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Author SHA1 Message Date
Oliver Kieselbach ec025686ce bump pointer: internal (hello wait timeout plan, D-301)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 15:38:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 821c41e2ba Tenant Hello wait timeout up to 1 hour (#167)
* feat: tenant Hello wait timeout up to 1 hour

The "Hello Wait Timeout" setting (30..300 s in the UI) had no effect in the
V2 agent: its only consumer, HelloTracker.StartHelloWaitTimer, has no
production caller, while the decision engine armed a fixed 300 s
hello_safety deadline after the ESP exit and the tracker ran a fixed 300 s
completion timer after the wizard start.

The setting is now the real Hello budget, clamped to 300..3600 s
(HelloWaitTimeout in AutopilotMonitor.Shared). Every value that was valid
before (<= 300, including the old 30 s default) keeps today's 5 minutes.

- Engine: the agent stamps helloWaitTimeoutSeconds on EnrollmentFactsObserved
  (only when > 300), recorded set-once in EnrollmentScenarioObservations.
  All six hello_safety arm sites share one builder with the tenant window;
  a fact that arrives after hello_safety was armed moves it out. The WDP
  backstop is never shorter than the tenant window; the signal census
  surfaces hello_wait_extended.
- Agent: the Hello tracker's wizard completion timer uses the same budget;
  the stall probe skips session_stalled while hello_safety is pending.
- Backend: ValidateModel rejects values outside 300..3600; stored rows are
  read as their effective value, so legacy 30 s rows never block unrelated
  saves or backup reverts. Default 30 -> 300; shared manifest and wire types
  regenerated.
- Web: input 300..3600, bounds pinned against the C# constants.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S17pipjWqjZ8ULAu1JrFyG

* fix: keep the Hello wait's 30 s minimum and default, raise only the maximum

Product decision: the setting keeps its UI contract (30 s minimum and
default, same description); only the maximum moves to 3600 s. Configured
values up to 300 s keep the built-in 5-minute Hello window, larger values
extend it.

- HelloWaitTimeout: MinSeconds/DefaultSeconds 30; BuiltInSeconds 300 is the
  floor of EffectiveSeconds.
- Backend validates only a changed value (30..3600), like the retention cap;
  the read-time normalization is gone again.
- The agent stamps the tenant window only above BuiltInSeconds.
- Web keeps the original text and default; only the maximum and its hint
  change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S17pipjWqjZ8ULAu1JrFyG

* fix: Hello wait default 300 s, stale-fire guard, deferred stall report

Product decision: default 300 s (what V2 has always waited), minimum 30 s
still accepted, maximum 3600 s. Values up to 300 s keep the built-in
5-minute window, which the settings hint now says.

Review follow-ups:
- Engine: a hello_safety fire whose incarnation was replaced (armed due
  later than the fire's due time) is dead-ended, same guard as RealmJoin —
  a late tenant window could otherwise be undercut by the queued fire of
  the built-in deadline. The tenant fact is recorded only when it extends
  the built-in window.
- Stall probe: session_stalled is held back while a tenant-extended Hello
  wait (hello_safety or the WDP backstop) is pending and emitted once it is
  over and the session is still idle; real activity drops it. Default
  tenants never hit the guard.
- Comments: WDP backstop wording, 5-min reference, AgentConfiguration.
- Web pins the default against the shared manifest; tracker constructor
  defaults use HelloWaitTimeout.DefaultSeconds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S17pipjWqjZ8ULAu1JrFyG

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 15:36:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ec3eaa6437 fix(web): sitemap and llms.txt list public pages at their canonical /page/ URL (#166) 2026-09-29 14:13:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d36c9a659d Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-09-29 12:02:55 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c27dbf2aa2 bump pointer: internal (client role gates plan)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 11:46:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 28443d11fa fix(web): don't send SignalR joins and bootstrap reads the backend refuses by role
Every visit by a user without a tenant role joined the tenant broadcast
group before the dashboard redirected to /progress, and the settings
area loaded the bootstrap session list for every role. The backend
refused both by rule: 134 AddToGroup 403s, 19 serial-less session
joins and 27 bootstrap-list 403s in 30 days, each one also an
api_request_failed event.

- lib/signalrGroupAccess mirrors the backend's same-tenant join rules
  (broadcast and member-notify groups need an own role or platform
  scope, the admin-notify group the Admin or a GA, a session group a
  serial for roleless callers, global-admins platform scope, an
  unparseable name is a 400). Cross-tenant joins stay with the
  backend's platform/delegated admission. The gate keys on
  hasOwnTenantOrPlatformRole, not hasTenantReadScope: a delegated admin
  without an own role is refused the home tenant's groups too.
- SignalRContext.joinGroup applies it before sending: a refused join
  reaches onDenied with the server's status and is never held for the
  reconnect rejoin. joinGroup depends on the caller's role fields as
  primitives, so its identity changes only when auth/me resolves, the
  same commit that delivers the tenant id consumers join with. That
  also ends the "tenant-" join the dashboard sent before the tenant id
  was known (the 400s).
- TenantConfigContext loads bootstrap sessions only for
  canManageBootstrapSessions (mirror of BootstrapManagerOrGA: GA, Admin,
  Operator with the bootstrap grant).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 11:46:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0c41b0f449 bump pointer: .claude/commands (ux-insights rejoin baseline)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 11:22:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7799fdb725 bump pointer: .claude/commands (platform-health baselines 2026-09-29)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 11:04:44 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 0c1a2a4192 chore(deps-dev): bump tsx (#165)
Bumps the mcp group in /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp with 1 update: [tsx](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx).


Updates `tsx` from 4.23.13 to 4.23.15
- [Release notes](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/blob/master/release.config.cjs)
- [Commits](https://github.com/privatenumber/tsx/compare/v4.23.13...v4.23.15)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: tsx
  dependency-version: 4.23.15
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-29 11:00:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0356770ae8 bump pointer: internal (operator group customer label, D-300)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 10:58:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3a9a074be1 Operator groups can carry a customer label; customers still never see the group name
Under D-267 a managed tenant saw every operator-provisioned access as
"Platform support". A customer in two operator groups run by different teams
got two identical entries under "Who can read this tenant" and could not tell
them apart.

A Global Admin can now give an operator group a customer label (at most 80
characters) with the existing PATCH global/tenant-groups/{groupId}, which takes
only the fields to change: name and/or customerLabel, where an empty label
clears it. The customer sees the label as the entry name; a group without one
and direct grants keep "Platform support". Owned (self-service) groups refuse a
label with 409, because their customers see the managing tenant's name.
RenameTenantGroupAsync becomes UpdateTenantGroupAsync, one read-modify-write on
the meta row.

DelegationSelfService.CustomerNameOf is now the one source of the name a
customer sees for a group. The managers view and the Group detail of the audit
rows written under every member tenant (assign, unassign, group delete) both use
it. Those audit rows carried the internal group name to the customer's audit
page before this change.

Admin, Tenant Groups: operator groups show "Customers see: ..." and get a
"Customer label" button next to Rename. The customer page is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 10:58:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a3870e7dcc bump pointer: internal (pre-provisioning seal + registration failure reason live)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 01:59:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8cb5d42edc Seal pre-provisioning despite IME's AccountSetup line; report why a session never registered
WhiteGlove seal: IME reports "EspPhase: AccountSetup" from the device session
as soon as the device apps are done when the user ESP is enabled. The sealing
classifier counted that as user activity (-40) and left pre-provisioning Part 1
unsealed, so no whiteglove.complete marker was written and the Part-2 boot hit
the 48-hour emergency break. The excluder now also needs the ESP registry to
show AccountSetup progress: the adapter stamps accountSetupProgress on
WhiteGloveShellCoreSuccess, only after the tracker has actually read the
AccountSetup subcategories (unread is never "untouched"). The new excluder is a
subset of the old one, so a verdict can only rise; signals without the key
score as before. WhiteGloveShellCoreSuccess v1 gets its replay fixture.

The Part-1 exit writes whiteglove.complete as its first step instead of after
analyzers, diagnostics upload, grace and drain, where a reseal could kill the
process before it.

Registration failures: a run that exits because register-session failed
records outcome, last error, network link at start and end, the wall-clock
attempt window and the config-fetch outcome in registration-failure.json. The
emergency break sends the record as AgentErrorReport.PriorRegistrationFailure
(null for older agents); the backend bounds it and adds it to the ops details,
the App Insights dimensions and the timeline data. Retry behaviour is unchanged.

The raw registry trigger whiteglove_signal_* is renamed save_result_step_*: the
step exists in every 25H2 enrollment and the old name read as a
pre-provisioning signal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 01:38:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fa637369e1 bump pointer: internal (emergency break session age live)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 00:05:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach edf30d35e0 Emergency break reports the session age; a break without a session row is Info
The agent measured the session age at its 48 h break but never sent it.
AgentErrorReport now carries SessionAgeHours (optional, null for older
agents), and the backend puts it into the ops details, the timeline data and
the App Insights dimension. It is information only: the backend cannot derive
it (no row, or a row registered seconds before the break after a hibernate
resume), and it never feeds the severity.

The backend now reads the Sessions row once for the owner binding and the
break verdict. A report for a session without a row (in practice one that
never registered) is Info and writes no timeline event and no EventType index
row: nothing can close or open that session, and the orphan sweep deleted the
event a day later with a Warning of its own. A row under cascade delete gets
nothing written past the lock. Terminal stays Info with lateCleanup; an open
status or a failed read stays Warning with the historical write. Break
materialization now requires GUID ids.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 23:40:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3b4228e3a1 bump pointer: internal (session-owner binding stage 2 live)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 23:38:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a029d69d5e Session-owner binding stage 2: refuse sessions bound to another device
Each Sessions row is bound to the device identity that registered it. The
binding ran in shadow; it now refuses every foreign-identity outcome:
register-session answers 403 with session_owner_mismatch before anything is
written, agent telemetry 403 in the error envelope (SessionOwnerMismatch),
the hosted diagnostics upload URL 403. The error channel stays 200 and only
skips its write into the named session. An evaluation defect fails open.

The agent already rotates its session id on the 403 at registration; it now
does the same for the coded 409 (session id claimed by another tenant) instead
of retrying six times and exiting, and fails without retry on any other coded
409 (BackendRefusalException, never an auth failure). A snapshot restored
after a rotation adopts the current session id.

A guard test pins the four call sites and fails when a site observes the
binding without acting on the refusal. Privacy page: session binding under
how data is protected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 23:12:18 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach daae1ce1fa bump pointer: internal (paged cross-partition merge released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 21:02:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d90cf24508 bump pointer: internal (D-294/D-295 paged cross-partition merge)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 20:53:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 32f1fd4132 Click-next lists change page only after the page loaded
The audit log, ops events, rule submissions and session reports each
carried a copy of the same paging state. Next bumped the page number and
cursor stack before the request and kept them when it failed, so a failed
request showed "Page 3" over the rows of page 1.

useCursorPager (pure transitions in lib/cursorPager) owns rows, cursors
and the stack; the page number is derived from the stack. A move commits
only after its page loaded, and only the latest move commits. The fetch is
read through useLatest, which retires the per-page workarounds for the
token getter's changing identity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 20:53:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ffb09e60fa Global audit and ops-event pages continue from one RowKey watermark
The cross-partition pages (audit log over all tenants, ops events over
all categories) kept one continuation entry per partition that still had
rows. On the tenant fan-out the nextLink outgrew the host's URL limit:
the follow-up request was rejected with HTTP 414 before the function ran,
so Next never loaded a second page for a Global Admin.

The continuation is now the (RowKey, Partition) of the last returned row.
Every page reads each partition through BoundedFanOut (pageSize + 1 rows
after the watermark) and merges by (RowKey, Partition), which is the
display order in both tables. Partitions after the watermark's partition
continue with `RowKey ge`, the others with `RowKey gt`, so equal ops
RowKeys across categories survive a page cut. The merge no longer sorts
by the resolved OccurredUtc while advancing by RowKey, which could skip
rows where the two disagree.

The fan-out was unbounded (Task.WhenAll over every tenant); it now runs
with the shared cross-tenant concurrency ceiling like the session list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 20:53:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f920b6228e fix(web): suspended and offboarded tenants get their page again (#164) 2026-09-28 18:23:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1765773116 bump pointer: internal (RealmJoin app install rows released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 18:21:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5c7295019b bump pointer: internal (D-292/D-293 RealmJoin app install rows)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 10:19:18 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a0ad769231 RealmJoin packages count as app installs next to Intune apps
App install rows now carry their install channel. The ingest folds the RealmJoin
watcher's package started/completed events into AppInstallSummaries rows (channel
"realmjoin", keyed by scope + package id; duration = completion minus the observed
start). IME rows keep their key and have no channel column, so they read as before.

Every per-app aggregate groups on (channel, name): apps list, app analytics and
sessions (new ?source=, default ime), metrics/app, SLA top failing apps and the
version-regression radar (tracker key, episode key, bell link, ops event). The app
install SLA rate includes RealmJoin packages. The ESP-blocking stamp stays IME-only.
RealmJoin packages do not feed the software inventory or CVE correlation.

Web: a RealmJoin pill and an All / Intune / RealmJoin filter on Software > Installs,
the pill on app detail, Fleet Health and SLA, source-aware app links and PDF meta
line, and a hint in the empty Inventory tab. The pill moves out of InstallProgress
into a shared component. MCP: get_app_install_metrics names the source field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 10:19:18 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 64da9f850b bump pointer: internal (D-291 chain build without downloads)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 09:07:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5dae21968b Client-certificate chain building never downloads an issuer
The platform forwards whatever certificate the TLS client presented, so an
unauthenticated caller can hand in a leaf signed by a CA it made up. The
chain engine then fetched the leaf's AIA caIssuers URL before rejecting it:
an attacker-directed GET from the backend, and a worker blocked for the
10 s retrieval timeout. Every legitimate issuer is embedded and Intune
certificates carry no AIA, so downloads are now disabled and the unused
retrieval timeout is gone.

The regression test signs a leaf with a CA that is neither embedded nor
sent and asserts that the listener behind its AIA URL sees no connection;
a self-signed leaf never reaches that path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 09:06:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 59897dfbd8 bump pointer: internal (B-g9t editor verify)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 20:33:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f4551ea1ed bump pointer: internal (D-288/D-289/D-290 live)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 20:21:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e816c92b88 Tenant configuration has one conditional write path; the full-model PUT is gone
A tenant configuration row is never written blind any more (D-290). Three writers saved
from the 5-minute instance cache and four wrote a fresh read without an ETag: auto-re-enable
could lift a suspension a Global Admin had just renewed, the PUT could write the cached
Disabled=false over the offboarding tombstone during the drain barrier, and a concurrent
first login could overwrite the write-once OnboardedBy.

- TenantConfigurationService.CreateOrUpdateAsync next to UpdateAsync (shared core): fresh
  read with ETag, tombstone refused, mutation decides, conditional replace, conditional
  insert for a missing row, re-read and re-decide on a lost race.
- SaveConfigurationAsync and IConfigRepository.SaveTenantConfigurationAsync deleted; new
  TryCreateTenantConfigurationAsync. The default row of GetConfigurationAsync is a
  conditional insert.
- Converted: first-login seed (writes only while the stored row has no domain; only the
  winning login fires the signup side effects), auto-re-enable (decided on the fresh row),
  auth client-id tracking, app-homing flip, conferred-Pro grace stamp, offboarding tombstone.
- PUT/POST config/{tenantId} removed (function, catalog entries, response DTO). The Global
  Admin tenant editor sends only its changed fields to the field PATCH; the Collect Logs
  quick-config PATCHes its two diagnostics fields with ?intent=collect-logs, which keeps
  the CollectLogsQuickConfigEnabled ops event. Shared diff helper lib/tenantConfigSave.ts.
- Tests: create-or-update and default-row races, concurrent first login, renewed
  suspension, tombstone paths; repository and service doubles in ConfigRepoMockExtensions.
  Regenerated shared manifest and wire types (web, MCP).

Deploy order: backend, then web right after (the old web's editor save and quick-config
use the removed PUT).

Bumps internal (D-290, plan, docs).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 20:11:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a16a70fba5 Self-service trial stays once per tenant across offboarding; plan writers decide on the fresh row
Offboarding deletes the tenant configuration, and the returning tenant's first login recreated
it with TrialConsumed=false, so the one-time 30-day Pro trial could be chained by offboarding
and re-onboarding.

- The offboard click reads the configuration fail-loud and ORs TrialConsumed into the
  OffboardingByTenantPointer (sticky across rounds, same ETag CAS as OffboardCount).
- The first-login write (HandleNewTenantDomainAsync, the one write that sets OnboardedBy)
  carries it onto the new row; an unreadable pointer means no write, retried next login.
  Re-onboarding itself is unchanged, auto-approve included.
- TenantConfigurationService.UpdateAsync: fresh projected row with ETag, offboarding
  tombstone refused (403 TenantSuspended), mutation may decline, conditional replace with
  the ordinary pre-write backup, re-read and re-decide on a lost race (409 after 3).
  SetTenantPlanTier and StartTrial use it, so a warm instance's cached row is never saved
  (it could lift the tombstone during the drain barrier) and two concurrent trial starts
  cannot both pass.
- Tests: TenantConfigUpdateTests (service + both endpoints), pointer stickiness and the
  offboard endpoint in TenantOffboardFunctionTests, first-login carry-over in
  AuthFunctionSideEffectTests; shared EndpointHarness.

Bumps internal (D-288, D-289, plan, docs).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 19:08:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1b2bdd8f35 bump pointer: internal (SSRF gate released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 13:43:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 942bd86238 bump pointer: internal (SSRF gate live-verify)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 13:08:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7a920049ca bump pointer: internal (D-287 Node/Next version plan)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 12:48:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2eeb4da950 bump pointer: internal (B-h4m CodeQL note)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 12:38:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 20a80cbdc6 bump pointer: internal (SSRF address gate D-286, B-h4m)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 12:37:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c59e65ee0a fix(backend): webhook SSRF gate moves onto the connection
SsrfGuard.ValidateDestinationAsync resolved the webhook host and checked
it, then HttpClient resolved it again for the POST, so a DNS-rebinding
host could pass the check and be connected to an internal address.

The webhook client's SocketsHttpHandler now connects through
SsrfGuard.ConnectToPublicAddress: it resolves once per connection,
refuses the connection if any address is blocked, enforces HTTPS and
connects the socket only to the checked addresses; TLS still runs against
the request host. The pre-flight check is removed, the registration moves
to AddWebhookNotificationHttpClient so a test can prove the wiring, the
notification retry policy no longer retries a refused destination, and
the test endpoint reports the refusal with the same message as before.

IsBlockedAddress follows the same model as the MCP server: all IANA
special-purpose space, IPv6 only 2000::/3, zone ids and IPv4-mapped
addresses refused (IPNetwork.Contains judges a mapped address by its
IPv4 form, so those are refused first).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 12:36:06 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 89aa9e1f10 fix(mcp): CIMD fetch checks the address inside the socket's own DNS lookup
The SSRF gate resolved the client_id host, checked the answer and then
handed the hostname to fetch(), which resolved it again at connect time.
A DNS-rebinding host could pass the check with a public answer and be
connected to an internal one.

The metadata fetch now runs through a dedicated undici dispatcher whose
connect.lookup is the gate: one resolution per connection, every address
must be public, the socket connects only to those addresses. The global
fetch is untouched.

The address classifier now refuses every IANA special-purpose block
(IPv4), allows only global unicast 2000::/3 minus its special-purpose
blocks (IPv6), and refuses zone ids and IPv4-mapped addresses. The tests
enumerate the unedited IANA registries (tests/fixtures/
iana-special-purpose-addresses) and prove on loopback sockets that a
refused host opens no socket and that an allowed one is connected to
exactly the address the gate returned.

Adds undici ^8.11.2 (engines >=22.19.0).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 12:35:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2d3700cfaf bump pointer: internal (B-5p4 release state)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 17:16:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5a182f3f16 bump pointer: internal (B-5p4 DO-geo deploy/verify)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 17:10:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 889b843d6d feat(agent): Delivery Optimization geo endpoint as last-resort geolocation provider
When ipinfo.io (plus retry) and ifconfig.co both fail, the agent now asks
geo.prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com/geo. It returns only CountryCode and
ExternalIpAddress, but it belongs to the DO/Windows Update endpoint set Autopilot
needs anyway, so it stays reachable where public geo services are blocked.
The session then gets a country-only device_location (source "do-geo", no
timezone, so timezone auto-set stays pending) instead of none.

- GeoLocationService: the three providers share one TryProvider skeleton;
  response parsers are internal and unit-tested; GeoLocationResult.Describe()
  skips missing parts ("DE" instead of ", , DE") in the event message and log.
- Failure trace carries doGeoError + lastResortProvider.
- Backend: geographic location keys skip empty region/city, so country-only
  sessions group as "DE" rather than ", DE"; drilldown still round-trips.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 17:08:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9b91119239 bump pointer: internal (way 3 docs live)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 14:58:33 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1e74d67da9 fix(web): service-principal member form names both uses — automation (access_as_application) and an app sending its users' tokens (delegated access_as_user, users read-only)
The ClientAppNotRegistered refusal (D-279, now enforced) sends Tenant Admins
to this form; its hint required access_as_application, which an app acting
on behalf of users does not need.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 14:51:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ed013bbdda bump pointers: internal (hash repair via v2.0.1466), .claude/commands (platform-health repair note)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 14:51:37 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4b40619d1d bump pointer: internal (client-app binding enforced, way 3 documented)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 14:48:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3ce1f2b036 bump pointer: internal (D-285 plan live)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 14:06:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 673f045212 fix(web): platform settings saves send only the changed fields via PATCH global/config (D-285)
Each save handler still builds the edited configuration but now sends changedAdminConfigFields(loaded, edited) through lib/adminConfigSave.ts, and nothing at all when nothing changed. This covers the Global Settings, the diagnostics paths, the ops alerts and the vulnerability section. The MCP access policy patches its single field without reading first. A page loaded before another writer (the agent release pipeline, a second operator, a sync job) can no longer revert that writer's fields. Deployed after the backend that serves PATCH global/config.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 13:55:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach df640e3684 fix(backend): admin configuration is written only in its changed columns; PATCH global/config replaces the full-model PUT (D-285)
On 2026-09-25 a Global Settings save from a page loaded before an agent release wrote the whole configuration back and reverted the release's LatestAgentV2* hashes. After that, every 2.0.1465 agent reported IntegrityCheckFailed. The flaw was structural: every writer (portal PUT, plan tiers, three vulnerability-sync stamp paths) replaced the whole row from the copy it held, usually the 5-minute cache.

- IConfigRepository.UpdateAdminConfigurationAsync(mutate, updatedBy) is the one write path. It reads the row fresh with its ETag and applies the mutation to a copy materialized from that read. It computes the changed columns from the converter projections and writes only those onto the freshly read raw entity; a null value drops the column. The replace is conditional, and a conflict triggers a re-read and retry. A no-op writes nothing. Pipeline-owned and unknown columns survive. The full-model SaveAdminConfigurationAsync / SaveConfigurationAsync are removed, and the first row is created with AddEntity.
- PATCH global/config with { fields } (PatchAdminConfigurationRequest) replaces PUT/POST. Its field gate is derived from the persisted columns and rejects server stamps, LatestAgentV2* / LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion, PlanTierDefinitionsJson, the sync stamps and redacted placeholders. The route catalog lists PATCH.
- Plan tiers, TriggerMsrcSync, TriggerVulnerabilityDataSync, VulnerabilityDataSyncFunction and VulnerabilityCacheRefreshService.StampAsync each hand in a mutation.
- Tests: AdminConfigurationChangedFieldsTests (stale-page toggle keeps the release hashes, concurrent pipeline write re-read and kept, no-op, rejection, null drop, first row, gate); existing tests adapted; the request guard allows the admin field map.
- Regenerated shared manifest and wire types (web utils + MCP). The web still sends PUT until the web commit that follows the backend deploy.
- The internal pointer is bumped to D-285.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 13:51:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 59bea9d888 bump pointers: internal (plan envelope live), .claude/commands (platform-health markers)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 13:11:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e2c91afda2 feat(mcp): seal refresh tokens of registered self-hosted clients so that deleting the registration also ends copies (D-283)
A portal-registered client (amc_) now receives its Entra refresh token only as a compact JWE (RFC 7516, dir + A256GCM, kid amc-rt-v1). The key is derived from OAuthStateSigningKey. At refresh, the registration comes from the envelope, never from the client_id parameter. Before, a copy of the token redeemed without client_id went to the organizations authority and skipped the registration check.

A raw refresh token presented with an amc_ client id is accepted and returned sealed, so these clients migrate on their next refresh. All other clients are unchanged. jose becomes a production dependency; it was a dev-only transitive dependency before. The internal pointer is bumped to D-283/D-284.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 13:00:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach eb47c4d69a bump pointer
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 12:32:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 91d56f2bbb bump pointer
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 11:58:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 12b847360c feat(web): Intune Enrollment Validation in the tenant settings; banners follow any device validation (D-282)
The option is a regular tenant-admin toggle in its own "Without pre-registration" block, with the
add-on permission state read from the existing graph-permissions status endpoint. The dashboard
banner and the admin Ready badge key on "any validation method enabled" (feature flag
deviceValidationEnabled, manifest-driven validate* fields) instead of Autopilot alone, so a
device-preparation tenant that validates by device association is no longer told that agent
ingestion is blocked. Stale "shadow mode" wording for Device Association is gone, the
Not-registered report names every method, sessions show "Intune Enrollment", and the privacy
page and FAQ list the new method. Grant script help describes the IntuneDeviceBinding feature
as Intune Enrollment Validation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 11:57:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2e736f40ad feat(backend,shared): Intune Enrollment Validation admits enrolled devices without pre-registration (D-282)
The certificate's Intune managedDevice id is looked up in the tenant's Intune. With the tenant
switch ValidateIntuneDeviceBinding on, that lookup is the last accepting link of the validator
chain: an enrolled device that is not being retired, wiped or deleted is admitted as
ValidatorType.IntuneEnrollment. A 404 for a certificate younger than 60 minutes is
NotFoundRecentEnrollment (503, never cached); a missing grant is 503 with 120 s.

For devices another validator admitted, the lookup only observes: in the background, never
admitting or rejecting, and only when the app token carries
DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All, so a tenant without the add-on costs no Graph call.
Outcomes ride on the request row (CertDeviceBinding, role, serial match, owner and enrollment
type).

TenantConfiguration.HasAnyDeviceValidation() is the single gate precondition; the feature flags
expose it as deviceValidationEnabled (replaces validateAutopilotDevice).

The agent parses ValidatorType strictly: release the agent before this backend.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 11:57:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9c3e5ecb30 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-09-25 06:55:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 27ce316206 bump pointer 2026-09-25 06:55:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7280b61d28 fix(web): self-hosted AI clients are ones the organization hosts itself (#163)
"Runs on its own servers" read as on-premises only and collided with the
MCP server. The criterion is who hosts the client (on premises or in the
cloud), matching the customer docs.


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012P3YpD3CSsR8Sy1Ubg4pUw

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 05:43:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 79f1ecd378 Tenant Config Report: show self-hosted AI client registrations (#162)
The registrations (name, callback URL, client id) live in their own table,
not in TenantConfiguration, so the report only showed the limit. Fetch
GET tenants/{tenantId}/mcp-client-registrations fail-soft alongside the
other side views and render them in the Tenant Status section, plus the
platform switch. The limit row is relabelled to say it is a limit.


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DbRs7NCppizQ7wWFjN7n3M

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 20:54:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b6791d37e0 ci(codeql): exclude js/missing-rate-limiting; a test pins every OAuth route to its limiter (D-281)
The query recognizes only npm limiter packages, never oauthRateLimit /
oauthTokenRateLimit, and flags a handler as soon as it calls a function
named like *auth*, *login* or *verify*. All six alerts it ever raised were
on throttled OAuth routes (the last two came from tenantAuthority()).

What it stood in for is now a test: every route of the OAuth router must
run a per-IP limiter first unless it is one of the three named discovery
documents, /oauth/token must carry the strict budget, and a router.use()
middleware fails the check. Verified by mutation: removing the limiter
from /oauth/authorize fails the test with the route name.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 18:58:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4f1b4f8c03 fix(mcp): URL-encode the registration id in the tenant-client lookup path
The registration lookup put a client_id-derived value into the backend URL
path unencoded. The amc_ regex already limits it to 32 hex characters, so
nothing changes at runtime, but every other request-derived path segment in
the MCP server goes through encodeURIComponent, and CodeQL counts only that
(or a ?/# prefix) as a request-forgery barrier - a regex capture group is
not one. Closes code-scanning alert js/request-forgery on oauth.ts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 18:33:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 869580c9df feat(web): progress portal deep link /progress?serial=
A ?serial= parameter (serial number or exact device name) runs one lookup
as soon as sign-in has resolved the tenant, so organisations can send users
a link to follow their own device. Every hit writes the found session's
serial back into the URL for reload, bookmark and copying. Authorization is
unchanged: sign-in stays mandatory and roleless callers still need the exact
serial server-side. The query survives the login redirect because
ProtectedRoute keeps pathname + search. progress_serial_submitted carries
source form | link.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 17:14:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1a96cd20da feat(web,backend): AI Integration settings page; one self-hosted client per tenant, raisable by a Global Admin
- Settings > Tenant > AI Integration (between SLA Targets and Bootstrap
  Sessions) explains the normal connection first - server URL for Claude,
  ChatGPT, VS Code and other hosted assistants, nothing to register - and
  shows the self-hosted client registration below it (Tenant Admin, platform
  switch on). The page is visible to admins, platform scopes and anyone with
  MCP access. The self-hosted example text is neutral.
- A tenant may hold one self-hosted client registration. The GA-only
  TenantConfiguration.McpClientRegistrationLimit (1-10) raises it on request:
  reverted for non-GA callers on PUT, refused on PATCH, edited in the Global
  Admin tenant dialog. MCP_SERVER_URL joins the portal URL registry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 15:00:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8e637cf86a feat(web): docs link of the self-hosted AI clients section points at its own docs section
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 14:47:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 93c6e1facb feat(mcp): tenant-bound registrations for self-hosted MCP clients (D-280)
A self-hosted AI client redirects to its own domain, which the vendor
redirect allowlist never admits, so it could not use the browser sign-in.
Tenant Admins can now register the client's exact OAuth callback in the
portal and configure the client with client id amc_<registrationId>.

- MCP OAuth proxy: an amc_ id is resolved through the backend; its
  registration is the redirect allowlist entry for that exact callback.
  Authorize and token run at the registering tenant's Entra authority, and
  the token endpoint discards a token of any other tenant (code and
  refresh). Lookups are cached for 60 s, a failed lookup fails closed. Every
  other client keeps the allowlist check before its resolution.
- Backend: table McpClientRegistrations, TenantAdminOrGA routes
  tenants/{tenantId}/mcp-client-registrations (list, create, delete; at
  most three, https or loopback http, exact URI, audited) and the anonymous,
  per-IP rate-limited lookup auth/mcp/client-registrations/{id} (under
  /api/auth for the client-certificate exclusion list).
- AdminConfiguration.McpClientRegistrationEnabled (default off) is the
  platform switch: off hides the portal section and makes every lookup 404.
  auth/me carries it for the sidebar.
- Portal: Settings > Tenant > Self-hosted AI clients (Tenant Admin / Global
  Admin), and the switch in Admin > Settings > Global.
- Tests: MCP tenant-client flow (authority, tid check, revocation, cache,
  allowlist), backend round trip, wire parity, validation, cap, switch,
  audit; nav visibility. Manifests and wire types regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 14:10:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4a4bbc056a fix(mcp): the OAuth proxy advertises and returns token auth method none
The proxy issues no client secrets, but its authorization server metadata
named no token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported (RFC 8414 then implies
client_secret_basic) and /oauth/register echoed a requested secret-based
method. A client following that default registered with client_secret_basic
and then failed the token exchange ("client_secret_basic authentication
requires a client_secret"), reproduced with the SDK calls a self-hosted chat
client makes. The metadata now lists ["none"] and registration always answers
none (RFC 7591 lets the server replace a requested value).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 13:35:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c59b366560 feat(auth): client-app binding for delegated tokens - measured always, enforced behind a switch (D-279)
A user token obtained by an application other than the platform's own
registrations (for example a self-hosted AI client using on-behalf-of) was
accepted with the user's full role; only audience, issuer, signature and
lifetime were checked. Such tokens are now classified on every request.

- ClientAppBindingMiddleware (after authentication, before policy enforcement)
  records the request dimensions ClientAppBinding (registered | unregistered |
  unidentified) and ClientAppId, plus a throttled Warning.
- AdminConfiguration.EnforceClientAppBinding (default off; Admin > Settings >
  Global): when on, a foreign client is refused with 403 ClientAppNotRegistered
  unless the application is an enabled member of the caller's tenant (the
  app:<client-id> row a service principal uses). An admitted caller keeps their
  identity but gets the application caps: at most Viewer, no platform role,
  DelegatedReader on managed tenants, roleless tiers closed except auth/mcp.
- AdminIdentity.IsCapped (application or admitted foreign client) is what the
  global, delegated and member-role resolvers switch on; RequestContext carries it.
- Own clients = the audience trust set plus EntraId:TrustedClientAppIds, a
  client-only trust for the local development registration that never widens
  the accepted audiences.
- Tests: classification, unforgeable cap marker, middleware in both modes, caps
  through the real policy middleware, pipeline order; manifests and wire types
  regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 13:28:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d0aded5401 chore: bump internal (D-278, MCP client plan draft)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 12:41:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8f9c683b7c chore: bump infra (redirect-allowlist parameter description)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 09:45:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e82878af57 feat(mcp): name the rejected token's aud/azp/tid and the rejected redirect targets in the auth log lines
A backend 401 on `initialize` logged only the UPN, and the backend's own trace
("IDX10214 audience validation failed") never names the token; a registration
rejection logged only a count of redirect_uris. Diagnosing a self-hosted client
(LibreChat) that first failed DCR on its own callback host and then presented
tokens minted for another resource took a customer round trip.

- access-guard: `invalid-token-claims` and `backend-rejected-token` carry
  `aud=... azp=... tid=...` (unverified claims; control characters stripped, capped)
- oauth/register: the rejection names origin + path of up to three rejected
  redirect_uris (never the query); the error_description names the actual
  defaults (VS Code, not Google)
- tests for both lines; skill catalog in .claude/commands (mcp-telemetry) updated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 09:44:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d60e858e95 chore: bump internal (signature-check lesson)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 14:27:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f6ce9ae0a0 chore: bump internal (web perf audit released, first RUM comparison)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 13:38:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b4f26401f5 perf(web): stop recording own-origin non-API fetches as dependencies (D-277)
Route payloads (__next.*.txt, index.txt), static JSON and the router's HEAD
self-requests were 20k of 62k dependency rows per week and nobody reads them.
lib/webTelemetryExclusions.ts builds the patterns (own origins minus /api/,
plus relative non-API URLs) for two layers: excludeRequestFromAutoTracking-
Patterns for string fetches, and a dependency initializer that drops the
finished item by its absolute target - the SDK's own check sees an empty URL
for the URL objects Next's router passes to fetch (verified against the ingest
batch: 11 such fetches, 0 shipped; API, SignalR and token rows still shipped).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 12:42:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2b5004fb33 perf(web): web perf audit 2026-09-23 - cache headers, intent prefetch, seeds, SignalR refcount, lazy telemetry
P1 - full loads
- staticwebapp.config.json: /_next/static/* immutable, /landing/* max-age=86400
  (SWA default was max-age=30 for hashed assets); guard test pins it
- components/NavLink.tsx: prefetch on hover/focus/touch for the portal chrome
  (prefetch={false} also disabled the hover prefetch); landing links stay off
- app/layout.tsx: preconnect to the API origin
- lib/dashboardSeed.ts + lib/prefetchSeeds.ts: the dashboard's first list and
  stats requests start with auth/me and are handed to the hooks as one-shot
  seeds (the own-tenant list URL carries no tenantId; the backend reads the JWT)
- lib/msalConfig.ts: the login request carries the API scope, so one token
  redemption serves the first API call; Graph consent via extraScopesToConsent

P2 - chatter per navigation
- lib/signalrGroupRegistry.ts + contexts/SignalRContext.tsx: group membership
  is reference-counted with a 2 s grace leave; reconnect rejoins run in
  parallel; on/off/invoke and the context value are memoised; the dashboard's
  unconditional leave no longer drops the notification bell's global-admins
  membership; consumers pair every join with a cleanup leave
- app/sessions/hooks: both group joins in parallel, the join catch-up is
  dropped while the initial walk is in flight, identical session deltas skip
  the state update
- lib/cachedAuthFetch.ts: TTL cache for feature flags, tenant list and latest
  versions with invalidation on every write path; FeedbackBubble defers its
  status call

P3 - pure derivations only (D-274): memoised filter arrays, one-pass phase
  summary, status counts, useDeferredValue on both search inputs

P4 - landing
- lib/authHint.ts + AuthGate + globals.css: the loading overlay is applied by
  an inline head script only when the site root is opened by a browser with an
  auth hint; the prerendered HTML carries no overlay; CSS lifts it after 8 s
- hero as WebP srcset (81 KB instead of a 180 KB PNG), dead landing-v1 CSS
  removed, terminal demo pauses off-screen, duplicate twitter image dropped

Telemetry (D-276)
- lib/appInsightsRuntime.ts: the SDK is its own chunk, deferred until idle on
  the public host, remote config fetch off (blkCdnCfg), initial trackPageView
  on both hosts, Web Vitals as web_vital_* custom metrics

Verified: tsc, eslint --max-warnings 0, vitest 127 files / 1442 tests, next
build, Playwright click-through of every portal route, settings section,
session views and public pages on the production bundle against the live API.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 12:10:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 00f4cb1f26 fix(agent,web): a script run duration is judged from both lines' provenance; an offset-error span is omitted, never shown (D-273)
A platform script that ran 10 s was shown as "1h 00m" (session 4377911b): its
start line was self-anchored (+120 min) while its result line, re-read after an
overwrite rewind and therefore never fresh, fell back to the agent's cached zone
(+60 min), was rejected as ahead of the clock, and the duration was taken from
the raw pair. The same shape fired script_timeout_suspected daily in one tenant
on 2-9 s scripts read as 17 h. Fleet 2026-09-20..23: about 1 % of script
durations, 28 of 28 inflated ones carrying derivedTimestamp.

Agent: ScriptExecutionState binds the provenance of its start, result and exit
lines (CmTraceLineProvenance, persisted); EmitScriptCompleted judges the pair -
verified (both measured, or both assumed with the same offset from the same
file), unverified, or suppressed with durationSuppressedReason
(rejected-endpoint | offset-grid, CmTraceOffsetCalibrator.IsOnOffsetGrid) - and
always emits durationProvenance plus startSourceOffset*. A held completion's
sourceOffset* tags now describe its own result line; script_timeout_suspected
only judges a measurable duration; the emitted-run marker is capped at the
clock so a future-shifted result no longer swallows the next run's start.

Web: the reducer applies the same rule to stored events from older agents,
pairing a final with the latest script_started of its policy, and the panel
shows "n/a" with the explanation where the run time would be.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 09:50:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e091e50862 chore: bump internal (plan and backlog on the commit state)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 09:47:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 27ce07b111 chore: bump internal and .claude/commands (IME wait states D-271, ime-diffs note D-272)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 09:46:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f06fe5afc0 feat(agent): registry observer surfaces IME install-deadline waits and app-in-use deferrals (D-271)
ImeRegistryAppStateObserver reads a fourth IME registry surface,
Win32Apps\OperationalState\<userGuid>\<appGuid>: the install deadline a
downloaded app waits for (ExecutionDeadlineTime, IME 1.106) and the
app-in-use deferral counters (DeferralsUsed, DeferUntilTime,
DeferralMaxDeferrals, DeferralAutoDeferred, IME 1.105). Both travel on the
existing registry_app_state event as data (installDeadlineUtc, deferralsUsed,
deferralMaxDeferrals, deferUntilUtc, deferralAutoDeferred) with the change
triggers installDeadline / deferralsUsed / deferUntil, and the message says
the state in words ("downloaded, install deadline ... UTC", "deferred by user
1/3 until ... UTC", "auto-deferred ..."). No new event type.

ClassifyStatusServiceStatus maps IME's legacy AppInstallStatus explicitly:
1000/1002/1004 installed, 1001/1003 installing, 2000 band notApplicable,
3000 failed, anything else unjudged. The 1000 band was treated as installed,
but IME maps every InProgress enforcement state to 1001, so a running app
counted as terminal success on the registry rail (observability only).

Tests: explicit status mapping, both registry timestamp shapes, the new
change triggers, the wait-state text, and the tick flow for a deadline and a
deferral event. Mutation proof: classifier and trigger broken on purpose
turn exactly the five expected tests red.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 09:46:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 37e920237c chore: bump internal (Web-Performance-Audit 2026-09-23)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 09:30:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7279650772 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-09-23 08:32:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d8ab70b166 chore(rules): override fast-json-patch to 3.1.1 (Dependabot #103)
ajv-cli 5.0.0 is the latest release and still declares fast-json-patch ^2.0.0,
so neither Dependabot nor npm audit fix can move past CVE-2021-4279. An npm
override forces 3.1.1 into the lockfile; the 3.x API is backward compatible and
the validate command used in combine-rules.yml never touches the package.
Verified: npm ci from the lockfile plus all four ajv validate steps pass locally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 08:29:58 +02:00
dependabot[bot] fb8703a4c6 chore(deps): bump the actions group with 3 updates (#160)
Bumps the actions group with 3 updates: [azure/login](https://github.com/azure/login), [github/codeql-action/init](https://github.com/github/codeql-action) and [github/codeql-action/analyze](https://github.com/github/codeql-action).


Updates `azure/login` from 3.0.2 to 3.1.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/azure/login/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/azure/login/compare/7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c...a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906)

Updates `github/codeql-action/init` from 4.37.9 to 4.38.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/compare/cdf488f595d80d6e07e03d4674febd5ab45fa938...b96794f015dfd88f77b49b1c93e0fa7110f94c63)

Updates `github/codeql-action/analyze` from 4.37.9 to 4.38.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/compare/cdf488f595d80d6e07e03d4674febd5ab45fa938...b96794f015dfd88f77b49b1c93e0fa7110f94c63)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: azure/login
  dependency-version: 3.1.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: actions
- dependency-name: github/codeql-action/init
  dependency-version: 4.38.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: actions
- dependency-name: github/codeql-action/analyze
  dependency-version: 4.38.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: actions
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-23 08:18:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ac3fa8b2b6 chore: bump internal (B-2am deployed)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 21:29:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach efcb4f9ca1 fix(offboarding): farewell feedback reaches the backend again; farewell mail leaves an ops event; suspended page instead of alert
The offboard endpoint tombstones the tenant (Disabled=true, "Offboarding in
progress") before it answers 202, so the departing admin submits the farewell
feedback from an already-suspended tenant. Since the suspension gate moved onto
the shared authorization path (43ddc601, 2026-08-29) every feedback POST was
403 TenantSuspended — invisible, because nobody clicked and the two stored
feedbacks predate the gate (D-270).

- Endpoint catalog: `AllowedDuringOffboarding` on exactly
  POST tenants/{tenantId}/offboard/feedback; the middleware ignores the
  offboarding tombstone for that route only. An operator suspension still
  denies; policy tier, cross-tenant check and the function's active-marker
  check are untouched. Middleware tests for all four cases plus a catalog
  ratchet pinning the flag to the one route.
- Farewell mail: IOffboardFarewellEmailSender.SendAsync returns whether the
  provider accepted; the offboarding worker records FarewellEmailSent /
  FarewellEmailSkipped / FarewellEmailFailed like the welcome mail — the
  send's own success log is Information and never reaches Application
  Insights. Missing Email:ApiKey logs Warning. Handler tests per outcome;
  OpsAlertRules catalog and the generated manifests (Web + MCP vocabulary)
  carry the three types.
- Web: auth/me 403 TenantSuspended no longer shows alert() and forces a
  logout. AuthContext keeps the user signed in with claims-only info and
  ProtectedRoute renders a suspended page: for the offboarding tombstone
  "Your organization is being offboarded" with the farewell feedback form
  (a reload during the 6-minute preparation window keeps the form), for any
  other suspension the reason text plus contact links; both with sign-out.
  The feedback widget moved from OffboardingSection into
  components/OffboardingFeedbackForm.tsx.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 21:18:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7a7a31e8e3 chore: bump internal (B-z9d root cause)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 20:26:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3fdcbabd48 chore: bump internal (backlog B-az5, B-z9d)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 20:11:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b2e8c7627f chore: bump internal and .claude/commands (context diet)
internal: operations facts as reference doc, leaner CLAUDE.md, context-diet plan. .claude/commands: shorter skill descriptions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 20:02:27 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach bd08d13011 chore: bump internal (mcp catalog sight check in Claude Code done)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 19:55:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 10c69f592e chore: bump internal (mcp-catalog-context-audit released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 18:41:06 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fe0b2dc7fe refactor(mcp): catalog diet — shared argument texts, scope-first instructions, $schema stripped (D-269)
Every tool description and both role instructions now fit the 2048-char host cap
(Claude Code truncated the Global Admin instructions and two descriptions silently).
Pagination, projection and scope mechanics are said once in the instructions and
the shared pageSize/continuation/tenantId/days texts; role markers left tools only
that role can see; get_resource lists its sections on the argument. The SDK $schema
URL is stripped from tools/list.

Measured (compact tools/list): Global Admin 111.4 KB -> 89.1 KB, Reader 94.7 -> 74.3,
tenant user 64.5 -> 51.3, delegated 75.1 -> 55.6 KB. catalog-budget.test.ts pins the
new ceilings, the variant counts and the empty over-cap list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 18:14:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a0f007fd43 fix(mcp): synthetic tenant examples, catalog budget test and audit script (D-269)
list_tenants named a real customer domain as its example; the filterTenantList test
carried three real tenants. Both now use synthetic names and GUIDs.

catalog-budget.test.ts pins the per-role wire catalog as a ratchet (size, repeated
argument texts, no foreign domains or GUIDs, the 2048-char host truncation cap with
the four known over-cap texts listed). scripts/audit-catalog.ts dumps and sizes the
catalog per role for before/after measurements.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 14:02:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1b27babd17 ci: zizmor gate for the workflow files plus a clean baseline (D-268)
zizmor (static analysis for GitHub Actions) now runs twice: locally before a
workflow commit (hard rule in .claude/CLAUDE.md) and as the `zizmor` job next to
the pin gate in action-pins.yml (zizmorcore/zizmor-action pinned by SHA, zizmor
1.30.1 pinned, SARIF into Code scanning, severity low and above). Like the pin
gate it reports and does not block. zizmor.yml holds the single reasoned ignore.

Baseline fixes so the gate starts green:
- persist-credentials: false on every checkout except combine-rules.yml, the one
  job that pushes with the checkout credentials (ignored in zizmor.yml, with reason)
- publish-scripts.yml: id-token: write moves from the workflow to the publish job;
  indexnow-notify.yml: permissions: {}
- deploy-mcp.yml: env values referenced as shell variables inside bash steps
  instead of template expansion
- pester.yml / publish-scripts.yml: reusable workflow via the self-repository form
  $/ (GitHub changelog 2026-07-30); the pin gate treats $/ like ./
- combine-rules.yml: ajv-cli installed with npm ci from rules/scripts/package-lock.json
  (no ts-node peer, no lifecycle scripts) instead of an ad-hoc global install;
  Dependabot watches /rules/scripts
- azure/login pin comment corrected to the tag the SHA actually is (v3.0.2; v3
  moved on to v3.1.0), no runtime change
- Dependabot: 7-day cooldown on every ecosystem (security updates are exempt)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 12:56:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 100d2242fa chore: regenerate shared manifest and wire types (TenantManagerItem.Name doc)
The XML summary added on TenantManagerItem.Name in ef280b7b rides into
shared-manifests.json as the field's doc; CI run 35701895623 caught the drift.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 10:02:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 089b1b38fd Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-09-22 09:53:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ac465839a5 chore: bump internal (backlog B-umq for D-267)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 09:52:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ef280b7bb5 fix(backend): managed tenants see operator-provisioned access as "Platform support"
GET delegations/managers no longer exposes the name of an operator-created
Tenant Group to the customer; both operator shapes (groups and direct grants)
carry the neutral label. Assignees, reader count and source stay visible.
Web badge reads "Provisioned by operators". D-267.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 09:52:00 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 233737f333 chore(deps-dev): bump the web group (#159)
Bumps the web group in /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web with 2 updates: [@types/node](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/node) and [autoprefixer](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer).


Updates `@types/node` from 22.20.2 to 22.20.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/node)

Updates `autoprefixer` from 10.5.6 to 10.6.1
- [Release notes](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/compare/10.5.6...10.6.1)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: "@types/node"
  dependency-version: 22.20.4
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: autoprefixer
  dependency-version: 10.6.1
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-22 09:29:05 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 909904e928 chore(deps): bump the mcp group (#158)
Bumps the mcp group in /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp with 2 updates: [zod](https://github.com/colinhacks/zod) and [@types/node](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/node).


Updates `zod` from 4.6.2 to 4.6.5
- [Release notes](https://github.com/colinhacks/zod/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/colinhacks/zod/compare/v4.6.2...v4.6.5)

Updates `@types/node` from 22.20.2 to 22.20.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/node)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: zod
  dependency-version: 4.6.5
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
- dependency-name: "@types/node"
  dependency-version: 22.20.4
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-22 09:28:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 59ab47de8c chore: bump internal (D-266 network link changes are not activity)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 00:48:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f252a0709f fix(agent): network link changes no longer count as enrollment activity
network_state_change and network_connectivity_check join the non-activity
list next to power_state_change. A flapping dock or access point kept the
idle-stopped periodic collectors running for the whole episode and reset
the stall clock of the enrollment it was stalling. The events are emitted
unchanged; the device-info network snapshots stay activity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 00:48:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d6d9638981 chore: bump internal (D-265 recurring health-script runs, backlog B-c6h)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 00:38:55 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 020248fbda feat(agent): collapse recurring health-script runs into one summary per policy
IME re-runs remediation policies on its own schedule for as long as the
device is up, so an enrollment that waits for its user reported every run
of every policy. The tracker now emits a policy's first run and every run
whose result differs from the last reported one (compliance, exit code,
stderr, remediation status, error code); repeats are counted and surface
as one script_recurrence_summary per policy when the tracker stops.

The start signal of a known policy is held until its result is known,
because the running indicators pair a start with a later result; a start
without any result is still emitted after a grace. The counters live in
the tracker state file next to the file positions, so a hard kill rolls
both back together. Platform scripts are untouched. The summary does not
count as enrollment activity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 00:38:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a06a0dbfff chore: bump internal (D-264 emergency break stays a start-time check, backlog B-drn)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 00:08:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 96c24e0688 chore: bump internal (D-263 excessive-events recount, backlog B-7wp)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 23:46:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c156350183 fix(backend): excessive-events sweep warns and blocks on recounted rows
The stored EventCount doubles on replayed upload batches and was only
corrected at terminal transitions, so the sweep judged running sessions on
an inflated number. It now recounts a candidate before it records the ops
event or blocks the device, skips candidates it cannot verify, and limits
the recount to candidates with a pending action. The warn text no longer
claims an agent loop bug.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 23:45:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 15b25ff509 chore: bump internal (D-261 typed wrapper bodies, D-262 req.Query, backlog B-t5z)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 22:31:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5163d7d6a0 refactor(backend): read the request query through req.Query only
73 sites in 68 files built the query collection with
HttpUtility.ParseQueryString(req.Url.Query), 15 files used req.Query and five mixed
both. HttpRequestData.Query is that same call, cached per request, and the ASP.NET
Core request type does not override it, so the change is behaviour-neutral.

- QueryParamGuardTests: ParseQueryString in the Functions project is limited to a
  named baseline of three sites that parse something other than the request query.
- A fact pins req.Query against HttpUtility.ParseQueryString (repeated keys, encoded
  values, caching) so a worker update that changes the implementation fails a test.
- Test mocks that set Url answer Query through CallBase; a loose mock returns null.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 22:28:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9fd343d328 fix(backend): typed bodies and error envelope for backup, session-restore and delegation wrappers
Six functions wrote their responses through a private wrapper taking the body as
object, which no typed-response guard could see. Their error bodies carried the code
in the error slot, no correlation id, and RestoreRow returned the raw exception text
on a 500.

- Backup job status, row restore and backup trigger answer through ResponseHelper:
  errors are the envelope, the 500 is sanitized, the 202 body is BackupTriggerResponse.
- Same for the session-deletion maintenance trigger, RestoreSession's three error
  sites and the delegation acknowledgements (MessageResponse).
- Backup codes are constants (Constants.BackupErrorCodes) and part of apiErrorCodes;
  RunAlreadyActive and EnqueueFailed join ApiErrorCodes.
- TypedResponseGuardTests gains guard F: no HttpResponseData-returning method with an
  object parameter. BackupWireParityTests pins that the move from the backup
  serializer options to the worker pipeline leaves the wire unchanged.
- Web reads BackupTriggerResponse from the generated wire types.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 22:19:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach aef88f3337 chore: bump internal (IME archiver pre-walk check doc, backlog B-ryg)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 20:59:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 12af1d6c76 fix(backend): IME archiver accepts an existing archive entry before walking the hosts
A version whose installer was already in the archive could only turn
Archived through the 409 on the write-once upload, which needs a
distribution host that still serves the build. For a version no host
serves any more the row stayed Failed:VersionMismatch next to its own
blob and re-walked every host once a day.

The archiver now checks the archive first: an entry whose ProductVersion
is the observed version ends the job as Archived with the hash and size
of the archived bytes and no download; a missing provenance sidecar is
written without a source URL. An entry holding another build, or an
unreadable one, is not accepted and the walk runs as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 20:58:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5433bff3db chore: bump internal (navbar profile photo plan and backlog)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 17:40:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 355509aa7c feat(web): show the signed-in user's profile photo in the navbar avatar
The browser loads the photo straight from Microsoft Graph with the User.Read
scope already consented at sign-in; it never reaches the backend. Any failure
(no photo, token, network) falls back to the initials. One request per account
and tab, cached in sessionStorage including the no-photo answer.

The four copied avatar blocks in the navbar become one UserAvatar component.
Graph host added to the URL registry and to connect-src in both CSPs; the
privacy page states where the photo comes from and that it is not stored.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 17:39:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7fb78a7e29 update pointer 2026-09-21 15:31:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach bfd8d58142 chore: bump internal (WNS deck plan)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 15:27:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8ad472d1bc fix(agent): single-instance guard counts a same-named process only in session 0
A process name is not a protected namespace: any user session can keep a
binary named like the agent resident, which made every agent start during
that session exit 1 before registration and let install mode report a
runtime launch that never happened.

The guard and install mode's launch verification now share one rule
(FindSiblingAgentPid): a name match counts only in session 0 and never for
the caller itself. Every runtime start lands there (Scheduled Task, WMI
launch from the SYSTEM install chain, self-update restart), so behaviour
for real agents is unchanged. The session id comes from the process
snapshot, so no handle is opened; a process that cannot be read does not
count, which fails open into two agents rather than none.

Two interactive --console runs in the same user session no longer block
each other; an interactive run next to the session-0 runtime still does.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 15:23:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fc5e2cd751 chore: bump internal (D-259 final, SLA plan and backlog)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 15:10:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9540791441 fix(web): SLA page headlines the window the alerts judge and shows "No data" for an empty period
Banner and the success-rate/duration gauges read the evaluation period
(last 30 days) instead of the current ISO week and name the window in their
labels; the app install gauge says "this week". A target whose period holds
no finished enrollment renders a neutral "No data" card and is left out of
the banner count; with nothing to judge the banner is neutral.

Banner logic moved to lib/slaStatus.ts (pure, tested).

Needs the backend of the previous commit: the page reads
evaluationPeriod / evaluationWindowDays.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 15:08:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 058da1627f fix(sla): alert and dashboard judge one rolling 30-day window; an empty period is no data; a lasting breach repeats only on new enrollments
The SLA breach alert judged the calendar month while the dashboard headline
showed the current ISO week, so an alert could report 78 % while the page it
links to showed 0 everywhere - and an empty week rendered as 0.0 % "Breached".

- SlaEvaluationWindow is the single definition of the SLA populations:
  success rate and P95 duration on terminal sessions of the last 30 days
  (rolling), app installs on the install attempts of the current ISO week.
  The breach evaluator and SlaMetricsService both read it, including the
  one-decimal rounding, so the value shown is the value judged.
- SlaMetricsResponse carries EvaluationPeriod and EvaluationWindowDays;
  SlaSnapshot carries Period and HasData. A period without a finished
  enrollment meets every target flag and is marked HasData = false.
- The dashboard reads from whichever starts earlier, the selected months or
  the evaluation window; trend and violators stay on the selected months.
- A lasting breach is notified again only after the cooldown AND once
  something finished since the last notification. A new breach episode after
  a resolve still notifies. Resolve notifications are unchanged.
- Alert period fact and telemetry tag follow the window constant.
- SlaMetricsService takes a nowProvider; the week-boundary workaround in its
  tests is gone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 15:08:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach cb9b3fe404 fix(agent): diagnostics paths collect exactly the folder the guard validated, and never the hard-blocked event logs
A configured diagnostics entry is resolved once to folder, pattern and recursion, and
that target is what gets validated and enumerated; recursion asks the guard before
entering a subfolder, and the user-profile token is expanded before validation.
Security, PowerShell and Sysmon event logs are refused per file, by name and by
resolved channel, in every mode; the portal flags such a path before it is saved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 14:58:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 12315b2f2d fix(web): Monitoring nav is ordered by admin usage, Progress Portal moves to the end
Directly under Dashboard the Progress Portal collected misclicks: 418 of 1,050
admin page views in 90 days went on to the dashboard within 5 seconds, from
every origin page. It is the end-user page; regular users keep it as their only
entry via REGULAR_USER_ITEMS. Annotations showed the same walk-through pattern
and moves down with it. Fleet Health, Geographic Perf. and Software lead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 13:56:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0a4a051866 feat(web): dashboard stat cards get one descriptive icon per metric, red only when sessions failed
All five cards showed the same bar-chart glyph on a differently coloured
block, so the colour carried no meaning. Each card now has a small grey
outline icon for its metric (pulse, check, stopwatch, calendar, x) in the
top-right corner, and the label gets the freed width. Failed Today turns
its value and icon red only when the count is above zero and reads
"No failures" at zero.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 13:40:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f47d961947 fix(web): rule pages tell non-admins that contributing is admin-only instead of failing with 403
The analyze and gather rule pages loaded the community submissions list for
every role. rules/submissions is TenantAdminOrGA, so an Operator or Viewer got
a 403 and a red "Failed to load your community submissions" banner on every
page visit (16 denials in 24 h from two operators of one tenant).

The pages now skip the list for callers who cannot read it and the
contribution box says that only tenant admins can contribute and follow the
tenant's submissions. Tenant admins, Global Admins and a global-scope override
are unchanged; the backend policy stays as it is.

Bumps the internal and .claude/commands gitlinks (platform-health marker
catalog, backlog).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 13:27:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c701d0d694 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-09-19 14:40:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d4a3edf849 fix(offboarding): a completed run removes the tenant's superseded dead letters (D-256)
A retry after a poisoned offboarding is a new envelope with a new history
row, and nothing ever deleted from a poison queue. The dead letter of the
failed run therefore stayed until its 7-day TTL and kept the poison backlog
alert firing daily for a tenant that was already gone.

TenantOffboardingHandler.HandleAsync now reports a TenantOffboardingOutcome.
On Completed the worker receives tenant-offboarding-poison in batches and
deletes the envelopes of that tenant; other tenants' and malformed messages
reappear untouched. The sweep never throws: a failure there would keep the
completed envelope on the main queue and end with a Completed run in poison.
A re-pickup of a completed envelope sweeps again.

Other poison queues stay terminal on purpose; their failures have no later
success that supersedes the dead letter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-19 14:09:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e164eac1eb feat(backend,web): manual maintenance trigger answers 202, the run is single-flight (D-255)
The trigger ran the whole maintenance inside the HTTP request (about three
minutes against a 230 s gateway limit): the portal reported a timeout while the
run went on, a second click started a second run, and nothing serialized those
runs against each other or against the 2h timer.

Backend
- MaintenanceRunGate: the timer and the manual run enter through one blob
  lease. A held lease writes MaintenanceSkippedLocked and runs nothing;
  MaintenanceStarted is written after the lease is held, the lease is released
  last.
- POST maintenance/trigger validates the date, probes the lease (409 while a
  run is active), enqueues on maintenance-trigger (fail-hard) and answers 202
  with the typed TriggerMaintenanceResponse. MaintenanceTriggerQueueWorker
  (self-polling) runs it; a failing or skipped run is not retried.
- The run report travels in the details of MaintenanceCompleted.
- BlobLeaseLockStore is the shared base of the lease lock stores;
  SessionDeletionMaintenanceLockStore derives from it, behaviour unchanged.
- The probe lets a failed lease release surface as 5xx: a probe lease still
  held at worker pickup would turn the queued run into a silent skip.

Web
- useOpsRunStatus: run status from ops events (latest Started newer than the
  latest Completed/Failed = active), used by the session-cleanup banner
  (rendering unchanged) and the maintenance trigger section.
- Trigger section: queued / already-active messages, status line, polls every
  15 s while a run is active, button disabled meanwhile. The 230 s fetch
  timeout is gone.

Shared manifest, generated wire types and the MCP ops-event vocabulary
regenerated (two new ops event types, reshaped response).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-19 13:50:06 +02:00
Claude c81591b498 feat(offboarding): operator retry of a Failed tenant offboarding from Tenant Management
A Failed offboarding was a dead end: the worker returns early on a Failed
history, the offboard re-click refuses to re-enqueue on a Failed marker, and
the marker cleanup only warns. Recovery meant deleting the marker row in Table
Storage by hand, while the tenant sat in the list as a tombstone counted on the
Waitlist (its whitelist row is wiped early in the cascade).

- GET global/tenants/{tenantId}/offboarding returns the offboarding record
  (marker status, failed phase, attempts, history details) as the typed
  TenantOffboardingStatusResponse; GA + Reader, never delegated.
- POST global/tenants/{tenantId}/offboarding/retry re-drives a Failed run: the
  History row keeps its RowKey and DrainCompletedAt (the worker's resume anchor)
  and counts the retry, marker and history go back to Initiated, the ordinary
  resume path re-affirms the Disabled-gate, waits out the remaining drain
  barrier and enqueues the envelope. Completed / in-flight answer 409, no
  marker 404, a missing history row 500 before any write. Global audit row
  RETRY/TenantOffboarding. Nothing retries on its own.
- Tenant editor: an "Offboarding" card replaces the Offboard action while the
  cascade owns the row (status, started by, attempts, failed phase and error);
  Failed offers "Retry offboarding…" behind the type-to-confirm dialog in its
  retry variant.
- Tenant list: tombstone rows carry an Offboarding badge (own Status facet)
  instead of Suspended, and no longer count as Waitlist.
- Tests: retry decision (reset order, drain anchor, conflicts, not found,
  enqueue failure, remaining-barrier delay), status projection, wire parity
  facts, filter facet. Shared manifest and generated wire types regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XPG5WCmSwfNAv4xkK62n5r
2026-09-18 10:30:06 +00:00
Oliver Kieselbach d8c03d9d95 fix(web): manual maintenance trigger waits for the run instead of timing out at 30 s
The run answers when it is done (about three minutes); the default fetch
timeout reported "signal timed out" although the run completed, which invites
a second click and a second run. Wait up to the gateway limit of 230 s.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 11:18:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ffb133f0b9 fix(backend): platform counters no longer freeze under retention (D-254)
The landing-page counters stood still since D-198: the two-hourly recompute
was their only writer and merged Max(live figure, stored figure), while
retention prunes the live figure below the stored one - so new enrollments
never showed up again.

- Hot path increments the per-tenant counters only (CAS): enrollments at the
  fresh registration, successes at the one status seam every Succeeded writer
  passes (transitioned && Succeeded), events per ingest batch. No batch
  touches the global row.
- The maintenance run floors the tenant counters at the live figures (one
  multi-field write per tenant), sums the tenant rows and adds the growth
  since the previous run to the platform row. The previous sums live in a
  baseline row written in one transaction with the platform row. A total is
  never derived from an absolute figure again: a shrinking source (retention,
  offboarding) costs the growth of one interval instead of freezing the
  counter. Without a baseline the sum is a lower bound only.
- TotalTenants rolls up the tenant rows with enrollments, UniqueDeviceModels
  a persisted set of seen models. TotalUsers stays a high-water-mark (a
  persisted user set would outlive the user-activity retention).
- The platform row is merged with its read ETag and never carries
  IssuesDetected: the former full-row upsert undid every increment that
  landed during the run.
- Reads that feed the baseline are not fail-soft, and a floor that could not
  be written skips the rollup of that run - a swallowed zero would be added
  as growth a second time.

Shared manifest and generated wire types: doc comment of PlatformStats only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 10:48:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b3fe321f0d fix(offboarding): owned-group wipe no longer poisons every tenant offboarding
The wipe of the tenant's own self-service Tenant Group handed the derived
group id ("msp-{tenantId}") to the tenant-GUID entry points of SafeWipeService.
Their GUID guard threw on every attempt, so each offboarding since the
self-service delegation change ran into max_dequeue and ended Failed after the
tenant tables were already wiped.

- SafeWipeService: WipeByOwnedGroupPartitionAsync / WipeByOwnedGroupRowKeyAsync
  take the tenant GUID and derive the group id themselves; matching filters in
  OffboardingFilters.
- The public wipe entry points are no longer virtual: they validate and hand
  over to protected virtual cores. Test fakes override the cores only, so the
  guard runs under every fake. With the old handler code 16 handler tests fail
  on the guard, which is how this shipped unnoticed.
- Tests: handler regression on the owned-group anchors, owned-group variants
  incl. verify-abort on a foreign group, filter shapes and guards.

Deploy and recovery of the stuck offboarding: B-5g6.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 09:41:21 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 69d210c51d chore(deps): bump the mcp group (#156)
Bumps the mcp group in /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp with 3 updates: [compression](https://github.com/expressjs/compression), [zod](https://github.com/colinhacks/zod) and [@types/node](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/node).


Updates `compression` from 1.8.1 to 1.8.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/expressjs/compression/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/expressjs/compression/blob/master/HISTORY.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/expressjs/compression/compare/v1.8.1...v1.8.2)

Updates `zod` from 4.5.4 to 4.6.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/colinhacks/zod/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/colinhacks/zod/compare/v4.5.4...v4.6.2)

Updates `@types/node` from 22.20.1 to 22.20.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/node)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: compression
  dependency-version: 1.8.2
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
- dependency-name: zod
  dependency-version: 4.6.2
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: mcp
- dependency-name: "@types/node"
  dependency-version: 22.20.2
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-15 11:33:51 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 06a88e9897 chore(deps): bump the web group (#157)
Bumps the web group in /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web with 10 updates:

| Package | From | To |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [@microsoft/applicationinsights-web](https://github.com/microsoft/ApplicationInsights-JS) | `3.4.3` | `3.4.4` |
| [next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js) | `16.3.4` | `16.3.5` |
| [react](https://github.com/react/react/tree/HEAD/packages/react) | `19.2.8` | `19.3.0` |
| [@types/react](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/react) | `19.2.18` | `19.3.0` |
| [react-dom](https://github.com/react/react/tree/HEAD/packages/react-dom) | `19.2.8` | `19.3.0` |
| [@types/react-dom](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/react-dom) | `19.2.7` | `19.3.0` |
| [@next/bundle-analyzer](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/next-bundle-analyzer) | `16.3.4` | `16.3.5` |
| [@types/node](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/node) | `22.20.1` | `22.20.2` |
| [autoprefixer](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer) | `10.5.5` | `10.5.6` |
| [eslint-config-next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/eslint-config-next) | `16.3.4` | `16.3.5` |


Updates `@microsoft/applicationinsights-web` from 3.4.3 to 3.4.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/microsoft/ApplicationInsights-JS/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/microsoft/ApplicationInsights-JS/blob/main/RELEASES.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/microsoft/ApplicationInsights-JS/commits)

Updates `next` from 16.3.4 to 16.3.5
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/compare/v16.3.4...v16.3.5)

Updates `react` from 19.2.8 to 19.3.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/react/react/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/react/react/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/react/react/commits/v19.3.0/packages/react)

Updates `@types/react` from 19.2.18 to 19.3.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/react)

Updates `react-dom` from 19.2.8 to 19.3.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/react/react/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/react/react/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/react/react/commits/v19.3.0/packages/react-dom)

Updates `@types/react-dom` from 19.2.7 to 19.3.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/react-dom)

Updates `@next/bundle-analyzer` from 16.3.4 to 16.3.5
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.5/packages/next-bundle-analyzer)

Updates `@types/node` from 22.20.1 to 22.20.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/node)

Updates `@types/react` from 19.2.18 to 19.3.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/react)

Updates `@types/react-dom` from 19.2.7 to 19.3.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/react-dom)

Updates `autoprefixer` from 10.5.5 to 10.5.6
- [Release notes](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/compare/10.5.5...10.5.6)

Updates `eslint-config-next` from 16.3.4 to 16.3.5
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.5/packages/eslint-config-next)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: "@microsoft/applicationinsights-web"
  dependency-version: 3.4.4
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: next
  dependency-version: 16.3.5
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: react
  dependency-version: 19.3.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@types/react"
  dependency-version: 19.3.0
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: react-dom
  dependency-version: 19.3.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@types/react-dom"
  dependency-version: 19.3.0
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@next/bundle-analyzer"
  dependency-version: 16.3.5
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@types/node"
  dependency-version: 22.20.2
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@types/react"
  dependency-version: 19.3.0
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@types/react-dom"
  dependency-version: 19.3.0
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: autoprefixer
  dependency-version: 10.5.6
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: eslint-config-next
  dependency-version: 16.3.5
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-15 11:33:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach aee30f68e8 chore(submodule): tenant-management-filters plan and deploy item B-h7n
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-15 11:29:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3db9a884de feat(web): facet filters for the Tenant Management list
Replaces the two Ready/Waitlist toggles with a Filter popover of five
facets (Plan, Paying, Trial, App registration, Status): OR within a
facet, AND across facets, each option carrying the count it would match
under the other facets, active selections as removable chips, and a
plan breakdown (Community / Pro with paying / Trial / MSP) over all
tenants in the statistics line.

