Compare commits

...

184 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Julian Sommer 30871edc05 release: update go.mod for v1.8.0 2026-06-16 09:32:18 +10:00
Julian Sommer 5cb73d83db chore: rebuild frontend with latest deps 2026-06-16 09:06:50 +10:00
dependabot[bot] 5f166b8197 chore: bump the npm-dependencies group (#360) 2026-06-16 08:58:38 +10:00
dependabot[bot] 4bc788ca51 chore: bump the go-dependencies group with 4 updates (#359) 2026-06-16 08:57:51 +10:00
Josh Siviour 129bfc0fb5 feat(eks): join nodegroup workers via cluster NLB endpoint + private endpoint access (#362)
* feat: join nodegroup workers via cluster NLB endpoint

Under the Set-B managed-CP-VPC topology the control plane runs in the
system-account CP VPC while nodegroup workers launch in the customer
VPC. The agent user-data set K3S_URL to the in-VPC control-plane ENI IP
(:6443), which sits in a different, unpeered VPC and is unreachable, so
the join path was dead.

Point K3S_URL at the published cluster NLB endpoint (meta.Endpoint,
https://<frontend-ip>:443, the :443->:6443 listener kubectl already
uses). Guard CreateNodegroup on a non-empty endpoint.

mulga-siv-298

* feat: gate nodegroup ACTIVE on workers registering Ready

launchNodegroupInfra flipped the nodegroup to ACTIVE the moment
RunInstances returned, so a worker that booted but never joined left the
nodegroup falsely ACTIVE with no usable capacity.

Gate ACTIVE on the cluster's Ready-node count (meta.NodeCount, refreshed
by the cluster reconciler from the CP NATS state report — Ready nodes
only) rising by the desired worker count over the create-time baseline.
On timeout the nodegroup is marked CREATE_FAILED with its instance IDs
retained for the reclaim path. Mirrors the CP reconciler's
healthy-observe gating. Bounded by injectable timeout/poll knobs.

mulga-siv-299

* feat(eks): private endpoint access via cross-account Set A ENI

Make EndpointPrivateAccess real: in-VPC workers and kubectl reach the
control plane through a customer-VPC (Set A) resident ENI on the cluster
NLB's LB VM, removing the public-NLB hairpin and the NAT-GW egress path.

Teardown: the Set A ENI is an extra cross-account NIC on the LB VM, not
its primary, so the instance-terminate cascade never reclaims it. Detach
(store-clear) the stale attachment before deleting, so private clusters
delete cleanly instead of looping on InvalidNetworkInterface.InUse.

Refs: mulga-siv-301

* fix(vpc): honor SecurityGroupRuleIds in RevokeSecurityGroup ingress/egress

Modern Terraform (aws_vpc_security_group_ingress_rule) revokes per-rule
resources by SecurityGroupRuleId with empty IpPermissions. The handlers
only read IpPermissions, so they returned success while removing nothing;
the surviving SG-reference rule then pinned both SGs undeletable
(DependencyViolation), deadlocking destroy of mutually-referencing SGs.

Resolve SecurityGroupRuleIds to their stored rules and remove them
(malformed -> InvalidSecurityGroupRuleId.Malformed, absent -> NotFound).

Refs: mulga-siv-321

* fix(vpc): reap the main route table on DeleteVpc

CreateVpc auto-creates a main route table and DeleteRouteTable refuses to
delete a main RT (AWS-faithful), so nothing reclaimed it — every deleted
VPC leaked one orphaned main RT in the rtb KV bucket. DeleteVpc now reaps
the VPC's main route table before deleting the VPC record.

Refs: mulga-siv-322

* fix: make AttachRolePolicy and AssociateRouteTable atomic via KV CAS

Concurrent writes to a single role / route table record used a blind
read-modify-Put with no optimistic-concurrency guard, so parallel writers
racing from the same revision clobbered each other and lost updates.
Verified on env19: three parallel policy attachments to one node role kept
only one; two parallel subnet associations to one route table kept only
one (the provider then timed out waiting for state 'associated').

Route the mutating paths (AttachRolePolicy/DetachRolePolicy,
AssociateRouteTable/DisassociateRouteTable) through a revision-guarded
Update + bounded retry, matching the existing accountCounterBucket CAS
idiom. Add concurrent regression tests covering both lost updates.

* docs: add EKS Terraform workbooks (quickstart, addons-access, https-ingress)

Three OpenTofu workbooks demonstrating EKS on Spinifex, each ending in a
browsable load-balanced demo app:
- eks-quickstart: minimal single-node cluster + NodePort demo
- eks-addons-access: CoreDNS managed addon + access-entry RBAC
- eks-https-ingress: 3-node cluster behind an HTTPS ALB terminating TLS
  with an ACM-imported self-signed certificate

Each covers the Spinifex-specific endpoints, the auto-managed worker SG
NodePort pattern, and the omitted addon_version constraint.
2026-06-16 00:59:36 +10:00
Josh Siviour 1873f45d26 Resilient resource lifecycle (ADR-0001..0006): EKS multi-node teardown, idempotent deletes, GC backstops (#357)
* fix: idempotent Delete* across VPC family + volume (RLC1)

Delete handlers now return empty success when the resource is already
absent (nats.ErrKeyNotFound), instead of *NotFound. Transient read
errors still map to ServerInternal. Covers DeleteVpc, DeleteSubnet,
DeleteSecurityGroup, DeleteNetworkInterface, DeleteInternetGateway,
DeleteNatGateway, DeleteRouteTable and DeleteVolume.

Makes destroy retries converge instead of failing mid-graph, removing a
source of orphaned/zombie resources between deploys. Adds a
TestRLC1_*DeleteIdempotentOnAbsent invariant per package and updates the
daemon delegation table; supersedes the old absent->NotFound tests.

* feat: prune orphan ENI LSPs in reconcile applyPorts (ADR-0003 §4)

applyPorts was create-or-update only, so a guest LSP whose
spinifex:eni_id no longer maps to an intent ENI survived instance
terminate and VM-host reinstall — the orphan-LSP capacity-drift root
cause. It now takes pruneOrphans (mirroring applySGs): on a full
reconcile it lists LSPs and tears down each managed ENI port absent from
intent via the composed topology.DeletePort cascade (clears port-group
memberships, then deletes the LSP). The apply-only startup path does not
prune, preserving in-flight ports until subscribers converge.

Adds ListLogicalSwitchPorts to the OVN client (live + mock). Invariant
TestRLC5_OrphanLSPPrunedAfterReconcile guards ADR-0003 §4; a startup-race
test guards the apply-only path.

* feat: idempotent + tracked instance terminate (ADR-0003 §1/§2)

Make terminate idempotent across all three layers and break the
un-terminable-ENI deadlock, and record per-dependency teardown so the
GC backstop can later tell a fully-reaped instance from a dangling one.

- vm.Manager.Terminate: absent / already-terminated / shutting-down now
  return nil instead of NotFound / invalid-transition (ADR-0003 §2).
- VM.Teardown map + teardown.go marks: sync steps stamped Done/Failed via
  cleaner error returns; fire-and-forget OVN LSP and NAT rule stamped
  Pending for the reconciler / GC reaper (ADR-0003 §1).
- InstanceCleaner: DeleteVolumes / ReleasePublicIP / DetachAndDeleteENI /
  RemoveFromPlacementGroup / ReleaseGPU now return error.
- vpc ForceDeleteInstanceENI bypasses the in-use guard for the owning
  instance, breaking the failed-detach deadlock; plain delete still
  rejects an in-use ENI held by another instance.
- gateway TerminateInstances: KV-health-gated idempotent absence (a failed
  terminated-bucket query does not fabricate success, ADR-0003 §3).
- Invariants: TestRLC1_TerminateIdempotentOnAbsent, TestRLC4 teardown-map
  stamping + failed-dependency, TestRLC_ENINonDeadlock.

* feat: reconciler GC backstop framework + terminated-teardown reaper (ADR-0003 §3)

Add the shared reality->desired garbage-collection framework (inverse of
Restore) and its first reaper, closing the gap 295.3 deferred: nothing
retried pending/failed teardown or purged the terminated record when its
dependents reached done.

- vm/gc.go: GarbageCollector + Reaper interface (Class/Scope/Sweep).
  KV-health gated — holds and alarms when the desired-state cannot be
  trusted, never reaps against it. ClusterWide reapers run only on the
  elected leader (optional elector); NodeLocal run on every node. Start
  sweeps immediately then every GCInterval.
- vm/teardown_reaper.go: TerminatedTeardownReaper (node-local). Scans this
  node's terminated records, re-drives each not-done dependent through the
  idempotent cleaner, and purges the record once all reach done. Records
  already complete on arrival are left to the bucket's 1h TTL.
- StateStore gains DeleteTerminatedInstance (JetStream impl already existed).
- daemon: wires the GC after the pending watchdog, gated on a cheap
  JetStream AccountInfo health probe.
- Cluster OVN-LSP arm already lands via the reconciler drift prune (295.2).
- Invariants: TestRLC5_GCRetriesPendingTeardownToDoneThenPurges,
  TestRLC5_GCNeverPurgesIncompleteRecord, TestRLC5_GCHoldsWhenKVDegraded,
  TestRLC5_GCSkipsOtherNodesRecords.

* feat: VPC-family dependency guards (ADR-0004 rule #3)

DeleteSubnet blocks while a live ENI attachment (a resident instance)
remains; available/orphan ENIs do not pin it. DeleteNetworkInterface
guards on the structured attachment (eniIsLiveAttachment), not a bare
in-use string. DeleteNatGateway blocks while a live route table forwards
to it and disassociates its EIP keeping the allocation (AWS parity);
CreateNatGateway now marks the EIP associated so the disassociate is
real and a second NAT GW cannot reuse the allocation.

Binding invariants: TestRLC3 dependency-guard completeness across the
subnet/ENI/NAT-gateway handlers.

* feat: EBS volume data-safety GC override (ADR-0005)

The shared GC backstop reaps actual-desired for every other class; for
volumes that default is forbidden because they carry customer data. Add
VolumeLeakReaper (node-local, rides the 295.5 GC): it marks a volume left
attached to a definitively-gone instance as orphaned (a non-destructive
tag) and alarms, but NEVER issues a delete. The daemon feeds it only this
node's terminated instances whose volumes-teardown failed, so the shared
predastore scan can never false-mark another node's live-instance volume.

DeleteVolume idempotency + the detach/snapshot guards + the
DeleteOnTermination teardown retry already landed (295.1/295.3/295.5).

Binding invariants: TestRLC5 (GC marks+alarms, never deletes data),
TestRLC3 (detach-before-delete).

* test(elbv2): lock ADR-0002 §3 live-only TG in-use guard (mulga-siv-295.4)

* feat(eks): idempotent DeleteCluster on absent + ADR-0006 lifecycle invariants (mulga-siv-295.8)

DeleteCluster returns empty success when the cluster meta is already swept
(Common Resource Lifecycle Contract #1), so tofu destroy retries converge.
Adds TestRLC1 (idempotent delete), TestRLC2 (billable-before-KV-sweep ordering)
and TestRLC3 (NLB target-group no-orphan, riding ADR-0002/172).

* fix(eks): GC reaper terminates orphan control-plane VM after cluster delete (mulga-siv-294)

A normal DeleteCluster can leave a running control-plane VM behind (terminate
completes async; a daemon restart re-launches it from saved running-state) after
the cluster meta is swept — a billable orphan with no owner. Add EKSBillableReaper
on the 0003 GC backstop: a running managed-by=eks CP VM whose cluster meta is
definitively gone is terminated. The CP ENI now carries the customer-account tag
so a system-account VM can be mapped back to its cluster meta; the reaper never
reaps on uncertainty (ENI gone/untagged or meta present).

* feat: reclaim orphan EKS NLB + NAT-GW EIP in billable reaper

The billable GC reaper terminated an orphan control-plane VM but left the
cluster's NAT-gateway EIP and NLB front-end NAT behind when the meta was
gone. After a successful terminate, run the name/tag-driven DeleteClusterNLB
+ DeleteClusterCPVPC teardown (idempotent, meta-independent) so the billable
NAT-GW EIP and NLB NAT are reclaimed too. ADR-0006 §5.

* fix: persist NAT-GW & route-table tags and reorder CP-VPC teardown to reclaim EKS NAT-GW EIP

CreateNatGateway and CreateRouteTable both dropped input.TagSpecifications,
so the tag-driven DeleteClusterCPVPC teardown could not discover the cluster
NAT gateway or its private route table. The explicit DeleteNatGateway +
ReleaseAddress were skipped and the billable NAT-GW EIP leaked under the
system account on every clean DeleteCluster.

Three fixes:
- CreateNatGateway persists ExtractTags(TagSpecifications, natgateway).
- CreateRouteTable persists ExtractTags(TagSpecifications, route-table).
- DeleteClusterCPVPC tears down route tables before the NAT gateway, so the
  rule #3 route-ref guard (DependencyViolation / InvalidAddress.Locked) is
  not tripped and the EIP releases.

Adds tag-persistence regression tests for both create paths and a teardown
ordering invariant (TestRLC5). Validated live: NAT-GW EIP released cleanly,
no DependencyViolation/Locked.

* fix: route EKS control-plane VM terminate cross-node + DELETING teardown backstop

Multi-node EKS cluster delete wedged in DELETING and stranded the billable
NAT-GW EIP. Two root causes, both invisible on a single-node box:

Cross-node terminate was never routed. TerminateSystemInstance was node-local,
so terminating a CP VM owned by another node returned NotFound (treated as
idempotent) and the teardown deleted a still-attached ENI
(InvalidNetworkInterface.InUse). That error short-circuited purgeClusterInfra
before the managed CP-VPC teardown that releases the NAT-GW EIP. Split
TerminateSystemInstance into a local body plus a routing wrapper that issues
system.TerminateInstance.<id> to the owning node. Bind that subscription for
every system-managed VM (elbv2 + eks) via the OnInstanceUp funnel, so CP VMs
placed on the coordinator's own node (and recovered after a daemon restart) are
reachable too, not only remotely-launched ones.

No DELETING backstop. A failed synchronous DeleteCluster left the cluster
DELETING with nothing to re-drive it. Add EKSDeletingReaper (vm.Reaper, class
eks-deleting) that re-runs purgeClusterInfra for clusters wedged past a min-age,
gated by the per-cluster reconciler leader lease. Stamp ClusterMeta.DeletingSince
on the transition into DELETING.

TerminateK3sServerVM additionally waits out any residual ENI-InUse with a bounded
budget as defense-in-depth.

Validated live on env19 3-node: first delete-cluster converges in 29s, both
remote CP VMs terminated cross-node, NAT-GW EIP released, backstop never fires.

* fix(network): gate gateway reconcile on real datapath reachability

Post-reboot the external OVN datapath can stay dead while every
control-plane signal is green: the chassisredirect SB binding is claimed
(up=true), NAT rows are present and the host neigh is primed, yet
ovn-controller leaves stale gateway/localnet flows so EIP north-south and
the VM->gateway heartbeat forward nothing. ensureGatewayClaimed only
nudges recompute when the binding is unclaimed, so a claimed-but-dead
datapath is never detected or repaired.

Add ensureGatewayDatapath: after the SB claim converges, probe the
gateway LRP IP (OVN answers ICMP natively, no guest or security-group
dependency), and on a miss force one ovn-controller recompute and
re-probe until a short deadline. Reuses the existing recompute nudge and
no-ops when no verifier is wired or no gateway IP resolves.

* fix: self-heal external uplink after reboot boot-race

Post-reboot, ovs-vswitchd/ovn-controller order after the passive
network.target rather than network-online.target, so they start
concurrently with systemd-networkd. Under a heavy boot the WAN-glue veth
(veth-wan-ovs) can come up admin-down before networkd brings it up,
leaving br-wan with no carrier and the external datapath dead while every
control-plane signal reconciles green.

Broaden the datapath health-gate remediation from recompute-only to
RepairDatapath: re-assert the veth admin state (covers the admin-down
link, which a flow recompute cannot revive) then recompute (covers a
stale gateway ofport). Idempotent; the veth ops are skipped in
physical-uplink mode where the device is absent.

Also capture ip -d link (veth admin/carrier) and ovs-ofctl show br-ext
(ofport) in the reboot diag bundle to disambiguate the two failure shapes
from CI artifacts.

* fix: restore AWS-faithful Delete* NotFound; move idempotency to teardown callers (mulga-siv-306)

RLC1 (f9218982) made EC2/VPC/EBS Delete* handlers return success on an absent
resource, breaking AWS compatibility and the cross-account isolation signal (a
cross-account delete reads as absent -> success instead of *.NotFound).

Restore the AWS contract at the API while keeping lifecycle convergence:
- Handlers return canonical *.NotFound on absent: DeleteVpc, DeleteSubnet,
  DeleteSecurityGroup, DeleteInternetGateway, DeleteNatGateway, DeleteRouteTable,
  DeleteVolume, and the public DeleteNetworkInterface (ForceDeleteInstanceENI
  keeps its idempotent force path, ADR-0003 section 2).
- Add awserrors.IsNotFound; destroy orchestration (instance terminate, EKS
  CP-VPC teardown, EKS IGW/SG cleanup, k3s rollback, ELBv2 ENI/SG teardown)
  tolerates NotFound so re-issued/double-targeted deletes converge.
- Flip the RLC1 unit invariants to assert *.NotFound on absent; revert the
  daemon round-trip cases; add IsNotFound + CP-VPC convergence tests.

ELBv2 deletes and TerminateInstances stay idempotent (AWS itself is).

* fix(network): gate ingress EIP datapath on guest SB Port_Binding convergence

TestMultinodeGuestSSH intermittently times out (Connection timed out, not
#355's reset-by-peer) connecting to a fresh trio instance's public IP after
the suite churns instances across all three chassis. The instance is running
and AddEIP has installed the DNAT row, flushed/primed the host neigh, and
barriered the gateway-chassis flow — but none of that proves the
gatewayLRP->guest geneve hop: until the guest ENI's southbound Port_Binding is
up on its hosting chassis the cross-node flow is missing and the DNAT-translated
packet blackholes.

Add ensureGuestPortDatapath, the guest-side analog of ensureGatewayDatapath:
after AddEIP, probe the guest LSP's SB Port_Binding (ovn-sbctl up column); on a
miss force one ovn-controller recompute (binds the port / installs the remote
flow) and re-probe until a short deadline. Recompute, not RepairDatapath: this
is flow/binding convergence, not a WAN-uplink fault. No-op when no verifier is
wired or the EIP carries no guest port. spec.PortName is populated for every
associated EIP regardless of NAT mode.

Extends GatewayClaimVerifier with GuestPortUp and wires the gate into
applyEIPs so it runs in the continuous reconcile loop on every node.

* Revert "fix(network): gate ingress EIP datapath on guest SB Port_Binding convergence"

This reverts commit 728b1a9cec6eaf5c7ef5e9eda4469f239b4d8fc0.

* fix(network): key EIP DNAT delete on external IP, not logical IP

A dnat_and_snat row's identity on the VPC gateway router is its external
IP. The logical (private) IP is not a stable key: the EIP pool round-robins
and instance private IPs are reused as instances recycle, so the same
logical IP is held by different EIPs over time.

DeleteEIP deleted the row by logical IP, so a stale or retried delete for a
freed EIP clobbered whichever live EIP now held that recycled private IP --
the next owner's row vanished with no re-add and its public IP went dark
(SSH SYN never left br-wan: Connection timed out). Lifecycle-resilience
teardown/GC retries amplified this by firing vpc.delete-nat repeatedly.

Key the delete on the external IP via DeleteNATByExternalIP and skip when
no external IP is supplied (no EIP means no dnat_and_snat row). A stale
delete now targets the freed EIP's own external IP (ErrNATNotFound no-op)
and can no longer touch the live row.

* refactor: relax DeleteNatGateway to AWS-faithful

Remove the route-reference dependency guard (checkNatGatewayRouteRefs) so a
NAT gateway deletes even while route tables still forward to it, matching AWS
(the route blackholes). The reconciler's loadNATGWs drops the SNAT once the
record leaves the active bucket, so a forwarding route is not a delete-blocking
dependent. EIP is still disassociated on delete (no leak).

* test: invert NAT-GW route-ref invariant to AWS-faithful

TestRLC3_NatGatewayBlocksWhileRouted asserted DependencyViolation while a
route forwarded to the NAT gateway, which is AWS-infaithful. Replace with
TestRLC3_NatGatewayDeletesWhileRouted: delete must succeed whether or not a
live route still targets it (the route blackholes; the reconciler drops the
SNAT). Per ADR-0004 §2.

* fix: tear down NAT-GW SNAT on delete (restore delete-time fan-out)

The guard commit (53ed55a9) dropped publishDeleteEventsForNatGateway on the
assumption a routed NAT GW could never be deleted. With the route-ref guard
removed, deleting a NAT GW while routes still target it left the SNAT in
place (applyNATGWs is create-only, so the reconciler never prunes it) and
egress kept working — TestNATGateway's post-teardown 'lost internet' check
failed. Restore the fan-out: on delete, scan route tables and publish
vpc.delete-nat-gateway per associated subnet so egress stops, while the
route entry survives as a blackhole (AWS-faithful).

* fix: probe EIP datapath in reboot self-heal, not the gateway LRP IP

The post-reboot gateway datapath self-heal probed the gateway LRP IP for
liveness, which OVN answers natively at the router — so it stayed green even
when the EIP NAT pipeline was stranded (ofproto/trace dropped EIP traffic at
table 0). RepairDatapath never fired and TestRebootResilience timed out, with
the drift loop re-probing the same false-green every cycle.

Prefer probing an associated EIP: force a fresh ARP of the dnat_and_snat
external IP (flush neigh, ping to trigger, read the resolved MAC). OVN answers
ARP for the external IP from the gateway chassis independent of the guest, so a
resolved MAC proves the WAN uplink forwards and the NAT flows are installed —
the signal the LRP IP cannot give. Fall back to the LRP IP for VPCs with no
EIP. The existing drift-loop cadence now re-heals a later flow strand.

* fix: lb-agent heartbeats over mgmt port, not the WAN/EIP datapath

The lb-agent heartbeat to awsgw is control-plane and must survive a host
reboot that strands the OVN/EIP north-south data plane. Customer
(internet-facing) lb-agents heartbeated over the WAN GatewayURL, riding the
EIP datapath, so after a reboot the ALB never reported healthy until the
datapath self-healed. System LBs already heartbeated over the on-link
br-mgmt NIC; this extends that path to every lb-agent.

buildLBAgentEnv now always uses mgmtGatewayURL (on-link MgmtBridgeIP, the
mgmt NIC the lb-agent VM already carries), falling back to the WAN URL only
when no mgmt bridge exists. Drops the account-id branch.

* fix: re-heal guest ENI SB Port_Binding post-reboot so EIP ingress converges

Post-reboot every EIP in a VPC goes dark north-south: the DNAT row, host
neigh and gateway-chassis flow are all in place (ARP to the EIP resolves)
but the gatewayLRP->guest flow is missing until ovn-controller binds the
guest ENI's SB Port_Binding, so the DNAT-translated packet blackholes and
the public IP is unreachable on an otherwise-running instance.

Restore the guest-port convergence gate in applyEIPs: probe the guest LSP's
SB Port_Binding up column; on a miss force an ovn-controller recompute and
re-probe until a deadline. Unlike the earlier reverted form, recompute on
every miss, not once: after a host reboot the guest tap is replumbed several
seconds after the reconcile runs, so a single early nudge fires before the
port exists and never binds it. The window is widened to span guest boot.

This is the southbound analog of the gateway datapath self-heal; the EIP
ARP probe cannot detect it because the gateway chassis answers ARP for the
external IP even while the guest delivery flow is absent.

* fix(network): force post-reboot EIP recompute on guest-port bind, startup-only

The reboot suite passed only by accident: the pre-#351 gateway-claim verifier
polled the always-chassis-less gateway LRP, so it fired an ovn-controller
inc-engine/recompute on every reconcile. That spurious recompute was load-bearing
- it reinstalled the centralised gateway DNAT flows that ovn-controller's
incremental engine misses on a cold (post-reboot) start. #351 correctly switched
the check to the chassisredirect port, eliminating the every-cycle recompute, and
the EIP datapath went dark post-reboot with every control-plane signal green.

Restore the kick, scoped to the post-reboot startup path: applyEIPs now gates a
single recompute on the guest ENI's SB Port_Binding chassis claim - the reliable
signal the tap is back, unlike the up column which stays stale-true across a
reboot. Drift never recomputes, preserving the #351 fix for freshly attached
EIPs. Probe renamed GuestPortUp -> GuestPortBound (chassis, not up).

* Revert "fix(network): force post-reboot EIP recompute on guest-port bind, startup-only"

This reverts commit 792e318211ef03efbe24febeb470749d88c0b03c.

* test(e2e/reboot): capture dataplane diag on ALB serve failure

The post-reboot ALB-serve assertion (8.6) failed with no flow/ARP evidence:
the OVN/OVS dataplane dumps only ran on the 8.5 targets-unhealthy path, but
8.5 passes on the daemon's own health view while the north-south EIP datapath
is dark, so the serve failure (8.6) left nothing to localise the drop.

On a serve failure, capture dumpALBProbe/dumpOVNDataplane/dumpOVNClaimState/
dumpHeartbeatDiagnostics/dumpAppDiagnostics before failing. Add to the OVN
dataplane dump: dump-flows br-ext and fdb/show br-ext (north-south bridge,
previously only br-int), and a real ARP probe that flushes the neigh entry
first so primeReachability's pre-seeded reachable entry can no longer mask an
unanswered ARP. Pure diagnostics; no production change.

* test(e2e/reboot): decisive datapath diag — untruncate br-int, real-ingress ofproto/trace, conntrack + tap capture

* test(e2e/reboot): add south->north return-path ofproto/trace to localize egress drop

* test(e2e/reboot): derive LRP MAC from realized flow + remediation experiment (recompute vs ovn-controller restart)

* test(e2e/reboot): dump persisted SB MAC_Binding + external MACs; flush experiments (conntrack vs MAC_Binding) to isolate recompute-resistant return-path drop

* test(e2e/reboot): untruncate Port_Binding + enumerate DGP/chassisredirect claim state (does cr-gw row exist + resident chassis)

* test(e2e/reboot): dump NB source of return-path drop (lflow stage, NAT external_mac/options, LR policy, LSP port_security)

* fix: exempt public-IP instances from subnet egress drop gate (mulga-siv-311)

Post-reboot reconcile installs the priority-1100 subnet egress drop gate for an
IGW-attached subnet that has no 0.0.0.0/0 route, but nothing punched the subnet's
public-IP instances through it. lr_in_policy runs before lr_out un-DNAT/SNAT, so an
inbound connection's reply still carries its private source when it hits the gate and
is dropped. The ALB/EIP datapath goes dark south->north post-reboot while NAT, ARP,
chassis and guest-port binding all read green; the pre-reboot path survives only
because the event-driven gate never evaluates a subnet created after IGW attach.

Install the existing priority-1200 /32 reroute (above the gate) for every public-IP
instance during reconcile. Reroute only: the instance's dnat_and_snat already supplies
SNAT, unlike EnsureSystemInstanceEgress which also adds a plain snat. Public IPs come
from two disjoint sources -- auto-assigned/ELB addresses on the ENI record and user
EIPs in the EIP bucket -- so drive the exemption from both intent.Ports (new
PortSpec.PublicIP) and intent.EIPs.

* refactor: scope public-IP drop-gate exemption to gated subnets

Only install the priority-1200 reroute when the instance's subnet actually carries
a drop gate. Routed subnets egress via their priority-1000 reroute and need no
exemption, so bounding on gate presence keeps the change inert for IGW-routed and
NATGW-routed subnets (no redundant or overriding policy). Adds a negative test.

* refactor: drop unused RemoveEIPInstanceEgress

No production caller; the exemption is install-only in reconcile. Removed the
interface method and impl rather than leave dead API surface.

* test: dump guest console + OVN/datapath diag on SG-to-SG client SSH timeout

TestSGToSGDatapath waited for client-vm SSH via EventuallyErr and reported
only 'exit status 255' on timeout — no guest-side or datapath state. When the
fresh public-IP VM is unreachable for the full window the failure was
undiagnosable from CI artifacts.

Swap the wait to the non-fatal trySSHReady probe and, on timeout, call
DumpVPCFlowDiagnostics (guest console tail, ovn-nbctl/sbctl show, NAT rows,
br-int flows / conntrack / host ARP keyed on the public + private IP) before
Fatal, mirroring vpc_test/baseline_test. Captures persist to the artifact dir
for the Stage 2 analyzer bundle.

* fix: ownership-scope public-IP teardown to survive IP recycling

A live instance's dnat_and_snat rule, host ARP, and IPAM lease were torn down
by the delayed garbage-collection teardown of a different, long-dead instance
that previously held the same recycled public IP. The 2-min vm/gc
instance-teardown reaper re-runs ReleasePublicIP on a stale terminated record;
because the external IPAM round-robins a small pool, the IP had already been
reassigned to a live instance, and both teardown primitives acted on the IP by
value with no ownership check:

- policy.DeleteEIP deleted the dnat_and_snat row by external IP alone,
  discarding the logical IP it receives.
- StaticPoolAllocator.Release freed the pool entry by IP value.

Scope both to the current owner so a stale or duplicated teardown for a
recycled IP is a no-op:

- DeleteEIP looks up the row by external IP and skips the delete (and the ARP
  flush) when its logical IP no longer matches, mirroring AddEIP's idempotency
  lookup. Defeats both external- and logical-IP reuse races.
- Allocator.Release / ExternalIPAM.ReleaseIP take an ownerENIID; the static
  allocator no-ops a release whose ENI differs from the live allocation, and
  treats an already-freed owner-scoped release as idempotent. Teardown and
  rollback callers pass their ENI; user-driven EIP release passes none.

Proven via E2E single TestSGToSGDatapath (run 27515293563): client-vm SSH
black-holed after its NAT was deleted by the dead instance's GC sweep.

* fix(eks): single-flight DeleteCluster teardown per cluster

SDK retries of one DeleteCluster get fanned across nodes by the worker
queue group, so purgeClusterInfra raced the same cluster on multiple
nodes: duplicate ENI/NLB teardown, duplicate TargetGroupNotFound
deregisters, and a real double-release risk on the billable NAT-GW EIP.
Idempotency kept it correct but noisy.

Add a dedicated per-cluster teardown lease (teardownLeaderKey =
reconcilerLeaderKey + "/teardown"), distinct from the reconciler lease
so a delete never contends with the still-live reconciler that holds the
reconciler lease until it observes DELETING and exits. DeleteCluster
acquires it after the NotFound-idempotency check: the loser returns the
cluster as DELETING (AWS-async semantics) without running the teardown;
the winner drives purgeClusterInfra and releases. The DELETING backstop
reaper shares the same lease, so at most one purgeClusterInfra runs per
cluster cluster-wide.

A nil leaderKV (single-node) skips gating, so local behavior is
unchanged.

* fix: env-driven SSH-ready budget for slow baremetal guests

Add SPINIFEX_SSH_READY_TIMEOUT override for the single-node SSH-handshake
probes (default unchanged at 3m). Baremetal boots q35 guests slower (OVMF +
NBD-backed disks) than CI loop devices and intermittently misses the 3m
window; the harness can now widen it to 5m without affecting shared-runner
e2e. Applied at all single-node probe sites; failure messages now report the
actual budget.

* fix: shared external switch to stop per-VPC localnet ARP collision

Per-VPC external switches each attached an untagged localnet port to the same
physical network (br-ext). OVN cannot keep multiple untagged localnets on one
physical network L2-separate, so with two or more concurrent public-IP VPCs ARP
for a public IP landed on the wrong VPC's switch and the owning gateway router's
ARP responder never fired, leaving the public IP unreachable.

Move to a single shared external switch (provider-network pattern): one switch
with one localnet on network_name=external. Each VPC's gateway LRP attaches via
its own router-type switch port; per-VPC NAT isolation is unchanged. AttachIGW
ensures the shared switch idempotently and is migration-safe; DetachIGW removes
only the per-VPC port + LRP and preserves the shared switch. DeleteVPC removes
the per-VPC gateway switch port from the shared switch so it does not dangle.
Reconcile detects attachment via the gateway LRP since the shared switch carries
no vpc_id.

* fix: owner-scope DeleteEIP by ENI port to survive identical pair recycling

A stale or GC-re-emitted vpc.delete-nat for a terminated instance tore down a
live instance's dnat_and_snat rule (and flushed the host ARP) when the public
IP and private IP both recycled, together, to that live instance in the same
VPC. The (external_ip, logical_ip) pair-key matches under identical recycling,
so the existing logical-IP guard fell through.

Stamp the owning ENI port (spinifex:logical_port) on the dnat_and_snat row at
AddEIP, thread the port through handleDeleteNAT -> DetachEIP -> DeleteEIP, and
skip the delete when the row's stamped port differs from the incoming one. The
IPAM release was already owner-scoped; this mirrors that guard at the NAT layer
so any stale delete for a recycled pair is a no-op. Empty port preserves the
prior pair-key behaviour.
2026-06-15 23:27:39 +10:00
Josh Siviour 465fa1e6c7 fix: complete at-rest encryption launch + volume lifecycle (#361)
* chore: bump viperblock to encrypted-snapshot VolumeUUID nonce fix

Pull viperblock 1044c2a (feat/snapshot-uuid-nonce-fix) so E2E builds against
the fix for the encrypted AMI snapshot metadata tag-verify failure
(cipher: message authentication failed) on instance launch. Pairs with
viperblock PR #22.

* fix: forward viperblock master key to nbdkit mount path

viperblockd loaded the master key but never passed it to the nbdkit
plugin it spawns for volume mounts, so encrypted boot volumes opened
in cleartext and failed LoadState with an encryption-state mismatch.
Forward cfg.EncryptionKeyFile into NBDKitConfig and emit the plugin's
encryption_key_file= argument when set.

* chore: bump viperblock to fresh-volume VolumeUUID mint fix

* chore: bump viperblock to snapshot-link LoadState ordering fix

* fix: route encrypted-volume config writes through viperblock keyholder

config.json is a sealed VBState whose AES-GCM tag and StateSeqNum-derived
nonce can only be advanced by the master-key holder that owns the volume.
The EC2 volume handler wrote it directly to S3, so mergeVolumeConfig had to
refuse encrypted volumes (rewriting would strip the tag) — bricking
UpdateVolumeState (attach in-use / detach available) and ModifyVolume.

Route encrypted-volume config updates through viperblockd, mirroring the
ebs.snapshot idiom: per-volume ebs.config.{volumeID} hits the owning node's
live VB (the single StateSeqNum writer); on ErrNoResponders the ebs.config
queue group opens the detached volume exclusively and reseals. Cleartext
volumes keep the direct-S3 fast path. No crypto leaves viperblockd.

mulga-siv-323

* fix: unwrap encryption envelope when snapshot handler reads config.json

CreateSnapshot and snapshotInUseByVolumes decoded config.json straight into
a VBState. For encrypted volumes config.json is an at-rest envelope
{payload, authtag}; a raw decode yields a zero VBState (SizeGiB==0), so
CreateSnapshot 500s on the size guard and the in-use scan silently drops
encrypted volumes' snapshots. Unwrap via viperblock.StateBody first,
mirroring the volume handler's mergeVolumeConfig path.

mulga-siv-324

* test: cover viperblockd ebs.config handlers

Unit/integration coverage for applyConfigUpdate, makeConfigUpdateHandler
(ebs.config.{volumeID}), and the ebs.config queue-group fallback: grow-only
size reconcile, live-VB apply, invalid JSON, apply errors, and the
detached-volume open path. Clears the diff-coverage gate (68.8%).

* chore: pin viperblock to dev tip (#22 merged)
2026-06-15 22:43:56 +10:00
Josh Siviour 17c83cb3ad fix: build microVM rootfs via buildx to stop overlay2 export leak (#358)
docker export of a container leaks its overlay mount on Docker's
overlay2 driver — the mount survives docker rm, so the layer dirs are
never reaped except by a daemon restart. The lb-agent microVM build ran
docker export on every e2e job across ~9 runners, accumulating ~69G of
orphaned overlay2 layers on the CI host (disk hit 94%).

Build the rootfs with `docker buildx --output type=local` from a small
generated Dockerfile instead, which writes the image filesystem to a
directory and releases all mounts — nothing leaks. Keep the podman path
(its store is unaffected). Tighten the e2e cleanup image prune to
dangling-only so the alpine base stays cached instead of re-pulling.
2026-06-15 10:50:10 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 3835f39d35 fix: bump predastore + viperblock pins to dev-tip pseudo-versions
CI e2e-build compiles the spinifex module with GOWORK=off, resolving the
go.mod pins instead of the go.work local submodule redirect. v1.7.0 of both
modules predates symbols spinifex now calls (viperblock.StateBody,
predastore auth.ParseRoleARN), so the build failed with undefined-symbol
errors that go.work masked locally. Pin both to current dev-branch
pseudo-versions until a coordinated release is cut.
2026-06-15 10:46:56 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga eed57ee084 Merge branch 'dev' of github.com:mulgadc/spinifex into dev 2026-06-15 10:29:11 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga 69276f9a7a fix: Added better intro to Reference Architecture docs 2026-06-15 10:28:53 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga 1f22c96b3d fix: Added better intro to Reference Architecture docs 2026-06-15 10:26:51 +10:00
Bryn Mailer f6f3956952 feat: enable viperblock at-rest encryption by default on fresh installs (#323)
* feat: enable viperblock at-rest encryption by default on fresh installs

Fresh installs left nodes.<node>.viperblock.encryption_key_file empty, which
viperblockd treats as legacy cleartext mode. The encryption machinery existed
but the install path never generated a key or set the field.

Provision a cluster-wide viperblock master key in all three fresh-install
flows and render its path into spinifex.toml:

- admin init (single node): generate the key locally.
- admin init --multi-node (leader): generate once, save locally, and
  distribute via the formation server (mirrors IAM master key distribution).
- admin join (joiner): receive the shared key from the leader rather than
  minting its own, so volumes sealed on any node open everywhere. Lenient on
  absence — an older leader returns no key, so the joiner warns and stays
  cleartext instead of failing the join.

The key file is omitted from the template when unset, so upgrades with no
existing key keep running cleartext.

* fix: make viperblock encryption key group-readable for both readers

The key is loaded by two services per node — viperblockd (spinifex-viperblock)
and the awsgw EC2 handlers (spinifex-gw), both in the spinifex group — so it
must be group-readable, not owner-only like the per-node predastore key.

The previous commit generated the key but never registered its path with the
deployment ownership machinery, leaving /etc/spinifex/viperblock as root:root
0700 (non-traversable) and the key as root:root 0600. The daemon failed at
startup with "stat ... permission denied".

Mirror master.key: setup.sh creates /etc/spinifex/viperblock (0750), and
SetServiceOwnership chowns the dir to spinifex-viperblock and promotes the key
to root:spinifex 0640.

* fix: read viperblock config.json through StateBody for encrypted volumes

The metadata layer parsed config.json with json.Unmarshal/NewDecoder directly,
which fails on encrypted volumes/AMIs now that viperblock wraps VBState in a
valid-JSON envelope ({"v":1,"payload":...,"authtag":...}). DescribeImages
silently skipped encrypted AMIs (count=0 → "no AMIs available"), bricking the
whole launch path.

Route every config.json read through viperblock.StateBody, which unwraps the
envelope (no key needed — the metadata is authenticated, not encrypted) and is
a no-op for unencrypted volumes:

- image: DescribeImages, getVolumeConfig, amiNameExists, GetAMIConfig
- volume: getVolumeConfigAndEncryption, and mergeVolumeConfig (so the
  refuse-to-merge-encrypted guard sees the real VBState instead of clobbering
  the envelope with a tag-less blob)
- admin: readAMIConfig, readVolumeConfig
2026-06-15 09:31:23 +10:00
Josh Siviour b23fa3bf60 feat(eks): managed control-plane VPC (Set B) + control-plane lifecycle hardening (#356)
* feat(eks): VM-side managed-addon delivery transport

Stage CreateAddon manifests in KV host-side; the control-plane VM pulls the
staged set through the AWS gateway (signed GET /clusters/{name}/internal-addons/
{accountId}), renders the baked bundles into the K3s auto-deploy dir, and
reports per-addon delivery status on a dedicated eks.addon.*.status channel that
the cluster reconciler CASes onto AWS-visible AddonStatus (CREATING->ACTIVE).

- gateway: ListInternalAddons route + ListStagedAddonManifests NATS action
- handlers: addon status reconciler (nextAddonStatus), staging installer
- eks-node AMI: eks-gateway-fetch binary + mulga-eks-addon-sync agent
- agent renders idempotently (cmp before replace) so K3s auto-deploy does not
  re-apply every tick and clear the Addon CR .status.gvks readiness signal
- agent mirrors per-tick delivery outcomes to the serial console for host-side
  observability

* fix(eks): provision cluster NLB synchronously so the endpoint carries the real front-end IP

The cluster NLB front-end IP is assigned by the async LB-VM launch
(launchLBVMAsync), but EnsureClusterNLB read it back synchronously right after
CreateLoadBalancer returned — losing the race and falling back to the synthetic
<lb>.elb.spinifex.local DNS name. That name is unresolvable (no Route53) and is
not in the apiserver serving-cert SAN, so kubectl against the cluster never
connects.

Split the elbv2 create: the public CreateLoadBalancer stays async (267.4 — an
inline multi-minute VM boot head-of-line-blocks the gateway responder), and a
new CreateLoadBalancerSync drives the data-plane launch inline and returns the
LB carrying its front-end address. The EKS cluster-create worker runs off the
gateway responder, so it uses the sync entry and reads the IP from the return
value instead of racing persisted state. No polling.

- elbv2: factor provisionLBDataPlane out of launchLBVMAsync; add CreateLoadBalancerSync
- eks: ensureClusterLB uses the sync entry, sets FrontendIP from the result,
  drops the read-back; EnsureClusterNLB fails loud (ErrClusterNLBFrontendIPUnavailable)
  when no front-end IP is allocated rather than shipping the DNS-name fallback
- eks: drop the DNS-name endpoint fallback; the endpoint is always the front-end IP

* feat: auto-wire IGW for internet-facing EKS cluster endpoint

An internet-facing cluster NLB allocates an external front-end IP and the
OVN dnat_and_snat for it, but the external switch + localnet + gateway LRP
that make that IP answerable on the wire are built only on IGW attach. The
control-plane NLB is a system instance, so ensure an IGW on cluster build
and reclaim it on teardown.

EnsureClusterIGW (idempotent, reuses a customer IGW untouched) runs before
EnsureClusterNLB when the endpoint is public; DeleteClusterIGW (ownership-
scoped) removes only the cluster-owned IGW in purgeClusterInfra, before the
VPC delete. New IGW dep wired from the daemon.

* fix(eks): tear down infra on failed cluster launch to stop LB EIP leak

A CreateCluster that fails during its background launch flipped the meta
to FAILED but performed no teardown, relying on a later same-name create
to reclaim and purge the infra. EKS cluster names are unique per create,
so that reclaim never fires: the internet-facing load-balancer VM keeps
running with its allocated+associated dnat_and_snat EIP indefinitely.
Over repeated create/delete cycles the EIP pool fills with allocations
bound to terminated instances, so a later allocation's advertised
endpoint and its live OVN NAT diverge onto different pool addresses.

- failClusterLaunch now runs a best-effort purgeClusterInfra on the
  in-memory meta (freshest refs even when the failing step was the meta
  write itself) before MarkClusterFailed. purgeClusterInfra is
  idempotent, so a later reclaim or DeleteCluster re-purge is a no-op;
  the FAILED meta is retained for observability.
- Daemon releaseSystemInstanceEIP extracted and called from both
  TerminateSystemInstance and cleanupFailedSystemInstance, so a launch
  that fails after AssociateAddress releases the eipService allocation
  instead of leaking it (MarkFailed's ReleasePublicIP only knows the
  externalIPAM path).

* feat: EKS managed control-plane VPC (AWS Set B) composed from EC2 APIs

CreateCluster now auto-builds the managed control-plane VPC under the
system account, the spinifex analogue of AWS EKS's hidden managed-account
VPC: a public subnet for the internet-facing NLB, private subnet(s) for the
k3s control-plane VM(s), and a NAT gateway giving the private CP egress for
image pulls. It is composed from the real EC2 VPC-family APIs
(CreateVpc/Subnet, IGW, RouteTable/Route, NatGateway), so per-subnet egress
gating is wired by the existing topology subscribers off the route-table
events those APIs publish — no direct OVN mutation.

This resolves the mulga-siv-292 root cause: the internet-facing NLB and the
private CP were crammed into one customer subnet with no IGW route, so both
were treated as private and dropped by the lr_in_policy 1100 rule, killing
the LB-VM return leg and lb-agent heartbeat. The CP only survived via a
per-instance 1200 reroute bandaid, now removed — the topology expresses
egress instead.

Placement is uniform single/multi-node (CP always in the private subnet).
The system LB VM heartbeats over the mgmt bridge (SystemGatewayURL) rather
than the WAN. Managed-VPC teardown reclaims NAT GW + EIP, route tables,
subnets, IGW, and the VPC in dependency order. Customer subnetIds (Set A /
worker side) remain consumed-not-created and are deferred to the worker
round.

* fix(eks): bake cluster-owner account into CP-VM EKS_ACCOUNT_ID

The managed control-plane VPC (Set B) launches the K3s control-plane VMs and
their ENIs under the system (infra) account, but the on-VM agents — bootstrap
publish, state report, token-review, and add-on fetch — must key on the
cluster-OWNER (customer) account that owns the cluster meta, namespaces, and
AccessEntry KV. Add ClusterAccountID to K3sServerInput and bake it into the
VM's EKS_ACCOUNT_ID, decoupling it from the infra AccountID the VM launches
under. Without this the VM reported state and fetched add-ons against the
system account, so the cluster never observed a healthy control plane (stuck
CREATING, null CA) and kubectl/add-on delivery timed out.

Also refresh the e2e suite doc comment to describe the Set B topology and the
data-plane subtests (kubectl + managed-addon delivery) that now run.

* fix(eks): explicitly delete addon objects on unstage

K3s does not delete the applied resources when an auto-deploy manifest file is
removed from the server manifests dir (documented behaviour). The addon-sync
GC pass relied on that, so after DeleteAddon the rendered manifest was dropped
but its Namespace/ConfigMap stayed standing — the e2e AddonDelivery GC wait
timed out. Copy the manifest aside, drop the original so K3s stops tracking it,
then kubectl delete the objects (--wait=false to avoid finalizer stalls).
2026-06-12 22:29:24 +10:00
Julian Sommer a57ebd0ad9 chore: remove references to pseudo multi node 2026-06-12 15:28:23 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 022c6cfd2a Update Makefile
Signed-off-by: joshsiv-mulga <mrk@mulgadc.com>
2026-06-12 15:26:11 +10:00
Julian Sommer 19472c377a chore: delete legacy scripts 2026-06-12 15:17:48 +10:00
Julian Sommer 5238e29f48 fix: admin init message 2026-06-12 15:02:54 +10:00
Julian Sommer 4adecc0794 chore: delete old scripts 2026-06-12 14:52:18 +10:00
Julian Sommer ef86d09a42 chore: delete legacy scripts/iac 2026-06-12 14:51:38 +10:00
Julian Sommer ad4e6e8896 chore: delete empty INSTALL.md 2026-06-12 14:41:52 +10:00
Julian Sommer 642fdacdb7 chore: delete dead function 2026-06-12 14:37:29 +10:00
Julian Sommer 2c6f65b2e9 fix(network): restore centralised EIP gateway-port neigh prime (#355) 2026-06-12 14:23:01 +10:00
Josh Siviour a2ede7c476 EKS AWS-compat + nodegroup lifecycle hardening (env19) (#353)
* fix(eks): surface CREATING block reason at Info, not Debug

A cluster stuck in CREATING logged its per-tick bootstrap/health block
reason at Debug, invisible at the default level, so a create that ran to
the 15m timeout FAILED gave no diagnosable cause. Bump both reasons to
Info; they fire only during the CREATING window.

* feat(iam): round-trip AWS-managed policy ARNs for stock EKS tooling

Stock terraform-aws-eks / eksctl attach AWS-managed policies
(AmazonEKSClusterPolicy, AmazonEKSWorkerNodePolicy, AmazonEKS_CNI_Policy,
...) that Spinifex does not provision. AttachRolePolicy rejected them
NoSuchEntity and ListAttachedRolePolicies dropped them, breaking the
node/cluster role round-trip DescribeNodegroup relies on. Accept and
store managed ARNs opaquely (no backing document), deriving the policy
name from the ARN on read.

* feat(eks): echo cluster tags + store-only Tag/Untag/ListTags

DescribeCluster never returned create-time tags and ClusterMeta did not
store them, so a stock terraform-aws provider reconciling default_tags
saw perpetual drift and issued TagResource on every apply — which itself
returned NotImplemented. Store tags on the cluster record, echo them from
DescribeCluster, and back the three tag ops store-only against the record
(cluster ARNs only) so the default_tags round-trip is clean.

* fix(eks): persist nodegroup workers incrementally + boot reclaim sweep

launchWorkers only wrote the worker IDs to the record after the whole
launch loop, so a daemon crash mid-loop stranded already-launched workers
under a record that still showed empty InstanceIDs — nothing could reclaim
them. Persist each worker before launching the next, and add a boot-time
reclaim sweep (SpawnRegisteredReconcilers) that terminates recorded
workers for any nodegroup left CREATING by a crashed launcher, or
CREATE_FAILED still holding workers, settling it to CREATE_FAILED with
InstanceIDs cleared.

* fix: plumb query params into EKS gateway dispatcher

EKS_Request never passed the query string to per-action handlers, so
UntagResource (DELETE /tags/{arn}?tagKeys=k1&tagKeys=k2) saw an empty
TagKeys and silently no-op'd. Fold url.Values into the JSON body when
the body is empty so the handler unmarshal sees the keys.

* feat(iam): resolve AWS-managed EKS policy grants for authorization

Assumed-role/user authorization (checkPolicy -> Get{Role,User}Policies ->
EvaluateAccess) could not honour AWS-managed policy grants: Spinifex stores
no document for managed ARNs, so stock EKS roles whose permissions come
entirely from managed policies (node role: AmazonEKSWorkerNodePolicy +
AmazonEC2ContainerRegistryReadOnly + AmazonEKS_CNI_Policy) evaluated to an
empty grant set and were denied every call.

Add a builtin registry of well-known AWS-managed policy documents, resolved
via a shared resolveAttachedPolicy helper used by both GetRolePolicies and
GetUserPolicies. Unmodeled managed ARNs resolve to no grant (fail-closed
deny) rather than erroring the whole request; customer-managed ARNs still
fail closed when unresolvable.
2026-06-12 13:54:11 +10:00
Julian Sommer 50b5495d26 chore: more comment cleanup 2026-06-12 12:38:31 +10:00
Julian Sommer 53e8c3f60f chore: trim comments 2026-06-12 12:06:57 +10:00
Julian Sommer 58842e5e8c chore: fix stale comments 2026-06-12 11:42:19 +10:00
Julian Sommer 1dda4cb37c feat(gateway): enforce assumed-role session policies (#354) 2026-06-12 11:34:53 +10:00
Julian Sommer c6c26c04e2 chore: trim workflow comments 2026-06-12 11:04:46 +10:00
Julian Sommer 2df35d3822 chore: remove reboot e2e 2026-06-12 10:46:14 +10:00
Josh Siviour d076a434d4 Feat/e2e targeted suites (#352)
* test(e2e): add targeted suite selector + shadow-mode CI step

select-suites maps a diff to the e2e suites it must run: changed files →
services (manifest path/additional_paths) → consumer closure over
depends_on vs publishes/subscribes → suites whose covers intersect.
Special cases force-all (infra/harness/workflow, ≥3 services, submodule
bumps) or a lone suite dir; empty diffs fall back to default suites. An
AST scan of each suite's harness.Ensure* call graph derives per-test
service coverage and emits an optional -test.run subset (RUN_PATTERN).

Wired into e2e.yml as a non-gating 'Select Suites (shadow)' job that
logs the computed selection to the run summary so predicted vs actual
can be compared before the selector drives SUITES.

* ci(e2e): add dispatch-only per-suite job blocks grouped by env

Restructure the looped e2e flow into env-grouped provision -> matrix
suites -> teardown blocks so each suite surfaces as its own node in the
Actions graph instead of a single green tick:

  single_provision -> single_suite [single,cert,lb,eks] -> single_teardown
  multi_provision  -> multi_suite  [multinode]          -> multi_teardown

Provision resolves the VM/cluster and ships test binaries, emitting WAN
IP + ssh key path as job outputs; each matrix leg runs one suite over
SSH and uploads its own junit/analysis artifacts; teardown (if:always)
reuses the persisted tofu workspace on the same runner to destroy.

workflow_dispatch only -- runs alongside the gating e2e.yml for
validation and posts no commit status.

* test(e2e): add manifest drift lint (fixture-create + NATS subject)

Bead 5 of the targeted-suite-selection plan. Two ratcheted drift guards in
tests/e2e/manifest-lint, wired into make preflight and the spinifex.yml PR job:

- Fixture lint: AST-flags direct resource-create AWS calls
  (c.EC2.RunInstances, c.ELBv2.CreateLoadBalancer, ...) in suite test files,
  steering them through harness.Ensure* fixtures. ~104 pre-existing call sites
  are captured in a checked-in baseline; the lint fails only on NEW creates.
  Intentional create-path tests opt out with an inline // e2e:allow-create.

- Subject lint: extracts NATS subject literals from the natsSub{} registry and
  literal Subscribe/Publish/Request args, cross-referenced wildcard-aware
  against service-interfaces.yaml. Code subjects missing from the manifest fail
  (ratcheted); manifest subjects with no static reference warn only (many are
  produced dynamically). Fixed real drift surfaced on first run: declared the
  five spinifex.cluster.shutdown.* phase subjects under spinifex_daemon.

manifest-check is now CI-enforced alongside manifest-lint (previously
preflight/local-only).

* feat: run-scoped e2e teardown sweep

Tag every Ensure* fixture resource with e2e:run=<run-id> when
SPINIFEX_E2E_RUN_ID is set, and add a teardown.test suite that sweeps
everything carrying that tag at end of run — reclaiming resources leaked
by a crashed suite, an interrupted run, or a persistent cluster.

- harness/sweep.go: tagRunResources (EC2 CreateTags) + tagRunELB (ELBv2
  AddTags) + SweepRunResources in dependency order (LB, instances, NAT,
  snapshots, volumes, images, SGs, subnets, key pairs). Blank run id
  no-ops both tagging and sweeping, so the sweep can never touch an
  untagged or foreign resource.
- harness/fixtures.go: stamp the run tag on each created resource.
- tests/e2e/teardown: thin suite that runs the sweep; skips without a
  cluster or run id, logs the report, never fails the run.
- e2e-suites.yml: build + ship teardown.test, pass the run id into suite
  legs, sweep on the VM in both teardown jobs before tofu destroy.
2026-06-11 21:09:50 +10:00
Julian Sommer 0b3e950abd fix(network): verify gateway claim on chassisredirect port, not distributed LRP (#351)
The gateway-claim verifier polled the SB Port_Binding for the distributed
gateway port LRP (gw-<vpc>), which is always chassis-less by OVN design — the
chassis claim lands on the chassisredirect port cr-gw-<vpc>. So
ensureGatewayClaimed always read "unclaimed", fired ovn-appctl
inc-engine/recompute every reconcile cycle, and logged a spurious "gateway SB
chassis claim did not converge" error after its 30s budget. The repeated forced
recomputes rebuilt the entire OVN flow table every cycle, intermittently
darkening freshly attached EIP datapaths and flaking the single-node e2e suite
(observed: every br-int EIP flow at duration~10s with n_packets=0).

Check the chassisredirect Port_Binding instead. The nudge now fires only on a
genuinely unclaimed redirect — the real reboot race #339 targets — rather than
on every healthy reconcile.

- topology: add GatewayChassisRedirectPort(vpcID) -> "cr-gw-<vpc>"
- reconcile/apply: pass the cr- port to ensureGatewayClaimed
- reconcile/host: doc the verifier checks the chassisredirect binding
- test: capture the queried port; assert the cr- port is checked, no nudge
2026-06-11 20:35:34 +10:00
Julian Sommer c4926d423f feat: IMDS public-keys (#350) 2026-06-11 15:19:01 +10:00
Julian Sommer b38c888b4d chore: dedupe auth helpers (#349) 2026-06-11 14:03:13 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga a5b6a74a0b fix(e2e): serialise TestMultinodeGuestSSH after cluster restabilises
TestMultinodeGuestSSH ran with t.Parallel(), so it resumed immediately
after the sequential bucket and probed trio[0] — which CrossNodeOps
stop/starts but only waits to reach state "running", not for sshd to
answer. The guest was often still booting, producing
kex_exchange_identification resets and 2m timeouts that flaked CI red.

Drop t.Parallel() and declare the test last in the sequential bucket so
it runs after CrossNodeOps + NodeFailure/Recovery + Spread have
restabilised the cluster, giving every trio member time to settle and
removing concurrent VM churn.
2026-06-11 13:00:35 +10:00
Julian Sommer 19de3b0994 chore: update COMMANDS.md 2026-06-11 12:50:34 +10:00
Julian Sommer 620b96f9c6 feat: Terraform S3 Webapp using IMDS (#348) 2026-06-11 12:35:15 +10:00
Julian Sommer 05e66bd6a0 feat: ListPolicyVersions 2026-06-11 12:25:12 +10:00
Josh Siviour db8d5a7265 fix(elbv2): build lb-agent data-plane config on LB-ready heartbeat (#347)
CreateLoadBalancer is async: InstanceID is only set when the LB VM's QEMU
process starts, ~600ms after the create burst. The reactive
updateStoredConfig calls from CreateListener/RegisterTargets all no-op
during that window (InstanceID empty), and nothing rebuilds config once
the VM launches. The lb-agent then heartbeats, gets an empty ConfigHash,
never sees it change, and probes zero backends -> e2e 0/2 healthy.

Build the data-plane config on the provisioning->active heartbeat
transition instead: that is the one point where InstanceID is guaranteed
set and the agent is alive to consume config. The InstanceID guard in
updateStoredConfig stays as a cheap no-data-plane skip, no longer the
primary gate.
2026-06-11 11:56:42 +10:00
Julian Sommer 3a9a1564eb chore: delete orphaned bash e2e scirpts 2026-06-11 10:34:58 +10:00
Josh Siviour c7f337229f feat(vpcd): drain held DHCP leases on teardown (#346)
DHCP-source external-pool leases are DHCPRELEASEd only on explicit
instance/EIP terminate. Manager.Stop() preserves leases for
adopt-on-reboot, so env teardown/reset kills vpcd and destroys the
per-AZ lease KV without releasing — stranding every live lease
(instance ENIs, EIP allocations, per-VPC LRP gateways) on the upstream
DHCP server until TTL. Across CI churn with fresh client-ids the
upstream scope fills and new launches get no public IP.

Add Manager.DrainAll + a vpc.dhcp.drain RPC and a standalone
'spx admin cluster drain-dhcp' command that releases every held lease.
Wired into both teardown paths (single-node teardown role and
multi-node cluster-teardown.yml) before services stop. Stop() is
unchanged, so normal restarts still adopt leases on reboot.
2026-06-11 10:11:23 +10:00
Josh Siviour e8bd99386e fix(ec2): fail RunInstances when public-IP auto-assign fails (mulga-siv-275) (#345)
* fix(ec2): fail RunInstances when public-IP auto-assign fails

PrepareRunInstances swallowed an AllocateIP failure for a
MapPublicIpOnLaunch subnet (logged WARN, fell through), so the instance
booted running with no public IP. With no qemu-hostfwd fallback such an
instance is unreachable. Mirror the adjacent AddNAT-failure path: detach
and delete the auto-created ENI, deallocate capacity, drop the instance,
and surface InsufficientAddressCapacity.

* test(daemon): deterministically pick a fitting 2-vCPU type in capacity filter test

CapacityFilterRespectsAllocation selected the first 2-vCPU type by Go
map-iteration order, intermittently picking a type near the
schedulable-memory boundary the allocator then rejected (~3/5 failures in
isolation on small hosts). Select the smallest-memory 2-vCPU type from the
capacity-aware set so it always fits.
2026-06-11 09:47:40 +10:00
Josh Siviour 5069a085c6 fix: roll back ELBv2 partial create-load-balancer/listener infra (#344)
CreateLoadBalancer's PutLoadBalancer-failure path only released the name
claim, orphaning the ENIs and managed front-end SG already created. Extract
the ENI+SG+claim teardown into rollbackLBInfra and call it from both the
ENI-create-failure and PutLoadBalancer-failure paths.

CreateListener persisted the listener record before authorizing the NLB
managed-SG port and reloading config; a failure in either left an orphan
listener record (and, after a config failure, a dangling SG authorization).
Add rollbackListener to revoke the port (when already opened) and
cascade-delete the listener on every post-persist failure.

Also wait for the async worker launch in the two CreateNodegroup disk-size
tests so they observe the launch under the record-before-launch contract.
2026-06-10 23:20:20 +10:00
Josh Siviour 8ab5441103 fix: async platform create handlers to stop responder starvation (mulga-siv-267.4) (#343)
* fix: make platform create handlers async to stop responder starvation

EKS CreateCluster/CreateNodegroup and ELBv2 CreateLoadBalancer ran their
full VM/control-plane launch synchronously inside the NATS subscription
callback on the shared spinifex-workers queue. A multi-minute create
head-of-line blocked the worker, so system.LaunchInstance/TerminateInstance
found no responder within the gateway timeout and failed with
'nats: no responders available' (mulga-siv-267.4).

Each create now runs validation + the atomic name claim synchronously,
snapshots the CREATING/provisioning output, then spawns the slow launch on
a per-impl launchWG and returns immediately. Launch failures mark the
record FAILED/CREATE_FAILED so 267.3 reclaim makes a retry idempotent. The
service interfaces are shared by the gateway NATS clients and the daemon
impls, so the async split lives inside the impl method and leaves the
interface, handleNATSRequest, and all daemon handlers unchanged.

The host-pinned system.LaunchInstance/TerminateInstance responders now
dispatch each request on its own goroutine (systemDispatchWg) so a slow
boot, which must respond after it completes, no longer blocks the subject.

ELBv2 keeps ENI creation synchronous (cheap VPC calls that yield the
AZ/VpcId the create response needs); only the LB-VM boot goes async,
folding InstanceID/IPs back into the record for a later Describe.

* fix: keep node-targeted launch subscription live under capacity pressure

The node-targeted (unicast) system.LaunchInstance.{type}.{node} subject was
torn down whenever the node filled, same as the queue (anycast) subject. For
the queue subject that is correct — NATS reroutes the launch to a node with
room. For the node-targeted subject there is no other node: a committed spread
reservation (EKS HA control-plane leg) that targets the now-unsubscribed node
gets 'nats: no responders available' instead of a capacity decision.

Keep the node-targeted subscription live for any type the node can host;
enforce capacity at launch time via ResourceManager.allocate, which already
rejects an over-capacity launch atomically. A reserved launch always reaches a
responder and, when the slot is still good, succeeds.
2026-06-10 22:41:43 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga e8cbd99158 fix(eks): propagate nodegroup DiskSize to worker root volume
launchWorkers built RunInstancesInput with no BlockDeviceMappings, so
parseVolumeParams applied the 4GB root-volume default and the nodegroup
DiskSize was silently ignored. Wire rec.DiskSize into a BlockDeviceMapping
when set.
2026-06-10 22:36:42 +10:00
Josh Siviour 22d316f76e test(reboot): capture OVN chassis-identity churn + ovn-controller claim/connection state on post-reboot failure (#342)
Run 27254808154 showed TestRebootResilience fail with ovn-controller on
the live chassis claiming NO local Port_Bindings post-reboot: ENIs stuck
on a dead chassis UUID, cr-gw chassis empty, NAT external_mac empty —
while NB intent was correct and taps carried the right iface-id. The SB
Chassis _uuid churned across the reboot (old UUID gone, new one created)
while the SB DB persisted, orphaning every claim.

The current artifacts cannot pin WHY the new chassis won't reclaim: the
ovn-controller vlog lives under /var/log/ovn, not journald, so it is
absent from the systemd-journal capture.

Add:
- phase5Snapshot: capture chassis identity PRE-reboot (system-id, SB
  Chassis/Chassis_Private, get-connection) to ovn-pre-chassis.txt as the
  churn baseline.
- dumpOVNClaimState: at post-reboot failure, capture the same chassis
  state POST-reboot plus ovn-controller connection-status/debug, the
  gw/eni Port_Binding claim detail, ovn-central-vs-ovn-controller boot
  ordering, and tails of ovn-controller.log / ovn-northd.log →
  diag-ovn-claim.txt.

Disambiguates chassis-identity churn from an SB/NB startup-ordering race
on the next reboot-suite run. Diagnostic only; no behavior change.
2026-06-10 16:19:34 +10:00
Josh Siviour 0b79697c15 feat: atomic create idempotency across EKS, ELBv2 and EC2 ClientToken (267.3) (#340)
* feat: atomic create idempotency across EKS, ELBv2 and EC2 ClientToken

Every create handler took a non-atomic Get-check then a blind Put, so a
gateway/NATS retry that spawned a second concurrent handler could pass the
check in both and double-launch + leak VMs (267 failure-mode C).

Make each create claim its identity key atomically before any launching work:

- EKS CreateCluster: claim the cluster meta via kv.Create; a prior FAILED
  attempt is reclaimed via a CREATING CAS so exactly one concurrent retry wins.
  purgeClusterInfra gains a deleteMeta flag so reclaim purges infra while
  keeping its claim key.
- EKS CreateNodegroup: claim the nodegroup record before SG provisioning or
  worker launch; duplicates return ResourceInUse without provisioning.
- ELBv2 CreateLoadBalancer: account-scoped name claim (lbname.<acct>.<name>)
  taken before ENI/VM work, released on every failure path and in
  DeleteLoadBalancer; a name claim whose owner lbID has no live record is a
  crashed-create orphan and is reclaimed.
- EC2 RunInstances: ClientToken dedup over a dedicated TTL bucket with a
  two-phase claim (in-flight -> done) and reservation replay; a token reused
  with different params returns IdempotentParameterMismatch.

Race tests under -race assert exactly one owner and a single launch for
concurrent same-name creates on all paths.

* test: cover ClientToken idempotency; extract orchestration for testability

Extract the claim->replay->launch->finalize/abort flow out of RunInstances
into runInstancesWithClientToken(store, ..., launch func) so the idempotency
path is unit-testable without a live gateway/NATS. RunInstances now just
resolves the store, hashes params, and passes a launch closure.

Make the in-flight poll timeout/step package vars so a duplicate-caller
wait-timeout is deterministically testable.

Adds tests: replay-skips-launch, owner-launches-once-then-replay,
launch-failure-aborts, param-mismatch maps to AWS error, getClientTokenStore
binds once, and in-flight wait-timeout.
2026-06-10 15:43:37 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 908005df74 feat(iam): add ListRolePolicies handler returning empty inline list
Satisfies the AWS provider's aws_iam_role read-back. Spinifex only
attaches managed policies, never inline, so this always returns empty.
2026-06-10 15:20:21 +10:00
Josh Siviour 19c53b0794 fix: verify SB gateway-port chassis claim after rebind, nudge ovn-controller (#339)
After a host reboot the Northbound gateway_chassis intent recovers correctly
(SetGatewayChassis re-asserts it idempotently), but ovn-controller can leave the
Southbound Port_Binding for the gateway router port unclaimed (chassis == []).
With no claimed binding it installs no logical->physical flows for the centralised
gateway redirect, so every floating IP on the VPC is dark: ofproto/trace drops the
FIP ingress at br-int table 0, host->FIP is 100% packet loss, and the ALB lb-agent
heartbeat times out until the 5-min health window expires (TestRebootResilience).

rebindGatewayChassis only asserted NB intent. Now, after SetGatewayChassis, the
reconciler verifies the SB Port_Binding has a non-empty chassis and, if not, nudges
the local ovn-controller to recompute (inc-engine/recompute), polling until the
claim converges or a bounded deadline elapses — logging an error rather than
blocking reconcile. SB read + recompute are exec-only (ovn-sbctl/ovn-appctl) and
live in network/host behind a reconcile.GatewayClaimVerifier interface, wired in
vpcd; reconcile stays NB-pure and mockable. No NB object create/delete (ADR-0006 S5).

Verified by run 27251769281's diag-ovn-flows.txt (SB chassis empty + table-0 drop).
Validation completes on the next reboot-suite nightly (single-node self-heals too
fast to reproduce locally).
2026-06-10 15:02:31 +10:00
Josh Siviour f8482ad05a test(reboot): heartbeat-path diagnostics on post-reboot health timeout (#337)
* test(reboot): capture heartbeat-path diagnostics on post-reboot health timeout

When post-reboot ALB targets fail to go healthy, the lb-agent's heartbeat to the
gateway times out with 'context deadline exceeded while awaiting headers' — a
symptom that alone cannot distinguish a network-level drop from an app/gateway
stall. Replace the fatal WaitForTargetsHealthy with a non-fatal poll that, on
timeout, tcpdumps br-wan for the heartbeat 5-tuple + ARP for the ALB floating IP
and pulls the lb-agent console + awsgw journal, then fails. Disambiguates the
layer before any fix (mulga-siv-265).

* test(reboot): re-aim heartbeat capture + add OVN dataplane flow-dump

Run 27250238163 proved the post-reboot failure is network-level (all 3 floating
IPs 100% packet-loss from host) but NOT neigh/NAT priming — neigh is primed and
NAT rows are present, only br-int forwarding is dead. The prior capture watched
br-wan for the ALB floating IP, while the real lb-agent heartbeat posts to the
gateway port on the host's advertise interface, so the L4 classifier could never
see the heartbeat and defaulted regardless.

- heartbeat tcpdump now watches the gateway port on `any` (real path) plus a
  secondary br-wan floating-IP capture for north-south; classifier keys off
  gateway-port L4 presence.
- new dumpOVNDataplane captures ovs-vsctl show, ovs-ofctl dump-flows br-int,
  ovn-sbctl chassis + Port_Binding, dnat_and_snat NAT rows, host neigh, and a
  host->floating-IP ping + ofproto/trace, to pin the flow-restore step.
- failure path dumps diag-ovn-flows.txt alongside diag-heartbeat.txt.

Test-only, build-tagged e2e; no production code.
2026-06-10 14:56:34 +10:00
Josh Siviour 11e58b200d fix: persist EKS control-plane VM refs before egress alloc to prevent leak (#338)
CreateCluster set the control-plane VM/ENI/spread-group refs into the cluster
meta but first persisted them to KV only after allocateClusterEgressIP. A
failure between placement and that persist left the live sys.medium CP VMs
unrecorded, so neither DeleteCluster nor the FAILED-cluster reclaim could reach
them and they leaked, reserving host capacity.

Persist the meta immediately after placeControlPlane returns. The reclaim path
keys off the persisted ControlPlaneNodes + ControlPlaneSpreadGroup, so this also
frees reserved spread capacity on teardown.
2026-06-10 13:37:44 +10:00
Josh Siviour 4457b813ae fix: make EKS DeleteCluster egress-EIP release idempotent (#336)
A retried DeleteCluster (or the egress-delete cascade) can release the
hidden-pool allocation before the release step runs, so ReleaseAddress
returns InvalidAllocationID.NotFound. That was treated as a fatal teardown
error, so the cluster wedged in DELETING forever and its KV meta plus
downstream resources leaked. Swallow the NotFound variants as idempotent
success — mirroring the 165.17 ENI-teardown fix — so the SG + KV sweep
proceeds. A genuine release failure still wedges DELETING for retry.
2026-06-10 13:37:40 +10:00
Josh Siviour 74b91b5cc5 feat(eks): HA control plane — 3-node etcd quorum spread across distinct hosts (#335)
* feat(eks): node-targetable control-plane VM (HA spread transport prereq)

Groundwork for HA control-plane placement (mulga-siv-231.7.1): make the k3s
control-plane VM placeable on a specific Spinifex host.

- Add a sys.medium instance type (2 vCPU / 4 GB) and boot the control-plane VM
  as it instead of t3.medium. A sys.* type keeps the CP VM out of customer
  DescribeInstanceTypes and makes the daemon register the node-targeted
  system.LaunchInstance.{type}.{nodeID} subject (only sys.* types get it).
- Add K3sServerInput.TargetNodeID and a LaunchSystemInstanceOnNode method on
  the launcher: empty/local node launches in-process (unchanged single-CP
  path); any other node dispatches over the node-targeted subject, where the
  receiving daemon runs the launch and owns the VM.

The spread orchestrator (reserve N hosts, launch per host, verify, rollback,
<3-host fallback) lands separately; CreateCluster still launches locally
(TargetNodeID empty), so behaviour is unchanged.

* feat(eks): HA control-plane spread orchestrator

Place N=3 k3s server VMs across distinct Spinifex hosts via a per-cluster
spread placement group, with all-or-nothing rollback and single-CP fallback.

- placeControlPlane: capacity fan-out (HostScheduler) -> >=3-host gate ->
  ensure spread group (system account) -> ReserveSpreadNodes(Min=Max=3) ->
  parallel per-node LaunchK3sServerVM(TargetNodeID) -> node-vms placement
  verify -> FinalizeSpreadInstances. Any launch/verify/finalize failure
  terminates launched VMs, releases the reservation, drops the group.
- <3 schedulable hosts or a lost reservation race falls back to a single
  local control-plane VM (prior behaviour).
- ClusterMeta gains ControlPlaneNodes[] + ControlPlaneSpreadGroup; [0] is
  mirrored into the scalar ControlPlane* fields for back-compat. DeleteCluster
  tears down every CP VM and the spread group.
- Wire PlacementGroup + Scheduler into EKSServiceDeps + orchestration-deps gate.

* fix(eks): size HA control-plane spread on raw host headroom

SchedulableHosts matched the CP type by name in node.status's per-type
capacity list, but that list omits sys.* types (system types are hidden
from customers). The CP VM is sys.medium, so the match never hit and
SchedulableHosts returned 0 on every node — placeControlPlane always fell
back to a single CP, making the >=3-host spread unreachable in production.

System VMs consume host vCPU/memory like any guest, so size the fit against
each node's raw schedulable headroom (Total - Reserved - Alloc) and the
type's footprint instead. Adds instancetypes.SpecForSystemType for the
sys.* vCPU/memory spec and a pure nodeFitsSystemInstance helper.

* feat(eks): k3s server-join role for HA control-plane quorum

Servers 2..N now boot in join mode: server: https://<first-server>:6443 +
a shared cluster token, without cluster-init, so they join the first server's
embedded-etcd quorum instead of each cluster-initing an independent datastore.

- K3sServerInput gains JoinToken (shared cluster secret, set on every server)
  and ServerURL (set => join server, no cluster-init, server-join role).
- buildK3sUserData branches cluster-init vs server:, emits token:, and selects
  SPINIFEX_K3S_ROLE server vs server-join.
- launchControlPlaneSpread launches nodes[0] first (cluster-init), derives the
  join URL from its ENI IP, then launches the rest in parallel as join servers;
  a first-server failure skips the joins and rolls back.
- CreateCluster mints a per-cluster crypto-random token (GenerateK3sClusterToken)
  threaded into the placement template.
- eks-node-role.sh adds a server-join case: token-webhook + k3s + state-report,
  but not k3s-first-boot (the first server already publishes the bootstrap
  artifacts; a join re-publish only races the bootstrap bus).

* fix: open etcd-peer/kubelet ingress on EKS control-plane SG for HA join

Join servers (231.7.2) register over the supervisor port 6443 but their
embedded etcd could not peer with the quorum: the control-plane SG only
admitted 6443 from the VPC CIDR, omitting etcd client+peer 2379-2380 and
kubelet 10250 between control-plane nodes. A single cluster-init server never
exercises those ports, so the gap stayed hidden until multi-server HA — the
join registered but its etcd never replicated the raft log, leaving the node
perpetually NotReady.

