Compare commits

..

192 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Julian Sommer c2ed729ce1 release: update go.mod for v1.10.0 2026-06-30 10:30:07 +10:00
Julian Sommer 6757f847d2 chore: rebuild ui 2026-06-30 09:50:03 +10:00
dependabot[bot] 99fb65b1ef chore: bump the npm-dependencies group (#437) 2026-06-30 09:48:38 +10:00
Josh Siviour a7241e01f9 feat: run EKS apiserver with anonymous-auth=false (CIS) (#447)
Flip the k3s server apiserver to anonymous-auth=false. The only
consumer of the anonymous path was mulga-eks-state-report's /healthz
probe; switch it to an authenticated kubectl get --raw=/healthz through
the node admin kubeconfig (an unauthenticated curl now returns 401).
The NLB target group uses a TCP health check, and the host-side
reconciler rides the authenticated NATS state-report, so neither
depends on the anonymous apiserver path.
2026-06-30 09:21:07 +10:00
dependabot[bot] 6fe9220d6f chore: bump github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2 in the go-dependencies group (#436) 2026-06-30 09:06:21 +10:00
Josh Siviour 52c0ed1e77 fix: free host-netns :80 for ECS bridge/host tasks via cred-endpoint DNAT (#446)
* fix: free host-netns :80 for ECS bridge/host tasks via cred-endpoint DNAT

bridge and host network-mode tasks share the VM host netns where the
ecs-agent credential endpoint bound 169.254.170.2:80, so a task binding
0.0.0.0:80 hit EADDRINUSE and crash-looped. Bind the listener on the high
proxy port 51679 and DNAT 169.254.170.2:80 to it (OUTPUT for host/bridge
task traffic, PREROUTING for the awsvpc credential veth), keeping the dst
IP on the endpoint so no route_localnet is needed. Nothing holds a socket
on :80, so host/bridge tasks can bind it.

e2e runs nginx on :80 in all three network modes; the settle guard catches
a regression where a crash-looping :80 bind flaps RUNNING then STOPPED.

* test: validate ECS host-netns :80 binding via bridge task

The bridge subtest now runs nginx on :80 to prove the cred-endpoint DNAT
frees the host netns (pre-fix it crash-looped on EADDRINUSE). host mode
keeps a no-port command: it shares the same host netns, so two :80 tasks
cannot coexist on one node (one :80 per host, as on AWS), and StopTask
does not synchronously reap the prior container's port.
2026-06-30 08:59:52 +10:00
Josh Siviour ab1b1bacf6 fix: auto-restart NATS when JetStream is disabled while the process lives (#445)
When NATS disables JetStream at runtime (e.g. a filesystem permission error
flushing stream state) it keeps the process alive and serves KV as read-only.
That is not a process failure, so spinifex-nats.service's Restart=on-failure
never fires, and KV-backed startup (awsgw IAM bucket init) stalls for minutes
until an operator restarts NATS by hand.

Add a JetStream liveness watchdog:

- build/scripts/nats-js-watchdog.sh probes the NATS monitoring endpoint
  (http://127.0.0.1:8222/healthz?js-enabled-only=true). Only when the service
  is active and JS fails every sample of a short multi-sample window (so
  transient startup/quorum 503s are ignored) does it systemctl try-restart
  spinifex-nats.
- spinifex-nats-watchdog.{service,timer} run it as a oneshot every 30s, with a
  60s boot delay so cluster quorum settles first.
- spinifex.target Wants= the timer so it starts with the platform.

The NATS-internal permission race itself is a server quirk outside spinifex's
control; this restores service automatically when it recurs.
2026-06-30 08:41:10 +10:00
Josh Siviour 686a57b4e0 fix: reap orphan LBC ALBs and security groups on EKS cluster teardown (#444)
The in-cluster AWS LoadBalancer Controller provisions its own ALBs
(k8s-toc-*) and security groups (k8s-traffic-toc-*) in the customer VPC
via the awsgw ELBv2/EC2 APIs. Spinifex never tracks these, so cluster
teardown left them orphaned: DeleteSecurityGroup / DeleteVpc then failed
with DependencyViolation and the cluster wedged in DELETING.

purgeClusterInfra now reaps them by the AWS-standard ownership tag
elbv2.k8s.aws/cluster=<name>, scoped to the customer VPC, after the
cluster NLB teardown and before the SG / VPC block:

- ReapLBCLoadBalancers lists account LBs, filters to the customer VPC,
  confirms the ownership tag via DescribeTags, and deletes by ARN.
- DeleteClusterSGs deletes any VPC SG carrying the ownership tag (reusing
  the DependencyViolation retry budget), in addition to the named cluster
  SGs, after rules are revoked.
- DescribeTags is added to the narrow nlbProvisioner interface.

Errors join teardownErrs so a failed reap keeps the cluster in DELETING
for a retry rather than completing with leaked, VPC-pinning infra.
2026-06-30 08:03:56 +10:00
Josh Siviour ea38f46392 fix: force-terminate stopped+wedged EKS workers on teardown (#443)
TerminateWorkerInstances routes terminates via the per-instance ec2.cmd.<id>
topic, whose subscription is torn down when a VM stops. A stopped (incl.
stopped+wedged, volume remount broken) worker therefore has no responder, and
the old code treated ErrNoResponders as already-gone and returned nil. The
worker was still in shared KV with its ENI intact, so the nodegroup record was
deleted while the ENI kept pinning the customer subnet/VPC, wedging DeleteCluster
in DELETING on DependencyViolation until a manual ec2 terminate-instances.

On ErrNoResponders, fall back to the ec2.terminate queue group (mirroring the
gateway TerminateInstances path), which runs TerminateStoppedInstance against
shared KV — deleting the worker's volumes, IP, and ENI without a running QEMU.
NotFound or no responder is idempotent success; any other error surfaces so the
teardown backstop retries.
2026-06-29 22:34:41 +10:00
Josh Siviour 746a6f5d05 fix: reap orphan QEMU for terminated instances via node-local reaper (#442)
TerminateInstances marks the EC2 record terminated and drives node-local
teardown, but when that teardown runs on a node other than the one hosting
QEMU (per-instance subscription lost, request falls back to the ec2.terminate
broadcast), the process survives and keeps holding its OVN logical port / IP,
blocking rebuilds.

Add OrphanQEMUReaper (node-local, ScopeNodeLocal): it inspects only the
terminated KV bucket and reaps a live process found via the instance's local
PID file. Running, pending, and stopped instances are never touched. Whichever
node holds the orphan PID file is the one that reaps it; every other node's
lookup misses and is a no-op.

Add utils.ProcessAlive (signal-0 liveness) and utils.ForceKillProcess
(SIGKILL + bounded wait), guard shutdownAndUnmount's force-kill on liveness,
and register the reaper in the daemon GC loop.
2026-06-29 22:33:58 +10:00
Josh Siviour d6cfd22ddb fix: re-assert boot-volume in-use state on daemon-restart reconnect (#441)
reconnectInstance re-asserted the instance running state but never the boot
volume's in-use state, so after a daemon restart describe-instances showed the
VM running while describe-volumes showed its root volume available — a
split-brain that makes start-instances attempt to double-launch a live QEMU.

Extract the launch path's boot-volume promotion into markBootVolumesInUse and
call it from reconnectInstance so launch and recovery keep volume state
consistent. Add a reconnect unit test asserting the boot volume is marked
in-use and non-boot volumes are left to their own attach flow.
2026-06-29 21:05:06 +10:00
Josh Siviour aaef758426 fix: cross-check live BlockDeviceMappings before DeleteVolume (#440)
The daemon-side in-use gate trusts persisted volume State/AttachedInstance,
which the attach/detach lifecycle can leave desynced: a running root volume
was observed with State:"" and AttachedInstance:"" while the instance's
BlockDeviceMappings still listed it, so DeleteVolume passed the gate and
removed the durable backing under a live QEMU.

Add an authoritative guard at the gateway DeleteVolume path: fan out the
strict DescribeInstances survey and refuse with VolumeInUse when any
non-terminated instance's BlockDeviceMappings reference the volume. Fail
closed on an incomplete cluster view rather than delete against a partial
survey. Terminate-time cleanup uses the daemon volume service directly and is
unaffected.
2026-06-29 15:30:26 +10:00
Josh Siviour 47c9808a96 test(e2e): add ECS end-to-end suite (awsvpc, bridge, host, ELB service) (#439)
Drives the ECS data plane against the local awsgw: a customer VPC plus a real
container instance launched from the spinifex-ecs-node AMI, then standalone
tasks in all three network modes and an awsvpc service fronted by an ALB target
group. Adds an ECS client to the harness, a Makefile target, and a
service-interfaces suite entry.

bridge/host tasks share the host netns where the agent credential endpoint owns
169.254.170.2:80, so they run a no-port command and assert placement + mode;
awsvpc and the ELB service prove real :80 serving. waitTaskRunning re-checks
after a settle so a transient RUNNING cannot pass.
2026-06-29 14:16:23 +10:00
Josh Siviour ae800386fb feat: complete EC2 instance health checks (Phase C + E) (#438)
Wire crash detection and host-resource signals through to the AWS-faithful
DescribeInstanceStatus API and the spx CLI, closing out the EC2 health
monitoring / self-healing work.

Phase C — QMP health monitoring:
- qmpHeartbeat now tracks consecutive query-status failures; at
  QMPMaxConsecutiveFailures it checks process liveness, triggering HandleCrash
  on a dead QEMU and marking an alive-but-wedged process impaired.
- InstanceHealthState gains QMPConsecutiveFailures, LastQMPSuccess, ImpairedSince.

Phase E — DescribeInstanceStatus mapping:
- buildInstanceStatus maps running VMs to ok / impaired (QMP-unresponsive,
  with ImpairedSince) / initializing (2-min launch grace), non-running to
  not-applicable.
- SystemStatus reflects node memory pressure via ResourceManager
  HostUnderMemoryPressure (live MemAvailable below the host reserve).

Phase C2 — observability:
- spx get vms gains HEALTH and CRASHES columns derived from vmHealthLabel.

Tests cover crash/QMP helpers, status mapping, memory-pressure system status,
and the health label.
2026-06-29 13:16:58 +10:00
Josh Siviour 4e6a2eb46a feat: ECS agent reboot reconciler — re-adopt running containers on restart (#435)
On startup the agent had no reconcile pass: Run registered, heartbeat, and
immediately polled assignments with an in-memory dedup map. After a restart the
gateway re-delivers the instance's assignments and the agent re-ran them,
orphaning containers still running from before and double-starting tasks.

Add a reconcile() pass that runs once before polling: it lists the runtime's
containers, and for each task still running in this cluster re-registers its IAM
credentials, re-attaches the exit-wait, and refreshes RUNNING on the gateway.
The adopted task set seeds pollAssignments so re-delivered assignments are acked
but not re-run.

- runtime: add a label-agnostic List(ctx) []Container to the Runner seam, with a
  containerd implementation and fake support.
- taskLabels: stamp credID / taskRoleArn / eniMac (when set) so a container is
  self-describing enough to re-register creds and tear down its netns on adoption.
- pollAssignments takes the seed dedup map.

Best-effort: a nil runner or a List error degrades to today's poll+run behaviour.
2026-06-29 12:13:25 +10:00
Josh Siviour 07722e563f docs: ECS service guide + register ecs-quickstart workbook (#434)
* docs: add ECS (Elastic Container Service) guide + register ecs-quickstart workbook

Add a Container Services -> ECS doc mirroring the EKS/ECR shape: concepts
(cluster, task definition, task, service, container instances via the
ECS-AMI EC2 launch type), an aws ecs / console / Terraform quickstart,
task IAM roles via the credential endpoint, awsvpc networking, and the
honest v1 limitations (no service discovery, awslogs discarded, no rolling
deployments, no capacity providers, no distinct execution role).

Convert the ecs-quickstart workbook README to the doc-page format
(frontmatter + overview/prerequisites/instructions/troubleshooting) so it
renders as a Terraform Workbooks entry alongside the EKS workbooks.

* docs: add node-image prerequisite banner + infra diagram to EKS and ECS pages

Add a GitHub-style [!IMPORTANT] banner to the EKS and ECS prerequisites
flagging the required node-image import (eks-node / spinifex-ecs-node),
mirroring the install page's WAN-bridge banner, each with a describe-images
verification command.

Add a basic Spinifex topology diagram (SVG) to each Overview, in the
tf-nginx-alb visual style: the EKS managed control plane + node-group
workers, and the ECS ALB + container instances with the gateway/agent
and task-credential path.
2026-06-29 10:44:19 +10:00
Josh Siviour dd6ed6db2c docs: add ECS quickstart terraform/opentofu workbook (#433)
End-to-end ECS stack against the Spinifex gateway: cluster, task definition
with a task role, container instances from the spinifex-ecs-node AMI, and an
awsvpc service fronted by an ALB target group. Unlike the console's provision-
capacity action, the workbook spells out the two things a Spinifex container
instance needs that AWS hides: a LAN-reachable gateway URL and the gateway CA,
both seeded into cloud-init user-data; instance creds come from IMDS via the
ecsInstanceRole profile. Live-verified apply (HTTP 200 through the ALB) and
destroy round-trip.
2026-06-29 09:36:00 +10:00
Josh Siviour be7ca0f828 test: lock reaper capacity release + clean re-activation (#432) 2026-06-29 08:30:14 +10:00
Julian Sommer 485cca941f feat: IAM inline role policies (Put/Get/DeleteRolePolicy + real ListRolePolicies) (#429) 2026-06-26 15:38:45 +10:00
Josh Siviour be3af1c6d8 fix: recover reaped container instances when the agent re-registers (#430)
The agent heartbeats by periodically re-registering through the gateway
(RegisterContainerInstance). After a control-plane restart, the heartbeat
reaper marks instances DRAINING for the missed-heartbeat window, but the
re-register path only refreshed LastSeen and never restored the status, so a
reaped instance stayed DRAINING forever even though its agent was healthy and
re-registering.

Mark reaper-induced DRAINING with a Reaped flag and restore the instance to
ACTIVE on the next re-register, clearing the flag. An operator
UpdateContainerInstancesState drain clears Reaped, so an intentional drain is
never undone by the live agent.
2026-06-26 15:32:49 +10:00
Josh Siviour 9a6bf692ca feat(ecs): EC2 capacity provisioning + auto-EIP service tasks + task/service detail pages (#431)
* feat(ecs): provision EC2 container-instance capacity via IMDS instance-role

Adds a ProvisionCapacity gateway action that launches spinifex-ecs-node
EC2 instances which register as ECS container instances, fixing
RESOURCE:placement when a cluster has no capacity.

Agent control-plane now SigV4-signs gateway calls with instance-role
credentials read from IMDS (no static keys seeded in user-data). The
gateway already verifies STS/temp creds, so the instance role carries an
ecs:* policy + ec2 trust; ensureECSInstanceProfile find-or-creates the
ecsInstanceRole instance profile attached at launch.

Backend resolves the spinifex-ecs-node AMI by spinifex:managed-by=ecs
tag, renders keyless user-data, and launches via the customer
RunInstances path. Frontend adds a hand-signed JSON-1.1 ProvisionCapacity
call, a provision-capacity dialog on the container-instances tab, and the
ECS console section nav + system-image gating.

* feat: auto-assign EIPs to awsvpc service tasks; add ECS task/service detail pages

Wire AssignPublicIp=ENABLED through the service reconciler so awsvpc service
tasks automatically allocate and associate an Elastic IP on the RUNNING
transition, and release it on STOP. assignTaskPublicIP/releaseTaskPublicIP
mirror the target-group registration hooks in recordTaskState and forceStopTask;
the public IP and allocation ID are persisted on the task record and surfaced in
DescribeTasks attachments as publicIPv4Address.

Add AWS-parity ECS task and service detail pages showing private and public
endpoints, container state, and networking configuration, reachable by clicking
a task or service in the cluster tabs.

* test: cover natsEIPManager allocate/associate/release over NATS
2026-06-26 14:58:31 +10:00
Julian Sommer 7ffe12ac82 feat: EC2 instance metadata-options API (IMDSv2-only, faithfully reported) (#428) 2026-06-26 13:36:00 +10:00
Julian Sommer 26167c017e chore: delete orphaned directory 2026-06-26 10:57:50 +10:00
Julian Sommer 8c9561cb1e chore: delete orphaned directory 2026-06-26 10:54:05 +10:00
Julian Sommer 4bc28172d9 feat: per-account service quotas (#427) 2026-06-26 10:52:53 +10:00
Julian Sommer 54d2c8f250 chore: cleanup wrapper functions 2026-06-26 10:47:19 +10:00
Julian Sommer eda5987e0b chore: delete unused files 2026-06-26 10:42:41 +10:00
Josh Siviour 06ea7ecfd1 fix: ECS ListTaskDefinitions honors Status filter (default ACTIVE) (#426)
ListTaskDefinitions appended every revision regardless of the requested
status, so deregistered (INACTIVE) task definitions never dropped off the
default listing and the console could not clear them. Filter by status,
defaulting to ACTIVE to match AWS.
2026-06-26 09:23:03 +10:00
Josh Siviour cb67fbec87 feat: ECS console with deploy-container wizards (#425)
Add an ECS console mirroring the EKS/ECR route shape: a single ECS nav
entry, cluster list and detail with Services/Tasks/Task Definitions/
Container Instances tabs, plus create and teardown paths.

Adds three full-page wizards to drive container deploys end-to-end:
Register Task Definition, Run Task, and Create Service. RunTask surfaces
a 200-with-failures placement result as an error instead of silently
navigating away.

Includes the @aws-sdk/client-ecs client singleton, ecs queries and
mutations, zod form schemas, and co-located tests.
2026-06-26 08:57:54 +10:00
Josh Siviour 873398337a feat: ECS STOPPED task GC (leader sweep, 1h retention) (#424)
STOPPED task records were never pruned: ListTasks enumerated every task a
cluster ever ran and the per-account KV grew unbounded. Add a leader-gated sweep
tick to the scheduler cron (alongside the reaper/reconcile) that deletes task
records STOPPED longer than a 1h retention window — keeping a just-stopped task
describable for DescribeTasks / UI exit reason, matching AWS's STOPPED window.

A task missing its StoppedAt timestamp is never pruned (defensive). Single-writer
(leader only), reuses the reap() bucket walk.
2026-06-25 23:41:44 +10:00
Josh Siviour 30c58ec358 feat: ECS P0 teardown (DeleteCluster cascade, Deregister taskdef/instance, drain) (#423)
Wire the four NotImplemented ECS teardown actions so an IaC stack and the
console can reverse a deployment:

- DeleteCluster cascades: force-stops every task (releasing ENIs, deregistering
  TG targets, returning capacity), then sweeps the cluster's whole KV subtree.
  Unlike AWS it cascades rather than rejecting a non-empty cluster, so terraform
  destroy round-trips regardless of teardown ordering.
- DeregisterTaskDefinition marks a specific family:revision INACTIVE (kept
  describable); a bare family is rejected, matching AWS.
- DeregisterContainerInstance removes an instance, force-stopping its tasks when
  Force is set and rejecting a non-empty instance otherwise.
- UpdateContainerInstancesState sets ACTIVE/DRAINING; draining force-stops the
  instance's service-owned tasks so the reconciler relaunches them elsewhere.

Reuses the existing forceStopTask primitive and the reaper drain pattern; adds a
deleteKeysWithPrefix KV helper and INACTIVE status constants.
2026-06-25 23:21:23 +10:00
Josh Siviour 93a398afb8 feat: ECS task IAM credential endpoint (sprint 4g) (#422)
Serve task-role credentials to containers the AWS-faithful way: an HTTP
endpoint at 169.254.170.2:80 inside the ecs-agent (host VM netns) serving
short-lived credentials at /v2/credentials/{credID}. Containers find it via
AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI, injected per container.

The agent mints credentials by SigV4-signing sts:AssumeRole(taskRoleARN)
against the gateway with its instance-role credentials, mirroring
internal/ecrauth. This reconciles ecs-v1 Q4/Q10 (STS over NATS + scheduler
JWT assertion) with the 4f rewire that moved the agent entirely onto the
gateway: the agent has no NATS connection and already holds instance creds,
so it assumes the task role directly. Credentials are cached per credID and
refreshed near expiry.

Each awsvpc task netns gets a credentials veth into the host netns and a
host-routed /32 to the endpoint, keeping it off the task ENI's VPC route.
The scheduler now persists taskRoleArn on the task definition and carries it
in the assign payload so the endpoint activates end to end.
2026-06-25 22:06:19 +10:00
Josh Siviour 2ca655cd39 fix: EBS hot-plug PCIe port allocator (every attach past the first collided) (#421)
* fix: serialize EBS hot-plug per instance to prevent PCIe port race

Concurrent AttachVolume calls to one instance both allocated the lowest free
hot-plug PCIe root port via nextHotplugEBSPort (which reads live QEMU state),
then issued QMP device_add on the same hotplug-ebs bus. The second device_add
failed with 'PCI: slot 0 function 0 already occupied by virtio-blk-pci',
surfacing as nats:timeout -> ServerInternal and a CSI retry-storm
('retry quota exceeded'); volumes never attached.

Add a per-instance attachMu and hold it across the whole AttachVolume and
DetachVolume critical sections, mirroring the ENI hot-plug serialization.
The mutex is non-persisted and shared via the Manager's stable *VM.

* fix: allocate EBS hot-plug PCIe port from in-memory accounting

AttachVolume derived the free PCIe hot-plug root port from a live
query-block scan (nextHotplugEBSPort), extracting the bus with a
hotplug-ebs(\d+) regex on each device's QDev. Real QEMU reports a
hot-plugged blockdev by id (/machine/peripheral/vdisk-vol-xxx/
virtio-backend), with no hotplug-ebs component, so the regex never
matched, the used set stayed empty, and the allocator always returned
port 1. Only the first EBS volume per instance attached; every later
attach collided on "PCI: slot 0 function 0 already occupied by
virtio-blk-pci", rolling back the blockdev, killing NBDKit, and
surfacing as nats: timeout / ServerInternal to the CSI driver, which
then exhausted its retry quota.

Allocate the port from authoritative in-memory accounting instead:
record the chosen port as EBSRequest.HotplugPort (persisted, so it
survives a daemon restart) and pick the lowest unclaimed port with
freeHotplugEBSPort over the instance's recorded requests. Hold
attachMu across allocate->device_add so concurrent CSI attaches cannot
pick the same port. DetachVolume already removes the request, freeing
the port. Drops the query-block round-trip from the attach path.
2026-06-25 21:24:32 +10:00
Josh Siviour 471e95dac2 feat(ecs): service controller + ELBv2 target-group registration (Sprint 4f) (#420)
* feat(ecsgw): on-VM SigV4 client for the ECS agent→gateway channel

Adds internal/ecsgw, the twin of internal/eksgw: a TLS + SigV4 (service "ecs")
client the ecs-agent will use to reach the AWS gateway over HTTPS instead of
connecting to host NATS directly. Calls are AWS JSON 1.1 with an X-Amz-Target
action; the gateway relays onto ecs.* host-side, keeping NATS cluster-internal.

* feat(ecs): SubmitTaskStateChange gateway action → recordTaskState

Wires the AWS-API SubmitTaskStateChange action end to end (gateway action →
ecs.SubmitTaskStateChange NATS → daemon → Service.SubmitTaskStateChange) so a
gateway-routed agent reports task state without touching the NATS bus. The
handler maps the SDK input onto the same bus.TaskState shape and converges on
recordTaskState; the account is authoritative from the SigV4 caller, so an
instance cannot report state for another account's task.

* feat(ecs): durable assign KV inbox + PollAssignments gateway action

Scheduler writes task assigns into a per-instance KV inbox
(clusters/{cluster}/assignments/{instance}/{task}) instead of a
fire-and-forget core-NATS publish, and a new PollAssignments gateway
action lets a gateway-routed agent drain its inbox over TLS+SigV4.

At-least-once: an unacked assign is re-delivered on the next poll;
the agent acks accepted assigns (AckTaskIDs) and STOPPED transitions
reclaim stale inbox entries. The Poll response carries bus.Assign with
an RFC3339 time, so it is encoded with encoding/json (RawJSONActions)
rather than the jsonutil epoch-second marshaler.

* feat(ecs-agent): rewire control-plane off NATS onto the AWS gateway

The agent no longer connects to NATS. It registers, heartbeats, reports
task state, and receives assignments entirely through the AWS gateway
over TLS+SigV4, using seeded IAM credentials — keeping the NATS bus
host-internal and closing the trust-boundary gap (a tenant container
instance must not hold a shared bus token).

- controlPlane seam over ecsgw.Client replaces the NATS publisher:
  Register (RegisterContainerInstance), SubmitTaskState
  (SubmitTaskStateChange), PollAssignments.
- Heartbeat folds into a periodic idempotent re-register (refreshes
  LastSeen); bus.Heartbeat is dropped from the agent.
- subscribeAssign (NATS subscribe) becomes a poll loop: drain the
  inbox, dispatch each assign once, ack accepted taskIDs on the next
  poll (at-least-once).
- config: ECS_ACCESS_KEY / ECS_SECRET_KEY / ECS_POLL_INTERVAL added,
  ECS_NATS_URL removed; cloud-init initd seeds the IAM creds.

Tests move from the NATS publisher fake to a controlPlane fake.

* feat(ecs): cloud-init cred-seed + ecs-node bring-up script

ECS container instances are plain EC2 booted from the spinifex-ecs-node
AMI (AWS-faithful: no ECS-specific launch API). This renders the
cloud-init user-data that seeds /etc/spinifex-ecs/agent.env (gateway
URL/CA/region/cluster + IAM creds) and the gateway CA, then runs the
instance. The agent registers, heartbeats, polls assignments, and
reports task state entirely through the AWS gateway over TLS+SigV4 —
never NATS.

The guest dials the customer-facing gateway address (network advertise
IP), not the mgmt bridge, mirroring the EKS GatewayURL/AddonGatewayURL
split. Seeds the system key for now; scoped per-instance creds are a
follow-up (4g task-role endpoint).

* fix(ecs): reconcile dev merge — restore #418 ENI release + netns wiring

The 'Merge branch dev' resolution dropped code where Sprint 4d (#418,
awsvpc ENI-per-task) and the gateway control-plane rewrite (#419) touch
the same paths:

- recordTaskState STOPPED branch: reclaimTaskENI was clobbered by
  reclaimAssignInbox; both are needed (release the task ENI AND drain the
  KV inbox). Restores TestRecordTaskState_Awsvpc_ReleasesENIOnStopOnce.
- ecs-agent Agent: the netns field, its init, and the setupTaskNetns/
  teardownTaskNetns wrappers were lost when the controlPlane Agent struct
  won the merge, leaving taskrun.go calling undefined methods.
- eni_test assign assertion read the assign over NATS; #419 delivers it via
  the durable KV inbox, so it now polls via PollAssignments.
- taskrun_test netns cases used the removed historyPub fake; switched to
  fakeCP to match the controlPlane seam.

* feat(ecs): service controller + ELBv2 target-group registration (Sprint 4f)

Land the ECS Service controller on top of the 4e scheduler/RunTask flow:

- CreateService/UpdateService/DeleteService/DescribeServices/ListServices.
  REPLICA only; DAEMON and serviceRegistries rejected in v1 (Q15).
- StartTask (explicit placement) and StopTask.
- Leader-driven replica reconciliation: a 10s scheduler tick converges each
  service's running task count on desiredCount, launching the shortfall via
  RunTask (tasks tagged group=service:{name}) and force-stopping the surplus.
- ELBv2 target-group registration: the scheduler registers a task's awsvpc ENI
  IP on the RUNNING transition and deregisters on STOPPED via the existing
  elbv2.RegisterTargets/DeregisterTargets NATS handlers (Q8, single-writer).
- forceStopTask consolidates the control-plane stop (STOPPED state, capacity +
  ENI release, inbox drain, TG deregister); reused by StopTask, scale-in, and
  the heartbeat reaper (the reaper now deregisters targets per Q13).
- Wire the 7 new actions through the gateway action map, NATS adapter, and
  daemon subscriptions; add ServiceNotFoundException.

* fix(ecs-agent): anonymous pull for non-ECR images + normalize image refs

The agent minted an ECR authorization token via IMDS for every image, so
public docker.io refs failed with 'IMDS returned empty role name' on hosts
without an instance role. Gate ECR auth on .dkr.ecr. refs and pull all other
registries anonymously.

Bare image strings (nginx:alpine) were handed to containerd unmodified, which
parsed them as dummy://nginx:alpine and rejected the pull. Normalize refs to
their fully-qualified form (docker.io/library/nginx:alpine, :latest default)
before Pull and GetImage.

Adds StartTask/StopTask service-controller coverage.

* fix: address ECS 4f live-verification findings

ecs-node-bringup.sh defaulted GATEWAY_IP to the mgmt bridge (10.15.8.1), which
a VPC guest cannot route to — the agent could not reach the gateway. Default to
the host's WAN-bridge IP, which guests reach by NATing out through the WAN.

A target group not forwarded to by any listener reported its targets stuck in
'initial' forever (no health checker advances a detached TG). DescribeTargetHealth
now reports such targets as 'unused' with reason Target.NotInUse, matching AWS.
2026-06-25 21:06:00 +10:00
Josh Siviour de64d6c63d feat(ecs): agent control-plane over the AWS gateway (drop direct NATS) (#419)
* feat(ecsgw): on-VM SigV4 client for the ECS agent→gateway channel

Adds internal/ecsgw, the twin of internal/eksgw: a TLS + SigV4 (service "ecs")
client the ecs-agent will use to reach the AWS gateway over HTTPS instead of
connecting to host NATS directly. Calls are AWS JSON 1.1 with an X-Amz-Target
action; the gateway relays onto ecs.* host-side, keeping NATS cluster-internal.

* feat(ecs): SubmitTaskStateChange gateway action → recordTaskState

Wires the AWS-API SubmitTaskStateChange action end to end (gateway action →
ecs.SubmitTaskStateChange NATS → daemon → Service.SubmitTaskStateChange) so a
gateway-routed agent reports task state without touching the NATS bus. The
handler maps the SDK input onto the same bus.TaskState shape and converges on
recordTaskState; the account is authoritative from the SigV4 caller, so an
instance cannot report state for another account's task.

* feat(ecs): durable assign KV inbox + PollAssignments gateway action

Scheduler writes task assigns into a per-instance KV inbox
(clusters/{cluster}/assignments/{instance}/{task}) instead of a
fire-and-forget core-NATS publish, and a new PollAssignments gateway
action lets a gateway-routed agent drain its inbox over TLS+SigV4.

At-least-once: an unacked assign is re-delivered on the next poll;
the agent acks accepted assigns (AckTaskIDs) and STOPPED transitions
reclaim stale inbox entries. The Poll response carries bus.Assign with
an RFC3339 time, so it is encoded with encoding/json (RawJSONActions)
rather than the jsonutil epoch-second marshaler.

* feat(ecs-agent): rewire control-plane off NATS onto the AWS gateway

The agent no longer connects to NATS. It registers, heartbeats, reports
task state, and receives assignments entirely through the AWS gateway
over TLS+SigV4, using seeded IAM credentials — keeping the NATS bus
host-internal and closing the trust-boundary gap (a tenant container
instance must not hold a shared bus token).

- controlPlane seam over ecsgw.Client replaces the NATS publisher:
  Register (RegisterContainerInstance), SubmitTaskState
  (SubmitTaskStateChange), PollAssignments.
- Heartbeat folds into a periodic idempotent re-register (refreshes
  LastSeen); bus.Heartbeat is dropped from the agent.
- subscribeAssign (NATS subscribe) becomes a poll loop: drain the
  inbox, dispatch each assign once, ack accepted taskIDs on the next
  poll (at-least-once).
- config: ECS_ACCESS_KEY / ECS_SECRET_KEY / ECS_POLL_INTERVAL added,
  ECS_NATS_URL removed; cloud-init initd seeds the IAM creds.

Tests move from the NATS publisher fake to a controlPlane fake.

* feat(ecs): cloud-init cred-seed + ecs-node bring-up script

ECS container instances are plain EC2 booted from the spinifex-ecs-node
AMI (AWS-faithful: no ECS-specific launch API). This renders the
cloud-init user-data that seeds /etc/spinifex-ecs/agent.env (gateway
URL/CA/region/cluster + IAM creds) and the gateway CA, then runs the
instance. The agent registers, heartbeats, polls assignments, and
reports task state entirely through the AWS gateway over TLS+SigV4 —
never NATS.

The guest dials the customer-facing gateway address (network advertise
IP), not the mgmt bridge, mirroring the EKS GatewayURL/AddonGatewayURL
split. Seeds the system key for now; scoped per-instance creds are a
follow-up (4g task-role endpoint).

* fix(ecs): reconcile dev merge — restore #418 ENI release + netns wiring

The 'Merge branch dev' resolution dropped code where Sprint 4d (#418,
awsvpc ENI-per-task) and the gateway control-plane rewrite (#419) touch
the same paths:

- recordTaskState STOPPED branch: reclaimTaskENI was clobbered by
  reclaimAssignInbox; both are needed (release the task ENI AND drain the
  KV inbox). Restores TestRecordTaskState_Awsvpc_ReleasesENIOnStopOnce.
- ecs-agent Agent: the netns field, its init, and the setupTaskNetns/
  teardownTaskNetns wrappers were lost when the controlPlane Agent struct
  won the merge, leaving taskrun.go calling undefined methods.
- eni_test assign assertion read the assign over NATS; #419 delivers it via
  the durable KV inbox, so it now polls via PollAssignments.
- taskrun_test netns cases used the removed historyPub fake; switched to
  fakeCP to match the controlPlane seam.
2026-06-25 18:42:24 +10:00
Josh Siviour 9c76df3373 feat(ecs): awsvpc mode — ENI-per-task allocation + guest datapath (Sprint 4d) (#418)
* feat(ecs): awsvpc ENI-per-task control plane (Sprint 4d)

Scheduler owns the task-ENI lifecycle for awsvpc mode: allocate from the
task subnet on placement, hot-plug onto the container instance, plumb ENI
identity through the assign payload + task record, and detach+delete on
STOPPED (graceful + reaper, idempotent leak guard). bridge/host unchanged.

* feat(ecs-agent): awsvpc guest-side task netns from hot-plugged ENI

The agent builds a per-task network namespace for awsvpc tasks: it finds the
hot-plugged ENI NIC by MAC, moves it into /var/run/netns/ecs-<taskID>, and DHCPs
the OVN-assigned ENI IP. The container then joins that netns via the OCI network
namespace path; bridge/host tasks keep the host (VM) netns as before.

* build(ecs-node): add iproute2 for awsvpc task netns

The ecs-agent builds awsvpc task network namespaces with `ip netns`, which
busybox's `ip` applet does not implement. Install iproute2 in the ecs-node AMI;
udhcpc (for the in-netns ENI DHCP lease) is already provided by busybox.
2026-06-25 16:01:14 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 3046240915 fix(e2e): ENI reconcile test SSHes as ubuntu to match stock AMI default
PR #411 (cloud-init EC2 datasource) dropped the cloud-init ISO that
created the ec2-user account and baked the harness SSH key; guests now
boot the stock Ubuntu gold AMI (default user ubuntu) bootstrapped via the
Ec2/IMDS datasource. eni_reconcile_test.go was the lone single-suite test
still SSHing as ec2-user, so TestENIHotplugReconcile failed publickey at
the first SSH. Align it with every other single-suite test.
2026-06-25 15:37:11 +10:00
Julian Sommer 82e443f305 chore: more inlines 2026-06-25 14:53:37 +10:00
Julian Sommer 1dfa4a672a chore: remove functions with stdlib alternatives 2026-06-25 14:31:05 +10:00
Julian Sommer 446f93ae8c chore: rename ubuntu-latest to ubuntu-26.04 2026-06-25 13:49:51 +10:00
Julian Sommer 8a94886b13 feat: cloud-init EC2 datasource (#411) 2026-06-25 13:48:08 +10:00
Josh Siviour 5e58645192 feat(eni): hot-plug reconciler + orphan sweep + e2e (Sprint 3d/3e) (#417)
* feat(eni): hot-plug reconciler + orphan sweep (Sprint 3d)

Add eniReconciler, a node-local vm.Reaper that converges ENI hot-plug
state across a daemon restart or crash: KV ENIRecord <-> in-memory PCIe
slot map <-> guest query-pci device list. Resolves records stuck in
attaching/detaching, re-adopts the slot map after restart, and reaps
orphan QMP devices and slot entries.

A staleness gate (new ENIRecord.AttachmentStateAt + 30s threshold) keeps
the reconciler off records a live attach/detach handler is mid-pipeline
on. Wired into the existing GarbageCollector backstop.

* test(eni): unit-cover hot-plug reconciler vm helpers

* test(eni): e2e reconciler convergence across daemon restart (Sprint 3e)
2026-06-25 11:35:52 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 5fa12ec358 fix(e2e): skip stopped node in multinode NATS peer poll
StopNode now stops spinifex-nats.service, so WaitNATSPeers polling that
node's dead 127.0.0.1:8222 monitor port fails with curl exit 7 and never
converges. Add WithSkipNodes to exclude the stopped node from the poll;
TestMultinodeNodeFailure skips node2.
2026-06-25 08:05:44 +10:00
Josh Siviour d32712b727 feat: ECS scheduler, RunTask placement, and agent task execution (#416)
Add the ECS v1 scheduler control loop and end-to-end RunTask flow:

- handlers/ecs: per-account KV-backed Service (clusters, task definitions,
  container instances, tasks), bin-pack/spread/random placement with CAS
  capacity reservation, and a leader-elected Scheduler that owns the Layer-2
  bus subscriptions (register/heartbeat/task-state) plus a heartbeat reaper.
- gateway/ecs: wire CreateCluster, Describe/ListClusters,
  Register/Describe/ListTaskDefinitions, Register/Describe/ListContainerInstances,
  RunTask, Describe/ListTasks onto the daemon over NATS.
- daemon: construct the Service, start the Scheduler goroutine, subscribe the
  ECS action subjects.
- ecs-agent: subscribe the per-instance assign subject, pull and run each
  container via containerd, and report task state back on the bus.
2026-06-25 07:52:07 +10:00
Josh Siviour 24bd50a53c feat: ecs-node AMI (alpine + containerd + ecs-agent baked) (#415)
Adds the spinifex-ecs-node AMI variant: alpine 3.21.7 + containerd + runc +
cni-plugins + ca-certificates with the ecs-agent binary baked to
/usr/local/bin and three OpenRC services wired in dependency order
(ecs-ca-install -> containerd -> ecs-agent).

- manifest.conf drives build-system-image.sh (no host mounts).
- ecs-ca-install.initd: first-boot oneshot installing the cloud-init
  delivered gateway CA into the system trust; no-op when absent.
- ecs-agent.initd: sources /etc/spinifex-ecs/agent.env, backgrounds the
  agent after net + containerd.
- 10-bridge.conflist: CNI bridge for task networking (Sprint 4d).
- setup.sh: exec bits, /opt/cni/bin symlink, content-store dirs, ttyS0
  console reorder + fast boot menu.
- Makefile: build-ecs-node-image / import-ecs-node-image targets.
2026-06-24 21:54:35 +10:00
Josh Siviour 93db7e4d1b feat(ecs): ecs-agent skeleton + containerd image pull (Sprint 4c) (#414)
* feat(ecs): ecs-agent skeleton + containerd image pull (Sprint 4c)

Add the ecs-agent binary that runs inside an ECS container instance: it
resolves host identity from IMDS, registers on the Layer-2 NATS bus, and
heartbeats while alive. Image pulls go through a containerd-backed
ImagePuller behind an interface, with an ECR resolver that mints
GetAuthorizationToken creds from the instance role.

Extract the IMDS-credential and ECR-auth flow out of
ecr-credential-provider into internal/imdscreds and internal/ecrauth so
the agent and the kubelet provider share one implementation.

Add spinifex/handlers/ecs/bus as the single source of truth for Layer-2
subject builders and wire payloads, shared by the agent now and the
scheduler in Sprint 4e.

* build: pin genproto via replace to fix containerd/v2 ambiguous import

go.opencensus.io -> grpc@v1.33.2 drags the pre-split monolithic genproto
into the module graph; it still ships googleapis/rpc/status, which collides
with the split genproto/googleapis/rpc module that containerd/ttrpc needs.

The main module never imports the monolith, so a plain require bump is
dropped by 'go mod tidy'. Pin it with a replace to a post-split version so
the fix survives tidy and contributors can run 'go mod tidy' freely.

* fix(ecs): agent boot failsafes from runtime verify

- Build the ECR gateway HTTP client lazily on first image pull instead of
  at boot. A missing/malformed gateway CA no longer kills the agent before
  it can register + heartbeat, matching the best-effort containerd path.
- Actively probe containerd with IsServing in runtime.New. The client dials
  lazily, so a dead socket previously slipped past the boot-time
  'containerd unavailable' warn and only surfaced on the first pull.
- Make the heartbeat interval configurable via ECS_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL
  (default 30s) for test/verify and slow-link tuning.
2026-06-24 21:18:03 +10:00
Julian Sommer ea03efe415 fix: reset-dev-env regex 2026-06-24 16:48:06 +10:00
Julian Sommer fa066a64d7 fix 2026-06-24 16:37:58 +10:00
Josh Siviour 78739cc93b feat(ecs): Phase 4 gateway scaffolding + KV constants (Sprint 4a) (#413)
* fix: drop removed predastore s3.Config.Compaction from admin_test

The predastore submodule bump removed the Compaction field from s3.Config.
Parse the rendered [compaction] block into a local struct so the template
round-trip test no longer references the deleted field.

* feat(ecs): Phase 4 gateway scaffolding + KV constants (Sprint 4a)

ECS v1 control-plane skeleton. Every action is a 501 NotImplemented stub
until its handler lands in a later Phase 4 sprint; this sprint locks the
API contract + JetStream KV schema so sprints 4c-4h can build against it.

- gateway/ecs: X-Amz-Target JSON 1.1 dispatch (AmazonEC2ContainerServiceV20141113),
  full v1 action namespace mapped to NotImplemented (mirrors gateway/ecrapi)
- gateway: register ecs in supportedServices + Request dispatch switch
- handlers/ecs/store.go: per-account bucket ecs-account-{accountID} + shared
  leader bucket spinifex-ecs-leader + Q2 key-path helpers (mirrors handlers/eks)
- NATS_HANDLER_NAMING.md: document the two-layer ecs.* subject convention (Q14)

Ref: docs/development/feature/ecs-v1.md, ecs-4a-gateway-scaffolding.md

* test(ecs): cover store factories + gateway handler/error branches

Lift Sprint 4a diff coverage above the 60% gate (54.5% -> 78%):
- handlers/ecs: JetStream-backed GetOrCreateAccountBucket / InitLeaderBucket
  idempotency + NewStore success (testutil.StartTestJetStream)
- gateway/ecs: in-package NotImplemented + WriteJSONResponse coverage
- gateway: ECS_Request missing-account-ID branch
2026-06-24 15:15:51 +10:00
Julian Sommer 1a4046fd69 chore: delete bad tests 2026-06-24 14:43:52 +10:00
Josh Siviour 9e333c8a6c feat: graceful guest drain on systemctl stop / host shutdown (#412)
* fix: drop removed predastore s3.Config.Compaction from admin_test

The predastore submodule bump removed the Compaction field from s3.Config.
Parse the rendered [compaction] block into a local struct so the template
round-trip test no longer references the deleted field.

* feat: graceful guest drain on systemctl stop / host shutdown

systemctl stop spinifex.target tore down nbdkit/viperblock while guest QEMU
was still writing, corrupting guest filesystems. The ordered drain existed
only over NATS via cluster shutdown, never on the systemd/host path.

Add spx admin node drain --local (GATE+DRAIN against the local node, leaving
STORAGE/PERSIST/INFRA to systemd), wired as the ExecStop of a new
spinifex-shutdown.service oneshot ordered After= all services so it stops
first and drains guests while every service is still up. DDIL preserved: the
oneshot fires only on target/host shutdown, not on a daemon restart.

Harden the viperblockd SIGTERM handler to flush the WAL but skip reaping an
nbdkit a guest is still attached to. Add a units ordering invariant.

* fix: ExecStop drain timeout needs duration unit (120 -> 120s)

The spinifex-shutdown.service ExecStop passed --timeout=120, but spx admin
node drain's --timeout is a cobra Duration flag and rejects a bare integer
(time: missing unit in duration "120"). The drain exited 1 without running,
so a systemctl stop tore nbdkit out from under the running guest and corrupted
its ext4 (the exact failure this feature prevents). Pass 120s.

* fix: nbdkitInUse read ss state from correct column + cover it

ss -H rows are '<netid> <state> ...', so the state is field[1], not field[0]
(field[0] is 'u_str'). The old index never matched ESTAB, so an in-use nbdkit
read as idle and the SIGTERM path would reap it under a live guest. Add tests
exercising a real connected unix socket, an absent socket, and TCP transport.
2026-06-24 13:31:14 +10:00
Julian Sommer f45c97215a chore: bump total coverage requirement 2026-06-24 09:32:31 +10:00
Julian Sommer 98db2c4e0c feat(imds): serve network/interfaces/macs/<mac> subtree (single-NIC) (#410) 2026-06-24 09:27:40 +10:00
Julian Sommer e11437cec9 feat(imds): per-tap responder datapath (#408) 2026-06-23 16:44:53 +10:00
Julian Sommer caa1658663 release: update go.mod for v1.9.0 2026-06-23 16:22:08 +10:00
Bryn Mailer 15dede64ad feat: predastore compaction E2E (#407)
* feat: add predastore compaction E2E

Inject a short compaction interval into test-cluster predastore config via a
new --predastore-compaction-interval flag on admin init/join, gated so
production output stays byte-identical when unset. Add a harness helper that
drives write-then-delete churn against predastore S3, brackets it with
du-over-SSH usage, and asserts end-of-churn usage settles below 70% of the
churn peak; wire it into the multinode suite as TestPredastoreCompaction.

* fix: compaction E2E gate writes churn to its own bucket

The reclaim gate signed PutObject against the config-defined system
'predastore' bucket, which belongs to account 000000000000 with only a
static [[auth]] grant. The harness admin identity is a different IAM
account, so predastore returned 403 AccessDenied cross-account.

Create a per-run bucket the admin identity owns (AdministratorAccess)
and churn into it. Objects still erasure-code into distributed/nodes/
node-* so the du-based reclaim measurement is unchanged. The gateway
(:9999) does not proxy S3, so the client stays predastore-direct.

* test: run predastore compaction gate before destructive node tests

The compaction reclaim gate was declared last in the multinode suite, so it
measured shard-store usage after NodeFailure/NodeRecovery had torn down and
restarted node2. NodeRecovery only gates on NATS/gateway/EC2 readiness, not
predastore, so node2's shard store was still settling and the du baseline came
back empty. Move the test before the destructive node tests so it runs against
a pristine, fully-converged cluster primed by the volume tests.

* fix: race-free SSH output capture + empty-tolerant du probe

The compaction reclaim gate crashed with ParseInt("") when node1's du
probe returned empty combined output. Harden the probe and the SSH layer:

- ssh.Run used one bytes.Buffer for both session.Stdout and session.Stderr,
  which x/crypto/ssh copies in two concurrent goroutines — a data race on a
  non-concurrent-safe type. Switch to session.CombinedOutput, which guards the
  combined stream with a mutex-wrapped singleWriter.
- shardStoreUsageBytes now terminates the remote command with a sentinel echo.
  A missing sentinel is reported as output lost in SSH retrieval; a present
  sentinel with no number is treated as a 0 measurement (anomalous, logged)
  instead of crashing the gate.

The sentinel lets the next run distinguish a transport-layer drop from a
genuinely empty remote measurement.

* test(e2e): replace predastore du-reclaim gate with object lifecycle contract

The multinode compaction gate measured shard-store disk usage over SSH (du)
and asserted reclaim after churn. It could never pass: segments only seal at
the 4 GiB roll threshold, so test-scale churn produces no compactable segment,
and the du probe read 0 bytes before and after. Reclaim correctness is already
covered deterministically by predastore's store-level unit tests.

Delete AssertPredastoreCompaction and its du/churn/poll/sentinel machinery,
the harness unit tests that exercised them, and the multinode TestPredastore
Compaction entry. Add a single-node TestPredastoreObjectLifecycle that checks
the user-visible contract: an object is readable after PutObject, gone after
DeleteObject (GET returns NoSuchKey and ListObjectsV2 is empty), and the store
keeps serving fresh writes. newPredastoreS3 is retained, refactored to take a
host so it works outside the multinode cluster type.

* test(e2e): drop orphaned multinode TestPredastoreCompaction

Complete the du-reclaim -> object-lifecycle refactor: remove the
multinode TestPredastoreCompaction caller (and its now-unused context
and harness imports) that still referenced the deleted
harness.AssertPredastoreCompaction, which broke e2e-build. Wire the
single-node TestPredastoreObjectLifecycle entry that replaces it.
2026-06-23 16:19:10 +10:00
Josh Siviour 5025a37006 feat: Containers — internal-ECR pulls, DNS-free registry, EKS hardening + docs (#409)
* docs: add Containers section with EKS and ECR service pages

New docs/containers/{eks,ecr} pages covering each service via AWS CLI, the Spinifex console, and Terraform, plus the requisite VPC/IGW/NAT/SG/IAM setup. EKS page embeds console screenshots. Cross-links the EKS Terraform workbooks.

* docs(eks): rework Terraform workbooks into a capability ladder

Rework the three EKS workbooks into a coherent ladder and publish them to
the Containers section. All tiers are single- or three-node capable via
node_desired_size and serve a shared Spinifex-themed demo app from ECR,
replacing nginxdemos/hello.

- demo-app: new std-lib Go web app (themed page reporting pod/node/cluster/
  region + hit counter; optional /data persistence), distroless image.
- eks-quickstart: node_desired_size var, ECR repo + themed app over NodePort.
- eks-https-ingress (was eks-addons-access): HTTPS via the aws-load-balancer-
  controller addon + ACM, public/private VPC with NAT, managed-ingress=false.
- eks-gitops-argocd (was eks-https-ingress): Argo CD addon syncs the app from
  a git repo, aws-ebs-csi-driver PVC (Viperblock-backed) for state, access
  entry RBAC, HTTPS Ingress carried over.

Pending live e2e verification (image build/push, apply, ALB + PVC bind).

* fix(ecr): implement ListTagsForResource (empty tags) for client parity

The AWS provider calls ecr:ListTagsForResource on every repository read, which
returned 501 NotImplementedException and broke 'tofu apply' of any workbook that
creates an aws_ecr_repository. Implement it to return an empty tag set (resource
tagging stays a deferred feature) so reads succeed. Drop the tags block from the
three EKS workbooks' ECR repos so the provider doesn't call the still-stubbed
TagResource on create.

* feat(eks): pull from internal ECR via kubelet credential provider

Worker nodes could not pull custom images from the internal Spinifex ECR
registry: the eks-node had no DNS for the registry host, no containerd CA
trust, no port rewrite to :9999, and no pull credentials. Only public
images worked.

Add cmd/ecr-credential-provider, a kubelet exec credential provider that
fetches the node IAM-role credentials from IMDS, calls GetAuthorizationToken
against the gateway ECR endpoint, and returns the minted AWS:<jwt> as Basic
auth for the registry host. Thread the gateway URL, account, region, and
internal suffix into the agent userdata, which now writes the gateway CA,
a registries.yaml (CA trust + :9999 endpoint), the kubelet
credential-provider config and config.yaml.d drop-in, and an /etc/hosts
entry mapping the registry host to the gateway IP. Ship the provider binary
in the eks-node AMI.

Also remove a stray paragraph from the admin-cli README.

* fix: dial EKS ECR registry mirror by gateway IP

cloud-init manage_etc_hosts rewrites /etc/hosts from the alpine template on
every boot, wiping the registry-host mapping appended via bootcmd, so worker
nodes could not resolve the internal ECR host and pulls failed with no such
host. Point the k3s registries.yaml mirror endpoint and tls config at the
gateway IP instead (the gateway cert carries an IP SAN), keeping the pod image
ref port-less and dropping the DNS leg until northstar lands. Fall back to the
hostname endpoint when the gateway is not an IP.

* fix: attach node-role instance profile to EKS workers for ECR

EKS workers launched with no IAM instance profile, so IMDS served no role and
the ECR credential provider could not mint a registry token, leaving internal
ECR pulls failing with 401. Real EKS implicitly creates an instance profile for
the node role; do the same here. Wire a KV-backed IAM service into the EKS deps
and, at worker launch, find-or-create an instance profile named for the node
role, attach the role, and pass it to RunInstances so IMDS exposes the role to
the credential provider.

* feat: use mulga logo in EKS demo app

* feat: add ACM certificate tag support (List/Add/RemoveTags)

Implements ListTagsForCertificate, AddTagsToCertificate and RemoveTagsFromCertificate across the store, service, NATS, daemon and gateway layers. Import now persists tags. Fixes terraform aws_acm_certificate InvalidActionException on ListTagsForCertificate.

* test: cover ACM tag gateway and NATS wrapper paths

* feat: support EKS nodegroup tags (Tag/Untag/ListTags)

Extends EKS tag ops to back nodegroup ARNs alongside cluster ARNs. Nodegroup create-time tags persist on the record and echo via DescribeNodegroup, giving the terraform-aws provider a clean default_tags round-trip. Fixes aws_eks_node_group TagResource 501 NotImplementedException.

* fix: provision EKS ALB ingress via node credentials

The aws-load-balancer-controller addon could not provision an ALB. Three fixes:

- TLS: the controller's per-service ec2/elbv2/acm SDK clients install their own
  BaseEndpoint resolver and build an HTTP client that bypasses AWS_CA_BUNDLE,
  falling back to the Go system trust pool and rejecting the gateway cert as
  'unknown authority'. Add SSL_CERT_FILE so the gateway CA joins the system pool.
- Credentials: an empty AWS_ROLE_ARN beside the web-identity token file
  half-arms the SDK web-identity provider, which then signs anonymously
  (MissingAuthenticationToken). Inject the IRSA env only when a service-account
  role ARN is staged; otherwise omit it so the default chain falls back to the
  node instance-profile credentials served over IMDS.
- Authorization: the node role lacked the ec2/elbv2 actions the controller
  needs. The eks-https-ingress workbook now attaches an AWSLoadBalancerController
  managed policy to the node role (CreatePolicy + AttachRolePolicy).

* fix: add force_delete to EKS workbook demo ECR repos

tofu destroy of an EKS workbook left the demo ECR repository behind: it
still holds the pushed demo image, so DeleteRepository (force=false)
returns RepositoryNotEmptyException. Add force_delete = true to each
workbook's aws_ecr_repository.demo so teardown removes the repo with its
images.

* fix: force-delete EKS control-plane ENIs on teardown

TerminateK3sServerVM deleted the CP ENI with a plain force=false
DeleteNetworkInterface. eniIsLiveAttachment reports InUse whenever the
record's Status/InstanceId/AttachmentId are set, so when the K3s VM is
gone but the ENI record's attachment fields were never cleared the delete
returned InvalidNetworkInterface.InUse permanently and EKSDeletingReaper
re-drove the same non-idempotent call every 90s, wedging the cluster in
DELETING.

Teardown owns its CP ENIs and has already terminated the VM, so the
attachment is authoritatively dead. Replace the InUse-retry budget loop
with detach-then-delete (detachAndDeleteServerENI): DetachENI clears the
stale attachment fields, then DeleteNetworkInterface passes the in-use
guard. Both calls tolerate an already-gone ENI (NotFound) so a race with
the async instance-terminate cascade resolves to idempotent success.
purgeClusterInfra's private-endpoint ENI path reuses the same helper.

* fix: detach+delete worker ENIs on EKS nodegroup teardown

A terminated nodegroup worker could leave its primary ENI in
spinifex-vpc-enis as in-use/attached, and a dangling ENI throws
DependencyViolation on subnet/VPC delete, blocking tofu destroy. Two
gaps:

TerminateWorkerInstances did a local-only vmMgr.Get and silently skipped
any worker owned by another node, stranding both the VM and its ENI on
multi-node clusters. Route the terminate per-instance via ec2.cmd.<id>
(mirroring the gateway TerminateInstances path) so the owning daemon runs
the full teardown — detach + force-delete the primary ENI and clear its
record. No responder / NotFound payload is treated as already-gone so a
retried DeleteNodegroup stays idempotent.

deleteInstanceENI (stopped-instance terminate) issued a force=false
DeleteNetworkInterface with no prior detach: a stale in-use attachment
made it fail InvalidNetworkInterface.InUse, leaving the ENI record behind
after the instance was already written to the terminated bucket. Detach
first, then delete, tolerating NotFound.

* fix: heal volume State drift on detach/terminate teardown

A detach/terminate could leave a volume's State empty instead of
'available'. DeleteVolume gated on State=='available' exactly, so it
returned VolumeInUse for an unattached volume nothing was using, leaving
it undeletable and blocking stack teardown. DescribeVolumes cosmetically
rendered an empty State as 'available', masking the drift.

- DeleteVolume now treats an empty State with no attachment as deletable
  (an attached volume still returns VolumeInUse).
- DescribeVolumes derives an empty State from the attachment (attached ->
  in-use, unattached -> available) instead of blindly rendering
  available, so an empty-but-attached volume is no longer hidden.
- UpdateVolumeState normalizes an unattached volume with an empty state to
  available, so a detach writeback that omits the state cannot strand the
  volume in drift.

* fix: break all SG cross-references on EKS teardown

DeleteClusterSGs broke the cp<->nodegroup cycle too narrowly. It revoked
only ingress (IpPermissions), never egress (IpPermissionsEgress), so a
cross-reference via an egress rule kept the SG pinned on
DependencyViolation. It also resolved only the two named cluster SGs, so
any OTHER SG in the VPC referencing them — the default SG, the LBC/ALB SG,
the private-endpoint SG, user/TF SGs — was never revoked and pinned the
referenced SG on delete, leaving the VPC stuck.

Enumerate every non-default SG in the VPC and revoke BOTH ingress and
egress on each before deleting, breaking any cycle order-independently,
then delete only the cluster-owned SGs (referrer SGs are deleted by their
own teardown). The default SG is left untouched. Since DeleteClusterSGs
runs against both the customer VPC and the managed control-plane VPC, the
broadened sweep covers both teardown paths.

* feat: support TargetGroup ProtocolVersion in elbv2

CreateTargetGroup now stores ProtocolVersion (defaulting HTTP/HTTPS target
groups to HTTP1) and DescribeTargetGroups/Create output return it. Without
this the aws-load-balancer-controller sees a perpetual immutable-field
mismatch (desired HTTP1 vs empty) and recreates the target group every
reconcile, looping on DuplicateTargetGroupName once a shared ALB IngressGroup
reconciles more than one target group. NLB protocols (TCP/UDP/TLS) keep it
omitted to match AWS.

* fix: omit IRSA env from ebs-csi addon when no role staged

The ebs-csi controller manifest hardcoded AWS_ROLE_ARN={{SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ROLE_ARN}}
plus the web-identity token volume. With no service-account role staged the
placeholder rendered empty, half-arming the SDK web-identity provider, which
panics 'role ARN is not set' and CrashLoops the controller, leaving PVCs
Pending. Convert to the conditional {{IRSA_ENV}}/{{IRSA_VOLUME_MOUNT}}/{{IRSA_VOLUME}}
markers like the LBC bundle so the IRSA env and token volume are omitted when
no role is staged, falling back to node instance-profile credentials over IMDS.
The EBS-specific AWS_EC2_ENDPOINT/AWS_ENDPOINT_URL_EC2 stay in both modes.
Requires an eks-node AMI rebake to take effect.

* docs: route gitops-argocd workbook through a shared ALB and expose ArgoCD UI

Fold the demo app and ArgoCD ingresses onto one ALB via an LBC IngressGroup
with host routing (app./argocd. on a wildcard cert) instead of one ALB per
ingress, add a NodePort + HTTPS Ingress for the ArgoCD UI, and document the
access steps. Add the node-role LBC and EBS-CSI IAM policies the controllers
need (Spinifex wires controller creds at the node level, not IRSA) and an
ignore_changes block for the cluster's access_config and
vpc_config security_group_ids, which Spinifex DescribeCluster does not echo
back, so the provider stops trying to replace the cluster on every plan.

* fix: stop addon-sync substituting IRSA markers named in comments

The ebs-csi controller manifest's header comment spelled out the literal
{{IRSA_ENV}} / {{IRSA_VOLUME_MOUNT}} / {{IRSA_VOLUME}} marker tokens. addon-sync
matched each marker by substring, so the comment lines were replaced with the
env/mount blocks, injecting a bare YAML sequence between two documents. K3s'
auto-deploy then rejected the whole file (ParseManifestFailed: cannot unmarshal
array into unstructured), so the ebs-csi Addon CR never applied and the EKS
addon hung in CREATING. Reword the comment to not contain the literal tokens,
and anchor the marker substitution to lines that are exactly the marker
(whitespace aside) so a future comment mentioning a marker can't retrigger it.

* fix: disable K3s local-storage on EKS clusters in parity mode

In AWS LB Controller parity mode (BuiltinIngress=false) the K3s server
disabled traefik and servicelb but left local-storage enabled. Its local-path
provisioner ships a StorageClass marked default, which races the EBS CSI
ebs-gp3 default StorageClass — two defaults, so dynamic PVCs bind
nondeterministically. EKS has no local-path, so disable local-storage too and
let ebs-gp3 be the sole default. The built-in-ingress path is unchanged.

* fix: re-encrypt HTTPS target groups in haproxy ALB backends

An ALB target group with backend-protocol HTTPS (e.g. argocd-server, which
serves TLS on its own port) rendered a plaintext haproxy server line. HAProxy's
own check then spoke HTTP to a TLS port, failed, and marked the server DOWN,
returning 503 — even though the lb-agent's separate HTTPS health probe reported
the target healthy, so describe-target-health masked the fault.

Emit check-ssl ssl verify none on the server line for HTTPS target groups so
both the check and proxied traffic re-encrypt to the backend.

* fix: reconnect wedged QMP client on next command

A timed-out QMP decode under host contention left the cached client's
shared json.Decoder mid-message, wedging every later command and breaking
EBS AttachVolume/DetachVolume for the VM's lifetime. Mark the client Dead
on encode/decode error and redial the retained socket path (re-running the
qmp_capabilities handshake in place) on the next send.

* fix: round-trip security-group rule descriptions

SG ingress/egress rules dropped the per-rule Description on store and
describe. The AWS Load Balancer Controller tags the worker-node SG rules it
manages with a UserIdGroupPair description and identifies them by that value
to revoke them on teardown. Without the round-trip the controller cannot
match its rules, never revokes them, and the backend security group stays
referenced — DeleteSecurityGroup returns DependencyViolation forever,
hanging the ingress finalizer and tofu destroy with orphaned security groups.

Persist Description on SGRule (excluded from sgRuleKey so it is metadata, not
identity) and render it back through describe.

* fix: reclaim customer-VPC nodegroup SGs on managed-CP-VPC teardown

In the managed control-plane VPC topology, launchNodegroupInfra creates the
cluster control-plane and nodegroup security groups in the customer VPC for
worker<->control-plane networking, but purgeClusterInfra only reclaimed the
security groups in the managed CP VPC. The customer-VPC SGs orphaned,
cross-referenced each other, and pinned the customer VPC with
DependencyViolation, hanging tofu destroy of the VPC. Reclaim them in the
managed-CP-VPC branch too, matching the legacy customer-VPC branch.

* fix: reclaim ALB EIP when system VM already gone on terminate

TerminateSystemInstance only released an internet-facing ALB's Elastic IP on
the local path, where the VM is still present in the manager. When the VM was
already gone (health-reaped, crashed, or raced by ENI teardown), it took the
remote/no-owner path and returned idempotent success without reconciling the
EIP, leaking the wan-pool address still associated to a deleted ENI.

Add EIPServiceImpl.ReleaseAddressByInstanceID, an idempotent account-agnostic
scan that disassociates then releases any EIP recorded against an instance, and
call it as a backstop in TerminateSystemInstance for both branches.

* fix: cascade-prune demo PVC via Argo CD finalizer in eks-gitops workbook

The demo Application carried no resources finalizer, so tofu destroy removed
the Application CR without pruning the synced PVC. The PVC survived, the cluster
was destroyed, and the Delete-reclaim PV's EBS volume orphaned. Add the
resources-finalizer.argocd.argoproj.io finalizer so deleting the Application
cascades to the PVC and ebs-csi reaps the volume before cluster teardown.

* feat: raw-IP access + documented Argo CD creds in eks-gitops workbook

The shared ALB host-routed everything, so the raw ALB IP 404'd in a browser
without an /etc/hosts entry. Make the app the hostless catch-all on :443 and add
a hostless Argo CD listener on :8443, so https://<alb-ip>/ serves the app and
https://<alb-ip>:8443/ serves the UI with no DNS. Surface the admin-password
command as a tofu output and document the credential + IP URLs in the README.

* fix: reclaim ALB EIP on the owning-node terminate path

The EIP backstop lived only in TerminateSystemInstance, but the ALB
delete path goes serveSystemTerminateInstance -> terminateSystemInstanceLocal
directly, bypassing it, and releaseSystemInstanceEIP relied on the VM's
cached allocation which is often empty. Extract reclaimSystemInstanceEIP
(authoritative KV reconcile via ReleaseAddressByInstanceID) and call it
from terminateSystemInstanceLocal as well as the no-owner backstop, so an
internet-facing ALB's EIP is released on every terminate route.

* chore(eks): drop coredns from the managed addon catalog

Cluster DNS ships as the baked node-local coredns-mulga DaemonSet, not as
a managed addon — there is no bundled coredns manifest, so CreateAddon
coredns would stage but fail VM-side render. Remove the phantom catalog
entry so DescribeAddonVersions and CreateAddon no longer advertise it;
repoint the addon tests that used coredns as their sample to argocd.

* feat(ui): group EKS and ECR under a Containers nav section

Fold the separate EKS and ECR sidebar groups into one Containers group
with EKS (clusters) and ECR (repositories) entries.

* fix(ui): satisfy strict null checks in ECR component tests

Index mock.calls via optional chaining and narrow the getAllByRole result
before clicking, clearing the TS2532/TS2345 errors that failed pnpm fix.

* refactor(eks): hide internal fixture addons from the public catalog

Add an AddonSpec.Hidden flag and mark spinifex-noop hidden: it stays
creatable (lookupAddon finds it, so the delivery-transport e2e still drives
it) but no longer surfaces in the unfiltered DescribeAddonVersions listing.

* refactor(eks): remove K3s built-in ingress; LBC-only

Drop the BuiltinIngress option and its managed-ingress tag opt-in. traefik,
servicelb, and local-storage are now always disabled on EKS nodes (AWS
parity — Service type=LoadBalancer and Ingress are the Load Balancer
Controller's job). Removes the EKS_DEFER_TRAEFIK userdata flag, the k3s.initd
traefik .skip staging, and the maybe_enable_traefik deferred-enable loop in
the state reporter.

* fix(ui): clear lint debt in VPC-wizard mutations and CIDR validation

Parallelize the independent subnet-create and route-table-association loops
in the create-VPC mutation with Promise.all (each task records its resource
in the rollback list before any further call), and switch the CIDR-validation
regex to named capture groups. Clears the no-await-in-loop and
prefer-named-capture-group lint errors.

* fix: carry gateway port in ECR registry endpoints; rename mulga.internal -> spinifex.internal

The ECR registry is served on the gateway port (:9999), but proxyEndpoint and
repositoryUri were emitted port-less, so docker login/tag/push dialed :443 and
failed. Derive the port from the awsgw listen host and append it to the registry
host (omitted for 443). Also rename the default internal DNS suffix.

* docs: drop verbose ECR :9999 host note

* docs: fix literal-asterisk emphasis (single-* not rendered)

* docs: brace-wrap ${REGISTRY}:latest (zsh :l modifier ate the tag); document Docker CA trust

* feat: default ECR registry URIs to the gateway host (no-DNS interim)

The registry authenticates by token, not hostname, so the per-account
<acct>.dkr.ecr name is cosmetic. Advertise the gateway's reachable bind host:port
(already a cert SAN) in repositoryUri/proxyEndpoint so docker login/tag/push need
no DNS; the parity host still works server-side where DNS exists.

* fix: serve ECR registry on a DNS-free gateway host end to end

Advertise the gateway's AdvertiseIP as the ECR registry host when the AWSGW
bind is unspecified (0.0.0.0/::), so repository_url resolves to a reachable
host:9999 carried in the server cert SANs rather than the unresolvable
per-account parity name. Docker push then dials it directly with no DNS.

Mirror the same host on EKS workers: the registries.yaml mirror keys and the
credential provider matchImages now cover the port-less parity name, the
port-ful parity name, and the gateway IP:9999, all redirecting to the dialed
gateway endpoint. A port-ful pull from the API-returned repository_url matches
the mirror instead of bypassing it into a failed DNS lookup.

Net: docker push host, pod image host, and the API's repository_url are the
same value, with no DNS or /etc/hosts.

* docs: resolve eks-https Ingress ALB DNS name to its public IP (no DNS)

* docs: resolve eks-gitops Ingress ALB DNS name to its public IP (no DNS)

* docs: remind to run aws eks update-kubeconfig before kubectl in EKS workbooks
2026-06-23 15:29:14 +10:00
Julian Sommer 35eaca5dc4 fix: add detailed logging to e2e 2026-06-23 09:59:54 +10:00
Julian Sommer 413f9efa18 chore: use typescript native preview 2026-06-23 09:18:59 +10:00
Julian Sommer 3452746f47 fix: lint rules 2026-06-23 09:17:35 +10:00
dependabot[bot] c13a88537d chore: bump the npm-dependencies group (#406) 2026-06-23 09:12:38 +10:00
dependabot[bot] 1550f5c488 chore: bump github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2 in the go-dependencies group (#404) 2026-06-23 09:11:20 +10:00
dependabot[bot] 79e881f1c8 chore: bump actions/checkout from 6 to 7 in the github-actions group (#405) 2026-06-23 09:11:02 +10:00
Josh Siviour bb2ea2fd2d feat(ecr): OperationNotSupportedException for image-scanning actions (#403)
* feat(ecr): return OperationNotSupportedException for image-scanning actions

The ECR image-scan control-plane actions resolved to the generic
NotImplemented 501 stub, indistinguishable from unbuilt features and
surfaced as a server fault. mulga runs no vulnerability scanner, so the
scan surface now returns OperationNotSupportedException (400):

- awserrors: add OperationNotSupportedException (400) ECR code.
- ecrapi: ScanningNotSupported handler; repoint the four image-scan
  actions and register the three registry-scanning actions at it.
- spinifexui: Scan tab on the repository detail page renders a static
  'scanning not supported' panel rather than a request that errors.

* refactor(config): default internal DNS suffix to spinifex.internal

Rename the AWS-parity internal DNS suffix from mulga.internal to
spinifex.internal across the config default, cert SAN builder, ECR
endpoint/audience construction, and their tests. Single runtime knob is
config.DefaultAWSInternalSuffix; no DNS backend exists yet, so this is a
naming change with no functional impact.
2026-06-22 09:31:01 +10:00
Josh Siviour 6165b9f517 feat(ecr): rotate JWT signing keys with previous-key retention (#401)
The ECR auth bridge minted ES256 tokens from a key that was created once and
never rotated. Add a background rotator (ecr-v1 Q3): mint a fresh key every 30
days, retain the previous keys for 24h so in-flight 12h tokens stay verifiable,
then prune. The active key is now the newest by KV creation time (not the
lexically-greatest kid) so a minted key takes over and all nodes converge. The
Issuer and Verifier became hot-swappable so the rotator updates the live
gateway as keys roll.
2026-06-22 07:59:40 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga 0ca350ef27 fix: MIG doc touch up 2026-06-19 16:30:47 +10:00
Julian Sommer 51706938e8 chore: use ubuntu-26.04 runners 2026-06-19 16:04:09 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga 879cfde07a fix: more docs tweaks 2026-06-19 15:06:31 +10:00
Josh Siviour 9d662f9889 feat: EKS EBS CSI driver (Viperblock) — egress, attach, node discovery, e2e (#402)
* feat: bake aws-ebs-csi-driver addon + mdev by-id bridge

Add the aws-ebs-csi-driver entry (v1.40.1) to the eks addon catalog and
ship its baked manifests (RBAC, IRSA-wired controller, node DaemonSet,
default gp3 StorageClass) under the eks-node image.

The node plugin locates EBS volumes via /dev/disk/by-id, which busybox
mdev does not populate. Add mulga-ebs-byid: an mdev rule + helper that
symlinks nvme-Amazon_Elastic_Block_Store_<serial> from the virtio-blk
serial, plus a boot oneshot that points the kernel hotplug helper at
mdev and coldplugs volumes present at boot.

