(FailedAppName, AsString(failedApp["value"]));
}
[Fact]
public async Task ANALYZE_ESP_004_does_not_fire_when_continue_anyway_is_false()
{
@@ -75,7 +122,7 @@ public class RuleEngineEspSoftFailureTests
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent>
{
EnrollmentFailedEvent(mayHaveContinuedAnyway: "false"),
AppInstallFailed(),
AppInstallFailed(failureType: "esp_apps_timeout"),
};
var outcome = await RunAsync(rule, events);
@@ -92,7 +139,7 @@ public class RuleEngineEspSoftFailureTests
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent>
{
EnrollmentFailedEvent(mayHaveContinuedAnyway: null),
AppInstallFailed(),
AppInstallFailed(failureType: "esp_apps_timeout"),
};
var outcome = await RunAsync(rule, events);
@@ -132,23 +179,61 @@ public class RuleEngineEspSoftFailureTests
return data;
}
private static EnrollmentEvent AppInstallFailed() => new()
private static EnrollmentEvent SettleStartedEvent(string? errorCode)
{
EventId = Guid.NewGuid().ToString(),
TenantId = TenantId,
SessionId = SessionId,
EventType = "app_install_failed",
Timestamp = DateTime.UtcNow,
Sequence = 220,
Data = new Dictionary<string, object>
var data = new Dictionary<string, object>
{
["appName"] = FailedAppName,
["category"] = "DeviceSetup",
["failedSubcategory"] = "Certificates",
["failureType"] = "Provisioning_DeviceSetup_Certificates_Failed",
["settleSeconds"] = 30,
["reason"] = "wait_for_late_ime_signals",
};
if (errorCode != null)
data["errorCode"] = errorCode;
return new EnrollmentEvent
{
EventId = Guid.NewGuid().ToString(),
TenantId = TenantId,
SessionId = SessionId,
EventType = "esp_failure_settle_started",
Timestamp = DateTime.UtcNow,
Sequence = 212,
Data = data,
};
}
private static EnrollmentEvent AppInstallFailed(
string? failureType,
string? exitCodeClass = null,
string appName = FailedAppName,
int sequence = 220)
{
var data = new Dictionary<string, object>
{
["appName"] = appName,
["state"] = "Error",
["targeted"] = "Device",
["failureType"] = "esp_apps_timeout",
["errorDetail"] = "Install status unconfirmed — ESP gave up while this app was still installing.",
};
if (failureType != null)
{
data["failureType"] = failureType;
data["confidence"] = "presumed";
data["errorDetail"] = "Install status unconfirmed — ESP gave up while this app was still installing.";
}
};
if (exitCodeClass != null)
data["exitCodeClass"] = exitCodeClass;
return new EnrollmentEvent
{
EventId = Guid.NewGuid().ToString(),
TenantId = TenantId,
SessionId = SessionId,
EventType = "app_install_failed",
Timestamp = DateTime.UtcNow,
Sequence = sequence,
Data = data,
};
}
private static Dictionary<string, object> AsDict(object o)
{
@@ -7,12 +7,17 @@ using Moq;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Pins the absence gate on <c>event_type</c> conditions: <c>not_exists</c> without a
/// <c>dataField</c> matches when no event of that type occurs in the session and is disproved by
/// a single such event. Before this branch an absent type always evaluated false, so a required
/// "must not have happened" condition could never be expressed (ANALYZE-ID-004 v2 relies on it).
/// The dataField variant keeps its historical meaning (some event of the type has an empty field)
/// and is not touched here.
/// Pins the absence gates on conditions.
///
/// Without a <c>dataField</c>, <c>not_exists</c> matches when no event of that type occurs in
/// the session and is disproved by a single such event (ANALYZE-ID-004 v2 relies on it).
///
/// With a <c>dataField</c>, <c>not_exists</c> matches when no event of the type carries a
/// non-empty value at that field — including when the type is absent — and is disproved by a
/// single non-empty value; on <c>event_data</c> the same-event filter narrows the inspected set
/// first. Before this the per-event loop's null short-circuit rejected a missing field before
/// the operator ever ran, so "the ESP failure carried no HRESULT" (session 683f1eff) could not be
/// expressed at all, while the precondition gate already had the absence semantics.
/// </summary>
public class RuleEngineEventTypeNotExistsTests
{
@@ -24,7 +29,7 @@ public class RuleEngineEventTypeNotExistsTests
{
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent> { Event("marker_seen", 1) };
var outcome = await RunAsync(Rule(), events);
var outcome = await RunAsync(TypeAbsenceRule(), events);
var result = Assert.Single(outcome.Results);
var evidence = Assert.IsType<Dictionary<string, object>>(result.MatchedConditions["disproof_absent"]);
@@ -37,12 +42,111 @@ public class RuleEngineEventTypeNotExistsTests
{
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent> { Event("marker_seen", 1), Event("disproof", 2) };
var outcome = await RunAsync(Rule(), events);
var outcome = await RunAsync(TypeAbsenceRule(), events);
Assert.Empty(outcome.Results);
}
private static AnalyzeRule Rule() => new()
[Fact]
public async Task Field_not_exists_matches_when_no_event_carries_the_field()
{
// The event type is present, the field is not — the shape of an ESP failure without an
// HRESULT (esp_failure_settle_started without errorCode).
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent> { Event("marker_seen", 1), Event("disproof", 2) };
var outcome = await RunAsync(FieldAbsenceRule("event_type"), events);
var result = Assert.Single(outcome.Results);
var evidence = Assert.IsType<Dictionary<string, object>>(result.MatchedConditions["code_absent"]);
Assert.Equal("disproof", evidence["eventType"]);
Assert.Equal("errorCode", evidence["field"]);
Assert.Equal(1, evidence["count"]);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Field_not_exists_matches_when_the_event_type_is_absent()
{
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent> { Event("marker_seen", 1) };
var outcome = await RunAsync(FieldAbsenceRule("event_type"), events);
var result = Assert.Single(outcome.Results);
var evidence = Assert.IsType<Dictionary<string, object>>(result.MatchedConditions["code_absent"]);
Assert.Equal(0, evidence["count"]);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("event_type")]
[InlineData("event_data")]
public async Task A_non_empty_value_on_any_event_vetoes_a_required_field_not_exists(string source)
{
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent>
{
Event("marker_seen", 1),
Event("disproof", 2),
Event("disproof", 3, ("errorCode", "0x80070652")),
};
var outcome = await RunAsync(FieldAbsenceRule(source), events);
Assert.Empty(outcome.Results);
}
[Fact]
public async Task An_empty_string_does_not_count_as_a_carried_value()
{
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent> { Event("marker_seen", 1), Event("disproof", 2, ("errorCode", "")) };
var outcome = await RunAsync(FieldAbsenceRule("event_type"), events);
Assert.Single(outcome.Results);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Event_data_field_not_exists_inspects_only_the_filtered_events()
{
// The carrier of the field is filtered out (kind=a); among kind=b events nobody carries it.
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent>
{
Event("marker_seen", 1),
Event("disproof", 2, ("kind", "a"), ("errorCode", "0x80070652")),
Event("disproof", 3, ("kind", "b")),
};
var matched = await RunAsync(FieldAbsenceRule("event_data", filterKind: "b"), events);
var result = Assert.Single(matched.Results);
var evidence = Assert.IsType<Dictionary<string, object>>(result.MatchedConditions["code_absent"]);
Assert.Equal(1, evidence["count"]);
var vetoed = await RunAsync(FieldAbsenceRule("event_data", filterKind: "a"), events);
Assert.Empty(vetoed.Results);
}
private static AnalyzeRule TypeAbsenceRule() => Rule(
new RuleCondition { Signal = "disproof_absent", Source = "event_type", EventType = "disproof", Operator = "not_exists", Value = "", Required = true });
private static AnalyzeRule FieldAbsenceRule(string source, string? filterKind = null)
{
var absence = new RuleCondition
{
Signal = "code_absent",
Source = source,
EventType = "disproof",
DataField = "errorCode",
Operator = "not_exists",
Value = "",
Required = true,
};
if (filterKind != null)
{
absence.FilterField = "kind";
absence.FilterOperator = "equals";
absence.FilterValue = filterKind;
}
return Rule(absence);
}
private static AnalyzeRule Rule(RuleCondition absence) => new()
{
// Custom-namespace rule: a built-in ID outside the live catalog is hidden by the
// sunset filter in AnalyzeRuleService (IsBuiltIn defaults to true).
@@ -58,11 +162,11 @@ public class RuleEngineEventTypeNotExistsTests
Conditions = new List<RuleCondition>
{
new() { Signal = "marker", Source = "event_type", EventType = "marker_seen", Operator = "exists", Value = "", Required = true },
new() { Signal = "disproof_absent", Source = "event_type", EventType = "disproof", Operator = "not_exists", Value = "", Required = true },
absence,
},
};
private static EnrollmentEvent Event(string eventType, int sequence) => new()
private static EnrollmentEvent Event(string eventType, int sequence, params (string key, string value)[] data) => new()
{
EventId = Guid.NewGuid().ToString(),
TenantId = TenantId,
@@ -70,7 +174,7 @@ public class RuleEngineEventTypeNotExistsTests
EventType = eventType,
Timestamp = DateTime.UtcNow.AddMinutes(sequence),
Sequence = sequence,
Data = new Dictionary<string, object>(),
Data = data.ToDictionary(d => d.key, d => (object)d.value),
};
private static async Task<AnalysisOutcome> RunAsync(AnalyzeRule rule, List<EnrollmentEvent> events)
@@ -0,0 +1,530 @@
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Text.Json.Nodes;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.DataAccess;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Pagination;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Moq;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// The pure pieces of <see cref="RuleSubmissionService"/> (id suggestion, repo file, snapshot
/// stripping, attribution shape) and the review state machine against mocked repositories.
/// </summary>
public class RuleSubmissionServiceTests
{
private const string TenantId = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111";
// ── id suggestion ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[Fact]
public void Suggest_is_max_plus_one_and_never_fills_a_gap()
{
// 001 and 003 exist, 002 is a retired id — the next is 004, not 002.