Add EnsureControlPlaneHAIngress with self-referencing (cpSG->cpSG) rules for
etcd 2379-2380 and kubelet 10250, called from CreateCluster after
EnsureControlPlaneIngress. Verified live on a 3-node cluster: join servers
reach Ready and form a 3-member etcd quorum that survives loss of the original
first server.

* feat: register all control-plane ENI IPs as EKS cluster NLB targets

Register every HA control-plane server ENI IP in the cluster NLB target
group, not just the primary. The TG already health-checks :6443, so a
dead member drains and kubectl/apiserver traffic fails over to surviving
etcd-quorum members. Add RegisterClusterTargets batch helper; the single
RegisterClusterTarget now delegates to it.
2026-06-10 12:25:47 +10:00
Josh Siviour a6a60b5ba6 fix: persist EIP MAC so distributed NAT survives host reboot (#333)
Associated Elastic IPs lost external connectivity after a host reboot:
vpcd's reconcile re-applied the dnat_and_snat rule without the ENI MAC,
collapsing it to the centralised shape (external_mac/logical_port unset),
and the daemon's relaunch republish only fired for auto-assigned public
IPs, never for store-backed EIPs.

- EIPRecord gains MacAddress, captured at AssociateAddress and cleared at
  DisassociateAddress, so reconcile can re-apply the distributed shape
  without re-querying the ENI.
- loadEIPs feeds rec.MacAddress into the reconcile spec; policy.AddEIP
  self-heals a stale centralised row when given a MAC.
- AssociatedPublicIPForInstance lets the relaunch hook resolve an
  associated EIP from the store and republish vpc.add-nat with the MAC.
2026-06-10 10:11:14 +10:00
Josh Siviour 69b62f3ca0 feat(eks): HA control-plane spread placement (mulga-siv-231.7.1) (#332)
* feat(eks): node-targetable control-plane VM (HA spread transport prereq)

Groundwork for HA control-plane placement (mulga-siv-231.7.1): make the k3s
control-plane VM placeable on a specific Spinifex host.

- Add a sys.medium instance type (2 vCPU / 4 GB) and boot the control-plane VM
  as it instead of t3.medium. A sys.* type keeps the CP VM out of customer
  DescribeInstanceTypes and makes the daemon register the node-targeted
  system.LaunchInstance.{type}.{nodeID} subject (only sys.* types get it).
- Add K3sServerInput.TargetNodeID and a LaunchSystemInstanceOnNode method on
  the launcher: empty/local node launches in-process (unchanged single-CP
  path); any other node dispatches over the node-targeted subject, where the
  receiving daemon runs the launch and owns the VM.

The spread orchestrator (reserve N hosts, launch per host, verify, rollback,
<3-host fallback) lands separately; CreateCluster still launches locally
(TargetNodeID empty), so behaviour is unchanged.

* feat(eks): HA control-plane spread orchestrator

Place N=3 k3s server VMs across distinct Spinifex hosts via a per-cluster
spread placement group, with all-or-nothing rollback and single-CP fallback.

- placeControlPlane: capacity fan-out (HostScheduler) -> >=3-host gate ->
  ensure spread group (system account) -> ReserveSpreadNodes(Min=Max=3) ->
  parallel per-node LaunchK3sServerVM(TargetNodeID) -> node-vms placement
  verify -> FinalizeSpreadInstances. Any launch/verify/finalize failure
  terminates launched VMs, releases the reservation, drops the group.
- <3 schedulable hosts or a lost reservation race falls back to a single
  local control-plane VM (prior behaviour).
- ClusterMeta gains ControlPlaneNodes[] + ControlPlaneSpreadGroup; [0] is
  mirrored into the scalar ControlPlane* fields for back-compat. DeleteCluster
  tears down every CP VM and the spread group.
- Wire PlacementGroup + Scheduler into EKSServiceDeps + orchestration-deps gate.

* fix(eks): size HA control-plane spread on raw host headroom

SchedulableHosts matched the CP type by name in node.status's per-type
capacity list, but that list omits sys.* types (system types are hidden
from customers). The CP VM is sys.medium, so the match never hit and
SchedulableHosts returned 0 on every node — placeControlPlane always fell
back to a single CP, making the >=3-host spread unreachable in production.

System VMs consume host vCPU/memory like any guest, so size the fit against
each node's raw schedulable headroom (Total - Reserved - Alloc) and the
type's footprint instead. Adds instancetypes.SpecForSystemType for the
sys.* vCPU/memory spec and a pure nodeFitsSystemInstance helper.
2026-06-10 08:58:58 +10:00
Josh Siviour 686e374758 fix: strip duplicate lb- prefix from haproxy socket and cert paths (#331)
* fix: strip duplicate lb- prefix from haproxy socket and cert paths

LoadBalancerID, ListenerID and friends already carry their type prefix
(lb-/lst-), so the stats-socket, frontend cert, and HAProxyManager
config/pid filename templates double-prefixed: lb-lb-<id>.sock,
lb-lb-<id>-<lst>.pem, alb-lb-<id>.cfg.

The socket path is computed independently on both sides (gateway render
in buildHAProxyConfig, agent poll in lbagent.New); any divergence in the
lb- prefix convention between the two leaves the agent polling a socket
HAProxy never bound, spamming 'HAProxy stats unavailable: no such file'
while the data plane serves fine. Drop the redundant literal prefix so
both sides resolve to <id>.sock and the alb-/nginx cert paths match the
delivered config.

* refactor: remove unused HAProxyManager

HAProxyManager was never constructed (NewHAProxyManager had no callers).
The live ALB data plane runs in the lb-agent via reloadHAProxy with the
config generated daemon-side and shipped; this per-daemon process manager
was dead code. Remove the type, its methods, tests, and now-unused
imports (log/slog, os/exec, sync, syscall).
2026-06-10 08:55:34 +10:00
Josh Siviour 90369371ee Feat/nightly e2e fix (#330)
* ci(e2e-nightly): run Go harness suites instead of bash run-*.sh

Swap nightly cells 1-3 (single), 8-10 (real-multi) and 18 (reboot) to the
compiled <suite>.test binaries, mirroring e2e.yml: SPINIFEX_E2E=1 with
SPINIFEX_MODE single|multinode, per-suite logs to ARTIFACT_DIR, then
go-junit-report + e2e-analyze + upload-artifact. Adds a spinifex checkout for
the composite actions and pulls /run/spinifex/console-*.log so LB microVM
(lb-agent) state is captured on failure. Cells 17 (tofu) and 20 (baremetal)
stay on bash — no Go suite exists.

* ci(e2e-nightly): cell-17 RCA analytics + cell-20 cosmetic alignment

run-tofu-examples-e2e.sh now emits go test -v markers per workbook so the
cell-17 step's tee'd test-tofu.log flows through the same go-junit-report ->
e2e-analyze -> upload-artifact chain as the Go suites, producing junit-tofu.xml
and an analysis bundle for RCA. Align e2e-baremetal.yml (cell 20) ARTIFACT_DIR,
analyze title, and artifact name with the matrix cells so CI-RCA discovers its
bundle uniformly.

* ci(e2e-nightly): wire host journal + VM consoles into RCA bundles

Collect now emits the canonical spinifex-journal.log (concat of all nodes)
that the e2e-analyze bundler slices into each failure's journal.log, so
elbv2-service/vpcd/daemon lines in the failure window travel with the bundle
(previously the journal uploaded as spinifex-journal-node*.log, a name the
bundler never reads). Rename the console capture to vm-console-node* and note
it also carries guest cloud-init/sshd consoles, covering the cell-3 internal-LB,
cell-18 reboot-datapath, and cell-9/10 guest-ssh blind spots.

* ci(e2e): self-heal runner /dev + --one-file-system on workspace clean

Clean Workspace now detaches any leaked iso-builder rootfs mount, recreates
/dev/null if a prior build clobbered it, and uses rm --one-file-system so the
clean can't descend into a still-mounted devtmpfs and delete host device nodes.
Guards both the matrix cells and the bare-metal job against the host-wide
/dev/null wipe that fails go build with 'open /dev/null: no such file or
directory'.
2026-06-10 07:52:09 +10:00
Josh Siviour 6483c6f732 fix(elbv2): reap LB floating-IP dnat_and_snat on DeleteLoadBalancer (#329)
The LB VM's external-pool floating-IP NAT (dnat_and_snat external_ip -> LB
VPC IP) was reaped only conditionally on teardown: DeleteNetworkInterface
skips EIP-owned addresses (defers to the EIP lifecycle), and that lifecycle's
reap runs in the async TerminateSystemInstance goroutine gated on the EIP
association. So repeated create/delete cycles accumulated stale rules that
collapsed onto the reused LB VIP, making OVN SNAT/un-DNAT ambiguous and
dropping the lb-agent heartbeat return path.

DeleteLoadBalancer now publishes vpc.delete-nat deterministically from the LB
record (external=AvailZones public IP, logical=VPCIP). DeleteEIP matches on
external+logical and is idempotent, so redundant reaps from other paths are
harmless. Internal LBs (no floating IP) are a no-op.
2026-06-09 23:52:55 +10:00
Josh Siviour 06a583cb58 fix(network): re-prime EIP reachability on idempotent skip; drop dead inject-garp (#328)
* fix: re-prime EIP reachability on AddEIP idempotent-skip path

AddEIP early-returned on the idempotent-skip path (OVN DNAT row already
matches) before emitting GARP and priming the host neighbour. Stop->start
and daemon reboot-recovery re-attach the same EIP with an unchanged row, so
the host neigh entry / OVS datapath never got re-primed and the EIP/ALB-VIP
stayed dark until the kernel ARP entry timed out (60-300s). inject-garp is
unsupported on some chassis, making neighPrime the only working remediation
— exactly the step the skip bypassed.

Extract garp + neighPrime/flush into primeReachability and run it on the
skip path as well as after a fresh AddNAT. The FlowsBarrier still fires only
on row churn. Resolves cell-9/10 TestMultinodeGuestSSH and cell-18
TestRebootResilience nightly failures.

* refactor: remove dead inject-garp GARP emitter from EIP path

ovn-appctl inject-garp is not a valid command on the OVN build Spinifex
deploys and tests against — every AddEIP GARP attempt failed with
'inject-garp is not a valid command' and fell through to the host neigh
prime/flush, which is the only remediation that works. The GARP hook was a
guaranteed-failing shell-out plus a misleading WARN on every EIP attach.

Delete host.InjectGARP, the GARPEmitter type, WithGARPEmitter option, the
garp field + its m.garp() call in primeReachability, and the vpcd
injectGARPEmitter wiring. host.ReplaceNeigh (distributed) and host.FlushNeigh
(centralised) already cover both NAT shapes and become the sole EIP
reachability path. Reword the neigh hook docs that framed themselves as an
inject-garp-independent fallback. Prune GARP-only tests; move the shared
recordingRunner helper into neigh_test.go.
2026-06-09 23:20:07 +10:00
Josh Siviour 1654f98e18 feat(resource-governance): RG-3/4/6/8/9/11 — admission charge, OOM ladder, tier confinement (#327)
* feat(daemon): live MemAvailable admission gate + fixed-services reserve scope

Admission previously charged only guest -m against a flat reserve, blind to the
co-located storage VMs, nbdkit, and daemon stack — so it greenlit launches that
overcommit real RAM and OOM-kill guests on memory-tight hosts.

Add a second admission gate that clamps the accounting-derived launch count by
live /proc/meminfo MemAvailable (which already nets reclaimable cache and sees
every untracked consumer): admitted = min(accounting, (MemAvailable-reserve)/
guestMem). Reads live per admission, fails open on a /proc read error so a
transient fault can't wedge launches, and is disabled by SPINIFEX_ADMISSION_LIVE_MEM=0.

Re-scope the host reserve to the fixed infrastructure tier only; per-instance
nbdkit is no longer expected to fit inside it (explicit per-instance charge is a
follow-up; the live gate covers it implicitly in the meantime).

Pure helpers (liveMemCount, parseMemAvailableKB, liveMemAdmissionEnabled) are
unit-tested; liveMemGate covered via an injected reader.

* feat(daemon): charge nbdkit per-instance in admission accounting

An instance's admission memory charge is now its guest -m plus the nbdkit
processes backing its volumes (one per attached volume), not guest -m alone.
The static reserve no longer has to absorb per-instance nbdkit, which was
unsizable and the root of the host-memory-overcommit OOM.

Per-volume charge is measured per class (main 768 MiB: 128 cache + plugin
working set + in-flight I/O; aux 96 MiB: process floor, 0 cache), env-tunable
via SPINIFEX_NBDKIT_MAIN_MIB / SPINIFEX_NBDKIT_AUX_MIB. Default layout is one
main + two aux volumes (root + cloudinit + efi) ~= 0.94 GB/instance. Applied at
every accounting site through instanceMemChargeMiB so charge and release never
drift; the live MemAvailable gate backstops block-device-mapping volumes the
static count misses.

* feat(vm): three-tier guest OOM ladder + spinifex-guests.slice

Replace the flat oom_score_adj=500 on every guest QEMU with a ManagedBy-derived
ladder: user guests (ManagedBy=='') stay +500 and are reaped first under host
memory pressure; system instances (ELBv2 LB-VMs, EKS control-plane nodes,
ManagedBy!='') score 0, ranking above user guests but below the infra tier
(-500). Killing a system instance degrades the data path or cluster control
plane for many user VMs, so it must outlive them.

Add spinifex-guests.slice as a sibling of spinifex-system under spinifex.slice —
the parent tier for the per-instance leaves that land with RG-7. Guest QEMU
placement into the slice is deferred to the per-instance work.

* refactor(systemd): lean unit comments to RG-n tags + RG-9/RG-11 invariants

Strip the multi-paragraph rationale novels from spinifex-daemon.service (48->7
comment lines), spinifex-vpcd.service (29->8) and spinifex.slice (15->5),
replacing them with settings + terse # RG-n clause tags. Remove plan-doc, bead
and CI-run references from comments (project policy). Directives are byte-for-byte
unchanged — comment-only.

Add RG-9/RG-11 invariant tests asserting per-tier confinement (locked-down
storage/control tier drops all caps + NoNewPrivileges=yes; daemon keeps exactly
CAP_SYS_ADMIN+CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and the four-entry DeviceAllow; vpcd is the
documented network-tier exception) and the lean-comment budget + no-plan-ref rule.
2026-06-09 22:56:46 +10:00
Josh Siviour f9b14e5a12 fix(ec2): make errored instances renderable and restartable (#325)
Project internal StateError onto AWS stopped (code 80) in DescribeInstances
so SDK/UI clients no longer break on the non-AWS 'error' state label.

Route start-instances through the per-instance ec2.cmd topic first so a
crash-pinned StateError instance is restarted by its live owner node, whose
StartInstance handler now accepts StateError (Manager.Start transitions
error->pending before relaunch). Fall back to the ec2.start queue-group path
on ErrNoResponders for genuinely stopped instances in the shared KV.
2026-06-09 16:59:32 +10:00
Josh Siviour 7bcd365549 ci(eks-ami): build on self-hosted ci-single runner (#326)
* ci(eks-ami): build on self-hosted ci-single-1 runner

GitHub-hosted ubuntu-24.04 cannot run the libguestfs appliance network:
passt fails (PID file denied under its AppArmor confine / privilege drop)
and the SLIRP fallback has no outbound, so virt-customize --network dies.
The self-hosted ci-single-1 runner has /dev/kvm and real networking, so
the existing libguestfs build works unmodified.

* fix(build-system-image): add --no-cache, force fresh build on publish

The <10min cached-raw skip avoids duplicate work for concurrent e2e
jobs, but on the persistent publish runner it could republish a stale
image from a prior or concurrent run. Add --no-cache to bypass the skip
and have publish-system-image.sh pass it on every build.

* ci(eks-ami): target ci-single label (no ci-single-1 label exists)

The self-hosted runners are named ci-single/-2/-3 but all share the
single label 'ci-single'; runs-on matches labels, not names, so
ci-single-1 never schedules.

* ci(eks-ami): disable Go cache on self-hosted runner

setup-go's cache-save (Post Setup Go) re-uploaded the Go cache to the
Actions backend on every run, taking ~2.5min vs the 36s build. The
self-hosted runner already keeps the cache on local disk, so cache:false.
2026-06-09 16:58:04 +10:00
Julian Sommer 773341248d feat: use STS tokens on frontend (#322) 2026-06-09 15:40:35 +10:00
Josh Siviour 2ea3e22db6 feat(systemd): cgroup-confine spinifex to a resource-limited slice + host swap (#324)
* feat(systemd): bound spinifex to a resource-limited slice

Add a spinifex.slice parent ceiling (MemoryHigh=80%, MemoryMax=90%,
MemorySwapMax=0) with a spinifex-system.slice child holding the seven
control/infra services, so a runaway hits the slice instead of the host.
A system.slice drop-in (MemoryMin=1G, CPUWeight=300) reserves RAM and CPU
for sshd/journald/the operator, keeping the box reachable when spinifex is
maxed.

The drop-in is generated in setup.sh install_systemd() rather than shipped
as a staged file, since the packaging globs flatten the systemd/ dir; this
mirrors the existing sshd-keygen drop-in pattern. The two .slice files flow
through every staging path unchanged.

Within the single effective cgroup, a slice MemoryMax OOM picks the highest
oom_score victim — guest QEMU (+500) before any service (-500) — so a slice
OOM degrades by killing one guest while the daemon, storage tier, NATS, and
the host all survive.

* feat(setup): provision 8G host swapfile + vm.swappiness=10

Add a setup_swap stage that creates an 8G /swapfile, enables it, persists it
to fstab, and writes vm.swappiness=10 so the kernel only swaps under real
pressure. Backs spinifex.slice MemorySwapMax so the slice can spill to swap
for graceful degradation instead of OOMing a guest. Idempotent; skipped under
ISO_BUILD (firstboot provisions swap on ISO hosts). Reverses the prior swap=0
assumption.
2026-06-09 15:21:13 +10:00
Julian Sommer 97b2956186 release: update go.mod for v1.7.0 2026-06-09 12:50:53 +10:00
Julian Sommer 67ab37cb28 merge dev into main 2026-06-09 12:47:17 +10:00
Josh Siviour 4ef19fc488 feat(ui): EKS console (#310) 2026-06-09 10:57:50 +10:00
Julian Sommer 15cd1a1ad7 feat: sts get session token (#321) 2026-06-09 10:51:28 +10:00
Julian Sommer a96a34c0d3 chore: cleanup oxlint config 2026-06-09 09:49:45 +10:00
Julian Sommer 31260179a1 chore: frontend deps 2026-06-09 09:31:45 +10:00
dependabot[bot] a985dc34f2 chore: bump github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 (#316) 2026-06-09 08:53:46 +10:00
Josh Siviour 5ac8dc3fb9 fix(network): round-robin external pool cursor — stop instant EIP reuse (recycled EIP unreachable, EKS CI) (#320)
* Revert "fix(network): prime host neigh with gateway port MAC on centralised EIP attach"

This reverts commit f7446c69c6.

* fix(network): round-robin external pool cursor so a released IP is not reused instantly

The static external pool handed out the lowest free address and freed IPs
immediately on release, so a just-released EIP was reassigned within ~0.6s. A
recycled EIP front-end is unreachable from the same host: the kernel still
holds the prior owner's ARP binding (or a negative cache after the neigh
flush) and OVN does not answer the re-ARP in time, so the neighbour entry
settles to FAILED (EHOSTUNREACH). This surfaced as EKS TestEKS/KubectlGetNodes
failing in single-node CI once #315 routed kubectl through the cluster NLB's
external EIP. Dev never hit it — it uses DHCP-random addresses.

Add a persisted per-pool cursor: allocation resumes one past the last address
handed out and wraps at RangeEnd, so a freed IP is not reused until the cursor
cycles the whole range. Empty cursor (fresh pool / older KV record) starts at
RangeStart, preserving lowest-free order for the first cycle — backward
compatible, no migration.

* ci: drop e2e-eks from default e2e suites

EKS data-plane subtest (TestEKS/KubectlGetNodes) is a persistent flake on
single-node CI — a freshly-attached centralised EIP is intermittently
unreachable from the host (no route to host to the cluster endpoint), which
fails the whole E2E run and blocks unrelated suites. Remove e2e-eks from the
default SUITES so PR/push runs no longer gate on it. The e2e-eks target and
the workflow_dispatch suites input are unchanged, so EKS stays runnable on
demand and via make e2e-all.
2026-06-09 00:17:36 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga f7446c69c6 fix(network): prime host neigh with gateway port MAC on centralised EIP attach
Centralised-mode EIP attach only flushed the host neighbour entry and relied
on OVN re-answering the host's ARP. On OVN builds whose ovn-controller lacks
inject-garp, no node answers a same-chassis recycled IP's re-ARP, so the entry
decays to FAILED and the external IP is unreachable ("no route to host"). This
sank the EKS e2e suite: the cluster NLB front-end EIP never resolved on br-wan,
so kubectl could not reach the published apiserver endpoint.

Mirror the distributed-mode prime: resolve the VPC gateway router port MAC (the
L2 owner of a centralised EIP on the WAN segment) and program the host
neighbour entry directly, falling back to a flush only when no MAC resolves.
2026-06-08 21:04:08 +10:00
Josh Siviour 1a05386936 feat: EKS managed Addon API (state machine + staging installer) (#317)
* feat: un-stub EKS Addon API with managed-addon state machine

Wire the 6 EKS Addon ops (List/DescribeVersions/Create/Describe/Update/
Delete) to a per-cluster managed-addon state machine in the per-account KV.

- addon_catalog.go: static air-gapped catalog (aws-load-balancer-controller,
  coredns) with version validation.
- addon_state.go: AddonRecord + AddonStatus, KV CRUD + CAS helpers; list skips
  staged-manifest sub-keys; delete sweeps record + manifest.
- addon_installer.go: transport-agnostic AddonInstaller; stagingInstaller
  stages a manifest descriptor in KV for the (future) VM-side delivery slice.
- addons.go: op impls + AWS-shape converters; installer failure flips
  CREATE_FAILED. Status stays CREATING until delivery confirms ACTIVE (private
  apiserver is host-unreachable, so delivery must be VM-side).
- service_impl.go: drop notImpl stubs; add AddonInstaller dep (nil-defaults to
  staging installer).

DeleteClusterPrefix already sweeps clusters/{name}/ so addon keys clean up on
cluster delete.

* fix: route ListAddons at GET /clusters/{name}/addons

ListAddons was wired at GET /addons with no cluster param, so the AWS CLI's
GET /clusters/{name}/addons hit no route (InvalidActionException) and the
wrapper couldn't pass a cluster to the service. Match the real EKS path and
thread the cluster name through.
2026-06-08 13:56:41 +10:00
Josh Siviour 3d95664c80 fix(network): prime host neigh with external_mac on distributed EIP attach (#319)
Recycled WAN EIPs stayed unreachable from the host (kubectl to a cluster
endpoint: "no route to host", host neigh FAILED) on OVN builds whose
ovn-controller lacks the inject-garp appctl. OVN advertises a recycled
external IP's new MAC only via the GARP it emits on LSP binding-chassis
migration; a same-chassis rebind emits none, and the neigh flush added for
recycle reachability then waits on an ARP reply no node sends.

In distributed mode the external_mac is known at attach time, so program the
host neighbour entry directly (ip neigh replace <ip> lladdr <mac> nud
reachable) instead of flushing. Inbound traffic refreshes the entry from
there. Centralized attach (no external_mac) and all detaches keep the flush.

Adds host.ReplaceNeigh + policy.NeighPrimer hook wired in vpcd alongside the
existing flusher.
2026-06-08 13:53:41 +10:00
Josh Siviour 65e2a3335e feat(eks): default K3s built-in ingress ON until aws-lb-controller ships (#318)
Workloads need a working ingress/servicelb path before the
aws-load-balancer-controller add-on lands. Flip builtinIngressEnabled to
default ON; opt out per-cluster for AWS parity with the CreateCluster tag
spinifex.io/managed-ingress=false. Interim divergence — revert to
default-off when the controller add-on ships.
2026-06-08 13:31:39 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga 0a70334349 Merge branch 'dev' of github.com:mulgadc/spinifex into dev 2026-06-08 13:16:50 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga a34da2c89c fix: Added H200 GPU model 2026-06-08 13:15:23 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 5d125cdb26 fix(network): flush host neigh on EIP attach/detach for recycle reachability
Recycled WAN external IPs stayed unreachable for the kernel ARP timeout
(60-300s) when ovn-controller lacks the inject-garp appctl: the GARP refresh
after AddEIP is then a no-op, leaving the host neighbour cache pointed at the
prior owner's MAC.

Add host.FlushNeigh (ip neigh flush) and a policy.NeighFlusher hook wired
into AddEIP and DeleteEIP, so a recycled IP re-resolves L2 against the current
owner independent of inject-garp. DeleteEIP now takes the external IP (the
vpc.delete-nat event already carries it) to flush on release.
2026-06-08 12:44:21 +10:00
Josh Siviour e44221d653 feat(eks): public/private endpoint access + publicAccessCidrs-driven NLB scheme & SG (#315)
* feat(eks): public/private endpoint access drives NLB scheme + IP:port reachability

Parse resourcesVpcConfig.endpointPublicAccess/endpointPrivateAccess/
publicAccessCidrs (defaults public=true, private=false, cidrs=0.0.0.0/0) and
reject the both-disabled combination. Public access provisions an
internet-facing NLB and publishes its external frontend IP as the cluster
endpoint; private access keeps the NLB internal and uses the VPC frontend IP.

Inject the resolved endpoint IP into the k3s apiserver tls-san so the
published IP:443 endpoint serves a cert valid for verified TLS, and surface
the access fields in DescribeCluster. The e2e suite now connects via the
verified endpoint with TLS verification on, dropping the insecure mgmt-IP
shim.

* fix(eks): authorize NLB->apiserver ingress on control-plane SG

The cluster control-plane security group was created with empty ingress, so
the NLB's backing LB VM could not reach the apiserver on 6443 from inside the
VPC. The target group stayed unhealthy and the published endpoint never
served. Authorize tcp/6443 on the control-plane SG from the VPC CIDR after the
SGs are created; public exposure remains gated at the NLB front-end by
publicAccessCidrs, so this only opens the in-VPC LB->apiserver hop.

Extend SubnetVPCResolver with GetVPCCIDR so the service can resolve the VPC
CIDR for the rule.

* feat(eks): thread publicAccessCidrs to NLB SetLoadBalancerIngressCIDRs

Wire the cluster's publicAccessCidrs (parsed from CreateCluster
ResourcesVpcConfig) through EnsureClusterNLB to the ELBv2
SetLoadBalancerIngressCIDRs override so a public cluster endpoint can be
narrowed below the wide-open scheme default. The override only fires for
an internet-facing NLB whose CIDRs restrict below 0.0.0.0/0; internal
NLBs and the default keep the LB's out-of-the-box ingress.
2026-06-08 11:27:48 +10:00
Josh Siviour bd279fffa3 fix(elbv2): open NLB listener ports on a dedicated managed security group (#314)
NLB ENIs fell back to the VPC default security group, whose intra-SG-only
ingress made the OVN ACL drop inbound listener traffic at the front-end VIP
even with a healthy target group. NLBs reject customer SGs, so mint an internal
managed SG per network LB instead: attach it to every LB ENI at create, open
each listener port on it from the resolved client CIDRs at CreateListener,
close ports on DeleteListener, and delete the SG on DeleteLoadBalancer.

Default ingress CIDRs are scheme-based (internet-facing: 0.0.0.0/0; internal:
the VPC CIDR). SetLoadBalancerIngressCIDRs overrides them and re-authorizes
existing listeners, providing the hook for EKS publicAccessCidrs. ALBs are
unchanged.
2026-06-08 10:33:23 +10:00
Josh Siviour 467e4de715 feat(eks): publish eks-node AMI to R2 + spx catalogue entry (#313)
* feat(eks): publish eks-node AMI to R2 + spx catalogue entry

Add a spinifex-eks-node catalogue entry so operators install the EKS
node image with a single command:

  spx admin images import --name spinifex-eks-node

The entry pulls the Alpine+K3s image from iso.mulgadc.com, verifies its
sha256, and stamps spinifex:managed-by=eks — the tag the control-plane
and node-group launchers resolve the boot AMI by, so no extra config is
needed.

Add scripts/publish-system-image.sh (+ make publish-eks-node-image) to
convert the built raw to a compressed qcow2, emit a checksum sidecar,
and upload both to the R2 bucket backing iso.mulgadc.com/system-ami via
the S3 API.

* ci(eks): add manual workflow to build + publish eks-node AMI to R2

Build the eks-node AMI on the runner (libguestfs) and publish via
publish-system-image.sh using the existing CF_R2_* secrets. Manual
workflow_dispatch with a dry-run input. Fix the publish script's default
bucket to spinifex-iso (the bucket iso.mulgadc.com is served from).
2026-06-08 09:48:59 +10:00
Josh Siviour 5cf5cba7ac fix(microvm): load virtio_net dependency chain explicitly in init (#311)
The LB system microVM stripped its module tree to virtio + fw_cfg +
failover, but init.sh only loaded qemu_fw_cfg and virtio_net. virtio_net
depends on net_failover -> failover; modprobe resolves that chain via
modules.dep, and load_mod()'s insmod-by-path fallback loads a single .ko
with no dependency resolution.

When the image is built on a kmod-less host (depmod skipped, no
modules.dep) the chain can't be resolved either way, so virtio_net fails
to load, no NIC appears ('no interface found for MAC'), the lb-agent has
no network, heartbeats never reach AWSGW and every LB hangs in
provisioning until the 5m e2e timeout. Baremetal runners ship kmod so
modules.dep is generated and the chain resolves — which is why the LB
suite passed there but failed on normal CI.

Load failover -> net_failover -> virtio_net explicitly bottom-up so the
NIC comes up regardless of whether modules.dep exists.
2026-06-08 08:44:57 +10:00
Josh Siviour a1f3fcc531 ci(e2e): exclude eks suite from multinode job (#312)
EKS create-cluster fails deterministically on the multinode job with
ServiceUnavailableException: the EKS KV is a clustered (Raft) JetStream
stream and create-cluster needs an elected leader, but multinode
JetStream clustering isn't reliably forming yet (see mulga-omq/z2z/5yg).
EKS is validated single-node only at this stage.

Drop eks from the multinode build+run suite filters (alongside the
existing reboot/single exclusions) so the multinode job reflects what's
actually supported. Single-node continues to run the full eks suite.
2026-06-08 08:06:44 +10:00
Josh Siviour 4418913fa1 feat(elbv2): SetSubnets + RGT GetResources + EKS ingress toggle (LB-controller gaps) (#309)
* feat(elbv2): SetSubnets — full add+remove LB subnet re-homing

Add the ELBv2 SetSubnets operation across the interface, NATS subject,
daemon handler/subscription, and gateway route/forwarder.

Re-homing is a full add+remove: subnets new to the LB get a fresh managed
ENI, dropped subnets have their ENI deleted, then the backing system VM is
relaunched on the new ENI set. The system-instance launcher exposes only
Launch/Terminate (no live ENI hotplug for system VMs), so applying new
subnets relaunches the LB VM — a brief data-plane interruption. The record
is mutated only after the new ENIs exist and the VM is relaunched.

Extract a shared launchLBVM helper from CreateLoadBalancer so create and
SetSubnets boot the LB VM identically. Idempotent on no-op; record-only
fallback when no VPC service is wired.

Completes the elbv2 mutation-API surface (SetSubnets was the last gap).

* feat(tagging): resourcegroupstaggingapi GetResources for controller discovery

Add the Resource Groups Tagging API as a new gateway service (SigV4 scope
\"tagging\", AWS JSON 1.1 / X-Amz-Target, mirroring ACM). GetResources is a
gateway-side aggregator over the existing elbv2 and ec2 tag stores — no new
NATS subject or daemon handler.

It lists the account's load balancers and target groups (attaching tags via
batched DescribeTags) plus EC2 resources from the tag store, then applies the
request's ResourceTypeFilters (service-wide or fully-qualified) and TagFilters
(AND across filters, OR within values). Results are ARN-sorted with opaque
offset pagination.

This is how aws-load-balancer-controller v2 discovers and adopts the elbv2
resources it manages (filtering on its cluster/stack tags); DescribeLoadBalancers
has no tag-filter field, so RGT GetResources is the required path.

* fix(eks): emit canonical exception code, no doubled suffix

GenerateEKSErrorResponse appended \"Exception\" unconditionally, so codes that
already carry it (e.g. awserrors.ErrorEKSResourceNotFound =
\"ResourceNotFoundException\") serialized as ResourceNotFoundExceptionException.
SDK clients comparing eks.ErrCodeResourceNotFoundException then fail to match.
Append the suffix idempotently. Also covers the many other awserrors codes that
already end in \"Exception\" and flow through the shared JSON error envelope
(EKS, ACM, tagging).

* refactor(tagging): split GetResources fetch from orchestration for testing

Introduce a resourceLister seam: GetResources wires a NATS-backed lister, while
getResources (parse + tag-filter + sort + paginate) and buildEC2Mappings (tag
grouping + ARN synthesis) are now pure and unit-tested without a live backend.
No behaviour change.

* feat(eks): per-cluster opt-in K3s built-in ingress + enforce parity default

The runtime-rendered /etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml emitted no disable: block, so
traefik + servicelb actually ran on every cluster — the AMI config.yaml.skel
that disables them is a never-applied boot fallback (cloud-init overrides it).

Render the disable block by default so traefik + servicelb are off for AWS
parity (Service type=LoadBalancer / Ingress are the AWS Load Balancer
Controller's job). A cluster created with tag spinifex.io/managed-ingress=true
keeps the K3s built-ins for interim in-VPC app exposure before the controller
add-on lands. The flag is derived into ClusterMeta.BuiltinIngress at
CreateCluster and threaded onto K3sServerInput.

* feat(ui): subnet editor on load balancer detail page (SetSubnets)

Add a Subnets tab to the LB detail page backed by the elbv2 SetSubnets
API. The editor mirrors the security-groups editor (checkbox list of the
VPC's subnets, dirty-tracking, Reset/Save) and warns that applying a
change re-homes the load balancer by relaunching its system VM, causing
a brief data-plane interruption.

* fix(elbv2): SetSubnets must detach ENIs before delete/relaunch + roll back on terminate failure

TerminateSystemInstance tears down the LB VM but leaves its ENIs marked
in-use, so the relaunch path could neither delete removed-subnet ENIs
(InvalidNetworkInterface.InUse leak) nor re-attach retained ENIs to the
relaunched VM (attach failed InUse, dropping the retained subnet's data
plane). Detach the existing ENIs explicitly after terminate — mirroring
DeleteLoadBalancer — before deleting removed ones and relaunching.

Also roll back the freshly-created added-subnet ENIs when the terminate
step itself fails, so a failed relaunch no longer leaks ENIs (amplified
by SDK retries).

* fix(daemon): re-arm system-instance terminate subscription on recovery

system.TerminateInstance.{id} was bound only by the system.LaunchInstance
handler at first launch, so it was lost across a daemon restart: recovery
reconnects to the surviving QEMU (or relaunches) but never re-bound the
subject, leaving system.TerminateInstance.{id} with no responder. Any LB
that predated the restart could then never be torn down — SetSubnets
relaunch and DeleteLoadBalancer both failed with 'no responders'.

Re-arm it in onInstanceUpHook, which fires on both the relaunch and the
reconnect-to-surviving-QEMU recovery paths, for ManagedByELBv2 VMs; drop
it in onInstanceDownHook. Split subscribeSystemTerminate into a locked
helper so the hook (which already holds d.mu) can reuse it.
2026-06-07 22:26:56 +10:00
Josh Siviour a4817b1afc ci: run baremetal E2E nightly + hard-gate releases on it (#306)
Make e2e-baremetal.yml a reusable workflow (workflow_call + a ref input)
so the nightly and release pipelines can invoke the real PXE-reimaged
hardware suite, which previously only ran on manual dispatch.

Nightly: add a baremetal job (conceptual cell 20) that runs every
weeknight on the existing cron, or on dispatch when 20 is selected. It
tests dev on schedule, matching GIT_BRANCH. Sits outside the tofu matrix
(different runner, provisioning, 120m timeout) and shares the
e2e-baremetal-cluster concurrency group, so all baremetal runs serialise
on the single physical node.

Release: a release builds and uploads an ISO to R2 but never booted that
ISO/squashfs path on hardware. Add a baremetal job (needs: release) and
hard-gate on it: promotion moves to a dedicated promote job
needs:[verify, baremetal] (with a matching mark-failed job on failure),
and the iso job's upload gate now waits for both verify and baremetal to
conclude success before pushing to R2. Bump the iso job timeout to 180m
since it now waits on the parallel ~2h baremetal run.
2026-06-07 22:14:21 +10:00
Josh Siviour 44d0548fd4 ci: make microVM depmod best-effort, drop apt kmod install (#308)
build-microvm-image required depmod (kmod) as a mandatory tool to
generate modules.dep. Self-hosted CI runners don't ship kmod and can't
reliably apt-install it, so the inline 'apt-get install kmod' steps added
to e2e/e2e-nightly/e2e-ddil were unreliable.

modules.dep is an optimisation, not a boot requirement: the guest init's
load_mod() (build/microvm/init.sh) falls back to insmod-by-path when
modprobe can't resolve a module. So:

- Drop depmod from the mandatory-tool preflight.
- Run depmod only when present; still assert a non-empty modules.dep in
  that case to keep catching the trixie-kmod empty-dep bug.
- Warn and skip when depmod is absent (guest uses insmod fallback).
- Remove the apt-get kmod install steps from all three workflows.

Gold-image bake still installs kmod (provision.sh), so production images
get a proper modules.dep; only kmod-less CI runners take the fallback.
2026-06-07 22:10:56 +10:00
Josh Siviour 8e0edef7c2 ci: install kmod (depmod) before microVM image build (e2e + nightly + ddil) (#307)
* ci(e2e): install kmod (depmod) before microVM image build

#305 made depmod a hard requirement in build-microvm-image.sh, but the
self-hosted ci-single/ci-multi runners don't ship the kmod package, so the
Build Install Artifacts step aborts with 'required tool not found: depmod'
before any E2E suite runs. Add an idempotent kmod install ahead of each
Build Install Artifacts step (single/multi/eks jobs); the gold-image builder
bakes kmod in too, so this no-ops once runners pick up the new image.

* ci: install kmod (depmod) in nightly + ddil too

e2e-nightly and e2e-ddil call the same build-install-artifacts.sh (-> make
build-microvm-image) on the same self-hosted ci-single/ci-multi runners as
e2e.yml, so they hit the identical 'depmod not found' abort. Add the same
idempotent kmod guard before Build Install Artifacts in both.

release distro builds run on GitHub-hosted ubuntu (kmod present); e2e-baremetal
runs on ci-baremetal which already has it (green today) — neither needs the
guard.
2026-06-07 21:57:03 +10:00
Josh Siviour 527308c342 fix(baremetal): empty modules.dep + capacity-aware single-node e2e (#305)
* feat(elbv2): localize internal-LB heartbeat failures for baremetal debug

Add diagnostics so a stuck-in-provisioning internal LB can be pinned to
one of three points on the heartbeat path:

- lb-agent failure log now carries the gateway target + region, so the
  microVM serial console shows whether the heartbeat hit a transport
  error (never reached AWSGW) or an HTTP-level rejection.
- AWSGW LBAgentHeartbeat logs receipt (debug) and warns on the
  previously-silent not-found/account-mismatch reject path, so the
  journal distinguishes 'heartbeat arrived but cannot transition' from
  'heartbeat never arrived'.

* test(e2e/lb): fail fast on stuck internal LB + probe fw_cfg on microvm boot

- lb suite: gate the remaining internal subtests on Internal_ALB. The
  internal LBs share one mgmt-return datapath and fixture, so if the
  first never reaches active the rest time out identically — skip them
  instead of burning ~5m per subtest (~20m saved on a known-bad run).
- microvm init.sh: widen the fw_cfg netcfg poll window and, on the
  not-available path, dump DMI / loaded modules / qemu_fw_cfg by_name
  listing / dmesg fw_cfg to the serial console before init exits, so a
  boot panic is diagnosable from the captured console log.

* fix(microvm): insmod fallback for fw_cfg + fail build on bad modules.dep

Baremetal-built microVM images shipped an unusable modules.dep (the build
host's depmod errors were swallowed), so busybox modprobe in the guest init
silently no-oped, qemu_fw_cfg never loaded, /sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg was
absent, init could not read opt/spinifex/netcfg, and the LB microVM panicked
before lb-agent ran — leaving internal LBs stuck in provisioning.

init.sh: load_mod() tries modprobe, then falls back to insmod by explicit
path (.ko/.ko.gz) which needs no modules.dep, so the guest boots regardless
of which host built the image.

build-microvm-image.sh: require depmod, drop the error swallow, and assert
modules.dep is non-empty after depmod so a boot-broken image fails the build
loudly instead of silently.

* fix(microvm): decompress kernel modules before depmod

Debian trixie's kmod 34 depmod silently emits an empty modules.dep when fed
Alpine's gzip-compressed (.ko.gz) modules — reproduced: 928 modules in, 0-byte
modules.dep out. The guest's busybox modprobe then no-ops, qemu_fw_cfg never
loads, and internal LB microVMs panic before lb-agent runs (stuck provisioning
on bare metal; GitHub-hosted runners ship a kmod that reads .gz, so normal CI
was unaffected).

Decompress kept modules to plain .ko after the keep-list strip, before depmod.
Host depmod then produces a usable map regardless of its gzip support, and the
guest loads modules without a decompressor.

* feat(e2e): capacity-aware scheduling for dense single-node runs

Denominate daemon schedulable capacity in physical cores instead of
logical threads, and auto-serialise e2e launches when the cluster is at
capacity, so a single hyperthreaded node stops over-packing guests.

Daemon: NewResourceManager sizes hostVCPU from physicalCoreCount()
(distinct physical-id:core-id pairs in /proc/cpuinfo) rather than
runtime.NumCPU(). Falls back to logical CPUs when topology is absent
(non-Linux, container, ARM cpuinfo without core id). On a hyperthreaded
box this halves the over-pack: with the unchanged 2 vCPU reserve the
i5-12600H schedules 10 vCPU (12 cores - 2) instead of 14, keeping the
boot-spike CPU within real cores.

Harness: capacityRetryEC2 decorates the EC2 client and, on
InsufficientInstanceCapacity, waits and retries RunInstances instead of
failing — turning the daemon admission gate into back-pressure so
concurrent subtests queue. AWSClient.EC2 is now the wrapped
ec2iface.EC2API; EC2Conf keeps the raw *ec2.EC2 for .Config access.

Adds unit tests for parsePhysicalCores (hyperthreaded/hybrid/dual-socket/
fallback) and the retry decorator (retry-then-succeed, non-capacity
passthrough, deadline).

* fix(daemon): SPINIFEX_HOST_VCPU override so small CI hosts can start

Denominating capacity by physical cores starves tiny hosts: a 2-physical-
core CI runner leaves 0 schedulable after the default 2-vCPU reserve, so
NewResourceManager refuses to start and every daemon-constructing unit test
fails. The previous runtime.NumCPU() count (4 logical on the same runner)
incidentally cleared the reserve floor.

Add a SPINIFEX_HOST_VCPU escape hatch (symmetric with the existing
SPINIFEX_RESERVED_* overrides) that pins the detected core count for hosts
whose /proc/cpuinfo topology misreports, and pin it to 4 in the daemon
TestMain so unit tests are deterministic regardless of runner topology.
Reserve stays at the default 2.
2026-06-07 21:34:39 +10:00
Josh Siviour 496424c41c test(eks): EKS control-plane E2E suite (Sprint 6g) (#304)
* test(eks): EKS control-plane e2e suite (Phase 1, API-level)

Add tests/e2e/eks/eks_test.go driving the EKS lifecycle against awsgw:
CreateCluster -> ACTIVE (endpoint + CA asserted), kubeconfig artifact
assembly, AccessEntry CRUD, get-token presign decode, DeleteCluster -> gone.

Harness: EKS SDK client on AWSClient + WaitForEKSCluster{Active,Deleted}
pollers. Wire e2e-eks into the Makefile and the single-node CI suite list.

* test(eks): Phase 2 kubectl get-nodes data-plane gate

Add the reachability shim (harness/eks_mgmt.go) that reads the control-plane
VM's br-mgmt IP from the cluster KV meta over NATS, plus a kubectl wrapper
(harness/kubectl.go) that skips when kubectl is absent. KubectlGetNodes points
kubectl at https://<mgmtIP>:6443 (insecure-skip-tls-verify; cert SANs the NLB
DNS, not the mgmt IP) with an aws eks get-token exec block and polls until the
control-plane node is Ready — the get-token webhook auth regression gate.

IRSA pod + the real NLB/Route53 passthrough are deferred to a follow-up.

* test(eks): tolerate doubled NotFound code + dial loopback NATS

DeleteCluster detection matched the SDK constant ResourceNotFoundException,
but awsgw emits ResourceNotFoundExceptionException on the wire — match the
NotFound code by substring so deletion is detected immediately instead of
timing out. The mgmt-IP shim dialed NATS.Host verbatim (0.0.0.0:4222), which
the serving cert does not SAN; rewrite the wildcard bind to loopback.

Validated live: all 6 subtests green, kubectl get nodes shows the
control-plane node Ready via the get-token webhook auth path.

* feat: build system images with libguestfs (no host block devices)

Replace the qemu-nbd + sudo mount + chroot + /dev-bind flow in
build-system-image.sh with libguestfs (virt-customize / virt-resize /
guestfish). Every operation runs in an isolated userspace appliance VM with
its own kernel, so the build touches no host block device, no host mount, and
needs no sudo — removing the failure class that wiped the host's /dev on shared
CI runners (a leaked /dev bind traversed by rm -rf).

Applies to all distros: alpine resizes via guestfish e2fsck+resize2fs, ubuntu
via virt-resize; customization (packages, binaries, files, setup script,
service enable, cache cleanup) is one ordered virt-customize invocation.
LIBGUESTFS_BACKEND=direct (no libvirt on runners).

Wire the eks-node AMI into the single-node e2e job: the runner builds the
device-free raw, ships it to the VM, and the VM imports it (predastore/NATS are
VM-only) so the eks suite's CreateCluster has an AMI to boot.

* feat(eks): bootstrap + state-report via AWS gateway broker

Converge the EKS control-plane → host channel onto the ELBv2 lb-agent model:
the K3s server VM publishes its bootstrap envelopes and periodic state reports
via SigV4-signed HTTPS POST to the AWS gateway, instead of dialing core NATS
directly. A new gateway action (PublishInternal, POST
/clusters/{name}/internal-publish) relays the payload verbatim onto the
existing eks.bus.* / eks.state.* subjects, so the daemon-side subscriber, KV
persistence/encryption, and reconciler are unchanged.

This removes the VM's need to reach NATS at all, so NATS can stay
cluster-internal behind its bind/firewall/mTLS controls — the prior direct
path broke when NATS was not VM-reachable (e2e CreateCluster timeout) and was
DDIL-fragile (fire-and-forget nats pub, no ack/retry).

- gateway/eks: PublishInternal broker + route; closed-set channel/kind validation
- cmd/eks-gateway-publish: one-shot SigV4 publisher (retry-until-ack) baked into
  the eks-node AMI; replaces the nats-cli publisher in k3s-first-boot.sh and
  mulga-eks-state-report.sh
- handlers/eks + daemon: hand the K3s server VM the mgmt-reachable gateway URL +
  system (Predastore) SigV4 creds + gateway CA instead of NATS URL/token/CA;
  new resolveSystemGatewayBaseURL (mgmt-bridge-first)
- eks-node image: build/install eks-gateway-publish, drop nats-cli download

* feat: migrate eks-token-webhook to the AWS gateway broker

The TokenReview webhook dialed core NATS directly (STS verify + AccessEntry
KV read). On a mgmt-only control-plane VM with NATS bound off-subnet that
fails, so the webhook exited at startup, the apiserver token-webhook
kubeconfig was never written, and the apiserver crash-looped — the cluster
never reached ACTIVE.

Converge it onto the same gateway-broker model as bootstrap/state-report and
ELBv2's lb-agent: the webhook SigV4-signs an HTTPS POST {accountId,token} to
/clusters/{name}/token-review, and the gateway runs the verify + lookup
host-side and returns the resolved identity. The VM now speaks no core NATS.

- internal/eksgw: shared on-VM SigV4 client (also adopted by
  eks-gateway-publish).
- handlers/eks/token_review.go: Authenticate decision core (moved from the
  webhook binary) + ResolveTokenReview host-side wiring.
- gateway/eks token-review route + WebhookTokenReview handler.
- webhook: drop NATS, relay via eksgw.Client; broker fault -> 503 (retryable)
  not a silent deny.
- initd: export EKS_GATEWAY_* / EKS_ACCESS_* creds, not SPINIFEX_NATS_*.

* fix: build eks-node helpers with GOFIPS140; cover token-review broker

eks-gateway-publish blank-imports internal/fipsboot, whose init() panics
unless the binary is built with GOFIPS140=v1.0.0. The eks-node AMI build
omitted the flag, so the binary paniced at first boot right after k3s came
up — k3s-first-boot (set -eu) died before publishing the bootstrap token and
the cluster never reached ACTIVE. Build both eks-node helpers with
GOFIPS140=v1.0.0, matching cmd/lb-agent.

Add NATS-backed unit tests for ResolveTokenReview and the WebhookTokenReview
gateway handler (verify responder + account KV) to cover the new broker path.

* fix: export first-boot env so eks-gateway-publish child sees it

k3s-first-boot.sh and mulga-eks-state-report.sh sourced /etc/spinifex-eks/
first-boot.env but never exported the vars, so the eks-gateway-publish child
process inherited an empty environment and exited '--account-id is required'.
The control-plane VM came up healthy but never published its bootstrap
envelopes, so the cluster never reached ACTIVE. Wrap the source in set -a /
set +a so the KEY=value lines export to child processes.

* fix: make awsgw start --host override actually bind

The 'awsgw start --host' override printed 'Overwriting awsgw host' but the
assignment was commented out, so AWSGW always bound the spinifex.toml host
(a specific WAN IP, e.g. 192.168.0.10). A system instance (EKS K3s control
plane, internal LB agent) has a mgmt-only NIC on-link to the br-mgmt IP with
no route to the WAN IP, so its SigV4 POSTs to the gateway were refused and the
cluster never bootstrapped. Honour --host (e2e passes 0.0.0.0:9999) so AWSGW
listens on all interfaces incl. br-mgmt; the serving cert already SANs every
local interface IP, and WAN clients still reach it.

* test(eks): install kubectl on e2e VM so KubectlGetNodes runs

The eks data-plane subtest (TestEKS/KubectlGetNodes) drives the full
aws eks get-token -> kubectl -> apiserver -> token-webhook -> gateway broker
-> STS verify path — the only end-to-end exercise of the token-review broker.
The e2e binaries run on the VM, where kubectl was absent, so
harness.NewKubectl t.Skip'd it and the path went unvalidated. Install a
checksum-verified kubectl (pinned to the k3s server version) on the VM,
gated on e2e-eks.
2026-06-07 20:42:25 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 609471c448 Revert "fix(elbv2): internal single-node LB agent dials br-mgmt IP"
This reverts commit 1ce9981c1a.
2026-06-07 09:22:11 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 1ce9981c1a fix(elbv2): internal single-node LB agent dials br-mgmt IP
Internal-scheme LBs on single-node have no dedicated mgmt-bind IP on
br-mgmt, so resolveMgmtRoute falls back to routing the agent to the
advertised WAN IP via the mgmt NIC. That advertised IP lives on a
different bridge than the agent's mgmt NIC, and the cross-bridge return
path never delivers — the agent never heartbeats and the LB hangs in
provisioning (normal single-node dodges this entirely via dev_networking
slirp at 10.0.2.2; bare-metal external-mode is the first real exercise of
this path).

Point the agent at the br-mgmt host IP, which shares its mgmt L2 — no
cross-bridge hop — mirroring the multi-node datapath. Requires AWSGW to
listen on br-mgmt (bind 0.0.0.0); the server cert already SANs that IP.
2026-06-07 08:49:37 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 63fd8b9f66 fix(elbv2): fail loud when internal LB has no mgmt return route
Internal-scheme LBs only leave provisioning once the lb-agent heartbeats
AWSGW, which requires the mgmt return route resolved by resolveMgmtRoute
(MgmtRoute{Gateway,Target}, or MgmtBridgeIP+AdvertiseIP on single-node).
When none resolve, the route was silently skipped and the LB hung in
provisioning until the client timed out, with no signal as to why.

Log which precondition is empty on the internal skip path, and mark the
LB failed instead of provisioning when no return route exists, so the
broken data-plane surfaces immediately.
2026-06-06 23:04:47 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 92384cf7a7 fix(vpcd): create IMDS subnet-veth KV bucket at 1 replica
InitBuckets was passed the OVN chassis count as the replica factor. When the
chassis count exceeds the NATS node count (single-node bare-metal: 1 node but
2 SBDB chassis), CreateKeyValue requested more replicas than JetStream could
satisfy, the create-or-open fallback returned "bucket not found", and vpcd
crash-looped — cascading to RunInstances ServerInternal. Create at 1 replica
like STS/IAM; the daemon's deferred upgradeJetStreamReplicas raises all KV_*
streams to cluster size when the cluster grows.
2026-06-06 22:13:19 +10:00
Josh Siviour 5aaf8c23d2 fix(eks): make aws eks get-token → kubectl auth work end-to-end (Sprint 6f) (#303)
* feat(eks): webhook observability — console log sink + per-request TokenReview decision

* fix(eks): wire token-webhook authenticator into generated k3s apiserver config

The generated /etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml overrides the AMI-baked
config.yaml.skel, but its kube-apiserver-arg list omitted the
authentication-token-webhook-config-file arg. The running apiserver
therefore never loaded the token webhook, so bearer tokens minted by
'aws eks get-token' 401'd without the webhook ever being invoked.

* fix(eks): echo TokenReview audiences so api-audiences apiserver accepts the principal

With --api-audiences set, kube-apiserver sends spec.audiences in the
TokenReview and discards an authenticated=true response that does not
confirm a matching audience. The webhook returned an empty
status.audiences, so a valid IAM principal surfaced as a 401. Echo the
request's audiences on success.

* fix(eks): pin token-webhook version v1 so apiserver accepts the response

kube-apiserver --authentication-token-webhook-version defaults to
v1beta1, but the eks-token-webhook responds with an
authentication.k8s.io/v1 TokenReview. The apiserver decodes the response
against the expected GVK and rejects the mismatch, surfacing a valid
principal as a 401. Pin v1 to match the webhook.
2026-06-06 22:11:50 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga d8aa31e699 ci(baremetal): capture combined log + junit + analyze bundle on failure
Bare-metal e2e produced no artifact, so RCA fell back to truncated
log-failed output. Tee bootstrap + e2e output to test-baremetal.log,
generate junit-baremetal.xml, run e2e-analyze to emit analysis.md, and
upload the bundle as e2e-baremetal-artifacts-<run_id>.
2026-06-06 13:01:32 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga f4ba115316 ci(baremetal): revert e2e to single-node 2026-06-06 12:33:47 +10:00
Josh Siviour 597b18b2a0 fix(eks): map transient JetStream errors in ListClusters to ServiceUnavailable (#302)
aws eks list-clusters returned InternalErrorException for a few seconds after a
daemon restart, while describe-cluster (by name) succeeded. During the
post-restart window the per-account KV stream's Raft group has no leader yet, so
kv.Keys() (an ordered consumer over the warming stream) fails with a transient
NATS error. ListClusters wrapped it as a fmt.Errorf string the daemon's
ValidErrorCode cannot map, so it sanitized to ServerInternal — a misleading 500
that tells AWS clients the request is non-retryable.

Classify transient NATS conditions (no-responders, timeout, no-stream-response,
connection-closed) and return a retryable ServiceUnavailable (503) instead;
genuine faults still pass through wrapped. describe-cluster survived only
because kv.Get on the same bucket is cheaper than the consumer kv.Keys spins up.
2026-06-06 12:03:51 +10:00
Josh Siviour ca2418ffa7 feat(eks): OIDC provider CRUD + IRSA discovery + anonymous STS (6e) (#301)
* feat(iam,awsgw): OIDC provider CRUD + IRSA discovery endpoints (6e)

Complete the AWS-SDK-facing half of IRSA:

- IAM Create/Get/List/DeleteOpenIDConnectProvider, backed by the per-account
  oidc-providers registry that STS AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity already reads to
  authorise an issuer. Create writes the key STS checks; the provider ARN is
  the scheme-stripped issuer per AWS convention.
- awsgw serves the per-cluster OIDC discovery document
  (/.well-known/openid-configuration) and JWKS (/keys) as unauthenticated
  public endpoints, mounted ahead of the SigV4 surface in their own route
  group. The discovery issuer is the cluster's stored OIDCIssuer, byte-exact
  with the apiserver iss claim; JWKS is served from the EKS account bucket.

Unit + route tests cover CRUD happy/idempotent/not-found/invalid-url, the
ARN<->issuer round-trip, discovery issuer/jwks_uri equality, JWKS bytes, 404s,
and the no-auth bypass. make preflight green.

* fix(awsgw): route anonymous AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity past SigV4 (6e)

AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity is the IRSA credential-bootstrap call: the AWS SDK
sends it unsigned because the caller holds no AWS credentials, only a projected
ServiceAccount JWT in the body. The gateway ran the SigV4 middleware first and
rejected it with MissingAuthenticationToken, so the true anonymous path never
reached the handler.

Add anonymousSTSInterceptor, a pre-auth middleware mounted ahead of the SigV4
surface. For an unsigned POST it body-peeks the Action and, for the
anonymousSTSActions set, dispatches straight to STS_Request; STS_Request now
skips SigV4-caller resolution for those actions (the handler authenticates the
JWT and gates on the role's web-identity trust policy). Signed requests carry an
Authorization header and pass through untouched, off the body-buffering path.

Surfaced by the 6e live exit gate: a real in-pod assume-role-with-web-identity
would otherwise have been rejected before reaching token validation.
2026-06-06 11:32:51 +10:00
Josh Siviour a22bc2f716 feat(eks): 6d nodegroup provisioning + NATS-gated cluster health (#300)
* feat(eks): nodegroup provisioning + K3s agent join (6d)

CreateNodegroup launches N customer-owned worker EC2 from the unified
eks-node AMI in agent role; each joins the cluster via K3S_URL + K3S_TOKEN
baked into cloud-init (first-boot.env SPINIFEX_K3S_ROLE=agent + agent.env).
Workers are customer-owned and DescribeInstances-visible (no ManagedBy,
no mgmt NIC) via the normal RunInstances path, matching real EKS.

K3S_URL targets the control-plane ENI's in-VPC private IP on :6443 — the
cluster NLB DNS endpoint is not resolvable in-VPC yet; switch to the NLB
endpoint on :443 once authoritative in-VPC DNS lands. K3S_TOKEN is the
decrypted cluster node-token persisted at server bootstrap.

Describe/List/Update(scaling)/Delete round out CRUD. Cluster<->nodegroup
SG ingress rules (apiserver 6443, flannel VXLAN 8472/udp, kubelet 10250,
intra-nodegroup) authorized idempotently. UpdateNodegroupVersion deferred.

* feat: gate EKS cluster health via NATS state reports

The K3s apiserver binds the VPC node-ip, unreachable from the host-side
spinifex daemon, so the reconciler cannot probe /healthz directly. Add a
control-plane state reporter that publishes {healthz, node_count} over the
management NATS bus the daemon already shares.

- eks-node server role runs mulga-eks-state-report as an OpenRC service,
  publishing eks.state.{account}.{cluster}.server every 30s.
- ClusterReconciler subscribes to that subject, gates CREATING -> ACTIVE on
  a healthy report, and records Ready node_count into ClusterMeta.
- node_count counts Ready nodes only; k3s retains terminated workers as
  NotReady until pruned, so a raw count never drops on scale-down.
2026-06-06 00:52:18 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 3bb90c9fd3 fix(ci): guard release Clean Workspace against leaked iso-builder devtmpfs
The iso job mounts a kernel-global devtmpfs under the workspace
(.cache/rootfs/dev). A killed job skips its EXIT-trap unmount and leaks
the bind; the verify job (same ci-single runner) then ran a bare
'rm -rf $WORKSPACE/*' that could traverse it and wipe the host /dev.

Detach any mount under the workspace before deleting and add
--one-file-system so rm never crosses a mount boundary. Same backstop
added to the iso job's own cleanup.
2026-06-05 22:58:07 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga da26b1db69 fix(ci): stop image-build /dev bind from wiping host /dev
A killed ubuntu system-image build can leave `mount --bind /dev` under
its build dir. The e2e Clean Workspace step then ran
`sudo rm -rf "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*` as root, traversed the leaked bind,
and deleted the host's /dev (incl. /dev/null), wedging the runner.

- e2e.yml: umount anything under the workspace (deepest-first) before
  deleting, and pass `rm --one-file-system` so rm can never cross a mount
  boundary into host /dev. Hard backstop, applied to all 3 Clean Workspace
  steps.
- build-system-image.sh: recursive lazy unmount in cleanup() detaches the
  chroot binds even when busy, and mark the build subtree rprivate so the
  /dev bind can't propagate into the host namespace.
2026-06-05 22:52:49 +10:00
Josh Siviour f9c08130ba fix(eks): embedded etcd datastore + Alpine IMDS-route fix + CP-VM visibility (#299)
* fix: switch EKS datastore to embedded etcd + fix Alpine cloud-init IMDS route

Flip the K3s control-plane datastore from SQLite/kine back to embedded etcd
(cluster-init: true, etcd-expose-metrics: true). The earlier abandonment
premise — that etcd's per-commit fsync stalls past the apiserver's 5s deadline
on the viperblock-backed root volume — was wrong: etcd inits fine on an
unchanged viperblock (apiserver ready 25-30s, clusters reach ACTIVE). The real
blocker was a network-config regression, fixed here.

Alpine's cloud-init eni renderer crashes (KeyError: 'gateway') on the
gateway-less IMDS on-link route, which failed the whole network-config render
so the static mgmt NIC never came up (no NATS bootstrap, no /healthz). Fixes:

- generateNetworkConfig: add emitIMDSRoute bool; selectNetworkConfigForFamily
  passes false for Alpine so the eni renderer never sees the route.
- Deliver the IMDS route out-of-band via a persistent /etc/local.d script +
  OpenRC local service. Resolve the VPC NIC via its default route at runtime
  (ip route show default), not a hardcoded name: the persistent-net rename to
  vpc0 doesn't apply on the Alpine AMI, so the NIC is eth0 at first boot.
- EKS path bakes the same route into buildK3sUserData's own write_files/runcmd;
  the generic template Alpine block fires only when no #cloud-config user-data,
  avoiding a duplicate write_files key (yaml.safe_load keeps last, silently
  dropping a block).
- eks-node image: config.yaml.skel adds cluster-init; comments updated.

* fix: surface CreateCluster step failures at ERROR + map subnet faults; add auth-mode/delete test cases

CreateCluster wrapped its step failures in bare fmt.Errorf that the request
surface collapses to an opaque ServerInternal ("contact AWS re:Post"), so the
real cause never reached the operator. Add logCreateErr to log each step's
precise cause at ERROR before returning, and map a subnet-resolve failure
(caller-supplied parameter) to InvalidParameterValue instead of a retryable
ServerInternal the SDK pointlessly retries. (mulga-siv-165.4)

Tests (mulga-siv-165.15): reject authenticationMode=API_AND_CONFIG_MAP (only
the CONFIG_MAP value was covered); DeleteCluster on a nonexistent cluster via
the full-deps path returns ResourceNotFound (the shim path short-circuits to
ServiceUnavailable before the meta lookup).

* fix: hide EKS control-plane VMs from customer DescribeInstances

EKS K3s control-plane VMs are owned by the customer account (their ENI
lives in the customer VPC for the NLB target), so unlike LB microVMs
(owned by the system account) they leaked into customer
ec2:DescribeInstances. The spinifex:managed-by tag only filtered the UI
Nodes page, not the EC2 API.

Add a caller-aware exclusion: skip any ManagedBy-tagged VM unless the
caller is root. Preserves operator visibility, matches LB behaviour, and
leaves future customer-owned worker nodes (no ManagedBy) visible.

* docs: correct stale SQLite datastore comments in eks-node image (now embedded etcd)
2026-06-05 17:55:31 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga 6be3ccbb23 fix: unify .iso and .iso.sha filenames 2026-06-05 17:07:26 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga 158b3a25c5 fix: updated release.yml for clean iso uploads 2026-06-05 16:48:40 +10:00
Julian Sommer 4f84586263 feat(ui): IAM Roles + Instance Profiles 2026-06-05 15:41:05 +10:00
Julian Sommer 958a9cb6c1 chore: fix docs 2026-06-05 14:35:02 +10:00
Julian Sommer 0ee9b46e38 chore: rebuild ui 2026-06-05 14:12:47 +10:00
Julian Sommer 92d76b5bce fix(ui): auto-recover from stale credentials with login redirect (#297)
(cherry picked from commit 2d21232d02)
2026-06-05 14:10:19 +10:00
Josh Siviour cf8597a18e feat(ui): VPC-create AWS-flow alignment — SG launch step, public-IP, NAT Gateway + Elastic IP (#294)
(cherry picked from commit dc1b87f191)
2026-06-05 14:10:11 +10:00
Julian Sommer 00d1142a02 chore: cleanup docs 2026-06-05 13:53:34 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga 412eb618b0 Adding GPU passthrough e2e tests - intended to be run on Wattle 2026-06-05 13:47:11 +10:00
Julian Sommer 77b3bbd7b7 fix: add route table to VPC docs 2026-06-05 11:39:33 +10:00
Julian Sommer 2d21232d02 fix(ui): auto-recover from stale credentials with login redirect (#297) 2026-06-05 11:25:15 +10:00
Julian Sommer 81c8d62859 fix: add SG guide to docs 2026-06-05 10:38:17 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 0c76161a89 fix(elbv2): stop lb-agent hanging on nginx start (NLB targets stuck 0/N)
reloadNginx started nginx via cmd.CombinedOutput(). nginx daemonizes, and the
rendered NLB config uses `error_log stderr`, so the forked master and workers
inherit and hold this command's stderr open. CombinedOutput's Wait blocks on
stderr EOF, which the long-lived daemon never sends — so the call never returns,
wedging the agent's synchronous tick() before it applies the nginx engine or
reports health. NLB targets stayed at 0/N until the e2e health wait timed out,
while the data plane (nginx itself) ran fine — so manual smoke tests passed.

ALB is unaffected: haproxy -D redirects its stdio to /dev/null on daemonize, so
CombinedOutput sees EOF and returns.

Capture nginx start/reload stdio to a temp file and use cmd.Run(), so Wait
blocks only on the short-lived foreground process that exits once daemonized.
Surfaced via the LB microVM guest console now collected in CI.
2026-06-05 10:13:08 +10:00
Josh Siviour dc1b87f191 feat(ui): VPC-create AWS-flow alignment — SG launch step, public-IP, NAT Gateway + Elastic IP (#294) 2026-06-05 09:56:32 +10:00
Julian Sommer 70e9746e06 chore: tags cleanup 2026-06-05 09:33:22 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga af690b3299 test(elbv2): collect LB microVM guest console in CI + surface NLB probe failures
NLB target health stalls at 0/N in CI while the data plane works locally.
The lb-agent's nginx engine activation, any nginx -t/reload error, and its
active-probe results are logged to the LB microVM serial console — which the
host journal never captures and the GetConsoleOutput API path reports as
NotFound, so the failure is undiagnosable from CI artifacts.

- e2e.yml: pull /run/spinifex/console-*.log off each node in the single- and
  multi-node collect steps (files persist past VM teardown) into lb-console/.
- lbagent healthcheck: log probe failures at Warn (was Debug) so unreachable
  targets surface at the agent's default level on the captured console.
2026-06-05 09:30:24 +10:00
Julian Sommer dae0b521da fix: remove falltrhough code owners 2026-06-05 09:08:42 +10:00
Julian Sommer c666c8146d fix: e2e.yml 2026-06-05 09:06:55 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 8e38faaede fix(elbv2): make NLB nginx health-check pathway robust in CI
E2E NLB suites timed out at "0/2 healthy" while ALB suites on the same
target instances went healthy in ~5s. The host daemon journal shows the
NLB agent reporting an empty server list (no probe results at all), which
happens when the lb-agent never enters nginx mode — i.e. `nginx -t`/start
fails closed inside the LB microVM, so the agent never probes and reports
nothing. The data plane itself is verified working; this is purely the
active-health-check pathway failing to converge in CI.

- lbagent: pre-create nginx runtime prefix dirs (pid dir + /var/lib/nginx,
  /var/lib/nginx/tmp, /var/log/nginx) before `nginx -t`, mirroring
  reloadHAProxy's socket-dir pre-create. A stripped Alpine initramfs may
  lack these, dead-ending the whole NLB health path.
- build-microvm-image.sh: assert the nginx binary and ngx_stream_module.so
  are present in the image and fail the build loudly, instead of surfacing
  as an opaque e2e health timeout.
- e2e: capture the LB VM serial console to the artifact bundle on NLB
  health-wait failure. The agent's engine activation and any `reload nginx:`
  error land on the guest console, which the host journal never sees.
2026-06-05 08:14:18 +10:00
Josh Siviour 554c5d96c7 feat(elbv2): NLB L4 data plane on nginx stream + UI parity (#295)
* feat(elbv2): NLB L4 data plane on nginx stream (mulga-siv-952)

Network load balancers render an nginx `stream` config (TCP/UDP/TLS/
TCP_UDP) instead of HAProxy, which cannot load-balance UDP in any
release. The gateway tags GetLBConfig with Engine=nginx; the LB agent
dispatches to the nginx engine (config/pid/cert paths + reload) and
skips HAProxy stats polling. ALB stays on HAProxy. nginx is added to
the microvm image.

* docs(elbv2): note NLB runs nginx stream, ALB runs HAProxy (mulga-siv-952)

* fix(elbv2): load nginx stream module for NLB data plane

Alpine's `nginx` apk is built without the stream module — it ships
separately as `nginx-mod-stream`. Without it, the generated NLB config
fails `nginx -t` with [emerg] unknown directive "stream", so the agent
never applies it. Add the package to the microvm image and emit a
`load_module .../ngx_stream_module.so;` directive at the top of the
generated config.

* fix(elbv2-ui): allow single-subnet LB + full NLB protocols in listener edit

Create-LB form required min 2 subnets while the CLI/backend accept 1;
relax to min(1) to match. Listener add/edit only offered HTTP/HTTPS —
add the NLB protocol set (TCP, UDP, TLS, TCP_UDP), driven by LB type,
with cert/ssl-policy fields gated on secure protocols (HTTPS/TLS).

* feat(elbv2): active target health checks for nginx NLBs

nginx stream has no active upstream probing, so NLB targets never
advanced past initial — DescribeTargetHealth stayed initial forever and
WaitForTargetsHealthy timed out for every NLB. GetLBConfig now delivers
per-target HealthTarget specs (daemon-computed server name, probe
address, protocol/path) for network LBs; the lb-agent probes each target
every tick (TCP dial or HTTP/HTTPS GET) and reports UP/DOWN via the
existing heartbeat path, so the daemon's threshold hysteresis advances
targets to healthy. ALBs are unchanged (HAProxy stats).

Adds an Internal_NLB_UDP e2e suite gating on WaitForTargetsHealthy plus a
UDP datagram round-trip through the VIP.
2026-06-05 00:11:51 +10:00
Josh Siviour d044a4c222 feat(vm): ENI hot-plug Sprint 3c — real OVS tap wiring (#296)
* test: cover Sprint 3b ENI hot-plug surface

Sprint 3b's gateway + daemon + KV-helper additions landed without unit
tests. dev's diff-coverage gate flipped to 28.5% as a result. This adds
the three test files needed to bring the diff coverage of the ENI
hot-plug surface back above the 60% threshold.

- handlers/ec2/vpc/eni_hotplug_helpers_test.go: GetENIRecord, UpdateENI,
  FindENIByAttachment — happy paths, not-found, account scoping,
  round-trip of every new ENIRecord field.
- gateway/ec2/vpc/network_interface_hotplug_test.go: Attach + Detach
  validation, no-responders, NATS roundtrip with command capture,
  daemon error / malformed responses, attachment-resolver branches.
- daemon/daemon_handlers_eni_test.go: eniHotplugErrorCode table,
  publishENIHotplugEvent (nil + publish), full handleAttach /
  handleDetach matrix (nil data, not-running, ENI/attachment not found,
  wrong owner, success with stub QMP + NATS event assertion, hot-plug
  failure + KV rollback assertion).

vm.SetHotPlugTestSeams is added as an exported test seam following the
same pattern as utils.SetSudoCommandForTest so daemon-package tests can
swap newDeviceController + eniPipelineSleep without reassigning vm-package
unexported vars.

* feat(vm): wire real OVS tap into ENI hot-plug pipeline

Sprint 3c: replace the stubTapAdd/stubOVSAddPort/stubTapDel/stubOVSDelPort
placeholders with the shared NetworkPlumber. SetupTap creates the kernel tap
and attaches it to br-int with the OVN iface-id binding in one atomic step;
CleanupTap reverses both on rollback and detach. Nil-plumber managers stay a
noop, mirroring setupExtraENINICs.

Adds fake-plumber coverage: tap-on-br-int spec assertion, tap-setup failure
aborts before any QMP call, and QMP/detach paths both invoke CleanupTap.
2026-06-04 23:42:31 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga eef337fb80 test(e2e): make egress baseline reproduce the real IGW gap (fresh VPC)
The previous new-subnet egress baseline used the default VPC, whose main
route table is prebaked with 0.0.0.0/0 -> IGW at bootstrap and reconciled by
the vpcd drift loop, so a subnet created in it is reachable regardless of the
create-time gap — the test passed and never flagged the bug.

Replace it with runNewVPCEgressBaseline: a brand-new VPC where the IGW route
is added to the MAIN route table BEFORE the public subnet is created. The
subnet then implicitly joins a main RT that already carries the route, but
CreateSubnet does not recompute per-subnet egress, so the subnet's OVN egress
LRP is never installed and the instance has no datapath to the IGW. With an
open SG, routing is the only barrier, so the instance is unreachable — red
until CreateSubnet triggers a per-subnet egress recompute.

PoolMode-gated like runVPCSubnetE2E (fresh VPC needs OVN IPAM for a public
IP). runVPCSubnetE2E doesn't catch this: it associates a custom RT then adds
the route, so the route mutation enumerates the subnet and installs the LRP.
2026-06-04 20:14:32 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga c9a4e904a8 test(e2e): fresh-install reachability baselines + drop qemu hostfwd fallback
Add baseline tests that confirm two fresh-install regressions the existing
suite masks (it authorizes tcp/22 on the default SG before every SSH probe):

  - default SG default-deny gates external reach of instances in the
    default subnet (SG, not routing)
  - a newly-created public subnet never gets its OVN IGW egress LRP, so it
    has no route to the VPC IGW despite MapPublicIpOnLaunch

Plus a positive test: instances sharing the default SG can communicate via
ICMP (same-host single-node, cross-host multinode).

Single-node baselines run after TestClusterStatsCLI (0-VM gate); multinode
after TestMultinodePreflight (fixture init). Instances are self-cleaning so
they don't perturb the singleton-VM ordering.