The list badge, the filter and the edit modal now derive the effective
edition through one function; a trial-only tenant reads "Pro (Trial)"
in the list instead of "Community". The App facet is bound to the
dual-app parallel window (legacyConfigured), like the badge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-15 11:28:57 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0037b8cb12 chore(submodule): WDP docs push and Cloud PC automatic-mode backlog items
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-12 23:59:48 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 205b13dbb9 chore(submodule): backlog items for the ARM64 requirements docs push
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-12 23:24:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b938a03367 chore(submodule): backlog item for the published-DPA deploy
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 23:36:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d474c2be9f fix(web): privacy and terms point to the published DPA instead of "available on request"
The DPA is published in the customer docs and accepted on the Get started
page before the first sign-in (D-251); the onboarding records the accepted
version on the tenant (D-252). The legal pages still described it as
available on request and as a Pro-only signed document.

- privacy: the Roles section says the DPA is published, applies to both
  plans, is accepted at sign-up with the version recorded, and that an
  individually signed DPA prevails; External Services links the DPA and its
  sub-processor list; Changes no longer hinges on "if you hold a signed
  DPA"; Contact no longer offers to send one.
- terms: the DPA is no longer listed as a Pro differentiator; Security and
  Transparency links the DPA as applying to both plans. Last updated
  11 September 2026.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 23:35:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 96390beeb9 chore(submodule): drop the separate todo file from the working-file rules
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 23:29:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fe63a0a352 chore(submodule): park the zone-anchoring plan behind B-ugv
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 22:02:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2e36e9c234 fix(web): Fleet Health model rows without failures link to all sessions of the model — the "Health by Device Model" deep link carried status=Failed unconditionally, so a 100 % row landed on a list that is empty by definition; the Failed filter now travels only when the bucket has failed sessions, and the link title says which list opens
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 22:00:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b83aa6d97d chore(submodule): plan for the AgentExecutor.log zone-anchoring defect
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 21:52:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f42fcbcb3c fix(web): the app/script panel divider names the ESP phase, not the assignment — sections read "Device Setup" / "Account Setup" from the phase timeline's table with a tooltip that device-assigned work runs under Account Setup too (a Cloud PC runs its device scripts after the user signed in), Device Preparation sessions get no divider, and user-assigned app and download rows carry a User pill from the extension's own targeting
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 21:48:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f70ba354f8 feat(web): additional managed tenants are add-ons — the Pro plan card reads "2 managed tenants included, additional tenants as add-ons" and a full slot count in Delegated Access suggests buying add-ons instead of asking for a larger package
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 20:03:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fc17047290 feat(web): plan cards — the Pro MSP line says 2 managed tenants are included and more are available on request
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 19:54:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7bbc2cbddf feat(backend): the tenant row records the accepted DPA version — HandleNewTenantDomainAsync writes Constants.CurrentDpaVersion (2026-09-1.7) into TenantConfiguration.DpaVersion in the same first write as OnboardedBy, once, and later logins never touch it; the field is system-owned (patch deny-list, PUT preserve, revert-protected), projected by config/all, the MCP tenant list and the GA tenant report; no backfill (D-252)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 19:30:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9a78daa880 chore(submodule): work files — D-251 settled (DPA accepted with the onboarding)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 19:05:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5d532d3dbc feat(web): Pro is available — /buy hands off to Microsoft Marketplace and Cleverbridge (no price on the page), the plan cards show the list price of €149 / month, the self-service 30-day trial opens in the portal Plan section, and the get-started sign-in waits for a Terms of Use + DPA tick (D-251)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 18:45:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a22c26eb9d feat(web): session detail — the Download, Install and Script panels mark where the user phase begins: a quiet "Device phase" caption over the first row and a "User phase" divider before the first row that started after the device entered Account Setup, so user-targeted apps and user-context scripts stand out; sessions without a user phase render unchanged
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 17:28:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b84c467255 chore(web): admin settings nav — Config Reseed and Usage Plans move up behind Diagnostics Log Paths so the MCP-related entries (Usage Plans, MCP Users, Delegated Admins, Tenant Groups) sit together
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 17:02:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 53124e94a6 feat(web): Optional Graph capabilities — tick features in the table to build the grant command (all ticked ⇒ -Features All, ScriptDisplayNames pre-ticked), Copy permissions follows the selection, and the grant card names Azure Cloud Shell as a run location
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 16:48:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 838068fd31 chore(submodule): work files for the MCP quota build (D-250) — commit hashes and the staging-list lesson
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 16:46:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 71282f3556 feat(backend,web,mcp): the MCP quota follows the delegating tenant — every request is checked and counted on the caller's home tenant, a managed tenant is never charged or blocked by its manager's reads, and every delegation slot bought beyond the edition's included ones grows both the account and the organization windows by operator-editable per-slot values (D-250)
Backend/Shared:
- McpQuotaService: ResolveHomeAsync reads definitions, entitlements, plan name and purchased slots once per check; Grow adds slots × per-slot value to every window (a lifted window stays unlimited); the decision and McpPlanLimits carry the breakdown; CheckManyAsync, the charge scope and TargetTenantId are gone
- McpQuotaEnforcementMiddleware: one home charge for every caller; IsExempt = Global Admin only (counted, never blocked; the Global Reader stays quota'd); two 429 texts (organization / user)
- TenantEntitlementService.GetPurchasedDelegatedSlots = max(0, effective slot limit − catalog count), 0 without the delegation right; FeatureEntitlementCatalog gains McpSlot*RequestLimit (Pro 300/6000 per account, 900/18000 per organization = 30 % of the Pro windows; Community and conferred Pro 0)
- PlanTierDefinition gains four nullable slot fields; GET/PUT global/config/plan-tiers return the catalog (UsagePlanCatalogDefaults per edition) so a blank field is explained
- McpUsageQuotaNode / McpOrganizationQuotaNode carry purchasedDelegatedSlots and the slot values (absent without purchased slots)
- Removed: the Tenant Group flag ChargeHomeTenantQuota with its scope plumbing (HomeChargedTenantIds, IsDelegatedAggregate, CatalogDecisionResult), Narrow/quotaExcludedTenants on the session envelopes and the X-MCP-Quota-Excluded-Tenants header, targetTenantId on the 429 body, the foreign-home attribution on McpTenantUsage (HomeTenantId, delegated/homeTenantId on the organization report) and the managed tenant's budget on the manager's managed-tenant list; PATCH global/tenant-groups/{id} is a rename

Web: SectionUsagePlans with four slot inputs, catalog placeholders and a built-in-defaults line; SectionMcpUsage renders "base + slots × per-slot" on both cards and drops the delegated badge; SectionTenantGroups without the charge toggle; SectionDelegatedAccess, the accept page and the privacy page state the new model (privacy last updated 2026-09-11).
MCP: get_fleet_overview no longer merges an exclusion list, the 429 renderer names only the caller's organization, the delegated-scope instruction states the home-charge model; wire types regenerated.
Tests: quota service slot-growth suite, entitlement purchased-slot matrix, conferred-Pro self-service writes (403/409), parity facts for the new and the removed fields; the radar analytics fixture is dated off the real clock (it had aged out of the 30-day window).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 16:46:27 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7080dcc45a fix(backend): rule catalogs — a GitHub reseed newer than the deployed build closes the embedded self-seed (RuleCatalogStamp), the IME self-seed sunsets retired patterns, and IME pattern health reads the global partition instead of the embedded catalog (D-249)
The self-seed of every fresh backend instance treated the embedded catalog as authoritative and wrote it over a newer GitHub reseed: on 2026-09-11 it re-inserted PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE three hours after the reseed had deleted it (D-248), so agents ran 83 patterns. Every explicit reseed now stamps its kind in AdminConfiguration (PK RuleCatalog); the three self-seeds do nothing while a github stamp is newer than BackendBuildInfo.BuildUtc, and an empty table is still seeded from the binary. The IME self-seed deletes built-in rows the embedded catalog no longer ships.

ImePatternHealthService (health matrix and the ime_pattern_hits ingest filter) takes the pattern list from the seeded global partition via ImeLogPatternService.GetGlobalCatalogAsync, never from BuiltInImeLogPatterns, so the health page and the drift statistics follow a reseed without a deploy; the response carries catalog { source, stampedAt, patternCount } (manifests regenerated, web line, MCP description).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 12:09:18 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5a62714dc2 chore(submodule): fleet baseline for the IME overwrite fix (40.7 % fallback before, 0 % after) and the P6 todo
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 03:46:37 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c930d18f1e feat(agent,mcp): the IME log tracker's poll-loop pauses become measurable — longest pass and longest gap between passes as session maxima in agent_metrics_snapshot, ime_pattern_hits and the MCP coverage block (B-wr4)
Test-VM session c3ecb568 (2.0.1460): the tracker loop was not scheduled for 26 s at 100 %
VM CPU while the rest of the agent kept running; five results were read before their
executor end blocks — held and completed correctly (D-247) — and nothing in the fleet
telemetry could have shown the pause (ime_backlog_bytes is an instantaneous value).

- ImeLogTracker.RunPollPassAsync hosts the loop body (file reads, the pending-completion
  flush, the token-failure window) and times it on a monotonic clock (MonotonicMillisProvider,
  Stopwatch in production): PassMaxMs = longest single pass (time INSIDE — reads, ledger
  verification, regex), PassGapMaxMs = longest pause between the end of one pass and the
  start of the next (the 100 ms delay, SaveState and any scheduling delay). Restart-safe
  like the other health counters (TrackerHealthData); ImeTrackerHealth carries both.
- agent_metrics_snapshot: ime_pass_max_ms / ime_pass_gap_max_ms; ime_pattern_hits:
  passMaxMs / passGapMaxMs.
- MCP session coverage: sessionTotals.passMaxMs / passGapMaxMs, and from 5 s on a note that
  says the lines were read late, not lost — every event keeps its log line's timestamp; the
  overwrite note and the pause note join when both apply.
- Tests: ImeLogTrackerPollTimingTests (maxima over three passes with a fake clock, fresh
  tracker at zero, restart keeps and never lowers them); MCP coverage tests for the note
  threshold. Agent suite 2941 green, solution build 0 warnings, MCP tsc clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 03:41:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 583c81c9a8 chore(submodule): IME overwrite fix verified in the field (2.0.1460, five held results), B-pd2/B-2rs closed, B-wr4 opened
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 03:26:40 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 483ec8b8e0 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-09-11 02:55:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 328446864a chore(submodule): todo for P5 of the IME overwrite fix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 02:53:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 106480ef52 fix(agent,rules): health-script lines never feed a platform-script slot — PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE deleted, HS-INVOCATION opens an unowned invocation in the IME log, the no-marker fallback stays within files platform runs open in (D-248)
Test-VM session 24dc69d1 (2.0.1459) had the overwrite geometry the result hold (D-247)
was built for, yet the hold never fired: "Powershell execution is done, exitCode = 0" —
written by IME's health-script worker (AgentCommon ScriptWorker) to both
IntuneManagementExtension.log and HealthScripts.log — was read as PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE and
attributed to the pending platform script c81b8053 1.2 s before its executor even started
(IME-log marker: the last PS-SCRIPT-GENERATED; HealthScripts.log: the no-marker fallback to
the last platform start). The completion went out at the result line with the foreign exit
code, and the run's own end block, recovered 150 ms later by the rewind, was dropped as
already emitted. Both codes were 0 by luck; a failing health script would have turned a
succeeded platform script into script_failed. The worker's launch line flipped the pending
script's context the same way (338d9434, twice in one run).

- rules: PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE deleted — the line is health-script-only (3 hits = 3 cycles,
  platform scripts never produce it), HS-EXITCODE already carries the value, and a line that
  lands inside a parallel platform run's window cannot be attributed by position.
  HS-INVOCATION (new): the worker's command line `"…\agentexecutor.exe"  -remediationScript`
  (identical from IME 1.104.102 to 1.105.152) as agentInvocationArgument of a non-powershell
  kind — the launch line it writes next stays with that invocation. Both take effect on the
  next reseed for every agent from 2.0.1458 on.
- tracker: a file without markers resolves to the platform run in flight only when a
  platform run has ever opened in that file (IntuneManagementExtension.log after a rollover,
  AgentExecutor.log); HealthScripts.log and the app logs never qualify. Test seams:
  ProcessLogMessageForTest takes the source file, ClearInvocationMarkersForTest.
- tests: ImeLogTrackerPlatformScriptContaminationTests +5 with the session's real lines —
  the worker's exit line pre-fills nothing, its launch line flips no context, HealthScripts.log
  lines resolve to no platform script, the context line after an IME-log rollover still finds
  the run in flight, and no shipped pattern reads the worker's exit line.
- rules/dist regenerated (node rules/scripts/combine.js); analyze-rules.json catches up with
  ANALYZE-OFFICE-001 1.1.1 (6657c6b9 was committed without its dist).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 02:52:43 +02:00
github-actions[bot] d3a45f958d chore: regenerate rules/dist + generated TS from individual files 2026-09-11 00:29:54 +00:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6657c6b9c0 fix(rules): ANALYZE-OFFICE-001 explains what the detector actually reports
office_install_failed is emitted only for an error code in the C2R INSTALL scenario; a window without on-disk proof ends silently. The old text described a StreamingFinished-based failure and attributed the early "done" of the built-in app type to IME, which never sees Office CSP installs. Text only, version 1.1.1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 02:28:12 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6c5e2fd921 chore(submodule): IME overwrite plan closed as RELEASED after the 2.0.1459 test-VM run
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 02:04:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 65842b87bf chore(submodule): todo for P4 of the IME overwrite fix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 01:34:01 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b323c52364 fix(agent): a platform script's IME result waits for its executor end block before the completion is emitted; a start line older than the emitted result never opens a new run (D-247)
The first agent with the ledger (2.0.1458, session e7f3c910) lost nothing — 16/16 results,
20/20 end blocks, 20 rewinds — yet 3 of 16 completions carried no exit code and one policy
got an agentexecutor_fallback duplicate. The IME result line reaches the tracker before the
AgentExecutor.log end block of the same run: always when the block was overwritten (the check
the result triggers recovers it one pass later), often without any overwrite (the
AgentExecutor.log read of a pass precedes the IME log read by tens of milliseconds while the
exit line and the result line are 8–30 ms apart), and whenever the poll loop stalls (2 s at
100 % VM CPU). Emitting at the result line dropped every recovered end block, and the late
start line reopened the slot, cleared the emitted-marker and the fallback emitted the same
run again 15 s later.

- CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResult (one core for the handler and the test seam) emits at
  the result line only when the slot has its exit code; otherwise the result stays on the
  slot (ResultObservedAtUtc, ResultPatternId, ResultHeldSinceUtc) and
  FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults — the former FlushStalePlatformScriptResults, still the
  home of the 15 s exit-code fallback — emits it at the end of the pass in which the exit
  code arrived (the block's output lines come with it), at shutdown, or after
  PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace (5 s, wall clock).
- The emitted-marker is a Dictionary keyed by policy id with the run's source timestamp
  (state file: PlatformScriptResultEmittedAt; the old list is read as MinValue). A start
  line strictly older than the emitted result is the late start line of that run: it owns
  the lines behind it in its file, opens no slot, emits no script_started. A start line at
  or after a held result closes the hold as the next run; a start line that meets a slot
  the result opened stamps StartedAtUtc.
- The adapter binds the completion to the result line (ResultObservedAtUtc, patternId =
  ResultPatternId) the way the fallback binds to the exit line, so a held emit keeps its
  timestamp, pattern and duration.
- Exit-code lines whose owner has no pending slot any more log why they are dropped;
  ApplyExitCode is shared by the handler and the test seam.
- Tests: ImeLogTrackerResultHoldTests (11) and ImeLogTrackerAdapterResultHoldTests (1); six
  existing cases that encoded the immediate emit without an exit code now flush explicitly.
  Agent suite 2933 green, solution build 0 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 01:33:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 321a6efc81 chore(submodule): P2 of the IME overwrite fix — plan, concept doc, todo
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 00:14:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5ecb2a998b feat(web,mcp): the IME overwrite counters surface — session page row "Overwritten log blocks recovered"; get_session_summary coverage carries overwriteRewinds/overwriteBytesReprocessed and a recovered-not-missing note, never a gap (D-246, P2)
The agent (v2.0.1458) counts the log blocks it re-read after a concurrent IME process had overwritten bytes behind its bookmark. The IME Tracker rows on the session page show the count and bytes as their own row, apart from Skipped work; the MCP coverage block adds both counters to sessionTotals and, when rewinds > 0, an imeTracker.note saying the script results and exit codes in those blocks are complete — no coverage.gaps line, no degraded flag, so an assistant does not read recovered data as a blind spot. Sessions from older agents carry neither key and show neither.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 00:14:55 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach bb6df93b51 chore(submodule): agent v2.0.1458 released
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 00:02:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 096a049deb chore(submodule): todo for the IME overwrite fix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 23:40:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b9caf524c3 chore(submodules): concept doc, D-246, plan and skill helper for the IME multi-writer overwrite fix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 23:40:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 197de1d718 fix(agent): the IME log tracker verifies and rewinds when a concurrent IME process overwrote bytes behind its bookmark; executor lines belong to the invocation at their file position (D-246)
IME's trace listener opens every log once per process with FileMode.Append and FileShare.ReadWrite
and writes at its own stream position afterwards. AgentExecutor.exe (two processes per user-context
script, one per detection script) has such a listener on AgentExecutor.log and on
IntuneManagementExtension.log, so a process that resumes logging after another one appended
overwrites those bytes: the final file holds the last writer, a byte-position tailer has read the
first version. Session 46749560 lost 6 of 16 platform-script results and 4 of 16 executor end
blocks with every tracker health counter at zero — results fell back to the exit code (one Success
where IME said Failed), one finished script stayed Incomplete. The agentexecutor_fallback results
in the fleet are this race, not late IME logging.

The tracker now keeps a fingerprint ledger of every entry it processed from the two multi-writer
files (FNV-1a 64 over the decoded bytes, one CmTraceEntryAssembler shared by the read loop and the
verification so entry boundaries are identical by construction), verifies it on every script end
signal, on a byte-budgeted cadence while an invocation is in flight (256 KB/s, at least 1 s
apart), in a 4 KB guard zone on every growth pass and on a fragment at the bookmark, and rewinds
to the first changed entry; entries whose (offset, hash) still read unchanged are skipped,
everything else is processed as backlog (never fresh, never a calibration anchor). The
policyId-less executor lines are owned by the nearest preceding invocation marker in their file
(PS-AGENT-ARG opens, PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START upgrades to the platform script, PS-AGENT-INVOCATION and
PS-AGENT-COMPLETED close) instead of a last-started pointer, so an end block a rewind uncovers
reaches its own script. Restart seeds the ledger from the 64 KB behind the persisted bookmark;
a rollover clears it. Four restart-safe counters (ime_overwrite_rewinds,
ime_overwrite_bytes_reprocessed, ime_verify_passes, ime_verified_bytes) ride agent_metrics_snapshot
and ime_pattern_hits — recovered data, not skipped work, no new event type.

Tests: ImeLogTrackerOverwriteRewindTests (15) drive the positional-overwrite write pattern against
both files, including the two field scenarios with the shipped patterns; agent suite 2921 green,
backend known-actions list extended for the two new patterns.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 23:40:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 18d4f08f2b chore(submodule): todo closed for the request-row marker (D-244)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 21:42:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ddf450d87d chore(submodule): plan request-row marker RELEASED (D-244)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 21:41:46 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e3b2113365 chore(submodules): import-session time shift, token, note and scrub semantics; demo import work files (D-242, D-245)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 21:13:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6a85f45604 backend: agent request rows carry the admitting device validator and the proven tenant (D-244)
SecurityValidator stamps ValidatedTenantId once the certificate tenant binding
(or the bootstrap token) proves the tenant, and DeviceValidation once the
device-validation chain has run: the admitting ValidatorType name, None for a
tenant without a validator, Transient for the 503, Rejected for the 403 of
stage device. RequestTelemetryMiddleware resolves the row's TenantId in one
place (policy tenant, proven tenant, then the X-Tenant-Id header only on the
routes that validate it) and copies DeviceValidation as a dimension.

Register, config and upload-url rows carried no TenantId before, so
tenant-filtered KQL missed exactly the calls that run the validation, and the
validators' success line is Information-level and never reaches App Insights.
Proving which validator admitted a device is now one query.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 19:48:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a2d1aedcad fix(web,mcp): a script still running when observation ends is Incomplete, not running forever (D-243)
Session 2ebcd480: the last platform script started 27 s after enrollment_complete and its
start line was the session's last event; two days later the Script Executions panel still
ticked "Running (175306s — stuck?)" in amber with "1 running" in the header. Same blind
spot as D-237, one panel over.

Web: applyObservationEnd in lib/scriptExecutions.ts marks a Running placeholder on a
terminal session as Incomplete (bounded by session.lastEventAt); the row stops ticking and
shows "Incomplete" in slate with the watched span as a lower bound, the header counts
"N incomplete" apart from running/succeeded/failed, and the card keeps its React key across
the live→terminal flip. No backend change: there is no per-script row, and the session
counters count finals only.

MCP: get_session_summary adds coverage.scripts.stillRunning and a coverage.gaps line for
terminal sessions, folded from script_started without a later result — the same rule as the
web placeholder.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 19:10:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e955faa97e Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor 2026-09-10 12:50:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2b755bf99a fix(deps): raise sharp override to ^0.35.4 in MCP and Web (GHSA-rgj7-g3m4-5g8c)
sharp < 0.35.4 bundles a libheif with GHSA-g89c-p67h-r497 and
GHSA-2jg2-4ch7-h545 (Dependabot alert #100, high). Both packages already
pinned sharp through an override; the floor moves to the patched release.
MCP pulls it via @huggingface/transformers, Web via next. Lockfile changes
are limited to sharp, its @img/* binaries and one @emnapi/runtime dedupe.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 12:43:27 +02:00
dependabot[bot] ce1162a055 chore(deps): bump the web-security group across 1 directory with 2 updates (#155)
Bumps the web-security group with 2 updates in the /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web directory: [js-yaml](https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml) and [sharp](https://github.com/lovell/sharp).


Updates `js-yaml` from 4.3.1 to 4.3.2
- [Changelog](https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/blob/4.3.2/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/compare/4.3.1...4.3.2)

Updates `sharp` from 0.35.3 to 0.35.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/lovell/sharp/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/lovell/sharp/compare/v0.35.3...v0.35.4)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: js-yaml
  dependency-version: 4.3.2
  dependency-type: indirect
  dependency-group: web-security
- dependency-name: sharp
  dependency-version: 0.35.4
  dependency-type: indirect
  dependency-group: web-security
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-10 12:10:17 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 447786b447 chore(deps): bump hono (#154)
Bumps the mcp-security group with 1 update in the /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp directory: [hono](https://github.com/honojs/hono).


Updates `hono` from 4.13.0 to 4.13.7
- [Release notes](https://github.com/honojs/hono/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/honojs/hono/compare/v4.13.0...v4.13.7)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: hono
  dependency-version: 4.13.7
  dependency-type: indirect
  dependency-group: mcp-security
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-10 12:01:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2b4dbe087a fix(web,backend): MCP Usage under a tenant override shows only that tenant (D-241 amended)
- GetMcpOrganizationUsageResponse.daily: charged requests per day inside the range from the same McpTenantUsage rows (BuildOrganizationDaily, MSP reads included); manifest + wire types regenerated (web + MCP copy); fold test
- Web: viewing another tenant no longer fetches the caller's own usage — no UPN, plan badge or own quota; the summary tiles and the daily chart come from the tenant's daily series. The own tenant stays the caller's usage page. Internal gitlink.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 03:38:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6804bcfd4e fix(web): Reporting — Global Admin banner and tenant selector in the page header, section control row back to its old layout
The reporting layout (ReportingSidebar) now owns the override-only scope, renders the banner above the header and the selector next to the title like Fleet Health, and hands the scope to the sections through ReportingScopeContext (one hook instance). Delegated callers get neither. Fixes the five-line wrap of the section control row on phones; internal gitlink.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 03:27:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d2221eb0b9 feat(web,backend): MCP Usage page follows the global-admin tenant selector for its organization cards (D-241)
- Backend: GET global/metrics/mcp-usage/organization?tenantId= (GlobalReadOrAdmin, TenantScoping.None on purpose — the route enumerates accounts, so the delegated path stays out; 400 without a GUID, no aggregate); GetMcpOrganizationUsageResponse carries `quota` (tenant plan + daily/monthly windows summed from the same McpTenantUsage rows); McpQuotaService.ResolveTenantPlanAsync with public TenantPlanLimits; two folds tests
- Web: TenantScopeSelector on /settings/reporting/mcp-usage (override-only, hidden for a delegated scope), scopedApi.mcpOrganizationUsage, Organization-quota card from the organization response (falls back to the caller's own node only on the own tenant), latest-wins fetch guard, wording follows the viewpoint
- Manifest + wire types regenerated (web + MCP copy); internal + skills gitlinks

Deploy order: Backend before Web — under a tenant override the page calls the new route.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 03:18:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9ac6de7c7d chore: bump internal gitlink (B-fes reworded to a measurement task)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 02:43:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f5613be495 fix(web): Network Timeline — more headroom above the phase lane so "Completed (timeout)" stays inside the drawing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 02:34:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 819b6c8e4f docs(mcp): correct the query_raw_events cap figure in the payload page-size rationale (250 KB, not 500 KB); internal gitlink
Comment-only. The 500 KB figure is query_table's cap; query_raw_events serializes under
MAX_RESULT_SIZE_CHARS.events = 250 KB. Live 2026-09-10: 100 app_install_failed rows = 193 KB.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 02:33:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9c1fb07f33 fix(web): Network Timeline — session link in portal green; Duration and Asleep tiles name the enrollment figure where the observed span differs
The band and its tiles cover the observed span (until the agent stopped); the
session page measures the enrollment (first activity event → verdict). The
tiles now carry that figure as a sub-line so both pages read the same two
numbers. enrollmentWindowOf in lib/standby.ts is the shared definition, used
by the session hook as well.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 02:28:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fa31872903 fix(agent,engine,web): keep the due time as the deadline stamp; draw timeout verdicts hollow in the Network Timeline (D-238 revised)
Revises 14b185db after the pre-release review. The fleet measurement (30 days,
all tenants) showed 87 of 821 sessions with a sleep episode had their verdict
inside the episode — 59 of them one tenant's self-deploying devices closed two
minutes before the device-only detection came due and reopened 5–7 days later.
Stamping the firing clock would have turned those outages into session
duration and pushed the tenant's mean duration from minutes to days.

- OnDeadlineFired posts OccurredAtUtc = DueAtUtc again; the due time stays in the
  payload and the two stale-fire guards keep reading it (any stamp stays safe).
- Network Timeline: a timeout verdict (helloOutcome timeout, device-only detection
  window) is drawn as a hollow marker "Completed (timeout)" with a legend line and a
  plain-language tooltip — a wait expired, nothing observed on the device; the
  Asleep block is never split at it. finalizing_grace alone is not an indicator.
- Session Info standby note clips to the two WhiteGlove spans when the card shows
  the combined WhiteGlove duration; the dedup key is consumed only by a usable
  observation (review findings).
- Stale comments describing the firing-clock contract corrected.

Tests: DeadlineFireTimeStampTests (reducer stays correct for any stamp),
EnrollmentOrchestratorTests (due-time stamp + payload), networkTimelineModel
timeout markers (3), standby windows, WhiteGlove windows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 01:55:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b08b79eafe test(mcp): revert_tenant_config backupId is required — schema and description pin (D-240 review)
Left out of e43d916c's explicit file list by mistake; part of the same change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 01:47:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e43d916c24 fix(mcp): spec gates, secret-safe error text, enforced response cap, payload-coupled pageSize, client cancellation (D-239, D-240)
Request gates: an Origin other than the server's own is refused with 403 before any token
work (spec MUST); a token the backend rejects is answered 401 + WWW-Authenticate
error="invalid_token" instead of a final 403. The auth.ts header now names the
backend-audience token forwarding as a deliberate deviation (D-239) instead of calling
it spec-conformant.

Secrets: the per-argument echo policy travels in the tool-call context, so toolError's
"Parameters used" block masks update_tenant_config.fields the same way the log line
does. revert_tenant_config requires backupId (a retried revert without one restored the
snapshot the previous revert had just created). /oauth/token relays Entra errors through
an allowlist (error, capped description, error_codes). OAuthStateSigningKey is required
in production (B-uba).

Results: toolResultText enforces the response cap — a page above it is refused with an
overflow answer naming the pageSize that fits (from this page's bytes per row), never
rows or a nextLink; the telemetry logs the size the page would have had (B-zhp).
query_raw_events with DataJson in the effective projection defaults to 50 rows and
refuses more than 100 before the backend runs (30-day measurement: p90 3.3 KB, outliers
21-29 KB per row) (B-s2y). The caller context carries the request's cancellation signal:
apiFetch, the retry wait and the timeout fallback stop when the client goes away, and the
tool_call line logs cancelled instead of an error.

Tests: 9 new files (origin guard both eras over HTTP, 401 + cancellation, apiFetch abort,
arg policy in error text, signing key, token error body, overflow, raw-events pageSize,
telemetry overflow/cancelled); vitest 844 green, tsc 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 01:47:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 14b185db35 fix(agent,engine,web): a deadline decision is stamped with the firing clock, never the due time (D-238)
A HelloSafety deadline due during Modern Standby fired after wake but was stamped
with its due time, so enrollment_complete and CompletedAt landed inside the sleep
window: the Network Timeline drew "Completed" in the middle of the Asleep block
and three views named three different standby durations.

- OnDeadlineFired posts OccurredAtUtc = FiredAtUtc and carries the due time under
  SignalPayloadKeys.DeadlineDueAtUtc; the stale-fire guards (RealmJoin re-arm,
  SelfDeploying guard C) identify the incarnation via DecisionEngine.DeadlineDueAtUtc,
  which falls back to the signal time for pre-key signal logs.
- SignalSerializer renders Date-tokenized payload strings as ISO-8601 round-trip text
  instead of the culture-formatted JValue.ToString() (a replayed deadlineDueAtUtc came
  back as "4/20/2026 9:55:00 AM").
- Web: the Session Info standby note is clipped to the same window as the duration
  next to it (lib/standby.ts) and printed with seconds, matching the attribution chip.

Tests: DeadlineFireTimeStampTests (late HelloSafety fire, guard C, RealmJoin re-arm,
helper fallback), SerializationTests date-like payload round-trip,
EnrollmentOrchestratorTests late fire, lib/__tests__/standby.test.ts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 01:05:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach baa51102fd feat(web,backend,mcp): app rows without a terminal state become Incomplete instead of running forever (D-237)
An app still installing when the session's observation ended has no terminal
event and never will. The session page ticked Date.now() - startedAt for it
("11h 39m" on a session that finished hours ago), and its AppInstallSummaries
row stayed InProgress forever - ranked behind failures in the app's session
list and counted in totalInstalls with no named bucket.

Web: applyObservationEnd marks such rows Incomplete once the session is
terminal (isTerminalStatus), bounded by session.lastEventAt; the panel shows a
slate Incomplete badge and the watched span as a lower bound, the "active"
pill excludes them, and the download panel carries the parallel flag. Covers
every historic session without a backfill.

Backend: CloseOpenAppInstallsForSessionAsync closes InProgress rows without a
CompletedAt as Incomplete - at the terminal seam, again on the ingest batch
that carries agent_shutting_down for a terminal session (rows opened after
the verdict), and from the 30-day sweep. The sticky-status reconcile keeps
Incomplete against a late progress-only batch and lets a real terminal win.
App metrics and app analytics disclose the bucket (incomplete,
totalIncomplete) outside the failure rate; manifest and wire types
regenerated.

MCP: get_session_summary coverage gains an apps block and a gaps line naming
the apps the agent's last app_tracking_summary still listed as installing or
downloading, terminal sessions only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 00:02:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5577f5e7e5 feat(rules): rule submissions — retention (withdrawn 30d, declined 90d), contact email, pending-first tenant list, operator hard delete (D-236 amended)
Closed submissions leave through the daily maintenance sweep (RuleSubmissionRetention, one place for rule and test); pending/approved/published never. The submit dialog takes an optional contact email (a UPN is not always a mailbox), stored for the reviewer and never published. The tenant list shows pending rows by default with the rest behind Show all, and the contribute button shows for every writer, also before the first custom rule exists. DELETE global/rule-submissions/{id} (GlobalAdminOnly, MCP delete_rule_submission) removes test/demo rows for operator and tenant alike. Bumps internal and .claude/commands gitlinks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 23:27:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 61892592e4 feat(rules): community rule submissions — submit custom rules from the portal, review via GA page or MCP, publish by repo commit + reseed (D-236)
Tenant admins submit references to their own gather/analyze rules; the server freezes the rule, records pre-flight findings and fire stats, and stores it under a 12-character id (RuleSubmissions, SessionReports layout). Attribution is the submitter's frozen choice (anonymous by default) and becomes the published author. Review (approve with reserved id / decline with comment) through /admin/reports/rule-submissions or the MCP tools list_rule_submissions, get_rule_submission, review_rule_submission, reseed_rules_from_github; published is derived from the global catalog, never stored. Analyze rules now get the same server-side author stamp as gather rules; ANALYZE-ID-001 carries author Community. Privacy page names the credit; bumps internal and .claude/commands gitlinks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 22:53:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1e2ca46946 chore: bump internal gitlink (ESP-004 released, B-kfu)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 17:40:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8224c8f1a8 fix(rules,engine,agent): ESP-004 gates on the esp_apps_timeout verdict; not_exists absence gate; Shell-Core failure inherits settle detail (D-234, D-235)
ANALYZE-ESP-004 fired on every ESP terminal failure of a Continue-anyway
profile and rendered the configured FirstSync limit as elapsed time — the
mayHaveContinuedAnyway flag only says the profile has the button. The rule
now requires the agent's own verdict (app_install_failed with
failureType=esp_apps_timeout), names that app via a same-event filter, reads
failedSubcategory from esp_failure_settle_started and words the limit as a
limit. Verified with test_analyze_rule: cb7036a6 fires, 683f1eff (0x80070652
after 19 min) stays silent.

Rule engine: not_exists with a dataField on event_type/event_data
conditions matches when no event of the type carries a non-empty value —
including an absent type — instead of being dead behind the fieldValue null
short-circuit. Schema and MCP authoring guide say so.

Agent: a Shell-Core 62407 failure that lands inside the provisioning
tracker's 30-s settle window (a third of all ESP terminal failures) now
inherits the pending errorCode / failedSubcategory / category /
likelyCulpritApps, so enrollment_failed, Sessions.FailureReason and the
termination-time app classification see the HRESULT the registry had
already named. failureType stays the Shell-Core value.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 17:20:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d7f39895f5 fix(web): omit the two default field values from the browser catalog (D-233)
The Entra family (D-231) pushed utils/error-codes.json to 123026 bytes against
the 120000-byte client-bundle budget, breaking the Web CI job.

Raising the cap would have been the wrong repair -- it was set three days ago
with the v2 catalog, and a guard that gets widened whenever content grows is not
a guard. The bytes were elsewhere: confidence "high" holds for 562 of 641 rows
and source "msdoc" for about half, ~19 KB of bundle spent repeating two
constants. The sync now omits them and errorCodeMap restores them while building
the map, so every consumer still sees a complete entry and errorCodeTooltip
renders exactly as before. 123026 -> 102399 bytes, cap unchanged, ~17 KB of
headroom left.

Dropping the fields outright was rejected: the tooltip renders both, so they are
provenance a customer sees. The vocabulary test now asserts on the resolved
entry via getErrorCodeEntry rather than the raw file -- a default changed on one
side only would otherwise make tooltips lie about provenance silently.
2026-09-09 15:26:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 790bd35385 small gather rule description change 2026-09-09 14:59:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 34c9fd42fe chore: bump internal and .claude/commands gitlinks
internal: D-231/D-232, the plan with its review, backlog B-y5d and B-s2y.
.claude/commands: the platform-health marker-catalog corrections from the
2026-09-09 health pass (weekday vs weekend ingest baseline, CAS retried scales
with load, WhatsNewNotificationSent is not proof of a run).
2026-09-09 14:55:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 19a336870c fix(mcp): put the catalog pointer on the parameter, not only the tool (D-232)
Seven of 44 tool errors in the 7-day telemetry were invented catalog values, and
in every case the tool description already said the right thing while the
parameter description was bare or contradicted it.

update_tenant_config is the clean proof: its description says "Call
get_tenant_config_schema FIRST", but the fields parameter said "Use
get_tenant_config for current values and exact field names" -- and over 30 days
the model called get_tenant_config 12 times and get_tenant_config_schema once.
The text next to the argument wins, and get_tenant_config cannot answer what it
was pointed at: it shows only the fields this tenant has set, with no type,
writability or nullability.

Also: get_session_events.eventType (event_types catalog, matching the pointer
search_sessions_by_event.eventType already carries), query_table (list_tables)
and test_analyze_rule.rule (rule_schemas, validate_rule first).
2026-09-09 14:55:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5ba5942d0b feat(error-codes): parse the Entra device-registration family (D-231)
The catalog held 2 of 607 entries in entra-join, while the 0x801Cxxxx DSREG
family is what an enrollment meets during hybrid join and the ESP account-setup
phase. The Windows Hello PIN error page is the only MS table that documents it;
both of its tables are now parsed, restricted to 0x801c* (607 -> 641 entries).

The block runs after PROSE_ENTRIES so the Autopilot-specific text for 0x801c03ea
keeps precedence over the generic one. The Mitigation column is not carried --
the catalog describes codes, it does not advise. A "SYMBOL: text" cell yields a
symbol (0x801c004d -> DSREG_NO_DEFAULT_ACCOUNT). The run fails below 30 keys,
because parseTables drops non-matching rows silently and a reshaped page would
otherwise look like a clean run.

decode() now strips zero-width and bidi marks: the page carries U+200B in one
hex cell and four description cells, JS \s does not match it, and such a hex
cell fails every ^0x...$ test. Placed in decode() rather than in the new source
so the next parsed page cannot walk into it -- regeneration shows 34 added,
0 changed.

0x801C044F, the zero-hit lookup that started this, is on none of the three MS
pages and deliberately stays unknown.
2026-09-09 14:55:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach aa20d9102c fix(backend): show the freshly published agent version, not the previous one (D-230)
The What's new panel prints "Latest agent version" under the release
entries, and the session list draws its outdated badges from the same
endpoint — but the value was cached 12h in each Function instance and 1h
in the browser, so the panel announced the previous release for up to 13h
and two instances could disagree.

- LatestVersionsService: TTL 12h -> 5 min; keep the last successful result
  and serve it when the blob read fails, so the shorter TTL cannot blank
  the version line on a transient hiccup (failure marker 5 min -> 1 min).
- GetLatestVersions: Cache-Control max-age 3600 -> 60.
- No refresh callback from build-agent.yml: the cache is per instance, a
  warm-up request would leave every other instance stale.

The origin is a ~200-byte no-cache blob behind the download alias that
Front Door does not cache, so a warm instance now reads it at most 12x/h.

Backend deploy (workflow_dispatch) pending — B-uq7.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 12:26:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 097be1700b chore: bump internal gitlink
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 12:10:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f1457d823d chore: bump .claude/commands gitlink 2026-09-09 12:02:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 12e66299e6 feat(rules): allow-list folders under the signed-in user's profile (D-228, D-229)
Gather rules and admin-configured diagnostics paths could never reach a
folder below a user profile. The %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token lifts the
C:\Users hard block for AppData\Local and AppData\Roaming, but lifting is
not admitting: the path then fell into filePrefixes, which is matched
literally against the already-expanded path, and the profile name is not
known when that list is authored. The exception only ever worked in
unrestricted mode, and no agent test passed a non-null userProfilePath.

D-228 introduces userProfileFilePrefixes, holding entries relative to the
profile root (AppData\Local\RealmJoin). Both guards resolve them against
the detected profile and match segment-bounded; entries that are rooted,
contain "..", or sit outside AppData\Local / AppData\Roaming are dropped at
load, so configuration can only narrow the hard block's exception, never
widen it. The allowlist is anchored to the detected profile, so a rule
cannot reach another user's AppData. The AppData subdirectory list existed
in both guard classes with the GatherRuleGuards copy unused; it is now one
list and DiagnosticsPathGuards delegates. filePrefixes additionally gains
C:\ProgramData\RealmJoin\choco\logs.

D-229 fixes the pre-flight validators, which must only ever reject what the
agent rejects:
- the portal returned "allowed" on the lifted hard block without consulting
  the allowlist, so a rule the agent refuses passed the enable gate and then
  failed silently on the device with a security_warning;
- the MCP validator offered logparser the diagnosticsPathPrefixes list that
  no collector consults (four paths reported allowed that the agent blocks);
- the MCP validator did not expand environment variables at all, reporting
  %ProgramData% targets as blocked although the device reads them.

Measured before changing the portal: no rule in any tenant used the token,
so nothing that was working gets disabled.

Verified: solution build 0 warnings, agent 2897 tests, web 1257 + tsc +
eslint 0, MCP 779, guardrails.json validates against its schema, rules/dist
regenerates without drift. The six new agent tests were green against the
unchanged guard first, which is what proves the exception was inert.

Takes effect on devices only after an agent release: guardrails.json is an
EmbeddedResource in the agent assembly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 11:54:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e9a01de9da chore: bump .claude/commands gitlink
Event reference in /ux-insights completed and live-verified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 10:06:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5f793ea01a chore: bump .claude/commands gitlink
Marker-catalog rows for the What's new panel events and the digest timer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 09:58:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e86f7efed3 feat(bootstrap): verify the publisher of the extracted agent binaries before --install (D-227)
The SHA-256 check proves the ZIP is the one version.json names, but that
manifest lives in the same container as the ZIP: it cannot outlive a
compromise of the download host. The expected publisher travels inside this
script, which the loader verified before running it, so the chain from the
file an administrator assigns to the process that starts is publisher-anchored
end to end.

Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 v2.4 -> v2.5:
- Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries checks every AutopilotMonitor.*.exe/.dll in the
  extracted payload for status Valid and the same subject pin the loader
  carries; the gate runs immediately before --install and throws on any
  rejection, exactly like the hash check.
- Third-party assemblies keep their own publisher's signature and are not
  checked: System.Management.Automation.dll ships unsigned, so a gate over all
  files would refuse the live payload.
- An extracted folder with no binary of ours is a rejection, not a pass.
- The SHA-256 manifest check is unchanged and still runs first: it proves the
  bytes, the signature proves the author.

Verified against the live payload 2.0.1454 (all five of our PEs Valid and
glueckkanja AG, gate passes); appending one byte to AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll
makes it reject. Pester 55/55.

The portal privacy and about pages carried the pre-signing wording and are
corrected in the same change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 23:11:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 78bfad0ec6 web: the portal What's new panel names the currently published agent version
A quiet third line in the panel header ("Latest agent version 2.0.1452",
faint, the number monospaced) reads from the existing config/latest-versions
endpoint. The monospaced string is the same one the session list shows in its
"Agent Version" column, so a reader can tell at a glance whether their fleet
runs the latest agent.

Portal and signed-in only: the endpoint is AuthenticatedUser, and the public
site has no session list to compare against. The gate sits on the mount of the
small component, so the landing page never even issues the request; a missing
version renders nothing.
2026-09-08 22:37:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f5efadfd07 ci: pin every third-party action to a commit SHA, gated and Dependabot-maintained (D-226)
A tag is a mutable pointer owned by the action's publisher. These jobs are not
ordinary CI: they hold the code-signing Key Vault token (D-223), the federated
storage credentials (D-222), and combine-rules.yml holds a contents:write token
that pushes to main. Whoever could repoint v7 would run code with all of that.

azure/login and Azure/functions-action were already pinned; the actions/* and
github/codeql-action references were not, on the usual argument that GitHub owns
them and shares the runner's trust boundary. That argument does not survive the
fact that they run in the same jobs as the signing identity. All seven are now
pinned by SHA with the version in a trailing comment -- the comment is what keeps
the line reviewable, and Dependabot rewrites both together.

action-pins.yml is the guard: pins nobody enforces rot, and no review reliably
catches one @v4 added to a 200-line workflow. It lives in its own workflow because
ci.yml deliberately ignores changes to the other workflow files, so a job placed
there would stay silent for exactly the commits it must inspect. Like CI it reports
rather than blocks -- main is unprotected; making it binding would mean adding it
as a required status check, which is a branch-protection decision.

Verified both directions: 49 references pass against the repo, and a fixture with
@v7, @main and a bare SHA fails with three annotations while the local reusable
workflow refs are skipped.

Two floating tool versions closed while here. wix went from the range 5.* to 5.0.2
-- it writes the bytes of the MSI customers install, where AzureSignTool only signs
them. ajv was the worse one: unpinned, and npm runs lifecycle scripts at install,
so a hijacked release would have executed with the push token before a single rule
was validated; now exact versions with --ignore-scripts.

Line endings: sed -i rewrote the workflow files as LF. Git normalises on commit, so
the content diff is unaffected and indexnow-notify.yml carries no change at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 22:14:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c26eca2f01 chore: bump internal gitlink
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 21:36:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9f1879a9f3 fix(agent): raise the captured script output cap from 2K to 8K
The portal showed the two-stage bootstrap output ending in ...[truncated]. That marker
comes from the agent, not from the web view: the stdout is cut at capture time, so no
amount of UI space brings the rest back.

Measured over 1,486 script outputs in the fleet (2026-08-25..09-08): median 39, p90 644,
max 1,501 chars, and the 2,048 cap had never been hit -- the maximum was our own
one-stage bootstrap. The loader preamble of ~460 chars pushed exactly that output over
the edge, i.e. this is a consequence of D-224 and it hit the one output an operator
actually reads.

8,192 covers the realistic worst case (download retries plus relax logging, ~2,700) and
stays 4x below the 32K-char Table Storage property limit that bounds the event
downstream. Other scripts are unaffected in practice: p90 is 644 chars.

Reaches the fleet with the next agent release.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 21:36:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c24c7bf7ef fix(publish): serve the customer scripts as a download, not as a web page
The blobs carry Content-Type: text/plain and no Content-Disposition, so every browser
renders them inline -- the documented "download the bootstrapper script" step turns into
"select this text and save it yourself", with whatever the editor then does to the line
endings and the signature block.

x-ms-blob-content-disposition makes the link a download in every browser, which is a
server-side fact rather than a per-browser hint in the docs. Command-line clients (the
loader, the MSI runner, curl) ignore the header, so nothing on the device path changes.

Metadata only: the script bytes are untouched, so no version bump and the bump guard
still sees the published copies as current.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 21:07:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5fac3d6004 Agent Host changes for agents/whats-new-notification-settings (#153) 2026-09-08 20:51:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7605d2e9f5 fix(loader): log the signer CN instead of the whole EV subject
The full subject of an EV certificate is a line of street address and registration
numbers and pushed the useful part of the log line off the screen. The CN answers the
question the log has to answer. The full subject is still logged in the one case where it
is the finding itself: a valid signature from a publisher that is not us.

Loader 1.1 -> 1.2; a Pester case pins the short form. Suite on PS 5.1: 45/45.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:49:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7bf5412d63 docs(mcp): teach the diag-zip map the loader log
bootstrap-loader.log is new with the two-stage bootstrap and told the diag tooling
nothing so far. Names which channel a device was assigned: the loader logs there when
assigned directly, and to bootstrap-msi.log when it runs from the MDM-LOB MSI.

Takes effect with the next MCP deploy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:47:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b53ceb1a7c chore: bump internal gitlink (MSI loader consolidation)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:47:01 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 647581b4ff refactor(msi): the MSI carries the shared stage-1 loader instead of its own downloader
Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1 and Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 had become the same script:
download the current installer, run it, log, always exit 0. The MSI copy additionally
downloaded and executed WITHOUT verifying what it got, which is exactly the gap the loader
was written to close. The MSI is now packaging only -- it installs and runs the same file
that is assigned directly in Intune, and both delivery channels get publisher verification
from one implementation.

Dropped from the MSI path: its own Deployed-marker check. That guard lives in stage 2 and
runs there anyway, so the only cost is one download on a device that is already deployed.

Kept: the log file name. bootstrap-msi.log is what the diagnostics tooling keys on to tell
the MDM-LOB channel apart from the Intune script channel, so the loader takes -LogFileName
(default bootstrap-loader.log) and the custom action passes bootstrap-msi.log. A Pester
test now pins that contract across the two files -- renaming the parameter on either side
would leave the MSI channel logging under the wrong name.

Package version 1.0.2 -> 1.1.0 so Intune LOB update detection sees the new payload, and a
new component GUID because the key path file changed.

Loader 1.0 -> 1.1. Bootstrap suite on Windows PowerShell 5.1: 44/44.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:41:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach db9b1995bc refactor: move the error-code generator from scripts/ to tools/ (D-225)
scripts/ at the repo root is the customer surface: everything under
Bootstrap/ and CustomerSetup/ is published to the download container by
Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1, Authenticode-signed and version-gated. The
error-code generator is a maintainer tool no workflow runs, so it diluted
that invariant. .github/scripts/ was not the alternative -- it holds only
helpers a workflow step invokes, and unlike guardrails-in-sync and
shared-manifests-in-sync the catalog has no CI drift gate (the generator
needs IME_ENUMS_JSON from operator tooling and live MS Learn fetches).

REPO_ROOT stays ../.. at the new depth, so only the documented path moved:
the generator header and README, the C# and TypeScript comments, the test
summary, and the description header of error-codes.json together with the
generator literal that emits it (the two must stay identical or the next
regeneration diffs). The web sync re-ran clean at 607 entries with no
change to utils/error-codes.json, which drops the header.
2026-09-08 20:35:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7563435837 feat(ci): Authenticode-sign the bootstrap MSI and the runner it embeds (D-223)
MSI carries an Authenticode signature like any PE, so the same identity and the same
ordering rules apply: signing identity logs in first and only for the Key Vault token,
the storage login stays last, and no environment: on the job.

The embedded Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1 is signed BEFORE wix build -- wix embeds the
file as it finds it, so signing afterwards would leave the copy inside the MSI unsigned,
and a device under an AllSigned policy needs the runner to carry its own signature.

The MSI is signed after the build and before the hash and the upload, then both files are
verified (Valid, timestamped, optional publisher pin) while nothing is published yet.
The provenance attestation now also skips runs that upload nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:34:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e39f2abb61 chore: bump internal gitlink (comment lesson)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 19:21:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 47dad7143f docs(ci): tighten the code-signing comments in build-agent
Public repo: keep the reasoning that a later change could break -- signing must precede
the release hashes, the job must never carry an environment, the timestamp is not
optional -- and drop the rest. Comments only, no behaviour change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 19:20:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d81f41dc72 chore: bump internal gitlink (D-223/D-224 plans and decisions)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:59:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach cc6be10532 fix(publish): read the signed bytes back as byte[], not as a wrapped Object[]
The ',' operator elsewhere in this file exists because PowerShell unrolls an array
RETURNED from a function; a property assignment does not unroll, so it wrapped the
byte[] in an Object[] of length 1 and the upload failed converting it back. Signing
itself was fine -- run 34253331703 signed all six scripts and uploaded none, so nothing
reached the download alias.

Added the invariant that would have caught it: signed bytes must be longer than the
unsigned form, since a signature only ever adds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:54:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0ac548bfce feat(bootstrap): two-stage loader and Authenticode-signed customer scripts (D-224)
Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 is the new stage 1 -- the file an administrator assigns in
Intune. It carries no enrollment logic: it downloads the published installer, verifies its
Authenticode signature, and runs it in the same process, passing through every remaining
argument. Assigning the installer directly stays supported and unchanged.

The point of the split is that the customer-held artifact stops changing. Today every
bootstrap change forces customers to replace their Intune copy, so the fleet runs a
distribution of script versions we do not control. It is also what makes script signing
worth doing: signing a file that gets swapped by hand each release is a one-off gain,
signing a loader that never changes is permanent.

The loader is deliberately minimal, because it is the one piece that cannot be fixed
remotely -- every guard placed in it would be frozen for years. All guards stay in stage 2.

Verification pins the certificate SUBJECT, never a thumbprint: certificates get renewed and
a deployed loader cannot be, so a thumbprint pin would strand the fleet at the next
renewal. A hash oracle was rejected for a different reason -- it would have to be fetched
from the same host as the script, so it could not survive a compromise of that host, while
the expected publisher travels inside the loader.

Fail-closed on verification, fail-soft on exit: nothing runs without a valid signature from
us (running unverified code as SYSTEM is the risk being removed here), but the loader still
exits 0, because a device without monitoring is acceptable and a failed enrollment step is
not. The accepted cost is that a device which can never fetch or verify stays silent.

Publisher changes:

- every published script is signed (loader, installer, both -Dev renders,
  Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent, Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn), and signing is the LAST
  transformation: it covers exactly the CRLF/UTF-8 bytes Get-PublishBytes produced, so
  nothing may normalise or re-encode them afterwards.
- signing is mandatory for a real publish. Only -DryRun may run unsigned, because the PR
  gate executes the publisher without any Azure login.
- comparisons against a published copy strip the signature block first. A timestamped
  signature differs on every run, so without stripping the version-bump guard and the
  drift check would report a change for every unchanged script.
- the bump guard became Assert-VersionBump and now covers the loader as well.
- version.json gains loaderVersion. Additive, no consumer yet: stage 2 is current by
  construction, so only stage 1's version says anything about a customer's Intune copy.
- -SignedOutputDir writes the exact uploaded bytes for the CI artifact, in a dry run too --
  that is how a signed script gets inspected before it reaches anyone.

publish-scripts.yml logs in with the signing identity first and only to fetch the Key Vault
token (azure/login sets the default az account and the storage login has to be the one that
stays), then publishes and offers the signed scripts as an artifact. build-agent.yml passes
the same parameters on a stable cutover.

Tests: 14 new Pester cases, including that a validly signed script from a FOREIGN publisher
is refused -- that is what an attacker with any code-signing certificate can produce. Full
bootstrap suite on Windows PowerShell 5.1: 43/43.

Not covered: the MSI runner still downloads stage 2 without verifying it, and the customer
docs still describe the direct assignment only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:48:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9c1d0586ef ci: skip the provenance attestation on test runs of build-agent
A dispatch with upload_blob=false and create_release=false publishes nothing, so the
Sigstore attestation would write a permanent public transparency-log entry for bytes
nobody ever receives. The step now runs only when the run actually ships something.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:34:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 21ec5e4773 ci: Authenticode-sign the agent binaries before the release hashes are computed (D-223)
Every assembly we author -- AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe, AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe
and the three AutopilotMonitor.*.dll beside them -- is signed with AzureSignTool (pinned
7.0.1) against a certificate in the corporate code-signing Key Vault, SHA-256 file digest
plus an RFC-3161 timestamp. Third-party assemblies keep their own publisher's signature.

The position of the step is load-bearing: signing rewrites the PE file, so it has to run
before the staging copy, the ZIP and every SHA-256 in "Create release artifact". Those
hashes are the bootstrap's integrity oracle (version.json, AdminConfiguration) -- signing
after hashing would publish hashes that no downloaded file can ever match.

The signing identity is a SECOND federated principal in the same tenant and logs in FIRST,
only to fetch a Key Vault token; the storage login of D-222 follows and owns the az context
from there, because azure/login sets the default account and the last login wins. Both
federated credentials carry the subject repo:okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor:ref:refs/heads/main,
so this job must never be given a GitHub 'environment:' -- that rewrites the OIDC subject
claim and would break BOTH logins at once.

No unsigned fallback and no dispatch input to skip signing: a missing repository variable,
a Key Vault failure or a non-zero azuresigntool exit code fails the run before anything is
published. azuresigntool is a native tool, so $LASTEXITCODE is checked explicitly --
PowerShell does not throw on a non-zero exit, and a silently unsigned release is exactly
the outcome signing exists to prevent.

Verification runs against the STAGED bytes, not the build output: every AutopilotMonitor.*
PE in the ZIP must be Valid, must carry a timestamp (without one the signature dies with
the certificate) and all of them must share one signing certificate. Setting the optional
repository variable CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT additionally pins the publisher, so the gate
proves "signed by us" instead of "signed by someone trusted".

The build provenance attestation now covers the ZIP and both EXEs, so an extracted binary
can be verified without the ZIP. Authenticode and the attestation answer different
questions and both stay: who published this binary (offline, what Windows, SmartScreen and
WDAC evaluate) versus which build produced these exact bytes (gh attestation verify).

Not covered here: the customer bootstrap script (its signature block changes the published
bytes and must follow the dev render; see B-57c, the two-stage loader), the bootstrap MSI,
and the local build.ps1 path, which from now on produces unsigned bits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:20:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e4a5a6654d ci: workflows authorize Azure Storage with the federated identity, not SAS secrets (D-222)
Every storage write against autopilotmonitoreu -- build-counter CAS, agent ZIP and MSI,
version manifests, customer bootstrap scripts, the AdminConfiguration hash oracle -- now
rides on the existing federated credential (subject repo:.../ref:refs/heads/main) instead
of a long-lived SAS in repo secrets.

The REST calls themselves are unchanged: '?<sas>' became an Authorization header, so the
ETag-CAS of the counters, Content-MD5 and the no-cache contract survive verbatim. That is
also why this is not a rewrite onto 'az storage blob upload' -- it cannot express If-Match,
and two concurrent builds could then mint the same build number.

.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1 is the single place that knows the resource id,
the az invocation and the service version. x-ms-version is mandatory for Entra-authorized
requests (>= 2017-11-09) and for any Table request without a SAS; 2021-08-06 was verified
live against both the blob and the table endpoint of this account.

azure/login added to build-agent, build-msi, publish-scripts (plus id-token: write) and
deploy-web; deploy-backend and deploy-mcp already had it. Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1
-DryRun acquires NO token: the PR gate runs it without any Azure login, and that must
stay true.

The AdminConfiguration merge lost its "secret not configured" skip branch -- a failure
there now surfaces instead of silently leaving the hash oracle pointing at an older build.

AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN, AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN and AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN
are retired once the first runs are green. AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN stays: that
account lives in the pre-migration tenant, where this principal has no identity -- it dies
with the mirror, not before.

Requires on the SP: Storage Blob Data Contributor on the containers 'agent' and 'versions',
Storage Table Data Contributor on the table 'AdminConfiguration'. Granted 2026-09-08.
2026-09-08 17:38:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 01bc35aa97 new ordering for What's new section 2026-09-08 15:48:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e33d85c01d Agent Host changes for agents/gather-rule-exitcode-info-update (#151) 2026-09-08 14:57:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4e73ba8900 Agent Host changes for agents/improve-changelog-promotion-ui (#152) 2026-09-08 14:57:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4df52b3da9 Agent Host changes for agents/timeline-search-enhancement (#150) 2026-09-08 14:47:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 844d86410c Agent Host changes for agents/mcp-server-beschreibung-lieferung (#149) 2026-09-08 14:46:15 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 9514e1033d chore(deps): bump the web group (#148)
Bumps the web group in /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web with 5 updates:

| Package | From | To |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js) | `16.3.3` | `16.3.4` |
| [@next/bundle-analyzer](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/next-bundle-analyzer) | `16.3.3` | `16.3.4` |
| [@types/react-dom](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/react-dom) | `19.2.5` | `19.2.7` |
| [autoprefixer](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer) | `10.5.4` | `10.5.5` |
| [eslint-config-next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/eslint-config-next) | `16.3.3` | `16.3.4` |


Updates `next` from 16.3.3 to 16.3.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/compare/v16.3.3...v16.3.4)

Updates `@next/bundle-analyzer` from 16.3.3 to 16.3.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.4/packages/next-bundle-analyzer)

Updates `@types/react-dom` from 19.2.5 to 19.2.7
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/react-dom)

Updates `autoprefixer` from 10.5.4 to 10.5.5
- [Release notes](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/compare/10.5.4...10.5.5)

Updates `eslint-config-next` from 16.3.3 to 16.3.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.4/packages/eslint-config-next)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: next
  dependency-version: 16.3.4
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@next/bundle-analyzer"
  dependency-version: 16.3.4
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@types/react-dom"
  dependency-version: 19.2.7
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: autoprefixer
  dependency-version: 10.5.5
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: eslint-config-next
  dependency-version: 16.3.4
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-08 13:07:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b2236bf65f web: card and page headers stack below sm so their action buttons stay on screen at phone width
Title and trailing controls shared one non-wrapping flex row with the controls
marked flex-shrink-0. At 440px (iPhone 16 Pro Max) that squeezed the Operational
Events title into an 86px column and pushed the Refresh buttons of Agent Metrics
and the Tenant Config Report past the viewport, scrolling the whole page sideways.
SectionCardHeader now stacks below sm, which covers all 32 cards that use it.

A width sweep over the portal routes at 440px found two more real overflows, fixed
here as well: the audit From/To date pair, and Alert Rules, where the unbreakable
event-type names and a channel-name input without min-w-0 pushed the severity
selects 99px off screen.

Verified: every swept route now measures zero horizontal overflow at 440px, desktop
is unchanged at 1440px. The header test asserted "no trailing group" via the absence
of gap-3, which the wrapper itself now carries; it checks flex-wrap instead and pins
the stacking classes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 01:35:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 31535b07e0 web+backend: a warming MCP health card says only "Starting instance... (attempt n of 12)" and re-probes for ~60s before it warns (D-220)
The card composed its line from the backend's explanation ("did not answer within
3s - it scales to zero when idle ... ~20-30s"): probe mechanics nobody waiting on a
starting instance needs. It now writes its own one-liner and ignores check.message,
so the server's "warming" and a client-side probe timeout read identically and the
wording does not depend on a backend deploy. The backend message is shortened but
still carries the budget for direct API callers.

The re-poll budget of 8 x 5s (~40s) expired on a real cold start - Container Apps
activation has no upper bound we control - so it is now 12 x 5s (~60s), with a test
pinning that the stated seconds come from cadence x attempts.
2026-09-07 21:27:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 066b6e6f04 backend+web: the MCP health probe answers a cold container in 3s with status "warming" instead of holding the request for 30s, and the System Health card re-probes until it is up (D-220)
Measured over 14 days, GET health/mcp answered in 4..148ms when warm and timed out at 30s
in 50 of 83 calls — the median call took 27,972ms. A cold start is 20-30s of Container Apps
activation (~98% KEDA plus image mount, ~500ms application), so no UI wait covers it and the
generous timeout only bought a long wall in front of the same answer. The browser's own
budget is the same 30s, so the backend's carefully worded warning never reached the user at
all: they saw a raw DOMException.

Backend: the budget drops to 3s, which sits in the widest observed latency gap
(2347ms..3930ms) so jitter cannot flip the verdict. Our own cancellation now reports the new
status "warming" at Information level (with minReplicas=0 a cold probe is the expected path,
and logging it as a warning poisons the ops signal); HttpRequestException is split out of
that catch and stays a real warning, still without the host in the message. The warm-hit
threshold drops to 750ms — ~5x the warm maximum, deliberately generous because every
measurement comes from a near-idle single-user system and warm latency will rise under
concurrency — and moves into McpReachableMessage so a test can pin the boundary. The XML doc
now describes the probe that exists rather than the wake-signal design the measurements
disproved.

"warming" is a new status value rather than an added DTO boolean because the backend deploys
before the web: an unknown value degrades to a grey card with a clean banner, whereas a
boolean would leave old web showing yellow and "Warnings detected" on every cold start.
HealthCheck.Status now documents the five-value vocabulary, which rides into both generated
TypeScript mirrors as JSDoc.

Web: resolveMcpCardState owns display, banner rating and the poll decision as a pure
function (the suite runs on node, so testable logic cannot live in JSX). A warming server
re-probes every 5s for up to 8 attempts and stays out of the overall banner exactly as
"unknown" already does — scaling from zero is expected behaviour, not a degraded platform —
and only becomes a real warning once the re-polls are spent. The card keeps showing
"warming" while the next probe is in flight so it cannot flicker, carries the blue
in-progress look instead of yellow, and was hoisted out of the healthResult guard: a failing
detailed check would otherwise hide a card that is still polling.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 18:25:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a1e2b76a9f web: the session Vulnerability Report names its inventory badge "Identification Confidence" (header and legend, Inventory and Delta tab); the Software Inventory analyzer toggle uses the rose accent like the other Agent Analyzer toggles
The column showed high/medium/low under the header "Identification", which reads as a method rather than a rating. The wire field is `confidence` and the tooltip already says "identification confidence"; the header and legend now match. The analyzer toggle and its hover border were still emerald from before the section moved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 13:13:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 29e5b8251d web(rules): analyze and gather rule cards get a two-row header on every breakpoint — badge row with fixed-width toggle, severity and rule-id columns on top, the full title below with threshold, sparkline and hit rate right-aligned; gather badges ordered category, type, collector like the analyze card
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 13:11:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 02168a5c55 chore: bump internal gitlink (geo-statistics-explained plan, D-219, backlog B-fpu/B-csp)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 12:12:12 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a6b6661320 web(geo): the Location Performance table states what Avg Duration, P95 and vs Global are computed over (footnote with docs links, header and benchmark tooltips); a location without a succeeded session shows no duration instead of 0 min / -100% in the fastest bucket
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 12:10:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0c72666a7a chore: bump skills gitlink (CAS marker row corrected to the pre-fix code path)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 10:35:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9023321db9 chore: bump skills gitlink (platform-health KQL fix + 09-07 marker baselines)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 07:48:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7ef097529c backend: deleting an owned tenant group stamps the retention grace anchor on every member (conferred Pro ended without ProDowngradedUtc)
The portal hides Delete for owned (msp-{home}) groups, but DELETE global/tenant-groups/{groupId} accepts any id: a Global Admin deleting one ended Pro (MSP) for every member with no grace anchor, so a member that raised its retention under Pro was clamped to the Community cap at the next sweep. DeleteGroupCoreAsync now snapshots the owner and calls ProConferralService.RecordLossAsync(member, owner, "group-deleted") per member, owner excluded, independent of assignees. Two tests in RevokeEnforcementTests; internal docs list the fourth writer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 00:15:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e7df69efe4 backend+web: vulnerability summary carries a priority breakdown (act/attend/track); the exposure panel shows Act and Attend tiles and every severity or priority chip filters the top-CVE list (D-218)
Act equals the KEV set by construction (CvePriority: KEV => act), so the KEV tile becomes the Act tile and Attend joins it instead of a duplicate count. The breakdown is counted in the backend over every CVE in the window, like the severity breakdown, because the list is top-N. Both panel consumers read the generated CveExposureSummary type; the MCP tool description names the new block. Wire types regenerated for web and MCP.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 22:30:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2c7efa2733 backend: key-safe X-MCP-Tool-Name prefix for the usage row key (CodeQL cs/log-forging #91)
The caller-supplied X-MCP-Tool-Name header went verbatim into the UserUsageLog
row key ({yyyyMMdd}_{tool}:{endpoint}) and from there into the CAS-conflict
warning of TableCasRetry. EndpointNormalizer.ToolNameKey now strips CR/LF and
every other control character or line separator, replaces the characters Table
Storage rejects in keys (/ \ # ?) and caps the length at 64; an empty result
skips the prefix. Real tool names pass through unchanged, so existing usage
rows keep their keys. A header with an illegal key character previously made
every usage increment fail with 400 (fail-soft, counter never advanced).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 22:19:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2742549827 chore: bump skills gitlink (platform-health marker baselines + GetBootstrapScript trap)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 22:07:46 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3c45f5cb09 chore: regenerate the shared manifest and wire types for the NtpServer summary text (D-216 follow-up)
The manifest committed with d5d1d7bf carried the types section of the previous HEAD, so
the ntpServer doc string still read "null = use agent default"; SharedManifestParityTests
compares byte-for-byte. Generated output only, no wire change. Bumps the internal gitlink
(plan review addendum).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 22:02:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d5d1d7bfbd backend+web: one agent-config derivation (AgentConfigResolver) served on agent/config and GET config/{tenantId}/effective-agent-config; wire-type initializer defaults in the shared manifest; the Tenant Config Report reads both (D-216)
The report still carried two hand copies after D-215: a typed map of C#
initializer defaults for the "custom" highlight, and a TypeScript mirror of
GetAgentConfigFunction's resolution rules for the runtime column.

Backend: the derivation moves verbatim into Services/AgentConfigResolver
(Build = pure, ResolveAsync loads tenant + admin config and the two rule
catalogs). GetAgentConfigFunction keeps the kill verdict, the migrate logging
and the device fields on top; ParseAgentMajor, ResolveDiagnosticsUploadEnabled,
MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths and ResolveMigrateTarget move with it (call sites and
tests retargeted; the QueryParams ratchet baseline shrinks by the file). New
GlobalAdminOnly route config/{tenantId}/effective-agent-config returns the same
AgentConfigResponse without a device (optional ?agentVersion=, default the V2
line). AgentConfigResolverTests pin the rules that used to live in the web:
upload 10, Hosted destination without SAS, SAS regardless of mode, unrestricted
only with entitlement + gate + toggle, operator knobs from AdminConfiguration,
analyzer defaults, hash line per major, migrate override and rejection.

Manifest: SharedManifestParityTests emits "defaults" next to "fields" for
TenantConfiguration and AdminConfiguration and an "agentConfig" section with
the AgentConfigResponse / CollectorConfiguration / AnalyzerConfiguration class
defaults (fresh-instance values; nested objects null). TenantConfiguration.
NtpServer gets the initializer "time.windows.com" the table read already
applies, so the manifest default and a stored row agree.

Web: the catalog rows lose value() and default; the runtime column renders
the endpoint's response, the highlight compares against the manifest defaults,
informational rows (reasons, timestamps, identities, secrets) never read as
custom. Previously excluded fields are visible (configVersion, catalog counts,
sealing pattern ids, hash oracle, migrate target); the collector class
defaults sit in a collapsed "Collector Internals" section. Fail-soft: while the
backend is not deployed the runtime column shows a notice.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 21:59:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f4e2088b69 chore: bump internal gitlink (lessons: shared index) 2026-09-06 21:57:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 55425058a8 chore: bump internal gitlink (dashboard-search plan review) 2026-09-06 21:57:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach eec0d17607 chore: bump internal + skills gitlinks (D-217 plan/review, lessons, ux-insights marker row) 2026-09-06 21:54:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 43f5304ba4 web+backend: dashboard search gets field qualifiers (model=, manufacturer=), AND-ed terms and exclusions, parsed identically on both sides; Fleet Health model rows link with that search (D-217)
The "Health by Device Model" link searched "{Manufacturer} {Model}" as one substring; the server's
free-text predicate tested it per field, so once the failed sessions were outside the loaded first
page the sweep returned nothing.