var taken = new[] { "ANALYZE-NET-001", "ANALYZE-NET-003", "ANALYZE-APP-018", "GATHER-NET-009" };
Assert.Equal("ANALYZE-NET-004", RuleSubmissionService.SuggestPublishedRuleId("analyze", "network", taken));
}
[Fact]
public void Suggest_starts_at_001_for_an_empty_category_and_maps_the_kind_convention()
{
Assert.Equal("ANALYZE-NET-001", RuleSubmissionService.SuggestPublishedRuleId("analyze", "network", Array.Empty<string>()));
Assert.Equal("GATHER-DEVICE-001", RuleSubmissionService.SuggestPublishedRuleId("gather", "device", Array.Empty<string>()));
Assert.Equal("ANALYZE-DEV-001", RuleSubmissionService.SuggestPublishedRuleId("analyze", "device", Array.Empty<string>()));
Assert.Equal("ANALYZE-ENRL-001", RuleSubmissionService.SuggestPublishedRuleId("analyze", "enrollment", Array.Empty<string>()));
Assert.Equal("GATHER-ENROLL-001", RuleSubmissionService.SuggestPublishedRuleId("gather", "enrollment", Array.Empty<string>()));
}
[Fact]
public void Suggest_is_case_insensitive_over_taken_ids()
{
Assert.Equal("ANALYZE-SEC-008", RuleSubmissionService.SuggestPublishedRuleId("analyze", "security", new[] { "analyze-sec-007" }));
}
[Fact]
public void Suggest_falls_back_to_the_upper_cased_category_when_unmapped()
{
Assert.Equal("ANALYZE-OFFICE-001", RuleSubmissionService.SuggestPublishedRuleId("analyze", "office", Array.Empty<string>()));
}
// ── freeze + repo file ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
private static AnalyzeRule CustomAnalyzeRule() => new()
{
RuleId = "ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003",
Title = "Proxy PAC unreachable",
Description = "PAC download fails",
Severity = "warning",
Category = "network",
Version = "1.2.0",
Author = "Alice Admin",
Enabled = false,
IsBuiltIn = false,
IsCommunity = false,
Provenance = "embedded",
MarkSessionAsFailed = true,
Notify = true,
NotifyChannelIds = new List<string> { "chan-1" },
DerivedFromTemplateRuleId = "ANALYZE-SEC-004",
Explanation = "The PAC file could not be fetched.",
Conditions = new List<RuleCondition>
{
new() { Signal = "pac_failed", Source = "event_type", EventType = "network_pac_failed", Required = true },
},
CreatedAt = new DateTime(2026, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc),
UpdatedAt = new DateTime(2026, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc),
};
[Fact]
public void Freeze_strips_server_and_tenant_fields_and_keeps_the_rule()
{
var json = RuleSubmissionService.FreezeRule(CustomAnalyzeRule());
var node = JsonNode.Parse(json)!.AsObject();
foreach (var stripped in new[] { "isBuiltIn", "provenance", "createdAt", "updatedAt", "markSessionAsFailed", "notifyDefault", "notify", "notifyChannelIds" })
Assert.False(node.ContainsKey(stripped), $"{stripped} must not be frozen");
Assert.Equal("ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003", node["ruleId"]!.GetValue<string>());
Assert.Equal("Alice Admin", node["author"]!.GetValue<string>());
Assert.Equal("ANALYZE-SEC-004", node["derivedFromTemplateRuleId"]!.GetValue<string>());
Assert.Single(node["conditions"]!.AsArray());
}
[Fact]
public void RepoFile_carries_schema_pointer_assigned_id_credit_and_community_flag_in_repo_order()
{
var s = new RuleSubmission
{
RuleKind = RuleSubmissionKinds.Analyze,
RuleJson = RuleSubmissionService.FreezeRule(CustomAnalyzeRule()),
AttributionName = RuleAttributionModes.AnonymousAuthor,
};
var file = RuleSubmissionService.BuildRepoFile(s, "ANALYZE-NET-002");
Assert.Equal("rules/analyze/ANALYZE-NET-002.json", file.Path);
Assert.EndsWith("\n", file.Content);
var node = JsonNode.Parse(file.Content)!.AsObject();
var keys = node.Select(kv => kv.Key).ToList();
Assert.Equal(new[] { "$schema", "ruleId", "title", "description", "severity", "category", "version", "author", "enabled", "isCommunity" }, keys.Take(10));
Assert.Equal("../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json", node["$schema"]!.GetValue<string>());
Assert.Equal("ANALYZE-NET-002", node["ruleId"]!.GetValue<string>());
Assert.Equal("Community contribution", node["author"]!.GetValue<string>());
Assert.True(node["isCommunity"]!.GetValue<bool>());
// Analyze rules ship enabled — the tenant's own toggle state does not travel.
Assert.True(node["enabled"]!.GetValue<bool>());
Assert.False(node.ContainsKey("derivedFromTemplateRuleId"));
Assert.False(node.ContainsKey("isBuiltIn"));
Assert.Contains("\"explanation\": \"The PAC file could not be fetched.\"", file.Content);
}
[Fact]
public void RepoFile_for_a_gather_rule_ships_disabled_and_without_severity()
{
var gather = new GatherRule
{
RuleId = "GATHER-CUSTOM-001",
Title = "BIOS config",
Description = "Reads the BIOS registry block",
Category = "device",
Enabled = true,
IsBuiltIn = false,
CollectorType = "registry",
Target = "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Vendor\\BIOS",
Trigger = "startup",
OutputEventType = "gather_bios_config",
};
var s = new RuleSubmission
{
RuleKind = RuleSubmissionKinds.Gather,
RuleJson = RuleSubmissionService.FreezeRule(gather),
AttributionName = "Contoso IT",
};
var file = RuleSubmissionService.BuildRepoFile(s, "GATHER-DEVICE-009");
Assert.Equal("rules/gather/GATHER-DEVICE-009.json", file.Path);
var node = JsonNode.Parse(file.Content)!.AsObject();
Assert.Equal("../schema/gather-rule.schema.json", node["$schema"]!.GetValue<string>());
Assert.False(node["enabled"]!.GetValue<bool>());
Assert.Equal("Contoso IT", node["author"]!.GetValue<string>());
Assert.False(node.ContainsKey("severity"));
// No \u escaping of the backslash-heavy registry path beyond JSON's own rules.
Assert.Contains("HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Vendor\\\\BIOS", file.Content);
}
// ── attribution ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[Theory]
[InlineData("Alice A.")]
[InlineData("Contoso IT & Ops (EMEA)")]
[InlineData("Zoë Müller-Lüdenscheidt")]
public void AttributionName_accepts_names(string name)
=> Assert.Equal(name, RuleSubmissionService.ValidateAttributionName(name));
[Theory]
[InlineData("")]
[InlineData("<script>")]
[InlineData("https://example.com")]
[InlineData("line\nbreak")]
public void AttributionName_rejects_markup_urls_and_control_characters(string name)
=> Assert.Throws<ArgumentException>(() => RuleSubmissionService.ValidateAttributionName(name));
[Theory]
[InlineData(null, null)]
[InlineData("", null)]
[InlineData(" alice@contoso.com ", "alice@contoso.com")]
public void Email_is_trimmed_or_null(string? input, string? expected)
=> Assert.Equal(expected, RuleSubmissionService.NormalizeEmail(input));
[Theory]
[InlineData("alice")]
[InlineData("@contoso.com")]
[InlineData("alice@")]
[InlineData("a@b@c")]
[InlineData("alice @contoso.com")]
public void Email_rejects_non_addresses(string input)
=> Assert.Throws<ArgumentException>(() => RuleSubmissionService.NormalizeEmail(input));
// ── review state machine ────────────────────────────────────────────────
private static (RuleSubmissionService service, Mock<IRuleSubmissionRepository> repo) Build(
RuleSubmission row, IEnumerable<string>? globalAnalyzeIds = null, IEnumerable<string>? reservedIds = null)
{
var repo = new Mock<IRuleSubmissionRepository>(MockBehavior.Loose);
repo.Setup(r => r.GetAsync(row.SubmissionId)).ReturnsAsync(row);
repo.Setup(r => r.UpdateAsync(It.IsAny<RuleSubmission>())).ReturnsAsync(true);
repo.Setup(r => r.GetReservedPublishedRuleIdsAsync())
.ReturnsAsync(new HashSet<string>(reservedIds ?? Array.Empty<string>(), StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
var rules = new Mock<IRuleRepository>(MockBehavior.Loose);
rules.Setup(r => r.GetAnalyzeRulesAsync("global")).ReturnsAsync(
(globalAnalyzeIds ?? Array.Empty<string>()).Select(id => new AnalyzeRule { RuleId = id, IsBuiltIn = true }).ToList());
rules.Setup(r => r.GetGatherRulesAsync("global")).ReturnsAsync(new List<GatherRule>());
var metrics = new Mock<IMetricsRepository>(MockBehavior.Loose);
var config = new Mock<TenantConfigurationService>(MockBehavior.Loose,
Mock.Of<IConfigRepository>(), NullLogger<TenantConfigurationService>.Instance, new MemoryCache(new MemoryCacheOptions()));
var service = new RuleSubmissionService(repo.Object, rules.Object, metrics.Object, config.Object,
NullLogger<RuleSubmissionService>.Instance);
return (service, repo);
}
private static RuleSubmission PendingRow() => new()
{
SubmissionId = "a1b2c3d4e5f6",
BatchId = "b",
TenantId = TenantId,
RuleKind = RuleSubmissionKinds.Analyze,
SourceRuleId = "ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003",
Title = "Proxy PAC unreachable",
Category = "network",
RuleJson = RuleSubmissionService.FreezeRule(CustomAnalyzeRule()),
SubmittedBy = "alice@contoso.com",
SubmittedByName = "Alice Admin",
SubmittedAt = DateTime.UtcNow,
Status = RuleSubmissionStatuses.Pending,
};
[Fact]
public async Task Approve_requires_a_reserved_id_of_the_same_kind()
{
var (service, _) = Build(PendingRow());
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<ArgumentException>(() => service.ReviewAsync("a1b2c3d4e5f6",
new ReviewRuleSubmissionRequest { Decision = "approve" }, "ga@example.com"));
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<ArgumentException>(() => service.ReviewAsync("a1b2c3d4e5f6",
new ReviewRuleSubmissionRequest { Decision = "approve", PublishedRuleId = "ANALYZE-CUSTOM-009" }, "ga@example.com"));
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<ArgumentException>(() => service.ReviewAsync("a1b2c3d4e5f6",
new ReviewRuleSubmissionRequest { Decision = "approve", PublishedRuleId = "GATHER-NET-002" }, "ga@example.com"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Approve_refuses_an_id_taken_by_the_catalog_or_another_approval()
{
var (service, _) = Build(PendingRow(), globalAnalyzeIds: new[] { "ANALYZE-NET-001" }, reservedIds: new[] { "ANALYZE-NET-002" });
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<InvalidOperationException>(() => service.ReviewAsync("a1b2c3d4e5f6",
new ReviewRuleSubmissionRequest { Decision = "approve", PublishedRuleId = "ANALYZE-NET-001" }, "ga@example.com"));
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<InvalidOperationException>(() => service.ReviewAsync("a1b2c3d4e5f6",
new ReviewRuleSubmissionRequest { Decision = "approve", PublishedRuleId = "ANALYZE-NET-002" }, "ga@example.com"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Approve_stores_id_comment_adaptation_flag_and_reviewer()
{
var (service, repo) = Build(PendingRow());
RuleSubmission? written = null;
repo.Setup(r => r.UpdateAsync(It.IsAny<RuleSubmission>())).Callback<RuleSubmission>(s => written = s).ReturnsAsync(true);
var result = await service.ReviewAsync("a1b2c3d4e5f6",
new ReviewRuleSubmissionRequest { Decision = "approve", PublishedRuleId = "ANALYZE-NET-003", ReviewComment = "Taken, will generalise the title.", WillBeAdapted = true },
"ga@example.com");
Assert.Same(result, written);
Assert.Equal(RuleSubmissionStatuses.Approved, result.Status);
Assert.Equal("ANALYZE-NET-003", result.PublishedRuleId);
Assert.True(result.WillBeAdapted);
Assert.Equal("Taken, will generalise the title.", result.ReviewComment);
Assert.Equal("ga@example.com", result.ReviewedBy);
Assert.NotNull(result.ReviewedAt);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Decline_requires_a_comment_and_clears_the_published_id()
{
var row = PendingRow();
row.Status = RuleSubmissionStatuses.Approved;
row.PublishedRuleId = "ANALYZE-NET-003";
var (service, _) = Build(row);
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<ArgumentException>(() => service.ReviewAsync("a1b2c3d4e5f6",
new ReviewRuleSubmissionRequest { Decision = "decline" }, "ga@example.com"));
var result = await service.ReviewAsync("a1b2c3d4e5f6",