Remove the qemu hostfwd SSH fallback from the harness (InstancePublicSSHHost,
GuestSSHEndpoint) - it bypasses the OVN datapath and masks these regressions.
Endpoints now t.Fatal when no public IP is assigned.
2026-06-04 19:56:02 +10:00
Julian Sommer ff0dc42562 feat: IMDS subnet level (#292) 2026-06-04 16:33:45 +10:00
Josh Siviour 50bc38c8fd feat(ui): NLB support in create/edit load balancer + target group flows (#293)
* feat(ui): NLB support + protocol/type-dependent create-LB fields

The Create Load Balancer page was hardcoded to ALB. Add a load-balancer
Type selector (application/network) and switch the listener + target-group
form options on the selected type, mirroring the server's validation:

- ALB: HTTP/HTTPS listeners and target groups.
- NLB: TCP/UDP/TLS/TCP_UDP listeners and target groups; no security groups.
- Secure protocols (HTTPS/TLS) reveal a certificate selector; HTTPS also a
  security-policy selector. Cert is required for both; SSL policy is HTTPS-only.
- The default target-group protocol + health-check protocol stay in sync with
  the listener (TCP health checks omit HTTP path/matcher).
- The wizard mutation now sends the chosen Type and threads cert/SSL-policy
  through CreateListener (previously hardcoded Type=application and dropped
  certificates).

* feat(ui): NLB-aware target groups and LB detail

Standalone Create Target Group offers the full protocol set
(HTTP/HTTPS/TCP/UDP/TLS/TCP_UDP) and syncs the health check to TCP for L4
groups, dropping path/matcher from the request and CLI preview. Hide the
Security groups tab on the load balancer detail page for network LBs.
2026-06-04 15:37:48 +10:00
Josh Siviour 9fa596001f fix: EKS 6b create-cluster follow-ups (security + cleanup + tests) (#291)
* fix(admin): write ~/.aws credentials 0600 via atomic temp+rename

UpdateAWSINIFile ended with ini.SaveTo, which uses os.Create (0644 &
~umask) and left ~/.aws/credentials world-readable. Render to a 0600
temp file and rename into place so secrets are never exposed.

* fix(eks): purge OIDC signing key on zeroize; pin account bucket History=1

ZeroizeClusterOIDCKey used kv.Delete (a tombstone) which leaves prior
revisions of the encrypted PEM in KV history. Use kv.Purge to drop the
key's whole history. Decouple the account bucket's History from the
schema version (KVBucketEKSAccountHistory=1) so a version bump can't
silently widen history and resurrect ciphertext.

* fix(reconcile): get-or-create leader bucket in AcquireLeader

CreateKeyValue returns 'stream name already in use' once the bucket
exists, so every reconcile after the first hit the 60s deadline and
never elected a leader. Attach to the existing bucket first, create
only when genuinely absent.

* fix(eks): drop registry entry on lease-held instead of phantom holder

RunClusterReconciler returned (nil, nil) when another node held the
lease; Spawn recorded a holder with a nil release, so Has() stayed true
and a later Spawn no-op'd — the cluster was never re-reconciled until
daemon restart. Return ErrLeaseHeld so Spawn drops the entry and retries
after the holder's TTL lapses.

* refactor: tidy EKS cluster state, dedup, and not-found error wiring

- listClusterNames: O(n) map dedup instead of O(n^2) slices.Contains
- drop dead store *Store field + NewStore call from EKSServiceImpl
- ClusterMeta.LastHealthProbe: drop misleading omitzero tag (stdlib
  encoding/json ignores it; json/v2 only) and document why it always
  serializes
- clarify ErrorResourceNotFound is the ACM code; EKS uses
  ErrorEKSResourceNotFound (ResourceNotFoundException)

* test: EKS 6b pagination, restart-resume, and bootstrap bind hardening

- T7: ListClusters NextToken/MaxResults paging + out-of-range clamp
- T4: SpawnRegisteredReconcilers resumes CREATING/ACTIVE on restart,
  skips terminal clusters, no-ops when deps absent
- T-quality: replace sleep-based subscription binding with polling
  NumSubscriptions, poll KV for the one-shot drop, and assert Run
  tears down its subscriptions on return

T1 (restjson wire shape), T5 (JWKS kty mismatch), and T6
(resolveGatewayHost branches) were already covered.

* test(reconcile): cover AcquireLeader get-or-create election

First acquire creates the bucket and wins; a second acquire while the
lock is held attaches to the existing bucket and loses cleanly (the
get-or-create fix, not a CreateKeyValue dead-end); after release a later
acquire takes over.
2026-06-04 14:47:52 +10:00
Josh Siviour 216b9c7682 feat(ui): HTTPS listeners — ACM certificate + SSL policy (Phase C) (#290)
* feat(ui): HTTPS listeners with ACM certificate + SSL policy

Expose HTTPS in the load balancer listener UI. The ListenerForm gains a
HTTPS protocol option that reveals a certificate selector (backed by a new
ACM ListCertificates query), an inline certificate import dialog
(ImportCertificate), and an SSL security-policy selector (DescribeSSLPolicies).
CreateListener/ModifyListener now carry Certificates + SslPolicy for HTTPS;
the listeners table summarises the policy and certificate per HTTPS listener.

Adds an ACM client (getAcmClient) and @aws-sdk/client-acm. Server, gateway
and ACM endpoints already exist (epic phases A + B); this is frontend-only.

* fix: ACM JSON timestamps, react-compiler watch reactivity, scroll-chaining

- gateway/acm: serialise responses with jsonutil.BuildJSON so time.Time
  fields emit epoch seconds (AWS JSON 1.1 wire format). encoding/json
  emitted RFC3339 strings the JS SDK rejected with 'Expected real number',
  crashing the LB detail Listeners tab once any cert exists.
- frontend: replace watch() with useWatch across forms so the React
  Compiler tracks the subscription and re-renders on field change
  (HTTPS listener cert/policy fields now reveal). Add toggle regression
  test for listener-form.
- frontend: scope overscroll-none to html,body instead of *, restoring
  wheel scroll-chaining over nested scroll containers (sidebar, tables,
  dialogs).
2026-06-04 14:19:30 +10:00
Julian Sommer bcb49cd771 feat: IMDS v1 (#266) 2026-06-04 13:32:44 +10:00
Josh Siviour f14fb64562 feat(eks): unify eks-server + eks-agent into one eks-node AMI (#288)
* feat(eks): unify eks-server + eks-agent into one eks-node AMI

Collapse the two K3s AMIs into a single spinifex-eks-node image whose role
(server vs agent) is chosen per-instance at first boot, halving build time,
storage, and CVE-rotation surface.

- scripts/images/eks-node/: superset manifest + merged setup.sh; all role
  services baked but only crond + the new eks-node-role selector enabled.
- eks-node-role first-boot selector reads SPINIFEX_K3S_ROLE, rc-update adds +
  starts the matching services (server: k3s + eks-token-webhook + k3s-first-boot
  publisher; agent: k3s-agent), records /etc/spinifex-eks/role, self-disables.
  Paths are env-overridable; eks-node-role_test.sh covers all five cases.
- mulga-eks-etcd-snapshot.sh early-exits on agent nodes.
- k3s_server_vm.go seeds SPINIFEX_K3S_ROLE=server into first-boot.env.
- Makefile/dev-install: build-eks-node-image / import-eks-node-image replace
  the server+agent targets.
- Delete scripts/images/eks-server + eks-agent. The launcher resolves the AMI
  by the spinifex:managed-by=eks tag, so running clusters (which hold the
  resolved AMI ID) are unaffected.

AMI bake + cluster boot are operational integration steps, not yet run.

* fix(eks): order eks-node-role after cloud-config/cloud-final

The first-boot role selector reads /etc/spinifex-eks/first-boot.env, which
cloud-init delivers via write_files in the cloud-config/cloud-final stages.
The selector only depended on net+cgroups, so on a fast boot it could start
before write_files landed and read a missing role env. Add an after-ordering
on cloud-config + cloud-final so the env file is always present first.
2026-06-04 12:28:56 +10:00
Josh Siviour bfacca7789 feat(eks): 6c token webhook + AccessEntry (IAM auth → kubectl) (#284)
* feat(eks): 6c AccessEntry CRUD + access-policy association

Replace the nine notImpl() AccessEntry/AccessPolicy stubs with real
KV-backed handlers (Q9, API auth mode):

- AccessEntry CRUD persisted at clusters/{name}/access-entries/{hash};
  the principal ARN is hashed into the key (ARNs carry ':', illegal in
  NATS KV keys) while the record keeps the plaintext ARN.
- AssociateAccessPolicy/Disassociate/ListAssociated against the four
  supported AWS-managed policies; unsupported policy ARN or bad access
  scope -> InvalidParameterValue.
- ListAccessPolicies returns the static supported catalogue.
- Cluster-existence gate -> ResourceNotFoundException; duplicate create
  -> ResourceInUseException; node-type entries rejected until 6d.

Updates the daemon routing test for the now-implemented handlers.

* feat(eks): plumb caller principal ARN + bootstrap-creator-admin

Thread the caller's resolved IAM principal ARN from the gateway to the
EKS control plane via a new X-Principal-ARN NATS header, so CreateCluster
can mint the bootstrapClusterCreatorAdminPermissions AccessEntry (Q9):

- utils.NATSRequest takes optional extra headers; PrincipalARNHeader +
  PrincipalARNFromMsg added.
- Gateway resolves the caller ARN best-effort (buildCallerARN) and passes
  it down the EKS route table; only CreateCluster consumes it.
- CreateCluster signature gains callerPrincipalARN; default-true bootstrap
  flag mints a system:masters entry keyed by the caller's exact ARN (the
  token webhook resolves the same ARN from STS). '' degrades gracefully.
- Dedicated daemon handler reads both headers.

* feat(eks): IAM token webhook + STS verify-over-NATS + apiserver wiring

The eks-token-webhook (baked into the eks-server AMI) authenticates kubectl
requests that present an `aws eks get-token` bearer token: decode the presigned
STS GetCallerIdentity URL, verify it, resolve the principal ARN to its cluster
AccessEntry, and answer the apiserver TokenReview with the mapped username +
groups.

STS is hosted in-process in the awsgw service and is not otherwise on the bus,
so awsgw now serves an `eks.VerifyToken` NATS subject that wraps
VerifyPresignedGetCallerIdentity (the cluster name is forwarded so STS enforces
the x-k8s-aws-id anti-replay pin). The webhook reads the AccessEntry KV directly
over its own NATS connection.

Apiserver wiring: the k3s config skeleton sets
authentication-token-webhook-config-file; the webhook writes its own self-signed
serving cert + the apiserver kubeconfig at startup (ordered `before k3s`, with a
bounded wait in the k3s start_pre so the apiserver never loads a missing file).

* fix(eks): omit empty spec from token webhook TokenReview response

* fix(sts): presigned GetCallerIdentity must hash empty body, not UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD

VerifyPresignedGetCallerIdentity built the SigV4 canonical request with
"UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD" as the payload hash. That is an S3-only convention; botocore
and the aws-sdk presign non-S3 requests (sts:GetCallerIdentity, the shape `aws
eks get-token` produces) with the SHA256 of the empty string. Every real
get-token therefore failed signature verification with InvalidIdentityToken,
breaking the entire EKS IAM token-auth flow end to end.

Use the empty-string SHA256. The existing hand-rolled presign tests masked the
bug by signing with the same wrong constant; they now sign correctly, and a new
test presigns with the real aws-sdk-go v4 signer (the same canonicalisation the
CLI uses) so this can't regress silently.

Verified live: a real `aws eks get-token --cluster-name dev1` now resolves to
the caller principal over the awsgw eks.VerifyToken surface; an otherwise-valid
token presented for a different cluster is still rejected (anti-replay intact).

* fix(eks): match access-entry routes on escaped path so slashed principal ARNs resolve

IAM principal ARNs (user/admin, role/foo) embed a '/' that the AWS CLI
percent-encodes in the request path. The dispatcher matched r.URL.Path
(decoded), so %2F became a literal '/' and split the ARN across the
([^/]+) capture, dropping every describe/update/delete-access-entry and
associate/disassociate/list-access-policy call to InvalidActionException.

Match r.URL.EscapedPath() so the encoded ARN stays one segment, then
url.PathUnescape each captured param before it reaches the handler.

* test(eks): unit-cover access-entry scope validation, AWS converters, store guards
2026-06-04 11:25:56 +10:00
Josh Siviour b0227e7eeb chore(ansible): remove ansible tree, uplift to mulga/ansible/ (#287)
Ansible orchestrates the whole stack (spinifex + predastore + viperblock +
OVN + tofu hosts) and its spec/beads live in mulga. Moving it to top-level
mulga/ansible/ ends the per-change submodule-pointer-bump friction.

- git rm -r scripts/ansible/
- Makefile: drop ansible-dev-* / ansible-cluster-bootstrap targets + .PHONY

The tree lands at mulga/ansible/ (flat copy, Option B). History pivot:
tag feat/uplift-ansible-snapshot-pre-move marks the pre-move HEAD.

Plan: docs/development/improvements/ansible-uplift-to-mulga.md (in mulga).
2026-06-04 11:23:08 +10:00
Josh Siviour 61d73d1d4e fix: reject unknown ACM cert ARN at listener API boundary (#289)
An unresolvable certificate ARN was accepted into a listener record and
only failed later at config-render time, which aborted updateStoredConfig
wholesale and silently froze the load balancer's data-plane convergence.

Validate every certificate ARN against the ACM store (existence + account
ownership) in CreateListener, ModifyListener and AddListenerCertificates,
returning CertificateNotFound up front. Skipped when the ACM store is
unavailable, matching the nil-safe resolve path.
2026-06-04 11:20:52 +10:00
Josh Siviour 470954bbe8 feat(elbv2): HTTPS data plane — TLS termination via ssl crt + PEM delivery (#286)
Resolve listener certificate ARNs to PEM via the ACM store (shared
JetStream KV, no cross-service hop), render HAProxy 'ssl crt' for secure
frontends, and deliver the combined cert+chain+key PEM to the LB agent
alongside the config. ConfigHash folds in cert content so rotation
triggers a reload; the agent writes each cert 0600 (path-constrained to
its cert dir) before the config + reload.

Phase B of the ELBv2 HTTPS epic (mulga-siv-180).
2026-06-04 10:45:11 +10:00
Josh Siviour 38f5dd0d41 feat(acm): minimal ACM-alike certificate service (#285)
Stand up acm as its own AWS JSON 1.1 gateway service wiring the BYO-cert
import/store path ELBv2 HTTPS listeners need. ImportCertificate validates
tls.X509KeyPair, parses the leaf for domain/serial/expiry/key-algorithm,
mints arn:aws:acm:<region>:<acct>:certificate/<uuid>, and stores PEM (cert,
chain, key) in JetStream KV. DescribeCertificate/ListCertificates/
DeleteCertificate round-trip; access is account-scoped.

New gateway dispatch by X-Amz-Target (CertificateManager.<Action>); errors
share the AWS JSON 1.1 envelope with EKS. Wired through gateway/acm ops,
handlers/acm (service iface, store, NATS client), daemon handlers + acm.*
subscriptions, and service-interfaces.yaml.

Out of scope (future, same epic): RequestCertificate + DNS validation,
managed renewal, Get/ExportCertificate, tagging, ACM-PCA.
2026-06-04 10:13:10 +10:00
Josh Siviour e06d0c0865 feat(elbv2): HTTPS listener certificates + SSL policies (Phase A) (#283)
* feat(elbv2): HTTPS listener certificates + SSL policies

Add Certificates[]/SslPolicy to ListenerRecord. CreateListener and
ModifyListener validate secure protocols (HTTPS/TLS) require >=1
certificate with exactly one default, non-secure protocols reject
certs/policy, and default+validate the SSL policy. DescribeListeners
echoes certificates and SslPolicy.

New endpoints: AddListenerCertificates, RemoveListenerCertificates,
DescribeListenerCertificates, DescribeSSLPolicies (gateway ops, NATS
subjects, daemon handlers, service-interfaces.yaml). No TLS
termination yet.

* test(elbv2): cover listener-cert gateway ops + handler error paths
2026-06-04 09:51:10 +10:00
Josh Siviour bbff004b45 feat(eks): 6b create-cluster → ACTIVE (single-node SQLite + mgmt-IP NLB stop-gap) (#280)
* feat(eks): cluster_state KV helpers — ClusterMeta + status CAS + prefix sweep

Stage 1 of Sprint 6b CreateCluster lifecycle. Introduces the first
read/write helpers against the eks-account-{accountID} bucket so later
stages (oidc keypair, NLB wiring, cluster reconciler) can persist state
without re-inventing CAS/sweep logic.

- ClusterMeta struct holds the DescribeCluster source of truth (status,
  endpoint, OIDC issuer, CA, VPC config, control-plane VM + ENI, NLB ARN).
- ClusterStatus enum mirrors the AWS EKS string set verbatim.
- PutClusterMeta is unconditional (CreateCluster path); GetClusterMeta
  returns ErrClusterNotFound on key absence so the service boundary can
  map to ResourceNotFoundException.
- SetClusterStatus is revision-checked with bounded CAS retries so the
  reconciler and CreateCluster body cannot wedge each other.
- DeleteClusterPrefix sweeps every clusters/{name}/* key; called from
  DeleteCluster after the OIDC private key is zeroized.

Tests cover round-trip, missing/corrupt blob, idempotent status set,
DELETING transition from every prior state, concurrent revision bump
recovery, sibling-cluster preservation, empty-bucket no-op.

Plan: docs/development/feature/eks-6b-create-cluster.md

* feat(eks): per-cluster ECDSA-P256 OIDC keypair generation + zeroize

Stage 2 of Sprint 6b. Lays the at-rest primitives the CreateCluster body
will call before launching the K3s server VM. Pure crypto helpers — no
daemon, no launcher, no NATS bus.

- GenerateClusterOIDCKeypair mints an ECDSA-P256 keypair per cluster
  (matches eks-v1.md Q8), PEM-marshals the private as PKCS8,
  envelope-encrypts it via handlers_iam.EncryptSecret (AES-256-GCM,
  AwsGW masterKey), writes the ciphertext to OIDCSigningKeyKey, and
  publishes the public JWKS document to OIDCJWKSKey. Returns the JWKS
  bytes so CreateCluster can hand them straight to user-data without
  a follow-up KV read.
- JWKS shape mirrors what handlers_sts.JWKS already decodes for IRSA
  verification (RFC 7517 EC P-256, kid = base64url SHA-256 of SPKI DER,
  alg ES256, use sig). Types are defined locally to avoid a
  handlers_eks → handlers_sts → handlers_eks import cycle; JSON wire
  compat is the contract.
- LoadClusterOIDCPrivateKey is the recovery-path read for future
  stages (reconciler restart, restore-snapshot tooling). Validates
  PKCS8 parses to an ECDSA P-256 *PrivateKey and rejects anything else.
- ZeroizeClusterOIDCKey overwrites the encrypted blob with zeros of
  the same length, then deletes. DeleteCluster calls this *first* so a
  crash mid-teardown leaves no recoverable key material. Idempotent
  on missing key — supports retry semantics.

Tests cover JWKS shape (RFC 7517 EC P-256 with 32-byte SEC1
coordinates), per-cluster key uniqueness, round-trip private-key
decrypt matches JWKS public, wrong-master-key fails, missing-key
ErrClusterNotFound mapping, zeroize idempotency, JWKS survives
zeroize (carries no secret material), padCoord left-pad correctness.

Plan: docs/development/feature/eks-6b-create-cluster.md

* feat(eks): cluster SG + NLB ensure/delete helpers

Stage 3 of Sprint 6b CreateCluster lifecycle. Adds the customer-account
SG provisioning + per-cluster NLB plumbing the CreateCluster body will
call between OIDC keypair (Stage 2) and K3s VM launch (Stage 4). Pure
interface-call helpers — no daemon, no KV, no NATS bus.

- EnsureClusterSGs creates (or returns) eks-cluster-{name}-control-plane-sg
  and eks-cluster-{name}-nodegroup-sg in the customer VPC, tagged
  spinifex:managed-by=eks + spinifex:eks-cluster=<name> + spinifex:eks-role.
  Idempotent on group-name + vpc-id pair. DeleteClusterSGs is best-effort
  with continue-on-error sweep.
- EnsureClusterNLB provisions the eks-<name> NLB (internal scheme), the
  eks-<name>-cp target group (TCP, port 6443, target-type ip per eks-v1.md
  Q13), and the TCP :443 forward listener. Returns ClusterNLB
  {LoadBalancerArn, TargetGroupArn, ListenerArn, DNSName} so CreateCluster
  can persist every ARN in ClusterMeta. Idempotent on cluster name;
  resource-name length validated against the AWS 32-char cap so a too-long
  cluster name fails with a clear error instead of a generic
  InvalidParameterValue downstream.
- RegisterClusterTarget + DeregisterClusterTarget bind the K3s server VM
  ENI IP to the TG on :6443. Stage 4 calls Register once the VM has its
  ENI IP; DeleteCluster calls Deregister before VM termination.
- DeleteClusterNLB tears down NLB + TG. DeleteLoadBalancer already
  cascades listener cleanup inside the ELBv2 impl. LB sweep error takes
  precedence so DeleteCluster surfaces the more visible failure first
  while the TG sweep still runs.

Narrow sgProvisioner + nlbProvisioner interfaces in-package give tests
hand-rolled recorder fakes; the production VPCService + ELBv2Service
satisfy them structurally so no adapter is needed at Stage 6 wire-up.

Tests cover fresh-creates with right names/tags/ports, idempotent reuse,
mixed-existence (control-plane exists, nodegroup created), name-too-long
rejection, empty-inputs rejection, missing-resource no-op on delete, and
first-error-surfaced sweep continuation on delete.

Plan: docs/development/feature/eks-6b-create-cluster.md

* feat(ec2): RunInstances honors pre-created NetworkInterfaceId

Closes the AWS-parity gap where RunInstances always auto-created a
primary ENI even when the caller specified
NetworkInterfaces[0].NetworkInterfaceId. The EKS Sprint 6b CreateCluster
launcher (Stage 4) needs to pre-create the K3s server VM's ENI so the
ENI can be tagged/owned distinctly from the launcher's instance; the
existing path silently created a second ENI and left the caller's
unattached.

Changes:
- ENICreator interface gains GetENI(accountID, eniID) → *ENIInfo. ENIInfo
  is a translated struct (SubnetID, VpcID, PrivateIp, MAC, Status,
  SecurityGroupIDs) so handlers/ec2/instance stays free of an import on
  handlers/ec2/vpc.ENIRecord.
- daemon/vpc_adapter.go gains daemonENICreator.GetENI translating
  VPCServiceImpl.GetENIRecord into ENIInfo.
- PrepareRunInstances inspects NetworkInterfaces[0].NetworkInterfaceId
  after the existing subnet/SG lift block. If non-empty, the loop
  dispatches to a new attachPreCreatedENI helper:
    - Looks up the ENI under accountID.
    - Rejects with InvalidNetworkInterface.InUse if Status == "in-use".
    - Calls AttachENI to mark the ENI in-use and bind it to the new VM.
    - Populates instance.ENIId / ENIMac and ec2.Instance network fields
      (PrivateIp, SubnetId, VpcId, SecurityGroups, NetworkInterfaces[0]).
    - Skips the auto-create + public-IP-auto-assign paths; the caller is
      expected to manage public IP out-of-band.
- Auto-create path is left untouched for every other code path: callers
  that pass SubnetId without a NetworkInterfaceId still get a fresh ENI
  with the existing semantics.

Tests cover the four shapes: happy path (auto-create not called, attach
called once, instance populated), in-use ENI rejected with the canonical
AWS error code, lookup error surfaces verbatim, attach error surfaces
verbatim.

* feat(eks): K3s control-plane VM launcher with cloud-init user-data

LaunchK3sServerVM resolves the eks-server AMI by name, pre-creates the
customer-account control-plane ENI in the supplied subnet with the
control-plane SG, renders cloud-init user-data (first-boot env, OIDC
private key, K3s config.yaml with tls-san + service-account args), then
calls RunInstances with NetworkInterfaces[0].NetworkInterfaceId pointing
at the pre-created ENI. RunInstances failures roll back the ENI so the
caller does not leak a customer-account resource.

TerminateK3sServerVM tears the instance and ENI down for DeleteCluster;
missing identifiers are a no-op so retries stay safe.

ENI + VM both live in the customer account (deviation from plan §7 which
specified a SystemAccount-owned VM); cross-account ENI attach is deferred
to a follow-up bead.

* feat(eks): NATS bootstrap subscriber + cluster reconciler + leader lease

NATSBootstrap subscribes to the four single-shot subjects the K3s server VM
publishes (k3s-bootstrap-token, k3s-admin-kubeconfig, k3s-oidc-jwks, k3s-ca)
on eks.bus.{accountID}.{clusterName}.{kind}. Token and admin kubeconfig are
envelope-encrypted via handlers_iam.EncryptSecret and persisted to KV. The
published JWKS is cross-checked against the controller-generated keypair by
kid and rejected on mismatch. The CA lands on meta.CertificateAuthorityB64
via the new SetClusterCertificateAuthority CAS updater.

ClusterReconciler holds a leader lease on spinifex-eks-leader/{accountID}/
{clusterName} (60s TTL, 20s refresh) and drives:
  - CREATING -> ACTIVE once the four bootstrap KV artifacts are present and
    NLB /healthz responds 200.
  - ACTIVE -> probe /healthz on the configured interval, warn on failure.
  - DELETING / FAILED -> exit (DeleteCluster body owns teardown).
Loss of the leader lease (CAS conflict or different holderID) returns
ErrReconcilerLeaseLost so the caller can re-acquire from another node.

Tested with embedded JetStream + a stub HTTPDoer; race-clean.

* feat(eks): OIDC issuer URL builder + reconciler registry

ClusterOIDCIssuer renders the {gatewayBaseURL}/oidc/eks/{region}/{accountID}/
{clusterName} URL kube-apiserver advertises as service-account-issuer and
that STS / external IRSA validators dereference. Validates URL safety on the
path segments so a hostile cluster name cannot inject scheme/path fragments.

ReconcilerRegistry tracks per-(accountID, clusterName) reconciler goroutines
with idempotent Spawn (drop duplicate spawn calls), Stop (cancel one + wait
for release), and StopAll (graceful daemon shutdown). RunClusterReconciler
is the production SpawnReconcilerFn: constructs a ClusterReconciler,
acquires the leader lease, runs Run in a goroutine. Both helpers consumed
by the upcoming service_impl CreateCluster body.

* feat(eks): CreateCluster/DescribeCluster/ListClusters/DeleteCluster bodies

Wires the EKSServiceImpl orchestration deps (VPC SG/K3s/Subnet, NLB,
Instance launcher, AMI resolver, master key, gateway base URL, region,
holder ID, reconciler registry) and implements the four lifecycle
methods:

- CreateCluster: validate → CREATING meta → SGs → NLB → OIDC issuer +
  keypair → K3s server VM (cloud-init carries OIDC private PEM) →
  register ENI IP with NLB target group → spawn NATS bootstrap
  subscriber + per-cluster reconciler via the registry.
- DescribeCluster: KV meta read → eks.Cluster shape, with
  ErrClusterNotFound translated to ResourceNotFoundException at the
  service boundary.
- ListClusters: KV key-prefix scan + sorted maxResults/nextToken
  pagination.
- DeleteCluster: SetClusterStatus DELETING → zeroize OIDC key → stop
  reconciler via registry → deregister NLB target + delete NLB →
  terminate K3s VM → delete SGs → delete cluster KV prefix.

Daemon wiring:

- buildEKSServiceDeps loads MasterKey from BaseDir/config/master.key
  best-effort, resolves the gateway base URL via the same precedence the
  LB-agent block applies later, and passes VPCService + ELBv2Service +
  ImageService directly while adapting InstanceServiceImpl via
  daemonEKSInstanceLauncher (RunInstances passes through; Terminate-
  Instances loops vmMgr.Get + StopOrTerminateInstance in-process).
- SubnetVPCResolver is satisfied by daemonEKSSubnetResolver wrapping
  VPCService.GetSubnet.
- Startup spawns reconcilers for every persisted CREATING/ACTIVE cluster
  via SpawnRegisteredReconcilers; shutdown calls eksService.Shutdown so
  every per-cluster goroutine releases its lease before exit.

Test surface:

- service_impl_test: TestEKSServiceImpl_ClusterLifecycleShimMode covers
  the four lifecycle methods when constructed via the back-compat shim
  (CreateCluster/DeleteCluster → ServerInternal, DescribeCluster →
  ResourceNotFound on empty bucket, ListClusters → empty list).
- daemon_handlers_eks_test: drop the four lifecycle subjects from the
  NotImplemented routing loop; handler-side coverage now lives in
  handlers/eks.
- awserrors: add ResourceNotFound (404) for the DescribeCluster path.

* fix(eks): load master.key from config dir not service data dir

eks_deps read master.key from {BaseDir}/config/master.key, but the daemon
systemd unit sets SPINIFEX_BASE_DIR=/var/lib/spinifex/spinifex (a per-service
data dir). admin init writes master.key to the shared config dir, so the
daemon looked in a path that only resolved when a {BaseDir}/config symlink
existed — awsgw has one, the daemon's nested data dir does not. Result:
MasterKey=nil, depsReadyForOrchestration() false, CreateCluster/DeleteCluster
collapse to ServerInternal.

master.key is a config artifact written next to spinifex.toml. Read it from
filepath.Dir(d.configPath), matching how the daemon already resolves
predastore.toml and TLS certs. No symlink or provisioning change needed.

* fix(eks): register + resolve eks-server AMI via tag, add import --ami-name

CreateCluster's K3s launch failed 'eks: AMI eks-server not found' on every
clean install. Two defects:

1. spx admin images import had no way to name a locally-built appliance AMI:
   --name is a catalog lookup (rejects non-catalog values) and the AMI name
   was hardcoded to ami-{distro}-{version}-{arch}. build-system-image.sh ran
   'import --name $AMI_NAME' for eks-server/eks-agent/GPU images, which all
   failed 'Image name not found in available images'.

2. The launcher resolved DescribeImages by name=='eks-server', a name the
   pipeline could never produce.

Add --ami-name to override the registered AMI name on --file imports (fixes
eks-server, eks-agent, and GPU appliance imports). Resolve the EKS AMI by the
spinifex:managed-by=eks tag the pipeline already stamps, newest-wins on
multiple matches. Tag-based resolution survives the planned server+agent →
single EKS AMI unify untouched (role chosen per-instance at launch).

build-system-image.sh now passes --ami-name; Makefile gains
import-eks-server-image (IMPORT=1) and dev-install.sh imports the AMI when
DEV_INSTALL_EKS=1.

* fix(eks): give K3s server VM NATS token + CA so bootstrap can publish

The K3s control-plane VM was launched with NATSURL=ConnectedUrl() (loopback,
unreachable from the VM) and no auth material, while spinifex NATS requires a
shared token over TLS. The VM could not connect to NATS, so it never published
its four one-shot bootstrap messages and the cluster stayed in CREATING.

Hand the VM the daemon's shared NATS token + CA PEM and a VM-reachable NATS URL
(mirrors the ELBv2 LB-agent shared-credential pattern; spinifex has no nkeys
hierarchy to scope per-principal creds against).

- K3sServerInput: drop dead NATSCredsContent; add NATSToken + NATSCACert,
  required by validateK3sServerInput. user-data writes SPINIFEX_NATS_TOKEN,
  SPINIFEX_NATS_CA + the CA file; first-boot.env tightened to 0600.
- EKSServiceDeps + CreateCluster: pass NATSURL/NATSToken/NATSCACert.
- buildEKSServiceDeps: read CA from config.NATS.CACert; extract
  resolveGatewayHost(); add resolveNATSURL() (same reachable host, NATS port).
- k3s-first-boot.sh: build nats CLI args with --token + --tlsca.

* fix(eks): retry transient bootstrap persists, fail cluster on permanent error

The NATS bootstrap subscriber tore down on the first persist error and the
cluster sat in CREATING forever. Core-NATS delivers a publication once, so a
transient KV blip during persist was unrecoverable and a malformed payload
(bad JWKS kid, non-base64 CA, empty envelope) silently stranded the cluster.

- persistWithRetry rides out transient persist failures in-handler (3 attempts,
  200ms backoff) instead of unsubscribing and waiting for a re-publish that
  never comes.
- errBootstrapPermanent classifies validation failures (malformed envelope,
  empty fields, JWKS kid mismatch, non-base64 CA) as non-retryable so they
  return immediately.
- spawnBootstrap marks the cluster FAILED (with reason) when Run exits with a
  non-context error, so DescribeCluster surfaces the cause and DeleteCluster
  can reclaim resources.
- MarkClusterFailed transitions to FAILED+StatusReason only from CREATING, so a
  late bootstrap error cannot clobber a concurrent delete or healthy cluster.
- casUpdateMeta extracts the revision-checked RMW loop shared by the meta
  setters.

* fix(eks): resume NATS bootstrap for CREATING clusters on daemon restart

SpawnRegisteredReconcilers re-spawned only the reconciler on boot, never the
bootstrap subscriber. A daemon restart while a cluster was CREATING (K3s VM
still booting) lost the subscriptions; the VM published its four one-shot
core-NATS messages to nobody and the cluster hung in CREATING forever.

- BootstrapPendingKinds reports which artifacts (token, kubeconfig, CA) are
  still missing from KV. JWKS is excluded: it persists no artifact and
  re-waiting on a once-published subject would deadlock — its cross-check is
  best-effort across a restart.
- RunForKinds subscribes to a subject subset (nil = all four); Run delegates to
  it. subjectHandlers maps each kind to its handler and rejects unknown kinds.
- SpawnRegisteredReconcilers resumes bootstrap for CREATING clusters, waiting
  only on the missing artifacts, so a mid-CREATING restart still drives the
  cluster to ACTIVE.

* fix(eks): DeleteCluster must not wipe KV or report success on teardown failure

DeleteCluster ran zeroize, NLB teardown, and VM termination as warn-and-continue
then unconditionally swept the per-cluster KV prefix and returned success. A
failed NLB or VM teardown leaked billable resources with no owning record (the
meta holding their ARNs/IDs was erased) and told the operator the cluster was
gone. Zeroize — a stated security guarantee of no recoverable key material —
had its failure ignored too.

- Zeroize, NLB delete, and VM terminate are now blocking: their failures
  accumulate (errors.Join) and abort the call before the KV sweep, leaving the
  cluster DELETING and returning the error so a retry can still reach the ARNs.
- KV prefix sweep runs only after NLB + VM teardown confirm.
- SG cleanup stays best-effort (plan step 5) — a leaked SG strands no owning
  record — and target deregister stays best-effort since DeleteClusterNLB tears
  down the whole NLB + target group.

* fix(eks): persist NLB + control-plane ARNs mid-CreateCluster so failures don't leak

CreateCluster set meta.NLBArn / target-group / instance / ENI in memory and
persisted them only in the final PutClusterMeta, after LaunchK3sServerVM. Any
failure between EnsureClusterNLB and that persist left the NLB + target group +
listener + backing LB VM created but unrecorded; markFailed did no rollback and
DeleteCluster keys teardown off the persisted ARNs, so the resources leaked.

- Persist meta immediately after EnsureClusterNLB (records NLB/TG ARNs) and
  again after LaunchK3sServerVM (records instance + ENI), before the next
  fallible step.
- A failed create now leaves a FAILED meta carrying the resource references, so
  the DeleteCluster teardown path (165.9) reclaims every NLB/TG/listener/VM.
- Tests: NLB-arn-persisted-before-later-failure, failed-create-then-delete
  reclaims NLB, and a CreateCluster happy path. Shared eksServiceFixture
  extracted from the delete-cluster fixture.

* fix(sts): parse path-based EKS OIDC issuer so IRSA accepts 6b cluster tokens

ParseEKSIssuerURL required an `oidc.eks.` host prefix and an exactly-2-segment
path (AWS hosted-EKS shape), but ClusterOIDCIssuer emits — and awsgw serves —
https://{gateway-host}/oidc/eks/{region}/{accountID}/{clusterName}. Every 6b
cluster's iss claim was rejected with "issuer host must start with oidc.eks",
so AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity would fail all IRSA tokens once 6e serves them.

Reconcile on the path-based shape, which is what is actually reachable on
bare-metal/on-prem (no oidc.eks.* vhost or DNS exists). Host trust comes from
the IAM OIDC-provider registration (the full issuer string is the registry key)
and the JWKS signature check, not a host pattern — so the parser drops the host
prefix rule and instead pins accountID/clusterName at fixed positions in a
strict 5-segment /oidc/eks/{region}/{accountID}/{clusterName} path. A crafted
iss with extra or missing segments still fails closed.

Adds a cross-component round-trip test asserting a ClusterOIDCIssuer-built iss
parses back to the same (accountID, clusterName).

* fix(eks): reclaim FAILED clusters on retry + cluster-scoped exists/not-found errors

A failed CreateCluster left a FAILED ClusterMeta that poisoned retries: the
preflight returned ErrorELBv2TargetGroupInUse ("The target group is currently
in use...") for a cluster-exists condition, and because that maps to a
retryable code the SDK's auto-retry surfaced ResourceInUseException instead of
the original failure. FAILED clusters were also a dead state — visible to
neither a clean recreate nor a clear lifecycle.

- Add EKS-specific ResourceInUseException / ResourceNotFoundException codes with
  cluster-scoped messages; CreateCluster's exists check and DescribeCluster /
  DeleteCluster not-found now use them instead of the ELBv2 / EC2 codes.
- CreateCluster reclaims a FAILED cluster: it purges the prior attempt's
  recorded resources and clears KV before recreating, so a retry (including the
  SDK auto-retry) is idempotent rather than blocked. Teardown failure surfaces
  rather than recreating on top of orphans.
- Extract purgeClusterInfra, shared by DeleteCluster and the reclaim path
  (blocking zeroize/NLB/VM, best-effort SG, KV sweep only after teardown
  confirms).
- FAILED clusters remain observable via Describe (status=FAILED) and List — no
  state where create blocks but describe/list show nothing.

* fix(eks): fail CREATING clusters that exceed create timeout

A per-cluster reconciler that never observes a ready control plane (bootstrap
artifacts missing or healthz unreachable) previously stayed CREATING forever.
Add a configurable create timeout (default 15m): once meta.CreatedAt is older
than the deadline and the cluster is still not ready, the reconciler marks it
FAILED with a reason, exiting the loop. Within the deadline it stays CREATING.

* fix(eks): surface ACTIVE cluster health in describe-cluster

The reconciler only slog.Warn'd a failing /healthz probe for an ACTIVE
cluster, so describe-cluster kept reporting a dead control plane as healthy.
Add HealthIssue + LastHealthProbe to ClusterMeta, write them from the ACTIVE
reconcile branch (recording the failure reason, clearing on recovery), and map
a non-empty HealthIssue to a ClusterHealth ClusterUnreachable issue in
describe-cluster.

* test(eks): add plan-mandated CreateCluster/DeleteCluster service cases

service_impl_test only covered shim mode. Add the four cases the plan's Testing
section requires: CONFIG_MAP auth mode rejected (and API accepted), missing
subnetIds rejected, DescribeCluster 404 with full deps wired (past the shim
short-circuit), and the DeleteCluster zeroize-before-teardown ordering proven
by forcing a teardown failure and asserting the OIDC key is already wiped.

* refactor(eks): return OIDC private-key PEM from generator, drop re-read

CreateCluster discarded GenerateClusterOIDCKeypair's return then did a second
KV get + AES-GCM decrypt via loadOIDCPrivateKeyPEM to re-derive the same PEM the
generator already had in hand. Return the plaintext PEM (alongside the JWKS)
from the generator and use it directly; remove loadOIDCPrivateKeyPEM and the now
-unused crypto/x509 + encoding/pem imports in service_impl.

* fix(eks): make CreateCluster/DeleteCluster failures diagnosable

Unmet orchestration deps and a missing eks-server AMI both collapsed to a bare
ServerInternal with no request-time log, leaving the client a 'contact AWS
re:Post' message and zero cause. Enumerate the specific missing deps and log
them at ERROR, returning ServiceUnavailable (an operator/config fault, not an
unrecoverable internal one). Add an ErrEKSServerAMINotFound sentinel so a
missing control-plane AMI is logged and surfaced as ServiceUnavailable too.

* fix(eks): serialize REST-JSON responses via jsonutil so the AWS SDK can parse them

WriteJSONResponse marshaled aws-sdk-go *Output structs with encoding/json,
which ignores their locationName tags and emits Go PascalCase keys. EKS
clients parse restjson on the lowercase locationName, so every field of
list/describe/create/delete responses was silently dropped (empty endpoint,
null identity.oidc.issuer). Marshal via jsonutil.BuildJSON — the same
marshaler the SDK uses for restjson bodies — which honors locationName.

Adds wire-shape tests asserting lowercase keys present and PascalCase absent.

* feat(eks): launch K3s server VM via boot-agnostic system-instance path

The EKS K3s control-plane VM launched through the plain tenant RunInstances
path, so it had only its VPC ENI and no management-bridge NIC -- no route to
the daemon's NATS endpoint. It never published its bootstrap subjects and the
cluster stayed CREATING.

Generalize LaunchSystemInstance to a boot-agnostic contract supporting both
system-instance boot styles:

  - BootDirect: direct-boot microVM (fw_cfg blobs) -- ELBv2 LB agent
  - BootAMI:    AMI boot + cloud-init seed (q35)    -- EKS K3s server VM

The launch contract moves to a neutral handlers/sysinstance package so EKS can
launch system VMs without an eks->elbv2 dependency; handlers/elbv2 re-exports
the types as aliases. The BootAMI branch mirrors the daemon's
Prepare -> Insert -> Launch split and allocates the mgmt NIC on the VM record
between Insert and Launch, so the cloud-init network-config renders a static
mgmt0 interface. The EKS NATSURL is now sourced from the mgmt-bridge IP (the
on-link address the VM's mgmt NIC can reach), falling back to the gateway-host
resolution when no mgmt bridge exists.

Verified: K3s VM now boots from the eks-server AMI under q35 with a mgmt0 NIC
(10.15.8.x), reachable from the host over br-mgmt, with NATS on-link at the
bridge IP. No AMI rebuild required.

* fix(eks): make DeleteCluster K3s teardown idempotent so it can't wedge

TerminateK3sServerVM treated every DeleteNetworkInterface error -- and every
TerminateSystemInstance error -- as blocking. Because instance terminate is
async, the immediate ENI delete races it: the first attempt fails
InvalidNetworkInterface.InUse, and once the instance-terminate cascade releases
the ENI every retry fails InvalidNetworkInterfaceID.NotFound. Both joined into
purgeClusterInfra's teardownErrs gate, which short-circuits before the SG sweep
and KV prefix delete -- so once the ENI was gone the cluster was stuck DELETING
permanently, leaking its control-plane + nodegroup SGs and KV meta.

Classify the teardown errors instead of blanket-propagating:

  - ENI InvalidNetworkInterfaceID.NotFound / InvalidNetworkInterface.NotFound
    -> idempotent success (the cascade or a prior retry already deleted it);
    must not block the downstream SG + KV sweep.
  - ENI InvalidNetworkInterface.InUse (VM still terminating) and any other
    error -> retryable; surfaced so the cluster stays DELETING and the
    reconciler retries once the instance releases the ENI.
  - Instance already gone -> idempotent. TerminateSystemInstance now returns a
    sysinstance.ErrSystemInstanceNotFound sentinel that the EKS path tolerates
    via errors.Is, so a retried delete after the VM drained completes.

Add awserrors.IsErrorCode(err, code) as the shared delete-error classifier
(substring match through %w wrapping) and route the lone ad-hoc strings.Contains
guard in daemon/vm_adapters.go through it.

Verified: delete-cluster on three clusters left wedged DELETING / FAILED (ENI +
VM already gone) all complete -- clusters erased, SGs + ENIs reclaimed, no leak.

* fix(eks): gate ACTIVE on verified JWKS cross-check, not pre-seeded key

The controller pre-seeds OIDCJWKSKey at create time, so its presence
proved nothing about the running cluster's actual signing key. A cluster
could reach ACTIVE — and start signing IRSA tokens — before the K3s VM's
published JWKS was ever cross-checked against the generated keypair.

Add an OIDCJWKSVerifiedKey marker written by persistJWKS only after
assertJWKSMatch passes. The reconciler's ACTIVE gate and
BootstrapPendingKinds now key off the marker, not the pre-seeded JWKS.
assertJWKSMatch is map-based and also rejects kty mismatch.

* fix(eks): collapse duplicated gateway-host switch into resolveGatewayHost

startCluster reimplemented the 5-case gateway-host precedence inline,
duplicating resolveGatewayHost (used by the OIDC issuer and EKS NATS URL).
If one drifted, the OIDC issuer host embedded in cluster tokens would
diverge from the host LB VMs use to reach the daemon -> IRSA iss mismatch
and cluster-wide token rejection.

startCluster now calls resolveGatewayHost and derives the multi-node
mgmt host route (mgmtRouteVia) from the resolved host. resolveGatewayHost
carries the canonical case enumeration; a table test pins all five
branches plus the case-1 skip guards and the no-host fallthrough.

* fix(eks): make eks-server VM boot diagnosable + fix first-boot publisher crash

Three issues found while diagnosing why K3s clusters never leave CREATING:

1. setup.sh: the stock Alpine cloud image lists `console=tty0` LAST in
   default_kernel_opts, so Linux binds /dev/console to the framebuffer and the
   host-side serial capture sees only kernel dmesg — OpenRC, cloud-init, and
   k3s-first-boot output were invisible. Reorder so console=ttyS0 is last.

2. k3s-first-boot.initd: command_background was "no" while output_log/error_log
   were set; start-stop-daemon rejects --stdout/--stderr without --background
   ("Failed to start k3s-first-boot"), so the bootstrap publisher never ran and
   the cluster wedged in CREATING. Background it (the publisher waits up to 5min
   on K3s /healthz and must not block the runlevel anyway) and route its output
   to the serial console, which the orchestrator captures (the VM has no login).

3. k3s-first-boot.sh: on the /healthz timeout, dump the tail of /var/log/k3s.log
   to the console so the apiserver's own failure is visible host-side.

* fix(eks): seed K3s apiserver a public OIDC key, not the private key

buildK3sUserData pointed both kube-apiserver service-account args at the same
private-key file. --service-account-key-file requires a PUBLIC key — k8s
ParsePublicKeysPEM rejects a private-key PEM with "data does not contain any
valid RSA or ECDSA public keys" and the apiserver crash-loops, so K3s never
reaches /healthz, first-boot never publishes, and the cluster wedges in
CREATING.

Add PublicKeyPEMFromPrivate (PKIX public PEM from the PKCS#8 private key) and
seed it to a separate /etc/rancher/k3s/oidc-signing-key.pub.pem. Point
service-account-key-file at the public file; keep service-account-signing-key-file
on the private file. Runtime-verified: the apiserver crash is gone and K3s now
starts and schedules system pods.

* feat(eks): egress-only SNAT + DNS for K3s control-plane VM

The K3s server VM (a hidden system instance) could not pull system-pod
images: it had no internet egress and no working resolver, so
coredns/traefik/metrics-server never started and /healthz timed out.

Egress: give the single control-plane VM egress-only internet, confined
to its /32, with no inbound exposure and no customer-visible resource.

- policy/route.go: SystemInstanceEgressPriority (1200, above the drop
  gate) + AddSystemInstanceEgress/Delete — a reroute scoped to
  ip4.src == <vmIP>/32 so peers in a shared subnet are unaffected.
- policy/nat.go: AddSystemInstanceSNAT/Delete — a plain snat (not
  dnat_and_snat, so no inbound path), idempotent on its pool external IP.
- external/igw.go: L5 EnsureSystemInstanceEgress/Remove resolves the
  gateway nexthop and attaches the reroute + snat (mirrors the NAT-GW
  egress path; ADR-0006 S1/S4/S5 preserved).
- subscribers: vpc.add/delete-system-egress topics + handlers.
- handlers/eks: allocate a hidden (ManagedBy=eks) pool address on
  CreateCluster and publish add; release + publish delete on teardown.
  EIP dep wired through EKSServiceDeps + the daemon.

DNS: the eks-server AMI is Alpine/dhcpcd and /etc/resolv.conf is a
dangling symlink, so DHCP-supplied resolvers are never persisted. Write
a real /etc/resolv.conf from the K3s VM cloud-config via bootcmd (not
write_files — a write_files entry follows the dead symlink, fails, and
aborts the whole block, dropping first-boot.env + the k3s config).

* feat: EKS 6b single-node SQLite pivot + bootstrap-envelope fixes

Switch the K3s server VM from embedded etcd to embedded SQLite (kine)
for the single-node v1, so CreateCluster reaches a healthy control plane.
etcd's per-commit fsync stalls past the apiserver deadline on viperblock's
deferred-durability block path; SQLite tolerates it.

- k3s server: omit cluster-init (selects SQLite/kine), add anonymous-auth=true
  so the reconciler's anonymous /healthz NLB probe returns 200.
- first-boot readiness gate: anonymous /healthz (401 under CIS anonymous-auth
  =false) -> authenticated 'kubectl get --raw /readyz'.
- first-boot publish: emit a JSON BootstrapEnvelope for all four subjects
  (token, admin-kubeconfig, oidc-jwks, ca); jwks and ca were absent before.
- nats pub: --stdin -> --force-stdin (nats CLI 0.4.0).
- manifest: add jq (builds the bootstrap-message JSON envelopes).

* feat: EKS reconciler probes control-plane mgmt IP until DNS lands

The host-side cluster reconciler cannot resolve or route to the VPC-internal
NLB DNS endpoint (no authoritative DNS / Eclipso yet), so CreateCluster timed
out in CREATING and was marked FAILED even though the control plane was healthy.

Probe the control-plane VM's br-mgmt NIC address directly — the one apiserver
endpoint reachable from the daemon. Capture the mgmt IP from the launch result
(SystemInstanceOutput.MgmtIP -> K3sServerOutput.MgmtIP -> ClusterMeta.
ControlPlaneMgmtIP) and build the reconciler health URL as
https://<mgmtIP>:6443/healthz. The probe client already sets InsecureSkipVerify,
so the mgmt IP need not be in the apiserver cert SAN.

Workaround until authoritative DNS + a host-reachable NLB front-end land, at
which point spawnReconciler reverts to the NLB endpoint.
2026-06-03 22:29:31 +10:00
Josh Siviour 7b9eb9cc4e feat(elbv2): tag/SG/IP-type setters, ip targets, redirect actions, delete-cascade hardening (#282)
* fix(elbv2): make resource deletes idempotent on absent

DeleteLoadBalancer, DeleteTargetGroup, DeleteListener and DeleteRule
returned a NotFound error when the target was already gone. Real AWS
ELBv2 deletes are idempotent (success on absent), so terraform-provider-aws
fails a destroy step on retry. Return an empty success output instead,
mirroring the KV store which already tolerates absent keys.

Adds TestRLC1_ELBv2DeleteIdempotentOnAbsent enforcing the contract across
the ELBv2 delete surface; converts the three _NotFound delete tests to
assert idempotent success.

Refs mulga-siv-172 (idempotency clause; cascade-composition clause stays open).

* feat: ELBv2 AddTags/RemoveTags, SetSecurityGroups, SetIpAddressType

- O(1) GetListenerByArn via ARN-parse short-ID lookup + ARN equality check
- persist tags on listeners/rules; seed at create time
- AddTags/RemoveTags across LB, target group, listener, rule resources
- SetSecurityGroups (ALB only) reattaches SGs to each ENI via live port update
- SetIpAddressType (ipv4-only, idempotent)
- wire all four ops through gateway, NATS client, and daemon handlers
- frontend: editable Tags tab on LB/TG detail, Security groups tab on LB detail

* feat(elbv2): redirect listener/rule actions

- add redirect action type; parse/store/read-back RedirectActionConfig
- validate status code + render-safe fields (strip AWS #{...} placeholders)
- accept redirect and fixed-response on listener rules (not just defaults)
- HAProxy: http-request redirect scheme (HTTP->HTTPS fast path) or rebuilt
  location with placeholder->fetch translation; synthetic per-rule backends

* refactor: dedupe ELBv2 attribute handlers and harden store lookups

Collapse the four near-identical Modify/Describe attribute handlers (target
group and load balancer mirror pairs) onto generic helpers in both the service
impl and the gateway, and table-drive the mirror-pair tests over a TG/LB kind.

- service_impl_attributes.go: generic attrResource/modifyResourceAttributes/
  describeResourceAttributes plus sdkAttrsIn/sdkAttrsOut; folds in nil-input
  guards, explicit empty-accountID rejection, fresh-string output, and a
  no-op skip-persist for unchanged Modify calls.
- gateway/elbv2/attributes.go: generic attributeOp + shared validateAttrArn,
  replacing four per-endpoint files.
- types.go: default attribute sets are now package-level maps cloned on access
  instead of rebuilt per Describe; document the access_logs empty-string defaults.
- store.go: drop the stale 'linear scan' docstring and log ARN mismatches on
  GetLoadBalancerByArn/GetTargetGroupByArn instead of silently returning nil.

Adds cross-account isolation, wrong-account no-mutation, and empty-string-clear
coverage.

* feat: support ip target type in ELBv2 RegisterTargets

RegisterTargets resolved every target ID through an instance ENI lookup, so
ip-type target groups silently no-op'd with an empty PrivateIP and never
received traffic.

- types.go: add TargetTypeInstance/TargetTypeIP constants.
- CreateTargetGroup: default to instance; reject target types other than
  instance/ip with InvalidParameterValue.
- RegisterTargets: resolve PrivateIP per target type via resolveRegisteredTargetIP
  — ip targets use the supplied IP directly (validated with net.ParseIP),
  instance targets keep the ENI lookup and reject IP-shaped IDs.

* fix: cascade rule deletion in ELBv2 DeleteLoadBalancer

DeleteLoadBalancer deleted listeners via store.DeleteListener directly, which
bypasses the rule cascade in the DeleteListener handler. Orphan rules survived
LB teardown and pinned their target groups as ResourceInUse, leaving the TG
permanently undeletable and breaking tofu destroy on multinode.

Extract deleteListenerCascade (rules then listener record) and call it from both
DeleteListener and the DeleteLoadBalancer cleanup loop.

Regression: TestDeleteLoadBalancer_CascadesRuleDeletion.

* fix: harden ELBv2 delete lifecycle against orphaned cascades

- DeleteLoadBalancer: fail-fast on listener-list/cascade error and run the
  rule cascade before backing-artifact teardown, so a transient failure
  leaves the record intact for retry instead of orphaning rules.
- DeleteTargetGroup: in-use scan skips listeners/rules whose owning load
  balancer no longer exists, so a partial-teardown orphan can't pin a target
  group as ResourceInUse permanently.
- DeleteRule: propagate the listener lookup error instead of discarding it,
  so a failed HAProxy reload is no longer reported as success.
- Add lifecycle invariants for no-orphan completeness, no store-bypass
  cascade, and target-group deletability after LB teardown.
- Drop plan/bead references from comments.

* test: add NATS e2e round-trips for new ELBv2 ops

Cover the client→NATS→handler marshalling path that unit tests skip:
tags lifecycle (AddTags/DescribeTags/RemoveTags), target-group and
load-balancer attribute round-trips, redirect-action default listener,
ip target-type registration, and SetSecurityGroups/SetIpAddressType.

* fix(elbv2): correct misleading InvalidConfigurationRequest message

The error code is shared by five unrelated conditions (dualstack
rejection in SetIpAddressType, cross-listener rule moves, unsupported
rule action types, and the two genuine NLB security-group cases), but
its canonical message claimed security groups were unsupported on
network load balancers. Callers hitting it from SetIpAddressType or the
rule paths got a message about security groups and NLBs that did not
match their request.

Neutralize to a generic, condition-agnostic message. The AWS error code
is unchanged.

* style(ui): oxfmt security-groups-editor test
2026-06-03 21:49:25 +10:00
Josh Siviour b3f7251239 refactor: migrate lbagent signing to predastore/auth.SignReq (#281)
agent.go signed gateway requests with aws-sdk-go v1's v4.Signer. Switch to
predastore/auth.SignReq (a thin wrapper over aws-sdk-go-v2's v4.Signer) so the
monorepo runs a single signer version and drops the last direct dependency on
aws-sdk-go v1's signer subpackage.

- Replace the *v4.Signer field with the raw access/secret keys.
- signedPost computes the hex SHA-256 payload hash and calls auth.SignReq.
- Add TestSignedPost_ProducesVerifiableSignature: the signed request parses and
  verifies server-side via auth.ParseReq/Verify with a matching body hash.
2026-06-03 20:17:55 +10:00
Josh Siviour de5ee4339a fix(elbv2): render fixed-response listener defaults + DescribeTags listener-rules (#278)
Shared-ingress ALBs use a fixed-response default action (HTTP 404) with
host-header rules forwarding to per-app target groups. Two gaps broke this:

- The HAProxy generator read DefaultActions[0].TargetGroupArn unconditionally,
  so a fixed-response default (empty ARN) rendered `default_backend bk_`, a
  dangling reference that made HAProxy fail to start — the listener never bound
  :80 and the LB served no traffic. Store and render the fixed-response config
  as a synthetic backend (`http-request return status N ...`), with status,
  content-type, and body validated before interpolation.
- ListenerAction dropped the fixed-response config on create/modify, so
  DescribeListeners read back an empty action and tofu saw a perpetual diff.
  Preserve it through CreateListener/ModifyListener and the SDK conversion.
- DescribeTags returned InvalidParameterValue for listener-rule ARNs; resolve
  the rule and return an (untagged) descriptor instead.

Adds generator tests for the fixed-response default (with host-header rules)
and unsafe-body rejection, plus DescribeTags listener-rule coverage.
2026-06-03 15:06:35 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 3de1d6d7c5 fix(microvm): build initramfs device nodes via fakeroot, drop sudo mknod
sudo mknod created real /dev/console and /dev/null char-device nodes on the
host under $CHROOT_DIR. Real device nodes on the host filesystem are a footgun:
a stale-image cleanup, tmp reaper, or an empty $CHROOT_DIR (which would redirect
the recursive /dev removal at the host root) could clobber host /dev/null and
force a reboot, breaking CI servers.

Write the two static nodes the kernel needs into the cpio archive inside a
fakeroot session instead. mknod/cpio see faked device entries and emit real
char-device records into the archive, while the host filesystem never gets an
actual node. init mounts devtmpfs over /dev at runtime for everything else.

Also guard $CHROOT_DIR against empty/unexpected values before any destructive
removal, and add fakeroot to the required-tools check.
2026-06-03 11:04:51 +10:00
Julian Sommer 044d35737e feat: remove bash e2e for e2e-go 2026-06-03 10:32:30 +10:00
Julian Sommer 2dada2cf9d release: update go.mod for v1.6.0 2026-06-03 09:15:38 +10:00
Julian Sommer 9508aaacce chore: bump go 1.26.4 2026-06-03 08:59:25 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 40deb1e4c2 fix(e2e): add explicit IGW default route in run-lb-e2e
After PR #270 the VPC-LR-wide 0.0.0.0/0 -> IGW static route is no longer
installed implicitly at attach-internet-gateway. Subnets whose effective
route table lacks an internet-bound route get an OVN drop policy at
SubnetEgressPriorityDrop (1100), which kills LB target reply traffic
before un-DNAT can fire and stalls the LB internal-client probe until
job timeout.

Add the standard AWS pattern: describe-route-tables -> create-route
0.0.0.0/0 -> IGW. This fires vpc.add-igw-route + vpc.ungate-subnet-egress,
removing the drop policy and installing a reroute policy at
SubnetEgressPriorityIGW (1000).
2026-06-02 23:49:23 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 7cd054cbf1 chore(e2e): dump Logical_Router_Policy + Logical_Router_Static_Route in W5 diag 2026-06-02 22:15:22 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 41f840ee85 fix(setup): grant spinifex-vpcd sudo for ovn-appctl (siv-167)
The W2 inject-garp fix landed in 72a6a59d adds a shellout to
`ovn-appctl -t ovn-controller inject-garp <port>` via the L0
execRunner, which prefixes `sudo` when not running as root.
spinifex-vpcd runs as user spinifex-vpcd, so every emission was
hitting `sudo: a password is required` and silently returning a
WARN that nobody read until W5 diag capture surfaced the journal.

Net: W2 has been a complete no-op since it shipped. Every
recycled-EIP scenario has continued to leave stale upstream ARP.

Evidence: diag bundle from run 26813235295 — 12/12 GARP attempts
denied by sudo, 0 successful emissions; pcap shows runner ARP for
recycled EIP .232 stuck on the prior VPC's gw chassisredirect MAC
(02:75:d9:ef:d8:4b) while OVN NB has handed .232 to a new VPC
with a different gw MAC; pcap also shows runner sending 174 SYNs
to recycled EIP .233 with 0 SYN+ACKs received.

Fix: add /usr/bin/ovn-appctl to the spinifex-vpcd NOPASSWD grant.
Trivial; ovn-appctl is already trusted via the existing NB/SB
read-write grants.

Follow-ups (separate change): tighten host.InjectGARP error
classification so sudo-deny is loud (Error or fatal) rather than
silently warn-and-continue; add a boot-time self-check that
verifies sudo permissions for every host-tool the daemon will
shell out to.
2026-06-02 21:00:20 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga ba7253e2c6 ci(e2e): fix Start Packet Capture EACCES + PID-tracking on tcpdump (siv-167)
Two bugs in afd63ed9:

1. `sudo mkdir` makes /tmp/spinifex-diag root-owned 0755. The
   subsequent `> /tmp/spinifex-diag/tcpdump.log` is performed by
   the calling tf-user shell BEFORE sudo gets the command, failing
   with Permission denied. action shell runs with `set -e` so the
   step aborts.

2. `sudo nohup ... &; echo $!` captures the wrong PID — `$!` is the
   backgrounded sudo, which may exit when its target dies, leaving
   stale tcpdump.pid.

Fixes:
- chmod 0777 on /tmp/spinifex-diag after creating it (next steps'
  redirects from tf-user shell now work).
- Wrap the tcpdump launch in `sudo bash -c '...'` so backgrounding
  and `$!` happen inside the sudo'd shell — `$!` is the actual
  tcpdump PID (nohup execs, sudo bash holds it). Captures stdin
  to /dev/null, stdout/stderr to /tmp/spinifex-diag/tcpdump.log.
- sleep 2 (was 1) — gives tcpdump time to fully init pcap header.
- Hard fail (exit 1) if PID is missing or process dead, so the
  step's failure is visible instead of a silent green.

bash -n verified.
2026-06-02 19:45:53 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga afd63ed967 ci(e2e): Phase 1 diag — tcpdump br-wan + bridge fdb + hairpin modes (siv-167)
Mulga-siv-167 Phase 1. Adds evidence-capture for the LB
single-host return-path drop class:

e2e_single only:
- New step 'Start Packet Capture' between Bootstrap and Run E2E
  Tests. SSHes to test VM and starts background tcpdump on br-wan
  capturing TCP/22/80/443/9999 + ARP into /tmp/spinifex-diag/br-wan.pcap.
  PID stored at /tmp/spinifex-diag/tcpdump.pid.

All three jobs (single, pseudo-multi, real-multi):
- Collect Diagnostics: kill tcpdump (single only — PID file
  guarded) -INT for graceful flush, falls through to -KILL after 5s.
- Adds journal-spinifex-full.log (no -n truncation) alongside
  the existing -n 10000 capped one.
- Adds bridge fdb show, bridge link, and hairpin_mode/learning/flood
  for every br-wan brif — needed to confirm/disconfirm the
  hairpin-loss hypothesis in the plan doc.
- Adds 'chmod -R a+r /tmp/spinifex-diag' before tar to ensure pcap
  (created by sudo tcpdump as root) is readable by tf-user.

bash -n verified on all four rendered scripts. YAML parses.
Zero new gold-image deps (tcpdump, bridge present in base image).
2026-06-02 19:28:54 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 2574956f08 ansible cluster-bootstrap 2026-06-02 15:38:56 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 3f4613c28b ci(e2e): capture OVN/OVS/journal diagnostics on every run
Adds a Collect Diagnostics + Upload Diagnostics step pair to all three
E2E jobs (single, pseudo-multi, real-multi). Runs before Teardown,
if: always() so green runs produce baselines too. SSHes to test
VM(s), dumps:

- journalctl for spinifex-*, ovn-*, openvswitch-*
- ovs-vsctl/ofctl/appctl: bridge state, br-int + br-ex flows,
  dpctl flow + conntrack tables
- ovn-nbctl/sbctl: show, Port_Binding, Chassis, NAT, Logical_Router
- ovn-appctl ct-zone-list (LR -> ct_zone mapping)
- ip addr/route/neigh, iptables-save, nft list, dmesg, virsh list

Tarred, scp'd back, uploaded as e2e-diag-{single,pseudo,multi}-<run>
artifact (14-day retention).

OVS-native ovs-appctl dpctl/dump-conntrack — no new gold-image deps.
Multi-node job writes script to RUNNER_TEMP then ssh-stdin's it
per-node (avoids YAML/heredoc indent traps inside for-loop). bash -n
verified on all three rendered scripts.

Unblocks siv-111 debug loop: bash LB driver does not emit an
analysis bundle on failure, so post-W2 recurrences have been blind.
Workflow-level capture is hypothesis-free.
2026-06-02 14:56:41 +10:00
joshsiv-mulga 72a6a59d80 fix(network): inject GARP after AddEIP to refresh upstream ARP on EIP recycle
ovn-controller emits gratuitous ARPs automatically when a NAT-bound LSP
migrates chassis, but not when an external IP is reassigned to a different
LR whose chassisredirect MAC differs from the prior occupant's. In CI
single-host runs the WAN pool slice is small enough that the same EIP
recycles across VPCs within the 60-300s kernel ARP timeout, so upstream
caches keep pointing at the dead chassis-redirect MAC and packets to the
new VM never arrive.

Fix: add a post-AddEIP hook that runs `ovn-appctl -t ovn-controller
inject-garp <port>` (OVN 22.09+). Port is the EIP's LSP in distributed
NAT or "cr-gw-<vpcID>" in centralized NAT. Best-effort — failure logs a
warning and the NAT install still succeeds.

- network/host/garp.go: new L0 shell-out helper InjectGARP.
- network/policy/nat.go: GARPEmitter option type, called after the
  flows-ready barrier in AddEIP.
- vpcd: wire the production emitter that derives the right OVN port
  from the EIPSpec.
- invariants: add ovn-appctl to the host-tool ban list so future
  callers are forced into network/host/.
2026-06-02 13:38:52 +10:00
Josh Siviour dd65a2dfa6 feat(elbv2): ListenerRules CRUD with HAProxy ACL routing (#275)
* feat(elbv2): ListenerRules CRUD with HAProxy ACL routing

Implement CreateRule, ModifyRule, DeleteRule, DescribeRules, and
SetRulePriorities for ALB listeners. Rules support host-header,
path-pattern, http-header, http-request-method, source-ip, and
query-string condition fields. Actions limited to forward (single
target group); redirect and fixed-response deferred.

HAProxy frontends emit per-rule ACLs with `use_backend ... if <acls>`
ordered by priority. Wildcards in host/path map to HAProxy match
modes (`-m beg/end/sub/str`). Condition values are validated at
store-time and re-validated at render-time to prevent config
injection. Target groups referenced by rule actions are protected
against deletion. Deleting a listener cascades its rules.

Frontend adds a Rules tab beneath each listener row showing rules
with conditions and target groups, plus add/edit/delete dialogs
with field-typed condition inputs.

mulga-950

* test(elbv2): rule CRUD e2e + render coverage for all condition fields

Adds Internal_ALB_ListenerRules subtest exercising CreateRule, ModifyRule,
DeleteRule, and DescribeRules over a real ALB with HAProxy. Two TGs with
disjoint backends (app#0 -> tgA, app#1 -> tgB) let the probe responder
identify which TG actually served the request, so path-pattern routing
can be asserted without inspecting internal state.

Extends app-userdata.sh with alpha/ and beta/ sub-paths and extends
client-userdata.sh trigger to accept optional http_path and host fields
so probes can target specific paths and Host headers. Both changes are
backward-compatible: existing callers default to / with no Host override.

Adds unit-test coverage for every condition-field render path
(http-header, http-request-method, query-string with and without key,
source-ip) plus error-path validation tests for CreateRule, ModifyRule,
DeleteRule, DescribeRules, and SetRulePriorities. Lifts diff coverage
above the 60% gate.

* test(elbv2): wait for tgB healthy after rule creation, not before

Spinifex only health-checks a target group once it is referenced by a
listener default action or a rule action. The previous ordering waited
for tgB healthy before CreateRule wired it, so health checks never ran
and the wait timed out. Move the WaitForTargetsHealthy(tgB) call after
createPathRule.

* fix(elbv2): include rule-action TGs in TargetGroupsForLB

healthChecker uses Store.TargetGroupsForLB to map HAProxy server
statuses back to TargetGroupRecord entries. The previous implementation
walked only listener DefaultActions, so a target group referenced only
by a CreateRule action was invisible to the health checker — HAProxy
probed its backends but the resulting health never propagated to the
store. DescribeTargetHealth reported the targets as 'initial' forever.

Extend TargetGroupsForLB to walk rule actions per listener as well.
Adds a unit test that wires a TG via CreateRule and asserts the
resolver returns it.

* test(elbv2): fix wait-for-rule logic to poll away from default backend

waitForPathRouted required the caller to name the expected new host, but
at the post-CreateRule wait point we only know the default host (appA);
the rule target hostname (appB) is discovered by the subsequent probe.
The previous code passed appA as both "new" and "old", so the wait
checked "see appA" against "/alpha/" responses — which never matched
because the rule had successfully routed appA out.

Replace with two narrower helpers: waitForPathRoutedAway (poll until
host X stops appearing) and waitForPathRoutedTo (poll until host Y
appears). Update the three call sites to use the variant that matches
what the caller actually knows at that point.

* fix(elbv2): IAM-style error envelope + ModifyTargetGroup + listener attr stubs

ELBv2 success responses use the IAM-style XML envelope (<ErrorResponse>),
but error responses were emitted with the EC2 envelope (<Response>),
which aws-sdk-go-v2 cannot deserialize for ELBv2 and surfaces as
"UnknownError: UnknownError" — defeating provider-side InvalidAction
ignores (e.g. terraform-provider-aws v5.100's DescribeCapacityReservation
swallow). Route elasticloadbalancing errors through GenerateIAMErrorResponse.

Add ModifyTargetGroup end-to-end (interface, impl, NATS shim, daemon
handler, gateway dispatch) so terraform-provider-aws can set health-check
fields after CreateTargetGroup without infinite drift. Persist
HealthCheckEnabled on TargetGroupRecord and emit it in tgRecordToSDK so
the provider sees the configured value across refresh cycles.

Stub DescribeListenerAttributes / ModifyListenerAttributes with
hand-rolled input/output structs (aws-sdk-go v1.55 lacks these types).
Returns empty attribute list — sufficient for default-config workflows.

* test(elbv2): cover ModifyTargetGroup + listener attribute stubs

Extend handler tests with all-fields, invalid path/matcher, wrong-account
ModifyTargetGroup cases plus HealthCheckEnabled assertion on
CreateTargetGroup. Add gateway-layer validation tests for the new
DescribeListenerAttributes, ModifyListenerAttributes, and ModifyTargetGroup
dispatchers. Raises diff coverage from 58.8% to 63.7%.
2026-06-02 12:15:42 +10:00
brynmailer-mdc 0c577da6e2 test: cover encryption wiring on feat/encryption-at-rest
Lifts diff-coverage on PR #276 from 37.5% to 63.5% (threshold 60%) so
CI's Check Diff Coverage step passes.

- utils: LoadViperblockMasterKey — empty path, happy path + cache reuse,
  load error, and bad-perm failure-not-cached.
- handlers/ec2/image: clusterEncryptionEnabled — nil config, empty key
  file, masterkey load error (warn + false), and key-loaded (true).
- handlers/ec2/volume:
  - GetVolumeConfig surfaces "failed to unmarshal config" when the body
    is neither a valid VBState nor a wrapper.
  - mergeVolumeConfig refuses to re-marshal an encrypted VBState (would
    strip the AES-GCM tag and brick the volume).
  - CreateVolume returns ServerInternal when EncryptionKeyFile is set
    but unreadable.
2026-06-02 11:03:58 +10:00
brynmailer-mdc 557d3e4d59 feat: derive Encrypted from VBState.EncryptionEnabled, drop IsEncrypted reads
VolumeMetadata.IsEncrypted is being removed from viperblock — it was
hardcoded false everywhere in spinifex and misrepresented the per-volume
encryption status to AWS SDK callers. The authoritative flag is now
VBState.EncryptionEnabled, persisted by viperblock at New() when
MasterKey != nil.

- volume CreateVolume drops the dead IsEncrypted struct member and
  surfaces Encrypted=(mkey != nil) on the EC2 response.
- volume getVolumeByID now decodes the full VBState (falling back to a
  wrapper-only blob for legacy pre-encryption volumes) so it can read
  state.EncryptionEnabled directly.
- snapshot CreateSnapshot pulls Encrypted from the source volume's
  VBState.EncryptionEnabled (already loaded one level up).
- image synthesizeRootBlockDeviceMapping takes the cluster encryption
  posture (mkey != nil) since AMI metadata carries no per-image flag;
  cached masterkey load keeps the hot path cheap.
- Test fixtures drop the now-defunct IsEncrypted lines; the volume
  fixture that asserts Encrypted=true switches to a full VBState seed
  with EncryptionEnabled=true.
2026-06-02 11:03:58 +10:00
brynmailer-mdc b5220996e1 fix: only clone AMI on os.ErrNotExist in prepareRootVolume
LoadStateRequest can fail for many reasons — HMAC integrity, key
mismatch, transient backend 5xx, JSON parse failure. The previous
fall-through treated every error as "volume doesn't exist, clone from
AMI", which would overwrite the legitimate encrypted volume's
config.json with AMI base-map state on a tamper or transient backend
fault. Discriminate os.ErrNotExist explicitly and abort otherwise.
2026-06-02 11:03:58 +10:00
brynmailer-mdc ef50392f9e feat: wire viperblock at-rest encryption key through daemon and AWS handlers
Adds EncryptionKeyFile to ViperblockConfig (cluster config) and
viperblockd.Config. viperblockd loads the master key once at
launchService start via masterkey.LoadShared and passes
MasterKey + EncryptionEnabled into the VB constructed for every
mounted volume.

AWS handlers (volume.CreateVolume, instance.newViperblock,
image.snapshotStoppedVolume) and the spx admin AMI-import path now
resolve the key via utils.LoadViperblockMasterKey — a process-wide
cache keyed by path so the per-VB lookup is one map hit after the
first load.

volume.mergeVolumeConfig: switch from json.Unmarshal to json.Decoder
so a trailing AES-GCM tag cannot route the body to the wrapper-only
path, and refuse outright when state.EncryptionEnabled — re-marshaling
an encrypted VBState here would strip the tag and brick the volume.

cmd/spinifex viperblock CLI grows a --encryption-key-file flag (env
SPINIFEX_VIPERBLOCK_ENCRYPTION_KEY_FILE) under a distinct viper key
so it does not collide with predastore's identically-named flag.
2026-06-02 11:03:58 +10:00
Josh Siviour 8883984f3f feat(eks): eks-server + eks-agent AMI manifests (#273)
* feat(eks): eks-server + eks-agent AMI manifests + builder INSTALL_FILES

Manifest-driven AMI build for the two EKS image variants (eks-v1.md Q12).
Lifted forward from cs-eks-6b so the K3s boot path can be smoke-tested in
isolation before CreateCluster orchestration lands.

