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Author SHA1 Message Date
Oliver Kieselbach fa31872903 fix(agent,engine,web): keep the due time as the deadline stamp; draw timeout verdicts hollow in the Network Timeline (D-238 revised)
Revises 14b185db after the pre-release review. The fleet measurement (30 days,
all tenants) showed 87 of 821 sessions with a sleep episode had their verdict
inside the episode — 59 of them one tenant's self-deploying devices closed two
minutes before the device-only detection came due and reopened 5–7 days later.
Stamping the firing clock would have turned those outages into session
duration and pushed the tenant's mean duration from minutes to days.

- OnDeadlineFired posts OccurredAtUtc = DueAtUtc again; the due time stays in the
  payload and the two stale-fire guards keep reading it (any stamp stays safe).
- Network Timeline: a timeout verdict (helloOutcome timeout, device-only detection
  window) is drawn as a hollow marker "Completed (timeout)" with a legend line and a
  plain-language tooltip — a wait expired, nothing observed on the device; the
  Asleep block is never split at it. finalizing_grace alone is not an indicator.
- Session Info standby note clips to the two WhiteGlove spans when the card shows
  the combined WhiteGlove duration; the dedup key is consumed only by a usable
  observation (review findings).
- Stale comments describing the firing-clock contract corrected.

Tests: DeadlineFireTimeStampTests (reducer stays correct for any stamp),
EnrollmentOrchestratorTests (due-time stamp + payload), networkTimelineModel
timeout markers (3), standby windows, WhiteGlove windows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 01:55:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b08b79eafe test(mcp): revert_tenant_config backupId is required — schema and description pin (D-240 review)
Left out of e43d916c's explicit file list by mistake; part of the same change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 01:47:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e43d916c24 fix(mcp): spec gates, secret-safe error text, enforced response cap, payload-coupled pageSize, client cancellation (D-239, D-240)
Request gates: an Origin other than the server's own is refused with 403 before any token
work (spec MUST); a token the backend rejects is answered 401 + WWW-Authenticate
error="invalid_token" instead of a final 403. The auth.ts header now names the
backend-audience token forwarding as a deliberate deviation (D-239) instead of calling
it spec-conformant.

Secrets: the per-argument echo policy travels in the tool-call context, so toolError's
"Parameters used" block masks update_tenant_config.fields the same way the log line
does. revert_tenant_config requires backupId (a retried revert without one restored the
snapshot the previous revert had just created). /oauth/token relays Entra errors through
an allowlist (error, capped description, error_codes). OAuthStateSigningKey is required
in production (B-uba).

Results: toolResultText enforces the response cap — a page above it is refused with an
overflow answer naming the pageSize that fits (from this page's bytes per row), never
rows or a nextLink; the telemetry logs the size the page would have had (B-zhp).
query_raw_events with DataJson in the effective projection defaults to 50 rows and
refuses more than 100 before the backend runs (30-day measurement: p90 3.3 KB, outliers
21-29 KB per row) (B-s2y). The caller context carries the request's cancellation signal:
apiFetch, the retry wait and the timeout fallback stop when the client goes away, and the
tool_call line logs cancelled instead of an error.

Tests: 9 new files (origin guard both eras over HTTP, 401 + cancellation, apiFetch abort,
arg policy in error text, signing key, token error body, overflow, raw-events pageSize,
telemetry overflow/cancelled); vitest 844 green, tsc 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 01:47:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 14b185db35 fix(agent,engine,web): a deadline decision is stamped with the firing clock, never the due time (D-238)
A HelloSafety deadline due during Modern Standby fired after wake but was stamped
with its due time, so enrollment_complete and CompletedAt landed inside the sleep
window: the Network Timeline drew "Completed" in the middle of the Asleep block
and three views named three different standby durations.

- OnDeadlineFired posts OccurredAtUtc = FiredAtUtc and carries the due time under
  SignalPayloadKeys.DeadlineDueAtUtc; the stale-fire guards (RealmJoin re-arm,
  SelfDeploying guard C) identify the incarnation via DecisionEngine.DeadlineDueAtUtc,
  which falls back to the signal time for pre-key signal logs.
- SignalSerializer renders Date-tokenized payload strings as ISO-8601 round-trip text
  instead of the culture-formatted JValue.ToString() (a replayed deadlineDueAtUtc came
  back as "4/20/2026 9:55:00 AM").
- Web: the Session Info standby note is clipped to the same window as the duration
  next to it (lib/standby.ts) and printed with seconds, matching the attribution chip.

Tests: DeadlineFireTimeStampTests (late HelloSafety fire, guard C, RealmJoin re-arm,
helper fallback), SerializationTests date-like payload round-trip,
EnrollmentOrchestratorTests late fire, lib/__tests__/standby.test.ts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 01:05:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach baa51102fd feat(web,backend,mcp): app rows without a terminal state become Incomplete instead of running forever (D-237)
An app still installing when the session's observation ended has no terminal
event and never will. The session page ticked Date.now() - startedAt for it
("11h 39m" on a session that finished hours ago), and its AppInstallSummaries
row stayed InProgress forever - ranked behind failures in the app's session
list and counted in totalInstalls with no named bucket.

Web: applyObservationEnd marks such rows Incomplete once the session is
terminal (isTerminalStatus), bounded by session.lastEventAt; the panel shows a
slate Incomplete badge and the watched span as a lower bound, the "active"
pill excludes them, and the download panel carries the parallel flag. Covers
every historic session without a backfill.

Backend: CloseOpenAppInstallsForSessionAsync closes InProgress rows without a
CompletedAt as Incomplete - at the terminal seam, again on the ingest batch
that carries agent_shutting_down for a terminal session (rows opened after
the verdict), and from the 30-day sweep. The sticky-status reconcile keeps
Incomplete against a late progress-only batch and lets a real terminal win.
App metrics and app analytics disclose the bucket (incomplete,
totalIncomplete) outside the failure rate; manifest and wire types
regenerated.

MCP: get_session_summary coverage gains an apps block and a gaps line naming
the apps the agent's last app_tracking_summary still listed as installing or
downloading, terminal sessions only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 00:02:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5577f5e7e5 feat(rules): rule submissions — retention (withdrawn 30d, declined 90d), contact email, pending-first tenant list, operator hard delete (D-236 amended)
Closed submissions leave through the daily maintenance sweep (RuleSubmissionRetention, one place for rule and test); pending/approved/published never. The submit dialog takes an optional contact email (a UPN is not always a mailbox), stored for the reviewer and never published. The tenant list shows pending rows by default with the rest behind Show all, and the contribute button shows for every writer, also before the first custom rule exists. DELETE global/rule-submissions/{id} (GlobalAdminOnly, MCP delete_rule_submission) removes test/demo rows for operator and tenant alike. Bumps internal and .claude/commands gitlinks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 23:27:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 61892592e4 feat(rules): community rule submissions — submit custom rules from the portal, review via GA page or MCP, publish by repo commit + reseed (D-236)
Tenant admins submit references to their own gather/analyze rules; the server freezes the rule, records pre-flight findings and fire stats, and stores it under a 12-character id (RuleSubmissions, SessionReports layout). Attribution is the submitter's frozen choice (anonymous by default) and becomes the published author. Review (approve with reserved id / decline with comment) through /admin/reports/rule-submissions or the MCP tools list_rule_submissions, get_rule_submission, review_rule_submission, reseed_rules_from_github; published is derived from the global catalog, never stored. Analyze rules now get the same server-side author stamp as gather rules; ANALYZE-ID-001 carries author Community. Privacy page names the credit; bumps internal and .claude/commands gitlinks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 22:53:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1e2ca46946 chore: bump internal gitlink (ESP-004 released, B-kfu)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 17:40:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8224c8f1a8 fix(rules,engine,agent): ESP-004 gates on the esp_apps_timeout verdict; not_exists absence gate; Shell-Core failure inherits settle detail (D-234, D-235)
ANALYZE-ESP-004 fired on every ESP terminal failure of a Continue-anyway
profile and rendered the configured FirstSync limit as elapsed time — the
mayHaveContinuedAnyway flag only says the profile has the button. The rule
now requires the agent's own verdict (app_install_failed with
failureType=esp_apps_timeout), names that app via a same-event filter, reads
failedSubcategory from esp_failure_settle_started and words the limit as a
limit. Verified with test_analyze_rule: cb7036a6 fires, 683f1eff (0x80070652
after 19 min) stays silent.

Rule engine: not_exists with a dataField on event_type/event_data
conditions matches when no event of the type carries a non-empty value —
including an absent type — instead of being dead behind the fieldValue null
short-circuit. Schema and MCP authoring guide say so.

Agent: a Shell-Core 62407 failure that lands inside the provisioning
tracker's 30-s settle window (a third of all ESP terminal failures) now
inherits the pending errorCode / failedSubcategory / category /
likelyCulpritApps, so enrollment_failed, Sessions.FailureReason and the
termination-time app classification see the HRESULT the registry had
already named. failureType stays the Shell-Core value.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 17:20:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d7f39895f5 fix(web): omit the two default field values from the browser catalog (D-233)
The Entra family (D-231) pushed utils/error-codes.json to 123026 bytes against
the 120000-byte client-bundle budget, breaking the Web CI job.

Raising the cap would have been the wrong repair -- it was set three days ago
with the v2 catalog, and a guard that gets widened whenever content grows is not
a guard. The bytes were elsewhere: confidence "high" holds for 562 of 641 rows
and source "msdoc" for about half, ~19 KB of bundle spent repeating two
constants. The sync now omits them and errorCodeMap restores them while building
the map, so every consumer still sees a complete entry and errorCodeTooltip
renders exactly as before. 123026 -> 102399 bytes, cap unchanged, ~17 KB of
headroom left.

Dropping the fields outright was rejected: the tooltip renders both, so they are
provenance a customer sees. The vocabulary test now asserts on the resolved
entry via getErrorCodeEntry rather than the raw file -- a default changed on one
side only would otherwise make tooltips lie about provenance silently.
2026-09-09 15:26:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 790bd35385 small gather rule description change 2026-09-09 14:59:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 34c9fd42fe chore: bump internal and .claude/commands gitlinks
internal: D-231/D-232, the plan with its review, backlog B-y5d and B-s2y.
.claude/commands: the platform-health marker-catalog corrections from the
2026-09-09 health pass (weekday vs weekend ingest baseline, CAS retried scales
with load, WhatsNewNotificationSent is not proof of a run).
2026-09-09 14:55:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 19a336870c fix(mcp): put the catalog pointer on the parameter, not only the tool (D-232)
Seven of 44 tool errors in the 7-day telemetry were invented catalog values, and
in every case the tool description already said the right thing while the
parameter description was bare or contradicted it.

update_tenant_config is the clean proof: its description says "Call
get_tenant_config_schema FIRST", but the fields parameter said "Use
get_tenant_config for current values and exact field names" -- and over 30 days
the model called get_tenant_config 12 times and get_tenant_config_schema once.
The text next to the argument wins, and get_tenant_config cannot answer what it
was pointed at: it shows only the fields this tenant has set, with no type,
writability or nullability.

Also: get_session_events.eventType (event_types catalog, matching the pointer
search_sessions_by_event.eventType already carries), query_table (list_tables)
and test_analyze_rule.rule (rule_schemas, validate_rule first).
2026-09-09 14:55:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5ba5942d0b feat(error-codes): parse the Entra device-registration family (D-231)
The catalog held 2 of 607 entries in entra-join, while the 0x801Cxxxx DSREG
family is what an enrollment meets during hybrid join and the ESP account-setup
phase. The Windows Hello PIN error page is the only MS table that documents it;
both of its tables are now parsed, restricted to 0x801c* (607 -> 641 entries).

The block runs after PROSE_ENTRIES so the Autopilot-specific text for 0x801c03ea
keeps precedence over the generic one. The Mitigation column is not carried --
the catalog describes codes, it does not advise. A "SYMBOL: text" cell yields a
symbol (0x801c004d -> DSREG_NO_DEFAULT_ACCOUNT). The run fails below 30 keys,
because parseTables drops non-matching rows silently and a reshaped page would
otherwise look like a clean run.

decode() now strips zero-width and bidi marks: the page carries U+200B in one
hex cell and four description cells, JS \s does not match it, and such a hex
cell fails every ^0x...$ test. Placed in decode() rather than in the new source
so the next parsed page cannot walk into it -- regeneration shows 34 added,
0 changed.

0x801C044F, the zero-hit lookup that started this, is on none of the three MS
pages and deliberately stays unknown.
2026-09-09 14:55:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach aa20d9102c fix(backend): show the freshly published agent version, not the previous one (D-230)
The What's new panel prints "Latest agent version" under the release
entries, and the session list draws its outdated badges from the same
endpoint — but the value was cached 12h in each Function instance and 1h
in the browser, so the panel announced the previous release for up to 13h
and two instances could disagree.

- LatestVersionsService: TTL 12h -> 5 min; keep the last successful result
  and serve it when the blob read fails, so the shorter TTL cannot blank
  the version line on a transient hiccup (failure marker 5 min -> 1 min).
- GetLatestVersions: Cache-Control max-age 3600 -> 60.
- No refresh callback from build-agent.yml: the cache is per instance, a
  warm-up request would leave every other instance stale.

The origin is a ~200-byte no-cache blob behind the download alias that
Front Door does not cache, so a warm instance now reads it at most 12x/h.

Backend deploy (workflow_dispatch) pending — B-uq7.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 12:26:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 097be1700b chore: bump internal gitlink
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 12:10:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f1457d823d chore: bump .claude/commands gitlink 2026-09-09 12:02:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 12e66299e6 feat(rules): allow-list folders under the signed-in user's profile (D-228, D-229)
Gather rules and admin-configured diagnostics paths could never reach a
folder below a user profile. The %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token lifts the
C:\Users hard block for AppData\Local and AppData\Roaming, but lifting is
not admitting: the path then fell into filePrefixes, which is matched
literally against the already-expanded path, and the profile name is not
known when that list is authored. The exception only ever worked in
unrestricted mode, and no agent test passed a non-null userProfilePath.

D-228 introduces userProfileFilePrefixes, holding entries relative to the
profile root (AppData\Local\RealmJoin). Both guards resolve them against
the detected profile and match segment-bounded; entries that are rooted,
contain "..", or sit outside AppData\Local / AppData\Roaming are dropped at
load, so configuration can only narrow the hard block's exception, never
widen it. The allowlist is anchored to the detected profile, so a rule
cannot reach another user's AppData. The AppData subdirectory list existed
in both guard classes with the GatherRuleGuards copy unused; it is now one
list and DiagnosticsPathGuards delegates. filePrefixes additionally gains
C:\ProgramData\RealmJoin\choco\logs.

D-229 fixes the pre-flight validators, which must only ever reject what the
agent rejects:
- the portal returned "allowed" on the lifted hard block without consulting
  the allowlist, so a rule the agent refuses passed the enable gate and then
  failed silently on the device with a security_warning;
- the MCP validator offered logparser the diagnosticsPathPrefixes list that
  no collector consults (four paths reported allowed that the agent blocks);
- the MCP validator did not expand environment variables at all, reporting
  %ProgramData% targets as blocked although the device reads them.

Measured before changing the portal: no rule in any tenant used the token,
so nothing that was working gets disabled.

Verified: solution build 0 warnings, agent 2897 tests, web 1257 + tsc +
eslint 0, MCP 779, guardrails.json validates against its schema, rules/dist
regenerates without drift. The six new agent tests were green against the
unchanged guard first, which is what proves the exception was inert.

Takes effect on devices only after an agent release: guardrails.json is an
EmbeddedResource in the agent assembly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 11:54:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e9a01de9da chore: bump .claude/commands gitlink
Event reference in /ux-insights completed and live-verified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 10:06:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5f793ea01a chore: bump .claude/commands gitlink
Marker-catalog rows for the What's new panel events and the digest timer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-09 09:58:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e86f7efed3 feat(bootstrap): verify the publisher of the extracted agent binaries before --install (D-227)
The SHA-256 check proves the ZIP is the one version.json names, but that
manifest lives in the same container as the ZIP: it cannot outlive a
compromise of the download host. The expected publisher travels inside this
script, which the loader verified before running it, so the chain from the
file an administrator assigns to the process that starts is publisher-anchored
end to end.

Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 v2.4 -> v2.5:
- Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries checks every AutopilotMonitor.*.exe/.dll in the
  extracted payload for status Valid and the same subject pin the loader
  carries; the gate runs immediately before --install and throws on any
  rejection, exactly like the hash check.
- Third-party assemblies keep their own publisher's signature and are not
  checked: System.Management.Automation.dll ships unsigned, so a gate over all
  files would refuse the live payload.
- An extracted folder with no binary of ours is a rejection, not a pass.
- The SHA-256 manifest check is unchanged and still runs first: it proves the
  bytes, the signature proves the author.

Verified against the live payload 2.0.1454 (all five of our PEs Valid and
glueckkanja AG, gate passes); appending one byte to AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll
makes it reject. Pester 55/55.

The portal privacy and about pages carried the pre-signing wording and are
corrected in the same change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 23:11:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 78bfad0ec6 web: the portal What's new panel names the currently published agent version
A quiet third line in the panel header ("Latest agent version 2.0.1452",
faint, the number monospaced) reads from the existing config/latest-versions
endpoint. The monospaced string is the same one the session list shows in its
"Agent Version" column, so a reader can tell at a glance whether their fleet
runs the latest agent.

Portal and signed-in only: the endpoint is AuthenticatedUser, and the public
site has no session list to compare against. The gate sits on the mount of the
small component, so the landing page never even issues the request; a missing
version renders nothing.
2026-09-08 22:37:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f5efadfd07 ci: pin every third-party action to a commit SHA, gated and Dependabot-maintained (D-226)
A tag is a mutable pointer owned by the action's publisher. These jobs are not
ordinary CI: they hold the code-signing Key Vault token (D-223), the federated
storage credentials (D-222), and combine-rules.yml holds a contents:write token
that pushes to main. Whoever could repoint v7 would run code with all of that.

azure/login and Azure/functions-action were already pinned; the actions/* and
github/codeql-action references were not, on the usual argument that GitHub owns
them and shares the runner's trust boundary. That argument does not survive the
fact that they run in the same jobs as the signing identity. All seven are now
pinned by SHA with the version in a trailing comment -- the comment is what keeps
the line reviewable, and Dependabot rewrites both together.

action-pins.yml is the guard: pins nobody enforces rot, and no review reliably
catches one @v4 added to a 200-line workflow. It lives in its own workflow because
ci.yml deliberately ignores changes to the other workflow files, so a job placed
there would stay silent for exactly the commits it must inspect. Like CI it reports
rather than blocks -- main is unprotected; making it binding would mean adding it
as a required status check, which is a branch-protection decision.

Verified both directions: 49 references pass against the repo, and a fixture with
@v7, @main and a bare SHA fails with three annotations while the local reusable
workflow refs are skipped.

Two floating tool versions closed while here. wix went from the range 5.* to 5.0.2
-- it writes the bytes of the MSI customers install, where AzureSignTool only signs
them. ajv was the worse one: unpinned, and npm runs lifecycle scripts at install,
so a hijacked release would have executed with the push token before a single rule
was validated; now exact versions with --ignore-scripts.

Line endings: sed -i rewrote the workflow files as LF. Git normalises on commit, so
the content diff is unaffected and indexnow-notify.yml carries no change at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 22:14:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c26eca2f01 chore: bump internal gitlink
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 21:36:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9f1879a9f3 fix(agent): raise the captured script output cap from 2K to 8K
The portal showed the two-stage bootstrap output ending in ...[truncated]. That marker
comes from the agent, not from the web view: the stdout is cut at capture time, so no
amount of UI space brings the rest back.

Measured over 1,486 script outputs in the fleet (2026-08-25..09-08): median 39, p90 644,
max 1,501 chars, and the 2,048 cap had never been hit -- the maximum was our own
one-stage bootstrap. The loader preamble of ~460 chars pushed exactly that output over
the edge, i.e. this is a consequence of D-224 and it hit the one output an operator
actually reads.

8,192 covers the realistic worst case (download retries plus relax logging, ~2,700) and
stays 4x below the 32K-char Table Storage property limit that bounds the event
downstream. Other scripts are unaffected in practice: p90 is 644 chars.

Reaches the fleet with the next agent release.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 21:36:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c24c7bf7ef fix(publish): serve the customer scripts as a download, not as a web page
The blobs carry Content-Type: text/plain and no Content-Disposition, so every browser
renders them inline -- the documented "download the bootstrapper script" step turns into
"select this text and save it yourself", with whatever the editor then does to the line
endings and the signature block.

x-ms-blob-content-disposition makes the link a download in every browser, which is a
server-side fact rather than a per-browser hint in the docs. Command-line clients (the
loader, the MSI runner, curl) ignore the header, so nothing on the device path changes.

Metadata only: the script bytes are untouched, so no version bump and the bump guard
still sees the published copies as current.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 21:07:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5fac3d6004 Agent Host changes for agents/whats-new-notification-settings (#153) 2026-09-08 20:51:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7605d2e9f5 fix(loader): log the signer CN instead of the whole EV subject
The full subject of an EV certificate is a line of street address and registration
numbers and pushed the useful part of the log line off the screen. The CN answers the
question the log has to answer. The full subject is still logged in the one case where it
is the finding itself: a valid signature from a publisher that is not us.

Loader 1.1 -> 1.2; a Pester case pins the short form. Suite on PS 5.1: 45/45.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:49:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7bf5412d63 docs(mcp): teach the diag-zip map the loader log
bootstrap-loader.log is new with the two-stage bootstrap and told the diag tooling
nothing so far. Names which channel a device was assigned: the loader logs there when
assigned directly, and to bootstrap-msi.log when it runs from the MDM-LOB MSI.

Takes effect with the next MCP deploy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:47:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b53ceb1a7c chore: bump internal gitlink (MSI loader consolidation)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:47:01 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 647581b4ff refactor(msi): the MSI carries the shared stage-1 loader instead of its own downloader
Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1 and Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 had become the same script:
download the current installer, run it, log, always exit 0. The MSI copy additionally
downloaded and executed WITHOUT verifying what it got, which is exactly the gap the loader
was written to close. The MSI is now packaging only -- it installs and runs the same file
that is assigned directly in Intune, and both delivery channels get publisher verification
from one implementation.

Dropped from the MSI path: its own Deployed-marker check. That guard lives in stage 2 and
runs there anyway, so the only cost is one download on a device that is already deployed.

Kept: the log file name. bootstrap-msi.log is what the diagnostics tooling keys on to tell
the MDM-LOB channel apart from the Intune script channel, so the loader takes -LogFileName
(default bootstrap-loader.log) and the custom action passes bootstrap-msi.log. A Pester
test now pins that contract across the two files -- renaming the parameter on either side
would leave the MSI channel logging under the wrong name.

Package version 1.0.2 -> 1.1.0 so Intune LOB update detection sees the new payload, and a
new component GUID because the key path file changed.

Loader 1.0 -> 1.1. Bootstrap suite on Windows PowerShell 5.1: 44/44.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:41:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach db9b1995bc refactor: move the error-code generator from scripts/ to tools/ (D-225)
scripts/ at the repo root is the customer surface: everything under
Bootstrap/ and CustomerSetup/ is published to the download container by
Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1, Authenticode-signed and version-gated. The
error-code generator is a maintainer tool no workflow runs, so it diluted
that invariant. .github/scripts/ was not the alternative -- it holds only
helpers a workflow step invokes, and unlike guardrails-in-sync and
shared-manifests-in-sync the catalog has no CI drift gate (the generator
needs IME_ENUMS_JSON from operator tooling and live MS Learn fetches).

REPO_ROOT stays ../.. at the new depth, so only the documented path moved:
the generator header and README, the C# and TypeScript comments, the test
summary, and the description header of error-codes.json together with the
generator literal that emits it (the two must stay identical or the next
regeneration diffs). The web sync re-ran clean at 607 entries with no
change to utils/error-codes.json, which drops the header.
2026-09-08 20:35:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7563435837 feat(ci): Authenticode-sign the bootstrap MSI and the runner it embeds (D-223)
MSI carries an Authenticode signature like any PE, so the same identity and the same
ordering rules apply: signing identity logs in first and only for the Key Vault token,
the storage login stays last, and no environment: on the job.

The embedded Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1 is signed BEFORE wix build -- wix embeds the
file as it finds it, so signing afterwards would leave the copy inside the MSI unsigned,
and a device under an AllSigned policy needs the runner to carry its own signature.

The MSI is signed after the build and before the hash and the upload, then both files are
verified (Valid, timestamped, optional publisher pin) while nothing is published yet.
The provenance attestation now also skips runs that upload nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:34:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e39f2abb61 chore: bump internal gitlink (comment lesson)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 19:21:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 47dad7143f docs(ci): tighten the code-signing comments in build-agent
Public repo: keep the reasoning that a later change could break -- signing must precede
the release hashes, the job must never carry an environment, the timestamp is not
optional -- and drop the rest. Comments only, no behaviour change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 19:20:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d81f41dc72 chore: bump internal gitlink (D-223/D-224 plans and decisions)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:59:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach cc6be10532 fix(publish): read the signed bytes back as byte[], not as a wrapped Object[]
The ',' operator elsewhere in this file exists because PowerShell unrolls an array
RETURNED from a function; a property assignment does not unroll, so it wrapped the
byte[] in an Object[] of length 1 and the upload failed converting it back. Signing
itself was fine -- run 34253331703 signed all six scripts and uploaded none, so nothing
reached the download alias.

Added the invariant that would have caught it: signed bytes must be longer than the
unsigned form, since a signature only ever adds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:54:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0ac548bfce feat(bootstrap): two-stage loader and Authenticode-signed customer scripts (D-224)
Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 is the new stage 1 -- the file an administrator assigns in
Intune. It carries no enrollment logic: it downloads the published installer, verifies its
Authenticode signature, and runs it in the same process, passing through every remaining
argument. Assigning the installer directly stays supported and unchanged.

The point of the split is that the customer-held artifact stops changing. Today every
bootstrap change forces customers to replace their Intune copy, so the fleet runs a
distribution of script versions we do not control. It is also what makes script signing
worth doing: signing a file that gets swapped by hand each release is a one-off gain,
signing a loader that never changes is permanent.

The loader is deliberately minimal, because it is the one piece that cannot be fixed
remotely -- every guard placed in it would be frozen for years. All guards stay in stage 2.

Verification pins the certificate SUBJECT, never a thumbprint: certificates get renewed and
a deployed loader cannot be, so a thumbprint pin would strand the fleet at the next
renewal. A hash oracle was rejected for a different reason -- it would have to be fetched
from the same host as the script, so it could not survive a compromise of that host, while
the expected publisher travels inside the loader.

Fail-closed on verification, fail-soft on exit: nothing runs without a valid signature from
us (running unverified code as SYSTEM is the risk being removed here), but the loader still
exits 0, because a device without monitoring is acceptable and a failed enrollment step is
not. The accepted cost is that a device which can never fetch or verify stays silent.

Publisher changes:

- every published script is signed (loader, installer, both -Dev renders,
  Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent, Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn), and signing is the LAST
  transformation: it covers exactly the CRLF/UTF-8 bytes Get-PublishBytes produced, so
  nothing may normalise or re-encode them afterwards.
- signing is mandatory for a real publish. Only -DryRun may run unsigned, because the PR
  gate executes the publisher without any Azure login.
- comparisons against a published copy strip the signature block first. A timestamped
  signature differs on every run, so without stripping the version-bump guard and the
  drift check would report a change for every unchanged script.
- the bump guard became Assert-VersionBump and now covers the loader as well.
- version.json gains loaderVersion. Additive, no consumer yet: stage 2 is current by
  construction, so only stage 1's version says anything about a customer's Intune copy.
- -SignedOutputDir writes the exact uploaded bytes for the CI artifact, in a dry run too --
  that is how a signed script gets inspected before it reaches anyone.

publish-scripts.yml logs in with the signing identity first and only to fetch the Key Vault
token (azure/login sets the default az account and the storage login has to be the one that
stays), then publishes and offers the signed scripts as an artifact. build-agent.yml passes
the same parameters on a stable cutover.

Tests: 14 new Pester cases, including that a validly signed script from a FOREIGN publisher
is refused -- that is what an attacker with any code-signing certificate can produce. Full
bootstrap suite on Windows PowerShell 5.1: 43/43.

Not covered: the MSI runner still downloads stage 2 without verifying it, and the customer
docs still describe the direct assignment only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:48:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9c1d0586ef ci: skip the provenance attestation on test runs of build-agent
A dispatch with upload_blob=false and create_release=false publishes nothing, so the
Sigstore attestation would write a permanent public transparency-log entry for bytes
nobody ever receives. The step now runs only when the run actually ships something.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:34:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 21ec5e4773 ci: Authenticode-sign the agent binaries before the release hashes are computed (D-223)
Every assembly we author -- AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe, AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe
and the three AutopilotMonitor.*.dll beside them -- is signed with AzureSignTool (pinned
7.0.1) against a certificate in the corporate code-signing Key Vault, SHA-256 file digest
plus an RFC-3161 timestamp. Third-party assemblies keep their own publisher's signature.

The position of the step is load-bearing: signing rewrites the PE file, so it has to run
before the staging copy, the ZIP and every SHA-256 in "Create release artifact". Those
hashes are the bootstrap's integrity oracle (version.json, AdminConfiguration) -- signing
after hashing would publish hashes that no downloaded file can ever match.

The signing identity is a SECOND federated principal in the same tenant and logs in FIRST,
only to fetch a Key Vault token; the storage login of D-222 follows and owns the az context
from there, because azure/login sets the default account and the last login wins. Both
federated credentials carry the subject repo:okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor:ref:refs/heads/main,
so this job must never be given a GitHub 'environment:' -- that rewrites the OIDC subject
claim and would break BOTH logins at once.

No unsigned fallback and no dispatch input to skip signing: a missing repository variable,
a Key Vault failure or a non-zero azuresigntool exit code fails the run before anything is
published. azuresigntool is a native tool, so $LASTEXITCODE is checked explicitly --
PowerShell does not throw on a non-zero exit, and a silently unsigned release is exactly
the outcome signing exists to prevent.

Verification runs against the STAGED bytes, not the build output: every AutopilotMonitor.*
PE in the ZIP must be Valid, must carry a timestamp (without one the signature dies with
the certificate) and all of them must share one signing certificate. Setting the optional
repository variable CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT additionally pins the publisher, so the gate
proves "signed by us" instead of "signed by someone trusted".

The build provenance attestation now covers the ZIP and both EXEs, so an extracted binary
can be verified without the ZIP. Authenticode and the attestation answer different
questions and both stay: who published this binary (offline, what Windows, SmartScreen and
WDAC evaluate) versus which build produced these exact bytes (gh attestation verify).

Not covered here: the customer bootstrap script (its signature block changes the published
bytes and must follow the dev render; see B-57c, the two-stage loader), the bootstrap MSI,
and the local build.ps1 path, which from now on produces unsigned bits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 18:20:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e4a5a6654d ci: workflows authorize Azure Storage with the federated identity, not SAS secrets (D-222)
Every storage write against autopilotmonitoreu -- build-counter CAS, agent ZIP and MSI,
version manifests, customer bootstrap scripts, the AdminConfiguration hash oracle -- now
rides on the existing federated credential (subject repo:.../ref:refs/heads/main) instead
of a long-lived SAS in repo secrets.

The REST calls themselves are unchanged: '?<sas>' became an Authorization header, so the
ETag-CAS of the counters, Content-MD5 and the no-cache contract survive verbatim. That is
also why this is not a rewrite onto 'az storage blob upload' -- it cannot express If-Match,
and two concurrent builds could then mint the same build number.

.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1 is the single place that knows the resource id,
the az invocation and the service version. x-ms-version is mandatory for Entra-authorized
requests (>= 2017-11-09) and for any Table request without a SAS; 2021-08-06 was verified
live against both the blob and the table endpoint of this account.

azure/login added to build-agent, build-msi, publish-scripts (plus id-token: write) and
deploy-web; deploy-backend and deploy-mcp already had it. Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1
-DryRun acquires NO token: the PR gate runs it without any Azure login, and that must
stay true.

The AdminConfiguration merge lost its "secret not configured" skip branch -- a failure
there now surfaces instead of silently leaving the hash oracle pointing at an older build.

AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN, AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN and AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN
are retired once the first runs are green. AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN stays: that
account lives in the pre-migration tenant, where this principal has no identity -- it dies
with the mirror, not before.

Requires on the SP: Storage Blob Data Contributor on the containers 'agent' and 'versions',
Storage Table Data Contributor on the table 'AdminConfiguration'. Granted 2026-09-08.
2026-09-08 17:38:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 01bc35aa97 new ordering for What's new section 2026-09-08 15:48:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e33d85c01d Agent Host changes for agents/gather-rule-exitcode-info-update (#151) 2026-09-08 14:57:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4e73ba8900 Agent Host changes for agents/improve-changelog-promotion-ui (#152) 2026-09-08 14:57:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4df52b3da9 Agent Host changes for agents/timeline-search-enhancement (#150) 2026-09-08 14:47:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 844d86410c Agent Host changes for agents/mcp-server-beschreibung-lieferung (#149) 2026-09-08 14:46:15 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 9514e1033d chore(deps): bump the web group (#148)
Bumps the web group in /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web with 5 updates:

| Package | From | To |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js) | `16.3.3` | `16.3.4` |
| [@next/bundle-analyzer](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/next-bundle-analyzer) | `16.3.3` | `16.3.4` |
| [@types/react-dom](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/react-dom) | `19.2.5` | `19.2.7` |
| [autoprefixer](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer) | `10.5.4` | `10.5.5` |
| [eslint-config-next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/eslint-config-next) | `16.3.3` | `16.3.4` |


Updates `next` from 16.3.3 to 16.3.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/compare/v16.3.3...v16.3.4)

Updates `@next/bundle-analyzer` from 16.3.3 to 16.3.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.4/packages/next-bundle-analyzer)

Updates `@types/react-dom` from 19.2.5 to 19.2.7
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/react-dom)

Updates `autoprefixer` from 10.5.4 to 10.5.5
- [Release notes](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/compare/10.5.4...10.5.5)

Updates `eslint-config-next` from 16.3.3 to 16.3.4
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.3.4/packages/eslint-config-next)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: next
  dependency-version: 16.3.4
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@next/bundle-analyzer"
  dependency-version: 16.3.4
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@types/react-dom"
  dependency-version: 19.2.7
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: autoprefixer
  dependency-version: 10.5.5
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: eslint-config-next
  dependency-version: 16.3.4
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-08 13:07:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b2236bf65f web: card and page headers stack below sm so their action buttons stay on screen at phone width
Title and trailing controls shared one non-wrapping flex row with the controls
marked flex-shrink-0. At 440px (iPhone 16 Pro Max) that squeezed the Operational
Events title into an 86px column and pushed the Refresh buttons of Agent Metrics
and the Tenant Config Report past the viewport, scrolling the whole page sideways.
SectionCardHeader now stacks below sm, which covers all 32 cards that use it.

A width sweep over the portal routes at 440px found two more real overflows, fixed
here as well: the audit From/To date pair, and Alert Rules, where the unbreakable
event-type names and a channel-name input without min-w-0 pushed the severity
selects 99px off screen.

Verified: every swept route now measures zero horizontal overflow at 440px, desktop
is unchanged at 1440px. The header test asserted "no trailing group" via the absence
of gap-3, which the wrapper itself now carries; it checks flex-wrap instead and pins
the stacking classes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 01:35:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 31535b07e0 web+backend: a warming MCP health card says only "Starting instance... (attempt n of 12)" and re-probes for ~60s before it warns (D-220)
The card composed its line from the backend's explanation ("did not answer within
3s - it scales to zero when idle ... ~20-30s"): probe mechanics nobody waiting on a
starting instance needs. It now writes its own one-liner and ignores check.message,
so the server's "warming" and a client-side probe timeout read identically and the
wording does not depend on a backend deploy. The backend message is shortened but
still carries the budget for direct API callers.

The re-poll budget of 8 x 5s (~40s) expired on a real cold start - Container Apps
activation has no upper bound we control - so it is now 12 x 5s (~60s), with a test
pinning that the stated seconds come from cadence x attempts.
2026-09-07 21:27:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 066b6e6f04 backend+web: the MCP health probe answers a cold container in 3s with status "warming" instead of holding the request for 30s, and the System Health card re-probes until it is up (D-220)
Measured over 14 days, GET health/mcp answered in 4..148ms when warm and timed out at 30s
in 50 of 83 calls — the median call took 27,972ms. A cold start is 20-30s of Container Apps
activation (~98% KEDA plus image mount, ~500ms application), so no UI wait covers it and the
generous timeout only bought a long wall in front of the same answer. The browser's own
budget is the same 30s, so the backend's carefully worded warning never reached the user at
all: they saw a raw DOMException.

Backend: the budget drops to 3s, which sits in the widest observed latency gap
(2347ms..3930ms) so jitter cannot flip the verdict. Our own cancellation now reports the new
status "warming" at Information level (with minReplicas=0 a cold probe is the expected path,
and logging it as a warning poisons the ops signal); HttpRequestException is split out of
that catch and stays a real warning, still without the host in the message. The warm-hit
threshold drops to 750ms — ~5x the warm maximum, deliberately generous because every
measurement comes from a near-idle single-user system and warm latency will rise under
concurrency — and moves into McpReachableMessage so a test can pin the boundary. The XML doc
now describes the probe that exists rather than the wake-signal design the measurements
disproved.

"warming" is a new status value rather than an added DTO boolean because the backend deploys
before the web: an unknown value degrades to a grey card with a clean banner, whereas a
boolean would leave old web showing yellow and "Warnings detected" on every cold start.
HealthCheck.Status now documents the five-value vocabulary, which rides into both generated
TypeScript mirrors as JSDoc.

Web: resolveMcpCardState owns display, banner rating and the poll decision as a pure
function (the suite runs on node, so testable logic cannot live in JSX). A warming server
re-probes every 5s for up to 8 attempts and stays out of the overall banner exactly as
"unknown" already does — scaling from zero is expected behaviour, not a degraded platform —
and only becomes a real warning once the re-polls are spent. The card keeps showing
"warming" while the next probe is in flight so it cannot flicker, carries the blue
in-progress look instead of yellow, and was hoisted out of the healthResult guard: a failing
detailed check would otherwise hide a card that is still polling.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 18:25:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a1e2b76a9f web: the session Vulnerability Report names its inventory badge "Identification Confidence" (header and legend, Inventory and Delta tab); the Software Inventory analyzer toggle uses the rose accent like the other Agent Analyzer toggles
The column showed high/medium/low under the header "Identification", which reads as a method rather than a rating. The wire field is `confidence` and the tooltip already says "identification confidence"; the header and legend now match. The analyzer toggle and its hover border were still emerald from before the section moved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 13:13:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 29e5b8251d web(rules): analyze and gather rule cards get a two-row header on every breakpoint — badge row with fixed-width toggle, severity and rule-id columns on top, the full title below with threshold, sparkline and hit rate right-aligned; gather badges ordered category, type, collector like the analyze card
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 13:11:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 02168a5c55 chore: bump internal gitlink (geo-statistics-explained plan, D-219, backlog B-fpu/B-csp)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 12:12:12 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a6b6661320 web(geo): the Location Performance table states what Avg Duration, P95 and vs Global are computed over (footnote with docs links, header and benchmark tooltips); a location without a succeeded session shows no duration instead of 0 min / -100% in the fastest bucket
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 12:10:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0c72666a7a chore: bump skills gitlink (CAS marker row corrected to the pre-fix code path)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 10:35:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9023321db9 chore: bump skills gitlink (platform-health KQL fix + 09-07 marker baselines)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 07:48:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7ef097529c backend: deleting an owned tenant group stamps the retention grace anchor on every member (conferred Pro ended without ProDowngradedUtc)
The portal hides Delete for owned (msp-{home}) groups, but DELETE global/tenant-groups/{groupId} accepts any id: a Global Admin deleting one ended Pro (MSP) for every member with no grace anchor, so a member that raised its retention under Pro was clamped to the Community cap at the next sweep. DeleteGroupCoreAsync now snapshots the owner and calls ProConferralService.RecordLossAsync(member, owner, "group-deleted") per member, owner excluded, independent of assignees. Two tests in RevokeEnforcementTests; internal docs list the fourth writer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 00:15:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e7df69efe4 backend+web: vulnerability summary carries a priority breakdown (act/attend/track); the exposure panel shows Act and Attend tiles and every severity or priority chip filters the top-CVE list (D-218)
Act equals the KEV set by construction (CvePriority: KEV => act), so the KEV tile becomes the Act tile and Attend joins it instead of a duplicate count. The breakdown is counted in the backend over every CVE in the window, like the severity breakdown, because the list is top-N. Both panel consumers read the generated CveExposureSummary type; the MCP tool description names the new block. Wire types regenerated for web and MCP.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 22:30:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2c7efa2733 backend: key-safe X-MCP-Tool-Name prefix for the usage row key (CodeQL cs/log-forging #91)
The caller-supplied X-MCP-Tool-Name header went verbatim into the UserUsageLog
row key ({yyyyMMdd}_{tool}:{endpoint}) and from there into the CAS-conflict
warning of TableCasRetry. EndpointNormalizer.ToolNameKey now strips CR/LF and
every other control character or line separator, replaces the characters Table
Storage rejects in keys (/ \ # ?) and caps the length at 64; an empty result
skips the prefix. Real tool names pass through unchanged, so existing usage
rows keep their keys. A header with an illegal key character previously made
every usage increment fail with 400 (fail-soft, counter never advanced).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 22:19:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2742549827 chore: bump skills gitlink (platform-health marker baselines + GetBootstrapScript trap)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 22:07:46 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3c45f5cb09 chore: regenerate the shared manifest and wire types for the NtpServer summary text (D-216 follow-up)
The manifest committed with d5d1d7bf carried the types section of the previous HEAD, so
the ntpServer doc string still read "null = use agent default"; SharedManifestParityTests
compares byte-for-byte. Generated output only, no wire change. Bumps the internal gitlink
(plan review addendum).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 22:02:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d5d1d7bfbd backend+web: one agent-config derivation (AgentConfigResolver) served on agent/config and GET config/{tenantId}/effective-agent-config; wire-type initializer defaults in the shared manifest; the Tenant Config Report reads both (D-216)
The report still carried two hand copies after D-215: a typed map of C#
initializer defaults for the "custom" highlight, and a TypeScript mirror of
GetAgentConfigFunction's resolution rules for the runtime column.

Backend: the derivation moves verbatim into Services/AgentConfigResolver
(Build = pure, ResolveAsync loads tenant + admin config and the two rule
catalogs). GetAgentConfigFunction keeps the kill verdict, the migrate logging
and the device fields on top; ParseAgentMajor, ResolveDiagnosticsUploadEnabled,
MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths and ResolveMigrateTarget move with it (call sites and
tests retargeted; the QueryParams ratchet baseline shrinks by the file). New
GlobalAdminOnly route config/{tenantId}/effective-agent-config returns the same
AgentConfigResponse without a device (optional ?agentVersion=, default the V2
line). AgentConfigResolverTests pin the rules that used to live in the web:
upload 10, Hosted destination without SAS, SAS regardless of mode, unrestricted
only with entitlement + gate + toggle, operator knobs from AdminConfiguration,
analyzer defaults, hash line per major, migrate override and rejection.

Manifest: SharedManifestParityTests emits "defaults" next to "fields" for
TenantConfiguration and AdminConfiguration and an "agentConfig" section with
the AgentConfigResponse / CollectorConfiguration / AnalyzerConfiguration class
defaults (fresh-instance values; nested objects null). TenantConfiguration.
NtpServer gets the initializer "time.windows.com" the table read already
applies, so the manifest default and a stored row agree.

Web: the catalog rows lose value() and default; the runtime column renders
the endpoint's response, the highlight compares against the manifest defaults,
informational rows (reasons, timestamps, identities, secrets) never read as
custom. Previously excluded fields are visible (configVersion, catalog counts,
sealing pattern ids, hash oracle, migrate target); the collector class
defaults sit in a collapsed "Collector Internals" section. Fail-soft: while the
backend is not deployed the runtime column shows a notice.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 21:59:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f4e2088b69 chore: bump internal gitlink (lessons: shared index) 2026-09-06 21:57:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 55425058a8 chore: bump internal gitlink (dashboard-search plan review) 2026-09-06 21:57:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach eec0d17607 chore: bump internal + skills gitlinks (D-217 plan/review, lessons, ux-insights marker row) 2026-09-06 21:54:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 43f5304ba4 web+backend: dashboard search gets field qualifiers (model=, manufacturer=), AND-ed terms and exclusions, parsed identically on both sides; Fleet Health model rows link with that search (D-217)
The "Health by Device Model" link searched "{Manufacturer} {Model}" as one substring; the server's
free-text predicate tested it per field, so once the failed sessions were outside the loaded first
page the sweep returned nothing.

- lib/searchQueryTokens.ts: tokenizer shared by the timeline and the session search (terms, quotes,
  leading minus, key=value / key:value qualifier when the separator precedes any quote)
- app/dashboard/utils/sessionSearchQuery.ts: 15 qualifiers = exactly the fields both sides search,
  matcher over session fields + client-derived extra text, suggestion field lookup, link builder
- useDashboardFilters / SessionTable: filter and suggestions use the grammar; fuzzy only for a
  single free term; session_searched gains a `qualifiers` count
- Helpers/SessionSearchQuery.cs: the same grammar for q= on /api/search/sessions (+ global), parsed
  once per request; MatchesFreeText is a thin wrapper
- utils/session-search-syntax.cases.json: one case file run by vitest and by
  SessionFreeTextSearchTests (parity proof)
- FleetModelHealth/FleetSlowModel/FleetFailingModel: manufacturer + model as stored plus label,
  grouped on the pair; useFleetHealth uses the generated wire types; "Unknown" is not a link
- shared manifest + wire types regenerated for the three DTOs

Backend suite 6158/6159 (the one failure is SharedManifestParityTests against uncommitted WIP of a
parallel task), web vitest 1177/1177, build 0 warnings.
2026-09-06 21:54:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b21472dd8c web(progress): pre-provisioned device parked after the technician part sits on Account setup instead of a forever-running device apps step
The progress portal placed the active step purely by the stored phase. After
whiteglove_complete the backend caps that phase at Apps (Device), so the end
user saw "Waiting for you to sign in" above a step list that still showed
"Installing apps (device)" as running at 43 % (customer report).

The seal detection the headline already used is now one helper,
isParkedAfterTechnicianPart (pre-provisioned, whiteglove_complete, no resumedAt
and no whiteglove_resumed), and resolveActiveStepIndex places such a session on
the first user step: every device step done, 57 %, Account setup current. A
stale Complete phase on older sessions can no longer push it past the sign-in;
once resumed the placement is phase-driven again.

Vitest 24/24, tsc and eslint clean. Backlog B-ydz carries the post-deploy check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 21:24:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e3991d55be web(admin): Tenant Config Report renders from an exhaustive catalog over the generated wire types (D-215)
The report typed its own TenantConfig interface and drifted for five months: 31 stored
fields were missing (payingCustomer, the MSP overrides, three validation gates, the SLA
block, four analyzer flags, app-homing and trial bookkeeping) and three runtime values
were wrong (upload interval 30 instead of 10, diagnostics-enabled without the Hosted
destination, unrestricted mode without the entitlement).

tenantConfigReportCatalog.ts is Record<keyof TenantConfiguration> and
Record<keyof AgentConfigResponse | CollectorConfiguration | AnalyzerConfiguration>:
every key is rendered or excluded with a reason, so a new C# property fails tsc once the
wire type is regenerated. Runtime rows carry the GetAgentConfigFunction rule and a source
tag; entitlement values come from feature-flags, operator knobs from global/config.
A vitest pins the same parity against SHARED_MANIFEST.tenantConfiguration.fields and the
resolution rules (upload 10, Hosted destination, flags-driven unrestricted mode, admin
idle timeout, analyzer defaults). Empty strings count as unset for the custom highlight.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 21:08:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 864d1ed31e backend: MCP usage counters go through TableCasRetry with an 8-attempt jittered budget instead of three immediate retries (B-c92)
Parallel tool calls of one user hit the same (user, day, endpoint) row in the same instant; without backoff the losers stayed synchronised and 3 of 6 increments were lost. Both increments now use the one CAS helper (merge patch, AddEntity on 404, StorageCasConflict marker) with UsageCounterRetries = 8; the tenant counter's attribution columns travel in the merge patch. Tests pin the budget, the patch shape and the create path.
2026-09-06 19:04:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 76ef1e53ca chore: bump internal gitlink (final check 2026-09-06: plans released, backlog long-tail rewritten, todo cleared) 2026-09-06 18:48:46 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7dd298f04e chore: bump skills gitlink (session skills: exit-code class, packaging counters, WU symbols)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 18:21:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 66452621c6 exit-code class per app + reboot rule: IME-EXITCODE-CLASS, ANALYZE-APP-018, exitCode on every terminal app event (D-214)
- IME-EXITCODE-CLASS captures the return-code class of the installer exit code ("lpExitCode is defined as <Success|SoftReboot|HardReboot|Retry|Failed>", verified against the IME string literal) as exitCodeClass on AppPackageState; new action captureExitCodeClass, persisted across the agent restart a reboot causes, last value wins across a Retry loop. IME-EXITCODE-MAPPED-FAILED keeps the error path; both match the same line.
- Adapter: exitCodeClass whenever known, exitCode on every terminal state (Installed/Postponed/Skipped/Error) instead of Error only.
- ANALYZE-APP-018 (warning, apps): app_install_completed.exitCodeClass in SoftReboot,HardReboot; +25 HardReboot, +15 observed system_reboot_detected; never fails the session.
- Web: completed-app exit badge amber (failed stays red), "mapped as SoftReboot/HardReboot/Retry" on timeline and Install Progress.
- Tests: pack end to end (phase, current app, class lines, negatives, restart round trip), adapter payloads, linearity samples, backend rule engine + known actions.
- internal gitlink: plan, D-214, backlog.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 18:08:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0b23d93957 updated last modified 2026-09-06 17:49:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4281a6d81b chore: bump internal gitlink (rules category groups plan, Paket 3) 2026-09-06 17:39:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fe919a51aa web rules pages: group analyze and gather rules by category with collapsible headers, counters and Expand/Collapse All (state per tab in localStorage); reveal a rule inside its group from telemetry, template copy and view-copy
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 17:37:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0dcf0eb503 Observation coverage in get_session_summary, absence audit with coverage lint, diagnostics packaging counters (D-213)
MCP: coverage block (window, IME tracker, collectors, upload, diagnostics, gaps) built from the
health events the summary already fetches (session-coverage.ts, data.<key> slices); validate_rule
warns on a required not_exists of an IME-log-derived event without the ime_tracker_degraded
precondition; authoring guide 'absence'; instructions and prompts point at coverage.gaps.
Rules: guardrails.json imeLogDerivedEventTypes (schema + combine). Backend: catalog invariant test —
absence rules carry the coverage gate or a documented exception (ANALYZE-ID-004).
Agent: diagnostics_uploaded/_upload_failed carry packaging counters (truncated, includedFiles,
skippedFiles, skippedByReason, problemsByKind) — counts only, never paths.
Also: shared-manifests.json regenerated (was stale at HEAD; McpAccessPolicy doc string) + codegen.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 17:35:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e2fb99d5d8 mcp access-guard: surface the suspension text from the policy envelope; AdminConfiguration.McpAccessPolicy comment matches the enforced AllMembers semantics; internal gitlink (MCP-Nebenbefunde, B-4s2)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 17:12:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a3ee613b60 scripts/error-codes: decode entities in one pass and strip tags until none remain (CodeQL 89/90)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 16:33:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d2197c6a57 error-code catalog v2: generated from primary sources, symbols and families, MCP lookup_error_code (D-211/D-212)
Shared: error-codes.json schemaVersion 2 (607 entries, 50 IME enforcement states) generated
by scripts/error-codes/generate.mjs from MS Learn tables and the IME enums of one build;
ErrorCodeEntry gains symbol/category/imeRetriesDuringEsp, ErrorCodeCatalog gains
TryLookupDetailed (HRESULT_FROM_WIN32 derivation as data), TryLookupBySymbol,
TryLookupEnforcementState. Backend enricher siblings carry symbol/category/derivedFromWin32
plus enforcementStateInfo. Web: validating, minifying sync; formatErrorCodeSource for every
tooltip; windows_update_failed badge; script error codes decoded; bundle budget test.
Agent: WindowsUpdateTracker reads the catalog symbol (WU_E_UNKNOWN sentinel, load failure
never costs an event). MCP: error-code-catalog.ts (lexical-only), lookup_error_code for every
role, search_knowledge merges catalog hits, get_session_summary key events carry
errorCode/errorText, Dockerfile COPY + ERROR_CODES_PATH. ANALYZE-APP-014 1.2.1 corrects the
0x80073cf0 gloss. Gitlinks: internal (D-211/D-212, plan review, backlog), .claude/commands.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 16:24:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e5997bc50e chore: bump internal gitlink (error-code catalog v2 plan)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 15:25:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 75138016ce chore: bump internal gitlink (analysis notes revision 2)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 14:46:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fc4772efb0 chore: bump internal gitlink (analysis notes: detection-coverage ideas)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 14:42:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0bde428fa0 web: GA tenant modal — MCP switch and suspension moved down next to offboarding
Order at the end of the modal: MCP Access, Tenant Suspension, Offboard Tenant. Rarely used
levers sit together; the frequently edited plan, contact and limit sections come first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 14:13:40 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 16ca3a059c backend/web/mcp: per-tenant MCP switch as an operator control (D-210)
TenantConfiguration.McpDisabled + McpDisabledReason (GA-only, same deny-list and PUT guard as Disabled).
Front door: McpUserService denies every caller of a closed home tenant below the platform roles.
Per request: PolicyEnforcementMiddleware denies a closed home or target tenant for X-Client-Source: mcp
(403 McpDisabled) and narrows the delegated fleet bound, never to null. ClientSourceHeader is the one
reader of the header. The MCP access guard surfaces the backend reason verbatim. GA tenant modal,
list badge and config report; wire types regenerated; internal doc, health marker, gitlinks bumped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 14:01:01 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1bfc80e6db chore: bump internal gitlink (release backfill plan RELEASED, D-209)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 13:26:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fa705a2ef6 updated Readme.md 2026-09-06 13:13:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 81f807e124 web: modal overlays render through ModalPortal into <body> (D-208)
A fixed overlay still receives its parent's box-model margins: the tenants page's
space-y-8 wrapper gave the edit dialog's backdrop a 32 px margin-top, leaving the
navbar un-dimmed. All 21 full-screen overlays now portal to document.body.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 12:27:01 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a4f7c88785 chore: bump internal gitlink (request-wire-contract RELEASED, live verify) 2026-09-06 12:02:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 54259f070f chore: bump internal gitlink (request-wire-contract GEBAUT, D-207, B-r95/B-cme) 2026-09-06 11:42:37 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 26cef3ab06 web: request bodies as jsonBody<T> against the generated wire types (D-207)
Every request body in app/, components/, contexts/, hooks/ and lib/ is encoded
as jsonBody<SomeRequest>(…) from lib/apiClient.ts; the apiClient ratchet gains
the `body[:=] JSON.stringify(` pattern (74 → 10 sites) and refuses a bare
jsonBody(. The hand-written RestoreRowRequestBody/RestoreRowMode are the
generated RestoreRowRequest/RestoreRowMode now; scriptDisplayNames posts through
fetchJson; the tenant-group and delegation mutate helpers take a pre-encoded body.

