fix(security): self-update verifies and extracts the ZIP through one exclusive FileShare.None handle — SHA-256 is computed on the same stream the ZipArchive reads, so the file can no longer be swapped between verification and extraction (TOCTOU); handle is released before cleanup, open failure aborts with integrity_mismatch marker

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.github/workflows/build-agent.yml

@@ -76,12 +76,23 @@ jobs:
       - name: Reserve build number (counter blob CAS)
         id: version
         shell: pwsh
+        # Input and secret reach the script only as environment variables, never as script
+        # text: ${{ }} is substituted before pwsh parses the block, so a crafted
+        # build_number could otherwise break out of the quotes and run arbitrary code.
+        env:
+          BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE: ${{ inputs.build_number }}
+          AGENT_SAS_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}
         run: |
           $override = 0
-          if ('${{ inputs.build_number }}' -ne '') { $override = [int]'${{ inputs.build_number }}' }
+          if ($env:BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE -ne '') {
+            if ($env:BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE -notmatch '^\d+$') {
+              throw "build_number must be a positive integer, got '$($env:BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE)'"
+            }
+            $override = [int]$env:BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE
+          }
 
           $counterUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent/buildcounter-v$($env:LINE_MAJOR).txt"
-          $buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $counterUrl -SasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_SAS_TOKEN }}' -Override $override
+          $buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $counterUrl -SasToken $env:AGENT_SAS_TOKEN -Override $override
 
           $csproj = Get-Content $env:CSPROJ_PATH -Raw
           if ($csproj -match '<VersionPrefix>(\d+\.\d+)</VersionPrefix>') {

.github/workflows/combine-rules.yml

@@ -54,6 +54,12 @@ jobs:
             ajv validate -s rules/schema/ime-log-pattern.schema.json -d "$f" --spec=draft2020 -c ajv-formats
           done
 
+      # guardrails.json values are baked verbatim into generated TypeScript that is
+      # auto-committed to main and shipped to the portal - the schema forbids control
+      # and line-terminator characters so a "data" PR can never become code.
+      - name: Validate Guardrails
+        run: ajv validate -s rules/schema/guardrails.schema.json -d rules/guardrails.json --spec=draft2020 -c ajv-formats
+
       - name: Combine rules into dist/
         run: node rules/scripts/combine.js
 

.github/workflows/deploy-mcp.yml

@@ -11,7 +11,11 @@ env:
   ACR_NAME: autopilotmonitoreuacr
   CONTAINER_APP_NAME: autopilotmonitor-mcp
   RESOURCE_GROUP: ${{ secrets.AZURE_MCP_RESOURCE_GROUP }}
-  IMAGE_TAG: ${{ github.sha }}
+  # Unique per RUN, not per commit: the docs corpus is baked into the image, so a
+  # docs-only redeploy at an unchanged code sha must still produce a new image
+  # reference — with a sha-only tag `az containerapp update` saw the same image
+  # and silently created no revision (2026-08-28).
+  IMAGE_TAG: ${{ github.sha }}-${{ github.run_number }}
   HEALTH_URL: https://mcp.autopilotmonitor.com/health
   VERSIONS_CONTAINER: https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/versions
   PACKAGE_JSON: src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/package.json
@@ -28,8 +32,9 @@ jobs:
       # baked into the image as the search_docs corpus (see the Dockerfile). No
       # token is needed. Checking it out here rather than vendoring it keeps the
       # docs single-sourced — but it also means EDITING THE DOCS DOES NOT UPDATE A
-      # RUNNING SERVER; this workflow must be re-run. /health reports the SHA
-      # captured below so that staleness is checkable.
+      # RUNNING SERVER; this workflow must be re-run (IMAGE_TAG is per run so the
+      # re-run actually rolls a new revision). /health reports the SHA captured
+      # below so that staleness is checkable.
       - name: Check out documentation bundle
         uses: actions/checkout@v7
         with:

docs/agent/cmtrace-time-resolution.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ title: CMTrace Time Resolution — Per-Line Self-Anchoring
 description: How the agent converts bias-less CMTrace local times to UTC without trusting any process's timezone belief — each provably fresh line anchors its own offset against the agent clock on the 15-minute grid; everything not provably fresh falls back uniformly and says so.
 resource: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime
 tags: [agent, ime, cmtrace, timestamps, timezone, calibration, provenance]
-timestamp: 2026-08-20
+timestamp: 2026-08-30
 ---
 
 # Problem
@@ -86,6 +86,40 @@ with the process zone).
 * Mixed pairs remain possible across a restart (start resolved from backlog fallback,
   completion line-anchored) and are recognizable via provenance.
 
+# Line parsing (bounded cost)
+
+`CmTraceLogParser.TryParseLine` (Shared) is the single CMTrace line parser for the agent
+(`ImeLogTracker`, `LogParserCollector`, `StallProbeCollector`) and the backend
+(`TestLogPatternFunction`). Both feed it input an outsider influences: tenant-supplied
+sample lines (200 x 8 KB per request) on the backend, and on the agent every tailed log
+file, including entries that IME assembles from installer or script output. It is
+therefore not one regex. The former shape — a greedy `(?<message>.*)` in front of the
+`]LOG]!><time="` literal, unanchored, no match timeout — re-tried every `<![LOG[`
+occurrence as a fresh start and backtracked the message group across every later character
+for each: quadratic in line length (an 8 KB line of repeated prefixes and `]` filler cost
+~7 million engine steps; a 1 MB assembled entry would have spun the SYSTEM agent for
+hours and blacked out IME tracking for the rest of the enrollment).
+
+The parser reproduces exactly what that regex returned, in linear time: the message begins
+after the first `<![LOG[` (a later start could only match when the first one does, since
+`.*` spans the difference) and ends at the last `]LOG]!><time="` occurrence whose trailer
+parses — earlier occurrences are tried in turn, which is the order greedy backtracking
+visited them. The trailer is checked with a `\G`-anchored regex that has no ambiguous
+quantifier and a 1-second match timeout as a backstop; a timeout means "not a CMTrace
+line" (callers already have that path: raw-text matching in the tracker, `parse_failed`
+on the backend), never an exception. `CmTraceLogParserTests` pins the equivalence against
+the legacy regex over the shapes that matter (multiline messages, bias suffix, trailer
+literal inside the message, a last trailer that fails to parse, BOM prefix) and the
+reported worst case at 200 lines.
+
+On the agent, `ImeLogTracker` additionally caps an assembled multiline entry at 100 raw
+lines **and** 1 MB of characters (`MaxMultiLineBufferChars`). A capped entry is dropped
+and logged at **Warning** — visible at the default `Info` level, so a real IME entry that
+large shows up in the client log and can be acted on. The remaining physical lines of a
+dropped entry are skipped until it closes or a new `<![LOG[` entry begins; previously they
+fell through to raw-text pattern matching, so fragments of a discarded entry could fire
+patterns without CMTrace context.
+
 # Backend regression tripwire
 
 The backend watches for the failure mode this design eliminates. On every terminal ingest
@@ -94,7 +128,11 @@ batch, the counter reconcile's existing event-partition scan additionally collec
 rest (`CmTraceSkewTripwire`, hooked in `EventIngestProcessor`). If
 `median(Δ_IME) − median(Δ_other)` is a clean 15-minute multiple (residual < 2 min — the
 same constants as the anchoring grid guard above) with ≥ 20 samples over ≥ 3 distinct
-upload batches per side, a `CmTraceTimeSkewRegression` ops event fires (category Agent,
+upload batches per side, and ≥ 80 % of the individual IME deltas (relative to the other
+side's median) themselves sit within 2 min of some grid multiple — added after the 2026-08-28
+soak, when relaunched agents re-tailing the IME log produced one burst holding most of a
+session's IME samples with a continuum of ages whose median hit the grid by chance (7 false
+fires in a week, 0 true) — a `CmTraceTimeSkewRegression` ops event fires (category Agent,
 warning), carrying all numbers plus the session's `sourceOffsetOrigin` histogram.
 Bias-dominated sessions are suppressed (writer-declared offsets cannot be an anchoring
 regression); `measuredWriterOffsetMinutes` is never consulted (sticky after era
@@ -125,3 +163,6 @@ precisely so an anchoring regression can never surface as a customer finding.
 * `tasks/todo.md` (2026-08-20) — full evidence trail: field measurements, the revert,
   the two-writer-era fixture, and the disproven foreign-binary hypothesis (the SHA
   mismatch was the known release race against the 5-minute AdminConfiguration cache).
+* `CmTraceLogParser.TryParseLine` + `CmTraceLogParserTests` — the linear parser and its
+  legacy-regex equivalence oracle; `ImeLogTracker.LogProcessing.cs` multiline buffering
+  (`MaxMultiLineBufferLines` / `MaxMultiLineBufferChars`, `skippingDroppedEntry`).

docs/agent/decision-engine.md

@@ -128,6 +128,15 @@ user-ESP Install-intent apps are still pending (IME logs "Completed user session
 *pass*, not once per session — sessions 14690fc2/6cb01530). The reducer stays free of
 app-pending guards; adapters sanitize evidence before it becomes a signal.
 
+**Zero user-targeted apps** (sessions 81daa77f/75d6ae8e): IME never writes its
+"Completed user session" line at all when the user has no assigned apps — its zero-app
+branch returns first — so fact 3 was unreachable by construction and every such device
+fell through to the backstop. `IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS` reads the line IME *does*
+write there and posts the same signal, guarded to the AccountSetup phase. The event
+carries an `evidence` field (`zero_user_apps_enumerated` vs `user_session_completed`)
+naming which observation carried the completion. See
+[zero-user-apps-completion-gate.md](zero-user-apps-completion-gate.md).
+
 ## Completion attempt sites and sequence
 
 Completion can be attempted from whichever fact arrives last: `HelloResolved`,
@@ -166,6 +175,11 @@ advisory backstop. All routes converge on `CompleteThroughFinalizingOrDefer`:
    scheduler contract) dead-ends as `realmjoin_timeout_stale_superseded_by_rearm`.
    The idle case (detected, no deployment activity ever) times out at 60 min
    unchanged, and phase 200/210 activity never extends.
+   A closed gate also outranks the 30-minute `AdvisoryCompletion` backstop: that
+   handler re-arms (trigger suffix `:CompletionGateHolding`) instead of failing while
+   the RealmJoin gate is closed *and* its own deadline is still armed, because the gate
+   carries a bounded resolution of its own. Before this, the shorter timer always won —
+   session 75d6ae8e was failed 2 min after its 25th successful RealmJoin package.
 2. `Finalizing` stage + ~5 s `FinalizingGrace` deadline.
 3. Grace fires → `Completed`, `EnrollmentComplete` outcome, `enrollment_complete`
    timeline event with full audit payload.
@@ -202,7 +216,12 @@ Wired by `EnrollmentOrchestrator.Start` (`src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Co
 - `SignalIngress` — bounded queue (256, back-pressure) + **one** worker thread. Per
   signal, in order: assign ordinals → `SignalLog.Append` (durable, *before* reducing;
   append failure ⇒ reducer does not run, no ordinal gap) → `engine.Reduce` →
-  `DecisionStepProcessor.ApplyStep`.
+  `DecisionStepProcessor.ApplyStep`. A `Post` issued *by the worker thread itself*
+  (the `EffectRunner` posting `ClassifierVerdictIssued` from inside `ApplyStep`) never
+  enters the bounded queue: it goes to a worker-local follow-up queue that is drained,
+  ahead of the channel, right after the current item — the worker is the queue's only
+  consumer, so blocking on a full channel there would freeze the pipeline for the rest
+  of the run.
 - `DecisionStepProcessor.ApplyStep` (same thread, no locks): journal append (the only
   hard-throwing path; 3 consecutive failures escalate to quarantine) → effects run
   synchronously via `EffectRunner` → best-effort snapshot → advance `CurrentState` →

docs/agent/diagnostics-package.md

@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+---
+type: concept
+title: Diagnostics Package
+description: What the agent's diagnostics ZIP contains and why — the built-in section catalog shared with the portal, the RealmJoin and Device Preparation collection gates, the configured-path guards, the handle-validated reads that close the enumerate-then-open junction race, caps, and the package manifest.
+resource: agent
+tags: [diagnostics, realmjoin, device-preparation, guardrails, portal, security]
+timestamp: 2026-08-30
+---
+
+# Schema
+
+The diagnostics package is the agent's last-resort support artifact: a ZIP built in memory
+by `DiagnosticsPackageService.BuildArchiveBytes` and uploaded through a short-lived SAS
+URL at the end of a session, at the WhiteGlove seal (`Always` mode) or on a server-requested
+on-demand collection ([server actions](../backend/server-actions-on-demand-diagnostics.md)).
+
+## Archive layout
+
+```
+sessioninfo.txt                 session/tenant/device/outcome, hardware via WMI
+<built-in sections>             catalog order, see below
+AdditionalLogs/<last folder>/   admin-configured paths (global ∪ tenant)
+package-manifest.txt            every packaging decision (always written)
+_TRUNCATED.txt                  only when a cap skipped something
+```
+
+## The built-in catalog is the single source of truth
+
+Everything the package collects **before** any configured path is data, not code paths:
+`DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.All` in Shared (`Models/Diagnostics/DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.cs`).
+The agent iterates it in order; the backend serves the same list to the portal
+(`GET /api/diagnostics/paths`, MemberRead) so what administrators see is exactly what the
+agent does. There is no second copy to drift.
+
+| Id | ZIP folder | Source (unexpanded) | Patterns | Recursive | Condition |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| AgentLogs | `AgentLogs` | `%ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor\Logs` | log patterns | no | Always |
+| ImeLogs | `ImeLogs` | `%ProgramData%\Microsoft\IntuneManagementExtension\Logs` | log patterns | no | Always |
+| ImeBootstrapperEventLog | `ImeLogs` | `C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs` | `BootstrapperAgentServiceLogProvider.evtx` | no | DevicePreparation |
+| AgentState | `AgentState` | `%ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor\State` | log patterns + `*.complete`, `*.marker` | yes | Always |
+| AgentSpool | `AgentSpool` | `%ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor\Spool` | `*.jsonl`, `*.json` | no | Always |
+| AgentMarkers | `AgentMarkers` | `%ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor` | `*.complete`, `*.marker` | no | Always |
+| RealmJoinWindows | `RealmJoinLogs/Windows` | `C:\Windows\Logs` | `realmjoin*.log` | no | RealmJoinWatcher |
+| RealmJoinPackages | `RealmJoinLogs/Windows/RealmJoin` | `C:\Windows\Logs\RealmJoin` | `*.log` | yes | RealmJoinWatcher |
+| RealmJoinChoco | `RealmJoinLogs/Choco` | `%ProgramData%\RealmJoin\choco\logs` | `*.log` | yes | RealmJoinWatcher |
+| RealmJoinUserTray | `RealmJoinLogs/User` | `%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\AppData\Local\RealmJoin` | `tray*.log` | no | RealmJoinWatcher |
+| RealmJoinUserLogs | `RealmJoinLogs/User/Logs` | `%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\AppData\Local\RealmJoin\Logs` | `*.log` | yes | RealmJoinWatcher |
+
+"Log patterns" = `*.log *.txt *.json *.jsonl *.etl *.evtx *.xml *.csv *.cab`. The five
+`Always` sections are the historical layout (PR1-B forensics) and are lock-tested in order;
+the RealmJoin ZIP layout mirrors the disk (`C:\Windows\Logs\{realmjoin*.log, RealmJoin\…}` →
+`RealmJoinLogs/Windows/…`, `%LOCALAPPDATA%\RealmJoin\{tray*.log, Logs\…}` →
+`RealmJoinLogs/User/…`), so a flat section and a tree section never produce the same entry
+name. Two sections may share a ZIP folder only when they read different source folders
+(`ImeLogs` + the bootstrapper evtx) — `(ZipFolder, SourceFolder)` pairs are unique.
+
+### Conditions
+
+`DiagnosticsSectionCondition` is evaluated by the agent (`IsSectionActive`, pure) against its
+effective configuration and the enrollment scenario; unknown values fail closed.
+
+* **RealmJoinWatcher** — the tenant's RealmJoin Watcher toggle
+  (`AnalyzerConfiguration.EnableRealmJoinWatcher`). The package service only sees
+  `AgentConfiguration`, so `RemoteConfigMerger` mirrors that one Analyzers knob onto
+  `AgentConfiguration.EnableRealmJoinWatcher` (the RealmJoin host keeps reading the remote
+  block). Deliberately NOT additionally gated on the compile-time `RealmJoinTrackingEnabled`
+  kill switch: if the live watcher is ever disabled, the logs become more useful, not less.
+  No ConfigVersion bump — no new wire field.
+* **DevicePreparation** — `EnrollmentRegistryDetector.IsDeterministicDevicePreparation()`,
+  the same deterministic `DevicePreparation\BootstrapperAgent\ExecutionContext` marker every
+  other WDP gate keys on ([WDP scenario gates](wdp-scenario-gates.md)); CloudAssigned*
+  fallback rules count as Classic. The probe is a registry read, evaluated once per build
+  (`SCENARIO: devicePreparation=… realmJoinWatcher=…` in the manifest); a probe failure is
+  treated as Classic and logged — the evtx export is skipped, never the package. The channel
+  is exclusively locked while active, so the existing `wevtutil epl` export path
+  (`ResolveChannelForEvtxFile`, field case 2026-08-17) handles it.
+
+Inactive sections are never silent: `BUILT-IN SKIPPED (RealmJoin Watcher disabled): <Id>`,
+`BUILT-IN SKIPPED (not a Device Preparation enrollment): <Id>`,
+`BUILT-IN SKIPPED (no user session for token): <Id> '<source>'` (the
+`%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%` token resolves via `UserProfileResolver` only once an
+interactive user exists — identical to configured paths). Active ones log
+`BUILT-IN: <Id> -> folder='…' zip='…' recursive=…` followed by the per-pattern
+`ADDED / NO MATCH / FOLDER MISSING` lines.
+
+## Built-ins bypass the configured-path guards — on purpose
+
+`DiagnosticsPathGuards` ([gather-rule guardrails](../rules/gather-rule-guardrails.md))
+validates **admin-typed** paths: allowlisted prefixes, wildcard only in the last segment,
+`C:\Users` blocked except the token's `AppData\Local|Roaming`. The catalog is reviewed code,
+exactly like the five sections that never went through the guard before — and
+`%ProgramData%\RealmJoin` is not on the allowlist at all. What does apply to every section:
+the handle-validated read (next section), the `.evtx` channel export, and the caps
+(100 MB per file, 500 MB total, 5000 files) tracked globally across sections by
+`BudgetTracker`, with every skip recorded in the manifest and `_TRUNCATED.txt`.
+
+## Reads are validated on the handle, not the path
+
+Every guard above judges a path string. Reading the bytes from that string later —
+`File.GetAttributes` on the candidate, then a `FileStream` open after earlier files have been
+compressed — leaves a window: under any folder a local user can write to (the user-profile
+token paths, `ProgramData` subtrees, `C:\Install\Log`) that user can turn a subdirectory into
+a junction in between. An attribute check on the file resolves through a junction in a
+*parent* component, and SYSTEM would copy the junction target into the package.
+`PinnedSourceFolder` (`Monitoring/Runtime/PinnedSourceFolder.cs`, Win32 declarations in
+`Monitoring/Interop/FileNativeMethods.cs`) closes the window by deciding on the handle that
+is read:
+
+* `AddLogFiles` pins the section folder once. It is opened with
+  `FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT | FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS`, must not be a reparse point
+  itself, and its `GetFinalPathNameByHandle` result — every reparse point resolved — must
+  equal the validated lexical path (8.3 names expanded through `GetLongPathName`, so a
+  `%TEMP%`-style short name is not mistaken for a junction). Anything else skips the section
+  with `FOLDER REJECTED (<reason>)`; a missing folder stays `FOLDER MISSING`. The handle is
+  held, with `FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY` access and no delete share, until the section is done:
+  NTFS refuses to rename or delete a directory while it or anything beneath it is open, so
+  the validated chain cannot be swapped underneath the build either.
+* Every candidate file is opened by `PinnedSourceFolder.TryOpenFile` with
+  `FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT` — a symlink at the final component is opened as itself and
+  refused (`SKIPPED (reparse point)`) — and the handle's final path must be exactly
+  `<canonical folder>\<relative path>`. A subdirectory that became a junction after
+  enumeration resolves elsewhere: `SKIPPED (resolved outside validated folder)`, naming only
+  the requested path in the manifest, never the resolved one. The length charged against the
+  caps and the stream copied into the archive come from that same handle; any other open
+  failure is `FAILED (open): <path>: <reason>`.
+* `CollectFilesNoReparseDirs` still skips reparse-point directories while enumerating — as a
+  candidate filter and to keep the walk out of junction loops — but nothing it decides is
+  trusted at copy time.
+* The `.evtx` channel export is the agent's own file under an unguessable name in SYSTEM's
+  temp folder and is streamed as-is. Hard links are out of scope: Windows refuses to create
+  one to a file the caller cannot write.
+
+The race itself is pinned by `DiagnosticsPackageServiceTests`: the `BeforeSourceFileOpen`
+seam swaps a subdirectory for a junction after enumeration and before the open, and the
+archive must not carry the file.
+
+## Configured paths: global ∪ tenant
+
+`GetAgentConfigFunction.MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths` sends global paths (Global Admin,
+`AdminConfiguration.DiagnosticsGlobalLogPathsJson`) first, then tenant paths
+(`TenantConfiguration.DiagnosticsLogPathsJson`), dropping blank entries and collapsing
+duplicates (trimmed, case-insensitive) onto the first occurrence — a path present in both
+lists used to produce duplicate ZIP entry names. The agent keys each entry's ZIP folder on
+the last directory name (`AdditionalLogs/<folder>`), so two configured paths ending in a
+same-named folder share one ZIP folder.
+
+## Portal surfaces
+
+* Global Admin → Settings → Diagnostics Log Paths: the built-in catalog (collapsed, read-only,
+  neutral condition pills) above the editable global list; add-row first.
+* Tenant → Settings → Agent → Diagnostics Package: built-in catalog (header carries the
+  tenant's persisted RealmJoin Watcher state, RealmJoin rows show on/off), the global paths
+  read-only, then the tenant's own entries; every role with a tenant membership can read the
+  catalog (the route is MemberRead, JWT-scoped). One line per entry (`DiagnosticsPathRow`),
+  full values in tooltips.
+
+## Test seams
+
+* `DiagnosticsPackageService` internal ctor: the five historical folder overrides map onto
+  catalog ids; `sectionFolderOverrides` covers any other section; `devicePreparationProbe`
+  replaces the registry read (seam callers default to "not WDP", so existing rigs never touch
+  the registry). `UserProfileResolver.SetForTesting(path|null)` / `Reset()` drive the token.
+  `BeforeSourceFileOpen` fires with each candidate path after enumeration and before its open
+  — the point at which the junction-race test swaps the directory.
+* Catalog invariants live in the backend test project (`DiagnosticsBuiltInSectionsTests`),
+  because Shared has no test project.
+
+# Examples
+
+A RealmJoin tenant (watcher on) with a signed-in user: `RealmJoinLogs/Windows/realmjoin.log`,
+`RealmJoinLogs/Windows/RealmJoin/Packages/<pkg>/<timestamp>_install.log`,
+`RealmJoinLogs/Choco/<pkg>/<timestamp>_install.log`, `RealmJoinLogs/User/tray.log`,
+`RealmJoinLogs/User/Logs/RjImeHost.log`. The same tenant's package collected before the
+desktop: the two `User` sections appear as `BUILT-IN SKIPPED (no user session for token)`.
+A Classic enrollment: `BUILT-IN SKIPPED (not a Device Preparation enrollment):
+ImeBootstrapperEventLog`. A tenant that had added
+`%LOGGED_ON_USER_PROFILE%\AppData\Local\RealmJoin\Logs\*.log` manually keeps working — the
+files simply appear twice (`AdditionalLogs/Logs/…` and `RealmJoinLogs/User/Logs/…`) until the
+entry is removed.
+
+# Citations
+
+* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Models/Diagnostics/DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.cs` — the catalog
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Runtime/DiagnosticsPackageService.cs` — `BuildArchiveBytes`, `AddBuiltInSection`, `IsSectionActive`, `AddLogFiles` / `AddLogFile` / `OpenSource`, caps, evtx export
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Runtime/PinnedSourceFolder.cs` — pinned folder handle, `TryOpenFile`, `SourceFile`
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/FileNativeMethods.cs` — `CreateFileW`, `GetFileInformationByHandle`, `GetFinalPathNameByHandleW`, `GetLongPathNameW`
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Configuration/RemoteConfigMerger.cs` — `EnableRealmJoinWatcher` mirror
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Diagnostics/GetDiagnosticsPathsFunction.cs` — `GET diagnostics/paths`
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Config/GetAgentConfigFunction.cs` — `MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths`
+* `src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/components/diagnostics/` — `DiagnosticsPathRow`, `BuiltInSectionsList`, `builtInSectionDisplay`
+* Tests: `DiagnosticsPackageServiceTests` (RealmJoin on/off, no user session, bootstrapper evtx, probe failure, junction swapped in after enumeration, junction as section folder), `PinnedSourceFolderTests` (final-path equality, short names, junction in the chain, symlink at the final component, rename refused while pinned), `DiagnosticsBuiltInSectionsTests`, `GetDiagnosticsPathsPayloadTests`, `GetAgentConfigFunctionTests.MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths_*`

docs/agent/do-group-id-auto-set.md

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+---
+type: Concept
+title: DO GroupId Auto-Set — Delivery Optimization peering group from a network fingerprint
+description: EnableDoGroupIdAutoSet (ConfigVersion 40) makes the agent set the DOGroupId policy value to a deterministic GUID derived from the default gateway's IPv4 address and MAC (RealmJoin-compatible byte layout), so devices on the same local network form one DO peering group during enrollment; foreign DOGroupId/DOGroupIdSource policies always win.
+resource: /src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Transport/DoGroupIdService.cs
+tags:
+  - agent
+  - delivery-optimization
+  - network
+  - tenant-configuration
+timestamp: 2026-08-21T00:00:00+02:00
+---
+
+# DO GroupId Auto-Set
+
+## Schema
+
+### The problem
+
+With Delivery Optimization download mode Group (2), peering is scoped by GroupId. When no
+GroupId is configured, Windows derives it from AD site → authenticated domain SID → Entra
+tenant ID — for a cloud-native tenant that means **one tenant-wide group**, so "peers on
+the same network" degrades to "peers anywhere in the tenant" and DO's cloud service has to
+match them by public IP. A GroupId derived from the local network makes the group exactly
+"devices behind the same gateway" — including branch offices behind NAT. RealmJoin ships
+this as its network-fingerprint GroupId; our agent is on the device even earlier (during
+ESP, when the big app downloads actually happen), so it can seed the same value for
+Autopilot enrollments.
+
+### The setting
+
+`TenantConfiguration.EnableDoGroupIdAutoSet` (`bool?`, default null→false), served as
+`AgentConfigResponse.EnableDoGroupIdAutoSet` — **ConfigVersion 40**. Portal: Settings →
+Agent → Settings, toggle "Set Delivery Optimization Group ID", stored via the usual
+tenant-config roundtrip (`TableConfigRepository` Store+Map). Also shown in the admin
+tenant-config report. `RemoteConfigMerger` maps the bool 1:1; it survives the offline
+config cache like every plain feature flag.
+
+The agent does NOT configure `DODownloadMode` — the fingerprint GroupId only has an
+effect when the tenant already deploys download mode Group (2) via Intune/GPO.
+
+### The fingerprint
+
+`DoGroupIdService.ComputeGroupId(ipv4Bytes, macBytes)` builds a 16-byte GUID:
+
+```
+{101,48,6} + {0,0,0} + {ip[1], 0, ip[2], ip[3]} + mac[0..5]   →  new Guid(byte[16])
+```
+
+Gateway discovery reuses the shared `NetworkInterfaceLocator` heuristic (Up, not
+Loopback/Tunnel, non-0.0.0.0 gateway; IPv4 gateway required), the gateway MAC comes from
+`ArpNativeMethods` (`iphlpapi!SendARP`). The byte layout — including the IP shuffle and
+the zero padding — is **RealmJoin-compatible and must never change**: devices managed by
+RealmJoin on the same network compute the identical GUID and peer with ours. The registry
+value is written as `Guid.ToString()` (braceless lowercase), identical to RealmJoin's
+`SetValue(name, Guid)` string form. Deliberate divergence from RealmJoin: **no
+random-GUID fallback** — a random per-device ID would isolate the device in a one-member
+group, which is worse than the OS default grouping, so no gateway/no MAC means skip.
+
+### Ownership + conflict rules (never fight a foreign policy)
+
+Target: `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\DeliveryOptimization\DOGroupId`
+(64-bit registry view — the Policies store is WOW64-redirected; key paths reused from
+`DoThrottlePolicyReader`). Only this GPO-store value is written; the legacy pre-1607
+`GroupId` value name is intentionally not.
+
+Skip conditions (Info event with `skipReason`, nothing written):
+
+| skipReason | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `no_ipv4_gateway` | No active interface with an IPv4 default gateway |
+| `arp_failed` | Gateway MAC could not be resolved via SendARP |
+| `group_id_source_policy` | `DOGroupIdSource` configured in GPO or MDM store (dynamic group source wins) |
+| `mdm_policy_present` | `DOGroupId` managed via the Policy CSP store (Intune owns it) |
+| `foreign_value_present` | Existing GPO value neither matches the computed GUID nor the one we last wrote |
+
+Ownership is tracked through the `StartupEventGate` fingerprint for the
+`do_group_id_auto_set` key: `written:<guid>` records the GUID we last wrote, so after a
+gateway change the agent recognizes its own stale value and updates it — while a value
+written by anyone else is never overwritten (`DecideAction`: empty→write, equal→no-op,
+ours→update, else→skip; unparseable existing values count as foreign). Every write is
+verified by readback.
+
+### The event
+
+One `do_group_id_auto_set` event per outcome change (Source `StartupEnvironmentProbes`,
+gated on the fingerprint — unchanged reruns across reboots stay silent; errors never
+latch, so each failing start keeps its retry trail). Severity: Info for
+success/skip, Warning for errors. Data: `groupId`, `previousValue`, `gatewayIp`,
+`gatewayMac`, `written`, `skipped`, `skipReason`, `success`, `error`.
+
+## Examples
+
+First boot on a network with gateway `192.168.178.1` / MAC `00-11-22-33-44-55`:
+
+```
+do_group_id_auto_set (Info): Delivery Optimization GroupId set to
+00063065-0000-00a8-b201-001122334455 (gateway 192.168.178.1)
+```
+
+Tenant already deploys a DO GroupId via Intune:
+
+```
+do_group_id_auto_set (Info): Delivery Optimization GroupId not set: mdm_policy_present
+```
+
+## Citations
+
+* Service (fingerprint, ownership, write+readback): `../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Transport/DoGroupIdService.cs`
+* ARP interop: `../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/ArpNativeMethods.cs`
+* Probe wiring + event + fingerprint dedup: `../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Runtime/StartupEnvironmentProbes.cs`
+* Backend serve + ConfigVersion: `../../src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Config/GetAgentConfigFunction.cs`
+* DO policy stores (key paths, Registry64 rationale): `../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Telemetry/Periodic/DoThrottlePolicyReader.cs`

docs/agent/index.md

@@ -5,8 +5,13 @@ How the on-device agent works:
 * [Runtime Overview](overview.md) - lifecycle (install → boot guards → runtime → termination), collector hosts, the single-rail event pipeline to the backend, config & kill switch, on-disk layout.
 * [Decision Engine](decision-engine.md) - the pure-reducer state machine (DecisionCore): signals, state, effects, the A/B/C completion arms, invariants, threading.
 * [Logs, Persistence & Crash Recovery](logs-and-persistence.md) - every persisted file and why it exists; signal log vs spool; snapshot/journal; the replay-based recovery flow and quarantine.
+* [Diagnostics Package](diagnostics-package.md) - what the diagnostics ZIP contains: the built-in section catalog shared with the portal (Shared `DiagnosticsBuiltInSections`, served by GET diagnostics/paths), the RealmJoin Watcher and Device Preparation collection gates, why built-ins bypass the configured-path guards, global ∪ tenant path dedup, caps and the package manifest.
 * [Hello Wizard Un-Skip](hello-wizard-unskip.md) - why a single "WHfB disabled" policy read never decides completion: the HelloWizardStarted signal (prevention + cure) and the HelloTracker confirmation second read.
+* [Zero User-Targeted Apps](zero-user-apps-completion-gate.md) - why a user with no targeted Intune apps starved every user-phase completion path (IME never writes its "Completed user session" line in the zero-app branch), and why a completion gate that is still holding the session must outrank the 30-minute backstop.
 * [Autopilot ZTD Diagnostics](autopilot-ztd-diagnostics.md) - Windows' own diagnostic surfaces for the profile-download flow: ModernDeployment event IDs (807/815/164/...), the Diagnostics\Autopilot registry key, deployment-service endpoints, and the known-issue error-code map.
 * [MDM Reboot Coalescing](mdm-reboot-coalescing.md) - attributing the mid-ESP coalesced reboot ("second sign-in") to the device-assigned policy URIs that forced it: aggregated 2800 observations (neutral, flush-time watermark) + ANALYZE-ESP-005 gated on an actually-observed reboot.
+* [Power-State Watcher](power-state-watcher.md) - live AC↔battery transitions and 50/30/15% downward threshold crossings via a WMI push subscription (no polling): power_state_change semantics (latch/debounce/cap, never armed without a battery) and the single-condition analyze rules ANALYZE-DEV-009/-010 on top.
+* [DO GroupId Auto-Set](do-group-id-auto-set.md) - the optional Delivery Optimization peering-group seed: deterministic GUID from default gateway IPv4 + MAC (RealmJoin-compatible), written to the DOGroupId policy value with readback, ownership-tracked so foreign Intune/GPO values are never overwritten; skip reasons and the do_group_id_auto_set event.
+* [System Timeline Watcher](system-timeline-watcher.md) - clock steps (system_clock_changed: oldTime/newTime/timeDeltaMs/process, micro-slew floor) and completed sleep episodes (system_sleep_episode: sleep/hibernate/Modern Standby with authoritative enteredAt/exitedAt) from one System-channel EventLogWatcher with pre-agent backfill; feeds the web clock-set jump cause, the standby duration note, time-attribution SleepSpans and ANALYZE-DEV-012.
 
 Reading order for newcomers: overview → decision engine → persistence.

docs/agent/local-admin-analyzer.md

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+---
+type: Concept
+title: Local Admin Analyzer — account inventory, dormant accounts and Administrators membership
+description: What the local_admin_analysis event asserts about a device at enrollment start and completion, why disabled accounts are inventoried (a /active:no backdoor re-enabled after enrollment is dormant at both scans), how Administrators-group membership is read from the SAM by well-known SID (NetLocalGroupGetMembers, independent of WMI and account state), why built-ins are matched by well-known RID (localized Guest/Administrator), why the shutdown-time dynamic allowance never covers a local SAM account (CWE-807 — the login state is attacker-controlled), which folders are not profiles, which members are scored versus only listed, and why the built-in Administrator's enabled state is reported but not scored.
+resource: /src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Telemetry/Analyzers/LocalAdminAnalyzer.cs
+tags:
+  - agent
+  - security
+  - local-admin
+  - analyze-rules
+  - bypass-detection
+timestamp: 2026-08-30T00:00:00+02:00
+---
+
+# Local Admin Analyzer
+
+`LocalAdminAnalyzer` emits one `local_admin_analysis` event at agent startup and one at
+shutdown. The pair is a before/after inventory of local accounts on the device; the backend
+rule `ANALYZE-ID-002` alerts when the finding is `unexpected_local_admins_detected`.
+The threat model is the classic Autopilot bypass: a person with a Shift+F10 SYSTEM console
+during OOBE/ESP who creates a persistent local administrator.
+
+# Schema
+
+## Checks
+
+| Check | Source | What it yields |
+|---|---|---|
+| `bypass_nro` | `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\OOBE\BypassNRO` | value + `flagged` |
+| Local accounts | WMI `Win32_UserAccount WHERE LocalAccount = True` (Name, Disabled, SID) | `accounts_checked`, `account_details` (name / disabled / administrators_member), `unexpected_accounts`, `builtin_administrator_enabled` |
+| Administrators membership | `NetLocalGroupGetMembers` level 2 on the group resolved from `S-1-5-32-544` (`LocalGroupNativeMethods`) | `administrators_group.{enumerated,error_code,members}`, `unexpected_admin_members` |
+| Profile folders | `C:\Users` top-level directories, junctions and `$<32 hex>` folders skipped | `profiles_found`, `unexpected_profiles` |
+
+## Allowed list
+
+Built-in names (`Administrator`, `Guest`, `DefaultAccount`, `WDAGUtilityAccount`,
+`defaultuser0/1/2`, `kioskUser0` — the Assigned Access autologon account of kiosk profiles —
+and the non-account folders `Public`, `Default`, `Default User`, `All Users`) plus the
+tenant's *Allowed Local Accounts* (glob `*`/`?`, case-insensitive).
+`defaultuser1/2` stay allowlisted deliberately: they do appear during OOBE enrollment.
+
+**Well-known RIDs.** Built-in accounts are additionally recognised by RID on the machine SID
+(`S-1-5-21-…-500` Administrator, `-501` Guest, `-503` DefaultAccount, `-504`
+WDAGUtilityAccount), for the WMI inventory and for the SAM-member fallback alike. Localized
+installs name them `Gast`, `Invité`, `Гость`, `Administrateur`, … — disabled by default and
+therefore invisible before disabled accounts were inventoried; without the RID match every
+non-English device would flag its own Guest. Name matching is unchanged (an ordinary-RID
+account named `Gast` is still unexpected).
+
+## Dynamic allowance at shutdown
+
+The shutdown run adds the logged-in users (explorer.exe owners outside session 0) to the
+allowed list — but **only names that are not a local SAM account**. The WMI inventory is read
+first; a logged-in name found in it is rejected for both the account and the profile check
+and reported as `logged_in_local_accounts` (Warning in the agent log).
+
+Why this is safe for false positives: in real sessions the logged-in identity is an Entra or
+domain user (user-driven, hybrid, or an Entra user signing in to a self-deploying device
+after ESP). Those never appear in `Win32_UserAccount`; the allowance only ever mattered for
+their `C:\Users` folder — and `unexpected_profiles` alone scores 0. A logged-in *local*
+account is the one case the allowance changed the score, and that is the attack: an account
+created after the startup scan that signs itself in before the shutdown scan (CWE-807 —
+exempting on a condition the adversary controls). Kiosk autologon (`kioskUser0`) is covered
+by the built-in list instead.
+
+## Profile folders that are not profiles
+
+Junctions (`All Users`, `Default User` and localized variants such as `Все пользователи`,
+all pointing at ProgramData / Default) and `$<32 hex>` folders are skipped entirely — neither
+can be the profile of a local account (a SAM account name is at most 20 characters), so they
+can never contribute to the profile-overlap score; listing them was payload noise.
+
+## Evaluation (`EvaluateAccounts`, pure)
+
+* Every local account is evaluated, **disabled ones included**; the disabled state is reported
+  per account instead of excluding the account.
+* An account is an Administrators member when its SID matches a group member, or — SID
+  unavailable — its name matches a member of the local machine domain.
+* `unexpected_accounts` = accounts not matching the allowed list (any state).
+* `unexpected_admin_members` = unexpected accounts holding Administrators membership, plus
+  local-domain members not on the allowed list that WMI did not return at all (WMI failure
+  or provider gap — the SAM is authoritative for membership).
+* Members outside the machine domain (Entra role SIDs such as `S-1-12-1-…` on Entra-joined
+  devices, domain groups on hybrid devices, unresolved/deleted SIDs) are **listed for delta
+  comparison but never scored** — they are expected on joined devices.
+* `builtin_administrator_enabled` = `!Disabled` of the RID-500 account (null when absent).
+  Reported, not scored: whether OOBE enables it transiently is not established; the field
+  collects evidence first.
+
+## Scoring
+
+| Signal | Weight |
+|---|---|
+| `BypassNRO = 1` | +20 |
+| any `unexpected_accounts` | +40 |
+| any `unexpected_admin_members` | +40 |
+| unexpected account with a matching `C:\Users` folder | +40 |
+
+Capped at 100. `0` → Info `no_unexpected_admins_detected`; `<40` → Info
+`bypass_nro_flag_only`; `40–79` → Warning, `≥80` → Error, both
+`unexpected_local_admins_detected`. A dormant backdoor with admin membership therefore lands
+at 80 (Error) without ever having a profile folder.
+
+## Failure behaviour
+
+WMI and the SAM read are independent; either failing is logged at Warning with the native
+status (`NET_API_STATUS=…`) and the other source still evaluates. The event carries
+`administrators_group.enumerated=false` + `error_code` so a "no members" result is never
+mistaken for an empty group.
+
+# Examples
+
+`net user backdoor P@ss /add /active:no` + `net localgroup Administrators backdoor /add`
+during OOBE, re-enabled by a scheduled task after enrollment: at both scans the account is
+disabled; before this change it was skipped entirely. Now `unexpected_accounts=[backdoor]`,
+`unexpected_admin_members=[backdoor]`, `account_details[backdoor].disabled=true` →
+confidence 80, Error.
+
+`net user backdoor P@ss /add` + `net localgroup Administrators backdoor /add` during ESP,
+then an interactive sign-in as `backdoor` (fast user switching) before enrollment completes:
+the shutdown scan finds `backdoor` in the SAM inventory → not allowed dynamically →
+`unexpected_accounts=[backdoor]`, `unexpected_admin_members=[backdoor]`, profile overlap →
+confidence 100, Error, `logged_in_local_accounts=[backdoor]`. Before this change the login
+alone silenced the finding to 0.
+
+German device, tenant allowed list empty: `Gast` (RID 501, disabled) and `Administrator`
+are inventoried and matched by RID → `unexpected_accounts=[]`, confidence 0.
+
+`net localgroup Administrators adm-helpdesk /add` where `adm-*` is allowlisted: not flagged
+(the allowed list is the tenant's statement of intent), but `administrators_group.members`
+shows the new membership in the shutdown event for delta review.
+
+# Citations
+
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Telemetry/Analyzers/LocalAdminAnalyzer.cs`
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/LocalGroupNativeMethods.cs`
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Analyzers/LocalAdminAnalyzerEvaluateAccountsTests.cs`
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Analyzers/LocalAdminAnalyzerDynamicAllowanceTests.cs`
+* `rules/analyze/ANALYZE-ID-002.json`

