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Author SHA1 Message Date
Oliver Kieselbach 8224c8f1a8 fix(rules,engine,agent): ESP-004 gates on the esp_apps_timeout verdict; not_exists absence gate; Shell-Core failure inherits settle detail (D-234, D-235)
ANALYZE-ESP-004 fired on every ESP terminal failure of a Continue-anyway
profile and rendered the configured FirstSync limit as elapsed time — the
mayHaveContinuedAnyway flag only says the profile has the button. The rule
now requires the agent's own verdict (app_install_failed with
failureType=esp_apps_timeout), names that app via a same-event filter, reads
failedSubcategory from esp_failure_settle_started and words the limit as a
limit. Verified with test_analyze_rule: cb7036a6 fires, 683f1eff (0x80070652
after 19 min) stays silent.

Rule engine: not_exists with a dataField on event_type/event_data
conditions matches when no event of the type carries a non-empty value —
including an absent type — instead of being dead behind the fieldValue null
short-circuit. Schema and MCP authoring guide say so.

Agent: a Shell-Core 62407 failure that lands inside the provisioning
tracker's 30-s settle window (a third of all ESP terminal failures) now
inherits the pending errorCode / failedSubcategory / category /
likelyCulpritApps, so enrollment_failed, Sessions.FailureReason and the
termination-time app classification see the HRESULT the registry had
already named. failureType stays the Shell-Core value.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 17:20:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d7f39895f5 fix(web): omit the two default field values from the browser catalog (D-233)
The Entra family (D-231) pushed utils/error-codes.json to 123026 bytes against
the 120000-byte client-bundle budget, breaking the Web CI job.

Raising the cap would have been the wrong repair -- it was set three days ago
with the v2 catalog, and a guard that gets widened whenever content grows is not
a guard. The bytes were elsewhere: confidence "high" holds for 562 of 641 rows
and source "msdoc" for about half, ~19 KB of bundle spent repeating two
constants. The sync now omits them and errorCodeMap restores them while building
the map, so every consumer still sees a complete entry and errorCodeTooltip
renders exactly as before. 123026 -> 102399 bytes, cap unchanged, ~17 KB of
headroom left.

Dropping the fields outright was rejected: the tooltip renders both, so they are
provenance a customer sees. The vocabulary test now asserts on the resolved
entry via getErrorCodeEntry rather than the raw file -- a default changed on one
side only would otherwise make tooltips lie about provenance silently.
2026-09-09 15:26:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 790bd35385 small gather rule description change 2026-09-09 14:59:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 34c9fd42fe chore: bump internal and .claude/commands gitlinks
internal: D-231/D-232, the plan with its review, backlog B-y5d and B-s2y.
.claude/commands: the platform-health marker-catalog corrections from the
2026-09-09 health pass (weekday vs weekend ingest baseline, CAS retried scales
with load, WhatsNewNotificationSent is not proof of a run).
2026-09-09 14:55:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 19a336870c fix(mcp): put the catalog pointer on the parameter, not only the tool (D-232)
Seven of 44 tool errors in the 7-day telemetry were invented catalog values, and
in every case the tool description already said the right thing while the
parameter description was bare or contradicted it.

update_tenant_config is the clean proof: its description says "Call
get_tenant_config_schema FIRST", but the fields parameter said "Use
get_tenant_config for current values and exact field names" -- and over 30 days
the model called get_tenant_config 12 times and get_tenant_config_schema once.
The text next to the argument wins, and get_tenant_config cannot answer what it
was pointed at: it shows only the fields this tenant has set, with no type,
writability or nullability.

Also: get_session_events.eventType (event_types catalog, matching the pointer
search_sessions_by_event.eventType already carries), query_table (list_tables)
and test_analyze_rule.rule (rule_schemas, validate_rule first).
2026-09-09 14:55:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5ba5942d0b feat(error-codes): parse the Entra device-registration family (D-231)
The catalog held 2 of 607 entries in entra-join, while the 0x801Cxxxx DSREG
family is what an enrollment meets during hybrid join and the ESP account-setup
phase. The Windows Hello PIN error page is the only MS table that documents it;
both of its tables are now parsed, restricted to 0x801c* (607 -> 641 entries).

The block runs after PROSE_ENTRIES so the Autopilot-specific text for 0x801c03ea
keeps precedence over the generic one. The Mitigation column is not carried --
the catalog describes codes, it does not advise. A "SYMBOL: text" cell yields a
symbol (0x801c004d -> DSREG_NO_DEFAULT_ACCOUNT). The run fails below 30 keys,
because parseTables drops non-matching rows silently and a reshaped page would
otherwise look like a clean run.

decode() now strips zero-width and bidi marks: the page carries U+200B in one
hex cell and four description cells, JS \s does not match it, and such a hex
cell fails every ^0x...$ test. Placed in decode() rather than in the new source
so the next parsed page cannot walk into it -- regeneration shows 34 added,
0 changed.

0x801C044F, the zero-hit lookup that started this, is on none of the three MS
pages and deliberately stays unknown.
2026-09-09 14:55:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach aa20d9102c fix(backend): show the freshly published agent version, not the previous one (D-230)
The What's new panel prints "Latest agent version" under the release
entries, and the session list draws its outdated badges from the same
endpoint — but the value was cached 12h in each Function instance and 1h
in the browser, so the panel announced the previous release for up to 13h
and two instances could disagree.

- LatestVersionsService: TTL 12h -> 5 min; keep the last successful result
  and serve it when the blob read fails, so the shorter TTL cannot blank
  the version line on a transient hiccup (failure marker 5 min -> 1 min).
- GetLatestVersions: Cache-Control max-age 3600 -> 60.
- No refresh callback from build-agent.yml: the cache is per instance, a
  warm-up request would leave every other instance stale.

The origin is a ~200-byte no-cache blob behind the download alias that
Front Door does not cache, so a warm instance now reads it at most 12x/h.

Backend deploy (workflow_dispatch) pending — B-uq7.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 12:26:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 097be1700b chore: bump internal gitlink
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 12:10:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f1457d823d chore: bump .claude/commands gitlink 2026-09-09 12:02:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 12e66299e6 feat(rules): allow-list folders under the signed-in user's profile (D-228, D-229)
Gather rules and admin-configured diagnostics paths could never reach a
folder below a user profile. The %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token lifts the
C:\Users hard block for AppData\Local and AppData\Roaming, but lifting is
not admitting: the path then fell into filePrefixes, which is matched
literally against the already-expanded path, and the profile name is not
known when that list is authored. The exception only ever worked in
unrestricted mode, and no agent test passed a non-null userProfilePath.

D-228 introduces userProfileFilePrefixes, holding entries relative to the
profile root (AppData\Local\RealmJoin). Both guards resolve them against
the detected profile and match segment-bounded; entries that are rooted,
contain "..", or sit outside AppData\Local / AppData\Roaming are dropped at
load, so configuration can only narrow the hard block's exception, never
widen it. The allowlist is anchored to the detected profile, so a rule
cannot reach another user's AppData. The AppData subdirectory list existed
in both guard classes with the GatherRuleGuards copy unused; it is now one
list and DiagnosticsPathGuards delegates. filePrefixes additionally gains
C:\ProgramData\RealmJoin\choco\logs.

D-229 fixes the pre-flight validators, which must only ever reject what the
agent rejects:
- the portal returned "allowed" on the lifted hard block without consulting
  the allowlist, so a rule the agent refuses passed the enable gate and then
  failed silently on the device with a security_warning;
- the MCP validator offered logparser the diagnosticsPathPrefixes list that
  no collector consults (four paths reported allowed that the agent blocks);
- the MCP validator did not expand environment variables at all, reporting
  %ProgramData% targets as blocked although the device reads them.

Measured before changing the portal: no rule in any tenant used the token,
so nothing that was working gets disabled.

Verified: solution build 0 warnings, agent 2897 tests, web 1257 + tsc +
eslint 0, MCP 779, guardrails.json validates against its schema, rules/dist
regenerates without drift. The six new agent tests were green against the
unchanged guard first, which is what proves the exception was inert.

Takes effect on devices only after an agent release: guardrails.json is an
EmbeddedResource in the agent assembly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 11:54:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e9a01de9da chore: bump .claude/commands gitlink
Event reference in /ux-insights completed and live-verified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 10:06:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5f793ea01a chore: bump .claude/commands gitlink
Marker-catalog rows for the What's new panel events and the digest timer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 09:58:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e86f7efed3 feat(bootstrap): verify the publisher of the extracted agent binaries before --install (D-227)
The SHA-256 check proves the ZIP is the one version.json names, but that
manifest lives in the same container as the ZIP: it cannot outlive a
compromise of the download host. The expected publisher travels inside this
script, which the loader verified before running it, so the chain from the
file an administrator assigns to the process that starts is publisher-anchored
end to end.

Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 v2.4 -> v2.5:
- Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries checks every AutopilotMonitor.*.exe/.dll in the
  extracted payload for status Valid and the same subject pin the loader
  carries; the gate runs immediately before --install and throws on any
  rejection, exactly like the hash check.
- Third-party assemblies keep their own publisher's signature and are not
  checked: System.Management.Automation.dll ships unsigned, so a gate over all
  files would refuse the live payload.
- An extracted folder with no binary of ours is a rejection, not a pass.
- The SHA-256 manifest check is unchanged and still runs first: it proves the
  bytes, the signature proves the author.

Verified against the live payload 2.0.1454 (all five of our PEs Valid and
glueckkanja AG, gate passes); appending one byte to AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll
makes it reject. Pester 55/55.

The portal privacy and about pages carried the pre-signing wording and are
corrected in the same change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 23:11:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 78bfad0ec6 web: the portal What's new panel names the currently published agent version
A quiet third line in the panel header ("Latest agent version 2.0.1452",
faint, the number monospaced) reads from the existing config/latest-versions
endpoint. The monospaced string is the same one the session list shows in its
"Agent Version" column, so a reader can tell at a glance whether their fleet
runs the latest agent.

Portal and signed-in only: the endpoint is AuthenticatedUser, and the public
site has no session list to compare against. The gate sits on the mount of the
small component, so the landing page never even issues the request; a missing
version renders nothing.
2026-09-08 22:37:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f5efadfd07 ci: pin every third-party action to a commit SHA, gated and Dependabot-maintained (D-226)
A tag is a mutable pointer owned by the action's publisher. These jobs are not
ordinary CI: they hold the code-signing Key Vault token (D-223), the federated
storage credentials (D-222), and combine-rules.yml holds a contents:write token
that pushes to main. Whoever could repoint v7 would run code with all of that.

azure/login and Azure/functions-action were already pinned; the actions/* and
github/codeql-action references were not, on the usual argument that GitHub owns
them and shares the runner's trust boundary. That argument does not survive the
fact that they run in the same jobs as the signing identity. All seven are now
pinned by SHA with the version in a trailing comment -- the comment is what keeps
the line reviewable, and Dependabot rewrites both together.

action-pins.yml is the guard: pins nobody enforces rot, and no review reliably
catches one @v4 added to a 200-line workflow. It lives in its own workflow because
ci.yml deliberately ignores changes to the other workflow files, so a job placed
there would stay silent for exactly the commits it must inspect. Like CI it reports
rather than blocks -- main is unprotected; making it binding would mean adding it
as a required status check, which is a branch-protection decision.

Verified both directions: 49 references pass against the repo, and a fixture with
@v7, @main and a bare SHA fails with three annotations while the local reusable
workflow refs are skipped.

Two floating tool versions closed while here. wix went from the range 5.* to 5.0.2
-- it writes the bytes of the MSI customers install, where AzureSignTool only signs
them. ajv was the worse one: unpinned, and npm runs lifecycle scripts at install,
so a hijacked release would have executed with the push token before a single rule
was validated; now exact versions with --ignore-scripts.

Line endings: sed -i rewrote the workflow files as LF. Git normalises on commit, so
the content diff is unaffected and indexnow-notify.yml carries no change at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 22:14:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c26eca2f01 chore: bump internal gitlink
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 21:36:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9f1879a9f3 fix(agent): raise the captured script output cap from 2K to 8K
The portal showed the two-stage bootstrap output ending in ...[truncated]. That marker
comes from the agent, not from the web view: the stdout is cut at capture time, so no
amount of UI space brings the rest back.

Measured over 1,486 script outputs in the fleet (2026-08-25..09-08): median 39, p90 644,
max 1,501 chars, and the 2,048 cap had never been hit -- the maximum was our own
one-stage bootstrap. The loader preamble of ~460 chars pushed exactly that output over
the edge, i.e. this is a consequence of D-224 and it hit the one output an operator
actually reads.

8,192 covers the realistic worst case (download retries plus relax logging, ~2,700) and
stays 4x below the 32K-char Table Storage property limit that bounds the event
downstream. Other scripts are unaffected in practice: p90 is 644 chars.

Reaches the fleet with the next agent release.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 21:36:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c24c7bf7ef fix(publish): serve the customer scripts as a download, not as a web page
The blobs carry Content-Type: text/plain and no Content-Disposition, so every browser
renders them inline -- the documented "download the bootstrapper script" step turns into
"select this text and save it yourself", with whatever the editor then does to the line
endings and the signature block.

x-ms-blob-content-disposition makes the link a download in every browser, which is a
server-side fact rather than a per-browser hint in the docs. Command-line clients (the
loader, the MSI runner, curl) ignore the header, so nothing on the device path changes.

Metadata only: the script bytes are untouched, so no version bump and the bump guard
still sees the published copies as current.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 21:07:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5fac3d6004 Agent Host changes for agents/whats-new-notification-settings (#153) 2026-09-08 20:51:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7605d2e9f5 fix(loader): log the signer CN instead of the whole EV subject
The full subject of an EV certificate is a line of street address and registration
numbers and pushed the useful part of the log line off the screen. The CN answers the
question the log has to answer. The full subject is still logged in the one case where it
is the finding itself: a valid signature from a publisher that is not us.

Loader 1.1 -> 1.2; a Pester case pins the short form. Suite on PS 5.1: 45/45.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:49:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7bf5412d63 docs(mcp): teach the diag-zip map the loader log
bootstrap-loader.log is new with the two-stage bootstrap and told the diag tooling
nothing so far. Names which channel a device was assigned: the loader logs there when
assigned directly, and to bootstrap-msi.log when it runs from the MDM-LOB MSI.

Takes effect with the next MCP deploy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:47:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b53ceb1a7c chore: bump internal gitlink (MSI loader consolidation)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:47:01 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 647581b4ff refactor(msi): the MSI carries the shared stage-1 loader instead of its own downloader
Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1 and Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 had become the same script:
download the current installer, run it, log, always exit 0. The MSI copy additionally
downloaded and executed WITHOUT verifying what it got, which is exactly the gap the loader
was written to close. The MSI is now packaging only -- it installs and runs the same file
that is assigned directly in Intune, and both delivery channels get publisher verification
from one implementation.

Dropped from the MSI path: its own Deployed-marker check. That guard lives in stage 2 and
runs there anyway, so the only cost is one download on a device that is already deployed.

Kept: the log file name. bootstrap-msi.log is what the diagnostics tooling keys on to tell
the MDM-LOB channel apart from the Intune script channel, so the loader takes -LogFileName
(default bootstrap-loader.log) and the custom action passes bootstrap-msi.log. A Pester
test now pins that contract across the two files -- renaming the parameter on either side
would leave the MSI channel logging under the wrong name.

Package version 1.0.2 -> 1.1.0 so Intune LOB update detection sees the new payload, and a
new component GUID because the key path file changed.

Loader 1.0 -> 1.1. Bootstrap suite on Windows PowerShell 5.1: 44/44.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:41:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach db9b1995bc refactor: move the error-code generator from scripts/ to tools/ (D-225)
scripts/ at the repo root is the customer surface: everything under
Bootstrap/ and CustomerSetup/ is published to the download container by
Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1, Authenticode-signed and version-gated. The
error-code generator is a maintainer tool no workflow runs, so it diluted
that invariant. .github/scripts/ was not the alternative -- it holds only
helpers a workflow step invokes, and unlike guardrails-in-sync and
shared-manifests-in-sync the catalog has no CI drift gate (the generator
needs IME_ENUMS_JSON from operator tooling and live MS Learn fetches).

REPO_ROOT stays ../.. at the new depth, so only the documented path moved:
the generator header and README, the C# and TypeScript comments, the test
summary, and the description header of error-codes.json together with the
generator literal that emits it (the two must stay identical or the next
regeneration diffs). The web sync re-ran clean at 607 entries with no
change to utils/error-codes.json, which drops the header.
2026-09-08 20:35:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7563435837 feat(ci): Authenticode-sign the bootstrap MSI and the runner it embeds (D-223)
MSI carries an Authenticode signature like any PE, so the same identity and the same
ordering rules apply: signing identity logs in first and only for the Key Vault token,
the storage login stays last, and no environment: on the job.

The embedded Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1 is signed BEFORE wix build -- wix embeds the
file as it finds it, so signing afterwards would leave the copy inside the MSI unsigned,
and a device under an AllSigned policy needs the runner to carry its own signature.

The MSI is signed after the build and before the hash and the upload, then both files are
verified (Valid, timestamped, optional publisher pin) while nothing is published yet.
The provenance attestation now also skips runs that upload nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:34:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e39f2abb61 chore: bump internal gitlink (comment lesson)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 19:21:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 47dad7143f docs(ci): tighten the code-signing comments in build-agent
Public repo: keep the reasoning that a later change could break -- signing must precede
the release hashes, the job must never carry an environment, the timestamp is not
optional -- and drop the rest. Comments only, no behaviour change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 19:20:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d81f41dc72 chore: bump internal gitlink (D-223/D-224 plans and decisions)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:59:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach cc6be10532 fix(publish): read the signed bytes back as byte[], not as a wrapped Object[]
The ',' operator elsewhere in this file exists because PowerShell unrolls an array
RETURNED from a function; a property assignment does not unroll, so it wrapped the
byte[] in an Object[] of length 1 and the upload failed converting it back. Signing
itself was fine -- run 34253331703 signed all six scripts and uploaded none, so nothing
reached the download alias.

Added the invariant that would have caught it: signed bytes must be longer than the
unsigned form, since a signature only ever adds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:54:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0ac548bfce feat(bootstrap): two-stage loader and Authenticode-signed customer scripts (D-224)
Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 is the new stage 1 -- the file an administrator assigns in
Intune. It carries no enrollment logic: it downloads the published installer, verifies its
Authenticode signature, and runs it in the same process, passing through every remaining
argument. Assigning the installer directly stays supported and unchanged.

The point of the split is that the customer-held artifact stops changing. Today every
bootstrap change forces customers to replace their Intune copy, so the fleet runs a
distribution of script versions we do not control. It is also what makes script signing
worth doing: signing a file that gets swapped by hand each release is a one-off gain,
signing a loader that never changes is permanent.

The loader is deliberately minimal, because it is the one piece that cannot be fixed
remotely -- every guard placed in it would be frozen for years. All guards stay in stage 2.

Verification pins the certificate SUBJECT, never a thumbprint: certificates get renewed and
a deployed loader cannot be, so a thumbprint pin would strand the fleet at the next
renewal. A hash oracle was rejected for a different reason -- it would have to be fetched
from the same host as the script, so it could not survive a compromise of that host, while
the expected publisher travels inside the loader.

Fail-closed on verification, fail-soft on exit: nothing runs without a valid signature from
us (running unverified code as SYSTEM is the risk being removed here), but the loader still
exits 0, because a device without monitoring is acceptable and a failed enrollment step is
not. The accepted cost is that a device which can never fetch or verify stays silent.

Publisher changes:

- every published script is signed (loader, installer, both -Dev renders,
  Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent, Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn), and signing is the LAST
  transformation: it covers exactly the CRLF/UTF-8 bytes Get-PublishBytes produced, so
  nothing may normalise or re-encode them afterwards.
- signing is mandatory for a real publish. Only -DryRun may run unsigned, because the PR
  gate executes the publisher without any Azure login.
- comparisons against a published copy strip the signature block first. A timestamped
  signature differs on every run, so without stripping the version-bump guard and the
  drift check would report a change for every unchanged script.
- the bump guard became Assert-VersionBump and now covers the loader as well.
- version.json gains loaderVersion. Additive, no consumer yet: stage 2 is current by
  construction, so only stage 1's version says anything about a customer's Intune copy.
- -SignedOutputDir writes the exact uploaded bytes for the CI artifact, in a dry run too --
  that is how a signed script gets inspected before it reaches anyone.

publish-scripts.yml logs in with the signing identity first and only to fetch the Key Vault
token (azure/login sets the default az account and the storage login has to be the one that
stays), then publishes and offers the signed scripts as an artifact. build-agent.yml passes
the same parameters on a stable cutover.

Tests: 14 new Pester cases, including that a validly signed script from a FOREIGN publisher
is refused -- that is what an attacker with any code-signing certificate can produce. Full
bootstrap suite on Windows PowerShell 5.1: 43/43.

Not covered: the MSI runner still downloads stage 2 without verifying it, and the customer
docs still describe the direct assignment only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:48:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9c1d0586ef ci: skip the provenance attestation on test runs of build-agent
A dispatch with upload_blob=false and create_release=false publishes nothing, so the
Sigstore attestation would write a permanent public transparency-log entry for bytes
nobody ever receives. The step now runs only when the run actually ships something.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:34:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 21ec5e4773 ci: Authenticode-sign the agent binaries before the release hashes are computed (D-223)
Every assembly we author -- AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe, AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe
and the three AutopilotMonitor.*.dll beside them -- is signed with AzureSignTool (pinned
7.0.1) against a certificate in the corporate code-signing Key Vault, SHA-256 file digest
plus an RFC-3161 timestamp. Third-party assemblies keep their own publisher's signature.

The position of the step is load-bearing: signing rewrites the PE file, so it has to run
before the staging copy, the ZIP and every SHA-256 in "Create release artifact". Those
hashes are the bootstrap's integrity oracle (version.json, AdminConfiguration) -- signing
after hashing would publish hashes that no downloaded file can ever match.

The signing identity is a SECOND federated principal in the same tenant and logs in FIRST,
only to fetch a Key Vault token; the storage login of D-222 follows and owns the az context
from there, because azure/login sets the default account and the last login wins. Both
federated credentials carry the subject repo:okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor:ref:refs/heads/main,
so this job must never be given a GitHub 'environment:' -- that rewrites the OIDC subject
claim and would break BOTH logins at once.

No unsigned fallback and no dispatch input to skip signing: a missing repository variable,
a Key Vault failure or a non-zero azuresigntool exit code fails the run before anything is
published. azuresigntool is a native tool, so $LASTEXITCODE is checked explicitly --
PowerShell does not throw on a non-zero exit, and a silently unsigned release is exactly
the outcome signing exists to prevent.

Verification runs against the STAGED bytes, not the build output: every AutopilotMonitor.*
PE in the ZIP must be Valid, must carry a timestamp (without one the signature dies with
the certificate) and all of them must share one signing certificate. Setting the optional
repository variable CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT additionally pins the publisher, so the gate
proves "signed by us" instead of "signed by someone trusted".

The build provenance attestation now covers the ZIP and both EXEs, so an extracted binary
can be verified without the ZIP. Authenticode and the attestation answer different
questions and both stay: who published this binary (offline, what Windows, SmartScreen and
WDAC evaluate) versus which build produced these exact bytes (gh attestation verify).

Not covered here: the customer bootstrap script (its signature block changes the published
bytes and must follow the dev render; see B-57c, the two-stage loader), the bootstrap MSI,
and the local build.ps1 path, which from now on produces unsigned bits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:20:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e4a5a6654d ci: workflows authorize Azure Storage with the federated identity, not SAS secrets (D-222)
Every storage write against autopilotmonitoreu -- build-counter CAS, agent ZIP and MSI,
version manifests, customer bootstrap scripts, the AdminConfiguration hash oracle -- now
rides on the existing federated credential (subject repo:.../ref:refs/heads/main) instead
of a long-lived SAS in repo secrets.

The REST calls themselves are unchanged: '?<sas>' became an Authorization header, so the
ETag-CAS of the counters, Content-MD5 and the no-cache contract survive verbatim. That is
also why this is not a rewrite onto 'az storage blob upload' -- it cannot express If-Match,
and two concurrent builds could then mint the same build number.

.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1 is the single place that knows the resource id,
the az invocation and the service version. x-ms-version is mandatory for Entra-authorized
requests (>= 2017-11-09) and for any Table request without a SAS; 2021-08-06 was verified
live against both the blob and the table endpoint of this account.

azure/login added to build-agent, build-msi, publish-scripts (plus id-token: write) and
deploy-web; deploy-backend and deploy-mcp already had it. Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1
-DryRun acquires NO token: the PR gate runs it without any Azure login, and that must
stay true.

The AdminConfiguration merge lost its "secret not configured" skip branch -- a failure
there now surfaces instead of silently leaving the hash oracle pointing at an older build.

AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN, AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN and AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN
are retired once the first runs are green. AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN stays: that
account lives in the pre-migration tenant, where this principal has no identity -- it dies
with the mirror, not before.