What the typing surfaced and fixes here: canManageBootstrapTokens and `all` are
sent explicitly, AdminConfiguration goes back on the wire through
toWireAdminConfiguration (the outbound twin of fromWire…), TenantManagementSection
uses the wire TenantConfiguration instead of a local subset, nameless CPE entries
are filtered before they are sent, the session action posts
QueueSessionActionRequest, create-from-template sends { variables }.

Remaining baseline (with reason): the three rule/pattern pages, whose local rule
types diverge from the wire — B-cme.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 11:42:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 00ad230ffe mcp: request bodies typed against the generated wire types (jsonBody<T>, D-207)
The eight backend POST/PUT/PATCH bodies name their request DTO through
jsonBody<T> from client.ts — the one place a body is encoded — so a renamed
or retyped backend field fails tsc instead of surfacing as a 400 at runtime.
The apiFetch guard additionally refuses `body: JSON.stringify(` and a bare
`jsonBody(` with an empty baseline.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 11:42:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3d920a8113 shared+backend: IApiRequest marker, one RequestBody reader, every request body a Shared wire type (D-207)
Every HTTP request body the web, the MCP or the agent sends is now a flat class in
AutopilotMonitor.Shared implementing IApiRequest — the request twin of IApiResponse.
WireTypeManifestBuilder exports the implementers as a third root, so the request DTOs
reach wire-types.generated.ts on both clients; for request types a nullable property
keeps `| null` (a PATCH may send an explicit null to clear an override).

Functions read a body only through RequestBody.ReadAsync<T>/ReadOptionalAsync<T>
(System.Text.Json, ApiJsonOptions.Read = wire options + case-insensitive; empty or
malformed body = 400 envelope, never a 500) whose generic constrains on IApiRequest.
ReadNewtonsoftAsync<T> stays for the Newtonsoft-bound cluster (tenant/admin config via
the patch service's PopulateObject, rule and pattern documents) as a frozen per-file
baseline. The tenant-plan PATCH keeps its presence-sensitive JsonDocument walk with the
keys derived from PatchTenantPlanRequest by nameof (PlanPatchKeyParityTests).

35 nested request classes, 7 JObject/JsonDocument hand-walks and the anonymous
DeserializeAnonymousType bodies moved to Shared; the two identical TicketRequests are
one DownloadTicketRequest; ServerAction is no longer the request (QueueSessionActionRequest,
the stored row is built server-side); create-from-template takes { "variables": … }
instead of a bare map. Fields the endpoints default server-side are nullable now
(CPE mapping, report attachments, feedback rating on dismissal, upn for applications).

TypedRequestGuardTests: no raw deserializer under Functions/ (named exemptions: agent
routes frozen by D-200, Azure Monitor webhook, upstream/stored-column parses), the
Newtonsoft branch only in its baseline, no request type in the Functions assembly, every
DTO flat and in Shared. RequestBodyTests cover both readers, the cap and the envelope.
QueryParamGuardTests baseline shrinks by 14 (the Content-Length TryParse lives in the reader).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 11:42:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f6eac1964a chore: bump internal gitlink (both plans RELEASED, live verify, B-fq7 / B-8va)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 04:10:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e1b5b9d163 backend+web: per-user rate limits split by throttle surface — portal (public client) gets its own global budget, MCP/integrations keep override and floor (D-206)
The surface comes from the signed appidacr/azpacr claim (0 = public client = portal;
secret/certificate, app-only or missing = integration), never from a header: portal SPA,
MCP server and API share one app registration in production, so the client id cannot tell
them apart and any token holder controls headers. New AdminConfiguration field
PortalUserRateLimitRequestsPerMinute (default 600, Global Settings round-trip, wire types
regenerated); the existing user budget is relabelled MCP & integrations and keeps the tenant
override and the Pro floor; buckets are keyed per surface; ThrottleSurface is a request
dimension next to ClientSource so the classification is auditable (platform-health check 2).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 03:45:42 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 094833f831 backend: a Graph 401/403 on the first validator attempt invalidates the tenant token and retries fresh; the agent keeps getting 503 for a permission gap (D-205)
A freshly onboarded tenant spent 45 minutes in 503 because a second instance held a
roleless app-only token minted before the consent; InvalidateTenant never reaches other
instances. GraphAuthFailure is the shared step for all five Graph validators: attempt 1
drops the cached token and reports transient so the existing loop re-mints; attempt 2
keeps each validator's semantics (Autopilot/DeviceAssociation transient with Retry-After
120, CorporateIdentifier/CloudPc/IntuneBinding definitive) and logs a stable marker.
SecurityValidator hands the agent the largest Retry-After requested. Platform-health
check 6 and the marker catalog know both markers; the cloudpc concept doc carries the
contract.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 03:35:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3579ce0add chore: bump internal gitlink (typed call sites RELEASED, verify) 2026-09-06 02:55:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0188860d1c chore: bump internal gitlink (storage-budgets plan RELEASED)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 02:52:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 871a1ac059 chore: bump internal (typed call sites plan GEBAUT, D-204, envelope doc consumers, B-7sw) and .claude/commands (mcp-telemetry retries) gitlinks 2026-09-06 02:37:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 298a182fbb shared+web: backup job status and restore-row payloads join the wire contract; the web reads the generated types (audit package 5, stage 4b)
BackupJobStatus, RestoreRowPreviewResponse and RestoreRowCommitResponse were the last response payloads the
portal typed by hand: the C# classes existed in Shared but were not marked [WireContract], so the manifest
never carried them. The attribute pulls them and their enums (BackupJobKind/State, BackupOutcome,
RestoreRowDiffKind, RestoreRowCommitOutcome) into shared-manifests.json and both generated wire-type files;
the three backup pages import those and lib/api.ts drops eleven hand-written mirrors. Attribute only: no
runtime behaviour changes, no backend deploy needed.

Still hand-written in lib/api.ts, with reason: BackupManifest/BackupTableEntry (a blob passed through by
GET global/backups/{id}), BackupTriggerResponse (the 202 body of global/backups/trigger is an anonymous
object outside the typed regime) and the RestoreRow request body.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 02:34:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e71223507c web: customs archive reads the generated types, annotations page follows nextLink through the typed builder, dead PaginatedResponse removed (audit package 5, stage 4a)
The five hand-written customs-archive response types in lib/api.ts duplicated CustomsArchiveRunListResponse,
CustomsArchiveEntryListResponse, CustomsArchiveRunSummary, CustomsArchiveEntrySummary and
TenantOffboardingCustomsArchiveEntry from the manifest; the two pages import those. The annotations page
built its next-page URL from API_BASE_URL + nextLink instead of the scoped builder plus extractContinuation.
PaginatedResponse<T> had no importer. types/diagnostics.ts states why it stays hand-written (no wire DTO
for GET diagnostics/paths).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 02:28:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 02187f0f3c web: the last raw API call sites join the call layer; ratchet baseline for authenticatedFetch reaches zero (audit package 5, stage 3d)
Rules pages, apps tabs, audit, delegations, diagnosis, fleet health, geographic, health check, SLA, usage
metrics, the notification and SignalR contexts, the feedback bubble, global search and the shared hooks
now call fetchJson/fetchOk; the activation page's hand-rolled Bearer fetch (no 401 retry, no
telemetry) joins the layer too. The SignalR join/leave paths keep their visible-refusal semantics through
ApiError, the delegation acceptance explains refusals by code, the health check keeps its 403 wording,
and the local mirrors of SlaMetricsResponse and PlatformUsageMetrics give way to the generated types.

No page, component, hook or context calls authenticatedFetch directly any more. What stays is
documented per file in the baseline's PERMANENT map: the auth/me bootstrap, the SWA's own version.json,
the public stats manifest, the delete-cascade classifier's 202 body, and seven TokenExpiredError
branches where the UI must act differently from showing the message (route, rethrow, batch, retry flag).

Ratchet baseline: 39 → 0 raw fetches, 40 → 7 parses, 25 → 8 token checks (from 228 / 221 / 140).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 02:21:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3e2f62daeb backend: host.json holds Azure.Identity, Microsoft.AspNetCore and Microsoft.Hosting.Lifetime at Warning
About 12 MB/day of severityLevel-1 traces without diagnostic value (MSAL verbose, StatusCodeResult,
CORS success, Application started). Application logs were Warning+ already via Function: Warning.
Measured and documented in internal/docs/backend/telemetry-ingest-shaping.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 02:11:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c8b8a8dbb4 web(sessions/dashboard/progress): every API call through fetchJson/fetchOk/fetchBlob (audit package 5, stage 3c)
The 33 raw authenticatedFetch sites under app/sessions, app/dashboard and app/progress are gone. Hooks
that receive addNotification as a parameter report failures through notifyApiError (same rendering as
notifyError, injected notifier); fail-soft reads that used to check res.ok read through
.catch(nullOnApiError). The delete-cascade classifier accepts the ApiError of a refused DELETE next to
the 202 Response, so the 409/503/404 branches keep their wording; the polling probe reads the status
from either. Session and event reads name their wire types (GetSessionResponse, GetSessionEventsResponse,
SearchSessionsResponse, SessionStatsResponse, the progress and rule-stats responses); the legacy
list-shaped fallbacks on the single-session read are gone. SessionTimeBreakdownDto is the generated type.

Ratchet baseline: 72 → 39 raw fetches, 67 → 40 parses, 36 → 25 token checks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 02:09:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9e4c5f11c5 chore: bump internal gitlink (plan verify line, trace-noise backlog idea)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 02:00:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b16e72c10e web(settings): every API call through fetchJson/fetchOk, errors through apiErrorText (audit package 5, stage 3b)
The 46 raw authenticatedFetch sites under app/settings are gone: 20 by the transformer, the rest by hand.
The tenant config load keeps its 403 fallback to the feature-flags view through ApiError; the access
check treats a backend refusal as an outcome and only a failed round trip as transient; delegated
access, MCP users and the offboarding flows read their specialised envelopes through ApiError.code
and ApiError.body. Twenty 'Session Expired toast / else inline' catch dialects collapse to the inline
message apiErrorText already renders; local mirrors of McpUserEntry, PlanTierDefinition,
HardwareRejectedResponse and DeviceNotRegisteredResponse give way to the generated types.

Ratchet baseline: 115 → 72 raw fetches, 111 → 67 parses, 59 → 36 token checks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 01:56:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5cb9b0b30b backend: storage SDK budgets under the agent timeout, ingest 503 on an exhausted budget, request-token fan-outs, single-flight factory budget, ProcessStall monitor (audit F09, D-203)
- StorageClientOptions: Table/Queue 8 s per attempt × 3 attempts + capped backoffs = 25.8 s < the
  agent's 30 s upload timeout (pinned by test); Blob 60 s × 4. Every production client takes its
  options from there. No Polly over the SDK.
- StorageErrors.IsTransient(Exception): OperationCanceled / IO / HttpRequest / Aggregate-of-those
  / RequestFailed status 0; the ingest answers 503 + Retry-After instead of 500.
- The ingest still takes no caller cancellation (a batch is a unit). GetAllSessionsPageAsync
  carries the request token down to BoundedFanOut (Global Admin list); SingleFlightCache hands its
  factory a 30 s budget token and evicts on timeout (tenant ids, app-summary snapshot, session stats).
- ProcessStallMonitor: 1 s tick drift ≥ 1 s ⇒ ProcessStall event (sampling bypass) + metric with
  cause gc / threadpool / unknown from GC.GetTotalPauseDuration and thread-pool counters;
  GcPauseMs on request rows ≥ 100 ms. Measures the instance-local 5–10 s pauses seen in production.
- Gitlinks: internal (plan, D-203, concept doc, B-9hf, lesson), .claude/commands (marker rows).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 01:51:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c925001a8a web(admin): every API call through fetchJson/fetchOk/fetchBlob, errors through apiErrorText (audit package 5, stage 3a)
The 113 raw authenticatedFetch sites under app/admin are gone: 73 by the transformer (fetch + ok-check
+ json parse become one typed call), the rest by hand — 404-as-empty lists read through
.catch(nullOn404), the app-homing, offboard, delegated-admin and tenant-group flows read the
specialised envelope through the new ApiError.body, downloads use fetchBlob, action calls fetchOk.
Session-expired branches that only logged or set the same message are gone; apiErrorText renders
every failure with the reference.

Typing the responses surfaced eight local mirrors that had drifted from the wire types (required
fields the backend leaves optional): BlockedDevice, FeedbackEntry, DistressReport, OpsEvent,
SessionReport, IdentityBinding, UnmatchedSoftwareEntry, DailySummary and the whole
SectionPlatformUsage metric set are now aliases of the generated types, with the optional fields
handled where they render. AdminConfiguration keeps its literal-union narrowing through
fromWireAdminConfiguration instead of an unchecked parse.

Ratchet baseline: 228 → 115 raw fetches, 221 → 111 parses, 140 → 59 token checks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 01:41:19 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e494334720 mcp: apiFetch<T> at every call site, one retry on 429/503 within Retry-After, typed error envelope (audit package 5, stage 2)
apiFetch takes a mandatory wire type (60 call sites name their generated DTO; the 28 as-casts
and 31 unknown results are gone) and refuses an empty or malformed 2xx body. It retries once on
429 (never the MCP quota) or 503 when Retry-After is at most 10 s — GET only, never with a
caller-supplied signal, opt-in via retry:true otherwise — and counts the retry on the tool-call
context, which withToolTelemetry writes as `retries` on the tool_call line. ApiError.parsed is
the generated ApiErrorResponse plus domain fields and carries retryAfterSeconds; toolError
renders it in the 503, envelope and rate-limit branches. The lean-projection default lives in
one helper (leanFieldSelection) instead of two copies.

apifetch-typed.guard.test.ts refuses a bare apiFetch( or apiFetch<unknown>; apifetch-retry.test.ts
pins the retry, the opt-outs and the body contract. tools-delegated fakes now answer text() with
the body they claim (the client parses text, not json).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 01:13:20 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1554540431 web: one API call layer (fetchJson/fetchOk/fetchBlob), notifyError, ratchets with the full baseline (audit package 5, stage 1)
lib/scopedFetch.ts becomes lib/apiClient.ts: ApiError carries retryAfterSeconds (body first,
Retry-After header second), fetchJson<T> refuses empty and malformed 2xx bodies instead of
handing back undefined, sets Content-Type for string bodies, fetchOk covers action calls and
fetchBlob downloads. describeApiError renders 429/503 with the server's retry advice;
apiErrorText is the one-string form for inline error slots; apiErrorNotification folds the
"Session Expired" dialect into one place and NotificationContext.notifyError uses it.
useAuthenticatedFetch throws ApiError (correlation id preserved), drops the dead 204 branch
and onTokenExpired. dedupedFetchJson<T> for the three feature-flag readers.

lib/__tests__/apiClient.guard.test.ts ratchets raw authenticatedFetch(/dedupedAuthFetch(/
.json()/instanceof TokenExpiredError per file against a baseline that may only shrink
(a count above fails as a new site, below as a stale entry); fetchJson without a type
argument is a violation. Baseline today: 228 raw fetches, 221 parses, 140 token checks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 01:01:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fef09690d2 web: coalesce live timeline refetches per burst instead of per SignalR signal
Agent uploads arrive as bursts of batches ~0.3 s apart with seconds of silence in
between, and every batch raises a SignalR signal. The 300 ms trailing debounce on the
session page either refetched once per batch or hid a tight burst until it paused;
session 46096bcd produced 155 full first-page reads for 261 batches in 13 minutes.

lib/burstScheduler: leading edge + trailing debounce + max wait. The first signal after
a quiet period refetches at once, later signals of a burst refetch once after the
burst's last signal, and a burst that never pauses still refetches every max-wait
(spool replay after reconnect/reboot). Fetch semantics are unchanged: every run reads
the full first page, the server stays the single source of truth, no incremental path.

Session page: trailing 300 ms, max wait 1 s. Progress portal (same pattern, two
requests per refresh): trailing 500 ms, max wait 1.5 s. scheduleFetchEvents loses its
delayMs parameter; the scheduler is created lazily on the first signal so refs stay
out of render (react-hooks/refs). Seven fake-timer tests pin the timing rules.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-06 00:41:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3a975fa74f chore: bump internal gitlink (wire-contract plan RELEASED, short-sentence lesson) 2026-09-05 23:47:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 69c6353fb1 chore: bump internal (plan gebaut, D-200/D-201/D-202, drift-guards) and .claude/commands (platform-health 422 marker) gitlinks 2026-09-05 23:28:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2b9bf3cd3f backend: one query-parameter parser (QueryParams) with a lenient and a strict contract, ratcheted (D-202)
Helpers/QueryParams replaces fourteen private days/limit parsers, the three
TryParseUtc copies, eleven identical pageSize blocks and ~50 inline TryParse sites
under Functions/ and Pagination/. Lenient (Int/IntOrNull/UtcInstant): absent, garbage
or below-minimum means the call site's default, above-maximum clamps. Strict
(TryInt/TryPageSize/TryUtcInstant): absent is null, anything else invalid is a 400
with a message that names the parameter. Integers are invariant-culture, instants are
invariant UTC (AssumeUniversal | AdjustToUniversal), whitespace counts as absent.
Defaults and ranges stay arguments at every call site.

Settled differences: the Apps windows clamp above 365 instead of falling back to 30,
days=0 or negative yields the default everywhere, the two global geo endpoints and
the session list cap days at 365, SLA months is capped at SlaMetricsService.MaxMonths
on the HTTP layer, a whitespace date means no filter on every route, the admin batch
sizes reject values above their maximum, and the three culture-dependent
DateTime.TryParse sites parse as UTC.

QueryParamGuardTests ratchets TryParse out of Functions/ and Pagination/ (baseline:
headers, raw cells, the agent version major, the se= of a stored SAS URL);
QueryParamsTests carries the cases the removed copies pinned.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 23:26:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d99e16314b agent+backend: one telemetry wire class, 422 poison for rejected items, agent responses in the typed regime (D-200/D-201)
TelemetryItemKind moves to Shared; TelemetryItem.ToWire() maps onto TelemetryItemDto
and the uploader serialises the DTO, so both ends share one wire class. The spool line
keeps writing Kind by name (StringEnumConverter registered in TelemetryItemSerializer).

IngestTelemetryFunction.PartitionBatch routes by exact kind name and collects every
item it cannot route or parse; a non-empty rejection list answers the batch with 422 +
TelemetryItemsRejectedResponse (poison, rejectedRowKeys, reason) before anything is
persisted, logs a Warning and writes the new TelemetryItemsRejected ops event. The
agent's existing poison protocol drops exactly the named RowKeys and re-uploads the
rest; before this the ingest skipped the items, answered 200 and the agent cleared
its spool.

Contract tests from both sides: TelemetryWireContractTests (agent) freezes the real
batch body under tests/fixtures/telemetry-wire/ and parses the pinned poison body;
TelemetryWireFixtureTests (backend) dispatches every frozen body with zero rejections,
requires an arm per kind and pins the poison body.

Agent-facing responses implement IApiResponse and go through ResponseHelper, request
types carry [WireContract]; plain ingest refusals use the error envelope, the
register-session and upload-url refusals keep their DTO bodies (the agent reads
ErrorCode/Message). Manifests and generated wire types regenerated (also picks up
four types HEAD had left out of the manifest).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 23:10:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e4203e0f15 chore: bump .claude/commands (platform-health skill, backend-logs corrections) and internal (marker-catalog rule) gitlinks; drop stale index dual-write mention in the dependency filter comment
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 22:53:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2a5366d9c3 chore: bump internal gitlink (D-198/D-199, counters concept doc, storage-hardening plan GEBAUT)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 22:31:33 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9c9cf24ddc backend: platform counters recomputed instead of incremented, RuleStats keyed per scope and day with CAS batches (audit F06, D-198/D-199)
PlatformStats(global,current) took a GET plus a full-row upsert without ETag
from every ingest batch: increments were lost under concurrency and a writer
clobbered fields another writer had just changed. RuleStats put every tenant's
daily rule traffic into one date partition (1,459 rows on 2026-09-04), the
writer issued four serial calls per evaluated rule without ETag, and the
reader was a cross-partition scan whose 10k cap dropped the newest dates.

- D-198: TotalEnrollments / SuccessfulEnrollments / TotalEventsProcessed have
  no hot-path writer; the two-hourly recompute is the only source. Only
  IssuesDetected still increments, through TableCasRetry (ETag + field-only
  merge, AddEntity for a missing row, conflicts as StorageCasConflict). The
  tenant counters share the helper.
- D-199: RuleStats PartitionKey "{scope}_{date}", RowKey ruleId.
  RecordRuleStatsAsync merges a session's increments per rule, reads the
  partition once and writes one transaction (UpdateReplace with ETag / Add),
  retrying on 412/409. Readers are PartitionKey ranges per scope; aggregation
  and the regression radar fan out over the registered tenants; the cleanup
  deletes per scope. RuleStats joins the offboarding composite wipe.
- Legacy rows (PartitionKey = date) are read by an extra query and cleaned by
  a date range that checks every row for a bare-date key, until 2026-12-05.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 22:30:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ec0d8ad735 backend: blob proxy lifetime and timing, one delegation key per process, shared KEV instance, single-flight config misses (audit F11/F12)
- DiagnosticsBlobStreamer disposes the download result on every exit path
  (it was disposed only on the 413 branch), measures open and transfer
  separately and fires DiagnosticsDownloadProxied after the copy with
  Completed=true/false.
- UserDelegationKeyCache: one user delegation key per process (24 h, re-mint
  under a lock with 2 h margin or when a SAS would outlive it) instead of one
  storage round-trip per download or upload SAS.
- KevDataService is resolved as one singleton over the typed-client handler
  pipeline; the cache warmer used to hydrate a throwaway transient instance
  while the correlation service held a cold one.
- Admin and tenant configuration services single-flight concurrent cache
  misses (Lazy<Task> per key); the MemoryCache and the in-place projection
  semantics stay untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 22:14:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fc9e9d13e6 backend: keep slow storage successes and count CAS conflicts as a metric (audit F10)
The dependency filter dropped every successful storage call and the expected
412/409 outcomes, so storage-side latency and ETag contention were invisible
until a call failed outright (seven days of App Insights held zero storage
dependency rows).

- StorageDependencyFilterProcessor keeps a successful storage call at or above
  2 s and stamps SlowStorage=true; the operation name is on the row, the table
  name is not (the Azure SDK span carries neither URL nor table).
- StorageMetrics wraps TelemetryClient.GetMetric("StorageCasConflict",
  operation, table, outcome): pre-aggregated per minute, bypasses the worker's
  adaptive sampling, null-tolerant for tests.
- The CAS loops report conflicts: session event count, session counter
  reconcile, session store, tenant stats, MCP user/tenant usage.
- TableStorageService keeps its two-argument constructors (Moq matches by
  exact arity); DI resolves the three-argument overload.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 22:09:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d0cb7e66f4 backend: byte-aware table transactions and classified storage failures on the ingest (audit F07)
Every entity-group transaction was chunked by count only; 100 payload-heavy rows
(Signals with chunked PayloadJson, Events with 30k-char Message + DataJson) could
exceed the 4 MiB transaction cap, and the failure surfaced as an opaque 500. The
agent halves its batch only on 413 and treats 5xx as "replay later", so such a
batch wedged the device forever.

- TableTransactionBatcher: 100 actions, 3.5 MB per transaction, 1 MB per entity,
  never across partitions; an entity that cannot fit throws
  TableEntityTooLargeException. Used by the event, signal, transition, restore
  and rules writers; delete-only batches keep their count chunking.
- StorageErrors: one classifier for RequestFailedException (transient 408/429/
  5xx, payload-too-large by status or error code, already-exists incl. the
  Azurite 400 shape); the two IsAlreadyExistsStatus copies use it.
- Event writer: per-row fallback only for data-shaped rejections; throttling,
  outages and oversize batches propagate. Single and batched writer share one
  entity builder.
- IngestTelemetryFunction: payload too large -> 413, transient -> 503 with
  Retry-After: 5, anything else 500.
- TableStorageChunking.MaxPropertyChars is the one 30,000-char bound.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 22:03:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach bd66480ccc chore: bump internal gitlink (remove-decision-inspector RELEASED)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 05:05:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b05f1f6bcf chore: bump internal gitlink (remove-v2-index-tables RELEASED)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 04:51:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 12ad9c9436 Remove the Decision Inspector: web subpage, three session read endpoints, renderer deps (D-197)
Web: app/sessions/inspector, Inspector button, inspectorUrl, legacy /sessions/{id}/inspector
redirect, SWA rewrites, api.inspector; drops @xyflow/react, dagre, @types/dagre.
Backend/Shared: GetSessionSignals/DecisionGraph/ReducerVerification functions, DecisionGraphBuilder,
ReducerVerifier, their DTOs and tests, the QueryBySessionAsync readers and SignalQueryLimits;
three catalog entries fewer. Signals/DecisionTransitions tables and ingest unchanged; operator
analysis reads them through MCP. Wire manifests regenerated (web + MCP copy).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 04:51:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c8ce7cdb37 backend: remove the V2 index tables and their dual-write pipeline (D-196)
The five cross-session index tables (SessionsByTerminal, SessionsByStage,
DeadEndsByReason, ClassifierVerdictsByIdLevel, SignalsByKind) were write-only
since M5.d: no endpoint, MCP tool or web page ever read them, while the
dual-write cost a serial queue send per signal/transition on the ingest path,
a 5-13 min full scan of Signals + DecisionTransitions every two hours and five
property-filter scans per session deletion (audit 2026-09-05 F05).

Removed: the tables from TableNames.All (schema hash changes, next cold start
runs a full pass without them), the telemetry-index-reconcile queue name,
producer, envelope, handler, queue function and 2h timer, the cross-partition
Timestamp scans on the signal/transition repositories, the EnableIndexDualWrite
flag (model, config mapping, admin UI, generated wire types), cascade steps
11-15 (later steps renumbered 11-18), the deletion wrappers and the offboarding
wipe entries. DiscriminatorPkProp stays as a step class so manifests written
before this change still resume.

Order of operations: deploy first, then delete the queue pair and the five
tables in the portal (B-88h). Deleting the tables before the deploy 500s every
delete preview/enqueue and poisons offboarding.

Submodules: .claude/commands (import_session.py), internal (D-196, docs, plan).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 04:27:48 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 56d4dd8b84 chore: bump internal gitlink (queue-trigger plan RELEASED, live verify)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 03:16:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 86fdc5aca9 backend: stateless queue consumers become [QueueTrigger] functions; webhooks go through a queue; poll loop receives one message at a time
Audit 2026-09-05 F01/F02. Analyze, VulnerabilityCorrelate, TenantAutoApprove,
IndexReconcile and ImeMsiArchive are now host-managed queue functions under
Functions/Queue bound to the DataStorage connection (identity-based, resolved
by the host): the Flex scale controller wakes an instance for a message, the
host renews the lease and owns the retry/poison ladder. The four cascade
workers with lease/CAS state stay self-polling BackgroundServices; their base
now receives one message per poll so waiting messages can no longer expire
under another worker. Terminal enrollment alerts and hardware-rejection alerts
are enqueued on notification-dispatch (channel ids only, resolved at send
time) instead of fire-and-forget sends the host could drop on scale-in.
Requires the app setting DataStorage__queueServiceUri before deploy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 02:52:37 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 87c5bc59dc chore: bump internal gitlink (error envelope RELEASED)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 01:57:06 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 21b30b21c2 chore: bump internal gitlink (lessons rule block)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 01:44:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f94f1c0c4e chore: bump internal gitlink (lesson: no Front Door for the API)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 01:44:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a6a9883451 chore: bump internal gitlink (error envelope + correlation docs, D-192/D-193)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 01:37:57 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 03116a97d1 mcp: one correlation id per tool call — sent to the backend, logged, shown in every error
withToolTelemetry mints a UUID per tool call and runs the handler in a
ToolCallContext (tool name + correlation id); apiFetch stamps it as
X-Correlation-ID next to X-MCP-Tool-Name, so every backend request of the call
(pagination scans included) and the MCP_TOOL_LOGGING tool_call line carry the
same id — a row-level join between the MCP log and the backend's request rows.
ApiError reads the X-Correlation-ID response header (body correlationId as
fallback), and the error handler names it in every branch — 5xx, quota 429,
structured 4xx and the unstructured 401/403/404/429 texts that had none. The
handler reads the envelope's `code` (errorCode as the pre-envelope fallback),
the quota body's `error`, and the log proxy's `upstreamCode`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 01:33:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2abc78ab6d web: send X-Correlation-ID on every API call, read the error envelope, show the reference
authenticatedFetch mints one UUID per logical call (kept across the 401 retry,
where caller headers now survive too), sends it as X-Correlation-ID — the id
the backend echoes, stamps on its request row and writes into every error body
— and tracks api_request_failed {path, method, status, correlationId} for any
final status >= 400. App Insights gets enableCorsCorrelation + W3C
distributedTracingMode scoped to the API host, so portal dependency rows and
backend request rows share an operation_Id.

fetchJson/ApiError read the envelope (error, code, correlationId, hint; the
pre-envelope `message` as fallback), describeApiError renders message +
short reference, addNotification takes an optional reference the bell renders
as "Ref …"; the error boundaries show and track Next's digest. Consumers of
renamed fields follow: delete-session parser (code ?? hint, PascalCase codes),
app-homing (code ?? reason). API_ERROR_CODES comes from the manifest, and
HOME_TENANT_UNRESOLVED plus the cascade codes are `satisfies ApiErrorCode`.
InstallsTab is the first site showing the reference.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 01:29:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6e54b52376 backend: migrate the 458 anonymous error bodies to the typed envelope helpers
Every non-2xx body in the Functions project now goes through ResponseHelper
(ErrorAsync / BadRequestAsync / NotFoundAsync / ForbiddenAsync /
UnauthorizedAsync / ConflictAsync / InternalServerErrorAsync): 408 sites by a
pattern-exact rewrite of the CreateResponse + WriteAsJsonAsync + return shape,
50 by hand. The eight private BadRequestAsync shadow helpers are gone; the raw
500 catch blocks use InternalServerErrorAsync (sanitized message, correlation
id, MCP hint). 429s keep Retry-After via retryAfterSeconds.

Specialised error bodies where a consumer reads more than the prefix:
AppHomingDeniedResponse (kebab reason codes now Constants.AppHomingReasonCodes,
probe result), TenantConfigPatchFailedResponse (backupId, drift),
QueryBackendLogsErrorResponse (upstreamCode, statusCode, source, hint,
upstream). Twenty-one message-first 200 bodies that the old error tolerance had
let through are typed too (MessageResponse, PreviewWhitelistActionResponse,
SuccessMessageResponse). New codes: PayloadTooLarge, UpstreamError,
UpstreamTimeout, the three trial-gate codes; the agent security path
(SecurityValidationExtensions) writes the envelope with the retry window.

TypedResponseGuardTests: WriteBaseline is empty again — the anonymous
WriteAsJsonAsync ratchet now covers error bodies with zero tolerated sites.
Manifest and generated TypeScript regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 01:21:01 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7cef2ea361 backend: one typed error envelope (IApiErrorResponse) on every non-2xx body
Every error body now leads with { error, code, correlationId }: the generic
ApiErrorResponse (hint?, retryAfterSeconds?, operation?) plus the specialised
McpQuotaExceededResponse (reordered; `message` became `error`),
DelegatedSlotLimitReachedResponse (+correlationId) and the new
SessionDeletionRejectedResponse (replaces the anonymous delete arms). The
correlation id is stamped by the writers — ResponseHelper.ErrorAsync and the
new ApiErrorWriter for the middleware side (auth 401, policy 403/503, rate
limit 429, MCP quota 429, global exception 500) — never by call sites.
exceptionType and rateLimitInfo leave the wire; Constants.ApiErrorCodes is the
code vocabulary and is exported as the manifest section `apiErrorCodes`
(API_ERROR_CODES for web + MCP). CorrelationIdMiddleware names the readable
headers via Access-Control-Expose-Headers.

Guard: TypedResponseGuardTests no longer tolerates anonymous error shapes;
the 458 legacy sites in 149 files are frozen in WriteBaseline to melt down.
New facts: envelope-prefix reflection, ApiErrorWriter body/header pins,
exact-shape pins for the generic envelope and the changed specialised bodies.

Reverses the "error bodies stay anonymous" clause of D-043 (decision entry
follows with the docs stage).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-05 00:56:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5b5ee0e8fd chore: bump internal gitlink (release verify)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 21:43:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7bcc4f00b1 chore: bump internal gitlink (release verify 2026-09-04)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 21:42:33 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 34ec44e3d4 backend: duration evaluators refuse mixed timestamp provenance only
The first cut refused every reader-zone-fallback endpoint. The DeviceSetup line is
written before the agent starts and is backlog on every device, so that silenced
ANALYZE-ESP-001 for all agents without an era anchor (control sessions 2708e6b4 and
18d80f9c came back "not measurable" after the deploy). Two fallback endpoints share the
writer-zone error and cancel it; only a span mixing a fallback endpoint with an anchored
one (or with "now" for an open phase) is unmeasurable — the a7140f98 shape.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 21:34:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f607e21c13 agent+rules: Hybrid Join user affinity from the IME user token; IME backlog eras anchored by the bootstrap record
hybrid_login_pending now measures the absence of a real-user desktop after a reboot
(cancelled by the DesktopArrivalDetector or a real JoinInfo user), is never armed on
WhiteGlove devices (resume marker, Part-2 flag, .part1- archive) and reports the
JoinInfo placeholder as a fact only — on a Hybrid join the AD sign-in never replaces it.
New EntraUserAffinityDetector: armed at the real-user desktop on Hybrid devices, the
first IME-TOKEN-SUCCESS line after the desktop posts ime_user_token_acquired; ten
minutes without one post entra_user_affinity_pending with the IME token-failure codes.
ImeLogTracker exposes raw per-line token callbacks past the historic-replay gate;
HelloTracker surfaces User Device Registration 304/305 as device_registration_event.
ANALYZE-ID-004 v2.0.0 keys on those events (event_type not_exists gained a branch),
GATHER-DEVICE-006 follows, GATHER-DEVICE-007/008 collect the Entra operational log.
Constants + MCP catalog gain the five types (D-072), the guard test learns the
multi-line OnTraceEvent shape, gather_* outputs pass the MCP filter gate by prefix.

CMTrace: ImeLogEraPreScan/CmTraceEraTable anchor the backlog era that holds the
bootstrap execution record against the Deployed install marker (0.13-0.36 s in the
field), whole era or nothing, sibling files by local time; origin era-anchored.
Backend phase_duration/app_install_duration refuse a reader-zone-fallback endpoint.

Decisions D-190, D-191. Session a7140f98.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 21:12:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5940e9fc6a auth: application principals — app-only tokens flow as app:<client-id> members (B-nuw)
A service principal (idtyp=app, typically behind a federated credential) is admitted only
with the access_as_application application permission and then keys every role table,
binding, audit actor and throttle bucket as app:<client-id>. Caps at resolution: Viewer in a
tenant, DelegatedReader on managed tenants, never a platform role; the roleless catalog tiers
are closed to applications except GET auth/mcp. MCP guard keys on the same principal key.
Members / MCP Users / Delegated Access get a User / Service principal switch; usage views
badge App; McpServicePrincipalFirstSeen ops event and PrincipalKind request dimension.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 19:17:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 98cfd76232 plans: Pro (MSP) — a permanent-Pro managing tenant confers Pro on its managed tenants, derived at read time (B-qvu)
A tenant in the owned group of a permanent-Pro tenant is effectively Pro with source "msp":
badge "Pro (MSP)" (also over its own Pro), the Pro entitlement set without the delegation
right (no transitive delegation, no slots), no trial CTA. Nothing is written for that —
TenantConfiguration.ManagedByProTenantId is a load-time projection from a process-wide
index over the Tenant Groups table (owner tier read raw, never through the config service),
so the end of the delegation, the manager losing its permanent tier, or its offboarding
revert automatically. The one write is the retention grace anchor (ProDowngradedUtc),
stamped by ProConferralService from the four paths that end a conferring relationship.

- FeatureEntitlementCatalog.Resolve → EditionResolution { Edition, Source, OwnPro };
  Get(resolution) returns ProViaMsp for conferred Pro; the 3-argument ResolveEdition is
  gone so every caller resolves from the config (incl. the projection)
- DelegatedAdminService home gate checks the DelegatedAdminAllowed entitlement, not the edition
- TrialExpirySweep reads through the config service: a managed tenant's expired trial emits nothing
- feature-flags + plan response carry editionSource; config/all projects payingCustomer and
  managedByProTenantId; shared manifest + web/MCP codegen regenerated
- PayingCustomer: GA-only sales bookkeeping flag on the plan endpoint, no entitlement effect
- web: "Pro (MSP)" label/tooltips, plan section badge, delegated-access hints, tenant
  management chips + paying checkbox

Tests: catalog matrix, ManagedTenantProIndexTests (incl. mutual management without recursion,
fail-closed on storage error), ProConferralServiceTests, projection on every config read path,
feature-flags payload, parity facts, serialization (projection never stored), plan transitions,
edition gate, sweep. Backend 5902 green, web tsc/vitest/lint clean, MCP tsc/vitest green.

Concept doc + D-188 in internal (gitlink); customer docs in the docs repo (MCP redeploy needed).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 18:31:48 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 09e68a614f web(geo): legend buckets under the Performance Map toggle which markers are shown
Click a bucket to narrow the map to it, add more with further clicks, Show all
or the last toggle returns to the full map; a Color-by switch resets it. Camera
fit and marker radius scale stay on the full location list so filtering never
moves or rescales the map. Customer docs updated in the docs repo.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 16:32:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 88290caadc security: sanitize method and decoded path in the privileged-denial record
CodeQL flagged the new denial flow (cs/log-forging #83-#87): header values and the request
path travel from the deny branch into a log line, the ops-events table and the alert
channels. Headers were already stripped of control characters and capped; the path was not,
and Request.Path is percent-DECODED, so %0A arrives as a newline. BuildPrivilegedDenial now
cleans method and path (LogSanitizer) and caps the path at 256 chars, once, before any sink.
Test pins CR/LF stripping and the cap. The remaining alerts are the known false-positive
class (structured ILogger sinks with sanitized discrete properties).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 16:25:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f442dce9a4 logs proxy: a rejected query is the caller's 400, so the MCP shows the store's error in full
Live check after the x29 deploy: a KQL syntax error came back as 502, and the MCP sanitizes
every 5xx down to the error code — the syntax message and the forwarded upstream JSON were
invisible, exactly the parity loss the proxy exists to avoid. Upstream 4xx (other than
401/403) now maps to 400 with message, hint and `upstream`; 401/403 (the managed identity's
missing read grant, with a hint naming the role) and store 5xx stay 502. The MCP's structured
4xx renderer appends `upstream` as a fenced block (capped), and keeps sanitizing 5xx.