docs/agent/overview.md

@@ -109,7 +109,9 @@ telemetry directly:
 ```
 Collector callback
   → SignalAdapter (dual emission: decision signal + InformationalEvent)
-    → SignalIngress.Post()            (bounded queue 256, back-pressure blocks producer)
+    → SignalIngress.Post()            (bounded queue 256, back-pressure blocks producer;
+                                       posts from the worker thread itself bypass the
+                                       queue via a worker-local follow-up queue)
       → single worker thread:
           assign ordinals → SignalLog.Append (durable)   ← source of truth
           → DecisionEngine.Reduce → apply step/effects

docs/agent/power-state-watcher.md

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+---
+type: Concept
+title: Power-State Watcher — live AC/battery transitions and threshold events during enrollment
+description: How the agent observes AC↔battery switches and downward battery-threshold crossings mid-enrollment via a WMI push subscription (no polling), the power_state_change event semantics (transition field, 50/30/15 ladder, latch/debounce/cap), and the two analyze rules on top (ANALYZE-DEV-009/-010).
+resource: /src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Orchestration/Hosts/PowerStateWatcherHost.cs
+tags:
+  - agent
+  - power
+  - battery
+  - collector
+  - wmi
+  - analyze-rules
+timestamp: 2026-08-21T00:00:00+02:00
+---
+
+# Power-State Watcher
+
+The startup probe (`power_state_check`, one-shot from `StartupEnvironmentProbes` via
+`PowerStateProbe`/`GetSystemPowerStatus`) only captures the power state at agent start. A
+device unplugged mid-enrollment — or draining its battery across a multi-hour ESP — was
+invisible. The watcher closes that gap **event-driven, with zero polling**.
+
+# Mechanism
+
+- `PowerStateWatcherHost` (`Orchestration/Hosts`) arms a WMI event subscription with a
+  two-step chain:
+  1. `SELECT * FROM Win32_PowerManagementEvent WHERE EventCode = 10` (PBT_APMPOWERSTATUSCHANGE:
+     true kernel push, fires on AC↔DC switches and battery-percentage steps).
+  2. **Fallback** `SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 30 WHERE TargetInstance
+     ISA 'Win32_Battery'` — required because on Windows 11 24H2/25H2 (observed on builds
+     26200 and 26220, session 161b838c) the `MS_Power_Management_Event_Provider` is still
+     registered in the repository but its activation fails with `WBEM_E_NOT_FOUND`: the
+     legacy push provider no longer loads on exactly the OS builds new devices enroll with.
+     The WITHIN sampling runs inside WinMgmt (one Win32_Battery snapshot every 30 s), not in
+     the agent; worst-case detection latency ≈ 35 s incl. debounce. `collector_degraded`
+     (`watcher_arm_failed`) is emitted only when BOTH attempts fail; the agent log's arm
+     line names the active mode.
+
+  Either way the arriving event's payload is ignored — each arrival re-probes via the
+  existing `PowerStateProbe.Probe()` (cheap P/Invoke).
+- Snapshots are diffed by the pure `PowerStateTransitionTracker`
+  (`Monitoring/Enrollment/SystemSignals`), which decides what to emit. The host only owns
+  WMI, a 5 s trailing-edge debounce timer (dock-flap AC→battery→AC inside the window
+  collapses to a no-diff) and the emit path (`InformationalEventPost`, single rail).
+- **No battery / probe error ⇒ WMI is never armed** — desktops and VMs pay nothing. WMI
+  arming runs on a background thread (WinMgmt can hang in OOBE; `ConsoleBypassWatcher`
+  precedent); an arm failure emits one `collector_degraded` (`watcher_arm_failed`).
+- Registered as a plain always-on peripheral host after `NetworkChangeHost`, deliberately
+  NOT under `PeriodicCollectorLifecycleHost`: it is push-based (zero idle cost) and must be
+  alive precisely when the device idles on battery. Kill-switch:
+  `Collectors.EnablePowerStateWatcher` (default true, compile-time default like the other
+  collector toggles; ConfigVersion 38).
+
+# Event: power_state_change
+
+`data.transition` discriminates three shapes (payload always carries `onAcPower`,
+`batteryPercent`, `isCharging`, `batteryLifeMinutes`; unknowns as `"unknown"`):
+
+| transition | Severity | Immediate | Notes |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `ac_to_battery` | Warning | yes | one per accepted edge |
+| `battery_to_ac` | Info | no | recovery |
+| `threshold_crossed` | Info (50) / Warning (30) / Error (15) | 30+15 only | extra field `thresholdPercent` |
+
+Threshold semantics (tracker):
+
+- Ladder 50/30/15, evaluated only while ON battery; **each level latches once per agent
+  lifetime** (charge-up + re-drain does not re-emit — no plug-cycle alarm spam).
+- A multi-level jump emits only the LOWEST newly-crossed level (60%→10% ⇒ one `15` event).
+- Entering battery power already below a level counts as crossing it; the arm-time baseline
+  does too — an enrollment STARTING at 12% battery emits its `thresholdPercent: 15` event
+  immediately (the analyze rule would otherwise never see sessions that began low).
+- Lifetime emission cap 20 (storm backstop against a flapping dock / dying battery
+  controller); the host logs one warning when it engages.
+
+Backend/agent hygiene: `power_state_change` is classified as non-activity on both sides —
+`SignalActivityClassifier.NonActivityEventTypes` (agent: must not reset the
+PeriodicCollectorLifecycleHost/StallProbeHost idle clocks) and
+`EventIngestProcessor.IsPeriodicOrStallEvent` (backend: must not heal a Stalled session —
+battery drain is not enrollment progress).
+
+# Analyze Rules
+
+- **ANALYZE-DEV-009** (high): battery crossed 15% while on battery — matches the
+  agent-stamped `thresholdPercent equals 15`.
+- **ANALYZE-DEV-010** (warning): AC→battery switch — matches `transition equals
+  ac_to_battery`.
+- Both: `evaluateOn: ["enrollment_end", "whiteglove_sealed", "on_event:power_state_change"]`
+  (live interim finding + terminal finalization), `markSessionAsFailedDefault: false`.
+- Both are deliberately **single-required-condition**: `event_data` conditions scan events
+  independently (no same-instance join), so a two-condition rule (e.g. `transition ==
+  threshold_crossed AND batteryPercent < 15`) could false-positive across two different
+  power events. `thresholdPercent` exists only on threshold events and its value pins the
+  ladder level, so one condition fully identifies the instance.
+- `{{token}}` caveat: `AddDataFieldsToEvidence` whitelists only generic identifiers
+  (appId/errorCode/…), so `{{batteryPercent}}` would render literally. DEV-009 interpolates
+  `{{thresholdPercent}}` (the matched condition's own dataField); the exact percentage lives
+  on the linked event in the timeline.
+
+# Citations
+
+- `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Orchestration/Hosts/PowerStateWatcherHost.cs`
+- `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/SystemSignals/PowerStateTransitionTracker.cs`
+- `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Runtime/PowerStateProbe.cs` (probe, unchanged)
+- `rules/analyze/ANALYZE-DEV-009.json`, `rules/analyze/ANALYZE-DEV-010.json`
+- [analyze-rule-triggers](../rules/analyze-rule-triggers.md) (interim-trigger design; the WG battery rule was its motivating case)

docs/agent/system-timeline-watcher.md

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+---
+type: Concept
+title: System Timeline Watcher — clock steps and sleep episodes from the System event log
+description: How the agent turns two enrollment blind spots into timeline ground truth via one EventLogWatcher on the System channel — system_clock_changed (Kernel-General 1, oldTime/newTime/timeDeltaMs/process) and system_sleep_episode (Power-Troubleshooter 1 classic sleep/hibernate, Kernel-Power 507 Modern Standby) — including backfill of pre-agent records, the payload-times-are-authoritative rule, SleepSpans in time attribution, the web clock-set jump cause, and ANALYZE-DEV-012.
+resource: /src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/SystemSignals/SystemTimelineTracker.cs
+tags:
+  - agent
+  - eventlog
+  - time
+  - clock-skew
+  - standby
+  - collector
+  - time-attribution
+  - analyze-rules
+timestamp: 2026-08-21T00:00:00+02:00
+---
+
+# System Timeline Watcher
+
+Two things silently distort every session timeline and its wall-clock duration:
+
+1. **The OS clock gets stepped** — classically w32time correcting a wrong BIOS clock early
+   in OOBE, but also tzutil/MDM actions. Before this watcher the jump was only *inferred*
+   (TimeJumpBadge, `clock_skew`/DEV-008); Windows records the ground truth.
+2. **The device sleeps mid-enrollment** — the timeline shows an unexplained gap, the
+   duration looks inflated, and nothing says "the device was simply asleep for 56 minutes".
+
+`SystemTimelineTracker` (hosted by `SystemTimelineWatcherHost`, config flag
+`Collectors.EnableSystemTimelineWatcher`, ConfigVersion 39) subscribes to the **System**
+channel with one provider-qualified XPath and forwards both facts as events.
+
+# Sources and events
+
+| Source (System channel) | Emitted event | Key payload |
+|---|---|---|
+| `Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General` EventID 1 | `system_clock_changed` | `oldTime`, `newTime` (ISO-8601), signed `timeDeltaMs`, `reason`/`reasonText` (1=`application_set`, 2=`hardware_clock_sync`), `processName`/`processId` |
+| `Microsoft-Windows-Power-Troubleshooter` EventID 1 | `system_sleep_episode` | `kind`=`sleep`/`hibernate` (EffectiveState 5 ⇒ hibernate), `enteredAt`=SleepTime, `exitedAt`=WakeTime, `durationSeconds`, `wakeSourceType`/`wakeSourceText` |
+| `Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Power` EventID 507 | `system_sleep_episode` | `kind`=`modern_standby`, `exitedAt`=TimeCreated, `enteredAt`=exit − DurationInUs, `durationSeconds` (scenario), `sleepDurationSeconds` (real sleep), `reason`, `onAcPower`, `batteryRemainingCapacityOnExit` |
+
+**506 is deliberately not consumed.** 507 carries the full episode; pairing 506/507 would
+need an orphan-tolerant state machine across agent restarts for zero information gain — an
+episode without a 507 never completed and would not be emitted under any design.
+
+# Thresholds (constants, not knobs)
+
+- `MinClockDeltaMs = 2000` — w32time logs Kernel-General 1 for routine **1 ms micro-slews**
+  (verified live, several per hour); only genuine steps are emitted. Suppressed records are
+  still claimed by the dedup watermark.
+- `ClockDeltaWarningMs = 5 min` — larger steps are Warning + immediate upload (can break
+  token/cert validation windows; matches the web TimeJumpBadge threshold).
+- `MinSleepDurationSeconds = 60` — **Modern Standby only**: every screen-off scenario logs a
+  506/507 pair, including seconds-long ones with `SleepDurationInUs 0` (`SleepEntered=false`);
+  the single duration gate suppresses both. Classic Power-Troubleshooter episodes have no
+  floor — they only exist for genuinely completed S3/S4 transitions.
+
+# Payload times are authoritative
+
+The decisive clock correction happens exactly when the device clock is untrustworthy, and
+the backend clamps implausible event timestamps (±168 h/24 h) to server time. Every semantic
+instant therefore travels as an explicit ISO-8601 payload field (`oldTime`/`newTime`,
+`enteredAt`/`exitedAt`); consumers must never read the event's own `Timestamp` for these.
+The event `Timestamp` is set to the record's TimeCreated (WindowsUpdateTracker backfill
+convention) so rows land where the wake/step happened.
+
+# Backfill and dedup
+
+Template: `WindowsUpdateTracker`. `LoadWatermark → arm watcher → backfill` with lookback
+`SystemEventBackfillLookbackMinutes` (default 1440 = 24 h; 0 disables). The System .evtx
+persists across OOBE reboots, so the pre-agent w32time correction and pre-agent standby
+episodes are recovered with `backfilled=true`. Cross-restart dedup via RecordId watermark
+(`system-timeline-watermark.json` in the state directory) plus an intra-run `HashSet` —
+deliberately **not** a high-water mark, which would drop exactly the older, never-emitted
+pre-agent records (the live watcher arms before the backfill scan).
+
+# Non-activity classification (both sides)
+
+Both event types are environment observation, not enrollment progress:
+`SignalActivityClassifier.NonActivityEventTypes` (agent — must not reset idle/stall clocks)
+and `EventIngestProcessor.IsPeriodicOrStallEvent` (backend — a device that slept through its
+stall must stay Stalled).
+
+# Consumers
+
+- **Web timeline** (`EventTimeline.tsx`): badge blocks for both events; the TimeJumpBadge
+  gains the ground-truth cause `clock-set` — `classifyTimeJump` receives the session's
+  `system_clock_changed` deltas and matches a backward display step against a backward clock
+  set within max(60 s, 20 %) (`lib/timeProvenance.ts`).
+- **Duration story** (`SessionInfoCard` via `useSessionDerivedData.standbySeconds`): the
+  wall-clock duration deliberately keeps the pause (the enrollment really took that long);
+  a `· 🌙 56m standby` note explains it. Episodes are dedup'd on `enteredAt`.
+- **Time attribution** (`TimeAttributionCalculator.BuildSleepSpans`, AttributionVersion 3):
+  `SleepSpan`s mirror `RebootSpan`s — cross-cutting annotations clipped to the observation
+  windows (a WhiteGlove-pause episode contributes only its in-window flanks), never a slice
+  of the wall-clock partition. Persisted as `SleepSeconds`/`SleepSpansJson`; rendered as the
+  standby chip in `TimeAttributionLane`.
+- **ANALYZE-DEV-012** (info, `trigger: single`, `on_event:system_sleep_episode`): fires once
+  per session for episodes ≥ 5 min. Deliberately the ONLY new rule: clock issues already
+  have DEV-008 (`clock_skew`) — a second clock rule would double-report the same action item
+  (user decision 2026-08-21); clock steps stay timeline ground truth with badges instead.
+
+# Citations
+
+- `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/SystemSignals/SystemTimelineTracker.cs`
+- `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Orchestration/Hosts/SystemTimelineWatcherHost.cs`
+- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Helpers/TimeAttributionCalculator.cs` (`BuildSleepSpans`)
+- `src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/lib/timeProvenance.ts` (`clock-set`, `findExplainingClockChange`)
+- `rules/analyze/ANALYZE-DEV-012.json`
+- Live payload evidence (2026-08-21, Win11 26220): Kernel-General 1 with `TimeDeltaInMs=1`
+  micro-slews; Kernel-Power 507 with `SleepDurationInUs=2324095807`; Power-Troubleshooter 1
+  with `SleepTime`/`WakeTime` across a hibernate.

docs/agent/wifi-ssid-location-gate.md

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+---
+type: Concept
+title: WiFi SSID and the Windows 24H2 Location Gate
+description: Why wifi_signal_info silently disappeared on Windows 11 24H2+ devices, why the netsh fallback could never fix it, and the tiered reader that restores the SSID from the SYSTEM context.
+resource: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/WifiInfoProvider.cs
+tags:
+  - agent
+  - interop
+  - wifi
+  - telemetry
+timestamp: 2026-08-26T14:05:00+02:00
+---
+
+# Summary
+
+The agent reports the enrollment WiFi as a `wifi_signal_info` event (SSID, signal, PHY, channel).
+On Windows 11 24H2 and later the event went missing on a large share of devices — no error, no
+partial payload, simply no event. The cause is a Windows privacy change, not a bug in the reader:
+**`WlanQueryInterface` with `wlan_intf_opcode_current_connection` is gated behind precise-location
+consent**, and the agent runs as SYSTEM in session 0 where that consent usually does not exist.
+
+The fix is a tiered reader ([WifiInfoProvider](../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/WifiInfoProvider.cs))
+whose middle tier uses the one SSID API Microsoft left ungated.
+
+# The Gate
+
+Microsoft restricted the Win32 WLAN APIs that expose BSSIDs, because nearby-BSSID lists are a
+precise-location oracle. Without consent these return `ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED` (5):
+
+* `WlanGetAvailableNetworkList`
+* `WlanGetNetworkBssList`
+* `WlanScan`
+* **`WlanQueryInterface` when `OpCode` is `wlan_intf_opcode_current_connection`** — the only opcode
+  the agent needs, and the one that carries SSID, signal quality, PHY type.
+
+Two properties of the gate decide the agent's fate:
+
+1. **The consent prompt only appears for a process running in the user's context and outside
+   `C:\Windows\System32`.** The agent is neither during ESP: it is SYSTEM, in session 0, before any
+   user has seen the OOBE privacy page. It is therefore denied *silently* — no prompt, no event
+   log, nothing that surfaces without asking the API for its return code.
+2. **Consent resolves per user hive, with the device-level setting as the floor.** An interactive
+   user typically has
+   `HKCU\...\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\location\NonPackaged\Value = Allow`
+   ("Let desktop apps access your location"). The SYSTEM account (`HKU\S-1-5-18`) normally has
+   **nothing** set there and falls back to
+   `HKLM\...\ConsentStore\location\Value`. Where that device-level value is `Deny`, SYSTEM is
+   denied even though the logged-on user on the very same machine reads the SSID fine.
+
+That asymmetry is why the failure looks random from the outside: it tracks the **image's
+device-level location setting**, which varies per fleet, not per hardware, driver, or language.
+
+# Why netsh Was Never the Answer
+
+`NetshWifiFallback` was added in 2026-07 on the theory that inbox `netsh` still reported the
+connection where the WLAN API did not, and it was later extended with localized label variants for
+every enrollment-geography language. Field data says otherwise: **`netsh wlan` hangs off the same
+location gate** ("Network shell commands need location permission to access WLAN information"), so
+it fails in lockstep with tier 1 rather than covering for it. In the reported session the agent
+build already contained the netsh fallback and still produced no event.
+
+Consequence for future work: **adding more netsh language labels cannot fix a missing SSID.** Every
+`wifi_signal_info` event that does exist carries a fully populated SSID — the failure is binary at
+the reader level, never a half-parsed or mis-decoded payload. A missing SSID is an access problem,
+not a parsing problem.
+
+# The Tiered Reader
+
+`WifiInfoProvider.TryRead` owns the order so the two collectors (`DeviceInfoCollector`,
+`NetworkChangeDetector`) cannot drift apart. First non-null wins:
+
+| # | Reader | Yields | Location-gated |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 1 | `WifiInfoReader` (native `wlanapi.dll`) | SSID, signal %, PHY, channel | yes |
+| 2 | `WinRtWifiSsidReader` (WinRT `GetConnectedSsid`) | SSID only | **no** |
+| 3 | `NetshWifiFallback` (process spawn, localized parse) | SSID, signal %, radio type, channel | yes |
+
+Tier 2 is Microsoft's own documented replacement for this exact scenario:
+`Windows.Networking.Connectivity.WlanConnectionProfileDetails.GetConnectedSsid()`. It is not part of
+the BSSID-bearing surface, so it needs no consent, and it has existed since Windows 10 1507.
+
+It is bound through the CLR's built-in WinRT projection with
+`Type.GetType("…, ContentType=WindowsRuntime")` — no NuGet package, no winmd reference, no csproj
+change — the same mechanism [OobeStateReader](../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/OobeStateReader.cs)
+already uses from the SYSTEM service context. Every step degrades to null rather than throwing,
+because the caller runs fire-and-forget inside `Task.Run`.
+
+# Telling the Operator
+
+A missing signal reading is indistinguishable from a bug unless the payload says why, and the
+device-level location setting is not something an admin would think to check. When tier 2 wins
+*and* the native tier reported `rc=5`, the `wifi_signal_info` payload therefore carries
+
+```
+wifiDataLimitedReason = "location_services_off"
+```
+
+and the event message gains `- signal unavailable, Location services off`, so the reason is visible
+in the timeline itself. The portal's WiFi card (`DeviceDetailsCard`) matches that literal and
+renders the explanation plus the Intune setting that fixes it. The value is a published contract —
+agent, portal and the MCP device-property catalog all match the same string.
+
+The claim is only made on observed evidence: any other native failure (no WLAN service, no
+connected interface) leaves the field null rather than blaming a privacy setting we did not
+measure. `WifiInfoProvider.IsLocationGateDenied` is the single predicate, pinned by tests at its
+boundaries (`rc=5` yes; `rc=50`, `rc=5023`, `rc=1062` no).
+
+The network timeline reads the same field. It needs no payload of its own: `buildSegments`
+already merges every `wifi_signal_info` into the WiFi segment covering its timestamp, so the
+reason rides in with the sample. A segment that never got a sample (a mid-session reconnect emits
+no `wifi_signal_info`) inherits it — the gate is a device-level setting and cannot flip during an
+enrollment — while a segment that *did* get a real reading is never overwritten. The segment
+tooltip then reads `Signal: unavailable - Location services off on this device` where the
+percentage would be, and the "Avg WiFi signal" stat says `n/a (Location services off)` instead of
+disappearing.
+
+`network_state_change` deliberately does NOT carry the reason: that event has never carried
+`signalPercent` or `radioType` at all (`NetworkChangeDetector` collects them into its snapshot for
+change detection but only `before_/after_wifiSsid` reaches the payload), so there is no absent
+field there for a reason to explain. Adding it would ship a field nothing reads. The SSID it does
+carry is unaffected by the gate.
+
+Fleet-wide the same field is queryable through
+`search_sessions(deviceProperties: { "wifi_signal_info.wifiDataLimitedReason": "location_services_off" })`,
+which sizes how much of a fleet is affected before anyone changes a policy.
+
+Tier 2 returns the SSID alone. Signal quality, PHY type and channel have no ungated source; they
+stay null when the native tier is denied. That is deliberate — deriving a percentage from
+`ConnectionProfile.GetSignalBars()` (0–5) would fabricate precision the API does not have.
+
+# Diagnostics
+
+The step-level native return codes were already collected, but they were logged with
+`_logger.Debug` — and the agent's default log level is `Info`, so the diagnostic built to explain
+this failure never reached a single field log. Both collectors now log at **Warning** when all tiers
+fail, which they only reach when the active NIC really is WiFi. A native `rc=5` is spelled out as
+`ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED` with the location-gate explanation, so the log line diagnoses itself:
+
+```
+EnrollmentTracker: no wifi_signal_info — no WiFi info from any reader — native: [<guid>]
+query(current_connection) rc=5; ; WinRT: no SSID; netsh: no parsable output. rc=5 is
+ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED — Windows 11 24H2+ gates the current-connection opcode (and netsh wlan)
+behind precise-location consent, which is off in this image; enable Location services to
+restore signal/PHY/channel.
+```
+
+# Evidence
+
+Session `7305e0ad` (HP EliteBook X Flip G1i, build 26200.9168, agent 2.0.1407, reported as
+`WIFI SSID fehlt`): `network_interface_info` shows the active NIC as `Intel(R) Wi-Fi 7 BE201`,
+`Wireless80211`, `connectionType=WiFi`, so the `isWifi` gate passed and collection ran — yet zero
+`wifi_signal_info` events across 214 events and 22 minutes, with the netsh fallback already shipped
+in that build.
+
+Fleet correlation over WiFi sessions from 2026-08-01 (n=276), share with a `wifi_signal_info` event:
+
+| OS build | WiFi sessions | with SSID |
+|---|---|---|
+| 22631 (23H2, pre-gate) | 3 | 100% |
+| 26100 (24H2) | 178 | 21% |
+| 26200 (25H2) | 95 | 45% |
+
+Within a single model the outcome splits by fleet, not by hardware — ThinkPad T14 Gen 6: 7/91;
+ThinkPad E14 Gen 7: 9/9 — which is what a per-image privacy setting looks like.
+
+Local verification (build 26220.9022): `HKLM\…\ConsentStore\location = Deny` while
+`HKCU\…\ConsentStore\location\NonPackaged = Allow`; the interactive user reads the SSID through
+both the native API and netsh, `HKU\S-1-5-18` has no consent value at all, and the WinRT chain
+resolves and returns the SSID under net48.
+
+# Operator Guidance
+
+A device that reports no SSID is not misconfigured for enrollment — only the telemetry field is
+missing. To get the full payload (signal, PHY, channel) back, the **device-level** location setting
+must be on: *Settings → Privacy & security → Location → Location services*, or via Intune
+(`Privacy/LetAppsAccessLocation`). Without it the SSID still arrives via tier 2.
+
+# Citations
+
+* [Changes to API behavior for Wi-Fi access and location](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/nativewifi/wi-fi-access-location-changes)
+* [WlanConnectionProfileDetails.GetConnectedSsid](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/uwp/api/windows.networking.connectivity.wlanconnectionprofiledetails.getconnectedssid)
+* [WifiInfoProvider.cs](../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/WifiInfoProvider.cs)
+* [WinRtWifiSsidReader.cs](../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/WinRtWifiSsidReader.cs)
+* [WifiInfoReader.cs](../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/WifiInfoReader.cs)
+* [NetshWifiFallback.cs](../../src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Interop/NetshWifiFallback.cs)

docs/agent/zero-user-apps-completion-gate.md

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+---
+type: Concept
+title: Zero User-Targeted Apps — the starved user-phase completion gate
+description: Why a device with no user-targeted Intune apps could never satisfy the IME user-session gate, how that turned into a 30-minute esp_exit_without_completion_evidence false positive on a third of one tenant's enrollments, and the two fixes — reading the line IME actually writes in its zero-app branch, and refusing to fail a session while a completion gate is deliberately holding it.
+resource: /src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime
+tags:
+  - agent
+  - ime
+  - esp
+  - completion
+  - realmjoin
+  - false-positive
+timestamp: 2026-08-25
+---
+
+# Summary
+
+A Classic user-driven enrollment whose user has **zero targeted Intune Win32 apps** could not
+produce the evidence every user-phase completion path required. The session parked, and the
+30-minute `advisory_completion` backstop resolved it as
+`enrollment_failed: esp_exit_without_completion_evidence` — while the user was at a working
+desktop, Windows Hello was provisioned, and RealmJoin was still installing packages.
+
+One tenant hit this on **10 of 30 enrollments in a week**. Every one of them was a false
+positive; the devices were healthy in Intune and RealmJoin.
+
+# The starvation chain
+
+The IME writes `Completed user session N, userId: …` at the end of a user-session processing
+pass. `IME-USER-SESSION-COMPLETED` matches it and the adapter posts
+`ImeUserSessionCompleted`, which sets `DecisionState.ImeUserSessionCompletedUtc`.
+
+But the IME never reaches that statement when the user has no assigned apps. Decompiled IME
+`1.104.102.0`, `Win32AppPlugIn/ApplicationPoller.cs`:
+
+```csharp
+if (!appPolicies.Any())
+{
+    AppWorkloadLog.TraceInformation($"[Win32App] Get 0 apps for user session {user.RDSSessionId}, user id = {user.IntuneId}");
+    RegisterApplicationsInIfInESP(sender, user, delegate {
+        espLockInProcessor.AttemptToLockInApplications(user, new List<ProcessorSubgraph>());
+    });
+    continue;                       // skips the "Completed user session" statement below
+}
+```
+
+Identical shape in `1.97.107.0`, `1.83.107.0`, `1.80.132.0`. With that fact missing, every door
+out of the user phase is shut at once:
+
+| Path | Requirement | Why it is dead |
+|---|---|---|
+| `ShouldTransitionToAwaitingHello` arm A | `AccountSetupProvisioningSucceededUtc` | ESP registry froze at `AccountSetup: 1 of 5`; neither `categorySucceeded` nor the all-subcategories fallback can ever hold |
+| arm B | `SkipUserEsp` | Full ESP, not a skip-user flow |
+| arm C | `IsImeUserSessionGenuine` | needs the missing IME fact |
+| arm D | `EnrollmentMode.DevicePreparation` | Autopilot v1, not WDP |
+| `MaybeSynthesizeAccountSetupCompleteFromSettledUserApps` | `AreUserEspAppsSettled` | returned `false` on an empty app list |
+| `HandleAdvisoryCompletionDeadlineFired` conjunction | `imeUserSessionGenuine \|\| isObservationAdvisory` | both false |
+
+The last row is the one that produced the verdict: the backstop that exists to resolve a
+dead-end resolved it as a failure.
+
+`AreUserEspAppsSettled` deserves its own note. Its "at least one required app" rule is
+deliberately conservative — an empty list normally means *the phase just cleared* or *apps have
+not surfaced yet*. But it made **zero apps**, the most settled state possible, indistinguishable
+from *unknown*, and there was no evidence available to tell them apart.
+
+# Fix 1 — read the line IME does write
+
+`IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS` matches the zero-app line and routes it through the **same**
+`OnUserSessionCompleted` callback. Downstream this genuinely *is* a completed user session, so
+the adapter's pending-apps deferral and its fire-once flag apply unchanged.
+
+This is not a weakened gate — it is IME's own verdict. The zero-app branch locks the ESP in with
+an *empty* application list, and the sibling emit site in `AppWorkloadAbstraction.ExecuteUserCheckIn`
+returns `ProviderResult.ProvisioningComplete` straight after logging it. All three emit sites are
+user-session-scoped (`user.RDSSessionId`, `user.IntuneId`); none is device-scoped.
+
+Guards that stay in force:
+
+* **Phase guard** — the observation only fires while the tracker is in `AccountSetup`. Firing
+  earlier would burn the adapter's fire-once flag on a pre-sign-in (defaultuser0) timestamp that
+  `IsImeUserSessionGenuine` (`>= AccountSetupEnteredUtc`) can never accept. An observation made
+  before the phase was known is remembered and replayed on the transition into it, because IME
+  writes its check-in lines independently of when the agent first parses the phase marker.
+* **Engine guards unchanged** — arm C still requires a post-AccountSetup final ESP exit *and* a
+  DAD-validated real-user desktop.
+* `AreUserEspAppsSettled` returns `true` for an empty list **only** with this explicit
+  observation — never for a merely empty list.
+
+# Fix 2 — do not fail while a completion gate is holding
+
+An independent defect, and the decisive one for the affected tenant. `advisory_completion` runs
+for 30 minutes. The RealmJoin completion gate blocks completion until phase 110 and carries its
+*own* bounded resolution: 60 minutes from detection, re-armed on deployment activity, hard-capped
+at 4 hours. The shorter timer always won.
+
+Session `75d6ae8e` installed **25 RealmJoin packages successfully inside the window**, the last
+one 2 minutes before the failure, while the engine's own `completion_waiting` still read
+`waiting on: realmjoin_resolution`.
+
+`HandleAdvisoryCompletionDeadlineFired` now re-arms instead of failing when the RealmJoin gate is
+closed *and* its deadline is still armed, emitting `completion_waiting` with trigger
+`DeadlineFired:advisory_completion:CompletionGateHolding`.
+
+Convergence comes from the gate itself: `Resolved`, `FirstDeploymentIncomplete` and `Timeout` all
+set `RealmJoinFacts.Outcome`, which opens `RealmJoinGateOpen` and stops the guard applying.
+Requiring the gate's deadline to still be armed keeps a gate that can no longer resolve itself
+from parking the session; `AgentMaxLifetimeMinutes` bounds it regardless.
+
+# Timeline evidence
+
+`ime_user_session_completed` carries an `evidence` field so the basis of the verdict is legible
+without the diagnostics archive:
+
+* `user_session_completed` — IME wrote its completion line and no required app was pending.
+* `zero_user_apps_enumerated` — IME reported zero targeted apps; the user phase had nothing to
+  enforce.
+
+No new event type: the fact is the same, only the observation behind it differs.
+
+# Deployment
+
+The pattern ships through the config API and reaches existing agents without a rebuild; an agent
+that does not know the `userSessionZeroApps` action logs one Debug line and ignores it. The
+*behaviour* needs an agent release. Sessions already stamped `Failed` are not reclassified — the
+backend mirrors the agent verdict (`VerdictPaths.AgentFailed`) and has no independent judgement
+here by design.
+
+# Citations
+
+* `rules/ime-log-patterns/IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS.json`
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime/ImeLogTracker.Handlers.cs` — `HandleUserSessionZeroApps`, the phase replay in `HandleEspPhaseDetected`
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime/ImeLogTracker.cs` — `AreUserEspAppsSettled`
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/SignalAdapters/ImeLogTrackerAdapter.cs` — `EmitUserSessionCompleted`, evidence labels
+* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore/Engine/DecisionEngine.Edge.cs` — `HandleAdvisoryCompletionDeadlineFired`
+* [decision-engine.md](decision-engine.md), [post-reboot-completion-recovery.md](post-reboot-completion-recovery.md)

docs/backend/admin-identity-binding.md

@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+---
+type: Concept
+title: Admin Identity Binding — tid + oid behind every cross-tenant-role UPN
+description: Why a GlobalAdmins, DelegatedAdmins or McpUsers row keyed on a UPN string must never confer access by itself in an API that accepts tokens from every Entra tenant, the AdminIdentityBindings table that pins each such UPN to its immutable home tenant id and object id, the fail-closed resolution order in the role services and the MCP whitelist, the first-sign-in object-id pin, and the explicit rebind surface.
+resource: src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/AdminIdentityBindingService.cs
+tags:
+  - backend
+  - security
+  - authorization
+  - multi-tenant
+  - global-admin
+  - delegated-admin
+  - mcp
+timestamp: 2026-08-30T00:00:00+02:00
+---
+
+# Problem
+
+The API is a multi-tenant Entra application on purpose: `AuthenticationMiddleware` accepts a token from
+any tenant (issuer prefix `login.microsoftonline.com/` or `sts.windows.net/`), and signature, audience,
+lifetime and algorithm are validated strictly. Tenant-member roles (`TenantAdmins`) are keyed on
+`(tid, upn)` and therefore bound to the verified tenant.
+
+The two cross-tenant tiers were not. `GlobalAdmins` (GlobalAdmin / GlobalReader) and the delegated MSP
+tier (`DelegatedAdmins` + `TenantGroupAssignments`) resolved their role from the **UPN string alone**
+(`upn`, falling back to `preferred_username`). Both claims are mutable and reusable across tenants:
+
+* **Domain re-registration**: if the domain behind a platform admin's UPN lapses or moves, whoever
+  verifies it in a fresh tenant can mint the identical UPN; the token is genuine, only `tid` differs.
+* **UPN recycling**: a User Administrator in the home tenant can re-assign the UPN to another account;
+  same `tid`, different `oid`.
+* **MSP variant**: the delegated tier was gated only on the caller's home tenant being Pro — which any
+  tenant can self-provision via the trial endpoint.
+
+Any of these yielded full platform scope: raw table dumps including `TenantConfiguration` secrets,
+tenant offboarding, GA management. Microsoft's own guidance (post-nOAuth) is explicit: authorization
+data must be keyed on the immutable `tid` + `oid` pair, never on `upn` / `preferred_username`.
+
+# Mechanism
+
+## One binding per UPN
+
+`AdminIdentityBindings` (PK `Bindings`, RK = lowercase UPN) holds, for every UPN that carries a
+cross-tenant role, the identity that may use it:
+
+| Column | Meaning |
+| --- | --- |
+| `TenantId` | The admin's **home** Entra tenant — must equal the JWT `tid`. Mandatory at grant time. |
+| `ObjectId` | The admin's Entra object id — must equal the JWT `oid`. Empty until pinned. |
+| `BoundBy`, `BoundDate` | Operator provenance. |
+| `ObjectIdPinnedDate` | When the object id was fixed (grant time, or the first matching sign-in). |
+
+A single table rather than columns on three role tables: a UPN string belongs to exactly one identity
+at a time, a person may hold a GlobalAdmins row *and* delegated assignments, and the role rows stay
+what they are — grants. The binding says whose grants they are.
+
+## Resolution order (both role services)
+
+`AdminIdentity` is the record `(Upn, TenantId, ObjectId)` built from a validated principal; it is
+`null` when any of the three claims is missing (app-only tokens, foreign IdP shapes). Both
+`GlobalAdminService.GetGlobalRoleAsync(AdminIdentity?)` and
+`DelegatedAdminService.GetScopeAsync(AdminIdentity?)` follow the same order:
+
+1. `null` identity → no role, no storage read.
+2. Resolve the **row** by UPN (cached 30 s, unchanged from before).
+3. No row / empty scope → return; the binding is not even read. Ordinary tenant users cost one cached
+   read and never produce a binding log line.
+4. `AdminIdentityBindingService.IsBoundAsync(identity)` → false ⇒ no role / empty scope.
+5. Delegated only: the Pro home-tenant entitlement gate, **after** the binding check — an unbound caller
+   never triggers an edition lookup.
+
+`IsBoundAsync` is the single choke-point: no binding ⇒ false; `TenantId` mismatch ⇒ false (checked
+before anything else, so a foreign-tenant token can never claim the pin below); pinned `ObjectId`
+mismatch ⇒ false; unpinned binding + matching tenant ⇒ **pin** the caller's `oid` and verify against
+what was actually stored afterwards. Every false outcome is logged at Warning with its reason
+(`[IdentityBinding] TENANT MISMATCH …` / `OBJECT-ID MISMATCH …` / `holds no identity binding`), the
+one level the worker forwards to Application Insights; matches are silent. Pins are logged at Warning
+once — they are one-off, operator-relevant events.
+
+The pin is a conditional update in the repository (`TryPinIdentityObjectIdAsync`: only onto an unpinned
+row homed in the caller's tenant, ETag-guarded; a 412 re-reads and the caller compares against the
+winner). Two accounts racing the first sign-in inside the home tenant therefore leave exactly one bound.
+
+Row lookups stay cached by UPN; the binding has its own 30 s cache keyed by UPN and is invalidated on
+pin, rebind and removal. A rebind on one scaled-out instance converges on the others within seconds.
+
+## The MCP whitelist is a third UPN-keyed grant
+
+`McpUsers` (PK `McpUsers`, RK = lowercase UPN) is the WhitelistOnly allow-list consulted by
+`GET auth/mcp`, which runs under the AuthenticatedUser policy — a token from any Entra tenant reaches it.
+Before 2026-08-30 the row was honoured by UPN alone, so a same-UPN identity from another tenant
+received `allowed=true` / `accessGrant=McpUser`, inherited the row's `UsagePlan` (a paid quota tier
+provisioned for another organization's user), and was also hit by the row's Disabled kill-switch. The
+data reach stayed tenant-bound (the MCP server routes a non-global caller on its own JWT `tid`), but the
+GA-curated whitelist and the per-user entitlement were bypassable.
+
+`McpUserService` now resolves the whitelist exactly like the role services: row by UPN (cached 30 s) →
+no row ⇒ `NotPresent` without touching the binding → `IsBoundAsync(identity)` false ⇒ `NotPresent`. Grant,
+usage-plan override (`GetBoundMcpUserAsync`, used by `McpQuotaService.ResolvePlanAsync` and the
+self-service usage view) and the Disabled kill-switch all belong to the bound identity only; an unbound
+legacy row is inert. `POST global/mcp-users` binds first via the same resolver / 422 / 409 contract as the
+other grant endpoints, and the MCP users settings section shows the same home-tenant picker on 422. The
+AllMembers path is unaffected — it is tenant-bound by the auth middleware itself.
+
+## Grants bind first — and resolve the identity themselves
+
+Granting is "type the UPN". The four grant endpoints (`POST auth/global-admins`,
+`POST global/delegated-admins`, `POST global/tenant-groups/{id}/assignees`, `POST global/mcp-users`) accept `homeTenantId` /
+`objectId` only as optional overrides; normally `AdminIdentityResolver` supplies them:
+
+1. **Sign-in history** (`UserActivity`, filtered on the UPN): the person has signed in before ⇒ tid + oid
+   are known, both from validated tokens. The most recent sign-in wins for the oid. A UPN seen under
+   **more than one tenant** is never auto-resolved — that is the attack shape the binding exists for.
+2. **UPN domain → onboarded tenant** (`TenantConfiguration.DomainName`, exactly one match): tid only; the
+   oid is pinned on the first sign-in.
+3. Neither ⇒ **422 `HomeTenantUnresolved`**; the portal then shows a home-tenant picker (onboarded
+   tenants) and retries with `homeTenantId`. This is the only manual step, and only for a UPN whose
+   domain the platform has never seen.
+
+`AddGlobalAdminAsync`, `DelegatedAdminService.UpsertAsync`, `AssignGroupAsync` and `AddMcpUserAsync` then take the resolved
+`homeTenantId` / `objectId` and call `EnsureBoundAsync` **before** writing the role row. `EnsureBoundAsync` creates the binding, keeps a compatible one (same tenant; the
+supplied object id equals the pin or upgrades an unpinned one), and throws
+`IdentityBindingConflictException` for a different tenant or a different pinned object id — the
+functions map that to **409**. A grant can therefore never silently re-home a UPN.
+
+Why the object id may be unknown: a person who has never signed in has no history to resolve from, and
+the operator granting an external MSP admin has no directory access to the partner tenant. The first
+sign-in from the bound tenant pins it; from then on a recycled UPN in the same tenant is refused.
+
+## Explicit rebind surface
+
+| Route | Policy | Purpose |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `GET global/identity-bindings` | GlobalReadOrAdmin | Audit which tenant / object id each grant is usable from. |
+| `PUT global/identity-bindings/{upn}` | GlobalAdminOnly | Replace the binding: move a UPN to another tenant, or re-pin after a legitimate account re-creation (omit `objectId` to clear the pin). |
+| `DELETE global/identity-bindings/{upn}` | GlobalAdminOnly | Make every role row of the UPN inert without touching the rows. Self-removal is refused. |
+
+Both mutations are audited under the binding's home tenant (`AdminIdentityBinding` entity, previous
+values in the details) and logged at Warning. The portal surfaces this in **Tenant Management → Edit
+Tenant Configuration → Identity bindings** (collapsed): the bindings homed in that tenant, with inline
+edit (re-home / re-pin; empty object id ⇒ re-pinned on the next sign-in) and remove. The grant forms
+themselves carry no identity fields — the binding is a background property of the grant.
+
+## Lifecycle and secondary effects
+
+* `AdminIdentityBindings` is in `TableNames.All`, in `CriticalBackupTables.All` and in
+  `AuthTablesFullRestoreForbidden` (single-row restore only, like the other auth tables).
+* Tenant offboarding wipes bindings whose `TenantId` is the offboarded tenant (property-only bucket):
+  once a home tenant is gone, its admins' grants become inert.
+* `RequestContext.ObjectId` carries the JWT `oid`; `AdminIdentity.FromRequestContext` serves the
+  handlers that resolve roles outside the middleware (SignalR group join/leave, health checks).
+* The throttle identity (`GetCallerId`) now prefers `oid` over the UPN, so two accounts in different
+  tenants that share a UPN string no longer share a rate-limit bucket. Audit and presence rows keep the
+  UPN as their display key; they already carry the tenant id.
+* Legacy role rows without a binding are **inert, not grandfathered**. Rolling this out therefore means
+  seeding the binding rows for the existing admin UPNs (their `tid` and `oid` are recorded per login in
+  `UserActivity`) *before* the backend deploy — an unseeded platform admin locks themselves out of every
+  GlobalAdminOnly route, including the rebind surface.
+
+# Examples
+
+A GlobalAdmin row for `admin@vendor.example` bound to tenant `1111…` with object id `aaaa…`:
+
+| Token | Result |
+| --- | --- |
+| `tid=1111… oid=aaaa… upn=admin@vendor.example` | GlobalAdmin |
+| `tid=2222… oid=aaaa… upn=admin@vendor.example` | no role — `TENANT MISMATCH` warning |
+| `tid=1111… oid=bbbb… upn=admin@vendor.example` | no role — `OBJECT-ID MISMATCH` warning |
+| `tid=1111… upn=admin@vendor.example` (no `oid`) | no role — identity incomplete |
+
+Same row, binding without an object id: the first `tid=1111…` sign-in pins its `oid` and is admitted; a
+`tid=2222…` sign-in before that is refused **and does not pin**.
+
+# Citations
+
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/AdminIdentity.cs` — the identity record and its factories.
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/AdminIdentityBindingService.cs` — verdict, pin, grant-time binding, rebind; the table entity.
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/AdminIdentityResolver.cs` — sign-in-history / UPN-domain resolution at grant time (`AdminIdentityResolverTests`).
+* `src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/admin/components/IdentityBindingsSection.tsx` — the per-tenant inspect/correct panel.
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/GlobalAdminService.cs`, `DelegatedAdminService.cs`, `McpUserService.cs` — resolution order (`McpUserServiceIdentityBindingTests` for the whitelist matrix).
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/DataAccess/TableStorage/TableAdminRepository.cs` — `TryPinIdentityObjectIdAsync` and the binding CRUD.
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Admin/IdentityBindingManagementFunction.cs` — the rebind surface and the shared `IdentityBindingRequest.Validate`.
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/AdminIdentityBindingServiceTests.cs`, `AdminIdentityBindingAuthorizationTests.cs` — verdict matrix, race semantics, and the middleware-level denials for foreign-tenant and recycled-UPN tokens.
+* [Client-Certificate Tenant Binding](client-cert-tenant-binding.md) — the same "chain-valid is not tenant-bound" argument on the device side.

docs/backend/app-install-duration-attempt.md

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+---
+type: concept
+title: Attempt-Scoped App Install Durations
+description: AppInstallSummary.DurationSeconds measures the status-defining (last) install attempt via a LastAttemptStartedAt max-fold anchor — replacing the first-observation-to-last-terminal span that billed multi-pass IME processing gaps to trivial apps; time attribution counts the union of active attempt segments.
+resource: src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/EventIngestProcessor.AppInstall.cs
+tags: [backend, agent, ingest, app-installs, metrics, time-attribution, durations]
+timestamp: 2026-08-21
+---
+
+# Problem
+
+The IME processes the ESP app list in multiple passes: a device-ESP evaluation pass can
+touch an app (often ending `Skipped`) long before the real install runs in a later pass.
+`AppInstallSummary` is keyed by `{SessionId}_{AppName}` and folded from ALL of the app's
+events, so `DurationSeconds = last terminal − first observation` spanned those passes.
+Field case (session `44862cd3`, "Set TimeZone"): evaluation pass 09:16, real install
+10:22:58 → 10:23:21 — reported 4002 s for a 23-second install. Fleet averages, the
+Slowest-Apps ranking, p95s, and the version-regression radar all inherited the inflation;
+the rule engine's `app_install_duration` (already attempt-scoped) contradicted the
+dashboard for the same install.
+
+# Schema
+
+Three durable anchors on the row — each with a distinct, non-interchangeable job:
+
+| Column | Fold | Role |
+|---|---|---|
+| `StartedAt` | min (earliest wins) | First observation. Server-side window/bucket filter of every AppInstallSummaries scan and the radar's version-ordering key. Never re-anchored. |
+| `LastAttemptStartedAt` | **max** (in-batch and in `ReconcileAppInstallSummaryWithExisting`) | Anchor of `DurationSeconds`. Null = sentinel (row predates 2026-08, or no start observed) → duration falls back to the historical `StartedAt` span. Replay of an older batch can never regress it. |
+| `InstallPassCount` | additive, guarded by `LastAttemptStartedAt` monotonicity (a batch whose newest start is not newer than the stored anchor adds 0) | Explains "finished long after first seen" (web ×N chip); 2+ is normal. |
+
+`DurationSeconds = CompletedAt − LastAttemptStartedAt`, computed at the terminal event and
+re-derived in one central reconcile site covering in-order and Q4 out-of-order batches.
+A `LastAttemptStartedAt` newer than `CompletedAt` means a fresh pass is in flight — the
+completed attempt's stored duration stands (the 0 value omits the column; Merge preserves).
+`DownloadDurationSeconds` pairs the latest `app_download_started` with the NEXT
+`app_install_started` (attempt-scoped, in-batch). The full span stays derivable as
+`CompletedAt − StartedAt` — deliberately not a column.
+
+Weaker-terminal guard (both in-batch and cross-batch): `app_install_completed` with
+state `Skipped`/`Postponed` never overrides an `Installed`/`Error` terminal, nor its
+`CompletedAt`/`DurationSeconds` — mirroring the long-pinned `app_install_skipped` rule.
+
+# Consumers
+
+* **Fleet metrics / apps dashboard / PDF** (`MetricsMath`, `AppsAnalyticsHelper`): values
+  drop to attempt scale; labels say "install time (final attempt)". The 6 h
+  `MaxPlausibleInstallDurationSeconds` gate remains (an attempt longer than the agent's
+  lifetime is still unobservable).
+* **AppVersionRegressionRadar**: cutover gate in `MeasuredAppGroups` — only rows with
+  `LastAttemptStartedAt` enter the duration population, on BOTH comparison sides. A mixed
+  population would mask real regressions and falsely re-arm active episodes for up to the
+  35-day horizon. `MinMeasuredInstalls` keeps it silent until enough post-cutover rows
+  exist. Thresholds (2.0× / 300 s) were tuned on span data — re-evaluate ~4 weeks after
+  rollout.
+* **Time attribution** (`TimeAttributionCalculator.BuildBlockingAppIntervals`):
+  sequence-ordered start→terminal pairing yields one segment per pass/attempt. Per-app
+  seconds = SUM of clamped segments (failed attempts and evaluation passes count — they
+  occupied the path); occupancy merges the segments, never the per-app hulls; hull
+  endpoints remain first-start→last-terminal for display and what-if. Deliberately
+  BROADER than the metrics duration: active time across all passes vs. final attempt.
+* **Agent payloads** (`AppInstallTiming` / `ImeLogTrackerAdapter.UpdateAppTiming`): a
+  terminal→active transition re-arms BOTH endpoints, so event `durationSeconds` also
+  describes the attempt (needs the agent release carrying this change).
+* **Rule engine** `app_install_duration`: was already attempt-scoped — now consistent.
+
+# Rollout
+
+No backfill (user decision, analog to the CMTrace legacy): pre-cutover rows keep span
+values, so time-series charts step down visibly at the changeover (documented in the
+public platform changelog). Sentinel-gated columns follow the standard chain:
+`BuildAppInstallSummaryEntity` + `MapToAppInstallSummary` + `AppsDashboardProjection`
+(the only projection whose consumers read the new columns).
+
+# Citations
+
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/EventIngestProcessor.AppInstall.cs` — fold + weaker-terminal guard + attempt pairing
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableStorageService.Metrics.cs` — reconcile max-fold, pass-count guard, central duration recompute
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Helpers/AppVersionRegressionRadar.cs` — cutover gate
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Helpers/TimeAttributionCalculator.cs` — per-pass segments + occupancy
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/SignalAdapters/ImeLogTrackerAdapter.cs` — payload timing re-arm
+* Tests: `AppInstallTerminalStateAndReconcileTests`, `EventTimestampValidationTests`, `AppVersionRegressionRadarTests`, `TimeAttributionCalculatorTests`

docs/backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md

@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+---
+type: Concept
+title: Client-Certificate Tenant Binding — Closing the Cross-Tenant Gap
+description: Why a chain-valid Intune MDM certificate does not prove the caller belongs to the tenant it claims, which certificate extension carries the Entra tenant id (and which two look like it but do not), and the shadow-then-enforce rollout that measures field coverage before it can lock devices out.
+resource: src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/CertTenantBinding.cs
+tags:
+  - backend
+  - security
+  - authentication
+  - certificates
+  - intune
+  - multi-tenant
+timestamp: 2026-08-29T00:00:00+02:00
+---
+
+# Problem
+
+Agent requests authenticate with mTLS. `CertificateValidator` pins the chain to the embedded
+Intune roots (`X509ChainTrustMode.CustomRootTrust`), checks the validity window and requires the
+Client-Authentication EKU. All of that together proves exactly one thing: **the certificate was
+issued by the Microsoft Intune MDM Device CA to some tenant**.
+
+Those roots are shared by every Intune tenant on the planet. Nothing in the certificate stage ties
+the caller to the tenant in the request. The tenant scoping came entirely from the downstream
+device validators — the serial number must appear in that tenant's Autopilot / imported-device /
+Cloud PC inventory. Device serial numbers are not secrets; they are printed on the chassis.
+
+So the pre-existing attack was: enroll a device in your own Intune tenant, obtain a legitimate
+device certificate, learn one serial number of the victim tenant, and submit telemetry as that
+tenant. Certificate validation passes, device validation passes.
+
+# Mechanism
+
+The Intune MDM Device CA stamps the customer's identifiers into the leaf certificate. Since the
+agent presents this certificate in the TLS handshake, its contents are proof of possession and the
+backend can compare them against the requested tenant — no Graph call, no additional consent, and
+nothing the agent has to send.
+
+## Which extension carries what
+
+Verified by decoding a real field certificate (issued 2026-05-08, `Functions.Tests/device-cert-sample.pem`):
+
+| OID | Encoding | Content |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `1.2.840.113556.5.14` | nested OCTET STRING (`04 10` + 16 bytes) | **Entra tenant id** — the one to compare |
+| `1.2.840.113556.5.6` | nested OCTET STRING (`04 10` + 16 bytes) | Intune **Account** id — a *different* GUID, never equal to the tenant id |
+| `1.2.840.113556.5.4` | **16 raw bytes, no wrapper** | Intune device id, identical to the certificate's Subject CN |
+
+Two traps are worth stating explicitly, because both cost real debugging time:
+
+1. `…5.6` is widely described as "the tenant id (AccountID)". It is not the Entra tenant id.
+   Comparing it against the requested tenant would reject every request in production.
+2. The encodings are not uniform. `…5.4` holds the GUID bare while the other two nest it in a
+   second OCTET STRING, so a decoder written against one shape silently fails on the other.
+   `MsDeviceCertificateOids.TryParseGuid` accepts both, and all GUIDs are Microsoft
+   little-endian (what `new Guid(byte[])` expects).
+
+A 16-byte input is inherently ambiguous — it is indistinguishable from a truncated wrapper and is
+always read as a bare GUID. That is harmless here: the value is only ever compared for equality
+against a known tenant id, never trusted as a standalone claim.
+
+## Where it is NOT
+
+`EntraDeviceCertHelper` reads tenant and device ids from the **MS-Organization-Access** certificate
+(`1.2.840.113556.1.5.284.*`). That certificate is not part of the authentication path at all — the
+agent selects the Intune MDM certificate by exact issuer match (`CN=Microsoft Intune MDM Device CA`,
+see `CertificateHelper.SelectMdmCertificate`) and the backend pins only the MDM chain. The Entra
+certificate is used purely as a local fallback for `TenantIdResolver`; it never leaves the device.
+
+Sending it in a header instead would prove nothing: only the certificate used in the TLS handshake
+demonstrates possession of a private key. A certificate copied into a custom header can be replayed
+by anyone who has seen it once.
+
+# Rollout
+
+Enforcing immediately would be reckless: any device population whose certificates predate the
+extension, or whose CA behaves differently (sovereign clouds), would be locked out at once. The
+rollout therefore has staged consequences.
+
+**Stage 1 — shadow (completed, kept as the measurement that justified stage 2).** `SecurityValidator.ObserveCertTenantBinding` evaluates the binding
+after certificate validation and logs the outcome. It returns `void`, changes no state, and swallows
+its own exceptions, so it cannot fail a request that would otherwise be accepted. The pure comparison
+lives in `CertTenantBinding.Evaluate`; the outcome codes (`Match`, `Mismatch`, `ExtensionMissing`,
+`Unparseable`, `RequestTenantNotAGuid`) are stable and queried by exact match in KQL.
+`WouldRejectUnderEnforcement` records what stage 2 *would* have done, so the telemetry can be read
+without re-deriving the rule at query time.
+
+The telemetry uses two carriers, because the numerator and the denominator have very different
+costs and answer different questions:
+
+* **Every** outcome, `Match` included, is stamped onto the request row as the `CertTenantBinding`
+  dimension — `SecurityValidator` writes it into `FunctionContext.Items`
+  (`CertTenantBinding.RequestItemKey`) and `RequestTelemetryMiddleware` copies it onto the
+  `RequestTelemetry` it already emits. That row exists per request and is unsampled, so the
+  denominator costs no additional telemetry at all.
+* Outcomes that need an enforcement decision (mismatch, missing, undecodable) are **additionally**
+  logged at Warning with the full context — thumbprint, certificate tenant, session.
+
+`Match` is deliberately not a trace line. Worker-side `LogInformation` never reaches App Insights
+(the ApplicationInsightsLoggerProvider default rule is Warning+ and host-forwarding of worker logs
+is disabled), so a `Match` trace is dead code that silently costs the denominator. The first
+deployment of this feature made exactly that mistake: it emitted zero rows across 32k requests,
+which is indistinguishable from the code never running.
+
+**Stage 2 — enforced since 2026-08-25.** `Mismatch` returns 403 and is recorded through the shared
+`LogRequestRejection` path (`stage=certtenant`) so it lands in the same KQL raster as every other
+rejection reason. The switch was made against measured data: 35,684 requests across 32 tenants,
+every one a `Match`, with the Warning channel independently verified to be carrying other traffic so
+the zero could not be a telemetry artefact.
+
+The rule lives in one place, `CertTenantBinding.Rejects`, and only `Mismatch` blocks. Everything
+else means "cannot tell" and is deliberately tolerated:
+
+* `ExtensionMissing` — the sample only covers devices active in the measurement window, so older
+  certificates or a sovereign-cloud CA could still lack the extension. Rejecting on absence would
+  lock those devices out for something they cannot control. **This is the one to tighten later**,
+  once the `ExtensionMissing` rate is provably zero across a wider window; a test pins the current
+  tolerance so removing it has to be a deliberate decision rather than a drive-by edit.
+* `Unparseable` — a decoder or encoding surprise is our problem, not the device's.
+* `RequestTenantNotAGuid` — nothing to compare against, and such a request fails the tenant lookup
+  in §0 long before reaching this point.
+
+The evaluation fails open on its own exception: this gate exists to stop a cross-tenant certificate,
+and a defect on our side is not evidence of one. The 403 body deliberately does not echo which
+tenant the certificate belongs to — that pair is in the rejection log, not in the response.
+
+Grep marker for every site involved: `CERT-TENANT-BINDING`.
+
+The bootstrap-token path (`X-Bootstrap-Token`) bypasses certificate validation by design and is
+unaffected by either stage.
+
+# Certificate transport and proof of possession
+
+Every stage above validates certificate *content*: chain, validity window, EKU, tenant extension.
+None of them proves the caller holds the private key — a certificate is public material (sent in
+clear in a TLS 1.2 client-auth handshake, readable from the machine store by any local user, present
+on resold hardware). Proof of possession comes from the TLS handshake alone: the platform runs
+`clientCertMode=Required` on every path not listed in its `clientCertExclusionPaths`, forwards the
+handshake certificate as `X-ARR-ClientCert`, and **strips any inbound copy of that header — on
+excluded paths too** (verified 2026-08-29 with a spoofed header against `/api/bootstrap/config`:
+the validator saw "No certificate provided"). So `X-ARR-ClientCert` is trustworthy exactly because
+the caller cannot write it.
+
+Two consequences shape `SecurityValidator`:
+
+* **No other certificate header is ever read.** A former local-dev fallback (`X-Client-Certificate`)
+  accepted certificate bytes from a client-writable header, which decouples the certificate from
+  key possession: anyone holding a device's public certificate would authenticate as that device.
+  Removed 2026-08-29. Local development sets `X-ARR-ClientCert` directly — Core Tools does not strip
+  it.
+* **Bootstrap routes are token-only, fail-closed.** `/api/bootstrap/*` is in the platform's
+  exclusion list so cert-less OOBE agents can reach it — which also means nothing on those paths
+  proves a handshake happened. The token is therefore the sole credential there:
+  `SecurityValidator.IsBootstrapRoute` (path prefix, mirroring the exclusion entry so no function
+  can forget to opt in) rejects a missing or **empty** `X-Bootstrap-Token`, and a missing
+  `BootstrapSessionService`, with 401 before the certificate stage can run. The live gap this
+  closes: the function-level `Headers.Contains` gate accepted an empty header while the validator
+  treated it as "no token" and fell through to the certificate stage, where the fallback header
+  above was parsed. Bootstrap tokens are never accepted as a *replacement* for the certificate on
+  platform-enforced routes either — there the cert requirement is already satisfied by the
+  handshake before the request reaches code.
+
+The exclusion list is portal-only state (no IaC). Adding `/api/agent` to it, or moving a
+device-authenticated function under an excluded prefix, would silently reopen the header path;
+`BootstrapRouteFailClosedTests` pins the code half of this contract.
+
+**Stage 3 — device binding (Global-Admin-only preview).** Tenant binding proves the certificate was
+issued to this tenant; it does not prove the certificate belongs to a device the tenant still has.
+`IntuneDeviceBindingValidator` closes that by resolving the Intune managedDevice id from the
+certificate's Subject CN against the tenant's own `deviceManagement/managedDevices` inventory
+(point-GET on `managedDevices/{id}` — no OData filter to inject into, and a 404 is unambiguous).
+
+It is modelled on `CloudPcDeviceValidator` and shares its cache/retry/transient contract, with one
+important difference in how it is wired: the lookup is fire-and-forget, like the DevPrep
+association shadow, because a cold Graph round-trip can take seconds and must never sit in the
+agent's request path. That rules out the request-row dimension stage 1 uses — the row is written
+the moment the function returns, before the detached task finishes — so the outcome is logged at
+Warning instead. Volume stays bounded because only Global Admins can see the toggle
+(`user?.isGlobalAdmin === true`, the same gate as the DevPrep preview). Widening it beyond preview
+should move to an inline call plus a request dimension.
+
+Outcomes: `Match`, `NotFound`, `NoDeviceIdInCert`, `PermissionMissing`, `Transient`. Only
+`Transient` is retried and left uncached — a missing grant or a foreign device is a state, not an
+outage.
+
+Graph cost is not a concern, and that is measured rather than assumed: the first live enrollment
+produced **136 requests and exactly one Graph call**, because the 30-minute positive cache absorbs
+the rest. For comparison, the per-request Autopilot serial validator made 25 calls in the same
+window. Lengthening the positive TTL would buy nothing and would delay noticing a device that has
+been wiped or removed; shortening the 5-minute negative TTL matters more, since that is how quickly
+a device object appearing late is picked up.
+
+What the 136 requests *did* cost was log lines saying the same thing 136 times, so the shadow log is
+gated on `IntuneDeviceBindingResult.ServedFromCache`: one line per real Graph lookup. Cached repeats
+add nothing — the reported age just counts up mechanically from the same `enrolledDateTime`.
+Outcomes that are never cached (`Transient`, `NoDeviceIdInCert`) still log every time, which is the
+right behaviour for an anomaly.
+
+The open question this preview exists to answer is a race, not an attack: a device object can in
+principle appear in Intune *after* the agent's first call, and enforcing before that is understood
+would reject legitimate enrollments. Every result therefore carries `enrolledDateTime`, and the log
+line records `enrolledAgeSeconds` — a device whose object was created seconds before the request
+looks completely different from a certificate that never belonged to the tenant. Grep marker:
+`CERT-DEVICE-BINDING-SHADOW`.
+
+Enabling it needs the optional Graph permission `DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All`, granted
+per tenant with the customer script — it is not in the default-consent set:
+
+```powershell
+.\Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1 -ClientId "<client-id>" -Features IntuneDeviceBinding
+```
+
+`GraphFeatureCatalog` (feature `IntuneDeviceBinding`) and the script's catalog, `ValidateSet` and
+help block are pinned to each other by `GraphFeatureCatalogSyncTests`.
+
+# Examples
+
+Coverage — the question stage 2 depends on ("would enforcing lock anyone out?"):
+
+```kusto
+requests
+| where isnotempty(customDimensions.CertTenantBinding)
+| summarize Requests = sum(itemCount)
+    by Outcome = tostring(customDimensions.CertTenantBinding),
+       Tenant  = tostring(customDimensions.TenantId)
+| order by Requests desc
+```
+
+Detail on the individually actionable ones:
+
+```kusto
+traces
+| where message has "AgentCertTenantBinding"
+| extend Outcome = tostring(customDimensions.Outcome),
+         Tenant  = tostring(customDimensions.TenantId)
+| summarize count() by Outcome, Tenant
+```
+
+Anything in `Mismatch` is a cross-tenant certificate; anything in `ExtensionMissing` is a device
+that stage-2 enforcement would have to make a policy decision about. Note that the trace query
+alone can never show `Match`, so it cannot tell "everything matched" apart from "nothing ran" —
+use the request-row query for that.
+
+Stage 3, including the enrollment-race measurement:
+
+```kusto
+traces
+| where message has "AgentCertDeviceBinding"
+| extend Outcome  = tostring(customDimensions.Outcome),
+         AgeSecs  = toint(customDimensions.EnrolledAgeSeconds)
+| summarize Requests = count(),
+            MinAgeSecs = min(AgeSecs),
+            P05AgeSecs = percentile(AgeSecs, 5)
+    by Outcome
+```
+
+`NotFound` is the row that decides whether this can ever become a gate. A small `MinAgeSecs` on
+`Match` means device objects are appearing only just in time — the race is real and enforcement
+would need a grace path.
+
+# Citations
+
+* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Security/MsDeviceCertificateOids.cs` — OID catalog and the
+  shared ASN.1 GUID decoder (one implementation for agent and backend).
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/CertificateValidator.cs` — extension extraction
+  alongside chain validation, cached per thumbprint.
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/CertTenantBinding.cs` — the pure comparison.
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/SecurityValidator.cs` — shadow observation.
+* [W365 Cloud PC Device Validation](cloudpc-device-validation.md) — the other consumer of this
+  certificate's identity fields (Subject CN = Intune device id).

docs/backend/device-journeys.md

@@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ Durations shown for attempts are the sessions' authoritative `DurationSeconds` v
   completed journeys, first-time-right count, attempt histogram, junk-serial exclusion
   count, `JourneyVersion`. A journey buckets on the StartedAt date of its completing
   success session (the platform's StartedAt-date convention; late terminals converge via
-  the sweep). All counts are **additive**, so a window rate is the ratio of summed daily
+  the sweep, which slices the tick's shared projected window scan — see
+  `time-attribution.md`). All counts are **additive**, so a window rate is the ratio of summed daily
   rows — there is no rolling-window row (unlike the median-based time-attribution
   aggregates, which cannot merge). 180-day retention. Rows exist below the ≥20 UI gate
   on purpose (the UI needs the n for "insufficient data (n=…)").

docs/backend/ime-msi-archive.md

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+---
+type: Concept
+title: IME Installer Archive (version-verified, multi-host)
+description: How every fleet-observed Intune Management Extension build is archived as its MSI - the ime_agent_version sighting that queues the job, the candidate hosts, the ProductVersion check that keeps a wrong ring's build out of the version folder, the re-queue on later sightings, and the manual skill-side backfill.
+resource: src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/Ime/ImeMsiArchiver.cs
+tags:
+  - backend
+  - ime
+  - archive
+  - blob
+  - queue
+timestamp: 2026-08-30T12:00:00+02:00
+---
+
+# IME Installer Archive
+
+The platform keeps every Intune Management Extension build it has ever seen in the fleet
+as the original installer, so any IME version can be decompiled and diffed later
+(`ime-decompiles` repository, `/ime-decompile` skill) even after Microsoft's CDN has moved
+on. Two stores:
+
+| Store | Content | Written by |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Blob container `ime-archive` (private, kept by design, not tenant-scoped) | `{version}/IntuneWindowsAgent.msi` (write-once) + `{version}/provenance.json` (derived, overwritable) | `ImeMsiArchiver` via the `ime-msi-archive` queue; `/ime-decompile` skill as manual backfill |
+| Table `ImeVersionHistory` (partition `Global`, RowKey = version) | first/last seen, session count, `CorroboratedAt`, `MsiArchiveStatus`, `MsiArchiveUpdatedAt`, `MsiArchiveBlobPath`, `MsiSha256`, `MsiBytes`, `MsiSourceUrl` | `RecordImeVersionAsync` (sighting), `UpdateImeVersionArchiveInfoAsync` (archive outcome / queued stamp) |
+
+# Schema
+
+## Sighting → job
+
+`EventIngestProcessor` looks at the batch's `ime_agent_version` event (`agentVersion`, plus
+the agent's CSP-registry enrichment `msiDownloadUrl` / `msiMatchedBy` when present).
+`RecordImeVersionAsync` returns an `ImeVersionSighting`:
+
+* `IsNew` — the insert succeeded: first fleet-wide sighting → ops event + enqueue.
+* otherwise the row's `MsiArchiveStatus` / `MsiArchiveUpdatedAt`, read in the same point
+  read that bumps `SessionCount` (no second table read).
+
+A known version is **re-queued** (`ImeMsiArchiver.ShouldRequeueOnSighting`) only when all
+of these hold: the event URL passes the allowlist **and** `msiMatchedBy == productVersion`
+(the CSP row's ProductVersion equals the observed version, so the URL is authoritative),
+the status is neither `Archived` nor `Failed:BadVersion`, and the last archive activity is
+older than 24 h (`RequeueBackoff`) or never happened. The ingest path then merges
+`MsiArchiveStatus = Queued` (stamping `MsiArchiveUpdatedAt`) before enqueueing, so the other
+sessions of that version see "in flight" and do not pile on. Worst case for a version no
+host serves any more: one walk over the hosts per day, not one per enrollment.
+
+## Trust boundary of a sighting
+
+The version string is **device-supplied** (any device holding a tenant agent credential can
+send an `ime_agent_version` event) and becomes the RowKey of a caller-independent GLOBAL
+partition that every tenant reads. Four layers keep one tenant's device from turning a
+claim into a platform fact:
+
+| Layer | Where | Effect |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Plausibility guard | `ImeMsiArchiver.IsPlausibleVersion`, called first in `RecordImeVersionAsync` (and again by the archiver) | plain dotted digits, 2–4 components, inside Windows Installer `ProductVersion` bounds (major/minor ≤ 255, build ≤ 65535). Anything else → `ImeVersionSighting.Rejected`: no row, no ops event, no archive job, no re-queue. |
+| One sighting per session | `UpdateSessionImeAgentVersionAsync` returns whether the session's stored version changed; only then does the ingest path call `RecordImeVersionAsync` | `SessionCount` moves once per session and version; a re-sent or replayed event, a tombstoned or unregistered session, count nothing. |
+| Corroboration | merge path of `RecordImeVersionAsync` stamps `CorroboratedAt` on the first sighting from a tenant other than `FirstSeenTenantId` | the first-seen tenant's own devices can never corroborate their own claim. |
+| Fleet confirmation on read | `GetImeVersionHistoryFunction.IsFleetConfirmed` (MemberRead projection only) | tenant members see a version once it is `Archived` (ProductVersion matched a real package), or corroborated, or first seen before `LegacyTrustCutoffUtc` (2026-08-31 — the 16 rows reviewed on 2026-08-30 are all genuine builds). Global scope sees every row, unconfirmed ones included. |
+
+What remains possible for a hostile device: a plausible, never-shipped version creates a
+row visible to Global Admins plus one `NewImeVersionDetected` ops event and one archive walk
+that ends `Failed:VersionMismatch` (no blob). It is never listed to other tenants and can
+never occupy the archive folder of a real build.
+
+## Candidate hosts and the version check
+
+Microsoft distributes IME from several versionless URLs that carry **different rollout
+rings at the same time**. Observed 2026-08-29: `imeswdb-afd-secondary` served 1.104.102.0,
+`imeswda-afd-primary` 1.105.101.0, `imeswda-afd-hotfix` 1.105.103.0. "A new version is by
+definition what the canonical URL serves right now" is therefore false, and the first
+version of the archiver filed a 1.104.102.0 package under `1.105.103.0/` (fixed by hand:
+blob overwritten, row merged).
+
+The archiver walks `BuildCandidateUrls(eventUrl)`: the allowlisted event URL first (HTTPS,
+host `*.manage.microsoft.com`, filename exactly `IntuneWindowsAgent.msi`), then
+`FallbackMsiUrls` = primary, secondary, hotfix — de-duplicated. For each candidate:
+
+1. Download with the admin size cap (Content-Length preflight + mid-stream cap) into a
+   delete-on-close temp file while SHA-256 hashing.
+2. Read the package's `ProductVersion` with `MsiProductVersionReader` — a pure managed OLE
+   compound-file reader (v3 512-byte and v4 4096-byte sectors, DIFAT/FAT/mini-FAT, MSI
+   stream-name decoding, `_StringPool`/`_StringData` incl. long strings and holes, the
+   column-major `Property` table with 2- or 3-byte string refs). It never throws; anything
+   unreadable is `null`. Needed because the Function host is Linux — no `msiexec`.
+3. `VersionsMatch(observed, productVersion)` (component-count tolerant: `1.105.103` ==
+   `1.105.103.0`). Mismatch or unreadable → log, record the attempt, next candidate.
+4. Match → write-once upload (If-None-Match:*), then `provenance.json` with
+   `productVersion`, the chosen `url`, `urlFromEvent`, hash/size and the full `candidates`
+   walk (`url`, `outcome` ∈ match / version-mismatch / too-large / download-failed /
+   timeout, `productVersion`).
+
+Outcome precedence when no candidate archived: any transient failure (download/timeout)
+→ `Failed:Download` / `Failed:Timeout`, retryable via the queue's visibility ladder (the
+down host might have had it); every candidate over the cap → `Failed:TooLarge`; otherwise
+`Failed:VersionMismatch` — **not** retryable by the queue (retrying in minutes changes
+nothing), left to the sighting re-queue above. Storage/unexpected errors stay
+`Failed:Error`, retryable. A 409 on the write-once upload means an earlier attempt
+archived the version: the provenance sidecar is healed from the archived bytes (hash,
+size, ProductVersion) if missing — this is also how a manual skill backfill turns a null
+row into `Archived` on the next authoritative sighting.
+
+## Manual path (skill)
+
+`/ime-decompile` downloads from the blob (`ime-blob.sh download`), and
+`fetch-ime-decompile.py` names the decompile folder after the **actual** FileVersion of
+the extracted binaries — so the decompile repo can never be poisoned, only the blob folder.
+When the blob's version mismatches, look for `msiDownloadUrl` in *other* sessions of the
+version (the first-seen session often lacks the enrichment) and fetch from that host.
+`ime-blob.sh upload … --overwrite` replaces a blob known to hold the wrong build; merge the
+row's `MsiSha256` / `MsiBytes` / `MsiSourceUrl` afterwards.
+
+# Examples
+
+* First sighting of 1.105.103.0 with no URL: primary → 1.105.101.0 (mismatch), secondary →
+  1.104.102.0 (mismatch), hotfix → 1.105.103.0 (match) → archived from hotfix, provenance
+  lists all three.
+* Hotfix host down during the walk, others mismatching → `Failed:Download`, queue retries.
+* Version 1.101.111.0 (predates the archiver, row status null): a session whose CSP row
+  matches by ProductVersion arrives → status `Queued`, job runs; if no host serves it any
+  more → `Failed:VersionMismatch`, next try no sooner than 24 h later.
+
+# Citations
+
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/Ime/ImeMsiArchiver.cs`
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/Ime/MsiProductVersionReader.cs`
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/Ime/ImeMsiArchiveQueueWorker.cs`
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/EventIngestProcessor.cs` (ime_agent_version block)
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableStorageService.Sessions.cs` (`RecordImeVersionAsync`, `UpdateImeVersionArchiveInfoAsync`)
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/SystemSignals/ImeMsiInstallSourceProbe.cs` (event enrichment)
+* `.claude/commands/scripts/ime-blob.sh`, `.claude/commands/scripts/fetch-ime-decompile.py`
+* Tests: `ImeMsiArchiverTests`, `MsiProductVersionReaderTests` (synthetic packages + local sweep over `ime-files/`)

docs/backend/plan-downgrade-retention-grace.md

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+---
+type: concept
+title: Plan Downgrade Policy & the Retention Grace Period
+description: What happens when a tenant loses Pro (explicit downgrade or trial expiry) — every entitlement gates read-time and reversibly, except retention, which gets a 30-day grace before the Community cap starts hard-deleting; the anchor model, the ops events, and the deliberate non-grace of everything else.
+resource: backend
+tags: [plan, edition, downgrade, retention, grace-period, trial, entitlements]
+timestamp: 2026-08-22
+---
+
+# Schema
+
+## The downgrade model: gate, don't destroy
+
+Edition is resolved at READ time (`FeatureEntitlementCatalog.ResolveEdition`): Pro ⇔
+permanent tier `pro`/legacy `enterprise` OR an active trial. A plan mutation is a single
+field write (`PATCH config/{tenantId}/plan`, GA-only) — there is no downgrade event
+handler, no cascade. On Pro → Community every entitlement simply gates on the next read
+(≤ ~5 min config cache):
+
+* **Unrestricted Mode** — effective value flips false; the GA on-request flag and the
+  tenant toggle survive untouched (inert). Re-upgrade restores it verbatim.
+* **Delegated (MSP) admin** — scope suppressed at the home-tenant gate
+  (`DelegatedAdminService.ApplyHomeTenantGateAsync`); grant rows / tenant groups /
+  assignments are never touched. Resurrects on re-upgrade.
+* **OOBE bootstrap** — endpoints 403/404 unless the additive GA per-tenant flag
+  (`BootstrapTokenEnabled`) is set; `BootstrapSessions` rows are kept.
+* **Rate limits / MCP quota** — pure computed-at-read floors/plan names.
+
+**Retention is the one exception**: the retention sweep (12-hourly
+`SessionDeletionMaintenance` → `SessionRetentionFanoutService`) hard-deletes sessions
+older than `GetEffectiveRetentionDays` = `min(stored DataRetentionDays, edition cap)`.
+Without protection, a downgrade (or trial expiry) with stored retention 365 would start
+irreversibly cascade-deleting the 90–365-day band on the next tick.
+
+## The retention grace period (30 days)
+
+`FeatureEntitlementCatalog.RetentionDowngradeGraceDays = 30`. For 30 days after losing
+Pro, `GetEffectiveRetentionDays` keeps clamping to the **Pro** cap (365); only after the
+grace does the Community cap (90) bite. The stored `DataRetentionDays` is never rewritten.
+`days <= 0` (GA-only "infinite") short-circuits before any cap — those tenants are never
+swept, grace or not.
+
+**Anchor** — "when was Pro lost" (`TenantEntitlementService.GetRetentionGraceEndUtc`,
+returns null while effectively Pro; grace end = latest anchor + 30d):
+
+* **Explicit downgrade**: `TenantConfiguration.ProDowngradedUtc` (backend-only field, no
+  agent ConfigVersion impact), maintained exclusively by the plan endpoint's pure mutation
+  core `PlanManagementFunction.ApplyPlanChanges`. Stamped when the EFFECTIVE edition
+  (before vs. after, same `nowUtc`) transitions Pro → Community — this covers both a
+  planTier downgrade and a GA explicitly ending a trial (`trialExpiresUtc: null`, where
+  the trial timestamp disappears and could not anchor). Cleared on any transition back to
+  effectively Pro (PATCH pro, trial grant, self-service trial start), so a re-upgrade also
+  resets the grace clock.
+* **Trial expiry**: no write happens — the stored `TrialExpiresUtc` itself is the anchor
+  (read-time, like edition resolution). A planTier downgrade under a still-active trial
+  deliberately does NOT stamp: the edition is still Pro, and the later trial expiry
+  anchors the grace then.
+
+The field is on the patch-endpoint `BaseDeniedFields` and `RevertProtectedFields` lists