* test: e2e EBS CSI volume — PVC bind + mount + reschedule survival

Add a TestEKS/EBSCSIVolume subtest that installs the aws-ebs-csi-driver
managed addon bound to an IRSA role, provisions a default gp3 PVC + pod,
and asserts a marker written by the first pod survives a reschedule onto a
fresh pod backed by the same PVC. Exercises the full data path:
CreateVolume(Viperblock)/AttachVolume virtio-blk hotplug with serial set to
the volume-id, mdev /dev/disk/by-id symlink, and ext4 mount.

* feat: eks-node provider-id + topology/instance-type labels for EBS CSI

mulga-eks-provider-id boot oneshot writes a K3s config.yaml.d drop-in
from IMDS before K3s starts: kubelet provider-id plus the region, zone
and instance-type node labels. The aws-ebs-csi-driver node plugin reads
this metadata for NodeGetInfo (instance id from providerID, region/zone
from topology labels, instance type for the volume-limit family lookup).
k3s runs no AWS cloud-provider so none of it is set otherwise, which left
the node plugin's metadata init failing, NodeGetInfo panicking in
IsNitroInstanceType, and the CSINode carrying no topology key. Wire the
service into the image manifest (INSTALL_FILES + ENABLE_SERVICES) and
chmod it in setup.

* test: e2e EBS CSI controller IRSA policy + failure diagnostics

awsgw enforces IAM on assumed-role EC2 calls, so the controller's
CreateVolume/AttachVolume need a permission policy on the IRSA role.
Attach a customer-managed EC2 policy (AWS-managed ARNs are opaque and
grant nothing) covering the EBS CSI action set; CreateVolume then
succeeds. Add an OnFailure dump of the CSI control path (provisioner and
plugin logs, pvc/pod describe, events, csinode) to the EBSCSIVolume
subtest so provisioning/attach failures are diagnosable post-teardown.

* feat: EBS CSI obeys control-plane taint; e2e worker nodegroup

Drop the CriticalAddonsOnly/NoExecute tolerations from the EBS CSI
controller + node manifests so the driver runs only on customer worker
nodes, never the system control-plane VM. The e2e creates a 1-node
worker nodegroup and the writer/reader pods drop their CP tolerations so
the customer-owned volume attaches in the customer space.

* fix: EBS CSI attach — decouple hotplug PCIe port from device name; iothread rollback

virtio-blk-pci hot-plug bus was derived from the AWS device-name letter
(/dev/sd[f-p]); the EBS CSI driver sends arbitrary names (/dev/xvdaa) that
map to no slot, so device_add fell back to pcie.0 — which rejects hot-plug —
and the attach hung. A failed attach also left the per-volume iothread object
behind, so every retry died on object-add 'duplicate property'.

nextHotplugEBSPort allocates the lowest free hotplug-ebs port from live
query-block state, independent of the device name. delIothreadBestEffort
removes the iothread on every attach rollback path.

* fix: EBS CSI node discovery — un-shadow mdev by-id rule, mint nvme link

Alpine eks-node runs busybox mdev (no eudev), which stops at the first
matching /etc/mdev.conf rule. setup.sh appended the mulga-ebs-byid rule after
the stock 'vd[a-z].* -> persistent-storage' line, so it never fired on
hot-attach: only /dev/disk/by-id/virtio-<serial> was created, while the
upstream aws-ebs-csi-driver resolves nvme-Amazon_Elastic_Block_Store_<volid>.

Swap the stock vd* rule in place to route through mulga-ebs-byid, which now
delegates to persistent-storage (preserving stock links) before minting the
nvme-style link the node plugin expects.

* test: EKS e2e — NAT Gateway egress for private worker nodegroup

The customer-VPC worker is private; AttachIGW programs no SNAT (mirrors AWS:
an IGW serves only public-IP instances), so an IGW-only fixture left the worker
unable to reach the public NLB endpoint or pull public CSI images — the
nodegroup never joined.

createWorkerEgress now builds the real topology: an IGW-fronted public subnet
hosting a NAT Gateway, with the worker subnet default-routed to it. Associating
the worker route table triggers the subnet-wide SNAT egress reroute. Teardown
drains the NAT Gateway before releasing the public subnet + EIP it pins.
2026-06-19 14:43:20 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga cf3f7f1222 docs fix 2026-06-19 13:12:40 +10:00
Josh Siviour 57737af09e feat(ecr): require repository to exist before push (#400)
The OCI /v2 registry auto-created a repository on first push (ensureRepo).
AWS ECR does not: a push or PutImage to a repository that was never created
with CreateRepository is rejected. Replace ensureRepo with requireRepo, which
returns OCI NAME_UNKNOWN on the data plane and RepositoryNotFoundException on
the JSON PutImage path. Enforcement sits at the single push choke point
(startUpload + StoreManifest).
2026-06-19 12:38:15 +10:00
Ben Duncan 2cde4ed21e Merge branch 'dev' of github.com:mulgadc/spinifex into dev 2026-06-19 12:31:19 +10:00
Ben Duncan 63f5520a89 Doc tweaks 2026-06-19 12:31:09 +10:00
Julian Sommer ad05544075 feat: EC2 capacity reservations — launch into reservation (#397) 2026-06-19 12:25:50 +10:00
Josh Siviour f9858d4e5d test(e2e): ECR end-to-end suite (control plane + docker/crane/skopeo) (#398)
* test(e2e): add ECR end-to-end suite (control plane + docker/crane/skopeo)

New tests/e2e/ecr/ suite plus harness support:
- harness: ECR SDK client, control-plane helpers (repo CRUD, get-login-password,
  describe-images), and docker/crane/skopeo CLI wrappers that skip when the
  binary or registry-host resolution is absent.
- suite: control-plane CRUD + policy + lifecycle round-trip; docker login/push/
  pull; crane append/pull and skopeo copy exercising the Bearer /v2/token flow.
- registered e2e-ecr in the Makefile + service manifest.

Predastore capacity/load leg is a skipped placeholder pending mulga-siv-359/356.

* test(e2e): carry awsgw port in ECR registry host for dev clusters

Dev clusters bind awsgw on a non-standard port (e.g. 9999); production uses
:443. ECRRegistryHost now appends SPINIFEX_ECR_PORT when set so docker/crane/
skopeo address the right endpoint, and RequireRegistryResolves strips the port
before DNS lookup.
2026-06-19 11:34:38 +10:00
Josh Siviour 188e7459e3 fix(ecr): negotiate manifest media type across all Accept headers (#399)
getManifest read only the first Accept header line via r.Header.Get, so
clients that send each acceptable manifest media type as a separate Accept
header (skopeo) never matched the stored type and got 406 MANIFEST_INVALID.
Join all Accept header values before negotiation.
2026-06-19 11:34:21 +10:00
Julian Sommer 003b2bc420 chore: switch to single default PR template 2026-06-19 11:22:36 +10:00
Julian Sommer b1b7d4196f chore: cleanup .gitignore 2026-06-19 11:13:16 +10:00
Julian Sommer 29ff386af2 chore: add PR Templates 2026-06-19 11:04:20 +10:00
Josh Siviour bd77ea8ee1 feat: ECR OCI /v2/token endpoint + Bearer challenge (#396)
Add the Docker Registry v2 token endpoint (GET /v2/token) and switch the
/v2 401 challenge from Basic to a Bearer realm pointing at it. The endpoint
verifies the caller's existing AWS:<jwt> credential and re-mints a fresh
full-TTL token, providing the token-refresh path for OCI clients (docker,
crane, skopeo). The auth bridge still accepts Basic AWS:<jwt> directly.
2026-06-19 10:32:32 +10:00
Josh Siviour 5d9e948b31 feat: set EBS volume-id as virtio-blk serial on attach (#395)
Stamp the dash-stripped volume-id (vol+17hex = 20 bytes, the virtio-blk
serial limit) as the hotplug disk serial so the EBS CSI node plugin can
locate the device via /dev/disk/by-id and match lsblk SERIAL.
2026-06-19 10:21:58 +10:00
Josh Siviour 1eda1ce88b feat: ECR background lifecycle expiry sweep (#394)
* feat: ECR background lifecycle expiry sweep

Add a gateway-side periodic sweep (LifecycleSweeper) that applies each repo's
stored lifecycle policy: it evaluates the shared rule engine against the repo's
current images and deletes the expired set through the existing registry GC
reclaim path (DeleteImage -> reclaimManifest). It runs in the gateway because
only the gateway holds a Registry (object store + meta); the daemon owns the KV
but cannot reclaim predastore bytes. Launched on the STS janitor's lifetime
context in awsgw, enumerating ACTIVE IAM accounts.

Per repo: skip when no policy; evaluate; then before deleting, re-read the
current tag set and skip any image whose tags changed since evaluation
(optimistic-concurrency guard against concurrent push/re-tag). Cross-repo blob
mount safety is provided by reclaimManifest/referencedDigests. Per-item errors
are logged and skipped so one bad repo never aborts the cycle.

* test: cover lifecycle sweeper Run loop and active-account filter

Add tests for LifecycleSweeper.Run ticker loop, NewLifecycleSweeper
interval fallback, and sweepRepo error branches. Extract accountLister
interface so activeAccountIDs is unit-testable. Raises diff coverage
on the sweep changes from 53.4% to 76.9%.
2026-06-19 10:03:21 +10:00
Julian Sommer e977683195 fix: imds e2e harness 2026-06-19 09:29:36 +10:00
Josh Siviour 2053b07878 feat: ECR lifecycle policies (CRUD + evaluation engine + preview) (#393)
* feat: ECR lifecycle policies (CRUD + evaluation engine + preview)

Implement PutLifecyclePolicy/GetLifecyclePolicy/DeleteLifecyclePolicy and
StartLifecyclePolicyPreview/GetLifecyclePolicyPreview, replacing the
NotImplemented stubs. A pure rule-evaluation engine parses the AWS
lifecycle-policy JSON and, given a repo's images, returns the ordered set that
would expire; each image is claimed by at most one rule (lowest rulePriority
first). Preview is served synchronously and deletes nothing.

Lifecycle-policy documents persist as a per-repo KV doc (repos/<name>/lifecycle)
over the ecr.lifecycle.* NATS subjects, mirroring the repo-policy storage stack,
and cascade on DeleteRepository. The console gains a Lifecycle tab with a policy
editor and a preview table over the saved policy.

The background expiry sweep that applies the engine and deletes images via GC is
deferred to mulga-siv-387.

* feat: client-side JSON validation in ECR policy editors

Swap the raw Textarea in the repository-policy and lifecycle-policy editors for
the shared JsonEditor (blur-time pretty-print) and gate Save on isValidJson,
showing an inline error for malformed JSON — matching the IAM/EKS editors. The
backend remains the source of truth for schema validation.
2026-06-19 08:42:28 +10:00
Josh Siviour a65843daa5 feat: ECR image tag mutability (immutable tags) (#392)
Honor, persist and echo imageTagMutability on CreateRepository and
DescribeRepositories instead of the hardcoded MUTABLE, and implement
PutImageTagMutability to flip a repository between MUTABLE and IMMUTABLE.

Enforce immutability at the shared StoreManifest chokepoint: on an
IMMUTABLE repo, re-tagging an existing tag onto a different digest is
rejected before any write (OCI 409 TAG_IMMUTABLE; JSON PutImage maps to
ImageTagAlreadyExistsException). Same-digest re-pushes, new tags and
digest references are still allowed.

Console: migrate the repository detail page to Summary/Images/Permissions
tabs and add a tag-immutability toggle on the Summary tab.
2026-06-19 00:19:16 +10:00
Josh Siviour 8cae94c715 feat(ui): ECR console — repositories, images, push commands, policy editor (#391)
Add a Repositories section to the Spinifex console backed by the ECR
control plane:

- getEcrClient() factory + @aws-sdk/client-ecr dependency
- queries/ecr.ts: repositories, per-repo images, repository policy
- mutations/ecr.ts: create/delete repository, batch-delete image,
  set/delete repository policy
- Routes under /ecr/list-repositories: list (table + create dialog +
  delete) and detail ($id: images table + delete-image + push-commands
  snippet + policy editor)
- ECR group + Repositories entry in the sidebar

Component tests cover the list, detail, create dialog, push commands and
policy editor.
2026-06-18 23:46:49 +10:00
Josh Siviour 590942b278 feat(ecr): reclaim manifest objects + GC orphaned blobs on digest delete (#390)
DELETE /v2/{name}/manifests/{digest} was a 202 no-op. Now delete-by-digest
removes the manifest record, deletes the manifest object, and sweeps the
account-wide blob pool: each child blob no longer referenced by any live
manifest is reclaimed, while shared blobs survive.

- DeleteImage (digest path) captures ChildDigests, deletes the manifest object,
  then reclaimManifest() drops orphaned blobs via referencedDigests() (a
  mark-and-sweep over the live manifest set across the account's repos).
- OCI deleteManifest by-digest wired to DeleteImage (real work + 202; 404 on
  unknown). Tag delete stays KV-only so untagged images persist (AWS-faithful).
- Predastore reclaim is best-effort: a failure leaks bytes but never undoes the
  logical delete.
2026-06-18 22:33:59 +10:00
Josh Siviour 2655178cb5 feat(ecr): implement image-management control plane (ListImages, DescribeImages, BatchGetImage, PutImage, BatchDeleteImage) (#389)
Serve the five image-management JSON 1.1 actions inline in ECR_Request,
reusing the gateway-side OCI Registry for manifest bytes:

- ListImages / DescribeImages enumerate images by tag + digest (KV meta).
- BatchGetImage returns verbatim manifest bytes with Q14 partial-failure
  semantics (cap 100, digest wins over tag, 200 + failures array).
- PutImage stores a manifest + tag via a shared StoreManifest core that the
  OCI manifest PUT now delegates to.
- BatchDeleteImage removes tag pointers / manifest meta (blob GC deferred).

Adds DeleteManifestMeta across the MetaStore relay chain and ECR image
error codes.
2026-06-18 22:14:57 +10:00
Josh Siviour 1608ffa465 feat(ecr): implement CreateRepository + DeleteRepository control plane (#388)
Add the two missing repository-lifecycle actions, served inline in
ECR_Request (like DescribeRepositories) since both return the repository
ARN/URI built from the gateway region + internal suffix.

CreateRepository validates the name, guards cross-account registryId,
rejects an existing repo (RepositoryAlreadyExistsException), and writes
the per-account KV meta (predastore bucket stays lazy on first push).

DeleteRepository rejects a non-empty repo without force
(RepositoryNotEmptyException) and cascades the KV records (meta, policy,
tags, manifests). Predastore blob GC is deferred to a separate pass.

Adds MetaStore DeleteRepo + ListManifests with the matching daemon-relayed
subjects, service methods, and NATS client, plus two new awserrors codes.
2026-06-18 21:38:30 +10:00
Josh Siviour 41dc53b7f8 fix(ci): prevent stale suite-status from false-failing e2e re-runs (#387)
The per-run ARTIFACT_DIR lives in /tmp, outside GITHUB_WORKSPACE, so a
re-run on the same self-hosted runner reused a prior attempt's append-only
suite-status.txt. The 'Fail job if any suite failed' gate's -s check then
failed the job even when the surviving attempt passed with rc=0.

Wipe ARTIFACT_DIR in Clean Workspace and gate solely on the per-attempt
steps.e2e.outputs.rc (fail-closed: an empty rc still fails).
2026-06-18 20:58:32 +10:00
Josh Siviour 56f960ebdc fix(ec2): mirror CreateTags/DeleteTags into AMI config (#386)
CreateTags/DeleteTags wrote only the standalone tag store, which
DescribeImages does not read (it reads AMI metadata), so tag mutations on
an AMI were invisible — DeleteTags appeared to be a silent no-op. Mirror
tag add/remove into the owning AMI config (ownership-checked; absent or
foreign AMIs skipped) so DescribeImages reflects them, matching the
existing subnet/vpc mirror.
2026-06-18 18:23:57 +10:00
Josh Siviour 2faad4b9e7 feat(ecr): repository policy passthrough + DescribeRepositories scoping (Sprint 2e) (#385)
Add Set/Get/DeleteRepositoryPolicy as JSON policy-doc passthrough stored at
KV repos/{name}/policy, and DescribeRepositories scoped to the caller account
with registryId override (cross-account denied pending registry-policy v2).

- MetaStore: PutRepoPolicy/GetRepoPolicy/DeleteRepoPolicy (KV + memory)
- NATS surface: ecr.policy.{put,get,delete} + daemon handlers
- gateway/ecrapi: repository-policy control-plane handlers
- gateway: handleDescribeRepositories dispatched inline for region/suffix
- awserrors: RepositoryNotFoundException, RepositoryPolicyNotFoundException
2026-06-18 18:23:22 +10:00
Josh Siviour a4a4288d7d feat(ecr): auth bridge + GetAuthorizationToken JWT (Sprint 2c) (#380)
* feat(ecr): auth bridge + GetAuthorizationToken JWT (Sprint 2c)

Mint a self-contained ES256 JWT from GetAuthorizationToken and verify it on
the /v2 OCI registry via a new ECRAuthBridgeMiddleware (Bearer | Basic AWS:jwt).
Signing keys live in the cluster-replicated awsgw-keys KV bucket under
jwt-signing/{kid}, encrypted with the IAM master key.

The registry is now scoped per-request to the token's account (replacing the
fixed bootstrap account); bucket-ensure is cached per account. Cross-account
token/host mismatch is rejected 403; unauthenticated /v2 access gets a 401
Bearer challenge.

* fix(ecr): use Basic auth challenge on /v2 (not Bearer token-endpoint flow)

ECR authenticates the OCI registry with Basic AWS:<token>; a Bearer realm
made docker chase an unimplemented /v2/token endpoint and fail login.
2026-06-18 17:29:41 +10:00
Julian Sommer 3f592b4a5e fix: alpine image ssh (#384) 2026-06-18 16:58:26 +10:00
Julian Sommer 038927d18e fix: stop NAT Gateway teardown leaking SNAT rule (#383) 2026-06-18 16:27:40 +10:00
Julian Sommer 83e538f2f2 feat: IMDS version discovery, instance-identity document, and cheap metadata routes (#382) 2026-06-18 15:26:14 +10:00
Josh Siviour 3e6dfde7dd feat(ui): inline EKS cluster IAM role creation in wizard (#379)
* feat(ui): inline EKS cluster IAM role creation in wizard

* feat(ui): show trust policy + attached managed policy in EKS role dialog

Render the trust policy with PolicyDocumentViewer (pretty-printed, safe
fallback) instead of a raw read-only textarea, matching the IAM detail
pages. Surface the attached AmazonEKSClusterPolicy ARN so users can see
exactly which permissions the cluster role grants.
2026-06-18 14:01:48 +10:00
Josh Siviour 833456ae09 fix(ui): EKS image banner shows spx admin images import command (#378) 2026-06-18 13:35:04 +10:00
Julian Sommer 941978a28c refactor: consolidate NATS fan-out onto a single utils.Gather (#381) 2026-06-18 13:33:43 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga b0810bd5a1 Merge branch 'dev' of github.com:mulgadc/spinifex into dev 2026-06-18 10:54:04 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga 116a80f0ca fixed up SMCI MIG doc 2026-06-18 10:53:56 +10:00
Josh Siviour 2acb37342d feat(eks): aws-load-balancer-controller addon — real ALB Ingress (L7, IRSA) (#376)
* fix(ec2): stamp subnet AvailabilityZoneId for single-AZ ALB resolution

DescribeSubnets omitted AvailabilityZoneId, so the AWS Load Balancer
Controller's DescribeAvailabilityZones-by-ZoneId lookup resolved no AZ
info ("cannot resolve AZ info for AZs: []") and never built the ALB
model. Stamp the single zone-id on every subnet and share it with
DescribeAvailabilityZones through one SingleZoneID constant so the two
responses can never drift.

* feat(eks): add aws-load-balancer-controller v2.8.1 addon bundle

Baked manifests for the LBC managed addon (CRDs, controller Deployment/
RBAC/webhooks/Service, IngressClass alb, IRSA render markers). Two
wirings make it work against the spinifex gateway:

- --aws-api-endpoints carries sts= alongside elasticloadbalancing/ec2/
  acm. The aws-sdk-go v1 credential bootstrap resolves the STS client
  from the session endpoint resolver, not AWS_ENDPOINT_URL_STS, so the
  web-identity AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity must be pointed at the gateway
  here or it falls back to real AWS STS.
- --feature-gates=ALBSingleSubnet=true drops the ALB minimum subnet
  count from two to one so an ALB provisions in a single-AZ deployment.

* feat(eks): render IRSA into managed addons + node-minted webhook cert

Extend the addon-sync renderer to inject the projected-token / role-arn /
gateway STS-endpoint + CA block into managed-addon pod specs via opt-in
markers, and substitute cluster-name/region/vpc-id/gateway-endpoint/CA
placeholders. Add cmd/eks-webhook-cert: the eks-node AMI has no openssl,
so this mints (then reuses) a self-signed ECDSA-P256 serving cert for the
admission webhook, cached on disk so the render is byte-stable across
ticks. Wire both into the image build (manifest.conf) plus INSTALL_FILES
for the LBC bundle.

* feat(eks): surface cluster VPC id as EKS_VPC_ID for the LB controller

Thread the control-plane VPC id through K3sServerInput.VpcID into the
first-boot EKS_VPC_ID env so the in-cluster aws-load-balancer-controller
can pass --aws-vpc-id to the gateway elbv2/ec2 handlers.

* fix(eks): point the LB controller at the customer VPC + customer-facing gateway

The aws-load-balancer-controller ran with two control-plane-scoped values
that customer worker pods cannot use:

- --aws-vpc-id was set from the managed control-plane VPC (cpRefs.VpcID),
  which the gateway's DescribeVpcs does not return for customer calls, so
  backend-SG auto-create failed with InvalidVpcID.NotFound. Source it from
  meta.ResourcesVpcConfig.VpcId, the customer cluster VPC where the workers
  and their subnets live and where the ALB is provisioned.

- The addon render baked the mgmt gateway endpoint (EKS_GATEWAY_URL /
  SystemGatewayURL) into pod specs, unreachable from worker pods. Add a
  distinct EKS_ADDON_GATEWAY_URL (the customer-facing GatewayBaseURL, same
  host as the OIDC issuer) and substitute it for {{GATEWAY_ENDPOINT}} in
  managed addon manifests. EKS_GATEWAY_URL stays mgmt for the CP's own
  bootstrap, state-report and token-webhook paths.

* fix(elbv2): resolve forward target group from ForwardConfig

listenerActionFromSDK read only the legacy flat Action.TargetGroupArn, so a
forward action carrying its target group via ForwardConfig.TargetGroups (the
shape the aws-load-balancer-controller emits) left the action target empty and
CreateRule/CreateListener rejected it with MissingParameter. Flatten the first
target group from ForwardConfig when the flat field is absent.

* fix(ec2): mirror CreateTags/DeleteTags into subnet/vpc records

The generic S3 tag store and the per-resource KV records are disjoint:
DescribeSubnets/DescribeVpcs read tags from their KV record, while
CreateTags only wrote the generic store. Subnet tags applied after
create were therefore invisible to tag-filtered describes, breaking
aws-load-balancer-controller subnet auto-discovery (kubernetes.io/role/elb).

Write through CreateTags/DeleteTags to the owning subnet/vpc record so
tag-filtered describes observe them. Resource types the VPC service does
not own are skipped; the generic store stays their record of truth.

* test(daemon): pin synthetic capacity in host-dependent allocate tests

TestCanAllocate_CountEdgeCases/Mixed_instance_types and
TestHandleEC2DescribeInstanceTypes/NoFilterReturnsSupportedRegardlessOfAllocation
called rm.allocate against live-detected host capacity. allocate gates on
readMemAvailableGB (live /proc MemAvailable), so a box already running VMs
fails the allocation spuriously, breaking the preflight gate locally.

Pin hostVCPU/hostMemGB/reserved and nil readMemAvailableGB to a synthetic
host, matching the sibling Capacity_decreases_after_allocation subtest.

* fix(eks): route apiserver->pod traffic via agent tunnel (egress-selector cluster)

In the managed-CP topology the apiserver VM sits in the system CP VPC with
no route to the worker pod network in the unpeered customer VPC. k3s default
egress-selector-mode=agent tunnels only apiserver->kubelet, so kubectl
logs/exec work but apiserver->pod traffic (admission webhooks, aggregated
APIs) is attempted directly and times out -- the aws-load-balancer-controller
webhooks fail with context deadline exceeded, blocking Service/Ingress
creation cluster-wide.

Set egress-selector-mode=cluster so apiserver->pod/service traffic routes
through the agent's outbound tunnel, selected by the node hosting the
destination, without requiring inbound CP->worker reachability.

* feat: bump aws-load-balancer-controller addon bundle to v2.11.0

v2.8.1 predates the ALBSingleSubnet feature gate, so single-AZ spinifex
clusters fail Ingress reconcile (subnet resolver dedups to 1 < required 2)
and never provision an ALB. v2.11.0 honors --feature-gates=ALBSingleSubnet=true.

Replace the baked bundle: new CRDs (ingressclassparams + targetgroupbindings),
controller manifest, and image tag v2.11.0, re-applying the spinifex deltas
(IRSA SA annotation, node-minted webhook serving-cert secret, gateway-CA
secret, gateway aws-api-endpoints, caBundle on every webhook clientConfig,
alb IngressClass). Pick up the new ClusterRole configmaps rule. Drop v2.8.1.

* fix: point LBC at the gateway via AWS_ENDPOINT_URL (sdk-v2)

LBC v2.11 uses aws-sdk-go-v2, which keys --aws-api-endpoints on SDK
service IDs (e.g. 'Elastic Load Balancing v2'), not the legacy lowercase
names the bundle passed. Those overrides were silently ignored, so every
non-STS call (ec2/elbv2/acm) went to real AWS and failed TLS against the
gateway CA -- no ALB could provision.

Inject AWS_ENDPOINT_URL in the shared IRSA env block (sdk-v2 global
base-endpoint override; AWS_ENDPOINT_URL_STS still takes precedence for
STS) and drop the dead --aws-api-endpoints flag from the controller args.

* fix: synthesize taggable ARN for default listener rule

Gateway DescribeRules returned the synthetic IsDefault rule with a null
RuleArn. LBC read the arn-less default rule after creating a listener and
issued DescribeTags with an empty resource ARN, which the gateway rejected
with 400 MissingParameter, aborting reconcile.

Set a deterministic RuleArn on the default rule, resolve it back to its
parent listener in DescribeTags (empty tags) and DescribeRules by-arn.
Also disable shield/waf/wafv2 in the LBC bundle to drop unsupported calls.

* feat: inject ELB subnets into alb IngressClassParams for single-AZ ALB

LBC's tag auto-discovery never threads the ALBSingleSubnet feature gate, so a
single-AZ cluster (subnets sharing one AZ) dedups to 1<2 subnets and aborts
Ingress reconcile. Only the explicit-subnet path honors the gate.

Resolve the cluster's ELB-eligible subnets, dedup to one per AZ, and surface
them as EKS_ELB_SUBNET_IDS. The addon sync renders them into the alb
IngressClassParams .spec.subnets.ids so every Ingress takes the explicit path.
An empty set falls back to auto-discovery, preserving the native UX.

* fix: route LBC service clients to gateway via --aws-api-endpoints, link IngressClassParams

Live verification showed two gaps in the LBC addon bundle:

LBC installs a per-client BaseEndpoint resolver, so the global AWS_ENDPOINT_URL
is ignored for the ec2/elbv2/acm clients (calls hit real AWS, failing TLS).
Redirect them with --aws-api-endpoints keyed on the aws-sdk-go-v2 service IDs
(EC2, "Elastic Load Balancing v2", ACM, STS) rather than the legacy lowercase
names the flag never matched. Drop the misleading AWS_ENDPOINT_URL env; the
web-identity STS client still resolves via AWS_ENDPOINT_URL_STS.

The injected IngressClassParams was orphaned: the alb IngressClass had no
.spec.parameters, so LBC fell back to subnet auto-discovery (which fails on a
single-AZ cluster). Link the IngressClass to the IngressClassParams so the
explicit-subnet path is taken.

* fix: stamp EKS-parity providerID on worker nodes for LBC ip targets

k3s registers workers with providerID k3s://<name>, which the AWS Load
Balancer Controller rejects (providerID invalid for EC2 instances) when
resolving nodes for ip-mode target registration. Resolve the instance-id and
AZ from IMDSv2 at agent boot and set --kubelet-arg=provider-id=aws:///<az>/<id>
so LBC can map the node to its EC2 instance. On any IMDS miss the agent keeps
the default providerID and still starts.

* fix(elbv2): honor SubnetMappings in CreateLoadBalancer

LBC supplies ALB subnets via SubnetMappings, not the plain Subnets list.
createLoadBalancer only read input.Subnets, so ENI allocation was skipped,
VpcId/AZ stayed empty, and the HAProxy data-plane VM never launched — the
ALB went active but could not serve traffic. Add flattenSubnetIDs to read
both sources and reuse it in createLoadBalancer and desiredSubnetSet.

* fix(vm): capture GCInterval before spawning GC goroutine

TestStart_SweepsImmediatelyThenStopsOnCtxCancel mutates the package global
GCInterval and restores it in a defer, racing the Start goroutine's read at
time.NewTicker(GCInterval) under -race. Read GCInterval on the caller's
goroutine into a local before spawning so the global access is ordered with
the test's defer; the goroutine touches only the captured local.
2026-06-18 10:53:05 +10:00
Josh Siviour 332087fccc feat: OCI Distribution v2 blob + manifest storage (#375)
* feat: implement OCI Distribution v2 blob and manifest storage

Replace the /v2/* 501 stub with a real path-parsing dispatcher and
content-addressable storage for the ECR registry surface:

- Blob upload (monolithic + chunked PATCH), HEAD/GET, cross-repo mount,
  and cancel, with server-side sha256 verification on finalize.
- Manifest PUT with type-aware shallow validation (image manifest blob
  existence; image index child-manifest existence + mediaType match),
  byte-for-byte GET with stored Content-Type, HEAD, and tag delete.
- Tag list and account-scoped catalog.

Blob and manifest bytes stream straight to predastore; repo, tag,
manifest and in-progress-upload metadata live in a per-account
JetStream KV bucket with optimistic-concurrency CAS on uploads. Chunks
are buffered to a temp upload object and reassembled on finalize, since
predastore exposes no append primitive through the shared object-store
interface. Adds HeadObject to the objectstore abstraction.

Refs: mulgadc/mulga#73

* refactor(ecr): route registry metadata through NATS daemon handlers

The gateway no longer talks JetStream KV directly. The daemon owns the
per-account KV via a MetaService bound to ecr.* request/reply subjects;
the gateway is a NATS client (NATSMetaStore). Blob and manifest bytes
still stream gateway-to-predastore directly.

Also fixes four registry review findings:
- finishUpload: clean up the temp object and upload record on a blob
  store failure so the uuid is reusable and no partial blob lingers.
- patchUpload: commit the appended bytes and advanced hash state under a
  single KV CAS keyed per write, so a racing PATCH is rejected (409)
  rather than corrupting the assembled bytes; the verified digest always
  matches the stored bytes.
- cancelUpload: delete both the temp bytes and the record, 204 on
  success, 404 on unknown uuid, no dead branch.
- getManifest: return MANIFEST_INVALID (not MANIFEST_UNKNOWN) for a 406
  Accept media-type mismatch.

Refs: mulgadc/mulga#73

* fix(ecr): provision account predastore bucket on demand

OCI blob/manifest writes target ecr-{accountID}, which nothing created,
so every push failed with a backend 403. Add idempotent EnsureBucket to
the object store (HeadBucket -> CreateBucket, swallowing already-owned)
and ensure it once per process at the top of the registry ServeHTTP, so
ECR storage appears transparently like AWS-managed ECR.

* fix(ecr): sanitize ':' from predastore blob/manifest object keys

predastore mis-canonicalizes SigV4 for object keys containing ':', so
writes/reads of content-addressable keys (sha256:<hex>) were rejected
403 (reproducible with the aws CLI too). Route BlobKey and ManifestKey
digests through DigestToken so the object key carries no ':' separator.
2026-06-18 10:51:26 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga aa46943e0a fixed up SMCI MIG doc 2026-06-18 10:49:43 +10:00
Julian Sommer 996eb370f3 feat: Capacity Reservations (#377) 2026-06-18 10:44:21 +10:00
Julian Sommer 28c6e8ccff chore: bump CI time 2026-06-18 10:44:01 +10:00
Josh Siviour 167c93b1c7 feat: ECR TLS SAN wildcard + hostmatch host-routing middleware (#374)
Implement the registry host-routing middleware so /v2/* requests addressed
at {accountID}.dkr.ecr.{region}.{suffix} carry the parsed target account and
region on the request context; non-registry hosts pass through unchanged.

Add cluster-wide AWS-parity config (aws.region, aws.internal_suffix) with
defaults, and append the AWS-parity ECR SANs (exact control-plane host plus
*.dkr wildcard) to the awsgw server certificate during cert generation.

Refs: mulgadc/mulga#78
2026-06-17 23:36:06 +10:00
Josh Siviour a1c307a128 feat: scaffold ECR control-plane + OCI registry gateway (501 stubs) (#373)
* feat: scaffold ECR control-plane + OCI registry gateway with 501 stubs

Add the ECR HTTP surface on awsgw as compiling skeletons that return
NotImplemented, so later work can call into the packages against a fixed
contract.

- gateway/ecrapi: ECR control plane (AWS JSON 1.1, X-Amz-Target). Full action
  namespace registered; every action resolves to a shared 501 stub.
- gateway/ecr: OCI Distribution v2 (/v2/*). Catch-all 501 with the OCI error
  envelope; GET /v2/ is live for the registry version-check probe.
- gateway/hostmatch: no-op host-routing middleware skeleton for the registry
  host group.
- handlers/ecr/storage: per-account bucket + object-key layout constants.
- gateway wiring: ecr in supportedServices, dispatch case, JSON 1.1 error
  branch, and /v2 mounted outside the SigV4 group.

* test: cover ECR scaffolding packages for diff-coverage gate

In-package tests for gateway_ecr, gateway_ecrapi, and handlers/ecr so the new
code reports coverage under its own package profile. Diff coverage 76.5%.
2026-06-17 20:47:38 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga 42db84184d Merge branch 'dev' of github.com:mulgadc/spinifex into dev 2026-06-17 16:45:25 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga a396e1bd30 updating SMCI docs 2026-06-17 16:45:04 +10:00
Julian Sommer d88783d5bf feat: ui json formatting 2026-06-17 16:02:48 +10:00
Julian Sommer eced3f733a feat: split IAM e2e (#372) 2026-06-17 15:06:16 +10:00
Julian Sommer b99b46c18c chore: consistent ui malformed json rejection 2026-06-17 14:37:56 +10:00
Julian Sommer 9288ecc7dc chore: delete no op tests + speedup e2e 2026-06-17 12:19:13 +10:00
Julian Sommer 5c0c9ed173 chore: fix favicon 2026-06-17 11:35:01 +10:00
Julian Sommer 058da3eff4 fix(viperblockd): seal volume block-map to predastore on detach + durability e2es (#371) 2026-06-17 11:24:03 +10:00
Julian Sommer 89ec47a69b chore: update COMMANDS.md 2026-06-17 10:20:31 +10:00
Julian Sommer 2e9501524b feat(e2e): more e2e coverage (#365) 2026-06-17 09:52:50 +10:00
Josh Siviour 67092d40be fix(workbooks): split EKS demo workloads into separate root module (#370)
The kubernetes provider in the eks-quickstart, eks-addons-access and
eks-https-ingress workbooks was configured from the managed cluster
resource (host = aws_eks_cluster.this.endpoint). On destroy the endpoint
resolved empty, the provider fell back to localhost:80, and refreshing
kubernetes_deployment_v1.hello / kubernetes_service_v1.hello failed with
'dial tcp [::1]:80: connect: connection refused'.

Move the kubernetes provider and the hello Deployment + Service into a
nested workloads/ root module with its own state. It reads cluster
identity from the parent via terraform_remote_state and the live
endpoint/CA from a data aws_eks_cluster source, so the provider is only
ever configured while the cluster exists. Apply parent then workloads;
destroy workloads then parent.
2026-06-16 21:48:56 +10:00
Josh Siviour da0f10015c fix(eks): stop leaking cluster SGs that pin the customer VPC on teardown (#369)
purgeClusterInfra stranded the cluster security groups two ways, leaving
the nodegroup/control-plane SGs (which live in the customer VPC) behind to
pin aws_vpc destroy on DependencyViolation:

  * an early return before the SG cleanup block skipped DeleteClusterSGs
    whenever any earlier best-effort step (NLB / ENI / VM / EIP) errored;
  * DeleteClusterSGs failures were warn-and-swallowed, so a nodegroup SG
    still referenced by a terminating worker's ENI leaked while the cluster
    completed deletion — no reaper retry ever fired.

Surface DeleteClusterSGs / DeleteClusterCPVPC / DeleteClusterIGW failures
into teardownErrs and gate the KV sweep on them, so a leaked VPC-pinning SG
keeps the cluster DELETING for a retry. Add a bounded DependencyViolation
retry to the SG delete (mirroring deleteENIAwaitingTerminate) to ride out
the worker-ENI-detach race in the common case.

Fixes the manual 'revoke rules + delete SGs before the VPC will destroy'
teardown step.
2026-06-16 21:20:05 +10:00
Josh Siviour bc9556d1a9 fix(eks): managed-CP worker data-plane — apiserver reachability, node-local CoreDNS, SG teardown (#368)
* fix: persist instance TagSpecifications in RunInstance

RunInstance built the ec2.Instance metadata but never read
input.TagSpecifications, so DescribeInstances returned untagged
instances and tag filters matched nothing. EKS node groups discover
their workers by the spinifex:eks-cluster / spinifex:eks-nodegroup
tags, so scale-up convergence and worker reconciliation depended on
tags that were silently dropped.

Apply instance-scoped TagSpecifications onto the built instance so the
tags surface through DescribeInstances and tag filters.

* fix: serialize nodegroup reconcile via CAS to prevent scale overshoot

UpdateNodegroupConfig is dispatched on a queue group, so two
overlapping requests (e.g. an SDK retry mid-flight) each read
current = len(InstanceIDs) and each launched desired-current workers,
overshooting the target (1 -> 5 for desired=3) and stranding untracked
VMs via last-writer-wins on the unconditional PutNodegroupRecord.

Make every durable nodegroup-record mutation a compare-and-swap on the
KV revision. Scale-up launches one worker at a time and CAS-appends it
only while the record is below the live ScalingDesired, terminating any
surplus VM launched into an already-full record. Scale-down terminates
before the CAS truncation so a crash or retry leaves reclaimable dead
IDs rather than orphaned VMs. A concurrent regression test asserts two
overlapping scale-ups converge to exactly desired under -race.

* fix: return securityGroupRuleSet from AuthorizeSecurityGroup ingress/egress

The AWS provider's aws_vpc_security_group_ingress_rule reads
SecurityGroupRules[0].SecurityGroupRuleId on create; an empty ruleset
panics the plugin (Plugin did not respond), though the rule applies
server-side. Echo the created rules via sgRuleToSecurityGroupRule, the
same shape DescribeSecurityGroupRules already returns.

* fix: surface InsufficientInstanceCapacity from nodegroup scale, not 500

launchWorkersCAS wrapped the bare awserror code via fmt.Errorf, so the
gateway ErrorHandler's exact-match against ErrorLookup missed and remapped
to InternalError (500). An out-of-capacity scale now surfaces the real
InsufficientInstanceCapacity code (400); opaque internal failures still
wrap and stay 500. Adds awserrors.HasErrorCode for the membership test.

* fix: cut EKS node boot ~50s — drop cloud-final deadlock + syslinux menu

Worker/server user-data runcmd ended with `[ rc-service, local, start ]`,
which runs inside cloud-final while the OpenRC `local` service is ordered
after it — a deadlock broken only by OpenRC's ~50s start timeout, stalling
the k3s join. Run the IMDS route script directly instead and keep
`rc-update add local default` for reboot persistence.

setup.sh: cut the SYSLINUX boot-menu countdown 10s->~1s (kept nonzero so the
menu stays interruptible over serial).

Validated live on env19 CP: boot menu 1s, no `waiting for cloud-final`
stall, apiserver ready ~66s (was ~109s+).

mulga-siv-332

* feat: add argocd managed addon + bake bundle into eks-node AMI

The addon catalog advertised coredns and aws-load-balancer-controller, but
the only baked manifest shipped in the eks-node AMI was the spinifex-noop
fixture. Installing any real addon failed with 'no baked bundle for version'
once the VM-side renderer found nothing on disk.

Add argocd v3.0.23 as a real, demonstrable managed addon: catalog entry (no
IRSA), a flattened namespaced install manifest baked into the AMI, and the
manifest.conf bake line. The eks-addons-access workbook switches from coredns
(redundant on K3s, never baked) to argocd.

The baked bundle is generated from upstream install.yaml via kubectl kustomize
with namespace: argocd plus a prepended Namespace, since upstream is
namespace-agnostic and K3s auto-deploy applies with no -n flag.

* fix(eks): run CoreDNS as a node-local DaemonSet for worker DNS

k3s ships CoreDNS as a single-replica Deployment that tolerates the CP taint
and strands itself on the control-plane node. In the managed-CP topology the
worker<->CP pod overlay cannot cross the VPC boundary, so worker pods cannot
reach a CP-resident CoreDNS and lose all cluster + external DNS.

Skip the bundled CoreDNS (coredns.yaml.skip, staged in k3s.initd like traefik)
and deploy a Mulga-owned variant: a DaemonSet (one pod per node) plus kube-dns
internalTrafficPolicy=Local, so every node resolves via its own CoreDNS. Immune
to the cross-VPC overlay gap and topology-agnostic (single-node and managed-CP
both work). Image-side only; no handler change.

* fix(eks): revoke cross-referencing SG rules before delete on teardown

DeleteClusterSGs deleted the control-plane and nodegroup SGs directly, but they
cross-reference each other (EnsureNodegroupSGRules), and AWS refuses to delete a
security group still referenced by another SG's rule. Both deletes failed with
DependencyViolation, the SGs leaked, and the VPC could not be deleted (tofu
destroy hung on DeleteVpc).

Resolve both SG IDs, revoke all ingress on each to break the cp<->ng cycle, then
delete both. Adds RevokeSecurityGroupIngress to sgProvisioner (already on
VPCServiceImpl) and revokeAllSGIngress, with a regression test that models AWS's
DependencyViolation.

* fix(eks): advertise NLB front-end so worker pods reach the apiserver ClusterIP

In the managed-control-plane topology the apiserver advertised its Set-B
node-ip into the in-cluster `kubernetes` Endpoints. That IP lives in the
unpeered CP VPC and is unreachable from worker pods, so every worker pod
using the apiserver ClusterIP (CoreDNS kubernetes-plugin sync, controllers,
argocd redis secret-init) failed.

- k3s_server_vm.go: set advertise-address to the worker-reachable NLB
  front-end (PrivateEndpointIP, else EndpointIP); both are already cert SANs.
- nlb.go: add a second :6443 listener on the cluster NLB (same CP target
  group) so PrivateEndpointIP:6443 — the advertised endpoint — is served.
- security_groups.go: admit :6443 on the private-endpoint SG.

Validated on a live managed-CP cluster: worker CoreDNS /ready 200, all argocd
pods Running, kubectl logs on worker pods working.
2026-06-16 20:27:21 +10:00
Josh Siviour cba1ecceaf fix: route EKS DisassociateAccessPolicy policyArn path segment (#367)
The DisassociateAccessPolicy route regex terminated at
/access-entries/{principalArn}/access-policies, but the AWS EKS REST API
sends the policy ARN as the final path segment:

  DELETE /clusters/{name}/access-entries/{principalArn}/access-policies/{policyArn}

The route never matched, so the gateway returned InvalidActionException
(seen as a 400 on 'tofu destroy' of aws_eks_access_policy_association).
The handler also read policyArn from the request body, which AWS leaves
empty for this DELETE.

Capture policyArn as a third path param and pass it through to the input,
dropping the body read. Update route and wrapper tests accordingly.
2026-06-16 16:37:44 +10:00
Josh Siviour c22a6f4ffc fix: install chrony on host via curl|bash setup path (#366)
The host clock needs an NTP daemon; without one it drifts and SigV4 request
signatures fall outside the skew window, kicking the web console back to /login.
Mirrors the ISO rootfs (iso-builder packages.list) so both host-install paths
ship the same software. Guest VMs track the host via kvm-clock.

Bug: mulga-siv-335
2026-06-16 16:03:34 +10:00
Ben Duncan 0dc5c97ba9 Draft doc feedback 2026-06-16 14:42:13 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga 362e1f42c1 Merge branch 'dev' of github.com:mulgadc/spinifex into dev 2026-06-16 12:17:52 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga e2782ede44 chore: first draft of SMCI MIG writeup 2026-06-16 12:17:45 +10:00
Josh Siviour 9a474220ce fix: preserve terminated-instance describe-visibility window in GC reaper (#363)
* fix: preserve terminated-instance describe-visibility window in GC reaper

The TerminatedTeardownReaper purged a terminated record the moment it drove
the instance's pending NAT/OVN teardown to done. Normal terminations always
arrive NAT/OVN-pending, so the first 2m GC sweep completed and purged them
immediately, removing the instance from DescribeInstances before clients could
observe state=terminated — an AWS-compat divergence that flaked e2e-single
TestRunInstancesMultiCount.

Stamp TerminatedAt on transition and purge a completed record only once it is
older than a 15m visibility window; fresher records are left to the terminated
bucket's 1h TTL, keeping the instance describable as terminated. The ADR-0003
§3 purge-on-completion invariants still hold (their seeded records predate the
window). Closes mulga-siv-328.

* test(e2e): poll intra-SG east-west ping until L2 converges

TestSameSGComms fired a single un-retried 'ping -c 3 -W 2' immediately after
the source instance's SSH became reachable, but the ICMP target is the
destination's east-west data plane. Two instances boot in parallel and the
destination guest NIC / OVN port flows come up several seconds after the EC2
running transition the launch waits on. When the probe wins that race the
source kernel reports 'Destination Host Unreachable' (ARP unresolved), not an
ACL drop, and the test flaked.

Replace the one-shot ping with pingConverged, a bounded poll that retries
until 0% packet loss or 45s. A genuine self-ingress/datapath break still
stays at 100% loss for the full window and fails, so coverage is preserved.
2026-06-16 11:38:05 +10:00
Julian Sommer 1f7adcc4dd chore: more e2e tests for IAM + STS + IMDS (#364) 2026-06-16 11:11:12 +10:00
Julian Sommer 30871edc05 release: update go.mod for v1.8.0 2026-06-16 09:32:18 +10:00
Julian Sommer 5cb73d83db chore: rebuild frontend with latest deps 2026-06-16 09:06:50 +10:00
dependabot[bot] 5f166b8197 chore: bump the npm-dependencies group (#360) 2026-06-16 08:58:38 +10:00
dependabot[bot] 4bc788ca51 chore: bump the go-dependencies group with 4 updates (#359) 2026-06-16 08:57:51 +10:00
Josh Siviour 129bfc0fb5 feat(eks): join nodegroup workers via cluster NLB endpoint + private endpoint access (#362)
* feat: join nodegroup workers via cluster NLB endpoint

Under the Set-B managed-CP-VPC topology the control plane runs in the
system-account CP VPC while nodegroup workers launch in the customer
VPC. The agent user-data set K3S_URL to the in-VPC control-plane ENI IP
(:6443), which sits in a different, unpeered VPC and is unreachable, so
the join path was dead.

Point K3S_URL at the published cluster NLB endpoint (meta.Endpoint,
https://<frontend-ip>:443, the :443->:6443 listener kubectl already
uses). Guard CreateNodegroup on a non-empty endpoint.

mulga-siv-298

* feat: gate nodegroup ACTIVE on workers registering Ready

launchNodegroupInfra flipped the nodegroup to ACTIVE the moment
RunInstances returned, so a worker that booted but never joined left the
nodegroup falsely ACTIVE with no usable capacity.

Gate ACTIVE on the cluster's Ready-node count (meta.NodeCount, refreshed
by the cluster reconciler from the CP NATS state report — Ready nodes
only) rising by the desired worker count over the create-time baseline.
On timeout the nodegroup is marked CREATE_FAILED with its instance IDs
retained for the reclaim path. Mirrors the CP reconciler's
healthy-observe gating. Bounded by injectable timeout/poll knobs.

mulga-siv-299

* feat(eks): private endpoint access via cross-account Set A ENI

Make EndpointPrivateAccess real: in-VPC workers and kubectl reach the
control plane through a customer-VPC (Set A) resident ENI on the cluster
NLB's LB VM, removing the public-NLB hairpin and the NAT-GW egress path.

Teardown: the Set A ENI is an extra cross-account NIC on the LB VM, not
its primary, so the instance-terminate cascade never reclaims it. Detach
(store-clear) the stale attachment before deleting, so private clusters
delete cleanly instead of looping on InvalidNetworkInterface.InUse.

Refs: mulga-siv-301

* fix(vpc): honor SecurityGroupRuleIds in RevokeSecurityGroup ingress/egress

Modern Terraform (aws_vpc_security_group_ingress_rule) revokes per-rule
resources by SecurityGroupRuleId with empty IpPermissions. The handlers
only read IpPermissions, so they returned success while removing nothing;
the surviving SG-reference rule then pinned both SGs undeletable
(DependencyViolation), deadlocking destroy of mutually-referencing SGs.

Resolve SecurityGroupRuleIds to their stored rules and remove them
(malformed -> InvalidSecurityGroupRuleId.Malformed, absent -> NotFound).

Refs: mulga-siv-321

* fix(vpc): reap the main route table on DeleteVpc

CreateVpc auto-creates a main route table and DeleteRouteTable refuses to
delete a main RT (AWS-faithful), so nothing reclaimed it — every deleted
VPC leaked one orphaned main RT in the rtb KV bucket. DeleteVpc now reaps
the VPC's main route table before deleting the VPC record.

Refs: mulga-siv-322

* fix: make AttachRolePolicy and AssociateRouteTable atomic via KV CAS

Concurrent writes to a single role / route table record used a blind
read-modify-Put with no optimistic-concurrency guard, so parallel writers
racing from the same revision clobbered each other and lost updates.
Verified on env19: three parallel policy attachments to one node role kept
only one; two parallel subnet associations to one route table kept only
one (the provider then timed out waiting for state 'associated').

Route the mutating paths (AttachRolePolicy/DetachRolePolicy,
AssociateRouteTable/DisassociateRouteTable) through a revision-guarded
Update + bounded retry, matching the existing accountCounterBucket CAS
idiom. Add concurrent regression tests covering both lost updates.

* docs: add EKS Terraform workbooks (quickstart, addons-access, https-ingress)

Three OpenTofu workbooks demonstrating EKS on Spinifex, each ending in a
browsable load-balanced demo app:
- eks-quickstart: minimal single-node cluster + NodePort demo
- eks-addons-access: CoreDNS managed addon + access-entry RBAC
- eks-https-ingress: 3-node cluster behind an HTTPS ALB terminating TLS
  with an ACM-imported self-signed certificate

Each covers the Spinifex-specific endpoints, the auto-managed worker SG
NodePort pattern, and the omitted addon_version constraint.
2026-06-16 00:59:36 +10:00
Josh Siviour 1873f45d26 Resilient resource lifecycle (ADR-0001..0006): EKS multi-node teardown, idempotent deletes, GC backstops (#357)
* fix: idempotent Delete* across VPC family + volume (RLC1)

Delete handlers now return empty success when the resource is already
absent (nats.ErrKeyNotFound), instead of *NotFound. Transient read
errors still map to ServerInternal. Covers DeleteVpc, DeleteSubnet,
DeleteSecurityGroup, DeleteNetworkInterface, DeleteInternetGateway,
DeleteNatGateway, DeleteRouteTable and DeleteVolume.

Makes destroy retries converge instead of failing mid-graph, removing a
source of orphaned/zombie resources between deploys. Adds a
TestRLC1_*DeleteIdempotentOnAbsent invariant per package and updates the
daemon delegation table; supersedes the old absent->NotFound tests.

* feat: prune orphan ENI LSPs in reconcile applyPorts (ADR-0003 §4)

applyPorts was create-or-update only, so a guest LSP whose
spinifex:eni_id no longer maps to an intent ENI survived instance
terminate and VM-host reinstall — the orphan-LSP capacity-drift root
cause. It now takes pruneOrphans (mirroring applySGs): on a full
reconcile it lists LSPs and tears down each managed ENI port absent from
intent via the composed topology.DeletePort cascade (clears port-group
memberships, then deletes the LSP). The apply-only startup path does not
prune, preserving in-flight ports until subscribers converge.

Adds ListLogicalSwitchPorts to the OVN client (live + mock). Invariant
TestRLC5_OrphanLSPPrunedAfterReconcile guards ADR-0003 §4; a startup-race
test guards the apply-only path.

* feat: idempotent + tracked instance terminate (ADR-0003 §1/§2)

Make terminate idempotent across all three layers and break the
un-terminable-ENI deadlock, and record per-dependency teardown so the
GC backstop can later tell a fully-reaped instance from a dangling one.

- vm.Manager.Terminate: absent / already-terminated / shutting-down now
  return nil instead of NotFound / invalid-transition (ADR-0003 §2).
- VM.Teardown map + teardown.go marks: sync steps stamped Done/Failed via
  cleaner error returns; fire-and-forget OVN LSP and NAT rule stamped
  Pending for the reconciler / GC reaper (ADR-0003 §1).
- InstanceCleaner: DeleteVolumes / ReleasePublicIP / DetachAndDeleteENI /
  RemoveFromPlacementGroup / ReleaseGPU now return error.
- vpc ForceDeleteInstanceENI bypasses the in-use guard for the owning
  instance, breaking the failed-detach deadlock; plain delete still
  rejects an in-use ENI held by another instance.
- gateway TerminateInstances: KV-health-gated idempotent absence (a failed
  terminated-bucket query does not fabricate success, ADR-0003 §3).
- Invariants: TestRLC1_TerminateIdempotentOnAbsent, TestRLC4 teardown-map
  stamping + failed-dependency, TestRLC_ENINonDeadlock.

* feat: reconciler GC backstop framework + terminated-teardown reaper (ADR-0003 §3)

Add the shared reality->desired garbage-collection framework (inverse of
Restore) and its first reaper, closing the gap 295.3 deferred: nothing
retried pending/failed teardown or purged the terminated record when its
dependents reached done.

- vm/gc.go: GarbageCollector + Reaper interface (Class/Scope/Sweep).
  KV-health gated — holds and alarms when the desired-state cannot be
  trusted, never reaps against it. ClusterWide reapers run only on the
  elected leader (optional elector); NodeLocal run on every node. Start
  sweeps immediately then every GCInterval.
- vm/teardown_reaper.go: TerminatedTeardownReaper (node-local). Scans this
  node's terminated records, re-drives each not-done dependent through the
  idempotent cleaner, and purges the record once all reach done. Records
  already complete on arrival are left to the bucket's 1h TTL.
- StateStore gains DeleteTerminatedInstance (JetStream impl already existed).
- daemon: wires the GC after the pending watchdog, gated on a cheap
  JetStream AccountInfo health probe.
- Cluster OVN-LSP arm already lands via the reconciler drift prune (295.2).
- Invariants: TestRLC5_GCRetriesPendingTeardownToDoneThenPurges,
  TestRLC5_GCNeverPurgesIncompleteRecord, TestRLC5_GCHoldsWhenKVDegraded,
  TestRLC5_GCSkipsOtherNodesRecords.

* feat: VPC-family dependency guards (ADR-0004 rule #3)

DeleteSubnet blocks while a live ENI attachment (a resident instance)
remains; available/orphan ENIs do not pin it. DeleteNetworkInterface
guards on the structured attachment (eniIsLiveAttachment), not a bare
in-use string. DeleteNatGateway blocks while a live route table forwards
to it and disassociates its EIP keeping the allocation (AWS parity);
CreateNatGateway now marks the EIP associated so the disassociate is
real and a second NAT GW cannot reuse the allocation.

Binding invariants: TestRLC3 dependency-guard completeness across the
subnet/ENI/NAT-gateway handlers.

* feat: EBS volume data-safety GC override (ADR-0005)

The shared GC backstop reaps actual-desired for every other class; for
volumes that default is forbidden because they carry customer data. Add
VolumeLeakReaper (node-local, rides the 295.5 GC): it marks a volume left
attached to a definitively-gone instance as orphaned (a non-destructive
tag) and alarms, but NEVER issues a delete. The daemon feeds it only this
node's terminated instances whose volumes-teardown failed, so the shared
predastore scan can never false-mark another node's live-instance volume.

DeleteVolume idempotency + the detach/snapshot guards + the
DeleteOnTermination teardown retry already landed (295.1/295.3/295.5).

Binding invariants: TestRLC5 (GC marks+alarms, never deletes data),
TestRLC3 (detach-before-delete).

* test(elbv2): lock ADR-0002 §3 live-only TG in-use guard (mulga-siv-295.4)

* feat(eks): idempotent DeleteCluster on absent + ADR-0006 lifecycle invariants (mulga-siv-295.8)

DeleteCluster returns empty success when the cluster meta is already swept
(Common Resource Lifecycle Contract #1), so tofu destroy retries converge.
Adds TestRLC1 (idempotent delete), TestRLC2 (billable-before-KV-sweep ordering)
and TestRLC3 (NLB target-group no-orphan, riding ADR-0002/172).

* fix(eks): GC reaper terminates orphan control-plane VM after cluster delete (mulga-siv-294)

A normal DeleteCluster can leave a running control-plane VM behind (terminate
completes async; a daemon restart re-launches it from saved running-state) after
the cluster meta is swept — a billable orphan with no owner. Add EKSBillableReaper
on the 0003 GC backstop: a running managed-by=eks CP VM whose cluster meta is
definitively gone is terminated. The CP ENI now carries the customer-account tag
so a system-account VM can be mapped back to its cluster meta; the reaper never
reaps on uncertainty (ENI gone/untagged or meta present).

* feat: reclaim orphan EKS NLB + NAT-GW EIP in billable reaper

The billable GC reaper terminated an orphan control-plane VM but left the
cluster's NAT-gateway EIP and NLB front-end NAT behind when the meta was
gone. After a successful terminate, run the name/tag-driven DeleteClusterNLB
+ DeleteClusterCPVPC teardown (idempotent, meta-independent) so the billable
NAT-GW EIP and NLB NAT are reclaimed too. ADR-0006 §5.

* fix: persist NAT-GW & route-table tags and reorder CP-VPC teardown to reclaim EKS NAT-GW EIP

CreateNatGateway and CreateRouteTable both dropped input.TagSpecifications,
so the tag-driven DeleteClusterCPVPC teardown could not discover the cluster
NAT gateway or its private route table. The explicit DeleteNatGateway +
ReleaseAddress were skipped and the billable NAT-GW EIP leaked under the
system account on every clean DeleteCluster.

Three fixes:
- CreateNatGateway persists ExtractTags(TagSpecifications, natgateway).
- CreateRouteTable persists ExtractTags(TagSpecifications, route-table).
- DeleteClusterCPVPC tears down route tables before the NAT gateway, so the
  rule #3 route-ref guard (DependencyViolation / InvalidAddress.Locked) is
  not tripped and the EIP releases.

Adds tag-persistence regression tests for both create paths and a teardown
ordering invariant (TestRLC5). Validated live: NAT-GW EIP released cleanly,
no DependencyViolation/Locked.

* fix: route EKS control-plane VM terminate cross-node + DELETING teardown backstop

Multi-node EKS cluster delete wedged in DELETING and stranded the billable
NAT-GW EIP. Two root causes, both invisible on a single-node box:

Cross-node terminate was never routed. TerminateSystemInstance was node-local,
so terminating a CP VM owned by another node returned NotFound (treated as
idempotent) and the teardown deleted a still-attached ENI
(InvalidNetworkInterface.InUse). That error short-circuited purgeClusterInfra
before the managed CP-VPC teardown that releases the NAT-GW EIP. Split
TerminateSystemInstance into a local body plus a routing wrapper that issues
system.TerminateInstance.<id> to the owning node. Bind that subscription for
every system-managed VM (elbv2 + eks) via the OnInstanceUp funnel, so CP VMs
placed on the coordinator's own node (and recovered after a daemon restart) are
reachable too, not only remotely-launched ones.

No DELETING backstop. A failed synchronous DeleteCluster left the cluster
DELETING with nothing to re-drive it. Add EKSDeletingReaper (vm.Reaper, class
eks-deleting) that re-runs purgeClusterInfra for clusters wedged past a min-age,
gated by the per-cluster reconciler leader lease. Stamp ClusterMeta.DeletingSince
on the transition into DELETING.

TerminateK3sServerVM additionally waits out any residual ENI-InUse with a bounded
budget as defense-in-depth.

Validated live on env19 3-node: first delete-cluster converges in 29s, both
remote CP VMs terminated cross-node, NAT-GW EIP released, backstop never fires.

* fix(network): gate gateway reconcile on real datapath reachability

Post-reboot the external OVN datapath can stay dead while every
control-plane signal is green: the chassisredirect SB binding is claimed
(up=true), NAT rows are present and the host neigh is primed, yet
ovn-controller leaves stale gateway/localnet flows so EIP north-south and
the VM->gateway heartbeat forward nothing. ensureGatewayClaimed only
nudges recompute when the binding is unclaimed, so a claimed-but-dead
datapath is never detected or repaired.

Add ensureGatewayDatapath: after the SB claim converges, probe the
gateway LRP IP (OVN answers ICMP natively, no guest or security-group
dependency), and on a miss force one ovn-controller recompute and
re-probe until a short deadline. Reuses the existing recompute nudge and
no-ops when no verifier is wired or no gateway IP resolves.

* fix: self-heal external uplink after reboot boot-race

Post-reboot, ovs-vswitchd/ovn-controller order after the passive
network.target rather than network-online.target, so they start
concurrently with systemd-networkd. Under a heavy boot the WAN-glue veth
(veth-wan-ovs) can come up admin-down before networkd brings it up,
leaving br-wan with no carrier and the external datapath dead while every
control-plane signal reconciles green.

Broaden the datapath health-gate remediation from recompute-only to
RepairDatapath: re-assert the veth admin state (covers the admin-down
link, which a flow recompute cannot revive) then recompute (covers a
stale gateway ofport). Idempotent; the veth ops are skipped in
physical-uplink mode where the device is absent.

Also capture ip -d link (veth admin/carrier) and ovs-ofctl show br-ext
(ofport) in the reboot diag bundle to disambiguate the two failure shapes
from CI artifacts.

* fix: restore AWS-faithful Delete* NotFound; move idempotency to teardown callers (mulga-siv-306)

RLC1 (f9218982) made EC2/VPC/EBS Delete* handlers return success on an absent
resource, breaking AWS compatibility and the cross-account isolation signal (a
cross-account delete reads as absent -> success instead of *.NotFound).

Restore the AWS contract at the API while keeping lifecycle convergence:
- Handlers return canonical *.NotFound on absent: DeleteVpc, DeleteSubnet,
  DeleteSecurityGroup, DeleteInternetGateway, DeleteNatGateway, DeleteRouteTable,
  DeleteVolume, and the public DeleteNetworkInterface (ForceDeleteInstanceENI
  keeps its idempotent force path, ADR-0003 section 2).
- Add awserrors.IsNotFound; destroy orchestration (instance terminate, EKS
  CP-VPC teardown, EKS IGW/SG cleanup, k3s rollback, ELBv2 ENI/SG teardown)
  tolerates NotFound so re-issued/double-targeted deletes converge.
- Flip the RLC1 unit invariants to assert *.NotFound on absent; revert the
  daemon round-trip cases; add IsNotFound + CP-VPC convergence tests.

ELBv2 deletes and TerminateInstances stay idempotent (AWS itself is).

* fix(network): gate ingress EIP datapath on guest SB Port_Binding convergence

TestMultinodeGuestSSH intermittently times out (Connection timed out, not
#355's reset-by-peer) connecting to a fresh trio instance's public IP after
the suite churns instances across all three chassis. The instance is running
and AddEIP has installed the DNAT row, flushed/primed the host neigh, and
barriered the gateway-chassis flow — but none of that proves the
gatewayLRP->guest geneve hop: until the guest ENI's southbound Port_Binding is
up on its hosting chassis the cross-node flow is missing and the DNAT-translated
packet blackholes.

Add ensureGuestPortDatapath, the guest-side analog of ensureGatewayDatapath:
after AddEIP, probe the guest LSP's SB Port_Binding (ovn-sbctl up column); on a
miss force one ovn-controller recompute (binds the port / installs the remote
flow) and re-probe until a short deadline. Recompute, not RepairDatapath: this
is flow/binding convergence, not a WAN-uplink fault. No-op when no verifier is
wired or the EIP carries no guest port. spec.PortName is populated for every
associated EIP regardless of NAT mode.

Extends GatewayClaimVerifier with GuestPortUp and wires the gate into
applyEIPs so it runs in the continuous reconcile loop on every node.

* Revert "fix(network): gate ingress EIP datapath on guest SB Port_Binding convergence"

This reverts commit 728b1a9cec6eaf5c7ef5e9eda4469f239b4d8fc0.

* fix(network): key EIP DNAT delete on external IP, not logical IP

A dnat_and_snat row's identity on the VPC gateway router is its external
IP. The logical (private) IP is not a stable key: the EIP pool round-robins
and instance private IPs are reused as instances recycle, so the same
logical IP is held by different EIPs over time.

DeleteEIP deleted the row by logical IP, so a stale or retried delete for a
freed EIP clobbered whichever live EIP now held that recycled private IP --
the next owner's row vanished with no re-add and its public IP went dark
(SSH SYN never left br-wan: Connection timed out). Lifecycle-resilience
teardown/GC retries amplified this by firing vpc.delete-nat repeatedly.

Key the delete on the external IP via DeleteNATByExternalIP and skip when
no external IP is supplied (no EIP means no dnat_and_snat row). A stale
delete now targets the freed EIP's own external IP (ErrNATNotFound no-op)
and can no longer touch the live row.

* refactor: relax DeleteNatGateway to AWS-faithful

Remove the route-reference dependency guard (checkNatGatewayRouteRefs) so a
NAT gateway deletes even while route tables still forward to it, matching AWS
(the route blackholes). The reconciler's loadNATGWs drops the SNAT once the
record leaves the active bucket, so a forwarding route is not a delete-blocking
dependent. EIP is still disassociated on delete (no leak).

* test: invert NAT-GW route-ref invariant to AWS-faithful

TestRLC3_NatGatewayBlocksWhileRouted asserted DependencyViolation while a
route forwarded to the NAT gateway, which is AWS-infaithful. Replace with
TestRLC3_NatGatewayDeletesWhileRouted: delete must succeed whether or not a
live route still targets it (the route blackholes; the reconciler drops the
SNAT). Per ADR-0004 §2.

* fix: tear down NAT-GW SNAT on delete (restore delete-time fan-out)

The guard commit (53ed55a9) dropped publishDeleteEventsForNatGateway on the
assumption a routed NAT GW could never be deleted. With the route-ref guard
removed, deleting a NAT GW while routes still target it left the SNAT in
place (applyNATGWs is create-only, so the reconciler never prunes it) and
egress kept working — TestNATGateway's post-teardown 'lost internet' check
failed. Restore the fan-out: on delete, scan route tables and publish
vpc.delete-nat-gateway per associated subnet so egress stops, while the
route entry survives as a blackhole (AWS-faithful).

* fix: probe EIP datapath in reboot self-heal, not the gateway LRP IP

The post-reboot gateway datapath self-heal probed the gateway LRP IP for
liveness, which OVN answers natively at the router — so it stayed green even
when the EIP NAT pipeline was stranded (ofproto/trace dropped EIP traffic at
table 0). RepairDatapath never fired and TestRebootResilience timed out, with
the drift loop re-probing the same false-green every cycle.

Prefer probing an associated EIP: force a fresh ARP of the dnat_and_snat
external IP (flush neigh, ping to trigger, read the resolved MAC). OVN answers
ARP for the external IP from the gateway chassis independent of the guest, so a
resolved MAC proves the WAN uplink forwards and the NAT flows are installed —
the signal the LRP IP cannot give. Fall back to the LRP IP for VPCs with no
EIP. The existing drift-loop cadence now re-heals a later flow strand.

* fix: lb-agent heartbeats over mgmt port, not the WAN/EIP datapath

The lb-agent heartbeat to awsgw is control-plane and must survive a host
reboot that strands the OVN/EIP north-south data plane. Customer
(internet-facing) lb-agents heartbeated over the WAN GatewayURL, riding the
EIP datapath, so after a reboot the ALB never reported healthy until the
datapath self-healed. System LBs already heartbeated over the on-link
br-mgmt NIC; this extends that path to every lb-agent.

buildLBAgentEnv now always uses mgmtGatewayURL (on-link MgmtBridgeIP, the
mgmt NIC the lb-agent VM already carries), falling back to the WAN URL only
when no mgmt bridge exists. Drops the account-id branch.

* fix: re-heal guest ENI SB Port_Binding post-reboot so EIP ingress converges

Post-reboot every EIP in a VPC goes dark north-south: the DNAT row, host
neigh and gateway-chassis flow are all in place (ARP to the EIP resolves)
but the gatewayLRP->guest flow is missing until ovn-controller binds the
guest ENI's SB Port_Binding, so the DNAT-translated packet blackholes and
the public IP is unreachable on an otherwise-running instance.

Restore the guest-port convergence gate in applyEIPs: probe the guest LSP's
SB Port_Binding up column; on a miss force an ovn-controller recompute and
re-probe until a deadline. Unlike the earlier reverted form, recompute on
every miss, not once: after a host reboot the guest tap is replumbed several
seconds after the reconcile runs, so a single early nudge fires before the
port exists and never binds it. The window is widened to span guest boot.

This is the southbound analog of the gateway datapath self-heal; the EIP
ARP probe cannot detect it because the gateway chassis answers ARP for the
external IP even while the guest delivery flow is absent.

* fix(network): force post-reboot EIP recompute on guest-port bind, startup-only

The reboot suite passed only by accident: the pre-#351 gateway-claim verifier
polled the always-chassis-less gateway LRP, so it fired an ovn-controller
inc-engine/recompute on every reconcile. That spurious recompute was load-bearing
- it reinstalled the centralised gateway DNAT flows that ovn-controller's
incremental engine misses on a cold (post-reboot) start. #351 correctly switched
the check to the chassisredirect port, eliminating the every-cycle recompute, and
the EIP datapath went dark post-reboot with every control-plane signal green.

Restore the kick, scoped to the post-reboot startup path: applyEIPs now gates a
single recompute on the guest ENI's SB Port_Binding chassis claim - the reliable
signal the tap is back, unlike the up column which stays stale-true across a
reboot. Drift never recomputes, preserving the #351 fix for freshly attached
EIPs. Probe renamed GuestPortUp -> GuestPortBound (chassis, not up).

* Revert "fix(network): force post-reboot EIP recompute on guest-port bind, startup-only"

This reverts commit 792e318211ef03efbe24febeb470749d88c0b03c.

* test(e2e/reboot): capture dataplane diag on ALB serve failure

The post-reboot ALB-serve assertion (8.6) failed with no flow/ARP evidence:
the OVN/OVS dataplane dumps only ran on the 8.5 targets-unhealthy path, but
8.5 passes on the daemon's own health view while the north-south EIP datapath
is dark, so the serve failure (8.6) left nothing to localise the drop.

On a serve failure, capture dumpALBProbe/dumpOVNDataplane/dumpOVNClaimState/
dumpHeartbeatDiagnostics/dumpAppDiagnostics before failing. Add to the OVN
dataplane dump: dump-flows br-ext and fdb/show br-ext (north-south bridge,
previously only br-int), and a real ARP probe that flushes the neigh entry
first so primeReachability's pre-seeded reachable entry can no longer mask an
unanswered ARP. Pure diagnostics; no production change.

* test(e2e/reboot): decisive datapath diag — untruncate br-int, real-ingress ofproto/trace, conntrack + tap capture

* test(e2e/reboot): add south->north return-path ofproto/trace to localize egress drop

* test(e2e/reboot): derive LRP MAC from realized flow + remediation experiment (recompute vs ovn-controller restart)

* test(e2e/reboot): dump persisted SB MAC_Binding + external MACs; flush experiments (conntrack vs MAC_Binding) to isolate recompute-resistant return-path drop

* test(e2e/reboot): untruncate Port_Binding + enumerate DGP/chassisredirect claim state (does cr-gw row exist + resident chassis)

* test(e2e/reboot): dump NB source of return-path drop (lflow stage, NAT external_mac/options, LR policy, LSP port_security)

* fix: exempt public-IP instances from subnet egress drop gate (mulga-siv-311)

Post-reboot reconcile installs the priority-1100 subnet egress drop gate for an
IGW-attached subnet that has no 0.0.0.0/0 route, but nothing punched the subnet's
public-IP instances through it. lr_in_policy runs before lr_out un-DNAT/SNAT, so an
inbound connection's reply still carries its private source when it hits the gate and
is dropped. The ALB/EIP datapath goes dark south->north post-reboot while NAT, ARP,
chassis and guest-port binding all read green; the pre-reboot path survives only
because the event-driven gate never evaluates a subnet created after IGW attach.