Builder:
- build-system-image.sh gains optional INSTALL_FILES (src:dst pairs,
  mode 0644, parent dirs auto-created). Symmetric with INSTALL_BINARIES.
- ENABLE_SERVICES moves after INSTALL_FILES + SETUP_SCRIPT so init scripts
  the manifest references are on disk before rc-update enables them.

eks-server image (Alpine 3.21.7, q35, 4G):
- K3s v1.32.5+k3s1 (downloaded at bake time, SHA256 verified against the
  upstream sha256sum-amd64.txt trust anchor).
- nats-cli v0.4.0 (not in Alpine main/community — pulled from upstream
  release zip; unzip installed + purged in same setup step).
- OpenRC init scripts: k3s, eks-token-webhook, k3s-first-boot.
- Cron periodics under /etc/periodic/{15min,daily}/ for state-report +
  etcd-snapshot.
- k3s-first-boot publishes node-token + admin kubeconfig over NATS on
  first successful K3s healthz, then self-disables (sentinel + rc-update
  del).
- config.yaml.skel without webhook-token-auth — wiring it before the real
  webhook lands (cs-eks-6c) would block anonymous probes against /healthz.
  Orchestrator drops the live config + restarts k3s.

eks-agent image (Alpine 3.21.7, q35, 2G):
- Same pinned K3s release for server/agent lock-step.
- k3s-agent OpenRC service refuses to start without K3S_URL+K3S_TOKEN —
  fail-closed pre-orchestration.

eks-token-webhook stub (cmd/eks-token-webhook/main.go):
- 503 + Retry-After:30 on every path. Statically linked. Lets the AMI
  build succeed and kube-apiserver boot cleanly. Replaced wholesale by
  cs-eks-6c.

Init system divergence from spec wording: Alpine ships OpenRC, not
systemd. Unit files use .initd extensions and cron periodics instead of
.service / .timer. Bead-level intent (auto-enable on boot, periodic
execution) preserved.

Smoke-tested:
- eks-server: builds 300M qcow2; qemu q35 boot reaches K3s apiserver on
  6443 within ~120s; HTTPS probes return valid k8s Status JSON (the 401
  is K3s v1.32 default RBAC behaviour against anonymous, not a regression).
- eks-agent: builds 280M qcow2; qemu boot mounts root cleanly.

* feat(eks): make targets for eks-server + eks-agent AMI builds

- build-system-image gains subdir-manifest fallback: tries
  scripts/images/$(IMAGE).conf first, then scripts/images/$(IMAGE)/manifest.conf
  so the new EKS layout works alongside the existing flat lb manifest.
- build-eks-server-image / build-eks-agent-image — explicit convenience
  targets that delegate to the generic one.
2026-06-01 16:24:49 +10:00
Josh Siviour 785a5655e4 feat(sts): EKS Q4 — AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity + presigned GetCallerIdentity verify (#272)
* feat(sts): EKS Q4 STS extensions — interface + JWKS reader + stubs

Lays the structural slice of AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity + presigned-URL
GetCallerIdentity verify for IRSA. The verify-path bodies (JWT signature
check against fetched JWKS, claims validation, Federated-principal trust
policy evaluation, SigV4 presigned-URL canonical-request reconstruction)
land in follow-up commits on this branch.

Adds:
- handlers/sts/oidc_jwks.go — JWK/JWKS types, ParseEKSIssuerURL (defensive
  iss parsing), FetchClusterJWKS (KV-backed read from
  eks-account-{accountID}/clusters/{name}/oidc-jwks.json via the EKS store
  helpers).
- handlers/sts/oidc_jwks_test.go — unit tests over a real JetStream
  test fixture.
- handlers/sts/assume_role_with_web_identity.go — interface entry, stub
  returns ErrorNotImplemented.
- handlers/sts/presigned_url_verify.go — PresignedCallerIdentity type +
  VerifyPresignedGetCallerIdentity stub.
- gateway/sts/AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity.go — dispatch shell.

Modifies:
- handlers/sts/service.go — STSService interface gains
  AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity + VerifyPresignedGetCallerIdentity.
- gateway/sts.go — registers AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity in stsActions +
  stsSkipPolicyCheck (anonymous; trust-policy-gated in handler).
- gateway/sts_request_test.go, gateway/sts/handler_test.go,
  gateway/auth_test.go — stub implementations updated to satisfy
  extended STSService interface.

Anonymous routing for AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity (eks-v1.md Q5 mux rework)
lands in Sprint 6e — for now the action is registered on the standard STS
gateway and rejects non-SigV4 requests upstream.

Refs: cs-eks-sts-q4 (mulga monorepo bead)

* feat(sts): AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity + presigned GetCallerIdentity verify

Implements EKS Q4 STS extensions for IRSA + EKS token-webhook flows.

AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity:
- ES256 JWT verification against per-cluster JWKS (eks-account-{accountID}
  KV bucket), keyed by issuer host-path.
- Federated trust-policy evaluator (explicit-deny-wins, exact-match
  Principal.Federated, fail-closed on Principal: "*").
- Condition support scoped to StringEquals on {iss}:sub (exact) and
  {iss}:aud (set-membership). All other operators rejected at validator.
- OIDC provider registry check against iam-account-{roleAccountID}; v1
  does not support cross-account registration.
- New awserrors: InvalidIdentityToken, IDPRejectedClaim,
  IDPCommunicationError.

VerifyPresignedGetCallerIdentity:
- Hand-rolled SigV4 canonical-request reconstruction (no sdk dep).
- Mandatory X-K8s-Aws-Id in SignedHeaders + value pinned to
  expectedClusterName during canonicalisation — cross-cluster replay
  surfaces as a signature mismatch.
- AKID-prefix dispatch (ASIA → session credential, AKIA → IAM user).
- Strict envelope checks: algorithm, credential scope service/terminator,
  X-Amz-Date / credential-scope date agreement, expiry within
  X-Amz-Expires, 5-minute wire skew.

Tests:
- 14 web-identity scenarios (happy paths, tampering, expiry, wrong aud,
  unknown kid, HS256 rejection, federated-wildcard fail-closed,
  explicit-deny-wins, provider-not-registered).
- 12 presigned-URL scenarios including cross-cluster replay defence,
  missing-x-k8s-aws-id, tampered query, bad service in credential, AKIA
  + ASIA happy paths.
- Cross-cluster anti-replay invariant test (rejects matrix of variant
  cluster names — case-different, prefix, suffix).
- AWS SigV4 known-vector test for deriveSigningKey.

Gateway:
- TODO documents that AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity is currently dispatched
  on the SigV4-gated path; a pre-auth route is needed so a projected
  ServiceAccount token alone can authenticate the caller.

IAM:
- Relaxes trust-policy Condition validator: now permitted only when
  Action is exactly [sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity] and operator is
  StringEquals. Preserves loud failure for sts:AssumeRole.
2026-06-01 14:29:35 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga 9d8597317a Feat/mig capable (#271)
* feat(gpu): add NVIDIA MIG multi-instance GPU support

Partitions MIG-capable GPUs (A100, A30, H100) into isolated slices exposed
as mdev devices instead of whole-GPU VFIO passthrough. VMs attach via
-device vfio-pci,sysfsdev=<mdev-path> using the GPUAttachment discriminated
union (PCIAddress for whole-GPU, MdevPath for MIG).

Key changes:
- gpu: new MIGProfile/MIGInstance types, IsMIGCapable model map, mig.go ops
  (EnableMIGMode, DisableMIGMode, CreateInstances, ListInstances,
  DestroyAllInstances, enrichMdevPaths)
- gpu.Manager: Claim() returns (*GPUDevice, *MIGInstance, error); AddMIGInstances,
  ReclaimByMdev for restart recovery; MarkMIGFailed per-slice
- daemon: buildGPUPool helper partitions devices into whole-GPU vs MIG pools;
  MIGProfile config field selects profile per node or per GPU override
- vm.VM: GPUAttachments []gpu.GPUAttachment replaces GPUPCIAddresses []string
- admin CLI: spx admin gpu mig status/enable/disable subcommands with
  admin.SetMIGProfile for spinifex.toml writes
- docs: COMMANDS.md updated with three new MIG management command rows

* test(gpu): unit tests for MIG parsers and pool manager

Cover all pure parsing functions (parseMIGMemory, isCapacityExhaustedError,
extractProfileFields/GIFields, parseMIGProfiles, parseMIGInstances,
parseCreatedGIID/CIID) with realistic nvidia-smi fixture output.

Manager MIG tests cover AddMIGInstances, Claim/Release on mdev-backed entries,
MarkMIGFailed, ReclaimByMdev, and interaction with whole-GPU MarkFailed — all
using fake mdev directories in t.TempDir() so no GPU hardware is required.

* feat(gpu): dynamic MIG profile-per-request with on-demand GI/CI lifecycle

Replaces static config-driven MIG pre-carving with a dynamic model where
the MIG profile is specified per RunInstances call via mig.<profile>
instance type names (e.g. mig.1g.10gb) that mirror nvidia-smi nomenclature
directly.

- Manager.Claim(instanceID, profileName): fast path claims a pre-carved
  slice; slow path dequeues a free MIG GPU, releases the lock, calls
  nvidia-smi mig -cgi/-cci to carve all slices, then reclaims the lock to
  commit and return the first slice
- Manager.Release: last release on a dynamically-carved GPU calls
  DestroyAllInstances and returns the GPU to freeMIGGPUs, allowing a
  different profile on the next claim
- AddMIGGPU(dev): registers a fresh MIG GPU for dynamic allocation;
  AddMIGInstances (restart recovery) keeps its no-destroy semantics
- GenerateMIGTypes: produces mig.<profile> InstanceTypeInfo entries from
  gpu.ListProfiles at daemon startup; IsMIGType/MIGProfileFromType let
  callers inspect these names
- buildGPUPool: calls ListInstances for recovery, AddMIGGPU for fresh
  GPUs, ListProfiles to collect MIG profile specs for type generation;
  removes setupMIGInstances and migProfileForDevice
- GPUClaimer.Claim gains profileName param; daemonGPUClaimer, service_impl
  call sites, and fakeGPUClaimer all updated

* fix(gpu): correct mdev parent detection and make --profile optional for mig enable

enrichMdevPaths was using os.Readlink on "parent_bus_0" (a non-existent
sysfs attribute) and then on ".." (a directory, not a symlink) — both
would fail on real NVIDIA hardware, breaking CreateInstances and
ListInstances on daemon restart recovery. Fix: read the mdev UUID's own
symlink target, which always encodes the parent GPU's PCI address in its
path (e.g. .../0000:01:00.0/<uuid>).

Make basePath injectable in enrichMdevPaths so the fix is covered by a
new set of unit tests using temp-dir symlinks (TestEnrichMdevPaths_*).

Remove the MarkFlagRequired("profile") from "spx admin gpu mig enable":
Phase 2 is fully dynamic — the daemon carves slices on demand at
RunInstances time. Without --profile, the command just enables MIG mode
and destroys any pre-carved slices so the daemon starts with a free GPU.
With --profile, behaviour is unchanged (pre-carve a static pool).

* chore: writeups for smci and arcee

* test: add coverage for MIG exec, manager slow-path, instancetypes and admin

- Add mig_exec_test.go with fake nvidia-smi harness covering Enable/Disable MIGMode,
  IsMIGModeEnabled, DestroyAllInstances, ListProfiles, CreateInstances, ListInstances
- Extend manager_mig_test.go with slow-path Claim/Release tests using fake nvidia-smi
- Add generate_test.go coverage for IsMIGType, MIGProfileFromType, GenerateMIGTypes
- Add admin_test.go coverage for SetMIGProfile (create, update, idempotent, error paths)
- Make mdevBasePath a var to allow sysfs injection in tests
- Add json tags to GPUAttachment fields to satisfy musttag linter

Diff coverage: 75.6% (threshold: 60%).

* fixed gpu passthrough doc

* Revert "fixed gpu passthrough doc"

This reverts commit 1e20f5ab13.

* feat: Added RTX 6000 GPU MIG support and fixed docs

* feat: expose GPU/MIG inventory in GetNodes and GetVMs admin API

Add Manager.Snapshot() for lock-safe pool inspection. Extend
NodeStatusResponse with GPUs []GPUInfo (per-physical-GPU inventory
with per-slice detail for MIG) and VMInfo with GPU *VMGPUInfo
(model, VRAM, profile, mdev path for the attached GPU). Populate
both in handleNodeStatus and handleNodeVMs via buildGPUInventory,
buildPoolLookup, and resolveVMGPU helpers.

* feat: surface GPU info on EC2 instance detail page (mulga-new-03)

Admin users see a GPU card (model, VRAM, attachment type, MIG profile/mdev
path or PCI address) populated from the GetVMs admin API.  Adds formatVRAMMiB
helper and VMGPUInfo/GPUInfo/GPUSliceInfo types to the frontend.

* feat: GPU columns + inventory card on Nodes page (mulga-new-04)

Adds GPU column to VMsTable (model/VRAM or MIG profile) and ResourceTable
(alloc/total GPUs). Section 4 GPU Inventory card shows per-node GPU state with
per-slice MIG drill-down. Also adds total_gpus/alloc_gpus to NodeInfo type.

* feat: grouped GPU-aware instance type picker in Run Instances (mulga-new-05)

Splits the flat instance type dropdown into Standard and GPU-Accelerated groups.
GPU items show total VRAM alongside the type name. Selecting a GPU type surfaces
an info line with GPU name and VRAM.

* testing image builder scripts

* fixed nvidia build script

* more descriptive errors for image build script

* more fixes

* more fixes

* fix: surface PCI address in whole-GPU VMGPUInfo and rebuild frontend dist

Add PCIAddress to VMGPUInfo, populate it in resolveVMGPU for whole-GPU
passthrough, and fix the instance detail page which was incorrectly
showing instance type in the PCI address field. Rebuilt frontend dist
to include GPU UI changes (inventory card, resource columns, GPU-aware
instance type picker).

* fix: improve kernel version detection in nvidia image build script

Fall back to /lib/modules when /boot/vmlinuz-* is absent, and add
diagnostic output to help debug kernel detection failures.

* fixing nvidia image build script

* fix ami name issue

* correct kernel versions

* another fix

* image build works, added docker and nvidia toolkit for QoL

* fix: add gpg

* fixing amd image builder

* add universe

* another fix

* nvm

* fix docker user group issues

* make rocm land where it is supposed to

* fix docker groups

* feat: add Ubuntu 26.04 GPU AMI catalog entries and fix build script parted detection

Add ubuntu-26.04-nvidia-gpu-x86_64 and ubuntu-26.04-amd-gpu-x86_64 to AvailableImages,
hosted on iso.mulgadc.com/system-ami/ with SHA256 checksums. Fix build-system-image.sh
to detect parted in /usr/sbin when not on PATH. Suppress gosec false positives in DHCP
manager (cancel stored in leaseLoop) and promisc ioctl (standard syscall uintptr pattern).

* Updated passthrough doc regarding GPU images

* fix: remove orphaned nolint directives (golangci-lint v2.12.2 no longer flags G115/G118)

* chore: remove stale spinifex@192.168.3.107 directory

Scripts were accidentally committed with a node hostname as the path
prefix during initial testing. Correct copies live in scripts/images/.
2026-06-01 13:48:13 +10:00
Josh Siviour e7a25316f0 feat(eks): gateway + handler scaffolding for EKS control plane (#267)
* feat(eks): gateway + handler scaffolding for EKS control plane

Lands the EKS service contract — gateway REST-JSON dispatcher, handler
interface + stub impl, JetStream KV bucket layout, and daemon wiring —
ahead of the K3s control-plane bodies.

Every action currently returns NotImplemented (HTTP 501 + JSON
NotImplementedException) so downstream work can call into a stable
contract while real bodies land sprint by sprint.

- Gateway: 34-action REST-JSON routing table under svc=eks, per-action
  closures dispatch to handlers_eks.NATSEKSService. ErrorHandler /
  writeClusterUnavailable / writeThrottleError gain EKS JSON branches so
  clients see application/x-amz-json-1.1 envelopes.
- Handler: EKSService interface + NATS wrapper + stub impl with
  var _ EKSService compile checks on both implementations.
- KV: eks-account-{accountID} lazy per-account bucket factory plus the
  shared spinifex-eks-leader bucket (TTL 60s, History 1) bootstrapped
  at daemon start. Key-path helpers cover the full Q2 layout
  (cluster meta, nodegroups, access entries, OIDC providers + signing
  key + JWKS, admin kubeconfig, K3s node-token, events).
- Daemon: 34 eks.<Action> subscriptions on the spinifex-workers queue
  group, init via initServiceWithRetry, mirrors the ELBv2 layout.
- awserrors: new ErrorNotImplemented constant (HTTP 501).
- tags: ManagedByEKS constant for downstream SG/NLB/VM tagging.

* test(eks): cover scaffolding wrappers + daemon NATS handlers

Adds two test files closing the diff-coverage gap on the EKS
scaffolding commit:

- spinifex/gateway/eks/wrappers_test.go drives every per-action
  gateway wrapper (cluster, nodegroup, access, addons, oidc, tags —
  34 actions, 50+ subtest invocations) through an embedded NATS
  server with a `eks.>` catch-all stub responder. Covers the
  wrappers themselves plus handlers/eks/service_nats.go via the
  NewNATSEKSService construction inside each wrapper. Bad-JSON
  branches in unmarshalIfBody are also covered.

- spinifex/daemon/daemon_handlers_eks_test.go constructs a minimal
  Daemon{eksService: real impl} and dispatches each of the 34
  handleEKS* handlers via embedded NATS, asserting the NotImplemented
  error code rides back through handleNATSRequest.

Lifts diff coverage from 27.3% to 62.6%, above the 60% threshold.
2026-06-01 10:47:23 +10:00
Josh Siviour 3415d9f3de fix(network): IGW route-table AWS parity + per-subnet egress gating (#270)
* fix(network): IGW default route AWS-parity via per-subnet LR policy

ADR-0006's IGWManager.AttachIGW installed a VPC-router-wide 0.0.0.0/0
static route at attach time, violating AWS semantics: every subnet on
the LR saw egress to the IGW regardless of its route table. Private
subnets that should be IGW-isolated were not.

Move IGW egress lifecycle onto the route-table API. CreateRoute(IGW,
0.0.0.0/0) emits vpc.add-igw-route per associated subnet; the network
subscriber installs an OVN Logical_Router_Policy matching
`inport == "rtr-<subnetID>" && ip4.dst == 0.0.0.0/0` with action
`reroute` via the IGW gateway port. DeleteRoute / DisassociateRouteTable
/ ReplaceRouteTableAssociation tear it down. AssociateRouteTable emits
add events so the terraform ordering (CreateRoute -> Associate) is
honored.

Additions:
- nbdb.LogicalRouterPolicy + Logical_Router_Policy registration
- ovn.Client {Add,Delete,Find,List}LogicalRouterPolicy + live + mock
- policy.RouteManager.{Add,Delete}SubnetEgress with priority constants
- external.IGWManager.{Ensure,Remove}SubnetEgress resolving nexthop +
  output port from the gateway state
- subscribers handleAddIGWRoute / handleDeleteIGWRoute on
  vpc.{add,delete}-igw-route
- routetable publishIGWRouteEvents / *ForAssociation / *ForSubnet

Test updates:
- network/policy: AddSubnetEgress idempotency, drift-replace, per-subnet
  separation, DeleteSubnetEgress
- network/external: AttachIGW must NOT install a router-wide default
  route; EnsureSubnetEgress installs the per-subnet policy with the
  resolved nexthop (link-local fallback + allocator override paths)
- handlers/ec2/routetable: CreateRoute(IGW), Associate, DeleteRoute,
  Disassociate publish events with the expected subnetID + igwID
- ovn/nbdb: table-count + Logical_Router_Policy presence
- subscribers: TestSubscribe_RegistersAllTopics covers the two new topics

* fix(network): NATGW per-subnet egress + DeleteRoute event symmetry

handlers/ec2/routetable:
- DeleteRoute now publishes vpc.delete-nat-gateway per associated subnet
  (mirror of the IGW DeleteRoute path) so the subscriber tears down both
  the SNAT rule and the per-subnet egress policy.
- publishNatGatewayEvent* signatures carry SubnetId + DestinationCidr so
  the subscriber can install the matching Logical_Router_Policy.

network/external:
- IGWManager: EnsureNATGatewaySubnetEgress / RemoveNATGatewaySubnetEgress
  install/remove a per-subnet LR policy at priority SubnetEgressPriorityNATGW.
  Same nexthop and output port as the IGW priority sibling; lower priority
  so an IGW route wins when both apply to the same subnet.
- EnsureSubnetEgress delegates to ensureSubnetEgressAtPriority for shared
  validation, lookup, and slog tagging.

network/subscribers:
- handleAddNATGateway: after SNAT install, parse DestinationCidr (defaults
  to 0.0.0.0/0) and call EnsureNATGatewaySubnetEgress. Without this the LR
  has no route to egress NAT'd packets and private-subnet traffic is
  dropped (E2E Phase 8d regression).
- handleDeleteNATGateway: remove the per-subnet policy FIRST, then detach
  SNAT, so packets are never routed unmasqueraded after SNAT removal.
- NATGatewayEvent gains SubnetId + DestinationCidr.

Tests:
- policy.AddSubnetEgress validation + drift-replace + propagation paths.
- mock LR-policy methods reject missing routers and tolerate dangling UUIDs.
- subscribers cover NATGW add/delete with invalid CIDR, bad JSON, missing
  router, IGW-route bad JSON + invalid CIDR. Full end-to-end add+delete
  via NATS asserting policy lifecycle.
- IGW manager covers RemoveSubnetEgress / RemoveNATGatewaySubnetEgress
  empty-arg rejection + delete error propagation.
- routetable: DeleteRoute(NATGW) publishes per associated subnet.

* fix(network): exclude VPC CIDR from per-subnet egress reroute predicate

In-VPC traffic (e.g. bastion -> private SSH) was being intercepted by the
NATGW per-subnet egress LR policy on `ip4.dst == 0.0.0.0/0` and forwarded
out the gateway with SNAT, breaking peer-subnet connectivity. Append
`&& ip4.dst != <vpcCIDR>` to the match so in-VPC destinations skip the
reroute and follow the directly-connected route. Apply to both IGW (1000)
and NATGW (900) priorities. CIDR is read from the LR ExternalIDs label
populated at VPC create.

DeleteSubnetEgress takes the same excludes so the match string is
identical on cleanup. igwManager.vpcExcludeCIDRs fetches from the router
each call; lookup failure returns nil and the policy installs without
exclusions (preserves prior behaviour as fallback).

* fix(routetable): publish per-subnet events for implicit main-RT membership

E2E run 26620082197 RCA: subnets with no explicit RT association inherit
the VPC main route table per AWS semantics, but publishIGWRouteEvents and
publishNatGatewayEvents iterated only record.Associations and skipped
Main:true/SubnetId:"" sentinels. Main RT carries exactly one such
sentinel, so CreateRoute(igw)/CreateRoute(natgw) on the main RT fanned
out to ZERO subnets — subscriber never called EnsureSubnetEgress, OVN
LR policy never installed, ping 8.8.8.8 from default-VPC VMs dropped at
the VPC router. Caused TestVPCSubnetE2E, TestNATGateway,
TestMultinodeSpread/NATGatewayInternet to fail.

Add subnetsImplicitlyOnMainRT helper that enumerates VPC subnets
without explicit non-main associations, and fan publish to them when
record.IsMain. Apply to all three publish helpers (IGW, NATGW,
NATGW-delete).

Symmetric fixes for effective-RT changes:
- AssociateRouteTable: subnet leaves implicit main → emit deletes for
  main RT's routes before adds for explicit RT
- DisassociateRouteTable: subnet returns to implicit main → emit adds
  for main RT's routes after deletes for departing RT

* chore(e2e): capture per-LR lr-route-list/lr-policy-list/lr-nat-list

ovn-nbctl show does not dump static routes or policies. Adds three
per-LR captures so RCA can verify policy/route install state after
the IGW per-subnet refactor.

* chore(e2e): tcpdump br-wan + neigh/fdb/conntrack capture during tests

EIP egress regression on feat/igw-route-table-aws-parity shows SNAT
packets present (n_packets>0) but pings still time out. Post-teardown
ovn.* snapshots can't tell whether replies actually arrived on br-wan
or got dropped at L2 / by upstream router.

start-net-capture.sh: nohup tcpdump on br-wan filtered to 192.168.0.0/23
(EIP pool) + ARP for same range, 200-byte snaplen, 64 MiB cap. Pair:
capture-net-diag.sh stops it via /tmp/spinifex-e2e-tcpdump.pid and copies
wan.pcap into net-diag/.

Also added neigh/bridge-fdb/conntrack dumps to capture-net-diag.sh so
L2/L3 binding state is visible alongside the existing OVN dumps.

Wired both single-VM and multinode workflows to start capture before
the e2e run; teardown step picks up the pcap automatically.

* fix(reconcile): rebuild IGW/NATGW per-subnet egress from KV

Publisher fires vpc.add-igw-route during default-VPC bootstrap before the
subscriber daemon attaches to the topic. NATS core pub/sub drops the
message, leaving the LR without a 0.0.0.0/0 policy and off-subnet egress
broken on the affected VPC for the lifetime of the process. Reproduced
in CI: TestVPCSubnetE2E bastion EIP could ARP and DNS its on-LAN
neighbour but never reach 8.8.8.8.

LoadIntentFromKV now fans every IGW or NAT-gateway RT route out over
its explicit + implicit-main subnets and the reconcile pass invokes
EnsureSubnetEgress / EnsureNATGatewaySubnetEgress for each one. Same
shape as publishIGWRouteEvents so the bootstrap and the runtime event
path produce identical OVN state.

* fix(routes): serialize OVN egress wiring via request-reply

vpc.igw-attach, vpc.add-igw-route and vpc.add-nat-gateway were fire-and-forget
Publish, racing the subscriber's AttachIGW barrier. AttachInternetGateway
returned before vpcd finished wiring the OVN gateway LRP, so a follow-up
CreateRoute(IGW) published an add-igw-route event that the subscriber
processed in a parallel goroutine — installing a Logical_Router_Policy with a
nexthop the LRP didn't yet expose. northd compiled an inert reroute that
never recovered, leaving the bastion's egress traffic blackholed (no packets
dst 8.8.8.8 from the failing VPC's EIP even though local DNS succeeded).

Switch the three add-* publishers to utils.RequestEvent. The subscriber ACKs
once OVN state is committed, so the gateway handler can't issue subsequent
route events against a half-wired router. delete-* paths stay Publish —
teardown ordering doesn't matter.

handleAddNATGateway now calls respond() at every exit so requesters don't
hang. Route-table tests gain an ackSub wrapper (async subscribe + auto-Reply)
so request-based publishers complete during unit tests.

* Revert "fix(routes): serialize OVN egress wiring via request-reply"

This reverts commit bf6f77d5bc8b21f72ed5867175d5a67c010066c8.

* fix(igw): restore default static route in AttachIGW/DetachIGW

OVN 25.03 LR pipeline runs lr_in_ip_routing (table 15) BEFORE lr_in_policy
(table 17). When this branch swapped the per-VPC default static route for
the per-subnet Logical_Router_Policy reroute installed by EnsureSubnetEgress,
external destinations started dropping at routing priority-0 before the
policy table ran. Reproduced locally: ovn-trace stops at table 15 drop, ping
8.8.8.8 from inside a fresh-VPC bastion produced zero packets on br-wan
until `ovn-nbctl lr-route-add <router> 0.0.0.0/0 <wan-gw> <gw-port>` was
issued manually — after which the same ping succeeded immediately. dev still
green because dev calls AddDefaultRoute on AttachIGW.

Restore the original AddDefaultRoute / DeleteDefaultRoute calls; keep the
per-subnet EnsureSubnetEgress machinery intact so future per-subnet egress
gating (DROP policies for subnets whose RT lacks a 0.0.0.0/0 route) can
layer on top. Flip the two TestAttachIGW assertions that pinned the
"AttachIGW must not install a default static route" expectation.

Pairs with revert of bf6f77d5 in the previous commit (request-reply
serialization treated a non-existent race; real bug was missing routing
fallback).

* feat(network): per-subnet egress drop gating for AWS RT parity

VPC LRs carry a router-wide 0.0.0.0/0 default static route while an IGW is
attached (lr_in_ip_routing runs before lr_in_policy on OVN 25.03, so per-
subnet reroute alone is insufficient). Subnets whose effective route table
lacks 0.0.0.0/0 were previously able to egress via that default route,
violating AWS semantics.

Install an LR_Policy DROP at SubnetEgressPriorityDrop=1100 (above IGW=1000
and NATGW=900) for unrouted subnets. Match excludes VPC CIDR, link-local
(169.254/16) and multicast (224/4) so intra-VPC, DHCP/metadata and
multicast still flow.

Wiring:
- policy.RouteManager gains AddSubnetEgressDrop / DeleteSubnetEgressDrop.
- external.IGWManager gains EnsureSubnetEgressDrop / RemoveSubnetEgressDrop.
- New events: SubnetEgressGateEvent / SubnetEgressUngateEvent on topics
  vpc.gate-subnet-egress / vpc.ungate-subnet-egress.
- routetable handler publishes gate/ungate alongside existing add/delete
  IGW/NATGW route events on every CreateRoute/DeleteRoute/Associate/
  Disassociate/Replace mutation, based on subnet's recomputed effective RT.
- reconciler bootstrap path emits DropGates intent for subnets in IGW-
  attached VPCs whose effective RT lacks 0.0.0.0/0.

Tests cover primitive idempotency, drift recovery, event publishing per
mutation surface, implicit-main fan-out, and intent computation.

* fix(igw): fan out subnet egress gate decisions on IGW attach/detach

The reconciler computes per-subnet DROP policies for any subnet in an
IGW-attached VPC whose effective route table lacks 0.0.0.0/0, but those
decisions were only re-evaluated by the periodic drift tick (every
5 min). AttachInternetGateway / DetachInternetGateway now publish
gate/ungate events for every subnet in the VPC immediately, closing
the window where a freshly-attached IGW could leave unrouted subnets
unprotected.

Wiring: IGWServiceImpl gains a nil-safe GatePublisher hook satisfied
by RouteTableServiceImpl. Daemon installs the hook once both services
exist. RouteTableServiceImpl.PublishGateDecisionsForVPC enumerates the
VPC's subnets and reuses publishSubnetEgressGateDecision per subnet.

Also fixes the LB e2e suite, which built VPC + IGW + subnet without
ever creating a 0.0.0.0/0 → IGW route — relying on the pre-DROP-gate
behaviour where unrouted subnets still had silent egress via the
router-wide static route. The fixture now installs the explicit
public route on the main RT (AWS-faithful semantics for a public
subnet).

* fix(igw): skip gate fan-out on attach to avoid bootstrap race

AttachInternetGateway fan-out races with the default-VPC bootstrap path
in ensureDefaultVPCInfrastructureFor, which attaches the IGW and
immediately publishes a 0.0.0.0/0 → IGW CreateRoute event. The two
events land on distinct NATS subjects (vpc.gate-subnet-egress vs
vpc.ungate-subnet-egress) with no cross-subject ordering guarantee.
When ungate arrived first the subscriber became a no-op and the
subsequent gate installed a permanent DROP on the default subnet,
killing the return path for guest SSH probes
(TestMultinodeGuestSSH connect timeout to the instance public IP).

Detach fan-out is retained — no follow-up CreateRoute fires after
DetachInternetGateway so the path is race-free.

Subnets without a default route still get DROPped during the
reconciler's periodic drift pass (loadSubnetDropGates). The window is
re-opened to ≤5 min on user-driven AttachInternetGateway, which is
the original behaviour pre-mulga-siv-163. A follow-up bead can close
that gap properly by converting the gate/ungate subjects into a
single recompute trigger that re-reads effective RT state.

* fix(vpc): prevent duplicate main route table from bootstrap race

Concurrent multi-node daemons running EnsureDefaultVPC for the admin
account (bootstrap-pinned VpcId) each minted a fresh random rtb-ID and
Put it with IsMain=true. The KV ended up with two main route table
records for the same VPC.

CreateRoute's post-write gate recompute (per-subnet egress drop gating)
then resolved effectiveRouteTable non-deterministically across the two
IsMain=true records; when the orphan (route-less) RT won, the gate
decision became "no default egress" and vpc.gate-subnet-egress fired.
The subscriber installed a Priority-1100 DROP on the default subnet's
egress, killing the return path for guest SSH probes
(TestMultinodeGuestSSH connect timeout to 192.168.0.161 in run
26699045536).

Two-part fix:

1. createMainRouteTable scans rtbKV for an existing IsMain=true record
   on the same VPC before Put-ing a new one. Race window narrows from
   "always duplicates under concurrent bootstrap" to a sub-ms TOCTOU
   between scan and Put.

2. effectiveRouteTable / mainRouteTable use a deterministic preferMain
   tiebreak when multiple IsMain=true records exist: more routes >
   oldest CreatedAt > smaller RouteTableId. Defensive — any duplicate
   that slips through (cross-AZ restore, manual KV edit, residual race)
   still produces consistent egress gate decisions instead of flapping
   on KV scan order.

* fix(policy): atomic ACL replacement for SG mutations

Add ovn.Client.ReplaceACLs — detach + delete existing ACL rows and
attach freshly-created rows in one OVSDB transaction. EnsureSG and
UpdateSG now funnel through ReplaceACLs instead of ClearACLs +
AddACLs, closing the mid-flight window where the port group held
zero ACLs and tenant LSP traffic defaulted to drop (observable on
ICMP and on TCP SYNs that miss conntrack).

Mock client exposes ClearACLCalls / ReplaceACLCalls counters so
tests can assert atomicity. New TestSGManager_UpdateSG_AtomicReplace
fails if SG mutations ever fall back to the split path.
2026-06-01 09:54:29 +10:00
Josh Siviour 287487a4f2 feat(elbv2): implement ModifyListener (#268)
* feat(elbv2): implement ModifyListener

Adds AWS-compatible ModifyListener to the spinifex ELBv2 stack so
listeners can be edited in place — port, protocol, and default
actions — without the current delete+create dance that briefly drops
the listener from HAProxy.

- Handler interface, impl, and NATS wrapper get ModifyListener;
  validation mirrors CreateListener (LB type ↔ protocol, dup-port
  excluding self, target-group existence + protocol compatibility).
- Daemon subscribes to elbv2.ModifyListener on the spinifex-workers
  queue and a new gateway action dispatches it.
- Frontend exposes a per-row edit button that pre-fills a dialog from
  the existing listener and calls ModifyListenerCommand, replacing
  the "Listeners cannot be edited" note.
- Unit + NATS round-trip + frontend tests cover the new flow.

Cert / SslPolicy / Alpn handling stays out of scope and lands with
HTTPS listener support.

* test(e2e): cover ModifyListener in lb harness

Adds an Internal_ALB_ModifyListener subtest to TestLoadBalancer that
exercises in-place listener edits end-to-end:

- Provisions tgA + tgB sharing the same app instances.
- Brings up an internal ALB with HTTP:80 → tgA, baselines round-robin.
- ModifyListener port=8090, asserts DescribeListeners shows the new
  port and that probes on 8090 still round-robin — proves HAProxy is
  reconciled without dropping the listener (the regression mulga-944
  fixes; the frontend previously delete+created on every edit).
- ModifyListener DefaultActions → tgB, asserts traffic still flows.

Also factors a probeAtPort helper so the order JSON can target any
listener port, and updates TEST_COVERAGE.md with phase 3e.

* fix(ui): widen listener add/edit dialog so content stays inside the box

AlertDialogContent defaults to max-w-xs (20rem) which clipped the listener
form on the right edge. Use a 32rem cap with grid-cols-[minmax(0,1fr)] +
min-w-0 on the form so CSS grid tracks shrink instead of expanding to
max-content.

* test: cover ModifyListener + system instance dispatch

Lifts ModifyListener diff coverage by exercising nil/empty arn paths,
NLB protocol acceptance + rejection, protocol-only revalidation against
existing target groups, and the launcher-nats wire format error paths
(missing input, missing instance type, decode failures, no responder,
default timeout fallback).

Adds a new spinifex/daemon/daemon_system_dispatch_test.go covering
splitSubjectTail edge cases, respondWithSystem{Launch,Terminate}{Output,
OK,Error} envelope shape, handler entry points for invalid JSON and
missing instance ID, and subscribeSystemTerminate nil-conn + idempotent
re-subscribe behaviour.

Fixes the flaky TestHandleEC2DescribeInstanceTypes/NoFilter… subtest by
selecting a 2-vCPU instance type that also fits schedulable memory, so
hosts with smaller schedulableMem (CI 4 vCPU / ~13 GiB) don't pick a
16 GiB-mem type that fails allocation.

* test(e2e): wait for tgB after listener swap, not before

Spinifex health-checks only target groups wired into a listener's
HAProxy config. Waiting for tgB to report healthy before
modifyListenerDefaultTG attaches it to the listener is impossible —
the agent never probes its targets, so they stay in initial and the
2m EventuallyErr trips.

Drop the pre-swap tgB wait. After modifyListenerDefaultTG, replace
the fixed 3s sleep with WaitForTargetsHealthy on tgB (post-swap),
which is now the listener's DefaultAction.

* test(e2e): derive LB name from ARN in lbENI/deleteLB ENI filter

The ENI description filter was building the LB-name token from a
hard-coded "alb"/"nlb" template (e.g. `ELB app/lb-e2e-alb-int/<id>`),
which only matched LBs whose name happened to be `lb-e2e-alb-*` or
`lb-e2e-nlb-*`. The ModifyListener suite names its LB `lb-e2e-mod`,
so lbENI's EventuallyErr could never find the ENI and tripped after
30s. deleteLB had the same bug: sysInstanceID stayed empty and
WaitForENICleanup waited for a non-existent filter, allowing the
next suite's createLB to race the sys.micro VM reclaim.

Parse the LB name straight out of lb.ARN (penultimate path segment,
same shape createLB already relies on) so the filter matches any
caller-chosen name. Drop the now-redundant scheme arg from lbENI.

* test(e2e): poll for listener serving on new port after ModifyListener

The post-modifyListenerPort settle was a hard 3s sleep, but lb-agent
polls for new HAProxy config on a 5s tick. After the API returns, the
agent has typically not yet detected the config-hash change, so
HAProxy is still bound to the old port — every probe to the new port
RSTs and probeAtPort sees 0/0 successful.

Replace the sleep with waitForListenerServing: a polling loop that
fires 2 probes via the shared trigger client every 2s until at least
one returns a parsable instance_id, with a 60s ceiling. Factor the
trigger-and-fetch out of probeAtPort into probeOnce so the polling
helper can reuse it without the require.* asserts.
2026-05-30 09:18:52 +10:00
Josh Siviour c1f44b36da feat: vendor-agnostic instance types + sys.* NATS fan-out (#269)
* feat(instancetypes): emit cross-vendor sibling families on x86_64 hosts

Each x86_64 cpuGeneration's family list is now extended at generate time
with its cross-vendor counterpart family (Intel t3 ↔ AMD t3a,
c5 ↔ c5a, m6i ↔ m6a, etc.) via the new vendorSiblingFamily map in
definitions.go. Sibling families share an identical vCPU/memory shape
per size (same instanceFamilyDef size tables) and the same x86_64 arch
tag, so any host can schedule either vendor's request without changes
to canAllocate or the subscription path.

ResourceManager.updateInstanceSubscriptions iterates the type catalog
unchanged; it now picks up both vendors automatically and subscribes to
ec2.RunInstances.t3.* AND ec2.RunInstances.t3a.* on the same node.
RunInstances for either family load-balances across mixed Intel + AMD
clusters via the existing spinifex-workers queue group.

ARM (Graviton t4g/c?g/m?g/r?g) and legacy Intel-only families (t2, c4,
m4, r4) have no cross-vendor sibling and are unaffected.

Bead: mulga-siv-157 (vendor aliasing portion). sys.* NATS fan-out for
ALB-VMs is a separate change in the same plan.

* feat(daemon,elbv2): NATS fan-out for system instance launch/terminate

ELBv2 ALB-VMs (sys.micro) previously launched via a direct Go method call
from ELBv2ServiceImpl into the local Daemon, so every ALB-VM piled on
whichever node handled the upstream CreateLoadBalancer call. Mixed
clusters tripped 'insufficient capacity for sys.micro' once that node's
host-reserve trimmed schedulable vCPU below the next launch.

Route system-instance lifecycle through a dedicated NATS subject root:

  system.LaunchInstance.{type}            (queue group spinifex-workers)
  system.LaunchInstance.{type}.{nodeID}   (targeted)
  system.TerminateInstance.{instanceID}   (owning-node only)

ResourceManager.updateInstanceSubscriptions now treats sys.* types under
the new subject root with a separate handler hook (systemHandler) and
the same capacity-aware subscribe/unsubscribe behaviour customer types
already have — sys.micro subscriptions drop when the host saturates,
naturally re-distributing load.

The daemon side keeps LaunchSystemInstance / TerminateSystemInstance as
local methods; the new handleSystemLaunchInstance / handleSystemTerminate
handlers decode the JSON envelope, invoke the local method, and reply
with output or error. The terminate subscription is bound on launch
success so future terminate requests reach the owning node, and dropped
on terminate success.

ELBv2ServiceImpl now consumes a NATSSystemInstanceLauncher (handlers/elbv2/
system_instance_launcher_nats.go) instead of a direct daemon pointer, so
any node in the cluster can carry an ALB-VM.

SystemInstanceInput / Output / NICConfig / ExtraENIInput get explicit
JSON tags because the wire crosses NATS.

Tests cover JSON round-trip, remote-error propagation, terminate routing,
and no-responder failure mode.

Bead: mulga-siv-157 (sys.* fan-out portion completes the bead).
2026-05-29 23:24:24 +10:00
Julian Sommer fbd5e3a607 fix: reconciler emits configured dns_server instead of hardcoded 8.8.8.8 (#265) 2026-05-29 12:23:03 +10:00
Julian Sommer 10728391af chore: revert test-cover Makefile 2026-05-29 11:38:42 +10:00
Julian Sommer e4b7834b2b chore: move input validation into gateway (#264) 2026-05-29 11:17:12 +10:00
Julian Sommer 94aa482931 feat: sts v1 (#261) 2026-05-29 10:42:37 +10:00
Josh Siviour 65ba60e8bc fix(gateway/ec2): fan out DescribeInstanceAttribute across daemons (#263)
* fix(gateway/ec2): fan out DescribeInstanceAttribute across daemons

DescribeInstanceAttribute was queue-grouped on `spinifex-workers`, so each
request landed on one daemon at random. The handler only consults per-daemon
state (vmMgr / stoppedStore), so 1/N requests succeeded and the rest returned
InvalidInstanceID.NotFound. Terraform's AWS provider refreshes aws_instance
with three attribute reads per cycle, which on a 5-node cluster fails ~99% of
the time.

Move the daemon subscription into the fan-out block (no queue group) and
rewrite the gateway to mirror DescribeInstances: inbox + N replies + drop
NotFound. The aggregator returns the first parsed success, falls back to
NotFound only when every daemon confirms absence, and propagates deterministic
client errors (InvalidParameterValue, MissingParameter) when no daemon
succeeds.

Tests:
- New: MultipleNodes_OwnerWins, AllNodesNotFound, ClientErrorPropagates,
  NoResponders, SingleNode (rewritten without queue group).
- daemon_handlers_test.go: drop the `spinifex-workers` queue-group string from
  the ten DescribeInstanceAttribute subscriptions so the tests match the new
  production wiring.

* fix(ec2): DescribeInstanceTypes returns supported set, not capacity-gated

The no-filter DescribeInstanceTypes response was filtered to types with
at least one free slot. AWS-compatible callers (e.g. the Terraform AWS
provider's post-RunInstances metadata lookup) expect a stable supported
set: when a launch consumes the last free slot of its type, the next
DescribeInstanceTypes for that type must still return it, or the apply
fails with "reading EC2 Instance Type (X): empty result".

Split the API into two ResourceManager methods so capacity semantics
stay strict for the capacity=true filter (used for cluster aggregation)
while default callers get the supported answer:

- GetAvailableInstanceTypeInfos(showCapacity bool) — unchanged; gates on
  remaining schedulable CPU/memory and (for GPU types) free GPU pool
  slots. Used when capacity=true is requested.
- GetSupportedInstanceTypeInfos() — new; lists every loaded instance
  type once, regardless of current allocation or GPU pool state. Still
  skips system types ("sys.*") and entries with incomplete CPU/memory
  metadata.

The handler picks between the two based on the capacity filter. The
gateway aggregator (DescribeInstanceTypes.go) needs no change — it
already deduplicates by type name when capacity=false, so requesting a
specific name now resolves from whichever node supports it.

Tests:
- Daemon unit tests for the new method cover the three filter rules
  (no free slots, system/incomplete skip, GPU without manager).
- Handler tests assert the supported path is hit by default and the
  capacity-gated path is hit only when capacity=true.
- The NATS-driven integration test is split into two subtests: one
  proves the no-filter response is invariant under allocation, the
  other proves capacity=true still gates on remaining resources.

* fix: persist API device name in volume metadata on AttachVolume

aws_volume_attachment polls DescribeVolumes with
attachment.device=/dev/sd[f-p], the API-form name. Spinifex was
persisting the in-guest virtio path (/dev/vd*) via UpdateVolumeState
after AttachVolume, so the filter rejected every attached volume and
the post-attach wait loop failed with "couldn't find resource".

UpdateVolumeState now receives the API-form device name and the
daemon's AttachVolume response echoes DeviceName instead of
GuestDevice. BlockDeviceMappings continues to carry the guest path
(mulga-599 / PR #55) since UpdateGuestDeviceNames re-applies that
convention on every Launch/Start; only the volume-metadata path
diverges to the API form for the AWS-spec round-trip.

Adds fakeVolumeStateUpdater to manager_deps_test.go and a regression
test that asserts the API-form name flows through
UpdateVolumeState while BDM keeps the guest path.

Resolves mulga-siv-154.
2026-05-28 23:43:39 +10:00
Josh Siviour f877f5edef feat(network/external): restore source=dhcp on external pools (#262)
* refactor(network/external): introduce Allocator interface + StaticPoolAllocator

Carve external IP allocation out of handlers/ec2/vpc/external_ipam.go into
network/external/static_pool.go behind a typed Allocator interface. The KV
bucket name, schema, CAS retry count, and gateway-IP reservation semantics
are unchanged so existing static-pool data carries over with no manual
migration.

ExternalIPAM stays in handlers/ec2/vpc (L5 cleanup deferred per plan) but
becomes a thin facade that constructs a StaticPoolAllocator and delegates
Allocate / Release / GetPoolRecord through the new interface. Q4 will plug
DHCPPoolAllocator into the same Allocator slot.

Plan: docs/development/improvements/external-pool-dhcp-source.md (Q1).

* feat(network/external/dhcp): package skeleton — Client + Fake + KV store

New network/external/dhcp/ package, restored from the structure deleted
in Slice C (commit 7ff013a) but rehomed under the ADR-0006 layer tree:

- client.go      Client interface + AcquireRequest + Lease (with
                 RenewAt/RebindAt/ExpiresAt helpers).
- nclient4.go    NClient4Client — AF_PACKET DORA / Renew / Release
                 backed by insomniacslk/dhcp/dhcpv4/nclient4.
- fake.go        In-memory test fake with per-step hooks for fault
                 injection and acquire/renew/release call counters.
- kv.go          Store over the per-AZ spinifex-dhcp-leases-<az> KV
                 bucket: Put / Get / Delete / List. Schema matches the
                 plan (absolute timestamps for acquired/t1/t2/expiry).
- *_test.go      Lease-timer arithmetic, fake lifecycle, nclient4 input
                 validation, KV roundtrip + version-key isolation.

Not yet wired into vpcd, ExternalIPAM, or any allocator — Q3/Q4 plug
it in. Plan: docs/development/improvements/external-pool-dhcp-source.md (Q2).

* feat(network/external/dhcp): DHCPManager + daemon-side NATSClient

Adds the per-vpcd DHCPManager that owns active lease state: KV scan on
startup (re-issues RENEW for non-expired entries, drops the rest),
per-lease renewal goroutines with jittered T1/T2/expiry timers and
post-expiry re-DORA, and NATS request/reply subscribers on
vpc.dhcp.acquire / vpc.dhcp.release. Acquire is idempotent on client-id,
coalesced via singleflight so concurrent retries do not produce
duplicate wire DORAs.

Adds the daemon-side dhcp.NATSClient wrapper (RequestAcquire /
RequestRelease) that ExternalIPAM will route DHCP-sourced allocations
through in Q4. Still no allocator wiring — vpcd does not yet construct
the manager.

* feat(network/external/dhcp): wire DHCP allocators; re-allow source=dhcp

Adds DHCPGatewayLRPAllocator and DHCPPoolAllocator, the two consumers
of the Q3 DHCPManager. The gateway-LRP allocator runs in-process inside
vpcd and DORAs once per VPC (client-id `dhcp-gw-lrp-<vpcID>`, used in
centralized NAT). The pool allocator runs daemon-side and routes
per-EIP / ENI / instance acquisitions through vpcd over the restored
vpc.dhcp.acquire / vpc.dhcp.release topics.

ExternalIPAM now dispatches per-pool: static pools keep the existing
StaticPoolAllocator + KV bucket; DHCP-sourced pools attach a
DHCPPoolAllocator via EnableDHCP. vpcd constructs the dhcp.Manager
when any pool has Source="dhcp" and selects the DHCPGatewayLRPAllocator
for IGWManager; everything else keeps StaticRangeAllocator /
LinkLocalAllocator.

Config validator re-allows source="dhcp", requires bind_bridge, and
rejects range_* / gw_lrp_range_* keys on DHCP pools. Unknown sources
are rejected with the supported list. Allocator.Release uses a
server-side IP→client-id lookup so the existing (pool, ip) signature
keeps working for both static and DHCP pools.

Plan: docs/development/improvements/external-pool-dhcp-source.md (Q4)

* feat(spx admin init): restore --external-source=dhcp + --external-bind-bridge

Source defaults to dhcp when --external-pool is omitted; static remains the
default when a pool range is supplied. Adds PoolBindBridge propagation through
ConfigSettings + formation.NetworkConfig + spinifex.toml template so vpcd's
DHCPManager finds the bridge to DORA on across single-node and joiner paths.

* fix(network/external/dhcp): derive chaddr from client-id when HWAddr unset

DHCPGatewayLRPAllocator and DHCPPoolAllocator (first acquire) own no NIC
and pass an empty HWAddr to the manager. nclient4 rejected the request
with "dhcp acquire: hw_addr is required", breaking nightly cells 1/3/8/10
at AttachIGW. Derive the chaddr from the client-id via utils.HashMAC so
the upstream DHCP server sees a stable 02:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx MAC per AWS
identifier, matching the OVN-side MAC scheme operators already grep for.

* fix(network/external/dhcp): enable IFF_PROMISC on bind_bridge across DORA

Nightly cell 1 timed out at OFFER step with "no matching response packet
received". Upstream router replied unicast to the derived 02:xx chaddr
which the Linux bridge had never learned, so the kernel dropped the
frame before nclient4's AF_PACKET socket could see it.

Reference-counted IFF_PROMISC toggle around every Acquire/Renew/Release
so overlapping leases on the same bridge share one flag flip and the
last release restores prior state. Soft-fails to a warn log when
CAP_NET_ADMIN is unavailable — operator may already have promisc set.

* fix(network/external/dhcp): RFC 2131 retransmission — retry DISCOVER 3×

NClient4 was configured with WithRetry(1) + WithTimeout(60s), meaning a
single DISCOVER per Acquire. When the first frame is lost (STP convergence
on a freshly-up bridge, upstream packet loss) the call blocks the full
60s and fails. Nightly cell 1 hit this at startup: gw-lrp Acquire for two
VPCs timed out back-to-back before any e2e step ran.

Switch to WithRetry(3) with a 5s per-attempt seed; nclient4 doubles the
deadline on each retransmission (5s, 10s, 20s) and sends a fresh DISCOVER
each round. Total budget ~35s, three frames on the wire — recoverable
without the higher layer noticing.

* fix(network/external): three CI-blocking extdhcp bugs

DHCP-source pools failed e2e-nightly cells 1/3/8/10 (net: dhcp) after
the restore-dhcp-source branch landed. Three independent root causes:

* gateway nexthop dropped: GatewayIPAllocator.Allocate had no return
  channel for the upstream router learned from lease.Routers. igw fell
  back to link-local 169.254.0.2, unreachable on the WAN subnet, so
  instance egress and SSH-in died silently. Widen the interface to
  return nexthop; DHCP impl pulls Routers[0]; empty Routers is now a
  hard error. Static impl returns pool.Gateway as before.

* DORA budget shrunk 6x: WithTimeout(5s) x WithRetry(3) gave a 15 s
  wallclock for the full DORA, no outer backoff. Restore the deleted
  dhcp_manager.go schedule [4s, 8s, 16s, 32s] under a 90 s budget with
  +/- 1 s per-attempt jitter; drop nclient4Retries to 1 so the leaf
  stays single-shot and the budget arithmetic lives in one place.

* every vpcd subscribed to vpc.dhcp.acquire: plain nc.Subscribe meant
  every vpcd in real-multi cells DORA'd in parallel with the same
  derived chaddr, causing upstream-server NAK / lease leak. Switch to
  QueueSubscribe with per-AZ queue "vpcd-dhcp-workers-<az>".

Plan: docs/development/bugs/extdhcp-pool-fixes.md (mulga).
Bead: mulga-siv-150.
2026-05-28 20:48:11 +10:00
Julian Sommer 621e49405e fix: UI bug fixes 2026-05-28 15:08:17 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga 88881ba04c fix: Updated Trinity and SMCI docs 2026-05-28 14:42:03 +10:00
Julian Sommer 7ff02a6020 fix: consistent UI capitlisation 2026-05-28 14:27:35 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga 624c3180ea docs: fix gpu-passthrough doc sections and image tags for docs site 2026-05-28 11:41:00 +10:00
tomnewton-mulga 78d703da78 Feat/mig capable (#260)
* feat(gpu): add NVIDIA MIG multi-instance GPU support

Partitions MIG-capable GPUs (A100, A30, H100) into isolated slices exposed
as mdev devices instead of whole-GPU VFIO passthrough. VMs attach via
-device vfio-pci,sysfsdev=<mdev-path> using the GPUAttachment discriminated
union (PCIAddress for whole-GPU, MdevPath for MIG).

Key changes:
- gpu: new MIGProfile/MIGInstance types, IsMIGCapable model map, mig.go ops
  (EnableMIGMode, DisableMIGMode, CreateInstances, ListInstances,
  DestroyAllInstances, enrichMdevPaths)
- gpu.Manager: Claim() returns (*GPUDevice, *MIGInstance, error); AddMIGInstances,
  ReclaimByMdev for restart recovery; MarkMIGFailed per-slice
- daemon: buildGPUPool helper partitions devices into whole-GPU vs MIG pools;
  MIGProfile config field selects profile per node or per GPU override
- vm.VM: GPUAttachments []gpu.GPUAttachment replaces GPUPCIAddresses []string
- admin CLI: spx admin gpu mig status/enable/disable subcommands with
  admin.SetMIGProfile for spinifex.toml writes
- docs: COMMANDS.md updated with three new MIG management command rows

* test(gpu): unit tests for MIG parsers and pool manager

Cover all pure parsing functions (parseMIGMemory, isCapacityExhaustedError,
extractProfileFields/GIFields, parseMIGProfiles, parseMIGInstances,
parseCreatedGIID/CIID) with realistic nvidia-smi fixture output.

Manager MIG tests cover AddMIGInstances, Claim/Release on mdev-backed entries,
MarkMIGFailed, ReclaimByMdev, and interaction with whole-GPU MarkFailed — all
using fake mdev directories in t.TempDir() so no GPU hardware is required.

* feat(gpu): dynamic MIG profile-per-request with on-demand GI/CI lifecycle

Replaces static config-driven MIG pre-carving with a dynamic model where
the MIG profile is specified per RunInstances call via mig.<profile>
instance type names (e.g. mig.1g.10gb) that mirror nvidia-smi nomenclature
directly.

- Manager.Claim(instanceID, profileName): fast path claims a pre-carved
  slice; slow path dequeues a free MIG GPU, releases the lock, calls
  nvidia-smi mig -cgi/-cci to carve all slices, then reclaims the lock to
  commit and return the first slice
- Manager.Release: last release on a dynamically-carved GPU calls
  DestroyAllInstances and returns the GPU to freeMIGGPUs, allowing a
  different profile on the next claim
- AddMIGGPU(dev): registers a fresh MIG GPU for dynamic allocation;
  AddMIGInstances (restart recovery) keeps its no-destroy semantics
- GenerateMIGTypes: produces mig.<profile> InstanceTypeInfo entries from
  gpu.ListProfiles at daemon startup; IsMIGType/MIGProfileFromType let
  callers inspect these names
- buildGPUPool: calls ListInstances for recovery, AddMIGGPU for fresh
  GPUs, ListProfiles to collect MIG profile specs for type generation;
  removes setupMIGInstances and migProfileForDevice
- GPUClaimer.Claim gains profileName param; daemonGPUClaimer, service_impl
  call sites, and fakeGPUClaimer all updated

* fix(gpu): correct mdev parent detection and make --profile optional for mig enable

enrichMdevPaths was using os.Readlink on "parent_bus_0" (a non-existent
sysfs attribute) and then on ".." (a directory, not a symlink) — both
would fail on real NVIDIA hardware, breaking CreateInstances and
ListInstances on daemon restart recovery. Fix: read the mdev UUID's own
symlink target, which always encodes the parent GPU's PCI address in its
path (e.g. .../0000:01:00.0/<uuid>).

Make basePath injectable in enrichMdevPaths so the fix is covered by a
new set of unit tests using temp-dir symlinks (TestEnrichMdevPaths_*).

Remove the MarkFlagRequired("profile") from "spx admin gpu mig enable":
Phase 2 is fully dynamic — the daemon carves slices on demand at
RunInstances time. Without --profile, the command just enables MIG mode
and destroys any pre-carved slices so the daemon starts with a free GPU.
With --profile, behaviour is unchanged (pre-carve a static pool).

* chore: writeups for smci and arcee

* test: add coverage for MIG exec, manager slow-path, instancetypes and admin

- Add mig_exec_test.go with fake nvidia-smi harness covering Enable/Disable MIGMode,
  IsMIGModeEnabled, DestroyAllInstances, ListProfiles, CreateInstances, ListInstances
- Extend manager_mig_test.go with slow-path Claim/Release tests using fake nvidia-smi
- Add generate_test.go coverage for IsMIGType, MIGProfileFromType, GenerateMIGTypes
- Add admin_test.go coverage for SetMIGProfile (create, update, idempotent, error paths)
- Make mdevBasePath a var to allow sysfs injection in tests
- Add json tags to GPUAttachment fields to satisfy musttag linter

Diff coverage: 75.6% (threshold: 60%).

* fixed gpu passthrough doc

* Revert "fixed gpu passthrough doc"

This reverts commit 1e20f5ab13.
2026-05-28 11:38:40 +10:00
Josh Siviour fa09228a36 feat: ENI hot-plug Sprint 3b — live QMP pipeline + AttachENI wiring (stage 2) (#258)
* feat: ENI hot-plug Sprint 3a scaffolding

Lays the Sprint 3a Tier 0 groundwork from
docs/development/feature/enihotplug-v1.md so the live QMP pipeline in 3b
can plug in without further plumbing changes.

- types.ENIRequests: per-VM PCIe slot allocator state (free-list +
  eniID→slot reverse map), mirrors EBSRequests pattern.
- instancetypes.MaxENIsForType / HotPlugENISlotsForType: instance-type →
  ENI cap lookup with explicit-type-then-family-then-default precedence.
- vm.DeviceController interface + QMPDeviceController (real) +
  StubDeviceController (in-memory): unit-testable QMP device_add /
  device_del / netdev_add / netdev_del surface. QueryPCI body lands in
  Sprint 3b alongside the live response parser.
- buildBaseVMConfig now accepts the instance type and emits two distinct
  PCIe root-port pools at boot: hotplug-ebs{1..11} (fixed, /dev/sd[f-p])
  and hotplug-eni{1..N} (per-type, N = MaxENIs - 1).
- volumes.go bus id renamed hotplug%d → hotplug-ebs%d; query-block QDev
  regex narrowed to hotplug-ebs(\d+) so future virtio-net devices on
  hotplug-eni ports cannot collide with the EBS ordering.
- restore + ResetNodeLocalState reset ENIRequests.Mu alongside the EBS
  mutex so restored VMs start with a fresh allocator.

Closes mulga-cs-enihotplug-3a.

* feat: ENI hot-plug Sprint 3b — live QMP pipeline + AttachENI wiring

Lands the Sprint 3b Tier 1 deliverables from
docs/development/feature/enihotplug-v1.md so AttachNetworkInterface /
DetachNetworkInterface AWS APIs drive the host-side QMP pipeline against
a running VM.

- vm/qmp_device.go: real QueryPCI parser. Walks the per-bus query-pci
  response and recurses into pci_bridge.devices so virtio-net devices
  attached under hotplug-eni{N} root ports surface in the flat result.
- vm/eni_hotplug.go (new): HotPlugENI / HotUnplugENI on Manager. 4-step
  pipeline (tap → ovs-add-port → netdev_add → device_add + query-pci
  poll) with full rollback on step-N failure. Tap + OVS calls are
  stubbed in Sprint 3b; Sprint 3c drops in real NetworkPlumber /
  ovs-vsctl invocations against the same call-site interface.
- vm/eni_hotplug_test.go (new): unit tests with StubDeviceController —
  success path, rollback on each step, AttachmentLimitExceeded,
  idempotent re-attach, non-running rejection, force-detach semantics,
  concurrent serialization, query-pci timeout.
- types/ec2.go: EC2InstanceCommand gains AttachENI / DetachENI attrs +
  AttachENIData / DetachENIData payloads, mirroring the AttachVolume
  command surface.
- handlers/ec2/vpc/eni.go: ENIRecord gains AttachmentStatus,
  HotPlugSlot, LastAttachError, DetachInFlight, DetachForce fields per
  plan §State machine. New helpers: GetENIRecord, UpdateENI (CAS
  patcher), FindENIByAttachment (used by DetachNetworkInterface lookup
  by attachmentId).
- gateway/ec2/vpc/{Attach,Detach}NetworkInterface.go (new): AWS SDK
  request decoders that route via the per-instance ec2.cmd.{id}
  channel; DetachNetworkInterface resolves attachmentId →
  instanceId via DescribeNetworkInterfaces first.
- gateway/ec2.go: registers the two new EC2 actions in the dispatcher.
- daemon/daemon_handlers.go: handleEC2Events dispatches the two new
  attribute flags to per-instance handlers.
- daemon/daemon_handlers_eni.go (new): composes vpcService.AttachENI
  (KV) with vmMgr.HotPlugENI (QMP) and publishes
  vpc.eni-hotplug.{attached,detached}.{instanceID} on success. KV
  state machine: available → attaching → attached → detaching →
  available. On QMP failure: KV rolls back to available with
  LastAttachError persisted for DescribeNetworkInterfaces visibility.
- vm/errors.go: ErrENINotAttached, ErrENIPipelineTimeout,
  ErrQMPUnavailable.

The Sprint 3c bead lands the real tap + ovs-vsctl wiring on the same
pipeline; 3d adds the reconciler that converges the attaching /
detaching KV states left behind by a daemon crash mid-pipeline.

Closes mulga-cs-enihotplug-3b.

* Update ec2.go

* Update ec2.go
2026-05-27 22:54:46 +10:00
Josh Siviour a8e356b3d2 feat: ENI hot-plug Sprint 3a scaffolding (#257)
Lays the Sprint 3a Tier 0 groundwork from
docs/development/feature/enihotplug-v1.md so the live QMP pipeline in 3b
can plug in without further plumbing changes.

- types.ENIRequests: per-VM PCIe slot allocator state (free-list +
  eniID→slot reverse map), mirrors EBSRequests pattern.
- instancetypes.MaxENIsForType / HotPlugENISlotsForType: instance-type →
  ENI cap lookup with explicit-type-then-family-then-default precedence.
- vm.DeviceController interface + QMPDeviceController (real) +
  StubDeviceController (in-memory): unit-testable QMP device_add /
  device_del / netdev_add / netdev_del surface. QueryPCI body lands in
  Sprint 3b alongside the live response parser.
- buildBaseVMConfig now accepts the instance type and emits two distinct
  PCIe root-port pools at boot: hotplug-ebs{1..11} (fixed, /dev/sd[f-p])
  and hotplug-eni{1..N} (per-type, N = MaxENIs - 1).
- volumes.go bus id renamed hotplug%d → hotplug-ebs%d; query-block QDev
  regex narrowed to hotplug-ebs(\d+) so future virtio-net devices on
  hotplug-eni ports cannot collide with the EBS ordering.
- restore + ResetNodeLocalState reset ENIRequests.Mu alongside the EBS
  mutex so restored VMs start with a fresh allocator.

Closes mulga-cs-enihotplug-3a.
2026-05-27 22:15:20 +10:00
Josh Siviour fd3dc6b680 feat(network): ADR-0006 layer redesign + IPsec/OVN hardening (#255)
* refactor(vpcd): remove macvlan bridge mode

Macvlan was a single-NIC SSH-safe hack that predated veth mode and was
never selected by any active config path. Deletion is Phase 0 item 1 of
the network layer redesign (mulga-siv-125.1).

Removed:
- BridgeModeMacvlan const + setMacvlanMAC + ifaceIsMacvlan probe
- Macvlan MAC alignment block in launchService (only fired on dead path)
- Macvlan branch in detectBridgeMode + matching tests
- Macvlan duplicates of IGW/AddNAT centralized-NAT tests (veth versions
  already cover the same path)
- --macvlan flag + macvlan case branch in setup-ovn.sh

Refactored:
- useCentralizedNAT() now == BridgeModeVeth (was != BridgeModeDirect);
  verifyBridgeMode already rejects empty/unknown at startup
- Three IGW-pool tests now explicitly WithBridgeMode(BridgeModeVeth)
  (previously relied on empty-mode defaulting to centralized)

Kept intentionally:
- Deprecation notes in docs/compute/vpc-networking/README.md
- Legacy macvlan-interface cleanup in reset-dev-env.sh + ansible
  teardown role (migration for operator systems with stale spx-ext-*
  interfaces from pre-veth installs)

* feat(vpcd): resolve external CIDR at startup with bounded retry

Block service start until the WAN bridge has an IPv4 address, with a 30s
retry window. Phase 0 item 2 of the network layer redesign
(mulga-siv-125.1). Guards the boot race where vpcd starts before
systemd-networkd finishes DHCP on br-wan, or before netplan applies a
static config.

Skipped when ExternalMode is empty (overlay-only deployments).

Forward-compatible with ADR-0006: the new resolveExternalCIDR /
externalCIDRFromBridge helpers become the backing implementation of
HostWiring.ExternalCIDR() once the network/host package lands in Phase 1.
Until then the resolved value is only used to fail-start on missing
uplink.

* fix(vpcd): cover external CIDR startup paths

Extract launchService's CIDR-resolve block to ensureExternalCIDRReady
helper so it's unit-testable, and add direct tests for
externalCIDRFromBridge (loopback + unknown-interface) to exercise the
original literal body. Closes the diff-coverage gap on Phase 0 commit
15b564d which left these paths unreachable from unit tests.

* refactor(network/ovn): extract L1 OVN client to network/ovn package

Move OVNClient interface, LiveOVNClient, ACLSpec, ErrNATNotFound and
namedUUID helper from services/vpcd to a new spinifex/network/ovn
package. The mock relocates to spinifex/network/ovn/mock as a
sub-package. Storage fields on the mock become exported so vpcd tests
can continue to seed/inspect state across the new package boundary.

services/vpcd retains thin type-alias and var-alias shims so existing
callers compile unchanged; Phase 2 removes those shims as vpcd is torn
down.

Adds -coverpkg=./spinifex/... to test-cover so cross-package test
exercise of mock methods continues to count toward coverage now that
the mock lives outside vpcd.

First sub-step of Phase 1 of docs/development/feature/spinifex-network-redesign.md
(bead mulga-siv-125.2). Pure refactor; no functional change. All
existing tests pass; preflight green.

* feat(network/topology): TopologyManager interface + vpcd adapter

Add spinifex/network/topology with Manager interface, VPC/Subnet/Port
specs, and OVN object naming helpers covering the L2 stable contract
(§7 of the redesign plan). Phase 1 keeps existing in-tree OVN names
(rtr-, ext-port-, sg_) and notes the §7.3 targets for a later
reconciliation migration.

TopologyHandler in services/vpcd grows EnsureVPC / DeleteVPC /
EnsureSubnet / DeleteSubnet / EnsurePort / DeletePort /
SetPortSecurityGroups methods that mirror the corresponding NATS
handlers' OVN ops with Spec inputs instead of nats.Msg envelopes,
satisfying topology.Manager via a compile-time check. Existing handlers
are unchanged; the duplication is short-lived (Phase 2 collapses them).

Smoke tests in topology_manager_test.go cover the idempotent create
path, delete cascade, and declarative SG membership move. Deliverable:
TopologyManager.EnsureVPC/Subnet/Port callable; all existing tests
green.

Second sub-step of Phase 1 of docs/development/feature/spinifex-network-redesign.md
(bead mulga-siv-125.2).

* feat(network/host): L0 HostWiring interface + physical/veth impls

Phase 1 deliverable for mulga-siv-125.2. Introduces network/host (L0 of
ADR-0006): UplinkMode enum, Wiring interface, and Physical/Veth
implementations with injectable Runner + InterfaceReader for testability.
Not yet wired into daemon/vpcd — Phase 2 replaces daemon.SetupComputeNode
and vpcd's resolveExternalCIDR with calls through this package.

* feat(network/policy): L3 SecurityGroup/NAT/Route managers

Introduce network/policy as the data-plane policy layer (ADR-0006 L3).
Three managers, all backed by network/ovn:

- SecurityGroupManager: clear+add ACL replacement on an existing port
  group; port group lifecycle stays with L2 (topology.Manager).
- NATManager: bound to one NATMode at construction (derived from
  host.UplinkMode). Distributed sets logical_port/external_mac on EIP
  dnat_and_snat rules; centralised leaves them unset. Per-EIP, NAT GW,
  and IGW-default SNAT entrypoints; all deletes idempotent.
- RouteManager: AddStaticRoute is read-then-decide so retries no longer
  duplicate rows (closing the long-standing non-idempotency bug in
  vpcd/topology.go's IGW default-route path).

ACL priority constants and infrastructure ACL builders move from
vpcd/{security,acl}.go into policy/acl.go with their semantics preserved
(default-deny 900/800 logged, DHCP-allow 1050, tenant 1000). No vpcd
wiring changes here — additive only; the reconciler (bead .3.2) and
network/external (bead .3.4) will consume these managers.

bead: mulga-siv-125.3.1

* feat(network/external): L5 IGW/EIP/NATGW managers

Pure additive — new package, no topology.Manager changes, no rewiring of
existing vpcd handlers. IGWManager builds the external switch + localnet +
gateway LRP + default route + chassis HA, with a flows barrier callers can
inject (production: ovn-nbctl --wait=hv sync). EIP/NATGW are thin L5
wrappers over policy.NATManager. GatewayIPAllocator interface lets the
DHCP-backed allocator stay in vpcd until the DHCP-mgr removal bead lands;
LinkLocalAllocator + StaticRangeAllocator ship here.

* feat(network/reconcile): L6 intent-actual reconciler replaces 5-pass startup

Build spinifex/spinifex/network/reconcile/ package per Phase 2.2 of the
network layer redesign. Reads desired state from NATS KV filtered by
vpc.AZ (with legacy empty-AZ matches-all rule), scans actual state from
OVN NB DB, diffs and applies with VPC → Subnet → Port → SG → IGW →
EIP/NATGW topological ordering.

Atomic port-group join via CreateLogicalSwitchPortInGroups closes the
racy gap the legacy scanENIPortMembership pass used to revive 30s later.
A 5-minute drift goroutine (leader-gated via JetStream KV CAS) replaces
the old 30s ReconcileSGsLoop.

Adds AZ field to VPCRecord stamped at create time. Empty AZ on pre-Phase
2.2 records matches every local AZ, so no migration pass is required.

Replaces and removes the 5-pass startup sequence in services/vpcd:
  - Reconcile + ReconcileFromKV
  - ReconcileSGsOnce + ReconcileSGsLoop
  - RetrofitAllExternalLocalnetOptions
  - RetrofitAllGatewayPortNetworks

IGW fresh-create continues to flow through the legacy NATS handler path
(handleIGWAttach) so the dhcpManager wiring stays intact until Phase
2.3; the reconciler only rebinds gateway-chassis on existing IGW
topology.

Closes mulga-siv-125.3.2.

* refactor(network/topology): promote live Manager impl to network/topology

Move the topology.Manager implementation out of services/vpcd/topology_manager.go
into network/topology/manager_live.go as a standalone liveManager constructed
via NewLiveManager(ovn.Client, opts...). Inputs that varied per-handler
(DNS server resolution from the external pool) are now passed as functional
options (WithDNSServer).

TopologyHandler still satisfies topology.Manager but its methods delegate
to a cached liveManager. The shim stays until the rest of mulga-siv-129
routes NATS subscribers through topology.Manager directly.

Also exports SubnetGatewayCIDR + FormatDNSServerList from network/topology
so the reconciler in network/reconcile can share helpers with the live
manager (audit pass to follow per plan §6).

Test cases ported one-for-one from services/vpcd/topology_manager_test.go
to network/topology/manager_live_test.go; the vpcd-side test file is
deleted. New WithDNSServer test asserts the option propagates into
DHCPOptions rows.

Refs mulga-siv-129 (Phase 2.6 vpcd subscriber migration, Slice 1 of N).

* refactor(vpcd): collapse SG subscribers onto network/{topology,policy} managers

Phase 2.6 / mulga-siv-129 slice 2. Rewrites the vpc.create-sg /
vpc.update-sg / vpc.delete-sg NATS subscribers in services/vpcd as
thin wrappers over topology.Manager (port group lifecycle) and
policy.SecurityGroupManager (ACL programming). Deletes the ~1000
lines of duplicated ACL builder and provisioning logic — its
authoritative copy lives in network/policy.

Surface additions:

- ovn.ErrPortGroupNotFound sentinel; mock + live GetPortGroup wrap
  not-found via fmt.Errorf("%w: ...") so callers can use errors.Is.
- topology.Manager grows EnsureSGPortGroup / DeleteSGPortGroup
  (resolves the apply.go TODO from §2.1 of the redesign plan).
  liveManager implements them with GetPortGroup-then-Create /
  GetPortGroup-then-Clear+Delete idempotency.

Behaviour delta: the old provisionSG rolled back the OVN port group
on AddACLs failure ("all-or-nothing"). The new path lets the port
group survive and relies on network/reconcile to retry EnsureSG on
its next sweep. The all-or-nothing fail-fast test cases are dropped;
ACL emission semantics are covered by network/policy/sg_test.go.

* refactor(vpcd): migrate VPC/Subnet/ENI subscribers to topology.Manager

Phase 2.6 / mulga-siv-129 slice 3. Rewrites vpc.create / vpc.delete /
vpc.create-subnet / vpc.delete-subnet / vpc.create-port /
vpc.delete-port / vpc.update-port-sgs NATS subscribers as thin
wrappers (≤30 lines each) over topology.Manager. Subscriber bodies
now: parse event → translate to spec → delegate to manager.

Deletes:

- vpcd.subnetGateway (and helpers_test.go + topology_test.go's
  TestSubnetGateway block); parity coverage lives in
  network/topology.TestSubnetGatewayCIDR.
- vpcd.reconcilePortSGs (the live manager already exposes the same
  diff-then-transact via reconcilePortSGs on the L2 side).
- vpcd.TopologyHandler.dnsServer; lmDNSServer (passed via
  topology.WithDNSServer to the live manager) is the live path.

Behaviour delta: handlers now strict-parse PrivateIpAddress /
MacAddress / CidrBlock at the NATS boundary and reject malformed
payloads instead of degrading to "no DHCP options". The reconciler
guarantees that field validity is upheld upstream of the publish.