+(a config revert must not time-travel the anchor) and roundtrips the table-serialization
+contract (Store+Map + roundtrip tests). Legacy rows read null → no anchor → no grace,
+which is correct: no tenant had been downgraded before the feature existed.
+
+## Ops visibility (dual-registered event types)
+
+* `TenantPlanDowngraded` (Warning) — emitted by the PATCH handler on an effective
+  Pro→Community transition; carries `retentionGraceEndsUtc` + stored retention days. The
+  response body also returns `retentionGraceEndsUtc`.
+* `TenantRetentionGraceExpiring` / `TenantRetentionGraceEnded` (Warning) — emitted by the
+  daily `TrialExpirySweepFunction` (03:30 UTC) with the same stateless window mechanics as
+  the trial events (≤3-day heads-up re-fired daily; ended once via the 24h look-back), and
+  ONLY when data is actually at risk: stored `DataRetentionDays` above the Community cap
+  (0 = infinite ⇒ never). Re-upgraded tenants go silent automatically (grace resolves null).
+
+All three are registered in the web `OPS_EVENT_TYPES` catalog (OpsAlertRulesSection.tsx)
+so Telegram alert rules can route them.
+
+## Deliberate non-goals
+
+* No grace for Unrestricted/MSP/bootstrap/limits — reversible gates need none.
+* The retention WRITE cap (`TenantConfigValidation`) does not honor the grace: during the
+  grace a tenant admin cannot SET a value above the Community cap. The grace protects
+  existing data; new writes follow the new plan.
+* The feature-flags endpoint keeps publishing the plain edition cap
+  (`retentionCapDays`) — it feeds the settings input maximum, which is the write cap.
+
+# Citations
+
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TenantEntitlementService.cs` — grace + effective retention
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Config/PlanManagementFunction.cs` — `ApplyPlanChanges` anchor lifecycle
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Maintenance/TrialExpirySweepFunction.cs` — grace event windows
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/Deletion/SessionRetentionFanoutService.cs` — enforcement point
+* Tests: `TenantEntitlementServiceTests`, `PlanManagementTransitionTests`, `TrialExpirySweepFunctionTests`, `SessionRetentionFanoutServiceTests`, `TenantConfigTableSerializationTests`

docs/backend/session-owner-binding.md

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+---
+type: Concept
+title: Session Owner Binding — Session-Level Authorization for Agent Writes
+description: Why tenant-level agent authentication (any device certificate, or a bootstrap token) was enough to rewrite every session in the tenant, how each Sessions row is now bound to the device identity that created it, the rule matrix that keeps every legitimate lifecycle working, the shadow-then-enforce rollout, and why enforcement needs the agent to rotate its session id rather than count an auth failure.
+resource: src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/SessionOwnershipPolicy.cs
+tags:
+  - backend
+  - security
+  - authorization
+  - sessions
+  - agent
+  - multi-tenant
+timestamp: 2026-08-29T00:00:00+02:00
+---
+
+# Problem
+
+Agent endpoints authenticate at **tenant** granularity: a chain-valid Intune MDM certificate whose
+tenant stamp matches the request (see [client-cert-tenant-binding.md](client-cert-tenant-binding.md)),
+or a bootstrap token minted for the tenant. They authorize writes at **session** granularity using a
+session id the caller supplies — `IngestTelemetryFunction` takes it from the `PartitionKey` of the
+first item, `RegisterSessionFunction` from the body, `ReportAgentErrorFunction` from the body. Until
+2026-08-29 nothing on the Sessions row recorded which device created it, so nothing could be compared.
+
+The consequence: one enrolled device — or anyone who saw a 6-character bootstrap short code — could,
+for every other session of the tenant, forge `enrollment_complete` / failure events (flipping the live
+status, firing webhooks and SLA logic), pollute the timeline, re-register the session with different
+device metadata (which also redirects the Progress-Portal serial-knowledge proof), and — worst — send a
+Signal-only batch that **fetches and clears the victim's pending ServerActions**, silently stealing
+admin commands such as diagnostics collection. Session ids are GUIDs, but they travel in portal URLs
+and tenant SignalR messages; they were never meant to be a capability.
+
+# Mechanism
+
+## Owner on the row
+
+`SessionOwner` (Shared) is stamped by the backend from the validated caller identity — never from
+agent input — and lives in six primary-only Sessions columns (`OwnerKind`, `OwnerThumbprint`,
+`OwnerDeviceId`, `OwnerBootstrapCode`, `OwnerSerial`, `OwnerBoundAt`). They are listed in
+`SessionIndexFieldManifest.PrimaryOnly`: never mirrored to `SessionsIndex`, never on `SessionSummary`,
+so no certificate identity travels to clients.
+
+| Auth path | Identity that binds | Proven by |
+|---|---|---|
+| Certificate | `OwnerThumbprint` + `OwnerDeviceId` (Intune device id from the certificate CN, lower-case GUID) | TLS handshake; the CN survives a certificate re-issue |
+| Bootstrap token | `OwnerBootstrapCode` + `OwnerSerial` | Token possession + the serial the caller announced (header, unverified) |
+
+`SecurityValidationResult.IntuneDeviceId` is new: the CN was already extracted for the Cloud PC
+validator, now it is surfaced on the result for every certificate-authenticated request.
+
+## Rule matrix
+
+`SessionOwnershipPolicy.Evaluate(existingRow, validation, now)` is pure. It returns an outcome, the
+owner to stamp (if any) and whether the caller's serial equals the row's serial.
+
+| Caller | Row owner | Outcome | Stamps | Would reject |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| any | no row | `Fresh` | caller | no |
+| any | no owner columns (legacy), serial equal | `ClaimLegacy` | caller | no |
+| any | no owner columns, serial differs | `LegacySerialMismatch` | — | **yes** |
+| any | — (validation carried neither thumbprint nor code) | `CallerUnidentified` | — | no |
+| Cert | Cert, same thumbprint | `Match` | — | no |
+| Cert | Cert, other thumbprint, same device id | `RebindCertRotation` | caller | no |
+| Cert | Cert, other thumbprint and device id | `MismatchCert` (+ `serialMatch`) | — | **yes** |
+| Cert | Bootstrap, same serial | `RebindBootstrapHandoff` | caller | no |
+| Cert | Bootstrap, other serial | `MismatchBootstrapOwned` | — | **yes** |
+| Bootstrap | Bootstrap, same code + serial | `Match` | — | no |
+| Bootstrap | Bootstrap, otherwise | `MismatchBootstrap` | — | **yes** |
+| Bootstrap | Cert | `DowngradeToBootstrap` | — | **yes** |
+
+The tolerated rows are the legitimate lifecycle: agent restart and reboot (same certificate),
+WhiteGlove Part 2 (same certificate), the install→runtime handoff where a bootstrap-registered session
+continues under the MDM certificate once it exists, a re-issued certificate of the same Intune device,
+and rows that predate the binding.
+
+`MismatchCert` with `serialMatch=true` is the one shape that is *not* an attack: an Intune
+re-enrollment **without a wipe**. `session.id` survives in `%ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor`, but the
+device gets a new Intune device id and therefore a new certificate identity. Under enforcement this
+would be refused — which is why enforcement needs the agent-side rotation below.
+
+## Where it runs
+
+`SessionOwnerBindingObserver` is the single side-effect carrier; the three call sites hand it the
+row they already hold:
+
+* `RegisterSessionFunction.ProcessRegisterAsync` — the cascade-delete guard now returns the row
+  (`EnsureWritableAndGetRowAsync`); the decision's owner goes into `StoreSessionAsync(registration,
+  ownerToStamp)`, whose Replace preserves an existing owner when nothing new is stamped (including a
+  Merge-stamped owner that landed after the initial read — the CAS re-read selects the owner columns).
+  The bootstrap wrapper inherits this.
+* `IngestTelemetryFunction.Run` — evaluated against `guardSessionRow` (zero extra reads) before
+  `PersistItemsAsync`, so the Signal-only path that serves pending ServerActions is covered. Legacy
+  claims and rebinds are written with `UpdateSessionOwnerAsync` (Merge, fail-soft).
+* `ReportAgentErrorFunction` and its bootstrap wrapper — one point-read, observe only.
+
+## Shadow telemetry (stage 1)
+
+Same three carriers as the cert-tenant binding:
+
+* **Denominator** — `requests | extend o = tostring(customDimensions.SessionOwnerBinding) | where
+  isnotempty(o) | summarize count() by o` (request-row dimension via `RequestTelemetryMiddleware`;
+  worker `LogInformation` never reaches App Insights).
+* **Numerator** — `traces | where message startswith "AgentSessionOwnerBinding"` — one Warning per
+  non-Match/non-Fresh request with `outcome`, `wouldReject`, `callerKind`, `ownerKind`, `serialMatch`,
+  `endpoint`, `ver`.
+* **Operator signal** — ops event `SessionOwnerMismatch` (Security / Warning, dual-registered in the
+  admin alert-rule catalog) for would-reject outcomes, throttled to one per session+outcome per hour.
+  `serialMatch=true` counts re-enrollments without wipe; `serialMatch=false` is a foreign device.
+
+Nothing is refused in stage 1. `SessionOwnershipPolicy` deliberately has no `Rejects` member
+(pinned by `SessionOwnershipPolicyTests.Stage1_has_no_Rejects_rule`).
+
+## Enforcement contract (stage 2, not yet built)
+
+* Backend: `Rejects(outcome)` = the would-reject set; register/ingest/error answer 403 with
+  `RegisterSessionResponse.ErrorCode = Constants.AgentErrorCodes.SessionOwnerMismatch`
+  (`"session_owner_mismatch"`). The code and field already exist so the agent could ship first.
+* Agent (shipped dormant with this change): `BackendApiClient` reads `errorCode` off a JSON 401/403
+  body into `BackendAuthException.ErrorCode`; `SessionRegistrationHelper` reacts to exactly that code
+  by calling `rotateSession` once and re-registering immediately — **without** feeding
+  `AuthFailureTracker` (five consecutive 403s would otherwise soft-shutdown a perfectly authorized
+  agent). `BackendSessionRegistration.RotateSession` rotates `session.id` (keeping
+  `whiteglove.complete`), re-targets `agentConfig.SessionId` and the `EmergencyReporter`, and drops
+  `spool.jsonl` + `upload-cursor.json` because their lines carry the refused partition key. The
+  `agent_started` event then reports `sessionRotated=true` + `previousSessionId`.
+* Registration is the first session-scoped call of every agent start and everything after Phase 6
+  reads `agentConfig.SessionId` live, so a mismatch on ingest can only mean an agent older than the
+  rotation logic or a genuinely foreign caller.
+
+Switch on only after: the shadow distribution has run for weeks, every `wouldReject=true` is
+explained, and the fleet's `X-Agent-Version` is at or above the rotation-capable release. Then add
+`Rejects`, delete the stage-1 pin test, update the trust pages (isolation model) and bump their
+"Last reviewed" date.
+
+# Residual risk (accepted)
+
+* The serial is a caller-supplied header on both paths. A certificate holder who also knows a victim's
+  serial can still claim a **legacy** row, or a **bootstrap-owned** row during its handoff window.
+* One bootstrap token serves many devices; two devices on the same short code can still write into
+  each other's session until the certificate handoff closes it.
+* `SupersedeOrphanedPredecessorsAsync` is keyed on the announced serial and can still resolve foreign
+  open sessions to `Incomplete`. Follow-up: restrict to rows without owner or with the same
+  `OwnerSerial`, and require a minimum age.
+
+None of these are closable without a signature scheme over the request body, which is deliberately
+not built (it would duplicate the TLS proof).
+
+# Citations
+
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/SessionOwnershipPolicy.cs` — matrix, `WouldRejectUnderEnforcement`, row (de)serialization
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/SessionOwnerBindingObserver.cs` — carriers, throttle, stamping
+* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Models/Enrollment/SessionOwner.cs` — column names and kinds
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableStorageService.Sessions.cs` — `StoreSessionAsync(…, ownerToStamp)`, `UpdateSessionOwnerAsync`
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Security/SessionRegistrationHelper.cs` — rotation branch
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2/Runtime/BackendSessionRegistration.cs` — `RotateSession`
+* Tests: `SessionOwnershipPolicyTests`, `SessionOwnerBindingObserverTests`, `StoreSessionReregistrationPreserveTests`, agent `SessionRegistrationHelperTests`, `BackendSessionRegistrationTests`, `SessionIdPersistenceTests`, `BackendApiClientAuthClassificationTests`
+* Grep marker: `SESSION-OWNER-BINDING`

docs/backend/silent-session-classification.md

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+---
+type: Concept
+title: Silent-Session Classification (Sweep, Max-Lifetime, Retro-Reconcile)
+description: How a session whose agent went silent gets its honest status — the two-stage maintenance sweep (2h Stalled marker, 5h timeout classification), the EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier rule order incl. the WhiteGlove Part-2 and self-deploying gates, which ingest paths share the classifier, and the admin retro-reconcile modes.
+resource: src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.cs
+tags:
+  - backend
+  - maintenance
+  - session-status
+  - classification
+  - whiteglove
+  - self-deploying
+timestamp: 2026-08-27T20:00:00+02:00
+---
+
+# Silent-Session Classification
+
+A session only ever becomes terminal through evidence. When the agent stops reporting
+(power-off, reboot without relaunch, Wi-Fi never re-associating, max-lifetime watchdog),
+the backend must decide the status from what it last saw — it never hard-fails a session
+for being silent. One pure function holds that decision,
+`EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.ClassifyTimedOutSession`, and every silent-session path calls it
+so a session gets the same verdict regardless of which path noticed the silence first.
+
+# Schema
+
+## Inputs (`EspProvisioningRollup` + session flags)
+
+`ExtractRollup(events)` distills the event stream into facts: Device/Account Setup
+subcategory counts (incl. the 30s fallback-confirmed messages), `HasExplicitFailure`,
+`HasEnrollmentComplete` vs. `HasTerminalComplete` (the Part-1 `whiteglove_complete`),
+`HasAgentEmergencyBreak`, `DesktopArrived`, `HelloResolved`, `HelloPolicyDisabled`,
+`SkipUserEsp`, RealmJoin detection/resolution, `HasAppInstallFailure` (any
+`app_install_failed`), and `HasAgentMaxLifetimeTimeout` (either max-lifetime shape:
+`enrollment_failed`/`agent_timeout` or `agent_shutting_down`/`max_lifetime` — the agent is
+provably gone). Session-row flags are passed alongside:
+`IsPreProvisioned` + `ResumedAt` (WhiteGlove Part 2) and `IsSelfDeployingProfile`
+(registry-confirmed `CloudAssignedOobeConfig 0x20|0x40`, set at registration).
+
+## Rule order (first match wins)
+
+| # | Condition | Verdict |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| 1 | `HasExplicitFailure` | Failed |
+| 1b | `IsWhiteGloveAwaitingUser`: pre-provisioned + resumed + Device Setup done + **no** user evidence since resume + no explicit failure/enrollment_complete | AwaitingUser within grace; Succeeded (honest WG reason) past grace |
+| 1c | `IsSelfDeployingProvisioned`: self-deploying profile + Device Setup done + no explicit failure | **Succeeded** (reconcile) — no grace, no AwaitingUser: the profile has no user phase |
+| 2 | Account Setup all-succeeded, or `enrollment_complete`, or `whiteglove_complete` on a **non-resumed** session | Succeeded |
+| 3 | `HasAgentEmergencyBreak` | Incomplete immediately (agent self-destructed, nothing can arrive) |
+| 4 | `DesktopArrived` + (Hello terminal, or Hello disabled + SkipUserEsp) | Succeeded (user provably finished) |
+| 5 | Device Setup done + within grace + **no** max-lifetime watchdog observed | AwaitingUser |
+| 5a | Device Setup done + past grace (or watchdog observed) + `DesktopArrived` + no `app_install_failed` | **Succeeded** — completed (assumed), `r5_assumed` |
+| 5b | Device Setup done, otherwise past grace (or watchdog observed) | Incomplete |
+| 6 | otherwise | Incomplete |
+
+Grace = `ResolveGraceHours(SessionGraceHours, AbsoluteMaxSessionHours)` (~51h default),
+measured from `ResumedAt ?? StartedAt`. Every Succeeded-reconcile reason carries the
+silence-transparency clause (`AppendReconcileTiming`: last agent contact, silence, verdict time).
+
+## Why rule 1c exists (kiosk tenant audit 2026-08-23)
+
+On a self-deploying profile Device ESP all-succeeded IS the enrollment's end; the agent's
+own SelfDeploying terminal only adds a 5-min confirmation window
+(`DecisionEngine.SelfDeploying.s_deviceOnlyEspDetectionWindow`). Tenant `aebdce78` (school,
+Wi-Fi ThinkBooks, a language-change app forcing a reboot right after Device ESP) lost that
+window on 836 of ~970 sessions in one week: the agent died 0–4 min after
+`DeviceSetup fallback_confirmed`, the reboot relaunch never registered (30s registration
+budget on a Wi-Fi link still associating), and rule 5 labeled finished kiosks
+"awaiting user / Account Setup 0/5" → Incomplete 51h later. Nobody signs in on these devices
+(prepared during the holidays, boxed, in service) — AwaitingUser was factually wrong and
+Incomplete turned a working rollout into a red wall. Other self-deploying tenants completed
+normally in the same window, so this is a classification gap, not a profile-wide agent bug.
+Agent-side companion fix: `SessionRegistrationHelper` now waits up to 15s for a network link
+and retries 6× (~62s backoff) instead of 5× (~30s). Measured 2026-08-27 (builds
+2.0.1428/1429, both carrying the fix): the reconcile share did not move, and the backend saw
+no registration attempt from any relaunch — no success, no 4xx, zero `register:superseded`
+in the tenant — so the relaunch never reaches the network at all (device powered off after
+ESP, or the relaunch never runs). The sweep reconcile is the permanent completion path for
+this profile, not a stopgap.
+
+## Callers (all pass both gate inputs)
+
+| Path | File | Notes |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Sweep stage 1 (2h agent-silent marker) | `MaintenanceService.MarkStalledSessionsAsTimedOutAsync` | Default: InProgress → Stalled. Gates run BEFORE the Stalled write: `TryMarkWhiteGloveAwaitingUserAsync` (AwaitingUser) and `TryReconcileSelfDeployingAsync` (Succeeded). Only flagged sessions pay the event read. |
+| Sweep stage 2 (SessionTimeoutHours, 5h default) | same | InProgress/Stalled/AwaitingUser past the window and past the 2h silence cutoff → full classification; AwaitingUser within grace is skipped without an event read. |
+| Agent max-lifetime (`enrollment_failed`/max_lifetime, `agent_shutting_down`/max_lifetime) | `EventIngestProcessor.ApplyMaxLifetimeVerdictAsync` | Watchdog = "agent stopped waiting", not a verdict; classified from evidence. Pending sessions exempt. |
+| Late-telemetry reconcile | `EventIngestProcessor.TryLateTelemetryReconcileAsync` | Heal-only: applies a Succeeded verdict to Incomplete/AwaitingUser rows when straggler events arrive. |
+| Agent stall probe (`session_stalled`) | `EventIngestProcessor.TryMapStallToWhiteGloveAwaitingUserAsync` | Only the WG gate (1b); a stall probe on a self-deploying device with Device Setup done means the agent is alive and something else blocks — stays Stalled. |
+| Admin retro-reconcile | `LegacyReclassificationService` | Modes `legacy_timeouts`, `pending_orphans`, `self_deploying_silent` (Incomplete/AwaitingUser/Stalled rows with the profile flag, heal-only to Succeeded, admin-marked rows skipped). `POST /api/maintenance/reclassify-legacy?mode=…&dryRun=false&tenantId=…&maxSessions=…`, dry-run by default. |
+
+## Why rule 5a exists (calibration read 2026-08-27)
+
+The verdict-calibration matrix showed r5-Incomplete devices re-enrolling at 2.6 % within
+7 days — the succeeded background (`agent:complete_soft` sits at 2.8 %), not the ~29 %
+failure level — consistently across tenants, and half the sampled sessions were healthy
+desktops with a clean app record whose agent died before the Hello terminal (some with the
+agent's own "AccountSetup treated as complete" synthesis as the literally last event). Past
+the full grace, "the user phase is still running" is no longer a possible explanation, so
+desktop + zero `app_install_failed` + no explicit failure now reconciles to Succeeded
+("completed (assumed)") instead of a red Incomplete. Sessions without a desktop (user never
+began sign-in: battery-drained, powered off, max-lifetime) and sessions with any failed app
+stay Incomplete — "completed" must not overclaim. Rule 4 remains the IMMEDIATE reconcile
+(desktop + Hello proof); 5a only fires where waiting is over. Desktop arrival alone is still
+rejected as a live completion signal.
+
+## Closed gap: max-lifetime AwaitingUser (2026-08-27)
+
+After max-lifetime the agent writes `enrollment-complete.marker` and self-destructs, so an
+AwaitingUser verdict from that path could never heal — the calibration correction stream
+confirmed it: all five observed `maxlife:r5_awaiting` episodes expired to Incomplete
+unhealed, while live-agent `sweep:r5_awaiting` parks upgraded 7 of 26 to Succeeded. Rule 5
+therefore skips the grace once `HasAgentMaxLifetimeTimeout` is in the stream and decides the
+terminal fork (5a/5b) immediately; the max-lifetime ingest appends its trigger event to the
+read stream so the fact is never missed, and late straggler telemetry still heals a terminal
+verdict via `TryLateTelemetryReconcileAsync`. WhiteGlove rule 1b deliberately keeps its
+park — sealed/boxed devices do heal (the observed `maxlife:r1b_awaiting` episode resolved to
+Succeeded).
+
+# Examples
+
+* Session `195593e2` (tenant aebdce78): `DeviceSetup 4/4` + `fallback_confirmed`, `AccountSetup 0/5`
+  (IME false positive), Hello disabled, SkipUser=True, silent after 13:01 → rule 1c →
+  Succeeded "self-deploying profile — Device Setup fully provisioned … agent went silent
+  before confirming completion. Agent last reported 2026-08-21 13:01 UTC …".
+* Same event shape on a user-driven profile → rule 5 → AwaitingUser (within grace) /
+  Incomplete (past grace). Guarded by
+  `Classify_same_stream_without_self_deploying_flag_keeps_user_phase_verdicts`.
+* fairstone WG Part 2 reseal-reboot, technician powers off at logon screen → rule 1b →
+  AwaitingUser; user unboxes days later → ingest completion heals to Succeeded.
+
+# Citations
+
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier.cs` — rollup + rule order, `IsWhiteGloveAwaitingUser`, `IsSelfDeployingProvisioned`, reason helpers.
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/MaintenanceService.cs` — `MarkStalledSessionsAsTimedOutAsync`, `TryMarkWhiteGloveAwaitingUserAsync`, `TryReconcileSelfDeployingAsync`.
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/EventIngestProcessor.Classification.cs` — max-lifetime verdict, late-telemetry reconcile, stall mapping.
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/LegacyReclassificationService.cs`, `Functions/Admin/ReclassifyLegacySessionsFunction.cs` — retro modes.
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableStorageService.Maintenance.cs` — `GetAgentSilentSessionsAsync`, `GetStalledSessionsAsync`, `GetSelfDeployingSilentSessionsAsync`.
+* `src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Security/SessionRegistrationHelper.cs` — link wait + 6-attempt registration budget.
+* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore/Engine/DecisionEngine.SelfDeploying.cs` — the agent-side 5-min SelfDeploying terminal window.
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/EnrollmentTimeoutClassifierTests.cs` — rule coverage incl. the 2026-08-23 self-deploying block.

docs/backend/table-schema-sentinel.md

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+---
+type: Concept
+title: Table Schema Sentinel (startup table initialization)
+description: Why a cold start no longer issues one CreateTableIfNotExists per registered table - a hash over TableNames.All stored in AdminConfiguration gates the full pass, the SessionsIndex backfill only runs after a full pass and behind a conditional-insert claim, and daily maintenance repairs out-of-band deletions.
+resource: /src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableStorageService.cs
+tags:
+  - backend
+  - table-storage
+  - startup
+  - maintenance
+timestamp: 2026-08-23
+---
+
+# Schema
+
+## Problem
+
+`TableInitializerService` (hosted service) called `InitializeTablesAsync` on every process start, which issued `CreateTableIfNotExistsAsync` for every entry of `Constants.TableNames.All` (66 at the time of writing, DoP 8). Each call is a Create POST whose 409 is swallowed - on Flex Consumption with frequent cold starts that was ~9 serial round-trip waves before the first request. It was followed by a SessionsIndex emptiness query whose *error* path returned "empty", so a transient storage error triggered a full Sessions scan with serial upserts - on every scaled-out instance at once.
+
+## Sentinel
+
+* Row `AdminConfiguration` / PK `SchemaSentinel` / RK `tables`, property `TableSchemaHash` (+ `TableCount`, `UpdatedUtc`).
+* Value = `ComputeTableSchemaHash(TableNames.All)`: SHA-256 over the ordinal-sorted, newline-joined table names. Derived, never hand-maintained: adding a table to `TableNames.All` changes the hash by construction (`TableLifecycleBucketTests` already forces every constant into `All`).
+* `InitializeTablesAsync` (returns `bool fullPassRan`):
+  1. Point-read the sentinel. Match -> mark initialized, **zero** table calls, return `false`.
+  2. Missing / stale / unreadable (fresh storage has no AdminConfiguration table yet) -> `EnsureAllTablesAsync` (the old full pass), then upsert the sentinel **only if no table failed**, return `true`. A failed pass leaves `_tablesInitialized = false`, so the next call retries.
+* Scale-out: two instances that both see a stale sentinel both run the idempotent pass - harmless.
+
+## SessionsIndex backfill
+
+* Only evaluated when the full pass ran (`fullPassRan == true`): an empty index can only exist on fresh storage, which is exactly the case without a sentinel.
+* `IsSessionIndexEmptyAsync` now returns `false` on error (skip), not `true`.
+* `TryClaimSessionIndexBackfillAsync`: conditional `AddEntityAsync` on `SchemaSentinel` / `sessionIndexBackfill` - only the winner scans; 409 or any error -> skip. The manual maintenance backfill (`RunManualAsync`) remains the safety net.
+
+## Known gap and repair
+
+A table deleted out-of-band (cleanup skill, portal, tests) is not noticed at startup anymore. `IStorageInitializer.EnsureAllAsync` runs as the first step of the daily timer maintenance (`MaintenanceService.RunAllAsync`), recreating it within 24h. Storage helpers are fail-soft in the meantime.
+
+## Measuring it
+
+`StartupTelemetryService` (hosted service) emits two App Insights metrics on `IHostApplicationLifetime.ApplicationStarted` - i.e. after every hosted service finished `StartAsync`:
+
+* `BackendStartupMs` - process start (`Process.StartTime`) to host ready; includes runtime, DI and all hosted services.
+* `BackendTableInitMs` - the `InitializeTablesAsync` slice alone (`TableStorageService.LastInitialization`).
+
+Dimensions: `version`, `commit`, `tableInitFullPass`, `instance`. Metrics bypass adaptive sampling and the worker log level, so they arrive even though Information traces do not. The MCP server logs the same idea as one `{"type":"boot","readyMs":…}` stderr line per start (ContainerAppConsoleLogs_CL, see `.claude/commands/mcp-telemetry.md`).
+
+```kusto
+customMetrics
+| where name in ("BackendStartupMs", "BackendTableInitMs")
+| summarize p50 = percentile(value, 50), p95 = percentile(value, 95), n = count()
+  by name, version = tostring(customDimensions.version), fullPass = tostring(customDimensions.tableInitFullPass)
+```
+
+# Examples
+
+* Deploy that adds a table: first cold start after the deploy runs the full pass once (log: "Table schema sentinel missing or stale"), every later start logs "Table schema sentinel matches (...)".
+* Fresh storage account: sentinel read throws TableNotFound -> full pass -> index empty -> one instance claims and backfills.
+
+# Citations
+
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableStorageService.cs` - sentinel, `InitializeTablesAsync`, `EnsureAllTablesAsync`, `TryClaimSessionIndexBackfillAsync`
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableInitializerService.cs` - startup gating
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/MaintenanceService.cs` - daily `EnsureAllTablesAsync`
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/StartupTelemetryService.cs` - `BackendStartupMs` / `BackendTableInitMs`
+* `src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/index.ts` - `{"type":"boot"}` line
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/TableSchemaSentinelTests.cs`, `StartupTelemetryServiceTests.cs`

docs/backend/telemetry-ingest-shaping.md

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+---
+type: Concept
+title: Telemetry Ingest Shaping (App Insights / Log Analytics)
+description: What the backend deliberately keeps out of Application Insights and why - one canonical request record (worker copy, per-item sampling bypass; host HTTP duplicate dropped by a workspace transformation), expected storage outcomes (404/412/409) and successful SignalR REST calls filtered in the worker, and the query rules that follow.
+resource: /src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Telemetry/StorageDependencyFilterProcessor.cs
+tags:
+  - backend
+  - telemetry
+  - application-insights
+  - cost
+timestamp: 2026-08-23
+---
+
+# Telemetry Ingest Shaping
+
+The backend is storage-I/O heavy and runs on the Functions isolated worker, which emits telemetry from TWO processes (host and worker). Left alone, Log Analytics ingestion is dominated by rows nobody reads. This document records what is removed, where, and what that means for queries.
+
+# Schema
+
+## Request telemetry — one canonical record
+
+| Source | Emitted by | Content | Fate |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Host HTTP request (`Properties.Source` empty, `Url` set) | Functions host process | Name, duration, status — no tenant/user/correlation | **Dropped at ingestion** by the workspace transformation on `AppRequests` (`infra/appinsights-workspace-transforms.bicep`) |
+| Host non-HTTP invocation (`Url` empty) | Functions host process | Timer / queue executions | Kept (the worker middleware never sees them) |
+| Worker request (`Properties.Source == 'WorkerMiddleware'`) | `RequestTelemetryMiddleware` | TenantId, UserId, UserRole, CorrelationId, ClientSource, McpToolName, HttpPath | **Kept, unsampled** — the canonical record |
+
+Why two mechanisms:
+
+* The host request item cannot be suppressed from worker code or from `host.json` (`Host.Results` controls log traces, not the request item; verified 2026-06-09). The only lever is a Log Analytics workspace transformation: `source | where tostring(Properties.Source) == 'WorkerMiddleware' or isempty(Url)`.
+* `host.json` `samplingSettings.excludedTypes: "Request;Event"` only applies to the host process. The worker's `AddApplicationInsightsTelemetryWorkerService` runs its own adaptive sampling; before 2026-08-23 worker request rows carried `ItemCount` 2–5 on weekdays (≈30 % of individual requests missing, `count()` undercounting by the same share — `sum(ItemCount)` matched the host copy to 1.00 per day). Re-configuring the worker sampling chain did not take effect in the isolated worker (see the L4 note in `Program.cs`). The per-item opt-out does: the middleware sets `SamplingPercentage = 100` on its own `RequestTelemetry`, and the SDK sampling processor passes through every item whose sampling percentage is already set.
+
+## Dependency telemetry — keep only signal
+
+`StorageDependencyFilterProcessor` (worker pipeline) drops:
+
+* successful Azure Storage calls (Table/Queue/Blob) in both shapes — the HTTP shape (`Azure table`, target `*.table.core.windows.net`) and the Azure SDK ActivitySource shape (`InProc | Microsoft.Tables`, `InProc | Microsoft.Storage`);
+* storage calls with an **expected outcome**: `404` (point-read miss — EventTypeIndex, BlockedDevices lookups), `412` (ETag precondition), `409` (idempotent insert conflict). HTTP-shape rows carry the code in `ResultCode`; InProc rows only in `Properties["Error"]` (`Status: 404 (`). Before this filter these were 100 % of the remaining "failed" storage rows (~540 MB/week, two rows per call);
+* successful Azure SignalR Service REST calls the worker makes itself (`*.service.signalr.net`).
+
+The bulk of SignalR REST traffic (group add/remove per connection, ~470 MB/week) is emitted by the **host** process for the SignalR output binding (`SDKVersion rdddsc:*`) and never passes the worker pipeline — live-verified after the 2026-08-23 deploy (worker rows: 0, host rows: ~560/h). Those are removed by the second data flow of the same workspace transformation: `AppDependencies | where not(Success == true and Target endswith '.service.signalr.net')`.
+
+Everything else passes: storage 429/5xx/auth/timeouts, failed SignalR calls, all HTTP/Graph/NVD/MSRC dependencies, the worker's own `InProc Invoke` span, and every non-dependency item.
+
+## Measured baseline (7 days before the change, `_BilledSize`, `autopilotmonitor-api-eu`)
+
+| Table | Rows | MB | After |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| AppDependencies | 976k | 1248 | ≈ 240 (SignalR + expected-outcome rows gone) |
+| AppRequests host copy | 274k | 323 | ≈ 0 (only timer/queue rows) |
+| AppRequests worker copy | 189k | 208 | ≈ 300 (now 100 % of requests) |
+| AppTraces | 142k | 137 | unchanged |
+| AppEvents | 6k | 4 | unchanged — not worth touching |
+
+Net ≈ −1.3 GB/week with MORE usable data (every request now has tenant context).
+
+# Examples
+
+Counting requests (exact since 2026-08-23; for older data replace `count()` with `sum(itemCount)`):
+
+```kql
+requests
+| where customDimensions.Source == 'WorkerMiddleware'
+| summarize total=count(), failed=countif(success == false) by name
+```
+
+Real storage trouble only:
+
+```kql
+dependencies
+| where type startswith 'InProc | Microsoft.Tables' or target endswith '.table.core.windows.net'
+| summarize count() by resultCode, tostring(customDimensions.Error)
+```
+
+Post-deploy verification of the per-item sampling bypass (must be `ItemCount == 1` only):
+
+```kql
+AppRequests
+| where TimeGenerated > ago(1h) and tostring(Properties.Source) == 'WorkerMiddleware'
+| summarize rows=count() by ItemCount
+```
+
+# Citations
+
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Middleware/RequestTelemetryMiddleware.cs` — `SamplingPercentage = 100` before `TrackRequest`.
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Telemetry/StorageDependencyFilterProcessor.cs` + `StorageDependencyFilterProcessorTests.cs` — the filter contract.
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Program.cs` — the failed L4 worker-sampling attempt and why it must not be retried.
+* `infra/appinsights-workspace-transforms.bicep` — the AppRequests transformation DCR, apply/verify/rollback commands.
+* `.claude/commands/backend-logs.md`, `session-debug.md` — query conventions.

docs/backend/tenant-activation-welcome-mail.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ title: Tenant Activation & the Once-Only Welcome Mail
 description: How a signup becomes an activated tenant (manual approve or auto-approve queue), and how the welcome mail is sent exactly once even though activation and the user-provided address race each other.
 resource: backend
 tags: [activation, auto-approve, welcome-email, preview-whitelist, race]
-timestamp: 2026-08-02
+timestamp: 2026-08-23
 ---
 
 # Schema
@@ -36,6 +36,14 @@ same table) — the only reliable address: it is typed by the user on the activa
 page (`PUT /api/preview/notification-email`). The signup admin UPN may have no mailbox and
 `ContactEmail` is merely seeded from the notification email.
 
+The PUT is `AuthenticatedUserWithRole`, not a member tier, because the signup user is still
+roleless until approval auto-promotes them to Admin. The function re-gates on the resolved
+role (`PreviewWhitelistFunction.MayWriteNotificationEmailAsync`): a member role or platform
+scope always may write; a roleless caller may write only while the tenant has **no enabled
+member** at all. Once any member exists the window is closed for good — the address feeds the
+welcome and farewell mails and is shown to operators as the tenant contact, so an ordinary
+employee with a JWT but no product role must not be able to redirect or clear it (403).
+
 That makes activation and address entry concurrent writers. With auto-approve, activation
 usually wins (observed in production: approve at T+64 s, address saved at T+69 s → the
 approval path found no address and the mail was silently skipped).
@@ -58,6 +66,71 @@ The Global-Admin resend endpoint (`POST /api/preview/send-welcome-email/{tenantI
 always sends (explicit intent) and consumes the marker best-effort so the automatic
 paths never duplicate afterwards.
 
+## Finding the tenant behind an address
+
+The provider's delivery log names only the recipient — never the tenant it belonged to. The
+reverse lookup is therefore part of the tenant console: its search matches `tenantId`,
+`domainName`, `ContactEmail` **and** the notification address. No other address is searchable
+(an admin UPN never receives platform mail and would only widen the PII surface of the list).
+
+The addresses live in a different table than the tenant configs the list is built from, so the
+console loads them as a map from `GET /api/preview/notification-emails` (GA + read-only Global
+Reader, `excludeDelegated`) — one cross-partition scan of `RowKey eq 'notification-email'`
+instead of a point read per tenant. Keys are lowercased on both sides of the join: the address
+rows are written from the JWT `tid` (lowercase) while a config PartitionKey's casing is not
+guaranteed. Stored addresses keep the casing the user typed, so matching is case-insensitive.
+
+The map is **best-effort** in the portal: it powers only the search-by-address, so a failed read
+degrades that one capability instead of taking the tenant list down. The addresses are not
+rendered in the list — they are a search key, and stay visible in the tenant editor.
+
+## Mail transport
+
+Both transactional mails (welcome, post-offboarding farewell) go through the
+provider-neutral `EmailService` (`IEmailService` for the welcome path,
+`IOffboardFarewellEmailSender` for the farewell path). The provider is an implementation
+detail confined to one private transport method plus the `Email:*` configuration
+section — a provider swap must not rename classes, DI registrations or callers.
+
+* Current provider: **Mailchimp Transactional (Mandrill)**, `POST {Email:Endpoint}`
+  (`messages/send`), API key in the JSON body, typed `HttpClient` with the shared
+  `ResiliencePolicies.Notification` retry policy (15 s timeout).
+* Settings (App Settings use `Email__Key`): `Email:ApiKey` (required — empty means every
+  send is a logged no-op, never an error), `Email:Endpoint`, `Email:FromAddress`
+  (default `noreply@autopilotmonitor.com`), `Email:FromName` (default `Autopilot Monitor`).
+* Result handling: per-recipient status `sent`/`queued`/`scheduled` = success;
+  `rejected`/`invalid` (with `reject_reason`), non-2xx or malformed bodies = warning.
+  Never throws — both callers rely on that fail-soft contract.
+* `track_opens`/`track_clicks` are explicitly `false` and `auto_text` is `true`: the provider
+  receives only the recipient address and the tenant domain, which is exactly the claim on
+  the privacy page and the trust data-flows page. Changing tracking = changing those pages.
+
+## Template overrides (operator-editable)
+
+Global Admins can replace either HTML body without a deployment (portal: Settings →
+Email Templates). `EmailTemplateService` resolves the body for every send: the stored
+override wins, otherwise the built-in `EmailTemplates.*`. Overrides live in the
+`PreviewConfig` table (partition `EmailTemplates`, row key `welcome` | `farewell`,
+properties `Html`, `UpdatedBy`, `UpdatedUtc`), cached 5 minutes, invalidated on save/reset.
+
+* The only placeholder is `{{domainName}}`; an empty domain renders as "your organization",
+  matching the built-ins. Subjects are not editable (pinned constants).
+* The domain is HTML-encoded at the point of substitution (`EmailTemplateService.Render` and the
+  built-in template builders) — the mail goes out under the product's signed sender to a
+  tenant-chosen recipient, so no writer of `DomainName` may ever inject markup into it.
+  `DomainName` itself is tenant identity: seeded once at first login from the UPN domain
+  (`AuthFunction`, only when it passes `TenantConfigValidation.IsValidDomainName` — a strict
+  dotted host name), preserved from the stored row on the full-model config PUT for every
+  caller, and "never writable" in the field-patch flow.
+* Limit 30 000 characters (Table string property cap is 32K UTF-16 chars).
+* The send path is fail-soft: a storage error falls back to the built-in body. The admin
+  read path is not — a broken store surfaces as an error instead of silently showing the
+  built-in.
+* Endpoints (all GlobalAdminOnly): `GET|PUT|DELETE /api/global/email-templates/{kind}` and
+  `POST /api/global/email-templates/{kind}/test`. The test send goes to the caller's tenant
+  contact address (activation notification email → `ContactEmail` → caller UPN) with the
+  caller's tenant domain, optionally with an unsaved draft body; provider tag `test`.
+
 # Examples
 
 * Auto-approve wins the race: approve at T+64 s finds no address → logs "deferred to the
@@ -73,3 +146,9 @@ paths never duplicate afterwards.
 * `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Rules/PreviewWhitelistFunction.cs` — save-path trigger, GA resend
 * `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/DataAccess/TableStorage/TableConfigRepository.cs` — conditional inserts (approved / welcome-email-sent)
 * `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/TenantApprovalServiceTests.cs` — ordering + dedup pins
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/EmailService.cs` — provider-neutral transport (Mandrill wire format, result handling, tracking off)
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/EmailServiceTests.cs` — wire-format, fail-soft and gate-ordering pins
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/EmailTemplateService.cs` — override resolution, placeholder rendering, cache
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Admin/EmailTemplatesFunction.cs` — GA endpoints (read / override / reset / test send)
+* `src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/admin/settings/sections/SectionEmailTemplates.tsx` — portal editor, preview frame, test send
+* `src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/admin/components/tenantSearch.ts` — the console's match rules (searchable fields, quoted exact mode, lowercased join)

docs/backend/time-attribution.md

@@ -105,6 +105,11 @@ the partition).
 * Self-healing 30-day maintenance sweep (2h tick): backfills missing breakdowns, folds
   late-terminating sessions into their StartedAt-date aggregates, and enforces version
   purity — a stale-version row whose events aged out counts as missing, never mixed.
+  Reads the tick's **shared window scan** (`MaintenanceService.LoadSweepWindowSessionsAsync`,
+  one projected 35-day cross-tenant drain via `MaintenanceSweepSessionProjection` that
+  also feeds the device-journey and verdict-calibration sweeps) — the StartedAt-only
+  filter is a full-table read in Table Storage, so it is done once per tick, not once per
+  sweep; `MaintenanceSweepProjectionEquivalenceTests` pins the column set.
 * `TimeAttributionAggregates` (PK = TenantId or `global`, RK = `{yyyy-MM-dd}|{class}` and
   `rolling30|{class}`): per enrollment class (`user_driven`, `whiteglove`, `self_deploying`,
   `device_preparation` — never mixed) median/p75/p90 per segment over the fixed six-segment

docs/backend/verdict-calibration.md

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+---
+type: Concept
+title: Verdict Calibration (classifier thermometer)
+description: How every session status write declares its VerdictPath, how overriding a verdict preserves it as PriorStatus/PriorVerdictPath, how the daily calibration aggregate counts paths with the re-enrollment proxy and the correction stream, and how the drift radar (share / silence / evidence-gap) turns that into operator-only ops events.
+resource: src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/MaintenanceService.VerdictCalibration.cs
+tags:
+  - backend
+  - sessions
+  - classifier
+  - calibration
+  - regression-radar
+timestamp: 2026-08-27T20:00:00+02:00
+---
+
+# Verdict Calibration (classifier thermometer)
+
+A session's terminal status is written by ~20 code paths: the agent's own terminal events,
+the silence classifier (`EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier`, rules 1–6) reached via the
+maintenance sweep / the agent's max-lifetime shutdown / late-telemetry heal / retro
+reclassification, the analyze-rule engine, admin marks and session superseding. Verdict
+calibration makes every one of those paths **countable**, tracks how often a path's verdict
+was later **overridden**, attaches the delayed **re-enrollment proxy**, and raises an
+operator-only alarm when a path's share **drifts**. It is deterministic, fact-based tuning
+input for the rules — explicitly not a learned model, and never a customer-facing feature.
+
+# Schema
+
+## VerdictPath on the session row
+
+`SessionSummary.VerdictPath` (`VerdictPaths` vocabulary, `origin:detail`, append-only) is
+stamped by **every** status write — `UpdateSessionStatusAsync` takes it as a required
+parameter, `StoreSessionAsync` stamps `register:new` / `register:whiteglove_resume` and
+preserves an existing path through the re-registration Replace, `SetSessionPreProvisionedAsync`
+requires it whenever it writes a status. Unlike `FailureSource` (persisted only on `Failed`),
+the path survives for Incomplete, AwaitingUser, Stalled and Pending.
+
+| Origin | Paths |
+| --- | --- |
+| `agent` | `complete`, `complete_soft` (Continue-Anyway), `failed`, `esp_failure_fallback`, `gather_complete`, `whiteglove_pending`, `whiteglove_resumed`, `stall_probe`, `stall_heal` |
+| `ingest` | `wg_awaiting` (stall probe mapped to WhiteGlove AwaitingUser) |
+| `sweep` | `stalled`, `wg_awaiting`, `sd_reconcile`, `r{rule}` (stage-2 classifier) |
+| `maxlife` / `late` / `retro` | `r{rule}` (classifier via max-lifetime shutdown / late-telemetry heal / retro reclassification); `retro:sd_reconcile`, `retro:superseded` |
+| `register` | `new`, `whiteglove_resume`, `superseded` |
+| `rule` | `rule:{ruleId}` (analyze rule with MarkSessionAsFailed) |
+| `manual` | `failed`, `succeeded` |
+| `legacy` | read-side derivation only (`legacy:{rule}` when the rule is recoverable from the reason literal, `legacy:unknown` otherwise) — never written |
+
+Classifier rule ids (`ClassifierRules`): `r1`, `r1b_awaiting`, `r1b_succeeded`, `r1c`, `r2`,
+`r3`, `r4`, `r5_awaiting`, `r5_incomplete`, `r6`. `ClassifyTimedOutSession` returns
+`(Status, Reason, Rule)` so each `return` names its rule.
+
+## PriorStatus / PriorVerdictPath — the correction stream
+
+When a write replaces a prior **verdict** (existing status ∈ Succeeded/Failed/Incomplete/
+AwaitingUser with a stamped path, incoming status different), the storage seam preserves the
+pair (`TableStorageService.ComputePriorVerdict`, both the ETag path and the force path). A
+stall marker healing to InProgress, a same-status refresh, or an unstamped legacy row never
+sets it. Admin marks, late agent completions and retro reclassifications all flow through it.
+
+## Read-side derivation for pre-instrumentation rows
+
+`VerdictPathDerivation.Derive(session)` returns the stamped path verbatim, otherwise derives
+from `AdminMarkedAction`, `FailureSource`, `ReconcileReason` and `FailureReason` using the
+writers' fixed literals (classifier rule prefixes, the `max-lifetime watchdog` / `Retro-
+reclassified` suffixes, `Rule: `, `Superseded by session`, `Late completion report received`).
+Unambiguous rows get the real path (`agent:complete`, `manual:failed`, `rule:…`,
+`maxlife:r6`), ambiguous-but-rule-known rows `legacy:{rule}`, the rest `legacy:unknown`. No
+mass backfill: the aggregate counts derived rows with `DerivedCount` so the matrix shows
+history while flagging its weaker evidence. Tests pin the literals against the classifier
+output so a wording change fails loudly.
+
+## Daily aggregate — `VerdictCalibrationAggregates`
+
+PK = `TenantId` | `"global"`, RK = `yyyy-MM-dd` (session **StartedAt** date, like every daily
+aggregate). `VerdictCalibrationDailyAggregate { Version, SessionCount, TerminalSessionCount,
+Buckets[], ComputedAt }` with one bucket per (VerdictPath, Status):
+
+| Field | Meaning |
+| --- | --- |
+| `Count` / `DerivedCount` | sessions currently on the path; of those, derived read-side |
+| `Eligible7d` | terminal sessions whose end (`CompletedAt ?? LastEventAt ?? StartedAt`) lies ≥ 7 d before compute time |
+| `ReEnrolled7d` | of the eligible: the device's `DeviceHistories` chain shows the next terminal session starting < 7 d after this one's end |
+| `OverriddenByAdmin` / `OverriddenByLateCompletion` / `OverriddenOther` | sessions whose **PriorVerdictPath** is this bucket — attributed to the path that was overridden, so a bucket can carry overrides with `Count = 0` |
+
+`MaintenanceService.SweepVerdictCalibrationAsync` (2-hourly, after the device-journey sweep
+so the chains are fresh; manual maintenance parity; kill switch
+`VerdictCalibrationSweepDisabled`) slices the tick's shared projected window scan
+(`LoadSweepWindowSessionsAsync` — one 35-day cross-tenant drain feeds the time-attribution,
+device-journey and calibration sweeps plus the radar's tenant discovery; the StartedAt-only
+filter is a full-table read, so never per sweep), recomputes the rolling 30-day window whole (Replace),
+deletes stale date rows it did not regenerate, and the unbounded-tables cleanup applies the
+180-day retention. Sessions inside a deletion cascade are skipped; the table is regenerable
+and is wiped with the tenant on offboarding.
+
+## Read surfaces
+
+* `GET global/metrics/verdict-calibration?days=&tenantId=` (GlobalReadOrAdmin,
+  TenantScoping.QueryParam; `VerdictCalibrationResponse.Build`): per path — count, share of
+  all window sessions, derived count, eligible/re-enrolled with `reEnrollRatePct` **null below
+  20 eligible**, the three override counters, a today-anchored 7d-vs-28d share trend
+  (`window7`, `baseline28`, `lift` null without baseline) — plus totals, the trend basis and
+  the active `alerts[]`. Empty but well-formed before the first sweep.
+* MCP `get_verdict_calibration` (platform scope: GA + Global Reader). Same endpoint, LLM-shaped in
+  `verdict-calibration-shape.ts`: per-row `window7.sessions` / `baseline28.sessions` are dropped (the
+  denominators live once in `trend`), `reEnrollRatePct` / `lift` are always present (`null` = withheld),
+  and `minSharePct` / `top` trim the one-session tail — rows carrying overrides are never trimmed and
+  everything dropped is reported in `omitted`. The wire shape the admin page consumes is untouched.
+* Portal: Global Admin → Metrics → Verdict Calibration (`/admin/metrics/verdict-calibration`):
+  matrix grouped by origin, status pill, `derived n` gray pill, trend glyph (arrow only from
+  5 window hits and lift ≥ 2 / ≤ 0.5), re-enrollment rate or `— (n=…)`, overrides
+  `admin / late / other`, `↑ Drift` pill on rows with an active episode, and the active
+  episodes list.
+
+## Drift radar — `VerdictCalibrationRadar`
+
+Same statistics as the [rule regression radar](rule-regression-radar.md) (7-day window vs the
+prior 28 days, ≥ 20 window sessions, lift ≥ 2, `MetricsMath.RateIncreaseSeparated`), with
+stricter floors since the first-month tuning (2026-08-27): **≥ 10 window hits** (verdict
+shares on single-digit counts are noise — a 3-hit episode survived as such), and a per-path
+share regression additionally needs **≥ 5 baseline hits** — a path with no established
+baseline is new (or renamed) vocabulary, not a regression. Anchored on yesterday, over every
+partition with rows (each tenant and `global`):
+
+| Kind | Signal | Re-arm |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `share_regression` | one **backend-decided** path's share of all sessions doubled (`sweep`/`maxlife`/`late`/`retro`/`rule`/`manual`/`ingest`; `agent:*` and `register:*` mirror customer workflow mix — first prod pass fired on `agent:whiteglove_pending` rollout weeks — and `legacy:*` is derived, all excluded per-path) | share < 1.5× baseline, the path stops occurring, the path is no longer eligible, or the current numbers fall below the fire floors |
+| `silence_share_regression` | the `sweep:*` + `maxlife:*` share doubled — the backend had to decide more often because the agent went silent (a liveness signal, not a classifier one). Rule-shaped `legacy:*` paths count into BOTH sums (window and baseline): they were the same backend decisions before the 2026-08-23 instrumentation, and without that continuity the group had a near-zero baseline by construction and fired a lift-124 rollout artifact | share < 1.5× baseline or hits stop |
+| `evidence_gap` | absolute: `r6` (pure fallthrough) decides ≥ 20 % of the window's classifier verdicts (stamped rule paths plus rule-shaped `legacy:*`, same continuity), ≥ 20 verdicts | < 15 % or < 20 verdicts |
+
+Episodes are tracker rows `verdictcalibration|{kind}|{path}|{status}` (register = `AddEntity`,
+409 = already burning, fail-closed; refresh carries `FirstNotifiedAt`; 30-day tracker
+retention re-arms long burners). A new episode fires **one** `VerdictCalibrationDrift` ops
+event (category Maintenance, Warning; dual-registered in the web `OPS_EVENT_TYPES`) — there
+is deliberately **no tenant bell**. Per-path findings on a tenant partition get the on-fire
+dimension correlation (`RuleRegressionRadar.ComputeDimensionConcentration` over the window's
+sessions whose derived path matches), reported with the shared wording contract "correlated,
+not necessarily causal"; group kinds and the global partition carry no dimension claim.
+Kill switch `VerdictCalibrationRadarDisabled`.
+
+# Examples
+
+* **Reading the thermometer (prod, 2026-08-23 hand analysis that motivated this):**
+  re-enrollment within 7 days after Succeeded 8.9 % (lab background), after Failed 24.3 %,
+  after Incomplete 10.6 % — Incomplete behaves like Succeeded, so rules 5/6 are probably too
+  cautious; the matrix now shows this per rule instead of per status.
+* **First real calibration read (2026-08-27, four days instrumented):** the per-rule and
+  per-tenant split resolved that hand analysis — `legacy:r5_incomplete` re-enrolled at 2.6 %
+  (the `agent:complete_soft` background), spread across tenants, while `legacy:r6`'s 29 %
+  was concentrated in one tenant that disciplinedly redoes failed enrollments (48.5 % there,
+  6.7 % elsewhere — so r6 stays untouched, it correctly flags that tenant). Consequences
+  shipped the same day: rule 5a "completed (assumed)" (see
+  [Silent-Session Classification](silent-session-classification.md)), the max-lifetime grace
+  skip, and the radar floors + legacy group continuity above — the first production month
+  had produced nine standing alerts, every one an instrumentation-rollout artifact.
+* **Correction stream:** a session swept to `sweep:r5_incomplete`, later completed by the
+  agent → row `agent:complete` with `PriorVerdictPath = sweep:r5_incomplete`; the aggregate
+  increments `OverriddenByLateCompletion` on the `sweep:r5_incomplete / Incomplete` bucket.
+  Four admin marks since launch were invisible before — now each one counts against the path
+  it corrected.
+* **Evidence gap:** a tenant whose agent build stopped emitting the Device Setup rollup line
+  drives its sweep verdicts into `r6`; the absolute gate fires at 20 % and names the
+  tenant — the fix is agent-side, the classifier is only the messenger.
+
+# Citations
+
+* `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Models/VerdictPaths.cs` — vocabulary + `ClassifierRules`
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableStorageService.Sessions.cs` — `ComputePriorVerdict`, `ApplyVerdictPath`, re-registration preserve
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Helpers/VerdictPathDerivation.cs`
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/MaintenanceService.VerdictCalibration.cs` — sweep + `BuildVerdictCalibrationAggregates`
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Metrics/GetVerdictCalibrationFunction.cs`
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Helpers/VerdictCalibrationRadar.cs`, `Services/MaintenanceService.VerdictCalibrationRadar.cs`
+* `src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/tools/admin.ts` — `get_verdict_calibration`
+* `src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/verdict-calibration-shape.ts` — LLM-facing response shaping (`minSharePct` / `top`, explicit nulls)
+* `src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/admin/metrics/sections/SectionVerdictCalibration.tsx`
+* Tests: `VerdictPathTests`, `VerdictCalibrationTests`, `VerdictCalibrationRadarTests`
+* Related: [Silent-Session Classification](silent-session-classification.md), [Device Journeys](device-journeys.md), [Rule Regression Radar](rule-regression-radar.md)

docs/backend/vulnerability-correlation-sources.md

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+---
+type: Concept
+title: Vulnerability Correlation Sources (NVD, KEV, MSRC, EPSS)
+description: How the software inventory is turned into CVE findings - CPE mapping, the per-CPE NVD cache with its budget and TTLs, KEV/MSRC/EPSS enrichment, the throttle contract that keeps a refused NVD answer out of the cache, and the act/attend/track priority.
+resource: src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/Vulnerability/VulnerabilityCorrelationService.cs
+tags:
+  - backend
+  - vulnerability
+  - nvd
+  - epss
+  - kev
+  - msrc
+  - cache
+timestamp: 2026-08-29T18:00:00+02:00
+---
+
+# Vulnerability Correlation Sources
+
+The Software Inventory & Vulnerability Analyzer (tenant opt-in) ships the installed-software
+list with the session; the backend turns it into CVE findings entirely from cached public
+reference data. Four sources, all trustworthy primaries, no aggregators:
+
+| Source | What it contributes | Fetch shape | Cache |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| NVD 2.0 (NIST) | CVE records per product: CVSS v3.1 (v3.0 fallback) score, severity, **vector**, description, affected version ranges; CPE dictionary for auto-mapping | `cves/2.0?virtualMatchString={cpe}` per product, `cpes/2.0?keywordSearch=` for unmapped titles; optional API key (`AdminConfiguration.NvdApiKey`) | Azure Table `VulnerabilityCache`, one row per CPE (`cve_{cpe}` / `cache_result`), `CveDataJson` chunked; soft TTL 7 d (serve + background refresh), hard 14 d |
+| CISA KEV | "Exploited in the wild" flag, due date, required action, ransomware use | Whole catalog JSON | In-memory dictionary, 24 h, blob mirror `kev-catalog.json` |
+| MSRC | Microsoft-side confirmation: document id/title, release date, Microsoft severity / score / vector | CVRF v3.0 index of the last six Patch Tuesdays | In-memory index, blob mirror `msrc-index.json` |
+| FIRST EPSS | Probability (0..1) that the CVE is exploited within 30 days + percentile + scoring date | `api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=a,b,c` - 100 ids per request, unauthenticated | Stored **on the cached CVE** (no separate table): filled when a CPE row is (re)fetched, re-scored for every row by the nightly sync |
+
+Nothing about a tenant leaves the backend. The one outbound query that carries content is the
+EPSS lookup, and its payload is the list of public CVE ids held in the shared, tenant-agnostic
+CPE cache. Customer-facing wording: `autopilotmonitor-docs/trust/data-flows.md` and the
+terms page attribution block.
+
+# Schema
+
+## Cached CVE (`CachedCve`, serialised into `CveDataJson`)
+
+```
+CveId, CvssScore, CvssSeverity, CvssVector?, Description (<=500), PublishedDate,
+EpssScore?, EpssPercentile?, EpssDate?, AffectedVersions[] {Criteria, VersionStart/End Incl/Excl}
+```
+
+`JsonOptions` is `WhenWritingNull` + case-insensitive, so rows written before the vector / EPSS
+properties existed deserialise with those as `null`, and a row is never rewritten just to add
+nulls. `CveCacheBudget` bounds the row (24 months, or CVSS >= 7 within 60 months; max 100 CVEs
+per CPE, 50 ranges per CVE) - which is also why one CPE fill is exactly one EPSS request.
+
+`ProjectNvdResponse` is the single NVD -> `CachedCve` projection; the live fill and the nightly
+refresh both call it, so both write the same shape. `BuildCveCacheRow(cpe, cves, cachedAt)` is the
+single row builder; `cachedAt` is the **NVD** freshness stamp, an EPSS-only rewrite passes the
+existing value through so it does not look like a fresh NVD fetch to the 7-day TTL.
+
+## Per-finding output (report `findings[].vulnerabilities[]`)
+
+```
+cveId, cvssScore, cvssSeverity, cvssVector?, description, publishedDate, source ("NVD" | "NVD+MSRC"),
+isKev, kevDueDate, kevRequiredAction, knownRansomware,
+epssScore?, epssPercentile?, epssDate?,
+priority ("act" | "attend" | "track"),
+msrc* (when MSRC confirmed), versionMatchConfidence ("low" on wildcard CPE matches)
+```
+
+Finding level: `riskLevel` (unchanged CVSS+KEV bands), `priority` (highest band), `maxEpssScore?`.
+`scan_summary` additionally carries `act_cves` / `attend_cves`. `MergeReports` (Part 1 + Part 2)
+recomputes all of these. The `CveIndex` row (one per tenant/CVE/session) carries `EpssScore`
+(max over occurrences, absent when unscored) and `Priority` (highest), which the fleet summary
+(`TopCve.epssScore` / `priority`) reads.
+
+## Priority (`CvePriority.Compute`)
+
+* `act` - in CISA KEV.
+* `attend` - EPSS >= 0.1 **or** CVSS >= 9.0.
+* `track` - everything else.
+
+Three visible rules instead of a weighted composite: severity (`riskLevel`) keeps saying how bad,
+priority says how soon. A CVE without an EPSS score is "unknown likelihood" - it can still reach
+`attend` via CVSS, never via a defaulted 0. The thresholds are constants; changing them is a
+product decision, not a tuning knob.
+
+# Throttle contract (NVD)
+
+The typed `HttpClient` runs under the `ExternalDataApi` Polly policy: 429/5xx/timeouts are retried
+three times (1/2/4 s + jitter) with a circuit breaker. A 429 that reaches `NvdApiClient` therefore
+means NVD is refusing us for real. Two things then happen, and one deliberately does not:
+
+1. `NvdFetchResult<T>` reports `Succeeded = false`, `Throttled = true`. `Data` is an empty object
+   so enumerating callers keep working, but **nothing that persists may treat it as an answer**:
+   the CPE cache fill returns null and writes no row; the negative auto-resolve cache is not
+   touched; the admin auto-resolve reports `nvd_throttled`. Before this contract an empty response
+   was cached as "0 CVEs" for seven days - a product NVD happened to throttle disappeared from
+   every report for a week.
+2. A process-wide cooldown opens: `Retry-After` when present (delta or date, capped at 120 s),
+   otherwise 30 s. During the cooldown every NVD call fails fast with `Throttled` - no wait, no
+   retry chain. Worst case added latency per cooldown window is one Polly chain (~7.5 s), never
+   a per-item stall; the nightly refresh breaks out of its loop on the first throttled answer and
+   reports the remainder as `cveSkippedThrottled`.
+3. Not done on purpose: no in-process retry beyond Polly, no VulnCheck-style mirror, no separate
+   "throttled" cache state. Hard-expired cache rows keep serving while NVD is unavailable
+   (better than nothing, logged); a product with no row at all is reported without CVE data for
+   that run and gets a real attempt on the next correlation.
+
+# Nightly sync (`VulnerabilityDataSync`, 03:00 UTC) and the manual buttons
+
+1. KEV catalog refresh (blob mirror updated).
+2. MSRC index refresh (last six Patch Tuesdays).
+3. NVD refresh of cache rows older than 7 days (sequential, breaks on throttle).
+4. **EPSS re-score of every `cve_*` row** - all ids batched through FIRST, only rows whose score /
+   percentile / date changed are rewritten (with their original `CachedAt`). A missing id in the
+   response keeps yesterday's score: a failed batch never erases data.
+
+Steps 3 and 4 live in `VulnerabilityCacheRefreshService` (singleton, one in-flight slot per walk),
+which the timer and the Global-Admin buttons share, so a manual run writes exactly what the nightly
+run writes. Four endpoints, one per source, each with its own "Last … Sync" line on the admin page
+(`GET vulnerability/sync-status`):
+
+| Button | Endpoint | Shape | Timestamp |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| Sync KEV | `POST vulnerability/sync` | synchronous | `VulnerabilityDataLastSyncUtc` |
+| Sync MSRC | `POST vulnerability/sync-msrc` | synchronous | `MsrcLastSyncUtc` |
+| Refresh NVD Cache | `POST vulnerability/sync-nvd` | **202 + background** (minutes, NVD-rate-limited); 409 while running; the page polls `nvdRefreshRunning` / `nvdLastRun` every 10 s | `NvdCacheLastRefreshUtc` - stamped only for a walk that reached every stale row (no throttle cut-off) |
+| Sync EPSS | `POST vulnerability/sync-epss` | synchronous (seconds); 409 while running | `EpssLastSyncUtc` |
+
+The timer skips a walk whose slot a manual run currently holds (`cveSkippedBusy` in telemetry)
+rather than queueing a duplicate. `nvdLastRun` / `epssLastRun` are in-memory on the answering
+instance (null after a cold start); the persisted timestamps are the durable signal.
+
+Telemetry event `VulnerabilityDataSyncCompleted` carries `epssRows / epssCves / epssScored /
+epssRowsRewritten / epssError` next to the KEV / MSRC / CVE counters; the manual EPSS run emits
+`ManualEpssSyncCompleted`.
+
+# Examples
+
+* Chrome 126 finding: `CVE-2024-4947` CVSS 8.8 HIGH, `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R`, KEV yes -> `priority =
+  act`, riskLevel `critical` (KEV) - unchanged severity semantics, priority now explicit.
+* A 5.5 MEDIUM local-privilege CVE with EPSS 0.31 -> `attend`; the same CVE with EPSS 0.004 ->
+  `track`. Same severity band, different order of work.
+* Nightly sync while NVD throttles: `[VulnSync] NVD throttled - leaving 37 stale entries for the
+  next run`, then `[VulnSync] EPSS refresh: 1412/1450 CVEs scored across 212 rows, 180 rows
+  rewritten` - EPSS is independent of NVD's mood.
+
+# Not done (recorded)
+
+* **ExploitDB CSV** as a "public exploit exists" flag (static file, daily, same shape as the KEV
+  mirror) - useful, cheap, deliberately not added: four primary sources are enough for now and
+  each additional outbound dependency is a trust-page line. Revisit if customers ask "is there a
+  public exploit?".
+* GitHub / Nuclei PoC search, composite 0-100 risk scores, CWE -> ATT&CK mapping - noise for an
+  Intune admin, not adopted.
+
+# Citations
+
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/Vulnerability/NvdApiClient.cs` - `NvdFetchResult`, cooldown, `ComputeCooldown`
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/Vulnerability/EpssApiClient.cs` - batching, `ParseResponse`
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/Vulnerability/CvePriority.cs`
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/Vulnerability/VulnerabilityCorrelationService.cs` - `ProjectNvdResponse`, `ApplyEpssScores`, `BuildCveCacheRow`, `StampFindingPriority`, `FetchAndCacheCvesFromNvdAsync`
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Vulnerability/VulnerabilityDataSyncFunction.cs` - `RefreshStaleCveCacheAsync`, `RefreshEpssScoresAsync`
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableStorageService.AgentApi.cs` - `BuildCveIndexEntities`, `ScanCveIndexAsync`
+* `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/EpssAndNvdThrottleTests.cs`
+* FIRST EPSS API: https://api.first.org/epss/ - CISA KEV: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog

docs/index.md

@@ -19,35 +19,49 @@ https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com (separate repository).
 
 # Agent
 
-* [V2 Agent](agent/index.md) - How the on-device agent works: [runtime overview](agent/overview.md), [decision engine](agent/decision-engine.md) (reducer, signals, completion arms), [logs & persistence](agent/logs-and-persistence.md) (signal log, snapshot, crash recovery), [Hello wizard un-skip](agent/hello-wizard-unskip.md) (why a single "WHfB disabled" read never decides completion), [Autopilot ZTD diagnostics](agent/autopilot-ztd-diagnostics.md) (event IDs, diagnostic registry, endpoints, error-code map).
+* [V2 Agent](agent/index.md) - How the on-device agent works: [runtime overview](agent/overview.md), [decision engine](agent/decision-engine.md) (reducer, signals, completion arms), [logs & persistence](agent/logs-and-persistence.md) (signal log, snapshot, crash recovery), [diagnostics package](agent/diagnostics-package.md) (built-in section catalog shared with the portal, RealmJoin/Device Preparation collection gates, handle-validated reads against the junction race, caps, manifest), [Hello wizard un-skip](agent/hello-wizard-unskip.md) (why a single "WHfB disabled" read never decides completion), [Autopilot ZTD diagnostics](agent/autopilot-ztd-diagnostics.md) (event IDs, diagnostic registry, endpoints, error-code map).
 * [Build Counter Blob](agent/build-counter-blob.md) - How agent build numbers are minted: shared counter blob with ETag-CAS so local and CI builds never collide; CI additionally attests build provenance (Sigstore).
 * [Agent Endpoint Migration](agent/endpoint-migration.md) - How the backend re-homes agents to a new API base URL via the config channel (backend move or per-tenant region move): live-fetch-only, allowlist-validated on both sides, one hop, kill wins.
 * [Gather Rule Debug Log](agent/gather-rule-debug-log.md) - EnableGatherRuleDebugLog (ConfigVersion 36): the per-tenant local trace file that explains every gather-rule evaluation decision — scope skips, on_change suppression, empty collector results, logparser position/parse-mode outcomes — for rules that produce no timeline events.
 * [MDM Reboot Coalescing](agent/mdm-reboot-coalescing.md) - Attributing the mid-ESP coalesced reboot ("second sign-in") to the device-assigned policy URIs that forced it: aggregated DM-Enterprise 2800 observations (neutral, flush-time watermark) + the ANALYZE-ESP-005 advisory gated on an actually-observed reboot.
 * [ESP Completion Starvation — the sits-d Cloud-PC complex](agent/post-reboot-completion-recovery.md) - Why a SkipUser=true flow (no user ESP page → no Shell-Core 62407, no AccountSetup registry) left the completion gate satisfied but never evaluated — five Cloud PCs idled six hours at "waiting on: hello_resolution" — and the fix: the observed skip stands in for the final-exit evidence in the IME user-session completion attempt. Plus the two adjacent defects fixed alongside: the edge-only user-apps-settled synthesis (now level-triggered) and the never-wired Shell-Core restart replay (now Hello-wizard-only, with the reasoning why a replayed 62407 must never reach the reducer).
+* [Zero User-Targeted Apps — the starved user-phase completion gate](agent/zero-user-apps-completion-gate.md) - Why a device with no user-targeted Intune apps could never satisfy the IME user-session gate — IME skips its "Completed user session" line entirely in the zero-app branch — turning the 30-minute completion backstop into `esp_exit_without_completion_evidence` on a third of one tenant's enrollments, with the user at the desktop and RealmJoin still installing. The two fixes: read the line IME does write (IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS), and never fail a session while a completion gate with its own armed deadline is deliberately holding it.
 * [Secure Boot CA-2023 Detection](agent/secureboot-ca2023-detection.md) - Why ANALYZE-SEC-001 v3 reads the UEFI db/KEK variables directly instead of trusting the SecureBoot\Servicing registry, and how the one-sided uefiCa2023FirmwareConfirmed marker plus a not_exists precondition give absence-tolerant suppression across old and new agents.
 * [Continue-Anyway Observation Mode](agent/continue-anyway-observation.md) - EnableEspContinueAnywayObservation (ConfigVersion 37, operator-set): Device-phase ESP terminal failures on Continue-Anyway profiles get a bounded 60-min observation instead of an immediate hard fail; the DAD-validated real-user desktop + Hello gate detect the true end, the session completes Succeeded + EspSoftFailure (amber "with issues" badge), expiry un-defangs to the original esp_terminal_failure.
-* [CMTrace Time Resolution](agent/cmtrace-time-resolution.md) - Converting bias-less CMTrace local times to UTC without trusting any process's timezone belief: per-line self-anchoring on the 15-minute offset grid for provably fresh lines, uniform marked reader-zone fallback for backlog, and the provenance vocabulary (bias / line-anchored / reader-zone-fallback) that keeps every event re-derivable.
+* [CMTrace Time Resolution](agent/cmtrace-time-resolution.md) - Converting bias-less CMTrace local times to UTC without trusting any process's timezone belief: per-line self-anchoring on the 15-minute offset grid for provably fresh lines, uniform marked reader-zone fallback for backlog, and the provenance vocabulary (bias / line-anchored / reader-zone-fallback) that keeps every event re-derivable; plus the linear-cost CMTrace line parser (first open / last parseable trailer, timeout-backed) and the agent multiline caps.
 * [Registry App-State Second Pillar](agent/registry-app-state-pillar.md) - IME's authoritative per-app state read straight from the registry (Win32Apps EnforcementStateMessage, EspTrackingWin32Apps, StatusServiceReports) via a snapshot-and-diff watcher; registry/log reconciliation doubles as the built-in IME log-pattern drift alarm.
 * [WDP Scenario Gates & Completion Backstop](agent/wdp-scenario-gates.md) - How the agent gates Autopilot/ESP-only machinery off on Windows Device Preparation sessions (deterministic ExecutionContext marker, fail-toward-Classic), which noise it suppresses (ZTD probe, esp_config unknown, ModernDeployment 100/417/418/1005, starved sweep), and the WDP completion model: High-confidence seed, desktop-based arm D, and the 30-min device_prep_completion backstop.
+* [Local Admin Analyzer](agent/local-admin-analyzer.md) - What local_admin_analysis asserts at enrollment start/end: every local account inventoried, disabled ones included (a /active:no backdoor is dormant at both scans), Administrators membership read from the SAM by well-known SID (NetLocalGroupGetMembers, WMI-independent), unexpected admin members scored +40, built-ins matched by well-known RID (localized Guest/Administrator never flagged), shutdown-time dynamic allowance never covers a local SAM account (CWE-807), junctions and $GUID folders are not profiles, non-local members (Entra role SIDs) listed but never flagged, built-in Administrator enabled-state reported but not scored.
+* [Power-State Watcher](agent/power-state-watcher.md) - Live AC↔battery transitions and 50/30/15% downward battery-threshold crossings during enrollment via a WMI Win32_PowerManagementEvent push subscription (zero polling, never armed on battery-less devices): the power_state_change event (transition field, per-level lifetime latch, 5s debounce, emission cap) and the analyze rules ANALYZE-DEV-009 (battery <15%, high) / ANALYZE-DEV-010 (AC→battery, warning) with on_event interim triggers.
+* [System Timeline Watcher](agent/system-timeline-watcher.md) - Ground truth for two timeline blind spots from one System-channel EventLogWatcher with pre-agent backfill: system_clock_changed (Kernel-General 1 — oldTime/newTime/signed timeDeltaMs/reason/setting process; 2 s micro-slew floor, ≥5 min Warning+immediate) and system_sleep_episode (Power-Troubleshooter 1 sleep/hibernate + Kernel-Power 507 Modern Standby; authoritative enteredAt/exitedAt payload instants, 60 s Modern-Standby floor). Consumed by the TimeJumpBadge clock-set cause, the SessionInfoCard standby note, time-attribution SleepSpans (AttributionVersion 3) and ANALYZE-DEV-012.
+* [DO GroupId Auto-Set](agent/do-group-id-auto-set.md) - EnableDoGroupIdAutoSet (ConfigVersion 40): the agent seeds the Delivery Optimization DOGroupId policy with a deterministic network-fingerprint GUID (default gateway IPv4 + SendARP MAC, RealmJoin-compatible byte layout) so same-network devices form one DO peering group during ESP; ownership-tracked via the StartupEventGate fingerprint, foreign DOGroupId/DOGroupIdSource policies always win, no random-GUID fallback.
 * [ESP Policy-Provider Stall Detection](agent/esp-policy-provider-stall.md) - The EnrollmentStatusTracking CSP's no-timeout Setup/Apps wait is keyed to the Intune-registered "Sidecar" provider by NAME: co-management's "ConfigMgr" parks the user ESP at "Apps (Identifying)" for days even with TrackingPoliciesCreated=1 (issue #106); the always-on two-arm esp_policy_provider_stalled tripwire (provider_incomplete | sidecar_provider_missing) and the SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Autopilot gather-rule allowlist entry that surface it.
+* [WiFi SSID and the Windows 24H2 Location Gate](agent/wifi-ssid-location-gate.md) - Why wifi_signal_info vanished on Windows 11 24H2+: WlanQueryInterface(wlan_intf_opcode_current_connection) is gated behind precise-location consent, the prompt only fires in a user context outside System32, and SYSTEM in session 0 falls back to the device-level ConsentStore value - so netsh (same gate) could never cover for it. The tiered WifiInfoProvider (native, then ungated WinRT GetConnectedSsid, then netsh), SSID-only semantics on tier 2, and the Warning-level rc=5 diagnostic that names the gate.
 
 # Rules
 
 * [Gather Rule Phase Scoping, One-Shot Triggers & Emit-on-Change](rules/gather-rule-phase-scoping.md) - Restricting gather rules to enrollment phases (activePhases / activeFromPhase sticky latch), one-shot collection at a phase's start/end (phase_change / phase_exit), and emitMode "on_change" result-dedup.
 * [Gather Rule Guardrails](rules/gather-rule-guardrails.md) - Why the allowlists in rules/guardrails.json are enforced on the agent and nowhere else, which hard blocks survive unrestricted mode, and the rule that every collector must call a guard and emit security_warning on refusal.
 * [Rule Authoring Surface](rules/rule-authoring-surface.md) - How customer AIs author rules against the real contract: the baked MCP resources (guide/schemas/guardrails via combine.js), the MCP-local validate_rule pre-flight, and the side-effect-free POST rules/analyze/dryrun whose trace twin shares the production evaluators (parity + side-effect-freedom pinned by tests).
+* [Rule ID Namespace & Collision Guards](rules/rule-id-namespace.md) - Why rule identity is the human-readable ruleId (no GUIDs) with tenant isolation via Table Storage partitioning, the reserved built-in namespace (RuleIdPolicy), which collisions are possible (custom-vs-custom across tenants: allowed and harmless), and the guards keeping the global RuleStats aggregate catalog-only and the global partition inside the reserved namespace (combine.js, reseed, cross-tenant RuleState GC).
 * [Analyze Rule Evaluation Triggers](rules/analyze-rule-triggers.md) - Opt-in `evaluateOn` interim triggers (`whiteglove_sealed`, `on_event:<type>`) so rules can fire before a session is terminal, with RuleResults update-semantics (interim → finalize/resolve, NotifiedAt notification dedupe) replacing the permanent dedupe freeze, KO/stat suppression on interim runs, the ingest-side cached trigger registry, and the authoring lints that keep interim rules monotonic.
 
 # Backend
 
+* [Telemetry Ingest Shaping](backend/telemetry-ingest-shaping.md) - One canonical App Insights request record (worker copy with tenant context, per-item sampling bypass; host HTTP duplicate dropped by a workspace transformation DCR), expected storage outcomes 404/412/409 and successful SignalR REST calls filtered in the worker, and the count()/sum(itemCount) query rules that follow.
+* [Table Schema Sentinel](backend/table-schema-sentinel.md) - Startup no longer issues one CreateTableIfNotExists per table: a SHA-256 over TableNames.All in AdminConfiguration gates the full pass (derived, never hand-maintained), the SessionsIndex backfill runs only after a full pass behind a conditional-insert claim, and daily maintenance repairs out-of-band deletions.
 * [Business Timestamps](backend/business-timestamps.md) - Why the Azure Tables system Timestamp is never authoritative (migrations reset it), and the OccurredUtc + RowKey-decode compensation for AuditLogs/OpsEvents/Events after the 2026-07-18 migration.
 * [Send-Time Frame Separation](backend/send-time-frame-separation.md) - One device-clock send timestamp per upload batch (X-Send-Time-Utc → SentAt on Events) splits ReceivedAt − OccurredUtc into pure spool delay and pure device-vs-server clock offset; the clock_skew condition measures SentAt batches directly (spool-immune), the CMTrace tripwire deliberately stays on its differential math.
 * [OOBE Bootstrap go-Code Flow](backend/oobe-bootstrap-go-flow.md) - The bootstrap short-code lifecycle (portal-created session → `irm go.autopilotmonitor.com/CODE | iex` at Shift+F10 → GetBootstrapScriptFunction), the always-HTTP-200 text/plain contract, the two-line injection defense (GUID/URL/expiry validator + single-quoted PS literals, golden-pinned against the legacy TS template), and the per-IP rate-limit story behind Front Door.
+* [Silent-Session Classification](backend/silent-session-classification.md) - How a session whose agent went silent gets its honest status: the two-stage maintenance sweep (2h Stalled marker with the WhiteGlove Part-2 AwaitingUser gate and the self-deploying Succeeded gate, 5h timeout classification), the EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier rule order (explicit failure → WG Part 2 → self-deploying → completion evidence → emergency break → desktop+Hello → Device Setup/grace), the ingest paths sharing it (max-lifetime, late-telemetry heal, stall probe) and the admin retro-reconcile modes incl. self_deploying_silent.