- lib/searchQueryTokens.ts: tokenizer shared by the timeline and the session search (terms, quotes,
  leading minus, key=value / key:value qualifier when the separator precedes any quote)
- app/dashboard/utils/sessionSearchQuery.ts: 15 qualifiers = exactly the fields both sides search,
  matcher over session fields + client-derived extra text, suggestion field lookup, link builder
- useDashboardFilters / SessionTable: filter and suggestions use the grammar; fuzzy only for a
  single free term; session_searched gains a `qualifiers` count
- Helpers/SessionSearchQuery.cs: the same grammar for q= on /api/search/sessions (+ global), parsed
  once per request; MatchesFreeText is a thin wrapper
- utils/session-search-syntax.cases.json: one case file run by vitest and by
  SessionFreeTextSearchTests (parity proof)
- FleetModelHealth/FleetSlowModel/FleetFailingModel: manufacturer + model as stored plus label,
  grouped on the pair; useFleetHealth uses the generated wire types; "Unknown" is not a link
- shared manifest + wire types regenerated for the three DTOs

Backend suite 6158/6159 (the one failure is SharedManifestParityTests against uncommitted WIP of a
parallel task), web vitest 1177/1177, build 0 warnings.
2026-09-06 21:54:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b21472dd8c web(progress): pre-provisioned device parked after the technician part sits on Account setup instead of a forever-running device apps step
The progress portal placed the active step purely by the stored phase. After
whiteglove_complete the backend caps that phase at Apps (Device), so the end
user saw "Waiting for you to sign in" above a step list that still showed
"Installing apps (device)" as running at 43 % (customer report).

The seal detection the headline already used is now one helper,
isParkedAfterTechnicianPart (pre-provisioned, whiteglove_complete, no resumedAt
and no whiteglove_resumed), and resolveActiveStepIndex places such a session on
the first user step: every device step done, 57 %, Account setup current. A
stale Complete phase on older sessions can no longer push it past the sign-in;
once resumed the placement is phase-driven again.

Vitest 24/24, tsc and eslint clean. Backlog B-ydz carries the post-deploy check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 21:24:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e3991d55be web(admin): Tenant Config Report renders from an exhaustive catalog over the generated wire types (D-215)
The report typed its own TenantConfig interface and drifted for five months: 31 stored
fields were missing (payingCustomer, the MSP overrides, three validation gates, the SLA
block, four analyzer flags, app-homing and trial bookkeeping) and three runtime values
were wrong (upload interval 30 instead of 10, diagnostics-enabled without the Hosted
destination, unrestricted mode without the entitlement).