Tests: status mapping theory, hint texts, upstream rendering on 400 and non-rendering on 502.
Backend 5849, MCP 693 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 16:14:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4f03f39e9a chore: bump internal gitlink (q8n post-verify)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 16:11:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 38b667799c ci: workflow-only commits no longer trigger CI and CodeQL
The 9eb8cac5 filters covered gitlink bumps and prose but not the
workflow files themselves, so every edit to build-agent.yml or a deploy
workflow still cost a full CI and CodeQL run. Neither reads any other
workflow: CI runs the suites and drift guards, CodeQL analyzes C# and
TypeScript. paths-ignore cannot negate, so each file lists the other
twelve workflows explicitly and leaves itself out; .github/scripts and,
for CI, .github/codeql join the list for the same reason.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 16:05:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a5f74d6abc ci(agent): release body no longer repeats the release title
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 16:01:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d0e09301a1 ci(agent): release body drops the Installation and Included Components sections
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 15:59:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 177915ea6b chore: bump gitlinks (agent-release approval gate, plan released with v2.0.1448)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 15:58:39 +02:00
988 changed files with 51373 additions and 22100 deletions
+4
View File
@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ updates:
- dependency-name: '*'
update-types: ['version-update:semver-major']
# Every action is referenced by commit SHA with the version in a trailing comment;
# action-pins.yml fails any workflow change that reintroduces a mutable tag. Dependabot
# is what keeps those pins current: it rewrites the SHA and the comment together, so the
# pins are reviewed in a PR instead of drifting silently or being bumped by hand.
- package-ecosystem: github-actions
directory: /
schedule:
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Returns the request headers that authorize an Azure Storage REST call with Microsoft Entra.
.DESCRIPTION
One place for the storage OAuth contract shared by every publisher in this repo -- the
agent ZIP and MSI, the customer bootstrap scripts, the version manifests and the build
counters. Resource id, the az invocation, the service version and the failure message
live here so they cannot drift between call sites.
Identity comes from whatever `az login` established: the federated GitHub OIDC principal
in CI (azure/login, subject repo:okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor:ref:refs/heads/main), the
operator's own account for the local build. No secret is read, stored or passed around.
x-ms-version is MANDATORY here, not decoration: Entra-authorized requests are rejected
below 2017-11-09, and Table requests without a SAS must carry the header at all. 2021-08-06
is old enough to be deployed in every region and new enough for everything we send.
Callers merge the result into their own headers -- `$auth + @{ ... }` yields a new
hashtable per request, so nothing is shared across uploads:
$auth = & "$PSScriptRoot/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1"
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($auth + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob' }) -Body $bytes
Acquire once per step and reuse: every call shells out to az (~1s) and the token is valid
for the lifetime of a job.
.OUTPUTS
[hashtable] Authorization + x-ms-version.
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param()
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
# The data-plane resource, not management.azure.com -- a management token is accepted by
# neither the blob nor the table endpoint.
$token = az account get-access-token --resource https://storage.azure.com --query accessToken -o tsv 2>$null
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw ('Could not acquire an Azure Storage token. In CI this means the azure/login step ' +
'is missing or its federated credential does not cover this ref; locally, run ' +
'`az login`. A token alone is not enough: the principal also needs Storage Blob ' +
'Data Contributor on the container it writes, and Storage Table Data Contributor ' +
'on the table -- a missing role shows up later as HTTP 403 AuthorizationPermissionMismatch.')
}
return @{
'Authorization' = "Bearer $token"
'x-ms-version' = '2021-08-06'
}
+263 -67
View File
@@ -12,52 +12,78 @@
lands a consistent set (ZIP + manifest + scripts).
Both callers run the same code. The scripts on the download alias are the live
copy the WDP bootstrap MSI (Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1) downloads on every
enrolling device, so "current" is a correctness property, not cosmetics.
copy the stage-1 loader downloads on every enrolling device, whether it came from
Intune or from the bootstrap MSI, so "current" is a correctness property, not
cosmetics.
Steps, in order:
1. Parse $ScriptVersion from the bootstrap source.
2. Render the -Dev variant by literal substitution of the two URL/manifest
1. Parse $ScriptVersion from the loader and the bootstrap source.
2. Render the -Dev variants by literal substitution of the URL/manifest
defaults. A missing anchor is a hard failure -- a silently un-substituted
dev script would point the dev fleet at the stable agent.
3. Version-bump guard: if the published bootstrap differs from the source
but carries the same $ScriptVersion, abort. Otherwise the docs badge,
3. Version-bump guard: if a published script differs from its source but
carries the same $ScriptVersion, abort. Otherwise the docs badge,
version.json.bootstrapVersion and the portal's "your script is outdated"
hint would all keep asserting a version that is no longer what ships.
4. Upload every script blob with Cache-Control: no-cache (they rotate in
4. Build the publish set (loader, bootstrap, both dev renders, the extras).
5. Authenticode-sign every script (see -SigningToken). Signing is the LAST
transformation: it covers the exact CRLF/UTF-8 bytes that get uploaded,
and nothing may touch them afterwards or the signature breaks.
6. Upload every script blob with Cache-Control: no-cache (they rotate in
place), mirrored fail-soft to the legacy account.
5. Reconcile the two version oracles: version.json.bootstrapVersion
(read-modify-write under If-Match, so a concurrent agent release cannot
lose its agent fields) and AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion.
6. Verify through the alias -- re-download each blob and compare SHA-256.
7. Reconcile the version oracles: version.json.bootstrapVersion and
.loaderVersion (read-modify-write under If-Match, so a concurrent agent
release cannot lose its agent fields) and
AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion.
8. Verify through the alias -- re-download each blob and compare SHA-256.
.PARAMETER SasToken
Container SAS for the eu storage account with write permission. Leading '?' tolerated.
Comparisons against a published script always strip its signature block first
(Get-ComparableText). A signature carries a timestamp, so signed bytes differ on
every run; without stripping, the bump guard and the drift check would report a
change for every unchanged script.
.PARAMETER LegacySasToken
Container SAS for the legacy account. Optional -- a mirror failure warns, never fails.
.PARAMETER TableSasToken
Table SAS for AdminConfiguration. Optional -- omitted or 'XXX' skips the oracle update.
The legacy account lives in a different tenant, so the ambient Entra identity cannot
reach it; this is the only credential the publisher still takes.
.PARAMETER RepoRoot
Repository root. Defaults to the parent of .github/scripts.
.PARAMETER DryRun
Run every check and render, upload nothing.
Run every check and render, upload nothing. A dry run signs when a token is supplied
and skips signing when it is not: the PR gate runs this without any Azure login.
.PARAMETER SigningToken
Azure Key Vault access token for AzureSignTool. MANDATORY for a real publish -- an
unsigned customer script is not something this repo publishes. Together with
-KeyVaultUrl and -CertificateName.
.PARAMETER ExpectedPublisher
Optional -like pattern the signer subject must match after signing. Pins the publisher
instead of accepting any trusted signature; the loader on the device pins the same way.
.PARAMETER SignedOutputDir
Optional directory that receives a copy of every published file exactly as uploaded.
Used by CI to offer the signed scripts as a build artifact for local inspection.
.EXAMPLE
./Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 -DryRun
.EXAMPLE
./Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 -SasToken $env:SAS -TableSasToken $env:TABLE_SAS
./Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 -LegacySasToken $env:LEGACY_SAS -SigningToken $env:AKV_TOKEN `
-KeyVaultUrl $env:KV_URL -CertificateName $env:CERT
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[string]$SasToken,
[string]$LegacySasToken,
[string]$TableSasToken,
[string]$RepoRoot,
[string]$SigningToken,
[string]$KeyVaultUrl,
[string]$CertificateName,
[string]$TimestampUrl = 'http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com',
[string]$ExpectedPublisher,
[string]$SignedOutputDir,
[switch]$DryRun
)
@@ -66,9 +92,6 @@ $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
if (-not $RepoRoot) {
$RepoRoot = (Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '../..')).Path
}
if (-not $DryRun -and [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($SasToken)) {
throw 'SasToken is required unless -DryRun is used.'
}
$ContainerUrl = 'https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent'
$LegacyContainerUrl = 'https://autopilotmonitor.blob.core.windows.net/agent'
@@ -78,8 +101,23 @@ $TableUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.table.core.windows.net/AdminCo
$BootstrapSource = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'scripts/Bootstrap/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$BootstrapBlob = 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$DevBlob = 'Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1'
# Stage 1. Assigned in Intune once, and embedded in the bootstrap MSI; it downloads the
# bootstrap above on every device and verifies its publisher before running it.
$LoaderSource = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'scripts/Bootstrap/Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$LoaderBlob = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$LoaderDevBlob = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1'
$ScriptContentType = 'text/plain; charset=utf-8'
$SigningEnabled = -not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($SigningToken)
if (-not $DryRun -and -not $SigningEnabled) {
throw ('Publishing requires -SigningToken (plus -KeyVaultUrl and -CertificateName): the ' +
'loader on every device verifies the publisher of what it downloads, so an unsigned ' +
'script would be rejected in the field. Only -DryRun may run without signing.')
}
if ($SigningEnabled -and ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($KeyVaultUrl) -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($CertificateName))) {
throw '-SigningToken needs -KeyVaultUrl and -CertificateName.'
}
function Get-HttpStatus {
param($ErrorRecord)
if ($ErrorRecord.Exception.PSObject.Properties['Response'] -and $ErrorRecord.Exception.Response) {
@@ -125,6 +163,132 @@ function Get-PublishBytes {
return ,(New-Object System.Text.UTF8Encoding $false).GetBytes($normalised)
}
# A PowerShell signature is appended as a comment block at the end of the file, so the
# published bytes are "source + signature". Everything that compares a published script to
# its source has to cut that block off first -- the signature carries a timestamp and is
# therefore different on every publish, while the script above it is unchanged.
function Remove-SignatureBlock {
param([string]$Text)
$marker = '# SIG # Begin signature block'
$index = $Text.IndexOf($marker)
if ($index -lt 0) { return $Text }
return $Text.Substring(0, $index)
}
# Comparison form: no signature, LF, no trailing blank lines. Used for "is the published
# copy still this source" -- never for what gets uploaded.
function Get-ComparableText {
param([string]$Text)
return (Remove-SignatureBlock $Text).Replace("`r`n", "`n").TrimEnd("`n")
}
# Signs the publish set in place: each item's bytes are written to a work directory, signed
# there, verified, and read back as the bytes that will be uploaded. Signing has to be the
# last transformation -- the signature covers exactly these bytes, so nothing may normalise
# or re-encode them afterwards.
function Set-PublishSetSignature {
param([object[]]$Items, [string]$WorkDir)
if (-not (Get-Command azuresigntool -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)) {
throw "azuresigntool is not on PATH. Install it with: dotnet tool install --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1"
}
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $WorkDir | Out-Null
$paths = @()
foreach ($item in $Items) {
$path = Join-Path $WorkDir $item.BlobName
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($path, [byte[]]$item.Bytes)
$paths += $path
}
Write-Host "Signing $($paths.Count) script(s) with certificate '$CertificateName'..."
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url $KeyVaultUrl `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken $SigningToken `
--azure-key-vault-certificate $CertificateName `
--timestamp-rfc3161 $TimestampUrl `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor bootstrap' `
--description-url 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com' `
$paths
# Native tool: PowerShell does not throw on a non-zero exit, and an unnoticed signing
# failure would publish unsigned scripts that every loader in the field then rejects.
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE -- nothing was uploaded."
}
foreach ($item in $Items) {
$path = Join-Path $WorkDir $item.BlobName
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $path
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
throw "Signature on $($item.BlobName) is '$($sig.Status)', expected 'Valid'."
}
# Without a timestamp the signature dies with the certificate, and these scripts sit
# on customer devices far longer than a certificate lifetime.
if (-not $sig.TimeStamperCertificate) {
throw "Signature on $($item.BlobName) carries no timestamp."
}
if ($ExpectedPublisher -and $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -notlike $ExpectedPublisher) {
throw "$($item.BlobName) was signed by '$($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)', expected '$ExpectedPublisher'."
}
# Plain assignment, NO comma operator: the ',' elsewhere in this file exists because
# PowerShell unrolls an array RETURNED from a function, which is not what a property
# assignment does -- here it would wrap the byte[] in an Object[] of length 1 and the
# upload would fail converting it back.
$signedBytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($path)
if ($signedBytes.Length -le $item.Bytes.Length) {
throw ("Signed $($item.BlobName) is $($signedBytes.Length) bytes but the unsigned form " +
"was $($item.Bytes.Length) -- a signature only ever adds bytes, so this is a " +
'read-back bug, not a signing result.')
}
$item.Bytes = $signedBytes
Write-Host " signed $($item.BlobName) ($($signedBytes.Length) bytes, signer $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject.Split(',')[0]))"
}
}
# Aborts when a published script changed behaviour without a version bump. Consumers act on
# the version (docs badge, version.json, the portal's outdated-script hint), so an unchanged
# version has to mean unchanged behaviour.
function Assert-VersionBump {
param(
[string]$BlobName,
[string]$SourceContent,
[string]$SourceOrigin,
[string]$SourceVersion
)
$publishedBytes = Get-PublishedBytes "$AliasUrl/$BlobName"
if ($null -eq $publishedBytes) {
Write-Host "No published $BlobName yet -- version-bump guard skipped (first publish)"
return
}
$publishedText = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($publishedBytes)
if ((Get-ComparableText $publishedText) -eq (Get-ComparableText $SourceContent)) {
Write-Host "Published $BlobName is already this source (signature block aside)"
return
}
$publishedVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $publishedText -Origin "$AliasUrl/$BlobName" -Optional
if ($null -eq $publishedVersion) {
Write-Host "::warning::The published $BlobName is not a readable script (no ScriptVersion found). Republishing over it."
} elseif ($publishedVersion -ne $SourceVersion) {
Write-Host "Version bump: $publishedVersion -> $SourceVersion ($BlobName)"
} elseif ((Get-CodeFingerprint -Text (Remove-SignatureBlock $publishedText) -Origin "$AliasUrl/$BlobName") -eq
(Get-CodeFingerprint -Text $SourceContent -Origin $SourceOrigin)) {
# Comments, typos in comments, reflow -- nothing a consumer of the version can act on.
Write-Host "::warning::$BlobName changed in comments or formatting only; publishing under the unchanged version $SourceVersion."
} else {
throw ("Version-bump guard: $BlobName changed behaviour but ScriptVersion is still $SourceVersion. " +
"Bump it in $SourceOrigin -- the docs badge, version.json and the " +
'portal outdated-script hint all read that value, and customers decide from it whether ' +
'to re-upload their Intune copy. Comment-only and formatting changes do not need a bump.')
}
}
function Get-BootstrapScriptVersion {
param([string]$Content, [string]$Origin, [switch]$Optional)
if ($Content -match '\$ScriptVersion\s*=\s*"([\d\.\-a-zA-Z]+)"') { return $Matches[1] }
@@ -152,12 +316,16 @@ function Get-CodeFingerprint {
return (($tokens | Where-Object { $ignored -notcontains $_.Kind.ToString() } | ForEach-Object { $_.Text }) -join "`n")
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. source
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. sources
$sourceContent = Get-Content $BootstrapSource -Raw
$sourceBytes = Get-PublishBytes $sourceContent
$scriptVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $sourceContent -Origin $BootstrapSource
Write-Host "Bootstrap script version: $scriptVersion"
$loaderContent = Get-Content $LoaderSource -Raw
$loaderVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $loaderContent -Origin $LoaderSource
Write-Host "Loader script version: $loaderVersion"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 2. dev render
$stableUrlLiteral = '$AgentDownloadUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip"'
$devUrlLiteral = '$AgentDownloadUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Agent-dev.zip"'
@@ -170,33 +338,21 @@ if ($sourceContent.IndexOf($stableUrlLiteral) -lt 0 -or $sourceContent.IndexOf($
$devContent = $sourceContent.Replace($stableUrlLiteral, $devUrlLiteral).Replace($stableManLiteral, $devManLiteral)
Write-Host "Rendered $DevBlob (dev agent URL + version-dev.json)"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 3. bump guard
$publishedBytes = Get-PublishedBytes "$AliasUrl/$BootstrapBlob"
if ($null -eq $publishedBytes) {
Write-Host 'No published bootstrap yet -- version-bump guard skipped (first publish)'
} elseif ((Get-Sha256 $publishedBytes) -eq (Get-Sha256 $sourceBytes)) {
Write-Host 'Published bootstrap is already byte-identical to the source'
} else {
$publishedText = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($publishedBytes)
$publishedVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $publishedText -Origin "$AliasUrl/$BootstrapBlob" -Optional
# The dev loader must fetch the dev bootstrap, or a dev device would run the stable chain.
$stableLoaderLiteral = '$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"'
$devLoaderLiteral = '$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1"'
if ($null -eq $publishedVersion) {
Write-Host "::warning::The published $BootstrapBlob is not a readable bootstrap script (no ScriptVersion found). Republishing over it."
} elseif ($publishedVersion -ne $scriptVersion) {
Write-Host "Version bump: $publishedVersion -> $scriptVersion"
} elseif ((Get-CodeFingerprint -Text $publishedText -Origin "$AliasUrl/$BootstrapBlob") -eq
(Get-CodeFingerprint -Text $sourceContent -Origin $BootstrapSource)) {
# Comments, typos in comments, reflow -- nothing a consumer of the version can act on.
Write-Host "::warning::$BootstrapBlob changed in comments or formatting only; publishing under the unchanged version $scriptVersion."
} else {
throw ("Version-bump guard: $BootstrapBlob changed behaviour but ScriptVersion is still $scriptVersion. " +
"Bump it in $BootstrapSource -- the docs badge, version.json.bootstrapVersion and the " +
'portal outdated-script hint all read that value, and customers decide from it whether ' +
'to re-upload their Intune copy. Comment-only and formatting changes do not need a bump.')
}
if ($loaderContent.IndexOf($stableLoaderLiteral) -lt 0) {
throw "Loader dev-render: anchor literal missing in $LoaderSource"
}
$devLoaderContent = $loaderContent.Replace($stableLoaderLiteral, $devLoaderLiteral)
Write-Host "Rendered $LoaderDevBlob (points at $DevBlob)"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 4. upload
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 3. bump guards
Assert-VersionBump -BlobName $BootstrapBlob -SourceContent $sourceContent -SourceOrigin $BootstrapSource -SourceVersion $scriptVersion
Assert-VersionBump -BlobName $LoaderBlob -SourceContent $loaderContent -SourceOrigin $LoaderSource -SourceVersion $loaderVersion
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 4. publish set
# Sources beyond the bootstrap pair, read straight from the repo.
$extraSources = @(
@{ Path = 'scripts/Bootstrap/Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent.ps1'; BlobName = 'Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent.ps1' }
@@ -206,20 +362,38 @@ $extraSources = @(
# Uninstall-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 is deliberately NOT published: nothing links it, and
# an unauthenticated uninstall script on the public download host is not a feature.
# Text is the unsigned publish form and stays the reference for every comparison against a
# published copy; Bytes is what goes on the wire and carries the signature after step 4.
$publishSet = [System.Collections.Generic.List[object]]::new()
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $BootstrapBlob; Bytes = $sourceBytes })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $DevBlob; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devContent) })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $LoaderBlob; Text = $loaderContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $loaderContent) })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $LoaderDevBlob; Text = $devLoaderContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devLoaderContent) })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $BootstrapBlob; Text = $sourceContent; Bytes = $sourceBytes })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $DevBlob; Text = $devContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devContent) })
foreach ($extra in $extraSources) {
$extraPath = Join-Path $RepoRoot $extra.Path
if (-not (Test-Path $extraPath)) {
throw "Publish source missing: $extraPath"
}
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $extra.BlobName; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes (Get-Content $extraPath -Raw)) })
$extraText = Get-Content $extraPath -Raw
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $extra.BlobName; Text = $extraText; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $extraText) })
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 5. sign
# After this point the bytes are final. Normalising, re-encoding or rewriting a line ending
# would invalidate the signature, and the device-side loader would refuse the script.
if ($SigningEnabled) {
Set-PublishSetSignature -Items $publishSet -WorkDir (Join-Path ([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath()) "apm-publish-$PID")
} else {
Write-Host '::warning::No signing token supplied -- dry run continues with unsigned scripts.'
}
$legacySas = if ($LegacySasToken) { $LegacySasToken.TrimStart('?') } else { '' }
$writeSas = if ($SasToken) { $SasToken.TrimStart('?') } else { '' }
# Acquired lazily: a dry run must stay runnable without any Azure login -- the PR gate
# (bootstrap-script-gates.yml) executes this script with -DryRun and never logs in.
$authHeaders = if ($DryRun) { $null } else { & (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1') }
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 6. upload
foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
# Explicit type, not a convenience: an Object[] body is uploaded as space-separated
# decimals rather than raw bytes, and every hash check still passes because [byte[]]
@@ -227,11 +401,21 @@ foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
[byte[]]$bytes = $item.Bytes
$item | Add-Member -NotePropertyName Sha256 -NotePropertyValue (Get-Sha256 $bytes) -Force
# Exactly the bytes that go on the wire, for the CI artifact. Written in a dry run too:
# that is the run an operator uses to inspect a signed script before it is published.
if ($SignedOutputDir) {
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $SignedOutputDir | Out-Null
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes((Join-Path $SignedOutputDir $item.BlobName), $bytes)
}
if ($DryRun) {
# Doubles as a drift check: says per blob whether the alias already serves this source.
# Doubles as a drift check: says per blob whether the alias already serves this
# source. Compared as text without the signature block -- signed bytes differ on
# every run, so a byte comparison would report drift for every unchanged script.
$served = Get-PublishedBytes "$AliasUrl/$($item.BlobName)"
$state = if ($null -eq $served) { 'MISSING on the alias' }
elseif ((Get-Sha256 $served) -eq $item.Sha256) { 'already current' }
elseif ((Get-ComparableText ([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($served))) -eq
(Get-ComparableText $item.Text)) { 'already current' }
else { 'STALE on the alias' }
Write-Host " [dry-run] $($item.BlobName) ($($bytes.Length) bytes, sha256 $($item.Sha256)) -- $state"
continue
@@ -241,8 +425,18 @@ foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
# with Front Door. Route caching is disabled there, but a stale script paired with a
# fresh manifest would fail the bootstrap SHA check -- this keeps that class of bug
# impossible even if caching is ever re-enabled.
$headers = @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'Content-Type' = $ScriptContentType; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$ContainerUrl/$($item.BlobName)?$writeSas" -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body $bytes | Out-Null
#
# Content-Disposition: without it a text/plain blob opens as a web page in every
# browser, and the documented "download the script" step silently becomes "copy this
# text". The header makes the link a download everywhere, and command-line clients
# (the loader, the MSI, curl) ignore it.
$headers = @{
'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'
'Content-Type' = $ScriptContentType
'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache'
'x-ms-blob-content-disposition' = ('attachment; filename="{0}"' -f $item.BlobName)
}
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$ContainerUrl/$($item.BlobName)" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $headers) -Body $bytes | Out-Null
# Read straight back from the blob (authoritative, no CDN in the way) before touching the
# mirror or the next file. The alias verification at the end would catch a bad body too,
@@ -266,7 +460,7 @@ foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
}
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 5. version oracles
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 7. version oracles
# version.json is the agent manifest; only bootstrapVersion belongs to us. Read from the
# blob (not the alias) for an authoritative ETag, write back under If-Match so a concurrent
# agent release cannot lose its version/sha256 fields.
@@ -278,11 +472,15 @@ if (-not $DryRun) {
} else { [string]$manifestResp.Content }
$manifest = $manifestRaw | ConvertFrom-Json
if ($manifest.bootstrapVersion -eq $scriptVersion) {
Write-Host "version.json already reports bootstrapVersion $scriptVersion"
if ($manifest.bootstrapVersion -eq $scriptVersion -and $manifest.loaderVersion -eq $loaderVersion) {
Write-Host "version.json already reports bootstrapVersion $scriptVersion and loaderVersion $loaderVersion"
} else {
$etag = '"' + ([string]($manifestResp.Headers['ETag'] | Select-Object -First 1)).Trim('"') + '"'
$manifest | Add-Member -NotePropertyName 'bootstrapVersion' -NotePropertyValue $scriptVersion -Force
# Additive: no consumer reads loaderVersion yet. It exists so support can tell
# which stage-1 file a device was assigned -- stage 2 is always current by
# construction, so its version says nothing about the customer's Intune copy.
$manifest | Add-Member -NotePropertyName 'loaderVersion' -NotePropertyValue $loaderVersion -Force
$body = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(($manifest | ConvertTo-Json -Compress))
$manifestHeaders = @{
'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'
@@ -290,8 +488,8 @@ if (-not $DryRun) {
'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache'
'If-Match' = $etag
}
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$ContainerUrl/version.json?$writeSas" -Method Put -Headers $manifestHeaders -Body $body | Out-Null
Write-Host "version.json bootstrapVersion -> $scriptVersion (agent fields untouched)"
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$ContainerUrl/version.json" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $manifestHeaders) -Body $body | Out-Null
Write-Host "version.json bootstrapVersion -> $scriptVersion, loaderVersion -> $loaderVersion (agent fields untouched)"
if ($legacySas) {
try {
@@ -310,11 +508,8 @@ if (-not $DryRun) {
}
}
$tableSas = if ($TableSasToken) { $TableSasToken.TrimStart('?') } else { '' }
if ($DryRun) {
Write-Host " [dry-run] would set AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion"
} elseif ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($tableSas) -or $tableSas -eq 'XXX') {
Write-Host 'SKIPPED: AdminConfiguration update -- set AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN to enable the portal version oracle'
} else {
$tableHeaders = @{
'Content-Type' = 'application/json'
@@ -322,11 +517,11 @@ if ($DryRun) {
'If-Match' = '*'
}
$tableBody = @{ LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion } | ConvertTo-Json
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$TableUrl`?$tableSas" -Method Merge -Headers $tableHeaders -Body $tableBody | Out-Null
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $TableUrl -Method Merge -Headers ($authHeaders + $tableHeaders) -Body $tableBody | Out-Null
Write-Host "AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion"
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 6. verify via alias
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 8. verify via alias
if (-not $DryRun) {
$pending = [System.Collections.ArrayList]::new()
$publishSet | ForEach-Object { [void]$pending.Add($_) }
@@ -358,7 +553,8 @@ if ($env:GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY) {
$summary = @(
"### Bootstrap scripts: $mode",
'',
"Bootstrap script version: **$scriptVersion**",
"Loader script version: **$loaderVersion** | Bootstrap script version: **$scriptVersion**",
"Signed: **$(if ($SigningEnabled) { "yes, certificate '$CertificateName'" } else { 'NO (unsigned dry run)' })**",
''
) + ($publishSet | ForEach-Object { "- $($_.BlobName) -- sha256 $($_.Sha256)" })
($summary -join [Environment]::NewLine) | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY -Append -Encoding utf8
+8 -11
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@
A failed build burns a number, which is harmless -- uniqueness matters,
density does not.
The blob is public-read; only the write needs the container SAS.
The blob is public-read; only the write needs authorization, and that comes from the
ambient Entra identity (see Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1) -- no secret is passed in.
Why a counter and not the published version manifest: manifests are written
on publish, not on build (the agent writes version.json only for stable
@@ -20,10 +21,7 @@
overwrite each other's versioned artifact.
.PARAMETER CounterUrl
Full URL of the counter blob, without SAS.
.PARAMETER SasToken
Container SAS with create+write permission. A leading '?' is tolerated.
Full URL of the counter blob.
.PARAMETER Override
Explicit build number instead of counter+1. If it is not greater than the
@@ -37,20 +35,19 @@
[int] the reserved build number. Progress goes to the host, not the pipeline.
.EXAMPLE
$n = ./Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $url -SasToken $sas
$n = ./Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $url
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$CounterUrl,
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$SasToken,
[int]$Override = 0,
[int]$MaxAttempts = 5
)
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
# Tolerate both secret formats ("sp=cw&..." and "?sp=cw&...").
$writeUrl = $CounterUrl + '?' + $SasToken.TrimStart('?')
# The write is Entra-authorized; the read below stays anonymous (public container).
$authHeaders = & (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1')
function Get-HttpStatus {
param($ErrorRecord)
@@ -85,8 +82,8 @@ for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le $MaxAttempts; $attempt++) {
$target = if ($Override -gt 0) { $Override } else { $counter.Value + 1 }
try {
$headers = @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'If-Match' = $counter.ETag }
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $writeUrl -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body "$target" -ContentType 'text/plain' | Out-Null
$headers = $authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'If-Match' = $counter.ETag }
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $CounterUrl -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body "$target" -ContentType 'text/plain' | Out-Null
Write-Host " Reserved build number $target (CAS write ok, attempt $attempt)"
return $target
} catch {
+70
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
name: Action Pin Gate
# Every third-party action must be referenced by a full commit SHA, never by a tag.
# Tags are mutable: whoever controls an action repository can repoint v4 at new code,
# and that code runs inside jobs that hold the code-signing identity, the storage
# credentials and a token that can push to main. A SHA is the only reference an
# upstream owner cannot change under us.
#
# Lives in its own workflow rather than in ci.yml: CI deliberately ignores changes to
# the other workflow files, so a guard placed there would stay silent for exactly the
# commits it needs to inspect.
#
# Like CI, this reports rather than blocks: main is deliberately unprotected, so a red
# run is a signal to act on, not a merge barrier. Making it binding means adding
# 'Verify action pins' as a required status check -- a branch-protection decision, not
# something this file can assert.
#
# The pins are not maintained by hand — .github/dependabot.yml opens a monthly grouped
# PR that rewrites both the SHA and the trailing version comment. The comment is
# therefore required too: it is what makes a pinned line reviewable.
on:
push:
branches: [main]
paths: ['.github/workflows/**']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['.github/workflows/**']
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
verify-pins:
name: Verify action pins
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- name: Every third-party action is pinned to a SHA
run: |
set -uo pipefail
failed=0
while IFS=: read -r file line ref; do
# Reusable workflows from this repository move with the commit that calls
# them, so there is nothing to pin.
case "$ref" in ./*) continue ;; esac
if [[ "$ref" =~ ^[^@]+@[0-9a-f]{40}[[:space:]]+#[[:space:]]*[^[:space:]] ]]; then
printf 'ok %s:%s %s\n' "$file" "$line" "$ref"
continue
fi
if [[ "$ref" =~ ^[^@]+@[0-9a-f]{40}[[:space:]]*$ ]]; then
echo "::error file=$file,line=$line::Pinned but the version comment is missing: '$ref'. Write 'owner/action@<sha> # vN' so the line stays reviewable."
else
echo "::error file=$file,line=$line::Action '$ref' is not pinned to a commit SHA. Tags are mutable -- resolve it with: gh api repos/<owner>/<action>/git/ref/tags/<tag>"
fi
failed=1
# -H is load-bearing: with a single matching file grep omits the name, the
# fields shift by one and every diagnostic points at nothing.
done < <(grep -nHE '^[[:space:]]*(-[[:space:]]+)?uses:' .github/workflows/*.yml \
| sed -E 's/^([^:]+):([0-9]+):[[:space:]]*(-[[:space:]]+)?uses:[[:space:]]*/\1:\2:/')
if [ "$failed" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "::error::Unpinned action references found -- fix them before this reaches main."
exit 1
fi
echo "All action references are pinned to commit SHAs."
+1 -1
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ jobs:
name: Bootstrap guard tests (PS 5.1)
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- name: Install Pester 5+
shell: powershell
+178 -35
View File
@@ -57,6 +57,13 @@ env:
VERSIONED_ZIP: AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v2.zip
STABLE_ZIP: AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip
STABLE_MANIFEST: version.json
# Authenticode via Azure Key Vault; identity and vault come from repository variables.
# CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT is optional and pins the publisher in the verify step.
CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME }}
CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL }}
CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT }}
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL: http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com
jobs:
build:
@@ -65,14 +72,66 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v7
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
# Every released build is signed; a missing variable stops the run before a build
# number is burnt.
- name: Check code-signing configuration
shell: pwsh
run: |
foreach ($name in 'CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID', 'CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME', 'CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL') {
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace([Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable($name))) {
throw "Repository variable $name is not set. Every released build must be Authenticode-signed."
}
}
Write-Host "Code-signing configuration present (certificate '$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME')"
# Logs in FIRST and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account, so the storage login below has to be the last one. Both federated credentials
# are bound to the ref, so this job must never be given an `environment:` -- that would
# change the OIDC subject claim and break both logins.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ env.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
allow-no-subscriptions: true
- name: Acquire Key Vault token for signing
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$token = az account get-access-token --scope https://vault.azure.net/.default --query accessToken --output tsv
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw "Could not acquire a Key Vault token for the code-signing identity."
}
Write-Host "::add-mask::$token"
"CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN=$token" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
# Every storage write below (counter blob, agent ZIP, manifests, AdminConfiguration)
# is authorized by this federated identity -- no SAS secret. One login covers the whole
# job: the federated credential is bound to the ref, and a release run takes ~2 minutes,
# well inside the token lifetime. Only the legacy mirror still needs a SAS: that account
# lives in the pre-migration tenant, where this principal has no identity.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# SDK 10 = single build toolchain (parity with local build.ps1 / global.json).
- name: Setup .NET
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
# Version pinned; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK above.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
# Build numbers come from the shared counter blob -- one counter and one
# implementation for CI and the local build (.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1).
# Reserve-before-build with ETag-CAS: concurrent builds can never mint the same
@@ -85,7 +144,6 @@ jobs:
# build_number could otherwise break out of the quotes and run arbitrary code.
env:
BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE: ${{ inputs.build_number }}
AGENT_SAS_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}
run: |
$override = 0
if ($env:BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE -ne '') {
@@ -96,7 +154,7 @@ jobs:
}
$counterUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent/buildcounter-v$($env:LINE_MAJOR).txt"
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $counterUrl -SasToken $env:AGENT_SAS_TOKEN -Override $override
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $counterUrl -Override $override
$csproj = Get-Content $env:CSPROJ_PATH -Raw
if ($csproj -match '<VersionPrefix>(\d+\.\d+)</VersionPrefix>') {
@@ -129,6 +187,47 @@ jobs:
- name: Run Agent unit tests
run: dotnet test ${{ env.TEST_PROJECT }} --configuration Release --no-restore --verbosity quiet
# Authenticode over everything we author; third-party assemblies keep their own signature.
#
# THE POSITION IS LOAD-BEARING: signing rewrites the PE file, so it must run before the
# ZIP and every SHA-256 in the next step -- those hashes are the bootstrap's integrity
# oracle, and hashes taken before signing match no downloaded file.
#
# $LASTEXITCODE is checked explicitly: PowerShell does not throw on a native non-zero exit.
- name: Sign agent binaries (Authenticode)
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$targets = @()
$targets += Get-ChildItem -Path "$env:AGENT_OUTPUT/*" -Include 'AutopilotMonitor.*.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.*.dll' -File
$targets += Get-ChildItem -Path "$env:DIALOG_OUTPUT/AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe" -File
if (-not ($targets | Where-Object Name -eq 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')) {
throw "AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe not found in $env:AGENT_OUTPUT -- nothing to sign."
}
if (-not ($targets | Where-Object Name -eq 'AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe')) {
throw "AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe not found in $env:DIALOG_OUTPUT -- nothing to sign."
}
$targets | ForEach-Object { Write-Host "Signing $($_.Name)" }
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
--azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description "Autopilot Monitor Agent" `
--description-url "https://www.autopilotmonitor.com" `
($targets | ForEach-Object { $_.FullName })
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE -- aborting before anything is published."
}
- name: Create release artifact
id: artifact
shell: pwsh
@@ -219,12 +318,57 @@ jobs:
"sha256=$sha256Hash" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
"exe_sha256=$exeSha256Hash" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
# Verified against the STAGING copy -- the exact bytes that ship. The invariant is "every
# AutopilotMonitor PE in the ZIP is signed", so a project added later cannot ride along
# unsigned. A missing timestamp fails too: without it the signature dies with the cert.
- name: Verify Authenticode signatures
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$files = Get-ChildItem -Path "staging/agent/*" -Include 'AutopilotMonitor.*.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.*.dll' -File
if ($files.Count -lt 2) {
throw "Expected signed binaries in staging/agent, found $($files.Count)."
}
$failed = $false
$thumbprints = @{}
foreach ($file in $files) {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $file.FullName
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::Signature status is '$($sig.Status)' -- expected 'Valid'."
$failed = $true
continue
}
if (-not $sig.TimeStamperCertificate) {
Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::Signature carries no RFC-3161 timestamp -- it would expire with the certificate."
$failed = $true
continue
}
if (-not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) -and
$sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -notlike $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) {
Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::Signed by '$($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)', expected '$env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT'."
$failed = $true
continue
}
$thumbprints[$sig.SignerCertificate.Thumbprint] = $true
Write-Host "$($file.Name): Valid, timestamped $($sig.TimeStamperCertificate.Subject.Split(',')[0]), signer $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)"
}
if ($thumbprints.Count -gt 1) {
Write-Host "::error::Staged binaries carry $($thumbprints.Count) different signing certificates -- expected exactly one."
$failed = $true
}
if ($failed) {
throw "Signature verification failed. Nothing was published."
}
Write-Host "All $($files.Count) binaries signed with certificate $($thumbprints.Keys -join ', ')"
- name: Upload to Azure Blob Storage
if: inputs.upload_blob
shell: pwsh
run: |
$containerUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent"
$sasToken = "${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}".TrimStart('?')
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
# Legacy mirror (transition until customers moved to the download.-alias):
# blobs are ALSO pushed to the old account so the bootstrap URL baked into
# customers' Intune scripts keeps serving current bits. Fail-soft -- a
@@ -234,7 +378,6 @@ jobs:
function Send-Blob {
param([string]$Local, [string]$BlobName, [string]$ContentType)
$url = "$containerUrl/$BlobName`?$sasToken"
$bytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($Local)
# no-cache on EVERY blob: they all rotate in place (even the per-line ZIP is
# overwritten each build), and the download alias fronts them with Front Door.
@@ -248,7 +391,7 @@ jobs:
$md5.Dispose()
}
Write-Host "Uploading $BlobName ($([math]::Round($bytes.Length / 1MB, 2)) MB)..."
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body $bytes
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$containerUrl/$BlobName" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $headers) -Body $bytes
Write-Host " uploaded $BlobName"
if (-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($legacySasToken)) {
try {
@@ -274,56 +417,66 @@ jobs:
# to main, so a release lands a set that is consistent with what is already live
# (dev render, version-bump guard, bootstrapVersion oracles, alias verification).
# Runs AFTER version.json so its bootstrapVersion read sees this build's manifest.
# Signed with the same identity: the device-side loader verifies the publisher
# of what it downloads, and the publisher refuses to upload unsigned scripts.
./.github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 `
-SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-LegacySasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-TableSasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN }}'
-SigningToken $env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN `
-KeyVaultUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL `
-CertificateName $env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME `
-TimestampUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL `
-ExpectedPublisher $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT
}
# Update AdminConfiguration LatestAgentV2* -- ONLY on stable cutover. The hash-oracle
# must never point at a build that is not actually in the stable namespace.
# LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion is NOT set here: it belongs to the script publisher
# above, which also owns it on script-only pushes. One writer per field.
$tableSasToken = "${{ secrets.AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN }}".TrimStart('?')
if ('${{ inputs.publish_as_stable }}' -ne 'true') {
Write-Host "SKIPPED: AdminConfiguration update (versioned-only run -- stable namespace unchanged)"
} elseif ([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($tableSasToken) -or $tableSasToken -eq "XXX") {
Write-Host "SKIPPED: Table SAS token not configured -- set AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN secret to enable backend hash-oracle"
} else {
$sha256 = "${{ steps.artifact.outputs.sha256 }}"
$exeSha256 = "${{ steps.artifact.outputs.exe_sha256 }}"
$agentVersion = "${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}"
$tableUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.table.core.windows.net/AdminConfiguration(PartitionKey='GlobalConfig',RowKey='config')?$tableSasToken"
$tableUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.table.core.windows.net/AdminConfiguration(PartitionKey='GlobalConfig',RowKey='config')"
$tableBody = @{
LatestAgentV2Version = $agentVersion
LatestAgentV2Sha256 = $sha256
LatestAgentV2ExeSha256 = $exeSha256
}
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $tableUrl -Method Merge -Headers @{
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $tableUrl -Method Merge -Headers ($authHeaders + @{
"Content-Type" = "application/json"
"Accept" = "application/json;odata=nometadata"
"If-Match" = "*"
} -Body ($tableBody | ConvertTo-Json)
}) -Body ($tableBody | ConvertTo-Json)
Write-Host "AdminConfiguration updated: V2 version=$agentVersion, sha256=$sha256, exeSha256=$exeSha256"
}
# Sigstore keyless provenance: binds the ZIP digest to this workflow run (repo, ref,
# commit, workflow file) in a public transparency log. The digest covers the identical
# Sigstore keyless provenance: binds the artifact digests to this workflow run (repo, ref,
# commit, workflow file) in a public transparency log. The digests cover the identical
# bytes uploaded to blob (versioned AND stable), so one attestation covers all copies.
# Verify: gh attestation verify <zip> --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
- name: Attest build provenance (ZIP)
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v4
# Complements Authenticode rather than replacing it: the signature says who published a
# binary, the attestation which build produced these exact bytes. Both EXEs are subjects
# of their own so an extracted binary can be verified without the ZIP.
# Verify: gh attestation verify <file> --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
# Skipped on runs that publish nothing -- no log entry for bytes nobody receives.
- name: Attest build provenance
if: inputs.upload_blob || inputs.create_release
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@4d101475d8b20a2381f78447822ac1eab6504dd8 # v4
with:
subject-path: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
subject-path: |
${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
staging/agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe
staging/agent/AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe
- name: Upload build artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
path: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
- name: Upload version metadata
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: version-metadata
path: ${{ env.MANIFEST_NAME }}
@@ -348,16 +501,6 @@ jobs:
RELEASE_ZIP: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
RELEASE_NOTES: ${{ inputs.release_notes }}
RELEASE_BODY_TAIL: |
### Installation
1. Download `AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}.zip`
2. Extract to `C:\ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor\Agent\`
3. Run `AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe --install` to register the Scheduled Task
### Included Components
- **AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe** - Monitoring agent (V2 release line)
- **AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.exe** - Enrollment summary dialog (WPF)
- **version-v2.json** - Per-line version manifest
### Version Info
- **Version:** ${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
- **Build Number:** ${{ steps.version.outputs.build_number }}
@@ -366,7 +509,7 @@ jobs:
- **Published as stable:** ${{ inputs.publish_as_stable }}
### Provenance
This ZIP carries a [GitHub Artifact Attestation](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/attestations) (Sigstore keyless). Verify:
The executables are Authenticode-signed and timestamped. The ZIP and both executables carry a [GitHub Artifact Attestation](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/attestations) (Sigstore keyless). Verify:
```
gh attestation verify AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}.zip --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
```
@@ -392,7 +535,7 @@ jobs:
$compare = "`n`n**Full changelog:** https://github.com/$env:GITHUB_REPOSITORY/compare/$prevTag...$env:RELEASE_TAG`n"
}
$body = "## $env:RELEASE_NAME`n`n### What's new`n$notes`n`n" + "$env:RELEASE_BODY_TAIL".TrimEnd() + $compare
$body = "### What's new`n$notes`n`n" + "$env:RELEASE_BODY_TAIL".TrimEnd() + $compare
$notesFile = Join-Path $env:RUNNER_TEMP 'release-notes.md'
Set-Content -Path $notesFile -Value $body -Encoding utf8 -NoNewline
+126 -16
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
name: Build & Publish Bootstrap MSI
# Thin MDM LOB delivery vehicle for WDP (Autopilot v2) — see
# src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi/Package.wxs. The MSI carries no bootstrap
# logic (only the runner script that downloads the CURRENT server-hosted
# Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1), so it is rebuilt rarely: only when the runner script
# or the WiX package changes. Version lives in Package.wxs — bump it there before
# dispatching so Intune LOB update detection sees a new ProductVersion.
# src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi/Package.wxs. The MSI is packaging only: it
# carries the SAME stage-1 loader that is assigned directly in Intune, so it is rebuilt
# rarely — only when that loader or the WiX package changes. Version lives in Package.wxs
# — bump it there before dispatching so Intune LOB update detection sees a new
# ProductVersion.
on:
workflow_dispatch:
@@ -23,8 +23,15 @@ permissions:
env:
MSI_PROJECT_DIR: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi
RUNNER_SCRIPT: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi/Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1
RUNNER_SCRIPT: scripts/Bootstrap/Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1
STABLE_MSI: AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap.msi
# Authenticode via Azure Key Vault; identity and vault come from repository variables.
# CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT is optional and pins the publisher in the verify steps.
CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME }}
CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL }}
CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT }}
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL: http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com
jobs:
build:
@@ -33,10 +40,12 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v7
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
# The runner executes as SYSTEM on every enrolling device — a parse error or
# The loader executes as SYSTEM on every enrolling device — a parse error or
# non-ASCII mojibake (PS 5.1 codepage roulette) must fail the build, not the fleet.
# bootstrap-script-gates.yml runs the same checks plus Pester on pushes; this job
# stands on its own because it can be dispatched at any time.
- name: Validate runner script (parse + ASCII-only)
shell: pwsh
run: |
@@ -62,8 +71,77 @@ jobs:
Write-Host "MSI version (from Package.wxs): $version"
"version=$version" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
# Every published MSI is signed; a missing variable stops the run before the build.
- name: Check code-signing configuration
shell: pwsh
run: |
foreach ($name in 'CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID', 'CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME', 'CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL') {
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace([Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable($name))) {
throw "Repository variable $name is not set. Every published MSI must be Authenticode-signed."
}
}
# Logs in FIRST and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account, so the storage login below has to be the last one. Both federated credentials
# are bound to the ref, so this job must never be given an `environment:` -- that would
# change the OIDC subject claim and break both logins.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ env.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
allow-no-subscriptions: true
- name: Acquire Key Vault token for signing
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$token = az account get-access-token --scope https://vault.azure.net/.default --query accessToken --output tsv
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw "Could not acquire a Key Vault token for the code-signing identity."
}
Write-Host "::add-mask::$token"
"CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN=$token" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
# The blob upload below is authorized by this federated identity, not by a SAS.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# Exact version, not a "5.*" range: wix writes the bytes of the MSI that customers
# install, so a compromised or simply broken point release must not flow into a build
# unnoticed. Bumping is a reviewed commit.
- name: Install WiX toolset
run: dotnet tool install --global wix --version "5.*"
run: dotnet tool install --global wix --version 5.0.2
# Version pinned; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
# BEFORE the build: wix embeds the file as it finds it, so a loader signed afterwards
# would leave the copy inside the MSI unsigned. Devices under an AllSigned policy need
# the embedded loader to carry a signature of its own.
- name: Sign bootstrap loader (Authenticode)
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
--azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor bootstrap runner' `
--description-url 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com' `
$env:RUNNER_SCRIPT
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE" }
- name: Build MSI
shell: pwsh
@@ -75,16 +153,46 @@ jobs:
wix build Package.wxs -arch x64 -o $out
Pop-Location
if (-not (Test-Path $env:STABLE_MSI)) { Write-Error "wix build produced no MSI"; exit 1 }
$sha256 = (Get-FileHash $env:STABLE_MSI -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()
Write-Host "Built $env:STABLE_MSI ($([math]::Round((Get-Item $env:STABLE_MSI).Length / 1KB)) KB)"
Write-Host "SHA-256: $sha256"
# Signing rewrites the MSI, so it runs before the hash and the upload. A missing
# timestamp fails the run: without it the signature dies with the certificate.
- name: Sign MSI (Authenticode)
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
--azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap' `
--description-url 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com' `
$env:STABLE_MSI
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE" }
# The MSI and the loader it carries -- verified here, before anything is published.
foreach ($file in @($env:STABLE_MSI, $env:RUNNER_SCRIPT)) {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $file
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') { throw "Signature on $file is '$($sig.Status)', expected 'Valid'." }
if (-not $sig.TimeStamperCertificate) { throw "Signature on $file carries no timestamp." }