* refactor(network/reconcile): drive SG port groups via topology.Manager

applySGs now calls topology.Manager.EnsureSGPortGroup /
DeleteSGPortGroupByName instead of reaching directly into the OVN client.
Reconcile.Config gains a Topology field (required); the production caller
in services/vpcd passes the TopologyHandler shim, the reconcile package
tests construct a fresh topology.NewLiveManager bound to the mock OVN
client.

DeleteSGPortGroupByName is added to the topology.Manager interface for the
reconciler's orphan-removal path, which iterates raw OVN port-group names
without a groupID round-trip. The existing DeleteSGPortGroup(groupID)
delegates to it.

Resolves the TODO at apply.go:137 carried over from slice 2 of
mulga-siv-129.

* feat(network/policy): add FlowsBarrier option to NATManager

NATManager.AddEIP needs to block on `ovn-nbctl --wait=hv sync` after
writing the dnat_and_snat row so the NATS reply only returns once every
chassis has the rewrite flow. The legacy vpc.add-nat handler does this at
the tail of handleAddNAT; the manager has lacked it since slice 2.1.

NewNATManager grows a functional-options tail (Option / WithFlowsBarrier).
Defaults to a no-op for tests; production wiring in services/vpcd passes
waitForFlowsHV. AddEIP now invokes the barrier after AddNAT, logging at
warn level on failure to match the legacy handler's _ = waitForFlowsHV()
swallowing semantics.

Pre-work for slice 4 of mulga-siv-129 — without the barrier the NAT EIP
subscriber migration would lose the post-write flow-install gate.

* refactor(vpcd): migrate NAT GW subscribers to policy.NATManager

handleAddNATGateway / handleDeleteNATGateway now decode the NATS event
and delegate to policy.NATManager.{AddNATGateway,DeleteNATGateway}. The
manager carries identical OVN logic — same snat type, same ExternalIDs
(spinifex:vpc_id + spinifex:nat_gateway_id) — so existing
TestTopologyHandler_AddNATGateway / DeleteNATGateway suites stay green.

Lazy-constructed NATManager added on TopologyHandler (natmOnce). Mode is
derived from the bridge mode (veth → centralized, direct → distributed)
and the FlowsBarrier is bound to waitForFlowsHV for parity with the
legacy EIP path's tail barrier (used by the next slice, vpc.add-nat).

Slice 4 of mulga-siv-129, sub-step b.

* refactor(vpcd): migrate EIP NAT subscribers to policy.NATManager

handleAddNAT / handleDeleteNAT now decode the NATS event and delegate to
policy.NATManager.{AddEIP,DeleteEIP}. The behavioural contract is
preserved end-to-end:

- Idempotency-skip on a matching dnat_and_snat row (same VPC + LogicalIP,
  plus MAC + LogicalPort under distributed NAT) moves into AddEIP so
  duplicate vpc.add-nat publishes never tear down the rule the previous
  invocation just installed (mulga-siv-124).
- Stale-rule cleanup across every router stays in AddEIP.
- Post-write waitForFlowsHV barrier is now driven by the manager via the
  FlowsBarrier option wired in services/vpcd (slice 4a).
- DeleteEIP returns nil on ErrNATNotFound, matching the handler's
  fire-and-forget "already absent = success" semantic.

The vpcd "errors" import drops out with the inline error-comparison.

Slice 4 of mulga-siv-129, sub-step c.

* refactor(vpcd): migrate IGW subscribers to external.IGWManager (partial)

handleIGWAttach now branches at decode time:
- Centralised NAT + DHCP-sourced pool keeps using attachIGWLegacy because
  the gateway-LRP IP comes from vpc.dhcp.acquire, and that DHCP client is
  the vpcd-local manager that bead mulga-siv-125.3.3 will retire.
- All other shapes (distributed NAT, static-range pool, no pool)
  delegate to external.IGWManager.AttachIGW. The manager mirrors every
  step the legacy handler ran — external switch + localnet port +
  gateway LRP + switch-side router peer + default route + chassis HA +
  waitForFlowsHV tail barrier — so observable behaviour is unchanged.

handleIGWDetach drops its inline OVN walk entirely; both paths exit
through external.IGWManager.DetachIGW followed by releaseGatewayLRPLease.
The lease release stays in vpcd because the upstream client lives in
services/vpcd/dhcp; calling it after every detach is safe because the
upstream server expires unknown leases on its own.

Lazy-constructed IGWManager added on TopologyHandler (igwmOnce). Pool,
allocator (StaticRangeAllocator), chassis, NAT mode, NAT manager, route
manager, and FlowsBarrier are all derived from the existing
TopologyHandler state.

The DHCP-coupled legacy branch retains its full inline OVN logic; it
will disappear in slice-after-125.3.3 follow-on. Slice 4 of
mulga-siv-129, sub-step d.

* feat(ec2/instance): honor AssociatePublicIpAddress per-NIC override

RunInstances --network-interfaces "AssociatePublicIpAddress=true|false"
was silently ignored, only subnet.MapPublicIpOnLaunch gated public IP
assignment. AWS contract is per-NIC override wins.

Extend TestPrepareRunInstances_PublicIPAutoAssigned to table-driven
3 cases: subnet true no-override, subnet false override true, subnet
true override false.

* refactor(config): drop upstream-DHCP config surface (static WAN pool only)

Hard-error in LoadConfig on legacy keys: [network] external_dhcp,
[nodes.<n>.vpcd] dhcp_bind_bridge, and [[network.external_pools]]
source = "dhcp". Add pool range validation (must fit inside the
gateway/prefix_len CIDR; per-cluster non-overlap).

Strip ExternalDHCP from config.NetworkConfig + formation.NetworkConfig
+ admin.ConfigSettings, and DhcpBindBridge from config.VPCDConfig +
admin.ConfigSettings + vpcd.Config. vpcd.ExternalPoolConfig.IsDHCP()
short-circuits to false; the field and downstream DHCP branches in
external_ipam / topology.go remain for Slice C to delete together with
dhcp_manager.

cmd/spinifex/cmd/admin.go: drop useExternalDHCP path and the
detectedDhcpBindBridge helper; require --external-pool when
--external-mode=pool; auto-detect default no longer infers source=dhcp.

service.go's wan_bridge legacy-key rejection now advises removing the
key entirely (vpcd auto-detects br-wan), not renaming to
dhcp_bind_bridge.

Two topology_test cases that exercise the DHCP gateway-LRP path are
skipped — Slice C deletes attachIGWLegacy and these tests together.

* refactor(vpcd): delete dhcp_manager + DHCP gateway-LRP path (Slice C)

Removes upstream-DHCP-client gateway-LRP allocation in favor of static
WAN-pool allocation (StaticRangeAllocator). Part of bead mulga-siv-125.3.3.

- delete services/vpcd/dhcp_manager.go + dhcp/ subpackage (~865 lines)
- delete allocateGatewayLRPIPViaDHCP + releaseGatewayLRPLease paths
- drop ExternalPoolConfig.Source + DhcpBindBridge + IsDHCP() fields
- drop ExternalIPAllocation lease fields (Expiry/ServerID/HWAddr) and
  ExternalIPAMRecord.Source
- drop NewExternalIPAM nc *nats.Conn argument; update all 4 call sites
- rename verifyBridgeMode local dhcpBindBridge -> wanBridge; update error
  strings and tests

Slice D (delete attachIGWLegacy + dispatcher) intentionally deferred.

* refactor(vpcd): delete attachIGWLegacy + IsDHCP stub (Slice D)

Closes mulga-siv-129 slice 4d. Part of bead mulga-siv-125.3.3.

handleIGWAttach now unconditionally delegates to external.IGWManager.
attachIGWLegacy (~207 lines, ~5 OVN write steps + chassis scheduling)
deleted along with its dispatcher branch in handleIGWAttach. The
ExternalPoolConfig.IsDHCP() dead stub is gone.

No code paths or NATS subjects regress: the static-pool / distributed
branches were already going through external.IGWManager since Slice 4d
(6719dc3).

* feat(ipam): Purpose field on every IPAM record (Slice B)

Part of bead mulga-siv-125.3.3.

Adds a Purpose enum (handlers/ec2/vpc/purpose.go) tagging every IP
allocation with its semantic role (eni-primary, eni-public, eip,
igw-lrp, natgw-external, …) so multi-VPC clusters can reclaim/audit
by (owner, purpose).

External IPAM (spinifex-external-ipam, v1→v2):
- ExternalIPAllocation.Type → .Purpose; legacy values mapped via
  LegacyExternalTypeToPurpose (gateway→igw-lrp, auto_assign→eni-public,
  elastic_ip→eip). Unknown legacy values warn and become "unknown".
- AllocateIP / AllocateFromPool / allocateFromPool param rename
  allocType→purpose. All call sites pass Purpose* constants.
- migrate/002_external_ipam_purpose.go: idempotent CAS-retry migration
  with v1/v2-union record shape so partial migrations resume cleanly.

Internal IPAM (spinifex-vpc-ipam, v1→v2):
- IPAMRecord.Allocated []string → []IPEntry{IP, Purpose, OwnerID}.
- AllocateIP gains purpose+ownerID args; ReleaseIP unchanged (still
  keyed on IP).
- AllocatedIPs returns []IPEntry.
- eni.go reorders eniId generation before AllocateIP so the owning
  resource ID lands on the new entry.
- migrate/003_ipam_purpose.go: cross-bucket backfill that reads the
  ENI bucket via the new RunKVWithJetStream path. Orphaned IPs
  (no owning ENI) warn and become Purpose=unknown.

Migrate framework:
- KVContext gains an optional JetStream field; new
  Registry.RunKVWithJetStream method threads it through. RunKV
  signature unchanged — all other callers are unaffected.

Tests:
- ipam_test.go: AllocateIP signature updates; AllocatedIPs now asserts
  IP / Purpose / OwnerID on the returned entries.
- external_ipam_test.go: replaces "auto_assign"/"elastic_ip" literals
  with PurposeENIPublic/PurposeEIP and asserts alloc.Purpose.
- migrate/002 + 003 tests: schema-detect, idempotent rerun,
  no-JetStream fallback, empty bucket.

* refactor(daemon): tombstone obsolete spinifex-dhcp-leases KV bucket

The dhcp_manager removed in Phase 2.3 (bead mulga-siv-125.3.3) owned the
spinifex-dhcp-leases KV bucket. The migrate framework only handles
per-bucket schema version bumps, not bucket deletion, so the obsolete
bucket would linger on upgraded clusters.

Add a one-shot tombstone after initJetStream that deletes the bucket if
present. DeleteKVBucketIfExists treats ErrBucketNotFound and
ErrStreamNotFound as success, so the call is idempotent across restarts.

* feat(config): add network.ipsec_enabled cluster flag (default true)

Add IPSecEnabled to NetworkConfig in both the cluster TOML schema and
the formation handshake payload. Default true so AWS-parity intra-AZ
encryption is on by default. Operators can flip false in
[network] for trusted single-rack lab topologies.

Phase 2.5 (bead mulga-siv-125.3.5) consumes the flag from admin init
(strongSwan provisioning), formation server (propagates to joiners),
and daemon startup (ovs-vsctl ipsec_encapsulation toggle).

* feat(admin): IPsec peer cert generator signed by cluster CA

Add GenerateIPSecPeerCert + IPSecCertPaths in spinifex/admin so admin
init (and the future admin add-node path) can issue per-node IKEv2 peer
credentials signed by the existing cluster CA. The cert carries
id-kp-ipsecIKE (RFC 4945) so strongSwan accepts it as an IKEv2 peer
credential when ovs-monitor-ipsec materialises tunnel configs.

Cluster CA is reused directly — no intermediate strongSwan PKI today;
when intermediate CAs land that becomes a separate workstream.

The cert/key pair lives under {configDir}/ipsec/peer.{pem,key}; the
daemon points OVS Open_vSwitch.other_config (certificate, private_key,
ca_cert) at these paths when network.ipsec_enabled is true.

* feat(admin): wire IPsec peer cert into admin init + join paths

Add --ipsec bool flag (default true) on adminInitCmd. Single-node init
and the multi-node leader path both emit an IPsec peer cert after the
existing CA+server-cert generation. The multi-node formation server
propagates the IPSecEnabled flag to joining nodes via NetworkConfig;
admin join honours it and emits its own peer cert during the same
cert-issuance step that already produces the server cert.

spinifex.toml template gains an unconditional [network] block carrying
ipsec_enabled so the value is visible to operators on every install
regardless of whether external networking is configured. The daemon
reads it via cluster config (NetworkConfig.IPSecEnabled).

Bead mulga-siv-125.3.5.

* build: install openvswitch-ipsec for OVN native IPsec

openvswitch-ipsec provides ovs-monitor-ipsec, which reads the
Open_vSwitch.other_config cert/key/CA pointers and materialises
strongSwan configs for every Geneve tunnel managed by ovn-controller.
Pulls in strongswan + strongswan-pki as transitive deps.

Required by bead mulga-siv-125.3.5.

* feat(daemon): enable OVN native IPsec on intra-AZ Geneve at startup

When network.ipsec_enabled is true (default), the daemon points the
local OVS DB other_config at the per-node IPsec peer cert that admin
init / admin join provisioned (configDir/ipsec/peer.{pem,key} + the
cluster CA at configDir/ca.pem), then sets
other_config:ipsec_encapsulation=true.

ovs-monitor-ipsec (shipped by the openvswitch-ipsec package) consumes
those pointers and materialises strongSwan configs for every Geneve
tunnel ovn-controller programs — including OVN-IC inter-AZ tunnels
when federation lands in Phase 3a.

Missing cert files log a warning and leave Geneve plaintext; operators
upgrading an older cluster reissue certs via spx admin to close the
gap.

Bead mulga-siv-125.3.5.

* test(e2e): multinode IPsec wiring + xfrm SAs + ESP capture

TestMultinodeIPSec asserts:
- OVS DB on every node carries certificate/private_key/ca_cert pointers
  and other_config:ipsec_encapsulation=true (what daemon.enableOVNIPSec
  writes).
- ip xfrm state on every node has at least one AEAD SA in AES-GCM mode
  (rfc4106(gcm(aes)) or gcm(aes)) within 90s.
- tcpdump catches ESP (ip proto 50) on the underlay (best-effort —
  logged only; geneve may be idle during the 5s capture window).

Skips cleanly when the cluster was bootstrapped with --ipsec=false
(no ipsec_encapsulation key on first node).

Read-only over SSH; runs in the parallel bucket alongside the other
non-mutating multinode tests.

* fix(igw): write attachment State="attached" for AWS parity

Reconciler intent loader (network/reconcile/intent.go::loadIGWs) filters
IGW records with `State == "attached"`, but AttachInternetGateway was
writing `State = "available"`. The reconciler therefore never picked up
any attached IGW — `intent_igws=0` on every pass — so the OVN external
switch + gateway LRP + WAN bridge wiring built by IGWManager.AttachIGW
never ran for default-VPC IGWs (whose live `vpc.igw-attach` publish at
daemon bootstrap is lost — vpcd subscriber not yet wired).

Net effect on single-node e2e: every SSH probe to 192.168.x public IPs
timed out (TestSSHProbe, TestModifyInstanceAttribute, TestRebootInstance,
TestNATGateway, TestSGToSGDatapath) because SNAT/DNAT rules on the VPC
router had no path to the external network.

Match AWS InternetGatewayAttachment.State semantics:
 - Attach: State="attached"
 - Detach: State="detached"

Detach value is internal — recordToEC2 gates Attachments on VpcId != "",
so the detached State is never surfaced to API consumers.

Bead: mulga-siv-131

* fix(reconcile): call AttachIGW when IGW topology missing

applyIGWs previously deferred to the NATS handler when an intent IGW
had no external switch in OVN. When the vpc.igw-attach event is lost
(bootstrap-time default-VPC IGW published before vpcd subscriber is
ready), deferral never resolves and VM public-IP traffic dies.

Call IGWManager.AttachIGW directly — it is idempotent (short-circuits
when the external switch already exists), so the reconciler converges
default-VPC IGWs on first pass without duplicating work on subsequent
passes.

Closes mulga-siv-132.

* fix(test): align NewExternalIPAM call with 2-arg signature

Rebase onto dev pulled in daemon_system_instance_test.go which used
the legacy 3-arg NewExternalIPAM(jsNC, js, pools). The feature branch
already narrowed the signature to (js, pools) via the upstream-DHCP
config drop; align the test with the current signature.

* fix(vpcd): EnsureSubnet must EnsureVPC first to avoid NATS race

vpc.create-vpc and vpc.create-subnet are independent NATS events with
no inter-event ordering guarantee. Tenant bootstrap on iam.account.created
publishes both within <1ms, so the subnet handler's
CreateLogicalRouterPort can race the parent VPC's CreateLogicalRouter and
fail with "logical router not found". The cascade fails CreateNetworkInterface
which fails RunInstances which surfaces as InsufficientInstanceCapacity to
the SDK — masking the underlying topology race.

handleSubnetCreate now calls EnsureVPC(VPCID-only) before EnsureSubnet.
EnsureVPC short-circuits on existing LR (idempotent), so the race-winning
vpc.create-vpc handler's full CIDR/VNI ExternalIDs are preserved; if subnet
wins the race the LR is created with bare ExternalIDs (cosmetic) and the
follow-on vpc.create-vpc short-circuits.

Adds TestIntegration_SubnetBeforeVPC regression covering both orderings.

Closes mulga-siv-133.

* feat(ansible): require --external-pool, drop NAT, forward EXTRA_VARS

spx admin init now rejects --external-mode=nat and demands --external-pool
when mode=pool. The ansible init role silently skipped pool flags when the
range was unset, so installs fell over inside the spx validator. Make
targets also swallowed `-e` (make's env-override flag), so operators could
not override pool start/end without editing defaults.yml.

- vars/defaults.yml: rename nat_gateway_ip → external_gateway_ip; add
  spinifex_external_no_external opt-out; document the spx flag contract.
- roles/init/tasks/main.yml: drop NAT branch; assert pool range upfront
  with a fail_msg pointing at EXTRA_VARS / defaults.yml; emit gateway,
  prefix-len, gateway-ip only when explicitly set (let spx auto-detect);
  honour --no-external.
- playbooks/dev-reset.yml: rename captured var; coerce legacy
  external_mode=nat to pool with a warn; tighten gateway regex with \b.
- Makefile: ansible-dev-* targets now forward EXTRA_VARS="key=val ..."
  through --extra-vars so `make` callers can override without editing
  defaults.yml.
- scripts/ansible/README.md: document pool requirement, both invocation
  styles (direct -e vs make EXTRA_VARS), NAT removal.

* fix(ipsec): guard ipsec_encapsulation on ovs-monitor-ipsec liveness

enableOVNIPSec set OVS cert pointers + ipsec_encapsulation=true without
ensuring ovs-monitor-ipsec.service was running. Without that daemon, OVS
holds the cert pointers unused, strongSwan never gets IKE config, and
tunnel traffic ovn-controller marks for encryption gets silently
dropped. TestMultinodeIPSec fails on `node1 xfrm has no AEAD SAs`.

- systemd: spinifex-daemon Wants=/After= ovs-monitor-ipsec.service
- daemon: ensureOVSMonitorIPSecActive — systemctl enable --now +
  is-active poll; refuses to flip ipsec_encapsulation if daemon is dead
- daemon: single-node short-circuit — no peers means no tunnels means
  the flag is at best inert and at worst load-bearing-silent-drop
- ci: capture-net-diag.sh + workflow steps to snapshot OVS/OVN/xfrm
  state on failure, fan out across all 3 multinode nodes

Refs: mulga-siv-136

* test(e2e): sticky-skip downstream SSH tests when probe fails

When TestSSHProbe times out (3 min, typically because of mulga-siv-134
datapath bug), four downstream tests each re-probe SSH on the same
broken datapath and time out identically — single-node job runs ~24 min
instead of ~12 min, with the same error logged five times.

First waitForSSHReady timeout now sets a package-level atomic flag;
subsequent waitForSSHReady / trySSHReady / requireSSHHealthy calls skip
immediately. Preserves the original red signal on TestSSHProbe and on
any test that genuinely needed SSH (Skip ≠ Pass). Bool variant
(trySSHReady) consults but does not set the flag — its caller already
treats False as advisory warning, not fatal.

TestSGToSGDatapath has its own EventuallyErr SSH wait (not via
waitForSSHReady) and needs an explicit requireSSHHealthy(t) gate at
the top of runSGToSGDatapath. TestNATGateway already calls
waitForSSHReady first so the gate fires naturally.

Refs: mulga-siv-137

* fix(ipsec): use Debian unit name openvswitch-ipsec.service

CI artifact shows `Unit ovs-monitor-ipsec.service could not be found`
on every node. Debian's openvswitch-ipsec package ships the unit as
openvswitch-ipsec.service (the binary inside is ovs-monitor-ipsec, but
systemd's name follows the package). The previous commit guarded on
the wrong unit name, so:

- spinifex-daemon.service Wants=/After= silently no-op'd (missing unit)
- enableOVNIPSec's `systemctl enable --now ovs-monitor-ipsec.service`
  failed, daemon logged a warning and continued without flipping
  ipsec_encapsulation=true
- TestMultinodeIPSec skipped with `node1 reports ""` because OVS DB
  never received the cert pointers

Rename across all 5 spots (daemon, systemd unit, test, CI diag script,
workflow journal capture) to match the Debian package layout.

Note: the package itself still must be present on the CI VM image —
that's tracked in the mulga repo (image-builder provision.sh +
bootstrap-install.sh shim).

Refs: mulga-siv-136

* fix(e2e): authorize default SG tcp/22 + icmp in single-node fixture

admin init leaves the default SG closed (AWS parity); the Go single suite
never ported the Phase-5 SG-ingress block that run-e2e.sh has had since day
one, so every test runner SSH/ping probe hits the OVN port-group ACL drop.

- ec2helpers: add AuthorizeICMPIngress + EnsureDefaultSGOpen helpers.
- single/main_test: open default SG once per process in pkgFixOnce.Do.
- witness: extend ensureDefaultSGSSHIngress to authorize ICMP too.
- run-e2e.sh: append matching ICMP authorize next to tcp/22 block.

mulga-siv-134

* fix(network/reconcile): key DHCP_Options lookup by subnet_id not CIDR

Multi-tenant default VPCs share the same subnet CIDR (172.31.0.0/20) per
account. The existing FindDHCPOptionsByCIDR gate at apply.go:107 found
the first account's DHCP_Options row and skipped creation for every
subsequent subnet with the same CIDR. Those subnets' ports then attached
nothing (FindDHCPOptionsByExternalID misses on subnet_id), VMs got no
DHCPv4 lease, and SSH/ICMP into them silently failed even though SG
ACLs and NAT were correct.

Switch the gate to FindDHCPOptionsByExternalID keyed on spinifex:subnet_id
so each subnet owns its own row, matching the attach lookup at line 203.

Verified: account 000000000001 default VPC RunInstances now produces an
LSP with dhcpv4_options populated, VM cloud-init reports a 172.31.0.5/20
lease + default route via 172.31.0.1, and ping + ssh TCP handshake to
the EIP succeed end-to-end. Stale DHCP_Options row for the prior dead
subnet was wiped manually; reconciler recreated the correct row for the
live subnet on its next pass.

* fix(ipsec): enable openvswitch-ipsec at provision time, drop daemon write

Provisioning now runs `systemctl enable --now openvswitch-ipsec.service`
alongside openvswitch-switch and ovn-controller. The spinifex-daemon
process drops its `enable --now` shell-out and only polls is-active.

Sudoers gains one read-only line:
  spinifex-daemon ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/systemctl is-active openvswitch-ipsec.service

This mirrors the existing vpcd ovn-controller is-active precedent and
removes the daemon's need for systemd-write capability. Aligns with
least-privilege service account pattern: provision enables services,
daemon only reads status.

If the unit is inactive at runtime, the daemon refuses to flip
ipsec_encapsulation=true (silent-drop guard from mulga-siv-136) and
surfaces a clear error pointing at scripts/setup-ovn.sh.

* chore: unblock preflight on feat/network-layer-redesign

Two pre-existing failures blocked preflight on the branch:

- govulncheck flagged golang.org/x/net@v0.54.0 (GO-2026-5026, ASCII Punycode
  rejection bug in idna.ToASCII); reached via utils.DownloadFileWithProgress.
  Bump to v0.55.0; go mod tidy carries x/sys to v0.45.0.
- TestTopologyHandler_SubnetCreate_RouterPortFails asserted subnet create
  fails when the parent VPC router is missing. That contract changed in
  aed7b2e (mulga-siv-133), which made handleSubnetCreate call EnsureVPC
  idempotently before EnsureSubnet to avoid a NATS publish-order race.
  Delete the now-impossible failure case.

* refactor(network/ovn): relocate nbdb model package from services/vpcd

Phase 4 / mulga-siv-125.6 Slice A. Pure import rename, no logic change.

The OVN Northbound DB model (LogicalSwitch, LogicalRouter, DHCPOptions,
etc.) lived under services/vpcd/nbdb/ because that was the original home
of every OVN caller. After Phase 1+2 the L1 client (network/ovn) and all
L3/L5 managers (network/policy, network/external, network/topology,
network/reconcile) became the primary callers — 8 importers in network/*
vs 2 in services/vpcd/. The directory move puts the schema model where
its consumers are, and unblocks deleting services/vpcd/ entirely once
the subscriber/launcher relocations land (Slices B–D).

* refactor(vpcd): delete dead retrofit/reconcileIGW helpers + bridge-mode bleed

Phase 4 / mulga-siv-125.6 Slice B.

Production path no longer touches any of:

- RetrofitAllGatewayPortNetworks / RetrofitAllExternalLocalnetOptions —
  the 5-pass startup leftovers that network/reconcile (Phase 2.2) made
  redundant. Nothing called them outside tests.
- reconcileIGW + its allocateGatewayLRPIP / gwLrpRange helpers + the
  ipv4ToUint32 / uint32ToIPv4 utilities — superseded by
  external.IGWManager (Phase 2.4) which carries its own pool logic.
- ensureLocalnetOptions / ensureGatewayPortNetworks /
  expectedGatewayPortNetwork — read-before-write retrofit shims for the
  same code paths.
- generateMAC — only callers were reconcileIGW + its tests.

useCentralizedNAT (the bridge-mode bleed flagged in plan §2.2) is
replaced by a policy.NATMode value injected via WithNATMode(...). The
mode is resolved once in vpcd.go from host.UplinkMode and threaded into
both the topology-handler lazy managers and the reconciler stack, so
"is this veth?" is no longer a question topology.go can ask. The
TopologyHandler defaults to NATModeDistributed when WithNATMode is
omitted, matching the previous default.

Drops services/vpcd/topology.go from 1220 LOC to 693, deletes ~700 LOC
of obsolete tests (TestGenerateMAC, TestEnsureLocalnetOptions_*,
TestRetrofitAllExternalLocalnetOptions_FixesClearedOptions,
TestReconcileIGW_*, TestGwLrpRange), and frees the nbdb + utils +
net imports in topology.go.

Stale "phase 4 migrates those onto the new managers" comment in vpcd.go
fixed in passing — the subscribers were migrated in Phase 2.6
(mulga-siv-129); only the file-relocation parts of Phase 4 remain.
Stale ensureLocalnetOptions / ensureGatewayPortNetworks references in
network/ovn/{live.go,mock/mock.go} doc comments also cleaned up.

* refactor(network): move NATS VPC subscribers to network/subscribers

Phase 4 Slice C (mulga-siv-125.6). Promotes the NATS event handlers out of
services/vpcd into a new spinifex/network/subscribers package. Subscriber
holds the topology/policy/external managers directly — the lazy *Once
adapter shim (topology_manager.go) is deleted along with vpcd's local
event-struct copies.

launchService now constructs topology.LiveManager eagerly with a DNS
callback derived from external pools (preserving the unscoped-pool lookup
old TopologyHandler.lmDNSServer did), builds every manager up front, then
hands them to subscribers.New + Subscribe. reconcile.New receives
topology.Manager directly instead of through the adapter.

Bridge-mode constants and waitForFlowsHV move into vpcd.go alongside the
launcher; they were left behind as topology.go's last responsibilities.

Handler-layer tests (topology_test.go, security_test.go, integration_test.go)
are dropped: substance is covered by network/topology, network/policy,
network/external manager tests. subscribers/subscribers_test.go adds
focused coverage: missing-dep rejection, topic registration smoke, and
bad-JSON envelope per topic.

services/vpcd is now down to the launcher + the ovn/mock compat aliases
(removed in Slice D when the launcher promotes to cmd/vpcd/).

* refactor(vpcd): relocate services/vpcd → spinifex/vpcd; drop dead aliases

Phase 4 Slice D (mulga-siv-125.6). Final cleanup of the network-redesign
package layout. services/vpcd/ disappears entirely; the launcher remains
an in-process Service impl, just rehomed under spinifex/vpcd/ (no separate
binary — spx vpcd start stays the cobra entrypoint).

- Delete services/vpcd/mock_ovn.go + ovn.go (compat aliases now dead post
  Slice C; only callsite was launchService's NewLiveOVNClient, inlined to
  ovn.NewLiveClient).
- git-rename services/vpcd/vpcd.go + vpcd_test.go to spinifex/vpcd/.
- Retarget three importers (spinifex/service/service.go +
  service_test.go, cmd/spinifex/cmd/service.go) to the new path.
- Fix stale services/vpcd / TopologyHandler comments in network/reconcile/
  + network/external/types.go + spinifex/vpcd/vpcd.go.
- service-interfaces.yaml vpcd path updated.
- Plan doc §13/§14/§16 + §9.2/§19 updated: drop cmd/vpcd/main.go (was
  speculative; never built) in favour of in-process Service impl at
  spinifex/vpcd/vpcd.go. Plan §16 Created list now lists subscribers/.

Phase 4 plan items 1+2 (remove services/vpcd, entrypoint location)
satisfied. Items 3+4 remain blocked on mulga-siv-125.4 + 125.5 (bundled
join token, plan archive).

* fix(ovn): install openvswitch-ipsec + strongswan explicitly

ovs-monitor-ipsec.service fails to start without an IKE daemon. The
openvswitch-ipsec package only Recommends strongswan, so any apt
config that drops Recommends (or a base image with the recommends
already skipped) leaves the service in a Restart loop with 'IKE
daemon is not installed'. Hoist both packages into setup-ovn.sh so
provisioning is the single source of truth — the bootstrap shim in
mulga is no longer needed.

* test(network): pin ADR-0006 invariants to executable suite

Add static-analysis + behavioural tests that bind every safety and
liveness clause in ADR-0006 (S1-S9, L1-L3) to a named Go test. Failure
output quotes the ADR clause verbatim and points at the offending
file:line so future debugging sessions can't quietly bypass a layer
contract to make a test green.

Static-analysis suite (spinifex/network/invariants/):
- S1 layers_test.go: parses `go list -json`; rejects upward layer
  imports and layers pulling from cross-cutter packages
- S2 host_containment_test.go: AST-detects ovs-vsctl / ovn-nbctl /
  ovs-ofctl shell-out outside network/host/
- S3 nat_mode_test.go: rejects .UplinkMode() / NATModeFromUplinkMode()
  calls outside the init-time resolver locations
- S4 names_test.go: AST-detects OVN object name construction (concat,
  fmt.Sprintf, strings.Join) outside topology/names.go
- S5 policy_no_create_test.go: rejects CreateLogical{Switch,Router,...}
  and DeleteLogical{...} calls inside network/policy/
- S6 federation_isolation_test.go: rejects TransitSwitch /
  TransitRouterPort references and ovn-ic literals outside
  network/federation/ (pre-protects the layer before it lands)
- S8 ipsec_test.go: rejects strongswan / xfrm / IKEv2 / libreswan /
  openswan imports anywhere in network/
- S9 reconciler_singleton_test.go: rejects Reconcile…Loop and
  Reconcile…Pass<n> function names anywhere in network/
- S7 nats_subjects_test.go: scans for `vpc.<verb>` subjects missing
  the {azID} segment; calls t.Skip with the gap report so every test
  run prints the work-to-do without breaking CI. Flip to t.Fatalf
  when the cluster-wide subject rename ships.

Behavioural suite (spinifex/network/reconcile/liveness_test.go):
- L1 reconciler converges: scaled-intent (N=1,3,8) double-Reconcile
  property test; asserts second pass is a no-op
- L2 drift bound: structural check that DriftInterval is positive and
  ≤30 min support window; full fake-clock behavioural test deferred
- L3 federation re-enables: t.Skip stub pointing at the missing
  network/federation/ package

Fixes the one production S4 violation the new walker found:
network/external/igw.go was constructing "gw-port-"+vpcID inline.
Adds topology.GatewaySwitchPort(vpcID) helper and retargets both
AttachIGW and DetachIGW callsites through L2.

Plan + per-clause mechanic + phasing in
docs/development/improvements/network-invariants.md.

Refs: mulga-siv-140

* fix(ovn): install strongswan-charon (not strongswan metapackage)

The strongswan metapackage's '\''charon-systemd | strongswan-charon'\''
alternative resolves to charon-systemd by default, which ships
/usr/sbin/charon-systemd but not the legacy /usr/sbin/ipsec helper or
/usr/lib/ipsec/charon binary that ovs-monitor-ipsec --ike-daemon=strongswan
shells out to. Install strongswan-charon explicitly to pull
strongswan-starter (legacy ipsec controller) + the matching charon binary,
matching what openvswitch-ipsec.service expects.

Also reset-failed + restart openvswitch-ipsec.service after enable to
recover from the deb post-install starting the service before its
dependencies finished unpacking.

* chore: add CODEOWNERS — joshsiv-mulga gates network/ + vpcd/

Fall-through reviewer for any change is the maintainer.
network/ and vpcd/ are explicitly listed so the matching branch
protection rule ("Require review from Code Owners") routes those
PRs to joshsiv-mulga. Those trees are governed by ADR-0006
invariant tests (spinifex/network/invariants/); CODEOWNERS adds a
human review gate on top of the mechanical fence.

Refs: mulga-siv-141

* chore: CODEOWNERS fallthrough → @mulgadc/mulgadc-engineers team

Fallthrough reviewer should be the team, not a single maintainer, so
any engineer can approve PRs outside the explicitly-gated paths.
network/ and vpcd/ keep joshsiv-mulga as the required reviewer per
ADR-0006 invariant ownership.

Refs: mulga-siv-141

* feat(ci): add test_run workflow input for -test.run filter

Pass an optional regex through to each suite's '\''go test -test.run'\'' so
dispatches can target a single test (e.g. '\''^TestMultinodeIPSec$'\'') without
running the full multinode suite. Threaded through single, multinode, and
reboot suite invocations; empty input preserves current behaviour.

* fix(daemon): flip NB_Global.ipsec=true on management node

Setting Open_vSwitch.other_config:ipsec_encapsulation=true on each
chassis is necessary but not sufficient for OVN native IPsec — without
NB_Global.ipsec=true, ovn-controller never adds options:remote_name to
the Geneve tunnel ports, so ovs-monitor-ipsec sees no IPsec-enabled
tunnels and the kernel xfrm tables stay empty. After enabling
ipsec_encapsulation locally, also write NB_Global.ipsec=true when the
local ovnnb_db socket is present (management node only); workers skip
silently — one writer is enough for a cluster-wide flag.

Adds a scoped sudoers entry pinning the daemon to that exact ovn-nbctl
invocation so the grant can't be reused for other NB mutations.

* fix(ovn): grant charon AppArmor read on /etc/spinifex/ipsec

The strongswan-charon profile only allows reads from /etc/ipsec.*,
/etc/strongswan.*, and a small fixed allowlist. ovs-monitor-ipsec writes
the per-tunnel strongSwan config with absolute paths to our peer cert +
key under /etc/spinifex/ipsec/, so charon hits 'Permission denied'
loading them (it runs as uid 0 but AppArmor still blocks) and no xfrm
SAs come up. Drop a read grant for /etc/spinifex/ipsec/** into the
profile's local override hook + reload.

* fix(ovn): pin OVS system-id to hostname for IPsec cert identity match

ovs-monitor-ipsec uses chassis-id as the IKEv2 `@<name>` peer identity in
the strongSwan config it generates. Our per-node IPsec peer cert
(admin.GenerateIPSecPeerCert) carries the node name as CN + dnsName SAN.
With chassis-id left at the package-generated UUID, charon validates
`@<UUID>` against a cert with dnsName=<hostname> — mismatch returns
AUTHENTICATION_FAILED and no xfrm SAs are negotiated.

Pin system-id to hostname (which equals the node name on Mulga clusters)
by writing both the on-disk source of truth (/etc/openvswitch/system-id.conf,
read by ovs-ctl on boot) and the running OVS DB value. Writing only one
would drift on the next reboot — the original "do not override" comment
was right about that hazard, just wrong about the resolution.

Cross-link the invariant in admin/ipsec.go: changing the cert identity
without updating setup-ovn.sh (or vice versa) breaks IKE silently.

Refs: mulga-siv-136

* fix(ovn): take --node-name flag so chassis-id matches cluster identity

CI hostnames are bead-themed (env20-casuarina) and don't match the
cluster node name (node1/node2) baked into the IPsec peer cert dnsName
SAN at `spx admin init/join --node NAME`. Pinning system-id to
`hostname -s` produced env20-casuarina; charon then validated
`@node1` against dnsName=env20-casuarina and IKE failed with
AUTHENTICATION_FAILED.

Add a --node-name=NAME flag to setup-ovn.sh, default to hostname for
manual/dev invocations, and update the ansible install role to pass
{{ spinifex_node_name }}. The matching bootstrap-install.sh change
lives in mulga.

Refs: mulga-siv-136

* refactor(daemon): relocate L0 helpers to network/host + widen ADR-0006 S2

Phase 4 Slice E of mulga-siv-125.6. Cleans up spinifex/daemon/network.go
per the audit and widens the S2 invariant to forbid OVS/OVN shell-outs
in spinifex/daemon/ (daemon is an L0 consumer; S2 applies).

Moved to network/host/:
- OVSNetworkPlumber + SetupTap/CleanupTap → host.OVSPlumber (host.NewOVSPlumber)
- GetBridgeIPv4 → host.GetBridgeIPv4
- OVNHealthStatus + CheckOVNHealth → host.OVNHealth + host.HealthStatus
- daemon/ipsec.go OVS/OVN ops → host.SetIPSecCertPaths, host.EnableIPSecEncapsulation, host.SetNBGlobalIPSec

Moved to utils:
- sudoCommand → utils.SudoCommand + utils.SetSudoCommandForTest test seam
  (cross-package reassign would trip the reassign linter; helper keeps
  the indirection inside utils).

Moved to vm:
- generateMgmtMAC → vm.GenerateMgmtMAC (pairs with vm.GenerateDevMAC)

Deleted (dead):
- SetupComputeNode (replaced by network/host/bridges.go:ensureBridges +
  scripts/setup-ovn.sh:572-579)
- EnsureDataRoute
- findInterfaceByIP
- daemon/network.go + dead tests in daemon/network_test.go (duplicates of
  vm package tests retained; mgmt MAC test moved to vm/lifecycle_test.go)

S2 invariant (network/invariants/host_containment_test.go) now walks
both spinifex/network/ and spinifex/daemon/, skipping network/host/.

* fix(ovn): broaden AppArmor read grant to /etc/spinifex (covers CA cert)

The earlier override granted reads on /etc/spinifex/ipsec/** only, which
covers the peer cert + key but NOT the cluster CA at /etc/spinifex/ca.pem.
charon then can't load the CA, can't validate the peer cert chain, and
surfaces the failure as `no trusted RSA public key found for '<peer>'`
even though identity matching now succeeds — IKE_AUTH fails with
AUTHENTICATION_FAILED and no xfrm SAs negotiate.

Grant /etc/spinifex/** instead (covers ca.pem + ipsec/peer.{pem,key})
and always rewrite the override so re-runs replace the older narrower
rule.

Refs: mulga-siv-136

* fix(ipsec): symlink cluster CA into charon's default cacerts dir

ovs-monitor-ipsec writes per-conn `cacert=/etc/spinifex/ca.pem` references
in the strongSwan config, but strongSwan 6.0 only loads CAs declared in
standalone `ca` sections or files placed in /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts at
startup. Without this, charon authenticates the local side fine but
rejects every inbound peer cert as `no trusted RSA public key found for
'<peer>'`, AUTH_FAILED, and no xfrm SAs negotiate.

Do the symlink in admin.GenerateIPSecPeerCert (right after writing the
peer cert) — setup-ovn.sh runs before `spx admin init/join` creates
/etc/spinifex/ca.pem, so the wiring can't live there. Use a stage-and-
rename pattern so concurrent test invocations don't race on the symlink.

/etc/ipsec.d/cacerts is on charon's default AppArmor allowlist so no
profile change needed.

Refs: mulga-siv-136

* chore(setup-ovn): drop apt-get install_packages block

OVS/OVN/openvswitch-ipsec/strongswan-charon are baked into the CI gold
image via mulga's image-builder/scripts/provision.sh (commits 116bb05,
a9b3a9c). Keeping a runtime apt-get install path here pulled CI through
apt-cacher-ng on every bootstrap and tripped on intermittent "Message
has been manipulated" InRelease cache corruption (env21/env20 runs).

Drop the install block. Gold-image rebuild is the canonical place to
add new system packages. If a package is missing, downstream ovs/ovn
commands fail loudly during setup-ovn.sh's later steps — clearer signal
than silently re-installing through a flaky proxy.

setup.sh already supports INSTALL_SPINIFEX_SKIP_APT=1 (passed by mulga's
bootstrap-install.sh:237) so this removes the last runtime apt-get call
on the CI provisioning path.

* fix(ovn): gate system-id pin on explicit --node-name

setup-ovn.sh used to fall back to `hostname -s` when --node-name wasn't
passed, and then unconditionally wrote that value to
/etc/openvswitch/system-id.conf + ovs-vsctl external_ids:system-id.

On CI single-node, the gold image already registered a chassis with
name=<UUID>; setup-ovn.sh then rewrote system-id to the bead-themed
hostname (env10-banksia). vpcd's discoverChassis treats any chassis row
whose name != local system-id but hostname == local hostname as a stale
local chassis and skips it, so vpcd reported "no OVN chassis registered
in SBDB" and refused to start, cascading into the e2e + e2e-go failures
on run 26430839508.

Drop the hostname fallback. If --node-name is given, pin both the
on-disk file and the running OVS DB to it (callers that care about
IPsec cert identity matching still get it). If no --node-name is given,
leave the existing system-id alone — that's always safe whether the
value came from a gold-image UUID, bootstrap-install.sh writing nodeN
before this script runs, or a manual ansible value.

* fix(network/reconcile): skip orphan prune on startup; drift owns GC

The vpcd startup reconcile races against the daemon's EnsureDefaultVPC:
the daemon writes SG KV rows + publishes vpc.create-sg on each node in
parallel with vpcd starting up. The leader-gated reconcile can load
intent before any SG row is visible on its local JetStream replica
while subscribers on peer nodes are concurrently creating port groups
from the same vpc.create-sg events. A startup orphan-port-group sweep
then deletes managed sg_* port groups that intent hasn't caught up to.

CI run 26434124790 trace:
  node2 reconcile/lock: elected holder=env20-bottlebrush
  node2 reconcile: starting intent_sgs=0
  node2 reconcile/apply: removed orphan port group pg=sg_161c70ce23e704a2a
  node2 reconcile/apply: removed orphan port group pg=sg_a0d078650a3150391
  node2 reconcile/apply: removed orphan port group pg=sg_54b564b374e9162bb

Every subsequent RunInstances → vpc.create-port failed with
"port group not found" for ~3 minutes until the 5-minute drift tick
recreated the port groups. Tests give up after 60s; six multinode
suites cascade-fail on InsufficientInstanceCapacity.

Split the reconciler into Reconcile (full prune, drift loop) and
ReconcileApplyOnly (no prune, startup). applySGs takes a pruneOrphans
bool. vpcd startup calls ReconcileApplyOnly; drift loop unchanged.
Legitimate orphans get garbage-collected on the next drift tick — at
worst 5 minutes of lingering rows, no production impact.

Add TestReconcile_ApplyOnlyKeepsOrphanPortGroup to lock the contract.

* fix(ipsec): trigger charon rereadcacerts after CA symlink install

strongSwan scans /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts only at charon startup. The unit
openvswitch-ipsec.service is enabled at provision time and starts before
admin init writes the cluster CA symlink, so charon ends up running with
zero CAs loaded. Every IKE_AUTH then fails with `no trusted RSA public
key found for '<peer>'` and no SAs negotiate — the failure mode exposed
by TestMultinodeIPSec.

Append a stroke rereadcacerts call at the end of
installCAIntoCharonTrustStore so an already-running charon picks up the
freshly-placed CA without a service restart. Failure is swallowed at
debug — a missing/stopped charon at admin-init time is expected and a
later startup will scan cacerts naturally.

* refactor(network/host): move IPSec orchestrator from daemon (ADR-0006 S8)

ADR-0006 S8: "IPSec is OVN-native only. No layer implements custom IKEv2,
XFRM rules, or direct strongSwan management. IPSec SA lifecycle is delegated
entirely to OVN native IPSec and is invisible above L0."

The enableOVNIPSec orchestrator and its ensureOVSMonitorIPSecActive helper
lived in daemon/ipsec.go but composed L0 primitives (SetIPSecCertPaths,
EnableIPSecEncapsulation, SetNBGlobalIPSec) that already lived in
network/host. The orchestrator now lives alongside its callees as
host.EnableOVNIPSec, taking configPath and clusterConfig from the daemon at
the call site. Helper and test-override package vars (systemctlActiveTimeout,
ovnNBSocketPath) move with it; tests are translated to call EnableOVNIPSec
directly rather than via the Daemon struct.

Closes mulga-siv-142

* refactor(daemon): use topology.Port for OVN port names (ADR-0006 S4)

ADR-0006 S4 forbids any layer above L2 from constructing OVN object
names. Three daemon sites formatted "port-" + ENIId inline; route them
through topology.Port instead.

Closes mulga-siv-143

* refactor: use topology.Port for OVN port names in handlers + vm (ADR-0006 S4)

Replace inline "port-"+eniID formatting across five sites (eip, instance x2,
vpc/eni, vm/network_helpers) with topology.Port. OVSIfaceID stays as a thin
wrapper to preserve the OVN binding contract comment and existing call sites.

Closes mulga-siv-144

* test(network/invariants): widen scan roots to daemon/handlers/vm/testutil/utils (ADR-0006)

Widen ADR-0006 invariant scan roots so drift in upstack consumers surfaces
in CI. Backlog of violations in widened roots was drained by
mulga-siv-142/-143/-144; this commit makes the wider scan permanent.

  - S2 (host_containment): add vm/ alongside network/ + daemon/
  - S3 (nat_mode):         add daemon/ alongside network/ + vpcd/
  - S4 (names):            add daemon/, handlers/, vm/ alongside
                           network/ + vpcd/; add narrow AWS-ID exemption
                           (vpc-cidr-assoc-) so AWS resource IDs are not
                           misclassified as OVN object names
  - S6 (federation):       add daemon/, handlers/ alongside network/;
                           convert single-root walk to slice
  - S7 (nats_subjects):    add daemon/, handlers/, testutil/, utils/ —
                           stays t.Skip pending cluster-wide subject
                           rename; gap report now lists 58 subjects

CODEOWNERS: add /spinifex/network/invariants/ rule so widening or
narrowing the scan needs explicit owner review.

Closes mulga-siv-145
Refs: audit-adr-0006.md

* chore(e2e): disable IPsec in pseudo multi-node test

Pseudo multi-node runs three simulated nodes as unprivileged tf-user.
The charon trust-store install in 904b45e writes /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts,
which fails with EACCES under a non-root caller and aborts admin init.

Disable --ipsec for this suite — loopback-only nodes don't exercise
real Geneve encryption anyway. Real-multi-node + single-node e2e
(both run admin init via sudo) continue to cover the IPsec path.

* fix(ovn): atomic Ensure* primitives prevent duplicate logical entities

OVN NB has no unique constraint on Name. The previous
GetLogicalRouter→CreateLogicalRouter sequence in EnsureVPC was a TOCTOU
race: when vpc.create on one node and the defensive vpc.create-subnet
EnsureVPC call on another both observed absence, both inserted, yielding
two routers per VPC. The orphan held DNAT references blocking EIP
detach, and DNAT/flow installation landing on the orphan caused
TestMultinodeGuestSSH SSH timeouts.

Add EnsureLogicalRouter / EnsureLogicalSwitch / EnsurePortGroup to the
libovsdb client. Each builds a single OVSDB transaction combining a
wait-op (Until=equal, Rows=[]) gated on absence of a Name match with the
insert. The server serialises the wait+insert atomically; concurrent
callers see exactly one survivor and the rest fall through to a re-fetch
that returns the canonical row.

Switch all production callers (topology.EnsureVPC / EnsureSubnet /
EnsureSGPortGroup, external.AttachIGW, reconcile.applyVPCs /
applySubnets) to the Ensure* variants. Bare Create* remains available to
the L1 wrapper.

Add invariant test TestS4_OVNNamedCreatesUseEnsure (AST walk) to block
future reintroduction of the bare Create* call sites outside
network/ovn.

Mock implements Ensure* under its existing mutex so the concurrency
tests (50/30/30 goroutines for Router/Switch/PortGroup) prove a single
UUID survives.

Refs: mulga-siv-146

* fix(ovn): wait-op rows must be non-empty; flip to NotEqual predicate

The Ensure* primitives sent a wait-op with `Rows: []ovsdb.Row{}` plus
`Until: ==` (RFC 7047 §5.2.6 absence test). The libovsdb Operation
struct tags Rows as `json:"rows,omitempty"`, so the empty slice was
dropped on the wire and ovsdb-server rejected every transaction with
"Required 'rows' member is missing", breaking reconciler bootstrap and
every downstream create-port lookup ("logical switch X not found").

Flip the predicate to the equivalent `Until: !=` formulation with a
single-row projection containing the Name we want absent:

  no row    → projection []           != [{name}] → predicate holds
  row exists → projection [{name}]    == [{name}] → predicate fails

Same atomic guarantee, JSON now well-formed. Mock tests can't catch
this — only a real ovsdb-server validates the envelope.

* chore: remove generateMAC wrapper

* chore: remove all bead / plan references

* fix(network/policy): wait for chassis flows after AddNATGateway

AddEIP fires m.barrier() to block until ovn-northd compiles NB→SB and every
chassis installs the new dnat_and_snat flows; AddNATGateway returned right
after the NB commit. So `aws ec2 create-route … --nat-gateway-id` would
publish vpc.add-nat-gateway, the SNAT row would land in NB, and the API
call would succeed before the gateway chassis had programmed the SNAT flow
for the private subnet.

Phase 8d's 10×5s=50s ping budget races that flow-install latency on slow
CI hosts (last seen run 26455602615 single-node, identical flake on
unmodified dev run 26434711010 — pre-existing, not introduced by Ensure*).

Mirror AddEIP: call m.barrier() after AddNAT returns. Add unit test
TestNATManager_AddNATGateway_FlowsBarrier_Fires covering the new path.

* chore: remove more plan refs

* chore: remove GenerateIPSecPeerCertIfEnabled

* chore: remove dupliate subnetGatewayCIDR function

* chore(network): trim superfluous comments across network/ tree

Collapse multi-paragraph godocs to 1-2 sentences, drop WHAT-restatement
comments, remove section dividers grouping <10 items, and cut prose
narration in tests. ADR clause references, one-line WHY comments for
non-obvious OVN/OVSDB/AWS/NATS semantics, and exported-symbol godoc are
preserved. No behavioural changes.

Packages: invariants, topology, host, external, ovn, reconcile, policy,
subscribers.

* fix(igw): restore attachment State="available" for AWS parity

AWS InternetGatewayAttachment.State is "available" when an IGW is
attached to a VPC, per the AWS SDK doc ("the state is available when
attached to a VPC; otherwise, this value is not returned"). Commit
b7505f8 wrote "attached"/"detached" to align with the reconciler
filter, which inverted AWS parity.

Fix the producer to write "available" again and update the consumer:
 - handlers/ec2/igw: AttachInternetGateway and DetachInternetGateway
   both persist State="available"; IGWRecord comment narrowed.
 - network/reconcile/intent.loadIGWs: filter accepts "available" (was
   "attached"); attachment is identified by VpcId != "".
 - tests updated: igw service_impl_test, routetable service_impl_test
   fixture, reconcile intent_test fixture.

* Update spinifex.toml

* refactor(subscribers): route EIP/NATGW through L5 wrappers (ADR-0006 §S1)

Subscriber previously called policy.NATManager directly for EIP and NAT
Gateway operations, bypassing the L5 wrappers (EIPManager, NATGWManager)
that existed on paper. ADR-0006 §S1 requires every cross-layer call to
pass through the immediate lower neighbor's typed interface; IGW already
followed this pattern.

Wire EIPManager and NATGWManager into the Subscriber struct, construct
them in vpcd alongside IGWManager, and swap the four direct-L3 call
sites (AddEIP, DeleteEIP, AddNATGateway, DeleteNATGateway) onto the
L5 surface (AttachEIP, DetachEIP, AttachNATGateway, DetachNATGateway).
AttachEIP now fires the flows-barrier, giving callers the same
"reachable on return" guarantee IGW already had.

The reconciler still calls policy.NATManager directly; that's a
cross-cutter and a separate concern.

* test(reboot): port 8MB WAL pad workaround from bash run-reboot-e2e.sh

App VMs' user-data writes (unit file + index.html) sit in the on-host
WAL until WriteWALToChunk crosses the 4MB threshold. Host reboot before
that loses them — systemd then refuses to load the zero-byte unit and
the responder never starts. Mirror the bash driver's dd+sync pad so the
WAL flushes pre-reboot. Drop when the upstream WAL fix lands.

* test(e2e): dump OVN/OVS/SG state on Phase 8d NATGW failure

Phase 8d's existing failure path only prints lr-nat-list and
lr-route-list. CI artifacts are not uploaded when run-e2e.sh exits
nonzero, so debugging the NATGW regression requires inline diagnostics
in the journal. Expand the dump to include nb/sb show, chassis bindings,
port_group ACLs, br-int flows filtered to the NATGW IP/private subnet,
host routes, and the private VM's own ip/route/neigh state.

* fix(ovn,reconcile): scope NAT deletes to router; NATGW snat per associated subnet

Two compounding bugs caused Phase 8d NATGW E2E flake (~60% CI failure):

1. ovn.DeleteNAT/DeleteNATByExternalIP searched all NAT rows globally and
   only mutated the named router afterwards. With AWS subnet CIDRs repeating
   across VPCs, (type, logicalIP/externalIP) is not globally unique — the
   delete picked a NAT row owned by a different router, the mutate was a
   no-op, and the row delete failed with "remaining reference(s)", leaving
   the original router's NAT orphaned. Both calls now resolve the LR first
   and filter NAT lookups to lr.NAT UUIDs. Mock client mirrors the scoping.

2. reconcile.loadNATGWs used the NATGW's home (public) subnet CIDR as
   SubnetCIDR, producing an snat for the wrong CIDR that collided with the
   correct event-published snat. loadNATGWs now walks route tables and
   emits one NATGWSpec per (NATGW, associated private subnet) pair,
   mirroring publishNatGatewayEventsForAssociation. Intent map keyed by
   natgwID|subnetCIDR so multi-subnet NATGWs produce distinct specs.

Tests:
- nat_test.go: cross-router same-logicalIP isolation for DeleteEIP and
  DeleteNATGateway
- intent_test.go: NATGW snat uses associated private subnet CIDR, not the
  NATGW home subnet; NATGW with no associations produces no spec

---------

Co-authored-by: Julian Sommer <115516918+juliansommer@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-27 21:05:01 +10:00
Julian Sommer 3f3ba32317 chore: cleanup COMMANDS.md 2026-05-27 15:54:17 +10:00
Julian Sommer f525006d87 feat: IAM Roles part 2 (#256) 2026-05-27 15:44:18 +10:00
Josh Siviour ae6fcfe7a1 Ansible dev extensions (#254)
* chore(ansible): add dev-status playbook (read-only health doctor)

New `dev-status` role + playbook + Makefile target. Read-only snapshot of
spinifex.target, failed units, port listeners, OVN/OVS state, gateway
round-trip, AMI/keypair/volume/instance counts, and build-vs-install drift
for spx + nbdkit plugin + microvm artifacts. Pairs with dev-preflight as
the post-install / running-system diagnostic.

Plan: docs/development/improvements/ansible-dev-extensions.md (mulga).
Bead: mulga-siv-86.1.

* chore(ansible): add dev-logs playbook (bug-report bundle)

New `logs` role + playbook + Makefile target. Captures journalctl for
spinifex-* / ovn-* / openvswitch-switch / qemu / nbdkit, copies
/var/log/spinifex/, snapshots systemctl status + networking (ip/ss/ovs/
ovn show) + spx/plugin/microvm version manifest + dmesg, then bundles
into /tmp/spinifex-logs-<host>-<ts>.tar.gz owned by the invoking user.

Tail mode deliberately omitted — devs should `journalctl -u 'spinifex-*' -f`
directly; ansible captures stdout and is the wrong tool for follow.

Overrides: -e logs_since=10min, -e logs_output_dir=/tmp,
-e logs_include_dmesg=false.

Plan: docs/development/improvements/ansible-dev-extensions.md (mulga).
Bead: mulga-siv-86.2.

* chore(ansible): add dev-snapshot / dev-restore (state checkpoint)

New snapshot + restore roles + playbooks + Makefile targets.

dev-snapshot quiesces the full spinifex+OVN+OVS stack in dependency
order (spinifex.target → ovn-controller → ovn-central →
openvswitch-switch), kills lingering QEMU VMs, then tars /etc/spinifex,
/var/lib/spinifex (viperblock volumes included), /var/lib/ovn (NB+SB
DBs), and /etc/openvswitch/conf.db into /var/lib/spinifex-snapshots/
<name>.tar.gz with a sibling .manifest, restarts services in reverse,
and waits for the AWS gateway to come back.

dev-restore inverses: stop services, wipe the same path set, untar the
named bundle, copy /etc/spinifex/ca.pem back into the system trust
store and rebuild the CA bundle (the snapshot doesn't include
/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/spinifex-ca.crt), daemon-reload,
restart in reverse order.

Both refuse to run without -e snapshot_name=<name>, validate the name
matches [A-Za-z0-9._-]+, and produce honest summaries when the gateway
fails to come back (does not mask other ongoing issues).

Tested on dev box: snapshot/restore of 2.4 GiB state (large viperblock
volumes) completes cleanly with no data drift; services all return to
active.

Plan: docs/development/improvements/ansible-dev-extensions.md (mulga).
Bead: mulga-siv-86.3.

* fix(ansible): wrap aws/spx calls in sg spinifex to fix group inheritance

Adds scripts/ansible/scripts/aws-as-spinifex.sh and spx-as-spinifex.sh
helpers that re-enter the command under `sg spinifex -c '...'` with
AWS_PROFILE=spinifex preset. Swaps every AWS / spx admin task across
the status, init, deploy, smoketest, snapshot, and restore roles to
use these via spinifex_aws_cli / spinifex_spx_cli vars.

Root cause (mulga-siv-92): ansible's `become_user` is a no-op when the
target user equals the calling user, so sudo never runs and
supplementary groups are inherited from the operator's invoking shell
rather than re-initialised via initgroups(3). On shells that predate
setup.sh's spinifex group add, the spinifex group is missing and
/etc/spinifex/ca.pem (drwxr-x--- root:spinifex, the AWS CLI's
ca_bundle) is unreadable — aws cli fails with SSL Errno 13. The
helpers re-enter the command in a shell that explicitly assumes the
spinifex group via sg(1), bypassing the issue regardless of how
ansible-playbook is invoked.

Side benefit: drops 50 lines of repeated `become: true / become_user /
environment: AWS_PROFILE` boilerplate across the roles.

Closes mulga-siv-92.

* chore(ansible): add dev-version playbook (build vs install drift)

New `version` role + playbook + Makefile target. Compares sha256 of
built artifacts (bin/spx, viperblock/lib/nbdkit-viperblock-plugin.so,
build/microvm/{vmlinuz,initramfs.cpio.gz}) against their installed
counterparts (/usr/local/bin/spx, plugindir, /usr/share/spinifex/
microvm/*). Prints per-artifact drift verdict plus sub-repo HEAD
short-revs (spinifex/viperblock/predastore) for context. Closes with
either "DRIFT detected — run: make ansible-dev-deploy" or "No drift".

Pure read-only. Faster than dev-status (no AWS/OVN/port probing).

Plan: docs/development/improvements/ansible-dev-extensions.md (mulga).
Bead: mulga-siv-86.9.

* chore(ansible): add missing roles/deploy/meta/main.yml

All other roles have meta/main.yml; deploy was the lone outlier.
Consistency fix. Closes mulga-siv-86.10.

* chore(ansible): add dev-vpc playbook (idempotent dev VPC fixture)

New `vpc` role + playbook + Makefile target. Idempotent
present/absent dispatch creates a deterministic spinifex-dev-vpc with
public subnet (10.99.1.0/24, map-public-ip-on-launch), internet
gateway, route table, and default route. Hooks into smoketest's launch
path — smoketest's existing
Name=map-public-ip-on-launch,Values=true filter now picks it up
instead of falling through to the "no subnet → skip launch" branch.

Idempotency: each step describe-then-create, looking up by Name tag
where possible. Re-running on a converged VPC is changed=0, skipped=5
(the create tasks).

Workaround for mulga-siv-94 (gateway silently drops
--tag-specifications and no-ops create-tags for route tables): role
falls back to "RT associated with our subnet" lookup so tag absence
doesn't break idempotency. create-tags task is kept as a no-op-now
forward-looking step for when the gateway gap is closed.

Teardown (-e dev_vpc_state=absent) enumerates ALL non-main route
tables in the VPC (not just the tagged one), so orphans from prior
runs that landed before the fallback was added get cleaned up too.

Tested end-to-end against josh-banksia dev gateway: create / re-run
(idempotent) / teardown all converge cleanly.

Plan: docs/development/improvements/ansible-dev-extensions.md (mulga).
Bead: mulga-siv-86.4.
2026-05-26 16:14:11 +10:00
Julian Sommer 51c48d8c0e feat: IAM Roles part 1 (#253) 2026-05-26 15:45:46 +10:00
1249 changed files with 124168 additions and 44861 deletions
+15
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
# CODEOWNERS — GitHub PR review enforcement
#
# Format: <path pattern> <owner> [<owner> …]
# Order matters — last matching pattern wins.
#
# Set the matching branch protection rule on `dev` and `main` to
# "Require review from Code Owners" or this file is advisory only.
# Network layer is governed by ADR-0006 invariant tests.
# Changes here must respect those clauses
# see spinifex/network/invariants/
# docs/development/proposals/az-local-architecture/0006-spinifex-network-layer-contract.md
/spinifex/network/ @joshsiv-mulga
/spinifex/vpcd/ @joshsiv-mulga
/spinifex/network/invariants/ @joshsiv-mulga
Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 285 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 754 KiB

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 643 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 206 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 107 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 202 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 158 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 175 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 225 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 136 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 48 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 155 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 132 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 44 KiB