tenantConfigReportCatalog.ts is Record<keyof TenantConfiguration> and
Record<keyof AgentConfigResponse | CollectorConfiguration | AnalyzerConfiguration>:
every key is rendered or excluded with a reason, so a new C# property fails tsc once the
wire type is regenerated. Runtime rows carry the GetAgentConfigFunction rule and a source
tag; entitlement values come from feature-flags, operator knobs from global/config.
A vitest pins the same parity against SHARED_MANIFEST.tenantConfiguration.fields and the
resolution rules (upload 10, Hosted destination, flags-driven unrestricted mode, admin
idle timeout, analyzer defaults). Empty strings count as unset for the custom highlight.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 21:08:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 864d1ed31e backend: MCP usage counters go through TableCasRetry with an 8-attempt jittered budget instead of three immediate retries (B-c92)
Parallel tool calls of one user hit the same (user, day, endpoint) row in the same instant; without backoff the losers stayed synchronised and 3 of 6 increments were lost. Both increments now use the one CAS helper (merge patch, AddEntity on 404, StorageCasConflict marker) with UsageCounterRetries = 8; the tenant counter's attribution columns travel in the merge patch. Tests pin the budget, the patch shape and the create path.
2026-09-06 19:04:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 76ef1e53ca chore: bump internal gitlink (final check 2026-09-06: plans released, backlog long-tail rewritten, todo cleared) 2026-09-06 18:48:46 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7dd298f04e chore: bump skills gitlink (session skills: exit-code class, packaging counters, WU symbols)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 18:21:14 +02:00
898 changed files with 53098 additions and 11017 deletions
+1
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
- Stage explicit file lists; never `git add -A` or a directory. Pushing is the user's call.
- New API responses need a typed DTO plus the parity fact. MCP vocabularies are generated from the wire types, never retyped.
- Every route belongs in the route policy catalog; every new event type goes into the MCP resource catalog.
- Workflow files under `.github/` go through zizmor before they are committed (`zizmor .` from the repository root, findings from severity low on): fix every finding or ignore it in `zizmor.yml` with a reason. The `zizmor` job in `action-pins.yml` runs the same check on every push.
- The about, terms and privacy pages under `src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/` state facts customers rely on: verify every claim against the code before writing it and update them in the same change as the fact they describe.
## Code Quality
+18 -6
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
# CodeQL configuration.
#
# The default query suites stay active — this file only filters out two C# queries
# that fire structurally on this codebase, where the flagged behavior is the feature,
# not a defect:
# The default query suites stay active — this file only filters out queries that
# fire structurally on this codebase, where the flagged behavior is the feature
# or the protection exists in a form the query cannot see:
#
# cs/exposure-of-sensitive-information
# Audit and operational logs record WHO performed an action (actor UPN / email)
@@ -15,10 +15,20 @@
# key. The IP is an identifier for throttling, not a secret at rest; storing it in
# the in-memory / table rate-limit key is by design.
#
# js/missing-rate-limiting
# Only the MCP server has Express routes. Every one that does work is throttled by
# our own limiters (oauthRateLimit / oauthTokenRateLimit on /oauth/*, accessGuard
# on /mcp); /health and the OAuth discovery documents return static JSON.
# The query only recognizes limiters from npm packages (express-rate-limit and
# similar) and flags a route handler as soon as it calls a function named
# like *auth*, *login* or *verify*. So it reports throttled and unthrottled
# routes the same way, and every alert it ever raised was a false positive. The
# coverage check it stood in for is a test: every OAuth router route must carry
# a limiter or be named as exempt (MCP oauth-rate-limit.test.ts).
#
# Genuine one-off false positives from OTHER queries (e.g. an open-redirect the taint
# model can't see is allow-listed, a rate-limited route it doesn't recognize) are
# dismissed individually in the Security tab so those queries stay sharp — they are
# NOT suppressed here.
# model can't see is allow-listed) are dismissed individually in the Security tab so
# those queries stay sharp — they are NOT suppressed here.
#
# Log-injection (cs/log-forging) is deliberately NOT filtered: user-controlled values
# are sanitized at the sink via Helpers/LogSanitizer, so the query stays useful for
@@ -29,3 +39,5 @@ query-filters:
id: cs/exposure-of-sensitive-information
- exclude:
id: cs/cleartext-storage-of-sensitive-information
- exclude:
id: js/missing-rate-limiting
+32
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
version: 2
# Cooldown: a version is proposed only once it has been public for 7 days, so a
# release that is yanked or found malicious within its first week never reaches a
# PR. Security updates are exempt from the cooldown by Dependabot's own rules.
#
# Grouping: every ecosystem gets one batched PR for minor/patch version
# updates and one batched PR for security updates. Groups apply to version
# updates only by default, so the security-updates groups are declared
@@ -10,6 +14,8 @@ updates:
directory: /
schedule:
interval: weekly
cooldown:
default-days: 7
open-pull-requests-limit: 5
groups:
dotnet:
@@ -23,6 +29,8 @@ updates:
directory: /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web
schedule:
interval: weekly
cooldown:
default-days: 7
open-pull-requests-limit: 5
groups:
web:
@@ -41,6 +49,8 @@ updates:
directory: /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp
schedule:
interval: weekly
cooldown:
default-days: 7
open-pull-requests-limit: 5
groups:
mcp:
@@ -55,10 +65,32 @@ updates:
- dependency-name: '*'
update-types: ['version-update:semver-major']
# Validator tooling for rules/ (ajv-cli); combine-rules.yml installs it from this
# lockfile with contents:write in hand, so the pins must not go stale.
- package-ecosystem: npm
directory: /rules/scripts
schedule:
interval: weekly
cooldown:
default-days: 7
open-pull-requests-limit: 5
groups:
rules-tooling:
patterns: ['*']
rules-tooling-security:
applies-to: security-updates
patterns: ['*']
# Every action is referenced by commit SHA with the version in a trailing comment;
# action-pins.yml fails any workflow change that reintroduces a mutable tag. Dependabot
# is what keeps those pins current: it rewrites the SHA and the comment together, so the
# pins are reviewed in a PR instead of drifting silently or being bumped by hand.
- package-ecosystem: github-actions
directory: /
schedule:
interval: monthly
cooldown:
default-days: 7
groups:
actions:
patterns: ['*']
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Returns the request headers that authorize an Azure Storage REST call with Microsoft Entra.
.DESCRIPTION
One place for the storage OAuth contract shared by every publisher in this repo -- the
agent ZIP and MSI, the customer bootstrap scripts, the version manifests and the build
counters. Resource id, the az invocation, the service version and the failure message
live here so they cannot drift between call sites.
Identity comes from whatever `az login` established: the federated GitHub OIDC principal
in CI (azure/login, subject repo:okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor:ref:refs/heads/main), the
operator's own account for the local build. No secret is read, stored or passed around.
x-ms-version is MANDATORY here, not decoration: Entra-authorized requests are rejected
below 2017-11-09, and Table requests without a SAS must carry the header at all. 2021-08-06
is old enough to be deployed in every region and new enough for everything we send.
Callers merge the result into their own headers -- `$auth + @{ ... }` yields a new
hashtable per request, so nothing is shared across uploads:
$auth = & "$PSScriptRoot/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1"
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($auth + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob' }) -Body $bytes
Acquire once per step and reuse: every call shells out to az (~1s) and the token is valid
for the lifetime of a job.
.OUTPUTS
[hashtable] Authorization + x-ms-version.
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param()
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
# The data-plane resource, not management.azure.com -- a management token is accepted by
# neither the blob nor the table endpoint.
$token = az account get-access-token --resource https://storage.azure.com --query accessToken -o tsv 2>$null
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw ('Could not acquire an Azure Storage token. In CI this means the azure/login step ' +
'is missing or its federated credential does not cover this ref; locally, run ' +
'`az login`. A token alone is not enough: the principal also needs Storage Blob ' +
'Data Contributor on the container it writes, and Storage Table Data Contributor ' +
'on the table -- a missing role shows up later as HTTP 403 AuthorizationPermissionMismatch.')
}
return @{
'Authorization' = "Bearer $token"
'x-ms-version' = '2021-08-06'
}
+263 -67
View File
@@ -12,52 +12,78 @@
lands a consistent set (ZIP + manifest + scripts).
Both callers run the same code. The scripts on the download alias are the live
copy the WDP bootstrap MSI (Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1) downloads on every
enrolling device, so "current" is a correctness property, not cosmetics.
copy the stage-1 loader downloads on every enrolling device, whether it came from
Intune or from the bootstrap MSI, so "current" is a correctness property, not
cosmetics.
Steps, in order:
1. Parse $ScriptVersion from the bootstrap source.
2. Render the -Dev variant by literal substitution of the two URL/manifest
1. Parse $ScriptVersion from the loader and the bootstrap source.
2. Render the -Dev variants by literal substitution of the URL/manifest
defaults. A missing anchor is a hard failure -- a silently un-substituted
dev script would point the dev fleet at the stable agent.
3. Version-bump guard: if the published bootstrap differs from the source
but carries the same $ScriptVersion, abort. Otherwise the docs badge,
3. Version-bump guard: if a published script differs from its source but
carries the same $ScriptVersion, abort. Otherwise the docs badge,
version.json.bootstrapVersion and the portal's "your script is outdated"
hint would all keep asserting a version that is no longer what ships.
4. Upload every script blob with Cache-Control: no-cache (they rotate in
4. Build the publish set (loader, bootstrap, both dev renders, the extras).
5. Authenticode-sign every script (see -SigningToken). Signing is the LAST
transformation: it covers the exact CRLF/UTF-8 bytes that get uploaded,
and nothing may touch them afterwards or the signature breaks.
6. Upload every script blob with Cache-Control: no-cache (they rotate in
place), mirrored fail-soft to the legacy account.
5. Reconcile the two version oracles: version.json.bootstrapVersion
(read-modify-write under If-Match, so a concurrent agent release cannot
lose its agent fields) and AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion.
6. Verify through the alias -- re-download each blob and compare SHA-256.
7. Reconcile the version oracles: version.json.bootstrapVersion and
.loaderVersion (read-modify-write under If-Match, so a concurrent agent
release cannot lose its agent fields) and
AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion.
8. Verify through the alias -- re-download each blob and compare SHA-256.
.PARAMETER SasToken
Container SAS for the eu storage account with write permission. Leading '?' tolerated.
Comparisons against a published script always strip its signature block first
(Get-ComparableText). A signature carries a timestamp, so signed bytes differ on
every run; without stripping, the bump guard and the drift check would report a
change for every unchanged script.
.PARAMETER LegacySasToken
Container SAS for the legacy account. Optional -- a mirror failure warns, never fails.
.PARAMETER TableSasToken
Table SAS for AdminConfiguration. Optional -- omitted or 'XXX' skips the oracle update.
The legacy account lives in a different tenant, so the ambient Entra identity cannot
reach it; this is the only credential the publisher still takes.
.PARAMETER RepoRoot
Repository root. Defaults to the parent of .github/scripts.
.PARAMETER DryRun
Run every check and render, upload nothing.
Run every check and render, upload nothing. A dry run signs when a token is supplied
and skips signing when it is not: the PR gate runs this without any Azure login.
.PARAMETER SigningToken
Azure Key Vault access token for AzureSignTool. MANDATORY for a real publish -- an
unsigned customer script is not something this repo publishes. Together with
-KeyVaultUrl and -CertificateName.
.PARAMETER ExpectedPublisher
Optional -like pattern the signer subject must match after signing. Pins the publisher
instead of accepting any trusted signature; the loader on the device pins the same way.
.PARAMETER SignedOutputDir
Optional directory that receives a copy of every published file exactly as uploaded.
Used by CI to offer the signed scripts as a build artifact for local inspection.
.EXAMPLE
./Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 -DryRun
.EXAMPLE
./Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 -SasToken $env:SAS -TableSasToken $env:TABLE_SAS
./Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 -LegacySasToken $env:LEGACY_SAS -SigningToken $env:AKV_TOKEN `
-KeyVaultUrl $env:KV_URL -CertificateName $env:CERT
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[string]$SasToken,
[string]$LegacySasToken,
[string]$TableSasToken,
[string]$RepoRoot,
[string]$SigningToken,
[string]$KeyVaultUrl,
[string]$CertificateName,
[string]$TimestampUrl = 'http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com',
[string]$ExpectedPublisher,
[string]$SignedOutputDir,
[switch]$DryRun
)
@@ -66,9 +92,6 @@ $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
if (-not $RepoRoot) {
$RepoRoot = (Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '../..')).Path
}
if (-not $DryRun -and [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($SasToken)) {
throw 'SasToken is required unless -DryRun is used.'
}
$ContainerUrl = 'https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent'
$LegacyContainerUrl = 'https://autopilotmonitor.blob.core.windows.net/agent'
@@ -78,8 +101,23 @@ $TableUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.table.core.windows.net/AdminCo
$BootstrapSource = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'scripts/Bootstrap/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$BootstrapBlob = 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$DevBlob = 'Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1'
# Stage 1. Assigned in Intune once, and embedded in the bootstrap MSI; it downloads the
# bootstrap above on every device and verifies its publisher before running it.
$LoaderSource = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'scripts/Bootstrap/Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$LoaderBlob = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$LoaderDevBlob = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1'
$ScriptContentType = 'text/plain; charset=utf-8'
$SigningEnabled = -not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($SigningToken)
if (-not $DryRun -and -not $SigningEnabled) {
throw ('Publishing requires -SigningToken (plus -KeyVaultUrl and -CertificateName): the ' +
'loader on every device verifies the publisher of what it downloads, so an unsigned ' +
'script would be rejected in the field. Only -DryRun may run without signing.')
}
if ($SigningEnabled -and ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($KeyVaultUrl) -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($CertificateName))) {
throw '-SigningToken needs -KeyVaultUrl and -CertificateName.'
}
function Get-HttpStatus {
param($ErrorRecord)
if ($ErrorRecord.Exception.PSObject.Properties['Response'] -and $ErrorRecord.Exception.Response) {
@@ -125,6 +163,132 @@ function Get-PublishBytes {
return ,(New-Object System.Text.UTF8Encoding $false).GetBytes($normalised)
}
# A PowerShell signature is appended as a comment block at the end of the file, so the
# published bytes are "source + signature". Everything that compares a published script to
# its source has to cut that block off first -- the signature carries a timestamp and is
# therefore different on every publish, while the script above it is unchanged.
function Remove-SignatureBlock {
param([string]$Text)
$marker = '# SIG # Begin signature block'
$index = $Text.IndexOf($marker)
if ($index -lt 0) { return $Text }
return $Text.Substring(0, $index)
}
# Comparison form: no signature, LF, no trailing blank lines. Used for "is the published
# copy still this source" -- never for what gets uploaded.
function Get-ComparableText {
param([string]$Text)
return (Remove-SignatureBlock $Text).Replace("`r`n", "`n").TrimEnd("`n")
}
# Signs the publish set in place: each item's bytes are written to a work directory, signed
# there, verified, and read back as the bytes that will be uploaded. Signing has to be the
# last transformation -- the signature covers exactly these bytes, so nothing may normalise
# or re-encode them afterwards.
function Set-PublishSetSignature {
param([object[]]$Items, [string]$WorkDir)
if (-not (Get-Command azuresigntool -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)) {
throw "azuresigntool is not on PATH. Install it with: dotnet tool install --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1"
}
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $WorkDir | Out-Null
$paths = @()
foreach ($item in $Items) {
$path = Join-Path $WorkDir $item.BlobName
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($path, [byte[]]$item.Bytes)
$paths += $path
}
Write-Host "Signing $($paths.Count) script(s) with certificate '$CertificateName'..."
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url $KeyVaultUrl `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken $SigningToken `
--azure-key-vault-certificate $CertificateName `
--timestamp-rfc3161 $TimestampUrl `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor bootstrap' `
--description-url 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com' `
$paths
# Native tool: PowerShell does not throw on a non-zero exit, and an unnoticed signing
# failure would publish unsigned scripts that every loader in the field then rejects.
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE -- nothing was uploaded."
}
foreach ($item in $Items) {
$path = Join-Path $WorkDir $item.BlobName
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $path
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
throw "Signature on $($item.BlobName) is '$($sig.Status)', expected 'Valid'."
}
# Without a timestamp the signature dies with the certificate, and these scripts sit
# on customer devices far longer than a certificate lifetime.
if (-not $sig.TimeStamperCertificate) {
throw "Signature on $($item.BlobName) carries no timestamp."
}
if ($ExpectedPublisher -and $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -notlike $ExpectedPublisher) {
throw "$($item.BlobName) was signed by '$($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)', expected '$ExpectedPublisher'."
}
# Plain assignment, NO comma operator: the ',' elsewhere in this file exists because
# PowerShell unrolls an array RETURNED from a function, which is not what a property
# assignment does -- here it would wrap the byte[] in an Object[] of length 1 and the
# upload would fail converting it back.
$signedBytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($path)
if ($signedBytes.Length -le $item.Bytes.Length) {
throw ("Signed $($item.BlobName) is $($signedBytes.Length) bytes but the unsigned form " +
"was $($item.Bytes.Length) -- a signature only ever adds bytes, so this is a " +
'read-back bug, not a signing result.')
}
$item.Bytes = $signedBytes
Write-Host " signed $($item.BlobName) ($($signedBytes.Length) bytes, signer $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject.Split(',')[0]))"
}
}
# Aborts when a published script changed behaviour without a version bump. Consumers act on
# the version (docs badge, version.json, the portal's outdated-script hint), so an unchanged
# version has to mean unchanged behaviour.
function Assert-VersionBump {
param(
[string]$BlobName,
[string]$SourceContent,
[string]$SourceOrigin,
[string]$SourceVersion
)
$publishedBytes = Get-PublishedBytes "$AliasUrl/$BlobName"
if ($null -eq $publishedBytes) {
Write-Host "No published $BlobName yet -- version-bump guard skipped (first publish)"
return
}
$publishedText = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($publishedBytes)
if ((Get-ComparableText $publishedText) -eq (Get-ComparableText $SourceContent)) {
Write-Host "Published $BlobName is already this source (signature block aside)"
return
}
$publishedVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $publishedText -Origin "$AliasUrl/$BlobName" -Optional
if ($null -eq $publishedVersion) {
Write-Host "::warning::The published $BlobName is not a readable script (no ScriptVersion found). Republishing over it."
} elseif ($publishedVersion -ne $SourceVersion) {
Write-Host "Version bump: $publishedVersion -> $SourceVersion ($BlobName)"
} elseif ((Get-CodeFingerprint -Text (Remove-SignatureBlock $publishedText) -Origin "$AliasUrl/$BlobName") -eq
(Get-CodeFingerprint -Text $SourceContent -Origin $SourceOrigin)) {
# Comments, typos in comments, reflow -- nothing a consumer of the version can act on.
Write-Host "::warning::$BlobName changed in comments or formatting only; publishing under the unchanged version $SourceVersion."
} else {
throw ("Version-bump guard: $BlobName changed behaviour but ScriptVersion is still $SourceVersion. " +
"Bump it in $SourceOrigin -- the docs badge, version.json and the " +
'portal outdated-script hint all read that value, and customers decide from it whether ' +
'to re-upload their Intune copy. Comment-only and formatting changes do not need a bump.')
}
}
function Get-BootstrapScriptVersion {
param([string]$Content, [string]$Origin, [switch]$Optional)
if ($Content -match '\$ScriptVersion\s*=\s*"([\d\.\-a-zA-Z]+)"') { return $Matches[1] }
@@ -152,12 +316,16 @@ function Get-CodeFingerprint {
return (($tokens | Where-Object { $ignored -notcontains $_.Kind.ToString() } | ForEach-Object { $_.Text }) -join "`n")
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. source
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. sources
$sourceContent = Get-Content $BootstrapSource -Raw
$sourceBytes = Get-PublishBytes $sourceContent
$scriptVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $sourceContent -Origin $BootstrapSource
Write-Host "Bootstrap script version: $scriptVersion"
$loaderContent = Get-Content $LoaderSource -Raw
$loaderVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $loaderContent -Origin $LoaderSource
Write-Host "Loader script version: $loaderVersion"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 2. dev render
$stableUrlLiteral = '$AgentDownloadUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip"'
$devUrlLiteral = '$AgentDownloadUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Agent-dev.zip"'
@@ -170,33 +338,21 @@ if ($sourceContent.IndexOf($stableUrlLiteral) -lt 0 -or $sourceContent.IndexOf($
$devContent = $sourceContent.Replace($stableUrlLiteral, $devUrlLiteral).Replace($stableManLiteral, $devManLiteral)
Write-Host "Rendered $DevBlob (dev agent URL + version-dev.json)"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 3. bump guard
$publishedBytes = Get-PublishedBytes "$AliasUrl/$BootstrapBlob"
if ($null -eq $publishedBytes) {
Write-Host 'No published bootstrap yet -- version-bump guard skipped (first publish)'
} elseif ((Get-Sha256 $publishedBytes) -eq (Get-Sha256 $sourceBytes)) {
Write-Host 'Published bootstrap is already byte-identical to the source'
} else {
$publishedText = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($publishedBytes)
$publishedVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $publishedText -Origin "$AliasUrl/$BootstrapBlob" -Optional
# The dev loader must fetch the dev bootstrap, or a dev device would run the stable chain.
$stableLoaderLiteral = '$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"'
$devLoaderLiteral = '$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1"'
if ($null -eq $publishedVersion) {
Write-Host "::warning::The published $BootstrapBlob is not a readable bootstrap script (no ScriptVersion found). Republishing over it."
} elseif ($publishedVersion -ne $scriptVersion) {
Write-Host "Version bump: $publishedVersion -> $scriptVersion"
} elseif ((Get-CodeFingerprint -Text $publishedText -Origin "$AliasUrl/$BootstrapBlob") -eq
(Get-CodeFingerprint -Text $sourceContent -Origin $BootstrapSource)) {
# Comments, typos in comments, reflow -- nothing a consumer of the version can act on.
Write-Host "::warning::$BootstrapBlob changed in comments or formatting only; publishing under the unchanged version $scriptVersion."
} else {
throw ("Version-bump guard: $BootstrapBlob changed behaviour but ScriptVersion is still $scriptVersion. " +
"Bump it in $BootstrapSource -- the docs badge, version.json.bootstrapVersion and the " +
'portal outdated-script hint all read that value, and customers decide from it whether ' +
'to re-upload their Intune copy. Comment-only and formatting changes do not need a bump.')
}
if ($loaderContent.IndexOf($stableLoaderLiteral) -lt 0) {
throw "Loader dev-render: anchor literal missing in $LoaderSource"
}
$devLoaderContent = $loaderContent.Replace($stableLoaderLiteral, $devLoaderLiteral)
Write-Host "Rendered $LoaderDevBlob (points at $DevBlob)"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 4. upload
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 3. bump guards
Assert-VersionBump -BlobName $BootstrapBlob -SourceContent $sourceContent -SourceOrigin $BootstrapSource -SourceVersion $scriptVersion
Assert-VersionBump -BlobName $LoaderBlob -SourceContent $loaderContent -SourceOrigin $LoaderSource -SourceVersion $loaderVersion
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 4. publish set
# Sources beyond the bootstrap pair, read straight from the repo.
$extraSources = @(
@{ Path = 'scripts/Bootstrap/Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent.ps1'; BlobName = 'Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent.ps1' }
@@ -206,20 +362,38 @@ $extraSources = @(
# Uninstall-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 is deliberately NOT published: nothing links it, and
# an unauthenticated uninstall script on the public download host is not a feature.
# Text is the unsigned publish form and stays the reference for every comparison against a
# published copy; Bytes is what goes on the wire and carries the signature after step 4.
$publishSet = [System.Collections.Generic.List[object]]::new()
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $BootstrapBlob; Bytes = $sourceBytes })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $DevBlob; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devContent) })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $LoaderBlob; Text = $loaderContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $loaderContent) })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $LoaderDevBlob; Text = $devLoaderContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devLoaderContent) })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $BootstrapBlob; Text = $sourceContent; Bytes = $sourceBytes })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $DevBlob; Text = $devContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devContent) })
foreach ($extra in $extraSources) {
$extraPath = Join-Path $RepoRoot $extra.Path
if (-not (Test-Path $extraPath)) {
throw "Publish source missing: $extraPath"
}
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $extra.BlobName; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes (Get-Content $extraPath -Raw)) })
$extraText = Get-Content $extraPath -Raw
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $extra.BlobName; Text = $extraText; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $extraText) })
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 5. sign
# After this point the bytes are final. Normalising, re-encoding or rewriting a line ending
# would invalidate the signature, and the device-side loader would refuse the script.
if ($SigningEnabled) {
Set-PublishSetSignature -Items $publishSet -WorkDir (Join-Path ([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath()) "apm-publish-$PID")
} else {
Write-Host '::warning::No signing token supplied -- dry run continues with unsigned scripts.'
}
$legacySas = if ($LegacySasToken) { $LegacySasToken.TrimStart('?') } else { '' }
$writeSas = if ($SasToken) { $SasToken.TrimStart('?') } else { '' }
# Acquired lazily: a dry run must stay runnable without any Azure login -- the PR gate
# (bootstrap-script-gates.yml) executes this script with -DryRun and never logs in.
$authHeaders = if ($DryRun) { $null } else { & (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1') }
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 6. upload
foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
# Explicit type, not a convenience: an Object[] body is uploaded as space-separated
# decimals rather than raw bytes, and every hash check still passes because [byte[]]
@@ -227,11 +401,21 @@ foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
[byte[]]$bytes = $item.Bytes
$item | Add-Member -NotePropertyName Sha256 -NotePropertyValue (Get-Sha256 $bytes) -Force
# Exactly the bytes that go on the wire, for the CI artifact. Written in a dry run too:
# that is the run an operator uses to inspect a signed script before it is published.
if ($SignedOutputDir) {
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $SignedOutputDir | Out-Null
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes((Join-Path $SignedOutputDir $item.BlobName), $bytes)
}
if ($DryRun) {
# Doubles as a drift check: says per blob whether the alias already serves this source.
# Doubles as a drift check: says per blob whether the alias already serves this
# source. Compared as text without the signature block -- signed bytes differ on
# every run, so a byte comparison would report drift for every unchanged script.
$served = Get-PublishedBytes "$AliasUrl/$($item.BlobName)"
$state = if ($null -eq $served) { 'MISSING on the alias' }
elseif ((Get-Sha256 $served) -eq $item.Sha256) { 'already current' }
elseif ((Get-ComparableText ([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($served))) -eq
(Get-ComparableText $item.Text)) { 'already current' }
else { 'STALE on the alias' }
Write-Host " [dry-run] $($item.BlobName) ($($bytes.Length) bytes, sha256 $($item.Sha256)) -- $state"
continue
@@ -241,8 +425,18 @@ foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
# with Front Door. Route caching is disabled there, but a stale script paired with a
# fresh manifest would fail the bootstrap SHA check -- this keeps that class of bug
# impossible even if caching is ever re-enabled.
$headers = @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'Content-Type' = $ScriptContentType; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$ContainerUrl/$($item.BlobName)?$writeSas" -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body $bytes | Out-Null
#
# Content-Disposition: without it a text/plain blob opens as a web page in every
# browser, and the documented "download the script" step silently becomes "copy this
# text". The header makes the link a download everywhere, and command-line clients
# (the loader, the MSI, curl) ignore it.
$headers = @{
'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'
'Content-Type' = $ScriptContentType
'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache'
'x-ms-blob-content-disposition' = ('attachment; filename="{0}"' -f $item.BlobName)
}
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$ContainerUrl/$($item.BlobName)" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $headers) -Body $bytes | Out-Null
# Read straight back from the blob (authoritative, no CDN in the way) before touching the
# mirror or the next file. The alias verification at the end would catch a bad body too,
@@ -266,7 +460,7 @@ foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
}
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 5. version oracles
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 7. version oracles
# version.json is the agent manifest; only bootstrapVersion belongs to us. Read from the
# blob (not the alias) for an authoritative ETag, write back under If-Match so a concurrent
# agent release cannot lose its version/sha256 fields.
@@ -278,11 +472,15 @@ if (-not $DryRun) {
} else { [string]$manifestResp.Content }
$manifest = $manifestRaw | ConvertFrom-Json
if ($manifest.bootstrapVersion -eq $scriptVersion) {
Write-Host "version.json already reports bootstrapVersion $scriptVersion"
if ($manifest.bootstrapVersion -eq $scriptVersion -and $manifest.loaderVersion -eq $loaderVersion) {
Write-Host "version.json already reports bootstrapVersion $scriptVersion and loaderVersion $loaderVersion"
} else {
$etag = '"' + ([string]($manifestResp.Headers['ETag'] | Select-Object -First 1)).Trim('"') + '"'
$manifest | Add-Member -NotePropertyName 'bootstrapVersion' -NotePropertyValue $scriptVersion -Force
# Additive: no consumer reads loaderVersion yet. It exists so support can tell
# which stage-1 file a device was assigned -- stage 2 is always current by
# construction, so its version says nothing about the customer's Intune copy.
$manifest | Add-Member -NotePropertyName 'loaderVersion' -NotePropertyValue $loaderVersion -Force
$body = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(($manifest | ConvertTo-Json -Compress))
$manifestHeaders = @{
'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'
@@ -290,8 +488,8 @@ if (-not $DryRun) {
'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache'
'If-Match' = $etag
}
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$ContainerUrl/version.json?$writeSas" -Method Put -Headers $manifestHeaders -Body $body | Out-Null
Write-Host "version.json bootstrapVersion -> $scriptVersion (agent fields untouched)"
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$ContainerUrl/version.json" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $manifestHeaders) -Body $body | Out-Null
Write-Host "version.json bootstrapVersion -> $scriptVersion, loaderVersion -> $loaderVersion (agent fields untouched)"
if ($legacySas) {
try {
@@ -310,11 +508,8 @@ if (-not $DryRun) {
}
}
$tableSas = if ($TableSasToken) { $TableSasToken.TrimStart('?') } else { '' }
if ($DryRun) {
Write-Host " [dry-run] would set AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion"
} elseif ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($tableSas) -or $tableSas -eq 'XXX') {
Write-Host 'SKIPPED: AdminConfiguration update -- set AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN to enable the portal version oracle'
} else {
$tableHeaders = @{
'Content-Type' = 'application/json'
@@ -322,11 +517,11 @@ if ($DryRun) {
'If-Match' = '*'
}
$tableBody = @{ LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion } | ConvertTo-Json
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$TableUrl`?$tableSas" -Method Merge -Headers $tableHeaders -Body $tableBody | Out-Null
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $TableUrl -Method Merge -Headers ($authHeaders + $tableHeaders) -Body $tableBody | Out-Null
Write-Host "AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion"
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 6. verify via alias
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 8. verify via alias
if (-not $DryRun) {
$pending = [System.Collections.ArrayList]::new()
$publishSet | ForEach-Object { [void]$pending.Add($_) }
@@ -358,7 +553,8 @@ if ($env:GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY) {
$summary = @(
"### Bootstrap scripts: $mode",
'',
"Bootstrap script version: **$scriptVersion**",
"Loader script version: **$loaderVersion** | Bootstrap script version: **$scriptVersion**",
"Signed: **$(if ($SigningEnabled) { "yes, certificate '$CertificateName'" } else { 'NO (unsigned dry run)' })**",
''
) + ($publishSet | ForEach-Object { "- $($_.BlobName) -- sha256 $($_.Sha256)" })
($summary -join [Environment]::NewLine) | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY -Append -Encoding utf8
+8 -11
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@
A failed build burns a number, which is harmless -- uniqueness matters,
density does not.
The blob is public-read; only the write needs the container SAS.
The blob is public-read; only the write needs authorization, and that comes from the
ambient Entra identity (see Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1) -- no secret is passed in.
Why a counter and not the published version manifest: manifests are written
on publish, not on build (the agent writes version.json only for stable
@@ -20,10 +21,7 @@
overwrite each other's versioned artifact.
.PARAMETER CounterUrl
Full URL of the counter blob, without SAS.
.PARAMETER SasToken
Container SAS with create+write permission. A leading '?' is tolerated.
Full URL of the counter blob.
.PARAMETER Override
Explicit build number instead of counter+1. If it is not greater than the
@@ -37,20 +35,19 @@
[int] the reserved build number. Progress goes to the host, not the pipeline.
.EXAMPLE
$n = ./Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $url -SasToken $sas
$n = ./Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $url
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$CounterUrl,
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$SasToken,
[int]$Override = 0,
[int]$MaxAttempts = 5
)
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
# Tolerate both secret formats ("sp=cw&..." and "?sp=cw&...").
$writeUrl = $CounterUrl + '?' + $SasToken.TrimStart('?')
# The write is Entra-authorized; the read below stays anonymous (public container).
$authHeaders = & (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1')
function Get-HttpStatus {
param($ErrorRecord)
@@ -85,8 +82,8 @@ for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le $MaxAttempts; $attempt++) {
$target = if ($Override -gt 0) { $Override } else { $counter.Value + 1 }
try {
$headers = @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'If-Match' = $counter.ETag }
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $writeUrl -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body "$target" -ContentType 'text/plain' | Out-Null
$headers = $authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'If-Match' = $counter.ETag }
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $CounterUrl -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body "$target" -ContentType 'text/plain' | Out-Null
Write-Host " Reserved build number $target (CAS write ok, attempt $attempt)"
return $target
} catch {
+103
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
name: Workflow gates
# Two checks over the workflow files themselves:
# * verify-pins -- every third-party action is referenced by a full commit SHA plus a
# version comment (stricter than zizmor's unpinned-uses audit).
# * zizmor -- static analysis of every workflow (permissions, credential
# persistence, template injection, ...). Configuration and the
# reasoned ignores live in zizmor.yml at the repository root; the
# same run is expected locally before a workflow change is committed.
#
# Every third-party action must be referenced by a full commit SHA, never by a tag.
# Tags are mutable: whoever controls an action repository can repoint v4 at new code,
# and that code runs inside jobs that hold the code-signing identity, the storage
# credentials and a token that can push to main. A SHA is the only reference an
# upstream owner cannot change under us.
#
# Lives in its own workflow rather than in ci.yml: CI deliberately ignores changes to
# the other workflow files, so a guard placed there would stay silent for exactly the
# commits it needs to inspect. Dependabot's action-pin PRs are the main customer: they
# rewrite workflow files without anyone running zizmor locally.
#
# Like CI, this reports rather than blocks: main is deliberately unprotected, so a red
# run is a signal to act on, not a merge barrier. Making it binding means adding
# 'Verify action pins' as a required status check -- a branch-protection decision, not
# something this file can assert.
#
# The pins are not maintained by hand — .github/dependabot.yml opens a monthly grouped
# PR that rewrites both the SHA and the trailing version comment. The comment is
# therefore required too: it is what makes a pinned line reviewable.
on:
push:
branches: [main]
paths: ['.github/workflows/**', '.github/dependabot.yml', 'zizmor.yml']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['.github/workflows/**', '.github/dependabot.yml', 'zizmor.yml']
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
verify-pins:
name: Verify action pins
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Every third-party action is pinned to a SHA
run: |
set -uo pipefail
failed=0
while IFS=: read -r file line ref; do
# Reusable workflows from this repository (workspace-relative ./ or the
# self-repository form $/) move with the commit that calls them, so there is
# nothing to pin.
case "$ref" in ./*|\$/*) continue ;; esac
if [[ "$ref" =~ ^[^@]+@[0-9a-f]{40}[[:space:]]+#[[:space:]]*[^[:space:]] ]]; then
printf 'ok %s:%s %s\n' "$file" "$line" "$ref"
continue
fi
if [[ "$ref" =~ ^[^@]+@[0-9a-f]{40}[[:space:]]*$ ]]; then
echo "::error file=$file,line=$line::Pinned but the version comment is missing: '$ref'. Write 'owner/action@<sha> # vN' so the line stays reviewable."
else
echo "::error file=$file,line=$line::Action '$ref' is not pinned to a commit SHA. Tags are mutable -- resolve it with: gh api repos/<owner>/<action>/git/ref/tags/<tag>"
fi
failed=1
# -H is load-bearing: with a single matching file grep omits the name, the
# fields shift by one and every diagnostic points at nothing.
done < <(grep -nHE '^[[:space:]]*(-[[:space:]]+)?uses:' .github/workflows/*.yml \
| sed -E 's/^([^:]+):([0-9]+):[[:space:]]*(-[[:space:]]+)?uses:[[:space:]]*/\1:\2:/')
if [ "$failed" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "::error::Unpinned action references found -- fix them before this reaches main."
exit 1
fi
echo "All action references are pinned to commit SHAs."
zizmor:
name: zizmor audit
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write # SARIF upload: findings land in the Code scanning tab next to CodeQL
actions: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
# zizmor itself is version-pinned like every other tool here; bump it together with
# the local install so the gate and the pre-commit run agree on the finding set.
# Informational findings (template expansion of our own step outputs in pwsh) are
# visible locally but do not fail the gate.
- uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@cc914d7f3750a2d13d75c7f184a1060aa0e9d482 # v0.6.4
with:
version: 1.30.1
min-severity: low
+3 -1
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,9 @@ jobs:
name: Bootstrap guard tests (PS 5.1)
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Install Pester 5+
shell: powershell
+179 -24
View File
@@ -57,6 +57,13 @@ env:
VERSIONED_ZIP: AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v2.zip
STABLE_ZIP: AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip
STABLE_MANIFEST: version.json
# Authenticode via Azure Key Vault; identity and vault come from repository variables.
# CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT is optional and pins the publisher in the verify step.
CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME }}
CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL }}
CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT }}
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL: http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com
jobs:
build:
@@ -65,14 +72,68 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v7
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
# Every released build is signed; a missing variable stops the run before a build
# number is burnt.
- name: Check code-signing configuration
shell: pwsh
run: |
foreach ($name in 'CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID', 'CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME', 'CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL') {
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace([Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable($name))) {
throw "Repository variable $name is not set. Every released build must be Authenticode-signed."
}
}
Write-Host "Code-signing configuration present (certificate '$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME')"
# Logs in FIRST and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account, so the storage login below has to be the last one. Both federated credentials
# are bound to the ref, so this job must never be given an `environment:` -- that would
# change the OIDC subject claim and break both logins.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ env.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
allow-no-subscriptions: true
- name: Acquire Key Vault token for signing
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$token = az account get-access-token --scope https://vault.azure.net/.default --query accessToken --output tsv
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw "Could not acquire a Key Vault token for the code-signing identity."
}
Write-Host "::add-mask::$token"
"CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN=$token" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
# Every storage write below (counter blob, agent ZIP, manifests, AdminConfiguration)
# is authorized by this federated identity -- no SAS secret. One login covers the whole
# job: the federated credential is bound to the ref, and a release run takes ~2 minutes,
# well inside the token lifetime. Only the legacy mirror still needs a SAS: that account
# lives in the pre-migration tenant, where this principal has no identity.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# SDK 10 = single build toolchain (parity with local build.ps1 / global.json).
- name: Setup .NET
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
# Version pinned; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK above.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
# Build numbers come from the shared counter blob -- one counter and one
# implementation for CI and the local build (.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1).
# Reserve-before-build with ETag-CAS: concurrent builds can never mint the same
@@ -85,7 +146,6 @@ jobs:
# build_number could otherwise break out of the quotes and run arbitrary code.
env:
BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE: ${{ inputs.build_number }}
AGENT_SAS_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}
run: |
$override = 0
if ($env:BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE -ne '') {
@@ -96,7 +156,7 @@ jobs:
}
$counterUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent/buildcounter-v$($env:LINE_MAJOR).txt"
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $counterUrl -SasToken $env:AGENT_SAS_TOKEN -Override $override
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $counterUrl -Override $override
$csproj = Get-Content $env:CSPROJ_PATH -Raw
if ($csproj -match '<VersionPrefix>(\d+\.\d+)</VersionPrefix>') {
@@ -129,6 +189,47 @@ jobs:
- name: Run Agent unit tests
run: dotnet test ${{ env.TEST_PROJECT }} --configuration Release --no-restore --verbosity quiet
# Authenticode over everything we author; third-party assemblies keep their own signature.
#
# THE POSITION IS LOAD-BEARING: signing rewrites the PE file, so it must run before the
# ZIP and every SHA-256 in the next step -- those hashes are the bootstrap's integrity
# oracle, and hashes taken before signing match no downloaded file.
#
# $LASTEXITCODE is checked explicitly: PowerShell does not throw on a native non-zero exit.
- name: Sign agent binaries (Authenticode)
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$targets = @()
$targets += Get-ChildItem -Path "$env:AGENT_OUTPUT/*" -Include 'AutopilotMonitor.*.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.*.dll' -File
$targets += Get-ChildItem -Path "$env:DIALOG_OUTPUT/AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe" -File
if (-not ($targets | Where-Object Name -eq 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')) {
throw "AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe not found in $env:AGENT_OUTPUT -- nothing to sign."
}
if (-not ($targets | Where-Object Name -eq 'AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe')) {
throw "AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe not found in $env:DIALOG_OUTPUT -- nothing to sign."
}
$targets | ForEach-Object { Write-Host "Signing $($_.Name)" }
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
--azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description "Autopilot Monitor Agent" `
--description-url "https://www.autopilotmonitor.com" `
($targets | ForEach-Object { $_.FullName })
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE -- aborting before anything is published."
}
- name: Create release artifact
id: artifact
shell: pwsh
@@ -219,12 +320,57 @@ jobs:
"sha256=$sha256Hash" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
"exe_sha256=$exeSha256Hash" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
# Verified against the STAGING copy -- the exact bytes that ship. The invariant is "every
# AutopilotMonitor PE in the ZIP is signed", so a project added later cannot ride along
# unsigned. A missing timestamp fails too: without it the signature dies with the cert.
- name: Verify Authenticode signatures
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$files = Get-ChildItem -Path "staging/agent/*" -Include 'AutopilotMonitor.*.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.*.dll' -File
if ($files.Count -lt 2) {
throw "Expected signed binaries in staging/agent, found $($files.Count)."
}
$failed = $false
$thumbprints = @{}
foreach ($file in $files) {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $file.FullName
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::Signature status is '$($sig.Status)' -- expected 'Valid'."
$failed = $true
continue
}
if (-not $sig.TimeStamperCertificate) {
Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::Signature carries no RFC-3161 timestamp -- it would expire with the certificate."
$failed = $true
continue
}
if (-not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) -and
$sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -notlike $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) {
Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::Signed by '$($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)', expected '$env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT'."
$failed = $true
continue
}
$thumbprints[$sig.SignerCertificate.Thumbprint] = $true
Write-Host "$($file.Name): Valid, timestamped $($sig.TimeStamperCertificate.Subject.Split(',')[0]), signer $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)"
}
if ($thumbprints.Count -gt 1) {
Write-Host "::error::Staged binaries carry $($thumbprints.Count) different signing certificates -- expected exactly one."
$failed = $true
}
if ($failed) {
throw "Signature verification failed. Nothing was published."
}
Write-Host "All $($files.Count) binaries signed with certificate $($thumbprints.Keys -join ', ')"
- name: Upload to Azure Blob Storage
if: inputs.upload_blob
shell: pwsh
run: |
$containerUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent"
$sasToken = "${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}".TrimStart('?')
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
# Legacy mirror (transition until customers moved to the download.-alias):
# blobs are ALSO pushed to the old account so the bootstrap URL baked into
# customers' Intune scripts keeps serving current bits. Fail-soft -- a
@@ -234,7 +380,6 @@ jobs:
function Send-Blob {
param([string]$Local, [string]$BlobName, [string]$ContentType)
$url = "$containerUrl/$BlobName`?$sasToken"
$bytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($Local)
# no-cache on EVERY blob: they all rotate in place (even the per-line ZIP is
# overwritten each build), and the download alias fronts them with Front Door.
@@ -248,7 +393,7 @@ jobs:
$md5.Dispose()
}
Write-Host "Uploading $BlobName ($([math]::Round($bytes.Length / 1MB, 2)) MB)..."
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body $bytes
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$containerUrl/$BlobName" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $headers) -Body $bytes
Write-Host " uploaded $BlobName"
if (-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($legacySasToken)) {
try {
@@ -274,56 +419,66 @@ jobs:
# to main, so a release lands a set that is consistent with what is already live
# (dev render, version-bump guard, bootstrapVersion oracles, alias verification).
# Runs AFTER version.json so its bootstrapVersion read sees this build's manifest.
# Signed with the same identity: the device-side loader verifies the publisher
# of what it downloads, and the publisher refuses to upload unsigned scripts.
./.github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 `
-SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-LegacySasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-TableSasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN }}'
-SigningToken $env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN `
-KeyVaultUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL `
-CertificateName $env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME `
-TimestampUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL `
-ExpectedPublisher $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT
}
# Update AdminConfiguration LatestAgentV2* -- ONLY on stable cutover. The hash-oracle
# must never point at a build that is not actually in the stable namespace.
# LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion is NOT set here: it belongs to the script publisher
# above, which also owns it on script-only pushes. One writer per field.
$tableSasToken = "${{ secrets.AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN }}".TrimStart('?')
if ('${{ inputs.publish_as_stable }}' -ne 'true') {
Write-Host "SKIPPED: AdminConfiguration update (versioned-only run -- stable namespace unchanged)"
} elseif ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($tableSasToken) -or $tableSasToken -eq "XXX") {
Write-Host "SKIPPED: Table SAS token not configured -- set AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN secret to enable backend hash-oracle"
} else {
$sha256 = "${{ steps.artifact.outputs.sha256 }}"
$exeSha256 = "${{ steps.artifact.outputs.exe_sha256 }}"
$agentVersion = "${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}"
$tableUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.table.core.windows.net/AdminConfiguration(PartitionKey='GlobalConfig',RowKey='config')?$tableSasToken"
$tableUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.table.core.windows.net/AdminConfiguration(PartitionKey='GlobalConfig',RowKey='config')"
$tableBody = @{
LatestAgentV2Version = $agentVersion
LatestAgentV2Sha256 = $sha256
LatestAgentV2ExeSha256 = $exeSha256
}
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $tableUrl -Method Merge -Headers @{
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $tableUrl -Method Merge -Headers ($authHeaders + @{
"Content-Type" = "application/json"
"Accept" = "application/json;odata=nometadata"
"If-Match" = "*"
} -Body ($tableBody | ConvertTo-Json)
}) -Body ($tableBody | ConvertTo-Json)
Write-Host "AdminConfiguration updated: V2 version=$agentVersion, sha256=$sha256, exeSha256=$exeSha256"
}
# Sigstore keyless provenance: binds the ZIP digest to this workflow run (repo, ref,
# commit, workflow file) in a public transparency log. The digest covers the identical
# Sigstore keyless provenance: binds the artifact digests to this workflow run (repo, ref,
# commit, workflow file) in a public transparency log. The digests cover the identical
# bytes uploaded to blob (versioned AND stable), so one attestation covers all copies.
# Verify: gh attestation verify <zip> --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
- name: Attest build provenance (ZIP)
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v4
# Complements Authenticode rather than replacing it: the signature says who published a
# binary, the attestation which build produced these exact bytes. Both EXEs are subjects
# of their own so an extracted binary can be verified without the ZIP.
# Verify: gh attestation verify <file> --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
# Skipped on runs that publish nothing -- no log entry for bytes nobody receives.
- name: Attest build provenance
if: inputs.upload_blob || inputs.create_release
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@4d101475d8b20a2381f78447822ac1eab6504dd8 # v4
with:
subject-path: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
subject-path: |
${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
staging/agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe
staging/agent/AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe
- name: Upload build artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
path: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
- name: Upload version metadata
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: version-metadata
path: ${{ env.MANIFEST_NAME }}
@@ -356,7 +511,7 @@ jobs:
- **Published as stable:** ${{ inputs.publish_as_stable }}
### Provenance
This ZIP carries a [GitHub Artifact Attestation](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/attestations) (Sigstore keyless). Verify:
The executables are Authenticode-signed and timestamped. The ZIP and both executables carry a [GitHub Artifact Attestation](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/attestations) (Sigstore keyless). Verify:
```
gh attestation verify AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}.zip --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
```
+128 -16
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
name: Build & Publish Bootstrap MSI
# Thin MDM LOB delivery vehicle for WDP (Autopilot v2) — see
# src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi/Package.wxs. The MSI carries no bootstrap
# logic (only the runner script that downloads the CURRENT server-hosted
# Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1), so it is rebuilt rarely: only when the runner script
# or the WiX package changes. Version lives in Package.wxs — bump it there before
# dispatching so Intune LOB update detection sees a new ProductVersion.
# src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi/Package.wxs. The MSI is packaging only: it
# carries the SAME stage-1 loader that is assigned directly in Intune, so it is rebuilt
# rarely — only when that loader or the WiX package changes. Version lives in Package.wxs
# — bump it there before dispatching so Intune LOB update detection sees a new
# ProductVersion.
on:
workflow_dispatch:
@@ -23,8 +23,15 @@ permissions:
env:
MSI_PROJECT_DIR: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi
RUNNER_SCRIPT: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi/Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1
RUNNER_SCRIPT: scripts/Bootstrap/Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1
STABLE_MSI: AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap.msi
# Authenticode via Azure Key Vault; identity and vault come from repository variables.
# CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT is optional and pins the publisher in the verify steps.
CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME }}
CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL }}
CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT }}
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL: http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com
jobs:
build:
@@ -33,10 +40,14 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v7
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
# The runner executes as SYSTEM on every enrolling device — a parse error or
# The loader executes as SYSTEM on every enrolling device — a parse error or
# non-ASCII mojibake (PS 5.1 codepage roulette) must fail the build, not the fleet.
# bootstrap-script-gates.yml runs the same checks plus Pester on pushes; this job
# stands on its own because it can be dispatched at any time.
- name: Validate runner script (parse + ASCII-only)
shell: pwsh
run: |
@@ -62,8 +73,77 @@ jobs:
Write-Host "MSI version (from Package.wxs): $version"
"version=$version" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
# Every published MSI is signed; a missing variable stops the run before the build.
- name: Check code-signing configuration
shell: pwsh
run: |
foreach ($name in 'CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID', 'CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME', 'CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL') {
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace([Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable($name))) {
throw "Repository variable $name is not set. Every published MSI must be Authenticode-signed."
}
}
# Logs in FIRST and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account, so the storage login below has to be the last one. Both federated credentials
# are bound to the ref, so this job must never be given an `environment:` -- that would
# change the OIDC subject claim and break both logins.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ env.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
allow-no-subscriptions: true
- name: Acquire Key Vault token for signing
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$token = az account get-access-token --scope https://vault.azure.net/.default --query accessToken --output tsv
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw "Could not acquire a Key Vault token for the code-signing identity."
}
Write-Host "::add-mask::$token"
"CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN=$token" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
# The blob upload below is authorized by this federated identity, not by a SAS.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# Exact version, not a "5.*" range: wix writes the bytes of the MSI that customers
# install, so a compromised or simply broken point release must not flow into a build
# unnoticed. Bumping is a reviewed commit.
- name: Install WiX toolset
run: dotnet tool install --global wix --version "5.*"
run: dotnet tool install --global wix --version 5.0.2
# Version pinned; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
# BEFORE the build: wix embeds the file as it finds it, so a loader signed afterwards
# would leave the copy inside the MSI unsigned. Devices under an AllSigned policy need
# the embedded loader to carry a signature of its own.
- name: Sign bootstrap loader (Authenticode)
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
--azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor bootstrap runner' `
--description-url 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com' `
$env:RUNNER_SCRIPT
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE" }
- name: Build MSI
shell: pwsh
@@ -75,16 +155,46 @@ jobs:
wix build Package.wxs -arch x64 -o $out
Pop-Location
if (-not (Test-Path $env:STABLE_MSI)) { Write-Error "wix build produced no MSI"; exit 1 }
$sha256 = (Get-FileHash $env:STABLE_MSI -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()
Write-Host "Built $env:STABLE_MSI ($([math]::Round((Get-Item $env:STABLE_MSI).Length / 1KB)) KB)"
Write-Host "SHA-256: $sha256"
# Signing rewrites the MSI, so it runs before the hash and the upload. A missing
# timestamp fails the run: without it the signature dies with the certificate.
- name: Sign MSI (Authenticode)
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
--azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap' `
--description-url 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com' `
$env:STABLE_MSI
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE" }
# The MSI and the loader it carries -- verified here, before anything is published.
foreach ($file in @($env:STABLE_MSI, $env:RUNNER_SCRIPT)) {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $file
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') { throw "Signature on $file is '$($sig.Status)', expected 'Valid'." }
if (-not $sig.TimeStamperCertificate) { throw "Signature on $file carries no timestamp." }
if ($env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT -and $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -notlike $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) {
throw "$file was signed by '$($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)', expected '$env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT'."
}
Write-Host "$file : Valid, timestamped, signer $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject.Split(',')[0])"
}
Write-Host "SHA-256: $((Get-FileHash $env:STABLE_MSI -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant())"
- name: Upload to Azure Blob Storage
if: inputs.upload_blob
shell: pwsh
run: |
$containerUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent"
$sasToken = "${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}".TrimStart('?')
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$version = "${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}"
# Same Send-Blob contract as build-agent.yml: no-cache on every blob because the
@@ -102,7 +212,7 @@ jobs:
$headers["Content-MD5"] = [Convert]::ToBase64String($md5.ComputeHash($bytes))
$md5.Dispose()
Write-Host "Uploading $BlobName ($([math]::Round($bytes.Length / 1KB)) KB)..."
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$containerUrl/$BlobName`?$sasToken" -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body $bytes
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$containerUrl/$BlobName" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $headers) -Body $bytes
Write-Host " uploaded $BlobName"
}
@@ -125,15 +235,17 @@ jobs:
}
Write-Host "Alias verified: https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/$env:STABLE_MSI ($remoteSize bytes)"
# Sigstore keyless provenance, same as the agent ZIP. Verify:
# Sigstore keyless provenance, same as the agent ZIP; covers the signed bytes. Skipped
# on runs that publish nothing -- no log entry for bytes nobody receives. Verify:
# gh attestation verify AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap.msi --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
- name: Attest build provenance (MSI)
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v4
if: inputs.upload_blob
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@4d101475d8b20a2381f78447822ac1eab6504dd8 # v4
with:
subject-path: ${{ env.STABLE_MSI }}
- name: Upload build artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
path: ${{ env.STABLE_MSI }}
+25 -11
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ on:
- 'infra/**'
- '.claude/**'
- '.gitmodules'
- 'zizmor.yml'
- '**/*.md'
- 'LICENSE'
- '.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/**'
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ on:
# Every other workflow: nothing here builds or tests anything CI covers. paths-ignore
# cannot negate, so they are listed one by one; ci.yml itself stays out of the list
# so a change to CI runs CI. A new workflow file is opt-in — add it here too.
- '.github/workflows/action-pins.yml'
- '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-agent.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-msi.yml'
@@ -56,6 +58,7 @@ on:
- 'infra/**'
- '.claude/**'
- '.gitmodules'
- 'zizmor.yml'
- '**/*.md'
- 'LICENSE'
- '.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/**'
@@ -67,6 +70,7 @@ on:
# Every other workflow: nothing here builds or tests anything CI covers. paths-ignore
# cannot negate, so they are listed one by one; ci.yml itself stays out of the list
# so a change to CI runs CI. A new workflow file is opt-in — add it here too.
- '.github/workflows/action-pins.yml'
- '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-agent.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-msi.yml'
@@ -94,9 +98,11 @@ jobs:
# windows-latest is required: the agent test projects target net48.
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
@@ -125,9 +131,11 @@ jobs:
run:
working-directory: src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
cache: npm
@@ -159,9 +167,11 @@ jobs:
run:
working-directory: src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
cache: npm
@@ -179,7 +189,7 @@ jobs:
# (run 31252869254). Persist the model across runs instead; HF_CACHE_DIR
# is honored by vector-search-provider.ts.
- name: Cache embedding model
uses: actions/cache@v6
uses: actions/cache@55cc8345863c7cc4c66a329aec7e433d2d1c52a9 # v6
with:
path: ${{ github.workspace }}/.hf-cache
key: hf-model-Xenova-all-MiniLM-L6-v2
@@ -193,9 +203,11 @@ jobs:
name: Generated guardrails match rules/guardrails.json
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
@@ -214,9 +226,11 @@ jobs:
name: Generated wire types match shared-manifests.json
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
+8 -4
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ on:
- 'infra/**'
- '.claude/**'
- '.gitmodules'
- 'zizmor.yml'
- '**/*.md'
- 'LICENSE'
- '.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/**'
@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ on:
- 'infra/**'
- '.claude/**'
- '.gitmodules'
- 'zizmor.yml'
- '**/*.md'
- 'LICENSE'
- '.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/**'
@@ -102,15 +104,17 @@ jobs:
build-mode: none
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
if: matrix.language == 'csharp'
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
- name: Initialize CodeQL
uses: github/codeql-action/init@v4.37.9
uses: github/codeql-action/init@b96794f015dfd88f77b49b1c93e0fa7110f94c63 # v4.38.0
with:
languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
build-mode: ${{ matrix.build-mode }}
@@ -121,6 +125,6 @@ jobs:
run: dotnet build AutopilotMonitor.sln --configuration Release
- name: Analyze
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v4.37.9
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@b96794f015dfd88f77b49b1c93e0fa7110f94c63 # v4.38.0
with:
category: /language:${{ matrix.language }}
+12 -4
View File
@@ -24,14 +24,22 @@ jobs:
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
- name: Install ajv-cli
run: npm install -g ajv-cli ajv-formats
# Lockfile and no lifecycle scripts: this job holds contents:write and pushes to
# main, so an install-time script from a hijacked package would run with a token that
# can rewrite the repository. rules/scripts/package-lock.json pins ajv-cli, ajv-formats
# and every transitive package (Dependabot keeps it current); ajv is pure JS and
# needs no install hooks.
- name: Install ajv-cli from the lockfile
working-directory: rules/scripts
run: |
npm ci --ignore-scripts
echo "$PWD/node_modules/.bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
- name: Validate Gather Rules
run: |
+9 -7
View File
@@ -19,17 +19,19 @@ jobs:
name: Build and Deploy Backend
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
- name: Setup .NET 10
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
@@ -41,7 +43,7 @@ jobs:
id: version
shell: pwsh
run: |
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.txt" -SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.txt"
$csproj = Get-Content ${{ env.CSPROJ_PATH }} -Raw
if ($csproj -notmatch '<VersionPrefix>(\d+\.\d+)</VersionPrefix>') {
@@ -115,9 +117,9 @@ jobs:
runId = '${{ github.run_id }}'
} | ConvertTo-Json
$sas = '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'.TrimStart('?')
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.json?$sas"
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.json"
# no-cache: rotating pointer, must never be served stale by any fronting cache.
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' } -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }) -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Write-Host "Published versions/backend.json"
Write-Host $manifest
+17 -14
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,9 @@ jobs:
name: Build and Deploy MCP Server
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
# The published customer documentation lives in its own PUBLIC repo and is
# baked into the image as the search_docs corpus (see the Dockerfile). No
@@ -36,8 +38,9 @@ jobs:
# re-run actually rolls a new revision). /health reports the SHA captured
# below so that staleness is checkable.
- name: Check out documentation bundle
uses: actions/checkout@v7
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
repository: autopilotmonitor/autopilotmonitor-docs
path: mcp-docs
@@ -46,7 +49,7 @@ jobs:
run: echo "sha=$(git -C mcp-docs rev-parse HEAD)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
@@ -59,7 +62,7 @@ jobs:
id: version
shell: pwsh
run: |
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.txt" -SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.txt"
$pkgVersion = (Get-Content ${{ env.PACKAGE_JSON }} -Raw | ConvertFrom-Json).version
$prefix = ($pkgVersion -split '\.')[0..1] -join '.'
@@ -77,7 +80,7 @@ jobs:
"short_sha=$shortSha" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
- name: Login to ACR
run: az acr login --name ${{ env.ACR_NAME }}
run: az acr login --name "$ACR_NAME"
- name: Build and push container image
run: |
@@ -87,17 +90,17 @@ jobs:
--build-arg BUILD_NUMBER=${{ steps.version.outputs.build_number }} \
--build-arg BUILD_COMMIT=${{ steps.version.outputs.short_sha }} \
--build-arg BUILD_UTC=${{ steps.version.outputs.build_utc }} \
-t ${{ env.ACR_NAME }}.azurecr.io/${{ env.CONTAINER_APP_NAME }}:${{ env.IMAGE_TAG }} \
-t ${{ env.ACR_NAME }}.azurecr.io/${{ env.CONTAINER_APP_NAME }}:latest \
-t "$ACR_NAME.azurecr.io/$CONTAINER_APP_NAME:$IMAGE_TAG" \
-t "$ACR_NAME.azurecr.io/$CONTAINER_APP_NAME:latest" \
.
docker push ${{ env.ACR_NAME }}.azurecr.io/${{ env.CONTAINER_APP_NAME }} --all-tags
docker push "$ACR_NAME.azurecr.io/$CONTAINER_APP_NAME" --all-tags
- name: Deploy to Container App
run: |
az containerapp update \
--name ${{ env.CONTAINER_APP_NAME }} \
--resource-group ${{ env.RESOURCE_GROUP }} \
--image ${{ env.ACR_NAME }}.azurecr.io/${{ env.CONTAINER_APP_NAME }}:${{ env.IMAGE_TAG }}
--name "$CONTAINER_APP_NAME" \
--resource-group "$RESOURCE_GROUP" \
--image "$ACR_NAME.azurecr.io/$CONTAINER_APP_NAME:$IMAGE_TAG"
# `az containerapp update` returns once the revision is provisioned, not once
# it serves traffic — and with minReplicas=0 the first request also pays a cold
@@ -144,9 +147,9 @@ jobs:
docsCommit = '${{ steps.docs.outputs.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7)
} | ConvertTo-Json
$sas = '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'.TrimStart('?')
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.json?$sas"
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.json"
# no-cache: rotating pointer, must never be served stale by any fronting cache.
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' } -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }) -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Write-Host "Published versions/mcp.json"
Write-Host $manifest
+42 -9
View File
@@ -35,12 +35,40 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Build and Deploy Job
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
lfs: false
fetch-depth: 0 # Full history needed for git-based sitemap lastmod dates
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
# Only the version manifest at the very end needs Azure; logging in here rather than
# next to that step keeps a credential problem from surfacing after a live deploy.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# The customer docs repo is the single source of the "What's new" panel: the prebuild
# step (scripts/whats-new/build-whats-new.js) turns changelog/*.md into
# public/whats-new.json and dates every bullet via git blame — hence the full history.
# Public repo, no token. Editing the docs does NOT update the live panel until this
# workflow runs again (push under src/Web/** or a manual dispatch); versions/web.json
# records which docs commit is live.
- name: Check out documentation bundle
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
repository: autopilotmonitor/autopilotmonitor-docs
path: whats-new-docs
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Resolve docs commit
id: docs
run: echo "sha=$(git -C whats-new-docs rev-parse HEAD)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
cache: npm
@@ -51,7 +79,7 @@ jobs:
run: npm ci
# next.config output:'export' -- `next build` writes the static site to out/
# (prebuild: sync-error-codes, generate-lastmod, generate-version).
# (prebuild: sync-error-codes, generate-lastmod, generate-version, whats-new).
- name: Build
working-directory: ${{ env.WEB_DIR }}
env:
@@ -68,9 +96,12 @@ jobs:
# Build stamp for public/version.json (scripts/generate-version.js in prebuild);
# the verify step below polls the deployed file for exactly this commit.
GITHUB_SHA: ${{ github.sha }}
# Docs checkout for public/whats-new.json; the prebuild fails in CI without it.
WHATS_NEW_DOCS_DIR: ${{ github.workspace }}/whats-new-docs
run: |
npm run build
test -f out/version.json || { echo "out/version.json missing - export did not run"; exit 1; }
test -f out/whats-new.json || { echo "out/whats-new.json missing - whats-new prebuild did not run"; exit 1; }
# One archive of the exact bytes that get uploaded, so the attestation has a single subject.
- name: Package export
@@ -85,12 +116,12 @@ jobs:
# commit, workflow file) in a public transparency log.
# Verify: gh attestation verify portal-<sha>.tar.gz --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
- name: Attest build provenance (portal export)
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v4
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@4d101475d8b20a2381f78447822ac1eab6504dd8 # v4
with:
subject-path: ${{ steps.package.outputs.archive }}
- name: Upload build artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: portal-${{ github.sha }}
path: ${{ steps.package.outputs.archive }}
@@ -136,7 +167,8 @@ jobs:
throw "Portal did not serve commit $expectedCommit within 5 minutes -- deployment not verified, version manifest NOT published"
# Cross-component deploy record, written last and only on a verified deploy --
# same contract as versions/backend.json and versions/mcp.json.
# same contract as versions/backend.json and versions/mcp.json. docsCommit says which
# docs revision the live What's new panel was generated from (as for the MCP corpus).
- name: Publish version manifest
shell: pwsh
run: |
@@ -145,11 +177,12 @@ jobs:
commit = '${{ github.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7)
deployedUtc = [DateTime]::UtcNow.ToString('o')
runId = '${{ github.run_id }}'
docsCommit = '${{ steps.docs.outputs.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7)
} | ConvertTo-Json
$sas = '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'.TrimStart('?')
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/web.json?$sas"
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/web.json"
# no-cache: rotating pointer, must never be served stale by any fronting cache.
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' } -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }) -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Write-Host "Published versions/web.json"
Write-Host $manifest
+3
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ name: IndexNow Notify (Bing/Yandex)
on:
workflow_dispatch:
# The job only talks to public endpoints; it never needs a repository token.
permissions: {}
jobs:
notify:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ jobs:
name: Federated login + read check
steps:
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
+2 -1
View File
@@ -25,5 +25,6 @@ concurrency:
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
# $/ is the self-repository form: this repository at the running commit.
gates:
uses: ./.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml
uses: $/.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml
+90 -4
View File
@@ -34,23 +34,109 @@ concurrency:
group: agent-blob-publish
cancel-in-progress: false
# Authenticode for the customer scripts. Same identity and same repository variables as
# build-agent.yml -- the loader on every device pins this publisher, so the two must not
# drift apart.
env:
CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME }}
CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL }}
CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT }}
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL: http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com
jobs:
# $/ is the self-repository form: this repository at the running commit, never a
# path some earlier step could have written to the workspace.
gates:
uses: ./.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml
uses: $/.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml
publish:
name: Publish to the download alias
needs: gates
runs-on: windows-latest
# Job-scoped: only the publish job federates to Azure, the gates job never holds an
# OIDC token it does not need.
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # OIDC federated login for the storage writes (secret-less)
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Check code-signing configuration
shell: pwsh
run: |
foreach ($name in 'CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID', 'CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME', 'CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL') {
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace([Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable($name))) {
throw "Repository variable $name is not set. Published customer scripts must be signed."
}
}
# First, and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account and the storage login below has to be the one that stays. See D-223 --
# both federated credentials are bound to the ref, so this job must never carry a
# GitHub `environment:`.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ env.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
allow-no-subscriptions: true
- name: Acquire Key Vault token for signing
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$token = az account get-access-token --scope https://vault.azure.net/.default --query accessToken --output tsv
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw "Could not acquire a Key Vault token for the code-signing identity."
}
Write-Host "::add-mask::$token"
"CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN=$token" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
# Authorizes the eu blob writes and the AdminConfiguration merge. The gates job above
# runs the same publisher with -DryRun and deliberately without a login -- a dry run
# must never need Azure credentials.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# Version pinned so a new or compromised NuGet release cannot flow into signing
# unreviewed; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK
# preinstalled on the runner.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
- name: Publish bootstrap + customer scripts
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$dryRun = '${{ inputs.dry_run }}' -eq 'true'
./.github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 `
-SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-LegacySasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-TableSasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-SigningToken $env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN `
-KeyVaultUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL `
-CertificateName $env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME `
-TimestampUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL `
-ExpectedPublisher $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT `
-SignedOutputDir "$env:RUNNER_TEMP/signed-scripts" `
-DryRun:$dryRun
# The exact bytes that were (or, on a dry run, would have been) uploaded. A dry-run
# dispatch is therefore the way to inspect a signed script locally before it reaches
# a single customer. Kept on failure too: a failed alias verification is precisely
# when someone wants to look at the file.
- name: Upload signed scripts
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: signed-scripts
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/signed-scripts
if-no-files-found: ignore
+4
View File
@@ -145,6 +145,10 @@ internal/docs/~$Introduction-AutopilotMonitor.pptx
# changes each run) and served at /version.json from the static export.
src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/public/version.json
# What's new payload: generated by scripts/whats-new/build-whats-new.js from the docs
# checkout on every build and served at /whats-new.json from the static export.
src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/public/whats-new.json
# Local IME installer scratch (MSI + extracted payload per version, for grepping
# in binaries). Operator-only, never committed.
+1 -1
Submodule infra updated: 2c2687b6ab...be0165a223
+31 -19
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-ESP-004",
"title": "ESP Timeout with 'Continue Anyway' (Soft Failure)",
"description": "Detects an ESP terminal failure on a profile that allows 'Continue anyway'. The enrollment is reported as failed, but the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop — a soft failure rather than an unusable device.",
"title": "ESP Gave Up on a Blocking App with 'Continue Anyway' (Soft Failure)",
"description": "Detects an ESP terminal failure where the ESP gave up while a blocking app was still installing (the agent's own esp_apps_timeout verdict — no per-app HRESULT was reported) on a profile that allows 'Continue anyway'. The enrollment is reported as failed, but the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop — a soft failure rather than an unusable device. An ESP failure that carries a specific error code (a failed installer, a detection mismatch) is a different case and stays with the rule that explains that code.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "esp",
"version": "1.0.1",
"version": "1.1.0",
"enabled": true,
"baseConfidence": 80,
"conditions": [
@@ -26,6 +26,27 @@
"value": "true",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "esp_gave_up_on_app",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "failureType",
"operator": "equals",
"value": "esp_apps_timeout",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "appName",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "appName",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"filterField": "failureType",
"filterOperator": "equals",
"filterValue": "esp_apps_timeout",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes",
"source": "event_type",
@@ -38,34 +59,25 @@
{
"signal": "failedSubcategory",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "enrollment_failed",
"eventType": "esp_failure_settle_started",
"dataField": "failedSubcategory",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "appName",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "appName",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{ "signal": "appName", "condition": "exists", "weight": 10 }
{ "signal": "failedSubcategory", "condition": "exists", "weight": 10 }
],
"explanation": "This enrollment was reported as **failed** because the Enrollment Status Page reached its configured terminal timeout (`{{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min`) before all blocking items finished. The ESP profile, however, allows **'Continue anyway'** — so the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop with a working, though not fully provisioned, device.\n\nThe agent only observes the ESP terminal failure on the device side; it cannot see what the user did after the failure screen. Treat this as a **soft failure**: the device may well be in productive use, while at least one blocking item (`{{failedSubcategory}}` subcategory / app `{{appName}}`) did not complete inside the ESP window.\n\nA cluster of these across a tenant almost always points at one slow blocking app holding the whole fleet at the ESP timeout wall, not at broken devices. Any field still shown as a literal `{{…}}` placeholder was simply not recorded for this session (e.g. a certificate-only failure has no failed app).",
"explanation": "This enrollment was reported as **failed** because the Enrollment Status Page gave up while the blocking app **{{appName}}** was still installing — the agent recorded no per-app error code, only that the app never finished inside the ESP window (the profile's configured limit is `{{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min`; the ESP may have stopped earlier than that). The ESP profile, however, allows **'Continue anyway'** — so the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop with a working, though not fully provisioned, device.\n\nThe agent only observes the ESP terminal failure on the device side; it cannot see what the user did after the failure screen. Treat this as a **soft failure**: the device may well be in productive use, while the `{{failedSubcategory}}` subcategory did not complete inside the ESP window.\n\nA cluster of these across a tenant almost always points at one slow blocking app holding the whole fleet at the ESP limit, not at broken devices. This rule deliberately stays silent when the failed app reported a specific error code — a failed installer or a detection mismatch is explained by the rule for that code, and 'Continue anyway' does not make it a timing problem. Any field still shown as a literal `{{…}}` placeholder was simply not recorded for this session.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Relieve ESP pressure so enrollments finish inside the window",
"steps": [
"Identify the slow blocking app (`{{appName}}`) and either remove it from the ESP 'block device use until these required apps are installed' list, or raise the ESP installation timeout (currently {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min).",
"If the app legitimately needs longer than the ESP allows, make it non-blocking and let it install after the desktop arrives.",
"Verify the app's detection rule matches after install — an app that installs but fails detection times out the ESP on every device (see ANALYZE-APP-013).",
"If a subcategory such as Certificates is reported under '{{failedSubcategory}}', confirm the certificate/connector actually delivers — 'Continue anyway' hides a missing certificate, it does not fix it."
"Look at how long `{{appName}}` takes on a device that completes: if it legitimately needs longer than the ESP allows, make it non-blocking (remove it from 'block device use until these required apps are installed') and let it install after the desktop arrives.",
"If the app must stay blocking, raise the ESP setting 'Show error when installation takes longer than' (configured at {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min) — a limit, not a target; it only helps when the app reliably finishes within the new value.",
"Check the app's dependencies and install order: a blocking app waiting on a large dependency download (Delivery Optimization, proxy throughput) is the usual reason it never finishes in time.",
"If the ESP reported a non-Apps subcategory under '{{failedSubcategory}}', confirm the certificate/connector actually delivers — 'Continue anyway' hides a missing certificate, it does not fix it."
]
}
],
+1
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects when a certificate with the configured subject is missing from the local machine personal store (LocalMachine\\My). Requires the gather rule GATHER-ID-002 (machine cert store inventory) to be enabled — the check runs against its gather_machine_cert_store output. A missing certificate may indicate that MDM enrollment certificate provisioning or SCEP certificate deployment failed.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "identity",
"author": "Community",
"isCommunity": true,
"enabled": false,
"evaluateOn": [
+4 -4
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
"$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-OFFICE-001",