if ($env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT -and $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -notlike $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) {
throw "$file was signed by '$($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)', expected '$env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT'."
}
Write-Host "$file : Valid, timestamped, signer $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject.Split(',')[0])"
}
Write-Host "SHA-256: $((Get-FileHash $env:STABLE_MSI -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant())"
- name: Upload to Azure Blob Storage
if: inputs.upload_blob
shell: pwsh
run: |
$containerUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent"
$sasToken = "${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}".TrimStart('?')
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$version = "${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}"
# Same Send-Blob contract as build-agent.yml: no-cache on every blob because the
@@ -102,7 +210,7 @@ jobs:
$headers["Content-MD5"] = [Convert]::ToBase64String($md5.ComputeHash($bytes))
$md5.Dispose()
Write-Host "Uploading $BlobName ($([math]::Round($bytes.Length / 1KB)) KB)..."
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$containerUrl/$BlobName`?$sasToken" -Method Put -Headers $headers -Body $bytes
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$containerUrl/$BlobName" -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + $headers) -Body $bytes
Write-Host " uploaded $BlobName"
}
@@ -125,15 +233,17 @@ jobs:
}
Write-Host "Alias verified: https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/$env:STABLE_MSI ($remoteSize bytes)"
# Sigstore keyless provenance, same as the agent ZIP. Verify:
# Sigstore keyless provenance, same as the agent ZIP; covers the signed bytes. Skipped
# on runs that publish nothing -- no log entry for bytes nobody receives. Verify:
# gh attestation verify AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap.msi --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
- name: Attest build provenance (MSI)
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v4
if: inputs.upload_blob
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@4d101475d8b20a2381f78447822ac1eab6504dd8 # v4
with:
subject-path: ${{ env.STABLE_MSI }}
- name: Upload build artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
path: ${{ env.STABLE_MSI }}
+49 -13
View File
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ name: CI
# red run reports rather than blocks. Read the result and follow up.
#
# Path filters: commits that only bump a private submodule gitlink (internal/, infra/,
# .claude/commands) or touch prose cannot change anything the suites cover, so they are
# skipped instead of burning ~15 runner-minutes each. A gitlink bump reports the bare
# .claude/commands), touch prose or edit another workflow cannot change anything the
# suites cover, so they are skipped instead of burning ~15 runner-minutes each. A gitlink bump reports the bare
# path ('internal', no trailing slash), which 'internal/**' does NOT match — both forms
# are listed. GitHub skips only when EVERY changed path matches; a commit that touches
# docs AND code still runs.
@@ -30,6 +30,24 @@ on:
- '.github/FUNDING.yml'
- '.github/dependabot.yml'
- '.github/assets/**'
- '.github/codeql/**'
- '.github/scripts/**'
# Every other workflow: nothing here builds or tests anything CI covers. paths-ignore
# cannot negate, so they are listed one by one; ci.yml itself stays out of the list
# so a change to CI runs CI. A new workflow file is opt-in — add it here too.
- '.github/workflows/action-pins.yml'
- '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-agent.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-msi.yml'
- '.github/workflows/codeql.yml'
- '.github/workflows/combine-rules.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-backend.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-mcp.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-web.yml'
- '.github/workflows/indexnow-notify.yml'
- '.github/workflows/oidc-login-test.yml'
- '.github/workflows/pester.yml'
- '.github/workflows/publish-scripts.yml'
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths-ignore:
@@ -45,6 +63,24 @@ on:
- '.github/FUNDING.yml'
- '.github/dependabot.yml'
- '.github/assets/**'
- '.github/codeql/**'
- '.github/scripts/**'
# Every other workflow: nothing here builds or tests anything CI covers. paths-ignore
# cannot negate, so they are listed one by one; ci.yml itself stays out of the list
# so a change to CI runs CI. A new workflow file is opt-in — add it here too.
- '.github/workflows/action-pins.yml'
- '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-agent.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-msi.yml'
- '.github/workflows/codeql.yml'
- '.github/workflows/combine-rules.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-backend.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-mcp.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-web.yml'
- '.github/workflows/indexnow-notify.yml'
- '.github/workflows/oidc-login-test.yml'
- '.github/workflows/pester.yml'
- '.github/workflows/publish-scripts.yml'
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
@@ -60,9 +96,9 @@ jobs:
# windows-latest is required: the agent test projects target net48.
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
@@ -91,9 +127,9 @@ jobs:
run:
working-directory: src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
cache: npm
@@ -125,9 +161,9 @@ jobs:
run:
working-directory: src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
cache: npm
@@ -145,7 +181,7 @@ jobs:
# (run 31252869254). Persist the model across runs instead; HF_CACHE_DIR
# is honored by vector-search-provider.ts.
- name: Cache embedding model
uses: actions/cache@v6
uses: actions/cache@55cc8345863c7cc4c66a329aec7e433d2d1c52a9 # v6
with:
path: ${{ github.workspace }}/.hf-cache
key: hf-model-Xenova-all-MiniLM-L6-v2
@@ -159,9 +195,9 @@ jobs:
name: Generated guardrails match rules/guardrails.json
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
@@ -180,9 +216,9 @@ jobs:
name: Generated wire types match shared-manifests.json
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
+37 -5
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ name: CodeQL
# A gitlink bump reports the bare path ('internal', no trailing slash), which
# 'internal/**' does NOT match — both forms are listed. A commit that touches docs
# AND code still runs: GitHub skips only when EVERY changed path matches the filter.
# Same list as ci.yml; keep them in step.
# Same list as ci.yml except that each file leaves itself out; keep them in step.
on:
push:
branches: [main]
@@ -23,6 +23,22 @@ on:
- '.github/FUNDING.yml'
- '.github/dependabot.yml'
- '.github/assets/**'
- '.github/scripts/**'
# Every other workflow: none of them changes the C# or TypeScript CodeQL analyzes.
# paths-ignore cannot negate, so they are listed one by one; codeql.yml itself and
# .github/codeql/ stay out of the list. A new workflow file is opt-in — add it here too.
- '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-agent.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-msi.yml'
- '.github/workflows/ci.yml'
- '.github/workflows/combine-rules.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-backend.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-mcp.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-web.yml'
- '.github/workflows/indexnow-notify.yml'
- '.github/workflows/oidc-login-test.yml'
- '.github/workflows/pester.yml'
- '.github/workflows/publish-scripts.yml'
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths-ignore:
@@ -38,6 +54,22 @@ on:
- '.github/FUNDING.yml'
- '.github/dependabot.yml'
- '.github/assets/**'
- '.github/scripts/**'
# Every other workflow: none of them changes the C# or TypeScript CodeQL analyzes.
# paths-ignore cannot negate, so they are listed one by one; codeql.yml itself and
# .github/codeql/ stay out of the list. A new workflow file is opt-in — add it here too.
- '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-agent.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-msi.yml'
- '.github/workflows/ci.yml'
- '.github/workflows/combine-rules.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-backend.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-mcp.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-web.yml'
- '.github/workflows/indexnow-notify.yml'
- '.github/workflows/oidc-login-test.yml'
- '.github/workflows/pester.yml'
- '.github/workflows/publish-scripts.yml'
schedule:
# Weekly, so advisories published after a merge still surface. Deliberately
# unfiltered — it re-analyzes the whole tree regardless of what changed, which
@@ -70,15 +102,15 @@ jobs:
build-mode: none
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
if: matrix.language == 'csharp'
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
- name: Initialize CodeQL
uses: github/codeql-action/init@v4.37.9
uses: github/codeql-action/init@cdf488f595d80d6e07e03d4674febd5ab45fa938 # v4.37.9
with:
languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
build-mode: ${{ matrix.build-mode }}
@@ -89,6 +121,6 @@ jobs:
run: dotnet build AutopilotMonitor.sln --configuration Release
- name: Analyze
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v4.37.9
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@cdf488f595d80d6e07e03d4674febd5ab45fa938 # v4.37.9
with:
category: /language:${{ matrix.language }}
+6 -3
View File
@@ -24,14 +24,17 @@ jobs:
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
# Exact versions and no lifecycle scripts: this job holds contents:write and pushes to
# main, so an install-time script from a hijacked package would run with a token that
# can rewrite the repository. ajv is pure JS and needs no install hooks.
- name: Install ajv-cli
run: npm install -g ajv-cli ajv-formats
run: npm install -g --ignore-scripts ajv-cli@5.0.0 ajv-formats@3.0.1
- name: Validate Gather Rules
run: |
+6 -6
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ jobs:
name: Build and Deploy Backend
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ jobs:
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
- name: Setup .NET 10
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ jobs:
id: version
shell: pwsh
run: |
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.txt" -SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.txt"
$csproj = Get-Content ${{ env.CSPROJ_PATH }} -Raw
if ($csproj -notmatch '<VersionPrefix>(\d+\.\d+)</VersionPrefix>') {
@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ jobs:
runId = '${{ github.run_id }}'
} | ConvertTo-Json
$sas = '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'.TrimStart('?')
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.json?$sas"
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.json"
# no-cache: rotating pointer, must never be served stale by any fronting cache.
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' } -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }) -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Write-Host "Published versions/backend.json"
Write-Host $manifest
+6 -6
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ jobs:
name: Build and Deploy MCP Server
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
# The published customer documentation lives in its own PUBLIC repo and is
# baked into the image as the search_docs corpus (see the Dockerfile). No
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ jobs:
# re-run actually rolls a new revision). /health reports the SHA captured
# below so that staleness is checkable.
- name: Check out documentation bundle
uses: actions/checkout@v7
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
repository: autopilotmonitor/autopilotmonitor-docs
path: mcp-docs
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ jobs:
id: version
shell: pwsh
run: |
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.txt" -SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.txt"
$pkgVersion = (Get-Content ${{ env.PACKAGE_JSON }} -Raw | ConvertFrom-Json).version
$prefix = ($pkgVersion -split '\.')[0..1] -join '.'
@@ -144,9 +144,9 @@ jobs:
docsCommit = '${{ steps.docs.outputs.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7)
} | ConvertTo-Json
$sas = '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'.TrimStart('?')
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.json?$sas"
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.json"
# no-cache: rotating pointer, must never be served stale by any fronting cache.
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' } -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }) -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Write-Host "Published versions/mcp.json"
Write-Host $manifest
+40 -9
View File
@@ -35,12 +35,38 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Build and Deploy Job
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
lfs: false
fetch-depth: 0 # Full history needed for git-based sitemap lastmod dates
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
# Only the version manifest at the very end needs Azure; logging in here rather than
# next to that step keeps a credential problem from surfacing after a live deploy.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# The customer docs repo is the single source of the "What's new" panel: the prebuild
# step (scripts/whats-new/build-whats-new.js) turns changelog/*.md into
# public/whats-new.json and dates every bullet via git blame — hence the full history.
# Public repo, no token. Editing the docs does NOT update the live panel until this
# workflow runs again (push under src/Web/** or a manual dispatch); versions/web.json
# records which docs commit is live.
- name: Check out documentation bundle
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
repository: autopilotmonitor/autopilotmonitor-docs
path: whats-new-docs
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Resolve docs commit
id: docs
run: echo "sha=$(git -C whats-new-docs rev-parse HEAD)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
with:
node-version: '22'
cache: npm
@@ -51,7 +77,7 @@ jobs:
run: npm ci
# next.config output:'export' -- `next build` writes the static site to out/
# (prebuild: sync-error-codes, generate-lastmod, generate-version).
# (prebuild: sync-error-codes, generate-lastmod, generate-version, whats-new).
- name: Build
working-directory: ${{ env.WEB_DIR }}
env:
@@ -68,9 +94,12 @@ jobs:
# Build stamp for public/version.json (scripts/generate-version.js in prebuild);
# the verify step below polls the deployed file for exactly this commit.
GITHUB_SHA: ${{ github.sha }}
# Docs checkout for public/whats-new.json; the prebuild fails in CI without it.
WHATS_NEW_DOCS_DIR: ${{ github.workspace }}/whats-new-docs
run: |
npm run build
test -f out/version.json || { echo "out/version.json missing - export did not run"; exit 1; }
test -f out/whats-new.json || { echo "out/whats-new.json missing - whats-new prebuild did not run"; exit 1; }
# One archive of the exact bytes that get uploaded, so the attestation has a single subject.
- name: Package export
@@ -85,12 +114,12 @@ jobs:
# commit, workflow file) in a public transparency log.
# Verify: gh attestation verify portal-<sha>.tar.gz --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
- name: Attest build provenance (portal export)
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@v4
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@4d101475d8b20a2381f78447822ac1eab6504dd8 # v4
with:
subject-path: ${{ steps.package.outputs.archive }}
- name: Upload build artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: portal-${{ github.sha }}
path: ${{ steps.package.outputs.archive }}
@@ -136,7 +165,8 @@ jobs:
throw "Portal did not serve commit $expectedCommit within 5 minutes -- deployment not verified, version manifest NOT published"
# Cross-component deploy record, written last and only on a verified deploy --
# same contract as versions/backend.json and versions/mcp.json.
# same contract as versions/backend.json and versions/mcp.json. docsCommit says which
# docs revision the live What's new panel was generated from (as for the MCP corpus).
- name: Publish version manifest
shell: pwsh
run: |
@@ -145,11 +175,12 @@ jobs:
commit = '${{ github.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7)
deployedUtc = [DateTime]::UtcNow.ToString('o')
runId = '${{ github.run_id }}'
docsCommit = '${{ steps.docs.outputs.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7)
} | ConvertTo-Json
$sas = '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_VERSIONS_SAS_TOKEN }}'.TrimStart('?')
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/web.json?$sas"
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/web.json"
# no-cache: rotating pointer, must never be served stale by any fronting cache.
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' } -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }) -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Write-Host "Published versions/web.json"
Write-Host $manifest
+81 -3
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ on:
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # OIDC federated login for the storage writes (secret-less)
# Shared with build-agent.yml: a script publish and an agent release both touch
# version.json, and the bootstrapVersion read-modify-write must not interleave with the
@@ -34,6 +35,16 @@ concurrency:
group: agent-blob-publish
cancel-in-progress: false
# Authenticode for the customer scripts. Same identity and same repository variables as
# build-agent.yml -- the loader on every device pins this publisher, so the two must not
# drift apart.
env:
CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME }}
CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL }}
CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT }}
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL: http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com
jobs:
gates:
uses: ./.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml
@@ -43,14 +54,81 @@ jobs:
needs: gates
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- name: Check code-signing configuration
shell: pwsh
run: |
foreach ($name in 'CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID', 'CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME', 'CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL') {
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace([Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable($name))) {
throw "Repository variable $name is not set. Published customer scripts must be signed."
}
}
# First, and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account and the storage login below has to be the one that stays. See D-223 --
# both federated credentials are bound to the ref, so this job must never carry a
# GitHub `environment:`.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ env.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
allow-no-subscriptions: true
- name: Acquire Key Vault token for signing
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$token = az account get-access-token --scope https://vault.azure.net/.default --query accessToken --output tsv
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw "Could not acquire a Key Vault token for the code-signing identity."
}
Write-Host "::add-mask::$token"
"CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN=$token" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
# Authorizes the eu blob writes and the AdminConfiguration merge. The gates job above
# runs the same publisher with -DryRun and deliberately without a login -- a dry run
# must never need Azure credentials.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@7ddb5af1ef8758cf1353cf3b42f940aee27ba21c # v3
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# Version pinned so a new or compromised NuGet release cannot flow into signing
# unreviewed; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK
# preinstalled on the runner.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
- name: Publish bootstrap + customer scripts
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$dryRun = '${{ inputs.dry_run }}' -eq 'true'
./.github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 `
-SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-LegacySasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-TableSasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_TABLE_ADMIN_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-SigningToken $env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN `
-KeyVaultUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL `
-CertificateName $env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME `
-TimestampUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL `
-ExpectedPublisher $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT `
-SignedOutputDir "$env:RUNNER_TEMP/signed-scripts" `
-DryRun:$dryRun
# The exact bytes that were (or, on a dry run, would have been) uploaded. A dry-run
# dispatch is therefore the way to inspect a signed script locally before it reaches
# a single customer. Kept on failure too: a failed alias verification is precisely
# when someone wants to look at the file.
- name: Upload signed scripts
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
with:
name: signed-scripts
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/signed-scripts
if-no-files-found: ignore
+4
View File
@@ -145,6 +145,10 @@ internal/docs/~$Introduction-AutopilotMonitor.pptx
# changes each run) and served at /version.json from the static export.
src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/public/version.json
# What's new payload: generated by scripts/whats-new/build-whats-new.js from the docs
# checkout on every build and served at /whats-new.json from the static export.
src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/public/whats-new.json
# Local IME installer scratch (MSI + extracted payload per version, for grepping
# in binaries). Operator-only, never committed.
+50 -14
View File
@@ -1,33 +1,63 @@
# <img src=".github/assets/logo.svg" height="28" alt="" /> Autopilot Monitor
# <img src=".github/assets/logo.svg" height="28" alt="Autopilot Monitor logo" /> Autopilot Monitor
[![Status](https://img.shields.io/badge/status-live-brightgreen)](https://www.autopilotmonitor.com)
[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT%20%2B%20AGPL--3.0-blue)](LICENSE)
[![Website](https://img.shields.io/badge/website-autopilotmonitor.com-2ea44f)](https://www.autopilotmonitor.com)
Advanced monitoring and troubleshooting solution for Windows Autopilot deployments. Gain full visibility into every enrollment session with a detailed event timeline, fleet health dashboards, and session reporting. Define custom analysis rules to automatically detect issues and gather rules to collect targeted evidence. Retrieve diagnostics packages on demand, configure agent settings like auto-reboot behavior and automatic timezone adjustment — all managed centrally from the web dashboard.
Autopilot Monitor is an open-source, real-time monitoring and troubleshooting platform for **Windows Autopilot** and **Microsoft Intune** enrollment. It records enrollment events, application installations, policies, device state, and diagnostics while provisioning is still running, instead of collecting logs by hand after a failure. Administrators get live enrollment tracking, Enrollment Status Page (ESP) visibility, detailed session timelines, automated issue detection, on-demand diagnostics, fleet health analytics, and AI-assisted troubleshooting through a hosted Model Context Protocol (MCP) server.
The platform supports classic Windows Autopilot and modern Intune provisioning scenarios, including **Windows Autopilot Device Preparation**.
## Availability
Autopilot Monitor is **publicly available** — the Community plan is free. Sign in with your work account at **[autopilotmonitor.com](https://www.autopilotmonitor.com)**; new organizations complete a short activation step after first sign-in.
<p align="center">
<img src=".github/assets/SessionList.png" width="45%" />
<img src=".github/assets/FleetHealth.png" width="45%" />
<img src=".github/assets/SessionList.png" width="45%" alt="Autopilot Monitor dashboard showing live Windows Autopilot and Intune enrollment sessions" />
<img src=".github/assets/FleetHealth.png" width="45%" alt="Autopilot Monitor fleet health dashboard with Windows Autopilot enrollment analytics and success metrics" />
</p>
<p align="center">
<img src=".github/assets/SessionDetails.png" width="45%" />
<img src=".github/assets/SessionTimeline.png" width="45%" />
<img src=".github/assets/SessionDetails.png" width="45%" alt="Autopilot Monitor session details showing device information, diagnostics, apps, policies, and enrollment status" />
<img src=".github/assets/SessionTimeline.png" width="45%" alt="Windows Autopilot enrollment timeline showing ESP phases, application installs, policies, events, and errors" />
</p>
## Overview
## Key Features
Autopilot Monitor provides real-time tracking, intelligent diagnostics, and automated troubleshooting for Windows Autopilot enrollment processes. It consists of:
- **Real-time Windows Autopilot monitoring** — follow device provisioning while enrollment is still running
- **Detailed enrollment timelines** — correlate Autopilot, ESP, Intune Management Extension, apps, policies, device state, and system events
- **Enrollment Status Page visibility** — see which phase, application, or policy is delaying provisioning
- **Automated issue detection** — define custom analysis rules that identify known failure patterns
- **Targeted evidence collection** — gather registry values, event log entries, files, log-parser matches, and allow-listed commands when specific conditions are detected
- **On-demand diagnostics** — request diagnostics packages from enrolled devices remotely
- **Fleet health analytics** — success rates, deployment duration, device models, applications, errors, and recurring issues
- **Session reporting** — inspect and share detailed enrollment information for individual devices
- **Windows Autopilot Device Preparation support** — monitor Device Preparation deployments alongside classic Autopilot scenarios
- **Centralized agent configuration** — control diagnostic behavior, automatic reboots, timezone adjustment, and other monitoring settings from the web dashboard
- **AI-assisted troubleshooting** — query enrollment data through the built-in Model Context Protocol server
- **Bootstrap Script** — PowerShell script deployed via Intune that starts monitoring early in the enrollment process
- **Monitoring Agent** — Lightweight .NET application that collects telemetry and evidence during enrollment
## How it works
Autopilot Monitor consists of several components working together throughout Windows enrollment:
- **Bootstrap Script** — PowerShell script deployed through Microsoft Intune that starts monitoring early in the provisioning process
- **Monitoring Agent** — lightweight .NET application that collects telemetry and evidence during enrollment
- **Backend API** — Azure Functions-based ingestion and processing pipeline
- **Web Dashboard** — Next.js application for real-time monitoring and fleet analytics
- **MCP Server** — Model Context Protocol server that lets AI assistants query and troubleshoot enrollments in natural language
- **Web Dashboard** — Next.js application for real-time monitoring, troubleshooting, and fleet analytics
- **MCP Server** — Model Context Protocol server that lets AI assistants query Autopilot Monitor data in natural language
## Windows Autopilot and Intune Troubleshooting
Autopilot Monitor helps investigate common Windows provisioning and enrollment problems such as:
- Windows Autopilot deployments that fail or appear stuck
- Enrollment Status Page (ESP) delays and unusually long deployment phases
- Win32 application installation failures and slow application downloads
- Intune Management Extension problems
- Microsoft Entra join, Hybrid Join, and device registration issues
- policies that block or delay provisioning
- inconsistent behavior across hardware models and recurring failures affecting multiple devices
Because telemetry is collected during enrollment, many problems can be investigated without reproducing the issue or manually collecting logs from the affected device.
## AI Integration (MCP)
@@ -35,13 +65,19 @@ Autopilot Monitor ships a hosted **[Model Context Protocol](https://modelcontext
- *"Show me all failed enrollments from the last 24 hours and group them by failure reason."*
- *"Why did session X fail, and which app install caused the delay?"*
- *"Which devices had unusually long ESP application phases this week?"*
- *"Which device models have the highest Autopilot failure rate?"*
- *"Which devices in my fleet are affected by CVE-2024-30078?"*
Server URL: `https://mcp.autopilotmonitor.com/mcp` — sign-in runs through your existing work account, access is scoped to your tenant exactly like in the portal, and no credentials are stored. Setup guide: **[AI Integration (MCP)](https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/integrations/ai-integration-mcp)**.
Server URL: `https://mcp.autopilotmonitor.com/mcp` — sign-in runs through your existing work account, access is scoped to your tenant exactly like in the portal, and the MCP server stores no credentials. Setup guide: **[AI Integration (MCP)](https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/integrations/ai-integration-mcp)**.
## Documentation
Full admin documentation is available at **[docs.autopilotmonitor.com](https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com)**
Full admin documentation is available at **[docs.autopilotmonitor.com](https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com)** — deployment, configuration, monitoring, diagnostics, troubleshooting, analysis and gather rules, integrations, and AI-assisted troubleshooting.
## Open Source
Autopilot Monitor is developed openly on GitHub. The source is published so that customers and security reviewers can see what runs on their devices and with their data: the repository contains the device agent, shared library, backend, web dashboard, and MCP server.
## Feedback
+1 -1
Submodule infra updated: 2c2687b6ab...742249e7e3
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects when the Enrollment Status Page failed on the Apps subcategory and the agent's AppX deployment log scan identified a suspected MSIX/Store package. Store/MSIX apps install outside the Win32 pipeline, so the regular per-app tracking sees nothing — this correlation names the likely culprit.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.2.0",
"version": "1.2.1",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@
"steps": [
"Open Event Viewer → Applications and Services Logs → Microsoft → Windows → AppXDeploymentServer → Operational on the device (or in the diagnostics archive if uploaded)",
"Filter for Error-level events around the ESP failure time and confirm the package name and HRESULT match this finding",
"Look up the HRESULT: 0x80073cf9 = generic install failure, 0x80073cf0 = invalid/corrupt package, 0x80073cff = sideloading/licensing policy block, 0x80073d02 = blocked because app is in use"
"Look up the HRESULT: 0x80073cf9 = generic install failure, 0x80073cf0 = package could not be opened (unsigned, publisher mismatch, or not found), 0x80073cff = sideloading/licensing policy block, 0x80073d02 = blocked because app is in use"
]
},
{
+98
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-APP-018",
"title": "App Return Code Requested a Reboot During Enrollment",
"description": "Detects Win32 apps whose installer exit code maps to Soft reboot or Hard reboot in the app's Intune return-code table (the '[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as ...' line). Hard reboot stops app processing and restarts the device in Device Setup - the mid-enrollment restart and second sign-in; Soft reboot leaves the app pending until the next restart while the ESP moves on. Confidence rises for Hard reboot and when a reboot was actually observed in the session.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.0.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed"
],
"trigger": "single",
"baseConfidence": 60,
"conditions": [
{
"signal": "reboot_return_code",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "app_install_completed",
"dataField": "exitCodeClass",
"operator": "in",
"value": "SoftReboot,HardReboot",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "hard_reboot_return_code",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "app_install_completed",
"dataField": "exitCodeClass",
"operator": "equals",
"value": "HardReboot",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "reboot_observed",
"source": "event_count",
"eventType": "system_reboot_detected",
"operator": "count_gte",
"value": "1",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{
"signal": "hard_reboot_return_code",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 25
},
{
"signal": "reboot_observed",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 15
}
],
"confidenceThreshold": 60,
"explanation": "App **{{appName}}** returned exit code **{{exitCode}}**, which its Intune return-code table maps to **{{exitCodeClass}}** - the installer asked for a restart before its work is complete.\n\n- **SoftReboot**: the Intune Management Extension reports the app as *pending reboot*. The Enrollment Status Page treats it as completed and moves on, and Intune only marks the app installed after the next restart re-evaluates the detection rule. Until then the app may be unusable or half-configured, and the user sees a restart notification.\n- **HardReboot**: the Intune Management Extension stops processing further apps and, in Device Setup, restarts the device right away (the restart grace period does not apply during the ESP) - the same mid-enrollment restart and second sign-in that ANALYZE-ESP-005 attributes to reboot-required policies. In Account Setup the extension does not restart the device itself and the app stays pending.\n\nA restart requested by an installer is normal for many MSI packages (exit codes 3010 and 1641), but during Autopilot it lengthens the ESP, can surprise the user with a restart, and hides the app's real state until after the reboot. The return-code class is the app's own configuration in Intune, not a device fault.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Check the app's return-code mapping",
"steps": [
"Open the app in the Intune admin center > Properties > Program and review the return codes table: exit code {{exitCode}} is currently mapped to {{exitCodeClass}}",
"If the installer only recommends a restart (MSI 3010 ERROR_SUCCESS_REBOOT_REQUIRED, 1641 ERROR_SUCCESS_REBOOT_INITIATED), map the code to Soft reboot instead of Hard reboot so the next app can install before the restart",
"If the app works without an immediate restart, suppress the installer's own reboot (for MSI: REBOOT=ReallySuppress on the install command) so it returns 0 and the restart happens on your schedule",
"Keep Hard reboot only when the following apps genuinely cannot install before the restart - and then expect the mid-ESP restart in every enrollment"
]
},
{
"title": "Take the app out of the ESP critical path",
"steps": [
"If the app is not needed for first use, remove it from the ESP blocking-app list so the restart happens after the user reaches the desktop",
"If it must stay blocking, order it last in Device Setup (dependencies or install order) so a hard reboot does not interrupt the remaining apps",
"For Soft reboot apps, plan a restart at the end of enrollment or accept that the app finishes on the user's first restart"
]
}
],
"relatedDocs": [
{
"title": "Microsoft Learn: Add a Win32 app - Program step (device restart behavior and return codes)",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/app-management/deployment/add-win32#step-2-program"
},
{
"title": "Microsoft Learn: Enrollment Status Page tracking",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/enrollment-status"
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"tags": [
"apps",
"reboot",
"return-code",
"soft-reboot",
"hard-reboot",
"esp",
"second-sign-in"
]
}
+31 -19
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-ESP-004",
"title": "ESP Timeout with 'Continue Anyway' (Soft Failure)",
"description": "Detects an ESP terminal failure on a profile that allows 'Continue anyway'. The enrollment is reported as failed, but the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop — a soft failure rather than an unusable device.",
"title": "ESP Gave Up on a Blocking App with 'Continue Anyway' (Soft Failure)",
"description": "Detects an ESP terminal failure where the ESP gave up while a blocking app was still installing (the agent's own esp_apps_timeout verdict — no per-app HRESULT was reported) on a profile that allows 'Continue anyway'. The enrollment is reported as failed, but the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop — a soft failure rather than an unusable device. An ESP failure that carries a specific error code (a failed installer, a detection mismatch) is a different case and stays with the rule that explains that code.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "esp",
"version": "1.0.1",
"version": "1.1.0",
"enabled": true,
"baseConfidence": 80,
"conditions": [
@@ -26,6 +26,27 @@
"value": "true",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "esp_gave_up_on_app",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "failureType",
"operator": "equals",
"value": "esp_apps_timeout",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "appName",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "appName",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"filterField": "failureType",
"filterOperator": "equals",
"filterValue": "esp_apps_timeout",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes",
"source": "event_type",
@@ -38,34 +59,25 @@
{
"signal": "failedSubcategory",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "enrollment_failed",
"eventType": "esp_failure_settle_started",
"dataField": "failedSubcategory",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "appName",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "appName",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{ "signal": "appName", "condition": "exists", "weight": 10 }
{ "signal": "failedSubcategory", "condition": "exists", "weight": 10 }
],
"explanation": "This enrollment was reported as **failed** because the Enrollment Status Page reached its configured terminal timeout (`{{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min`) before all blocking items finished. The ESP profile, however, allows **'Continue anyway'** — so the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop with a working, though not fully provisioned, device.\n\nThe agent only observes the ESP terminal failure on the device side; it cannot see what the user did after the failure screen. Treat this as a **soft failure**: the device may well be in productive use, while at least one blocking item (`{{failedSubcategory}}` subcategory / app `{{appName}}`) did not complete inside the ESP window.\n\nA cluster of these across a tenant almost always points at one slow blocking app holding the whole fleet at the ESP timeout wall, not at broken devices. Any field still shown as a literal `{{…}}` placeholder was simply not recorded for this session (e.g. a certificate-only failure has no failed app).",
"explanation": "This enrollment was reported as **failed** because the Enrollment Status Page gave up while the blocking app **{{appName}}** was still installing — the agent recorded no per-app error code, only that the app never finished inside the ESP window (the profile's configured limit is `{{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min`; the ESP may have stopped earlier than that). The ESP profile, however, allows **'Continue anyway'** — so the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop with a working, though not fully provisioned, device.\n\nThe agent only observes the ESP terminal failure on the device side; it cannot see what the user did after the failure screen. Treat this as a **soft failure**: the device may well be in productive use, while the `{{failedSubcategory}}` subcategory did not complete inside the ESP window.\n\nA cluster of these across a tenant almost always points at one slow blocking app holding the whole fleet at the ESP limit, not at broken devices. This rule deliberately stays silent when the failed app reported a specific error code — a failed installer or a detection mismatch is explained by the rule for that code, and 'Continue anyway' does not make it a timing problem. Any field still shown as a literal `{{…}}` placeholder was simply not recorded for this session.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Relieve ESP pressure so enrollments finish inside the window",
"steps": [
"Identify the slow blocking app (`{{appName}}`) and either remove it from the ESP 'block device use until these required apps are installed' list, or raise the ESP installation timeout (currently {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min).",
"If the app legitimately needs longer than the ESP allows, make it non-blocking and let it install after the desktop arrives.",
"Verify the app's detection rule matches after install — an app that installs but fails detection times out the ESP on every device (see ANALYZE-APP-013).",
"If a subcategory such as Certificates is reported under '{{failedSubcategory}}', confirm the certificate/connector actually delivers — 'Continue anyway' hides a missing certificate, it does not fix it."
"Look at how long `{{appName}}` takes on a device that completes: if it legitimately needs longer than the ESP allows, make it non-blocking (remove it from 'block device use until these required apps are installed') and let it install after the desktop arrives.",
"If the app must stay blocking, raise the ESP setting 'Show error when installation takes longer than' (configured at {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min) — a limit, not a target; it only helps when the app reliably finishes within the new value.",
"Check the app's dependencies and install order: a blocking app waiting on a large dependency download (Delivery Optimization, proxy throughput) is the usual reason it never finishes in time.",
"If the ESP reported a non-Apps subcategory under '{{failedSubcategory}}', confirm the certificate/connector actually delivers — 'Continue anyway' hides a missing certificate, it does not fix it."
]
}
],
+1
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects when a certificate with the configured subject is missing from the local machine personal store (LocalMachine\\My). Requires the gather rule GATHER-ID-002 (machine cert store inventory) to be enabled — the check runs against its gather_machine_cert_store output. A missing certificate may indicate that MDM enrollment certificate provisioning or SCEP certificate deployment failed.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "identity",
"author": "Community",
"isCommunity": true,
"enabled": false,
"evaluateOn": [
+16 -17
View File
@@ -2,14 +2,14 @@
"$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-ID-004",
"title": "Hybrid Sign-In Never Establishes Entra User Affinity",
"description": "On a hybrid-joined device the real user reached the desktop, but the Autopilot provisioning placeholder stayed active in JoinInfo and the agent repeatedly reported the hybrid sign-in as overdue. The user session never establishes Entra user affinity (no PRT), so the Account Setup ESP re-runs on every logon and the enrollment never completes.",
"description": "On a hybrid-joined device the real user reached the desktop, but the Intune Management Extension never acquired a Microsoft Entra user token for that user within the wait window — repeatedly across reboots when the warning recurs. Without a user token the signed-in user has no Entra user affinity: user-targeted apps and policies cannot apply, Windows Hello for Business cannot provision, and with a user ESP the Account Setup page re-runs on every logon.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "identity",
"version": "1.2.0",
"version": "2.0.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"trigger": "correlation",
"evaluateOn": ["enrollment_end", "on_event:hybrid_login_pending"],
"evaluateOn": ["enrollment_end", "on_event:entra_user_affinity_pending"],
"baseConfidence": 60,
"confidenceThreshold": 75,
"preconditions": [
@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "enrollment_complete",
"operator": "not_exists",
"description": "Suppress when the session eventually completed — a single overdue-login warning followed by a successful sign-in is normal hybrid latency, not a broken affinity."
"description": "Suppress when the session eventually completed — a single pending-affinity warning followed by a successful token acquisition is hybrid latency, not a broken affinity."
}
],
"conditions": [
{
"signal": "hybrid_login_overdue",
"signal": "user_affinity_pending",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "hybrid_login_pending",
"eventType": "entra_user_affinity_pending",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": true
@@ -38,28 +38,27 @@
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "placeholder_still_active",
"signal": "no_user_token",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "aad_placeholder_user_detected",
"operator": "exists",
"eventType": "ime_user_token_acquired",
"operator": "not_exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
"required": true
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{ "signal": "hybrid_login_pending", "condition": "count >= 2", "weight": 20 },
{ "signal": "hybrid_login_pending", "condition": "count >= 3", "weight": 10 },
{ "signal": "aad_placeholder_user_detected", "condition": "count >= 3", "weight": 10 }
{ "signal": "entra_user_affinity_pending", "condition": "count >= 2", "weight": 20 },
{ "signal": "entra_user_affinity_pending", "condition": "count >= 3", "weight": 10 }
],
"explanation": "A real user signed in and reached the desktop, but the device kept reporting the **Autopilot provisioning placeholder** as the active identity in JoinInfo and the hybrid sign-in as **overdue** — across multiple reboots. This means the signed-in user never established **Microsoft Entra user affinity** (no Primary Refresh Token), so:\n\n- the Account Setup ESP page re-appears on every logon,\n- user-targeted required apps and policies cannot settle,\n- the enrollment never reaches completion.\n\nAfter this many hours this is not normal Entra Connect sync latency — something is structurally preventing the user (or the computer object) from registering:\n\n- the computer object's `userCertificate` attribute is not syncing to Entra ID (sync scope / OU filtering),\n- the signing-in user is not synced, or their UPN does not match a verified Entra domain,\n- the device has no line of sight to a domain controller **at logon time**, so the hybrid PRT flow cannot finish,\n- time skew or a proxy blocking `login.microsoftonline.com` / `enterpriseregistration.windows.net` from the user context.\n\nA frequent variant: the user's **first sign-in happens without domain-controller reachability** — for example when a pre-logon VPN tunnel (GlobalProtect, Always On VPN, Zscaler ZPA) is not established yet at the logon screen. Windows falls back to cached credentials, the hybrid PRT flow silently never runs, and later reboots do not fix it — sessions in this state typically show repeated reboots and network flapping while the placeholder identity stays active.\n\nA visible side effect: **the Windows Hello for Business wizard never appears**, because Hello provisioning requires an Entra user token (PRT). Hello is a downstream symptom here, not the cause.",
"explanation": "**What was measured.** A real user signed in and reached the desktop (`desktop_arrived`), and by the end of the agent's wait window the Intune Management Extension (IME) had still not acquired a **Microsoft Entra user token** for that user (`entra_user_affinity_pending`). That event lists the IME token error codes observed after the desktop (`tokenFailureCodes`) and how often the acquisition failed (`tokenFailureCount`). Each agent run reports this at most once, so a second or third occurrence means the same outcome across reboots — that repetition is what raises the confidence of this finding. No `ime_user_token_acquired` event followed in this session.\n\n**Why this means no user affinity.** IME's user check-in acquires the user token through the Windows web account manager (WAM), which needs the signed-in user's Entra identity — the Primary Refresh Token (PRT) that a hybrid sign-in establishes at logon. When that PRT was never issued, every token request fails and the user has **no Entra user affinity** on this device. Consequences:\n\n- user-targeted required apps and policies cannot apply,\n- Windows Hello for Business cannot provision (it requires a user token),\n- with a user ESP the Account Setup page re-appears on every logon instead of completing.\n\n**What this diagnosis does not use.** The Autopilot provisioning placeholder in JoinInfo (`aad_placeholder_user_detected`) is not part of this finding — on hybrid devices it can stay present through a perfectly healthy sign-in. Likewise, `dsregcmd /status` collected by the agent runs as SYSTEM and shows only the **device** join state; the per-user PRT state is visible only when the command runs as the signed-in user.\n\n**Typical causes** — something structurally prevents the user (or the computer object) from registering:\n\n- the computer object's `userCertificate` attribute is not syncing to Entra ID (sync scope / OU filtering),\n- the signing-in user is not synced, or their UPN does not match a verified Entra domain,\n- the device has no line of sight to a domain controller **at logon time**, so the hybrid PRT flow cannot finish,\n- time skew or a proxy blocking `login.microsoftonline.com` / `enterpriseregistration.windows.net` from the user context.\n\nA frequent variant: the user's **first sign-in happens without domain-controller reachability** — for example when a pre-logon VPN tunnel (GlobalProtect, Always On VPN, Zscaler ZPA) is not established yet at the logon screen. Windows falls back to cached credentials, the hybrid PRT flow silently never runs, and later reboots do not fix it.\n\nThe `device_registration_event` entries in the timeline (User Device Registration events 304/305) carry the OS-side record of the failed registration; the error codes in `entra_user_affinity_pending` carry the token side. A missing Windows Hello for Business wizard is a downstream symptom here, not the cause.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Verify user affinity on the device",
"steps": [
"Sign in as the affected user and run: dsregcmd /status — under 'SSO State' the value AzureAdPrt must be YES. NO means the user has no Entra token and this diagnosis is confirmed.",
"Also check 'Device State': AzureAdJoined = YES and DomainJoined = YES are expected for hybrid join.",
"Check Event Viewer: Applications and Services Logs > Microsoft > Windows > User Device Registration > Admin for PRT / registration errors (e.g. event 304/305/362).",
"Enable the gather rules 'Collect dsregcmd join status' so future sessions capture this state automatically."
"Also check 'Device State': AzureAdJoined = YES and DomainJoined = YES are expected for hybrid join — they prove the device join only, not the user's registration.",
"Check Event Viewer: Applications and Services Logs > Microsoft > Windows > User Device Registration > Admin for PRT / registration errors (e.g. event 304/305/362). The device_registration_event entries (304/305) in the session timeline carry the same OS-side failure record.",
"Enable the gather rule GATHER-DEVICE-006 (dsregcmd /status at the moment of the finding — device state only, the agent runs as SYSTEM). GATHER-DEVICE-007 and GATHER-DEVICE-008 (Microsoft-Windows-AAD/Operational events 1098 and 1097 at the same moment) are on by default."
]
},
{
+147 -42
View File
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@
"description": "Detects when the Enrollment Status Page failed on the Apps subcategory and the agent's AppX deployment log scan identified a suspected MSIX/Store package. Store/MSIX apps install outside the Win32 pipeline, so the regular per-app tracking sees nothing — this correlation names the likely culprit.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.2.0",
"version": "1.2.1",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@
"steps": [
"Open Event Viewer → Applications and Services Logs → Microsoft → Windows → AppXDeploymentServer → Operational on the device (or in the diagnostics archive if uploaded)",
"Filter for Error-level events around the ESP failure time and confirm the package name and HRESULT match this finding",
"Look up the HRESULT: 0x80073cf9 = generic install failure, 0x80073cf0 = invalid/corrupt package, 0x80073cff = sideloading/licensing policy block, 0x80073d02 = blocked because app is in use"
"Look up the HRESULT: 0x80073cf9 = generic install failure, 0x80073cf0 = package could not be opened (unsigned, publisher mismatch, or not found), 0x80073cff = sideloading/licensing policy block, 0x80073d02 = blocked because app is in use"
]
},
{
@@ -1034,6 +1034,103 @@
"esp"
]
},
{
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-APP-018",
"title": "App Return Code Requested a Reboot During Enrollment",
"description": "Detects Win32 apps whose installer exit code maps to Soft reboot or Hard reboot in the app's Intune return-code table (the '[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as ...' line). Hard reboot stops app processing and restarts the device in Device Setup - the mid-enrollment restart and second sign-in; Soft reboot leaves the app pending until the next restart while the ESP moves on. Confidence rises for Hard reboot and when a reboot was actually observed in the session.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.0.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed"
],
"trigger": "single",
"baseConfidence": 60,
"conditions": [
{
"signal": "reboot_return_code",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "app_install_completed",
"dataField": "exitCodeClass",
"operator": "in",
"value": "SoftReboot,HardReboot",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "hard_reboot_return_code",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "app_install_completed",
"dataField": "exitCodeClass",
"operator": "equals",
"value": "HardReboot",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "reboot_observed",
"source": "event_count",
"eventType": "system_reboot_detected",
"operator": "count_gte",
"value": "1",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{
"signal": "hard_reboot_return_code",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 25
},
{
"signal": "reboot_observed",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 15
}
],
"confidenceThreshold": 60,
"explanation": "App **{{appName}}** returned exit code **{{exitCode}}**, which its Intune return-code table maps to **{{exitCodeClass}}** - the installer asked for a restart before its work is complete.\n\n- **SoftReboot**: the Intune Management Extension reports the app as *pending reboot*. The Enrollment Status Page treats it as completed and moves on, and Intune only marks the app installed after the next restart re-evaluates the detection rule. Until then the app may be unusable or half-configured, and the user sees a restart notification.\n- **HardReboot**: the Intune Management Extension stops processing further apps and, in Device Setup, restarts the device right away (the restart grace period does not apply during the ESP) - the same mid-enrollment restart and second sign-in that ANALYZE-ESP-005 attributes to reboot-required policies. In Account Setup the extension does not restart the device itself and the app stays pending.\n\nA restart requested by an installer is normal for many MSI packages (exit codes 3010 and 1641), but during Autopilot it lengthens the ESP, can surprise the user with a restart, and hides the app's real state until after the reboot. The return-code class is the app's own configuration in Intune, not a device fault.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Check the app's return-code mapping",
"steps": [
"Open the app in the Intune admin center > Properties > Program and review the return codes table: exit code {{exitCode}} is currently mapped to {{exitCodeClass}}",
"If the installer only recommends a restart (MSI 3010 ERROR_SUCCESS_REBOOT_REQUIRED, 1641 ERROR_SUCCESS_REBOOT_INITIATED), map the code to Soft reboot instead of Hard reboot so the next app can install before the restart",
"If the app works without an immediate restart, suppress the installer's own reboot (for MSI: REBOOT=ReallySuppress on the install command) so it returns 0 and the restart happens on your schedule",
"Keep Hard reboot only when the following apps genuinely cannot install before the restart - and then expect the mid-ESP restart in every enrollment"
]
},
{
"title": "Take the app out of the ESP critical path",
"steps": [
"If the app is not needed for first use, remove it from the ESP blocking-app list so the restart happens after the user reaches the desktop",
"If it must stay blocking, order it last in Device Setup (dependencies or install order) so a hard reboot does not interrupt the remaining apps",
"For Soft reboot apps, plan a restart at the end of enrollment or accept that the app finishes on the user's first restart"
]
}
],
"relatedDocs": [
{
"title": "Microsoft Learn: Add a Win32 app - Program step (device restart behavior and return codes)",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/app-management/deployment/add-win32#step-2-program"
},
{
"title": "Microsoft Learn: Enrollment Status Page tracking",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/enrollment-status"
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"tags": [
"apps",
"reboot",
"return-code",
"soft-reboot",
"hard-reboot",
"esp",
"second-sign-in"
]
},
{
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-CORR-003",
"title": "Proxy Configuration Causing Download Failure",
@@ -2399,11 +2496,11 @@
},
{
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-ESP-004",
"title": "ESP Timeout with 'Continue Anyway' (Soft Failure)",
"description": "Detects an ESP terminal failure on a profile that allows 'Continue anyway'. The enrollment is reported as failed, but the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop — a soft failure rather than an unusable device.",
"title": "ESP Gave Up on a Blocking App with 'Continue Anyway' (Soft Failure)",
"description": "Detects an ESP terminal failure where the ESP gave up while a blocking app was still installing (the agent's own esp_apps_timeout verdict — no per-app HRESULT was reported) on a profile that allows 'Continue anyway'. The enrollment is reported as failed, but the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop — a soft failure rather than an unusable device. An ESP failure that carries a specific error code (a failed installer, a detection mismatch) is a different case and stays with the rule that explains that code.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "esp",
"version": "1.0.1",
"version": "1.1.0",
"enabled": true,
"baseConfidence": 80,
"conditions": [
@@ -2424,6 +2521,27 @@
"value": "true",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "esp_gave_up_on_app",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "failureType",
"operator": "equals",
"value": "esp_apps_timeout",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "appName",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "appName",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"filterField": "failureType",
"filterOperator": "equals",
"filterValue": "esp_apps_timeout",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes",
"source": "event_type",
@@ -2436,38 +2554,29 @@
{
"signal": "failedSubcategory",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "enrollment_failed",
"eventType": "esp_failure_settle_started",
"dataField": "failedSubcategory",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "appName",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "app_install_failed",