Requires on the SP: Storage Blob Data Contributor on the containers 'agent' and 'versions',
Storage Table Data Contributor on the table 'AdminConfiguration'. Granted 2026-09-08.
2026-09-08 17:38:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 01bc35aa97 new ordering for What's new section 2026-09-08 15:48:28 +02:00
92 changed files with 4129 additions and 463 deletions
+4
View File
@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ updates:
- dependency-name: '*'
update-types: ['version-update:semver-major']
# Every action is referenced by commit SHA with the version in a trailing comment;
# action-pins.yml fails any workflow change that reintroduces a mutable tag. Dependabot
# is what keeps those pins current: it rewrites the SHA and the comment together, so the
# pins are reviewed in a PR instead of drifting silently or being bumped by hand.
- package-ecosystem: github-actions
directory: /
schedule:
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Returns the request headers that authorize an Azure Storage REST call with Microsoft Entra.
.DESCRIPTION
One place for the storage OAuth contract shared by every publisher in this repo -- the
agent ZIP and MSI, the customer bootstrap scripts, the version manifests and the build
counters. Resource id, the az invocation, the service version and the failure message
live here so they cannot drift between call sites.
Identity comes from whatever `az login` established: the federated GitHub OIDC principal
in CI (azure/login, subject repo:okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor:ref:refs/heads/main), the
operator's own account for the local build. No secret is read, stored or passed around.
x-ms-version is MANDATORY here, not decoration: Entra-authorized requests are rejected
below 2017-11-09, and Table requests without a SAS must carry the header at all. 2021-08-06
is old enough to be deployed in every region and new enough for everything we send.
Callers merge the result into their own headers -- `$auth + @{ ... }` yields a new
hashtable per request, so nothing is shared across uploads:
$auth = & "$PSScriptRoot/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1"
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($auth + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob' }) -Body $bytes
Acquire once per step and reuse: every call shells out to az (~1s) and the token is valid
for the lifetime of a job.
.OUTPUTS
[hashtable] Authorization + x-ms-version.
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param()
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
# The data-plane resource, not management.azure.com -- a management token is accepted by
# neither the blob nor the table endpoint.
$token = az account get-access-token --resource https://storage.azure.com --query accessToken -o tsv 2>$null
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw ('Could not acquire an Azure Storage token. In CI this means the azure/login step ' +
'is missing or its federated credential does not cover this ref; locally, run ' +
'`az login`. A token alone is not enough: the principal also needs Storage Blob ' +
'Data Contributor on the container it writes, and Storage Table Data Contributor ' +
'on the table -- a missing role shows up later as HTTP 403 AuthorizationPermissionMismatch.')
}
return @{
'Authorization' = "Bearer $token"
'x-ms-version' = '2021-08-06'
}
+263 -67
View File
@@ -12,52 +12,78 @@
lands a consistent set (ZIP + manifest + scripts).
Both callers run the same code. The scripts on the download alias are the live
copy the WDP bootstrap MSI (Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1) downloads on every
enrolling device, so "current" is a correctness property, not cosmetics.
copy the stage-1 loader downloads on every enrolling device, whether it came from
Intune or from the bootstrap MSI, so "current" is a correctness property, not
cosmetics.
Steps, in order:
1. Parse $ScriptVersion from the bootstrap source.
2. Render the -Dev variant by literal substitution of the two URL/manifest
1. Parse $ScriptVersion from the loader and the bootstrap source.
2. Render the -Dev variants by literal substitution of the URL/manifest
defaults. A missing anchor is a hard failure -- a silently un-substituted
dev script would point the dev fleet at the stable agent.
3. Version-bump guard: if the published bootstrap differs from the source
but carries the same $ScriptVersion, abort. Otherwise the docs badge,
3. Version-bump guard: if a published script differs from its source but
carries the same $ScriptVersion, abort. Otherwise the docs badge,
version.json.bootstrapVersion and the portal's "your script is outdated"
hint would all keep asserting a version that is no longer what ships.
4. Upload every script blob with Cache-Control: no-cache (they rotate in
4. Build the publish set (loader, bootstrap, both dev renders, the extras).
5. Authenticode-sign every script (see -SigningToken). Signing is the LAST
transformation: it covers the exact CRLF/UTF-8 bytes that get uploaded,
and nothing may touch them afterwards or the signature breaks.
6. Upload every script blob with Cache-Control: no-cache (they rotate in
place), mirrored fail-soft to the legacy account.
5. Reconcile the two version oracles: version.json.bootstrapVersion
(read-modify-write under If-Match, so a concurrent agent release cannot
lose its agent fields) and AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion.
6. Verify through the alias -- re-download each blob and compare SHA-256.
7. Reconcile the version oracles: version.json.bootstrapVersion and
.loaderVersion (read-modify-write under If-Match, so a concurrent agent
release cannot lose its agent fields) and
AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion.
8. Verify through the alias -- re-download each blob and compare SHA-256.
.PARAMETER SasToken
Container SAS for the eu storage account with write permission. Leading '?' tolerated.
Comparisons against a published script always strip its signature block first
(Get-ComparableText). A signature carries a timestamp, so signed bytes differ on
every run; without stripping, the bump guard and the drift check would report a
change for every unchanged script.
.PARAMETER LegacySasToken
Container SAS for the legacy account. Optional -- a mirror failure warns, never fails.
.PARAMETER TableSasToken
Table SAS for AdminConfiguration. Optional -- omitted or 'XXX' skips the oracle update.
The legacy account lives in a different tenant, so the ambient Entra identity cannot
reach it; this is the only credential the publisher still takes.
.PARAMETER RepoRoot
Repository root. Defaults to the parent of .github/scripts.
.PARAMETER DryRun
Run every check and render, upload nothing.
Run every check and render, upload nothing. A dry run signs when a token is supplied
and skips signing when it is not: the PR gate runs this without any Azure login.
.PARAMETER SigningToken
Azure Key Vault access token for AzureSignTool. MANDATORY for a real publish -- an
unsigned customer script is not something this repo publishes. Together with
-KeyVaultUrl and -CertificateName.
.PARAMETER ExpectedPublisher
Optional -like pattern the signer subject must match after signing. Pins the publisher
instead of accepting any trusted signature; the loader on the device pins the same way.
.PARAMETER SignedOutputDir
Optional directory that receives a copy of every published file exactly as uploaded.
Used by CI to offer the signed scripts as a build artifact for local inspection.
.EXAMPLE
./Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 -DryRun
.EXAMPLE
./Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 -SasToken $env:SAS -TableSasToken $env:TABLE_SAS
./Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 -LegacySasToken $env:LEGACY_SAS -SigningToken $env:AKV_TOKEN `
-KeyVaultUrl $env:KV_URL -CertificateName $env:CERT
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[string]$SasToken,
[string]$LegacySasToken,
[string]$TableSasToken,
[string]$RepoRoot,
[string]$SigningToken,
[string]$KeyVaultUrl,
[string]$CertificateName,
[string]$TimestampUrl = 'http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com',
[string]$ExpectedPublisher,
[string]$SignedOutputDir,
[switch]$DryRun
)
@@ -66,9 +92,6 @@ $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
if (-not $RepoRoot) {
$RepoRoot = (Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '../..')).Path
}
if (-not $DryRun -and [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($SasToken)) {
throw 'SasToken is required unless -DryRun is used.'
}
$ContainerUrl = 'https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent'
$LegacyContainerUrl = 'https://autopilotmonitor.blob.core.windows.net/agent'
@@ -78,8 +101,23 @@ $TableUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.table.core.windows.net/AdminCo
$BootstrapSource = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'scripts/Bootstrap/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$BootstrapBlob = 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$DevBlob = 'Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1'
# Stage 1. Assigned in Intune once, and embedded in the bootstrap MSI; it downloads the
# bootstrap above on every device and verifies its publisher before running it.
$LoaderSource = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'scripts/Bootstrap/Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$LoaderBlob = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$LoaderDevBlob = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1'
$ScriptContentType = 'text/plain; charset=utf-8'
$SigningEnabled = -not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($SigningToken)
if (-not $DryRun -and -not $SigningEnabled) {
throw ('Publishing requires -SigningToken (plus -KeyVaultUrl and -CertificateName): the ' +
'loader on every device verifies the publisher of what it downloads, so an unsigned ' +
'script would be rejected in the field. Only -DryRun may run without signing.')
}
if ($SigningEnabled -and ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($KeyVaultUrl) -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($CertificateName))) {
throw '-SigningToken needs -KeyVaultUrl and -CertificateName.'
}
function Get-HttpStatus {
param($ErrorRecord)
if ($ErrorRecord.Exception.PSObject.Properties['Response'] -and $ErrorRecord.Exception.Response) {
@@ -125,6 +163,132 @@ function Get-PublishBytes {
return ,(New-Object System.Text.UTF8Encoding $false).GetBytes($normalised)
}
# A PowerShell signature is appended as a comment block at the end of the file, so the
# published bytes are "source + signature". Everything that compares a published script to
# its source has to cut that block off first -- the signature carries a timestamp and is
# therefore different on every publish, while the script above it is unchanged.
function Remove-SignatureBlock {
param([string]$Text)
$marker = '# SIG # Begin signature block'
$index = $Text.IndexOf($marker)
if ($index -lt 0) { return $Text }
return $Text.Substring(0, $index)
}
# Comparison form: no signature, LF, no trailing blank lines. Used for "is the published
# copy still this source" -- never for what gets uploaded.
function Get-ComparableText {
param([string]$Text)
return (Remove-SignatureBlock $Text).Replace("`r`n", "`n").TrimEnd("`n")
}
# Signs the publish set in place: each item's bytes are written to a work directory, signed
# there, verified, and read back as the bytes that will be uploaded. Signing has to be the
# last transformation -- the signature covers exactly these bytes, so nothing may normalise
# or re-encode them afterwards.
function Set-PublishSetSignature {
param([object[]]$Items, [string]$WorkDir)
if (-not (Get-Command azuresigntool -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)) {
throw "azuresigntool is not on PATH. Install it with: dotnet tool install --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1"
}
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $WorkDir | Out-Null
$paths = @()
foreach ($item in $Items) {
$path = Join-Path $WorkDir $item.BlobName
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($path, [byte[]]$item.Bytes)
$paths += $path
}
Write-Host "Signing $($paths.Count) script(s) with certificate '$CertificateName'..."
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url $KeyVaultUrl `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken $SigningToken `
--azure-key-vault-certificate $CertificateName `
--timestamp-rfc3161 $TimestampUrl `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor bootstrap' `
--description-url 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com' `
$paths
# Native tool: PowerShell does not throw on a non-zero exit, and an unnoticed signing
# failure would publish unsigned scripts that every loader in the field then rejects.
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE -- nothing was uploaded."
}
foreach ($item in $Items) {
$path = Join-Path $WorkDir $item.BlobName
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $path
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
throw "Signature on $($item.BlobName) is '$($sig.Status)', expected 'Valid'."
}
# Without a timestamp the signature dies with the certificate, and these scripts sit
# on customer devices far longer than a certificate lifetime.
if (-not $sig.TimeStamperCertificate) {
throw "Signature on $($item.BlobName) carries no timestamp."
}
if ($ExpectedPublisher -and $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -notlike $ExpectedPublisher) {
throw "$($item.BlobName) was signed by '$($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)', expected '$ExpectedPublisher'."
}
# Plain assignment, NO comma operator: the ',' elsewhere in this file exists because
# PowerShell unrolls an array RETURNED from a function, which is not what a property
# assignment does -- here it would wrap the byte[] in an Object[] of length 1 and the
# upload would fail converting it back.
$signedBytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($path)
if ($signedBytes.Length -le $item.Bytes.Length) {
throw ("Signed $($item.BlobName) is $($signedBytes.Length) bytes but the unsigned form " +
"was $($item.Bytes.Length) -- a signature only ever adds bytes, so this is a " +
'read-back bug, not a signing result.')
}
$item.Bytes = $signedBytes
Write-Host " signed $($item.BlobName) ($($signedBytes.Length) bytes, signer $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject.Split(',')[0]))"
}
}
# Aborts when a published script changed behaviour without a version bump. Consumers act on
# the version (docs badge, version.json, the portal's outdated-script hint), so an unchanged
# version has to mean unchanged behaviour.
function Assert-VersionBump {
param(
[string]$BlobName,
[string]$SourceContent,
[string]$SourceOrigin,
[string]$SourceVersion
)
$publishedBytes = Get-PublishedBytes "$AliasUrl/$BlobName"
if ($null -eq $publishedBytes) {
Write-Host "No published $BlobName yet -- version-bump guard skipped (first publish)"
return
}
$publishedText = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($publishedBytes)
if ((Get-ComparableText $publishedText) -eq (Get-ComparableText $SourceContent)) {
Write-Host "Published $BlobName is already this source (signature block aside)"
return
}
$publishedVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $publishedText -Origin "$AliasUrl/$BlobName" -Optional
if ($null -eq $publishedVersion) {
Write-Host "::warning::The published $BlobName is not a readable script (no ScriptVersion found). Republishing over it."
} elseif ($publishedVersion -ne $SourceVersion) {
Write-Host "Version bump: $publishedVersion -> $SourceVersion ($BlobName)"
} elseif ((Get-CodeFingerprint -Text (Remove-SignatureBlock $publishedText) -Origin "$AliasUrl/$BlobName") -eq
(Get-CodeFingerprint -Text $SourceContent -Origin $SourceOrigin)) {
# Comments, typos in comments, reflow -- nothing a consumer of the version can act on.
Write-Host "::warning::$BlobName changed in comments or formatting only; publishing under the unchanged version $SourceVersion."
} else {
throw ("Version-bump guard: $BlobName changed behaviour but ScriptVersion is still $SourceVersion. " +
"Bump it in $SourceOrigin -- the docs badge, version.json and the " +
'portal outdated-script hint all read that value, and customers decide from it whether ' +
'to re-upload their Intune copy. Comment-only and formatting changes do not need a bump.')
}
}
function Get-BootstrapScriptVersion {
param([string]$Content, [string]$Origin, [switch]$Optional)
if ($Content -match '\$ScriptVersion\s*=\s*"([\d\.\-a-zA-Z]+)"') { return $Matches[1] }
@@ -152,12 +316,16 @@ function Get-CodeFingerprint {
return (($tokens | Where-Object { $ignored -notcontains $_.Kind.ToString() } | ForEach-Object { $_.Text }) -join "`n")
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. source
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. sources
$sourceContent = Get-Content $BootstrapSource -Raw
$sourceBytes = Get-PublishBytes $sourceContent
$scriptVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $sourceContent -Origin $BootstrapSource
Write-Host "Bootstrap script version: $scriptVersion"
$loaderContent = Get-Content $LoaderSource -Raw
$loaderVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $loaderContent -Origin $LoaderSource
Write-Host "Loader script version: $loaderVersion"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 2. dev render
$stableUrlLiteral = '$AgentDownloadUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip"'
$devUrlLiteral = '$AgentDownloadUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Agent-dev.zip"'
@@ -170,33 +338,21 @@ if ($sourceContent.IndexOf($stableUrlLiteral) -lt 0 -or $sourceContent.IndexOf($
$devContent = $sourceContent.Replace($stableUrlLiteral, $devUrlLiteral).Replace($stableManLiteral, $devManLiteral)
Write-Host "Rendered $DevBlob (dev agent URL + version-dev.json)"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 3. bump guard
$publishedBytes = Get-PublishedBytes "$AliasUrl/$BootstrapBlob"
if ($null -eq $publishedBytes) {
Write-Host 'No published bootstrap yet -- version-bump guard skipped (first publish)'
} elseif ((Get-Sha256 $publishedBytes) -eq (Get-Sha256 $sourceBytes)) {
Write-Host 'Published bootstrap is already byte-identical to the source'
} else {
$publishedText = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($publishedBytes)
$publishedVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $publishedText -Origin "$AliasUrl/$BootstrapBlob" -Optional
# The dev loader must fetch the dev bootstrap, or a dev device would run the stable chain.
$stableLoaderLiteral = '$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"'
$devLoaderLiteral = '$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1"'
if ($null -eq $publishedVersion) {
Write-Host "::warning::The published $BootstrapBlob is not a readable bootstrap script (no ScriptVersion found). Republishing over it."
} elseif ($publishedVersion -ne $scriptVersion) {
Write-Host "Version bump: $publishedVersion -> $scriptVersion"
} elseif ((Get-CodeFingerprint -Text $publishedText -Origin "$AliasUrl/$BootstrapBlob") -eq
(Get-CodeFingerprint -Text $sourceContent -Origin $BootstrapSource)) {
# Comments, typos in comments, reflow -- nothing a consumer of the version can act on.
Write-Host "::warning::$BootstrapBlob changed in comments or formatting only; publishing under the unchanged version $scriptVersion."
} else {
throw ("Version-bump guard: $BootstrapBlob changed behaviour but ScriptVersion is still $scriptVersion. " +
"Bump it in $BootstrapSource -- the docs badge, version.json.bootstrapVersion and the " +
'portal outdated-script hint all read that value, and customers decide from it whether ' +
'to re-upload their Intune copy. Comment-only and formatting changes do not need a bump.')
}
if ($loaderContent.IndexOf($stableLoaderLiteral) -lt 0) {
throw "Loader dev-render: anchor literal missing in $LoaderSource"
}
$devLoaderContent = $loaderContent.Replace($stableLoaderLiteral, $devLoaderLiteral)
Write-Host "Rendered $LoaderDevBlob (points at $DevBlob)"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 4. upload
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 3. bump guards
Assert-VersionBump -BlobName $BootstrapBlob -SourceContent $sourceContent -SourceOrigin $BootstrapSource -SourceVersion $scriptVersion
Assert-VersionBump -BlobName $LoaderBlob -SourceContent $loaderContent -SourceOrigin $LoaderSource -SourceVersion $loaderVersion
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 4. publish set
# Sources beyond the bootstrap pair, read straight from the repo.
$extraSources = @(
@{ Path = 'scripts/Bootstrap/Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent.ps1'; BlobName = 'Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent.ps1' }
@@ -206,20 +362,38 @@ $extraSources = @(
# Uninstall-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 is deliberately NOT published: nothing links it, and
# an unauthenticated uninstall script on the public download host is not a feature.
# Text is the unsigned publish form and stays the reference for every comparison against a
# published copy; Bytes is what goes on the wire and carries the signature after step 4.
$publishSet = [System.Collections.Generic.List[object]]::new()
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $BootstrapBlob; Bytes = $sourceBytes })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $DevBlob; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devContent) })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $LoaderBlob; Text = $loaderContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $loaderContent) })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $LoaderDevBlob; Text = $devLoaderContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devLoaderContent) })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $BootstrapBlob; Text = $sourceContent; Bytes = $sourceBytes })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $DevBlob; Text = $devContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devContent) })
foreach ($extra in $extraSources) {
$extraPath = Join-Path $RepoRoot $extra.Path
if (-not (Test-Path $extraPath)) {
throw "Publish source missing: $extraPath"
}
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $extra.BlobName; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes (Get-Content $extraPath -Raw)) })
$extraText = Get-Content $extraPath -Raw
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $extra.BlobName; Text = $extraText; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $extraText) })
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 5. sign
# After this point the bytes are final. Normalising, re-encoding or rewriting a line ending
# would invalidate the signature, and the device-side loader would refuse the script.
if ($SigningEnabled) {
Set-PublishSetSignature -Items $publishSet -WorkDir (Join-Path ([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath()) "apm-publish-$PID")
} else {
Write-Host '::warning::No signing token supplied -- dry run continues with unsigned scripts.'
}
$legacySas = if ($LegacySasToken) { $LegacySasToken.TrimStart('?') } else { '' }
$writeSas = if ($SasToken) { $SasToken.TrimStart('?') } else { '' }
# Acquired lazily: a dry run must stay runnable without any Azure login -- the PR gate
# (bootstrap-script-gates.yml) executes this script with -DryRun and never logs in.
$authHeaders = if ($DryRun) { $null } else { & (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1') }
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 6. upload
foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
# Explicit type, not a convenience: an Object[] body is uploaded as space-separated
# decimals rather than raw bytes, and every hash check still passes because [byte[]]
@@ -227,11 +401,21 @@ foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
[byte[]]$bytes = $item.Bytes
$item | Add-Member -NotePropertyName Sha256 -NotePropertyValue (Get-Sha256 $bytes) -Force
# Exactly the bytes that go on the wire, for the CI artifact. Written in a dry run too:
# that is the run an operator uses to inspect a signed script before it is published.
if ($SignedOutputDir) {
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $SignedOutputDir | Out-Null
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes((Join-Path $SignedOutputDir $item.BlobName), $bytes)
}
if ($DryRun) {
# Doubles as a drift check: says per blob whether the alias already serves this source.
# Doubles as a drift check: says per blob whether the alias already serves this
# source. Compared as text without the signature block -- signed bytes differ on
# every run, so a byte comparison would report drift for every unchanged script.
$served = Get-PublishedBytes "$AliasUrl/$($item.BlobName)"
$state = if ($null -eq $served) { 'MISSING on the alias' }
elseif ((Get-Sha256 $served) -eq $item.Sha256) { 'already current' }
elseif ((Get-ComparableText ([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($served))) -eq
(Get-ComparableText $item.Text)) { 'already current' }
else { 'STALE on the alias' }
Write-Host " [dry-run] $($item.BlobName) ($($bytes.Length) bytes, sha256 $($item.Sha256)) -- $state"
continue
@@ -241,8 +425,18 @@ foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
# with Front Door. Route caching is disabled there, but a stale script paired with a
# fresh manifest would fail the bootstrap SHA check -- this keeps that class of bug
# impossible even if caching is ever re-enabled.
$headers = @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'Content-Type' = $ScriptContentType; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$ContainerUrl/$($item.BlobName)?$writeSas" -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body $bytes | Out-Null
#
# Content-Disposition: without it a text/plain blob opens as a web page in every
# browser, and the documented "download the script" step silently becomes "copy this
# text". The header makes the link a download everywhere, and command-line clients
# (the loader, the MSI, curl) ignore it.
$headers = @{
'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'
'Content-Type' = $ScriptContentType
'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache'
'x-ms-blob-content-disposition' = ('attachment; filename="{0}"' -f $item.BlobName)
}
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$ContainerUrl/$($item.BlobName)" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $headers) -Body $bytes | Out-Null
# Read straight back from the blob (authoritative, no CDN in the way) before touching the
# mirror or the next file. The alias verification at the end would catch a bad body too,
@@ -266,7 +460,7 @@ foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
}
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 5. version oracles
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 7. version oracles
# version.json is the agent manifest; only bootstrapVersion belongs to us. Read from the
# blob (not the alias) for an authoritative ETag, write back under If-Match so a concurrent
# agent release cannot lose its version/sha256 fields.
@@ -278,11 +472,15 @@ if (-not $DryRun) {
} else { [string]$manifestResp.Content }
$manifest = $manifestRaw | ConvertFrom-Json
if ($manifest.bootstrapVersion -eq $scriptVersion) {
Write-Host "version.json already reports bootstrapVersion $scriptVersion"
if ($manifest.bootstrapVersion -eq $scriptVersion -and $manifest.loaderVersion -eq $loaderVersion) {
Write-Host "version.json already reports bootstrapVersion $scriptVersion and loaderVersion $loaderVersion"
} else {
$etag = '"' + ([string]($manifestResp.Headers['ETag'] | Select-Object -First 1)).Trim('"') + '"'
$manifest | Add-Member -NotePropertyName 'bootstrapVersion' -NotePropertyValue $scriptVersion -Force
# Additive: no consumer reads loaderVersion yet. It exists so support can tell
# which stage-1 file a device was assigned -- stage 2 is always current by
# construction, so its version says nothing about the customer's Intune copy.
$manifest | Add-Member -NotePropertyName 'loaderVersion' -NotePropertyValue $loaderVersion -Force
$body = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(($manifest | ConvertTo-Json -Compress))
$manifestHeaders = @{
'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'
@@ -290,8 +488,8 @@ if (-not $DryRun) {
'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache'
'If-Match' = $etag
}
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$ContainerUrl/version.json?$writeSas" -Method Put -Headers $manifestHeaders -Body $body | Out-Null
Write-Host "version.json bootstrapVersion -> $scriptVersion (agent fields untouched)"
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$ContainerUrl/version.json" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $manifestHeaders) -Body $body | Out-Null
Write-Host "version.json bootstrapVersion -> $scriptVersion, loaderVersion -> $loaderVersion (agent fields untouched)"
if ($legacySas) {
try {
@@ -310,11 +508,8 @@ if (-not $DryRun) {
}
}
$tableSas = if ($TableSasToken) { $TableSasToken.TrimStart('?') } else { '' }
if ($DryRun) {
Write-Host " [dry-run] would set AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion"
} elseif ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($tableSas) -or $tableSas -eq 'XXX') {
Write-Host 'SKIPPED: AdminConfiguration update -- set AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN to enable the portal version oracle'
} else {
$tableHeaders = @{
'Content-Type' = 'application/json'
@@ -322,11 +517,11 @@ if ($DryRun) {
'If-Match' = '*'
}
$tableBody = @{ LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion } | ConvertTo-Json
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$TableUrl`?$tableSas" -Method Merge -Headers $tableHeaders -Body $tableBody | Out-Null
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $TableUrl -Method Merge -Headers ($authHeaders + $tableHeaders) -Body $tableBody | Out-Null
Write-Host "AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion"
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 6. verify via alias
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 8. verify via alias
if (-not $DryRun) {
$pending = [System.Collections.ArrayList]::new()
$publishSet | ForEach-Object { [void]$pending.Add($_) }
@@ -358,7 +553,8 @@ if ($env:GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY) {
$summary = @(
"### Bootstrap scripts: $mode",
'',
"Bootstrap script version: **$scriptVersion**",
"Loader script version: **$loaderVersion** | Bootstrap script version: **$scriptVersion**",
"Signed: **$(if ($SigningEnabled) { "yes, certificate '$CertificateName'" } else { 'NO (unsigned dry run)' })**",
''
) + ($publishSet | ForEach-Object { "- $($_.BlobName) -- sha256 $($_.Sha256)" })
($summary -join [Environment]::NewLine) | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY -Append -Encoding utf8
+8 -11
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@
A failed build burns a number, which is harmless -- uniqueness matters,
density does not.
The blob is public-read; only the write needs the container SAS.
The blob is public-read; only the write needs authorization, and that comes from the
ambient Entra identity (see Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1) -- no secret is passed in.
Why a counter and not the published version manifest: manifests are written
on publish, not on build (the agent writes version.json only for stable
@@ -20,10 +21,7 @@
overwrite each other's versioned artifact.
.PARAMETER CounterUrl
Full URL of the counter blob, without SAS.
.PARAMETER SasToken
Container SAS with create+write permission. A leading '?' is tolerated.
Full URL of the counter blob.
.PARAMETER Override
Explicit build number instead of counter+1. If it is not greater than the
@@ -37,20 +35,19 @@
[int] the reserved build number. Progress goes to the host, not the pipeline.
.EXAMPLE
$n = ./Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $url -SasToken $sas
$n = ./Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $url
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$CounterUrl,
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$SasToken,
[int]$Override = 0,
[int]$MaxAttempts = 5
)
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
# Tolerate both secret formats ("sp=cw&..." and "?sp=cw&...").
$writeUrl = $CounterUrl + '?' + $SasToken.TrimStart('?')
# The write is Entra-authorized; the read below stays anonymous (public container).
$authHeaders = & (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1')
function Get-HttpStatus {
param($ErrorRecord)
@@ -85,8 +82,8 @@ for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le $MaxAttempts; $attempt++) {
$target = if ($Override -gt 0) { $Override } else { $counter.Value + 1 }
try {
$headers = @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'If-Match' = $counter.ETag }
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $writeUrl -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body "$target" -ContentType 'text/plain' | Out-Null
$headers = $authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'If-Match' = $counter.ETag }
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $CounterUrl -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body "$target" -ContentType 'text/plain' | Out-Null
Write-Host " Reserved build number $target (CAS write ok, attempt $attempt)"
return $target
} catch {
+70
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
name: Action Pin Gate
# Every third-party action must be referenced by a full commit SHA, never by a tag.
# Tags are mutable: whoever controls an action repository can repoint v4 at new code,
# and that code runs inside jobs that hold the code-signing identity, the storage
# credentials and a token that can push to main. A SHA is the only reference an
# upstream owner cannot change under us.
#
# Lives in its own workflow rather than in ci.yml: CI deliberately ignores changes to
# the other workflow files, so a guard placed there would stay silent for exactly the
# commits it needs to inspect.
#
# Like CI, this reports rather than blocks: main is deliberately unprotected, so a red
# run is a signal to act on, not a merge barrier. Making it binding means adding
# 'Verify action pins' as a required status check -- a branch-protection decision, not
# something this file can assert.
#
# The pins are not maintained by hand — .github/dependabot.yml opens a monthly grouped
# PR that rewrites both the SHA and the trailing version comment. The comment is
# therefore required too: it is what makes a pinned line reviewable.
on:
push:
branches: [main]
paths: ['.github/workflows/**']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['.github/workflows/**']
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
verify-pins:
name: Verify action pins
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- name: Every third-party action is pinned to a SHA
run: |
set -uo pipefail
failed=0
while IFS=: read -r file line ref; do
# Reusable workflows from this repository move with the commit that calls
# them, so there is nothing to pin.
case "$ref" in ./*) continue ;; esac
if [[ "$ref" =~ ^[^@]+@[0-9a-f]{40}[[:space:]]+#[[:space:]]*[^[:space:]] ]]; then
printf 'ok %s:%s %s\n' "$file" "$line" "$ref"
continue
fi
if [[ "$ref" =~ ^[^@]+@[0-9a-f]{40}[[:space:]]*$ ]]; then
echo "::error file=$file,line=$line::Pinned but the version comment is missing: '$ref'. Write 'owner/action@<sha> # vN' so the line stays reviewable."
else
echo "::error file=$file,line=$line::Action '$ref' is not pinned to a commit SHA. Tags are mutable -- resolve it with: gh api repos/<owner>/<action>/git/ref/tags/<tag>"
fi
failed=1
# -H is load-bearing: with a single matching file grep omits the name, the
# fields shift by one and every diagnostic points at nothing.
done < <(grep -nHE '^[[:space:]]*(-[[:space:]]+)?uses:' .github/workflows/*.yml \
| sed -E 's/^([^:]+):([0-9]+):[[:space:]]*(-[[:space:]]+)?uses:[[:space:]]*/\1:\2:/')
if [ "$failed" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "::error::Unpinned action references found -- fix them before this reaches main."
exit 1
fi
echo "All action references are pinned to commit SHAs."
+1 -1
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ jobs:
name: Bootstrap guard tests (PS 5.1)
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- name: Install Pester 5+
shell: powershell
+177 -24
View File
@@ -57,6 +57,13 @@ env:
VERSIONED_ZIP: AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v2.zip
STABLE_ZIP: AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip
STABLE_MANIFEST: version.json
# Authenticode via Azure Key Vault; identity and vault come from repository variables.
# CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT is optional and pins the publisher in the verify step.
CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME }}
CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL }}
CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT }}
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL: http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com
jobs:
build:
@@ -65,14 +72,66 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v7
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
# Every released build is signed; a missing variable stops the run before a build
# number is burnt.
- name: Check code-signing configuration
shell: pwsh
run: |
foreach ($name in 'CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID', 'CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME', 'CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL') {
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace([Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable($name))) {
throw "Repository variable $name is not set. Every released build must be Authenticode-signed."
}
}
Write-Host "Code-signing configuration present (certificate '$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME')"
# Logs in FIRST and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account, so the storage login below has to be the last one. Both federated credentials
# are bound to the ref, so this job must never be given an `environment:` -- that would
# change the OIDC subject claim and break both logins.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ env.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
allow-no-subscriptions: true
- name: Acquire Key Vault token for signing
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$token = az account get-access-token --scope https://vault.azure.net/.default --query accessToken --output tsv
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw "Could not acquire a Key Vault token for the code-signing identity."
}
Write-Host "::add-mask::$token"
"CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN=$token" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
# Every storage write below (counter blob, agent ZIP, manifests, AdminConfiguration)
# is authorized by this federated identity -- no SAS secret. One login covers the whole
# job: the federated credential is bound to the ref, and a release run takes ~2 minutes,
# well inside the token lifetime. Only the legacy mirror still needs a SAS: that account
# lives in the pre-migration tenant, where this principal has no identity.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# SDK 10 = single build toolchain (parity with local build.ps1 / global.json).
- name: Setup .NET
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
# Version pinned; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK above.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
# Build numbers come from the shared counter blob -- one counter and one
# implementation for CI and the local build (.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1).
# Reserve-before-build with ETag-CAS: concurrent builds can never mint the same
@@ -85,7 +144,6 @@ jobs:
# build_number could otherwise break out of the quotes and run arbitrary code.
env:
BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE: ${{ inputs.build_number }}
AGENT_SAS_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}
run: |
$override = 0
if ($env:BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE -ne '') {
@@ -96,7 +154,7 @@ jobs:
}
$counterUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent/buildcounter-v$($env:LINE_MAJOR).txt"
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $counterUrl -SasToken $env:AGENT_SAS_TOKEN -Override $override
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $counterUrl -Override $override
$csproj = Get-Content $env:CSPROJ_PATH -Raw
if ($csproj -match '<VersionPrefix>(\d+\.\d+)</VersionPrefix>') {
@@ -129,6 +187,47 @@ jobs:
- name: Run Agent unit tests
run: dotnet test ${{ env.TEST_PROJECT }} --configuration Release --no-restore --verbosity quiet
# Authenticode over everything we author; third-party assemblies keep their own signature.
#
# THE POSITION IS LOAD-BEARING: signing rewrites the PE file, so it must run before the
# ZIP and every SHA-256 in the next step -- those hashes are the bootstrap's integrity
# oracle, and hashes taken before signing match no downloaded file.
#
# $LASTEXITCODE is checked explicitly: PowerShell does not throw on a native non-zero exit.
- name: Sign agent binaries (Authenticode)
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$targets = @()