new ReviewRuleSubmissionRequest { Decision = "decline", ReviewComment = "Too tenant-specific." }, "ga@example.com");
Assert.Equal(RuleSubmissionStatuses.Declined, result.Status);
Assert.Null(result.PublishedRuleId);
Assert.False(result.WillBeAdapted);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Published_is_derived_and_final()
{
var row = PendingRow();
row.Status = RuleSubmissionStatuses.Approved;
row.PublishedRuleId = "ANALYZE-NET-003";
var (service, _) = Build(row, globalAnalyzeIds: new[] { "ANALYZE-NET-003" });
var items = await service.ToItemsAsync(new[] { row });
Assert.Equal(RuleSubmissionStatuses.Published, items[0].Status);
Assert.Equal(RuleSubmissionStatuses.Approved, row.Status);
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<InvalidOperationException>(() => service.ReviewAsync("a1b2c3d4e5f6",
new ReviewRuleSubmissionRequest { Decision = "decline", ReviewComment = "too late" }, "ga@example.com"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Approved_but_unpublished_stays_approved_on_the_wire()
{
var row = PendingRow();
row.Status = RuleSubmissionStatuses.Approved;
row.PublishedRuleId = "ANALYZE-NET-003";
var (service, _) = Build(row, globalAnalyzeIds: new[] { "ANALYZE-NET-001" });
var items = await service.ToItemsAsync(new[] { row });
Assert.Equal(RuleSubmissionStatuses.Approved, items[0].Status);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Withdraw_only_pending_and_only_own_tenant()
{
var row = PendingRow();
var (service, _) = Build(row);
Assert.False(await service.WithdrawAsync("22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222", "a1b2c3d4e5f6", crossTenantAllowed: false));
Assert.True(await service.WithdrawAsync(TenantId, "a1b2c3d4e5f6", crossTenantAllowed: false));
Assert.Equal(RuleSubmissionStatuses.Withdrawn, row.Status);
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<InvalidOperationException>(() => service.WithdrawAsync(TenantId, "a1b2c3d4e5f6", crossTenantAllowed: false));
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<InvalidOperationException>(() => service.ReviewAsync("a1b2c3d4e5f6",
new ReviewRuleSubmissionRequest { Decision = "approve", PublishedRuleId = "ANALYZE-NET-003" }, "ga@example.com"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Operator_delete_passes_through_to_the_repository()
{
var (service, repo) = Build(PendingRow());
repo.Setup(r => r.DeleteAsync("a1b2c3d4e5f6")).ReturnsAsync(true);
Assert.True(await service.DeleteAsync("a1b2c3d4e5f6"));
repo.Verify(r => r.DeleteAsync("a1b2c3d4e5f6"), Times.Once);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Unknown_decision_is_a_bad_request()
{
var (service, _) = Build(PendingRow());
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<ArgumentException>(() => service.ReviewAsync("a1b2c3d4e5f6",
new ReviewRuleSubmissionRequest { Decision = "maybe" }, "ga@example.com"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Detail_returns_the_typed_rule_suggested_id_and_repo_file()
{
var (service, _) = Build(PendingRow(), globalAnalyzeIds: new[] { "ANALYZE-NET-001" });
var detail = await service.GetDetailAsync("a1b2c3d4e5f6");
Assert.NotNull(detail);
Assert.NotNull(detail!.AnalyzeRule);
Assert.Null(detail.GatherRule);
Assert.Equal("ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003", detail.AnalyzeRule!.RuleId);
Assert.False(detail.AnalyzeRule.IsBuiltIn);
Assert.Equal("ANALYZE-NET-002", detail.SuggestedPublishedRuleId);
Assert.Equal("rules/analyze/ANALYZE-NET-002.json", detail.RepoFile!.Path);
}
// ── submit ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
private static (RuleSubmissionService service, List<RuleSubmission> stored) BuildForSubmit(
List<AnalyzeRule> tenantAnalyze, List<RuleSubmission>? existing = null, TenantConfiguration? config = null)
{
var stored = new List<RuleSubmission>();
var repo = new Mock<IRuleSubmissionRepository>(MockBehavior.Loose);
repo.Setup(r => r.GetForTenantAsync(TenantId)).ReturnsAsync(existing ?? new List<RuleSubmission>());
repo.Setup(r => r.AddAsync(It.IsAny<RuleSubmission>())).Callback<RuleSubmission>(stored.Add).ReturnsAsync(true);
repo.Setup(r => r.GetReservedPublishedRuleIdsAsync()).ReturnsAsync(new HashSet<string>());
var rules = new Mock<IRuleRepository>(MockBehavior.Loose);
rules.Setup(r => r.GetAnalyzeRulesAsync(TenantId)).ReturnsAsync(tenantAnalyze);
rules.Setup(r => r.GetGatherRulesAsync(TenantId)).ReturnsAsync(new List<GatherRule>());
rules.Setup(r => r.GetAnalyzeRulesAsync("global")).ReturnsAsync(new List<AnalyzeRule>());
rules.Setup(r => r.GetGatherRulesAsync("global")).ReturnsAsync(new List<GatherRule>());
var metrics = new Mock<IMetricsRepository>(MockBehavior.Loose);
metrics.Setup(m => m.GetRuleStatsAsync(TenantId, It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<string?>(), It.IsAny<int>()))
.ReturnsAsync(new List<RuleStatsEntry>
{
new() { RuleId = "ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003", FireCount = 4, SessionsEvaluated = 40, EvaluationCount = 41 },
new() { RuleId = "ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003", FireCount = 1, SessionsEvaluated = 10, EvaluationCount = 10 },
new() { RuleId = "ANALYZE-CUSTOM-999", FireCount = 99, SessionsEvaluated = 99, EvaluationCount = 99 },
});
var configRepo = new Mock<IConfigRepository>(MockBehavior.Loose);
var configService = new Mock<TenantConfigurationService>(MockBehavior.Loose, configRepo.Object,
NullLogger<TenantConfigurationService>.Instance, new MemoryCache(new MemoryCacheOptions()));
configService.Setup(c => c.GetConfigurationIfExistsAsync(TenantId)).ReturnsAsync(config);
var service = new RuleSubmissionService(repo.Object, rules.Object, metrics.Object, configService.Object,
NullLogger<RuleSubmissionService>.Instance);
return (service, stored);
}
private static SubmitRuleSubmissionsRequest Request(params string[] ruleIds) => new()
{
TenantId = TenantId,
Items = ruleIds.Select(id => new RuleSubmissionItemRef { Kind = "analyze", RuleId = id }).ToList(),
Comment = "Fires when the PAC download fails during ESP.",
AttributionMode = RuleAttributionModes.Anonymous,
};
[Fact]
public async Task Submit_freezes_the_tenant_rule_records_findings_and_fire_stats()
{
var (service, stored) = BuildForSubmit(new List<AnalyzeRule> { CustomAnalyzeRule() });
var created = await service.SubmitAsync(TenantId, Request("ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003"), "alice@contoso.com", "Alice Admin");
var s = Assert.Single(created);
Assert.Same(s, Assert.Single(stored));
Assert.Equal(12, s.SubmissionId.Length);
Assert.Equal(12, s.BatchId.Length);
Assert.Equal(RuleSubmissionStatuses.Pending, s.Status);
Assert.Equal("Community contribution", s.AttributionName);
Assert.Null(s.ContactEmail);
Assert.Equal("Proxy PAC unreachable", s.Title);
Assert.Equal("network", s.Category);
Assert.Equal("ANALYZE-SEC-004", s.DerivedFromTemplateRuleId);
Assert.Contains(s.ValidationFindings, f => f.Level == "info" && f.Message.Contains("ANALYZE-SEC-004"));
Assert.DoesNotContain(s.ValidationFindings, f => f.Level == "error");
Assert.Equal(5, s.SourceFireStats!.FireCount);
Assert.Equal(50, s.SourceFireStats.SessionsEvaluated);
Assert.DoesNotContain("isBuiltIn", s.RuleJson);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Submit_rejects_built_in_and_unknown_rules_without_storing_anything()
{
var builtIn = CustomAnalyzeRule();
builtIn.RuleId = "ANALYZE-NET-001";
builtIn.IsBuiltIn = true;
var (service, stored) = BuildForSubmit(new List<AnalyzeRule> { CustomAnalyzeRule(), builtIn });
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<ArgumentException>(() =>
service.SubmitAsync(TenantId, Request("ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003", "ANALYZE-NET-001", "ANALYZE-CUSTOM-404"), "alice@contoso.com", "Alice Admin"));
Assert.Contains("ANALYZE-NET-001", ex.Message);
Assert.Contains("ANALYZE-CUSTOM-404", ex.Message);
Assert.Empty(stored);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Submit_rejects_a_rule_whose_draft_validation_fails()
{
var broken = CustomAnalyzeRule();
broken.Conditions = new List<RuleCondition>();
var (service, stored) = BuildForSubmit(new List<AnalyzeRule> { broken });
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<ArgumentException>(() =>
service.SubmitAsync(TenantId, Request("ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003"), "alice@contoso.com", "Alice Admin"));
Assert.Contains("at least one condition", ex.Message);
Assert.Empty(stored);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Submit_refuses_a_second_pending_submission_of_the_same_rule()
{
var (service, _) = BuildForSubmit(new List<AnalyzeRule> { CustomAnalyzeRule() }, existing: new List<RuleSubmission> { PendingRow() });
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<InvalidOperationException>(() =>
service.SubmitAsync(TenantId, Request("ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003"), "alice@contoso.com", "Alice Admin"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Submit_enforces_the_daily_cap()
{
var existing = Enumerable.Range(0, RuleSubmissionService.MaxSubmissionsPerTenantPerDay)
.Select(i => { var r = PendingRow(); r.SourceRuleId = $"OTHER-{i}"; r.Status = RuleSubmissionStatuses.Declined; return r; })
.ToList();
var (service, _) = BuildForSubmit(new List<AnalyzeRule> { CustomAnalyzeRule() }, existing);
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<InvalidOperationException>(() =>
service.SubmitAsync(TenantId, Request("ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003"), "alice@contoso.com", "Alice Admin"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Submit_organization_attribution_uses_the_company_name_and_fails_without_one()
{
var withName = new TenantConfiguration { TenantId = TenantId, DomainName = "contoso.example", CompanyName = "Contoso Ltd." };
var (service, _) = BuildForSubmit(new List<AnalyzeRule> { CustomAnalyzeRule() }, config: withName);
var request = Request("ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003");
request.AttributionMode = RuleAttributionModes.Organization;
var created = await service.SubmitAsync(TenantId, request, "alice@contoso.com", "Alice Admin");
Assert.Equal("Contoso Ltd.", created[0].AttributionName);
var (noConfig, _) = BuildForSubmit(new List<AnalyzeRule> { CustomAnalyzeRule() }, config: null);
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<ArgumentException>(() => noConfig.SubmitAsync(TenantId, request, "alice@contoso.com", "Alice Admin"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Submit_stores_the_contact_email_when_given()
{
var (service, _) = BuildForSubmit(new List<AnalyzeRule> { CustomAnalyzeRule() });
var request = Request("ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003");
request.Email = " alice.reply@contoso.com ";
var created = await service.SubmitAsync(TenantId, request, "alice@contoso.com", "Alice Admin");
Assert.Equal("alice.reply@contoso.com", created[0].ContactEmail);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Submit_person_attribution_freezes_the_requested_name()
{
var (service, _) = BuildForSubmit(new List<AnalyzeRule> { CustomAnalyzeRule() });
var request = Request("ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003");
request.AttributionMode = RuleAttributionModes.Person;
request.AttributionName = " Alice A. ";
var created = await service.SubmitAsync(TenantId, request, "alice@contoso.com", "Alice Admin");
Assert.Equal("Alice A.", created[0].AttributionName);
Assert.Equal(RuleAttributionModes.Person, created[0].AttributionMode);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Wire pins for the rule-submission responses (typed from the start — the anonymous side is
/// the literal a client sees, so a reordered or renamed property fails here first).