 * [Device Journeys & First-Time-Right](backend/device-journeys.md) - How a device's terminal enrollment attempts are grouped into journeys (trim+casefold device key with junk-serial exclusion, first-success end, 30-day gap, WhiteGlove = one attempt), the DeviceHistories chain with its tombstone-driven deleted-session pruning, the additive daily FTR aggregates, and the banner/fleet/MCP surfaces.
 * [Enrollment Time Attribution](backend/time-attribution.md) - How a terminal session's authoritative wall clock (DurationSeconds, WhiteGlove pause excluded) is partitioned into named segments with an explicit unattributed remainder, ESP-blocking apps as positive evidence with "up to" what-if bounds, reboot spans from event gaps, and the breakdown/aggregate tables the sweep maintains.
+* [Attempt-Scoped App Install Durations](backend/app-install-duration-attempt.md) - AppInstallSummary.DurationSeconds = status-defining (last) install attempt via the LastAttemptStartedAt max-fold anchor instead of the first-observation→last-terminal span that billed multi-pass IME gaps to trivial apps; InstallPassCount, the weaker-terminal guard, the radar's cutover gate, and time attribution's union-of-attempt-segments occupancy.
 * [Rule Regression Radar](backend/rule-regression-radar.md) - How analyze-rule hit-rate regressions are detected (7-day window ≥2× the 28-day baseline with disjoint Wilson intervals), which suppressions keep the radar quiet (grace period, edit-in-window, kill switch), how alert episodes live in the ruleregression tracker keyspace with re-arm semantics, and the on-fire dimension correlation with its "correlated, not necessarily causal" wording contract.
+* [Verdict Calibration](backend/verdict-calibration.md) - How every session status write declares its VerdictPath (origin:detail vocabulary incl. classifier rule ids), how overriding a verdict preserves PriorStatus/PriorVerdictPath as the correction stream, the daily per-path calibration aggregate with the 7-day re-enrollment proxy and read-side legacy derivation, the GA endpoint / MCP tool / admin matrix, and the drift radar (share, silence-share, r6 evidence gap) with its operator-only ops events.
 * [App Version Duration Regression Radar](backend/app-version-regression-radar.md) - How app versions whose median install duration regressed vs. the previous version are detected (first-seen-ordered versions, median lift ≥2× plus a 5-minute absolute floor over measured installs only), how alert episodes live in the appversionregression tracker keyspace with drain/median re-arm semantics, and the bell/ops-event/analytics surfaces.
+* [Session Owner Binding](backend/session-owner-binding.md) - Agent endpoints authenticate per tenant but write per caller-supplied session id; each Sessions row is now bound to the device identity that created it (cert thumbprint + Intune device id from the CN, or bootstrap code + serial), the rule matrix that keeps restart / WhiteGlove Part 2 / bootstrap→cert handoff / cert re-issue working, the shadow telemetry (`SessionOwnerBinding` request dimension, `AgentSessionOwnerBinding` warning, `SessionOwnerMismatch` ops event), and the enforcement contract where a 403 `session_owner_mismatch` makes the agent rotate its session id instead of counting an auth failure.
+* [Plan Downgrade Policy & the Retention Grace Period](backend/plan-downgrade-retention-grace.md) - What happens when a tenant loses Pro: every entitlement gates read-time and reversibly ("gate, don't destroy"), except retention — a 30-day grace keeps the Pro cap before the Community cap starts hard-deleting; the ProDowngradedUtc/trial-expiry anchor model, the TenantPlanDowngraded/RetentionGrace* ops events, and the deliberate non-grace of everything else.
 * [Tenant Activation & the Once-Only Welcome Mail](backend/tenant-activation-welcome-mail.md) - How a signup becomes an activated tenant (manual approve or the auto-approve queue), and the write-then-read + conditional-marker arbitration that sends the welcome mail exactly once even though activation and the user-typed notification address race each other.
 * [W365 Cloud PC Device Validation](backend/cloudpc-device-validation.md) - Why Cloud PCs can never pass the Autopilot serial lookup, and the cert-CN-bound CloudPc fallback validator: Subject CN (= Intune device id) matched against the tenant's Graph virtualEndpoint/cloudPCs inventory — admits exactly the service-provisioned Cloud PCs, nothing else.
 * [ServerActions & On-Demand Diagnostics](backend/server-actions-on-demand-diagnostics.md) - The queue-on-session, deliver-on-ingest action channel, the TenantAdminOrOperator tier with in-function per-type re-gating, the portal's Collect Logs flow (quick-config orders rotate_config before request_diagnostics), and the hosted-prefix sweep in the offboarding cascade.
@@ -56,6 +70,7 @@ https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com (separate repository).
 
 # MCP Server
 
+* [MCP Protocol Eras & Client ID Metadata Documents](mcp/protocol-eras-and-cimd.md) - One per-request factory serving the 2026-07-28 stateless revision (server/discover, ttlMs/cacheScope, Mcp-Method routing) and 2025-era initialize clients side by side, why the legacy leg stays a hand-wired JSON+gzip transport, the never-public cache-hint contract, and the CIMD client-registration path (SSRF-gated document fetch, same redirect allowlist) next to the deprecated dynamic registration.
 * [MCP Docs Corpus](mcp/docs-corpus.md) - How the published customer documentation becomes the `search_docs` corpus: CRLF-safe heading chunking, build-time embedding as a third precomputed section, and why a docs edit needs an MCP redeploy.
 * [MCP Tool Telemetry](mcp/tool-telemetry.md) - The three telemetry layers for judging tool quality: backend App Insights via X-MCP-Tool-Name, the per-user usage table, and the MCP_TOOL_LOGGING stderr lines (soft errors, result size vs. cap, zero-hit searches, Zod rejections).
 
@@ -66,6 +81,10 @@ https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com (separate repository).
 # Security & Identity
 
 * [MCP OAuth Flow](mcp-oauth-flow.md) - Who authenticates where when connecting an AI client to the MCP server; two identities, three parties plus Entra ID.
+* [Vulnerability Correlation Sources](backend/vulnerability-correlation-sources.md) - How the software inventory becomes CVE findings from four cached primaries (NVD per-CPE cache with budget and TTLs, CISA KEV, MSRC, FIRST EPSS stored on the cached CVE and re-scored nightly), the NVD throttle contract (a refused answer is never cached as "0 CVEs"; bounded process-wide cooldown honouring Retry-After), the persisted CVSS vector, and the act/attend/track priority that keeps severity and likelihood as two visible signals instead of one composite score.
+* [Client-Certificate Tenant Binding](backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md) - Why a chain-valid Intune MDM certificate only proves "issued to some tenant", which extension actually carries the Entra tenant id (`…5.14`) versus the two that look like it (`…5.6` Intune Account id, `…5.4` device id, different encodings), why the Entra join certificate is not part of the auth path, the shadow-then-enforce rollout with its volume-controlled telemetry, and why `X-ARR-ClientCert` is the only certificate transport (TLS handshake = proof of possession; bootstrap routes token-only, fail-closed).
+* [Admin Identity Binding](backend/admin-identity-binding.md) - Why a GlobalAdmins / DelegatedAdmins row keyed on a UPN string must never confer access by itself in an API that accepts tokens from every Entra tenant (domain re-registration, UPN recycling), the AdminIdentityBindings table pinning each cross-tenant-role UPN to its immutable home tid + oid, the fail-closed resolution order in both role services (row → binding → entitlement), the first-sign-in object-id pin with its race semantics, the 409 on grant-time conflicts, and the explicit GET/PUT/DELETE rebind surface.
+* [IME Installer Archive](backend/ime-msi-archive.md) - How every fleet-observed IME build is archived as its MSI: the ime_agent_version sighting that queues the job (first sighting, or a later sighting with a version-authoritative CSP URL after a 24 h backoff), the primary/secondary/hotfix candidate walk, the managed MSI ProductVersion check that keeps another ring's build out of the version folder (Failed:VersionMismatch), provenance with the full candidate walk, the skill-side overwrite path for corrections, and the trust boundary of a device-reported version (plausibility guard, one sighting per session, second-tenant corroboration, fleet-confirmed tenant view).
 
 # Conventions for this bundle
 

docs/log.md

@@ -1,7 +1,162 @@
 # Log
 
+## 2026-08-30 (6)
+
+* **Update**: `rules/rule-id-namespace.md` — guard 1 rewritten: gather RuleStats (tenant + `global_*` rows) are now resolved against the tenant's active gather catalog (`EventIngestProcessor.ResolveFiredGatherRules`), metadata catalog-sourced, unknown IDs dropped — same design as the analyze path; the `IsReservedBuiltInId` pattern gate on device-supplied IDs is gone.
+
+## 2026-08-30 (5)
+
+* **Update**: `backend/admin-identity-binding.md` — new "The MCP whitelist is a third UPN-keyed grant" section: `McpUsers` rows (grant, `UsagePlan` override and Disabled kill-switch) are honoured only for the identity the UPN is bound to (`McpUserService` row → `IsBoundAsync`, `GetBoundMcpUserAsync` for the quota plan); `POST global/mcp-users` binds first with the shared resolver / 422 / 409 contract; unbound legacy rows are inert.
+
+## 2026-08-30 (4)
+
+* **Update**: `backend/ime-msi-archive.md` — new "Trust boundary of a sighting" section: the device-supplied `ime_agent_version` string is gated by `ImeMsiArchiver.IsPlausibleVersion` (dotted digits within MSI ProductVersion bounds) before it can become a GLOBAL `ImeVersionHistory` RowKey (`ImeVersionSighting.Rejected` → no row/ops event/archive job); a session counts once (`UpdateSessionImeAgentVersionAsync` returns whether the version changed); a second tenant's sighting stamps `CorroboratedAt`; the MemberRead projection lists only fleet-confirmed versions (Archived, corroborated, or first seen before 2026-08-31), Global scope sees every row.
+
+## 2026-08-30 (3)
+
+* **Update**: `agent/local-admin-analyzer.md` — built-ins matched by well-known RID (500/501/503/504) so localized Guest/Administrator are not flagged now that disabled accounts are inventoried; `kioskUser0` built-in; shutdown-time dynamic allowance restricted to non-SAM identities (a logged-in local account is never exempted — CWE-807) with new `logged_in_local_accounts` field; junctions and `$<32 hex>` folders skipped by the profile check.
+
+* **New**: `agent/local-admin-analyzer.md` — `LocalAdminAnalyzer` no longer skips disabled accounts (a `/active:no` backdoor re-enabled after enrollment was invisible at both scans) and reads Administrators-group membership from the SAM via `NetLocalGroupGetMembers` on `S-1-5-32-544` (`LocalGroupNativeMethods`, WMI-independent). New event fields `unexpected_admin_members` (+40), `account_details`, `administrators_group.{enumerated,error_code,members}`, `builtin_administrator_enabled` (reported, not scored). Non-local members (Entra role SIDs, domain groups) are listed, never flagged. `ANALYZE-ID-002` 1.2.0 explanation names the new fields. Registered in `index.md`.
+
+## 2026-08-30 (2)
+
+* **Update**: `agent/cmtrace-time-resolution.md` — new "Line parsing (bounded cost)" section: `CmTraceLogParser.TryParseLine` is no longer one greedy-`.*` regex (quadratic on hostile lines, no timeout) but a linear first-open / last-parseable-trailer search with a `\G`-anchored, timeout-backed trailer regex that returns exactly what the old regex did; the agent's multiline buffer gains a 1 MB char cap next to the 100-line cap, both logged at Warning, and the tail of a dropped entry is skipped instead of raw-matched.
+
+## 2026-08-30 (1)
+
+* **Update**: `agent/diagnostics-package.md` — reads are validated on the handle, not the path: `PinnedSourceFolder` pins each section folder (its final path must equal the validated path; held open so the chain cannot be renamed) and opens every file with `FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT`, requiring the handle's final path to be `<canonical folder>\<relative path>`. A subdirectory swapped for a junction between enumeration and open is skipped (`SKIPPED (resolved outside validated folder)`) instead of copied into the package.
+
+## 2026-08-29 (12)
+
+* **Update**: `backend/tenant-activation-welcome-mail.md` — `PUT preview/notification-email` moved to `AuthenticatedUserWithRole`; roleless callers may write the address only while the tenant has no enabled member (signup window), afterwards a member role is required.
+
+## 2026-08-29 (11)
+
+* **Update**: `rules/gather-rule-phase-scoping.md` — `on_event` feedback-loop guard: `TimelineEventStream` publishes the event source and `GatherRuleExecutorHost` never dispatches `on_event` for gather-emitted events (a rule triggering on its own output type looped for the whole session); per-rule on_event execution cap (100/session); backend rejects `on_event` rules whose trigger equals their output type or `gather_result`.
+
+## 2026-08-29 (10)
+
+* **Update**: `backend/tenant-activation-welcome-mail.md` — welcome/farewell mails HTML-encode the domain at substitution; `DomainName` is frozen on the full-model config PUT (was persisted verbatim) and the first-login seed only accepts a strict DNS host name.
+
+## 2026-08-29 (9)
+
+* **Update**: `agent/decision-engine.md`, `agent/overview.md` — `SignalIngress.Post` is worker-thread re-entrancy-safe: signals the worker posts to itself from inside `ApplyStep` (EffectRunner `ClassifierVerdictIssued`) go to a worker-local follow-up queue drained ahead of the bounded channel instead of blocking on it, so a full channel can no longer deadlock the single consumer.
+
+## 2026-08-29 (8)
+
+* **Creation**: Added `backend/session-owner-binding.md` — SESSION-OWNER-BINDING stage 1 (shadow): Sessions rows carry the creating device identity (`OwnerKind/OwnerThumbprint/OwnerDeviceId/OwnerBootstrapCode/OwnerSerial/OwnerBoundAt`, primary-only), `SessionOwnershipPolicy` evaluates every register / telemetry / error-report request against it, outcomes ride on the request row (`SessionOwnerBinding`), warnings and a throttled `SessionOwnerMismatch` ops event; nothing is refused yet. Agent ships the dormant counterpart: `errorCode` parsing on 401/403, one-shot session rotation on `session_owner_mismatch` without feeding the auth-failure tracker, spool drop, `agent_started.sessionRotated`.
+
+## 2026-08-29 (7)
+
+* **Update**: `backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md` — new "Certificate transport and proof of possession" section: `X-ARR-ClientCert` (platform-set after the mTLS handshake, inbound copies stripped even on excluded paths) is the only certificate source; the client-writable `X-Client-Certificate` fallback is gone; `/api/bootstrap/*` routes are token-only and fail closed on a missing/empty token or unwired token service instead of falling through to the certificate stage.
+
+## 2026-08-29 (6)
+
+* **Update**: `backend/admin-identity-binding.md` — grants are self-maintaining: `AdminIdentityResolver` derives the home tenant + object id from sign-in history (`UserActivity`), falls back to the UPN domain of an onboarded tenant, refuses to guess when a UPN was seen under two tenants; 422 `HomeTenantUnresolved` + portal tenant picker only for a never-seen domain. Identity fields and pills removed from the delegated / tenant-group forms; inspect/correct lives in Tenant Management → Edit Tenant Configuration → Identity bindings (collapsed).
+
+## 2026-08-29 (5)
+
+* **Creation**: Added `backend/admin-identity-binding.md` — cross-tenant roles (GlobalAdmin / GlobalReader, delegated MSP) were resolved from the UPN string alone while the API accepts tokens from every Entra tenant. New `AdminIdentityBindings` table (RK = UPN → home `TenantId` + `ObjectId`), `AdminIdentity` (upn + tid + oid) as the key both role services resolve on, binding checked after the row and before the Pro gate, object id pinned on the first sign-in from the bound tenant (ETag-guarded), grants require `homeTenantId` and refuse to re-home (409), `global/identity-bindings` GET/PUT/DELETE as the audited rebind path, `RequestContext.ObjectId`, throttle bucket keyed on oid. Legacy rows are inert until bound — seed bindings before the backend deploy.
+
+## 2026-08-29 (4)
+
+* **Creation**: Added `backend/ime-msi-archive.md` — the version-verified, multi-host IME installer archive: MsiProductVersionReader (managed CFB/MSI Property reader), candidate host walk, Failed:VersionMismatch, sighting re-queue with 24 h backoff, and the 2026-08-29 1.105.103.0 poisoning that motivated it.
+
+## 2026-08-29 (3)
+
+* **Update**: `backend/vulnerability-correlation-sources.md` - the admin page's Data Sync Status is complete: next to Sync KEV / Sync MSRC there are now Refresh NVD Cache and Sync EPSS, each with its own last-sync line (`NvdCacheLastRefreshUtc`, `EpssLastSyncUtc` on AdminConfiguration; shared manifest regenerated). The NVD and EPSS walks moved out of the timer into `VulnerabilityCacheRefreshService` (singleton, one in-flight slot per walk) so the button and the nightly run are literally the same code; the NVD walk is minutes long and rate-limited, so `POST vulnerability/sync-nvd` answers 202 and the page polls `sync-status` (`nvdRefreshRunning`, `nvdLastRun`) while it runs, `sync-epss` runs synchronously. 409 while a walk is in flight; the timer skips a slot a manual run holds. Operator-only surface - no customer docs.
+
+## 2026-08-29 (2)
+
+* **New**: `backend/vulnerability-correlation-sources.md` - FIRST EPSS joins NVD / CISA KEV / MSRC as the fourth vulnerability source: the probability + percentile + date live on the cached CVE (one batch of <= 100 ids per CPE fill, every `cve_*` row re-scored by the nightly sync, only changed rows rewritten and with their original `CachedAt`), the CVSS vector is persisted instead of dropped, and each CVE carries an act / attend / track priority (KEV; EPSS >= 0.1 or CVSS >= 9.0; rest) next to the unchanged severity bands - two visible signals, no composite score. The comparison with an open-source CVE MCP server surfaced the real 429 defect: Polly already retried, but a refused NVD answer came back as an empty response and was cached as "0 CVEs" for seven days. `NvdFetchResult` now separates "answered" from "refused" (nothing persists a refusal - CPE cache, negative auto-resolve cache, admin auto-resolve), and a 429 opens a process-wide cooldown (`Retry-After` capped at 120 s, else 30 s) so the run fails fast instead of paying a retry chain per software item; hard-expired rows keep serving meanwhile. NVD -> cache projection and the row builder are now single functions shared by the live fill and the sync. CveIndex / fleet summary carry `epssScore` + `priority`; portal shows EPSS pill, priority pill, vector; MCP tool descriptions and the CVE-audit prompt name the fields. ExploitDB recorded as a deliberate not-now. Backend before web; trust pages (terms attribution, privacy, data-flows), settings and portal-guide docs updated in the same change.
+
+## 2026-08-29
+
+* **New**: `mcp/protocol-eras-and-cimd.md` - the MCP server moved to the 2026-07-28 protocol revision (TypeScript SDK v2: `@modelcontextprotocol/server` + `/node`, zod 4; the monolithic `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` is gone). One per-request factory (`mcp-server-factory.ts`) feeds both eras through `mcp-http.ts`: 2026 clients are served by the SDK entry (`createMcpHandler`, `legacy: 'reject'`, JSON response mode), 2025 clients keep the existing stateless transport with `enableJsonResponse` - routed on the SDK's own `isLegacyRequest` predicate, because the built-in stateless fallback would answer today's Claude/VS Code clients with SSE and lose the gzip win. Capabilities now declare `listChanged: false` (the SDK default advertised a notification a per-request server cannot send); `cacheHints` stamp `ttlMs`/`cacheScope: 'private'` on discover/list results (5 min) and resource reads (60 min) - never public, the catalog is role-dependent. Client registration: `client_id_metadata_document_supported: true`; an https `client_id` is a Client ID Metadata Document resolved by `cimd.ts` (SSRF gate on the resolved addresses before any request, no redirects, 5 s / 16 KB, exact `client_id` match, bounded `redirect_uris`, 10-60 min cache), the requested redirect_uri still has to pass the dynamic-registration allowlist; HMAC-signed DCR client_ids stay as the fallback. `mcp-oauth-flow.md` updated. Package version 1.5 -> 1.6. Pinned by `mcp-http.test.ts` (real v2 client over loopback HTTP, both eras, role parity), `cimd.test.ts`, `oauth-cimd.test.ts`.
+
+## 2026-08-28
+
+* **Update**: `CmTraceSkewTripwire` - the backend regression tripwire additionally requires >= 80 % of the individual IME deltas (relative to the other side's median) to sit within 2 min of some 15-minute grid multiple before `CmTraceTimeSkewRegression` fires; the ops event and its details now carry that fraction. Motivation: the first soak week produced 7 fires, all backlog replays - a relaunched agent re-tailing the IME log uploads one burst holding most of the session's IME samples with a continuum of ages whose median hit the grid by chance (session d832560a: 508 of 627 samples, 46...733 min, median 91). Era-mixing regressions (every line on the grid) still fire. Doc: `docs/agent/cmtrace-time-resolution.md`.
+
+## 2026-08-27 (2)
+
+* **Update**: `SecurityValidator` / `DeviceAssociationValidator` - Microsoft released Windows Autopilot device association on 2026-08-25 (learn.microsoft.com/autopilot/device-preparation/device-association/overview: TPM-backed UEFI marker, device-targeted device preparation policies, associated devices are marked corporate-owned by Intune with no corporate identifier upload). The DevPrep association lookup therefore leaves shadow mode and becomes the third accepting method of the device-validation gate, evaluated inline after the Autopilot and Corporate Identifier lookups and before the Cloud PC fallback; a match sets `ValidatedBy = DeviceAssociation`, a miss joins the combined 403 detail, a transient failure the 503 Retry-After - the same contract as its siblings, so enabling it can only widen acceptance, never reject a device the other methods would have taken. `ValidateDeviceAssociation` counts toward "at least one validation enabled" and is no longer GA-only anywhere (`UpdateTenantConfigurationFunction` revert, `TenantConfigPatchService.GaOnlyFields`, the Global-Admin gate on the settings toggle); the toggle sits under Device Preparation next to Corporate Identifier and follows the shared consent rule (first serial-based validation carries the consent, any further one is a plain persisted toggle). Known gap carried over from the shadow phase: the `/beta/deviceManagement/tenantAssociatedDevices` endpoint is still undocumented in Graph reference and every production lookup so far answered `matched=False` for Autopilot v1 devices, i.e. the positive match path is unproven in the field - first associated enrollment must be checked for `ValidatedBy = DeviceAssociation` on the session row. Landing hero carries a release pill linking to the customer docs; dashboard tip added. Backend before web; customer docs updated in `autopilotmonitor-docs`.
+
+## 2026-08-27
+
+* **Update**: `backend/silent-session-classification.md`, `backend/verdict-calibration.md` - the first real calibration read tuned what it measures. Rule 5 grew a past-grace fork 5a: Device Setup done + real-user desktop + zero `app_install_failed` reconciles to Succeeded "completed (assumed)" (`r5_assumed`) - r5-Incomplete devices re-enrolled at 2.6 %, the succeeded background, and the sampled desktop half had clean app records; no desktop or any failed app stays Incomplete. The max-lifetime watchdog (either event shape) now skips the AwaitingUser grace entirely - all five observed maxlife parks expired unhealed, and late telemetry heals a terminal verdict anyway - while WhiteGlove rule 1b keeps its park (its one episode healed). The drift radar got floors (≥ 10 window hits; per-path share regression needs ≥ 5 baseline hits, so new/renamed vocabulary cannot "regress") and legacy continuity: rule-shaped `legacy:*` paths count into the silence and classifier-verdict group sums on both sides of the 2026-08-23 cutover, which dissolves the lift-124 silence artifact and lets sub-floor episodes clear themselves. Backend only; the new path shows up in the matrix on its own.
+
+* **Update**: `backend/tenant-activation-welcome-mail.md` - the reverse lookup. A delivery log names only the recipient, so an address had to lead back to its tenant: the tenant console's search now matches the notification and contact address as well as domain and tenant id, with the quoted exact mode unchanged. The addresses sit in `PreviewWhitelist`, not on the tenant config, so a new GA/Reader-only `GET /api/preview/notification-emails` returns them as one map (single cross-partition scan of `RowKey eq 'notification-email'`) instead of a point read per tenant; both sides join on the lowercased tenant id because the address rows carry the JWT `tid` while a config PartitionKey's casing is not guaranteed, and matching is case-insensitive because stored addresses keep the casing the user typed. The map is best-effort in the portal - a failed read costs only the search-by-address, never the tenant list - and the addresses stay out of the list rows (search key, not a column). Match rules moved into `tenantSearch.ts` with unit pins. Backend before web.
+
+
+## 2026-08-26
+
+* **Update**: `agent/wifi-ssid-location-gate.md` - the network timeline now explains its blank signal too, with no agent change: `buildSegments` already merges `wifi_signal_info` into the covering WiFi segment, so `wifiDataLimitedReason` rides in with the sample. Segments that never got a sample (a mid-session reconnect emits none) inherit it - the gate is a device-level setting and cannot flip mid-enrollment - while a segment with a real reading is never overwritten. Tooltip shows `Signal: unavailable - Location services off on this device`; the "Avg WiFi signal" stat reads `n/a (Location services off)` instead of vanishing. `network_state_change` is deliberately left alone: it has never carried `signalPercent` or `radioType` (only `before_/after_wifiSsid` reaches its payload), so there is no absent field there for a reason to explain, and the SSID it does carry is unaffected by the gate. Web-only change.
+
+
+## 2026-08-26
+
+* **Update**: `agent/wifi-ssid-location-gate.md` - the gate is now surfaced instead of only logged. When the WinRT tier wins and the native tier reported `rc=5`, `wifi_signal_info` carries `wifiDataLimitedReason = "location_services_off"` and the message gains `- signal unavailable, Location services off`, so the reason is readable straight from the timeline; the portal WiFi card (`DeviceDetailsCard`) matches that literal and names the Intune setting that restores the full payload. The claim is evidence-only - any other native failure leaves the field null rather than blaming a privacy setting, with `IsLocationGateDenied` pinned at its boundaries. New `wifi_signal_info` group in the MCP `DEVICE_PROPERTIES_CATALOG` so a fleet can be sized via `search_sessions` before any policy changes. Agent release + web deploy + MCP redeploy; backend untouched (the payload is opaque DataJson).
+
+
+## 2026-08-26
+
+* **New**: `agent/wifi-ssid-location-gate.md` - `wifi_signal_info` was missing on most Windows 11 24H2+ WiFi enrollments (build 22631 3/3, 26100 37/178, 26200 43/95 over n=276 sessions from 08-01). Not a parser or language problem: every event that exists carries a full SSID, so the failure is binary at the reader. Cause is the 24H2 location gate on `WlanQueryInterface` with `wlan_intf_opcode_current_connection` - the only opcode the agent uses - which returns `ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED`; the consent prompt only fires for a process in the user context outside `System32`, so the agent (SYSTEM, session 0, pre-privacy-page) is denied silently, and it resolves consent from the HKLM ConsentStore because the `S-1-5-18` hive has none - while the interactive user on the same box reads the SSID fine via the per-user NonPackaged value. `netsh wlan` hangs off the same gate, so the 2026-07 netsh fallback (and its multi-language labels) never covered the case it was built for; more labels cannot fix it. New `WinRtWifiSsidReader` uses the documented replacement `WlanConnectionProfileDetails.GetConnectedSsid` (ungated, SSID only), bound via the CLR WinRT projection with no winmd/NuGet like `OobeStateReader`; new `WifiInfoProvider` owns the tier order (native, WinRT, netsh) that both collectors had duplicated. The step diagnostics added in 2026-07 were logged at `Debug` while the default level is `Info`, so they never reached a field log - the all-tiers-failed case is now a Warning that decodes `rc=5` into the location-gate explanation. Agent-only change; needs an agent release.
+
+
+## 2026-08-25
+
+* **Update**: `backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md` — stage 2 enforced: `Mismatch` now returns 403 via `LogRequestRejection(stage=certtenant)`. Switched on against 35,684 requests / 32 tenants at 100 % `Match`, with the Warning channel verified to be carrying other traffic so the zero was not an artefact. The rule is one function (`CertTenantBinding.Rejects`) and only `Mismatch` blocks; `ExtensionMissing` / `Unparseable` / `RequestTenantNotAGuid` are tolerated on purpose (the first is the candidate for later tightening and has a test pinning the tolerance). Evaluation fails open on its own exception, and the 403 body does not echo the certificate's tenant. Device binding (stage 3) stays shadow + Global-Admin-only and is unaffected.
+
+## 2026-08-25
+
+* **New**: `agent/zero-user-apps-completion-gate.md` — a Classic enrollment whose user has zero targeted Intune Win32 apps could not produce the evidence any user-phase completion path required: IME's zero-app branch (`ApplicationPoller`, verified against decompiled 1.104.102.0 and three older builds) `continue`s before its `Completed user session` statement, so `ImeUserSessionCompletedUtc` stayed null, all four arms of `ShouldTransitionToAwaitingHello` were dead, and the 30-min `advisory_completion` backstop resolved the session as `esp_exit_without_completion_evidence` — with a DAD-validated desktop, Hello provisioned and RealmJoin still installing. One tenant: 10 of 30 enrollments in a week, all false positives. Two fixes. (1) New pattern `IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS` reads the line IME *does* write and routes it through the same `OnUserSessionCompleted` callback, guarded to the AccountSetup phase and replayed if the observation predates the phase marker; `AreUserEspAppsSettled` now accepts an empty app list only with that explicit observation. (2) `HandleAdvisoryCompletionDeadlineFired` re-arms instead of failing while the RealmJoin gate is closed and its own deadline is still armed — session 75d6ae8e installed 25 RealmJoin packages inside the window, the last 2 min before the failure. `ime_user_session_completed` gains an `evidence` field (`zero_user_apps_enumerated` / `user_session_completed`); no new event type. The pattern reaches existing agents via the config API (an unknown action is a Debug line), the behaviour needs an agent release.
+
+## 2026-08-24
+
+* **Change**: `DeviceAssociationValidator` / `SecurityValidator` — the DevPrep association shadow now logs one line per real Graph lookup instead of one per request (`DeviceAssociationResult.ServedFromCache`, `AsCacheHit()` copies rather than marking the shared cached instance), the same gate the cert-device-binding shadow uses. Measured: one enrollment produced 263 identical lines off a handful of calls. Status of that preview, for the record: the `/beta/deviceManagement/tenantAssociatedDevices` endpoint answers (6 calls, all HTTP 200, `transient=False`), but every result so far is `matched=False` from a single Autopilot **v1** device — which is the correct answer for a device that was never part of a Device Preparation policy. The matching itself is therefore still unproven, and the endpoint remains undocumented in both v1.0 and beta Graph reference, so it is not a basis for enforcement.
+
+* **Update**: `backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md` — stage 3 verified live (`ea6a375`, gktatooine): 136 requests, all `Match`, device object ~72 s older than the session start, so no enrollment race in that run. Measured Graph cost: **1 call for 136 requests** (30 min positive cache), versus 25 for the per-request Autopilot validator — the positive TTL needs no change. The shadow log is now gated on `ServedFromCache` (one line per real lookup instead of per request); never-cached outcomes still log every time.
+
+* **Update**: `backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md` — stage 3, the cert-to-device binding: new `IntuneDeviceBindingValidator` resolves the Subject-CN managedDevice id against the tenant's own `deviceManagement/managedDevices` (point-GET, no filter literal), modelled on `CloudPcDeviceValidator` and wired fire-and-forget like the DevPrep shadow so a cold Graph round-trip never enters the agent request path. New GA-only tenant toggle `ValidateIntuneDeviceBinding` (shadow — never touches `deviceValidated`), new optional Graph feature `IntuneDeviceBinding` → `DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All` in `GraphFeatureCatalog` + the customer grant script, and `enrolledAgeSeconds` on every log line so the enrollment race can be measured before this could ever become a gate. Grep marker: `CERT-DEVICE-BINDING-SHADOW`.
+
+* **Update**: `backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md` — shadow telemetry moved off the dead `LogInformation` path: the `Match` outcome now rides on the request row as the `CertTenantBinding` dimension (`SecurityValidator` → `FunctionContext.Items` → `RequestTelemetryMiddleware`), which is unsampled and already exists per request, so the denominator costs nothing. Non-Match outcomes keep their Warning trace. Post-deploy verification of 249e39bc found zero rows across 32k requests — worker `LogInformation` never reaches App Insights (provider default rule Warning+), making "everything matched" indistinguishable from "never ran". `CertificateValidationResult.FromCache` removed with the sampling path it existed for.
+* **New**: `backend/client-cert-tenant-binding.md` — the agent's mTLS certificate chains to Microsoft's shared Intune roots, so certificate validation alone never proved tenant membership; tenant scoping rested entirely on the (non-secret) device serial in the downstream validators. The Intune MDM leaf carries the Entra tenant id in OID `1.2.840.113556.5.14` (nested OCTET STRING), which is NOT `…5.6` (Intune Account id, a different GUID) and NOT `…5.4` (device id, stored as 16 bare bytes) — all decoded by one shared `MsDeviceCertificateOids.TryParseGuid` now used by agent and backend. Stage 1 ships as shadow only: `CertTenantBinding.Evaluate` (pure) plus `SecurityValidator.ObserveCertTenantBinding` (returns void, swallows its own exceptions, cannot change an authorization outcome), with `Match` sampled via `CertificateValidationResult.FromCache` so the denominator survives without per-request volume. Grep marker for the stage-2 enforcement change: `CERT-TENANT-BINDING-SHADOW`.
+
+## 2026-08-23
+
+* **New**: `backend/telemetry-ingest-shaping.md` — `RequestTelemetryMiddleware` sets `SamplingPercentage=100` on its own item (worker request rows were adaptively sampled, ItemCount 2–5 on weekdays, despite host.json `excludedTypes`), the redundant host HTTP request copy is dropped by a workspace transformation DCR (`infra/appinsights-workspace-transforms.bicep`, timer/queue rows kept), and `StorageDependencyFilterProcessor` now also drops expected storage outcomes (404/412/409, both InProc and HTTP shapes) and successful SignalR REST calls; the host-emitted SignalR binding calls (bulk of the volume, SDK `rdddsc`) are dropped by a second `AppDependencies` flow in the same DCR. Measured ≈ −1.3 GB/week.
+* **Update**: `backend/table-schema-sentinel.md` — "Measuring it": `StartupTelemetryService` emits `BackendStartupMs` (process start → ApplicationStarted) and `BackendTableInitMs` as App Insights custom metrics with version/commit/fullPass dimensions; the MCP server writes one `{"type":"boot","readyMs"}` stderr line per start (query in `.claude/commands/mcp-telemetry.md` §A2).
+* **New**: `backend/table-schema-sentinel.md` — startup table initialization gated by a schema sentinel (SHA-256 over `TableNames.All` in `AdminConfiguration`/`SchemaSentinel`/`tables`): matching sentinel ⇒ zero `CreateTableIfNotExists` calls on a cold start, missing/stale ⇒ one full pass + sentinel rewrite. SessionsIndex startup backfill only after a full pass, `IsSessionIndexEmptyAsync` no longer treats errors as "empty", conditional-insert claim so one scaled-out instance backfills. Daily maintenance runs `IStorageInitializer.EnsureAllAsync` to repair out-of-band table deletions.
+* **Update**: `backend/verdict-calibration.md` — MCP `get_verdict_calibration` response shaping: per-row trend denominators dropped, explicit nulls, `minSharePct` / `top` with an `omitted` report.
+* **Update**: `backend/verdict-calibration.md` — share-regression radar restricted to backend-decided paths; agent-declared/registration paths (customer workflow mix) and derived legacy paths no longer alert, stale episodes re-arm themselves.
+* **Update**: `backend/time-attribution.md`, `backend/device-journeys.md`, `backend/verdict-calibration.md` — the rolling maintenance sweeps (time attribution, device journeys, verdict calibration, calibration-radar discovery) now share ONE projected 35-day cross-tenant Sessions scan per tick (`LoadSweepWindowSessionsAsync` + `MaintenanceSweepSessionProjection`, pinned by `MaintenanceSweepProjectionEquivalenceTests`) instead of four full-table drains; each sweep slices its own window by StartedAt.
+* **New**: `backend/verdict-calibration.md` — the classifier thermometer: every status write now stamps `VerdictPath` (required parameter on `UpdateSessionStatusAsync`; `EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier` returns its rule id), overriding a verdict preserves `PriorStatus`/`PriorVerdictPath`, `VerdictPathDerivation` attributes pre-instrumentation rows read-side (`legacy:*` when ambiguous). New daily aggregate `VerdictCalibrationAggregates` (per-path count/derived/eligible7d/reEnrolled7d/overridden-by-admin|late|other, sweep after the device-journey pass, 180d retention), `GET global/metrics/verdict-calibration`, MCP `get_verdict_calibration`, admin metrics section, and the `VerdictCalibrationRadar` (share / silence-share / r6 evidence-gap episodes in the tracker keyspace `verdictcalibration|`, `VerdictCalibrationDrift` ops event, no tenant bell).
+* **New**: `backend/silent-session-classification.md` — one place for the silent-session verdict: `EnrollmentTimeoutClassifier` rule order incl. the new rule 1c `IsSelfDeployingProvisioned` (self-deploying profile + Device Setup all-succeeded + no explicit failure ⇒ Succeeded reconcile, no grace/AwaitingUser — kiosk tenant aebdce78 audit: 836 finished devices parked AwaitingUser/Incomplete), the sweep stage-1 gates (`TryMarkWhiteGloveAwaitingUserAsync`, new `TryReconcileSelfDeployingAsync`), the ingest callers (max-lifetime, late-telemetry heal, stall probe) and the new admin retro mode `self_deploying_silent` (`GetSelfDeployingSilentSessionsAsync`). Agent companion: `SessionRegistrationHelper` waits up to 15s for a network link and retries 6× (~62s) instead of 5× (~30s) so the reboot relaunch on Wi-Fi no longer exits 7 before the link is back.
+* **New**: `agent/diagnostics-package.md` — the diagnostics ZIP's built-in collection is now ONE catalog in Shared (`DiagnosticsBuiltInSections.All`): the agent iterates it in order and the backend serves the same list to the portal (`GET diagnostics/paths`, MemberRead), so what administrators see is exactly what the agent collects. New conditional sections: RealmJoin client/package/Chocolatey/per-user logs behind the tenant's RealmJoin Watcher toggle (mirrored onto `AgentConfiguration.EnableRealmJoinWatcher` by the merger) and the Device Preparation bootstrapper event log behind the deterministic WDP marker (probe once per build, fail toward Classic); every skip is a manifest line. Built-ins bypass `DiagnosticsPathGuards` by design (reviewed code, `%ProgramData%\RealmJoin` is not allowlisted); caps/reparse/evtx export still apply. `MergeDiagnosticsLogPaths` dedups global ∪ tenant paths. Portal: collapsed read-only catalog + one-line rows in both cards, tenant context dropped the GA-only global fetch.
+* **Update**: `rules/gather-rule-guardrails.md` — `DiagnosticsPathGuards` scope clarified: configured diagnostics paths only, never the built-in catalog.
+* **Update**: `backend/tenant-activation-welcome-mail.md` — new "Template overrides" section: Global Admins can replace the welcome/farewell HTML in the portal (Settings → Email Templates); `EmailTemplateService` resolves override-or-built-in per send (PreviewConfig table, partition `EmailTemplates`, 5-min cache, `{{domainName}}` placeholder, 30k limit, fail-soft send path), GA endpoints `global/email-templates/{kind}` (+`/test` to the caller's tenant contact address). Also: the mail header is image-free (CSS-drawn brand mark, gradient stripes and clip-path edge as progressive enhancement).
+
+## 2026-08-22
+
+* **Update**: `backend/tenant-activation-welcome-mail.md` — new "Mail transport" section: transactional mail now goes through the provider-neutral `EmailService` (`IEmailService` + `IOffboardFarewellEmailSender`) with the provider confined to one private transport method and the `Email:*` settings (`ApiKey`, `Endpoint`, `FromAddress`, `FromName`); current provider Mailchimp Transactional (Mandrill) replacing Resend (NuGet dropped, typed `HttpClient` + `ResiliencePolicies.Notification`). Result-array semantics (`sent`/`queued`/`scheduled` ok, `rejected`/`invalid` warn), open/click tracking explicitly off because the privacy/trust claim depends on it.
+
+* **New**: `backend/plan-downgrade-retention-grace.md` — plan downgrade policy: every Pro entitlement gates read-time and reversibly on downgrade ("gate, don't destroy"), except retention, which now gets a 30-day grace (`FeatureEntitlementCatalog.RetentionDowngradeGraceDays`) before the Community cap starts hard-deleting the 90–365-day band. Anchor model: `ProDowngradedUtc` stamped/cleared by the plan endpoint's pure `ApplyPlanChanges` core on EFFECTIVE-edition transitions (covers explicitly ended trials; planTier downgrade under an active trial deliberately doesn't stamp), trial expiry anchors read-time via `TrialExpiresUtc`. New Warning ops events `TenantPlanDowngraded` (PATCH handler) and `TenantRetentionGraceExpiring`/`TenantRetentionGraceEnded` (TrialExpirySweep window mechanics, only when stored retention exceeds the Community cap). Field is patch-denied + revert-protected; retention WRITE cap deliberately ignores the grace.
+
 ## 2026-08-21
 
+* **New**: `agent/do-group-id-auto-set.md` — optional DO peering-group seed (`EnableDoGroupIdAutoSet`, default off, ConfigVersion 40): `DoGroupIdService` derives a deterministic GUID from the default gateway's IPv4 + SendARP MAC in RealmJoin's exact byte layout (cross-product peering) and writes `DOGroupId` in the 64-bit GPO Policies store with readback verification. Conservative by design: no random-GUID fallback (skip on missing gateway/MAC), `DOGroupIdSource`/MDM-managed values/foreign GPO values always win (skip reasons in the `do_group_id_auto_set` event), own stale values are recognized via the `written:<guid>` StartupEventGate fingerprint and updated after a gateway change. Gateway heuristic extracted into the shared `NetworkInterfaceLocator` (dedup of NetworkChangeDetector + DeviceInfoCollector copies).
+
+* **New**: `agent/system-timeline-watcher.md` — clock-step and sleep-episode ground truth from the System event log: one `EventLogWatcher` (Kernel-General 1, Power-Troubleshooter 1, Kernel-Power 507; 506 deliberately unconsumed) emits `system_clock_changed` (oldTime/newTime/signed timeDeltaMs/reason/process; 2 s micro-slew floor, ≥5 min = Warning+immediate) and `system_sleep_episode` (kind sleep/hibernate/modern_standby, authoritative `enteredAt`/`exitedAt` payload instants, 60 s Modern-Standby floor). WindowsUpdateTracker-style backfill (24 h default, `system-timeline-watermark.json`) recovers pre-agent records; ConfigVersion 39 (`Collectors.EnableSystemTimelineWatcher`). Consumers: TimeJumpBadge cause `clock-set` (ground truth beats inference), SessionInfoCard standby note next to the unchanged wall-clock duration, `SleepSpan`s in time attribution (AttributionVersion 3, RebootSpan clone), and ANALYZE-DEV-012 (info, single, ≥5 min episode; deliberately the only new rule — clock issues stay with DEV-008).
+
+* **New**: `agent/power-state-watcher.md` — live AC/battery observation during enrollment: `PowerStateWatcherHost` subscribes to the WMI push `Win32_PowerManagementEvent EventCode 10` (no polling; re-probes `GetSystemPowerStatus` per push, 5 s trailing-edge debounce, never armed on battery-less devices, `Collectors.EnablePowerStateWatcher` kill-switch, ConfigVersion 38). The pure `PowerStateTransitionTracker` emits `power_state_change` with `transition` = ac_to_battery (Warning, immediate) / battery_to_ac (Info) / threshold_crossed at 50/30/15% (each level latched once per lifetime, lowest-crossed-only on jumps, baseline-below-level covered, emission cap 20). Classified non-activity on both sides (SignalActivityClassifier + IsPeriodicOrStallEvent). New analyze rules ANALYZE-DEV-009 (thresholdPercent=15, high) and ANALYZE-DEV-010 (transition=ac_to_battery, warning), both with `on_event:power_state_change` interim triggers and deliberately single-required-condition (event_data conditions have no same-instance join).
+
+* **Update**: `rules/rule-id-namespace.md` — the export→paste round-trip is no longer lossy: the JSON editors now map rule-shaped exports into the form (`gatherRuleToForm` unflattens the nested gather `parameters` object, analyze `jsonToForm` maps `evaluateOn` onto the eval checkboxes; `tags` and the effective `markSessionAsFailed` carry into the created rule). Both editors still accept the serialized-form shape; edit-mode pastes merge, with an explicit `parameters`/`evaluateOn` winning over stale flat fields.
+
+* **New**: `rules/rule-id-namespace.md` — rule identity model: human-readable `ruleId` strings (no GUIDs), tenant isolation via Table Storage partitioning (`global` = built-in/community, tenantId = custom), the reserved built-in namespace from `RuleIdPolicy`, and the four collision guards: catalog-only global `RuleStats` aggregate (same-ID custom rules of unrelated tenants no longer sum into one `global_{ruleId}` row), combine.js duplicate/namespace fail, GitHub-reseed rejection of non-reserved IDs into the global partition, and the namespace gate on the cross-tenant RuleState GC.
+
+* **New**: `backend/app-install-duration-attempt.md` — attempt-scoped app install durations: `DurationSeconds` = status-defining (last) attempt anchored on the new max-folded `LastAttemptStartedAt` (StartedAt stays the earliest-wins window/version-ordering key; legacy rows without the anchor keep the span fallback); `InstallPassCount` with replay-guarded additive fold; weaker-terminal guard (completed-with-Skipped never overrides Installed/Error, in-batch and cross-batch); attempt-scoped `DownloadDurationSeconds` pairing; the version-regression radar's both-sides cutover gate; time attribution counts the union of per-pass active segments (occupancy merges segments, hulls stay for display/what-if); agent payload timing re-arms both endpoints on terminal→active. No backfill — pre-cutover rows keep span semantics.
+
 * **Update**: `agent/decision-engine.md` — activity-based RealmJoin timeout extension (report 55e6afd61c9d: a large RJ package catalog outlived the 60-min window mid-install — the timer arms at RJ-agent-MSI detection, so the first deployment had effectively ~44 min). When the `RealmJoinTimeout` deadline fires with `LastDeploymentPhase` 100/101 and deployment activity (phase change or package observation, persisted in `RealmJoinFacts.LastActivityUtc`; the detection-time phase capture deliberately excluded) inside the last 60 min, the deadline re-arms to `lastActivity + 60 min` (Info event `realmjoin_timeout_extended`), clamped at detection + 4 h. `realmjoin_timeout` now carries `reason` = `hard_timeout` / `inactivity` / `absolute_cap`; a fire of a superseded deadline incarnation dead-ends. Idle detection and phase-200/210 sessions keep the original 60-min behavior.
 
 * **New**: `backend/send-time-frame-separation.md` — P14: the agent stamps one device-clock send timestamp per upload attempt (`X-Send-Time-Utc`), the ingest function server-stamps it as `SentAt` on every event of the request. `SentAt − OccurredUtc` is pure spool delay, `ReceivedAt − SentAt` is network + device-vs-server clock offset — the two were indistinguishable before and had to be separated statistically. The `clock_skew` condition measures SentAt-carrying batches directly (spool-immune, no spread cap, IME-only sessions become measurable; evidence carries `sentAtBatchCount`), legacy batches keep the median path; the CMTrace tripwire deliberately stays on its differential math (common-mode clock offset cancels there).

docs/mcp-oauth-flow.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ tags:
   - oauth
   - entra-id
   - security
-timestamp: 2026-07-11T10:59:31+02:00
+timestamp: 2026-08-29T08:45:00+02:00
 ---
 
 # MCP OAuth Flow — Who Authenticates Where
@@ -41,9 +41,12 @@ The two identities never mix:
    in the vendor's backend, not on the user's machine.
 2. **MCP server** (Container App) — acts as a stateless **OAuth proxy /
    authorization-server façade** in front of Entra ID. It is *not* an IdP:
-   it registers clients dynamically (RFC 7591, HMAC-signed stateless
-   `client_id`), enforces the redirect-URI allowlist and PKCE, and exchanges
-   codes at Entra using its confidential client secret.
+   it establishes the client's identity statelessly — a Client ID Metadata
+   Document (MCP spec 2026-07-28: the `client_id` is an HTTPS URL the server
+   fetches and validates) or, for older clients, dynamic registration
+   (RFC 7591, HMAC-signed stateless `client_id`) — enforces the redirect-URI
+   allowlist and PKCE, and exchanges codes at Entra using its confidential
+   client secret. See [Protocol Eras & CIMD](mcp/protocol-eras-and-cimd.md).
 3. **Entra ID** — the real identity provider. This is where `adm.luke` lives.
 
 ## Full sequence
@@ -54,9 +57,10 @@ Claude Desktop        Browser (user's           MCP server              Entra ID
      │                      │                        │                      │
  1.  │─ POST /mcp ──────────┼───────────────────────▶│ 401 + WWW-Auth       │
  2.  │─ Discovery ──────────┼───────────────────────▶│ RFC 9728/8414 docs   │
- 3.  │─ POST /oauth/register┼───────────────────────▶│ client_id (HMAC-     │
-     │                      │                        │ signed, embeds the   │
-     │                      │                        │ registered callback) │
+ 3.  │─ client identity ────┼───────────────────────▶│ CIMD: client_id is a │
+     │   (CIMD, or legacy   │                        │ URL, doc fetched at  │
+     │    POST /oauth/      │                        │ /authorize; DCR:     │
+     │    register)         │                        │ HMAC-signed client_id│
      │                      │                        │                      │
  4.  │─ opens browser ─────▶│─ GET /oauth/authorize ▶│─ 302 to Entra ──────▶│
      │                      │  (PKCE challenge)      │  app-reg client_id,  │

docs/mcp/protocol-eras-and-cimd.md

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+---
+type: Concept
+title: MCP Protocol Eras & Client ID Metadata Documents
+description: How the MCP server serves the 2026-07-28 stateless revision and 2025-era clients from one per-request factory, why the legacy leg is hand-wired (JSON + gzip), the cache-hint and capability contract, and the CIMD client-registration path next to the deprecated dynamic registration.
+resource: /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/mcp-http.ts
+tags:
+  - mcp
+  - protocol
+  - oauth
+  - cimd
+  - security
+timestamp: 2026-08-29T08:40:00+02:00
+---
+
+# MCP Protocol Eras & Client ID Metadata Documents
+
+**Status:** Concept · **Owner:** MCP Server · **Code:** [`mcp-http.ts`](../../src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/mcp-http.ts), [`mcp-server-factory.ts`](../../src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/mcp-server-factory.ts), [`cimd.ts`](../../src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/cimd.ts), [`oauth.ts`](../../src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/oauth.ts)
+
+# Schema
+
+## The two eras
+
+MCP revision **2026-07-28** turned the protocol into a stateless request/response
+protocol: no `initialize` handshake, no `Mcp-Session-Id`, every request carries its
+protocol version, client identity and capabilities in `_meta`, capabilities and
+instructions are fetched with `server/discover`, list results carry `ttlMs` /
+`cacheScope`, and `Mcp-Method` / `Mcp-Name` HTTP headers let gateways route without
+parsing bodies. Roots, Sampling, Logging and the HTTP+SSE transport are deprecated
+(twelve-month window); Dynamic Client Registration is deprecated in favour of Client
+ID Metadata Documents.
+
+The server was already stateless by design (scale-to-zero Container App, no
+server→client traffic), so the revision cost no architecture — only wiring:
+
+| Concern | 2026-07-28 ("modern") | 2025-era ("legacy") |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Routing decision | `isLegacyRequest()` from the SDK — the exact classifier `createMcpHandler` uses internally | same predicate, inverse |
+| Serving | `createMcpHandler(factory, { legacy: 'reject', responseMode: 'json' })` via `toNodeHandler` | fresh `NodeStreamableHTTPServerTransport({ sessionIdGenerator: undefined, enableJsonResponse: true })` per POST |
+| Response shape | single `application/json` body | single `application/json` body |
+| Instructions | `server/discover` result | `initialize` result |
+| Cache fields | `ttlMs` + `cacheScope` stamped by the SDK from `cacheHints` | none (2025 codec has no cache path) |
+
+Both legs are fed by **one** factory (`createServerForCaller`), so the tool catalog,
+resource set, prompts and instructions can never drift between eras — the
+`mcp-http.test.ts` suite pins that a Global Admin and a plain tenant user see the
+same catalog on either path.
+
+## Why the legacy leg is hand-wired
+
+`createMcpHandler`'s built-in `legacy: 'stateless'` fallback constructs its transport
+with only `sessionIdGenerator: undefined`, i.e. it answers every 2025 client with an
+SSE frame. Every production client today (Claude Code, Claude.ai, VS Code) is a 2025
+client, and their large tool results are gzipped by the compression middleware only
+because the response is a plain JSON body (measured 5–30×). Routing on the SDK's own
+predicate in user land keeps that behaviour while still running the 2026 path through
+the SDK entry unchanged — no re-implementation of the classification, no second
+catalog.
+
+## Capability and cache contract
+
+* `capabilities` are declared explicitly with `listChanged: false` for tools,
+  resources and prompts. The SDK's default (`?? true`) would advertise a
+  notification a per-request server can never emit.
+* `cacheHints`: `server/discover`, `tools/list`, `prompts/list`, `resources/list`,
+  `resources/templates/list` → `{ ttlMs: 300_000, cacheScope: 'private' }`;
+  `resources/read` → `{ ttlMs: 3_600_000, cacheScope: 'private' }`. **Never
+  `public`**: the catalog and the instructions are role-dependent (Global Admin /
+  Global Reader / delegated MSP / tenant user), so a shared cache would leak one
+  caller's surface to another. Five minutes is the bound on how long a role change
+  can go unnoticed by a caching client; resources are static per deployment.
+* No Roots / Sampling / Logging / elicitation / subscriptions are used anywhere, so
+  nothing on the deprecation list has to be migrated.
+
+## Client registration: CIMD first, DCR as fallback
+
+The authorization-server metadata now advertises
+`client_id_metadata_document_supported: true` next to the (deprecated)
+`registration_endpoint`. Clients following the spec's priority order use a
+**Client ID Metadata Document**: their `client_id` *is* an HTTPS URL that serves a
+JSON document (`client_id`, `client_name`, `redirect_uris`, …). `oauth.ts` resolves
+every `client_id` through one helper: an HTTPS URL goes to `cimd.ts`, anything else
+must be one of our HMAC-signed dynamic-registration tokens. Both yield the same shape
+(`redirectUris`), and the rest of the authorize/callback logic is unchanged.
+
+What the document decides — and what it does not:
+
+* It only asserts **which** redirect URIs the client claims. The requested
+  `redirect_uri` must still pass the host/path allowlist that gates dynamic
+  registration (`isAllowedRedirectUri`), checked *before* the document is fetched. A
+  self-hosted document cannot widen the destinations an authorization code may be
+  sent to. Loopback remains allowed for every client (RFC 8252 §7.3);
+  `application_type: "native"` is informational.
+* Fetching a caller-chosen URL is an SSRF surface, so the fetch is: HTTPS only, path
+  component required, no fragment/userinfo, no loopback or IP-literal host, every
+  resolved address must be public (RFC 1918/4193/3927/6598, CGNAT, multicast,
+  IPv4-mapped all refused — checked before any request leaves), `redirect: 'error'`,
+  5 s budget, 16 KB body cap (declared *and* streamed), JSON media type required.
+  Nothing from the response reaches the caller beyond an OAuth error code.
+* The document's `client_id` must equal the URL by simple string comparison — no
+  normalization, per the draft. `redirect_uris` is bounded exactly like a dynamic
+  registration (`oauth-limits.ts`). A missing `client_name` falls back to the host:
+  it only ever reaches a log line, and failing a login over a label would be wrong.
+* Cache: positive entries live for the document's `Cache-Control: max-age`, clamped
+  to 10–60 min so the `/oauth/callback` re-check within the 10-min signed-state
+  window is a cache hit on the same replica; rejections are cached for 60 s; the map
+  is bounded to 256 entries.
+
+RFC 9207 `iss` (already emitted since 2026-07-29) completes the authorization side
+of the 2026-07-28 revision.
+
+# Examples
+
+* A 2026 client: `POST /mcp` with `_meta["io.modelcontextprotocol/protocolVersion"] = "2026-07-28"`
+  and `Mcp-Method: tools/list` → `{ tools: [...], ttlMs: 300000, cacheScope: "private", _meta: { "io.modelcontextprotocol/serverInfo": { name: "Autopilot-Monitor", version: "1.6.<build>" } } }`.
+* A 2025 client: `POST /mcp` `initialize` → `application/json` body with
+  `protocolVersion: "2025-11-25"` and the role-tailored `instructions`; no
+  `Mcp-Session-Id` header.
+* `GET /oauth/authorize?client_id=https://app.example.test/oauth/client.json&redirect_uri=http://127.0.0.1:49152/callback&code_challenge=…` →
+  document fetched (or served from cache) → 302 to Entra. `client_id=https://10.0.0.8/x` → `400 invalid_client`
+  without any outbound request.
+
+# Citations
+
+* MCP spec 2026-07-28 — https://blog.modelcontextprotocol.io/posts/2026-07-28/ ; authorization / client registration:
+  https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/authorization/client-registration
+* TypeScript SDK v2 (`@modelcontextprotocol/server` 2.0.0) — `createMcpHandler`, `isLegacyRequest`, `cacheHints`.
+* draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document-00 §6 (security considerations, SSRF).
+* Tests: `src/__tests__/mcp-http.test.ts`, `src/__tests__/cimd.test.ts`, `src/__tests__/oauth-cimd.test.ts`.
+* Related: [MCP OAuth Flow](../mcp-oauth-flow.md), [MCP Docs Corpus](docs-corpus.md).

docs/rules/analyze-rule-triggers.md

@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ Interim evaluation changes what a rule's conditions mean mid-flight. Three new l
 
 # Application to the Motivating Cases
 
-- WG battery rule (sits-d): `evaluateOn: ["enrollment_end", "whiteglove_sealed"]` — technician gets the channel alert at the bench; Part-2 terminal pass finalizes or resolves the finding.
+- WG battery rule (sits-d): shipped 2026-08-21 as ANALYZE-DEV-009 (battery below 15% while on battery) and ANALYZE-DEV-010 (AC→battery switch), both `evaluateOn: ["enrollment_end", "whiteglove_sealed", "on_event:power_state_change"]` on the live power watcher's `power_state_change` events (see `../agent/power-state-watcher.md`) — technician gets the channel alert at the bench; the terminal pass finalizes the finding. Both are deliberately single-required-condition rules: `event_data` conditions scan events independently (no same-instance join), so DEV-009 matches the agent-stamped `thresholdPercent` and DEV-010 matches `transition`.
 - Hybrid-affinity stuck (esa): ANALYZE-ID-004 gets `evaluateOn: ["enrollment_end", "on_event:hybrid_login_pending"]` — the second overdue-login event (threshold 65) produces a live finding on the still-InProgress session. ANALYZE-APP-015 stays `enrollment_end`-only until its conditions are hardened (lint 1).
 
 - Stuck after a forced mid-ESP reboot (sits-d Cloud PCs, 2026-08-19): `on_event:session_stalled` is the established trigger for the never-terminal stuck session. The agent emits `session_stalled` exactly once per session (60-minute stall probe), so the trigger is rare by construction and needs no throttle. Five Cloud PCs sat at `InProgress` with **zero findings** for hours — a mid-ESP reboot had killed the agent in `Stage=EspAccountSetup` — before the max-lifetime watchdog eventually terminalised them as `Incomplete`. ANALYZE-ESP-005 carries the trigger and fires on that stream at confidence 95 (verified against session `8110e262`): both its conditions (`mdm_policy_reboot_required.firstRebootUri` exists, `system_reboot_detected` count ≥ 1) are **monotonic** and it has no terminal preconditions, so lint 1 does not apply. ANALYZE-APP-016 is interim-safe for the same reason (`app_install_starved` count ≥ 1 only ever grows).

docs/rules/gather-rule-guardrails.md

@@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ item in `AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.csproj`) and regenerated into the portal
 | `IsCommandAllowed` | `allowedCommands` | **exact** match, trimmed — never prefix |
 | `IsEventLogChannelAllowed` | `eventLogChannels` | prefix, boundary `/` or end |
 
+`DiagnosticsPathGuards.IsDiagnosticsPathAllowed` (allowlist `diagnosticsPathPrefixes`, a C#
+literal mirrored in the JSON) applies the same hard blocks and the same user-profile
+exception to **admin-configured diagnostics paths** only. The diagnostics package's built-in
+sections are reviewed code and never pass through it — see
+[Diagnostics Package](../agent/diagnostics-package.md).
+
 **Hard blocks live in code, not in the JSON**, so a parse error cannot lift them — on a
 parse failure the allowlists fall back to empty and everything is blocked (fail-closed),
 but the hard blocks must hold regardless of configuration:

docs/rules/gather-rule-phase-scoping.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ tags:
   - backend
   - gather-rules
   - config
-timestamp: 2026-08-04T00:00:00+02:00
+timestamp: 2026-08-29T00:00:00+02:00
 ---
 
 # Problem
@@ -89,6 +89,18 @@ Consequences of the emitted-event feed:
   the raw signal stream — the documented "On Event with `enrollment_complete`" end-of-enrollment
   pattern only works because of this. This restores V1 semantics (V1 fired triggers from every
   emitted `EnrollmentEvent`).
+* **Feedback-loop guard** (2026-08-29): gather output travels the same post → ingress →
+  reducer → emitter → stream path, so the stream would hand the executor's own events straight
+  back to `OnEvent`. A rule with `triggerEventType == outputEventType` (or two rules chained
+  A→B→A) then executed and emitted without bound for the whole session — `emitMode:
+  on_change` does not help when the collected result varies. `TimelineEventStream` therefore
+  publishes the event **source**, and `GatherRuleExecutorHost` never dispatches `on_event` for
+  `Source == GatherRuleExecutor.SourceName` (phase declarations on such events are still
+  honoured). Second layer: `GatherRuleExecutor.MaxOnEventExecutionsPerRule` (100 per rule and
+  session) bounds any cycle that reaches the executor through a non-gather event; the boundary
+  is logged once (agent log Warning + debug-trace `trigger` line). Backend validation rejects
+  `on_event` rules whose trigger equals their own output type or `gather_result` — such a rule
+  could never fire.
 * Other hosts (`DeviceInfoHost`, `UserEspKeepAwakeHost`, `ProvisioningPackageHost`) still key
   off the raw signal stream deliberately — their collections are about OS state at the raw
   boundary (ESP exit, keep-awake), not about timeline agreement.
@@ -103,7 +115,8 @@ Consequences of the emitted-event feed:
     `_startupRulesExecuted` dedup; it is not part of the `WaitForStartupRules` latch).
   * `phase_change` — evaluated against the **new** phase; the scope gate runs before the
     per-(rule, phase) dedup so an out-of-scope pass does not consume the execution slot.
-  * `on_event` — gated by the current phase.
+  * `on_event` — gated by the current phase; never fires on gather output; capped at
+    `MaxOnEventExecutionsPerRule` per rule and session.
 * **Before the first phase signal** of a session (`_currentPhase == Unknown`) scoped rules are
   inactive. Sessions that never produce phase signals never run them (documented behavior).
 * **From-phase latch**: activates when `phase != Unknown && phase != Failed && (int)phase >=
@@ -164,4 +177,4 @@ Consequences of the emitted-event feed:
 * `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Rules/GatherRulesFunction.cs` — `ValidateScopeAndEmitMode`
 * `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/GatherRuleService.cs` — partial-PUT merge, `ContentEquivalent`
 * `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Models/Rules/GatherRule.cs` — field contracts
-* Tests: `GatherRuleExecutorPhaseScopeTests`, `GatherRuleExecutorEmitModeTests`, `GatherRuleExecutorHostTimelineFeedTests` (agent); `GatherRuleUpdatePartialMergeTests`, `GatherRuleScopeFieldsTests` (backend)
+* Tests: `GatherRuleExecutorPhaseScopeTests`, `GatherRuleExecutorEmitModeTests`, `GatherRuleExecutorHostTimelineFeedTests`, `GatherRuleExecutorOnEventCapTests` (agent); `GatherRuleUpdatePartialMergeTests`, `GatherRuleScopeFieldsTests` (backend)

docs/rules/rule-id-namespace.md

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+---
+type: concept
+title: Rule ID Namespace & Collision Guards
+description: How gather/analyze rule identity is scoped (tenant partition vs global partition), why there are no GUIDs, which collisions are possible, and the guards that keep the reserved built-in namespace and the global RuleStats aggregate clean.
+resource: backend, rules
+tags: [rules, ruleid, namespace, collision, rulestats, tenant-isolation]
+timestamp: 2026-08-21
+---
+
+# Schema
+
+Rule identity is the human-readable `ruleId` string — there are no GUIDs, deliberately: the ID appears in logs, mails, notifications, RuleResults, the agent config payload, and docs, and tenant isolation is provided by Table Storage partitioning instead.
+
+| Store | PartitionKey | RowKey | Content |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `GatherRules` / `AnalyzeRules` | `"global"` | ruleId | Built-in + community rules (shared, all tenants) |
+| `GatherRules` / `AnalyzeRules` | tenantId | ruleId | Custom rules (visible only to that tenant) |
+| `RuleStates` | tenantId | ruleId | Per-tenant enable/notify overrides — built-in/community rules ONLY (custom rules fold state into their own row) |
+| `RuleStats` | date | `{tenantId}_{ruleId}` and `global_{ruleId}` | Daily fire/eval telemetry; the global row is catalog-only (see guards) |
+
+Namespace split (`RuleIdPolicy.cs`, shared model):
+
+- **Reserved built-in namespace**: `(ANALYZE|GATHER)-<CATEGORY>-<NUMBER>` with `CATEGORY != CUSTOM`, case-insensitive, including currently unused numbers (gaps = retired rules that may return).
+- **Tenant namespace**: everything else — `ANALYZE-CUSTOM-NNN` (portal suggestion), `-CUSTOM` suffixes, org prefixes (`CONTOSO-WIFI-001`), freeform.
+
+# Collision model
+
+- **Custom vs built-in**: impossible via API — `CreateRuleAsync`/`UpdateRuleAsync` reject reserved IDs (409) and check existence against `global` ∪ own tenant partition. Legacy debris is neutralized at merge time: global wins, tenant copy dropped with a warning (pinned by `RuleMergeCollisionGuardTests`, motivated by the 5ca2b350 duplicate-key incident).
+- **Custom vs custom across tenants**: allowed and harmless — separate partitions, separate evaluation, separate RuleResults/tenant stats. Two tenants both using `ANALYZE-CUSTOM-101` never interact.
+- **JSON copy between tenants** (export → paste into create editor): goes through the same create path, so an ID already taken in the receiving tenant surfaces as 409 — the user renames. There is no bulk import endpoint. The JSON editors accept both shapes — a rule export and the serialized form — via `gatherRuleToForm` / `jsonToForm` (web `types.ts` of each rules page): nested gather `parameters` are unflattened, analyze `evaluateOn` maps onto the eval checkboxes, and `tags` plus the effective `markSessionAsFailed` survive the import.
+
+# Guards (all enforced, 2026-08-21)
+
+1. **Global RuleStats aggregate is catalog-only.** The `global_{ruleId}` row would otherwise sum same-ID custom rules of unrelated tenants (title/severity last-writer-wins). Both paths gate on the server-side catalog rule object: analyze on `rule.IsBuiltIn || rule.IsCommunity` of the evaluated rule (`AnalyzeOnEnrollmentEndHandler`), gather on the same flags of the rule resolved from the tenant's active gather catalog (`EventIngestProcessor.ResolveFiredGatherRules`). The agent event contributes only the `ruleId`; title/category/severity are taken from the catalog, never from event `Data`, and a claimed ID that is not an active rule for the tenant is dropped — so a device cannot mint `global_*` rows for retired/unshipped IDs, inflate a built-in rule's counters under a foreign ID, or respell its title. (Earlier the gather path selected the global row by `RuleIdPolicy.IsReservedBuiltInId` on the device-supplied ID and wrote the device-supplied title — pattern membership is not catalog membership.)
+2. **Catalog build fails on namespace violations.** `rules/scripts/combine.js` rejects duplicate IDs (case-insensitive) and any gather/analyze built-in outside the reserved pattern; `BuiltInRuleCatalogPolicyTests` pins the same invariants on the embedded resource actually deployed.
+3. **GitHub reseed rejects non-reserved IDs** before writing to the `global` partition (`ReseedFromGitHubFunction`) — a seeded `*-CUSTOM-*` rule would silently shadow every tenant's same-ID custom rule at merge time.
+4. **Cross-tenant RuleState GC is namespace-gated.** `DeleteRuleStatesForRuleIdAcrossTenantsAsync` deletes by bare RowKey across all partitions; it now refuses non-reserved IDs with `failed=-1` (callers then skip the global catalog delete, same contract as enumeration failure).
+
+Invariant chain: schema pattern + combine.js + reseed guard ⇒ the `global` partition only ever contains reserved-pattern IDs ⇒ the pattern is a safe built-in/custom discriminator everywhere no `IsBuiltIn` flag is available.
+
+# Citations
+
+- `src/Shared/AutopilotMonitor.Shared/Models/Rules/RuleIdPolicy.cs` — reserved pattern + rationale
+- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/AnalyzeRuleService.cs`, `GatherRuleService.cs` — create/update guards, merge collision guard
+- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Services/TableStorageService.Rules.cs` — key schemes, cross-tenant GC guard
+- `src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/BuiltInRuleCatalogPolicyTests.cs`, `RuleIdReservationTests.cs`, `RuleMergeCollisionGuardTests.cs`
+- `rules/scripts/combine.js` — build-time namespace/duplicate guard

infra/appinsights-workspace-transforms.bicep

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+// Autopilot-Monitor — Log Analytics workspace transformation (ingestion-time filter)
+//
+// Two ingestion-time filters. (2) Successful Azure SignalR REST dependencies emitted by the
+// HOST process for the SignalR output binding (SDKVersion rdddsc:*) — the worker-side
+// StorageDependencyFilterProcessor never sees those. Failed SignalR calls are kept.
+// (1) Drops the redundant HOST-side HTTP request record from AppRequests so that exactly one
+// canonical request row remains: the worker-side copy emitted by RequestTelemetryMiddleware
+// (Properties.Source == 'WorkerMiddleware', carries TenantId/UserId/CorrelationId and is
+// sampling-exempt per item). Non-HTTP host invocations (timer/queue triggers) have an empty
+// Url and are kept — the worker middleware never sees them.
+//
+// Why ingestion-time: the host request item is emitted by the Functions host process and
+// cannot be suppressed from worker code or host.json (verified 2026-06-09, see Program.cs).
+// Live numbers 2026-08-23 (7d): host copy 274k rows / 323 MB, worker copy 189k rows / 208 MB.
+//
+// Cost note: transformation filtering is free up to 50% of the table's incoming volume; the
+// portion beyond that (here ~11% of AppRequests) is billed at the (cheap) data-processing rate.
+//
+// Apply (two steps; the link is a CLI update = GET+PUT, which keeps retention/SKU intact):
+//   az deployment group create -g rg-autopilotmonitor-prd-gwc \
+//     --template-file infra/appinsights-workspace-transforms.bicep \
+//     --query properties.outputs.dcrId.value -o tsv
+//   az monitor log-analytics workspace update -g rg-autopilotmonitor-prd-gwc -n AutopilotMonitor \
+//     --data-collection-rule <dcrId-from-above>
+//
+// Verify after ~20 min (ingestion latency):
+//   AppRequests | where TimeGenerated > ago(15m) | where AppRoleName == 'autopilotmonitor-api-eu'
+//   | summarize rows=count() by source=tostring(Properties.Source), hasUrl=isnotempty(Url)
+//   → only (WorkerMiddleware, true) and ('', false) buckets remain.
+//
+// Rollback: az monitor log-analytics workspace update -g <rg> -n AutopilotMonitor
+//   --set properties.defaultDataCollectionRuleResourceId=null   (then delete the DCR)
+
+@description('Log Analytics workspace that backs the workspace-based Application Insights resources.')
+param workspaceName string = 'AutopilotMonitor'
+
+param location string = resourceGroup().location
+
+resource workspace 'Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces@2023-09-01' existing = {
+  name: workspaceName
+}
+
+resource transforms 'Microsoft.Insights/dataCollectionRules@2023-03-11' = {
+  name: 'dcr-autopilotmonitor-ws-transforms'
+  location: location
+  kind: 'WorkspaceTransforms'
+  properties: {
+    description: 'AppRequests: keep the enriched worker request record (Properties.Source == WorkerMiddleware) and non-HTTP host invocations (empty Url); drop the host HTTP duplicate.'
+    destinations: {
+      logAnalytics: [
+        {
+          workspaceResourceId: workspace.id
+          name: 'ws'
+        }
+      ]
+    }
+    dataFlows: [
+      {
+        streams: [ 'Microsoft-Table-AppRequests' ]
+        destinations: [ 'ws' ]
+        transformKql: 'source | where tostring(Properties.Source) == \'WorkerMiddleware\' or isempty(Url)'
+      }
+      {
+        // Successful Azure SignalR REST calls (group add/remove per connection) are emitted by
+        // the HOST process for the SignalR output binding (SDKVersion rdddsc:*), so the worker's
+        // StorageDependencyFilterProcessor never sees them. Failed SignalR calls are kept.
+        streams: [ 'Microsoft-Table-AppDependencies' ]
+        destinations: [ 'ws' ]
+        transformKql: 'source | where not(Success == true and Target endswith \'.service.signalr.net\')'
+      }
+    ]
+  }
+}
+
+// A workspace has exactly one transformation DCR, activated by linking it as the workspace's
+// defaultDataCollectionRuleResourceId — deliberately NOT modelled here (see Apply above).
+
+output dcrId string = transforms.id

rules/analyze/ANALYZE-APP-017.json

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
+  "ruleId": "ANALYZE-APP-017",
+  "title": "App Install Blocked by Another Installer (0x80070652)",
+  "description": "Detects Win32 app installs that failed because the Windows Installer was busy with another installation (HRESULT 0x80070652 / MSI exit code 1618, ERROR_INSTALL_ALREADY_RUNNING). The IME retries on a fixed budget (~15-17 minutes across several attempts) and then reports the app as failed; when the app is ESP-blocking, the Device Setup Apps subcategory terminates with it.",
+  "severity": "high",
+  "category": "apps",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
+  "enabled": true,
+  "baseConfidence": 70,
+  "conditions": [
+    {
+      "signal": "mutex_blocked_install",
+      "source": "event_type",
+      "eventType": "app_install_failed",
+      "dataField": "hresultFromWin32",
+      "operator": "equals",
+      "value": "-2147023278",
+      "required": true
+    },
+    {
+      "signal": "installer_exit_1618",
+      "source": "event_data",
+      "eventType": "app_install_failed",
+      "dataField": "exitCode",
+      "operator": "equals",
+      "value": "1618",
+      "required": false
+    },
+    {
+      "signal": "esp_failed_with_mutex_code",
+      "source": "event_data",
+      "eventType": "esp_failure_settle_started",
+      "dataField": "errorCode",
+      "operator": "equals",
+      "value": "0x80070652",
+      "required": false
+    }
+  ],
+  "confidenceFactors": [
+    {
+      "signal": "installer_exit_1618",
+      "condition": "exists",
+      "weight": 10
+    },
+    {
+      "signal": "esp_failed_with_mutex_code",
+      "condition": "exists",
+      "weight": 20
+    }
+  ],
+  "confidenceThreshold": 65,
+  "explanation": "App **{{appName}}** failed to install because the Windows Installer service was already busy with another installation — HRESULT **0x80070652** / MSI exit code **1618** (`ERROR_INSTALL_ALREADY_RUNNING`). Only one Windows Installer transaction can run at a time; the Intune Management Extension retried on its fixed budget (typically ~15-17 minutes across several attempts) and then reported the app as failed. If this app is required in the Enrollment Status Page, the Device Setup Apps subcategory fails with it and the enrollment terminates.\n\nThis failure is **deterministic per attempt**: as long as the competing installer keeps winning the race, a plain re-enrollment fails again at roughly the same minute mark — retrying without fixing the collision only churns devices.\n\nCommon sources of the competing installation:\n\n- The **preceding Win32 app in the install order**: its installer exits 0 (so IME moves on) but leaves a child `msiexec` transaction or post-install MSI work running. Security agents and proxy clients that chain multiple MSIs are frequent offenders.\n- **OEM factory software** installing on first boot (factory-image provisioning packages, vendor updaters) — typical on brand-new hardware batches.\n- **Microsoft 365 Apps (C2R), driver updaters or Windows servicing** running installations in parallel outside IME's control.",
+  "remediation": [
+    {
+      "title": "Identify the competing installer",
+      "steps": [
+        "In this session's timeline, note which app finished installing immediately before {{appName}} started — its installer is the prime suspect for holding the Windows Installer mutex",
+        "On a reproduction device, when the failure window is active, check for running installers: Get-Process msiexec | Select-Object Id,StartTime and the in-progress marker key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Installer\\InProgress",
+        "Check the Application event log for MsiInstaller events around the failure timestamp to see which product held the transaction",
+        "On factory-fresh hardware, also look for OEM first-boot installers (vendor updater services, factory provisioning packages) that run outside Intune"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "title": "Serialize the install chain",
+      "steps": [
+        "Add an Intune Win32 dependency so {{appName}} depends on the app whose installer causes the collision — IME then orders them explicitly instead of racing",
+        "Alternatively, wrap the offending predecessor so its install script waits until msiexec has fully finished (poll the InProgress registry key or the _MSIExecute mutex with a bounded timeout) before exiting",
+        "If the app does not have to gate the ESP, remove it from the blocking-app list so a transient 1618 no longer terminates the enrollment; Intune retries it after the desktop"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "relatedDocs": [
+    {
+      "title": "Microsoft Learn: MsiExec.exe error messages (1618 = another installation is in progress)",
+      "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/error-codes"
+    },
+    {
+      "title": "Microsoft Learn: Troubleshoot Win32 app installations in Intune",
+      "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/mem/intune/app-management/troubleshoot-win32-app-install"
+    }
+  ],
+  "tags": [
+    "apps",
+    "msiexec",
+    "mutex",
+    "0x80070652",
+    "1618",
+    "esp"
+  ]
+}

rules/analyze/ANALYZE-DEV-009.json

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
+  "ruleId": "ANALYZE-DEV-009",
+  "title": "Battery Critically Low During Enrollment",
+  "description": "Detects that the device's battery dropped to 15% or less while enrolling on battery power (power_state_change threshold event from the agent's live power watcher). A device dying mid-enrollment leaves a half-provisioned state that typically needs a full reset; this rule surfaces the risk while there is still time to plug the device in. Uses a single required condition on the agent-stamped thresholdPercent field (the data field 'transition' on the event is unrelated to this rule's 'trigger' property).",
+  "severity": "high",
+  "category": "device",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "enabled": true,
+  "evaluateOn": [
+    "enrollment_end",
+    "whiteglove_sealed",
+    "on_event:power_state_change"
+  ],
+  "trigger": "single",