Install the existing priority-1200 /32 reroute (above the gate) for every public-IP
instance during reconcile. Reroute only: the instance's dnat_and_snat already supplies
SNAT, unlike EnsureSystemInstanceEgress which also adds a plain snat. Public IPs come
from two disjoint sources -- auto-assigned/ELB addresses on the ENI record and user
EIPs in the EIP bucket -- so drive the exemption from both intent.Ports (new
PortSpec.PublicIP) and intent.EIPs.

* refactor: scope public-IP drop-gate exemption to gated subnets

Only install the priority-1200 reroute when the instance's subnet actually carries
a drop gate. Routed subnets egress via their priority-1000 reroute and need no
exemption, so bounding on gate presence keeps the change inert for IGW-routed and
NATGW-routed subnets (no redundant or overriding policy). Adds a negative test.

* refactor: drop unused RemoveEIPInstanceEgress

No production caller; the exemption is install-only in reconcile. Removed the
interface method and impl rather than leave dead API surface.

* test: dump guest console + OVN/datapath diag on SG-to-SG client SSH timeout

TestSGToSGDatapath waited for client-vm SSH via EventuallyErr and reported
only 'exit status 255' on timeout — no guest-side or datapath state. When the
fresh public-IP VM is unreachable for the full window the failure was
undiagnosable from CI artifacts.

Swap the wait to the non-fatal trySSHReady probe and, on timeout, call
DumpVPCFlowDiagnostics (guest console tail, ovn-nbctl/sbctl show, NAT rows,
br-int flows / conntrack / host ARP keyed on the public + private IP) before
Fatal, mirroring vpc_test/baseline_test. Captures persist to the artifact dir
for the Stage 2 analyzer bundle.

* fix: ownership-scope public-IP teardown to survive IP recycling

A live instance's dnat_and_snat rule, host ARP, and IPAM lease were torn down
by the delayed garbage-collection teardown of a different, long-dead instance
that previously held the same recycled public IP. The 2-min vm/gc
instance-teardown reaper re-runs ReleasePublicIP on a stale terminated record;
because the external IPAM round-robins a small pool, the IP had already been
reassigned to a live instance, and both teardown primitives acted on the IP by
value with no ownership check:

- policy.DeleteEIP deleted the dnat_and_snat row by external IP alone,
  discarding the logical IP it receives.
- StaticPoolAllocator.Release freed the pool entry by IP value.

Scope both to the current owner so a stale or duplicated teardown for a
recycled IP is a no-op:

- DeleteEIP looks up the row by external IP and skips the delete (and the ARP
  flush) when its logical IP no longer matches, mirroring AddEIP's idempotency
  lookup. Defeats both external- and logical-IP reuse races.
- Allocator.Release / ExternalIPAM.ReleaseIP take an ownerENIID; the static
  allocator no-ops a release whose ENI differs from the live allocation, and
  treats an already-freed owner-scoped release as idempotent. Teardown and
  rollback callers pass their ENI; user-driven EIP release passes none.

Proven via E2E single TestSGToSGDatapath (run 27515293563): client-vm SSH
black-holed after its NAT was deleted by the dead instance's GC sweep.

* fix(eks): single-flight DeleteCluster teardown per cluster

SDK retries of one DeleteCluster get fanned across nodes by the worker
queue group, so purgeClusterInfra raced the same cluster on multiple
nodes: duplicate ENI/NLB teardown, duplicate TargetGroupNotFound
deregisters, and a real double-release risk on the billable NAT-GW EIP.
Idempotency kept it correct but noisy.

Add a dedicated per-cluster teardown lease (teardownLeaderKey =
reconcilerLeaderKey + "/teardown"), distinct from the reconciler lease
so a delete never contends with the still-live reconciler that holds the
reconciler lease until it observes DELETING and exits. DeleteCluster
acquires it after the NotFound-idempotency check: the loser returns the
cluster as DELETING (AWS-async semantics) without running the teardown;
the winner drives purgeClusterInfra and releases. The DELETING backstop
reaper shares the same lease, so at most one purgeClusterInfra runs per
cluster cluster-wide.

A nil leaderKV (single-node) skips gating, so local behavior is
unchanged.

* fix: env-driven SSH-ready budget for slow baremetal guests

Add SPINIFEX_SSH_READY_TIMEOUT override for the single-node SSH-handshake
probes (default unchanged at 3m). Baremetal boots q35 guests slower (OVMF +
NBD-backed disks) than CI loop devices and intermittently misses the 3m
window; the harness can now widen it to 5m without affecting shared-runner
e2e. Applied at all single-node probe sites; failure messages now report the
actual budget.

* fix: shared external switch to stop per-VPC localnet ARP collision

Per-VPC external switches each attached an untagged localnet port to the same
physical network (br-ext). OVN cannot keep multiple untagged localnets on one
physical network L2-separate, so with two or more concurrent public-IP VPCs ARP
for a public IP landed on the wrong VPC's switch and the owning gateway router's
ARP responder never fired, leaving the public IP unreachable.

Move to a single shared external switch (provider-network pattern): one switch
with one localnet on network_name=external. Each VPC's gateway LRP attaches via
its own router-type switch port; per-VPC NAT isolation is unchanged. AttachIGW
ensures the shared switch idempotently and is migration-safe; DetachIGW removes
only the per-VPC port + LRP and preserves the shared switch. DeleteVPC removes
the per-VPC gateway switch port from the shared switch so it does not dangle.
Reconcile detects attachment via the gateway LRP since the shared switch carries
no vpc_id.

* fix: owner-scope DeleteEIP by ENI port to survive identical pair recycling

A stale or GC-re-emitted vpc.delete-nat for a terminated instance tore down a
live instance's dnat_and_snat rule (and flushed the host ARP) when the public
IP and private IP both recycled, together, to that live instance in the same
VPC. The (external_ip, logical_ip) pair-key matches under identical recycling,
so the existing logical-IP guard fell through.

Stamp the owning ENI port (spinifex:logical_port) on the dnat_and_snat row at
AddEIP, thread the port through handleDeleteNAT -> DetachEIP -> DeleteEIP, and
skip the delete when the row's stamped port differs from the incoming one. The
IPAM release was already owner-scoped; this mirrors that guard at the NAT layer
so any stale delete for a recycled pair is a no-op. Empty port preserves the
prior pair-key behaviour.
2026-06-15 23:27:39 +10:00
Josh Siviour 465fa1e6c7 fix: complete at-rest encryption launch + volume lifecycle (#361)
* chore: bump viperblock to encrypted-snapshot VolumeUUID nonce fix

Pull viperblock 1044c2a (feat/snapshot-uuid-nonce-fix) so E2E builds against
the fix for the encrypted AMI snapshot metadata tag-verify failure
(cipher: message authentication failed) on instance launch. Pairs with
viperblock PR #22.

* fix: forward viperblock master key to nbdkit mount path

viperblockd loaded the master key but never passed it to the nbdkit
plugin it spawns for volume mounts, so encrypted boot volumes opened
in cleartext and failed LoadState with an encryption-state mismatch.
Forward cfg.EncryptionKeyFile into NBDKitConfig and emit the plugin's
encryption_key_file= argument when set.

* chore: bump viperblock to fresh-volume VolumeUUID mint fix

* chore: bump viperblock to snapshot-link LoadState ordering fix

* fix: route encrypted-volume config writes through viperblock keyholder

config.json is a sealed VBState whose AES-GCM tag and StateSeqNum-derived
nonce can only be advanced by the master-key holder that owns the volume.
The EC2 volume handler wrote it directly to S3, so mergeVolumeConfig had to
refuse encrypted volumes (rewriting would strip the tag) — bricking
UpdateVolumeState (attach in-use / detach available) and ModifyVolume.

Route encrypted-volume config updates through viperblockd, mirroring the
ebs.snapshot idiom: per-volume ebs.config.{volumeID} hits the owning node's
live VB (the single StateSeqNum writer); on ErrNoResponders the ebs.config
queue group opens the detached volume exclusively and reseals. Cleartext
volumes keep the direct-S3 fast path. No crypto leaves viperblockd.

mulga-siv-323

* fix: unwrap encryption envelope when snapshot handler reads config.json

CreateSnapshot and snapshotInUseByVolumes decoded config.json straight into
a VBState. For encrypted volumes config.json is an at-rest envelope
{payload, authtag}; a raw decode yields a zero VBState (SizeGiB==0), so
CreateSnapshot 500s on the size guard and the in-use scan silently drops
encrypted volumes' snapshots. Unwrap via viperblock.StateBody first,
mirroring the volume handler's mergeVolumeConfig path.

mulga-siv-324

* test: cover viperblockd ebs.config handlers

Unit/integration coverage for applyConfigUpdate, makeConfigUpdateHandler
(ebs.config.{volumeID}), and the ebs.config queue-group fallback: grow-only
size reconcile, live-VB apply, invalid JSON, apply errors, and the
detached-volume open path. Clears the diff-coverage gate (68.8%).

* chore: pin viperblock to dev tip (#22 merged)
2026-06-15 22:43:56 +10:00
Josh Siviour 17c83cb3ad fix: build microVM rootfs via buildx to stop overlay2 export leak (#358)
docker export of a container leaks its overlay mount on Docker's
overlay2 driver — the mount survives docker rm, so the layer dirs are
never reaped except by a daemon restart. The lb-agent microVM build ran
docker export on every e2e job across ~9 runners, accumulating ~69G of
orphaned overlay2 layers on the CI host (disk hit 94%).

Build the rootfs with `docker buildx --output type=local` from a small
generated Dockerfile instead, which writes the image filesystem to a
directory and releases all mounts — nothing leaks. Keep the podman path
(its store is unaffected). Tighten the e2e cleanup image prune to
dangling-only so the alpine base stays cached instead of re-pulling.
2026-06-15 10:50:10 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 3835f39d35 fix: bump predastore + viperblock pins to dev-tip pseudo-versions
CI e2e-build compiles the spinifex module with GOWORK=off, resolving the
go.mod pins instead of the go.work local submodule redirect. v1.7.0 of both
modules predates symbols spinifex now calls (viperblock.StateBody,
predastore auth.ParseRoleARN), so the build failed with undefined-symbol
errors that go.work masked locally. Pin both to current dev-branch
pseudo-versions until a coordinated release is cut.
2026-06-15 10:46:56 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga eed57ee084 Merge branch 'dev' of github.com:mulgadc/spinifex into dev 2026-06-15 10:29:11 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga 69276f9a7a fix: Added better intro to Reference Architecture docs 2026-06-15 10:28:53 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga 1f22c96b3d fix: Added better intro to Reference Architecture docs 2026-06-15 10:26:51 +10:00
Bryn Mailer f6f3956952 feat: enable viperblock at-rest encryption by default on fresh installs (#323)
* feat: enable viperblock at-rest encryption by default on fresh installs

Fresh installs left nodes.<node>.viperblock.encryption_key_file empty, which
viperblockd treats as legacy cleartext mode. The encryption machinery existed
but the install path never generated a key or set the field.

Provision a cluster-wide viperblock master key in all three fresh-install
flows and render its path into spinifex.toml:

- admin init (single node): generate the key locally.
- admin init --multi-node (leader): generate once, save locally, and
  distribute via the formation server (mirrors IAM master key distribution).
- admin join (joiner): receive the shared key from the leader rather than
  minting its own, so volumes sealed on any node open everywhere. Lenient on
  absence — an older leader returns no key, so the joiner warns and stays
  cleartext instead of failing the join.

The key file is omitted from the template when unset, so upgrades with no
existing key keep running cleartext.

* fix: make viperblock encryption key group-readable for both readers

The key is loaded by two services per node — viperblockd (spinifex-viperblock)
and the awsgw EC2 handlers (spinifex-gw), both in the spinifex group — so it
must be group-readable, not owner-only like the per-node predastore key.

The previous commit generated the key but never registered its path with the
deployment ownership machinery, leaving /etc/spinifex/viperblock as root:root
0700 (non-traversable) and the key as root:root 0600. The daemon failed at
startup with "stat ... permission denied".

Mirror master.key: setup.sh creates /etc/spinifex/viperblock (0750), and
SetServiceOwnership chowns the dir to spinifex-viperblock and promotes the key
to root:spinifex 0640.

* fix: read viperblock config.json through StateBody for encrypted volumes

The metadata layer parsed config.json with json.Unmarshal/NewDecoder directly,
which fails on encrypted volumes/AMIs now that viperblock wraps VBState in a
valid-JSON envelope ({"v":1,"payload":...,"authtag":...}). DescribeImages
silently skipped encrypted AMIs (count=0 → "no AMIs available"), bricking the
whole launch path.

Route every config.json read through viperblock.StateBody, which unwraps the
envelope (no key needed — the metadata is authenticated, not encrypted) and is
a no-op for unencrypted volumes:

- image: DescribeImages, getVolumeConfig, amiNameExists, GetAMIConfig
- volume: getVolumeConfigAndEncryption, and mergeVolumeConfig (so the
  refuse-to-merge-encrypted guard sees the real VBState instead of clobbering
  the envelope with a tag-less blob)
- admin: readAMIConfig, readVolumeConfig
2026-06-15 09:31:23 +10:00
Josh Siviour b23fa3bf60 feat(eks): managed control-plane VPC (Set B) + control-plane lifecycle hardening (#356)
* feat(eks): VM-side managed-addon delivery transport

Stage CreateAddon manifests in KV host-side; the control-plane VM pulls the
staged set through the AWS gateway (signed GET /clusters/{name}/internal-addons/
{accountId}), renders the baked bundles into the K3s auto-deploy dir, and
reports per-addon delivery status on a dedicated eks.addon.*.status channel that
the cluster reconciler CASes onto AWS-visible AddonStatus (CREATING->ACTIVE).

- gateway: ListInternalAddons route + ListStagedAddonManifests NATS action
- handlers: addon status reconciler (nextAddonStatus), staging installer
- eks-node AMI: eks-gateway-fetch binary + mulga-eks-addon-sync agent
- agent renders idempotently (cmp before replace) so K3s auto-deploy does not
  re-apply every tick and clear the Addon CR .status.gvks readiness signal
- agent mirrors per-tick delivery outcomes to the serial console for host-side
  observability

* fix(eks): provision cluster NLB synchronously so the endpoint carries the real front-end IP

The cluster NLB front-end IP is assigned by the async LB-VM launch
(launchLBVMAsync), but EnsureClusterNLB read it back synchronously right after
CreateLoadBalancer returned — losing the race and falling back to the synthetic
<lb>.elb.spinifex.local DNS name. That name is unresolvable (no Route53) and is
not in the apiserver serving-cert SAN, so kubectl against the cluster never
connects.

Split the elbv2 create: the public CreateLoadBalancer stays async (267.4 — an
inline multi-minute VM boot head-of-line-blocks the gateway responder), and a
new CreateLoadBalancerSync drives the data-plane launch inline and returns the
LB carrying its front-end address. The EKS cluster-create worker runs off the
gateway responder, so it uses the sync entry and reads the IP from the return
value instead of racing persisted state. No polling.

- elbv2: factor provisionLBDataPlane out of launchLBVMAsync; add CreateLoadBalancerSync
- eks: ensureClusterLB uses the sync entry, sets FrontendIP from the result,
  drops the read-back; EnsureClusterNLB fails loud (ErrClusterNLBFrontendIPUnavailable)
  when no front-end IP is allocated rather than shipping the DNS-name fallback
- eks: drop the DNS-name endpoint fallback; the endpoint is always the front-end IP

* feat: auto-wire IGW for internet-facing EKS cluster endpoint

An internet-facing cluster NLB allocates an external front-end IP and the
OVN dnat_and_snat for it, but the external switch + localnet + gateway LRP
that make that IP answerable on the wire are built only on IGW attach. The
control-plane NLB is a system instance, so ensure an IGW on cluster build
and reclaim it on teardown.

EnsureClusterIGW (idempotent, reuses a customer IGW untouched) runs before
EnsureClusterNLB when the endpoint is public; DeleteClusterIGW (ownership-
scoped) removes only the cluster-owned IGW in purgeClusterInfra, before the
VPC delete. New IGW dep wired from the daemon.

* fix(eks): tear down infra on failed cluster launch to stop LB EIP leak

A CreateCluster that fails during its background launch flipped the meta
to FAILED but performed no teardown, relying on a later same-name create
to reclaim and purge the infra. EKS cluster names are unique per create,
so that reclaim never fires: the internet-facing load-balancer VM keeps
running with its allocated+associated dnat_and_snat EIP indefinitely.
Over repeated create/delete cycles the EIP pool fills with allocations
bound to terminated instances, so a later allocation's advertised
endpoint and its live OVN NAT diverge onto different pool addresses.

- failClusterLaunch now runs a best-effort purgeClusterInfra on the
  in-memory meta (freshest refs even when the failing step was the meta
  write itself) before MarkClusterFailed. purgeClusterInfra is
  idempotent, so a later reclaim or DeleteCluster re-purge is a no-op;
  the FAILED meta is retained for observability.
- Daemon releaseSystemInstanceEIP extracted and called from both
  TerminateSystemInstance and cleanupFailedSystemInstance, so a launch
  that fails after AssociateAddress releases the eipService allocation
  instead of leaking it (MarkFailed's ReleasePublicIP only knows the
  externalIPAM path).

* feat: EKS managed control-plane VPC (AWS Set B) composed from EC2 APIs

CreateCluster now auto-builds the managed control-plane VPC under the
system account, the spinifex analogue of AWS EKS's hidden managed-account
VPC: a public subnet for the internet-facing NLB, private subnet(s) for the
k3s control-plane VM(s), and a NAT gateway giving the private CP egress for
image pulls. It is composed from the real EC2 VPC-family APIs
(CreateVpc/Subnet, IGW, RouteTable/Route, NatGateway), so per-subnet egress
gating is wired by the existing topology subscribers off the route-table
events those APIs publish — no direct OVN mutation.

This resolves the mulga-siv-292 root cause: the internet-facing NLB and the
private CP were crammed into one customer subnet with no IGW route, so both
were treated as private and dropped by the lr_in_policy 1100 rule, killing
the LB-VM return leg and lb-agent heartbeat. The CP only survived via a
per-instance 1200 reroute bandaid, now removed — the topology expresses
egress instead.

Placement is uniform single/multi-node (CP always in the private subnet).
The system LB VM heartbeats over the mgmt bridge (SystemGatewayURL) rather
than the WAN. Managed-VPC teardown reclaims NAT GW + EIP, route tables,
subnets, IGW, and the VPC in dependency order. Customer subnetIds (Set A /
worker side) remain consumed-not-created and are deferred to the worker
round.

* fix(eks): bake cluster-owner account into CP-VM EKS_ACCOUNT_ID

The managed control-plane VPC (Set B) launches the K3s control-plane VMs and
their ENIs under the system (infra) account, but the on-VM agents — bootstrap
publish, state report, token-review, and add-on fetch — must key on the
cluster-OWNER (customer) account that owns the cluster meta, namespaces, and
AccessEntry KV. Add ClusterAccountID to K3sServerInput and bake it into the
VM's EKS_ACCOUNT_ID, decoupling it from the infra AccountID the VM launches
under. Without this the VM reported state and fetched add-ons against the
system account, so the cluster never observed a healthy control plane (stuck
CREATING, null CA) and kubectl/add-on delivery timed out.

Also refresh the e2e suite doc comment to describe the Set B topology and the
data-plane subtests (kubectl + managed-addon delivery) that now run.

* fix(eks): explicitly delete addon objects on unstage

K3s does not delete the applied resources when an auto-deploy manifest file is
removed from the server manifests dir (documented behaviour). The addon-sync
GC pass relied on that, so after DeleteAddon the rendered manifest was dropped
but its Namespace/ConfigMap stayed standing — the e2e AddonDelivery GC wait
timed out. Copy the manifest aside, drop the original so K3s stops tracking it,
then kubectl delete the objects (--wait=false to avoid finalizer stalls).
2026-06-12 22:29:24 +10:00
Julian Sommer a57ebd0ad9 chore: remove references to pseudo multi node 2026-06-12 15:28:23 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 022c6cfd2a Update Makefile
Signed-off-by: joshsiv-mulga <mrk@mulgadc.com>
2026-06-12 15:26:11 +10:00
Julian Sommer 19472c377a chore: delete legacy scripts 2026-06-12 15:17:48 +10:00
Julian Sommer 5238e29f48 fix: admin init message 2026-06-12 15:02:54 +10:00
Julian Sommer 4adecc0794 chore: delete old scripts 2026-06-12 14:52:18 +10:00
Julian Sommer ef86d09a42 chore: delete legacy scripts/iac 2026-06-12 14:51:38 +10:00
Julian Sommer ad4e6e8896 chore: delete empty INSTALL.md 2026-06-12 14:41:52 +10:00
Julian Sommer 642fdacdb7 chore: delete dead function 2026-06-12 14:37:29 +10:00
Julian Sommer 2c6f65b2e9 fix(network): restore centralised EIP gateway-port neigh prime (#355) 2026-06-12 14:23:01 +10:00
Josh Siviour a2ede7c476 EKS AWS-compat + nodegroup lifecycle hardening (env19) (#353)
* fix(eks): surface CREATING block reason at Info, not Debug

A cluster stuck in CREATING logged its per-tick bootstrap/health block
reason at Debug, invisible at the default level, so a create that ran to
the 15m timeout FAILED gave no diagnosable cause. Bump both reasons to
Info; they fire only during the CREATING window.

* feat(iam): round-trip AWS-managed policy ARNs for stock EKS tooling

Stock terraform-aws-eks / eksctl attach AWS-managed policies
(AmazonEKSClusterPolicy, AmazonEKSWorkerNodePolicy, AmazonEKS_CNI_Policy,
...) that Spinifex does not provision. AttachRolePolicy rejected them
NoSuchEntity and ListAttachedRolePolicies dropped them, breaking the
node/cluster role round-trip DescribeNodegroup relies on. Accept and
store managed ARNs opaquely (no backing document), deriving the policy
name from the ARN on read.

* feat(eks): echo cluster tags + store-only Tag/Untag/ListTags

DescribeCluster never returned create-time tags and ClusterMeta did not
store them, so a stock terraform-aws provider reconciling default_tags
saw perpetual drift and issued TagResource on every apply — which itself
returned NotImplemented. Store tags on the cluster record, echo them from
DescribeCluster, and back the three tag ops store-only against the record
(cluster ARNs only) so the default_tags round-trip is clean.

* fix(eks): persist nodegroup workers incrementally + boot reclaim sweep

launchWorkers only wrote the worker IDs to the record after the whole
launch loop, so a daemon crash mid-loop stranded already-launched workers
under a record that still showed empty InstanceIDs — nothing could reclaim
them. Persist each worker before launching the next, and add a boot-time
reclaim sweep (SpawnRegisteredReconcilers) that terminates recorded
workers for any nodegroup left CREATING by a crashed launcher, or
CREATE_FAILED still holding workers, settling it to CREATE_FAILED with
InstanceIDs cleared.

* fix: plumb query params into EKS gateway dispatcher

EKS_Request never passed the query string to per-action handlers, so
UntagResource (DELETE /tags/{arn}?tagKeys=k1&tagKeys=k2) saw an empty
TagKeys and silently no-op'd. Fold url.Values into the JSON body when
the body is empty so the handler unmarshal sees the keys.

* feat(iam): resolve AWS-managed EKS policy grants for authorization

Assumed-role/user authorization (checkPolicy -> Get{Role,User}Policies ->
EvaluateAccess) could not honour AWS-managed policy grants: Spinifex stores
no document for managed ARNs, so stock EKS roles whose permissions come
entirely from managed policies (node role: AmazonEKSWorkerNodePolicy +
AmazonEC2ContainerRegistryReadOnly + AmazonEKS_CNI_Policy) evaluated to an
empty grant set and were denied every call.

Add a builtin registry of well-known AWS-managed policy documents, resolved
via a shared resolveAttachedPolicy helper used by both GetRolePolicies and
GetUserPolicies. Unmodeled managed ARNs resolve to no grant (fail-closed
deny) rather than erroring the whole request; customer-managed ARNs still
fail closed when unresolvable.
2026-06-12 13:54:11 +10:00
Julian Sommer 50b5495d26 chore: more comment cleanup 2026-06-12 12:38:31 +10:00
Julian Sommer 53e8c3f60f chore: trim comments 2026-06-12 12:06:57 +10:00
Julian Sommer 58842e5e8c chore: fix stale comments 2026-06-12 11:42:19 +10:00
Julian Sommer 1dda4cb37c feat(gateway): enforce assumed-role session policies (#354) 2026-06-12 11:34:53 +10:00
Julian Sommer c6c26c04e2 chore: trim workflow comments 2026-06-12 11:04:46 +10:00
Julian Sommer 2df35d3822 chore: remove reboot e2e 2026-06-12 10:46:14 +10:00
Josh Siviour d076a434d4 Feat/e2e targeted suites (#352)
* test(e2e): add targeted suite selector + shadow-mode CI step

select-suites maps a diff to the e2e suites it must run: changed files →
services (manifest path/additional_paths) → consumer closure over
depends_on vs publishes/subscribes → suites whose covers intersect.
Special cases force-all (infra/harness/workflow, ≥3 services, submodule
bumps) or a lone suite dir; empty diffs fall back to default suites. An
AST scan of each suite's harness.Ensure* call graph derives per-test
service coverage and emits an optional -test.run subset (RUN_PATTERN).

Wired into e2e.yml as a non-gating 'Select Suites (shadow)' job that
logs the computed selection to the run summary so predicted vs actual
can be compared before the selector drives SUITES.

* ci(e2e): add dispatch-only per-suite job blocks grouped by env

Restructure the looped e2e flow into env-grouped provision -> matrix
suites -> teardown blocks so each suite surfaces as its own node in the
Actions graph instead of a single green tick:

  single_provision -> single_suite [single,cert,lb,eks] -> single_teardown
  multi_provision  -> multi_suite  [multinode]          -> multi_teardown

Provision resolves the VM/cluster and ships test binaries, emitting WAN
IP + ssh key path as job outputs; each matrix leg runs one suite over
SSH and uploads its own junit/analysis artifacts; teardown (if:always)
reuses the persisted tofu workspace on the same runner to destroy.

workflow_dispatch only -- runs alongside the gating e2e.yml for
validation and posts no commit status.

* test(e2e): add manifest drift lint (fixture-create + NATS subject)

Bead 5 of the targeted-suite-selection plan. Two ratcheted drift guards in
tests/e2e/manifest-lint, wired into make preflight and the spinifex.yml PR job:

- Fixture lint: AST-flags direct resource-create AWS calls
  (c.EC2.RunInstances, c.ELBv2.CreateLoadBalancer, ...) in suite test files,
  steering them through harness.Ensure* fixtures. ~104 pre-existing call sites
  are captured in a checked-in baseline; the lint fails only on NEW creates.
  Intentional create-path tests opt out with an inline // e2e:allow-create.

- Subject lint: extracts NATS subject literals from the natsSub{} registry and
  literal Subscribe/Publish/Request args, cross-referenced wildcard-aware
  against service-interfaces.yaml. Code subjects missing from the manifest fail
  (ratcheted); manifest subjects with no static reference warn only (many are
  produced dynamically). Fixed real drift surfaced on first run: declared the
  five spinifex.cluster.shutdown.* phase subjects under spinifex_daemon.

manifest-check is now CI-enforced alongside manifest-lint (previously
preflight/local-only).

* feat: run-scoped e2e teardown sweep

Tag every Ensure* fixture resource with e2e:run=<run-id> when
SPINIFEX_E2E_RUN_ID is set, and add a teardown.test suite that sweeps
everything carrying that tag at end of run — reclaiming resources leaked
by a crashed suite, an interrupted run, or a persistent cluster.

- harness/sweep.go: tagRunResources (EC2 CreateTags) + tagRunELB (ELBv2
  AddTags) + SweepRunResources in dependency order (LB, instances, NAT,
  snapshots, volumes, images, SGs, subnets, key pairs). Blank run id
  no-ops both tagging and sweeping, so the sweep can never touch an
  untagged or foreign resource.
- harness/fixtures.go: stamp the run tag on each created resource.
- tests/e2e/teardown: thin suite that runs the sweep; skips without a
  cluster or run id, logs the report, never fails the run.
- e2e-suites.yml: build + ship teardown.test, pass the run id into suite
  legs, sweep on the VM in both teardown jobs before tofu destroy.
2026-06-11 21:09:50 +10:00
Julian Sommer 0b3e950abd fix(network): verify gateway claim on chassisredirect port, not distributed LRP (#351)
The gateway-claim verifier polled the SB Port_Binding for the distributed
gateway port LRP (gw-<vpc>), which is always chassis-less by OVN design — the
chassis claim lands on the chassisredirect port cr-gw-<vpc>. So
ensureGatewayClaimed always read "unclaimed", fired ovn-appctl
inc-engine/recompute every reconcile cycle, and logged a spurious "gateway SB
chassis claim did not converge" error after its 30s budget. The repeated forced
recomputes rebuilt the entire OVN flow table every cycle, intermittently
darkening freshly attached EIP datapaths and flaking the single-node e2e suite
(observed: every br-int EIP flow at duration~10s with n_packets=0).

Check the chassisredirect Port_Binding instead. The nudge now fires only on a
genuinely unclaimed redirect — the real reboot race #339 targets — rather than
on every healthy reconcile.

- topology: add GatewayChassisRedirectPort(vpcID) -> "cr-gw-<vpc>"
- reconcile/apply: pass the cr- port to ensureGatewayClaimed
- reconcile/host: doc the verifier checks the chassisredirect binding
- test: capture the queried port; assert the cr- port is checked, no nudge
2026-06-11 20:35:34 +10:00
Julian Sommer c4926d423f feat: IMDS public-keys (#350) 2026-06-11 15:19:01 +10:00
Julian Sommer b38c888b4d chore: dedupe auth helpers (#349) 2026-06-11 14:03:13 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga a5b6a74a0b fix(e2e): serialise TestMultinodeGuestSSH after cluster restabilises
TestMultinodeGuestSSH ran with t.Parallel(), so it resumed immediately
after the sequential bucket and probed trio[0] — which CrossNodeOps
stop/starts but only waits to reach state "running", not for sshd to
answer. The guest was often still booting, producing
kex_exchange_identification resets and 2m timeouts that flaked CI red.

Drop t.Parallel() and declare the test last in the sequential bucket so
it runs after CrossNodeOps + NodeFailure/Recovery + Spread have
restabilised the cluster, giving every trio member time to settle and
removing concurrent VM churn.
2026-06-11 13:00:35 +10:00
Julian Sommer 19de3b0994 chore: update COMMANDS.md 2026-06-11 12:50:34 +10:00
Julian Sommer 620b96f9c6 feat: Terraform S3 Webapp using IMDS (#348) 2026-06-11 12:35:15 +10:00
Julian Sommer 05e66bd6a0 feat: ListPolicyVersions 2026-06-11 12:25:12 +10:00
Josh Siviour db8d5a7265 fix(elbv2): build lb-agent data-plane config on LB-ready heartbeat (#347)
CreateLoadBalancer is async: InstanceID is only set when the LB VM's QEMU
process starts, ~600ms after the create burst. The reactive
updateStoredConfig calls from CreateListener/RegisterTargets all no-op
during that window (InstanceID empty), and nothing rebuilds config once
the VM launches. The lb-agent then heartbeats, gets an empty ConfigHash,
never sees it change, and probes zero backends -> e2e 0/2 healthy.

Build the data-plane config on the provisioning->active heartbeat
transition instead: that is the one point where InstanceID is guaranteed
set and the agent is alive to consume config. The InstanceID guard in
updateStoredConfig stays as a cheap no-data-plane skip, no longer the
primary gate.
2026-06-11 11:56:42 +10:00
Julian Sommer 3a9a1564eb chore: delete orphaned bash e2e scirpts 2026-06-11 10:34:58 +10:00
Josh Siviour c7f337229f feat(vpcd): drain held DHCP leases on teardown (#346)
DHCP-source external-pool leases are DHCPRELEASEd only on explicit
instance/EIP terminate. Manager.Stop() preserves leases for
adopt-on-reboot, so env teardown/reset kills vpcd and destroys the
per-AZ lease KV without releasing — stranding every live lease
(instance ENIs, EIP allocations, per-VPC LRP gateways) on the upstream
DHCP server until TTL. Across CI churn with fresh client-ids the
upstream scope fills and new launches get no public IP.

Add Manager.DrainAll + a vpc.dhcp.drain RPC and a standalone
'spx admin cluster drain-dhcp' command that releases every held lease.
Wired into both teardown paths (single-node teardown role and
multi-node cluster-teardown.yml) before services stop. Stop() is
unchanged, so normal restarts still adopt leases on reboot.
2026-06-11 10:11:23 +10:00
Josh Siviour e8bd99386e fix(ec2): fail RunInstances when public-IP auto-assign fails (mulga-siv-275) (#345)
* fix(ec2): fail RunInstances when public-IP auto-assign fails

PrepareRunInstances swallowed an AllocateIP failure for a
MapPublicIpOnLaunch subnet (logged WARN, fell through), so the instance
booted running with no public IP. With no qemu-hostfwd fallback such an
instance is unreachable. Mirror the adjacent AddNAT-failure path: detach
and delete the auto-created ENI, deallocate capacity, drop the instance,
and surface InsufficientAddressCapacity.

* test(daemon): deterministically pick a fitting 2-vCPU type in capacity filter test

CapacityFilterRespectsAllocation selected the first 2-vCPU type by Go
map-iteration order, intermittently picking a type near the
schedulable-memory boundary the allocator then rejected (~3/5 failures in
isolation on small hosts). Select the smallest-memory 2-vCPU type from the
capacity-aware set so it always fits.
2026-06-11 09:47:40 +10:00
Josh Siviour 5069a085c6 fix: roll back ELBv2 partial create-load-balancer/listener infra (#344)
CreateLoadBalancer's PutLoadBalancer-failure path only released the name
claim, orphaning the ENIs and managed front-end SG already created. Extract
the ENI+SG+claim teardown into rollbackLBInfra and call it from both the
ENI-create-failure and PutLoadBalancer-failure paths.

CreateListener persisted the listener record before authorizing the NLB
managed-SG port and reloading config; a failure in either left an orphan
listener record (and, after a config failure, a dangling SG authorization).
Add rollbackListener to revoke the port (when already opened) and
cascade-delete the listener on every post-persist failure.

Also wait for the async worker launch in the two CreateNodegroup disk-size
tests so they observe the launch under the record-before-launch contract.
2026-06-10 23:20:20 +10:00
Josh Siviour 8ab5441103 fix: async platform create handlers to stop responder starvation (mulga-siv-267.4) (#343)
* fix: make platform create handlers async to stop responder starvation

EKS CreateCluster/CreateNodegroup and ELBv2 CreateLoadBalancer ran their
full VM/control-plane launch synchronously inside the NATS subscription
callback on the shared spinifex-workers queue. A multi-minute create
head-of-line blocked the worker, so system.LaunchInstance/TerminateInstance
found no responder within the gateway timeout and failed with
'nats: no responders available' (mulga-siv-267.4).

Each create now runs validation + the atomic name claim synchronously,
snapshots the CREATING/provisioning output, then spawns the slow launch on
a per-impl launchWG and returns immediately. Launch failures mark the
record FAILED/CREATE_FAILED so 267.3 reclaim makes a retry idempotent. The
service interfaces are shared by the gateway NATS clients and the daemon
impls, so the async split lives inside the impl method and leaves the
interface, handleNATSRequest, and all daemon handlers unchanged.

The host-pinned system.LaunchInstance/TerminateInstance responders now
dispatch each request on its own goroutine (systemDispatchWg) so a slow
boot, which must respond after it completes, no longer blocks the subject.

ELBv2 keeps ENI creation synchronous (cheap VPC calls that yield the
AZ/VpcId the create response needs); only the LB-VM boot goes async,
folding InstanceID/IPs back into the record for a later Describe.

* fix: keep node-targeted launch subscription live under capacity pressure

The node-targeted (unicast) system.LaunchInstance.{type}.{node} subject was
torn down whenever the node filled, same as the queue (anycast) subject. For
the queue subject that is correct — NATS reroutes the launch to a node with
room. For the node-targeted subject there is no other node: a committed spread
reservation (EKS HA control-plane leg) that targets the now-unsubscribed node
gets 'nats: no responders available' instead of a capacity decision.

Keep the node-targeted subscription live for any type the node can host;
enforce capacity at launch time via ResourceManager.allocate, which already
rejects an over-capacity launch atomically. A reserved launch always reaches a
responder and, when the slot is still good, succeeds.
2026-06-10 22:41:43 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga e8cbd99158 fix(eks): propagate nodegroup DiskSize to worker root volume
launchWorkers built RunInstancesInput with no BlockDeviceMappings, so
parseVolumeParams applied the 4GB root-volume default and the nodegroup
DiskSize was silently ignored. Wire rec.DiskSize into a BlockDeviceMapping
when set.
2026-06-10 22:36:42 +10:00
Josh Siviour 22d316f76e test(reboot): capture OVN chassis-identity churn + ovn-controller claim/connection state on post-reboot failure (#342)
Run 27254808154 showed TestRebootResilience fail with ovn-controller on
the live chassis claiming NO local Port_Bindings post-reboot: ENIs stuck
on a dead chassis UUID, cr-gw chassis empty, NAT external_mac empty —
while NB intent was correct and taps carried the right iface-id. The SB
Chassis _uuid churned across the reboot (old UUID gone, new one created)
while the SB DB persisted, orphaning every claim.

The current artifacts cannot pin WHY the new chassis won't reclaim: the
ovn-controller vlog lives under /var/log/ovn, not journald, so it is
absent from the systemd-journal capture.

Add:
- phase5Snapshot: capture chassis identity PRE-reboot (system-id, SB
  Chassis/Chassis_Private, get-connection) to ovn-pre-chassis.txt as the
  churn baseline.
- dumpOVNClaimState: at post-reboot failure, capture the same chassis
  state POST-reboot plus ovn-controller connection-status/debug, the
  gw/eni Port_Binding claim detail, ovn-central-vs-ovn-controller boot
  ordering, and tails of ovn-controller.log / ovn-northd.log →
  diag-ovn-claim.txt.

Disambiguates chassis-identity churn from an SB/NB startup-ordering race
on the next reboot-suite run. Diagnostic only; no behavior change.
2026-06-10 16:19:34 +10:00
Josh Siviour 0b79697c15 feat: atomic create idempotency across EKS, ELBv2 and EC2 ClientToken (267.3) (#340)
* feat: atomic create idempotency across EKS, ELBv2 and EC2 ClientToken

Every create handler took a non-atomic Get-check then a blind Put, so a
gateway/NATS retry that spawned a second concurrent handler could pass the
check in both and double-launch + leak VMs (267 failure-mode C).

Make each create claim its identity key atomically before any launching work:

- EKS CreateCluster: claim the cluster meta via kv.Create; a prior FAILED
  attempt is reclaimed via a CREATING CAS so exactly one concurrent retry wins.
  purgeClusterInfra gains a deleteMeta flag so reclaim purges infra while
  keeping its claim key.
- EKS CreateNodegroup: claim the nodegroup record before SG provisioning or
  worker launch; duplicates return ResourceInUse without provisioning.
- ELBv2 CreateLoadBalancer: account-scoped name claim (lbname.<acct>.<name>)
  taken before ENI/VM work, released on every failure path and in
  DeleteLoadBalancer; a name claim whose owner lbID has no live record is a
  crashed-create orphan and is reclaimed.
- EC2 RunInstances: ClientToken dedup over a dedicated TTL bucket with a
  two-phase claim (in-flight -> done) and reservation replay; a token reused
  with different params returns IdempotentParameterMismatch.

Race tests under -race assert exactly one owner and a single launch for
concurrent same-name creates on all paths.

* test: cover ClientToken idempotency; extract orchestration for testability

Extract the claim->replay->launch->finalize/abort flow out of RunInstances
into runInstancesWithClientToken(store, ..., launch func) so the idempotency
path is unit-testable without a live gateway/NATS. RunInstances now just
resolves the store, hashes params, and passes a launch closure.

Make the in-flight poll timeout/step package vars so a duplicate-caller
wait-timeout is deterministically testable.

Adds tests: replay-skips-launch, owner-launches-once-then-replay,
launch-failure-aborts, param-mismatch maps to AWS error, getClientTokenStore
binds once, and in-flight wait-timeout.
2026-06-10 15:43:37 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 908005df74 feat(iam): add ListRolePolicies handler returning empty inline list
Satisfies the AWS provider's aws_iam_role read-back. Spinifex only
attaches managed policies, never inline, so this always returns empty.
2026-06-10 15:20:21 +10:00
Josh Siviour 19c53b0794 fix: verify SB gateway-port chassis claim after rebind, nudge ovn-controller (#339)
After a host reboot the Northbound gateway_chassis intent recovers correctly
(SetGatewayChassis re-asserts it idempotently), but ovn-controller can leave the
Southbound Port_Binding for the gateway router port unclaimed (chassis == []).
With no claimed binding it installs no logical->physical flows for the centralised
gateway redirect, so every floating IP on the VPC is dark: ofproto/trace drops the
FIP ingress at br-int table 0, host->FIP is 100% packet loss, and the ALB lb-agent
heartbeat times out until the 5-min health window expires (TestRebootResilience).

rebindGatewayChassis only asserted NB intent. Now, after SetGatewayChassis, the
reconciler verifies the SB Port_Binding has a non-empty chassis and, if not, nudges
the local ovn-controller to recompute (inc-engine/recompute), polling until the
claim converges or a bounded deadline elapses — logging an error rather than
blocking reconcile. SB read + recompute are exec-only (ovn-sbctl/ovn-appctl) and
live in network/host behind a reconcile.GatewayClaimVerifier interface, wired in
vpcd; reconcile stays NB-pure and mockable. No NB object create/delete (ADR-0006 S5).

Verified by run 27251769281's diag-ovn-flows.txt (SB chassis empty + table-0 drop).
Validation completes on the next reboot-suite nightly (single-node self-heals too
fast to reproduce locally).
2026-06-10 15:02:31 +10:00
Josh Siviour f8482ad05a test(reboot): heartbeat-path diagnostics on post-reboot health timeout (#337)
* test(reboot): capture heartbeat-path diagnostics on post-reboot health timeout

When post-reboot ALB targets fail to go healthy, the lb-agent's heartbeat to the
gateway times out with 'context deadline exceeded while awaiting headers' — a
symptom that alone cannot distinguish a network-level drop from an app/gateway
stall. Replace the fatal WaitForTargetsHealthy with a non-fatal poll that, on
timeout, tcpdumps br-wan for the heartbeat 5-tuple + ARP for the ALB floating IP
and pulls the lb-agent console + awsgw journal, then fails. Disambiguates the
layer before any fix (mulga-siv-265).

* test(reboot): re-aim heartbeat capture + add OVN dataplane flow-dump

Run 27250238163 proved the post-reboot failure is network-level (all 3 floating
IPs 100% packet-loss from host) but NOT neigh/NAT priming — neigh is primed and
NAT rows are present, only br-int forwarding is dead. The prior capture watched
br-wan for the ALB floating IP, while the real lb-agent heartbeat posts to the
gateway port on the host's advertise interface, so the L4 classifier could never
see the heartbeat and defaulted regardless.

- heartbeat tcpdump now watches the gateway port on `any` (real path) plus a
  secondary br-wan floating-IP capture for north-south; classifier keys off
  gateway-port L4 presence.
- new dumpOVNDataplane captures ovs-vsctl show, ovs-ofctl dump-flows br-int,
  ovn-sbctl chassis + Port_Binding, dnat_and_snat NAT rows, host neigh, and a
  host->floating-IP ping + ofproto/trace, to pin the flow-restore step.
- failure path dumps diag-ovn-flows.txt alongside diag-heartbeat.txt.

Test-only, build-tagged e2e; no production code.
2026-06-10 14:56:34 +10:00
Josh Siviour 11e58b200d fix: persist EKS control-plane VM refs before egress alloc to prevent leak (#338)
CreateCluster set the control-plane VM/ENI/spread-group refs into the cluster
meta but first persisted them to KV only after allocateClusterEgressIP. A
failure between placement and that persist left the live sys.medium CP VMs
unrecorded, so neither DeleteCluster nor the FAILED-cluster reclaim could reach
them and they leaked, reserving host capacity.

Persist the meta immediately after placeControlPlane returns. The reclaim path
keys off the persisted ControlPlaneNodes + ControlPlaneSpreadGroup, so this also
frees reserved spread capacity on teardown.
2026-06-10 13:37:44 +10:00
Josh Siviour 4457b813ae fix: make EKS DeleteCluster egress-EIP release idempotent (#336)
A retried DeleteCluster (or the egress-delete cascade) can release the
hidden-pool allocation before the release step runs, so ReleaseAddress
returns InvalidAllocationID.NotFound. That was treated as a fatal teardown
error, so the cluster wedged in DELETING forever and its KV meta plus
downstream resources leaked. Swallow the NotFound variants as idempotent
success — mirroring the 165.17 ENI-teardown fix — so the SG + KV sweep
proceeds. A genuine release failure still wedges DELETING for retry.
2026-06-10 13:37:40 +10:00
Josh Siviour 74b91b5cc5 feat(eks): HA control plane — 3-node etcd quorum spread across distinct hosts (#335)
* feat(eks): node-targetable control-plane VM (HA spread transport prereq)

Groundwork for HA control-plane placement (mulga-siv-231.7.1): make the k3s
control-plane VM placeable on a specific Spinifex host.

- Add a sys.medium instance type (2 vCPU / 4 GB) and boot the control-plane VM
  as it instead of t3.medium. A sys.* type keeps the CP VM out of customer
  DescribeInstanceTypes and makes the daemon register the node-targeted
  system.LaunchInstance.{type}.{nodeID} subject (only sys.* types get it).
- Add K3sServerInput.TargetNodeID and a LaunchSystemInstanceOnNode method on
  the launcher: empty/local node launches in-process (unchanged single-CP
  path); any other node dispatches over the node-targeted subject, where the
  receiving daemon runs the launch and owns the VM.

The spread orchestrator (reserve N hosts, launch per host, verify, rollback,
<3-host fallback) lands separately; CreateCluster still launches locally
(TargetNodeID empty), so behaviour is unchanged.

* feat(eks): HA control-plane spread orchestrator

Place N=3 k3s server VMs across distinct Spinifex hosts via a per-cluster
spread placement group, with all-or-nothing rollback and single-CP fallback.

- placeControlPlane: capacity fan-out (HostScheduler) -> >=3-host gate ->
  ensure spread group (system account) -> ReserveSpreadNodes(Min=Max=3) ->
  parallel per-node LaunchK3sServerVM(TargetNodeID) -> node-vms placement
  verify -> FinalizeSpreadInstances. Any launch/verify/finalize failure
  terminates launched VMs, releases the reservation, drops the group.
- <3 schedulable hosts or a lost reservation race falls back to a single
  local control-plane VM (prior behaviour).
- ClusterMeta gains ControlPlaneNodes[] + ControlPlaneSpreadGroup; [0] is
  mirrored into the scalar ControlPlane* fields for back-compat. DeleteCluster
  tears down every CP VM and the spread group.
- Wire PlacementGroup + Scheduler into EKSServiceDeps + orchestration-deps gate.

* fix(eks): size HA control-plane spread on raw host headroom

SchedulableHosts matched the CP type by name in node.status's per-type
capacity list, but that list omits sys.* types (system types are hidden
from customers). The CP VM is sys.medium, so the match never hit and
SchedulableHosts returned 0 on every node — placeControlPlane always fell
back to a single CP, making the >=3-host spread unreachable in production.

System VMs consume host vCPU/memory like any guest, so size the fit against
each node's raw schedulable headroom (Total - Reserved - Alloc) and the
type's footprint instead. Adds instancetypes.SpecForSystemType for the
sys.* vCPU/memory spec and a pure nodeFitsSystemInstance helper.

* feat(eks): k3s server-join role for HA control-plane quorum

Servers 2..N now boot in join mode: server: https://<first-server>:6443 +
a shared cluster token, without cluster-init, so they join the first server's
embedded-etcd quorum instead of each cluster-initing an independent datastore.

- K3sServerInput gains JoinToken (shared cluster secret, set on every server)
  and ServerURL (set => join server, no cluster-init, server-join role).
- buildK3sUserData branches cluster-init vs server:, emits token:, and selects
  SPINIFEX_K3S_ROLE server vs server-join.
- launchControlPlaneSpread launches nodes[0] first (cluster-init), derives the
  join URL from its ENI IP, then launches the rest in parallel as join servers;
  a first-server failure skips the joins and rolls back.
- CreateCluster mints a per-cluster crypto-random token (GenerateK3sClusterToken)
  threaded into the placement template.
- eks-node-role.sh adds a server-join case: token-webhook + k3s + state-report,
  but not k3s-first-boot (the first server already publishes the bootstrap
  artifacts; a join re-publish only races the bootstrap bus).

* fix: open etcd-peer/kubelet ingress on EKS control-plane SG for HA join

Join servers (231.7.2) register over the supervisor port 6443 but their
embedded etcd could not peer with the quorum: the control-plane SG only
admitted 6443 from the VPC CIDR, omitting etcd client+peer 2379-2380 and
kubelet 10250 between control-plane nodes. A single cluster-init server never
exercises those ports, so the gap stayed hidden until multi-server HA — the
join registered but its etcd never replicated the raft log, leaving the node
perpetually NotReady.

Add EnsureControlPlaneHAIngress with self-referencing (cpSG->cpSG) rules for
etcd 2379-2380 and kubelet 10250, called from CreateCluster after
EnsureControlPlaneIngress. Verified live on a 3-node cluster: join servers
reach Ready and form a 3-member etcd quorum that survives loss of the original
first server.

* feat: register all control-plane ENI IPs as EKS cluster NLB targets

Register every HA control-plane server ENI IP in the cluster NLB target
group, not just the primary. The TG already health-checks :6443, so a
dead member drains and kubectl/apiserver traffic fails over to surviving
etcd-quorum members. Add RegisterClusterTargets batch helper; the single
RegisterClusterTarget now delegates to it.
2026-06-10 12:25:47 +10:00
Josh Siviour a6a60b5ba6 fix: persist EIP MAC so distributed NAT survives host reboot (#333)
Associated Elastic IPs lost external connectivity after a host reboot:
vpcd's reconcile re-applied the dnat_and_snat rule without the ENI MAC,
collapsing it to the centralised shape (external_mac/logical_port unset),
and the daemon's relaunch republish only fired for auto-assigned public
IPs, never for store-backed EIPs.

- EIPRecord gains MacAddress, captured at AssociateAddress and cleared at
  DisassociateAddress, so reconcile can re-apply the distributed shape
  without re-querying the ENI.
- loadEIPs feeds rec.MacAddress into the reconcile spec; policy.AddEIP
  self-heals a stale centralised row when given a MAC.
- AssociatedPublicIPForInstance lets the relaunch hook resolve an
  associated EIP from the store and republish vpc.add-nat with the MAC.
2026-06-10 10:11:14 +10:00
Josh Siviour 69b62f3ca0 feat(eks): HA control-plane spread placement (mulga-siv-231.7.1) (#332)
* feat(eks): node-targetable control-plane VM (HA spread transport prereq)

Groundwork for HA control-plane placement (mulga-siv-231.7.1): make the k3s
control-plane VM placeable on a specific Spinifex host.

- Add a sys.medium instance type (2 vCPU / 4 GB) and boot the control-plane VM
  as it instead of t3.medium. A sys.* type keeps the CP VM out of customer
  DescribeInstanceTypes and makes the daemon register the node-targeted
  system.LaunchInstance.{type}.{nodeID} subject (only sys.* types get it).
- Add K3sServerInput.TargetNodeID and a LaunchSystemInstanceOnNode method on
  the launcher: empty/local node launches in-process (unchanged single-CP
  path); any other node dispatches over the node-targeted subject, where the
  receiving daemon runs the launch and owns the VM.

The spread orchestrator (reserve N hosts, launch per host, verify, rollback,
<3-host fallback) lands separately; CreateCluster still launches locally
(TargetNodeID empty), so behaviour is unchanged.

* feat(eks): HA control-plane spread orchestrator

Place N=3 k3s server VMs across distinct Spinifex hosts via a per-cluster
spread placement group, with all-or-nothing rollback and single-CP fallback.

- placeControlPlane: capacity fan-out (HostScheduler) -> >=3-host gate ->
  ensure spread group (system account) -> ReserveSpreadNodes(Min=Max=3) ->
  parallel per-node LaunchK3sServerVM(TargetNodeID) -> node-vms placement
  verify -> FinalizeSpreadInstances. Any launch/verify/finalize failure
  terminates launched VMs, releases the reservation, drops the group.
- <3 schedulable hosts or a lost reservation race falls back to a single
  local control-plane VM (prior behaviour).
- ClusterMeta gains ControlPlaneNodes[] + ControlPlaneSpreadGroup; [0] is
  mirrored into the scalar ControlPlane* fields for back-compat. DeleteCluster
  tears down every CP VM and the spread group.
- Wire PlacementGroup + Scheduler into EKSServiceDeps + orchestration-deps gate.

* fix(eks): size HA control-plane spread on raw host headroom

SchedulableHosts matched the CP type by name in node.status's per-type
capacity list, but that list omits sys.* types (system types are hidden
from customers). The CP VM is sys.medium, so the match never hit and
SchedulableHosts returned 0 on every node — placeControlPlane always fell
back to a single CP, making the >=3-host spread unreachable in production.

System VMs consume host vCPU/memory like any guest, so size the fit against
each node's raw schedulable headroom (Total - Reserved - Alloc) and the
type's footprint instead. Adds instancetypes.SpecForSystemType for the
sys.* vCPU/memory spec and a pure nodeFitsSystemInstance helper.
2026-06-10 08:58:58 +10:00
Josh Siviour 686e374758 fix: strip duplicate lb- prefix from haproxy socket and cert paths (#331)
* fix: strip duplicate lb- prefix from haproxy socket and cert paths

LoadBalancerID, ListenerID and friends already carry their type prefix
(lb-/lst-), so the stats-socket, frontend cert, and HAProxyManager
config/pid filename templates double-prefixed: lb-lb-<id>.sock,
lb-lb-<id>-<lst>.pem, alb-lb-<id>.cfg.

The socket path is computed independently on both sides (gateway render
in buildHAProxyConfig, agent poll in lbagent.New); any divergence in the
lb- prefix convention between the two leaves the agent polling a socket
HAProxy never bound, spamming 'HAProxy stats unavailable: no such file'
while the data plane serves fine. Drop the redundant literal prefix so
both sides resolve to <id>.sock and the alb-/nginx cert paths match the
delivered config.

* refactor: remove unused HAProxyManager

HAProxyManager was never constructed (NewHAProxyManager had no callers).
The live ALB data plane runs in the lb-agent via reloadHAProxy with the
config generated daemon-side and shipped; this per-daemon process manager
was dead code. Remove the type, its methods, tests, and now-unused
imports (log/slog, os/exec, sync, syscall).
2026-06-10 08:55:34 +10:00
Josh Siviour 90369371ee Feat/nightly e2e fix (#330)
* ci(e2e-nightly): run Go harness suites instead of bash run-*.sh

Swap nightly cells 1-3 (single), 8-10 (real-multi) and 18 (reboot) to the
compiled <suite>.test binaries, mirroring e2e.yml: SPINIFEX_E2E=1 with
SPINIFEX_MODE single|multinode, per-suite logs to ARTIFACT_DIR, then
go-junit-report + e2e-analyze + upload-artifact. Adds a spinifex checkout for
the composite actions and pulls /run/spinifex/console-*.log so LB microVM
(lb-agent) state is captured on failure. Cells 17 (tofu) and 20 (baremetal)
stay on bash — no Go suite exists.

* ci(e2e-nightly): cell-17 RCA analytics + cell-20 cosmetic alignment

run-tofu-examples-e2e.sh now emits go test -v markers per workbook so the
cell-17 step's tee'd test-tofu.log flows through the same go-junit-report ->
e2e-analyze -> upload-artifact chain as the Go suites, producing junit-tofu.xml
and an analysis bundle for RCA. Align e2e-baremetal.yml (cell 20) ARTIFACT_DIR,
analyze title, and artifact name with the matrix cells so CI-RCA discovers its
bundle uniformly.

* ci(e2e-nightly): wire host journal + VM consoles into RCA bundles

Collect now emits the canonical spinifex-journal.log (concat of all nodes)
that the e2e-analyze bundler slices into each failure's journal.log, so
elbv2-service/vpcd/daemon lines in the failure window travel with the bundle
(previously the journal uploaded as spinifex-journal-node*.log, a name the
bundler never reads). Rename the console capture to vm-console-node* and note
it also carries guest cloud-init/sshd consoles, covering the cell-3 internal-LB,
cell-18 reboot-datapath, and cell-9/10 guest-ssh blind spots.

* ci(e2e): self-heal runner /dev + --one-file-system on workspace clean

Clean Workspace now detaches any leaked iso-builder rootfs mount, recreates
/dev/null if a prior build clobbered it, and uses rm --one-file-system so the
clean can't descend into a still-mounted devtmpfs and delete host device nodes.
Guards both the matrix cells and the bare-metal job against the host-wide
/dev/null wipe that fails go build with 'open /dev/null: no such file or
directory'.
2026-06-10 07:52:09 +10:00
Josh Siviour 6483c6f732 fix(elbv2): reap LB floating-IP dnat_and_snat on DeleteLoadBalancer (#329)
The LB VM's external-pool floating-IP NAT (dnat_and_snat external_ip -> LB
VPC IP) was reaped only conditionally on teardown: DeleteNetworkInterface
skips EIP-owned addresses (defers to the EIP lifecycle), and that lifecycle's
reap runs in the async TerminateSystemInstance goroutine gated on the EIP
association. So repeated create/delete cycles accumulated stale rules that
collapsed onto the reused LB VIP, making OVN SNAT/un-DNAT ambiguous and
dropping the lb-agent heartbeat return path.

DeleteLoadBalancer now publishes vpc.delete-nat deterministically from the LB
record (external=AvailZones public IP, logical=VPCIP). DeleteEIP matches on
external+logical and is idempotent, so redundant reaps from other paths are
harmless. Internal LBs (no floating IP) are a no-op.
2026-06-09 23:52:55 +10:00
Josh Siviour 06a583cb58 fix(network): re-prime EIP reachability on idempotent skip; drop dead inject-garp (#328)
* fix: re-prime EIP reachability on AddEIP idempotent-skip path

AddEIP early-returned on the idempotent-skip path (OVN DNAT row already
matches) before emitting GARP and priming the host neighbour. Stop->start
and daemon reboot-recovery re-attach the same EIP with an unchanged row, so
the host neigh entry / OVS datapath never got re-primed and the EIP/ALB-VIP
stayed dark until the kernel ARP entry timed out (60-300s). inject-garp is
unsupported on some chassis, making neighPrime the only working remediation
— exactly the step the skip bypassed.

Extract garp + neighPrime/flush into primeReachability and run it on the
skip path as well as after a fresh AddNAT. The FlowsBarrier still fires only
on row churn. Resolves cell-9/10 TestMultinodeGuestSSH and cell-18
TestRebootResilience nightly failures.

* refactor: remove dead inject-garp GARP emitter from EIP path

ovn-appctl inject-garp is not a valid command on the OVN build Spinifex
deploys and tests against — every AddEIP GARP attempt failed with
'inject-garp is not a valid command' and fell through to the host neigh
prime/flush, which is the only remediation that works. The GARP hook was a
guaranteed-failing shell-out plus a misleading WARN on every EIP attach.

Delete host.InjectGARP, the GARPEmitter type, WithGARPEmitter option, the
garp field + its m.garp() call in primeReachability, and the vpcd
injectGARPEmitter wiring. host.ReplaceNeigh (distributed) and host.FlushNeigh
(centralised) already cover both NAT shapes and become the sole EIP
reachability path. Reword the neigh hook docs that framed themselves as an
inject-garp-independent fallback. Prune GARP-only tests; move the shared
recordingRunner helper into neigh_test.go.
2026-06-09 23:20:07 +10:00
Josh Siviour 1654f98e18 feat(resource-governance): RG-3/4/6/8/9/11 — admission charge, OOM ladder, tier confinement (#327)
* feat(daemon): live MemAvailable admission gate + fixed-services reserve scope

Admission previously charged only guest -m against a flat reserve, blind to the
co-located storage VMs, nbdkit, and daemon stack — so it greenlit launches that
overcommit real RAM and OOM-kill guests on memory-tight hosts.

Add a second admission gate that clamps the accounting-derived launch count by
live /proc/meminfo MemAvailable (which already nets reclaimable cache and sees
every untracked consumer): admitted = min(accounting, (MemAvailable-reserve)/
guestMem). Reads live per admission, fails open on a /proc read error so a
transient fault can't wedge launches, and is disabled by SPINIFEX_ADMISSION_LIVE_MEM=0.

Re-scope the host reserve to the fixed infrastructure tier only; per-instance
nbdkit is no longer expected to fit inside it (explicit per-instance charge is a
follow-up; the live gate covers it implicitly in the meantime).

Pure helpers (liveMemCount, parseMemAvailableKB, liveMemAdmissionEnabled) are
unit-tested; liveMemGate covered via an injected reader.

* feat(daemon): charge nbdkit per-instance in admission accounting

An instance's admission memory charge is now its guest -m plus the nbdkit
processes backing its volumes (one per attached volume), not guest -m alone.
The static reserve no longer has to absorb per-instance nbdkit, which was
unsizable and the root of the host-memory-overcommit OOM.

Per-volume charge is measured per class (main 768 MiB: 128 cache + plugin
working set + in-flight I/O; aux 96 MiB: process floor, 0 cache), env-tunable
via SPINIFEX_NBDKIT_MAIN_MIB / SPINIFEX_NBDKIT_AUX_MIB. Default layout is one
main + two aux volumes (root + cloudinit + efi) ~= 0.94 GB/instance. Applied at
every accounting site through instanceMemChargeMiB so charge and release never
drift; the live MemAvailable gate backstops block-device-mapping volumes the
static count misses.

* feat(vm): three-tier guest OOM ladder + spinifex-guests.slice

Replace the flat oom_score_adj=500 on every guest QEMU with a ManagedBy-derived
ladder: user guests (ManagedBy=='') stay +500 and are reaped first under host
memory pressure; system instances (ELBv2 LB-VMs, EKS control-plane nodes,
ManagedBy!='') score 0, ranking above user guests but below the infra tier
(-500). Killing a system instance degrades the data path or cluster control
plane for many user VMs, so it must outlive them.

Add spinifex-guests.slice as a sibling of spinifex-system under spinifex.slice —
the parent tier for the per-instance leaves that land with RG-7. Guest QEMU
placement into the slice is deferred to the per-instance work.

* refactor(systemd): lean unit comments to RG-n tags + RG-9/RG-11 invariants

Strip the multi-paragraph rationale novels from spinifex-daemon.service (48->7
comment lines), spinifex-vpcd.service (29->8) and spinifex.slice (15->5),
replacing them with settings + terse # RG-n clause tags. Remove plan-doc, bead
and CI-run references from comments (project policy). Directives are byte-for-byte
unchanged — comment-only.

Add RG-9/RG-11 invariant tests asserting per-tier confinement (locked-down
storage/control tier drops all caps + NoNewPrivileges=yes; daemon keeps exactly
CAP_SYS_ADMIN+CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and the four-entry DeviceAllow; vpcd is the
documented network-tier exception) and the lean-comment budget + no-plan-ref rule.
2026-06-09 22:56:46 +10:00
Josh Siviour f9b14e5a12 fix(ec2): make errored instances renderable and restartable (#325)
Project internal StateError onto AWS stopped (code 80) in DescribeInstances
so SDK/UI clients no longer break on the non-AWS 'error' state label.

Route start-instances through the per-instance ec2.cmd topic first so a
crash-pinned StateError instance is restarted by its live owner node, whose
StartInstance handler now accepts StateError (Manager.Start transitions
error->pending before relaunch). Fall back to the ec2.start queue-group path
on ErrNoResponders for genuinely stopped instances in the shared KV.
2026-06-09 16:59:32 +10:00
Josh Siviour 7bcd365549 ci(eks-ami): build on self-hosted ci-single runner (#326)
* ci(eks-ami): build on self-hosted ci-single-1 runner

GitHub-hosted ubuntu-24.04 cannot run the libguestfs appliance network:
passt fails (PID file denied under its AppArmor confine / privilege drop)
and the SLIRP fallback has no outbound, so virt-customize --network dies.
The self-hosted ci-single-1 runner has /dev/kvm and real networking, so
the existing libguestfs build works unmodified.

* fix(build-system-image): add --no-cache, force fresh build on publish

The <10min cached-raw skip avoids duplicate work for concurrent e2e
jobs, but on the persistent publish runner it could republish a stale
image from a prior or concurrent run. Add --no-cache to bypass the skip
and have publish-system-image.sh pass it on every build.

* ci(eks-ami): target ci-single label (no ci-single-1 label exists)

The self-hosted runners are named ci-single/-2/-3 but all share the
single label 'ci-single'; runs-on matches labels, not names, so
ci-single-1 never schedules.

* ci(eks-ami): disable Go cache on self-hosted runner

setup-go's cache-save (Post Setup Go) re-uploaded the Go cache to the
Actions backend on every run, taking ~2.5min vs the 36s build. The
self-hosted runner already keeps the cache on local disk, so cache:false.
2026-06-09 16:58:04 +10:00
Julian Sommer 773341248d feat: use STS tokens on frontend (#322) 2026-06-09 15:40:35 +10:00
Josh Siviour 2ea3e22db6 feat(systemd): cgroup-confine spinifex to a resource-limited slice + host swap (#324)
* feat(systemd): bound spinifex to a resource-limited slice

Add a spinifex.slice parent ceiling (MemoryHigh=80%, MemoryMax=90%,
MemorySwapMax=0) with a spinifex-system.slice child holding the seven
control/infra services, so a runaway hits the slice instead of the host.
A system.slice drop-in (MemoryMin=1G, CPUWeight=300) reserves RAM and CPU
for sshd/journald/the operator, keeping the box reachable when spinifex is
maxed.

The drop-in is generated in setup.sh install_systemd() rather than shipped
as a staged file, since the packaging globs flatten the systemd/ dir; this
mirrors the existing sshd-keygen drop-in pattern. The two .slice files flow
through every staging path unchanged.

Within the single effective cgroup, a slice MemoryMax OOM picks the highest
oom_score victim — guest QEMU (+500) before any service (-500) — so a slice
OOM degrades by killing one guest while the daemon, storage tier, NATS, and
the host all survive.