$targets += Get-ChildItem -Path "$env:AGENT_OUTPUT/*" -Include 'AutopilotMonitor.*.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.*.dll' -File
$targets += Get-ChildItem -Path "$env:DIALOG_OUTPUT/AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe" -File
if (-not ($targets | Where-Object Name -eq 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')) {
throw "AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe not found in $env:AGENT_OUTPUT -- nothing to sign."
}
if (-not ($targets | Where-Object Name -eq 'AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe')) {
throw "AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe not found in $env:DIALOG_OUTPUT -- nothing to sign."
}
$targets | ForEach-Object { Write-Host "Signing $($_.Name)" }
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
--azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description "Autopilot Monitor Agent" `
--description-url "https://www.autopilotmonitor.com" `
($targets | ForEach-Object { $_.FullName })
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE -- aborting before anything is published."
}
- name: Create release artifact
id: artifact
shell: pwsh
@@ -219,12 +318,57 @@ jobs:
"sha256=$sha256Hash" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
"exe_sha256=$exeSha256Hash" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
# Verified against the STAGING copy -- the exact bytes that ship. The invariant is "every
# AutopilotMonitor PE in the ZIP is signed", so a project added later cannot ride along
# unsigned. A missing timestamp fails too: without it the signature dies with the cert.
- name: Verify Authenticode signatures
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$files = Get-ChildItem -Path "staging/agent/*" -Include 'AutopilotMonitor.*.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.*.dll' -File
if ($files.Count -lt 2) {
throw "Expected signed binaries in staging/agent, found $($files.Count)."
}
$failed = $false
$thumbprints = @{}
foreach ($file in $files) {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $file.FullName
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::Signature status is '$($sig.Status)' -- expected 'Valid'."
$failed = $true
continue
}
if (-not $sig.TimeStamperCertificate) {
Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::Signature carries no RFC-3161 timestamp -- it would expire with the certificate."
$failed = $true
continue
}
if (-not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) -and
$sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -notlike $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) {
Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::Signed by '$($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)', expected '$env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT'."
$failed = $true
continue
}
$thumbprints[$sig.SignerCertificate.Thumbprint] = $true
Write-Host "$($file.Name): Valid, timestamped $($sig.TimeStamperCertificate.Subject.Split(',')[0]), signer $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)"
}
if ($thumbprints.Count -gt 1) {
Write-Host "::error::Staged binaries carry $($thumbprints.Count) different signing certificates -- expected exactly one."
$failed = $true
}
if ($failed) {
throw "Signature verification failed. Nothing was published."
}
Write-Host "All $($files.Count) binaries signed with certificate $($thumbprints.Keys -join ', ')"
- name: Upload to Azure Blob Storage
if: inputs.upload_blob
shell: pwsh
run: |
$containerUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent"
$sasToken = "${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}".TrimStart('?')
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
# Legacy mirror (transition until customers moved to the download.-alias):
# blobs are ALSO pushed to the old account so the bootstrap URL baked into
# customers' Intune scripts keeps serving current bits. Fail-soft -- a
@@ -234,7 +378,6 @@ jobs:
function Send-Blob {
param([string]$Local, [string]$BlobName, [string]$ContentType)
$url = "$containerUrl/$BlobName`?$sasToken"
$bytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($Local)
# no-cache on EVERY blob: they all rotate in place (even the per-line ZIP is
# overwritten each build), and the download alias fronts them with Front Door.
@@ -248,7 +391,7 @@ jobs:
$md5.Dispose()
}
Write-Host "Uploading $BlobName ($([math]::Round($bytes.Length / 1MB, 2)) MB)..."
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body $bytes
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$containerUrl/$BlobName" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $headers) -Body $bytes
Write-Host " uploaded $BlobName"
if (-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($legacySasToken)) {
try {
@@ -274,56 +417,66 @@ jobs:
# to main, so a release lands a set that is consistent with what is already live
# (dev render, version-bump guard, bootstrapVersion oracles, alias verification).
# Runs AFTER version.json so its bootstrapVersion read sees this build's manifest.
# Signed with the same identity: the device-side loader verifies the publisher
# of what it downloads, and the publisher refuses to upload unsigned scripts.
./.github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 `
-SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-LegacySasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-TableSasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN }}'
-SigningToken $env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN `
-KeyVaultUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL `
-CertificateName $env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME `
-TimestampUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL `
-ExpectedPublisher $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT
}
# Update AdminConfiguration LatestAgentV2* -- ONLY on stable cutover. The hash-oracle
# must never point at a build that is not actually in the stable namespace.
# LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion is NOT set here: it belongs to the script publisher
# above, which also owns it on script-only pushes. One writer per field.
$tableSasToken = "${{ secrets.AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN }}".TrimStart('?')
if ('${{ inputs.publish_as_stable }}' -ne 'true') {
Write-Host "SKIPPED: AdminConfiguration update (versioned-only run -- stable namespace unchanged)"
} elseif ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($tableSasToken) -or $tableSasToken -eq "XXX") {
Write-Host "SKIPPED: Table SAS token not configured -- set AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN secret to enable backend hash-oracle"
} else {
$sha256 = "${{ steps.artifact.outputs.sha256 }}"
$exeSha256 = "${{ steps.artifact.outputs.exe_sha256 }}"
$agentVersion = "${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}"
$tableUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.table.core.windows.net/AdminConfiguration(PartitionKey='GlobalConfig',RowKey='config')?$tableSasToken"
$tableUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.table.core.windows.net/AdminConfiguration(PartitionKey='GlobalConfig',RowKey='config')"
$tableBody = @{
LatestAgentV2Version = $agentVersion
LatestAgentV2Sha256 = $sha256
LatestAgentV2ExeSha256 = $exeSha256
}
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $tableUrl -Method Merge -Headers @{
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $tableUrl -Method Merge -Headers ($authHeaders + @{
"Content-Type" = "application/json"
"Accept" = "application/json;odata=nometadata"
"If-Match" = "*"
} -Body ($tableBody | ConvertTo-Json)
}) -Body ($tableBody | ConvertTo-Json)
Write-Host "AdminConfiguration updated: V2 version=$agentVersion, sha256=$sha256, exeSha256=$exeSha256"
}
# Sigstore keyless provenance: binds the ZIP digest to this workflow run (repo, ref,
# commit, workflow file) in a public transparency log. The digest covers the identical
# Sigstore keyless provenance: binds the artifact digests to this workflow run (repo, ref,
# commit, workflow file) in a public transparency log. The digests cover the identical
# bytes uploaded to blob (versioned AND stable), so one attestation covers all copies.
# Verify: gh attestation verify <zip> --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
- name: Attest build provenance (ZIP)
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v4
# Complements Authenticode rather than replacing it: the signature says who published a
# binary, the attestation which build produced these exact bytes. Both EXEs are subjects
# of their own so an extracted binary can be verified without the ZIP.
# Verify: gh attestation verify <file> --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
# Skipped on runs that publish nothing -- no log entry for bytes nobody receives.
- name: Attest build provenance
if: inputs.upload_blob || inputs.create_release
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@4d101475d8b20a2381f78447822ac1eab6504dd8 # v4
with:
subject-path: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
subject-path: |
${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
staging/agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe
staging/agent/AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe
- name: Upload build artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
path: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
- name: Upload version metadata
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: version-metadata
path: ${{ env.MANIFEST_NAME }}
@@ -356,7 +509,7 @@ jobs:
- **Published as stable:** ${{ inputs.publish_as_stable }}
### Provenance
This ZIP carries a [GitHub Artifact Attestation](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/attestations) (Sigstore keyless). Verify:
The executables are Authenticode-signed and timestamped. The ZIP and both executables carry a [GitHub Artifact Attestation](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/attestations) (Sigstore keyless). Verify:
```
gh attestation verify AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}.zip --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
```
+126 -16
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
name: Build & Publish Bootstrap MSI
# Thin MDM LOB delivery vehicle for WDP (Autopilot v2) — see
# src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi/Package.wxs. The MSI carries no bootstrap
# logic (only the runner script that downloads the CURRENT server-hosted
# Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1), so it is rebuilt rarely: only when the runner script
# or the WiX package changes. Version lives in Package.wxs — bump it there before
# dispatching so Intune LOB update detection sees a new ProductVersion.
# src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi/Package.wxs. The MSI is packaging only: it
# carries the SAME stage-1 loader that is assigned directly in Intune, so it is rebuilt
# rarely — only when that loader or the WiX package changes. Version lives in Package.wxs
# — bump it there before dispatching so Intune LOB update detection sees a new
# ProductVersion.
on:
workflow_dispatch:
@@ -23,8 +23,15 @@ permissions:
env:
MSI_PROJECT_DIR: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi
RUNNER_SCRIPT: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi/Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1
RUNNER_SCRIPT: scripts/Bootstrap/Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1
STABLE_MSI: AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap.msi
# Authenticode via Azure Key Vault; identity and vault come from repository variables.
# CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT is optional and pins the publisher in the verify steps.
CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME }}
CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL }}
CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT }}
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL: http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com
jobs:
build:
@@ -33,10 +40,12 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v7
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
# The runner executes as SYSTEM on every enrolling device — a parse error or
# The loader executes as SYSTEM on every enrolling device — a parse error or
# non-ASCII mojibake (PS 5.1 codepage roulette) must fail the build, not the fleet.
# bootstrap-script-gates.yml runs the same checks plus Pester on pushes; this job
# stands on its own because it can be dispatched at any time.
- name: Validate runner script (parse + ASCII-only)
shell: pwsh
run: |
@@ -62,8 +71,77 @@ jobs:
Write-Host "MSI version (from Package.wxs): $version"
"version=$version" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
# Every published MSI is signed; a missing variable stops the run before the build.
- name: Check code-signing configuration
shell: pwsh
run: |
foreach ($name in 'CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID', 'CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME', 'CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL') {
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace([Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable($name))) {
throw "Repository variable $name is not set. Every published MSI must be Authenticode-signed."
}
}
# Logs in FIRST and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account, so the storage login below has to be the last one. Both federated credentials
# are bound to the ref, so this job must never be given an `environment:` -- that would
# change the OIDC subject claim and break both logins.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ env.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
allow-no-subscriptions: true
- name: Acquire Key Vault token for signing
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$token = az account get-access-token --scope https://vault.azure.net/.default --query accessToken --output tsv
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw "Could not acquire a Key Vault token for the code-signing identity."
}
Write-Host "::add-mask::$token"
"CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN=$token" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
# The blob upload below is authorized by this federated identity, not by a SAS.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# Exact version, not a "5.*" range: wix writes the bytes of the MSI that customers
# install, so a compromised or simply broken point release must not flow into a build
# unnoticed. Bumping is a reviewed commit.
- name: Install WiX toolset
run: dotnet tool install --global wix --version "5.*"
run: dotnet tool install --global wix --version 5.0.2
# Version pinned; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
# BEFORE the build: wix embeds the file as it finds it, so a loader signed afterwards
# would leave the copy inside the MSI unsigned. Devices under an AllSigned policy need
# the embedded loader to carry a signature of its own.
- name: Sign bootstrap loader (Authenticode)
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
--azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor bootstrap runner' `
--description-url 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com' `
$env:RUNNER_SCRIPT
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE" }
- name: Build MSI
shell: pwsh
@@ -75,16 +153,46 @@ jobs:
wix build Package.wxs -arch x64 -o $out
Pop-Location
if (-not (Test-Path $env:STABLE_MSI)) { Write-Error "wix build produced no MSI"; exit 1 }
$sha256 = (Get-FileHash $env:STABLE_MSI -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()
Write-Host "Built $env:STABLE_MSI ($([math]::Round((Get-Item $env:STABLE_MSI).Length / 1KB)) KB)"
Write-Host "SHA-256: $sha256"
# Signing rewrites the MSI, so it runs before the hash and the upload. A missing
# timestamp fails the run: without it the signature dies with the certificate.
- name: Sign MSI (Authenticode)
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
--azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap' `
--description-url 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com' `
$env:STABLE_MSI
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE" }
# The MSI and the loader it carries -- verified here, before anything is published.
foreach ($file in @($env:STABLE_MSI, $env:RUNNER_SCRIPT)) {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $file
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') { throw "Signature on $file is '$($sig.Status)', expected 'Valid'." }
if (-not $sig.TimeStamperCertificate) { throw "Signature on $file carries no timestamp." }
if ($env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT -and $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -notlike $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) {
throw "$file was signed by '$($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)', expected '$env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT'."
}
Write-Host "$file : Valid, timestamped, signer $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject.Split(',')[0])"
}
Write-Host "SHA-256: $((Get-FileHash $env:STABLE_MSI -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant())"
- name: Upload to Azure Blob Storage
if: inputs.upload_blob
shell: pwsh
run: |
$containerUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent"
$sasToken = "${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}".TrimStart('?')
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$version = "${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}"
# Same Send-Blob contract as build-agent.yml: no-cache on every blob because the
@@ -102,7 +210,7 @@ jobs:
$headers["Content-MD5"] = [Convert]::ToBase64String($md5.ComputeHash($bytes))
$md5.Dispose()
Write-Host "Uploading $BlobName ($([math]::Round($bytes.Length / 1KB)) KB)..."
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$containerUrl/$BlobName`?$sasToken" -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body $bytes
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$containerUrl/$BlobName" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $headers) -Body $bytes
Write-Host " uploaded $BlobName"
}
@@ -125,15 +233,17 @@ jobs:
}
Write-Host "Alias verified: https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/$env:STABLE_MSI ($remoteSize bytes)"
# Sigstore keyless provenance, same as the agent ZIP. Verify:
# Sigstore keyless provenance, same as the agent ZIP; covers the signed bytes. Skipped
# on runs that publish nothing -- no log entry for bytes nobody receives. Verify:
# gh attestation verify AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap.msi --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
- name: Attest build provenance (MSI)
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v4
if: inputs.upload_blob
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@4d101475d8b20a2381f78447822ac1eab6504dd8 # v4
with:
subject-path: ${{ env.STABLE_MSI }}
- name: Upload build artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
path: ${{ env.STABLE_MSI }}
+13 -11
View File
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ on:
# Every other workflow: nothing here builds or tests anything CI covers. paths-ignore
# cannot negate, so they are listed one by one; ci.yml itself stays out of the list
# so a change to CI runs CI. A new workflow file is opt-in — add it here too.
- '.github/workflows/action-pins.yml'
- '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-agent.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-msi.yml'
@@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ on:
# Every other workflow: nothing here builds or tests anything CI covers. paths-ignore
# cannot negate, so they are listed one by one; ci.yml itself stays out of the list
# so a change to CI runs CI. A new workflow file is opt-in — add it here too.
- '.github/workflows/action-pins.yml'
- '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-agent.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-msi.yml'
@@ -94,9 +96,9 @@ jobs:
# windows-latest is required: the agent test projects target net48.
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
@@ -125,9 +127,9 @@ jobs:
run:
working-directory: src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
cache: npm
@@ -159,9 +161,9 @@ jobs:
run:
working-directory: src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
cache: npm
@@ -179,7 +181,7 @@ jobs:
# (run 31252869254). Persist the model across runs instead; HF_CACHE_DIR
# is honored by vector-search-provider.ts.
- name: Cache embedding model
uses: actions/cache@v6
uses: actions/cache@55cc8345863c7cc4c66a329aec7e433d2d1c52a9 # v6
with:
path: ${{ github.workspace }}/.hf-cache
key: hf-model-Xenova-all-MiniLM-L6-v2
@@ -193,9 +195,9 @@ jobs:
name: Generated guardrails match rules/guardrails.json
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
@@ -214,9 +216,9 @@ jobs:
name: Generated wire types match shared-manifests.json
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
+4 -4
View File
@@ -102,15 +102,15 @@ jobs:
build-mode: none
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
if: matrix.language == 'csharp'
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
- name: Initialize CodeQL
uses: github/codeql-action/init@v4.37.9
uses: github/codeql-action/init@cdf488f595d80d6e07e03d4674febd5ab45fa938 # v4.37.9
with:
languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
build-mode: ${{ matrix.build-mode }}
@@ -121,6 +121,6 @@ jobs:
run: dotnet build AutopilotMonitor.sln --configuration Release
- name: Analyze
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v4.37.9
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@cdf488f595d80d6e07e03d4674febd5ab45fa938 # v4.37.9
with:
category: /language:${{ matrix.language }}
+6 -3
View File
@@ -24,14 +24,17 @@ jobs:
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
# Exact versions and no lifecycle scripts: this job holds contents:write and pushes to
# main, so an install-time script from a hijacked package would run with a token that
# can rewrite the repository. ajv is pure JS and needs no install hooks.
- name: Install ajv-cli
run: npm install -g ajv-cli ajv-formats
run: npm install -g --ignore-scripts ajv-cli@5.0.0 ajv-formats@3.0.1
- name: Validate Gather Rules
run: |
+6 -6
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ jobs:
name: Build and Deploy Backend
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ jobs:
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
- name: Setup .NET 10
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ jobs:
id: version
shell: pwsh
run: |
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.txt" -SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.txt"
$csproj = Get-Content ${{ env.CSPROJ_PATH }} -Raw
if ($csproj -notmatch '<VersionPrefix>(\d+\.\d+)</VersionPrefix>') {
@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ jobs:
runId = '${{ github.run_id }}'
} | ConvertTo-Json
$sas = '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'.TrimStart('?')
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.json?$sas"
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.json"
# no-cache: rotating pointer, must never be served stale by any fronting cache.
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' } -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }) -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Write-Host "Published versions/backend.json"
Write-Host $manifest
+6 -6
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
name: Build and Deploy MCP Server
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
# The published customer documentation lives in its own PUBLIC repo and is
# baked into the image as the search_docs corpus (see the Dockerfile). No
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ jobs:
# re-run actually rolls a new revision). /health reports the SHA captured
# below so that staleness is checkable.
- name: Check out documentation bundle
uses: actions/checkout@v7
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
repository: autopilotmonitor/autopilotmonitor-docs
path: mcp-docs
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ jobs:
id: version
shell: pwsh
run: |
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.txt" -SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.txt"
$pkgVersion = (Get-Content ${{ env.PACKAGE_JSON }} -Raw | ConvertFrom-Json).version
$prefix = ($pkgVersion -split '\.')[0..1] -join '.'
@@ -144,9 +144,9 @@ jobs:
docsCommit = '${{ steps.docs.outputs.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7)
} | ConvertTo-Json
$sas = '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'.TrimStart('?')
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.json?$sas"
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.json"
# no-cache: rotating pointer, must never be served stale by any fronting cache.
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' } -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }) -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Write-Host "Published versions/mcp.json"
Write-Host $manifest
+17 -8
View File
@@ -35,11 +35,20 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Build and Deploy Job
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
lfs: false
fetch-depth: 0 # Full history needed for git-based sitemap lastmod dates
# Only the version manifest at the very end needs Azure; logging in here rather than
# next to that step keeps a credential problem from surfacing after a live deploy.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# The customer docs repo is the single source of the "What's new" panel: the prebuild
# step (scripts/whats-new/build-whats-new.js) turns changelog/*.md into
# public/whats-new.json and dates every bullet via git blame — hence the full history.
@@ -47,7 +56,7 @@ jobs:
# workflow runs again (push under src/Web/** or a manual dispatch); versions/web.json
# records which docs commit is live.
- name: Check out documentation bundle
uses: actions/checkout@v7
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
repository: autopilotmonitor/autopilotmonitor-docs
path: whats-new-docs
@@ -57,7 +66,7 @@ jobs:
id: docs
run: echo "sha=$(git -C whats-new-docs rev-parse HEAD)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
cache: npm
@@ -105,12 +114,12 @@ jobs:
# commit, workflow file) in a public transparency log.
# Verify: gh attestation verify portal-<sha>.tar.gz --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
- name: Attest build provenance (portal export)
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v4
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@4d101475d8b20a2381f78447822ac1eab6504dd8 # v4
with:
subject-path: ${{ steps.package.outputs.archive }}
- name: Upload build artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: portal-${{ github.sha }}
path: ${{ steps.package.outputs.archive }}
@@ -169,9 +178,9 @@ jobs:
docsCommit = '${{ steps.docs.outputs.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7)
} | ConvertTo-Json
$sas = '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'.TrimStart('?')
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/web.json?$sas"
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/web.json"
# no-cache: rotating pointer, must never be served stale by any fronting cache.
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' } -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }) -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Write-Host "Published versions/web.json"
Write-Host $manifest
+81 -3
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ on:
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # OIDC federated login for the storage writes (secret-less)
# Shared with build-agent.yml: a script publish and an agent release both touch
# version.json, and the bootstrapVersion read-modify-write must not interleave with the
@@ -34,6 +35,16 @@ concurrency:
group: agent-blob-publish
cancel-in-progress: false
# Authenticode for the customer scripts. Same identity and same repository variables as
# build-agent.yml -- the loader on every device pins this publisher, so the two must not
# drift apart.
env:
CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME }}
CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL }}
CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT }}
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL: http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com
jobs:
gates:
uses: ./.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml
@@ -43,14 +54,81 @@ jobs:
needs: gates
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- name: Check code-signing configuration
shell: pwsh
run: |
foreach ($name in 'CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID', 'CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME', 'CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL') {
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace([Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable($name))) {
throw "Repository variable $name is not set. Published customer scripts must be signed."
}
}
# First, and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account and the storage login below has to be the one that stays. See D-223 --
# both federated credentials are bound to the ref, so this job must never carry a
# GitHub `environment:`.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ env.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
allow-no-subscriptions: true
- name: Acquire Key Vault token for signing
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$token = az account get-access-token --scope https://vault.azure.net/.default --query accessToken --output tsv
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw "Could not acquire a Key Vault token for the code-signing identity."
}
Write-Host "::add-mask::$token"
"CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN=$token" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
# Authorizes the eu blob writes and the AdminConfiguration merge. The gates job above
# runs the same publisher with -DryRun and deliberately without a login -- a dry run
# must never need Azure credentials.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# Version pinned so a new or compromised NuGet release cannot flow into signing
# unreviewed; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK
# preinstalled on the runner.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
- name: Publish bootstrap + customer scripts
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$dryRun = '${{ inputs.dry_run }}' -eq 'true'
./.github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 `
-SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-LegacySasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-TableSasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-SigningToken $env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN `
-KeyVaultUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL `
-CertificateName $env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME `
-TimestampUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL `
-ExpectedPublisher $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT `
-SignedOutputDir "$env:RUNNER_TEMP/signed-scripts" `
-DryRun:$dryRun
# The exact bytes that were (or, on a dry run, would have been) uploaded. A dry-run
# dispatch is therefore the way to inspect a signed script locally before it reaches
# a single customer. Kept on failure too: a failed alias verification is precisely
# when someone wants to look at the file.
- name: Upload signed scripts
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: signed-scripts
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/signed-scripts
if-no-files-found: ignore
+1 -1
Submodule infra updated: 2c2687b6ab...55a8eaf929
+31 -19
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-ESP-004",
"title": "ESP Timeout with 'Continue Anyway' (Soft Failure)",
"description": "Detects an ESP terminal failure on a profile that allows 'Continue anyway'. The enrollment is reported as failed, but the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop — a soft failure rather than an unusable device.",
"title": "ESP Gave Up on a Blocking App with 'Continue Anyway' (Soft Failure)",
"description": "Detects an ESP terminal failure where the ESP gave up while a blocking app was still installing (the agent's own esp_apps_timeout verdict — no per-app HRESULT was reported) on a profile that allows 'Continue anyway'. The enrollment is reported as failed, but the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop — a soft failure rather than an unusable device. An ESP failure that carries a specific error code (a failed installer, a detection mismatch) is a different case and stays with the rule that explains that code.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "esp",
"version": "1.0.1",
"version": "1.1.0",
"enabled": true,
"baseConfidence": 80,
"conditions": [
@@ -26,6 +26,27 @@
"value": "true",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "esp_gave_up_on_app",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "failureType",
"operator": "equals",
"value": "esp_apps_timeout",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "appName",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "appName",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"filterField": "failureType",
"filterOperator": "equals",
"filterValue": "esp_apps_timeout",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes",
"source": "event_type",
@@ -38,34 +59,25 @@
{
"signal": "failedSubcategory",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "enrollment_failed",
"eventType": "esp_failure_settle_started",
"dataField": "failedSubcategory",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "appName",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "appName",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{ "signal": "appName", "condition": "exists", "weight": 10 }
{ "signal": "failedSubcategory", "condition": "exists", "weight": 10 }
],
"explanation": "This enrollment was reported as **failed** because the Enrollment Status Page reached its configured terminal timeout (`{{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min`) before all blocking items finished. The ESP profile, however, allows **'Continue anyway'** — so the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop with a working, though not fully provisioned, device.\n\nThe agent only observes the ESP terminal failure on the device side; it cannot see what the user did after the failure screen. Treat this as a **soft failure**: the device may well be in productive use, while at least one blocking item (`{{failedSubcategory}}` subcategory / app `{{appName}}`) did not complete inside the ESP window.\n\nA cluster of these across a tenant almost always points at one slow blocking app holding the whole fleet at the ESP timeout wall, not at broken devices. Any field still shown as a literal `{{…}}` placeholder was simply not recorded for this session (e.g. a certificate-only failure has no failed app).",
"explanation": "This enrollment was reported as **failed** because the Enrollment Status Page gave up while the blocking app **{{appName}}** was still installing — the agent recorded no per-app error code, only that the app never finished inside the ESP window (the profile's configured limit is `{{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min`; the ESP may have stopped earlier than that). The ESP profile, however, allows **'Continue anyway'** — so the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop with a working, though not fully provisioned, device.\n\nThe agent only observes the ESP terminal failure on the device side; it cannot see what the user did after the failure screen. Treat this as a **soft failure**: the device may well be in productive use, while the `{{failedSubcategory}}` subcategory did not complete inside the ESP window.\n\nA cluster of these across a tenant almost always points at one slow blocking app holding the whole fleet at the ESP limit, not at broken devices. This rule deliberately stays silent when the failed app reported a specific error code — a failed installer or a detection mismatch is explained by the rule for that code, and 'Continue anyway' does not make it a timing problem. Any field still shown as a literal `{{…}}` placeholder was simply not recorded for this session.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Relieve ESP pressure so enrollments finish inside the window",
"steps": [
"Identify the slow blocking app (`{{appName}}`) and either remove it from the ESP 'block device use until these required apps are installed' list, or raise the ESP installation timeout (currently {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min).",
"If the app legitimately needs longer than the ESP allows, make it non-blocking and let it install after the desktop arrives.",
"Verify the app's detection rule matches after install — an app that installs but fails detection times out the ESP on every device (see ANALYZE-APP-013).",
"If a subcategory such as Certificates is reported under '{{failedSubcategory}}', confirm the certificate/connector actually delivers — 'Continue anyway' hides a missing certificate, it does not fix it."
"Look at how long `{{appName}}` takes on a device that completes: if it legitimately needs longer than the ESP allows, make it non-blocking (remove it from 'block device use until these required apps are installed') and let it install after the desktop arrives.",
"If the app must stay blocking, raise the ESP setting 'Show error when installation takes longer than' (configured at {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min) — a limit, not a target; it only helps when the app reliably finishes within the new value.",
"Check the app's dependencies and install order: a blocking app waiting on a large dependency download (Delivery Optimization, proxy throughput) is the usual reason it never finishes in time.",
"If the ESP reported a non-Apps subcategory under '{{failedSubcategory}}', confirm the certificate/connector actually delivers — 'Continue anyway' hides a missing certificate, it does not fix it."
]
}
],
+31 -19
View File
@@ -2496,11 +2496,11 @@
},
{
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-ESP-004",
"title": "ESP Timeout with 'Continue Anyway' (Soft Failure)",
"description": "Detects an ESP terminal failure on a profile that allows 'Continue anyway'. The enrollment is reported as failed, but the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop — a soft failure rather than an unusable device.",
"title": "ESP Gave Up on a Blocking App with 'Continue Anyway' (Soft Failure)",
"description": "Detects an ESP terminal failure where the ESP gave up while a blocking app was still installing (the agent's own esp_apps_timeout verdict — no per-app HRESULT was reported) on a profile that allows 'Continue anyway'. The enrollment is reported as failed, but the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop — a soft failure rather than an unusable device. An ESP failure that carries a specific error code (a failed installer, a detection mismatch) is a different case and stays with the rule that explains that code.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "esp",
"version": "1.0.1",
"version": "1.1.0",
"enabled": true,
"baseConfidence": 80,
"conditions": [
@@ -2521,6 +2521,27 @@
"value": "true",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "esp_gave_up_on_app",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "failureType",
"operator": "equals",
"value": "esp_apps_timeout",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "appName",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "appName",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"filterField": "failureType",
"filterOperator": "equals",
"filterValue": "esp_apps_timeout",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes",
"source": "event_type",
@@ -2533,38 +2554,29 @@
{
"signal": "failedSubcategory",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "enrollment_failed",
"eventType": "esp_failure_settle_started",
"dataField": "failedSubcategory",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "appName",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "appName",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{
"signal": "appName",
"signal": "failedSubcategory",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 10
}
],
"explanation": "This enrollment was reported as **failed** because the Enrollment Status Page reached its configured terminal timeout (`{{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min`) before all blocking items finished. The ESP profile, however, allows **'Continue anyway'** — so the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop with a working, though not fully provisioned, device.\n\nThe agent only observes the ESP terminal failure on the device side; it cannot see what the user did after the failure screen. Treat this as a **soft failure**: the device may well be in productive use, while at least one blocking item (`{{failedSubcategory}}` subcategory / app `{{appName}}`) did not complete inside the ESP window.\n\nA cluster of these across a tenant almost always points at one slow blocking app holding the whole fleet at the ESP timeout wall, not at broken devices. Any field still shown as a literal `{{…}}` placeholder was simply not recorded for this session (e.g. a certificate-only failure has no failed app).",