+  "baseConfidence": 90,
+  "confidenceThreshold": 60,
+  "conditions": [
+    {
+      "signal": "battery_threshold_15",
+      "source": "event_data",
+      "eventType": "power_state_change",
+      "dataField": "thresholdPercent",
+      "operator": "equals",
+      "value": "15",
+      "required": true
+    }
+  ],
+  "explanation": "The device's battery fell below **{{thresholdPercent}}%** while the enrollment was running on battery power. If the battery drains completely mid-enrollment, the device is left in a half-provisioned state — apps, policies, or the user profile may be incomplete, and in most cases the device has to be reset and re-enrolled. The agent detected the threshold crossing live via a Windows power-status notification; the exact percentage at that moment is recorded on the matched power_state_change event in the session timeline.",
+  "remediation": [
+    {
+      "title": "Secure power for the running enrollment",
+      "steps": [
+        "Connect the device to AC power immediately — the enrollment continues normally once power is stable.",
+        "If the device shut down before completing, check whether the session reached the desktop; if not, reset the device (Autopilot reset or reimage) and re-enroll it plugged in.",
+        "For technician/White Glove flows, make AC power part of the bench checklist — pre-provisioning on battery is the most common source of this alert.",
+        "If this fires across many devices of one model, review that model's battery health (the hardware_spec event carries design vs. full-charge capacity)."
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "tags": [
+    "device",
+    "power",
+    "battery",
+    "environment"
+  ]
+}

rules/analyze/ANALYZE-DEV-010.json

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
+  "ruleId": "ANALYZE-DEV-010",
+  "title": "Enrollment Switched From AC to Battery Power",
+  "description": "Detects that the device lost AC power and switched to battery while the enrollment was running (power_state_change event with transition ac_to_battery from the agent's live power watcher). Uses a single required condition so the match is pinned to one event instance; the event payload carries the battery percentage at the moment of the switch. The agent debounces power flapping (5s) so a brief unplug/replug does not produce this event.",
+  "severity": "warning",
+  "category": "device",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "enabled": true,
+  "evaluateOn": [
+    "enrollment_end",
+    "whiteglove_sealed",
+    "on_event:power_state_change"
+  ],
+  "trigger": "single",
+  "baseConfidence": 85,
+  "confidenceThreshold": 60,
+  "conditions": [
+    {
+      "signal": "switched_to_battery",
+      "source": "event_data",
+      "eventType": "power_state_change",
+      "dataField": "transition",
+      "operator": "equals",
+      "value": "ac_to_battery",
+      "required": true
+    }
+  ],
+  "explanation": "The device switched from AC to battery power mid-enrollment. Enrollments are power-hungry — app downloads, Windows Update and disk encryption drain a battery quickly, and Windows may also throttle CPU and network on battery, slowing the enrollment down. The battery percentage at the moment of the switch is recorded on the matched power_state_change event in the session timeline; if the device stayed on battery, look there for subsequent threshold events (50/30/15%) — a later battery_to_ac event means power was restored.",
+  "remediation": [
+    {
+      "title": "Restore AC power",
+      "steps": [
+        "Reconnect the device to AC power; the enrollment continues normally.",
+        "Check the session timeline for a subsequent battery_to_ac event (power restored) or threshold_crossed events (battery draining) to judge urgency.",
+        "If this alert is frequent in a deployment area, check docking stations/USB-C hubs for loose power delivery — a flapping dock is a common cause.",
+        "Make 'plugged in during setup' part of the end-user/technician enrollment instructions."
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "tags": [
+    "device",
+    "power",
+    "battery",
+    "environment"
+  ]
+}

rules/analyze/ANALYZE-DEV-012.json

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
+  "ruleId": "ANALYZE-DEV-012",
+  "title": "Device Entered Standby During Enrollment",
+  "description": "Detects that the device completed a sleep, hibernate or Modern Standby episode of at least 5 minutes while the enrollment was running (system_sleep_episode event from the agent's system timeline watcher, recorded retroactively at wake from the Windows event log — pre-agent episodes are backfilled). Uses a single required condition on the episode's durationSeconds so the match is pinned to one event instance and the interpolated duration is the matched value. Short Modern Standby screen-off scenarios (under 60 s of real sleep) never emit the event, and this rule adds a 5-minute floor so brief lid-close moments do not fire it.",
+  "severity": "info",
+  "category": "device",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "enabled": true,
+  "evaluateOn": [
+    "enrollment_end",
+    "whiteglove_sealed",
+    "on_event:system_sleep_episode"
+  ],
+  "trigger": "single",
+  "baseConfidence": 90,
+  "confidenceThreshold": 60,
+  "conditions": [
+    {
+      "signal": "slept_during_enrollment",
+      "source": "event_data",
+      "eventType": "system_sleep_episode",
+      "dataField": "durationSeconds",
+      "operator": "gte",
+      "value": "300",
+      "required": true
+    }
+  ],
+  "explanation": "The device was asleep for {{durationSeconds}} seconds during the enrollment window. Nothing progresses while the device sleeps — downloads pause, the IME stops processing and the ESP simply waits — so the wall-clock enrollment duration includes this pause and can look much slower than the enrollment actually was. The matched system_sleep_episode event in the session timeline carries the exact enter/exit times, the episode kind (sleep, hibernate or Modern Standby) and, for Modern Standby, whether the device was on AC power. A long unexplained gap in the timeline right before that event is this pause, not missing telemetry.",
+  "remediation": [
+    {
+      "title": "Keep the device awake during enrollment",
+      "steps": [
+        "Check the matched system_sleep_episode event in the timeline for the episode bounds and kind — the enrollment duration minus the episode duration is the real active time.",
+        "If the device slept on battery, connect AC power during setup; Windows sleeps far more aggressively on battery.",
+        "Instruct users/technicians to keep the lid open and the device powered until the enrollment finishes.",
+        "For recurring cases, review the power plan applied during OOBE/ESP (e.g. via provisioning or Intune policy) — consider disabling sleep on AC for the enrollment window."
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "tags": [
+    "device",
+    "power",
+    "standby",
+    "sleep",
+    "environment"
+  ]
+}

rules/analyze/ANALYZE-ID-002.json

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
   "description": "Detects when the LocalAdminAnalyzer flags unexpected local user accounts or profile directories on the device. This is a known Autopilot bypass technique where admin accounts are created before or during enrollment to gain persistent local admin access.",
   "severity": "high",
   "category": "identity",
-  "version": "1.1.0",
+  "version": "1.3.0",
   "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
   "enabled": true,
   "evaluateOn": [
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
     }
   ],
   "confidenceThreshold": 50,
-  "explanation": "The agent detected unexpected local user accounts or profile directories on this device that are not in the built-in or tenant-configured allowed list.\n\nThis is a security-relevant finding. Creating local admin accounts before or during Autopilot enrollment is a known bypass technique (e.g. via BypassNRO or Shift+F10 during OOBE) that grants persistent local administrator access.\n\nClick the event link below to jump to the local_admin_analysis event and check: unexpected_accounts (local user accounts not on the allowed list), unexpected_profiles (C:\\Users profile directories not on the allowed list), bypass_nro (whether the BypassNRO registry flag was set), and confidence_score (the agent's confidence in the finding, 0-100).\n\nIf these accounts are expected for your environment (e.g. a service account or helpdesk account), add them to the allowed list in Tenant Settings.",
+  "explanation": "The agent detected unexpected local user accounts or profile directories on this device that are not in the built-in or tenant-configured allowed list.\n\nThis is a security-relevant finding. Creating local admin accounts before or during Autopilot enrollment is a known bypass technique (e.g. via BypassNRO or Shift+F10 during OOBE) that grants persistent local administrator access.\n\nClick the event link below to jump to the local_admin_analysis event and check: unexpected_accounts (local user accounts not on the allowed list — disabled accounts included, a dormant account can be re-enabled later), unexpected_admin_members (unexpected accounts that are members of the local Administrators group — the actual backdoor), account_details (per account: disabled state and Administrators membership), unexpected_profiles (C:\\Users profile directories not on the allowed list), logged_in_local_accounts (local accounts that were signed in when the shutdown scan ran — a signed-in local account is never exempted, only Entra/domain users are), bypass_nro (whether the BypassNRO registry flag was set), and confidence_score (the agent's confidence in the finding, 0-100).\n\nIf these accounts are expected for your environment (e.g. a service account or helpdesk account), add them to the allowed list in Tenant Settings.",
   "remediation": [
     {
       "title": "Review the unexpected accounts",
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
       "steps": [
         "Check if the BypassNRO registry flag was set (indicates OOBE was bypassed)",
         "Review the enrollment timeline for Shift+F10 or other OOBE escape indicators",
-        "Check whether the unexpected account has admin group membership",
+        "Check 'unexpected_admin_members' and 'account_details' — an unexpected account with Administrators membership is a backdoor even while it is disabled (it can be re-enabled by a scheduled task after enrollment)",
         "Consider re-imaging the device if unauthorized admin access is confirmed"
       ]
     }

rules/analyze/ANALYZE-NET-001.json

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
+  "ruleId": "ANALYZE-NET-001",
+  "title": "Diagnostics Upload Blocked by Web Security Gateway",
+  "description": "Detects diagnostics package uploads that were answered by a security appliance's HTML block page instead of the Autopilot Monitor backend. A forward proxy / secure web gateway (SWG) with SSL inspection is intercepting the upload endpoint, so exactly the sessions where diagnostics matter most (OnFailure uploads) are the ones losing them.",
+  "severity": "warning",
+  "category": "network",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
+  "enabled": true,
+  "baseConfidence": 75,
+  "conditions": [
+    {
+      "signal": "foreign_html_response",
+      "source": "event_data",
+      "eventType": "diagnostics_upload_failed",
+      "dataField": "errorCode",
+      "operator": "contains",
+      "value": "HTML platform error page",
+      "required": true
+    },
+    {
+      "signal": "security_gateway_marker",
+      "source": "event_data",
+      "eventType": "diagnostics_upload_failed",
+      "dataField": "errorCode",
+      "operator": "regex",
+      "value": "mcafee|skyhigh|zscaler|netskope|blue ?coat|proxysg|forcepoint|websense|palo ?alto|fortigate|fortiguard|sophos|watchguard|barracuda|iboss|umbrella|lightspeed|smoothwall|contentkeeper|web ?gateway|web ?filter|content ?filter|secure ?gateway",
+      "required": true
+    },
+    {
+      "signal": "http_403_block",
+      "source": "event_data",
+      "eventType": "diagnostics_upload_failed",
+      "dataField": "errorCode",
+      "operator": "contains",
+      "value": "403",
+      "required": false
+    }
+  ],
+  "confidenceFactors": [
+    {
+      "signal": "http_403_block",
+      "condition": "exists",
+      "weight": 15
+    }
+  ],
+  "confidenceThreshold": 70,
+  "explanation": "The agent collected a diagnostics package but the upload was answered with an **HTML block page from a web security gateway** instead of a response from the Autopilot Monitor backend — the event message names the product that served the page. A forward proxy / SWG with SSL inspection is intercepting HTTPS traffic from the enrollment network and blocking the upload endpoint.\n\nThe consequence is quietly painful: diagnostics upload is typically configured **OnFailure**, so the sessions that fail — the ones where the IME logs and diagnostics ZIP would explain the root cause — are exactly the sessions whose evidence never arrives. Enrollment telemetry itself may still flow (the agent often starts before the gateway's client enforcement does, or other endpoints are treated differently), which makes the gap easy to miss until a failure needs investigating.\n\nNote this rule only fires when the blocking page carries a recognizable security-product marker. A plain HTML error page without one usually means a stale or stopped endpoint instead — that is a different problem.",
+  "remediation": [
+    {
+      "title": "Exempt the upload endpoint in the web gateway",
+      "steps": [
+        "Identify the product from the block-page title quoted in this event's message (e.g. a Skyhigh/McAfee Web Gateway notification page)",
+        "In that gateway, add the Autopilot Monitor API host shown in the event message to the SSL-inspection bypass AND the URL allowlist for the enrollment network segment",
+        "Enrollment traffic often originates from a dedicated provisioning VLAN or from devices without the proxy client yet — make sure the exemption applies to that segment, not only to managed clients",
+        "If the gateway enforces per-user policy, remember ESP-phase traffic runs as SYSTEM/device before any user signs in — the exemption must cover unauthenticated device traffic"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "title": "Verify the fix",
+      "steps": [
+        "Re-run an enrollment (or wait for the next failed one) and confirm a diagnostics package appears on the session in the portal",
+        "Optionally set diagnostics upload to Always temporarily to validate the path without needing a failure"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "relatedDocs": [
+    {
+      "title": "Microsoft Learn: Windows Autopilot networking requirements",
+      "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/networking-requirements"
+    }
+  ],
+  "tags": [
+    "network",
+    "proxy",
+    "ssl-inspection",
+    "swg",
+    "diagnostics"
+  ]
+}

rules/dist/analyze-rules.json

@@ -943,6 +943,97 @@
         "delivery-gap"
       ]
     },
+    {
+      "ruleId": "ANALYZE-APP-017",
+      "title": "App Install Blocked by Another Installer (0x80070652)",
+      "description": "Detects Win32 app installs that failed because the Windows Installer was busy with another installation (HRESULT 0x80070652 / MSI exit code 1618, ERROR_INSTALL_ALREADY_RUNNING). The IME retries on a fixed budget (~15-17 minutes across several attempts) and then reports the app as failed; when the app is ESP-blocking, the Device Setup Apps subcategory terminates with it.",
+      "severity": "high",
+      "category": "apps",
+      "version": "1.0.0",
+      "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
+      "enabled": true,
+      "baseConfidence": 70,
+      "conditions": [
+        {
+          "signal": "mutex_blocked_install",
+          "source": "event_type",
+          "eventType": "app_install_failed",
+          "dataField": "hresultFromWin32",
+          "operator": "equals",
+          "value": "-2147023278",
+          "required": true
+        },
+        {
+          "signal": "installer_exit_1618",
+          "source": "event_data",
+          "eventType": "app_install_failed",
+          "dataField": "exitCode",
+          "operator": "equals",
+          "value": "1618",
+          "required": false
+        },
+        {
+          "signal": "esp_failed_with_mutex_code",
+          "source": "event_data",
+          "eventType": "esp_failure_settle_started",
+          "dataField": "errorCode",
+          "operator": "equals",
+          "value": "0x80070652",
+          "required": false
+        }
+      ],
+      "confidenceFactors": [
+        {
+          "signal": "installer_exit_1618",
+          "condition": "exists",
+          "weight": 10
+        },
+        {
+          "signal": "esp_failed_with_mutex_code",
+          "condition": "exists",
+          "weight": 20
+        }
+      ],
+      "confidenceThreshold": 65,
+      "explanation": "App **{{appName}}** failed to install because the Windows Installer service was already busy with another installation — HRESULT **0x80070652** / MSI exit code **1618** (`ERROR_INSTALL_ALREADY_RUNNING`). Only one Windows Installer transaction can run at a time; the Intune Management Extension retried on its fixed budget (typically ~15-17 minutes across several attempts) and then reported the app as failed. If this app is required in the Enrollment Status Page, the Device Setup Apps subcategory fails with it and the enrollment terminates.\n\nThis failure is **deterministic per attempt**: as long as the competing installer keeps winning the race, a plain re-enrollment fails again at roughly the same minute mark — retrying without fixing the collision only churns devices.\n\nCommon sources of the competing installation:\n\n- The **preceding Win32 app in the install order**: its installer exits 0 (so IME moves on) but leaves a child `msiexec` transaction or post-install MSI work running. Security agents and proxy clients that chain multiple MSIs are frequent offenders.\n- **OEM factory software** installing on first boot (factory-image provisioning packages, vendor updaters) — typical on brand-new hardware batches.\n- **Microsoft 365 Apps (C2R), driver updaters or Windows servicing** running installations in parallel outside IME's control.",
+      "remediation": [
+        {
+          "title": "Identify the competing installer",
+          "steps": [
+            "In this session's timeline, note which app finished installing immediately before {{appName}} started — its installer is the prime suspect for holding the Windows Installer mutex",
+            "On a reproduction device, when the failure window is active, check for running installers: Get-Process msiexec | Select-Object Id,StartTime and the in-progress marker key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Installer\\InProgress",
+            "Check the Application event log for MsiInstaller events around the failure timestamp to see which product held the transaction",
+            "On factory-fresh hardware, also look for OEM first-boot installers (vendor updater services, factory provisioning packages) that run outside Intune"
+          ]
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "Serialize the install chain",
+          "steps": [
+            "Add an Intune Win32 dependency so {{appName}} depends on the app whose installer causes the collision — IME then orders them explicitly instead of racing",
+            "Alternatively, wrap the offending predecessor so its install script waits until msiexec has fully finished (poll the InProgress registry key or the _MSIExecute mutex with a bounded timeout) before exiting",
+            "If the app does not have to gate the ESP, remove it from the blocking-app list so a transient 1618 no longer terminates the enrollment; Intune retries it after the desktop"
+          ]
+        }
+      ],
+      "relatedDocs": [
+        {
+          "title": "Microsoft Learn: MsiExec.exe error messages (1618 = another installation is in progress)",
+          "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/error-codes"
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "Microsoft Learn: Troubleshoot Win32 app installations in Intune",
+          "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/mem/intune/app-management/troubleshoot-win32-app-install"
+        }
+      ],
+      "tags": [
+        "apps",
+        "msiexec",
+        "mutex",
+        "0x80070652",
+        "1618",
+        "esp"
+      ]
+    },
     {
       "ruleId": "ANALYZE-CORR-003",
       "title": "Proxy Configuration Causing Download Failure",
@@ -1584,6 +1675,148 @@
         "known-issue"
       ]
     },
+    {
+      "ruleId": "ANALYZE-DEV-009",
+      "title": "Battery Critically Low During Enrollment",
+      "description": "Detects that the device's battery dropped to 15% or less while enrolling on battery power (power_state_change threshold event from the agent's live power watcher). A device dying mid-enrollment leaves a half-provisioned state that typically needs a full reset; this rule surfaces the risk while there is still time to plug the device in. Uses a single required condition on the agent-stamped thresholdPercent field (the data field 'transition' on the event is unrelated to this rule's 'trigger' property).",
+      "severity": "high",
+      "category": "device",
+      "version": "1.0.0",
+      "enabled": true,
+      "evaluateOn": [
+        "enrollment_end",
+        "whiteglove_sealed",
+        "on_event:power_state_change"
+      ],
+      "trigger": "single",
+      "baseConfidence": 90,
+      "confidenceThreshold": 60,
+      "conditions": [
+        {
+          "signal": "battery_threshold_15",
+          "source": "event_data",
+          "eventType": "power_state_change",
+          "dataField": "thresholdPercent",
+          "operator": "equals",
+          "value": "15",
+          "required": true
+        }
+      ],
+      "explanation": "The device's battery fell below **{{thresholdPercent}}%** while the enrollment was running on battery power. If the battery drains completely mid-enrollment, the device is left in a half-provisioned state — apps, policies, or the user profile may be incomplete, and in most cases the device has to be reset and re-enrolled. The agent detected the threshold crossing live via a Windows power-status notification; the exact percentage at that moment is recorded on the matched power_state_change event in the session timeline.",
+      "remediation": [
+        {
+          "title": "Secure power for the running enrollment",
+          "steps": [
+            "Connect the device to AC power immediately — the enrollment continues normally once power is stable.",
+            "If the device shut down before completing, check whether the session reached the desktop; if not, reset the device (Autopilot reset or reimage) and re-enroll it plugged in.",
+            "For technician/White Glove flows, make AC power part of the bench checklist — pre-provisioning on battery is the most common source of this alert.",
+            "If this fires across many devices of one model, review that model's battery health (the hardware_spec event carries design vs. full-charge capacity)."
+          ]
+        }
+      ],
+      "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+      "tags": [
+        "device",
+        "power",
+        "battery",
+        "environment"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "ruleId": "ANALYZE-DEV-010",
+      "title": "Enrollment Switched From AC to Battery Power",
+      "description": "Detects that the device lost AC power and switched to battery while the enrollment was running (power_state_change event with transition ac_to_battery from the agent's live power watcher). Uses a single required condition so the match is pinned to one event instance; the event payload carries the battery percentage at the moment of the switch. The agent debounces power flapping (5s) so a brief unplug/replug does not produce this event.",
+      "severity": "warning",
+      "category": "device",
+      "version": "1.0.0",
+      "enabled": true,
+      "evaluateOn": [
+        "enrollment_end",
+        "whiteglove_sealed",
+        "on_event:power_state_change"
+      ],
+      "trigger": "single",
+      "baseConfidence": 85,
+      "confidenceThreshold": 60,
+      "conditions": [
+        {
+          "signal": "switched_to_battery",
+          "source": "event_data",
+          "eventType": "power_state_change",
+          "dataField": "transition",
+          "operator": "equals",
+          "value": "ac_to_battery",
+          "required": true
+        }
+      ],
+      "explanation": "The device switched from AC to battery power mid-enrollment. Enrollments are power-hungry — app downloads, Windows Update and disk encryption drain a battery quickly, and Windows may also throttle CPU and network on battery, slowing the enrollment down. The battery percentage at the moment of the switch is recorded on the matched power_state_change event in the session timeline; if the device stayed on battery, look there for subsequent threshold events (50/30/15%) — a later battery_to_ac event means power was restored.",
+      "remediation": [
+        {
+          "title": "Restore AC power",
+          "steps": [
+            "Reconnect the device to AC power; the enrollment continues normally.",
+            "Check the session timeline for a subsequent battery_to_ac event (power restored) or threshold_crossed events (battery draining) to judge urgency.",
+            "If this alert is frequent in a deployment area, check docking stations/USB-C hubs for loose power delivery — a flapping dock is a common cause.",
+            "Make 'plugged in during setup' part of the end-user/technician enrollment instructions."
+          ]
+        }
+      ],
+      "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+      "tags": [
+        "device",
+        "power",
+        "battery",
+        "environment"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "ruleId": "ANALYZE-DEV-012",
+      "title": "Device Entered Standby During Enrollment",
+      "description": "Detects that the device completed a sleep, hibernate or Modern Standby episode of at least 5 minutes while the enrollment was running (system_sleep_episode event from the agent's system timeline watcher, recorded retroactively at wake from the Windows event log — pre-agent episodes are backfilled). Uses a single required condition on the episode's durationSeconds so the match is pinned to one event instance and the interpolated duration is the matched value. Short Modern Standby screen-off scenarios (under 60 s of real sleep) never emit the event, and this rule adds a 5-minute floor so brief lid-close moments do not fire it.",
+      "severity": "info",
+      "category": "device",
+      "version": "1.0.0",
+      "enabled": true,
+      "evaluateOn": [
+        "enrollment_end",
+        "whiteglove_sealed",
+        "on_event:system_sleep_episode"
+      ],
+      "trigger": "single",
+      "baseConfidence": 90,
+      "confidenceThreshold": 60,
+      "conditions": [
+        {
+          "signal": "slept_during_enrollment",
+          "source": "event_data",
+          "eventType": "system_sleep_episode",
+          "dataField": "durationSeconds",
+          "operator": "gte",
+          "value": "300",
+          "required": true
+        }
+      ],
+      "explanation": "The device was asleep for {{durationSeconds}} seconds during the enrollment window. Nothing progresses while the device sleeps — downloads pause, the IME stops processing and the ESP simply waits — so the wall-clock enrollment duration includes this pause and can look much slower than the enrollment actually was. The matched system_sleep_episode event in the session timeline carries the exact enter/exit times, the episode kind (sleep, hibernate or Modern Standby) and, for Modern Standby, whether the device was on AC power. A long unexplained gap in the timeline right before that event is this pause, not missing telemetry.",
+      "remediation": [
+        {
+          "title": "Keep the device awake during enrollment",
+          "steps": [
+            "Check the matched system_sleep_episode event in the timeline for the episode bounds and kind — the enrollment duration minus the episode duration is the real active time.",
+            "If the device slept on battery, connect AC power during setup; Windows sleeps far more aggressively on battery.",
+            "Instruct users/technicians to keep the lid open and the device powered until the enrollment finishes.",
+            "For recurring cases, review the power plan applied during OOBE/ESP (e.g. via provisioning or Intune policy) — consider disabling sleep on AC for the enrollment window."
+          ]
+        }
+      ],
+      "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+      "tags": [
+        "device",
+        "power",
+        "standby",
+        "sleep",
+        "environment"
+      ]
+    },
     {
       "ruleId": "ANALYZE-ENRL-001",
       "title": "Enrollment Failed",
@@ -2533,7 +2766,7 @@
       "description": "Detects when the LocalAdminAnalyzer flags unexpected local user accounts or profile directories on the device. This is a known Autopilot bypass technique where admin accounts are created before or during enrollment to gain persistent local admin access.",
       "severity": "high",
       "category": "identity",
-      "version": "1.1.0",
+      "version": "1.3.0",
       "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
       "enabled": true,
       "evaluateOn": [
@@ -2584,7 +2817,7 @@
         }
       ],
       "confidenceThreshold": 50,
-      "explanation": "The agent detected unexpected local user accounts or profile directories on this device that are not in the built-in or tenant-configured allowed list.\n\nThis is a security-relevant finding. Creating local admin accounts before or during Autopilot enrollment is a known bypass technique (e.g. via BypassNRO or Shift+F10 during OOBE) that grants persistent local administrator access.\n\nClick the event link below to jump to the local_admin_analysis event and check: unexpected_accounts (local user accounts not on the allowed list), unexpected_profiles (C:\\Users profile directories not on the allowed list), bypass_nro (whether the BypassNRO registry flag was set), and confidence_score (the agent's confidence in the finding, 0-100).\n\nIf these accounts are expected for your environment (e.g. a service account or helpdesk account), add them to the allowed list in Tenant Settings.",
+      "explanation": "The agent detected unexpected local user accounts or profile directories on this device that are not in the built-in or tenant-configured allowed list.\n\nThis is a security-relevant finding. Creating local admin accounts before or during Autopilot enrollment is a known bypass technique (e.g. via BypassNRO or Shift+F10 during OOBE) that grants persistent local administrator access.\n\nClick the event link below to jump to the local_admin_analysis event and check: unexpected_accounts (local user accounts not on the allowed list — disabled accounts included, a dormant account can be re-enabled later), unexpected_admin_members (unexpected accounts that are members of the local Administrators group — the actual backdoor), account_details (per account: disabled state and Administrators membership), unexpected_profiles (C:\\Users profile directories not on the allowed list), logged_in_local_accounts (local accounts that were signed in when the shutdown scan ran — a signed-in local account is never exempted, only Entra/domain users are), bypass_nro (whether the BypassNRO registry flag was set), and confidence_score (the agent's confidence in the finding, 0-100).\n\nIf these accounts are expected for your environment (e.g. a service account or helpdesk account), add them to the allowed list in Tenant Settings.",
       "remediation": [
         {
           "title": "Review the unexpected accounts",
@@ -2607,7 +2840,7 @@
           "steps": [
             "Check if the BypassNRO registry flag was set (indicates OOBE was bypassed)",
             "Review the enrollment timeline for Shift+F10 or other OOBE escape indicators",
-            "Check whether the unexpected account has admin group membership",
+            "Check 'unexpected_admin_members' and 'account_details' — an unexpected account with Administrators membership is a backdoor even while it is disabled (it can be re-enabled by a scheduled task after enrollment)",
             "Consider re-imaging the device if unauthorized admin access is confirmed"
           ]
         }
@@ -2822,6 +3055,86 @@
         "esp"
       ]
     },
+    {
+      "ruleId": "ANALYZE-NET-001",
+      "title": "Diagnostics Upload Blocked by Web Security Gateway",
+      "description": "Detects diagnostics package uploads that were answered by a security appliance's HTML block page instead of the Autopilot Monitor backend. A forward proxy / secure web gateway (SWG) with SSL inspection is intercepting the upload endpoint, so exactly the sessions where diagnostics matter most (OnFailure uploads) are the ones losing them.",
+      "severity": "warning",
+      "category": "network",
+      "version": "1.0.0",
+      "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
+      "enabled": true,
+      "baseConfidence": 75,
+      "conditions": [
+        {
+          "signal": "foreign_html_response",
+          "source": "event_data",
+          "eventType": "diagnostics_upload_failed",
+          "dataField": "errorCode",
+          "operator": "contains",
+          "value": "HTML platform error page",
+          "required": true
+        },
+        {
+          "signal": "security_gateway_marker",
+          "source": "event_data",
+          "eventType": "diagnostics_upload_failed",
+          "dataField": "errorCode",
+          "operator": "regex",
+          "value": "mcafee|skyhigh|zscaler|netskope|blue ?coat|proxysg|forcepoint|websense|palo ?alto|fortigate|fortiguard|sophos|watchguard|barracuda|iboss|umbrella|lightspeed|smoothwall|contentkeeper|web ?gateway|web ?filter|content ?filter|secure ?gateway",
+          "required": true
+        },
+        {
+          "signal": "http_403_block",
+          "source": "event_data",
+          "eventType": "diagnostics_upload_failed",
+          "dataField": "errorCode",
+          "operator": "contains",
+          "value": "403",
+          "required": false
+        }
+      ],
+      "confidenceFactors": [
+        {
+          "signal": "http_403_block",
+          "condition": "exists",
+          "weight": 15
+        }
+      ],
+      "confidenceThreshold": 70,
+      "explanation": "The agent collected a diagnostics package but the upload was answered with an **HTML block page from a web security gateway** instead of a response from the Autopilot Monitor backend — the event message names the product that served the page. A forward proxy / SWG with SSL inspection is intercepting HTTPS traffic from the enrollment network and blocking the upload endpoint.\n\nThe consequence is quietly painful: diagnostics upload is typically configured **OnFailure**, so the sessions that fail — the ones where the IME logs and diagnostics ZIP would explain the root cause — are exactly the sessions whose evidence never arrives. Enrollment telemetry itself may still flow (the agent often starts before the gateway's client enforcement does, or other endpoints are treated differently), which makes the gap easy to miss until a failure needs investigating.\n\nNote this rule only fires when the blocking page carries a recognizable security-product marker. A plain HTML error page without one usually means a stale or stopped endpoint instead — that is a different problem.",
+      "remediation": [
+        {
+          "title": "Exempt the upload endpoint in the web gateway",
+          "steps": [
+            "Identify the product from the block-page title quoted in this event's message (e.g. a Skyhigh/McAfee Web Gateway notification page)",
+            "In that gateway, add the Autopilot Monitor API host shown in the event message to the SSL-inspection bypass AND the URL allowlist for the enrollment network segment",
+            "Enrollment traffic often originates from a dedicated provisioning VLAN or from devices without the proxy client yet — make sure the exemption applies to that segment, not only to managed clients",
+            "If the gateway enforces per-user policy, remember ESP-phase traffic runs as SYSTEM/device before any user signs in — the exemption must cover unauthenticated device traffic"
+          ]
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "Verify the fix",
+          "steps": [
+            "Re-run an enrollment (or wait for the next failed one) and confirm a diagnostics package appears on the session in the portal",
+            "Optionally set diagnostics upload to Always temporarily to validate the path without needing a failure"
+          ]
+        }
+      ],
+      "relatedDocs": [
+        {
+          "title": "Microsoft Learn: Windows Autopilot networking requirements",
+          "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/networking-requirements"
+        }
+      ],
+      "tags": [
+        "network",
+        "proxy",
+        "ssl-inspection",
+        "swg",
+        "diagnostics"
+      ]
+    },
     {
       "ruleId": "ANALYZE-OFFICE-001",
       "title": "Microsoft 365 Apps Install Failed",

rules/dist/ime-log-patterns.json

@@ -675,6 +675,14 @@
       "description": "Detects when IME completes a user session, indicating enrollment has finished for that user.",
       "enabled": true
     },
+    {
+      "patternId": "IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS",
+      "category": "always",
+      "pattern": "\\[Win32App\\] Get 0 apps for user session (?<sessionId>\\d+), user id = (?<userId>[a-f0-9\\-]+)",
+      "action": "userSessionZeroApps",
+      "description": "Detects when IME enumerated a user session and found zero targeted Win32 apps. IME then skips its 'Completed user session' line entirely (the zero-app branch in ApplicationPoller continues before that log statement), so this line is the only evidence that user-phase enforcement finished on a device with no user-targeted apps. Treated as equivalent to a completed user session.",
+      "enabled": true
+    },
     {
       "patternId": "IME-WIN32-STATE-1",
       "category": "currentPhase",

rules/ime-log-patterns/IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "../schema/ime-log-pattern.schema.json",
+  "patternId": "IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS",
+  "category": "always",
+  "pattern": "\\[Win32App\\] Get 0 apps for user session (?<sessionId>\\d+), user id = (?<userId>[a-f0-9\\-]+)",
+  "action": "userSessionZeroApps",
+  "description": "Detects when IME enumerated a user session and found zero targeted Win32 apps. IME then skips its 'Completed user session' line entirely (the zero-app branch in ApplicationPoller continues before that log statement), so this line is the only evidence that user-phase enforcement finished on a device with no user-targeted apps. Treated as equivalent to a completed user session.",
+  "enabled": true
+}

rules/schema/guardrails.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/OliverKieselbach/Autopilot-Monitor/main/rules/schema/guardrails.schema.json",
+  "title": "Autopilot Monitor Gather-Rule Guardrails",
+  "description": "Agent-side collection allowlists/blocklists. Every string is emitted verbatim into generated TypeScript (web + MCP), so values are single-line and must not contain control characters or the U+2028/U+2029 line terminators.",
+  "type": "object",
+  "properties": {
+    "$schema": { "type": "string" },
+    "registryPrefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/categorizedList" },
+    "filePrefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
+    "wmiQueryPrefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
+    "eventLogChannels": { "$ref": "#/$defs/categorizedList" },
+    "blockedEventLogChannels": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
+    "allowedCommands": { "$ref": "#/$defs/categorizedList" },
+    "diagnosticsPathPrefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
+    "blockedFilePrefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
+    "blockedCommandPatterns": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
+    "blockedInterimTriggerEventTypes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
+    "maxCommandLength": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 100000 }
+  },
+  "required": [
+    "registryPrefixes",
+    "filePrefixes",
+    "wmiQueryPrefixes",
+    "eventLogChannels",
+    "blockedEventLogChannels",
+    "allowedCommands",
+    "diagnosticsPathPrefixes",
+    "blockedFilePrefixes",
+    "blockedCommandPatterns",
+    "maxCommandLength"
+  ],
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "$defs": {
+    "safeString": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "minLength": 1,
+      "maxLength": 2000,
+      "pattern": "^[^\\u0000-\\u001F\\u007F\\u2028\\u2029]+$"
+    },
+    "stringList": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/safeString" }
+    },
+    "categorizedList": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "items": {
+        "type": "object",
+        "properties": {
+          "category": { "$ref": "#/$defs/safeString" },
+          "prefixes": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
+          "channels": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" },
+          "commands": { "$ref": "#/$defs/stringList" }
+        },
+        "required": ["category"],
+        "minProperties": 2,
+        "maxProperties": 2,
+        "additionalProperties": false
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

rules/schema/ime-log-pattern.schema.json

@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
             "imeImpersonation",
             "imeTokenFailure",
             "enrollmentCompleted",
+            "userSessionZeroApps",
             "updateDoTelemetry",
             "scriptStarted",
             "scriptContext",

rules/scripts/combine.js

@@ -13,18 +13,26 @@ const rulesRoot = path.resolve(__dirname, '..');
 
 // ── Rule combination ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
+// Shipped gather/analyze rules must stay inside the reserved built-in namespace:
+// (ANALYZE|GATHER)-<CATEGORY>-<NNN> with CATEGORY !== CUSTOM. The CUSTOM category is
+// the sanctioned tenant namespace (RuleIdPolicy.cs) — a built-in shipped there would
+// silently shadow every tenant's same-ID custom rule at merge time (global wins).
+const RESERVED_BUILTIN_ID = /^(ANALYZE|GATHER)-(?!CUSTOM-)[A-Z]+-\d{3}$/;
+
 const configs = [
   {
     dir: path.join(rulesRoot, 'gather'),
     output: path.join(rulesRoot, 'dist', 'gather-rules.json'),
     schema: '../schema/gather-rule.schema.json',
-    idField: 'ruleId'
+    idField: 'ruleId',
+    reservedNamespace: RESERVED_BUILTIN_ID
   },
   {
     dir: path.join(rulesRoot, 'analyze'),
     output: path.join(rulesRoot, 'dist', 'analyze-rules.json'),
     schema: '../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json',
-    idField: 'ruleId'
+    idField: 'ruleId',
+    reservedNamespace: RESERVED_BUILTIN_ID
   },
   {
     dir: path.join(rulesRoot, 'ime-log-patterns'),
@@ -37,12 +45,27 @@ const configs = [
 for (const config of configs) {
   const files = fs.readdirSync(config.dir).filter(f => f.endsWith('.json')).sort();
   const rules = [];
+  const seenIds = new Map(); // lowercased id -> filename (case variants collide for humans and RuleIdPolicy)
 
   for (const file of files) {
     const content = fs.readFileSync(path.join(config.dir, file), 'utf8');
     const rule = JSON.parse(content);
     // Remove $schema from individual entries (it's on the wrapper)
     delete rule['$schema'];
+
+    const id = rule[config.idField] || '';
+    const idKey = id.toLowerCase();
+    if (seenIds.has(idKey)) {
+      console.error(`ERROR: duplicate ${config.idField} "${id}" in ${file} (already defined in ${seenIds.get(idKey)})`);
+      process.exit(1);
+    }
+    seenIds.set(idKey, file);
+
+    if (config.reservedNamespace && !config.reservedNamespace.test(id)) {
+      console.error(`ERROR: ${file}: ${config.idField} "${id}" is outside the reserved built-in namespace ${config.reservedNamespace} — built-ins must never use the tenant CUSTOM namespace`);
+      process.exit(1);
+    }
+
     rules.push(rule);
   }
 
@@ -74,18 +97,71 @@ const guardrailsOutput = path.resolve(
 if (fs.existsSync(guardrailsPath)) {
   const guardrails = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(guardrailsPath, 'utf8'));
 
-  /** Escape a string for use inside a TS string literal (double-quoted). */
-  const esc = (s) => s.replace(/\\/g, '\\\\').replace(/"/g, '\\"');
+  // Every value below is emitted into a TypeScript module that ships in the
+  // portal bundle (and is auto-committed + auto-deployed from main). A string
+  // containing a raw newline / CR / U+2028 / U+2029 inside a naive "..." literal
+  // would terminate the literal and turn the remainder of the value into CODE.
+  // Two independent defences: (1) reject any control/line-terminator character
+  // outright — no legitimate prefix, command or channel name contains one —
+  // and (2) render every literal through a complete encoder (JSON.stringify),
+  // so even a value that slipped past (1) stays an inert string constant.
+  // rules/schema/guardrails.schema.json enforces the same constraints in CI
+  // before this script runs; this in-process check keeps local runs honest.
+  const UNSAFE_CHAR = /[\u0000-\u001F\u007F\u2028\u2029]/;
+  const fail = (msg) => {
+    console.error(`ERROR: guardrails.json ${msg}`);
+    process.exit(1);
+  };
+  const assertSafeString = (value, where) => {
+    if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) {
+      fail(`${where}: expected a non-empty string, got ${JSON.stringify(value)}`);
+    }
+    if (UNSAFE_CHAR.test(value)) {
+      fail(`${where}: control or line-terminator character in ${JSON.stringify(value)}`);
+    }
+  };
+  const assertStringList = (list, where) => {
+    if (!Array.isArray(list)) fail(`${where}: expected an array`);
+    list.forEach((s, i) => assertSafeString(s, `${where}[${i}]`));
+  };
+  const assertCategorized = (groups, itemsKey, where) => {
+    if (!Array.isArray(groups)) fail(`${where}: expected an array`);
+    groups.forEach((g, i) => {
+      assertSafeString(g && g.category, `${where}[${i}].category`);
+      assertStringList(g[itemsKey], `${where}[${i}].${itemsKey}`);
+    });
+  };
+
+  assertCategorized(guardrails.registryPrefixes, 'prefixes', 'registryPrefixes');
+  assertCategorized(guardrails.allowedCommands, 'commands', 'allowedCommands');
+  assertCategorized(guardrails.eventLogChannels, 'channels', 'eventLogChannels');
+  for (const key of [
+    'filePrefixes', 'wmiQueryPrefixes', 'diagnosticsPathPrefixes', 'blockedFilePrefixes',
+    'blockedEventLogChannels', 'blockedCommandPatterns'
+  ]) {
+    assertStringList(guardrails[key], key);
+  }
+  assertStringList(guardrails.blockedInterimTriggerEventTypes ?? [], 'blockedInterimTriggerEventTypes');
+  if (!Number.isInteger(guardrails.maxCommandLength) || guardrails.maxCommandLength < 1) {
+    fail(`maxCommandLength: expected a positive integer, got ${JSON.stringify(guardrails.maxCommandLength)}`);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Render a string as a complete, self-contained TS double-quoted literal.
+   * JSON.stringify escapes backslash, quote and every C0 control character;
+   * U+2028/U+2029 are escaped on top because JSON does not require it.
+   */
+  const lit = (s) => JSON.stringify(s).replace(/\u2028/g, '\\u2028').replace(/\u2029/g, '\\u2029');
 
   /** Render an array of strings as a TS readonly array. */
   const flatArray = (items) =>
-    items.map((s) => `  "${esc(s)}",`).join('\n');
+    items.map((s) => `  ${lit(s)},`).join('\n');
 
   /** Render a categorized list as a TS readonly array of { category, items }. */
   const categorizedArray = (groups, itemsKey) =>
     groups.map((g) => {
-      const items = g[itemsKey].map((s) => `      "${esc(s)}",`).join('\n');
-      return `  {\n    category: "${esc(g.category)}",\n    items: [\n${items}\n    ],\n  },`;
+      const items = g[itemsKey].map((s) => `      ${lit(s)},`).join('\n');
+      return `  {\n    category: ${lit(g.category)},\n    items: [\n${items}\n    ],\n  },`;
     }).join('\n');
 
   // Flatten categorized lists for validation

scripts/CustomerSetup/Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#Requires -Version 5.1
+#Requires -Version 5.1
 <#
 .SYNOPSIS
     Grants additional Microsoft Graph application permissions to the Autopilot Monitor
@@ -28,10 +28,18 @@
         (validates Windows 365 Cloud PCs against the tenant's Cloud PC inventory --
          Cloud PCs are never Autopilot-registered, so this enables agent monitoring
          of Cloud PC first-connect enrollment)
+      - IntuneDeviceBinding     -> DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All
+        (cert-to-device binding: verifies that the Intune device id carried in the
+         agent's client certificate is a device THIS tenant actually enrolled --
+         currently a Global-Admin-only preview that records telemetry and does not
+         block enrollment)
+      - All                    -> every optional permission above, in one run
+        (also works with -Revoke to remove all optional grants at once)
 
 .PARAMETER Permissions
-    Microsoft Graph application permission names to grant directly. Use when the admin UI
-    rendered a copy-paste command for you, or when you have a specific list in mind.
+    Microsoft Graph application permission names to grant directly. Use when you copied the
+    permission list from the admin UI ("Copy permissions"), or when you have a specific list
+    in mind.
 
 .PARAMETER TenantId
     Tenant ID (GUID) or verified domain. Optional -- defaults to the signed-in context.
@@ -47,12 +55,16 @@
     .\Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1 -ClientId "<your-client-id>" -Features ScriptDisplayNames
 
 .EXAMPLE
-    # Same effect, using the explicit-permission form (what the admin UI generates):
+    # Same effect, using the explicit-permission form:
     .\Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1 `
         -ClientId "<your-client-id>" `
         -Permissions "DeviceManagementScripts.Read.All" `
         -TenantId "contoso.onmicrosoft.com"
 
+.EXAMPLE
+    # Grant every optional capability in one run:
+    .\Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1 -ClientId "<your-client-id>" -Features All
+
 .EXAMPLE
     # Verify current state only, no changes:
     .\Grant-AutopilotMonitorAddOn.ps1 -ClientId "<your-client-id>" -Features ScriptDisplayNames -VerifyOnly
@@ -65,6 +77,12 @@
     Requires:
       - Microsoft.Graph.Authentication PowerShell module (auto-installs if missing).
       - Sign-in as Global Administrator OR Privileged Role Administrator OR Cloud Application Administrator.
+
+    Sign-in behaviour:
+      In Azure Cloud Shell the script signs in via the ambient identity endpoint (a delegated
+      token for the already-signed-in user) - no device-code prompt, which Conditional Access
+      policies commonly block. Outside Cloud Shell it falls back to a normal interactive
+      Microsoft Graph sign-in. -TenantId only applies to the interactive fallback.
       - The Autopilot Monitor app must be admin-consented in your tenant first
         (its service principal must exist before grants can be added).
 
@@ -80,7 +98,7 @@ param(
     [string]$ClientId,
 
     [Parameter(Mandatory = $true, ParameterSetName = 'ByFeatures')]
-    [ValidateSet('ScriptDisplayNames', 'W365CloudPcValidation')]
+    [ValidateSet('All', 'ScriptDisplayNames', 'W365CloudPcValidation', 'IntuneDeviceBinding')]
     [string[]]$Features,
 
     [Parameter(Mandatory = $true, ParameterSetName = 'ByPermissions')]
@@ -103,10 +121,15 @@ $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
 $FeatureCatalog = @{
     'ScriptDisplayNames'    = @('DeviceManagementScripts.Read.All')
     'W365CloudPcValidation' = @('CloudPC.Read.All')
+    'IntuneDeviceBinding'   = @('DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All')
 }
 
 # Translate Features -> Permissions when caller used the high-level form.
+# 'All' is a script-side meta-value: it expands to every catalog feature.
 if ($PSCmdlet.ParameterSetName -eq 'ByFeatures') {
+    if ($Features -contains 'All') {
+        $Features = @($FeatureCatalog.Keys)
+    }
     $Permissions = @()
     foreach ($f in $Features) {
         $Permissions += $FeatureCatalog[$f]
@@ -133,7 +156,25 @@ if ($TenantId) { $connectParams['TenantId'] = $TenantId }
 
 Write-Host ""
 Write-Host "[Auth] Connecting to Microsoft Graph..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
-Connect-MgGraph @connectParams | Out-Null
+
+# Preferred path: ambient identity. In Azure Cloud Shell the local identity endpoint issues a
+# delegated Graph token for the signed-in user, which avoids the device-code flow that
+# Conditional Access policies commonly block. Outside Azure this throws and we fall back to
+# an interactive sign-in with explicit scopes.
+$identityConnected = $false
+try {
+    Connect-MgGraph -Identity -NoWelcome -ErrorAction Stop | Out-Null
+    # An ambient identity can exist yet hold no Graph permissions (e.g. a plain VM managed
+    # identity) - probe with a read before committing to this session.
+    Invoke-MgGraphRequest -Method GET -Uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/servicePrincipals?`$select=id&`$top=1" -ErrorAction Stop | Out-Null
+    $identityConnected = $true
+    Write-Host "[Auth] Connected via ambient identity (Azure Cloud Shell / managed identity)." -ForegroundColor Green
+}
+catch {
+    if (Get-MgContext) { Disconnect-MgGraph -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null }
+    Write-Host "[Auth] No usable ambient identity - falling back to interactive sign-in..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
+    Connect-MgGraph @connectParams | Out-Null
+}
 
 $ctx = Get-MgContext
 if (-not $ctx) {
@@ -144,7 +185,10 @@ Write-Host "[Auth] Signed in as : $($ctx.Account)"
 Write-Host "[Auth] Tenant       : $($ctx.TenantId)"
 Write-Host "[Auth] Granted scopes: $($ctx.Scopes -join ', ')"
 
-if (-not ($ctx.Scopes -contains 'AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All')) {
+# Scope check only applies to the interactive path: an ambient-identity (Cloud Shell) token
+# carries a fixed scope set (incl. Directory.AccessAsUser.All) instead of the requested scopes,
+# and its effective rights follow the signed-in user's directory role.
+if (-not $identityConnected -and -not ($ctx.Scopes -contains 'AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All')) {
     Write-Warning "Scope 'AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All' was NOT granted. The signed-in user likely lacks the required role (Global Admin / Privileged Role Admin / Cloud App Admin)."
     if (-not $VerifyOnly) { return }
 }

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Configuration/BuiltInConfigCatalogTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+using System.Linq;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Pins the compiled-in fallback rule catalogs (<see cref="BuiltInConfigCatalog"/>):
+    /// the agent embeds the SAME CI-combined rules/dist artifacts the backend serves, so a
+    /// no-config/no-cache session still runs full IME tracking. These tests guard the
+    /// embedding + deserialization end-to-end — a broken LogicalName, a moved resource or a
+    /// shape change in the combined JSON must fail HERE, not silently strip the fallback
+    /// back down to zero patterns in the field.
+    /// </summary>
+    public class BuiltInConfigCatalogTests
+    {
+        [Fact]
+        public void ImeLogPatterns_LoadFromEmbeddedCatalog_EnabledOnly()
+        {
+            var patterns = BuiltInConfigCatalog.GetEnabledImeLogPatterns(logger: null);
+
+            Assert.NotEmpty(patterns);
+            Assert.All(patterns, p =>
+            {
+                Assert.True(p.Enabled);
+                Assert.False(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(p.PatternId));
+                Assert.False(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(p.Pattern));
+                Assert.False(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(p.Action));
+                Assert.False(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(p.Category));
+            });
+            Assert.Equal(patterns.Count, patterns.Select(p => p.PatternId).Distinct().Count());
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ImeLogPatterns_CarryCoreTrackingActions()
+        {
+            // The app-tracking backbone: without these two actions the ImeLogTracker cannot
+            // attribute installs to apps or follow ESP phases. Their presence proves the
+            // deserialization actually populated the action field (a shape drift in the
+            // combined JSON would otherwise still pass the structural checks above).
+            var actions = BuiltInConfigCatalog.GetEnabledImeLogPatterns(logger: null)
+                .Select(p => p.Action).ToHashSet();
+
+            Assert.Contains("setCurrentApp", actions);
+            Assert.Contains("espPhaseDetected", actions);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void GatherRules_LoadFromEmbeddedCatalog_EnabledOnly()
+        {
+            // The built-in gather-rule catalog ships mostly disabled rules — only the
+            // default-enabled ones may reach the fallback config.
+            var rules = BuiltInConfigCatalog.GetEnabledGatherRules(logger: null);
+
+            Assert.All(rules, r =>
+            {
+                Assert.True(r.Enabled);
+                Assert.False(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(r.RuleId));
+            });
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Configuration/RemoteConfigMergerCompletenessTests.cs

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
             nameof(AgentConfigResponse.EnrollmentSummaryLaunchRetrySeconds),
             nameof(AgentConfigResponse.NtpServer),
             nameof(AgentConfigResponse.EnableTimezoneAutoSet),
+            nameof(AgentConfigResponse.EnableDoGroupIdAutoSet),
             nameof(AgentConfigResponse.DiagnosticsUploadEnabled),
             nameof(AgentConfigResponse.DiagnosticsUploadMode),
             nameof(AgentConfigResponse.DiagnosticsLogPaths),
@@ -52,6 +53,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
             // Merge reads two Collectors knobs (AgentMaxLifetimeMinutes, HelloWaitTimeoutSeconds);
             // the remaining CollectorConfiguration flags flow untouched to DefaultComponentFactory.
             nameof(AgentConfigResponse.Collectors),
+            // Merge reads one Analyzers knob (EnableRealmJoinWatcher → diagnostics RealmJoin sections);
+            // the remaining flags flow untouched to DefaultComponentFactory + AgentAnalyzerManager.
+            nameof(AgentConfigResponse.Analyzers),
         };
 
         /// <summary>
@@ -69,8 +73,6 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
             nameof(AgentConfigResponse.ImeLogPatterns),
             // Passed by AgentRuntimeHost into IComponentFactory.CreateCollectorHosts → ImeLogHost sealing re-emit.
             nameof(AgentConfigResponse.WhiteGloveSealingPatternIds),
-            // Consumed by DefaultComponentFactory (RealmJoin/KeepAwake/ConsoleBypass host gates) + AgentAnalyzerManager.
-            nameof(AgentConfigResponse.Analyzers),
             // Self-update ZIP integrity second trust channel — BinaryIntegrityVerifier / Program update path.
             nameof(AgentConfigResponse.LatestAgentSha256),
             // Running-EXE integrity verification — BinaryIntegrityVerifier post-config check.

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Configuration/RemoteConfigMergerTests.cs

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
             EnrollmentSummaryLaunchRetrySeconds = 300,
             NtpServer = "pool.ntp.org",
             EnableTimezoneAutoSet = true,
+            EnableDoGroupIdAutoSet = true,
             DiagnosticsUploadEnabled = true,
             DiagnosticsUploadMode = "OnFailure",
             DiagnosticsLogPaths = new List<DiagnosticsLogPath>
@@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
             Assert.Equal(300, agent.EnrollmentSummaryLaunchRetrySeconds);
             Assert.Equal("pool.ntp.org", agent.NtpServer);
             Assert.True(agent.EnableTimezoneAutoSet);
+            Assert.True(agent.EnableDoGroupIdAutoSet);
             Assert.True(agent.DiagnosticsUploadEnabled);
             Assert.Equal("OnFailure", agent.DiagnosticsUploadMode);
             Assert.Single(agent.DiagnosticsLogPaths);
@@ -366,6 +368,33 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
             Assert.Equal(30, agent.HelloWaitTimeoutSeconds);
         }
 
+        [Fact]
+        public void Merge_mirrors_analyzers_realmjoin_watcher_onto_agent_config()
+        {
+            // The diagnostics package gates its RealmJoin sections on this flag but never
+            // sees the remote response — the merger carries the one Analyzers knob over.
+            var agent = NewAgentConfig();
+            var remote = FullRemote();
+            remote.Analyzers = new AnalyzerConfiguration { EnableRealmJoinWatcher = true };
+
+            RemoteConfigMerger.Merge(agent, remote);
+
+            Assert.True(agent.EnableRealmJoinWatcher);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Merge_clears_realmjoin_watcher_when_remote_analyzers_missing()
+        {
+            var agent = NewAgentConfig();
+            agent.EnableRealmJoinWatcher = true;   // stale cached true must not survive
+            var remote = FullRemote();
+            remote.Analyzers = null!;
+
+            RemoteConfigMerger.Merge(agent, remote);
+
+            Assert.False(agent.EnableRealmJoinWatcher);
+        }
+
         [Fact]
         public void Merge_replaces_diagnostics_log_paths_with_empty_list_when_remote_null()
         {

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Configuration/RemoteConfigServiceRetryTests.cs

@@ -114,6 +114,22 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
             Assert.Equal(1, svc.LastFetchAttempts);
         }
 
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task FetchConfig_DefaultsFallback_CarriesBuiltInCatalogs()
+        {
+            // A no-config/no-cache session must still get the compiled-in rule catalogs —
+            // an empty ImeLogPatterns list kills the entire IME tracking pipeline (the
+            // pre-catalog behaviour this pins against regressing to).
+            var svc = NewService(BackendBehaviour.AlwaysTransientFailure);
+
+            var result = await svc.FetchConfigAsync(retryOnTransientErrors: true);
+
+            Assert.Equal(0, result.ConfigVersion);
+            Assert.NotEmpty(result.ImeLogPatterns);
+            Assert.All(result.ImeLogPatterns, p => Assert.True(p.Enabled));
+            Assert.All(result.GatherRules, r => Assert.True(r.Enabled));
+        }
+
         [Fact]
         public async Task FetchConfig_EmptyResponse_TreatedAsTransient()
         {
@@ -128,6 +144,94 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
             Assert.Equal(4, svc.LastFetchAttempts);
         }
 
+        // ── Network-link gate (tenant aebdce78 audit 2026-08-24) ────────────
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task FetchConfig_InitialFetch_WaitsForNetworkLink()
+        {
+            // The initial startup fetch must gate on the link-level signal so the retry
+            // budget isn't burned into a NIC that is provably still down (agent relaunched
+            // at boot, Wi-Fi still associating).
+            var svc = NewService(BackendBehaviour.SuccessImmediately);
+
+            await svc.FetchConfigAsync(retryOnTransientErrors: true);
+
+            Assert.Equal(1, svc.NetworkLinkWaits);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task FetchConfig_RotatePath_SkipsNetworkLinkGate()
+        {
+            // rotate_config runs mid-session on a proven link and must stay latency-bounded.
+            var svc = NewService(BackendBehaviour.SuccessImmediately);
+
+            await svc.FetchConfigAsync(retryOnTransientErrors: false);
+
+            Assert.Equal(0, svc.NetworkLinkWaits);
+        }
+
+        // ── Post-registration recovery ──────────────────────────────────────
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task TryRecover_AfterFailedFetch_AppliesLiveConfig_KeepsFailureRecord()
+        {
+            // The core self-heal contract: registration proved the backend reachable, the
+            // recovery swaps in the live config — but the LastFetch* observability keeps
+            // describing the failed startup fetch so the wire event can report both.
+            var svc = NewService(BackendBehaviour.FailAllThenSucceed);
+            await svc.FetchConfigAsync(retryOnTransientErrors: true);
+            Assert.Equal(RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.UsedDefaults, svc.LastFetchOutcome);
+
+            var recovered = await svc.TryRecoverConfigAsync();
+
+            Assert.NotNull(recovered);
+            Assert.Equal(42, recovered.ConfigVersion);
+            Assert.Equal(42, svc.CurrentConfig.ConfigVersion);
+            Assert.True(svc.RecoveredAfterFetchFailure);
+            // Startup-failure record intact:
+            Assert.Equal(RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.UsedDefaults, svc.LastFetchOutcome);
+            Assert.Equal(1 + RemoteConfigService.InitialFetchRetryBackoff.Length, svc.LastFetchAttempts);
+            Assert.Equal(nameof(HttpRequestException), svc.LastFetchFailureType);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task TryRecover_AfterSuccessfulFetch_IsNoOp()
+        {
+            var svc = NewService(BackendBehaviour.SuccessImmediately);
+            await svc.FetchConfigAsync(retryOnTransientErrors: true);
+
+            var recovered = await svc.TryRecoverConfigAsync();
+
+            Assert.Null(recovered);
+            Assert.False(svc.RecoveredAfterFetchFailure);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task TryRecover_BeforeAnyFetch_IsNoOp()
+        {
+            var svc = NewService(BackendBehaviour.SuccessImmediately);
+
+            var recovered = await svc.TryRecoverConfigAsync();
+
+            Assert.Null(recovered);
+            Assert.False(svc.RecoveredAfterFetchFailure);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task TryRecover_WhenBackendStillFailing_KeepsFallback_NeverThrows()
+        {
+            var svc = NewService(BackendBehaviour.AlwaysTransientFailure);
+            var fallback = await svc.FetchConfigAsync(retryOnTransientErrors: true);
+            Assert.Equal(0, fallback.ConfigVersion);
+
+            var recovered = await svc.TryRecoverConfigAsync();
+
+            Assert.Null(recovered);
+            Assert.False(svc.RecoveredAfterFetchFailure);
+            Assert.Equal(0, svc.CurrentConfig.ConfigVersion); // fallback config untouched
+            Assert.Equal(RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.UsedDefaults, svc.LastFetchOutcome);
+        }
+
         // ── Outcome state defaults ──────────────────────────────────────────
 
         [Fact]
@@ -145,6 +249,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
             SuccessImmediately,
             AlwaysTransientFailure,
             FailTwiceThenSucceed,
+            /// <summary>All 4 initial attempts fail; the NEXT call (the recovery fetch) succeeds.</summary>
+            FailAllThenSucceed,
             AlwaysAuthFailure401,
             AlwaysReturnNull,
         }
@@ -177,6 +283,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
                 _behaviour = behaviour;
             }
 
+            /// <summary>Number of times the network-link gate seam was awaited.</summary>
+            public int NetworkLinkWaits { get; private set; }
+
             protected override Task<AgentConfigResponse> CallBackendAsync()
             {
                 _calls++;
@@ -188,6 +297,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
                         if (_calls < 3)
                             throw new HttpRequestException("simulated cold-start timeout");
                         return Task.FromResult(new AgentConfigResponse { ConfigVersion = 42 });
+                    case BackendBehaviour.FailAllThenSucceed:
+                        if (_calls <= 1 + RemoteConfigService.InitialFetchRetryBackoff.Length)
+                            throw new HttpRequestException("simulated dead network link");
+                        return Task.FromResult(new AgentConfigResponse { ConfigVersion = 42 });
                     case BackendBehaviour.AlwaysTransientFailure:
                         throw new HttpRequestException("simulated network failure");
                     case BackendBehaviour.AlwaysAuthFailure401:
@@ -202,6 +315,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
             // Zero-delay so the suite finishes in ms instead of the live 10/30/60 s schedule.
             protected override Task DelayBetweenAttemptsAsync(TimeSpan delay) => Task.CompletedTask;
 
+            // Record + skip the real link poll so the suite is deterministic on offline CI.
+            protected override Task WaitForNetworkLinkAsync()
+            {
+                NetworkLinkWaits++;
+                return Task.CompletedTask;
+            }
+
             // In-memory + per-instance cache so a prior test's successful fetch can't
             // bleed into a later test that expects UsedDefaults.
             private AgentConfigResponse? _cached;

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Harness/NtfsLinks.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+using System;
+using System.Diagnostics;
+using System.IO;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Creates NTFS reparse points for guard tests through <c>cmd.exe /c mklink</c> — the stock
+    /// System32 binary started as-is, nothing copied or renamed (EDR-neutral). Directory
+    /// junctions need no privilege; file symlinks need SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege or
+    /// Developer Mode, so that helper reports failure instead of throwing.
+    /// </summary>
+    internal static class NtfsLinks
+    {
+        public static void CreateJunction(string link, string target)
+        {
+            var output = RunMklink($"/J \"{link}\" \"{target}\"");
+            if (!Directory.Exists(link) || (File.GetAttributes(link) & FileAttributes.ReparsePoint) == 0)
+                throw new InvalidOperationException($"mklink /J failed for '{link}' -> '{target}': {output}");
+        }
+
+        public static bool TryCreateFileSymlink(string link, string target)
+        {
+            RunMklink($"\"{link}\" \"{target}\"");
+            return File.Exists(link) && (File.GetAttributes(link) & FileAttributes.ReparsePoint) != 0;
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>Removes a junction or symlink itself, never the target's content.</summary>
+        public static void RemoveLink(string link)
+        {
+            if (Directory.Exists(link)) Directory.Delete(link, recursive: false);
+            else if (File.Exists(link)) File.Delete(link);
+        }
+
+        private static string RunMklink(string arguments)
+        {
+            var psi = new ProcessStartInfo
+            {
+                FileName = Path.Combine(Environment.SystemDirectory, "cmd.exe"),
+                Arguments = "/c mklink " + arguments,
+                UseShellExecute = false,
+                CreateNoWindow = true,
+                RedirectStandardOutput = true,
+                RedirectStandardError = true,
+            };
+            using var process = Process.Start(psi);
+            if (process == null) throw new InvalidOperationException("cmd.exe did not start");
+            var stdout = process.StandardOutput.ReadToEnd();
+            var stderr = process.StandardError.ReadToEnd();
+            process.WaitForExit(15000);
+            return (stdout + stderr).Trim();
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Analyzers/LocalAdminAnalyzerDynamicAllowanceTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+#nullable enable
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using System.IO;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Analyzers;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Analyzers
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// LocalAdminAnalyzer shutdown-time dynamic allowance and profile-folder filtering.
+    /// Pins the CWE-807 fix: a logged-in user is only exempted when the name is NOT a local
+    /// SAM account — a backdoor account that signs itself in before the shutdown scan must
+    /// still be scored. All names are synthetic.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class LocalAdminAnalyzerDynamicAllowanceTests
+    {
+        private static LocalAdminAnalyzer.LocalAccountInfo Account(string name, int rid = 1001) =>
+            new LocalAdminAnalyzer.LocalAccountInfo { Name = name, Disabled = false, Sid = "S-1-5-21-111-222-333-" + rid };
+
+        private static readonly List<LocalAdminAnalyzer.LocalAccountInfo> Inventory = new List<LocalAdminAnalyzer.LocalAccountInfo>
+        {
+            Account("Administrator", 500),
+            Account("Guest", 501),
+            Account("defaultuser0", 1000),
+            Account("backdoor", 1001)
+        };
+
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------- logged-in split
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Entra_or_domain_user_is_allowed_dynamically()
+        {
+            var split = LocalAdminAnalyzer.SplitLoggedInUsers(new[] { "A0D715F", "jane.doe" }, Inventory);
+
+            Assert.Equal(new[] { "A0D715F", "jane.doe" }, split.Allowed);
+            Assert.Empty(split.LocalAccounts);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Logged_in_local_account_is_never_allowed_dynamically()
+        {
+            var split = LocalAdminAnalyzer.SplitLoggedInUsers(new[] { "backdoor" }, Inventory);
+
+            Assert.Empty(split.Allowed);
+            Assert.Equal(new[] { "backdoor" }, split.LocalAccounts);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Local_account_match_is_case_insensitive()
+        {
+            var split = LocalAdminAnalyzer.SplitLoggedInUsers(new[] { "BACKDOOR" }, Inventory);
+
+            Assert.Empty(split.Allowed);
+            Assert.Equal(new[] { "BACKDOOR" }, split.LocalAccounts);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Mixed_logins_are_split_and_blank_names_dropped()
+        {
+            var split = LocalAdminAnalyzer.SplitLoggedInUsers(new[] { "kftest", "", "backdoor", " " }, Inventory);
+
+            Assert.Equal(new[] { "kftest" }, split.Allowed);
+            Assert.Equal(new[] { "backdoor" }, split.LocalAccounts);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void No_logins_or_no_inventory_yield_empty_or_all_allowed()
+        {
+            var none = LocalAdminAnalyzer.SplitLoggedInUsers(null, Inventory);
+            Assert.Empty(none.Allowed);
+            Assert.Empty(none.LocalAccounts);
+
+            // WMI failed: nothing to compare against — the SAM membership check still covers admins.
+            var noInventory = LocalAdminAnalyzer.SplitLoggedInUsers(new[] { "backdoor" }, null);
+            Assert.Equal(new[] { "backdoor" }, noInventory.Allowed);
+        }
+
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------- profile folders
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData("All Users",         FileAttributes.Directory | FileAttributes.ReparsePoint | FileAttributes.Hidden, true)]
+        [InlineData("Default User",      FileAttributes.Directory | FileAttributes.ReparsePoint, true)]
+        [InlineData("Все пользователи",  FileAttributes.Directory | FileAttributes.ReparsePoint, true)]
+        [InlineData("$4720C0479E8F4B51ABD4C5195A3F6399", FileAttributes.Directory, true)]
+        [InlineData("$4720c0479e8f4b51abd4c5195a3f6399", FileAttributes.Directory, true)]
+        [InlineData("Public",            FileAttributes.Directory, false)]
+        [InlineData("Default",           FileAttributes.Directory | FileAttributes.Hidden, false)]
+        [InlineData("backdoor",          FileAttributes.Directory, false)]
+        [InlineData("$backdoor",         FileAttributes.Directory, false)]
+        [InlineData("$4720C0479E8F4B51ABD4C5195A3F639",  FileAttributes.Directory, false)]   // 31 hex
+        [InlineData("$4720C0479E8F4B51ABD4C5195A3F6399G", FileAttributes.Directory, false)]  // non-hex
+        public void Non_profile_folders_are_recognised(string name, FileAttributes attributes, bool expected)
+        {
+            Assert.Equal(expected, LocalAdminAnalyzer.IsNonProfileFolder(name, attributes));
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Analyzers/LocalAdminAnalyzerEvaluateAccountsTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+#nullable enable
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using System.Linq;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Interop;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Analyzers;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Analyzers
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// LocalAdminAnalyzer.EvaluateAccounts — the account/admin-membership evaluation contract.
+    /// Pins the two evasions that the old name-only, enabled-only scan missed: a disabled
+    /// (dormant) backdoor account, and Administrators membership as an independent signal.
+    /// All names are synthetic; the machine name is a fixture constant.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class LocalAdminAnalyzerEvaluateAccountsTests
+    {
+        private const string Machine = "DESKTOP-TEST01";
+        private const string MachineSidPrefix = "S-1-5-21-111-222-333-";
+
+        private static readonly List<string> Allowed = new List<string>
+        {
+            "Administrator", "Guest", "DefaultAccount", "WDAGUtilityAccount", "defaultuser0", "defaultuser1", "adm-*"
+        };
+
+        private static LocalAdminAnalyzer.LocalAccountInfo Account(string name, bool disabled, int rid) =>
+            new LocalAdminAnalyzer.LocalAccountInfo { Name = name, Disabled = disabled, Sid = MachineSidPrefix + rid };
+
+        private static LocalGroupMember LocalMember(string name, int rid) =>
+            new LocalGroupMember { DomainAndName = Machine + "\\" + name, Sid = MachineSidPrefix + rid, SidUsage = 1 };
+
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------- disabled backdoor
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Disabled_unexpected_account_is_still_reported()
+        {
+            var accounts = new List<LocalAdminAnalyzer.LocalAccountInfo>
+            {
+                Account("Administrator", disabled: true, rid: 500),
+                Account("backdoor", disabled: true, rid: 1001)
+            };
+
+            var result = LocalAdminAnalyzer.EvaluateAccounts(accounts, new List<LocalGroupMember>(), true, Machine, Allowed);
+
+            Assert.Equal(new[] { "backdoor" }, result.Unexpected);
+            Assert.Empty(result.UnexpectedAdminMembers);
+            var detail = result.AccountDetails.Single(d => (string)d["name"] == "backdoor");
+            Assert.True((bool)detail["disabled"]);
+            Assert.False((bool)detail["administrators_member"]);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Disabled_unexpected_account_with_admin_membership_is_an_unexpected_admin_member()
+        {
+            var accounts = new List<LocalAdminAnalyzer.LocalAccountInfo>
+            {
+                Account("Administrator", disabled: true, rid: 500),
+                Account("backdoor", disabled: true, rid: 1001)
+            };
+            var members = new List<LocalGroupMember>
+            {
+                LocalMember("Administrator", 500),
+                LocalMember("backdoor", 1001)
+            };
+
+            var result = LocalAdminAnalyzer.EvaluateAccounts(accounts, members, true, Machine, Allowed);
+
+            Assert.Equal(new[] { "backdoor" }, result.Unexpected);
+            Assert.Equal(new[] { "backdoor" }, result.UnexpectedAdminMembers);
+            var detail = result.AccountDetails.Single(d => (string)d["name"] == "backdoor");
+            Assert.True((bool)detail["administrators_member"]);
+        }
+
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------- allowed list
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Allowed_admin_members_are_not_flagged_but_listed()
+        {
+            var accounts = new List<LocalAdminAnalyzer.LocalAccountInfo>
+            {
+                Account("Administrator", disabled: false, rid: 500),
+                Account("adm-4711", disabled: false, rid: 1002)
+            };
+            var members = new List<LocalGroupMember>
+            {
+                LocalMember("Administrator", 500),
+                LocalMember("adm-4711", 1002)
+            };
+
+            var result = LocalAdminAnalyzer.EvaluateAccounts(accounts, members, true, Machine, Allowed);
+
+            Assert.Empty(result.Unexpected);
+            Assert.Empty(result.UnexpectedAdminMembers);
+            Assert.Equal(2, result.AdministratorsGroupMembers.Count);
+            Assert.True(result.AccountDetails.All(d => (bool)d["administrators_member"]));
+        }
+
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------- non-local members
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Members_outside_the_machine_domain_are_listed_but_never_flagged()
+        {
+            var accounts = new List<LocalAdminAnalyzer.LocalAccountInfo>
+            {
+                Account("Administrator", disabled: true, rid: 500)
+            };
+            var members = new List<LocalGroupMember>
+            {
+                LocalMember("Administrator", 500),
+                // Entra role SIDs on an Entra-joined device resolve to nothing — the API returns the SID
+                new LocalGroupMember { DomainAndName = "S-1-12-1-123-456-789-1011", Sid = "S-1-12-1-123-456-789-1011", SidUsage = 8 },
+                // Domain group on a hybrid device