* feat(setup): provision 8G host swapfile + vm.swappiness=10

Add a setup_swap stage that creates an 8G /swapfile, enables it, persists it
to fstab, and writes vm.swappiness=10 so the kernel only swaps under real
pressure. Backs spinifex.slice MemorySwapMax so the slice can spill to swap
for graceful degradation instead of OOMing a guest. Idempotent; skipped under
ISO_BUILD (firstboot provisions swap on ISO hosts). Reverses the prior swap=0
assumption.
2026-06-09 15:21:13 +10:00
1230 changed files with 117471 additions and 113246 deletions
+102
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="900" height="470" viewBox="0 0 900 470">
<defs>
<linearGradient id="bg" x1="0%" y1="0%" x2="100%" y2="100%">
<stop offset="0%" style="stop-color:#0a0a0a"/>
<stop offset="100%" style="stop-color:#0d1117"/>
</linearGradient>
<linearGradient id="inet-grad" x1="0%" y1="0%" x2="0%" y2="100%">
<stop offset="0%" style="stop-color:#3fb95022"/>
<stop offset="100%" style="stop-color:#3fb95008"/>
</linearGradient>
<linearGradient id="pub-grad" x1="0%" y1="0%" x2="0%" y2="100%">
<stop offset="0%" style="stop-color:#3fb9501f"/>
<stop offset="100%" style="stop-color:#3fb95008"/>
</linearGradient>
<linearGradient id="gw-grad" x1="0%" y1="0%" x2="0%" y2="100%">
<stop offset="0%" style="stop-color:#DC26261f"/>
<stop offset="100%" style="stop-color:#DC262608"/>
</linearGradient>
</defs>
<rect width="900" height="470" fill="url(#bg)" rx="12"/>
<text x="24" y="30" font-family="'Segoe UI', system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="11" fill="#a1a1aa" letter-spacing="2.5" font-weight="600">ECS · EC2 LAUNCH TYPE ON SPINIFEX</text>
<text x="876" y="30" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="10" fill="#71717a" text-anchor="end">container instances from spinifex-ecs-node AMI · awsvpc + ALB</text>
<!-- Internet -->
<rect x="120" y="52" width="200" height="40" rx="8" fill="url(#inet-grad)" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-width="1.1" stroke-opacity="0.55"/>
<text x="220" y="76" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="13" fill="#3fb950" text-anchor="middle" font-weight="700">Internet</text>
<!-- connector to ALB -->
<line x1="220" y1="92" x2="220" y2="112" stroke="#71717a" stroke-width="1" opacity="0.5"/>
<polygon points="216,108 224,108 220,116" fill="#71717a" opacity="0.7"/>
<!-- ALB -->
<g transform="translate(90, 116)">
<rect width="260" height="60" rx="8" fill="url(#pub-grad)" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-width="1.2" stroke-opacity="0.6"/>
<text x="20" y="24" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="12.5" fill="#3fb950" font-weight="700">Application Load Balancer</text>
<line x1="16" y1="32" x2="244" y2="32" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-opacity="0.3" stroke-width="0.5"/>
<text x="20" y="50" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="10" fill="#7ee787">target group · target_type = ip</text>
</g>
<!-- Spinifex Gateway (control plane) -->
<g transform="translate(560, 110)">
<rect width="316" height="72" rx="8" fill="url(#gw-grad)" stroke="#DC2626" stroke-width="1.2" stroke-opacity="0.65"/>
<text x="20" y="24" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="12.5" fill="#F87171" font-weight="700">Spinifex Gateway :9999</text>
<text x="296" y="24" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="9.5" fill="#FCA5A5" text-anchor="end">control plane</text>
<line x1="16" y1="32" x2="300" y2="32" stroke="#DC2626" stroke-opacity="0.3" stroke-width="0.5"/>
<text x="20" y="48" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="10" fill="#FCA5A5">ECS agent registers · TLS + SigV4 (IMDS creds)</text>
<text x="20" y="63" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="10" fill="#FCA5A5">task role creds → container at 169.254.170.2</text>
</g>
<!-- ALB fan-out to subnets (traffic) -->
<line x1="220" y1="176" x2="220" y2="200" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-width="1" stroke-dasharray="3,3" opacity="0.55"/>
<line x1="220" y1="200" x2="650" y2="200" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-width="1" stroke-dasharray="3,3" opacity="0.55"/>
<line x1="220" y1="200" x2="220" y2="228" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-width="1" stroke-dasharray="3,3" opacity="0.55"/>
<line x1="650" y1="200" x2="650" y2="228" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-width="1" stroke-dasharray="3,3" opacity="0.55"/>
<text x="435" y="195" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="9.5" fill="#7ee787" text-anchor="middle">balances to each task's ENI</text>
<!-- agent path: subnets up to gateway -->
<line x1="718" y1="228" x2="718" y2="182" stroke="#F87171" stroke-width="1.1" stroke-dasharray="3,3" opacity="0.6"/>
<polygon points="714,186 722,186 718,178" fill="#F87171" opacity="0.8"/>
<!-- subnet_a -->
<g transform="translate(60, 228)">
<rect width="320" height="156" rx="8" fill="url(#pub-grad)" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-width="1.2" stroke-opacity="0.55"/>
<text x="20" y="24" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="12" fill="#3fb950" font-weight="700">subnet_a</text>
<text x="300" y="24" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="9.5" fill="#7ee787" text-anchor="end">az-a</text>
<line x1="16" y1="32" x2="304" y2="32" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-opacity="0.3" stroke-width="0.5"/>
<!-- container instance -->
<rect x="20" y="42" width="280" height="98" rx="6" fill="#a855f71a" stroke="#a855f7" stroke-opacity="0.55" stroke-width="0.8"/>
<text x="34" y="60" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="11" fill="#c084fc" font-weight="700">container instance</text>
<text x="286" y="60" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="9" fill="#d8b4fe" text-anchor="end">AMI: spinifex-ecs-node</text>
<text x="34" y="74" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="8.5" fill="#a1a1aa">ecsInstanceRole · ECS agent</text>
<rect x="34" y="82" width="118" height="50" rx="4" fill="#a855f71a" stroke="#a855f7" stroke-opacity="0.45" stroke-width="0.6"/>
<text x="93" y="102" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="10" fill="#d8b4fe" text-anchor="middle">task (web)</text>
<text x="93" y="116" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="8" fill="#a1a1aa" text-anchor="middle">awsvpc ENI</text>
<rect x="166" y="82" width="118" height="50" rx="4" fill="#a855f71a" stroke="#a855f7" stroke-opacity="0.45" stroke-width="0.6"/>
<text x="225" y="102" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="10" fill="#d8b4fe" text-anchor="middle">task (web)</text>
<text x="225" y="116" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="8" fill="#a1a1aa" text-anchor="middle">awsvpc ENI</text>
</g>
<!-- subnet_b -->
<g transform="translate(520, 228)">
<rect width="320" height="156" rx="8" fill="url(#pub-grad)" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-width="1.2" stroke-opacity="0.55"/>
<text x="20" y="24" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="12" fill="#3fb950" font-weight="700">subnet_b</text>
<text x="300" y="24" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="9.5" fill="#7ee787" text-anchor="end">az-b</text>
<line x1="16" y1="32" x2="304" y2="32" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-opacity="0.3" stroke-width="0.5"/>
<rect x="20" y="42" width="280" height="98" rx="6" fill="#a855f71a" stroke="#a855f7" stroke-opacity="0.55" stroke-width="0.8"/>
<text x="34" y="60" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="11" fill="#c084fc" font-weight="700">container instance</text>
<text x="286" y="60" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="9" fill="#d8b4fe" text-anchor="end">AMI: spinifex-ecs-node</text>
<text x="34" y="74" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="8.5" fill="#a1a1aa">ecsInstanceRole · ECS agent</text>
<rect x="34" y="82" width="118" height="50" rx="4" fill="#a855f71a" stroke="#a855f7" stroke-opacity="0.45" stroke-width="0.6"/>
<text x="93" y="102" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="10" fill="#d8b4fe" text-anchor="middle">task (web)</text>
<text x="93" y="116" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="8" fill="#a1a1aa" text-anchor="middle">awsvpc ENI</text>
<rect x="166" y="82" width="118" height="50" rx="4" fill="#3fb9501a" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-opacity="0.45" stroke-width="0.6"/>
<text x="225" y="103" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="9.5" fill="#7ee787" text-anchor="middle">image pull</text>
<text x="225" y="117" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="8" fill="#7ee787" text-anchor="middle">registry / ECR</text>
</g>
<!-- footer note -->
<text x="450" y="410" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="9.5" fill="#71717a" text-anchor="middle">No ECS launch API — you add capacity by booting EC2 instances from the spinifex-ecs-node AMI (the console's "Provision capacity" wraps RunInstances)</text>
<text x="450" y="426" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="9.5" fill="#71717a" text-anchor="middle">The service keeps the desired task count running and registers each task's ENI IP with the ALB target group</text>
</svg>

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 8.4 KiB

+96
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="900" height="470" viewBox="0 0 900 470">
<defs>
<linearGradient id="bg" x1="0%" y1="0%" x2="100%" y2="100%">
<stop offset="0%" style="stop-color:#0a0a0a"/>
<stop offset="100%" style="stop-color:#0d1117"/>
</linearGradient>
<linearGradient id="inet-grad" x1="0%" y1="0%" x2="0%" y2="100%">
<stop offset="0%" style="stop-color:#3fb95022"/>
<stop offset="100%" style="stop-color:#3fb95008"/>
</linearGradient>
<linearGradient id="pub-grad" x1="0%" y1="0%" x2="0%" y2="100%">
<stop offset="0%" style="stop-color:#3fb9501f"/>
<stop offset="100%" style="stop-color:#3fb95008"/>
</linearGradient>
<linearGradient id="cp-grad" x1="0%" y1="0%" x2="0%" y2="100%">
<stop offset="0%" style="stop-color:#DC26261f"/>
<stop offset="100%" style="stop-color:#DC262608"/>
</linearGradient>
</defs>
<rect width="900" height="470" fill="url(#bg)" rx="12"/>
<text x="24" y="30" font-family="'Segoe UI', system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="11" fill="#a1a1aa" letter-spacing="2.5" font-weight="600">EKS · MANAGED KUBERNETES ON SPINIFEX</text>
<text x="876" y="30" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="10" fill="#71717a" text-anchor="end">control plane VM + NLB · workers from eks-node AMI</text>
<!-- Internet / kubectl -->
<rect x="330" y="52" width="240" height="40" rx="8" fill="url(#inet-grad)" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-width="1.1" stroke-opacity="0.55"/>
<text x="450" y="76" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="13" fill="#3fb950" text-anchor="middle" font-weight="700">Internet · kubectl + aws eks</text>
<!-- connector to control plane -->
<line x1="450" y1="92" x2="450" y2="112" stroke="#71717a" stroke-width="1" opacity="0.5"/>
<polygon points="446,108 454,108 450,116" fill="#71717a" opacity="0.7"/>
<!-- Control plane (Spinifex-managed) -->
<g transform="translate(290, 116)">
<rect width="320" height="76" rx="8" fill="url(#cp-grad)" stroke="#DC2626" stroke-width="1.2" stroke-opacity="0.65"/>
<text x="20" y="24" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="12.5" fill="#F87171" font-weight="700">EKS Control Plane</text>
<text x="300" y="24" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="9.5" fill="#FCA5A5" text-anchor="end">Spinifex-managed</text>
<line x1="16" y1="32" x2="304" y2="32" stroke="#DC2626" stroke-opacity="0.3" stroke-width="0.5"/>
<rect x="20" y="42" width="135" height="22" rx="4" fill="#DC26261a" stroke="#DC2626" stroke-opacity="0.5" stroke-width="0.6"/>
<text x="87" y="57" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="10.5" fill="#FCA5A5" text-anchor="middle" font-weight="600">API NLB (public)</text>
<rect x="165" y="42" width="135" height="22" rx="4" fill="#DC26261a" stroke="#DC2626" stroke-opacity="0.5" stroke-width="0.6"/>
<text x="232" y="57" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="10.5" fill="#FCA5A5" text-anchor="middle" font-weight="600">apiserver VM</text>
</g>
<!-- authn note -->
<rect x="624" y="138" width="172" height="32" rx="6" fill="#0a0a0a" stroke="#71717a" stroke-width="0.6" stroke-opacity="0.5"/>
<text x="710" y="151" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="9.5" fill="#a1a1aa" text-anchor="middle">authn: API · access entries</text>
<text x="710" y="163" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="9.5" fill="#a1a1aa" text-anchor="middle">aws eks get-token (IAM → RBAC)</text>
<!-- fan-out to node-group subnets -->
<line x1="450" y1="192" x2="450" y2="210" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-width="1" stroke-dasharray="3,3" opacity="0.55"/>
<line x1="230" y1="210" x2="670" y2="210" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-width="1" stroke-dasharray="3,3" opacity="0.55"/>
<line x1="230" y1="210" x2="230" y2="228" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-width="1" stroke-dasharray="3,3" opacity="0.55"/>
<line x1="670" y1="210" x2="670" y2="228" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-width="1" stroke-dasharray="3,3" opacity="0.55"/>
<text x="450" y="206" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="9.5" fill="#7ee787" text-anchor="middle">managed node group · workers join the control plane</text>
<!-- subnet_a -->
<g transform="translate(108, 228)">
<rect width="320" height="150" rx="8" fill="url(#pub-grad)" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-width="1.2" stroke-opacity="0.55"/>
<text x="20" y="24" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="12" fill="#3fb950" font-weight="700">subnet_a</text>
<text x="300" y="24" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="9.5" fill="#7ee787" text-anchor="end">az-a</text>
<line x1="16" y1="32" x2="304" y2="32" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-opacity="0.3" stroke-width="0.5"/>
<!-- worker node -->
<rect x="20" y="42" width="280" height="92" rx="6" fill="#a855f71a" stroke="#a855f7" stroke-opacity="0.55" stroke-width="0.8"/>
<text x="34" y="60" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="11" fill="#c084fc" font-weight="700">worker node</text>
<text x="286" y="60" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="9" fill="#d8b4fe" text-anchor="end">AMI: eks-node</text>
<rect x="34" y="72" width="76" height="50" rx="4" fill="#a855f71a" stroke="#a855f7" stroke-opacity="0.45" stroke-width="0.6"/>
<text x="72" y="100" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="10" fill="#d8b4fe" text-anchor="middle">pod</text>
<rect x="122" y="72" width="76" height="50" rx="4" fill="#a855f71a" stroke="#a855f7" stroke-opacity="0.45" stroke-width="0.6"/>
<text x="160" y="100" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="10" fill="#d8b4fe" text-anchor="middle">pod</text>
<rect x="210" y="72" width="76" height="50" rx="4" fill="#a855f71a" stroke="#a855f7" stroke-opacity="0.45" stroke-width="0.6"/>
<text x="248" y="100" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="10" fill="#d8b4fe" text-anchor="middle">pod</text>
</g>
<!-- subnet_b -->
<g transform="translate(472, 228)">
<rect width="320" height="150" rx="8" fill="url(#pub-grad)" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-width="1.2" stroke-opacity="0.55"/>
<text x="20" y="24" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="12" fill="#3fb950" font-weight="700">subnet_b</text>
<text x="300" y="24" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="9.5" fill="#7ee787" text-anchor="end">az-b</text>
<line x1="16" y1="32" x2="304" y2="32" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-opacity="0.3" stroke-width="0.5"/>
<rect x="20" y="42" width="280" height="92" rx="6" fill="#a855f71a" stroke="#a855f7" stroke-opacity="0.55" stroke-width="0.8"/>
<text x="34" y="60" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="11" fill="#c084fc" font-weight="700">worker node</text>
<text x="286" y="60" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="9" fill="#d8b4fe" text-anchor="end">AMI: eks-node</text>
<rect x="34" y="72" width="76" height="50" rx="4" fill="#a855f71a" stroke="#a855f7" stroke-opacity="0.45" stroke-width="0.6"/>
<text x="72" y="100" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="10" fill="#d8b4fe" text-anchor="middle">pod</text>
<rect x="122" y="72" width="76" height="50" rx="4" fill="#a855f71a" stroke="#a855f7" stroke-opacity="0.45" stroke-width="0.6"/>
<text x="160" y="100" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="10" fill="#d8b4fe" text-anchor="middle">pod</text>
<rect x="210" y="72" width="76" height="50" rx="4" fill="#3fb9501a" stroke="#3fb950" stroke-opacity="0.45" stroke-width="0.6"/>
<text x="248" y="93" font-family="'SF Mono', ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="9.5" fill="#7ee787" text-anchor="middle">ECR</text>
<text x="248" y="107" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="8" fill="#7ee787" text-anchor="middle">pull</text>
</g>
<!-- footer note -->
<text x="450" y="404" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="9.5" fill="#71717a" text-anchor="middle">You provide the VPC, subnets, and IAM roles · Spinifex provisions the control plane, node-group VMs, and security groups</text>
<text x="450" y="420" font-family="'Segoe UI', sans-serif" font-size="9.5" fill="#71717a" text-anchor="middle">Node groups always boot the registered eks-node image · workers need egress (IGW / NAT) to pull images</text>
</svg>

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 8.2 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 189 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 274 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 352 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 92 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 21 KiB