"dataField": "appName",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{
"signal": "appName",
"signal": "failedSubcategory",
"condition": "exists",
"weight": 10
}
],
"explanation": "This enrollment was reported as **failed** because the Enrollment Status Page reached its configured terminal timeout (`{{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min`) before all blocking items finished. The ESP profile, however, allows **'Continue anyway'** — so the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop with a working, though not fully provisioned, device.\n\nThe agent only observes the ESP terminal failure on the device side; it cannot see what the user did after the failure screen. Treat this as a **soft failure**: the device may well be in productive use, while at least one blocking item (`{{failedSubcategory}}` subcategory / app `{{appName}}`) did not complete inside the ESP window.\n\nA cluster of these across a tenant almost always points at one slow blocking app holding the whole fleet at the ESP timeout wall, not at broken devices. Any field still shown as a literal `{{…}}` placeholder was simply not recorded for this session (e.g. a certificate-only failure has no failed app).",
"explanation": "This enrollment was reported as **failed** because the Enrollment Status Page gave up while the blocking app **{{appName}}** was still installing — the agent recorded no per-app error code, only that the app never finished inside the ESP window (the profile's configured limit is `{{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min`; the ESP may have stopped earlier than that). The ESP profile, however, allows **'Continue anyway'** — so the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop with a working, though not fully provisioned, device.\n\nThe agent only observes the ESP terminal failure on the device side; it cannot see what the user did after the failure screen. Treat this as a **soft failure**: the device may well be in productive use, while the `{{failedSubcategory}}` subcategory did not complete inside the ESP window.\n\nA cluster of these across a tenant almost always points at one slow blocking app holding the whole fleet at the ESP limit, not at broken devices. This rule deliberately stays silent when the failed app reported a specific error code — a failed installer or a detection mismatch is explained by the rule for that code, and 'Continue anyway' does not make it a timing problem. Any field still shown as a literal `{{…}}` placeholder was simply not recorded for this session.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Relieve ESP pressure so enrollments finish inside the window",
"steps": [
"Identify the slow blocking app (`{{appName}}`) and either remove it from the ESP 'block device use until these required apps are installed' list, or raise the ESP installation timeout (currently {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min).",
"If the app legitimately needs longer than the ESP allows, make it non-blocking and let it install after the desktop arrives.",
"Verify the app's detection rule matches after install — an app that installs but fails detection times out the ESP on every device (see ANALYZE-APP-013).",
"If a subcategory such as Certificates is reported under '{{failedSubcategory}}', confirm the certificate/connector actually delivers — 'Continue anyway' hides a missing certificate, it does not fix it."
"Look at how long `{{appName}}` takes on a device that completes: if it legitimately needs longer than the ESP allows, make it non-blocking (remove it from 'block device use until these required apps are installed') and let it install after the desktop arrives.",
"If the app must stay blocking, raise the ESP setting 'Show error when installation takes longer than' (configured at {{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes}} min) — a limit, not a target; it only helps when the app reliably finishes within the new value.",
"Check the app's dependencies and install order: a blocking app waiting on a large dependency download (Delivery Optimization, proxy throughput) is the usual reason it never finishes in time.",
"If the ESP reported a non-Apps subcategory under '{{failedSubcategory}}', confirm the certificate/connector actually delivers — 'Continue anyway' hides a missing certificate, it does not fix it."
]
}
],
@@ -2697,6 +2806,7 @@
"description": "Detects when a certificate with the configured subject is missing from the local machine personal store (LocalMachine\\My). Requires the gather rule GATHER-ID-002 (machine cert store inventory) to be enabled — the check runs against its gather_machine_cert_store output. A missing certificate may indicate that MDM enrollment certificate provisioning or SCEP certificate deployment failed.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "identity",
"author": "Community",
"isCommunity": true,
"enabled": false,
"evaluateOn": [
@@ -2940,16 +3050,16 @@
{
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-ID-004",
"title": "Hybrid Sign-In Never Establishes Entra User Affinity",
"description": "On a hybrid-joined device the real user reached the desktop, but the Autopilot provisioning placeholder stayed active in JoinInfo and the agent repeatedly reported the hybrid sign-in as overdue. The user session never establishes Entra user affinity (no PRT), so the Account Setup ESP re-runs on every logon and the enrollment never completes.",
"description": "On a hybrid-joined device the real user reached the desktop, but the Intune Management Extension never acquired a Microsoft Entra user token for that user within the wait window — repeatedly across reboots when the warning recurs. Without a user token the signed-in user has no Entra user affinity: user-targeted apps and policies cannot apply, Windows Hello for Business cannot provision, and with a user ESP the Account Setup page re-runs on every logon.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "identity",
"version": "1.2.0",
"version": "2.0.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"trigger": "correlation",
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"on_event:hybrid_login_pending"
"on_event:entra_user_affinity_pending"
],
"baseConfidence": 60,
"confidenceThreshold": 75,
@@ -2958,14 +3068,14 @@
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "enrollment_complete",
"operator": "not_exists",
"description": "Suppress when the session eventually completed — a single overdue-login warning followed by a successful sign-in is normal hybrid latency, not a broken affinity."
"description": "Suppress when the session eventually completed — a single pending-affinity warning followed by a successful token acquisition is hybrid latency, not a broken affinity."
}
],
"conditions": [
{
"signal": "hybrid_login_overdue",
"signal": "user_affinity_pending",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "hybrid_login_pending",
"eventType": "entra_user_affinity_pending",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": true
@@ -2979,40 +3089,35 @@
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "placeholder_still_active",
"signal": "no_user_token",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "aad_placeholder_user_detected",
"operator": "exists",
"eventType": "ime_user_token_acquired",
"operator": "not_exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
"required": true
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
{
"signal": "hybrid_login_pending",
"signal": "entra_user_affinity_pending",
"condition": "count >= 2",
"weight": 20
},
{
"signal": "hybrid_login_pending",
"condition": "count >= 3",
"weight": 10
},
{
"signal": "aad_placeholder_user_detected",
"signal": "entra_user_affinity_pending",
"condition": "count >= 3",
"weight": 10
}
],
"explanation": "A real user signed in and reached the desktop, but the device kept reporting the **Autopilot provisioning placeholder** as the active identity in JoinInfo and the hybrid sign-in as **overdue** — across multiple reboots. This means the signed-in user never established **Microsoft Entra user affinity** (no Primary Refresh Token), so:\n\n- the Account Setup ESP page re-appears on every logon,\n- user-targeted required apps and policies cannot settle,\n- the enrollment never reaches completion.\n\nAfter this many hours this is not normal Entra Connect sync latency — something is structurally preventing the user (or the computer object) from registering:\n\n- the computer object's `userCertificate` attribute is not syncing to Entra ID (sync scope / OU filtering),\n- the signing-in user is not synced, or their UPN does not match a verified Entra domain,\n- the device has no line of sight to a domain controller **at logon time**, so the hybrid PRT flow cannot finish,\n- time skew or a proxy blocking `login.microsoftonline.com` / `enterpriseregistration.windows.net` from the user context.\n\nA frequent variant: the user's **first sign-in happens without domain-controller reachability** — for example when a pre-logon VPN tunnel (GlobalProtect, Always On VPN, Zscaler ZPA) is not established yet at the logon screen. Windows falls back to cached credentials, the hybrid PRT flow silently never runs, and later reboots do not fix it — sessions in this state typically show repeated reboots and network flapping while the placeholder identity stays active.\n\nA visible side effect: **the Windows Hello for Business wizard never appears**, because Hello provisioning requires an Entra user token (PRT). Hello is a downstream symptom here, not the cause.",
"explanation": "**What was measured.** A real user signed in and reached the desktop (`desktop_arrived`), and by the end of the agent's wait window the Intune Management Extension (IME) had still not acquired a **Microsoft Entra user token** for that user (`entra_user_affinity_pending`). That event lists the IME token error codes observed after the desktop (`tokenFailureCodes`) and how often the acquisition failed (`tokenFailureCount`). Each agent run reports this at most once, so a second or third occurrence means the same outcome across reboots — that repetition is what raises the confidence of this finding. No `ime_user_token_acquired` event followed in this session.\n\n**Why this means no user affinity.** IME's user check-in acquires the user token through the Windows web account manager (WAM), which needs the signed-in user's Entra identity — the Primary Refresh Token (PRT) that a hybrid sign-in establishes at logon. When that PRT was never issued, every token request fails and the user has **no Entra user affinity** on this device. Consequences:\n\n- user-targeted required apps and policies cannot apply,\n- Windows Hello for Business cannot provision (it requires a user token),\n- with a user ESP the Account Setup page re-appears on every logon instead of completing.\n\n**What this diagnosis does not use.** The Autopilot provisioning placeholder in JoinInfo (`aad_placeholder_user_detected`) is not part of this finding — on hybrid devices it can stay present through a perfectly healthy sign-in. Likewise, `dsregcmd /status` collected by the agent runs as SYSTEM and shows only the **device** join state; the per-user PRT state is visible only when the command runs as the signed-in user.\n\n**Typical causes** — something structurally prevents the user (or the computer object) from registering:\n\n- the computer object's `userCertificate` attribute is not syncing to Entra ID (sync scope / OU filtering),\n- the signing-in user is not synced, or their UPN does not match a verified Entra domain,\n- the device has no line of sight to a domain controller **at logon time**, so the hybrid PRT flow cannot finish,\n- time skew or a proxy blocking `login.microsoftonline.com` / `enterpriseregistration.windows.net` from the user context.\n\nA frequent variant: the user's **first sign-in happens without domain-controller reachability** — for example when a pre-logon VPN tunnel (GlobalProtect, Always On VPN, Zscaler ZPA) is not established yet at the logon screen. Windows falls back to cached credentials, the hybrid PRT flow silently never runs, and later reboots do not fix it.\n\nThe `device_registration_event` entries in the timeline (User Device Registration events 304/305) carry the OS-side record of the failed registration; the error codes in `entra_user_affinity_pending` carry the token side. A missing Windows Hello for Business wizard is a downstream symptom here, not the cause.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Verify user affinity on the device",
"steps": [
"Sign in as the affected user and run: dsregcmd /status — under 'SSO State' the value AzureAdPrt must be YES. NO means the user has no Entra token and this diagnosis is confirmed.",
"Also check 'Device State': AzureAdJoined = YES and DomainJoined = YES are expected for hybrid join.",
"Check Event Viewer: Applications and Services Logs > Microsoft > Windows > User Device Registration > Admin for PRT / registration errors (e.g. event 304/305/362).",
"Enable the gather rules 'Collect dsregcmd join status' so future sessions capture this state automatically."
"Also check 'Device State': AzureAdJoined = YES and DomainJoined = YES are expected for hybrid join — they prove the device join only, not the user's registration.",
"Check Event Viewer: Applications and Services Logs > Microsoft > Windows > User Device Registration > Admin for PRT / registration errors (e.g. event 304/305/362). The device_registration_event entries (304/305) in the session timeline carry the same OS-side failure record.",
"Enable the gather rule GATHER-DEVICE-006 (dsregcmd /status at the moment of the finding — device state only, the agent runs as SYSTEM). GATHER-DEVICE-007 and GATHER-DEVICE-008 (Microsoft-Windows-AAD/Operational events 1098 and 1097 at the same moment) are on by default."
]
},
{
+52 -4
View File
@@ -130,16 +130,16 @@
},
{
"ruleId": "GATHER-DEVICE-006",
"title": "Collect dsregcmd join status on overdue hybrid sign-in",
"description": "Runs dsregcmd /status the moment the agent reports a hybrid sign-in as overdue (hybrid_login_pending), capturing the Entra join and registration state at exactly the point where the problem is detected. Complements GATHER-DEVICE-001 (snapshot on entering Account Setup). Note: the agent runs as SYSTEM, so the output shows device join state — the per-user SSO/PRT state still requires running dsregcmd as the signed-in user.",
"title": "Collect dsregcmd join status on pending user affinity",
"description": "Runs dsregcmd /status the moment the agent reports that the signed-in user still has no Entra user token (entra_user_affinity_pending), capturing the device join and registration state at exactly the point where ANALYZE-ID-004 draws its evidence. Complements GATHER-DEVICE-001 (snapshot on entering Account Setup). Note: the agent runs as SYSTEM, so the output shows device join state — the per-user SSO/PRT state still requires running dsregcmd as the signed-in user.",
"category": "device",
"version": "1.0.0",
"version": "1.1.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": false,
"collectorType": "command_allowlisted",
"target": "dsregcmd /status",
"trigger": "on_event",
"triggerEventType": "hybrid_login_pending",
"triggerEventType": "entra_user_affinity_pending",
"outputEventType": "gather_dsregcmd_status",
"outputSeverity": "Info",
"tags": [
@@ -149,6 +149,54 @@
"hybrid"
]
},
{
"ruleId": "GATHER-DEVICE-007",
"title": "Collect Entra operational log on pending user affinity (event 1098)",
"description": "Collects the most recent Entra token-broker operational events with ID 1098 from Microsoft-Windows-AAD/Operational the moment the agent reports that the signed-in user still has no Entra user token (entra_user_affinity_pending). Captures the OS-side token-broker record at exactly the point where ANALYZE-ID-004 draws its evidence. The event log collector filters on one event ID per rule; GATHER-DEVICE-008 collects event 1097 from the same channel.",
"category": "device",
"version": "1.0.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"collectorType": "eventlog",
"target": "Microsoft-Windows-AAD/Operational",
"parameters": {
"eventId": "1098",
"maxEntries": "20"
},
"trigger": "on_event",
"triggerEventType": "entra_user_affinity_pending",
"outputEventType": "gather_aad_operational_events",
"outputSeverity": "Warning",
"tags": [
"device",
"entra",
"hybrid"
]
},
{
"ruleId": "GATHER-DEVICE-008",
"title": "Collect Entra operational log on pending user affinity (event 1097)",
"description": "Collects the most recent Entra token-broker operational events with ID 1097 from Microsoft-Windows-AAD/Operational the moment the agent reports that the signed-in user still has no Entra user token (entra_user_affinity_pending). Captures the OS-side token-broker record at exactly the point where ANALYZE-ID-004 draws its evidence. The event log collector filters on one event ID per rule; GATHER-DEVICE-007 collects event 1098 from the same channel.",
"category": "device",
"version": "1.0.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"collectorType": "eventlog",
"target": "Microsoft-Windows-AAD/Operational",
"parameters": {
"eventId": "1097",
"maxEntries": "20"
},
"trigger": "on_event",
"triggerEventType": "entra_user_affinity_pending",
"outputEventType": "gather_aad_operational_events",
"outputSeverity": "Warning",
"tags": [
"device",
"entra",
"hybrid"
]
},
{
"ruleId": "GATHER-ENROLL-001",
"title": "MDM enrollment diagnostic events",
+11
View File
@@ -339,6 +339,17 @@
"description": "Captures the installer exit code (lpExitCode) for the current app.",
"enabled": true
},
{
"patternId": "IME-EXITCODE-CLASS",
"category": "currentPhase",
"pattern": "^\\[Win32App\\] lpExitCode is defined as (?<exitCodeClass>Success|SoftReboot|HardReboot|Retry|Failed)$",
"action": "captureExitCodeClass",
"parameters": {
"useCurrentApp": "true"
},
"description": "Captures the admin-defined return-code class of the installer exit code for the current app ('[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as <Failed|Success|SoftReboot|HardReboot|Retry>', Win32AppInstaller.cs, enum AppReturnCodeType - literal identical from IME 1.50 through 1.105). Stored as exitCodeClass on the app and emitted on its terminal events; the last value wins, so a Retry loop that ends in Success reports Success. Anchored on both ends on purpose: the no-mapping warning ('... defined as <n>, fall into default now.') and an unparsable numeric type print a raw number and must not match. Companion of IME-EXITCODE (the number, logged just before) and IME-EXITCODE-MAPPED-FAILED (the Failed state transition), which still owns the error path.",
"enabled": true
},
{
"patternId": "IME-EXITCODE-MAPPED-FAILED",
"category": "currentPhase",
+4 -4
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/gather-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "GATHER-DEVICE-006",
"title": "Collect dsregcmd join status on overdue hybrid sign-in",
"description": "Runs dsregcmd /status the moment the agent reports a hybrid sign-in as overdue (hybrid_login_pending), capturing the Entra join and registration state at exactly the point where the problem is detected. Complements GATHER-DEVICE-001 (snapshot on entering Account Setup). Note: the agent runs as SYSTEM, so the output shows device join state — the per-user SSO/PRT state still requires running dsregcmd as the signed-in user.",
"title": "Collect dsregcmd join status on pending user affinity",
"description": "Runs dsregcmd /status the moment the agent reports that the signed-in user still has no Entra user token (entra_user_affinity_pending), capturing the device join and registration state at exactly the point where ANALYZE-ID-004 draws its evidence. Complements GATHER-DEVICE-001 (snapshot on entering Account Setup). Note: the agent runs as SYSTEM, so the output shows device join state — the per-user SSO/PRT state still requires running dsregcmd as the signed-in user.",
"category": "device",
"version": "1.0.0",
"version": "1.1.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": false,
"collectorType": "command_allowlisted",
"target": "dsregcmd /status",
"trigger": "on_event",
"triggerEventType": "hybrid_login_pending",
"triggerEventType": "entra_user_affinity_pending",
"outputEventType": "gather_dsregcmd_status",
"outputSeverity": "Info",
"tags": ["device", "entra", "join", "hybrid"]
+21
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/gather-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "GATHER-DEVICE-007",
"title": "Collect Entra operational log on pending user affinity (event 1098)",
"description": "Collects the most recent Entra token-broker operational events with ID 1098 from Microsoft-Windows-AAD/Operational the moment the agent reports that the signed-in user still has no Entra user token (entra_user_affinity_pending). Captures the OS-side token-broker record at exactly the point where ANALYZE-ID-004 draws its evidence. The event log collector filters on one event ID per rule; GATHER-DEVICE-008 collects event 1097 from the same channel.",
"category": "device",
"version": "1.0.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"collectorType": "eventlog",
"target": "Microsoft-Windows-AAD/Operational",
"parameters": {
"eventId": "1098",
"maxEntries": "20"
},
"trigger": "on_event",
"triggerEventType": "entra_user_affinity_pending",
"outputEventType": "gather_aad_operational_events",
"outputSeverity": "Warning",
"tags": ["device", "entra", "hybrid"]
}
+21
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/gather-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "GATHER-DEVICE-008",
"title": "Collect Entra operational log on pending user affinity (event 1097)",
"description": "Collects the most recent Entra token-broker operational events with ID 1097 from Microsoft-Windows-AAD/Operational the moment the agent reports that the signed-in user still has no Entra user token (entra_user_affinity_pending). Captures the OS-side token-broker record at exactly the point where ANALYZE-ID-004 draws its evidence. The event log collector filters on one event ID per rule; GATHER-DEVICE-007 collects event 1098 from the same channel.",
"category": "device",
"version": "1.0.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"collectorType": "eventlog",
"target": "Microsoft-Windows-AAD/Operational",
"parameters": {
"eventId": "1097",
"maxEntries": "20"
},
"trigger": "on_event",
"triggerEventType": "entra_user_affinity_pending",
"outputEventType": "gather_aad_operational_events",
"outputSeverity": "Warning",
"tags": ["device", "entra", "hybrid"]
}
+25 -1
View File
@@ -94,7 +94,11 @@
"C:\\Windows\\Panther",
"C:\\Windows\\SetupDiag",
"C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\DiagnosticLogCSP",
"C:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\ReportingEvents.log"
"C:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\ReportingEvents.log",
"C:\\ProgramData\\RealmJoin\\choco\\logs"
],
"userProfileFilePrefixes": [
"AppData\\Local\\RealmJoin"
],
"wmiQueryPrefixes": [
"SELECT * FROM Win32_OperatingSystem",
@@ -282,5 +286,25 @@
"log_entry",
"agent_trace",
"stall_probe_check"
],
"imeLogDerivedEventTypes": [
"app_install_started",
"app_install_completed",
"app_install_failed",
"app_install_skipped",
"app_download_started",
"app_tracking_summary",
"download_progress",
"do_telemetry",
"script_started",
"script_completed",
"script_failed",
"script_timeout_suspected",
"esp_phase_changed",
"ime_agent_version",
"ime_token_failure",
"ime_user_session_completed",
"ime_process_exited",
"ime_user_token_acquired"
]
}
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/ime-log-pattern.schema.json",
"patternId": "IME-EXITCODE-CLASS",
"category": "currentPhase",
"pattern": "^\\[Win32App\\] lpExitCode is defined as (?<exitCodeClass>Success|SoftReboot|HardReboot|Retry|Failed)$",
"action": "captureExitCodeClass",
"parameters": { "useCurrentApp": "true" },
"description": "Captures the admin-defined return-code class of the installer exit code for the current app ('[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as <Failed|Success|SoftReboot|HardReboot|Retry>', Win32AppInstaller.cs, enum AppReturnCodeType - literal identical from IME 1.50 through 1.105). Stored as exitCodeClass on the app and emitted on its terminal events; the last value wins, so a Retry loop that ends in Success reports Success. Anchored on both ends on purpose: the no-mapping warning ('... defined as <n>, fall into default now.') and an unparsable numeric type print a raw number and must not match. Companion of IME-EXITCODE (the number, logged just before) and IME-EXITCODE-MAPPED-FAILED (the Failed state transition), which still owns the error path.",
"enabled": true
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@
},
"source": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Source of the signal.",
"description": "Source of the signal. phase_duration and app_install_duration never derive a duration from a span with mixed timestamp provenance (exactly one IME-log endpoint with sourceOffsetOrigin=reader-zone-fallback, i.e. the writer timezone was unknown to the agent for one endpoint only): such a condition evaluates false with evidence timestampProvenance=reader-zone-fallback. Two fallback endpoints share the same error and stay measurable.",
"enum": ["event_type", "event_data", "event_data_array", "phase_duration", "event_count", "app_install_duration", "event_correlation", "clock_skew"]
},
"skewMetric": {
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@
},
"operator": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Comparison operator.",
"description": "Comparison operator. exists/not_exists with a dataField test whether ANY event of the type carries a non-empty value at that field: not_exists matches when no event does — including when the event type is absent altogether — so a rule can gate on a missing field (e.g. an ESP failure without an HRESULT). Without a dataField they test only the presence of the event type.",
"enum": ["equals", "not_equals", "contains", "not_contains", "regex", "not_regex", "gt", "lt", "gte", "lte", "exists", "not_exists", "count_gte", "count_per_group_gte", "in", "not_in"]
},
"value": {
+5
View File
@@ -114,6 +114,11 @@
"description": "Emit behavior: \"always\" (default — emit on every collection) or \"on_change\" (poll on the trigger cadence but emit only when the collected result changes; the first in-scope result always emits).",
"enum": ["always", "on_change"]
},
"enrichErrorCodes": {
"type": "boolean",
"description": "Opt-in: let the backend explain error-code fields in this rule's output (exitCode, errorCode, hresult, ...) with the Windows/MSI/Intune error-code catalog, attaching the same *Info siblings built-in events get. Default false because gather-rule codes usually come from third-party logs or commands (HP Image Assistant, Dell Command Update, custom scripts) with their own exit-code numbering, where the catalog meaning would be wrong. Enable only when the parsed source really uses Windows codes (e.g. an msiexec or IME log).",
"default": false
},
"outputEventType": {
"type": "string",
"description": "EventType for the emitted event (e.g., \"gather_proxy_settings\")."
+11
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,16 @@
"$schema": { "type": "string" },
"registryPrefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/categorizedList" },
"filePrefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
"userProfileFilePrefixes": {
"description": "Folders under the signed-in user's profile that file collectors and diagnostics paths may read, RELATIVE to the profile root (e.g. \"AppData\\\\Local\\\\Vendor\"). Resolved against %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% at match time. Entries outside AppData\\Local / AppData\\Roaming are dropped at load: the C:\\Users hard block never admits them, so this list can only ever narrow what the block's exception already permits.",
"type": "array",
"items": {
"allOf": [
{ "$ref": "#/$defs/safeString" },
{ "pattern": "^AppData\\\\(Local|Roaming)(\\\\|$)" }
]
}
},
"wmiQueryPrefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
"eventLogChannels": { "$ref": "#/$defs/categorizedList" },
"blockedEventLogChannels": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
@@ -16,6 +26,7 @@
"blockedFilePrefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
"blockedCommandPatterns": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
"blockedInterimTriggerEventTypes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
"imeLogDerivedEventTypes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
"maxCommandLength": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 100000 }
},
"required": [
+2 -1
View File
@@ -79,7 +79,8 @@
"captureAppTypeWinGet",
"captureAppTypeMsi",
"captureAttemptNumber",
"captureDetectionResult"
"captureDetectionResult",
"captureExitCodeClass"
]
},
"parameters": {
+9
View File
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ if (fs.existsSync(guardrailsPath)) {
assertStringList(guardrails[key], key);
}
assertStringList(guardrails.blockedInterimTriggerEventTypes ?? [], 'blockedInterimTriggerEventTypes');
assertStringList(guardrails.imeLogDerivedEventTypes ?? [], 'imeLogDerivedEventTypes');
if (!Number.isInteger(guardrails.maxCommandLength) || guardrails.maxCommandLength < 1) {
fail(`maxCommandLength: expected a positive integer, got ${JSON.stringify(guardrails.maxCommandLength)}`);
}
@@ -207,6 +208,14 @@ export const ALLOWED_FILE_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = [
${flatArray(guardrails.filePrefixes)}
];
// Folders under the signed-in user's profile, RELATIVE to the profile root. The agent
// resolves %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% at runtime; the portal validates against a placeholder
// profile. These cannot live in ALLOWED_FILE_PREFIXES — that list is matched literally
// against the already-expanded path, where the user name is unknown at authoring time.
export const USER_PROFILE_FILE_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = [
${flatArray(guardrails.userProfileFilePrefixes ?? [])}
];
export const ALLOWED_WMI_QUERY_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = [
${flatArray(guardrails.wmiQueryPrefixes)}
];
@@ -14,6 +14,22 @@
BeforeAll {
. (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')
function New-FakeSignature {
param([string]$Status, [string]$Subject)
$cert = if ($Subject) {
[pscustomobject]@{ Subject = $Subject; Thumbprint = '0123456789ABCDEF' }
} else { $null }
return [pscustomobject]@{ Status = $Status; SignerCertificate = $cert }
}
function New-FakePayload {
param([string[]]$Files)
$dir = Join-Path $TestDrive ([guid]::NewGuid().ToString())
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $dir -Force | Out-Null
foreach ($f in $Files) { Set-Content -Path (Join-Path $dir $f) -Value 'x' }
return $dir
}
function New-FakeProfile {
param([string]$Name, [double]$AgeMinutes)
$p = Join-Path $TestDrive $Name
@@ -305,3 +321,93 @@ Describe 'logging purity' {
Get-Content $LogFile -Raw | Should -Match 'SKIP: Agent was previously deployed'
}
}
Describe 'Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries' {
# The publisher gate on the extracted payload. What matters is the DECISION: which
# payload is accepted, which is refused, and which files are looked at at all.
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Log { }
$script:ours = 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE'
}
It 'accepts a payload where every binary of ours is validly signed by us' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject $script:ours }
Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
}
It 'checks the binaries we author and leaves third-party assemblies alone' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @(
'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe',
'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe.config',
'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll',
'Newtonsoft.Json.dll',
'System.Management.Automation.dll'
)
$script:checked = @()
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature {
$script:checked += (Split-Path $FilePath -Leaf)
New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject $script:ours
}
Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
$script:checked | Should -Be @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll')
}
It 'refuses an unsigned agent executable' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'NotSigned' -Subject $null }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses a tampered binary (hash mismatch)' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'HashMismatch' -Subject $script:ours }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses a signature whose chain does not validate' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'UnknownError' -Subject $script:ours }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses a validly signed binary from a different publisher' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=Somebody Else, O=Somebody Else Ltd, C=US' }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses the whole payload when a single DLL of ours is swapped' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature {
if ((Split-Path $FilePath -Leaf) -eq 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll') {
New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=Somebody Else, O=Somebody Else Ltd, C=US'
} else {
New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject $script:ours
}
}
$rejected = Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir
$rejected.Count | Should -Be 1
$rejected[0] | Should -BeLike 'AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll*'
}
It 'refuses when the signature check itself throws' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { throw 'access denied' }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses an empty payload instead of passing it' {
$dir = New-FakePayload -Files @('Newtonsoft.Json.dll')
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject $script:ours }
(Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $dir).Count | Should -Be 1
}
}
Describe 'publisher pin' {
It 'pins the expected publisher by subject, not by thumbprint' {
$ExpectedPublisher | Should -Be '*O=glueckkanja AG*'
$ExpectedPublisher | Should -Not -Match '^[0-9A-Fa-f]{40}$'
}
}
+78 -3
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,9 @@
2. Downloads the monitoring agent ZIP from Azure Blob Storage
3. Verifies integrity via SHA-256 hash from the version manifest (mandatory)
4. Extracts the agent into %ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor\Agent
5. Runs the agent in --install mode (registers Scheduled Task, spawns the runtime)
6. Verifies the runtime process actually launched
5. Verifies the Authenticode signature and publisher of every binary we author
6. Runs the agent in --install mode (registers Scheduled Task, spawns the runtime)
7. Verifies the runtime process actually launched
Agent self-destructs when enrollment completes.
Relax flow (guards 2+3): a real user profile (or a real LastLoggedOnUser)
@@ -76,6 +77,11 @@
PowerShell 5.1 (IME) reads scripts without BOM as ANSI, corrupting multi-byte chars.
.CHANGELOG
2026-09-08 v2.5 Publisher gate: every AutopilotMonitor binary in the extracted
payload must carry a valid Authenticode signature from the
expected publisher before --install runs. The SHA-256 manifest
check stays and is unchanged; it proves the bytes, the signature
proves the author.
2026-08-08 v2.3 Windows 365 Cloud PC support: a positively identified Cloud PC
(Windows365 registry key AND CloudManagedDesktopExtension
service) now triggers the guard 2+3 relax alongside OOBE
@@ -128,7 +134,12 @@ param(
)
# Script version (bump on meaningful changes; see .CHANGELOG above)
$ScriptVersion = "2.4"
$ScriptVersion = "2.5"
# The publisher every binary we author must carry. A -like pattern on the subject, NOT a
# thumbprint: certificates are renewed, deployed copies of this script are not. Same value
# the loader pins for this script.
$ExpectedPublisher = "*O=glueckkanja AG*"
# Configuration - Everything in ProgramData for easy cleanup
$AgentBasePath = "$env:ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor"
@@ -329,6 +340,56 @@ function Get-BootstrapDecision {
return [pscustomobject]@{ Install = $true; ReasonCode = $null; RelaxActive = $relax.Active }
}
# Returns the list of reasons why the extracted payload is not ours; an empty result means
# every binary we author carries a valid Authenticode signature from the expected publisher.
# Third-party assemblies keep their own publisher's signature and are not checked here.
# Any error is a rejection: an unreadable signature is an unverified binary.
function Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries {
param([string]$Path)
$rejected = @()
$ourBinaries = @(
Get-ChildItem -Path $Path -Filter 'AutopilotMonitor.*' -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.Extension -in @('.exe', '.dll') }
)
# An empty set is a rejection, not a pass: it means the extraction produced nothing we
# recognise, and the alternative would be a gate that silently approves an empty folder.
# The comma keeps a single rejection an ARRAY: PowerShell unrolls a one-element result to
# a bare string, and the caller reads .Count and indexes into it.
if ($ourBinaries.Count -eq 0) {
return , @("no AutopilotMonitor binaries found in $Path")
}
foreach ($binary in $ourBinaries) {
try {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $binary.FullName -ErrorAction Stop
}
catch {
$rejected += "$($binary.Name): signature check failed to run ($($_.Exception.Message))"
continue
}
if ($null -eq $sig) {
$rejected += "$($binary.Name): signature check returned nothing"
continue
}
$subject = if ($sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject } else { '<unsigned>' }
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
$rejected += "$($binary.Name): signature status $($sig.Status)"
continue
}
if ($subject -notlike $ExpectedPublisher) {
$rejected += "$($binary.Name): unexpected publisher $subject"
continue
}
}
return , $rejected
}
# Main bootstrap flow. Only invoked when the script is run directly (see entry guard
# at the bottom); never on dot-source.
function Invoke-Bootstrap {
@@ -445,6 +506,20 @@ function Invoke-Bootstrap {
}
}
# Publisher gate. The SHA-256 above proves the ZIP is the one the manifest names, but
# that manifest lives in the same container as the ZIP and cannot outlive a compromise
# of the download host. The expected publisher travels inside THIS script, which the
# loader verified before running it, so the chain from the file an administrator
# assigns to the process that starts here stays publisher-anchored end to end.
# Fail-closed, exactly like the hash check: running unverified code as SYSTEM is the
# risk being removed.
Write-Log "Verifying Authenticode signatures of the agent binaries..."
$unverified = Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries -Path $AgentBinPath
if ($unverified.Count -gt 0) {
throw "Authenticode verification FAILED ($($unverified -join '; ')). Refusing to run an agent that is not signed by the expected publisher."
}
Write-Log "Authenticode verification passed (publisher pin: $ExpectedPublisher)"
Write-Log "Calling agent install mode (--install)..."
& $agentExePath --install
$installExitCode = $LASTEXITCODE
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
# Pester tests (Pester 5+) for the stage-1 loader Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1.
#
# The script under test is dot-sourced; its entry guard prevents the loader from
# executing, so loading it here is side-effect free. Network and signature checks
# are mocked -- what is verified is the DECISION: what does the loader accept, what
# does it refuse, and how often does it retry.
#
# Run under Windows PowerShell 5.1 to match the IME runtime:
# powershell.exe -NoProfile -Command "& { $c = New-PesterConfiguration; $c.Run.Path = 'scripts\Bootstrap'; $c.Output.Verbosity = 'Detailed'; Invoke-Pester -Configuration $c }"
#
# This file MUST remain pure ASCII (PS 5.1 reads BOM-less files as ANSI).
BeforeAll {
. (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')
function New-FakeSignature {
param([string]$Status, [string]$Subject)
$cert = if ($Subject) {
[pscustomobject]@{ Subject = $Subject; Thumbprint = '0123456789ABCDEF' }
} else { $null }
return [pscustomobject]@{ Status = $Status; SignerCertificate = $cert }
}
}
Describe 'Test-BootstrapSignature' {
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Log { }
}
It 'accepts a valid signature from the expected publisher' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
}
# An EV subject is a line of street address and registration numbers; the log gets the CN.
It 'logs the signer CN, not the whole subject' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature {
New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, L=Offenbach am Main, C=DE, SERIALNUMBER=HRB 12381'
}
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Write-Log -ParameterFilter { $Message -eq 'Signature status: Valid. Signer: glueckkanja AG' }
}
It 'refuses an unsigned script' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'NotSigned' -Subject $null }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'refuses a tampered script (hash mismatch)' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'HashMismatch' -Subject 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'refuses a signature whose chain does not validate' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'UnknownError' -Subject 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
# The whole point of the pinned publisher: a validly signed script from someone else
# is exactly what an attacker with any code-signing certificate can produce.
It 'refuses a valid signature from a different publisher' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { New-FakeSignature -Status 'Valid' -Subject 'CN=Somebody Else, O=Somebody Else Ltd, C=US' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'refuses when the signature check itself fails' {
Mock Get-AuthenticodeSignature { throw 'file not found' }
Test-BootstrapSignature -Path 'TestDrive:\x.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
}
Describe 'Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript' {
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Log { }
Mock Start-Sleep { }
Mock Invoke-WebRequest { }
}
It 'returns after the first attempt when the download verifies' {
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $true }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 1 -Exactly
}
It 'gives up after three attempts when verification keeps failing' {
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $false }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 3 -Exactly
}
# A truncated or proxy-mangled body fails verification, so the retry has to cover the
# download AND the check, not just the transport.
It 'retries a failed verification and accepts a later attempt' {
$script:calls = 0
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $script:calls++; return ($script:calls -ge 2) }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 2 -Exactly
}
It 'retries a transport failure' {
$script:downloads = 0
Mock Invoke-WebRequest { $script:downloads++; if ($script:downloads -eq 1) { throw 'connection reset' } }
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $true }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 2 -Exactly
}
It 'never executes anything when no attempt verifies' {
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $false }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
}
}
Describe 'publish contract' {
BeforeAll {
$script:loaderText = Get-Content (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1') -Raw
}
# Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 renders the -Dev loader by substituting this exact
# literal and fails the publish when it is gone. Catching that here means the PR fails
# instead of the publish.
It 'carries the dev-render anchor the publisher substitutes' {
$anchor = '$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"'
$script:loaderText.Contains($anchor) | Should -BeTrue
}
# The publisher parses this to write version.json.loaderVersion and to run the
# version-bump guard.
It 'declares a parsable ScriptVersion' {
$script:loaderText -match '\$ScriptVersion\s*=\s*"([\d\.\-a-zA-Z]+)"' | Should -BeTrue
}
It 'pins the expected publisher by subject, not by thumbprint' {
$script:loaderText -match '\$ExpectedPublisher\s*=\s*"\*O=' | Should -BeTrue
}
# The bootstrap MSI installs this same file and runs it with -LogFileName so the delivery
# channel stays visible in a diagnostics package. Renaming the parameter on either side
# would leave the MSI channel silently logging under the wrong name.
It 'keeps the -LogFileName contract the bootstrap MSI relies on' {
$script:loaderText -match '\[string\]\$LogFileName' | Should -BeTrue
$wxs = Get-Content (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '..\..\src\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi\Package.wxs') -Raw
$wxs.Contains('[INSTALLFOLDER]Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1') | Should -BeTrue
$wxs.Contains('-LogFileName bootstrap-msi.log') | Should -BeTrue
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Stage 1 of the Autopilot Monitor bootstrap: fetches the current installer and runs it.
.DESCRIPTION
This is the file an administrator assigns in Intune, and the same file the bootstrap MSI
installs and runs -- one implementation for both delivery channels; the MSI is only the
packaging. It carries no enrollment logic at all: it downloads the published
Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1, proves that it was signed by Autopilot Monitor, and runs it
in this process.
Why two stages: the installer holds every guard, relax rule and download path, and those
change. Whoever assigns the installer directly has to replace their Intune copy each
time; whoever assigns this loader never does, because the part that changes lives on the
server. Assigning the installer directly stays supported and unchanged.
This file is deliberately boring. It is the one piece that cannot be fixed remotely, so
it does the least it can: download, verify, invoke, log.
Verification is by Authenticode publisher, not by hash. A hash oracle would have to be
fetched from the same host as the script itself, so it could not survive a compromise of
that host, while the expected publisher below travels with this file. It pins the
certificate SUBJECT and not a thumbprint, so a certificate renewal does not brick a
loader that is already deployed on devices.
Fail-soft: the loader always exits 0 and never throws into the caller. A device that
cannot reach the download endpoint is a device without monitoring, never a failed
enrollment step. Verification failures are the same: nothing runs, and the reason is in
the log. Refusing to execute unverified code as SYSTEM is the point of this file.
This file MUST remain pure ASCII (PS 5.1 reads BOM-less files as ANSI).
.PARAMETER BootstrapUrl
Installer URL. Defaults to the published stable installer; the -Dev variant of this
loader is rendered from that default at publish time.
.PARAMETER LogFileName
Log file inside the agent log directory. The MSI channel passes bootstrap-msi.log so the
delivery channel stays visible in a diagnostics package; the diag tooling keys on these
names, so do not rename them.
.PARAMETER BootstrapArguments
Everything else is passed through to the installer unchanged, so any parameter the
installer accepts can be set here without this file knowing about it.
.EXAMPLE
.\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1
.EXAMPLE
.\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 24
.NOTES
Author : Oliver Kieselbach (autopilotmonitor.com)
Runtime : Windows PowerShell 5.1, SYSTEM context, during Autopilot enrollment
.CHANGELOG
2026-09-08 v1.2 Log the signer CN instead of the full EV subject; the full subject is
logged only when the publisher is why a script was rejected.
2026-09-08 v1.1 Also used by the bootstrap MSI, which replaced its own copy of this
logic; -LogFileName keeps the channel visible in diagnostics.
2026-09-08 v1.0 Initial version: two-stage bootstrap, publisher-pinned verification.
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false)]
[string]$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1",
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false)]
[ValidatePattern('^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$')]
[string]$LogFileName = "bootstrap-loader.log",
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false, ValueFromRemainingArguments = $true)]
[string[]]$BootstrapArguments
)
# Script version (bump on meaningful changes; see .CHANGELOG above)
$ScriptVersion = "1.2"
# The publisher every downloaded stage-2 script must carry. A -like pattern on the subject,
# NOT a thumbprint: certificates are renewed, deployed loaders are not.
$ExpectedPublisher = "*O=glueckkanja AG*"
$LoaderBasePath = "$env:ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor"
$LoaderLogPath = "$LoaderBasePath\Logs"
$LogFile = "$LoaderLogPath\$LogFileName"
$BootstrapPath = "$LoaderBasePath\Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"
$DownloadAttempts = 3
$RetryDelaySeconds = 10
# Write-Host as well as the file: the Intune script output is what an administrator sees in
# the portal, the file is what a support case reads.
function Write-Log {
param([string]$Message)
$timestamp = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
$logMessage = "[$timestamp] $Message"
Write-Host $logMessage
Add-Content -Path $LogFile -Value $logMessage -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}
# True only when the file is signed, the signature validates against the machine's trust
# chain, and the signer is us. Any error is a false -- an unreadable signature is an
# unverified script.
function Test-BootstrapSignature {
param([string]$Path)
try {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $Path -ErrorAction Stop
}
catch {
Write-Log "Signature check failed to run: $($_.Exception.Message)"
return $false
}
if ($null -eq $sig) {
Write-Log "Signature check returned nothing."
return $false
}
# The full subject of an EV certificate is a line of street address and registration
# numbers. The CN answers the only question the log has to answer; the full subject is
# logged when it is the reason for a rejection.
$subject = if ($sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject } else { "<unsigned>" }
$signer = if ($subject -match 'CN=([^,]+)') { $Matches[1] } else { $subject }
Write-Log "Signature status: $($sig.Status). Signer: $signer"
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
Write-Log "REJECTED: expected signature status 'Valid'."
return $false
}
if ($subject -notlike $ExpectedPublisher) {
Write-Log "REJECTED: signer does not match the expected publisher. Full subject: $subject"
return $false
}
Write-Log "Signature accepted (thumbprint $($sig.SignerCertificate.Thumbprint))."
return $true
}
# Downloads the installer and returns $true once a downloaded copy passes verification.
# Verification lives inside the retry loop on purpose: a truncated or proxy-mangled body
# fails the signature check, and that is worth another attempt.
function Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript {
param([string]$Url, [string]$Destination)
for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le $DownloadAttempts; $attempt++) {
try {
Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt/$DownloadAttempts from $Url"
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $Url -OutFile $Destination -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 60 -ErrorAction Stop
if (Test-BootstrapSignature -Path $Destination) {
return $true
}
}
catch {
Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
if ($attempt -lt $DownloadAttempts) {
Start-Sleep -Seconds $RetryDelaySeconds
}
}
return $false
}
# Main flow. Only invoked when the script is run directly (see entry guard at the bottom),
# so the Pester suite can dot-source this file without bootstrapping anything.
function Start-BootstrapLoader {
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $LoaderLogPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null
Write-Log "=== Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v$ScriptVersion started (user=$env:USERNAME, pid=$PID) ==="
# PS 5.1 on an OOBE device still defaults to TLS 1.0 for this process.
try {
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol -bor [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
}
catch {
Write-Log "INFO: could not raise the TLS protocol: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
if (-not (Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url $BootstrapUrl -Destination $BootstrapPath)) {
Write-Log "No verified installer available after $DownloadAttempts attempt(s). Nothing was executed."
return
}
Write-Log "Executing $BootstrapPath"
# Same process, so the execution policy this loader runs under applies to stage 2 as
# well and no second policy decision can strand the installer. Splatting an array of
# remaining arguments keeps this file free of any knowledge about the installer's
# parameters.
$arguments = @()
if ($BootstrapArguments) { $arguments = $BootstrapArguments }
try {
& $BootstrapPath @arguments
Write-Log "Installer finished (exit code $LASTEXITCODE)."
}
catch {
Write-Log "Installer threw: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
}
# Entry guard: dot-sourcing (Pester) loads the functions without running the loader.
if ($MyInvocation.InvocationName -ne '.') {
try {
Start-BootstrapLoader
}
catch {
# Nothing above should throw; if it does, it must not become a failed Intune script.
Write-Log "Loader failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
exit 0
}
@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests
new Regex("\\[\"eventType\"\\]\\s*=\\s*\"([a-z][a-z0-9_]*)\"", RegexOptions.Compiled),
};
// Multi-line callback shape (2026-09-04, D-072 gap): `OnTraceEvent?.Invoke(` at the end
// of one line, the event-type literal alone on the NEXT line. The single-line patterns
// above never saw `desktop_real_user_detected` / `desktop_excluded_user` this way.
private static readonly Regex InvokeOpener = new Regex("\\.Invoke\\(\\s*$", RegexOptions.Compiled);
private static readonly Regex BareLiteralLine = new Regex("^\\s*\"([a-z][a-z0-9_]*)\"\\s*,?\\s*$", RegexOptions.Compiled);
// The reducer/param key name itself ("eventType") and the like are not event types.
private static readonly HashSet<string> NotEventTypes = new(StringComparer.Ordinal)
{
@@ -59,33 +65,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests
Assert.True(Directory.Exists(full), $"V2 source dir not found: {full}");
foreach (var file in EnumerateSourceFiles(full))
{
var lines = File.ReadAllLines(file);
for (int i = 0; i < lines.Length; i++)
{
var line = lines[i];
var trimmed = line.TrimStart();
// Skip comments and const DEFINITIONS (Constants/DeadlineNames key names etc.).
if (trimmed.StartsWith("//") || trimmed.StartsWith("*") || trimmed.StartsWith("///"))
continue;
if (line.Contains("const ")) continue;
foreach (var pattern in EmitPatterns)
{
foreach (Match m in pattern.Matches(line))
{
var literal = m.Groups[1].Value;
if (NotEventTypes.Contains(literal)) continue;
if (!known.Contains(literal))
{
offenders.Add(
$"{Path.GetFileName(file)}:{i + 1} \"{literal}\" -> {line.Trim()}");
}
}
}
}
}
offenders.AddRange(FindOffenders(Path.GetFileName(file), File.ReadAllLines(file), known));
}
Assert.True(
@@ -95,6 +75,65 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests
string.Join("\n ", offenders));
}
[Fact]
public void Guard_detects_multiline_Invoke_literal()
{
// Mutation proof for the multi-line shape: a synthetic emit site with an unknown
// literal on the line after `OnTraceEvent?.Invoke(` must be reported; the same
// shape with a known type must not.
var known = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.Ordinal) { "desktop_arrived" };
string[] bad =
{
" OnTraceEvent?.Invoke(",
" \"desktop_not_a_real_type\",",
" $\"Real user desktop detected\",",
};
string[] good =
{
" OnTraceEvent?.Invoke(",
" \"desktop_arrived\",",
};
var offender = Assert.Single(FindOffenders("X.cs", bad, known));
Assert.Contains("desktop_not_a_real_type", offender);
Assert.Empty(FindOffenders("X.cs", good, known));
}
private static List<string> FindOffenders(string fileName, string[] lines, HashSet<string> known)
{
var offenders = new List<string>();
for (int i = 0; i < lines.Length; i++)
{
var line = lines[i];
var trimmed = line.TrimStart();
// Skip comments and const DEFINITIONS (Constants/DeadlineNames key names etc.).
if (trimmed.StartsWith("//") || trimmed.StartsWith("*") || trimmed.StartsWith("///"))
continue;
if (line.Contains("const ")) continue;
foreach (var pattern in EmitPatterns)
{
foreach (Match m in pattern.Matches(line))
Check(m.Groups[1].Value, line, i);
}
if (i > 0 && InvokeOpener.IsMatch(lines[i - 1]))
{
var bare = BareLiteralLine.Match(line);
if (bare.Success) Check(bare.Groups[1].Value, line, i);
}
}
return offenders;
void Check(string literal, string line, int index)
{
if (NotEventTypes.Contains(literal)) return;
if (!known.Contains(literal))
offenders.Add($"{fileName}:{index + 1} \"{literal}\" -> {line.Trim()}");
}
}
/// <summary>All string-const values declared on <see cref="Constants.EventTypes"/>.</summary>
private static HashSet<string> KnownEventTypes()
{
@@ -113,18 +152,6 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests
.Where(p => !p.Contains($"{Path.DirectorySeparatorChar}obj{Path.DirectorySeparatorChar}")
&& !p.Contains($"{Path.DirectorySeparatorChar}bin{Path.DirectorySeparatorChar}"));
private static string RepoRoot()
{
var dir = AppContext.BaseDirectory;
for (int i = 0; i < 12; i++)
{
if (File.Exists(Path.Combine(dir, "AutopilotMonitor.sln"))) return dir;
var parent = Directory.GetParent(dir)?.FullName;
if (parent == null || parent == dir) break;
dir = parent;
}
throw new DirectoryNotFoundException(
"Could not locate repo root (AutopilotMonitor.sln) from " + AppContext.BaseDirectory);
}
private static string RepoRoot() => Harness.RepoPaths.Root();
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
using System;
using System.IO;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness
{
/// <summary>Repository paths for tests that read or write checked-in files (guards, fixtures).</summary>
internal static class RepoPaths
{
/// <summary>Walks up from the test binary to the directory holding <c>AutopilotMonitor.sln</c>.</summary>
public static string Root()
{
var dir = AppContext.BaseDirectory;
for (int i = 0; i < 12; i++)
{
if (File.Exists(Path.Combine(dir, "AutopilotMonitor.sln"))) return dir;
var parent = Directory.GetParent(dir)?.FullName;
if (parent == null || parent == dir) break;
dir = parent;
}
throw new DirectoryNotFoundException(
"Could not locate repo root (AutopilotMonitor.sln) from " + AppContext.BaseDirectory);
}
/// <summary><c>tests/fixtures/&lt;name&gt;</c> under the repo root.</summary>
public static string Fixtures(string name) => Path.Combine(Root(), "tests", "fixtures", name);
}
}
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Classifiers;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.State;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Integration
{
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Transport.Telemetry;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Classifiers;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.State;
using Xunit;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
#pragma warning disable xUnit1031 // SpinWait.SpinUntil for uploader-batch-arrival assertion
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
#nullable enable
using System;
using System.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using SharedEventTypes = AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Constants.EventTypes;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring
{
/// <summary>
/// Entra user affinity after the real-user desktop (2026-09-04, session a7140f98). The
/// contracts that matter: arm only on Hybrid devices and only at the desktop; the first
/// IME user-token line AFTER the desktop cancels and posts <c>ime_user_token_acquired</c>;
/// token lines from before the desktop (device phase) are ignored; the timer posts
/// <c>entra_user_affinity_pending</c> with the failure codes seen since the desktop; both
/// emissions are single-shot per process.