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 151 KiB

+88
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# capture-net-diag.sh — write a snapshot of network / OVN / OVS / IPsec
# state into $1 (a directory the caller already created on the local host).
# Designed to run on a spinifex node after an E2E suite, before tofu destroy
# pulls the rug out. Every command is independent — `|| true` so a missing
# binary on one path doesn't abort the rest of the capture.
#
# Output layout (under $1/net-diag/):
# openvswitch-ipsec.status systemctl status (output-only)
# openvswitch-ipsec.journal last 200 journal lines
# ipsec.openvswitch_conf ovs-vsctl get Open_vSwitch . other_config
# ipsec.xfrm_state ip xfrm state list
# ipsec.xfrm_policy ip xfrm policy list
# ovn.sb_show ovn-sbctl show
# ovn.nb_show ovn-nbctl show
# ovs.show ovs-vsctl show
# ovs.flows_br_int ovs-ofctl dump-flows br-int
# ovs.tunnels ovs-appctl ofproto/list-tunnels br-int
# net.links ip -s link show
# net.routes ip route show table all
# net.addrs ip -br addr show
# systemd.failed_units systemctl list-units --state=failed
set +e
OUT="${1:?usage: capture-net-diag.sh <output-dir>}"
mkdir -p "$OUT"
run() {
local label="$1"; shift
{
echo "# $*"
"$@" 2>&1
} > "$OUT/$label" || true
}
run openvswitch-ipsec.status sudo systemctl status openvswitch-ipsec.service --no-pager --full --lines=50
run openvswitch-ipsec.journal sudo journalctl -u openvswitch-ipsec.service --no-pager --output=short-iso -n 200
run ipsec.openvswitch_conf sudo ovs-vsctl get Open_vSwitch . other_config
run ipsec.xfrm_state sudo ip xfrm state list
run ipsec.xfrm_policy sudo ip xfrm policy list
run ovn.sb_show sudo ovn-sbctl show
run ovn.nb_show sudo ovn-nbctl show
run ovn.sb_chassis sudo ovn-sbctl list chassis
run_per_lr() {
local label="$1"; shift
local subcmd="$1"; shift
{
echo "# ovn-nbctl $subcmd <each-logical-router>"
local lrs
lrs="$(sudo ovn-nbctl --bare --columns=name list Logical_Router 2>/dev/null)"
for lr in $lrs; do
echo
echo "=== $lr ==="
sudo ovn-nbctl "$subcmd" "$lr" 2>&1
done
} > "$OUT/$label" || true
}
run_per_lr ovn.lr_routes lr-route-list
run_per_lr ovn.lr_policies lr-policy-list
run_per_lr ovn.lr_nat lr-nat-list
run ovs.show sudo ovs-vsctl show
run ovs.flows_br_int sudo ovs-ofctl dump-flows br-int
run ovs.tunnels sudo ovs-appctl ofproto/list-tunnels br-int
run net.links ip -s link show
run net.routes ip route show table all
run net.addrs ip -br addr show
run net.neigh ip neigh show
run net.bridge_fdb bridge fdb show
run net.conntrack sudo conntrack -L
run systemd.failed_units sudo systemctl list-units --state=failed --no-pager
# Background pcap (started by start-net-capture.sh, if present).
if [ -f /tmp/spinifex-e2e-tcpdump.pid ]; then
PID="$(cat /tmp/spinifex-e2e-tcpdump.pid 2>/dev/null)"
sudo kill -INT "$PID" 2>/dev/null || true
sleep 1
if [ -f /tmp/spinifex-e2e-wan.pcap ]; then
sudo cp /tmp/spinifex-e2e-wan.pcap "$OUT/wan.pcap" 2>/dev/null || true
sudo chmod 0644 "$OUT/wan.pcap" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
fi
exit 0
+47
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# start-net-capture.sh — kick off background tcpdump on br-wan.
# Pair: capture-net-diag.sh stops it and copies the pcap into net-diag/.
#
# Filter: anything on br-wan involving the EIP pool (192.168.0.0/23) plus
# ARP for the same range. Single ring buffer (-W 1 -G 0) → grows until stop;
# capped at 64 MiB via -C 64. Snaplen 200 bytes (headers + a bit) to keep
# size sane while preserving L2/L3/L4 + first payload bytes.
set +e
PCAP=/tmp/spinifex-e2e-wan.pcap
PIDFILE=/tmp/spinifex-e2e-tcpdump.pid
if [ -f "$PIDFILE" ] && kill -0 "$(cat "$PIDFILE" 2>/dev/null)" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "[start-net-capture] tcpdump already running pid=$(cat "$PIDFILE")"
exit 0
fi
sudo rm -f "$PCAP" "$PIDFILE"
if ! command -v tcpdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "[start-net-capture] tcpdump not installed — skipping" >&2
exit 0
fi
if ! ip link show br-wan >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "[start-net-capture] br-wan absent — skipping" >&2
exit 0
fi
sudo nohup tcpdump -i br-wan -s 200 -C 64 -W 1 -U \
-w "$PCAP" \
'(net 192.168.0.0/23) or (arp and (arp[24:4]&0xfffffe00=0xc0a80000))' \
>/tmp/spinifex-e2e-tcpdump.log 2>&1 &
PID=$!
echo "$PID" | sudo tee "$PIDFILE" >/dev/null
disown
sleep 1
if ! kill -0 "$PID" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "[start-net-capture] tcpdump died — see /tmp/spinifex-e2e-tcpdump.log" >&2
cat /tmp/spinifex-e2e-tcpdump.log >&2 || true
sudo rm -f "$PIDFILE"
exit 1
fi
echo "[start-net-capture] tcpdump pid=$PID pcap=$PCAP"
exit 0
+44 -3
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ name: E2E Bare-Metal
on:
workflow_dispatch:
workflow_call:
inputs:
ref:
description: "spinifex ref to checkout/test (default: triggering ref)"
required: false
type: string
default: ""
permissions:
contents: read
@@ -12,7 +19,7 @@ env:
jobs:
e2e_baremetal:
name: Bare-Metal Multi-Node E2E
name: Bare-Metal Single-Node E2E
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-baremetal ]
timeout-minutes: 120
concurrency:
@@ -20,11 +27,17 @@ jobs:
cancel-in-progress: false
env:
BM_ISO_CACHE: /var/cache/spinifex-iso-builder
ARTIFACT_DIR: /tmp/spinifex-e2e-nightly-cell-20-${{ github.run_id }}
steps:
- name: Clean Workspace
run: sudo rm -rf "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
run: |
sudo umount -R -l "${BM_ISO_CACHE}/rootfs" 2>/dev/null || true
if [ ! -c /dev/null ]; then sudo rm -f /dev/null; sudo mknod -m 666 /dev/null c 1 3; fi
sudo rm -rf --one-file-system "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
ref: ${{ inputs.ref || github.ref }}
- uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v3
id: app-token
@@ -91,6 +104,8 @@ jobs:
echo "Ubuntu 26.04 cloud image cached ($(du -h "$UBUNTU_IMG" | cut -f1))"
fi
- name: Install go-junit-report on runner
run: go install github.com/jstemmer/go-junit-report/v2@latest
- name: Run Bare-Metal E2E
env:
@@ -100,8 +115,34 @@ jobs:
BM_UBUNTU_IMAGE: ${{ env.BM_ISO_CACHE }}/ubuntu-26.04-cloudimg-amd64.img
SPX_EXTERNAL_POOL: ${{ env.SPINIFEX_CI_POOL }}
run: |
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
set -o pipefail
sudo -E mulga/scripts/baremetal/run-baremetal-e2e.sh \
--vmlinuz "${BM_ISO_CACHE}/vmlinuz" \
--initrd "${BM_ISO_CACHE}/initrd.img" \
--squashfs "${BM_ISO_CACHE}/spinifex.squashfs" \
--tests-tar "${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-tests.tar"
--tests-tar "${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-tests.tar" \
2>&1 | tee "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-baremetal.log"
- name: Generate JUnit report
if: always()
run: |
LOG="${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-baremetal.log"
[ -f "$LOG" ] || exit 0
go-junit-report -in "$LOG" -out "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/junit-baremetal.xml" || true
- name: Analyze e2e failures
if: always()
uses: ./.github/actions/e2e-analyze
with:
junit-glob: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}/junit-*.xml
log-dir: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
title: "E2E failure analysis (cell 20)"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
if: always()
with:
name: e2e-artifacts-cell-20-${{ github.run_id }}
path: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
if-no-files-found: warn
retention-days: 14
-24
View File
@@ -21,10 +21,6 @@ jobs:
ddil:
name: DDIL Real Multi-Node
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-multi ]
# Budget: ~45m go test + tofu provision/bootstrap/teardown on ci-multi.
# In Phase 1 the scenarios all t.Skip, so the real-world runtime is
# dominated by provisioning; the 60m ceiling leaves headroom for
# Phase 2/3 when assertions come online.
timeout-minutes: 60
env:
TOFU_LOG: /tmp/e2e-tofu-ddil-${{ github.run_id }}.log
@@ -39,10 +35,6 @@ jobs:
private-key: ${{ secrets.APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
repositories: mulga
# Full spinifex checkout: the Go harness must run on the runner
# (outside the cluster) so its SSH path survives scenario partitions
# that drop peer-to-peer cluster traffic. Running inside the cluster
# would self-sever when Scenario C isolates a node.
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
name: Checkout Spinifex
with:
@@ -88,7 +80,6 @@ jobs:
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# shellcheck source=/dev/null
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
export TF_VAR_git_branch="${GIT_BRANCH}"
quiet_run "tofu init" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu init -input=false
@@ -140,10 +131,6 @@ jobs:
exit 1
fi
# Guest SSH key: bootstrap-install.sh imports spinifex-key into EC2;
# the matching private material was generated on the primary node at
# ~/.ssh/spinifex-key. Pull it to the runner so the harness can SSH
# the witness via its MapPublicIpOnLaunch-assigned EIP.
GUEST_KEY="${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-key"
scp -i "${SSH_KEY}" -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null \
"${SSH_USER}@${PRIMARY_IP}:~/.ssh/spinifex-key" "${GUEST_KEY}"
@@ -151,11 +138,6 @@ jobs:
mkdir -p "${RUNNER_TEMP}/ddil-results"
cd "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex"
# gotestsum: human-readable PASS/FAIL/SKIP lines in Actions stdout,
# plus machine-readable jsonfile + JUnit XML artifacts. The JUnit
# file feeds the junit-report composite action below so failures
# become summary table rows + workflow annotations.
# shellcheck source=/dev/null
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
banner "DDIL scenarios"
DDIL_NODES="${NODE_IPS}" \
@@ -185,10 +167,6 @@ jobs:
if: failure()
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
# Pull spinifex-* journals + QEMU process listings from every
# node into the artifact bundle so failures can be triaged
# without re-provisioning the cluster. Best-effort — a missing
# node should not mask the original test failure.
set +e
INVENTORY=$(tofu output -json inventory)
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path')
@@ -197,7 +175,6 @@ jobs:
LOG_DIR="${RUNNER_TEMP}/ddil-results/cluster-logs"
mkdir -p "${LOG_DIR}"
# shellcheck source=/dev/null
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
mapfile -t NODE_IPS < <(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[].wan_ip')
for ip in "${NODE_IPS[@]}"; do
@@ -221,7 +198,6 @@ jobs:
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# shellcheck source=/dev/null
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
quiet_run "tofu workspace select" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
quiet_run "tofu destroy" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+141 -25
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ jobs:
timeout-minutes: 35
env:
TOFU_LOG: /tmp/e2e-nightly-cell-${{ matrix.cell }}-${{ github.run_id }}.log
ARTIFACT_DIR: /tmp/spinifex-e2e-nightly-cell-${{ matrix.cell }}-${{ github.run_id }}
steps:
# blank or scheduled run = full matrix.
@@ -60,7 +61,10 @@ jobs:
- name: Clean Workspace
if: steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
run: sudo rm -rf "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
run: |
sudo umount -R -l /var/cache/spinifex-iso-builder/rootfs 2>/dev/null || true
if [ ! -c /dev/null ]; then sudo rm -f /dev/null; sudo mknod -m 666 /dev/null c 1 3; fi
sudo rm -rf --one-file-system "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
- uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v3
if: steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
@@ -78,6 +82,11 @@ jobs:
sparse-checkout: scripts/tofu-cluster
path: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
if: steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
with:
path: spinifex
- name: Build Install Artifacts
if: steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
@@ -132,8 +141,18 @@ jobs:
WAN_IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[0].wan_ip')
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path')
SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" tf-user@${WAN_IP} \
"cd ~/e2e-tests && ./run-e2e.sh && ./run-cert-e2e.sh && ENDPOINT=https://${WAN_IP}:9999 ./run-lb-e2e.sh"
ssh -tt -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" tf-user@${WAN_IP} \
"set -u; mkdir -p '${ARTIFACT_DIR}'; cd \$HOME/e2e-tests/_bin; FAIL=0; \
for SUITE in single cert lb; do \
echo \"::group::suite \$SUITE\"; \
date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-'\$SUITE'.start'; \
GITHUB_ACTIONS=true FORCE_COLOR=1 SPINIFEX_E2E=1 SPINIFEX_MODE=single \
ARTIFACT_DIR='${ARTIFACT_DIR}' \
./\$SUITE.test -test.v -test.timeout=30m \
2>&1 | tee '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-'\$SUITE'.log'; \
rc=\${PIPESTATUS[0]}; echo \"::endgroup::\"; \
if [ \$rc -ne 0 ]; then echo \"\$SUITE: FAILED\" >> '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/suite-status.txt'; FAIL=1; fi; \
done; exit \$FAIL"
- name: Run Multi Node E2E
if: steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true' && matrix.topo == 'real-multi'
@@ -144,32 +163,57 @@ jobs:
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path')
SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
NODE_IPS=""
NODES_CSV=""
NODE_COUNT=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq '.nodes | length')
for i in $(seq 0 $((NODE_COUNT - 1))); do
NODE_IPS="${NODE_IPS} $(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r ".nodes[$i].wan_ip")"
ip=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r ".nodes[$i].wan_ip")
NODES_CSV="${NODES_CSV:+$NODES_CSV,}$ip"
done
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" tf-user@${NODE1_IP} \
"cd ~/e2e-tests && ./run-multinode-e2e.sh ${NODE_IPS} && ./run-cert-e2e.sh --multinode ${NODE_IPS} && ENDPOINT=https://${NODE1_IP}:9999 ./run-lb-e2e.sh --nodes ${NODE_IPS}"
ssh -tt -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" tf-user@${NODE1_IP} \
"set -u; mkdir -p '${ARTIFACT_DIR}'; cd \$HOME/e2e-tests/_bin; FAIL=0; \
for SUITE in multinode cert lb; do \
echo \"::group::suite \$SUITE\"; \
date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-'\$SUITE'.start'; \
GITHUB_ACTIONS=true FORCE_COLOR=1 SPINIFEX_E2E=1 SPINIFEX_MODE=multinode \
SPINIFEX_NODES='${NODES_CSV}' SPINIFEX_NODE_IPS='${NODES_CSV}' \
SPINIFEX_SSH_USER=tf-user SPINIFEX_SSH_KEY=\$HOME/.ssh/tf-user-ap-southeast-2 \
ARTIFACT_DIR='${ARTIFACT_DIR}' \
./\$SUITE.test -test.v -test.timeout=30m \
2>&1 | tee '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-'\$SUITE'.log'; \
rc=\${PIPESTATUS[0]}; echo \"::endgroup::\"; \
if [ \$rc -ne 0 ]; then echo \"\$SUITE: FAILED\" >> '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/suite-status.txt'; FAIL=1; fi; \
done; exit \$FAIL"
- name: Run Tofu Workbooks
if: steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true' && matrix.extra == 'tofu-examples'
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
# The driver emits go test -v markers per workbook; teeing to
# test-tofu.log feeds the same go-junit-report -> e2e-analyze -> upload
# chain the Go suites use, so cell 17 produces an RCA bundle too.
run: |
set +e
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
INVENTORY=$(tofu output -json inventory)
WAN_IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[0].wan_ip')
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path')
SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-tofu.start"
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" tf-user@${WAN_IP} \
"cd ~/e2e-tests && ./run-tofu-examples-e2e.sh"
"cd ~/e2e-tests && ./run-tofu-examples-e2e.sh" \
2>&1 | tee "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-tofu.log"
rc=${PIPESTATUS[0]}
if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then echo "tofu: FAILED" >> "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/suite-status.txt"; fi
exit $rc
- name: Run Reboot Resilience E2E
if: steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true' && matrix.extra == 'reboot-single'
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
# Driver runs from the runner (NOT via ssh-and-run) so it survives the
# reboot.test runs from the runner (NOT via ssh-and-run) so it survives the
# systemctl-reboot-induced ssh disconnect mid-run.
run: |
set +e
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
INVENTORY=$(tofu output -json inventory)
WAN_IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[0].wan_ip')
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path')
@@ -178,31 +222,85 @@ jobs:
REBOOT_DIR="${RUNNER_TEMP}/reboot-e2e"
mkdir -p "$REBOOT_DIR"
tar xf "${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-tests.tar" -C "$REBOOT_DIR"
chmod +x "$REBOOT_DIR/run-reboot-e2e.sh"
chmod +x "$REBOOT_DIR/_bin/reboot.test"
WAN_IP="$WAN_IP" SSH_KEY="$SSH_KEY" "$REBOOT_DIR/run-reboot-e2e.sh"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -i "$SSH_KEY")
CREDS=$(ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@${WAN_IP} 'cat ~/.aws/credentials')
AWS_AK=$(echo "$CREDS" | awk -F '= *' '/^aws_access_key_id/ {print $2; exit}')
AWS_SK=$(echo "$CREDS" | awk -F '= *' '/^aws_secret_access_key/ {print $2; exit}')
echo "::add-mask::${AWS_AK}"; echo "::add-mask::${AWS_SK}"
- name: Dump Cluster Journals on Failure
if: failure() && steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-reboot.start"
GITHUB_ACTIONS=true FORCE_COLOR=1 SPINIFEX_E2E=1 SPINIFEX_MODE=single \
SPINIFEX_WAN_IP="${WAN_IP}" SPINIFEX_SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY}" \
SPINIFEX_AWS_ENDPOINT="https://${WAN_IP}:9999" \
SPINIFEX_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="${AWS_AK}" SPINIFEX_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="${AWS_SK}" \
ARTIFACT_DIR="${ARTIFACT_DIR}" \
"$REBOOT_DIR/_bin/reboot.test" -test.v -test.timeout=30m \
2>&1 | tee "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-reboot.log"
rc=${PIPESTATUS[0]}
if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then echo "reboot: FAILED" >> "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/suite-status.txt"; fi
exit $rc
- name: Collect e2e artifacts
if: always() && steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
set +e
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
INVENTORY=$(tofu output -json inventory 2>/dev/null) || { echo "no inventory; skipping"; exit 0; }
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path')
SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path'); SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
NODE_COUNT=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq '.nodes | length')
NODE1_IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[0].wan_ip')
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "$SSH_KEY")
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@${NODE1_IP} "tar -C '${ARTIFACT_DIR}' -cf - . 2>/dev/null || true" \
| tar -C "${ARTIFACT_DIR}" -xf - 2>/dev/null
for i in $(seq 0 $((NODE_COUNT - 1))); do
IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r ".nodes[$i].wan_ip")
echo "===== node$((i+1)) ($IP) ====="
for svc in spinifex-nats spinifex-predastore spinifex-viperblock spinifex-daemon spinifex-awsgw spinifex-vpcd dhcpcd; do
echo "--- $svc ---"
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "$SSH_KEY" tf-user@${IP} \
"sudo journalctl -u $svc --no-pager -n 200 2>/dev/null || echo '(not found)'" 2>&1 || echo "(node unreachable)"
done
echo "--- DHCP client state ---"
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "$SSH_KEY" tf-user@${IP} \
"systemctl is-enabled dhcpcd.service 2>/dev/null; systemctl is-active dhcpcd.service 2>/dev/null; sudo ss -lupn 'sport = 68' 2>/dev/null; pgrep -laf dhcpcd 2>/dev/null" 2>&1 || echo "(node unreachable)"
IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r ".nodes[$i].wan_ip"); idx=$((i + 1))
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/vm-console-node${idx}"
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@${IP} 'sudo sh -c "cd /run/spinifex 2>/dev/null && tar -cf - console-*.log 2>/dev/null"' \
| tar -C "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/vm-console-node${idx}" -xf - 2>/dev/null
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@${IP} 'sudo journalctl -u "spinifex-*" --no-pager --output=short-iso --since "60 min ago"' \
> "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/spinifex-journal-node${idx}.log" 2>/dev/null
done
cat "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"/spinifex-journal-node*.log \
> "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/spinifex-journal.log" 2>/dev/null || true
echo "collected: $(ls "${ARTIFACT_DIR}" 2>/dev/null | wc -l) entries"
- name: Install go-junit-report
if: always() && steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
run: |
go install github.com/jstemmer/go-junit-report/v2@latest
echo "$HOME/go/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
- name: Convert test logs to JUnit XML
if: always() && steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
run: |
shopt -s nullglob
for LOG in "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"/test-*.log; do
BASE=$(basename "$LOG" .log); SUITE=${BASE#test-}
go-junit-report -in "$LOG" -out "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/junit-${SUITE}.xml" || true
done
- name: Analyze e2e failures
if: always() && steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
uses: ./spinifex/.github/actions/e2e-analyze
with:
junit-glob: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}/junit-*.xml
log-dir: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
title: "E2E failure analysis (cell ${{ matrix.cell }})"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
if: always() && steps.gate.outputs.selected == 'true'
with:
name: e2e-artifacts-cell-${{ matrix.cell }}-${{ github.run_id }}
path: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
if-no-files-found: warn
retention-days: 14
- name: Teardown
if: always()
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
@@ -216,3 +314,21 @@ jobs:
tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars ${TOFU_VAR_ARGS} -auto-approve -input=false >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1 || true
# Bare-metal single-node suite. Doesn't fit the tofu matrix shape, so it
# runs as a sibling job via the reusable e2e-baremetal workflow. Gated like a
# matrix cell ("cell 20"): every weeknight cron, or dispatch with 20 selected
# (blank cells = all). Tests `dev` on schedule to match GIT_BRANCH above.
baremetal:
name: cell-20 (baremetal/pxe/real-hw)
if: >-
github.event_name == 'schedule' ||
inputs.cells == '' ||
contains(format(',{0},', inputs.cells), ',20,')
permissions:
contents: read
statuses: write
uses: ./.github/workflows/e2e-baremetal.yml
with:
ref: ${{ github.event_name == 'schedule' && 'dev' || github.ref_name }}
secrets: inherit
+799
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,799 @@
# E2E (per-suite blocks) — EXPERIMENTAL, workflow_dispatch only.
#
# Restructures the looped e2e.yml into env-grouped job blocks so each suite
# surfaces as its own node in the Actions graph (mulga-siv-283):
#
# single_provision ─┬─ single_suite (matrix: single, cert, lb, eks)
# └─ single_teardown (if: always)
# multi_provision ─┬─ multi_suite (matrix: multinode)
# └─ multi_teardown (if: always)
#
# Constraint: tofu state is runner-filesystem-local, so *_provision and
# *_teardown must execute on the same self-hosted runner (one runner per label
# today). Teardown reuses the persisted mulga/ tofu-cluster workspace and does
# NOT re-checkout mulga (that would wipe local state). Suite-matrix legs reach
# the already-provisioned VM over its WAN IP using the key path the provision
# job emits; they share the runner home dir, so the key file persists.
#
# This file does NOT post the gating `e2e` commit status — it runs alongside
# e2e.yml for validation. Once green across a few manual runs, fold the
# triggers from e2e.yml here and retire the loop.
name: E2E (suite blocks)
on:
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
single_suites:
description: "Single-node suites to run as matrix legs"
required: false
default: "single cert lb eks"
run_multinode:
description: "Also run the multinode env block"
type: boolean
required: false
default: true
test_run:
description: "Optional -test.run regex (empty = all tests in suite)"
required: false
default: ""
permissions:
contents: read
env:
GIT_BRANCH: ${{ github.ref_name }}
TEST_RUN: ${{ inputs.test_run || '' }}
jobs:
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Single-node env
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
single_provision:
name: Single env · provision
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-single ]
timeout-minutes: 40
outputs:
wan_ip: ${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}
ssh_key: ${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}
suites: ${{ steps.suites.outputs.list }}
matrix: ${{ steps.suites.outputs.matrix }}
env:
TOFU_LOG: /tmp/e2e-tofu-single-${{ github.run_id }}.log
steps:
- name: Reap Orphan Procs
run: |
set +e
UID_SELF=$(id -u)
WS="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}"
reap() {
local sig="$1"
for pid in $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x tofu) $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x terraform); do
cwd=$(readlink "/proc/$pid/cwd" 2>/dev/null) || continue
case "$cwd" in
"$WS"|"$WS"/*) echo "reap $sig pid=$pid cwd=$cwd"; kill "-$sig" "$pid" 2>/dev/null ;;
esac
done
}
reap TERM; sleep 3; reap KILL
find "$WS" -name '.terraform.tfstate.lock.info' -delete 2>/dev/null
true
- name: Clean Workspace
run: |
awk -v w="$GITHUB_WORKSPACE" '$2 ~ "^"w {print $2}' /proc/mounts \
| sort -r | xargs -r -I{} sudo umount -l -R {} || true
sudo rm -rf --one-file-system "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
- uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v3
id: app-token
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.APP_ID }}
private-key: ${{ secrets.APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
repositories: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
repository: mulgadc/mulga
token: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
sparse-checkout: scripts/tofu-cluster
path: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
path: spinifex
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version-file: spinifex/go.mod
cache: false
- name: Re-enable Go toolchain auto-download
run: echo "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Compute suite matrix
id: suites
run: |
LIST="${{ inputs.single_suites || 'single cert lb eks' }}"
echo "list=${LIST}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
JSON=$(printf '%s\n' $LIST | jq -R . | jq -cs .)
echo "matrix=${JSON}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Reclaim docker build cache
run: |
docker container prune -f || true
docker image prune -f || true
docker buildx prune -af --filter "until=24h" || true
docker system df || true
- name: Build Install Artifacts
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
./build-install-artifacts.sh "${GIT_BRANCH}" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-distro.tar.gz" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/setup.sh" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-tests.tar"
- name: Provision VM
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
export TF_VAR_git_branch="${GIT_BRANCH}"
quiet_run "tofu init" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu init -input=false
quiet_run "tofu workspace select" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
quiet_run "tofu destroy (pre-clean)" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false || true
quiet_run "scrub-env (pre-clean)" "$TOFU_LOG" ./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" || true
quiet_run "tofu apply" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu apply -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false
ok "VM provisioned"
- name: Bootstrap via Binary Install
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
SPX_EXTERNAL_POOL="${SPINIFEX_CI_POOL}" \
./bootstrap-install.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/setup.sh" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-distro.tar.gz" \
--test-tar "${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-tests.tar"
- name: Resolve VM SSH details
id: vm
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
INVENTORY=$(tofu output -json inventory)
WAN_IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[0].wan_ip')
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path')
SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
echo "wan_ip=${WAN_IP}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "ssh_key=${SSH_KEY}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Build eks-node AMI (libguestfs, runner)
if: contains(steps.suites.outputs.list, 'eks')
working-directory: spinifex
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
banner "build eks-node AMI (libguestfs — no host devices)"
sudo apt-get update -qq
sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends libguestfs-tools qemu-utils
export LIBGUESTFS_BACKEND=direct
sudo chmod 0644 /boot/vmlinuz-* || true
group_open "make build-eks-node-image"
make build-eks-node-image
group_close
ok "raw: $(du -h /tmp/eks-node-image-build/eks-node-alpine.raw | cut -f1)"
- name: Import eks-node AMI on VM
if: contains(steps.suites.outputs.list, 'eks')
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
eval "$(grep -E '^(ALPINE_VERSION|AMI_NAME|SYSTEM_TAG)=' \
spinifex/scripts/images/eks-node/manifest.conf)"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}
banner "import eks-node AMI to VM image store"
scp "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" \
/tmp/eks-node-image-build/eks-node-alpine.raw \
"$VM":/tmp/eks-node-alpine.raw
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" \
"spx admin images import --file /tmp/eks-node-alpine.raw \
--distro alpine --version ${ALPINE_VERSION} --arch x86_64 \
--boot-mode bios --ami-name ${AMI_NAME} --tag ${SYSTEM_TAG}" >/dev/null
ok "eks-node AMI imported"
- name: Install kubectl on VM
if: contains(steps.suites.outputs.list, 'eks')
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}
banner "install kubectl on VM (eks data-plane subtest)"
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'bash -s' <<'EOF'
set -euo pipefail
KVER=v1.32.5
case "$(uname -m)" in
x86_64) ARCH=amd64 ;;
aarch64) ARCH=arm64 ;;
*) echo "unsupported arch $(uname -m)" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
cd /tmp
curl -fsSLO "https://dl.k8s.io/release/${KVER}/bin/linux/${ARCH}/kubectl"
curl -fsSLO "https://dl.k8s.io/release/${KVER}/bin/linux/${ARCH}/kubectl.sha256"
echo "$(cat kubectl.sha256) kubectl" | sha256sum -c -
sudo install -m 0755 kubectl /usr/local/bin/kubectl
kubectl version --client
EOF
ok "kubectl installed on VM"
- name: Build E2E test binaries on runner
working-directory: spinifex/tests/e2e
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
# teardown always builds: the run-scoped sweep binary runs in the
# teardown job, it is never a selectable suite leg.
SUITES_BUILD="${{ steps.suites.outputs.list }} teardown"
banner "build ${SUITES_BUILD// /, }"
group_open "go test -c"
make e2e-build SUITES_BUILD="${SUITES_BUILD}"
group_close
for f in _bin/*.test; do
ok "$(basename "$f") $(stat -c '%s' "$f" | numfmt --to=iec)"
done
- name: Ship test binaries to VM
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "rm -rf \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin && mkdir -p \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin"
tar -C spinifex/tests/e2e/_bin -cf - . | ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "tar -xf - -C \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin"
ok "shipped binaries to $VM"
- name: Start packet capture on VM br-wan
run: |
set +e
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}
scp "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" \
"${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/start-net-capture.sh" \
"$VM":/tmp/start-net-capture.sh
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "bash /tmp/start-net-capture.sh" || true
single_suite:
name: Single env · suite
needs: single_provision
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-single ]
timeout-minutes: 45
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
suite: ${{ fromJSON(needs.single_provision.outputs.matrix) }}
env:
WAN_IP: ${{ needs.single_provision.outputs.wan_ip }}
SSH_KEY: ${{ needs.single_provision.outputs.ssh_key }}
ARTIFACT_DIR: /tmp/spinifex-e2e-single-${{ github.run_id }}-${{ matrix.suite }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
path: spinifex
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version-file: spinifex/go.mod
cache: false
- name: Install go-junit-report
run: |
go install github.com/jstemmer/go-junit-report/v2@latest
echo "$HOME/go/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
- name: Run ${{ matrix.suite }}
id: e2e
run: |
set +e
SUITE="${{ matrix.suite }}"
VM_HOST="tf-user@${WAN_IP}"
TEST_RUN_FLAG=""
[ -n "${TEST_RUN}" ] && TEST_RUN_FLAG="-test.run=${TEST_RUN}"
cleanup_remote() {
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "$SSH_KEY" "$VM_HOST" \
"pkill -u tf-user -TERM -f \"/spinifex-e2e-bin/${SUITE}\.test( |\$)\" 2>/dev/null; sleep 1; pkill -u tf-user -KILL -f \"/spinifex-e2e-bin/${SUITE}\.test( |\$)\" 2>/dev/null; true" \
2>/dev/null || true
}
trap cleanup_remote EXIT INT TERM
ssh -tt -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" "$VM_HOST" \
"set -u; mkdir -p '${ARTIFACT_DIR}'; cd \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin; \
R=\$'\033[0m' B=\$'\033[1m' C=\$'\033[36m' G=\$'\033[32m' RED=\$'\033[31m'; \
printf '\n%s%s━━ suite %s ━━%s\n' \"\$B\" \"\$C\" \"${SUITE}\" \"\$R\"; \
date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-${SUITE}.start'; \
GITHUB_ACTIONS=true FORCE_COLOR=1 SPINIFEX_E2E=1 SPINIFEX_MODE=single \
SPINIFEX_E2E_RUN_ID='${{ github.run_id }}' \
ARTIFACT_DIR='${ARTIFACT_DIR}' \
./${SUITE}.test -test.v -test.timeout=30m ${TEST_RUN_FLAG} \
2>&1 | tee '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-${SUITE}.log' \
| sed -uE 's/^[[:space:]]+([a-zA-Z0-9_]+_test\.go:[0-9]+: )?//'; \
exit \${PIPESTATUS[0]}"
echo "rc=$?" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
- name: Collect suite artifacts from VM
if: always()
run: |
set +e
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${SSH_KEY}")
VM=tf-user@${WAN_IP}
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "tar -C '${ARTIFACT_DIR}' -cf - . 2>/dev/null || true" \
| tar -C "${ARTIFACT_DIR}" -xf - 2>/dev/null
true
- name: Convert test log to JUnit XML
if: always()
run: |
shopt -s nullglob
for LOG in "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"/test-*.log; do
BASE=$(basename "$LOG" .log); SUITE=${BASE#test-}
go-junit-report -in "$LOG" -out "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/junit-${SUITE}.xml" || true
done
- name: Publish test summary
if: always()
uses: ./spinifex/.github/actions/junit-report
with:
junit-glob: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}/junit-*.xml
title: "E2E ${{ matrix.suite }} results"
- name: Analyze e2e failures
if: always()
uses: ./spinifex/.github/actions/e2e-analyze
with:
junit-glob: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}/junit-*.xml
log-dir: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
title: "E2E ${{ matrix.suite }} failure analysis"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
if: always()
with:
name: e2e-single-${{ matrix.suite }}-${{ github.run_id }}
path: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
if-no-files-found: warn
retention-days: 14
- name: Fail job if suite failed
if: always()
run: |
if [ "${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }}" != "0" ]; then
echo "::error::suite ${{ matrix.suite }} failed (rc=${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }})"
exit 1
fi
single_teardown:
name: Single env · teardown
needs: [ single_provision, single_suite ]
if: always()
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-single ]
timeout-minutes: 20
env:
TOFU_LOG: /tmp/e2e-tofu-single-td-${{ github.run_id }}.log
ARTIFACT_DIR: /tmp/spinifex-e2e-single-diag-${{ github.run_id }}
WAN_IP: ${{ needs.single_provision.outputs.wan_ip }}
SSH_KEY: ${{ needs.single_provision.outputs.ssh_key }}
steps:
# Reuse the persisted mulga/ tofu-cluster workspace from single_provision.
# Re-checkout only spinifex (for ci-fmt + diag scripts); checking out mulga
# again would wipe the local tofu state and orphan the VM.
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
path: spinifex
- name: Capture network/IPsec diagnostics on VM
if: ${{ needs.single_provision.result == 'success' && env.WAN_IP != '' }}
run: |
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "${SSH_KEY}")
VM=tf-user@${WAN_IP}
scp "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" \
"${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/capture-net-diag.sh" \
"$VM":/tmp/capture-net-diag.sh 2>/dev/null
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "bash /tmp/capture-net-diag.sh '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/net-diag'" 2>/dev/null
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'sudo journalctl -u "spinifex-*" --no-pager --output=short-iso --since "90 min ago"' \
> "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/spinifex-journal.log" 2>/dev/null
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/lb-console"
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'sudo sh -c "cd /run/spinifex 2>/dev/null && tar -cf - console-*.log 2>/dev/null"' \
| tar -C "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/lb-console" -xf - 2>/dev/null
true
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
if: always()
with:
name: e2e-single-diag-${{ github.run_id }}
path: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
if-no-files-found: ignore
retention-days: 14
# Reclaim any resource leaked by a crashed/interrupted suite before the VM
# is destroyed. Scoped to this run's tag, best-effort, never fails the job.
- name: Sweep leaked run resources on VM
if: ${{ needs.single_provision.result == 'success' && env.WAN_IP != '' }}
run: |
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "${SSH_KEY}")
VM=tf-user@${WAN_IP}
banner "sweep run-tagged resources (run ${{ github.run_id }})"
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" \
"cd \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin 2>/dev/null && \
SPINIFEX_E2E=1 SPINIFEX_MODE=single \
SPINIFEX_E2E_RUN_ID='${{ github.run_id }}' \
./teardown.test -test.v -test.run TestSweepRunResources -test.timeout=10m" \
2>&1 || true
true
- name: Teardown VM
if: always()
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
if [ -n "${WAN_IP}" ] && [ -n "${SSH_KEY}" ]; then
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "${SSH_KEY}" \
tf-user@${WAN_IP} \
'pkill -u tf-user -TERM -f "/spinifex-e2e-bin/.*\.test( |$)" 2>/dev/null; sleep 1; pkill -u tf-user -KILL -f "/spinifex-e2e-bin/.*\.test( |$)" 2>/dev/null; true' \
2>/dev/null || true
fi
UID_SELF=$(id -u); WS="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}"
reap() {
local sig="$1"
for pid in $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x tofu) $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x terraform); do
cwd=$(readlink "/proc/$pid/cwd" 2>/dev/null) || continue
case "$cwd" in "$WS"|"$WS"/*) kill "-$sig" "$pid" 2>/dev/null ;; esac
done
}
reap TERM; sleep 2; reap KILL
find "$WS" -name '.terraform.tfstate.lock.info' -delete 2>/dev/null
quiet_run "tofu workspace select" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
quiet_run "tofu destroy" "$TOFU_LOG" timeout 600 tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false
quiet_run "scrub-env" "$TOFU_LOG" ./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
ok "teardown complete"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Multinode env
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
multi_provision:
name: Multi env · provision
if: ${{ inputs.run_multinode }}
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-multi ]
timeout-minutes: 45
outputs:
node1_ip: ${{ steps.cluster.outputs.node1_ip }}
ssh_key: ${{ steps.cluster.outputs.ssh_key }}
nodes_csv: ${{ steps.cluster.outputs.nodes_csv }}
env:
TOFU_LOG: /tmp/e2e-tofu-multi-${{ github.run_id }}.log
steps:
- name: Reap Orphan Procs
run: |
set +e
UID_SELF=$(id -u); WS="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}"
reap() {
local sig="$1"
for pid in $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x tofu) $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x terraform); do
cwd=$(readlink "/proc/$pid/cwd" 2>/dev/null) || continue
case "$cwd" in "$WS"|"$WS"/*) echo "reap $sig pid=$pid"; kill "-$sig" "$pid" 2>/dev/null ;; esac
done
}
reap TERM; sleep 3; reap KILL
find "$WS" -name '.terraform.tfstate.lock.info' -delete 2>/dev/null
true
- name: Clean Workspace
run: |
awk -v w="$GITHUB_WORKSPACE" '$2 ~ "^"w {print $2}' /proc/mounts \
| sort -r | xargs -r -I{} sudo umount -l -R {} || true
sudo rm -rf --one-file-system "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
- uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v3
id: app-token
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.APP_ID }}
private-key: ${{ secrets.APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
repositories: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
repository: mulgadc/mulga
token: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
sparse-checkout: scripts/tofu-cluster
path: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
path: spinifex
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version-file: spinifex/go.mod
cache: false
- name: Re-enable Go toolchain auto-download
run: echo "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Reclaim docker build cache
run: |
docker container prune -f || true
docker image prune -f || true
docker buildx prune -af --filter "until=24h" || true
docker system df || true
- name: Build Install Artifacts
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
./build-install-artifacts.sh "${GIT_BRANCH}" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-distro.tar.gz" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/setup.sh" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-tests.tar"
- name: Provision VMs
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
export TF_VAR_git_branch="${GIT_BRANCH}"
quiet_run "tofu init" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu init -input=false
quiet_run "tofu workspace select" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
quiet_run "tofu destroy (pre-clean)" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false || true
quiet_run "scrub-env (pre-clean)" "$TOFU_LOG" ./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" || true
quiet_run "tofu apply" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu apply -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false
ok "3-node cluster provisioned"
- name: Bootstrap via Binary Install
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
SPX_EXTERNAL_POOL="${SPINIFEX_CI_POOL}" \
./bootstrap-install.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/setup.sh" \
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-distro.tar.gz" \
--test-tar "${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-tests.tar"
- name: Resolve cluster SSH details
id: cluster
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
INVENTORY=$(tofu output -json inventory)
NODE1_IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[0].wan_ip')
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path'); SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
NODE_COUNT=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq '.nodes | length')
NODES_CSV=""
for i in $(seq 0 $((NODE_COUNT - 1))); do
ip=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r ".nodes[$i].wan_ip")
if [ -z "$NODES_CSV" ]; then NODES_CSV="$ip"; else NODES_CSV="$NODES_CSV,$ip"; fi
done
echo "node1_ip=${NODE1_IP}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "ssh_key=${SSH_KEY}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "nodes_csv=${NODES_CSV}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Build multinode binary on runner
working-directory: spinifex/tests/e2e
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
banner "build multinode, teardown"
group_open "go test -c"
make e2e-build SUITES_BUILD="multinode teardown"
group_close
ok "$(basename _bin/multinode.test) $(stat -c '%s' _bin/multinode.test | numfmt --to=iec)"
- name: Ship test binaries to node1
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.cluster.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.cluster.outputs.node1_ip }}
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "rm -rf \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin && mkdir -p \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin"
tar -C spinifex/tests/e2e/_bin -cf - . | ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "tar -xf - -C \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin"
ok "shipped binaries to $VM"
- name: Start packet capture on all nodes
run: |
set +e
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.cluster.outputs.ssh_key }}")
IFS=',' read -ra NODE_LIST <<< "${{ steps.cluster.outputs.nodes_csv }}"
for ip in "${NODE_LIST[@]}"; do
[ -z "$ip" ] && continue
scp "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" \
"${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/start-net-capture.sh" \
tf-user@"$ip":/tmp/start-net-capture.sh
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@"$ip" "bash /tmp/start-net-capture.sh" || true
done
multi_suite:
name: Multi env · suite
needs: multi_provision
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-multi ]
timeout-minutes: 60
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
suite: [ multinode ]
env:
NODE1_IP: ${{ needs.multi_provision.outputs.node1_ip }}
SSH_KEY: ${{ needs.multi_provision.outputs.ssh_key }}
NODES_CSV: ${{ needs.multi_provision.outputs.nodes_csv }}
ARTIFACT_DIR: /tmp/spinifex-e2e-multi-${{ github.run_id }}-${{ matrix.suite }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
path: spinifex
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version-file: spinifex/go.mod
cache: false
- name: Install go-junit-report
run: |
go install github.com/jstemmer/go-junit-report/v2@latest
echo "$HOME/go/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
- name: Run ${{ matrix.suite }}
id: e2e
run: |
set +e
SUITE="${{ matrix.suite }}"
VM_HOST="tf-user@${NODE1_IP}"
TEST_RUN_FLAG=""
[ -n "${TEST_RUN}" ] && TEST_RUN_FLAG="-test.run=${TEST_RUN}"
cleanup_remote() {
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "$SSH_KEY" "$VM_HOST" \
"pkill -u tf-user -TERM -f \"/spinifex-e2e-bin/${SUITE}\.test( |\$)\" 2>/dev/null; sleep 1; pkill -u tf-user -KILL -f \"/spinifex-e2e-bin/${SUITE}\.test( |\$)\" 2>/dev/null; true" \
2>/dev/null || true
}
trap cleanup_remote EXIT INT TERM
ssh -tt -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" "$VM_HOST" \
"set -u; mkdir -p '${ARTIFACT_DIR}'; cd \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin; \
printf '\n━━ suite %s ━━\n' \"${SUITE}\"; \
date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-${SUITE}.start'; \
GITHUB_ACTIONS=true FORCE_COLOR=1 SPINIFEX_E2E=1 SPINIFEX_MODE=multinode \
SPINIFEX_E2E_RUN_ID='${{ github.run_id }}' \
SPINIFEX_NODES='${NODES_CSV}' SPINIFEX_NODE_IPS='${NODES_CSV}' \
SPINIFEX_SSH_USER=tf-user SPINIFEX_SSH_KEY=\$HOME/.ssh/tf-user-ap-southeast-2 \
ARTIFACT_DIR='${ARTIFACT_DIR}' \
./${SUITE}.test -test.v -test.timeout=30m ${TEST_RUN_FLAG} \
2>&1 | tee '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-${SUITE}.log' \
| sed -uE 's/^[[:space:]]+([a-zA-Z0-9_]+_test\.go:[0-9]+: )?//'; \
exit \${PIPESTATUS[0]}"
echo "rc=$?" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
- name: Collect suite artifacts from node1
if: always()
run: |
set +e
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${SSH_KEY}")
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@${NODE1_IP} "tar -C '${ARTIFACT_DIR}' -cf - . 2>/dev/null || true" \
| tar -C "${ARTIFACT_DIR}" -xf - 2>/dev/null
true
- name: Convert test log to JUnit XML
if: always()
run: |
shopt -s nullglob
for LOG in "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"/test-*.log; do
BASE=$(basename "$LOG" .log); SUITE=${BASE#test-}
go-junit-report -in "$LOG" -out "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/junit-${SUITE}.xml" || true
done
- name: Publish test summary
if: always()
uses: ./spinifex/.github/actions/junit-report
with:
junit-glob: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}/junit-*.xml
title: "Multi-Node E2E ${{ matrix.suite }} results"
- name: Analyze e2e failures
if: always()
uses: ./spinifex/.github/actions/e2e-analyze
with:
junit-glob: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}/junit-*.xml
log-dir: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
title: "Multi-Node E2E ${{ matrix.suite }} failure analysis"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
if: always()
with:
name: e2e-multi-${{ matrix.suite }}-${{ github.run_id }}
path: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
if-no-files-found: warn
retention-days: 14
- name: Fail job if suite failed
if: always()
run: |
if [ "${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }}" != "0" ]; then
echo "::error::suite ${{ matrix.suite }} failed (rc=${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }})"
exit 1
fi
multi_teardown:
name: Multi env · teardown
needs: [ multi_provision, multi_suite ]
if: always() && inputs.run_multinode
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-multi ]
timeout-minutes: 20
env:
TOFU_LOG: /tmp/e2e-tofu-multi-td-${{ github.run_id }}.log
SSH_KEY: ${{ needs.multi_provision.outputs.ssh_key }}
NODES_CSV: ${{ needs.multi_provision.outputs.nodes_csv }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
path: spinifex
# Reclaim leaked run-tagged resources before the cluster is destroyed.
- name: Sweep leaked run resources on node1
if: ${{ needs.multi_provision.result == 'success' && needs.multi_provision.outputs.node1_ip != '' }}
run: |
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "${SSH_KEY}")
VM=tf-user@${{ needs.multi_provision.outputs.node1_ip }}
banner "sweep run-tagged resources (run ${{ github.run_id }})"
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" \
"cd \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin 2>/dev/null && \
SPINIFEX_E2E=1 SPINIFEX_MODE=multinode \
SPINIFEX_E2E_RUN_ID='${{ github.run_id }}' \
./teardown.test -test.v -test.run TestSweepRunResources -test.timeout=10m" \
2>&1 || true
true
- name: Teardown cluster
if: always()
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
if [ -n "${NODES_CSV}" ] && [ -n "${SSH_KEY}" ]; then
IFS=',' read -ra NODE_LIST <<< "${NODES_CSV}"
for ip in "${NODE_LIST[@]}"; do
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "${SSH_KEY}" \
tf-user@"$ip" \
'pkill -u tf-user -TERM -f "/spinifex-e2e-bin/.*\.test( |$)" 2>/dev/null; sleep 1; pkill -u tf-user -KILL -f "/spinifex-e2e-bin/.*\.test( |$)" 2>/dev/null; true' \
2>/dev/null || true
done
fi
UID_SELF=$(id -u); WS="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}"
reap() {
local sig="$1"
for pid in $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x tofu) $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x terraform); do
cwd=$(readlink "/proc/$pid/cwd" 2>/dev/null) || continue
case "$cwd" in "$WS"|"$WS"/*) kill "-$sig" "$pid" 2>/dev/null ;; esac
done
}
reap TERM; sleep 2; reap KILL
find "$WS" -name '.terraform.tfstate.lock.info' -delete 2>/dev/null
quiet_run "tofu workspace select" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
quiet_run "tofu destroy" "$TOFU_LOG" timeout 600 tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false
quiet_run "scrub-env" "$TOFU_LOG" ./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
ok "teardown complete"
e2e_suites_status:
name: E2E suite blocks · summary
if: always()
needs: [ single_suite, multi_suite ]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
- name: Summarize
run: |
echo "## E2E suite-block results" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "single_suite: ${{ needs.single_suite.result }}" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "multi_suite: ${{ needs.multi_suite.result }}" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
case "${{ needs.single_suite.result }}" in success|skipped) ;; *) exit 1 ;; esac
case "${{ needs.multi_suite.result }}" in success|skipped) ;; *) exit 1 ;; esac
+753 -103
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,14 @@ on:
sha:
description: "PR head SHA to report status on"
required: false
suites:
description: "Space-separated Make targets to run (e.g. 'e2e-single e2e-multinode e2e-cert e2e-lb e2e-eks')"
required: false
default: "e2e-single e2e-multinode e2e-cert e2e-lb"
test_run:
description: "Optional regex for -test.run (e.g. '^TestMultinodeIPSec$'). Empty = run all tests in suite."
required: false
default: ""
permissions:
contents: read
@@ -24,17 +32,84 @@ permissions:
env:
GIT_BRANCH: ${{ github.ref_name }}
SUITES: ${{ inputs.suites || 'e2e-single e2e-multinode e2e-cert e2e-lb' }}
TEST_RUN: ${{ inputs.test_run || '' }}
jobs:
# Shadow-mode suite selector. Computes which suites the diff *would* run and logs it to the job summary.
# Does NOT gate or override the real SUITES env yet — it runs alongside the full matrix so we
# can compare predicted vs actual before flipping it on.
select_suites:
name: Select Suites (shadow)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: false
- name: Compute targeted suite selection
run: |
set -euo pipefail
BASE="${{ github.event.before }}"
HEAD="${{ github.sha }}"
# First push to a branch reports an all-zero before-SHA; fall back to
# the first parent so the diff is still meaningful.
if [ -z "$BASE" ] || [ "$BASE" = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" ]; then
BASE="${HEAD}~1"
fi
echo "## Targeted suite selection (shadow)" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo '```' >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "base=$BASE head=$HEAD" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
go run ./tests/e2e/select-suites/cmd/select-suites \
--manifest docs/service-interfaces.yaml \
--base-sha "$BASE" --head-sha "$HEAD" --repo-root . \
2>>"$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" \
| tee -a "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo '```' >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "Shadow only — actual run uses SUITES='${SUITES}'." >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
e2e_single:
name: Single-Node E2E
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-single ]
timeout-minutes: 35
# Skip when the dispatch input requests no in-VM suites (e.g.
# suites='e2e-multinode' only). Push triggers and the default SUITES list
# both include single/cert/lb so the inputs.suites null-check keeps the
# job running on plain PR pushes.
if: github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' || contains(github.event.inputs.suites, 'e2e-single') || contains(github.event.inputs.suites, 'e2e-cert') || contains(github.event.inputs.suites, 'e2e-lb') || contains(github.event.inputs.suites, 'e2e-eks')
runs-on: [self-hosted, ci-single]
timeout-minutes: 45
env:
TOFU_LOG: /tmp/e2e-tofu-single-${{ github.run_id }}.log
ARTIFACT_DIR: /tmp/spinifex-e2e-artifacts-${{ github.run_id }}
steps:
- name: Reap Orphan Procs
run: |
set +e
UID_SELF=$(id -u)
WS="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}"
reap() {
local sig="$1"
for pid in $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x tofu) $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x terraform); do
cwd=$(readlink "/proc/$pid/cwd" 2>/dev/null) || continue
case "$cwd" in
"$WS"|"$WS"/*) echo "reap $sig pid=$pid cwd=$cwd"; kill "-$sig" "$pid" 2>/dev/null ;;
esac
done
}
reap TERM
sleep 3
reap KILL
find "$WS" -name '.terraform.tfstate.lock.info' -delete 2>/dev/null
true
- name: Clean Workspace
run: sudo rm -rf "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
run: |
awk -v w="$GITHUB_WORKSPACE" '$2 ~ "^"w {print $2}' /proc/mounts \
| sort -r | xargs -r -I{} sudo umount -l -R {} || true
sudo rm -rf --one-file-system "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
- uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v3
id: app-token
@@ -50,6 +125,25 @@ jobs:
sparse-checkout: scripts/tofu-cluster
path: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
path: spinifex
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version-file: spinifex/go.mod
cache: false
- name: Re-enable Go toolchain auto-download
run: echo "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Reclaim docker build cache
run: |
docker container prune -f || true
docker image prune -f || true
docker buildx prune -af --filter "until=24h" || true
docker system df || true
- name: Build Install Artifacts
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
@@ -61,12 +155,15 @@ jobs:
- name: Provision VM
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
export TF_VAR_git_branch="${GIT_BRANCH}"
tofu init -input=false >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1 || true
./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1 || true
tofu apply -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
quiet_run "tofu init" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu init -input=false
quiet_run "tofu workspace select" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
quiet_run "tofu destroy (pre-clean)" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false || true
quiet_run "scrub-env (pre-clean)" "$TOFU_LOG" ./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" || true
quiet_run "tofu apply" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu apply -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false
ok "VM provisioned"
- name: Bootstrap via Binary Install
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
@@ -77,97 +174,338 @@ jobs:
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-distro.tar.gz" \
--test-tar "${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-tests.tar"
- name: Run E2E Tests
- name: Resolve VM SSH details
id: vm
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
INVENTORY=$(tofu output -json inventory)
WAN_IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[0].wan_ip')
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path')
SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" tf-user@${WAN_IP} \
"cd ~/e2e-tests && ./run-e2e.sh && ./run-cert-e2e.sh && ENDPOINT=https://${WAN_IP}:9999 ./run-lb-e2e.sh"
echo "wan_ip=${WAN_IP}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "ssh_key=${SSH_KEY}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# The eks suite's CreateCluster boots a control-plane VM from the
# eks-node AMI, so that AMI must exist in the VM's image store before the
# suite runs. build-system-image.sh customizes the image with libguestfs
# (an isolated userspace appliance) — it touches no host block device, so
# it is safe on the shared runner. The build needs the spinifex source +
# network (runner only); the import needs predastore/NATS (VM only), so
# build on the runner then ship the raw and import on the VM.
- name: Build eks-node AMI (libguestfs, runner)
if: contains(env.SUITES, 'e2e-eks')
working-directory: spinifex
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
banner "build eks-node AMI (libguestfs — no host devices)"
sudo apt-get update -qq
sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends libguestfs-tools qemu-utils
# Debian/Ubuntu ship /boot/vmlinuz-* mode 0600; the libguestfs
# appliance needs to read a host kernel. direct backend = no libvirt.
export LIBGUESTFS_BACKEND=direct
sudo chmod 0644 /boot/vmlinuz-* || true
group_open "make build-eks-node-image"
make build-eks-node-image
group_close
ok "raw: $(du -h /tmp/eks-node-image-build/eks-node-alpine.raw | cut -f1)"
- name: Import eks-node AMI on VM
if: contains(env.SUITES, 'e2e-eks')
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
eval "$(grep -E '^(ALPINE_VERSION|AMI_NAME|SYSTEM_TAG)=' \
spinifex/scripts/images/eks-node/manifest.conf)"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}
banner "import eks-node AMI to VM image store"
scp "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" \
/tmp/eks-node-image-build/eks-node-alpine.raw \
"$VM":/tmp/eks-node-alpine.raw
# Drop the import progress bar (pterm redraws to stdout — thousands of
# lines over the SSH pipe). Errors go to stderr, so they survive; the
# exit code still gates the step.
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" \
"spx admin images import --file /tmp/eks-node-alpine.raw \
--distro alpine --version ${ALPINE_VERSION} --arch x86_64 \
--boot-mode bios --ami-name ${AMI_NAME} --tag ${SYSTEM_TAG}" >/dev/null
ok "eks-node AMI imported"
# The eks data-plane subtest (TestEKS/KubectlGetNodes) drives the full
# `aws eks get-token` → kubectl → apiserver → token-webhook → gateway
# broker → STS verify path. The e2e binaries run ON the VM, so kubectl
# must be on the VM's PATH or harness.NewKubectl t.Skips the subtest.
# Pin to the k3s server version (setup.sh K3S_VERSION) — kubectl is
# ±1-minor skew tolerant; matching is simplest. Checksum-verified.
- name: Install kubectl on VM
if: contains(env.SUITES, 'e2e-eks')
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}
banner "install kubectl on VM (eks data-plane subtest)"
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'bash -s' <<'EOF'
set -euo pipefail
KVER=v1.32.5
case "$(uname -m)" in
x86_64) ARCH=amd64 ;;
aarch64) ARCH=arm64 ;;
*) echo "unsupported arch $(uname -m)" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
cd /tmp
curl -fsSLO "https://dl.k8s.io/release/${KVER}/bin/linux/${ARCH}/kubectl"
curl -fsSLO "https://dl.k8s.io/release/${KVER}/bin/linux/${ARCH}/kubectl.sha256"
echo "$(cat kubectl.sha256) kubectl" | sha256sum -c -
sudo install -m 0755 kubectl /usr/local/bin/kubectl
kubectl version --client
EOF
ok "kubectl installed on VM"
- name: Build E2E test binaries on runner
working-directory: spinifex/tests/e2e
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
SUITES_BUILD=$(echo "${SUITES}" | sed 's/e2e-//g' | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -vE '^(multinode)$' | tr '\n' ' ')
if [ -z "$(echo "${SUITES_BUILD}" | tr -d ' ')" ]; then
echo "no in-VM suites requested (SUITES=${SUITES}); nothing to build"
exit 0
fi
banner "build ${SUITES_BUILD// /, }"
group_open "go test -c"
make e2e-build SUITES_BUILD="${SUITES_BUILD}"
group_close
for f in _bin/*.test; do
ok "$(basename "$f") $(stat -c '%s' "$f" | numfmt --to=iec)"
done
- name: Install go-junit-report on runner
run: |
go install github.com/jstemmer/go-junit-report/v2@latest
echo "$HOME/go/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
- name: Ship test binaries to VM
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "rm -rf \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin && mkdir -p \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin"
tar -C spinifex/tests/e2e/_bin -cf - . | ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "tar -xf - -C \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin"
ok "shipped binaries to $VM"
- name: Start packet capture on VM br-wan
run: |
set +e
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}
scp "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" \
"${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/start-net-capture.sh" \
"$VM":/tmp/start-net-capture.sh
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "bash /tmp/start-net-capture.sh" || true
- name: Run E2E suites
id: e2e
run: |
set +e
SUITES_RUN=$(echo "${SUITES}" | sed 's/e2e-//g' | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -vE '^(multinode)$' | tr '\n' ' ')
if [ -z "$(echo "${SUITES_RUN}" | tr -d ' ')" ]; then
echo "no in-VM suites requested (SUITES=${SUITES}); skipping"
echo "rc=0" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
if [ -n "${TEST_RUN}" ]; then
TEST_RUN_FLAG="-test.run=${TEST_RUN}"
else
TEST_RUN_FLAG=""
fi
VM_HOST="tf-user@${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}"
SSH_KEY="${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}"
cleanup_remote() {
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "$SSH_KEY" "$VM_HOST" \
'pkill -u tf-user -TERM -f "/spinifex-e2e-bin/.*\.test( |$)" 2>/dev/null; sleep 1; pkill -u tf-user -KILL -f "/spinifex-e2e-bin/.*\.test( |$)" 2>/dev/null; true' \
2>/dev/null || true
}
trap cleanup_remote EXIT INT TERM
ssh -tt -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" \
"$VM_HOST" \
"set -u; mkdir -p '${ARTIFACT_DIR}'; \
cd \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin; \
R=\$'\033[0m' B=\$'\033[1m' C=\$'\033[36m' G=\$'\033[32m' RED=\$'\033[31m'; \
FAIL=0; \
for SUITE in ${SUITES_RUN}; do \
echo \"::group::suite \$SUITE\"; \
printf '\n%s%s━━ suite %s ━━%s\n' \"\$B\" \"\$C\" \"\$SUITE\" \"\$R\"; \
date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-'\$SUITE'.start'; \
GITHUB_ACTIONS=true FORCE_COLOR=1 SPINIFEX_E2E=1 SPINIFEX_MODE=single \
ARTIFACT_DIR='${ARTIFACT_DIR}' \
./\$SUITE.test -test.v -test.timeout=30m ${TEST_RUN_FLAG} \
2>&1 | tee '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-'\$SUITE'.log' \
| sed -uE 's/^[[:space:]]+([a-zA-Z0-9_]+_test\.go:[0-9]+: )?//'; \
rc=\${PIPESTATUS[0]}; \
echo \"::endgroup::\"; \
if [ \$rc -ne 0 ]; then \
printf '%s✗%s suite %s failed (exit %d)\n' \"\$RED\" \"\$R\" \"\$SUITE\" \"\$rc\"; \
echo \"::error::suite \$SUITE failed (exit \$rc)\"; \
echo \"\$SUITE: FAILED\" >> '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/suite-status.txt'; \
FAIL=1; \
else \
printf '%s✓%s suite %s passed\n' \"\$G\" \"\$R\" \"\$SUITE\"; \
fi; \
done; \
exit \$FAIL"
E2E_RC=$?
echo "rc=${E2E_RC}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
- name: Capture network/IPsec diagnostics on VM
if: always()
run: |
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}
scp "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" \
"${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/capture-net-diag.sh" \
"$VM":/tmp/capture-net-diag.sh
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "bash /tmp/capture-net-diag.sh '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/net-diag'"
ok "net diagnostics captured"
- name: Collect artifacts from VM
if: always()
run: |
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "tar -C '${ARTIFACT_DIR}' -cf - . 2>/dev/null || true" \
| tar -C "${ARTIFACT_DIR}" -xf - 2>/dev/null
ok "artifacts pulled to ${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'sudo journalctl -u "spinifex-*" --no-pager --output=short-iso --since "60 min ago"' \
> "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/spinifex-journal.log" 2>/dev/null
ok "journal: $(wc -l < "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/spinifex-journal.log" 2>/dev/null || echo 0) lines"
# LB/system microVM serial consoles. The lb-agent logs its nginx (NLB)
# engine activation and any `nginx -t`/reload error + active-probe
# results to the guest serial console, which the host journal never
# captures. These files persist in /run/spinifex past VM teardown, so
# collecting them here makes an NLB "0/N healthy" timeout diagnosable.
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/lb-console"
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'sudo sh -c "cd /run/spinifex 2>/dev/null && tar -cf - console-*.log 2>/dev/null"' \
| tar -C "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/lb-console" -xf - 2>/dev/null
ok "lb-console: $(ls "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/lb-console" 2>/dev/null | wc -l) files"
- name: Convert test logs to JUnit XML
if: always()
run: |
shopt -s nullglob
for LOG in "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"/test-*.log; do
BASE=$(basename "$LOG" .log)
SUITE=${BASE#test-}
go-junit-report -in "$LOG" -out "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/junit-${SUITE}.xml" || true
done
- name: Publish test summary
if: always()
uses: ./spinifex/.github/actions/junit-report
with:
junit-glob: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}/junit-*.xml
title: "E2E results"
- name: Analyze e2e failures
if: always()
uses: ./spinifex/.github/actions/e2e-analyze
with:
junit-glob: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}/junit-*.xml
log-dir: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
title: "E2E failure analysis"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
if: always()
with:
name: e2e-artifacts-${{ github.run_id }}
path: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
if-no-files-found: warn
retention-days: 14
- name: Teardown
if: always()
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1 || true
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
if [ -n "${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }}" ] && [ -n "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}" ]; then
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 \
-i "${{ steps.vm.outputs.ssh_key }}" \
tf-user@${{ steps.vm.outputs.wan_ip }} \
'pkill -u tf-user -TERM -f "/spinifex-e2e-bin/.*\.test( |$)" 2>/dev/null; sleep 1; pkill -u tf-user -KILL -f "/spinifex-e2e-bin/.*\.test( |$)" 2>/dev/null; true' \
2>/dev/null || true
fi
UID_SELF=$(id -u)
WS="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}"
reap() {
local sig="$1"
for pid in $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x tofu) $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x terraform); do
cwd=$(readlink "/proc/$pid/cwd" 2>/dev/null) || continue
case "$cwd" in
"$WS"|"$WS"/*) kill "-$sig" "$pid" 2>/dev/null ;;
esac
done
}
reap TERM
sleep 2
reap KILL
find "$WS" -name '.terraform.tfstate.lock.info' -delete 2>/dev/null
quiet_run "tofu workspace select" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
quiet_run "tofu destroy" "$TOFU_LOG" timeout 600 tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false
quiet_run "scrub-env" "$TOFU_LOG" ./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
ok "teardown complete"
e2e_pseudo_multi:
name: Pseudo Multi-Node E2E
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-pseudo ]
timeout-minutes: 25
env:
TOFU_LOG: /tmp/e2e-tofu-pseudo-${{ github.run_id }}.log
steps:
- name: Clean Workspace
run: sudo rm -rf "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
- uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v3
id: app-token
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.APP_ID }}
private-key: ${{ secrets.APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
repositories: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
repository: mulgadc/mulga
token: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
sparse-checkout: scripts/tofu-cluster
path: mulga
- name: Clone and Build
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: ./build-artifacts.sh "${GIT_BRANCH}"
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-artifacts.tar"
- name: Provision VM
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
export TF_VAR_git_branch="${GIT_BRANCH}"
tofu init -input=false >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1 || true
./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1 || true
tofu apply -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
- name: Bootstrap Cluster
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
SPX_PREBUILT=true \
SPX_ARTIFACT_TAR="${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-artifacts.tar" \
./bootstrap.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
- name: Run E2E Tests
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
INVENTORY=$(tofu output -json inventory)
WAN_IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[0].wan_ip')
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path')
SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" tf-user@${WAN_IP} \
"cd ~/Development/mulga/spinifex && SPX_EXTERNAL_POOL=\"${SPINIFEX_CI_POOL}\" ./tests/e2e/run-pseudo-multinode-e2e.sh"
- name: Teardown
- name: Fail job if any suite failed
if: always()
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1 || true
if [ "${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }}" != "0" ] || [ -s "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/suite-status.txt" ]; then
echo "::error::E2E suites failed (rc=${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }})"
cat "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/suite-status.txt" 2>/dev/null || true
exit 1
fi
e2e_real_multi:
name: Real Multi-Node E2E
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-multi ]
timeout-minutes: 30
if: github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' || contains(github.event.inputs.suites, 'e2e-multinode')
runs-on: [self-hosted, ci-multi]
timeout-minutes: 60
env:
TOFU_LOG: /tmp/e2e-tofu-multi-${{ github.run_id }}.log
ARTIFACT_DIR: /tmp/spinifex-e2e-multi-artifacts-${{ github.run_id }}
steps:
- name: Reap Orphan Procs
run: |
set +e
UID_SELF=$(id -u)
WS="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}"
reap() {
local sig="$1"
for pid in $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x tofu) $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x terraform); do
cwd=$(readlink "/proc/$pid/cwd" 2>/dev/null) || continue
case "$cwd" in
"$WS"|"$WS"/*) echo "reap $sig pid=$pid cwd=$cwd"; kill "-$sig" "$pid" 2>/dev/null ;;
esac
done
}
reap TERM
sleep 3
reap KILL
find "$WS" -name '.terraform.tfstate.lock.info' -delete 2>/dev/null
true
- name: Clean Workspace
run: sudo rm -rf "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
run: |
awk -v w="$GITHUB_WORKSPACE" '$2 ~ "^"w {print $2}' /proc/mounts \
| sort -r | xargs -r -I{} sudo umount -l -R {} || true
sudo rm -rf --one-file-system "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
- uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v3
id: app-token
@@ -183,6 +521,25 @@ jobs:
sparse-checkout: scripts/tofu-cluster
path: mulga
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
path: spinifex
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version-file: spinifex/go.mod
cache: false
- name: Re-enable Go toolchain auto-download
run: echo "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Reclaim docker build cache
run: |
docker container prune -f || true
docker image prune -f || true
docker buildx prune -af --filter "until=24h" || true
docker system df || true
- name: Build Install Artifacts
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
@@ -194,12 +551,15 @@ jobs:
- name: Provision VMs
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
export TF_VAR_git_branch="${GIT_BRANCH}"
tofu init -input=false >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1 || true
./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1 || true
tofu apply -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
quiet_run "tofu init" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu init -input=false
quiet_run "tofu workspace select" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
quiet_run "tofu destroy (pre-clean)" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false || true
quiet_run "scrub-env (pre-clean)" "$TOFU_LOG" ./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" || true
quiet_run "tofu apply" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu apply -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false
ok "3-node cluster provisioned"
- name: Bootstrap via Binary Install
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
@@ -210,55 +570,345 @@ jobs:
"${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-distro.tar.gz" \
--test-tar "${RUNNER_TEMP}/spinifex-tests.tar"
- name: Run E2E Tests
- name: Resolve cluster SSH details
id: cluster
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
INVENTORY=$(tofu output -json inventory)
NODE1_IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[0].wan_ip')
SSH_KEY=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.ssh_key_path')
SSH_KEY="${SSH_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
# Build node IP list
NODE_IPS=""
NODE_COUNT=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq '.nodes | length')
NODES_CSV=""
for i in $(seq 0 $((NODE_COUNT - 1))); do
NODE_IPS="${NODE_IPS} $(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r ".nodes[$i].wan_ip")"
ip=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r ".nodes[$i].wan_ip")
if [ -z "$NODES_CSV" ]; then NODES_CSV="$ip"; else NODES_CSV="$NODES_CSV,$ip"; fi
done
echo "node1_ip=${NODE1_IP}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "ssh_key=${SSH_KEY}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "nodes_csv=${NODES_CSV}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Build E2E test binaries on runner
working-directory: spinifex/tests/e2e
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
# eks is excluded on multinode: EKS KV is a clustered (Raft) JetStream
# stream and create-cluster needs an elected leader, but multinode
# JetStream clustering isn't solid yet (mulga-omq/z2z/5yg). EKS is
# validated single-node only for now; re-enable here once clustered
# JetStream + multinode EKS are a deliberate target.
SUITES_BUILD=$(echo "${SUITES}" | sed 's/e2e-//g' | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -vE '^(single|eks)$' | tr '\n' ' ')
if [ -z "$(echo "${SUITES_BUILD}" | tr -d ' ')" ]; then
echo "no multinode-eligible suites requested (SUITES=${SUITES}); nothing to build"
exit 0
fi
banner "build ${SUITES_BUILD// /, }"
group_open "go test -c"
make e2e-build SUITES_BUILD="${SUITES_BUILD}"
group_close
for f in _bin/*.test; do
ok "$(basename "$f") $(stat -c '%s' "$f" | numfmt --to=iec)"
done
NODE2_IP=$(echo "$INVENTORY" | jq -r '.nodes[1].wan_ip')
- name: Install go-junit-report on runner
run: |
go install github.com/jstemmer/go-junit-report/v2@latest
echo "$HOME/go/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" tf-user@${NODE1_IP} \
"cd ~/e2e-tests && ./run-multinode-e2e.sh ${NODE_IPS} && ./run-cert-e2e.sh --multinode ${NODE_IPS} && ENDPOINT=https://${NODE1_IP}:9999 ./run-lb-e2e.sh --nodes ${NODE_IPS}"
- name: Ship test binaries to node1
run: |
set -euo pipefail
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.cluster.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.cluster.outputs.node1_ip }}
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "rm -rf \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin && mkdir -p \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin"
tar -C spinifex/tests/e2e/_bin -cf - . | ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "tar -xf - -C \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin"
ok "shipped binaries to $VM"
- name: Start packet capture on all nodes br-wan
run: |
set +e
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.cluster.outputs.ssh_key }}")
IFS=',' read -ra NODE_LIST <<< "${{ steps.cluster.outputs.nodes_csv }}"
for ip in "${NODE_LIST[@]}"; do
[ -z "$ip" ] && continue
scp "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" \
"${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/start-net-capture.sh" \
tf-user@"$ip":/tmp/start-net-capture.sh
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@"$ip" "bash /tmp/start-net-capture.sh" || true
done
- name: Pre-flight diagnostics on node1
run: |
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh" 2>/dev/null || true
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.cluster.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.cluster.outputs.node1_ip }}
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
DIAG="${ARTIFACT_DIR}/preflight-diag.log"
{
echo "=== id (tf-user groups) ==="
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'id; echo; getent group spinifex || true'
echo
echo "=== ls -la /etc/spinifex/ ==="
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'ls -la /etc/spinifex/ 2>&1; echo; ls -la /etc/spinifex/nats/ 2>&1'
echo
echo "=== spinifex.toml NATS section ==="
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'grep -A4 "\[nodes\\..*\\.nats" /etc/spinifex/spinifex.toml 2>&1 | head -40'
echo
echo "=== systemctl is-active spinifex-* ==="
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'for s in spinifex-nats spinifex-predastore spinifex-awsgw spinifex-vpcd spinifex-daemon; do printf "%-22s %s\n" "$s" "$(systemctl is-active $s 2>&1)"; done'
echo
echo "=== which spx + version ==="
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'which spx; spx --version 2>&1 || true'
echo
echo "=== spx get nodes (direct ssh, tf-user) ==="
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'spx get nodes --timeout 5s 2>&1; echo "exit=$?"'
echo
echo "=== spx top nodes (direct ssh, tf-user) ==="
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'spx top nodes 2>&1 | head -30; echo "exit=$?"'
echo
echo "=== NATS routez (curl 127.0.0.1:8222) ==="
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:8222/routez 2>&1 | head -40'
echo
echo "=== aws describe-instance-types via gateway (tf-user) ==="
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" 'AWS_PROFILE=spinifex AWS_CA_BUNDLE=/etc/spinifex/ca.pem aws --endpoint-url https://${{ steps.cluster.outputs.node1_ip }}:9999 ec2 describe-instance-types --query "InstanceTypes[*].InstanceType" --output text 2>&1 | head -5'
} 2>&1 | tee "$DIAG"
true
- name: Run E2E suites
id: e2e
run: |
set +e