+7
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
## Summary
<!-- What does this PR do, and why? -->
## Changes
<!-- The notable changes, as bullets. -->
+9 -14
View File
@@ -27,16 +27,16 @@ jobs:
cancel-in-progress: false
env:
BM_ISO_CACHE: /var/cache/spinifex-iso-builder
ARTIFACT_DIR: /tmp/spinifex-e2e-baremetal-artifacts-${{ github.run_id }}
ARTIFACT_DIR: /tmp/spinifex-e2e-nightly-cell-20-${{ github.run_id }}
steps:
- name: Clean Workspace
run: sudo rm -rf "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
run: |
sudo umount -R -l "${BM_ISO_CACHE}/rootfs" 2>/dev/null || true
if [ ! -c /dev/null ]; then sudo rm -f /dev/null; sudo mknod -m 666 /dev/null c 1 3; fi
sudo rm -rf --one-file-system "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
# When called (nightly/release) the caller picks the ref (dev on
# schedule, the tag on release); standalone dispatch defaults to the
# triggering ref.
ref: ${{ inputs.ref || github.ref }}
- uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v3
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ jobs:
private-key: ${{ secrets.APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
repositories: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/mulga
token: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
@@ -104,7 +104,6 @@ jobs:
echo "Ubuntu 26.04 cloud image cached ($(du -h "$UBUNTU_IMG" | cut -f1))"
fi
- name: Install go-junit-report on runner
run: go install github.com/jstemmer/go-junit-report/v2@latest
@@ -117,10 +116,6 @@ jobs:
SPX_EXTERNAL_POOL: ${{ env.SPINIFEX_CI_POOL }}
run: |
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
# Capture combined bootstrap + e2e output so failures produce a
# downloadable, analyzable artifact (the suites run go test -v on the
# init node and stream back over SSH). pipefail keeps the script's
# real exit code through the tee.
set -o pipefail
sudo -E mulga/scripts/baremetal/run-baremetal-e2e.sh \
--vmlinuz "${BM_ISO_CACHE}/vmlinuz" \
@@ -142,12 +137,12 @@ jobs:
with:
junit-glob: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}/junit-*.xml
log-dir: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
title: "Bare-Metal E2E failure analysis"
title: "E2E failure analysis (cell 20)"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
if: always()
with:
name: e2e-baremetal-artifacts-${{ github.run_id }}
name: e2e-artifacts-cell-20-${{ github.run_id }}
path: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
if-no-files-found: warn
retention-days: 14
+2 -26
View File
@@ -21,10 +21,6 @@ jobs:
ddil:
name: DDIL Real Multi-Node
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-multi ]
# Budget: ~45m go test + tofu provision/bootstrap/teardown on ci-multi.
# In Phase 1 the scenarios all t.Skip, so the real-world runtime is
# dominated by provisioning; the 60m ceiling leaves headroom for
# Phase 2/3 when assertions come online.
timeout-minutes: 60
env:
TOFU_LOG: /tmp/e2e-tofu-ddil-${{ github.run_id }}.log
@@ -39,16 +35,12 @@ jobs:
private-key: ${{ secrets.APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
repositories: mulga
# Full spinifex checkout: the Go harness must run on the runner
# (outside the cluster) so its SSH path survives scenario partitions
# that drop peer-to-peer cluster traffic. Running inside the cluster
# would self-sever when Scenario C isolates a node.
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
name: Checkout Spinifex
with:
path: spinifex
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
name: Checkout Mulga (tofu-cluster)
with:
repository: mulgadc/mulga
@@ -88,7 +80,6 @@ jobs:
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# shellcheck source=/dev/null
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
export TF_VAR_git_branch="${GIT_BRANCH}"
quiet_run "tofu init" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu init -input=false
@@ -140,10 +131,6 @@ jobs:
exit 1
fi
# Guest SSH key: bootstrap-install.sh imports spinifex-key into EC2;
# the matching private material was generated on the primary node at
# ~/.ssh/spinifex-key. Pull it to the runner so the harness can SSH
# the witness via its MapPublicIpOnLaunch-assigned EIP.
GUEST_KEY="${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-key"
scp -i "${SSH_KEY}" -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null \
"${SSH_USER}@${PRIMARY_IP}:~/.ssh/spinifex-key" "${GUEST_KEY}"
@@ -151,11 +138,6 @@ jobs:
mkdir -p "${RUNNER_TEMP}/ddil-results"
cd "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex"
# gotestsum: human-readable PASS/FAIL/SKIP lines in Actions stdout,
# plus machine-readable jsonfile + JUnit XML artifacts. The JUnit
# file feeds the junit-report composite action below so failures
# become summary table rows + workflow annotations.
# shellcheck source=/dev/null
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
banner "DDIL scenarios"
DDIL_NODES="${NODE_IPS}" \
@@ -185,10 +167,6 @@ jobs:
if: failure()
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
# Pull spinifex-* journals + QEMU process listings from every
# node into the artifact bundle so failures can be triaged
# without re-provisioning the cluster. Best-effort — a missing
# node should not mask the original test failure.
set +e
INVENTORY=$(tofu output -json inventory)
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path')
@@ -197,7 +175,6 @@ jobs:
LOG_DIR="${RUNNER_TEMP}/ddil-results/cluster-logs"
mkdir -p "${LOG_DIR}"
# shellcheck source=/dev/null
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
mapfile -t NODE_IPS < <(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[].wan_ip')
for ip in "${NODE_IPS[@]}"; do
@@ -221,7 +198,6 @@ jobs:
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# shellcheck source=/dev/null
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
quiet_run "tofu workspace select" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
quiet_run "tofu destroy" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false
+125 -28
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ jobs:
timeout-minutes: 35
env:
TOFU_LOG: /tmp/e2e-nightly-cell-${{ matrix.cell }}-${{ github.run_id }}.log
ARTIFACT_DIR: /tmp/spinifex-e2e-nightly-cell-${{ matrix.cell }}-${{ github.run_id }}
steps:
# blank or scheduled run = full matrix.
@@ -60,7 +61,10 @@ jobs:
- name: Clean Workspace
if: steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
run: sudo rm -rf "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
run: |
sudo umount -R -l /var/cache/spinifex-iso-builder/rootfs 2>/dev/null || true
if [ ! -c /dev/null ]; then sudo rm -f /dev/null; sudo mknod -m 666 /dev/null c 1 3; fi
sudo rm -rf --one-file-system "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
- uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v3
if: steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
@@ -70,7 +74,7 @@ jobs:
private-key: ${{ secrets.APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
repositories: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
if: steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
with:
repository: mulgadc/mulga
@@ -78,6 +82,11 @@ jobs:
sparse-checkout: scripts/tofu-cluster
path: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
if: steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
with:
path: spinifex
- name: Build Install Artifacts
if: steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
@@ -132,8 +141,18 @@ jobs:
WAN_IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[0].wan_ip')
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path')
SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" tf-user@${WAN_IP} \
"cd ~/e2e-tests && ./run-e2e.sh && ./run-cert-e2e.sh && ENDPOINT=https://${WAN_IP}:9999 ./run-lb-e2e.sh"
ssh -tt -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" tf-user@${WAN_IP} \
"set -u; mkdir -p '${ARTIFACT_DIR}'; cd \$HOME/e2e-tests/_bin; FAIL=0; \
for SUITE in single cert lb; do \
echo \"::group::suite \$SUITE\"; \
date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-'\$SUITE'.start'; \
GITHUB_ACTIONS=true FORCE_COLOR=1 SPINIFEX_E2E=1 SPINIFEX_MODE=single \
ARTIFACT_DIR='${ARTIFACT_DIR}' \
./\$SUITE.test -test.v -test.timeout=30m \
2>&1 | tee '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-'\$SUITE'.log'; \
rc=\${PIPESTATUS[0]}; echo \"::endgroup::\"; \
if [ \$rc -ne 0 ]; then echo \"\$SUITE: FAILED\" >> '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/suite-status.txt'; FAIL=1; fi; \
done; exit \$FAIL"
- name: Run Multi Node E2E
if: steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true' && matrix.topo == 'real-multi'
@@ -144,32 +163,57 @@ jobs:
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path')
SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
NODE_IPS=""
NODES_CSV=""
NODE_COUNT=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq '.nodes | length')
for i in $(seq 0 $((NODE_COUNT - 1))); do
NODE_IPS="${NODE_IPS} $(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r ".nodes[$i].wan_ip")"
ip=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r ".nodes[$i].wan_ip")
NODES_CSV="${NODES_CSV:+$NODES_CSV,}$ip"
done
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" tf-user@${NODE1_IP} \
"cd ~/e2e-tests && ./run-multinode-e2e.sh ${NODE_IPS} && ./run-cert-e2e.sh --multinode ${NODE_IPS} && ENDPOINT=https://${NODE1_IP}:9999 ./run-lb-e2e.sh --nodes ${NODE_IPS}"
ssh -tt -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" tf-user@${NODE1_IP} \
"set -u; mkdir -p '${ARTIFACT_DIR}'; cd \$HOME/e2e-tests/_bin; FAIL=0; \
for SUITE in multinode cert lb; do \
echo \"::group::suite \$SUITE\"; \
date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-'\$SUITE'.start'; \
GITHUB_ACTIONS=true FORCE_COLOR=1 SPINIFEX_E2E=1 SPINIFEX_MODE=multinode \
SPINIFEX_NODES='${NODES_CSV}' SPINIFEX_NODE_IPS='${NODES_CSV}' \
SPINIFEX_SSH_USER=tf-user SPINIFEX_SSH_KEY=\$HOME/.ssh/tf-user-ap-southeast-2 \
ARTIFACT_DIR='${ARTIFACT_DIR}' \
./\$SUITE.test -test.v -test.timeout=30m \
2>&1 | tee '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-'\$SUITE'.log'; \
rc=\${PIPESTATUS[0]}; echo \"::endgroup::\"; \
if [ \$rc -ne 0 ]; then echo \"\$SUITE: FAILED\" >> '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/suite-status.txt'; FAIL=1; fi; \
done; exit \$FAIL"
- name: Run Tofu Workbooks
if: steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true' && matrix.extra == 'tofu-examples'
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
# The driver emits go test -v markers per workbook; teeing to
# test-tofu.log feeds the same go-junit-report -> e2e-analyze -> upload
# chain the Go suites use, so cell 17 produces an RCA bundle too.
run: |
set +e
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
INVENTORY=$(tofu output -json inventory)
WAN_IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[0].wan_ip')
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path')
SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-tofu.start"
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" tf-user@${WAN_IP} \
"cd ~/e2e-tests && ./run-tofu-examples-e2e.sh"
"cd ~/e2e-tests && ./run-tofu-examples-e2e.sh" \
2>&1 | tee "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-tofu.log"
rc=${PIPESTATUS[0]}
if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then echo "tofu: FAILED" >> "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/suite-status.txt"; fi
exit $rc
- name: Run Reboot Resilience E2E
if: steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true' && matrix.extra == 'reboot-single'
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
# Driver runs from the runner (NOT via ssh-and-run) so it survives the
# reboot.test runs from the runner (NOT via ssh-and-run) so it survives the
# systemctl-reboot-induced ssh disconnect mid-run.
run: |
set +e
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
INVENTORY=$(tofu output -json inventory)
WAN_IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[0].wan_ip')
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path')
@@ -178,31 +222,85 @@ jobs:
REBOOT_DIR="${RUNNER_TEMP}/reboot-e2e"
mkdir -p "$REBOOT_DIR"
tar xf "${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-tests.tar" -C "$REBOOT_DIR"
chmod +x "$REBOOT_DIR/run-reboot-e2e.sh"
chmod +x "$REBOOT_DIR/_bin/reboot.test"
WAN_IP="$WAN_IP" SSH_KEY="$SSH_KEY" "$REBOOT_DIR/run-reboot-e2e.sh"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -i "$SSH_KEY")
CREDS=$(ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@${WAN_IP} 'cat ~/.aws/credentials')
AWS_AK=$(echo "$CREDS" | awk -F '= *' '/^aws_access_key_id/ {print $2; exit}')
AWS_SK=$(echo "$CREDS" | awk -F '= *' '/^aws_secret_access_key/ {print $2; exit}')
echo "::add-mask::${AWS_AK}"; echo "::add-mask::${AWS_SK}"
- name: Dump Cluster Journals on Failure
if: failure() && steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-reboot.start"
GITHUB_ACTIONS=true FORCE_COLOR=1 SPINIFEX_E2E=1 SPINIFEX_MODE=single \
SPINIFEX_WAN_IP="${WAN_IP}" SPINIFEX_SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY}" \
SPINIFEX_AWS_ENDPOINT="https://${WAN_IP}:9999" \
SPINIFEX_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="${AWS_AK}" SPINIFEX_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="${AWS_SK}" \
ARTIFACT_DIR="${ARTIFACT_DIR}" \
"$REBOOT_DIR/_bin/reboot.test" -test.v -test.timeout=30m \
2>&1 | tee "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-reboot.log"
rc=${PIPESTATUS[0]}
if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then echo "reboot: FAILED" >> "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/suite-status.txt"; fi
exit $rc
- name: Collect e2e artifacts
if: always() && steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
set +e
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
INVENTORY=$(tofu output -json inventory 2>/dev/null) || { echo "no inventory; skipping"; exit 0; }
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path')
SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path'); SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
NODE_COUNT=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq '.nodes | length')
NODE1_IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[0].wan_ip')
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "$SSH_KEY")
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@${NODE1_IP} "tar -C '${ARTIFACT_DIR}' -cf - . 2>/dev/null || true" \
| tar -C "${ARTIFACT_DIR}" -xf - 2>/dev/null
for i in $(seq 0 $((NODE_COUNT - 1))); do
IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r ".nodes[$i].wan_ip")
echo "===== node$((i+1)) ($IP) ====="
for svc in spinifex-nats spinifex-predastore spinifex-viperblock spinifex-daemon spinifex-awsgw spinifex-vpcd dhcpcd; do
echo "--- $svc ---"
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "$SSH_KEY" tf-user@${IP} \
"sudo journalctl -u $svc --no-pager -n 200 2>/dev/null || echo '(not found)'" 2>&1 || echo "(node unreachable)"
done
echo "--- DHCP client state ---"
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "$SSH_KEY" tf-user@${IP} \
"systemctl is-enabled dhcpcd.service 2>/dev/null; systemctl is-active dhcpcd.service 2>/dev/null; sudo ss -lupn 'sport = 68' 2>/dev/null; pgrep -laf dhcpcd 2>/dev/null" 2>&1 || echo "(node unreachable)"
IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r ".nodes[$i].wan_ip"); idx=$((i + 1))
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/vm-console-node${idx}"
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@${IP} 'sudo sh -c "cd /run/spinifex 2>/dev/null && tar -cf - console-*.log 2>/dev/null"' \
| tar -C "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/vm-console-node${idx}" -xf - 2>/dev/null
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@${IP} 'sudo journalctl -u "spinifex-*" --no-pager --output=short-iso --since "60 min ago"' \
> "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/spinifex-journal-node${idx}.log" 2>/dev/null
done
cat "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"/spinifex-journal-node*.log \
> "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/spinifex-journal.log" 2>/dev/null || true
echo "collected: $(ls "${ARTIFACT_DIR}" 2>/dev/null | wc -l) entries"
- name: Install go-junit-report
if: always() && steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
run: |
go install github.com/jstemmer/go-junit-report/v2@latest
echo "$HOME/go/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
- name: Convert test logs to JUnit XML
if: always() && steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
run: |
shopt -s nullglob
for LOG in "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"/test-*.log; do
BASE=$(basename "$LOG" .log); SUITE=${BASE#test-}
go-junit-report -in "$LOG" -out "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/junit-${SUITE}.xml" || true
done
- name: Analyze e2e failures
if: always() && steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
uses: ./spinifex/.github/actions/e2e-analyze
with:
junit-glob: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}/junit-*.xml
log-dir: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
title: "E2E failure analysis (cell ${{ matrix.cell }})"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
if: always() && steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
with:
name: e2e-artifacts-cell-${{ matrix.cell }}-${{ github.run_id }}
path: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
if-no-files-found: warn
retention-days: 14
- name: Teardown
if: always()
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
@@ -217,8 +315,7 @@ jobs:
tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars ${TOFU_VAR_ARGS} -auto-approve -input=false >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1 || true
# Bare-metal single-node suite (PXE-reimaged physical hardware). Doesn't fit
# the tofu matrix shape (different runner/provisioning/120m timeout), so it
# Bare-metal single-node suite. Doesn't fit the tofu matrix shape, so it
# runs as a sibling job via the reusable e2e-baremetal workflow. Gated like a
# matrix cell ("cell 20"): every weeknight cron, or dispatch with 20 selected
# (blank cells = all). Tests `dev` on schedule to match GIT_BRANCH above.
+799
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,799 @@
# E2E (per-suite blocks) — EXPERIMENTAL, workflow_dispatch only.
#
# Restructures the looped e2e.yml into env-grouped job blocks so each suite
# surfaces as its own node in the Actions graph (mulga-siv-283):
#
# single_provision ─┬─ single_suite (matrix: single, cert, lb, eks, iam)
# └─ single_teardown (if: always)
# multi_provision ─┬─ multi_suite (matrix: multinode)
# └─ multi_teardown (if: always)
#
# Constraint: tofu state is runner-filesystem-local, so *_provision and
# *_teardown must execute on the same self-hosted runner (one runner per label
# today). Teardown reuses the persisted mulga/ tofu-cluster workspace and does
# NOT re-checkout mulga (that would wipe local state). Suite-matrix legs reach
# the already-provisioned VM over its WAN IP using the key path the provision
# job emits; they share the runner home dir, so the key file persists.
#
# This file does NOT post the gating `e2e` commit status — it runs alongside
# e2e.yml for validation. Once green across a few manual runs, fold the
# triggers from e2e.yml here and retire the loop.
name: E2E (suite blocks)
on:
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
single_suites:
description: "Single-node suites to run as matrix legs"
required: false
default: "single cert lb eks iam"
run_multinode:
description: "Also run the multinode env block"
type: boolean
required: false
default: true
test_run:
description: "Optional -test.run regex (empty = all tests in suite)"
required: false
default: ""
permissions:
contents: read
env:
GIT_BRANCH: ${{ github.ref_name }}
TEST_RUN: ${{ inputs.test_run || '' }}
jobs:
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Single-node env
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
single_provision:
name: Single env · provision
runs-on: [self-hosted, ci-single]
timeout-minutes: 40
outputs:
wan_ip: ${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}
ssh_key: ${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}
suites: ${{ steps.suites.outputs.list }}
matrix: ${{ steps.suites.outputs.matrix }}
env:
TOFU_LOG: /tmp/e2e-tofu-single-${{ github.run_id }}.log
steps:
- name: Reap Orphan Procs
run: |
set +e
UID_SELF=$(id -u)
WS="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}"
reap() {
local sig="$1"
for pid in $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x tofu) $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x terraform); do
cwd=$(readlink "/proc/$pid/cwd" 2>/dev/null) || continue
case "$cwd" in
"$WS"|"$WS"/*) echo "reap $sig pid=$pid cwd=$cwd"; kill "-$sig" "$pid" 2>/dev/null ;;
esac
done
}
reap TERM; sleep 3; reap KILL
find "$WS" -name '.terraform.tfstate.lock.info' -delete 2>/dev/null
true
- name: Clean Workspace
run: |
awk -v w="$GITHUB_WORKSPACE" '$2 ~ "^"w {print $2}' /proc/mounts \
| sort -r | xargs -r -I{} sudo umount -l -R {} || true
sudo rm -rf --one-file-system "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
- uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v3
id: app-token
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.APP_ID }}
private-key: ${{ secrets.APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
repositories: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/mulga
token: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
sparse-checkout: scripts/tofu-cluster
path: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
path: spinifex
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version-file: spinifex/go.mod
cache: false
- name: Re-enable Go toolchain auto-download
run: echo "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Compute suite matrix
id: suites
run: |
LIST="${{ inputs.single_suites || 'single cert lb eks iam' }}"
echo "list=${LIST}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
JSON=$(printf '%s\n' $LIST | jq -R . | jq -cs .)
echo "matrix=${JSON}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Reclaim docker build cache
run: |
docker container prune -f || true
docker image prune -f || true
docker buildx prune -af --filter "until=24h" || true
docker system df || true
- name: Build Install Artifacts
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
./build-install-artifacts.sh "${GIT_BRANCH}" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-distro.tar.gz" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/setup.sh" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-tests.tar"
- name: Provision VM
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
export TF_VAR_git_branch="${GIT_BRANCH}"
quiet_run "tofu init" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu init -input=false
quiet_run "tofu workspace select" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
quiet_run "tofu destroy (pre-clean)" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false || true
quiet_run "scrub-env (pre-clean)" "$TOFU_LOG" ./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" || true
quiet_run "tofu apply" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu apply -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false
ok "VM provisioned"
- name: Bootstrap via Binary Install
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
SPX_EXTERNAL_POOL="${SPINIFEX_CI_POOL}" \
./bootstrap-install.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/setup.sh" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-distro.tar.gz" \
--test-tar "${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-tests.tar"
- name: Resolve VM SSH details
id: vm
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
INVENTORY=$(tofu output -json inventory)
WAN_IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[0].wan_ip')
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path')
SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
echo "wan_ip=${WAN_IP}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "ssh_key=${SSH_KEY}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Build eks-node AMI (libguestfs, runner)
if: contains(steps.suites.outputs.list, 'eks')
working-directory: spinifex
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
banner "build eks-node AMI (libguestfs — no host devices)"
sudo apt-get update -qq
sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends libguestfs-tools qemu-utils
export LIBGUESTFS_BACKEND=direct
sudo chmod 0644 /boot/vmlinuz-* || true
group_open "make build-eks-node-image"
make build-eks-node-image
group_close
ok "raw: $(du -h /tmp/eks-node-image-build/eks-node-alpine.raw | cut -f1)"
- name: Import eks-node AMI on VM
if: contains(steps.suites.outputs.list, 'eks')
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
eval "$(grep -E '^(ALPINE_VERSION|AMI_NAME|SYSTEM_TAG)=' \
spinifex/scripts/images/eks-node/manifest.conf)"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}
banner "import eks-node AMI to VM image store"
scp "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" \
/tmp/eks-node-image-build/eks-node-alpine.raw \
"$VM":/tmp/eks-node-alpine.raw
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" \
"spx admin images import --file /tmp/eks-node-alpine.raw \
--distro alpine --version ${ALPINE_VERSION} --arch x86_64 \
--boot-mode bios --ami-name ${AMI_NAME} --tag ${SYSTEM_TAG}" >/dev/null 2>&1
ok "eks-node AMI imported"
- name: Install kubectl on VM
if: contains(steps.suites.outputs.list, 'eks')
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}
banner "install kubectl on VM (eks data-plane subtest)"
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'bash -s' <<'EOF'
set -euo pipefail
KVER=v1.32.5
case "$(uname -m)" in
x86_64) ARCH=amd64 ;;
aarch64) ARCH=arm64 ;;
*) echo "unsupported arch $(uname -m)" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
cd /tmp
curl -fsSLO "https://dl.k8s.io/release/${KVER}/bin/linux/${ARCH}/kubectl"
curl -fsSLO "https://dl.k8s.io/release/${KVER}/bin/linux/${ARCH}/kubectl.sha256"
echo "$(cat kubectl.sha256) kubectl" | sha256sum -c -
sudo install -m 0755 kubectl /usr/local/bin/kubectl
kubectl version --client
EOF
ok "kubectl installed on VM"
- name: Build E2E test binaries on runner
working-directory: spinifex/tests/e2e
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
# teardown always builds: the run-scoped sweep binary runs in the
# teardown job, it is never a selectable suite leg.
SUITES_BUILD="${{ steps.suites.outputs.list }} teardown"
banner "build ${SUITES_BUILD// /, }"
group_open "go test -c"
make e2e-build SUITES_BUILD="${SUITES_BUILD}"
group_close
for f in _bin/*.test; do
ok "$(basename "$f") $(stat -c '%s' "$f" | numfmt --to=iec)"
done
- name: Ship test binaries to VM
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "rm -rf \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin && mkdir -p \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin"
tar -C spinifex/tests/e2e/_bin -cf - . | ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "tar -xf - -C \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin"
ok "shipped binaries to $VM"
- name: Start packet capture on VM br-wan
run: |
set +e
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}
scp "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" \
"${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/start-net-capture.sh" \
"$VM":/tmp/start-net-capture.sh
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "bash /tmp/start-net-capture.sh" || true
single_suite:
name: Single env · suite
needs: single_provision
runs-on: [self-hosted, ci-single]
timeout-minutes: 45
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
suite: ${{ fromJSON(needs.single_provision.outputs.matrix) }}
env:
WAN_IP: ${{ needs.single_provision.outputs.wan_ip }}
SSH_KEY: ${{ needs.single_provision.outputs.ssh_key }}
ARTIFACT_DIR: /tmp/spinifex-e2e-single-${{ github.run_id }}-${{ matrix.suite }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
path: spinifex
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version-file: spinifex/go.mod
cache: false
- name: Install go-junit-report
run: |
go install github.com/jstemmer/go-junit-report/v2@latest
echo "$HOME/go/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
- name: Run ${{ matrix.suite }}
id: e2e
run: |
set +e
SUITE="${{ matrix.suite }}"
VM_HOST="tf-user@${WAN_IP}"
TEST_RUN_FLAG=""
[ -n "${TEST_RUN}" ] && TEST_RUN_FLAG="-test.run=${TEST_RUN}"
cleanup_remote() {
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "$SSH_KEY" "$VM_HOST" \
"pkill -u tf-user -TERM -f \"/spinifex-e2e-bin/${SUITE}\.test( |\$)\" 2>/dev/null; sleep 1; pkill -u tf-user -KILL -f \"/spinifex-e2e-bin/${SUITE}\.test( |\$)\" 2>/dev/null; true" \
2>/dev/null || true
}
trap cleanup_remote EXIT INT TERM
ssh -tt -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" "$VM_HOST" \
"set -u; mkdir -p '${ARTIFACT_DIR}'; cd \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin; \
R=\$'\033[0m' B=\$'\033[1m' C=\$'\033[36m' G=\$'\033[32m' RED=\$'\033[31m'; \
printf '\n%s%s━━ suite %s ━━%s\n' \"\$B\" \"\$C\" \"${SUITE}\" \"\$R\"; \
date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-${SUITE}.start'; \
GITHUB_ACTIONS=true FORCE_COLOR=1 SPINIFEX_E2E=1 SPINIFEX_MODE=single \
SPINIFEX_E2E_RUN_ID='${{ github.run_id }}' \
ARTIFACT_DIR='${ARTIFACT_DIR}' \
./${SUITE}.test -test.v -test.timeout=30m ${TEST_RUN_FLAG} \
2>&1 | tee '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-${SUITE}.log' \
| sed -uE 's/^[[:space:]]+([a-zA-Z0-9_]+_test\.go:[0-9]+: )?//'; \
exit \${PIPESTATUS[0]}"
echo "rc=$?" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
- name: Collect suite artifacts from VM
if: always()
run: |
set +e
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${SSH_KEY}")
VM=tf-user@${WAN_IP}
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "tar -C '${ARTIFACT_DIR}' -cf - . 2>/dev/null || true" \
| tar -C "${ARTIFACT_DIR}" -xf - 2>/dev/null
true
- name: Convert test log to JUnit XML
if: always()
run: |
shopt -s nullglob
for LOG in "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"/test-*.log; do
BASE=$(basename "$LOG" .log); SUITE=${BASE#test-}
go-junit-report -in "$LOG" -out "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/junit-${SUITE}.xml" || true
done
- name: Publish test summary
if: always()
uses: ./spinifex/.github/actions/junit-report
with:
junit-glob: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}/junit-*.xml
title: "E2E ${{ matrix.suite }} results"
- name: Analyze e2e failures
if: always()
uses: ./spinifex/.github/actions/e2e-analyze
with:
junit-glob: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}/junit-*.xml
log-dir: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
title: "E2E ${{ matrix.suite }} failure analysis"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
if: always()
with:
name: e2e-single-${{ matrix.suite }}-${{ github.run_id }}
path: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
if-no-files-found: warn
retention-days: 14
- name: Fail job if suite failed
if: always()
run: |
if [ "${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }}" != "0" ]; then
echo "::error::suite ${{ matrix.suite }} failed (rc=${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }})"
exit 1
fi
single_teardown:
name: Single env · teardown
needs: [single_provision, single_suite]
if: always()
runs-on: [self-hosted, ci-single]
timeout-minutes: 20
env:
TOFU_LOG: /tmp/e2e-tofu-single-td-${{ github.run_id }}.log
ARTIFACT_DIR: /tmp/spinifex-e2e-single-diag-${{ github.run_id }}
WAN_IP: ${{ needs.single_provision.outputs.wan_ip }}
SSH_KEY: ${{ needs.single_provision.outputs.ssh_key }}
steps:
# Reuse the persisted mulga/ tofu-cluster workspace from single_provision.
# Re-checkout only spinifex (for ci-fmt + diag scripts); checking out mulga
# again would wipe the local tofu state and orphan the VM.
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
path: spinifex
- name: Capture network/IPsec diagnostics on VM
if: ${{ needs.single_provision.result == 'success' && env.WAN_IP != '' }}
run: |
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "${SSH_KEY}")
VM=tf-user@${WAN_IP}
scp "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" \
"${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/capture-net-diag.sh" \
"$VM":/tmp/capture-net-diag.sh 2>/dev/null
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "bash /tmp/capture-net-diag.sh '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/net-diag'" 2>/dev/null
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'sudo journalctl -u "spinifex-*" --no-pager --output=short-iso --since "90 min ago"' \
> "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/spinifex-journal.log" 2>/dev/null
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/lb-console"
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'sudo sh -c "cd /run/spinifex 2>/dev/null && tar -cf - console-*.log 2>/dev/null"' \
| tar -C "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/lb-console" -xf - 2>/dev/null
true
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
if: always()
with:
name: e2e-single-diag-${{ github.run_id }}
path: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
if-no-files-found: ignore
retention-days: 14
# Reclaim any resource leaked by a crashed/interrupted suite before the VM
# is destroyed. Scoped to this run's tag, best-effort, never fails the job.
- name: Sweep leaked run resources on VM
if: ${{ needs.single_provision.result == 'success' && env.WAN_IP != '' }}
run: |
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "${SSH_KEY}")
VM=tf-user@${WAN_IP}
banner "sweep run-tagged resources (run ${{ github.run_id }})"
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" \
"cd \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin 2>/dev/null && \
SPINIFEX_E2E=1 SPINIFEX_MODE=single \
SPINIFEX_E2E_RUN_ID='${{ github.run_id }}' \
./teardown.test -test.v -test.run TestSweepRunResources -test.timeout=10m" \
2>&1 || true
true
- name: Teardown VM
if: always()
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
if [ -n "${WAN_IP}" ] && [ -n "${SSH_KEY}" ]; then
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "${SSH_KEY}" \
tf-user@${WAN_IP} \
'pkill -u tf-user -TERM -f "/spinifex-e2e-bin/.*\.test( |$)" 2>/dev/null; sleep 1; pkill -u tf-user -KILL -f "/spinifex-e2e-bin/.*\.test( |$)" 2>/dev/null; true' \
2>/dev/null || true
fi
UID_SELF=$(id -u); WS="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}"
reap() {
local sig="$1"
for pid in $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x tofu) $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x terraform); do
cwd=$(readlink "/proc/$pid/cwd" 2>/dev/null) || continue
case "$cwd" in "$WS"|"$WS"/*) kill "-$sig" "$pid" 2>/dev/null ;; esac
done
}
reap TERM; sleep 2; reap KILL
find "$WS" -name '.terraform.tfstate.lock.info' -delete 2>/dev/null
quiet_run "tofu workspace select" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
quiet_run "tofu destroy" "$TOFU_LOG" timeout 600 tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false
quiet_run "scrub-env" "$TOFU_LOG" ./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
ok "teardown complete"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Multinode env
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
multi_provision:
name: Multi env · provision
if: ${{ inputs.run_multinode }}
runs-on: [self-hosted, ci-multi]
timeout-minutes: 45
outputs:
node1_ip: ${{ steps.cluster.outputs.node1_ip }}
ssh_key: ${{ steps.cluster.outputs.ssh_key }}
nodes_csv: ${{ steps.cluster.outputs.nodes_csv }}
env:
TOFU_LOG: /tmp/e2e-tofu-multi-${{ github.run_id }}.log
steps:
- name: Reap Orphan Procs
run: |
set +e
UID_SELF=$(id -u); WS="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}"
reap() {
local sig="$1"
for pid in $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x tofu) $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x terraform); do
cwd=$(readlink "/proc/$pid/cwd" 2>/dev/null) || continue
case "$cwd" in "$WS"|"$WS"/*) echo "reap $sig pid=$pid"; kill "-$sig" "$pid" 2>/dev/null ;; esac
done
}
reap TERM; sleep 3; reap KILL
find "$WS" -name '.terraform.tfstate.lock.info' -delete 2>/dev/null
true
- name: Clean Workspace
run: |
awk -v w="$GITHUB_WORKSPACE" '$2 ~ "^"w {print $2}' /proc/mounts \
| sort -r | xargs -r -I{} sudo umount -l -R {} || true
sudo rm -rf --one-file-system "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
- uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v3
id: app-token
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.APP_ID }}
private-key: ${{ secrets.APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
repositories: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/mulga
token: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
sparse-checkout: scripts/tofu-cluster
path: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
path: spinifex
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version-file: spinifex/go.mod
cache: false
- name: Re-enable Go toolchain auto-download
run: echo "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Reclaim docker build cache
run: |
docker container prune -f || true
docker image prune -f || true
docker buildx prune -af --filter "until=24h" || true
docker system df || true
- name: Build Install Artifacts
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
./build-install-artifacts.sh "${GIT_BRANCH}" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-distro.tar.gz" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/setup.sh" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-tests.tar"
- name: Provision VMs
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
export TF_VAR_git_branch="${GIT_BRANCH}"
quiet_run "tofu init" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu init -input=false
quiet_run "tofu workspace select" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
quiet_run "tofu destroy (pre-clean)" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false || true
quiet_run "scrub-env (pre-clean)" "$TOFU_LOG" ./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" || true
quiet_run "tofu apply" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu apply -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false
ok "3-node cluster provisioned"
- name: Bootstrap via Binary Install
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
SPX_EXTERNAL_POOL="${SPINIFEX_CI_POOL}" \
./bootstrap-install.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/setup.sh" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-distro.tar.gz" \
--test-tar "${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-tests.tar"
- name: Resolve cluster SSH details
id: cluster
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
INVENTORY=$(tofu output -json inventory)
NODE1_IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[0].wan_ip')
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path'); SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
NODE_COUNT=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq '.nodes | length')
NODES_CSV=""
for i in $(seq 0 $((NODE_COUNT - 1))); do
ip=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r ".nodes[$i].wan_ip")
if [ -z "$NODES_CSV" ]; then NODES_CSV="$ip"; else NODES_CSV="$NODES_CSV,$ip"; fi
done
echo "node1_ip=${NODE1_IP}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "ssh_key=${SSH_KEY}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "nodes_csv=${NODES_CSV}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Build multinode binary on runner
working-directory: spinifex/tests/e2e
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
banner "build multinode, teardown"
group_open "go test -c"
make e2e-build SUITES_BUILD="multinode teardown"
group_close
ok "$(basename _bin/multinode.test) $(stat -c '%s' _bin/multinode.test | numfmt --to=iec)"
- name: Ship test binaries to node1
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.cluster.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.cluster.outputs.node1_ip }}
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "rm -rf \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin && mkdir -p \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin"
tar -C spinifex/tests/e2e/_bin -cf - . | ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "tar -xf - -C \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin"
ok "shipped binaries to $VM"
- name: Start packet capture on all nodes
run: |
set +e
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.cluster.outputs.ssh_key }}")
IFS=',' read -ra NODE_LIST <<< "${{ steps.cluster.outputs.nodes_csv }}"
for ip in "${NODE_LIST[@]}"; do
[ -z "$ip" ] && continue
scp "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" \
"${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/start-net-capture.sh" \
tf-user@"$ip":/tmp/start-net-capture.sh
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@"$ip" "bash /tmp/start-net-capture.sh" || true
done
multi_suite:
name: Multi env · suite
needs: multi_provision
runs-on: [self-hosted, ci-multi]
timeout-minutes: 60
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
suite: [multinode]
env:
NODE1_IP: ${{ needs.multi_provision.outputs.node1_ip }}
SSH_KEY: ${{ needs.multi_provision.outputs.ssh_key }}
NODES_CSV: ${{ needs.multi_provision.outputs.nodes_csv }}
ARTIFACT_DIR: /tmp/spinifex-e2e-multi-${{ github.run_id }}-${{ matrix.suite }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
path: spinifex
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version-file: spinifex/go.mod
cache: false
- name: Install go-junit-report
run: |
go install github.com/jstemmer/go-junit-report/v2@latest
echo "$HOME/go/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
- name: Run ${{ matrix.suite }}
id: e2e
run: |
set +e
SUITE="${{ matrix.suite }}"
VM_HOST="tf-user@${NODE1_IP}"
TEST_RUN_FLAG=""
[ -n "${TEST_RUN}" ] && TEST_RUN_FLAG="-test.run=${TEST_RUN}"
cleanup_remote() {
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "$SSH_KEY" "$VM_HOST" \
"pkill -u tf-user -TERM -f \"/spinifex-e2e-bin/${SUITE}\.test( |\$)\" 2>/dev/null; sleep 1; pkill -u tf-user -KILL -f \"/spinifex-e2e-bin/${SUITE}\.test( |\$)\" 2>/dev/null; true" \
2>/dev/null || true
}
trap cleanup_remote EXIT INT TERM
ssh -tt -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" "$VM_HOST" \
"set -u; mkdir -p '${ARTIFACT_DIR}'; cd \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin; \
printf '\n━━ suite %s ━━\n' \"${SUITE}\"; \
date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-${SUITE}.start'; \
GITHUB_ACTIONS=true FORCE_COLOR=1 SPINIFEX_E2E=1 SPINIFEX_MODE=multinode \
SPINIFEX_E2E_RUN_ID='${{ github.run_id }}' \
SPINIFEX_NODES='${NODES_CSV}' SPINIFEX_NODE_IPS='${NODES_CSV}' \
SPINIFEX_SSH_USER=tf-user SPINIFEX_SSH_KEY=\$HOME/.ssh/tf-user-ap-southeast-2 \
ARTIFACT_DIR='${ARTIFACT_DIR}' \
./${SUITE}.test -test.v -test.timeout=30m ${TEST_RUN_FLAG} \
2>&1 | tee '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-${SUITE}.log' \
| sed -uE 's/^[[:space:]]+([a-zA-Z0-9_]+_test\.go:[0-9]+: )?//'; \
exit \${PIPESTATUS[0]}"
echo "rc=$?" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
- name: Collect suite artifacts from node1
if: always()
run: |
set +e
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${SSH_KEY}")
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@${NODE1_IP} "tar -C '${ARTIFACT_DIR}' -cf - . 2>/dev/null || true" \
| tar -C "${ARTIFACT_DIR}" -xf - 2>/dev/null
true
- name: Convert test log to JUnit XML
if: always()
run: |
shopt -s nullglob
for LOG in "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"/test-*.log; do
BASE=$(basename "$LOG" .log); SUITE=${BASE#test-}
go-junit-report -in "$LOG" -out "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/junit-${SUITE}.xml" || true
done
- name: Publish test summary
if: always()
uses: ./spinifex/.github/actions/junit-report
with:
junit-glob: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}/junit-*.xml
title: "Multi-Node E2E ${{ matrix.suite }} results"
- name: Analyze e2e failures
if: always()
uses: ./spinifex/.github/actions/e2e-analyze
with:
junit-glob: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}/junit-*.xml
log-dir: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
title: "Multi-Node E2E ${{ matrix.suite }} failure analysis"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
if: always()
with:
name: e2e-multi-${{ matrix.suite }}-${{ github.run_id }}
path: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
if-no-files-found: warn
retention-days: 14
- name: Fail job if suite failed
if: always()
run: |
if [ "${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }}" != "0" ]; then
echo "::error::suite ${{ matrix.suite }} failed (rc=${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }})"
exit 1
fi
multi_teardown:
name: Multi env · teardown
needs: [multi_provision, multi_suite]
if: always() && inputs.run_multinode
runs-on: [self-hosted, ci-multi]
timeout-minutes: 20
env:
TOFU_LOG: /tmp/e2e-tofu-multi-td-${{ github.run_id }}.log
SSH_KEY: ${{ needs.multi_provision.outputs.ssh_key }}
NODES_CSV: ${{ needs.multi_provision.outputs.nodes_csv }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
path: spinifex
# Reclaim leaked run-tagged resources before the cluster is destroyed.
- name: Sweep leaked run resources on node1
if: ${{ needs.multi_provision.result == 'success' && needs.multi_provision.outputs.node1_ip != '' }}
run: |
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "${SSH_KEY}")
VM=tf-user@${{ needs.multi_provision.outputs.node1_ip }}
banner "sweep run-tagged resources (run ${{ github.run_id }})"
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" \
"cd \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin 2>/dev/null && \
SPINIFEX_E2E=1 SPINIFEX_MODE=multinode \
SPINIFEX_E2E_RUN_ID='${{ github.run_id }}' \
./teardown.test -test.v -test.run TestSweepRunResources -test.timeout=10m" \
2>&1 || true
true
- name: Teardown cluster
if: always()
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
if [ -n "${NODES_CSV}" ] && [ -n "${SSH_KEY}" ]; then
IFS=',' read -ra NODE_LIST <<< "${NODES_CSV}"
for ip in "${NODE_LIST[@]}"; do
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "${SSH_KEY}" \
tf-user@"$ip" \
'pkill -u tf-user -TERM -f "/spinifex-e2e-bin/.*\.test( |$)" 2>/dev/null; sleep 1; pkill -u tf-user -KILL -f "/spinifex-e2e-bin/.*\.test( |$)" 2>/dev/null; true' \
2>/dev/null || true
done
fi
UID_SELF=$(id -u); WS="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}"
reap() {
local sig="$1"
for pid in $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x tofu) $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x terraform); do
cwd=$(readlink "/proc/$pid/cwd" 2>/dev/null) || continue
case "$cwd" in "$WS"|"$WS"/*) kill "-$sig" "$pid" 2>/dev/null ;; esac
done
}
reap TERM; sleep 2; reap KILL
find "$WS" -name '.terraform.tfstate.lock.info' -delete 2>/dev/null
quiet_run "tofu workspace select" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
quiet_run "tofu destroy" "$TOFU_LOG" timeout 600 tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false
quiet_run "scrub-env" "$TOFU_LOG" ./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
ok "teardown complete"
e2e_suites_status:
name: E2E suite blocks · summary
if: always()
needs: [single_suite, multi_suite]
runs-on: ubuntu-26.04
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
- name: Summarize
run: |
echo "## E2E suite-block results" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "single_suite: ${{ needs.single_suite.result }}" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "multi_suite: ${{ needs.multi_suite.result }}" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
case "${{ needs.single_suite.result }}" in success|skipped) ;; *) exit 1 ;; esac
case "${{ needs.multi_suite.result }}" in success|skipped) ;; *) exit 1 ;; esac
+79 -322
View File
@@ -14,13 +14,10 @@ on:
- .github/workflows/e2e.yml
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
sha:
description: "PR head SHA to report status on"
required: false
suites:
description: "Space-separated Make targets to run (e.g. 'e2e-single e2e-multinode e2e-cert e2e-lb e2e-eks')"
description: "Space-separated Make targets to run (e.g. 'e2e-single e2e-multinode e2e-cert e2e-lb e2e-eks e2e-iam')"
required: false
default: "e2e-single e2e-multinode e2e-cert e2e-lb"
default: "e2e-single e2e-multinode e2e-cert e2e-lb e2e-iam"
test_run:
description: "Optional regex for -test.run (e.g. '^TestMultinodeIPSec$'). Empty = run all tests in suite."
required: false
@@ -32,19 +29,55 @@ permissions:
env:
GIT_BRANCH: ${{ github.ref_name }}
SUITES: ${{ inputs.suites || 'e2e-single e2e-multinode e2e-cert e2e-lb' }}
SUITES: ${{ inputs.suites || 'e2e-single e2e-multinode e2e-cert e2e-lb e2e-iam' }}
TEST_RUN: ${{ inputs.test_run || '' }}
jobs:
# Shadow-mode suite selector. Computes which suites the diff *would* run and logs it to the job summary.
# Does NOT gate or override the real SUITES env yet — it runs alongside the full matrix so we
# can compare predicted vs actual before flipping it on.
select_suites:
name: Select Suites (shadow)
runs-on: ubuntu-26.04
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: false
- name: Compute targeted suite selection
run: |
set -euo pipefail
BASE="${{ github.event.before }}"
HEAD="${{ github.sha }}"
# First push to a branch reports an all-zero before-SHA; fall back to
# the first parent so the diff is still meaningful.
if [ -z "$BASE" ] || [ "$BASE" = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" ]; then
BASE="${HEAD}~1"
fi
echo "## Targeted suite selection (shadow)" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo '```' >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "base=$BASE head=$HEAD" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
go run ./tests/e2e/select-suites/cmd/select-suites \
--manifest docs/service-interfaces.yaml \
--base-sha "$BASE" --head-sha "$HEAD" --repo-root . \
2>>"$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" \
| tee -a "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo '```' >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "Shadow only — actual run uses SUITES='${SUITES}'." >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
e2e_single:
name: Single-Node E2E
# Skip when the dispatch input requests no in-VM suites (e.g.
# suites='e2e-reboot' only). Push triggers and the default SUITES list
# suites='e2e-multinode' only). Push triggers and the default SUITES list
# both include single/cert/lb so the inputs.suites null-check keeps the
# job running on plain PR pushes.
if: github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' || contains(github.event.inputs.suites, 'e2e-single') || contains(github.event.inputs.suites, 'e2e-cert') || contains(github.event.inputs.suites, 'e2e-lb') || contains(github.event.inputs.suites, 'e2e-eks')
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-single ]
timeout-minutes: 45
if: github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' || contains(github.event.inputs.suites, 'e2e-single') || contains(github.event.inputs.suites, 'e2e-cert') || contains(github.event.inputs.suites, 'e2e-lb') || contains(github.event.inputs.suites, 'e2e-eks') || contains(github.event.inputs.suites, 'e2e-iam')
runs-on: [self-hosted, ci-single]
timeout-minutes: 50
env:
TOFU_LOG: /tmp/e2e-tofu-single-${{ github.run_id }}.log
ARTIFACT_DIR: /tmp/spinifex-e2e-artifacts-${{ github.run_id }}
@@ -71,14 +104,13 @@ jobs:
- name: Clean Workspace
run: |
# Detach any leaked mounts under the workspace before deleting. A
# killed image build can leave a `mount --bind /dev` under its build
# dir; if `rm -rf` traverses it as root it wipes the host's /dev
# (deletes /dev/null and wedges the box). umount deepest-first, then
# forbid rm from crossing any mount boundary as a hard backstop.
awk -v w="$GITHUB_WORKSPACE" '$2 ~ "^"w {print $2}' /proc/mounts \
| sort -r | xargs -r -I{} sudo umount -l -R {} || true
sudo rm -rf --one-file-system "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
# ARTIFACT_DIR lives in /tmp, outside the workspace, so a re-run on
# the same self-hosted runner reuses it. Wipe it so a prior attempt's
# stale suite-status.txt / analysis dirs can't leak into this attempt.
rm -rf "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
- uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v3
id: app-token
@@ -87,14 +119,14 @@ jobs:
private-key: ${{ secrets.APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
repositories: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/mulga
token: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
sparse-checkout: scripts/tofu-cluster
path: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
path: spinifex
@@ -106,10 +138,10 @@ jobs:
- name: Re-enable Go toolchain auto-download
run: echo "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Prune rootless docker cache
- name: Reclaim docker build cache
run: |
docker container prune -f || true
docker image prune -af || true
docker image prune -f || true
docker buildx prune -af --filter "until=24h" || true
docker system df || true
@@ -184,7 +216,6 @@ jobs:
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
# Pull import args straight from the manifest so they never drift.
eval "$(grep -E '^(ALPINE_VERSION|AMI_NAME|SYSTEM_TAG)=' \
spinifex/scripts/images/eks-node/manifest.conf)"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}")
@@ -193,13 +224,10 @@ jobs:
scp "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" \
/tmp/eks-node-image-build/eks-node-alpine.raw \
"$VM":/tmp/eks-node-alpine.raw
# Drop the import progress bar (pterm redraws to stdout — thousands of
# lines over the SSH pipe). Errors go to stderr, so they survive; the
# exit code still gates the step.
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" \
"spx admin images import --file /tmp/eks-node-alpine.raw \
--distro alpine --version ${ALPINE_VERSION} --arch x86_64 \
--boot-mode bios --ami-name ${AMI_NAME} --tag ${SYSTEM_TAG}" >/dev/null
--boot-mode bios --ami-name ${AMI_NAME} --tag ${SYSTEM_TAG}" >/dev/null 2>&1
ok "eks-node AMI imported"
# The eks data-plane subtest (TestEKS/KubectlGetNodes) drives the full
@@ -238,7 +266,7 @@ jobs:
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
SUITES_BUILD=$(echo "${SUITES}" | sed 's/e2e-//g' | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -vE '^(reboot|multinode)$' | tr '\n' ' ')
SUITES_BUILD=$(echo "${SUITES}" | sed 's/e2e-//g' | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -vE '^(multinode)$' | tr '\n' ' ')
if [ -z "$(echo "${SUITES_BUILD}" | tr -d ' ')" ]; then
echo "no in-VM suites requested (SUITES=${SUITES}); nothing to build"
exit 0
@@ -280,7 +308,7 @@ jobs:
id: e2e
run: |
set +e
SUITES_RUN=$(echo "${SUITES}" | sed 's/e2e-//g' | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -vE '^(reboot|multinode)$' | tr '\n' ' ')
SUITES_RUN=$(echo "${SUITES}" | sed 's/e2e-//g' | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -vE '^(multinode)$' | tr '\n' ' ')
if [ -z "$(echo "${SUITES_RUN}" | tr -d ' ')" ]; then
echo "no in-VM suites requested (SUITES=${SUITES}); skipping"
echo "rc=0" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
@@ -436,16 +464,16 @@ jobs:
- name: Fail job if any suite failed
if: always()
run: |
if [ "${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }}" != "0" ] || [ -s "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/suite-status.txt" ]; then
if [ "${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }}" != "0" ]; then
echo "::error::E2E suites failed (rc=${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }})"
cat "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/suite-status.txt" 2>/dev/null || true
exit 1
fi
e2e_real_multi:
name: Real Multi-Node E2E
e2e_multi:
name: Multi-Node E2E
if: github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' || contains(github.event.inputs.suites, 'e2e-multinode')
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-multi ]
runs-on: [self-hosted, ci-multi]
timeout-minutes: 60
env:
TOFU_LOG: /tmp/e2e-tofu-multi-${{ github.run_id }}.log
@@ -473,14 +501,13 @@ jobs:
- name: Clean Workspace
run: |
# Detach any leaked mounts under the workspace before deleting. A
# killed image build can leave a `mount --bind /dev` under its build
# dir; if `rm -rf` traverses it as root it wipes the host's /dev
# (deletes /dev/null and wedges the box). umount deepest-first, then
# forbid rm from crossing any mount boundary as a hard backstop.
awk -v w="$GITHUB_WORKSPACE" '$2 ~ "^"w {print $2}' /proc/mounts \
| sort -r | xargs -r -I{} sudo umount -l -R {} || true
sudo rm -rf --one-file-system "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
# ARTIFACT_DIR lives in /tmp, outside the workspace, so a re-run on
# the same self-hosted runner reuses it. Wipe it so a prior attempt's
# stale suite-status.txt / analysis dirs can't leak into this attempt.
rm -rf "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
- uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v3
id: app-token
@@ -489,14 +516,14 @@ jobs:
private-key: ${{ secrets.APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
repositories: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/mulga
token: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
sparse-checkout: scripts/tofu-cluster
path: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
path: spinifex
@@ -508,10 +535,10 @@ jobs:
- name: Re-enable Go toolchain auto-download
run: echo "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Prune rootless docker cache
- name: Reclaim docker build cache
run: |
docker container prune -f || true
docker image prune -af || true
docker image prune -f || true
docker buildx prune -af --filter "until=24h" || true
docker system df || true
@@ -568,12 +595,15 @@ jobs:
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
# single + iam are single-node-only suites — their fixtures skip
# unless SPINIFEX_MODE=single, so building/running them on multinode
# is wasted work.
# eks is excluded on multinode: EKS KV is a clustered (Raft) JetStream
# stream and create-cluster needs an elected leader, but multinode
# JetStream clustering isn't solid yet (mulga-omq/z2z/5yg). EKS is
# validated single-node only for now; re-enable here once clustered
# JetStream + multinode EKS are a deliberate target.
SUITES_BUILD=$(echo "${SUITES}" | sed 's/e2e-//g' | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -vE '^(reboot|single|eks)$' | tr '\n' ' ')
SUITES_BUILD=$(echo "${SUITES}" | sed 's/e2e-//g' | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -vE '^(single|eks|iam)$' | tr '\n' ' ')
if [ -z "$(echo "${SUITES_BUILD}" | tr -d ' ')" ]; then
echo "no multinode-eligible suites requested (SUITES=${SUITES}); nothing to build"
exit 0
@@ -635,9 +665,6 @@ jobs:
echo "=== systemctl is-active spinifex-* ==="
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'for s in spinifex-nats spinifex-predastore spinifex-awsgw spinifex-vpcd spinifex-daemon; do printf "%-22s %s\n" "$s" "$(systemctl is-active $s 2>&1)"; done'
echo
echo "=== which spx + version ==="
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'which spx; spx --version 2>&1 || true'
echo
echo "=== spx get nodes (direct ssh, tf-user) ==="
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'spx get nodes --timeout 5s 2>&1; echo "exit=$?"'
echo
@@ -656,7 +683,7 @@ jobs:
id: e2e
run: |
set +e
SUITES_RUN=$(echo "${SUITES}" | sed 's/e2e-//g' | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -vE '^(reboot|single|eks)$' | tr '\n' ' ')
SUITES_RUN=$(echo "${SUITES}" | sed 's/e2e-//g' | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -vE '^(single|eks|iam)$' | tr '\n' ' ')
if [ -z "$(echo "${SUITES_RUN}" | tr -d ' ')" ]; then
echo "no multinode-eligible suites requested (SUITES=${SUITES}); skipping"
echo "rc=0" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
@@ -851,303 +878,33 @@ jobs:
- name: Fail job if any suite failed
if: always()
run: |
if [ "${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }}" != "0" ] || [ -s "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/suite-status.txt" ]; then
if [ "${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }}" != "0" ]; then
echo "::error::Multi-node E2E suites failed (rc=${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }})"
cat "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/suite-status.txt" 2>/dev/null || true
exit 1
fi
e2e_reboot:
name: Reboot Resilience E2E
# Opt-in: only fires when the SUITES dispatch input lists e2e-reboot.
# The reboot test reboots the spinifex VM, so it must run on the runner
# (not shipped to the VM like the cert/lb/single suites). Runs in
# parallel with e2e_single — both target [self-hosted, ci-single]
# and GitHub Actions serialises on the underlying runner allocation,
# so no explicit needs: ordering is required.
if: contains(github.event.inputs.suites, 'e2e-reboot')
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-single ]
timeout-minutes: 60
env:
TOFU_LOG: /tmp/e2e-tofu-reboot-${{ github.run_id }}.log
ARTIFACT_DIR: /tmp/spinifex-e2e-reboot-artifacts-${{ github.run_id }}
steps:
- name: Reap Orphan Procs
run: |
set +e
UID_SELF=$(id -u)
WS="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}"
reap() {
local sig="$1"
for pid in $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x tofu) $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x terraform); do
cwd=$(readlink "/proc/$pid/cwd" 2>/dev/null) || continue
case "$cwd" in
"$WS"|"$WS"/*) echo "reap $sig pid=$pid cwd=$cwd"; kill "-$sig" "$pid" 2>/dev/null ;;
esac
done
}
reap TERM
sleep 3
reap KILL
find "$WS" -name '.terraform.tfstate.lock.info' -delete 2>/dev/null
true
- name: Clean Workspace
run: |
# Detach any leaked mounts under the workspace before deleting. A
# killed image build can leave a `mount --bind /dev` under its build
# dir; if `rm -rf` traverses it as root it wipes the host's /dev
# (deletes /dev/null and wedges the box). umount deepest-first, then
# forbid rm from crossing any mount boundary as a hard backstop.
awk -v w="$GITHUB_WORKSPACE" '$2 ~ "^"w {print $2}' /proc/mounts \
| sort -r | xargs -r -I{} sudo umount -l -R {} || true
sudo rm -rf --one-file-system "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
- uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v3
id: app-token
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.APP_ID }}
private-key: ${{ secrets.APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
repositories: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
repository: mulgadc/mulga
token: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
sparse-checkout: scripts/tofu-cluster
path: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
path: spinifex
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version-file: spinifex/go.mod
cache: false
- name: Re-enable Go toolchain auto-download
run: echo "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Prune rootless docker cache
run: |
docker container prune -f || true
docker image prune -af || true
docker buildx prune -af --filter "until=24h" || true
docker system df || true
- name: Build Install Artifacts
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
./build-install-artifacts.sh "${GIT_BRANCH}" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-distro.tar.gz" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/setup.sh" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-tests.tar"
- name: Provision VM
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
export TF_VAR_git_branch="${GIT_BRANCH}"
quiet_run "tofu init" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu init -input=false
quiet_run "tofu workspace select" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
quiet_run "tofu destroy (pre-clean)" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false || true
quiet_run "scrub-env (pre-clean)" "$TOFU_LOG" ./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" || true
quiet_run "tofu apply" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu apply -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false
ok "VM provisioned"
- name: Bootstrap via Binary Install
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
SPX_EXTERNAL_POOL="${SPINIFEX_CI_POOL}" \
./bootstrap-install.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/setup.sh" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-distro.tar.gz" \
--test-tar "${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-tests.tar"
- name: Resolve VM SSH details
id: vm
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
INVENTORY=$(tofu output -json inventory)
WAN_IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[0].wan_ip')
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path')
SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
echo "wan_ip=${WAN_IP}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "ssh_key=${SSH_KEY}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Build reboot.test on runner
working-directory: spinifex/tests/e2e
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
banner "build reboot"
group_open "go test -c"
make e2e-build SUITES_BUILD="reboot"
group_close
ok "$(basename _bin/reboot.test) $(stat -c '%s' _bin/reboot.test | numfmt --to=iec)"
- name: Fetch AWS credentials from VM
id: creds
run: |
set -euo pipefail
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null \
-i "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}
CREDS=$(ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'cat ~/.aws/credentials')
AWS_AK=$(echo "$CREDS" | awk -F '= *' '/^aws_access_key_id/ {print $2; exit}')
AWS_SK=$(echo "$CREDS" | awk -F '= *' '/^aws_secret_access_key/ {print $2; exit}')
if [ -z "$AWS_AK" ] || [ -z "$AWS_SK" ]; then
echo "::error::Failed to extract spinifex AWS credentials from ${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}"
exit 1
fi
echo "::add-mask::${AWS_AK}"
echo "::add-mask::${AWS_SK}"
echo "ak=${AWS_AK}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "sk=${AWS_SK}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Run reboot suite on runner
id: e2e
run: |
set +e
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-reboot.start"
R=$'\033[0m'; B=$'\033[1m'; C=$'\033[36m'
printf '\n%s%s━━ suite reboot ━━%s\n' "$B" "$C" "$R"
if [ -n "${TEST_RUN}" ]; then
TEST_RUN_FLAG="-test.run=${TEST_RUN}"
else
TEST_RUN_FLAG=""
fi
GITHUB_ACTIONS=true FORCE_COLOR=1 \
SPINIFEX_E2E=1 SPINIFEX_MODE=single \
SPINIFEX_WAN_IP="${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}" \
SPINIFEX_SSH_KEY="${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}" \
SPINIFEX_AWS_ENDPOINT="https://${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}:9999" \
SPINIFEX_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="${{ steps.creds.outputs.ak }}" \
SPINIFEX_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="${{ steps.creds.outputs.sk }}" \
ARTIFACT_DIR="${ARTIFACT_DIR}" \
./spinifex/tests/e2e/_bin/reboot.test -test.v -test.timeout=30m ${TEST_RUN_FLAG} \
2>&1 | tee "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-reboot.log" \
| sed -uE 's/^[[:space:]]+([a-zA-Z0-9_]+_test\.go:[0-9]+: )?//'
rc=${PIPESTATUS[0]}
echo "rc=${rc}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
- name: Collect VM journals
if: always()
run: |
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 \
-i "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'sudo journalctl -u "spinifex-*" --no-pager --output=short-iso --since "60 min ago"' \
> "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/spinifex-journal.log" 2>/dev/null || true
ok "journal: $(wc -l < "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/spinifex-journal.log" 2>/dev/null || echo 0) lines"
- name: Install go-junit-report
if: always()
run: |
go install github.com/jstemmer/go-junit-report/v2@latest
echo "$HOME/go/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
- name: Convert test log to JUnit XML
if: always()
run: |
shopt -s nullglob
for LOG in "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"/test-*.log; do
BASE=$(basename "$LOG" .log)
SUITE=${BASE#test-}
go-junit-report -in "$LOG" -out "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/junit-${SUITE}.xml" || true
done
- name: Publish test summary
if: always()
uses: ./spinifex/.github/actions/junit-report
with:
junit-glob: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}/junit-*.xml
title: "E2E reboot results"
- name: Analyze e2e failures
if: always()
uses: ./spinifex/.github/actions/e2e-analyze
with:
junit-glob: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}/junit-*.xml
log-dir: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
title: "Reboot E2E failure analysis"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
if: always()
with:
name: e2e-reboot-artifacts-${{ github.run_id }}
path: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
if-no-files-found: warn
retention-days: 14
- name: Teardown
if: always()
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
UID_SELF=$(id -u)
WS="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}"
reap() {
local sig="$1"
for pid in $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x tofu) $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x terraform); do
cwd=$(readlink "/proc/$pid/cwd" 2>/dev/null) || continue
case "$cwd" in
"$WS"|"$WS"/*) kill "-$sig" "$pid" 2>/dev/null ;;
esac
done
}
reap TERM
sleep 2
reap KILL
find "$WS" -name '.terraform.tfstate.lock.info' -delete 2>/dev/null
quiet_run "tofu workspace select" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
quiet_run "tofu destroy" "$TOFU_LOG" timeout 600 tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false
quiet_run "scrub-env" "$TOFU_LOG" ./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
ok "teardown complete"
- name: Fail job if reboot suite failed
if: always()
run: |
if [ "${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }}" != "0" ]; then
echo "::error::Reboot suite failed (rc=${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }})"
exit 1
fi
e2e_status:
name: Report E2E Status
if: always()
needs: [ e2e_single, e2e_real_multi, e2e_reboot ]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: [e2e_single, e2e_multi]
runs-on: ubuntu-26.04
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
- name: Report Status to PR
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
REPORT_SHA: ${{ inputs.sha || github.sha }}
REPORT_SHA: ${{ github.sha }}
run: |
if [[ -z "${REPORT_SHA}" ]]; then
echo "::error::no SHA available (inputs.sha and github.sha both empty)"
exit 1
fi
single_ok=true; multi_ok=true; reboot_ok=true
single_ok=true; multi_ok=true
case "${{ needs.e2e_single.result }}" in success|skipped) ;; *) single_ok=false ;; esac
case "${{ needs.e2e_real_multi.result }}" in success|skipped) ;; *) multi_ok=false ;; esac
case "${{ needs.e2e_reboot.result }}" in success|skipped) ;; *) reboot_ok=false ;; esac
if $single_ok && $multi_ok && $reboot_ok; then
case "${{ needs.e2e_multi.result }}" in success|skipped) ;; *) multi_ok=false ;; esac
if $single_ok && $multi_ok; then
STATE="success"
DESC="E2E suites passed"
else
STATE="failure"
DESC="E2E failed: single=${{ needs.e2e_single.result }} multi=${{ needs.e2e_real_multi.result }} reboot=${{ needs.e2e_reboot.result }}"
DESC="E2E failed: single=${{ needs.e2e_single.result }} multi=${{ needs.e2e_multi.result }}"
fi
gh api "repos/${{ github.repository }}/statuses/${REPORT_SHA}" \
-f state="$STATE" \
+9 -5
View File
@@ -26,23 +26,23 @@ concurrency:
jobs:
publish:
name: Build + publish eks-node AMI
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-single ]
steps:
- name: Checkout Spinifex
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
path: spinifex
- name: Checkout Viperblock
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/viperblock
ref: dev
path: viperblock
- name: Checkout Predastore
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/predastore
ref: dev
@@ -51,8 +51,12 @@ jobs:
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
cache-dependency-path: "spinifex/go.sum"
go-version-file: "spinifex/go.mod"
# Self-hosted runner: the Go module + build cache already persists on
# local disk between runs. setup-go's cache-save ("Post Setup Go")
# otherwise re-uploads hundreds of MB to the Actions cache backend,
# taking longer than the build itself.
cache: false
- name: Setup Go Workspace
run: go work init ./spinifex ./viperblock ./predastore
+17 -34
View File
@@ -9,21 +9,21 @@ permissions:
jobs:
distro-amd64:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
runs-on: ubuntu-26.04
steps:
- name: Checkout Spinifex
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
path: spinifex
- name: Checkout Predastore
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/predastore
path: predastore
- name: Checkout Viperblock
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/viperblock
path: viperblock
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version: '1.26.4'
go-version: "1.26.4"
- name: Build microVM artifacts (lb-agent + kernel + initramfs)
run: cd spinifex && make build-microvm-image
@@ -54,21 +54,21 @@ jobs:
spinifex/scripts/setup.sh
distro-arm64:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04-arm
runs-on: ubuntu-26.04-arm
steps:
- name: Checkout Spinifex
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
path: spinifex
- name: Checkout Predastore
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/predastore
path: predastore
- name: Checkout Viperblock
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/viperblock
path: viperblock
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ jobs:
release:
needs: [ distro-amd64, distro-arm64 ]
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
runs-on: ubuntu-26.04
steps:
- name: Download amd64 Artifacts
uses: actions/download-artifact@v8
@@ -132,12 +132,6 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Clean Workspace
run: |
# This runner (ci-single) is shared with the iso job, which mounts a
# kernel-global devtmpfs at <workspace>/mulga/scripts/iso-builder/.cache/rootfs/dev.
# If that job is killed its EXIT-trap unmount never runs and the bind
# leaks; a plain rm -rf then traverses it and deletes the host's /dev
# (wipes /dev/null, wedges the box). Detach any leaked mounts under the
# workspace first, then forbid rm from crossing a mount boundary.
awk -v w="$GITHUB_WORKSPACE" '$2 ~ "^"w {print $2}' /proc/mounts \
| sort -r | xargs -r -I{} sudo umount -l -R {} || true
sudo rm -rf --one-file-system "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
@@ -149,7 +143,7 @@ jobs:
private-key: ${{ secrets.APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
repositories: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/mulga
token: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
@@ -186,10 +180,6 @@ jobs:
tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1 || true
# Bare-metal single-node suite on the real ISO/squashfs + PXE-boot path —
# the only release check that exercises hardware install. Runs in parallel
# with `verify` (both need: release). Promotion and ISO upload both hard-gate
# on this passing.
baremetal:
needs: release
permissions:
@@ -198,11 +188,9 @@ jobs:
uses: ./.github/workflows/e2e-baremetal.yml
secrets: inherit
# Promote the draft only after BOTH the tofu install (`verify`) and the
# bare-metal hardware boot (`baremetal`) pass — runs only if both succeed.
promote:
needs: [ verify, baremetal ]
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
runs-on: ubuntu-26.04
env:
TAG: ${{ github.ref_name }}
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
@@ -223,7 +211,7 @@ jobs:
mark-failed:
needs: [ verify, baremetal ]
if: failure()
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
runs-on: ubuntu-26.04
env:
TAG: ${{ github.ref_name }}
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
@@ -248,8 +236,6 @@ jobs:
- name: Clean Workspace
run: |
ROOTFS="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/mulga/scripts/iso-builder/.cache/rootfs"
# Mirror make clean's umount sequence unconditionally — lazy unmount
# detaches immediately even if the mount is busy, so rm -rf is safe.
sudo umount -l -R "${ROOTFS}" 2>/dev/null || true
sudo umount -l "${ROOTFS}/dev/pts" 2>/dev/null || true
sudo umount -l "${ROOTFS}/dev" 2>/dev/null || true
@@ -265,25 +251,25 @@ jobs:
repositories: mulga
- name: Checkout Spinifex
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
path: spinifex
ref: ${{ github.ref }}
- name: Checkout Predastore
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/predastore
path: predastore
- name: Checkout Viperblock
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/viperblock
path: viperblock
- name: Checkout Mulga iso-builder
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/mulga
token: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
@@ -335,9 +321,6 @@ jobs:
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
run: |
# Gate the R2 upload on BOTH the tofu install (`verify`) and the
# real-hardware boot (`baremetal`, a reusable workflow whose job shows
# as "baremetal / ..."). Upload only if both conclude success.
echo "Waiting for verify + baremetal jobs to complete..."
while true; do
JOBS=$(gh api \
+15 -12
View File
@@ -23,24 +23,24 @@ permissions:
jobs:
build_and_test:
name: Build and Test
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
runs-on: ubuntu-26.04
steps:
- name: Checkout Spinifex
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
path: spinifex
fetch-depth: 2
- name: Checkout Viperblock
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/viperblock
ref: dev
path: viperblock
- name: Checkout Predastore
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/predastore
ref: dev
@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Build Spinifex
run: make -C spinifex build
- name: Manifest check + drift lint
run: make -C spinifex manifest-check manifest-lint
- name: Run Tests with Coverage
run: make -C spinifex test-cover
@@ -69,23 +72,23 @@ jobs:
race_detection:
name: Race Detection
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
runs-on: ubuntu-26.04
steps:
- name: Checkout Spinifex
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
path: spinifex
- name: Checkout Viperblock
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/viperblock
ref: dev
path: viperblock
- name: Checkout Predastore
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/predastore
ref: dev
@@ -105,23 +108,23 @@ jobs:
lint_and_security:
name: Lint and Security
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
runs-on: ubuntu-26.04
steps:
- name: Checkout Spinifex
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
path: spinifex
- name: Checkout Viperblock
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/viperblock
ref: dev
path: viperblock
- name: Checkout Predastore
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
repository: mulgadc/predastore
ref: dev
+2 -2
View File
@@ -23,14 +23,14 @@ permissions:
jobs:
ui_build_and_test:
name: UI Build and Test
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
runs-on: ubuntu-26.04
defaults:
run:
working-directory: spinifex/services/spinifexui/frontend
steps:
- name: Checkout Code
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v7
with:
sparse-checkout: spinifex/services/spinifexui/frontend
-10
View File
@@ -37,13 +37,3 @@ Thumbs.db
# Test reports
*-report.txt
# Internal docs (moved to private mulga repo)
docs/INTERNAL.md
docs/PRIVATE.md
docs/DEVNOTES.md
docs/PLAN.md
docs/TODO.md
docs/development/
docs/internal/
scripts/iac/aws/spinifex-test.pem
-1
View File
@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ linters:
check-type-assertions: true
exclude-functions:
- (*github.com/nats-io/nats.go.Subscription).Unsubscribe # cleanup-only, errors not actionable
- (*github.com/kdomanski/iso9660.ImageWriter).Cleanup # deferred cleanup, errors not actionable
govet:
enable-all: true
-3
View File
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
# Spinifex Installation
For documentation on using and installing Spinifex see [https://docs.mulgadc.com](https://docs.mulgadc.com/)
+24 -80
View File
@@ -6,17 +6,12 @@ ARCH := $(shell uname -m)
ifeq ($(ARCH),x86_64)
GO_ARCH := amd64
AWS_ARCH := x86_64
# On x86, we can run ARM VMs via emulation
QEMU_PACKAGES := qemu-system-x86 qemu-system-arm
else ifeq ($(ARCH),aarch64)
GO_ARCH := arm64
AWS_ARCH := aarch64
# On ARM, we can run x86 VMs via emulation
QEMU_PACKAGES := qemu-system-aarch64 qemu-system-x86
else ifeq ($(ARCH),arm64)
GO_ARCH := arm64
AWS_ARCH := aarch64
QEMU_PACKAGES := qemu-system-aarch64 qemu-system-x86
else
$(error Unsupported architecture: $(ARCH). Only x86_64 and aarch64/arm64 are supported.)
endif
@@ -73,6 +68,10 @@ build-lb-agent:
@echo -e "\n....Building lb-agent (static)"
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -ldflags "-s -w" -o ./bin/lb-agent cmd/lb-agent/main.go
build-ecs-agent: ## Build the ecs-agent (ships in the ECS-AMI guest; not in host `build`)
@echo -e "\n....Building ecs-agent (static)"
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -ldflags "-s -w -X main.version=$(VERSION)" -o ./bin/ecs-agent ./cmd/ecs-agent
build-system-image: ## Build a system image from manifest (use IMAGE=lb or IMAGE=eks-node)
ifndef IMAGE
$(error IMAGE is required. Usage: make build-system-image IMAGE=lb)
@@ -95,6 +94,12 @@ import-eks-node-image: ## Build + register the eks-node AMI (requires a running
publish-eks-node-image: ## Build + publish the eks-node AMI to Cloudflare R2 (needs R2_ENDPOINT + AWS_* env)
./scripts/publish-system-image.sh scripts/images/eks-node/manifest.conf --build
build-ecs-node-image: ## Build the spinifex-ecs-node AMI (Alpine + containerd + ecs-agent; IMPORT=1 to register)
$(MAKE) build-system-image IMAGE=ecs-agent
import-ecs-node-image: ## Build + register the ecs-node AMI (requires a running cluster)
$(MAKE) build-system-image IMAGE=ecs-agent IMPORT=1
MICROVM_OUT_DIR := build/microvm
MICROVM_ARTIFACTS := $(MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/vmlinuz $(MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/initramfs.cpio.gz
MICROVM_INPUTS := scripts/build-microvm-image.sh $(MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/init.sh $(MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/inittab bin/lb-agent
@@ -115,14 +120,10 @@ install-microvm: $(MICROVM_ARTIFACTS) ## Install microVM artifacts to /usr/share
sudo install -m 0644 $(MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/vmlinuz /usr/share/spinifex/microvm/vmlinuz
sudo install -m 0644 $(MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/initramfs.cpio.gz /usr/share/spinifex/microvm/initramfs.cpio.gz
go_run:
@echo -e "\n....Running $(GO_PROJECT_NAME)...."
$(GOPATH)/bin/$(GO_PROJECT_NAME)
# Preflight — runs the same checks as GitHub Actions (lint + vuln + tests).
# Use this before committing to catch CI failures locally.
preflight:
@$(MAKE) --no-print-directory QUIET=1 manifest-check lint govulncheck test-cover diff-coverage test-race test-harness
@$(MAKE) --no-print-directory QUIET=1 manifest-check manifest-lint lint govulncheck test-cover diff-coverage test-race test-harness
@echo -e "\n ✅ Preflight passed — safe to commit."
# E2E harness unit tests. Build-tagged `e2e` so they're skipped by the
@@ -139,6 +140,17 @@ manifest-check:
@echo -e "\n....Checking service-interfaces.yaml...."
@go run ./tests/e2e/manifest-check/cmd/manifest-check -repo-root . -manifest docs/service-interfaces.yaml
# Drift guards (Bead 5): direct-create fixture lint + NATS subject lint,
# ratcheted against tests/e2e/manifest-lint/baseline.txt. Fails only on NEW
# drift beyond the baseline.
manifest-lint:
@echo -e "\n....Linting manifest drift (fixtures + subjects)...."
@go run ./tests/e2e/manifest-lint/cmd/manifest-lint -repo-root .
# Accept current drift into the baseline. Run after an intentional change.
manifest-lint-update:
@go run ./tests/e2e/manifest-lint/cmd/manifest-lint -repo-root . -update
# Run unit tests
test:
@echo -e "\n....Running tests for $(GO_PROJECT_NAME)...."
@@ -168,13 +180,8 @@ diff-coverage: test-cover
bench:
@echo -e "\n....Running benchmarks for $(GO_PROJECT_NAME)...."
$(MAKE) easyjson
LOG_IGNORE=1 go test -benchmem -run=. -bench=. ./...
run:
$(MAKE) go_build
$(MAKE) go_run
# Fast iteration: build + install binary + restart all services.
# Microvm artifacts are reinstalled when they already exist on disk — the rule's
# input timestamps drive a rebuild only if anything actually changed. On a fresh
@@ -201,11 +208,10 @@ clean:
install-system:
@echo -e "\n....Installing system dependencies for $(ARCH)...."
@echo "QEMU packages: $(QEMU_PACKAGES)"
sudo apt-get update && sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y \
-o Dpkg::Options::="--force-confdef" \
-o Dpkg::Options::="--force-confold" \
nbdkit nbdkit-plugin-dev pkg-config $(QEMU_PACKAGES) qemu-utils qemu-kvm \
nbdkit nbdkit-plugin-dev pkg-config qemu-system-x86 qemu-system-arm qemu-utils qemu-kvm \
ovmf qemu-efi-aarch64 \
libvirt-daemon-system libvirt-clients libvirt-dev make gcc jq curl \
iproute2 netcat-openbsd openssh-client wget git unzip sudo xz-utils file \
@@ -234,19 +240,15 @@ install-aws:
quickinstall: install-system install-go install-aws
@echo -e "\n✅ Quickinstall complete for $(ARCH)."
@echo " Please ensure /usr/local/go/bin is in your PATH."
@echo " Installed: Go ($(GO_ARCH)), AWS CLI ($(AWS_ARCH)), QEMU ($(QEMU_PACKAGES))"
# Lint all Go code via golangci-lint (replaces check-format, vet, gosec, staticcheck)
lint:
@echo "Running golangci-lint..."
$(_Q)golangci-lint run ./...
@echo " golangci-lint ok"
# Auto-fix all linter issues that have fixers
fix:
golangci-lint run --fix ./...
# Govulncheck — dependency vulnerability scanning (not covered by golangci-lint)
govulncheck:
@echo "Running govulncheck..."
$(_Q)go tool govulncheck ./...
@@ -295,65 +297,7 @@ distro-arm64:
distro-clean:
rm -rf dist/
# Ansible dev lifecycle (experimental, parallel to dev-*.sh / reset-dev-env.sh).
# See scripts/ansible/README.md and docs/development/improvements/ansible-dev-lifecycle.md.
#
# Variable overrides: pass EXTRA_VARS="key=val key2=val2" to forward as
# `--extra-vars` to ansible-playbook. Plain `-e` on the make command line is
# make's own flag and does NOT reach ansible.
# make ansible-dev-install EXTRA_VARS="spinifex_external_pool_start=192.168.1.90 spinifex_external_pool_end=192.168.1.99"
EXTRA_VARS ?=
_ANSIBLE_EXTRA = $(if $(strip $(EXTRA_VARS)),--extra-vars "$(EXTRA_VARS)",)
ansible-dev-preflight:
cd scripts/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-preflight.yml $(_ANSIBLE_EXTRA)
ansible-dev-teardown:
cd scripts/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-teardown.yml $(_ANSIBLE_EXTRA)
ansible-dev-install:
cd scripts/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-install.yml $(_ANSIBLE_EXTRA)
ansible-dev-reset:
cd scripts/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-reset.yml $(_ANSIBLE_EXTRA)
ansible-dev-deploy:
cd scripts/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-deploy.yml $(_ANSIBLE_EXTRA)
ansible-dev-status:
cd scripts/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-status.yml
ansible-dev-logs:
cd scripts/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-logs.yml
# Snapshot / restore require an explicit -e snapshot_name=<name>. The
# wrapper passes ANSIBLE_EXTRA through so devs can run
# `make ansible-dev-snapshot ANSIBLE_EXTRA='-e snapshot_name=before-merge'`.
ansible-dev-snapshot:
cd scripts/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-snapshot.yml $(ANSIBLE_EXTRA)
ansible-dev-restore:
cd scripts/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-restore.yml $(ANSIBLE_EXTRA)
ansible-dev-version:
cd scripts/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-version.yml
ansible-dev-vpc:
cd scripts/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-vpc.yml $(ANSIBLE_EXTRA)
# Multi-node cluster bootstrap against a tofu env (env1, env2, bryn, etc).
# Inventory is generated from scripts/tofu-cluster/envs/<env>.tfvars.
# make ansible-cluster-bootstrap ENV=env1 POOL=192.168.1.150-192.168.1.159
ENV ?=
POOL ?=
ansible-cluster-bootstrap:
@test -n "$(ENV)" || { echo "ENV=<env> required (e.g. env1, env2)"; exit 64; }
cd scripts/ansible && CLUSTER_ENV=$(ENV) ansible-playbook -i inventory/tofu.py playbooks/cluster-bootstrap.yml \
-e cluster_env=$(ENV) \
$(if $(POOL),-e cluster_external_pool=$(POOL),) \
$(_ANSIBLE_EXTRA)
.PHONY: build build-ui build-installer build-lb-agent build-system-image build-eks-node-image import-eks-node-image publish-eks-node-image build-microvm-image install-microvm go_build go_run preflight test test-cover test-race diff-coverage bench run test-actions test-harness manifest-check diff-coverage bench run \
.PHONY: build build-ui build-installer build-lb-agent build-ecs-agent build-system-image build-eks-node-image import-eks-node-image publish-eks-node-image build-ecs-node-image import-ecs-node-image build-microvm-image install-microvm go_build preflight test test-cover test-race diff-coverage bench test-actions test-harness manifest-check manifest-lint manifest-lint-update \
deploy reinstall clean \
install-system install-go install-aws quickinstall \
lint fix govulncheck \
+50
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
#!/bin/sh
# JetStream liveness watchdog for spinifex-nats.
#
# NATS can disable JetStream at runtime (e.g. a filesystem permission error while
# flushing stream state) and keep the process alive serving KV as read-only. That
# is not a process failure, so Restart=on-failure never fires and KV-backed
# services (awsgw IAM bucket init, etc.) stall until NATS is restarted by hand.
#
# This probes the NATS monitoring endpoint's JS health and restarts the service
# only when JetStream is sustainedly unhealthy while the service is running. The
# multi-sample window avoids restarting during transient startup/quorum 503s.
set -eu
HEALTH_URL="http://127.0.0.1:8222/healthz?js-enabled-only=true"
SERVICE="spinifex-nats.service"
SAMPLES=3 # consecutive failing samples required before acting
SAMPLE_GAP=2 # seconds between samples
# Only act on a running service: a stopped/activating unit is systemd's to manage,
# and try-restart on it would either no-op or fight an in-flight (re)start.
if ! systemctl is-active --quiet "$SERVICE"; then
exit 0
fi
# curl is the probe transport; if it is unavailable, do nothing rather than
# false-restart a healthy server.
if ! command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "nats-js-watchdog: curl not found, skipping JS health probe" >&2
exit 0
fi
# A single 200 means JetStream is healthy — exit fast on the common case.
js_healthy() {
curl -fsS -o /dev/null --max-time 5 "$HEALTH_URL" 2>/dev/null
}
i=1
while [ "$i" -le "$SAMPLES" ]; do
if js_healthy; then
exit 0
fi
if [ "$i" -lt "$SAMPLES" ]; then
sleep "$SAMPLE_GAP"
fi
i=$((i + 1))
done
echo "nats-js-watchdog: JetStream unhealthy on $SAMPLES consecutive probes ($HEALTH_URL); restarting $SERVICE" >&2
systemctl try-restart "$SERVICE"
+1
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ Wants=spinifex-nats.service
[Service]
Type=simple
Slice=spinifex-system.slice
User=spinifex-gw
Group=spinifex
ExecStartPre=/var/lib/spinifex/wait-for-nats.sh
+11 -49
View File
@@ -2,66 +2,29 @@
Description=Spinifex Daemon (VM Orchestration)
PartOf=spinifex.target
After=spinifex-nats.service spinifex-viperblock.service openvswitch-switch.service ovn-controller.service openvswitch-ipsec.service
# Wants=openvswitch-ipsec.service so systemd brings the IPsec userspace
# daemon up before spinifex flips other_config:ipsec_encapsulation=true.
# Without that daemon, OVS holds the cert pointers unused and strongSwan
# never gets IKE config — tunnel traffic is encrypted with no SAs and
# silently dropped. Wants= (not Requires=) keeps daemon bootable on
# single-node / lab hosts where the package is intentionally absent.
# Wants (not Requires): stay bootable when openvswitch-ipsec is absent
Wants=openvswitch-ipsec.service
# No Wants=spinifex-nats.service: Wants= reactivates a stopped unit during
# `systemctl restart spinifex-daemon`, which would mask the standalone-startup
# path the Tier 1 DDIL Scenario B exercises. spinifex.target Wants= covers
# cold boot.
[Service]
Type=simple
Slice=spinifex-system.slice
User=spinifex-daemon
Group=spinifex
# DDIL Tier 1 (siv-17): no ExecStartPre wait-for-nats. The daemon starts in
# standalone mode and reconnects to NATS in the background — process-exiting
# on a missing NATS would kill the local VM management plane.
#
# Opt-in strict-startup (§1d-strict, siv-44): set SPINIFEX_REQUIRE_NATS=1 to
# restore pre-DDIL fail-fast UX. First NATS connect uses a ~30s bounded retry
# and the daemon aborts on timeout. Intended for dev/test/single-node deploys
# where silent NATS misconfig is more confusing than helpful. Do NOT set this
# in the shipped unit — it re-introduces the SPOF that Tier 1 removed.
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/spx service spinifex start
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=5
# DDIL Tier 1: KillMode=process so systemd only signals the
# daemon's main PID, not the cgroup. QEMU children stay alive across
# `systemctl restart spinifex-daemon` and the new daemon reattaches to them
# via the persisted local state file + pidfile + QMP socket. With the
# default control-group mode, restart would terminate every guest VM —
# defeating Scenario B's "daemon restart preserves running instances".
# KillMode=process: guest QEMU survives daemon restart; the new daemon reattaches (DDIL)
KillMode=process
# 15s upper bound on the SIGTERM grace window. The new SIGTERM handler
# skips VM teardown (it now just persists state and exits), so 15s is
# plenty of slack for the cluster-manager + NATS unsubscribe path.
TimeoutStopSec=15
# RG-4: infra tier — reaped only after every guest
OOMScoreAdjust=-500
Environment=SPINIFEX_CONFIG_PATH=/etc/spinifex/spinifex.toml
Environment=SPINIFEX_BASE_DIR=/var/lib/spinifex/spinifex/
Environment=SPINIFEX_WAL_DIR=/var/lib/spinifex/spinifex/
# DDIL Tier 1: QEMU pidfiles, QMP sockets, and the
# shared qemu.log all resolve via utils.pidPath() — which falls back
# to os.TempDir() (=/tmp) when $HOME/spinifex doesn't exist. With
# PrivateTmp=yes, each daemon start gets a fresh /tmp namespace, so
# pidfiles written by QEMU (running in the OLD daemon's namespace)
# are invisible to the new daemon. The /local/instances handler then
# reports PID=0 and Scenario B fails its "live QEMU PID" assertion.
# Pin XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to the host-wide tmpfs at /run/spinifex (created
# by tmpfiles.d, already in ReadWritePaths) so pidPath() returns a
# stable, namespace-independent path that both daemon incarnations and
# QEMU children resolve identically.
# Pin to host tmpfs: QEMU pidfiles/QMP sockets must survive PrivateTmp namespace churn (DDIL)
Environment=XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/spinifex
# Filesystem access — NoNewPrivileges omitted (daemon uses sudo for ip, ovs-vsctl, dhcpcd)
# CAP_SYS_ADMIN: required for GPU passthrough sysfs operations (vfio group management).
# CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE: sysfs driver bind/unbind paths (/sys/bus/pci/drivers/vfio-pci/bind,
# unbind) are root:root 0200; non-root processes need CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE to open them.
# RG-9: daemon tier — privileged by necessity (GPU vfio). NoNewPrivileges omitted (RG-10: sudo ip/ovs-vsctl/dhcpcd)
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_SYS_ADMIN CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
ProtectSystem=full
PrivateDevices=no
@@ -71,9 +34,11 @@ DeviceAllow=/dev/net/tun rw
DeviceAllow=char-vfio rw
DeviceAllow=/dev/vfio/vfio rw
ReadOnlyPaths=/etc/spinifex/spinifex.toml /etc/spinifex/server.pem /etc/spinifex/server.key /etc/spinifex/ca.pem
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/spinifex/spinifex /var/log/spinifex /run/spinifex /run/spinifex/nbd
# /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf: per-tap IMDS endpoints set rp_filter/accept_local, which
# ProtectKernelTunables=yes would otherwise keep read-only.
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/spinifex/spinifex /var/log/spinifex /run/spinifex /run/spinifex/nbd /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf
# Hardening
# RG-9: hardening baseline
ProtectHome=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
@@ -88,8 +53,6 @@ ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectProc=invisible
SystemCallArchitectures=native
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
# DHCP lease acquisition moved to spinifex-vpcd (see dhcp-allocate-error.md);
# the daemon no longer needs AF_PACKET or the softened kernel protections.
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX AF_NETLINK
ProtectHostname=yes
KeyringMode=private
@@ -97,8 +60,7 @@ RemoveIPC=yes
LimitCORE=0
LimitNOFILE=65536
LimitNPROC=4096
# VFIO GPU passthrough requires locking all guest RAM into physical memory.
# Without this, QEMU fails with RLIMIT_MEMLOCK exceeded when pinning guest pages.
# LimitMEMLOCK=infinity: VFIO pins all guest RAM
LimitMEMLOCK=infinity
[Install]
+8
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
[Unit]
Description=Spinifex guest VM tier
Before=slices.target
[Slice]
# RG-3: child of spinifex.slice (spinifex-guests -> spinifex), sibling of
# spinifex-system. Parent for the per-instance spinifex-instance-<id>.slice
# leaves (0002 RG-7). Inherits the spinifex.slice ceiling; no extra limit here.
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
[Unit]
Description=Spinifex NATS JetStream liveness watchdog
PartOf=spinifex.target
After=spinifex-nats.service
[Service]
Type=oneshot
# Runs as root: the probe is a local curl to the NATS monitoring port, and the
# remedy is `systemctl try-restart spinifex-nats` when JetStream is disabled while
# the process stays alive (which Restart=on-failure cannot catch).
ExecStart=/var/lib/spinifex/nats-js-watchdog.sh
# Hardening (kept compatible with talking to PID1 over /run/systemd).
NoNewPrivileges=yes
ProtectHome=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes
ProtectControlGroups=yes
RestrictRealtime=yes
LockPersonality=yes
RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
[Unit]
Description=Spinifex NATS JetStream liveness watchdog timer
PartOf=spinifex.target
[Timer]
# Delay the first probe so NATS startup + JetStream cluster quorum settle (a
# forming cluster reports JS not-current transiently, which is not a fault).
OnBootSec=60s
OnUnitActiveSec=30s
AccuracySec=5s
[Install]
WantedBy=timers.target
+1
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ Before=spinifex-predastore.service spinifex-daemon.service spinifex-awsgw.servic
[Service]
Type=simple
Slice=spinifex-system.slice
User=spinifex-nats
Group=spinifex
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/spx service nats start
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ Wants=spinifex-nats.service
[Service]
Type=simple
Slice=spinifex-system.slice
User=spinifex-storage
Group=spinifex
ExecStartPre=/var/lib/spinifex/wait-for-nats.sh
+18
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
[Unit]
Description=Spinifex graceful guest drain
PartOf=spinifex.target
# After= all services so it stops FIRST on target/host shutdown: the drain runs
# while nats/predastore/viperblock/daemon are still up (QMP, unmount, WAL flush).
After=spinifex-nats.service spinifex-predastore.service spinifex-viperblock.service spinifex-daemon.service
[Service]
Type=oneshot
RemainAfterExit=yes
ExecStart=/bin/true
# ExecStop only runs when the target/host goes down, not on a single-service
# restart — so a daemon restart still leaves guests running (DDIL).
ExecStop=/usr/local/bin/spx admin node drain --local --timeout=120s
TimeoutStopSec=180
[Install]
WantedBy=spinifex.target
+9
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
[Unit]
Description=Spinifex control/infra tier (NATS, predastore, viperblock, daemon, awsgw, vpcd, ui)
Before=slices.target
[Slice]
# RG-3: child of spinifex.slice (spinifex-system -> spinifex), inherits the
# parent ceiling, no extra limit. Holds the 7 control/infra services. Guest QEMU
# moves to the sibling spinifex-guests.slice (per-instance placement lands in
# 0002 RG-7); until then the daemon-forked guests stay under spinifex-daemon.service.
+1
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ After=spinifex-awsgw.service
[Service]
Type=simple
Slice=spinifex-system.slice
User=spinifex-ui
Group=spinifex
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/spx service spinifex-ui start
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ Wants=spinifex-nats.service
[Service]
Type=simple
Slice=spinifex-system.slice
User=spinifex-viperblock
Group=spinifex
ExecStartPre=/var/lib/spinifex/wait-for-nats.sh
+23 -36
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ Wants=spinifex-nats.service ovn-controller.service
[Service]
Type=simple
Slice=spinifex-system.slice
User=spinifex-vpcd
Group=spinifex
ExecStartPre=/var/lib/spinifex/wait-for-nats.sh
@@ -16,48 +17,34 @@ OOMScoreAdjust=-500
Environment=SPINIFEX_CONFIG_PATH=/etc/spinifex/spinifex.toml
Environment=SPINIFEX_BASE_DIR=/var/lib/spinifex/vpcd/
# vpcd MUST share the HOST mount namespace. IMDS binds one listener per VPC inside
# a per-VPC netns entered in-process via setns(CLONE_NEWNET); the /run/netns/<vpc>
# bind-mount that `ip netns add` creates must be host-visible (for diagnostics) and
# must survive a vpcd restart (so the listener can rebind). ANY filesystem-sandbox
# directive — ProtectSystem / ProtectHome / PrivateTmp / ProtectKernel* /
# ProtectControlGroups / ProtectProc / Read{Only,Write}Paths — forks a PRIVATE
# mount namespace that traps that bind-mount inside vpcd, leaving the host a stale
# handle that fails setns(2) with EINVAL (CI runs 26920490454, 26922587471). Those
# directives are therefore omitted by design, and so is the MountFlags=shared /
# spinifex-netns.service propagation workaround they required.
#
# Boundary that REMAINS: DAC (User=spinifex-vpcd) plus the seccomp / capability /
# namespace / address-family restrictions below. The durable fix that restores
# filesystem sandboxing AND drops CAP_SYS_ADMIN is the process-per-netns model
# (`ip netns exec` helper instead of in-process setns) — see
# docs/development/improvements/imds-l2-datapath.md Phase 5.
PrivateDevices=no
# RG-9: network tier. Per-tap IMDS removed the in-process setns, so vpcd no
# longer enters a per-VPC netns: CAP_SYS_ADMIN is dropped and the filesystem
# sandbox is restored. NoNewPrivileges stays off (RG-10: sudo ip/ovs-vsctl/dhcpcd).
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_RAW CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE CAP_SETUID CAP_SETGID
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_RAW CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE CAP_SETUID CAP_SETGID
NoNewPrivileges=no
ProtectSystem=full
PrivateDevices=yes
ReadOnlyPaths=/etc/spinifex/spinifex.toml /etc/spinifex/server.pem /etc/spinifex/server.key /etc/spinifex/ca.pem
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/spinifex/vpcd /var/log/spinifex
# Hardening that does NOT fork a mount namespace (kept)
RestrictSUIDSGID=no
# RG-9: hardening baseline
ProtectHome=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
LockPersonality=yes
RestrictRealtime=yes
RestrictNamespaces=yes
ProtectClock=yes
# IMDS enters the per-VPC netns via setns(CLONE_NEWNET); the `ip -n <netns>` /
# `ip netns exec` plumbing also unshares a mount namespace (CLONE_NEWNS, to give
# the netns its own /sys), so `mnt` must be allowlisted alongside `net` or the
# first in-netns command fails with EPERM.
RestrictNamespaces=net mnt
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes
ProtectKernelLogs=yes
ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectProc=invisible
SystemCallArchitectures=native
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=no
# AF_PACKET: required by the in-process DHCP client (github.com/insomniacslk/dhcp
# / nclient4) for raw L2 BOOTP on br-wan before an IP is configured on the
# interface. See docs/development/bugs/dhcp-allocate-error.md.
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
# AF_PACKET: raw L2 BOOTP for the in-process DHCP client before the iface has an IP
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX AF_NETLINK AF_PACKET
# CAP_NET_RAW: open AF_PACKET sockets.
# CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE: covers unicast RENEW to UDP :68.
# CAP_NET_ADMIN: already used for ovs-vsctl / ip link wiring on the bridge.
# CAP_SYS_ADMIN: setns(CLONE_NEWNET) into per-VPC IMDS netns to bind the listener.
# Note, disabled for now, sudo issue with ovs
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_RAW CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE CAP_SETUID CAP_SETGID CAP_SYS_ADMIN
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_RAW CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE CAP_SETUID CAP_SETGID CAP_SYS_ADMIN
NoNewPrivileges=no
ProtectHostname=yes
KeyringMode=private
RemoveIPC=yes
+13
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
[Unit]
Description=Spinifex resource-bounded slice (host ceiling)
Before=slices.target
[Slice]
# RG-1: no CPUWeight — slice roots are siblings; capping below the default would
# let user.slice out-prioritize the VM fleet. Operator CPU priority lives on
# system.slice (system.slice.d/spinifex-reserve.conf).
# RG-1/RG-5: throttle+reclaim at High, hard wall at Max (% of physical RAM).
MemoryHigh=80%
MemoryMax=90%
# RG-5: spill to the full swap device before the MemoryMax wall; matched to swap size.
MemorySwapMax=8G
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
Description=Spinifex Infrastructure Platform
After=network-online.target
Wants=network-online.target
Wants=spinifex-nats.service spinifex-predastore.service spinifex-viperblock.service spinifex-daemon.service spinifex-awsgw.service spinifex-vpcd.service spinifex-ui.service openvswitch-switch.service ovn-controller.service
Wants=spinifex-nats.service spinifex-predastore.service spinifex-viperblock.service spinifex-daemon.service spinifex-awsgw.service spinifex-vpcd.service spinifex-ui.service spinifex-shutdown.service spinifex-nats-watchdog.timer openvswitch-switch.service ovn-controller.service
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
+205
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
// ecr-credential-provider is a kubelet exec credential provider that lets a
// Spinifex EKS worker node pull images from the internal Spinifex ECR registry.
//
// kubelet invokes it per-pull, feeding a CredentialProviderRequest on STDIN and
// reading a CredentialProviderResponse on STDOUT. The provider fetches the
// node IAM-role credentials from IMDS, SigV4-signs GetAuthorizationToken against
// the AWS gateway's ECR endpoint, and returns the minted AWS:<jwt> as Basic auth
// for the requested registry host.
//
// Static node config (gateway URL, CA, region) is read from the cloud-init env
// file /etc/spinifex-eks/agent.env (KEY=value); real env vars override it.
package main
import (
"bufio"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"os"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/ecrauth"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/imdscreds"
_ "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/fipsboot"
)
const (
credProviderAPIVersion = "credentialprovider.kubelet.k8s.io/v1"
defaultCacheDuration = "10h"
// expiryMargin trims the token's real TTL so kubelet re-invokes the provider
// before the JWT actually expires mid-run.
expiryMargin = 30 * time.Minute
defaultEnvFile = "/etc/spinifex-eks/agent.env"
defaultGatewayCA = "/etc/spinifex-eks/gateway-ca.pem"
defaultIMDSBase = "http://169.254.169.254/latest"
)
// CredentialProviderRequest is the kubelet exec-provider request on STDIN.
type CredentialProviderRequest struct {
APIVersion string `json:"apiVersion"`
Kind string `json:"kind"`
Image string `json:"image"`
}
// AuthConfig is a single registry credential entry.
type AuthConfig struct {
Username string `json:"username"`
Password string `json:"password"`
}
// CredentialProviderResponse is the kubelet exec-provider response on STDOUT.
type CredentialProviderResponse struct {
APIVersion string `json:"apiVersion"`
Kind string `json:"kind"`
CacheKeyType string `json:"cacheKeyType"`
CacheDuration string `json:"cacheDuration"`
Auth map[string]AuthConfig `json:"auth"`
}
// config holds the static node settings the provider needs.
type config struct {
GatewayURL string
GatewayCA string
Region string
IMDSBase string
}
func main() {
cfg := loadConfig(defaultEnvFile)
httpClient, err := ecrauth.GatewayHTTPClient(cfg.GatewayCA)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("ecr-credential-provider: build gateway client", "err", err)
emitEmpty(os.Stdout)
os.Exit(1)
}
if err := run(os.Stdin, os.Stdout, cfg, httpClient); err != nil {
slog.Error("ecr-credential-provider: run failed", "err", err)
// Still emit a valid empty-auth response so kubelet has a parseable reply.
emitEmpty(os.Stdout)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
// run is the testable core: it reads a CredentialProviderRequest from in,
// resolves credentials via IMDS + the gateway, and writes a
// CredentialProviderResponse to out. The httpClient must trust the gateway CA.
func run(in io.Reader, out io.Writer, cfg config, httpClient *http.Client) error {
var req CredentialProviderRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(in).Decode(&req); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decode request: %w", err)
}
if req.Image == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("request image is empty")
}
imageHost := ecrauth.HostFromImage(req.Image)
creds, err := imdscreds.Fetch(httpClient, cfg.IMDSBase)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("fetch IMDS credentials: %w", err)
}
tok, err := ecrauth.GetAuthorizationToken(cfg.Region, cfg.GatewayURL, httpClient,
creds.AccessKeyID, creds.SecretAccessKey, creds.SessionToken)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("get authorization token: %w", err)
}
auth := AuthConfig{Username: tok.Username, Password: tok.Password}
authMap := map[string]AuthConfig{imageHost: auth}
if tok.ProxyHost != "" && tok.ProxyHost != imageHost {
authMap[tok.ProxyHost] = auth
}
resp := CredentialProviderResponse{
APIVersion: credProviderAPIVersion,
Kind: "CredentialProviderResponse",
CacheKeyType: "Registry",
CacheDuration: cacheDurationFrom(tok.ExpiresAt),
Auth: authMap,
}
return json.NewEncoder(out).Encode(&resp)
}
// cacheDurationFrom derives a Go-duration string from the token expiry minus a
// safety margin, falling back to the default when expiry is unknown or too near.
func cacheDurationFrom(expiresAt time.Time) string {
if expiresAt.IsZero() {
return defaultCacheDuration
}
d := time.Until(expiresAt) - expiryMargin
if d <= 0 {
return defaultCacheDuration
}
return d.Round(time.Second).String()
}
// loadConfig reads the cloud-init env file then lets real env vars override. The
// IMDS base is fixed (not in the env file) but overridable for tests.
func loadConfig(envFile string) config {
env := parseEnvFile(envFile)
get := func(key string) string {
if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
return v
}
return env[key]
}
cfg := config{
GatewayURL: get("EKS_GATEWAY_URL"),
GatewayCA: get("EKS_GATEWAY_CA"),
Region: get("EKS_REGION"),
IMDSBase: get("EKS_IMDS_BASE"),
}
if cfg.GatewayCA == "" {
cfg.GatewayCA = defaultGatewayCA
}
if cfg.IMDSBase == "" {
cfg.IMDSBase = defaultIMDSBase
}
return cfg
}
// parseEnvFile reads a simple KEY=value file; missing files yield an empty map.
func parseEnvFile(path string) map[string]string {
out := map[string]string{}
f, err := os.Open(path)
if err != nil {
return out
}
defer f.Close()
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(f)
for scanner.Scan() {
line := strings.TrimSpace(scanner.Text())
if line == "" || strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") {
continue
}
key, val, ok := strings.Cut(line, "=")
if !ok {
continue
}
out[strings.TrimSpace(key)] = strings.TrimSpace(val)
}
return out
}
// emitEmpty writes a valid CredentialProviderResponse with no auth entries.
func emitEmpty(out io.Writer) {
resp := CredentialProviderResponse{
APIVersion: credProviderAPIVersion,
Kind: "CredentialProviderResponse",
CacheKeyType: "Registry",
CacheDuration: defaultCacheDuration,
Auth: map[string]AuthConfig{},
}
if err := json.NewEncoder(out).Encode(&resp); err != nil {
slog.Error("ecr-credential-provider: encode empty response", "err", err)
}
}
+124
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
package main
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// fakeBackend serves both the IMDS role/credentials endpoints and the gateway
// ECR GetAuthorizationToken on one TLS server, routed by request path.
func fakeBackend(t *testing.T) *httptest.Server {
t.Helper()
mux := http.NewServeMux()
// IMDSv2 token.
mux.HandleFunc("/latest/api/token", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPut {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("imds-v2-token"))
})
// IMDS role name.
mux.HandleFunc("/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == "/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" {
if r.Header.Get("X-Aws-Ec2-Metadata-Token") != "imds-v2-token" {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("node-role"))
return
}
// Role credentials.
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{
"Code": "Success",
"Type": "AWS-HMAC",
"AccessKeyId": "AKIATEST",
"SecretAccessKey": "secrettest",
"Token": "sessiontoken",
"AccountId": "123456789012",
})
})
// Gateway ECR GetAuthorizationToken (X-Amz-Target dispatch).
mux.HandleFunc("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !strings.Contains(r.Header.Get("X-Amz-Target"), "GetAuthorizationToken") {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