+                new LocalGroupMember { DomainAndName = "CORP\\Workstation Admins", Sid = "S-1-5-21-9-9-9-1105", SidUsage = 2 }
+            };
+
+            var result = LocalAdminAnalyzer.EvaluateAccounts(accounts, members, true, Machine, Allowed);
+
+            Assert.Empty(result.Unexpected);
+            Assert.Empty(result.UnexpectedAdminMembers);
+            Assert.Equal(3, result.AdministratorsGroupMembers.Count);
+            Assert.Contains("S-1-12-1-123-456-789-1011", result.AdministratorsGroupMembers);
+        }
+
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------- WMI gap
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Local_admin_member_missing_from_the_wmi_inventory_is_still_flagged()
+        {
+            // WMI failed or did not list the account — the SAM group membership alone is enough.
+            var members = new List<LocalGroupMember>
+            {
+                LocalMember("Administrator", 500),
+                LocalMember("backdoor", 1001)
+            };
+
+            var result = LocalAdminAnalyzer.EvaluateAccounts(
+                new List<LocalAdminAnalyzer.LocalAccountInfo>(), members, true, Machine, Allowed);
+
+            Assert.Empty(result.Unexpected);
+            Assert.Equal(new[] { "backdoor" }, result.UnexpectedAdminMembers);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Membership_matches_by_sid_when_the_member_name_differs_in_case()
+        {
+            var accounts = new List<LocalAdminAnalyzer.LocalAccountInfo> { Account("BackDoor", false, 1001) };
+            var members  = new List<LocalGroupMember> { LocalMember("backdoor", 1001) };
+
+            var result = LocalAdminAnalyzer.EvaluateAccounts(accounts, members, true, Machine, Allowed);
+
+            Assert.Equal(new[] { "BackDoor" }, result.UnexpectedAdminMembers);
+        }
+
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------- localized built-ins (RID)
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Localized_builtin_accounts_are_allowed_by_well_known_rid()
+        {
+            // German / French install: the English names are on the allowed list, the local
+            // names are not — before the RID match every disabled Guest was an unexpected account.
+            var accounts = new List<LocalAdminAnalyzer.LocalAccountInfo>
+            {
+                Account("Administrateur",     disabled: true,  rid: 500),
+                Account("Gast",               disabled: true,  rid: 501),
+                Account("Standardkonto",      disabled: true,  rid: 503),
+                Account("WDAGDienstprogramm", disabled: true,  rid: 504),
+                Account("defaultuser0",       disabled: false, rid: 1000)
+            };
+            var members = new List<LocalGroupMember> { LocalMember("Administrateur", 500) };
+
+            var result = LocalAdminAnalyzer.EvaluateAccounts(accounts, members, true, Machine, Allowed);
+
+            Assert.Empty(result.Unexpected);
+            Assert.Empty(result.UnexpectedAdminMembers);
+            Assert.Equal(5, result.AllChecked.Count);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Localized_builtin_admin_member_missing_from_wmi_is_not_flagged()
+        {
+            var members = new List<LocalGroupMember>
+            {
+                LocalMember("Administrateur", 500),
+                LocalMember("backdoor", 1001)
+            };
+
+            var result = LocalAdminAnalyzer.EvaluateAccounts(
+                new List<LocalAdminAnalyzer.LocalAccountInfo>(), members, true, Machine, Allowed);
+
+            Assert.Equal(new[] { "backdoor" }, result.UnexpectedAdminMembers);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Well_known_rid_does_not_cover_ordinary_accounts_or_foreign_sids()
+        {
+            Assert.True(LocalAdminAnalyzer.IsWellKnownBuiltInRid(MachineSidPrefix + "500"));
+            Assert.True(LocalAdminAnalyzer.IsWellKnownBuiltInRid(MachineSidPrefix + "501"));
+            Assert.True(LocalAdminAnalyzer.IsWellKnownBuiltInRid(MachineSidPrefix + "503"));
+            Assert.True(LocalAdminAnalyzer.IsWellKnownBuiltInRid(MachineSidPrefix + "504"));
+            Assert.False(LocalAdminAnalyzer.IsWellKnownBuiltInRid(MachineSidPrefix + "502"));
+            Assert.False(LocalAdminAnalyzer.IsWellKnownBuiltInRid(MachineSidPrefix + "1500"));
+            Assert.False(LocalAdminAnalyzer.IsWellKnownBuiltInRid(MachineSidPrefix + "1001"));
+            Assert.False(LocalAdminAnalyzer.IsWellKnownBuiltInRid("S-1-12-1-1-2-3-500"));
+            Assert.False(LocalAdminAnalyzer.IsWellKnownBuiltInRid("S-1-5-32-544"));
+            Assert.False(LocalAdminAnalyzer.IsWellKnownBuiltInRid(MachineSidPrefix));
+            Assert.False(LocalAdminAnalyzer.IsWellKnownBuiltInRid(null));
+            Assert.False(LocalAdminAnalyzer.IsWellKnownBuiltInRid(""));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Account_named_like_a_builtin_but_with_an_ordinary_rid_is_still_matched_by_name_only()
+        {
+            // Name-based allowance is unchanged: the RID match only ADDS coverage.
+            var accounts = new List<LocalAdminAnalyzer.LocalAccountInfo>
+            {
+                Account("Gast", disabled: false, rid: 1001)
+            };
+
+            var result = LocalAdminAnalyzer.EvaluateAccounts(accounts, new List<LocalGroupMember>(), true, Machine, Allowed);
+
+            Assert.Equal(new[] { "Gast" }, result.Unexpected);
+        }
+
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------- built-in Administrator
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData(true,  false)]
+        [InlineData(false, true)]
+        public void Builtin_administrator_enabled_state_is_reported_by_rid_500(bool disabled, bool expectedEnabled)
+        {
+            var accounts = new List<LocalAdminAnalyzer.LocalAccountInfo>
+            {
+                Account("Administrator", disabled, rid: 500),
+                Account("Guest", disabled: true, rid: 501)
+            };
+
+            var result = LocalAdminAnalyzer.EvaluateAccounts(accounts, new List<LocalGroupMember>(), true, Machine, Allowed);
+
+            Assert.Equal(expectedEnabled, result.BuiltInAdministratorEnabled);
+            Assert.Empty(result.Unexpected);
+        }
+
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------- native path (Windows only, net48)
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Native_administrators_enumeration_succeeds_and_contains_the_builtin_administrator()
+        {
+            // Proves the P/Invoke marshalling end-to-end on the executing machine: the SAM
+            // always holds the RID-500 Administrator in BUILTIN\Administrators.
+            var result = LocalGroupNativeMethods.GetAdministratorsMembers();
+
+            Assert.True(result.Succeeded, $"NET_API_STATUS={result.ErrorCode}");
+            Assert.False(string.IsNullOrEmpty(result.GroupName));
+            Assert.Contains(result.Members, m => m.Sid != null && m.Sid.EndsWith("-500"));
+            Assert.All(result.Members, m => Assert.False(string.IsNullOrEmpty(m.DomainAndName)));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Builtin_administrator_state_is_null_when_rid_500_is_absent()
+        {
+            var accounts = new List<LocalAdminAnalyzer.LocalAccountInfo> { Account("Guest", true, 501) };
+
+            var result = LocalAdminAnalyzer.EvaluateAccounts(accounts, new List<LocalGroupMember>(), false, Machine, Allowed);
+
+            Assert.Null(result.BuiltInAdministratorEnabled);
+            Assert.False(result.AdministratorsGroupEnumerated);
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Gather/GatherRuleExecutorOnEventCapTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+using System;
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using System.Diagnostics;
+using System.Threading;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Gather
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// on_event has no once-per-(rule, phase) dedup like the phase triggers. The per-rule
+    /// execution cap (<see cref="GatherRuleExecutor.MaxOnEventExecutionsPerRule"/>) bounds any
+    /// trigger cycle that survives the host's source guard (e.g. two rules chained through an
+    /// intermediate non-gather event) so a mis-authored rule can never spin for a whole session.
+    /// Executions are observed through the emitted events; the rule uses a registry path that
+    /// exists on every Windows box so each execution emits exactly one event.
+    /// </summary>
+    [Collection("SerialThreading")] // rules execute on the shared ThreadPool
+    public sealed class GatherRuleExecutorOnEventCapTests : IDisposable
+    {
+        private readonly TempDirectory _tmp = new TempDirectory();
+        private readonly List<EnrollmentEvent> _events = new List<EnrollmentEvent>();
+        private readonly object _gate = new object();
+        private readonly GatherRuleExecutor _executor;
+
+        public GatherRuleExecutorOnEventCapTests()
+        {
+            var logger = new AgentLogger(_tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info);
+            _executor = new GatherRuleExecutor("sess", "tenant",
+                evt => { lock (_gate) _events.Add(evt); }, logger)
+            {
+                UnrestrictedMode = true
+            };
+        }
+
+        public void Dispose()
+        {
+            _executor.Dispose();
+            _tmp.Dispose();
+        }
+
+        private int EventCount { get { lock (_gate) return _events.Count; } }
+
+        private bool WaitForEventCount(int count, int timeoutMs = 20000)
+        {
+            var sw = Stopwatch.StartNew();
+            while (sw.ElapsedMilliseconds < timeoutMs)
+            {
+                if (EventCount >= count) return true;
+                Thread.Sleep(25);
+            }
+            return EventCount >= count;
+        }
+
+        private static GatherRule OnEventRule(string id, string triggerEventType) => new GatherRule
+        {
+            RuleId = id,
+            Title = id,
+            CollectorType = "registry",
+            Target = "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion",
+            Trigger = "on_event",
+            TriggerEventType = triggerEventType,
+            OutputEventType = "gather_cap_test",
+            Enabled = true,
+        };
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void OnEvent_ExecutesAtMostMaxOnEventExecutionsPerRule_PerSession()
+        {
+            _executor.UpdateRules(new List<GatherRule> { OnEventRule("GATHER-CAP-001", "ext_event") });
+
+            var cap = GatherRuleExecutor.MaxOnEventExecutionsPerRule;
+            for (var i = 0; i < cap + 25; i++)
+                _executor.OnEvent("ext_event");
+
+            Assert.True(WaitForEventCount(cap), $"expected {cap} executions, got {EventCount}");
+            Thread.Sleep(500);
+            Assert.Equal(cap, EventCount);
+
+            // Further triggers stay ignored for the rest of the session.
+            _executor.OnEvent("ext_event");
+            Thread.Sleep(300);
+            Assert.Equal(cap, EventCount);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void OnEventCap_IsPerRule_NotGlobal()
+        {
+            _executor.UpdateRules(new List<GatherRule>
+            {
+                OnEventRule("GATHER-CAP-002", "ext_event"),
+                OnEventRule("GATHER-CAP-003", "ext_event"),
+            });
+
+            var cap = GatherRuleExecutor.MaxOnEventExecutionsPerRule;
+            for (var i = 0; i < cap + 5; i++)
+                _executor.OnEvent("ext_event");
+
+            Assert.True(WaitForEventCount(2 * cap), $"expected {2 * cap} executions, got {EventCount}");
+            Thread.Sleep(500);
+            Assert.Equal(2 * cap, EventCount);
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Ime/CmTraceLogParserTests.cs

@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
 using System;
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using System.Diagnostics;
+using System.Linq;
+using System.Text;
+using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Logging;
 using Xunit;
 
@@ -137,5 +142,107 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
             Assert.NotNull(entry);
             Assert.Equal(hugeMessage.Length, entry.Message.Length);
         }
+
+        // ── Hostile input: cost must be linear, never quadratic ───────────────
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// The legacy single-regex parser (greedy <c>.*</c> message group before the trailer
+        /// literal, unanchored, Singleline, no timeout). Kept here ONLY as the semantic oracle:
+        /// the linear parser must return exactly what this regex returned for every line that
+        /// matches, and false for every line it rejected.
+        /// </summary>
+        private static readonly Regex LegacyRegex = new Regex(
+            @"<!\[LOG\[(?<message>.*)\]LOG\]!><time=""(?<time>[\d:.]+)(?<bias>[+-]\d{1,4})?""\s+date=""(?<date>[\d-]+)""\s+component=""(?<component>[^""]*)""\s+context=""[^""]*""\s+type=""(?<type>\d+)""\s+thread=""(?<thread>\d+)""\s+file=""[^""]*"">",
+            RegexOptions.Singleline);
+
+        public static IEnumerable<object[]> EquivalenceLines()
+        {
+            const string trailer = "]LOG]!><time=\"06:08:04.8834397\" date=\"2-8-2026\" component=\"C\" context=\"\" type=\"2\" thread=\"7\" file=\"\">";
+            const string badTrailer = "]LOG]!><time=\"06:08:04\" date=\"2-8-2026\" component=\"C\" context=\"\" type=\"x\" thread=\"7\" file=\"\">";
+            yield return new object[] { CmTraceLine("plain", "06:08:04.8834397", "2-8-2026") };
+            yield return new object[] { CmTraceLine("multi\nline\r\nmessage", "06:08:04.8834397", "2-8-2026") };
+            yield return new object[] { CmTraceLine("bias", "11:46:19.0226610+480", "7-29-2026") };
+            yield return new object[] { CmTraceLine("", "06:08:04.8834397", "2-8-2026") };
+            // The trailer literal INSIDE the message: greedy .* takes the LAST parseable trailer.
+            yield return new object[] { "<![LOG[inner " + trailer + " outer" + trailer };
+            // Last trailer occurrence does not parse (type="x") → the earlier one wins, and the
+            // failing trailer text is part of the message.
+            yield return new object[] { "<![LOG[first" + trailer + " second" + badTrailer };
+            // Only a broken trailer → false.
+            yield return new object[] { "<![LOG[msg" + badTrailer };
+            // A nested "<![LOG[" inside the message: the FIRST open wins (message keeps the inner one).
+            yield return new object[] { "<![LOG[outer <![LOG[inner" + trailer };
+            // Whitespace variants the old regex tolerated (\s+ between attributes).
+            yield return new object[] { "<![LOG[ws]LOG]!><time=\"06:08:04.8834397\"   date=\"2-8-2026\"\tcomponent=\"C\" context=\"\" type=\"1\" thread=\"1\" file=\"x.cpp:12\">" };
+            // BOM-prefixed first line of a fresh log.
+            yield return new object[] { "\uFEFF" + CmTraceLine("bom", "06:08:04.8834397", "2-8-2026") };
+            // Trailer text without its leading ']' → false on both.
+            yield return new object[] { "<![LOG[" + trailer.Substring(1) };
+            yield return new object[] { "<![LOG[truncated" };
+        }
+
+        [Theory]
+        [MemberData(nameof(EquivalenceLines))]
+        public void TryParseLine_is_semantically_identical_to_the_legacy_greedy_regex(string line)
+        {
+            var legacy = LegacyRegex.Match(line);
+            var ok = CmTraceLogParser.TryParseLine(line, out var entry);
+
+            Assert.Equal(legacy.Success, ok);
+            if (!legacy.Success) return;
+
+            Assert.NotNull(entry);
+            Assert.Equal(legacy.Groups["message"].Value, entry.Message);
+            Assert.Equal(legacy.Groups["component"].Value, entry.Component);
+            Assert.Equal(int.Parse(legacy.Groups["type"].Value), entry.Type);
+            Assert.Equal(legacy.Groups["thread"].Value, entry.Thread);
+            var expectedBias = legacy.Groups["bias"].Success ? int.Parse(legacy.Groups["bias"].Value) : (int?)null;
+            Assert.Equal(expectedBias, entry.BiasMinutes);
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// The reported worst case: 585 x "&lt;![LOG[" (4095 chars) + 4097 x "]" — passes the StartsWith
+        /// gate, never matches, and drove ~7 million backtracking steps through the legacy regex
+        /// (k prefix restarts x m filler positions). The linear parser has no trailer literal to
+        /// find and returns false in a handful of string searches.
+        /// </summary>
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryParseLine_rejects_reported_worst_case_in_bounded_time()
+        {
+            var line = string.Concat(Enumerable.Repeat("<![LOG[", 585)) + new string(']', 4097);
+            Assert.Equal(8192, line.Length);
+
+            var sw = Stopwatch.StartNew();
+            for (var i = 0; i < 200; i++)
+            {
+                Assert.False(CmTraceLogParser.TryParseLine(line, out _));
+            }
+            sw.Stop();
+
+            // 200 lines = one maximal backend request. Generous bound for a slow CI box; the
+            // legacy regex needed seconds here.
+            Assert.True(sw.ElapsedMilliseconds < 500, $"200 worst-case lines took {sw.ElapsedMilliseconds} ms");
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// The agent variant: a multi-megabyte assembled entry stuffed with prefixes, trailer
+        /// literals whose attributes never parse, and filler — every occurrence is tried once,
+        /// each trailer probe fails at its first attribute, total work stays linear.
+        /// </summary>
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryParseLine_rejects_multi_megabyte_hostile_entry_in_bounded_time()
+        {
+            var sb = new StringBuilder(2 * 1024 * 1024);
+            sb.Append("<![LOG[");
+            while (sb.Length < 1024 * 1024)
+                sb.Append("<![LOG[").Append("]LOG]!><time=\"x\" ").Append(new string(']', 40)).Append('\n');
+            var line = sb.ToString();
+
+            var sw = Stopwatch.StartNew();
+            Assert.False(CmTraceLogParser.TryParseLine(line, out _));
+            sw.Stop();
+
+            Assert.True(sw.ElapsedMilliseconds < 1000, $"1 MB hostile entry took {sw.ElapsedMilliseconds} ms");
+        }
     }
 }

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Ime/ImeLogTrackerLineAnchoringTests.cs

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 using System;
 using System.Collections.Generic;
 using System.IO;
+using System.Linq;
 using System.Threading;
 using System.Threading.Tasks;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
@@ -437,5 +438,43 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
         }
 
         private DateTime? _expectedForCurrentEntry;
+
+        // ── Multiline buffer caps ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// 100 raw lines of unbounded length could still assemble a multi-megabyte entry. The
+        /// char cap drops such an entry (its marker never fires) and says so at Warning, which
+        /// is visible at the default Info level — a capped real entry would be news worth
+        /// reacting to. A same-shaped entry under the cap still assembles and matches.
+        /// </summary>
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData(2 * 1024 * 1024, false)]   // over cap → dropped, warned
+        [InlineData(64 * 1024, true)]          // under cap → assembled, matched
+        public async Task MultilineEntry_IsDroppedAndWarned_WhenItExceedsTheCharCap(int fillerChars, bool expectMatch)
+        {
+            using var h = new Harness();
+            h.Append("AgentExecutor.log", Line("marker 0", h.Now, TimeSpan.Zero));
+            await h.Pass();
+
+            var matched = new List<string>();
+            h.Tracker.OnPatternMatched += id => matched.Add(id);
+
+            // One entry spanning 3 physical lines; the closing trailer sits on the last line.
+            var filler = new string('x', fillerChars / 2);
+            h.Append("AgentExecutor.log", "<![LOG[write output done. output = " + filler);
+            h.Append("AgentExecutor.log", filler);
+            h.Append("AgentExecutor.log", Line("marker 7", h.Now, TimeSpan.Zero).Substring("<![LOG[".Length));
+            h.Now = T0.AddSeconds(10);
+            await h.Pass();
+
+            Assert.Equal(expectMatch ? 1 : 0, matched.Count);
+            var agentLog = string.Concat(Directory.GetFiles(h.PathOf(""), "*.log")
+                .Where(f => !Path.GetFileName(f).Equals("AgentExecutor.log", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
+                .Select(File.ReadAllText));
+            if (expectMatch)
+                Assert.DoesNotContain("discarding multiline CMTrace buffer", agentLog);
+            else
+                Assert.Contains("discarding multiline CMTrace buffer in AgentExecutor.log", agentLog);
+        }
     }
 }

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Ime/ImeLogTrackerZeroUserAppsTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Ime
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Sessions 81daa77f / 75d6ae8e (2026-08-25) — zero user-targeted apps starved every
+    /// user-phase completion probe. The IME zero-app branch returns before it writes the
+    /// "Completed user session" line, so a device whose user has no targeted Win32 apps never
+    /// produced the evidence <c>IsImeUserSessionGenuine</c> requires, and the AdvisoryCompletion
+    /// window failed the enrollment 30 minutes later — with the user at the desktop, Hello
+    /// provisioned and RealmJoin still installing.
+    /// <para>
+    /// IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS reads the line IME does write in that branch and routes it
+    /// through the same <see cref="ImeLogTracker.OnUserSessionCompleted"/> callback.
+    /// </para>
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class ImeLogTrackerZeroUserAppsTests
+    {
+        // Mirrors rules/ime-log-patterns/IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS.json. The JSON itself is
+        // pinned against a real IME line by BuiltInRulesTests in the backend suite.
+        private const string ZeroAppsPattern =
+            @"\[Win32App\] Get 0 apps for user session (?<sessionId>\d+), user id = (?<userId>[a-f0-9\-]+)";
+
+        private const string EspPhasePattern =
+            @"\[Win32App\] (?:In|The) EspPhase: (?<espPhase>\w+)";
+
+        private const string ZeroAppsLine =
+            "[Win32App] Get 0 apps for user session 1, user id = 4a1ba5db-44ed-4e69-8477-47ed88e76020";
+
+        private static ImeLogTracker BuildTracker(TempDirectory tmp) =>
+            new ImeLogTracker(
+                logFolder: tmp.Path,
+                patterns: new List<ImeLogPattern>
+                {
+                    new ImeLogPattern
+                    {
+                        PatternId = "IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS",
+                        Category = "always",
+                        Pattern = ZeroAppsPattern,
+                        Action = "userSessionZeroApps",
+                    },
+                    new ImeLogPattern
+                    {
+                        PatternId = "IME-ESP-PHASE",
+                        Category = "always",
+                        Pattern = EspPhasePattern,
+                        Action = "espPhaseDetected",
+                    },
+                },
+                logger: new AgentLogger(tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info));
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ZeroApps_line_during_user_phase_fires_user_session_completed()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
+            var fired = 0;
+            tracker.OnUserSessionCompleted = () => fired++;
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
+
+            Assert.Equal(1, fired);
+            Assert.True(tracker.UserSessionZeroAppsObserved);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ZeroApps_line_before_user_phase_does_not_fire()
+        {
+            // Firing here would burn the adapter fire-once flag on a pre-sign-in timestamp that
+            // IsImeUserSessionGenuine (>= AccountSetupEnteredUtc) can never accept.
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
+            var fired = 0;
+            tracker.OnUserSessionCompleted = () => fired++;
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: DeviceSetup");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
+
+            Assert.Equal(0, fired);
+            Assert.True(tracker.UserSessionZeroAppsObserved);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ZeroApps_observed_early_is_replayed_on_the_user_phase_transition()
+        {
+            // IME writes its check-in lines independently of when the agent first parses the ESP
+            // phase marker, so the evidence can legitimately arrive first. Dropping it would
+            // leave a zero-app device with no completion evidence at all.
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
+            var fired = 0;
+            tracker.OnUserSessionCompleted = () => fired++;
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: DeviceSetup");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
+            Assert.Equal(0, fired);
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
+
+            Assert.Equal(1, fired);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Repeated_user_phase_matches_do_not_replay_again()
+        {
+            // IME re-emits the phase string as it re-evaluates app sets. Only a real transition
+            // replays; the adapter fire-once flag is the outer guard, but the tracker must not
+            // spam the callback either.
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
+            var fired = 0;
+            tracker.OnUserSessionCompleted = () => fired++;
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: DeviceSetup");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
+
+            Assert.Equal(1, fired);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Nonzero_app_count_lines_do_not_match_the_pattern()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
+            var fired = 0;
+            tracker.OnUserSessionCompleted = () => fired++;
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(
+                "[Win32App] Get 3 apps for user session 1, user id = 4a1ba5db-44ed-4e69-8477-47ed88e76020");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(
+                "[Win32App] Get 10 apps for user session 1, user id = 4a1ba5db-44ed-4e69-8477-47ed88e76020");
+
+            Assert.Equal(0, fired);
+            Assert.False(tracker.UserSessionZeroAppsObserved);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void AreUserEspAppsSettled_true_after_zero_apps_observation()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
+
+            Assert.True(tracker.AreUserEspAppsSettled());
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void AreUserEspAppsSettled_stays_false_on_an_empty_list_without_the_observation()
+        {
+            // Mutation proof for the branch above: an empty live list on its own still means
+            // "phase just cleared / apps not surfaced yet", never vacuously settled.
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
+
+            Assert.False(tracker.AreUserEspAppsSettled());
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void AreUserEspAppsSettled_false_outside_the_user_phase_even_after_the_observation()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: DeviceSetup");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
+
+            Assert.True(tracker.UserSessionZeroAppsObserved);
+            Assert.False(tracker.AreUserEspAppsSettled());
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void GetPendingRequiredUserEspInstallApps_is_empty_for_a_zero_app_user_session()
+        {
+            // The adapter deferral probe must not park the signal when there is nothing to wait
+            // for — otherwise the zero-app path would starve exactly like the old one.
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var tracker = BuildTracker(tmp);
+
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest("[Win32App] In EspPhase: AccountSetup");
+            tracker.ProcessLogMessageForTest(ZeroAppsLine);
+
+            Assert.Empty(tracker.GetPendingRequiredUserEspInstallApps());
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Interop/WifiInfoProviderTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+#nullable enable
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Interop;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Interop
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Tests for the tiered WiFi reader. The WLAN state of the test machine is unknown (CI
+    /// runners have no WLAN service, dev boxes may be on WiFi with or without location consent),
+    /// so the live path only pins the fail-soft contract. The diagnostics composer is pinned
+    /// exactly — it is the only field evidence for a missing wifi_signal_info event, and the
+    /// ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED hint is what tells an operator that Windows 11 24H2's location gate,
+    /// not the hardware, swallowed the SSID.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class WifiInfoProviderTests
+    {
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryRead_never_throws_and_reports_a_reason_when_it_yields_nothing()
+        {
+            var result = WifiInfoProvider.TryRead(null, out var diagnostics);
+
+            if (result == null)
+            {
+                Assert.False(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(diagnostics),
+                    "a null result must always explain itself — that string is the only field evidence");
+                Assert.Contains("native:", diagnostics);
+                Assert.Contains("WinRT:", diagnostics);
+                Assert.Contains("netsh:", diagnostics);
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                Assert.Null(diagnostics);
+                // Every tier either carries an SSID or was not supposed to return at all.
+                Assert.False(result.Ssid == null && result.SignalPercent == null
+                             && result.RadioType == null && result.Channel == null,
+                    "an all-null payload must surface as null, not as an empty connection");
+            }
+        }
+
+        // ----- BuildDiagnostics ---------------------------------------------
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildDiagnostics_names_every_tier()
+        {
+            var text = WifiInfoProvider.BuildDiagnostics(null, null);
+
+            Assert.Contains("no WiFi info from any reader", text);
+            Assert.Contains("native: no connected WLAN interface", text);
+            Assert.Contains("WinRT: no SSID", text);
+            Assert.Contains("netsh: no parsable output", text);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildDiagnostics_passes_through_tier_reasons()
+        {
+            var text = WifiInfoProvider.BuildDiagnostics("WlanOpenHandle rc=1062", "WinRT NetworkInformation unavailable");
+
+            Assert.Contains("native: WlanOpenHandle rc=1062", text);
+            Assert.Contains("WinRT: WinRT NetworkInformation unavailable", text);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildDiagnostics_explains_access_denied_as_the_location_gate()
+        {
+            var text = WifiInfoProvider.BuildDiagnostics(
+                "[1cbc79c3-2e31-468a-b949-17fafa6e23ed] query(current_connection) rc=5; ", null);
+
+            Assert.Contains("ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED", text);
+            Assert.Contains("24H2", text);
+            Assert.Contains("Location services", text);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildDiagnostics_explains_access_denied_without_a_trailing_separator()
+        {
+            var text = WifiInfoProvider.BuildDiagnostics("WlanOpenHandle rc=5", null);
+
+            Assert.Contains("ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED", text);
+        }
+
+        // ----- IsLocationGateDenied -----------------------------------------
+        //
+        // This predicate decides whether the wifi_signal_info payload claims
+        // "location_services_off" to the operator. A false positive blames a privacy setting
+        // that is actually fine, so the boundaries are pinned exactly.
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData("[guid] query(current_connection) rc=5; ")]
+        [InlineData("WlanOpenHandle rc=5")]
+        public void IsLocationGateDenied_true_only_for_error_access_denied(string nativeDiag)
+        {
+            Assert.True(WifiInfoProvider.IsLocationGateDenied(nativeDiag));
+        }
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData(null)]
+        [InlineData("")]
+        [InlineData("query(current_connection) rc=50; ")]
+        [InlineData("query(current_connection) rc=5023; ")]
+        [InlineData("WlanEnumInterfaces rc=1062")]
+        [InlineData("no WLAN interfaces")]
+        [InlineData("[guid] state=wlan_interface_state_disconnected; ")]
+        public void IsLocationGateDenied_false_for_every_other_reason(string? nativeDiag)
+        {
+            Assert.False(WifiInfoProvider.IsLocationGateDenied(nativeDiag));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void LocationServicesOff_literal_is_the_published_payload_contract()
+        {
+            // Matched verbatim by the portal's WiFi card (wifiDataLimitedReason) — renaming it
+            // silently drops the hint instead of breaking a build.
+            Assert.Equal("location_services_off", WifiInfoProvider.LocationServicesOff);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryRead_never_claims_the_location_gate_on_the_native_tier()
+        {
+            // The native tier only returns when it succeeded, so a full payload must never carry
+            // a "data limited" reason.
+            var result = WifiInfoProvider.TryRead(null, out _);
+
+            if (result?.SignalPercent != null)
+                Assert.Null(result.DataLimitedReason);
+        }
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData("query(current_connection) rc=50; ")]
+        [InlineData("query(current_connection) rc=5023; ")]
+        [InlineData("WlanEnumInterfaces rc=1062")]
+        [InlineData("[guid] state=wlan_interface_state_disconnected; ")]
+        public void BuildDiagnostics_does_not_blame_the_location_gate_for_other_codes(string nativeDiag)
+        {
+            var text = WifiInfoProvider.BuildDiagnostics(nativeDiag, null);
+
+            Assert.DoesNotContain("ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED", text);
+            Assert.Contains($"native: {nativeDiag}", text);
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Interop/WinRtWifiSsidReaderTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+#nullable enable
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Interop;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Interop
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Tests for the WinRT SSID reader. Its whole value is that it keeps working where the
+    /// native WLAN API is denied, so the contract that matters here is fail-soft resolution:
+    /// the type is bound by name at runtime (no winmd), and every step must degrade to null
+    /// with a reason instead of throwing — a throw would take the Task.Run collector down
+    /// silently, which is precisely the failure mode this tier exists to end.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class WinRtWifiSsidReaderTests
+    {
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryGetConnectedSsid_never_throws()
+        {
+            var ssid = WinRtWifiSsidReader.TryGetConnectedSsid(out var diagnostics);
+
+            if (ssid == null)
+                Assert.False(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(diagnostics), "a null SSID must carry a reason");
+            else
+                Assert.Null(diagnostics);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryGetConnectedSsid_never_returns_an_empty_ssid()
+        {
+            // An AP broadcasting an empty SSID must surface as null, never as "" — the caller
+            // maps a non-null SSID straight into the wifi_signal_info payload.
+            var ssid = WinRtWifiSsidReader.TryGetConnectedSsid(out _);
+
+            Assert.True(ssid == null || ssid.Length > 0);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryGetConnectedSsid_is_stable_across_calls()
+        {
+            // Reflection members are resolved once and cached; a second call must take the
+            // cached path and behave identically.
+            var first = WinRtWifiSsidReader.TryGetConnectedSsid(out _);
+            var second = WinRtWifiSsidReader.TryGetConnectedSsid(out _);
+
+            Assert.Equal(first, second);
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Runtime/DiagnosticsPackageServiceTests.cs

@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
 #nullable enable
+using System.Collections.Generic;
 using System.IO;
 using System.IO.Compression;
 using System.Linq;
 using System.Text;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport;
@@ -46,7 +48,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
                 Directory.CreateDirectory(SpoolFolder);
             }
 
-            public DiagnosticsPackageService Build(System.Action<AgentConfiguration>? mutateConfig = null)
+            public DiagnosticsPackageService Build(
+                System.Action<AgentConfiguration>? mutateConfig = null,
+                IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string>? sectionFolderOverrides = null,
+                System.Func<bool>? devicePreparationProbe = null)
             {
                 // BackendApiClient is required by the public ctor but BuildArchiveBytes
                 // never touches it — construct with a throwaway HttpClient. Tests only
@@ -71,7 +76,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
                     imeLogFolderOverride: ImeTmp.Path,
                     agentStateFolderOverride: StateFolder,
                     agentSpoolFolderOverride: SpoolFolder,
-                    agentDataFolderOverride: DataFolder);
+                    agentDataFolderOverride: DataFolder,
+                    sectionFolderOverrides: sectionFolderOverrides,
+                    devicePreparationProbe: devicePreparationProbe);
             }
 
             public void Dispose()
@@ -287,6 +294,185 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
             Assert.DoesNotContain(entries, e => e.StartsWith("AgentSpool/"));
         }
 
+        // ===================================================== built-in catalog gates ====
+        // The RealmJoin sections ride behind the tenant's RealmJoin Watcher toggle, the
+        // Device Preparation bootstrapper event log behind the deterministic WDP marker.
+        // Every conditional section is skipped WITH a manifest line, never silently.
+
+        /// <summary>RealmJoin system-side folders redirected to temp (user-side goes via UserProfileResolver).</summary>
+        private sealed class RealmJoinRig : System.IDisposable
+        {
+            public TempDirectory WindowsLogs { get; } = new TempDirectory();
+            public TempDirectory Choco { get; } = new TempDirectory();
+            public TempDirectory UserProfile { get; } = new TempDirectory();
+            public string PackagesFolder => Path.Combine(WindowsLogs.Path, "RealmJoin");
+
+            public RealmJoinRig()
+            {
+                File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(WindowsLogs.Path, "realmjoin.log"), "rj");
+                File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(WindowsLogs.Path, "realmjoin2.log"), "rj2");
+                var pkg = Path.Combine(PackagesFolder, "Packages", "generic-7zip");
+                Directory.CreateDirectory(pkg);
+                File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(pkg, "install.log"), "pkg");
+                var choco = Path.Combine(Choco.Path, "generic-7zip");
+                Directory.CreateDirectory(choco);
+                File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(choco, "2026-06-30_install.log"), "choco");
+                var userRj = Path.Combine(UserProfile.Path, "AppData", "Local", "RealmJoin");
+                Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.Combine(userRj, "Logs", "generic-office"));
+                File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(userRj, "tray.log"), "tray");
+                File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(userRj, "config.pjson"), "not a log");
+                File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(userRj, "Logs", "RjImeHost.log"), "host");
+                File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(userRj, "Logs", "generic-office", "usersettings.log"), "pkg-user");
+            }
+
+            public IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string> Overrides => new Dictionary<string, string>
+            {
+                ["RealmJoinWindows"] = WindowsLogs.Path,
+                ["RealmJoinPackages"] = PackagesFolder,
+                ["RealmJoinChoco"] = Choco.Path,
+            };
+
+            public void Dispose()
+            {
+                WindowsLogs.Dispose();
+                Choco.Dispose();
+                UserProfile.Dispose();
+            }
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildArchiveBytes_skips_realmjoin_sections_when_watcher_disabled()
+        {
+            using var rig = new Rig();
+            using var rj = new RealmJoinRig();
+            UserProfileResolver.SetForTesting(rj.UserProfile.Path);
+            try
+            {
+                var bytes = rig.Build(sectionFolderOverrides: rj.Overrides).BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: true);
+
+                var entries = ZipEntryNames(bytes);
+                Assert.DoesNotContain(entries, e => e.StartsWith("RealmJoinLogs/"));
+                var manifest = ReadZipEntryText(bytes, "package-manifest.txt")!;
+                Assert.Contains("SCENARIO: devicePreparation=False realmJoinWatcher=False", manifest);
+                Assert.Contains("BUILT-IN SKIPPED (RealmJoin Watcher disabled): RealmJoinWindows", manifest);
+                Assert.Contains("BUILT-IN SKIPPED (RealmJoin Watcher disabled): RealmJoinUserLogs", manifest);
+            }
+            finally
+            {
+                UserProfileResolver.Reset();
+            }
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildArchiveBytes_includes_realmjoin_sections_when_watcher_enabled()
+        {
+            using var rig = new Rig();
+            using var rj = new RealmJoinRig();
+            UserProfileResolver.SetForTesting(rj.UserProfile.Path);
+            try
+            {
+                var bytes = rig.Build(cfg => cfg.EnableRealmJoinWatcher = true, rj.Overrides)
+                    .BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: false);
+
+                var entries = ZipEntryNames(bytes);
+                // ZIP layout mirrors the disk layout: flat client logs + package tree under
+                // Windows/, tray logs + per-user Logs tree under User/.
+                Assert.Contains("RealmJoinLogs/Windows/realmjoin.log", entries);
+                Assert.Contains("RealmJoinLogs/Windows/realmjoin2.log", entries);
+                Assert.Contains("RealmJoinLogs/Windows/RealmJoin/Packages/generic-7zip/install.log", entries);
+                Assert.Contains("RealmJoinLogs/Choco/generic-7zip/2026-06-30_install.log", entries);
+                Assert.Contains("RealmJoinLogs/User/tray.log", entries);
+                Assert.Contains("RealmJoinLogs/User/Logs/RjImeHost.log", entries);
+                Assert.Contains("RealmJoinLogs/User/Logs/generic-office/usersettings.log", entries);
+                // Only tray*.log is collected from the user RealmJoin root — config stays out.
+                Assert.DoesNotContain(entries, e => e.EndsWith("config.pjson"));
+                var manifest = ReadZipEntryText(bytes, "package-manifest.txt")!;
+                Assert.Contains("BUILT-IN: RealmJoinUserLogs -> folder=", manifest);
+                Assert.DoesNotContain("BUILT-IN SKIPPED (RealmJoin Watcher disabled)", manifest);
+            }
+            finally
+            {
+                UserProfileResolver.Reset();
+            }
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildArchiveBytes_skips_realmjoin_user_sections_without_user_session()
+        {
+            using var rig = new Rig();
+            using var rj = new RealmJoinRig();
+            // Token present, no interactive user detected → user-profile sections skip with a
+            // manifest line; the system-side sections are unaffected.
+            UserProfileResolver.SetForTesting(null!);
+            try
+            {
+                var bytes = rig.Build(cfg => cfg.EnableRealmJoinWatcher = true, rj.Overrides)
+                    .BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: true);
+
+                var entries = ZipEntryNames(bytes);
+                Assert.Contains("RealmJoinLogs/Windows/realmjoin.log", entries);
+                Assert.DoesNotContain(entries, e => e.StartsWith("RealmJoinLogs/User"));
+                var manifest = ReadZipEntryText(bytes, "package-manifest.txt")!;
+                Assert.Contains("BUILT-IN SKIPPED (no user session for token): RealmJoinUserTray", manifest);
+                Assert.Contains("BUILT-IN SKIPPED (no user session for token): RealmJoinUserLogs", manifest);
+            }
+            finally
+            {
+                UserProfileResolver.Reset();
+            }
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildArchiveBytes_collects_bootstrapper_event_log_only_on_device_preparation()
+        {
+            using var rig = new Rig();
+            using var winevt = new TempDirectory();
+            // Synthetic evtx: no registered channel claims the file, so the export falls
+            // back to a raw copy — the point here is the scenario gate, not wevtutil.
+            File.WriteAllBytes(Path.Combine(winevt.Path, "BootstrapperAgentServiceLogProvider.evtx"), new byte[] { 1, 2, 3 });
+            var overrides = new Dictionary<string, string> { ["ImeBootstrapperEventLog"] = winevt.Path };
+
+            var classic = rig.Build(sectionFolderOverrides: overrides, devicePreparationProbe: () => false)
+                .BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: true);
+            Assert.DoesNotContain("ImeLogs/BootstrapperAgentServiceLogProvider.evtx", ZipEntryNames(classic));
+            Assert.Contains("BUILT-IN SKIPPED (not a Device Preparation enrollment): ImeBootstrapperEventLog",
+                ReadZipEntryText(classic, "package-manifest.txt"));
+
+            var wdp = rig.Build(sectionFolderOverrides: overrides, devicePreparationProbe: () => true)
+                .BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: true);
+            Assert.Contains("ImeLogs/BootstrapperAgentServiceLogProvider.evtx", ZipEntryNames(wdp));
+            Assert.Contains("SCENARIO: devicePreparation=True", ReadZipEntryText(wdp, "package-manifest.txt"));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildArchiveBytes_treats_failing_device_preparation_probe_as_classic()
+        {
+            using var rig = new Rig();
+            var bytes = rig.Build(devicePreparationProbe: () => throw new System.InvalidOperationException("registry boom"))
+                .BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: true);
+
+            var manifest = ReadZipEntryText(bytes, "package-manifest.txt")!;
+            Assert.Contains("SCENARIO PROBE FAILED (treated as Classic): registry boom", manifest);
+            Assert.Contains("BUILT-IN SKIPPED (not a Device Preparation enrollment): ImeBootstrapperEventLog", manifest);
+            Assert.Contains("sessioninfo.txt", ZipEntryNames(bytes)); // archive still built
+        }
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData(DiagnosticsSectionCondition.Always, false, false, true)]
+        [InlineData(DiagnosticsSectionCondition.RealmJoinWatcher, false, true, false)]
+        [InlineData(DiagnosticsSectionCondition.RealmJoinWatcher, true, false, true)]
+        [InlineData(DiagnosticsSectionCondition.DevicePreparation, true, false, false)]
+        [InlineData(DiagnosticsSectionCondition.DevicePreparation, false, true, true)]
+        [InlineData((DiagnosticsSectionCondition)999, true, true, false)]
+        public void IsSectionActive_gates_on_condition(DiagnosticsSectionCondition condition, bool watcher, bool wdp, bool expected)
+        {
+            var section = new DiagnosticsBuiltInSection("X", "X", @"C:\X", new[] { "*.log" }, false, "x", condition);
+            var cfg = Cfg();
+            cfg.EnableRealmJoinWatcher = watcher;
+
+            Assert.Equal(expected, DiagnosticsPackageService.IsSectionActive(section, cfg, wdp));
+        }
+
         private static string[] ZipEntryNames(byte[] zipBytes)
         {
             using var ms = new MemoryStream(zipBytes);
@@ -341,7 +527,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
         {
             // On-demand mid-session (no outcome yet): the OnFailure gate must NOT skip —
             // there is no known success to skip on. Reaching the archive build (sentinel
-            // throw → error result) proves the gate was passed; a skip would return null.
+            // throw → error result) proves the gate was passed; a skip would return Skipped.
             using var rig = new Rig();
             var result = await BuildGateProbe(rig.Logger, "OnFailure")
                 .CreateAndUploadAsync(enrollmentSucceeded: null, fileNameSuffix: "server-requested");
@@ -357,7 +543,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
             var result = await BuildGateProbe(rig.Logger, "OnFailure")
                 .CreateAndUploadAsync(enrollmentSucceeded: true);
 
-            Assert.Null(result);
+            Assert.NotNull(result);
+            Assert.True(result!.Skipped);
+            Assert.False(result.Success);
+            Assert.Equal(DiagnosticsUploadResult.SkipOnFailureSucceeded, result.ErrorCode);
         }
 
         [Fact]
@@ -367,7 +556,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
             var result = await BuildGateProbe(rig.Logger, "Off")
                 .CreateAndUploadAsync(enrollmentSucceeded: null);
 
-            Assert.Null(result);
+            // The gate name travels in ErrorCode so the dispatcher's server_action_failed
+            // event says "mode_off" instead of a generic "diagnostics_upload_failed".
+            Assert.NotNull(result);
+            Assert.True(result!.Skipped);
+            Assert.Equal(DiagnosticsUploadResult.SkipModeOff, result.ErrorCode);
         }
 
         [Theory]
@@ -618,5 +811,97 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
             Assert.False(DiagnosticsPackageService.IsReparsePoint(FileAttributes.ReadOnly | FileAttributes.Hidden));
             Assert.False(DiagnosticsPackageService.IsReparsePoint(FileAttributes.Archive));
         }
+
+        // ========================================== handle-validated reads (TOCTOU) ====
+        // Every guard up to here inspects a PATH: the config guard, the enumeration's reparse
+        // skip, the per-file attribute check. A local user who can write under a recursive
+        // source folder swaps a subdirectory for a junction between enumeration and open, and
+        // the bytes would come from the junction target. The read is validated on the handle
+        // that is actually copied, so the swapped file is skipped and the manifest says why.
+
+        private static string AllZipEntryTexts(byte[] zipBytes)
+        {
+            using var ms = new MemoryStream(zipBytes);
+            using var archive = new ZipArchive(ms, ZipArchiveMode.Read);
+            var sb = new StringBuilder();
+            foreach (var entry in archive.Entries)
+            {
+                using var reader = new StreamReader(entry.Open(), Encoding.UTF8);
+                sb.AppendLine(reader.ReadToEnd());
+            }
+            return sb.ToString();
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildArchiveBytes_skips_file_whose_parent_became_a_junction_after_enumeration()
+        {
+            using var rig = new Rig();
+            using var outside = new TempDirectory();
+            var sub1 = Path.Combine(rig.StateFolder, "sub1");
+            var sub2 = Path.Combine(rig.StateFolder, "sub2");
+            Directory.CreateDirectory(sub1);
+            Directory.CreateDirectory(sub2);
+            File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(sub1, "decoy.txt"), "decoy");
+            File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(sub2, "x.txt"), "harmless");
+            File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(outside.Path, "x.txt"), "OUTSIDE-THE-VALIDATED-FOLDER");
+
+            var svc = rig.Build();
+            var swapped = false;
+            svc.BeforeSourceFileOpen = candidate =>
+            {
+                if (swapped || !candidate.EndsWith(Path.Combine("sub2", "x.txt"), System.StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
+                    return;
+                // Enumeration is done and sub2 passed its reparse check — now it becomes a junction.
+                Directory.Delete(sub2, recursive: true);
+                NtfsLinks.CreateJunction(sub2, outside.Path);
+                swapped = true;
+            };
+
+            try
+            {
+                var bytes = svc.BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: true);
+
+                Assert.True(swapped, "race seam never fired for sub2/x.txt");
+                var entries = ZipEntryNames(bytes);
+                Assert.Contains("AgentState/sub1/decoy.txt", entries);
+                Assert.DoesNotContain("AgentState/sub2/x.txt", entries);
+                Assert.DoesNotContain("OUTSIDE-THE-VALIDATED-FOLDER", AllZipEntryTexts(bytes));
+
+                var manifest = ReadZipEntryText(bytes, "package-manifest.txt");
+                Assert.NotNull(manifest);
+                Assert.Contains("SKIPPED (resolved outside validated folder)", manifest!);
+                Assert.Contains("ADDED: AgentState/sub1/decoy.txt", manifest!);
+            }
+            finally
+            {
+                NtfsLinks.RemoveLink(sub2);
+            }
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildArchiveBytes_rejects_source_folder_that_is_a_junction()
+        {
+            using var rig = new Rig();
+            using var outside = new TempDirectory();
+            File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(outside.Path, "snapshot.json"), "{\"leak\":true}");
+            var link = Path.Combine(rig.Tmp.Path, "StateLink");
+            NtfsLinks.CreateJunction(link, outside.Path);
+
+            try
+            {
+                var bytes = rig.Build(sectionFolderOverrides: new Dictionary<string, string> { ["AgentState"] = link })
+                    .BuildArchiveBytes(enrollmentSucceeded: true);
+
+                var entries = ZipEntryNames(bytes);
+                Assert.DoesNotContain(entries, e => e.StartsWith("AgentState/"));
+                var manifest = ReadZipEntryText(bytes, "package-manifest.txt");
+                Assert.NotNull(manifest);
+                Assert.Contains("FOLDER REJECTED (reparse point)", manifest!);
+            }
+            finally
+            {
+                NtfsLinks.RemoveLink(link);
+            }
+        }
     }
 }

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Runtime/PinnedSourceFolderTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+#nullable enable
+using System;
+using System.IO;
+using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
+using System.Text;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// PinnedSourceFolder is the diagnostics packager's answer to the enumerate-then-open race:
+    /// the folder and every file are judged on the handle that is read, never on the path
+    /// string. Junctions come from the stock mklink (no privilege needed); the file-symlink
+    /// case degrades to a no-op on hosts without the symlink privilege.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class PinnedSourceFolderTests
+    {
+        [DllImport("kernel32.dll", CharSet = CharSet.Unicode, SetLastError = true)]
+        private static extern uint GetShortPathNameW(string lpszLongPath, StringBuilder lpszShortPath, uint cchBuffer);
+
+        private static string? ShortPathOf(string path)
+        {
+            var sb = new StringBuilder(1024);
+            var len = GetShortPathNameW(path, sb, (uint)sb.Capacity);
+            return len == 0 || len >= sb.Capacity ? null : sb.ToString();
+        }
+
+        private static string LongPathOf(string path) => PinnedSourceFolder.TryGetLongPath(path) ?? path;
+
+        private static bool SamePath(string a, string b) =>
+            string.Equals(a.TrimEnd('\\'), b.TrimEnd('\\'), StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryOpen_pins_a_real_folder_and_reports_where_it_points()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var folder = Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "Logs");
+            Directory.CreateDirectory(folder);
+
+            using var pinned = PinnedSourceFolder.TryOpen(folder + "\\", out var rejection);
+
+            Assert.Null(rejection);
+            Assert.NotNull(pinned);
+            Assert.Equal(folder, pinned!.LexicalPath);
+            Assert.True(SamePath(LongPathOf(folder), pinned.CanonicalPath), $"canonical '{pinned.CanonicalPath}' vs '{folder}'");
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryOpen_accepts_a_short_name_path_and_canonicalizes_it()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var folder = Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "LongFolderNameForShortNames");
+            Directory.CreateDirectory(folder);
+            // 8.3 generation may be disabled on the volume; then the short form IS the long form
+            // and this degrades to the plain case (CI runners hand out C:\Users\RUNNER~1\...).
+            var shortForm = ShortPathOf(folder) ?? folder;
+
+            using var pinned = PinnedSourceFolder.TryOpen(shortForm, out var rejection);
+
+            Assert.Null(rejection);
+            Assert.NotNull(pinned);
+            Assert.True(SamePath(LongPathOf(folder), pinned!.CanonicalPath), $"canonical '{pinned.CanonicalPath}' vs '{folder}' (opened as '{shortForm}')");
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryOpen_reports_a_missing_folder()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+
+            var pinned = PinnedSourceFolder.TryOpen(Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "nope"), out var rejection);
+
+            Assert.Null(pinned);
+            Assert.Equal(PinnedSourceFolder.RejectMissing, rejection);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryOpen_rejects_a_folder_that_is_a_junction()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            using var target = new TempDirectory();
+            var link = Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "link");
+            NtfsLinks.CreateJunction(link, target.Path);
+            try
+            {
+                var pinned = PinnedSourceFolder.TryOpen(link, out var rejection);
+
+                Assert.Null(pinned);
+                Assert.Equal(PinnedSourceFolder.RejectReparsePoint, rejection);
+            }
+            finally
+            {
+                NtfsLinks.RemoveLink(link);
+            }
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryOpen_rejects_a_folder_reached_through_a_junction()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            using var target = new TempDirectory();
+            Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.Combine(target.Path, "Logs"));
+            var link = Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "link");
+            NtfsLinks.CreateJunction(link, target.Path);
+            try
+            {
+                // link\Logs is a real directory reached THROUGH a junction: its own attributes are
+                // clean, only the handle's final path gives it away.
+                var pinned = PinnedSourceFolder.TryOpen(Path.Combine(link, "Logs"), out var rejection);
+
+                Assert.Null(pinned);
+                Assert.Equal(PinnedSourceFolder.RejectResolvedElsewhere, rejection);
+            }
+            finally
+            {
+                NtfsLinks.RemoveLink(link);
+            }
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryOpenFile_returns_the_bytes_of_a_real_file()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var sub = Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "sub");
+            Directory.CreateDirectory(sub);
+            var file = Path.Combine(sub, "a.log");
+            File.WriteAllText(file, "hello");
+
+            using var pinned = PinnedSourceFolder.TryOpen(tmp.Path, out _);
+            Assert.NotNull(pinned);
+            using var source = pinned!.TryOpenFile(file, out var rejection);
+
+            Assert.Null(rejection);
+            Assert.NotNull(source);
+            Assert.Equal(5, source!.Length);
+            using var reader = new StreamReader(source.Stream, Encoding.UTF8);
+            Assert.Equal("hello", reader.ReadToEnd());
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryOpenFile_rejects_a_file_reached_through_a_junction_created_after_the_pin()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            using var outside = new TempDirectory();
+            var sub = Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "sub");
+            Directory.CreateDirectory(sub);
+            var file = Path.Combine(sub, "x.log");
+            File.WriteAllText(file, "harmless");
+            File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(outside.Path, "x.log"), "outside");
+
+            using var pinned = PinnedSourceFolder.TryOpen(tmp.Path, out _);
+            Assert.NotNull(pinned);
+            // Enumeration would have listed sub\x.log by now — the attacker swaps sub for a junction.
+            Directory.Delete(sub, recursive: true);
+            NtfsLinks.CreateJunction(sub, outside.Path);
+            try
+            {
+                var source = pinned!.TryOpenFile(file, out var rejection);
+
+                Assert.Null(source);
+                Assert.Equal(PinnedSourceFolder.RejectResolvedElsewhere, rejection);
+            }
+            finally
+            {
+                NtfsLinks.RemoveLink(sub);
+            }
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryOpenFile_rejects_a_symlink_at_the_final_component()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            using var outside = new TempDirectory();
+            var targetFile = Path.Combine(outside.Path, "secret.log");
+            File.WriteAllText(targetFile, "outside");
+            var link = Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "x.log");
+            if (!NtfsLinks.TryCreateFileSymlink(link, targetFile))
+                return; // no SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege / Developer Mode on this host — nothing to assert
+            try
+            {
+                using var pinned = PinnedSourceFolder.TryOpen(tmp.Path, out _);
+                Assert.NotNull(pinned);
+
+                var source = pinned!.TryOpenFile(link, out var rejection);
+
+                Assert.Null(source);
+                Assert.Equal(PinnedSourceFolder.RejectReparsePoint, rejection);
+            }
+            finally
+            {
+                NtfsLinks.RemoveLink(link);
+            }
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void TryOpenFile_refuses_a_candidate_outside_the_pinned_folder()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            using var other = new TempDirectory();
+            var elsewhere = Path.Combine(other.Path, "x.log");
+            File.WriteAllText(elsewhere, "x");
+
+            using var pinned = PinnedSourceFolder.TryOpen(tmp.Path, out _);
+            Assert.NotNull(pinned);
+
+            var source = pinned!.TryOpenFile(elsewhere, out var rejection);
+
+            Assert.Null(source);
+            Assert.Equal(PinnedSourceFolder.RejectOutsideFolder, rejection);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Pinned_folder_and_its_ancestors_cannot_be_renamed_while_pinned()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var parent = Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "parent");
+            var folder = Path.Combine(parent, "Logs");
+            Directory.CreateDirectory(folder);
+
+            using (var pinned = PinnedSourceFolder.TryOpen(folder, out _))
+            {
+                Assert.NotNull(pinned);
+                Assert.ThrowsAny<Exception>(() => Directory.Move(folder, Path.Combine(parent, "Logs2")));
+                Assert.ThrowsAny<Exception>(() => Directory.Move(parent, Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "parent2")));
+                Assert.True(Directory.Exists(folder));
+            }
+
+            // Released: the same rename now succeeds.
+            Directory.Move(parent, Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "parent2"));
+            Assert.True(Directory.Exists(Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "parent2", "Logs")));
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Runtime/ServerActionDispatcherTests.cs

@@ -122,6 +122,28 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
             Assert.Equal("config_fetch_failed", (string)typed["failureReason"]);
         }
 
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Dispatch_request_diagnostics_skipped_by_gate_surfaces_gate_name_as_failure_reason()
+        {
+            // Session 2550bcea (2026-08-29): the on-demand collection was refused by the
+            // mode=Off gate and the portal only saw a generic "diagnostics_upload_failed".
+            // The gate name must travel through to the event so the operator can tell a
+            // config gate from a real upload error.
+            using var rig = new Rig();
+            rig.DiagnosticsResult = DiagnosticsUploadResult.SkippedBy(DiagnosticsUploadResult.SkipModeOff);
+
+            await rig.Build().DispatchAsync(new List<ServerAction>
+            {
+                new ServerAction { Type = ServerActionTypes.RequestDiagnostics, QueuedAt = DateTime.UtcNow },
+            });
+
+            Assert.Equal(1, rig.DiagnosticsCalls);
+            Assert.Empty(rig.EventsOfType("server_action_executed"));
+            var failed = rig.EventsOfType("server_action_failed").Single();
+            var typed = Assert.IsAssignableFrom<IReadOnlyDictionary<string, object>>(failed.TypedPayload!);
+            Assert.Equal(DiagnosticsUploadResult.SkipModeOff, (string)typed["failureReason"]);
+        }
+
         [Fact]
         public async Task Dispatch_unknown_action_type_emits_failed_with_unknown_action_type_reason()
         {

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Security/ConsoleBypassWatcherTests.cs

@@ -94,6 +94,22 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Security
             Assert.Equal("interactive_console_with_command", info.Classification);
         }
 
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData(@"cmd /k rem /c")]
+        [InlineData(@"cmd.exe /k ""title /c""")]
+        public void Cmd_k_with_slash_c_in_payload_is_not_demoted_to_scripted(string commandLine)
+        {
+            // cmd.exe honors only the FIRST /c-or-/k switch; a '/c' inside the /k payload is inert, so
+            // the console is a persistent human-usable shell and must still be surfaced (low confidence).
+            using var rig = new Rig(Probe(commandLine));
+
+            rig.Sut.HandleStart(2223, 1, sessionId: 1, ownerSidHint: null, detectedVia: "process_start_trace");
+
+            var info = Assert.Single(rig.Detected);
+            Assert.Equal("low", info.Confidence);
+            Assert.Equal("interactive_console_with_command", info.Classification);
+        }
+
         [Fact]
         public void Instant_close_unreadable_commandline_raises_low_confidence()
         {
@@ -146,6 +162,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Security
         [InlineData(2, @"C:\x\cmd.exe /K bar", "InteractiveWithCommand")] // L12: /k stays interactive
         [InlineData(1, @"cmd.exe /k whoami", "InteractiveWithCommand")]   // technician-planted shell
         [InlineData(1, @"cmd.exe /d/q/c exit 9", "Ignore")]            // combined run-and-exit wins
+        [InlineData(1, @"cmd /k rem /c", "InteractiveWithCommand")]     // cmd.exe honors the FIRST switch: /k stays interactive
+        [InlineData(1, @"cmd.exe /k ""title /c""", "InteractiveWithCommand")] // /c inside the /k payload is not a switch
+        [InlineData(1, @"cmd /k /c", "InteractiveWithCommand")]         // /c after /k is just the /k payload
+        [InlineData(1, @"cmd.exe /c cmd /k", "Ignore")]                 // first switch /c wins the other way round
         public void Classify_maps_session_and_commandline(int sessionId, string? commandLine, string expected)
         {
             Assert.Equal(expected, ConsoleBypassWatcher.Classify(sessionId, commandLine).ToString());
@@ -165,6 +185,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Security
         [InlineData(@"cmd.exe /k", false)]                       // L12: /k leaves an interactive shell
         [InlineData(@"cmd.exe /d/q/c exit 9", true)]             // combined switches — the field case
         [InlineData(@"cmd.exe /D/Q/K stay", false)]              // L12: run-and-stay is not scripted
+        [InlineData(@"cmd.exe /k rem /c", false)]                // first switch /k wins — payload /c is inert
+        [InlineData(@"cmd.exe /c rem /k", true)]                 // first switch /c wins
         [InlineData(@"""C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe"" /c ""x.bat""", true)]
         public void HasScriptArgument_detects_run_command_switch(string commandLine, bool expected)
         {

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/SystemSignals/PowerStateTransitionTrackerTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+#nullable enable
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Runtime;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.SystemSignals
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Pure state machine behind the power watcher: AC↔battery edges, the 50/30/15 threshold
+    /// ladder (latch once per lifetime, lowest-crossed-only on multi-level jumps, baseline
+    /// coverage for sessions starting low), null-percent tolerance and the storm cap.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class PowerStateTransitionTrackerTests
+    {
+        private static PowerStateResult Ac(int? percent = 80, bool charging = true) => new PowerStateResult
+        {
+            OnAcPower = true,
+            HasBattery = true,
+            BatteryPercent = percent,
+            IsCharging = charging,
+            BatteryLifeMinutes = null,
+        };
+
+        private static PowerStateResult Battery(int? percent, int? lifeMinutes = 90) => new PowerStateResult
+        {
+            OnAcPower = false,
+            HasBattery = true,
+            BatteryPercent = percent,
+            IsCharging = false,
+            BatteryLifeMinutes = lifeMinutes,
+        };
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Baseline_on_ac_is_silent()
+        {
+            var tracker = new PowerStateTransitionTracker();
+            Assert.Empty(tracker.Baseline(Ac()));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Baseline_without_battery_or_with_probe_error_is_silent()
+        {
+            var tracker = new PowerStateTransitionTracker();
+            Assert.Empty(tracker.Baseline(new PowerStateResult { OnAcPower = true, HasBattery = false }));
+            Assert.Empty(tracker.Baseline(new PowerStateResult { ProbeError = "boom" }));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Baseline_on_battery_above_ladder_is_silent()
+        {
+            var tracker = new PowerStateTransitionTracker();
+            Assert.Empty(tracker.Baseline(Battery(80)));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Baseline_at_12_percent_emits_exactly_the_15_threshold()
+        {
+            var tracker = new PowerStateTransitionTracker();
+
+            var emissions = tracker.Baseline(Battery(12));
+
+            var e = Assert.Single(emissions);
+            Assert.Equal(PowerStateTransitionTracker.TransitionThresholdCrossed, e.Transition);
+            Assert.Equal(15, e.ThresholdPercent);
+            Assert.Equal(12, e.BatteryPercent);
+            Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Error, e.Severity);
+            Assert.True(e.ImmediateUpload);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Baseline_at_25_percent_emits_30_and_latches_50()
+        {
+            var tracker = new PowerStateTransitionTracker();
+
+            var baseline = tracker.Baseline(Battery(25));
+            var e = Assert.Single(baseline);
+            Assert.Equal(30, e.ThresholdPercent);
+            Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Warning, e.Severity);
+            Assert.True(e.ImmediateUpload);
+
+            // 50 and 30 are latched by the baseline; draining to 40% stays silent, 14% emits 15.
+            Assert.Empty(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(40)));
+            var next = Assert.Single(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(14)));
+            Assert.Equal(15, next.ThresholdPercent);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Ac_to_battery_emits_warning_with_immediate_upload()
+        {
+            var tracker = new PowerStateTransitionTracker();
+            tracker.Baseline(Ac(63));
+
+            var e = Assert.Single(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(63)));
+
+            Assert.Equal(PowerStateTransitionTracker.TransitionAcToBattery, e.Transition);
+            Assert.Null(e.ThresholdPercent);
+            Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Warning, e.Severity);
+            Assert.True(e.ImmediateUpload);
+            Assert.False(e.OnAcPower);
+            Assert.Equal(63, e.BatteryPercent);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Battery_to_ac_emits_info_without_immediate_upload()
+        {
+            var tracker = new PowerStateTransitionTracker();
+            tracker.Baseline(Battery(70));
+
+            var e = Assert.Single(tracker.Evaluate(Ac(70)));
+
+            Assert.Equal(PowerStateTransitionTracker.TransitionBatteryToAc, e.Transition);
+            Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Info, e.Severity);
+            Assert.False(e.ImmediateUpload);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void No_diff_stays_silent()
+        {
+            var tracker = new PowerStateTransitionTracker();
+            tracker.Baseline(Ac());
+
+            Assert.Empty(tracker.Evaluate(Ac()));
+            Assert.Empty(tracker.Evaluate(Ac(79)));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Unplug_below_threshold_emits_transition_and_threshold_together()
+        {
+            var tracker = new PowerStateTransitionTracker();
+            tracker.Baseline(Ac(10));
+
+            var emissions = tracker.Evaluate(Battery(10));
+
+            Assert.Equal(2, emissions.Count);
+            Assert.Equal(PowerStateTransitionTracker.TransitionAcToBattery, emissions[0].Transition);
+            Assert.Equal(PowerStateTransitionTracker.TransitionThresholdCrossed, emissions[1].Transition);
+            Assert.Equal(15, emissions[1].ThresholdPercent);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Multi_level_drop_emits_lowest_crossed_level_only()
+        {
+            var tracker = new PowerStateTransitionTracker();
+            tracker.Baseline(Battery(60));
+
+            var e = Assert.Single(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(10)));
+
+            Assert.Equal(15, e.ThresholdPercent);
+            // All levels are latched — recovering and re-draining emits nothing more.
+            tracker.Evaluate(Ac(90));
+            Assert.Single(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(45)), x => x.Transition == PowerStateTransitionTracker.TransitionAcToBattery);
+            Assert.Empty(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(13)));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Each_level_latches_once_per_lifetime()
+        {
+            var tracker = new PowerStateTransitionTracker();
+            tracker.Baseline(Battery(70));
+
+            Assert.Single(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(48))); // 50
+            Assert.Empty(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(47)));  // still inside 50, no re-emit
+            Assert.Single(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(29))); // 30
+            Assert.Single(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(15))); // 15 (boundary: <= level)
+            Assert.Empty(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(5)));   // ladder exhausted
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Threshold_severity_ladder_is_info_warning_error()
+        {
+            var tracker = new PowerStateTransitionTracker();
+            tracker.Baseline(Battery(70));
+
+            var fifty = Assert.Single(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(50)));
+            Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Info, fifty.Severity);
+            Assert.False(fifty.ImmediateUpload);
+
+            var thirty = Assert.Single(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(30)));
+            Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Warning, thirty.Severity);
+            Assert.True(thirty.ImmediateUpload);
+
+            var fifteen = Assert.Single(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(15)));
+            Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Error, fifteen.Severity);
+            Assert.True(fifteen.ImmediateUpload);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Null_battery_percent_skips_thresholds_but_ac_diff_still_works()
+        {
+            var tracker = new PowerStateTransitionTracker();
+            tracker.Baseline(Ac(null));
+
+            var e = Assert.Single(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(null, lifeMinutes: null)));
+
+            Assert.Equal(PowerStateTransitionTracker.TransitionAcToBattery, e.Transition);
+            Assert.Null(e.BatteryPercent);
+            Assert.Contains("battery level unknown", e.Message);
+            Assert.Empty(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(null, lifeMinutes: null)));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Probe_error_mid_run_preserves_state()
+        {
+            var tracker = new PowerStateTransitionTracker();
+            tracker.Baseline(Ac());
+
+            Assert.Empty(tracker.Evaluate(new PowerStateResult { ProbeError = "transient" }));
+            // State was not corrupted by the error — the real transition still diffs cleanly.
+            Assert.Single(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(60)));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Evaluate_without_baseline_latches_like_a_baseline()
+        {
+            var tracker = new PowerStateTransitionTracker();
+
+            var e = Assert.Single(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(12)));
+
+            // No phantom ac_to_battery from the implicit default state — only the threshold.
+            Assert.Equal(PowerStateTransitionTracker.TransitionThresholdCrossed, e.Transition);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Emission_cap_suppresses_and_flips_flag_once()
+        {
+            var tracker = new PowerStateTransitionTracker(maxEmissions: 4);
+            tracker.Baseline(Ac());
+
+            // Flapping power source: each edge is one emission.
+            for (var i = 0; i < 2; i++)
+            {
+                Assert.Single(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(80)));
+                Assert.Single(tracker.Evaluate(Ac(80)));
+            }
+            Assert.False(tracker.EmissionCapReached);
+
+            Assert.Empty(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(80)));
+            Assert.True(tracker.EmissionCapReached);
+            Assert.Empty(tracker.Evaluate(Ac(80)));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Message_carries_percent_and_transition_context()
+        {
+            var tracker = new PowerStateTransitionTracker();
+            tracker.Baseline(Ac(62));
+
+            var toBattery = Assert.Single(tracker.Evaluate(Battery(62)));
+            Assert.Contains("AC to battery", toBattery.Message);
+            Assert.Contains("battery 62%", toBattery.Message);
+
+            var backToAc = Assert.Single(tracker.Evaluate(Ac(63)));
+            Assert.Contains("back to AC", backToAc.Message);
+            Assert.Contains("charging", backToAc.Message);
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/SystemSignals/SystemTimelineTrackerTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,429 @@
+#nullable enable
+using System;
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using System.Linq;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration;
+using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
+using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.SystemSignals
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// SystemTimelineTracker — clock steps (Kernel-General 1) and completed sleep episodes
+    /// (Power-Troubleshooter 1 / Kernel-Power 507) from the System channel. Drives the primitive
+    /// <see cref="SystemTimelineTracker.ProcessEvent"/> test seam (no real EventRecord, which is
+    /// abstract + Windows-only), mirroring the WindowsUpdateTracker test pattern.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class SystemTimelineTrackerTests : IDisposable
+    {
+        private static readonly DateTime At = new DateTime(2026, 8, 21, 10, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
+
+        private readonly TempDirectory _tmp = new TempDirectory();
+        private readonly FakeSignalIngressSink _sink;
+        private readonly SystemTimelineTracker _tracker;
+        private long _nextRecordId = 1;