/// </summary>
public sealed class EntraUserAffinityDetectorTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Fixed = new DateTime(2026, 9, 4, 13, 54, 6, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private sealed class Fixture : IDisposable
{
public TempDirectory Tmp { get; } = new TempDirectory();
public AgentLogger Logger { get; }
public FakeSignalIngressSink Ingress { get; } = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
public VirtualClock Clock { get; } = new VirtualClock(Fixed);
public InformationalEventPost Post { get; }
public bool Hybrid { get; set; } = true;
public bool PlaceholderActive { get; set; } = true;
public Fixture()
{
Logger = new AgentLogger(Tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info);
Post = new InformationalEventPost(Ingress, Clock);
}
public EntraUserAffinityDetector Build() => new EntraUserAffinityDetector(
Post, Logger,
isHybridJoinProbe: () => Hybrid,
placeholderActiveProbe: () => PlaceholderActive,
delay: TimeSpan.FromMinutes(10),
utcNow: () => Clock.UtcNow);
public void Dispose() => Tmp.Dispose();
}
private static FakeSignalIngressSink.PostedSignal? Find(FakeSignalIngressSink ingress, string eventType) =>
ingress.Posted.FirstOrDefault(p =>
p.Kind == DecisionSignalKind.InformationalEvent
&& p.Payload != null
&& p.Payload.TryGetValue(SignalPayloadKeys.EventType, out var et)
&& et == eventType);
[Fact]
public void Desktop_on_hybrid_device_arms()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var d = f.Build();
d.NotifyRealUserDesktop();
Assert.True(d.IsArmedForTest);
}
[Fact]
public void Desktop_on_non_hybrid_device_does_not_arm()
{
using var f = new Fixture { Hybrid = false };
using var d = f.Build();
d.NotifyRealUserDesktop();
d.TriggerFromTest();
Assert.False(d.IsArmedForTest);
Assert.Null(Find(f.Ingress, SharedEventTypes.EntraUserAffinityPending));
}
[Fact]
public void Timer_without_token_emits_pending_with_failure_codes()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var d = f.Build();
d.NotifyRealUserDesktop();
d.NotifyTokenFailureLine("3399548929", f.Clock.UtcNow.AddMinutes(1));
d.NotifyTokenFailureLine("3399548929", f.Clock.UtcNow.AddMinutes(3));
d.NotifyTokenFailureLine("3400073247", f.Clock.UtcNow.AddMinutes(5));
f.Clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(10));
d.TriggerFromTest();
var pending = Find(f.Ingress, SharedEventTypes.EntraUserAffinityPending);
Assert.NotNull(pending);
Assert.Equal("Warning", pending!.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.Severity]);
Assert.Equal("true", pending.Payload[SignalPayloadKeys.ImmediateUpload]);
Assert.Equal("EntraUserAffinityDetector", pending.Payload[SignalPayloadKeys.Source]);
Assert.Equal("10", pending.Payload["delayMinutes"]);
Assert.Equal("timer_fired", pending.Payload["reason"]);
Assert.Equal("3", pending.Payload["tokenFailureCount"]);
Assert.Equal("3399548929,3400073247", pending.Payload["tokenFailureCodes"]);
Assert.Equal("true", pending.Payload["placeholderActive"]);
Assert.Equal("10.0", pending.Payload["minutesSinceDesktop"]);
Assert.True(d.HasFiredForTest);
Assert.Null(Find(f.Ingress, SharedEventTypes.ImeUserTokenAcquired));
}
[Fact]
public void Token_after_desktop_cancels_and_posts_token_acquired()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var d = f.Build();
d.NotifyRealUserDesktop();
d.NotifyTokenFailureLine("3399548929", f.Clock.UtcNow.AddSeconds(30));
var tokenAt = f.Clock.UtcNow.AddMinutes(3.7);
d.NotifyUserTokenAcquired(tokenAt);
f.Clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(10));
d.TriggerFromTest();
var acquired = Find(f.Ingress, SharedEventTypes.ImeUserTokenAcquired);
Assert.NotNull(acquired);
Assert.Equal("Info", acquired!.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.Severity]);
Assert.Equal("3.7", acquired.Payload["minutesAfterDesktop"]);
Assert.Equal("1", acquired.Payload["tokenFailuresBeforeSuccess"]);
Assert.Equal(tokenAt, acquired.OccurredAtUtc);
Assert.True(d.TokenAcquiredPostedForTest);
Assert.False(d.HasFiredForTest);
Assert.Null(Find(f.Ingress, SharedEventTypes.EntraUserAffinityPending));
}
[Fact]
public void Token_lines_from_before_the_desktop_are_ignored()
{
// Device-phase token lines ("Failed to get AAD token" is routine there; a success
// can be the device check-in) must neither count nor cancel — the 2-min tolerance
// only covers the desktop poll interval.
using var f = new Fixture();
using var d = f.Build();
d.NotifyRealUserDesktop();
d.NotifyUserTokenAcquired(f.Clock.UtcNow.AddMinutes(-20));
d.NotifyTokenFailureLine("3399548929", f.Clock.UtcNow.AddMinutes(-15));
f.Clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(10));
d.TriggerFromTest();
Assert.Null(Find(f.Ingress, SharedEventTypes.ImeUserTokenAcquired));
var pending = Find(f.Ingress, SharedEventTypes.EntraUserAffinityPending);
Assert.NotNull(pending);
Assert.Equal("0", pending!.Payload!["tokenFailureCount"]);
Assert.Equal(string.Empty, pending.Payload["tokenFailureCodes"]);
}
[Fact]
public void Token_within_desktop_poll_tolerance_counts_as_after_desktop()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var d = f.Build();
d.NotifyRealUserDesktop();
d.NotifyUserTokenAcquired(f.Clock.UtcNow.AddSeconds(-90));
Assert.NotNull(Find(f.Ingress, SharedEventTypes.ImeUserTokenAcquired));
Assert.Equal("0.0", Find(f.Ingress, SharedEventTypes.ImeUserTokenAcquired)!.Payload!["minutesAfterDesktop"]);
}
[Fact]
public void Token_without_arm_is_ignored()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var d = f.Build();
d.NotifyUserTokenAcquired(f.Clock.UtcNow);
Assert.Null(Find(f.Ingress, SharedEventTypes.ImeUserTokenAcquired));
}
[Fact]
public void Pending_fires_once_and_a_late_token_still_resolves_it_once()
{
// A token that arrives AFTER the warning is the most useful thing the timeline can
// show ("affinity came late") and lets the backend rule drop the finding — so it is
// posted, but like the warning only once per process.
using var f = new Fixture();
using var d = f.Build();
d.NotifyRealUserDesktop();
d.NotifyRealUserDesktop();
f.Clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(10));
d.TriggerFromTest();
d.TriggerFromTest();
d.NotifyUserTokenAcquired(f.Clock.UtcNow);
d.NotifyUserTokenAcquired(f.Clock.UtcNow.AddMinutes(1));
Assert.Single(f.Ingress.Posted, p =>
p.Payload != null && p.Payload.TryGetValue(SignalPayloadKeys.EventType, out var et)
&& et == SharedEventTypes.EntraUserAffinityPending);
Assert.Single(f.Ingress.Posted, p =>
p.Payload != null && p.Payload.TryGetValue(SignalPayloadKeys.EventType, out var et)
&& et == SharedEventTypes.ImeUserTokenAcquired);
Assert.Equal("10.0", Find(f.Ingress, SharedEventTypes.ImeUserTokenAcquired)!.Payload!["minutesAfterDesktop"]);
}
[Fact]
public void Hybrid_probe_throwing_does_not_arm()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var d = new EntraUserAffinityDetector(
f.Post, f.Logger,
isHybridJoinProbe: () => throw new InvalidOperationException("registry"),
utcNow: () => f.Clock.UtcNow);
d.NotifyRealUserDesktop();
Assert.False(d.IsArmedForTest);
}
[Fact]
public void Dispose_after_arm_does_not_throw_and_blocks_emission()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
var d = f.Build();
d.NotifyRealUserDesktop();
d.Dispose();
d.TriggerFromTest();
Assert.Null(Find(f.Ingress, SharedEventTypes.EntraUserAffinityPending));
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring
{
/// <summary>
/// Session 683f1eff — a Shell-Core 62407 failure (<c>WhiteGlove_Failed</c>) arrived four
/// seconds into the provisioning tracker's 30-s settle window and terminalised the session
/// with nothing but its failure type: the HRESULT (0x80070652) and the failed subcategory
/// (Apps) the registry had already named never reached the terminal event, the backend
/// FailureReason or the termination-time app classification. The coordinator now inherits
/// the pending settle detail onto the Shell-Core args and records the terminal-failure
/// snapshot from it.
/// </summary>
public sealed class EspAndHelloTrackerShellCoreFailureInheritanceTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Fixed = new DateTime(2026, 9, 8, 18, 11, 6, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private sealed class Fixture : IDisposable
{
public TempDirectory Tmp { get; } = new TempDirectory();
public AgentLogger Logger { get; }
public FakeSignalIngressSink Ingress { get; } = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
public FakeSignalIngressSink TrackerPostSink { get; } = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
public VirtualClock Clock { get; } = new VirtualClock(Fixed);
public List<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs> Forwarded { get; } = new List<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs>();
public Fixture() { Logger = new AgentLogger(Tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Debug); }
public EspAndHelloTracker BuildCoordinator(Func<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs?> pendingProbe)
{
var coordinator = new EspAndHelloTracker(
sessionId: "S1",
tenantId: "T1",
post: new InformationalEventPost(TrackerPostSink, Clock),
logger: Logger,
skipConfigProbe: () => ((bool?)false, (bool?)false),
accountSetupActivityProbe: () => false,
pendingEspFailureProbe: pendingProbe);
coordinator.EspFailureDetected += (_, args) => Forwarded.Add(args);
return coordinator;
}
public FakeSignalIngressSink.PostedSignal TerminalSignal() =>
Assert.Single(Ingress.Posted, p => p.Kind == DecisionSignalKind.EspTerminalFailure);
public void Dispose() { Tmp.Dispose(); }
}
private static EspFailureDetectedEventArgs PendingAppsFailure() => new EspFailureDetectedEventArgs(
failureType: "Provisioning_DeviceSetup_Apps_Failed",
errorCode: "0x80070652",
failedSubcategory: "Apps",
category: "DeviceSetup",
likelyCulpritApps: new[] { "ESP Finalizer US" });
[Fact]
public void ShellCore_failure_inside_the_settle_window_inherits_the_registry_detail()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var coordinator = f.BuildCoordinator(PendingAppsFailure);
using var adapter = new EspAndHelloTrackerAdapter(coordinator, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
coordinator.TriggerShellCoreEspFailureForTest("WhiteGlove_Failed");
var args = Assert.Single(f.Forwarded);
Assert.Equal("WhiteGlove_Failed", args.FailureType); // the signal that terminalised
Assert.Equal("0x80070652", args.ErrorCode);
Assert.Equal("Apps", args.FailedSubcategory);
Assert.Equal("DeviceSetup", args.Category);
Assert.Equal(new[] { "ESP Finalizer US" }, args.LikelyCulpritApps);
// Wire-through: the EspTerminalFailure signal payload carries the detail the
// DecisionEngine copies onto enrollment_failed.
var signal = f.TerminalSignal();
Assert.Equal("WhiteGlove_Failed", signal.Payload!["failureType"]);
Assert.Equal("0x80070652", signal.Payload["errorCode"]);
Assert.Equal("Apps", signal.Payload["failedSubcategory"]);
Assert.Equal("DeviceSetup", signal.Payload["category"]);
Assert.Equal("ESP Finalizer US", signal.Payload["likelyCulpritApps"]);
// Termination-time classification reads the same context.
Assert.NotNull(coordinator.LastEspTerminalFailure);
Assert.Equal("0x80070652", coordinator.LastEspTerminalFailure.ErrorCode);
Assert.True(coordinator.LastEspTerminalFailure.IsAppsSubcategory);
}
[Fact]
public void ShellCore_failure_without_a_pending_window_stays_bare()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var coordinator = f.BuildCoordinator(() => null);
using var adapter = new EspAndHelloTrackerAdapter(coordinator, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
coordinator.TriggerShellCoreEspFailureForTest("ESPProgress_Timeout");
var args = Assert.Single(f.Forwarded);
Assert.Equal("ESPProgress_Timeout", args.FailureType);
Assert.Null(args.ErrorCode);
Assert.Null(args.FailedSubcategory);
Assert.Null(args.Category);
Assert.Empty(args.LikelyCulpritApps);
Assert.Null(coordinator.LastEspTerminalFailure);
var signal = f.TerminalSignal();
Assert.False(signal.Payload!.ContainsKey("errorCode"));
Assert.False(signal.Payload.ContainsKey("failedSubcategory"));
}
[Fact]
public void A_throwing_probe_degrades_to_the_bare_failure()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var coordinator = f.BuildCoordinator(() => throw new InvalidOperationException("probe"));
coordinator.TriggerShellCoreEspFailureForTest("WhiteGlove_Failed");
var args = Assert.Single(f.Forwarded);
Assert.Equal("WhiteGlove_Failed", args.FailureType);
Assert.Null(args.ErrorCode);
}
}
}
@@ -456,5 +456,124 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Gather
SingleSecurityWarning();
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------
// %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% exception (userProfilePath overload)
//
// The token lifts the C:\Users hard block for AppData\Local and
// AppData\Roaming — and nothing more. The allowlist still decides,
// which is what the cases below pin down: the exception is a gate the
// allowlist has to open, never an allowance of its own.
// -------------------------------------------------------------------
private const string TestProfile = @"C:\Users\TestUser";
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AppDataPath_WithoutAllowlistEntry_IsStillBlocked()
{
// The lifted hard block alone admits nothing: without a matching
// userProfileFilePrefixes entry the path falls through to the
// allowlist and is refused there.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\UnlistedVendor\app.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_OutsideAppData_IsBlockedByTheHardBlock()
{
foreach (var target in new[] { @"\Desktop\secret.txt", @"\Documents\notes.txt", @"\ntuser.dat" })
{
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + target, unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_NullProfile_KeepsTheUsersHardBlock()
{
// No interactive user detected — the exception cannot apply and the
// path stays under the plain C:\Users block.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
@"C:\Users\TestUser\AppData\Local\UnlistedVendor\app.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: null));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_TraversalOutOfAppData_IsBlocked()
{
// Spelling Documents as a traversal out of AppData must not survive
// Path.GetFullPath normalisation.
const string traversal = @"C:\Users\TestUser\AppData\Local\..\..\Documents\secret.txt";
Assert.Equal(@"C:\Users\TestUser\Documents\secret.txt", Path.GetFullPath(traversal));
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
traversal, unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_ForeignProfile_IsBlockedEvenUnderAppData()
{
// The exception is scoped to the DETECTED profile — a rule must not
// reach a second user's AppData by spelling the path out.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
@"C:\Users\OtherUser\AppData\Local\UnlistedVendor\app.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AllowlistedVendorFolder_IsAllowed()
{
// AppData\Local\RealmJoin is on userProfileFilePrefixes: the file itself, a
// subfolder below it, and the folder itself all pass.
foreach (var target in new[] { @"\tray.log", @"\Logs\rj.log", "" })
{
Assert.True(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\RealmJoin" + target,
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile),
$"expected allowed: ...\\RealmJoin{target}");
}
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_SiblingOfAnAllowlistedVendorFolder_IsBlocked()
{
// Segment-bounded: "RealmJoin" must not admit "RealmJoinSomethingElse".
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\RealmJoinSomethingElse\tray.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AllowlistedVendorFolder_InAForeignProfile_IsBlocked()
{
// The allowlist is anchored to the DETECTED profile, not to C:\Users\*.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
@"C:\Users\OtherUser\AppData\Local\RealmJoin\tray.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AllowlistedVendorFolder_WithoutADetectedUser_IsBlocked()
{
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
@"C:\Users\TestUser\AppData\Local\RealmJoin\tray.log",
unrestrictedMode: false, userProfilePath: null));
}
[Fact]
public void UserProfile_AppDataPath_IsAllowedInUnrestrictedMode()
{
// Where the exception does bite today: unrestricted mode returns
// before the allowlist, so the lifted hard block is the whole story.
Assert.True(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\AppData\Local\UnlistedVendor\app.log",
unrestrictedMode: true, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
// ...but only under AppData — Documents stays blocked even there.
Assert.False(GatherRuleGuards.IsFilePathAllowed(
TestProfile + @"\Documents\secret.txt",
unrestrictedMode: true, userProfilePath: TestProfile));
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.Threading;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Gather
{
/// <summary>
/// <see cref="GatherRule.EnrichErrorCodes"/> is an opt-in the backend honours at response time:
/// the agent stamps <c>enrichErrorCodes: true</c> into the event data of a rule that set it and
/// nothing at all otherwise (the default payload stays as it was).
/// </summary>
[Collection("SerialThreading")] // startup rules execute on the shared ThreadPool
public sealed class GatherRuleExecutorEnrichErrorCodesTests : IDisposable
{
private readonly TempDirectory _tmp = new TempDirectory();
private readonly List<EnrollmentEvent> _events = new List<EnrollmentEvent>();
private readonly object _eventsGate = new object();
private readonly GatherRuleExecutor _executor;
private const string AbsentPath =
"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\AutopilotMonitorTests\\DefinitelyAbsent_7e3a1f4b-0000-0000-0000-000000000000";
public GatherRuleExecutorEnrichErrorCodesTests()
{
var logger = new AgentLogger(_tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info);
_executor = new GatherRuleExecutor(
"sess", "tenant",
evt => { lock (_eventsGate) _events.Add(evt); },
logger)
{
UnrestrictedMode = true
};
}
public void Dispose()
{
_executor.Dispose();
_tmp.Dispose();
}
private EnrollmentEvent SingleEvent()
{
lock (_eventsGate) return Assert.Single(_events);
}
private bool WaitForEventCount(int count, int timeoutMs = 10000)
{
var sw = Stopwatch.StartNew();
while (sw.ElapsedMilliseconds < timeoutMs)
{
lock (_eventsGate) if (_events.Count >= count) return true;
Thread.Sleep(25);
}
lock (_eventsGate) return _events.Count >= count;
}
private static GatherRule StartupRule(bool enrichErrorCodes) => new GatherRule
{
RuleId = "GATHER-EEC-001",
Title = "enrich test",
CollectorType = "registry",
Target = AbsentPath,
Trigger = "startup",
OutputEventType = "gather_test",
Enabled = true,
EnrichErrorCodes = enrichErrorCodes,
};
[Fact]
public void StampRuleMarkers_AddsMarkerOnlyWhenOptedIn()
{
var optedIn = new Dictionary<string, object> { ["exitCode"] = "1603" };
GatherRuleExecutor.StampRuleMarkers(StartupRule(enrichErrorCodes: true), optedIn);
Assert.Equal(true, optedIn[Constants.GatherRuleDataKeys.EnrichErrorCodes]);
var defaultRule = new Dictionary<string, object> { ["exitCode"] = "1603" };
GatherRuleExecutor.StampRuleMarkers(StartupRule(enrichErrorCodes: false), defaultRule);
Assert.False(defaultRule.ContainsKey(Constants.GatherRuleDataKeys.EnrichErrorCodes));
Assert.Single(defaultRule);
}
[Fact]
public void ExecuteRule_StampsMarker_WhenRuleOptsIn()
{
_executor.UpdateRules(new List<GatherRule> { StartupRule(enrichErrorCodes: true) });
Assert.True(_executor.WaitForStartupRules(30));
Assert.True(WaitForEventCount(1));
var evt = SingleEvent();
Assert.Equal(GatherRuleExecutor.SourceName, evt.Source);
Assert.Equal(true, evt.Data[Constants.GatherRuleDataKeys.EnrichErrorCodes]);
}
[Fact]
public void ExecuteRule_LeavesPayloadUnchanged_ByDefault()
{
_executor.UpdateRules(new List<GatherRule> { StartupRule(enrichErrorCodes: false) });
Assert.True(_executor.WaitForStartupRules(30));
Assert.True(WaitForEventCount(1));
Assert.False(SingleEvent().Data.ContainsKey(Constants.GatherRuleDataKeys.EnrichErrorCodes));
}
}
}
@@ -73,6 +73,27 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring
Assert.Equal("true", info.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.ImmediateUpload]);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(304, "join phase")]
[InlineData(305, "authentication phase")]
public void ProcessHelloEvent_304_305_emit_device_registration_event_with_immediate_upload(int eventId, string phaseLabel)
{
// Hybrid affinity companion (2026-09-04): UDR 304/305 ride the already-armed
// watcher and surface as device_registration_event — a Warning, flushed at once,
// and never a Hello completion.
using var f = new Fixture();
f.Tracker.ProcessHelloEvent(eventId, Fixed, "Microsoft-Windows-User Device Registration", isBackfill: false);
var info = f.InfoEvent("device_registration_event");
Assert.Equal("Warning", info.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.Severity]);
Assert.Equal("true", info.Payload[SignalPayloadKeys.ImmediateUpload]);
Assert.Contains(phaseLabel, info.Payload[SignalPayloadKeys.Message]);
Assert.DoesNotContain(f.Ingress.Posted, p =>
p.Payload != null && p.Payload.TryGetValue(SignalPayloadKeys.EventType, out var et)
&& et.StartsWith("hello_provisioning"));
}
[Fact]
public void ProcessHelloEvent_358_willlaunch_is_suppressed()
{
@@ -194,6 +194,58 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring
Assert.NotNull(FindHybridLoginPending(f.Ingress));
}
// ============================================================================
// Real-user desktop cancel path (2026-09-04, session a7140f98)
// ============================================================================
[Fact]
public void Real_user_desktop_after_Arm_cancels_emission()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var detector = new HybridLoginPendingDetector(f.Watcher, f.Post, f.Logger);
detector.Arm();
detector.NotifyRealUserDesktop();
detector.TriggerFromTest();
Assert.True(detector.IsCancelledByDesktopForTest);
Assert.False(detector.HasFiredForTest);
Assert.Null(FindHybridLoginPending(f.Ingress));
}
[Fact]
public void Real_user_desktop_before_Arm_short_circuits_Arm()
{
// The DAD first poll runs seconds after start; the arm request comes from the
// runtime host slightly later. A desktop seen first must make the arm a no-op.
using var f = new Fixture();
using var detector = new HybridLoginPendingDetector(f.Watcher, f.Post, f.Logger);
detector.NotifyRealUserDesktop();
detector.Arm();
detector.TriggerFromTest();
Assert.False(detector.IsArmedForTest);
Assert.Null(FindHybridLoginPending(f.Ingress));
}
[Fact]
public void Emission_reports_desktop_absence_and_placeholder_as_fact()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
using var detector = new HybridLoginPendingDetector(f.Watcher, f.Post, f.Logger);
detector.Arm();
detector.TriggerFromTest();
var info = FindHybridLoginPending(f.Ingress);
Assert.NotNull(info);
Assert.Equal("false", info!.Payload!["realUserDesktopSeen"]);
Assert.Equal("false", info.Payload["placeholderActive"]); // watcher never saw JoinInfo in this fixture
Assert.Contains("no real-user desktop", info.Payload[SignalPayloadKeys.Message]);
Assert.DoesNotContain("placeholder still active", info.Payload[SignalPayloadKeys.Message]);
}
// ============================================================================
// Lifecycle / Dispose
// ============================================================================
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
#nullable enable
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
{
/// <summary>
/// Backlog era anchoring (2026-09-04, session a7140f98). The property under test: the
/// bootstrap execution record — stdout in AgentExecutor.log, policy result in the service
/// log — measured against the install marker anchors exactly the era it sits in; a SKIP
/// re-run, a missing marker, an MSI bootstrap and an off-grid residual anchor nothing; the
/// anchor never crosses an "EMS Agent Started" boundary; sibling files join by local time
/// only while the service eras are unambiguous.
/// </summary>
public sealed class ImeLogEraPreScanTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Deployed = new DateTime(2026, 9, 4, 13, 31, 49, 100, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private static readonly TimeSpan Pacific = TimeSpan.FromHours(-7);
private static readonly TimeSpan Eastern = TimeSpan.FromHours(-4);
private const string PolicyId = "93d9df23-1111-2222-3333-444455556666";
private static string Entry(string message, DateTime utcInstant, TimeSpan writerOffset)
{
var local = utcInstant + writerOffset;
return $"<![LOG[{message}]LOG]!><time=\"{local:HH:mm:ss.fffffff}\" date=\"{local:M-d-yyyy}\" " +
"component=\"X\" context=\"\" type=\"1\" thread=\"1\" file=\"\">";
}
private static string ScriptStart(DateTime utc, TimeSpan offset) =>
Entry($@"Adding argument powershell with value C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension\Policies\Scripts\00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000_{PolicyId}.ps1", utc, offset);
private static string BootstrapStdout(DateTime utc, TimeSpan offset, string tail = "===== Bootstrap Completed Successfully =====") =>
Entry("write output done. output = ===== Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap Started =====\nBootstrap script version: v2.0\nAgent install mode completed successfully\n" + tail + ", error = ", utc, offset);
private static string PolicyResult(DateTime utc, TimeSpan offset, string policyId = PolicyId) =>
Entry($"[PowerShell] User Id = 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000, Policy id = {policyId}, policy result = Success", utc, offset);
private static string ServiceStarted(DateTime utc, TimeSpan offset) => Entry("EMS Agent Started", utc, offset);
private sealed class Fixture : IDisposable
{
public TempDirectory Tmp { get; } = new TempDirectory();
private readonly List<ImeLogEraPreScan.ScanInput> _inputs = new List<ImeLogEraPreScan.ScanInput>();
public string Write(string fileName, params string[] entries)
{
var path = Path.Combine(Tmp.Path, fileName);
File.WriteAllText(path, string.Join(Environment.NewLine, entries) + Environment.NewLine);
_inputs.Add(new ImeLogEraPreScan.ScanInput(path, 0));
return path;
}
public long OffsetOfLine(string fileName, int lineIndex)
{
// Entries are written line by line; the byte offset of entry N is the sum of the
// preceding lines (CRLF-agnostic through Environment.NewLine).
var path = Path.Combine(Tmp.Path, fileName);
var lines = File.ReadAllLines(path);
long offset = 0;
for (var i = 0; i < lineIndex; i++)
offset += System.Text.Encoding.UTF8.GetByteCount(lines[i]) + Environment.NewLine.Length;
return offset;
}
public CmTraceEraTable Build(DateTime? deployed) =>
ImeLogEraPreScan.Build(_inputs, deployed, ImeLogTracker.MaxEntryBytes, null);
public void Dispose() => Tmp.Dispose();
}
[Fact]
public void Bootstrap_record_anchors_service_era_and_executor_block_only_within_their_boundaries()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
f.Write("AgentExecutor.log",
ScriptStart(Deployed.AddSeconds(-20), Pacific),
BootstrapStdout(Deployed.AddMilliseconds(200), Pacific),
Entry("Adding argument powershell with value C:\\x\\Policies\\Scripts\\u_aaaaaaaa-0000-0000-0000-000000000000.ps1", Deployed.AddMinutes(5), Pacific),
Entry("write output done. output = other script, error = ", Deployed.AddMinutes(5).AddSeconds(2), Pacific));
f.Write("IntuneManagementExtension.log",
Entry("In EspPhase: DeviceSetup", Deployed.AddMinutes(-1), Pacific), // line 0, era 0
PolicyResult(Deployed.AddMilliseconds(260), Pacific), // line 1, anchor
Entry("In EspPhase: DeviceSetup", Deployed.AddMinutes(10), Pacific), // line 2, era 0
ServiceStarted(Deployed.AddMinutes(20), Eastern), // line 3, era 1 (post-boot, new zone)
Entry("Successfully get the token", Deployed.AddMinutes(21), Eastern)); // line 4, era 1
var table = f.Build(Deployed);
Assert.Equal(2, table.AnchoredEraCount);
Assert.False(table.TransferAmbiguous);
// Service era 0: every offset before "EMS Agent Started" resolves to the Pacific offset.
Assert.True(table.TryResolveByOffset("IntuneManagementExtension.log", f.OffsetOfLine("IntuneManagementExtension.log", 0), out var off0, out var kind0));
Assert.Equal(Pacific, off0);
Assert.Equal(ImeLogEraPreScan.AnchorKindBootstrapPolicyResult, kind0);
Assert.True(table.TryResolveByOffset("IntuneManagementExtension.log", f.OffsetOfLine("IntuneManagementExtension.log", 2), out var off2, out _));
Assert.Equal(Pacific, off2);
// Era 1 has no anchor of its own — the Pacific anchor must not leak across the boundary.
Assert.False(table.TryResolveByOffset("IntuneManagementExtension.log", f.OffsetOfLine("IntuneManagementExtension.log", 3), out _, out _));
Assert.False(table.TryResolveByOffset("IntuneManagementExtension.log", f.OffsetOfLine("IntuneManagementExtension.log", 4), out _, out _));
// Executor: only the bootstrap execution block is anchored, not the next script's block.
Assert.True(table.TryResolveByOffset("AgentExecutor.log", f.OffsetOfLine("AgentExecutor.log", 0), out var offX, out var kindX));
Assert.Equal(Pacific, offX);
Assert.Equal(ImeLogEraPreScan.AnchorKindBootstrapStdout, kindX);
Assert.False(table.TryResolveByOffset("AgentExecutor.log", f.OffsetOfLine("AgentExecutor.log", 5), out _, out _));
// Transfer for in-process sibling files: a local time inside era 0's range resolves,
// one inside era 1's range does not.
Assert.True(table.TryResolveByLocalTime(Deployed.AddMinutes(5) + Pacific, out var offT, out var kindT));
Assert.Equal(Pacific, offT);
Assert.EndsWith("/service-era-transfer", kindT);
Assert.False(table.TryResolveByLocalTime(Deployed.AddMinutes(25) + Eastern, out _, out _));
}
[Fact]
public void Without_deployed_marker_nothing_is_anchored()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
f.Write("AgentExecutor.log", ScriptStart(Deployed.AddSeconds(-20), Pacific), BootstrapStdout(Deployed.AddMilliseconds(200), Pacific));
f.Write("IntuneManagementExtension.log", PolicyResult(Deployed.AddMilliseconds(260), Pacific));
var table = f.Build(null);
Assert.Equal(0, table.AnchoredEraCount);
}
[Fact]
public void Msi_bootstrap_without_stdout_record_anchors_nothing()
{
// The MSI runner never passes through AgentExecutor; without the policy id the
// service log's result lines cannot be told apart from any other script's.
using var f = new Fixture();
f.Write("AgentExecutor.log", Entry("Adding argument powershell with value C:\\x\\Policies\\Scripts\\u_aaaaaaaa-0000-0000-0000-000000000000.ps1", Deployed.AddMinutes(3), Pacific));
f.Write("IntuneManagementExtension.log", PolicyResult(Deployed.AddMilliseconds(260), Pacific));
var table = f.Build(Deployed);
Assert.Equal(0, table.AnchoredEraCount);
}
[Fact]
public void Skip_rerun_record_is_never_offered_and_first_record_off_grid_anchors_nothing()
{
// The install run is the FIRST bootstrap record; a SKIP re-run 15 minutes later
// would round onto the grid with zero residual and anchor a wrong offset.
using var f = new Fixture();
f.Write("AgentExecutor.log",
ScriptStart(Deployed.AddMinutes(-9), Pacific),
BootstrapStdout(Deployed.AddMinutes(-8), Pacific), // first record: residual 8 min → rejected
ScriptStart(Deployed.AddMinutes(15).AddSeconds(-2), Pacific),
BootstrapStdout(Deployed.AddMinutes(15), Pacific)); // would be a perfect (wrong) grid hit
f.Write("IntuneManagementExtension.log",
PolicyResult(Deployed.AddMinutes(-8), Pacific),
PolicyResult(Deployed.AddMinutes(15), Pacific));
var table = f.Build(Deployed);
Assert.Equal(0, table.AnchoredEraCount);
}
[Fact]
public void Service_era_continues_across_a_log_rotation()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
f.Write("AgentExecutor.log", ScriptStart(Deployed.AddSeconds(-20), Pacific), BootstrapStdout(Deployed.AddMilliseconds(200), Pacific));
f.Write("IntuneManagementExtension-20260904-133000.log",
PolicyResult(Deployed.AddMilliseconds(260), Pacific),
Entry("In EspPhase: DeviceSetup", Deployed.AddMinutes(2), Pacific));
f.Write("IntuneManagementExtension.log",
Entry("In EspPhase: DeviceSetup", Deployed.AddMinutes(12), Pacific), // same process, rotated file
ServiceStarted(Deployed.AddMinutes(20), Eastern));
var table = f.Build(Deployed);
Assert.True(table.TryResolveByOffset("IntuneManagementExtension.log", 0, out var off, out _));
Assert.Equal(Pacific, off);
Assert.False(table.TryResolveByOffset("IntuneManagementExtension.log", f.OffsetOfLine("IntuneManagementExtension.log", 1), out _, out _));
}
[Fact]
public void Overlapping_service_era_local_ranges_disable_the_transfer()
{
// A westward zone change between two service starts makes era 1 start "before"
// era 0 in local time; the sibling-file transfer must refuse rather than guess.
using var f = new Fixture();
f.Write("AgentExecutor.log", ScriptStart(Deployed.AddSeconds(-20), TimeSpan.FromHours(2)), BootstrapStdout(Deployed.AddMilliseconds(200), TimeSpan.FromHours(2)));
f.Write("IntuneManagementExtension.log",
ServiceStarted(Deployed.AddMinutes(-30), TimeSpan.FromHours(2)),
PolicyResult(Deployed.AddMilliseconds(260), TimeSpan.FromHours(2)),
ServiceStarted(Deployed.AddMinutes(20), TimeSpan.FromHours(-7)));
var table = f.Build(Deployed);
Assert.True(table.TransferAmbiguous);
Assert.False(table.TryResolveByLocalTime(Deployed.AddMinutes(5) + TimeSpan.FromHours(2), out _, out _));
// Offset-based lookup is unaffected.
Assert.True(table.TryResolveByOffset("IntuneManagementExtension.log", f.OffsetOfLine("IntuneManagementExtension.log", 1), out var off, out _));
Assert.Equal(TimeSpan.FromHours(2), off);
}
[Fact]
public void Deployment_marker_parses_roundtrip_utc()
{
Assert.Equal(Deployed, AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security.DeploymentMarker.Parse("2026-09-04T13:31:49.1000000Z"));
Assert.Null(AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security.DeploymentMarker.Parse(""));
Assert.Null(AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security.DeploymentMarker.Parse("not a date"));
}
}
}
@@ -311,6 +311,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
"[Win32App] Admin did NOT set mapping for lpExitCode: 1603 of app: " + Guid1,
new[] { "exitCode=1603", "id=" + Guid1 }
};
// Win32AppInstaller.cs "[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as {0}", enum AppReturnCodeType
// (identical 1.50–1.105).
yield return new object[]
{
"IME-EXITCODE-CLASS",
"[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as SoftReboot",
new[] { "exitCodeClass=SoftReboot" }
};
yield return new object[]
{
"IME-GRS-SKIP",
@@ -361,6 +369,31 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
}
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("Success")]
[InlineData("SoftReboot")]
[InlineData("HardReboot")]
[InlineData("Retry")]
[InlineData("Failed")]
public void IME_EXITCODE_CLASS_captures_every_AppReturnCodeType_member(string member)
{
var m = Compile(Get("IME-EXITCODE-CLASS")).Match("[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as " + member);
Assert.True(m.Success);
Assert.Equal(member, m.Groups["exitCodeClass"].Value);
}
[Fact]
public void IME_EXITCODE_CLASS_ignores_the_no_mapping_warning_and_raw_numeric_types()
{
// The default branch logs "... defined as {0}, fall into default now." and an admin
// type outside the enum prints as a raw number; neither is a class the app carries.
var regex = Compile(Get("IME-EXITCODE-CLASS"));
Assert.DoesNotMatch(regex, "[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as 5, fall into default now.");
Assert.DoesNotMatch(regex, "[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as SoftReboot, fall into default now.");
Assert.DoesNotMatch(regex, "[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as 5");
Assert.DoesNotMatch(regex, "[Win32App] lpExitCode 3010");
}
[Fact]
public void PS_SCRIPT_CONTEXT_no_longer_fires_on_Win32App_detection_script_lines()
{
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
#nullable enable
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
{
/// <summary>
/// End-to-end through the tracker: a restart/first-sight backlog whose pre-reboot era was
/// written under the OOBE default zone (a7140f98: Pacific) while the agent believes the
/// zone Windows set later (Eastern). With the bootstrap record anchoring that era, every
/// pre-reboot line resolves to its true instant with origin <c>era-anchored</c>; the
/// post-reboot era without an anchor keeps the marked fallback; in-process sibling files
/// join by local time; a fresh pass still self-anchors per line.
/// </summary>
public sealed class ImeLogTrackerEraAnchoringTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Deployed = new DateTime(2026, 9, 4, 13, 31, 49, 100, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private static readonly TimeSpan Pacific = TimeSpan.FromHours(-7);
private static readonly TimeSpan Eastern = TimeSpan.FromHours(-4);
private const string PolicyId = "93d9df23-1111-2222-3333-444455556666";
private static List<ImeLogPattern> Patterns() => new List<ImeLogPattern>
{
new ImeLogPattern
{
PatternId = "T-ALL", Category = "always", Enabled = true,
Pattern = @"marker (?<n>\d+)",
Action = "noop",
Parameters = new Dictionary<string, string>(),
},
};
private static string Entry(string message, DateTime utcInstant, TimeSpan writerOffset)
{
var local = utcInstant + writerOffset;
return $"<![LOG[{message}]LOG]!><time=\"{local:HH:mm:ss.fffffff}\" date=\"{local:M-d-yyyy}\" " +
"component=\"X\" context=\"\" type=\"1\" thread=\"1\" file=\"\">";
}
private sealed class Harness : IDisposable
{
private readonly TempDirectory _tmp = new TempDirectory();
public ImeLogTracker Tracker { get; }
public DateTime Now { get; set; } = Deployed.AddMinutes(30);
public List<(string Message, DateTime? Ts, CmTraceOffsetOrigin Origin, int? Offset, string Anchor)> Resolved { get; } =
new List<(string, DateTime?, CmTraceOffsetOrigin, int?, string)>();
public Harness()
{
Tracker = new ImeLogTracker(
logFolder: _tmp.Path,
patterns: Patterns(),
logger: new AgentLogger(_tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info));
Tracker.UtcNowProvider = () => Now;
Tracker.DeployedUtcProvider = () => Deployed;
Tracker.OnPatternMatched += _ => Resolved.Add((
Tracker.LastMatchedPatternId ?? string.Empty,
Tracker.LastMatchedLogTimestamp,
Tracker.LastMatchedSourceOffsetOrigin,
Tracker.LastMatchedSourceOffsetMinutes,
Tracker.LastMatchedEraAnchorKind));
}
public void Append(string fileName, params string[] lines)
=> File.AppendAllText(Path.Combine(_tmp.Path, fileName), string.Join(Environment.NewLine, lines) + Environment.NewLine);
public Task Pass() => Tracker.CheckLogFilesAsync(CancellationToken.None);
public void Dispose()
{
Tracker.Dispose();
_tmp.Dispose();
}
}
[Fact]
public async Task Backlog_lines_of_the_bootstrap_era_resolve_through_the_anchor_and_the_next_era_stays_on_fallback()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Append("AgentExecutor.log",
Entry($@"Adding argument powershell with value C:\x\Policies\Scripts\u_{PolicyId}.ps1", Deployed.AddSeconds(-20), Pacific),
Entry("write output done. output = ===== Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap Started =====\n===== Bootstrap Completed Successfully =====, error = ", Deployed.AddMilliseconds(200), Pacific),
Entry("marker 10", Deployed.AddSeconds(1), Pacific));
h.Append("IntuneManagementExtension.log",
Entry("marker 1", Deployed.AddMinutes(-1), Pacific),
Entry($"[PowerShell] User Id = 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000, Policy id = {PolicyId}, policy result = Success", Deployed.AddMilliseconds(260), Pacific),
Entry("marker 2", Deployed.AddMinutes(10), Pacific),
Entry("EMS Agent Started", Deployed.AddMinutes(20), Eastern),
Entry("marker 3", Deployed.AddMinutes(21), Eastern));
h.Append("AppWorkload.log",
Entry("marker 4", Deployed.AddMinutes(5), Pacific),
Entry("marker 5", Deployed.AddMinutes(25), Eastern));
h.Tracker.PreScanEras();
await h.Pass(); // first sight: backlog, never fresh
var byMarker = new Dictionary<string, (string Message, DateTime? Ts, CmTraceOffsetOrigin Origin, int? Offset, string Anchor)>();
foreach (var r in h.Resolved) byMarker[r.Message] = r;
Assert.Equal(6, h.Resolved.Count);
// Marker text is the pattern id (T-ALL) — index by resolution order instead.
var r1 = h.Resolved[0]; // AgentExecutor marker 10 (files sort: AgentExecutor < AppWorkload < IntuneManagementExtension)
Assert.Equal(CmTraceOffsetOrigin.EraAnchored, r1.Origin);
Assert.Equal(Deployed.AddSeconds(1), r1.Ts);
Assert.Equal(-420, r1.Offset);
Assert.Equal(ImeLogEraPreScan.AnchorKindBootstrapStdout, r1.Anchor);
var r4 = h.Resolved[1]; // AppWorkload marker 4 — transfer by local time into the service era
Assert.Equal(CmTraceOffsetOrigin.EraAnchored, r4.Origin);
Assert.Equal(Deployed.AddMinutes(5), r4.Ts);
Assert.EndsWith("/service-era-transfer", r4.Anchor);
var r5 = h.Resolved[2]; // AppWorkload marker 5 — post-boot era, unanchored
Assert.Equal(CmTraceOffsetOrigin.None, r5.Origin);
Assert.Equal(string.Empty, r5.Anchor);
var rm1 = h.Resolved[3]; // IME marker 1
Assert.Equal(CmTraceOffsetOrigin.EraAnchored, rm1.Origin);
Assert.Equal(Deployed.AddMinutes(-1), rm1.Ts);
Assert.Equal(ImeLogEraPreScan.AnchorKindBootstrapPolicyResult, rm1.Anchor);
var rm2 = h.Resolved[4]; // IME marker 2
Assert.Equal(CmTraceOffsetOrigin.EraAnchored, rm2.Origin);
Assert.Equal(Deployed.AddMinutes(10), rm2.Ts);
var rm3 = h.Resolved[5]; // IME marker 3 — after "EMS Agent Started", no anchor
Assert.Equal(CmTraceOffsetOrigin.None, rm3.Origin);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Fresh_lines_still_self_anchor_after_the_pre_scan()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Append("IntuneManagementExtension.log", Entry("marker 1", h.Now, Eastern));
h.Tracker.PreScanEras();
await h.Pass();
h.Now = h.Now.AddSeconds(10);
var writtenAt = h.Now.AddMilliseconds(-80);
h.Append("IntuneManagementExtension.log", Entry("marker 2", writtenAt, Eastern));
await h.Pass();
var last = h.Resolved[h.Resolved.Count - 1];
Assert.Equal(CmTraceOffsetOrigin.LineAnchored, last.Origin);
Assert.Equal(writtenAt, last.Ts);
Assert.Equal(string.Empty, last.Anchor);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Without_marker_the_backlog_keeps_the_reader_zone_fallback()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Tracker.DeployedUtcProvider = () => null;
h.Append("IntuneManagementExtension.log", Entry("marker 1", Deployed.AddMinutes(-1), Pacific));
h.Tracker.PreScanEras();
await h.Pass();
Assert.Single(h.Resolved);
Assert.Equal(CmTraceOffsetOrigin.None, h.Resolved[0].Origin);
Assert.Equal(0, h.Tracker.EraTable.AnchoredEraCount);
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
#nullable enable
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using System.Linq;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Newtonsoft.Json;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
{
/// <summary>
/// Return-code class of the installer exit code (IME "[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as
/// {AppReturnCodeType}"): captured by the shipped IME-EXITCODE-CLASS pattern into
/// <see cref="AppPackageState.ExitCodeClass"/>, last value wins across a Retry loop, the
/// no-mapping/default-branch variants are ignored, and the value survives the agent
/// restart that a SoftReboot/HardReboot app causes (persistence round trip).
/// </summary>
public sealed class ImeLogTrackerExitCodeClassTests
{
private const string AppId = "5c95bf94-1cf4-4629-88d1-3f616e7a405c";
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- AppPackageState
[Fact]
public void UpdateExitCodeClass_last_value_wins_and_ignores_empty()
{
var pkg = new AppPackageState(AppId, 0);
Assert.Null(pkg.ExitCodeClass);
Assert.True(pkg.UpdateExitCodeClass("Retry"));
Assert.True(pkg.UpdateExitCodeClass(" Success "));
Assert.Equal("Success", pkg.ExitCodeClass);
Assert.False(pkg.UpdateExitCodeClass("Success"));
Assert.False(pkg.UpdateExitCodeClass(""));
Assert.False(pkg.UpdateExitCodeClass(null));
Assert.Equal("Success", pkg.ExitCodeClass);
}
[Fact]
public void ToEventData_carries_the_class_only_when_known()
{
var pkg = new AppPackageState(AppId, 0);
Assert.False(pkg.ToEventData().ContainsKey("exitCodeClass"));
pkg.UpdateExitCode("3010");
pkg.UpdateExitCodeClass("SoftReboot");
var data = pkg.ToEventData();
Assert.Equal("3010", data["exitCode"]);
Assert.Equal("SoftReboot", data["exitCodeClass"]);
}
[Fact]
public void Restore_round_trips_the_class()
{
var pkg = AppPackageState.Restore(
AppId, 0, "Contoso VPN",
AppRunAs.System, AppIntent.Install, AppTargeted.Device,
new HashSet<string>(),
AppInstallationState.Installed, true, 100, 0, 0,
exitCode: "3010", exitCodeClass: "SoftReboot");
Assert.Equal("SoftReboot", pkg.ExitCodeClass);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- shipped pack, end to end
private static string FindRulesPatternDir()
{
var dir = new DirectoryInfo(AppContext.BaseDirectory);
while (dir != null)
{
var candidate = Path.Combine(dir.FullName, "rules", "ime-log-patterns");
if (Directory.Exists(candidate)) return candidate;
dir = dir.Parent;
}
throw new DirectoryNotFoundException($"Could not locate rules/ime-log-patterns walking up from {AppContext.BaseDirectory}");
}
/// <summary>The shipped pack, exactly as combine.js embeds it (sorted by file name).</summary>
private static List<ImeLogPattern> ShippedPack()
=> Directory.GetFiles(FindRulesPatternDir(), "*.json")
.OrderBy(f => f, StringComparer.Ordinal)
.Select(f => JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<ImeLogPattern>(File.ReadAllText(f))!)
.ToList();
private static string Entry(string message, DateTime utcInstant)
{
// CMTrace line with a zero writer offset: the tracker reads the local time and
// resolves it against the reader zone; only freshness (< 24 h) matters here.
return $"<![LOG[{message}]LOG]!><time=\"{utcInstant:HH:mm:ss.fffffff}\" date=\"{utcInstant:M-d-yyyy}\" " +
"component=\"IntuneManagementExtension\" context=\"\" type=\"1\" thread=\"1\" file=\"\">";
}
private sealed class Harness : IDisposable
{
private readonly TempDirectory _tmp = new TempDirectory();
public ImeLogTracker Tracker { get; }
public string StateDir { get; }
public DateTime Now { get; } = new DateTime(2026, 9, 6, 12, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
public Harness()
{
StateDir = Path.Combine(_tmp.Path, "State");
Tracker = Build();
}
public ImeLogTracker Build()
{
var tracker = new ImeLogTracker(
logFolder: _tmp.Path,
patterns: ShippedPack(),
logger: new AgentLogger(_tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info),
stateDirectory: StateDir);
// The historic-replay guard skips app-mutating actions for lines older than 24 h
// relative to "now": pin both so the CMTrace entries below are always fresh.
tracker.UtcNowProvider = () => Now;
return tracker;
}
public void Append(params string[] messages)
{
var lines = messages.Select((m, i) => Entry(m, Now.AddSeconds(-60 + i)));
File.AppendAllText(Path.Combine(_tmp.Path, "IntuneManagementExtension.log"),
string.Join(Environment.NewLine, lines) + Environment.NewLine);
}
public Task Pass() => Tracker.CheckLogFilesAsync(CancellationToken.None);
public void Dispose()
{
Tracker.Dispose();
_tmp.Dispose();
}
}
private static string PhaseLine => "[Win32App] In EspPhase: DeviceSetup.";
private static string CurrentAppLine => @"[Win32App] SetCurrentDirectory: C:\Windows\IMECache\" + AppId + "_1";
[Fact]
public async Task Shipped_pattern_captures_the_class_for_the_current_app()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Tracker.PackageStates.Add(new AppPackageState(AppId, 0));
h.Append(
PhaseLine, // activates the currentPhase pack (IME-EXITCODE, IME-EXITCODE-CLASS)
CurrentAppLine, // IME-SET-CURRENT-4 → current app
"[Win32App] lpExitCode 3010",
"[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as SoftReboot");
await h.Pass();
var pkg = h.Tracker.PackageStates.GetPackage(AppId);
Assert.NotNull(pkg);
Assert.Equal("3010", pkg!.ExitCode);
Assert.Equal("SoftReboot", pkg.ExitCodeClass);
Assert.NotEqual(AppInstallationState.Error, pkg.InstallationState);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Retry_loop_that_ends_in_success_reports_the_last_class()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Tracker.PackageStates.Add(new AppPackageState(AppId, 0));
h.Append(
PhaseLine, CurrentAppLine,
"[Win32App] lpExitCode 1618",
"[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as Retry",
"[Win32App] lpExitCode 1618",
"[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as Retry",
"[Win32App] lpExitCode 0",
"[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as Success");
await h.Pass();
var pkg = h.Tracker.PackageStates.GetPackage(AppId)!;
Assert.Equal("0", pkg.ExitCode);
Assert.Equal("Success", pkg.ExitCodeClass);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Failed_class_still_drives_the_error_transition_and_carries_the_class()
{
// IME-EXITCODE-CLASS and IME-EXITCODE-MAPPED-FAILED both match the Failed line: the
// class is captured and the existing error path stays intact.
using var h = new Harness();
var pkg = new AppPackageState(AppId, 0);
pkg.UpdateState(AppInstallationState.Installing);
h.Tracker.PackageStates.Add(pkg);
h.Append(
PhaseLine, CurrentAppLine,
"[Win32App] lpExitCode 1603",
"[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as Failed");
await h.Pass();
Assert.Equal(AppInstallationState.Error, pkg.InstallationState);
Assert.Equal("Failed", pkg.ExitCodeClass);
Assert.Equal("IME-EXITCODE-MAPPED-FAILED", pkg.ErrorPatternId);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Default_branch_and_raw_numeric_types_leave_the_class_unset()
{
using var h = new Harness();
h.Tracker.PackageStates.Add(new AppPackageState(AppId, 0));
h.Append(
PhaseLine, CurrentAppLine,
"[Win32App] lpExitCode 5",
"[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as 5",
"[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as 5, fall into default now.",
"[Win32App] Setting enforcementState as: Error with lpExitCode: 5 without mapping");
await h.Pass();
var pkg = h.Tracker.PackageStates.GetPackage(AppId)!;
Assert.Equal("5", pkg.ExitCode);
Assert.Null(pkg.ExitCodeClass);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Class_survives_the_state_round_trip_of_an_agent_restart()
{
// A SoftReboot/HardReboot app completes only after the reboot; the restarted agent
// must still know the class when the post-reboot Success line arrives.
using var h = new Harness();
h.Tracker.PackageStates.Add(new AppPackageState(AppId, 0));
h.Append(
PhaseLine, CurrentAppLine,
"[Win32App] lpExitCode 1641",
"[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as HardReboot");
await h.Pass();
h.Tracker.SaveStateForTest();
using var restarted = h.Build();
restarted.LoadStateForTest();
var pkg = restarted.GetAllKnownPackageStates().Single(p => p.Id == AppId);
Assert.Equal("1641", pkg.ExitCode);
Assert.Equal("HardReboot", pkg.ExitCodeClass);
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
{
/// <summary>
/// Raw per-line token callbacks for the Entra user-affinity detector (2026-09-04).
/// <c>OnUserTokenAcquired</c> fires on EVERY IME-TOKEN-SUCCESS line — independent of the
/// phase-change dedup that swallows the second AccountSetup detection — and
/// <c>OnTokenFailureLine</c> on every failure line; both honour the historic-replay gate.
/// </summary>
public sealed class ImeLogTrackerTokenLineCallbackTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Now = new DateTime(2026, 9, 4, 14, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private static List<ImeLogPattern> Patterns() => new List<ImeLogPattern>
{
new ImeLogPattern
{
PatternId = "IME-TOKEN-SUCCESS", Category = "always", Enabled = true,
Pattern = "^Successfully get the token",
Action = "espPhaseDetected",
Parameters = new Dictionary<string, string> { ["phase"] = "AccountSetup" },
},
new ImeLogPattern
{
PatternId = "IME-TOKEN-FAILURE", Category = "always", Enabled = true,
Pattern = @"^Failed to get AAD token\..*?errorCode = (?<errorCode>.*?)$",
Action = "imeTokenFailure",
Parameters = new Dictionary<string, string>(),
},
};
private static ImeLogTracker Build(TempDirectory tmp)
{
var tracker = new ImeLogTracker(
logFolder: tmp.Path,
patterns: Patterns(),
logger: new AgentLogger(tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info));
tracker.UtcNowProvider = () => Now;
return tracker;
}
private const string Success = "Successfully get the token with client id fc0f3af4-6835-4174-b806-f7db311fd2f3 and resource id 26a4ae64-5862-427f-a9b0-044e62572a4f";
private const string Failure = "Failed to get AAD token. len = 34 using client id fc0f3af4-6835-4174-b806-f7db311fd2f3 and resource id 26a4ae64-5862-427f-a9b0-044e62572a4f, errorCode = 3399548929";
[Fact]
public void Every_token_success_line_invokes_callback_even_when_phase_is_deduplicated()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
using var tracker = Build(tmp);
var tokens = new List<DateTime?>();
tracker.OnUserTokenAcquired = ts => tokens.Add(ts);
// The phase-change dedup lives in the adapter (AccountSetup is emitted once);
// the raw token callback must fire for BOTH lines regardless.
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(Success, Now.AddMinutes(-6));
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(Success, Now.AddMinutes(-2));
Assert.Equal(2, tokens.Count);
Assert.Equal(Now.AddMinutes(-6), tokens[0]);
Assert.Equal(Now.AddMinutes(-2), tokens[1]);
}
[Fact]
public void Every_failure_line_invokes_callback_with_error_code()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
using var tracker = Build(tmp);
var failures = new List<(string code, DateTime? ts)>();
tracker.OnTokenFailureLine = (code, ts) => failures.Add((code, ts));
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(Failure, Now.AddMinutes(-5));
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(Failure, Now.AddMinutes(-4));
Assert.Equal(2, failures.Count);
Assert.All(failures, f => Assert.Equal("3399548929", f.code));
Assert.Equal(Now.AddMinutes(-5), failures[0].ts);
}
[Fact]
public void Historic_replay_lines_do_not_invoke_either_callback()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
using var tracker = Build(tmp);
var tokens = 0;
var failures = 0;
tracker.OnUserTokenAcquired = _ => tokens++;
tracker.OnTokenFailureLine = (_, __) => failures++;
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(Success, Now.AddDays(-3));
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(Failure, Now.AddDays(-3));
Assert.Equal(0, tokens);
Assert.Equal(0, failures);
}
[Fact]
public void Callback_exception_does_not_break_the_drain()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
using var tracker = Build(tmp);
tracker.OnUserTokenAcquired = _ => throw new InvalidOperationException("boom");
tracker.OnTokenFailureLine = (_, __) => throw new InvalidOperationException("boom");
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(Success, Now.AddMinutes(-1));
tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(Failure, Now.AddMinutes(-1));
}
}
}
@@ -903,5 +903,87 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
NtfsLinks.RemoveLink(link);
}
}
// ============================================================= packaging counters
[Fact]
public void BuildArchiveBytes_records_packaging_counters_by_reason_and_kind_without_paths()
{
using var rig = new Rig();
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(rig.StateFolder, "small.json"), "{}");
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(rig.StateFolder, "big-1.json"), new string('x', 64));
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(rig.StateFolder, "big-2.json"), new string('y', 64));
var blockedPath = @"C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM";
var service = rig.Build(cfg => cfg.DiagnosticsLogPaths.Add(
new AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models.DiagnosticsLogPath { Path = blockedPath }));
service.Budget = new DiagnosticsBudget { MaxSingleFileBytes = 16, MaxTotalUncompressedBytes = 1L << 30, MaxFileCount = 5000 };
Assert.Null(service.LastPackaging);
var bytes = service.BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: true);
var stats = service.LastPackaging;
Assert.NotNull(stats);
Assert.True(stats!.Truncated);
Assert.Equal(2, stats.SkippedFiles);
Assert.Equal(2, stats.SkippedByReason["size"]);
Assert.Single(stats.SkippedByReason);
Assert.Equal(1, stats.ProblemsByKind["path-guard"]);
Assert.Single(stats.ProblemsByKind);
Assert.True(stats.IncludedFiles >= 1, "the small file must have been included");
Assert.True(stats.IncludedBytes >= 2);
// The ZIP still carries the per-file list; the counters never do.
Assert.NotNull(ReadZipEntryText(bytes, "_TRUNCATED.txt"));
foreach (var key in stats.SkippedByReason.Keys.Concat(stats.ProblemsByKind.Keys))
{
Assert.DoesNotContain("\\", key);
Assert.DoesNotContain(":", key);
Assert.DoesNotContain("/", key);
}
}
[Fact]
public void BuildArchiveBytes_reports_a_clean_build_as_not_truncated_with_empty_maps()
{
using var rig = new Rig();
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(rig.StateFolder, "snapshot.json"), "{}");
var service = rig.Build();
service.BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: true);
var stats = service.LastPackaging;
Assert.NotNull(stats);
Assert.False(stats!.Truncated);
Assert.Equal(0, stats.SkippedFiles);
Assert.Empty(stats.SkippedByReason);
Assert.Empty(stats.ProblemsByKind);
Assert.True(stats.IncludedFiles >= 1);
}
[Fact]
public void BuildArchiveBytes_counts_a_rejected_source_folder_as_a_problem()
{
using var rig = new Rig();
using var outside = new TempDirectory();
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(outside.Path, "snapshot.json"), "{}");
var link = Path.Combine(rig.Tmp.Path, "StateLink");
NtfsLinks.CreateJunction(link, outside.Path);
try
{
var service = rig.Build(sectionFolderOverrides: new Dictionary<string, string> { ["AgentState"] = link });
service.BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: true);
// The section is walked once per search pattern (11 patterns) but the folder
// failed once — the counter says so.
Assert.Equal(1, service.LastPackaging!.ProblemsByKind["folder-rejected"]);
Assert.False(service.LastPackaging.Truncated);
}
finally
{
NtfsLinks.RemoveLink(link);
}
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
using System;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.SystemSignals
{
/// <summary>
/// <see cref="ProvisioningStatusTracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs"/> exposes the registry
/// failure detail while its settle window is open and nothing once the window has fired —
/// the coordinator reads it when a Shell-Core failure terminalises first (session 683f1eff).
/// </summary>
public sealed class ProvisioningStatusTrackerPendingFailureTests
{
private static readonly DateTime Fixed = new DateTime(2026, 9, 8, 18, 11, 2, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private const string InProgressJson = @"{
""categorySucceeded"": null,
""AppsSubcategory"": {""subcategoryState"":""inProgress"",""subcategoryStatusText"":""Apps (Working)""}
}";
private const string AppsFailedJson = @"{
""categorySucceeded"": null,
""AppsSubcategory"": {""subcategoryState"":""failed"",""subcategoryStatusText"":""Apps (0x80070652)""}
}";
private sealed class Fixture : IDisposable
{
public TempDirectory Tmp { get; } = new TempDirectory();
public ProvisioningStatusTracker Tracker { get; }
public Fixture()
{
var post = new InformationalEventPost(new FakeSignalIngressSink(), new VirtualClock(Fixed));
var logger = new AgentLogger(Tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info);
Tracker = new ProvisioningStatusTracker(
sessionId: "S1",
tenantId: "T1",
post: post,
logger: logger,
appxScanner: new FakeAppxDeploymentFailureScanner(),
backgroundDispatcher: action => action());
}
public void Dispose()
{
Tracker.Dispose();
Tmp.Dispose();
}
}
[Fact]
public void Nothing_pending_before_any_failure()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
Assert.Null(f.Tracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs());
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", InProgressJson);
Assert.Null(f.Tracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs());
}
[Fact]
public void Armed_settle_window_exposes_the_registry_detail()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", InProgressJson);
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", AppsFailedJson);
var pending = f.Tracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs();
Assert.NotNull(pending);
Assert.Equal("Provisioning_DeviceSetup_Apps_Failed", pending!.FailureType);
Assert.Equal("0x80070652", pending.ErrorCode);
Assert.Equal("Apps", pending.FailedSubcategory);
Assert.Equal("DeviceSetup", pending.Category);
}
[Fact]
public void Expired_settle_window_leaves_nothing_pending()
{
using var f = new Fixture();
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", InProgressJson);
f.Tracker.ProcessCategoryStatusForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", AppsFailedJson);