authToken := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("AWS:testjwt"))
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-amz-json-1.1")
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
"authorizationData": []map[string]any{{
"authorizationToken": authToken,
"proxyEndpoint": "https://123456789012.dkr.ecr.us-east-1.spinifex.internal",
}},
})
})
srv := httptest.NewTLSServer(mux)
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
return srv
}
func clientTrusting(srv *httptest.Server) *http.Client {
pool := x509.NewCertPool()
pool.AddCert(srv.Certificate())
return &http.Client{Transport: &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{RootCAs: pool, MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12}}}
}
func TestRun_ReturnsBasicAuth(t *testing.T) {
srv := fakeBackend(t)
client := clientTrusting(srv)
cfg := config{
GatewayURL: srv.URL,
Region: "us-east-1",
IMDSBase: srv.URL + "/latest",
}
const image = "123456789012.dkr.ecr.us-east-1.spinifex.internal/spinifex-demo:latest"
reqBody, err := json.Marshal(CredentialProviderRequest{
APIVersion: credProviderAPIVersion,
Kind: "CredentialProviderRequest",
Image: image,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal request: %v", err)
}
var out bytes.Buffer
if err := run(bytes.NewReader(reqBody), &out, cfg, client); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("run: %v", err)
}
var resp CredentialProviderResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(out.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmarshal response: %v\n%s", err, out.String())
}
if resp.Kind != "CredentialProviderResponse" {
t.Errorf("Kind = %q, want CredentialProviderResponse", resp.Kind)
}
if resp.CacheKeyType != "Registry" {
t.Errorf("CacheKeyType = %q, want Registry", resp.CacheKeyType)
}
host := "123456789012.dkr.ecr.us-east-1.spinifex.internal"
auth, ok := resp.Auth[host]
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("auth map missing host %q; got %v", host, resp.Auth)
}
if auth.Username != "AWS" {
t.Errorf("username = %q, want AWS", auth.Username)
}
if auth.Password != "testjwt" {
t.Errorf("password = %q, want testjwt", auth.Password)
}
}
+188
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
package main
import (
"bufio"
"context"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"os"
goruntime "runtime"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/cmd/ecs-agent/credentials"
ctrruntime "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/cmd/ecs-agent/runtime"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/handlers/ecs/bus"
)
// version is the agent build version, reported in the register message.
// Overridable via -ldflags "-X main.version=...".
var version = "dev"
// Agent wires the ecs-agent's runtime seams: a gateway control-plane client, a
// container runtime, and an ECR resolver. It registers the host as a container
// instance at boot, heartbeats (re-registers) while alive, polls the gateway for
// task assignments, and runs them through containerd, reporting state back over
// the gateway. It never connects to NATS — the bus stays host-internal.
type Agent struct {
cfg config
id identity
cp controlPlane
puller ctrruntime.ImagePuller
runner ctrruntime.Runner
resolver ctrruntime.Resolver
reg *registrar
hb *heartbeater
// netns builds awsvpc task network namespaces (nil-safe; bridge/host skip it).
netns *taskNetns
// cred serves task IAM role credentials at 169.254.170.2 (nil in unit tests).
cred *credEndpoint
closers []func() error
}
// newAgent assembles an Agent from already-built seams. Tests use this directly
// with fakes; New builds the production seams and delegates here. runner may be
// nil when containerd is unavailable; the assign path then reports the task
// STOPPED rather than crashing.
func newAgent(cfg config, id identity, cp controlPlane, puller ctrruntime.ImagePuller, runner ctrruntime.Runner, resolver ctrruntime.Resolver) *Agent {
return &Agent{
cfg: cfg,
id: id,
cp: cp,
puller: puller,
runner: runner,
resolver: resolver,
reg: newRegistrar(cp, id),
hb: newHeartbeater(cp, id, cfg.Heartbeat),
netns: newTaskNetns(execNetRunner{}),
}
}
// New builds an Agent from config: it resolves the host identity from IMDS,
// builds the gateway control-plane client, the ECR resolver and (best-effort)
// the containerd runtime. A containerd connect failure is logged, not fatal —
// registration and heartbeat still run so the instance is visible while the
// runtime recovers. The ECR gateway client is built lazily on first image pull
// (not here), so a missing or malformed gateway CA does not stop registration.
func New(cfg config) (*Agent, error) {
imdsClient := &http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}
meta, err := fetchInstanceMetadata(imdsClient, cfg.IMDSBase)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("instance metadata: %w", err)
}
host, _ := os.Hostname()
id := identity{
AccountID: meta.AccountID,
ClusterName: cfg.ClusterName,
InstanceID: meta.InstanceID,
AZ: meta.AZ,
Hostname: host,
Capacity: detectCapacity(),
AgentVersion: version,
}
creds := credentials.NewIMDSProvider(imdsClient, cfg.IMDSBase)
resolver := newLazyECRResolver(creds, cfg.Region, cfg.GatewayURL, cfg.GatewayCA)
var puller ctrruntime.ImagePuller
var runner ctrruntime.Runner
if rt, perr := ctrruntime.New(cfg.ContainerdSocket); perr != nil {
slog.Warn("ecs-agent: containerd unavailable at boot, image pulls disabled", "err", perr)
} else {
puller = rt
runner = rt
}
cp, err := newGatewayControlPlane(cfg, creds)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("build gateway control-plane: %w", err)
}
a := newAgent(cfg, id, cp, puller, runner, resolver)
a.cred = newCredEndpoint(creds, cfg.Region, cfg.GatewayURL, cfg.GatewayCA,
cfg.CredEndpointIP, cfg.CredEndpointPort, execNetRunner{})
if puller != nil {
a.closers = append(a.closers, puller.Close)
}
return a, nil
}
// Run registers the instance, starts the heartbeat and assignment-poll loops,
// and blocks until ctx is cancelled, then tears down.
func (a *Agent) Run(ctx context.Context) error {
if err := a.reg.Register(); err != nil {
slog.Error("ecs-agent: initial registration failed", "err", err)
} else {
slog.Info("ecs-agent: registered", "cluster", a.id.ClusterName, "instance", a.id.InstanceID)
}
if a.cred != nil {
if err := a.cred.Start(); err != nil {
slog.Error("ecs-agent: credential endpoint start failed", "err", err)
}
}
go a.hb.Run(ctx)
// Re-adopt containers still running from before this restart, then poll with
// their tasks pre-seeded so re-delivered assignments are acked, not re-run.
go a.pollAssignments(ctx, a.reconcile(ctx))
<-ctx.Done()
return a.Stop()
}
// Stop closes the runtime. Safe to call once.
func (a *Agent) Stop() error {
var firstErr error
if a.cred != nil {
_ = a.cred.Stop()
}
for _, c := range a.closers {
if err := c(); err != nil && firstErr == nil {
firstErr = err
}
}
return firstErr
}
// detectCapacity reports the host's total CPU units (1 vCPU = 1024) and memory.
func detectCapacity() bus.InstanceCapacity {
return bus.InstanceCapacity{
CPU: goruntime.NumCPU() * 1024,
MemoryMiB: memTotalMiB(),
}
}
// memTotalMiB reads MemTotal from /proc/meminfo, returning 0 if unavailable.
func memTotalMiB() int {
f, err := os.Open("/proc/meminfo")
if err != nil {
return 0
}
defer f.Close()
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(f)
for scanner.Scan() {
line := scanner.Text()
if !strings.HasPrefix(line, "MemTotal:") {
continue
}
fields := strings.Fields(line)
if len(fields) < 2 {
return 0
}
kb, err := strconv.Atoi(fields[1])
if err != nil {
return 0
}
return kb / 1024
}
return 0
}
+53
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
package main
import (
"context"
"testing"
"time"
ctrruntime "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/cmd/ecs-agent/runtime"
)
func TestAgent_RunRegistersThenStopsOnContext(t *testing.T) {
cp := &fakeCP{}
cfg := config{Heartbeat: 5 * time.Millisecond, PollInterval: 5 * time.Millisecond}
puller := &ctrruntime.FakePuller{}
a := newAgent(cfg, testIdentity(), cp, puller, puller, nil)
a.closers = append(a.closers, puller.Close)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- a.Run(ctx) }()
// Give it time to register + re-register (heartbeat) a few times.
time.Sleep(30 * time.Millisecond)
cancel()
select {
case err := <-done:
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run returned error: %v", err)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Run did not return after cancel")
}
// One boot register + at least one heartbeat re-register.
if cp.registerCount() < 2 {
t.Errorf("registers = %d, want >= 2 (boot + heartbeat)", cp.registerCount())
}
if !puller.Closed {
t.Error("Stop did not close the puller")
}
}
func TestDetectCapacity_Positive(t *testing.T) {
c := detectCapacity()
if c.CPU <= 0 {
t.Errorf("CPU = %d, want > 0", c.CPU)
}
// MemoryMiB may be 0 on platforms without /proc/meminfo; just assert non-negative.
if c.MemoryMiB < 0 {
t.Errorf("MemoryMiB = %d, want >= 0", c.MemoryMiB)
}
}
+119
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
package main
import (
"bufio"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
const (
defaultEnvFile = "/etc/spinifex-ecs/agent.env"
defaultGatewayCA = "/etc/spinifex-ecs/gateway-ca.pem"
defaultIMDSBase = "http://169.254.169.254/latest"
defaultContainerdSocket = "/run/containerd/containerd.sock"
defaultHeartbeat = 30 * time.Second
defaultPollInterval = 5 * time.Second
)
// config holds the static settings the agent reads at boot. Cluster identity
// (account ID, instance ID) is discovered at runtime from IMDS, not configured;
// only the cluster *name* the instance was launched into is static. AccessKey /
// SecretKey are legacy seeded creds, optional now that the agent SigV4-signs
// gateway calls with instance-role credentials from IMDS; the agent never holds
// a NATS token.
type config struct {
GatewayURL string
GatewayCA string
Region string
ClusterName string
AccessKey string
SecretKey string
IMDSBase string
ContainerdSocket string
Heartbeat time.Duration
PollInterval time.Duration
CredEndpointIP string
CredEndpointPort int
}
// loadConfig reads the cloud-init env file then lets real env vars override.
func loadConfig(envFile string) config {
env := parseEnvFile(envFile)
get := func(key string) string {
if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
return v
}
return env[key]
}
cfg := config{
GatewayURL: get("ECS_GATEWAY_URL"),
GatewayCA: get("ECS_GATEWAY_CA"),
Region: get("ECS_REGION"),
ClusterName: get("ECS_CLUSTER"),
AccessKey: get("ECS_ACCESS_KEY"),
SecretKey: get("ECS_SECRET_KEY"),
IMDSBase: get("ECS_IMDS_BASE"),
ContainerdSocket: get("ECS_CONTAINERD_SOCKET"),
}
if cfg.GatewayCA == "" {
cfg.GatewayCA = defaultGatewayCA
}
if cfg.IMDSBase == "" {
cfg.IMDSBase = defaultIMDSBase
}
if cfg.ContainerdSocket == "" {
cfg.ContainerdSocket = defaultContainerdSocket
}
if cfg.ClusterName == "" {
cfg.ClusterName = "default"
}
cfg.Heartbeat = defaultHeartbeat
if v := get("ECS_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL"); v != "" {
if d, err := time.ParseDuration(v); err == nil && d > 0 {
cfg.Heartbeat = d
}
}
cfg.PollInterval = defaultPollInterval
if v := get("ECS_POLL_INTERVAL"); v != "" {
if d, err := time.ParseDuration(v); err == nil && d > 0 {
cfg.PollInterval = d
}
}
cfg.CredEndpointIP = get("ECS_CRED_ENDPOINT_IP")
if cfg.CredEndpointIP == "" {
cfg.CredEndpointIP = defaultCredEndpointIP
}
cfg.CredEndpointPort = defaultCredEndpointPort
if v := get("ECS_CRED_ENDPOINT_PORT"); v != "" {
if p, err := strconv.Atoi(v); err == nil && p > 0 {
cfg.CredEndpointPort = p
}
}
return cfg
}
// parseEnvFile reads a simple KEY=value file; missing files yield an empty map.
func parseEnvFile(path string) map[string]string {
out := map[string]string{}
f, err := os.Open(path)
if err != nil {
return out
}
defer f.Close()
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(f)
for scanner.Scan() {
line := strings.TrimSpace(scanner.Text())
if line == "" || strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") {
continue
}
key, val, ok := strings.Cut(line, "=")
if !ok {
continue
}
out[strings.TrimSpace(key)] = strings.TrimSpace(val)
}
return out
}
+88
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
package main
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestLoadConfig_Defaults(t *testing.T) {
// Ensure env vars don't leak in from the host.
for _, k := range []string{"ECS_GATEWAY_URL", "ECS_GATEWAY_CA", "ECS_REGION",
"ECS_CLUSTER", "ECS_ACCESS_KEY", "ECS_SECRET_KEY", "ECS_IMDS_BASE",
"ECS_CONTAINERD_SOCKET", "ECS_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL", "ECS_POLL_INTERVAL"} {
t.Setenv(k, "")
}
cfg := loadConfig(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent.env"))
if cfg.GatewayCA != defaultGatewayCA {
t.Errorf("GatewayCA = %q, want default", cfg.GatewayCA)
}
if cfg.IMDSBase != defaultIMDSBase {
t.Errorf("IMDSBase = %q, want default", cfg.IMDSBase)
}
if cfg.ContainerdSocket != defaultContainerdSocket {
t.Errorf("ContainerdSocket = %q, want default", cfg.ContainerdSocket)
}
if cfg.ClusterName != "default" {
t.Errorf("ClusterName = %q, want default", cfg.ClusterName)
}
if cfg.Heartbeat != defaultHeartbeat {
t.Errorf("Heartbeat = %v, want %v", cfg.Heartbeat, defaultHeartbeat)
}
if cfg.PollInterval != defaultPollInterval {
t.Errorf("PollInterval = %v, want %v", cfg.PollInterval, defaultPollInterval)
}
}
func TestLoadConfig_FileThenEnvOverride(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
envFile := filepath.Join(dir, "agent.env")
body := "# comment\nECS_GATEWAY_URL=https://gw.file\nECS_REGION=us-west-2\nECS_CLUSTER=prod\n"
if err := os.WriteFile(envFile, []byte(body), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Setenv("ECS_GATEWAY_URL", "https://gw.env")
t.Setenv("ECS_ACCESS_KEY", "AKIAENV")
cfg := loadConfig(envFile)
if cfg.GatewayURL != "https://gw.env" {
t.Errorf("GatewayURL = %q, want env override", cfg.GatewayURL)
}
if cfg.Region != "us-west-2" {
t.Errorf("Region = %q, want from file", cfg.Region)
}
if cfg.ClusterName != "prod" {
t.Errorf("ClusterName = %q, want from file", cfg.ClusterName)
}
if cfg.AccessKey != "AKIAENV" {
t.Errorf("AccessKey = %q, want env", cfg.AccessKey)
}
}
func TestLoadConfig_HeartbeatOverride(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("ECS_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL", "5s")
if cfg := loadConfig(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent.env")); cfg.Heartbeat != 5*time.Second {
t.Errorf("Heartbeat = %v, want 5s", cfg.Heartbeat)
}
// Garbage value falls back to the default, not zero.
t.Setenv("ECS_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL", "not-a-duration")
if cfg := loadConfig(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent.env")); cfg.Heartbeat != defaultHeartbeat {
t.Errorf("Heartbeat = %v, want default on bad value", cfg.Heartbeat)
}
}
func TestParseEnvFile_SkipsBlankAndComments(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
p := filepath.Join(dir, "f.env")
if err := os.WriteFile(p, []byte("\n# c\nA=1\nnokeyval\nB = 2 \n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
m := parseEnvFile(p)
if m["A"] != "1" || m["B"] != "2" {
t.Errorf("parse mismatch: %#v", m)
}
if _, ok := m["nokeyval"]; ok {
t.Errorf("line without = should be skipped")
}
}
+129
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
package main
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/aws"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/service/ecs"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/cmd/ecs-agent/credentials"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/ecsgw"
handlers_ecs "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/handlers/ecs"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/handlers/ecs/bus"
)
// controlPlane is the agent's channel to the AWS gateway. It replaces the direct
// NATS publisher: every method is a SigV4-signed gateway request, so the NATS bus
// stays host-internal. Tests inject a fake; production uses gatewayControlPlane.
type controlPlane interface {
// Register (re-)registers the container instance. Called at boot and on every
// heartbeat tick — the gateway's RegisterContainerInstance is idempotent and
// refreshes LastSeen, folding liveness into registration (no bus.Heartbeat).
Register(id identity) error
// SubmitTaskState reports a task's RUNNING/STOPPED transition.
SubmitTaskState(st bus.TaskState) error
// PollAssignments drains this instance's assignment inbox, acking the taskIDs
// accepted on the previous poll. Returns the still-pending assignments.
PollAssignments(cluster, instance string, ack []string) ([]bus.Assign, error)
}
// gatewayControlPlane implements controlPlane over the SigV4 ECS gateway client.
type gatewayControlPlane struct {
client *ecsgw.Client
}
var _ controlPlane = (*gatewayControlPlane)(nil)
// pollTimeout bounds a single PollAssignments request; larger than the register
// timeout to leave room for a future server-side long-poll.
const pollTimeout = 30 * time.Second
// newGatewayControlPlane builds the SigV4 client signing with the instance-role
// credentials from IMDS (fetched per call so rotation is transparent) + pinned CA.
func newGatewayControlPlane(cfg config, creds credentials.CredentialsProvider) (*gatewayControlPlane, error) {
client, err := ecsgw.New(cfg.GatewayURL, cfg.GatewayCA, credentialsFunc(creds), cfg.Region, pollTimeout)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &gatewayControlPlane{client: client}, nil
}
// credentialsFunc adapts the agent's IMDS CredentialsProvider to the ecsgw
// per-call credentials hook.
func credentialsFunc(p credentials.CredentialsProvider) ecsgw.CredentialsFunc {
return func(ctx context.Context) (string, string, string, error) {
c, err := p.Retrieve(ctx)
if err != nil {
return "", "", "", err
}
return c.AccessKeyID, c.SecretAccessKey, c.SessionToken, nil
}
}
func (g *gatewayControlPlane) Register(id identity) error {
in := &ecs.RegisterContainerInstanceInput{
Cluster: aws.String(id.ClusterName),
InstanceIdentityDocument: aws.String(id.InstanceID),
TotalResources: []*ecs.Resource{
{Name: aws.String("CPU"), Type: aws.String("INTEGER"), IntegerValue: aws.Int64(int64(id.Capacity.CPU))},
{Name: aws.String("MEMORY"), Type: aws.String("INTEGER"), IntegerValue: aws.Int64(int64(id.Capacity.MemoryMiB))},
},
VersionInfo: &ecs.VersionInfo{AgentVersion: aws.String(id.AgentVersion)},
}
body, err := json.Marshal(in)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("marshal register: %w", err)
}
if _, err := g.client.Call("RegisterContainerInstance", body); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("register: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
func (g *gatewayControlPlane) SubmitTaskState(st bus.TaskState) error {
in := &ecs.SubmitTaskStateChangeInput{
Cluster: aws.String(st.ClusterName),
Task: aws.String(st.TaskID),
Status: aws.String(st.LastStatus),
Reason: aws.String(st.Reason),
}
for _, c := range st.Containers {
csc := &ecs.ContainerStateChange{
ContainerName: aws.String(c.Name),
Status: aws.String(c.Status),
RuntimeId: aws.String(c.ContainerID),
}
if c.ExitCode != nil {
csc.ExitCode = aws.Int64(int64(*c.ExitCode))
}
in.Containers = append(in.Containers, csc)
}
body, err := json.Marshal(in)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("marshal task-state: %w", err)
}
if _, err := g.client.Call("SubmitTaskStateChange", body); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("submit task-state: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
func (g *gatewayControlPlane) PollAssignments(cluster, instance string, ack []string) ([]bus.Assign, error) {
in := &handlers_ecs.PollAssignmentsInput{Cluster: cluster, ContainerInstance: instance, AckTaskIDs: ack}
body, err := json.Marshal(in)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal poll: %w", err)
}
resp, err := g.client.Call("PollAssignments", body)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("poll: %w", err)
}
var out handlers_ecs.PollAssignmentsOutput
if err := json.Unmarshal(resp, &out); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode poll: %w", err)
}
return out.Assignments, nil
}
+361
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
package main
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/cmd/ecs-agent/credentials"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/ecrauth"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/stsauth"
)
const (
// defaultCredEndpointIP is the AWS-reserved link-local address tasks reach for
// container credentials; defaultCredEndpointPort is the standard HTTP port.
defaultCredEndpointIP = "169.254.170.2"
defaultCredEndpointPort = 80
// defaultCredProxyPort is the high port the listener actually binds; a nat
// DNAT rule rewrites 169.254.170.2:80 to it so nothing holds a socket on :80
// and host/bridge tasks sharing the netns can bind :80 themselves.
defaultCredProxyPort = 51679
// credRefreshMargin refreshes a cached credential set this long before expiry
// so a container never starts a request with a token about to lapse.
credRefreshMargin = 5 * time.Minute
// credDummyIface is the dummy interface the endpoint IP is added to in the host
// netns so the agent can bind it.
credDummyIface = "ecs-cred"
)
// credResponse is the ECS task-credentials JSON the container's AWS SDK expects
// at AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI.
type credResponse struct {
RoleArn string `json:"RoleArn"`
AccessKeyID string `json:"AccessKeyId"`
SecretAccessKey string `json:"SecretAccessKey"`
Token string `json:"Token"`
Expiration string `json:"Expiration"`
}
// credEntry caches one task's assumed-role credentials alongside the role it was
// assumed from.
type credEntry struct {
roleARN string
creds stsauth.Credentials
}
// credEndpoint is the host-netns HTTP server that hands a task its IAM role
// credentials. It maps credID -> taskRoleARN (registered as tasks start) and
// mints/caches credentials on demand by assuming the role over the gateway with
// the agent's instance credentials.
type credEndpoint struct {
provider credentials.CredentialsProvider
region string
gatewayURL string
caPath string
ip string
port int
proxyPort int
run netCmdRunner
// assume mints fresh credentials for a role; defaults to AssumeRole over the
// gateway and is overridable in tests.
assume func(ctx context.Context, roleARN, sessionName string) (stsauth.Credentials, error)
mu sync.Mutex
roles map[string]string // credID -> taskRoleARN
cache map[string]credEntry // credID -> cached creds
httpClient *http.Client
srv *http.Server
ln net.Listener
}
// newCredEndpoint builds the endpoint. An empty ip/port falls back to the
// AWS-reserved 169.254.170.2:80; tests pass loopback + an ephemeral port. run
// adds the link-local address to the dummy interface (real or fake).
func newCredEndpoint(provider credentials.CredentialsProvider, region, gatewayURL, caPath, ip string, port int, run netCmdRunner) *credEndpoint {
if ip == "" {
ip = defaultCredEndpointIP
}
if port == 0 {
port = defaultCredEndpointPort
}
c := &credEndpoint{
provider: provider,
region: region,
gatewayURL: gatewayURL,
caPath: caPath,
ip: ip,
port: port,
proxyPort: defaultCredProxyPort,
run: run,
roles: map[string]string{},
cache: map[string]credEntry{},
}
c.assume = c.assumeOverGateway
return c
}
// Register associates a credID with the task role it serves; Deregister removes
// it and drops any cached credentials. Both are no-ops for an empty credID.
func (c *credEndpoint) Register(credID, roleARN string) {
if credID == "" || roleARN == "" {
return
}
c.mu.Lock()
c.roles[credID] = roleARN
c.mu.Unlock()
}
func (c *credEndpoint) Deregister(credID string) {
if credID == "" {
return
}
c.mu.Lock()
delete(c.roles, credID)
delete(c.cache, credID)
c.mu.Unlock()
}
// relativeURI is the value injected into a container's
// AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI for the given credID.
func credRelativeURI(credID string) string { return "/v2/credentials/" + credID }
// ServeHTTP serves GET /v2/credentials/{credID}. Unknown paths/credIDs return
// 404; non-GET returns 405; an AssumeRole failure returns 502.
func (c *credEndpoint) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
credID, ok := strings.CutPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/v2/credentials/")
if !ok || credID == "" || strings.Contains(credID, "/") {
http.Error(w, "not found", http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
creds, roleARN, err := c.fetch(r.Context(), credID)
if err != nil {
if err == errUnknownCredID {
http.Error(w, "not found", http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
slog.Error("ecs-agent: assume task role failed", "credId", credID, "err", err)
http.Error(w, "credentials unavailable", http.StatusBadGateway)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(credResponse{
RoleArn: roleARN,
AccessKeyID: creds.AccessKeyID,
SecretAccessKey: creds.SecretAccessKey,
Token: creds.SessionToken,
Expiration: creds.Expiration.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
}); err != nil {
slog.Warn("ecs-agent: encode credential response", "credId", credID, "err", err)
}
}
// errUnknownCredID signals a credID with no registered task role.
var errUnknownCredID = fmt.Errorf("unknown credId")
// fetch returns valid credentials for credID, reusing the cache until within the
// refresh margin and otherwise assuming the task role over the gateway.
func (c *credEndpoint) fetch(ctx context.Context, credID string) (stsauth.Credentials, string, error) {
c.mu.Lock()
roleARN, known := c.roles[credID]
if !known {
c.mu.Unlock()
return stsauth.Credentials{}, "", errUnknownCredID
}
if e, ok := c.cache[credID]; ok && e.roleARN == roleARN && credValid(e.creds, credRefreshMargin) {
c.mu.Unlock()
return e.creds, roleARN, nil
}
c.mu.Unlock()
creds, err := c.assume(ctx, roleARN, sessionName(credID))
if err != nil {
return stsauth.Credentials{}, "", err
}
c.mu.Lock()
c.cache[credID] = credEntry{roleARN: roleARN, creds: creds}
c.mu.Unlock()
return creds, roleARN, nil
}
// assumeOverGateway mints credentials for roleARN by SigV4-signing AssumeRole
// against the gateway with the agent's instance credentials.
func (c *credEndpoint) assumeOverGateway(ctx context.Context, roleARN, sessionName string) (stsauth.Credentials, error) {
instCreds, err := c.provider.Retrieve(ctx)
if err != nil {
return stsauth.Credentials{}, fmt.Errorf("instance credentials: %w", err)
}
client, err := c.client()
if err != nil {
return stsauth.Credentials{}, err
}
return stsauth.AssumeRole(c.region, c.gatewayURL, client,
instCreds.AccessKeyID, instCreds.SecretAccessKey, instCreds.SessionToken,
roleARN, sessionName)
}
// client builds the pinned-CA gateway HTTP client on first use and caches it.
func (c *credEndpoint) client() (*http.Client, error) {
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
if c.httpClient != nil {
return c.httpClient, nil
}
hc, err := ecrauth.GatewayHTTPClient(c.caPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
c.httpClient = hc
return hc, nil
}
// Start adds the endpoint IP to a dummy interface in the host netns, serves HTTP
// on the high proxy port, and DNATs the advertised :80 to it. A bind, address,
// or nat failure is returned so the caller can log it without aborting
// register/heartbeat.
func (c *credEndpoint) Start() error {
if err := c.addEndpointAddr(); err != nil {
return err
}
ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", net.JoinHostPort(c.ip, strconv.Itoa(c.listenPort())))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("listen %s:%d: %w", c.ip, c.listenPort(), err)
}
if err := c.addRedirect(); err != nil {
_ = ln.Close()
return err
}
c.ln = ln
c.srv = &http.Server{Handler: c, ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second}
go func() {
if err := c.srv.Serve(ln); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
slog.Error("ecs-agent: credential endpoint serve", "err", err)
}
}()
slog.Info("ecs-agent: credential endpoint listening", "addr", ln.Addr().String())
return nil
}
// Stop shuts the server down and removes the dummy interface. Safe on a nil/
// never-started endpoint.
func (c *credEndpoint) Stop() error {
if c == nil {
return nil
}
if c.srv != nil {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_ = c.srv.Shutdown(ctx)
}
c.delRedirect()
c.delEndpointAddr()
return nil
}
// listenPort is the port the socket binds. Loopback test mode binds the
// caller-supplied (ephemeral) port directly; the real endpoint binds the high
// proxy port and reaches :80 via the DNAT rules.
func (c *credEndpoint) listenPort() int {
if c.ip == "127.0.0.1" {
return c.port
}
return c.proxyPort
}
// addRedirect installs nat DNAT rules rewriting the advertised :80 to the proxy
// port, for both locally generated traffic (host/bridge task containers, OUTPUT)
// and traffic arriving over the awsvpc credential veth (PREROUTING). The dst IP
// is left on the endpoint IP so no route_localnet handling is needed. Skipped in
// loopback test mode, which binds the port directly.
func (c *credEndpoint) addRedirect() error {
if c.run == nil || c.ip == "127.0.0.1" {
return nil
}
for _, chain := range []string{"OUTPUT", "PREROUTING"} {
if _, err := c.run.Run("iptables", c.natArgs("-C", chain)...); err == nil {
continue // rule already present
}
if _, err := c.run.Run("iptables", c.natArgs("-A", chain)...); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("add nat redirect %s: %w", chain, err)
}
}
return nil
}
func (c *credEndpoint) delRedirect() {
if c.run == nil || c.ip == "127.0.0.1" {
return
}
for _, chain := range []string{"OUTPUT", "PREROUTING"} {
_, _ = c.run.Run("iptables", c.natArgs("-D", chain)...)
}
}
// natArgs builds the iptables nat rule for op (-A/-C/-D) on chain: DNAT the
// advertised endpoint :80 to the proxy port on the same IP.
func (c *credEndpoint) natArgs(op, chain string) []string {
return []string{
"-t", "nat", op, chain,
"-d", c.ip, "-p", "tcp", "--dport", strconv.Itoa(c.port),
"-j", "DNAT", "--to-destination", net.JoinHostPort(c.ip, strconv.Itoa(c.proxyPort)),
}
}
// addEndpointAddr brings up the dummy interface holding the endpoint IP. Skipped
// for loopback (tests bind 127.0.0.1 directly, no interface plumbing needed).
func (c *credEndpoint) addEndpointAddr() error {
if c.run == nil || c.ip == "127.0.0.1" {
return nil
}
_, _ = c.run.Run("ip", "link", "add", credDummyIface, "type", "dummy")
if _, err := c.run.Run("ip", "addr", "add", c.ip+"/32", "dev", credDummyIface); err != nil &&
!strings.Contains(err.Error(), "exists") {
return fmt.Errorf("add endpoint addr %s: %w", c.ip, err)
}
if _, err := c.run.Run("ip", "link", "set", credDummyIface, "up"); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("bring up %s: %w", credDummyIface, err)
}
return nil
}
func (c *credEndpoint) delEndpointAddr() {
if c.run == nil || c.ip == "127.0.0.1" {
return
}
_, _ = c.run.Run("ip", "link", "del", credDummyIface)
}
// credValid reports whether creds are usable now with margin to spare.
func credValid(c stsauth.Credentials, margin time.Duration) bool {
if c.AccessKeyID == "" || c.SecretAccessKey == "" {
return false
}
if c.Expiration.IsZero() {
return true
}
return time.Now().Add(margin).Before(c.Expiration)
}
// sessionName derives an AssumeRole RoleSessionName from credID, satisfying the
// STS [\w+=,.@-]{2,64} constraint.
func sessionName(credID string) string {
name := "ecs-" + credID
if len(name) > 64 {
name = name[:64]
}
return name
}
+197
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
package main
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/stsauth"
)
// newTestCredEndpoint builds an endpoint whose assume seam returns canned creds,
// counting calls so cache behaviour is observable. run is nil (no iface plumbing).
func newTestCredEndpoint(creds stsauth.Credentials) (*credEndpoint, *int32) {
c := newCredEndpoint(nil, "us-east-1", "https://gw", "", "127.0.0.1", 0, nil)
var calls int32
c.assume = func(ctx context.Context, roleARN, sessionName string) (stsauth.Credentials, error) {
atomic.AddInt32(&calls, 1)
return creds, nil
}
return c, &calls
}
func TestCredEndpoint_ServesRegisteredCredID(t *testing.T) {
exp := time.Now().Add(time.Hour).UTC().Truncate(time.Second)
c, _ := newTestCredEndpoint(stsauth.Credentials{
AccessKeyID: "AKIA", SecretAccessKey: "secret", SessionToken: "tok", Expiration: exp,
})
c.Register("cred-1", "arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/task")
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
c.ServeHTTP(rr, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/v2/credentials/cred-1", nil))
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200; body=%s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
}
var got credResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(rr.Body.Bytes(), &got); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
}
if got.AccessKeyID != "AKIA" || got.SecretAccessKey != "secret" || got.Token != "tok" {
t.Errorf("bad creds in response: %+v", got)
}
if got.RoleArn != "arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/task" {
t.Errorf("RoleArn = %q", got.RoleArn)
}
if got.Expiration != exp.Format(time.RFC3339) {
t.Errorf("Expiration = %q, want %q", got.Expiration, exp.Format(time.RFC3339))
}
}
func TestCredEndpoint_UnknownCredIDIs404(t *testing.T) {
c, calls := newTestCredEndpoint(stsauth.Credentials{AccessKeyID: "x", SecretAccessKey: "y"})
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
c.ServeHTTP(rr, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/v2/credentials/nope", nil))
if rr.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 404", rr.Code)
}
if *calls != 0 {
t.Errorf("assume called %d times for unknown credID, want 0", *calls)
}
}
func TestCredEndpoint_WrongMethodIs405(t *testing.T) {
c, _ := newTestCredEndpoint(stsauth.Credentials{AccessKeyID: "x", SecretAccessKey: "y"})
c.Register("cred-1", "arn:role")
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
c.ServeHTTP(rr, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/v2/credentials/cred-1", nil))
if rr.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 405", rr.Code)
}
}
func TestCredEndpoint_CachesUntilExpiry(t *testing.T) {
c, calls := newTestCredEndpoint(stsauth.Credentials{
AccessKeyID: "AKIA", SecretAccessKey: "secret", Expiration: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
})
c.Register("cred-1", "arn:role")
for hit := range 3 {
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
c.ServeHTTP(rr, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/v2/credentials/cred-1", nil))
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("hit %d: status %d", hit, rr.Code)
}
}
if *calls != 1 {
t.Errorf("assume called %d times, want 1 (cached)", *calls)
}
}
func TestCredEndpoint_RefreshesNearExpiry(t *testing.T) {
// Expiry inside the refresh margin -> every hit re-assumes.
c, calls := newTestCredEndpoint(stsauth.Credentials{
AccessKeyID: "AKIA", SecretAccessKey: "secret", Expiration: time.Now().Add(time.Minute),
})
c.Register("cred-1", "arn:role")
for range 2 {
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
c.ServeHTTP(rr, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/v2/credentials/cred-1", nil))
}
if *calls != 2 {
t.Errorf("assume called %d times, want 2 (expiry within margin)", *calls)
}
}
func TestCredEndpoint_DeregisterDropsCredID(t *testing.T) {
c, _ := newTestCredEndpoint(stsauth.Credentials{AccessKeyID: "x", SecretAccessKey: "y"})
c.Register("cred-1", "arn:role")
c.Deregister("cred-1")
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
c.ServeHTTP(rr, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/v2/credentials/cred-1", nil))
if rr.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 404 after deregister", rr.Code)
}
}
func TestCredEndpoint_AssumeFailureIs502(t *testing.T) {
c, _ := newTestCredEndpoint(stsauth.Credentials{})
c.assume = func(ctx context.Context, roleARN, sessionName string) (stsauth.Credentials, error) {
return stsauth.Credentials{}, context.DeadlineExceeded
}
c.Register("cred-1", "arn:role")
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
c.ServeHTTP(rr, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/v2/credentials/cred-1", nil))
if rr.Code != http.StatusBadGateway {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 502", rr.Code)
}
}
func TestCredEndpoint_StartServesOverLoopback(t *testing.T) {
c, _ := newTestCredEndpoint(stsauth.Credentials{
AccessKeyID: "AKIA", SecretAccessKey: "secret", Expiration: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
})
c.Register("cred-1", "arn:role")
c.port = 0 // bind an ephemeral port instead of privileged 80
if err := c.Start(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
}
defer c.Stop()
url := "http://" + c.ln.Addr().String() + credRelativeURI("cred-1")
resp, err := http.Get(url)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200", resp.StatusCode)
}
}
func TestCredEndpoint_RedirectInstallsAndRemovesDNAT(t *testing.T) {
// failOn the -C existence check so addRedirect falls through to -A.
f := &fakeNetRunner{failOn: "-t nat -C"}
c := newCredEndpoint(nil, "us-east-1", "https://gw", "", "169.254.170.2", 80, f)
if c.listenPort() != defaultCredProxyPort {
t.Fatalf("listenPort = %d, want %d (proxy)", c.listenPort(), defaultCredProxyPort)
}
if err := c.addRedirect(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("addRedirect: %v", err)
}
target := "-d 169.254.170.2 -p tcp --dport 80 -j DNAT --to-destination 169.254.170.2:51679"
for _, chain := range []string{"-A OUTPUT", "-A PREROUTING"} {
if !f.sawAny("iptables -t nat " + chain + " " + target) {
t.Errorf("missing add rule for %s; calls=%v", chain, f.joined())
}
}
c.delRedirect()
for _, chain := range []string{"-D OUTPUT", "-D PREROUTING"} {
if !f.sawAny("iptables -t nat " + chain + " " + target) {
t.Errorf("missing delete rule for %s; calls=%v", chain, f.joined())
}
}
}
func TestCredEndpoint_RedirectSkippedOnLoopback(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeNetRunner{}
c := newCredEndpoint(nil, "us-east-1", "https://gw", "", "127.0.0.1", 0, f)
if err := c.addRedirect(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("addRedirect: %v", err)
}
c.delRedirect()
if f.sawAny("iptables") {
t.Errorf("loopback mode must not touch iptables; calls=%v", f.joined())
}
if c.listenPort() != c.port {
t.Errorf("loopback listenPort = %d, want caller port %d", c.listenPort(), c.port)
}
}
func TestCredRelativeURI(t *testing.T) {
if got := credRelativeURI("abc"); got != "/v2/credentials/abc" {
t.Errorf("credRelativeURI = %q", got)
}
}
+59
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
package credentials
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/imdscreds"
)
// refreshMargin is how long before expiry the cache is considered stale.
const refreshMargin = 5 * time.Minute
// IMDSProvider fetches instance-role credentials from IMDS and caches them until
// they near expiry. Safe for concurrent use.
type IMDSProvider struct {
client *http.Client
base string
mu sync.Mutex
cached Credentials
}
var _ CredentialsProvider = (*IMDSProvider)(nil)
// NewIMDSProvider builds a provider against the given IMDS base URL (e.g.
// "http://169.254.169.254/latest"). A nil client uses http.DefaultClient.
func NewIMDSProvider(client *http.Client, base string) *IMDSProvider {
if client == nil {
client = http.DefaultClient
}
return &IMDSProvider{client: client, base: base}
}
// Retrieve returns cached credentials when still valid, else fetches fresh ones.
func (p *IMDSProvider) Retrieve(ctx context.Context) (Credentials, error) {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
if p.cached.Valid(refreshMargin) {
return p.cached, nil
}
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
return Credentials{}, err
}
raw, err := imdscreds.Fetch(p.client, p.base)
if err != nil {
return Credentials{}, err
}
p.cached = Credentials{
AccessKeyID: raw.AccessKeyID,
SecretAccessKey: raw.SecretAccessKey,
SessionToken: raw.SessionToken,
Expiration: raw.Expiration,
}
return p.cached, nil
}
+104
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
package credentials
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
)
func imdsStub(t *testing.T, hits *int32, creds map[string]string) *httptest.Server {
t.Helper()
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("/api/token", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("v2-token"))
})
mux.HandleFunc("/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == "/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" {
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("node-role"))
return
}
if hits != nil {
atomic.AddInt32(hits, 1)
}
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(creds)
})
srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
return srv
}
func TestRetrieve_FetchesAndCaches(t *testing.T) {
var hits int32
exp := time.Now().Add(6 * time.Hour).UTC().Round(time.Second)
srv := imdsStub(t, &hits, map[string]string{
"AccessKeyId": "AKIA",
"SecretAccessKey": "secret",
"Token": "session",
"Expiration": exp.Format(time.RFC3339),
})
p := NewIMDSProvider(srv.Client(), srv.URL)
got, err := p.Retrieve(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Retrieve: %v", err)
}
if got.AccessKeyID != "AKIA" || !got.Expiration.Equal(exp) {
t.Errorf("creds mismatch: %+v", got)
}
// Second call within validity window must not re-hit IMDS.
if _, err := p.Retrieve(context.Background()); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Retrieve 2: %v", err)
}
if hits != 1 {
t.Errorf("IMDS credential hits = %d, want 1 (cached)", hits)
}
}
func TestRetrieve_RefetchesWhenStale(t *testing.T) {
var hits int32
// Expiry inside the refresh margin → never cached, always refetched.
srv := imdsStub(t, &hits, map[string]string{
"AccessKeyId": "AKIA",
"SecretAccessKey": "secret",
"Expiration": time.Now().Add(time.Minute).UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
})
p := NewIMDSProvider(srv.Client(), srv.URL)
if _, err := p.Retrieve(context.Background()); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := p.Retrieve(context.Background()); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if hits != 2 {
t.Errorf("hits = %d, want 2 (stale refetch)", hits)
}
}
func TestRetrieve_CancelledContext(t *testing.T) {
srv := imdsStub(t, nil, map[string]string{"AccessKeyId": "A", "SecretAccessKey": "B"})
p := NewIMDSProvider(srv.Client(), srv.URL)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
if _, err := p.Retrieve(ctx); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error from cancelled context")
}
}
func TestCredentials_Valid(t *testing.T) {
if (Credentials{}).Valid(0) {
t.Error("empty creds should be invalid")
}
noExp := Credentials{AccessKeyID: "a", SecretAccessKey: "b"}
if !noExp.Valid(time.Hour) {
t.Error("zero expiry should be treated valid")
}
soon := Credentials{AccessKeyID: "a", SecretAccessKey: "b", Expiration: time.Now().Add(time.Minute)}
if soon.Valid(5 * time.Minute) {
t.Error("expiry inside margin should be invalid")
}
}
+36
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
// Package credentials supplies AWS SigV4 credentials to the ecs-agent. The agent
// signs gateway calls (ECR GetAuthorizationToken, instance register/heartbeat)
// with the host's instance-role credentials, fetched from IMDS and cached until
// near expiry.
package credentials
import (
"context"
"time"
)
// Credentials is a SigV4 credential set with an expiry.
type Credentials struct {
AccessKeyID string
SecretAccessKey string
SessionToken string
Expiration time.Time
}
// Valid reports whether the credentials are usable now, leaving a margin so a
// caller does not start a request with a token about to expire mid-flight.
func (c Credentials) Valid(margin time.Duration) bool {
if c.AccessKeyID == "" || c.SecretAccessKey == "" {
return false
}
if c.Expiration.IsZero() {
return true
}
return time.Now().Add(margin).Before(c.Expiration)
}
// CredentialsProvider yields current credentials, refreshing as needed. Retrieve
// must be safe for concurrent use.
type CredentialsProvider interface {
Retrieve(ctx context.Context) (Credentials, error)
}
+55
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
package main
import (
"testing"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/handlers/ecs/bus"
)
func TestTaskCredID(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
as bus.Assign
want string
}{
{"no role", bus.Assign{TaskID: "t1"}, ""},
{"role, no credID -> taskID", bus.Assign{TaskID: "t1", TaskRoleARN: "arn:role"}, "t1"},
{"role + credID", bus.Assign{TaskID: "t1", CredID: "c9", TaskRoleARN: "arn:role"}, "c9"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
if got := taskCredID(&tc.as); got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("%s: taskCredID = %q, want %q", tc.name, got, tc.want)
}
}
}
func TestWithCredEnv(t *testing.T) {
base := map[string]string{"FOO": "bar"}
// No credID -> env returned unchanged (same map).
if got := withCredEnv(base, ""); got["FOO"] != "bar" || got["AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI"] != "" {
t.Errorf("blank credID mutated env: %v", got)
}
got := withCredEnv(base, "cred-1")
if got["AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI"] != "/v2/credentials/cred-1" {
t.Errorf("missing relative-uri: %v", got)
}
if got["FOO"] != "bar" {
t.Errorf("dropped existing env: %v", got)
}
// Original map must be untouched (copy semantics).
if _, ok := base["AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI"]; ok {
t.Errorf("source env mutated: %v", base)
}
}
func TestSessionName(t *testing.T) {
if got := sessionName("abc"); got != "ecs-abc" {
t.Errorf("sessionName = %q", got)
}
long := sessionName(string(make([]byte, 100)))
if len(long) != 64 {
t.Errorf("sessionName not truncated to 64: len=%d", len(long))
}
}
+95
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
package main
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/cmd/ecs-agent/credentials"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/cmd/ecs-agent/runtime"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/ecrauth"
)
// ecrResolver implements runtime.Resolver by minting an ECR authorization token
// per pull: it fetches the host's IMDS credentials, SigV4-signs
// GetAuthorizationToken against the gateway, and returns the AWS:<jwt> as a
// user/password pair for containerd.
//
// The gateway HTTP client is built lazily on first Authorize, not at agent boot:
// a missing or malformed gateway CA only matters when an image is actually
// pulled, so the agent can still register + heartbeat on a host with absent or
// wrong ECR config.
type ecrResolver struct {
creds credentials.CredentialsProvider
region string
gatewayURL string
caPath string
mu sync.Mutex
httpClient *http.Client
}
var _ runtime.Resolver = (*ecrResolver)(nil)
// newECRResolver builds a resolver with an injected HTTP client (tests). The
// client is used as-is and never rebuilt from caPath.
func newECRResolver(creds credentials.CredentialsProvider, region, gatewayURL string, httpClient *http.Client) *ecrResolver {
return &ecrResolver{creds: creds, region: region, gatewayURL: gatewayURL, httpClient: httpClient}
}
// newLazyECRResolver builds a resolver that constructs its gateway HTTP client
// from caPath on first use (production path).
func newLazyECRResolver(creds credentials.CredentialsProvider, region, gatewayURL, caPath string) *ecrResolver {
return &ecrResolver{creds: creds, region: region, gatewayURL: gatewayURL, caPath: caPath}
}
// client returns the gateway HTTP client, building it from caPath on first call
// and caching the result. An injected client (newECRResolver) is returned as-is.
func (e *ecrResolver) client() (*http.Client, error) {
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
if e.httpClient != nil {
return e.httpClient, nil
}
c, err := ecrauth.GatewayHTTPClient(e.caPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
e.httpClient = c
return c, nil
}
// isECRRef reports whether ref targets an ECR registry, i.e. its registry host
// is "<acct>.dkr.ecr.<region>.<domain>". Only ECR pulls need a minted token;
// public registries (docker.io and friends) pull anonymously, so refs without
// an ECR host must not drag in IMDS host credentials.
func isECRRef(ref string) bool {
host, _, _ := strings.Cut(ref, "/")
if !strings.Contains(host, ".") && !strings.Contains(host, ":") {
return false // no registry host -> docker.io default
}
return strings.Contains(host, ".dkr.ecr.")
}
// Authorize returns the ECR token's user/password and proxy endpoint for ref.
// Non-ECR refs resolve to anonymous pull (empty credentials).
func (e *ecrResolver) Authorize(ctx context.Context, ref string) (user, pass, endpoint string, err error) {
if !isECRRef(ref) {
return "", "", "", nil
}
c, err := e.creds.Retrieve(ctx)
if err != nil {
return "", "", "", err
}
httpClient, err := e.client()
if err != nil {
return "", "", "", err
}
tok, err := ecrauth.GetAuthorizationToken(e.region, e.gatewayURL, httpClient,
c.AccessKeyID, c.SecretAccessKey, c.SessionToken)
if err != nil {
return "", "", "", err
}
return tok.Username, tok.Password, tok.ProxyHost, nil
}
+131
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
package main
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/cmd/ecs-agent/credentials"
)
// stubCreds is a credentials.CredentialsProvider returning fixed creds or error.
type stubCreds struct {
c credentials.Credentials
err error
}
func (s stubCreds) Retrieve(context.Context) (credentials.Credentials, error) {
return s.c, s.err
}
func gatewayStub(t *testing.T, token, proxy string, status int) *httptest.Server {
t.Helper()
srv := httptest.NewTLSServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !strings.Contains(r.Header.Get("X-Amz-Target"), "GetAuthorizationToken") {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if status != http.StatusOK {
w.WriteHeader(status)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/x-amz-json-1.1")
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
"authorizationData": []map[string]any{{
"authorizationToken": base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(token)),
"proxyEndpoint": proxy,
}},
})
}))
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
return srv
}
func trusting(srv *httptest.Server) *http.Client {
pool := x509.NewCertPool()
pool.AddCert(srv.Certificate())
return &http.Client{Transport: &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{RootCAs: pool, MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12}}}
}
func TestECRResolver_Authorize(t *testing.T) {
srv := gatewayStub(t, "AWS:jwt", "https://123456789012.dkr.ecr.us-east-1.spinifex.internal", http.StatusOK)
creds := stubCreds{c: credentials.Credentials{
AccessKeyID: "AKIA", SecretAccessKey: "secret", SessionToken: "sess",
Expiration: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
}}
r := newECRResolver(creds, "us-east-1", srv.URL, trusting(srv))
user, pass, endpoint, err := r.Authorize(context.Background(), "123456789012.dkr.ecr.us-east-1.spinifex.internal/app:1")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Authorize: %v", err)
}
if user != "AWS" || pass != "jwt" {
t.Errorf("got %q:%q, want AWS:jwt", user, pass)
}
if endpoint != "123456789012.dkr.ecr.us-east-1.spinifex.internal" {
t.Errorf("endpoint = %q", endpoint)
}
}
func TestECRResolver_CredsError(t *testing.T) {
r := newECRResolver(stubCreds{err: errors.New("no imds")}, "us-east-1", "https://x", http.DefaultClient)
if _, _, _, err := r.Authorize(context.Background(), "123456789012.dkr.ecr.us-east-1.spinifex.internal/app:1"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected creds error to propagate")
}
}
func TestECRResolver_GatewayError(t *testing.T) {
srv := gatewayStub(t, "", "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
creds := stubCreds{c: credentials.Credentials{AccessKeyID: "A", SecretAccessKey: "B"}}
r := newECRResolver(creds, "us-east-1", srv.URL, trusting(srv))
if _, _, _, err := r.Authorize(context.Background(), "123456789012.dkr.ecr.us-east-1.spinifex.internal/app:1"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected gateway error")
}
}
func TestECRResolver_LazyClient_BadCADeferredToAuthorize(t *testing.T) {
creds := stubCreds{c: credentials.Credentials{AccessKeyID: "A", SecretAccessKey: "B"}}
// Construction with a bogus CA path must not fail — only Authorize does.
r := newLazyECRResolver(creds, "us-east-1", "https://gw", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent.pem"))
if _, _, _, err := r.Authorize(context.Background(), "123456789012.dkr.ecr.us-east-1.spinifex.internal/app:1"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected lazy gateway-client build to fail on missing CA")
}
}
// TestECRResolver_NonECRAnonymous asserts that a public-registry ref pulls
// anonymously: Authorize returns empty creds without ever touching IMDS, even
// when the credentials provider would error.
func TestECRResolver_NonECRAnonymous(t *testing.T) {
r := newECRResolver(stubCreds{err: errors.New("imds must not be called")}, "us-east-1", "https://x", http.DefaultClient)
for _, ref := range []string{"nginx:alpine", "docker.io/library/nginx:alpine", "ghcr.io/org/app:1"} {
user, pass, endpoint, err := r.Authorize(context.Background(), ref)
if err != nil || user != "" || pass != "" || endpoint != "" {
t.Errorf("ref %q: got (%q,%q,%q,%v), want anonymous", ref, user, pass, endpoint, err)
}
}
}
func TestIsECRRef(t *testing.T) {
cases := map[string]bool{
"nginx:alpine": false,
"docker.io/library/nginx": false,
"ghcr.io/org/app:1": false,
"registry:5000/app:1": false,
"123456789012.dkr.ecr.us-east-1.spinifex.internal/app:1": true,
"123456789012.dkr.ecr.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/x": true,
}
for ref, want := range cases {
if got := isECRRef(ref); got != want {
t.Errorf("isECRRef(%q) = %v, want %v", ref, got, want)
}
}
}
+46
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
package main
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"time"
)
// heartbeater keeps the container instance alive by periodically re-registering
// it through the gateway. Real ECS folds liveness into ACS; v1 folds it into an
// idempotent RegisterContainerInstance, which refreshes the instance's LastSeen
// so the scheduler can tell live instances from dead ones (no bus.Heartbeat).
type heartbeater struct {
cp controlPlane
id identity
interval time.Duration
}
func newHeartbeater(cp controlPlane, id identity, interval time.Duration) *heartbeater {
if interval <= 0 {
interval = defaultHeartbeat
}
return &heartbeater{cp: cp, id: id, interval: interval}
}
// beat re-registers the instance once, refreshing its LastSeen.
func (h *heartbeater) beat() error {
return h.cp.Register(h.id)
}
// Run beats every interval until ctx is cancelled. A failed beat is logged and
// retried on the next tick rather than killing the loop.
func (h *heartbeater) Run(ctx context.Context) {
ticker := time.NewTicker(h.interval)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-ticker.C:
if err := h.beat(); err != nil {
slog.Warn("ecs-agent: heartbeat (re-register) failed", "err", err)
}
}
}
}
+39
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
// ecs-agent runs inside a Spinifex ECS container instance (a guest VM booted from
// the ECS-AMI, with containerd baked in). It registers the host with the ECS
// scheduler through the AWS gateway over TLS+SigV4 (never NATS), heartbeats by
// re-registering, polls the gateway for task assignments, runs them through
// containerd, and reports state back over the gateway.
//
// Static config (gateway URL, CA, region, cluster, seeded IAM creds, containerd
// socket) is read from the cloud-init env file /etc/spinifex-ecs/agent.env
// (KEY=value); real env vars override it. Host identity (account, instance, AZ)
// comes from IMDS at boot.
package main
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"os"
"os/signal"
"syscall"
_ "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/fipsboot"
)
func main() {
cfg := loadConfig(defaultEnvFile)
agent, err := New(cfg)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("ecs-agent: startup failed", "err", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
defer stop()
if err := agent.Run(ctx); err != nil {
slog.Error("ecs-agent: run failed", "err", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
+97
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
package main
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
)
// instanceMetadata is the IMDS-derived identity of the host the agent runs on.
type instanceMetadata struct {
AccountID string
InstanceID string
AZ string
}
// fetchInstanceMetadata reads the instance-id, AZ and account-id from IMDSv2.
// base is the IMDS root, e.g. "http://169.254.169.254/latest".
func fetchInstanceMetadata(client *http.Client, base string) (instanceMetadata, error) {
token, err := imdsToken(client, base)
if err != nil {
return instanceMetadata{}, err
}
instanceID, err := imdsGet(client, base+"/meta-data/instance-id", token)
if err != nil {
return instanceMetadata{}, fmt.Errorf("instance-id: %w", err)
}
az, err := imdsGet(client, base+"/meta-data/placement/availability-zone", token)
if err != nil {
return instanceMetadata{}, fmt.Errorf("availability-zone: %w", err)
}
doc, err := imdsGet(client, base+"/dynamic/instance-identity/document", token)
if err != nil {
return instanceMetadata{}, fmt.Errorf("identity document: %w", err)
}
var ident struct {
AccountID string `json:"accountId"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(doc), &ident); err != nil {
return instanceMetadata{}, fmt.Errorf("parse identity document: %w", err)
}
return instanceMetadata{
AccountID: ident.AccountID,
InstanceID: strings.TrimSpace(instanceID),
AZ: strings.TrimSpace(az),
}, nil
}
// imdsToken fetches an IMDSv2 session token.
func imdsToken(client *http.Client, base string) (string, error) {
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, base+"/api/token", nil)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
req.Header.Set("X-Aws-Ec2-Metadata-Token-Ttl-Seconds", "21600")
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("imds token: %w", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return "", fmt.Errorf("imds token: status %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
return string(body), nil
}
// imdsGet performs a token-authenticated IMDS GET.
func imdsGet(client *http.Client, url, token string) (string, error) {
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, url, nil)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if token != "" {
req.Header.Set("X-Aws-Ec2-Metadata-Token", token)
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return "", fmt.Errorf("status %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
return string(body), nil
}
+76
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
package main
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
)
func metadataStub(t *testing.T, enforceV2 bool) *httptest.Server {
t.Helper()
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("/api/token", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPut {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("v2-token"))
})
guard := func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) bool {
if enforceV2 && r.Header.Get("X-Aws-Ec2-Metadata-Token") != "v2-token" {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
return false
}
return true
}
mux.HandleFunc("/meta-data/instance-id", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if guard(w, r) {
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("i-0abc123"))
}
})
mux.HandleFunc("/meta-data/placement/availability-zone", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if guard(w, r) {
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("us-east-1a"))
}
})
mux.HandleFunc("/dynamic/instance-identity/document", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if guard(w, r) {
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"accountId":"123456789012","region":"us-east-1"}`))
}
})
srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
return srv
}
func TestFetchInstanceMetadata_OK(t *testing.T) {
srv := metadataStub(t, true)
got, err := fetchInstanceMetadata(srv.Client(), srv.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("fetch: %v", err)
}
if got.InstanceID != "i-0abc123" || got.AZ != "us-east-1a" || got.AccountID != "123456789012" {
t.Errorf("metadata mismatch: %+v", got)
}
}
func TestFetchInstanceMetadata_TokenRequired(t *testing.T) {
// Server returns 405 for non-PUT token; a GET-only client would 401 downstream.
srv := metadataStub(t, true)
if _, err := fetchInstanceMetadata(srv.Client(), srv.URL); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("v2 path should succeed: %v", err)
}
}
func TestFetchInstanceMetadata_BadDocument(t *testing.T) {
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("/api/token", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { _, _ = w.Write([]byte("t")) })
mux.HandleFunc("/meta-data/instance-id", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { _, _ = w.Write([]byte("i-1")) })
mux.HandleFunc("/meta-data/placement/availability-zone", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { _, _ = w.Write([]byte("z")) })
mux.HandleFunc("/dynamic/instance-identity/document", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { _, _ = w.Write([]byte("not json")) })
srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
if _, err := fetchInstanceMetadata(srv.Client(), srv.URL); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected parse error on bad identity document")
}
}
+167
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
package main
import (
"fmt"
"hash/crc32"
"os/exec"
"strings"
"time"
)
// netnsRunDir is the iproute2 netns mount directory; a name here is the netns
// path containerd joins via the OCI network namespace path.
const netnsRunDir = "/var/run/netns"
// Credentials path constants: each task netns gets a /30 veth into the host netns
// from 169.254.172.0/22 and a host-routed /32 to the credential endpoint, keeping
// the endpoint off the task ENI's VPC route. credTaskVeth is the task-side name
// (unique per netns); the host side is per-task (credVethName).
const (
credTaskVeth = "ecsc0"
credEndpointCIDR = defaultCredEndpointIP + "/32"
)
// netCmdRunner executes a host networking command. Abstracted so unit tests can
// assert the ip/netns sequence without touching the kernel.
type netCmdRunner interface {
Run(name string, args ...string) (string, error)
}
// execNetRunner runs real commands.
type execNetRunner struct{}
func (execNetRunner) Run(name string, args ...string) (string, error) {
out, err := exec.Command(name, args...).CombinedOutput()
return string(out), err
}
// taskNetns builds and tears down per-task awsvpc network namespaces. The ENI is
// already hot-plugged into the VM (scheduler did that); the agent finds the NIC
// by MAC, moves it into a task netns, and DHCPs the OVN-assigned ENI IP — the
// same way the primary NIC obtains its address.
type taskNetns struct {
run netCmdRunner
nicWait time.Duration
poll time.Duration
}
func newTaskNetns(run netCmdRunner) *taskNetns {
return &taskNetns{run: run, nicWait: 30 * time.Second, poll: time.Second}
}
func netnsName(taskID string) string { return "ecs-" + taskID }
func netnsPathFor(taskID string) string {
return netnsRunDir + "/" + netnsName(taskID)
}
// Setup creates the task netns, moves the ENI NIC (matched by MAC) into it, and
// brings it up with a DHCP lease. It returns the netns path for containerd. On
// any failure it tears the partial netns down so a retry starts clean.
func (n *taskNetns) Setup(taskID, mac string) (string, error) {
iface, err := n.waitForNIC(mac)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
name := netnsName(taskID)
if _, err := n.run.Run("ip", "netns", "add", name); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("netns add %s: %w", name, err)
}
hostVeth := credVethName(taskID)
hostIP, taskIP := credSubnet(taskID)
steps := [][]string{
{"ip", "link", "set", iface, "netns", name},
{"ip", "-n", name, "link", "set", "lo", "up"},
{"ip", "-n", name, "link", "set", iface, "up"},
{"ip", "netns", "exec", name, "udhcpc", "-i", iface, "-q", "-n"},
// Credentials path: a veth into the host netns plus a host-routed /32 to the
// credential endpoint, so the container reaches 169.254.170.2 without it
// leaking onto the task ENI's VPC route.
{"ip", "link", "add", hostVeth, "type", "veth", "peer", "name", credTaskVeth, "netns", name},
{"ip", "addr", "add", hostIP + "/30", "dev", hostVeth},
{"ip", "link", "set", hostVeth, "up"},
{"ip", "-n", name, "addr", "add", taskIP + "/30", "dev", credTaskVeth},
{"ip", "-n", name, "link", "set", credTaskVeth, "up"},
{"ip", "-n", name, "route", "add", credEndpointCIDR, "via", hostIP},
}
for _, s := range steps {
if _, err := n.run.Run(s[0], s[1:]...); err != nil {
_ = n.Teardown(taskID)
return "", fmt.Errorf("netns setup %v: %w", s, err)
}
}
return netnsPathFor(taskID), nil
}
// credVethName is the host-side veth name for a task's credential path. Derived
// from the taskID and kept within the 15-char interface-name limit.
func credVethName(taskID string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("ecsv%08x", crc32.ChecksumIEEE([]byte(taskID)))
}
// credSubnet derives a unique /30 in 169.254.172.0/22 for a task's credential
// veth, returning the host-side and task-side addresses. The host side is the
// container's gateway to the credential endpoint.
func credSubnet(taskID string) (hostIP, taskIP string) {
slot := crc32.ChecksumIEEE([]byte(taskID)) % 256 // 256 /30s in the /22
third := 172 + (slot*4)/256
base := (slot * 4) % 256
hostIP = fmt.Sprintf("169.254.%d.%d", third, base+1)
taskIP = fmt.Sprintf("169.254.%d.%d", third, base+2)
return hostIP, taskIP
}
// Teardown deletes the task netns (releasing the moved NIC). Idempotent enough
// for the stop path: a missing netns is reported but not fatal to the caller.
func (n *taskNetns) Teardown(taskID string) error {
name := netnsName(taskID)
// Deleting the netns destroys the task-side veth and its host peer; remove the
// host side explicitly too so a leaked half from a partial setup is reaped.
_, _ = n.run.Run("ip", "link", "del", credVethName(taskID))
if _, err := n.run.Run("ip", "netns", "del", name); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("netns del %s: %w", name, err)
}
return nil
}
// waitForNIC polls until a NIC with the given MAC appears in the host netns,
// returning its interface name. The hot-plug pipeline is async, so the device
// may lag the assign by a few seconds.
func (n *taskNetns) waitForNIC(mac string) (string, error) {
want := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(mac))
deadline := time.Now().Add(n.nicWait)
for {
iface, err := n.findNICByMAC(want)
if err == nil {
return iface, nil
}
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("nic with mac %s not found within %s", want, n.nicWait)
}
time.Sleep(n.poll)
}
}
// findNICByMAC parses `ip -o link` and returns the interface whose link/ether
// matches mac.
func (n *taskNetns) findNICByMAC(mac string) (string, error) {
out, err := n.run.Run("ip", "-o", "link")
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("ip -o link: %w", err)
}
for line := range strings.SplitSeq(out, "\n") {
if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(line), mac) {
continue
}
// "<idx>: <ifname>: <flags> ... link/ether <mac> ..."
fields := strings.Fields(line)
if len(fields) < 2 {
continue
}
name := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimSuffix(fields[1], ":"), "@")
if i := strings.IndexByte(name, '@'); i >= 0 {
name = name[:i]
}
return name, nil
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("no interface with mac %s", mac)
}
+154
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
package main
import (
"errors"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
)
// fakeNetRunner records every command and serves canned `ip -o link` output. A
// failOn substring forces the matching command to error so teardown paths run.
type fakeNetRunner struct {
mu sync.Mutex
calls [][]string
linkOut string
failOn string
}
func (f *fakeNetRunner) Run(name string, args ...string) (string, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
cmd := append([]string{name}, args...)
f.calls = append(f.calls, cmd)
joined := strings.Join(cmd, " ")
if f.failOn != "" && strings.Contains(joined, f.failOn) {
return "", errors.New("boom: " + joined)
}
if name == "ip" && len(args) >= 2 && args[0] == "-o" && args[1] == "link" {
return f.linkOut, nil
}
return "", nil
}
func (f *fakeNetRunner) joined() []string {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
out := make([]string, len(f.calls))
for i, c := range f.calls {
out[i] = strings.Join(c, " ")
}
return out
}
func (f *fakeNetRunner) sawAny(sub string) bool {
for _, j := range f.joined() {
if strings.Contains(j, sub) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
const linkWithENI = `1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP> mtu 65536 ... link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 ...
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,UP> mtu 1500 ... link/ether 52:54:00:aa:bb:cc ...
3: eth1: <BROADCAST,UP> mtu 1500 ... link/ether 52:54:00:de:ad:01 ...`
func newTestNetns(f *fakeNetRunner) *taskNetns {
n := newTaskNetns(f)
n.nicWait = 50 * time.Millisecond
n.poll = 5 * time.Millisecond
return n
}
func TestNetns_FindNICByMAC(t *testing.T) {
n := newTestNetns(&fakeNetRunner{linkOut: linkWithENI})
iface, err := n.findNICByMAC("52:54:00:de:ad:01")
if err != nil || iface != "eth1" {
t.Fatalf("want eth1, got %q err=%v", iface, err)
}
if _, err := n.findNICByMAC("52:54:00:ff:ff:ff"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("want error for absent mac")
}
}
func TestNetns_SetupSequence(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeNetRunner{linkOut: linkWithENI}
n := newTestNetns(f)
path, err := n.Setup("t-001", "52:54:00:DE:AD:01")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
}
if path != netnsPathFor("t-001") {
t.Fatalf("want %q, got %q", netnsPathFor("t-001"), path)
}
hostIP, taskIP := credSubnet("t-001")
hostVeth := credVethName("t-001")
want := []string{
"ip netns add ecs-t-001",
"ip link set eth1 netns ecs-t-001",
"ip -n ecs-t-001 link set lo up",
"ip -n ecs-t-001 link set eth1 up",
"ip netns exec ecs-t-001 udhcpc -i eth1 -q -n",
"ip link add " + hostVeth + " type veth peer name ecsc0 netns ecs-t-001",
"ip addr add " + hostIP + "/30 dev " + hostVeth,
"ip -n ecs-t-001 addr add " + taskIP + "/30 dev ecsc0",
"ip -n ecs-t-001 route add 169.254.170.2/32 via " + hostIP,
}
for _, w := range want {
if !f.sawAny(w) {
t.Errorf("missing command %q in %v", w, f.joined())
}
}
}
func TestCredSubnet_UniquePer30(t *testing.T) {
hostA, taskA := credSubnet("task-a")
hostB, taskB := credSubnet("task-b")
if hostA == hostB {
t.Errorf("distinct tasks share a host IP: %s", hostA)
}
for _, ip := range []string{hostA, taskA, hostB, taskB} {
if !strings.HasPrefix(ip, "169.254.17") {
t.Errorf("cred IP %s outside 169.254.172.0/22", ip)
}
}
// host and task ends of one task sit in the same /30 (differ in last octet).
if hostA[:strings.LastIndexByte(hostA, '.')] != taskA[:strings.LastIndexByte(taskA, '.')] {
t.Errorf("host %s and task %s not in same /30", hostA, taskA)
}
}
func TestNetns_SetupNICNotFound(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeNetRunner{linkOut: linkWithENI}
n := newTestNetns(f)
if _, err := n.Setup("t-001", "52:54:00:00:00:99"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("want timeout error for absent NIC")
}
if f.sawAny("netns add") {
t.Error("should not create netns when NIC never appears")
}
}
func TestNetns_SetupTearsDownOnStepFailure(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeNetRunner{linkOut: linkWithENI, failOn: "udhcpc"}
n := newTestNetns(f)
if _, err := n.Setup("t-001", "52:54:00:de:ad:01"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("want error when udhcpc fails")
}
if !f.sawAny("ip netns del ecs-t-001") {
t.Errorf("expected teardown after step failure, got %v", f.joined())
}
}
func TestNetns_Teardown(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeNetRunner{}
n := newTestNetns(f)
if err := n.Teardown("t-001"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("teardown: %v", err)
}
if !f.sawAny("ip netns del ecs-t-001") {
t.Errorf("expected netns del, got %v", f.joined())
}
}
+72
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
package main
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
ctrruntime "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/cmd/ecs-agent/runtime"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/handlers/ecs/bus"
)
// reconcile re-adopts containers that survived an agent restart. It lists the
// runtime's containers and, for each task still running in this cluster,
// re-registers its IAM credentials, re-attaches the exit-wait, and refreshes its
// RUNNING state on the gateway. The returned set seeds pollAssignments so the
// gateway's re-delivered assignments for these tasks are acked but not re-run.
//
// It is best-effort: a nil runner or a List error returns an empty set and the
// agent falls back to its pre-reconcile behaviour (poll + run).
func (a *Agent) reconcile(ctx context.Context) map[string]bool {
adopted := map[string]bool{}
if a.runner == nil {
return adopted
}
containers, err := a.runner.List(ctx)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("ecs-agent: reconcile list failed", "err", err)
return adopted
}
// Group this cluster's running containers back into their tasks. The Assign is
// reconstructed from labels — enough to re-register creds and tear down netns.
type task struct {
as *bus.Assign
containers []ctrruntime.Container
}
tasks := map[string]*task{}
for _, c := range containers {
if !c.Running || c.Labels[labelClusterName] != a.id.ClusterName {
continue
}
taskID := c.Labels[labelTaskID]
if taskID == "" {
continue
}
t := tasks[taskID]
if t == nil {
t = &task{as: &bus.Assign{
TaskID: taskID,
ClusterName: a.id.ClusterName,
CredID: c.Labels[labelCredID],
TaskRoleARN: c.Labels[labelTaskRoleARN],
ENIMacAddress: c.Labels[labelENIMac],
}}
tasks[taskID] = t
}
t.containers = append(t.containers, c)
}
for taskID, t := range tasks {
a.registerTaskCreds(t.as)
statuses := make([]bus.ContainerStatus, 0, len(t.containers))
for _, c := range t.containers {
name := c.Labels[labelContainerName]
go a.waitContainer(ctx, t.as, name, c.ID)
statuses = append(statuses, bus.ContainerStatus{Name: name, Status: bus.TaskStatusRunning, ContainerID: c.ID})
}
a.reportTaskState(t.as, bus.TaskStatusRunning, "", statuses)
adopted[taskID] = true
slog.Info("ecs-agent: re-adopted running task", "task", taskID, "containers", len(t.containers))
}
return adopted
}
+181
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
package main
import (
"context"
"errors"
"slices"
"testing"
"time"
ctrruntime "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/cmd/ecs-agent/runtime"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/handlers/ecs/bus"
)
const testTaskRole = "arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/task"
// adoptedContainer builds a runtime.Container as the reconciler would discover it,
// stamping only the mulga.ecs.* labels that are non-empty.
func adoptedContainer(taskID, name, cluster, credID, role, mac string, running bool) ctrruntime.Container {
labels := map[string]string{
labelTaskID: taskID,
labelContainerName: name,
labelClusterName: cluster,
}
if credID != "" {
labels[labelCredID] = credID
}
if role != "" {
labels[labelTaskRoleARN] = role
}
if mac != "" {
labels[labelENIMac] = mac
}
return ctrruntime.Container{ID: containerID(taskID, name), Labels: labels, Running: running}
}
func waitedFor(t *testing.T, rt *ctrruntime.FakePuller, id string) {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.After(time.Second)
for !slices.Contains(rt.Waits(), id) {
select {
case <-deadline:
t.Fatalf("exit-wait never re-attached for %s; waited=%v", id, rt.Waits())
case <-time.After(2 * time.Millisecond):
}
}
}
// A running, correctly-labeled container is re-adopted: its credentials are
// re-registered, its RUNNING state refreshed, and its exit-wait re-attached.
func TestReconcile_AdoptsRunningLabeledContainer(t *testing.T) {
cp := &fakeCP{}
rt := &ctrruntime.FakePuller{
WaitErr: errors.New("blocked"),
Containers: []ctrruntime.Container{
adoptedContainer("t-001", "web", "default", "t-001", testTaskRole, "52:54:00:de:ad:01", true),
},
}
a := newAgent(config{}, testIdentity(), cp, rt, rt, nil)
a.cred = newCredEndpoint(nil, "us-east-1", "https://gw", "", "127.0.0.1", 0, nil)
adopted := a.reconcile(context.Background())
if !adopted["t-001"] {
t.Fatalf("t-001 not adopted; got %v", adopted)
}
if got := a.cred.roles["t-001"]; got != testTaskRole {
t.Errorf("cred not re-registered: roles[t-001] = %q, want %q", got, testTaskRole)
}
if n := countStatus(cp.taskStates(), "t-001", bus.TaskStatusRunning); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("RUNNING reports for t-001 = %d, want 1", n)
}
waitedFor(t, rt, containerID("t-001", "web"))
}
// pollAssignments seeded with an adopted task acks its re-delivered assignment
// but does not re-run it, while a genuinely new task still dispatches.
func TestPollAssignments_SeededTaskNotRerun(t *testing.T) {
mk := func(id string) bus.Assign {
return bus.Assign{
AccountID: "123456789012", ClusterName: "default", InstanceID: "i-abc123", TaskID: id,
Containers: []bus.AssignContainer{{Name: "web", Image: "registry/web:1", Command: []string{"/bin/true"}}},
}
}
adopted, fresh := mk("t-001"), mk("t-002")
cp := &fakeCP{pollReplies: [][]bus.Assign{
{adopted, fresh},
{adopted, fresh},
nil,
}}
rt := &ctrruntime.FakePuller{WaitErr: errors.New("blocked")}
a := newAgent(config{PollInterval: 5 * time.Millisecond}, testIdentity(), cp, rt, rt, nil)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
go a.pollAssignments(ctx, map[string]bool{"t-001": true})
deadline := time.After(time.Second)
for countStatus(cp.taskStates(), "t-002", bus.TaskStatusRunning) < 1 {
select {
case <-deadline:
t.Fatal("fresh task t-002 was never dispatched")
case <-time.After(2 * time.Millisecond):
}
}
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
cancel()
if n := countStatus(cp.taskStates(), "t-001", bus.TaskStatusRunning); n != 0 {
t.Errorf("adopted task t-001 was re-run %d times, want 0", n)
}
if n := countStatus(cp.taskStates(), "t-002", bus.TaskStatusRunning); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("fresh task t-002 dispatched %d times, want 1", n)
}
var t1Acked bool
for _, ack := range cp.acks() {
for _, id := range ack {
if id == "t-001" {
t1Acked = true
}
}
}
if !t1Acked {
t.Errorf("adopted task t-001 was never acked; acks=%v", cp.acks())
}
}
// Containers for another cluster or with a stopped task are not adopted.
func TestReconcile_FiltersOtherClusterAndStopped(t *testing.T) {
rt := &ctrruntime.FakePuller{
WaitErr: errors.New("blocked"),
Containers: []ctrruntime.Container{
adoptedContainer("t-other", "web", "other", "", "", "", true),
adoptedContainer("t-stop", "web", "default", "", "", "", false),
adoptedContainer("t-ok", "web", "default", "", "", "", true),
},
}
a := newAgent(config{}, testIdentity(), &fakeCP{}, rt, rt, nil)
adopted := a.reconcile(context.Background())
if len(adopted) != 1 || !adopted["t-ok"] {
t.Fatalf("adopted = %v, want only t-ok", adopted)
}
}
// A nil runner or a List error degrades to an empty set without panicking.
func TestReconcile_DegradesGracefully(t *testing.T) {
noRunner := newAgent(config{}, testIdentity(), &fakeCP{}, nil, nil, nil)
if got := noRunner.reconcile(context.Background()); len(got) != 0 {
t.Errorf("nil runner: adopted = %v, want empty", got)
}
rt := &ctrruntime.FakePuller{ListErr: errors.New("boom")}
listErr := newAgent(config{}, testIdentity(), &fakeCP{}, rt, rt, nil)
if got := listErr.reconcile(context.Background()); len(got) != 0 {
t.Errorf("list error: adopted = %v, want empty", got)
}
}
// taskLabels emits the optional cred/role/MAC labels only when set.
func TestTaskLabels_OmitsEmptyOptionalLabels(t *testing.T) {
full := taskLabels(&bus.Assign{
TaskID: "t1", ClusterName: "c", CredID: "x", TaskRoleARN: testTaskRole, ENIMacAddress: "mac",
}, "web")
for k, want := range map[string]string{
labelCredID: "x", labelTaskRoleARN: testTaskRole, labelENIMac: "mac",
} {
if full[k] != want {
t.Errorf("full labels[%q] = %q, want %q", k, full[k], want)
}
}
bare := taskLabels(&bus.Assign{TaskID: "t1", ClusterName: "c"}, "web")
if len(bare) != 3 {
t.Errorf("bare labels = %v, want only taskID/containerName/clusterName", bare)
}
for _, k := range []string{labelCredID, labelTaskRoleARN, labelENIMac} {
if _, ok := bare[k]; ok {
t.Errorf("bare labels unexpectedly carry %q", k)
}
}
}
+39
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
package main
import (
"fmt"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/handlers/ecs/bus"
)
// identity is the container instance's stable identity, assembled at boot from
// IMDS (account, instance, AZ) and config (cluster). It is the join key the
// scheduler uses to track this instance.
type identity struct {
AccountID string
ClusterName string
InstanceID string
AZ string
Hostname string
Capacity bus.InstanceCapacity
AgentVersion string
}
// registrar registers the host as a container instance through the gateway.
type registrar struct {
cp controlPlane
id identity
}
func newRegistrar(cp controlPlane, id identity) *registrar {
return &registrar{cp: cp, id: id}
}
// Register calls the gateway's RegisterContainerInstance. The scheduler records
// (or refreshes) the container instance on receipt.
func (r *registrar) Register() error {
if err := r.cp.Register(r.id); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("register instance %s: %w", r.id.InstanceID, err)
}
return nil
}
+145
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
package main
import (
"context"
"errors"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/handlers/ecs/bus"
)
// fakeCP is a test double for the gateway control-plane. It records registers and
// task-state reports, and replays a scripted queue of poll responses.
type fakeCP struct {
mu sync.Mutex
registers int
states []bus.TaskState
pollAcks [][]string
pollReplies [][]bus.Assign
pollCalls int
registerErr bool
submitErr bool
}
var _ controlPlane = (*fakeCP)(nil)
func (f *fakeCP) Register(_ identity) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
if f.registerErr {
return errors.New("register boom")
}
f.registers++
return nil
}
func (f *fakeCP) SubmitTaskState(st bus.TaskState) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
if f.submitErr {
return errors.New("submit boom")
}
f.states = append(f.states, st)
return nil
}
func (f *fakeCP) PollAssignments(_, _ string, ack []string) ([]bus.Assign, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
cp := append([]string(nil), ack...)
f.pollAcks = append(f.pollAcks, cp)
var out []bus.Assign
if f.pollCalls < len(f.pollReplies) {
out = f.pollReplies[f.pollCalls]
}
f.pollCalls++
return out, nil
}
func (f *fakeCP) registerCount() int {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
return f.registers
}
func (f *fakeCP) taskStates() []bus.TaskState {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
return append([]bus.TaskState(nil), f.states...)
}
func (f *fakeCP) acks() [][]string {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
return append([][]string(nil), f.pollAcks...)
}
func testIdentity() identity {
return identity{
AccountID: "123456789012",
ClusterName: "default",
InstanceID: "i-abc123",
AZ: "us-east-1a",
Hostname: "ecs-host",
Capacity: bus.InstanceCapacity{CPU: 2048, MemoryMiB: 4096},
AgentVersion: "test",
}
}
func TestRegistrar_Register(t *testing.T) {
cp := &fakeCP{}
if err := newRegistrar(cp, testIdentity()).Register(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Register: %v", err)
}
if cp.registerCount() != 1 {
t.Errorf("registers = %d, want 1", cp.registerCount())
}
}
func TestRegistrar_RegisterError(t *testing.T) {
cp := &fakeCP{registerErr: true}
if err := newRegistrar(cp, testIdentity()).Register(); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected register error")
}
}
func TestHeartbeater_Beat(t *testing.T) {
cp := &fakeCP{}
if err := newHeartbeater(cp, testIdentity(), time.Second).beat(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("beat: %v", err)
}
if cp.registerCount() != 1 {
t.Errorf("beat should re-register once, got %d", cp.registerCount())
}
}
func TestHeartbeater_DefaultInterval(t *testing.T) {
h := newHeartbeater(&fakeCP{}, testIdentity(), 0)
if h.interval != defaultHeartbeat {
t.Errorf("interval = %v, want default", h.interval)
}
}
func TestHeartbeater_RunStopsOnContext(t *testing.T) {
cp := &fakeCP{}
h := newHeartbeater(cp, testIdentity(), 5*time.Millisecond)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() { h.Run(ctx); close(done) }()
time.Sleep(25 * time.Millisecond)
cancel()
select {
case <-done:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Run did not stop on context cancel")
}
if cp.registerCount() == 0 {
t.Error("expected at least one re-register before cancel")
}
}
+118
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
package runtime
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"time"
containerd "github.com/containerd/containerd/v2/client"
"github.com/containerd/containerd/v2/core/remotes"
"github.com/containerd/containerd/v2/core/remotes/docker"
"github.com/containerd/containerd/v2/pkg/namespaces"
"github.com/distribution/reference"
)
// ecsNamespace isolates ecs-agent images/containers in containerd, mirroring the
// "moby"/"k8s.io" convention other runtimes use.
const ecsNamespace = "ecs"
// servingProbeTimeout bounds the boot-time daemon liveness check.
const servingProbeTimeout = 3 * time.Second
// containerdPuller drives a real containerd daemon over its unix socket.
type containerdPuller struct {
client *containerd.Client
}
var _ ImagePuller = (*containerdPuller)(nil)
// New connects to the containerd daemon at socket (e.g.
// "/run/containerd/containerd.sock") and returns an ImagePuller. The containerd
// client dials lazily, so New actively probes the daemon with IsServing and
// returns an error if it is unreachable — otherwise a dead socket would only
// surface on the first pull, and the agent's boot-time "containerd unavailable"
// log would never fire.
func New(socket string) (Runtime, error) {
client, err := containerd.New(socket, containerd.WithDefaultNamespace(ecsNamespace))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("connect containerd %s: %w", socket, err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), servingProbeTimeout)
defer cancel()
serving, err := client.IsServing(ctx)
if err != nil || !serving {
_ = client.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("containerd %s not serving: %w", socket, err)
}
return &containerdPuller{client: client}, nil
}
// Pull resolves credentials via r, then pulls and unpacks the image.
func (p *containerdPuller) Pull(ctx context.Context, spec PullSpec, r Resolver) (Image, error) {
ctx = namespaces.WithNamespace(ctx, ecsNamespace)
ref, err := normalizeRef(spec.Ref)
if err != nil {
return Image{}, err
}
resolver, err := newDockerResolver(ctx, ref, r)
if err != nil {
return Image{}, err
}
img, err := p.client.Pull(ctx, ref,
containerd.WithPullUnpack,
containerd.WithResolver(resolver),
)
if err != nil {
return Image{}, fmt.Errorf("pull %s: %w", ref, err)
}
target := img.Target()
return Image{
Ref: ref,
Digest: target.Digest.String(),
Size: target.Size,
}, nil
}
// normalizeRef expands a task-definition image string into the fully-qualified
// reference containerd's resolver requires: a bare "nginx:alpine" becomes
// "docker.io/library/nginx:alpine" and an untagged ref gets ":latest". Without
// this, containerd parses the bare ref as "dummy://nginx:alpine" and rejects it.
func normalizeRef(ref string) (string, error) {
named, err := reference.ParseNormalizedNamed(ref)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("parse image ref %q: %w", ref, err)
}
return reference.TagNameOnly(named).String(), nil
}
// Close releases the containerd client connection.
func (p *containerdPuller) Close() error {
if p.client == nil {
return nil
}
return p.client.Close()
}
// newDockerResolver builds a containerd remote resolver whose per-host
// credentials come from r (the ECR token resolver). Credentials are fetched once
// for ref and reused for every host containerd asks about during the pull.
func newDockerResolver(ctx context.Context, ref string, r Resolver) (remotes.Resolver, error) {
creds := func(string) (string, string, error) { return "", "", nil }
if r != nil {
user, pass, _, err := r.Authorize(ctx, ref)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("authorize %s: %w", ref, err)
}
creds = func(string) (string, string, error) { return user, pass, nil }
}
authorizer := docker.NewDockerAuthorizer(docker.WithAuthCreds(creds))
return docker.NewResolver(docker.ResolverOptions{
Hosts: docker.ConfigureDefaultRegistries(docker.WithAuthorizer(authorizer)),
}), nil
}
+142
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
package runtime
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"sort"
containerd "github.com/containerd/containerd/v2/client"
"github.com/containerd/containerd/v2/pkg/cio"
"github.com/containerd/containerd/v2/pkg/namespaces"
"github.com/containerd/containerd/v2/pkg/oci"
specs "github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/specs-go"
)
var _ Runner = (*containerdPuller)(nil)
// Run creates a container from an already-pulled image and starts its task. The
// container joins the host network namespace (bridge/CNI task networking is a
// later sprint) and carries spec.Labels for the reboot reconciler. id must be
// unique within the "ecs" namespace.
func (p *containerdPuller) Run(ctx context.Context, id string, spec RunSpec) (string, error) {
ctx = namespaces.WithNamespace(ctx, ecsNamespace)
ref, err := normalizeRef(spec.Image)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
image, err := p.client.GetImage(ctx, ref)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("get image %s: %w", ref, err)
}
specOpts := []oci.SpecOpts{
oci.WithImageConfig(image),
oci.WithHostHostsFile,
oci.WithHostResolvconf,
}
if spec.NetnsPath != "" {
// awsvpc: join the task ENI netns built by the agent.
specOpts = append(specOpts, oci.WithLinuxNamespace(specs.LinuxNamespace{
Type: specs.NetworkNamespace,
Path: spec.NetnsPath,
}))
} else {
// bridge/host: share the VM (host) netns.
specOpts = append(specOpts, oci.WithHostNamespace(specs.NetworkNamespace))
}
if len(spec.Command) > 0 {
specOpts = append(specOpts, oci.WithProcessArgs(spec.Command...))
}
if len(spec.Env) > 0 {
specOpts = append(specOpts, oci.WithEnv(envSlice(spec.Env)))
}
container, err := p.client.NewContainer(ctx, id,
containerd.WithNewSnapshot(id+"-snapshot", image),
containerd.WithNewSpec(specOpts...),
containerd.WithContainerLabels(spec.Labels),
)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("create container %s: %w", id, err)
}
task, err := container.NewTask(ctx, cio.NullIO)
if err != nil {
_ = container.Delete(ctx, containerd.WithSnapshotCleanup)
return "", fmt.Errorf("create task %s: %w", id, err)
}
if err := task.Start(ctx); err != nil {
_, _ = task.Delete(ctx)
_ = container.Delete(ctx, containerd.WithSnapshotCleanup)
return "", fmt.Errorf("start task %s: %w", id, err)
}
return id, nil
}
// Wait blocks until the container's task exits and returns its exit code.
func (p *containerdPuller) Wait(ctx context.Context, containerID string) (RunStatus, error) {
ctx = namespaces.WithNamespace(ctx, ecsNamespace)
container, err := p.client.LoadContainer(ctx, containerID)
if err != nil {
return RunStatus{}, fmt.Errorf("load container %s: %w", containerID, err)
}
task, err := container.Task(ctx, nil)
if err != nil {
return RunStatus{}, fmt.Errorf("attach task %s: %w", containerID, err)
}
statusC, err := task.Wait(ctx)
if err != nil {
return RunStatus{}, fmt.Errorf("wait task %s: %w", containerID, err)
}
status := <-statusC
code, _, err := status.Result()
return RunStatus{ExitCode: int(code)}, err
}
// List enumerates every container in the ecs namespace with its labels and
// whether its task is running, so the agent can re-adopt live containers after a
// restart. Per-container label/task errors are treated as "not running" rather
// than failing the whole list.
func (p *containerdPuller) List(ctx context.Context) ([]Container, error) {
ctx = namespaces.WithNamespace(ctx, ecsNamespace)
containers, err := p.client.Containers(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("list containers: %w", err)
}
out := make([]Container, 0, len(containers))
for _, c := range containers {
labels, _ := c.Labels(ctx)
running := false
if task, terr := c.Task(ctx, nil); terr == nil {
if status, serr := task.Status(ctx); serr == nil {
running = status.Status == containerd.Running
}
}
out = append(out, Container{ID: c.ID(), Labels: labels, Running: running})
}
return out, nil
}
// Remove kills and deletes the container's task, then the container + snapshot.
func (p *containerdPuller) Remove(ctx context.Context, containerID string) error {
ctx = namespaces.WithNamespace(ctx, ecsNamespace)
container, err := p.client.LoadContainer(ctx, containerID)
if err != nil {
return nil //nolint:nilerr // load failure means the container is already gone
}
if task, terr := container.Task(ctx, nil); terr == nil {
_, _ = task.Delete(ctx, containerd.WithProcessKill)
}
return container.Delete(ctx, containerd.WithSnapshotCleanup)
}
// envSlice renders an env map as sorted "K=V" entries for deterministic specs.
func envSlice(env map[string]string) []string {
out := make([]string, 0, len(env))
for k, v := range env {
out = append(out, k+"="+v)
}
sort.Strings(out)
return out
}
+82
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
// Package runtime is the ecs-agent's container-runtime seam. The agent pulls
// task images and (from Sprint 4e) runs containers through an ImagePuller; the
// real implementation drives containerd, but the interface lets tests and the
// scheduler-only build run against a fake.
package runtime
import "context"
// PullSpec describes one image to pull.
type PullSpec struct {
// Ref is the full image reference, e.g.
// "123456789012.dkr.ecr.us-east-1.spinifex.internal/app:latest".
Ref string
}
// Image identifies a pulled image in the runtime's content store.
type Image struct {
Ref string
Digest string
Size int64
}
// Resolver supplies registry credentials for a given image reference. The
// ecs-agent backs this with ECR GetAuthorizationToken (see ecrresolver.go).
type Resolver interface {
// Authorize returns the username, password and registry endpoint to use for
// ref. An empty user/pass means anonymous pull.
Authorize(ctx context.Context, ref string) (user, pass, endpoint string, err error)
}
// ImagePuller pulls images into the local runtime. Close releases the runtime
// client connection.
type ImagePuller interface {
Pull(ctx context.Context, spec PullSpec, r Resolver) (Image, error)
Close() error
}
// RunSpec describes a single container the agent must create and start. v1 runs
// the container in the host network namespace (bridge/CNI task networking lands
// in a later sprint); Labels carry the mulga.ecs.* task identity for the reboot
// reconciler.
type RunSpec struct {
Image string
Command []string
Env map[string]string
Labels map[string]string
// NetnsPath, when set, joins the container to a pre-built network namespace
// (awsvpc task ENI). Empty keeps the container in the host (VM) netns —
// bridge/host mode behaviour.
NetnsPath string
}
// RunStatus is a finished container's outcome.
type RunStatus struct {
ExitCode int
}
// Container is a container the runtime already knows about, discovered by List.
// Labels carry the mulga.ecs.* task identity so the agent can re-adopt running
// containers after a restart; Running reports whether its task is live.
type Container struct {
ID string
Labels map[string]string
Running bool
}
// Runner creates and starts containers from already-pulled images. id is a
// caller-unique container ID; Wait blocks until the container exits; Remove
// tears down the container + its task; List enumerates known containers so the
// reboot reconciler can re-adopt the ones still running.
type Runner interface {
Run(ctx context.Context, id string, spec RunSpec) (containerID string, err error)
Wait(ctx context.Context, containerID string) (RunStatus, error)
Remove(ctx context.Context, containerID string) error
List(ctx context.Context) ([]Container, error)
}
// Runtime is the full container runtime the ecs-agent drives: pull + run.
type Runtime interface {
ImagePuller
Runner
}
+125
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
package runtime
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"sync"
)
// FakePuller is an in-memory ImagePuller for tests and the scheduler-only build.
// It records pull requests and replays a programmed result or error.
type FakePuller struct {
mu sync.Mutex
Pulls []PullSpec
Authzd []string
Result Image
Err error
Closed bool
OnPull func(PullSpec) (Image, error)
// Run bookkeeping.
Runs []RunSpec
RunErr error
WaitCode int
WaitErr error
Waited []string
Removed []string
OnRun func(string, RunSpec) (string, error)
// List bookkeeping: Containers is replayed by List; ListErr forces a failure;
// Listed records that List was called.
Containers []Container
ListErr error
Listed bool
}
var (
_ ImagePuller = (*FakePuller)(nil)
_ Runner = (*FakePuller)(nil)
)
// Pull records the spec, exercises the resolver, and returns the programmed
// result. If OnPull is set it takes precedence over Result/Err.
func (f *FakePuller) Pull(ctx context.Context, spec PullSpec, r Resolver) (Image, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
f.Pulls = append(f.Pulls, spec)
f.mu.Unlock()
if r != nil {
user, _, _, err := r.Authorize(ctx, spec.Ref)
if err != nil {
return Image{}, fmt.Errorf("authorize %s: %w", spec.Ref, err)
}
f.mu.Lock()
f.Authzd = append(f.Authzd, user)
f.mu.Unlock()
}
if f.OnPull != nil {
return f.OnPull(spec)
}
if f.Err != nil {
return Image{}, f.Err
}
res := f.Result
if res.Ref == "" {
res.Ref = spec.Ref
}
return res, nil
}
// Close marks the puller closed.
func (f *FakePuller) Close() error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.Closed = true
return nil
}
// Run records the spec and returns id (or the programmed result/error).
func (f *FakePuller) Run(_ context.Context, id string, spec RunSpec) (string, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
f.Runs = append(f.Runs, spec)
f.mu.Unlock()
if f.OnRun != nil {
return f.OnRun(id, spec)
}
if f.RunErr != nil {
return "", f.RunErr
}
return id, nil
}
// Wait records the container ID and returns the programmed exit code/error.
func (f *FakePuller) Wait(_ context.Context, containerID string) (RunStatus, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
f.Waited = append(f.Waited, containerID)
f.mu.Unlock()
return RunStatus{ExitCode: f.WaitCode}, f.WaitErr
}
// Remove records the container ID.
func (f *FakePuller) Remove(_ context.Context, containerID string) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.Removed = append(f.Removed, containerID)
return nil
}
// Waits returns a copy of the container IDs passed to Wait, for assertions.
func (f *FakePuller) Waits() []string {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
return append([]string(nil), f.Waited...)
}
// List replays the programmed container set (or error).
func (f *FakePuller) List(_ context.Context) ([]Container, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.Listed = true
if f.ListErr != nil {
return nil, f.ListErr
}
return f.Containers, nil
}
+89
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
package runtime
import (
"context"
"errors"
"testing"
)
// staticResolver is a test Resolver returning fixed creds or an error.
type staticResolver struct {
user, pass, endpoint string
err error
}
func (s staticResolver) Authorize(_ context.Context, _ string) (string, string, string, error) {
return s.user, s.pass, s.endpoint, s.err
}
func TestFakePuller_RecordsAndDefaultsRef(t *testing.T) {
f := &FakePuller{}
img, err := f.Pull(context.Background(), PullSpec{Ref: "repo/app:1"}, staticResolver{user: "AWS"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Pull: %v", err)
}
if img.Ref != "repo/app:1" {
t.Errorf("Ref defaulted wrong: %q", img.Ref)
}
if len(f.Pulls) != 1 || f.Pulls[0].Ref != "repo/app:1" {
t.Errorf("Pulls = %+v", f.Pulls)
}
if len(f.Authzd) != 1 || f.Authzd[0] != "AWS" {
t.Errorf("Authzd = %+v", f.Authzd)
}
}
func TestFakePuller_ResolverError(t *testing.T) {
f := &FakePuller{}
_, err := f.Pull(context.Background(), PullSpec{Ref: "r"}, staticResolver{err: errors.New("boom")})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected resolver error to propagate")
}
}
func TestFakePuller_ProgrammedError(t *testing.T) {
f := &FakePuller{Err: errors.New("pull failed")}
if _, err := f.Pull(context.Background(), PullSpec{Ref: "r"}, nil); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected programmed error")
}
}
func TestFakePuller_OnPullOverrides(t *testing.T) {
want := Image{Ref: "x", Digest: "sha256:abc", Size: 42}
f := &FakePuller{Err: errors.New("ignored"), OnPull: func(PullSpec) (Image, error) {
return want, nil
}}
got, err := f.Pull(context.Background(), PullSpec{Ref: "r"}, nil)
if err != nil || got != want {
t.Fatalf("got %+v, %v; want %+v", got, err, want)
}
}
func TestFakePuller_Close(t *testing.T) {
f := &FakePuller{}
if err := f.Close(); err != nil || !f.Closed {
t.Fatalf("Close: err=%v closed=%v", err, f.Closed)
}
}
func TestNormalizeRef(t *testing.T) {
cases := map[string]string{
"nginx:alpine": "docker.io/library/nginx:alpine",
"nginx": "docker.io/library/nginx:latest",
"ghcr.io/org/app:1": "ghcr.io/org/app:1",
"123456789012.dkr.ecr.ap-southeast-2.spinifex.internal/app:1": "123456789012.dkr.ecr.ap-southeast-2.spinifex.internal/app:1",
}
for in, want := range cases {
got, err := normalizeRef(in)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("normalizeRef(%q): %v", in, err)
continue
}
if got != want {
t.Errorf("normalizeRef(%q) = %q, want %q", in, got, want)
}
}
if _, err := normalizeRef("Bad::Ref"); err == nil {
t.Error("normalizeRef accepted invalid ref")
}
}
+234
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
package main
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"maps"
"time"
ctrruntime "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/cmd/ecs-agent/runtime"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/handlers/ecs/bus"
)
// pollAssignments drains the instance's assignment inbox on a ticker until ctx is
// cancelled. Each assign is dispatched to runTask exactly once; the taskIDs seen
// on a poll are acked on the next poll so the gateway can drop them — a crash
// before ack re-delivers (at-least-once), matching ACS. A failed poll is logged
// and retried on the next tick rather than killing the loop. dispatched is seeded
// by the startup reconcile with tasks already adopted from running containers, so
// their re-delivered assignments are acked but not re-run.
func (a *Agent) pollAssignments(ctx context.Context, dispatched map[string]bool) {
ticker := time.NewTicker(a.cfg.PollInterval)
defer ticker.Stop()
var ackNext []string
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-ticker.C:
assigns, err := a.cp.PollAssignments(a.id.ClusterName, a.id.InstanceID, ackNext)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("ecs-agent: poll assignments failed", "err", err)
continue
}
ackNext = ackNext[:0]
for i := range assigns {
as := assigns[i]
if !dispatched[as.TaskID] {
dispatched[as.TaskID] = true
slog.Info("ecs-agent: task assigned", "task", as.TaskID, "containers", len(as.Containers))
go a.runTask(ctx, &as)
}
ackNext = append(ackNext, as.TaskID)
}
}
}
}
// runTask pulls each container image, starts the containers, and reports task
// state on the bus. A missing runtime or any per-container failure reports the
// task STOPPED with a reason; success reports RUNNING and waits for exit.
func (a *Agent) runTask(ctx context.Context, as *bus.Assign) {
if a.puller == nil || a.runner == nil {
a.reportTaskState(as, bus.TaskStatusStopped, "containerd unavailable on agent", nil)
return
}
// awsvpc: build the task netns from the hot-plugged ENI before any container.
netnsPath, err := a.setupTaskNetns(as)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("ecs-agent: task netns setup failed", "task", as.TaskID, "err", err)
a.reportTaskState(as, bus.TaskStatusStopped, "network setup failed: "+err.Error(), nil)
return
}
credID := a.registerTaskCreds(as)
statuses := make([]bus.ContainerStatus, 0, len(as.Containers))
for _, c := range as.Containers {
if _, err := a.puller.Pull(ctx, ctrruntime.PullSpec{Ref: c.Image}, a.resolver); err != nil {
slog.Error("ecs-agent: pull failed", "task", as.TaskID, "image", c.Image, "err", err)
a.teardownTaskNetns(as)
a.reportTaskState(as, bus.TaskStatusStopped, "image pull failed: "+err.Error(), statuses)
return
}
cid := containerID(as.TaskID, c.Name)
spec := ctrruntime.RunSpec{
Image: c.Image,
Command: c.Command,
Env: withCredEnv(c.Environment, credID),
Labels: taskLabels(as, c.Name),
NetnsPath: netnsPath,
}
id, err := a.runner.Run(ctx, cid, spec)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("ecs-agent: run failed", "task", as.TaskID, "container", c.Name, "err", err)
a.teardownTaskNetns(as)
a.reportTaskState(as, bus.TaskStatusStopped, "container start failed: "+err.Error(), statuses)
return
}
statuses = append(statuses, bus.ContainerStatus{Name: c.Name, Status: bus.TaskStatusRunning, ContainerID: id})
go a.waitContainer(ctx, as, c.Name, id)
}
a.reportTaskState(as, bus.TaskStatusRunning, "", statuses)
slog.Info("ecs-agent: task running", "task", as.TaskID, "containers", len(statuses))
}
// waitContainer blocks until a container exits, then reports the task STOPPED
// with the exit code. v1 stops the whole task when its first container exits.
func (a *Agent) waitContainer(ctx context.Context, as *bus.Assign, name, containerID string) {
status, err := a.runner.Wait(ctx, containerID)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("ecs-agent: wait container failed", "task", as.TaskID, "container", name, "err", err)
return
}
exit := status.ExitCode
a.teardownTaskNetns(as)
statuses := []bus.ContainerStatus{{Name: name, Status: bus.TaskStatusStopped, ContainerID: containerID, ExitCode: &exit}}
a.reportTaskState(as, bus.TaskStatusStopped, fmt.Sprintf("container %s exited (%d)", name, exit), statuses)
slog.Info("ecs-agent: task stopped", "task", as.TaskID, "container", name, "exitCode", exit)
}
// setupTaskNetns builds the awsvpc task netns from the hot-plugged ENI. Bridge/
// host tasks (no ENI MAC) and a nil controller are no-ops returning an empty path.
func (a *Agent) setupTaskNetns(as *bus.Assign) (string, error) {
if as.ENIMacAddress == "" || a.netns == nil {
return "", nil
}
return a.netns.Setup(as.TaskID, as.ENIMacAddress)
}
// teardownTaskNetns releases the task's IAM credential registration, then removes
// the awsvpc task netns (the latter is a no-op for bridge/host tasks). It runs at
// every task-stop path so credentials never outlive the task that owns them.
func (a *Agent) teardownTaskNetns(as *bus.Assign) {
if a.cred != nil {
a.cred.Deregister(taskCredID(as))
}
if as.ENIMacAddress == "" || a.netns == nil {
return
}
if err := a.netns.Teardown(as.TaskID); err != nil {
slog.Warn("ecs-agent: task netns teardown", "task", as.TaskID, "err", err)
}
}
// registerTaskCreds registers the task's credID -> role mapping with the
// credential endpoint and returns the credID (empty when the task has no role).
func (a *Agent) registerTaskCreds(as *bus.Assign) string {
credID := taskCredID(as)
if credID == "" || a.cred == nil {
return credID
}
a.cred.Register(credID, as.TaskRoleARN)
return credID
}
// taskCredID is the credential ID a task's containers fetch credentials under:
// the scheduler-assigned CredID, falling back to the taskID. Empty when the task
// carries no IAM role.
func taskCredID(as *bus.Assign) string {
if as.TaskRoleARN == "" {
return ""
}
if as.CredID != "" {
return as.CredID
}
return as.TaskID
}
// withCredEnv returns env with AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI set for
// credID, copying the map so the assign's container env is left untouched. A
// blank credID (no task role) returns env unchanged.
func withCredEnv(env map[string]string, credID string) map[string]string {
if credID == "" {
return env
}
out := make(map[string]string, len(env)+1)
maps.Copy(out, env)
out["AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI"] = credRelativeURI(credID)
return out
}
// reportTaskState reports a task transition through the gateway's
// SubmitTaskStateChange action.
func (a *Agent) reportTaskState(as *bus.Assign, status, reason string, containers []bus.ContainerStatus) {
if a.cp == nil {
return
}
msg := bus.TaskState{
AccountID: a.id.AccountID,
ClusterName: a.id.ClusterName,
InstanceID: a.id.InstanceID,
TaskID: as.TaskID,
LastStatus: status,
Containers: containers,
Reason: reason,
ReportedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
}
if err := a.cp.SubmitTaskState(msg); err != nil {
slog.Error("ecs-agent: report task-state failed", "task", as.TaskID, "err", err)
}
}
// containerID composes a containerd-valid container ID from a task + container.
func containerID(taskID, name string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s-%s", taskID, name)
}
// mulga.ecs.* label keys stamped on every container. The reboot reconciler reads
// them back to re-associate running containers with their task on restart; the
// cred/role/MAC labels make a container self-describing enough to re-register its
// credentials and tear down its netns without the original assignment.
const (
labelTaskID = "mulga.ecs.taskID"
labelContainerName = "mulga.ecs.containerName"
labelClusterName = "mulga.ecs.clusterName"
labelCredID = "mulga.ecs.credID"
labelTaskRoleARN = "mulga.ecs.taskRoleArn"
labelENIMac = "mulga.ecs.eniMac"
)
// taskLabels are the mulga.ecs.* labels stamped on a container. The cred/role/MAC
// labels are omitted when empty so a container carries only what it needs.
func taskLabels(as *bus.Assign, name string) map[string]string {
labels := map[string]string{
labelTaskID: as.TaskID,
labelContainerName: name,
labelClusterName: as.ClusterName,
}
if credID := taskCredID(as); credID != "" {
labels[labelCredID] = credID
}
if as.TaskRoleARN != "" {
labels[labelTaskRoleARN] = as.TaskRoleARN
}
if as.ENIMacAddress != "" {
labels[labelENIMac] = as.ENIMacAddress
}
return labels
}
+229
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
package main
import (
"context"
"errors"
"testing"
"time"
ctrruntime "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/cmd/ecs-agent/runtime"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/handlers/ecs/bus"
)
func testAssign() *bus.Assign {
return &bus.Assign{
AccountID: "123456789012",
ClusterName: "default",
InstanceID: "i-abc123",
TaskID: "t-001",
Containers: []bus.AssignContainer{
{Name: "web", Image: "registry/web:1", Command: []string{"/bin/true"},
Environment: map[string]string{"FOO": "bar"}},
},
}
}
func newRunAgent(cp controlPlane, rt *ctrruntime.FakePuller) *Agent {
return newAgent(config{}, testIdentity(), cp, rt, rt, nil)
}
// runTask with no runtime reports the task STOPPED instead of crashing.
func TestRunTask_NoRuntimeReportsStopped(t *testing.T) {
cp := &fakeCP{}
a := newAgent(config{}, testIdentity(), cp, nil, nil, nil)
a.runTask(context.Background(), testAssign())
st := cp.taskStates()
if len(st) != 1 || st[0].LastStatus != bus.TaskStatusStopped {
t.Fatalf("want one STOPPED state, got %+v", st)
}
if st[0].Reason == "" {
t.Error("STOPPED state missing reason")
}
}
// Happy path: pull + run reports RUNNING with the container ID; Wait blocking
// (forced error) means no STOPPED overwrite, so we can assert the RUNNING frame.
func TestRunTask_PullRunReportsRunning(t *testing.T) {
cp := &fakeCP{}
rt := &ctrruntime.FakePuller{WaitErr: errors.New("blocked")}
a := newRunAgent(cp, rt)
as := testAssign()
a.runTask(context.Background(), as)
if len(rt.Pulls) != 1 || rt.Pulls[0].Ref != "registry/web:1" {
t.Fatalf("expected one pull of registry/web:1, got %+v", rt.Pulls)
}
if len(rt.Runs) != 1 || rt.Runs[0].Image != "registry/web:1" {
t.Fatalf("expected one run, got %+v", rt.Runs)
}
if rt.Runs[0].Labels["mulga.ecs.taskID"] != "t-001" {
t.Errorf("missing task label: %+v", rt.Runs[0].Labels)
}
st := cp.taskStates()
if len(st) == 0 || st[len(st)-1].LastStatus != bus.TaskStatusRunning {
t.Fatalf("want RUNNING final state, got %+v", st)
}
if len(st[len(st)-1].Containers) != 1 || st[len(st)-1].Containers[0].ContainerID != "t-001-web" {
t.Errorf("RUNNING state container wrong: %+v", st[len(st)-1].Containers)
}
}
// A pull failure reports STOPPED and never starts the container.
func TestRunTask_PullFailureReportsStopped(t *testing.T) {
cp := &fakeCP{}
rt := &ctrruntime.FakePuller{Err: errors.New("pull denied")}
a := newRunAgent(cp, rt)
a.runTask(context.Background(), testAssign())
if len(rt.Runs) != 0 {
t.Errorf("container should not run after pull failure, got %+v", rt.Runs)
}
st := cp.taskStates()
if len(st) != 1 || st[0].LastStatus != bus.TaskStatusStopped {
t.Fatalf("want STOPPED, got %+v", st)
}
}
// A run failure reports STOPPED.
func TestRunTask_RunFailureReportsStopped(t *testing.T) {
cp := &fakeCP{}
rt := &ctrruntime.FakePuller{RunErr: errors.New("start boom")}
a := newRunAgent(cp, rt)
a.runTask(context.Background(), testAssign())
st := cp.taskStates()
if len(st) != 1 || st[0].LastStatus != bus.TaskStatusStopped {
t.Fatalf("want STOPPED, got %+v", st)
}
}
// On container exit, waitContainer reports STOPPED with the exit code.
func TestRunTask_ExitReportsStoppedWithCode(t *testing.T) {