/// </summary>
public class RuleSubmissionsWireParityTests
{
private static readonly DateTime T0 = new(2026, 9, 9, 10, 30, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private static RuleSubmissionItem Item() => new()
{
SubmissionId = "a1b2c3d4e5f6",
BatchId = "0f0e0d0c0b0a",
TenantId = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111",
RuleKind = "analyze",
SourceRuleId = "ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003",
Title = "Proxy PAC unreachable",
Category = "network",
Comment = "Fires when the PAC download fails.",
SubmittedBy = "alice@contoso.com",
SubmittedByName = "Alice Admin",
ContactEmail = "alice.reply@contoso.com",
AttributionMode = "anonymous",
AttributionName = "Community contribution",
SubmittedAt = T0,
Status = "approved",
ValidationFindings = new List<RuleSubmissionFinding> { new() { Level = "info", Message = "Derived from template ANALYZE-SEC-004" } },
SourceFireStats = new RuleSubmissionFireStats { Days = 30, FireCount = 42, SessionsEvaluated = 310, EvaluationCount = 312 },
ReviewedBy = "ga@example.com",
ReviewedAt = T0.AddDays(1),
ReviewComment = "Taken.",
WillBeAdapted = true,
PublishedRuleId = "ANALYZE-NET-002",
DerivedFromTemplateRuleId = "ANALYZE-SEC-004",
};
private static object ItemLiteral() => new
{
submissionId = "a1b2c3d4e5f6",
batchId = "0f0e0d0c0b0a",
tenantId = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111",
ruleKind = "analyze",
sourceRuleId = "ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003",
title = "Proxy PAC unreachable",
category = "network",
comment = "Fires when the PAC download fails.",
submittedBy = "alice@contoso.com",
submittedByName = "Alice Admin",
contactEmail = "alice.reply@contoso.com",
attributionMode = "anonymous",
attributionName = "Community contribution",
submittedAt = T0,
status = "approved",
validationFindings = new List<object> { new { level = "info", message = "Derived from template ANALYZE-SEC-004" } },
sourceFireStats = new { days = 30, fireCount = 42, sessionsEvaluated = 310, evaluationCount = 312 },
reviewedBy = "ga@example.com",
reviewedAt = T0.AddDays(1),
reviewComment = "Taken.",
willBeAdapted = true,
publishedRuleId = "ANALYZE-NET-002",
derivedFromTemplateRuleId = "ANALYZE-SEC-004",
};
[Fact]
public void Submit_response_shape()
{
ApiResponseWireParityTests.AssertWireIdentical(
new { success = true, message = "Rule submitted for review.", batchId = "0f0e0d0c0b0a", submissions = new List<object> { ItemLiteral() } },
new SubmitRuleSubmissionsResponse { Success = true, Message = "Rule submitted for review.", BatchId = "0f0e0d0c0b0a", Submissions = new List<RuleSubmissionItem> { Item() } });
}
[Fact]
public void List_nonPaged_has_no_nextLink_key()
{
ApiResponseWireParityTests.AssertWireIdentical(
new { success = true, count = 1, submissions = new List<object> { ItemLiteral() } },
new RuleSubmissionListResponse { Success = true, Count = 1, Submissions = new List<RuleSubmissionItem> { Item() } });
}
[Fact]
public void List_paged_carries_nextLink()
{
ApiResponseWireParityTests.AssertWireIdentical(
new { success = true, count = 1, submissions = new List<object> { ItemLiteral() }, nextLink = "/api/global/rule-submissions?pageSize=20&continuation=abc" },
new RuleSubmissionListResponse { Success = true, Count = 1, Submissions = new List<RuleSubmissionItem> { Item() }, NextLink = "/api/global/rule-submissions?pageSize=20&continuation=abc" });
}
[Fact]
public void List_last_page_drops_the_nextLink_key()
{
ApiResponseWireParityTests.AssertWireIdentical(
new { success = true, count = 0, submissions = new List<object>() },
new RuleSubmissionListResponse { Success = true, Count = 0, Submissions = new List<RuleSubmissionItem>(), NextLink = null });
}
[Fact]
public void Detail_shape_with_analyze_rule_omits_the_gather_slot()
{
var rule = new AnalyzeRule
{
RuleId = "ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003", Title = "Proxy PAC unreachable", Description = "d", Severity = "warning", Category = "network",
Explanation = "e", IsBuiltIn = false, Conditions = new List<RuleCondition>(),
};
var typed = new RuleSubmissionDetailResponse
{
Success = true,
Submission = Item(),
AnalyzeRule = rule,
LiveFireStats = new RuleSubmissionFireStats { Days = 30, FireCount = 1, SessionsEvaluated = 2, EvaluationCount = 3 },
SuggestedPublishedRuleId = "ANALYZE-NET-002",
RepoFile = new RuleSubmissionRepoFile { Path = "rules/analyze/ANALYZE-NET-002.json", Content = "{}\n" },
};
ApiResponseWireParityTests.AssertWireIdentical(
new
{
success = true,
submission = ItemLiteral(),
analyzeRule = rule,
liveFireStats = new { days = 30, fireCount = 1, sessionsEvaluated = 2, evaluationCount = 3 },
suggestedPublishedRuleId = "ANALYZE-NET-002",
repoFile = new { path = "rules/analyze/ANALYZE-NET-002.json", content = "{}\n" },
},
typed);
}
[Fact]
public void Review_response_shape()
{
ApiResponseWireParityTests.AssertWireIdentical(
new { success = true, message = "Submission approved.", submission = ItemLiteral() },
new ReviewRuleSubmissionResponse { Success = true, Message = "Submission approved.", Submission = Item() });
}
}
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests.Shared;
/// <summary>
/// Pins the schemaVersion-2 catalog contract (generated by scripts/error-codes/generate.mjs):
/// Pins the schemaVersion-2 catalog contract (generated by tools/error-codes/generate.mjs):
/// key/source/category vocabulary, the HRESULT_FROM_WIN32 derivation, the symbol and
/// enforcement-state indexes, and the handful of entries product code and rules rely on.
/// </summary>
@@ -88,6 +88,12 @@ public sealed class SharedManifestParityTests
["webhookProviderTypes"] = EnumMap<WebhookProviderType>(),
["annotationLanes"] = AnnotationLanes.All,
["annotationVerdicts"] = AnnotationVerdicts.All,
// Community rule submissions: kinds, effective statuses (incl. the derived "published"),
// attribution modes and reviewer decisions — the MCP tool schemas enumerate these.
["ruleSubmissionKinds"] = RuleSubmissionKinds.All,
["ruleSubmissionStatuses"] = RuleSubmissionStatuses.All,
["ruleAttributionModes"] = RuleAttributionModes.All,
["ruleSubmissionDecisions"] = RuleSubmissionDecisions.All,
// Ops vocabularies. Declaration order kept for severities — it IS the ladder
// (Info < Warning < Error < Critical), and the MCP renders it in that order.
["opsEventCategories"] = ConstStrings(typeof(OpsEventCategory)),
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.DataAccess.TableStorage;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Helpers;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Round-trip pins for the RuleSubmissions Store/Map pair (memory:
/// feedback_table_storage_serialization — every new field in <see cref="RuleSubmission"/>
/// MUST be exercised in Store+Map so silent drops surface here), plus the key and filter shapes.
/// </summary>
public class TableRuleSubmissionRepositoryTests
{
private const string TenantId = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111";
private static RuleSubmission Full() => new()
{
SubmissionId = "a1b2c3d4e5f6",
BatchId = "0f0e0d0c0b0a",
TenantId = TenantId,
RuleKind = RuleSubmissionKinds.Analyze,
SourceRuleId = "ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003",
Title = "Proxy PAC unreachable",
Category = "network",
RuleJson = "{\"ruleId\":\"ANALYZE-CUSTOM-003\",\"title\":\"Proxy PAC unreachable\"}",
Comment = "Fires when the PAC download fails during ESP.",
SubmittedBy = "alice@contoso.com",
SubmittedByName = "Alice Admin",
ContactEmail = "alice.reply@contoso.com",
AttributionMode = RuleAttributionModes.Person,
AttributionName = "Alice A.",
SubmittedAt = new DateTime(2026, 9, 9, 10, 30, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc),
Status = RuleSubmissionStatuses.Approved,
ValidationFindings = new List<RuleSubmissionFinding>
{
new() { Level = "info", Message = "Derived from template ANALYZE-SEC-004" },
},
SourceFireStats = new RuleSubmissionFireStats { Days = 30, FireCount = 42, SessionsEvaluated = 310, EvaluationCount = 312 },
ReviewedBy = "ga@example.com",
ReviewedAt = new DateTime(2026, 9, 10, 8, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc),
ReviewComment = "Taken, generalised for the community.",
WillBeAdapted = true,
PublishedRuleId = "ANALYZE-NET-002",
DerivedFromTemplateRuleId = "ANALYZE-SEC-004",
};
[Fact]
public void Roundtrip_all_fields_survive_store_and_map()
{
var original = Full();
var mapped = TableRuleSubmissionRepository.MapSubmission(
TableRuleSubmissionRepository.StoreSubmission(original));
Assert.Equal(original.SubmissionId, mapped.SubmissionId);
Assert.Equal(original.BatchId, mapped.BatchId);
Assert.Equal(original.TenantId, mapped.TenantId);
Assert.Equal(original.RuleKind, mapped.RuleKind);
Assert.Equal(original.SourceRuleId, mapped.SourceRuleId);
Assert.Equal(original.Title, mapped.Title);
Assert.Equal(original.Category, mapped.Category);
Assert.Equal(original.RuleJson, mapped.RuleJson);
Assert.Equal(original.Comment, mapped.Comment);
Assert.Equal(original.SubmittedBy, mapped.SubmittedBy);
Assert.Equal(original.SubmittedByName, mapped.SubmittedByName);
Assert.Equal(original.ContactEmail, mapped.ContactEmail);
Assert.Equal(original.AttributionMode, mapped.AttributionMode);
Assert.Equal(original.AttributionName, mapped.AttributionName);
Assert.Equal(original.SubmittedAt, mapped.SubmittedAt);
Assert.Equal(original.Status, mapped.Status);
Assert.Single(mapped.ValidationFindings);
Assert.Equal("info", mapped.ValidationFindings[0].Level);
Assert.Equal(original.ValidationFindings[0].Message, mapped.ValidationFindings[0].Message);
Assert.NotNull(mapped.SourceFireStats);
Assert.Equal(42, mapped.SourceFireStats!.FireCount);
Assert.Equal(310, mapped.SourceFireStats.SessionsEvaluated);
Assert.Equal(312, mapped.SourceFireStats.EvaluationCount);
Assert.Equal(30, mapped.SourceFireStats.Days);
Assert.Equal(original.ReviewedBy, mapped.ReviewedBy);
Assert.Equal(original.ReviewedAt, mapped.ReviewedAt);
Assert.Equal(original.ReviewComment, mapped.ReviewComment);
Assert.True(mapped.WillBeAdapted);
Assert.Equal(original.PublishedRuleId, mapped.PublishedRuleId);
Assert.Equal(original.DerivedFromTemplateRuleId, mapped.DerivedFromTemplateRuleId);
}
[Fact]
public void Roundtrip_pending_row_keeps_nulls_null()
{
var original = Full();
original.Status = RuleSubmissionStatuses.Pending;
original.Comment = null;
original.ContactEmail = null;
original.SourceFireStats = null;
original.ValidationFindings = new List<RuleSubmissionFinding>();
original.ReviewedBy = null;
original.ReviewedAt = null;
original.ReviewComment = null;
original.WillBeAdapted = false;
original.PublishedRuleId = null;
original.DerivedFromTemplateRuleId = null;
var mapped = TableRuleSubmissionRepository.MapSubmission(
TableRuleSubmissionRepository.StoreSubmission(original));
Assert.Null(mapped.Comment);
Assert.Null(mapped.ContactEmail);
Assert.Null(mapped.SourceFireStats);
Assert.Empty(mapped.ValidationFindings);
Assert.Null(mapped.ReviewedBy);
Assert.Null(mapped.ReviewedAt);
Assert.Null(mapped.ReviewComment);
Assert.False(mapped.WillBeAdapted);
Assert.Null(mapped.PublishedRuleId);
Assert.Null(mapped.DerivedFromTemplateRuleId);
}
[Fact]
public void Store_uses_the_single_partition_and_an_inverted_tick_row_key()
{
var s = Full();
var entity = TableRuleSubmissionRepository.StoreSubmission(s);
Assert.Equal("submissions", entity.PartitionKey);
Assert.Equal($"{RowKeyCodec.InvertedTicks(s.SubmittedAt)}_{s.SubmissionId}", entity.RowKey);
}
[Fact]
public void Newer_submission_sorts_first()
{
var older = Full();
var newer = Full();
newer.SubmittedAt = older.SubmittedAt.AddMinutes(5);
var olderKey = TableRuleSubmissionRepository.StoreSubmission(older).RowKey;
var newerKey = TableRuleSubmissionRepository.StoreSubmission(newer).RowKey;
Assert.True(string.CompareOrdinal(newerKey, olderKey) < 0);
}
[Fact]
public void Map_tolerates_a_corrupt_json_column()
{
var entity = TableRuleSubmissionRepository.StoreSubmission(Full());
entity["ValidationFindingsJson"] = "{not json";
entity["SourceFireStatsJson"] = "[]";
var mapped = TableRuleSubmissionRepository.MapSubmission(entity);
Assert.Empty(mapped.ValidationFindings);
Assert.Null(mapped.SourceFireStats);
}
// ── retention rule (shared by the sweep and this pin) ──
private static readonly DateTime Now = new(2026, 12, 1, 12, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
[Theory]
[InlineData("withdrawn", 29, false)]
[InlineData("withdrawn", 30, true)]
[InlineData("declined", 89, false)]
[InlineData("declined", 90, true)]
[InlineData("pending", 400, false)]
[InlineData("approved", 400, false)]
public void Retention_expires_only_closed_rows_at_their_window(string status, int ageDays, bool expired)
{
var s = Full();
s.Status = status;
s.SubmittedAt = Now.AddDays(-ageDays);
s.ReviewedAt = status == "declined" ? Now.AddDays(-ageDays) : null;
Assert.Equal(expired, RuleSubmissionRetention.IsExpired(s, Now));