"explanation": "This enrollment was reported as **failed** because the Enrollment Status Page gave up while the blocking app **{{appName}}** was still installing — the agent recorded no per-app error code, only that the app never finished inside the ESP window (the profile's configured limit is `{{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min`; the ESP may have stopped earlier than that). The ESP profile, however, allows **'Continue anyway'** — so the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop with a working, though not fully provisioned, device.\n\nThe agent only observes the ESP terminal failure on the device side; it cannot see what the user did after the failure screen. Treat this as a **soft failure**: the device may well be in productive use, while the `{{failedSubcategory}}` subcategory did not complete inside the ESP window.\n\nA cluster of these across a tenant almost always points at one slow blocking app holding the whole fleet at the ESP limit, not at broken devices. This rule deliberately stays silent when the failed app reported a specific error code — a failed installer or a detection mismatch is explained by the rule for that code, and 'Continue anyway' does not make it a timing problem. Any field still shown as a literal `{{…}}` placeholder was simply not recorded for this session.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Relieve ESP pressure so enrollments finish inside the window",
"steps": [
"Identify the slow blocking app (`{{appName}}`) and either remove it from the ESP 'block device use until these required apps are installed' list, or raise the ESP installation timeout (currently {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min).",
"If the app legitimately needs longer than the ESP allows, make it non-blocking and let it install after the desktop arrives.",
"Verify the app's detection rule matches after install — an app that installs but fails detection times out the ESP on every device (see ANALYZE-APP-013).",
"If a subcategory such as Certificates is reported under '{{failedSubcategory}}', confirm the certificate/connector actually delivers — 'Continue anyway' hides a missing certificate, it does not fix it."
"Look at how long `{{appName}}` takes on a device that completes: if it legitimately needs longer than the ESP allows, make it non-blocking (remove it from 'block device use until these required apps are installed') and let it install after the desktop arrives.",
"If the app must stay blocking, raise the ESP setting 'Show error when installation takes longer than' (configured at {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min) — a limit, not a target; it only helps when the app reliably finishes within the new value.",
"Check the app's dependencies and install order: a blocking app waiting on a large dependency download (Delivery Optimization, proxy throughput) is the usual reason it never finishes in time.",
"If the ESP reported a non-Apps subcategory under '{{failedSubcategory}}', confirm the certificate/connector actually delivers — 'Continue anyway' hides a missing certificate, it does not fix it."
]
}
],
+5 -1
View File
@@ -94,7 +94,11 @@
"C:\\Windows\\Panther",
"C:\\Windows\\SetupDiag",
"C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\DiagnosticLogCSP",
"C:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\ReportingEvents.log"
"C:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\ReportingEvents.log",
"C:\\ProgramData\\RealmJoin\\choco\\logs"
],
"userProfileFilePrefixes": [
"AppData\\Local\\RealmJoin"
],
"wmiQueryPrefixes": [
"SELECT * FROM Win32_OperatingSystem",
+1 -1
View File
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@
},
"operator": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Comparison operator.",
"description": "Comparison operator. exists/not_exists with a dataField test whether ANY event of the type carries a non-empty value at that field: not_exists matches when no event does — including when the event type is absent altogether — so a rule can gate on a missing field (e.g. an ESP failure without an HRESULT). Without a dataField they test only the presence of the event type.",
"enum": ["equals", "not_equals", "contains", "not_contains", "regex", "not_regex", "gt", "lt", "gte", "lte", "exists", "not_exists", "count_gte", "count_per_group_gte", "in", "not_in"]
},
"value": {
+10
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,16 @@
"$schema": { "type": "string" },
"registryPrefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/categorizedList" },
"filePrefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
"userProfileFilePrefixes": {
"description": "Folders under the signed-in user's profile that file collectors and diagnostics paths may read, RELATIVE to the profile root (e.g. \"AppData\\\\Local\\\\Vendor\"). Resolved against %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% at match time. Entries outside AppData\\Local / AppData\\Roaming are dropped at load: the C:\\Users hard block never admits them, so this list can only ever narrow what the block's exception already permits.",
"type": "array",
"items": {
"allOf": [
{ "$ref": "#/$defs/safeString" },
{ "pattern": "^AppData\\\\(Local|Roaming)(\\\\|$)" }
]
}
},
"wmiQueryPrefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
"eventLogChannels": { "$ref": "#/$defs/categorizedList" },
"blockedEventLogChannels": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
+8
View File
@@ -208,6 +208,14 @@ export const ALLOWED_FILE_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = [
${flatArray(guardrails.filePrefixes)}
];
// Folders under the signed-in user's profile, RELATIVE to the profile root. The agent
// resolves %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% at runtime; the portal validates against a placeholder
// profile. These cannot live in ALLOWED_FILE_PREFIXES — that list is matched literally
// against the already-expanded path, where the user name is unknown at authoring time.
export const USER_PROFILE_FILE_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = [
${flatArray(guardrails.userProfileFilePrefixes ?? [])}
];
export const ALLOWED_WMI_QUERY_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = [
${flatArray(guardrails.wmiQueryPrefixes)}
];
@@ -14,6 +14,22 @@
BeforeAll {
. (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')
function New-FakeSignature {
param([string]$Status, [string]$Subject)
$cert = if ($Subject) {
[pscustomobject]@{ Subject = $Subject; Thumbprint = '0123456789ABCDEF' }
} else { $null }
return [pscustomobject]@{ Status = $Status; SignerCertificate = $cert }
}
function New-FakePayload {
param([string[]]$Files)
$dir = Join-Path $TestDrive ([guid]::NewGuid().ToString())
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $dir -Force | Out-Null
foreach ($f in $Files) { Set-Content -Path (Join-Path $dir $f) -Value 'x' }
return $dir
}
function New-FakeProfile {
param([string]$Name, [double]$AgeMinutes)
$p = Join-Path $TestDrive $Name
@@ -305,3 +321,93 @@ Describe 'logging purity' {
Get-Content $LogFile -Raw | Should -Match 'SKIP: Agent was previously deployed'
}
}
Describe 'Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries' {
# The publisher gate on the extracted payload. What matters is the DECISION: which
# payload is accepted, which is refused, and which files are looked at at all.
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Log { }
$script:ours = 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE'
}
It 'accepts a payload where every binary of ours is validly signed by us' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject $script:ours }
Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
}
It 'checks the binaries we author and leaves third-party assemblies alone' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @(
'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe',
'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe.config',
'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll',
'Newtonsoft.Json.dll',
'System.Management.Automation.dll'
)
$script:checked = @()
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature {
$script:checked += (Split-Path $FilePath -Leaf)
New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject $script:ours
}
Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
$script:checked | Should -Be @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll')
}
It 'refuses an unsigned agent executable' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'NotSigned' -Subject $null }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses a tampered binary (hash mismatch)' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'HashMismatch' -Subject $script:ours }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses a signature whose chain does not validate' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'UnknownError' -Subject $script:ours }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses a validly signed binary from a different publisher' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=Somebody Else, O=Somebody Else Ltd, C=US' }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses the whole payload when a single DLL of ours is swapped' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature {
if ((Split-Path $FilePath -Leaf) -eq 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll') {
New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=Somebody Else, O=Somebody Else Ltd, C=US'
} else {
New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject $script:ours
}
}
$rejected = Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir
$rejected.Count | Should -Be 1
$rejected[0] | Should -BeLike 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll*'
}
It 'refuses when the signature check itself throws' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { throw 'access denied' }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses an empty payload instead of passing it' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('Newtonsoft.Json.dll')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject $script:ours }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
}
Describe 'publisher pin' {
It 'pins the expected publisher by subject, not by thumbprint' {
$ExpectedPublisher | Should -Be '*O=glueckkanja AG*'
$ExpectedPublisher | Should -Not -Match '^[0-9A-Fa-f]{40}$'
}
}
+78 -3
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,9 @@
2. Downloads the monitoring agent ZIP from Azure Blob Storage
3. Verifies integrity via SHA-256 hash from the version manifest (mandatory)
4. Extracts the agent into %ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor\Agent
5. Runs the agent in --install mode (registers Scheduled Task, spawns the runtime)
6. Verifies the runtime process actually launched
5. Verifies the Authenticode signature and publisher of every binary we author
6. Runs the agent in --install mode (registers Scheduled Task, spawns the runtime)
7. Verifies the runtime process actually launched
Agent self-destructs when enrollment completes.
Relax flow (guards 2+3): a real user profile (or a real LastLoggedOnUser)
@@ -76,6 +77,11 @@
PowerShell 5.1 (IME) reads scripts without BOM as ANSI, corrupting multi-byte chars.
.CHANGELOG
2026-09-08 v2.5 Publisher gate: every AutopilotMonitor binary in the extracted
payload must carry a valid Authenticode signature from the
expected publisher before --install runs. The SHA-256 manifest
check stays and is unchanged; it proves the bytes, the signature
proves the author.
2026-08-08 v2.3 Windows 365 Cloud PC support: a positively identified Cloud PC
(Windows365 registry key AND CloudManagedDesktopExtension
service) now triggers the guard 2+3 relax alongside OOBE
@@ -128,7 +134,12 @@ param(
)
# Script version (bump on meaningful changes; see .CHANGELOG above)
$ScriptVersion = "2.4"
$ScriptVersion = "2.5"
# The publisher every binary we author must carry. A -like pattern on the subject, NOT a
# thumbprint: certificates are renewed, deployed copies of this script are not. Same value
# the loader pins for this script.
$ExpectedPublisher = "*O=glueckkanja AG*"
# Configuration - Everything in ProgramData for easy cleanup
$AgentBasePath = "$env:ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor"
@@ -329,6 +340,56 @@ function Get-BootstrapDecision {
return [pscustomobject]@{ Install = $true; ReasonCode = $null; RelaxActive = $relax.Active }
}
# Returns the list of reasons why the extracted payload is not ours; an empty result means
# every binary we author carries a valid Authenticode signature from the expected publisher.
# Third-party assemblies keep their own publisher's signature and are not checked here.
# Any error is a rejection: an unreadable signature is an unverified binary.
function Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries {
param([string]$Path)
$rejected = @()
$ourBinaries = @(
Get-ChildItem -Path $Path -Filter 'AutopilotMonitor.*' -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.Extension -in @('.exe', '.dll') }
)
# An empty set is a rejection, not a pass: it means the extraction produced nothing we
# recognise, and the alternative would be a gate that silently approves an empty folder.
# The comma keeps a single rejection an ARRAY: PowerShell unrolls a one-element result to
# a bare string, and the caller reads .Count and indexes into it.
if ($ourBinaries.Count -eq 0) {
return , @("no AutopilotMonitor binaries found in $Path")
}
foreach ($binary in $ourBinaries) {
try {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $binary.FullName -ErrorAction Stop
}
catch {
$rejected += "$($binary.Name): signature check failed to run ($($_.Exception.Message))"
continue
}
if ($null -eq $sig) {
$rejected += "$($binary.Name): signature check returned nothing"
continue
}
$subject = if ($sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject } else { '<unsigned>' }
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
$rejected += "$($binary.Name): signature status $($sig.Status)"
continue
}
if ($subject -notlike $ExpectedPublisher) {
$rejected += "$($binary.Name): unexpected publisher $subject"
continue
}
}
return , $rejected
}
# Main bootstrap flow. Only invoked when the script is run directly (see entry guard
# at the bottom); never on dot-source.
function Invoke-Bootstrap {
@@ -445,6 +506,20 @@ function Invoke-Bootstrap {
}
}
# Publisher gate. The SHA-256 above proves the ZIP is the one the manifest names, but
# that manifest lives in the same container as the ZIP and cannot outlive a compromise
# of the download host. The expected publisher travels inside THIS script, which the
# loader verified before running it, so the chain from the file an administrator
# assigns to the process that starts here stays publisher-anchored end to end.
# Fail-closed, exactly like the hash check: running unverified code as SYSTEM is the
# risk being removed.
Write-Log "Verifying Authenticode signatures of the agent binaries..."
$unverified = Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $AgentBinPath
if ($unverified.Count -gt 0) {
throw "Authenticode verification FAILED ($($unverified -join '; ')). Refusing to run an agent that is not signed by the expected publisher."
}
Write-Log "Authenticode verification passed (publisher pin: $ExpectedPublisher)"
Write-Log "Calling agent install mode (--install)..."
& $agentExePath --install
$installExitCode = $LASTEXITCODE
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
# Pester tests (Pester 5+) for the stage-1 loader Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1.
#
# The script under test is dot-sourced; its entry guard prevents the loader from
# executing, so loading it here is side-effect free. Network and signature checks
# are mocked -- what is verified is the DECISION: what does the loader accept, what
# does it refuse, and how often does it retry.
#
# Run under Windows PowerShell 5.1 to match the IME runtime:
# powershell.exe -NoProfile -Command "& { $c = New-PesterConfiguration; $c.Run.Path = 'scripts\Bootstrap'; $c.Output.Verbosity = 'Detailed'; Invoke-Pester -Configuration $c }"
#
# This file MUST remain pure ASCII (PS 5.1 reads BOM-less files as ANSI).
BeforeAll {
. (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')
function New-FakeSignature {
param([string]$Status, [string]$Subject)
$cert = if ($Subject) {
[pscustomobject]@{ Subject = $Subject; Thumbprint = '0123456789ABCDEF' }
} else { $null }
return [pscustomobject]@{ Status = $Status; SignerCertificate = $cert }
}
}
Describe 'Test-BootstrapSignature' {
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Log { }
}
It 'accepts a valid signature from the expected publisher' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
}
# An EV subject is a line of street address and registration numbers; the log gets the CN.
It 'logs the signer CN, not the whole subject' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature {
New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, L=Offenbach am Main, C=DE, SERIALNUMBER=HRB 12381'
}
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Write-Log -ParameterFilter { $Message -eq 'Signature status: Valid. Signer: glueckkanja AG' }
}
It 'refuses an unsigned script' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'NotSigned' -Subject $null }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'refuses a tampered script (hash mismatch)' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'HashMismatch' -Subject 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'refuses a signature whose chain does not validate' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'UnknownError' -Subject 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
# The whole point of the pinned publisher: a validly signed script from someone else
# is exactly what an attacker with any code-signing certificate can produce.
It 'refuses a valid signature from a different publisher' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=Somebody Else, O=Somebody Else Ltd, C=US' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'refuses when the signature check itself fails' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { throw 'file not found' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
}
Describe 'Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript' {
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Log { }
Mock Start-Sleep { }
Mock Invoke-WebRequest { }
}
It 'returns after the first attempt when the download verifies' {
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $true }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 1 -Exactly
}
It 'gives up after three attempts when verification keeps failing' {
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $false }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 3 -Exactly
}
# A truncated or proxy-mangled body fails verification, so the retry has to cover the
# download AND the check, not just the transport.
It 'retries a failed verification and accepts a later attempt' {
$script:calls = 0
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $script:calls++; return ($script:calls -ge 2) }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 2 -Exactly
}
It 'retries a transport failure' {
$script:downloads = 0
Mock Invoke-WebRequest { $script:downloads++; if ($script:downloads -eq 1) { throw 'connection reset' } }
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $true }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 2 -Exactly
}
It 'never executes anything when no attempt verifies' {
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $false }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
}
Describe 'publish contract' {
BeforeAll {
$script:loaderText = Get-Content (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1') -Raw
}
# Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 renders the -Dev loader by substituting this exact
# literal and fails the publish when it is gone. Catching that here means the PR fails
# instead of the publish.
It 'carries the dev-render anchor the publisher substitutes' {
$anchor = '$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"'
$script:loaderText.Contains($anchor) | Should -BeTrue
}
# The publisher parses this to write version.json.loaderVersion and to run the
# version-bump guard.
It 'declares a parsable ScriptVersion' {
$script:loaderText -match '\$ScriptVersion\s*=\s*"([\d\.\-a-zA-Z]+)"' | Should -BeTrue
}
It 'pins the expected publisher by subject, not by thumbprint' {
$script:loaderText -match '\$ExpectedPublisher\s*=\s*"\*O=' | Should -BeTrue
}
# The bootstrap MSI installs this same file and runs it with -LogFileName so the delivery
# channel stays visible in a diagnostics package. Renaming the parameter on either side
# would leave the MSI channel silently logging under the wrong name.
It 'keeps the -LogFileName contract the bootstrap MSI relies on' {
$script:loaderText -match '\[string\]\$LogFileName' | Should -BeTrue
$wxs = Get-Content (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '..\..\src\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi\Package.wxs') -Raw
$wxs.Contains('[INSTALLFOLDER]Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1') | Should -BeTrue
$wxs.Contains('-LogFileName bootstrap-msi.log') | Should -BeTrue
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Stage 1 of the Autopilot Monitor bootstrap: fetches the current installer and runs it.
.DESCRIPTION
This is the file an administrator assigns in Intune, and the same file the bootstrap MSI
installs and runs -- one implementation for both delivery channels; the MSI is only the
packaging. It carries no enrollment logic at all: it downloads the published
Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1, proves that it was signed by Autopilot Monitor, and runs it
in this process.
Why two stages: the installer holds every guard, relax rule and download path, and those
change. Whoever assigns the installer directly has to replace their Intune copy each
time; whoever assigns this loader never does, because the part that changes lives on the
server. Assigning the installer directly stays supported and unchanged.
This file is deliberately boring. It is the one piece that cannot be fixed remotely, so
it does the least it can: download, verify, invoke, log.
Verification is by Authenticode publisher, not by hash. A hash oracle would have to be
fetched from the same host as the script itself, so it could not survive a compromise of
that host, while the expected publisher below travels with this file. It pins the
certificate SUBJECT and not a thumbprint, so a certificate renewal does not brick a
loader that is already deployed on devices.
Fail-soft: the loader always exits 0 and never throws into the caller. A device that
cannot reach the download endpoint is a device without monitoring, never a failed
enrollment step. Verification failures are the same: nothing runs, and the reason is in
the log. Refusing to execute unverified code as SYSTEM is the point of this file.
This file MUST remain pure ASCII (PS 5.1 reads BOM-less files as ANSI).
.PARAMETER BootstrapUrl
Installer URL. Defaults to the published stable installer; the -Dev variant of this
loader is rendered from that default at publish time.
.PARAMETER LogFileName
Log file inside the agent log directory. The MSI channel passes bootstrap-msi.log so the
delivery channel stays visible in a diagnostics package; the diag tooling keys on these
names, so do not rename them.
.PARAMETER BootstrapArguments
Everything else is passed through to the installer unchanged, so any parameter the
installer accepts can be set here without this file knowing about it.
.EXAMPLE
.\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1
.EXAMPLE
.\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 24
.NOTES
Author : Oliver Kieselbach (autopilotmonitor.com)
Runtime : Windows PowerShell 5.1, SYSTEM context, during Autopilot enrollment
.CHANGELOG
2026-09-08 v1.2 Log the signer CN instead of the full EV subject; the full subject is
logged only when the publisher is why a script was rejected.
2026-09-08 v1.1 Also used by the bootstrap MSI, which replaced its own copy of this
logic; -LogFileName keeps the channel visible in diagnostics.
2026-09-08 v1.0 Initial version: two-stage bootstrap, publisher-pinned verification.
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false)]
[string]$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1",
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false)]
[ValidatePattern('^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$')]
[string]$LogFileName = "bootstrap-loader.log",
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false, ValueFromRemainingArguments = $true)]
[string[]]$BootstrapArguments
)
# Script version (bump on meaningful changes; see .CHANGELOG above)
$ScriptVersion = "1.2"
# The publisher every downloaded stage-2 script must carry. A -like pattern on the subject,
# NOT a thumbprint: certificates are renewed, deployed loaders are not.
$ExpectedPublisher = "*O=glueckkanja AG*"
$LoaderBasePath = "$env:ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor"
$LoaderLogPath = "$LoaderBasePath\Logs"
$LogFile = "$LoaderLogPath\$LogFileName"
$BootstrapPath = "$LoaderBasePath\Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"
$DownloadAttempts = 3
$RetryDelaySeconds = 10
# Write-Host as well as the file: the Intune script output is what an administrator sees in
# the portal, the file is what a support case reads.
function Write-Log {
param([string]$Message)
$timestamp = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
$logMessage = "[$timestamp] $Message"
Write-Host $logMessage
Add-Content -Path $LogFile -Value $logMessage -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}
# True only when the file is signed, the signature validates against the machine's trust
# chain, and the signer is us. Any error is a false -- an unreadable signature is an
# unverified script.
function Test-BootstrapSignature {
param([string]$Path)
try {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $Path -ErrorAction Stop
}
catch {
Write-Log "Signature check failed to run: $($_.Exception.Message)"
return $false
}
if ($null -eq $sig) {
Write-Log "Signature check returned nothing."
return $false
}
# The full subject of an EV certificate is a line of street address and registration
# numbers. The CN answers the only question the log has to answer; the full subject is
# logged when it is the reason for a rejection.
$subject = if ($sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject } else { "<unsigned>" }
$signer = if ($subject -match 'CN=([^,]+)') { $Matches[1] } else { $subject }
Write-Log "Signature status: $($sig.Status). Signer: $signer"
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
Write-Log "REJECTED: expected signature status 'Valid'."
return $false
}
if ($subject -notlike $ExpectedPublisher) {
Write-Log "REJECTED: signer does not match the expected publisher. Full subject: $subject"
return $false
}
Write-Log "Signature accepted (thumbprint $($sig.SignerCertificate.Thumbprint))."
return $true
}
# Downloads the installer and returns $true once a downloaded copy passes verification.
# Verification lives inside the retry loop on purpose: a truncated or proxy-mangled body
# fails the signature check, and that is worth another attempt.
function Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript {
param([string]$Url, [string]$Destination)
for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le $DownloadAttempts; $attempt++) {
try {
Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt/$DownloadAttempts from $Url"
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $Url -OutFile $Destination -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 60 -ErrorAction Stop
if (Test-BootstrapSignature -Path $Destination) {
return $true
}
}
catch {
Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
if ($attempt -lt $DownloadAttempts) {
Start-Sleep -Seconds $RetryDelaySeconds
}
}
return $false
}
# Main flow. Only invoked when the script is run directly (see entry guard at the bottom),
# so the Pester suite can dot-source this file without bootstrapping anything.
function Start-BootstrapLoader {
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $LoaderLogPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null
Write-Log "=== Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v$ScriptVersion started (user=$env:USERNAME, pid=$PID) ==="
# PS 5.1 on an OOBE device still defaults to TLS 1.0 for this process.
try {
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol -bor [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
}
catch {
Write-Log "INFO: could not raise the TLS protocol: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
if (-not (Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url $BootstrapUrl -Destination $BootstrapPath)) {
Write-Log "No verified installer available after $DownloadAttempts attempt(s). Nothing was executed."
return
}
Write-Log "Executing $BootstrapPath"
# Same process, so the execution policy this loader runs under applies to stage 2 as
# well and no second policy decision can strand the installer. Splatting an array of
# remaining arguments keeps this file free of any knowledge about the installer's
# parameters.
$arguments = @()
if ($BootstrapArguments) { $arguments = $BootstrapArguments }
try {
& $BootstrapPath @arguments
Write-Log "Installer finished (exit code $LASTEXITCODE)."
}
catch {
Write-Log "Installer threw: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
}
# Entry guard: dot-sourcing (Pester) loads the functions without running the loader.
if ($MyInvocation.InvocationName -ne '.') {
try {
Start-BootstrapLoader
}
catch {
# Nothing above should throw; if it does, it must not become a failed Intune script.
Write-Log "Loader failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
exit 0
}
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring
{
/// <summary>
/// Session 683f1eff — a Shell-Core 62407 failure (<c>WhiteGlove_Failed</c>) arrived four
/// seconds into the provisioning tracker's 30-s settle window and terminalised the session
/// with nothing but its failure type: the HRESULT (0x80070652) and the failed subcategory
/// (Apps) the registry had already named never reached the terminal event, the backend
/// FailureReason or the termination-time app classification. The coordinator now inherits
/// the pending settle detail onto the Shell-Core args and records the terminal-failure
/// snapshot from it.
/// </summary>
public sealed class EspAndHelloTrackerShellCoreFailureInheritanceTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Fixed = new DateTime(2026, 9, 8, 18, 11, 6, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private sealed class Fixture : IDisposable
{
public TempDirectory Tmp { get; } = new TempDirectory();
public AgentLogger Logger { get; }
public FakeSignalIngressSink Ingress { get; } = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
public FakeSignalIngressSink TrackerPostSink { get; } = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
public VirtualClock Clock { get; } = new VirtualClock(Fixed);
public List<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs> Forwarded { get; } = new List<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs>();
public Fixture() { Logger = new AgentLogger(Tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Debug); }
public EspAndHelloTracker BuildCoordinator(Func<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs?> pendingProbe)
{
var coordinator = new EspAndHelloTracker(
sessionId: "S1",
tenantId: "T1",
post: new InformationalEventPost(TrackerPostSink, Clock),
logger: Logger,
skipConfigProbe: () => ((bool?)false, (bool?)false),
accountSetupActivityProbe: () => false,
pendingEspFailureProbe: pendingProbe);
coordinator.EspFailureDetected += (_, args) => Forwarded.Add(args);
return coordinator;
}
public FakeSignalIngressSink.PostedSignal TerminalSignal() =>
Assert.Single(Ingress.Posted, p => p.Kind == DecisionSignalKind.EspTerminalFailure);
public void Dispose() { Tmp.Dispose(); }
}
private static EspFailureDetectedEventArgs PendingAppsFailure() => new EspFailureDetectedEventArgs(
failureType: "Provisioning_DeviceSetup_Apps_Failed",
errorCode: "0x80070652",
failedSubcategory: "Apps",
category: "DeviceSetup",
likelyCulpritApps: new[] { "ESP Finalizer US" });
[Fact]
public void ShellCore_failure_inside_the_settle_window_inherits_the_registry_detail()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var coordinator = f.BuildCoordinator(PendingAppsFailure);
using var adapter = new EspAndHelloTrackerAdapter(coordinator, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
coordinator.TriggerShellCoreEspFailureForTest("WhiteGlove_Failed");
var args = Assert.Single(f.Forwarded);
Assert.Equal("WhiteGlove_Failed", args.FailureType); // the signal that terminalised
Assert.Equal("0x80070652", args.ErrorCode);
Assert.Equal("Apps", args.FailedSubcategory);
Assert.Equal("DeviceSetup", args.Category);
Assert.Equal(new[] { "ESP Finalizer US" }, args.LikelyCulpritApps);
// Wire-through: the EspTerminalFailure signal payload carries the detail the
// DecisionEngine copies onto enrollment_failed.
var signal = f.TerminalSignal();
Assert.Equal("WhiteGlove_Failed", signal.Payload!["failureType"]);
Assert.Equal("0x80070652", signal.Payload["errorCode"]);
Assert.Equal("Apps", signal.Payload["failedSubcategory"]);
Assert.Equal("DeviceSetup", signal.Payload["category"]);
Assert.Equal("ESP Finalizer US", signal.Payload["likelyCulpritApps"]);
// Termination-time classification reads the same context.
Assert.NotNull(coordinator.LastEspTerminalFailure);
Assert.Equal("0x80070652", coordinator.LastEspTerminalFailure.ErrorCode);
Assert.True(coordinator.LastEspTerminalFailure.IsAppsSubcategory);
}
[Fact]
public void ShellCore_failure_without_a_pending_window_stays_bare()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var coordinator = f.BuildCoordinator(() => null);
using var adapter = new EspAndHelloTrackerAdapter(coordinator, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
coordinator.TriggerShellCoreEspFailureForTest("ESPProgress_Timeout");
var args = Assert.Single(f.Forwarded);
Assert.Equal("ESPProgress_Timeout", args.FailureType);
Assert.Null(args.ErrorCode);
Assert.Null(args.FailedSubcategory);
Assert.Null(args.Category);
Assert.Empty(args.LikelyCulpritApps);
Assert.Null(coordinator.LastEspTerminalFailure);
var signal = f.TerminalSignal();
Assert.False(signal.Payload!.ContainsKey("errorCode"));
Assert.False(signal.Payload.ContainsKey("failedSubcategory"));
}
[Fact]
public void A_throwing_probe_degrades_to_the_bare_failure()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var coordinator = f.BuildCoordinator(() => throw new InvalidOperationException("probe"));
coordinator.TriggerShellCoreEspFailureForTest("WhiteGlove_Failed");
var args = Assert.Single(f.Forwarded);
Assert.Equal("WhiteGlove_Failed", args.FailureType);
Assert.Null(args.ErrorCode);
}
}
}
@@ -456,5 +456,124 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Gather
SingleSecurityWarning();
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------
// %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% exception (userProfilePath overload)
//
// The token lifts the C:\Users hard block for AppData\Local and
// AppData\Roaming — and nothing more. The allowlist still decides,
// which is what the cases below pin down: the exception is a gate the
// allowlist has to open, never an allowance of its own.
// -------------------------------------------------------------------
private const string TestProfile = @"C:\Users\TestUser";
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AppDataPath_WithoutAllowlistEntry_IsStillBlocked()
{
// The lifted hard block alone admits nothing: without a matching
// userProfileFilePrefixes entry the path falls through to the
// allowlist and is refused there.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\UnlistedVendor\app.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_OutsideAppData_IsBlockedByTheHardBlock()
{
foreach (var target in new[] { @"\Desktop\secret.txt", @"\Documents\notes.txt", @"\ntuser.dat" })
{
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + target, unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_NullProfile_KeepsTheUsersHardBlock()
{
// No interactive user detected — the exception cannot apply and the
// path stays under the plain C:\Users block.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
@"C:\Users\TestUser\AppData\Local\UnlistedVendor\app.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: null));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_TraversalOutOfAppData_IsBlocked()
{
// Spelling Documents as a traversal out of AppData must not survive
// Path.GetFullPath normalisation.
const string traversal = @"C:\Users\TestUser\AppData\Local\..\..\Documents\secret.txt";
Assert.Equal(@"C:\Users\TestUser\Documents\secret.txt", Path.GetFullPath(traversal));
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
traversal, unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_ForeignProfile_IsBlockedEvenUnderAppData()
{
// The exception is scoped to the DETECTED profile — a rule must not
// reach a second user's AppData by spelling the path out.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
@"C:\Users\OtherUser\AppData\Local\UnlistedVendor\app.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AllowlistedVendorFolder_IsAllowed()
{
// AppData\Local\RealmJoin is on userProfileFilePrefixes: the file itself, a
// subfolder below it, and the folder itself all pass.
foreach (var target in new[] { @"\tray.log", @"\Logs\rj.log", "" })
{
Assert.True(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\RealmJoin" + target,
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile),
$"expected allowed: ...\\RealmJoin{target}");
}
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_SiblingOfAnAllowlistedVendorFolder_IsBlocked()
{
// Segment-bounded: "RealmJoin" must not admit "RealmJoinSomethingElse".
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\RealmJoinSomethingElse\tray.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AllowlistedVendorFolder_InAForeignProfile_IsBlocked()
{
// The allowlist is anchored to the DETECTED profile, not to C:\Users\*.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
@"C:\Users\OtherUser\AppData\Local\RealmJoin\tray.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AllowlistedVendorFolder_WithoutADetectedUser_IsBlocked()
{
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
@"C:\Users\TestUser\AppData\Local\RealmJoin\tray.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: null));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AppDataPath_IsAllowedInUnrestrictedMode()
{
// Where the exception does bite today: unrestricted mode returns
// before the allowlist, so the lifted hard block is the whole story.
Assert.True(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\UnlistedVendor\app.log",
unrestrictedMode: true, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
// ...but only under AppData — Documents stays blocked even there.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\Documents\secret.txt",
unrestrictedMode: true, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
using System;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.SystemSignals
{
/// <summary>
/// <see cref="ProvisioningStatusTracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs"/> exposes the registry
/// failure detail while its settle window is open and nothing once the window has fired —
/// the coordinator reads it when a Shell-Core failure terminalises first (session 683f1eff).
/// </summary>
public sealed class ProvisioningStatusTrackerPendingFailureTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Fixed = new DateTime(2026, 9, 8, 18, 11, 2, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private const string InProgressJson = @"{
""categorySucceeded"": null,
""AppsSubcategory"": {""subcategoryState"":""inProgress"",""subcategoryStatusText"":""Apps (Working)""}
}";
private const string AppsFailedJson = @"{
""categorySucceeded"": null,
""AppsSubcategory"": {""subcategoryState"":""failed"",""subcategoryStatusText"":""Apps (0x80070652)""}
}";
private sealed class Fixture : IDisposable
{
public TempDirectory Tmp { get; } = new TempDirectory();
public ProvisioningStatusTracker Tracker { get; }
public Fixture()
{
var post = new InformationalEventPost(new FakeSignalIngressSink(), new VirtualClock(Fixed));
var logger = new AgentLogger(Tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info);
Tracker = new ProvisioningStatusTracker(
sessionId: "S1",
tenantId: "T1",
post: post,
logger: logger,
appxScanner: new FakeAppxDeploymentFailureScanner(),
backgroundDispatcher: action => action());
}
public void Dispose()
{
Tracker.Dispose();
Tmp.Dispose();
}
}
[Fact]
public void Nothing_pending_before_any_failure()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
Assert.Null(f.Tracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs());
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", InProgressJson);