+
+        public SystemTimelineTrackerTests()
+        {
+            _sink = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
+            var post = new InformationalEventPost(_sink, new VirtualClock(At));
+            var logger = new AgentLogger(_tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info);
+            _tracker = new SystemTimelineTracker(
+                sessionId: "sess-stl",
+                tenantId: "tenant-stl",
+                post: post,
+                logger: logger,
+                backfillEnabled: false,
+                stateDirectory: null); // in-memory dedup for most tests
+        }
+
+        public void Dispose() => _tmp.Dispose();
+
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // Emission helpers
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+        private void EmitClockChange(
+            DateTime? oldTime, DateTime? newTime, string? rawDeltaMs = null,
+            int reason = 1, long? recordId = null, bool isBackfill = false, DateTime? timeCreatedUtc = null)
+        {
+            var data = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
+            if (oldTime.HasValue) data["OldTime"] = oldTime.Value.ToString("o");
+            if (newTime.HasValue) data["NewTime"] = newTime.Value.ToString("o");
+            if (rawDeltaMs != null) data["TimeDeltaInMs"] = rawDeltaMs;
+            data["Reason"] = reason.ToString();
+            data["ProcessName"] = @"\Device\HarddiskVolume3\Windows\System32\svchost.exe";
+            data["ProcessID"] = "6892";
+
+            _tracker.ProcessEvent(
+                providerName: SystemTimelineTracker.ProviderKernelGeneral,
+                eventId: SystemTimelineTracker.EventId_ClockChange,
+                recordId: recordId ?? _nextRecordId++,
+                timeCreatedUtc: timeCreatedUtc ?? At,
+                eventData: data,
+                isBackfill: isBackfill);
+        }
+
+        private void EmitClassicResume(
+            DateTime sleepTime, DateTime wakeTime, string? effectiveState = "1",
+            string? wakeSourceText = null, long? recordId = null, bool isBackfill = false, DateTime? timeCreatedUtc = null)
+        {
+            var data = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
+            {
+                ["SleepTime"] = sleepTime.ToString("o"),
+                ["WakeTime"] = wakeTime.ToString("o"),
+                ["WakeSourceType"] = "0",
+            };
+            if (effectiveState != null) data["EffectiveState"] = effectiveState;
+            if (wakeSourceText != null) data["WakeSourceText"] = wakeSourceText;
+
+            _tracker.ProcessEvent(
+                providerName: SystemTimelineTracker.ProviderPowerTroubleshooter,
+                eventId: SystemTimelineTracker.EventId_ClassicResume,
+                recordId: recordId ?? _nextRecordId++,
+                timeCreatedUtc: timeCreatedUtc ?? wakeTime,
+                eventData: data,
+                isBackfill: isBackfill);
+        }
+
+        private void EmitModernStandbyExit(
+            long sleepDurationUs, long durationUs, string powerStateAc = "true",
+            long? recordId = null, bool isBackfill = false, DateTime? timeCreatedUtc = null)
+        {
+            var data = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
+            {
+                ["SleepDurationInUs"] = sleepDurationUs.ToString(),
+                ["DurationInUs"] = durationUs.ToString(),
+                ["Reason"] = "32",
+                ["PowerStateAc"] = powerStateAc,
+                ["BatteryRemainingCapacityOnExit"] = "34180",
+            };
+
+            _tracker.ProcessEvent(
+                providerName: SystemTimelineTracker.ProviderKernelPower,
+                eventId: SystemTimelineTracker.EventId_ModernStandbyExit,
+                recordId: recordId ?? _nextRecordId++,
+                timeCreatedUtc: timeCreatedUtc ?? At,
+                eventData: data,
+                isBackfill: isBackfill);
+        }
+
+        private IReadOnlyList<FakeSignalIngressSink.PostedSignal> ByType(string eventType) =>
+            _sink.Posted.Where(p =>
+                p.Kind == DecisionSignalKind.InformationalEvent
+                && p.Payload != null
+                && p.Payload.TryGetValue(SignalPayloadKeys.EventType, out var et)
+                && et == eventType).ToList();
+
+        private static IReadOnlyDictionary<string, object> Data(FakeSignalIngressSink.PostedSignal s) =>
+            (IReadOnlyDictionary<string, object>)s.TypedPayload!;
+
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // system_clock_changed
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ClockStep_AboveThreshold_EmitsInfo_WithSignedDeltaAndNormalizedTimes()
+        {
+            var oldTime = At;
+            var newTime = At.AddSeconds(10);
+            EmitClockChange(oldTime, newTime, reason: 1);
+
+            var s = Assert.Single(ByType(Constants.EventTypes.SystemClockChanged));
+            Assert.Equal("Info", s.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.Severity]);
+            Assert.Equal("false", s.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.ImmediateUpload]);
+
+            var data = Data(s);
+            Assert.Equal(10_000L, data["timeDeltaMs"]);
+            Assert.Equal("application_set", data["reasonText"]);
+            Assert.Equal(1, data["reason"]);
+            Assert.Equal(oldTime.ToString("o"), data["oldTime"]);
+            Assert.Equal(newTime.ToString("o"), data["newTime"]);
+            Assert.Equal(6892, data["processId"]);
+            Assert.Contains("forward", (string)s.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.Message]);
+            Assert.Contains("svchost.exe", (string)s.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.Message]);
+        }
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData(1)]
+        [InlineData(1999)]
+        public void ClockMicroStep_BelowThreshold_Suppressed(int deltaMs)
+        {
+            EmitClockChange(At, At.AddMilliseconds(deltaMs));
+            Assert.Empty(ByType(Constants.EventTypes.SystemClockChanged));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ClockStep_Backward_EmitsNegativeDelta()
+        {
+            EmitClockChange(oldTime: At, newTime: At.AddSeconds(-3));
+
+            var s = Assert.Single(ByType(Constants.EventTypes.SystemClockChanged));
+            Assert.Equal(-3000L, Data(s)["timeDeltaMs"]);
+            Assert.Contains("backward", (string)s.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.Message]);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ClockStep_AtLeastFiveMinutes_WarningAndImmediateUpload()
+        {
+            EmitClockChange(At, At.AddMinutes(5), reason: 2);
+
+            var s = Assert.Single(ByType(Constants.EventTypes.SystemClockChanged));
+            Assert.Equal("Warning", s.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.Severity]);
+            Assert.Equal("true", s.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.ImmediateUpload]);
+            Assert.Equal("hardware_clock_sync", Data(s)["reasonText"]);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ClockStep_NoUsableTimesOrDelta_Skipped()
+        {
+            EmitClockChange(oldTime: null, newTime: null, rawDeltaMs: "not-a-number");
+            Assert.Empty(ByType(Constants.EventTypes.SystemClockChanged));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ClockStep_FallsBackToTimeDeltaInMs_WhenTimesUnparseable()
+        {
+            // Only the raw delta parses — the direction information of NewTime/OldTime is gone,
+            // but the magnitude still gates and emits.
+            EmitClockChange(oldTime: null, newTime: null, rawDeltaMs: "7200000");
+
+            var s = Assert.Single(ByType(Constants.EventTypes.SystemClockChanged));
+            Assert.Equal(7_200_000L, Data(s)["timeDeltaMs"]);
+        }
+
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // system_sleep_episode — classic (Power-Troubleshooter 1)
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ClassicResume_EffectiveState5_EmitsHibernateEpisode()
+        {
+            var sleepAt = At.AddHours(-2);
+            EmitClassicResume(sleepAt, At, effectiveState: "5", wakeSourceText: "Power Button");
+
+            var s = Assert.Single(ByType(Constants.EventTypes.SystemSleepEpisode));
+            Assert.Equal("Info", s.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.Severity]);
+
+            var data = Data(s);
+            Assert.Equal("hibernate", data["kind"]);
+            Assert.Equal(7200L, data["durationSeconds"]);
+            Assert.Equal(sleepAt.ToString("o"), data["enteredAt"]);
+            Assert.Equal(At.ToString("o"), data["exitedAt"]);
+            Assert.Equal("Power Button", data["wakeSourceText"]);
+            Assert.Contains("hibernate", (string)s.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.Message]);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ClassicResume_NonHibernateState_EmitsSleepKind()
+        {
+            EmitClassicResume(At.AddMinutes(-30), At, effectiveState: "4");
+            Assert.Equal("sleep", Data(Assert.Single(ByType(Constants.EventTypes.SystemSleepEpisode)))["kind"]);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ClassicResume_ShortEpisode_StillEmits()
+        {
+            // No duration floor for classic sleep: the event only exists for genuinely completed
+            // S3/S4 transitions, so a 30 s real sleep is still signal.
+            EmitClassicResume(At.AddSeconds(-30), At);
+
+            var s = Assert.Single(ByType(Constants.EventTypes.SystemSleepEpisode));
+            Assert.Equal(30L, Data(s)["durationSeconds"]);
+        }
+
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // system_sleep_episode — Modern Standby (Kernel-Power 507)
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ModernStandbyExit_EmitsEpisode_WithDerivedEnterTime()
+        {
+            // Values from a live 507 on this dev machine: 38 min scenario, ~38 min actual sleep.
+            EmitModernStandbyExit(sleepDurationUs: 2_324_095_807, durationUs: 2_330_201_652);
+
+            var s = Assert.Single(ByType(Constants.EventTypes.SystemSleepEpisode));
+            var data = Data(s);
+            Assert.Equal("modern_standby", data["kind"]);
+            Assert.Equal(2330L, data["durationSeconds"]);
+            Assert.Equal(2324L, data["sleepDurationSeconds"]);
+            Assert.Equal(true, data["onAcPower"]);
+            Assert.Equal(34180L, data["batteryRemainingCapacityOnExit"]);
+            Assert.Equal(At.ToString("o"), data["exitedAt"]);
+            Assert.Equal(At.AddMilliseconds(-2_330_201.652).ToString("o"), data["enteredAt"]);
+            Assert.Contains("Modern Standby", (string)s.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.Message]);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ModernStandbyExit_SleepBelowFloor_Suppressed()
+        {
+            EmitModernStandbyExit(sleepDurationUs: 30_000_000, durationUs: 90_000_000); // 30 s sleep
+            Assert.Empty(ByType(Constants.EventTypes.SystemSleepEpisode));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ModernStandbyExit_ScreenOffWithoutSleep_Suppressed()
+        {
+            // SleepEntered=false scenarios carry SleepDurationInUs 0 — the single duration gate
+            // suppresses them without a separate branch.
+            EmitModernStandbyExit(sleepDurationUs: 0, durationUs: 6_106_696);
+            Assert.Empty(ByType(Constants.EventTypes.SystemSleepEpisode));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ModernStandbyExit_ScenarioShorterThanSleep_ClampsToSleepDuration()
+        {
+            EmitModernStandbyExit(sleepDurationUs: 120_000_000, durationUs: 0);
+
+            var data = Data(Assert.Single(ByType(Constants.EventTypes.SystemSleepEpisode)));
+            Assert.Equal(120L, data["durationSeconds"]);
+            Assert.Equal(120L, data["sleepDurationSeconds"]);
+        }
+
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // Backfill semantics
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BackfilledEvent_UsesEventTimeForTimelineTimestamp_AndFlagsData()
+        {
+            // A pre-agent standby episode (record created before the agent started) must land on
+            // the timeline where the device actually woke, not at agent start.
+            var wakeTime = At.AddHours(-3);
+            EmitClassicResume(wakeTime.AddHours(-1), wakeTime, isBackfill: true, timeCreatedUtc: wakeTime);
+
+            var s = Assert.Single(ByType(Constants.EventTypes.SystemSleepEpisode));
+            Assert.Equal(wakeTime, s.OccurredAtUtc);
+            Assert.Equal(true, Data(s)["backfilled"]);
+        }
+
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // Dedup / watermark
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void SameRecordId_ProcessedTwice_EmitsOnce()
+        {
+            EmitClockChange(At, At.AddMinutes(1), recordId: 42);
+            EmitClockChange(At, At.AddMinutes(1), recordId: 42);
+
+            Assert.Single(ByType(Constants.EventTypes.SystemClockChanged));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BackfillEventWithLowerRecordId_AfterLiveEvent_IsStillEmitted()
+        {
+            // The live watcher is armed BEFORE backfill runs, so a live record with a higher
+            // RecordId can be processed first. An older, never-emitted backfill record must NOT be
+            // suppressed — pre-agent episodes are the whole point (high-water-mark trap).
+            EmitClockChange(At, At.AddMinutes(1), recordId: 100);                       // live, high
+            EmitClockChange(At, At.AddMinutes(2), recordId: 50, isBackfill: true);      // backfill, older
+
+            Assert.Equal(2, ByType(Constants.EventTypes.SystemClockChanged).Count);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Watermark_PersistsAcrossTrackerInstances()
+        {
+            var post = new InformationalEventPost(_sink, new VirtualClock(At));
+            var logger = new AgentLogger(_tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info);
+            var clockData = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
+            {
+                ["OldTime"] = At.ToString("o"),
+                ["NewTime"] = At.AddMinutes(10).ToString("o"),
+                ["Reason"] = "1",
+            };
+
+            var first = new SystemTimelineTracker("s", "t", post, logger, backfillEnabled: false, stateDirectory: _tmp.Path);
+            first.ProcessEvent(SystemTimelineTracker.ProviderKernelGeneral, SystemTimelineTracker.EventId_ClockChange,
+                recordId: 500, timeCreatedUtc: At, eventData: clockData, isBackfill: false);
+
+            // A fresh tracker (agent restart) must load the watermark and skip the already-emitted
+            // record when the backfill re-reads it.
+            var second = new SystemTimelineTracker("s", "t", post, logger, backfillEnabled: false, stateDirectory: _tmp.Path);
+            second.LoadWatermark();
+            second.ProcessEvent(SystemTimelineTracker.ProviderKernelGeneral, SystemTimelineTracker.EventId_ClockChange,
+                recordId: 500, timeCreatedUtc: At, eventData: clockData, isBackfill: true);
+
+            Assert.Single(ByType(Constants.EventTypes.SystemClockChanged));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void UnknownProviderOrEventId_Ignored()
+        {
+            _tracker.ProcessEvent("Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Power", eventId: 566, recordId: _nextRecordId++,
+                timeCreatedUtc: At, eventData: new Dictionary<string, string>(), isBackfill: false);
+            _tracker.ProcessEvent("Some-Other-Provider", eventId: 1, recordId: _nextRecordId++,
+                timeCreatedUtc: At, eventData: new Dictionary<string, string>(), isBackfill: false);
+
+            Assert.Empty(_sink.Posted);
+        }
+
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // XPath + parsing
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildXPath_ContainsAllThreeProviderIdPairs_AndNo506()
+        {
+            var xpath = SystemTimelineTracker.BuildXPath();
+            Assert.Contains("Provider[@Name='Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General'] and EventID=1", xpath);
+            Assert.Contains("Provider[@Name='Microsoft-Windows-Power-Troubleshooter'] and EventID=1", xpath);
+            Assert.Contains("Provider[@Name='Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Power'] and EventID=507", xpath);
+            Assert.DoesNotContain("506", xpath);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildBackfillXPath_AppendsTimediffClause()
+        {
+            var xpath = SystemTimelineTracker.BuildBackfillXPath(86_400_000);
+            Assert.Contains("TimeCreated[timediff(@SystemTime) <= 86400000]", xpath);
+            Assert.Contains("EventID=507", xpath);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ParseEventData_RealKernelGeneralPayload_YieldsAuthoritativeFields()
+        {
+            // Verbatim (values shortened) from a live Kernel-General 1 record on a 26220 dev machine.
+            const string xml =
+                "<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'>" +
+                "<System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General'/><EventID>1</EventID></System>" +
+                "<EventData>" +
+                "<Data Name='NewTime'>2026-08-21T09:40:02.1987028Z</Data>" +
+                "<Data Name='OldTime'>2026-08-21T09:40:02.1973028Z</Data>" +
+                "<Data Name='TimeDeltaInMs'>1</Data>" +
+                "<Data Name='Reason'>1</Data>" +
+                "<Data Name='ProcessName'>\\Device\\HarddiskVolume3\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe</Data>" +
+                "<Data Name='ProcessID'>6892</Data>" +
+                "</EventData></Event>";
+
+            var data = SystemTimelineTracker.ParseEventData(xml);
+            Assert.Equal("1", data["TimeDeltaInMs"]);
+            Assert.Equal("2026-08-21T09:40:02.1987028Z", data["newtime"]); // case-insensitive keys
+            Assert.NotNull(SystemTimelineTracker.TryParseUtc(data["OldTime"]));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void FormatDuration_CompactForms()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal("2h 05m", SystemTimelineTracker.FormatDuration(TimeSpan.FromMinutes(125)));
+            Assert.Equal("56m 12s", SystemTimelineTracker.FormatDuration(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(56 * 60 + 12)));
+            Assert.Equal("45s", SystemTimelineTracker.FormatDuration(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(45)));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ProcessLeafName_StripsDevicePath()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal("svchost.exe",
+                SystemTimelineTracker.ProcessLeafName(@"\Device\HarddiskVolume3\Windows\System32\svchost.exe"));
+            Assert.Null(SystemTimelineTracker.ProcessLeafName(null));
+            Assert.Null(SystemTimelineTracker.ProcessLeafName(@"\Device\HarddiskVolume3\"));
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Monitoring/Transport/DoGroupIdServiceTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+using System;
+using System.Linq;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Transport
+{
+    public class DoGroupIdServiceTests
+    {
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // ComputeGroupId — RealmJoin byte-layout compatibility
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ComputeGroupId_MatchesHandComputedVector()
+        {
+            // Layout: {101,48,6} + {0,0,0} + {ip[1],0,ip[2],ip[3]} + mac — through new Guid(byte[])
+            // the first three groups print little-endian, the last eight bytes verbatim.
+            var guid = DoGroupIdService.ComputeGroupId(
+                new byte[] { 192, 168, 178, 1 },
+                new byte[] { 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55 });
+
+            Assert.Equal("00063065-0000-00a8-b201-001122334455", guid.ToString());
+        }
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData(new byte[] { 10, 0, 0, 1 }, new byte[] { 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF })]
+        [InlineData(new byte[] { 192, 168, 1, 254 }, new byte[] { 0x00, 0x50, 0x56, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03 })]
+        [InlineData(new byte[] { 172, 16, 254, 3 }, new byte[] { 0xF0, 0x9F, 0xC2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 })]
+        public void ComputeGroupId_MatchesRealmJoinReferenceImplementation(byte[] ip, byte[] mac)
+        {
+            Assert.Equal(RealmJoinReferenceGuid(ip, mac), DoGroupIdService.ComputeGroupId(ip, mac));
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>Verbatim port of RealmJoin's ConvertToGuid — the compatibility contract.</summary>
+        private static Guid RealmJoinReferenceGuid(byte[] ipBytes, byte[] address)
+        {
+            byte[] prefix = { 101, 48, 6 };
+            var stuff = new byte[4];
+            stuff[0] = ipBytes[1];
+            stuff[2] = ipBytes[2];
+            stuff[3] = ipBytes[3];
+
+            return new Guid(prefix
+                .Concat(new byte[16 - prefix.Length - stuff.Length - address.Length])
+                .Concat(stuff)
+                .Concat(address)
+                .ToArray());
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ComputeGroupId_RejectsNonIpv4AndBadMacLengths()
+        {
+            var ip4 = new byte[] { 10, 0, 0, 1 };
+            var mac = new byte[] { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 };
+
+            Assert.Throws<ArgumentException>(() => DoGroupIdService.ComputeGroupId(new byte[16], mac));
+            Assert.Throws<ArgumentException>(() => DoGroupIdService.ComputeGroupId(null!, mac));
+            Assert.Throws<ArgumentException>(() => DoGroupIdService.ComputeGroupId(ip4, new byte[8]));
+            Assert.Throws<ArgumentException>(() => DoGroupIdService.ComputeGroupId(ip4, null!));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void ComputeGroupId_RegistryFormat_IsBracelessLowercase()
+        {
+            // RealmJoin writes SetValue(name, Guid) which stringifies via Guid.ToString() ("d"
+            // format) — our written value must be the identical string form.
+            var text = DoGroupIdService.ComputeGroupId(
+                new byte[] { 10, 1, 2, 3 }, new byte[] { 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03 }).ToString();
+
+            Assert.DoesNotContain("{", text);
+            Assert.Equal(text.ToLowerInvariant(), text);
+            Assert.Equal(36, text.Length);
+        }
+
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // DecideAction — ownership matrix
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+        private const string Computed = "00063065-0000-00a8-b201-001122334455";
+        private const string Other = "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555";
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData(null)]
+        [InlineData("")]
+        public void DecideAction_NoExistingValue_Writes(string? existing)
+        {
+            Assert.Equal(DoGroupIdAction.Write, DoGroupIdService.DecideAction(existing, Computed, null));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void DecideAction_ExistingEqualsComputed_IsNoOp()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal(DoGroupIdAction.NoOp, DoGroupIdService.DecideAction(Computed, Computed, null));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void DecideAction_ExistingEqualsComputed_ToleratesBracesAndCase()
+        {
+            // A value written by another tool in "{...}"/uppercase form is still semantically ours.
+            var braced = "{" + Computed.ToUpperInvariant() + "}";
+            Assert.Equal(DoGroupIdAction.NoOp, DoGroupIdService.DecideAction(braced, Computed, null));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void DecideAction_ExistingIsOurStaleValue_WritesUpdate()
+        {
+            // Gateway changed: the registry still holds the GUID we wrote for the old network.
+            Assert.Equal(DoGroupIdAction.Write, DoGroupIdService.DecideAction(Other, Computed, Other));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void DecideAction_ForeignValue_Skips()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal(DoGroupIdAction.SkipForeign, DoGroupIdService.DecideAction(Other, Computed, null));
+            Assert.Equal(DoGroupIdAction.SkipForeign, DoGroupIdService.DecideAction(Other, Computed, Computed));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void DecideAction_NonGuidGarbageExisting_SkipsAsForeign()
+        {
+            // Never overwrite a value we can't even parse — conservative by design.
+            Assert.Equal(DoGroupIdAction.SkipForeign, DoGroupIdService.DecideAction("not-a-guid", Computed, null));
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Orchestration/FakeSignalIngressSink.cs

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 using System;
 using System.Collections.Generic;
+using System.Linq;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
 using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
 
@@ -11,8 +12,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
     internal sealed class FakeSignalIngressSink : ISignalIngressSink
     {
         private readonly List<PostedSignal> _posted = new List<PostedSignal>();
+        private readonly object _gate = new object();
 
-        public IReadOnlyList<PostedSignal> Posted => _posted;
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Snapshot, not the live list: producers post from timer / worker threads (e.g. the
+        /// parked-dwell tripwire) while tests poll this in a SpinWait loop. Enumerating the live
+        /// list across an Add throws "Collection was modified" — a rare CI-only failure
+        /// (run 32644425162) with no assertion text.
+        /// </summary>
+        public IReadOnlyList<PostedSignal> Posted
+        {
+            get { lock (_gate) return _posted.ToArray(); }
+        }
 
         /// <summary>When non-null, <see cref="Post"/> throws instead of capturing.</summary>
         public Exception? ThrowOnPost { get; set; }
@@ -27,7 +38,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
             object? typedPayload = null)
         {
             if (ThrowOnPost != null) throw ThrowOnPost;
-            _posted.Add(new PostedSignal(kind, occurredAtUtc, sourceOrigin, evidence, payload, kindSchemaVersion, typedPayload));
+            lock (_gate)
+                _posted.Add(new PostedSignal(kind, occurredAtUtc, sourceOrigin, evidence, payload, kindSchemaVersion, typedPayload));
         }
 
         internal sealed class PostedSignal

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Orchestration/GatherRuleExecutorHostTimelineFeedTests.cs

@@ -122,13 +122,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
             // The raw-world sequence of session 32312a32 as it reaches the emitted timeline:
             // esp_exiting and hello_wizard_started are emitted WITHOUT a phase declaration
             // (the engine holds FinalizingSetup back behind the RealmJoin gate) — no fire.
-            _stream.Publish("esp_exiting", EnrollmentPhase.Unknown);
-            _stream.Publish("hello_wizard_started", EnrollmentPhase.Unknown);
+            _stream.Publish("esp_exiting", EnrollmentPhase.Unknown, "Engine");
+            _stream.Publish("hello_wizard_started", EnrollmentPhase.Unknown, "Engine");
             Thread.Sleep(300);
             Assert.Equal(0, _sink.CountOf("gather_host_test"));
 
             // Only the engine's actual phase declaration fires the rule.
-            _stream.Publish("phase_transition", EnrollmentPhase.FinalizingSetup);
+            _stream.Publish("phase_transition", EnrollmentPhase.FinalizingSetup, "Engine");
             Assert.True(WaitForCount("gather_host_test", 1));
         }
 
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
             // enrollment_complete" trigger was dead under the previous SignalPosted feed.
             BuildHost(Rule("GATHER-HOST-002", "on_event", triggerEventType: "enrollment_complete"));
 
-            _stream.Publish("enrollment_complete", EnrollmentPhase.Unknown);
+            _stream.Publish("enrollment_complete", EnrollmentPhase.Unknown, "Engine");
             Assert.True(WaitForCount("gather_host_test", 1));
         }
 
@@ -151,14 +151,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
             // identical phase (e.g. duplicate esp_phase_changed) must not count as one.
             BuildHost(Rule("GATHER-HOST-003", "phase_change", triggerPhase: ""));
 
-            _stream.Publish("esp_phase_changed", EnrollmentPhase.DeviceSetup);
+            _stream.Publish("esp_phase_changed", EnrollmentPhase.DeviceSetup, "Engine");
             Assert.True(WaitForCount("gather_host_test", 1));
 
-            _stream.Publish("esp_phase_changed", EnrollmentPhase.DeviceSetup);
+            _stream.Publish("esp_phase_changed", EnrollmentPhase.DeviceSetup, "Engine");
             Thread.Sleep(300);
             Assert.Equal(1, _sink.CountOf("gather_host_test"));
 
-            _stream.Publish("esp_phase_changed", EnrollmentPhase.AccountSetup);
+            _stream.Publish("esp_phase_changed", EnrollmentPhase.AccountSetup, "Engine");
             Assert.True(WaitForCount("gather_host_test", 2));
         }
 
@@ -167,11 +167,44 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
         {
             BuildHost(Rule("GATHER-HOST-004", "phase_exit", triggerPhase: "AccountSetup"));
 
-            _stream.Publish("esp_phase_changed", EnrollmentPhase.AccountSetup);
+            _stream.Publish("esp_phase_changed", EnrollmentPhase.AccountSetup, "Engine");
             Thread.Sleep(300);
             Assert.Equal(0, _sink.CountOf("gather_host_test"));
 
-            _stream.Publish("phase_transition", EnrollmentPhase.FinalizingSetup);
+            _stream.Publish("phase_transition", EnrollmentPhase.FinalizingSetup, "Engine");
+            Assert.True(WaitForCount("gather_host_test", 1));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void OnEventRule_NeverFiresOnGatherExecutorOutput_BreaksSelfTriggerLoop()
+        {
+            // A rule whose TriggerEventType equals its own OutputEventType: the event it emits
+            // travels post → ingress → reducer → emitter → stream and comes back here with
+            // Source == GatherRuleExecutor. Without the source guard that re-enters OnEvent and
+            // the rule loops for the whole session (execute → emit → trigger → execute …).
+            BuildHost(Rule("GATHER-HOST-006", "on_event", triggerEventType: "gather_host_test"));
+
+            _stream.Publish("gather_host_test", EnrollmentPhase.Unknown,
+                Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather.GatherRuleExecutor.SourceName);
+            Thread.Sleep(300);
+            Assert.Equal(0, _sink.CountOf("gather_host_test"));
+
+            // The same event type from any other origin still triggers exactly once per event.
+            _stream.Publish("gather_host_test", EnrollmentPhase.Unknown, "Engine");
+            Assert.True(WaitForCount("gather_host_test", 1));
+            Thread.Sleep(300);
+            Assert.Equal(1, _sink.CountOf("gather_host_test"));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void PhaseDeclarationOnGatherSourcedEvent_StillDrivesPhaseTriggers()
+        {
+            // The source guard only suppresses on_event dispatch; a phase declaration is a
+            // timeline fact regardless of which component carried it.
+            BuildHost(Rule("GATHER-HOST-007", "phase_change", triggerPhase: "DeviceSetup"));
+
+            _stream.Publish("gather_host_test", EnrollmentPhase.DeviceSetup,
+                Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Gather.GatherRuleExecutor.SourceName);
             Assert.True(WaitForCount("gather_host_test", 1));
         }
 
@@ -181,7 +214,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
             BuildHost(Rule("GATHER-HOST-005", "on_event", triggerEventType: "enrollment_complete"));
 
             _host!.Stop();
-            _stream.Publish("enrollment_complete", EnrollmentPhase.Unknown);
+            _stream.Publish("enrollment_complete", EnrollmentPhase.Unknown, "Engine");
             Thread.Sleep(300);
             Assert.Equal(0, _sink.CountOf("gather_host_test"));
         }

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Orchestration/PowerStateWatcherHostTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+#nullable enable
+using System;
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using System.Linq;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Runtime;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
+using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
+using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Signals;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// PowerStateWatcherHost — no-battery/probe-error devices never arm, a low-battery baseline
+    /// emits its threshold event onto the single rail, and debounced ticks translate tracker
+    /// emissions into <c>power_state_change</c> events. WMI arming itself stays untested
+    /// (ConsoleBypassWatcher precedent); <c>StartCore(armWmi: false)</c> exercises everything else.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class PowerStateWatcherHostTests : IDisposable
+    {
+        private static readonly DateTime At = new DateTime(2026, 8, 21, 9, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
+
+        private readonly TempDirectory _tmp = new TempDirectory();
+        private readonly FakeSignalIngressSink _sink = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
+        private readonly AgentLogger _logger;
+        private PowerStateResult _probeResult = new PowerStateResult { OnAcPower = true, HasBattery = true, BatteryPercent = 80 };
+
+        public PowerStateWatcherHostTests()
+        {
+            _logger = new AgentLogger(_tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info);
+        }
+
+        public void Dispose() => _tmp.Dispose();
+
+        private PowerStateWatcherHost Build() => new PowerStateWatcherHost(
+            sessionId: "sess-power",
+            tenantId: "tenant-power",
+            ingress: _sink,
+            clock: new VirtualClock(At),
+            logger: _logger,
+            probe: () => _probeResult);
+
+        private IReadOnlyList<FakeSignalIngressSink.PostedSignal> PowerEvents() =>
+            _sink.Posted.Where(p =>
+                p.Kind == DecisionSignalKind.InformationalEvent
+                && p.Payload != null
+                && p.Payload.TryGetValue(SignalPayloadKeys.EventType, out var et)
+                && et == Constants.EventTypes.PowerStateChange).ToList();
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void No_battery_emits_nothing()
+        {
+            _probeResult = new PowerStateResult { OnAcPower = true, HasBattery = false };
+
+            Build().StartCore(armWmi: false);
+
+            Assert.Empty(_sink.Posted);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Probe_error_emits_nothing()
+        {
+            _probeResult = new PowerStateResult { ProbeError = "GetSystemPowerStatus returned false" };
+
+            Build().StartCore(armWmi: false);
+
+            Assert.Empty(_sink.Posted);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Baseline_below_threshold_emits_threshold_event_with_immediate_upload()
+        {
+            _probeResult = new PowerStateResult { OnAcPower = false, HasBattery = true, BatteryPercent = 12, BatteryLifeMinutes = 34 };
+
+            Build().StartCore(armWmi: false);
+
+            var s = Assert.Single(PowerEvents());
+            Assert.Equal("Error", s.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.Severity]);
+            Assert.Equal("true", s.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.ImmediateUpload]);
+            Assert.Contains("15%", s.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.Message]);
+
+            var data = (IReadOnlyDictionary<string, object>)s.TypedPayload!;
+            Assert.Equal("threshold_crossed", data["transition"]);
+            Assert.Equal(15, data["thresholdPercent"]);
+            Assert.Equal(12, data["batteryPercent"]);
+            Assert.Equal(false, data["onAcPower"]);
+            Assert.Equal(34, data["batteryLifeMinutes"]);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Tick_after_unplug_emits_ac_to_battery_warning()
+        {
+            var host = Build();
+            host.StartCore(armWmi: false);
+            Assert.Empty(PowerEvents());
+
+            _probeResult = new PowerStateResult { OnAcPower = false, HasBattery = true, BatteryPercent = 79 };
+            host.TickForTest();
+
+            var s = Assert.Single(PowerEvents());
+            Assert.Equal("Warning", s.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.Severity]);
+            Assert.Equal("true", s.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.ImmediateUpload]);
+
+            var data = (IReadOnlyDictionary<string, object>)s.TypedPayload!;
+            Assert.Equal("ac_to_battery", data["transition"]);
+            Assert.Equal(79, data["batteryPercent"]);
+            Assert.False(data.ContainsKey("thresholdPercent"));
+
+            // Replug: Info recovery event without immediate upload.
+            _probeResult = new PowerStateResult { OnAcPower = true, HasBattery = true, BatteryPercent = 79, IsCharging = true };
+            host.TickForTest();
+
+            Assert.Equal(2, PowerEvents().Count);
+            var back = PowerEvents()[1];
+            Assert.Equal("Info", back.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.Severity]);
+            Assert.Equal("false", back.Payload![SignalPayloadKeys.ImmediateUpload]);
+            Assert.Equal("battery_to_ac", ((IReadOnlyDictionary<string, object>)back.TypedPayload!)["transition"]);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Tick_with_unchanged_state_emits_nothing()
+        {
+            var host = Build();
+            host.StartCore(armWmi: false);
+
+            host.TickForTest();
+            host.TickForTest();
+
+            Assert.Empty(PowerEvents());
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Stopped_host_ignores_ticks()
+        {
+            var host = Build();
+            host.StartCore(armWmi: false);
+            host.Stop();
+
+            _probeResult = new PowerStateResult { OnAcPower = false, HasBattery = true, BatteryPercent = 50 };
+            host.TickForTest();
+
+            Assert.Empty(PowerEvents());
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Unknown_battery_percent_serializes_as_unknown()
+        {
+            var host = Build();
+            host.StartCore(armWmi: false);
+
+            _probeResult = new PowerStateResult { OnAcPower = false, HasBattery = true, BatteryPercent = null, BatteryLifeMinutes = null };
+            host.TickForTest();
+
+            var data = (IReadOnlyDictionary<string, object>)Assert.Single(PowerEvents()).TypedPayload!;
+            Assert.Equal("unknown", data["batteryPercent"]);
+            Assert.Equal("unknown", data["batteryLifeMinutes"]);
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Orchestration/SignalActivityClassifierTests.cs

@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
         // OS-eventlog forwarding — observability, not enrollment progress (session 8bc1180f:
         // an EventID-100 burst must not keep the periodic collectors alive).
         [InlineData("modern_deployment_log")]
+        // Environment observation — battery drain on an idle device must not reset idle clocks.
+        [InlineData("power_state_change")]
         // Agent health / control / transport — not device/enrollment progress (P2).
         [InlineData("collector_degraded")]
         [InlineData("telemetry_upload_poisoned")]

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Orchestration/SignalIngressTests.cs

@@ -498,6 +498,207 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
             Assert.Equal(5, observedCount);
         }
 
+        // ============================================================ Worker re-entrancy (2026-08-29)
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Worker_thread_post_with_full_channel_does_not_deadlock_and_is_processed_next()
+        {
+            // Channel capacity 1, the worker is parked inside ApplyStep on a gate while a
+            // second producer keeps the channel full. When the gate opens, ApplyStep posts a
+            // verdict from the worker thread. Before the fix, Post would block in
+            // BlockingCollection.Add forever (the worker is the only consumer). After the fix,
+            // the verdict goes to the worker-local queue, is processed BEFORE the queued channel
+            // item, and the worker keeps draining.
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var log = new SignalLogWriter(tmp.File("signal-log.jsonl"));
+            SignalIngress? ingRef = null;
+            var gate = new ManualResetEventSlim(false);
+            var inApply = new ManualResetEventSlim(false);
+            var processor = new GatedReentrantProcessor(() => ingRef!, gate, inApply);
+            var ing = new SignalIngress(
+                engine: new DecisionEngine(),
+                signalLog: log,
+                traceCounter: new SessionTraceOrdinalProvider(),
+                processor: processor,
+                clock: new VirtualClock(At),
+                channelCapacity: 1);
+            ingRef = ing;
+            ing.Start();
+
+            // Item 0 — worker takes it and parks inside ApplyStep on the gate.
+            ing.Post(DecisionSignalKind.SessionStarted, At, "Collector", RawEvidence("s0"));
+            Assert.True(inApply.Wait(5000));
+
+            // Item 1 fills the single slot; item 2 blocks a foreign producer (channel full).
+            ing.Post(DecisionSignalKind.DesktopArrived, At.AddSeconds(1), "Collector", RawEvidence("s1"));
+            var blockedProducer = Task.Run(() =>
+                ing.Post(DecisionSignalKind.DesktopArrived, At.AddSeconds(2), "Collector", RawEvidence("s2")));
+            Assert.True(WaitFor(() => ing.ApproximateQueueLength == 1));
+            Assert.False(blockedProducer.Wait(200));   // genuinely blocked by back-pressure
+
+            // Release the worker: ApplyStep(s0) now posts the verdict from the worker thread
+            // into a full channel.
+            gate.Set();
+
+            Assert.True(blockedProducer.Wait(5000), "foreign producer must be released — worker must keep draining");
+            Assert.True(WaitFor(() => processor.CallCount == 4));
+            ing.Stop();
+
+            Assert.Equal(
+                new[]
+                {
+                    DecisionSignalKind.SessionStarted,
+                    DecisionSignalKind.ClassifierVerdictIssued,   // follow-up drained BEFORE the next channel item
+                    DecisionSignalKind.DesktopArrived,
+                    DecisionSignalKind.DesktopArrived,
+                },
+                processor.Kinds);
+            Assert.Equal(1, ing.ReentrantPostCount);
+            Assert.Equal(0, ing.PendingSignalCount);
+            // Same worker thread for every step — single-writer invariant intact.
+            Assert.Single(processor.ThreadIds.Distinct());
+            // Follow-up went through the normal path: ordinal assigned + durably logged.
+            var logged = log.ReadAll();
+            Assert.Equal(4, logged.Count);
+            Assert.Equal(DecisionSignalKind.ClassifierVerdictIssued, logged[1].Kind);
+            Assert.Equal(1, logged[1].SessionSignalOrdinal);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Worker_thread_post_chain_is_drained_iteratively_in_order()
+        {
+            // A follow-up whose own ApplyStep posts another follow-up: both are processed on
+            // the worker, in order, before the next channel item, without recursion.
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var log = new SignalLogWriter(tmp.File("signal-log.jsonl"));
+            SignalIngress? ingRef = null;
+            var processor = new ChainingProcessor(() => ingRef!);
+            var ing = new SignalIngress(
+                engine: new DecisionEngine(),
+                signalLog: log,
+                traceCounter: new SessionTraceOrdinalProvider(),
+                processor: processor,
+                clock: new VirtualClock(At));
+            ingRef = ing;
+            ing.Start();
+
+            ing.Post(DecisionSignalKind.SessionStarted, At, "Collector", RawEvidence("s0"));
+            ing.Post(DecisionSignalKind.DesktopArrived, At.AddSeconds(1), "Collector", RawEvidence("s1"));
+            ing.Stop();
+
+            Assert.Equal(
+                new[] { "Collector", "chain:1", "chain:2", "Collector" },
+                processor.Origins);
+            Assert.Equal(2, ing.ReentrantPostCount);
+            Assert.Equal(4, log.ReadAll().Count);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Worker_thread_post_during_Stop_drain_is_still_processed()
+        {
+            // Stop() completes adding, but a verdict posted by the worker while it finishes
+            // the last channel item must not be dropped — it belongs to that step.
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var log = new SignalLogWriter(tmp.File("signal-log.jsonl"));
+            SignalIngress? ingRef = null;
+            var gate = new ManualResetEventSlim(false);
+            var inApply = new ManualResetEventSlim(false);
+            var processor = new GatedReentrantProcessor(() => ingRef!, gate, inApply);
+            var ing = new SignalIngress(
+                engine: new DecisionEngine(),
+                signalLog: log,
+                traceCounter: new SessionTraceOrdinalProvider(),
+                processor: processor,
+                clock: new VirtualClock(At));
+            ingRef = ing;
+            ing.Start();
+
+            ing.Post(DecisionSignalKind.SessionStarted, At, "Collector", RawEvidence("s0"));
+            Assert.True(inApply.Wait(5000));
+            var stopTask = Task.Run(() => ing.Stop());
+            Assert.True(WaitFor(() => ing.ApproximateQueueLength == 0 && !stopTask.IsCompleted));
+            gate.Set();
+            Assert.True(stopTask.Wait(5000));
+
+            Assert.Equal(
+                new[] { DecisionSignalKind.SessionStarted, DecisionSignalKind.ClassifierVerdictIssued },
+                processor.Kinds);
+            Assert.Equal(2, log.ReadAll().Count);
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Parks inside ApplyStep(SessionStarted) on a gate, then posts a verdict back into the
+        /// ingress from the worker thread — the EffectRunner/RunClassifier shape.
+        /// </summary>
+        private sealed class GatedReentrantProcessor : IDecisionStepProcessor
+        {
+            private readonly Func<ISignalIngressSink> _sink;
+            private readonly ManualResetEventSlim _gate;
+            private readonly ManualResetEventSlim _inApply;
+            private readonly List<(DecisionSignalKind Kind, int ThreadId)> _calls = new List<(DecisionSignalKind, int)>();
+            private DecisionCore.State.DecisionState _state = DecisionCore.State.DecisionState.CreateInitial("S1", "T1");
+
+            public GatedReentrantProcessor(Func<ISignalIngressSink> sink, ManualResetEventSlim gate, ManualResetEventSlim inApply)
+            {
+                _sink = sink;
+                _gate = gate;
+                _inApply = inApply;
+            }
+
+            public int CallCount { get { lock (_calls) { return _calls.Count; } } }
+            public DecisionSignalKind[] Kinds { get { lock (_calls) { return _calls.Select(c => c.Kind).ToArray(); } } }
+            public int[] ThreadIds { get { lock (_calls) { return _calls.Select(c => c.ThreadId).ToArray(); } } }
+
+            public DecisionCore.State.DecisionState CurrentState => _state;
+
+            public EffectRunResult ApplyStep(DecisionStep step, DecisionSignal signal)
+            {
+                lock (_calls) { _calls.Add((signal.Kind, Thread.CurrentThread.ManagedThreadId)); }
+                _state = step.NewState;
+                if (signal.Kind == DecisionSignalKind.SessionStarted)
+                {
+                    _inApply.Set();
+                    _gate.Wait();
+                    _sink().Post(
+                        DecisionSignalKind.ClassifierVerdictIssued,
+                        signal.OccurredAtUtc,
+                        "effectrunner:classifier:test",
+                        new Evidence(EvidenceKind.Synthetic, "classifier:test:h", "Strong/90"),
+                        new Dictionary<string, string> { ["level"] = "Strong" });
+                }
+                return EffectRunResult.Empty();
+            }
+        }
+
+        private sealed class ChainingProcessor : IDecisionStepProcessor
+        {
+            private readonly Func<ISignalIngressSink> _sink;
+            private DecisionCore.State.DecisionState _state = DecisionCore.State.DecisionState.CreateInitial("S1", "T1");
+            public List<string> Origins { get; } = new List<string>();
+
+            public ChainingProcessor(Func<ISignalIngressSink> sink) { _sink = sink; }
+
+            public DecisionCore.State.DecisionState CurrentState => _state;
+
+            public EffectRunResult ApplyStep(DecisionStep step, DecisionSignal signal)
+            {
+                Origins.Add(signal.SourceOrigin);
+                _state = step.NewState;
+                string? next = signal.Kind == DecisionSignalKind.SessionStarted ? "chain:1"
+                    : signal.SourceOrigin == "chain:1" ? "chain:2"
+                    : null;
+                if (next != null)
+                {
+                    _sink().Post(
+                        DecisionSignalKind.ClassifierVerdictIssued,
+                        signal.OccurredAtUtc,
+                        next,
+                        new Evidence(EvidenceKind.Synthetic, next, next));
+                }
+                return EffectRunResult.Empty();
+            }
+        }
+
         [Fact]
         public void Post_via_ISignalIngressSink_reaches_reducer_like_any_signal()
         {

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Orchestration/SystemTimelineWatcherHostTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+#nullable enable
+using System;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
+using AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Orchestration
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// SystemTimelineWatcherHost — thin ICollectorHost wrapper over SystemTimelineTracker.
+    /// Real event-log arming stays untested by convention (ConsoleBypassWatcher precedent);
+    /// these tests pin the lifecycle contract only.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class SystemTimelineWatcherHostTests : IDisposable
+    {
+        private readonly TempDirectory _tmp = new TempDirectory();
+
+        public void Dispose() => _tmp.Dispose();
+
+        private SystemTimelineWatcherHost CreateHost() => new SystemTimelineWatcherHost(
+            sessionId: "sess-stl",
+            tenantId: "tenant-stl",
+            logger: new AgentLogger(_tmp.Path, AgentLogLevel.Info),
+            ingress: new FakeSignalIngressSink(),
+            clock: new VirtualClock(new DateTime(2026, 8, 21, 10, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc)),
+            backfillLookbackMinutes: 0,
+            stateDirectory: _tmp.Path);
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Stop_BeforeStart_DoesNotThrow()
+        {
+            using (var host = CreateHost())
+            {
+                host.Stop();
+            }
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Dispose_Twice_DoesNotThrow()
+        {
+            var host = CreateHost();
+            host.Dispose();
+            host.Dispose();
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Name_IsStable()
+        {
+            using (var host = CreateHost())
+            {
+                Assert.Equal("SystemTimelineTracker", host.Name);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Program/BackendSessionRegistrationTests.cs

@@ -58,6 +58,47 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
             Assert.Same(registration, result.Registration);
         }
 
+        [Fact]
+        public void RotateSession_rotates_id_updates_config_drops_spool_and_keeps_whiteglove_marker()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var logger = NewLogger(tmp.Path);
+            var persistence = new SessionIdPersistence(tmp.Path);
+            var original = persistence.GetOrCreate();
+            persistence.SaveWhiteGloveComplete();
+            var config = new AgentConfiguration { ApiBaseUrl = "https://example.invalid", TenantId = "t", SessionId = original };
+
+            var transportDir = Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "Spool");
+            Directory.CreateDirectory(transportDir);
+            File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(transportDir, "spool.jsonl"), "{}");
+            File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(transportDir, "upload-cursor.json"), "{}");
+            File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(transportDir, "unrelated.txt"), "keep");
+
+            var rotated = BackendSessionRegistration.RotateSession(config, persistence, auth: null, transportDir, logger);
+
+            Assert.NotEqual(original, rotated);
+            Assert.Equal(rotated, config.SessionId);
+            Assert.Equal(rotated, new SessionIdPersistence(tmp.Path).GetOrCreate());
+            Assert.True(persistence.IsWhiteGloveResume());
+            Assert.False(File.Exists(Path.Combine(transportDir, "spool.jsonl")));
+            Assert.False(File.Exists(Path.Combine(transportDir, "upload-cursor.json")));
+            Assert.True(File.Exists(Path.Combine(transportDir, "unrelated.txt")));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void RotateSession_tolerates_a_missing_transport_directory()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var logger = NewLogger(tmp.Path);
+            var persistence = new SessionIdPersistence(tmp.Path);
+            var config = new AgentConfiguration { ApiBaseUrl = "https://example.invalid", TenantId = "t", SessionId = persistence.GetOrCreate() };
+
+            var rotated = BackendSessionRegistration.RotateSession(
+                config, persistence, auth: null, Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "does-not-exist"), logger);
+
+            Assert.Equal(rotated, config.SessionId);
+        }
+
         [Fact]
         public void Register_throws_on_null_arguments()
         {

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Program/LifecycleEmittersRemoteConfigTests.cs

@@ -182,6 +182,73 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
             Assert.Equal("FromCache", data["outcome"]);
         }
 
+        // ── Post-registration recovery (Phase 6.5, tenant aebdce78 audit 2026-08-24) ─
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void EmitFetchFailedIfAny_AfterRecovery_MarksRecoveredAndDemotesToInfo()
+        {
+            using var rig = new EmitterRig();
+            // Startup fetch failed (network link not up yet), then the post-registration
+            // recovery fetched ConfigVersion 39. The event must keep the original failure
+            // details AND mark the heal.
+            rig.RemoteConfig.SetFakeOutcome(
+                RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.UsedDefaults,
+                configVersion: 39, // CurrentConfig now holds the recovered config
+                attempts: 4,
+                failureType: "HttpRequestException",
+                failureMessage: "simulated dead network link",
+                recovered: true);
+
+            LifecycleEmitters.EmitRemoteConfigFetchFailedIfAny(
+                rig.Post, rig.AgentConfig, rig.RemoteConfig, rig.Logger);
+
+            var data = AssertSingleEmit(rig.Sink, expectedEventType: "remote_config_fetch_failed");
+            Assert.Equal("UsedDefaults", data["outcome"]); // startup failure record intact
+            Assert.Equal(4, data["attempts"]);
+            Assert.Equal(true, data["recovered"]);
+            Assert.Equal(39, data["recoveredConfigVersion"]);
+            Assert.Equal(nameof(EventSeverity.Info), rig.Sink.Posted[0].Payload!["severity"]);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void EmitFetchFailedIfAny_WithoutRecovery_StaysWarning()
+        {
+            using var rig = new EmitterRig();
+            rig.RemoteConfig.SetFakeOutcome(
+                RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.UsedDefaults,
+                configVersion: 0,
+                attempts: 4,
+                failureType: "HttpRequestException",
+                failureMessage: "still down");
+
+            LifecycleEmitters.EmitRemoteConfigFetchFailedIfAny(
+                rig.Post, rig.AgentConfig, rig.RemoteConfig, rig.Logger);
+
+            var data = AssertSingleEmit(rig.Sink, expectedEventType: "remote_config_fetch_failed");
+            Assert.False(data.ContainsKey("recovered"));
+            Assert.False(data.ContainsKey("recoveredConfigVersion"));
+            Assert.Equal(nameof(EventSeverity.Warning), rig.Sink.Posted[0].Payload!["severity"]);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void EmitAgentStarted_AfterRecovery_FlagsLiveConfig()
+        {
+            using var rig = new EmitterRig();
+            rig.RemoteConfig.SetFakeOutcome(
+                RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.UsedDefaults,
+                configVersion: 39,
+                recovered: true);
+
+            LifecycleEmitters.EmitAgentStarted(
+                rig.Post, rig.AgentConfig, rig.PreviousExit, "2.0.806", rig.RemoteConfig, rig.Logger);
+
+            var data = AssertSingleEmit(rig.Sink, expectedEventType: "agent_started");
+            Assert.Equal(39, data["configVersion"]);
+            Assert.Equal(true, data["remoteConfigFetched"]); // running on a live-fetched config
+            Assert.Equal("UsedDefaults", data["remoteConfigOutcome"]); // startup outcome stays honest
+            Assert.Equal(true, data["remoteConfigRecovered"]);
+        }
+
         // ── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
         private static Dictionary<string, object> AssertSingleEmit(
@@ -258,8 +325,10 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
                 int attempts = 1,
                 string? failureType = null,
                 string? failureMessage = null,
-                int? authStatusCode = null)
+                int? authStatusCode = null,
+                bool recovered = false)
             {
+                typeof(RemoteConfigService).GetProperty(nameof(RecoveredAfterFetchFailure))?.SetValue(this, recovered);
                 // CurrentConfig is set via the protected SetConfig path — easiest:
                 // a real FetchConfigAsync replacement that just stashes a canned config.
                 typeof(RemoteConfigService).GetMethod("SetConfig",

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Runtime/StartupEnvironmentProbesTests.cs

@@ -339,6 +339,114 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Runtime
             Assert.False(StartupEnvironmentProbes.IsNtpWithinTolerance(null!));
         }
 
+        // ================================================================= DO GroupId auto-set
+        // Builder/fingerprint tests only — TrySetGroupId itself does live registry + ARP I/O and
+        // must never run in a unit test (it would write HKLM on the build machine).
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildDoGroupIdEvent_written_success_is_info_with_full_data()
+        {
+            var result = new DoGroupIdSetResult
+            {
+                Success = true,
+                Written = true,
+                GroupId = "00063065-0000-00a8-b201-001122334455",
+                PreviousValue = null,
+                GatewayIp = "192.168.178.1",
+                GatewayMac = "00-11-22-33-44-55",
+            };
+
+            var evt = StartupEnvironmentProbes.BuildDoGroupIdEvent(Config(), result);
+
+            Assert.Equal("do_group_id_auto_set", evt.EventType);
+            Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Info, evt.Severity);
+            Assert.Equal("StartupEnvironmentProbes", evt.Source);
+            Assert.Equal("S1", evt.SessionId);
+            Assert.Equal("T1", evt.TenantId);
+            Assert.Contains("00063065-0000-00a8-b201-001122334455", evt.Message);
+            Assert.Equal("192.168.178.1", evt.Data["gatewayIp"]);
+            Assert.Equal("00-11-22-33-44-55", evt.Data["gatewayMac"]);
+            Assert.Equal(true, evt.Data["written"]);
+            Assert.Equal(true, evt.Data["success"]);
+            Assert.Equal(false, evt.Data["skipped"]);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildDoGroupIdEvent_noop_success_says_already_set()
+        {
+            var result = new DoGroupIdSetResult
+            {
+                Success = true,
+                Written = false,
+                GroupId = "00063065-0000-00a8-b201-001122334455",
+            };
+
+            var evt = StartupEnvironmentProbes.BuildDoGroupIdEvent(Config(), result);
+
+            Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Info, evt.Severity);
+            Assert.Contains("already set", evt.Message);
+            Assert.Equal(false, evt.Data["written"]);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildDoGroupIdEvent_skip_is_info_with_reason()
+        {
+            var result = new DoGroupIdSetResult
+            {
+                Skipped = true,
+                SkipReason = "foreign_value_present",
+                PreviousValue = "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555",
+            };
+
+            var evt = StartupEnvironmentProbes.BuildDoGroupIdEvent(Config(), result);
+
+            Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Info, evt.Severity);
+            Assert.Contains("foreign_value_present", evt.Message);
+            Assert.Equal("foreign_value_present", evt.Data["skipReason"]);
+            Assert.Equal("11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555", evt.Data["previousValue"]);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildDoGroupIdEvent_error_is_warning()
+        {
+            var result = new DoGroupIdSetResult { Error = "readback mismatch" };
+
+            var evt = StartupEnvironmentProbes.BuildDoGroupIdEvent(Config(), result);
+
+            Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Warning, evt.Severity);
+            Assert.Contains("readback mismatch", evt.Message);
+            Assert.Equal("readback mismatch", evt.Data["error"]);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void DoGroupIdFingerprint_roundtrips_ownership_marker_for_success()
+        {
+            var fp = StartupEnvironmentProbes.ComputeDoGroupIdFingerprint(new DoGroupIdSetResult
+            {
+                Success = true,
+                GroupId = "00063065-0000-00a8-b201-001122334455",
+            });
+
+            Assert.Equal("written:00063065-0000-00a8-b201-001122334455", fp);
+            Assert.Equal("00063065-0000-00a8-b201-001122334455", StartupEnvironmentProbes.ExtractLastWrittenGroupId(fp));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void DoGroupIdFingerprint_skip_carries_no_ownership_and_errors_never_dedupe()
+        {
+            var skipFp = StartupEnvironmentProbes.ComputeDoGroupIdFingerprint(new DoGroupIdSetResult
+            {
+                Skipped = true,
+                SkipReason = "mdm_policy_present",
+            });
+            Assert.Equal("skipped:mdm_policy_present", skipFp);
+            Assert.Null(StartupEnvironmentProbes.ExtractLastWrittenGroupId(skipFp));
+
+            // Errors: no fingerprint → the probe re-runs AND re-emits each failing start.
+            Assert.Null(StartupEnvironmentProbes.ComputeDoGroupIdFingerprint(new DoGroupIdSetResult { Error = "boom" }));
+            Assert.Null(StartupEnvironmentProbes.ExtractLastWrittenGroupId(null));
+        }
+
         [Fact]
         public async Task RunAsync_skips_geo_timezone_and_ntp_once_all_succeeded_only_power_state_emits()
         {

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Security/EntraDeviceCertHelperParseTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+using System;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Pins <see cref="EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension"/>, the pure byte-level part of the
+    /// cert probe. Both encodings Microsoft actually ships are covered: the ASN.1 OCTET STRING wrapper
+    /// used by the MS-Organization-Access TenantId/DeviceId extensions (and Intune's
+    /// <c>1.2.840.113556.5.6</c> / <c>5.14</c>), and the BARE 16-byte payload used by Intune's DeviceId
+    /// extension <c>1.2.840.113556.5.4</c> — the latter was silently returning <c>null</c> before.
+    /// The store-iteration shell around it needs a real machine cert store and is not unit-tested.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class EntraDeviceCertHelperParseTests
+    {
+        // Synthetic — never a real tenant/device id. ToByteArray() gives the MS little-endian layout
+        // that both cert encodings carry, so every expectation below is derived, not hand-transcribed.
+        private static readonly Guid Sample = new Guid("11223344-5566-7788-99aa-bbccddeeff00");
+
+        private static byte[] Wrap(byte[] payload, params byte[] header)
+        {
+            var buf = new byte[header.Length + payload.Length];
+            Buffer.BlockCopy(header, 0, buf, 0, header.Length);
+            Buffer.BlockCopy(payload, 0, buf, header.Length, payload.Length);
+            return buf;
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void OctetString_ShortForm_Parses()
+        {
+            var raw = Wrap(Sample.ToByteArray(), 0x04, 0x10);
+
+            Assert.Equal(Sample, EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(raw));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void OctetString_LongForm_Parses()
+        {
+            var raw = Wrap(Sample.ToByteArray(), 0x04, 0x81, 0x10);
+
+            Assert.Equal(Sample, EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(raw));
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// The regression this class exists for: Intune's <c>1.2.840.113556.5.4</c> extension value is
+        /// exactly 16 bytes with no <c>04 10</c> prefix, so the strict OCTET-STRING parser bailed on the
+        /// tag check and the DeviceId was unreadable.
+        /// </summary>
+        [Fact]
+        public void BareSixteenBytes_Parses()
+        {
+            var raw = Sample.ToByteArray();
+
+            Assert.Equal(Sample, EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(raw));
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// A bare GUID may legitimately start with 0x04 (the OCTET STRING tag). That must not be
+        /// mistaken for a wrapper: a wrapped 16-byte GUID is always >= 18 bytes, so the two forms are
+        /// disjoint by length and the bare path has to win here.
+        /// </summary>
+        [Fact]
+        public void BareSixteenBytes_StartingWithOctetStringTag_StillParses()
+        {
+            var guid = new Guid("aabbcc04-0110-4020-8030-405060708090");
+            var raw = guid.ToByteArray();
+
+            Assert.Equal(0x04, raw[0]); // guard: the byte layout really does start with the ASN.1 tag
+            Assert.Equal(16, raw.Length);
+            Assert.Equal(guid, EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(raw));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void OctetString_IsLittleEndianMsLayout()
+        {
+            // 04 10 + the canonical MS binary layout of {11223344-...} => first group byte-reversed.
+            var raw = new byte[]
+            {
+                0x04, 0x10,
+                0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11,
+                0x66, 0x55,
+                0x88, 0x77,
+                0x99, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF, 0x00
+            };
+
+            Assert.Equal(Sample, EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(raw));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Null_ReturnsNull()
+        {
+            Assert.Null(EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(null));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Empty_ReturnsNull()
+        {
+            Assert.Null(EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(new byte[0]));
+        }
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData(15)]
+        [InlineData(17)]
+        public void BarePayload_OfWrongLength_ReturnsNull(int length)
+        {
+            var raw = new byte[length];
+            for (var i = 0; i < length; i++) raw[i] = (byte)(0x40 + i); // no 0x04 tag, no valid wrapper
+
+            Assert.Null(EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(raw));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void NonOctetStringTag_ReturnsNull()
+        {
+            // e.g. Intune's 1.2.840.113556.5.15 => ASN.1 INTEGER 2.
+            Assert.Null(EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(new byte[] { 0x02, 0x01, 0x02 }));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void OctetString_WithNonGuidContentLength_ReturnsNull()
+        {
+            var raw = Wrap(new byte[8], 0x04, 0x08);
+
+            Assert.Null(EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(raw));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void OctetString_TruncatedContent_ReturnsNull()
+        {
+            // Declares 16 content bytes but only carries 10.
+            var raw = Wrap(new byte[10], 0x04, 0x10);
+
+            Assert.Null(EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(raw));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void OctetString_LongFormWithOversizedLengthHeader_ReturnsNull()
+        {
+            // 0x85 => 5 length bytes, above the 4 the parser accepts.
+            var raw = Wrap(Sample.ToByteArray(), 0x04, 0x85, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10);
+
+            Assert.Null(EntraDeviceCertHelper.ParseGuidFromExtension(raw));
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Security/SessionIdPersistenceTests.cs

@@ -72,6 +72,26 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
             Assert.NotEqual(first, second);
         }
 
+        [Fact]
+        public void Rotate_writes_a_new_id_and_keeps_the_whiteglove_marker()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var sut = new SessionIdPersistence(tmp.Path);
+            var first = sut.GetOrCreate();
+            sut.SaveWhiteGloveComplete();
+            var createdBefore = File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "session.created"));
+
+            var rotated = sut.Rotate();
+
+            Assert.True(Guid.TryParse(rotated, out _));
+            Assert.NotEqual(first, rotated);
+            Assert.Equal(rotated, File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "session.id")));
+            Assert.Equal(rotated, new SessionIdPersistence(tmp.Path).GetOrCreate());
+            Assert.True(sut.IsWhiteGloveResume(), "Rotate must not clear whiteglove.complete (unlike Delete)");
+            Assert.True(File.Exists(Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "session.created")));
+            Assert.NotEqual(createdBefore, File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "session.created")));
+        }
+
         [Fact]
         public void Ctor_creates_data_directory_when_missing()
         {

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Security/SessionRegistrationHelperTests.cs

@@ -96,8 +96,114 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
             Assert.Equal(1, tracker.ConsecutiveFailures);
         }
 
+        // ── SESSION-OWNER-BINDING ────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+        private static BackendAuthException OwnerMismatch()
+            => new BackendAuthException("Backend returned 403 Forbidden.", statusCode: 403,
+                errorCode: AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Constants.AgentErrorCodes.SessionOwnerMismatch);
+
         [Fact]
-        public async Task Fails_after_five_exceptions_without_auth_error()
+        public async Task Owner_mismatch_rotates_once_and_re_registers_without_recording_an_auth_failure()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var logger = NewLogger(tmp);
+            var config = NewConfig();
+            var originalSessionId = config.SessionId;
+            var rotatedTo = Guid.NewGuid().ToString();
+            var seenSessionIds = new System.Collections.Generic.List<string>();
+
+            var apiClient = new FakeApiClient(
+                attempt => attempt == 1
+                    ? throw OwnerMismatch()
+                    : new RegisterSessionResponse { Success = true, SessionId = rotatedTo, ValidatedBy = ValidatorType.AutopilotV1 },
+                onRegister: r => seenSessionIds.Add(r.SessionId));
+
+            var tracker = new AuthFailureTracker(maxFailures: 5, timeoutMinutes: 0,
+                clock: SystemClock.Instance, logger: logger);
+            var rotations = 0;
+
+            var result = await SessionRegistrationHelper.RegisterWithRetryAsync(
+                apiClient, config, agentVersion: "0.0.0", logger: logger,
+                authFailureTracker: tracker,
+                backoffDelay: _ => throw new InvalidOperationException("rotation must retry without backoff"),
+                networkLinkWait: _ => Task.CompletedTask,
+                rotateSession: () => { rotations++; config.SessionId = rotatedTo; return rotatedTo; });
+
+            Assert.Equal(SessionRegistrationOutcome.Succeeded, result.Outcome);
+            Assert.Equal(2, apiClient.CallCount);
+            Assert.Equal(1, rotations);
+            Assert.Equal(0, tracker.ConsecutiveFailures);
+            Assert.Equal(new[] { originalSessionId, rotatedTo }, seenSessionIds);
+            Assert.Equal(originalSessionId, result.RotatedFromSessionId);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Second_owner_mismatch_after_rotation_is_an_auth_failure()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var logger = NewLogger(tmp);
+            var config = NewConfig();
+
+            var apiClient = new FakeApiClient(_ => throw OwnerMismatch());
+            var tracker = new AuthFailureTracker(maxFailures: 5, timeoutMinutes: 0,
+                clock: SystemClock.Instance, logger: logger);
+
+            var result = await SessionRegistrationHelper.RegisterWithRetryAsync(
+                apiClient, config, agentVersion: "0.0.0", logger: logger,
+                authFailureTracker: tracker,
+                networkLinkWait: _ => Task.CompletedTask,
+                rotateSession: () => { config.SessionId = Guid.NewGuid().ToString(); return config.SessionId; });
+
+            Assert.Equal(SessionRegistrationOutcome.AuthFailed, result.Outcome);
+            Assert.Equal(403, result.HttpStatusCode);
+            Assert.Equal(2, apiClient.CallCount);
+            Assert.Equal(1, tracker.ConsecutiveFailures);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Owner_mismatch_without_rotation_hook_behaves_like_any_auth_failure()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var logger = NewLogger(tmp);
+            var config = NewConfig();
+
+            var apiClient = new FakeApiClient(_ => throw OwnerMismatch());
+            var tracker = new AuthFailureTracker(maxFailures: 5, timeoutMinutes: 0,
+                clock: SystemClock.Instance, logger: logger);
+
+            var result = await SessionRegistrationHelper.RegisterWithRetryAsync(
+                apiClient, config, agentVersion: "0.0.0", logger: logger,
+                authFailureTracker: tracker, networkLinkWait: _ => Task.CompletedTask);
+
+            Assert.Equal(SessionRegistrationOutcome.AuthFailed, result.Outcome);
+            Assert.Equal(1, apiClient.CallCount);
+            Assert.Equal(1, tracker.ConsecutiveFailures);
+            Assert.Null(result.RotatedFromSessionId);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Rotation_hook_failure_falls_back_to_auth_failed()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var logger = NewLogger(tmp);
+            var config = NewConfig();
+
+            var apiClient = new FakeApiClient(_ => throw OwnerMismatch());
+            var tracker = new AuthFailureTracker(maxFailures: 5, timeoutMinutes: 0,
+                clock: SystemClock.Instance, logger: logger);
+
+            var result = await SessionRegistrationHelper.RegisterWithRetryAsync(
+                apiClient, config, agentVersion: "0.0.0", logger: logger,
+                authFailureTracker: tracker, networkLinkWait: _ => Task.CompletedTask,
+                rotateSession: () => throw new IOException("disk full"));
+
+            Assert.Equal(SessionRegistrationOutcome.AuthFailed, result.Outcome);
+            Assert.Equal(1, apiClient.CallCount);
+            Assert.Equal(1, tracker.ConsecutiveFailures);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Fails_after_six_exceptions_without_auth_error()
         {
             using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
             var logger = NewLogger(tmp);
@@ -111,8 +217,50 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
                 backoffDelay: _ => Task.CompletedTask);
 
             Assert.Equal(SessionRegistrationOutcome.Failed, result.Outcome);
-            Assert.Equal(5, apiClient.CallCount);
-            Assert.Contains("transient attempt 5", result.ErrorMessage);
+            Assert.Equal(6, apiClient.CallCount);
+            Assert.Contains("transient attempt 6", result.ErrorMessage);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Waits_for_network_link_before_first_attempt()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var logger = NewLogger(tmp);
+            var config = NewConfig();
+
+            var order = new System.Collections.Generic.List<string>();
+            var apiClient = new FakeApiClient(_ =>
+            {
+                order.Add("register");
+                return new RegisterSessionResponse { Success = true, SessionId = config.SessionId };
+            });
+
+            var result = await SessionRegistrationHelper.RegisterWithRetryAsync(
+                apiClient, config, agentVersion: "0.0.0", logger: logger,
+                backoffDelay: _ => Task.CompletedTask,
+                networkLinkWait: _ => { order.Add("link-wait"); return Task.CompletedTask; });
+
+            Assert.Equal(SessionRegistrationOutcome.Succeeded, result.Outcome);
+            Assert.Equal(new[] { "link-wait", "register" }, order);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Network_link_wait_failure_does_not_block_registration()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var logger = NewLogger(tmp);
+            var config = NewConfig();
+
+            var apiClient = new FakeApiClient(_ =>
+                new RegisterSessionResponse { Success = true, SessionId = config.SessionId });
+
+            var result = await SessionRegistrationHelper.RegisterWithRetryAsync(
+                apiClient, config, agentVersion: "0.0.0", logger: logger,
+                backoffDelay: _ => Task.CompletedTask,
+                networkLinkWait: _ => throw new InvalidOperationException("probe broken"));
+
+            Assert.Equal(SessionRegistrationOutcome.Succeeded, result.Outcome);
+            Assert.Equal(1, apiClient.CallCount);
         }
 
         [Fact]

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/SignalAdapters/ImeLogTrackerAdapterTimingTests.cs

@@ -245,11 +245,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.SignalAdapters
         }
 
         [Fact]
-        public void Terminal_to_active_retry_rearms_CompletedAt_and_final_terminal_covers_total_occupancy()
+        public void Terminal_to_active_retry_rearms_BothEndpoints_and_final_terminal_covers_last_attempt()
         {
-            // Audit Q1: the IME retry path (Error -> Downloading -> Installed is permitted by
-            // AppPackageState.UpdateState). Pre-fix, CompletedAt froze at the first Error, so
-            // the final Installed payload carried the first failure's completedAt/duration.
+            // Audit Q1 + 2026-08 attempt-duration change: the IME retry path
+            // (Error -> Downloading -> Installed is permitted by AppPackageState.UpdateState).
+            // A terminal->active transition re-arms BOTH endpoints, so the final Installed
+            // payload describes the retry ATTEMPT (matching the backend's AppInstallSummaries
+            // semantics) — not the first-start -> last-terminal span across attempts.
             using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture(T0);
             using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
             var app = new AppPackageState("app-R", 0);
@@ -261,23 +263,23 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.SignalAdapters
             adapter.TriggerAppStateFromTest(app, AppInstallationState.Error, AppInstallationState.Downloading);
 
             // Re-armed while active again: the retry's download event carries no completedAt,
-            // and the FIRST start stamp is kept.
+            // and the start stamp is the RETRY's re-entry time (fresh attempt window).
             Assert.Null(adapter.AppTimings["app-R"].CompletedAtUtc);
             var retryDownload = f.InfoEvent(SharedEventTypes.AppDownloadStarted);
             Assert.False(retryDownload.Payload!.ContainsKey("completedAt"));
             Assert.False(retryDownload.Payload.ContainsKey("durationSeconds"));
-            Assert.Equal(T0.ToString("o"), retryDownload.Payload["startedAt"]);
+            Assert.Equal(T0.AddSeconds(15).ToString("o"), retryDownload.Payload["startedAt"]);
 
             f.Clock.Advance(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(20));
             adapter.TriggerAppStateFromTest(app, AppInstallationState.Downloading, AppInstallationState.Installed);
 
             var timing = adapter.AppTimings["app-R"];
-            Assert.Equal(T0, timing.StartedAtUtc);
+            Assert.Equal(T0.AddSeconds(15), timing.StartedAtUtc);
             Assert.Equal(T0.AddSeconds(35), timing.CompletedAtUtc);
-            Assert.Equal(35.0, timing.DurationSeconds);
+            Assert.Equal(20.0, timing.DurationSeconds);
 
             var completed = Assert.Single(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.AppInstallComplete));