cp := &fakeCP{}
rt := &ctrruntime.FakePuller{WaitCode: 7}
a := newRunAgent(cp, rt)
a.runTask(context.Background(), testAssign())
deadline := time.After(time.Second)
for {
st := cp.taskStates()
if len(st) > 0 && st[len(st)-1].LastStatus == bus.TaskStatusStopped {
last := st[len(st)-1]
if len(last.Containers) != 1 || last.Containers[0].ExitCode == nil || *last.Containers[0].ExitCode != 7 {
t.Fatalf("want exit code 7, got %+v", last.Containers)
}
return
}
select {
case <-deadline:
t.Fatalf("no STOPPED state after exit; got %+v", cp.taskStates())
case <-time.After(2 * time.Millisecond):
}
}
}
// pollAssignments dispatches each assign once and acks it on the next poll.
func TestPollAssignments_DispatchesOnceAndAcks(t *testing.T) {
as := testAssign()
cp := &fakeCP{pollReplies: [][]bus.Assign{
{*as}, // poll 1: one pending assign
{*as}, // poll 2: still present (not yet acked when poll 2 was issued)
nil, // poll 3: gateway dropped it after the ack
}}
rt := &ctrruntime.FakePuller{WaitErr: errors.New("blocked")}
a := newAgent(config{PollInterval: 5 * time.Millisecond}, testIdentity(), cp, rt, rt, nil)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
go a.pollAssignments(ctx, map[string]bool{})
// runTask reports RUNNING through the (mutex-guarded) control plane. With the
// assign returned on two consecutive polls, dedup means exactly one dispatch →
// exactly one RUNNING report.
deadline := time.After(time.Second)
for {
if running := countStatus(cp.taskStates(), as.TaskID, bus.TaskStatusRunning); running >= 1 {
break
}
select {
case <-deadline:
t.Fatal("assign was never dispatched (no RUNNING report)")
case <-time.After(2 * time.Millisecond):
}
}
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
cancel()
if running := countStatus(cp.taskStates(), as.TaskID, bus.TaskStatusRunning); running != 1 {
t.Errorf("task dispatched %d times, want exactly 1 (dedup on taskID)", running)
}
// The taskID must appear in a later poll's ack list.
acked := false
for _, ack := range cp.acks() {
for _, id := range ack {
if id == as.TaskID {
acked = true
}
}
}
if !acked {
t.Errorf("task %s was never acked; acks=%v", as.TaskID, cp.acks())
}
}
func countStatus(states []bus.TaskState, taskID, status string) int {
n := 0
for _, st := range states {
if st.TaskID == taskID && st.LastStatus == status {
n++
}
}
return n
}
// awsvpc: an assign carrying an ENI MAC builds the task netns and passes its
// path to the container RunSpec.
func TestRunTask_AwsvpcBuildsNetns(t *testing.T) {
cp := &fakeCP{}
rt := &ctrruntime.FakePuller{WaitErr: errors.New("blocked")}
a := newRunAgent(cp, rt)
f := &fakeNetRunner{linkOut: linkWithENI}
a.netns = newTestNetns(f)
as := testAssign()
as.ENIMacAddress = "52:54:00:de:ad:01"
a.runTask(context.Background(), as)
if !f.sawAny("ip netns add ecs-t-001") {
t.Fatalf("expected task netns build, got %v", f.joined())
}
if len(rt.Runs) != 1 || rt.Runs[0].NetnsPath != netnsPathFor("t-001") {
t.Fatalf("want NetnsPath %q on RunSpec, got %+v", netnsPathFor("t-001"), rt.Runs)
}
}
// bridge/host: no ENI MAC means no netns is built and the container runs in the
// host (VM) netns (empty NetnsPath).
func TestRunTask_NoMacSkipsNetns(t *testing.T) {
cp := &fakeCP{}
rt := &ctrruntime.FakePuller{WaitErr: errors.New("blocked")}
a := newRunAgent(cp, rt)
f := &fakeNetRunner{linkOut: linkWithENI}
a.netns = newTestNetns(f)
a.runTask(context.Background(), testAssign())
if len(f.joined()) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected no netns commands, got %v", f.joined())
}
if len(rt.Runs) != 1 || rt.Runs[0].NetnsPath != "" {
t.Fatalf("want empty NetnsPath, got %+v", rt.Runs)
}
}
func TestContainerID(t *testing.T) {
if got := containerID("t-1", "web"); got != "t-1-web" {
t.Errorf("containerID = %q, want t-1-web", got)
}
}
+139
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
// eks-gateway-fetch runs inside the EKS K3s control-plane VM and fetches a
// control-plane resource from the host through the AWS gateway, instead of
// dialing core NATS directly. It is the read-side companion to
// eks-gateway-publish.
//
// It SigV4-signs (service "eks") an HTTPS GET to the gateway, retrying with
// backoff until the gateway returns 2xx or the attempt budget is exhausted (so
// a degraded link surfaces as a non-zero exit), then emits the staged add-ons
// as tab-separated lines the on-VM addon-sync shell agent consumes without a
// JSON parser:
//
// <addonName>\t<addonVersion>\t<serviceAccountRoleArn>\t<base64(configurationValues)>
//
// The configuration values are base64-encoded so embedded tabs/newlines cannot
// break the line framing.
//
// Usage:
//
// eks-gateway-fetch -resource addons # GET /clusters/{cluster}/internal-addons/{accountId}
//
// Flags default to environment variables seeded by cloud-init:
// EKS_GATEWAY_URL, EKS_GATEWAY_CA, EKS_ACCESS_KEY, EKS_SECRET_KEY, EKS_REGION,
// EKS_ACCOUNT_ID, EKS_CLUSTER_NAME.
package main
import (
"bufio"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"flag"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"os"
"time"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/eksgw"
_ "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/fipsboot"
)
// stagedAddon mirrors the gateway's StagedAddonManifest wire shape; duplicated
// here to keep this tiny VM binary free of the handler package's dependency
// graph.
type stagedAddon struct {
AddonName string `json:"addonName"`
AddonVersion string `json:"addonVersion"`
ServiceAccountRoleArn string `json:"serviceAccountRoleArn"`
ConfigurationValues string `json:"configurationValues"`
}
type internalAddonsResponse struct {
Addons []stagedAddon `json:"addons"`
}
const (
maxAttempts = 30
retryDelay = 5 * time.Second
)
func main() {
var (
gatewayURL string
gatewayCA string
accessKey string
secretKey string
region string
accountID string
clusterName string
resource string
)
flag.StringVar(&gatewayURL, "gateway", os.Getenv("EKS_GATEWAY_URL"), "Gateway URL (e.g. https://10.15.8.1:9999)")
flag.StringVar(&gatewayCA, "gateway-ca", os.Getenv("EKS_GATEWAY_CA"), "Path to gateway TLS CA PEM (optional; falls back to system trust)")
flag.StringVar(&accessKey, "access-key", os.Getenv("EKS_ACCESS_KEY"), "AWS access key ID")
flag.StringVar(&secretKey, "secret-key", os.Getenv("EKS_SECRET_KEY"), "AWS secret access key")
flag.StringVar(&region, "region", os.Getenv("EKS_REGION"), "AWS region for SigV4 signing")
flag.StringVar(&accountID, "account-id", os.Getenv("EKS_ACCOUNT_ID"), "Cluster account ID")
flag.StringVar(&clusterName, "cluster", os.Getenv("EKS_CLUSTER_NAME"), "Cluster name")
flag.StringVar(&resource, "resource", "addons", "Resource to fetch: addons")
flag.Parse()
switch {
case accountID == "":
fatal("--account-id is required (or set EKS_ACCOUNT_ID)")
case clusterName == "":
fatal("--cluster is required (or set EKS_CLUSTER_NAME)")
case resource != "addons":
fatal("--resource must be addons")
}
client, err := eksgw.New(gatewayURL, gatewayCA, accessKey, secretKey, region)
if err != nil {
fatal(fmt.Sprintf("build gateway client: %v", err))
}
path := "/clusters/" + clusterName + "/internal-addons/" + accountID
var lastErr error
for attempt := 1; attempt <= maxAttempts; attempt++ {
body, err := client.Get(path)
if err != nil {
lastErr = err
slog.Warn("eks-gateway-fetch: attempt failed", "resource", resource, "attempt", attempt, "err", err)
if attempt < maxAttempts {
time.Sleep(retryDelay)
}
continue
}
if werr := emitAddonsTSV(os.Stdout, body); werr != nil {
fatal(fmt.Sprintf("render response: %v", werr))
}
return
}
fatal(fmt.Sprintf("fetch failed after %d attempts: %v", maxAttempts, lastErr))
}
// emitAddonsTSV decodes the internal-addons response and writes one TSV line per
// staged add-on to w. An empty add-on set writes nothing (the agent then GCs
// every locally-rendered manifest), which is the correct steady state for a
// cluster with no managed add-ons.
func emitAddonsTSV(out io.Writer, body []byte) error {
var resp internalAddonsResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &resp); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unmarshal internal-addons response: %w", err)
}
w := bufio.NewWriter(out)
for _, a := range resp.Addons {
cfg := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(a.ConfigurationValues))
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n", a.AddonName, a.AddonVersion, a.ServiceAccountRoleArn, cfg); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return w.Flush()
}
func fatal(msg string) {
slog.Error("eks-gateway-fetch: " + msg)
os.Exit(1)
}
+44
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
package main
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/base64"
"testing"
)
func TestEmitAddonsTSV(t *testing.T) {
body := []byte(`{"addons":[
{"addonName":"spinifex-noop","addonVersion":"0.1.0"},
{"addonName":"aws-load-balancer-controller","addonVersion":"2.8.1",
"serviceAccountRoleArn":"arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/alb",
"configurationValues":"{\"replicaCount\":2}"}
]}`)
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := emitAddonsTSV(&buf, body); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("emitAddonsTSV: %v", err)
}
cfg := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"replicaCount":2}`))
want := "spinifex-noop\t0.1.0\t\t\n" +
"aws-load-balancer-controller\t2.8.1\tarn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/alb\t" + cfg + "\n"
if buf.String() != want {
t.Fatalf("TSV mismatch:\n got: %q\nwant: %q", buf.String(), want)
}
}
func TestEmitAddonsTSV_Empty(t *testing.T) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := emitAddonsTSV(&buf, []byte(`{"addons":[]}`)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("emitAddonsTSV: %v", err)
}
if buf.Len() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("empty addon set must emit nothing, got %q", buf.String())
}
}
func TestEmitAddonsTSV_BadJSON(t *testing.T) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := emitAddonsTSV(&buf, []byte(`{not-json`)); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on malformed JSON")
}
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ func main() {
flag.StringVar(&region, "region", os.Getenv("EKS_REGION"), "AWS region for SigV4 signing")
flag.StringVar(&accountID, "account-id", os.Getenv("EKS_ACCOUNT_ID"), "Cluster account ID")
flag.StringVar(&clusterName, "cluster", os.Getenv("EKS_CLUSTER_NAME"), "Cluster name")
flag.StringVar(&channel, "channel", "", "Publish channel: bootstrap|state")
flag.StringVar(&channel, "channel", "", "Publish channel: bootstrap|state|addon")
flag.StringVar(&kind, "kind", "", "Bootstrap subject kind (bootstrap channel only)")
flag.Parse()
@@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ func main() {
fatal("--account-id is required (or set EKS_ACCOUNT_ID)")
case clusterName == "":
fatal("--cluster is required (or set EKS_CLUSTER_NAME)")
case channel != "bootstrap" && channel != "state":
fatal("--channel must be bootstrap or state")
case channel != "bootstrap" && channel != "state" && channel != "addon":
fatal("--channel must be bootstrap, state or addon")
case channel == "bootstrap" && kind == "":
fatal("--kind is required for the bootstrap channel")
}
+147
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
// Command eks-webhook-cert mints, then reuses, a self-signed ECDSA-P256 serving
// certificate for an in-cluster admission webhook and prints its base64 PEM so
// the addon renderer can embed it as the webhook Secret + each caBundle.
//
// The eks-node AMI carries no openssl, so this is the Go equivalent of the
// upstream Helm chart's install-time genSelfSignedCert: one cert per cluster,
// cached on disk under -dir, stable across addon-sync ticks. The single cert is
// its own CA (IsCA + ServerAuth), so the same PEM serves as both the TLS leaf
// and the caBundle the apiserver trusts.
//
// Usage:
//
// eks-webhook-cert -dir /var/lib/spinifex-eks/webhook-certs/<addon> \
// -cn <svc>.<ns>.svc -dns <svc>.<ns>.svc,<svc>.<ns>.svc.cluster.local
//
// Output (one line): <ca_b64>\t<tls_crt_b64>\t<tls_key_b64>
package main
import (
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/pem"
"flag"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"math/big"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
)
func main() {
dir := flag.String("dir", "", "directory to cache tls.crt/tls.key in")
cn := flag.String("cn", "", "certificate common name")
dnsCSV := flag.String("dns", "", "comma-separated DNS SANs")
flag.Parse()
if *dir == "" || *cn == "" || *dnsCSV == "" {
fatal("eks-webhook-cert: -dir, -cn and -dns are required")
}
dnsNames := splitCSV(*dnsCSV)
if len(dnsNames) == 0 {
fatal("eks-webhook-cert: -dns lists no names")
}
certPEM, keyPEM, err := ensureCert(*dir, *cn, dnsNames)
if err != nil {
fatal("eks-webhook-cert: " + err.Error())
}
b := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString
fmt.Printf("%s\t%s\t%s\n", b(certPEM), b(certPEM), b(keyPEM))
}
// ensureCert returns the cached cert/key under dir, minting and persisting a
// fresh self-signed pair (for cn + dnsNames) when none is present or readable.
func ensureCert(dir, cn string, dnsNames []string) (certPEM, keyPEM []byte, err error) {
certPath := filepath.Join(dir, "tls.crt")
keyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "tls.key")
if c, cerr := os.ReadFile(certPath); cerr == nil {
if k, kerr := os.ReadFile(keyPath); kerr == nil {
if _, perr := x509.ParseCertificate(decodeFirst(c)); perr == nil && len(k) > 0 {
return c, k, nil
}
}
}
certPEM, keyPEM, err = generateSelfSigned(cn, dnsNames)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
if err = os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700); err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("mkdir %s: %w", dir, err)
}
if err = os.WriteFile(certPath, certPEM, 0o644); err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("write %s: %w", certPath, err)
}
if err = os.WriteFile(keyPath, keyPEM, 0o600); err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("write %s: %w", keyPath, err)
}
return certPEM, keyPEM, nil
}
// generateSelfSigned mints an ECDSA-P256 self-signed cert valid as both a CA and
// a server cert, with the given common name and DNS SANs.
func generateSelfSigned(cn string, dnsNames []string) (certPEM, keyPEM []byte, err error) {
priv, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("generate key: %w", err)
}
serial, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 128))
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("serial: %w", err)
}
now := time.Now().UTC()
tmpl := x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: serial,
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
NotBefore: now.Add(-time.Hour),
NotAfter: now.AddDate(10, 0, 0),
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment | x509.KeyUsageCertSign,
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
IsCA: true,
DNSNames: dnsNames,
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, &tmpl, &tmpl, &priv.PublicKey, priv)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("create cert: %w", err)
}
keyDER, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(priv)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal key: %w", err)
}
certPEM = pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der})
keyPEM = pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: keyDER})
return certPEM, keyPEM, nil
}
// decodeFirst returns the DER bytes of the first PEM block, or nil.
func decodeFirst(pemBytes []byte) []byte {
blk, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes)
if blk == nil {
return nil
}
return blk.Bytes
}
func splitCSV(s string) []string {
var out []string
for p := range strings.SplitSeq(s, ",") {
if p = strings.TrimSpace(p); p != "" {
out = append(out, p)
}
}
return out
}
func fatal(msg string) {
slog.Error(msg)
os.Exit(1)
}
+81
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
package main
import (
"crypto/x509"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
const (
testCN = "aws-load-balancer-webhook-service.kube-system.svc"
testDNS = "aws-load-balancer-webhook-service.kube-system.svc.cluster.local"
)
func parseLeaf(t *testing.T, certPEM []byte) *x509.Certificate {
t.Helper()
leaf, err := x509.ParseCertificate(decodeFirst(certPEM))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse cert: %v", err)
}
return leaf
}
func TestEnsureCertMintsServingCert(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
certPEM, keyPEM, err := ensureCert(dir, testCN, []string{testCN, testDNS})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ensureCert: %v", err)
}
if len(keyPEM) == 0 {
t.Fatal("empty key PEM")
}
leaf := parseLeaf(t, certPEM)
// Both webhook service DNS names must be present, or the apiserver's TLS
// dial to the webhook fails SAN verification.
for _, want := range []string{testCN, testDNS} {
if err := leaf.VerifyHostname(want); err != nil {
t.Errorf("SAN %q missing: %v", want, err)
}
}
if !leaf.IsCA {
t.Error("cert must be a CA so the same PEM serves as the webhook caBundle")
}
// The single self-signed cert must verify against itself as a root — this is
// exactly what the apiserver does with caBundle == the serving cert.
roots := x509.NewCertPool()
roots.AddCert(leaf)
if _, err := leaf.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: roots,
DNSName: testCN,
KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
}); err != nil {
t.Errorf("self-signed cert does not verify as its own CA: %v", err)
}
}
func TestEnsureCertReusesCachedPair(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
cert1, key1, err := ensureCert(dir, testCN, []string{testCN})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first ensureCert: %v", err)
}
cert2, key2, err := ensureCert(dir, testCN, []string{testCN})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second ensureCert: %v", err)
}
if string(cert1) != string(cert2) || string(key1) != string(key2) {
t.Error("ensureCert regenerated instead of reusing the cached pair; a churning cert re-applies the addon every tick")
}
// The private key must not be world-readable on disk.
info, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "tls.key"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stat key: %v", err)
}
if info.Mode().Perm()&0o077 != 0 {
t.Errorf("tls.key mode %o is group/other-accessible", info.Mode().Perm())
}
}
+224 -26
View File
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ import (
"os/exec"
"path"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
@@ -115,6 +116,33 @@ Each phase waits for all nodes to ACK before proceeding to the next.`,
Run: runClusterShutdown,
}
var nodeCmd = &cobra.Command{
Use: "node",
Short: "Node-local operations",
Long: `Node-local administrative operations such as a graceful local guest drain.`,
}
var nodeDrainCmd = &cobra.Command{
Use: "drain",
Short: "Gracefully drain guests on the local node",
Long: `Run the GATE and DRAIN shutdown phases against the local node only: power down
its guests via QMP and unmount their volumes (flushing the viperblock WAL) while
every service is still running. STORAGE/PERSIST/INFRA are left to systemd's
ordered unit teardown. This is the ExecStop of spinifex-shutdown.service, so a
systemctl stop or host reboot drains guests before any storage service stops.`,
Run: runNodeDrainLocal,
}
var clusterDrainDHCPCmd = &cobra.Command{
Use: "drain-dhcp",
Short: "Release all upstream DHCP leases held by vpcd",
Long: `Ask each vpcd to DHCPRELEASE every external-pool DHCP lease it currently
holds, returning them to the upstream DHCP server. Run this on teardown before
stopping services: an env reset otherwise strands held leases on the upstream
server until their TTL expires, eventually exhausting the upstream scope.`,
Run: runClusterDrainDHCP,
}
var adminInitCmd = &cobra.Command{
Use: "init",
Short: "Initialize Spinifex platform configuration",
@@ -245,6 +273,14 @@ func init() {
clusterShutdownCmd.Flags().Duration("timeout", 120*time.Second, "Maximum time to wait per phase")
clusterShutdownCmd.Flags().Bool("dry-run", false, "Print phase plan without executing")
clusterCmd.AddCommand(clusterDrainDHCPCmd)
clusterDrainDHCPCmd.Flags().Duration("timeout", 30*time.Second, "Reply-collection window for vpcd drain responders")
adminCmd.AddCommand(nodeCmd)
nodeCmd.AddCommand(nodeDrainCmd)
nodeDrainCmd.Flags().Bool("local", false, "Drain the local node only (required)")
nodeDrainCmd.Flags().Duration("timeout", 120*time.Second, "Maximum time to wait per phase")
adminCmd.AddCommand(imagesCmd)
imagesCmd.AddCommand(imagesImportCmd)
imagesCmd.AddCommand(imagesListCmd)
@@ -285,6 +321,7 @@ func init() {
adminInitCmd.Flags().String("predastore-nodes", "", "Comma-separated IPs for multi-node Predastore cluster (e.g., 10.11.12.1,10.11.12.2,10.11.12.3). Requires >= 3 nodes.")
adminInitCmd.Flags().String("formation-timeout", "10m", "Timeout for cluster formation (e.g., 5m, 30s)")
adminInitCmd.Flags().String("token-ttl", "30m", "Join token validity duration (e.g. 30m, 1h, 2h)")
adminInitCmd.Flags().Int("predastore-compaction-interval", 0, "Predastore compactor interval in seconds (0 = unset, uses built-in default). Test clusters set a short interval.")
adminInitCmd.Flags().String("cluster-name", "spinifex", "NATS cluster name")
adminInitCmd.Flags().Bool("no-telemetry", false, "Disable telemetry metrics sent during init (default: enabled)")
adminInitCmd.Flags().String("email", "", "Operator email address (used for update and security notifications)")
@@ -318,6 +355,7 @@ func init() {
adminJoinCmd.Flags().StringSlice("services", nil, "Services this node runs (default: all)")
adminJoinCmd.Flags().Bool("no-telemetry", false, "Disable telemetry metrics sent during join (default: enabled)")
adminJoinCmd.Flags().String("email", "", "Operator email address (used for update and security notifications)")
adminJoinCmd.Flags().Int("predastore-compaction-interval", 0, "Predastore compactor interval in seconds (0 = unset, uses built-in default). Test clusters set a short interval.")
adminJoinCmd.MarkFlagRequired("node")
adminJoinCmd.MarkFlagRequired("host")
adminJoinCmd.MarkFlagRequired("token")
@@ -628,6 +666,13 @@ func runimagesImportCmd(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
EncryptionEnabled: mkey != nil,
}
// Bake the deployment CA into the image trust store so a stock cloud image
// trusts the gateway from first boot. Best-effort: never fails the import.
// The CA path derives from the --spinifex-dir data root (its config/ symlink
// holds ca.pem), not NodeBaseDir(): node.BaseDir is unset in the import
// command, which would collapse the path to a relative config/ca.pem.
bakeCACertIntoImage(extractedImagePath, filepath.Join(baseDir, "config", "ca.pem"))
err = v_utils.ImportDiskImage(&s3Config, &vbConfig, extractedImagePath)
if err != nil {
@@ -640,6 +685,64 @@ func runimagesImportCmd(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
fmt.Printf("✅ Image import complete. Image-ID (AMI): %s\n", volumeId)
}
// caBakeRunCommand installs the uploaded CA into the guest trust store across
// the distro families, then removes the staged copy. Each branch is gated on its
// updater existing so only the matching distro's branch writes anything (install
// -D creates the anchor dir on minimal images). Debian/Ubuntu use
// update-ca-certificates, RHEL/Rocky use update-ca-trust, and stock Alpine ships
// only ca-certificates-bundle (no updater, no anchor dir) so it falls back to
// appending the PEM to the static bundle. The install chain's exit code is
// preserved past the cleanup rm so a failure surfaces instead of a false success.
// The RHEL branch restorecon's only the trust-store paths it touched so the cert
// is correctly labelled without the image-wide --no-selinux-relabel (below)
// leaving an unlabelled bundle; restorecon is best-effort and never fails the bake.
const caBakeRunCommand = `( { command -v update-ca-certificates >/dev/null && install -D -m644 /tmp/spinifex-ca.pem /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/spinifex.crt && update-ca-certificates; } || ` +
`{ command -v update-ca-trust >/dev/null && install -D -m644 /tmp/spinifex-ca.pem /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/spinifex.crt && update-ca-trust && ` +
`{ command -v restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 && restorecon -RF /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/spinifex.crt /etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted >/dev/null 2>&1; true; }; } || ` +
`{ cat /tmp/spinifex-ca.pem >> /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt; } ); ` +
`rc=$?; rm -f /tmp/spinifex-ca.pem; exit $rc`
// caBakeTimeout bounds the virt-customize run so a stalled libguestfs appliance
// cannot hang the import indefinitely; on timeout the bake degrades to a skip.
const caBakeTimeout = 5 * time.Minute
// caBakeCmd builds the virt-customize invocation that uploads the deployment CA
// into the disk image at imagePath and installs it into the guest trust store.
// --no-selinux-relabel stops virt-customize flagging the image for a first-boot
// SELinux autorelabel: that relabel+reboot corrupts XFS roots (RHEL/Rocky) on the
// reboot, so the run-command relabels only the touched trust paths instead.
func caBakeCmd(ctx context.Context, imagePath, caCertPath string) *exec.Cmd {
return exec.CommandContext(ctx, "virt-customize", "-a", imagePath,
"--no-selinux-relabel",
"--upload", caCertPath+":/tmp/spinifex-ca.pem",
"--run-command", caBakeRunCommand)
}
// caBakeRunner resolves virt-customize and runs the CA bake; overridable in tests.
var caBakeRunner = func(imagePath, caCertPath string) ([]byte, error) {
if _, err := exec.LookPath("virt-customize"); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("virt-customize not found: %w", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), caBakeTimeout)
defer cancel()
return caBakeCmd(ctx, imagePath, caCertPath).CombinedOutput()
}
// bakeCACertIntoImage uploads the deployment CA into the image's trust store via
// virt-customize so an imported stock image trusts the gateway from first boot.
// Best-effort: a missing CA, an absent virt-customize, or an image libguestfs
// cannot inspect logs and continues — image import never fails on the CA.
func bakeCACertIntoImage(imagePath, caCertPath string) {
if _, err := os.Stat(caCertPath); err != nil {
slog.Warn("CA bake skipped: deployment CA not found; imported image will not auto-trust the gateway", "ca", caCertPath, "err", err)
return
}
if out, err := caBakeRunner(imagePath, caCertPath); err != nil {
slog.Warn("CA bake skipped: virt-customize could not customize image; imported image will not auto-trust the gateway", "err", err, "output", string(out))
return
}
}
func runimagesRemoveCmd(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
imageID, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("image-id")
force, _ := cmd.Flags().GetBool("force")
@@ -778,17 +881,8 @@ func runimagesListCmd(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
{"NAME", "DISTRO", "VERSION", "ARCH", "BOOT"},
}
// Sort A .. Z
// 1. Collect keys
keys := make([]string, 0, len(utils.AvailableImages))
for k := range utils.AvailableImages {
keys = append(keys, k)
}
// 2. Sort keys alphabetically (A→Z)
sort.Strings(keys)
// 3. Iterate in sorted order
// Sort A→Z then iterate.
keys := slices.Sorted(maps.Keys(utils.AvailableImages))
for _, k := range keys {
img := utils.AvailableImages[k]
@@ -833,6 +927,7 @@ func runAdminInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
predastoreNodesStr, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("predastore-nodes")
formationTimeoutStr, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("formation-timeout")
tokenTTLStr, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("token-ttl")
compactionInterval, _ := cmd.Flags().GetInt("predastore-compaction-interval")
clusterName, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("cluster-name")
services, _ := cmd.Flags().GetStringSlice("services")
@@ -1114,6 +1209,17 @@ func runAdminInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
fmt.Println("\n🔐 Generated predastore encryption key (per-node, never transmitted)")
fmt.Printf(" Key: %s\n", predastoreKeyPath)
// Viperblock at-rest encryption key is cluster-wide; on a single-node init
// there are no joiners, so generate it locally and enable encryption by
// default for all volumes created on this install.
viperblockKeyPath, err := writeViperblockEncryptionKey(configDir)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error generating viperblock encryption key: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Println("\n🔐 Generated viperblock at-rest encryption key")
fmt.Printf(" Key: %s\n", viperblockKeyPath)
fmt.Printf("\n🔑 Generated admin credentials (save these — they won't be shown again):\n")
fmt.Printf(" Access Key: %s\n", bootstrapResult.AdminAccessKey)
fmt.Printf(" Secret Key: %s\n", bootstrapResult.AdminSecretKey)
@@ -1121,7 +1227,7 @@ func runAdminInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
fmt.Printf(" AWS Profile: spinifex\n")
// Generate SSL certificates (with bind IP in SANs for multi-node support)
certPath := admin.GenerateCertificatesIfNeeded(configDir, force, bindIP)
certPath := admin.GenerateCertificatesIfNeeded(configDir, force, bindIP, region, config.DefaultAWSInternalSuffix)
// Generate per-node IPsec peer cert when cluster-wide IPsec is enabled
// (default true). Reuses the cluster CA — no intermediate strongSwan PKI.
@@ -1232,7 +1338,7 @@ func runAdminInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
}
// Generate multi-node predastore.toml
predastoreContent, err := admin.GenerateMultiNodePredastoreConfig(predastoreMultiNodeTemplate, predastoreNodes, accessKey, secretKey, region, natsToken, configDir, bindIP)
predastoreContent, err := admin.GenerateMultiNodePredastoreConfig(predastoreMultiNodeTemplate, predastoreNodes, accessKey, secretKey, region, natsToken, configDir, bindIP, compactionInterval)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error generating multi-node predastore config: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
@@ -1273,8 +1379,9 @@ func runAdminInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
ClusterRoutes: clusterRoutes,
ClusterName: clusterName,
PredastoreNodeID: predastoreNodeID,
Services: services,
PredastoreNodeID: predastoreNodeID,
CompactionIntervalSeconds: compactionInterval,
Services: services,
OVNNBAddr: "tcp:127.0.0.1:6641",
OVNSBAddr: "tcp:127.0.0.1:6642",
@@ -1301,6 +1408,8 @@ func runAdminInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
GPUPassthrough: gpuPassthrough,
IPSecEnabled: ipsecEnabled,
EncryptionKeyFile: viperblockKeyPath,
}
// Print external networking summary
@@ -1377,6 +1486,8 @@ func runAdminInitMultiNode(cmd *cobra.Command, accessKey, secretKey, accountID,
os.Exit(1)
}
compactionInterval, _ := cmd.Flags().GetInt("predastore-compaction-interval")
joinToken, err := formation.GenerateJoinToken()
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "❌ Error generating join token: %v\n", err)
@@ -1409,6 +1520,22 @@ func runAdminInitMultiNode(cmd *cobra.Command, accessKey, secretKey, accountID,
fmt.Println("\n🔐 Generated predastore encryption key (per-node, never transmitted)")
fmt.Printf(" Key: %s\n", predastoreKeyPath)
// Viperblock at-rest encryption key is cluster-wide and shared: the leader
// generates it once and distributes it to joiners via the formation server
// so a volume sealed on any node can be opened on any other.
viperblockKey, err := handlers_iam.GenerateMasterKey()
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "❌ Error generating viperblock encryption key: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
viperblockKeyPath, err := saveViperblockEncryptionKey(configDir, viperblockKey)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "❌ Error saving viperblock encryption key: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Println("\n🔐 Generated viperblock at-rest encryption key (cluster-wide, shared with joiners)")
fmt.Printf(" Key: %s\n", viperblockKeyPath)
// Read CA cert/key for distribution to joining nodes
caCertData, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(configDir, "ca.pem"))
if err != nil {
@@ -1437,6 +1564,9 @@ func runAdminInitMultiNode(cmd *cobra.Command, accessKey, secretKey, accountID,
// Include master key in formation server for distribution to joining nodes
fs.SetMasterKey(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(masterKey))
// Distribute the cluster-wide viperblock encryption key to joiners
fs.SetViperblockKey(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(viperblockKey))
// Register self (init node) as the first node
selfNode := formation.NodeInfo{
Name: node,
@@ -1501,7 +1631,7 @@ func runAdminInitMultiNode(cmd *cobra.Command, accessKey, secretKey, accountID,
var predastoreNodeID int
hasPredastoreConfig := len(predastoreNodes) >= 2
if hasPredastoreConfig {
predastoreContent, err := admin.GenerateMultiNodePredastoreConfig(predastoreMultiNodeTemplate, predastoreNodes, accessKey, secretKey, region, natsToken, configDir, bindIP)
predastoreContent, err := admin.GenerateMultiNodePredastoreConfig(predastoreMultiNodeTemplate, predastoreNodes, accessKey, secretKey, region, natsToken, configDir, bindIP, compactionInterval)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error generating multi-node predastore config: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
@@ -1538,12 +1668,15 @@ func runAdminInitMultiNode(cmd *cobra.Command, accessKey, secretKey, accountID,
ClusterRoutes: clusterRoutes,
ClusterName: clusterName,
PredastoreNodeID: predastoreNodeID,
Services: services,
RemoteNodes: buildRemoteNodes(allNodes, node),
PredastoreNodeID: predastoreNodeID,
CompactionIntervalSeconds: compactionInterval,
Services: services,
RemoteNodes: buildRemoteNodes(allNodes, node),
OperatorEmail: email,
EncryptionKeyFile: viperblockKeyPath,
// Init node runs ovn-central locally
OVNNBAddr: "tcp:127.0.0.1:6641",
OVNSBAddr: "tcp:127.0.0.1:6642",
@@ -1585,7 +1718,7 @@ func runAdminInitMultiNode(cmd *cobra.Command, accessKey, secretKey, accountID,
}
fmt.Println("\n📋 Next steps:")
fmt.Println(" 1. Start services on ALL nodes:")
fmt.Println(" ./scripts/start-dev.sh")
fmt.Println(" sudo systemctl start spinifex.target")
fmt.Println()
}
@@ -1608,6 +1741,7 @@ func runAdminJoin(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
configDir, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("config-dir")
clusterBind, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("cluster-bind")
services, _ := cmd.Flags().GetStringSlice("services")
compactionInterval, _ := cmd.Flags().GetInt("predastore-compaction-interval")
email, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("email")
email = strings.TrimSpace(email)
@@ -1889,8 +2023,30 @@ func runAdminJoin(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
}
fmt.Printf("✅ Predastore encryption key generated: %s\n", predastoreKeyPath)
// Viperblock at-rest encryption key is cluster-wide: receive it from the
// leader rather than generating one, so this node can open volumes sealed
// elsewhere. Lenient on absence — an older leader that predates key
// distribution returns nothing; fall back to cleartext rather than fail
// the join.
var viperblockKeyPath string
if statusResp.ViperblockKey == "" {
fmt.Println("⚠️ Leader did not provide a viperblock encryption key; at-rest encryption disabled on this node")
} else {
viperblockKeyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(statusResp.ViperblockKey)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "❌ Error decoding viperblock encryption key: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
viperblockKeyPath, err = saveViperblockEncryptionKey(configDir, viperblockKeyBytes)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "❌ Error saving viperblock encryption key: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Printf("✅ Viperblock encryption key received from leader: %s\n", viperblockKeyPath)
}
// Generate server cert signed by CA with this node's bind IP
if err := admin.GenerateServerCertOnly(configDir, bindIP); err != nil {
if err := admin.GenerateServerCertOnly(configDir, bindIP, region, config.DefaultAWSInternalSuffix); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error generating server certificate: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
@@ -1933,7 +2089,7 @@ func runAdminJoin(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
hasPredastoreConfig := len(predastoreNodes) >= 2
if hasPredastoreConfig {
predastoreContent, err := admin.GenerateMultiNodePredastoreConfig(predastoreMultiNodeTemplate, predastoreNodes, creds.AccessKey, creds.SecretKey, creds.Region, creds.NatsToken, configDir, bindIP)
predastoreContent, err := admin.GenerateMultiNodePredastoreConfig(predastoreMultiNodeTemplate, predastoreNodes, creds.AccessKey, creds.SecretKey, creds.Region, creds.NatsToken, configDir, bindIP, compactionInterval)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error generating multi-node predastore config: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
@@ -1974,12 +2130,15 @@ func runAdminJoin(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
ClusterRoutes: clusterRoutes,
ClusterName: creds.ClusterName,
PredastoreNodeID: predastoreNodeID,
Services: services,
RemoteNodes: buildRemoteNodes(statusResp.Nodes, node),
PredastoreNodeID: predastoreNodeID,
CompactionIntervalSeconds: compactionInterval,
Services: services,
RemoteNodes: buildRemoteNodes(statusResp.Nodes, node),
OperatorEmail: email,
EncryptionKeyFile: viperblockKeyPath,
// Joining nodes connect to the init node's OVN NB/SB DB
OVNNBAddr: fmt.Sprintf("tcp:%s:6641", leaderIP),
OVNSBAddr: fmt.Sprintf("tcp:%s:6642", leaderIP),
@@ -2265,6 +2424,7 @@ func runCertRenew(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) {
type configDirs struct {
AWSGW string
Predastore string
Viperblock string
NATS string
Spinifex string
}
@@ -2274,10 +2434,11 @@ func createConfigSubdirs(configDir string) (configDirs, error) {
dirs := configDirs{
AWSGW: filepath.Join(configDir, "awsgw"),
Predastore: filepath.Join(configDir, "predastore"),
Viperblock: filepath.Join(configDir, "viperblock"),
NATS: filepath.Join(configDir, "nats"),
Spinifex: filepath.Join(configDir, "spinifex"),
}
for _, dir := range []string{dirs.AWSGW, dirs.Predastore, dirs.NATS, dirs.Spinifex} {
for _, dir := range []string{dirs.AWSGW, dirs.Predastore, dirs.Viperblock, dirs.NATS, dirs.Spinifex} {
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700); err != nil {
return configDirs{}, fmt.Errorf("create directory %s: %w", dir, err)
}
@@ -2399,6 +2560,43 @@ func writePredastoreEncryptionKey(configDir string) (string, error) {
return keyPath, nil
}
// writeViperblockEncryptionKey generates a fresh 32-byte AES-256 master key for
// viperblock at-rest encryption and writes it to
// <configDir>/viperblock/encryption.key with mode 0600. Unlike the predastore
// key, this key is cluster-wide and shared: the leader generates it once at init
// and distributes it to joiners via the formation server, so a volume sealed on
// any node can be opened on any other. Loaded at startup via masterkey.LoadShared.
func writeViperblockEncryptionKey(configDir string) (string, error) {
viperblockDir := filepath.Join(configDir, "viperblock")
if err := os.MkdirAll(viperblockDir, 0750); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("create viperblock config dir: %w", err)
}
key, err := handlers_iam.GenerateMasterKey()
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("generate viperblock encryption key: %w", err)
}
keyPath := filepath.Join(viperblockDir, "encryption.key")
if err := handlers_iam.SaveMasterKey(keyPath, key); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("save viperblock encryption key: %w", err)
}
return keyPath, nil
}
// saveViperblockEncryptionKey writes an already-generated 32-byte viperblock
// master key (received from the formation leader) to
// <configDir>/viperblock/encryption.key with mode 0600.
func saveViperblockEncryptionKey(configDir string, key []byte) (string, error) {
viperblockDir := filepath.Join(configDir, "viperblock")
if err := os.MkdirAll(viperblockDir, 0750); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("create viperblock config dir: %w", err)
}
keyPath := filepath.Join(viperblockDir, "encryption.key")
if err := handlers_iam.SaveMasterKey(keyPath, key); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("save viperblock encryption key: %w", err)
}
return keyPath, nil
}
// writeSystemCredentials writes the system access key to a plaintext JSON file.
// The daemon reads this at startup to inject credentials into ALB VM cloud-init
// for SigV4-authenticated communication with the AWS gateway.
+67
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
package cmd
import (
"context"
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestCABakeCmd_Args(t *testing.T) {
cmd := caBakeCmd(context.Background(), "/img/disk.raw", "/data/config/ca.pem")
args := cmd.Args
assert.Equal(t, "virt-customize", filepath.Base(args[0]))
assert.Contains(t, args, "-a")
assert.Contains(t, args, "/img/disk.raw")
assert.Contains(t, args, "--upload")
assert.Contains(t, args, "/data/config/ca.pem:/tmp/spinifex-ca.pem")
assert.Contains(t, args, "--run-command")
// --no-selinux-relabel stops virt-customize forcing a first-boot autorelabel,
// whose relabel+reboot corrupts XFS roots on RHEL/Rocky.
assert.Contains(t, args, "--no-selinux-relabel")
// The run-command covers Debian/Ubuntu (update-ca-certificates), RHEL/Rocky
// (update-ca-trust), and the stock-Alpine fallback that appends to the static
// ca-certificates bundle when no updater is present. The RHEL branch relabels
// only the touched trust paths so the cert is labelled without a full relabel.
joined := strings.Join(args, " ")
assert.Contains(t, joined, "update-ca-certificates")
assert.Contains(t, joined, "update-ca-trust")
assert.Contains(t, joined, "restorecon")
assert.Contains(t, joined, "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt")
}
func TestBakeCACertIntoImage_SkipsWhenCAMissing(t *testing.T) {
called := false
orig := caBakeRunner
caBakeRunner = func(string, string) ([]byte, error) { called = true; return nil, nil }
defer func() { caBakeRunner = orig }()
// A missing CA must not invoke virt-customize and must not panic.
bakeCACertIntoImage("/img/disk.raw", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent-ca.pem"))
assert.False(t, called, "runner must not be called when the CA is absent")
}
func TestBakeCACertIntoImage_ContinuesOnRunnerError(t *testing.T) {
caPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "ca.pem")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(caPath, []byte("ca"), 0600))
called := false
orig := caBakeRunner
caBakeRunner = func(string, string) ([]byte, error) {
called = true
return []byte("libguestfs: cannot inspect image"), errors.New("exit status 1")
}
defer func() { caBakeRunner = orig }()
// An image libguestfs cannot inspect must skip-and-continue, never panic/fail.
bakeCACertIntoImage("/img/disk.raw", caPath)
assert.True(t, called, "runner must be invoked when the CA is present")
}
+160 -2
View File
@@ -6,11 +6,14 @@ import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/admin"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/formation"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/utils"
toml "github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/spf13/viper"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
@@ -206,7 +209,7 @@ func TestPredastoreMultinodeTemplate_NatsURLLoopbackShim(t *testing.T) {
{ID: 3, Host: "10.0.0.3"},
}
content, err := admin.GenerateMultiNodePredastoreConfig(
predastoreMultiNodeTemplate, nodes, "AK", "SK", "ap-southeast-2", "token", "/tmp", "0.0.0.0",
predastoreMultiNodeTemplate, nodes, "AK", "SK", "ap-southeast-2", "token", "/tmp", "0.0.0.0", 0,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, content, `nats_url = "nats://localhost:4222"`)
@@ -214,7 +217,7 @@ func TestPredastoreMultinodeTemplate_NatsURLLoopbackShim(t *testing.T) {
// Specific bind IP → stays as-is.
content2, err := admin.GenerateMultiNodePredastoreConfig(
predastoreMultiNodeTemplate, nodes, "AK", "SK", "ap-southeast-2", "token", "/tmp", "10.11.12.1",
predastoreMultiNodeTemplate, nodes, "AK", "SK", "ap-southeast-2", "token", "/tmp", "10.11.12.1", 0,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, content2, `nats_url = "nats://10.11.12.1:4222"`)
@@ -252,6 +255,74 @@ func TestWritePredastoreEncryptionKey(t *testing.T) {
assert.NotEqual(t, key1, key2, "per-node keys must differ")
}
// The viperblock key gates at-rest encryption for every volume on a fresh
// install. masterkey.LoadShared rejects anything that isn't exactly 32 bytes at
// 0640-or-stricter, so a regression in size/mode would silently fall back to
// cleartext (empty path) or fail service startup.
func TestWriteViperblockEncryptionKey(t *testing.T) {
configDir := t.TempDir()
keyPath, err := writeViperblockEncryptionKey(configDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, filepath.Join(configDir, "viperblock", "encryption.key"), keyPath)
info, err := os.Stat(keyPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, int64(32), info.Size(), "viperblock master key must be exactly 32 bytes")
assert.Equal(t, os.FileMode(0600), info.Mode().Perm(), "viperblock master key must be mode 0600")
}
// Joiners persist the leader's shared key via saveViperblockEncryptionKey
// against a configDir with no viperblock/ subdir yet. The bytes round-trip
// verbatim — the whole cluster shares one key, so any mutation would orphan
// volumes sealed on other nodes.
func TestSaveViperblockEncryptionKey_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
configDir := t.TempDir()
key := make([]byte, 32)
for i := range key {
key[i] = byte(i)
}
keyPath, err := saveViperblockEncryptionKey(configDir, key)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, filepath.Join(configDir, "viperblock", "encryption.key"), keyPath)
got, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, key, got, "shared key must be written verbatim")
}
// A fresh install must render encryption_key_file so viperblockd enables
// at-rest encryption; an empty field (upgrade / legacy) must omit the line
// entirely so the volume stays in cleartext legacy mode.
func TestSpinifexTomlTemplate_EncryptionKeyFile(t *testing.T) {
base := admin.ConfigSettings{
Node: "node1", Az: "ap-southeast-2a", Port: "4432", Region: "ap-southeast-2",
BindIP: "0.0.0.0", AccessKey: "AKIATEST", SecretKey: "SECRET",
AccountID: "123456789012", NatsToken: "token",
OVNNBAddr: "tcp:127.0.0.1:6641", OVNSBAddr: "tcp:127.0.0.1:6642",
}
dir := t.TempDir()
withKey := base
withKey.ConfigDir = dir
withKey.EncryptionKeyFile = "/etc/spinifex/viperblock/encryption.key"
path := filepath.Join(dir, "spinifex.toml")
require.NoError(t, admin.GenerateConfigFile(path, spinifexTomlTemplate, withKey))
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, string(data), `encryption_key_file = "/etc/spinifex/viperblock/encryption.key"`)
dir2 := t.TempDir()
noKey := base
noKey.ConfigDir = dir2
path2 := filepath.Join(dir2, "spinifex.toml")
require.NoError(t, admin.GenerateConfigFile(path2, spinifexTomlTemplate, noKey))
data2, err := os.ReadFile(path2)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotContains(t, string(data2), "encryption_key_file", "blank key must omit the field")
}
// Joiners run `spx admin join` against a configDir that doesn't yet contain
// a predastore/ subdir. The helper must create it (predastore subdir is
// owned by spinifex-storage in prod, but the helper just needs the dir to
@@ -386,3 +457,90 @@ func TestApplyNetworkConfig_PropagatesPoolBindBridge(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, "dhcp", settings.PoolSource)
assert.Equal(t, "br-wan", settings.PoolBindBridge)
}
func renderSingleNodePredastore(t *testing.T, settings admin.ConfigSettings) string {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "predastore.toml")
require.NoError(t, admin.GenerateConfigFile(path, predastoreTomlTemplate, settings))
b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
return string(b)
}
func predastoreMultinodeNodes() []admin.PredastoreNodeConfig {
return []admin.PredastoreNodeConfig{
{ID: 1, Host: "10.0.0.1"}, {ID: 2, Host: "10.0.0.2"}, {ID: 3, Host: "10.0.0.3"},
}
}
// Unset knob must leave production config byte-identical: no [compaction] block
// and the original trailing bytes unchanged (single-node has no trailing
// newline, multinode keeps one).
func TestPredastoreTemplates_UnsetCompactionEmitsNoBlock(t *testing.T) {
single := renderSingleNodePredastore(t, admin.ConfigSettings{
Region: "ap-southeast-2", BindIP: "0.0.0.0", ConfigDir: "/cfg",
AccessKey: "AK", SecretKey: "SK", NatsToken: "tok",
})
assert.NotContains(t, single, "[compaction]")
assert.True(t, strings.HasSuffix(single, `access_keys_bucket = "spinifex-iam-access-keys"`),
"unset single-node tail changed: %q", single[len(single)-40:])
multi, err := admin.GenerateMultiNodePredastoreConfig(
predastoreMultiNodeTemplate, predastoreMultinodeNodes(), "AK", "SK", "ap-southeast-2", "tok", "/cfg", "10.0.0.1", 0,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotContains(t, multi, "[compaction]")
assert.True(t, strings.HasSuffix(multi, "access_keys_bucket = \"spinifex-iam-access-keys\"\n"),
"unset multinode tail changed: %q", multi[len(multi)-40:])
}
func TestPredastoreTemplates_SetCompactionEmitsParseableBlock(t *testing.T) {
const interval = 30
single := renderSingleNodePredastore(t, admin.ConfigSettings{
Region: "ap-southeast-2", BindIP: "0.0.0.0", ConfigDir: "/cfg",
AccessKey: "AK", SecretKey: "SK", NatsToken: "tok", CompactionIntervalSeconds: interval,
})
assert.Contains(t, single, "[compaction]")
var singleCfg compactionConfig
require.NoError(t, toml.Unmarshal([]byte(single), &singleCfg))
assert.Equal(t, interval, singleCfg.Compaction.IntervalSeconds)
multi, err := admin.GenerateMultiNodePredastoreConfig(
predastoreMultiNodeTemplate, predastoreMultinodeNodes(), "AK", "SK", "ap-southeast-2", "tok", "/cfg", "10.0.0.1", interval,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
var multiCfg compactionConfig
require.NoError(t, toml.Unmarshal([]byte(multi), &multiCfg))
assert.Equal(t, interval, multiCfg.Compaction.IntervalSeconds)
}
// compactionConfig parses just the rendered [compaction] block. Predastore's
// s3.Config dropped its Compaction field, so this asserts the spinifex template
// still emits a valid, parseable block carrying the interval.
type compactionConfig struct {
Compaction struct {
IntervalSeconds int `toml:"interval_seconds"`
} `toml:"compaction"`
}
// The init/join flag must register with an unset (0) default and flow into the
// rendered config via ConfigSettings.
func TestAdminInitFlag_CompactionIntervalReachesRenderedConfig(t *testing.T) {
for _, c := range []*cobra.Command{adminInitCmd, adminJoinCmd} {
f := c.Flags().Lookup("predastore-compaction-interval")
require.NotNil(t, f, "%s missing --predastore-compaction-interval", c.Name())
assert.Equal(t, "0", f.DefValue)
}
require.NoError(t, adminInitCmd.Flags().Set("predastore-compaction-interval", "45"))
defer func() { _ = adminInitCmd.Flags().Set("predastore-compaction-interval", "0") }()
v, _ := adminInitCmd.Flags().GetInt("predastore-compaction-interval")
require.Equal(t, 45, v)
out := renderSingleNodePredastore(t, admin.ConfigSettings{
Region: "ap-southeast-2", BindIP: "0.0.0.0", CompactionIntervalSeconds: v,
})
assert.Contains(t, out, "interval_seconds = 45")
}
+161
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/daemon"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/network/external/dhcp"
"github.com/nats-io/nats.go"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
)
@@ -160,6 +161,166 @@ func runClusterShutdown(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
fmt.Printf("Cluster shutdown complete (%s)\n", time.Since(start).Round(time.Millisecond))
}
// runNodeDrainLocal runs the GATE and DRAIN shutdown phases against the local
// node only, leaving STORAGE/PERSIST/INFRA to systemd's ordered unit teardown.
// It is the ExecStop of spinifex-shutdown.service: guests are powered down and
// their volumes unmounted while every service is still up, so the subsequent
// service stops never tear storage out from under a running guest.
func runNodeDrainLocal(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
local, _ := cmd.Flags().GetBool("local")
timeout, _ := cmd.Flags().GetDuration("timeout")
if !local {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Error: node drain currently supports only --local")
os.Exit(1)
}
cfg, nc, err := loadConfigAndConnect()
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
defer nc.Close()
node := cfg.Node
fmt.Printf("Draining local node %q (gate -> drain), timeout %s/phase\n", node, timeout)
for _, phase := range []string{"gate", "drain"} {
topic := "spinifex.cluster.shutdown." + phase
req := daemon.ShutdownRequest{Phase: phase, Timeout: int(timeout.Seconds())}
reqData, err := json.Marshal(req)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error marshaling request: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
ack, err := collectLocalShutdownACK(nc, topic, reqData, node, timeout)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "[%s] %v\n", strings.ToUpper(phase), err)
os.Exit(1)
}
if ack.Error != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "[%s] %s: ERROR - %s\n", strings.ToUpper(phase), ack.Node, ack.Error)
os.Exit(1)
}
if len(ack.Stopped) > 0 {
fmt.Printf("[%s] %s: stopped %s\n", strings.ToUpper(phase), ack.Node, strings.Join(ack.Stopped, ", "))
} else {
fmt.Printf("[%s] %s: OK\n", strings.ToUpper(phase), ack.Node)
}
}
fmt.Printf("Local node %q drained; systemd may now stop storage services\n", node)
}
// collectLocalShutdownACK publishes a shutdown-phase request and returns the ACK
// from the local node, ignoring ACKs from any other node. Returns an error if
// the local node does not respond within timeout.
func collectLocalShutdownACK(nc *nats.Conn, topic string, reqData []byte, node string, timeout time.Duration) (daemon.ShutdownACK, error) {
inbox := nats.NewInbox()
sub, err := nc.SubscribeSync(inbox)
if err != nil {
return daemon.ShutdownACK{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to subscribe to inbox: %w", err)
}
defer sub.Unsubscribe()
if err := nc.PublishRequest(topic, inbox, reqData); err != nil {
return daemon.ShutdownACK{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to publish request: %w", err)
}
nc.Flush()
deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout)
for {
remaining := time.Until(deadline)
if remaining <= 0 {
return daemon.ShutdownACK{}, fmt.Errorf("timeout waiting for local node %q ACK", node)
}
msg, err := sub.NextMsg(remaining)
if err != nil {
return daemon.ShutdownACK{}, fmt.Errorf("timeout waiting for local node %q ACK", node)
}
var ack daemon.ShutdownACK
if err := json.Unmarshal(msg.Data, &ack); err != nil {
continue
}
if ack.Node == node {
return ack, nil
}
}
}
// runClusterDrainDHCP asks every vpcd to DHCPRELEASE all external-pool leases
// it currently holds, returning them to the upstream DHCP server. Intended for
// the teardown path: an env reset otherwise strands held leases until TTL
// because vpcd's Stop() preserves them for adopt-on-reboot. Best-effort — if
// the cluster is already partly down it warns and exits 0 so teardown proceeds.
func runClusterDrainDHCP(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
timeout, _ := cmd.Flags().GetDuration("timeout")
if timeout <= 0 {
timeout = 30 * time.Second
}
_, nc, err := loadConfigAndConnect()
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Warning: drain-dhcp could not connect (cluster may be down): %v\n", err)
return
}
defer nc.Close()
total, responders := drainDHCPLeases(nc, timeout)
fmt.Printf("DHCP drain complete: released %d lease(s) from %d vpcd responder(s)\n", total, responders)
}
// drainDHCPLeases publishes a drain request to vpc.dhcp.drain and collects
// replies until timeout — one responder per AZ (vpcd uses a per-AZ queue
// group). Returns the summed released count and the number of responders.
func drainDHCPLeases(nc *nats.Conn, timeout time.Duration) (released, responders int) {
reqData, err := json.Marshal(struct{}{})
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: %v\n", err)
return 0, 0
}
inbox := nats.NewInbox()
sub, err := nc.SubscribeSync(inbox)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Warning: drain-dhcp subscribe failed: %v\n", err)
return 0, 0
}
defer sub.Unsubscribe()
if err := nc.PublishRequest(dhcp.TopicDrain, inbox, reqData); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Warning: drain-dhcp publish failed: %v\n", err)
return 0, 0
}
nc.Flush()
deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout)
for {
remaining := time.Until(deadline)
if remaining <= 0 {
break
}
msg, err := sub.NextMsg(remaining)
if err != nil {
break
}
var reply struct {
Released int `json:"released"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(msg.Data, &reply); err != nil {
continue
}
responders++
if reply.Error != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, " vpcd drain error: %s\n", reply.Error)
continue
}
released += reply.Released
}
return released, responders
}
// collectShutdownACKs publishes a shutdown request and collects ACKs from nodes.
func collectShutdownACKs(nc *nats.Conn, topic string, reqData []byte, nodeCount int, timeout time.Duration) ([]daemon.ShutdownACK, error) {
inbox := nats.NewInbox()
+58
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
package cmd
import (
"encoding/json"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/network/external/dhcp"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/testutil"
"github.com/nats-io/nats.go"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// fakeDrainResponder subscribes a stand-in vpcd to vpc.dhcp.drain that
// replies with the given released count (or error), mirroring
// Manager.handleDrainMsg without a real lease store.
func fakeDrainResponder(t *testing.T, nc *nats.Conn, released int, errMsg string) {
t.Helper()
sub, err := nc.Subscribe(dhcp.TopicDrain, func(msg *nats.Msg) {
body, _ := json.Marshal(struct {
Released int `json:"released"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
}{Released: released, Error: errMsg})
_ = msg.Respond(body)
})
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sub.Unsubscribe() })
}
func TestDrainDHCPLeasesSumsReleased(t *testing.T) {
_, nc, _ := testutil.StartTestJetStream(t)
fakeDrainResponder(t, nc, 7, "")
released, responders := drainDHCPLeases(nc, 2*time.Second)
assert.Equal(t, 7, released)
assert.Equal(t, 1, responders)
}
func TestDrainDHCPLeasesReportsResponderError(t *testing.T) {
_, nc, _ := testutil.StartTestJetStream(t)
fakeDrainResponder(t, nc, 0, "list leases for drain: boom")
// An erroring responder still counts as a responder but contributes
// zero released leases.
released, responders := drainDHCPLeases(nc, 2*time.Second)
assert.Equal(t, 0, released)
assert.Equal(t, 1, responders)
}
func TestDrainDHCPLeasesNoResponders(t *testing.T) {
_, nc, _ := testutil.StartTestJetStream(t)
// No vpcd subscribed: the collection window elapses with zero replies.
released, responders := drainDHCPLeases(nc, 200*time.Millisecond)
assert.Equal(t, 0, released)
assert.Equal(t, 0, responders)
}
+10 -6
View File
@@ -19,8 +19,10 @@ package cmd
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"maps"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
@@ -206,11 +208,7 @@ func runGetNodes(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
for name := range respondedNodes {
nodeSet[name] = struct{}{}
}
nodeNames := make([]string, 0, len(nodeSet))
for name := range nodeSet {
nodeNames = append(nodeNames, name)
}
sort.Strings(nodeNames)
nodeNames := slices.Sorted(maps.Keys(nodeSet))
for _, name := range nodeNames {
nodeCfg := cfg.Nodes[name]
@@ -291,7 +289,7 @@ func runGetVMs(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
})
tableData := pterm.TableData{
{"INSTANCE", "STATUS", "TYPE", "VCPU", "MEM", "NODE", "IP", "AGE"},
{"INSTANCE", "STATUS", "HEALTH", "CRASHES", "TYPE", "VCPU", "MEM", "NODE", "IP", "AGE"},
}
for _, v := range allVMs {
@@ -299,9 +297,15 @@ func runGetVMs(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
if v.LaunchTime > 0 {
age = formatUptime(time.Now().Unix() - v.LaunchTime)
}
health := v.Health
if health == "" {
health = "-"
}
tableData = append(tableData, []string{
v.InstanceID,
v.Status,
health,
strconv.Itoa(v.CrashCount),
v.InstanceType,
strconv.Itoa(v.VCPU),
formatMemGB(v.MemoryGB),
+12 -3
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
# AWS Gateway configuration file in TOML format.
version = "2"
version = "3"
region = "{{.Region}}"
# Enable verbose debugging
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ debug = false
# API request throttling (per-account, per-action token bucket)
[ratelimit]
enabled = false
rate = 20 # Default sustained requests per second per account per action
burst = 100 # Default maximum burst capacity
rate = 20 # Default sustained requests per second per account per action
burst = 100 # Default maximum burst capacity
[ratelimit.action.RunInstances]
rate = 2
@@ -26,3 +26,12 @@ burst = 40
[ratelimit.action.StopInstances]
rate = 2
burst = 40
# Per-account service quotas (default off)
[quota]
enabled = false
vcpus = 8
vpcs = 8
subnets = 16
eips = 4
volumes_gib = 100
@@ -75,3 +75,8 @@ nats_token = "{{.NatsToken}}"
nats_ca_cert = "{{.ConfigDir}}/ca.pem"
master_key_path = "{{.ConfigDir}}/master.key"
access_keys_bucket = "spinifex-iam-access-keys"
{{- if .CompactionIntervalSeconds}}
[compaction]
interval_seconds = {{.CompactionIntervalSeconds}}
{{- end}}
+6 -1
View File
@@ -103,4 +103,9 @@ nats_url = "nats://{{if eq .BindIP "0.0.0.0"}}localhost{{else}}{{.BindIP}}{{end}
nats_token = "{{.NatsToken}}"
nats_ca_cert = "{{.ConfigDir}}/ca.pem"
master_key_path = "{{.ConfigDir}}/master.key"
access_keys_bucket = "spinifex-iam-access-keys"
access_keys_bucket = "spinifex-iam-access-keys"
{{- if .CompactionIntervalSeconds}}
[compaction]
interval_seconds = {{.CompactionIntervalSeconds}}
{{- end}}
+7
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ node = "{{.Node}}"
email = "{{.OperatorEmail}}"
{{- end}}
[aws]
region = "{{.Region}}"
internal_suffix = "spinifex.internal"
[network]
ipsec_enabled = {{.IPSecEnabled}}
{{- if .ExternalMode}}
@@ -93,6 +97,9 @@ token = "{{.NatsToken}}"
[nodes.{{.Node}}.viperblock]
shardwal = false
{{- if .EncryptionKeyFile}}
encryption_key_file = "{{.EncryptionKeyFile}}"
{{- end}}
[nodes.{{.Node}}.vpcd]
ovn_nb_addr = "{{.OVNNBAddr}}"
+4 -11
View File
@@ -19,8 +19,9 @@ package cmd
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"maps"
"os"
"sort"
"slices"
"strconv"
"time"
@@ -81,11 +82,7 @@ func runTopNodes(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
for name := range respondedNodes {
nodeSet[name] = struct{}{}
}
nodeNames := make([]string, 0, len(nodeSet))
for name := range nodeSet {
nodeNames = append(nodeNames, name)
}
sort.Strings(nodeNames)
nodeNames := slices.Sorted(maps.Keys(nodeSet))
nodeTable := pterm.TableData{
{"NAME", "CPU (used/total)", "MEM (used/total)", "GPU (used/total)", "VMs"},
@@ -141,11 +138,7 @@ func runTopNodes(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
fmt.Println()
capNames := make([]string, 0, len(capacityMap))
for name := range capacityMap {
capNames = append(capNames, name)
}
sort.Strings(capNames)
capNames := slices.Sorted(maps.Keys(capacityMap))
capTable := pterm.TableData{
{"INSTANCE TYPE", "AVAILABLE", "VCPU", "MEMORY"},
-183
View File
@@ -1,183 +0,0 @@
# Spinifex Systemd Service
This directory contains the systemd service configuration for running Spinifex services on Ubuntu and Debian systems.
## Files
- `spinifex.service` - The systemd service file that manages all Spinifex services
- `install-spinifex-service.sh` - Installation script to set up the service
- `README.md` - This documentation file
## Installation
### Prerequisites
1. Ensure Spinifex is installed in `/opt/spinifex/`
2. Ensure the `spx` binary is available at `/opt/spinifex/bin/spx`
3. Run the installation script as root
### Setup Configuration
```
/opt/spinifex/bin/spx admin init
```
This will init the Spinifex environment and create the default configuration files in the home directory, e.g `~/spinifex/`.
```
/home/username/spinifex:
amis config images logs nats predastore state viperblock volumes
/home/username/spinifex/amis:
/home/username/spinifex/config:
awsgw spinifex.toml nats predastore server.key server.pem
/home/username/spinifex/config/awsgw:
awsgw.toml
/home/username/spinifex/config/nats:
nats.conf
/home/username/spinifex/config/predastore:
predastore.toml
/home/username/spinifex/images:
/home/username/spinifex/logs:
awsgw.log awsgw.pid spinifex.log spinifex.pid nats.log nats.pid predastore.log predastore.pid viperblock.log viperblock.pid
/home/username/spinifex/nats:
/home/username/spinifex/predastore:
data
/home/username/spinifex/predastore/data:
predastore
/home/ben/spinifex/state:
/home/ben/spinifex/viperblock:
/home/ben/spinifex/volumes:
```
### Quick Installation
```bash
sudo ./config/install-spinifex-service.sh
```
### Manual Installation
If you prefer to install manually:
1. Copy the service file:
```bash
sudo cp config/spinifex.service /etc/systemd/system/
```
2. Reload systemd:
```bash
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
```
3. Enable the service:
```bash
sudo systemctl enable spinifex.service
```
## Service Management
### Start the service
```bash
sudo systemctl start spinifex
```
### Stop the service
```bash
sudo systemctl stop spinifex
```
### Check service status
```bash
sudo systemctl status spinifex
```
### Restart the service
```bash
sudo systemctl restart spinifex
```
### View service logs
```bash
sudo journalctl -u spinifex -f
```
### Disable auto-start
```bash
sudo systemctl disable spinifex
```
## Service Details
The `spinifex.service` file:
- Starts services in the correct order: NATS → Predastore → Viperblock
- Includes proper delays between service starts to ensure dependencies are ready
- Stops services in reverse order during shutdown
- Runs as root (required for system services)
- Includes security hardening settings
- Provides proper logging to systemd journal
- Automatically restarts on failure
## Service Order
The service starts the following components in order:
1. **NATS** - Message broker service
2. **Predastore** - Data storage service (waits 3 seconds after NATS)
3. **Viperblock** - Block storage service (waits 2 seconds after Predastore)
## Troubleshooting
### Check if the service is running
```bash
sudo systemctl is-active spinifex
```
### View recent logs
```bash
sudo journalctl -u spinifex --since "1 hour ago"
```
### Check service configuration
```bash
sudo systemctl cat spinifex
```
### Verify binary exists
```bash
ls -la /opt/spinifex/bin/spx
```
### Test service commands manually
```bash
/opt/spinifex/bin/spx service nats start
/opt/spinifex/bin/spx service predastore start
/opt/spinifex/bin/spx service viperblock start
```
## Customization
If you need to modify the service configuration:
1. Edit the service file: `sudo nano /etc/systemd/system/spinifex.service`
2. Reload systemd: `sudo systemctl daemon-reload`
3. Restart the service: `sudo systemctl restart spinifex`
## Security Notes
- The service runs as root, which is necessary for system-level services
- Security hardening is enabled with `ProtectSystem=strict` and `NoNewPrivileges=true`
- Only specific paths are writable: `/opt/spinifex`, `/var/log`, `/var/run`
-74
View File
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Spinifex Service Installation Script
# This script installs the spinifex systemd service on Ubuntu/Debian systems
set -e
# Colors for output
RED='\033[0;31m'
GREEN='\033[0;32m'
YELLOW='\033[1;33m'
NC='\033[0m' # No Color
# Function to print colored output
print_status() {
echo -e "${GREEN}[INFO]${NC} $1"
}
print_warning() {
echo -e "${YELLOW}[WARNING]${NC} $1"
}
print_error() {
echo -e "${RED}[ERROR]${NC} $1"
}
# Check if running as root
if [[ $EUID -ne 0 ]]; then
print_error "This script must be run as root (use sudo)"
exit 1
fi
# Check if systemd is available
if ! command -v systemctl &> /dev/null; then
print_error "systemd is not available on this system"
exit 1
fi
# Get the directory where this script is located
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
SERVICE_FILE="$SCRIPT_DIR/spinifex.service"
# Check if service file exists
if [[ ! -f "$SERVICE_FILE" ]]; then
print_error "Service file not found at $SERVICE_FILE"
exit 1
fi
print_status "Installing Spinifex systemd service..."
# Copy service file to systemd directory
cp "$SERVICE_FILE" /etc/systemd/system/
# Reload systemd to recognize the new service
systemctl daemon-reload
# Enable the service to start on boot
systemctl enable spinifex.service
print_status "Service installed successfully!"
print_status "You can now use the following commands:"
echo " systemctl start spinifex # Start the service"
echo " systemctl stop spinifex # Stop the service"
echo " systemctl status spinifex # Check service status"
echo " systemctl restart spinifex # Restart the service"
echo " journalctl -u spinifex -f # View service logs"
# Check if spinifex binary exists
if [[ ! -f "/opt/spinifex/bin/spinifex" ]]; then
print_warning "Spinifex binary not found at /opt/spinifex/bin/spinifex"
print_warning "Please ensure spinifex is installed in /opt/spinifex before starting the service"
fi
print_status "Installation complete!"
-80
View File
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
# Predastore S3-compatible storage configuration file in TOML format.
# MULTI NODE used for testing
version = "1.0"
region = "ap-southeast-2"
# Optionally configure port and host, or specify via daemon CLI options
host = "0.0.0.0"
port = 8443
# Enable verbose debugging
debug = false
# Optionally configure base-path if full directory path not defined for "fs" buckets
# base_path = "/home/predastore/data/"
# Specify reed solomon encoding
[rs]
data = 2
parity = 1
[[db]]
id = 1
host = "127.0.0.1"
port = 6660
#raft_port = 7660 # Optional: Raft consensus port (default: port + 1000)
#advertise_host = "" # Optional: Address to advertise to other Raft nodes
path = "distributed/db/node-1/"
access_key_id = "X"
secret_access_key = "X"
leader = true # Bootstrap leader hint
[[db]]
id = 2
host = "127.0.0.1"
port = 6661
path = "distributed/db/node-2/"
access_key_id = "X"
secret_access_key = "X"
[[db]]
id = 3
host = "127.0.0.1"
port = 6662
path = "distributed/db/node-3/"
access_key_id = "X"
secret_access_key = "X"
[[nodes]]
id = 1
host = "0.0.0.0"
port = 9991
path = "distributed/nodes/node-1/"
[[nodes]]
id = 2
host = "0.0.0.0"
port = 9992
path = "distributed/nodes/node-2/"
[[nodes]]
id = 3
host = "0.0.0.0"
port = 9993
path = "distributed/nodes/node-3/"
[[buckets]]
name = "predastore"
region = "ap-southeast-2"
type = "distributed"
public = false
encryption = ""
[[auth]]
access_key_id = "X"
secret_access_key = "X"
policy = [
{ bucket = "predastore", actions = ["s3:ListBucket", "s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject", "s3:DeleteObject", "s3:ListAllMyBuckets"] },
]
-49
View File
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=Spinifex Services
Documentation=https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex
After=network.target
Wants=network.target
[Service]
Type=oneshot
RemainAfterExit=yes
User=root
Group=root
WorkingDirectory=/opt/spinifex
Environment=PATH=/opt/spinifex/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
# Start NATS service
ExecStart=/opt/spinifex/bin/spinifex service nats start
ExecStartPost=/bin/sleep 3
# Start Predastore service
ExecStart=/opt/spinifex/bin/spinifex service predastore start
ExecStartPost=/bin/sleep 2
# Start Viperblock service
ExecStart=/opt/spinifex/bin/spinifex service viperblock start
# Stop services in reverse order
ExecStop=/opt/spinifex/bin/spinifex service viperblock stop
ExecStopPost=/bin/sleep 2
ExecStop=/opt/spinifex/bin/spinifex service predastore stop
ExecStopPost=/bin/sleep 2
ExecStop=/opt/spinifex/bin/spinifex service nats stop
# Restart policy
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=10
# Security settings
NoNewPrivileges=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=true
ReadWritePaths=/opt/spinifex /var/log /var/run
# Logging
StandardOutput=journal
StandardError=journal
SyslogIdentifier=spinifex
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
+134 -21
View File
@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ Operational commands for inspecting cluster state. These fan out NATS requests t
| Command | Flags | Description |
|---------|-------|-------------|
| `spx admin cluster shutdown` | `--force` (shutdown even if nodes don't respond), `--timeout` (max wait per phase, default 120s), `--dry-run` (print phase plan without executing) | Performs coordinated, phased shutdown of entire cluster. Phases execute in order: GATE (stop API/UI) → DRAIN (stop VMs) → STORAGE (stop viperblock) → PERSIST (stop predastore) → INFRA (stop NATS/daemon). Each phase waits for all nodes to ACK before proceeding. Uses JetStream state tracking. |
| `spx admin cluster drain-dhcp` | `--timeout` (reply-collection window, default 30s) | Asks each vpcd to DHCPRELEASE every external-pool DHCP lease it currently holds, returning them to the upstream DHCP server. Run on teardown before stopping services — an env reset otherwise strands held leases upstream until their TTL expires, eventually exhausting the upstream scope. Best-effort: warns and exits 0 if the cluster is already down. |
| `spx admin node drain --local` | `--local` (drain the local node only, required), `--timeout` (max wait per phase, default 120s) | Runs the GATE and DRAIN phases against the local node only: powers down its guests via QMP and unmounts their volumes (flushing the viperblock WAL) while every service is still up. STORAGE/PERSIST/INFRA are left to systemd's ordered teardown. Wired as the `ExecStop` of `spinifex-shutdown.service`, so `systemctl stop spinifex.target` and host reboot/poweroff drain guests before any storage service stops. |
### Certificate Management
@@ -89,7 +91,7 @@ Operational commands for inspecting cluster state. These fan out NATS requests t
| Command | Flags | Description |
|---------|-------|-------------|
| `spx admin images import` | `--name`, `--file`, `--distro`, `--version`, `--arch`, `--platform`, `--boot-mode` (bios/uefi/uefi-preferred), `--tag`, `--force`, `--skip-verify` | Catalog imports (`--name`) download the image, fetch the catalog `Checksum` URL, verify the SHA-256/SHA-512 digest, and inherit `BootMode` from the catalog entry. `--boot-mode` overrides the catalog value when set. Mismatch fails closed; the cached file is left on disk and `--force` re-downloads. `--file` imports skip checksum verification (operator-supplied media is outside Spinifex's trust boundary, the skip is logged at INFO for audit) and require an explicit `--boot-mode` because there is no catalog metadata to inherit from. `--skip-verify` bypasses verification for catalog imports and emits a WARN slog + stderr notice; use only for debugging or when upstream mirrors are confirmed-broken. |
| `spx admin images import` | `--name`, `--file`, `--distro`, `--version`, `--arch`, `--platform`, `--boot-mode` (bios/uefi/uefi-preferred), `--tag`, `--force`, `--skip-verify` | Catalog imports (`--name`) download the image, fetch the catalog `Checksum` URL, verify the SHA-256/SHA-512 digest, and inherit `BootMode` from the catalog entry. `--boot-mode` overrides the catalog value when set. Mismatch fails closed; the cached file is left on disk and `--force` re-downloads. `--file` imports skip checksum verification (operator-supplied media is outside Spinifex's trust boundary, the skip is logged at INFO for audit) and require an explicit `--boot-mode` because there is no catalog metadata to inherit from. `--skip-verify` bypasses verification for catalog imports and emits a WARN slog + stderr notice; use only for debugging or when upstream mirrors are confirmed-broken. On every import a best-effort `virt-customize` step bakes the deployment CA (`<data-root>/config/ca.pem`) into the image's trust store before the block copy, so in-guest SDK-over-TLS calls to Spinifex endpoints trust the gateway from first boot; an image libguestfs cannot customize is imported as-is (CA-free) and logs a skip. Because the CA is fixed into the image, rotating the cluster CA requires re-importing affected images. |
| `spx admin images list` | — | Lists available OS images that can be imported or downloaded |
| `spx admin images remove` | `--image-id` (required), `--force`, `--yes` | Loads `ami-<id>/config.json`, walks transitive dependents — copied snapshots whose `VolumeID == imageID`, volumes whose `SnapshotID` references the internal `snap-ami-<id>` or any derived snap, and account AMIs created via `CopyImage` whose `SnapshotID` is a derived snap — then prompts (skipped with `--yes`) before deleting `ami-<id>/config.json` (the DescribeImages barrier) followed by the rest of `ami-<id>/` and `snap-ami-<id>/`. Account-owned AMIs are refused with a hint pointing at `aws ec2 deregister-image` + `aws ec2 delete-snapshot`. `--force` bypasses the dependency, ownership and config-corrupt checks for salvage of orphaned blocks. |
@@ -112,7 +114,7 @@ Operational commands for inspecting cluster state. These fan out NATS requests t
| Command | Implemented Flags | Missing Flags | Status |
|---------|-------------------|---------------|--------|
| `run-instances` | `--image-id`, `--instance-type`, `--count`, `--key-name`, `--user-data`, `--subnet-id`, `--block-device-mappings` (DeviceName, VolumeSize, VolumeType, Iops, DeleteOnTermination), `--placement` (GroupName), `--iam-instance-profile` (Name/Arn) | `--security-group-ids`, `--tag-specifications`, `--dry-run`, `--client-token`, `--disable-api-termination`, `--ebs-optimized`, `--network-interfaces`, `--private-ip-address`, `--monitoring`, `--credit-specification`, `--cpu-options`, `--metadata-options`, `--launch-template`, `--hibernate-options` | **DONE** |
| `run-instances` | `--image-id`, `--instance-type`, `--count`, `--key-name`, `--user-data`, `--subnet-id`, `--security-group-ids`, `--tag-specifications` (instance-scoped), `--block-device-mappings` (DeviceName, VolumeSize, VolumeType, Iops, DeleteOnTermination), `--placement` (GroupName), `--iam-instance-profile` (Name/Arn), `--capacity-reservation-specification` (CapacityReservationTarget.CapacityReservationId, targeted-by-id only), `--metadata-options` (HttpPutResponseHopLimit; IMDSv2-only enforced — rejects `http-tokens=optional`) | `--dry-run`, `--client-token`, `--disable-api-termination`, `--ebs-optimized`, `--network-interfaces`, `--private-ip-address`, `--monitoring`, `--credit-specification`, `--cpu-options`, `--launch-template`, `--hibernate-options` | **DONE** |
| `describe-instances` | `--instance-ids`, `--filters` (instance-state-name, instance-id, instance-type, vpc-id, subnet-id, tag:*, tag-key, tag-value) | `--max-results`, `--next-token`, `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
| `start-instances` | `--instance-ids` | `--dry-run`, `--force` | **DONE** |
| `stop-instances` | `--instance-ids` | `--force`, `--hibernate`, `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
@@ -122,6 +124,7 @@ Operational commands for inspecting cluster state. These fan out NATS requests t
| `modify-instance-attribute` | `--instance-id`, `--instance-type`, `--user-data`, `--disable-api-termination` | `--ebs-optimized`, `--source-dest-check`, `--instance-initiated-shutdown-behavior`, `--block-device-mappings`, `--groups`, `--ena-support`, `--sriov-net-support` | **DONE** |
| `get-console-output` | `--instance-id` | `--latest`, `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
| `describe-instance-attribute` | `--instance-id`, `--attribute` (instanceType, userData, disableApiTermination, instanceInitiatedShutdownBehavior, disableApiStop, ebsOptimized, enaSupport, sourceDestCheck, rootDeviceName, kernel, ramdisk) | `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
| `modify-instance-metadata-options` | `--instance-id`, `--http-put-response-hop-limit` (1–64), `--http-tokens` (`required`), `--http-endpoint` (`enabled`), `--http-protocol-ipv6`/`--instance-metadata-tags` (`disabled`) — secure values are no-ops, downgrades return `UnsupportedOperation` | `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
| `describe-instance-credit-specifications` | `--instance-ids` | `--filters`, `--max-results`, `--dry-run` | **DONE** (stub — always returns `standard`) |
| `describe-instance-status` | `--instance-ids`, `--include-all-instances`, `--filters` (availability-zone, instance-state-code, instance-state-name, tag:*) | `--max-results`, `--next-token`, `--dry-run`, event/instance-status/system-status filters | **DONE** (static health) |
| `monitor-instances` | — | `--instance-ids` | **NOT STARTED** |
@@ -131,6 +134,18 @@ Operational commands for inspecting cluster state. These fan out NATS requests t
role ARN and rejects cross-account profile ARNs. Placement strategies: `spread`
(1 per node, atomic CAS) and `cluster` (pin all to one node).
`run-instances --capacity-reservation-specification` consumes a reserved slot on
the node owning the targeted reservation (targeted-by-id only; `open`
auto-matching is not supported). The combination with `--placement` (group) is
rejected. `describe-instances` then reports the instance's `CapacityReservationId`.
`modify-instance-metadata-options` is the only metadata-options mutator — AWS has
no `get-instance-metadata-options` API, so the per-instance block is read through
`describe-instances`. Only the hop limit is mutable; `--http-tokens optional` and
the other posture-weakening values are refused with `UnsupportedOperation`, since
the platform enforces IMDSv2 permanently. `run-instances --metadata-options` runs
the same validation at launch.
### EC2 — IAM Instance Profile Associations
Stored as `vm.VM.IamInstanceProfileArn` + `IamInstanceProfileAssociationId`
@@ -183,7 +198,7 @@ input but treat it as `uefi` at launch.
| `attach-volume` | `--volume-id`, `--instance-id`, `--device` (auto-assigns `/dev/sd[f-p]`) | `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
| `detach-volume` | `--volume-id`, `--instance-id` (optional), `--device`, `--force` | `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
| `describe-volume-status` | `--volume-ids`, `--filters` (volume-id, volume-status.status, availability-zone) | `--max-results`, `--next-token`, `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
| `describe-volumes-modifications` | — | `--volume-ids`, `--filters`, `--max-results` | **NOT STARTED** |
| `describe-volumes-modifications` | `--volume-ids`, `--filters` (modification-state, original-iops, original-size, original-volume-type, start-time, target-iops, target-size, target-volume-type, volume-id) | `--max-results`, `--next-token`, `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
### EC2 — Snapshots
@@ -233,6 +248,11 @@ by downstream services.
| `modify-instance-metadata-defaults` | — | `--http-tokens`, `--http-put-response-hop-limit`, `--http-endpoint`, `--instance-metadata-tags` | **NOT STARTED** |
| `get-instance-metadata-defaults` | — | `--dry-run` | **NOT STARTED** |
The account-level `modify-/get-instance-metadata-defaults` are blocked on an
`aws-sdk-go` bump: the `InstanceMetadataDefaultsResponse` type is absent from the
pinned v1.44.266 (these APIs landed ~March 2024), and the gateway's generic
handler needs the typed input struct to route them.
### EC2 — VPC Core
| Command | Implemented Flags | Missing Flags | Status |
@@ -432,9 +452,9 @@ EIP commands are only registered when an external IPAM pool is configured.
| `delete-dhcp-options` | — | `--dhcp-options-id`, `--dry-run` | **NOT STARTED** |
| `describe-dhcp-options` | — | `--dhcp-options-ids`, `--filters`, `--max-results` | **NOT STARTED** |
| `associate-dhcp-options` | — | `--dhcp-options-id`, `--vpc-id`, `--dry-run` | **NOT STARTED** |
| `create-capacity-reservation` | — | `--instance-type`, `--instance-platform`, `--availability-zone`, `--instance-count`, `--end-date`, `--end-date-type`, `--instance-match-criteria`, `--tag-specifications` | **NOT STARTED** |
| `cancel-capacity-reservation` | — | `--capacity-reservation-id`, `--dry-run` | **NOT STARTED** |
| `describe-capacity-reservations` | — | `--capacity-reservation-ids`, `--filters`, `--max-results` | **NOT STARTED** |
| `create-capacity-reservation` | `--instance-type`, `--instance-count`, `--availability-zone`, `--instance-platform`, `--instance-match-criteria`, `--tenancy` (default only), `--dry-run` | `--end-date`, `--end-date-type` (unlimited only), `--availability-zone-id`, `--tag-specifications` | **DONE** |
| `cancel-capacity-reservation` | `--capacity-reservation-id`, `--dry-run` | — | **DONE** |
| `describe-capacity-reservations` | `--capacity-reservation-ids`, `--filters` | `--max-results`, `--next-token` | **DONE** |
| `modify-capacity-reservation` | — | `--capacity-reservation-id`, `--instance-count`, `--end-date`, `--end-date-type` | **NOT STARTED** |
### EC2 — Misc
@@ -488,6 +508,7 @@ bypasses policy evaluation entirely.
| `create-policy` | `--policy-name`, `--policy-document`, `--path`, `--description` | `--tags` | **DONE** |
| `get-policy` | `--policy-arn` | — | **DONE** |
| `get-policy-version` | `--policy-arn`, `--version-id` | — | **DONE** |
| `list-policy-versions` | `--policy-arn` | `--max-items`, `--marker` | **DONE** |
| `list-policies` | — | `--scope`, `--only-attached`, `--path-prefix`, `--max-items`, `--marker` | **DONE** |
| `delete-policy` | `--policy-arn` | — | **DONE** |
| `attach-user-policy` | `--user-name`, `--policy-arn` | — | **DONE** |
@@ -507,6 +528,10 @@ bypasses policy evaluation entirely.
| `attach-role-policy` | `--role-name`, `--policy-arn` | — | **DONE** |
| `detach-role-policy` | `--role-name`, `--policy-arn` | — | **DONE** |
| `list-attached-role-policies` | `--role-name`, `--path-prefix` | `--max-items`, `--marker` | **DONE** |
| `list-role-policies` | `--role-name` | `--max-items`, `--marker` | **DONE** |
| `put-role-policy` | `--role-name`, `--policy-name`, `--policy-document` | — | **DONE** |
| `get-role-policy` | `--role-name`, `--policy-name` | — | **DONE** (document returned as raw JSON, not URL-encoded) |
| `delete-role-policy` | `--role-name`, `--policy-name` | — | **DONE** |
### IAM — Instance Profiles
@@ -520,6 +545,19 @@ bypasses policy evaluation entirely.
| `add-role-to-instance-profile` | `--instance-profile-name`, `--role-name` | — | **DONE** |
| `remove-role-from-instance-profile` | `--instance-profile-name`, `--role-name` | — | **DONE** |
### IAM — OIDC Providers
| Command | Implemented Flags | Missing Flags | Status |
|---------|-------------------|---------------|--------|
| `create-open-id-connect-provider` | `--url`, `--client-id-list`, `--thumbprint-list`, `--tags` | — | **DONE** |
| `get-open-id-connect-provider` | `--open-id-connect-provider-arn` | — | **DONE** |
| `list-open-id-connect-providers` | — | — | **DONE** |
| `delete-open-id-connect-provider` | `--open-id-connect-provider-arn` | — | **DONE** |
| `add-client-id-to-open-id-connect-provider` | — | `--open-id-connect-provider-arn`, `--client-id` | **NOT STARTED** |
| `remove-client-id-from-open-id-connect-provider` | — | `--open-id-connect-provider-arn`, `--client-id` | **NOT STARTED** |
| `update-open-id-connect-provider-thumbprint` | — | `--open-id-connect-provider-arn`, `--thumbprint-list` | **NOT STARTED** |
| `tag-open-id-connect-provider` / `untag-open-id-connect-provider` | — | `--open-id-connect-provider-arn`, `--tags`/`--tag-keys` | **NOT STARTED** |
### IAM — Groups
| Command | Implemented Flags | Missing Flags | Status |
@@ -544,16 +582,13 @@ bypasses policy evaluation entirely.
| `get-caller-identity` | — | — | **DONE** |
| `assume-role` | `--role-arn`, `--role-session-name`, `--duration-seconds` (900–min(role MaxSessionDuration, 43200)) | `--policy`, `--policy-arns` (→ `PackedPolicyTooLarge`); `--tags`, `--transitive-tag-keys` (→ `InvalidParameterValue`); `--serial-number`, `--token-code` (→ `InvalidParameterValue`); `--external-id`, `--source-identity` (accepted and logged, **not enforced** — no Condition evaluator in v1) | **DONE** |
| `get-session-token` | `--duration-seconds` (900–129600, default 43200 = 12h; clamped, not rejected) | `--serial-number`, `--token-code` (MFA → `InvalidParameterValue`) | **DONE** |
| `assume-role-with-web-identity` | — | `--role-arn`, `--role-session-name`, `--web-identity-token`, `--provider-id`, `--policy`, `--policy-arns`, `--duration-seconds` | **NOT STARTED** |
| `assume-role-with-web-identity` | `--role-arn`, `--role-session-name`, `--web-identity-token`, `--duration-seconds` (900–43200, default 3600) | `--provider-id`; `--policy`, `--policy-arns` (→ `PackedPolicyTooLarge`) | **DONE** |
| `assume-role-with-saml` | — | `--role-arn`, `--principal-arn`, `--saml-assertion`, `--policy`, `--policy-arns`, `--duration-seconds` | **NOT STARTED** |
| `get-access-key-info` | — | `--access-key-id` | **NOT STARTED** |
| `get-federation-token` | — | `--name`, `--policy`, `--policy-arns`, `--duration-seconds`, `--tags` | **NOT STARTED** |
| `decode-authorization-message` | — | `--encoded-message` | **NOT STARTED** |
Trust policies stored on roles (`AssumeRolePolicyDocument`) reject `Condition`,
`NotPrincipal`, `NotAction`, empty-string `Action` elements, and empty
`Principal` blocks at write time (`MalformedPolicyDocument`) — v1 has no
Condition evaluator so accepting them would silently allow.
Trust policies stored on roles (`AssumeRolePolicyDocument`) reject `Condition`, `NotPrincipal`, `NotAction`, empty-string `Action` elements, and empty `Principal` blocks at write time (`MalformedPolicyDocument`) — v1 has no Condition evaluator so accepting them would silently allow.
---
@@ -563,6 +598,8 @@ Available at `169.254.169.254` from inside every running guest VM, matching AWS.
**IMDSv2-only.** Every read requires a session token. A tokenless (v1-style) `GET` returns `401 Unauthorized` with an empty body. Obtain a token with a `PUT /latest/api/token` carrying `X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds` (1–21600), then send it back in `X-aws-ec2-metadata-token` on every read.
The EC2 control plane reports this posture faithfully: `describe-instances` returns `MetadataOptions.HttpTokens=required`, and `run-instances`/`modify-instance-metadata-options` reject `--http-tokens optional` (and `--http-endpoint disabled`) with `UnsupportedOperation` — exactly as AWS does under account-level IMDSv2 enforcement.
```bash
# Inside the guest VM:
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" \
@@ -579,24 +616,42 @@ curl -i http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/instance-id
| Path | Method | Source | Status |
|------|--------|--------|--------|
| `/latest/api/token` | PUT | Issues an ENI-bound IMDSv2 token; `X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds` ∈ [1, 21600] required | **DONE** |
| `/` | GET | Supported API-version list (`2021-07-15`, `latest`); token-gated | **DONE** |
| `/latest` | GET | Top-level tree listing (`dynamic`, `meta-data`, `user-data`) | **DONE** |
| `/<date>/...` | GET/PUT | Any dated API version aliases to `/latest` (cloud-init parity) | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/` | GET | Directory listing of supported children | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/instance-id` | GET | `vm.ID` | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/instance-type` | GET | `vm.InstanceType` | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/ami-id` | GET | launch `ImageId` | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/ami-launch-index` | GET | Per-instance launch index (`0..n-1`), contiguous on partial failure | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/reservation-id` | GET | `DescribeInstances` `Reservation.ReservationId` | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/instance-life-cycle` | GET | `on-demand` (Spot not modelled) | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/local-ipv4` | GET | `ENIRecord.PrivateIpAddress` (== request source IP) | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/public-ipv4` | GET | EIP, else instance public IP; empty body if none | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/public-hostname` | GET | Mirrors `public-ipv4`; 404 when no public IP | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/mac` | GET | `ENIRecord.MacAddress` | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/security-groups` | GET | `ENIRecord.SecurityGroupIds`, newline-separated | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/hostname`, `/local-hostname` | GET | Synthesised `ip-<dashed-ip>.<region>.compute.internal` | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/placement/availability-zone` | GET | `ENIRecord.AvailabilityZone` | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/placement/region` | GET | Derived from AZ (trailing letter stripped) | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/services/{domain,partition}` | GET | Static: `amazonaws.com` / `aws` | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/iam/info` | GET | `{InstanceProfileArn, InstanceProfileId}`; 404 if no profile | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/` | GET | Role name(s) under the profile, one per line; empty body if none | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>` | GET | STS `AssumeRoleForInstance` → ASIA-prefixed temporary credential JSON | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/public-keys/` | GET | `0=<keyName>` from the launch key pair; 404 if none | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/public-keys/0/` | GET | `openssh-key` (format list for index 0) | **DONE** |
| `/latest/meta-data/public-keys/0/openssh-key` | GET | Launch SSH public key, live-fetched from the key store; 404 if the key was deleted, 500 on backend fault | **DONE** |
| `/latest/user-data` | GET | `vm.UserData`; 404 if none | **DONE** |
| `/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/document` | GET | Needs a per-cluster signing key | **NOT STARTED** (404; lands with EKS IRSA) |
| `/latest/meta-data/network/interfaces/...` | GET | Multi-ENI rendering | **NOT STARTED** (404) |
| `/latest/meta-data/tags/...` | GET | Instance-tag metadata | **NOT STARTED** (404) |
| `/latest/dynamic` | GET | Lists `instance-identity/` | **DONE** |
| `/latest/dynamic/instance-identity` | GET | Lists `document` (signed forms listed when the signing key lands) | **DONE** |
| `/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/document` | GET | Unsigned identity document from resolved ENI + instance facts | **DONE** |
| `/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/{signature,pkcs7,rsa2048}` | GET | Signed forms; need a per-cluster signing key | **NOT STARTED** (404; lands with EKS IRSA) |
| `/latest/meta-data/network/interfaces/macs/<mac>/...` | GET | Primary ENI subtree: `mac`, `device-number`, `interface-id`, `owner-id`, `subnet-id`, `vpc-id`, `local-ipv4s`, `local-hostname`, `security-group-ids`, `security-groups`, `subnet-ipv4-cidr-block`, `vpc-ipv4-cidr-block(s)`, and `public-ipv4s`/`public-hostname` when an EIP is attached | **DONE** (single-NIC; multi-ENI deferred) |
| `/latest/meta-data/tags/instance/<key>` | GET | Instance-tag metadata; gated on `InstanceMetadataTags` enablement | **NOT STARTED** (404) |
| `/latest/meta-data/block-device-mapping/...` | GET | `ami`/`root`/`ebsN`/`ephemeralN` device map | **NOT STARTED** (404) |
| `/latest/meta-data/placement/{group-name,partition-number,availability-zone-id,host-id}` | GET | Placement extras beyond `availability-zone`/`region` | **NOT STARTED** (404) |
| `/latest/meta-data/instance-action` | GET | `none` unless interruptible instances ship | **NOT STARTED** (404) |
| `/latest/meta-data/spot/{instance-action,termination-time}` | GET | Only meaningful once Spot is modelled | **NOT STARTED** (404) |
---
@@ -632,10 +687,54 @@ The data plane uses a system-managed LB VM, launched automatically during `creat
| Command | Implemented Flags | Missing Flags | Status |
|---------|-------------------|---------------|--------|
| `create-listener` | `--load-balancer-arn`, `--default-actions` (Type=forward, TargetGroupArn), `--protocol` (HTTP), `--port` | `--ssl-policy`, `--certificates`, `--alpn-policy`, `--mutual-authentication`, `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
| `create-listener` | `--load-balancer-arn`, `--default-actions` (Type=forward, TargetGroupArn), `--protocol` (HTTP/HTTPS/TLS), `--port`, `--certificates` (HTTPS/TLS), `--ssl-policy` | `--alpn-policy`, `--mutual-authentication`, `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
| `modify-listener` | `--listener-arn`, `--protocol`, `--port`, `--default-actions`, `--certificates`, `--ssl-policy` | `--alpn-policy`, `--mutual-authentication`, `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
| `delete-listener` | `--listener-arn` | `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
| `describe-listeners` | `--load-balancer-arn`, `--listener-arns` | `--page-size`, `--marker`, `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
### ELBv2 — Listener Rules
| Command | Implemented Flags | Missing Flags | Status |
|---------|-------------------|---------------|--------|
| `create-rule` | `--listener-arn`, `--priority` (1–50000), `--conditions` (host-header, path-pattern, http-header, http-request-method, query-string, source-ip), `--actions` (forward, redirect, fixed-response), `--tags` | `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
| `modify-rule` | `--rule-arn`, `--conditions`, `--actions` | `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
| `delete-rule` | `--rule-arn` | `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
| `describe-rules` | `--listener-arn`, `--rule-arns` | `--page-size`, `--marker` (parsed, not enforced) | **DONE** |
| `set-rule-priorities` | `--rule-priorities` (RuleArn, Priority) | — | **DONE** |
A synthetic `default` rule is derived from the listener's `DefaultActions`.
### ELBv2 — Listener Certificates & SSL Policies
| Command | Implemented Flags | Missing Flags | Status |
|---------|-------------------|---------------|--------|
| `add-listener-certificates` | `--listener-arn`, `--certificates` | `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
| `remove-listener-certificates` | `--listener-arn`, `--certificates` | `--dry-run` | **DONE** |
| `describe-listener-certificates` | `--listener-arn` | `--page-size`, `--marker` | **DONE** |
| `describe-ssl-policies` | `--names` | `--load-balancer-type`, `--page-size`, `--marker` | **DONE** (static catalog: `ELBSecurityPolicy-FS-1-2-Res-2019-08`, `ELBSecurityPolicy-TLS13-1-2-2021-06` — metadata only, no in-platform TLS termination) |
The default certificate cannot be added/removed via these calls — set it on the listener.
### ELBv2 — Attributes & Modify
| Command | Implemented Flags | Missing Flags | Status |
|---------|-------------------|---------------|--------|
| `describe-load-balancer-attributes` | `--load-balancer-arn` | — | **DONE** (stored values over per-type defaults) |
| `modify-load-balancer-attributes` | `--load-balancer-arn`, `--attributes` | — | **DONE** (unknown keys → `ValidationError`) |
| `describe-target-group-attributes` | `--target-group-arn` | — | **DONE** |
| `modify-target-group-attributes` | `--target-group-arn`, `--attributes` (incl. `deregistration_delay.timeout_seconds`, `stickiness.*`) | — | **DONE** |
| `modify-target-group` | `--target-group-arn`, `--health-check-*`, `--matcher` | `--target-type`/`--protocol`/`--vpc-id` (immutable) | **DONE** |
| `describe-listener-attributes` | `--listener-arn` | — | **DONE** (stub — returns empty; not persisted) |
| `modify-listener-attributes` | `--listener-arn`, `--attributes` | — | **DONE** (stub — echoes input; not persisted) |
### ELBv2 — Network & Security
| Command | Implemented Flags | Missing Flags | Status |
|---------|-------------------|---------------|--------|
| `set-security-groups` | `--load-balancer-arn`, `--security-groups` | `--enforce-security-group-inbound-rules-on-private-link-traffic` | **DONE** (ALB only — NLB → `InvalidConfigurationRequest`) |
| `set-subnets` | `--load-balancer-arn`, `--subnets`, `--subnet-mappings` | `--ip-address-type` | **DONE** (live ENI add/remove with rollback) |
| `set-ip-address-type` | `--load-balancer-arn`, `--ip-address-type` (ipv4) | dualstack/IPv6 (rejected) | **DONE** |
### ELBv2 — Tags
| Command | Implemented Flags | Missing Flags | Status |
@@ -646,18 +745,32 @@ The data plane uses a system-managed LB VM, launched automatically during `creat
| Feature | Priority | Status |
|---------|----------|--------|
| Listener rules (CreateRule, DeleteRule, DescribeRules, ModifyRule) | High | **NOT STARTED** |
| HTTPS/TLS termination (SSL certificates, policies, ALPN) | High | **NOT STARTED** |
| Modify operations (`ModifyLoadBalancerAttributes`, `ModifyTargetGroup`, `ModifyTargetGroupAttributes`, `ModifyListener`) | Medium | **NOT STARTED** |
| Connection draining (deregistration delay) | Medium | **NOT STARTED** |
| Stickiness / session affinity | Medium | **NOT STARTED** |
| Active health checking (API-driven, vs. HAProxy-only today) | Medium | **NOT STARTED** |
| In-platform HTTPS/TLS termination (cert + SSL-policy APIs exist; data-plane TLS not terminated) | High | **NOT STARTED** |
| ALPN policy, mutual TLS (mTLS) | Medium | **NOT STARTED** |
| Listener attribute persistence (`Describe/ModifyListenerAttributes` are stubs) | Medium | **NOT STARTED** |
| Active health checking (API-driven, vs. HAProxy/nginx-only today) | Medium | **NOT STARTED** |
| IP and Lambda target types | Low | **NOT STARTED** |
| S3 access log delivery | Low | **NOT STARTED** |
| WAF integration | Low | **NOT STARTED** |
---
## ACM (AWS Certificate Manager)
Import-only — Spinifex stores externally-issued certificates for ELBv2 listener references; it does not issue certificates or validate domains (`RequestCertificate`). Certs are account-scoped; `describe`/`delete` enforce ownership.
| Command | Implemented Flags | Missing Flags | Status |
|---------|-------------------|---------------|--------|
| `import-certificate` | `--certificate`, `--private-key`, `--certificate-chain`, `--certificate-arn` (re-import) | `--tags` | **DONE** |
| `describe-certificate` | `--certificate-arn` | — | **DONE** |
| `list-certificates` | — | `--certificate-statuses`, `--includes`, `--max-items`, `--next-token` | **DONE** |
| `delete-certificate` | `--certificate-arn` | — | **DONE** |
| `request-certificate` | — | `--domain-name`, `--validation-method`, `--subject-alternative-names`, `--tags` | **NOT STARTED** |
| `add-tags-to-certificate` / `list-tags-for-certificate` / `remove-tags-from-certificate` | — | `--certificate-arn`, `--tags`/`--tag-keys` | **NOT STARTED** |
| `export-certificate` | — | `--certificate-arn`, `--passphrase` | **NOT STARTED** |
---
## CloudWatch (Basic Monitoring)
| Command | Implemented Flags | Missing Flags | Status |
+1 -2
View File
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ Daemons (`spinifex/daemon/daemon.go`) subscribe to NATS topics and handle reques
When a daemon handles `RunInstances`:
1. **Resource Check**: Validates CPU/memory availability via `ResourceManager`
2. **Volume Generation**: Creates boot, cloud-init, and EFI volumes via Viperblock
2. **Volume Generation**: Creates boot and EFI volumes via Viperblock
3. **Volume Mount**: Sends `ebs.mount` request to Viperblock, receives NBD URI
4. **QEMU Launch**: Builds and executes QEMU command with NBD-backed disks
5. **QMP Monitoring**: Establishes QEMU Machine Protocol connection for VM management
@@ -217,7 +217,6 @@ type EBSRequest struct {
VolType string // gp2, io1, etc.
Boot bool // Boot volume flag
EFI bool // EFI boot volume
CloudInit bool // Cloud-init volume
NBDURI string // NBD URI returned from mount
}
```
@@ -95,13 +95,6 @@ checksum, and registers it tagged `spinifex:managed-by=eks`. `eks create-cluster
and `eks create-nodegroup` resolve the boot AMI by that tag, so no further
configuration is needed.
Operators publishing a freshly built node image to the mirror run the
**Publish EKS node AMI** GitHub Actions workflow (manual dispatch; uses the
`CF_R2_*` repo secrets) or, locally, `make publish-eks-node-image` (see
`scripts/publish-system-image.sh`; requires `R2_ENDPOINT` + R2-scoped
`AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`/`AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`).
## Cluster Shutdown
Coordinated, phased shutdown of the entire cluster (API/UI → VMs → viperblock → predastore → NATS/daemon):
+1 -1
View File
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ In development mode, find the QEMU port forward and connect via localhost:
```bash
ps auxw | grep $INSTANCE_ID
ssh -i ~/.ssh/spinifex-key ec2-user@127.0.0.1 -p <port>
ssh -i ~/.ssh/spinifex-key ubuntu@127.0.0.1 -p <port>
```
For production SSH via public IPs, see [Setting Up Your Cluster](/docs/setting-up-your-cluster).
+188
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
---
title: "ECR (Container Registry)"
description: "Store and serve container images from Spinifex's AWS-compatible Elastic Container Registry — create a repository, authenticate Docker, push and pull images, and let your EKS workers pull from it, using the AWS CLI, the Spinifex console, or Terraform."
category: "Containers"
tags:
- ecr
- containers
- docker
- registry
- oci
sections:
- overview
- prerequisites
- instructions
- troubleshooting
resources:
- title: "Spinifex Repository"
url: "https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex"
- title: "Terraform AWS Provider — ECR"
url: "https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/aws/latest/docs/resources/ecr_repository"
- title: "OCI Distribution Spec"
url: "https://github.com/opencontainers/distribution-spec"
- title: "Docker CLI Reference"
url: "https://docs.docker.com/reference/cli/docker/"
---
# ECR (Container Registry)
> Spinifex's ECR service is an AWS-compatible, OCI-compliant container registry. You create repositories with `aws ecr`, authenticate Docker with a registry token, and `docker push` / `docker pull` exactly as you would on AWS — and your EKS clusters can pull from it directly.
## Overview
ECR on Spinifex serves a private container registry on the Spinifex gateway endpoint — the same `host:9999` you already use for the AWS API. Authentication is account-scoped by token, so you push and pull at the gateway host and never need extra DNS:
```
<spinifex-gateway-host>:9999/<repository>
```
`aws ecr describe-repositories` and `aws ecr get-login-password` return the exact host to use — always prefer that value. Where real DNS is configured, the AWS-parity per-account host `<account-id>.dkr.ecr.<region>.<your-spinifex-domain>:9999` also works.
Each repository holds image manifests and their layers. Images are stored in object storage ([Predastore](https://github.com/mulgadc/predastore)) in a per-account bucket, with blobs content-addressed and de-duplicated across repositories. Authentication is token-based: `aws ecr get-login-password` mints a short-lived bearer token that `docker login` uses against the registry's `/v2/` endpoint.
**What works today**
- Repository lifecycle — `CreateRepository`, `DeleteRepository`, `DescribeRepositories`.
- OCI push and pull — blobs, manifests, and tags, including cross-repository blob mounts.
- Token auth — `GetAuthorizationToken` plus bearer/basic auth on `/v2/`.
- Repository policies — set, get, and delete a repository policy document.
**Current limitations**
- **Image scanning is not supported** — scan APIs return an explicit "operation not supported" error.
- **No automatic garbage collection yet** — deleting images does not yet reclaim underlying blobs.
- Lifecycle-policy enforcement and tag-immutability enforcement are not active.
## Prerequisites
- **Spinifex running**, with the AWS CLI configured for the `spinifex` profile (see [Installing Spinifex](/docs/install)).
- **Docker** installed locally to build, push, and pull images.
- **Docker trusting the Spinifex CA.** The registry serves TLS signed by the Spinifex local CA. Install it into the host trust store once (Docker uses the host root pool for registry TLS, so this covers every account endpoint without per-host config):
```bash
sudo cp /etc/spinifex/ca.pem /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/spinifex-local-ca.crt
sudo update-ca-certificates
sudo systemctl restart docker
```
- **The registry endpoint** — the Spinifex gateway `host:9999`. `aws ecr get-login-password` and `aws ecr describe-repositories` return the exact `host:port`; copy it from there rather than constructing it by hand.
- **For EKS pulls:** worker nodes need the `AmazonEC2ContainerRegistryReadOnly` policy on their node IAM role (the EKS prerequisites already include this) and network egress to the registry endpoint.
## Instructions
Create a repository and push an image using your preferred tool.
:::tabs
@tab AWS CLI
### 1. Create a repository
```bash
export AWS_PROFILE=spinifex
aws ecr create-repository --repository-name my-app
aws ecr describe-repositories --repository-names my-app \
--query 'repositories[0].repositoryUri'
```
The `repositoryUri` is the value you tag and push to — the gateway `host:9999`
with the repository path, port included (for example `192.0.2.10:9999/my-app`).
Use it verbatim; don't hand-build a hostname.
### 2. Authenticate Docker
Take the registry host straight from the API so the `:9999` port is correct:
```bash
REGISTRY=$(aws ecr describe-repositories --repository-names my-app \
--query 'repositories[0].repositoryUri' --output text | cut -d/ -f1)
aws ecr get-login-password --region <region> \
| docker login --username AWS --password-stdin "$REGISTRY"
```
### 3. Build, tag, and push
```bash
docker build -t my-app:latest .
docker tag my-app:latest "$REGISTRY/my-app:latest"
docker push "$REGISTRY/my-app:latest"
```
### 4. Verify and pull
```bash
aws ecr describe-images --repository-name my-app
docker pull "$REGISTRY/my-app:latest"
```
@tab Spinifex UI
From the left navigation open **ECR → Repositories**.
<img src="ecr-list-repositories.png" alt="The ECR Repositories list in the Spinifex console, showing a repository with its registry URI, tag mutability, and creation date">
### 1. Create a repository
1. Click **Create Repository**.
2. Enter the **repository name** and, optionally, set **tag mutability** (mutable or immutable).
3. Submit — the repository appears in the list with its full registry URI.
### 2. Copy the push commands
Open the repository to see its detail page. The **Push commands** panel lists the exact `aws ecr get-login-password | docker login`, `docker build`, `docker tag`, and `docker push` commands, pre-filled with your registry host and repository URI — use the **Copy** button and run them locally.
<img src="ecr-push-commands.png" alt="A repository detail page in the Spinifex console, with the Push commands panel showing the docker login, build, tag, and push commands">
### 3. Manage the repository
- The **Permissions** tab edits the repository's access policy.
- The **Lifecycle** tab manages retention rules, and **Tag immutability** can be toggled from the detail page.
- The **Scan** tab reflects that image scanning is not supported on Spinifex.
- Delete a repository from the **Delete** action in the repositories list.
@tab Terraform
Repositories can be managed as code with the standard `aws_ecr_repository` resource, with the AWS provider pointed at Spinifex's `ecr` endpoint:
```hcl
provider "aws" {
region = "ap-southeast-2"
skip_credentials_validation = true
skip_requesting_account_id = true
endpoints {
ecr = "https://<your-spinifex-gateway>"
}
}
resource "aws_ecr_repository" "my_app" {
name = "my-app"
}
output "repository_url" {
value = aws_ecr_repository.my_app.repository_url
}
```
```bash
export AWS_PROFILE=spinifex
tofu init
tofu apply
```
Then authenticate Docker and push using the `repository_url` output, following steps 2–4 in the AWS CLI tab.
:::
## Troubleshooting
**`docker login` fails with an authorization error.** The token is account-scoped and short-lived. Re-run `aws ecr get-login-password` to mint a fresh token, and confirm the registry host in `docker login` matches your account's endpoint (`aws ecr describe-repositories` returns it).
**`docker push` cannot reach the registry.** Use the exact host from `aws ecr describe-repositories` — the Spinifex gateway `host:9999`. Docker dials it directly, so the `:9999` port must be present (without it docker tries `:443` and fails). If you are using the AWS-parity `<account-id>.dkr.ecr…` hostname instead, that path needs DNS resolving it to the gateway — prefer the gateway host the API returns.
**EKS workers cannot pull an image.** Confirm the node IAM role has `AmazonEC2ContainerRegistryReadOnly` and that the workers have egress to the registry endpoint (an Internet Gateway or NAT Gateway route). See the [EKS prerequisites](/docs/eks).
**Image-scanning commands return an error.** Image scanning is not supported on Spinifex; the scan APIs intentionally reject these calls. Remove scan-on-push configuration from your tooling.
**A pushed image still appears after deletion frees no space.** Garbage collection of unreferenced blobs is not yet automatic — deleting an image removes its manifest and tags but does not immediately reclaim the underlying layers.
Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 153 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 217 KiB