"title": "Microsoft 365 Apps Install Failed",
"description": "Detects when the Microsoft 365 Apps (Office Click-to-Run) background install did not reach completion. The V2 OfficeInstallDetector watches the C2R client directly (registry + process) and emits office_install_failed when the install scenario was abandoned (worker gone and streaming never finished) or a C2R failure code was observed. This catches Office failures that the Intune integrated app type hides, because IME reports the app done within 1-2 minutes while C2R keeps installing in the background.",
"description": "Detects when the Microsoft 365 Apps (Office Click-to-Run) install failed. The V2 OfficeInstallDetector watches the C2R client directly (registry, Delivery Optimization, process) and emits office_install_failed when the C2R INSTALL scenario records an error code. Completion is proven by the core Office binaries on disk; an install window that closes without that proof ends silently, never as a failure. This catches Office failures the deployment status hides: the Intune built-in app type is marked done once the configuration is delivered, and a Win32 or RealmJoin package once its installer exits, while C2R keeps installing in the background.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.1.1",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -39,12 +39,12 @@
}
],
"confidenceThreshold": 40,
"explanation": "The Microsoft 365 Apps (Office Click-to-Run) install did not finish.\n\nThe OfficeInstallDetector watches the C2R client directly and reports the real background install lifecycle. The Intune \"integrated\" Microsoft 365 Apps app type only pushes the configuration XML and starts the C2R bootstrapper, so IME marks the app done within 1-2 minutes while C2R keeps streaming and laying down the product for several more minutes. This event means C2R activity ended (the OfficeC2RClient worker exited and the install scenario cleared) without the StreamingFinished flag being set, or a C2R failure code was observed.\n\nReview the office_install_failed event payload: `products`, `channel`, `phase`, `streamingFinished`, `errorCode` (best-effort — may be empty) and `durationSeconds`.",
"explanation": "The Microsoft 365 Apps (Office Click-to-Run) install failed.\n\nThe OfficeInstallDetector watches the C2R client directly and reports the real install lifecycle, however it was started. The Intune built-in Microsoft 365 Apps app type delivers the configuration through the Office CSP and lets the device start C2R; a Win32 or RealmJoin package runs the Office Deployment Tool. Either way the deployment is marked done before C2R has finished laying down the product. This event means C2R recorded an error code in its INSTALL scenario before the core Office apps were on disk.\n\nReview the office_install_failed event payload: `products`, `channel`, `errorCode`, `errorSource` (the C2R registry value that carried the code) and `durationSeconds`.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Investigate the Office C2R install failure",
"steps": [
"Open the office_install_failed event and review products, channel, phase, streamingFinished and errorCode",
"Open the office_install_failed event and review products, channel, errorCode and errorSource",
"Check the Click-to-Run logs on the device (%windir%\\Temp and %temp%, files named <MachineName>-yyyymmdd-nnnn.log) for the failing operation",
"Verify the device had network reachability to the Office CDN / Microsoft Connected Cache during the enrollment window",
"Confirm the Intune Microsoft 365 Apps app configuration (products, channel, architecture) matches what the device can install",
+36 -23
View File
@@ -2496,11 +2496,11 @@
},
{
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-ESP-004",
"title": "ESP Timeout with 'Continue Anyway' (Soft Failure)",
"description": "Detects an ESP terminal failure on a profile that allows 'Continue anyway'. The enrollment is reported as failed, but the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop — a soft failure rather than an unusable device.",
"title": "ESP Gave Up on a Blocking App with 'Continue Anyway' (Soft Failure)",
"description": "Detects an ESP terminal failure where the ESP gave up while a blocking app was still installing (the agent's own esp_apps_timeout verdict — no per-app HRESULT was reported) on a profile that allows 'Continue anyway'. The enrollment is reported as failed, but the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop — a soft failure rather than an unusable device. An ESP failure that carries a specific error code (a failed installer, a detection mismatch) is a different case and stays with the rule that explains that code.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "esp",
"version": "1.0.1",
"version": "1.1.0",
"enabled": true,
"baseConfidence": 80,
"conditions": [
@@ -2521,6 +2521,27 @@
"value": "true",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "esp_gave_up_on_app",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "failureType",
"operator": "equals",
"value": "esp_apps_timeout",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "appName",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "appName",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"filterField": "failureType",
"filterOperator": "equals",
"filterValue": "esp_apps_timeout",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes",
"source": "event_type",
@@ -2533,38 +2554,29 @@
{
"signal": "failedSubcategory",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "enrollment_failed",
"eventType": "esp_failure_settle_started",
"dataField": "failedSubcategory",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "appName",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "appName",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{
"signal": "appName",
"signal": "failedSubcategory",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 10
}
],
"explanation": "This enrollment was reported as **failed** because the Enrollment Status Page reached its configured terminal timeout (`{{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min`) before all blocking items finished. The ESP profile, however, allows **'Continue anyway'** — so the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop with a working, though not fully provisioned, device.\n\nThe agent only observes the ESP terminal failure on the device side; it cannot see what the user did after the failure screen. Treat this as a **soft failure**: the device may well be in productive use, while at least one blocking item (`{{failedSubcategory}}` subcategory / app `{{appName}}`) did not complete inside the ESP window.\n\nA cluster of these across a tenant almost always points at one slow blocking app holding the whole fleet at the ESP timeout wall, not at broken devices. Any field still shown as a literal `{{…}}` placeholder was simply not recorded for this session (e.g. a certificate-only failure has no failed app).",
"explanation": "This enrollment was reported as **failed** because the Enrollment Status Page gave up while the blocking app **{{appName}}** was still installing — the agent recorded no per-app error code, only that the app never finished inside the ESP window (the profile's configured limit is `{{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min`; the ESP may have stopped earlier than that). The ESP profile, however, allows **'Continue anyway'** — so the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop with a working, though not fully provisioned, device.\n\nThe agent only observes the ESP terminal failure on the device side; it cannot see what the user did after the failure screen. Treat this as a **soft failure**: the device may well be in productive use, while the `{{failedSubcategory}}` subcategory did not complete inside the ESP window.\n\nA cluster of these across a tenant almost always points at one slow blocking app holding the whole fleet at the ESP limit, not at broken devices. This rule deliberately stays silent when the failed app reported a specific error code — a failed installer or a detection mismatch is explained by the rule for that code, and 'Continue anyway' does not make it a timing problem. Any field still shown as a literal `{{…}}` placeholder was simply not recorded for this session.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Relieve ESP pressure so enrollments finish inside the window",
"steps": [
"Identify the slow blocking app (`{{appName}}`) and either remove it from the ESP 'block device use until these required apps are installed' list, or raise the ESP installation timeout (currently {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min).",
"If the app legitimately needs longer than the ESP allows, make it non-blocking and let it install after the desktop arrives.",
"Verify the app's detection rule matches after install — an app that installs but fails detection times out the ESP on every device (see ANALYZE-APP-013).",
"If a subcategory such as Certificates is reported under '{{failedSubcategory}}', confirm the certificate/connector actually delivers — 'Continue anyway' hides a missing certificate, it does not fix it."
"Look at how long `{{appName}}` takes on a device that completes: if it legitimately needs longer than the ESP allows, make it non-blocking (remove it from 'block device use until these required apps are installed') and let it install after the desktop arrives.",
"If the app must stay blocking, raise the ESP setting 'Show error when installation takes longer than' (configured at {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min) — a limit, not a target; it only helps when the app reliably finishes within the new value.",
"Check the app's dependencies and install order: a blocking app waiting on a large dependency download (Delivery Optimization, proxy throughput) is the usual reason it never finishes in time.",
"If the ESP reported a non-Apps subcategory under '{{failedSubcategory}}', confirm the certificate/connector actually delivers — 'Continue anyway' hides a missing certificate, it does not fix it."
]
}
],
@@ -2794,6 +2806,7 @@
"description": "Detects when a certificate with the configured subject is missing from the local machine personal store (LocalMachine\\My). Requires the gather rule GATHER-ID-002 (machine cert store inventory) to be enabled — the check runs against its gather_machine_cert_store output. A missing certificate may indicate that MDM enrollment certificate provisioning or SCEP certificate deployment failed.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "identity",
"author": "Community",
"isCommunity": true,
"enabled": false,
"evaluateOn": [
@@ -3233,10 +3246,10 @@
{
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-OFFICE-001",
"title": "Microsoft 365 Apps Install Failed",
"description": "Detects when the Microsoft 365 Apps (Office Click-to-Run) background install did not reach completion. The V2 OfficeInstallDetector watches the C2R client directly (registry + process) and emits office_install_failed when the install scenario was abandoned (worker gone and streaming never finished) or a C2R failure code was observed. This catches Office failures that the Intune integrated app type hides, because IME reports the app done within 1-2 minutes while C2R keeps installing in the background.",
"description": "Detects when the Microsoft 365 Apps (Office Click-to-Run) install failed. The V2 OfficeInstallDetector watches the C2R client directly (registry, Delivery Optimization, process) and emits office_install_failed when the C2R INSTALL scenario records an error code. Completion is proven by the core Office binaries on disk; an install window that closes without that proof ends silently, never as a failure. This catches Office failures the deployment status hides: the Intune built-in app type is marked done once the configuration is delivered, and a Win32 or RealmJoin package once its installer exits, while C2R keeps installing in the background.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.1.1",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -3270,12 +3283,12 @@
}
],
"confidenceThreshold": 40,
"explanation": "The Microsoft 365 Apps (Office Click-to-Run) install did not finish.\n\nThe OfficeInstallDetector watches the C2R client directly and reports the real background install lifecycle. The Intune \"integrated\" Microsoft 365 Apps app type only pushes the configuration XML and starts the C2R bootstrapper, so IME marks the app done within 1-2 minutes while C2R keeps streaming and laying down the product for several more minutes. This event means C2R activity ended (the OfficeC2RClient worker exited and the install scenario cleared) without the StreamingFinished flag being set, or a C2R failure code was observed.\n\nReview the office_install_failed event payload: `products`, `channel`, `phase`, `streamingFinished`, `errorCode` (best-effort — may be empty) and `durationSeconds`.",
"explanation": "The Microsoft 365 Apps (Office Click-to-Run) install failed.\n\nThe OfficeInstallDetector watches the C2R client directly and reports the real install lifecycle, however it was started. The Intune built-in Microsoft 365 Apps app type delivers the configuration through the Office CSP and lets the device start C2R; a Win32 or RealmJoin package runs the Office Deployment Tool. Either way the deployment is marked done before C2R has finished laying down the product. This event means C2R recorded an error code in its INSTALL scenario before the core Office apps were on disk.\n\nReview the office_install_failed event payload: `products`, `channel`, `errorCode`, `errorSource` (the C2R registry value that carried the code) and `durationSeconds`.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Investigate the Office C2R install failure",
"steps": [
"Open the office_install_failed event and review products, channel, phase, streamingFinished and errorCode",
"Open the office_install_failed event and review products, channel, errorCode and errorSource",
"Check the Click-to-Run logs on the device (%windir%\\Temp and %temp%, files named <MachineName>-yyyymmdd-nnnn.log) for the failing operation",
"Verify the device had network reachability to the Office CDN / Microsoft Connected Cache during the enrollment window",
"Confirm the Intune Microsoft 365 Apps app configuration (products, channel, architecture) matches what the device can install",
+24 -8
View File
@@ -34,6 +34,14 @@
"description": "Captures the exit code of a health-script execution. Feeds the early-signal slot consumed by HS-COMPLIANCE so the user sees the real exit code (not just the inferred 0/1) before HS-NEW-RESULT arrives.",
"enabled": true
},
{
"patternId": "HS-INVOCATION",
"category": "always",
"pattern": "^\"[^\"]{0,260}\\\\agentexecutor\\.exe\"\\s+-(?<kind>remediationScript)\\s",
"action": "agentInvocationArgument",
"description": "The IME service's command line for a health-script executor, written by the health-script worker to IntuneManagementExtension.log and HealthScripts.log right before 'Launch powershell executor in ... session'. Opens an invocation that owns nothing, so the launch line the same worker writes next never sets the context of the platform script whose run is in flight in the IME log. The platform-script command line ('-powershell') does not match.",
"enabled": true
},
{
"patternId": "HS-NEW-RESULT",
"category": "always",
@@ -646,6 +654,22 @@
"description": "Detects WinGet app installation progress with Operation Phase = Installing (format variant 2).",
"enabled": true
},
{
"patternId": "PS-AGENT-ARG",
"category": "always",
"pattern": "^Adding argument (?<kind>[A-Za-z0-9]+) with value ",
"action": "agentInvocationArgument",
"description": "The first argument line of every AgentExecutor.exe invocation (powershell, remediationScript, detectionScript, requirementScript, ...). Opens the invocation that owns the policyId-less exit/output lines following it in AgentExecutor.log; PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START upgrades a powershell invocation to its platform script. Also keeps the tracker's overwrite check active while the invocation runs.",
"enabled": true
},
{
"patternId": "PS-AGENT-COMPLETED",
"category": "always",
"pattern": "^Agent executor completed\\.",
"action": "agentExecutorCompleted",
"description": "Last line of an AgentExecutor.exe invocation. Closes the invocation's ownership of the exit/output lines in AgentExecutor.log and triggers the tracker's overwrite check: the executor wrote its end block at its own stream position, which may lie behind the tracker's bookmark when another process appended meanwhile.",
"enabled": true
},
{
"patternId": "PS-AGENT-ERROR",
"category": "always",
@@ -708,14 +732,6 @@
"description": "Captures whether a PowerShell script runs in machine (System) or user session context.",
"enabled": true
},
{
"patternId": "PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE",
"category": "always",
"pattern": "^Powershell execution is done, exitCode = (?<exitCode>-?\\d+)",
"action": "scriptExitCode",
"description": "Captures the PowerShell exit code when script execution completes in the IME log.",
"enabled": true
},
{
"patternId": "PS-SCRIPT-GENERATED",
"category": "always",
+6 -1
View File
@@ -94,7 +94,11 @@
"C:\\Windows\\Panther",
"C:\\Windows\\SetupDiag",
"C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\DiagnosticLogCSP",
"C:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\ReportingEvents.log"
"C:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\ReportingEvents.log",
"C:\\ProgramData\\RealmJoin\\choco\\logs"
],
"userProfileFilePrefixes": [
"AppData\\Local\\RealmJoin"
],
"wmiQueryPrefixes": [
"SELECT * FROM Win32_OperatingSystem",
@@ -296,6 +300,7 @@
"script_completed",
"script_failed",
"script_timeout_suspected",
"script_recurrence_summary",
"esp_phase_changed",
"ime_agent_version",
"ime_token_failure",
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/ime-log-pattern.schema.json",
"patternId": "HS-INVOCATION",
"category": "always",
"pattern": "^\"[^\"]{0,260}\\\\agentexecutor\\.exe\"\\s+-(?<kind>remediationScript)\\s",
"action": "agentInvocationArgument",
"description": "The IME service's command line for a health-script executor, written by the health-script worker to IntuneManagementExtension.log and HealthScripts.log right before 'Launch powershell executor in ... session'. Opens an invocation that owns nothing, so the launch line the same worker writes next never sets the context of the platform script whose run is in flight in the IME log. The platform-script command line ('-powershell') does not match.",
"enabled": true
}
+9
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/ime-log-pattern.schema.json",
"patternId": "PS-AGENT-ARG",
"category": "always",
"pattern": "^Adding argument (?<kind>[A-Za-z0-9]+) with value ",
"action": "agentInvocationArgument",
"description": "The first argument line of every AgentExecutor.exe invocation (powershell, remediationScript, detectionScript, requirementScript, ...). Opens the invocation that owns the policyId-less exit/output lines following it in AgentExecutor.log; PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START upgrades a powershell invocation to its platform script. Also keeps the tracker's overwrite check active while the invocation runs.",
"enabled": true
}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/ime-log-pattern.schema.json",
"patternId": "PS-AGENT-COMPLETED",
"category": "always",
"pattern": "^Agent executor completed\\.",
"action": "agentExecutorCompleted",
"description": "Last line of an AgentExecutor.exe invocation. Closes the invocation's ownership of the exit/output lines in AgentExecutor.log and triggers the tracker's overwrite check: the executor wrote its end block at its own stream position, which may lie behind the tracker's bookmark when another process appended meanwhile.",
"enabled": true
}
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/ime-log-pattern.schema.json",
"patternId": "PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE",
"category": "always",
"pattern": "^Powershell execution is done, exitCode = (?<exitCode>-?\\d+)",
"action": "scriptExitCode",
"description": "Captures the PowerShell exit code when script execution completes in the IME log.",
"enabled": true
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@
},
"operator": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Comparison operator.",
"description": "Comparison operator. exists/not_exists with a dataField test whether ANY event of the type carries a non-empty value at that field: not_exists matches when no event does — including when the event type is absent altogether — so a rule can gate on a missing field (e.g. an ESP failure without an HRESULT). Without a dataField they test only the presence of the event type.",
"enum": ["equals", "not_equals", "contains", "not_contains", "regex", "not_regex", "gt", "lt", "gte", "lte", "exists", "not_exists", "count_gte", "count_per_group_gte", "in", "not_in"]
},
"value": {
+5
View File
@@ -114,6 +114,11 @@
"description": "Emit behavior: \"always\" (default — emit on every collection) or \"on_change\" (poll on the trigger cadence but emit only when the collected result changes; the first in-scope result always emits).",
"enum": ["always", "on_change"]
},
"enrichErrorCodes": {
"type": "boolean",
"description": "Opt-in: let the backend explain error-code fields in this rule's output (exitCode, errorCode, hresult, ...) with the Windows/MSI/Intune error-code catalog, attaching the same *Info siblings built-in events get. Default false because gather-rule codes usually come from third-party logs or commands (HP Image Assistant, Dell Command Update, custom scripts) with their own exit-code numbering, where the catalog meaning would be wrong. Enable only when the parsed source really uses Windows codes (e.g. an msiexec or IME log).",
"default": false
},
"outputEventType": {
"type": "string",
"description": "EventType for the emitted event (e.g., \"gather_proxy_settings\")."
+10
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,16 @@
"$schema": { "type": "string" },
"registryPrefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/categorizedList" },
"filePrefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
"userProfileFilePrefixes": {
"description": "Folders under the signed-in user's profile that file collectors and diagnostics paths may read, RELATIVE to the profile root (e.g. \"AppData\\\\Local\\\\Vendor\"). Resolved against %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% at match time. Entries outside AppData\\Local / AppData\\Roaming are dropped at load: the C:\\Users hard block never admits them, so this list can only ever narrow what the block's exception already permits.",
"type": "array",
"items": {
"allOf": [
{ "$ref": "#/$defs/safeString" },
{ "pattern": "^AppData\\\\(Local|Roaming)(\\\\|$)" }
]
}
},
"wmiQueryPrefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
"eventLogChannels": { "$ref": "#/$defs/categorizedList" },
"blockedEventLogChannels": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
+2
View File
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@
"scriptOutput",
"scriptCompleted",
"resetPlatformScriptContext",
"agentInvocationArgument",
"agentExecutorCompleted",
"healthScriptResult",
"healthScriptDetectionResult",
"captureExitCode",
+3
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
# ajv-cli declares ts-node as a peer dependency it never needs for JSON schemas; do not
# pull ts-node + typescript into a job that pushes to main.
legacy-peer-deps=true
+8
View File
@@ -208,6 +208,14 @@ export const ALLOWED_FILE_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = [
${flatArray(guardrails.filePrefixes)}
];
// Folders under the signed-in user's profile, RELATIVE to the profile root. The agent
// resolves %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% at runtime; the portal validates against a placeholder
// profile. These cannot live in ALLOWED_FILE_PREFIXES — that list is matched literally
// against the already-expanded path, where the user name is unknown at authoring time.
export const USER_PROFILE_FILE_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = [
${flatArray(guardrails.userProfileFilePrefixes ?? [])}
];
export const ALLOWED_WMI_QUERY_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = [
${flatArray(guardrails.wmiQueryPrefixes)}
];
+315
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
{
"name": "autopilot-monitor-rules-tooling",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "autopilot-monitor-rules-tooling",
"devDependencies": {
"ajv-cli": "5.0.0",
"ajv-formats": "3.0.1"
}
},
"node_modules/ajv": {
"version": "8.20.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/ajv/-/ajv-8.20.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-Thbli+OlOj+iMPYFBVBfJ3OmCAnaSyNn4M1vz9T6Gka5Jt9ba/HIR56joy65tY6kx/FCF5VXNB819Y7/GUrBGA==",
"dev": true,
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"fast-deep-equal": "^3.1.3",
"fast-uri": "^3.0.1",
"json-schema-traverse": "^1.0.0",
"require-from-string": "^2.0.2"
},
"funding": {
"type": "github",
"url": "https://github.com/sponsors/epoberezkin"
}
},
"node_modules/ajv-cli": {
"version": "5.0.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/ajv-cli/-/ajv-cli-5.0.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-LY4m6dUv44HTyhV+u2z5uX4EhPYTM38Iv1jdgDJJJCyOOuqB8KtZEGjPZ2T+sh5ZIJrXUfgErYx/j3gLd3+PlQ==",
"dev": true,
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"ajv": "^8.0.0",
"fast-json-patch": "^2.0.0",
"glob": "^7.1.0",
"js-yaml": "^3.14.0",
"json-schema-migrate": "^2.0.0",
"json5": "^2.1.3",
"minimist": "^1.2.0"
},
"bin": {
"ajv": "dist/index.js"
},
"peerDependencies": {
"ts-node": ">=9.0.0"
},
"peerDependenciesMeta": {
"ts-node": {
"optional": true
}
}
},
"node_modules/ajv-formats": {
"version": "3.0.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/ajv-formats/-/ajv-formats-3.0.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-8iUql50EUR+uUcdRQ3HDqa6EVyo3docL8g5WJ3FNcWmu62IbkGUue/pEyLBW8VGKKucTPgqeks4fIU1DA4yowQ==",
"dev": true,
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"ajv": "^8.0.0"
},
"peerDependencies": {
"ajv": "^8.0.0"
},
"peerDependenciesMeta": {
"ajv": {
"optional": true
}
}
},
"node_modules/argparse": {
"version": "1.0.10",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/argparse/-/argparse-1.0.10.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-o5Roy6tNG4SL/FOkCAN6RzjiakZS25RLYFrcMttJqbdd8BWrnA+fGz57iN5Pb06pvBGvl5gQ0B48dJlslXvoTg==",
"dev": true,
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"sprintf-js": "~1.0.2"
}
},
"node_modules/balanced-match": {
"version": "1.0.2",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/balanced-match/-/balanced-match-1.0.2.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-3oSeUO0TMV67hN1AmbXsK4yaqU7tjiHlbxRDZOpH0KW9+CeX4bRAaX0Anxt0tx2MrpRpWwQaPwIlISEJhYU5Pw==",
"dev": true,
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/brace-expansion": {
"version": "1.1.21",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-1.1.21.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-9zeA+KLZNNzglF2TPKRQEDyx6Yby7daAkuy8MiPzpXPsYDWi/DRM8jmwUDxokQjYqBpv5DgPiwD4h4ZZSy1Ujw==",
"dev": true,
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"balanced-match": "^1.0.0",
"concat-map": "0.0.1"
}
},
"node_modules/concat-map": {
"version": "0.0.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/concat-map/-/concat-map-0.0.1.tgz",
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"dev": true,
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/esprima": {
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"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/esprima/-/esprima-4.0.1.tgz",
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"dev": true,
"license": "BSD-2-Clause",
"bin": {
"esparse": "bin/esparse.js",
"esvalidate": "bin/esvalidate.js"
},
"engines": {
"node": ">=4"
}
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{
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}
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"dev": true,
"license": "ISC",
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"inflight": "^1.0.4",
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},
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}
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"license": "ISC",
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}
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"dev": true,
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"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/wrappy/-/wrappy-1.0.2.tgz",
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"dev": true,
"license": "ISC"
}
}
}
+12
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
{
"name": "autopilot-monitor-rules-tooling",
"private": true,
"description": "Validator tooling for rules/ - combine-rules.yml installs from the lockfile so nothing unpinned reaches a job that pushes to main.",
"devDependencies": {
"ajv-cli": "5.0.0",
"ajv-formats": "3.0.1"
},
"overrides": {
"fast-json-patch": "3.1.1"
}
}
@@ -14,6 +14,22 @@
BeforeAll {
. (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')
function New-FakeSignature {
param([string]$Status, [string]$Subject)
$cert = if ($Subject) {
[pscustomobject]@{ Subject = $Subject; Thumbprint = '0123456789ABCDEF' }
} else { $null }
return [pscustomobject]@{ Status = $Status; SignerCertificate = $cert }
}
function New-FakePayload {
param([string[]]$Files)
$dir = Join-Path $TestDrive ([guid]::NewGuid().ToString())
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $dir -Force | Out-Null
foreach ($f in $Files) { Set-Content -Path (Join-Path $dir $f) -Value 'x' }
return $dir
}
function New-FakeProfile {
param([string]$Name, [double]$AgeMinutes)
$p = Join-Path $TestDrive $Name
@@ -305,3 +321,93 @@ Describe 'logging purity' {
Get-Content $LogFile -Raw | Should -Match 'SKIP: Agent was previously deployed'
}
}
Describe 'Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries' {
# The publisher gate on the extracted payload. What matters is the DECISION: which
# payload is accepted, which is refused, and which files are looked at at all.
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Log { }
$script:ours = 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE'
}
It 'accepts a payload where every binary of ours is validly signed by us' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject $script:ours }
Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
}
It 'checks the binaries we author and leaves third-party assemblies alone' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @(
'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe',
'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe.config',
'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll',
'Newtonsoft.Json.dll',
'System.Management.Automation.dll'
)
$script:checked = @()
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature {
$script:checked += (Split-Path $FilePath -Leaf)
New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject $script:ours
}
Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
$script:checked | Should -Be @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll')
}
It 'refuses an unsigned agent executable' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'NotSigned' -Subject $null }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses a tampered binary (hash mismatch)' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'HashMismatch' -Subject $script:ours }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses a signature whose chain does not validate' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'UnknownError' -Subject $script:ours }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses a validly signed binary from a different publisher' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=Somebody Else, O=Somebody Else Ltd, C=US' }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses the whole payload when a single DLL of ours is swapped' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature {
if ((Split-Path $FilePath -Leaf) -eq 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll') {
New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=Somebody Else, O=Somebody Else Ltd, C=US'
} else {
New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject $script:ours
}
}
$rejected = Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir
$rejected.Count | Should -Be 1
$rejected[0] | Should -BeLike 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll*'
}
It 'refuses when the signature check itself throws' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { throw 'access denied' }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses an empty payload instead of passing it' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('Newtonsoft.Json.dll')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject $script:ours }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
}
Describe 'publisher pin' {
It 'pins the expected publisher by subject, not by thumbprint' {
$ExpectedPublisher | Should -Be '*O=glueckkanja AG*'
$ExpectedPublisher | Should -Not -Match '^[0-9A-Fa-f]{40}$'
}
}
+78 -3
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,9 @@
2. Downloads the monitoring agent ZIP from Azure Blob Storage
3. Verifies integrity via SHA-256 hash from the version manifest (mandatory)
4. Extracts the agent into %ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor\Agent
5. Runs the agent in --install mode (registers Scheduled Task, spawns the runtime)
6. Verifies the runtime process actually launched
5. Verifies the Authenticode signature and publisher of every binary we author
6. Runs the agent in --install mode (registers Scheduled Task, spawns the runtime)
7. Verifies the runtime process actually launched
Agent self-destructs when enrollment completes.
Relax flow (guards 2+3): a real user profile (or a real LastLoggedOnUser)
@@ -76,6 +77,11 @@
PowerShell 5.1 (IME) reads scripts without BOM as ANSI, corrupting multi-byte chars.
.CHANGELOG
2026-09-08 v2.5 Publisher gate: every AutopilotMonitor binary in the extracted
payload must carry a valid Authenticode signature from the
expected publisher before --install runs. The SHA-256 manifest
check stays and is unchanged; it proves the bytes, the signature
proves the author.
2026-08-08 v2.3 Windows 365 Cloud PC support: a positively identified Cloud PC
(Windows365 registry key AND CloudManagedDesktopExtension
service) now triggers the guard 2+3 relax alongside OOBE
@@ -128,7 +134,12 @@ param(
)
# Script version (bump on meaningful changes; see .CHANGELOG above)
$ScriptVersion = "2.4"
$ScriptVersion = "2.5"
# The publisher every binary we author must carry. A -like pattern on the subject, NOT a
# thumbprint: certificates are renewed, deployed copies of this script are not. Same value
# the loader pins for this script.
$ExpectedPublisher = "*O=glueckkanja AG*"
# Configuration - Everything in ProgramData for easy cleanup
$AgentBasePath = "$env:ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor"
@@ -329,6 +340,56 @@ function Get-BootstrapDecision {
return [pscustomobject]@{ Install = $true; ReasonCode = $null; RelaxActive = $relax.Active }
}
# Returns the list of reasons why the extracted payload is not ours; an empty result means
# every binary we author carries a valid Authenticode signature from the expected publisher.
# Third-party assemblies keep their own publisher's signature and are not checked here.
# Any error is a rejection: an unreadable signature is an unverified binary.
function Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries {
param([string]$Path)
$rejected = @()
$ourBinaries = @(
Get-ChildItem -Path $Path -Filter 'AutopilotMonitor.*' -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.Extension -in @('.exe', '.dll') }
)
# An empty set is a rejection, not a pass: it means the extraction produced nothing we
# recognise, and the alternative would be a gate that silently approves an empty folder.
# The comma keeps a single rejection an ARRAY: PowerShell unrolls a one-element result to
# a bare string, and the caller reads .Count and indexes into it.
if ($ourBinaries.Count -eq 0) {
return , @("no AutopilotMonitor binaries found in $Path")
}
foreach ($binary in $ourBinaries) {
try {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $binary.FullName -ErrorAction Stop
}
catch {
$rejected += "$($binary.Name): signature check failed to run ($($_.Exception.Message))"
continue
}
if ($null -eq $sig) {
$rejected += "$($binary.Name): signature check returned nothing"
continue
}
$subject = if ($sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject } else { '<unsigned>' }
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
$rejected += "$($binary.Name): signature status $($sig.Status)"
continue
}
if ($subject -notlike $ExpectedPublisher) {
$rejected += "$($binary.Name): unexpected publisher $subject"
continue
}
}
return , $rejected
}
# Main bootstrap flow. Only invoked when the script is run directly (see entry guard
# at the bottom); never on dot-source.
function Invoke-Bootstrap {
@@ -445,6 +506,20 @@ function Invoke-Bootstrap {
}
}
# Publisher gate. The SHA-256 above proves the ZIP is the one the manifest names, but
# that manifest lives in the same container as the ZIP and cannot outlive a compromise
# of the download host. The expected publisher travels inside THIS script, which the
# loader verified before running it, so the chain from the file an administrator
# assigns to the process that starts here stays publisher-anchored end to end.
# Fail-closed, exactly like the hash check: running unverified code as SYSTEM is the
# risk being removed.
Write-Log "Verifying Authenticode signatures of the agent binaries..."
$unverified = Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $AgentBinPath
if ($unverified.Count -gt 0) {
throw "Authenticode verification FAILED ($($unverified -join '; ')). Refusing to run an agent that is not signed by the expected publisher."
}
Write-Log "Authenticode verification passed (publisher pin: $ExpectedPublisher)"
Write-Log "Calling agent install mode (--install)..."
& $agentExePath --install
$installExitCode = $LASTEXITCODE
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
# Pester tests (Pester 5+) for the stage-1 loader Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1.
#
# The script under test is dot-sourced; its entry guard prevents the loader from
# executing, so loading it here is side-effect free. Network and signature checks
# are mocked -- what is verified is the DECISION: what does the loader accept, what
# does it refuse, and how often does it retry.
#
# Run under Windows PowerShell 5.1 to match the IME runtime:
# powershell.exe -NoProfile -Command "& { $c = New-PesterConfiguration; $c.Run.Path = 'scripts\Bootstrap'; $c.Output.Verbosity = 'Detailed'; Invoke-Pester -Configuration $c }"
#
# This file MUST remain pure ASCII (PS 5.1 reads BOM-less files as ANSI).
BeforeAll {
. (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')
function New-FakeSignature {
param([string]$Status, [string]$Subject)
$cert = if ($Subject) {
[pscustomobject]@{ Subject = $Subject; Thumbprint = '0123456789ABCDEF' }
} else { $null }
return [pscustomobject]@{ Status = $Status; SignerCertificate = $cert }
}
}
Describe 'Test-BootstrapSignature' {
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Log { }
}
It 'accepts a valid signature from the expected publisher' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
}
# An EV subject is a line of street address and registration numbers; the log gets the CN.
It 'logs the signer CN, not the whole subject' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature {
New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, L=Offenbach am Main, C=DE, SERIALNUMBER=HRB 12381'
}
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Write-Log -ParameterFilter { $Message -eq 'Signature status: Valid. Signer: glueckkanja AG' }
}
It 'refuses an unsigned script' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'NotSigned' -Subject $null }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'refuses a tampered script (hash mismatch)' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'HashMismatch' -Subject 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'refuses a signature whose chain does not validate' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'UnknownError' -Subject 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
# The whole point of the pinned publisher: a validly signed script from someone else
# is exactly what an attacker with any code-signing certificate can produce.
It 'refuses a valid signature from a different publisher' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=Somebody Else, O=Somebody Else Ltd, C=US' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'refuses when the signature check itself fails' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { throw 'file not found' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
}
Describe 'Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript' {
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Log { }
Mock Start-Sleep { }
Mock Invoke-WebRequest { }
}
It 'returns after the first attempt when the download verifies' {
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $true }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 1 -Exactly
}
It 'gives up after three attempts when verification keeps failing' {
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $false }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 3 -Exactly
}
# A truncated or proxy-mangled body fails verification, so the retry has to cover the
# download AND the check, not just the transport.
It 'retries a failed verification and accepts a later attempt' {
$script:calls = 0
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $script:calls++; return ($script:calls -ge 2) }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 2 -Exactly
}
It 'retries a transport failure' {
$script:downloads = 0
Mock Invoke-WebRequest { $script:downloads++; if ($script:downloads -eq 1) { throw 'connection reset' } }
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $true }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 2 -Exactly
}
It 'never executes anything when no attempt verifies' {
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $false }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
}
Describe 'publish contract' {
BeforeAll {
$script:loaderText = Get-Content (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1') -Raw
}
# Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 renders the -Dev loader by substituting this exact
# literal and fails the publish when it is gone. Catching that here means the PR fails
# instead of the publish.
It 'carries the dev-render anchor the publisher substitutes' {
$anchor = '$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"'
$script:loaderText.Contains($anchor) | Should -BeTrue
}
# The publisher parses this to write version.json.loaderVersion and to run the
# version-bump guard.
It 'declares a parsable ScriptVersion' {
$script:loaderText -match '\$ScriptVersion\s*=\s*"([\d\.\-a-zA-Z]+)"' | Should -BeTrue
}
It 'pins the expected publisher by subject, not by thumbprint' {
$script:loaderText -match '\$ExpectedPublisher\s*=\s*"\*O=' | Should -BeTrue
}
# The bootstrap MSI installs this same file and runs it with -LogFileName so the delivery
# channel stays visible in a diagnostics package. Renaming the parameter on either side
# would leave the MSI channel silently logging under the wrong name.
It 'keeps the -LogFileName contract the bootstrap MSI relies on' {
$script:loaderText -match '\[string\]\$LogFileName' | Should -BeTrue
$wxs = Get-Content (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '..\..\src\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi\Package.wxs') -Raw
$wxs.Contains('[INSTALLFOLDER]Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1') | Should -BeTrue
$wxs.Contains('-LogFileName bootstrap-msi.log') | Should -BeTrue
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Stage 1 of the Autopilot Monitor bootstrap: fetches the current installer and runs it.
.DESCRIPTION
This is the file an administrator assigns in Intune, and the same file the bootstrap MSI
installs and runs -- one implementation for both delivery channels; the MSI is only the
packaging. It carries no enrollment logic at all: it downloads the published
Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1, proves that it was signed by Autopilot Monitor, and runs it
in this process.
Why two stages: the installer holds every guard, relax rule and download path, and those
change. Whoever assigns the installer directly has to replace their Intune copy each
time; whoever assigns this loader never does, because the part that changes lives on the
server. Assigning the installer directly stays supported and unchanged.
This file is deliberately boring. It is the one piece that cannot be fixed remotely, so
it does the least it can: download, verify, invoke, log.
Verification is by Authenticode publisher, not by hash. A hash oracle would have to be
fetched from the same host as the script itself, so it could not survive a compromise of
that host, while the expected publisher below travels with this file. It pins the
certificate SUBJECT and not a thumbprint, so a certificate renewal does not brick a
loader that is already deployed on devices.
Fail-soft: the loader always exits 0 and never throws into the caller. A device that
cannot reach the download endpoint is a device without monitoring, never a failed
enrollment step. Verification failures are the same: nothing runs, and the reason is in
the log. Refusing to execute unverified code as SYSTEM is the point of this file.
This file MUST remain pure ASCII (PS 5.1 reads BOM-less files as ANSI).
.PARAMETER BootstrapUrl
Installer URL. Defaults to the published stable installer; the -Dev variant of this
loader is rendered from that default at publish time.
.PARAMETER LogFileName
Log file inside the agent log directory. The MSI channel passes bootstrap-msi.log so the
delivery channel stays visible in a diagnostics package; the diag tooling keys on these
names, so do not rename them.
.PARAMETER BootstrapArguments
Everything else is passed through to the installer unchanged, so any parameter the
installer accepts can be set here without this file knowing about it.
.EXAMPLE
.\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1
.EXAMPLE
.\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 24
.NOTES
Author : Oliver Kieselbach (autopilotmonitor.com)
Runtime : Windows PowerShell 5.1, SYSTEM context, during Autopilot enrollment
.CHANGELOG
2026-09-08 v1.2 Log the signer CN instead of the full EV subject; the full subject is
logged only when the publisher is why a script was rejected.
2026-09-08 v1.1 Also used by the bootstrap MSI, which replaced its own copy of this
logic; -LogFileName keeps the channel visible in diagnostics.
2026-09-08 v1.0 Initial version: two-stage bootstrap, publisher-pinned verification.
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false)]
[string]$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1",
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false)]
[ValidatePattern('^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$')]
[string]$LogFileName = "bootstrap-loader.log",
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false, ValueFromRemainingArguments = $true)]
[string[]]$BootstrapArguments
)
# Script version (bump on meaningful changes; see .CHANGELOG above)
$ScriptVersion = "1.2"
# The publisher every downloaded stage-2 script must carry. A -like pattern on the subject,
# NOT a thumbprint: certificates are renewed, deployed loaders are not.
$ExpectedPublisher = "*O=glueckkanja AG*"
$LoaderBasePath = "$env:ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor"
$LoaderLogPath = "$LoaderBasePath\Logs"
$LogFile = "$LoaderLogPath\$LogFileName"
$BootstrapPath = "$LoaderBasePath\Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"
$DownloadAttempts = 3
$RetryDelaySeconds = 10
# Write-Host as well as the file: the Intune script output is what an administrator sees in
# the portal, the file is what a support case reads.
function Write-Log {
param([string]$Message)
$timestamp = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
$logMessage = "[$timestamp] $Message"
Write-Host $logMessage
Add-Content -Path $LogFile -Value $logMessage -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}
# True only when the file is signed, the signature validates against the machine's trust
# chain, and the signer is us. Any error is a false -- an unreadable signature is an
# unverified script.
function Test-BootstrapSignature {
param([string]$Path)
try {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $Path -ErrorAction Stop
}
catch {
Write-Log "Signature check failed to run: $($_.Exception.Message)"
return $false
}
if ($null -eq $sig) {
Write-Log "Signature check returned nothing."
return $false
}
# The full subject of an EV certificate is a line of street address and registration
# numbers. The CN answers the only question the log has to answer; the full subject is
# logged when it is the reason for a rejection.
$subject = if ($sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject } else { "<unsigned>" }
$signer = if ($subject -match 'CN=([^,]+)') { $Matches[1] } else { $subject }
Write-Log "Signature status: $($sig.Status). Signer: $signer"
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
Write-Log "REJECTED: expected signature status 'Valid'."
return $false
}
if ($subject -notlike $ExpectedPublisher) {
Write-Log "REJECTED: signer does not match the expected publisher. Full subject: $subject"
return $false
}
Write-Log "Signature accepted (thumbprint $($sig.SignerCertificate.Thumbprint))."
return $true
}
# Downloads the installer and returns $true once a downloaded copy passes verification.
# Verification lives inside the retry loop on purpose: a truncated or proxy-mangled body
# fails the signature check, and that is worth another attempt.
function Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript {
param([string]$Url, [string]$Destination)
for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le $DownloadAttempts; $attempt++) {
try {
Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt/$DownloadAttempts from $Url"
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $Url -OutFile $Destination -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 60 -ErrorAction Stop
if (Test-BootstrapSignature -Path $Destination) {
return $true
}
}
catch {
Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
if ($attempt -lt $DownloadAttempts) {
Start-Sleep -Seconds $RetryDelaySeconds
}
}
return $false
}
# Main flow. Only invoked when the script is run directly (see entry guard at the bottom),
# so the Pester suite can dot-source this file without bootstrapping anything.
function Start-BootstrapLoader {
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $LoaderLogPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null
Write-Log "=== Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v$ScriptVersion started (user=$env:USERNAME, pid=$PID) ==="
# PS 5.1 on an OOBE device still defaults to TLS 1.0 for this process.
try {
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol -bor [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
}
catch {
Write-Log "INFO: could not raise the TLS protocol: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
if (-not (Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url $BootstrapUrl -Destination $BootstrapPath)) {
Write-Log "No verified installer available after $DownloadAttempts attempt(s). Nothing was executed."
return
}
Write-Log "Executing $BootstrapPath"
# Same process, so the execution policy this loader runs under applies to stage 2 as
# well and no second policy decision can strand the installer. Splatting an array of
# remaining arguments keeps this file free of any knowledge about the installer's
# parameters.
$arguments = @()
if ($BootstrapArguments) { $arguments = $BootstrapArguments }
try {
& $BootstrapPath @arguments
Write-Log "Installer finished (exit code $LASTEXITCODE)."
}
catch {
Write-Log "Installer threw: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
}
# Entry guard: dot-sourcing (Pester) loads the functions without running the loader.
if ($MyInvocation.InvocationName -ne '.') {
try {
Start-BootstrapLoader
}
catch {
# Nothing above should throw; if it does, it must not become a failed Intune script.
Write-Log "Loader failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
exit 0
}
@@ -29,10 +29,9 @@
Cloud PCs are never Autopilot-registered, so this enables agent monitoring
of Cloud PC first-connect enrollment)
- IntuneDeviceBinding -> DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All
(cert-to-device binding: verifies that the Intune device id carried in the
agent's client certificate is a device THIS tenant actually enrolled --
currently a Global-Admin-only preview that records telemetry and does not
block enrollment)
(Intune Enrollment Validation: accepts devices enrolled in THIS tenant's
Intune, matched by the Intune device id in the agent's client certificate,
without Autopilot registration, corporate identifier or device association)
- All -> every optional permission above, in one run
(also works with -Revoke to remove all optional grants at once)
@@ -76,15 +75,17 @@
.NOTES
Requires:
- Microsoft.Graph.Authentication PowerShell module (auto-installs if missing).
- Sign-in as Global Administrator OR Privileged Role Administrator OR Cloud Application Administrator.
- Sign-in as Global Administrator OR Privileged Role Administrator (with PIM, activate the
role first). Only these roles may assign Microsoft Graph application permissions;
Application Administrator and Cloud Application Administrator are not enough.
- The Autopilot Monitor app must be admin-consented in your tenant first
(its service principal must exist before grants can be added).
Sign-in behaviour:
In Azure Cloud Shell the script signs in via the ambient identity endpoint (a delegated
token for the already-signed-in user) - no device-code prompt, which Conditional Access
policies commonly block. Outside Cloud Shell it falls back to a normal interactive
Microsoft Graph sign-in. -TenantId only applies to the interactive fallback.
- The Autopilot Monitor app must be admin-consented in your tenant first
(its service principal must exist before grants can be added).
After granting:
The Autopilot Monitor backend may cache an older token for up to ~1 hour. Use the
@@ -140,6 +141,36 @@ if ($PSCmdlet.ParameterSetName -eq 'ByFeatures') {
# ---- Constants ----
$MicrosoftGraphAppId = '00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000'
# ---- Graph failure details ----
# Invoke-MgGraphRequest puts only "Response status code does not indicate success: ..." into the
# exception message. Graph's own error (code + message) is the response body in ErrorDetails,
# behind the request line, the status line and the headers. Some headers carry JSON themselves
# (x-ms-ags-diagnostic), so the body is taken from behind the blank line that ends the headers.
function Get-GraphFailure {
param([System.Management.Automation.ErrorRecord]$ErrorRecord)
$status = 0
if ($ErrorRecord.Exception.PSObject.Properties['Response'] -and $ErrorRecord.Exception.Response) {
$status = [int]$ErrorRecord.Exception.Response.StatusCode
}
$text = $ErrorRecord.Exception.Message
if ($ErrorRecord.ErrorDetails -and $ErrorRecord.ErrorDetails.Message) {
$body = ($ErrorRecord.ErrorDetails.Message -split '\r?\n\r?\n', 2)[-1].Trim()
if ($body.StartsWith('{')) {
try {
$graphError = ($body | ConvertFrom-Json).error
if ($graphError.code) { $text = "$($graphError.code): $($graphError.message)" }
}
catch {
# Not a Graph JSON body - keep the exception message.
}
}
}
[pscustomobject]@{ Status = $status; Text = $text }
}
# ---- Pre-flight: module ----
if (-not (Get-Module -ListAvailable -Name Microsoft.Graph.Authentication)) {
Write-Host "[Setup] Microsoft.Graph.Authentication not installed. Installing for current user..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
@@ -189,7 +220,7 @@ Write-Host "[Auth] Granted scopes: $($ctx.Scopes -join ', ')"
# carries a fixed scope set (incl. Directory.AccessAsUser.All) instead of the requested scopes,
# and its effective rights follow the signed-in user's directory role.
if (-not $identityConnected -and -not ($ctx.Scopes -contains 'AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All')) {
Write-Warning "Scope 'AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All' was NOT granted. The signed-in user likely lacks the required role (Global Admin / Privileged Role Admin / Cloud App Admin)."
Write-Warning "Scope 'AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All' was NOT granted. The signed-in user likely lacks the required role (Global Administrator or Privileged Role Administrator)."
if (-not $VerifyOnly) { return }
}
@@ -263,6 +294,7 @@ $action = if ($Revoke) { 'Revoke' } else { 'Grant' }
Write-Host "[4/4] $action mode - processing $($Permissions.Count) permission(s)..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$results = @()
$graphForbidden = $false
foreach ($permName in $Permissions) {
$appRole = $graphSp.appRoles | Where-Object {
$_.value -eq $permName -and $_.allowedMemberTypes -contains 'Application'
@@ -289,7 +321,9 @@ foreach ($permName in $Permissions) {
$results += [pscustomobject]@{ Permission = $permName; Status = 'Revoked' }
}
catch {
Write-Warning " [FAIL] '$permName' revoke failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
$failure = Get-GraphFailure $_
if ($failure.Status -eq 403) { $graphForbidden = $true }
Write-Warning " [FAIL] '$permName' revoke failed: $($failure.Text)"
$results += [pscustomobject]@{ Permission = $permName; Status = 'Failed' }
}
}
@@ -316,7 +350,9 @@ foreach ($permName in $Permissions) {
$results += [pscustomobject]@{ Permission = $permName; Status = 'Granted' }
}
catch {
Write-Warning " [FAIL] '$permName' grant failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
$failure = Get-GraphFailure $_
if ($failure.Status -eq 403) { $graphForbidden = $true }
Write-Warning " [FAIL] '$permName' grant failed: $($failure.Text)"
$results += [pscustomobject]@{ Permission = $permName; Status = 'Failed' }
}
}
@@ -325,6 +361,9 @@ foreach ($permName in $Permissions) {
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "=========== Summary ===========" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$results | Format-Table -AutoSize | Out-Host
if ($graphForbidden) {
Write-Warning "Microsoft Graph refused the change (403): the signed-in account may not manage Microsoft Graph application permissions. Sign in as Global Administrator or Privileged Role Administrator (with PIM, activate the role first) and run the script again."
}
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "Note: token-cached backends may need up to ~1h to see the new permission set." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Write-Host " Use 'Refresh permission status' in the admin UI to apply changes immediately." -ForegroundColor Yellow
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring
{
/// <summary>
/// Session 683f1eff — a Shell-Core 62407 failure (<c>WhiteGlove_Failed</c>) arrived four
/// seconds into the provisioning tracker's 30-s settle window and terminalised the session
/// with nothing but its failure type: the HRESULT (0x80070652) and the failed subcategory
/// (Apps) the registry had already named never reached the terminal event, the backend
/// FailureReason or the termination-time app classification. The coordinator now inherits
/// the pending settle detail onto the Shell-Core args and records the terminal-failure
/// snapshot from it.
/// </summary>
public sealed class EspAndHelloTrackerShellCoreFailureInheritanceTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Fixed = new DateTime(2026, 9, 8, 18, 11, 6, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private sealed class Fixture : IDisposable
{
public TempDirectory Tmp { get; } = new TempDirectory();
public AgentLogger Logger { get; }
public FakeSignalIngressSink Ingress { get; } = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
public FakeSignalIngressSink TrackerPostSink { get; } = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
public VirtualClock Clock { get; } = new VirtualClock(Fixed);
public List<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs> Forwarded { get; } = new List<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs>();
public Fixture() { Logger = new AgentLogger(Tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Debug); }
public EspAndHelloTracker BuildCoordinator(Func<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs?> pendingProbe)
{
var coordinator = new EspAndHelloTracker(
sessionId: "S1",
tenantId: "T1",
post: new InformationalEventPost(TrackerPostSink, Clock),
logger: Logger,
skipConfigProbe: () => ((bool?)false, (bool?)false),
accountSetupActivityProbe: () => false,
pendingEspFailureProbe: pendingProbe);
coordinator.EspFailureDetected += (_, args) => Forwarded.Add(args);
return coordinator;
}
public FakeSignalIngressSink.PostedSignal TerminalSignal() =>
Assert.Single(Ingress.Posted, p => p.Kind == DecisionSignalKind.EspTerminalFailure);
public void Dispose() { Tmp.Dispose(); }
}
private static EspFailureDetectedEventArgs PendingAppsFailure() => new EspFailureDetectedEventArgs(
failureType: "Provisioning_DeviceSetup_Apps_Failed",
errorCode: "0x80070652",
failedSubcategory: "Apps",
category: "DeviceSetup",
likelyCulpritApps: new[] { "ESP Finalizer US" });
[Fact]
public void ShellCore_failure_inside_the_settle_window_inherits_the_registry_detail()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var coordinator = f.BuildCoordinator(PendingAppsFailure);
using var adapter = new EspAndHelloTrackerAdapter(coordinator, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
coordinator.TriggerShellCoreEspFailureForTest("WhiteGlove_Failed");
var args = Assert.Single(f.Forwarded);
Assert.Equal("WhiteGlove_Failed", args.FailureType); // the signal that terminalised
Assert.Equal("0x80070652", args.ErrorCode);
Assert.Equal("Apps", args.FailedSubcategory);
Assert.Equal("DeviceSetup", args.Category);
Assert.Equal(new[] { "ESP Finalizer US" }, args.LikelyCulpritApps);
// Wire-through: the EspTerminalFailure signal payload carries the detail the
// DecisionEngine copies onto enrollment_failed.
var signal = f.TerminalSignal();
Assert.Equal("WhiteGlove_Failed", signal.Payload!["failureType"]);
Assert.Equal("0x80070652", signal.Payload["errorCode"]);
Assert.Equal("Apps", signal.Payload["failedSubcategory"]);
Assert.Equal("DeviceSetup", signal.Payload["category"]);
Assert.Equal("ESP Finalizer US", signal.Payload["likelyCulpritApps"]);
// Termination-time classification reads the same context.
Assert.NotNull(coordinator.LastEspTerminalFailure);
Assert.Equal("0x80070652", coordinator.LastEspTerminalFailure.ErrorCode);
Assert.True(coordinator.LastEspTerminalFailure.IsAppsSubcategory);
}
[Fact]
public void ShellCore_failure_without_a_pending_window_stays_bare()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var coordinator = f.BuildCoordinator(() => null);
using var adapter = new EspAndHelloTrackerAdapter(coordinator, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
coordinator.TriggerShellCoreEspFailureForTest("ESPProgress_Timeout");
var args = Assert.Single(f.Forwarded);
Assert.Equal("ESPProgress_Timeout", args.FailureType);
Assert.Null(args.ErrorCode);
Assert.Null(args.FailedSubcategory);
Assert.Null(args.Category);
Assert.Empty(args.LikelyCulpritApps);
Assert.Null(coordinator.LastEspTerminalFailure);
var signal = f.TerminalSignal();
Assert.False(signal.Payload!.ContainsKey("errorCode"));
Assert.False(signal.Payload.ContainsKey("failedSubcategory"));
}
[Fact]
public void A_throwing_probe_degrades_to_the_bare_failure()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var coordinator = f.BuildCoordinator(() => throw new InvalidOperationException("probe"));
coordinator.TriggerShellCoreEspFailureForTest("WhiteGlove_Failed");
var args = Assert.Single(f.Forwarded);
Assert.Equal("WhiteGlove_Failed", args.FailureType);
Assert.Null(args.ErrorCode);
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
using System;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Gather
{
/// <summary>
/// A configured diagnostics entry is resolved to the folder and pattern that get
/// enumerated, and the guard judges exactly that folder. The cases below pin the
/// property that matters: no spelling of an allowed entry ever selects its parent.
/// </summary>
public sealed class DiagnosticsPathGuardsTests
{
private const string TestProfile = @"C:\Users\TestUser";
private static readonly Func<string, bool> IsDirectory = _ => true;
private static readonly Func<string, bool> IsNotDirectory = _ => false;
private static DiagnosticsPathGuards.CollectionTarget Resolve(
string path,
bool includeSubfolders = false,
bool unrestrictedMode = false,
string? userProfilePath = null,
Func<string, bool>? directoryExists = null)
{
Assert.True(DiagnosticsPathGuards.TryResolveCollectionTarget(
path, includeSubfolders, unrestrictedMode, userProfilePath!, directoryExists ?? IsDirectory, out var target));
return target;
}
private static void AssertRefused(
string path,
bool unrestrictedMode = false,
string? userProfilePath = null,
Func<string, bool>? directoryExists = null)
{
Assert.False(DiagnosticsPathGuards.TryResolveCollectionTarget(
path, true, unrestrictedMode, userProfilePath!, directoryExists ?? IsDirectory, out var target));
Assert.Null(target);
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------ folder entries
[Theory]
[InlineData(@"C:\Windows\Logs")]
[InlineData(@"C:\Windows\Logs\")]
[InlineData(@"C:\Windows\SetupDiag")]
[InlineData(@"C:\ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor")]
[InlineData(@"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DiagnosticLogCSP")]
public void Folder_entry_collects_from_itself_never_from_its_parent(string configured)
{
var target = Resolve(configured, includeSubfolders: true);
Assert.Equal(configured.TrimEnd('\\'), target.Folder, ignoreCase: true);
Assert.Equal("*", target.Pattern);
Assert.True(target.Recurse);
}
[Fact]
public void Trailing_separator_means_folder_even_when_the_folder_does_not_exist_yet()
{
var target = Resolve(@"C:\Windows\Logs\NotThereYet\", directoryExists: IsNotDirectory);
Assert.Equal(@"C:\Windows\Logs\NotThereYet", target.Folder, ignoreCase: true);
Assert.Equal("*", target.Pattern);
}
[Fact]
public void Folder_name_with_a_dot_is_still_a_folder()
{
var target = Resolve(@"C:\Windows\Logs\vendor.v2");
Assert.Equal(@"C:\Windows\Logs\vendor.v2", target.Folder, ignoreCase: true);
Assert.Equal("*", target.Pattern);
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------ wildcard entries
[Fact]
public void Wildcard_entry_collects_the_pattern_from_its_validated_parent()
{
var target = Resolve(@"C:\Windows\Panther\*.log", includeSubfolders: true);
Assert.Equal(@"C:\Windows\Panther", target.Folder, ignoreCase: true);
Assert.Equal("*.log", target.Pattern);
Assert.True(target.Recurse);
}
[Fact]
public void Wildcard_beside_an_allowlisted_file_is_refused()
{
// Only ReportingEvents.log is on the allowlist, not the folder it lives in.
AssertRefused(@"C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\*.log");
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------ file entries
[Fact]
public void File_entry_never_recurses_because_its_folder_was_not_validated()
{
var target = Resolve(
@"C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\ReportingEvents.log",
includeSubfolders: true,
directoryExists: IsNotDirectory);
Assert.Equal(@"C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution", target.Folder, ignoreCase: true);
Assert.Equal("ReportingEvents.log", target.Pattern);
Assert.False(target.Recurse);
}
[Fact]
public void Missing_path_without_a_dot_is_one_file_name_not_a_wildcard_on_the_parent()
{
var target = Resolve(@"C:\Windows\Logs\nodot", includeSubfolders: true, directoryExists: IsNotDirectory);
Assert.Equal(@"C:\Windows\Logs", target.Folder, ignoreCase: true);
Assert.Equal("nodot", target.Pattern);
Assert.False(target.Recurse);
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------ refusals
[Theory]
[InlineData(@"C:\Windows")]
[InlineData(@"C:\ProgramData")]
[InlineData(@"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft")]
[InlineData(@"C:\Windows\Logs\..\System32")]
[InlineData(@"C:\Windows\LogsEvil")]
[InlineData("")]
public void Paths_outside_the_allowlist_are_refused(string configured)
{
AssertRefused(configured);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(@"C:\Users")]
[InlineData(@"C:\Users\TestUser\Documents")]
[InlineData(@"C:\Windows\System32\config")]
[InlineData(@"C:\Windows\System32\config\*")]
public void Hard_blocks_hold_in_unrestricted_mode(string configured)
{
AssertRefused(configured, unrestrictedMode: true);
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------ user-profile token
[Fact]
public void Expanded_token_path_outside_AppData_is_refused_even_in_unrestricted_mode()
{
// The service expands %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% before the guard sees the path; an
// unexpanded token is not under C:\Users lexically and used to slip past the block.
AssertRefused(TestProfile + @"\Documents", unrestrictedMode: true, userProfilePath: TestProfile);
AssertRefused(TestProfile + @"\Documents\*.txt", unrestrictedMode: true, userProfilePath: TestProfile);
}
[Fact]
public void Expanded_token_path_on_the_profile_allowlist_is_admitted_in_restricted_mode()
{
var target = Resolve(
TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\RealmJoin\Logs\*.log",
userProfilePath: TestProfile);
Assert.Equal(TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\RealmJoin\Logs", target.Folder, ignoreCase: true);
Assert.Equal("*.log", target.Pattern);
}
[Fact]
public void Profile_path_without_the_token_stays_blocked()
{
AssertRefused(TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\RealmJoin\Logs\*.log", userProfilePath: null);
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------ recursion guard
[Theory]
[InlineData(@"C:\Users")]
[InlineData(@"C:\Users\TestUser")]
[InlineData(@"C:\Windows\System32\config")]
[InlineData(@"C:\Windows\System32\config\RegBack")]
public void Recursion_never_enters_a_hard_blocked_subtree_in_unrestricted_mode(string directory)
{
Assert.False(DiagnosticsPathGuards.IsDirectoryEnterable(directory, unrestrictedMode: true, userProfilePath: null));
}
[Fact]
public void Recursion_enters_ordinary_subfolders()
{
Assert.True(DiagnosticsPathGuards.IsDirectoryEnterable(@"C:\Windows\System32\drivers", unrestrictedMode: true, userProfilePath: null));
Assert.True(DiagnosticsPathGuards.IsDirectoryEnterable(@"C:\Windows\Logs\CBS", unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: null));
Assert.False(DiagnosticsPathGuards.IsDirectoryEnterable(@"C:\Windows\System32\drivers", unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: null));
}
}
}
@@ -456,5 +456,124 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Gather
SingleSecurityWarning();
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------
// %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% exception (userProfilePath overload)
//
// The token lifts the C:\Users hard block for AppData\Local and
// AppData\Roaming — and nothing more. The allowlist still decides,
// which is what the cases below pin down: the exception is a gate the
// allowlist has to open, never an allowance of its own.
// -------------------------------------------------------------------
private const string TestProfile = @"C:\Users\TestUser";
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AppDataPath_WithoutAllowlistEntry_IsStillBlocked()
{
// The lifted hard block alone admits nothing: without a matching
// userProfileFilePrefixes entry the path falls through to the
// allowlist and is refused there.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\UnlistedVendor\app.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_OutsideAppData_IsBlockedByTheHardBlock()
{
foreach (var target in new[] { @"\Desktop\secret.txt", @"\Documents\notes.txt", @"\ntuser.dat" })
{
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + target, unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_NullProfile_KeepsTheUsersHardBlock()
{
// No interactive user detected — the exception cannot apply and the
// path stays under the plain C:\Users block.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
@"C:\Users\TestUser\AppData\Local\UnlistedVendor\app.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: null));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_TraversalOutOfAppData_IsBlocked()
{
// Spelling Documents as a traversal out of AppData must not survive
// Path.GetFullPath normalisation.
const string traversal = @"C:\Users\TestUser\AppData\Local\..\..\Documents\secret.txt";
Assert.Equal(@"C:\Users\TestUser\Documents\secret.txt", Path.GetFullPath(traversal));
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
traversal, unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_ForeignProfile_IsBlockedEvenUnderAppData()
{
// The exception is scoped to the DETECTED profile — a rule must not
// reach a second user's AppData by spelling the path out.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
@"C:\Users\OtherUser\AppData\Local\UnlistedVendor\app.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AllowlistedVendorFolder_IsAllowed()
{
// AppData\Local\RealmJoin is on userProfileFilePrefixes: the file itself, a
// subfolder below it, and the folder itself all pass.
foreach (var target in new[] { @"\tray.log", @"\Logs\rj.log", "" })
{
Assert.True(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\RealmJoin" + target,
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile),
$"expected allowed: ...\\RealmJoin{target}");
}
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_SiblingOfAnAllowlistedVendorFolder_IsBlocked()
{
// Segment-bounded: "RealmJoin" must not admit "RealmJoinSomethingElse".
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\RealmJoinSomethingElse\tray.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AllowlistedVendorFolder_InAForeignProfile_IsBlocked()
{
// The allowlist is anchored to the DETECTED profile, not to C:\Users\*.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
@"C:\Users\OtherUser\AppData\Local\RealmJoin\tray.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AllowlistedVendorFolder_WithoutADetectedUser_IsBlocked()
{
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
@"C:\Users\TestUser\AppData\Local\RealmJoin\tray.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: null));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AppDataPath_IsAllowedInUnrestrictedMode()
{
// Where the exception does bite today: unrestricted mode returns
// before the allowlist, so the lifted hard block is the whole story.
Assert.True(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\UnlistedVendor\app.log",
unrestrictedMode: true, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
// ...but only under AppData — Documents stays blocked even there.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\Documents\secret.txt",
unrestrictedMode: true, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.Threading;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Gather
{
/// <summary>
/// <see cref="GatherRule.EnrichErrorCodes"/> is an opt-in the backend honours at response time:
/// the agent stamps <c>enrichErrorCodes: true</c> into the event data of a rule that set it and
/// nothing at all otherwise (the default payload stays as it was).
/// </summary>
[Collection("SerialThreading")] // startup rules execute on the shared ThreadPool
public sealed class GatherRuleExecutorEnrichErrorCodesTests : IDisposable
{
private readonly TempDirectory _tmp = new TempDirectory();
private readonly List<EnrollmentEvent> _events = new List<EnrollmentEvent>();
private readonly object _eventsGate = new object();
private readonly GatherRuleExecutor _executor;
private const string AbsentPath =
"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\AutopilotMonitorTests\\DefinitelyAbsent_7e3a1f4b-0000-0000-0000-000000000000";
public GatherRuleExecutorEnrichErrorCodesTests()
{
var logger = new AgentLogger(_tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info);
_executor = new GatherRuleExecutor(
"sess", "tenant",
evt => { lock (_eventsGate) _events.Add(evt); },
logger)
{
UnrestrictedMode = true
};
}
public void Dispose()
{
_executor.Dispose();
_tmp.Dispose();
}
private EnrollmentEvent SingleEvent()
{
lock (_eventsGate) return Assert.Single(_events);
}
private bool WaitForEventCount(int count, int timeoutMs = 10000)
{
var sw = Stopwatch.StartNew();
while (sw.ElapsedMilliseconds < timeoutMs)
{
lock (_eventsGate) if (_events.Count >= count) return true;
Thread.Sleep(25);
}
lock (_eventsGate) return _events.Count >= count;
}
private static GatherRule StartupRule(bool enrichErrorCodes) => new GatherRule
{
RuleId = "GATHER-EEC-001",
Title = "enrich test",
CollectorType = "registry",
Target = AbsentPath,
Trigger = "startup",
OutputEventType = "gather_test",
Enabled = true,
EnrichErrorCodes = enrichErrorCodes,
};
[Fact]
public void StampRuleMarkers_AddsMarkerOnlyWhenOptedIn()
{
var optedIn = new Dictionary<string, object> { ["exitCode"] = "1603" };
GatherRuleExecutor.StampRuleMarkers(StartupRule(enrichErrorCodes: true), optedIn);
Assert.Equal(true, optedIn[Constants.GatherRuleDataKeys.EnrichErrorCodes]);
var defaultRule = new Dictionary<string, object> { ["exitCode"] = "1603" };
GatherRuleExecutor.StampRuleMarkers(StartupRule(enrichErrorCodes: false), defaultRule);
Assert.False(defaultRule.ContainsKey(Constants.GatherRuleDataKeys.EnrichErrorCodes));
Assert.Single(defaultRule);
}
[Fact]
public void ExecuteRule_StampsMarker_WhenRuleOptsIn()
{
_executor.UpdateRules(new List<GatherRule> { StartupRule(enrichErrorCodes: true) });
Assert.True(_executor.WaitForStartupRules(30));
Assert.True(WaitForEventCount(1));
var evt = SingleEvent();
Assert.Equal(GatherRuleExecutor.SourceName, evt.Source);
Assert.Equal(true, evt.Data[Constants.GatherRuleDataKeys.EnrichErrorCodes]);
}
[Fact]
public void ExecuteRule_LeavesPayloadUnchanged_ByDefault()
{
_executor.UpdateRules(new List<GatherRule> { StartupRule(enrichErrorCodes: false) });
Assert.True(_executor.WaitForStartupRules(30));
Assert.True(WaitForEventCount(1));
Assert.False(SingleEvent().Data.ContainsKey(Constants.GatherRuleDataKeys.EnrichErrorCodes));
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
#nullable enable
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring
{
/// <summary>
/// The completion timer a started Hello wizard runs against is the tenant's Hello wait
/// (<c>HelloWaitTimeoutSeconds</c>), resolved to 300..3600 s — the same budget the engine's
/// hello_safety window spends from the ESP exit, so a tenant allowing an hour is not cut off
/// by a fixed 5-min tracker timer while the user is still inside the wizard.
/// </summary>
public sealed class HelloTrackerCompletionBudgetTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Fixed = new DateTime(2026, 9, 29, 8, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
[Theory]
[InlineData(30, 300)] // the old default, still stored for many tenants → the built-in window
[InlineData(0, 300)]
[InlineData(300, 300)]
[InlineData(1800, 1800)]
[InlineData(3600, 3600)]
[InlineData(86400, 3600)] // clamped to the ceiling
public void Completion_budget_is_the_resolved_tenant_hello_wait(int configured, int expected)
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
using var tracker = NewTracker(tmp, new FakeSignalIngressSink(), configured);
Assert.Equal(expected, tracker.CompletionTimeoutSecondsForTest);
}
[Fact]
public void Completion_timeout_event_reports_the_tenant_budget()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var ingress = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
using var tracker = NewTracker(tmp, ingress, helloWaitTimeoutSeconds: 2400);
tracker.NotifyHelloWizardStarted();
Assert.True(tracker.IsCompletionTimerActiveForTest);
tracker.TriggerCompletionTimeoutForTest();
var timeout = ingress.Posted.Single(p =>
p.Kind == DecisionSignalKind.InformationalEvent
&& p.Payload != null
&& p.Payload.TryGetValue(SignalPayloadKeys.EventType, out var et)
&& et == Constants.EventTypes.HelloCompletionTimeout);
var data = Assert.IsAssignableFrom<IDictionary<string, object>>(timeout.TypedPayload);
Assert.Equal(2400, data["timeoutSeconds"]);
Assert.Equal("timeout", tracker.HelloOutcome);
}
private static HelloTracker NewTracker(TempDirectory tmp, FakeSignalIngressSink ingress, int helloWaitTimeoutSeconds) =>
new HelloTracker(
sessionId: "S1",
tenantId: "T1",
post: new InformationalEventPost(ingress, new VirtualClock(Fixed)),
logger: new AgentLogger(tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info),
helloWaitTimeoutSeconds: helloWaitTimeoutSeconds);
}
}
@@ -186,5 +186,20 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
DateTime resolved;
Assert.False(sut.TryResolveUtc(Source, UtcNow, out resolved));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(3610.39, true, 4)] // session 4377911b: +1 h on a 10 s script
[InlineData(61203.0, true, 68)] // 17 h on a 3 s script
[InlineData(7205.66, true, 8)] // session cbaed57b: +2 h
[InlineData(-3596.0, true, 4)] // the same error on the start end
[InlineData(26.4, false, 0)] // a run time below one grid step
[InlineData(1030.0, false, 1)] // 17 min 10 s: residual past the tolerance
[InlineData(900.0, true, 1)] // exactly one step — a genuine 15-minute run reads the same, the caller needs mixed provenance too
public void A_grid_sized_span_is_the_signature_of_an_offset_error(double seconds, bool onGrid, int expectedSteps)
{
int steps;
Assert.Equal(onGrid, CmTraceOffsetCalibrator.IsOnOffsetGrid(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(seconds), out steps));
if (onGrid) Assert.Equal(expectedSteps, steps);
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using System.Linq;
using System.Text;
using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Newtonsoft.Json;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
{
/// <summary>
/// Session 46749560: IME's trace listener writes every log through one FileMode.Append
/// stream per process, so a process that resumes logging after another one appended
/// overwrites those bytes at its own stale position. The tracker had read the first version
/// and never saw the second — 6 of 16 script results and 4 of 16 executor end blocks were
/// lost while the final files looked intact. These tests drive that exact write pattern
/// (positional overwrite behind the bookmark) against the two multi-writer logs and pin the
/// contract: unchanged bytes never rewind, changed bytes are processed exactly once, and the
/// executor lines a rewind uncovers belong to the invocation that owns their file position.
/// </summary>
public sealed class ImeLogTrackerOverwriteRewindTests
{
private static readonly DateTime T0 = new DateTime(2026, 9, 10, 19, 30, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private static List<ImeLogPattern> MarkerPatterns() => new List<ImeLogPattern>
{
new ImeLogPattern
{
PatternId = "T-MARK", Category = "always", Enabled = true,
Pattern = @"^marker (?<n>\d+)", Action = "noop",
Parameters = new Dictionary<string, string>(),
},
};
private static readonly string[] ScriptPatternIds =
{
"PS-AGENT-INVOCATION", "PS-AGENT-ARG", "PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START", "PS-AGENT-EXITCODE",
"PS-AGENT-OUTPUT", "PS-AGENT-COMPLETED", "PS-SCRIPT-GENERATED", "PS-SCRIPT-CONTEXT", "PS-SCRIPT-RESULT",
};
/// <summary>The shipped pattern JSON — the same source combine.js embeds — so the contract is the real one.</summary>
private static List<ImeLogPattern> ScriptPatterns()
{
DirectoryInfo? dir = new DirectoryInfo(AppContext.BaseDirectory);
string? patternDir = null;
while (dir != null)
{
var candidate = Path.Combine(dir.FullName, "rules", "ime-log-patterns");
if (Directory.Exists(candidate)) { patternDir = candidate; break; }
dir = dir.Parent;
}
Assert.NotNull(patternDir);
var byId = new Dictionary<string, ImeLogPattern>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
foreach (var file in Directory.GetFiles(patternDir, "*.json"))
{
var pattern = JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<ImeLogPattern>(File.ReadAllText(file));
if (pattern?.PatternId != null) byId[pattern.PatternId] = pattern;
}
return ScriptPatternIds.Select(id =>
{
Assert.True(byId.TryGetValue(id, out var p), $"Shipped IME pattern '{id}' not found under {patternDir}.");
return p!;
}).ToList();
}
private static string Entry(string message, string thread = "1")
=> $"<![LOG[{message}]LOG]!><time=\"12:00:00.0000000\" date=\"9-10-2026\" component=\"X\" context=\"\" type=\"1\" thread=\"{thread}\" file=\"\">\r\n";
private const string PlatformId = "d39eeef3-e88e-41a0-82d7-5e28ee7b5acf";
private const string PlatformStartLine =
@"Adding argument powershell with value C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Scripts\73d664e4-0886-4a73-b745-c694da45ddb4_d39eeef3-e88e-41a0-82d7-5e28ee7b5acf.ps1 to the named argument list.";
private const string DetectionStartLine =
@"Adding argument detectionScript with value C:\Windows\IMECache\DetectionScripts\App_cc46aa62-e93a-41a1-bdd0-44f57e92a66d.ps1 to the named argument list.";
private const string GeneratedLine =
@"Script file C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Scripts\73d664e4-0886-4a73-b745-c694da45ddb4_d39eeef3-e88e-41a0-82d7-5e28ee7b5acf.ps1 is generated.";
private const string ResultLine =
"[PowerShell] User Id = 73d664e4-0886-4a73-b745-c694da45ddb4, Policy id = " + PlatformId + ", policy result = Success";
private sealed class Harness : IDisposable
{
private readonly TempDirectory _tmp = new TempDirectory();
private readonly string _matchLog;
private readonly List<ImeLogPattern> _patterns;
public ImeLogTracker Tracker { get; private set; }
public DateTime Now { get; set; } = T0;
public string LogName { get; }
public string LogPath => Path.Combine(_tmp.Path, LogName);
public string StateDir { get; }
public List<ScriptExecutionState> Completed { get; } = new List<ScriptExecutionState>();
public Harness(string logName, List<ImeLogPattern> patterns)
{
LogName = logName;
_patterns = patterns;
var logDir = Path.Combine(_tmp.Path, "agent");
Directory.CreateDirectory(logDir);
_matchLog = Path.Combine(logDir, "ime-pattern-matches.log");
StateDir = Path.Combine(_tmp.Path, "state");
Tracker = Build();
}
private ImeLogTracker Build()
{
var t = new ImeLogTracker(_tmp.Path, _patterns, new AgentLogger(Path.Combine(_tmp.Path, "agent"), AgentLogLevel.Debug),
matchLogPath: _matchLog, stateDirectory: StateDir);
t.UtcNowProvider = () => Now;
t.OnScriptCompleted = s => Completed.Add(s);
return t;
}
/// <summary>Agent restart: dispose, rebuild over the same state directory, restore the bookmark.</summary>
public void Restart()
{
Tracker.SaveStateForTest();
Tracker.Dispose();
Tracker = Build();
Tracker.LoadStateForTest();
}
public void Append(string text) => File.AppendAllText(LogPath, text, new UTF8Encoding(false));
/// <summary>What IME's stale writer does: write at its own position, over whatever is there.</summary>
public void Overwrite(long offset, string text)
{
using (var fs = new FileStream(LogPath, FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Write, FileShare.ReadWrite))
{
fs.Seek(offset, SeekOrigin.Begin);
var bytes = new UTF8Encoding(false).GetBytes(text);
fs.Write(bytes, 0, bytes.Length);
}
}
public long Length => new FileInfo(LogPath).Length;
public Task Pass(CancellationToken token = default) => Tracker.CheckLogFilesAsync(token);
/// <summary>Marker numbers matched so far, in match order.</summary>
public List<int> Matched()
{
if (!File.Exists(_matchLog)) return new List<int>();
return File.ReadAllLines(_matchLog)
.Select(l => Regex.Match(l, @"\[T-MARK\] <!\[LOG\[marker (\d+)"))
.Where(m => m.Success).Select(m => int.Parse(m.Groups[1].Value)).ToList();
}
public ImeTrackerHealth Health => Tracker.GetHealthSnapshot();
public void Dispose()
{
Tracker.Dispose();
_tmp.Dispose();
}
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// Marker-level contract on AgentExecutor.log
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
[Fact]
public async Task Unchanged_bytes_never_rewind_however_often_they_are_verified()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("marker 1") + "<![LOG[marker 2\nsecond line\n]LOG]!><time=\"12:00:00.0000000\" date=\"9-10-2026\" component=\"X\" context=\"\" type=\"1\" thread=\"1\" file=\"\">\r\n" + Entry("marker 3"));
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3 }, h.Matched());
for (var i = 0; i < 5; i++)
{
h.Tracker.RequestOverwriteCheckForTest();
h.Now = h.Now.AddSeconds(2);
await h.Pass();
}
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(0, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
Assert.Equal(5, h.Health.VerifyPasses);
Assert.Equal(3, h.Tracker.LedgerEntryCountForTest("AgentExecutor.log"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Non_multi_writer_files_keep_no_ledger_and_are_never_verified()
{
using var h = new Harness("AppWorkload.log", MarkerPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("marker 1") + Entry("marker 2"));
await h.Pass();
h.Tracker.RequestOverwriteCheckForTest();
h.Now = h.Now.AddSeconds(2);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(0, h.Tracker.LedgerEntryCountForTest("AppWorkload.log"));
Assert.Equal(0, h.Health.VerifyPasses);
Assert.Equal(0, h.Health.VerifiedBytes);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Block_written_over_read_bytes_is_processed_once_and_the_surviving_tail_is_not_repeated()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
var one = Entry("marker 1");
h.Append(one + Entry("marker 2") + Entry("marker 3"));
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3 }, h.Matched());
// A stale writer lays two entries over the first two (same length: marker 3 survives
// intact at its old offset). No growth, no fragment — only the end signal finds it.
h.Overwrite(0, Entry("marker 7") + Entry("marker 8"));
Assert.Equal(3 * one.Length, h.Length);
h.Tracker.RequestOverwriteCheckForTest();
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
Assert.Equal(3 * one.Length, h.Health.OverwriteBytesReprocessed);
Assert.Equal(3, h.Tracker.LedgerEntryCountForTest("AgentExecutor.log"));
// Nothing left to find.
h.Tracker.RequestOverwriteCheckForTest();
h.Now = h.Now.AddSeconds(2);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Block_that_cuts_an_old_entry_leaves_a_fragment_that_is_never_matched()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("marker 1") + Entry("marker 2") + Entry("marker 3"));
await h.Pass();
// Longer than two old entries, shorter than three: the tail of marker 3's line survives
// as a fragment behind the new block.
h.Overwrite(0, Entry("marker 7") + Entry("marker 8 is a little longer"));
h.Tracker.RequestOverwriteCheckForTest();
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Guard_zone_catches_a_short_block_when_the_file_grows_without_any_signal()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("marker 1") + Entry("marker 2") + Entry("marker 3"));
await h.Pass();
// Same-length replacement of marker 1 (no fragment), then an ordinary append by
// another writer: the growth pass re-checks the last 4 KB and finds the change.
h.Overwrite(0, Entry("marker 7"));
h.Append(Entry("marker 4"));
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3, 7, 4 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.VerifyPasses); // the full check that follows a guard hit
Assert.True(h.Health.VerifiedBytes > 0);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Guard_hit_rewinds_to_the_true_start_of_the_block_not_the_guard_zone()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
// ~6 KB of entries so the guard zone covers only the last few.
var sb = new StringBuilder();
for (var i = 1; i <= 60; i++) sb.Append(Entry($"marker {i}"));
h.Append(sb.ToString());
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(60, h.Matched().Count);
// A block over everything plus one more entry: the guard sees a change at its
// zone start, the full check must place the rewind at offset 0.
var block = new StringBuilder();
for (var i = 101; i <= 161; i++) block.Append(Entry($"marker {i}"));
h.Overwrite(0, block.ToString());
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
var matched = h.Matched();
Assert.Equal(60 + 61, matched.Count);
Assert.Equal(Enumerable.Range(101, 61), matched.Skip(60));
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Fragment_at_the_bookmark_triggers_the_check_when_no_ledger_entry_starts_in_the_guard_zone()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
var one = Entry("marker 1");
var big = Entry("marker 2 " + new string('x', 6000));
h.Append(one + big);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2 }, h.Matched());
// The 6 KB entry is the last ledger entry and starts before the 4 KB guard zone, so
// the guard has nothing to check. The stale writer's block is longer than that entry:
// the pass after it starts mid-line — a fragment — and must not match it raw.
h.Overwrite(one.Length, Entry("marker 7 " + new string('y', 3000)) + Entry("marker 8 " + new string('z', 3100)));
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2 }, h.Matched());
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 7, 8 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Hidden_block_is_found_by_the_cadence_while_a_script_is_in_flight_and_the_cadence_is_throttled()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("marker 1") + Entry("marker 2") + Entry("marker 3"));
await h.Pass();
// A platform script is pending → contention. First pass in contention verifies at once.
h.Tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("policyX", exitCode: null, exitObservedAtUtc: null, startedAtUtc: T0);
h.Now = T0.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.VerifyPasses);
// Same-length replacement, no growth, no signal: only the cadence can find it —
// and not before a second has passed since the last verification.
h.Overwrite(0, Entry("marker 7"));
h.Now = T0.AddMilliseconds(500);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.VerifyPasses);
h.Now = T0.AddMilliseconds(1200);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3, 7 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(2, h.Health.VerifyPasses);
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Without_contention_or_signal_nothing_is_verified()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("marker 1") + Entry("marker 2"));
await h.Pass();
for (var i = 0; i < 20; i++)
{
h.Now = h.Now.AddSeconds(1);
await h.Pass();
}
Assert.Equal(0, h.Health.VerifyPasses);
Assert.Equal(0, h.Health.VerifiedBytes);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Restart_seeds_the_ledger_so_an_overwrite_after_the_restart_is_still_found()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("marker 1") + Entry("marker 2") + Entry("marker 3"));
await h.Pass();
h.Restart();
Assert.Equal(0, h.Tracker.LedgerEntryCountForTest("AgentExecutor.log"));
// First pass after the restart: nothing new to read, but the ledger is seeded from
// the bytes behind the persisted bookmark.
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(3, h.Tracker.LedgerEntryCountForTest("AgentExecutor.log"));
h.Overwrite(0, Entry("marker 7"));
h.Tracker.RequestOverwriteCheckForTest();
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3, 7 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
// The counter is part of the persisted health.
h.Restart();
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Rollover_clears_the_ledger_and_the_new_file_is_read_without_a_false_rewind()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("marker 1") + Entry("marker 2") + Entry("marker 3"));
await h.Pass();
File.WriteAllText(h.LogPath, Entry("marker 7") + Entry("marker 8"), new UTF8Encoding(false));
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 }, h.Matched());
h.Tracker.RequestOverwriteCheckForTest();
h.Now = h.Now.AddSeconds(2);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 }, h.Matched());
Assert.Equal(0, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
Assert.Equal(2, h.Tracker.LedgerEntryCountForTest("AgentExecutor.log"));
}
[Fact]
public async Task Cancelled_pass_does_not_lose_a_pending_check()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", MarkerPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("marker 1") + Entry("marker 2") + Entry("marker 3"));
await h.Pass();
h.Overwrite(0, Entry("marker 7") + Entry("marker 8"));
h.Tracker.RequestOverwriteCheckForTest();
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
using (var cts = new CancellationTokenSource())
{
cts.Cancel();
await h.Pass(cts.Token);
}
// The cancelled pass touched nothing after the rewind; the next one reads it all.
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(new[] { 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 }, h.Matched());
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// The field scenario with the shipped patterns
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
[Fact]
public async Task Executor_end_block_written_over_a_detection_invocation_belongs_to_its_own_script()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", ScriptPatterns());
// Executor E starts its platform script and waits for PowerShell.
h.Append(Entry("ExecutorLog AgentExecutor gets invoked") + Entry(PlatformStartLine) + Entry("[Executor] created powershell with process id 12708"));
await h.Pass();
var executorPosition = h.Length;
// Detection executor D appends its whole run while E waits — the tracker reads it.
var detectionBlock = Entry("ExecutorLog AgentExecutor gets invoked") + Entry(DetectionStartLine)
+ Entry("Powershell exit code is 3") + Entry("write output done. output = detected nothing, error = ")
+ Entry("Agent executor completed.") + Entry(@"Writing result: False to resultFilePath: C:\x\App_cc46aa62.txt");
h.Append(detectionBlock);
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
// E ends: its end block lands at its own stale position, over D's lines.
var endBlock = Entry("Powershell exit code is 0") + Entry("write output done. output = Hello from E, error = ") + Entry("Agent executor completed.");
Assert.True(endBlock.Length < detectionBlock.Length);
h.Overwrite(executorPosition, endBlock);
// Nothing visible signalled the end; the cadence (E is pending) finds the block.
h.Now = h.Now.AddSeconds(1.5);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
// IME's result line (in the other file) completes the script with E's own data.
h.Tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ResultLine);
var script = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Equal(PlatformId, script.PolicyId);
Assert.Equal("Success", script.Result);
Assert.Equal("ime_policy_result", script.ResultSource);
Assert.Equal(0, script.ExitCode);
Assert.Equal("Hello from E", script.Stdout);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Detection_exit_lines_read_before_the_overwrite_never_reach_the_platform_script()
{
using var h = new Harness("AgentExecutor.log", ScriptPatterns());
h.Append(Entry("ExecutorLog AgentExecutor gets invoked") + Entry(PlatformStartLine) + Entry("[Executor] created powershell with process id 1"));
await h.Pass();
h.Append(Entry("ExecutorLog AgentExecutor gets invoked") + Entry(DetectionStartLine)
+ Entry("Powershell exit code is 3") + Entry("write output done. output = detected nothing, error = ") + Entry("Agent executor completed."));
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
// The platform result arrives without any end block ever becoming visible: held for
// the grace, then emitted — the detection's exit code 3 must not stand in.
h.Tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ResultLine);
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
h.Now = h.Now.Add(ImeLogTracker.PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace);
h.Tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(h.Now);
var script = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Equal("Success", script.Result);
Assert.Null(script.ExitCode);
Assert.Null(script.Stdout);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Ime_result_line_hidden_by_an_executor_start_line_is_recovered_from_the_ime_log()
{
using var h = new Harness("IntuneManagementExtension.log", ScriptPatterns());
h.Append(Entry(GeneratedLine, "17") + Entry("Launch powershell executor in user session", "17") + Entry("process id = 10608", "17"));
await h.Pass();
var servicePosition = h.Length;
// The executor process appends its telemetry start line at the true end of file.
h.Append(Entry("[Telemetry] Telemetry is enabled. Starting mananger...", "1"));
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
// The service's first write after the script wait lands at ITS position — over the
// executor's line; the block is longer, so the pass sees a fragment at the bookmark.
h.Overwrite(servicePosition, Entry("Execution is done, collecting result", "17") + Entry(ResultLine, "17") + Entry("[PowerShell] Success, Result details length: 315", "17"));
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
h.Now = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(100);
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(1, h.Health.OverwriteRewinds);
// Recovered on the IME side alone (this harness has no AgentExecutor.log): held for
// the end block, emitted without an exit code after the grace.
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
h.Now = h.Now.Add(ImeLogTracker.PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace);
h.Tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(h.Now);
var script = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Equal(PlatformId, script.PolicyId);
Assert.Equal("Success", script.Result);
Assert.Equal("ime_policy_result", script.ResultSource);
Assert.Equal("User", script.RunContext);
}
}
}
@@ -36,8 +36,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
// silently passing against a stale inline copy.
private static readonly string[] RequiredPatternIds =
{
"PS-AGENT-INVOCATION", "PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START", "PS-AGENT-EXITCODE",
"PS-AGENT-OUTPUT", "PS-SCRIPT-RESULT",
"PS-AGENT-INVOCATION", "PS-AGENT-ARG", "PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START", "PS-AGENT-EXITCODE",
"PS-AGENT-OUTPUT", "PS-AGENT-COMPLETED", "PS-SCRIPT-GENERATED", "PS-SCRIPT-CONTEXT",
"PS-SCRIPT-RESULT", "HS-INVOCATION",
};
private static List<ImeLogPattern> ScriptPatterns()
@@ -83,6 +84,24 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
private const string RemediationStartLine =
@"Adding argument remediationScript with value C:\Windows\IMECache\HealthScripts\446f0450-d0ee-404c-8dc0-a74123bde31f_1\detect.ps1 to the named argument list.";
private const string ImeLog = "IntuneManagementExtension.log";
private const string HealthLog = "HealthScripts.log";
private const string ExecutorLog = "AgentExecutor.log";
private const string PlatformGeneratedLine =
@"Script file C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Scripts\00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000_c3e0124c-4936-4bfd-afcc-c7fe1d84d104.ps1 is generated";
private static readonly string PlatformResultLine =
$"[PowerShell] User Id = 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000, Policy id = {PlatformId}, policy result = Success";
// The health-script worker (IME AgentCommon ScriptWorker) writes its command line, the launch
// line and the exit line to IntuneManagementExtension.log AND HealthScripts.log — session
// 24dc69d1 (IME 1.105.152.0), where the exit line pre-filled a pending platform script's exit
// code and the launch line its context.
private const string HealthScriptCommandLine =
@"""C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\agentexecutor.exe"" -remediationScript """"C:\WINDOWS\IMECache\HealthScripts\446f0450-d0ee-404c-8dc0-a74123bde31f_1\detect.ps1"""" ""C:\WINDOWS\IMECache\HealthScripts\446f0450-d0ee-404c-8dc0-a74123bde31f_1\detect.ps1.result"" 60";
private const string HealthScriptExitLine = "Powershell execution is done, exitCode = 5";
private static ImeLogTracker BuildTracker(TempDirectory tmp, out List<ScriptExecutionState> emitted)
{
var captured = new List<ScriptExecutionState>();
@@ -111,9 +130,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("Powershell exit code is 0");
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("write output done. output = [Compliant] No Classic Teams found, error = ");
// Authoritative IME result for the PLATFORM script (keyed by policyId).
// Authoritative IME result for the PLATFORM script (keyed by policyId). Its own end
// block never comes here, so the result is held until the shutdown flush — which must
// not pick up the remediation's exit/output either.
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(
$"[PowerShell] User Id = 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000, Policy id = {PlatformId}, policy result = Failed");
Assert.Empty(emitted);
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(System.DateTime.UtcNow, force: true);
var script = Assert.Single(emitted);
Assert.Equal(PlatformId, script.PolicyId);
@@ -145,5 +168,100 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
Assert.Equal(0, script.ExitCode);
Assert.Equal("Hello from c3e0124c", script.Stdout);
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// Health-script lines never feed a platform slot (session 24dc69d1)
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
[Fact]
public void No_shipped_pattern_reads_the_health_script_workers_exit_line()
{
// "Powershell execution is done, exitCode = N" is the health-script worker's line only;
// as PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE (no scriptType) it pre-filled the exit code of whichever platform
// script was pending, which then emitted without waiting for its own end block.
foreach (var file in Directory.GetFiles(FindRulesPatternDir(), "*.json"))
{
var pattern = JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<ImeLogPattern>(File.ReadAllText(file))!;
Assert.False(System.Text.RegularExpressions.Regex.IsMatch(HealthScriptExitLine, pattern.Pattern),
$"{pattern.PatternId} matches the health-script worker's exit line");
}
}
[Fact]
public void Health_script_exit_line_in_the_ime_log_never_pre_fills_the_platform_slot()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp, out var emitted);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(PlatformGeneratedLine, sourceFileName: ImeLog);
// A health script that ran in parallel finishes: its exit line lands inside the platform
// run's window (c81b8053 had "exit code 0" before its executor even started).
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(HealthScriptExitLine, sourceFileName: ImeLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(PlatformResultLine, sourceFileName: ImeLog);
// No exit code of its own → held for the end block, never emitted with the health script's 5.
Assert.Empty(emitted);
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(DateTime.UtcNow, force: true);
var script = Assert.Single(emitted);
Assert.Null(script.ExitCode);
Assert.Equal("Success", script.Result);
}
[Fact]
public void Health_script_launch_line_in_the_ime_log_does_not_flip_the_platform_context()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp, out var emitted);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(PlatformGeneratedLine, sourceFileName: ImeLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("Launch powershell executor in user session", sourceFileName: ImeLog);
// The health-script worker launches its executor while the platform script runs: its
// command line opens an invocation that owns nothing, so its launch line stays there.
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(HealthScriptCommandLine, sourceFileName: ImeLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("Launch powershell executor in machine session", sourceFileName: ImeLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(PlatformResultLine, sourceFileName: ImeLog);
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(DateTime.UtcNow, force: true);
var script = Assert.Single(emitted);
Assert.Equal("User", script.RunContext);
}
[Fact]
public void Lines_from_the_health_scripts_log_never_resolve_to_a_platform_script()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp, out var emitted);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("ExecutorLog AgentExecutor gets invoked", sourceFileName: ExecutorLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(PlatformStartLine, sourceFileName: ExecutorLog);
// HealthScripts.log never carries a platform marker — the run in flight is not the
// fallback owner of the lines there.
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("Launch powershell executor in machine session", sourceFileName: HealthLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(PlatformResultLine, sourceFileName: ImeLog);
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(DateTime.UtcNow, force: true);
var script = Assert.Single(emitted);
Assert.Null(script.RunContext);
}
[Fact]
public void Context_line_after_an_ime_log_rollover_still_finds_the_run_in_flight()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp, out var emitted);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(PlatformGeneratedLine, sourceFileName: ImeLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("ExecutorLog AgentExecutor gets invoked", sourceFileName: ExecutorLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(PlatformStartLine, sourceFileName: ExecutorLog);
// IME rolls the log over between its two lines: the fresh file has no markers, but
// platform runs open there — the run in flight still owns the context line.
tracker.ClearInvocationMarkersForTest(ImeLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("Launch powershell executor in user session", sourceFileName: ImeLog);
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(PlatformResultLine, sourceFileName: ImeLog);
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(DateTime.UtcNow, force: true);
var script = Assert.Single(emitted);
Assert.Equal("User", script.RunContext);
}
}
}
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("dece354a", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: observedAt, stdout: "Script start.\nScript end.");
// Well past the grace window — should emit.
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
var script = Assert.Single(emitted);
Assert.Equal("dece354a", script.PolicyId);
@@ -60,11 +60,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("60b43a2e", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: observedAt);
// Inside the grace window — IME might still log its result; do not emit yet.
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(5));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(5));
Assert.Empty(emitted);
// Past the grace window — emit.
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
Assert.Single(emitted);
}
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("846cea22", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: observedAt);
// Shutdown flush right after exit — grace not elapsed, but force emits anyway.
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(1), force: true);
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(1), force: true);
Assert.Single(emitted);
}
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("bad5c0de", exitCode: 1, exitObservedAtUtc: observedAt);
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
var script = Assert.Single(emitted);
Assert.Equal(1, script.ExitCode);
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
// Started but no exit code yet → still running, must not be emitted even on force flush.
tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("running", exitCode: null, exitObservedAtUtc: null);
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(DateTime.UtcNow, force: true);
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(DateTime.UtcNow, force: true);
Assert.Empty(emitted);
}
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
var observedAt = new DateTime(2026, 6, 19, 12, 59, 4, DateTimeKind.Utc);
tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("dece354a", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: observedAt);
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
Assert.Single(emitted);
// IME finally logs its PS-SCRIPT-RESULT line — must NOT produce a second event.
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
var observedAt = new DateTime(2026, 6, 19, 12, 59, 4, DateTimeKind.Utc);
tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("dece354a", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: observedAt);
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
// The exit-observed timestamp must travel on the emitted state so the adapter can bind
// the event to it instead of an unrelated "last matched" line parsed during the grace.
@@ -156,14 +156,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
// Run 1 of policy X — fallback emits.
tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("policyX", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: firstRun);
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(firstRun.AddSeconds(20));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(firstRun.AddSeconds(20));
Assert.Single(emitted);
// Run 2 of the SAME policy later in the same agent lifetime (IME re-evaluation / retry)
// must NOT be deduped away — the fresh start clears the prior emitted-marker.
var secondRun = firstRun.AddMinutes(30);
tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("policyX", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: secondRun);
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(secondRun.AddSeconds(20));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(secondRun.AddSeconds(20));
Assert.Equal(2, emitted.Count);
}
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
Assert.Equal("ime_policy_result", script.ResultSource);
// Later fallback pass must find nothing pending → no duplicate.
tracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
Assert.Single(emitted);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
{
/// <summary>
/// The poll loop's timing maxima (session c3ecb568: the loop was not scheduled for 26 s at
/// 100 % VM CPU and nothing in the telemetry could show it): the longest pass and the
/// longest pause between two passes, on a monotonic clock, restart-safe like the other
/// health counters.
/// </summary>
public sealed class ImeLogTrackerPollTimingTests
{
/// <summary>Monotonic readings the tracker takes at the start and the end of every pass.</summary>
private sealed class Clock
{
private readonly Queue<long> _readings = new Queue<long>();
public void Enqueue(params long[] ms) { foreach (var m in ms) _readings.Enqueue(m); }
public long Next() => _readings.Dequeue();
}
private static ImeLogTracker Build(TempDirectory tmp, Clock clock)
{
var tracker = new ImeLogTracker(tmp.Path, new List<ImeLogPattern>(), new AgentLogger(tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info), stateDirectory: tmp.Path);
tracker.MonotonicMillisProvider = clock.Next;
return tracker;
}
[Fact]
public async Task Longest_pass_and_longest_pause_are_kept_as_session_maxima()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var clock = new Clock();
var tracker = Build(tmp, clock);
// Pass 1 takes 30 ms; the loop is not scheduled again for 26.1 s; pass 2 takes 10 ms,
// pass 3 follows after the normal 100 ms.
clock.Enqueue(0, 30, 26130, 26140, 26240, 26245);
await tracker.RunPollPassAsync(CancellationToken.None);
await tracker.RunPollPassAsync(CancellationToken.None);
await tracker.RunPollPassAsync(CancellationToken.None);
var health = tracker.GetHealthSnapshot();
Assert.Equal(30, health.PassMaxMs);
Assert.Equal(26100, health.PassGapMaxMs);
tracker.Dispose();
}
[Fact]
public void A_fresh_tracker_reports_zero()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var tracker = Build(tmp, new Clock());
var health = tracker.GetHealthSnapshot();
Assert.Equal(0, health.PassMaxMs);
Assert.Equal(0, health.PassGapMaxMs);
tracker.Dispose();
}
[Fact]
public async Task Maxima_survive_a_restart_and_are_never_lowered()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var clock = new Clock();
var tracker1 = Build(tmp, clock);
clock.Enqueue(0, 40, 5140, 5150);
await tracker1.RunPollPassAsync(CancellationToken.None);
await tracker1.RunPollPassAsync(CancellationToken.None);
tracker1.SaveStateForTest();
tracker1.Dispose();
var tracker2 = Build(tmp, clock);
tracker2.LoadStateForTest();
Assert.Equal(40, tracker2.GetHealthSnapshot().PassMaxMs);
Assert.Equal(5100, tracker2.GetHealthSnapshot().PassGapMaxMs);
// The first pass after a restart has no pause to measure; a calmer session afterwards
// never lowers what the session already saw.
clock.Enqueue(6000, 6010, 6110, 6115);
await tracker2.RunPollPassAsync(CancellationToken.None);
await tracker2.RunPollPassAsync(CancellationToken.None);
var health = tracker2.GetHealthSnapshot();
Assert.Equal(40, health.PassMaxMs);
Assert.Equal(5100, health.PassGapMaxMs);
tracker2.Dispose();
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
{
/// <summary>
/// The IME result waits for its executor end block (session e7f3c910): PS-SCRIPT-RESULT can
/// reach the tracker before the AgentExecutor.log end block of the same run — an overwritten
/// block is recovered one pass after the result that triggers the ledger check, the
/// AgentExecutor.log read of a pass may precede the exit line by milliseconds, or the poll
/// loop stalled. Emitting at once lost the exit code and, when the late start line reopened
/// the slot, produced a fallback duplicate 15 s later.
/// </summary>
public sealed class ImeLogTrackerResultHoldTests
{
private static readonly DateTime T0 = new DateTime(2026, 9, 10, 22, 13, 35, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private sealed class Harness : IDisposable
{
private readonly TempDirectory _tmp = new TempDirectory();
public ImeLogTracker Tracker { get; private set; }
public DateTime Now { get; set; } = T0;
public List<ScriptExecutionState> Completed { get; } = new List<ScriptExecutionState>();
public List<ScriptStartedInfo> Started { get; } = new List<ScriptStartedInfo>();
public Harness() { Tracker = Build(); }
private ImeLogTracker Build()
{
var t = new ImeLogTracker(_tmp.Path, new List<ImeLogPattern>(), new AgentLogger(_tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info), stateDirectory: _tmp.Path);
t.UtcNowProvider = () => Now;
t.OnScriptCompleted = s => Completed.Add(s);
t.OnScriptStarted = s => Started.Add(s);
return t;
}
/// <summary>Agent restart over the same state directory.</summary>
public void Restart()
{
Tracker.SaveStateForTest();
Tracker.Dispose();
Tracker = Build();
Tracker.LoadStateForTest();
}
/// <summary>A start line (IME "Script file … is generated" or the executor's argument line) with its source timestamp.</summary>
public void Start(string id, DateTime lineTs)
{
Tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = lineTs;
Tracker.NextTestEntry();
Tracker.HandlePlatformScriptStarted(id);
}
public void Result(string id, DateTime lineTs, string result = "Success")
=> Tracker.CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting(id, result, lineTs);
public void Exit(string id, DateTime lineTs, int exitCode = 0)
=> Tracker.RecordPlatformScriptExitCodeForTesting(id, exitCode, lineTs);
/// <summary>The end-of-pass flush at the harness clock.</summary>
public void Flush(bool force = false) => Tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(Now, force);
public void Dispose()
{
Tracker.Dispose();
_tmp.Dispose();
}
}
[Fact]
public void Result_before_the_end_block_is_held_and_emits_once_with_the_exit_code()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("376ee51a", T0);
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2);
h.Result("376ee51a", T0.AddSeconds(2));
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2.1);
h.Flush();
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
// The end block surfaces on the next pass (ledger rewind or plain read lag).
h.Exit("376ee51a", T0.AddSeconds(1.99));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2.2);
h.Flush();
var script = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Equal(0, script.ExitCode);
Assert.Equal("Success", script.Result);
Assert.Equal("ime_policy_result", script.ResultSource);
Assert.Equal(T0.AddSeconds(2), script.ResultObservedAtUtc);
Assert.Equal("PS-SCRIPT-RESULT", script.ResultPatternId);
Assert.Equal(T0, script.StartedAtUtc);
// Nothing fires twice: later passes, a repeated result line, the 15 s fallback window.
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(30);
h.Flush();
h.Result("376ee51a", T0.AddSeconds(2));
Assert.Single(h.Completed);
}
[Fact]
public void Result_with_the_end_block_already_read_emits_at_once()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("847da54e", T0);
h.Exit("847da54e", T0.AddSeconds(2.3));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2.31);
h.Result("847da54e", T0.AddSeconds(2.31));
var script = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Equal(0, script.ExitCode);
Assert.Null(script.ResultHeldSinceUtc);
Assert.Equal(T0.AddSeconds(2.31), script.ResultObservedAtUtc);
}
[Fact]
public void Held_result_emits_without_exit_code_after_the_grace()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("784fcaf5", T0);
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2);
h.Result("784fcaf5", T0.AddSeconds(2));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2).Add(ImeLogTracker.PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace).AddMilliseconds(-100);
h.Flush();
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2).Add(ImeLogTracker.PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace);
h.Flush();
var script = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Null(script.ExitCode);
Assert.Equal("Success", script.Result);
Assert.Equal("ime_policy_result", script.ResultSource);
// An exit line surfacing after the emit is dropped — no second event, no fallback.
h.Exit("784fcaf5", T0.AddSeconds(1.99));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(40);
h.Flush();
Assert.Single(h.Completed);
}
[Fact]
public void Shutdown_flush_emits_a_held_result_at_once()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("a52e4f47", T0);
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2);
h.Result("a52e4f47", T0.AddSeconds(2), "Failed");
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
h.Flush(force: true);
var script = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Equal("Failed", script.Result);
Assert.Null(script.ExitCode);
}
[Fact]
public void Late_start_line_of_an_emitted_run_opens_no_new_run()
{
// Session e7f3c910, 376ee51a: the result was emitted, THEN the executor's start and
// exit lines of the same run were read (a 2 s poll stall) — the start opened a second
// slot and the exit code became a fallback duplicate 15 s later.
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("376ee51a", T0);
h.Exit("376ee51a", T0.AddSeconds(1.99));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2);
h.Result("376ee51a", T0.AddSeconds(2));
Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Single(h.Started);
h.Start("376ee51a", T0.AddMilliseconds(300));
Assert.Single(h.Started);
h.Exit("376ee51a", T0.AddSeconds(1.99));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(30);
h.Flush();
Assert.Single(h.Completed);
}
[Fact]
public void Start_line_newer_than_the_emitted_result_is_the_next_run()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("338d9434", T0);
h.Exit("338d9434", T0.AddSeconds(1));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(1);
h.Result("338d9434", T0.AddSeconds(1));
Assert.Single(h.Completed);
// IME re-runs the policy after the user signed in.
h.Start("338d9434", T0.AddMinutes(7));
Assert.Equal(2, h.Started.Count);
h.Exit("338d9434", T0.AddMinutes(7).AddSeconds(3));
h.Now = T0.AddMinutes(7).AddSeconds(3);
h.Result("338d9434", T0.AddMinutes(7).AddSeconds(3));
Assert.Equal(2, h.Completed.Count);
Assert.Equal(T0.AddMinutes(7), h.Completed[1].StartedAtUtc);
}
[Fact]
public void Newer_start_line_closes_a_held_result_and_starts_the_next_run()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("c81b8053", T0);
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2);
h.Result("c81b8053", T0.AddSeconds(2));
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
// The end block never surfaced before the policy ran again.
h.Start("c81b8053", T0.AddSeconds(4));
var first = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Null(first.ExitCode);
Assert.Equal(T0, first.StartedAtUtc);
Assert.Equal(2, h.Started.Count);
h.Exit("c81b8053", T0.AddSeconds(6));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(6);
h.Result("c81b8053", T0.AddSeconds(6));
Assert.Equal(2, h.Completed.Count);
Assert.Equal(0, h.Completed[1].ExitCode);
Assert.Equal(T0.AddSeconds(4), h.Completed[1].StartedAtUtc);
}
[Fact]
public void Result_without_a_start_takes_the_recovered_start_line_and_end_block()
{
// Both the start block and the end block were hidden when the result arrived; the
// ledger rewind the result triggers brings both back on the next pass.
using var h = new Harness();
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2);
h.Result("d39eeef3", T0.AddSeconds(2));
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
h.Start("d39eeef3", T0);
Assert.Empty(h.Started);
h.Exit("d39eeef3", T0.AddSeconds(1.99));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2.2);
h.Flush();
var script = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Equal(T0, script.StartedAtUtc);
Assert.Equal(0, script.ExitCode);
}
[Fact]
public void Held_result_survives_a_restart()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("832e27bc", T0);
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2);
h.Result("832e27bc", T0.AddSeconds(2));
h.Restart();
Assert.Empty(h.Completed);
h.Exit("832e27bc", T0.AddSeconds(1.99));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(2.5);
h.Flush();
var script = Assert.Single(h.Completed);
Assert.Equal(0, script.ExitCode);
Assert.Equal(T0.AddSeconds(2), script.ResultObservedAtUtc);
Assert.Equal("PS-SCRIPT-RESULT", script.ResultPatternId);
}
[Fact]
public void Emitted_marker_keeps_the_run_timestamp_across_a_restart()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("89b3cbcd", T0);
h.Exit("89b3cbcd", T0.AddSeconds(1));
h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(1);
h.Result("89b3cbcd", T0.AddSeconds(1));
h.Restart();
h.Start("89b3cbcd", T0.AddMilliseconds(500)); // late line of the emitted run
Assert.Single(h.Started);
h.Start("89b3cbcd", T0.AddMinutes(5)); // the next run
Assert.Equal(2, h.Started.Count);
}
[Fact]
public void Marker_list_from_an_older_state_file_still_dedups()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var persistence = new ImeTrackerStatePersistence(tmp.Path, new AgentLogger(tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info));
persistence.Save(new ImeTrackerStateData { PlatformScriptResultEmitted = new List<string> { "policyZ" } });
var completed = new List<ScriptExecutionState>();
var started = new List<ScriptStartedInfo>();
var tracker = new ImeLogTracker(tmp.Path, new List<ImeLogPattern>(), new AgentLogger(tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info), stateDirectory: tmp.Path);
tracker.OnScriptCompleted = s => completed.Add(s);
tracker.OnScriptStarted = s => started.Add(s);
tracker.LoadStateForTest();
tracker.CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting("policyZ", "Success", T0);
Assert.Empty(completed);
// Without a timestamp on the marker every start line is a new run, as before.
tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = T0;
tracker.HandlePlatformScriptStarted("policyZ");
Assert.Single(started);
}
[Fact]
public void Emitted_marker_is_capped_at_the_clock_so_the_next_run_still_opens_a_slot()
{
// Session 4377911b: the result line was re-read after an overwrite rewind and resolved
// in the reader's zone, one hour ahead of the clock. Stored uncapped, that stamp made
// the genuine second run's start line read as a late line of the first run and its
// result a duplicate.
using var h = new Harness();
h.Start("d94468af", T0.AddSeconds(-10));
h.Result("d94468af", T0.AddHours(1));
h.Exit("d94468af", T0.AddSeconds(-1));
h.Flush();
Assert.Single(h.Completed);
// The second run, two minutes later on the clock — still "before" the uncapped stamp.
h.Now = T0.AddMinutes(2);
h.Start("d94468af", h.Now.AddSeconds(-5));
h.Result("d94468af", h.Now.AddSeconds(-1));
h.Exit("d94468af", h.Now.AddSeconds(-2));
h.Flush();
Assert.Equal(2, h.Completed.Count);
}
}
}
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
// Run 1: exit code seen, shutdown force-flush emits the fallback completion.
var tracker1 = BuildTracker(tmp, out var emitted1);
tracker1.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("policyA", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: observedAt);
tracker1.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(1), force: true);
tracker1.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(1), force: true);
Assert.Single(emitted1);
tracker1.SaveStateForTest();
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
// Restarted tracker continues the grace window instead of dropping the script.
var tracker2 = BuildTracker(tmp, out var emitted2);
tracker2.LoadStateForTest();
tracker2.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
tracker2.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
var script = Assert.Single(emitted2);
Assert.Equal("policyB", script.PolicyId);
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
var tracker1 = BuildTracker(tmp, out _);
tracker1.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("policyC", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: observedAt);
tracker1.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(1), force: true);
tracker1.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(1), force: true);
tracker1.SaveStateForTest();
// Restart, then a genuine RE-RUN of the same policy (fresh start clears the marker).
@@ -109,8 +109,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp, out var emitted);
tracker.LoadStateForTest(); // must not throw
// Degrades to pre-fix behavior: no markers restored, normal emission works.
// Degrades to pre-fix behavior: no markers restored, normal emission works (the
// result waits for its end block until the shutdown flush).
tracker.CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting("policyD", "Success");
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(DateTime.UtcNow, force: true);
Assert.Single(emitted);
}
@@ -128,8 +130,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
tracker.CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting("policyE", "Failed", run2Start.AddMinutes(-5));
Assert.Empty(emitted);
// Run 2's own result (newer than its start) still emits normally.
// Run 2's own result (newer than its start) still emits normally — held for the end
// block until the shutdown flush, since none is seeded here.
tracker.CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting("policyE", "Success", run2Start.AddMinutes(2));
tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(run2Start.AddMinutes(2), force: true);
var script = Assert.Single(emitted);
Assert.Equal("Success", script.Result);
Assert.Equal(run2Start, script.StartedAtUtc);
@@ -150,5 +154,45 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
Assert.False(tracker2.TryClaimScriptTimeoutSuspected("policyF")); // cross-restart dedup
Assert.True(tracker2.TryClaimScriptTimeoutSuspected("policyG")); // other policies unaffected
}
[Fact]
public void Line_provenance_of_a_pending_script_survives_restart()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var observedAt = new DateTime(2026, 9, 17, 13, 20, 7, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var start = new CmTraceLineProvenance
{
SourceLocalTs = new DateTime(2026, 9, 17, 15, 19, 57, DateTimeKind.Unspecified),
Origin = CmTraceOffsetOrigin.LineAnchored,
OffsetMinutes = 120,
MeasuredWriterOffsetMinutes = 120,
SourceFileName = "IntuneManagementExtension.log",
};
var exit = new CmTraceLineProvenance
{
SourceLocalTs = new DateTime(2026, 9, 17, 15, 20, 7, DateTimeKind.Unspecified),
Origin = CmTraceOffsetOrigin.None,
OffsetMinutes = 60,
SourceFileName = "AgentExecutor.log",
};
var tracker1 = BuildTracker(tmp, out _);
tracker1.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("policyH", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: observedAt,
startedAtUtc: observedAt.AddSeconds(-10), startedAtProvenance: start, exitProvenance: exit);
tracker1.SaveStateForTest();
var tracker2 = BuildTracker(tmp, out var emitted2);
tracker2.LoadStateForTest();
tracker2.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(observedAt.AddSeconds(20));
var script = Assert.Single(emitted2);
Assert.Equal(CmTraceOffsetOrigin.LineAnchored, script.StartedAtProvenance.Origin);
Assert.Equal(120, script.StartedAtProvenance.OffsetMinutes);
Assert.Equal(start.SourceLocalTs, script.StartedAtProvenance.SourceLocalTs);
Assert.Equal(DateTimeKind.Unspecified, script.StartedAtProvenance.SourceLocalTs!.Value.Kind); // no zone was ever attached
Assert.Equal("AgentExecutor.log", script.ExitProvenance.SourceFileName);
Assert.Equal(60, script.ExitProvenance.OffsetMinutes);
Assert.Null(script.ResultProvenance);
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Newtonsoft.Json;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
{
/// <summary>
/// IME re-runs health-script policies on its own schedule for as long as the device is up.
/// A session that waited days for its user reported every hourly run of every policy
/// (field: 9 policies × 94 runs in one session). The gate emits the first run and every
/// changed result, counts the rest, and keeps the start/result pairing intact that the
/// running indicators rely on.
/// </summary>
public sealed class RecurringScriptGateTests
{
private const string Policy = "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555";
private static readonly DateTime T0 = new DateTime(2026, 9, 16, 20, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private static ScriptExecutionState Early(string compliance, int exit = 0, string? stderr = null) =>
new ScriptExecutionState
{
PolicyId = Policy, ScriptType = "remediation", ScriptPart = "detection",
ComplianceResult = compliance, ExitCode = exit, Stderr = stderr, DurationBasis = "script_runtime",
};
private static ScriptExecutionState Consolidated(string compliance, int exit = 0, int status = 1) =>
new ScriptExecutionState
{
PolicyId = Policy, ScriptType = "remediation", ScriptPart = "detection",
ComplianceResult = compliance, ExitCode = exit, RemediationStatus = status,
DurationBasis = "cycle_including_reporting_latency",
};
[Fact]
public void First_run_emits_start_and_result()
{
var gate = new RecurringScriptGate();
Assert.True(gate.OnStart(Policy, T0, "6", "HS-SCRIPT-START"));
Assert.True(gate.OnResult(Early("True"), T0.AddSeconds(5), out var released));
Assert.Null(released);
}
[Fact]
public void Repeated_result_is_counted_and_its_start_stays_held()
{
var gate = new RecurringScriptGate();
gate.OnStart(Policy, T0, "6", "HS-SCRIPT-START");
gate.OnResult(Early("True"), T0.AddSeconds(5), out _);
Assert.False(gate.OnStart(Policy, T0.AddHours(1), "6", "HS-SCRIPT-START"));
Assert.False(gate.OnResult(Early("True"), T0.AddHours(1).AddSeconds(5), out var released));
Assert.Null(released);
var summary = Assert.Single(gate.TakeSummaries());
Assert.Equal(2, summary.RunsObserved);
Assert.Equal(1, summary.RunsCollapsed);
Assert.Equal(1, summary.CollapsedResults);
Assert.Equal(T0.AddHours(1).AddSeconds(5), summary.LastCollapsedAtUtc);
}
[Fact]
public void Changed_result_releases_the_held_start_with_its_own_timestamp()
{
var gate = new RecurringScriptGate();
gate.OnStart(Policy, T0, "6", "HS-SCRIPT-START");
gate.OnResult(Early("True"), T0.AddSeconds(5), out _);
var secondStart = T0.AddHours(1);
gate.OnStart(Policy, secondStart, "6", "HS-SCRIPT-START");
Assert.True(gate.OnResult(Early("False", exit: 1), secondStart.AddSeconds(5), out var released));
Assert.NotNull(released);
Assert.Equal(Policy, released.PolicyId);
Assert.Equal(secondStart, released.SourceTimestampUtc);
Assert.Equal("HS-SCRIPT-START", released.PatternId);
Assert.Equal("6", released.PolicyType);
Assert.Empty(gate.TakeSummaries());
}
[Fact]
public void New_stderr_counts_as_a_changed_result()
{
var gate = new RecurringScriptGate();
gate.OnStart(Policy, T0, "6", "p");
gate.OnResult(Early("True"), T0, out _);
gate.OnStart(Policy, T0.AddHours(1), "6", "p");
Assert.True(gate.OnResult(Early("True", stderr: "Get-ChildItem : path not found"), T0.AddHours(1), out _));
}
[Fact]
public void Early_signal_and_consolidated_result_do_not_overwrite_each_other()
{
// Both describe the detection phase, but only the consolidated one knows
// RemediationStatus. Sharing one signature slot would make every run look changed.
var gate = new RecurringScriptGate();
gate.OnStart(Policy, T0, "6", "p");
Assert.True(gate.OnResult(Early("True"), T0, out _));
Assert.True(gate.OnResult(Consolidated("True"), T0.AddMinutes(1), out _));
gate.OnStart(Policy, T0.AddHours(1), "6", "p");
Assert.False(gate.OnResult(Early("True"), T0.AddHours(1), out _));
Assert.False(gate.OnResult(Consolidated("True"), T0.AddHours(1).AddMinutes(1), out _));
}
[Fact]
public void Held_start_without_result_is_released_only_after_the_grace()
{
var gate = new RecurringScriptGate();
gate.OnStart(Policy, T0, "6", "p");
gate.OnResult(Early("True"), T0, out _);
var heldAt = T0.AddHours(1);
gate.OnStart(Policy, heldAt, "6", "p");
Assert.Empty(gate.ReleaseStartsWithoutResult(heldAt.AddMinutes(29), TimeSpan.FromMinutes(30)));
var released = Assert.Single(gate.ReleaseStartsWithoutResult(heldAt.AddMinutes(31), TimeSpan.FromMinutes(30)));
Assert.Equal(heldAt, released.SourceTimestampUtc);
Assert.Empty(gate.ReleaseStartsWithoutResult(heldAt.AddHours(2), TimeSpan.FromMinutes(30)));
}
[Fact]
public void Held_start_whose_result_was_collapsed_is_never_released_as_unfinished()
{
var gate = new RecurringScriptGate();
gate.OnStart(Policy, T0, "6", "p");
gate.OnResult(Early("True"), T0, out _);
gate.OnStart(Policy, T0.AddHours(1), "6", "p");
gate.OnResult(Early("True"), T0.AddHours(1), out _);
Assert.Empty(gate.ReleaseStartsWithoutResult(T0.AddDays(1), TimeSpan.FromMinutes(30)));
}
[Fact]
public void Run_superseded_by_the_next_start_counts_as_without_result()
{
var gate = new RecurringScriptGate();
gate.OnStart(Policy, T0, "6", "p");
gate.OnResult(Early("True"), T0, out _);
gate.OnStart(Policy, T0.AddHours(1), "6", "p"); // no result
gate.OnStart(Policy, T0.AddHours(2), "6", "p");
gate.OnResult(Early("True"), T0.AddHours(2), out _);
var summary = Assert.Single(gate.TakeSummaries());
Assert.Equal(3, summary.RunsObserved);
Assert.Equal(1, summary.RunsWithoutResult);
Assert.Equal(1, summary.RunsCollapsed);
}
[Fact]
public void Summary_reports_growth_only()
{
var gate = new RecurringScriptGate();
gate.OnStart(Policy, T0, "6", "p");
gate.OnResult(Early("True"), T0, out _);
gate.OnStart(Policy, T0.AddHours(1), "6", "p");
gate.OnResult(Early("True"), T0.AddHours(1), out _);
Assert.Single(gate.TakeSummaries());
Assert.Empty(gate.TakeSummaries());
gate.OnStart(Policy, T0.AddHours(2), "6", "p");
gate.OnResult(Early("True"), T0.AddHours(2), out _);
Assert.Equal(2, Assert.Single(gate.TakeSummaries()).RunsCollapsed);
}
[Fact]
public void State_round_trips_through_json()
{
var gate = new RecurringScriptGate();
gate.OnStart(Policy, T0, "6", "p");
gate.OnResult(Early("True"), T0, out _);
gate.OnStart(Policy, T0.AddHours(1), "6", "p");
var json = JsonConvert.SerializeObject(gate.ToPersisted());
var restored = new RecurringScriptGate();
restored.Restore(JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<Dictionary<string, RecurringScriptPolicyState>>(json));
// The restored gate still knows the last report and still holds the second start.
Assert.True(restored.OnResult(Early("False", exit: 1), T0.AddHours(1).AddSeconds(5), out var released));
Assert.Equal(T0.AddHours(1), released.SourceTimestampUtc);
}
// ── Through the tracker ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
private sealed class Rig
{
public readonly List<ScriptStartedInfo> Started = new List<ScriptStartedInfo>();
public readonly List<ScriptExecutionState> Completed = new List<ScriptExecutionState>();
public readonly List<ScriptRecurrenceSummary> Summaries = new List<ScriptRecurrenceSummary>();
public readonly ImeLogTracker Tracker;
public Rig(TempDirectory tmp)
{
Tracker = new ImeLogTracker(
logFolder: tmp.Path,
patterns: new List<ImeLogPattern>(),
logger: new AgentLogger(tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info),
stateDirectory: tmp.Path);
Tracker.OnScriptStarted = Started.Add;
Tracker.OnScriptCompleted = Completed.Add;
Tracker.OnScriptRecurrenceSummary = Summaries.Add;
}
public void Run(DateTime startedAtUtc, string compliance)
{
Tracker.HandleHealthScriptStartForTest(Policy, startedAtUtc);
Tracker.HandleHealthScriptDetectionResultForTest(Policy, compliance, "pre", exitCode: compliance == "True" ? 0 : 1);
}
}
[Fact]
public void Tracker_collapses_repeats_across_a_restart_and_reports_them_on_stop()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var first = new Rig(tmp);
first.Run(T0, "True");
first.Run(T0.AddHours(1), "True");
Assert.Single(first.Started);
Assert.Single(first.Completed);
first.Tracker.SaveStateForTest();
// Restart (reboot kill, WhiteGlove Part 2): the last report and the counter are back.
var second = new Rig(tmp);
second.Tracker.LoadStateForTest();
second.Run(T0.AddHours(2), "True");
Assert.Empty(second.Started);
Assert.Empty(second.Completed);
second.Run(T0.AddHours(3), "False");
var start = Assert.Single(second.Started);
Assert.Equal(T0.AddHours(3), start.SourceTimestampUtc);
Assert.Equal("False", Assert.Single(second.Completed).ComplianceResult);
second.Tracker.FlushRecurringScripts(T0.AddHours(4), shuttingDown: true);
var summary = Assert.Single(second.Summaries);
Assert.Equal(4, summary.RunsObserved);
Assert.Equal(2, summary.RunsCollapsed);
}
[Fact]
public void Tracker_leaves_platform_scripts_alone()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var rig = new Rig(tmp);
var observedAt = T0;
for (var run = 0; run < 2; run++)
{
rig.Tracker.SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting("platformA", exitCode: 0, exitObservedAtUtc: observedAt.AddMinutes(run * 10));
rig.Tracker.CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting("platformA", "Success", observedAt.AddMinutes(run * 10 + 1));
}
Assert.Equal(2, rig.Completed.Count(s => s.ScriptType == "platform"));
rig.Tracker.FlushRecurringScripts(T0.AddDays(1), shuttingDown: true);
Assert.Empty(rig.Summaries);
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
#nullable enable
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using System.IO.Compression;
using System.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
{
/// <summary>
/// The hard-blocked event-log channels (Security, PowerShell, Sysmon) are unreadable through
/// the diagnostics package as well — by path, by wildcard, by resolved channel, and in
/// unrestricted mode. Before this the block held only in the event-log collector.
/// </summary>
public sealed class DiagnosticsEventLogBlockTests
{
private const string WinevtLogs = @"C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs";
// A channel no machine has: the export fails and the packager falls back to the raw copy.
private const string HarmlessChannel = "AutopilotMonitor-Tests-NoSuchChannel/Operational";
[Theory]
[InlineData("Security.evtx")]
[InlineData("security.EVTX")]
[InlineData("Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell%4Operational.evtx")]
[InlineData("Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell%4Admin.evtx")]
[InlineData("Windows PowerShell.evtx")]
[InlineData("Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon%4Operational.evtx")]
[InlineData("Archive-Security-2026-09-21-10-15-30-123.evtx")]
[InlineData("Archive-Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell%4Operational-2026-09-21-10-15-30-123.evtx")]
public void Hard_blocked_channel_files_are_recognised_by_name(string fileName)
{
Assert.True(DiagnosticsPathGuards.IsHardBlockedEventLogFile(Path.Combine(WinevtLogs, fileName)));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("System.evtx")]
[InlineData("Application.evtx")]
[InlineData("SecurityAudit.evtx")]
[InlineData("Security.log")]
[InlineData("Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx")]
// Same boundary as the collector: only '/' continues a blocked channel name.
[InlineData("Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell-DesiredStateConfiguration-FileDownloadManager%4Operational.evtx")]
[InlineData("Archive-System-2026-09-21-10-15-30-123.evtx")]
public void Other_files_are_not_mistaken_for_a_blocked_channel(string fileName)
{
Assert.False(DiagnosticsPathGuards.IsHardBlockedEventLogFile(Path.Combine(WinevtLogs, fileName)));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(false)]
[InlineData(true)]
public void Path_guard_refuses_a_blocked_channel_file_in_every_mode(bool unrestrictedMode)
{
Assert.False(DiagnosticsPathGuards.IsDiagnosticsPathAllowed(
WinevtLogs + @"\Security.evtx", unrestrictedMode));
Assert.False(DiagnosticsPathGuards.IsDiagnosticsPathAllowed(
WinevtLogs + @"\Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell%4Operational.evtx", unrestrictedMode));
}
[Fact]
public void Path_guard_still_admits_other_channels_and_wildcards()
{
Assert.True(DiagnosticsPathGuards.IsDiagnosticsPathAllowed(WinevtLogs + @"\System.evtx"));
// Undecidable on the string — the packager filters per file (tests below).
Assert.True(DiagnosticsPathGuards.IsDiagnosticsPathAllowed(WinevtLogs + @"\*.evtx"));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("Security", true)]
[InlineData("Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", true)]
[InlineData(" Windows PowerShell ", true)]
[InlineData("Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", true)]
[InlineData("System", false)]
[InlineData("", false)]
[InlineData(null, false)]
public void Channel_block_is_one_matcher_for_collector_and_package(string? channel, bool blocked)
{
Assert.Equal(blocked, GatherRuleGuards.IsHardBlockedEventLogChannel(channel!));
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------ packager ----
// %TEMP% lives under C:\Users, which the path guard blocks in every mode, so the
// configured folder sits beside the test assembly and the run is unrestricted — which
// is also the strongest form of the claim: not even unrestricted mode collects these.
private sealed class EvtxFolder : System.IDisposable
{
public string Path { get; } = System.IO.Path.Combine(
System.AppContext.BaseDirectory, "diag-evtx-" + System.Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N"));
public EvtxFolder(params string[] fileNames)
{
Directory.CreateDirectory(Path);
foreach (var name in fileNames)
File.WriteAllBytes(System.IO.Path.Combine(Path, name), new byte[] { 1, 2, 3 });
}
public void Dispose()
{
try { Directory.Delete(Path, recursive: true); } catch { }
}
}
private static DiagnosticsPackageService BuildService(
TempDirectory scratch, string configuredPath, System.Func<string, string> channelResolver)
{
var logger = new AgentLogger(Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.Combine(scratch.Path, "logs")).FullName);
var apiClient = new BackendApiClient(
httpClient: new System.Net.Http.HttpClient(),
baseUrl: "http://localhost",
manufacturer: string.Empty,
model: string.Empty,
serialNumber: string.Empty,
useBootstrapTokenAuth: false,
bootstrapToken: null,
agentVersion: "0.0.0",
logger: logger);
var cfg = new AgentConfiguration
{
SessionId = "S1",
TenantId = "T1",
ApiBaseUrl = "http://localhost",
UnrestrictedMode = true,
};
cfg.DiagnosticsLogPaths.Add(new DiagnosticsLogPath { Path = configuredPath });
string Sub(string name) => Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.Combine(scratch.Path, name)).FullName;
return new DiagnosticsPackageService(
cfg,
logger,
apiClient,
agentLogFolderOverride: Sub("agentlogs"),
imeLogFolderOverride: Sub("ime"),
agentStateFolderOverride: Sub("state"),
agentSpoolFolderOverride: Sub("spool"),
agentDataFolderOverride: Sub("data"),
sectionFolderOverrides: null,
devicePreparationProbe: () => false)
{
EventLogChannelResolver = channelResolver,
};
}
private static List<string> ZipEntryNames(byte[] bytes)
{
using var ms = new MemoryStream(bytes);
using var archive = new ZipArchive(ms, ZipArchiveMode.Read);
return archive.Entries.Select(e => e.FullName).ToList();
}
private static string ReadManifest(byte[] bytes)
{
using var ms = new MemoryStream(bytes);
using var archive = new ZipArchive(ms, ZipArchiveMode.Read);
using var reader = new StreamReader(archive.GetEntry("package-manifest.txt")!.Open());
return reader.ReadToEnd();
}
[Fact]
public void Wildcard_entry_skips_blocked_channel_files_and_keeps_the_rest()
{
using var scratch = new TempDirectory();
using var folder = new EvtxFolder(
"Security.evtx", "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell%4Operational.evtx", "Setup.evtx");
var service = BuildService(scratch, Path.Combine(folder.Path, "*.evtx"), _ => HarmlessChannel);
var bytes = service.BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: false);
var entries = ZipEntryNames(bytes);
Assert.Contains(entries, e => e.EndsWith("/Setup.evtx"));
Assert.DoesNotContain(entries, e => e.EndsWith("Security.evtx"));
Assert.DoesNotContain(entries, e => e.Contains("PowerShell"));
var manifest = ReadManifest(bytes);
Assert.Contains("BLOCKED (event-log channel guard", manifest);
Assert.Contains("Security.evtx", manifest);
Assert.Equal(2, service.LastPackaging!.ProblemsByKind["path-guard"]);
}
[Fact]
public void File_with_a_harmless_name_is_blocked_when_it_resolves_to_a_blocked_channel()
{
// A channel is free to write to any file name; and the resolver's naming fallback
// maps a stray file onto a live channel. The export must never read that channel.
using var scratch = new TempDirectory();
using var folder = new EvtxFolder("Harmless.evtx");
var service = BuildService(scratch, Path.Combine(folder.Path, "Harmless.evtx"), _ => "Security");
var bytes = service.BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: false);
Assert.DoesNotContain(ZipEntryNames(bytes), e => e.EndsWith("Harmless.evtx"));
Assert.Contains("BLOCKED (event-log channel guard, channel 'Security')", ReadManifest(bytes));
}
}
}
@@ -206,6 +206,91 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
Assert.Contains($"BLOCKED (path guard): {configuredPath}", manifest);
}
// %TEMP% lives under C:\Users, which the guard blocks in every mode — the positive
// configured-path cases run beside the test assembly, in unrestricted mode.
private sealed class ConfiguredPathTree : System.IDisposable
{
public string Root { get; } = Path.Combine(
System.AppContext.BaseDirectory, "diag-paths-" + System.Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N"));
public string Logs => Path.Combine(Root, "Logs");
public ConfiguredPathTree()
{
Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.Combine(Logs, "sub"));
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(Root, "parent-only.txt"), "not configured");
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(Logs, "app.log"), "configured");
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(Logs, "sub", "app.log"), "below");
}
public void Dispose()
{
try { Directory.Delete(Root, recursive: true); } catch { /* best effort */ }
}
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("")]
[InlineData("\\")]
public void BuildArchiveBytes_folder_entry_collects_the_folder_not_its_parent(string trailing)
{
using var rig = new Rig();
using var tree = new ConfiguredPathTree();
var bytes = rig.Build(cfg =>
{
cfg.UnrestrictedMode = true;
cfg.DiagnosticsLogPaths.Add(new AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.DiagnosticsLogPath
{
Path = tree.Logs + trailing,
IncludeSubfolders = true,
});
})
.BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: true);
var entries = ZipEntryNames(bytes);
Assert.Contains("AdditionalLogs/Logs/app.log", entries);
Assert.Contains("AdditionalLogs/Logs/sub/app.log", entries);
Assert.DoesNotContain(entries, e => e.EndsWith("parent-only.txt"));
}
[Fact]
public void BuildArchiveBytes_file_entry_ignores_include_subfolders()
{
using var rig = new Rig();
using var tree = new ConfiguredPathTree();
var bytes = rig.Build(cfg =>
{
cfg.UnrestrictedMode = true;
cfg.DiagnosticsLogPaths.Add(new AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.DiagnosticsLogPath
{
Path = Path.Combine(tree.Logs, "app.log"),
IncludeSubfolders = true,
});
})
.BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: true);
var entries = ZipEntryNames(bytes);
Assert.Contains("AdditionalLogs/Logs/app.log", entries);
Assert.DoesNotContain("AdditionalLogs/Logs/sub/app.log", entries);
}
[Fact]
public void EnumerateFilesNoReparseDirs_asks_the_guard_before_entering_a_subfolder()
{
using var tree = new ConfiguredPathTree();
var refused = new List<string>();
var files = DiagnosticsPackageService.EnumerateFilesNoReparseDirs(
tree.Root, "*", recurse: true,
mayEnterDirectory: dir => !dir.EndsWith("sub"),
refusedDirectories: refused);
Assert.Contains(Path.Combine(tree.Logs, "app.log"), files);
Assert.DoesNotContain(Path.Combine(tree.Logs, "sub", "app.log"), files);
Assert.Equal(new[] { Path.Combine(tree.Logs, "sub") }, refused);
}
[Fact]
public void BuildArchiveBytes_excludes_top_level_session_id_and_bootstrap_config()
{
@@ -59,9 +59,17 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.SystemSignals
public void ClassifyEnforcementState_bands(int state, string expected)
=> Assert.Equal(expected, ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.ClassifyEnforcementState(state));
// IME AppInstallStatus values (StatusServiceReports\..\Status), stable IME 1.50 .. 1.106.
// 1001/1003 sit inside the 1000 band but are NOT terminal — IME maps every InProgress
// enforcement state to 1001 (verified in the decompiled 1.106 StatusServiceHelpers).
[Theory]
[InlineData(1000, "installed")]
[InlineData(1999, "installed")]
[InlineData(1002, "installed")]
[InlineData(1004, "installed")]
[InlineData(1001, "installing")]
[InlineData(1003, "installing")]
[InlineData(1005, null)]
[InlineData(1999, null)]
[InlineData(3000, "failed")]
[InlineData(2000, "notApplicable")]
[InlineData(2999, "notApplicable")]
@@ -72,6 +80,35 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.SystemSignals
public void ClassifyStatusServiceStatus_bands(int status, string? expected)
=> Assert.Equal(expected, ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.ClassifyStatusServiceStatus(status));
[Fact]
public void TryParseRegistryDateTime_reads_both_ime_shapes_as_utc()
{
// ExecutionDeadlineTime: DateTime.ToString(InvariantCulture), UTC without a kind marker.
var deadline = ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.TryParseRegistryDateTime("09/23/2026 18:00:00");
Assert.Equal(new DateTime(2026, 9, 23, 18, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc), deadline);
Assert.Equal(DateTimeKind.Utc, deadline!.Value.Kind);
// DeferUntilTime: round-trip "o" with trailing Z.
var until = ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.TryParseRegistryDateTime("2026-09-23T10:30:00.0000000Z");
Assert.Equal(new DateTime(2026, 9, 23, 10, 30, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc), until);
Assert.Equal(DateTimeKind.Utc, until!.Value.Kind);
Assert.Null(ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.TryParseRegistryDateTime(null));
Assert.Null(ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.TryParseRegistryDateTime(""));
Assert.Null(ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.TryParseRegistryDateTime("not a date"));
Assert.Null(ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.TryParseRegistryDateTime(42));
}
[Fact]
public void TryReadBool_parses_registry_strings_only()
{
Assert.True(ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.TryReadBool("True"));
Assert.False(ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.TryReadBool("false"));
Assert.Null(ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.TryReadBool("yes"));
Assert.Null(ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.TryReadBool(1));
Assert.Null(ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.TryReadBool(null));
}
[Fact]
public void TerminalOutcome_prefers_enforcement_state_then_status_service()
{
@@ -88,6 +125,49 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.SystemSignals
Assert.Null(ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.TerminalOutcome(Entry(enforcementState: 3000)));
Assert.Null(ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.TerminalOutcome(Entry(statusServiceStatus: 2500)));
Assert.Null(ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.TerminalOutcome(Entry()));
// Installing (1001) / InstallingPendingReboot (1003) share the 1000 band but are not terminal.
Assert.Null(ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.TerminalOutcome(Entry(statusServiceStatus: 1001)));
Assert.Null(ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.TerminalOutcome(Entry(enforcementState: 2009, statusServiceStatus: 1003)));
}
[Fact]
public void ChangedFields_reports_wait_state_triggers_only()
{
var prev = Entry(enforcementState: 2009);
var next = Entry(enforcementState: 2009,
installDeadlineUtc: T0.AddHours(2),
deferralsUsed: 1, deferralMaxDeferrals: 3, deferUntilUtc: T0.AddMinutes(30), deferralAutoDeferred: false);
Assert.Equal(new[] { "installDeadline", "deferralsUsed", "deferUntil" },
ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.ChangedFields(prev, next));
// MaxDeferrals / AutoDeferred alone are data, not a transition.
var sameCounters = Entry(enforcementState: 2009,
installDeadlineUtc: T0.AddHours(2),
deferralsUsed: 1, deferralMaxDeferrals: 5, deferUntilUtc: T0.AddMinutes(30), deferralAutoDeferred: true);
Assert.Empty(ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.ChangedFields(next, sameCounters));
// A cleared deadline is a transition too (IME clears it when the next download starts).
Assert.Equal(new[] { "installDeadline" },
ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.ChangedFields(
Entry(installDeadlineUtc: T0.AddHours(2)), Entry()));
}
[Fact]
public void DescribeWaitState_texts()
{
Assert.Equal(string.Empty, ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.DescribeWaitState(Entry(enforcementState: 2009)));
Assert.Equal(", downloaded, install deadline 2026-08-18 10:00 UTC",
ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.DescribeWaitState(Entry(installDeadlineUtc: T0.AddHours(2))));
Assert.Equal(", deferred by user 1/3 until 2026-08-18 08:30 UTC",
ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.DescribeWaitState(Entry(
deferralsUsed: 1, deferralMaxDeferrals: 3, deferUntilUtc: T0.AddMinutes(30), deferralAutoDeferred: false)));
Assert.Equal(", auto-deferred 2/3",
ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.DescribeWaitState(Entry(
deferralsUsed: 2, deferralMaxDeferrals: 3, deferralAutoDeferred: true)));
// Zero deferrals used is not a deferral; a missing max falls back to the bare count.
Assert.Equal(string.Empty, ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.DescribeWaitState(Entry(deferralsUsed: 0, deferralMaxDeferrals: 3)));
Assert.Equal(", deferred by user 1", ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.DescribeWaitState(Entry(deferralsUsed: 1)));
}
[Fact]
@@ -184,6 +264,54 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.SystemSignals
Assert.Equal("success", evt.Payload["enforcementClass"]);
}
[Fact]
public void Wait_state_changes_emit_state_events_with_data_and_text()
{
var (sink, clock, observer) = CreateObserver(trackerApps: null);
var current = Snapshot((App1, 2009, null));
using (new ImeRegistryAppStateObserver.ScopedSnapshotOverride(() => current))
{
observer.Tick("baseline");
// Download finished, IME parks the app until its install deadline (1.106 ExecutionDeadlineTime).
var withDeadline = Snapshot((App1, 2009, null));
withDeadline.Entries.Values.Single().InstallDeadlineUtc = T0.AddHours(2);
current = withDeadline;
observer.Tick("registry_change");
// A required app hits a running process and the user defers (1.105 app-in-use deferral).
var deferred = Snapshot((App1, 2014, null));
var entry = deferred.Entries.Values.Single();
entry.InstallDeadlineUtc = T0.AddHours(2);
entry.DeferralsUsed = 1;
entry.DeferralMaxDeferrals = 3;
entry.DeferUntilUtc = T0.AddMinutes(30);
entry.DeferralAutoDeferred = false;
current = deferred;
observer.Tick("registry_change");
}
var events = Events(sink, SharedEventTypes.RegistryAppState);
Assert.Equal(2, events.Count);
var deadlineEvent = events[0];
Assert.Equal("installDeadline", deadlineEvent.Payload!["changedFields"]);
Assert.Equal("2026-08-18T10:00:00.0000000Z", deadlineEvent.Payload["installDeadlineUtc"]);
Assert.DoesNotContain("deferralsUsed", deadlineEvent.Payload.Keys);
Assert.Contains("-> inProgress, downloaded, install deadline 2026-08-18 10:00 UTC",
deadlineEvent.Payload[SignalPayloadKeys.Message]);
var deferralEvent = events[1];
Assert.Equal("enforcementState,deferralsUsed,deferUntil", deferralEvent.Payload!["changedFields"]);
Assert.Equal("2014", deferralEvent.Payload["enforcementState"]);
Assert.Equal("1", deferralEvent.Payload["deferralsUsed"]);
Assert.Equal("3", deferralEvent.Payload["deferralMaxDeferrals"]);
Assert.Equal("2026-08-18T08:30:00.0000000Z", deferralEvent.Payload["deferUntilUtc"]);
Assert.Equal("false", deferralEvent.Payload["deferralAutoDeferred"]);
Assert.Contains("deferred by user 1/3 until 2026-08-18 08:30 UTC", deferralEvent.Payload[SignalPayloadKeys.Message]);
}
[Fact]
public void NonEmpty_baseline_emits_one_summary_with_counts()
{
@@ -331,7 +459,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.SystemSignals
private static AppRegistryEntry Entry(
int? enforcementState = null, long? errorCode = null, int? exitCode = null,
int? statusServiceStatus = null, bool espTracked = false, string? espPhase = null)
int? statusServiceStatus = null, bool espTracked = false, string? espPhase = null,
DateTime? installDeadlineUtc = null, int? deferralsUsed = null, int? deferralMaxDeferrals = null,
DateTime? deferUntilUtc = null, bool? deferralAutoDeferred = null)
{
var entry = new AppRegistryEntry($"{ImeRegistrySnapshot.DeviceContext}|{App1}", ImeRegistrySnapshot.DeviceContext, App1);
entry.EnforcementState = enforcementState;
@@ -340,6 +470,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.SystemSignals
entry.StatusServiceStatus = statusServiceStatus;
entry.EspTracked = espTracked;
entry.EspPhase = espPhase;
entry.InstallDeadlineUtc = installDeadlineUtc;
entry.DeferralsUsed = deferralsUsed;
entry.DeferralMaxDeferrals = deferralMaxDeferrals;
entry.DeferUntilUtc = deferUntilUtc;
entry.DeferralAutoDeferred = deferralAutoDeferred;
return entry;
}
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.SystemSignals
using var f = new Fixture();
Assert.False(f.Tracker.HasAccountSetupActivity);
Assert.False(f.Tracker.HasAccountSetupProgress);
Assert.Null(f.Tracker.AccountSetupProgressIfRead);
}
[Fact]
@@ -97,6 +98,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.SystemSignals
Assert.True(f.Tracker.HasAccountSetupActivity);
Assert.False(f.Tracker.HasAccountSetupProgress);
// Read and untouched — the only state the WhiteGlove sealing gate treats as "false".
Assert.False(f.Tracker.AccountSetupProgressIfRead);
}
[Fact]
@@ -108,6 +111,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.SystemSignals
Assert.True(f.Tracker.HasAccountSetupActivity);
Assert.True(f.Tracker.HasAccountSetupProgress);
Assert.True(f.Tracker.AccountSetupProgressIfRead);
}
[Theory]
@@ -138,5 +142,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.SystemSignals
Assert.False(f.Tracker.HasAccountSetupProgress);
}
[Fact]
public void OnlyDeviceSetupRead_AccountSetupProgressIsUnknown()
{
// Adversarial for the WhiteGlove sealing gate: the tracker holds DeviceSetup data but
// has not read the AccountSetup category — that must be "unknown", never "untouched".
using var f = new Fixture();
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status",
"{\"categoryState\":\"inProgress\",\"DeviceSetup.AppsSubcategory\":{\"subcategoryState\":\"inProgress\"}}");
Assert.Null(f.Tracker.AccountSetupProgressIfRead);
Assert.False(f.Tracker.HasAccountSetupProgress);
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
using System;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.SystemSignals
{
/// <summary>
/// <see cref="ProvisioningStatusTracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs"/> exposes the registry
/// failure detail while its settle window is open and nothing once the window has fired —
/// the coordinator reads it when a Shell-Core failure terminalises first (session 683f1eff).
/// </summary>
public sealed class ProvisioningStatusTrackerPendingFailureTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Fixed = new DateTime(2026, 9, 8, 18, 11, 2, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private const string InProgressJson = @"{
""categorySucceeded"": null,
""AppsSubcategory"": {""subcategoryState"":""inProgress"",""subcategoryStatusText"":""Apps (Working)""}
}";
private const string AppsFailedJson = @"{
""categorySucceeded"": null,
""AppsSubcategory"": {""subcategoryState"":""failed"",""subcategoryStatusText"":""Apps (0x80070652)""}
}";
private sealed class Fixture : IDisposable
{
public TempDirectory Tmp { get; } = new TempDirectory();
public ProvisioningStatusTracker Tracker { get; }
public Fixture()
{
var post = new InformationalEventPost(new FakeSignalIngressSink(), new VirtualClock(Fixed));
var logger = new AgentLogger(Tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info);
Tracker = new ProvisioningStatusTracker(
sessionId: "S1",
tenantId: "T1",
post: post,
logger: logger,
appxScanner: new FakeAppxDeploymentFailureScanner(),
backgroundDispatcher: action => action());
}
public void Dispose()
{
Tracker.Dispose();
Tmp.Dispose();
}
}
[Fact]
public void Nothing_pending_before_any_failure()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
Assert.Null(f.Tracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs());
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", InProgressJson);
Assert.Null(f.Tracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs());
}
[Fact]
public void Armed_settle_window_exposes_the_registry_detail()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", InProgressJson);
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", AppsFailedJson);
var pending = f.Tracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs();
Assert.NotNull(pending);
Assert.Equal("Provisioning_DeviceSetup_Apps_Failed", pending!.FailureType);
Assert.Equal("0x80070652", pending.ErrorCode);
Assert.Equal("Apps", pending.FailedSubcategory);
Assert.Equal("DeviceSetup", pending.Category);
}
[Fact]
public void Expired_settle_window_leaves_nothing_pending()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", InProgressJson);
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", AppsFailedJson);
f.Tracker.TriggerSettleTimerForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status");
Assert.Null(f.Tracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs());
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
#nullable enable
using System;
using System.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.SystemSignals
{
/// <summary>
/// A tenant-extended Hello wait runs up to 60 min — the default session_stalled threshold. While
/// it is pending the session waits on a bounded timer that resolves it either way, so the stall
/// probe holds the report back instead of flagging the session Stalled; once the wait is over
/// and the session is still idle the report fires, and real activity drops it. The collector
/// runs with no scan sources, so only the session_stalled decision is exercised.
/// </summary>
public sealed class StallProbeHelloWaitGuardTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Fixed = new DateTime(2026, 9, 29, 8, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private const double IdleAtStallThreshold = 60;
[Fact]
public void Session_stalled_is_held_back_while_the_hello_wait_is_pending()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var ingress = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
var collector = NewCollector(tmp, ingress, helloWaitPending: () => true);
collector.CheckAndRunProbes(IdleAtStallThreshold);
collector.CheckAndRunProbes(IdleAtStallThreshold + 1);
Assert.Equal(0, StalledCount(ingress));
}
[Fact]
public void Held_back_report_fires_once_the_hello_wait_is_over_and_the_session_is_still_idle()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var ingress = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
var pending = true;
var collector = NewCollector(tmp, ingress, helloWaitPending: () => pending);
collector.CheckAndRunProbes(IdleAtStallThreshold);
Assert.Equal(0, StalledCount(ingress));
// hello_safety resolved (a deadline fire is no activity, so no ResetProbes): the next
// tick emits the held-back report — once.
pending = false;
collector.CheckAndRunProbes(IdleAtStallThreshold + 1);
collector.CheckAndRunProbes(IdleAtStallThreshold + 2);
Assert.Equal(1, StalledCount(ingress));
}
[Fact]
public void Real_activity_drops_the_held_back_report()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var ingress = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
var pending = true;
var collector = NewCollector(tmp, ingress, helloWaitPending: () => pending);
collector.CheckAndRunProbes(IdleAtStallThreshold);
pending = false;
collector.ResetProbes();
collector.CheckAndRunProbes(1);
Assert.Equal(0, StalledCount(ingress));
// A new idle window reaches the threshold again — the fire-once report is still unused.
collector.CheckAndRunProbes(IdleAtStallThreshold);
Assert.Equal(1, StalledCount(ingress));
}
[Fact]
public void Without_a_hello_wait_probe_session_stalled_fires_as_before()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var ingress = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
var collector = NewCollector(tmp, ingress, helloWaitPending: null);
collector.CheckAndRunProbes(IdleAtStallThreshold);
Assert.Equal(1, StalledCount(ingress));
}
[Fact]
public void A_throwing_hello_wait_probe_never_costs_the_stall_report()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var ingress = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
var collector = NewCollector(tmp, ingress, helloWaitPending: () => throw new InvalidOperationException("probe down"));
collector.CheckAndRunProbes(IdleAtStallThreshold);
Assert.Equal(1, StalledCount(ingress));
}
private static StallProbeCollector NewCollector(TempDirectory tmp, FakeSignalIngressSink ingress, Func<bool>? helloWaitPending) =>
new StallProbeCollector(
sessionId: "S1",
tenantId: "T1",
post: new InformationalEventPost(ingress, new VirtualClock(Fixed)),
logger: new AgentLogger(tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info),
thresholdsMinutes: new[] { 60 },
traceIndices: Array.Empty<int>(),
sources: Array.Empty<string>(),
sessionStalledAfterProbeIndex: 1,
helloWaitPending: helloWaitPending);
private static int StalledCount(FakeSignalIngressSink ingress) =>
ingress.Posted.Count(p =>
p.Kind == DecisionSignalKind.InformationalEvent
&& p.Payload != null
&& p.Payload.TryGetValue(SignalPayloadKeys.EventType, out var et)
&& et == Constants.EventTypes.SessionStalled);
}
}
@@ -56,6 +56,31 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
LoadEmbeddedGuardrails()["maxCommandLength"]!.Value<int>());
}
[Fact]
public void User_profile_prefixes_are_all_accepted_by_the_loader()
{
// The loader drops entries outside AppData\Local / AppData\Roaming (the hard block
// would never release them anyway). A dropped entry is invisible at runtime — it
// just never matches — so a typo in the JSON must fail here instead.
var json = LoadEmbeddedGuardrails()["userProfileFilePrefixes"]?.ToObject<string[]>()
?? new string[0];
Assert.Equal(
json.Select(p => p.Trim().TrimEnd('\\')).OrderBy(p => p),
GatherRuleGuards.AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes.OrderBy(p => p));
}
[Fact]
public void User_profile_prefixes_stay_under_the_hard_blocks_exception()
{
Assert.All(
GatherRuleGuards.AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes,
prefix => Assert.Contains(
GatherRuleGuards.AllowedUserProfileSubdirs,
subdir => prefix.StartsWith(subdir, System.StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(prefix.Length == subdir.Length || prefix[subdir.Length] == '\\')));
}
[Fact]
public void Blocked_event_log_channels_match_code_constants()
{
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Transport
private sealed class FakeApiClient : BackendApiClient
{
public readonly List<TimeSpan?> Timeouts = new List<TimeSpan?>();
public readonly List<AgentErrorReport> Reports = new List<AgentErrorReport>();
public readonly Queue<bool> Results = new Queue<bool>();
public FakeApiClient() : base(
@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Transport
public override Task<bool> ReportAgentErrorAsync(AgentErrorReport report, TimeSpan? timeout = null)
{
Timeouts.Add(timeout);
Reports.Add(report);
return Task.FromResult(Results.Count > 0 && Results.Dequeue());
}
}
@@ -139,5 +141,37 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Transport
Assert.Equal(2, client.Calls);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Session_age_is_carried_in_the_report_and_absent_by_default()
{
// One reporter per report: a delivered report starts the 10-minute cooldown.
var client = new FakeApiClient();
client.Results.Enqueue(true);
client.Results.Enqueue(true);
await Reporter(client).TrySendAsync(AgentErrorType.SessionAgeEmergencyBreak, "m", sessionAgeHours: 478.2);
await Reporter(client).TrySendAsync(AgentErrorType.ConfigFetchFailed, "m");
Assert.Equal(2, client.Reports.Count);
Assert.Equal(478.2, client.Reports[0].SessionAgeHours);
Assert.Null(client.Reports[1].SessionAgeHours);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Prior_registration_failure_is_carried_in_the_report_and_absent_by_default()
{
var client = new FakeApiClient();
client.Results.Enqueue(true);
client.Results.Enqueue(true);
var record = new RegistrationFailureSummary { FailedRuns = 2, Outcome = "Failed", NetworkLinkUpAtEnd = false };
await Reporter(client).TrySendAsync(AgentErrorType.SessionAgeEmergencyBreak, "m", priorRegistrationFailure: record);
await Reporter(client).TrySendAsync(AgentErrorType.ConfigFetchFailed, "m");
Assert.Equal(2, client.Reports.Count);
Assert.Same(record, client.Reports[0].PriorRegistrationFailure);
Assert.Null(client.Reports[1].PriorRegistrationFailure);
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport;
using Newtonsoft.Json.Linq;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Transport
{
/// <summary>
/// Response parsers of the geo providers. Addresses come from the RFC 5737 documentation
/// ranges — never real ones.
/// </summary>
public class GeoLocationServiceTests
{
[Fact]
public void ParseDoGeo_maps_country_and_egress_ip_and_ignores_the_do_service_fields()
{
var json = JObject.Parse(@"{
""ExternalIpAddress"": ""203.0.113.7"",
""CountryCode"": ""DE"",
""KeyValue_EndpointFullUri"": ""https://kv601.prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com/all"",
""Version"": ""26A6D4D6994E8DA5"",
""CacheId"": ""7"",
""ContentCert"": false,
""DownloadModeFailSafe"": """"
}");
var result = GeoLocationService.ParseDoGeo(json);
Assert.NotNull(result);
Assert.Equal("DE", result.Country);
Assert.Equal("203.0.113.7", result.Ip);
Assert.Equal("do-geo", result.Source);
Assert.Null(result.Region);
Assert.Null(result.City);
Assert.Null(result.Loc);
Assert.Null(result.Timezone);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(@"{ ""ExternalIpAddress"": ""203.0.113.7"" }")]
[InlineData(@"{ ""ExternalIpAddress"": ""203.0.113.7"", ""CountryCode"": """" }")]
public void ParseDoGeo_without_country_is_a_failure(string body)
{
Assert.Null(GeoLocationService.ParseDoGeo(JObject.Parse(body)));
}
[Fact]
public void ParseIpInfo_maps_all_fields()
{
var json = JObject.Parse(@"{
""ip"": ""198.51.100.4"", ""city"": ""Stuttgart"", ""region"": ""Baden-Wurttemberg"",
""country"": ""DE"", ""loc"": ""48.7823,9.1770"", ""timezone"": ""Europe/Berlin""
}");
var result = GeoLocationService.ParseIpInfo(json);
Assert.Equal("DE", result.Country);
Assert.Equal("Baden-Wurttemberg", result.Region);
Assert.Equal("Stuttgart", result.City);
Assert.Equal("48.7823,9.1770", result.Loc);
Assert.Equal("Europe/Berlin", result.Timezone);
Assert.Equal("198.51.100.4", result.Ip);
Assert.Equal("ipinfo", result.Source);
}
[Fact]
public void ParseIfConfigCo_joins_coordinates_and_leaves_loc_empty_without_them()
{
var withCoords = GeoLocationService.ParseIfConfigCo(JObject.Parse(@"{
""ip"": ""198.51.100.4"", ""country_iso"": ""DE"", ""region_name"": ""Bavaria"",
""city"": ""Munich"", ""latitude"": 48.13, ""longitude"": 11.58, ""time_zone"": ""Europe/Berlin""
}"));
var withoutCoords = GeoLocationService.ParseIfConfigCo(JObject.Parse(@"{ ""country_iso"": ""DE"" }"));
Assert.Equal("48.13,11.58", withCoords.Loc);
Assert.Equal("DE", withCoords.Country);
Assert.Equal("Bavaria", withCoords.Region);
Assert.Equal("ifconfig.co", withCoords.Source);
Assert.Equal("", withoutCoords.Loc);
}
[Fact]
public void Describe_skips_the_parts_a_provider_did_not_return()
{
Assert.Equal("Stuttgart, BW, DE", new GeoLocationResult { City = "Stuttgart", Region = "BW", Country = "DE" }.Describe());
Assert.Equal("DE", new GeoLocationResult { Country = "DE", Region = "" }.Describe());
}
}
}
@@ -265,6 +265,42 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
sut.Stop();
}
[Fact]
public void Deadline_fired_late_keeps_the_due_time_as_stamp_and_carries_it_in_the_payload()
{
// A deadline that was due while the device slept (or the agent was down) fires only
// afterwards. The signal keeps the due time as OccurredAtUtc (D-238: the outage must not
// become session duration) and repeats it in the payload so the stale-fire guards
// identify the incarnation independently of the stamp.
using var rig = new EnrollmentOrchestratorRig(At);
var sut = rig.Build();
sut.Start();
var dueAt = At.AddMinutes(-5);
var scheduler = GetScheduler(sut);
scheduler.Schedule(new ActiveDeadline(
name: "hello_safety",
dueAtUtc: dueAt,
firesSignalKind: DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired,
firesPayload: new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline] = "hello_safety" }));
var signalLog = GetSignalLog(sut);
Assert.True(SpinWait.SpinUntil(() => ContainsDeadlineFired(signalLog), 3000));
DecisionSignal? fired = null;
foreach (var sig in signalLog.ReadAll())
{
if (sig.Kind == DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired) { fired = sig; break; }
}
Assert.NotNull(fired);
Assert.Equal(dueAt, fired!.OccurredAtUtc);
Assert.NotNull(fired.Payload);
Assert.Equal("hello_safety", fired.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline]);
Assert.Equal(dueAt.ToString("O"), fired.Payload[SignalPayloadKeys.DeadlineDueAtUtc]);
sut.Stop();
}
// ========================================================================= Quarantine
[Fact]
@@ -162,6 +162,28 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.AwaitingHello, result.InitialState.Stage);
}
[Fact]
public void Clean_snapshot_of_a_rotated_session_adopts_the_current_session_id()
{
// SESSION-OWNER-BINDING: the backend refused the persisted session id at registration,
// the agent rotated, and the snapshot on disk still names the old session. The
// enrollment state carries over; the session id must be the current one.
using var rig = new Rig();
var saved = DecisionState.CreateInitial("S-REFUSED", TenantId)
.ToBuilder()
.WithStage(SessionStage.EspAccountSetup)
.WithStepIndex(7)
.WithLastAppliedSignalOrdinal(6)
.Build();
SeedSnapshot(rig, saved);
var result = rig.Recover();
Assert.Equal(SessionId, result.InitialState.SessionId);
Assert.Equal(SessionStage.EspAccountSetup, result.InitialState.Stage);
Assert.Equal(7, result.InitialState.StepIndex);
}
[Fact]
public void Snapshot_plus_pending_tail_replays_tail_onto_snapshot()
{
@@ -37,6 +37,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
[InlineData("modern_deployment_log")]
// Environment observation — battery drain on an idle device must not reset idle clocks.
[InlineData("power_state_change")]
// A flapping link is environment too: it must neither keep the collectors awake nor
// reset the stall clock of the enrollment it is stalling.
[InlineData("network_state_change")]
[InlineData("network_connectivity_check")]
// Bookkeeping of health-script runs that were deliberately not reported.
[InlineData("script_recurrence_summary")]
// Agent health / control / transport — not device/enrollment progress (P2).
[InlineData("collector_degraded")]
[InlineData("telemetry_upload_poisoned")]
@@ -67,6 +73,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
Assert.True(SignalActivityClassifier.IsRealActivity(DecisionSignalKind.InformationalEvent, payload));
}
[Theory]
// Only the link-change pair is exempt. The device-info snapshots are emitted at start
// and at the end, not per flap, and stay activity.
[InlineData("network_interface_info")]
[InlineData("wifi_signal_info")]
[InlineData("network_bandwidth_estimate")]
public void Other_network_events_remain_activity(string eventType)
{
var payload = new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.EventType] = eventType };
Assert.True(SignalActivityClassifier.IsRealActivity(DecisionSignalKind.InformationalEvent, payload));
}
[Theory]
// Genuine ModernDeployment warnings/errors stay real activity — only the Info/Debug
// `modern_deployment_log` forwarding is excluded.
@@ -118,5 +118,88 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
Assert.Throws<ArgumentNullException>(
() => BackendSessionRegistration.Register(config, auth, http, "1.0", consoleMode: false, logger: null));
}
// ============================================================ failed-registration record
[Fact]
public void RecordRegistrationRun_records_a_failed_run_with_its_window_and_bounded_error()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var persistence = new SessionIdPersistence(tmp.Path);
var started = new DateTime(2026, 8, 20, 9, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
BackendSessionRegistration.RecordRegistrationRun(
persistence, SessionRegistrationResult.Failed(new string('e', 1000)),
started, started.AddSeconds(1204.46), linkUpAtStart: false, linkUpAtEnd: true,
configFetchOutcome: "UsedDefaults", logger: NewLogger(tmp.Path));
var record = persistence.LoadRegistrationFailure();
Assert.NotNull(record);
Assert.Equal(1, record!.FailedRuns);
Assert.Equal("Failed", record.Outcome);
Assert.Equal(BackendSessionRegistration.MaxRecordedErrorLength, record.LastError!.Length);
Assert.False(record.NetworkLinkUpAtStart);
Assert.True(record.NetworkLinkUpAtEnd);
Assert.Equal(1204.5, record.AttemptWindowSeconds);
Assert.Equal("UsedDefaults", record.ConfigFetchOutcome);
Assert.Equal(started.AddSeconds(1204.46), record.LastFailedAtUtc);
}
[Fact]
public void RecordRegistrationRun_records_auth_failures_and_clears_on_success()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var persistence = new SessionIdPersistence(tmp.Path);
var at = new DateTime(2026, 8, 20, 9, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
BackendSessionRegistration.RecordRegistrationRun(
persistence, SessionRegistrationResult.AuthFailed(401, "unauthorized"),
at, at.AddSeconds(3), true, true, "Succeeded", NewLogger(tmp.Path));
Assert.Equal("AuthFailed", persistence.LoadRegistrationFailure()!.Outcome);
BackendSessionRegistration.RecordRegistrationRun(
persistence, SessionRegistrationResult.Succeeded(new RegisterSessionResponse { Success = true }),
at, at.AddSeconds(1), true, true, "Succeeded", NewLogger(tmp.Path));
Assert.Null(persistence.LoadRegistrationFailure());
}
[Fact]
public void RecordRegistrationRun_without_persistence_is_a_no_op()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
BackendSessionRegistration.RecordRegistrationRun(
null, SessionRegistrationResult.Failed("x"), DateTime.UtcNow, DateTime.UtcNow,
null, null, null, NewLogger(tmp.Path));
}
// ============================================================ emergency-break message
[Fact]
public void Break_message_names_failed_registrations_in_invariant_culture()
{
var previous = System.Threading.Thread.CurrentThread.CurrentCulture;
try
{
System.Threading.Thread.CurrentThread.CurrentCulture = new System.Globalization.CultureInfo("de-DE");
var record = new RegistrationFailureSummary { FailedRuns = 3, Outcome = "Failed", NetworkLinkUpAtEnd = false };
var message = EmergencyBreakReporter.BuildMessage(478.2, 48, record);
Assert.Contains("session age 478.2h (cap 48h)", message);
Assert.EndsWith(" 3 earlier start(s) failed to register (last: Failed, network link at end: down).", message);
}
finally
{
System.Threading.Thread.CurrentThread.CurrentCulture = previous;
}
}
[Fact]
public void Break_message_without_record_keeps_the_historical_text()
{
Assert.Equal(
"Agent absolute session-age emergency break fired at session age 50.0h (cap 48h) — cleaning up and exiting.",
EmergencyBreakReporter.BuildMessage(50.0, 48, null));
}
}
}
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Xunit;
@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
var sink = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
var logger = NewLogger(tmp.Path);
AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.LifecycleEmitters.PostEnrollmentFactsObserved(sink, logger);
AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.LifecycleEmitters.PostEnrollmentFactsObserved(sink, HelloWaitTimeout.DefaultSeconds, logger);
Assert.Single(sink.Posted);
var posted = sink.Posted[0];
@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
var sink = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
var logger = NewLogger(tmp.Path);
AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.LifecycleEmitters.PostEnrollmentFactsObserved(sink, logger);
AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.LifecycleEmitters.PostEnrollmentFactsObserved(sink, HelloWaitTimeout.DefaultSeconds, logger);
var payload = sink.Posted[0].Payload;
Assert.NotNull(payload);