}
[Fact]
public void Retention_of_a_declined_row_counts_from_the_decision_not_the_submission()
{
var s = Full();
s.Status = RuleSubmissionStatuses.Declined;
s.SubmittedAt = Now.AddDays(-200);
s.ReviewedAt = Now.AddDays(-10);
Assert.False(RuleSubmissionRetention.IsExpired(s, Now));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(null, null, "PartitionKey eq 'submissions'")]
[InlineData("t'1", null, "PartitionKey eq 'submissions' and TenantId eq 't''1'")]
[InlineData(null, "pending", "PartitionKey eq 'submissions' and Status eq 'pending'")]
[InlineData("t1", "approved", "PartitionKey eq 'submissions' and TenantId eq 't1' and Status eq 'approved'")]
public void Filter_escapes_and_composes(string? tenantId, string? status, string expected)
{
Assert.Equal(expected, TableRuleSubmissionRepository.BuildFilter(tenantId, status));
}
}
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ public class TypedContractCompletionWireParityTests
totalInstalls = 4,
totalSkipped = 1,
totalUnmeasured = 1,
totalIncomplete = 0,
totalCollisionExcluded = 0,
slowestApps = new[]
{
@@ -195,6 +196,7 @@ public class TypedContractCompletionWireParityTests
skipped = 1,
unmeasured = 1,
failed = 1,
incomplete = 0,
failureRate = 33.3,
avgDurationSeconds = 120.0,
maxDurationSeconds = 240,
@@ -225,6 +227,7 @@ public class TypedContractCompletionWireParityTests
TotalInstalls = 4,
TotalSkipped = 1,
TotalUnmeasured = 1,
TotalIncomplete = 0,
TotalCollisionExcluded = 0,
SlowestApps = new[]
{
@@ -236,6 +239,7 @@ public class TypedContractCompletionWireParityTests
Skipped = 1,
Unmeasured = 1,
Failed = 1,
Incomplete = 0,
FailureRate = 33.3,
AvgDurationSeconds = 120.0,
MaxDurationSeconds = 240,
@@ -684,6 +688,7 @@ public class TypedContractCompletionWireParityTests
skipped = 0,
unmeasured = 0,
failed = 0,
incomplete = 0,
failureRate = 0.0,
avgDurationSeconds = 0.0,
p95DurationSeconds = 0,
@@ -715,6 +720,7 @@ public class TypedContractCompletionWireParityTests
Skipped = 0,
Unmeasured = 0,
Failed = 0,
Incomplete = 0,
FailureRate = 0.0,
AvgDurationSeconds = 0.0,
P95DurationSeconds = 0,
@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using System.Net.Http;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.Notifications;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.WhatsNew;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.DataAccess;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.Notifications;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.WhatsNew;
using Microsoft.ApplicationInsights;
using Microsoft.ApplicationInsights.Extensibility;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Moq;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// What's new → channel digest: feed parsing, watermark semantics (baseline on first run, diff by
/// entry key, claim-then-send with ETag CAS), per-channel opt-in routing, and the digest shape.
/// </summary>
public class WhatsNewNotificationServiceTests
{
// ── Fakes ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
private sealed class InMemoryStateRepository : IWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository
{
private WhatsNewNotificationState? _row;
private long _version = 0;
public int ConflictsToInject { get; set; }
public int Writes { get; private set; }
public WhatsNewNotificationState? Current => _row;
public void Seed(params string[] knownKeys)
{
_row = new WhatsNewNotificationState { KnownEntryKeys = new HashSet<string>(knownKeys, StringComparer.Ordinal) };
_version++;
}
public Task<(WhatsNewNotificationState? State, string? ETag)> GetWithETagAsync()
=> Task.FromResult(_row == null ? ((WhatsNewNotificationState?)null, (string?)null) : (Clone(_row), _version.ToString()));
public Task<bool> TryUpsertAsync(WhatsNewNotificationState state, string? ifMatchETag)
{
if (ConflictsToInject > 0)
{
ConflictsToInject--;
_version++;
return Task.FromResult(false);
}
if (ifMatchETag is null && _row != null) return Task.FromResult(false);
if (ifMatchETag is not null && ifMatchETag != _version.ToString()) return Task.FromResult(false);
_row = Clone(state);
_version++;
Writes++;
return Task.FromResult(true);
}
private static WhatsNewNotificationState Clone(WhatsNewNotificationState s) => new()
{
KnownEntryKeys = new HashSet<string>(s.KnownEntryKeys, StringComparer.Ordinal),
LastDocsCommit = s.LastDocsCommit,
LastRunUtc = s.LastRunUtc,
LastNotifiedUtc = s.LastNotifiedUtc,
LastNotifiedEntryCount = s.LastNotifiedEntryCount,
};
}
private sealed class Harness
{
public InMemoryStateRepository StateRepo { get; } = new();
public Mock<IWhatsNewFeedClient> Feed { get; } = new();
public Mock<IConfigRepository> ConfigRepo { get; } = new();
public Mock<NotificationChannelDispatcher> Dispatcher { get; }
public List<(List<NotificationChannel> Channels, NotificationAlert Alert)> Sent { get; } = new();
public WhatsNewNotificationService Service { get; }
public DateTime Now { get; } = new(2026, 9, 8, 12, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
public Harness()
{
var webhook = new WebhookNotificationService(new HttpClient(), NullLogger<WebhookNotificationService>.Instance);
var telegram = new TelegramNotificationService(new HttpClient(), Mock.Of<IConfigRepository>(), NullLogger<TelegramNotificationService>.Instance);
Dispatcher = new Mock<NotificationChannelDispatcher>(webhook, telegram);
Dispatcher
.Setup(d => d.SendToChannelsAsync(It.IsAny<IEnumerable<NotificationChannel>>(), It.IsAny<NotificationAlert>()))
.Returns<IEnumerable<NotificationChannel>, NotificationAlert>((channels, alert) =>
{
Sent.Add((channels.ToList(), alert));
return Task.CompletedTask;
});
ConfigRepo.Setup(r => r.GetAllTenantConfigurationsAsync()).ReturnsAsync(new List<TenantConfiguration>());
Service = new WhatsNewNotificationService(
Feed.Object,
StateRepo,
ConfigRepo.Object,
Dispatcher.Object,
new TelemetryClient(new TelemetryConfiguration()),
NullLogger<WhatsNewNotificationService>.Instance,
() => Now);
}
public void SetFeed(WhatsNewFeed? feed)
=> Feed.Setup(f => f.GetAsync(It.IsAny<CancellationToken>())).ReturnsAsync(feed);
public void SetTenants(params TenantConfiguration[] tenants)
=> ConfigRepo.Setup(r => r.GetAllTenantConfigurationsAsync()).ReturnsAsync(tenants.ToList());
}
private static WhatsNewFeedEntry Entry(string channel, string id, string? title = null, string body = "Body text.", int daysAgo = 0)
=> new()
{
Channel = channel,
Id = id,
AddedUtc = new DateTime(2026, 9, 8, 0, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc).AddDays(-daysAgo),
Period = "September 2026",
Title = title,
Body = body,
Link = null,
};
private static WhatsNewFeed Feed(params WhatsNewFeedEntry[] entries) => new()
{
DocsCommit = "abc1234",
Entries = entries,
DocsUrls = new Dictionary<string, string>
{
[WhatsNewFeed.PlatformChannel] = Constants.DocsBaseUrl + "/changelog/platform-changelog",
[WhatsNewFeed.AgentChannel] = Constants.DocsBaseUrl + "/changelog/agent-changelog",
},
};
private static TenantConfiguration Tenant(string id, params NotificationChannel[] channels) => new()
{
TenantId = id,
NotificationChannelsJson = NotificationChannel.SerializeList(channels),
};
private static NotificationChannel Channel(string id, bool whatsNew, bool enabled = true, string url = "https://hooks.example/x")
=> new() { Id = id, Name = id, ProviderType = 20, Url = url, Enabled = enabled, NotifyOnWhatsNew = whatsNew, NotifyOnSuccess = true };
// ── Feed parsing ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[Fact]
public void Parse_ValidPayload_YieldsEntriesForBothChannels()
{
const string json = """
{
"schemaVersion": 1,
"generatedUtc": "2026-09-08T10:00:00.000Z",
"docsCommit": "deadbee",
"channels": {
"platform": { "docsUrl": "https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/changelog/platform-changelog", "entries": [
{ "id": "0a1b2c3d", "addedUtc": "2026-09-07T09:00:00.000Z", "period": "September 2026", "title": "**Bold lead**", "body": "Body with [link](https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/x).", "link": "https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/x" }
] },
"agent": { "docsUrl": "https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/changelog/agent-changelog", "entries": [
{ "id": "ffffffff", "addedUtc": "2026-09-01T09:00:00.000Z", "period": "September 2026", "title": null, "body": "Agent bullet.", "link": null }
] }
}
}
""";
var feed = WhatsNewFeed.Parse(json);
Assert.NotNull(feed);
Assert.Equal("deadbee", feed!.DocsCommit);
Assert.Equal(2, feed.Entries.Count);
Assert.Equal("platform:0a1b2c3d", feed.Entries[0].Key);
Assert.Equal("agent:ffffffff", feed.Entries[1].Key);
Assert.Equal(new DateTime(2026, 9, 7, 9, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc), feed.Entries[0].AddedUtc);
Assert.Equal("https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/changelog/agent-changelog", feed.DocsUrls[WhatsNewFeed.AgentChannel]);
}
[Fact]
public void Parse_OffShape_YieldsNull()
{
Assert.Null(WhatsNewFeed.Parse(null));
Assert.Null(WhatsNewFeed.Parse(""));
Assert.Null(WhatsNewFeed.Parse("not json"));
Assert.Null(WhatsNewFeed.Parse("""{"schemaVersion":2,"channels":{"platform":{"entries":[]},"agent":{"entries":[]}}}"""));
// Missing channel
Assert.Null(WhatsNewFeed.Parse("""{"schemaVersion":1,"channels":{"platform":{"entries":[]}}}"""));
// Entry without id
Assert.Null(WhatsNewFeed.Parse("""{"schemaVersion":1,"channels":{"platform":{"entries":[{"addedUtc":"2026-09-07T09:00:00Z","body":"x"}]},"agent":{"entries":[]}}}"""));
}
// ── Run semantics ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[Fact]
public async Task Run_FeedUnavailable_DoesNotTouchStateOrSend()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.SetFeed(null);
h.StateRepo.Seed("platform:old");
var result = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.True(result.FeedUnavailable);
Assert.Equal(0, h.StateRepo.Writes);
Assert.Empty(h.Sent);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Run_FirstRun_BaselinesWithoutSending()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.SetFeed(Feed(Entry("platform", "a"), Entry("agent", "b")));
h.SetTenants(Tenant("t1", Channel("c1", whatsNew: true)));
var result = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.True(result.Baselined);
Assert.Empty(h.Sent);
Assert.NotNull(h.StateRepo.Current);
Assert.Equal(new[] { "agent:b", "platform:a" }, h.StateRepo.Current!.KnownEntryKeys.OrderBy(k => k));
Assert.Equal("abc1234", h.StateRepo.Current.LastDocsCommit);
Assert.Null(h.StateRepo.Current.LastNotifiedUtc);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Run_EmptyKnownSet_IsTreatedAsBaseline()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.StateRepo.Seed(); // row exists, no keys
h.SetFeed(Feed(Entry("platform", "a")));
h.SetTenants(Tenant("t1", Channel("c1", whatsNew: true)));
var result = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.True(result.Baselined);
Assert.Empty(h.Sent);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Run_NothingNew_NoSendAndNoWriteWhenUnchanged()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.StateRepo.Seed("platform:a", "agent:b");
h.SetFeed(Feed(Entry("platform", "a"), Entry("agent", "b")));
h.SetTenants(Tenant("t1", Channel("c1", whatsNew: true)));
var result = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.Equal(0, result.NewEntries);
Assert.Empty(h.Sent);
Assert.Equal(0, h.StateRepo.Writes);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Run_EntriesRolledOut_UpdatesWatermarkWithoutSending()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.StateRepo.Seed("platform:a", "platform:old");
h.SetFeed(Feed(Entry("platform", "a")));
var result = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.Equal(0, result.NewEntries);
Assert.Empty(h.Sent);
Assert.Equal(1, h.StateRepo.Writes);
Assert.Equal(new[] { "platform:a" }, h.StateRepo.Current!.KnownEntryKeys.ToArray());
}
[Fact]
public async Task Run_NewEntries_SendsOneDigestPerTenantToOptedInChannelsOnly()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.StateRepo.Seed("platform:a");
h.SetFeed(Feed(Entry("platform", "a"), Entry("platform", "b", title: "**New** thing"), Entry("agent", "c")));
h.SetTenants(
Tenant("opted-in", Channel("yes", whatsNew: true), Channel("no", whatsNew: false), Channel("disabled", whatsNew: true, enabled: false)),
Tenant("not-opted-in", Channel("no", whatsNew: false)),
Tenant("no-channels"));
var result = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.Equal(2, result.NewEntries);
Assert.Equal(1, result.TenantsNotified);
Assert.Equal(1, result.ChannelsNotified);
var (channels, alert) = Assert.Single(h.Sent);
Assert.Equal("yes", Assert.Single(channels).Id);
Assert.Equal("whats_new", alert.EventType);
Assert.Equal(2, alert.Sections.Count);
Assert.Contains("2 new updates", alert.Summary);
Assert.Contains("1 platform, 1 agent", alert.Summary);
// Watermark advanced to the full live set and marked as notified.