Assert.Null(f.Tracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs());
}
[Fact]
public void Armed_settle_window_exposes_the_registry_detail()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", InProgressJson);
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", AppsFailedJson);
var pending = f.Tracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs();
Assert.NotNull(pending);
Assert.Equal("Provisioning_DeviceSetup_Apps_Failed", pending!.FailureType);
Assert.Equal("0x80070652", pending.ErrorCode);
Assert.Equal("Apps", pending.FailedSubcategory);
Assert.Equal("DeviceSetup", pending.Category);
}
[Fact]
public void Expired_settle_window_leaves_nothing_pending()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", InProgressJson);
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", AppsFailedJson);
f.Tracker.TriggerSettleTimerForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status");
Assert.Null(f.Tracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs());
}
}
}
@@ -56,6 +56,31 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
LoadEmbeddedGuardrails()["maxCommandLength"]!.Value<int>());
}
[Fact]
public void User_profile_prefixes_are_all_accepted_by_the_loader()
{
// The loader drops entries outside AppData\Local / AppData\Roaming (the hard block
// would never release them anyway). A dropped entry is invisible at runtime — it
// just never matches — so a typo in the JSON must fail here instead.
var json = LoadEmbeddedGuardrails()["userProfileFilePrefixes"]?.ToObject<string[]>()
?? new string[0];
Assert.Equal(
json.Select(p => p.Trim().TrimEnd('\\')).OrderBy(p => p),
GatherRuleGuards.AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes.OrderBy(p => p));
}
[Fact]
public void User_profile_prefixes_stay_under_the_hard_blocks_exception()
{
Assert.All(
GatherRuleGuards.AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes,
prefix => Assert.Contains(
GatherRuleGuards.AllowedUserProfileSubdirs,
subdir => prefix.StartsWith(subdir, System.StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(prefix.Length == subdir.Length || prefix[subdir.Length] == '\\')));
}
[Fact]
public void Blocked_event_log_channels_match_code_constants()
{
@@ -223,7 +223,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
return true;
}
private const int MaxScriptOutputLength = 2048;
// Script stdout kept per event. Measured over 1,486 script outputs in the fleet
// (2026-08-25..09-08): median 39, p90 644, max 1,501 chars -- the maximum being our own
// one-stage bootstrap, and nothing ever hit the previous 2,048 cap. The two-stage
// bootstrap then added a ~460-char loader preamble to that maximum and started
// truncating the one output an operator actually reads. 8,192 leaves room for the
// realistic worst case (download retries plus relax logging, ~2,700) and stays 4x below
// the 32K-char Table Storage property limit that bounds the event downstream. Growth
// driver is the number of log lines the bootstrap chain writes, so re-measure before
// adding a chatty step rather than raising this again.
private const int MaxScriptOutputLength = 8192;
private const int MaxMultiLineBufferLines = 100;
// Size cap for ONE entry — a single physical line (enforced by BoundedLineReader before
// the line is materialized) and an assembled multiline entry alike. Any process able to
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
private readonly Func<bool> _userEspAppsSettledProbe;
private readonly Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> _starvedUserEspAppsProbe;
private readonly Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> _packageStatesProbe;
// Session 683f1eff: registry failure detail still sitting in an open settle window,
// consulted when a Shell-Core failure terminalises first (see OnShellCoreEspFailureDetected).
private readonly Func<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs> _pendingEspFailureProbe;
// Session caa6cf50 gate-starvation fix (2026-06-11) — fire-once guard for the
// user-ESP-apps-settled AccountSetup synthesis (see MaybeSynthesizeAccountSetupComplete).
@@ -174,8 +177,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
/// late "Installing-→-Error" promotion can classify the failure correctly
/// AND refuse to promote when the failure originated outside the Apps
/// subcategory (a non-Apps HRESULT does not describe per-app outcome).
/// Null when no HRESULT-carrying ESP failure has fired (or all observed
/// failures came from ShellCoreTracker, which has no HRESULT surface).
/// Null when no registry-derived failure detail has been observed — neither from
/// a settle window that expired nor from one a Shell-Core failure inherited.
/// </summary>
public Termination.EspTerminalFailureSnapshot LastEspTerminalFailure { get; private set; }
@@ -243,7 +246,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
Func<bool> accountSetupActivityProbe = null,
Func<bool> userEspAppsSettledProbe = null,
Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> starvedUserEspAppsProbe = null,
Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> packageStatesProbe = null)
Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> packageStatesProbe = null,
Func<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs> pendingEspFailureProbe = null)
{
_sessionId = sessionId ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(sessionId));
_tenantId = tenantId ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(tenantId));
@@ -277,6 +281,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
// provisioning tracker name not-completed apps on an Apps-subcategory failure.
_packageStatesProbe = packageStatesProbe
?? (() => Array.Empty<Ime.AppPackageState>());
// Test seam: defaults to the provisioning tracker's open settle window (null when
// none is armed or the tracker is not running, e.g. Device Preparation).
_pendingEspFailureProbe = pendingEspFailureProbe
?? (() => _provisioningTracker?.TryGetPendingFailureArgs());
}
/// <summary>
@@ -658,6 +666,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
internal void TriggerEspExitedForTest(DateTime occurredAtUtc) =>
OnEspExited(this, new EspExitedEventArgs(occurredAtUtc));
// Test seam for a Shell-Core 62407 failure — drives the coordinator forwarder including
// the pending-settle inheritance, without a real ShellCoreTracker.
internal void TriggerShellCoreEspFailureForTest(string failureType) =>
OnShellCoreEspFailureDetected(this, failureType);
// Test seam for HelloWizardStarted — same contract as TriggerEspExitedForTest.
internal void TriggerHelloWizardStartedForTest(DateTime occurredAtUtc) =>
OnHelloWizardStarted(this, new HelloWizardStartedEventArgs(occurredAtUtc));
@@ -673,33 +686,56 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
// Forwarder for ShellCoreTracker (event-log-derived ESP failures, e.g. Shell-Core 62407
// failure descriptions). Source-event timestamp is mirrored so the adapter can stamp the
// DecisionSignal with the historical instant on backfill. ShellCoreTracker has no HRESULT
// surface, so only FailureType is set on the args.
// surface; the registry detail is inherited from an open settle window (see below).
private void OnShellCoreEspFailureDetected(object sender, string failureType)
{
LastEventOccurredAtUtc = (sender as ShellCoreTracker)?.LastEventOccurredAtUtc;
try
{
EspFailureDetected?.Invoke(this, new EspFailureDetectedEventArgs(failureType));
EspFailureDetected?.Invoke(this, BuildShellCoreFailureArgs(failureType));
}
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Error($"Error forwarding ShellCore EspFailureDetected for '{failureType}'", ex); }
finally { LastEventOccurredAtUtc = null; }
}
// Forwarder for ProvisioningStatusTracker (registry-derived ESP failures). Args carry the
// full failure detail (FailureType, ErrorCode, FailedSubcategory, Category) extracted
// from the failed subcategory's statusText. Provisioning has no source-event timestamp
// surfaced today, so the adapter falls back to clock.
private void OnProvisioningEspFailureDetected(object sender, EspFailureDetectedEventArgs args)
// Session 683f1eff: the Shell-Core 62407 failure usually lands INSIDE the provisioning
// tracker's 30-s settle window — after the registry named the failed subcategory and its
// HRESULT, before the settle timer would have forwarded them. The engine terminalises on
// the first EspTerminalFailure and the agent stops seconds later, so whatever this signal
// carries is all the terminal event, the backend FailureReason and the termination-time
// app classification ever see (a third of all ESP terminal failures took this path). The
// pending detail is inherited here; FailureType stays the Shell-Core value because that
// is the signal that actually terminalised.
private EspFailureDetectedEventArgs BuildShellCoreFailureArgs(string failureType)
{
EspFailureDetectedEventArgs pending = null;
try { pending = _pendingEspFailureProbe(); }
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Warning($"EspAndHelloTracker: pending ESP failure probe threw: {ex.Message}"); }
if (pending == null)
return new EspFailureDetectedEventArgs(failureType);
RecordTerminalFailureSnapshot(pending);
_logger.Info(
$"EspAndHelloTracker: Shell-Core failure '{failureType}' inherits the pending provisioning failure detail " +
$"(category={pending.Category ?? "n/a"}, failedSubcategory={pending.FailedSubcategory ?? "n/a"}, " +
$"errorCode={pending.ErrorCode ?? "n/a"})");
return new EspFailureDetectedEventArgs(
failureType,
errorCode: pending.ErrorCode,
failedSubcategory: pending.FailedSubcategory,
category: pending.Category,
likelyCulpritApps: pending.LikelyCulpritApps);
}
// Session 080edee9 follow-up + Codex review (P2/P3) — snapshot the full failure context
// (HRESULT + failedSubcategory + category) so EnrollmentTerminationHandler can read it on
// the terminal-failure pathway. Only update when the args carry at least one of the three
// fields, so a bare Shell-Core failure cannot wipe out the registry snapshot. Deliberately
// NOT gated on ErrorCode alone — a non-Apps subcategory failure without HRESULT is still
// useful for downstream "should we promote?" gating.
private void RecordTerminalFailureSnapshot(EspFailureDetectedEventArgs args)
{
LastEventOccurredAtUtc = null;
// Session 080edee9 follow-up + Codex review (P2/P3) — snapshot the full
// failure context (HRESULT + failedSubcategory + category) before
// forwarding so EnrollmentTerminationHandler can read it on the terminal-
// failure pathway. Only update when the args carry at least one of the
// three fields, so a later ShellCore-derived failure (which has none of
// them) cannot wipe out the registry snapshot. We deliberately do NOT
// gate on ErrorCode alone — a non-Apps subcategory failure without
// HRESULT is still useful for downstream "should we promote?" gating.
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(args?.ErrorCode)
|| !string.IsNullOrEmpty(args?.FailedSubcategory)
|| !string.IsNullOrEmpty(args?.Category))
@@ -709,6 +745,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
failedSubcategory: args.FailedSubcategory,
category: args.Category);
}
}
// Forwarder for ProvisioningStatusTracker (registry-derived ESP failures). Args carry the
// full failure detail (FailureType, ErrorCode, FailedSubcategory, Category) extracted
// from the failed subcategory's statusText. Provisioning has no source-event timestamp
// surfaced today, so the adapter falls back to clock.
private void OnProvisioningEspFailureDetected(object sender, EspFailureDetectedEventArgs args)
{
LastEventOccurredAtUtc = null;
RecordTerminalFailureSnapshot(args);
try
{
EspFailureDetected?.Invoke(this, args);
@@ -80,6 +80,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
"AccountSetupCategory.Status"
};
// Order in which TryGetPendingFailureArgs resolves concurrently armed settle windows.
private static readonly string[] PendingFailurePreference =
{
"DeviceSetupCategory.Status",
"AccountSetupCategory.Status",
"DevicePreparationCategory.Status"
};
private readonly AgentLogger _logger;
private readonly string _sessionId;
private readonly string _tenantId;
@@ -1711,6 +1719,29 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
internal void TriggerSettleTimerForTest(string categoryName)
=> OnProvisioningFailureSettleExpired(categoryName);
/// <summary>
/// The registry-derived failure detail of a settle window that is still open (armed,
/// not yet expired or retracted) — null when none is pending. Read by the coordinator
/// when a Shell-Core 62407 failure arrives inside the window, so the terminal signal
/// inherits HRESULT / failed subcategory / category instead of racing them away
/// (session 683f1eff). Windows fail one category at a time, but should two be armed
/// the device-phase category wins: it is the one the ESP page reports.
/// </summary>
internal EspFailureDetectedEventArgs TryGetPendingFailureArgs()
{
lock (_stateLock)
{
if (_provisioningFailureSettleArgs == null || _provisioningFailureSettleArgs.Count == 0)
return null;
foreach (var category in PendingFailurePreference)
{
if (_provisioningFailureSettleArgs.TryGetValue(category, out var args) && args != null)
return args;
}
return null;
}
}
private bool HasCategorySucceededChanged(string categoryName, bool? newValue)
{
if (!_lastCategorySucceeded.TryGetValue(categoryName, out var oldValue))
@@ -70,12 +70,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
@"C:\Windows\System32\config", // SAM, SECURITY, SYSTEM hives
};
// Allowed subdirectories under a user profile (used with %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token)
private static readonly string[] AllowedUserProfileSubdirs = new[]
{
@"AppData\Local",
@"AppData\Roaming",
};
// The allowed user-profile subdirectories and the vendor allowlist under them live in
// GatherRuleGuards, which owns the embedded guardrails.json — one copy for both guards.
/// <summary>
/// Returns true if the given path is allowed for diagnostics collection.
@@ -135,7 +131,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
(normalizedDir.Length == BlockedUsersPrefix.Length ||
normalizedDir[BlockedUsersPrefix.Length] == Path.DirectorySeparatorChar))
{
if (!IsUserProfileSubpathAllowed(normalizedDir, userProfilePath))
if (!GatherRuleGuards.IsUserProfileSubpathAllowed(normalizedDir, userProfilePath))
return false;
}
@@ -169,7 +165,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
}
}
return false;
// Vendor folders under the signed-in user's profile — same allowlist the file
// collectors use, since it answers the same question: which folders below a
// profile carry enrollment-relevant logs rather than the user's own data.
return GatherRuleGuards.IsUserProfilePathOnAllowlist(normalizedDir, userProfilePath);
}
catch
{
@@ -178,38 +177,6 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Returns true if the normalized path falls under one of the allowed subdirectories
/// of the detected user profile (AppData\Local, AppData\Roaming).
/// Only applies when %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% was used to resolve the path.
/// </summary>
internal static bool IsUserProfileSubpathAllowed(string normalizedPath, string userProfilePath)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(userProfilePath))
return false;
try
{
var normalizedProfile = Path.GetFullPath(userProfilePath);
foreach (var subdir in AllowedUserProfileSubdirs)
{
var allowedPrefix = Path.GetFullPath(Path.Combine(normalizedProfile, subdir));
if (normalizedPath.StartsWith(allowedPrefix, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(normalizedPath.Length == allowedPrefix.Length ||
normalizedPath[allowedPrefix.Length] == Path.DirectorySeparatorChar))
{
return true;
}
}
}
catch
{
// Path normalization failure — deny
}
return false;
}
/// <summary>
/// Checks whether any component of the path (directories or file) is a symlink,
/// junction, or other reparse point. Returns true if a reparse point is detected.
@@ -32,6 +32,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
public static readonly IReadOnlyList<string> AllowedRegistryPrefixes;
public static readonly IReadOnlyList<string> AllowedFilePrefixes;
/// <summary>
/// Folders under the signed-in user's profile that file collectors and
/// admin-configured diagnostics paths may read, RELATIVE to the profile root
/// (e.g. <c>AppData\Local\Vendor</c>). Resolved against the path
/// %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% produced, at match time — the profile name is not
/// known when the list is authored, which is why these entries cannot live in
/// <see cref="AllowedFilePrefixes"/> (matched literally against the expanded path).
/// </summary>
public static readonly IReadOnlyList<string> AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes;
public static readonly IReadOnlyList<string> AllowedWmiQueryPrefixes;
public static readonly IReadOnlyCollection<string> AllowedCommands;
public static readonly IReadOnlyList<string> AllowedEventLogChannels;
@@ -63,8 +73,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
Path.GetFullPath(@"C:\Windows\System32\config"), // SAM, SECURITY, SYSTEM hives
};
// Allowed subdirectories under a user profile (used with %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token)
private static readonly string[] AllowedUserProfileSubdirs = new[]
// The only subdirectories of a user profile the C:\Users hard block will ever
// release (used with %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%). Single copy for both guards —
// DiagnosticsPathGuards delegates here.
internal static readonly string[] AllowedUserProfileSubdirs = new[]
{
@"AppData\Local",
@"AppData\Roaming",
@@ -118,6 +130,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
AllowedRegistryPrefixes = FlattenCategorized(obj, "registryPrefixes", "prefixes");
AllowedFilePrefixes = obj["filePrefixes"]?.ToObject<List<string>>() ?? new List<string>();
AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes = LoadUserProfilePrefixes(obj);
AllowedWmiQueryPrefixes = obj["wmiQueryPrefixes"]?.ToObject<List<string>>() ?? new List<string>();
var commands = FlattenCategorized(obj, "allowedCommands", "commands");
@@ -136,6 +149,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
AllowedRegistryPrefixes = new List<string>();
AllowedFilePrefixes = new List<string>();
AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes = new List<string>();
AllowedWmiQueryPrefixes = new List<string>();
AllowedCommands = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
AllowedEventLogChannels = new List<string>();
@@ -143,6 +157,43 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
ResidualWmiPrefixes = new List<string>();
}
/// <summary>
/// Reads <c>userProfileFilePrefixes</c> and drops every entry that is rooted, carries a
/// traversal, or does not sit under one of <see cref="AllowedUserProfileSubdirs"/>.
/// The C:\Users hard block releases nothing outside AppData, so such an entry could only
/// ever be dead text — dropping it at load keeps the list honest instead of silently
/// ineffective, and no configuration can widen the hard block's exception.
/// </summary>
private static List<string> LoadUserProfilePrefixes(JObject obj)
{
var raw = obj["userProfileFilePrefixes"]?.ToObject<List<string>>() ?? new List<string>();
var result = new List<string>();
foreach (var entry in raw)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(entry))
continue;
var trimmed = entry.Trim().TrimEnd('\\');
if (Path.IsPathRooted(trimmed))
continue;
if (trimmed.IndexOf("..", StringComparison.Ordinal) >= 0)
continue;
foreach (var subdir in AllowedUserProfileSubdirs)
{
if (trimmed.StartsWith(subdir, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(trimmed.Length == subdir.Length || trimmed[subdir.Length] == '\\'))
{
result.Add(trimmed);
break;
}
}
}
return result;
}
private static void DeriveWmiClassAllowlist(
IReadOnlyList<string> entries,
out HashSet<string> classes,
@@ -265,12 +316,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
// C:\Users block always applies (even in unrestricted mode)
// Exception: paths under <userProfilePath>\AppData\Local or AppData\Roaming
// are allowed when the %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token was used.
// are allowed when the %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token was used. The exception
// only LIFTS the block — in restricted mode the allowlist below still decides.
if (normalizedPath.StartsWith(BlockedUsersPrefix, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(normalizedPath.Length == BlockedUsersPrefix.Length ||
normalizedPath[BlockedUsersPrefix.Length] == Path.DirectorySeparatorChar))
{
if (!DiagnosticsPathGuards.IsUserProfileSubpathAllowed(normalizedPath, userProfilePath))
if (!IsUserProfileSubpathAllowed(normalizedPath, userProfilePath))
return false;
}
@@ -288,9 +340,61 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
if (unrestrictedMode)
return true;
return AllowedFilePrefixes.Any(prefix =>
if (AllowedFilePrefixes.Any(prefix =>
normalizedPath.StartsWith(prefix, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(normalizedPath.Length == prefix.Length || normalizedPath[prefix.Length] == '\\'));
(normalizedPath.Length == prefix.Length || normalizedPath[prefix.Length] == '\\')))
{
return true;
}
// Vendor folders under the signed-in user's profile. Only reachable when the rule
// spelled %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% and the resolver found an interactive user —
// a null profile denies, so a machine with nobody signed in cannot widen anything.
return IsUserProfilePathOnAllowlist(normalizedPath, userProfilePath);
}
/// <summary>
/// True when the normalized path sits under one of <see cref="AllowedUserProfileSubdirs"/>
/// of the detected user profile. This is the C:\Users hard block's only exception; it
/// releases the block and nothing else. A null profile denies.
/// </summary>
internal static bool IsUserProfileSubpathAllowed(string normalizedPath, string userProfilePath)
=> AllowedUserProfileSubdirs.Any(subdir =>
MatchesProfileRelativePrefix(normalizedPath, userProfilePath, subdir));
/// <summary>
/// True when the normalized path is admitted by an entry of
/// <see cref="AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes"/> under the detected user profile.
/// </summary>
internal static bool IsUserProfilePathOnAllowlist(string normalizedPath, string userProfilePath)
=> AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes.Any(prefix =>
MatchesProfileRelativePrefix(normalizedPath, userProfilePath, prefix));
/// <summary>
/// Segment-bounded match of <paramref name="normalizedPath"/> against
/// &lt;profile&gt;\&lt;relativePrefix&gt;. Both sides go through Path.GetFullPath, so a
/// traversal spelled into either one cannot slip past the boundary check.
/// </summary>
private static bool MatchesProfileRelativePrefix(
string normalizedPath, string userProfilePath, string relativePrefix)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(normalizedPath) || string.IsNullOrEmpty(userProfilePath))
return false;
try
{
var allowedPrefix = Path.GetFullPath(
Path.Combine(Path.GetFullPath(userProfilePath), relativePrefix));
return normalizedPath.StartsWith(allowedPrefix, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(normalizedPath.Length == allowedPrefix.Length ||
normalizedPath[allowedPrefix.Length] == Path.DirectorySeparatorChar);
}
catch
{
// Path normalization failure — deny.
return false;
}
}
/// <summary>
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
# Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1 - thin runner embedded in the Bootstrap MSI.
#
# The MSI is only a delivery vehicle (MDM LOB channel installs earlier than the IME
# script/app batches during Autopilot Device Preparation). This runner downloads the
# CURRENT Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 from the download endpoint and executes it, so
# every piece of real bootstrap logic (guards, relax rules, agent download) stays
# server-updatable without re-shipping the MSI.
#
# Fail-soft by design: the runner always exits 0 so a transient network failure never
# marks the LOB install as failed; diagnostics go to bootstrap-msi.log.
# ASCII only - no special characters in this file.
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$baseDir = Join-Path $env:ProgramData 'AutopilotMonitor'
$logDir = Join-Path $baseDir 'Logs'
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $logDir | Out-Null
$log = Join-Path $logDir 'bootstrap-msi.log'
function Write-Log([string]$message) {
Add-Content -Path $log -Value ("[{0}] {1}" -f (Get-Date -Format 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss'), $message)
}
try {
Write-Log "MSI bootstrap runner started (user=$env:USERNAME, pid=$PID)."
if (Test-Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor\Deployed') {
Write-Log 'Deployed marker present - skipping, another channel already installed the agent.'
exit 0
}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
$url = 'https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$dest = Join-Path $baseDir 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le 3; $attempt++) {
try {
Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri $url -OutFile $dest
break
} catch {
Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt failed: $_"
if ($attempt -eq 3) { throw }
Start-Sleep -Seconds 10
}
}
Write-Log "Bootstrap script downloaded to $dest - executing."
# PS 5.1 file redirection (*>>) writes UTF-16LE, which garbles a log otherwise
# written via Add-Content (ANSI). Route through Add-Content for one encoding.
& $dest *>&1 | ForEach-Object { $_.ToString() } | Add-Content -Path $log
Write-Log "Bootstrap script finished (exit code $LASTEXITCODE)."
exit 0
} catch {
Write-Log ("MSI bootstrap runner failed: " + ($_ | Out-String))
exit 0
}
@@ -4,16 +4,19 @@
LOB MSIs are installed by the OMA-DM stack (EnterpriseDesktopAppManagement CSP) during
the first MDM sync, i.e. BEFORE/parallel to the Device Preparation SLDM app batch -
earlier than any IME-delivered script (Batch 2) or Win32 app can run. The MSI itself
carries no bootstrap logic: it installs one runner script and executes it once. The
runner downloads the CURRENT server-hosted Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1, keeping all
real logic updatable without re-shipping the MSI.
carries no bootstrap logic and no downloader of its own: it installs the SAME stage-1
loader that is assigned directly in Intune (scripts/Bootstrap/Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1)
and runs it once. The loader downloads the current server-hosted
Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 and verifies its publisher before executing it, so all real
logic stays updatable without re-shipping the MSI, and both delivery channels share one
implementation.
Build: wix build Package.wxs -arch x64 -o bin\AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap.msi
-->
<Wix xmlns="http://wixtoolset.org/schemas/v4/wxs">
<Package Name="Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap"
Manufacturer="Autopilot Monitor"
Version="1.0.2"
Version="1.1.0"
UpgradeCode="1fbe5515-d346-445c-b8b8-14ee79f97522"
Scope="perMachine"
Compressed="yes">
@@ -28,8 +31,13 @@
</StandardDirectory>
<ComponentGroup Id="MainComponents" Directory="INSTALLFOLDER">
<Component Id="RunnerScript" Guid="8c8e8962-719f-458b-b291-dd99d3f1dc30">
<File Id="RunnerPs1" Source="Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1" KeyPath="yes" />
<!-- Source is relative to the build working directory (the project dir), not to this
file. New component GUID because the key path changed. -->
<Component Id="RunnerScript" Guid="A972F561-01B5-400A-8C2A-47D12BA97DCA">
<File Id="RunnerPs1"
Source="..\..\..\scripts\Bootstrap\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"
Name="Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"
KeyPath="yes" />
</Component>
</ComponentGroup>
@@ -38,11 +46,12 @@
</Feature>
<!-- Deferred + no-impersonate: runs as SYSTEM after files land. Return=ignore keeps
the LOB install green even if the runner hits a transient error (the runner is
additionally fail-soft itself); diagnostics live in bootstrap-msi.log. -->
the LOB install green even if the loader hits a transient error (the loader is
additionally fail-soft itself). -LogFileName keeps this channel distinguishable in
a diagnostics package; the diag tooling keys on that name. -->
<CustomAction Id="RunBootstrap"
Directory="INSTALLFOLDER"
ExeCommand="&quot;[System64Folder]WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe&quot; -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File &quot;[INSTALLFOLDER]Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1&quot;"
ExeCommand="&quot;[System64Folder]WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe&quot; -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File &quot;[INSTALLFOLDER]Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1&quot; -LogFileName bootstrap-msi.log"
Execute="deferred"
Impersonate="no"
Return="ignore" />
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Tests for <see cref="LatestVersionsService"/> — the 12h-cached reader for the
/// Tests for <see cref="LatestVersionsService"/> — the short-TTL reader for the
/// public <c>version.json</c> blob. Verifies cache hit/miss, forceRefresh bypass,
/// and failure fallback without hammering the blob on every call.
/// </summary>
@@ -140,6 +140,28 @@ public class LatestVersionsServiceTests
Assert.Equal(1, handler.CallCount);
}
[Fact]
public async Task GetAsync_HttpFailure_AfterSuccess_ServesLastKnownGood()
{
var (svc, handler, _) = Create();
await svc.GetAsync(forceRefresh: false, CancellationToken.None);
handler.Responder = _ => new HttpResponseMessage(HttpStatusCode.InternalServerError);
// The refresh fails, but the version line must not blank out: the last good
// value stands until the blob answers again.
var afterFailure = await svc.GetAsync(forceRefresh: true, CancellationToken.None);
Assert.NotNull(afterFailure);
Assert.Equal("1.0.706", afterFailure!.AgentVersion);
Assert.True(afterFailure.FromCache);
// ...and it is what the short failure cache serves to the next callers, too.
var next = await svc.GetAsync(forceRefresh: false, CancellationToken.None);
Assert.Equal("1.0.706", next!.AgentVersion);
Assert.Equal(2, handler.CallCount);
}
[Fact]
public async Task GetAsync_MalformedJson_ReturnsNull()
{
@@ -7,19 +7,21 @@ using Moq;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Pins ANALYZE-ESP-004 ("ESP Timeout with 'Continue Anyway' — Soft Failure").
/// Pins ANALYZE-ESP-004 ("ESP Gave Up on a Blocking App with 'Continue Anyway' — Soft Failure").
///
/// Background (tenant c9787ba2, session cb7036a6): a slow blocking app (Encompass
/// Hybrid Installer) does not finish inside the 30-min Device-ESP window, so the ESP
/// fails terminally in DeviceSetup. The profile allows "Continue anyway", so the user
/// most likely dismissed the failure screen and reached the desktop — but the agent
/// only ever sees the terminal failure and the session is recorded as Failed. The
/// DecisionEngine already stamps the enrollment_failed event with
/// <c>mayHaveContinuedAnyway=true</c>; this rule turns that into a customer-visible
/// "soft failure" advisory with the root-cause remediation.
/// only ever sees the terminal failure and the session is recorded as Failed.
///
/// The rule keys ONLY on <c>mayHaveContinuedAnyway==true</c> (set exclusively on the
/// ESP terminal-failure path), so an ordinary hard failure must not trip it.
/// The rule needs THREE facts: the terminal enrollment_failed, the DecisionEngine's
/// <c>mayHaveContinuedAnyway=true</c> stamp (profile allows the button), and the agent's own
/// timeout verdict — an app_install_failed promoted with <c>failureType=esp_apps_timeout</c>
/// (ESP gave up while the app was still installing, no per-app HRESULT). Session 683f1eff:
/// an ESP failure with a real HRESULT (0x80070652, installer collision) on a Continue-anyway
/// profile fired the rule and rendered the configured 90-min limit as if it had elapsed —
/// the continue-anyway flag alone proves nothing about timing.
/// </summary>
public class RuleEngineEspSoftFailureTests
{
@@ -37,8 +39,9 @@ public class RuleEngineEspSoftFailureTests
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent>
{
SettleStartedEvent(errorCode: null),
EnrollmentFailedEvent(mayHaveContinuedAnyway: "true"),
AppInstallFailed(),
AppInstallFailed(failureType: "esp_apps_timeout"),
};
var outcome = await RunAsync(rule, events);
@@ -47,13 +50,15 @@ public class RuleEngineEspSoftFailureTests
Assert.Equal("ANALYZE-ESP-004", result.RuleId);
Assert.Equal("warning", result.Severity);
// Required gate matched on the continue-anyway flag.
// Required gates: the continue-anyway flag AND the agent's timeout verdict.
var gate = AsDict(result.MatchedConditions["may_have_continued"]);
Assert.Equal("true", AsString(gate["value"]));
var verdict = AsDict(result.MatchedConditions["esp_gave_up_on_app"]);
Assert.Equal("esp_apps_timeout", AsString(verdict["value"]));
// Interpolation material for the explanation / remediation templates is present:
// {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}}, {{failedSubcategory}} (from enrollment_failed)
// and {{appName}} (from app_install_failed).
// Interpolation material: {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} (enrollment_failed),
// {{failedSubcategory}} (esp_failure_settle_started — the terminal event drops it when
// the Shell-Core failure wins the race) and {{appName}} (the promoted app).
var timeout = AsDict(result.MatchedConditions["espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes"]);
Assert.Equal("30", AsString(timeout["value"]));
@@ -65,6 +70,48 @@ public class RuleEngineEspSoftFailureTests
Assert.Equal(FailedAppName, AsString(failedApp["value"]));
}
[Fact]
public async Task ANALYZE_ESP_004_stays_silent_on_a_hard_failure_with_continue_anyway()
{
// Session 683f1eff: continue-anyway profile, but the ESP failed on a real installer
// error (0x80070652 / MSI 1618) after 19 minutes. The failed app carries no
// esp_apps_timeout verdict — the rule must not turn an installer collision into
// "the ESP reached its 90-min timeout".
var rule = BuiltInAnalyzeRules.GetAll().First(r => r.RuleId == "ANALYZE-ESP-004");
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent>
{
SettleStartedEvent(errorCode: "0x80070652"),
EnrollmentFailedEvent(mayHaveContinuedAnyway: "true"),
AppInstallFailed(failureType: null, exitCodeClass: "Retry"),
};
var outcome = await RunAsync(rule, events);
Assert.Empty(outcome.Results);
}
[Fact]
public async Task ANALYZE_ESP_004_names_the_timed_out_app_not_another_failed_one()
{
// Two failed apps: one hard installer failure earlier in the run, one promoted
// esp_apps_timeout at the terminal. {{appName}} must be the timed-out app.
var rule = BuiltInAnalyzeRules.GetAll().First(r => r.RuleId == "ANALYZE-ESP-004");
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent>
{
AppInstallFailed(failureType: null, exitCodeClass: "Failed", appName: "Contoso Agent", sequence: 100),
SettleStartedEvent(errorCode: null),
EnrollmentFailedEvent(mayHaveContinuedAnyway: "true"),
AppInstallFailed(failureType: "esp_apps_timeout"),
};
var outcome = await RunAsync(rule, events);
var result = Assert.Single(outcome.Results);
var failedApp = AsDict(result.MatchedConditions["appName"]);
Assert.Equal(FailedAppName, AsString(failedApp["value"]));
}
[Fact]
public async Task ANALYZE_ESP_004_does_not_fire_when_continue_anyway_is_false()
{
@@ -75,7 +122,7 @@ public class RuleEngineEspSoftFailureTests
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent>
{
EnrollmentFailedEvent(mayHaveContinuedAnyway: "false"),
AppInstallFailed(),
AppInstallFailed(failureType: "esp_apps_timeout"),
};
var outcome = await RunAsync(rule, events);
@@ -92,7 +139,7 @@ public class RuleEngineEspSoftFailureTests
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent>
{
EnrollmentFailedEvent(mayHaveContinuedAnyway: null),
AppInstallFailed(),
AppInstallFailed(failureType: "esp_apps_timeout"),
};
var outcome = await RunAsync(rule, events);
@@ -132,23 +179,61 @@ public class RuleEngineEspSoftFailureTests
return data;
}
private static EnrollmentEvent AppInstallFailed() => new()
private static EnrollmentEvent SettleStartedEvent(string? errorCode)
{
EventId = Guid.NewGuid().ToString(),
TenantId = TenantId,
SessionId = SessionId,
EventType = "app_install_failed",
Timestamp = DateTime.UtcNow,
Sequence = 220,
Data = new Dictionary<string, object>
var data = new Dictionary<string, object>
{
["appName"] = FailedAppName,
["category"] = "DeviceSetup",
["failedSubcategory"] = "Certificates",
["failureType"] = "Provisioning_DeviceSetup_Certificates_Failed",
["settleSeconds"] = 30,
["reason"] = "wait_for_late_ime_signals",
};
if (errorCode != null)
data["errorCode"] = errorCode;
return new EnrollmentEvent
{
EventId = Guid.NewGuid().ToString(),
TenantId = TenantId,
SessionId = SessionId,
EventType = "esp_failure_settle_started",
Timestamp = DateTime.UtcNow,
Sequence = 212,
Data = data,
};
}
private static EnrollmentEvent AppInstallFailed(
string? failureType,
string? exitCodeClass = null,
string appName = FailedAppName,
int sequence = 220)
{
var data = new Dictionary<string, object>
{
["appName"] = appName,
["state"] = "Error",
["targeted"] = "Device",
["failureType"] = "esp_apps_timeout",
["errorDetail"] = "Install status unconfirmed — ESP gave up while this app was still installing.",
};
if (failureType != null)
{
data["failureType"] = failureType;
data["confidence"] = "presumed";
data["errorDetail"] = "Install status unconfirmed — ESP gave up while this app was still installing.";
}
};
if (exitCodeClass != null)
data["exitCodeClass"] = exitCodeClass;
return new EnrollmentEvent
{
EventId = Guid.NewGuid().ToString(),
TenantId = TenantId,
SessionId = SessionId,
EventType = "app_install_failed",
Timestamp = DateTime.UtcNow,
Sequence = sequence,
Data = data,
};
}
private static Dictionary<string, object> AsDict(object o)
{
@@ -7,12 +7,17 @@ using Moq;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Pins the absence gate on <c>event_type</c> conditions: <c>not_exists</c> without a
/// <c>dataField</c> matches when no event of that type occurs in the session and is disproved by
/// a single such event. Before this branch an absent type always evaluated false, so a required
/// "must not have happened" condition could never be expressed (ANALYZE-ID-004 v2 relies on it).
/// The dataField variant keeps its historical meaning (some event of the type has an empty field)
/// and is not touched here.
/// Pins the absence gates on conditions.
///
/// Without a <c>dataField</c>, <c>not_exists</c> matches when no event of that type occurs in
/// the session and is disproved by a single such event (ANALYZE-ID-004 v2 relies on it).
///
/// With a <c>dataField</c>, <c>not_exists</c> matches when no event of the type carries a
/// non-empty value at that field — including when the type is absent — and is disproved by a
/// single non-empty value; on <c>event_data</c> the same-event filter narrows the inspected set
/// first. Before this the per-event loop's null short-circuit rejected a missing field before
/// the operator ever ran, so "the ESP failure carried no HRESULT" (session 683f1eff) could not be
/// expressed at all, while the precondition gate already had the absence semantics.
/// </summary>
public class RuleEngineEventTypeNotExistsTests
{
@@ -24,7 +29,7 @@ public class RuleEngineEventTypeNotExistsTests
{
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent> { Event("marker_seen", 1) };
var outcome = await RunAsync(Rule(), events);
var outcome = await RunAsync(TypeAbsenceRule(), events);
var result = Assert.Single(outcome.Results);
var evidence = Assert.IsType<Dictionary<string, object>>(result.MatchedConditions["disproof_absent"]);
@@ -37,12 +42,111 @@ public class RuleEngineEventTypeNotExistsTests
{
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent> { Event("marker_seen", 1), Event("disproof", 2) };
var outcome = await RunAsync(Rule(), events);
var outcome = await RunAsync(TypeAbsenceRule(), events);
Assert.Empty(outcome.Results);
}
private static AnalyzeRule Rule() => new()
[Fact]
public async Task Field_not_exists_matches_when_no_event_carries_the_field()
{
// The event type is present, the field is not — the shape of an ESP failure without an
// HRESULT (esp_failure_settle_started without errorCode).
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent> { Event("marker_seen", 1), Event("disproof", 2) };
var outcome = await RunAsync(FieldAbsenceRule("event_type"), events);
var result = Assert.Single(outcome.Results);
var evidence = Assert.IsType<Dictionary<string, object>>(result.MatchedConditions["code_absent"]);
Assert.Equal("disproof", evidence["eventType"]);
Assert.Equal("errorCode", evidence["field"]);
Assert.Equal(1, evidence["count"]);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Field_not_exists_matches_when_the_event_type_is_absent()
{
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent> { Event("marker_seen", 1) };
var outcome = await RunAsync(FieldAbsenceRule("event_type"), events);
var result = Assert.Single(outcome.Results);
var evidence = Assert.IsType<Dictionary<string, object>>(result.MatchedConditions["code_absent"]);
Assert.Equal(0, evidence["count"]);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("event_type")]
[InlineData("event_data")]