@@ -73,6 +74,34 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
Assert.True(cloudPc == "true" || cloudPc == "false");
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(300)] // the default — the payload stays exactly what it was before the key existed
[InlineData(30)] // the old default, still stored for many tenants
[InlineData(0)]
public void Hello_wait_not_extending_the_built_in_window_is_not_stamped(int helloWaitTimeoutSeconds)
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var sink = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.LifecycleEmitters.PostEnrollmentFactsObserved(sink, helloWaitTimeoutSeconds, NewLogger(tmp.Path));
Assert.DoesNotContain(SignalPayloadKeys.HelloWaitTimeoutSeconds, (IDictionary<string, string>)sink.Posted[0].Payload!);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(1800, "1800")]
[InlineData(3600, "3600")]
[InlineData(86400, "3600")] // the effective (clamped) value is what the engine should arm
public void Extended_hello_wait_is_stamped_as_its_effective_value(int helloWaitTimeoutSeconds, string expected)
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var sink = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.LifecycleEmitters.PostEnrollmentFactsObserved(sink, helloWaitTimeoutSeconds, NewLogger(tmp.Path));
Assert.Equal(expected, sink.Posted[0].Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.HelloWaitTimeoutSeconds]);
}
[Fact]
public void Swallows_sink_exceptions()
{
@@ -82,7 +111,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
var logger = NewLogger(tmp.Path);
var ex = Record.Exception(() =>
AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.LifecycleEmitters.PostEnrollmentFactsObserved(sink, logger));
AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.LifecycleEmitters.PostEnrollmentFactsObserved(sink, HelloWaitTimeout.DefaultSeconds, logger));
Assert.Null(ex);
}
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
persistence.SaveSessionCreatedAt(DateTime.UtcNow.AddHours(-100));
var stateDir = Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "State");
double? reportedAgeHours = null;
var tripped = AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.CheckSessionAgeEmergencyBreak(
dataDirectory: tmp.Path,
@@ -157,9 +158,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
selfDestructOnComplete: false,
cleanupServiceFactory: null,
logger: logger,
consoleMode: false);
consoleMode: false,
onBreakFired: ageHours => reportedAgeHours = ageHours);
Assert.True(tripped);
// The measured age reaches the break report (the backend cannot derive it).
Assert.NotNull(reportedAgeHours);
Assert.InRange(reportedAgeHours.Value, 99.9, 100.1);
// Marker must have been written so the next restart exits cleanly.
Assert.True(File.Exists(Path.Combine(stateDir, "enrollment-complete.marker")));
// Session must have been cleared.
@@ -302,6 +307,114 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
Assert.False(File.Exists(path));
}
// ================================================================= Multi-instance guard
private static AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.AgentProcessFact Proc(int pid, int sessionId)
=> new AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.AgentProcessFact(pid, sessionId);
[Fact]
public void FindSiblingAgentPid_ignores_a_same_named_process_in_a_user_session()
{
// The agent (pid 100, session 0) starts while a standard user keeps a process with
// the agent's image name resident in their own session. It must not block the start.
var matches = new[] { Proc(100, 0), Proc(200, 1) };
Assert.Equal(0, AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.FindSiblingAgentPid(matches, ownPid: 100));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(1)]
[InlineData(2)]
[InlineData(7)]
[InlineData(-1)]
public void FindSiblingAgentPid_ignores_every_session_but_zero(int sessionId)
{
var matches = new[] { Proc(100, 0), Proc(200, sessionId) };
Assert.Equal(0, AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.FindSiblingAgentPid(matches, ownPid: 100));
}
[Fact]
public void FindSiblingAgentPid_reports_a_second_runtime_in_session_zero()
{
// Self-update restart while the old runtime is still alive — the single-agent
// invariant the guard exists for.
var matches = new[] { Proc(100, 0), Proc(300, 0) };
Assert.Equal(300, AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.FindSiblingAgentPid(matches, ownPid: 100));
}
[Fact]
public void FindSiblingAgentPid_never_reports_the_caller_itself()
{
var matches = new[] { Proc(100, 0) };
Assert.Equal(0, AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.FindSiblingAgentPid(matches, ownPid: 100));
}
[Fact]
public void FindSiblingAgentPid_skips_user_session_processes_listed_before_the_runtime()
{
// Install-mode launch verification: a user-session process enumerated first must not
// be reported as the launched runtime.
var matches = new[] { Proc(200, 1), Proc(201, 2), Proc(100, 0), Proc(300, 0) };
Assert.Equal(300, AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.FindSiblingAgentPid(matches, ownPid: 100));
}
[Fact]
public void FindSiblingAgentPid_blocks_an_interactive_start_next_to_the_session_zero_runtime()
{
// --console run from an admin prompt (session 1) while the Scheduled Task runtime is up.
var matches = new[] { Proc(100, 1), Proc(300, 0) };
Assert.Equal(300, AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.FindSiblingAgentPid(matches, ownPid: 100));
}
[Fact]
public void FindSiblingAgentPid_returns_zero_for_no_matches()
{
Assert.Equal(0, AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.FindSiblingAgentPid(
new AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.AgentProcessFact[0], ownPid: 100));
Assert.Equal(0, AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.FindSiblingAgentPid(null, ownPid: 100));
}
[Fact]
public void SnapshotProcessesByName_reads_pid_and_session_of_the_running_test_host()
{
using var self = System.Diagnostics.Process.GetCurrentProcess();
var facts = AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.SnapshotProcessesByName(self.ProcessName);
var own = Assert.Single(facts, f => f.Pid == self.Id);
Assert.Equal(self.SessionId, own.SessionId);
}
[Fact]
public void SnapshotProcessesByName_reads_the_session_of_system_owned_processes_without_access_rights()
{
// Positive control for the fail-open direction: the session id comes from the process
// snapshot, not from an opened handle, so even an unprivileged caller reads it for
// SYSTEM-owned service hosts. A skipped process would let a real sibling go unseen.
var expected = System.Diagnostics.Process.GetProcessesByName("svchost");
foreach (var p in expected) p.Dispose();
var facts = AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.SnapshotProcessesByName("svchost");
Assert.NotEmpty(facts);
Assert.All(facts, f => Assert.True(f.Pid > 0));
Assert.Contains(facts, f => f.SessionId == 0);
// Service hosts come and go; a wholesale access failure would drop (nearly) all of them.
Assert.True(facts.Count >= expected.Length / 2,
$"Snapshot returned {facts.Count} of ~{expected.Length} svchost processes.");
}
[Fact]
public void SnapshotProcessesByName_returns_empty_for_an_unknown_name()
{
Assert.Empty(AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program.SnapshotProcessesByName("no-such-process-" + Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N")));
}
// ================================================================= Crash log writer
[Fact]
@@ -62,6 +62,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Runtime
Assert.Equal("ipinfo.io", evt.Data["source"]);
}
[Fact]
public void BuildGeoEvent_country_only_location_has_no_empty_parts_in_message()
{
var loc = new GeoLocationResult { Country = "DE", Source = "do-geo" };
var evt = StartupEnvironmentProbes.BuildGeoEvent(Config(), loc);
Assert.Equal("Device location: DE (via do-geo)", evt.Message);
Assert.Equal("DE", evt.Data["country"]);
Assert.Equal("do-geo", evt.Data["source"]);
}
// ================================================================= Outbound IP
[Fact]
@@ -98,6 +110,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Runtime
PrimaryError = "connection refused",
PrimaryRetryError = "DNS failure",
FallbackError = "timeout",
DoGeoError = "HTTP 403 (Forbidden)",
};
var evt = StartupEnvironmentProbes.BuildGeoFailureEvent(cfg, attempt);
@@ -108,6 +121,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Runtime
Assert.Equal("connection refused", evt.Data["primaryError"]);
Assert.Equal("DNS failure", evt.Data["primaryRetryError"]);
Assert.Equal("timeout", evt.Data["fallbackError"]);
Assert.Equal("HTTP 403 (Forbidden)", evt.Data["doGeoError"]);
Assert.Equal("do-geo", evt.Data["lastResortProvider"]);
}
[Fact]
@@ -119,6 +134,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Runtime
Assert.Equal("unknown", evt.Data["primaryError"]);
Assert.Equal("unknown", evt.Data["primaryRetryError"]);
Assert.Equal("unknown", evt.Data["fallbackError"]);
Assert.Equal("unknown", evt.Data["doGeoError"]);
}
// ================================================================= Timezone
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ using System.IO;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
@@ -234,5 +235,78 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
Assert.False(File.Exists(Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "session.created")));
Assert.False(File.Exists(Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "whiteglove.complete")));
}
// ============================================================ failed-registration record
private static RegistrationFailureSummary FailedRun(DateTime at, string outcome = "Failed", bool? linkUpAtEnd = false) =>
new RegistrationFailureSummary
{
FailedRuns = 1,
FirstFailedAtUtc = at,
LastFailedAtUtc = at,
Outcome = outcome,
LastError = "No such host is known.",
NetworkLinkUpAtStart = false,
NetworkLinkUpAtEnd = linkUpAtEnd,
AttemptWindowSeconds = 91.3,
ConfigFetchOutcome = "UsedDefaults",
};
[Fact]
public void RecordRegistrationFailure_counts_runs_keeps_the_first_time_and_describes_the_latest_run()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var sut = new SessionIdPersistence(tmp.Path);
var first = new DateTime(2026, 8, 20, 9, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var second = new DateTime(2026, 9, 12, 7, 30, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
Assert.Null(sut.LoadRegistrationFailure());
sut.RecordRegistrationFailure(FailedRun(first));
sut.RecordRegistrationFailure(FailedRun(second, outcome: "AuthFailed", linkUpAtEnd: true));
// A fresh instance reads it back from disk, as the next boot's emergency break does.
var record = new SessionIdPersistence(tmp.Path).LoadRegistrationFailure();
Assert.NotNull(record);
Assert.Equal(2, record!.FailedRuns);
Assert.Equal(first, record.FirstFailedAtUtc);
Assert.Equal(second, record.LastFailedAtUtc);
Assert.Equal("AuthFailed", record.Outcome);
Assert.True(record.NetworkLinkUpAtEnd);
Assert.Equal(91.3, record.AttemptWindowSeconds);
Assert.Equal("UsedDefaults", record.ConfigFetchOutcome);
}
[Fact]
public void Registration_failure_record_is_cleared_by_success_delete_and_rotate()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var sut = new SessionIdPersistence(tmp.Path);
sut.GetOrCreate();
var at = new DateTime(2026, 8, 20, 9, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
sut.RecordRegistrationFailure(FailedRun(at));
sut.ClearRegistrationFailure();
Assert.Null(sut.LoadRegistrationFailure());
sut.RecordRegistrationFailure(FailedRun(at));
sut.Rotate();
Assert.Null(sut.LoadRegistrationFailure());
sut.RecordRegistrationFailure(FailedRun(at));
sut.Delete();
Assert.Null(sut.LoadRegistrationFailure());
Assert.False(File.Exists(Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "registration-failure.json")));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("not json")]
[InlineData("{\"FailedRuns\":0}")]
public void LoadRegistrationFailure_reports_nothing_for_a_corrupt_or_empty_record(string content)
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "registration-failure.json"), content);
Assert.Null(new SessionIdPersistence(tmp.Path).LoadRegistrationFailure());
}
}
}
@@ -137,6 +137,86 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
Assert.Equal(originalSessionId, result.RotatedFromSessionId);
}
private static BackendRefusalException TenantConflict()
=> new BackendRefusalException("Backend returned 409 Conflict with error code session_owner_mismatch.", 409,
AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Constants.AgentErrorCodes.SessionOwnerMismatch);
[Fact]
public async Task Tenant_conflict_409_rotates_once_like_an_owner_mismatch()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var logger = NewLogger(tmp);
var config = NewConfig();
var originalSessionId = config.SessionId;
var rotatedTo = Guid.NewGuid().ToString();
var seenSessionIds = new System.Collections.Generic.List<string>();
var apiClient = new FakeApiClient(
attempt => attempt == 1
? throw TenantConflict()
: new RegisterSessionResponse { Success = true, SessionId = rotatedTo, ValidatedBy = ValidatorType.AutopilotV1 },
onRegister: r => seenSessionIds.Add(r.SessionId));
var tracker = new AuthFailureTracker(maxFailures: 5, timeoutMinutes: 0,
clock: SystemClock.Instance, logger: logger);
var result = await SessionRegistrationHelper.RegisterWithRetryAsync(
apiClient, config, agentVersion: "0.0.0", logger: logger,
authFailureTracker: tracker,
backoffDelay: _ => throw new InvalidOperationException("rotation must retry without backoff"),
networkLinkWait: _ => Task.CompletedTask,
rotateSession: () => { config.SessionId = rotatedTo; return rotatedTo; });
Assert.Equal(SessionRegistrationOutcome.Succeeded, result.Outcome);
Assert.Equal(new[] { originalSessionId, rotatedTo }, seenSessionIds);
Assert.Equal(originalSessionId, result.RotatedFromSessionId);
Assert.Equal(0, tracker.ConsecutiveFailures);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Coded_refusal_after_rotation_fails_without_retry_or_auth_failure()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var logger = NewLogger(tmp);
var config = NewConfig();
var apiClient = new FakeApiClient(_ => throw TenantConflict());
var tracker = new AuthFailureTracker(maxFailures: 5, timeoutMinutes: 0,
clock: SystemClock.Instance, logger: logger);
var result = await SessionRegistrationHelper.RegisterWithRetryAsync(
apiClient, config, agentVersion: "0.0.0", logger: logger,
authFailureTracker: tracker,
backoffDelay: _ => throw new InvalidOperationException("a coded refusal must not be retried"),
networkLinkWait: _ => Task.CompletedTask,
rotateSession: () => { config.SessionId = Guid.NewGuid().ToString(); return config.SessionId; });
Assert.Equal(SessionRegistrationOutcome.Failed, result.Outcome);
Assert.Equal(2, apiClient.CallCount);
Assert.Equal(0, tracker.ConsecutiveFailures);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Rotation_hook_failure_on_a_tenant_conflict_fails_without_auth_failure()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var logger = NewLogger(tmp);
var config = NewConfig();
var apiClient = new FakeApiClient(_ => throw TenantConflict());
var tracker = new AuthFailureTracker(maxFailures: 5, timeoutMinutes: 0,
clock: SystemClock.Instance, logger: logger);
var result = await SessionRegistrationHelper.RegisterWithRetryAsync(
apiClient, config, agentVersion: "0.0.0", logger: logger,
authFailureTracker: tracker, networkLinkWait: _ => Task.CompletedTask,
rotateSession: () => throw new IOException("disk full"));
Assert.Equal(SessionRegistrationOutcome.Failed, result.Outcome);
Assert.Equal(1, apiClient.CallCount);
Assert.Equal(0, tracker.ConsecutiveFailures);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Second_owner_mismatch_after_rotation_is_an_auth_failure()
{
@@ -99,6 +99,52 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.SignalAdapters
Assert.Equal(DecisionSignalKind.WhiteGloveShellCoreSuccess, posted.Kind);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(true, "true")]
[InlineData(false, "false")]
public void WhiteGloveEvent_stamps_read_AccountSetup_progress_on_payload_and_evidence(bool progress, string expected)
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var adapter = new EspAndHelloTrackerAdapter(
f.Coordinator, f.Ingress, f.Clock, accountSetupProgressProbe: () => progress);
adapter.TriggerWhiteGloveFromTest();
var posted = Assert.Single(f.Ingress.Posted);
Assert.Equal(expected, posted.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.AccountSetupProgress]);
Assert.Equal(expected, posted.Evidence.DerivationInputs![SignalPayloadKeys.AccountSetupProgress]);
}
[Fact]
public void WhiteGloveEvent_with_unread_AccountSetup_registry_sends_no_progress_key()
{
// Unknown must keep the sealing classifier's AccountSetup excluder — the payload key
// is absent, the evidence records why.
using var f = new Fixture();
using var adapter = new EspAndHelloTrackerAdapter(
f.Coordinator, f.Ingress, f.Clock, accountSetupProgressProbe: () => null);
adapter.TriggerWhiteGloveFromTest();
var posted = Assert.Single(f.Ingress.Posted);
Assert.True(posted.Payload == null || !posted.Payload.ContainsKey(SignalPayloadKeys.AccountSetupProgress));
Assert.Equal("unread", posted.Evidence.DerivationInputs![SignalPayloadKeys.AccountSetupProgress]);
}
[Fact]
public void WhiteGloveEvent_default_probe_on_unstarted_coordinator_reports_unread()
{
// Production probe: the provisioning tracker does not exist before Start (and never on
// Device Preparation) — that is "unread", not "untouched".
using var f = new Fixture();
using var adapter = new EspAndHelloTrackerAdapter(f.Coordinator, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
adapter.TriggerWhiteGloveFromTest();
var posted = Assert.Single(f.Ingress.Posted);
Assert.True(posted.Payload == null || !posted.Payload.ContainsKey(SignalPayloadKeys.AccountSetupProgress));
}
[Fact]
public void EspFailureEvent_emits_EspTerminalFailure_with_merged_subSource_annotation()
{
@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
using System;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using SharedEventTypes = AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Constants.EventTypes;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.SignalAdapters
{
/// <summary>
/// A script run duration is the span between two CMTrace lines, each resolved on its own zone
/// belief. When the beliefs differ the span is a whole number of offset-grid steps plus the run
/// time, not the run time: session 4377911b read a 10 s script as 3610 s (start line-anchored
/// +120, result re-read after an overwrite rewind in the reader's zone +60 and rejected as
/// ahead of the clock), a fleet tenant read 2–9 s scripts as 17 h every day. The adapter judges
/// the pair from the provenance bound to each line and omits the span rather than lie.
/// </summary>
public sealed class ImeLogTrackerAdapterDurationProvenanceTests
{
private const string ServiceLog = "IntuneManagementExtension.log";
private const string ExecutorLog = "AgentExecutor.log";
private static CmTraceLineProvenance Line(
DateTime resolvedUtc, int offsetMinutes, CmTraceOffsetOrigin origin,
string file = ServiceLog, string? anchor = null, int? measured = null) =>
new CmTraceLineProvenance
{
// The writer's local time is the resolved value with the applied offset put back.
SourceLocalTs = DateTime.SpecifyKind(resolvedUtc.AddMinutes(offsetMinutes), DateTimeKind.Unspecified),
Origin = origin,
OffsetMinutes = offsetMinutes,
EraAnchorKind = anchor,
MeasuredWriterOffsetMinutes = measured,
SourceFileName = file,
};
private static ScriptExecutionState Platform(string policyId, DateTime startedAtUtc, CmTraceLineProvenance start,
DateTime? resultObservedAtUtc = null, CmTraceLineProvenance? result = null, string outcome = "Success", int exitCode = 0) =>
new ScriptExecutionState
{
PolicyId = policyId,
ScriptType = "platform",
ExitCode = exitCode,
Result = outcome,
ResultSource = "ime_policy_result",
StartedAtUtc = startedAtUtc,
StartedAtProvenance = start,
ResultObservedAtUtc = resultObservedAtUtc,
ResultProvenance = result,
};
[Fact]
public void Rejected_result_line_against_a_line_anchored_start_omits_the_span()
{
// Session 4377911b, script d94468af: start 15:19:57.005 local, self-anchored (+120);
// result 15:20:07.391 local, re-read after a rewind and resolved in the reader's
// zone (+60) → 14:20:07Z, one hour ahead of the clock. The raw pair reads 3610 s.
var clockNow = new DateTime(2026, 9, 17, 13, 20, 7, 437, DateTimeKind.Utc);
using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture(clockNow);
using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
var startUtc = new DateTime(2026, 9, 17, 13, 19, 57, 5, DateTimeKind.Utc);
var resultRaw = new DateTime(2026, 9, 17, 14, 20, 7, 391, DateTimeKind.Utc);
adapter.TriggerScriptCompletedFromTest(Platform("d94468af",
startUtc, Line(startUtc, 120, CmTraceOffsetOrigin.LineAnchored, measured: 120),
resultRaw, Line(resultRaw, 60, CmTraceOffsetOrigin.None, measured: 120)));
var info = f.InfoEvent(SharedEventTypes.ScriptCompleted);
Assert.Equal(clockNow, info.OccurredAtUtc); // stamp: clamped to the clock
Assert.Equal("true", info.Payload!["derivedTimestamp"]);
Assert.Equal(resultRaw.ToString("o"), info.Payload["rejectedSourceTimestamp"]);
Assert.False(info.Payload.ContainsKey("durationSeconds"));
Assert.False(info.Payload.ContainsKey("durationBasis"));
Assert.Equal("rejected-endpoint", info.Payload["durationSuppressedReason"]);
Assert.Equal("unverified", info.Payload["durationProvenance"]);
// The end line's own provenance and the start line's, side by side.
Assert.Equal("reader-zone-fallback", info.Payload["sourceOffsetOrigin"]);
Assert.Equal("60", info.Payload["sourceOffsetMinutes"]);
Assert.Equal("120", info.Payload["measuredWriterOffsetMinutes"]);
Assert.Equal("2026-09-17T15:20:07.3910000", info.Payload["sourceLocalTs"]);
Assert.Equal("line-anchored", info.Payload["startSourceOffsetOrigin"]);
Assert.Equal("120", info.Payload["startSourceOffsetMinutes"]);
}
[Fact]
public void Rejected_era_anchored_result_of_a_failed_script_omits_the_span_and_the_timeout_verdict()
{
// Fleet shape (script_failed, daily in one tenant): result era-anchored at −420 (the
// OOBE default zone's era) on a line written under +600 → 17 h ahead of the clock;
// the 61203 s "run" of a 3 s script fired script_timeout_suspected every day.
var clockNow = new DateTime(2026, 9, 21, 1, 30, 13, DateTimeKind.Utc);
using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture(clockNow);
using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
var startUtc = clockNow.AddSeconds(-8);
var resultRaw = clockNow.AddSeconds(-5).AddHours(17);
adapter.TriggerScriptCompletedFromTest(Platform("88d406eb",
startUtc, Line(startUtc, 600, CmTraceOffsetOrigin.LineAnchored),
resultRaw, Line(resultRaw, -420, CmTraceOffsetOrigin.EraAnchored, anchor: "bootstrap-policy-result", measured: 600),
outcome: "Failed"));
var failed = f.InfoEvent(SharedEventTypes.ScriptFailed);
Assert.Equal("rejected-endpoint", failed.Payload!["durationSuppressedReason"]);
Assert.False(failed.Payload.ContainsKey("durationSeconds"));
Assert.Equal("era-anchored", failed.Payload["sourceOffsetOrigin"]);
Assert.Equal("bootstrap-policy-result", failed.Payload["sourceOffsetAnchor"]);
Assert.Empty(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.ScriptTimeoutSuspected));
}
[Fact]
public void Mixed_pair_on_the_offset_grid_omits_the_span_even_when_nothing_was_rejected()
{
// Session cbaed57b: start from AgentExecutor.log in the reader's zone (+120, two
// hours too early), result era-anchored at 0 in the service log → 7205 s.
var clockNow = new DateTime(2026, 9, 11, 8, 48, 25, DateTimeKind.Utc);
using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture(clockNow);
using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
var resultUtc = clockNow.AddSeconds(-1);
var startUtc = resultUtc.AddSeconds(-7205);
adapter.TriggerScriptCompletedFromTest(Platform("846cea22",
startUtc, Line(startUtc, 120, CmTraceOffsetOrigin.None, file: ExecutorLog),
resultUtc, Line(resultUtc, 0, CmTraceOffsetOrigin.EraAnchored, anchor: "bootstrap-policy-result")));
var info = f.InfoEvent(SharedEventTypes.ScriptCompleted);
Assert.False(info.Payload!.ContainsKey("derivedTimestamp"));
Assert.False(info.Payload.ContainsKey("durationSeconds"));
Assert.Equal("offset-grid", info.Payload["durationSuppressedReason"]);
Assert.Equal("unverified", info.Payload["durationProvenance"]);
}
[Fact]
public void Mixed_pair_off_the_grid_keeps_the_span_as_unverified()
{
var clockNow = ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture.DefaultClockStart;
using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture(clockNow);
using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
var resultUtc = clockNow.AddSeconds(-1);
var startUtc = resultUtc.AddSeconds(-26);
adapter.TriggerScriptCompletedFromTest(Platform("f6f67f79",
startUtc, Line(startUtc, 120, CmTraceOffsetOrigin.LineAnchored),
resultUtc, Line(resultUtc, 120, CmTraceOffsetOrigin.None)));
var info = f.InfoEvent(SharedEventTypes.ScriptCompleted);
Assert.Equal("26.00", info.Payload!["durationSeconds"]);
Assert.Equal("script_runtime", info.Payload["durationBasis"]);
Assert.Equal("unverified", info.Payload["durationProvenance"]);
Assert.False(info.Payload.ContainsKey("durationSuppressedReason"));
}
[Fact]
public void Two_line_anchored_ends_on_the_grid_are_a_verified_fifteen_minute_run()
{
var clockNow = ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture.DefaultClockStart;
using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture(clockNow);
using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
var resultUtc = clockNow.AddSeconds(-1);
var startUtc = resultUtc.AddSeconds(-900);
adapter.TriggerScriptCompletedFromTest(Platform("11111111",
startUtc, Line(startUtc, 120, CmTraceOffsetOrigin.LineAnchored),
resultUtc, Line(resultUtc, 120, CmTraceOffsetOrigin.LineAnchored)));
var info = f.InfoEvent(SharedEventTypes.ScriptCompleted);
Assert.Equal("900.00", info.Payload!["durationSeconds"]);
Assert.Equal("verified", info.Payload["durationProvenance"]);
}
[Fact]
public void Two_fallback_ends_from_the_same_file_share_their_error_and_stay_measurable()
{
var clockNow = ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture.DefaultClockStart;
using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture(clockNow);
using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
var resultUtc = clockNow.AddSeconds(-1);
var startUtc = resultUtc.AddSeconds(-900);
adapter.TriggerScriptCompletedFromTest(Platform("22222222",
startUtc, Line(startUtc, 60, CmTraceOffsetOrigin.None),
resultUtc, Line(resultUtc, 60, CmTraceOffsetOrigin.None)));
var info = f.InfoEvent(SharedEventTypes.ScriptCompleted);
Assert.Equal("900.00", info.Payload!["durationSeconds"]);
Assert.Equal("verified", info.Payload["durationProvenance"]);
}
[Fact]
public void Two_fallback_ends_from_different_files_are_different_writers()
{
// Same reader zone applied to both, but the executor child process and the service
// can hold different beliefs (cbaed57b) — a grid-sized span is not trusted.
var clockNow = ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture.DefaultClockStart;
using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture(clockNow);
using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
var resultUtc = clockNow.AddSeconds(-1);
var startUtc = resultUtc.AddSeconds(-900);
adapter.TriggerScriptCompletedFromTest(Platform("33333333",
startUtc, Line(startUtc, 60, CmTraceOffsetOrigin.None, file: ExecutorLog),
resultUtc, Line(resultUtc, 60, CmTraceOffsetOrigin.None)));
var info = f.InfoEvent(SharedEventTypes.ScriptCompleted);
Assert.False(info.Payload!.ContainsKey("durationSeconds"));
Assert.Equal("offset-grid", info.Payload["durationSuppressedReason"]);
}
[Fact]
public void Without_provenance_the_pair_is_taken_as_before()
{
// States from before the field (persisted by an older agent) and synthetic events:
// no snapshot on either end, the 30-minute Failed run still reads as a timeout.
var clockNow = ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture.DefaultClockStart;
using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture(clockNow);
using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
f.Tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = clockNow.AddSeconds(-1);
adapter.TriggerScriptCompletedFromTest(new ScriptExecutionState
{
PolicyId = "44444444",
ScriptType = "platform",
ExitCode = 0,
Result = "Failed",
StartedAtUtc = clockNow.AddSeconds(-1801),
});
var failed = f.InfoEvent(SharedEventTypes.ScriptFailed);
Assert.Equal("1800.00", failed.Payload!["durationSeconds"]);
Assert.False(failed.Payload.ContainsKey("durationProvenance"));
Assert.False(failed.Payload.ContainsKey("durationSuppressedReason"));
Assert.Single(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.ScriptTimeoutSuspected));
}
[Fact]
public void Negative_grid_sized_span_from_a_future_shifted_start_is_named_not_dropped_silently()
{
var clockNow = ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture.DefaultClockStart;
using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture(clockNow);
using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
var resultUtc = clockNow.AddSeconds(-1);
var startUtc = resultUtc.AddSeconds(3595); // resolved one hour ahead of its real instant
adapter.TriggerScriptCompletedFromTest(Platform("55555555",
startUtc, Line(startUtc, 60, CmTraceOffsetOrigin.None),
resultUtc, Line(resultUtc, 120, CmTraceOffsetOrigin.LineAnchored)));
var info = f.InfoEvent(SharedEventTypes.ScriptCompleted);
Assert.False(info.Payload!.ContainsKey("durationSeconds"));
Assert.Equal("offset-grid", info.Payload["durationSuppressedReason"]);
}
[Fact]
public void Health_script_cycle_is_judged_the_same_way()
{
// HS-SCRIPT-START self-anchored, HS-NEW-RESULT re-read in the reader's zone and
// rejected: the cycle duration is omitted, the compliance verdict stays.
var clockNow = ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture.DefaultClockStart;
using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture(clockNow);
using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
var startUtc = clockNow.AddSeconds(-40);
var resultRaw = clockNow.AddSeconds(-2).AddHours(1);
adapter.TriggerScriptCompletedFromTest(new ScriptExecutionState
{
PolicyId = "66666666",
ScriptType = "remediation",
ScriptPart = "detection",
ExitCode = 0,
ComplianceResult = "True",
StartedAtUtc = startUtc,
StartedAtProvenance = Line(startUtc, 120, CmTraceOffsetOrigin.LineAnchored),
ResultObservedAtUtc = resultRaw,
ResultProvenance = Line(resultRaw, 60, CmTraceOffsetOrigin.None),
DurationBasis = "cycle_including_reporting_latency",
});
var info = f.InfoEvent(SharedEventTypes.ScriptCompleted);
Assert.Equal("True", info.Payload!["complianceResult"]);
Assert.False(info.Payload.ContainsKey("durationSeconds"));
Assert.Equal("rejected-endpoint", info.Payload["durationSuppressedReason"]);
}
}
}
@@ -247,6 +247,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.SignalAdapters
f.Tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = ClockNow;
f.Tracker.CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting("beef7777", "Success", ClockNow);
// No end block is seeded — the held result goes out with the shutdown flush.
f.Tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(f.Clock.UtcNow, force: true);
var info = f.InfoEvent(SharedEventTypes.ScriptCompleted);
// Without the hardening the slot kept the 7-day-old start: the duration would have
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
using System;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using SharedEventTypes = AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Constants.EventTypes;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.SignalAdapters
{
/// <summary>
/// A held platform-script completion (IME result read before the executor end block) is
/// emitted at the end of a later pass, when the tracker's "last matched" line is an unrelated
/// one — the event stays bound to the result line's timestamp and pattern.
/// </summary>
public sealed class ImeLogTrackerAdapterResultHoldTests
{
private static readonly DateTime ClockNow = new DateTime(2026, 9, 10, 22, 13, 40, DateTimeKind.Utc);
[Fact]
public void Held_completion_is_bound_to_the_result_line_not_to_the_last_matched_one()
{
using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture(ClockNow);
using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
var startTs = ClockNow.AddSeconds(-95);
var resultTs = ClockNow.AddSeconds(-3);
f.Tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = startTs;
f.Tracker.HandlePlatformScriptStarted("376ee51a");
f.Tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = resultTs;
f.Tracker.LastMatchedPatternId = "PS-SCRIPT-RESULT";
f.Tracker.CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting("376ee51a", "Success", resultTs);
Assert.Empty(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.ScriptCompleted));
// Other lines were matched before the end block was read and the pass ended.
f.Tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = ClockNow.AddSeconds(-1);
f.Tracker.LastMatchedPatternId = "IME-DOWNLOADING";
f.Tracker.RecordPlatformScriptExitCodeForTesting("376ee51a", 0, resultTs.AddMilliseconds(-8));
f.Tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(f.Clock.UtcNow);
var info = f.InfoEvent(SharedEventTypes.ScriptCompleted);
Assert.Equal(resultTs, info.OccurredAtUtc);
Assert.Equal("PS-SCRIPT-RESULT", info.Payload!["patternId"]);
Assert.Equal("0", info.Payload["exitCode"]);
Assert.Equal("ime_policy_result", info.Payload["resultSource"]);
Assert.Equal("92.00", info.Payload["durationSeconds"]);
}
[Fact]
public void Held_completion_carries_the_provenance_of_its_result_line()
{
using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture(ClockNow);
using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
var startTs = ClockNow.AddSeconds(-95);
var resultTs = ClockNow.AddSeconds(-3);
// Start and result lines both self-anchored (+120).
f.Tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = startTs;
f.Tracker.LastMatchedSourceLocalTimestamp = DateTime.SpecifyKind(startTs.AddMinutes(120), DateTimeKind.Unspecified);
f.Tracker.LastMatchedSourceOffsetOrigin = CmTraceOffsetOrigin.LineAnchored;
f.Tracker.LastMatchedSourceOffsetMinutes = 120;
f.Tracker.HandlePlatformScriptStarted("376ee51a");
f.Tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = resultTs;
f.Tracker.LastMatchedSourceLocalTimestamp = DateTime.SpecifyKind(resultTs.AddMinutes(120), DateTimeKind.Unspecified);
f.Tracker.LastMatchedPatternId = "PS-SCRIPT-RESULT";
f.Tracker.CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting("376ee51a", "Success", resultTs);
// By the time the held completion is emitted, the last matched line is an unrelated
// one resolved in the reader's zone.
f.Tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp = ClockNow.AddSeconds(-1);
f.Tracker.LastMatchedSourceLocalTimestamp = DateTime.SpecifyKind(ClockNow.AddSeconds(-1).AddMinutes(60), DateTimeKind.Unspecified);
f.Tracker.LastMatchedSourceOffsetOrigin = CmTraceOffsetOrigin.None;
f.Tracker.LastMatchedSourceOffsetMinutes = 60;
f.Tracker.LastMatchedPatternId = "IME-DOWNLOADING";
f.Tracker.RecordPlatformScriptExitCodeForTesting("376ee51a", 0, resultTs.AddMilliseconds(-8));
f.Tracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(f.Clock.UtcNow);
var info = f.InfoEvent(SharedEventTypes.ScriptCompleted);
Assert.Equal("line-anchored", info.Payload!["sourceOffsetOrigin"]);
Assert.Equal("120", info.Payload["sourceOffsetMinutes"]);
Assert.Equal(resultTs.AddMinutes(120).ToString("yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ss.fffffff"), info.Payload["sourceLocalTs"]);
Assert.Equal("line-anchored", info.Payload["startSourceOffsetOrigin"]);
Assert.Equal("120", info.Payload["startSourceOffsetMinutes"]);
Assert.Equal("92.00", info.Payload["durationSeconds"]);
Assert.Equal("verified", info.Payload["durationProvenance"]);
}
}
}
@@ -564,6 +564,37 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Termination
Assert.False(File.Exists(Path.Combine(rig.StateDir, "enrollment-complete.marker")));
}
[Fact]
public void Handle_whiteglove_part1_writes_marker_before_the_later_exit_steps()
{
// The technician's reseal can kill the process anywhere after the seal. The marker
// is what lets the next boot skip the 48-hour break and resume Part 2, so it must
// exist before collectors stop, diagnostics upload, grace and drain run.
using var rig = new Rig();
rig.State = new DecisionStateBuilder(DecisionState.CreateInitial("S1", "T1")) { Stage = SessionStage.WhiteGloveSealed }.Build();
bool? markerPresentAtCollectorStop = null;
rig.StopPeripheralCollectorsHook = () => markerPresentAtCollectorStop = rig.SessionPersistence.IsWhiteGloveResume();
rig.Build().Handle(sender: null!,
Args(EnrollmentTerminationReason.DecisionTerminalStage, EnrollmentTerminationOutcome.Succeeded, SessionStage.WhiteGloveSealed));
Assert.True(markerPresentAtCollectorStop, "whiteglove.complete must be written before the peripheral collectors are stopped.");
var emitted = rig.EmittedEventTypes.ToList();
Assert.True(emitted.IndexOf("agent_shutting_down") >= 0, "agent_shutting_down must still be emitted.");
}
[Fact]
public void Handle_non_whiteglove_termination_never_writes_the_marker()
{
using var rig = new Rig();
rig.State = new DecisionStateBuilder(DecisionState.CreateInitial("S1", "T1")) { Stage = SessionStage.Completed }.Build();
rig.Build().Handle(sender: null!,
Args(EnrollmentTerminationReason.DecisionTerminalStage, EnrollmentTerminationOutcome.Succeeded, SessionStage.Completed));
Assert.False(rig.SessionPersistence.IsWhiteGloveResume());
}
[Fact]
public void Handle_whiteglove_part1_stops_collectors_before_emitting_part1_complete()
{
@@ -88,6 +88,35 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Transport
Assert.Null(ex.ErrorCode);
}
// ── coded 409: a refusal, never an auth failure ─────────────────────
[Fact]
public async Task Coded_409_is_a_refusal_not_an_auth_failure()
{
using var client = BuildClient(
HttpStatusCode.Conflict,
"{\"success\":false,\"message\":\"Session id is already registered to another tenant\",\"errorCode\":\"session_owner_mismatch\"}",
"application/json");
var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<BackendRefusalException>(
() => client.RegisterSessionAsync(new AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.SessionRegistration()));
Assert.Equal(409, ex.StatusCode);
Assert.Equal("session_owner_mismatch", ex.ErrorCode);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Uncoded_409_stays_a_plain_http_error()
{
using var client = BuildClient(
HttpStatusCode.Conflict,
"{\"success\":false,\"message\":\"A diagnostics package with this name already exists\"}",
"application/json");
await Assert.ThrowsAsync<HttpRequestException>(
() => client.GetDiagnosticsUploadUrlAsync("tenant-1", "session-1", "package.zip"));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(null, null)]
[InlineData("", null)]
@@ -157,12 +157,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
public double ReplaySpeedFactor { get; set; } = 50;
/// <summary>
/// Wait time in seconds after ESP exit before marking Hello as skipped.
/// When ESP exits, we wait this duration for Hello wizard to start (event 62404).
/// Default: 30 seconds (reasonable for systems under load).
/// If Hello wizard starts within this window, we continue waiting for Hello completion (300/301).
/// Tenant Hello wait in seconds after the ESP exit, merged from RemoteConfig. Stamped on
/// <c>EnrollmentFactsObserved</c> for the decision engine's hello_safety window; the Hello
/// tracker gets the same remote value through the collector configuration. Both resolve it
/// through <see cref="HelloWaitTimeout.EffectiveSeconds"/> (at least the built-in 300 s,
/// at most 3600 s). Default: 300 seconds.
/// </summary>
public int HelloWaitTimeoutSeconds { get; set; } = 30;
public int HelloWaitTimeoutSeconds { get; set; } = HelloWaitTimeout.DefaultSeconds;
/// <summary>
/// Maximum consecutive authentication failures (401/403) before the agent shuts down.
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
private readonly Stream _stream;
private readonly int _maxLineBytes;
private readonly bool _hashLines;
private readonly byte[] _readBuffer = new byte[ReadBufferSize];
private int _readPos;
private int _readLen;
@@ -41,21 +42,32 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
private byte[] _line = new byte[4096];
private int _lineLen;
private ulong _lineHash;
/// <param name="stream">Seekable stream positioned at the first byte to read.</param>
/// <param name="maxLineBytes">Upper bound of bytes kept per line; the remainder is discarded.</param>
public BoundedLineReader(Stream stream, int maxLineBytes)
/// <param name="hashLines">Fingerprint the raw bytes of every line (<see cref="LastLineHash"/>) — the
/// tracker's byte ledger needs it for multi-writer files only.</param>
public BoundedLineReader(Stream stream, int maxLineBytes, bool hashLines = false)
{
if (stream == null) throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(stream));
if (maxLineBytes <= 0) throw new ArgumentOutOfRangeException(nameof(maxLineBytes));
_stream = stream;
_maxLineBytes = maxLineBytes;
_hashLines = hashLines;
_readBufferFileOffset = stream.Position;
}
/// <summary>Cap in bytes applied to every line.</summary>
public int MaxLineBytes => _maxLineBytes;
/// <summary>
/// FNV-1a 64 over the bytes the most recently returned line was decoded from (BOM and
/// line terminator excluded; the capped prefix of a truncated line). Zero unless the
/// reader was created with hashing on.
/// </summary>
public ulong LastLineHash => _lineHash;
/// <summary>Absolute file offset of the next unread byte (exact — no decoder read-ahead).</summary>
public long Position => _readBufferFileOffset + _readPos;
@@ -78,6 +90,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
LastLineTerminated = false;
LastLineTruncated = false;
_lineLen = 0;
_lineHash = _hashLines ? Fnv1a64.OffsetBasis : 0UL;
var sawAnyByte = false;
while (true)
@@ -154,6 +167,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// tail (and thus any CR) discarded, so the check is skipped there.
if (LastLineTerminated && !LastLineTruncated && len > 0 && _line[start + len - 1] == (byte)'\r')
len--;
if (_hashLines)
{
// Fingerprint exactly the bytes the string is decoded from, so a tail that was
// first read unterminated and later gained its CRLF hashes the same.
var h = Fnv1a64.OffsetBasis;
var end = start + len;
for (var i = start; i < end; i++)
h = (h ^ _line[i]) * Fnv1a64.Prime;
_lineHash = h;
}
return len == 0 ? string.Empty : Encoding.UTF8.GetString(_line, start, len);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
using System.Text;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
{
/// <summary>FNV-1a 64-bit — the entry fingerprint used by the tracker's byte ledger.</summary>
internal static class Fnv1a64
{
public const ulong OffsetBasis = 14695981039346656037UL;
public const ulong Prime = 1099511628211UL;
public static ulong Fold(ulong hash, ulong value) => (hash ^ value) * Prime;
}
/// <summary>One assembled CMTrace entry: its byte range in the file, the fingerprint of those bytes and the text.</summary>
internal struct AssembledEntry
{
public long Offset;
public int Length;
public ulong Hash;
public string Text;
}
/// <summary>
/// Turns physical lines into CMTrace entries: a line is one entry, unless it opens
/// <c>&lt;![LOG[</c> without its <c>]LOG]!&gt;</c> close — then the continuation lines up to the
/// closing one belong to it. Oversized lines and capped entries are dropped together with
/// their remaining continuation lines, so no fragment is ever matched as an entry.
/// <para>
/// The read loop and the ledger verification (<c>ImeLogTracker.Overwrite.cs</c>) both feed
/// this class, which is what makes their entry boundaries — and therefore the fingerprints
/// they compare — identical by construction.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
internal sealed class CmTraceEntryAssembler
{
public enum Outcome
{
/// <summary>The line was absorbed into an open multiline entry.</summary>
Buffered,
/// <summary>An entry is complete.</summary>
Entry,
/// <summary>A line over the byte cap was dropped (its entry with it).</summary>
OversizedDropped,
/// <summary>An open multiline entry hit the line/char cap and was dropped.</summary>
CapDropped,
/// <summary>A continuation line of a dropped entry was skipped.</summary>
Skipped,
}
private const string LogOpen = "<![LOG[";
private const string LogClose = "]LOG]!>";
private readonly int _maxLines;
private readonly int _maxChars;
private StringBuilder _buffer;
private int _lineCount;
private long _entryStart;
private ulong _entryHash;
private bool _skippingDroppedEntry;
public CmTraceEntryAssembler(int maxMultiLineBufferLines, int maxEntryBytes)
{
_maxLines = maxMultiLineBufferLines;
_maxChars = maxEntryBytes;
}
/// <summary>True while a multiline entry is being assembled.</summary>
public bool HasOpenEntry => _buffer != null;
/// <summary>File offset of the open multiline entry (valid while <see cref="HasOpenEntry"/>).</summary>
public long OpenEntryStart => _entryStart;
/// <summary>Line count of the entry dropped by the last <see cref="Outcome.CapDropped"/>.</summary>
public int DroppedLines { get; private set; }
/// <summary>Char count of the entry dropped by the last <see cref="Outcome.CapDropped"/>.</summary>
public int DroppedChars { get; private set; }
/// <summary>
/// Feeds one physical line. <paramref name="lineStart"/> / <paramref name="positionAfter"/>
/// are the line's file offsets (start, next unread byte), <paramref name="lineHash"/> the
/// reader's raw-byte fingerprint of the line.
/// </summary>
public Outcome Feed(string line, long lineStart, long positionAfter, bool truncated, ulong lineHash, out AssembledEntry entry)
{
entry = default(AssembledEntry);
if (truncated)
{
// The capped prefix only tells whether the line opened an entry whose remaining
// lines must be skipped rather than matched as raw text.
if (_buffer != null)
{
_buffer = null;
_lineCount = 0;
_skippingDroppedEntry = true;
}
else if (line.StartsWith(LogOpen) && !line.Contains(LogClose))
{
_skippingDroppedEntry = true;
}
return Outcome.OversizedDropped;
}
if (_skippingDroppedEntry)
{
// A line opening a new entry ends the skip and is processed itself — checked
// BEFORE the close-tag test, because a complete single-line entry contains both.
if (line.StartsWith(LogOpen))
_skippingDroppedEntry = false;
else
{
if (line.Contains(LogClose)) _skippingDroppedEntry = false;
return Outcome.Skipped;
}
}
if (_buffer != null)
{
_buffer.Append('\n').Append(line);
_lineCount++;
_entryHash = Fnv1a64.Fold(_entryHash, lineHash);
if (line.Contains(LogClose))
{
entry = new AssembledEntry
{
Offset = _entryStart,
Length = (int)(positionAfter - _entryStart),
Hash = _entryHash,
Text = _buffer.ToString(),
};
_buffer = null;
_lineCount = 0;
return Outcome.Entry;
}
if (_lineCount >= _maxLines || _buffer.Length >= _maxChars)
{
DroppedLines = _lineCount;
DroppedChars = _buffer.Length;
_buffer = null;
_lineCount = 0;
_skippingDroppedEntry = true;
return Outcome.CapDropped;
}
return Outcome.Buffered;
}
if (line.StartsWith(LogOpen) && !line.Contains(LogClose))
{
_buffer = new StringBuilder(line);
_lineCount = 1;
_entryStart = lineStart;
_entryHash = lineHash;
return Outcome.Buffered;
}
entry = new AssembledEntry
{
Offset = lineStart,
Length = (int)(positionAfter - lineStart),
Hash = lineHash,
Text = line,
};
return Outcome.Entry;
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
using System;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
{
/// <summary>
/// How ONE CMTrace line's UTC value was arrived at, captured at the line itself.
/// <para>
/// The tracker exposes the provenance of the line it matched last. A consumer that acts later —
/// a platform-script result held for its executor end block, a run duration spanning a start
/// line and a result line — must describe ITS line, not whichever line happened to be matched
/// last, so the snapshot travels on <see cref="ScriptExecutionState"/> (persisted as a plain
/// DTO; null on state files written before it existed).
/// </para>
/// </summary>
public sealed class CmTraceLineProvenance
{
/// <summary>
/// The line's local time exactly as the writer wrote it (Kind Unspecified, no zone). Null
/// when the value did not come from a CMTrace line at all (clock fallback).
/// </summary>
public DateTime? SourceLocalTs { get; set; }
/// <summary>How the offset applied to <see cref="SourceLocalTs"/> was obtained.</summary>
public CmTraceOffsetOrigin Origin { get; set; }
/// <summary>The offset that was applied, in minutes (local = UTC + offset).</summary>
public int? OffsetMinutes { get; set; }
/// <summary>For <see cref="CmTraceOffsetOrigin.EraAnchored"/>: which anchor established the era's offset.</summary>
public string EraAnchorKind { get; set; }
/// <summary>What the calibrator measured for the source file — observational, never applied.</summary>
public int? MeasuredWriterOffsetMinutes { get; set; }
/// <summary>Name of the log file the line was read from — the closest thing to a writer identity the tracker has.</summary>
public string SourceFileName { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// True when the applied offset was ASSUMED for this line rather than declared by the
/// writer or measured against the agent clock: the reader's own zone (fallback), a writer
/// era's anchor, or the retired per-file calibration. A clock-derived value (no source
/// timestamp) sits on the true UTC axis and is not an assumption.
/// </summary>
public bool IsAssumed()
{
if (!SourceLocalTs.HasValue) return false;
switch (Origin)
{
case CmTraceOffsetOrigin.Bias:
case CmTraceOffsetOrigin.LineAnchored:
return false;
default:
return true;
}
}
}
}
@@ -159,6 +159,23 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
return true;
}
/// <summary>
/// Whether a span between two resolved lines is the signature of a wrong offset on one
/// of them rather than of elapsed time: a zone error is always a whole number of grid
/// steps, so a span within <see cref="MaxGridResidual"/> of k × <see cref="OffsetGrid"/>
/// (k ≥ 1) reads as an offset error plus a run time of seconds. Sign is ignored — a wrong
/// offset on the START end produces the same magnitude with the opposite sign.
/// </summary>
internal static bool IsOnOffsetGrid(TimeSpan span, out int gridSteps)
{
var magnitude = span.Duration();
gridSteps = (int)Math.Round(magnitude.TotalMinutes / OffsetGrid.TotalMinutes, MidpointRounding.AwayFromZero);
if (gridSteps < 1) return false;
var nearest = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(gridSteps * OffsetGrid.TotalMinutes);
return (magnitude - nearest).Duration() <= MaxGridResidual;
}
public bool TryCalibrate(string sourceKey, DateTime localTimestamp, DateTime agentUtcNow)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(sourceKey)) return false;
@@ -222,20 +222,6 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// PowerShell script tracking handlers
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// Returns the current platform-script accumulator, or null when no platform script is active.
// Health-script (remediation) state is no longer tracked line-by-line — the HS-NEW-RESULT
// pattern delivers the full pre-detection / remediation / post-detection JSON in one shot
// via HandleHealthScriptResult. The platform branch keeps its line-by-line accumulator
// because PS-* patterns (PS-SCRIPT-CONTEXT / PS-SCRIPT-EXITCODE / PS-AGENT-OUTPUT / …) still
// arrive across multiple log lines.
private ScriptExecutionState GetCurrentPlatformScript()
{
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId) &&
_pendingPlatformScripts.TryGetValue(_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId, out var state))
return state;
return null;
}
private void HandleScriptStarted(Match match, Dictionary<string, string> parameters)
{
var id = match.Groups["id"]?.Value;
@@ -266,10 +252,22 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// duration when the consolidated [HS] new result line arrives (the slot above is
// cleared by the early-signal HS-COMPLIANCE handler, so timing lives in its own
// map). Prefer the source CMTrace timestamp; latest start wins on a policy re-run.
_healthScriptStartTimes[id] = LastMatchedLogTimestamp ?? DateTime.UtcNow;
var startedAtUtc = LastMatchedLogTimestamp ?? UtcNowProvider();
_healthScriptStartTimes[id] = (startedAtUtc, CaptureLastMatchedProvenance());
_logger.Info($"ImeLogTracker: health script started: {id}");
try { OnScriptStarted?.Invoke(new ScriptStartedInfo { PolicyId = id, ScriptType = "remediation", PolicyType = policyType }); }
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Warning($"ImeLogTracker: OnScriptStarted handler threw: {ex.Message}"); }
// A replayed line of a previous enrollment bypasses the recurrence gate: the
// adapter drops its event, and a dropped run must not count as the policy's
// first report.
if (!_currentLineIsHistoricReplay
&& !_recurringScripts.OnStart(id, startedAtUtc, policyType, LastMatchedPatternId))
{
_stateDirty = true;
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: health script {id} is a recurring policy — start held until its result is known");
return;
}
_stateDirty = true;
RaiseScriptStarted(new ScriptStartedInfo { PolicyId = id, ScriptType = "remediation", PolicyType = policyType });
}
else
{
@@ -282,27 +280,61 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// a regex Match).
internal void HandlePlatformScriptStarted(string id, string source = null)
{
// Stale-slot hardening (session eaf3d8c4): a replayed start line from a previous
// enrollment whose matching result never appeared (script was mid-run when that
// enrollment ended) leaves a pending slot with a days-old StartedAtUtc. When the
// same policy genuinely re-runs now, the fresh start must begin a NEW execution —
// otherwise the ancient start pairs with the fresh completion and the duration
// lies. > 24 h mirrors the adapter's source-timestamp staleness clamp.
var currentStartTs = LastMatchedLogTimestamp ?? DateTime.UtcNow;
if (_pendingPlatformScripts.TryGetValue(id, out var pendingSlot)
&& pendingSlot.StartedAtUtc.HasValue
&& currentStartTs - pendingSlot.StartedAtUtc.Value > TimeSpan.FromHours(24))
var currentStartTs = LastMatchedLogTimestamp ?? UtcNowProvider();
var currentStartProvenance = CaptureLastMatchedProvenance();
// A start line older than the result this policy already emitted is the late start
// line of THAT run: its AgentExecutor block surfaced after the IME result — the two
// files are read in turn (AgentExecutor.log first, but a script's exit line and IME's
// result line are 8–30 ms apart), a ledger rewind recovered the block, or the poll
// loop stalled (session e7f3c910: the late line opened a second slot, cleared the
// emitted-marker and turned the exit code that followed into a fallback duplicate
// 15 s later). It owns the lines behind it in its file and opens nothing. Strictly
// older: a start line at the result's own timestamp is the next run (source lines
// never tie; a low-resolution clock in a test may).
if (_platformScriptResultEmitted.TryGetValue(id, out var emittedResultTs) && currentStartTs < emittedResultTs)
{
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: discarding stale pending platform-script slot for {id} (started {pendingSlot.StartedAtUtc:o})");
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(id);
RecordInvocationMarker(id, isClose: false);
NoteInvocationActivity();
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: platform script start line for {id} (source: {source ?? "ime"}) predates its emitted result — late line of that run, not a new one");
return;
}
if (_pendingPlatformScripts.TryGetValue(id, out var pendingSlot))
{
if (pendingSlot.StartedAtUtc.HasValue && currentStartTs - pendingSlot.StartedAtUtc.Value > TimeSpan.FromHours(24))
{
// Stale-slot hardening (session eaf3d8c4): a replayed start line from a previous
// enrollment whose matching result never appeared (script was mid-run when that
// enrollment ended) leaves a pending slot with a days-old StartedAtUtc. When the
// same policy genuinely re-runs now, the fresh start must begin a NEW execution —
// otherwise the ancient start pairs with the fresh completion and the duration
// lies. > 24 h mirrors the adapter's source-timestamp staleness clamp.
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: discarding stale pending platform-script slot for {id} (started {pendingSlot.StartedAtUtc:o})");
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(id);
}
else if (pendingSlot.Result != null && pendingSlot.ResultObservedAtUtc.HasValue && currentStartTs >= pendingSlot.ResultObservedAtUtc.Value)
{
// The held run is over — a start line at or after its result is the next run.
// Emit what the held run has; its end block did not surface in time.
EmitPlatformScriptResult(pendingSlot, "the next run of this policy started");
}
else if (!pendingSlot.StartedAtUtc.HasValue)
{
// The slot was opened by its result while the start block was still hidden;
// the recovered start line dates the run.
pendingSlot.StartedAtUtc = currentStartTs;
pendingSlot.StartedAtProvenance = currentStartProvenance;
_stateDirty = true;
}
}
if (!_pendingPlatformScripts.ContainsKey(id))
{
// A fresh start for this policy (no pending entry) begins a NEW execution.
// Clear any emitted-marker from a prior run so IME re-evaluations / retries of
// the same platform-script policy within one agent lifetime are not silently
// deduped away. Within a single run the start always precedes exit/result, so
// this never clears the current run's own marker.
// deduped away. A start line of the emitted run itself never reaches this point
// (the guard above), so this never clears the current run's own marker.
_platformScriptResultEmitted.Remove(id);
_pendingPlatformScripts[id] = new ScriptExecutionState
{
@@ -313,6 +345,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// Set only at slot creation: the start line fires twice (agentexecutor + ime
// source) but the earliest wins.
StartedAtUtc = currentStartTs,
StartedAtProvenance = currentStartProvenance,
};
// Live "running" indicator — same signal health scripts emit. Gated on slot
// creation so the duplicate start line (agentexecutor + ime source) doesn't
@@ -320,7 +353,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
try { OnScriptStarted?.Invoke(new ScriptStartedInfo { PolicyId = id, ScriptType = "platform" }); }
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Warning($"ImeLogTracker: OnScriptStarted handler threw: {ex.Message}"); }
}
_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId = id;
RecordInvocationMarker(id, isClose: false);
NoteInvocationActivity();
// Started lines fire twice per script (agentexecutor + ime source) and carry no
// outcome — the matching `platform script completed` line below carries result+exit
// and stays on Info. Keep starts on Debug so Info reflects script outcomes only.
@@ -329,42 +363,55 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// Routes line-by-line script-data handlers (context / exitCode / output) to the right
// accumulator based on the pattern's scriptType parameter. Health-script lines feed the
// single-slot _pendingHealthScript; platform-script lines feed _pendingPlatformScripts.
// single-slot _pendingHealthScript (the HS-NEW-RESULT JSON delivers the full cycle in one
// shot; the slot only enriches the early HS-COMPLIANCE signal). Platform-script lines feed
// _pendingPlatformScripts, and the slot that owns a line is decided by file position (see
// ImeLogTracker.Overwrite.cs), never by which script happened to start last.
private ScriptExecutionState GetCurrentScriptForLineUpdate(Dictionary<string, string> parameters)
=> GetCurrentScriptForLineUpdate(parameters, out _);
// ownerPolicyId names the platform script that owns the line by file position even when
// its pending slot is gone (the completion was already emitted); null for health-script
// lines and for lines no platform invocation owns.
private ScriptExecutionState GetCurrentScriptForLineUpdate(Dictionary<string, string> parameters, out string ownerPolicyId)
{
var scriptType = parameters != null && parameters.TryGetValue("scriptType", out var st) ? st : null;
return string.Equals(scriptType, "remediation", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
? _pendingHealthScript
: GetCurrentPlatformScript();
if (string.Equals(scriptType, "remediation", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
ownerPolicyId = null;
return _pendingHealthScript;
}
return ResolvePlatformScriptForCurrentEntry(out ownerPolicyId);
}
// Session 6b4993e5 fix — platform-script stdout/exit cross-contamination.
//
// AgentExecutor.exe hosts BOTH platform scripts (…\Policies\Scripts\<id>.ps1) and
// proactive-remediation scripts (…\IMECache\HealthScripts\<id>\detect.ps1), and writes
// their lines interleaved into the shared AgentExecutor.log. The policyId-less
// PS-AGENT-EXITCODE ("Powershell exit code is N") and PS-AGENT-OUTPUT ("write output
// done. output = …") lines are routed to whichever platform script
// _lastPlatformScriptPolicyId points at. A remediation invocation's start
// ("Adding argument remediationScript …") does NOT match PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START, so it
// never moves the pointer — its exit/output then bleed into the last-started PLATFORM
// script's slot (observed: platform c3e0124c emitted result=Failed but with exit 0 +
// stdout "[Compliant] No Classic Teams found" — the Teams remediation's output).
//
// Each AgentExecutor process logs "ExecutorLog AgentExecutor gets invoked" first, so a
// new banner means the previous invocation's line-capture context is over. Clearing the
// pointer here scopes line-capture to a single invocation: the immediately following
// "Adding argument powershell …\Policies\Scripts\<id>.ps1" (PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START)
// re-establishes it for a platform invocation, while a remediation invocation leaves it
// null so its exit/output are dropped (the remediation's authoritative data still
// arrives via HS-NEW-RESULT). The platform script's final result is unaffected — it is
// keyed by policyId via PS-SCRIPT-RESULT, not by this pointer.
private void HandleAgentExecutorInvocationBoundary()
// AgentExecutor.exe hosts platform scripts (…\Policies\Scripts\<id>.ps1) as well as
// detection, requirement and proactive-remediation scripts, and its policyId-less
// PS-AGENT-EXITCODE / PS-AGENT-OUTPUT lines belong to whichever invocation owns that
// file position. The banner closes the previous invocation; the argument line that
// follows opens the next one — as a platform script when PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START matched
// it, otherwise as an invocation whose exit/output are not captured (a remediation's
// authoritative data arrives via HS-NEW-RESULT; session 6b4993e5 saw its output bleed
// into a platform slot). "Agent executor completed" closes the invocation again.
private void HandleAgentExecutorInvocation()
{
if (_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId == null) return;
_logger.Debug(
$"ImeLogTracker: AgentExecutor invocation boundary — clearing platform-script line-capture pointer (was {_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId}).");
_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId = null;
RecordInvocationMarker(null, isClose: true);
NoteInvocationActivity();
}
private void HandleAgentInvocationArgument(string kind)
{
RecordInvocationMarker(null, isClose: false);
NoteInvocationActivity();
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(kind) && !string.Equals(kind, "powershell", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: AgentExecutor invocation of kind '{kind}' — exit/output lines not captured as a platform script");
}
private void HandleAgentExecutorCompleted()
{
RecordInvocationMarker(null, isClose: true);
// The end block was written at the executor's own stream position — if that lay
// behind the bookmark, the ledger check on the next pass finds it.
RequestOverwriteCheck();
}
private void HandleScriptContext(Match match, Dictionary<string, string> parameters)
@@ -372,6 +419,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
var context = match.Groups["context"]?.Value;
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(context)) return;
NoteInvocationActivity();
var runContext = string.Equals(context, "machine", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) ? "System" : "User";
var script = GetCurrentScriptForLineUpdate(parameters);
if (script != null)
@@ -386,18 +434,31 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
var exitCodeStr = match.Groups["exitCode"]?.Value;
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(exitCodeStr) || !int.TryParse(exitCodeStr, out var exitCode)) return;
var script = GetCurrentScriptForLineUpdate(parameters);
var script = GetCurrentScriptForLineUpdate(parameters, out var ownerPolicyId);
if (script != null)
ApplyExitCode(script, exitCode, LastMatchedLogTimestamp ?? UtcNowProvider(), CaptureLastMatchedProvenance());
else if (ownerPolicyId != null)
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: exit code {exitCode} belongs to platform script {ownerPolicyId}, whose completion was already emitted — dropped");
// An exit code means the executor just wrote its end block and IME is about to
// write the result — both land at a stale stream position when another process
// appended meanwhile. Check the ledgers on the next pass.
RequestOverwriteCheck();
}
private void ApplyExitCode(ScriptExecutionState script, int exitCode, DateTime observedAtUtc, CmTraceLineProvenance exitProvenance)
{
script.ExitCode = exitCode;
// Stamp when we learned the script's exit code so the deadline-based fallback
// (FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults) can fire if IME never logs its authoritative
// PS-SCRIPT-RESULT line in time. Prefer the source CMTrace timestamp (already
// UTC-normalized by the parser) so replayed log content is dated correctly. The
// line's provenance rides along: the fallback emit is bound to this line.
if (string.Equals(script.ScriptType, "platform", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
script.ExitCode = exitCode;
// Stamp when we learned the script's exit code so the deadline-based fallback
// (FlushStalePlatformScriptResults) can fire if IME never logs its authoritative
// PS-SCRIPT-RESULT line in time. Prefer the source CMTrace timestamp (already
// UTC-normalized by the parser) so replayed log content is dated correctly.
if (string.Equals(script.ScriptType, "platform", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
script.ExitObservedAtUtc = LastMatchedLogTimestamp ?? DateTime.UtcNow;
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: script exit code {exitCode} for {script.PolicyId}");
script.ExitObservedAtUtc = observedAtUtc;
script.ExitProvenance = exitProvenance;
}
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: script exit code {exitCode} for {script.PolicyId}");
}
private void HandleScriptOutput(Match match, Dictionary<string, string> parameters)
@@ -446,22 +507,36 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(id)) return;
// Dedup: the deadline-based fallback (FlushStalePlatformScriptResults) may already have
CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResult(id, result, LastMatchedLogTimestamp, LastMatchedPatternId, CaptureLastMatchedProvenance());
}
/// <summary>
/// The authoritative IME <c>PS-SCRIPT-RESULT</c> line of a platform script. Emits at once
/// when the executor end block (exit code, output) has been read already — the normal
/// order of the two files — and otherwise holds the completion: the end block reaches the
/// tracker after the result whenever a concurrent writer overwrote it (the check this
/// result triggers recovers it one pass later), when the AgentExecutor.log read of a pass
/// simply preceded the exit line by a few milliseconds, or when the poll loop stalled.
/// Emitting immediately lost the exit code in all three cases and, once the late start
/// line reopened the slot, produced a fallback duplicate (session e7f3c910).
/// <see cref="FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults"/> emits the held completion.
/// </summary>
internal void CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResult(string policyId, string result, DateTime? resultLineTimestampUtc, string patternId, CmTraceLineProvenance resultProvenance)
{
// Dedup: the deadline-based fallback (FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults) may already have
// emitted this script from its AgentExecutor exit code because IME's authoritative
// PS-SCRIPT-RESULT line arrived late. The fallback carries the same exit code + stdout,
// so re-emitting here would duplicate the timeline entry and inflate counts. Drop the
// now-redundant pending entry and skip.
if (_platformScriptResultEmitted.Contains(id))
if (_platformScriptResultEmitted.ContainsKey(policyId))
{
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: platform script {id} PS-SCRIPT-RESULT arrived after fallback emit — skipping duplicate");
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(id);
if (string.Equals(_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId, id, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId = null;
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: platform script {policyId} PS-SCRIPT-RESULT arrived after fallback emit — skipping duplicate");
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(policyId);
return;
}
// Merge with pending AgentExecutor data if available
if (_pendingPlatformScripts.TryGetValue(id, out var script))
if (_pendingPlatformScripts.TryGetValue(policyId, out var script))
{
// Stale-result guard: on an intra-lifetime re-run of the same policy, run 1's
// late PS-SCRIPT-RESULT can arrive after run 2's start line already created a
@@ -471,10 +546,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// line in the source log, so a result older than the pending slot's start
// belongs to a previous run — drop it and keep the live slot intact.
if (script.StartedAtUtc.HasValue
&& LastMatchedLogTimestamp.HasValue
&& LastMatchedLogTimestamp.Value < script.StartedAtUtc.Value)
&& resultLineTimestampUtc.HasValue
&& resultLineTimestampUtc.Value < script.StartedAtUtc.Value)
{
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: platform script {id} result predates the current run's start — stale result from a previous run, skipping");
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: platform script {policyId} result predates the current run's start — stale result from a previous run, skipping");
return;
}
}
@@ -482,70 +557,119 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
{
script = new ScriptExecutionState
{
PolicyId = id,
PolicyId = policyId,
ScriptType = "platform"
};
_pendingPlatformScripts[policyId] = script;
}
script.Result = result;
script.ResultSource = "ime_policy_result";
_logger.Info($"ImeLogTracker: platform script completed: {id}, result={result}, exit={script.ExitCode}");
EmitScriptEvent(script);
_platformScriptResultEmitted.Add(id);
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(id);
script.ResultObservedAtUtc = resultLineTimestampUtc ?? UtcNowProvider();
script.ResultProvenance = resultProvenance;
script.ResultPatternId = patternId;
_stateDirty = true;
if (script.ExitCode.HasValue)
{
EmitPlatformScriptResult(script);
}
else
{
script.ResultHeldSinceUtc = UtcNowProvider();
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: platform script {policyId} result={result} seen before its executor end block — holding the completion up to {PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace.TotalSeconds:F0}s for the exit code");
}
// The result block is IME's first write after the script wait — the executor's end
// block in the other file may have landed behind the bookmark at the same time.
RequestOverwriteCheck();
}
/// <summary>
/// The one emit path for platform-script completions (IME result, held result, exit-code
/// fallback): event, emitted-marker with the run's source timestamp, slot closed.
/// </summary>
private void EmitPlatformScriptResult(ScriptExecutionState script, string note = null)
{
_logger.Info($"ImeLogTracker: platform script completed: {script.PolicyId}, result={script.Result}, exit={script.ExitCode}{(note != null ? $" ({note})" : string.Empty)}");
EmitScriptEvent(script);
// The run's source stamp, capped at the clock: a result line cannot be read before it
// was written, so a stamp ahead of the clock is a wrong zone assumption on that line
// (a rewound result resolved in the reader's zone, session 4377911b: +1 h). Left
// uncapped, the marker made the genuine NEXT run's start line read as a late line of
// this run and its result a duplicate.
var runStamp = script.ResultObservedAtUtc ?? script.ExitObservedAtUtc ?? UtcNowProvider();
var nowUtc = UtcNowProvider();
_platformScriptResultEmitted[script.PolicyId] = runStamp > nowUtc ? nowUtc : runStamp;
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(script.PolicyId);
_stateDirty = true;
if (string.Equals(_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId, id, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId = null;
}
/// <summary>
/// Grace period after a platform script's AgentExecutor exit code is observed before
/// <see cref="FlushStalePlatformScriptResults"/> emits a completion from that exit code.
/// IME logs its authoritative <c>PS-SCRIPT-RESULT</c> line within ~1 s of exit on healthy
/// reporting cycles, so 15 s lets the normal path win virtually always — the fallback is a
/// true safety net for the case where IME has not flushed its batch-send to the Microsoft
/// service before the (often short) Autopilot enrollment ends and the agent terminates.
/// <see cref="FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults"/> emits a completion from that exit code.
/// IME logs its authoritative <c>PS-SCRIPT-RESULT</c> line within ~1 s of exit; when it
/// is missing after 15 s it was hidden by a concurrent writer (the ledger check in
/// <c>ImeLogTracker.Overwrite.cs</c> recovers that line) or the enrollment ended before
/// IME wrote it — this fallback is the safety net for the remaining cases.
/// </summary>
private static readonly TimeSpan PlatformScriptResultGrace = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(15);
/// <summary>
/// Policy IDs of platform scripts already emitted (via either the authoritative
/// PS-SCRIPT-RESULT path or the exit-code fallback). Guards against double emission when
/// both fire for the same script.
/// How long an IME result waits for the executor end block of its run before the
/// completion goes out without an exit code. An overwritten end block surfaces on the
/// pass after the result (100 ms, the result triggers the ledger check); a stalled poll
/// loop was measured at 2 s (session e7f3c910, VM at 100 % CPU). Well below the 15 s
/// exit-code fallback, and the event keeps the result line's timestamp — only its
/// delivery waits.
/// </summary>
private readonly HashSet<string> _platformScriptResultEmitted =
new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
internal static readonly TimeSpan PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5);
/// <summary>
/// Emits a <c>script_completed</c>/<c>script_failed</c> for every pending platform script
/// that has a known AgentExecutor exit code but whose IME <c>PS-SCRIPT-RESULT</c> line has
/// not arrived within <see cref="PlatformScriptResultGrace"/>. Without this, scripts that
/// completed shortly before the agent terminates are silently dropped (the
/// <c>_pendingPlatformScripts</c> buffer is neither persisted nor flushed on dispose), so a
/// device that ran N platform scripts could surface only the long-running one that happened
/// to get its IME result logged in time. Result is derived from the exit code (0 → Success,
/// else Failed) and tagged <c>resultSource=agentexecutor_fallback</c> so the data is honest
/// about its provenance.
/// <para>
/// Runs on the single-threaded polling loop (no locking needed, same as the handlers).
/// <paramref name="force"/> bypasses the grace check for the final pass on shutdown.
/// </para>
/// Platform scripts already emitted (via the authoritative PS-SCRIPT-RESULT path or the
/// exit-code fallback), keyed by policy id with the source timestamp of the emitted run
/// (the result line, or the exit line for a fallback emit). Guards against double emission
/// when both paths fire for the same script, and tells a late start line of the emitted
/// run from the start of the next run.
/// </summary>
internal void FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(DateTime nowUtc, bool force = false)
private readonly Dictionary<string, DateTime> _platformScriptResultEmitted =
new Dictionary<string, DateTime>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
/// <summary>
/// End-of-pass emit for pending platform scripts, two cases:
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item>A held IME result (<see cref="ScriptExecutionState.ResultHeldSinceUtc"/>) goes
/// out once its executor end block has been read — the block arrives within one pass, so
/// stdout/stderr are in by now — or after <see cref="PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace"/>.</item>
/// <item>A script with a known AgentExecutor exit code but no IME <c>PS-SCRIPT-RESULT</c>
/// line within <see cref="PlatformScriptResultGrace"/> is emitted from the exit code
/// (0 → Success, else Failed), tagged <c>resultSource=agentexecutor_fallback</c> so the
/// data is honest about its provenance. Without this, scripts that completed shortly
/// before the agent terminates were silently dropped.</item>
/// </list>
/// Runs on the single-threaded polling loop (no locking needed, same as the handlers).
/// <paramref name="force"/> bypasses both grace checks for the final pass on shutdown.
/// </summary>
internal void FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(DateTime nowUtc, bool force = false)
{
if (_pendingPlatformScripts.Count == 0) return;
List<string> toRemove = null;
foreach (var kv in _pendingPlatformScripts)
var fallbackEmitted = false;
foreach (var script in _pendingPlatformScripts.Values.ToList())
{
var script = kv.Value;
// Already emitted by the authoritative path — just drop the stale buffer entry.
if (_platformScriptResultEmitted.Contains(script.PolicyId))
if (_platformScriptResultEmitted.ContainsKey(script.PolicyId))
{
(toRemove ??= new List<string>()).Add(kv.Key);
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(script.PolicyId);
_stateDirty = true;
continue;
}
if (script.Result != null)
{
if (script.ExitCode.HasValue)
EmitPlatformScriptResult(script, "executor end block read after the result");
else if (force || !script.ResultHeldSinceUtc.HasValue || nowUtc - script.ResultHeldSinceUtc.Value >= PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace)
EmitPlatformScriptResult(script, $"no executor end block within {PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace.TotalSeconds:F0}s{(force ? ", shutdown flush" : string.Empty)}");
continue;
}
@@ -560,35 +684,20 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
script.Result = script.ExitCode.Value == 0 ? "Success" : "Failed";
script.ResultSource = "agentexecutor_fallback";
_logger.Info(
$"ImeLogTracker: platform script {script.PolicyId} result not seen within " +
$"{PlatformScriptResultGrace.TotalSeconds:F0}s{(force ? " (shutdown flush)" : "")} — " +
$"emitting from AgentExecutor exit code {script.ExitCode.Value} (fallback)");
EmitScriptEvent(script);
_platformScriptResultEmitted.Add(script.PolicyId);
(toRemove ??= new List<string>()).Add(kv.Key);
EmitPlatformScriptResult(script,
$"result not seen within {PlatformScriptResultGrace.TotalSeconds:F0}s{(force ? ", shutdown flush" : string.Empty)} — emitted from AgentExecutor exit code {script.ExitCode.Value} (fallback)");
fallbackEmitted = true;
}
if (toRemove != null)
{
// The flush can fire on a quiet polling cycle (grace expiry with no new log
// lines), where nothing else marks state dirty — the emitted-markers must reach
// the state file before a restart or the restarted tracker re-emits (H1).
_stateDirty = true;
foreach (var key in toRemove)
{
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(key);
if (string.Equals(_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId, key, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId = null;
}
}
// The fallback is an end signal like the others: the result line it stood in for
// may sit overwritten behind the bookmark of the other file.
if (fallbackEmitted) RequestOverwriteCheck();
}
/// <summary>Test seam: inject a pending platform script as if AgentExecutor.log had reported
/// its start + exit code, without an IME PS-SCRIPT-RESULT line.</summary>
internal void SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting(string policyId, int? exitCode, DateTime? exitObservedAtUtc, string stdout = null, DateTime? startedAtUtc = null)
internal void SeedPendingPlatformScriptForTesting(string policyId, int? exitCode, DateTime? exitObservedAtUtc, string stdout = null, DateTime? startedAtUtc = null,
CmTraceLineProvenance startedAtProvenance = null, CmTraceLineProvenance exitProvenance = null)
{
// Mirrors a fresh execution start: a new run clears any prior emitted-marker (see
// HandleScriptStarted) so re-runs of the same policy within one lifetime emit again.
@@ -601,50 +710,29 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
ExitObservedAtUtc = exitObservedAtUtc,
Stdout = stdout,
StartedAtUtc = startedAtUtc,
StartedAtProvenance = startedAtProvenance,
ExitProvenance = exitProvenance,
};
_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId = policyId;
NextTestEntry();
RecordInvocationMarker(policyId, isClose: false);
}
/// <summary>Test seam: simulate the authoritative IME PS-SCRIPT-RESULT path for a platform
/// script (same code as <see cref="HandleScriptCompleted"/> minus regex extraction).
/// <paramref name="resultLineTimestampUtc"/> stands in for the CMTrace timestamp of the
/// PS-SCRIPT-RESULT line (production reads it via <see cref="LastMatchedLogTimestamp"/>).</summary>
internal void CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting(string policyId, string result, DateTime? resultLineTimestampUtc = null)
/// <summary>Test seam: the authoritative IME PS-SCRIPT-RESULT path for a platform script
/// (the production handler minus regex extraction). <paramref name="resultLineTimestampUtc"/>
/// stands in for the CMTrace timestamp of the PS-SCRIPT-RESULT line (production reads it
/// via <see cref="LastMatchedLogTimestamp"/>, the fallback here).</summary>
internal void CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResultForTesting(string policyId, string result, DateTime? resultLineTimestampUtc = null, CmTraceLineProvenance resultProvenance = null)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(policyId)) return;
CompletePlatformScriptFromImeResult(policyId, result, resultLineTimestampUtc ?? LastMatchedLogTimestamp, "PS-SCRIPT-RESULT", resultProvenance ?? CaptureLastMatchedProvenance());
}
if (_platformScriptResultEmitted.Contains(policyId))
{
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(policyId);
if (string.Equals(_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId, policyId, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId = null;
return;
}
/// <summary>Test seam: the AgentExecutor exit-code line of a pending platform script (the
/// production handler minus regex extraction and positional ownership).</summary>
internal void RecordPlatformScriptExitCodeForTesting(string policyId, int exitCode, DateTime observedAtUtc, CmTraceLineProvenance exitProvenance = null)
{
if (_pendingPlatformScripts.TryGetValue(policyId, out var script))
{
// Mirror of HandleScriptCompleted's stale-result guard: a result older than the
// pending slot's start belongs to a previous run of the same policy.
if (script.StartedAtUtc.HasValue
&& resultLineTimestampUtc.HasValue
&& resultLineTimestampUtc.Value < script.StartedAtUtc.Value)
{
return;
}
}
else
{
script = new ScriptExecutionState { PolicyId = policyId, ScriptType = "platform" };
}
script.Result = result;
script.ResultSource = "ime_policy_result";
EmitScriptEvent(script);
_platformScriptResultEmitted.Add(policyId);
_pendingPlatformScripts.Remove(policyId);
if (string.Equals(_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId, policyId, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
_lastPlatformScriptPolicyId = null;
_stateDirty = true;
ApplyExitCode(script, exitCode, observedAtUtc, exitProvenance);
}
/// <summary>
@@ -720,8 +808,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// HS-NEW-RESULT path whose end stamp includes IME's batched reporting latency.
// Peek only: HS-NEW-RESULT still consumes + removes the entry for cycle timing.
StartedAtUtc = _healthScriptStartTimes.TryGetValue(id, out var earlyStart)
? earlyStart
? earlyStart.Utc
: (DateTime?)null,
StartedAtProvenance = _healthScriptStartTimes.TryGetValue(id, out var earlyStartProvenance)
? earlyStartProvenance.Provenance
: null,
// The HS-COMPLIANCE line is the end of this phase; emitted synchronously, so the
// last matched line is it.
ResultProvenance = CaptureLastMatchedProvenance(),
DurationBasis = "script_runtime",
};
@@ -736,6 +830,17 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
_pendingHealthScript = null;
}
/// <summary>
/// Test seam: a health-script start line for <paramref name="id"/> stamped
/// <paramref name="startedAtUtc"/>, without driving the regex pipeline.
/// </summary>
internal void HandleHealthScriptStartForTest(string id, DateTime startedAtUtc)
{
LastMatchedLogTimestamp = startedAtUtc;
var match = System.Text.RegularExpressions.Regex.Match(id ?? string.Empty, @"(?<id>.+)");
HandleScriptStarted(match, new Dictionary<string, string> { ["scriptType"] = "remediation" });
}
/// <summary>
/// Test seam: simulates the full HS-SCRIPT-START → HS-RUN-CONTEXT / HS-EXITCODE /
/// HS-STDOUT / HS-STDERR → HS-COMPLIANCE sequence by directly populating the
@@ -779,10 +884,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
/// HS-SCRIPT-START line had been observed, so a subsequent
/// <see cref="HandleHealthScriptResultJson"/> surfaces a run duration without driving the
/// full regex pipeline.</summary>
internal void SeedHealthScriptStartForTesting(string policyId, DateTime startedAtUtc)
internal void SeedHealthScriptStartForTesting(string policyId, DateTime startedAtUtc, CmTraceLineProvenance provenance = null)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(policyId)) return;
_healthScriptStartTimes[policyId] = startedAtUtc;
_healthScriptStartTimes[policyId] = (startedAtUtc, provenance);
}
private void HandleHealthScriptResult(Match match, Dictionary<string, string> parameters)
@@ -794,6 +899,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
return;
}
HandleHealthScriptResultJson(json);
// A remediation executor just ended too — its end block may sit behind the bookmark.
RequestOverwriteCheck();
}
/// <summary>
@@ -837,10 +944,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// emitted phase events — the remediation analog of platform-script timing. Consumed +
// removed so a later re-run of the same policy re-times from its own start. Null when
// the start line was never seen in the agent's window (e.g. a replayed result).
DateTime? cycleStartedAtUtc = _healthScriptStartTimes.TryGetValue(policyId, out var hsStart)
? hsStart
: (DateTime?)null;
var hasCycleStart = _healthScriptStartTimes.TryGetValue(policyId, out var hsStart);
DateTime? cycleStartedAtUtc = hasCycleStart ? hsStart.Utc : (DateTime?)null;
var cycleStartProvenance = hasCycleStart ? hsStart.Provenance : null;
_healthScriptStartTimes.Remove(policyId);
// Every phase ends on this HS-NEW-RESULT line.
var resultProvenance = CaptureLastMatchedProvenance();
// Common metadata — applied to every emitted phase event.
var remediationStatus = TryGetInt(root, "RemediationStatus");
@@ -880,7 +989,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
targetType: targetType,
errorCode: errorCode,
errorDetails: errorDetails,
startedAtUtc: cycleStartedAtUtc);
startedAtUtc: cycleStartedAtUtc,
startedAtProvenance: cycleStartProvenance,
resultProvenance: resultProvenance);
// complianceResult mirrors the legacy HS-COMPLIANCE event semantics: True when the
// pre-detection script reported compliant (exit 0), False otherwise.
detection.ComplianceResult = firstDetectExit == 0 ? "True" : (firstDetectExit.HasValue ? "False" : null);
@@ -904,7 +1015,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
targetType: targetType,
errorCode: errorCode,
errorDetails: errorDetails,
startedAtUtc: cycleStartedAtUtc);
startedAtUtc: cycleStartedAtUtc,
startedAtProvenance: cycleStartProvenance,
resultProvenance: resultProvenance);
// No complianceResult on the remediation phase — there is nothing to be compliant about.
EmitScriptEvent(remediation);
}
@@ -926,7 +1039,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
targetType: targetType,
errorCode: errorCode,
errorDetails: errorDetails,
startedAtUtc: cycleStartedAtUtc);
startedAtUtc: cycleStartedAtUtc,
startedAtProvenance: cycleStartProvenance,
resultProvenance: resultProvenance);
postDetection.ComplianceResult = lastDetectExit == 0 ? "True" : (lastDetectExit.HasValue ? "False" : null);
EmitScriptEvent(postDetection);
}
@@ -949,7 +1064,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
int? targetType,
int? errorCode,
string errorDetails,
DateTime? startedAtUtc) =>
DateTime? startedAtUtc,
CmTraceLineProvenance startedAtProvenance,
CmTraceLineProvenance resultProvenance) =>
new ScriptExecutionState
{
PolicyId = policyId,
@@ -966,6 +1083,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// Cycle start (HS-SCRIPT-START). Every phase carries the same cycle start so the
// adapter computes the total run duration; the Web surfaces it once at card level.
StartedAtUtc = startedAtUtc,
StartedAtProvenance = startedAtProvenance,
ResultProvenance = resultProvenance,
// End stamp is the HS-NEW-RESULT line — written only after IME's batched report
// to the service, so this duration overstates the actual script execution time.
DurationBasis = "cycle_including_reporting_latency"
@@ -992,9 +1111,58 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
private void EmitScriptEvent(ScriptExecutionState script)
{
if (script == null || string.IsNullOrEmpty(script.PolicyId)) return;
// Health scripts recur for as long as the device is up; platform scripts run once.
if (string.Equals(script.ScriptType, "remediation", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
&& !_currentLineIsHistoricReplay)
{
var emit = _recurringScripts.OnResult(script, LastMatchedLogTimestamp ?? UtcNowProvider(), out var releasedStart);
_stateDirty = true;
if (!emit)
{
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: health script {script.PolicyId} {script.ScriptPart} repeats its last reported result — counted, not emitted");
return;
}
if (releasedStart != null) RaiseScriptStarted(releasedStart);
}
OnScriptCompleted?.Invoke(script);
}
private void RaiseScriptStarted(ScriptStartedInfo info)
{
try { OnScriptStarted?.Invoke(info); }
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Warning($"ImeLogTracker: OnScriptStarted handler threw: {ex.Message}"); }
}
/// <summary>
/// A held start whose run produced no result for <see cref="HeldScriptStartGrace"/> is
/// emitted after all: the script did not finish. On shutdown the shorter
/// <see cref="HeldScriptStartShutdownGrace"/> applies — a start read moments before the
/// stop stays held for the next run of this session instead of reading as unfinished.
/// </summary>
internal void FlushRecurringScripts(DateTime nowUtc, bool shuttingDown)
{
var released = _recurringScripts.ReleaseStartsWithoutResult(
nowUtc, shuttingDown ? HeldScriptStartShutdownGrace : HeldScriptStartGrace);
foreach (var start in released) RaiseScriptStarted(start);
if (shuttingDown)
{
foreach (var summary in _recurringScripts.TakeSummaries())
{
try { OnScriptRecurrenceSummary?.Invoke(summary); }
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Warning($"ImeLogTracker: OnScriptRecurrenceSummary handler threw: {ex.Message}"); }
}
}
if (_recurringScripts.ConsumeDirty()) _stateDirty = true;
}
// IME aborts a health script after roughly 30 minutes.
internal static readonly TimeSpan HeldScriptStartGrace = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(30);
internal static readonly TimeSpan HeldScriptStartShutdownGrace = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5);
private static string TruncateOutput(string output)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(output) || output.Length <= MaxScriptOutputLength)
@@ -78,243 +78,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
try
{
var fileInfo = new FileInfo(filePath);
if (!fileInfo.Exists) continue;
// Captured BEFORE MarkChecked below stamps this pass. Growth measured
// against a previously observed state is what makes this pass's lines valid
// "written now" anchors — for the per-file measurement AND per-line anchoring.
var hadPreviousObservation = _positionTracker.HasSeen(filePath);
var lastCheckedUtc = _positionTracker.GetLastCheckedUtc(filePath);
var passNowUtc = UtcNowProvider();