var state = h.StateRepo.Current!;
Assert.Equal(new[] { "agent:c", "platform:a", "platform:b" }, state.KnownEntryKeys.OrderBy(k => k));
Assert.Equal(h.Now, state.LastNotifiedUtc);
Assert.Equal(2, state.LastNotifiedEntryCount);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Run_SkipsDisabledTenants()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.StateRepo.Seed("platform:a");
h.SetFeed(Feed(Entry("platform", "a"), Entry("platform", "b")));
var disabled = Tenant("off", Channel("yes", whatsNew: true));
disabled.Disabled = true;
h.SetTenants(disabled);
var result = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.Equal(1, result.NewEntries);
Assert.Empty(h.Sent);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Run_LostRace_DoesNotSend()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.StateRepo.Seed("platform:a");
h.StateRepo.ConflictsToInject = 1;
h.SetFeed(Feed(Entry("platform", "a"), Entry("platform", "b")));
h.SetTenants(Tenant("t1", Channel("c1", whatsNew: true)));
var result = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.True(result.LostRace);
Assert.Empty(h.Sent);
h.ConfigRepo.Verify(r => r.GetAllTenantConfigurationsAsync(), Times.Never);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Run_SecondRunAfterAnnouncement_IsQuiet()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.StateRepo.Seed("platform:a");
h.SetFeed(Feed(Entry("platform", "a"), Entry("platform", "b")));
h.SetTenants(Tenant("t1", Channel("c1", whatsNew: true)));
await h.Service.RunAsync();
var second = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.Equal(0, second.NewEntries);
Assert.Single(h.Sent);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Run_LegacySingleWebhookTenant_NeverReceivesWhatsNew()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.StateRepo.Seed("platform:a");
h.SetFeed(Feed(Entry("platform", "a"), Entry("platform", "b")));
h.SetTenants(new TenantConfiguration
{
TenantId = "legacy",
WebhookUrl = "https://hooks.example/legacy",
WebhookProviderType = 2,
WebhookNotifyOnSuccess = true,
});
var result = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.Equal(1, result.NewEntries);
Assert.Empty(h.Sent);
}
// ── Digest shape ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[Fact]
public void BuildWhatsNewAlert_NewestFirst_PlainText_Actions()
{
var entries = new List<WhatsNewFeedEntry>
{
Entry("agent", "old", body: "Older agent `fix` here.", daysAgo: 5),
Entry("platform", "new", title: "**Rules editor** revamp", body: "Read the [guide](https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/g) for _details_."),
};
var docs = new Dictionary<string, string>
{
[WhatsNewFeed.PlatformChannel] = Constants.DocsBaseUrl + "/changelog/platform-changelog",
[WhatsNewFeed.AgentChannel] = Constants.DocsBaseUrl + "/changelog/agent-changelog",
};
var alert = NotificationAlertBuilder.BuildWhatsNewAlert(entries, docs, WhatsNewNotificationService.PortalWhatsNewUrl("platform"));
Assert.Equal(2, alert.Sections.Count);
Assert.StartsWith("Platform \u00b7 Sep 8, 2026 \u2014 Rules editor revamp", alert.Sections[0].Title);
Assert.Equal("Read the guide for details.", alert.Sections[0].Text);
Assert.StartsWith("Agent \u00b7 Sep 3, 2026", alert.Sections[1].Title);
Assert.Equal("Older agent fix here.", alert.Sections[1].Text);
Assert.Equal(2, alert.Actions.Count);
Assert.Equal(Constants.PortalBaseUrl + "/dashboard?whats-new=platform", alert.Actions[0].Url);
// Tie (1 platform, 1 agent) → platform changelog.
Assert.Equal(Constants.DocsBaseUrl + "/changelog/platform-changelog", alert.Actions[1].Url);
}
[Fact]
public void BuildWhatsNewAlert_CapsSectionsAndFoldsRemainder()
{
var entries = Enumerable.Range(0, NotificationAlertBuilder.WhatsNewMaxSections + 3)
.Select(i => Entry("agent", $"id{i}", body: $"Bullet {i}", daysAgo: i))
.ToList();
var alert = NotificationAlertBuilder.BuildWhatsNewAlert(entries, null, WhatsNewNotificationService.PortalWhatsNewUrl("agent"));
Assert.Equal(NotificationAlertBuilder.WhatsNewMaxSections + 1, alert.Sections.Count);
Assert.Contains("+ 3 more updates", alert.Sections[^1].Text);
Assert.Single(alert.Actions); // no docs URLs → only the portal button
Assert.Contains($"{entries.Count} new updates", alert.Summary);
}
[Fact]
public void BuildWhatsNewAlert_TelegramText_CarriesSectionsAndLinks()
{
var alert = NotificationAlertBuilder.BuildWhatsNewAlert(
new List<WhatsNewFeedEntry> { Entry("platform", "p", title: "**Lead**", body: "Body.") },
null,
WhatsNewNotificationService.PortalWhatsNewUrl("platform"));
var text = TelegramNotificationService.RenderAlertText(alert);
Assert.Contains("What's new in Autopilot Monitor", text);
Assert.Contains("Platform \u00b7 Sep 8, 2026 \u2014 Lead", text);
Assert.Contains("Body.", text);
Assert.Contains("Open What's new: " + Constants.PortalBaseUrl + "/dashboard?whats-new=platform", text);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("**Bold** text", "Bold text")]
[InlineData("See [the docs](https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/x) now", "See the docs now")]
[InlineData("Run `agent.exe --verbose`", "Run agent.exe --verbose")]
[InlineData("_emphasis_ and *more*", "emphasis and more")]
[InlineData("snake_case_name stays", "snake_case_name stays")]
[InlineData(" spaced out ", "spaced out")]
[InlineData(null, "")]
public void StripInlineMarkdown_Flattens(string? input, string expected)
=> Assert.Equal(expected, NotificationAlertBuilder.StripInlineMarkdown(input));
// ── Channel model ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[Fact]
public void NotifyOnWhatsNew_RoundTripsThroughJson_AndDefaultsOff()
{
var json = NotificationChannel.SerializeList(new[] { Channel("c", whatsNew: true) });
Assert.Contains("\"notifyOnWhatsNew\":true", json);
Assert.True(NotificationChannel.ParseList(json).Single().NotifyOnWhatsNew);
var legacyShape = "[{\"id\":\"x\",\"name\":\"x\",\"providerType\":20,\"url\":\"https://hooks.example/x\",\"enabled\":true}]";
Assert.False(NotificationChannel.ParseList(legacyShape).Single().NotifyOnWhatsNew);
}
}
@@ -34,8 +34,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.DataAccess
services.AddSingleton<ISessionAnnotationRepository, TableSessionAnnotationRepository>();
services.AddSingleton<IBootstrapRepository, TableBootstrapRepository>();
services.AddSingleton<INotificationRepository, TableNotificationRepository>();
services.AddSingleton<IRuleSubmissionRepository, TableRuleSubmissionRepository>();
services.AddSingleton<ITenantNotificationRepository, TableTenantNotificationRepository>();
services.AddSingleton<ISlaTenantStatusRepository, TableSlaTenantStatusRepository>();
// What's new notifier watermark (single platform row in the AdminConfiguration table).
services.AddSingleton<IWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository, TableWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository>();
services.AddSingleton<IHardwareRejectionNotificationTracker, TableHardwareRejectionNotificationTracker>();
services.AddSingleton<IDeviceSecurityRepository, TableDeviceSecurityRepository>();
services.AddSingleton<IUserUsageRepository, TableUserUsageRepository>();
@@ -142,6 +142,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.DataAccess.TableStorage
public Task ResolveEspBlockingForSessionAsync(string tenantId, string sessionId)
=> _storage.ResolveEspBlockingForSessionAsync(tenantId, sessionId);
public Task<int> CloseOpenAppInstallsForSessionAsync(string tenantId, string sessionId)
=> _storage.CloseOpenAppInstallsForSessionAsync(tenantId, sessionId);
public Task<bool> SaveTimeAttributionAggregateAsync(TimeAttributionDailyAggregate aggregate)
=> _storage.SaveTimeAttributionAggregateAsync(aggregate);
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Helpers;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Pagination;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.DataAccess;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Pagination;
using Azure;
using Azure.Data.Tables;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.DataAccess.TableStorage
{
/// <summary>
/// Table-storage implementation of <see cref="IRuleSubmissionRepository"/>.
/// PK = <see cref="PartitionKey"/> for every tenant, RK = inverted ticks + id (newest first).