f.Tracker.TriggerSettleTimerForTest("DeviceSetupCategory.Status");
Assert.Null(f.Tracker.TryGetPendingFailureArgs());
}
}
}
@@ -243,12 +243,23 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.SystemSignals
}
[Fact]
public void DecodeHResult_KnownAndUnknown()
public void ResolveHResultSymbol_ReadsTheSharedCatalog()
{
Assert.Equal("WU_E_ALL_UPDATES_FAILED", WindowsUpdateTracker.DecodeHResult(0x80240022));
Assert.Equal("CBS_E_INSTALLERS_FAILED", WindowsUpdateTracker.DecodeHResult(0x800F0922));
Assert.Equal("S_OK", WindowsUpdateTracker.DecodeHResult(0x00000000));
Assert.Equal("WU_E_UNKNOWN", WindowsUpdateTracker.DecodeHResult(0x8888DEAD));
Assert.Equal("WU_E_ALL_UPDATES_FAILED", WindowsUpdateTracker.ResolveHResultSymbol(0x80240022));
Assert.Equal("CBS_E_INSTALLERS_FAILED", WindowsUpdateTracker.ResolveHResultSymbol(0x800F0922));
Assert.Equal("ERROR_TIMEOUT", WindowsUpdateTracker.ResolveHResultSymbol(0x800705B4));
Assert.Equal("S_OK", WindowsUpdateTracker.ResolveHResultSymbol(0x00000000));
Assert.Equal("WU_E_UNKNOWN", WindowsUpdateTracker.ResolveHResultSymbol(0x8888DEAD));
}
[Fact]
public void ResolveHResultSymbol_FallsBackWhenTheCatalogHasNoSymbolOrThrows()
{
// An entry without a symbol (IME/Intune paraphrases) still yields the sentinel.
Assert.Equal("WU_E_UNKNOWN", WindowsUpdateTracker.ResolveHResultSymbol(0x87D1041C));
// A catalog load failure is decoration lost, never an event lost.
Assert.Equal("WU_E_UNKNOWN", WindowsUpdateTracker.ResolveHResultSymbol(0x80240022, _ => throw new InvalidOperationException("catalog")));
Assert.Equal("S_OK", WindowsUpdateTracker.ResolveHResultSymbol(0, _ => throw new InvalidOperationException("catalog")));
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -56,6 +56,31 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
LoadEmbeddedGuardrails()["maxCommandLength"]!.Value<int>());
}
[Fact]
public void User_profile_prefixes_are_all_accepted_by_the_loader()
{
// The loader drops entries outside AppData\Local / AppData\Roaming (the hard block
// would never release them anyway). A dropped entry is invisible at runtime — it
// just never matches — so a typo in the JSON must fail here instead.
var json = LoadEmbeddedGuardrails()["userProfileFilePrefixes"]?.ToObject<string[]>()
?? new string[0];
Assert.Equal(
json.Select(p => p.Trim().TrimEnd('\\')).OrderBy(p => p),
GatherRuleGuards.AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes.OrderBy(p => p));
}
[Fact]
public void User_profile_prefixes_stay_under_the_hard_blocks_exception()
{
Assert.All(
GatherRuleGuards.AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes,
prefix => Assert.Contains(
GatherRuleGuards.AllowedUserProfileSubdirs,
subdir => prefix.StartsWith(subdir, System.StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(prefix.Length == subdir.Length || prefix[subdir.Length] == '\\')));
}
[Fact]
public void Blocked_event_log_channels_match_code_constants()
{
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.State;
using Xunit;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
{
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.State;
using Xunit;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
#pragma warning disable xUnit1031
@@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
// items must be a whiteglove_resumed event.
Assert.DoesNotContain(
rig.Uploader.Received.SelectMany(b => b),
item => item.Kind == AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Transport.Telemetry.TelemetryItemKind.Event &&
item => item.Kind == TelemetryItemKind.Event &&
item.PayloadJson != null &&
item.PayloadJson.Contains("\"whiteglove_resumed\""));
}
@@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
var resumedEvents = rig.Uploader.Received
.SelectMany(b => b)
.Where(item =>
item.Kind == AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Transport.Telemetry.TelemetryItemKind.Event &&
item.Kind == TelemetryItemKind.Event &&
item.PayloadJson != null &&
item.PayloadJson.Contains("\"whiteglove_resumed\""))
.ToList();
@@ -265,6 +265,42 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
sut.Stop();
}
[Fact]
public void Deadline_fired_late_keeps_the_due_time_as_stamp_and_carries_it_in_the_payload()
{
// A deadline that was due while the device slept (or the agent was down) fires only
// afterwards. The signal keeps the due time as OccurredAtUtc (D-238: the outage must not
// become session duration) and repeats it in the payload so the stale-fire guards
// identify the incarnation independently of the stamp.
using var rig = new EnrollmentOrchestratorRig(At);
var sut = rig.Build();
sut.Start();
var dueAt = At.AddMinutes(-5);
var scheduler = GetScheduler(sut);
scheduler.Schedule(new ActiveDeadline(
name: "hello_safety",
dueAtUtc: dueAt,
firesSignalKind: DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired,
firesPayload: new Dictionary<string, string> { [SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline] = "hello_safety" }));
var signalLog = GetSignalLog(sut);
Assert.True(SpinWait.SpinUntil(() => ContainsDeadlineFired(signalLog), 3000));
DecisionSignal? fired = null;
foreach (var sig in signalLog.ReadAll())
{
if (sig.Kind == DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired) { fired = sig; break; }
}
Assert.NotNull(fired);
Assert.Equal(dueAt, fired!.OccurredAtUtc);
Assert.NotNull(fired.Payload);
Assert.Equal("hello_safety", fired.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline]);
Assert.Equal(dueAt.ToString("O"), fired.Payload[SignalPayloadKeys.DeadlineDueAtUtc]);
sut.Stop();
}
// ========================================================================= Quarantine
[Fact]
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.State;
using Xunit;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
#pragma warning disable xUnit1031
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Transport.Telemetry;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using Xunit;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
#pragma warning disable xUnit1031
@@ -282,8 +282,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.SignalAdapters
errorPatternId: null,
errorDetail: null,
errorCode: null,
exitCode: null,
exitCode: "0",
hresultFromWin32: null,
exitCodeClass: "Success",
appVersion: "11.2.1787.0",
appType: "WinGet",
attemptNumber: 1,
@@ -293,6 +294,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.SignalAdapters
var info = Assert.Single(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.AppInstallComplete));
Assert.Equal("app-xyz", info.Payload!["appId"]);
// Installer outcome surfaces on the terminal event even when the app succeeded: the
// return-code class is the only evidence of a SoftReboot/HardReboot mapping and the
// number says which code was mapped (IME-EXITCODE-CLASS, ANALYZE-APP-018).
Assert.Equal("Success", info.Payload["exitCodeClass"]);
Assert.Equal("0", info.Payload["exitCode"]);
Assert.Equal("Company Portal", info.Payload["appName"]);
Assert.Equal("Installed", info.Payload["state"]);
Assert.Equal("Install", info.Payload["intent"]);
@@ -331,6 +337,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.SignalAdapters
errorCode: "60001",
exitCode: "60001",
hresultFromWin32: "-2146964895",
exitCodeClass: "Failed",
attemptNumber: 1,
detectionResult: "NotDetected");
@@ -340,6 +347,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.SignalAdapters
Assert.Equal("true", info.Payload!["isError"]);
Assert.Equal("IME-ERROR-UNMAPPED-EXIT", info.Payload["errorPatternId"]);
Assert.Equal("60001", info.Payload["errorCode"]);
Assert.Equal("60001", info.Payload["exitCode"]);
Assert.Equal("Failed", info.Payload["exitCodeClass"]);
Assert.Equal("-2146964895", info.Payload["hresultFromWin32"]);
Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Error.ToString(), info.Payload[SignalPayloadKeys.Severity]);
// Codex review follow-up (P1): an unrelated ErrorPatternId (here a regular
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Transport.Telemetry;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using Newtonsoft.Json.Linq;
using Xunit;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Telemetry.Signals
{
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.State;
using Newtonsoft.Json.Linq;
using Xunit;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Telemetry.Transitions
{
@@ -1701,5 +1701,86 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Termination
rig.PromotionCalls[0].failureType);
Assert.Null(rig.PromotionCalls[0].errorCode);
}
// ============================================================= packaging counters on the diag events
[Fact]
public void Handle_diagnostics_uploaded_carries_packaging_counters_when_the_packager_reported_them()
{
using var rig = new Rig();
rig.State = new DecisionStateBuilder(DecisionState.CreateInitial("S1", "T1")) { Stage = SessionStage.Completed }.Build();
rig.DiagnosticsResult = new DiagnosticsUploadResult
{
BlobName = "diag-blob.zip",
Packaging = new DiagnosticsPackagingStats
{
IncludedFiles = 412,
IncludedBytes = 123456,
SkippedFiles = 3,
SkippedByReason = new Dictionary<string, int> { ["size"] = 2, ["total"] = 1 },
ProblemsByKind = new Dictionary<string, int> { ["copy"] = 1 },
},
};
var cfg = rig.BuildConfig(diagEnabled: true, diagMode: "Always", selfDestruct: false);
rig.Build(cfg).Handle(sender: null!,
Args(EnrollmentTerminationReason.DecisionTerminalStage, EnrollmentTerminationOutcome.Succeeded, SessionStage.Completed));
var uploaded = rig.DataOf("diagnostics_uploaded");
Assert.NotNull(uploaded);
Assert.Equal(true, uploaded!["truncated"]);
Assert.Equal(412, uploaded["includedFiles"]);
Assert.Equal(123456L, uploaded["includedBytes"]);
Assert.Equal(3, uploaded["skippedFiles"]);
var byReason = Assert.IsType<Dictionary<string, int>>(uploaded["skippedByReason"]);
Assert.Equal(2, byReason["size"]);
Assert.Equal(1, byReason["total"]);
var problems = Assert.IsType<Dictionary<string, int>>(uploaded["problemsByKind"]);
Assert.Equal(1, problems["copy"]);
// Counters only — no key or value carries a file path.
foreach (var kv in uploaded)
Assert.False(kv.Value is string s && (s.Contains("\\") || s.Contains("/")) && kv.Key != "sasUrlPrefix",
$"payload key {kv.Key} looks like a path: {kv.Value}");
}
[Fact]
public void Handle_diagnostics_upload_failed_after_a_build_carries_the_counters_too()
{
using var rig = new Rig();
rig.State = new DecisionStateBuilder(DecisionState.CreateInitial("S1", "T1")) { Stage = SessionStage.Failed }.Build();
rig.DiagnosticsResult = new DiagnosticsUploadResult
{
ErrorCode = "upload_5xx",
Packaging = new DiagnosticsPackagingStats { IncludedFiles = 40, IncludedBytes = 1000 },
};
var cfg = rig.BuildConfig(diagEnabled: true, diagMode: "Always", selfDestruct: false);
rig.Build(cfg).Handle(sender: null!,
Args(EnrollmentTerminationReason.DecisionTerminalStage, EnrollmentTerminationOutcome.Failed, SessionStage.Failed));
var failed = rig.DataOf("diagnostics_upload_failed");
Assert.NotNull(failed);
Assert.Equal("upload_5xx", (string)failed!["errorCode"]);
Assert.Equal(false, failed["truncated"]);
Assert.Equal(40, failed["includedFiles"]);
Assert.Empty(Assert.IsType<Dictionary<string, int>>(failed["skippedByReason"]));
}
[Fact]
public void Handle_diagnostics_events_omit_the_counters_when_no_package_was_built()
{
using var rig = new Rig();
rig.State = new DecisionStateBuilder(DecisionState.CreateInitial("S1", "T1")) { Stage = SessionStage.Completed }.Build();
rig.DiagnosticsResult = new DiagnosticsUploadResult { BlobName = "diag-blob.zip" };
var cfg = rig.BuildConfig(diagEnabled: true, diagMode: "Always", selfDestruct: false);
rig.Build(cfg).Handle(sender: null!,
Args(EnrollmentTerminationReason.DecisionTerminalStage, EnrollmentTerminationOutcome.Succeeded, SessionStage.Completed));
var uploaded = rig.DataOf("diagnostics_uploaded");
Assert.NotNull(uploaded);
Assert.False(uploaded!.ContainsKey("truncated"));
Assert.False(uploaded.ContainsKey("skippedByReason"));
}
}
}
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ using System.Net.Http;
using System.Threading;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Transport.Telemetry;
using Xunit;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Transport
{
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Transport.Telemetry;
using Xunit;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Transport
{
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Transport.Telemetry;
using Newtonsoft.Json.Linq;
using Xunit;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Transport
{
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ using System.Text;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Transport.Telemetry;
using Xunit;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Transport
{
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Transport.Telemetry;
using Xunit;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Transport
{
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
#nullable enable
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using System.Linq;
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Http;
using System.Reflection;
using System.Text;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Telemetry.Events;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Telemetry.Signals;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Telemetry.Transitions;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Telemetry.Events;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Transport.Telemetry;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.State;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Newtonsoft.Json;
using Newtonsoft.Json.Linq;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Transport
{
/// <summary>
/// The agent → backend wire contract of <c>POST /api/agent/telemetry</c>, proven from the
/// WRITER side. <see cref="TelemetryItemDto"/> (Shared) is the one class both ends serialise;
/// <see cref="TelemetryItem.ToWire"/> is the only mapping onto it.
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item>Round trip + reflection: every DTO property is populated by <c>ToWire()</c> and
/// survives Newtonsoft defaults — a DTO field added without a mapping fails here.</item>
/// <item>Frozen body: the real batch serialiser's output for one item per
/// <see cref="TelemetryItemKind"/> is pinned under <c>tests/fixtures/telemetry-wire/</c>.
/// The backend's <c>TelemetryWireFixtureTests</c> reads the same files and demands zero
/// rejections, so a rename on either side breaks a test until both sides and the fixture
/// agree. Regenerate with <c>AM_WRITE_WIRE_FIXTURES=1</c>.</item>
/// <item>Poison body: the exact 422 shape the backend writes (pinned there by
/// <c>TelemetryWireFixtureTests</c>) is parsed as an item-level poison signal here.</item>
/// </list>
/// </summary>
public sealed class TelemetryWireContractTests
{
private const string TenantId = "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890";
private const string SessionId = "b2c3d4e5-f6a7-8901-bcde-f12345678901";
private const string FixtureFile = "agent-v2.json";
private static readonly DateTime At = new DateTime(2026, 4, 20, 10, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
private static TelemetryItem FullyPopulatedItem() =>
new TelemetryItem(
kind: TelemetryItemKind.DecisionTransition,
partitionKey: $"{TenantId}_{SessionId}",
rowKey: "0000000007",
telemetryItemId: 42,
sessionTraceOrdinal: 7,
payloadJson: "{\"StepIndex\":7}",
requiresImmediateFlush: true,
enqueuedAtUtc: At,
retryCount: 3);
// ============================================================ ToWire mapping
[Fact]
public void ToWire_round_trips_every_property_through_Newtonsoft_defaults()
{
var item = FullyPopulatedItem();
var json = JsonConvert.SerializeObject(item.ToWire());
var dto = JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<TelemetryItemDto>(json)!;
Assert.Equal("DecisionTransition", dto.Kind);
Assert.Equal(item.PartitionKey, dto.PartitionKey);
Assert.Equal(item.RowKey, dto.RowKey);
Assert.Equal(item.TelemetryItemId, dto.TelemetryItemId);
Assert.Equal(item.SessionTraceOrdinal, dto.SessionTraceOrdinal);
Assert.Equal(item.PayloadJson, dto.PayloadJson);
Assert.Equal(item.RequiresImmediateFlush, dto.RequiresImmediateFlush);
Assert.Equal(item.EnqueuedAtUtc, dto.EnqueuedAtUtc);
Assert.Equal(DateTimeKind.Utc, dto.EnqueuedAtUtc.Kind);
Assert.Equal(item.RetryCount, dto.RetryCount);
}
[Fact]
public void ToWire_populates_every_TelemetryItemDto_property()
{
// A DTO property that ToWire() does not set keeps its default — this catches a field
// added to the wire type without a mapping (the backend would read the default forever).
var dto = FullyPopulatedItem().ToWire();
var unset = typeof(TelemetryItemDto)
.GetProperties(BindingFlags.Public | BindingFlags.Instance)
.Where(p => IsDefault(p.GetValue(dto), p.PropertyType))
.Select(p => p.Name)
.ToList();
Assert.True(unset.Count == 0,
"TelemetryItem.ToWire() leaves these TelemetryItemDto properties at their default: " + string.Join(", ", unset));
}
[Fact]
public void TelemetryItemDto_properties_mirror_TelemetryItem()
{
var itemProps = typeof(TelemetryItem).GetProperties(BindingFlags.Public | BindingFlags.Instance)
.ToDictionary(p => p.Name, p => p.PropertyType);
foreach (var dtoProp in typeof(TelemetryItemDto).GetProperties(BindingFlags.Public | BindingFlags.Instance))
{
Assert.True(itemProps.TryGetValue(dtoProp.Name, out var itemType),
$"TelemetryItemDto.{dtoProp.Name} has no counterpart on TelemetryItem");
var expected = dtoProp.Name == nameof(TelemetryItemDto.Kind) ? typeof(TelemetryItemKind) : dtoProp.PropertyType;
Assert.True(itemType == expected,
$"TelemetryItemDto.{dtoProp.Name} is {dtoProp.PropertyType.Name}, TelemetryItem.{dtoProp.Name} is {itemType.Name}");
}
}
[Fact]
public void Every_kind_serialises_by_name_on_the_wire_and_on_the_spool_line()
{
foreach (var kind in TelemetryItemKinds.All)
{
var item = new TelemetryItem(kind, "T_S", "rk", 1, 1, "{}", false, At);
var wire = JObject.Parse(JsonConvert.SerializeObject(item.ToWire()));
Assert.Equal(kind.ToString(), (string?)wire["Kind"]);
// The spool line (TelemetryItemSerializer) has always written the NAME too; the enum's
// move to Shared must not turn it into an ordinal (a crash-restart rehydrates it).
var spool = JObject.Parse(TelemetryItemSerializer.Serialize(item));
Assert.Equal(kind.ToString(), (string?)spool["Kind"]);
Assert.Equal(kind, TelemetryItemSerializer.Deserialize(spool.ToString(Formatting.None)).Kind);
Assert.True(TelemetryItemKinds.TryParse(kind.ToString(), out var parsed));
Assert.Equal(kind, parsed);
}
}
// ============================================================ Frozen wire body
[Fact]
public void Frozen_wire_body_matches_the_current_serializer()
{
var items = OneItemPerKind();
Assert.Equal(TelemetryItemKinds.All.OrderBy(k => k), items.Select(i => i.Kind).Distinct().OrderBy(k => k));
var body = BackendTelemetryUploader.SerializeBatch(items);
var path = Path.Combine(RepoPaths.Fixtures("telemetry-wire"), FixtureFile);
if (Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("AM_WRITE_WIRE_FIXTURES") == "1")
{
Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.GetDirectoryName(path)!);
File.WriteAllText(path, body + "\n", new UTF8Encoding(false));
}
Assert.True(File.Exists(path), "Missing wire fixture " + path + " — run this test with AM_WRITE_WIRE_FIXTURES=1 to create it.");
var frozen = File.ReadAllText(path).TrimEnd('\r', '\n');
Assert.True(string.Equals(frozen, body, StringComparison.Ordinal),
"The agent's telemetry wire body changed. If the change is intended, update the backend ingest " +
"(TelemetryWireFixtureTests must still dispatch every frozen body) and regenerate with " +
"AM_WRITE_WIRE_FIXTURES=1.\nExpected: " + frozen + "\nActual: " + body);
}
/// <summary>
/// One item per kind through the REAL emitters (payload shapes are theirs, not hand-typed),
/// re-based onto fixed transport fields so the body is byte-stable.
/// </summary>
private static IReadOnlyList<TelemetryItem> OneItemPerKind()
{
using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
var transport = new FakeTelemetryTransport();
var counter = new EventSequenceCounter(new EventSequencePersistence(tmp.File("seq.json")));
new TelemetryEventEmitter(transport, counter, SessionId, TenantId).Emit(new EnrollmentEvent
{
EventId = "00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001",
EventType = Constants.EventTypes.AgentStarted,
Severity = EventSeverity.Info,
Source = "Agent",
Timestamp = At,
Phase = EnrollmentPhase.Unknown,
Message = "Agent started",
Data = new Dictionary<string, object> { ["agentVersion"] = "2.0.0" },
});
new TelemetrySignalEmitter(transport, SessionId, TenantId).Emit(new DecisionSignal(
sessionSignalOrdinal: 1,
sessionTraceOrdinal: 1,
kind: DecisionSignalKind.SessionStarted,
kindSchemaVersion: 1,
occurredAtUtc: At,
sourceOrigin: "Fixture",
evidence: new Evidence(EvidenceKind.Raw, "raw-1", "session start")));
new TelemetryTransitionEmitter(transport, SessionId, TenantId).Emit(new DecisionTransition(
stepIndex: 1,
sessionTraceOrdinal: 2,
signalOrdinalRef: 1,
occurredAtUtc: At,
trigger: "SessionStarted",
fromStage: SessionStage.Unknown,
toStage: SessionStage.AwaitingEspPhaseChange,
taken: true,
deadEndReason: null,
reducerVersion: "1.0.0"));
return transport.Enqueued
.Select(e => new TelemetryItem(e.Kind, e.PartitionKey, e.RowKey, e.TelemetryItemId, e.SessionTraceOrdinal,
e.PayloadJson, e.RequiresImmediateFlush, At))
.ToList();
}
// ============================================================ Poison body
/// <summary>
/// The exact 422 body the backend writes for rejected items (pinned byte-for-byte in the
/// backend's TelemetryWireFixtureTests). camelCase because the backend serialises with
/// its wire options; the agent's parser accepts both casings.
/// </summary>
internal const string BackendPoisonBody =
"{\"error\":\"2 of 3 telemetry item(s) cannot be ingested (unknown Kind or unusable payload); they were not stored.\"," +
"\"code\":\"TelemetryItemsRejected\",\"correlationId\":\"cid-1\",\"poison\":true,\"rejectedRowKeys\":[\"rk-1\",\"rk-3\"]," +
"\"reason\":\"unknown_kind=1;unparseable=1\",\"received\":3,\"rejected\":2}";
[Fact]
public async Task Backend_422_poison_body_is_parsed_as_item_level_poison()
{
using var handler = new RecordingHttpMessageHandler().QueueStatus((HttpStatusCode)422, BackendPoisonBody);
using var http = new HttpClient(handler);
var sut = new BackendTelemetryUploader(http, baseUrl: "https://backend.example.invalid", tenantId: TenantId, agentVersion: "2.0.0");
var result = await sut.UploadBatchAsync(new[] { FullyPopulatedItem() }, CancellationToken.None);
Assert.False(result.Success);
Assert.True(result.IsPoison);
Assert.Equal(new[] { "rk-1", "rk-3" }, result.PoisonRowKeys);
Assert.Equal("unknown_kind=1;unparseable=1", result.ErrorReason);
}
private static bool IsDefault(object? value, Type type)
{
if (value == null) return true;
if (type == typeof(string)) return ((string)value).Length == 0;
var underlying = Nullable.GetUnderlyingType(type) ?? type;
return underlying.IsValueType && value.Equals(Activator.CreateInstance(underlying));
}
}
}
@@ -99,6 +99,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// Installer result codes (captured from lpExitCode / hResultFromWin32 log lines)
public string ExitCode { get; private set; }
public string HResultFromWin32 { get; private set; }
/// <summary>
/// Admin-defined return-code class of the last installer exit code: Success, SoftReboot,
/// HardReboot, Retry or Failed (IME's AppReturnCodeType, captured from the
/// "lpExitCode is defined as X" line by IME-EXITCODE-CLASS). Last value wins, so a Retry
/// loop that ends in Success reports Success.
/// </summary>
public string ExitCodeClass { get; private set; }
// App metadata (captured from IME log patterns — used by App Dashboard / reports)
/// <summary>Product version detected after install (e.g. "11.2.1787.0"). From ReportingManager DetectedIdentityVersion.</summary>
@@ -167,6 +174,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
int? progressPercent, long bytesDownloaded, long bytesTotal,
string errorPatternId = null, string errorDetail = null, string errorCode = null,
string exitCode = null, string hresultFromWin32 = null,
string exitCodeClass = null,
long doFileSize = 0, long doTotalBytesDownloaded = 0,
long doBytesFromPeers = 0, int doPercentPeerCaching = 0,
long doBytesFromLanPeers = 0, long doBytesFromGroupPeers = 0,
@@ -195,6 +203,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
ErrorCode = errorCode,
ExitCode = exitCode,
HResultFromWin32 = hresultFromWin32,
ExitCodeClass = exitCodeClass,
InstallationStateLastChangedTicks = Stopwatch.GetTimestamp(),
DoFileSize = doFileSize,
DoTotalBytesDownloaded = doTotalBytesDownloaded,
@@ -302,6 +311,19 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
HResultFromWin32 = code;
}
/// <summary>
/// Captures the return-code class (Success/SoftReboot/HardReboot/Retry/Failed) IME assigned
/// to the last exit code. Last value wins; empty values are ignored.
/// </summary>
public bool UpdateExitCodeClass(string exitCodeClass)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(exitCodeClass)) return false;
var trimmed = exitCodeClass.Trim();
if (ExitCodeClass == trimmed) return false;
ExitCodeClass = trimmed;
return true;
}
/// <summary>
/// Updates the product version detected for this app (e.g. "11.2.1787.0").
/// Only applies non-empty values so a later detection without version cannot wipe it.
@@ -547,6 +569,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
data["exitCode"] = ExitCode;
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(HResultFromWin32))
data["hresultFromWin32"] = HResultFromWin32;
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(ExitCodeClass))
data["exitCodeClass"] = ExitCodeClass;
// App metadata fields (emitted whenever available so ingest can merge them).
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(AppVersion))
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
#nullable enable
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
{
/// <summary>
/// A writer era: the stretch of log written by ONE process lifetime, i.e. under one
/// timezone belief. For the IME service family (IntuneManagementExtension*.log) an era
/// starts at an "EMS Agent Started" entry and may continue across a log rotation into the
/// next file; for AgentExecutor.log every script execution is its own short-lived process
/// and therefore its own era. An era carries an offset only when an anchor inside it was
/// matched against an instant the agent knows in UTC (<see cref="ImeLogEraPreScan"/>).
/// </summary>
internal sealed class CmTraceEra
{
/// <summary>File segments (file name → [start, end) byte range) that belong to this era, in write order.</summary>
public List<CmTraceEraSegment> Segments { get; } = new List<CmTraceEraSegment>();
/// <summary>Local time of the era's first entry as written (null for a leading era whose start predates the scanned region).</summary>
public DateTime? StartLocal { get; set; }
/// <summary>Local time of the next era's first entry (null for the last era).</summary>
public DateTime? EndLocal { get; set; }
/// <summary>The writer's UTC offset (local = UTC + offset) when anchored.</summary>
public TimeSpan? Offset { get; set; }
/// <summary>What established <see cref="Offset"/> ("bootstrap-policy-result", "bootstrap-stdout", …).</summary>
public string? AnchorKind { get; set; }
public bool IsAnchored => Offset.HasValue;
}
internal sealed class CmTraceEraSegment
{
public CmTraceEraSegment(string fileName, long startOffset, long endOffset)
{
FileName = fileName;
StartOffset = startOffset;
EndOffset = endOffset;
}
public string FileName { get; }
public long StartOffset { get; }
/// <summary><c>long.MaxValue</c> while the era is still open in this file.</summary>
public long EndOffset { get; set; }
public bool Contains(string fileName, long offset) =>
string.Equals(FileName, fileName, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
&& offset >= StartOffset && offset < EndOffset;
}
/// <summary>
/// Era lookup for backlog lines (2026-09-04, session a7140f98). Two lookups:
/// <list type="bullet">
/// <item><description><see cref="TryResolveByOffset"/> — the line's own file and byte offset
/// (IME service family and AgentExecutor.log: eras are byte ranges).</description></item>
/// <item><description><see cref="TryResolveByLocalTime"/> — transfer for files written by the
/// SAME process as the IME service log but without their own era marker (AppWorkload.log,
/// AppActionProcessor.log: plugins hosted in IntuneManagementExtension.exe, verified in the
/// decompiled build). Within one process every file shares the zone belief, so a local
/// timestamp places the line in the service era whose local range contains it. Disabled
/// entirely when the service eras' local ranges are not monotonic (a westward zone change
/// between two service starts makes the ranges overlap) — ambiguity must never anchor.</description></item>
/// </list>
/// Everything not resolvable here stays on the marked reader-zone fallback; a partially
/// corrected era is never produced because an anchor applies to a whole era or not at all.
/// </summary>
internal sealed class CmTraceEraTable
{
private readonly List<CmTraceEra> _offsetEras = new List<CmTraceEra>();
private readonly List<CmTraceEra> _serviceEras = new List<CmTraceEra>();
private bool _transferAmbiguous;
public IReadOnlyList<CmTraceEra> ServiceEras => _serviceEras;
public bool TransferAmbiguous => _transferAmbiguous;
public int AnchoredEraCount
{
get
{
var n = 0;
foreach (var e in _offsetEras) if (e.IsAnchored) n++;
return n;
}
}
/// <summary>Register an era addressable by (file, offset). Service eras also take part in the local-time transfer.</summary>
public void Add(CmTraceEra era, bool isServiceEra)
{
_offsetEras.Add(era);
if (isServiceEra) _serviceEras.Add(era);
}
/// <summary>Call once after all service eras are added: validates the local ranges used by the transfer.</summary>
public void Seal()
{
_transferAmbiguous = false;
DateTime? previousStart = null;
foreach (var era in _serviceEras)
{
if (!era.StartLocal.HasValue) continue;
if (previousStart.HasValue && era.StartLocal.Value <= previousStart.Value)
{
_transferAmbiguous = true;
break;
}
previousStart = era.StartLocal;
}
}
public bool TryResolveByOffset(string fileName, long offset, out TimeSpan writerOffset, out string anchorKind)
{
writerOffset = TimeSpan.Zero;
anchorKind = string.Empty;
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(fileName) || offset < 0) return false;
foreach (var era in _offsetEras)
{
if (!era.IsAnchored) continue;
foreach (var seg in era.Segments)
{
if (seg.Contains(fileName, offset))
{
writerOffset = era.Offset!.Value;
anchorKind = era.AnchorKind ?? string.Empty;
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
public bool TryResolveByLocalTime(DateTime localTimestamp, out TimeSpan writerOffset, out string anchorKind)
{
writerOffset = TimeSpan.Zero;
anchorKind = string.Empty;
if (_transferAmbiguous) return false;
var local = DateTime.SpecifyKind(localTimestamp, DateTimeKind.Unspecified);
foreach (var era in _serviceEras)
{
if (!era.IsAnchored) continue;
// A leading era with unknown start covers everything before its end.
var afterStart = !era.StartLocal.HasValue || local >= era.StartLocal.Value;
var beforeEnd = !era.EndLocal.HasValue || local < era.EndLocal.Value;
if (afterStart && beforeEnd)
{
writerOffset = era.Offset!.Value;
anchorKind = era.AnchorKind + "/service-era-transfer";
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
}
}
@@ -27,6 +27,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
/// <see cref="CmTraceOffsetCalibrator.TryMeasureOffset"/>.
/// </summary>
LineAnchored = 3,
/// <summary>
/// A backlog line resolved through its writer ERA: the stretch of log written by one
/// process lifetime, anchored by an entry inside that era whose UTC instant the agent
/// knows exactly (the install marker vs. the IME's own record of the bootstrap script's
/// result — a few hundred milliseconds apart). An anchor applies to a whole era or not
/// at all, never across an "EMS Agent Started" boundary. See <c>ImeLogEraPreScan</c>
/// (2026-09-04, session a7140f98).
/// </summary>
EraAnchored = 4,
}
/// <summary>
@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
#nullable enable
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using System.Text;
using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Logging;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
{
/// <summary>
/// Builds the <see cref="CmTraceEraTable"/> for the backlog the tracker is about to read
/// (2026-09-04, session a7140f98: the IME service wrote the whole device-ESP era under the
/// OOBE default zone, Windows moved the zone before the agent started, and the restart
/// replay put every pre-reboot line three hours early — a 20-minute DeviceSetup became a
/// "blocking app timeout").
/// <para>
/// Backlog lines can never self-anchor (their age would round onto the offset grid), so an
/// era needs an entry whose UTC instant is known independently. The one such entry every
/// platform-script bootstrap leaves behind is the bootstrap script's own execution: the
/// install marker (<c>HKLM\SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor\Deployed</c>, UTC) is written
/// milliseconds before the script exits, and the IME logs that exit twice — AgentExecutor.log
/// records the script's stdout ("Bootstrap Completed Successfully"), and the service log
/// records "[PowerShell] … Policy id = &lt;bootstrap&gt;, policy result = …". Field measurement
/// (4 sessions, 2026-09-04): 0.13–0.28 s between marker and stdout record, 0.02–0.08 s more to
/// the service record — against a 15-minute grid with a 2-minute residual guard.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Rules that keep this sound: only the FIRST bootstrap record of each file is offered (a
/// SKIP re-run minutes later could round onto the grid); the residual guard is
/// <see cref="CmTraceOffsetCalibrator.TryMeasureOffset"/>; an anchor applies to the whole
/// era between two "EMS Agent Started" entries (service) or one script execution
/// (AgentExecutor) and never beyond; nothing is anchored without a marker (MSI bootstrap,
/// replay tooling). Everything else stays on the marked reader-zone fallback.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
internal static class ImeLogEraPreScan
{
internal const string AnchorKindBootstrapStdout = "bootstrap-stdout";
internal const string AnchorKindBootstrapPolicyResult = "bootstrap-policy-result";
private const string ServiceStartedPrefix = "EMS Agent Started";
private const string ExecutorScriptStartPrefix = "Adding argument powershell with value ";
private const string ExecutorOutputPrefix = "write output done.";
private const string BootstrapInstallRunMarker = "Bootstrap Completed Successfully";
private const string BootstrapInstallRunMarkerAlt = "Agent install mode completed successfully";
private static readonly Regex ExecutorScriptPolicyId = new Regex(
@"Policies\\Scripts\\[a-z0-9\-]+_(?<id>[a-f0-9]{8}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{12})\.ps1",
RegexOptions.Compiled | RegexOptions.IgnoreCase, TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1));
private static readonly Regex ServicePolicyResult = new Regex(
@"^\[PowerShell\] User Id = [a-f0-9\-]+, Policy id = (?<id>[a-f0-9]{8}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{12}), policy result = ",
RegexOptions.Compiled | RegexOptions.IgnoreCase, TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1));
private const int MaxEntryLines = 100;
public sealed class ScanInput
{
public ScanInput(string filePath, long startOffset)
{
FilePath = filePath;
StartOffset = startOffset;
}
public string FilePath { get; }
public long StartOffset { get; }
}
public static bool IsServiceLogFile(string fileName) =>
fileName.StartsWith("IntuneManagementExtension", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
|| fileName.StartsWith("_IntuneManagementExtension", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
public static bool IsExecutorLogFile(string fileName) =>
fileName.StartsWith("AgentExecutor", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
/// <summary>Files written in-process by the IME service without an era marker of their own (transfer by local time).</summary>
public static bool IsServiceHostedFile(string fileName) =>
fileName.StartsWith("AppWorkload", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
|| fileName.StartsWith("AppActionProcessor", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
/// <summary>
/// Scan the given files (sort order = write order; archived before current) from their
/// start offsets to EOF and return the era table. Never throws; a file that cannot be
/// read contributes no eras.
/// </summary>
public static CmTraceEraTable Build(
IReadOnlyList<ScanInput> files,
DateTime? deployedUtc,
int maxEntryBytes,
AgentLogger? logger)
{
var table = new CmTraceEraTable();
if (!deployedUtc.HasValue)
{
logger?.Info("ImeLogEraPreScan: no Deployed marker — backlog eras stay on the reader-zone fallback");
return table;
}
string? bootstrapPolicyId = null;
// AgentExecutor first: it is where the bootstrap policy id becomes known.
foreach (var input in files)
{
if (!IsExecutorLogFile(Path.GetFileName(input.FilePath))) continue;
try { ScanExecutorFile(input, deployedUtc.Value, maxEntryBytes, table, ref bootstrapPolicyId, logger); }
catch (Exception ex) { logger?.Debug($"ImeLogEraPreScan: {Path.GetFileName(input.FilePath)} skipped: {ex.Message}"); }
}
var serviceFiles = new List<ScanInput>();
foreach (var input in files)
if (IsServiceLogFile(Path.GetFileName(input.FilePath))) serviceFiles.Add(input);
try { ScanServiceFiles(serviceFiles, deployedUtc.Value, maxEntryBytes, table, bootstrapPolicyId, logger); }
catch (Exception ex) { logger?.Debug($"ImeLogEraPreScan: service scan aborted: {ex.Message}"); }
table.Seal();
logger?.Info(
$"ImeLogEraPreScan: {table.AnchoredEraCount} anchored era(s), {table.ServiceEras.Count} service era(s), " +
$"bootstrapPolicyId={(bootstrapPolicyId ?? "(unknown)")}, transfer={(table.TransferAmbiguous ? "ambiguous-disabled" : "enabled")}");
return table;
}
private static void ScanExecutorFile(
ScanInput input, DateTime deployedUtc, int maxEntryBytes, CmTraceEraTable table,
ref string? bootstrapPolicyId, AgentLogger? logger)
{
var fileName = Path.GetFileName(input.FilePath);
CmTraceEra? current = null;
string? currentPolicyId = null;
var anchored = false;
foreach (var e in ReadEntries(input, maxEntryBytes))
{
if (e.Message.StartsWith(ExecutorScriptStartPrefix, StringComparison.Ordinal))
{
if (current != null) current.Segments[0].EndOffset = e.Offset;
current = new CmTraceEra();
current.Segments.Add(new CmTraceEraSegment(fileName, e.Offset, long.MaxValue));
current.StartLocal = e.HasTimestamp ? e.LocalTimestamp : (DateTime?)null;
table.Add(current, isServiceEra: false);
var m = ExecutorScriptPolicyId.Match(e.Message);
currentPolicyId = m.Success ? m.Groups["id"].Value : null;
continue;
}
if (anchored || current == null || !e.HasTimestamp) continue;
if (!e.Message.StartsWith(ExecutorOutputPrefix, StringComparison.Ordinal)) continue;
if (e.Message.IndexOf(BootstrapInstallRunMarker, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) < 0
&& e.Message.IndexOf(BootstrapInstallRunMarkerAlt, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) < 0)
continue;
// First bootstrap install record of this file, offered once — accepted or not.
anchored = true;
if (CmTraceOffsetCalibrator.TryMeasureOffset(e.LocalTimestamp, deployedUtc, out var offset))
{
current.Offset = offset;
current.AnchorKind = AnchorKindBootstrapStdout;
if (bootstrapPolicyId == null) bootstrapPolicyId = currentPolicyId;
logger?.Info($"ImeLogEraPreScan: {fileName} bootstrap execution anchored at {offset} (stdout local={e.LocalTimestamp:yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ss.fff}, policy={currentPolicyId ?? "?"})");
}
else
{
logger?.Info($"ImeLogEraPreScan: {fileName} bootstrap stdout record rejected by the residual guard (local={e.LocalTimestamp:yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ss.fff}, deployed={deployedUtc:HH:mm:ss}Z)");
if (bootstrapPolicyId == null) bootstrapPolicyId = currentPolicyId;
}
}
}
private static void ScanServiceFiles(
IReadOnlyList<ScanInput> files, DateTime deployedUtc, int maxEntryBytes, CmTraceEraTable table,
string? bootstrapPolicyId, AgentLogger? logger)
{
if (files.Count == 0) return;
// The leading era: whatever process was writing when the scanned region begins.
var current = new CmTraceEra();
table.Add(current, isServiceEra: true);
var resultOffered = false;
foreach (var input in files)
{
var fileName = Path.GetFileName(input.FilePath);
var segment = new CmTraceEraSegment(fileName, input.StartOffset, long.MaxValue);
current.Segments.Add(segment);
foreach (var e in ReadEntries(input, maxEntryBytes))
{
if (e.Message.StartsWith(ServiceStartedPrefix, StringComparison.Ordinal))
{
segment.EndOffset = e.Offset;
var next = new CmTraceEra { StartLocal = e.HasTimestamp ? e.LocalTimestamp : (DateTime?)null };
current.EndLocal = next.StartLocal;
segment = new CmTraceEraSegment(fileName, e.Offset, long.MaxValue);
next.Segments.Add(segment);
table.Add(next, isServiceEra: true);
current = next;
continue;
}
if (resultOffered || bootstrapPolicyId == null || !e.HasTimestamp) continue;
if (!e.Message.StartsWith("[PowerShell] User Id = ", StringComparison.Ordinal)) continue;
var m = ServicePolicyResult.Match(e.Message);
if (!m.Success || !string.Equals(m.Groups["id"].Value, bootstrapPolicyId, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)) continue;
// First result record for the bootstrap policy, offered once.
resultOffered = true;
if (CmTraceOffsetCalibrator.TryMeasureOffset(e.LocalTimestamp, deployedUtc, out var offset))
{
current.Offset = offset;
current.AnchorKind = AnchorKindBootstrapPolicyResult;
logger?.Info($"ImeLogEraPreScan: {fileName} service era anchored at {offset} (policy result local={e.LocalTimestamp:yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ss.fff})");
}
else
{
logger?.Info($"ImeLogEraPreScan: {fileName} bootstrap policy result rejected by the residual guard (local={e.LocalTimestamp:yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ss.fff}, deployed={deployedUtc:HH:mm:ss}Z)");
}
}
// The era continues into the next (newer) file: close this file's segment at EOF.
try { segment.EndOffset = new FileInfo(input.FilePath).Length; } catch { segment.EndOffset = long.MaxValue; }
}
// The last era stays open in its last file.
var last = current.Segments[current.Segments.Count - 1];
last.EndOffset = long.MaxValue;
}
private sealed class ScannedEntry
{
public long Offset;
public bool HasTimestamp;
public DateTime LocalTimestamp;
public string Message = string.Empty;
}
/// <summary>
/// Enumerate CMTrace entries with their file offsets. Same multiline assembly as the
/// tracker's read loop (an AgentExecutor stdout record spans many lines; the closing tag
/// carries the time); oversized or over-long entries are dropped, never partially used.
/// </summary>
private static IEnumerable<ScannedEntry> ReadEntries(ScanInput input, int maxEntryBytes)
{
using (var stream = new FileStream(input.FilePath, FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read, FileShare.ReadWrite))
{
if (input.StartOffset > 0 && input.StartOffset < stream.Length)
stream.Seek(input.StartOffset, SeekOrigin.Begin);
else if (input.StartOffset >= stream.Length)
yield break;
var reader = new BoundedLineReader(stream, maxEntryBytes);
StringBuilder? buffer = null;
var bufferLines = 0;
long entryStart = input.StartOffset;
var skipping = false;
while (true)
{
var line = reader.ReadLineAsync(System.Threading.CancellationToken.None).GetAwaiter().GetResult();
if (line == null) yield break;
if (buffer == null) entryStart = reader.LastLineStart;
if (reader.LastLineTruncated)
{
buffer = null; bufferLines = 0; skipping = true;
continue;
}
if (skipping)
{
if (line.StartsWith("<![LOG[", StringComparison.Ordinal)) skipping = false;
else
{
if (line.Contains("]LOG]!>")) skipping = false;
continue;
}
}
if (buffer != null)
{
buffer.Append('\n').Append(line);
bufferLines++;
if (line.Contains("]LOG]!>"))
{
line = buffer.ToString();
buffer = null; bufferLines = 0;
}
else if (bufferLines >= MaxEntryLines || buffer.Length >= maxEntryBytes)
{
buffer = null; bufferLines = 0; skipping = true;
continue;
}
else continue;
}
else if (line.StartsWith("<![LOG[", StringComparison.Ordinal) && !line.Contains("]LOG]!>"))
{
buffer = new StringBuilder(line);
bufferLines = 1;
continue;
}
if (!CmTraceLogParser.TryParseLine(line, out var entry) || entry == null) continue;
yield return new ScannedEntry
{
Offset = entryStart,
HasTimestamp = entry.HasTimestamp && !entry.BiasMinutes.HasValue,
LocalTimestamp = entry.LocalTimestamp,
Message = entry.Message ?? string.Empty,
};
}
}
}
}
}
@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// --- Normal processing (single-line or completed multiline) ---
CmTraceLogEntry entry;
string messageToMatch;
_currentEntryOffset = entryStart;
if (CmTraceLogParser.TryParseLine(line, out entry))
{
messageToMatch = entry.Message;
@@ -312,6 +313,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// flagged as such.
if (hadPreviousObservation && calibrationAnchor != null)
CalibrateFrom(_currentSourceFileName, Path.GetFileName(filePath), calibrationAnchor);
_currentEntryOffset = -1;
}
}
catch (FileNotFoundException) { }
@@ -489,7 +491,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
"imeshutdown", "espphasedetected", "setcurrentapp",
"updatestateinstalled", "updatestatedownloading", "updatestateinstalling",
"updatestateskipped", "updatestateerror", "updatestatepostponed",
"captureexitcode", "capturehresult", "captureappversion",
"captureexitcode", "capturehresult", "captureexitcodeclass", "captureappversion",
"captureapptypewinget", "captureapptypemsi", "captureattemptnumber",
"capturedetectionresult", "esptrackstatus", "policiesdiscovered",
"ignorecompletedapp", "updatename", "updatewin32appstate",
@@ -509,6 +511,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
LastMatchedSourceOffsetMinutes = null;
LastMatchedSourceOffsetOrigin = CmTraceOffsetOrigin.None;
LastMatchedMeasuredWriterOffsetMinutes = null;
LastMatchedEraAnchorKind = string.Empty;
}
else
{
@@ -518,6 +521,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
LastMatchedSourceLocalTimestamp = entry.HasTimestamp ? entry.LocalTimestamp : (DateTime?)null;
LastMatchedSourceOffsetMinutes = offsetMinutes;
LastMatchedSourceOffsetOrigin = origin;
LastMatchedEraAnchorKind = origin == CmTraceOffsetOrigin.EraAnchored ? _lastEraAnchorKind : string.Empty;
// Observational: what the calibrator measured for this file, distinct from what
// was applied above.
@@ -555,7 +559,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// Placed after the staleness gate so a success replayed from a previous
// enrollment's log cannot clear a genuine current outage.
if (!isStaleReplayLine && string.Equals(pattern.PatternId, "IME-TOKEN-SUCCESS", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
ClearPendingTokenFailure();
// Raw user-token observation for the Entra user-affinity detector (2026-09-04).
// Deliberately NOT routed through espPhaseDetected: that path deduplicates once
// AccountSetup is set, so a FullESP session would never report the token that
// followed the real-user desktop.
try { OnUserTokenAcquired?.Invoke(LastMatchedLogTimestamp); }
catch (Exception ex) { _logger?.Warning($"OnUserTokenAcquired handler threw: {ex.Message}"); }
}
try
{
@@ -617,6 +629,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
case "imetokenfailure":
HandleImeTokenFailure(match.Groups["errorCode"]?.Value, message);
// Raw per-line observation (staleness already enforced above via
// AppMutatingActions) — the affinity detector counts failures after
// the real-user desktop; the grace-window Warning stays separate.
try { OnTokenFailureLine?.Invoke(match.Groups["errorCode"]?.Value, LastMatchedLogTimestamp); }
catch (Exception ex) { _logger?.Warning($"OnTokenFailureLine handler threw: {ex.Message}"); }
break;
case "imeimpersonation":
@@ -698,6 +715,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
_packageStates.GetPackage(_packageStates.CurrentPackageId)?.UpdateHResult(hresultVal);
break;
case "captureexitcodeclass":
// Return-code class of the exit code captured just before (IME logs the
// number, then "lpExitCode is defined as <class>"). Same current-app
// addressing as captureExitCode; last value wins across a Retry loop.
var exitCodeClassVal = match.Groups["exitCodeClass"]?.Value;
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(exitCodeClassVal) && !string.IsNullOrEmpty(_packageStates.CurrentPackageId))
_packageStates.GetPackage(_packageStates.CurrentPackageId)?.UpdateExitCodeClass(exitCodeClassVal);
break;
case "captureappversion":
var appVersionVal = match.Groups["appVersion"]?.Value;
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(id) && !string.IsNullOrEmpty(appVersionVal))
@@ -941,6 +967,29 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
}
}
// ERA ANCHOR (2026-09-04, session a7140f98): a backlog line whose writer era was
// anchored by the bootstrap execution record resolves through that era's offset.
// Whole era or nothing — the anchor never crosses an "EMS Agent Started" boundary,
// and in-process sibling files (AppWorkload, AppActionProcessor) join by local
// time only while the service eras' local ranges are unambiguous. See
// ImeLogEraPreScan for why this is the one anchor a backlog line can trust.
_lastEraAnchorKind = string.Empty;
if (_currentSourceFileName != null && _currentEntryOffset >= 0)
{
TimeSpan eraOffset;
string anchorKind;
var resolved = EraTable.TryResolveByOffset(_currentSourceFileName, _currentEntryOffset, out eraOffset, out anchorKind)
|| (ImeLogEraPreScan.IsServiceHostedFile(_currentSourceFileName)
&& EraTable.TryResolveByLocalTime(entry.LocalTimestamp, out eraOffset, out anchorKind));
if (resolved)
{
origin = CmTraceOffsetOrigin.EraAnchored;
offsetMinutes = (int)eraOffset.TotalMinutes;
_lastEraAnchorKind = anchorKind;
return DateTime.SpecifyKind(entry.LocalTimestamp - eraOffset, DateTimeKind.Utc);
}
}
// Fallback for everything not provably fresh: assume the reader's zone, UNIFORMLY.
// Wrong in absolute terms whenever the writer held a different belief, but
// self-consistent — both ends of a duration are wrong by the same amount, so derived
@@ -223,7 +223,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
return true;
}
private const int MaxScriptOutputLength = 2048;
// Script stdout kept per event. Measured over 1,486 script outputs in the fleet
// (2026-08-25..09-08): median 39, p90 644, max 1,501 chars -- the maximum being our own
// one-stage bootstrap, and nothing ever hit the previous 2,048 cap. The two-stage
// bootstrap then added a ~460-char loader preamble to that maximum and started
// truncating the one output an operator actually reads. 8,192 leaves room for the
// realistic worst case (download retries plus relax logging, ~2,700) and stays 4x below
// the 32K-char Table Storage property limit that bounds the event downstream. Growth
// driver is the number of log lines the bootstrap chain writes, so re-measure before
// adding a chatty step rather than raising this again.
private const int MaxScriptOutputLength = 8192;
private const int MaxMultiLineBufferLines = 100;
// Size cap for ONE entry — a single physical line (enforced by BoundedLineReader before
// the line is materialized) and an assembled multiline entry alike. Any process able to
@@ -400,6 +409,27 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
/// <summary>How that offset was arrived at — declared, measured, or neither.</summary>
public CmTraceOffsetOrigin LastMatchedSourceOffsetOrigin { get; internal set; }
/// <summary>
/// For <see cref="CmTraceOffsetOrigin.EraAnchored"/>: which anchor established the era's
/// offset ("bootstrap-policy-result", "bootstrap-stdout", with "/service-era-transfer"
/// when the line came from an in-process sibling file). Empty otherwise.
/// </summary>
public string LastMatchedEraAnchorKind { get; internal set; } = string.Empty;
/// <summary>
/// Source of the install marker's UTC instant for the backlog era pre-scan
/// (<see cref="ImeLogEraPreScan"/>). Defaults to the registry marker; tests inject.
/// </summary>
internal Func<DateTime?> DeployedUtcProvider { get; set; } = Security.DeploymentMarker.TryReadDeployedUtc;
/// <summary>Era table built by <see cref="PreScanEras"/> at <see cref="Start"/>; empty until then.</summary>
internal CmTraceEraTable EraTable { get; private set; } = new CmTraceEraTable();
// Byte offset of the entry currently being resolved in the read loop (-1 outside it) —
// the key for the era lookup. Set next to _currentSourceFileName.
private long _currentEntryOffset = -1;
private string _lastEraAnchorKind = string.Empty;
/// <summary>
/// The offset the calibrator MEASURED for the source file, which is not necessarily the
/// one applied.
@@ -425,6 +455,21 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// Args: errorCode (may be empty when IME logged none), raw failure line excerpt.
// Fired once per distinct errorCode per tracker lifetime (see HandleImeTokenFailure).
public Action<string, string> OnImeTokenFailure { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Fires on EVERY IME-TOKEN-SUCCESS line that passes the historic-replay gate, with the
/// line's resolved UTC (null when the line carried no timestamp). Unlike
/// <see cref="OnEspPhaseChanged"/> (deduplicated once AccountSetup is set) and unlike the
/// grace-window model behind <see cref="OnImeTokenFailure"/>, this is the raw observation:
/// "Successfully get the token" is IntuneTokenManager acquiring the signed-in user's token
/// through WAM, i.e. the only SYSTEM-visible proof of Entra user affinity (2026-09-04).
/// </summary>
public Action<DateTime?> OnUserTokenAcquired { get; set; }
/// <summary>
/// Fires on EVERY IME-TOKEN-FAILURE line that passes the historic-replay gate:
/// errorCode (may be empty) and the line's resolved UTC. Raw observation — the
/// deduplicated Warning stays on <see cref="OnImeTokenFailure"/>.
/// </summary>
public Action<string, DateTime?> OnTokenFailureLine { get; set; }
// Second arg: the [DO TEL] source log line's timestamp when the DO data came from a
// log line, null when the DO collector observed the completion live via polling. The
// consumer must stamp poll-driven telemetry with the clock — inheriting an unrelated
@@ -839,6 +884,44 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
ActivatePatterns(_logPhaseIsCurrentPhase, force: true);
}
/// <summary>
/// Build the backlog era table from the files the first pass will read, each from the
/// position the pass will start at. Never throws — a failure leaves the table empty and
/// every backlog line on the reader-zone fallback, exactly as before.
/// </summary>
internal void PreScanEras()
{
try
{
if (!Directory.Exists(_logFolder)) return;
var inputs = new List<ImeLogEraPreScan.ScanInput>();
var files = new List<string>();
foreach (var filePath in Directory.EnumerateFiles(_logFolder))
{
if (MatchesLogFilePattern(Path.GetFileName(filePath)))
files.Add(filePath);
}
files.Sort(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
foreach (var filePath in files)
{
var info = new FileInfo(filePath);
if (!info.Exists) continue;
inputs.Add(new ImeLogEraPreScan.ScanInput(filePath, _positionTracker.GetSafePosition(filePath, info.Length)));
}
DateTime? deployedUtc = null;
try { deployedUtc = DeployedUtcProvider?.Invoke(); }
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: Deployed marker read failed: {ex.Message}"); }
EraTable = ImeLogEraPreScan.Build(inputs, deployedUtc, MaxEntryBytes, _logger);
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
_logger.Warning($"ImeLogTracker: era pre-scan failed — backlog stays on the reader-zone fallback: {ex.Message}");
EraTable = new CmTraceEraTable();
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Starts the background polling task
/// </summary>
@@ -851,6 +934,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// exactly where we left off — no re-parsing, no device-phase bleeding.
LoadState();
// Era anchors for the backlog the first pass is about to read (2026-09-04). Runs
// before the poll loop so every replayed line already finds its era; read-only on
// the position tracker. Replay tooling anchors nothing — its logs did not come from
// this device's bootstrap.
if (!SimulationMode) PreScanEras();
_cts = new CancellationTokenSource();
var token = _cts.Token;
@@ -1161,6 +1250,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
ErrorCode = p.ErrorCode,
ExitCode = p.ExitCode,
HResultFromWin32 = p.HResultFromWin32,
ExitCodeClass = p.ExitCodeClass,
DoFileSize = p.DoFileSize,
DoTotalBytesDownloaded = p.DoTotalBytesDownloaded,
DoBytesFromPeers = p.DoBytesFromPeers,
@@ -1190,6 +1280,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
p.ProgressPercent, p.BytesDownloaded, p.BytesTotal,
errorPatternId: p.ErrorPatternId, errorDetail: p.ErrorDetail, errorCode: p.ErrorCode,
exitCode: p.ExitCode, hresultFromWin32: p.HResultFromWin32,
exitCodeClass: p.ExitCodeClass,
doFileSize: p.DoFileSize, doTotalBytesDownloaded: p.DoTotalBytesDownloaded,
doBytesFromPeers: p.DoBytesFromPeers, doPercentPeerCaching: p.DoPercentPeerCaching,
doBytesFromLanPeers: p.DoBytesFromLanPeers, doBytesFromGroupPeers: p.DoBytesFromGroupPeers,
@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
// Installer result codes
public string ExitCode { get; set; }
public string HResultFromWin32 { get; set; }
// Return-code class of the last exit code (null on state files written before the field
// existed) - must survive the reboot a SoftReboot/HardReboot app asks for.
public string ExitCodeClass { get; set; }
// Delivery Optimization telemetry
public long DoFileSize { get; set; }
@@ -67,6 +67,17 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
public event EventHandler<AadPlaceholderUserDetectedEventArgs> PlaceholderUserDetected;
public event EventHandler<AadUserJoinedEventArgs> AadUserJoined;
/// <summary>
/// <c>true</c> while a provisioning placeholder (foouser@/autopilot@) is the JoinInfo
/// user and no real user has replaced it. On a Hybrid join this stays true through the
/// whole user sign-in — the AD sign-in never touches JoinInfo — so consumers report it
/// as a fact, never as sign-in evidence (2026-09-04).
/// </summary>
internal bool PlaceholderObservedWithoutRealUser
{
get { lock (_stateLock) return _placeholderFired && !_realUserFired; }
}
public AadJoinWatcher(AgentLogger logger)
{
_logger = logger ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(logger));
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
try
{
OnTraceEvent?.Invoke(
"desktop_excluded_user",
SharedEventTypes.DesktopExcludedUser,
$"explorer.exe found but owned by excluded user '{owner}' — not a real user desktop",
new Dictionary<string, object> { { "pid", proc.Id }, { "session", proc.SessionId }, { "owner", owner } });
}
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
try
{
OnTraceEvent?.Invoke(
"desktop_real_user_detected",
SharedEventTypes.DesktopRealUserDetected,
$"Real user desktop detected (explorer.exe PID {proc.Id}, user '[redacted]')",
new Dictionary<string, object> { { "pid", proc.Id }, { "session", proc.SessionId }, { "owner", "[redacted]" } });
}
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
#nullable enable
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using System.Threading;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using SharedConstants = AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Constants;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
{
/// <summary>
/// Single-shot detector for Entra user affinity on Hybrid Azure AD Join devices
/// (2026-09-04, session a7140f98). After the real user signs in, IME acquires that user's
/// token through WAM and logs "Successfully get the token" (IntuneTokenManager,
/// <c>IME-TOKEN-SUCCESS</c>). That line is the only SYSTEM-visible proof that the user
/// session carries an Entra identity (PRT); a session whose user never gets one shows only
/// "Failed to get AAD token" lines after the desktop.
/// <para>
/// Contract: <see cref="NotifyRealUserDesktop"/> arms the timer when the device is a Hybrid
/// join (probe injected by the host). The first token success stamped after the desktop
/// cancels the timer and emits <c>ime_user_token_acquired</c>; the timer emits
/// <c>entra_user_affinity_pending</c> with the failure codes observed since the desktop.