public async Task A_non_empty_value_on_any_event_vetoes_a_required_field_not_exists(string source)
{
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent>
{
Event("marker_seen", 1),
Event("disproof", 2),
Event("disproof", 3, ("errorCode", "0x80070652")),
};
var outcome = await RunAsync(FieldAbsenceRule(source), events);
Assert.Empty(outcome.Results);
}
[Fact]
public async Task An_empty_string_does_not_count_as_a_carried_value()
{
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent> { Event("marker_seen", 1), Event("disproof", 2, ("errorCode", "")) };
var outcome = await RunAsync(FieldAbsenceRule("event_type"), events);
Assert.Single(outcome.Results);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Event_data_field_not_exists_inspects_only_the_filtered_events()
{
// The carrier of the field is filtered out (kind=a); among kind=b events nobody carries it.
var events = new List<EnrollmentEvent>
{
Event("marker_seen", 1),
Event("disproof", 2, ("kind", "a"), ("errorCode", "0x80070652")),
Event("disproof", 3, ("kind", "b")),
};
var matched = await RunAsync(FieldAbsenceRule("event_data", filterKind: "b"), events);
var result = Assert.Single(matched.Results);
var evidence = Assert.IsType<Dictionary<string, object>>(result.MatchedConditions["code_absent"]);
Assert.Equal(1, evidence["count"]);
var vetoed = await RunAsync(FieldAbsenceRule("event_data", filterKind: "a"), events);
Assert.Empty(vetoed.Results);
}
private static AnalyzeRule TypeAbsenceRule() => Rule(
new RuleCondition { Signal = "disproof_absent", Source = "event_type", EventType = "disproof", Operator = "not_exists", Value = "", Required = true });
private static AnalyzeRule FieldAbsenceRule(string source, string? filterKind = null)
{
var absence = new RuleCondition
{
Signal = "code_absent",
Source = source,
EventType = "disproof",
DataField = "errorCode",
Operator = "not_exists",
Value = "",
Required = true,
};
if (filterKind != null)
{
absence.FilterField = "kind";
absence.FilterOperator = "equals";
absence.FilterValue = filterKind;
}
return Rule(absence);
}
private static AnalyzeRule Rule(RuleCondition absence) => new()
{
// Custom-namespace rule: a built-in ID outside the live catalog is hidden by the
// sunset filter in AnalyzeRuleService (IsBuiltIn defaults to true).
@@ -58,11 +162,11 @@ public class RuleEngineEventTypeNotExistsTests
Conditions = new List<RuleCondition>
{
new() { Signal = "marker", Source = "event_type", EventType = "marker_seen", Operator = "exists", Value = "", Required = true },
new() { Signal = "disproof_absent", Source = "event_type", EventType = "disproof", Operator = "not_exists", Value = "", Required = true },
absence,
},
};
private static EnrollmentEvent Event(string eventType, int sequence) => new()
private static EnrollmentEvent Event(string eventType, int sequence, params (string key, string value)[] data) => new()
{
EventId = Guid.NewGuid().ToString(),
TenantId = TenantId,
@@ -70,7 +174,7 @@ public class RuleEngineEventTypeNotExistsTests
EventType = eventType,
Timestamp = DateTime.UtcNow.AddMinutes(sequence),
Sequence = sequence,
Data = new Dictionary<string, object>(),
Data = data.ToDictionary(d => d.key, d => (object)d.value),
};
private static async Task<AnalysisOutcome> RunAsync(AnalyzeRule rule, List<EnrollmentEvent> events)
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests.Shared;
/// <summary>
/// Pins the schemaVersion-2 catalog contract (generated by scripts/error-codes/generate.mjs):
/// Pins the schemaVersion-2 catalog contract (generated by tools/error-codes/generate.mjs):
/// key/source/category vocabulary, the HRESULT_FROM_WIN32 derivation, the symbol and
/// enforcement-state indexes, and the handful of entries product code and rules rely on.
/// </summary>
@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using System.Net.Http;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.Notifications;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.WhatsNew;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.DataAccess;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.Notifications;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.WhatsNew;
using Microsoft.ApplicationInsights;
using Microsoft.ApplicationInsights.Extensibility;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions;
using Moq;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// What's new → channel digest: feed parsing, watermark semantics (baseline on first run, diff by
/// entry key, claim-then-send with ETag CAS), per-channel opt-in routing, and the digest shape.
/// </summary>
public class WhatsNewNotificationServiceTests
{
// ── Fakes ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
private sealed class InMemoryStateRepository : IWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository
{
private WhatsNewNotificationState? _row;
private long _version = 0;
public int ConflictsToInject { get; set; }
public int Writes { get; private set; }
public WhatsNewNotificationState? Current => _row;
public void Seed(params string[] knownKeys)
{
_row = new WhatsNewNotificationState { KnownEntryKeys = new HashSet<string>(knownKeys, StringComparer.Ordinal) };
_version++;
}
public Task<(WhatsNewNotificationState? State, string? ETag)> GetWithETagAsync()
=> Task.FromResult(_row == null ? ((WhatsNewNotificationState?)null, (string?)null) : (Clone(_row), _version.ToString()));
public Task<bool> TryUpsertAsync(WhatsNewNotificationState state, string? ifMatchETag)
{
if (ConflictsToInject > 0)
{
ConflictsToInject--;
_version++;
return Task.FromResult(false);
}
if (ifMatchETag is null && _row != null) return Task.FromResult(false);
if (ifMatchETag is not null && ifMatchETag != _version.ToString()) return Task.FromResult(false);
_row = Clone(state);
_version++;
Writes++;
return Task.FromResult(true);
}
private static WhatsNewNotificationState Clone(WhatsNewNotificationState s) => new()
{
KnownEntryKeys = new HashSet<string>(s.KnownEntryKeys, StringComparer.Ordinal),
LastDocsCommit = s.LastDocsCommit,
LastRunUtc = s.LastRunUtc,
LastNotifiedUtc = s.LastNotifiedUtc,
LastNotifiedEntryCount = s.LastNotifiedEntryCount,
};
}
private sealed class Harness
{
public InMemoryStateRepository StateRepo { get; } = new();
public Mock<IWhatsNewFeedClient> Feed { get; } = new();
public Mock<IConfigRepository> ConfigRepo { get; } = new();
public Mock<NotificationChannelDispatcher> Dispatcher { get; }
public List<(List<NotificationChannel> Channels, NotificationAlert Alert)> Sent { get; } = new();
public WhatsNewNotificationService Service { get; }
public DateTime Now { get; } = new(2026, 9, 8, 12, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
public Harness()
{
var webhook = new WebhookNotificationService(new HttpClient(), NullLogger<WebhookNotificationService>.Instance);
var telegram = new TelegramNotificationService(new HttpClient(), Mock.Of<IConfigRepository>(), NullLogger<TelegramNotificationService>.Instance);
Dispatcher = new Mock<NotificationChannelDispatcher>(webhook, telegram);
Dispatcher
.Setup(d => d.SendToChannelsAsync(It.IsAny<IEnumerable<NotificationChannel>>(), It.IsAny<NotificationAlert>()))
.Returns<IEnumerable<NotificationChannel>, NotificationAlert>((channels, alert) =>
{
Sent.Add((channels.ToList(), alert));
return Task.CompletedTask;
});
ConfigRepo.Setup(r => r.GetAllTenantConfigurationsAsync()).ReturnsAsync(new List<TenantConfiguration>());
Service = new WhatsNewNotificationService(
Feed.Object,
StateRepo,
ConfigRepo.Object,
Dispatcher.Object,
new TelemetryClient(new TelemetryConfiguration()),
NullLogger<WhatsNewNotificationService>.Instance,
() => Now);
}
public void SetFeed(WhatsNewFeed? feed)
=> Feed.Setup(f => f.GetAsync(It.IsAny<CancellationToken>())).ReturnsAsync(feed);
public void SetTenants(params TenantConfiguration[] tenants)
=> ConfigRepo.Setup(r => r.GetAllTenantConfigurationsAsync()).ReturnsAsync(tenants.ToList());
}
private static WhatsNewFeedEntry Entry(string channel, string id, string? title = null, string body = "Body text.", int daysAgo = 0)
=> new()
{
Channel = channel,
Id = id,
AddedUtc = new DateTime(2026, 9, 8, 0, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc).AddDays(-daysAgo),
Period = "September 2026",
Title = title,
Body = body,
Link = null,
};
private static WhatsNewFeed Feed(params WhatsNewFeedEntry[] entries) => new()
{
DocsCommit = "abc1234",
Entries = entries,
DocsUrls = new Dictionary<string, string>
{
[WhatsNewFeed.PlatformChannel] = Constants.DocsBaseUrl + "/changelog/platform-changelog",
[WhatsNewFeed.AgentChannel] = Constants.DocsBaseUrl + "/changelog/agent-changelog",
},
};
private static TenantConfiguration Tenant(string id, params NotificationChannel[] channels) => new()
{
TenantId = id,
NotificationChannelsJson = NotificationChannel.SerializeList(channels),
};
private static NotificationChannel Channel(string id, bool whatsNew, bool enabled = true, string url = "https://hooks.example/x")
=> new() { Id = id, Name = id, ProviderType = 20, Url = url, Enabled = enabled, NotifyOnWhatsNew = whatsNew, NotifyOnSuccess = true };
// ── Feed parsing ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[Fact]
public void Parse_ValidPayload_YieldsEntriesForBothChannels()
{
const string json = """
{
"schemaVersion": 1,
"generatedUtc": "2026-09-08T10:00:00.000Z",
"docsCommit": "deadbee",
"channels": {
"platform": { "docsUrl": "https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/changelog/platform-changelog", "entries": [
{ "id": "0a1b2c3d", "addedUtc": "2026-09-07T09:00:00.000Z", "period": "September 2026", "title": "**Bold lead**", "body": "Body with [link](https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/x).", "link": "https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/x" }
] },
"agent": { "docsUrl": "https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/changelog/agent-changelog", "entries": [
{ "id": "ffffffff", "addedUtc": "2026-09-01T09:00:00.000Z", "period": "September 2026", "title": null, "body": "Agent bullet.", "link": null }
] }
}
}
""";
var feed = WhatsNewFeed.Parse(json);
Assert.NotNull(feed);
Assert.Equal("deadbee", feed!.DocsCommit);
Assert.Equal(2, feed.Entries.Count);
Assert.Equal("platform:0a1b2c3d", feed.Entries[0].Key);
Assert.Equal("agent:ffffffff", feed.Entries[1].Key);
Assert.Equal(new DateTime(2026, 9, 7, 9, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc), feed.Entries[0].AddedUtc);
Assert.Equal("https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/changelog/agent-changelog", feed.DocsUrls[WhatsNewFeed.AgentChannel]);
}
[Fact]
public void Parse_OffShape_YieldsNull()
{
Assert.Null(WhatsNewFeed.Parse(null));
Assert.Null(WhatsNewFeed.Parse(""));
Assert.Null(WhatsNewFeed.Parse("not json"));
Assert.Null(WhatsNewFeed.Parse("""{"schemaVersion":2,"channels":{"platform":{"entries":[]},"agent":{"entries":[]}}}"""));
// Missing channel
Assert.Null(WhatsNewFeed.Parse("""{"schemaVersion":1,"channels":{"platform":{"entries":[]}}}"""));
// Entry without id
Assert.Null(WhatsNewFeed.Parse("""{"schemaVersion":1,"channels":{"platform":{"entries":[{"addedUtc":"2026-09-07T09:00:00Z","body":"x"}]},"agent":{"entries":[]}}}"""));
}
// ── Run semantics ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[Fact]
public async Task Run_FeedUnavailable_DoesNotTouchStateOrSend()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.SetFeed(null);
h.StateRepo.Seed("platform:old");
var result = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.True(result.FeedUnavailable);
Assert.Equal(0, h.StateRepo.Writes);
Assert.Empty(h.Sent);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Run_FirstRun_BaselinesWithoutSending()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.SetFeed(Feed(Entry("platform", "a"), Entry("agent", "b")));
h.SetTenants(Tenant("t1", Channel("c1", whatsNew: true)));
var result = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.True(result.Baselined);
Assert.Empty(h.Sent);
Assert.NotNull(h.StateRepo.Current);
Assert.Equal(new[] { "agent:b", "platform:a" }, h.StateRepo.Current!.KnownEntryKeys.OrderBy(k => k));
Assert.Equal("abc1234", h.StateRepo.Current.LastDocsCommit);
Assert.Null(h.StateRepo.Current.LastNotifiedUtc);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Run_EmptyKnownSet_IsTreatedAsBaseline()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.StateRepo.Seed(); // row exists, no keys
h.SetFeed(Feed(Entry("platform", "a")));
h.SetTenants(Tenant("t1", Channel("c1", whatsNew: true)));
var result = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.True(result.Baselined);
Assert.Empty(h.Sent);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Run_NothingNew_NoSendAndNoWriteWhenUnchanged()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.StateRepo.Seed("platform:a", "agent:b");
h.SetFeed(Feed(Entry("platform", "a"), Entry("agent", "b")));
h.SetTenants(Tenant("t1", Channel("c1", whatsNew: true)));
var result = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.Equal(0, result.NewEntries);
Assert.Empty(h.Sent);
Assert.Equal(0, h.StateRepo.Writes);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Run_EntriesRolledOut_UpdatesWatermarkWithoutSending()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.StateRepo.Seed("platform:a", "platform:old");
h.SetFeed(Feed(Entry("platform", "a")));
var result = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.Equal(0, result.NewEntries);
Assert.Empty(h.Sent);
Assert.Equal(1, h.StateRepo.Writes);
Assert.Equal(new[] { "platform:a" }, h.StateRepo.Current!.KnownEntryKeys.ToArray());
}
[Fact]
public async Task Run_NewEntries_SendsOneDigestPerTenantToOptedInChannelsOnly()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.StateRepo.Seed("platform:a");
h.SetFeed(Feed(Entry("platform", "a"), Entry("platform", "b", title: "**New** thing"), Entry("agent", "c")));
h.SetTenants(
Tenant("opted-in", Channel("yes", whatsNew: true), Channel("no", whatsNew: false), Channel("disabled", whatsNew: true, enabled: false)),
Tenant("not-opted-in", Channel("no", whatsNew: false)),
Tenant("no-channels"));
var result = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.Equal(2, result.NewEntries);
Assert.Equal(1, result.TenantsNotified);
Assert.Equal(1, result.ChannelsNotified);
var (channels, alert) = Assert.Single(h.Sent);
Assert.Equal("yes", Assert.Single(channels).Id);
Assert.Equal("whats_new", alert.EventType);
Assert.Equal(2, alert.Sections.Count);
Assert.Contains("2 new updates", alert.Summary);
Assert.Contains("1 platform, 1 agent", alert.Summary);
// Watermark advanced to the full live set and marked as notified.
var state = h.StateRepo.Current!;
Assert.Equal(new[] { "agent:c", "platform:a", "platform:b" }, state.KnownEntryKeys.OrderBy(k => k));
Assert.Equal(h.Now, state.LastNotifiedUtc);
Assert.Equal(2, state.LastNotifiedEntryCount);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Run_SkipsDisabledTenants()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.StateRepo.Seed("platform:a");
h.SetFeed(Feed(Entry("platform", "a"), Entry("platform", "b")));
var disabled = Tenant("off", Channel("yes", whatsNew: true));
disabled.Disabled = true;
h.SetTenants(disabled);
var result = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.Equal(1, result.NewEntries);
Assert.Empty(h.Sent);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Run_LostRace_DoesNotSend()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.StateRepo.Seed("platform:a");
h.StateRepo.ConflictsToInject = 1;
h.SetFeed(Feed(Entry("platform", "a"), Entry("platform", "b")));
h.SetTenants(Tenant("t1", Channel("c1", whatsNew: true)));
var result = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.True(result.LostRace);
Assert.Empty(h.Sent);
h.ConfigRepo.Verify(r => r.GetAllTenantConfigurationsAsync(), Times.Never);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Run_SecondRunAfterAnnouncement_IsQuiet()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.StateRepo.Seed("platform:a");
h.SetFeed(Feed(Entry("platform", "a"), Entry("platform", "b")));
h.SetTenants(Tenant("t1", Channel("c1", whatsNew: true)));
await h.Service.RunAsync();
var second = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.Equal(0, second.NewEntries);
Assert.Single(h.Sent);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Run_LegacySingleWebhookTenant_NeverReceivesWhatsNew()
{
var h = new Harness();
h.StateRepo.Seed("platform:a");
h.SetFeed(Feed(Entry("platform", "a"), Entry("platform", "b")));
h.SetTenants(new TenantConfiguration
{
TenantId = "legacy",
WebhookUrl = "https://hooks.example/legacy",
WebhookProviderType = 2,
WebhookNotifyOnSuccess = true,
});
var result = await h.Service.RunAsync();
Assert.Equal(1, result.NewEntries);
Assert.Empty(h.Sent);
}
// ── Digest shape ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[Fact]
public void BuildWhatsNewAlert_NewestFirst_PlainText_Actions()
{
var entries = new List<WhatsNewFeedEntry>
{
Entry("agent", "old", body: "Older agent `fix` here.", daysAgo: 5),
Entry("platform", "new", title: "**Rules editor** revamp", body: "Read the [guide](https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/g) for _details_."),
};
var docs = new Dictionary<string, string>
{
[WhatsNewFeed.PlatformChannel] = Constants.DocsBaseUrl + "/changelog/platform-changelog",
[WhatsNewFeed.AgentChannel] = Constants.DocsBaseUrl + "/changelog/agent-changelog",
};
var alert = NotificationAlertBuilder.BuildWhatsNewAlert(entries, docs, WhatsNewNotificationService.PortalWhatsNewUrl("platform"));
Assert.Equal(2, alert.Sections.Count);
Assert.StartsWith("Platform \u00b7 Sep 8, 2026 \u2014 Rules editor revamp", alert.Sections[0].Title);
Assert.Equal("Read the guide for details.", alert.Sections[0].Text);
Assert.StartsWith("Agent \u00b7 Sep 3, 2026", alert.Sections[1].Title);
Assert.Equal("Older agent fix here.", alert.Sections[1].Text);
Assert.Equal(2, alert.Actions.Count);
Assert.Equal(Constants.PortalBaseUrl + "/dashboard?whats-new=platform", alert.Actions[0].Url);
// Tie (1 platform, 1 agent) → platform changelog.
Assert.Equal(Constants.DocsBaseUrl + "/changelog/platform-changelog", alert.Actions[1].Url);
}
[Fact]
public void BuildWhatsNewAlert_CapsSectionsAndFoldsRemainder()
{
var entries = Enumerable.Range(0, NotificationAlertBuilder.WhatsNewMaxSections + 3)
.Select(i => Entry("agent", $"id{i}", body: $"Bullet {i}", daysAgo: i))
.ToList();
var alert = NotificationAlertBuilder.BuildWhatsNewAlert(entries, null, WhatsNewNotificationService.PortalWhatsNewUrl("agent"));
Assert.Equal(NotificationAlertBuilder.WhatsNewMaxSections + 1, alert.Sections.Count);
Assert.Contains("+ 3 more updates", alert.Sections[^1].Text);
Assert.Single(alert.Actions); // no docs URLs → only the portal button
Assert.Contains($"{entries.Count} new updates", alert.Summary);
}
[Fact]
public void BuildWhatsNewAlert_TelegramText_CarriesSectionsAndLinks()
{
var alert = NotificationAlertBuilder.BuildWhatsNewAlert(
new List<WhatsNewFeedEntry> { Entry("platform", "p", title: "**Lead**", body: "Body.") },
null,
WhatsNewNotificationService.PortalWhatsNewUrl("platform"));
var text = TelegramNotificationService.RenderAlertText(alert);
Assert.Contains("What's new in Autopilot Monitor", text);
Assert.Contains("Platform \u00b7 Sep 8, 2026 \u2014 Lead", text);
Assert.Contains("Body.", text);
Assert.Contains("Open What's new: " + Constants.PortalBaseUrl + "/dashboard?whats-new=platform", text);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("**Bold** text", "Bold text")]
[InlineData("See [the docs](https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/x) now", "See the docs now")]
[InlineData("Run `agent.exe --verbose`", "Run agent.exe --verbose")]
[InlineData("_emphasis_ and *more*", "emphasis and more")]
[InlineData("snake_case_name stays", "snake_case_name stays")]
[InlineData(" spaced out ", "spaced out")]
[InlineData(null, "")]
public void StripInlineMarkdown_Flattens(string? input, string expected)
=> Assert.Equal(expected, NotificationAlertBuilder.StripInlineMarkdown(input));
// ── Channel model ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
[Fact]
public void NotifyOnWhatsNew_RoundTripsThroughJson_AndDefaultsOff()
{
var json = NotificationChannel.SerializeList(new[] { Channel("c", whatsNew: true) });
Assert.Contains("\"notifyOnWhatsNew\":true", json);
Assert.True(NotificationChannel.ParseList(json).Single().NotifyOnWhatsNew);
var legacyShape = "[{\"id\":\"x\",\"name\":\"x\",\"providerType\":20,\"url\":\"https://hooks.example/x\",\"enabled\":true}]";
Assert.False(NotificationChannel.ParseList(legacyShape).Single().NotifyOnWhatsNew);
}
}
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.DataAccess
services.AddSingleton<INotificationRepository, TableNotificationRepository>();
services.AddSingleton<ITenantNotificationRepository, TableTenantNotificationRepository>();
services.AddSingleton<ISlaTenantStatusRepository, TableSlaTenantStatusRepository>();
// What's new notifier watermark (single platform row in the AdminConfiguration table).
services.AddSingleton<IWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository, TableWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository>();
services.AddSingleton<IHardwareRejectionNotificationTracker, TableHardwareRejectionNotificationTracker>();
services.AddSingleton<IDeviceSecurityRepository, TableDeviceSecurityRepository>();
services.AddSingleton<IUserUsageRepository, TableUserUsageRepository>();
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.DataAccess;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.WhatsNew;
using Azure;
using Azure.Data.Tables;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.DataAccess.TableStorage
{
/// <summary>
/// Table Storage implementation of <see cref="IWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository"/>.
/// Lives as a side row in the AdminConfiguration table (PartitionKey
/// <see cref="PartitionKey"/>, RowKey <see cref="RowKey"/>) — platform-scoped state next to the
/// table-schema sentinel, so no new table is needed. Deliberately NOT a field on the
/// AdminConfiguration row itself: that row is round-tripped wholesale by the Global Admin
/// settings UI, and a stale save there would roll the watermark back and re-announce entries.
/// </summary>
public class TableWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository : IWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository
{
internal const string PartitionKey = "WhatsNewNotifications";
internal const string RowKey = "state";
private const string KnownEntryKeysProperty = "KnownEntryKeysJson";
private const string LastDocsCommitProperty = "LastDocsCommit";
private const string LastRunUtcProperty = "LastRunUtc";
private const string LastNotifiedUtcProperty = "LastNotifiedUtc";
private const string LastNotifiedEntryCountProperty = "LastNotifiedEntryCount";
private readonly TableClient _table;
private readonly ILogger<TableWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository> _logger;
public TableWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository(
TableStorageService storage,
ILogger<TableWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository> logger)
{
_logger = logger;
_table = storage.GetTableClient(Constants.TableNames.AdminConfiguration);
}
public async Task<(WhatsNewNotificationState? State, string? ETag)> GetWithETagAsync()
{
try
{
var response = await _table.GetEntityIfExistsAsync<TableEntity>(PartitionKey, RowKey);
if (!response.HasValue)
return (null, null);
var entity = response.Value!;
return (MapFromEntity(entity), entity.ETag.ToString());
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
_logger.LogError(ex, "Failed to load What's new notification state");
throw;
}
}
public async Task<bool> TryUpsertAsync(WhatsNewNotificationState state, string? ifMatchETag)
{
if (state == null)
return false;
try
{
var entity = MapToEntity(state);
if (ifMatchETag is null)
{
await _table.AddEntityAsync(entity);
return true;
}
await _table.UpdateEntityAsync(entity, new ETag(ifMatchETag), TableUpdateMode.Replace);
return true;
}
catch (RequestFailedException ex) when (ex.Status == 409 || ex.Status == 412)
{
// 409 EntityAlreadyExists (AddEntity) or 412 PreconditionFailed (ETag mismatch):
// a parallel run committed first — the caller must not send.
return false;
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
_logger.LogError(ex, "Failed conditional upsert of What's new notification state");
return false;
}
}
private static TableEntity MapToEntity(WhatsNewNotificationState state)
{
var entity = new TableEntity(PartitionKey, RowKey)
{
[KnownEntryKeysProperty] = JsonSerializer.Serialize(state.KnownEntryKeys),
[LastNotifiedEntryCountProperty] = state.LastNotifiedEntryCount,
};
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(state.LastDocsCommit))
entity[LastDocsCommitProperty] = state.LastDocsCommit;
if (state.LastRunUtc.HasValue)
entity[LastRunUtcProperty] = DateTime.SpecifyKind(state.LastRunUtc.Value, DateTimeKind.Utc);
if (state.LastNotifiedUtc.HasValue)
entity[LastNotifiedUtcProperty] = DateTime.SpecifyKind(state.LastNotifiedUtc.Value, DateTimeKind.Utc);
return entity;
}
private WhatsNewNotificationState MapFromEntity(TableEntity entity)
{
var known = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.Ordinal);
var json = entity.GetString(KnownEntryKeysProperty);
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(json))
{
try
{
var parsed = JsonSerializer.Deserialize<List<string>>(json!);
if (parsed != null)
{
foreach (var key in parsed)
{
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(key))
known.Add(key);
}
}
}
catch (JsonException ex)
{
// Treated as an empty watermark: the service then re-baselines silently
// (empty known set + existing row = "first run" semantics), never re-announces.
_logger.LogWarning(ex, "What's new notification state has malformed KnownEntryKeysJson — re-baselining");
}
}
return new WhatsNewNotificationState
{
KnownEntryKeys = known,
LastDocsCommit = entity.GetString(LastDocsCommitProperty),
LastRunUtc = entity.GetDateTime(LastRunUtcProperty),
LastNotifiedUtc = entity.GetDateTime(LastNotifiedUtcProperty),
LastNotifiedEntryCount = entity.GetInt32(LastNotifiedEntryCountProperty) ?? 0,
};
}
}
}
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Config
{
/// <summary>
/// Returns the latest published agent + bootstrap script versions.
/// Cached in-memory for 12h; supports <c>?refresh=true</c> to bypass the cache.
/// Cached in-memory for a few minutes; supports <c>?refresh=true</c> to bypass the cache.
/// Authenticated users only (read-only metadata).
/// </summary>
public class GetLatestVersionsFunction
@@ -44,15 +44,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Config
var response = req.CreateResponse(HttpStatusCode.OK);
// Force-refresh responses MUST NOT be browser-cached.
// Normal cached responses may be stored for up to 1h (aligns with 12h backend cache).
// Force-refresh responses MUST NOT be browser-cached. Normal responses are
// held for a minute only: the portal announces this number as "Latest agent
// version" right after a release, and a browser cache measured in hours would
// keep showing the previous release long after the backend refreshed. The
// payload is a few dozen bytes, so revalidating often is free.
if (forceRefresh)
{
response.Headers.Add("Cache-Control", "no-store");
}
else
{
response.Headers.Add("Cache-Control", "public, max-age=3600");
response.Headers.Add("Cache-Control", "public, max-age=60");
}
await response.WriteAsJsonAsync(new GetLatestVersionsResponse
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.WhatsNew;
using Microsoft.Azure.Functions.Worker;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.WhatsNew
{
/// <summary>
/// Hourly timer: diffs the portal's live <c>/whats-new.json</c> against the platform watermark
/// and sends one digest of the newly published entries to every tenant channel that opted in
/// (<c>NotificationChannel.NotifyOnWhatsNew</c>). Hourly — not on deploy — because the payload
/// only changes with a web deploy and a delay of up to an hour is fine for product news.
/// Offset to :20 so it does not collide with the :00 maintenance/SLA timers or the :30 sweep.
/// </summary>
public class WhatsNewNotificationFunction
{
private readonly WhatsNewNotificationService _service;
private readonly ILogger<WhatsNewNotificationFunction> _logger;
public WhatsNewNotificationFunction(
WhatsNewNotificationService service,
ILogger<WhatsNewNotificationFunction> logger)
{
_service = service;
_logger = logger;
}
[Function("WhatsNewNotification")]
public async Task Run([TimerTrigger("0 20 * * * *")] object timer)
{
_logger.LogInformation("What's new notification timer fired at {Time}", System.DateTime.UtcNow);
await _service.RunAsync();
}
}
}
@@ -468,6 +468,13 @@ builder.Services.AddHttpClient<TelegramNotificationService>()
// Channel-level send API — routes each NotificationChannel to its transport (webhook renderer
// vs. the platform Telegram bot). Transient: both transports are typed HttpClients.
builder.Services.AddTransient<AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.Notifications.NotificationChannelDispatcher>();
// What's new → channel digest (hourly timer). The feed client is a typed HttpClient reading the
// portal's static whats-new.json; the service is transient because the dispatcher it wraps is.
builder.Services.AddHttpClient<AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.WhatsNew.IWhatsNewFeedClient,
AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.WhatsNew.WhatsNewFeedClient>()
.ConfigureHttpClient(client => client.Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(15))
.AddPolicyHandler((sp, _) => sp.GetRequiredService<ResiliencePolicies>().ExternalDataApi);
builder.Services.AddTransient<AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.WhatsNew.WhatsNewNotificationService>();
// Durable channel notifications from the agent hot paths (ingest terminal alerts, hardware
// rejection): the producer enqueues channel ids + alert, Functions/Queue/NotificationDispatchQueueFunction
// re-resolves the channels from the tenant config and sends. Handler is transient because the
@@ -11,8 +11,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services
{
/// <summary>
/// Exposes the latest published agent/bootstrap versions as read from the
/// public <c>version.json</c> blob. Caches the result in memory for 12h
/// (short TTL on transient failures). Admin endpoint can force-refresh.
/// public <c>version.json</c> blob. The TTL is deliberately short: this number is
/// what the portal announces right after a release ("Latest agent version" in the
/// What's new panel), so a long cache shows the previous release for hours — and
/// because the cache is per Function instance, different instances would announce
/// different versions at the same time. The origin is a 200-byte no-cache blob
/// behind the download alias, so refetching it every few minutes costs nothing.
/// On a fetch failure the last known good value is kept rather than blanking the
/// display. Admin endpoint can force-refresh.
/// </summary>
public interface ILatestVersionsService
{
@@ -33,13 +39,19 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services
// it could silently serve a stale version while the release pipeline is green.
public const string VersionJsonUrl = Constants.AgentDownloadBaseUrl + "/" + Constants.AgentVersionFileName;
private const string CacheKey = "latest-versions";
private static readonly TimeSpan CacheDuration = TimeSpan.FromHours(12);
private static readonly TimeSpan FailureCacheDuration = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5);
private static readonly TimeSpan CacheDuration = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5);
private static readonly TimeSpan FailureCacheDuration = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(1);
private readonly IHttpClientFactory _httpClientFactory;
private readonly IMemoryCache _cache;
private readonly ILogger<LatestVersionsService> _logger;
/// <summary>
/// Survives cache expiry: served when the blob read fails so a transient hiccup
/// hides the version line for at most one request instead of a full failure TTL.
/// </summary>
private volatile LatestVersions? _lastGood;
public LatestVersionsService(
IHttpClientFactory httpClientFactory,
IMemoryCache cache,
@@ -85,15 +97,22 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services
FromCache: false);
_cache.Set(CacheKey, result, CacheDuration);
_lastGood = result;
_logger.LogInformation("LatestVersions refreshed: agent={AgentVersion}, bootstrap={BootstrapVersion}", version, bootstrapVersion);
return result;
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
_logger.LogWarning(ex, "Failed to fetch {Url}; caching null for {Minutes}m", VersionJsonUrl, FailureCacheDuration.TotalMinutes);
// Cache failure briefly to avoid hammering blob on repeated calls
_cache.Set(CacheKey, (LatestVersions?)null, FailureCacheDuration);
return null;
var lastGood = _lastGood;
_logger.LogWarning(
ex,
"Failed to fetch {Url}; serving {Fallback} for {Minutes}m",
VersionJsonUrl,
lastGood == null ? "nothing" : $"the value fetched at {lastGood.FetchedAtUtc:O}",
FailureCacheDuration.TotalMinutes);
// Cache the outcome briefly to avoid hammering the blob on repeated calls.
_cache.Set(CacheKey, lastGood, FailureCacheDuration);
return lastGood == null ? null : lastGood with { FromCache = true };
}
}
}
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.Notifications;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.WhatsNew;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.Notifications
{
@@ -465,5 +466,106 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.Notifications
var result = string.Join(" ", Array.FindAll(parts, p => p != null));
return string.IsNullOrEmpty(result) ? "\u2013" : result;
}
// ── What's new digest ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// <summary>Entries rendered in full; the rest is folded into a "+N more" line.</summary>
public const int WhatsNewMaxSections = 6;
private const int WhatsNewMaxBodyLength = 280;
/// <summary>
/// Builds the "What's new" digest sent to channels with <c>NotifyOnWhatsNew</c>: one
/// message per batch of newly published changelog entries (newest first), one section per
/// entry. Entry text is inline markdown authored for the docs; renderers disagree on
/// markdown dialects (Adaptive Card vs. Slack mrkdwn vs. Discord), so it is flattened to
/// plain text here and the links live in the action buttons instead.
/// </summary>
public static NotificationAlert BuildWhatsNewAlert(
IReadOnlyList<WhatsNewFeedEntry> newEntries,
IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string>? docsUrls,
string portalWhatsNewUrl)
{
if (newEntries == null) throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(newEntries));
if (newEntries.Count == 0) throw new ArgumentException("At least one entry is required.", nameof(newEntries));
var ordered = newEntries.OrderByDescending(e => e.AddedUtc).ToList();
var platformCount = ordered.Count(e => e.Channel == WhatsNewFeed.PlatformChannel);
var agentCount = ordered.Count - platformCount;
var alert = new NotificationAlert
{
EventType = "whats_new",
Title = "\ud83c\udd95 What's new in Autopilot Monitor",
Summary = BuildWhatsNewSummary(ordered.Count, platformCount, agentCount),
Severity = NotificationSeverity.Info,
ThemeColor = "0078D4",
};
foreach (var entry in ordered.Take(WhatsNewMaxSections))
{
var channelLabel = entry.Channel == WhatsNewFeed.AgentChannel ? "Agent" : "Platform";
var heading = $"{channelLabel} \u00b7 {entry.AddedUtc:MMM d, yyyy}";
var title = StripInlineMarkdown(entry.Title);
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(title))
heading += $" \u2014 {title}";
alert.Sections.Add(new NotificationSection
{
Title = heading,
Text = Truncate(StripInlineMarkdown(entry.Body), WhatsNewMaxBodyLength),
});
}
var remaining = ordered.Count - WhatsNewMaxSections;
if (remaining > 0)
{
alert.Sections.Add(new NotificationSection
{
Title = string.Empty,
Text = $"+ {remaining} more update{(remaining == 1 ? "" : "s")} \u2014 see the full changelog.",
});
}
alert.Actions.Add(new NotificationAction { Type = "openUrl", Title = "Open What's new", Url = portalWhatsNewUrl });
// Changelog button for the channel with the most new entries (platform on a tie).
var primaryChannel = agentCount > platformCount ? WhatsNewFeed.AgentChannel : WhatsNewFeed.PlatformChannel;
if (docsUrls != null && docsUrls.TryGetValue(primaryChannel, out var docsUrl) && !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(docsUrl))
alert.Actions.Add(new NotificationAction { Type = "openUrl", Title = "Full changelog", Url = docsUrl });
return alert;
}
private static string BuildWhatsNewSummary(int total, int platformCount, int agentCount)
{
var parts = new List<string>(2);
if (platformCount > 0) parts.Add($"{platformCount} platform");
if (agentCount > 0) parts.Add($"{agentCount} agent");
var breakdown = parts.Count == 2 ? $" ({string.Join(", ", parts)})" : string.Empty;
return $"{total} new update{(total == 1 ? "" : "s")}{breakdown} just went live in the portal.";
}
/// <summary>
/// Flattens the docs' inline markdown: <c>[label](url)</c> → label, <c>**x**</c>/<c>__x__</c> → x,
/// <c>`x`</c> → x, <c>*x*</c>/<c>_x_</c> → x. Null-safe; whitespace is collapsed.
/// </summary>
internal static string StripInlineMarkdown(string? markdown)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(markdown))
return string.Empty;
var text = markdown!;
text = System.Text.RegularExpressions.Regex.Replace(text, @"\[([^\]]+)\]\([^)]*\)", "$1");
text = System.Text.RegularExpressions.Regex.Replace(text, @"\*\*(.+?)\*\*", "$1");
text = System.Text.RegularExpressions.Regex.Replace(text, @"__(.+?)__", "$1");
text = System.Text.RegularExpressions.Regex.Replace(text, @"`([^`]*)`", "$1");
text = System.Text.RegularExpressions.Regex.Replace(text, @"(?<![\w*])\*(?!\s)(.+?)(?<!\s)\*(?![\w*])", "$1");
text = System.Text.RegularExpressions.Regex.Replace(text, @"(?<![\w_])_(?!\s)(.+?)(?<!\s)_(?![\w_])", "$1");
text = System.Text.RegularExpressions.Regex.Replace(text, @"\s+", " ");
return text.Trim();
}
private static string Truncate(string text, int maxLength)
=> text.Length <= maxLength ? text : text[..(maxLength - 1)].TrimEnd() + "\u2026";
}
}
@@ -127,6 +127,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services
});
}
// Field-absence gate: not_exists WITH a dataField matches when no event of the type
// carries a non-empty value at that field — including when the type is absent — the
// same semantics as the precondition gate. Must run before the "no matching events"
// veto and the per-event loop below, whose null short-circuit could never express
// "the field is missing" (session 683f1eff: "esp_failure_settle_started.errorCode
// not_exists" was silently dead).
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(condition.DataField)
&& string.Equals(condition.Operator, "not_exists", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
return EvaluateFieldAbsence(condition, matchingEvents);
}
if (!matchingEvents.Any())
return (false, "no matching events");
@@ -206,6 +218,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services
{
var matchingEvents = ApplyValueFilter(condition, events.Where(e => MatchesEventType(e, condition.EventType)).ToList());
// Field-absence gate — see EvaluateEventTypeCondition; here it applies to the
// filtered event set, so "no event with filterField=x carries dataField" is expressible.
if (string.Equals(condition.Operator, "not_exists", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
return EvaluateFieldAbsence(condition, matchingEvents);
foreach (var evt in matchingEvents)
{
var fieldValue = GetDataFieldValue(evt, condition.DataField);
@@ -227,6 +244,26 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services
return (false, "no matching data");
}
/// <summary>
/// <c>not_exists</c> with a dataField: true when none of <paramref name="matchingEvents"/>
/// carries a non-empty value at the field (an empty set counts as absent). A single
/// non-empty value disproves it. Evidence names the type, the field and how many events
/// of the type were inspected, so a finding can say "0 esp_failure_settle_started events
/// carried errorCode" rather than pointing at one event.
/// </summary>
private static (bool matched, object evidence) EvaluateFieldAbsence(RuleCondition condition, List<EnrollmentEvent> matchingEvents)
{
if (matchingEvents.Any(e => !string.IsNullOrEmpty(GetDataFieldValue(e, condition.DataField))))
return (false, "data field present");
return (true, new Dictionary<string, object>
{
["eventType"] = condition.EventType,
["field"] = condition.DataField,
["count"] = matchingEvents.Count
});
}
/// <summary>
/// Evidence values feed the finding UI and {{token}} interpolation, both of which
/// render via ToString() — a raw List would surface as its .NET type name
@@ -281,7 +281,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services
/// <summary>
/// Flattens an alert into the plain-text form Telegram accepts. Telegram has no card
/// format, so facts become "Name: Value" lines — that is also what carries an ops event's
/// structured payload into the message.
/// structured payload into the message. Sections (rule explanations, What's new entries)
/// follow as title + text blocks, and openUrl actions as trailing "Title: url" lines.
/// </summary>
internal static string RenderAlertText(NotificationAlert alert)
{
@@ -300,6 +301,25 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services