/// </summary>
public class TableRuleSubmissionRepository : IRuleSubmissionRepository
{
internal const string PartitionKey = "submissions";
private readonly TableClient _tableClient;
private readonly ILogger<TableRuleSubmissionRepository> _logger;
public TableRuleSubmissionRepository(TableStorageService storage, ILogger<TableRuleSubmissionRepository> logger)
{
_tableClient = storage.GetTableClient(Constants.TableNames.RuleSubmissions);
_logger = logger;
}
public async Task<bool> AddAsync(RuleSubmission submission)
{
try
{
await _tableClient.AddEntityAsync(StoreSubmission(submission));
return true;
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
_logger.LogError(ex, "Failed to store rule submission {SubmissionId}", submission.SubmissionId);
return false;
}
}
public async Task<RuleSubmission?> GetAsync(string submissionId)
{
var entity = await FindEntityAsync(submissionId);
return entity == null ? null : MapSubmission(entity);
}
public async Task<List<RuleSubmission>> GetForTenantAsync(string tenantId)
{
var results = new List<RuleSubmission>();
try
{
await foreach (var entity in _tableClient.QueryAsync<TableEntity>(filter: BuildFilter(tenantId, status: null)))
{
results.Add(MapSubmission(entity));
}
}
catch (RequestFailedException ex) when (ex.Status == 404)
{
_logger.LogDebug("RuleSubmissions table does not exist yet, returning empty list");
}
return results;
}
public async Task<RawPage<RuleSubmission>> GetPageAsync(string? tenantId, string? status, int pageSize, string? continuation)
{
if (pageSize < 1) throw new ArgumentOutOfRangeException(nameof(pageSize));
try
{
var (entities, nextRawToken) = await AzureTablesPaginator.FetchPageAsync<TableEntity>(
client: _tableClient,
filter: BuildFilter(tenantId, status),
pageSize: pageSize,
continuation: continuation);
var page = new List<RuleSubmission>(entities.Count);
foreach (var entity in entities) page.Add(MapSubmission(entity));
// RowKey is the inverted tick of SubmittedAt — newest first by construction.
return new RawPage<RuleSubmission>(page, nextRawToken);
}
catch (RequestFailedException ex) when (ex.Status == 404)
{
_logger.LogDebug("RuleSubmissions table does not exist yet, returning empty page");
return RawPage<RuleSubmission>.Empty;
}
}
public async Task<bool> UpdateAsync(RuleSubmission submission)
{
var existing = await FindEntityAsync(submission.SubmissionId);
if (existing == null)
{
_logger.LogWarning("UpdateAsync: rule submission {SubmissionId} not found", submission.SubmissionId);
return false;
}
var entity = StoreSubmission(submission);
entity.RowKey = existing.RowKey;
entity.ETag = existing.ETag;
try
{
// If-Match on the ETag: two reviewers deciding the same submission cannot both win.
await _tableClient.UpdateEntityAsync(entity, existing.ETag, TableUpdateMode.Replace);
return true;
}
catch (RequestFailedException ex) when (ex.Status == 412)
{
_logger.LogWarning("UpdateAsync: rule submission {SubmissionId} changed underneath the reviewer", submission.SubmissionId);
return false;
}
}
public async Task<HashSet<string>> GetReservedPublishedRuleIdsAsync()
{
var ids = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
try
{
await foreach (var entity in _tableClient.QueryAsync<TableEntity>(
filter: BuildFilter(tenantId: null, status: RuleSubmissionStatuses.Approved),
select: new[] { "PublishedRuleId" }))
{
var id = entity.GetString("PublishedRuleId");
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(id)) ids.Add(id!);
}
}
catch (RequestFailedException ex) when (ex.Status == 404)
{
_logger.LogDebug("RuleSubmissions table does not exist yet");
}
return ids;
}
public async Task<int> DeleteExpiredAsync(DateTime nowUtc)
{
var deleted = 0;
try
{
// The expiry rule is the shared RuleSubmissionRetention, so the sweep and its
// test cannot disagree; only the two closed statuses are scanned.
foreach (var status in new[] { RuleSubmissionStatuses.Withdrawn, RuleSubmissionStatuses.Declined })
{
var expired = new List<TableEntity>();
await foreach (var entity in _tableClient.QueryAsync<TableEntity>(filter: BuildFilter(tenantId: null, status)))
{
if (RuleSubmissionRetention.IsExpired(MapSubmission(entity), nowUtc)) expired.Add(entity);
}
foreach (var entity in expired)
{
try
{
await _tableClient.DeleteEntityAsync(entity.PartitionKey, entity.RowKey);
deleted++;
}
catch (RequestFailedException ex) when (ex.Status == 404)
{
// Already gone — a parallel sweep or a tenant offboarding won the race.
}
}
}
}
catch (RequestFailedException ex) when (ex.Status == 404)
{
_logger.LogDebug("RuleSubmissions table does not exist yet");
}
return deleted;
}
public async Task<bool> DeleteAsync(string submissionId)
{
var existing = await FindEntityAsync(submissionId);
if (existing == null) return false;
try
{
await _tableClient.DeleteEntityAsync(existing.PartitionKey, existing.RowKey);
return true;
}
catch (RequestFailedException ex) when (ex.Status == 404)
{
return false;
}
}
private async Task<TableEntity?> FindEntityAsync(string submissionId)
{
try
{
await foreach (var entity in _tableClient.QueryAsync<TableEntity>(
filter: $"PartitionKey eq '{PartitionKey}' and SubmissionId eq '{Escape(submissionId)}'"))
{
return entity;
}
}
catch (RequestFailedException ex) when (ex.Status == 404)
{
_logger.LogDebug("RuleSubmissions table does not exist yet");
}
return null;
}
internal static string BuildFilter(string? tenantId, string? status)
{
var filter = $"PartitionKey eq '{PartitionKey}'";
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(tenantId)) filter += $" and TenantId eq '{Escape(tenantId!)}'";
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(status)) filter += $" and Status eq '{Escape(status!)}'";
return filter;
}
private static string Escape(string value) => value.Replace("'", "''");
// ── Store / Map ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// internal static: pinned by round-trip unit tests — every property must survive
// Store→Map, so any new field lands in BOTH methods plus the test.
internal static TableEntity StoreSubmission(RuleSubmission s) =>
new(PartitionKey, $"{RowKeyCodec.InvertedTicks(s.SubmittedAt)}_{s.SubmissionId}")
{
["SubmissionId"] = s.SubmissionId,
["BatchId"] = s.BatchId,
["TenantId"] = s.TenantId,
["RuleKind"] = s.RuleKind,
["SourceRuleId"] = s.SourceRuleId,
["Title"] = s.Title,
["Category"] = s.Category,
["RuleJson"] = s.RuleJson,
["Comment"] = s.Comment ?? string.Empty,
["SubmittedBy"] = s.SubmittedBy,
["SubmittedByName"] = s.SubmittedByName,
["ContactEmail"] = s.ContactEmail ?? string.Empty,
["AttributionMode"] = s.AttributionMode,
["AttributionName"] = s.AttributionName,
["SubmittedAt"] = s.SubmittedAt,
["Status"] = s.Status,
["ValidationFindingsJson"] = JsonSerializer.Serialize(s.ValidationFindings),
["SourceFireStatsJson"] = s.SourceFireStats == null ? string.Empty : JsonSerializer.Serialize(s.SourceFireStats),
["ReviewedBy"] = s.ReviewedBy ?? string.Empty,
["ReviewedAt"] = s.ReviewedAt,
["ReviewComment"] = s.ReviewComment ?? string.Empty,
["WillBeAdapted"] = s.WillBeAdapted,
["PublishedRuleId"] = s.PublishedRuleId ?? string.Empty,
["DerivedFromTemplateRuleId"] = s.DerivedFromTemplateRuleId ?? string.Empty,
};
internal static RuleSubmission MapSubmission(TableEntity e) => new()
{
SubmissionId = e.GetString("SubmissionId") ?? string.Empty,
BatchId = e.GetString("BatchId") ?? string.Empty,
TenantId = e.GetString("TenantId") ?? string.Empty,
RuleKind = e.GetString("RuleKind") ?? string.Empty,
SourceRuleId = e.GetString("SourceRuleId") ?? string.Empty,
Title = e.GetString("Title") ?? string.Empty,
Category = e.GetString("Category") ?? string.Empty,
RuleJson = e.GetString("RuleJson") ?? string.Empty,
Comment = NullIfEmpty(e.GetString("Comment")),
SubmittedBy = e.GetString("SubmittedBy") ?? string.Empty,
SubmittedByName = e.GetString("SubmittedByName") ?? string.Empty,
ContactEmail = NullIfEmpty(e.GetString("ContactEmail")),
AttributionMode = e.GetString("AttributionMode") ?? RuleAttributionModes.Anonymous,
AttributionName = e.GetString("AttributionName") ?? RuleAttributionModes.AnonymousAuthor,
SubmittedAt = e.GetDateTimeOffset("SubmittedAt")?.UtcDateTime ?? DateTime.MinValue,
Status = e.GetString("Status") ?? RuleSubmissionStatuses.Pending,
ValidationFindings = DeserializeOrDefault<List<RuleSubmissionFinding>>(e.GetString("ValidationFindingsJson")) ?? new List<RuleSubmissionFinding>(),
SourceFireStats = DeserializeOrDefault<RuleSubmissionFireStats>(e.GetString("SourceFireStatsJson")),
ReviewedBy = NullIfEmpty(e.GetString("ReviewedBy")),
ReviewedAt = e.GetDateTimeOffset("ReviewedAt")?.UtcDateTime,
ReviewComment = NullIfEmpty(e.GetString("ReviewComment")),
WillBeAdapted = e.GetBoolean("WillBeAdapted") ?? false,
PublishedRuleId = NullIfEmpty(e.GetString("PublishedRuleId")),
DerivedFromTemplateRuleId = NullIfEmpty(e.GetString("DerivedFromTemplateRuleId")),
};
private static T? DeserializeOrDefault<T>(string? json) where T : class
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(json)) return null;
try
{
return JsonSerializer.Deserialize<T>(json!);
}
catch (JsonException)
{
// A corrupt column must not hide the submission itself.
return null;
}
}
private static string? NullIfEmpty(string? value) => string.IsNullOrEmpty(value) ? null : value;
}
}
@@ -101,6 +101,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.DataAccess.TableStorage
// complete. Positive evidence only (listed ⇒ EspBlocking=true, absent ⇒ stays
// unknown). Idempotent + fail-soft like the counter reconcile above.
await _storage.ResolveEspBlockingForSessionAsync(tenantId, sessionId);
// Observation end: app rows still InProgress on a terminal session never get a
// terminal event — close them as Incomplete (outcome unknown, not a failure).
// Early for the ingest path (verdict batch, the agent may still be watching),
// never wrong in the end state: a real terminal arriving later still wins via
// the sticky-status reconcile, and the shutdown batch re-runs the close for rows
// opened after the verdict. Idempotent + fail-soft.
await _storage.CloseOpenAppInstallsForSessionAsync(tenantId, sessionId);
// F1 PR2: compute + persist the time-attribution breakdown once, now that the
// terminal write stamped CompletedAt/DurationSeconds and the event stream is
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.DataAccess;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.WhatsNew;
using Azure;
using Azure.Data.Tables;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.DataAccess.TableStorage
{
/// <summary>
/// Table Storage implementation of <see cref="IWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository"/>.
/// Lives as a side row in the AdminConfiguration table (PartitionKey
/// <see cref="PartitionKey"/>, RowKey <see cref="RowKey"/>) — platform-scoped state next to the
/// table-schema sentinel, so no new table is needed. Deliberately NOT a field on the
/// AdminConfiguration row itself: that row is round-tripped wholesale by the Global Admin
/// settings UI, and a stale save there would roll the watermark back and re-announce entries.