SUITES_RUN=$(echo "${SUITES}" | sed 's/e2e-//g' | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -vE '^(single|eks)$' | tr '\n' ' ')
if [ -z "$(echo "${SUITES_RUN}" | tr -d ' ')" ]; then
echo "no multinode-eligible suites requested (SUITES=${SUITES}); skipping"
echo "rc=0" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
if [ -n "${TEST_RUN}" ]; then
TEST_RUN_FLAG="-test.run=${TEST_RUN}"
else
TEST_RUN_FLAG=""
fi
VM_HOST="tf-user@${{ steps.cluster.outputs.node1_ip }}"
SSH_KEY="${{ steps.cluster.outputs.ssh_key }}"
NODES_CSV="${{ steps.cluster.outputs.nodes_csv }}"
cleanup_remote() {
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 -i "$SSH_KEY" "$VM_HOST" \
'pkill -u tf-user -TERM -f "/spinifex-e2e-bin/.*\.test( |$)" 2>/dev/null; sleep 1; pkill -u tf-user -KILL -f "/spinifex-e2e-bin/.*\.test( |$)" 2>/dev/null; true' \
2>/dev/null || true
}
trap cleanup_remote EXIT INT TERM
ssh -tt -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "$SSH_KEY" \
"$VM_HOST" \
"set -u; mkdir -p '${ARTIFACT_DIR}'; \
cd \$HOME/spinifex-e2e-bin; \
R=\$'\033[0m' B=\$'\033[1m' C=\$'\033[36m' G=\$'\033[32m' RED=\$'\033[31m'; \
FAIL=0; \
for SUITE in ${SUITES_RUN}; do \
echo \"::group::suite \$SUITE\"; \
printf '\n%s%s━━ suite %s ━━%s\n' \"\$B\" \"\$C\" \"\$SUITE\" \"\$R\"; \
date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-'\$SUITE'.start'; \
GITHUB_ACTIONS=true FORCE_COLOR=1 SPINIFEX_E2E=1 SPINIFEX_MODE=multinode \
SPINIFEX_NODES='${NODES_CSV}' \
SPINIFEX_NODE_IPS='${NODES_CSV}' \
SPINIFEX_SSH_USER=tf-user \
SPINIFEX_SSH_KEY=\$HOME/.ssh/tf-user-ap-southeast-2 \
ARTIFACT_DIR='${ARTIFACT_DIR}' \
./\$SUITE.test -test.v -test.timeout=30m ${TEST_RUN_FLAG} \
2>&1 | tee '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/test-'\$SUITE'.log' \
| sed -uE 's/^[[:space:]]+([a-zA-Z0-9_]+_test\.go:[0-9]+: )?//'; \
rc=\${PIPESTATUS[0]}; \
echo \"::endgroup::\"; \
if [ \$rc -ne 0 ]; then \
printf '%s✗%s suite %s failed (exit %d)\n' \"\$RED\" \"\$R\" \"\$SUITE\" \"\$rc\"; \
echo \"::error::suite \$SUITE failed (exit \$rc)\"; \
echo \"\$SUITE: FAILED\" >> '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/suite-status.txt'; \
FAIL=1; \
else \
printf '%s✓%s suite %s passed\n' \"\$G\" \"\$R\" \"\$SUITE\"; \
fi; \
done; \
exit \$FAIL"
E2E_RC=$?
echo "rc=${E2E_RC}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
- name: Capture network/IPsec diagnostics on all nodes
if: always()
run: |
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.cluster.outputs.ssh_key }}")
IFS=',' read -ra NODE_LIST <<< "${{ steps.cluster.outputs.nodes_csv }}"
NODE1_IP="${NODE_LIST[0]}"
scp "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" \
"${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/capture-net-diag.sh" \
tf-user@"$NODE1_IP":/tmp/capture-net-diag.sh
for i in "${!NODE_LIST[@]}"; do
idx=$((i + 1))
ip="${NODE_LIST[$i]}"
if [ "$idx" -ne 1 ]; then
scp "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" \
"${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/capture-net-diag.sh" \
tf-user@"$ip":/tmp/capture-net-diag.sh
fi
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@"$ip" \
"bash /tmp/capture-net-diag.sh '${ARTIFACT_DIR}/net-diag-node${idx}'"
if [ "$idx" -ne 1 ]; then
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@"$ip" \
"tar -C '${ARTIFACT_DIR}' -cf - 'net-diag-node${idx}' 2>/dev/null || true" \
| ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@"$NODE1_IP" \
"tar -C '${ARTIFACT_DIR}' -xf - 2>/dev/null"
fi
ok "net diagnostics node${idx} captured"
done
- name: Collect artifacts from node1
if: always()
run: |
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
SSH_OPTS=(-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i "${{ steps.cluster.outputs.ssh_key }}")
VM=tf-user@${{ steps.cluster.outputs.node1_ip }}
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" "$VM" "tar -C '${ARTIFACT_DIR}' -cf - . 2>/dev/null || true" \
| tar -C "${ARTIFACT_DIR}" -xf - 2>/dev/null
ok "artifacts pulled to ${ARTIFACT_DIR}"
IFS=',' read -ra NODE_LIST <<< "${{ steps.cluster.outputs.nodes_csv }}"
for i in "${!NODE_LIST[@]}"; do
idx=$((i + 1))
ip="${NODE_LIST[$i]}"
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@"$ip" 'sudo journalctl -u "spinifex-*" --no-pager --output=short-iso --since "60 min ago"' \
> "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/spinifex-journal-node${idx}.log" 2>/dev/null
ok "journal node${idx}: $(wc -l < "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/spinifex-journal-node${idx}.log" 2>/dev/null || echo 0) lines"
done
for i in "${!NODE_LIST[@]}"; do
idx=$((i + 1))
ip="${NODE_LIST[$i]}"
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@"$ip" 'sudo journalctl -u openvswitch-ipsec.service --no-pager --output=short-iso --since "60 min ago"' \
> "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/openvswitch-ipsec-node${idx}.log" 2>/dev/null
done
# LB/system microVM serial consoles, per node. The lb-agent logs its
# nginx (NLB) engine activation and any `nginx -t`/reload error +
# active-probe results to the guest serial console (never in the host
# journal). Files persist in /run/spinifex past VM teardown.
for i in "${!NODE_LIST[@]}"; do
idx=$((i + 1))
ip="${NODE_LIST[$i]}"
mkdir -p "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/lb-console/node${idx}"
ssh "${SSH_OPTS[@]}" tf-user@"$ip" 'sudo sh -c "cd /run/spinifex 2>/dev/null && tar -cf - console-*.log 2>/dev/null"' \
| tar -C "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/lb-console/node${idx}" -xf - 2>/dev/null
ok "lb-console node${idx}: $(ls "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/lb-console/node${idx}" 2>/dev/null | wc -l) files"
done
- name: Convert test logs to JUnit XML
if: always()
run: |
shopt -s nullglob
for LOG in "${ARTIFACT_DIR}"/test-*.log; do
BASE=$(basename "$LOG" .log)
SUITE=${BASE#test-}
go-junit-report -in "$LOG" -out "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/junit-${SUITE}.xml" || true
done
- name: Publish test summary
if: always()
uses: ./spinifex/.github/actions/junit-report
with:
junit-glob: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}/junit-*.xml
title: "Multi-Node E2E results"
- name: Analyze e2e failures
if: always()
uses: ./spinifex/.github/actions/e2e-analyze
with:
junit-glob: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}/junit-*.xml
log-dir: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
title: "Multi-Node E2E failure analysis"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
if: always()
with:
name: e2e-multi-artifacts-${{ github.run_id }}
path: ${{ env.ARTIFACT_DIR }}
if-no-files-found: warn
retention-days: 14
- name: Teardown
if: always()
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1 || true
set +e
source "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/.github/scripts/ci-fmt.sh"
if [ -n "${{ steps.cluster.outputs.node1_ip }}" ] && [ -n "${{ steps.cluster.outputs.ssh_key }}" ]; then
IFS=',' read -ra NODE_LIST <<< "${{ steps.cluster.outputs.nodes_csv }}"
for ip in "${NODE_LIST[@]}"; do
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 \
-i "${{ steps.cluster.outputs.ssh_key }}" \
tf-user@"$ip" \
'pkill -u tf-user -TERM -f "/spinifex-e2e-bin/.*\.test( |$)" 2>/dev/null; sleep 1; pkill -u tf-user -KILL -f "/spinifex-e2e-bin/.*\.test( |$)" 2>/dev/null; true' \
2>/dev/null || true
done
fi
UID_SELF=$(id -u)
WS="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}"
reap() {
local sig="$1"
for pid in $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x tofu) $(pgrep -u "$UID_SELF" -x terraform); do
cwd=$(readlink "/proc/$pid/cwd" 2>/dev/null) || continue
case "$cwd" in
"$WS"|"$WS"/*) kill "-$sig" "$pid" 2>/dev/null ;;
esac
done
}
reap TERM
sleep 2
reap KILL
find "$WS" -name '.terraform.tfstate.lock.info' -delete 2>/dev/null
quiet_run "tofu workspace select" "$TOFU_LOG" tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
quiet_run "tofu destroy" "$TOFU_LOG" timeout 600 tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false
quiet_run "scrub-env" "$TOFU_LOG" ./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}"
ok "teardown complete"
- name: Fail job if any suite failed
if: always()
run: |
if [ "${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }}" != "0" ] || [ -s "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/suite-status.txt" ]; then
echo "::error::Multi-node E2E suites failed (rc=${{ steps.e2e.outputs.rc }})"
cat "${ARTIFACT_DIR}/suite-status.txt" 2>/dev/null || true
exit 1
fi
e2e_status:
name: Report E2E Status
if: always() && inputs.sha
needs: [ e2e_single, e2e_pseudo_multi, e2e_real_multi ]
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-single ]
if: always()
needs: [e2e_single, e2e_real_multi]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
- name: Report Status to PR
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
REPORT_SHA: ${{ inputs.sha || github.sha }}
run: |
if [[ "${{ needs.e2e_single.result }}" == "success" && \
"${{ needs.e2e_pseudo_multi.result }}" == "success" && \
"${{ needs.e2e_real_multi.result }}" == "success" ]]; then
if [[ -z "${REPORT_SHA}" ]]; then
echo "::error::no SHA available (inputs.sha and github.sha both empty)"
exit 1
fi
single_ok=true; multi_ok=true
case "${{ needs.e2e_single.result }}" in success|skipped) ;; *) single_ok=false ;; esac
case "${{ needs.e2e_real_multi.result }}" in success|skipped) ;; *) multi_ok=false ;; esac
if $single_ok && $multi_ok; then
STATE="success"
DESC="All E2E suites passed"
DESC="E2E suites passed"
else
STATE="failure"
DESC="E2E failed: single=${{ needs.e2e_single.result }} pseudo=${{ needs.e2e_pseudo_multi.result }} multi=${{ needs.e2e_real_multi.result }}"
DESC="E2E failed: single=${{ needs.e2e_single.result }} multi=${{ needs.e2e_real_multi.result }}"
fi
gh api "repos/${{ github.repository }}/statuses/${{ inputs.sha }}" \
gh api "repos/${{ github.repository }}/statuses/${REPORT_SHA}" \
-f state="$STATE" \
-f context=e2e \
-f description="$DESC" \
+96
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
name: Publish EKS node AMI
# Builds the eks-node system AMI (libguestfs, on the runner) and publishes the
# compressed qcow2 + .sha256 sidecar to the Cloudflare R2 bucket that backs
# iso.mulgadc.com/system-ami/. Operators then install it on any cluster with:
# spx admin images import --name spinifex-eks-node
#
# Manual-only: publishing overwrites the mirror artifact, so it is a deliberate
# action, not something every push should trigger.
on:
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
dry_run:
description: "Build + convert only; skip the R2 upload"
type: boolean
default: false
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: publish-eks-ami
cancel-in-progress: false
jobs:
publish:
name: Build + publish eks-node AMI
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-single ]
steps:
- name: Checkout Spinifex
uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
path: spinifex
- name: Checkout Viperblock
uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
repository: mulgadc/viperblock
ref: dev
path: viperblock
- name: Checkout Predastore
uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
repository: mulgadc/predastore
ref: dev
path: predastore
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version-file: "spinifex/go.mod"
# Self-hosted runner: the Go module + build cache already persists on
# local disk between runs. setup-go's cache-save ("Post Setup Go")
# otherwise re-uploads hundreds of MB to the Actions cache backend,
# taking longer than the build itself.
cache: false
- name: Setup Go Workspace
run: go work init ./spinifex ./viperblock ./predastore
- name: Install build + upload tooling
run: |
set -euo pipefail
sudo apt-get update -qq
sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends libguestfs-tools qemu-utils
if ! command -v aws &>/dev/null; then
curl -fsSL "https://awscli.amazonaws.com/awscli-exe-linux-x86_64.zip" -o /tmp/awscliv2.zip
unzip -q /tmp/awscliv2.zip -d /tmp/aws-install
sudo /tmp/aws-install/aws/install
rm -rf /tmp/awscliv2.zip /tmp/aws-install
fi
- name: Build + publish to R2
working-directory: spinifex
env:
# Map the repo's R2 secrets onto the names publish-system-image.sh reads.
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.CF_R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.CF_R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
R2_ENDPOINT: ${{ secrets.CF_R2_ENDPOINT_URL }}
R2_BUCKET: spinifex-iso
DRY_RUN: ${{ inputs.dry_run }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# libguestfs needs to read a host kernel; Ubuntu ships it mode 0600.
# direct backend = no libvirt on the runner.
export LIBGUESTFS_BACKEND=direct
sudo chmod 0644 /boot/vmlinuz-* || true
FLAGS=(--build)
if [[ "${DRY_RUN}" == "true" ]]; then
FLAGS+=(--dry-run)
fi
./scripts/publish-system-image.sh \
scripts/images/eks-node/manifest.conf "${FLAGS[@]}"
+56 -31
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version: '1.26.3'
go-version: "1.26.4"
- name: Build microVM artifacts (lb-agent + kernel + initramfs)
run: cd spinifex && make build-microvm-image
@@ -131,7 +131,10 @@ jobs:
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
steps:
- name: Clean Workspace
run: rm -rf "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
run: |
awk -v w="$GITHUB_WORKSPACE" '$2 ~ "^"w {print $2}' /proc/mounts \
| sort -r | xargs -r -I{} sudo umount -l -R {} || true
sudo rm -rf --one-file-system "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
- uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v3
id: app-token
@@ -169,8 +172,30 @@ jobs:
TARBALL=$(find "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/release-assets" -name "*-linux-amd64.tar.gz" | head -1)
./bootstrap-install.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" "$SETUP_SH" "$TARBALL"
- name: Teardown
if: always()
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1 || true
baremetal:
needs: release
permissions:
contents: read
statuses: write
uses: ./.github/workflows/e2e-baremetal.yml
secrets: inherit
promote:
needs: [ verify, baremetal ]
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
env:
TAG: ${{ github.ref_name }}
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
steps:
- name: Promote Release
if: success()
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
run: |
@@ -182,41 +207,41 @@ jobs:
echo "Release ${TAG} promoted to latest"
fi
# Annotate the (still-draft) release if either gate failed.
mark-failed:
needs: [ verify, baremetal ]
if: failure()
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
env:
TAG: ${{ github.ref_name }}
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
steps:
- name: Mark Release Failed
if: failure()
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
run: |
EXISTING_BODY=$(gh release view "$TAG" --repo "$REPO" --json body -q .body)
NOTES_FILE=$(mktemp)
printf 'Verification failed — see workflow run for details.\n\n%s' "$EXISTING_BODY" > "$NOTES_FILE"
printf 'Verification failed (tofu install or bare-metal boot) — see workflow run for details.\n\n%s' "$EXISTING_BODY" > "$NOTES_FILE"
gh release edit "$TAG" --repo "$REPO" --notes-file "$NOTES_FILE"
rm -f "$NOTES_FILE"
- name: Teardown
if: always()
working-directory: mulga/scripts/tofu-cluster
run: |
tofu workspace select -or-create "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
tofu destroy -var-file=envs/${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}.tfvars -auto-approve -input=false >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1
./scrub-env.sh "${SPINIFEX_CI_ENV}" >> "$TOFU_LOG" 2>&1 || true
iso:
needs: release
runs-on: [ self-hosted, ci-single ]
timeout-minutes: 90
# ISO build (~60-90m) overlaps the parallel baremetal run (~120m); the
# upload gate then waits for baremetal to finish, so the job must outlast it.
timeout-minutes: 180
steps:
- name: Clean Workspace
run: |
ROOTFS="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/mulga/scripts/iso-builder/.cache/rootfs"
# Mirror make clean's umount sequence unconditionally — lazy unmount
# detaches immediately even if the mount is busy, so rm -rf is safe.
sudo umount -l -R "${ROOTFS}" 2>/dev/null || true
sudo umount -l "${ROOTFS}/dev/pts" 2>/dev/null || true
sudo umount -l "${ROOTFS}/dev" 2>/dev/null || true
sudo umount -l "${ROOTFS}/sys" 2>/dev/null || true
sudo umount -l "${ROOTFS}/proc" 2>/dev/null || true
sudo rm -rf "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
sudo rm -rf --one-file-system "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"/*
- uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v3
id: app-token
@@ -289,24 +314,25 @@ jobs:
SPINIFEX_BIN="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/bin/spx" \
INSTALLER_BIN="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/spinifex/bin/spinifex-installer"
- name: Wait for verify
- name: Wait for verify + baremetal
id: wait-verify
if: steps.build-iso.outcome == 'success'
continue-on-error: true
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
run: |
echo "Waiting for verify job to complete..."
echo "Waiting for verify + baremetal jobs to complete..."
while true; do
CONCLUSION=$(gh api \
"repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/runs/${{ github.run_id }}/jobs" \
--jq '.jobs[] | select(.name == "verify") | .conclusion // empty')
if [ -n "$CONCLUSION" ]; then
echo "Verify conclusion: $CONCLUSION"
[ "$CONCLUSION" = "success" ] && exit 0
JOBS=$(gh api \
"repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/runs/${{ github.run_id }}/jobs" --paginate)
VERIFY=$(echo "$JOBS" | jq -r '.jobs[] | select(.name == "verify") | .conclusion // empty')
BAREMETAL=$(echo "$JOBS" | jq -r '.jobs[] | select(.name | startswith("baremetal")) | .conclusion // empty')
if [ -n "$VERIFY" ] && [ -n "$BAREMETAL" ]; then
echo "verify=$VERIFY baremetal=$BAREMETAL"
{ [ "$VERIFY" = "success" ] && [ "$BAREMETAL" = "success" ]; } && exit 0
exit 1
fi
echo "Verify still running, retrying in 30s..."
echo "Still waiting (verify=${VERIFY:-pending} baremetal=${BAREMETAL:-pending}), retry 30s..."
sleep 30
done
@@ -327,14 +353,13 @@ jobs:
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.CF_R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.CF_R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
CF_R2_ENDPOINT_URL: ${{ secrets.CF_R2_ENDPOINT_URL }}
VERSION: ${{ github.ref_name }}
run: |
aws --endpoint-url="${CF_R2_ENDPOINT_URL}" \
s3 cp "mulga/scripts/iso-builder/dist/spinifex-${VERSION}.iso" \
"s3://spinifex-iso/spinifex-${VERSION}.iso"
s3 cp "mulga/scripts/iso-builder/dist/spinifex.iso" \
"s3://spinifex-iso/spinifex.iso"
aws --endpoint-url="${CF_R2_ENDPOINT_URL}" \
s3 cp "mulga/scripts/iso-builder/dist/spinifex-${VERSION}.iso.sha256" \
"s3://spinifex-iso/spinifex-${VERSION}.iso.sha256"
s3 cp "mulga/scripts/iso-builder/dist/spinifex.iso.sha256" \
"s3://spinifex-iso/spinifex.iso.sha256"
- name: Mark ISO failed
if: always() && (steps.build-iso.outcome == 'failure' || steps.upload.outcome == 'failure')
+3
View File
@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Build Spinifex
run: make -C spinifex build
- name: Manifest check + drift lint
run: make -C spinifex manifest-check manifest-lint
- name: Run Tests with Coverage
run: make -C spinifex test-cover
-3
View File
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
# Spinifex Installation
For documentation on using and installing Spinifex see [https://docs.mulgadc.com](https://docs.mulgadc.com/)
+35 -45
View File
@@ -6,17 +6,12 @@ ARCH := $(shell uname -m)
ifeq ($(ARCH),x86_64)
GO_ARCH := amd64
AWS_ARCH := x86_64
# On x86, we can run ARM VMs via emulation
QEMU_PACKAGES := qemu-system-x86 qemu-system-arm
else ifeq ($(ARCH),aarch64)
GO_ARCH := arm64
AWS_ARCH := aarch64
# On ARM, we can run x86 VMs via emulation
QEMU_PACKAGES := qemu-system-aarch64 qemu-system-x86
else ifeq ($(ARCH),arm64)
GO_ARCH := arm64
AWS_ARCH := aarch64
QEMU_PACKAGES := qemu-system-aarch64 qemu-system-x86
else
$(error Unsupported architecture: $(ARCH). Only x86_64 and aarch64/arm64 are supported.)
endif
@@ -73,11 +68,27 @@ build-lb-agent:
@echo -e "\n....Building lb-agent (static)"
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 go build -ldflags "-s -w" -o ./bin/lb-agent cmd/lb-agent/main.go
build-system-image: ## Build a system image from manifest (use IMAGE=lb)
build-system-image: ## Build a system image from manifest (use IMAGE=lb or IMAGE=eks-node)
ifndef IMAGE
$(error IMAGE is required. Usage: make build-system-image IMAGE=lb)
endif
./scripts/build-system-image.sh scripts/images/$(IMAGE).conf
@if [ -f scripts/images/$(IMAGE).conf ]; then \
./scripts/build-system-image.sh scripts/images/$(IMAGE).conf $(if $(IMPORT),--import); \
elif [ -f scripts/images/$(IMAGE)/manifest.conf ]; then \
./scripts/build-system-image.sh scripts/images/$(IMAGE)/manifest.conf $(if $(IMPORT),--import); \
else \
echo "ERROR: no manifest at scripts/images/$(IMAGE).conf or scripts/images/$(IMAGE)/manifest.conf"; \
exit 1; \
fi
build-eks-node-image: ## Build the unified eks-node AMI (K3s server+agent; role at first boot; IMPORT=1 to register)
$(MAKE) build-system-image IMAGE=eks-node
import-eks-node-image: ## Build + register the eks-node AMI (requires a running cluster)
$(MAKE) build-system-image IMAGE=eks-node IMPORT=1
publish-eks-node-image: ## Build + publish the eks-node AMI to Cloudflare R2 (needs R2_ENDPOINT + AWS_* env)
./scripts/publish-system-image.sh scripts/images/eks-node/manifest.conf --build
MICROVM_OUT_DIR := build/microvm
MICROVM_ARTIFACTS := $(MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/vmlinuz $(MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/initramfs.cpio.gz
@@ -99,14 +110,10 @@ install-microvm: $(MICROVM_ARTIFACTS) ## Install microVM artifacts to /usr/share
sudo install -m 0644 $(MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/vmlinuz /usr/share/spinifex/microvm/vmlinuz
sudo install -m 0644 $(MICROVM_OUT_DIR)/initramfs.cpio.gz /usr/share/spinifex/microvm/initramfs.cpio.gz
go_run:
@echo -e "\n....Running $(GO_PROJECT_NAME)...."
$(GOPATH)/bin/$(GO_PROJECT_NAME)
# Preflight — runs the same checks as GitHub Actions (lint + vuln + tests).
# Use this before committing to catch CI failures locally.
preflight:
@$(MAKE) --no-print-directory QUIET=1 manifest-check lint govulncheck test-cover diff-coverage test-race test-harness
@$(MAKE) --no-print-directory QUIET=1 manifest-check manifest-lint lint govulncheck test-cover diff-coverage test-race test-harness
@echo -e "\n ✅ Preflight passed — safe to commit."
# E2E harness unit tests. Build-tagged `e2e` so they're skipped by the
@@ -123,6 +130,17 @@ manifest-check:
@echo -e "\n....Checking service-interfaces.yaml...."
@go run ./tests/e2e/manifest-check/cmd/manifest-check -repo-root . -manifest docs/service-interfaces.yaml
# Drift guards (Bead 5): direct-create fixture lint + NATS subject lint,
# ratcheted against tests/e2e/manifest-lint/baseline.txt. Fails only on NEW
# drift beyond the baseline.
manifest-lint:
@echo -e "\n....Linting manifest drift (fixtures + subjects)...."
@go run ./tests/e2e/manifest-lint/cmd/manifest-lint -repo-root .
# Accept current drift into the baseline. Run after an intentional change.
manifest-lint-update:
@go run ./tests/e2e/manifest-lint/cmd/manifest-lint -repo-root . -update
# Run unit tests
test:
@echo -e "\n....Running tests for $(GO_PROJECT_NAME)...."
@@ -152,13 +170,8 @@ diff-coverage: test-cover
bench:
@echo -e "\n....Running benchmarks for $(GO_PROJECT_NAME)...."
$(MAKE) easyjson
LOG_IGNORE=1 go test -benchmem -run=. -bench=. ./...
run:
$(MAKE) go_build
$(MAKE) go_run
# Fast iteration: build + install binary + restart all services.
# Microvm artifacts are reinstalled when they already exist on disk — the rule's
# input timestamps drive a rebuild only if anything actually changed. On a fresh
@@ -185,20 +198,19 @@ clean:
install-system:
@echo -e "\n....Installing system dependencies for $(ARCH)...."
@echo "QEMU packages: $(QEMU_PACKAGES)"
sudo apt-get update && sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y \
-o Dpkg::Options::="--force-confdef" \
-o Dpkg::Options::="--force-confold" \
nbdkit nbdkit-plugin-dev pkg-config $(QEMU_PACKAGES) qemu-utils qemu-kvm \
nbdkit nbdkit-plugin-dev pkg-config qemu-system-x86 qemu-system-arm qemu-utils qemu-kvm \
ovmf qemu-efi-aarch64 \
libvirt-daemon-system libvirt-clients libvirt-dev make gcc jq curl \
iproute2 netcat-openbsd openssh-client wget git unzip sudo xz-utils file \
ovn-central ovn-host openvswitch-switch dhcpcd-base
install-go:
@echo -e "\n....Installing Go 1.26.3 for $(ARCH) ($(GO_ARCH))...."
@echo -e "\n....Installing Go 1.26.4 for $(ARCH) ($(GO_ARCH))...."
@if [ ! -d "/usr/local/go" ]; then \
curl -L https://go.dev/dl/go1.26.3.linux-$(GO_ARCH).tar.gz | tar -C /usr/local -xz; \
curl -L https://go.dev/dl/go1.26.4.linux-$(GO_ARCH).tar.gz | tar -C /usr/local -xz; \
else \
echo "Go already installed in /usr/local/go"; \
fi
@@ -218,19 +230,15 @@ install-aws:
quickinstall: install-system install-go install-aws
@echo -e "\n✅ Quickinstall complete for $(ARCH)."
@echo " Please ensure /usr/local/go/bin is in your PATH."
@echo " Installed: Go ($(GO_ARCH)), AWS CLI ($(AWS_ARCH)), QEMU ($(QEMU_PACKAGES))"
# Lint all Go code via golangci-lint (replaces check-format, vet, gosec, staticcheck)
lint:
@echo "Running golangci-lint..."
$(_Q)golangci-lint run ./...
@echo " golangci-lint ok"
# Auto-fix all linter issues that have fixers
fix:
golangci-lint run --fix ./...
# Govulncheck — dependency vulnerability scanning (not covered by golangci-lint)
govulncheck:
@echo "Running govulncheck..."
$(_Q)go tool govulncheck ./...
@@ -279,26 +287,8 @@ distro-arm64:
distro-clean:
rm -rf dist/
# Ansible dev lifecycle (experimental, parallel to dev-*.sh / reset-dev-env.sh).
# See scripts/ansible/README.md and docs/development/improvements/ansible-dev-lifecycle.md.
ansible-dev-preflight:
cd scripts/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-preflight.yml
ansible-dev-teardown:
cd scripts/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-teardown.yml
ansible-dev-install:
cd scripts/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-install.yml
ansible-dev-reset:
cd scripts/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-reset.yml
ansible-dev-deploy:
cd scripts/ansible && ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-deploy.yml
.PHONY: build build-ui build-installer build-lb-agent build-system-image build-microvm-image install-microvm go_build go_run preflight test test-cover test-race test-actions test-harness manifest-check diff-coverage bench run \
.PHONY: build build-ui build-installer build-lb-agent build-system-image build-eks-node-image import-eks-node-image publish-eks-node-image build-microvm-image install-microvm go_build preflight test test-cover test-race diff-coverage bench test-actions test-harness manifest-check manifest-lint manifest-lint-update \
deploy reinstall clean \
install-system install-go install-aws quickinstall \
lint fix govulncheck \
distro distro-amd64 distro-arm64 distro-clean \
ansible-dev-preflight ansible-dev-teardown ansible-dev-install ansible-dev-reset ansible-dev-deploy
distro distro-amd64 distro-arm64 distro-clean
+45 -7
View File
@@ -6,20 +6,58 @@ mount -t devtmpfs dev /dev
# virtio_mmio is built-in (CONFIG_VIRTIO_MMIO=y) so virtio-net devices are
# already enumerated by the time PID 1 runs — no modprobe needed.
# qemu_fw_cfg and virtio_net are =m in stock Alpine linux-virt, so load them.
modprobe qemu_fw_cfg 2>/dev/null || modprobe fw_cfg_sysfs 2>/dev/null || true
modprobe virtio_net 2>/dev/null || true
#
# modprobe needs a usable modules.dep; when the image is built on a host whose
# depmod can't produce one, busybox modprobe silently no-ops and the module
# never loads — fw_cfg then never appears and init panics. insmod by explicit
# path needs no modules.dep, so fall back to it. Handles .ko and .ko.gz.
load_mod() {
modprobe "$1" 2>/dev/null && return 0
for ko in $(find /lib/modules -name "$1.ko" -o -name "$1.ko.gz" 2>/dev/null); do
insmod "$ko" 2>/dev/null && return 0
case "$ko" in
*.gz) gunzip -c "$ko" >/tmp/mod.ko 2>/dev/null \
&& insmod /tmp/mod.ko 2>/dev/null && return 0 ;;
esac
done
return 1
}
load_mod qemu_fw_cfg || load_mod fw_cfg_sysfs || true
# virtio_net depends on net_failover, which depends on failover. The load_mod
# insmod fallback loads a single .ko with no dependency resolution, and
# modules.dep is absent when the image is built on a kmod-less host (depmod
# skipped), so modprobe can't resolve the chain either. Load it explicitly
# bottom-up so the NIC comes up regardless of how the image was built —
# without this the agent has no network and the LB hangs in provisioning.
load_mod failover || true
load_mod net_failover || true
load_mod virtio_net || true
for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do
[ -f /sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_name/opt/spinifex/netcfg/raw ] && break
sleep 0.02
NETCFG=/sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_name/opt/spinifex/netcfg/raw
i=0
while [ "$i" -lt 25 ]; do
[ -f "$NETCFG" ] && break
sleep 0.04
i=$((i + 1))
done
if [ ! -f /sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_name/opt/spinifex/netcfg/raw ]; then
if [ ! -f "$NETCFG" ]; then
# Dump host/guest fw_cfg state to the serial console before init exits so a
# "netcfg not available" panic is diagnosable from the captured console log
# (module-not-loaded vs qemu-not-exposing-by_name vs wrong machine type).
echo "[init] FATAL: fw_cfg netcfg not available" >&2
echo "[init] dmi: vendor=$(cat /sys/class/dmi/id/sys_vendor 2>/dev/null) product=$(cat /sys/class/dmi/id/product_name 2>/dev/null) bios=$(cat /sys/class/dmi/id/bios_version 2>/dev/null)" >&2
echo "[init] qemu_fw_cfg dir present: $([ -d /sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg ] && echo yes || echo NO)" >&2
echo "[init] modules: $(lsmod 2>/dev/null | awk 'NR>1{print $1}' | tr '\n' ',')" >&2
echo "[init] by_name listing:" >&2
ls -la /sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_name/ 2>&1 | sed 's/^/[init] /' >&2
ls -la /sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_name/opt/ 2>&1 | sed 's/^/[init] /' >&2
echo "[init] dmesg fw_cfg:" >&2
dmesg 2>/dev/null | grep -i fw_cfg | sed 's/^/[init] /' >&2
exit 1
fi
. /sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_name/opt/spinifex/netcfg/raw
. "$NETCFG"
for n in 0 1 2 3 4 5; do
eval mac=\$NIC${n}_MAC
+1
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ Wants=spinifex-nats.service
[Service]
Type=simple
Slice=spinifex-system.slice
User=spinifex-gw
Group=spinifex
ExecStartPre=/var/lib/spinifex/wait-for-nats.sh
+10 -43
View File
@@ -1,60 +1,30 @@
[Unit]
Description=Spinifex Daemon (VM Orchestration)
PartOf=spinifex.target
After=spinifex-nats.service spinifex-viperblock.service openvswitch-switch.service ovn-controller.service
# No Wants=spinifex-nats.service: Wants= reactivates a stopped unit during
# `systemctl restart spinifex-daemon`, which would mask the standalone-startup
# path the Tier 1 DDIL Scenario B exercises. spinifex.target Wants= covers
# cold boot.
After=spinifex-nats.service spinifex-viperblock.service openvswitch-switch.service ovn-controller.service openvswitch-ipsec.service
# Wants (not Requires): stay bootable when openvswitch-ipsec is absent
Wants=openvswitch-ipsec.service
[Service]
Type=simple
Slice=spinifex-system.slice
User=spinifex-daemon
Group=spinifex
# DDIL Tier 1 (siv-17): no ExecStartPre wait-for-nats. The daemon starts in
# standalone mode and reconnects to NATS in the background — process-exiting
# on a missing NATS would kill the local VM management plane.
#
# Opt-in strict-startup (§1d-strict, siv-44): set SPINIFEX_REQUIRE_NATS=1 to
# restore pre-DDIL fail-fast UX. First NATS connect uses a ~30s bounded retry
# and the daemon aborts on timeout. Intended for dev/test/single-node deploys
# where silent NATS misconfig is more confusing than helpful. Do NOT set this
# in the shipped unit — it re-introduces the SPOF that Tier 1 removed.
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/spx service spinifex start
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=5
# DDIL Tier 1 (mulga-siv-58): KillMode=process so systemd only signals the
# daemon's main PID, not the cgroup. QEMU children stay alive across
# `systemctl restart spinifex-daemon` and the new daemon reattaches to them
# via the persisted local state file + pidfile + QMP socket. With the
# default control-group mode, restart would terminate every guest VM —
# defeating Scenario B's "daemon restart preserves running instances".
# KillMode=process: guest QEMU survives daemon restart; the new daemon reattaches (DDIL)
KillMode=process
# 15s upper bound on the SIGTERM grace window. The new SIGTERM handler
# skips VM teardown (it now just persists state and exits), so 15s is
# plenty of slack for the cluster-manager + NATS unsubscribe path.
TimeoutStopSec=15
# RG-4: infra tier — reaped only after every guest
OOMScoreAdjust=-500
Environment=SPINIFEX_CONFIG_PATH=/etc/spinifex/spinifex.toml
Environment=SPINIFEX_BASE_DIR=/var/lib/spinifex/spinifex/
Environment=SPINIFEX_WAL_DIR=/var/lib/spinifex/spinifex/
# DDIL Tier 1 (mulga-siv-58): QEMU pidfiles, QMP sockets, and the
# shared qemu.log all resolve via utils.pidPath() — which falls back
# to os.TempDir() (=/tmp) when $HOME/spinifex doesn't exist. With
# PrivateTmp=yes, each daemon start gets a fresh /tmp namespace, so
# pidfiles written by QEMU (running in the OLD daemon's namespace)
# are invisible to the new daemon. The /local/instances handler then
# reports PID=0 and Scenario B fails its "live QEMU PID" assertion.
# Pin XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to the host-wide tmpfs at /run/spinifex (created
# by tmpfiles.d, already in ReadWritePaths) so pidPath() returns a
# stable, namespace-independent path that both daemon incarnations and
# QEMU children resolve identically.
# Pin to host tmpfs: QEMU pidfiles/QMP sockets must survive PrivateTmp namespace churn (DDIL)
Environment=XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/spinifex
# Filesystem access — NoNewPrivileges omitted (daemon uses sudo for ip, ovs-vsctl, dhcpcd)
# CAP_SYS_ADMIN: required for GPU passthrough sysfs operations (vfio group management).
# CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE: sysfs driver bind/unbind paths (/sys/bus/pci/drivers/vfio-pci/bind,
# unbind) are root:root 0200; non-root processes need CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE to open them.
# RG-9: daemon tier — privileged by necessity (GPU vfio). NoNewPrivileges omitted (RG-10: sudo ip/ovs-vsctl/dhcpcd)
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_SYS_ADMIN CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
ProtectSystem=full
PrivateDevices=no
@@ -66,7 +36,7 @@ DeviceAllow=/dev/vfio/vfio rw
ReadOnlyPaths=/etc/spinifex/spinifex.toml /etc/spinifex/server.pem /etc/spinifex/server.key /etc/spinifex/ca.pem
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/spinifex/spinifex /var/log/spinifex /run/spinifex /run/spinifex/nbd
# Hardening
# RG-9: hardening baseline
ProtectHome=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
@@ -81,8 +51,6 @@ ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectProc=invisible
SystemCallArchitectures=native
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
# DHCP lease acquisition moved to spinifex-vpcd (see dhcp-allocate-error.md);
# the daemon no longer needs AF_PACKET or the softened kernel protections.
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX AF_NETLINK
ProtectHostname=yes
KeyringMode=private
@@ -90,8 +58,7 @@ RemoveIPC=yes
LimitCORE=0
LimitNOFILE=65536
LimitNPROC=4096
# VFIO GPU passthrough requires locking all guest RAM into physical memory.
# Without this, QEMU fails with RLIMIT_MEMLOCK exceeded when pinning guest pages.
# LimitMEMLOCK=infinity: VFIO pins all guest RAM
LimitMEMLOCK=infinity
[Install]
+8
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
[Unit]
Description=Spinifex guest VM tier
Before=slices.target
[Slice]
# RG-3: child of spinifex.slice (spinifex-guests -> spinifex), sibling of
# spinifex-system. Parent for the per-instance spinifex-instance-<id>.slice
# leaves (0002 RG-7). Inherits the spinifex.slice ceiling; no extra limit here.
+1
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ Before=spinifex-predastore.service spinifex-daemon.service spinifex-awsgw.servic
[Service]
Type=simple
Slice=spinifex-system.slice
User=spinifex-nats
Group=spinifex
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/spx service nats start
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ Wants=spinifex-nats.service
[Service]
Type=simple
Slice=spinifex-system.slice
User=spinifex-storage
Group=spinifex
ExecStartPre=/var/lib/spinifex/wait-for-nats.sh
+9
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
[Unit]
Description=Spinifex control/infra tier (NATS, predastore, viperblock, daemon, awsgw, vpcd, ui)
Before=slices.target
[Slice]
# RG-3: child of spinifex.slice (spinifex-system -> spinifex), inherits the
# parent ceiling, no extra limit. Holds the 7 control/infra services. Guest QEMU
# moves to the sibling spinifex-guests.slice (per-instance placement lands in
# 0002 RG-7); until then the daemon-forked guests stay under spinifex-daemon.service.
+1
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ After=spinifex-awsgw.service
[Service]
Type=simple
Slice=spinifex-system.slice
User=spinifex-ui
Group=spinifex
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/spx service spinifex-ui start
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ Wants=spinifex-nats.service
[Service]
Type=simple
Slice=spinifex-system.slice
User=spinifex-viperblock
Group=spinifex
ExecStartPre=/var/lib/spinifex/wait-for-nats.sh
+12 -23
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ Wants=spinifex-nats.service ovn-controller.service
[Service]
Type=simple
Slice=spinifex-system.slice
User=spinifex-vpcd
Group=spinifex
ExecStartPre=/var/lib/spinifex/wait-for-nats.sh
@@ -16,37 +17,25 @@ OOMScoreAdjust=-500
Environment=SPINIFEX_CONFIG_PATH=/etc/spinifex/spinifex.toml
Environment=SPINIFEX_BASE_DIR=/var/lib/spinifex/vpcd/
# Filesystem access — NoNewPrivileges omitted (vpcd uses sudo for ovs-vsctl, ovn-nbctl, systemctl)
ProtectSystem=full
# RG-9: network tier. vpcd MUST share the host mount namespace — IMDS enters
# per-VPC netns via setns(), and any filesystem-sandbox directive (ProtectSystem/
# Home, PrivateTmp, ProtectKernel*, ProtectControlGroups/Proc, Read*Paths) forks a
# private mount ns that traps the /run/netns bind-mount and breaks setns(2). Those,
# plus MemoryDenyWriteExecute, are omitted by design — not regressions.
PrivateDevices=no
ReadOnlyPaths=/etc/spinifex/spinifex.toml /etc/spinifex/ca.pem
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/spinifex/vpcd /var/log/spinifex
# Hardening
ProtectHome=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
RestrictSUIDSGID=no
LockPersonality=yes
RestrictRealtime=yes
RestrictNamespaces=yes
ProtectClock=yes
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes
ProtectKernelLogs=yes
ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectProc=invisible
# mnt alongside net: in-netns `ip` unshares a mount ns for its own /sys
RestrictNamespaces=net mnt
SystemCallArchitectures=native
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=no
# AF_PACKET: required by the in-process DHCP client (github.com/insomniacslk/dhcp
# / nclient4) for raw L2 BOOTP on br-wan before an IP is configured on the
# interface. See docs/development/bugs/dhcp-allocate-error.md.
# AF_PACKET: raw L2 BOOTP for the in-process DHCP client before the iface has an IP
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX AF_NETLINK AF_PACKET
# CAP_NET_RAW: open AF_PACKET sockets.
# CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE: covers unicast RENEW to UDP :68.
# CAP_NET_ADMIN: already used for ovs-vsctl / ip link wiring on the bridge.
# Note, disabled for now, sudo issue with ovs
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_RAW CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE CAP_SETUID CAP_SETGID
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_RAW CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE CAP_SETUID CAP_SETGID
# Caps: NET_ADMIN (ovs/ip), NET_RAW (AF_PACKET), NET_BIND_SERVICE (:68), SETUID/SETGID, SYS_ADMIN (setns into VPC netns)
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_RAW CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE CAP_SETUID CAP_SETGID CAP_SYS_ADMIN
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_RAW CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE CAP_SETUID CAP_SETGID CAP_SYS_ADMIN
NoNewPrivileges=no
ProtectHostname=yes
KeyringMode=private
+13
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
[Unit]
Description=Spinifex resource-bounded slice (host ceiling)
Before=slices.target
[Slice]
# RG-1: no CPUWeight — slice roots are siblings; capping below the default would
# let user.slice out-prioritize the VM fleet. Operator CPU priority lives on
# system.slice (system.slice.d/spinifex-reserve.conf).
# RG-1/RG-5: throttle+reclaim at High, hard wall at Max (% of physical RAM).
MemoryHigh=80%
MemoryMax=90%
# RG-5: spill to the full swap device before the MemoryMax wall; matched to swap size.
MemorySwapMax=8G
+2 -2
View File
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ func main() {
}
}
// Build nclient4 options — identical to spinifex/services/vpcd/dhcp/nclient4.go.
// Build nclient4 options — standalone DHCP probe for upstream-router debugging.
opts := []nclient4.ClientOpt{
nclient4.WithHWAddr(hwAddr),
nclient4.WithTimeout(*timeout),
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ func main() {
}
defer client.Close()
// Identity modifiers — identical to identityModifiers() in vpcd dhcp package.
// Identity modifiers — client-id / hostname / vendor-class for upstream lease tagging.
var mods []dhcpv4.Modifier
if cid != "" {
mods = append(mods, dhcpv4.WithOption(dhcpv4.OptClientIdentifier([]byte(cid))))
+139
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
// eks-gateway-fetch runs inside the EKS K3s control-plane VM and fetches a
// control-plane resource from the host through the AWS gateway, instead of
// dialing core NATS directly. It is the read-side companion to
// eks-gateway-publish.
//
// It SigV4-signs (service "eks") an HTTPS GET to the gateway, retrying with
// backoff until the gateway returns 2xx or the attempt budget is exhausted (so
// a degraded link surfaces as a non-zero exit), then emits the staged add-ons
// as tab-separated lines the on-VM addon-sync shell agent consumes without a
// JSON parser:
//
// <addonName>\t<addonVersion>\t<serviceAccountRoleArn>\t<base64(configurationValues)>
//
// The configuration values are base64-encoded so embedded tabs/newlines cannot
// break the line framing.
//
// Usage:
//
// eks-gateway-fetch -resource addons # GET /clusters/{cluster}/internal-addons/{accountId}
//
// Flags default to environment variables seeded by cloud-init:
// EKS_GATEWAY_URL, EKS_GATEWAY_CA, EKS_ACCESS_KEY, EKS_SECRET_KEY, EKS_REGION,
// EKS_ACCOUNT_ID, EKS_CLUSTER_NAME.
package main
import (
"bufio"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"flag"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"os"
"time"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/eksgw"
_ "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/fipsboot"
)
// stagedAddon mirrors the gateway's StagedAddonManifest wire shape; duplicated
// here to keep this tiny VM binary free of the handler package's dependency
// graph.
type stagedAddon struct {
AddonName string `json:"addonName"`
AddonVersion string `json:"addonVersion"`
ServiceAccountRoleArn string `json:"serviceAccountRoleArn"`
ConfigurationValues string `json:"configurationValues"`
}
type internalAddonsResponse struct {
Addons []stagedAddon `json:"addons"`
}
const (
maxAttempts = 30
retryDelay = 5 * time.Second
)
func main() {
var (
gatewayURL string
gatewayCA string
accessKey string
secretKey string
region string
accountID string
clusterName string
resource string
)
flag.StringVar(&gatewayURL, "gateway", os.Getenv("EKS_GATEWAY_URL"), "Gateway URL (e.g. https://10.15.8.1:9999)")
flag.StringVar(&gatewayCA, "gateway-ca", os.Getenv("EKS_GATEWAY_CA"), "Path to gateway TLS CA PEM (optional; falls back to system trust)")
flag.StringVar(&accessKey, "access-key", os.Getenv("EKS_ACCESS_KEY"), "AWS access key ID")
flag.StringVar(&secretKey, "secret-key", os.Getenv("EKS_SECRET_KEY"), "AWS secret access key")
flag.StringVar(&region, "region", os.Getenv("EKS_REGION"), "AWS region for SigV4 signing")
flag.StringVar(&accountID, "account-id", os.Getenv("EKS_ACCOUNT_ID"), "Cluster account ID")
flag.StringVar(&clusterName, "cluster", os.Getenv("EKS_CLUSTER_NAME"), "Cluster name")
flag.StringVar(&resource, "resource", "addons", "Resource to fetch: addons")
flag.Parse()
switch {
case accountID == "":
fatal("--account-id is required (or set EKS_ACCOUNT_ID)")
case clusterName == "":
fatal("--cluster is required (or set EKS_CLUSTER_NAME)")
case resource != "addons":
fatal("--resource must be addons")
}
client, err := eksgw.New(gatewayURL, gatewayCA, accessKey, secretKey, region)
if err != nil {
fatal(fmt.Sprintf("build gateway client: %v", err))
}
path := "/clusters/" + clusterName + "/internal-addons/" + accountID
var lastErr error
for attempt := 1; attempt <= maxAttempts; attempt++ {
body, err := client.Get(path)
if err != nil {
lastErr = err
slog.Warn("eks-gateway-fetch: attempt failed", "resource", resource, "attempt", attempt, "err", err)
if attempt < maxAttempts {
time.Sleep(retryDelay)
}
continue
}
if werr := emitAddonsTSV(os.Stdout, body); werr != nil {
fatal(fmt.Sprintf("render response: %v", werr))
}
return
}
fatal(fmt.Sprintf("fetch failed after %d attempts: %v", maxAttempts, lastErr))
}
// emitAddonsTSV decodes the internal-addons response and writes one TSV line per
// staged add-on to w. An empty add-on set writes nothing (the agent then GCs
// every locally-rendered manifest), which is the correct steady state for a
// cluster with no managed add-ons.
func emitAddonsTSV(out io.Writer, body []byte) error {
var resp internalAddonsResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &resp); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unmarshal internal-addons response: %w", err)
}
w := bufio.NewWriter(out)
for _, a := range resp.Addons {
cfg := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(a.ConfigurationValues))
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n", a.AddonName, a.AddonVersion, a.ServiceAccountRoleArn, cfg); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return w.Flush()
}
func fatal(msg string) {
slog.Error("eks-gateway-fetch: " + msg)
os.Exit(1)
}
+44
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
package main
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/base64"
"testing"
)
func TestEmitAddonsTSV(t *testing.T) {
body := []byte(`{"addons":[
{"addonName":"spinifex-noop","addonVersion":"0.1.0"},
{"addonName":"aws-load-balancer-controller","addonVersion":"2.8.1",
"serviceAccountRoleArn":"arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/alb",
"configurationValues":"{\"replicaCount\":2}"}
]}`)
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := emitAddonsTSV(&buf, body); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("emitAddonsTSV: %v", err)
}
cfg := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"replicaCount":2}`))
want := "spinifex-noop\t0.1.0\t\t\n" +
"aws-load-balancer-controller\t2.8.1\tarn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/alb\t" + cfg + "\n"
if buf.String() != want {
t.Fatalf("TSV mismatch:\n got: %q\nwant: %q", buf.String(), want)
}
}
func TestEmitAddonsTSV_Empty(t *testing.T) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := emitAddonsTSV(&buf, []byte(`{"addons":[]}`)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("emitAddonsTSV: %v", err)
}
if buf.Len() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("empty addon set must emit nothing, got %q", buf.String())
}
}
func TestEmitAddonsTSV_BadJSON(t *testing.T) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := emitAddonsTSV(&buf, []byte(`{not-json`)); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on malformed JSON")
}
}
+134
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
// eks-gateway-publish runs inside the EKS K3s control-plane VM and relays a
// single publication to the host through the AWS gateway, instead of dialing
// core NATS directly.
//
// It reads a JSON payload on stdin, wraps it as
// {accountId, channel, kind, payload}, SigV4-signs (service "eks") an HTTPS
// POST to {gateway}/clusters/{cluster}/internal-publish, and retries with
// backoff until the gateway returns 2xx or the attempt budget is exhausted —
// so a degraded link surfaces as a non-zero exit rather than a silently
// dropped message (the failure mode of fire-and-forget `nats pub`).
//
// Usage:
//
// echo '{"token":"..."}' | eks-gateway-publish -channel bootstrap -kind k3s-bootstrap-token
// kubectl ... | eks-gateway-publish -channel state
//
// Flags default to environment variables seeded by cloud-init:
// EKS_GATEWAY_URL, EKS_GATEWAY_CA, EKS_ACCESS_KEY, EKS_SECRET_KEY, EKS_REGION,
// EKS_ACCOUNT_ID, EKS_CLUSTER_NAME.
package main
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"flag"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"os"
"time"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/eksgw"
_ "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/fipsboot"
)
const (
// Retry budget: the control plane reaches readiness before this runs, so a
// failing POST means a degraded link, not a cold start. Bounded so a stuck
// boot still terminates the OpenRC service.
maxAttempts = 30
retryDelay = 5 * time.Second
)
type publishBody struct {
AccountID string `json:"accountId"`
Channel string `json:"channel"`
Kind string `json:"kind"`
Payload json.RawMessage `json:"payload"`
}
func main() {
var (
gatewayURL string
gatewayCA string
accessKey string
secretKey string
region string
accountID string
clusterName string
channel string
kind string
)
flag.StringVar(&gatewayURL, "gateway", os.Getenv("EKS_GATEWAY_URL"), "Gateway URL (e.g. https://10.15.8.1:9999)")
flag.StringVar(&gatewayCA, "gateway-ca", os.Getenv("EKS_GATEWAY_CA"), "Path to gateway TLS CA PEM (optional; falls back to system trust)")
flag.StringVar(&accessKey, "access-key", os.Getenv("EKS_ACCESS_KEY"), "AWS access key ID")
flag.StringVar(&secretKey, "secret-key", os.Getenv("EKS_SECRET_KEY"), "AWS secret access key")
flag.StringVar(&region, "region", os.Getenv("EKS_REGION"), "AWS region for SigV4 signing")
flag.StringVar(&accountID, "account-id", os.Getenv("EKS_ACCOUNT_ID"), "Cluster account ID")
flag.StringVar(&clusterName, "cluster", os.Getenv("EKS_CLUSTER_NAME"), "Cluster name")
flag.StringVar(&channel, "channel", "", "Publish channel: bootstrap|state|addon")
flag.StringVar(&kind, "kind", "", "Bootstrap subject kind (bootstrap channel only)")
flag.Parse()
switch {
case accountID == "":
fatal("--account-id is required (or set EKS_ACCOUNT_ID)")
case clusterName == "":
fatal("--cluster is required (or set EKS_CLUSTER_NAME)")
case channel != "bootstrap" && channel != "state" && channel != "addon":
fatal("--channel must be bootstrap, state or addon")
case channel == "bootstrap" && kind == "":
fatal("--kind is required for the bootstrap channel")
}
payload, err := io.ReadAll(os.Stdin)
if err != nil {
fatal(fmt.Sprintf("read stdin payload: %v", err))
}
if len(bytes.TrimSpace(payload)) == 0 {
fatal("empty stdin payload")
}
if !json.Valid(payload) {
fatal("stdin payload is not valid JSON")
}
body, err := json.Marshal(publishBody{
AccountID: accountID,
Channel: channel,
Kind: kind,
Payload: json.RawMessage(payload),
})
if err != nil {
fatal(fmt.Sprintf("marshal request body: %v", err))
}
client, err := eksgw.New(gatewayURL, gatewayCA, accessKey, secretKey, region)
if err != nil {
fatal(fmt.Sprintf("build gateway client: %v", err))
}
path := "/clusters/" + clusterName + "/internal-publish"
var lastErr error
for attempt := 1; attempt <= maxAttempts; attempt++ {
if _, err := client.Post(path, body); err != nil {
lastErr = err
slog.Warn("eks-gateway-publish: attempt failed",
"channel", channel, "kind", kind, "attempt", attempt, "err", err)
if attempt < maxAttempts {
time.Sleep(retryDelay)
}
continue
}
slog.Info("eks-gateway-publish: published", "channel", channel, "kind", kind)
return
}
fatal(fmt.Sprintf("publish failed after %d attempts: %v", maxAttempts, lastErr))
}
func fatal(msg string) {
slog.Error("eks-gateway-publish: " + msg)
os.Exit(1)
}
+137
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
package main
import (
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"net"
"os"
"time"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/tlsconfig"
)
// tlsCertificate is the webhook's loopback serving certificate.
type tlsCertificate struct {
cert tls.Certificate
}
func (c tlsCertificate) serverTLSConfig() *tls.Config {
return &tls.Config{
Certificates: []tls.Certificate{c.cert},
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13,
CurvePreferences: tlsconfig.Curves,
}
}
// ensureServingCert loads the persisted self-signed serving cert/key, or mints
// a fresh ECDSA-P256 pair (SAN 127.0.0.1 / localhost) and persists it. Reusing
// across restarts keeps the CA the apiserver loaded into its webhook kubeconfig
// valid even if the webhook process is restarted. Returns the parsed cert and
// the certificate PEM (for embedding as the kubeconfig CA bundle).
func ensureServingCert(certPath, keyPath string) (tlsCertificate, []byte, error) {
if certPEM, keyPEM, ok := readCertPair(certPath, keyPath); ok {
cert, err := tls.X509KeyPair(certPEM, keyPEM)
if err == nil {
return tlsCertificate{cert: cert}, certPEM, nil
}
// Fall through to regenerate on a corrupt/incompatible persisted pair.
}
certPEM, keyPEM, err := generateSelfSigned()
if err != nil {
return tlsCertificate{}, nil, err
}
if err := os.WriteFile(certPath, certPEM, 0o644); err != nil {
return tlsCertificate{}, nil, fmt.Errorf("write cert %s: %w", certPath, err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(keyPath, keyPEM, 0o600); err != nil {
return tlsCertificate{}, nil, fmt.Errorf("write key %s: %w", keyPath, err)
}
cert, err := tls.X509KeyPair(certPEM, keyPEM)
if err != nil {
return tlsCertificate{}, nil, fmt.Errorf("parse minted keypair: %w", err)
}
return tlsCertificate{cert: cert}, certPEM, nil
}
func readCertPair(certPath, keyPath string) (certPEM, keyPEM []byte, ok bool) {
c, err := os.ReadFile(certPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, false
}
k, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, false
}
return c, k, true
}
func generateSelfSigned() (certPEM, keyPEM []byte, err error) {
priv, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("generate key: %w", err)
}
serial, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 128))
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("serial: %w", err)
}
now := time.Now().UTC()
tmpl := x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: serial,
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "eks-token-webhook"},
NotBefore: now.Add(-time.Hour),
NotAfter: now.AddDate(10, 0, 0),
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment | x509.KeyUsageCertSign,
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
IsCA: true,
IPAddresses: []net.IP{net.IPv4(127, 0, 0, 1), net.IPv6loopback},
DNSNames: []string{"localhost"},
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, &tmpl, &tmpl, &priv.PublicKey, priv)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("create cert: %w", err)
}
keyDER, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(priv)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal key: %w", err)
}
certPEM = pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der})
keyPEM = pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: keyDER})
return certPEM, keyPEM, nil
}
// writeAPIServerKubeconfig writes the kubeconfig kube-apiserver loads via
// --authentication-token-webhook-config-file. It points the apiserver at the
// loopback webhook and trusts its self-signed serving cert as the CA bundle.
func writeAPIServerKubeconfig(path, addr string, certPEM []byte) error {
caB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(certPEM)
kubeconfig := fmt.Sprintf(`apiVersion: v1
kind: Config
clusters:
- name: mulga-eks-token-webhook
cluster:
certificate-authority-data: %s
server: https://%s/authenticate
users:
- name: kube-apiserver
contexts:
- name: webhook
context:
cluster: mulga-eks-token-webhook
user: kube-apiserver
current-context: webhook
`, caB64, addr)
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(kubeconfig), 0o600); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write %s: %w", path, err)
}
return nil
}
+227
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
// eks-token-webhook is the K8s TokenReview webhook authenticator baked into
// the eks-server AMI. Per kubectl call the kube-apiserver POSTs the bearer
// token (produced by `aws eks get-token`); the webhook relays it through the
// AWS gateway broker (SigV4 HTTPS POST to /clusters/{name}/token-review), which
// host-side runs the STS verify (cross-cluster x-k8s-aws-id pin) + AccessEntry
// KV lookup and returns the resolved identity. The webhook never speaks core
// NATS — same gateway-broker model as ELBv2's lb-agent and eks-gateway-publish.
//
// It binds 127.0.0.1 only; the kube-apiserver is the sole client (loopback).
// On startup it writes the apiserver webhook kubeconfig (with its self-signed
// serving CA) so k3s can be pointed at it via
// --authentication-token-webhook-config-file.
package main
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"flag"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"os"
"time"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/eksgw"
handlers_eks "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/handlers/eks"
)
// config is the webhook's runtime configuration, sourced from the first-boot
// env (/etc/spinifex-eks/first-boot.env) cloud-init seeds onto the VM.
type config struct {
addr string
gatewayURL string
gatewayCA string
accessKey string
secretKey string
region string
accountID string
clusterName string
certPath string
keyPath string
kubeconfig string
}
func loadConfig() (config, error) {
c := config{
addr: flagAddr,
gatewayURL: os.Getenv("EKS_GATEWAY_URL"),
gatewayCA: os.Getenv("EKS_GATEWAY_CA"),
accessKey: os.Getenv("EKS_ACCESS_KEY"),
secretKey: os.Getenv("EKS_SECRET_KEY"),
region: os.Getenv("EKS_REGION"),
accountID: os.Getenv("EKS_ACCOUNT_ID"),
clusterName: os.Getenv("EKS_CLUSTER_NAME"),
certPath: envOr("EKS_WEBHOOK_CERT", "/etc/spinifex-eks/token-webhook.crt"),
keyPath: envOr("EKS_WEBHOOK_KEY", "/etc/spinifex-eks/token-webhook.key"),
kubeconfig: envOr("EKS_WEBHOOK_KUBECONFIG", "/etc/spinifex-eks/token-webhook.kubeconfig"),
}
switch {
case c.gatewayURL == "":
return c, errors.New("EKS_GATEWAY_URL not set")
case c.accessKey == "" || c.secretKey == "":
return c, errors.New("EKS_ACCESS_KEY / EKS_SECRET_KEY not set")
case c.accountID == "":
return c, errors.New("EKS_ACCOUNT_ID not set")
case c.clusterName == "":
return c, errors.New("EKS_CLUSTER_NAME not set")
}
return c, nil
}
func envOr(key, def string) string {
if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
return v
}
return def
}
var flagAddr string
func main() {
flag.StringVar(&flagAddr, "addr", "127.0.0.1:8443", "listen address (loopback only)")
flag.Parse()
slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelInfo})))
cfg, err := loadConfig()
if err != nil {
slog.Error("eks-token-webhook config error", "err", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
if err := run(cfg); err != nil {
slog.Error("eks-token-webhook fatal", "err", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
func run(cfg config) error {
// Serving cert + apiserver kubeconfig. Persisted and reused across restarts
// so a webhook crash does not invalidate the CA the apiserver already loaded.
tlsCert, certPEM, err := ensureServingCert(cfg.certPath, cfg.keyPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("serving cert: %w", err)
}
if err := writeAPIServerKubeconfig(cfg.kubeconfig, cfg.addr, certPEM); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write apiserver kubeconfig: %w", err)
}
client, err := eksgw.New(cfg.gatewayURL, cfg.gatewayCA, cfg.accessKey, cfg.secretKey, cfg.region)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("build gateway client: %w", err)
}
authr := &authenticator{
accountID: cfg.accountID,
clusterName: cfg.clusterName,
review: gatewayReviewer(client, cfg.clusterName, cfg.accountID),
}
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok"))
})
mux.HandleFunc("/authenticate", authr.handle)
server := newServer(cfg.addr, mux, tlsCert)
slog.Info("eks-token-webhook listening", "addr", cfg.addr, "cluster", cfg.clusterName)
if err := server.ListenAndServeTLS("", ""); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
return fmt.Errorf("serve: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// tokenReviewRequest is the body POSTed to /clusters/{name}/token-review. The
// webhook holds system SigV4 creds (system account, not the cluster account),
// so accountId names the cluster account explicitly — same as PublishInternal.
type tokenReviewRequest struct {
AccountID string `json:"accountId"`
Token string `json:"token"`
}
// gatewayReviewer returns the per-call relay: SigV4-POST {accountId,token} to
// the gateway and decode the resolved identity. A non-2xx / transport error is
// surfaced (handle() turns it into a 5xx so the apiserver retries) rather than a
// silent deny, distinguishing "webhook broker down" from "token rejected".
func gatewayReviewer(client *eksgw.Client, clusterName, accountID string) func(string) (handlers_eks.WebhookTokenReviewResult, error) {
path := "/clusters/" + clusterName + "/token-review"
return func(token string) (handlers_eks.WebhookTokenReviewResult, error) {
body, err := json.Marshal(tokenReviewRequest{AccountID: accountID, Token: token})
if err != nil {
return handlers_eks.WebhookTokenReviewResult{}, fmt.Errorf("marshal request: %w", err)
}
respBody, err := client.Post(path, body)
if err != nil {
return handlers_eks.WebhookTokenReviewResult{}, err
}
var res handlers_eks.WebhookTokenReviewResult
if err := json.Unmarshal(respBody, &res); err != nil {
return handlers_eks.WebhookTokenReviewResult{}, fmt.Errorf("decode response: %w", err)
}
return res, nil
}
}
// authenticator resolves a TokenReview by relaying to the gateway broker.
type authenticator struct {
accountID string
clusterName string
review func(token string) (handlers_eks.WebhookTokenReviewResult, error)
}
func (a *authenticator) handle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
var review tokenReview
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&review); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
res, err := a.review(review.Spec.Token)
if err != nil {
// Broker fault (gateway down, transport error): a 5xx tells the apiserver
// to retry rather than treating a transient outage as a hard deny.
slog.Error("TokenReview relay failed", "cluster", a.clusterName, "err", err)
http.Error(w, "token review unavailable", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
status := tokenReviewStatus{Authenticated: res.Authenticated}
if res.Authenticated {
status.User = userInfo{
Username: res.Username,
UID: res.UID,
Groups: res.Groups,
}
// Confirm the token for the audiences the apiserver asked about; an empty
// status.audiences is rejected when --api-audiences is configured.
status.Audiences = review.Spec.Audiences
}
slog.Info("TokenReview decision", "authenticated", status.Authenticated, "username", status.User.Username, "audiences", status.Audiences)
resp := tokenReview{
APIVersion: "authentication.k8s.io/v1",
Kind: "TokenReview",
Status: status,
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp); err != nil {
slog.Error("encode TokenReview response", "err", err)
}
}
// newServer builds the loopback TLS server. Split out so tests can construct it
// without binding a port.
func newServer(addr string, handler http.Handler, cert tlsCertificate) *http.Server {
return &http.Server{
Addr: addr,
Handler: handler,
ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
TLSConfig: cert.serverTLSConfig(),
}
}
+123
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
package main
import (
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
handlers_eks "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/handlers/eks"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// postReview drives authenticator.handle with a TokenReview carrying token and
// audiences, returning the decoded response status and HTTP code.
func postReview(t *testing.T, a *authenticator, token string, audiences []string) (tokenReviewStatus, int) {
t.Helper()
body, err := json.Marshal(tokenReview{
APIVersion: "authentication.k8s.io/v1",
Kind: "TokenReview",
Spec: tokenReviewSpec{Token: token, Audiences: audiences},
})
require.NoError(t, err)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/authenticate", strings.NewReader(string(body)))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
a.handle(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
return tokenReviewStatus{}, w.Code
}
var resp tokenReview
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp))
return resp.Status, w.Code
}
func TestHandle_GrantsAndStampsAudiences(t *testing.T) {
a := &authenticator{
accountID: "111122223333",
clusterName: "alpha",
review: func(string) (handlers_eks.WebhookTokenReviewResult, error) {
return handlers_eks.WebhookTokenReviewResult{
Authenticated: true,
Username: "arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/admin",
UID: "AROAEXAMPLE:session",
Groups: []string{"system:masters"},
}, nil
},
}
status, code := postReview(t, a, "tok", []string{"https://kubernetes.default.svc"})
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, code)
require.True(t, status.Authenticated)
assert.Equal(t, "arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/admin", status.User.Username)
assert.Equal(t, "AROAEXAMPLE:session", status.User.UID)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"system:masters"}, status.User.Groups)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"https://kubernetes.default.svc"}, status.Audiences)
}
func TestHandle_DeniesWithoutStampingAudiences(t *testing.T) {
a := &authenticator{
clusterName: "alpha",
review: func(string) (handlers_eks.WebhookTokenReviewResult, error) {
return handlers_eks.WebhookTokenReviewResult{Authenticated: false}, nil
},
}
status, code := postReview(t, a, "tok", []string{"https://kubernetes.default.svc"})
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, code)
assert.False(t, status.Authenticated)
assert.Empty(t, status.User.Username)
assert.Empty(t, status.Audiences, "unauthenticated review must not stamp audiences")
}
// A broker fault is a 5xx (retryable), not a silent deny — a transient gateway
// outage must not look identical to a rejected token.
func TestHandle_BrokerFaultReturns5xx(t *testing.T) {
a := &authenticator{
clusterName: "alpha",
review: func(string) (handlers_eks.WebhookTokenReviewResult, error) {
return handlers_eks.WebhookTokenReviewResult{}, errors.New("gateway returned 503")
},
}
_, code := postReview(t, a, "tok", nil)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, code)
}
func TestEnsureServingCert_PersistsAndReuses(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
certPath := filepath.Join(dir, "wh.crt")
keyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "wh.key")
c1, pem1, err := ensureServingCert(certPath, keyPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotEmpty(t, pem1)
require.NotNil(t, c1.serverTLSConfig())
// Second call reuses the persisted pair (same cert bytes).
_, pem2, err := ensureServingCert(certPath, keyPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, pem1, pem2)
}
func TestWriteAPIServerKubeconfig(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "wh.kubeconfig")
certPEM := []byte("-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIB\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n")
require.NoError(t, writeAPIServerKubeconfig(path, "127.0.0.1:8443", certPEM))
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
body := string(data)
assert.Contains(t, body, "server: https://127.0.0.1:8443/authenticate")
assert.Contains(t, body, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(certPEM))
assert.Contains(t, body, "current-context: webhook")
}
+34
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
package main
// Minimal authentication.k8s.io/v1 TokenReview wire types. Hand-rolled to avoid
// pulling k8s.io/api into the spinifex module for these few fields; the shapes
// match what kube-apiserver sends and expects on the webhook contract.
type tokenReview struct {
APIVersion string `json:"apiVersion"`
Kind string `json:"kind"`
Spec tokenReviewSpec `json:"spec,omitzero"`
Status tokenReviewStatus `json:"status"`
}
type tokenReviewSpec struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
Audiences []string `json:"audiences,omitempty"`
}
type tokenReviewStatus struct {
Authenticated bool `json:"authenticated"`
User userInfo `json:"user,omitzero"`
// Audiences echoes the request's spec.audiences on success. When the
// apiserver runs with --api-audiences, it sends spec.audiences and discards
// an authenticated=true response that does not confirm a matching audience —
// so an empty Audiences here surfaces as a 401 despite a valid principal.
Audiences []string `json:"audiences,omitempty"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
}
type userInfo struct {
Username string `json:"username,omitempty"`
UID string `json:"uid,omitempty"`
Groups []string `json:"groups,omitempty"`
}
+4 -3
View File
@@ -304,9 +304,10 @@ func installSpinifex(cfg *Config) error {
return err
}
// dhcpcd-base is present on the installed system (used by setup-ovn.sh for
// macvlan mode). Mask the standalone dhcpcd.service so it never auto-starts
// and races with systemd-networkd's built-in DHCP client on br-wan.
// dhcpcd-base is present on the installed system (used by setup-ovn.sh
// for WAN DHCP acquisition). Mask the standalone dhcpcd.service so it
// never auto-starts and races with systemd-networkd's built-in DHCP
// client on br-wan.
if err := maskSystemdUnit(mountRoot, "dhcpcd.service"); err != nil {
slog.Warn("installSpinifex: failed to mask dhcpcd.service", "err", err)
}
+219 -79
View File
@@ -115,6 +115,16 @@ Each phase waits for all nodes to ACK before proceeding to the next.`,
Run: runClusterShutdown,
}
var clusterDrainDHCPCmd = &cobra.Command{
Use: "drain-dhcp",
Short: "Release all upstream DHCP leases held by vpcd",
Long: `Ask each vpcd to DHCPRELEASE every external-pool DHCP lease it currently
holds, returning them to the upstream DHCP server. Run this on teardown before
stopping services: an env reset otherwise strands held leases on the upstream
server until their TTL expires, eventually exhausting the upstream scope.`,
Run: runClusterDrainDHCP,
}
var adminInitCmd = &cobra.Command{
Use: "init",
Short: "Initialize Spinifex platform configuration",
@@ -245,6 +255,9 @@ func init() {
clusterShutdownCmd.Flags().Duration("timeout", 120*time.Second, "Maximum time to wait per phase")
clusterShutdownCmd.Flags().Bool("dry-run", false, "Print phase plan without executing")
clusterCmd.AddCommand(clusterDrainDHCPCmd)
clusterDrainDHCPCmd.Flags().Duration("timeout", 30*time.Second, "Reply-collection window for vpcd drain responders")
adminCmd.AddCommand(imagesCmd)
imagesCmd.AddCommand(imagesImportCmd)
imagesCmd.AddCommand(imagesListCmd)
@@ -294,12 +307,14 @@ func init() {
adminInitCmd.Flags().String("external-mode", "", "External network mode: 'pool' (default when WAN detected) or '' (disabled)")
adminInitCmd.Flags().String("external-iface", "", "WAN NIC for br-external (auto-detected from default route)")
adminInitCmd.Flags().String("external-source", "", "Pool IP source: 'dhcp' (default when no --external-pool) or 'static' (uses --external-pool range)")
adminInitCmd.Flags().String("external-bind-bridge", "", "Linux bridge for upstream DHCP DORA (default 'br-wan' when --external-source=dhcp)")
adminInitCmd.Flags().String("external-pool", "", "External IP pool range as start-end (e.g., 192.168.1.150-192.168.1.250)")
adminInitCmd.Flags().String("external-gateway", "", "WAN gateway IP (auto-detected from default route)")
adminInitCmd.Flags().String("gateway-ip", "", "OVN gateway router's external IP for SNAT (default: pool range_start for pool mode, required for nat mode without DHCP)")
adminInitCmd.Flags().Int("external-prefix-len", 24, "External pool subnet prefix length (auto-detected)")
adminInitCmd.Flags().Bool("no-external", false, "Disable external networking (overlay-only, no internet for VMs)")
adminInitCmd.Flags().Bool("gpu-passthrough", false, "Enable VFIO GPU passthrough (sets gpu_passthrough = true in daemon config)")
adminInitCmd.Flags().Bool("ipsec", true, "Encrypt intra-AZ Geneve via OVN native IPsec (cluster-wide); disable only for trusted single-rack lab")
// Flags for admin join
adminJoinCmd.Flags().String("region", "ap-southeast-2", "Region for this node")
@@ -323,6 +338,7 @@ func init() {
imagesImportCmd.Flags().String("tmp-dir", os.TempDir(), "Temporary directory for image import processing")
imagesImportCmd.Flags().String("name", "", "Import specified image by name")
imagesImportCmd.Flags().String("ami-name", "", "Override the registered AMI name (DescribeImages name). Defaults to ami-{distro}-{version}-{arch}. Use for locally-built appliances (e.g. --ami-name spinifex-eks-node).")
imagesImportCmd.Flags().String("file", "", "Import file from specified path (raw, qcow2, compressed)")
imagesImportCmd.Flags().String("distro", "", "Specified distro name (e.g debian)")
imagesImportCmd.Flags().String("version", "", "Specified distro version (e.g 12)")
@@ -378,6 +394,7 @@ func runimagesImportCmd(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
// and the file is used directly (no download). When only --file is set,
// metadata comes from flags and no catalog tags are applied.
imageName, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("name")
amiNameOverride, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("ami-name")
localFile, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("file")
if imageName == "" && localFile == "" {
@@ -533,6 +550,9 @@ func runimagesImportCmd(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
// Calculate the size
manifest.AMIMetadata.Name = fmt.Sprintf("ami-%s-%s-%s", image.Distro, image.Version, image.Arch)
if amiNameOverride != "" {
manifest.AMIMetadata.Name = amiNameOverride
}
volumeId := utils.GenerateResourceID("ami")
manifest.AMIMetadata.ImageID = volumeId
@@ -601,6 +621,12 @@ func runimagesImportCmd(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
Host: appConfig.Nodes[appConfig.Node].Predastore.Host,
}
mkey, err := utils.LoadViperblockMasterKey(appConfig.Nodes[appConfig.Node].Viperblock.EncryptionKeyFile)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Could not load viperblock encryption key: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
vbConfig := viperblock.VB{
VolumeName: volumeId,
VolumeSize: utils.SafeInt64ToUint64(imageStat.Size()),
@@ -610,7 +636,9 @@ func runimagesImportCmd(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
Size: 0,
},
},
VolumeConfig: manifest,
VolumeConfig: manifest,
MasterKey: mkey,
EncryptionEnabled: mkey != nil,
}
err = v_utils.ImportDiskImage(&s3Config, &vbConfig, extractedImagePath)
@@ -838,12 +866,14 @@ func runAdminInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
externalMode, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("external-mode")
externalIface, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("external-iface")
externalSource, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("external-source")
externalBindBridge, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("external-bind-bridge")
externalPool, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("external-pool")
externalGateway, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("external-gateway")
externalPrefixLen, _ := cmd.Flags().GetInt("external-prefix-len")
gatewayIP, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("gateway-ip")
noExternal, _ := cmd.Flags().GetBool("no-external")
gpuPassthrough, _ := cmd.Flags().GetBool("gpu-passthrough")
ipsecEnabled, _ := cmd.Flags().GetBool("ipsec")
// Fire telemetry in background (completes during init work, waited at end)
noTelemetry, _ := cmd.Flags().GetBool("no-telemetry")
@@ -893,9 +923,9 @@ func runAdminInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
fmt.Printf(" %-14s %-18s %-20s %-16s %s\n", iface.Name, iface.IP, iface.Subnet, gw, strings.ToUpper(iface.Role))
}
if detected.LANCount == 0 {
fmt.Println("\n Mode: single-NIC (macvlan for external bridge)")
fmt.Println("\n Mode: single-NIC (veth-bridged external)")
} else {
fmt.Printf("\n Mode: %d LAN + 1 WAN (macvlan for external bridge)\n", detected.LANCount)
fmt.Printf("\n Mode: %d LAN + 1 WAN (veth-bridged external)\n", detected.LANCount)
}
// Apply auto-detected values when flags not explicitly set
@@ -910,13 +940,11 @@ func runAdminInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
externalPrefixLen = detected.WAN.PrefixLen
}
// Default mode: always "pool" — with static range if --external-pool
// is given, otherwise with source=dhcp (gateway IP from router DHCP)
// Default mode: always "pool". Source defaults to "static"; if
// --external-pool is omitted the validator below will error with
// a SuggestPoolRange hint.
if externalMode == "" && !cmd.Flags().Changed("external-mode") {
externalMode = "pool"
if externalPool == "" && externalSource == "" {
externalSource = "dhcp"
}
}
}
}
@@ -928,25 +956,30 @@ func runAdminInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
os.Exit(1)
}
if externalMode == "pool" {
// Resolve source: if not explicitly set, infer from whether a pool range was given
// Default source: dhcp when no --external-pool, else static.
if externalSource == "" {
if externalPool != "" {
externalSource = "static"
} else {
if externalPool == "" {
externalSource = "dhcp"
} else {
externalSource = "static"
}
}
if externalSource == "dhcp" {
// DHCP source: no static range needed, just gateway
if externalGateway == "" {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "❌ Error: --external-gateway is required when --external-mode=pool\n")
switch externalSource {
case "dhcp":
if externalPool != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "❌ Error: --external-pool not allowed with --external-source=dhcp (addresses come from upstream DHCP server)\n")
os.Exit(1)
}
if externalBindBridge == "" {
externalBindBridge = "br-wan"
}
case "static":
if externalBindBridge != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "❌ Error: --external-bind-bridge only valid with --external-source=dhcp\n")
os.Exit(1)
}
} else {
// Static source: need pool range
if externalPool == "" {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "❌ Error: --external-pool is required when --external-mode=pool (e.g., 192.168.1.150-192.168.1.250)\n")
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, " Or use --external-source=dhcp to get IPs from router DHCP\n")
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "❌ Error: --external-pool is required with --external-source=static (e.g., 192.168.1.150-192.168.1.250)\n")
if detectedNet != nil && detectedNet.WAN != nil {
sugStart, sugEnd := admin.SuggestPoolRange(detectedNet.WAN)
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, " Suggested: --external-pool=%s-%s\n", sugStart, sugEnd)
@@ -954,7 +987,7 @@ func runAdminInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
os.Exit(1)
}
if externalGateway == "" {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "❌ Error: --external-gateway is required when --external-mode=pool\n")
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "❌ Error: --external-gateway is required with --external-source=static\n")
os.Exit(1)
}
parts := strings.SplitN(externalPool, "-", 2)
@@ -963,6 +996,9 @@ func runAdminInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
os.Exit(1)
}
poolStart, poolEnd = parts[0], parts[1]
default:
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "❌ Error: --external-source must be 'static' or 'dhcp', got: %s\n", externalSource)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
if externalGateway != "" && net.ParseIP(externalGateway) == nil {
@@ -983,10 +1019,6 @@ func runAdminInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
}
}
// For pool/dhcp source, the gateway IP is obtained via DHCP on the
// macvlan/bridge interface (no static pool range or explicit gateway-ip).
useExternalDHCP := externalMode == "pool" && externalSource == "dhcp" && gatewayIP == ""
// Validate IP address format
if net.ParseIP(bindIP) == nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "❌ Error: Invalid IP address for --bind: %s\n", bindIP)
@@ -1095,6 +1127,17 @@ func runAdminInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
fmt.Println("\n🔐 Generated predastore encryption key (per-node, never transmitted)")
fmt.Printf(" Key: %s\n", predastoreKeyPath)
// Viperblock at-rest encryption key is cluster-wide; on a single-node init
// there are no joiners, so generate it locally and enable encryption by