var startPos = _positionTracker.GetSafePosition(filePath, fileInfo.Length);
// Every look counts, including "no new data" and an empty first sight: the
// NEXT pass's freshness window is measured from here. Restored bookmarks
// deliberately carry no LastCheckedUtc — the first pass after a restart reads
// downtime backlog and must never count as fresh.
_positionTracker.MarkChecked(filePath, passNowUtc);
if (startPos >= fileInfo.Length)
{
// M2: guard the interpolated string so it isn't built every 100 ms tick
// (per file) when Trace is off — which is the production default (Info).
if (_logger.LogLevel >= AgentLogLevel.Trace)
_logger.Trace($"ImeLogTracker: {Path.GetFileName(filePath)} — no new data (pos={startPos}, size={fileInfo.Length})");
continue;
}
if (_logger.LogLevel >= AgentLogLevel.Trace)
_logger.Trace($"ImeLogTracker: reading {Path.GetFileName(filePath)} from pos {startPos} (size={fileInfo.Length}, delta={fileInfo.Length - startPos})");
_currentSourceFileName = Path.GetFileName(filePath);
_currentPassLinesAreFresh = hadPreviousObservation
&& lastCheckedUtc > DateTime.MinValue
&& (passNowUtc - lastCheckedUtc) <= FreshLineMaxAge;
// Newest bias-less line of this pass — the calibration anchor. Bias-carrying
// lines are skipped: they already state the writer's offset, so they need no
// measurement and must not overwrite one.
CmTraceLogEntry calibrationAnchor = null;
using (var stream = new FileStream(filePath, FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read, FileShare.ReadWrite))
{
stream.Seek(startPos, SeekOrigin.Begin);
var reader = new BoundedLineReader(stream, MaxEntryBytes);
var stats = new PassStats();
// Buffer for multiline CMTrace entries (e.g. AgentExecutor.log
// "write output done. output = ..." spans many lines)
StringBuilder multiLineBuffer = null;
int multiLineCount = 0;
// Set after a capped entry is dropped: its remaining physical lines
// are skipped instead of being matched as raw text, until the entry
// closes or a new entry begins (so no real entry is lost).
bool skippingDroppedEntry = false;
// File offset where the entry currently being assembled/processed
// begins — the bookmark to fall back to when that entry is NOT
// consumed (cancellation, or a held-back unterminated tail).
long entryStart = startPos;
// Where the next pass resumes. EOF unless an entry is left unconsumed.
long resumePos;
while (true)
{
// CancellationToken.None: cancellation is honoured by the explicit
// check below (exact bookmark) rather than by an exception out of
// the read, which the poll loop would log as an error.
var line = await reader.ReadLineAsync(CancellationToken.None);
if (line == null)
{
// EOF. An in-flight multiline entry here is an entry the writer
// has not finished — hold it back (see HoldBackTail) instead of
// dropping it and raw-matching its remaining lines next pass.
if (multiLineBuffer != null && HoldBackTail(filePath, entryStart, fileInfo.Length, passNowUtc))
{
_heldTailCount++;
resumePos = entryStart;
break;
}
resumePos = reader.Position;
break;
}
if (token.IsCancellationRequested)
{
// Exact bookmark: nothing of this line (or of the multiline
// entry it belongs to) has been handled.
resumePos = multiLineBuffer != null ? entryStart : reader.LastLineStart;
break;
}
if (multiLineBuffer == null)
entryStart = reader.LastLineStart;
_linesRead++;
// A physical line over the cap is never matched: its captures would be
// cut and the regexes would run over attacker-sized input. The capped
// prefix is enough to tell whether it opened an entry whose remaining
// lines must be skipped rather than raw-matched.
if (reader.LastLineTruncated)
{
stats.OversizedLines++;
_oversizedLines++;
if (multiLineBuffer != null)
{
multiLineBuffer = null;
multiLineCount = 0;
skippingDroppedEntry = true;
}
else if (line.StartsWith("<![LOG[") && !line.Contains("]LOG]!>"))
{
skippingDroppedEntry = true;
}
continue;
}
if (!reader.LastLineTerminated && multiLineBuffer == null
&& HoldBackTail(filePath, reader.LastLineStart, fileInfo.Length, passNowUtc))
{
// Unterminated single line at EOF: the writer is mid-line.
_heldTailCount++;
resumePos = reader.LastLineStart;
break;
}
if (skippingDroppedEntry)
{
// A line opening a new entry ends the skip and is processed
// itself — checked BEFORE the close-tag test, because a complete
// single-line entry contains both and must not be consumed as
// the dropped entry's close.
if (line.StartsWith("<![LOG["))
skippingDroppedEntry = false;
else
{
if (line.Contains("]LOG]!>")) skippingDroppedEntry = false;
continue;
}
}
// --- Multiline CMTrace buffering ---
// CMTrace entries: <![LOG[message]LOG]!><time=...>
// When message contains newlines, the entry spans multiple lines.
// We buffer until we find the closing ]LOG]!> tag.
if (multiLineBuffer != null)
{
// Continuing a multiline entry
multiLineBuffer.Append('\n').Append(line);
multiLineCount++;
if (line.Contains("]LOG]!>"))
{
// Entry complete — use the assembled line
line = multiLineBuffer.ToString();
multiLineBuffer = null;
multiLineCount = 0;
}
else if (multiLineCount >= MaxMultiLineBufferLines || multiLineBuffer.Length >= MaxEntryBytes)
{
// Safety limit — discard to bound memory and parser work. Warning
// (not Debug) so a capped entry is visible in the client log at the
// default level: a real IME entry this large would be news.
_logger.Warning($"ImeLogTracker: discarding multiline CMTrace buffer in {Path.GetFileName(filePath)} after {multiLineCount} lines / {multiLineBuffer.Length} chars (cap {MaxMultiLineBufferLines} lines / {MaxEntryBytes} chars) — entry dropped");
multiLineBuffer = null;
multiLineCount = 0;
skippingDroppedEntry = true;
continue;
}
else
{
// Still accumulating — read next line
continue;
}
}
else if (line.StartsWith("<![LOG[") && !line.Contains("]LOG]!>"))
{
// Start of a multiline CMTrace entry
multiLineBuffer = new StringBuilder(line);
multiLineCount = 1;
continue;
}
// --- Normal processing (single-line or completed multiline) ---
CmTraceLogEntry entry;
string messageToMatch;
_currentEntryOffset = entryStart;
if (CmTraceLogParser.TryParseLine(line, out entry))
{
messageToMatch = entry.Message;
if (entry.HasTimestamp && !entry.BiasMinutes.HasValue)
calibrationAnchor = entry;
}
else
{
// Non-CMTrace line - match raw
messageToMatch = line;
entry = null;
}
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(messageToMatch)) continue;
// Simulation mode delay
if (SimulationMode && entry != null)
{
await ApplySimulationDelay(ResolveEntryUtc(entry), token);
}
MatchLine(filePath, line, messageToMatch, entry, stats);
}
ClearHeldTailIfConsumed(filePath, resumePos);
_positionTracker.SetPosition(filePath, resumePos);
_stateDirty = true;
backlogBytes += Math.Max(0, fileInfo.Length - resumePos);
// One line per pass and file, never per hostile line: the counters are
// the operator's only trace that matching was skipped or cut short.
if (stats.RegexTimeouts > 0 || stats.BudgetBreaks > 0 || stats.OversizedLines > 0)
{
_logger.Warning(
$"ImeLogTracker: {Path.GetFileName(filePath)} pass skipped work — " +
$"oversizedLines={stats.OversizedLines} (cap {MaxEntryBytes} bytes), " +
$"regexTimeouts={stats.RegexTimeouts}, lineBudgetBreaks={stats.BudgetBreaks}" +
(stats.FirstSkippedPatternId != null ? $", firstSkippedPattern={stats.FirstSkippedPatternId}" : string.Empty));
RaiseTrackerDegradedOnce(Path.GetFileName(filePath), stats.FirstSkippedPatternId);
}
// Calibrate AFTER the pass: this pass's lines were resolved with the
// offset established previously, at most one poll (100 ms) old. Buffering
// the pass to calibrate first is not an option — the first pass of
// AppWorkload.log can be hundreds of MB. The cost is a warm-up of one
// growing pass, during which lines fall back to the reader zone and are
// flagged as such.
if (hadPreviousObservation && calibrationAnchor != null)
CalibrateFrom(_currentSourceFileName, Path.GetFileName(filePath), calibrationAnchor);
_currentEntryOffset = -1;
}
backlogBytes += await ProcessFileAsync(filePath, token);
}
catch (FileNotFoundException) { }
catch (IOException ex)
@@ -330,6 +94,246 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
}
}
/// <summary>
/// One pass over one file: the bytes behind the bookmark, on a multi-writer file preceded
/// by the overwrite check that may move the bookmark back first (see
/// <c>ImeLogTracker.Overwrite.cs</c>). Returns the file's remaining backlog in bytes.
/// </summary>
private async Task<long> ProcessFileAsync(string filePath, CancellationToken token)
{
var fileInfo = new FileInfo(filePath);
if (!fileInfo.Exists) return 0;
// Captured BEFORE MarkChecked below stamps this pass. Growth measured
// against a previously observed state is what makes this pass's lines valid
// "written now" anchors — for the per-file measurement AND per-line anchoring.
var hadPreviousObservation = _positionTracker.HasSeen(filePath);
var lastCheckedUtc = _positionTracker.GetLastCheckedUtc(filePath);
var passNowUtc = UtcNowProvider();
var startPos = _positionTracker.GetSafePosition(filePath, fileInfo.Length);
// Every look counts, including "no new data" and an empty first sight: the
// NEXT pass's freshness window is measured from here. Restored bookmarks
// deliberately carry no LastCheckedUtc — the first pass after a restart reads
// downtime backlog and must never count as fresh.
_positionTracker.MarkChecked(filePath, passNowUtc);
var fileName = Path.GetFileName(filePath);
var ledger = IsMultiWriterLogFile(fileName) ? GetLedger(fileName) : null;
// Set by a rewind: entries that still read unchanged behind the old bookmark are
// skipped, and nothing below the old bookmark is fresh or a calibration anchor.
HashSet<LedgerEntry> rewoundEntries = null;
long oldBookmark = -1;
if (ledger != null)
{
var rewindTo = await PrepareLedgerAsync(filePath, fileName, ledger, startPos, passNowUtc, token);
if (rewindTo >= 0)
{
rewoundEntries = ApplyRewind(filePath, fileName, ledger, rewindTo, startPos);
oldBookmark = startPos;
startPos = rewindTo;
}
}
if (startPos >= fileInfo.Length)
{
// M2: guard the interpolated string so it isn't built every 100 ms tick
// (per file) when Trace is off — which is the production default (Info).
if (_logger.LogLevel >= AgentLogLevel.Trace)
_logger.Trace($"ImeLogTracker: {fileName} — no new data (pos={startPos}, size={fileInfo.Length})");
return 0;
}
if (_logger.LogLevel >= AgentLogLevel.Trace)
_logger.Trace($"ImeLogTracker: reading {fileName} from pos {startPos} (size={fileInfo.Length}, delta={fileInfo.Length - startPos})");
_currentSourceFileName = fileName;
var passLinesAreFresh = hadPreviousObservation
&& lastCheckedUtc > DateTime.MinValue
&& (passNowUtc - lastCheckedUtc) <= FreshLineMaxAge;
_currentPassLinesAreFresh = passLinesAreFresh;
// Newest bias-less line of this pass — the calibration anchor. Bias-carrying
// lines are skipped: they already state the writer's offset, so they need no
// measurement and must not overwrite one.
CmTraceLogEntry calibrationAnchor = null;
using (var stream = new FileStream(filePath, FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read, FileShare.ReadWrite))
{
// Guard zone: the file grew and is open anyway — re-check the entries just behind
// the bookmark, where a stale writer's block lands when it is short.
if (ledger != null && rewoundEntries == null && ledger.Entries.Count > 0)
{
var guardFrom = ledger.OffsetOfEntryAtOrAfter(startPos - OverwriteGuardBytes);
if (guardFrom >= 0 && guardFrom < startPos)
{
var divergence = await FindOverwriteAsync(stream, ledger, guardFrom, startPos, token);
_verifiedBytes += startPos - guardFrom;
if (divergence >= 0)
{
// The guard saw only the tail of the ledger; the block may start earlier.
var earliest = await FindOverwriteAsync(stream, ledger, ledger.StartOffset, startPos, token);
_verifiedBytes += startPos - ledger.StartOffset;
_verifyPasses++;
if (earliest >= 0) divergence = earliest;
rewoundEntries = ApplyRewind(filePath, fileName, ledger, divergence, startPos);
oldBookmark = startPos;
startPos = divergence;
}
}
}
stream.Seek(startPos, SeekOrigin.Begin);
var reader = new BoundedLineReader(stream, MaxEntryBytes, hashLines: ledger != null);
var assembler = new CmTraceEntryAssembler(MaxMultiLineBufferLines, MaxEntryBytes);
var stats = new PassStats();
var firstEntry = true;
// Where the next pass resumes. EOF unless an entry is left unconsumed.
long resumePos;
while (true)
{
// CancellationToken.None: cancellation is honoured by the explicit
// check below (exact bookmark) rather than by an exception out of
// the read, which the poll loop would log as an error.
var line = await reader.ReadLineAsync(CancellationToken.None);
if (line == null)
{
// EOF. An in-flight multiline entry here is an entry the writer
// has not finished — hold it back (see HoldBackTail) instead of
// dropping it and raw-matching its remaining lines next pass.
if (assembler.HasOpenEntry && HoldBackTail(filePath, assembler.OpenEntryStart, fileInfo.Length, passNowUtc))
{
_heldTailCount++;
resumePos = assembler.OpenEntryStart;
break;
}
resumePos = reader.Position;
break;
}
if (token.IsCancellationRequested)
{
// Exact bookmark: nothing of this line (or of the multiline
// entry it belongs to) has been handled.
resumePos = assembler.HasOpenEntry ? assembler.OpenEntryStart : reader.LastLineStart;
break;
}
_linesRead++;
if (!reader.LastLineTruncated && !reader.LastLineTerminated && !assembler.HasOpenEntry
&& HoldBackTail(filePath, reader.LastLineStart, fileInfo.Length, passNowUtc))
{
// Unterminated single line at EOF: the writer is mid-line.
_heldTailCount++;
resumePos = reader.LastLineStart;
break;
}
AssembledEntry entry;
var outcome = assembler.Feed(line, reader.LastLineStart, reader.Position, reader.LastLineTruncated, reader.LastLineHash, out entry);
if (outcome == CmTraceEntryAssembler.Outcome.OversizedDropped)
{
// A physical line over the cap is never matched: its captures would be
// cut and the regexes would run over attacker-sized input.
stats.OversizedLines++;
_oversizedLines++;
continue;
}
if (outcome == CmTraceEntryAssembler.Outcome.CapDropped)
{
// Warning (not Debug) so a capped entry is visible in the client log at the
// default level: a real IME entry this large would be news.
_logger.Warning($"ImeLogTracker: discarding multiline CMTrace buffer in {fileName} after {assembler.DroppedLines} lines / {assembler.DroppedChars} chars (cap {MaxMultiLineBufferLines} lines / {MaxEntryBytes} chars) — entry dropped");
continue;
}
if (outcome != CmTraceEntryAssembler.Outcome.Entry) continue;
if (firstEntry)
{
firstEntry = false;
// A fragment right at the bookmark of a multi-writer file (the previous
// entry ended exactly here, this one does not open an entry) is the tail of
// a block a stale writer laid over already-read bytes: verify before reading on.
if (ledger != null && rewoundEntries == null && entry.Offset == ledger.EndOffset
&& ledger.LastFragmentOffset != entry.Offset && !entry.Text.StartsWith("<![LOG["))
{
ledger.VerifyRequested = true;
ledger.LastFragmentOffset = entry.Offset;
resumePos = entry.Offset;
break;
}
}
if (ledger != null) ledger.Record(entry);
if (rewoundEntries != null && rewoundEntries.Contains(new LedgerEntry { Offset = entry.Offset, Hash = entry.Hash }))
continue; // unchanged behind the old bookmark — processed before the rewind
_currentPassLinesAreFresh = passLinesAreFresh && entry.Offset >= oldBookmark;
// --- Normal processing (single-line or completed multiline) ---
CmTraceLogEntry parsed;
string messageToMatch;
_currentEntryOffset = entry.Offset;
if (CmTraceLogParser.TryParseLine(entry.Text, out parsed))
{
messageToMatch = parsed.Message;
if (parsed.HasTimestamp && !parsed.BiasMinutes.HasValue && entry.Offset >= oldBookmark)
calibrationAnchor = parsed;
}
else
{
// Non-CMTrace line - match raw
messageToMatch = entry.Text;
parsed = null;
}
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(messageToMatch)) continue;
// Simulation mode delay
if (SimulationMode && parsed != null)
{
await ApplySimulationDelay(ResolveEntryUtc(parsed), token);
}
MatchLine(filePath, entry.Text, messageToMatch, parsed, stats);
}
ClearHeldTailIfConsumed(filePath, resumePos);
_positionTracker.SetPosition(filePath, resumePos);
_stateDirty = true;
if (ledger != null) ledger.TrimBelow(RetentionFloor(fileName, resumePos));
// One line per pass and file, never per hostile line: the counters are
// the operator's only trace that matching was skipped or cut short.
if (stats.RegexTimeouts > 0 || stats.BudgetBreaks > 0 || stats.OversizedLines > 0)
{
_logger.Warning(
$"ImeLogTracker: {fileName} pass skipped work — " +
$"oversizedLines={stats.OversizedLines} (cap {MaxEntryBytes} bytes), " +
$"regexTimeouts={stats.RegexTimeouts}, lineBudgetBreaks={stats.BudgetBreaks}" +
(stats.FirstSkippedPatternId != null ? $", firstSkippedPattern={stats.FirstSkippedPatternId}" : string.Empty));
RaiseTrackerDegradedOnce(fileName, stats.FirstSkippedPatternId);
}
// Calibrate AFTER the pass: this pass's lines were resolved with the
// offset established previously, at most one poll (100 ms) old. Buffering
// the pass to calibrate first is not an option — the first pass of
// AppWorkload.log can be hundreds of MB. The cost is a warm-up of one
// growing pass, during which lines fall back to the reader zone and are
// flagged as such.
if (hadPreviousObservation && calibrationAnchor != null)
CalibrateFrom(_currentSourceFileName, fileName, calibrationAnchor);
_currentEntryOffset = -1;
return Math.Max(0, fileInfo.Length - resumePos);
}
}
private sealed class PassStats
{
public int RegexTimeouts;
@@ -501,6 +505,21 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
"imetokenfailure",
};
/// <summary>
/// Snapshot of the last matched line's provenance, for a consumer that acts later than
/// the match (a held platform-script result, a run duration across two lines) and must
/// describe THAT line rather than whichever line is matched by then.
/// </summary>
internal CmTraceLineProvenance CaptureLastMatchedProvenance() => new CmTraceLineProvenance
{
SourceLocalTs = LastMatchedSourceLocalTimestamp,
Origin = LastMatchedSourceOffsetOrigin,
OffsetMinutes = LastMatchedSourceOffsetMinutes,
EraAnchorKind = LastMatchedEraAnchorKind,
MeasuredWriterOffsetMinutes = LastMatchedMeasuredWriterOffsetMinutes,
SourceFileName = _currentSourceFileName,
};
private void HandlePatternMatch(CompiledPattern pattern, Match match, string message, CmTraceLogEntry entry)
{
LastMatchedPatternId = pattern.PatternId;
@@ -547,6 +566,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// replays historic logs on purpose and bypasses the guard.
var isStaleReplayLine = !SimulationMode && entry != null
&& (UtcNowProvider() - NormalizeUtc(ResolveEntryUtc(entry))) > HistoricReplayThreshold;
_currentLineIsHistoricReplay = isStaleReplayLine;
if (isStaleReplayLine && AppMutatingActions.Contains(pattern.Action?.ToLower() ?? string.Empty))
{
_logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: skipped app action '{pattern.Action}' for historic line ({ResolveEntryUtc(entry):o})");
@@ -828,10 +848,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
break;
case "resetplatformscriptcontext":
// Session 6b4993e5 fix: a fresh AgentExecutor invocation banner
// ("ExecutorLog AgentExecutor gets invoked") ends the previous
// invocation's line-capture context. See HandleAgentExecutorInvocationBoundary.
HandleAgentExecutorInvocationBoundary();
// "ExecutorLog AgentExecutor gets invoked": a new process — the executor
// lines that follow belong to its own argument line, never to the
// previous invocation (session 6b4993e5).
HandleAgentExecutorInvocation();
break;
case "agentinvocationargument":
HandleAgentInvocationArgument(match.Groups["kind"]?.Value);
break;
case "agentexecutorcompleted":
HandleAgentExecutorCompleted();
break;
case "healthscriptresult":
@@ -859,11 +887,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
/// <c>_activePatterns</c> → <see cref="HandlePatternMatch"/>). Lets unit tests drive the
/// script / app handlers deterministically without writing CMTrace files or spinning the
/// poller. <paramref name="sourceTimestampUtc"/> populates the entry timestamp some
/// handlers read via <see cref="LastMatchedLogTimestamp"/>.
/// handlers read via <see cref="LastMatchedLogTimestamp"/>. <paramref name="sourceFileName"/>
/// names the log the line comes from — positional ownership is per file — and stays in
/// effect for later calls; omitted, the line lands in the test file.
/// </summary>
internal void ProcessLogMessageForTest(string message, DateTime? sourceTimestampUtc = null)
internal void ProcessLogMessageForTest(string message, DateTime? sourceTimestampUtc = null, string sourceFileName = null)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(message)) return;
if (sourceFileName != null) _currentSourceFileName = sourceFileName;
NextTestEntry();
// The test seam hands in an already-resolved UTC instant, so it takes the same route a
// writer-declared bias does: TimestampUtc set, no zone left to guess.
var entry = sourceTimestampUtc.HasValue
@@ -0,0 +1,490 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
{
/// <summary>
/// Partial: overwrite-aware tailing of the two IME logs that several processes append to.
/// <para>
/// IME's trace listener opens each log once per process with FileMode.Append and
/// FileShare.ReadWrite and writes at its own stream position afterwards. AgentExecutor.exe
/// (two processes per user-context script, one per detection or remediation script) has such
/// a listener on AgentExecutor.log AND on IntuneManagementExtension.log. Whenever one process
/// resumes writing after another one appended, it overwrites those bytes: the final file
/// holds the last writer, while a tailer that trusts its bookmark read the first version and
/// never sees the second (session 46749560: 6 of 16 script results, 4 of 16 exit blocks).
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// So the bytes behind the bookmark are not immutable. The tracker keeps a fingerprint ledger
/// of every entry it read from these files, re-verifies it while script invocations are in
/// flight or right after a signal that a stale writer just wrote, and on the first changed
/// entry rewinds the bookmark — processing only entries it has not processed before.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
public partial class ImeLogTracker
{
/// <summary>Live logs with more than one writing process; archived rotations are closed files.</summary>
internal static readonly string[] MultiWriterLogFiles = { "AgentExecutor.log", "IntuneManagementExtension.log" };
/// <summary>Ledger depth behind the bookmark while no script is in flight.</summary>
internal const int LedgerRetentionBytes = 1024 * 1024;
/// <summary>Hard cap on the ledger depth, whatever is in flight.</summary>
internal const int LedgerMaxBytes = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
/// <summary>Entries this close to the bookmark are re-checked on every pass that found growth (the file is open anyway).</summary>
internal const int OverwriteGuardBytes = 4 * 1024;
/// <summary>After a restart the ledger is seeded from this many bytes before the persisted bookmark.</summary>
internal const int RestartSeedBytes = 64 * 1024;
/// <summary>Verification work per second while in contention — a deep ledger is checked less often, never skipped.</summary>
internal const long VerifyBudgetBytesPerSecond = 256 * 1024;
internal static readonly TimeSpan VerifyMinInterval = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1);
/// <summary>How long an observed invocation keeps the files in contention on its own (detection executors have no pending slot).</summary>
internal static readonly TimeSpan InvocationContentionWindow = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(120);
/// <summary>A pending script older than this no longer holds the files in contention.</summary>
internal static readonly TimeSpan MaxPendingScriptContention = TimeSpan.FromHours(2);
private const int MaxInvocationMarkersPerFile = 512;
private const string TestSourceFileName = "TEST.log";
private const string LogOpenTag = "<![LOG[";
/// <summary>One processed entry: where it starts, how far it reaches, what its bytes hashed to.</summary>
internal struct LedgerEntry : IEquatable<LedgerEntry>
{
public long Offset;
public int Length;
public ulong Hash;
// Identity is (offset, hash): a tail first read unterminated and later completed
// keeps its hash but grows by its terminator.
public bool Equals(LedgerEntry other) => Offset == other.Offset && Hash == other.Hash;
public override bool Equals(object obj) => obj is LedgerEntry other && Equals(other);
public override int GetHashCode() => unchecked(((int)Offset * 397) ^ (int)Hash ^ (int)(Hash >> 32));
}
internal sealed class FileLedger
{
public readonly List<LedgerEntry> Entries = new List<LedgerEntry>();
public bool VerifyRequested;
public DateTime NextCadenceVerifyUtc = DateTime.MinValue;
public long LastFragmentOffset = -1;
public bool Seeded;
public bool RewindLogged;
public long StartOffset => Entries.Count > 0 ? Entries[0].Offset : -1;
public long EndOffset => Entries.Count > 0 ? Entries[Entries.Count - 1].Offset + Entries[Entries.Count - 1].Length : -1;
public int IndexOfFirstAtOrAfter(long offset)
{
int lo = 0, hi = Entries.Count;
while (lo < hi)
{
var mid = (lo + hi) >> 1;
if (Entries[mid].Offset < offset) lo = mid + 1; else hi = mid;
}
return lo;
}
/// <summary>Entry offset at or after <paramref name="offset"/>, or -1.</summary>
public long OffsetOfEntryAtOrAfter(long offset)
{
var idx = IndexOfFirstAtOrAfter(offset);
return idx < Entries.Count ? Entries[idx].Offset : -1;
}
public void Record(AssembledEntry e)
{
var idx = IndexOfFirstAtOrAfter(e.Offset);
if (idx < Entries.Count) Entries.RemoveRange(idx, Entries.Count - idx);
Entries.Add(new LedgerEntry { Offset = e.Offset, Length = e.Length, Hash = e.Hash });
}
/// <summary>Drops everything from <paramref name="offset"/> on and returns it — the entries a rewind must not process twice.</summary>
public HashSet<LedgerEntry> TruncateFrom(long offset)
{
var idx = IndexOfFirstAtOrAfter(offset);
var removed = new HashSet<LedgerEntry>();
for (var i = idx; i < Entries.Count; i++) removed.Add(Entries[i]);
if (idx < Entries.Count) Entries.RemoveRange(idx, Entries.Count - idx);
return removed;
}
public void TrimBelow(long floor)
{
var idx = IndexOfFirstAtOrAfter(floor);
if (idx > 0) Entries.RemoveRange(0, idx);
}
public void Clear()
{
Entries.Clear();
LastFragmentOffset = -1;
}
}
// Keyed by file name (unique within the log folder). Poll thread only.
private readonly Dictionary<string, FileLedger> _ledgers = new Dictionary<string, FileLedger>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private DateTime _contentionUntilUtc = DateTime.MinValue;
// Cumulative, restart-safe like the other health counters.
private long _overwriteRewinds;
private long _overwriteBytesReprocessed;
private long _verifyPasses;
private long _verifiedBytes;
internal static bool IsMultiWriterLogFile(string fileName)
{
foreach (var f in MultiWriterLogFiles)
if (string.Equals(f, fileName, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)) return true;
return false;
}
private FileLedger GetLedger(string fileName)
{
FileLedger ledger;
if (!_ledgers.TryGetValue(fileName, out ledger))
{
ledger = new FileLedger();
_ledgers[fileName] = ledger;
}
return ledger;
}
/// <summary>A stale writer writes exactly when its script ends: every end signal asks both files for a check on the next pass.</summary>
private void RequestOverwriteCheck()
{
foreach (var ledger in _ledgers.Values) ledger.VerifyRequested = true;
}
private void NoteInvocationActivity()
{
_contentionUntilUtc = UtcNowProvider() + InvocationContentionWindow;
}
private bool InContention(DateTime nowUtc)
{
if (nowUtc < _contentionUntilUtc || _pendingHealthScript != null) return true;
foreach (var script in _pendingPlatformScripts.Values)
{
if (script.Result != null) continue;
if (!script.StartedAtUtc.HasValue || nowUtc - script.StartedAtUtc.Value < MaxPendingScriptContention) return true;
}
return false;
}
/// <summary>
/// Runs before a multi-writer file is read: rollover reset, restart seeding, then the
/// overwrite check when one is due. Returns the offset to rewind to, or -1.
/// </summary>
private async Task<long> PrepareLedgerAsync(string filePath, string fileName, FileLedger ledger, long bookmark, DateTime nowUtc, CancellationToken token)
{
if (ledger.Entries.Count > 0 && bookmark < ledger.EndOffset)
{
// The bookmark moved below what was read: the file was replaced (rollover).
ledger.Clear();
InvalidateInvocationMarkersFrom(fileName, 0);
}
if (!ledger.Seeded)
{
ledger.Seeded = true;
if (ledger.Entries.Count == 0 && bookmark > 0)
await SeedLedgerAsync(filePath, ledger, bookmark, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
var due = ledger.VerifyRequested || (InContention(nowUtc) && nowUtc >= ledger.NextCadenceVerifyUtc);
if (!due || ledger.Entries.Count == 0) return -1;
var from = ledger.StartOffset;
var bytes = bookmark - from;
if (bytes <= 0)
{
ledger.VerifyRequested = false;
return -1;
}
long divergence;
using (var stream = new FileStream(filePath, FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read, FileShare.ReadWrite))
divergence = await FindOverwriteAsync(stream, ledger, from, bookmark, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (token.IsCancellationRequested) return -1;
ledger.VerifyRequested = false;
var paceSeconds = Math.Max(VerifyMinInterval.TotalSeconds, (double)bytes / VerifyBudgetBytesPerSecond);
ledger.NextCadenceVerifyUtc = nowUtc.AddSeconds(paceSeconds);
_verifyPasses++;
_verifiedBytes += bytes;
return divergence;
}
/// <summary>
/// Re-reads [fromOffset, toOffset) with the read loop's assembler and compares against the
/// ledger. Returns the offset of the first entry whose bytes changed — a ledger entry not
/// reproduced, or an entry the ledger never had — or -1 when everything reads as before.
/// </summary>
private async Task<long> FindOverwriteAsync(FileStream stream, FileLedger ledger, long fromOffset, long toOffset, CancellationToken token)
{
var entries = ledger.Entries;
var idx = ledger.IndexOfFirstAtOrAfter(fromOffset);
if (idx >= entries.Count) return -1;
stream.Seek(entries[idx].Offset, SeekOrigin.Begin);
var reader = new BoundedLineReader(stream, MaxEntryBytes, hashLines: true);
var assembler = new CmTraceEntryAssembler(MaxMultiLineBufferLines, MaxEntryBytes);
while (reader.Position < toOffset)
{
var line = await reader.ReadLineAsync(CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (line == null) break;
if (token.IsCancellationRequested) return -1;
AssembledEntry e;
if (assembler.Feed(line, reader.LastLineStart, reader.Position, reader.LastLineTruncated, reader.LastLineHash, out e)
!= CmTraceEntryAssembler.Outcome.Entry)
continue;
if (e.Offset >= toOffset) break;
if (idx < entries.Count && entries[idx].Offset < e.Offset) return entries[idx].Offset;
if (idx < entries.Count && entries[idx].Offset == e.Offset)
{
if (entries[idx].Hash != e.Hash) return e.Offset;
idx++;
continue;
}
return e.Offset; // an entry the ledger never had: the bytes changed here
}
return idx < entries.Count && entries[idx].Offset < toOffset ? entries[idx].Offset : -1;
}
/// <summary>After a restart the ledger is empty: fingerprint the entries just behind the persisted bookmark without processing them.</summary>
private async Task SeedLedgerAsync(string filePath, FileLedger ledger, long bookmark, CancellationToken token)
{
var from = Math.Max(0, bookmark - RestartSeedBytes);
using (var stream = new FileStream(filePath, FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read, FileShare.ReadWrite))
{
stream.Seek(from, SeekOrigin.Begin);
var reader = new BoundedLineReader(stream, MaxEntryBytes, hashLines: true);
var assembler = new CmTraceEntryAssembler(MaxMultiLineBufferLines, MaxEntryBytes);
var aligned = from == 0;
while (reader.Position < bookmark)
{
var line = await reader.ReadLineAsync(CancellationToken.None).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (line == null || token.IsCancellationRequested) break;
if (!aligned)
{
// The seek may have landed mid-entry: wait for an entry boundary.
if (!line.StartsWith(LogOpenTag)) continue;
aligned = true;
}
AssembledEntry e;
if (assembler.Feed(line, reader.LastLineStart, reader.Position, reader.LastLineTruncated, reader.LastLineHash, out e)
== CmTraceEntryAssembler.Outcome.Entry
&& e.Offset + e.Length <= bookmark)
ledger.Record(e);
}
}
}
/// <summary>Moves the bookmark back to the first changed entry; returns the entries to skip if they still read unchanged behind it.</summary>
private HashSet<LedgerEntry> ApplyRewind(string filePath, string fileName, FileLedger ledger, long rewindTo, long bookmark)
{
var removed = ledger.TruncateFrom(rewindTo);
_positionTracker.SetPosition(filePath, rewindTo);
_heldTails.Remove(filePath);
InvalidateInvocationMarkersFrom(fileName, rewindTo);
_overwriteRewinds++;
_overwriteBytesReprocessed += bookmark - rewindTo;
var message = $"ImeLogTracker: {fileName} changed behind the bookmark at offset {rewindTo} " +
$"(a concurrent writer overwrote already-read bytes) — rewinding {bookmark - rewindTo} bytes";
if (!ledger.RewindLogged)
{
ledger.RewindLogged = true;
_logger.Info(message);
}
else
{
_logger.Debug(message);
}
return removed;
}
private long RetentionFloor(string fileName, long bookmark)
{
var floor = bookmark - LedgerRetentionBytes;
var oldest = OldestPendingScriptMarkerOffset(fileName);
if (oldest >= 0 && oldest < floor) floor = oldest;
var hardFloor = bookmark - LedgerMaxBytes;
return floor < hardFloor ? hardFloor : floor;
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// Invocation markers: who owns the policyId-less executor lines at a file position
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// AgentExecutor.log carries "Powershell exit code is N" / "write output done" without a
// policy id. Their owner is decided by FILE POSITION, not by the order lines were read:
// an executor writes its end block at its own stream position, i.e. directly after its
// own start block in the final bytes, so the nearest preceding invocation marker names
// it — and stays right after a rewind re-reads that region. A marker is a platform start
// (policy id), some other invocation (detection, remediation, requirement: null) or a
// close ("gets invoked" banner, "Agent executor completed").
private sealed class InvocationMarker
{
public long Offset;
public string PolicyId;
public bool IsClose;
}
private readonly Dictionary<string, List<InvocationMarker>> _invocationMarkers =
new Dictionary<string, List<InvocationMarker>>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private InvocationMarker _lastPlatformMarker;
// Files a platform run has opened in (PS-AGENT-SCRIPT-START in AgentExecutor.log,
// PS-SCRIPT-GENERATED in IntuneManagementExtension.log). Survives a rollover of the
// file's markers: the fallback below is meant for exactly that file.
private readonly HashSet<string> _platformMarkerFiles = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private long _testEntryOrdinal;
private void RecordInvocationMarker(string policyId, bool isClose)
{
if (_currentEntryOffset < 0) return;
var file = _currentSourceFileName ?? TestSourceFileName;
List<InvocationMarker> list;
if (!_invocationMarkers.TryGetValue(file, out list))
{
list = new List<InvocationMarker>();
_invocationMarkers[file] = list;
}
if (list.Count > 0 && list[list.Count - 1].Offset == _currentEntryOffset)
{
// Two patterns on one line: the platform start outranks the generic argument line.
var last = list[list.Count - 1];
if (!isClose && policyId != null)
{
last.PolicyId = policyId;
last.IsClose = false;
_lastPlatformMarker = last;
_platformMarkerFiles.Add(file);
}
return;
}
if (list.Count >= MaxInvocationMarkersPerFile) list.RemoveAt(0);
var marker = new InvocationMarker { Offset = _currentEntryOffset, PolicyId = policyId, IsClose = isClose };
list.Add(marker);
if (!isClose && policyId != null)
{
_lastPlatformMarker = marker;
_platformMarkerFiles.Add(file);
}
}
/// <summary>
/// The pending platform script that owns the entry being processed, or null.
/// <paramref name="ownerPolicyId"/> names the owning platform script even when its slot is
/// gone (completion already emitted); null when no platform invocation owns the entry.
/// </summary>
private ScriptExecutionState ResolvePlatformScriptForCurrentEntry(out string ownerPolicyId)
{
ownerPolicyId = null;
var file = _currentSourceFileName ?? TestSourceFileName;
InvocationMarker marker = null;
List<InvocationMarker> list = null;
if (_currentEntryOffset >= 0 && _invocationMarkers.TryGetValue(file, out list))
{
for (var i = list.Count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
if (list[i].Offset <= _currentEntryOffset)
{
marker = list[i];
break;
}
}
}
// A file without any marker resolves to the platform run in flight only when platform
// runs open in that file at all — IntuneManagementExtension.log right after a rollover
// cleared its markers, AgentExecutor.log likewise. HealthScripts.log and the app logs
// never carry a platform marker: their launch and exit lines belong to health scripts
// and detection scripts, never to the platform script that happens to be pending
// (session 24dc69d1: the health-script worker's exit line pre-filled a platform slot's
// exit code, its launch line the slot's context).
if (marker == null && (list == null || list.Count == 0) && _platformMarkerFiles.Contains(file)) marker = _lastPlatformMarker;
if (marker == null || marker.IsClose || marker.PolicyId == null) return null;
ownerPolicyId = marker.PolicyId;
ScriptExecutionState state;
return _pendingPlatformScripts.TryGetValue(marker.PolicyId, out state) ? state : null;
}
private void InvalidateInvocationMarkersFrom(string fileName, long offset)
{
List<InvocationMarker> list;
if (!_invocationMarkers.TryGetValue(fileName, out list) || list.Count == 0) return;
var removedLast = false;
for (var i = list.Count - 1; i >= 0 && list[i].Offset >= offset; i--)
{
if (ReferenceEquals(list[i], _lastPlatformMarker)) removedLast = true;
list.RemoveAt(i);
}
if (removedLast)
{
_lastPlatformMarker = null;
for (var i = list.Count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
if (!list[i].IsClose && list[i].PolicyId != null)
{
_lastPlatformMarker = list[i];
break;
}
}
}
}
private long OldestPendingScriptMarkerOffset(string fileName)
{
List<InvocationMarker> list;
if (!_invocationMarkers.TryGetValue(fileName, out list)) return -1;
long oldest = -1;
foreach (var marker in list)
{
if (marker.IsClose || marker.PolicyId == null || !_pendingPlatformScripts.ContainsKey(marker.PolicyId)) continue;
if (oldest < 0 || marker.Offset < oldest) oldest = marker.Offset;
}
return oldest;
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test seams
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
/// <summary>Same effect as an end signal: both multi-writer ledgers are verified on the next pass.</summary>
internal void RequestOverwriteCheckForTest() => RequestOverwriteCheck();
/// <summary>What a rollover of the file does to its invocation markers.</summary>
internal void ClearInvocationMarkersForTest(string fileName) => InvalidateInvocationMarkersFrom(fileName, 0);
internal int LedgerEntryCountForTest(string fileName)
{
FileLedger ledger;
return _ledgers.TryGetValue(fileName, out ledger) ? ledger.Entries.Count : 0;
}
/// <summary>Gives a seam-fed message a file position of its own so positional attribution behaves like in a real pass.</summary>
internal void NextTestEntry()
{
if (_currentSourceFileName == null) _currentSourceFileName = TestSourceFileName;
_currentEntryOffset = ++_testEntryOrdinal * 4096;
}
}
}
@@ -181,7 +181,6 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// arrive across multiple log entries and IME may interleave platform scripts).
private readonly Dictionary<string, ScriptExecutionState> _pendingPlatformScripts =
new Dictionary<string, ScriptExecutionState>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private string _lastPlatformScriptPolicyId;
// Health-script (remediation) line-by-line accumulator — single slot because IME
// executes health scripts SEQUENTIALLY within a session (verified across multiple
@@ -193,14 +192,23 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// UI dedupe (dataCompleteness scoring).
private ScriptExecutionState _pendingHealthScript;
// Collapses recurring health-script runs; persisted with the file positions.
private readonly RecurringScriptGate _recurringScripts = new RecurringScriptGate();
// Set for the duration of one pattern dispatch: the matched line is older than
// HistoricReplayThreshold, so the adapter drops whatever it produces.
private bool _currentLineIsHistoricReplay;
// Cycle start timestamps for health (remediation) scripts, keyed by policyId. Captured
// from the HS-SCRIPT-START line ([HS] ProcessScript) so the consolidated HS-NEW-RESULT
// emit can surface the cycle's total run duration (start → result) on its phase events —
// the remediation-script analog of the platform-script StartedAtUtc timing. Kept in a
// dedicated map (not on _pendingHealthScript) because the early-signal HS-COMPLIANCE
// handler clears that slot before HS-NEW-RESULT arrives. Consumed + removed on result emit.
private readonly Dictionary<string, DateTime> _healthScriptStartTimes =
new Dictionary<string, DateTime>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
// The start line's provenance rides along so the adapter can tell whether start and result
// were resolved on the same zone assumption before it subtracts them.
private readonly Dictionary<string, (DateTime Utc, CmTraceLineProvenance Provenance)> _healthScriptStartTimes =
new Dictionary<string, (DateTime Utc, CmTraceLineProvenance Provenance)>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
// Restart-safe dedup for the adapter's one-shot script_timeout_suspected Warning.
// Owned by the tracker (not the adapter) solely so it rides the persisted state file —
@@ -223,7 +231,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
return true;
}
private const int MaxScriptOutputLength = 2048;
// Script stdout kept per event. Measured over 1,486 script outputs in the fleet
// (2026-08-25..09-08): median 39, p90 644, max 1,501 chars -- the maximum being our own
// one-stage bootstrap, and nothing ever hit the previous 2,048 cap. The two-stage
// bootstrap then added a ~460-char loader preamble to that maximum and started
// truncating the one output an operator actually reads. 8,192 leaves room for the
// realistic worst case (download retries plus relax logging, ~2,700) and stays 4x below
// the 32K-char Table Storage property limit that bounds the event downstream. Growth
// driver is the number of log lines the bootstrap chain writes, so re-measure before
// adding a chatty step rather than raising this again.
private const int MaxScriptOutputLength = 8192;
private const int MaxMultiLineBufferLines = 100;
// Size cap for ONE entry — a single physical line (enforced by BoundedLineReader before
// the line is materialized) and an assembled multiline entry alike. Any process able to
@@ -328,7 +345,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
private int _unanchoredPatterns;
private int _filesTailed;
private long _backlogBytes;
// Poll-loop timing (restart-safe maxima on a monotonic clock): the longest pass and the
// longest pause between passes — see ImeTrackerHealth.PassMaxMs / PassGapMaxMs.
private long _passMaxMs;
private long _passGapMaxMs;
private long _lastPassEndMs = -1;
private string _imeAgentVersionSeen;
/// <summary>Monotonic milliseconds for the poll-loop timing; tests substitute a counter.</summary>
internal Func<long> MonotonicMillisProvider { get; set; } = () => Stopwatch.GetTimestamp() * 1000 / Stopwatch.Frequency;
private bool _trackerDegradedFired;
private readonly Dictionary<string, int> _patternHits = new Dictionary<string, int>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
@@ -358,6 +383,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
FilesTailed = _filesTailed,
BacklogBytes = _backlogBytes,
ImeAgentVersion = _imeAgentVersionSeen,
OverwriteRewinds = _overwriteRewinds,
OverwriteBytesReprocessed = _overwriteBytesReprocessed,
VerifyPasses = _verifyPasses,
VerifiedBytes = _verifiedBytes,
PassMaxMs = _passMaxMs,
PassGapMaxMs = _passGapMaxMs,
PatternHits = new Dictionary<string, int>(_patternHits, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase),
};
}
@@ -476,6 +507,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
/// </summary>
public Action<ScriptStartedInfo> OnScriptStarted { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Fires when the tracker stops, once per health-script policy whose repeated runs were
/// counted instead of emitted since the last summary (see <see cref="RecurringScriptGate"/>).
/// </summary>
public Action<ScriptRecurrenceSummary> OnScriptRecurrenceSummary { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Fires on every pattern match with the matched <c>PatternId</c>. Plan §4.x M4.4.4.
/// Invoked by <c>HandlePatternMatch</c> after <see cref="LastMatchedPatternId"/> is
@@ -942,18 +979,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
{
try
{
await CheckLogFilesAsync(token);
// Safety net: emit completions for platform scripts whose AgentExecutor
// exit code we already have but whose authoritative IME PS-SCRIPT-RESULT
// line never arrived within the grace period. Runs on this same loop
// thread (no locking) so it observes the buffer right after parsing.
FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(DateTime.UtcNow);
// Token-failure grace window: fires only when the failure stayed
// unresolved (no IME-TOKEN-SUCCESS) for the whole window. Runs after
// the drain so a success later in the same batch clears first.
CheckPendingTokenFailure(DateTime.UtcNow);
await RunPollPassAsync(token);
}
catch (OperationCanceledException) { break; }
catch (Exception ex)
@@ -976,12 +1002,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
try { await Task.Delay(_pollingIntervalMs, token); } catch (OperationCanceledException) { break; }
}
// Final pass: force-flush any platform script that completed within the last grace
// window before shutdown (exit code known, IME result still pending). Best-effort —
// emits only while callbacks are still wired (i.e. the adapter hasn't been disposed).
try { FlushStalePlatformScriptResults(DateTime.UtcNow, force: true); }
// Final pass: force-flush any platform script still waiting for the other file
// (a held IME result, or an exit code whose IME result is still pending).
// Best-effort — emits only while callbacks are still wired (i.e. the adapter
// hasn't been disposed).
try { FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(UtcNowProvider(), force: true); }
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Warning($"ImeLogTracker: shutdown script flush failed: {ex.Message}"); }
try { FlushRecurringScripts(UtcNowProvider(), shuttingDown: true); }
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Warning($"ImeLogTracker: shutdown recurring-script flush failed: {ex.Message}"); }
// Final state save on shutdown
if (_stateDirty)
{
@@ -993,6 +1023,37 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
}, token);
}
/// <summary>
/// One poll pass, timed: the file reads, then the platform-script completions that wait
/// for the other file (an IME result held for its executor end block, the exit-code
/// fallback for a result IME never logged), then the token-failure grace window — all on
/// this one loop thread, no locking, so the flushes observe the buffers right after
/// parsing. The longest pass and the longest pause since the previous pass ended are the
/// session's <see cref="ImeTrackerHealth.PassMaxMs"/> / <see cref="ImeTrackerHealth.PassGapMaxMs"/>.
/// </summary>
internal async Task RunPollPassAsync(CancellationToken token)
{
var startMs = MonotonicMillisProvider();
if (_lastPassEndMs >= 0 && startMs - _lastPassEndMs > _passGapMaxMs)
{
_passGapMaxMs = startMs - _lastPassEndMs;
_stateDirty = true;
}
await CheckLogFilesAsync(token);
FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults(UtcNowProvider());
FlushRecurringScripts(UtcNowProvider(), shuttingDown: false);
CheckPendingTokenFailure(UtcNowProvider());
var endMs = MonotonicMillisProvider();
if (endMs - startMs > _passMaxMs)
{
_passMaxMs = endMs - startMs;
_stateDirty = true;
}
_lastPassEndMs = endMs;
}
/// <summary>
/// Stops the background polling task
/// </summary>
@@ -1091,10 +1152,17 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// (the in-memory marker set started empty). Old state files have null here —
// degrades to the pre-fix behavior, no crash.
_platformScriptResultEmitted.Clear();
if (state.PlatformScriptResultEmitted != null)
if (state.PlatformScriptResultEmittedAt != null)
{
foreach (var kv in state.PlatformScriptResultEmittedAt)
_platformScriptResultEmitted[kv.Key] = kv.Value;
}
else if (state.PlatformScriptResultEmitted != null)
{
// State files from before the marker carried the run's timestamp: the dedup
// works as before, the late-start-line guard never fires for these runs.
foreach (var id in state.PlatformScriptResultEmitted)
_platformScriptResultEmitted.Add(id);
_platformScriptResultEmitted[id] = DateTime.MinValue;
}
_pendingPlatformScripts.Clear();
@@ -1114,6 +1182,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
_scriptTimeoutSuspectedPosted.Add(id);
}
_recurringScripts.Restore(state.RecurringScripts);
// Health counters + histogram: a restart (or WhiteGlove Part 2) must report the
// whole session, not only the lines seen since the last start. Null on state files
// written before these fields existed → counters start at zero.
@@ -1131,6 +1201,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
HealthScriptResultParseFailures = state.Health.HealthScriptResultParseFailures;
_imeAgentVersionSeen = state.Health.ImeAgentVersion;
_trackerDegradedFired = state.Health.TrackerDegradedFired;
_overwriteRewinds = state.Health.OverwriteRewinds;
_overwriteBytesReprocessed = state.Health.OverwriteBytesReprocessed;
_verifyPasses = state.Health.VerifyPasses;
_verifiedBytes = state.Health.VerifiedBytes;
_passMaxMs = state.Health.PassMaxMs;
_passGapMaxMs = state.Health.PassGapMaxMs;
}
if (state.PatternHits != null)
{
@@ -1181,9 +1257,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// H1 (delta review 2026-07-02): platform-script dedup markers + pending buffer
// must survive restarts — see the LoadState comment for the duplicate scenario.
PlatformScriptResultEmitted = _platformScriptResultEmitted.ToList(),
PlatformScriptResultEmittedAt = new Dictionary<string, DateTime>(_platformScriptResultEmitted, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase),
PendingPlatformScripts = _pendingPlatformScripts.Values.ToList(),
ScriptTimeoutSuspectedPosted = _scriptTimeoutSuspectedPosted.ToList(),
RecurringScripts = _recurringScripts.ToPersisted(),
};
lock (_healthLock)
@@ -1200,6 +1277,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
HealthScriptResultParseFailures = HealthScriptResultParseFailures,
ImeAgentVersion = _imeAgentVersionSeen,
TrackerDegradedFired = _trackerDegradedFired,
OverwriteRewinds = _overwriteRewinds,
OverwriteBytesReprocessed = _overwriteBytesReprocessed,
VerifyPasses = _verifyPasses,
VerifiedBytes = _verifiedBytes,
PassMaxMs = _passMaxMs,
PassGapMaxMs = _passGapMaxMs,
};
state.PatternHits = new Dictionary<string, int>(_patternHits, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
@@ -46,6 +46,41 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
/// <summary>IME version as logged by IME itself ("Agent version is: …"), null until seen.</summary>
public string ImeAgentVersion { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Times the bookmark of a multi-writer log (AgentExecutor.log, IntuneManagementExtension.log)
/// was moved back because bytes behind it had been overwritten by a concurrent IME
/// process. Expected nonzero whenever user-context scripts or detection scripts ran —
/// recovered data, not skipped work.
/// </summary>
public long OverwriteRewinds { get; set; }
/// <summary>Bytes re-read by those rewinds (only entries that changed are processed again).</summary>
public long OverwriteBytesReprocessed { get; set; }
/// <summary>Full ledger verifications run (cadence while scripts are in flight, end signals, fragments).</summary>
public long VerifyPasses { get; set; }
/// <summary>Bytes re-read for verification, guard-zone checks included — the cost of the overwrite detection.</summary>
public long VerifiedBytes { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Longest single poll pass this session (one <c>CheckLogFilesAsync</c> plus the
/// flushes), milliseconds on a monotonic clock. A pass spends its time in the file
/// reads, the ledger verifications and the regex matching; the fleet baseline is well
/// under 100 ms.
/// </summary>
public long PassMaxMs { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Longest pause between the end of one poll pass and the start of the next this
/// session, milliseconds. The loop sleeps 100 ms between passes and saves its state now
/// and then; anything far above that is the loop not being scheduled — session c3ecb568
/// lost 26 s this way at 100 % VM CPU while the rest of the agent kept running. Late
/// reading, not lost data: every event keeps its log line's own timestamp, and a
/// result read before its executor end block waits for it.
/// </summary>
public long PassGapMaxMs { get; set; }
/// <summary>Match count per enabled pattern ID — every enabled pattern is present, zeros included.</summary>
public IReadOnlyDictionary<string, int> PatternHits { get; set; }
@@ -142,10 +142,22 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// continues its grace window after the restart instead of being silently dropped.
// ScriptExecutionState is a plain DTO, serialized directly (no mapping layer needed).
// All three are null on state files from before this fix — LoadState treats null as empty.
// Read-only migration input: state files written before the marker carried the run's
// source timestamp (agents up to 2.0.1458). Never written any more.
[JsonProperty(NullValueHandling = NullValueHandling.Ignore)]
public List<string> PlatformScriptResultEmitted { get; set; }
// Policy id → source timestamp of the emitted run (its result line; the exit line for a
// fallback emit): the dedup marker plus the reference that tells a late start line of
// that run from the start of the next one.
public Dictionary<string, DateTime> PlatformScriptResultEmittedAt { get; set; }
public List<ScriptExecutionState> PendingPlatformScripts { get; set; }
public List<string> ScriptTimeoutSuspectedPosted { get; set; }
// Recurring health-script runs collapsed per policy. Saved in the same write as
// FilePositions on purpose: after a hard kill both fall back together, so re-read lines
// are counted again instead of twice. Null on older state files → empty.
public Dictionary<string, RecurringScriptPolicyState> RecurringScripts { get; set; }
// Cumulative tracker health + per-pattern histogram (ime_pattern_hits / ime_tracker_degraded,
// 2026-08-30). Restart-safe on purpose: WhiteGlove Part 2 reports the whole session and the
// one-shot degraded event must not fire twice. Null on older state files → zero.
@@ -165,6 +177,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
public int HealthScriptResultParseFailures { get; set; }
public string ImeAgentVersion { get; set; }
public bool TrackerDegradedFired { get; set; }
// Overwrite detection counters (null-defaulting on older state files).
public long OverwriteRewinds { get; set; }
public long OverwriteBytesReprocessed { get; set; }
public long VerifyPasses { get; set; }
public long VerifiedBytes { get; set; }
// Poll-loop timing maxima (null-defaulting on older state files).
public long PassMaxMs { get; set; }
public long PassGapMaxMs { get; set; }
}
public class PackageStateData
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Globalization;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
{
/// <summary>
/// Collapses recurring health-script (proactive remediation) runs. IME re-runs every assigned
/// policy on its own schedule for as long as the device is up; an enrollment that waits for
/// its user for days would otherwise report every hourly run of every policy. A policy's
/// first run and every run whose result differs from the last reported one are emitted in
/// full; runs that repeat the last reported result are only counted and surface once per
/// policy as a recurrence summary.
/// <para>
/// The start signal of an already known policy is held until its result is known, because
/// the running indicators (web panel, session coverage) pair a start with a later result of
/// the same policy — a start whose result was collapsed would read as "still running".
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// The state is part of the tracker state file and is saved in the same write as the file
/// positions: after a hard kill both fall back together, the lines after the last save are
/// read again and counted again — nothing is lost and nothing counts twice.
/// </para>
/// Not thread-safe: called from the tracker's single poll thread only.
/// </summary>
public sealed class RecurringScriptGate
{
private readonly Dictionary<string, RecurringScriptPolicyState> _policies =
new Dictionary<string, RecurringScriptPolicyState>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
/// <summary>True when any call changed persisted state since the last <see cref="ConsumeDirty"/>.</summary>
private bool _dirty;
public bool ConsumeDirty()
{
var wasDirty = _dirty;
_dirty = false;
return wasDirty;
}
/// <summary>
/// A start line was read. Returns <c>true</c> when the start signal is emitted right away
/// (first run of the policy); <c>false</c> when it is held until the run's result is known.
/// </summary>
public bool OnStart(string policyId, DateTime startedAtUtc, string policyType, string patternId)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(policyId)) return true;
var isKnown = _policies.TryGetValue(policyId, out var state);
if (!isKnown)
{
state = new RecurringScriptPolicyState();
_policies[policyId] = state;
}
CloseHeldRun(state);
state.RunsObserved++;
_dirty = true;
if (!isKnown) return true;
state.HeldStartAtUtc = startedAtUtc;
state.HeldStartPolicyType = policyType;
state.HeldStartPatternId = patternId;
state.HeldRunSawResult = false;
return false;
}
/// <summary>
/// A result (one phase event) is about to be emitted. Returns <c>true</c> to emit it; when
/// the run's start was held, <paramref name="releasedStart"/> carries the start signal to
/// emit first. Returns <c>false</c> when the result repeats the last reported one.
/// </summary>
public bool OnResult(ScriptExecutionState script, DateTime observedAtUtc, out ScriptStartedInfo releasedStart)
{
releasedStart = null;
if (script == null || string.IsNullOrEmpty(script.PolicyId)) return true;
if (!_policies.TryGetValue(script.PolicyId, out var state))
{
state = new RecurringScriptPolicyState();
_policies[script.PolicyId] = state;
}
var key = SignatureKey(script);
var signature = Signature(script);
_dirty = true;
if (state.Signatures.TryGetValue(key, out var last) && string.Equals(last, signature, StringComparison.Ordinal))
{
state.CollapsedResults++;
if (!state.FirstCollapsedAtUtc.HasValue) state.FirstCollapsedAtUtc = observedAtUtc;
state.LastCollapsedAtUtc = observedAtUtc;
if (state.HeldStartAtUtc.HasValue) state.HeldRunSawResult = true;
return false;
}
state.Signatures[key] = signature;
releasedStart = ReleaseHeldStart(script.PolicyId, state);
return true;
}
/// <summary>
/// Start signals that were held for at least <paramref name="minAge"/> without any result:
/// the script did not finish, which is exactly what the running indicators are for.
/// </summary>
public List<ScriptStartedInfo> ReleaseStartsWithoutResult(DateTime nowUtc, TimeSpan minAge)
{
var released = new List<ScriptStartedInfo>();
foreach (var kv in _policies)
{
var state = kv.Value;
if (!state.HeldStartAtUtc.HasValue || state.HeldRunSawResult) continue;
if (nowUtc - state.HeldStartAtUtc.Value < minAge) continue;
released.Add(ReleaseHeldStart(kv.Key, state));
_dirty = true;
}
return released;
}
/// <summary>
/// One summary per policy whose collapsed-run count grew since the last summary. Marks
/// the reported count, so a later stop of the same session only reports new growth.
/// </summary>
public List<ScriptRecurrenceSummary> TakeSummaries()
{
var summaries = new List<ScriptRecurrenceSummary>();
foreach (var kv in _policies)
{
var state = kv.Value;
var collapsedRuns = state.RunsCollapsed + (state.HeldStartAtUtc.HasValue && state.HeldRunSawResult ? 1 : 0);
if (collapsedRuns <= state.RunsCollapsedAtLastSummary) continue;
summaries.Add(new ScriptRecurrenceSummary
{
PolicyId = kv.Key,
RunsObserved = state.RunsObserved,
RunsCollapsed = collapsedRuns,
RunsWithoutResult = state.RunsWithoutResult,
CollapsedResults = state.CollapsedResults,
FirstCollapsedAtUtc = state.FirstCollapsedAtUtc,
LastCollapsedAtUtc = state.LastCollapsedAtUtc,
});
state.RunsCollapsedAtLastSummary = collapsedRuns;
_dirty = true;
}
return summaries;
}
public Dictionary<string, RecurringScriptPolicyState> ToPersisted() =>
new Dictionary<string, RecurringScriptPolicyState>(_policies, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
public void Restore(Dictionary<string, RecurringScriptPolicyState> persisted)
{
_policies.Clear();
if (persisted == null) return;
foreach (var kv in persisted)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(kv.Key) || kv.Value == null) continue;
if (kv.Value.Signatures == null)
kv.Value.Signatures = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.Ordinal);
_policies[kv.Key] = kv.Value;
}
}
// A held run ends when the next start of the policy arrives: all its results repeated the
// last report (collapsed), or it never produced one.
private static void CloseHeldRun(RecurringScriptPolicyState state)
{
if (!state.HeldStartAtUtc.HasValue) return;
if (state.HeldRunSawResult) state.RunsCollapsed++;
else state.RunsWithoutResult++;
ClearHeldStart(state);
}
private static ScriptStartedInfo ReleaseHeldStart(string policyId, RecurringScriptPolicyState state)
{
if (!state.HeldStartAtUtc.HasValue) return null;
var info = new ScriptStartedInfo
{
PolicyId = policyId,
ScriptType = "remediation",
PolicyType = state.HeldStartPolicyType,
SourceTimestampUtc = state.HeldStartAtUtc,
PatternId = state.HeldStartPatternId,
};
ClearHeldStart(state);
return info;
}
private static void ClearHeldStart(RecurringScriptPolicyState state)
{
state.HeldStartAtUtc = null;
state.HeldStartPolicyType = null;
state.HeldStartPatternId = null;
state.HeldRunSawResult = false;
}
// The early compliance signal and the consolidated result of one phase differ in
// completeness (only the latter knows RemediationStatus); keyed apart, or the two would
// overwrite each other's signature on every run and nothing would ever collapse.
private static string SignatureKey(ScriptExecutionState script) =>
(script.ScriptPart ?? string.Empty) + "|" + (script.DurationBasis ?? string.Empty);
private static string Signature(ScriptExecutionState script)
{
var culture = CultureInfo.InvariantCulture;
return string.Join("|",
script.ComplianceResult ?? string.Empty,
script.ExitCode.HasValue ? script.ExitCode.Value.ToString(culture) : string.Empty,
string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(script.Stderr) ? "0" : "1",
script.RemediationStatus.HasValue ? script.RemediationStatus.Value.ToString(culture) : string.Empty,
script.ErrorCode.HasValue ? script.ErrorCode.Value.ToString(culture) : string.Empty);
}
}
/// <summary>Persisted per-policy state of <see cref="RecurringScriptGate"/>.</summary>
public class RecurringScriptPolicyState
{
/// <summary>Last reported result per phase and signal kind.</summary>
public Dictionary<string, string> Signatures { get; set; } = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.Ordinal);
/// <summary>Start lines read for the policy.</summary>
public int RunsObserved { get; set; }
/// <summary>Runs whose every result repeated the last reported one.</summary>
public int RunsCollapsed { get; set; }
/// <summary>Runs that were followed by the next start without any result in between.</summary>
public int RunsWithoutResult { get; set; }
/// <summary>Phase events that were not emitted.</summary>
public int CollapsedResults { get; set; }
public DateTime? FirstCollapsedAtUtc { get; set; }
public DateTime? LastCollapsedAtUtc { get; set; }
public DateTime? HeldStartAtUtc { get; set; }
public string HeldStartPolicyType { get; set; }
public string HeldStartPatternId { get; set; }
public bool HeldRunSawResult { get; set; }
public int RunsCollapsedAtLastSummary { get; set; }
}
/// <summary>What <see cref="RecurringScriptGate"/> collapsed for one policy.</summary>
public class ScriptRecurrenceSummary
{
public string PolicyId { get; set; }
public int RunsObserved { get; set; }
public int RunsCollapsed { get; set; }
public int RunsWithoutResult { get; set; }
public int CollapsedResults { get; set; }
public DateTime? FirstCollapsedAtUtc { get; set; }
public DateTime? LastCollapsedAtUtc { get; set; }
}
}
@@ -29,6 +29,15 @@ public class ScriptExecutionState
/// </summary>
public System.DateTime? StartedAtUtc { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Provenance of <see cref="StartedAtUtc"/>: how the start line's offset was obtained. Paired
/// with <see cref="ResultProvenance"/> / <see cref="ExitProvenance"/> by the adapter to decide
/// whether a run duration is measurable — two lines resolved on different zone assumptions
/// differ by whole offset-grid steps, not by run time (session 4377911b: a 10 s script read
/// as 3610 s). Null when the start was never observed or on state files from before the field.
/// </summary>
public CmTraceLineProvenance StartedAtProvenance { get; set; }
/// <summary>"detection", "remediation", or "post-detection" (remediation scripts only).</summary>
public string ScriptPart { get; set; }
@@ -61,11 +70,45 @@ public class ScriptExecutionState
/// <summary>
/// UTC timestamp at which the AgentExecutor.log exit-code line for this platform script was
/// observed. Drives the deadline check in
/// <see cref="ImeLogTracker.FlushStalePlatformScriptResults"/> — set only on the platform path
/// <see cref="ImeLogTracker.FlushPendingPlatformScriptResults"/> — set only on the platform path
/// (PS-AGENT exit code); null until an exit code is seen.
/// </summary>
public System.DateTime? ExitObservedAtUtc { get; set; }
/// <summary>Provenance of the exit-code line behind <see cref="ExitObservedAtUtc"/> (the fallback emit's end).</summary>
public CmTraceLineProvenance ExitProvenance { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Source (CMTrace) timestamp of the IME <c>PS-SCRIPT-RESULT</c> line that delivered
/// <see cref="Result"/> (platform scripts, <c>ime_policy_result</c> only). The emitted event is
/// bound to it — the emit may happen passes later (see <see cref="ResultHeldSinceUtc"/>), when
/// the tracker's "last matched" line is an unrelated one. Also the reference a later start line
/// of the same policy is compared against: a start older than the emitted result is the late
/// start line of that run, not a new run.
/// </summary>
public System.DateTime? ResultObservedAtUtc { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Provenance of the line that delivered <see cref="Result"/> — bound here for the same reason
/// as <see cref="ResultObservedAtUtc"/>: a held completion is emitted passes later, when the
/// tracker's "last matched" provenance describes an unrelated line. For health scripts the
/// result line of the phase (HS-COMPLIANCE early signal or HS-NEW-RESULT).
/// </summary>
public CmTraceLineProvenance ResultProvenance { get; set; }
/// <summary>Pattern id of the line that delivered <see cref="Result"/> (surfaced as <c>patternId</c> on the event).</summary>
public string ResultPatternId { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Wall-clock time (agent UTC) at which the IME result was seen while the executor end block
/// (exit code, stdout, stderr) had not been read yet. The tracker holds the emit until the end
/// block arrives — an overwritten block surfaces one pass later through the ledger rewind that
/// the result itself triggers, and the AgentExecutor.log read can simply lag behind the IME log
/// read — or until <c>ImeLogTracker.PlatformScriptEndBlockGrace</c> elapsed. Null when the
/// result was not held.
/// </summary>
public System.DateTime? ResultHeldSinceUtc { get; set; }
/// <summary>"True" or "False" compliance result (remediation detection / post-detection only).</summary>
public string ComplianceResult { get; set; }
@@ -119,4 +162,14 @@ public class ScriptStartedInfo
/// <summary>Numeric IME PolicyType from the start line (captured as string), e.g. "6" for health scripts.</summary>
public string PolicyType { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Source timestamp of the start line when the signal is emitted later than it was read
/// (a held start of a recurring health script, see <see cref="RecurringScriptGate"/>). Null
/// for a start emitted while its own line is the tracker's last matched one.
/// </summary>
public System.DateTime? SourceTimestampUtc { get; set; }
/// <summary>Pattern id of the start line; set together with <see cref="SourceTimestampUtc"/>.</summary>
public string PatternId { get; set; }
}
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
private readonly Func<bool> _userEspAppsSettledProbe;
private readonly Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> _starvedUserEspAppsProbe;
private readonly Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> _packageStatesProbe;
// Session 683f1eff: registry failure detail still sitting in an open settle window,
// consulted when a Shell-Core failure terminalises first (see OnShellCoreEspFailureDetected).
private readonly Func<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs> _pendingEspFailureProbe;
// Session caa6cf50 gate-starvation fix (2026-06-11) — fire-once guard for the
// user-ESP-apps-settled AccountSetup synthesis (see MaybeSynthesizeAccountSetupComplete).
@@ -174,8 +177,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
/// late "Installing-→-Error" promotion can classify the failure correctly
/// AND refuse to promote when the failure originated outside the Apps
/// subcategory (a non-Apps HRESULT does not describe per-app outcome).
/// Null when no HRESULT-carrying ESP failure has fired (or all observed
/// failures came from ShellCoreTracker, which has no HRESULT surface).
/// Null when no registry-derived failure detail has been observed — neither from
/// a settle window that expired nor from one a Shell-Core failure inherited.
/// </summary>
public Termination.EspTerminalFailureSnapshot LastEspTerminalFailure { get; private set; }
@@ -213,6 +216,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
/// </summary>
public bool HasAccountSetupProgress => _provisioningTracker?.HasAccountSetupProgress ?? false;
/// <summary>
/// <see cref="ProvisioningStatusTracker.AccountSetupProgressIfRead"/>; <c>null</c> also when
/// the provisioning tracker is not running (Device Preparation, before Start). Stamped on
/// the WhiteGloveShellCoreSuccess signal for the sealing classifier.
/// </summary>
public bool? AccountSetupProgressIfRead => _provisioningTracker?.AccountSetupProgressIfRead;
/// <summary>
/// True once WhiteGlove start has been detected (EventID 509 or persisted from prior run).
/// Forwarded from ModernDeploymentTracker.
@@ -231,7 +241,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
string tenantId,
InformationalEventPost post,
AgentLogger logger,
int helloWaitTimeoutSeconds = 30,
int helloWaitTimeoutSeconds = HelloWaitTimeout.DefaultSeconds,
bool modernDeploymentWatcherEnabled = true,
int modernDeploymentLogLevelMax = 3,
bool modernDeploymentBackfillEnabled = true,
@@ -243,7 +253,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
Func<bool> accountSetupActivityProbe = null,
Func<bool> userEspAppsSettledProbe = null,
Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> starvedUserEspAppsProbe = null,
Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> packageStatesProbe = null)
Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> packageStatesProbe = null,
Func<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs> pendingEspFailureProbe = null)
{
_sessionId = sessionId ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(sessionId));
_tenantId = tenantId ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(tenantId));
@@ -277,6 +288,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
// provisioning tracker name not-completed apps on an Apps-subcategory failure.
_packageStatesProbe = packageStatesProbe
?? (() => Array.Empty<Ime.AppPackageState>());
// Test seam: defaults to the provisioning tracker's open settle window (null when
// none is armed or the tracker is not running, e.g. Device Preparation).
_pendingEspFailureProbe = pendingEspFailureProbe
?? (() => _provisioningTracker?.TryGetPendingFailureArgs());
}
/// <summary>
@@ -658,6 +673,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
internal void TriggerEspExitedForTest(DateTime occurredAtUtc) =>
OnEspExited(this, new EspExitedEventArgs(occurredAtUtc));
// Test seam for a Shell-Core 62407 failure — drives the coordinator forwarder including
// the pending-settle inheritance, without a real ShellCoreTracker.
internal void TriggerShellCoreEspFailureForTest(string failureType) =>
OnShellCoreEspFailureDetected(this, failureType);
// Test seam for HelloWizardStarted — same contract as TriggerEspExitedForTest.
internal void TriggerHelloWizardStartedForTest(DateTime occurredAtUtc) =>
OnHelloWizardStarted(this, new HelloWizardStartedEventArgs(occurredAtUtc));
@@ -673,33 +693,56 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
// Forwarder for ShellCoreTracker (event-log-derived ESP failures, e.g. Shell-Core 62407
// failure descriptions). Source-event timestamp is mirrored so the adapter can stamp the
// DecisionSignal with the historical instant on backfill. ShellCoreTracker has no HRESULT
// surface, so only FailureType is set on the args.
// surface; the registry detail is inherited from an open settle window (see below).
private void OnShellCoreEspFailureDetected(object sender, string failureType)
{
LastEventOccurredAtUtc = (sender as ShellCoreTracker)?.LastEventOccurredAtUtc;
try
{
EspFailureDetected?.Invoke(this, new EspFailureDetectedEventArgs(failureType));
EspFailureDetected?.Invoke(this, BuildShellCoreFailureArgs(failureType));
}
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Error($"Error forwarding ShellCore EspFailureDetected for '{failureType}'", ex); }
finally { LastEventOccurredAtUtc = null; }
}
// Forwarder for ProvisioningStatusTracker (registry-derived ESP failures). Args carry the
// full failure detail (FailureType, ErrorCode, FailedSubcategory, Category) extracted
// from the failed subcategory's statusText. Provisioning has no source-event timestamp
// surfaced today, so the adapter falls back to clock.
private void OnProvisioningEspFailureDetected(object sender, EspFailureDetectedEventArgs args)
// Session 683f1eff: the Shell-Core 62407 failure usually lands INSIDE the provisioning
// tracker's 30-s settle window — after the registry named the failed subcategory and its
// HRESULT, before the settle timer would have forwarded them. The engine terminalises on
// the first EspTerminalFailure and the agent stops seconds later, so whatever this signal
// carries is all the terminal event, the backend FailureReason and the termination-time
// app classification ever see (a third of all ESP terminal failures took this path). The
// pending detail is inherited here; FailureType stays the Shell-Core value because that
// is the signal that actually terminalised.
private EspFailureDetectedEventArgs BuildShellCoreFailureArgs(string failureType)
{
EspFailureDetectedEventArgs pending = null;
try { pending = _pendingEspFailureProbe(); }
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Warning($"EspAndHelloTracker: pending ESP failure probe threw: {ex.Message}"); }
if (pending == null)
return new EspFailureDetectedEventArgs(failureType);
RecordTerminalFailureSnapshot(pending);
_logger.Info(
$"EspAndHelloTracker: Shell-Core failure '{failureType}' inherits the pending provisioning failure detail " +
$"(category={pending.Category ?? "n/a"}, failedSubcategory={pending.FailedSubcategory ?? "n/a"}, " +
$"errorCode={pending.ErrorCode ?? "n/a"})");
return new EspFailureDetectedEventArgs(
failureType,
errorCode: pending.ErrorCode,
failedSubcategory: pending.FailedSubcategory,
category: pending.Category,
likelyCulpritApps: pending.LikelyCulpritApps);
}
// Session 080edee9 follow-up + Codex review (P2/P3) — snapshot the full failure context
// (HRESULT + failedSubcategory + category) so EnrollmentTerminationHandler can read it on
// the terminal-failure pathway. Only update when the args carry at least one of the three
// fields, so a bare Shell-Core failure cannot wipe out the registry snapshot. Deliberately
// NOT gated on ErrorCode alone — a non-Apps subcategory failure without HRESULT is still
// useful for downstream "should we promote?" gating.
private void RecordTerminalFailureSnapshot(EspFailureDetectedEventArgs args)
{
LastEventOccurredAtUtc = null;
// Session 080edee9 follow-up + Codex review (P2/P3) — snapshot the full
// failure context (HRESULT + failedSubcategory + category) before
// forwarding so EnrollmentTerminationHandler can read it on the terminal-
// failure pathway. Only update when the args carry at least one of the
// three fields, so a later ShellCore-derived failure (which has none of
// them) cannot wipe out the registry snapshot. We deliberately do NOT
// gate on ErrorCode alone — a non-Apps subcategory failure without
// HRESULT is still useful for downstream "should we promote?" gating.
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(args?.ErrorCode)
|| !string.IsNullOrEmpty(args?.FailedSubcategory)
|| !string.IsNullOrEmpty(args?.Category))
@@ -709,6 +752,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
failedSubcategory: args.FailedSubcategory,
category: args.Category);
}
}
// Forwarder for ProvisioningStatusTracker (registry-derived ESP failures). Args carry the
// full failure detail (FailureType, ErrorCode, FailedSubcategory, Category) extracted
// from the failed subcategory's statusText. Provisioning has no source-event timestamp
// surfaced today, so the adapter falls back to clock.
private void OnProvisioningEspFailureDetected(object sender, EspFailureDetectedEventArgs args)
{
LastEventOccurredAtUtc = null;
RecordTerminalFailureSnapshot(args);
try
{
EspFailureDetected?.Invoke(this, args);
@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
internal const string HResult_UserSkippedHello = "0x801C044F";
internal const int HelloCompletionTimeoutSeconds = 300;
internal const int BackfillLookbackMinutes = 5;
private static readonly HashSet<int> TrackedUdrEventIds = new HashSet<int>
@@ -81,6 +80,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
private readonly InformationalEventPost _post;
private readonly int _helloWaitTimeoutSeconds;
// How long a started Hello wizard may take to reach a terminal event (300/301/362): the
// tenant's Hello wait resolved through HelloWaitTimeout (300..3600 s). The engine's
// hello_safety window spends the same budget from the ESP exit, so this timer never cuts
// a user off inside the wizard before the tenant's budget is used up.
private readonly int _helloCompletionTimeoutSeconds;
private EventLogWatcher _udrWatcher;
private EventLogWatcher _helloForBusinessWatcher;
private System.Threading.Timer _policyCheckTimer;
@@ -121,13 +126,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
string tenantId,
InformationalEventPost post,
AgentLogger logger,
int helloWaitTimeoutSeconds = 30)
int helloWaitTimeoutSeconds = HelloWaitTimeout.DefaultSeconds)
{
_sessionId = sessionId ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(sessionId));
_tenantId = tenantId ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(tenantId));
_post = post ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(post));
_logger = logger ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(logger));
_helloWaitTimeoutSeconds = helloWaitTimeoutSeconds;
_helloCompletionTimeoutSeconds = HelloWaitTimeout.EffectiveSeconds(helloWaitTimeoutSeconds);
}
// =====================================================================
@@ -1094,7 +1100,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
if (policyKnownEnabled)
{
_logger.Info($"Hello wait timeout ({_helloWaitTimeoutSeconds}s) expired but Hello policy is enabled — " +
$"wizard not yet visible, starting long completion timer ({HelloCompletionTimeoutSeconds}s)");
$"wizard not yet visible, starting long completion timer ({_helloCompletionTimeoutSeconds}s)");
_post.Emit(new EnrollmentEvent
{
@@ -1105,7 +1111,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
Source = "EspAndHelloTracker",
Phase = EnrollmentPhase.Unknown,
Message = $"Hello wizard did not start within {_helloWaitTimeoutSeconds}s after ESP exit — " +
$"Hello policy is enabled, waiting up to {HelloCompletionTimeoutSeconds}s for wizard",
$"Hello policy is enabled, waiting up to {_helloCompletionTimeoutSeconds}s for wizard",
Data = new Dictionary<string, object>
{
{ "timeoutSeconds", _helloWaitTimeoutSeconds },
@@ -1205,11 +1211,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
if (_isHelloCompleted) return;
if (_helloCompletionTimer != null) return;
_logger.Info($"Starting Hello completion timer ({HelloCompletionTimeoutSeconds}s) - waiting for terminal Hello event (300/301/362)");
_logger.Info($"Starting Hello completion timer ({_helloCompletionTimeoutSeconds}s) - waiting for terminal Hello event (300/301/362)");
_helloCompletionTimer = new System.Threading.Timer(
OnHelloCompletionTimeout,
null,
TimeSpan.FromSeconds(HelloCompletionTimeoutSeconds),
TimeSpan.FromSeconds(_helloCompletionTimeoutSeconds),
TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(-1));
}
@@ -1230,7 +1236,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
return;
}
_logger.Warning($"Hello completion timeout ({HelloCompletionTimeoutSeconds}s) expired after wizard start without terminal event");
_logger.Warning($"Hello completion timeout ({_helloCompletionTimeoutSeconds}s) expired after wizard start without terminal event");
_isHelloCompleted = true;
HelloOutcome = _helloWizardStarted ? "timeout" : "wizard_not_started";
StopHelloCompletionTimerLocked();
@@ -1243,10 +1249,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
Severity = EventSeverity.Warning,
Source = "EspAndHelloTracker",
Phase = EnrollmentPhase.Unknown,
Message = $"Hello wizard started but no terminal event (300/301/362) arrived within {HelloCompletionTimeoutSeconds}s",
Message = $"Hello wizard started but no terminal event (300/301/362) arrived within {_helloCompletionTimeoutSeconds}s",
Data = new Dictionary<string, object>
{
{ "timeoutSeconds", HelloCompletionTimeoutSeconds },
{ "timeoutSeconds", _helloCompletionTimeoutSeconds },
{ "helloWizardStarted", _helloWizardStarted }
},
ImmediateUpload = true
@@ -1304,6 +1310,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
internal void TriggerWaitTimeoutForTest() => OnHelloWaitTimeout(null);
internal void TriggerCompletionTimeoutForTest() => OnHelloCompletionTimeout(null);
internal int CompletionTimeoutSecondsForTest => _helloCompletionTimeoutSeconds;
internal bool IsWaitTimerActiveForTest { get { lock (_stateLock) { return _helloWaitTimer != null; } } }
internal bool IsCompletionTimerActiveForTest { get { lock (_stateLock) { return _helloCompletionTimer != null; } } }
internal bool IsHelloWizardStartedForTest { get { lock (_stateLock) { return _helloWizardStarted; } } }
@@ -24,10 +24,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
/// <item><c>EspTrackingWin32Apps\&lt;userGuid&gt;\&lt;appGuid&gt;_&lt;rev&gt;</c> — which apps IME
/// registered for ESP tracking and in which phase.</item>
/// <item><c>SideCarPolicies\StatusServiceReports\&lt;userGuid&gt;\&lt;appId&gt;</c> — the exact
/// AppInstallStatusReport the ESP page renders (Status 1000=Installed .. 3000=Failed).</item>
/// AppInstallStatusReport the ESP page renders (Status 1000=Installed, 1001=Installing,
/// 1003=InstallingPendingReboot, 2000=NotApplicable, 3000=Failed).</item>
/// <item><c>Win32Apps\OperationalState\&lt;userGuid&gt;\&lt;appGuid&gt;</c> (bare GUIDs) — IME's
/// per-app operational state: the install deadline a downloaded app is waiting for
/// (<c>ExecutionDeadlineTime</c>, IME 1.106+) and the app-in-use deferral counters
/// (<c>DeferralsUsed</c>, <c>DeferUntilTime</c>, ..., IME 1.105+).</item>
/// </list>
/// The observer is snapshot-and-diff driven (RegistryWatcher gives key-scope edges only,
/// coalesced — a per-write parse is impossible by design): every tick re-reads the three
/// coalesced — a per-write parse is impossible by design): every tick re-reads the four
/// surfaces and emits <c>registry_app_state</c> on real field changes. Pre-existing state at
/// agent start is the silent baseline — Win32Apps keys survive re-enrollments, so replaying
/// them as fresh events would be the registry twin of the historic-IME-replay bug.
@@ -162,6 +167,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
ReadWin32Apps(root, snapshot);
ReadEspTracking(root, snapshot);
ReadStatusServiceReports(root, snapshot);
ReadOperationalState(root, snapshot);
return snapshot;
}
@@ -250,6 +256,42 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
}
}
// Only the two wait states are read; the download/execution bookkeeping next to them
// (DownloadStatus, DownloadStartTime, ExecutionStatus, ...) duplicates the log narrative
// and would double the event volume without adding a state the timeline lacks.
private static void ReadOperationalState(RegistryKey root, ImeRegistrySnapshot snapshot)
{
using var operational = root.OpenSubKey(@"Win32Apps\OperationalState");
if (operational == null) return;
foreach (var userName in operational.GetSubKeyNames())
{
if (!LooksLikeGuid(userName)) continue;
using var userKey = operational.OpenSubKey(userName);
if (userKey == null) continue;
foreach (var appKeyName in userKey.GetSubKeyNames())
{
var appId = ExtractAppId(appKeyName);
if (appId == null) continue;
using var appKey = userKey.OpenSubKey(appKeyName);
if (appKey == null) continue;
var deadline = TryParseRegistryDateTime(appKey.GetValue("ExecutionDeadlineTime"));
var deferralsUsed = TryReadInt(appKey.GetValue("DeferralsUsed"));
if (deadline == null && deferralsUsed == null) continue; // no wait state — no entry of its own
var entry = snapshot.GetOrAdd(userName, appId);
entry.InstallDeadlineUtc = deadline;
entry.DeferralsUsed = deferralsUsed;
entry.DeferralMaxDeferrals = TryReadInt(appKey.GetValue("DeferralMaxDeferrals"));
entry.DeferUntilUtc = TryParseRegistryDateTime(appKey.GetValue("DeferUntilTime"));
entry.DeferralAutoDeferred = TryReadBool(appKey.GetValue("DeferralAutoDeferred"));
}
}
}
// ── pure helpers (unit-tested directly) ─────────────────────────────────
internal static bool LooksLikeGuid(string name) =>
@@ -301,6 +343,23 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
}
}
internal static bool? TryReadBool(object? value) =>
value is string s && bool.TryParse(s, out var parsed) ? parsed : (bool?)null;
/// <summary>
/// OperationalState timestamps are UTC but stored in two InvariantCulture shapes:
/// <c>ExecutionDeadlineTime</c> as <c>MM/dd/yyyy HH:mm:ss</c> without a kind marker,
/// <c>DeferUntilTime</c> round-trip ("o", trailing Z). Both come back as UTC here.
/// </summary>
internal static DateTime? TryParseRegistryDateTime(object? value)
{
if (!(value is string s) || string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(s)) return null;
return DateTime.TryParse(s, CultureInfo.InvariantCulture,
DateTimeStyles.AssumeUniversal | DateTimeStyles.AdjustToUniversal, out var parsed)
? parsed
: (DateTime?)null;
}
/// <summary>StateMessageEnforcementState bands (verified against decompiled IME 1.97/1.104).</summary>
internal static string ClassifyEnforcementState(int state)
{
@@ -312,15 +371,59 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
return "unknown";
}
/// <summary>AppInstallStatus (StatusService/ESP page): 1000er = installed, 3000 = failed.</summary>
/// <summary>
/// AppInstallStatus as IME writes it to StatusServiceReports (unchanged IME 1.50 .. 1.106):
/// 1000 Installed, 1001 Installing, 1002 InstalledButDependenciesNotPresent,
/// 1003 InstallingPendingReboot, 1004 InstalledPendingReboot, 2000 NotApplicable, 3000 Failed.
/// The 1000 band is NOT uniformly terminal — IME maps every InProgress enforcement state to
/// 1001 — so the mapping is explicit and an unknown value is not judged.
/// </summary>
internal static string? ClassifyStatusServiceStatus(int status)
{
if (status >= 1000 && status < 2000) return "installed";
if (status == 3000) return "failed";
switch (status)
{
case 1000:
case 1002:
case 1004:
return "installed";
case 1001:
case 1003:
return "installing";
case 3000:
return "failed";
}
if (status >= 2000 && status < 3000) return "notApplicable";
return null;
}
/// <summary>
/// Human-readable suffix for the two IME wait states (install deadline, app-in-use
/// deferral); empty when neither applies. Culture-invariant on purpose — the agent runs
/// under whatever culture the SYSTEM account carries.
/// </summary>
internal static string DescribeWaitState(AppRegistryEntry entry)
{
var parts = new List<string>(2);
if (entry.InstallDeadlineUtc is DateTime deadline)
parts.Add("downloaded, install deadline " + FormatUtcMinute(deadline));
if (entry.DeferralsUsed is int used && used > 0)
{
var kind = entry.DeferralAutoDeferred == true ? "auto-deferred" : "deferred by user";
var count = entry.DeferralMaxDeferrals is int max
? used.ToString(CultureInfo.InvariantCulture) + "/" + max.ToString(CultureInfo.InvariantCulture)
: used.ToString(CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
parts.Add(entry.DeferUntilUtc is DateTime until
? kind + " " + count + " until " + FormatUtcMinute(until)
: kind + " " + count);
}
return parts.Count == 0 ? string.Empty : ", " + string.Join(", ", parts);
}
private static string FormatUtcMinute(DateTime utc) =>
utc.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm", CultureInfo.InvariantCulture) + " UTC";
internal static List<AppRegistryChange> DiffSnapshots(ImeRegistrySnapshot previous, ImeRegistrySnapshot next)
{
var changes = new List<AppRegistryChange>();
@@ -343,6 +446,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
if (prev?.StatusServiceStatus != next.StatusServiceStatus) changed.Add("statusServiceStatus");
if ((prev?.EspTracked ?? false) != next.EspTracked) changed.Add("espTracked");
if (!string.Equals(prev?.EspPhase, next.EspPhase, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)) changed.Add("espPhase");
// Wait states: the deadline and each recorded deferral are transitions worth an event;
// MaxDeferrals / AutoDeferred only travel along as data.
if (prev?.InstallDeadlineUtc != next.InstallDeadlineUtc) changed.Add("installDeadline");
if (prev?.DeferralsUsed != next.DeferralsUsed) changed.Add("deferralsUsed");
if (prev?.DeferUntilUtc != next.DeferUntilUtc) changed.Add("deferUntil");
return changed;
}
@@ -445,6 +553,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
}
if (e.EspTracked) data["espTracked"] = "true";
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(e.EspPhase)) data["espPhase"] = e.EspPhase!;
if (e.InstallDeadlineUtc is DateTime deadline) data["installDeadlineUtc"] = deadline.ToString("o", CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
if (e.DeferralsUsed is int used) data["deferralsUsed"] = used.ToString(CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
if (e.DeferralMaxDeferrals is int max) data["deferralMaxDeferrals"] = max.ToString(CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
if (e.DeferUntilUtc is DateTime until) data["deferUntilUtc"] = until.ToString("o", CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
if (e.DeferralAutoDeferred is bool auto) data["deferralAutoDeferred"] = auto ? "true" : "false";
var summary = data.TryGetValue("enforcementClass", out var encls) ? encls
: data.TryGetValue("statusServiceClass", out var sscls) ? sscls
@@ -453,7 +566,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
_post.Emit(
eventType: SharedEventTypes.RegistryAppState,
source: SourceLabel,
message: $"Registry app state: {e.AppId} ({(e.UserContext == ImeRegistrySnapshot.DeviceContext ? "device" : "user")}) -> {summary}",
message: $"Registry app state: {e.AppId} ({(e.UserContext == ImeRegistrySnapshot.DeviceContext ? "device" : "user")}) -> {summary}{DescribeWaitState(e)}",
severity: EventSeverity.Info,
data: data,
occurredAtUtc: nowUtc);
@@ -625,6 +738,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
public int? StatusServiceStatus { get; set; }
public bool EspTracked { get; set; }
public string? EspPhase { get; set; }
// Win32Apps\OperationalState — the two IME wait states (all UTC).
public DateTime? InstallDeadlineUtc { get; set; }
public int? DeferralsUsed { get; set; }
public int? DeferralMaxDeferrals { get; set; }
public DateTime? DeferUntilUtc { get; set; }
public bool? DeferralAutoDeferred { get; set; }
}
internal sealed class AppRegistryChange

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