/// </summary>
public class TableWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository : IWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository
{
internal const string PartitionKey = "WhatsNewNotifications";
internal const string RowKey = "state";
private const string KnownEntryKeysProperty = "KnownEntryKeysJson";
private const string LastDocsCommitProperty = "LastDocsCommit";
private const string LastRunUtcProperty = "LastRunUtc";
private const string LastNotifiedUtcProperty = "LastNotifiedUtc";
private const string LastNotifiedEntryCountProperty = "LastNotifiedEntryCount";
private readonly TableClient _table;
private readonly ILogger<TableWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository> _logger;
public TableWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository(
TableStorageService storage,
ILogger<TableWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository> logger)
{
_logger = logger;
_table = storage.GetTableClient(Constants.TableNames.AdminConfiguration);
}
public async Task<(WhatsNewNotificationState? State, string? ETag)> GetWithETagAsync()
{
try
{
var response = await _table.GetEntityIfExistsAsync<TableEntity>(PartitionKey, RowKey);
if (!response.HasValue)
return (null, null);
var entity = response.Value!;
return (MapFromEntity(entity), entity.ETag.ToString());
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
_logger.LogError(ex, "Failed to load What's new notification state");
throw;
}
}
public async Task<bool> TryUpsertAsync(WhatsNewNotificationState state, string? ifMatchETag)
{
if (state == null)
return false;
try
{
var entity = MapToEntity(state);
if (ifMatchETag is null)
{
await _table.AddEntityAsync(entity);
return true;
}
await _table.UpdateEntityAsync(entity, new ETag(ifMatchETag), TableUpdateMode.Replace);
return true;
}
catch (RequestFailedException ex) when (ex.Status == 409 || ex.Status == 412)
{
// 409 EntityAlreadyExists (AddEntity) or 412 PreconditionFailed (ETag mismatch):
// a parallel run committed first — the caller must not send.
return false;
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
_logger.LogError(ex, "Failed conditional upsert of What's new notification state");
return false;
}
}
private static TableEntity MapToEntity(WhatsNewNotificationState state)
{
var entity = new TableEntity(PartitionKey, RowKey)
{
[KnownEntryKeysProperty] = JsonSerializer.Serialize(state.KnownEntryKeys),
[LastNotifiedEntryCountProperty] = state.LastNotifiedEntryCount,
};
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(state.LastDocsCommit))
entity[LastDocsCommitProperty] = state.LastDocsCommit;
if (state.LastRunUtc.HasValue)
entity[LastRunUtcProperty] = DateTime.SpecifyKind(state.LastRunUtc.Value, DateTimeKind.Utc);
if (state.LastNotifiedUtc.HasValue)
entity[LastNotifiedUtcProperty] = DateTime.SpecifyKind(state.LastNotifiedUtc.Value, DateTimeKind.Utc);
return entity;
}
private WhatsNewNotificationState MapFromEntity(TableEntity entity)
{
var known = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.Ordinal);
var json = entity.GetString(KnownEntryKeysProperty);
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(json))
{
try
{
var parsed = JsonSerializer.Deserialize<List<string>>(json!);
if (parsed != null)
{
foreach (var key in parsed)
{
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(key))
known.Add(key);
}
}
}
catch (JsonException ex)
{
// Treated as an empty watermark: the service then re-baselines silently
// (empty known set + existing row = "first run" semantics), never re-announces.
_logger.LogWarning(ex, "What's new notification state has malformed KnownEntryKeysJson — re-baselining");
}
}
return new WhatsNewNotificationState
{
KnownEntryKeys = known,
LastDocsCommit = entity.GetString(LastDocsCommitProperty),
LastRunUtc = entity.GetDateTime(LastRunUtcProperty),
LastNotifiedUtc = entity.GetDateTime(LastNotifiedUtcProperty),
LastNotifiedEntryCount = entity.GetInt32(LastNotifiedEntryCountProperty) ?? 0,
};
}
}
}
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Apps
var measured = installed.Where(MetricsMath.HasMeasuredDuration).ToList();
var succeeded = installed.Count;
var failed = summaries.Count(s => s.Status == "Failed");
var incomplete = summaries.Count(s => s.Status == "Incomplete");
var failureRate = MetricsMath.TerminalFailureRatePct(failed, succeeded);
var avgDurationSeconds = measured.Count > 0 ? Math.Round(measured.Average(s => s.DurationSeconds), 0) : 0;
var p95DurationSeconds = Percentile(measured.Select(s => s.DurationSeconds).ToList(), 0.95);
@@ -423,6 +424,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Apps
Skipped = skipped,
Unmeasured = installed.Count - measured.Count,
Failed = failed,
Incomplete = incomplete,
FailureRate = failureRate,
AvgDurationSeconds = avgDurationSeconds,
P95DurationSeconds = p95DurationSeconds,
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Config
{
/// <summary>
/// Returns the latest published agent + bootstrap script versions.
/// Cached in-memory for 12h; supports <c>?refresh=true</c> to bypass the cache.
/// Cached in-memory for a few minutes; supports <c>?refresh=true</c> to bypass the cache.
/// Authenticated users only (read-only metadata).
/// </summary>
public class GetLatestVersionsFunction
@@ -44,15 +44,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Config
var response = req.CreateResponse(HttpStatusCode.OK);
// Force-refresh responses MUST NOT be browser-cached.
// Normal cached responses may be stored for up to 1h (aligns with 12h backend cache).
// Force-refresh responses MUST NOT be browser-cached. Normal responses are
// held for a minute only: the portal announces this number as "Latest agent
// version" right after a release, and a browser cache measured in hours would
// keep showing the previous release long after the backend refreshed. The
// payload is a few dozen bytes, so revalidating often is free.
if (forceRefresh)
{
response.Headers.Add("Cache-Control", "no-store");
}
else
{
response.Headers.Add("Cache-Control", "public, max-age=3600");
response.Headers.Add("Cache-Control", "public, max-age=60");
}
await response.WriteAsJsonAsync(new GetLatestVersionsResponse
@@ -115,6 +115,29 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Metrics
return await req.UnauthorizedAsync("Unable to determine tenant identity");
}
return await OrganizationUsageResponseAsync(req, tenantId);
}
/// <summary>
/// GET /api/global/metrics/mcp-usage/organization?tenantId=&amp;dateFrom=&amp;dateTo= — the same organization
/// breakdown for ONE tenant named by a Global Admin / Global Reader (the tenant MCP Usage page under a tenant
/// override). There is no aggregate path: tenantId is required. Catalogued with TenantScoping.None on
/// purpose — the route enumerates a tenant's accounts, which a delegated (MSP) caller must never reach.
/// </summary>
[Function("GetGlobalMcpOrganizationUsage")]
public async Task<HttpResponseData> GetGlobalOrganizationUsage(
[HttpTrigger(AuthorizationLevel.Anonymous, "get", Route = "global/metrics/mcp-usage/organization")] HttpRequestData req)
{
if (!Guid.TryParse(req.Query["tenantId"], out var tenantGuid))
{
return await req.BadRequestAsync("tenantId is required");
}
return await OrganizationUsageResponseAsync(req, tenantGuid.ToString());
}
private async Task<HttpResponseData> OrganizationUsageResponseAsync(HttpRequestData req, string tenantId)
{
try
{
var nowUtc = DateTime.UtcNow;
@@ -127,6 +150,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Metrics
var readFrom = string.CompareOrdinal(dateFrom, monthStart) < 0 ? dateFrom : monthStart;
var readTo = string.CompareOrdinal(dateTo, today) > 0 ? dateTo : today;
var records = await _userUsageRepo.GetTenantUsageAsync(tenantId, readFrom, readTo);
var limits = await _quotaService.ResolveTenantPlanAsync(tenantId);
var response = req.CreateResponse(HttpStatusCode.OK);
await response.WriteAsJsonAsync(new GetMcpOrganizationUsageResponse
@@ -135,6 +159,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Metrics
DateFrom = dateFrom,
DateTo = dateTo,
Users = AggregateOrganizationUsage(records, tenantId, dateFrom, dateTo, today, monthStart),
Quota = BuildOrganizationQuota(records, limits, today, monthStart),
Daily = BuildOrganizationDaily(records, dateFrom, dateTo),
});
return response;
}
@@ -144,6 +170,46 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Metrics
}
}
/// <summary>Pure: requests charged to the tenant per day inside [dateFrom, dateTo], oldest first.</summary>
internal static List<McpOrganizationDailyItem> BuildOrganizationDaily(
IEnumerable<TenantUsageRecord> records, string dateFrom, string dateTo)
{
var byDay = new SortedDictionary<string, long>(StringComparer.Ordinal);
foreach (var record in records)
{
if (string.CompareOrdinal(record.Date, dateFrom) < 0 || string.CompareOrdinal(record.Date, dateTo) > 0)
continue;
byDay[record.Date] = byDay.TryGetValue(record.Date, out var sum) ? sum + record.RequestCount : record.RequestCount;
}
return byDay.Select(kv => new McpOrganizationDailyItem { Date = kv.Key, Requests = kv.Value }).ToList();
}
/// <summary>
/// Pure: the tenant's organization windows from the same counter rows — today's and this month's total over
/// every account charged to the tenant, against the tenant plan's limits (0 = unlimited).
/// </summary>
internal static McpOrganizationQuotaNode BuildOrganizationQuota(
IEnumerable<TenantUsageRecord> records, McpQuotaService.TenantPlanLimits limits, string today, string monthStart)
{
long dailyUsed = 0, monthlyUsed = 0;
foreach (var record in records)
{
if (record.Date == today) dailyUsed += record.RequestCount;
if (string.CompareOrdinal(record.Date, monthStart) >= 0 && string.CompareOrdinal(record.Date, today) <= 0)
monthlyUsed += record.RequestCount;
}
return new McpOrganizationQuotaNode
{
TenantPlan = limits.TenantPlan,
DailyLimit = limits.TenantDailyLimit,
MonthlyLimit = limits.TenantMonthlyLimit,
DailyUsed = dailyUsed,
MonthlyUsed = monthlyUsed,
};
}
/// <summary>
/// Pure: folds the organization counter rows into one item per account. A row whose HomeTenantId is set
/// and differs from the tenant was charged by a delegated (MSP) read. Ordered by this month's usage.
@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Rules
return await req.BadRequestAsync("Invalid rule data");
}
// Author is stamped from the creator's token, never from the payload
// (anti-spoof), and stays immutable through every later update.
rule.Author = TenantHelper.GetUserDisplayName(req) ?? "Autopilot Monitor";
try
{
var success = await _ruleService.CreateRuleAsync(tenantId, rule);
@@ -88,6 +92,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Rules
rule.RuleId = ruleId;
// Same anti-spoof stamp as CreateRule: on a true update the service replaces
// this with the original author (immutable attribution), but a full-payload PUT
// that upserts a rule with no existing row must not store the payload's author.
rule.Author = TenantHelper.GetUserDisplayName(req) ?? "Autopilot Monitor";
try
{
var success = await _ruleService.UpdateRuleAsync(tenantId, rule);
@@ -124,7 +133,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Rules
try
{
var newRule = await _ruleService.CreateFromTemplateAsync(tenantId, ruleId, variables);
var author = TenantHelper.GetUserDisplayName(req) ?? "Autopilot Monitor";
var newRule = await _ruleService.CreateFromTemplateAsync(tenantId, ruleId, variables, author);
var response = req.CreateResponse(HttpStatusCode.Created);
await response.WriteAsJsonAsync(new CreateAnalyzeRuleFromTemplateResponse { Success = true, Rule = newRule, Message = "Custom rule created from template" });
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Helpers;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Microsoft.Azure.Functions.Worker;
using Microsoft.Azure.Functions.Worker.Http;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Rules.Submissions
{
/// <summary>
/// Operator hard delete of a submission (test/demo rows, or a tenant's request). The row
/// vanishes from both lists; a published rule in the repo is untouched.
/// </summary>
public class DeleteGlobalRuleSubmissionFunction
{
private readonly ILogger<DeleteGlobalRuleSubmissionFunction> _logger;
private readonly RuleSubmissionService _service;
public DeleteGlobalRuleSubmissionFunction(ILogger<DeleteGlobalRuleSubmissionFunction> logger, RuleSubmissionService service)
{
_logger = logger;
_service = service;
}
[Function("DeleteGlobalRuleSubmission")]
public async Task<HttpResponseData> Run(
[HttpTrigger(AuthorizationLevel.Anonymous, "delete", Route = "global/rule-submissions/{submissionId}")] HttpRequestData req,
string submissionId)
{
try
{
// Authentication + GlobalAdminOnly authorization enforced by PolicyEnforcementMiddleware
var user = TenantHelper.GetUserIdentifier(req);
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(submissionId)) return await req.BadRequestAsync("submissionId is required.");
var existing = await _service.GetAsync(submissionId);
if (existing == null) return await req.NotFoundAsync("Submission not found.");
if (!await _service.DeleteAsync(submissionId)) return await req.NotFoundAsync("Submission not found.");
// Warning on purpose: an operator delete is rare and must be visible in App Insights.
_logger.LogWarning("Rule submission {SubmissionId} ({RuleId}, tenant {TenantId}, status {Status}) deleted by {User}",
submissionId, existing.SourceRuleId, existing.TenantId, existing.Status, user);
return await req.OkAsync(new SuccessMessageResponse { Success = true, Message = "Submission deleted." });
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
return await req.InternalServerErrorAsync(_logger, ex, "DeleteGlobalRuleSubmission");
}
}
}
}

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