-            Assert.Equal("35.00", completed.Payload!["durationSeconds"]);
+            Assert.Equal("20.00", completed.Payload!["durationSeconds"]);
             Assert.Equal(T0.AddSeconds(35).ToString("o"), completed.Payload["completedAt"]);
         }
 

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/SignalAdapters/ImeLogTrackerAdapterUserSessionGateTests.cs

@@ -163,5 +163,45 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.SignalAdapters
             Assert.Single(f.DecisionSignals(DecisionSignalKind.ImeUserSessionCompleted));
             Assert.Single(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.ImeUserSessionCompleted));
         }
+
+        // ==================================================== zero-app evidence label ====
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Zero_app_user_session_labels_the_evidence_on_signal_and_timeline()
+        {
+            // Sessions 81daa77f / 75d6ae8e: with no user-targeted apps IME never writes its
+            // "Completed user session" line at all, so the verdict rests on a different
+            // observation. Whoever reads the timeline later must be able to tell which.
+            using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture();
+            using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
+            f.Tracker.SeedCurrentPhaseForTesting("AccountSetup");
+            f.Tracker.SeedUserSessionZeroAppsForTesting();
+
+            adapter.TriggerUserSessionCompletedFromTest();
+
+            Assert.Single(f.DecisionSignals(DecisionSignalKind.ImeUserSessionCompleted));
+            var evt = Assert.Single(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.ImeUserSessionCompleted));
+            Assert.Equal(
+                ImeLogTrackerAdapter.EvidenceZeroUserApps,
+                evt.Payload!["evidence"]);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Ordinary_user_session_completion_keeps_the_default_evidence_label()
+        {
+            // Mutation proof for the branch above.
+            using var f = new ImeLogTrackerAdapterFixture();
+            using var adapter = new ImeLogTrackerAdapter(f.Tracker, f.Ingress, f.Clock);
+            f.Tracker.SeedCurrentPhaseForTesting("AccountSetup");
+            AddApp(f.Tracker, "app-done", AppIntent.Install, AppInstallationState.Installed);
+
+            adapter.TriggerUserSessionCompletedFromTest();
+
+            var evt = Assert.Single(f.InfoEvents(SharedEventTypes.ImeUserSessionCompleted));
+            Assert.Equal(
+                ImeLogTrackerAdapter.EvidenceUserSessionCompleted,
+                evt.Payload!["evidence"]);
+        }
+
     }
 }

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Telemetry/Events/EventTimelineEmitterTests.cs

@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Telemetry.Events
             using var r = new Rig();
             var stream = new AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration.TimelineEventStream();
             var published = new List<(string EventType, EnrollmentPhase Phase)>();
-            stream.EventEmitted += (eventType, phase) => published.Add((eventType, phase));
+            stream.EventEmitted += (eventType, phase, _) => published.Add((eventType, phase));
             var sut = new EventTimelineEmitter(r.Inner, stream);
 
             sut.Emit(
@@ -190,8 +190,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Telemetry.Events
             using var r = new Rig();
             var stream = new AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration.TimelineEventStream();
             var secondSubscriberCalls = 0;
-            stream.EventEmitted += (_, _) => throw new InvalidOperationException("subscriber bug");
-            stream.EventEmitted += (_, _) => secondSubscriberCalls++;
+            stream.EventEmitted += (_, _, _) => throw new InvalidOperationException("subscriber bug");
+            stream.EventEmitted += (_, _, _) => secondSubscriberCalls++;
             var sut = new EventTimelineEmitter(r.Inner, stream);
 
             sut.Emit(

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Termination/SummaryDialogLauncherTests.cs

@@ -50,5 +50,42 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Termination
 
             Assert.Equal(a, b);
         }
+
+        // The branding URL is tenant config; the dialog parses arguments last-occurrence-wins, so
+        // an embedded quote must never terminate the argument and inject extra flags (CWE-88).
+
+        private const string BaseArgs = "--status-file \"C:\\x\\final-status.json\" --timeout 30 --cleanup";
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildDialogArguments_omits_branding_when_empty()
+        {
+            var args = SummaryDialogLauncher.BuildDialogArguments(@"C:\x\final-status.json", 30, null, null);
+
+            Assert.Equal(BaseArgs, args);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void BuildDialogArguments_appends_clean_https_url_as_single_quoted_argument()
+        {
+            var args = SummaryDialogLauncher.BuildDialogArguments(@"C:\x\final-status.json", 30, "https://cdn.example/logo.png?v=2", null);
+
+            Assert.Equal(BaseArgs + " --branding-url \"https://cdn.example/logo.png?v=2\"", args);
+        }
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData("x\" --status-file \"C:\\some\\file\" --timeout \"0")]
+        [InlineData("https://cdn.example/logo.png\" --cleanup")]
+        [InlineData("https://cdn.example/logo.png --timeout 0")]
+        [InlineData("https://cdn.example/lo'go.png")]
+        [InlineData("https://cdn.example/logo.png\r\n")]
+        [InlineData("http://cdn.example/logo.png")]
+        [InlineData("file:///C:/Windows/x.png")]
+        [InlineData("cdn.example/logo.png")]
+        public void BuildDialogArguments_drops_unsafe_branding_url(string url)
+        {
+            var args = SummaryDialogLauncher.BuildDialogArguments(@"C:\x\final-status.json", 30, url, null);
+
+            Assert.Equal(BaseArgs, args);
+        }
     }
 }

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/Transport/BackendApiClientAuthClassificationTests.cs

@@ -61,6 +61,46 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Transport
             Assert.Contains("The device is not authorized", ex.Message);
         }
 
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Backend_json_403_carries_the_errorCode_when_present()
+        {
+            using var client = BuildClient(
+                HttpStatusCode.Forbidden,
+                "{\"success\":false,\"message\":\"Session belongs to another device\",\"errorCode\":\"session_owner_mismatch\"}",
+                "application/json");
+
+            var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<BackendAuthException>(() => client.GetAgentConfigAsync("tenant-1"));
+
+            Assert.Equal(403, ex.StatusCode);
+            Assert.False(ex.EndpointUnavailable);
+            Assert.Equal("session_owner_mismatch", ex.ErrorCode);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Backend_json_403_without_errorCode_yields_null()
+        {
+            using var client = BuildClient(
+                HttpStatusCode.Forbidden,
+                "{\"success\":false,\"message\":\"Device validation failed\"}",
+                "application/json");
+
+            var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<BackendAuthException>(() => client.GetAgentConfigAsync("tenant-1"));
+            Assert.Null(ex.ErrorCode);
+        }
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData(null, null)]
+        [InlineData("", null)]
+        [InlineData("not json", null)]
+        [InlineData("<html><body>403</body></html>", null)]
+        [InlineData("{\"errorCode\":42}", null)]
+        [InlineData("{\"errorCode\":\"  \"}", null)]
+        [InlineData("{\"errorCode\":\"session_owner_mismatch\"}", "session_owner_mismatch")]
+        [InlineData("{\"ErrorCode\":\"session_owner_mismatch\"}", "session_owner_mismatch")]
+        [InlineData("  {\"success\":false,\"errorCode\":\" x \"}", "x")]
+        public void TryExtractErrorCode_is_tolerant(string? body, string? expected)
+            => Assert.Equal(expected, BackendApiClient.TryExtractErrorCode(body!));
+
         [Fact]
         public async Task Platform_html_403_is_reported_as_endpoint_unavailable_with_page_title()
         {

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.csproj

@@ -52,6 +52,11 @@
          carries the V2 assembly namespace so GatherRuleGuards locates it under
          "AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Resources.guardrails.json". -->
     <EmbeddedResource Include="..\..\..\rules\guardrails.json" LogicalName="AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Resources.guardrails.json" />
+    <!-- Built-in fallback rule catalogs (BuiltInConfigCatalog): the SAME CI-combined
+         rules/dist artifacts the backend embeds and serves. Snapshotted per agent build so
+         the no-config/no-cache fallback still runs full IME tracking instead of nothing. -->
+    <EmbeddedResource Include="..\..\..\rules\dist\ime-log-patterns.json" LogicalName="AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Resources.ime-log-patterns.json" />
+    <EmbeddedResource Include="..\..\..\rules\dist\gather-rules.json" LogicalName="AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Resources.gather-rules.json" />
   </ItemGroup>
 
   <ItemGroup>

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Configuration/AgentConfiguration.cs

@@ -109,6 +109,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
         /// </summary>
         public bool EnableTimezoneAutoSet { get; set; } = false;
 
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Whether to set the Delivery Optimization group ID (DOGroupId policy value) from a
+        /// deterministic network fingerprint (default gateway IP + MAC, RealmJoin-compatible).
+        /// Existing DOGroupId/DOGroupIdSource policies are never overwritten.
+        /// Default: false
+        /// </summary>
+        public bool EnableDoGroupIdAutoSet { get; set; } = false;
+
         /// <summary>
         /// Continue-Anyway observation mode (operator-set tenant opt-in, delivered via
         /// remote config): stamped into the esp_config_detected decision-signal payload so
@@ -254,6 +262,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
         /// </summary>
         public bool UnrestrictedMode { get; set; } = false;
 
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Mirror of <c>AnalyzerConfiguration.EnableRealmJoinWatcher</c> (remote, per tenant).
+        /// Gates the RealmJoin built-in sections of the diagnostics package — the package
+        /// service only sees this configuration, not the remote response. The RealmJoin host
+        /// itself keeps reading the remote Analyzers block. Default: false.
+        /// </summary>
+        public bool EnableRealmJoinWatcher { get; set; } = false;
+
         /// <summary>
         /// Sanitized command-line arguments for the agent_started event.
         /// Secrets (e.g. bootstrap token) are redacted before assignment.

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Configuration/BuiltInConfigCatalog.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+using System;
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using System.IO;
+using System.Linq;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
+using Newtonsoft.Json;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Compiled-in fallback copies of the global rule catalogs, embedded from the same
+    /// CI-generated <c>rules/dist</c> artifacts the backend seeds and serves — single
+    /// source by construction: each agent release snapshots the catalog state of its own
+    /// build, so the offline fallback can never drift further than the running agent
+    /// version itself (no manually maintained default to forget).
+    /// <para>
+    /// Consumed only by <see cref="RemoteConfigService"/>'s built-in default config,
+    /// i.e. when a session has NO live config and NO cache. Before this existed, that
+    /// path shipped an empty <c>ImeLogPatterns</c> list, which left the entire IME
+    /// tracking pipeline (app installs, platform/remediation scripts, health-script
+    /// compliance, IME ESP-phase signals) dead for the whole session — the core of
+    /// enrollment monitoring. A live fetch (startup, post-registration recovery or
+    /// rotate_config) always wins over this catalog.
+    /// </para>
+    /// Fail-soft: any load/parse error returns an empty list (the pre-catalog behaviour).
+    /// </summary>
+    internal static class BuiltInConfigCatalog
+    {
+        /// <summary>Enabled built-in IME log patterns from the embedded catalog.</summary>
+        public static List<ImeLogPattern> GetEnabledImeLogPatterns(AgentLogger logger)
+            => LoadEnabled<ImeLogPattern>("ime-log-patterns.json", p => p.Enabled, logger);
+
+        /// <summary>Enabled built-in gather rules from the embedded catalog.</summary>
+        public static List<GatherRule> GetEnabledGatherRules(AgentLogger logger)
+            => LoadEnabled<GatherRule>("gather-rules.json", r => r.Enabled, logger);
+
+        private static List<T> LoadEnabled<T>(string name, Func<T, bool> isEnabled, AgentLogger logger)
+        {
+            try
+            {
+                var assembly = typeof(BuiltInConfigCatalog).Assembly;
+                using (var stream = assembly.GetManifestResourceStream(
+                    "AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Resources." + name))
+                {
+                    if (stream == null)
+                    {
+                        logger?.Warning($"Built-in config catalog resource '{name}' not found — fallback runs without it.");
+                        return new List<T>();
+                    }
+
+                    using (var reader = new StreamReader(stream))
+                    {
+                        var wrapper = JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<RulesFile<T>>(reader.ReadToEnd());
+                        var all = wrapper?.Rules ?? new List<T>();
+                        return all.Where(isEnabled).ToList();
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            catch (Exception ex)
+            {
+                logger?.Warning($"Built-in config catalog '{name}' failed to load ({ex.Message}) — fallback runs without it.");
+                return new List<T>();
+            }
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>Shape of the CI-combined catalog files: <c>{ "rules": [...] }</c>.</summary>
+        private sealed class RulesFile<T>
+        {
+            [JsonProperty("rules")]
+            public List<T> Rules { get; set; }
+        }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Configuration/RemoteConfigMerger.cs

@@ -94,12 +94,17 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
             //                  a tenant admin can clear a previously-applied custom NTP server.
             agentConfig.NtpServer = remoteConfig.NtpServer;
             agentConfig.EnableTimezoneAutoSet = remoteConfig.EnableTimezoneAutoSet;
+            agentConfig.EnableDoGroupIdAutoSet = remoteConfig.EnableDoGroupIdAutoSet;
 
             // ---------------- Diagnostics — remote wins (including DiagnosticsUploadMode="Off"
             //                  which must clear any CLI-initial default).
             agentConfig.DiagnosticsUploadEnabled = remoteConfig.DiagnosticsUploadEnabled;
             agentConfig.DiagnosticsUploadMode = remoteConfig.DiagnosticsUploadMode;
             agentConfig.DiagnosticsLogPaths = remoteConfig.DiagnosticsLogPaths ?? new List<DiagnosticsLogPath>();
+            // The diagnostics package gates its RealmJoin sections on the tenant's watcher
+            // toggle but never sees the remote response — mirror the one Analyzers knob here.
+            // The remaining Analyzers flags flow untouched to DefaultComponentFactory.
+            agentConfig.EnableRealmJoinWatcher = remoteConfig.Analyzers?.EnableRealmJoinWatcher ?? false;
 
             agentConfig.SendTraceEvents = remoteConfig.SendTraceEvents;
 

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Configuration/RemoteConfigService.cs

@@ -42,6 +42,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
             TimeSpan.FromSeconds(60),
         };
 
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Upper bound for the pre-fetch network-link wait on the initial startup fetch.
+        /// Deliberately longer than the registration gate's 15s: the fetch runs FIRST after a
+        /// boot-time relaunch, when Wi-Fi may still be associating (802.1X, OOBE), and a fetch
+        /// burned into a dead link strands the whole session on built-in defaults — tenant aebdce78
+        /// audit 2026-08-24: ~50% of sessions lost their tenant config exactly this way.
+        /// </summary>
+        internal static readonly TimeSpan InitialFetchNetworkLinkWaitMax = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(60);
+
         /// <summary>
         /// Gets the current configuration (thread-safe)
         /// </summary>
@@ -76,6 +85,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
         /// <summary>HTTP status for auth failures (401/403), null otherwise.</summary>
         public int? LastFetchAuthStatusCode { get; private set; }
 
+        /// <summary>
+        /// True once <see cref="TryRecoverConfigAsync"/> replaced a failed startup fetch with a
+        /// live config. The <c>LastFetch*</c> properties intentionally keep describing the failed
+        /// startup fetch so the wire event can report both the original failure and the recovery.
+        /// </summary>
+        public bool RecoveredAfterFetchFailure { get; private set; }
+
         public RemoteConfigService(BackendApiClient apiClient, string tenantId, AgentLogger logger, EmergencyReporter emergencyReporter = null, DistressReporter distressReporter = null, AuthFailureTracker authFailureTracker = null)
         {
             _apiClient = apiClient ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(apiClient));
@@ -116,6 +132,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
             LastFetchFailureMessage = null;
             LastFetchAuthStatusCode = null;
 
+            // Initial startup fetch only: give a still-associating NIC a chance to come up
+            // before the first attempt. Without this the retry budget (10/30/60s) is burned
+            // into a provably dead link — the agent starts at boot, Wi-Fi associates minutes
+            // later, and the session runs on defaults although the backend was never the
+            // problem. The rotate_config path (retryOnTransientErrors:false) runs mid-session
+            // on a proven link and must stay latency-bounded, so it skips the gate.
+            if (retryOnTransientErrors)
+            {
+                try { await WaitForNetworkLinkAsync().ConfigureAwait(false); }
+                catch (Exception ex) { _logger.Debug($"Pre-fetch network wait failed ({ex.Message}) — fetching anyway."); }
+            }
+
             var maxAttempts = retryOnTransientErrors ? InitialFetchRetryBackoff.Length + 1 : 1;
             Exception lastException = null;
 
@@ -203,14 +231,63 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
                 return cached;
             }
 
-            // Fall back to defaults
-            _logger.Info("No cached config available, using defaults (all optional collectors disabled)");
+            // Fall back to built-in defaults (collector/analyzer defaults from the shared
+            // model initializers + the compiled-in rule catalogs).
             var defaults = CreateDefaultConfig();
+            _logger.Info($"No cached config available, using built-in defaults (ConfigVersion=0, " +
+                         $"{defaults.ImeLogPatterns?.Count ?? 0} built-in IME patterns, " +
+                         $"{defaults.GatherRules?.Count ?? 0} built-in gather rules)");
             SetConfig(defaults);
             LastFetchOutcome = RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.UsedDefaults;
             return defaults;
         }
 
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Single-attempt recovery fetch for a session whose startup fetch failed. Called right
+        /// after session registration succeeded — registration proves the backend is reachable,
+        /// so the config that Phase 4 could not get is one cheap call away instead of the whole
+        /// session being stranded on cache/defaults (only a manual <c>rotate_config</c> action
+        /// could rescue it before this existed).
+        /// <para>
+        /// Unlike <see cref="FetchConfigAsync"/> this does NOT reset the <c>LastFetch*</c>
+        /// observability state — those keep describing the failed startup fetch so
+        /// <c>remote_config_fetch_failed</c> can report the original failure AND the recovery.
+        /// Returns the recovered config, or null when there is nothing to recover (startup fetch
+        /// succeeded / never ran) or the recovery attempt itself failed. Never throws.
+        /// </para>
+        /// </summary>
+        public async Task<AgentConfigResponse> TryRecoverConfigAsync()
+        {
+            if (LastFetchOutcome != RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.FromCache &&
+                LastFetchOutcome != RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.UsedDefaults)
+                return null;
+
+            try
+            {
+                _logger.Info("Retrying remote config fetch after successful session registration...");
+                var config = await CallBackendAsync().ConfigureAwait(false);
+                if (config == null)
+                {
+                    _logger.Warning("Config recovery fetch returned empty response — keeping fallback config.");
+                    return null;
+                }
+
+                _logger.Info($"Remote config recovered: ConfigVersion={config.ConfigVersion}, " +
+                             $"GatherRules={config.GatherRules?.Count ?? 0}");
+                LogCollectorSettings(config.Collectors);
+                SetConfig(config);
+                CacheConfig(config);
+                _authFailureTracker?.RecordSuccess();
+                RecoveredAfterFetchFailure = true;
+                return config;
+            }
+            catch (Exception ex)
+            {
+                _logger.Warning($"Config recovery fetch failed ({ex.Message}) — keeping fallback config.");
+                return null;
+            }
+        }
+
         private void SetConfig(AgentConfigResponse config)
         {
             lock (_configLock)
@@ -319,6 +396,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
 
         private AgentConfigResponse CreateDefaultConfig()
         {
+            // Everything not set here falls to the shared AgentConfigResponse property
+            // initializers — the same values the backend uses as its `??` fallbacks, so the
+            // scalar knobs cannot drift. The rule catalogs are the one thing initializers
+            // cannot supply: without them the whole IME tracking pipeline is dead, so they
+            // come from the compiled-in snapshot of the served catalogs (BuiltInConfigCatalog).
             return new AgentConfigResponse
             {
                 ConfigVersion = 0,
@@ -330,8 +412,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
                 EnableGatherRuleDebugLog = false,
                 EnableEspContinueAnywayObservation = false,
                 Collectors = CollectorConfiguration.CreateDefault(),
-                GatherRules = new System.Collections.Generic.List<GatherRule>(),
-                ImeLogPatterns = new System.Collections.Generic.List<ImeLogPattern>()
+                GatherRules = BuiltInConfigCatalog.GetEnabledGatherRules(_logger),
+                ImeLogPatterns = BuiltInConfigCatalog.GetEnabledImeLogPatterns(_logger)
             };
         }
 
@@ -358,6 +440,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration
         protected virtual Task DelayBetweenAttemptsAsync(TimeSpan delay)
             => Task.Delay(delay);
 
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Awaits the pre-fetch network-link gate (initial startup fetch only). Production
+        /// polls the link-level signal via <see cref="NetworkLinkWait"/> bounded by
+        /// <see cref="InitialFetchNetworkLinkWaitMax"/>; tests subclass to record the call
+        /// and return immediately.
+        /// </summary>
+        protected virtual Task WaitForNetworkLinkAsync()
+            => NetworkLinkWait.WaitAsync(_logger, InitialFetchNetworkLinkWaitMax, "Remote config fetch");
+
         public void Dispose()
         {
             // Nothing to dispose

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime/AppInstallTiming.cs

@@ -10,10 +10,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
     /// the <c>app_tracking_summary</c> terminal event.
     /// <para>
     /// <b>StartedAtUtc</b> is recorded on the first lifecycle transition into Downloading /
-    /// Installing / InProgress and never overwritten. <b>CompletedAtUtc</b> is recorded on a
-    /// transition to a terminal state (Installed / Skipped / Postponed / Error) and re-armed
-    /// to <c>null</c> when the app goes terminal → active again (IME retry / re-evaluation,
-    /// audit Q1) — so the final terminal event carries first-start → last-terminal.
+    /// Installing / InProgress. <b>CompletedAtUtc</b> is recorded on a transition to a
+    /// terminal state (Installed / Skipped / Postponed / Error). When the app goes
+    /// terminal → active again (IME retry / re-evaluation pass, audit Q1) BOTH endpoints
+    /// re-arm — CompletedAtUtc to <c>null</c>, StartedAtUtc to the re-entry time — so the
+    /// final terminal event carries the status-defining ATTEMPT's window (2026-08
+    /// attempt-duration change, matching the backend's AppInstallSummaries semantics),
+    /// never the first-start → last-terminal span across install passes.
     /// </para>
     /// </summary>
     public sealed class AppInstallTiming

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime/ImeLogTracker.Handlers.cs

@@ -1042,6 +1042,56 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
         /// </summary>
         internal string LastEspPhaseDetected => _lastEspPhaseDetected;
 
+        /// <summary>
+        /// True while the user-scope ESP phase is the tracker's current phase. Every user-phase
+        /// probe and the zero-apps evidence gate on this — outside AccountSetup the IME lines
+        /// belong to the device phase or the pre-sign-in (defaultuser0) frame.
+        /// </summary>
+        private bool IsUserEspPhaseActive =>
+            string.Equals(_lastEspPhaseDetected, "AccountSetup", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// True once IME reported zero targeted Win32 apps for a user session while the user ESP
+        /// phase was active. Read by the adapter to label the evidence behind
+        /// <c>ime_user_session_completed</c>.
+        /// </summary>
+        internal bool UserSessionZeroAppsObserved => _userSessionZeroAppsObserved;
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS: IME enumerated the user session and found no targeted
+        /// Win32 apps. Its zero-app branch then <c>continue</c>s past the "Completed user
+        /// session" log statement, so this line is the only completion evidence such a device
+        /// ever produces — and IME itself treats the same condition as finished
+        /// (<c>ProviderResult.ProvisioningComplete</c> in the user check-in path, and an ESP
+        /// lock-in with an empty application list in the poller path).
+        /// <para>
+        /// Deliberately routed through <see cref="OnUserSessionCompleted"/> rather than a
+        /// separate callback: downstream this IS a completed user session, and the adapter's
+        /// pending-apps deferral plus its fire-once flag then apply unchanged.
+        /// </para>
+        /// <para>
+        /// Phase guard: firing before AccountSetup would burn the adapter's fire-once flag on a
+        /// pre-sign-in timestamp that <c>IsImeUserSessionGenuine</c> can never accept. The
+        /// observation is remembered instead and replayed by
+        /// <see cref="HandleEspPhaseDetected"/> on the transition into the user phase.
+        /// </para>
+        /// </summary>
+        private void HandleUserSessionZeroApps()
+        {
+            _userSessionZeroAppsObserved = true;
+
+            if (!IsUserEspPhaseActive)
+            {
+                _logger.Debug(
+                    "ImeLogTracker: zero-app user session observed before the user ESP phase " +
+                    $"(current phase: {_lastEspPhaseDetected ?? "(none)"}) - deferring until AccountSetup");
+                return;
+            }
+
+            _logger.Info("ImeLogTracker: user session enumerated with zero targeted apps - treating as user session completed");
+            OnUserSessionCompleted?.Invoke();
+        }
+
         private void HandleEspPhaseDetected(string espPhaseString)
         {
             // Validate phase and get its ordinal for forward-only enforcement
@@ -1120,6 +1170,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
             ActivatePatterns(logPhaseIsCurrentPhase);
 
             OnEspPhaseChanged?.Invoke(espPhaseString);
+
+            // Replay a zero-app user session observed before this phase was known. IME logs its
+            // check-in lines independently of when the agent first parses the ESP phase marker,
+            // so the evidence can legitimately arrive first; without this the only completion
+            // evidence a zero-app device produces would be dropped on the floor.
+            if (isFirstOrChangedPhase && IsUserEspPhaseActive && _userSessionZeroAppsObserved)
+            {
+                _logger.Info("ImeLogTracker: replaying zero-app user session evidence observed before the user ESP phase");
+                OnUserSessionCompleted?.Invoke();
+            }
         }
 
         private void HandleEspTrackStatus(Match match)

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime/ImeLogTracker.LogProcessing.cs

@@ -123,12 +123,23 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
                             // "write output done. output = ..." spans many lines)
                             StringBuilder multiLineBuffer = null;
                             int multiLineCount = 0;
+                            // Set after a capped entry is dropped: its remaining physical lines
+                            // are skipped instead of being matched as raw text, until the entry
+                            // closes or a new entry begins (so no real entry is lost).
+                            bool skippingDroppedEntry = false;
 
                             string line;
                             while ((line = await reader.ReadLineAsync()) != null)
                             {
                                 if (token.IsCancellationRequested) break;
 
+                                if (skippingDroppedEntry)
+                                {
+                                    if (line.Contains("]LOG]!>")) { skippingDroppedEntry = false; continue; }
+                                    if (!line.StartsWith("<![LOG[")) continue;
+                                    skippingDroppedEntry = false;
+                                }
+
                                 // --- Multiline CMTrace buffering ---
                                 // CMTrace entries: <![LOG[message]LOG]!><time=...>
                                 // When message contains newlines, the entry spans multiple lines.
@@ -146,12 +157,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
                                         multiLineBuffer = null;
                                         multiLineCount = 0;
                                     }
-                                    else if (multiLineCount >= MaxMultiLineBufferLines)
+                                    else if (multiLineCount >= MaxMultiLineBufferLines || multiLineBuffer.Length >= MaxMultiLineBufferChars)
                                     {
-                                        // Safety limit — discard to prevent unbounded memory usage
-                                        _logger.Debug($"ImeLogTracker: discarding multiline CMTrace buffer after {multiLineCount} lines (corrupt entry?)");
+                                        // Safety limit — discard to bound memory and parser work. Warning
+                                        // (not Debug) so a capped entry is visible in the client log at the
+                                        // default level: a real IME entry this large would be news.
+                                        _logger.Warning($"ImeLogTracker: discarding multiline CMTrace buffer in {Path.GetFileName(filePath)} after {multiLineCount} lines / {multiLineBuffer.Length} chars (cap {MaxMultiLineBufferLines} lines / {MaxMultiLineBufferChars} chars) — entry dropped");
                                         multiLineBuffer = null;
                                         multiLineCount = 0;
+                                        skippingDroppedEntry = true;
                                         continue;
                                     }
                                     else
@@ -387,6 +401,12 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
                         OnUserSessionCompleted?.Invoke();
                         break;
 
+                    case "usersessionzeroapps":
+                        // IME found no targeted user apps — its zero-app branch skips the
+                        // "Completed user session" line, so this is the equivalent evidence.
+                        HandleUserSessionZeroApps();
+                        break;
+
                     case "updatestateinstalled":
                         if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(id))
                             UpdateStateWithCallback(id, AppInstallationState.Installed);

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime/ImeLogTracker.cs

@@ -129,6 +129,14 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
         private CancellationTokenSource _cts;
         private bool _allAppsCompletedFired;
 
+        // Sticky: IME enumerated a user session and reported ZERO targeted Win32 apps
+        // (IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS). IME's zero-app branch returns before it writes the
+        // "Completed user session" line, so on a device with no user-targeted apps that line
+        // never appears and every user-phase completion probe would starve forever. This flag
+        // IS the user-phase completion evidence for that shape. Set only while the user ESP
+        // phase is active, or replayed on the transition into it.
+        private bool _userSessionZeroAppsObserved;
+
         // State persistence: saves tracker state to disk so agent restart continues
         // from the exact log position without re-parsing or re-building ignore lists.
         private readonly ImeTrackerStatePersistence _statePersistence;
@@ -216,6 +224,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
 
         private const int MaxScriptOutputLength = 2048;
         private const int MaxMultiLineBufferLines = 100;
+        // Companion byte cap: 100 raw lines of unbounded length could still assemble a
+        // multi-megabyte entry. Any process able to append to a tailed log can plant one; the
+        // parser is linear, but memory and the per-entry work must stay bounded regardless.
+        // Real IME entries (AgentExecutor script output is capped by IME itself) stay far below.
+        internal const int MaxMultiLineBufferChars = 1024 * 1024;
 
         // Counter for HS-NEW-RESULT JSON parse failures — visible to operators via tracker
         // metrics so we can detect IME log-format drift in production.
@@ -341,6 +354,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
             _lastEspPhaseDetected = phaseName;
         }
 
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Test-only seam: marks the zero-targeted-apps user session as observed without driving
+        /// the IME-USER-SESSION-ZERO-APPS pattern through a log line. The pattern-to-flag path
+        /// itself is covered end-to-end by <c>ImeLogTrackerZeroUserAppsTests</c>.
+        /// </summary>
+        internal void SeedUserSessionZeroAppsForTesting()
+        {
+            _userSessionZeroAppsObserved = true;
+        }
+
         /// <summary>
         /// Returns a deduped union of phase-snapshotted apps plus the live
         /// <see cref="PackageStates"/> (current phase). Live entries win on Id collision.
@@ -395,11 +418,18 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
         {
             try
             {
-                if (!string.Equals(_lastEspPhaseDetected, "AccountSetup", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
+                if (!IsUserEspPhaseActive)
                     return false;
 
                 var apps = new List<AppPackageState>(_packageStates);
-                if (apps.Count == 0) return false;
+
+                // Zero user-targeted apps is the MOST settled state there is, but the
+                // conservative "at least one required app" rule below reads it as "not
+                // settled" and starves the AccountSetup synthesis. Only an explicit IME
+                // observation lifts that — never a merely empty list, which also means
+                // "phase just cleared" or "apps not surfaced yet".
+                if (apps.Count == 0)
+                    return _userSessionZeroAppsObserved;
 
                 var sawRequired = false;
                 foreach (var pkg in apps)
@@ -746,6 +776,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
             _currentPhaseOrder = state.CurrentPhaseOrder;
             _lastEspPhaseDetected = state.LastEspPhaseDetected;
             _allAppsCompletedFired = state.AllAppsCompletedFired;
+            _userSessionZeroAppsObserved = state.UserSessionZeroAppsObserved;
             _logPhaseIsCurrentPhase = state.LogPhaseIsCurrentPhase;
 
             // Restore seen app IDs
@@ -861,6 +892,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
                 CurrentPhaseOrder = _currentPhaseOrder,
                 LastEspPhaseDetected = _lastEspPhaseDetected,
                 AllAppsCompletedFired = _allAppsCompletedFired,
+                UserSessionZeroAppsObserved = _userSessionZeroAppsObserved,
                 LogPhaseIsCurrentPhase = _logPhaseIsCurrentPhase,
                 SeenAppIds = _seenAppIds.ToList(),
                 IgnoreList = _packageStates.IgnoreList.ToList(),

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/Ime/ImeTrackerStatePersistence.cs

@@ -109,6 +109,13 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.Ime
         public int CurrentPhaseOrder { get; set; }
         public string LastEspPhaseDetected { get; set; }
         public bool AllAppsCompletedFired { get; set; }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// IME reported zero targeted Win32 apps for a user session. Absent in state files
+        /// written before this field existed — deserializing to false there is correct: the
+        /// tracker simply re-observes the line on the next IME check-in.
+        /// </summary>
+        public bool UserSessionZeroAppsObserved { get; set; }
         public bool LogPhaseIsCurrentPhase { get; set; }
         public List<string> SeenAppIds { get; set; }
         public List<string> IgnoreList { get; set; }

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/SystemSignals/PowerStateTransitionTracker.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+#nullable enable
+using System;
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using System.Linq;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Runtime;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Pure state machine behind <c>PowerStateWatcherHost</c>: diffs successive
+    /// <see cref="PowerStateResult"/> snapshots into <c>power_state_change</c> emissions.
+    /// No WMI, no timers, no logging — fully deterministic and unit-testable.
+    /// <para>
+    /// Semantics:
+    /// <list type="bullet">
+    ///   <item><b>AC↔battery transitions</b> — one emission per accepted edge
+    ///         (<c>ac_to_battery</c> Warning/immediate, <c>battery_to_ac</c> Info).</item>
+    ///   <item><b>Threshold ladder</b> (default 50/30/15 %) — evaluated only while ON battery;
+    ///         each level latches once per tracker lifetime (no re-emit when the device charges
+    ///         back up and drains again — avoids plug-cycle alarm spam). A multi-level jump
+    ///         emits only the LOWEST newly-crossed level. Entering battery power already below
+    ///         a level counts as crossing it (covers "unplugged at 12 %" and, via
+    ///         <see cref="Baseline"/>, "enrollment started at 12 %").</item>
+    ///   <item><b>Storm cap</b> — a lifetime emission cap (default 20) as backstop against a
+    ///         flapping dock / dying battery controller; <see cref="EmissionCapReached"/> flips
+    ///         once so the host can log a single warning.</item>
+    /// </list>
+    /// A snapshot with <see cref="PowerStateResult.ProbeError"/> is ignored (previous state
+    /// preserved); a null <see cref="PowerStateResult.BatteryPercent"/> skips threshold
+    /// evaluation but AC diffing still works.
+    /// </para>
+    /// </summary>
+    internal sealed class PowerStateTransitionTracker
+    {
+        public const string TransitionAcToBattery = "ac_to_battery";
+        public const string TransitionBatteryToAc = "battery_to_ac";
+        public const string TransitionThresholdCrossed = "threshold_crossed";
+
+        internal static readonly int[] DefaultThresholdLadder = { 50, 30, 15 };
+        internal const int DefaultMaxEmissions = 20;
+
+        private readonly int[] _ladder;              // strictly descending
+        private readonly int _maxEmissions;
+        private readonly HashSet<int> _latchedLevels = new HashSet<int>();
+
+        private bool _hasState;
+        private bool _lastOnAc;
+        private int _emitted;
+
+        public PowerStateTransitionTracker(IReadOnlyList<int>? thresholdLadder = null, int maxEmissions = DefaultMaxEmissions)
+        {
+            _ladder = (thresholdLadder ?? DefaultThresholdLadder).OrderByDescending(l => l).ToArray();
+            _maxEmissions = maxEmissions;
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>True once the lifetime emission cap suppressed at least one emission.</summary>
+        public bool EmissionCapReached { get; private set; }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Latches the arm-time state silently — except when the device is already on battery
+        /// at/below a ladder level, which yields one threshold emission for the lowest crossed
+        /// level (an enrollment STARTING at 12 % must still produce the event the analyze rule
+        /// matches on). No AC-transition emission is ever produced from a baseline.
+        /// </summary>
+        public IReadOnlyList<PowerStateEmission> Baseline(PowerStateResult probe)
+        {
+            if (probe == null || probe.ProbeError != null || !probe.HasBattery)
+                return Array.Empty<PowerStateEmission>();
+
+            _hasState = true;
+            _lastOnAc = probe.OnAcPower;
+
+            var emissions = new List<PowerStateEmission>();
+            EvaluateThresholds(probe, emissions);
+            return emissions;
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Diffs a fresh (host-debounced) snapshot against the last accepted state and returns
+        /// 0..n emissions — an AC transition and a threshold crossing can co-occur (unplugged
+        /// at 10 % ⇒ <c>ac_to_battery</c> + <c>threshold_crossed:15</c>).
+        /// </summary>
+        public IReadOnlyList<PowerStateEmission> Evaluate(PowerStateResult probe)
+        {
+            if (probe == null || probe.ProbeError != null)
+                return Array.Empty<PowerStateEmission>();
+            if (!_hasState)
+                return Baseline(probe);
+
+            var emissions = new List<PowerStateEmission>();
+
+            if (_lastOnAc && !probe.OnAcPower)
+            {
+                Emit(emissions, new PowerStateEmission(
+                    transition: TransitionAcToBattery,
+                    thresholdPercent: null,
+                    probe: probe,
+                    severity: EventSeverity.Warning,
+                    immediateUpload: true,
+                    message: $"Power source switched from AC to battery ({FormatPercent(probe)} remaining) during enrollment"));
+            }
+            else if (!_lastOnAc && probe.OnAcPower)
+            {
+                Emit(emissions, new PowerStateEmission(
+                    transition: TransitionBatteryToAc,
+                    thresholdPercent: null,
+                    probe: probe,
+                    severity: EventSeverity.Info,
+                    immediateUpload: false,
+                    message: $"Power source switched back to AC ({FormatPercent(probe)}{(probe.IsCharging ? ", charging" : string.Empty)})"));
+            }
+
+            _lastOnAc = probe.OnAcPower;
+            EvaluateThresholds(probe, emissions);
+            return emissions;
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// While on battery with a known percentage: emit the LOWEST ladder level at/above the
+        /// current charge that is not yet latched, then latch every level at/above the charge
+        /// (a 60 %→10 % jump emits threshold 15 only, latching 50/30/15).
+        /// </summary>
+        private void EvaluateThresholds(PowerStateResult probe, List<PowerStateEmission> emissions)
+        {
+            if (probe.OnAcPower || !probe.BatteryPercent.HasValue) return;
+            var percent = probe.BatteryPercent.Value;
+
+            int? lowestCrossed = null;
+            foreach (var level in _ladder) // descending — the last match is the lowest crossed level
+            {
+                if (percent <= level && !_latchedLevels.Contains(level))
+                    lowestCrossed = level;
+            }
+            if (!lowestCrossed.HasValue) return;
+
+            foreach (var level in _ladder)
+            {
+                if (percent <= level) _latchedLevels.Add(level);
+            }
+
+            var threshold = lowestCrossed.Value;
+            var severity = threshold <= 15 ? EventSeverity.Error
+                         : threshold <= 30 ? EventSeverity.Warning
+                         : EventSeverity.Info;
+            Emit(emissions, new PowerStateEmission(
+                transition: TransitionThresholdCrossed,
+                thresholdPercent: threshold,
+                probe: probe,
+                severity: severity,
+                immediateUpload: severity >= EventSeverity.Warning,
+                message: $"Battery dropped below {threshold}% ({FormatPercent(probe)} remaining) while enrolling on battery power"));
+        }
+
+        private void Emit(List<PowerStateEmission> emissions, PowerStateEmission emission)
+        {
+            if (_emitted >= _maxEmissions)
+            {
+                EmissionCapReached = true;
+                return;
+            }
+            _emitted++;
+            emissions.Add(emission);
+        }
+
+        private static string FormatPercent(PowerStateResult probe)
+            => probe.BatteryPercent.HasValue ? $"battery {probe.BatteryPercent.Value}%" : "battery level unknown";
+    }
+
+    /// <summary>One decided <c>power_state_change</c> emission — the host maps this 1:1 onto an event.</summary>
+    internal sealed class PowerStateEmission
+    {
+        public PowerStateEmission(string transition, int? thresholdPercent, PowerStateResult probe,
+            EventSeverity severity, bool immediateUpload, string message)
+        {
+            Transition = transition;
+            ThresholdPercent = thresholdPercent;
+            OnAcPower = probe.OnAcPower;
+            BatteryPercent = probe.BatteryPercent;
+            IsCharging = probe.IsCharging;
+            BatteryLifeMinutes = probe.BatteryLifeMinutes;
+            Severity = severity;
+            ImmediateUpload = immediateUpload;
+            Message = message;
+        }
+
+        public string Transition { get; }
+        public int? ThresholdPercent { get; }
+        public bool OnAcPower { get; }
+        public int? BatteryPercent { get; }
+        public bool IsCharging { get; }
+        public int? BatteryLifeMinutes { get; }
+        public EventSeverity Severity { get; }
+        public bool ImmediateUpload { get; }
+        public string Message { get; }
+    }
+}

src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core/Monitoring/Enrollment/SystemSignals/SystemTimelineTracker.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,681 @@
+using System;
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader;
+using System.Globalization;
+using System.IO;
+using System.Linq;
+using System.Xml.Linq;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
+using Newtonsoft.Json;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Watches the <c>System</c> event log for two enrollment blind spots and forwards them as
+    /// timeline ground truth:
+    /// <list type="bullet">
+    ///   <item><b>System clock steps</b> (Kernel-General EventID 1) → <c>system_clock_changed</c>.
+    ///         The payload carries <c>oldTime</c>/<c>newTime</c>/<c>timeDeltaMs</c> plus the
+    ///         setting process — the "clock set from X to Y" fact that today has to be inferred
+    ///         from timestamp discontinuities. w32time also logs frequent 1 ms micro-slews on the
+    ///         same EventID, so emissions are gated on <see cref="MinClockDeltaMs"/>.</item>
+    ///   <item><b>Completed sleep episodes</b> → <c>system_sleep_episode</c>. Classic S3/S4 comes
+    ///         from Power-Troubleshooter EventID 1 (one event per episode at wake, carrying
+    ///         SleepTime + WakeTime). Modern Standby comes from Kernel-Power EventID 507 (exit),
+    ///         whose payload carries the scenario duration and the actual sleep residency; the
+    ///         enter time is derived as exit − duration. Kernel-Power 506 (enter) is deliberately
+    ///         NOT consumed: 507 already carries everything, and pairing 506/507 would need an
+    ///         orphan-tolerant state machine across agent restarts for zero information gain —
+    ///         an episode without a 507 never completed and would not be emitted under any design.</item>
+    /// </list>
+    /// <para>
+    /// <b>Payload times are authoritative.</b> The decisive clock correction (w32time fixing a
+    /// wrong BIOS clock) happens exactly when the device clock is untrustworthy, and the backend
+    /// clamps implausible event timestamps to server time. All semantic instants therefore travel
+    /// as explicit ISO-8601 payload fields, never only as the event's own <c>Timestamp</c>.
+    /// </para>
+    /// <para>
+    /// <b>Backfill + cross-restart dedup</b> mirror <see cref="WindowsUpdateTracker"/>: the System
+    /// .evtx persists across the OOBE reboots, so a startup scan recovers pre-agent clock steps
+    /// and standby episodes; a persisted RecordId watermark plus an intra-run seen-set (a HashSet,
+    /// NOT a high-water mark — see the field comment) keep restarts from re-emitting.
+    /// </para>
+    /// </summary>
+    internal sealed class SystemTimelineTracker : IDisposable
+    {
+        internal const string Channel = "System";
+
+        internal const string ProviderKernelGeneral       = "Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General";       // EventID 1: system time changed
+        internal const string ProviderPowerTroubleshooter = "Microsoft-Windows-Power-Troubleshooter"; // EventID 1: resumed from classic sleep/hibernate
+        internal const string ProviderKernelPower         = "Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Power";         // EventID 507: Modern Standby exit
+
+        internal const int EventId_ClockChange       = 1;
+        internal const int EventId_ClassicResume     = 1;
+        internal const int EventId_ModernStandbyExit = 507;
+
+        internal const string WatermarkStateFileName = "system-timeline-watermark.json";
+
+        // w32time logs Kernel-General 1 for routine 1 ms slew corrections (verified live: several
+        // per hour). Only genuine steps are timeline-relevant; anything below this is claimed in
+        // the dedup set but never emitted.
+        internal const long MinClockDeltaMs = 2000;
+
+        // A step of at least 5 minutes can invalidate token/cert validation windows and visibly
+        // reorders the timeline (matches the web's TimeJumpBadge threshold) — surface it fast.
+        internal const long ClockDeltaWarningMs = 5 * 60 * 1000;
+
+        // Modern Standby logs a 506/507 pair for every screen-off scenario, including seconds-long
+        // ones where the device never actually slept (SleepDurationInUs 0). Only episodes with
+        // real sleep residency are emitted. Classic Power-Troubleshooter episodes have no floor:
+        // they only exist for genuinely completed S3/S4 transitions.
+        internal const long MinSleepDurationSeconds = 60;
+
+        private readonly AgentLogger _logger;
+        private readonly string _sessionId;
+        private readonly string _tenantId;
+        private readonly InformationalEventPost _post;
+        private readonly bool _backfillEnabled;
+        private readonly int _backfillLookbackMinutes;
+        private readonly string _stateDirectory;
+
+        private EventLogWatcher _watcher;
+
+        // Dedup. Guarded because EventRecordWritten callbacks run concurrently with the backfill scan.
+        //
+        // Cross-restart boundary loaded from disk: the highest RecordId emitted in a PRIOR run.
+        // Immutable during this run — records at/below it were already emitted before this process
+        // started and must not be re-emitted by the backfill scan.
+        private long _restartWatermark = -1;
+        // RecordIds claimed in THIS run — the intra-run dedup set. Deliberately a HashSet, NOT a
+        // high-water mark: the live watcher is armed before the backfill runs, so a live record with
+        // a HIGHER RecordId can be processed before/during backfill. A high-water mark would then
+        // make the dedup skip every older, never-emitted backfill record — silently dropping exactly
+        // the pre-agent clock corrections and standby episodes this tracker exists for. The targeted
+        // records are low-volume, so the set stays tiny.
+        private readonly HashSet<long> _seenThisRun = new HashSet<long>();
+        // Highest RecordId claimed so far (max of restart watermark + this run). Persisted so the
+        // next run's restart watermark is correct.
+        private long _maxEmittedRecordId = -1;
+        private readonly object _watermarkLock = new object();
+
+        public SystemTimelineTracker(
+            string sessionId,
+            string tenantId,
+            InformationalEventPost post,
+            AgentLogger logger,
+            bool backfillEnabled = true,
+            int backfillLookbackMinutes = 1440,
+            string stateDirectory = null)
+        {
+            _sessionId = sessionId ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(sessionId));
+            _tenantId = tenantId ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(tenantId));
+            _post = post ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(post));
+            _logger = logger ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(logger));
+            _backfillEnabled = backfillEnabled;
+            _backfillLookbackMinutes = backfillLookbackMinutes;
+            _stateDirectory = stateDirectory != null ? Environment.ExpandEnvironmentVariables(stateDirectory) : null;
+        }
+
+        public void Start()
+        {
+            LoadWatermark();
+            StartWatcher();
+
+            if (_backfillEnabled && _backfillLookbackMinutes > 0)
+                BackfillRecentEvents();
+            else
+                _logger.Info("SystemTimeline backfill disabled by config");
+        }
+
+        public void Stop()
+        {
+            if (_watcher == null) return;
+            try
+            {
+                _watcher.Enabled = false;
+                _watcher.Dispose();
+                _logger.Info("SystemTimeline watcher stopped");
+            }
+            catch (Exception ex)
+            {
+                _logger.Error("Error stopping SystemTimeline watcher", ex);
+            }
+            finally
+            {
+                _watcher = null;
+            }
+        }
+
+        public void Dispose() => Stop();
+
+        // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // Watcher lifecycle
+        // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+        private void StartWatcher()
+        {
+            try
+            {
+                var query = new EventLogQuery(Channel, PathType.LogName, BuildXPath());
+                _watcher = new EventLogWatcher(query);
+                _watcher.EventRecordWritten += OnEventRecordWritten;
+                _watcher.Enabled = true;
+                _logger.Info($"SystemTimeline watcher started: {Channel} (clock changes + sleep episodes)");
+            }
+            catch (EventLogNotFoundException)
+            {
+                _logger.Warning($"SystemTimeline event log not found: {Channel} (normal on non-Windows test environments)");
+            }
+            catch (UnauthorizedAccessException ex)
+            {
+                _logger.Warning($"SystemTimeline watcher access denied for {Channel}: {ex.Message}");
+            }
+            catch (Exception ex)
+            {
+                _logger.Error($"Failed to start SystemTimeline watcher for {Channel}", ex);
+                CollectorDegradationReporter.Report(_post, _sessionId, _tenantId,
+                    collectorName: "SystemTimelineTracker", reason: $"watcher_arm_failed:{Channel}", ex: ex);
+            }
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Provider-qualified XPath for the three targeted signals. Provider filtering is mandatory
+        /// on the System channel — EventID 1 alone matches many unrelated providers.
+        /// Exposed as internal for tests.
+        /// </summary>
+        internal static string BuildXPath() =>
+            "*[System[" + ProviderIdClauses() + "]]";
+
+        /// <summary>Backfill variant of <see cref="BuildXPath"/> with the lookback window applied.</summary>
+        internal static string BuildBackfillXPath(long lookbackMs) =>
+            "*[System[(" + ProviderIdClauses() + $") and TimeCreated[timediff(@SystemTime) <= {lookbackMs}]]]";
+
+        private static string ProviderIdClauses() =>
+            $"(Provider[@Name='{ProviderKernelGeneral}'] and EventID={EventId_ClockChange})" +
+            $" or (Provider[@Name='{ProviderPowerTroubleshooter}'] and EventID={EventId_ClassicResume})" +
+            $" or (Provider[@Name='{ProviderKernelPower}'] and EventID={EventId_ModernStandbyExit})";
+
+        // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // Event processing
+        // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+        private void OnEventRecordWritten(object sender, EventRecordWrittenEventArgs e)
+        {
+            if (e.EventRecord == null) return;
+            try
+            {
+                ProcessRecord(e.EventRecord, isBackfill: false);
+            }
+            catch (Exception ex)
+            {
+                _logger.Error("Error processing SystemTimeline event", ex);
+            }
+        }
+
+        private void ProcessRecord(EventRecord record, bool isBackfill)
+        {
+            var recordId = record.RecordId ?? -1;
+
+            // Cheap dedup gate BEFORE the XML rendering work.
+            if (IsAlreadyProcessed(recordId))
+                return;
+
+            string xml = null;
+            try { xml = record.ToXml(); }
+            catch { /* fall through with empty EventData */ }
+
+            ProcessEvent(
+                providerName: record.ProviderName,
+                eventId: record.Id,
+                recordId: recordId,
+                timeCreatedUtc: record.TimeCreated?.ToUniversalTime(),
+                eventData: ParseEventData(xml),
+                isBackfill: isBackfill);
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Core processing extracted to primitive inputs so tests can drive it without synthesizing
+        /// an abstract, Windows-only <see cref="EventRecord"/> (WindowsUpdateTracker test-seam
+        /// pattern; a plain dictionary instead of named args because three providers with ~10
+        /// payload fields each make a fixed signature impractical).
+        /// </summary>
+        internal void ProcessEvent(
+            string providerName,
+            int eventId,
+            long recordId,
+            DateTime? timeCreatedUtc,
+            Dictionary<string, string> eventData,
+            bool isBackfill)
+        {
+            if (!MarkProcessed(recordId))
+                return; // already emitted (cross-restart or duplicate delivery)
+
+            eventData = eventData ?? new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
+
+            if (string.Equals(providerName, ProviderKernelGeneral, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) && eventId == EventId_ClockChange)
+                HandleClockChange(recordId, timeCreatedUtc, eventData, isBackfill);
+            else if (string.Equals(providerName, ProviderPowerTroubleshooter, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) && eventId == EventId_ClassicResume)
+                HandleClassicResume(recordId, timeCreatedUtc, eventData, isBackfill);
+            else if (string.Equals(providerName, ProviderKernelPower, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) && eventId == EventId_ModernStandbyExit)
+                HandleModernStandbyExit(recordId, timeCreatedUtc, eventData, isBackfill);
+            // Anything else slipped past the XPath filter — ignore.
+        }
+
+        // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // system_clock_changed (Kernel-General EventID 1)
+        // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+        private void HandleClockChange(long recordId, DateTime? timeCreatedUtc, Dictionary<string, string> eventData, bool isBackfill)
+        {
+            eventData.TryGetValue("NewTime", out var newTimeRaw);
+            eventData.TryGetValue("OldTime", out var oldTimeRaw);
+            var newTime = TryParseUtc(newTimeRaw);
+            var oldTime = TryParseUtc(oldTimeRaw);
+
+            // Signed delta preferably from the authoritative instants (NewTime − OldTime carries
+            // the direction unambiguously); TimeDeltaInMs is the fallback when either fails to
+            // parse. Records with neither are unusable and skipped (already claimed by dedup).
+            long deltaMs;
+            if (newTime.HasValue && oldTime.HasValue)
+            {
+                deltaMs = (long)Math.Round((newTime.Value - oldTime.Value).TotalMilliseconds);
+            }
+            else if (eventData.TryGetValue("TimeDeltaInMs", out var deltaRaw) &&
+                long.TryParse(deltaRaw, NumberStyles.Integer, CultureInfo.InvariantCulture, out var parsedDelta))
+            {
+                deltaMs = parsedDelta;
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                _logger.Debug($"SystemTimeline: clock-change record {recordId} has no usable times/delta — skipped");
+                return;
+            }
+
+            if (Math.Abs(deltaMs) < MinClockDeltaMs)
+                return; // w32time micro-slew — claimed (MarkProcessed) but never emitted
+
+            eventData.TryGetValue("Reason", out var reasonRaw);
+            int.TryParse(reasonRaw, NumberStyles.Integer, CultureInfo.InvariantCulture, out var reason);
+            var reasonText = reason == 1 ? "application_set"
+                : reason == 2 ? "hardware_clock_sync"
+                : "unknown";
+
+            eventData.TryGetValue("ProcessName", out var processName);
+
+            var data = new Dictionary<string, object>
+            {
+                { "timeDeltaMs", deltaMs },
+                { "reason", reason },
+                { "reasonText", reasonText },
+                { "backfilled", isBackfill },
+            };
+            // Authoritative instants: re-normalized ISO-8601 when parseable, raw pass-through
+            // otherwise — the payload must survive even a malformed provider rendering.
+            data["newTime"] = newTime.HasValue ? newTime.Value.ToString("o") : (object)(newTimeRaw ?? string.Empty);
+            data["oldTime"] = oldTime.HasValue ? oldTime.Value.ToString("o") : (object)(oldTimeRaw ?? string.Empty);
+            if (recordId >= 0) data["recordId"] = recordId;
+            if (timeCreatedUtc.HasValue) data["timeCreated"] = timeCreatedUtc.Value.ToString("o");
+            if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(processName)) data["processName"] = processName;
+            if (eventData.TryGetValue("ProcessID", out var pidRaw) &&
+                int.TryParse(pidRaw, NumberStyles.Integer, CultureInfo.InvariantCulture, out var pid))
+            {
+                data["processId"] = pid;
+            }
+
+            var direction = deltaMs >= 0 ? "forward" : "backward";
+            var processLeaf = ProcessLeafName(processName);
+            var message = $"System clock stepped {direction} {FormatDuration(TimeSpan.FromMilliseconds(Math.Abs(deltaMs)))}" +
+                $" (reason: {reasonText}" + (processLeaf != null ? $", process: {processLeaf})" : ")");
+
+            var isLargeStep = Math.Abs(deltaMs) >= ClockDeltaWarningMs;
+            _post.Emit(new EnrollmentEvent
+            {
+                SessionId = _sessionId,
+                TenantId = _tenantId,
+                // The record's own creation time, not UtcNow: backfilled pre-agent clock steps must
+                // land on the timeline where they happened (WindowsUpdateTracker convention).
+                Timestamp = timeCreatedUtc ?? DateTime.UtcNow,
+                EventType = Constants.EventTypes.SystemClockChanged,
+                Severity = isLargeStep ? EventSeverity.Warning : EventSeverity.Info,
+                Source = "SystemTimelineWatcher",
+                Phase = EnrollmentPhase.Unknown,
+                Message = message,
+                Data = data,
+                ImmediateUpload = isLargeStep,
+            });
+        }
+
+        // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // system_sleep_episode — classic sleep/hibernate (Power-Troubleshooter EventID 1)
+        // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+        private void HandleClassicResume(long recordId, DateTime? timeCreatedUtc, Dictionary<string, string> eventData, bool isBackfill)
+        {
+            eventData.TryGetValue("SleepTime", out var sleepRaw);
+            eventData.TryGetValue("WakeTime", out var wakeRaw);
+            var enteredAt = TryParseUtc(sleepRaw);
+            var exitedAt = TryParseUtc(wakeRaw);
+
+            // EffectiveState 5 = hibernate (S4); TargetState is the fallback when the effective
+            // state is missing (older event versions).
+            eventData.TryGetValue("EffectiveState", out var effectiveState);
+            eventData.TryGetValue("TargetState", out var targetState);
+            var stateValue = !string.IsNullOrEmpty(effectiveState) ? effectiveState : targetState;
+            var kind = stateValue == "5" ? "hibernate" : "sleep";
+
+            long? durationSeconds = null;
+            if (enteredAt.HasValue && exitedAt.HasValue && exitedAt.Value > enteredAt.Value)
+                durationSeconds = (long)Math.Round((exitedAt.Value - enteredAt.Value).TotalSeconds);
+
+            var data = new Dictionary<string, object>
+            {
+                { "kind", kind },
+                { "backfilled", isBackfill },
+            };
+            data["enteredAt"] = enteredAt.HasValue ? enteredAt.Value.ToString("o") : (object)(sleepRaw ?? string.Empty);
+            data["exitedAt"] = exitedAt.HasValue ? exitedAt.Value.ToString("o") : (object)(wakeRaw ?? string.Empty);
+            if (durationSeconds.HasValue) data["durationSeconds"] = durationSeconds.Value;
+            if (recordId >= 0) data["recordId"] = recordId;
+            if (timeCreatedUtc.HasValue) data["timeCreated"] = timeCreatedUtc.Value.ToString("o");
+            if (eventData.TryGetValue("WakeSourceType", out var wakeTypeRaw) &&
+                int.TryParse(wakeTypeRaw, NumberStyles.Integer, CultureInfo.InvariantCulture, out var wakeType))
+            {
+                data["wakeSourceType"] = wakeType;
+            }
+            eventData.TryGetValue("WakeSourceText", out var wakeText);
+            if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(wakeText)) data["wakeSourceText"] = wakeText;
+
+            var durationLabel = durationSeconds.HasValue
+                ? " after " + FormatDuration(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(durationSeconds.Value))
+                : string.Empty;
+            var wakeLabel = !string.IsNullOrEmpty(wakeText) ? $" (wake source: {wakeText})" : string.Empty;
+
+            EmitSleepEpisode(timeCreatedUtc, data,
+                $"Device resumed from {kind}{durationLabel}{wakeLabel}");
+        }
+
+        // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // system_sleep_episode — Modern Standby (Kernel-Power EventID 507)
+        // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+        private void HandleModernStandbyExit(long recordId, DateTime? timeCreatedUtc, Dictionary<string, string> eventData, bool isBackfill)
+        {
+            eventData.TryGetValue("SleepDurationInUs", out var sleepUsRaw);
+            long.TryParse(sleepUsRaw, NumberStyles.Integer, CultureInfo.InvariantCulture, out var sleepUs);
+            var sleepDurationSeconds = sleepUs / 1_000_000;
+
+            // Every screen-off scenario logs a 507, including seconds-long ones where the device
+            // never slept (SleepDurationInUs 0, incl. SleepEntered=false) — one gate covers both.
+            if (sleepDurationSeconds < MinSleepDurationSeconds)
+                return; // claimed but not an episode worth the timeline
+
+            eventData.TryGetValue("DurationInUs", out var durationUsRaw);
+            long.TryParse(durationUsRaw, NumberStyles.Integer, CultureInfo.InvariantCulture, out var durationUs);
+            if (durationUs < sleepUs) durationUs = sleepUs; // scenario duration can never undercut its sleep residency
+
+            var durationSeconds = durationUs / 1_000_000;
+            var exitedAt = timeCreatedUtc; // 507 is written at scenario exit
+            DateTime? enteredAt = exitedAt.HasValue
+                ? exitedAt.Value.AddMilliseconds(-(durationUs / 1000.0))
+                : (DateTime?)null;
+
+            var data = new Dictionary<string, object>
+            {
+                { "kind", "modern_standby" },
+                { "durationSeconds", durationSeconds },
+                { "sleepDurationSeconds", sleepDurationSeconds },
+                { "backfilled", isBackfill },
+            };
+            if (enteredAt.HasValue) data["enteredAt"] = enteredAt.Value.ToString("o");
+            if (exitedAt.HasValue) data["exitedAt"] = exitedAt.Value.ToString("o");
+            if (recordId >= 0) data["recordId"] = recordId;
+            if (timeCreatedUtc.HasValue) data["timeCreated"] = timeCreatedUtc.Value.ToString("o");
+            if (eventData.TryGetValue("Reason", out var reasonRaw) &&
+                int.TryParse(reasonRaw, NumberStyles.Integer, CultureInfo.InvariantCulture, out var reason))
+            {
+                data["reason"] = reason;
+            }
+            bool? onAcPower = null;
+            if (eventData.TryGetValue("PowerStateAc", out var acRaw) && bool.TryParse(acRaw, out var ac))
+            {
+                onAcPower = ac;
+                data["onAcPower"] = ac;
+            }
+            if (eventData.TryGetValue("BatteryRemainingCapacityOnExit", out var battRaw) &&
+                long.TryParse(battRaw, NumberStyles.Integer, CultureInfo.InvariantCulture, out var batt))
+            {
+                data["batteryRemainingCapacityOnExit"] = batt;
+            }
+
+            var powerLabel = onAcPower.HasValue ? (onAcPower.Value ? ", on AC" : ", on battery") : string.Empty;
+            EmitSleepEpisode(timeCreatedUtc, data,
+                $"Device exited Modern Standby after {FormatDuration(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(durationSeconds))}" +
+                $" (slept {FormatDuration(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(sleepDurationSeconds))}{powerLabel})");
+        }
+
+        private void EmitSleepEpisode(DateTime? timeCreatedUtc, Dictionary<string, object> data, string message)
+        {
+            _post.Emit(new EnrollmentEvent
+            {
+                SessionId = _sessionId,
+                TenantId = _tenantId,
+                // Wake/exit moment (the record's creation time) — backfilled pre-agent episodes
+                // must land on the timeline where the device actually woke.
+                Timestamp = timeCreatedUtc ?? DateTime.UtcNow,
+                EventType = Constants.EventTypes.SystemSleepEpisode,
+                Severity = EventSeverity.Info,
+                Source = "SystemTimelineWatcher",
+                Phase = EnrollmentPhase.Unknown,
+                Message = message,
+                Data = data,
+                ImmediateUpload = false,
+            });
+        }
+
+        // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // Parsing helpers
+        // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Extracts <c>&lt;Data Name="..."&gt;value&lt;/Data&gt;</c> pairs from an event's rendered
+        /// XML, keyed case-insensitively. Namespace-agnostic (matches on local name). Returns an
+        /// empty map on null/malformed XML — never throws.
+        /// </summary>
+        internal static Dictionary<string, string> ParseEventData(string xml)
+        {
+            var result = new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
+            if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(xml)) return result;
+
+            try
+            {
+                var doc = XDocument.Parse(xml);
+                foreach (var el in doc.Descendants().Where(e => e.Name.LocalName == "Data"))
+                {
+                    var nameAttr = el.Attribute("Name");
+                    if (nameAttr == null || string.IsNullOrEmpty(nameAttr.Value)) continue;
+                    if (!result.ContainsKey(nameAttr.Value))
+                        result[nameAttr.Value] = el.Value;
+                }
+            }
+            catch
+            {
+                // Malformed / unexpected XML — best effort, return what we have.
+            }
+
+            return result;
+        }
+
+        internal static DateTime? TryParseUtc(string value)
+        {
+            if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(value)) return null;
+            return DateTime.TryParse(value, CultureInfo.InvariantCulture,
+                DateTimeStyles.AssumeUniversal | DateTimeStyles.AdjustToUniversal, out var parsed)
+                ? parsed
+                : (DateTime?)null;
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>Compact human duration for messages: "2h 05m", "56m 12s", "45s".</summary>
+        internal static string FormatDuration(TimeSpan span)
+        {
+            if (span.TotalHours >= 1)
+                return $"{(long)span.TotalHours}h {span.Minutes:D2}m";
+            if (span.TotalMinutes >= 1)
+                return $"{span.Minutes}m {span.Seconds:D2}s";
+            return $"{(long)Math.Ceiling(span.TotalSeconds)}s";
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>Leaf file name of a kernel device path like <c>\Device\HarddiskVolume3\Windows\System32\svchost.exe</c>.</summary>
+        internal static string ProcessLeafName(string devicePath)
+        {
+            if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(devicePath)) return null;
+            var idx = devicePath.LastIndexOf('\\');
+            var leaf = idx >= 0 ? devicePath.Substring(idx + 1) : devicePath;
+            return string.IsNullOrEmpty(leaf) ? null : leaf;
+        }
+
+        // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // Backfill
+        // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+        private void BackfillRecentEvents()
+        {
+            try
+            {
+                var lookbackMs = (long)_backfillLookbackMinutes * 60 * 1000;
+                _logger.Info($"SystemTimeline backfill: scanning {Channel} " +
+                    $"(lookback={_backfillLookbackMinutes}min, restartWatermark={_restartWatermark})");
+
+                var query = new EventLogQuery(Channel, PathType.LogName, BuildBackfillXPath(lookbackMs));
+
+                int processed = 0;
+                using (var reader = new EventLogReader(query))
+                {
+                    EventRecord record;
+                    while ((record = reader.ReadEvent()) != null)
+                    {
+                        using (record)
+                        {
+                            ProcessRecord(record, isBackfill: true);
+                            processed++;
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+
+                if (processed == 0)
+                    _logger.Debug($"SystemTimeline backfill: no targeted events in last {_backfillLookbackMinutes} minutes");
+                else
+                    _logger.Info($"SystemTimeline backfill: scanned {processed} record(s)");
+            }
+            catch (EventLogNotFoundException)
+            {
+                _logger.Warning($"SystemTimeline event log not found during backfill: {Channel} (normal on non-Windows test environments)");
+            }
+            catch (UnauthorizedAccessException ex)
+            {
+                _logger.Warning($"SystemTimeline backfill access denied: {ex.Message}");
+            }
+            catch (Exception ex)
+            {
+                _logger.Warning($"SystemTimeline backfill failed: {ex.Message}");
+            }
+        }
+
+        // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // Watermark dedup (cross-restart)
+        // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+        private bool IsAlreadyProcessed(long recordId)
+        {
+            if (recordId < 0) return false; // no RecordId → cannot dedup, let it through
+            lock (_watermarkLock)
+            {
+                return recordId <= _restartWatermark || _seenThisRun.Contains(recordId);
+            }
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// Atomically claims <paramref name="recordId"/>. Returns true if this is the first time we
+        /// see it (caller should evaluate/emit), false if it was already processed — either in a
+        /// PRIOR run (at/below the restart watermark) or already this run (in the seen-set). Only
+        /// advances + persists the max on a genuinely-new, higher RecordId. Records without a
+        /// RecordId (-1) are always processed, never tracked or persisted. Note: threshold-suppressed
+        /// records are claimed too, so a restart's backfill does not re-evaluate them.
+        /// </summary>
+        private bool MarkProcessed(long recordId)
+        {
+            if (recordId < 0) return true;
+
+            long toPersist = -1;
+            lock (_watermarkLock)
+            {
+                if (recordId <= _restartWatermark || !_seenThisRun.Add(recordId))
+                    return false;
+
+                if (recordId > _maxEmittedRecordId)
+                {
+                    _maxEmittedRecordId = recordId;
+                    toPersist = _maxEmittedRecordId;
+                }
+            }
+            if (toPersist >= 0) PersistWatermark(toPersist);
+            return true;
+        }
+
+        internal void LoadWatermark()
+        {
+            if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(_stateDirectory)) return;
+
+            var filePath = Path.Combine(_stateDirectory, WatermarkStateFileName);
+            if (!File.Exists(filePath)) return;
+
+            try
+            {
+                var json = File.ReadAllText(filePath);
+                var state = JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<WatermarkState>(json);
+                if (state != null)
+                {
+                    lock (_watermarkLock)
+                    {
+                        _restartWatermark = state.LastRecordId;
+                        _maxEmittedRecordId = state.LastRecordId;
+                    }
+                    _logger.Info($"SystemTimeline watermark loaded: lastRecordId={state.LastRecordId} (persisted {state.PersistedUtc:O})");
+                }
+            }
+            catch (Exception ex)
+            {
+                _logger.Warning($"Failed to load SystemTimeline watermark: {ex.Message}");
+            }
+        }
+
+        private void PersistWatermark(long recordId)
+        {
+            if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(_stateDirectory)) return;
+
+            try
+            {
+                Directory.CreateDirectory(_stateDirectory);
+                var filePath = Path.Combine(_stateDirectory, WatermarkStateFileName);
+                var state = new WatermarkState { LastRecordId = recordId, PersistedUtc = DateTime.UtcNow };
+                var json = JsonConvert.SerializeObject(state, Formatting.Indented);
+                var tempPath = filePath + ".tmp";
+                File.WriteAllText(tempPath, json);
+                File.Copy(tempPath, filePath, overwrite: true);
+                try { File.Delete(tempPath); } catch { }
+            }
+            catch (Exception ex)
+            {
+                _logger.Warning($"Failed to persist SystemTimeline watermark: {ex.Message}");
+            }
+        }
+
+        internal sealed class WatermarkState
+        {
+            public long LastRecordId { get; set; }
+            public DateTime PersistedUtc { get; set; }
+        }
+    }
+}