foreach (var fact in alert.Facts)
sb.AppendLine($"{fact.Name}: {fact.Value}");
foreach (var section in alert.Sections)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(section.Title) && string.IsNullOrEmpty(section.Text))
continue;
sb.AppendLine();
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(section.Title))
sb.AppendLine(section.Title);
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(section.Text))
sb.AppendLine(section.Text);
}
var links = alert.Actions.Where(a => a.Type == "openUrl" && !string.IsNullOrEmpty(a.Url)).ToList();
if (links.Count > 0)
{
sb.AppendLine();
foreach (var action in links)
sb.AppendLine($"{action.Title}: {action.Url}");
}
return sb.ToString().TrimEnd();
}
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
using System;
using System.Net.Http;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.WhatsNew;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.WhatsNew
{
/// <summary>Reads the live What's new payload the portal serves.</summary>
public interface IWhatsNewFeedClient
{
/// <summary>The parsed payload, or null when it could not be fetched or is off-shape.</summary>
Task<WhatsNewFeed?> GetAsync(CancellationToken ct = default);
}
/// <summary>
/// Fetches <c>{PortalBaseUrl}/whats-new.json</c> — the static file the web deploy generates from
/// the docs changelogs. Reading the portal's own copy (rather than the docs repo) keeps the
/// notifier in lockstep with what the panel shows: an entry is announced when it becomes visible
/// to users, not when it is committed to the docs.
/// </summary>
public sealed class WhatsNewFeedClient : IWhatsNewFeedClient
{
public const string FeedUrl = Constants.PortalBaseUrl + "/whats-new.json";
private readonly HttpClient _httpClient;
private readonly ILogger<WhatsNewFeedClient> _logger;
public WhatsNewFeedClient(HttpClient httpClient, ILogger<WhatsNewFeedClient> logger)
{
_httpClient = httpClient;
_logger = logger;
}
public async Task<WhatsNewFeed?> GetAsync(CancellationToken ct = default)
{
try
{
using var request = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Get, FeedUrl);
request.Headers.CacheControl = new System.Net.Http.Headers.CacheControlHeaderValue { NoCache = true };
using var response = await _httpClient.SendAsync(request, ct);
if (!response.IsSuccessStatusCode)
{
_logger.LogWarning("What's new feed returned HTTP {Status}", (int)response.StatusCode);
return null;
}
var json = await response.Content.ReadAsStringAsync(ct);
var feed = WhatsNewFeed.Parse(json);
if (feed == null)
_logger.LogWarning("What's new feed at {Url} has an unexpected shape — skipping", FeedUrl);
return feed;
}
catch (Exception ex) when (ex is HttpRequestException || ex is TaskCanceledException)
{
_logger.LogWarning(ex, "Failed to fetch What's new feed from {Url}", FeedUrl);
return null;
}
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.Linq;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.Notifications;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.DataAccess;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.Notifications;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.WhatsNew;
using Microsoft.ApplicationInsights;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services.WhatsNew
{
/// <summary>
/// Announces newly published What's new entries to every tenant channel that opted in
/// (<see cref="NotificationChannel.NotifyOnWhatsNew"/>).
/// <para>
/// "New" means: present in the live <c>/whats-new.json</c> but absent from the platform-wide
/// watermark (<see cref="WhatsNewNotificationState.KnownEntryKeys"/>) — i.e. the entry became
/// visible in the portal since the last run. Diffing on ids rather than dates matters because
/// the payload is regenerated only on web deploys: a bullet's docs commit date can be days
/// older than the moment it actually appears. All new entries of a run go out as ONE digest
/// per channel, so a release that adds five bullets is one message, not five.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Ordering is claim-then-send: the watermark is advanced with an ETag compare-and-swap
/// BEFORE any channel is contacted. A lost race means another run owns this batch and this
/// one exits without sending; a crash after the claim loses the batch rather than
/// double-announcing it (at-most-once, like every other channel notification here).
/// The very first run — no state row, or an empty known set — only baselines and never
/// announces: a fresh deployment must not blast the entire changelog at every tenant.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
public class WhatsNewNotificationService
{
/// <summary>Portal deep link that opens the panel on load (WhatsNewPanelHost reads <c>?whats-new=</c>).</summary>
internal static string PortalWhatsNewUrl(string channel)
=> $"{Constants.PortalBaseUrl}/dashboard?whats-new={Uri.EscapeDataString(channel)}";
private readonly IWhatsNewFeedClient _feedClient;
private readonly IWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository _stateRepo;
private readonly IConfigRepository _configRepo;
private readonly NotificationChannelDispatcher _channelDispatcher;
private readonly TelemetryClient _telemetryClient;
private readonly ILogger<WhatsNewNotificationService> _logger;
private readonly Func<DateTime> _nowProvider;
public WhatsNewNotificationService(
IWhatsNewFeedClient feedClient,
IWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository stateRepo,
IConfigRepository configRepo,
NotificationChannelDispatcher channelDispatcher,
TelemetryClient telemetryClient,
ILogger<WhatsNewNotificationService> logger,
Func<DateTime>? nowProvider = null)
{
_feedClient = feedClient;
_stateRepo = stateRepo;
_configRepo = configRepo;
_channelDispatcher = channelDispatcher;
_telemetryClient = telemetryClient;
_logger = logger;
_nowProvider = nowProvider ?? (() => DateTime.UtcNow);
}
public sealed class RunResult
{
public bool FeedUnavailable { get; init; }
public bool Baselined { get; init; }
public bool LostRace { get; init; }
public int NewEntries { get; init; }
public int TenantsNotified { get; init; }
public int ChannelsNotified { get; init; }
}
/// <summary>Timer entry point. Never throws for expected conditions (feed down, nothing new, lost race).</summary>
public async Task<RunResult> RunAsync(CancellationToken ct = default)
{
var sw = Stopwatch.StartNew();
var feed = await _feedClient.GetAsync(ct);
if (feed == null)
{
_logger.LogWarning("What's new notifier: feed unavailable — skipping run");
return new RunResult { FeedUnavailable = true };
}
var (state, etag) = await _stateRepo.GetWithETagAsync();
var now = _nowProvider();
var currentKeys = new HashSet<string>(feed.Entries.Select(e => e.Key), StringComparer.Ordinal);
var next = new WhatsNewNotificationState
{
KnownEntryKeys = currentKeys,
LastDocsCommit = feed.DocsCommit,
LastRunUtc = now,
LastNotifiedUtc = state?.LastNotifiedUtc,
LastNotifiedEntryCount = state?.LastNotifiedEntryCount ?? 0,
};
// First run (or a wiped/malformed watermark): record what is live, announce nothing.
if (state == null || state.KnownEntryKeys.Count == 0)
{
var stored = await _stateRepo.TryUpsertAsync(next, etag);
_logger.LogInformation("What's new notifier: baselined {Count} entries (docs @ {Commit}), stored={Stored}",
currentKeys.Count, feed.DocsCommit ?? "unknown", stored);
return new RunResult { Baselined = true };
}
var newEntries = feed.Entries.Where(e => !state.KnownEntryKeys.Contains(e.Key)).ToList();
if (newEntries.Count == 0)
{
// Only touch storage when the payload actually changed (entries rolled out of the window).
if (!currentKeys.SetEquals(state.KnownEntryKeys))
await _stateRepo.TryUpsertAsync(next, etag);
_logger.LogDebug("What's new notifier: nothing new ({Count} entries live)", currentKeys.Count);
return new RunResult();
}
next.LastNotifiedUtc = now;
next.LastNotifiedEntryCount = newEntries.Count;
if (!await _stateRepo.TryUpsertAsync(next, etag))
{
_logger.LogInformation("What's new notifier: watermark changed underneath this run — another run owns the batch");
return new RunResult { LostRace = true, NewEntries = newEntries.Count };
}
var (tenantsNotified, channelsNotified) = await DispatchAsync(feed, newEntries, ct);
_logger.LogInformation(
"What's new notifier: announced {New} new entries to {Channels} channels across {Tenants} tenants in {ElapsedMs}ms",
newEntries.Count, channelsNotified, tenantsNotified, sw.ElapsedMilliseconds);
_telemetryClient.TrackEvent("WhatsNewNotificationSent", new Dictionary<string, string>
{
{ "NewEntries", newEntries.Count.ToString() },
{ "PlatformEntries", newEntries.Count(e => e.Channel == WhatsNewFeed.PlatformChannel).ToString() },
{ "AgentEntries", newEntries.Count(e => e.Channel == WhatsNewFeed.AgentChannel).ToString() },
{ "Tenants", tenantsNotified.ToString() },
{ "Channels", channelsNotified.ToString() },
{ "DocsCommit", feed.DocsCommit ?? "unknown" },
});
return new RunResult
{
NewEntries = newEntries.Count,
TenantsNotified = tenantsNotified,
ChannelsNotified = channelsNotified,
};
}
private async Task<(int Tenants, int Channels)> DispatchAsync(
WhatsNewFeed feed, List<WhatsNewFeedEntry> newEntries, CancellationToken ct)
{
var platformCount = newEntries.Count(e => e.Channel == WhatsNewFeed.PlatformChannel);
var primaryChannel = newEntries.Count - platformCount > platformCount
? WhatsNewFeed.AgentChannel
: WhatsNewFeed.PlatformChannel;
var alert = NotificationAlertBuilder.BuildWhatsNewAlert(newEntries, feed.DocsUrls, PortalWhatsNewUrl(primaryChannel));
var configs = await _configRepo.GetAllTenantConfigurationsAsync();
int tenants = 0, channels = 0;
foreach (var config in configs)
{
if (ct.IsCancellationRequested) break;
if (config.IsCurrentlyDisabled()) continue;
var targets = config.GetNotificationChannels()
.Where(c => c.Enabled && c.NotifyOnWhatsNew && !string.IsNullOrEmpty(c.Url))
.ToList();
if (targets.Count == 0) continue;
try
{
await _channelDispatcher.SendToChannelsAsync(targets, alert);
tenants++;
channels += targets.Count;
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
_logger.LogWarning(ex, "What's new notifier: dispatch failed for tenant {TenantId}", config.TenantId);
}
}
return (tenants, channels);
}
}
}
@@ -113,6 +113,58 @@ describe('gather guardrails (agent matching semantics)', () => {
expect(errors(validateRuleDraft(bad).findings).some((m) => m.includes('hard-blocked'))).toBe(true);
});
// %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% releases the C:\Users hard block for AppData\Local and
// AppData\Roaming — and only releases it. The allowlist still decides, which is what
// the agent does (GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed) and what the portal shows.
it('accepts a userProfileFilePrefixes folder below %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%', () => {
const ok = validGather();
ok.collectorType = 'logparser';
ok.target = '%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\\AppData\\Local\\RealmJoin\\tray*.log';
ok.parameters = { pattern: '(?<msg>SSO)', format: 'text' };
expect(errors(validateRuleDraft(ok).findings).some((m) => m.includes('guardrails'))).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects an unlisted vendor folder below %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\\AppData', () => {
const bad = validGather();
bad.collectorType = 'file';
bad.target = '%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\\AppData\\Local\\SomeApp\\data.json';
expect(errors(validateRuleDraft(bad).findings).some((m) => m.includes('not under any allowed file prefix'))).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% outside AppData as hard-blocked', () => {
const bad = validGather();
bad.collectorType = 'file';
bad.target = '%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\\Documents\\secret.txt';
expect(errors(validateRuleDraft(bad).findings).some((m) => m.includes('hard-blocked'))).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects a sibling of a userProfileFilePrefixes folder (segment boundary)', () => {
const bad = validGather();
bad.collectorType = 'file';
bad.target = '%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\\AppData\\Local\\RealmJoinEvil\\tray.log';
expect(validateRuleDraft(bad).valid).toBe(false);
});
// The agent expands environment variables before guarding, so a target spelled with
// %ProgramData% must not be reported as blocked — there are live rules doing this.
it('accepts an allow-listed path spelled with %ProgramData%', () => {
const ok = validGather();
ok.collectorType = 'logparser';
ok.target = '%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\IntuneManagementExtension\\Logs\\HPReports\\HP Image Assistant.log';
ok.parameters = { pattern: '(?<msg>x)', format: 'text' };
expect(errors(validateRuleDraft(ok).findings).some((m) => m.includes('guardrails'))).toBe(false);
});
// diagnosticsPathPrefixes governs admin-configured diagnostics paths, not collectors:
// the agent guards logparser against filePrefixes alone.
it('rejects a logparser target that only diagnosticsPathPrefixes would allow', () => {
const bad = validGather();
bad.collectorType = 'logparser';
bad.target = 'C:\\Install\\Log\\setup.log';
bad.parameters = { pattern: '(?<msg>x)', format: 'text' };
expect(errors(validateRuleDraft(bad).findings).some((m) => m.includes('not under any allowed file prefix'))).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects the registry-hive store path (System32\\config) as hard-blocked', () => {
const bad = validGather();
bad.collectorType = 'file';
@@ -114,5 +114,6 @@ export const DIAG_ZIP_MAP = {
'Pre-provisioned (White Glove) blobs carry a -preprov suffix — that is normal.',
'No archive ≠ a problem: upload mode may be Off or OnFailure (so successful sessions have none).',
'Log naming is kebab-case since 2026-08-18: agent.log, bootstrap-script.log (was bootstrap_agent.log), bootstrap-msi.log (was msi-bootstrap.log), crash-*.log (was crash_*.log), gather-rules-debug.log, ime-pattern-matches.log. Archives from older agents/bootstraps carry the old names.',
'bootstrap-loader.log (since 2026-09-08) is the two-stage loader: it downloaded the installer, verified its publisher and started it. Its presence means the device was assigned the loader rather than the installer directly; the MDM-LOB MSI runs the same loader but logs to bootstrap-msi.log. bootstrap-script.log is the installer itself either way.',
],
} as const;
@@ -201,8 +201,11 @@ export const RULE_AUTHORING_GUIDE = {
],
operatorNotes:
'String comparisons are case-insensitive; regex runs case-insensitive with a 1s timeout ' +
'(.NET regex syntax); in/not_in take a comma-separated value list. An operator the engine ' +
'does not know silently evaluates to FALSE in production — validate_rule catches this.',
'(.NET regex syntax); in/not_in take a comma-separated value list. exists/not_exists with a ' +
'dataField test whether ANY event of the type carries a non-empty value there — not_exists ' +
'matches when none does, also when the event type is absent (e.g. "the ESP failure carried no ' +
'errorCode"); without a dataField they test only the presence of the event type. An operator ' +
'the engine does not know silently evaluates to FALSE in production — validate_rule catches this.',
required:
'required=true conditions are the firing core: ALL of them must match or the rule produces ' +
'nothing. required=false conditions are optional reinforcers whose evidence feeds ' +
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ export const ANALYZE_RULE_SCHEMA: Record<string, unknown> = {
},
"operator": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Comparison operator.",
"description": "Comparison operator. exists/not_exists with a dataField test whether ANY event of the type carries a non-empty value at that field: not_exists matches when no event does — including when the event type is absent altogether — so a rule can gate on a missing field (e.g. an ESP failure without an HRESULT). Without a dataField they test only the presence of the event type.",
"enum": [
"equals",
"not_equals",
@@ -870,7 +870,11 @@ export const RULE_GUARDRAILS = {
"C:\\Windows\\Panther",
"C:\\Windows\\SetupDiag",
"C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\DiagnosticLogCSP",
"C:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\ReportingEvents.log"
"C:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\ReportingEvents.log",
"C:\\ProgramData\\RealmJoin\\choco\\logs"
],
"userProfileFilePrefixes": [
"AppData\\Local\\RealmJoin"
],
"wmiQueryPrefixes": [
"SELECT * FROM Win32_OperatingSystem",
@@ -103,6 +103,52 @@ function pathPrefixAllowed(target: string, prefixes: readonly string[]): boolean
});
}
// The agent expands environment variables and the custom %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token
// BEFORE it guards a path (FileCollector/LogParserCollector -> UserProfileResolver ->
// GatherRuleGuards). Judging the raw spelling instead reported targets as blocked that the
// device happily reads (%ProgramData%\...) and made token targets unjudgeable altogether.
// The profile name is unknown here, so the token resolves to a placeholder profile — the
// same device-independent stand-in the portal validator uses.
const COMMON_ENV_VARS: Record<string, string> = {
'%ProgramData%': 'C:\\ProgramData',
'%SystemRoot%': 'C:\\Windows',
'%windir%': 'C:\\Windows',
'%SystemDrive%': 'C:',
};
const USER_PROFILE_TOKEN = '%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%';
const USER_PROFILE_PLACEHOLDER = 'C:\\Users\\__AGENT_RESOLVED__';
/** The only profile subdirectories the C:\Users hard block ever releases. */
const ALLOWED_USER_PROFILE_SUBDIRS: readonly string[] = ['AppData\\Local', 'AppData\\Roaming'];
/** Vendor folders below the profile, relative to its root (GatherRuleGuards.AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes). */
const USER_PROFILE_FILE_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = RULE_GUARDRAILS.userProfileFilePrefixes ?? [];
function escapeRegExp(literal: string): string {
return literal.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
}
function expandPathTokens(target: string): string {
let result = target.replace(
new RegExp(escapeRegExp(USER_PROFILE_TOKEN), 'gi'), USER_PROFILE_PLACEHOLDER);
for (const [envVar, replacement] of Object.entries(COMMON_ENV_VARS)) {
result = result.replace(new RegExp(escapeRegExp(envVar), 'gi'), replacement);
}
return result;
}
/** True when the expanded path sits in the part of the profile the hard block releases. */
function isUnderUserProfileException(expanded: string): boolean {
return ALLOWED_USER_PROFILE_SUBDIRS.some(
(subdir) => pathPrefixAllowed(expanded, [`${USER_PROFILE_PLACEHOLDER}\\${subdir}`]));
}
/** True when a userProfileFilePrefixes entry admits the expanded path. */
function userProfilePrefixAllowed(expanded: string): boolean {
return USER_PROFILE_FILE_PREFIXES.some(
(prefix) => pathPrefixAllowed(expanded, [`${USER_PROFILE_PLACEHOLDER}\\${prefix}`]));
}
function stripRegistryHive(target: string): string {
return target.replace(/^(HKLM|HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE|HKCU|HKEY_CURRENT_USER)\\/i, '');
}
@@ -127,19 +173,28 @@ function checkGatherTarget(collectorType: string, target: string): ValidationFin
case 'json':
case 'xml':
case 'logparser': {
const blocked = HARD_BLOCKED_PATH_PREFIXES.find((p) => pathPrefixAllowed(target, [p]));
if (blocked) {
const expanded = expandPathTokens(target);
// C:\Users is hard-blocked; %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% releases it for AppData\Local
// and AppData\Roaming and nothing else. The release is not an allowance — the
// allowlist below still decides, exactly as GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed does.
const blocked = HARD_BLOCKED_PATH_PREFIXES.find((p) => pathPrefixAllowed(expanded, [p]));
if (blocked && !isUnderUserProfileException(expanded)) {
findings.push({ level: 'error', message: `guardrails: "${target}" is under the hard-blocked path ${blocked} — the agent always refuses this, it cannot be allow-listed.` });
break;
}
const allowed = collectorType === 'logparser'
? [...RULE_GUARDRAILS.filePrefixes, ...RULE_GUARDRAILS.diagnosticsPathPrefixes]
: [...RULE_GUARDRAILS.filePrefixes];
// logparser targets may carry a glob suffix (*.log) — prefix matching still applies.
if (!pathPrefixAllowed(target, allowed) && !allowed.some((p) => target.toLowerCase().startsWith(p.toLowerCase() + '\\'))) {
// The agent guards EVERY file collector — logparser included — against
// filePrefixes alone (GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed). diagnosticsPathPrefixes
// governs admin-configured diagnostics paths, a different surface the collectors
// never consult; offering it here reported logparser targets as allowed that the
// agent refuses on the device (C:\Install\Log, winevt\Logs, WER, ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor).
// logparser targets may carry a glob suffix (*.log) — segment-bounded prefix
// matching covers that, the glob sits in the last segment.
if (!pathPrefixAllowed(expanded, RULE_GUARDRAILS.filePrefixes) &&
!userProfilePrefixAllowed(expanded)) {
findings.push({
level: 'error',
message: `guardrails: ${collectorType} target "${target}" is not under any allowed file prefix (rule_guardrails → filePrefixes${collectorType === 'logparser' ? ' / diagnosticsPathPrefixes' : ''}).`,
message: `guardrails: ${collectorType} target "${target}" is not under any allowed file prefix (rule_guardrails → filePrefixes, or userProfileFilePrefixes below %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%).`,
});
}
break;
@@ -1486,7 +1486,7 @@ export function registerAdminTools(server: McpServer, ga: boolean, strictGa: boo
{
title: 'Query Table',
description:
'Query any Azure Table Storage table directly with OData filters. Global Admin only. ' +
'Query any Azure Table Storage table directly with OData filters. Table names come from list_tables — a guessed name is a NotFound, not an empty result. Global Admin only. ' +
'Use list_tables to see available tables. Useful for inspecting TenantConfiguration, RuleResults, or any raw data ' +
'where no specialized tool exists. ' +
'For COUNTING / AGGREGATION queries pass `fields=PartitionKey,RowKey,Status,AgentVersion` (or similar lean subset) ' +
@@ -1673,7 +1673,8 @@ export function registerAdminTools(server: McpServer, ga: boolean, strictGa: boo
tenantId: TenantGuidSchema.describe('Tenant ID (GUID) whose configuration to change.'),
fields: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown())
.describe('Object of fieldName → newValue for ONLY the fields to change (e.g. {"dataRetentionDays": 90}). ' +
'Use get_tenant_config for current values and exact field names.'),
'Field names, JSON types and writability come from get_tenant_config_schema; get_tenant_config ' +
'shows the CURRENT values but not the full field set, so it cannot tell you what is writable.'),
reason: z.string().min(1)
.describe('REQUIRED: why this change is being made. Stored with the backup snapshot and the audit log entry.'),
},
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ export function registerRuleTools(server: McpServer, ga: boolean): void {
(ga ? ' Platform-scope callers can target any tenant\'s session — the tenant is resolved from the session automatically.' : ''),
inputSchema: {
sessionId: SessionIdSchema.describe('Session UUID to evaluate the draft against'),
rule: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()).describe('The draft analyze rule JSON object'),
rule: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()).describe('The draft analyze rule JSON object. Condition shapes — including the allowed condition `source` values — come from get_resource(name="rule_schemas"); run validate_rule first if the draft has not been validated yet'),
},
annotations: READ_ONLY,
},
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ export function registerSessionTools(server: McpServer, ga: boolean, delegated:
inputSchema: {
sessionId: SessionIdSchema.describe('Session UUID'),
tenantId: z.string().optional().describe(tenantIdDescription(ga, delegated, 'Tenant ID. If omitted, auto-resolved from the session.', 'Tenant ID. If omitted, auto-resolved from the session.')),
eventType: z.string().optional().describe('Filter to only events of this type'),
eventType: z.string().optional().describe('Filter to only events of this type — valid values come from the event_types catalog (call get_resource(name="event_types")); an invented type is rejected, not an empty result'),
severity: z.enum(EVENT_SEVERITIES).optional(),
source: z.string().optional().describe('Filter by event source/app name (e.g. "MicrosoftTeams")'),
fields: z.string().optional()
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.WhatsNew;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Shared.DataAccess
{
/// <summary>
/// Persistence for the single <see cref="WhatsNewNotificationState"/> row. Same
/// ETag-based compare-and-swap contract as <see cref="ISlaTenantStatusRepository"/>: the
/// caller reads state + ETag, decides what is new, and commits the advanced watermark with
/// the ETag it observed; a false return means another writer won and this run must not send.
/// </summary>
public interface IWhatsNewNotificationStateRepository
{
/// <summary>Returns (null, null) when the row does not exist yet (first run).</summary>
Task<(WhatsNewNotificationState? State, string? ETag)> GetWithETagAsync();
/// <summary>
/// Conditional write: insert when <paramref name="ifMatchETag"/> is null (caller observed
/// no row), otherwise replace if the ETag still matches. Returns false on conflict
/// (row appeared / changed since the read) and on storage failure — never throws.
/// </summary>
Task<bool> TryUpsertAsync(WhatsNewNotificationState state, string? ifMatchETag);
}
}
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models
/// <summary>
/// One Windows / MSI / Intune error-code catalog entry. Mirrors the structure of
/// <c>Resources/error-codes.json</c> (generated by <c>scripts/error-codes/generate.mjs</c>)
/// <c>Resources/error-codes.json</c> (generated by <c>tools/error-codes/generate.mjs</c>)
/// and the TypeScript <c>ErrorCodeEntry</c> in the web app.
/// </summary>
public sealed class ErrorCodeEntry
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.Notifications
/// per tenant. Stored as a JSON array in <c>TenantConfiguration.NotificationChannelsJson</c>
/// (camelCase contract shared with the web UI).
/// <para>
/// Routing granularity: enrollment/SLA events are opted into per channel via the
/// <c>NotifyOn*</c> toggles below; analyze rules reference a channel by <see cref="Id"/>
/// Routing granularity: enrollment/SLA events and What's new product updates are opted into
/// per channel via the <c>NotifyOn*</c> toggles below; analyze rules reference a channel by <see cref="Id"/>
/// (rule-level notify, see <c>RuleState.NotifyChannelIds</c>). A channel with all toggles
/// off that is only referenced by rules acts as a dedicated "rules-only" channel.
/// </para>
@@ -94,6 +94,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.Notifications
/// </summary>
public bool NotifyOnSlaEvents { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Receive "What's new" product updates: whenever new platform / agent changelog entries
/// go live in the portal's What's new panel, one digest message per batch is sent to this
/// channel (see <c>WhatsNewNotificationService</c>). Opt-in; the legacy synthesized channel
/// never receives them.
/// </summary>
public bool NotifyOnWhatsNew { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Parses <see cref="CustomHeadersJson"/> into request headers for the generic-webhook
/// dispatcher. Empty unless <see cref="ProviderType"/> is GenericJson. Never throws.
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Text.Json;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.WhatsNew
{
/// <summary>
/// The portal's <c>/whats-new.json</c> as the backend reads it — the same payload the What's new
/// panel renders (generated at web-deploy time from the docs changelogs by
/// <c>scripts/whats-new/build-whats-new.js</c>). Entries carry a content-hash id and the docs
/// commit date; the backend only needs ids (to diff against the last run) plus the display
/// fields for the digest message.
/// </summary>
public sealed class WhatsNewFeed
{
public const string PlatformChannel = "platform";
public const string AgentChannel = "agent";
public static readonly string[] Channels = { PlatformChannel, AgentChannel };
public string? GeneratedUtc { get; set; }
public string? DocsCommit { get; set; }
public IReadOnlyList<WhatsNewFeedEntry> Entries { get; set; } = Array.Empty<WhatsNewFeedEntry>();
/// <summary>Channel → docs URL of the full changelog ("View all updates" target).</summary>
public IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string> DocsUrls { get; set; } =
new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.Ordinal);
/// <summary>
/// Parses the payload. Returns null for anything off-shape (wrong schema version, missing
/// channel, malformed entry) — the caller then skips the run rather than diffing against a
/// half-read list, which would look like "everything was removed" or "everything is new".
/// </summary>
public static WhatsNewFeed? Parse(string? json)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(json))
return null;
try
{
using var doc = JsonDocument.Parse(json!);
var root = doc.RootElement;
if (root.ValueKind != JsonValueKind.Object)
return null;
if (!root.TryGetProperty("schemaVersion", out var schema) || schema.ValueKind != JsonValueKind.Number || schema.GetInt32() != 1)
return null;
if (!root.TryGetProperty("channels", out var channels) || channels.ValueKind != JsonValueKind.Object)
return null;
var entries = new List<WhatsNewFeedEntry>();
var docsUrls = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.Ordinal);
foreach (var channelName in Channels)
{
if (!channels.TryGetProperty(channelName, out var channel) || channel.ValueKind != JsonValueKind.Object)
return null;
if (!channel.TryGetProperty("entries", out var list) || list.ValueKind != JsonValueKind.Array)
return null;
if (channel.TryGetProperty("docsUrl", out var docsUrl) && docsUrl.ValueKind == JsonValueKind.String)
docsUrls[channelName] = docsUrl.GetString()!;
foreach (var item in list.EnumerateArray())
{
var entry = ParseEntry(channelName, item);
if (entry == null)
return null;
entries.Add(entry);
}
}
return new WhatsNewFeed
{
GeneratedUtc = GetString(root, "generatedUtc"),
DocsCommit = GetString(root, "docsCommit"),
Entries = entries,
DocsUrls = docsUrls,
};
}
catch (JsonException)
{
return null;
}
}
private static WhatsNewFeedEntry? ParseEntry(string channel, JsonElement item)
{
if (item.ValueKind != JsonValueKind.Object)
return null;
var id = GetString(item, "id");
var addedUtc = GetString(item, "addedUtc");
var body = GetString(item, "body");
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(id) || string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(addedUtc) || body == null)
return null;
if (!DateTime.TryParse(addedUtc, null, System.Globalization.DateTimeStyles.AdjustToUniversal | System.Globalization.DateTimeStyles.AssumeUniversal, out var added))
return null;
return new WhatsNewFeedEntry
{
Channel = channel,
Id = id!,
AddedUtc = added,
Period = GetString(item, "period") ?? string.Empty,
Title = GetString(item, "title"),
Body = body,
Link = GetString(item, "link"),
};
}
private static string? GetString(JsonElement element, string name)
=> element.TryGetProperty(name, out var value) && value.ValueKind == JsonValueKind.String
? value.GetString()
: null;
}
/// <summary>One changelog bullet as published in <c>/whats-new.json</c>.</summary>
public sealed class WhatsNewFeedEntry
{
/// <summary><see cref="WhatsNewFeed.PlatformChannel"/> or <see cref="WhatsNewFeed.AgentChannel"/>.</summary>
public string Channel { get; set; } = default!;
/// <summary>Content-hash id (stable across builds while the bullet text is unchanged).</summary>
public string Id { get; set; } = default!;
/// <summary>When the bullet was committed to the docs repo.</summary>
public DateTime AddedUtc { get; set; }
/// <summary>The changelog period heading, e.g. "September 2026".</summary>
public string Period { get; set; } = string.Empty;
/// <summary>Bold lead of platform bullets; agent bullets have none.</summary>
public string? Title { get; set; }
/// <summary>Inline markdown (**bold**, `code`, [label](url)).</summary>
public string Body { get; set; } = string.Empty;
/// <summary>First docs link of the bullet, if any.</summary>
public string? Link { get; set; }
/// <summary>Channel-qualified key used for the "already announced" set — ids are per-channel hashes.</summary>
public string Key => $"{Channel}:{Id}";
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.WhatsNew
{
/// <summary>
/// Platform-wide watermark of the What's new notifier: the channel-qualified entry keys that
/// were present in <c>/whats-new.json</c> the last time it was processed. A run diffs the live
/// payload against this set — keys not in it are "new" and get announced to every tenant
/// channel that opted in. Stored as one row; written with an ETag compare-and-swap so two
/// overlapping runs cannot both claim (and both announce) the same entries.
/// </summary>
public sealed class WhatsNewNotificationState
{
/// <summary>Entry keys (<c>{channel}:{id}</c>) of the last processed payload.</summary>
public HashSet<string> KnownEntryKeys { get; set; } = new(StringComparer.Ordinal);
/// <summary>Docs commit the last processed payload was generated from (diagnostics only).</summary>
public string? LastDocsCommit { get; set; }
/// <summary>When the state was last written.</summary>
public DateTime? LastRunUtc { get; set; }
/// <summary>When a digest was last dispatched to tenant channels.</summary>
public DateTime? LastNotifiedUtc { get; set; }
/// <summary>Number of entries announced in the last dispatched digest.</summary>
public int LastNotifiedEntryCount { get; set; }
}
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"schemaVersion": 2,
"description": "Single-source catalog of Windows / MSI / Intune error codes, generated by scripts/error-codes/generate.mjs from primary sources — never edit by hand. Consumed by the backend (ErrorCodeCatalog.cs, ErrorCodeEnricher.cs), the web app (utils/errorCodeMap.ts via the sync-error-codes prebuild step) and the MCP server (lookup_error_code). Keys are lowercase 8-digit hex ('0x80070005') or decimal MSI exit codes ('1603'; only 0, 1601-1654, 3010 — other decimal exit codes are installer-defined). Win32 codes live only as 0x8007xxxx entries; HRESULT_FROM_WIN32 values in the MSI range resolve to the decimal entry at lookup time. confidence: high = MS Learn or the IME build named in source; medium = paraphrase of an enum member name or of an analysis rule; low = carried over from the v1 catalog without a primary source. category is one of: msi, win32, com, appx, windows-update, cbs, intune-win32, intune-mobile, mdm-enrollment, autopilot, entra-join, delivery-optimization. imeRetriesDuringEsp marks the MSI return codes the IME retries automatically during the Autopilot ESP. enforcementStates maps the IME app enforcement state numbers to their names.",
"description": "Single-source catalog of Windows / MSI / Intune error codes, generated by tools/error-codes/generate.mjs from primary sources — never edit by hand. Consumed by the backend (ErrorCodeCatalog.cs, ErrorCodeEnricher.cs), the web app (utils/errorCodeMap.ts via the sync-error-codes prebuild step) and the MCP server (lookup_error_code). Keys are lowercase 8-digit hex ('0x80070005') or decimal MSI exit codes ('1603'; only 0, 1601-1654, 3010 — other decimal exit codes are installer-defined). Win32 codes live only as 0x8007xxxx entries; HRESULT_FROM_WIN32 values in the MSI range resolve to the decimal entry at lookup time. confidence: high = MS Learn or the IME build named in source; medium = paraphrase of an enum member name or of an analysis rule; low = carried over from the v1 catalog without a primary source. category is one of: msi, win32, com, appx, windows-update, cbs, intune-win32, intune-mobile, mdm-enrollment, autopilot, entra-join, delivery-optimization. imeRetriesDuringEsp marks the MSI return codes the IME retries automatically during the Autopilot ESP. enforcementStates maps the IME app enforcement state numbers to their names.",
"entries": {
"0": {"description":"The action completed successfully","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/error-codes","category":"msi","symbol":"ERROR_SUCCESS"},
"1601": {"description":"The Windows Installer service couldn't be accessed. Contact your support personnel to verify that the Windows Installer service is properly registered","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/error-codes","category":"msi","symbol":"ERROR_INSTALL_SERVICE_FAILURE"},
@@ -262,8 +262,42 @@
"0x8018002b": {"description":"Automatic MDM enrollment failed: the user's UPN has an unverified or non-routable domain, or the MDM user scope is set to None","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/mem/intune/device-enrollment/troubleshoot-windows-enrollment-errors","category":"mdm-enrollment"},
"0x80190193": {"description":"Forbidden (403)","confidence":"high","source":"winerror.h","category":"com","symbol":"HTTP_E_STATUS_FORBIDDEN"},
"0x80190194": {"description":"Not found (404)","confidence":"high","source":"winerror.h","category":"com","symbol":"HTTP_E_STATUS_NOT_FOUND"},
"0x801c0001": {"description":"ADRS server response isn't in a valid format","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c0002": {"description":"Server failed to authenticate the user","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c0003": {"description":"User isn't authorized to enroll","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c0006": {"description":"Unhandled exception from server","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c000b": {"description":"Redirection is needed and redirected location isn't a well known server","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c000c": {"description":"Discovery failed","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c000e": {"description":"Registration quota reached","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c000f": {"description":"Operation successful, but the device requires a reboot","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c0010": {"description":"The AIK certificate isn't valid or trusted","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c0011": {"description":"The attestation statement of the transport key is invalid","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c0012": {"description":"Discovery request isn't in a valid format","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c0013": {"description":"Tenant ID isn't found in the token","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c0014": {"description":"User SID isn't found in the token","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c0015": {"description":"The device is required to be joined to an Active Directory domain","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c0016": {"description":"The federation provider configuration is empty","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c0017": {"description":"The federation provider domain is empty","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c0018": {"description":"The federation provider client configuration URL is empty","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c0019": {"description":"The federation provider client configuration is empty","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c001a": {"description":"The DRS endpoint in the federation provider client configuration is empty","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c001b": {"description":"The device certificate isn't found","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c004d": {"description":"NGC provisioning is unable to find the default WAM account to use to request Microsoft Entra token for provisioning. Unable to enroll a device to use a PIN for login","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join","symbol":"DSREG_NO_DEFAULT_ACCOUNT"},