+270
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
---
title: "ECS (Elastic Container Service)"
description: "Run AWS-compatible ECS workloads on Spinifex — create a cluster, register a task definition, boot container instances from the ECS node image, run tasks, and front a long-running service with an Application Load Balancer, all via the AWS CLI, the Spinifex console, or Terraform."
category: "Containers"
tags:
- ecs
- containers
- tasks
- alb
- iam
sections:
- overview
- prerequisites
- instructions
- troubleshooting
resources:
- title: "ECS Quickstart Workbook"
url: "https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/tree/main/docs/terraform-workbooks/ecs-quickstart"
- title: "Terraform AWS Provider"
url: "https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/aws/latest"
- title: "AWS ECS Task IAM Roles"
url: "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/task-iam-roles.html"
---
# ECS (Elastic Container Service)
> Spinifex's ECS service gives you an AWS-compatible container orchestrator: you register task definitions and run them — one-off as tasks, or kept-running as a service behind a load balancer — on container instances you launch from the Spinifex ECS node image. Standard tools — `aws ecs`, the Terraform AWS provider — work unchanged.
## Overview
ECS on Spinifex follows the AWS **EC2 launch type**: you supply the compute. A cluster is a logical grouping; the capacity behind it is **container instances** — ordinary EC2 instances booted from Spinifex's `spinifex-ecs-node` image, each running the Spinifex ECS agent. The agent registers the instance with the cluster, reports its CPU/memory, and runs the containers the scheduler places on it.
There is **no ECS-specific launch API** — this is AWS-faithful. You add capacity by launching EC2 instances from the ECS node image (with the `ecsInstanceRole` instance profile), exactly as on AWS. The Spinifex console wraps this in a one-click **Provision capacity** action, but underneath it is just `RunInstances`.
A **task definition** describes one or more containers (image, CPU/memory, ports, environment, and an optional task IAM role). A **task** is a running instantiation of a task definition; the scheduler bin-packs tasks onto instances with free capacity. A **service** keeps a desired number of tasks running, replaces failed ones, and — when configured — registers each task's IP with an Application Load Balancer target group.
<p align="center">
<img src="../../../.github/assets/diagrams/ecs-topology.svg" alt="ECS on Spinifex — an Application Load Balancer fronts awsvpc tasks running on container instances booted from the spinifex-ecs-node AMI; the ECS agent registers with the Spinifex gateway over TLS and SigV4 and serves task-role credentials to containers" width="900">
</p>
**What you'll create:**
| Resource | Purpose |
|---|---|
| VPC + subnets | The network the cluster and tasks run in |
| Internet Gateway | Egress so instances can pull container images |
| `ecsInstanceRole` | Instance profile letting the agent reach the control plane |
| ECS cluster | The logical grouping tasks and instances join |
| Task definition | The container spec (image, CPU/memory, ports, task role) |
| Container instance(s) | EC2 VMs from the ECS node image that run tasks |
| Service + ALB target group | Keeps N tasks running and load-balances them |
**Spinifex specifics**
- **EC2 launch type only.** There is no Fargate-equivalent serverless capacity; you run and pay for the container instances. `RequiresCompatibilities` of `FARGATE` is not honoured.
- **`awsvpc` network mode.** Each task gets its own ENI and private IP in your subnet. Target groups must use `target_type = "ip"`; the service's `network_configuration` selects the subnets and security groups.
- **The container-instance image is fixed.** Instances must boot Spinifex's `spinifex-ecs-node` image (resolve it by the `spinifex:managed-by=ecs` tag) and carry the `ecsInstanceRole` instance profile.
- **Task IAM roles via the credential endpoint.** A task with a `taskRoleArn` gets `AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI` injected; the agent serves short-lived credentials for that role at `169.254.170.2`, AWS-faithful — your container's SDK picks them up with no static keys.
### Limitations
ECS v1 is deliberately minimal. Keep these in mind:
- **No service discovery.** `serviceRegistries` / Cloud Map integration is not implemented — reach a service through its load balancer, not a DNS name.
- **`awslogs` log driver is discarded.** Container stdout/stderr is not shipped to CloudWatch Logs; the log configuration is accepted but dropped.
- **No rolling deployments.** The reconciler keeps the desired count running but ignores `deploymentConfiguration` (`minimumHealthyPercent` / `maximumPercent`); an `UpdateService` to a new revision replaces tasks without a health-gated rollout or circuit-breaker.
- **No capacity providers or managed scaling.** Capacity is the static total of your registered instances; there is no scale-out/in or ASG binding — you manage the instance count.
- **No distinct execution role.** ECR pulls use the instance role directly; `executionRoleArn` is not honoured separately.
- **`secrets[]` are silently dropped**, and tags set via `TagResource` are not persisted. Health-check settings beyond the target group default are not forwarded.
## Prerequisites
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **Prerequisite — `spinifex-ecs-node` image required.**
>
> Container instances **must** boot Spinifex's **`spinifex-ecs-node`** image — it carries the ECS agent. Import it before provisioning capacity (during `spx admin init` or via the image catalogue); the console's provision-capacity action and the Terraform workbook both resolve it by tag.
>
> **Verify before continuing:**
>
> ```bash
> aws ec2 describe-images \
> --filters 'Name=tag:spinifex:managed-by,Values=ecs' \
> --query 'Images[].[ImageId,Name]' --output text
> ```
>
> No rows means the image is not imported — register it before continuing.
The Terraform workbook builds all of this for you. For the CLI or console paths, have it in place first.
- **Spinifex running**, with the AWS CLI configured for the `spinifex` profile (see [Installing Spinifex](/docs/install)).
- **The `spinifex-ecs-node` image** imported. Confirm it resolves:
```bash
aws ec2 describe-images \
--filters 'Name=tag:spinifex:managed-by,Values=ecs' \
--query 'Images[].[ImageId,Name]' --output text
```
- **A VPC with at least one subnet** and an **Internet Gateway** with a default route (`0.0.0.0/0 → IGW`), so instances can pull container images.
- **The `ecsInstanceRole` instance profile.** It is account-global: a role trusted by `ec2.amazonaws.com` with an `ecs:*` policy, exposed through an instance profile of the same name. The console's provision-capacity action creates it on first use; the Terraform workbook creates it unless you opt out.
- **An optional task IAM role** trusted by `ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com`, if your containers call AWS APIs.
## Instructions
The same workload can be created three ways. Pick your tool — each path reaches the same running service.
:::tabs
@tab AWS CLI
### 1. Create the cluster
```bash
export AWS_PROFILE=spinifex
aws ecs create-cluster --cluster-name demo
```
### 2. Register a task definition
`awsvpc` network mode, EC2 launch type, one nginx container on port 80:
```bash
aws ecs register-task-definition \
--family web \
--network-mode awsvpc \
--requires-compatibilities EC2 \
--cpu 256 --memory 512 \
--container-definitions '[{
"name":"web",
"image":"docker.io/library/nginx:1.27-alpine",
"portMappings":[{"containerPort":80,"protocol":"tcp"}],
"essential":true
}]'
```
### 3. Add capacity
Launch one or more EC2 instances from the ECS node image with the `ecsInstanceRole`
instance profile and a cloud-init that points the agent at the cluster. The
[ECS Quickstart workbook](https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/tree/main/docs/terraform-workbooks/ecs-quickstart)
produces this user-data for you; the console **Provision capacity** action is the
one-click equivalent. Once an instance boots and its agent registers, it appears here:
```bash
aws ecs list-container-instances --cluster demo
```
### 4. Run a task or create a service
Run a one-off task:
```bash
aws ecs run-task \
--cluster demo --task-definition web --count 1 \
--network-configuration 'awsvpcConfiguration={subnets=[subnet-aaaa]}'
```
Or keep it running behind an ALB target group (`target_type = ip`):
```bash
aws ecs create-service \
--cluster demo --service-name web --task-definition web \
--desired-count 2 \
--network-configuration 'awsvpcConfiguration={subnets=[subnet-aaaa]}' \
--load-balancers 'targetGroupArn=<tg-arn>,containerName=web,containerPort=80'
aws ecs describe-services --cluster demo --services web \
--query 'services[0].[runningCount,desiredCount]'
```
@tab Spinifex UI
The Spinifex console drives the same workflow. From the left navigation open **ECS → Clusters**.
### 1. Create the cluster
Click **Create Cluster**, give it a name, and submit. It appears in the **Clusters** list.
### 2. Provision capacity
Open the cluster and use **Provision capacity** on the **Infrastructure** (container instances) tab. The console launches instances from the `spinifex-ecs-node` image, attaches the `ecsInstanceRole` instance profile (creating it if needed), and injects the gateway URL and CA into the instance's cloud-init — so the agent registers without any manual key handling. The instances appear under **Infrastructure** as they register.
### 3. Register a task definition and run it
- The **Task definitions** view lists families and revisions; register a new revision with the container image, CPU/memory, and ports.
- From a task definition, **Run task** for a one-off, or create a **Service** to keep a desired count running.
- A cluster's **Services** and **Tasks** tabs show what is running; open a task or service for its detail page (containers, networking, and public/private endpoints).
### 4. Attach a load balancer
When creating a service, select an ALB target group (`target_type = ip`) so each task's ENI is registered and traffic is balanced across tasks.
@tab Terraform
The [ECS Quickstart workbook](https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/tree/main/docs/terraform-workbooks/ecs-quickstart) builds the whole stack in one `apply`: VPC, IAM, cluster, task definition, container instances, and an ALB-fronted service. It is the Terraform-native equivalent of the console's provision-capacity action.
```bash
git clone --depth 1 --filter=blob:none --sparse https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex.git spinifex-tf
cd spinifex-tf
git sparse-checkout set docs/terraform-workbooks
cd docs/terraform-workbooks/ecs-quickstart
```
The core resources point the AWS provider at Spinifex's `ecs`, `ec2`, `iam`, `sts`, and `elasticloadbalancingv2` endpoints, then create the cluster, an `awsvpc` task definition with a task role, and a service wired to a target group:
```hcl
resource "aws_ecs_cluster" "main" {
name = "ecs-quickstart"
}
resource "aws_ecs_task_definition" "web" {
family = "ecs-quickstart-web"
network_mode = "awsvpc"
requires_compatibilities = ["EC2"]
cpu = "256"
memory = "512"
task_role_arn = aws_iam_role.task.arn
container_definitions = jsonencode([{
name = "web"
image = "docker.io/library/nginx:1.27-alpine"
essential = true
portMappings = [{ containerPort = 80, protocol = "tcp" }]
}])
}
resource "aws_ecs_service" "web" {
name = "ecs-quickstart-web"
cluster = aws_ecs_cluster.main.id
task_definition = aws_ecs_task_definition.web.arn
desired_count = 1
network_configuration {
subnets = [aws_subnet.a.id, aws_subnet.b.id]
security_groups = [aws_security_group.node.id]
}
load_balancer {
target_group_arn = aws_lb_target_group.web.arn
container_name = "web"
container_port = 80
}
}
```
Because a container instance reaches the control plane over the gateway (TLS + SigV4) rather than a managed AWS endpoint, the workbook makes the two things the console injects explicit: a **LAN-reachable** `gateway_url` (the host's bridge IP, not `127.0.0.1`) and the gateway CA, both baked into the instance's cloud-init. Apply it:
```bash
export AWS_PROFILE=spinifex
tofu init
tofu apply -var 'gateway_url=https://<host-lan-ip>:9999'
```
`ecsInstanceRole` is account-global — if it already exists (from the console), pass `-var 'create_instance_role=false'`. See the workbook README for the full variable list and teardown.
:::
## Troubleshooting
**No container instances appear after launching them.** The agent registers over the gateway, not a managed endpoint, so check its cloud-init injected a correct **LAN-reachable** gateway URL (not `127.0.0.1` — a guest VM cannot reach the host loopback) and the gateway CA. `cloud-init write_files` runs once per instance, so fixing the user-data needs an instance **replacement**, not an in-place modify. Confirm the instance carries the `ecsInstanceRole` instance profile.
**Tasks stay `PENDING`.** No instance has free capacity for the task's CPU/memory reservation. Add capacity, or lower the task definition's reservations. `aws ecs list-container-instances` should show at least one `ACTIVE` instance.
**Service `runningCount` below `desiredCount`.** Either there is not enough capacity (see above), or tasks are failing to start — check the task's containers can pull their image (instances need an egress route) and that the image reference is valid.
**Load balancer target unhealthy / app unreachable.** The target group must be `target_type = ip` (tasks register their ENI IP, not an instance ID). The ALB DNS name ends in `.elb.spinifex.local` and does not resolve from outside; fetch its public IP with `aws elbv2 describe-load-balancers` and curl that. Note health-check settings beyond the target group default are not forwarded.
**Container cannot assume its task role.** Confirm the task definition sets `taskRoleArn` and the role is trusted by `ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com`. The agent injects `AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI`; a container that overrides this variable, or an SDK too old to honour it, will not pick up the credentials.
**Expected a feature that is missing.** ECS v1 omits service discovery, `awslogs` shipping, rolling deployments, capacity providers, and a distinct execution role. See the Limitations in the Overview.
+267
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
---
title: "EKS (Managed Kubernetes)"
description: "Run a managed, AWS-compatible Kubernetes cluster on Spinifex — provision the control plane and worker node group, wire up the VPC, IAM, and security groups it needs, and deploy your first workload via the AWS CLI, the Spinifex console, or Terraform."
category: "Containers"
tags:
- eks
- kubernetes
- containers
- vpc
- iam
sections:
- overview
- prerequisites
- instructions
- troubleshooting
resources:
- title: "EKS Quickstart Workbook"
url: "https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/tree/main/docs/terraform-workbooks/eks-quickstart"
- title: "EKS HTTPS Ingress Workbook (LBC + ACM)"
url: "https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/tree/main/docs/terraform-workbooks/eks-https-ingress"
- title: "EKS GitOps Workbook (Argo CD + EBS-CSI)"
url: "https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/tree/main/docs/terraform-workbooks/eks-gitops-argocd"
- title: "Terraform AWS Provider"
url: "https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/aws/latest"
- title: "kubectl Documentation"
url: "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubectl/"
---
# EKS (Managed Kubernetes)
> Spinifex's EKS service gives you a managed, AWS-compatible Kubernetes API: you create a cluster and a node group, and Spinifex provisions and runs the control plane and workers for you. Standard tools — `aws eks`, `kubectl`, the Terraform AWS provider — work unchanged against your cluster.
## Overview
An EKS cluster on Spinifex has two parts: a **control plane** (the managed Kubernetes API server, provisioned on a Spinifex-managed VM and fronted by a network load balancer) and one or more **managed node groups** of worker VMs that run your pods. You provide the VPC, subnets, and IAM roles; Spinifex creates and reconciles the cluster, its load balancer, and its security groups.
Authentication uses **EKS access entries** (the API authentication mode) — IAM principals are mapped to Kubernetes RBAC groups, and `kubectl` authenticates with `aws eks get-token` exactly as it does on AWS.
<p align="center">
<img src="../../../.github/assets/diagrams/eks-topology.svg" alt="EKS on Spinifex — a managed control plane (public API NLB plus apiserver VM) fronts a managed node group of eks-node worker VMs running pods across two subnets, pulling images from ECR" width="900">
</p>
**What you'll create:**
| Resource | Purpose |
|---|---|
| VPC + subnets | The network the cluster and workers run in |
| Internet Gateway / NAT Gateway | Egress so workers can pull container images |
| Cluster IAM role | Lets the control plane manage cluster resources |
| Node IAM role | Lets workers join the cluster and pull images |
| EKS cluster | The managed Kubernetes API endpoint |
| Managed node group | The worker VMs that run your pods |
| Security-group rule | Opens your app's port to reach the workers |
**Spinifex specifics**
- **Auth mode is API-only.** `authentication_mode` must be `API`; the legacy `CONFIG_MAP` and `API_AND_CONFIG_MAP` modes are rejected. Grant access with access entries, not an `aws-auth` ConfigMap.
- **Security groups are auto-managed.** Spinifex creates the cluster and node-group security groups deterministically (e.g. `eks-cluster-<name>-nodegroup-sg`); `vpc_config.security_group_ids` is ignored. To expose a workload you add an ingress rule to the auto-managed node-group SG.
- **The worker image is fixed.** Node groups always boot Spinifex's `eks-node` image. `ami_type` is recorded but does not select the image, and the image must be registered on the cluster before you create a node group.
- **Default Kubernetes version is `1.32`.**
## Prerequisites
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **Prerequisite — `eks-node` image required.**
>
> Node groups always boot Spinifex's **`eks-node`** image, and it **must** be registered before you create a cluster — the console blocks cluster creation until it is present. Import it during `spx admin init` (or via the image catalogue) ahead of time.
>
> **Verify before continuing:**
>
> ```bash
> aws ec2 describe-images \
> --filters 'Name=tag:spinifex:managed-by,Values=eks' \
> --query 'Images[].[ImageId,Name]' --output text
> ```
>
> No rows means the image is not imported — register it before continuing.
Before creating a cluster you need the supporting infrastructure in place. The Terraform workbooks build all of this for you; if you are using the CLI or console, create it first.
- **Spinifex running**, with the AWS CLI configured for the `spinifex` profile (see [Installing Spinifex](/docs/install)) and `kubectl` installed.
- **The `eks-node` image** registered on the cluster. The console blocks cluster creation until it is present.
- **A VPC with at least one subnet.** The control plane launches in your first subnet; workers run in the subnets you pass to the node group.
- **Egress for the workers.** Workers must reach the internet to pull container images:
- **Public workers** — an **Internet Gateway** with a default route (`0.0.0.0/0 → IGW`) and public IPs.
- **Private workers** — a **NAT Gateway** in a public subnet with a default route (`0.0.0.0/0 → NAT`) from the private subnets.
- **Two IAM roles:**
- A **cluster role** trusted by `eks.amazonaws.com` with `AmazonEKSClusterPolicy` attached.
- A **node role** trusted by `ec2.amazonaws.com` with `AmazonEKSWorkerNodePolicy`, `AmazonEKS_CNI_Policy`, and `AmazonEC2ContainerRegistryReadOnly` attached (the last lets workers pull images from [ECR](/docs/ecr)).
## Instructions
The same cluster can be created three ways. Pick your tool — each path reaches the same working cluster.
:::tabs
@tab AWS CLI
### 1. Create the cluster
Point the cluster at your VPC subnets and the cluster role, with API authentication and a public endpoint:
```bash
export AWS_PROFILE=spinifex
aws eks create-cluster \
--name demo \
--role-arn arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/eks-cluster-role \
--resources-vpc-config subnetIds=subnet-aaaa,subnet-bbbb,endpointPublicAccess=true \
--access-config authenticationMode=API \
--kubernetes-version 1.32
```
Wait for it to become active:
```bash
aws eks wait cluster-active --name demo
aws eks describe-cluster --name demo --query 'cluster.status'
```
### 2. Add a node group
```bash
aws eks create-nodegroup \
--cluster-name demo \
--nodegroup-name default \
--node-role-arn arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/eks-node-role \
--subnets subnet-aaaa subnet-bbbb \
--scaling-config minSize=1,maxSize=2,desiredSize=1 \
--instance-types t3.medium
aws eks wait nodegroup-active --cluster-name demo --nodegroup-name default
```
### 3. Connect kubectl
```bash
aws eks update-kubeconfig --name demo
kubectl get nodes
```
### 4. Expose a workload
Workers join an auto-managed security group that only allows intra-cluster traffic. To reach a NodePort service, add one ingress rule to that SG (look it up by its deterministic name):
```bash
SG=$(aws ec2 describe-security-groups \
--filters Name=group-name,Values=eks-cluster-demo-nodegroup-sg \
--query 'SecurityGroups[0].GroupId' --output text)
aws ec2 authorize-security-group-ingress \
--group-id "$SG" --protocol tcp --port 30080 --cidr 0.0.0.0/0
```
Then deploy and publish your app:
```bash
kubectl create deployment hello --image=nginxdemos/hello --replicas=2
kubectl expose deployment hello --type=NodePort --port=80 \
--overrides='{"spec":{"ports":[{"port":80,"nodePort":30080}]}}'
```
@tab Spinifex UI
The Spinifex console drives the same workflow through a guided form. From the left navigation open **EKS → Clusters**.
<img src="eks-list-clusters.png" alt="The EKS Clusters list in the Spinifex console, with a Create Cluster button">
### 1. Create the cluster
1. Click **Create Cluster**.
2. Enter a **name** and choose the **Kubernetes version** (default `1.32`).
3. Choose the **cluster IAM role**, or create one inline from the dialog.
4. Select the **VPC and subnets** the cluster will run in.
5. Set **endpoint access** (public, private, or both) and submit.
<img src="eks-create-cluster.png" alt="The Create Cluster form in the Spinifex console, showing name, Kubernetes version, IAM role, VPC, subnets, and endpoint access fields">
The form notes that the authentication mode is API and that the legacy aws-auth ConfigMap is not supported. The cluster appears in the **Clusters** list as `CREATING` and flips to `ACTIVE` once the control plane is healthy.
### 2. Add a node group
1. Open the cluster and switch to the **Node groups** tab.
2. Click **Add node group**, choose the **node IAM role**, **subnets**, **instance type**, and **scaling** (desired / min / max).
3. Submit and wait for the node group to reach `ACTIVE`.
### 3. Manage access and addons
- The **Access** tab lists IAM principals and their cluster-access policies — add an access entry to let another user or role reach the cluster.
- The **Addons** tab installs and shows the health of managed addons.
- The **Networking** tab shows the cluster's VPC, subnets, endpoint access, and the auto-managed security groups.
To run `kubectl` against the cluster, follow the AWS CLI tab's `update-kubeconfig` step.
@tab Terraform
The Terraform workbooks are the fastest way to a working cluster — they build the VPC, IAM roles, cluster, node group, and a demo workload in one `apply`. Start with **eks-quickstart**:
```bash
git clone --depth 1 --filter=blob:none --sparse https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex.git spinifex-tf
cd spinifex-tf
git sparse-checkout set docs/terraform-workbooks
cd docs/terraform-workbooks/eks-quickstart
```
The cluster config points the AWS provider at Spinifex's `eks`, `ec2`, `iam`, and `sts` endpoints, then creates the cluster and node group:
```hcl
resource "aws_eks_cluster" "this" {
name = "eks-quickstart"
role_arn = aws_iam_role.cluster.arn
version = "1.32"
access_config {
authentication_mode = "API"
}
vpc_config {
subnet_ids = [aws_subnet.a.id, aws_subnet.b.id]
endpoint_public_access = true
}
}
resource "aws_eks_node_group" "default" {
cluster_name = aws_eks_cluster.this.name
node_group_name = "default"
node_role_arn = aws_iam_role.node.arn
subnet_ids = [aws_subnet.a.id, aws_subnet.b.id]
scaling_config {
desired_size = 1
min_size = 1
max_size = 2
}
instance_types = ["t3.medium"]
}
```
Apply it, then connect:
```bash
export AWS_PROFILE=spinifex
tofu init
tofu apply
aws eks update-kubeconfig --name eks-quickstart
kubectl get nodes
```
The workbooks form a ladder. **eks-quickstart** is a NodePort demo; **eks-https-ingress** adds private subnets, a NAT gateway, and HTTPS via the AWS Load Balancer Controller + ACM; **eks-gitops-argocd** delivers the app from a git repo with the Argo CD addon and persists state on an EBS-CSI (Viperblock-backed) volume. See the full templates linked in Resources.
:::
## Troubleshooting
**Cluster stuck in `CREATING`.** The control plane is still booting. Check `aws eks describe-cluster --name <name> --query 'cluster.health'` for reported issues. The control plane needs egress to bootstrap, so confirm its subnet has an Internet Gateway route.
**`kubectl` cannot connect.** Re-run `aws eks update-kubeconfig --name <name>` to refresh the endpoint and CA, and confirm the cluster is `ACTIVE`. `aws sts get-caller-identity` verifies your credentials reach the Spinifex endpoint.
**Workers stay `NotReady`.** Almost always an egress or IAM problem:
- Confirm the workers can pull images — a default route to an Internet Gateway (public) or NAT Gateway (private).
- Confirm the node role has `AmazonEKSWorkerNodePolicy`, `AmazonEKS_CNI_Policy`, and `AmazonEC2ContainerRegistryReadOnly`.
**Workload unreachable from outside the cluster.** The node-group security group only allows intra-cluster traffic by default. Add an ingress rule for your NodePort to `eks-cluster-<name>-nodegroup-sg`, as shown in the CLI tab.
**`create-cluster` rejected with an authentication-mode error.** `authentication_mode` must be `API`. Remove any `CONFIG_MAP` / `API_AND_CONFIG_MAP` setting and grant access with access entries instead.
**Addon install fails.** Only addons bundled into the registered `eks-node` image install successfully. If you pin an addon version in Terraform, leave `addon_version` unset so Spinifex selects the catalog default.
Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 224 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 124 KiB

@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ SSH directly to the instance's public IP:
PUBLIC_IP=$(aws ec2 describe-instances --instance-ids $INSTANCE_ID \
--query 'Reservations[0].Instances[0].PublicIpAddress' --output text)
ssh -i ~/.ssh/spinifex-key ec2-user@$PUBLIC_IP
ssh -i ~/.ssh/spinifex-key ubuntu@$PUBLIC_IP
```
> **Note:** cloud-init takes 30-60 seconds to configure the instance. If SSH is refused, wait and retry.

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More