/// A token that arrives after the timer fired is still posted once — it tells the
/// timeline (and the backend rule) that affinity came late rather than never.
/// Both emissions happen at most once per agent process — a reboot starts a new process,
/// whose repeat is exactly the confidence signal the backend rule counts. Token lines older
/// than the desktop (minus a small tolerance for the 30 s desktop poll) belong to the
/// device phase and are ignored: they appear in every enrollment.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Not a decision signal. Never influences completion. The JoinInfo placeholder is reported
/// as a fact in the payload because it is NOT a login signal on a Hybrid join — the AD
/// sign-in never replaces it; only the later Entra device registration does.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
internal sealed class EntraUserAffinityDetector : IDisposable
{
internal const int DefaultDelayMinutes = 10;
internal const string SourceLabel = "EntraUserAffinityDetector";
/// <summary>Token lines this much older than the desktop observation still count as post-desktop.</summary>
internal static readonly TimeSpan DesktopPollTolerance = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(2);
private readonly InformationalEventPost _post;
private readonly AgentLogger _logger;
private readonly Func<bool> _isHybridJoinProbe;
private readonly Func<bool>? _placeholderActiveProbe;
private readonly Func<DateTime> _utcNow;
private readonly TimeSpan _delay;
private readonly object _lock = new object();
private readonly List<string> _failureCodesSinceDesktop = new List<string>();
private Timer? _timer;
private DateTime? _desktopObservedUtc;
private bool _armed;
private bool _fired;
private bool _tokenAcquiredPosted;
private int _failureCountSinceDesktop;
private int _disposed;
internal EntraUserAffinityDetector(
InformationalEventPost post,
AgentLogger logger,
Func<bool> isHybridJoinProbe,
Func<bool>? placeholderActiveProbe = null,
TimeSpan? delay = null,
Func<DateTime>? utcNow = null)
{
_post = post ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(post));
_logger = logger ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(logger));
_isHybridJoinProbe = isHybridJoinProbe ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(isHybridJoinProbe));
_placeholderActiveProbe = placeholderActiveProbe;
_delay = delay ?? TimeSpan.FromMinutes(DefaultDelayMinutes);
_utcNow = utcNow ?? (() => DateTime.UtcNow);
}
/// <summary>
/// The DesktopArrivalDetector resolved explorer.exe under a real (non-placeholder,
/// non-system) user. Arms the timer on Hybrid devices; idempotent; no-op after a
/// token success or after the timer fired.
/// </summary>
public void NotifyRealUserDesktop()
{
bool hybrid;
try { hybrid = _isHybridJoinProbe(); }
catch (Exception ex)
{
_logger.Warning($"EntraUserAffinityDetector: hybrid probe threw — not arming: {ex.Message}");
return;
}
lock (_lock)
{
if (_disposed != 0 || _armed || _fired || _tokenAcquiredPosted) return;
if (!hybrid)
{
_logger.Debug("EntraUserAffinityDetector: real-user desktop on a non-Hybrid device — not armed");
return;
}
_desktopObservedUtc = _utcNow();
_armed = true;
_logger.Info(
$"EntraUserAffinityDetector: armed at real-user desktop — will emit {SharedConstants.EventTypes.EntraUserAffinityPending} in {_delay.TotalMinutes:F0} min unless IME acquires a user token");
_timer = new Timer(OnTimer, null, _delay, Timeout.InfiniteTimeSpan);
}
}
/// <summary>IME-TOKEN-SUCCESS line observed; <paramref name="lineUtc"/> is the line's resolved time.</summary>
public void NotifyUserTokenAcquired(DateTime? lineUtc)
{
DateTime desktop;
double minutesAfterDesktop;
lock (_lock)
{
if (_disposed != 0 || !_armed || _tokenAcquiredPosted) return;
desktop = _desktopObservedUtc!.Value;
if (!IsAfterDesktop(lineUtc, desktop)) return;
_tokenAcquiredPosted = true;
_timer?.Dispose();
_timer = null;
minutesAfterDesktop = ((lineUtc ?? _utcNow()) - desktop).TotalMinutes;
}
var data = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.Ordinal)
{
["minutesAfterDesktop"] = Math.Max(0, minutesAfterDesktop).ToString("F1", System.Globalization.CultureInfo.InvariantCulture),
["tokenFailuresBeforeSuccess"] = _failureCountSinceDesktop.ToString(System.Globalization.CultureInfo.InvariantCulture),
["isHybridJoin"] = "true",
};
_post.Emit(
eventType: SharedConstants.EventTypes.ImeUserTokenAcquired,
source: SourceLabel,
message: "Entra user token acquired by IME after the real-user desktop — user affinity established",
severity: EventSeverity.Info,
immediateUpload: false,
data: data,
occurredAtUtc: lineUtc);
_logger.Info($"EntraUserAffinityDetector: user token observed {minutesAfterDesktop:F1} min after desktop — timer cancelled");
}
/// <summary>IME-TOKEN-FAILURE line observed; counted only when stamped after the desktop.</summary>
public void NotifyTokenFailureLine(string? errorCode, DateTime? lineUtc)
{
lock (_lock)
{
if (_disposed != 0 || !_armed || _fired || _tokenAcquiredPosted) return;
if (!IsAfterDesktop(lineUtc, _desktopObservedUtc!.Value)) return;
_failureCountSinceDesktop++;
var code = string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(errorCode) ? "unknown" : errorCode!.Trim();
if (!_failureCodesSinceDesktop.Contains(code, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
_failureCodesSinceDesktop.Add(code);
}
}
public void Dispose()
{
if (Interlocked.Exchange(ref _disposed, 1) == 1) return;
lock (_lock)
{
_timer?.Dispose();
_timer = null;
}
}
// Test seams — same lock and state guards as the production paths.
internal void TriggerFromTest() => OnTimer(null);
internal bool IsArmedForTest { get { lock (_lock) { return _armed; } } }
internal bool HasFiredForTest { get { lock (_lock) { return _fired; } } }
internal bool TokenAcquiredPostedForTest { get { lock (_lock) { return _tokenAcquiredPosted; } } }
private static bool IsAfterDesktop(DateTime? lineUtc, DateTime desktopUtc)
{
// A line without a timestamp cannot be placed — treat it as current (the tracker
// only hands us lines it just read), which is after the desktop by construction.
if (!lineUtc.HasValue) return true;
return lineUtc.Value >= desktopUtc - DesktopPollTolerance;
}
private void OnTimer(object? state)
{
string codes;
int count;
double minutesSinceDesktop;
lock (_lock)
{
if (_disposed != 0 || !_armed || _fired || _tokenAcquiredPosted) return;
_fired = true;
_timer?.Dispose();
_timer = null;
codes = string.Join(",", _failureCodesSinceDesktop);
count = _failureCountSinceDesktop;
minutesSinceDesktop = (_utcNow() - _desktopObservedUtc!.Value).TotalMinutes;
}
var placeholderActive = "unknown";
try
{
if (_placeholderActiveProbe != null)
placeholderActive = _placeholderActiveProbe() ? "true" : "false";
}
catch { /* observational */ }
var data = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.Ordinal)
{
["delayMinutes"] = ((int)_delay.TotalMinutes).ToString(System.Globalization.CultureInfo.InvariantCulture),
["reason"] = "timer_fired",
["minutesSinceDesktop"] = Math.Max(0, minutesSinceDesktop).ToString("F1", System.Globalization.CultureInfo.InvariantCulture),
["tokenFailureCount"] = count.ToString(System.Globalization.CultureInfo.InvariantCulture),
["tokenFailureCodes"] = codes,
["placeholderActive"] = placeholderActive,
["isHybridJoin"] = "true",
};
_post.Emit(
eventType: SharedConstants.EventTypes.EntraUserAffinityPending,
source: SourceLabel,
message: $"Hybrid AAD Join: {(int)_delay.TotalMinutes} min after the real-user desktop IME has not acquired an Entra user token — user affinity pending"
+ (count > 0 ? $" ({count} token failure(s): {codes})" : string.Empty),
severity: EventSeverity.Warning,
immediateUpload: true,
data: data);
_logger.Warning($"EntraUserAffinityDetector: emitted {SharedConstants.EventTypes.EntraUserAffinityPending} (failures={count}, codes={codes})");
}
}
}
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
private readonly Func<bool> _userEspAppsSettledProbe;
private readonly Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> _starvedUserEspAppsProbe;
private readonly Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> _packageStatesProbe;
// Session 683f1eff: registry failure detail still sitting in an open settle window,
// consulted when a Shell-Core failure terminalises first (see OnShellCoreEspFailureDetected).
private readonly Func<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs> _pendingEspFailureProbe;
// Session caa6cf50 gate-starvation fix (2026-06-11) — fire-once guard for the
// user-ESP-apps-settled AccountSetup synthesis (see MaybeSynthesizeAccountSetupComplete).
@@ -174,8 +177,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
/// late "Installing-→-Error" promotion can classify the failure correctly
/// AND refuse to promote when the failure originated outside the Apps
/// subcategory (a non-Apps HRESULT does not describe per-app outcome).
/// Null when no HRESULT-carrying ESP failure has fired (or all observed
/// failures came from ShellCoreTracker, which has no HRESULT surface).
/// Null when no registry-derived failure detail has been observed — neither from
/// a settle window that expired nor from one a Shell-Core failure inherited.
/// </summary>
public Termination.EspTerminalFailureSnapshot LastEspTerminalFailure { get; private set; }
@@ -243,7 +246,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
Func<bool> accountSetupActivityProbe = null,
Func<bool> userEspAppsSettledProbe = null,
Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> starvedUserEspAppsProbe = null,
Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> packageStatesProbe = null)
Func<System.Collections.Generic.IReadOnlyList<Ime.AppPackageState>> packageStatesProbe = null,
Func<EspFailureDetectedEventArgs> pendingEspFailureProbe = null)
{
_sessionId = sessionId ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(sessionId));
_tenantId = tenantId ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(tenantId));
@@ -277,6 +281,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
// provisioning tracker name not-completed apps on an Apps-subcategory failure.
_packageStatesProbe = packageStatesProbe
?? (() => Array.Empty<Ime.AppPackageState>());
// Test seam: defaults to the provisioning tracker's open settle window (null when
// none is armed or the tracker is not running, e.g. Device Preparation).
_pendingEspFailureProbe = pendingEspFailureProbe
?? (() => _provisioningTracker?.TryGetPendingFailureArgs());
}
/// <summary>
@@ -658,6 +666,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
internal void TriggerEspExitedForTest(DateTime occurredAtUtc) =>
OnEspExited(this, new EspExitedEventArgs(occurredAtUtc));
// Test seam for a Shell-Core 62407 failure — drives the coordinator forwarder including
// the pending-settle inheritance, without a real ShellCoreTracker.
internal void TriggerShellCoreEspFailureForTest(string failureType) =>
OnShellCoreEspFailureDetected(this, failureType);
// Test seam for HelloWizardStarted — same contract as TriggerEspExitedForTest.
internal void TriggerHelloWizardStartedForTest(DateTime occurredAtUtc) =>
OnHelloWizardStarted(this, new HelloWizardStartedEventArgs(occurredAtUtc));
@@ -673,33 +686,56 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
// Forwarder for ShellCoreTracker (event-log-derived ESP failures, e.g. Shell-Core 62407
// failure descriptions). Source-event timestamp is mirrored so the adapter can stamp the
// DecisionSignal with the historical instant on backfill. ShellCoreTracker has no HRESULT
// surface, so only FailureType is set on the args.
// surface; the registry detail is inherited from an open settle window (see below).
private void OnShellCoreEspFailureDetected(object sender, string failureType)
{
LastEventOccurredAtUtc = (sender as ShellCoreTracker)?.LastEventOccurredAtUtc;
try
{
EspFailureDetected?.Invoke(this, new EspFailureDetectedEventArgs(failureType));
EspFailureDetected?.Invoke(this, BuildShellCoreFailureArgs(failureType));
}
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Error($"Error forwarding ShellCore EspFailureDetected for '{failureType}'", ex); }
finally { LastEventOccurredAtUtc = null; }
}
// Forwarder for ProvisioningStatusTracker (registry-derived ESP failures). Args carry the
// full failure detail (FailureType, ErrorCode, FailedSubcategory, Category) extracted
// from the failed subcategory's statusText. Provisioning has no source-event timestamp
// surfaced today, so the adapter falls back to clock.
private void OnProvisioningEspFailureDetected(object sender, EspFailureDetectedEventArgs args)
// Session 683f1eff: the Shell-Core 62407 failure usually lands INSIDE the provisioning
// tracker's 30-s settle window — after the registry named the failed subcategory and its
// HRESULT, before the settle timer would have forwarded them. The engine terminalises on
// the first EspTerminalFailure and the agent stops seconds later, so whatever this signal
// carries is all the terminal event, the backend FailureReason and the termination-time
// app classification ever see (a third of all ESP terminal failures took this path). The
// pending detail is inherited here; FailureType stays the Shell-Core value because that
// is the signal that actually terminalised.
private EspFailureDetectedEventArgs BuildShellCoreFailureArgs(string failureType)
{
EspFailureDetectedEventArgs pending = null;
try { pending = _pendingEspFailureProbe(); }
catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Warning($"EspAndHelloTracker: pending ESP failure probe threw: {ex.Message}"); }
if (pending == null)
return new EspFailureDetectedEventArgs(failureType);
RecordTerminalFailureSnapshot(pending);
_logger.Info(
$"EspAndHelloTracker: Shell-Core failure '{failureType}' inherits the pending provisioning failure detail " +
$"(category={pending.Category ?? "n/a"}, failedSubcategory={pending.FailedSubcategory ?? "n/a"}, " +
$"errorCode={pending.ErrorCode ?? "n/a"})");
return new EspFailureDetectedEventArgs(
failureType,
errorCode: pending.ErrorCode,
failedSubcategory: pending.FailedSubcategory,
category: pending.Category,
likelyCulpritApps: pending.LikelyCulpritApps);
}
// Session 080edee9 follow-up + Codex review (P2/P3) — snapshot the full failure context
// (HRESULT + failedSubcategory + category) so EnrollmentTerminationHandler can read it on
// the terminal-failure pathway. Only update when the args carry at least one of the three
// fields, so a bare Shell-Core failure cannot wipe out the registry snapshot. Deliberately
// NOT gated on ErrorCode alone — a non-Apps subcategory failure without HRESULT is still
// useful for downstream "should we promote?" gating.
private void RecordTerminalFailureSnapshot(EspFailureDetectedEventArgs args)
{
LastEventOccurredAtUtc = null;
// Session 080edee9 follow-up + Codex review (P2/P3) — snapshot the full
// failure context (HRESULT + failedSubcategory + category) before
// forwarding so EnrollmentTerminationHandler can read it on the terminal-
// failure pathway. Only update when the args carry at least one of the
// three fields, so a later ShellCore-derived failure (which has none of
// them) cannot wipe out the registry snapshot. We deliberately do NOT
// gate on ErrorCode alone — a non-Apps subcategory failure without
// HRESULT is still useful for downstream "should we promote?" gating.
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(args?.ErrorCode)
|| !string.IsNullOrEmpty(args?.FailedSubcategory)
|| !string.IsNullOrEmpty(args?.Category))
@@ -709,6 +745,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
failedSubcategory: args.FailedSubcategory,
category: args.Category);
}
}
// Forwarder for ProvisioningStatusTracker (registry-derived ESP failures). Args carry the
// full failure detail (FailureType, ErrorCode, FailedSubcategory, Category) extracted
// from the failed subcategory's statusText. Provisioning has no source-event timestamp
// surfaced today, so the adapter falls back to clock.
private void OnProvisioningEspFailureDetected(object sender, EspFailureDetectedEventArgs args)
{
LastEventOccurredAtUtc = null;
RecordTerminalFailureSnapshot(args);
try
{
EspFailureDetected?.Invoke(this, args);
@@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
internal const int EventId_ProvisioningWillNotLaunch = 360;
internal const int EventId_ProvisioningBlocked = 362;
internal const int EventId_PinStatus = 376;
// Automatic device registration failed at the join / authentication phase (Hybrid Join
// affinity diagnosis, 2026-09-04). Not Hello events — they ride the same UDR watcher
// because the channel is already armed; surfaced as device_registration_event.
internal const int EventId_AutoRegistrationFailedJoin = 304;
internal const int EventId_AutoRegistrationFailedAuth = 305;
internal const int EventId_HelloForBusiness_ProcessingStarted = 3024;
internal const int EventId_HelloForBusiness_ProcessingStopped = 6045;
@@ -47,6 +52,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
private static readonly HashSet<int> TrackedUdrEventIds = new HashSet<int>
{
EventId_AutoRegistrationFailedJoin,
EventId_AutoRegistrationFailedAuth,
EventId_NgcKeyRegistered,
EventId_NgcKeyRegistrationFailed,
EventId_ProvisioningWillLaunch,
@@ -547,7 +554,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
var query = new EventLogQuery(
UdrEventLogChannel,
PathType.LogName,
"*[System[(EventID=300 or EventID=301 or EventID=358 or EventID=360 or EventID=362 or EventID=376)]]");
"*[System[(EventID=300 or EventID=301 or EventID=304 or EventID=305 or EventID=358 or EventID=360 or EventID=362 or EventID=376)]]");
_udrWatcher = new EventLogWatcher(query);
_udrWatcher.EventRecordWritten += OnUdrEventRecordWritten;
@@ -654,6 +661,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
message = "Windows Hello PIN status update";
break;
case EventId_AutoRegistrationFailedJoin: // 304
case EventId_AutoRegistrationFailedAuth: // 305
// OS-side record that the automatic device registration failed (join or
// authentication phase). Companion evidence for entra_user_affinity_pending —
// no Hello state involved, so no MarkHelloCompleted().
eventType = Constants.EventTypes.DeviceRegistrationEvent;
severity = EventSeverity.Warning;
message = $"User Device Registration: automatic registration failed (event {eventId}, "
+ (eventId == EventId_AutoRegistrationFailedJoin ? "join phase)" : "authentication phase)");
_logger.Info($"User Device Registration failure event {eventId} observed");
break;
default:
return;
}
@@ -691,6 +710,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
// flip state multiple times — keep batched.
ImmediateUpload = shouldTriggerHelloCompleted
|| eventType == Constants.EventTypes.HelloProvisioningFailed
|| eventType == Constants.EventTypes.DeviceRegistrationEvent
});
_logger.Info($"Hello event detected: {eventType} (EventID {eventId}{(isBackfill ? ", backfill" : "")})");
@@ -10,19 +10,27 @@ using SharedConstants = AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Constants;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
{
/// <summary>
/// Single-shot detector for the Hybrid User-Driven completion-gap (2026-05-01 trigger:
/// session e58bcfdb-3e68-4f23-a3c2-437429ca9e78). After a Hybrid AAD-Join reboot the
/// agent restarts and waits for the user to log in with their real AD/AAD account
/// (which replaces the foouser/autopilot placeholder in JoinInfo). When that login is
/// overdue the agent today goes silent until the backend 5-h watchdog fires; this
/// detector emits a <c>hybrid_login_pending</c> warning event after a short single-shot
/// timer so the operator sees an explicit "stuck waiting for AD login" signal in the
/// timeline.
/// Single-shot detector for the Hybrid User-Driven sign-in gap (2026-05-01 trigger:
/// session e58bcfdb-3e68-4f23-a3c2-437429ca9e78). After the Hybrid AAD-Join reboot the
/// agent restarts and waits for the user to sign in with their AD account. When nobody
/// signs in the agent goes silent until the backend watchdog fires; this detector emits a
/// <c>hybrid_login_pending</c> warning after a short single-shot timer so the operator sees
/// an explicit "still waiting for the sign-in" signal in the timeline.
/// <para>
/// Conditions checked at <see cref="Arm"/>: composition root must have already
/// confirmed a) post-reboot, b) <c>isHybridJoin == true</c>. The detector itself only
/// owns the timer + <see cref="AadJoinWatcher.AadUserJoined"/> cancel-path. No polling.
/// No periodicity. Fires at most once per agent process.
/// What it measures (rewritten 2026-09-04, session a7140f98): the ABSENCE of a real-user
/// desktop. Two cancel paths: the DesktopArrivalDetector resolving explorer.exe under a
/// real user (the actual sign-in evidence), and the AadJoinWatcher seeing a real user in
/// JoinInfo (the Entra-join flavour, where the OOBE sign-in completes the join). On a
/// Hybrid join the AD sign-in never replaces the JoinInfo placeholder — only the later
/// Entra device registration does — so the placeholder state is reported as a fact in the
/// payload, never as the reason for the warning.
/// </para>
/// <para>
/// Conditions checked at <see cref="Arm"/> by the composition root: post-reboot,
/// <c>isHybridJoin == true</c>, and not a WhiteGlove device (a sealed device legitimately
/// waits days for its user; the session status AwaitingUser already describes that).
/// The detector owns only the timer and the cancel paths. No polling. Fires at most once
/// per agent process.
/// </para>
/// </summary>
internal sealed class HybridLoginPendingDetector : IDisposable
@@ -40,6 +48,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
private bool _armed;
private bool _fired;
private bool _cancelledByRealUser;
private bool _cancelledByDesktop;
private int _disposed;
internal HybridLoginPendingDetector(
@@ -60,8 +69,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
/// <summary>
/// Starts the single-shot timer. Idempotent — repeated calls after the first arm
/// are no-ops. Has no effect if the watcher already saw a real AAD user (the
/// arming was racy and the cancel won), or if the detector already fired.
/// are no-ops. Has no effect if a real-user desktop or a real AAD user was already
/// observed (the arming was racy and the cancel won), or if the detector already fired.
/// </summary>
public void Arm()
{
@@ -69,6 +78,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
{
if (_disposed != 0) return;
if (_armed || _fired) return;
if (_cancelledByDesktop)
{
_logger.Info("HybridLoginPendingDetector: arm requested but a real-user desktop was already observed — skipped");
return;
}
if (_cancelledByRealUser)
{
_logger.Info("HybridLoginPendingDetector: arm requested but real AAD user already joined — skipped");
@@ -77,12 +91,29 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
_armed = true;
_logger.Info(
$"HybridLoginPendingDetector: armed — will emit hybrid_login_pending in {_delay.TotalMinutes:F0} min if real AAD user has not joined by then");
$"HybridLoginPendingDetector: armed — will emit hybrid_login_pending in {_delay.TotalMinutes:F0} min if no real-user desktop appears by then");
_timer = new Timer(OnTimer, null, _delay, Timeout.InfiniteTimeSpan);
}
}
/// <summary>
/// The DesktopArrivalDetector resolved explorer.exe under a real user — the sign-in
/// happened. Cancels a running timer; remembered so a later <see cref="Arm"/> is a no-op.
/// </summary>
public void NotifyRealUserDesktop()
{
lock (_lock)
{
_cancelledByDesktop = true;
if (!_armed || _fired) return;
_timer?.Dispose();
_timer = null;
_logger.Info("HybridLoginPendingDetector: cancelled — real-user desktop observed before timeout");
}
}
public void Dispose()
{
if (Interlocked.Exchange(ref _disposed, 1) == 1) return;
@@ -106,6 +137,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
internal bool IsArmedForTest { get { lock (_lock) { return _armed; } } }
internal bool IsCancelledByRealUserForTest { get { lock (_lock) { return _cancelledByRealUser; } } }
internal bool IsCancelledByDesktopForTest { get { lock (_lock) { return _cancelledByDesktop; } } }
internal bool HasFiredForTest { get { lock (_lock) { return _fired; } } }
private void OnTimer(object? state) => EmitInternal(reason: "timer_fired");
@@ -130,23 +162,26 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
// _armed guard (Codex review 2026-05-01): production is safe because the
// timer is only created in Arm(), but explicit guard makes the contract
// unambiguous — emission requires a deliberate Arm(), full stop.
if (!_armed || _fired || _cancelledByRealUser || _disposed != 0) return;
if (!_armed || _fired || _cancelledByRealUser || _cancelledByDesktop || _disposed != 0) return;
_fired = true;
_timer?.Dispose();
_timer = null;
}
var placeholderActive = _watcher.PlaceholderObservedWithoutRealUser ? "true" : "false";
var data = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.Ordinal)
{
["delayMinutes"] = ((int)_delay.TotalMinutes).ToString(),
["reason"] = reason,
["isHybridJoin"] = "true", // armed only when composition root verified this
["realUserDesktopSeen"] = "false",
["placeholderActive"] = placeholderActive,
};
_post.Emit(
eventType: SharedConstants.EventTypes.HybridLoginPending,
source: SourceLabel,
message: $"Hybrid AAD Join: {(int)_delay.TotalMinutes} min after reboot still no real AD user — login overdue (placeholder still active in JoinInfo)",
message: $"Hybrid AAD Join: {(int)_delay.TotalMinutes} min after reboot still no real-user desktop — sign-in overdue",
severity: EventSeverity.Warning,
immediateUpload: true,
data: data);
@@ -80,6 +80,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
"AccountSetupCategory.Status"
};
// Order in which TryGetPendingFailureArgs resolves concurrently armed settle windows.
private static readonly string[] PendingFailurePreference =
{
"DeviceSetupCategory.Status",
"AccountSetupCategory.Status",
"DevicePreparationCategory.Status"
};
private readonly AgentLogger _logger;
private readonly string _sessionId;
private readonly string _tenantId;
@@ -1711,6 +1719,29 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
internal void TriggerSettleTimerForTest(string categoryName)
=> OnProvisioningFailureSettleExpired(categoryName);
/// <summary>
/// The registry-derived failure detail of a settle window that is still open (armed,
/// not yet expired or retracted) — null when none is pending. Read by the coordinator
/// when a Shell-Core 62407 failure arrives inside the window, so the terminal signal
/// inherits HRESULT / failed subcategory / category instead of racing them away
/// (session 683f1eff). Windows fail one category at a time, but should two be armed
/// the device-phase category wins: it is the one the ESP page reports.
/// </summary>
internal EspFailureDetectedEventArgs TryGetPendingFailureArgs()
{
lock (_stateLock)
{
if (_provisioningFailureSettleArgs == null || _provisioningFailureSettleArgs.Count == 0)
return null;
foreach (var category in PendingFailurePreference)
{
if (_provisioningFailureSettleArgs.TryGetValue(category, out var args) && args != null)
return args;
}
return null;
}
}
private bool HasCategorySucceededChanged(string categoryName, bool? newValue)
{
if (!_lastCategorySucceeded.TryGetValue(categoryName, out var oldValue))
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Services;
using Newtonsoft.Json;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
@@ -303,7 +304,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
if (TryNormalizeHResult(errorCode, out var hresultValue, out hresultHex))
{
data["hresult"] = hresultHex;
data["hresultSymbol"] = DecodeHResult(hresultValue);
data["hresultSymbol"] = ResolveHResultSymbol(hresultValue);
}
var title = string.IsNullOrEmpty(updateTitle) ? "(unknown update)" : updateTitle;
@@ -462,36 +463,25 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
}
/// <summary>
/// Maps common Windows Update HRESULTs to their symbolic name. Not exhaustive — the full
/// catalog lives at
/// https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/deployment/update/windows-update-error-reference.
/// Unknown codes return "WU_E_UNKNOWN" so the raw <c>hresult</c> hex still carries the value.
/// Symbolic name of a WU HRESULT from the shared error-code catalog (WU, CBS, Win32 and
/// COM families). <c>S_OK</c> for zero, <c>WU_E_UNKNOWN</c> when the catalog has no symbol,
/// so the raw <c>hresult</c> hex still carries the value. A catalog load failure is
/// swallowed the same way: decoding is decoration and must never cost the event.
/// </summary>
internal static string DecodeHResult(uint hresult)
internal static string ResolveHResultSymbol(uint hresult)
=> ResolveHResultSymbol(hresult, code => ErrorCodeCatalog.TryLookup(code));
internal static string ResolveHResultSymbol(uint hresult, Func<string, ErrorCodeEntry> lookup)
{
switch (hresult)
if (hresult == 0) return "S_OK";
try
{
case 0x00000000: return "S_OK";
// WU agent codes (0x8024xxxx)
case 0x80240022: return "WU_E_ALL_UPDATES_FAILED";
case 0x8024200B: return "WU_E_UH_INSTALLERFAILURE";
case 0x80240020: return "WU_E_NO_INTERACTIVE_USER";
case 0x80240016: return "WU_E_INSTALL_NOT_ALLOWED";
case 0x8024000B: return "WU_E_CALL_CANCELLED";
case 0x8024000C: return "WU_E_NOOP";
case 0x80240FFF: return "WU_E_UNEXPECTED";
case 0x80248007: return "WU_E_DS_NODATA";
case 0x8024402C: return "WU_E_PT_WINHTTP_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED";
// Generic Win32 / HRESULT
case 0x80070005: return "E_ACCESSDENIED";
case 0x80070002: return "ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND";
case 0x80070003: return "ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND";
case 0x800705B4: return "ERROR_TIMEOUT";
// CBS / servicing (LCU install failures)
case 0x800F0831: return "CBS_E_STORE_CORRUPTION";
case 0x800F0922: return "CBS_E_INSTALLERS_FAILED";
case 0x800F0991: return "PSFX_E_MISSING_PAYLOAD_FILE";
default: return "WU_E_UNKNOWN";
var symbol = lookup("0x" + hresult.ToString("x8", CultureInfo.InvariantCulture))?.Symbol;
return string.IsNullOrEmpty(symbol) ? "WU_E_UNKNOWN" : symbol;
}
catch
{
return "WU_E_UNKNOWN";
}
}
@@ -65,6 +65,44 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
public static DiagnosticsUploadResult SkippedBy(string gate) =>
new DiagnosticsUploadResult { Skipped = true, ErrorCode = gate };
/// <summary>
/// Counters of the archive build that produced (or preceded) this result; null when no
/// package was built (configuration gate, build exception). Surfaced into the
/// <c>diagnostics_uploaded</c> / <c>diagnostics_upload_failed</c> events so a truncated or
/// partially failed package is visible without opening the ZIP.
/// </summary>
public DiagnosticsPackagingStats Packaging { get; set; }
}
/// <summary>
/// What the packager included, skipped and failed on — as bounded counters only. File paths
/// stay inside the ZIP (<c>package-manifest.txt</c>, <c>_TRUNCATED.txt</c>): they can carry
/// user names, and a skip list has no upper bound while this payload must stay small no
/// matter how many files a cap rejected.
/// </summary>
public sealed class DiagnosticsPackagingStats
{
private static readonly IReadOnlyDictionary<string, int> Empty = new Dictionary<string, int>();
public int IncludedFiles { get; set; }
public long IncludedBytes { get; set; }
/// <summary>Files rejected by a cap or a reparse-point check (the <c>_TRUNCATED.txt</c> list).</summary>
public int SkippedFiles { get; set; }
/// <summary>True when at least one file was skipped — the same condition that writes <c>_TRUNCATED.txt</c>.</summary>
public bool Truncated => SkippedFiles > 0;
/// <summary>Skip count per reason: <c>size</c>, <c>count</c>, <c>total</c>, <c>reparse</c>, <c>resolved-outside-folder</c>.</summary>
public IReadOnlyDictionary<string, int> SkippedByReason { get; set; } = Empty;
/// <summary>
/// Packaging problems that are not cap skips, per kind: <c>path-guard</c> (configured path
/// refused), <c>no-user-session</c> (user-profile token without a signed-in user),
/// <c>folder-rejected</c>, <c>enumerate</c>, <c>open</c>, <c>copy</c>.
/// </summary>
public IReadOnlyDictionary<string, int> ProblemsByKind { get; set; } = Empty;
}
/// <summary>
@@ -134,6 +172,41 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
Skipped.Add(new SkipRecord(path, reason, size));
public bool HasSkips => Skipped.Count > 0;
// Non-cap problems (guard refusals, enumeration/open/copy failures) by kind — the
// manifest names the files, the event carries only these counts.
public Dictionary<string, int> Problems { get; } = new Dictionary<string, int>(StringComparer.Ordinal);
private readonly HashSet<string> _problemKeys = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
/// <summary>
/// Counts one problem of <paramref name="kind"/>. A section is walked once per search
/// pattern, so a folder-level failure would otherwise be counted once per pattern —
/// pass the folder as <paramref name="dedupeKey"/> to count it once.
/// </summary>
public void RecordProblem(string kind, string dedupeKey = null)
{
if (dedupeKey != null && !_problemKeys.Add(kind + "|" + dedupeKey)) return;
Problems.TryGetValue(kind, out var n);
Problems[kind] = n + 1;
}
public DiagnosticsPackagingStats ToStats()
{
var byReason = new Dictionary<string, int>(StringComparer.Ordinal);
foreach (var s in Skipped)
{
byReason.TryGetValue(s.Reason, out var n);
byReason[s.Reason] = n + 1;
}
return new DiagnosticsPackagingStats
{
IncludedFiles = FileCount,
IncludedBytes = TotalBytes,
SkippedFiles = Skipped.Count,
SkippedByReason = byReason,
ProblemsByKind = new Dictionary<string, int>(Problems, StringComparer.Ordinal),
};
}
}
private readonly struct SkipRecord
@@ -262,6 +335,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
var zipFileName = $"AgentDiagnostics-{_configuration.SessionId}-{timestamp}{suffix}.zip";
var zipBytes = BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded);
var packaging = LastPackaging;
_logger.Info($"Diagnostics package created: {zipFileName} ({zipBytes.Length / 1024} KB)");
@@ -276,7 +350,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
{
var errorCode = uploadUrlResponse?.Message ?? "Failed to get diagnostics upload URL from backend";
_logger.Warning($"Failed to get diagnostics upload URL from backend — skipping upload: {errorCode}");
return new DiagnosticsUploadResult { ErrorCode = errorCode };
return new DiagnosticsUploadResult { ErrorCode = errorCode, Packaging = packaging };
}
var sasUrlPrefix = BuildSasUrlPrefix(uploadUrlResponse.UploadUrl);
@@ -305,6 +379,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
BlobName = persistedBlobName,
Destination = uploadUrlResponse.Destination,
SasUrlPrefix = sasUrlPrefix,
Packaging = packaging,
};
}
@@ -313,6 +388,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
Destination = uploadUrlResponse.Destination,
SasUrlPrefix = sasUrlPrefix,
ErrorCode = uploadErrorCode,
Packaging = packaging,
};
}
catch (Exception ex)
@@ -351,6 +427,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
// INSIDE the ZIP (field case: sessions a11102f4 / 3ae7528b, missing evtx undiagnosable).
private StringBuilder _manifest;
/// <summary>Counters of the most recent <see cref="BuildArchiveBytes"/>; null before the first build.</summary>
internal DiagnosticsPackagingStats LastPackaging { get; private set; }
private void ManifestLine(string text)
{
_manifest?.AppendLine($"[{DateTime.UtcNow:HH:mm:ss.fff}Z] {text}");
@@ -391,6 +470,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
{
_logger.Warning($"Diagnostics path blocked by guard: {entry.Path}");
ManifestLine($"BLOCKED (path guard): {entry.Path}");
tracker.RecordProblem("path-guard");
continue;
}
var expandedPath = UserProfileResolver.ExpandCustomTokens(entry.Path);
@@ -398,6 +478,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
{
_logger.Warning($"Diagnostics path skipped (no user session for token): {entry.Path}");
ManifestLine($"SKIPPED (no user session for token): {entry.Path}");
tracker.RecordProblem("no-user-session");
continue;
}
var folder = Path.GetDirectoryName(expandedPath);
@@ -427,6 +508,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
WriteTruncatedMarker(archive, tracker);
}
LastPackaging = tracker.ToStats();
return ms.ToArray();
}
}
@@ -498,6 +580,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
{
_logger.Warning($"Built-in diagnostics section skipped (no user session for token): {section.Id}");
ManifestLine($"BUILT-IN SKIPPED (no user session for token): {section.Id} '{section.SourceFolder}'");
tracker.RecordProblem("no-user-session");
return;
}
@@ -584,6 +667,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
{
_logger.Warning($"Diagnostics source folder rejected ({folderRejection}): {sourceFolder}");
ManifestLine($"FOLDER REJECTED ({folderRejection}): {sourceFolder} (pattern '{searchPattern}')");
tracker.RecordProblem("folder-rejected", sourceFolder);
}
return;
}
@@ -597,6 +681,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
{
_logger.Warning($"Failed to enumerate log files in {sourceFolder}: {ex.Message}");
ManifestLine($"ENUMERATION FAILED: {sourceFolder} (pattern '{searchPattern}'): {ex.Message}");
tracker.RecordProblem("enumerate", sourceFolder);
return;
}
@@ -681,6 +766,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
{
_logger.Warning($"Failed to add log file to diagnostics package: {file} - {ex.Message}");
ManifestLine($"FAILED (copy): {file}: {ex.Message}");
tracker.RecordProblem("copy");
}
finally
{
@@ -720,6 +806,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime
default:
_logger.Warning($"Failed to open {file}: {rejection}");
ManifestLine($"FAILED (open): {file}: {rejection}");
tracker.RecordProblem("open");
break;
}
return null;
@@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather.Collectors
data["logFile"] = Path.GetFileName(filePath);
data["ruleId"] = rule.RuleId;
data["ruleTitle"] = rule.Title;
GatherRuleExecutor.StampRuleMarkers(rule, data);
var eventType = !string.IsNullOrEmpty(rule.OutputEventType)
? rule.OutputEventType
@@ -347,6 +348,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather.Collectors
data["logFile"] = Path.GetFileName(filePath);
data["ruleId"] = rule.RuleId;
data["ruleTitle"] = rule.Title;
GatherRuleExecutor.StampRuleMarkers(rule, data);
var eventType = !string.IsNullOrEmpty(rule.OutputEventType)
? rule.OutputEventType
@@ -70,12 +70,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
@"C:\Windows\System32\config", // SAM, SECURITY, SYSTEM hives
};
// Allowed subdirectories under a user profile (used with %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token)
private static readonly string[] AllowedUserProfileSubdirs = new[]
{
@"AppData\Local",
@"AppData\Roaming",
};
// The allowed user-profile subdirectories and the vendor allowlist under them live in
// GatherRuleGuards, which owns the embedded guardrails.json — one copy for both guards.
/// <summary>
/// Returns true if the given path is allowed for diagnostics collection.
@@ -135,7 +131,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
(normalizedDir.Length == BlockedUsersPrefix.Length ||
normalizedDir[BlockedUsersPrefix.Length] == Path.DirectorySeparatorChar))
{
if (!IsUserProfileSubpathAllowed(normalizedDir, userProfilePath))
if (!GatherRuleGuards.IsUserProfileSubpathAllowed(normalizedDir, userProfilePath))
return false;
}
@@ -169,7 +165,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
}
}
return false;
// Vendor folders under the signed-in user's profile — same allowlist the file
// collectors use, since it answers the same question: which folders below a
// profile carry enrollment-relevant logs rather than the user's own data.
return GatherRuleGuards.IsUserProfilePathOnAllowlist(normalizedDir, userProfilePath);
}
catch
{
@@ -178,38 +177,6 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Returns true if the normalized path falls under one of the allowed subdirectories
/// of the detected user profile (AppData\Local, AppData\Roaming).
/// Only applies when %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% was used to resolve the path.
/// </summary>
internal static bool IsUserProfileSubpathAllowed(string normalizedPath, string userProfilePath)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(userProfilePath))
return false;
try
{
var normalizedProfile = Path.GetFullPath(userProfilePath);
foreach (var subdir in AllowedUserProfileSubdirs)
{
var allowedPrefix = Path.GetFullPath(Path.Combine(normalizedProfile, subdir));
if (normalizedPath.StartsWith(allowedPrefix, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(normalizedPath.Length == allowedPrefix.Length ||
normalizedPath[allowedPrefix.Length] == Path.DirectorySeparatorChar))
{
return true;
}
}
}
catch
{
// Path normalization failure — deny
}
return false;
}
/// <summary>
/// Checks whether any component of the path (directories or file) is a symlink,
/// junction, or other reparse point. Returns true if a reparse point is detected.
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
/// emits (executor, context guard events, collectors). The timeline feed uses it to keep
/// gather output from re-triggering on_event rules.
/// </summary>
public const string SourceName = "GatherRuleExecutor";
public const string SourceName = Constants.EventSources.GatherRuleExecutor;
/// <summary>
/// Upper bound on on_event executions per rule and session. on_event has no natural
@@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
result["ruleId"] = rule.RuleId;
result["ruleTitle"] = rule.Title;
StampRuleMarkers(rule, result);
var eventType = !string.IsNullOrEmpty(rule.OutputEventType) ? rule.OutputEventType : Constants.EventTypes.GatherResult;
@@ -537,6 +538,17 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
// ===== Phase scope (ActivePhases / ActiveFromPhase) =====
/// <summary>
/// Injects the per-rule opt-in markers the backend reads at response time. Called after
/// the on_change hash is taken (the markers are rule config, not collected data) by the
/// executor and by collectors that emit directly (logparser).
/// </summary>
internal static void StampRuleMarkers(GatherRule rule, Dictionary<string, object> data)
{
if (rule.EnrichErrorCodes)
data[Constants.GatherRuleDataKeys.EnrichErrorCodes] = true;
}
private static bool HasPhaseScope(GatherRule rule)
{
return (rule.ActivePhases != null && rule.ActivePhases.Count > 0)
@@ -32,6 +32,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
public static readonly IReadOnlyList<string> AllowedRegistryPrefixes;
public static readonly IReadOnlyList<string> AllowedFilePrefixes;
/// <summary>
/// Folders under the signed-in user's profile that file collectors and
/// admin-configured diagnostics paths may read, RELATIVE to the profile root
/// (e.g. <c>AppData\Local\Vendor</c>). Resolved against the path
/// %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% produced, at match time — the profile name is not
/// known when the list is authored, which is why these entries cannot live in
/// <see cref="AllowedFilePrefixes"/> (matched literally against the expanded path).
/// </summary>
public static readonly IReadOnlyList<string> AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes;
public static readonly IReadOnlyList<string> AllowedWmiQueryPrefixes;
public static readonly IReadOnlyCollection<string> AllowedCommands;
public static readonly IReadOnlyList<string> AllowedEventLogChannels;
@@ -63,8 +73,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
Path.GetFullPath(@"C:\Windows\System32\config"), // SAM, SECURITY, SYSTEM hives
};
// Allowed subdirectories under a user profile (used with %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token)
private static readonly string[] AllowedUserProfileSubdirs = new[]
// The only subdirectories of a user profile the C:\Users hard block will ever
// release (used with %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%). Single copy for both guards —
// DiagnosticsPathGuards delegates here.
internal static readonly string[] AllowedUserProfileSubdirs = new[]
{
@"AppData\Local",
@"AppData\Roaming",
@@ -118,6 +130,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
AllowedRegistryPrefixes = FlattenCategorized(obj, "registryPrefixes", "prefixes");
AllowedFilePrefixes = obj["filePrefixes"]?.ToObject<List<string>>() ?? new List<string>();
AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes = LoadUserProfilePrefixes(obj);
AllowedWmiQueryPrefixes = obj["wmiQueryPrefixes"]?.ToObject<List<string>>() ?? new List<string>();
var commands = FlattenCategorized(obj, "allowedCommands", "commands");
@@ -136,6 +149,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
AllowedRegistryPrefixes = new List<string>();
AllowedFilePrefixes = new List<string>();
AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes = new List<string>();
AllowedWmiQueryPrefixes = new List<string>();
AllowedCommands = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
AllowedEventLogChannels = new List<string>();
@@ -143,6 +157,43 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
ResidualWmiPrefixes = new List<string>();
}
/// <summary>
/// Reads <c>userProfileFilePrefixes</c> and drops every entry that is rooted, carries a
/// traversal, or does not sit under one of <see cref="AllowedUserProfileSubdirs"/>.
/// The C:\Users hard block releases nothing outside AppData, so such an entry could only
/// ever be dead text — dropping it at load keeps the list honest instead of silently
/// ineffective, and no configuration can widen the hard block's exception.
/// </summary>
private static List<string> LoadUserProfilePrefixes(JObject obj)
{
var raw = obj["userProfileFilePrefixes"]?.ToObject<List<string>>() ?? new List<string>();
var result = new List<string>();
foreach (var entry in raw)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(entry))
continue;
var trimmed = entry.Trim().TrimEnd('\\');
if (Path.IsPathRooted(trimmed))
continue;
if (trimmed.IndexOf("..", StringComparison.Ordinal) >= 0)
continue;
foreach (var subdir in AllowedUserProfileSubdirs)
{
if (trimmed.StartsWith(subdir, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(trimmed.Length == subdir.Length || trimmed[subdir.Length] == '\\'))
{
result.Add(trimmed);
break;
}
}
}
return result;
}
private static void DeriveWmiClassAllowlist(
IReadOnlyList<string> entries,
out HashSet<string> classes,
@@ -265,12 +316,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
// C:\Users block always applies (even in unrestricted mode)
// Exception: paths under <userProfilePath>\AppData\Local or AppData\Roaming
// are allowed when the %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token was used.
// are allowed when the %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% token was used. The exception
// only LIFTS the block — in restricted mode the allowlist below still decides.
if (normalizedPath.StartsWith(BlockedUsersPrefix, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(normalizedPath.Length == BlockedUsersPrefix.Length ||
normalizedPath[BlockedUsersPrefix.Length] == Path.DirectorySeparatorChar))
{
if (!DiagnosticsPathGuards.IsUserProfileSubpathAllowed(normalizedPath, userProfilePath))
if (!IsUserProfileSubpathAllowed(normalizedPath, userProfilePath))
return false;
}
@@ -288,9 +340,61 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather
if (unrestrictedMode)
return true;
return AllowedFilePrefixes.Any(prefix =>
if (AllowedFilePrefixes.Any(prefix =>
normalizedPath.StartsWith(prefix, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(normalizedPath.Length == prefix.Length || normalizedPath[prefix.Length] == '\\'));
(normalizedPath.Length == prefix.Length || normalizedPath[prefix.Length] == '\\')))
{
return true;
}
// Vendor folders under the signed-in user's profile. Only reachable when the rule
// spelled %LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE% and the resolver found an interactive user —
// a null profile denies, so a machine with nobody signed in cannot widen anything.
return IsUserProfilePathOnAllowlist(normalizedPath, userProfilePath);
}
/// <summary>
/// True when the normalized path sits under one of <see cref="AllowedUserProfileSubdirs"/>
/// of the detected user profile. This is the C:\Users hard block's only exception; it
/// releases the block and nothing else. A null profile denies.
/// </summary>
internal static bool IsUserProfileSubpathAllowed(string normalizedPath, string userProfilePath)
=> AllowedUserProfileSubdirs.Any(subdir =>
MatchesProfileRelativePrefix(normalizedPath, userProfilePath, subdir));
/// <summary>
/// True when the normalized path is admitted by an entry of
/// <see cref="AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes"/> under the detected user profile.
/// </summary>
internal static bool IsUserProfilePathOnAllowlist(string normalizedPath, string userProfilePath)
=> AllowedUserProfileFilePrefixes.Any(prefix =>
MatchesProfileRelativePrefix(normalizedPath, userProfilePath, prefix));
/// <summary>
/// Segment-bounded match of <paramref name="normalizedPath"/> against
/// &lt;profile&gt;\&lt;relativePrefix&gt;. Both sides go through Path.GetFullPath, so a
/// traversal spelled into either one cannot slip past the boundary check.
/// </summary>
private static bool MatchesProfileRelativePrefix(
string normalizedPath, string userProfilePath, string relativePrefix)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(normalizedPath) || string.IsNullOrEmpty(userProfilePath))
return false;
try
{
var allowedPrefix = Path.GetFullPath(
Path.Combine(Path.GetFullPath(userProfilePath), relativePrefix));
return normalizedPath.StartsWith(allowedPrefix, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
(normalizedPath.Length == allowedPrefix.Length ||
normalizedPath[allowedPrefix.Length] == Path.DirectorySeparatorChar);
}
catch
{
// Path normalization failure — deny.
return false;
}
}
/// <summary>
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
/// <para>
/// The orchestrator consumes this event and translates it into a synthetic
/// <c>DeadlineFired</c>-<see cref="AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals.DecisionSignal"/>
/// whose <c>OccurredAtUtc</c> equals the deadline's <see cref="ActiveDeadline.DueAtUtc"/>,
/// not the wall-clock firing time — so replay stays deterministic even if the agent
/// restarts long after the deadline has passed.
/// whose <c>OccurredAtUtc</c> equals the deadline's <see cref="ActiveDeadline.DueAtUtc"/>
/// (the policy instant the wait expired), with the due time repeated in the payload. The
/// firing clock is deliberately NOT the stamp: a timer due during Modern Standby or a
/// reboot fires only afterwards, and the outage would otherwise become session duration
/// (D-238).
/// </para>
/// </summary>
public sealed class DeadlineFiredEventArgs : EventArgs
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Office;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Periodic;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.SignalAdapters;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
@@ -312,6 +313,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
// later before the detector can fire). When the real-user desktop arrives, Shift+F10 is no
// longer possible, so the console watcher is stopped to avoid post-enrollment false positives.
ConsoleBypassHost? consoleBypassHost = null;
// Captured likewise (assigned right after this host). The real-user desktop is the
// sign-in evidence for the Hybrid detectors: it cancels hybrid_login_pending and arms
// the Entra user-affinity timer (2026-09-04, session a7140f98).
AadJoinHost? aadJoinHostRef = null;
var desktopArrivalHost = new DesktopArrivalHost(
logger,
ingress,
@@ -326,6 +331,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
// Shift+F10 works — stop the console watcher (no-op if not created / already stopped).
consoleBypassHost?.StopForDesktopArrival();
aadJoinHostRef?.NotifyRealUserDesktop();
if (realmJoinHost == null) return;
if (UserSidResolver.TryResolveSid(owner, out var sid) && !string.IsNullOrEmpty(sid))
{
@@ -340,8 +347,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
var aadJoinHost = new AadJoinHost(
logger, ingress, clock,
onRealUserJoined: desktopArrivalHost.RequestResetForRealUserSwitch);
onRealUserJoined: desktopArrivalHost.RequestResetForRealUserSwitch,
isHybridJoinProbe: EnrollmentRegistryDetector.DetectHybridJoin);
hosts.Add(aadJoinHost);
aadJoinHostRef = aadJoinHost;
// RealmJoin support is opt-in per tenant (portal toggle → AnalyzerConfiguration.
// EnableRealmJoinWatcher, default off). When disabled, leave realmJoinHost null:
@@ -439,6 +448,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
hosts.Add(imeLogHost);
imeLogHostRef = imeLogHost;
// Entra user affinity (2026-09-04): the raw IME token lines feed the AadJoinHost's
// affinity detector. New callbacks — nothing chained before us, so direct assignment.
imeLogHost.Tracker.OnUserTokenAcquired = lineUtc => aadJoinHost.NotifyUserTokenAcquired(lineUtc);
imeLogHost.Tracker.OnTokenFailureLine = (code, lineUtc) => aadJoinHost.NotifyTokenFailureLine(code, lineUtc);
// sits-d Cloud-PC fix (2026-08-19): the user-apps-settled AccountSetup synthesis used
// to run ONLY on the EspExited edge. On a tenant with a large required-app set the ESP
// page exits while apps are still in flight, the single attempt misses, and nothing
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
#nullable enable
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Globalization;
using System.IO;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
@@ -258,6 +259,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
/// </summary>
public bool IsWhiteGlovePart2 => _isWhiteGlovePart2;
/// <summary>
/// <c>true</c> when this device ever resumed a WhiteGlove Part 2 in this session — the
/// state folder holds a <c>.part1-&lt;ts&gt;/</c> archive. Unlike
/// <see cref="IsWhiteGlovePart2"/> (this start only) it survives later reboots within
/// Part 2; see <see cref="StateArchiver.HasPart1Archive"/>.
/// </summary>
public bool HasWhiteGlovePart1Archive => StateArchiver.HasPart1Archive(_stateDirectory);
/// <summary>
/// <c>true</c> wenn der Start auf einen korrupten State-Segment traf und
/// Snapshot + Log-Segmente nach <c>.quarantine/{ts}/</c> bewegt wurden.
@@ -1151,7 +1160,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
var evidence = new Evidence(
kind: EvidenceKind.Synthetic,
identifier: e.Deadline.Name,
summary: $"deadline '{e.Deadline.Name}' fired at {e.Deadline.DueAtUtc:O}");
summary: $"deadline '{e.Deadline.Name}' due {e.Deadline.DueAtUtc:O} fired at {e.FiredAtUtc:O}");
// The reducer reads the deadline name under SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline
// (see HandleDeadlineFiredV1 in DecisionEngine.Shared). Forward the
@@ -1172,7 +1181,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
payload[SignalPayloadKeys.Deadline] = e.Deadline.Name;
}
// OccurredAtUtc = DueAtUtc (not firedAt) — replay-determinism per DeadlineFiredEventArgs doc.
// OccurredAtUtc = DueAtUtc, not the firing clock (D-238). Every effect of the
// resulting step (phase_transition, enrollment_complete) is stamped with the signal
// time; a timer that came due during Modern Standby or a reboot fires only afterwards,
// and the firing clock would make the verdict — and the session duration — grow by
// the whole outage (measured: days for devices closed right after provisioning).
// The due time also travels in the payload so the stale-fire guards identify the
// deadline incarnation independently of the stamp.
payload[SignalPayloadKeys.DeadlineDueAtUtc] = e.Deadline.DueAtUtc.ToString("O", CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
_ingress.Post(
kind: DecisionSignalKind.DeadlineFired,
occurredAtUtc: e.Deadline.DueAtUtc,
@@ -8,6 +8,13 @@ using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
{
/// <summary>
/// Hybrid-identity host: the JoinInfo watcher plus the two single-shot detectors that
/// describe the user side of a Hybrid Azure AD Join — sign-in overdue
/// (<see cref="HybridLoginPendingDetector"/>) and Entra user affinity after the sign-in
/// (<see cref="EntraUserAffinityDetector"/>). The composition root feeds it the
/// DesktopArrivalDetector's real-user observation and the ImeLogTracker's raw token lines.
/// </summary>
internal sealed class AadJoinHost : ICollectorHost
{
public string Name => "AadJoinWatcher";
@@ -15,41 +22,87 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration
private readonly AadJoinWatcher _watcher;
private readonly AadJoinWatcherAdapter _adapter;
private readonly HybridLoginPendingDetector _hybridLoginPendingDetector;
private readonly EntraUserAffinityDetector _userAffinityDetector;
private int _disposed;
public AadJoinHost(
AgentLogger logger,
ISignalIngressSink ingress,
IClock clock,
Action? onRealUserJoined = null)
Action? onRealUserJoined = null,
Func<bool>? isHybridJoinProbe = null)
{
_watcher = new AadJoinWatcher(logger);
_adapter = new AadJoinWatcherAdapter(_watcher, ingress, clock, onRealUserJoined: onRealUserJoined);
var post = new InformationalEventPost(ingress, clock);
_hybridLoginPendingDetector = new HybridLoginPendingDetector(
watcher: _watcher,
post: new InformationalEventPost(ingress, clock),
post: post,
logger: logger);
_userAffinityDetector = new EntraUserAffinityDetector(
post: post,
logger: logger,
isHybridJoinProbe: isHybridJoinProbe ?? (() => false),
placeholderActiveProbe: () => _watcher.PlaceholderObservedWithoutRealUser,
utcNow: () => clock.UtcNow);
}
public void Start() => _watcher.Start();
public void Stop() => _watcher.Stop();
/// <summary>
/// Composition-root entry point for the Hybrid User-Driven completion-gap fix
/// (2026-05-01). Only call when both prerequisites hold: a) the prior agent process
/// was killed by an OS reboot (<c>previousExitType=reboot_kill</c>), b) the
/// Autopilot profile is Hybrid AAD Join (<c>isHybridJoin=true</c>). The detector
/// itself enforces single-shot semantics + cancel-on-real-user — repeated calls or
/// late calls after a real user joined are safe no-ops.
/// Composition-root entry point for the Hybrid User-Driven sign-in-overdue warning
/// (2026-05-01, semantics 2026-09-04). Only call when all prerequisites hold: a) the
/// prior agent process was killed by an OS reboot (<c>previousExitType=reboot_kill</c>),
/// b) the Autopilot profile is Hybrid AAD Join (<c>isHybridJoin=true</c>), c) the device
/// is not a WhiteGlove device (neither resuming Part 2 nor carrying a Part-1 archive).
/// The detector itself enforces single-shot semantics and both cancel paths —
/// repeated calls or late calls after a desktop / real user are safe no-ops.
/// </summary>
public void ArmHybridLoginPendingDetector() => _hybridLoginPendingDetector.Arm();
// Test seam — exposes the detector for unit tests in the V2.Core.Tests project.
/// <summary>
/// The DesktopArrivalDetector resolved explorer.exe under a real user: cancels the
/// sign-in-overdue timer and arms the user-affinity timer (Hybrid devices only).
/// </summary>
public void NotifyRealUserDesktop()
{
try { _hybridLoginPendingDetector.NotifyRealUserDesktop(); }
catch (Exception ex) { LogCallbackFailure("HybridLoginPendingDetector.NotifyRealUserDesktop", ex); }
try { _userAffinityDetector.NotifyRealUserDesktop(); }
catch (Exception ex) { LogCallbackFailure("EntraUserAffinityDetector.NotifyRealUserDesktop", ex); }
}
/// <summary>ImeLogTracker observed an IME-TOKEN-SUCCESS line (raw, every line).</summary>
public void NotifyUserTokenAcquired(DateTime? lineUtc)
{
try { _userAffinityDetector.NotifyUserTokenAcquired(lineUtc); }
catch (Exception ex) { LogCallbackFailure("EntraUserAffinityDetector.NotifyUserTokenAcquired", ex); }
}
/// <summary>ImeLogTracker observed an IME-TOKEN-FAILURE line (raw, every line).</summary>
public void NotifyTokenFailureLine(string? errorCode, DateTime? lineUtc)
{
try { _userAffinityDetector.NotifyTokenFailureLine(errorCode, lineUtc); }
catch (Exception ex) { LogCallbackFailure("EntraUserAffinityDetector.NotifyTokenFailureLine", ex); }
}
// Test seams — expose the detectors for unit tests in the V2.Core.Tests project.
internal HybridLoginPendingDetector HybridLoginPendingDetectorForTest => _hybridLoginPendingDetector;
internal EntraUserAffinityDetector UserAffinityDetectorForTest => _userAffinityDetector;
private static void LogCallbackFailure(string what, Exception ex)
{
// Host callbacks are best-effort — a detector fault must never break the caller
// (DesktopArrivalDetector poll / ImeLogTracker drain). Swallowed on purpose; the
// detectors log their own state transitions.
_ = what; _ = ex;
}
public void Dispose()
{
if (Interlocked.Exchange(ref _disposed, 1) == 1) return;
try { _userAffinityDetector.Dispose(); } catch { }
try { _hybridLoginPendingDetector.Dispose(); } catch { }
try { _adapter.Dispose(); } catch { }
try { _watcher.Dispose(); } catch { }

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