"0x801c03e9": {"description":"Server response message is invalid","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c03ea": {"description":"Registering the device for mobile management failed: the TPM supports 2.0 but has not been upgraded to 2.0, or the device is in two groups with different Autopilot profiles","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/mem/intune/device-enrollment/troubleshoot-windows-enrollment-errors","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c03eb": {"description":"Server response http status isn't valid","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c03ec": {"description":"Unhandled exception from server","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c03ed": {"description":"Multi-factor authentication is required for a 'ProvisionKey' operation, but wasn't performed. -or- Token wasn't found in the Authorization header. -or- Failed to read one or more objects. -or- The req…","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c03ee": {"description":"Attestation failed","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c03ef": {"description":"The AIK certificate is no longer valid","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c03f0": {"description":"There's no key registered for the user","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c03f1": {"description":"There's no UPN in the token","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c03f2": {"description":"Windows Hello key registration failed","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c03f3": {"description":"Microsoft Entra ID has no device object for the device being deployed (the object was deleted); remove the device from Entra ID, Intune and Autopilot and re-register it","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/known-issues","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c044c": {"description":"There's no core window for the current thread","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c044d": {"description":"Authorization token doesn't contain device ID","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c044e": {"description":"Failed to receive user credentials input","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x801c0451": {"description":"User token switch account","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation","category":"entra-join"},
"0x80240001": {"description":"Windows Update Agent was unable to provide the service","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/windows-update-error-reference","category":"windows-update","symbol":"WU_E_NO_SERVICE"},
"0x80240002": {"description":"The maximum capacity of the service was exceeded","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/windows-update-error-reference","category":"windows-update","symbol":"WU_E_MAX_CAPACITY_REACHED"},
"0x80240003": {"description":"An ID can't be found","confidence":"high","source":"msdoc:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/windows-update-error-reference","category":"windows-update","symbol":"WU_E_UNKNOWN_ID"},
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Services
/// <summary>
/// Single-source-of-truth lookup for Windows / MSI / Intune error codes. Loaded once
/// from the embedded <c>Resources/error-codes.json</c> resource (schemaVersion 2,
/// generated by <c>scripts/error-codes/generate.mjs</c>) and exposed via dictionaries
/// generated by <c>tools/error-codes/generate.mjs</c>) and exposed via dictionaries
/// keyed by normalised code string (lowercase hex, e.g. <c>0x80070005</c>, or decimal MSI
/// exit code, e.g. <c>1603</c>), by symbol and by enforcement state.
/// <para>
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ export default function AboutPage() {
data — into a central dashboard with intelligent analysis built in.
</p>
<p className="text-gray-700 leading-relaxed">
Deployed by assigning a bootstrapper script in Intune, the platform requires no infrastructure
Deployed by assigning a signed loader script in Intune, the platform requires no infrastructure
changes and no additional certificates on end user devices. It runs entirely on
<strong> Azure</strong>, authenticates via <strong>Microsoft Entra ID</strong>, and provides
multi-tenant support with strict per-tenant data isolation.
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ export default function AboutPage() {
items: [
".NET binary — lightweight, low-overhead monitoring",
"Runs via scheduled task (no Windows service — easy, residue-free removal)",
"Deployed via an Intune platform script (PowerShell bootstrapper); for Autopilot Device Preparation additionally as a thin MSI line-of-business app",
"Deployed via a signed Intune platform script (PowerShell loader); for Autopilot Device Preparation additionally as a thin MSI line-of-business app",
"Mutual TLS using the existing Intune MDM device certificate",
"Self-destruct on enrollment completion (on by default — removes task and files)",
],
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ interface ChannelView {
notifyOnSuccess?: boolean;
notifyOnFailure?: boolean;
notifyOnSlaEvents?: boolean;
notifyOnWhatsNew?: boolean;
}
/** Channel list when migrated, else the legacy single-webhook fields — mirrors TenantConfiguration.GetNotificationChannels. */
@@ -194,6 +195,7 @@ function ChannelRows({ config }: { config: TenantConfiguration }) {
<ConfigRow label="Notify On Success" display={formatValue(ch.notifyOnSuccess ?? false)} />
<ConfigRow label="Notify On Failure" display={formatValue(ch.notifyOnFailure ?? false)} />
<ConfigRow label="Notify On SLA" display={formatValue(ch.notifyOnSlaEvents ?? false)} />
<ConfigRow label="Notify On What's New" display={formatValue(ch.notifyOnWhatsNew ?? false)} />
</tbody>
</table>
</td>
@@ -679,8 +679,8 @@ export function GatherRuleFormFields({ form, setForm, showRuleId, unrestrictedMo
<p className="text-xs text-gray-400 mt-1 ml-6">
Attaches the Windows/MSI/Intune meaning to <code className="px-1 bg-gray-100 rounded">exitCode</code>,{" "}
<code className="px-1 bg-gray-100 rounded">errorCode</code> and <code className="px-1 bg-gray-100 rounded">hresult</code> fields
in this rule&apos;s output, like on built-in events. Leave off when the source uses its own exit codes
(HP Image Assistant, Dell Command Update, custom scripts) — the catalog would explain them wrongly.
in this rule&apos;s output, like on built-in events. Leave off when the source uses its own exit codes —
the catalog would explain them wrongly.
</p>
</div>
</div>
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ export default function PrivacyPage() {
<li><strong>Encryption</strong> — HTTPS with a TLS 1.2 floor in transit, Azure Storage encryption at rest with platform-managed keys</li>
<li><strong>Managed identity instead of storage keys</strong>, and secret-less OIDC deployment pipelines</li>
<li><strong>Rate limiting</strong> per device, per portal user, and per MCP user</li>
<li><strong>Verifiable agent binaries</strong> — Sigstore build attestation plus a four-stage integrity chain through download, backend cross-check, and runtime self-verification</li>
<li><strong>Verifiable agent binaries</strong> — Authenticode-signed scripts and binaries whose publisher is verified on the device before anything runs, Sigstore build attestation, and SHA-256 verification at download, through an independent backend cross-check, and at runtime</li>
<li><strong>Manifest-first deletion</strong> — what will be deleted is captured, restorably, before anything is removed</li>
</ul>
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ export default function NotificationsSection({
tone="sky"
iconPath="M15 17h5l-1.405-1.405A2.032 2.032 0 0118 14.158V11a6.002 6.002 0 00-4-5.659V5a2 2 0 10-4 0v.341C7.67 6.165 6 8.388 6 11v3.159c0 .538-.214 1.055-.595 1.436L4 17h5m6 0v1a3 3 0 11-6 0v-1m6 0H9"
title="Notifications"
subtitle="Send notifications to one or more channels — Teams, Slack, Discord, or any JSON webhook (ticketing, automation, bots). Each channel picks which events it receives."
subtitle="Send notifications to one or more channels — Teams, Slack, Discord, or any JSON webhook (ticketing, automation, bots). Each channel picks which events it receives, including What's new product updates."
docsPath={DOCS_PATHS.notifications}
/>
<div className="p-6 space-y-4">
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ export default function NotificationsSection({
<div className="space-y-4">
{channels.length === 0 && (
<p className="text-sm text-gray-500">
No channels configured yet. Add a channel to receive enrollment, SLA, or rule notifications.
No channels configured yet. Add a channel to receive enrollment, SLA, rule, or What&apos;s new notifications.
</p>
)}
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ export interface NotificationChannel {
notifyOnHardwareRejection?: boolean;
/** Receive SLA breach/resolved/consecutive-failure alerts (evaluation gated by tenant-level SLA flags). */
notifyOnSlaEvents?: boolean;
/** Receive "What's new" product updates (one digest per batch of new changelog entries). */
notifyOnWhatsNew?: boolean;
}
/** Backend cap (NotificationChannel.MaxChannelsPerTenant) — excess entries are ignored at parse time. */
@@ -1,10 +1,16 @@
"use client";
import { useEffect, useRef, useState } from "react";
import Link from "next/link";
import { usePathname } from "next/navigation";
import { ModalPortal } from "./ModalPortal";
import { useAuth } from "@/contexts/AuthContext";
import { useWhatsNew } from "@/hooks/useWhatsNew";
import { useLatestVersions } from "@/lib/useLatestVersions";
import { closeWhatsNew } from "@/lib/whatsNewStore";
import { formatInlineMarkdown } from "@/lib/formatInlineMarkdown";
import { isPublicPath } from "@/lib/hostRouting";
import { route } from "@/lib/routes";
import { trackEvent } from "@/lib/appInsights";
import {
formatBadgeCount,
@@ -17,6 +23,9 @@ import {
const CHANNEL_LABEL: Record<WhatsNewChannel, string> = { platform: "Platform", agent: "Agent" };
/** Tenant settings section where a channel's "What's new" toggle lives. */
const NOTIFICATION_SETTINGS_HREF = route("/settings/tenant/notifications");
/**
* The red unread counter used on the navbar icons, the menu rows and the panel tabs —
* same size and cap as the notification bell's badge.
@@ -99,6 +108,24 @@ function EntryRow({ entry, isNew }: { entry: WhatsNewEntry; isNew: boolean }) {
);
}
/**
* The currently published agent version, quiet under the header line. Rendered only for
* signed-in portal users (the endpoint is AuthenticatedUser, and the public site has no
* session list to compare against), so the mount itself is the fetch gate. Same plain,
* monospaced string as the "Agent Version" column of the session list — that match is the
* whole point: the reader sees at a glance whether their fleet runs the latest agent.
*/
function LatestAgentVersionLine() {
const { getAccessToken } = useAuth();
const { latestAgentVersion } = useLatestVersions(getAccessToken);
if (!latestAgentVersion) return null;
return (
<p className="mt-1 text-xs text-[var(--lp-ink-faint)]">
Latest agent version <span className="font-mono">{latestAgentVersion}</span>
</p>
);
}
function SkeletonRows() {
return (
<ul className="animate-pulse" aria-hidden="true">
@@ -124,12 +151,21 @@ function SkeletonRows() {
*/
export function WhatsNewPanel({ rootClassName }: { rootClassName?: string }) {
const wn = useWhatsNew();
const { user } = useAuth();
const pathname = usePathname();
const closeRef = useRef<HTMLButtonElement>(null);
// Marks as they were when the panel opened: the "New" labels must not vanish under the
// reader's eyes when the channel is marked seen a moment later.
const [seenAtOpen] = useState<WhatsNewSeen>(() => wn.seen);
const [openedAt] = useState(() => new Date());
// The portal shows things the public site cannot: /settings/tenant/… does not exist there,
// and the latest-agent line needs a signed-in caller plus a session list to compare against.
const onPortal = !isPublicPath(pathname);
// Only whoever can actually flip the channel toggle gets the "subscribe" link.
const canConfigureNotifications =
wn.tracksUnseen && (user?.isTenantAdmin === true || user?.isGlobalAdmin === true) && onPortal;
const channel = wn.panelChannel;
const entries = wn.entries(channel);
const newIds = new Set(wn.tracksUnseen ? unseenEntries(entries, seenAtOpen[channel], openedAt).map(e => e.id) : []);
@@ -181,6 +217,7 @@ export function WhatsNewPanel({ rootClassName }: { rootClassName?: string }) {
<div className="min-w-0 flex-1">
<h2 id="whats-new-title" className="text-lg font-bold leading-tight text-[var(--lp-ink)]">What&apos;s new</h2>
<p className="mt-0.5 text-sm text-[var(--lp-ink-soft)]">News and improvements from Autopilot Monitor.</p>
{onPortal && wn.tracksUnseen && <LatestAgentVersionLine />}
</div>
<button
ref={closeRef}
@@ -263,6 +300,22 @@ export function WhatsNewPanel({ rootClassName }: { rootClassName?: string }) {
<ExternalIcon className="w-4 h-4" />
</a>
)}
{canConfigureNotifications && (
<p className="mt-3 text-center text-xs text-[var(--lp-ink-faint)]">
<Link
href={NOTIFICATION_SETTINGS_HREF}
prefetch={false}
onClick={() => {
trackEvent("whats_new_notification_settings_clicked", { channel });
closeWhatsNew();
}}
className="inline-flex items-center gap-1 font-medium text-[var(--lp-ink-soft)] hover:text-[var(--lp-accent-ink)] hover:underline"
>
<BellIcon className="w-3.5 h-3.5" />
Get these updates in Teams, Slack or Discord
</Link>
</p>
)}
</footer>
</div>
</div>
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ const EVENT_TOGGLES: { key: keyof NotificationChannel; label: string; hint: stri
{ key: "notifyOnFailure", label: "Failure", hint: "Enrollment failed" },
{ key: "notifyOnHardwareRejection", label: "Hardware rejection", hint: "Device rejected by the hardware whitelist" },
{ key: "notifyOnSlaEvents", label: "SLA", hint: "SLA breach / resolved / consecutive failures (which breaches are evaluated is configured under SLA Targets)" },
{ key: "notifyOnWhatsNew", label: "What's new", hint: "Product updates: one digest whenever new platform or agent changelog entries go live in the portal's What's new panel" },
];
type HeaderRow = { key: string; value: string };
@@ -22,8 +22,9 @@ export interface UseLatestVersionsResult {
/**
* Fetches latest published agent/bootstrap versions from the backend
* once per mount. The backend caches the upstream blob for 12h, and
* the browser Cache-Control allows 1h of HTTP caching, so this is cheap.
* once per mount. Backend cache and browser Cache-Control are both minutes,
* not hours, so a fresh release shows up almost immediately — the What's new
* panel announces this number, and the panel mounts on every open.
*
* Silently swallows all errors — on failure, returns nulls so callers
* can gracefully hide "outdated" badges.
@@ -32,6 +32,11 @@ export interface WhatsNewEntry {
export interface WhatsNewChannelData {
docsUrl: string;
/**
* Period blocks in the order the changelog lists them; inside one block newest first,
* ties in authored order. The generator guarantees this — the panel renders the array as
* it comes, so an entry the badge counts is always at the top of its period.
*/
entries: WhatsNewEntry[];
}
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
*
* The authoritative copy lives at:
* src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Resources/error-codes.json
* (generated by scripts/error-codes/generate.mjs at the repo root; never edited by hand).
* (generated by tools/error-codes/generate.mjs at the repo root; never edited by hand).
*
* The backend (ErrorCodeCatalog.cs) embeds that file; the web app (utils/errorCodeMap.ts)
* imports the copy this script writes to utils/error-codes.json. The copy is validated,
@@ -64,16 +64,26 @@ function validate(rawText) {
return catalog;
}
/** The browser-facing shape: same keys, shortened source, no enforcement states. */
/**
* The browser-facing shape: same keys, shortened source, no enforcement states, and the two
* dominant field values omitted.
*
* `confidence: "high"` holds for 562 of 641 rows and `source: "msdoc"` for about half, so
* spelling them out costs ~19 KB of the client bundle to repeat two constants. They are
* omitted here and restored on read in `utils/errorCodeMap.ts` — the rendered tooltip is
* unchanged. Keep the two defaults in sync with that reader.
*/
const DEFAULT_CONFIDENCE = "high";
const DEFAULT_SOURCE = "msdoc";
function transform(catalog) {
const entries = {};
for (const [key, e] of Object.entries(catalog.entries)) {
const out = {
description: e.description,
confidence: e.confidence,
source: e.source.startsWith("msdoc:") ? "msdoc" : e.source,
category: e.category,
};
const source = e.source.startsWith("msdoc:") ? "msdoc" : e.source;
const out = { description: e.description };
if (e.confidence !== DEFAULT_CONFIDENCE) out.confidence = e.confidence;
if (source !== DEFAULT_SOURCE) out.source = source;
out.category = e.category;
if (e.symbol) out.symbol = e.symbol;
if (e.imeRetriesDuringEsp) out.imeRetriesDuringEsp = true;
entries[key] = out;
@@ -219,24 +219,28 @@ describe("buildPayload", () => {
expect(payload.channels.agent.docsUrl).toBe("https://docs.example/changelog/agent-changelog");
});
it("keeps the three newest periods only and preserves file order", () => {
const platformEntry = (title: string) => {
const entry = payload.channels.platform.entries.find(e => e.title === title);
if (!entry) throw new Error(`no platform entry titled ${title}`);
return entry;
};
it("keeps the three newest periods only and preserves the file order of the blocks", () => {
const periods = payload.channels.platform.entries.map(e => e.period);
expect(periods).toEqual(["September 2026", "September 2026", "September 2026", "August 2026", "July 2026"]);
});
it("dates bullets from blame and uncommitted ones from now", () => {
const [first, second] = payload.channels.platform.entries;
expect(first.addedUtc).toBe(new Date(1757200000 * 1000).toISOString());
expect(second.addedUtc).toBe(now.toISOString());
expect(platformEntry("Filter widgets by priority").addedUtc).toBe(new Date(1757200000 * 1000).toISOString());
expect(platformEntry("Wrapped bullet").addedUtc).toBe(now.toISOString());
});
it("splits platform titles, rewrites links and picks the first as the read-more target", () => {
const first = payload.channels.platform.entries[0];
expect(first.title).toBe("Filter widgets by priority");
expect(first.body).toBe(
const entry = platformEntry("Filter widgets by priority");
expect(entry.body).toBe(
"Every chip filters the list. See [Dashboard](https://docs.example/portal-guide/dashboard-and-sessions#search-syntax) and [Concepts](https://docs.example/rules/analyze-rules/concepts).",
);
expect(first.link).toBe("https://docs.example/portal-guide/dashboard-and-sessions#search-syntax");
expect(entry.link).toBe("https://docs.example/portal-guide/dashboard-and-sessions#search-syntax");
});
it("leaves agent bullets untitled with the sentence as body", () => {
@@ -255,6 +259,56 @@ describe("buildPayload", () => {
});
});
describe("entry order", () => {
const now = new Date("2026-09-08T10:00:00.000Z");
// Two commits, three bullets: the newest bullet is authored BELOW an older one — the
// topic grouping the changelogs use. Without ordering it would hide among older entries
// while the badge still counted it.
const MD = [
"# Platform Changelog",
"",
"## September 2026",
"",
"* **Older, listed first** — body.",
"* **Newest, listed last** — body.",
"* **Same commit as the newest** — body.",
"",
"## August 2026",
"",
"* **August** — body.",
].join("\n");
const order = (markdown: string, blame: Record<number, number | null>) =>
buildPayload({
docsUrl: "https://docs.example",
docsCommit: null,
summary: SUMMARY,
now,
channels: { platform: { markdown, blame: blameFor(blame) }, agent: { markdown: AGENT_MD, blame: blameFor({ 7: 1757300000, 8: 1757250000 }) } },
}).channels.platform.entries;
it("puts the newest bullet of a period first and keeps ties in authored order", () => {
const entries = order(MD, { 5: 1757100000, 6: 1757200000, 7: 1757200000, 11: 1756000000 });
expect(entries.map(e => e.title)).toEqual([
"Newest, listed last",
"Same commit as the newest",
"Older, listed first",
"August",
]);
});
it("does not reorder across periods — an old bullet stays in its own block", () => {
// August bullet dated after every September bullet: the blocks keep their file order.
const entries = order(MD, { 5: 1757100000, 6: 1757200000, 7: 1757200000, 11: 1757900000 });
expect(entries.map(e => e.period)).toEqual(["September 2026", "September 2026", "September 2026", "August 2026"]);
});
it("sorts an uncommitted bullet to the top — it is the newest a local build knows", () => {
const entries = order(MD, { 5: 1757100000, 6: 1757200000, 7: null, 11: 1756000000 });
expect(entries[0].title).toBe("Same commit as the newest");
expect(entries[0].addedUtc).toBe(now.toISOString());
});
});
describe("emptyPayload", () => {
it("has the full shape with no entries", () => {
const p = emptyPayload("https://docs.example");
@@ -8,7 +8,15 @@
* `## <Period>` blocks with `* ` bullets — and turns it into the JSON the portal
* panel renders. Nothing here adds meaning the markdown does not carry; the only
* derived facts are the per-bullet publish date (from `git blame`, supplied by the
* caller) and the absolute docs URL of every relative link.
* caller), the absolute docs URL of every relative link, and the order of the bullets
* within a period.
*
* Ordering: the changelogs are authored newest-first, but related bullets are grouped by
* topic, so a new entry can end up below older ones in the file. The panel counts unseen
* entries by date, so a reader could not find the bullet the counter meant. The payload
* therefore sorts each period's bullets by publish date, newest first — every unseen entry
* sits at the top of its period and the badge is countable. The docs page keeps its
* authored order; it shows no dates.
*/
const SCHEMA_VERSION = 1;
@@ -283,6 +291,8 @@ function toIso(epochSeconds, fallbackIso) {
/**
* Builds one channel's entry list from markdown + blame dates.
* `nowIso` dates bullets git has not committed yet (local runs on a dirty tree).
* Period blocks keep their file order; the bullets inside one block are ordered by
* publish date, newest first — see the ordering note at the top of this file.
* @returns {Entry[]}
*/
function buildChannelEntries(markdown, blameByLine, ctx, nowIso) {
@@ -290,11 +300,12 @@ function buildChannelEntries(markdown, blameByLine, ctx, nowIso) {
/** @type {Entry[]} */
const entries = [];
for (const block of blocks) {
/** @type {Entry[]} */
const blockEntries = [];
for (const bullet of block.bullets) {
if (entries.length >= MAX_ENTRIES) return entries;
const { title, body } = splitTitle(bullet.text);
const { text, link } = rewriteLinks(body, ctx);
entries.push({
blockEntries.push({
id: stableId(`${block.period}|${bullet.text}`),
addedUtc: toIso(blameByLine.get(bullet.line), nowIso),
period: block.period,
@@ -303,6 +314,13 @@ function buildChannelEntries(markdown, blameByLine, ctx, nowIso) {
link,
});
}
// Newest first inside the period; ties keep the authored order, so the bullets of one
// commit stay in the sequence they were written in.
blockEntries.sort((a, b) => Date.parse(b.addedUtc) - Date.parse(a.addedUtc));
for (const entry of blockEntries) {
if (entries.length >= MAX_ENTRIES) return entries;
entries.push(entry);
}
}
return entries;
}
@@ -31,11 +31,15 @@ describe("errorCodeMap", () => {
});
it("uses only the catalog vocabulary", () => {
for (const [key, entry] of Object.entries(catalogFile.entries)) {
// Asserted on the RESOLVED entry: the synced file omits confidence "high" and source
// "msdoc" to save bundle bytes, and getErrorCodeEntry restores them.
for (const key of Object.keys(catalogFile.entries)) {
expect(key, key).toMatch(/^(0x[0-9a-f]{8}|\d+)$/);
expect(ERROR_CODE_CATEGORIES, `${key} category`).toContain(entry.category);
expect(["high", "medium", "low"], `${key} confidence`).toContain(entry.confidence);
expect(entry.source, `${key} source`).toMatch(/^(msdoc|ime:\d+(\.\d+)+|winerror\.h|rule:[A-Z]+-[A-Z]+-\d{3}|legacy-catalog-v1)$/);
const entry = getErrorCodeEntry(key);
expect(entry, key).not.toBeNull();
expect(ERROR_CODE_CATEGORIES, `${key} category`).toContain(entry!.category);
expect(["high", "medium", "low"], `${key} confidence`).toContain(entry!.confidence);
expect(entry!.source, `${key} source`).toMatch(/^(msdoc|ime:\d+(\.\d+)+|winerror\.h|rule:[A-Z]+-[A-Z]+-\d{3}|legacy-catalog-v1)$/);
}
});
});
@@ -31,7 +31,9 @@ describe("error-codes sync", () => {
const out = sync.transform(catalog);
expect(catalog.enforcementStates).toBeDefined();
expect("enforcementStates" in out).toBe(false);
expect(out.entries["0x80070005"].source).toBe("msdoc");
// "msdoc" and "high" are the omitted defaults (restored by utils/errorCodeMap.ts).
expect(out.entries["0x80070005"]).not.toHaveProperty("source");
expect(out.entries["0x80070005"]).not.toHaveProperty("confidence");
expect(out.entries["0x87d30000"].source).toMatch(/^ime:/);
expect(out.entries["1603"].symbol).toBe("ERROR_INSTALL_FAILURE");
});
@@ -143,12 +143,32 @@ describe("validateFileTarget", () => {
expect(r.allowed).toBe(false);
});
it("allows %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% with AppData\\Local in file target", () => {
// The token lifts the C:\Users hard block for AppData — it does not admit the path.
// An unlisted vendor folder therefore falls through to the allowlist and is refused,
// exactly as GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed does on the device.
it("blocks an unlisted vendor folder under %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\\AppData\\Local", () => {
const r = validateFileTarget(
"%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\\AppData\\Local\\SomeApp\\data.json",
false,
);
expect(r.allowed).toBe(false);
});
it("allows a userProfileFilePrefixes folder under %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%", () => {
const r = validateFileTarget(
"%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\\AppData\\Local\\RealmJoin\\tray.log",
false,
);
expect(r.allowed).toBe(true);
expect(r.reason).toContain("%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%");
});
it("blocks a sibling of a userProfileFilePrefixes folder (segment-bounded)", () => {
const r = validateFileTarget(
"%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\\AppData\\Local\\RealmJoinSomethingElse\\tray.log",
false,
);
expect(r.allowed).toBe(false);
});
it("blocks %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% with Desktop in file target", () => {
@@ -348,12 +368,14 @@ describe("validateDiagnosticsPath", () => {
expect(r.reason).toContain("%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%");
});
it("allows %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% with AppData\\Roaming subpath", () => {
it("blocks an unlisted vendor folder under %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\\AppData\\Roaming", () => {
// AppData\Roaming is inside the hard block's exception, but the folder is not on
// userProfileFilePrefixes — the allowlist still has the last word.
const r = validateDiagnosticsPath(
"%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\\AppData\\Roaming\\SomeApp\\logs\\*.log",
false,
);
expect(r.allowed).toBe(true);
expect(r.allowed).toBe(false);
});
it("blocks %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% with non-AppData subpath", () => {
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* Wrapper around the shared error-codes catalog (schemaVersion 2).
*
* The catalog lives at `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Resources/error-codes.json`
* (generated by `scripts/error-codes/generate.mjs` at the repo root) and is synced into
* (generated by `tools/error-codes/generate.mjs` at the repo root) and is synced into
* `utils/error-codes.json` at build time (`scripts/sync-error-codes.js`, wired into the
* `prebuild` npm script). The sync validates the catalog, shortens `source` to its kind and
* drops the enforcement-state map; backend, MCP and web resolve from the same entries.
@@ -56,9 +56,14 @@ export interface ErrorCodeLookup {
derivedFromWin32?: number;
}
/**
* The synced file omits the two dominant field values to keep the client bundle small
* (`scripts/sync-error-codes.js`): a missing `confidence` means "high", a missing `source`
* means "msdoc". Both are restored below, so every consumer still sees a complete entry.
*/
interface CatalogFile {
schemaVersion: number;
entries: Record<string, ErrorCodeEntry>;
entries: Record<string, Omit<ErrorCodeEntry, "confidence" | "source"> & Partial<Pick<ErrorCodeEntry, "confidence" | "source">>>;
}
const typedCatalog = catalogFile as CatalogFile;
@@ -68,7 +73,10 @@ const typedCatalog = catalogFile as CatalogFile;
* Keys are normalised lowercase hex strings (e.g. "0x80070005") or decimal strings (e.g. "1603").
*/
const errorCodeMap: Record<string, ErrorCodeEntry> = Object.fromEntries(
Object.entries(typedCatalog.entries).map(([k, v]) => [k.toLowerCase(), v])
Object.entries(typedCatalog.entries).map(([k, v]) => [
k.toLowerCase(),
{ ...v, confidence: v.confidence ?? "high", source: v.source ?? "msdoc" },
])
);
/** Look up a structured entry for a raw code; null when no mapping is found. */
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
import {
ALLOWED_REGISTRY_PREFIXES,
ALLOWED_FILE_PREFIXES,
USER_PROFILE_FILE_PREFIXES,
ALLOWED_WMI_QUERY_PREFIXES,
ALLOWED_COMMANDS_LIST,
ALLOWED_DIAGNOSTICS_PATH_PREFIXES,
@@ -198,6 +199,18 @@ function isUserProfileSubpathAllowed(normalizedDir: string): boolean {
return false;
}
/**
* Returns the userProfileFilePrefixes entry admitting the path, if any.
* Mirrors GatherRuleGuards.IsUserProfilePathOnAllowlist: the entries are relative to
* the profile root, so they are matched against the placeholder profile the token
* expanded to.
*/
function findUserProfilePrefix(normalizedDir: string): string | undefined {
return USER_PROFILE_FILE_PREFIXES.find((prefix) =>
matchesPrefix(normalizedDir, `${USER_PROFILE_PLACEHOLDER}\\${prefix}`, "\\")
);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Validation functions
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -265,11 +278,14 @@ export function validateFileTarget(
normalizedDir = normalizePath(expanded);
}
// Hard block: C:\Users always blocked — except allowed subdirs via %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token
if (matchesPrefix(normalizedDir, BLOCKED_USERS_PREFIX, "\\")) {
if (isUserProfileSubpathAllowed(normalizedDir)) {
return { allowed: true, reason: "Allowed via %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% (AppData only)", unrestricted: false };
}
// Hard block: C:\Users always blocked. The %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token LIFTS it for
// AppData\Local and AppData\Roaming — it does not admit the path: the allowlist below
// still has to match, exactly as GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed does. Returning
// "allowed" here would show a target as green that the agent refuses on the device.
if (
matchesPrefix(normalizedDir, BLOCKED_USERS_PREFIX, "\\") &&
!isUserProfileSubpathAllowed(normalizedDir)
) {
return { allowed: false, reason: "C:\\Users is always blocked (privacy protection)", unrestricted: false };
}
@@ -289,6 +305,15 @@ export function validateFileTarget(
}
}
const userProfilePrefix = findUserProfilePrefix(normalizedDir);
if (userProfilePrefix) {
return {
allowed: true,
reason: `Matches: %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\\${userProfilePrefix}`,
unrestricted: false,
};
}
return {
allowed: false,
reason: "Not under any allowed file path prefix",
@@ -415,11 +440,14 @@ export function validateDiagnosticsPath(
normalizedDir = normalizePath(expanded);
}
// Hard block: C:\Users always blocked — except allowed subdirs via %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token
if (matchesPrefix(normalizedDir, BLOCKED_USERS_PREFIX, "\\")) {
if (isUserProfileSubpathAllowed(normalizedDir)) {
return { allowed: true, reason: "Allowed via %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% (AppData only)", unrestricted: false };
}
// Hard block: C:\Users always blocked. As in validateFileTarget, the
// %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token only lifts the block for AppData\Local and
// AppData\Roaming — DiagnosticsPathGuards.IsDiagnosticsPathAllowed then still
// requires an allowlist match below.
if (
matchesPrefix(normalizedDir, BLOCKED_USERS_PREFIX, "\\") &&
!isUserProfileSubpathAllowed(normalizedDir)
) {
return { allowed: false, reason: "C:\\Users is always blocked (privacy protection)", unrestricted: false };
}
@@ -439,6 +467,15 @@ export function validateDiagnosticsPath(
}
}
const userProfilePrefix = findUserProfilePrefix(normalizedDir);
if (userProfilePrefix) {
return {
allowed: true,
reason: `Matches: %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\\${userProfilePrefix}`,
unrestricted: false,
};
}
return {
allowed: false,
reason: "Not under any allowed diagnostics path prefix",
@@ -263,6 +263,15 @@ export const ALLOWED_FILE_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = [
"C:\\Windows\\SetupDiag",
"C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\DiagnosticLogCSP",
"C:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\ReportingEvents.log",
"C:\\ProgramData\\RealmJoin\\choco\\logs",
];
// Folders under the signed-in user's profile, RELATIVE to the profile root. The agent
// resolves %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% at runtime; the portal validates against a placeholder
// profile. These cannot live in ALLOWED_FILE_PREFIXES — that list is matched literally
// against the already-expanded path, where the user name is unknown at authoring time.
export const USER_PROFILE_FILE_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = [
"AppData\\Local\\RealmJoin",
];
export const ALLOWED_WMI_QUERY_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = [
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ hand: a wrong or missing entry is fixed in the generator (a source, a pin, a fam
regenerated, so the next regeneration cannot lose the fix.
```
IME_ENUMS_JSON=<path> node scripts/error-codes/generate.mjs [--cache-dir DIR] [--check]
IME_ENUMS_JSON=<path> node tools/error-codes/generate.mjs [--cache-dir DIR] [--check]
```
- `IME_ENUMS_JSON` — enum extract of one Intune Management Extension build (`imeVersion`,
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ duplicates are reported on stderr.
| windows-update / cbs | [Windows Update common errors](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/windows-update-errors) | One table per single-code heading; symbol = text before `;` in the Message cell, description = text after it, else the Description cell. `0x800F…` → `cbs`. |
| intune-mobile / intune-win32 | [Intune app installation error codes](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/mem/intune/app-management/app-install-error-codes) | iOS/iPadOS and Windows tables (Android skipped); description = the message cell. |
| mdm-enrollment / autopilot / entra-join | [Windows enrollment errors](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/mem/intune/device-enrollment/troubleshoot-windows-enrollment-errors), [Autopilot known issues](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/known-issues) | Prose pages: one-sentence paraphrase listed in `PROSE_ENTRIES`; the generator asserts the code appears on the page. Codes only our analysis rules name carry `rule:` and `medium`. |
| entra-join | [Windows Hello errors during PIN creation](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation) | Both tables parsed (`Hex \| Cause \| Mitigation` and the "unknown mitigation" one); the `Cause` column is the description, `Mitigation` is advice and is not carried. **Only `0x801c*`** — the page also lists NTE crypto codes, a Win32 code the `win32` family owns, and codes with no category here. Runs after `PROSE_ENTRIES` so the Autopilot-specific text for `0x801c03ea` wins. A `SYMBOL: text` cell yields `symbol`. Fails the run below 30 keys, so a reshaped page cannot silently shrink the family. |
| intune-win32 (`0x87D3xxxx`) | IME `CustomErrorCodes` enum | Member name as symbol, humanised as description, `medium`. Two known sign/digit defects in the enum source are corrected by `IME_ENUM_FIXUPS`; a build that fixes them makes the run fail so the fixup is removed. |
| delivery-optimization (`0x80D0xxxx`) | IME `DeliveryOptimizationConstants` | Member name as symbol, humanised, `medium`. |
| legacy | v1 catalog | Entries no primary source covers, `low`. |
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* sources and writes the web copy through the web sync script. Every entry carries the
* source it was taken from; nothing is typed in from memory.
*
* node scripts/error-codes/generate.mjs [--cache-dir DIR] [--check]
* node tools/error-codes/generate.mjs [--cache-dir DIR] [--check]
*
* IME_ENUMS_JSON required — path to the enum extract of one Intune Management Extension
* build (customErrorCodes, enforcementStates, msiRetriableErrorCodes,
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
* intune-* MS "Intune app installation error codes" (iOS + Windows tables)
* mdm-enrollment/ MS enrollment troubleshooting + Autopilot known-issues pages (prose:
* autopilot/entra-join one-sentence paraphrase, presence-checked against the page)
* entra-join MS "Windows Hello errors during PIN creation", 0x801Cxxxx only — the
* DSREG / device-registration family (runs after prose, which wins)
* intune-win32 IME CustomErrorCodes enum (0x87D3xxxx), member name paraphrased
* delivery-optimization IME DeliveryOptimizationConstants (0x80D0xxxx), member name paraphrased
* legacy v1 entries without a primary source, kept at confidence "low"
@@ -82,6 +84,7 @@ const URL = {
intuneApps: "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/mem/intune/app-management/app-install-error-codes",
enrollErrors: "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/mem/intune/device-enrollment/troubleshoot-windows-enrollment-errors",
knownIssues: "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/known-issues",
helloErrors: "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/hello-for-business/hello-errors-during-pin-creation",
winhttp: "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/winhttp/error-messages",
win32: (range) => `https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/debug/system-error-codes--${range}-`,
};
@@ -117,6 +120,10 @@ const ENTITIES = { nbsp: " ", amp: "&", lt: "<", gt: ">", quot: '"', "#39": "'",
/**
* Cell markup → plain text. Tags are stripped until none remain (a nested "<scr<b>ipt>" cannot
* survive), and entities are decoded in ONE pass so "&amp;lt;" yields "&lt;", never "<".
*
* Zero-width and bidi marks are removed before the whitespace collapse: MS Learn tables carry
* stray U+200B in hex and description cells, JS `\s` does not match them, and a hex cell that
* keeps one fails every `^0x…$` test — the row would then be skipped with no diagnostic.
*/
const decode = (s) => {
let text = s.replace(/<br\s*\/?>/gi, " ").replace(/<\/(p|li|div)>/gi, " ");
@@ -127,6 +134,7 @@ const decode = (s) => {
} while (text !== previous);
return text
.replace(/&(nbsp|amp|lt|gt|quot|#39|#x27);/g, (_, name) => ENTITIES[name])
.replace(/[​-‏‪-‮⁠]/g, "")
.replace(/\s+/g, " ")
.trim();
};
@@ -409,6 +417,45 @@ async function main() {
queue("prose", e.key, { symbol: e.symbol, description: e.description, confidence: e.confidence ?? "high", source: e.source ?? msdoc(e.page), category: e.category });
}
// entra-join — the Windows Hello PIN error page is the only MS table that documents the
// 0x801Cxxxx (DSREG / device-registration) family, which an enrollment meets during hybrid
// join and the ESP account-setup phase. Two tables: "Hex | Cause | Mitigation" and, for the
// codes without a documented fix, "Hex | Cause". The `Cause` column is the description in
// both — `Mitigation` is advice, and the catalog describes codes rather than advising.
//
// Runs AFTER the prose entries on purpose: 0x801c03ea is on both, and the Autopilot-specific
// prose ("TPM supports 2.0 but has not been upgraded") is the more useful of the two here,
// so the earlier family has to win. Scope stays at 0x801c*: the same page also lists NTE
// crypto codes, a plain Win32 code that the win32 family already owns, and two codes whose
// categories do not exist — none of them get invented here.
{
const ENTRA_MIN_KEYS = 30; // 35 on 2026-09-09; a drop means the page changed shape
let entraKeys = 0;
for (const table of parseTables(await fetchPage(URL.helloErrors))) {
for (const [value, cause] of table.slice(1)) {
if (!/^0x[0-9a-f]{8}$/i.test(value)) continue;
const key = normalizeHex(value);
if (!key.startsWith("0x801c")) continue;
// "DSREG_NO_DEFAULT_ACCOUNT: NGC provisioning is unable to …" — the cell leads with the
// symbol for the codes that have one.
const named = /^([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{2,}):\s+(.*)$/s.exec(cause);
queue("entra-join", key, {
symbol: named?.[1],
description: named ? named[2] : cause,
confidence: "high",
source: msdoc(URL.helloErrors),
category: "entra-join",
});
entraKeys += 1;
}
}
// parseTables drops a row whose hex cell does not match; without this the page silently
// yielding fewer codes would look like a clean run.
if (entraKeys < ENTRA_MIN_KEYS) {
throw new Error(`entra-join: only ${entraKeys} 0x801c keys parsed from ${URL.helloErrors} (expected >= ${ENTRA_MIN_KEYS}) — the page shape changed`);
}
}
// IME CustomErrorCodes (0x87D3xxxx)
for (const [name, rawValue] of Object.entries(ime.customErrorCodes)) {
if (name === "Undefined") continue;
@@ -492,7 +539,7 @@ async function main() {
const header = {
schemaVersion: 2,
description:
"Single-source catalog of Windows / MSI / Intune error codes, generated by scripts/error-codes/generate.mjs from primary sources — " +
"Single-source catalog of Windows / MSI / Intune error codes, generated by tools/error-codes/generate.mjs from primary sources — " +
"never edit by hand. Consumed by the backend (ErrorCodeCatalog.cs, ErrorCodeEnricher.cs), the web app (utils/errorCodeMap.ts via the " +
"sync-error-codes prebuild step) and the MCP server (lookup_error_code). Keys are lowercase 8-digit hex ('0x80070005') or decimal MSI exit " +
"codes ('1603'; only 0, 1601-1654, 3010 — other decimal exit codes are installer-defined). Win32 codes live only as 0x8007xxxx entries; " +