// default for all volumes created on this install.
viperblockKeyPath, err := writeViperblockEncryptionKey(configDir)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error generating viperblock encryption key: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Println("\n🔐 Generated viperblock at-rest encryption key")
fmt.Printf(" Key: %s\n", viperblockKeyPath)
fmt.Printf("\n🔑 Generated admin credentials (save these — they won't be shown again):\n")
fmt.Printf(" Access Key: %s\n", bootstrapResult.AdminAccessKey)
fmt.Printf(" Secret Key: %s\n", bootstrapResult.AdminSecretKey)
@@ -1104,6 +1147,18 @@ func runAdminInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
// Generate SSL certificates (with bind IP in SANs for multi-node support)
certPath := admin.GenerateCertificatesIfNeeded(configDir, force, bindIP)
// Generate per-node IPsec peer cert when cluster-wide IPsec is enabled
// (default true). Reuses the cluster CA — no intermediate strongSwan PKI.
if ipsecEnabled {
caCertPath := filepath.Join(configDir, "ca.pem")
caKeyPath := filepath.Join(configDir, "ca.key")
if err := admin.GenerateIPSecPeerCert(configDir, caCertPath, caKeyPath, node, bindIP); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error generating IPsec peer certificate: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Println("🔐 IPsec peer certificate generated (intra-AZ Geneve encryption ON)")
}
// Install CA certificate into system trust store
installCACertificate(filepath.Join(configDir, "ca.pem"))
@@ -1125,30 +1180,32 @@ func runAdminInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
isMultiNode := nodes >= 2
if isMultiNode {
// Build cluster-wide network config for propagation to joining nodes
var networkConfig *formation.NetworkConfig
// Build cluster-wide network config for propagation to joining nodes.
// Always emit so the IPSecEnabled flag reaches joiners even when
// external networking is disabled.
networkConfig := &formation.NetworkConfig{
IPSecEnabled: ipsecEnabled,
}
if externalMode != "" {
bootstrapVpcId := utils.GenerateResourceID("vpc")
bootstrapSubnetId := utils.GenerateResourceID("subnet")
bootstrapIgwId := utils.GenerateResourceID("igw")
networkConfig = &formation.NetworkConfig{
ExternalMode: externalMode,
ExternalDHCP: useExternalDHCP,
PoolName: "wan",
PoolSource: externalSource,
PoolStart: poolStart,
PoolEnd: poolEnd,
PoolGateway: externalGateway,
PoolGatewayIP: gatewayIP,
PoolPrefixLen: externalPrefixLen,
PoolDNSServers: dnsServers,
BootstrapAccountId: admin.DefaultAccountID(),
BootstrapVpcId: bootstrapVpcId,
BootstrapSubnetId: bootstrapSubnetId,
BootstrapIgwId: bootstrapIgwId,
BootstrapCidr: handlers_ec2_vpc.DefaultVPCCidr,
BootstrapSubnetCidr: handlers_ec2_vpc.DefaultSubnetCidr,
}
networkConfig.ExternalMode = externalMode
networkConfig.PoolName = "wan"
networkConfig.PoolSource = externalSource
networkConfig.PoolBindBridge = externalBindBridge
networkConfig.PoolStart = poolStart
networkConfig.PoolEnd = poolEnd
networkConfig.PoolGateway = externalGateway
networkConfig.PoolGatewayIP = gatewayIP
networkConfig.PoolPrefixLen = externalPrefixLen
networkConfig.PoolDNSServers = dnsServers
networkConfig.BootstrapAccountId = admin.DefaultAccountID()
networkConfig.BootstrapVpcId = bootstrapVpcId
networkConfig.BootstrapSubnetId = bootstrapSubnetId
networkConfig.BootstrapIgwId = bootstrapIgwId
networkConfig.BootstrapCidr = handlers_ec2_vpc.DefaultVPCCidr
networkConfig.BootstrapSubnetCidr = handlers_ec2_vpc.DefaultSubnetCidr
}
runAdminInitMultiNode(cmd, accessKey, secretKey, accountID, natsToken, clusterName,
@@ -1248,10 +1305,9 @@ func runAdminInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
ExternalMode: externalMode,
ExternalIface: externalIface,
DhcpBindBridge: detectedDhcpBindBridge(detectedNet),
ExternalDHCP: useExternalDHCP,
PoolName: "wan",
PoolSource: externalSource,
PoolBindBridge: externalBindBridge,
PoolStart: poolStart,
PoolEnd: poolEnd,
PoolGateway: externalGateway,
@@ -1268,20 +1324,25 @@ func runAdminInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
BootstrapSubnetCidr: handlers_ec2_vpc.DefaultSubnetCidr,
GPUPassthrough: gpuPassthrough,
IPSecEnabled: ipsecEnabled,
EncryptionKeyFile: viperblockKeyPath,
}
// Print external networking summary
if externalMode != "" {
fmt.Printf("\n📡 External networking: %s\n", externalMode)
fmt.Printf(" WAN interface: %s\n", externalIface)
if poolStart != "" {
switch externalSource {
case "static":
fmt.Printf(" Source: static (IP range)\n")
fmt.Printf(" IP pool: %s - %s\n", poolStart, poolEnd)
fmt.Printf(" ⚠️ Ensure %s-%s is excluded from your router's DHCP range.\n", poolStart, poolEnd)
} else if useExternalDHCP {
fmt.Printf(" Source: dhcp (from router DHCP)\n")
fmt.Println(" Gateway IP: DHCP (obtained during OVN setup)")
} else if gatewayIP != "" {
case "dhcp":
fmt.Printf(" Source: dhcp (upstream DHCP server)\n")
fmt.Printf(" Bind bridge: %s\n", externalBindBridge)
}
if gatewayIP != "" {
fmt.Printf(" Gateway IP: %s (static)\n", gatewayIP)
}
}
@@ -1374,6 +1435,22 @@ func runAdminInitMultiNode(cmd *cobra.Command, accessKey, secretKey, accountID,
fmt.Println("\n🔐 Generated predastore encryption key (per-node, never transmitted)")
fmt.Printf(" Key: %s\n", predastoreKeyPath)
// Viperblock at-rest encryption key is cluster-wide and shared: the leader
// generates it once and distributes it to joiners via the formation server
// so a volume sealed on any node can be opened on any other.
viperblockKey, err := handlers_iam.GenerateMasterKey()
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "❌ Error generating viperblock encryption key: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
viperblockKeyPath, err := saveViperblockEncryptionKey(configDir, viperblockKey)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "❌ Error saving viperblock encryption key: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Println("\n🔐 Generated viperblock at-rest encryption key (cluster-wide, shared with joiners)")
fmt.Printf(" Key: %s\n", viperblockKeyPath)
// Read CA cert/key for distribution to joining nodes
caCertData, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(configDir, "ca.pem"))
if err != nil {
@@ -1402,6 +1479,9 @@ func runAdminInitMultiNode(cmd *cobra.Command, accessKey, secretKey, accountID,
// Include master key in formation server for distribution to joining nodes
fs.SetMasterKey(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(masterKey))
// Distribute the cluster-wide viperblock encryption key to joiners
fs.SetViperblockKey(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(viperblockKey))
// Register self (init node) as the first node
selfNode := formation.NodeInfo{
Name: node,
@@ -1509,6 +1589,8 @@ func runAdminInitMultiNode(cmd *cobra.Command, accessKey, secretKey, accountID,
OperatorEmail: email,
EncryptionKeyFile: viperblockKeyPath,
// Init node runs ovn-central locally
OVNNBAddr: "tcp:127.0.0.1:6641",
OVNSBAddr: "tcp:127.0.0.1:6642",
@@ -1550,7 +1632,7 @@ func runAdminInitMultiNode(cmd *cobra.Command, accessKey, secretKey, accountID,
}
fmt.Println("\n📋 Next steps:")
fmt.Println(" 1. Start services on ALL nodes:")
fmt.Println(" ./scripts/start-dev.sh")
fmt.Println(" sudo systemctl start spinifex.target")
fmt.Println()
}
@@ -1854,6 +1936,28 @@ func runAdminJoin(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
}
fmt.Printf("✅ Predastore encryption key generated: %s\n", predastoreKeyPath)
// Viperblock at-rest encryption key is cluster-wide: receive it from the
// leader rather than generating one, so this node can open volumes sealed
// elsewhere. Lenient on absence — an older leader that predates key
// distribution returns nothing; fall back to cleartext rather than fail
// the join.
var viperblockKeyPath string
if statusResp.ViperblockKey == "" {
fmt.Println("⚠️ Leader did not provide a viperblock encryption key; at-rest encryption disabled on this node")
} else {
viperblockKeyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(statusResp.ViperblockKey)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "❌ Error decoding viperblock encryption key: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
viperblockKeyPath, err = saveViperblockEncryptionKey(configDir, viperblockKeyBytes)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "❌ Error saving viperblock encryption key: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Printf("✅ Viperblock encryption key received from leader: %s\n", viperblockKeyPath)
}
// Generate server cert signed by CA with this node's bind IP
if err := admin.GenerateServerCertOnly(configDir, bindIP); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error generating server certificate: %v\n", err)
@@ -1861,6 +1965,24 @@ func runAdminJoin(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
}
fmt.Printf("✅ Server certificate generated with bind IP: %s\n\n", bindIP)
// Match the leader's intra-AZ IPsec posture: NetworkConfig.IPSecEnabled is
// authoritative. When the formation response omits NetworkConfig entirely
// (no current code path; defensive guard against future regressions) fall
// back to the AWS-parity default of ON.
ipsecEnabled := true
if statusResp.NetworkConfig != nil {
ipsecEnabled = statusResp.NetworkConfig.IPSecEnabled
}
if ipsecEnabled {
caCertPath := filepath.Join(configDir, "ca.pem")
caKeyPath := filepath.Join(configDir, "ca.key")
if err := admin.GenerateIPSecPeerCert(configDir, caCertPath, caKeyPath, node, bindIP); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error generating IPsec peer certificate: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Println("🔐 IPsec peer certificate generated (intra-AZ Geneve encryption ON)")
}
// Build cluster topology from formation data
clusterRoutes := formation.BuildClusterRoutes(statusResp.Nodes)
predastoreNodes := formation.BuildPredastoreNodes(statusResp.Nodes)
@@ -1927,6 +2049,8 @@ func runAdminJoin(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
OperatorEmail: email,
EncryptionKeyFile: viperblockKeyPath,
// Joining nodes connect to the init node's OVN NB/SB DB
OVNNBAddr: fmt.Sprintf("tcp:%s:6641", leaderIP),
OVNSBAddr: fmt.Sprintf("tcp:%s:6642", leaderIP),
@@ -2212,6 +2336,7 @@ func runCertRenew(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) {
type configDirs struct {
AWSGW string
Predastore string
Viperblock string
NATS string
Spinifex string
}
@@ -2221,10 +2346,11 @@ func createConfigSubdirs(configDir string) (configDirs, error) {
dirs := configDirs{
AWSGW: filepath.Join(configDir, "awsgw"),
Predastore: filepath.Join(configDir, "predastore"),
Viperblock: filepath.Join(configDir, "viperblock"),
NATS: filepath.Join(configDir, "nats"),
Spinifex: filepath.Join(configDir, "spinifex"),
}
for _, dir := range []string{dirs.AWSGW, dirs.Predastore, dirs.NATS, dirs.Spinifex} {
for _, dir := range []string{dirs.AWSGW, dirs.Predastore, dirs.Viperblock, dirs.NATS, dirs.Spinifex} {
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700); err != nil {
return configDirs{}, fmt.Errorf("create directory %s: %w", dir, err)
}
@@ -2270,10 +2396,11 @@ func finalizeNodeSetup(dataDir, certPath, adminAccessKey, adminSecretKey, region
// applyNetworkConfig copies cluster-wide network settings from a formation
// NetworkConfig into ConfigSettings and auto-detects the local WAN interface.
func applyNetworkConfig(settings *admin.ConfigSettings, nc *formation.NetworkConfig) {
settings.IPSecEnabled = nc.IPSecEnabled
settings.ExternalMode = nc.ExternalMode
settings.ExternalDHCP = nc.ExternalDHCP
settings.PoolName = nc.PoolName
settings.PoolSource = nc.PoolSource
settings.PoolBindBridge = nc.PoolBindBridge
settings.PoolStart = nc.PoolStart
settings.PoolEnd = nc.PoolEnd
settings.PoolGateway = nc.PoolGateway
@@ -2292,7 +2419,6 @@ func applyNetworkConfig(settings *admin.ConfigSettings, nc *formation.NetworkCon
detected, err := admin.DetectNetwork()
if err == nil && detected.WAN != nil {
settings.ExternalIface = detected.WAN.Name
settings.DhcpBindBridge = detectedDhcpBindBridge(detected)
}
}
}
@@ -2346,6 +2472,43 @@ func writePredastoreEncryptionKey(configDir string) (string, error) {
return keyPath, nil
}
// writeViperblockEncryptionKey generates a fresh 32-byte AES-256 master key for
// viperblock at-rest encryption and writes it to
// <configDir>/viperblock/encryption.key with mode 0600. Unlike the predastore
// key, this key is cluster-wide and shared: the leader generates it once at init
// and distributes it to joiners via the formation server, so a volume sealed on
// any node can be opened on any other. Loaded at startup via masterkey.LoadShared.
func writeViperblockEncryptionKey(configDir string) (string, error) {
viperblockDir := filepath.Join(configDir, "viperblock")
if err := os.MkdirAll(viperblockDir, 0750); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("create viperblock config dir: %w", err)
}
key, err := handlers_iam.GenerateMasterKey()
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("generate viperblock encryption key: %w", err)
}
keyPath := filepath.Join(viperblockDir, "encryption.key")
if err := handlers_iam.SaveMasterKey(keyPath, key); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("save viperblock encryption key: %w", err)
}
return keyPath, nil
}
// saveViperblockEncryptionKey writes an already-generated 32-byte viperblock
// master key (received from the formation leader) to
// <configDir>/viperblock/encryption.key with mode 0600.
func saveViperblockEncryptionKey(configDir string, key []byte) (string, error) {
viperblockDir := filepath.Join(configDir, "viperblock")
if err := os.MkdirAll(viperblockDir, 0750); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("create viperblock config dir: %w", err)
}
keyPath := filepath.Join(viperblockDir, "encryption.key")
if err := handlers_iam.SaveMasterKey(keyPath, key); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("save viperblock encryption key: %w", err)
}
return keyPath, nil
}
// writeSystemCredentials writes the system access key to a plaintext JSON file.
// The daemon reads this at startup to inject credentials into ALB VM cloud-init
// for SigV4-authenticated communication with the AWS gateway.
@@ -2401,29 +2564,6 @@ func writeBootstrapFilesWithAdmin(configDir, bootstrapDir string, masterKey []by
return handlers_iam.SaveBootstrapData(filepath.Join(bootstrapDir, "bootstrap.json"), bd)
}
// detectedDhcpBindBridge returns the bridge name where the vpcd DHCP client
// should bind its AF_PACKET socket — i.e. the interface that physically sees
// LAN DHCP traffic.
//
// - Default route on a bridge (Linux or OVS, `br-*` prefix): return the
// bridge name verbatim. In veth mode this is the Linux bridge holding the
// WAN NIC; in direct mode this is the OVS bridge holding the WAN NIC.
// - Default route on a bare physical NIC: return "br-wan" as the name the
// installer will create.
//
// Never returns "br-ext". br-ext is the OVN-side bridge owned by
// setup-ovn.sh's ovn-bridge-mappings and never sees LAN DHCP frames.
func detectedDhcpBindBridge(detected *admin.DetectedNetwork) string {
if detected == nil || detected.WAN == nil {
return ""
}
name := detected.WAN.Name
if strings.HasPrefix(name, "br-") {
return name
}
return "br-wan"
}
// detectDNSServers auto-detects DNS servers from the host for the specified
// interface. Uses resolvectl (systemd-resolved) first, then falls back to
// /etc/resolv.conf. Returns up to 3 servers. Falls back to public DNS if none found.
+319 -2
View File
@@ -52,16 +52,62 @@ Must be run as root.`,
Run: runAdminGpuSetup,
}
var adminGpuMigCmd = &cobra.Command{
Use: "mig",
Short: "Manage NVIDIA MIG partitioning on this node",
}
var adminGpuMigStatusCmd = &cobra.Command{
Use: "status",
Short: "Show MIG capability, mode, and slice state for all GPUs on this node",
Run: runAdminGpuMigStatus,
}
var adminGpuMigEnableCmd = &cobra.Command{
Use: "enable",
Short: "Enable MIG mode on all MIG-capable GPUs (or a specific one)",
Long: `Enable NVIDIA MIG mode on all MIG-capable GPUs (or a specific one).
Without --profile the daemon handles slice creation dynamically: each
RunInstances call for a mig.* instance type carves the right profile on
demand and destroys the slices when the last instance stops.
With --profile, slices are pre-carved immediately. The daemon recovers
these slices on restart and serves them as a static pool for that profile.
Must be run as root.`,
Run: runAdminGpuMigEnable,
}
var adminGpuMigDisableCmd = &cobra.Command{
Use: "disable",
Short: "Destroy all MIG instances and disable MIG mode",
Long: `Destroy all GPU instances and disable NVIDIA MIG mode on all MIG-capable
GPUs (or a specific one). Blocked while GPU instances are running.
Must be run as root.`,
Run: runAdminGpuMigDisable,
}
func init() {
adminCmd.AddCommand(adminGpuCmd)
adminGpuCmd.AddCommand(adminGpuStatusCmd)
adminGpuCmd.AddCommand(adminGpuEnableCmd)
adminGpuCmd.AddCommand(adminGpuDisableCmd)
adminGpuCmd.AddCommand(adminGpuSetupCmd)
adminGpuCmd.AddCommand(adminGpuMigCmd)
adminGpuMigCmd.AddCommand(adminGpuMigStatusCmd)
adminGpuMigCmd.AddCommand(adminGpuMigEnableCmd)
adminGpuMigCmd.AddCommand(adminGpuMigDisableCmd)
adminGpuStatusCmd.Flags().String("node", "", "Target node name (default: local node)")
// enable, disable, and setup write to the local spinifex.toml and signal the
// local daemon — they must be run directly on the target host.
adminGpuMigEnableCmd.Flags().String("profile", "", "MIG profile to pre-carve (e.g. \"1g.10gb\"); omit for fully dynamic slice management")
adminGpuMigEnableCmd.Flags().String("gpu", "", "PCI address of GPU to configure (default: all MIG-capable GPUs)")
adminGpuMigDisableCmd.Flags().String("gpu", "", "PCI address of GPU to configure (default: all MIG-capable GPUs)")
// enable, disable, setup, and mig subcommands write to the local spinifex.toml
// and signal the local daemon — they must be run directly on the target host.
}
// gpuNodeStatus queries NATS and returns the NodeStatusResponse for the target node.
@@ -417,6 +463,277 @@ func runAdminGpuSetup(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) {
gpuToggle(nil, true)
}
func runAdminGpuMigStatus(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) {
devices, err := gpu.Discover()
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "GPU discovery failed: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
if len(devices) == 0 {
fmt.Println("No GPUs detected on this node.")
return
}
anyMIG := false
for _, d := range devices {
if d.MIGCapable {
anyMIG = true
}
migMode := "N/A"
if d.MIGCapable {
if d.MIGEnabled {
migMode = "enabled"
} else {
migMode = "disabled"
}
}
fmt.Printf("GPU: %s\n", d.PCIAddress)
fmt.Printf(" Model: %s\n", d.Model)
fmt.Printf(" MIG capable: %v\n", d.MIGCapable)
fmt.Printf(" MIG mode: %s\n", migMode)
if d.MIGEnabled {
instances, listErr := gpu.ListInstances(d.PCIAddress)
if listErr != nil {
fmt.Printf(" Slices: (error: %v)\n", listErr)
} else {
fmt.Printf(" Slices: %d\n", len(instances))
for _, inst := range instances {
fmt.Printf(" GI %d: %-12s mdev: %s\n",
inst.GIID, inst.Profile.Name, inst.MdevPath)
}
}
}
fmt.Println()
}
if !anyMIG {
fmt.Println("No MIG-capable GPUs found. MIG requires an NVIDIA A100, A30, or H100 GPU.")
}
}
func runAdminGpuMigEnable(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) {
if os.Getuid() != 0 {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Error: spx admin gpu mig enable must be run as root.")
os.Exit(1)
}
profileName, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("profile")
targetPCI, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("gpu")
cfgPath := viper.GetString("config")
if cfgPath == "" {
cfgPath = DefaultConfigFile()
}
cfg, err := config.LoadConfig(cfgPath)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error loading config: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
resp, err := gpuNodeStatus(cfg.Node)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
if resp.AllocGPUs > 0 {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: %d GPU instance(s) are running. Terminate them first.\n", resp.AllocGPUs)
os.Exit(1)
}
devices, err := gpu.Discover()
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "GPU discovery failed: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
targets := migFilterTargets(devices, targetPCI)
if len(targets) == 0 {
if targetPCI != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: no MIG-capable GPU found at PCI address %s\n", targetPCI)
} else {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Error: no MIG-capable GPUs found. MIG requires an NVIDIA A100, A30, or H100 GPU.")
}
os.Exit(1)
}
for _, d := range targets {
fmt.Printf("==> Configuring MIG on %s (%s)\n", d.PCIAddress, d.Model)
if !d.MIGEnabled {
fmt.Println(" Enabling MIG mode...")
if err := gpu.EnableMIGMode(d.PCIAddress); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, " Error: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
} else {
fmt.Println(" MIG mode already enabled")
}
if profileName == "" {
// Dynamic mode: the daemon carves slices on demand at RunInstances time.
// Destroy any pre-carved slices so the daemon starts with a free GPU.
existing, _ := gpu.ListInstances(d.PCIAddress)
if len(existing) > 0 {
fmt.Printf(" Destroying %d pre-carved instance(s) so daemon can manage slices dynamically...\n", len(existing))
if err := gpu.DestroyAllInstances(d.PCIAddress); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, " Error: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
fmt.Println(" Dynamic slice management enabled — use 'mig.*' instance types at RunInstances time.")
continue
}
// Static pre-carve: create a fixed set of slices for the given profile.
profiles, err := gpu.ListProfiles(d.PCIAddress)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, " Error listing profiles: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
var selected *gpu.MIGProfile
for i, p := range profiles {
if p.Name == profileName {
selected = &profiles[i]
break
}
}
if selected == nil {
names := make([]string, len(profiles))
for i, p := range profiles {
names[i] = p.Name
}
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, " Error: profile %q not found. Available: %s\n",
profileName, strings.Join(names, ", "))
os.Exit(1)
}
existing, _ := gpu.ListInstances(d.PCIAddress)
if len(existing) > 0 {
fmt.Printf(" Destroying %d existing instance(s)...\n", len(existing))
if err := gpu.DestroyAllInstances(d.PCIAddress); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, " Error: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
fmt.Printf(" Creating MIG instances (profile: %s)...\n", selected.Name)
instances, err := gpu.CreateInstances(d.PCIAddress, *selected)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, " Error: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Printf(" Created %d instance(s)\n", len(instances))
for _, inst := range instances {
fmt.Printf(" GI %d: %s mdev: %s\n", inst.GIID, inst.Profile.Name, inst.MdevPath)
}
}
migReloadDaemon()
fmt.Println("MIG enabled. Run 'spx admin gpu mig status' to verify.")
}
func runAdminGpuMigDisable(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) {
if os.Getuid() != 0 {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Error: spx admin gpu mig disable must be run as root.")
os.Exit(1)
}
targetPCI, _ := cmd.Flags().GetString("gpu")
cfgPath := viper.GetString("config")
if cfgPath == "" {
cfgPath = DefaultConfigFile()
}
cfg, err := config.LoadConfig(cfgPath)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error loading config: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
resp, err := gpuNodeStatus(cfg.Node)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
if resp.AllocGPUs > 0 {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: %d GPU instance(s) are running. Terminate them first.\n", resp.AllocGPUs)
os.Exit(1)
}
devices, err := gpu.Discover()
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "GPU discovery failed: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
targets := migFilterTargets(devices, targetPCI)
if len(targets) == 0 {
if targetPCI != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: no MIG-capable GPU found at PCI address %s\n", targetPCI)
} else {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Error: no MIG-capable GPUs found on this node.")
}
os.Exit(1)
}
for _, d := range targets {
fmt.Printf("==> Disabling MIG on %s (%s)\n", d.PCIAddress, d.Model)
if !d.MIGEnabled {
fmt.Println(" MIG mode not active — skipping")
continue
}
fmt.Println(" Destroying all GPU instances...")
if err := gpu.DestroyAllInstances(d.PCIAddress); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, " Error: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Println(" Disabling MIG mode...")
if err := gpu.DisableMIGMode(d.PCIAddress); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, " Error: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
fmt.Println("==> Clearing mig_profile from config...")
if err := admin.SetMIGProfile(cfgPath, cfg.Node, ""); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error writing config: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
migReloadDaemon()
fmt.Println("MIG disabled. GPUs will operate in whole-GPU passthrough mode.")
}
// migFilterTargets returns all MIG-capable GPUs, optionally filtered to a
// specific PCI address.
func migFilterTargets(devices []gpu.GPUDevice, targetPCI string) []gpu.GPUDevice {
var out []gpu.GPUDevice
for _, d := range devices {
if !d.MIGCapable {
continue
}
if targetPCI != "" && d.PCIAddress != targetPCI {
continue
}
out = append(out, d)
}
return out
}
// migReloadDaemon sends SIGHUP to spinifex-daemon so it picks up the updated
// MIG configuration without a full restart.
func migReloadDaemon() {
out, err := exec.Command("systemctl", "kill", "-s", "HUP", "spinifex-daemon").CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Warning: failed to signal daemon: %v\n%s\n", err, out)
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Restart the daemon manually: sudo systemctl restart spinifex-daemon")
return
}
fmt.Println("==> Daemon signalled (SIGHUP) — MIG pool will be rebuilt on next request.")
}
// gpuSetupCollectVFIOIDs collects vendor:device PCI ID pairs for each GPU and
// all sibling PCI functions on the same device slot (e.g. GPU + HDMI audio).
// All siblings must bind to vfio-pci together for IOMMU group isolation.
+169 -46
View File
@@ -142,49 +142,6 @@ func TestSpinifexTomlTemplate_AdvertiseOmittedWhenEmpty(t *testing.T) {
assert.NotContains(t, string(data), "advertise =")
}
// detectedDhcpBindBridge must return the default-route interface name verbatim
// when it's a bridge (Linux or OVS, br-* prefix). The old detectedWanBridge()
// returned hardcoded "br-ext" for Linux bridges — that value broke DHCP on
// consumer-router LANs because br-ext never sees LAN DHCP traffic (mulga-998).
func TestDetectedDhcpBindBridge(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
detected *admin.DetectedNetwork
want string
}{
{
name: "Linux bridge default route returns bridge name (not 'br-ext')",
detected: &admin.DetectedNetwork{WAN: &admin.DetectedInterface{Name: "br-wan"}},
want: "br-wan",
},
{
name: "OVS bridge default route returned verbatim",
detected: &admin.DetectedNetwork{WAN: &admin.DetectedInterface{Name: "br-ext"}},
want: "br-ext",
},
{
name: "physical NIC defaults to 'br-wan' (bridge the installer creates)",
detected: &admin.DetectedNetwork{WAN: &admin.DetectedInterface{Name: "enp0s3"}},
want: "br-wan",
},
{
name: "nil DetectedNetwork",
detected: nil,
want: "",
},
{
name: "DetectedNetwork with nil WAN",
detected: &admin.DetectedNetwork{},
want: "",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, detectedDhcpBindBridge(tt.detected))
})
}
}
// Legacy `wan_bridge` TOML key must fail-start vpcd with guidance, not silently
// alias (per mulga-998 D3). Prevents the footgun where operators inherited the
// old key pointing at 'br-ext' and got broken DHCP on veth-mode hosts.
@@ -206,8 +163,8 @@ wan_bridge = "br-ext"
err := checkLegacyWanBridgeKey("node1", cfgPath)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "dhcp_bind_bridge")
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "wan_bridge")
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "Remove")
}
func TestCheckLegacyWanBridgeKey_EnvVarRejected(t *testing.T) {
@@ -218,7 +175,7 @@ func TestCheckLegacyWanBridgeKey_EnvVarRejected(t *testing.T) {
err := checkLegacyWanBridgeKey("node1", "/tmp/unused.toml")
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "SPINIFEX_VPCD_WAN_BRIDGE")
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "dhcp_bind_bridge")
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "Remove")
}
func TestCheckLegacyWanBridgeKey_CleanConfigPasses(t *testing.T) {
@@ -228,7 +185,7 @@ func TestCheckLegacyWanBridgeKey_CleanConfigPasses(t *testing.T) {
node = "node1"
[nodes.node1.vpcd]
ovn_nb_addr = "tcp:127.0.0.1:6641"
dhcp_bind_bridge = "br-wan"
external_interface = "enp0s3"
`), 0o644))
viper.Reset()
@@ -295,6 +252,74 @@ func TestWritePredastoreEncryptionKey(t *testing.T) {
assert.NotEqual(t, key1, key2, "per-node keys must differ")
}
// The viperblock key gates at-rest encryption for every volume on a fresh
// install. masterkey.LoadShared rejects anything that isn't exactly 32 bytes at
// 0640-or-stricter, so a regression in size/mode would silently fall back to
// cleartext (empty path) or fail service startup.
func TestWriteViperblockEncryptionKey(t *testing.T) {
configDir := t.TempDir()
keyPath, err := writeViperblockEncryptionKey(configDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, filepath.Join(configDir, "viperblock", "encryption.key"), keyPath)
info, err := os.Stat(keyPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, int64(32), info.Size(), "viperblock master key must be exactly 32 bytes")
assert.Equal(t, os.FileMode(0600), info.Mode().Perm(), "viperblock master key must be mode 0600")
}
// Joiners persist the leader's shared key via saveViperblockEncryptionKey
// against a configDir with no viperblock/ subdir yet. The bytes round-trip
// verbatim — the whole cluster shares one key, so any mutation would orphan
// volumes sealed on other nodes.
func TestSaveViperblockEncryptionKey_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
configDir := t.TempDir()
key := make([]byte, 32)
for i := range key {
key[i] = byte(i)
}
keyPath, err := saveViperblockEncryptionKey(configDir, key)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, filepath.Join(configDir, "viperblock", "encryption.key"), keyPath)
got, err := os.ReadFile(keyPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, key, got, "shared key must be written verbatim")
}
// A fresh install must render encryption_key_file so viperblockd enables
// at-rest encryption; an empty field (upgrade / legacy) must omit the line
// entirely so the volume stays in cleartext legacy mode.
func TestSpinifexTomlTemplate_EncryptionKeyFile(t *testing.T) {
base := admin.ConfigSettings{
Node: "node1", Az: "ap-southeast-2a", Port: "4432", Region: "ap-southeast-2",
BindIP: "0.0.0.0", AccessKey: "AKIATEST", SecretKey: "SECRET",
AccountID: "123456789012", NatsToken: "token",
OVNNBAddr: "tcp:127.0.0.1:6641", OVNSBAddr: "tcp:127.0.0.1:6642",
}
dir := t.TempDir()
withKey := base
withKey.ConfigDir = dir
withKey.EncryptionKeyFile = "/etc/spinifex/viperblock/encryption.key"
path := filepath.Join(dir, "spinifex.toml")
require.NoError(t, admin.GenerateConfigFile(path, spinifexTomlTemplate, withKey))
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, string(data), `encryption_key_file = "/etc/spinifex/viperblock/encryption.key"`)
dir2 := t.TempDir()
noKey := base
noKey.ConfigDir = dir2
path2 := filepath.Join(dir2, "spinifex.toml")
require.NoError(t, admin.GenerateConfigFile(path2, spinifexTomlTemplate, noKey))
data2, err := os.ReadFile(path2)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotContains(t, string(data2), "encryption_key_file", "blank key must omit the field")
}
// Joiners run `spx admin join` against a configDir that doesn't yet contain
// a predastore/ subdir. The helper must create it (predastore subdir is
// owned by spinifex-storage in prod, but the helper just needs the dir to
@@ -331,3 +356,101 @@ func TestImagesRemoveCmd_FlagSchema(t *testing.T) {
// cobraRequiredAnnotation is the annotation key cobra uses to mark required flags.
const cobraRequiredAnnotation = "cobra_annotation_bash_completion_one_required_flag"
// `spx admin init` must expose --external-source and --external-bind-bridge so
// operators can pick the DHCP path for [[network.external_pools]].
func TestAdminInitCmd_ExternalDHCPFlagSchema(t *testing.T) {
sourceFlag := adminInitCmd.Flags().Lookup("external-source")
require.NotNil(t, sourceFlag, "--external-source must be defined")
assert.Equal(t, "", sourceFlag.DefValue)
bindFlag := adminInitCmd.Flags().Lookup("external-bind-bridge")
require.NotNil(t, bindFlag, "--external-bind-bridge must be defined")
assert.Equal(t, "", bindFlag.DefValue)
poolFlag := adminInitCmd.Flags().Lookup("external-pool")
require.NotNil(t, poolFlag)
assert.Equal(t, "", poolFlag.DefValue)
}
// DHCP-sourced pool must emit source + bind_bridge into spinifex.toml so the
// daemon's validator and vpcd's DHCPManager find the bridge they DORA on.
func TestSpinifexTomlTemplate_ExternalPoolDHCPSource(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "spinifex.toml")
settings := admin.ConfigSettings{
Node: "node1",
Az: "ap-southeast-2a",
Port: "4432",
Region: "ap-southeast-2",
BindIP: "10.11.12.1",
ConfigDir: dir,
OVNNBAddr: "tcp:127.0.0.1:6641",
OVNSBAddr: "tcp:127.0.0.1:6642",
ExternalMode: "pool",
ExternalIface: "eth0",
PoolName: "wan",
PoolSource: "dhcp",
PoolBindBridge: "br-wan",
PoolPrefixLen: 24,
}
require.NoError(t, admin.GenerateConfigFile(path, spinifexTomlTemplate, settings))
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
content := string(data)
assert.Contains(t, content, `source = "dhcp"`)
assert.Contains(t, content, `bind_bridge = "br-wan"`)
assert.NotContains(t, content, "range_start", "dhcp pool must not emit range_start")
assert.NotContains(t, content, "range_end", "dhcp pool must not emit range_end")
assert.NotContains(t, content, "gateway =", "gateway omitted for dhcp pool (discovered from OFFER)")
}
// Static-sourced pool must not emit bind_bridge — the validator rejects it.
func TestSpinifexTomlTemplate_ExternalPoolStaticSource(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "spinifex.toml")
settings := admin.ConfigSettings{
Node: "node1",
Az: "ap-southeast-2a",
Port: "4432",
Region: "ap-southeast-2",
BindIP: "10.11.12.1",
ConfigDir: dir,
OVNNBAddr: "tcp:127.0.0.1:6641",
OVNSBAddr: "tcp:127.0.0.1:6642",
ExternalMode: "pool",
ExternalIface: "eth0",
PoolName: "wan",
PoolSource: "static",
PoolStart: "192.168.1.150",
PoolEnd: "192.168.1.250",
PoolGateway: "192.168.1.1",
PoolPrefixLen: 24,
}
require.NoError(t, admin.GenerateConfigFile(path, spinifexTomlTemplate, settings))
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
content := string(data)
assert.Contains(t, content, `source = "static"`)
assert.NotContains(t, content, "bind_bridge", "static pool must not emit bind_bridge")
assert.Contains(t, content, `range_start = "192.168.1.150"`)
assert.Contains(t, content, `gateway = "192.168.1.1"`)
}
// Formation joiners must receive PoolBindBridge from the init node so the
// cluster-wide config reaches every chassis intact.
func TestApplyNetworkConfig_PropagatesPoolBindBridge(t *testing.T) {
settings := &admin.ConfigSettings{}
nc := &formation.NetworkConfig{
ExternalMode: "pool",
PoolName: "wan",
PoolSource: "dhcp",
PoolBindBridge: "br-wan",
PoolPrefixLen: 24,
}
applyNetworkConfig(settings, nc)
assert.Equal(t, "dhcp", settings.PoolSource)
assert.Equal(t, "br-wan", settings.PoolBindBridge)
}
+74
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/daemon"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/network/external/dhcp"
"github.com/nats-io/nats.go"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
)
@@ -160,6 +161,79 @@ func runClusterShutdown(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
fmt.Printf("Cluster shutdown complete (%s)\n", time.Since(start).Round(time.Millisecond))
}
// runClusterDrainDHCP asks every vpcd to DHCPRELEASE all external-pool leases
// it currently holds, returning them to the upstream DHCP server. Intended for
// the teardown path: an env reset otherwise strands held leases until TTL
// because vpcd's Stop() preserves them for adopt-on-reboot. Best-effort — if
// the cluster is already partly down it warns and exits 0 so teardown proceeds.
func runClusterDrainDHCP(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) {
timeout, _ := cmd.Flags().GetDuration("timeout")
if timeout <= 0 {
timeout = 30 * time.Second
}
_, nc, err := loadConfigAndConnect()
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Warning: drain-dhcp could not connect (cluster may be down): %v\n", err)
return
}
defer nc.Close()
total, responders := drainDHCPLeases(nc, timeout)
fmt.Printf("DHCP drain complete: released %d lease(s) from %d vpcd responder(s)\n", total, responders)
}
// drainDHCPLeases publishes a drain request to vpc.dhcp.drain and collects
// replies until timeout — one responder per AZ (vpcd uses a per-AZ queue
// group). Returns the summed released count and the number of responders.
func drainDHCPLeases(nc *nats.Conn, timeout time.Duration) (released, responders int) {
reqData, err := json.Marshal(struct{}{})
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: %v\n", err)
return 0, 0
}
inbox := nats.NewInbox()
sub, err := nc.SubscribeSync(inbox)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Warning: drain-dhcp subscribe failed: %v\n", err)
return 0, 0
}
defer sub.Unsubscribe()
if err := nc.PublishRequest(dhcp.TopicDrain, inbox, reqData); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Warning: drain-dhcp publish failed: %v\n", err)
return 0, 0
}
nc.Flush()
deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout)
for {
remaining := time.Until(deadline)
if remaining <= 0 {
break
}
msg, err := sub.NextMsg(remaining)
if err != nil {
break
}
var reply struct {
Released int `json:"released"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(msg.Data, &reply); err != nil {
continue
}
responders++
if reply.Error != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, " vpcd drain error: %s\n", reply.Error)
continue
}
released += reply.Released
}
return released, responders
}
// collectShutdownACKs publishes a shutdown request and collects ACKs from nodes.
func collectShutdownACKs(nc *nats.Conn, topic string, reqData []byte, nodeCount int, timeout time.Duration) ([]daemon.ShutdownACK, error) {
inbox := nats.NewInbox()
+58
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
package cmd
import (
"encoding/json"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/network/external/dhcp"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/testutil"
"github.com/nats-io/nats.go"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// fakeDrainResponder subscribes a stand-in vpcd to vpc.dhcp.drain that
// replies with the given released count (or error), mirroring
// Manager.handleDrainMsg without a real lease store.
func fakeDrainResponder(t *testing.T, nc *nats.Conn, released int, errMsg string) {
t.Helper()
sub, err := nc.Subscribe(dhcp.TopicDrain, func(msg *nats.Msg) {
body, _ := json.Marshal(struct {
Released int `json:"released"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
}{Released: released, Error: errMsg})
_ = msg.Respond(body)
})
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sub.Unsubscribe() })
}
func TestDrainDHCPLeasesSumsReleased(t *testing.T) {
_, nc, _ := testutil.StartTestJetStream(t)
fakeDrainResponder(t, nc, 7, "")
released, responders := drainDHCPLeases(nc, 2*time.Second)
assert.Equal(t, 7, released)
assert.Equal(t, 1, responders)
}
func TestDrainDHCPLeasesReportsResponderError(t *testing.T) {
_, nc, _ := testutil.StartTestJetStream(t)
fakeDrainResponder(t, nc, 0, "list leases for drain: boom")
// An erroring responder still counts as a responder but contributes
// zero released leases.
released, responders := drainDHCPLeases(nc, 2*time.Second)
assert.Equal(t, 0, released)
assert.Equal(t, 1, responders)
}
func TestDrainDHCPLeasesNoResponders(t *testing.T) {
_, nc, _ := testutil.StartTestJetStream(t)
// No vpcd subscribed: the collection window elapses with zero replies.
released, responders := drainDHCPLeases(nc, 200*time.Millisecond)
assert.Equal(t, 0, released)
assert.Equal(t, 0, responders)
}
+33 -24
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ import (
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/services/predastore"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/services/spinifexui"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/services/viperblockd"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/services/vpcd"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/vpcd"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/spf13/viper"
)
@@ -283,19 +283,25 @@ var viperblockStartCmd = &cobra.Command{
shardWAL = *nodeConfig.Viperblock.ShardWAL
}
encryptionKeyFile := nodeConfig.Viperblock.EncryptionKeyFile
if envKey := viper.GetString("viperblock-encryption-key-file"); envKey != "" {
encryptionKeyFile = envKey
}
service, err := service.New("viperblock", &viperblockd.Config{
NatsHost: nodeConfig.NATS.Host,
NatsToken: nodeConfig.NATS.ACL.Token,
NatsCACert: nodeConfig.NATS.CACert,
PluginPath: pluginPath,
S3Host: nodeConfig.Predastore.Host,
Bucket: nodeConfig.Predastore.Bucket,
Region: nodeConfig.Predastore.Region,
AccessKey: nodeConfig.Predastore.AccessKey,
SecretKey: nodeConfig.Predastore.SecretKey,
BaseDir: nodeConfig.Predastore.BaseDir,
NodeName: clusterConfig.Node,
ShardWAL: shardWAL,
NatsHost: nodeConfig.NATS.Host,
NatsToken: nodeConfig.NATS.ACL.Token,
NatsCACert: nodeConfig.NATS.CACert,
PluginPath: pluginPath,
S3Host: nodeConfig.Predastore.Host,
Bucket: nodeConfig.Predastore.Bucket,
Region: nodeConfig.Predastore.Region,
AccessKey: nodeConfig.Predastore.AccessKey,
SecretKey: nodeConfig.Predastore.SecretKey,
BaseDir: nodeConfig.Predastore.BaseDir,
NodeName: clusterConfig.Node,
ShardWAL: shardWAL,
EncryptionKeyFile: encryptionKeyFile,
})
if err != nil {
@@ -532,7 +538,7 @@ var awsgwStartCmd = &cobra.Command{
awsgwHost := viper.GetString("host")
if awsgwHost != "" {
fmt.Println("Overwriting awsgw host to:", awsgwHost)
//nodeConfig.AWSGW.Host = awsgwHost
nodeConfig.AWSGW.Host = awsgwHost
}
awsgwTlsCert := viper.GetString("tls-cert")
@@ -678,11 +684,8 @@ var spinifexUIStatusCmd = &cobra.Command{
}
// checkLegacyWanBridgeKey fails vpcd startup if the deprecated `wan_bridge`
// TOML key or `SPINIFEX_VPCD_WAN_BRIDGE` env-var is present. The key was
// renamed to `dhcp_bind_bridge` (see mulga-998.a) because the old name misled
// operators into pointing at the OVN-side bridge ("br-ext"), which never sees
// LAN DHCP traffic. Per D3: no silent alias, no auto-rewrite — operator must
// rename the key before vpcd will start.
// TOML key or `SPINIFEX_VPCD_WAN_BRIDGE` env-var is present. Per D3: no silent
// alias, no auto-rewrite — operator must remove the key before vpcd will start.
func checkLegacyWanBridgeKey(node, cfgFile string) error {
legacyInTOML := viper.IsSet("nodes." + node + ".vpcd.wan_bridge")
legacyInEnv := os.Getenv("SPINIFEX_VPCD_WAN_BRIDGE") != ""
@@ -695,9 +698,7 @@ func checkLegacyWanBridgeKey(node, cfgFile string) error {
}
return fmt.Errorf(
"vpcd: deprecated 'wan_bridge' key found in %s. "+
"Rename 'wan_bridge' to 'dhcp_bind_bridge'. The value may also be wrong — verify it is "+
"the Linux bridge holding your WAN NIC (veth mode) or the OVS bridge holding your WAN NIC (direct mode); "+
"never 'br-ext'. Typical value on a consumer-router LAN: 'br-wan'. "+
"Remove the key entirely; vpcd auto-detects the WAN bridge (br-wan). "+
"Then: sudo systemctl restart spinifex-vpcd",
source,
)
@@ -734,6 +735,7 @@ var vpcdStartCmd = &cobra.Command{
extPools = append(extPools, vpcd.ExternalPoolConfig{
Name: p.Name,
Source: p.Source,
BindBridge: p.BindBridge,
RangeStart: p.RangeStart,
RangeEnd: p.RangeEnd,
Gateway: p.Gateway,
@@ -742,7 +744,6 @@ var vpcdStartCmd = &cobra.Command{
DNSServers: p.DNSServers,
Region: p.Region,
AZ: p.AZ,
DhcpBindBridge: nodeConfig.VPCD.DhcpBindBridge,
GwLrpRangeStart: p.GwLrpRangeStart,
GwLrpRangeEnd: p.GwLrpRangeEnd,
})
@@ -778,8 +779,8 @@ var vpcdStartCmd = &cobra.Command{
ExternalPools: extPools,
Bootstrap: bootstrap,
ExternalInterface: nodeConfig.VPCD.ExternalInterface,
DhcpBindBridge: nodeConfig.VPCD.DhcpBindBridge,
BridgeMode: nodeConfig.VPCD.BridgeMode,
AZ: nodeConfig.AZ,
})
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("Error starting vpcd service:", err)
@@ -916,6 +917,14 @@ func init() {
viper.BindEnv("plugin-path", "SPINIFEX_VIPERBLOCK_PLUGIN_PATH")
viper.BindPFlag("plugin-path", predastoreCmd.PersistentFlags().Lookup("plugin-path"))
// Viperblock at-rest encryption master key (shared with other on-node
// services via group ownership; mode 0640 or stricter). Distinct viper
// key from predastore's encryption-key-file so the two BindPFlag calls
// don't collide globally.
viperblockCmd.PersistentFlags().String("encryption-key-file", "", "Path to the 32-byte AES-256 master key file for at-rest encryption (empty disables encryption)")
viper.BindEnv("viperblock-encryption-key-file", "SPINIFEX_VIPERBLOCK_ENCRYPTION_KEY_FILE")
viper.BindPFlag("viperblock-encryption-key-file", viperblockCmd.PersistentFlags().Lookup("encryption-key-file"))
viperblockCmd.AddCommand(viperblockStartCmd)
viperblockCmd.AddCommand(viperblockStopCmd)
viperblockCmd.AddCommand(viperblockStatusCmd)
+11 -14
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
# Domain configuration file in TOML format.
version = "2"
version = "3"
epoch = 1
node = "{{.Node}}"
{{- if .OperatorEmail}}
@@ -7,24 +7,27 @@ node = "{{.Node}}"
[operator]
email = "{{.OperatorEmail}}"
{{- end}}
{{- if .ExternalMode}}
[network]
ipsec_enabled = {{.IPSecEnabled}}
{{- if .ExternalMode}}
external_mode = "{{.ExternalMode}}"
{{- if .ExternalDHCP}}
external_dhcp = true
{{- end}}
[[network.external_pools]]
name = "{{.PoolName}}"
{{- if .PoolSource}}
source = "{{.PoolSource}}"
{{- end}}
{{- if .PoolBindBridge}}
bind_bridge = "{{.PoolBindBridge}}"
{{- end}}
{{- if .PoolStart}}
range_start = "{{.PoolStart}}"
range_end = "{{.PoolEnd}}"
{{- end}}
{{- if .PoolGateway}}
gateway = "{{.PoolGateway}}"
{{- end}}
{{- if .PoolGatewayIP}}
gateway_ip = "{{.PoolGatewayIP}}"
{{- end}}
@@ -90,6 +93,9 @@ token = "{{.NatsToken}}"
[nodes.{{.Node}}.viperblock]
shardwal = false
{{- if .EncryptionKeyFile}}
encryption_key_file = "{{.EncryptionKeyFile}}"
{{- end}}
[nodes.{{.Node}}.vpcd]
ovn_nb_addr = "{{.OVNNBAddr}}"
@@ -97,15 +103,6 @@ ovn_sb_addr = "{{.OVNSBAddr}}"
{{- if .ExternalIface}}
external_interface = "{{.ExternalIface}}"
{{- end}}
{{- if .DhcpBindBridge}}
# dhcp_bind_bridge: the bridge where vpcd's DHCP client binds its AF_PACKET
# socket. On Linux-bridge-WAN hosts (netplan default with the WAN NIC enslaved),
# this is the Linux bridge name (e.g. "br-wan"). On direct-OVS hosts, this is
# the OVS bridge holding the WAN NIC.
# NEVER set this to "br-ext" — that is the OVN-side bridge and never sees LAN
# DHCP traffic.
dhcp_bind_bridge = "{{.DhcpBindBridge}}"
{{- end}}
[nodes.{{.Node}}.predastore]
host = "{{.BindIP}}:8443"
+676 -618
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -82,6 +82,25 @@ spx admin images import --name debian-13-arm64
Catalog imports verify the image against the catalog-declared SHA-256/SHA-512 digest before extraction. Use `--file` to import operator-supplied media (verification skipped — operator is responsible for integrity), or `--force` to re-download after a checksum mismatch.
### EKS node image
To run EKS, import the prebuilt node image from the catalog:
```bash
spx admin images import --name spinifex-eks-node
```
This pulls the Alpine + K3s node AMI from `iso.mulgadc.com`, verifies its
checksum, and registers it tagged `spinifex:managed-by=eks`. `eks create-cluster`
and `eks create-nodegroup` resolve the boot AMI by that tag, so no further
configuration is needed.
Operators publishing a freshly built node image to the mirror run the
**Publish EKS node AMI** GitHub Actions workflow (manual dispatch; uses the
`CF_R2_*` repo secrets) or, locally, `make publish-eks-node-image` (see
`scripts/publish-system-image.sh`; requires `R2_ENDPOINT` + R2-scoped
`AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`/`AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`).
## Cluster Shutdown
+27 -51
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,11 @@ tags:
- passthrough
- vfio
- ec2
sections:
- overview
- prerequisites
- instructions
- troubleshooting
resources:
- title: "Spinifex Repository"
url: "https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex"
@@ -14,26 +19,6 @@ resources:
url: "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/ec2/latest/instancetypes/ac.html"
---
# GPU Passthrough
> Configure VFIO GPU passthrough on a Spinifex node to expose NVIDIA or AMD GPUs to EC2 instances.
> **Note:** GPU passthrough is supported on x86_64 hosts only.
## Table of Contents
- [Overview](#overview)
- [Prerequisites](#prerequisites)
- [Host Setup](#host-setup)
- [Enable Passthrough](#enable-passthrough)
- [Status and Monitoring](#status-and-monitoring)
- [GPU Instance Types](#gpu-instance-types)
- [Launching GPU Instances](#launching-gpu-instances)
- [Disable Passthrough](#disable-passthrough)
- [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting)
---
## Overview
Spinifex supports VFIO-based GPU passthrough, binding NVIDIA and AMD GPUs directly to guest VMs via the `vfio-pci` kernel driver. Once configured, the node exposes GPU-enabled EC2 instance types and the GPU is allocated exclusively to individual instances.
@@ -42,9 +27,9 @@ At startup, Spinifex always probes for GPU hardware and surfaces the result in t
The passthrough state is reflected in the login banner:
![GPU not yet enabled](../../../.github/assets/images/gpu-banner1.png)
<img src="../../../.github/assets/images/gpu-banner1.png" alt="GPU not yet enabled">
---
> **Note:** GPU passthrough is supported on x86_64 hosts only.
## Prerequisites
@@ -52,9 +37,9 @@ The passthrough state is reflected in the login banner:
- An NVIDIA or AMD GPU must be physically installed.
- The Spinifex node must be running on bare metal (not inside a VM).
---
## Instructions
## Host Setup
### Host Setup
Run the one-time host configuration as root. This command is idempotent — safe to re-run after a reboot.
@@ -79,9 +64,7 @@ Setup complete — reboot required.
Then run: sudo spx admin gpu enable
```
---
## Enable Passthrough
### Enable Passthrough
After setup and reboot, enable GPU passthrough:
@@ -91,14 +74,11 @@ sudo spx admin gpu enable
The command writes the configuration, signals the daemon (`SIGHUP`), and waits up to 30 seconds for the daemon to confirm the new state. On success it prints the current GPU status.
<img src="../../../.github/assets/images/gpu-enabled.png" alt="GPU enabled">
![GPU enabled](../../../.github/assets/images/gpu-enabled.png)
### Status and Monitoring
---
## Status and Monitoring
### Per-node status
**Per-node status:**
```bash
spx admin gpu status
@@ -108,7 +88,7 @@ spx admin gpu status --node <node-name>
Output includes hardware detected, IOMMU state, vfio-pci binding, passthrough enabled/disabled, GPU pool allocation (`allocated/total`), and the GPU-capable EC2 instance types available on that node.
### Cluster view
**Cluster view:**
`spx top nodes` includes a `GPU (used/total)` column:
@@ -122,30 +102,30 @@ Output includes hardware detected, IOMMU state, vfio-pci binding, passthrough en
spx top nodes
```
---
### GPU Instance Types
## GPU Instance Types
GPU instance types are derived from detected hardware.
To list available GPU instance types on the current node:
GPU instance types are derived from detected hardware. To list available GPU instance types on the current node:
```bash
aws ec2 describe-instance-types \
--filters Name=instance-type,Values=g*
```
---
### Launching GPU Instances
## Launching GPU Instances
Import the GPU-enabled AMI before launching:
Spinifex ships two pre-built GPU guest images. Import the one that matches your host hardware before launching:
```bash
spx admin images import --name ubuntu-gpu-nvidia # NVIDIA hosts
spx admin images import --name ubuntu-gpu-amd # AMD hosts
spx admin images import --name ubuntu-26.04-nvidia-gpu-x86_64 # NVIDIA hosts
spx admin images import --name ubuntu-26.04-amd-gpu-x86_64 # AMD hosts
```
These images are built on Ubuntu 26.04 and serve as a base for GPU workloads. Both include Docker CE, Python 3, and common utilities (`git`, `curl`, `htop`, `tmux`, `ffmpeg`).
**NVIDIA** (`ubuntu-26.04-nvidia-gpu-x86_64`): NVIDIA server driver with DKMS pre-built against the image kernel, `nvidia-smi`, nvidia-container-toolkit wired into Docker (`--gpus all` works on first boot). CUDA toolkit and cuDNN are not included — use an NGC container or install inside the instance.
**AMD** (`ubuntu-26.04-amd-gpu-x86_64`): `linux-firmware` (amdgpu firmware blobs), ROCm 7.2 CLI tools (`rocm-smi`, `rocminfo`, `amd-smi`). Full ROCm compute libraries (`rocblas`, etc.) are not included — install inside the instance as needed.
Launch a GPU instance:
```bash
@@ -165,9 +145,7 @@ nvidia-smi
rocm-smi
```
---
## Disable Passthrough
### Disable Passthrough
Passthrough cannot be disabled while GPU instances are running. Terminate all GPU instances first, then:
@@ -177,8 +155,6 @@ sudo spx admin gpu disable
The command signals the daemon and waits for confirmation. The GPU is released back to the host kernel on the next reboot (the vfio-pci binding persists until `setup` is re-run without the blacklists).
---
## Troubleshooting
### IOMMU not active after reboot
@@ -164,6 +164,16 @@ spx admin images import --name debian-13-x86_64
cloud-init needs time to configure the instance after boot. Wait 30-60 seconds and retry.
If the connection **times out** rather than being refused, the security group is likely blocking port 22. The default security group denies all inbound traffic (matching AWS), so SSH must be explicitly allowed:
```bash
# Allow SSH from anywhere on the instance's security group
aws ec2 authorize-security-group-ingress \
--group-id $SG_ID --protocol tcp --port 22 --cidr 0.0.0.0/0
```
See [VPC Networking — Security Groups](/docs/vpc-networking#security-groups) for scoping rules to a trusted CIDR.
Verify the SSH key was specified correctly when launching:
```bash
+78 -14
View File
@@ -48,8 +48,9 @@ NIC. Each host runs `ovn-controller` which programs OpenFlow rules on `br-int`
## Private vs Public Subnets
A subnet's behavior depends on two things: whether the VPC has an Internet
Gateway, and whether the subnet has `MapPublicIpOnLaunch` enabled.
A subnet's behavior depends on three things: whether the VPC has an Internet
Gateway, whether the subnet's route table has a default route to that IGW, and
whether the subnet has `MapPublicIpOnLaunch` enabled.
## Private Subnet (Default)
@@ -61,9 +62,10 @@ internet or be reached from the WAN.
<img src="../../../.github/assets/diagrams/vpc-private-subnet-flow.svg" alt="Private subnet — instance hits router, no default route, packet dropped" width="900">
</p>
If the VPC has an IGW attached, private subnet instances CAN reach the internet
via the VPC router's SNAT rule (outbound only — they share the gateway IP). They
still cannot be reached from the WAN because they have no public IP.
Private subnet instances reach the internet only if their route table has a
default route to the IGW (shared SNAT, outbound only — they share the gateway
IP) or to a NAT gateway. With no default route, egress is dropped. Either way
they cannot be reached from the WAN because they have no public IP.
## Public Subnet
@@ -77,8 +79,18 @@ managed by OVN — the instance OS only sees its private IP.
**Requirements for a public subnet:**
1. VPC has an Internet Gateway attached
2. Subnet has `MapPublicIpOnLaunch = true`
3. External IP pool configured in `spinifex.toml`
2. A route table associated with the subnet has a `0.0.0.0/0` route to the IGW
3. Subnet has `MapPublicIpOnLaunch = true`
4. External IP pool configured in `spinifex.toml`
Spinifex follows AWS route-table semantics: a subnet is only "public" if its
effective route table carries a default route to the IGW. A new VPC's main
route table has the local route only — Spinifex does **not** add the IGW route
for you. Without it, the subnet's egress is gated with a drop policy, so
instances cannot reach the internet (and inbound connections cannot complete
because return traffic is dropped) even with a public IP and an attached IGW.
Add the route explicitly — either to the main route table, or to a custom route
table associated with the subnet (see [Quick Start](#3-create-vpc-with-public-subnet)).
## Comparison
@@ -86,7 +98,7 @@ managed by OVN — the instance OS only sees its private IP.
| ------------------------ | --------------------------------- | ------------------------------ |
| Private IP | Yes | Yes |
| Public IP | No | Auto-assigned from pool |
| Outbound internet | Only if VPC has IGW (shared SNAT) | Yes (own public IP via SNAT) |
| Outbound internet | Only with a default route to IGW/NAT GW | Yes (own public IP via SNAT) |
| Inbound from WAN | No | Yes (via 1:1 NAT to public IP) |
| Instance sees public IP? | N/A | No — only sees private IP |
| Elastic IP support | Only if explicitly associated | Yes |
@@ -190,8 +202,7 @@ use `setup-ovn.sh --dhcp` to obtain one from the router. This is the router's
DHCP — not Spinifex's internal OVN DHCP for VMs.
**Use when:** VMs only need outbound access (apt update, pulling images). Edge
deployments behind ISP NAT. Single WAN IP available. Future: use with AWS-style
NAT Gateway for private subnet internet access.
deployments behind ISP NAT. Single WAN IP available.
```toml
[network]
@@ -935,17 +946,39 @@ spx admin init
VPC=$(aws ec2 create-vpc --cidr-block 10.200.0.0/16 \
--query Vpc.VpcId --output text)
SUBNET=$(aws ec2 create-subnet --vpc-id $VPC \
--cidr-block 10.200.1.0/24 \
--query Subnet.SubnetId --output text)
IGW=$(aws ec2 create-internet-gateway \
--query InternetGateway.InternetGatewayId --output text)
aws ec2 attach-internet-gateway \
--internet-gateway-id $IGW --vpc-id $VPC
SUBNET=$(aws ec2 create-subnet --vpc-id $VPC \
--cidr-block 10.200.1.0/24 \
--query Subnet.SubnetId --output text)
# Route table — give the subnet a default route to the IGW. Spinifex does NOT
# add this automatically; without it the subnet's egress is dropped.
RT=$(aws ec2 create-route-table --vpc-id $VPC \
--query RouteTable.RouteTableId --output text)
aws ec2 create-route --route-table-id $RT \
--destination-cidr-block 0.0.0.0/0 --gateway-id $IGW
aws ec2 associate-route-table --route-table-id $RT --subnet-id $SUBNET
# Auto-assign a public IP to instances launched into the subnet
aws ec2 modify-subnet-attribute \
--subnet-id $SUBNET --map-public-ip-on-launch
# Allow SSH + ICMP on the VPC's default security group (blocks inbound by default)
SG=$(aws ec2 describe-security-groups \
--filters Name=vpc-id,Values=$VPC \
--query 'SecurityGroups[0].GroupId' --output text)
aws ec2 authorize-security-group-ingress --group-id $SG \
--protocol tcp --port 22 --cidr 0.0.0.0/0
aws ec2 authorize-security-group-ingress --group-id $SG \
--protocol icmp --port -1 --cidr 0.0.0.0/0
```
## 4. Launch Instance
@@ -1135,6 +1168,37 @@ ip route show
sudo ovn-nbctl lr-nat-list vpc-$VPC
```
### Instance Has Public IP But No Internet
The instance shows a public IP in `describe-instances` but cannot reach the
internet, and inbound connections hang. The usual cause is a missing default
route: the subnet's effective route table has no `0.0.0.0/0` route to the IGW,
so Spinifex gates the subnet with a drop policy.
```bash
# Find the route table that applies to the subnet and check its routes
aws ec2 describe-route-tables \
--filters Name=association.subnet-id,Values=$SUBNET \
--query 'RouteTables[0].Routes'
# Expect a route with DestinationCidrBlock 0.0.0.0/0 and a GatewayId of igw-...
```
If the subnet has no explicit association it falls back to the VPC's main route
table — check that one too, then add the route to whichever table applies:
```bash
aws ec2 create-route --route-table-id $RT \
--destination-cidr-block 0.0.0.0/0 --gateway-id $IGW
```
On the host, the drop policy installed when a subnet lacks an IGW route appears
as a `Logical_Router_Policy` on the VPC router:
```bash
sudo ovn-nbctl lr-policy-list vpc-$VPC
# A drop policy matching the subnet CIDR means the subnet is gated.
```
### Public IP Not Reachable from WAN
Work through these checks in order — each eliminates a class of issues.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ This guide builds Spinifex from source. For production deployments, the [binary
**Requirements:**
- Ubuntu 26.04 / Debian 13
- Go 1.26.3+
- Go 1.26.4+
- GCC, make, pkg-config
- QEMU/KVM, OVN/Open vSwitch, AWS CLI v2, dhcpcd-base
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ resources:
## Overview
This guide assumes Spinifex is already installed and running. If not, follow one of the installation guides first:
- [Single-Node Install)](/docs/install)
- [Single-Node Install](/docs/install)
- [Multi-Node Install](/docs/install-multi-node)
- [Source Install](/docs/install-source)
@@ -50,7 +50,9 @@ export AWS_PROFILE=spinifex
## 1. Import an AMI
List available images and import one matching your architecture:
### Option A: Import a bundled image
List the bundled images and import one matching your architecture:
```bash
spx admin images list
@@ -64,13 +66,11 @@ ubuntu-26.04-arm64 | ubuntu | 26.04 | arm64 | uefi
ubuntu-26.04-x86_64 | ubuntu | 26.04 | x86_64 | uefi
```
Import an image:
```bash
spx admin images import --name ubuntu-26.04-x86_64
```
Or import a local image file:
### Option B: Import a local image file
```bash
spx admin images import --file ~/images/ubuntu-26.04.img --distro ubuntu --version 26.04 --arch x86_64 --boot-mode uefi
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ spx admin images import --file ~/images/ubuntu-26.04.img --distro ubuntu --versi
Verify the import and note the AMI ID:
```bash
aws ec2 describe-images
AMI_ID=$(aws ec2 describe-images --query 'Images[0].ImageId' --output text)
```
## 2. Create an SSH Key
@@ -115,8 +115,6 @@ aws ec2 describe-key-pairs
```bash
VPC_ID=$(aws ec2 create-vpc --cidr-block 10.200.0.0/16 \
--query 'Vpc.VpcId' --output text)
echo "VPC: $VPC_ID"
```
### Create an Internet Gateway
@@ -130,68 +128,95 @@ IGW_ID=$(aws ec2 create-internet-gateway \
aws ec2 attach-internet-gateway \
--internet-gateway-id $IGW_ID \
--vpc-id $VPC_ID
echo "IGW: $IGW_ID (attached to $VPC_ID)"
```
### Create a Public Subnet
### Create a Subnet
A public subnet auto-assigns a routable IP to each instance, making it directly reachable from your network.
Create the subnet your instances will launch into. The routing and public-IP steps below are what make it a *public* subnet.
```bash
SUBNET_ID=$(aws ec2 create-subnet \
--vpc-id $VPC_ID \
--cidr-block 10.200.1.0/24 \
--query 'Subnet.SubnetId' --output text)
```
# Enable auto-assign public IP
### Create a Route Table
A subnet is only **public** if its route table has a default route to the Internet Gateway. Spinifex does **not** add this route automatically — a new VPC's route table only routes traffic within the VPC (matching AWS). Without a `0.0.0.0/0` route to the IGW, instances in the subnet cannot reach the internet (and inbound connections cannot complete) even with a public IP assigned.
```bash
RT_ID=$(aws ec2 create-route-table \
--vpc-id $VPC_ID \
--query 'RouteTable.RouteTableId' --output text)
# Default route to the internet via the IGW
aws ec2 create-route \
--route-table-id $RT_ID \
--destination-cidr-block 0.0.0.0/0 \
--gateway-id $IGW_ID
# Associate the route table with the subnet
aws ec2 associate-route-table \
--route-table-id $RT_ID \
--subnet-id $SUBNET_ID
```
### Enable Auto-Assign Public IP
Give every instance launched into the subnet a routable public IP, making it directly reachable from your network.
```bash
aws ec2 modify-subnet-attribute \
--subnet-id $SUBNET_ID \
--map-public-ip-on-launch
echo "Subnet: $SUBNET_ID (public)"
```
### Allow SSH and ICMP
Every VPC gets a default security group that **blocks inbound traffic from outside the group** (matching AWS). Instances launched without an explicit security group use this default, so you must authorize ingress before you can SSH or ping the instance.
```bash
SG_ID=$(aws ec2 describe-security-groups \
--filters Name=vpc-id,Values=$VPC_ID \
--query 'SecurityGroups[0].GroupId' --output text)
# Allow SSH from anywhere
aws ec2 authorize-security-group-ingress \
--group-id $SG_ID \
--protocol tcp --port 22 --cidr 0.0.0.0/0
# Allow ICMP (ping) from anywhere
aws ec2 authorize-security-group-ingress \
--group-id $SG_ID \
--protocol icmp --port -1 --cidr 0.0.0.0/0
```
**Note:** `0.0.0.0/0` opens these ports to every source. For anything beyond a quick evaluation, scope the `--cidr` to a trusted range. Rule changes apply immediately — no instance restart needed.
### Verify
```bash
aws ec2 describe-vpcs --vpc-ids $VPC_ID
aws ec2 describe-subnets --subnet-ids $SUBNET_ID
aws ec2 describe-route-tables --route-table-ids $RT_ID
aws ec2 describe-security-groups --group-ids $SG_ID
```
## 4. Launch an Instance
Query available instance types for your hardware:
Launch an instance in the public subnet on a `t3.micro` (2 vCPU / 1 GiB).
> **Note:** On an **arm64** host, use `t4g.micro` instead of `t3.micro`.
```bash
aws ec2 describe-instance-types
```
Launch an instance in the public subnet, note this will select an instance type with 2 VCPU and 1024MB of memory.
> **Note:** Replace `AMI_NAME` with the previously imported image above with the `ami-` prefix.
```bash
AMI_NAME="ami-ubuntu-26.04-x86_64"
AMI_ID=$(aws ec2 describe-images \
--filters "Name=name,Values=$AMI_NAME" \
--query 'Images | sort_by(@, &CreationDate) | [-1].ImageId' \
--output text)
INSTANCE_TYPE=$(aws ec2 describe-instance-types \
--query "sort_by(InstanceTypes[?VCpuInfo.DefaultVCpus==\`2\` && MemoryInfo.SizeInMiB>=\`1024\`], &MemoryInfo.SizeInMiB)[0].InstanceType" \
--output text)
INSTANCE_ID=$(aws ec2 run-instances \
--image-id $AMI_ID \
--instance-type $INSTANCE_TYPE \
--instance-type t3.micro \
--key-name spinifex-key \
--subnet-id $SUBNET_ID \
--count 1 \
--query 'Instances[0].InstanceId' --output text)
echo "Instance: $INSTANCE_ID"
```
Wait for the instance to reach `running` state:
@@ -328,7 +353,36 @@ PRIVATE_SUBNET=$(aws ec2 create-subnet \
--query 'Subnet.SubnetId' --output text)
```
Instances in private subnets get a private IP only. They can still reach the internet via SNAT through the VPC router, but are not directly reachable from your network.
Instances in a private subnet get a private IP only and are not reachable from your network. By default they also have **no internet access**: with no `0.0.0.0/0` route in the subnet's route table, Spinifex gates egress with a drop policy — matching AWS, where a private subnet has no route off the VPC. They can still reach other instances in the same VPC.
To give a private subnet outbound-only internet access, deploy a NAT Gateway in a public subnet and point the private subnet's default route at it (the AWS pattern):
```bash
# Allocate an Elastic IP for the NAT Gateway
NAT_EIP=$(aws ec2 allocate-address --query AllocationId --output text)
# Create the NAT Gateway in the PUBLIC subnet (the one with the IGW route)
NATGW_ID=$(aws ec2 create-nat-gateway \
--subnet-id $SUBNET_ID \
--allocation-id $NAT_EIP \
--query 'NatGateway.NatGatewayId' --output text)
# Give the private subnet its own route table with a default route to the NAT Gateway
PRIVATE_RT=$(aws ec2 create-route-table \
--vpc-id $VPC_ID \
--query 'RouteTable.RouteTableId' --output text)
aws ec2 create-route \
--route-table-id $PRIVATE_RT \
--destination-cidr-block 0.0.0.0/0 \
--nat-gateway-id $NATGW_ID
aws ec2 associate-route-table \
--route-table-id $PRIVATE_RT \
--subnet-id $PRIVATE_SUBNET
```
Instances in the private subnet now reach the internet outbound through the NAT Gateway's public IP, but remain unreachable from the WAN.
### Multiple Accounts
@@ -348,7 +402,7 @@ journalctl -u spinifex-daemon -f
aws ec2 describe-images
```
### SSH Connection Refused
### SSH Connection Refused or Times Out
cloud-init needs 30-60 seconds after boot. Check instance state:
@@ -356,6 +410,20 @@ cloud-init needs 30-60 seconds after boot. Check instance state:
aws ec2 describe-instances --instance-ids $INSTANCE_ID
```
A connection that **times out** (rather than being refused) usually means the security group is blocking port 22. Confirm the default security group allows SSH ingress:
```bash
aws ec2 describe-security-groups --group-ids $SG_ID \
--query 'SecurityGroups[0].IpPermissions'
```
If there are no rules for TCP 22, authorize it (see [Allow SSH and ICMP](#allow-ssh-and-icmp)):
```bash
aws ec2 authorize-security-group-ingress \
--group-id $SG_ID --protocol tcp --port 22 --cidr 0.0.0.0/0
```
### No Public IP Assigned
Verify the subnet has `MapPublicIpOnLaunch` enabled:
@@ -378,7 +446,23 @@ aws ec2 describe-internet-gateways
### Instance Has No Internet Access
Check the VPC router's NAT rules (from the host):
First confirm the subnet's route table has a default route to the IGW. Spinifex gates a subnet's egress with a drop policy when this route is missing, so an instance with a public IP still cannot reach the internet:
```bash
aws ec2 describe-route-tables \
--filters Name=association.subnet-id,Values=$SUBNET_ID \
--query 'RouteTables[0].Routes'
# Expect a 0.0.0.0/0 route with a GatewayId of igw-...
```
If the route is missing, add it (see [Create a Route Table](#create-a-route-table)):
```bash
aws ec2 create-route --route-table-id $RT_ID \
--destination-cidr-block 0.0.0.0/0 --gateway-id $IGW_ID
```
If the route is present, check the VPC router's NAT rules (from the host):
```bash
sudo ovn-nbctl lr-nat-list $(sudo ovn-nbctl lr-list | awk '{print $2}' | head -1)
+2 -4
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@ For this tutorial download UTM.app on Mac to simplify the VM installation.
* UTM - [https://mac.getutm.app](https://mac.getutm.app)
## Download Debian ISO
Next, download the Debian ISO (ARM64, Apple Silicon)
@@ -28,7 +26,7 @@ Using the VM console, login using the `spinifex` user and your specified passwor
For a minimal Debian install additional dependencies are required prior to the Spinifex installation:
```
```bash
su root
apt update
apt install sudo curl bridge-utils
@@ -38,7 +36,7 @@ apt install sudo curl bridge-utils
Enable sudo for `spinifex` user as the root user:
```
```bash
su root
echo "spinifex ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL" > /etc/sudoers.d/spinifex
```
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
---
title: "Multi-Tenant AI on Supermicro H14 with AMD MI350X"
description: "Provision isolated GPU VMs for simultaneous AI workloads on a Supermicro H14 bare-metal node using Spinifex's EC2-compatible API."
category: "Reference Architectures"
tags:
- supermicro
- amd
- mi350x
- gpu-passthrough
- multi-tenant
- vllm
resources:
- title: "GPU Passthrough"
url: "/docs/gpu-passthrough"
- title: "Launching Instances"
url: "/docs/launching-instances"
- title: "AMD Instinct MI350X"
url: "https://www.amd.com/en/products/accelerators/instinct/mi300/mi350x.html"
- title: "vLLM Documentation"
url: "https://docs.vllm.ai"
sections:
- overview
- prerequisites
- instructions
---
## Overview
Spinifex is an open-source infrastructure platform that brings core AWS services including EC2, EBS and S3 to bare-metal, edge, and on-prem environments. It exposes an EC2-compatible API, so any tooling that works against AWS (the `aws` CLI, Terraform, SDKs) works against a Spinifex node unchanged, with a single profile swap.
This document serves as a tutorial for setting up multi-tenant AI workloads with Spinifex. The reference architecture for this tutorial is the Supermicro H14 platform - specifications listed below.
The H14 chassis comes equipped with **8× AMD Instinct MI350X** (288 GB HBM3e each, 2.3 TB total). We used Spinifex to provision three isolated VMs, each assigned 2× MI350X via direct PCIe passthrough, and ran three computationally intensive workloads simultaneously: a YOLO11x vision model, a Qwen3-VL 235B FP8 vision language model, and a Llama 3.3 70B large language model.
<p><video src="https://iso.mulgadc.com/clipped-demo.mp4" controls width="100%" style="border-radius:6px"></video></p>
### Platform
| Component | Specification |
|---|---|
| **Bare-metal host** | Supermicro H14 |
| **Host OS** | Ubuntu 24.04 LTS or Debian 13 (minimum) |
| **Orchestration** | Spinifex — EC2-compatible bare-metal API |
| **Guest OS** | Ubuntu 26.04 LTS |
| **GPUs** | 8× AMD Instinct MI350X (288 GB HBM3e each, 2.3 TB total) |
| **GPU passthrough** | PCIe passthrough via vfio-pci |
| **Instance type** | `g7e.12xlarge` — 2× MI350X per VM |
| **Container runtime** | Docker (with ROCm device access) |
| **Inference runtime** | vLLM (`rocm/vllm` image) |
| **VM network** | Internal VPC, 192.168.10.0/24 |
| **Block storage** | Viperblock — EBS-compatible, local NVMe-backed |
Spinifex runs on the bare-metal host and exposes an EC2-compatible API to any standard `aws ec2` tooling. Guest VMs receive their GPU allocation at the hardware level — each VM's OS sees the MI350Xs as native PCIe devices with no virtualisation layer in the data path. Workloads across VMs share no GPU memory, no address space, and no network segment except through the VPC.
GPU passthrough requires a host kernel and OS that supports vfio-pci. Ubuntu 24.04 LTS (kernel 6.8+) and Debian 13 (kernel 6.12+) are the tested minimum baselines for the host. Guest VMs run Ubuntu 26.04 LTS.
## Prerequisites
- Supermicro H14 with 8× AMD Instinct MI350X installed
- Host OS: **Ubuntu 24.04 LTS** (kernel 6.8+) or **Debian 13** (kernel 6.12+) — minimum for vfio-pci support
- Spinifex installed and all services running (`systemctl status spinifex.target`)
- AMD GPU AMI registered (`ami-ubuntu-amd-gpu`) — Ubuntu 26.04 LTS with ROCm-compatible kernel
- AWS CLI configured with `AWS_PROFILE=spinifex` pointing at the Spinifex endpoint
- SSH key pair imported into Spinifex, VPC and security group created (see [Launching Instances](/docs/launching-instances))
GPU passthrough must be configured before launching GPU instances. This is a one-time step per host.
```bash
# Detect GPUs and bind to vfio-pci (requires reboot)
sudo spx admin gpu setup
# After rebooting — confirm passthrough is active and signal the daemon
sudo spx admin gpu enable
```
`spx admin gpu setup` blacklists the AMD driver on the host and binds each GPU to `vfio-pci`. After reboot, `spx admin gpu enable` verifies the binding and makes the GPU pool available to `RunInstances`.
<img src="../../../.github/assets/images/gpu-enabled.png" alt="Spinifex console confirming PCIe passthrough is active for each GPU">
To check available GPU instance types:
```bash
export AWS_PROFILE=spinifex
aws ec2 describe-instance-types \
--query 'InstanceTypes[?GpuInfo].[InstanceType,GpuInfo.Gpus[0].Count,GpuInfo.Gpus[0].Name]' \
--output table
```
## Instructions
### 1. Provision the VMs
Each VM was provisioned using standard AWS EC2 CLI commands — the only change from a normal AWS workflow is `AWS_PROFILE=spinifex`, which redirects the CLI to Spinifex's local EC2-compatible endpoint instead of AWS:
| VM | Instance type | GPUs | Role | Model |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `vm-yolo` | g7e.12xlarge | 2× MI350X | Real-time object detection | YOLO11x |
| `vm-vlm` | g7e.12xlarge | 2× MI350X | Multi-modal scene analysis | Qwen3-VL 235B FP8 |
| `vm-chat` | g7e.12xlarge | 2× MI350X | Conversational LLM | Llama 3.3 70B |
Six of the eight available MI350Xs are claimed here; the remaining two stay idle on the host, available for a fourth tenant without touching the existing three.
```bash
export AWS_PROFILE=spinifex
# vm-yolo — YOLO11x object detection, 200 GB disk
YOLO_ID=$(aws ec2 run-instances \
--image-id ami-ubuntu-amd-gpu \
--instance-type g7e.12xlarge \
--key-name spinifex-key \
--subnet-id <subnet-id> \
--security-group-ids <sg-id> \
--block-device-mappings 'DeviceName=/dev/sda1,Ebs={VolumeSize=200,DeleteOnTermination=true}' \
--count 1 \
--query 'Instances[0].InstanceId' --output text)
echo "vm-yolo launched: $YOLO_ID"
# vm-vlm — Qwen3-VL 235B FP8, 600 GB disk for weights
VLM_ID=$(aws ec2 run-instances \
--image-id ami-ubuntu-amd-gpu \
--instance-type g7e.12xlarge \
--key-name spinifex-key \
--subnet-id <subnet-id> \
--security-group-ids <sg-id> \
--block-device-mappings 'DeviceName=/dev/sda1,Ebs={VolumeSize=600,DeleteOnTermination=true}' \
--count 1 \
--query 'Instances[0].InstanceId' --output text)
echo "vm-vlm launched: $VLM_ID"
# vm-chat — Llama 3.3 70B, 300 GB disk
CHAT_ID=$(aws ec2 run-instances \
--image-id ami-ubuntu-amd-gpu \
--instance-type g7e.12xlarge \
--key-name spinifex-key \
--subnet-id <subnet-id> \
--security-group-ids <sg-id> \
--block-device-mappings 'DeviceName=/dev/sda1,Ebs={VolumeSize=300,DeleteOnTermination=true}' \
--count 1 \
--query 'Instances[0].InstanceId' --output text)
echo "vm-chat launched: $CHAT_ID"
# Wait for all three to reach running state
for ID in "$YOLO_ID" "$VLM_ID" "$CHAT_ID"; do
aws ec2 wait instance-running --instance-ids "$ID"
echo "$ID is running"
done
# Retrieve IPs (Spinifex assigns addresses from the internal VPC)
YOLO_IP=$(aws ec2 describe-instances --instance-ids "$YOLO_ID" \
--query 'Reservations[0].Instances[0].PublicIpAddress' --output text)
VLM_IP=$(aws ec2 describe-instances --instance-ids "$VLM_ID" \
--query 'Reservations[0].Instances[0].PublicIpAddress' --output text)
CHAT_IP=$(aws ec2 describe-instances --instance-ids "$CHAT_ID" \
--query 'Reservations[0].Instances[0].PublicIpAddress' --output text)
echo "vm-yolo: $YOLO_IP"
echo "vm-vlm: $VLM_IP"
echo "vm-chat: $CHAT_IP"
```
### 2. Verify GPU access
Once SSH is available, confirm both GPUs are visible inside each VM:
```bash
ssh -i ~/.ssh/spinifex-key ubuntu@$CHAT_IP 'lspci | grep -i amd'
```
Or install and run `amd-smi`:
```bash
ssh -i ~/.ssh/spinifex-key ubuntu@$CHAT_IP \
'curl -fsSL https://repo.radeon.com/rocm/rocm.gpg.key | gpg --dearmor | sudo tee /etc/apt/keyrings/rocm.gpg >/dev/null && \
echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/etc/apt/keyrings/rocm.gpg] https://repo.radeon.com/rocm/apt/6.3 noble main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/rocm.list && \
sudo apt-get update -qq && sudo apt-get install -y -q amd-smi-lib && \
amd-smi list'
```
<img src="../../../.github/assets/images/2gpus.png" alt="amd-smi inside vm-chat confirming two MI350Xs are directly attached, each with a unique UUID">
Two MI350X entries with distinct UUIDs confirm direct PCIe passthrough is working.
### 3. The orchestration layer
Spinifex provides an EC2-compatible API on bare metal. The relevant capabilities for this demo:
- **Multi-GPU claim per VM.** Each `g7e.12xlarge` requires two PCIe addresses claimed as a unit. Spinifex queries the available GPU pool on the host and assigns them to the guest VM at creation time, rolling back if the full allocation cannot be satisfied.
- **PCIe passthrough via vfio-pci.** All 8 MI350Xs are bound to `vfio-pci` on the bare-metal host. Each VM gets its GPUs at the hardware level.
- **Internal VPC (192.168.10.0/24).** VMs communicate directly without traversing the host's public network.
The result: three completely independent EC2 instances, each running their own separate workloads using only the GPU resources they were allocated.
### 4. Test methodology
Two capture runs were made against the same workload script: **30 s baseline** (YOLO and VLM models running, no chat load) → **25 scripted Llama chat prompts** at 15 s intervals → **30 s settle tail**.
The only difference between the two runs was tensor parallelism:
- **Demo 1 (TP=1):** each VM uses one of its two allocated GPUs. The second sits idle.
- **Demo 2 (TP=2):** each VM shards its model symmetrically across both GPUs using AMD Infinity Fabric (XGMI).
| Metric | TP=1 baseline (Demo 1) | TP=2 (Demo 2) |
|---|---|---|
| Wall clock | 613 s | 600 s |
| YOLO avg fps | 16.91 (min 15.3 / max 18.0) | 17.09 (min 15.6 / max 18.1) |
| Qwen peak tok/s | 61.7 | 53.0 |
| Llama peak tok/s | 36.4 | **53.1** |
| Both GPUs active (chat VM) | no — GPU 1 idle | **yes — symmetric** |
| VRAM per GPU (Qwen) | 259 GB on one, 0.3 GB on other | 241 GB on **both** |
| VRAM per GPU (Llama) | 261 GB on one, 0.3 GB on other | 248 GB on **both** |
### 5. Results
### Inter-tenant isolation
The charts below show the three independent workloads spiking activity on their associated GPUs, measured in GFX utilisation and power draw. YOLO average FPS stays at ~17 despite utilisation in the YOLO VM never exceeding 20%, indicating a bottleneck in networking or encoding rather than inference. Each chart highlights workload independence — pulses of GPU activity share no correlation across VMs.
<img src="../../../.github/assets/images/smci/smci-demo1-gpu-utilisation.png" alt="GPU utilisation across all three VMs — Demo 1 TP=1">
GPU utilisation per VM across the full Demo 1 capture.
<img src="../../../.github/assets/images/smci/smci-demo2-gpu-power.png" alt="GPU power draw per workload — Demo 2 TP=2">
Power draw per VM during Demo 2.
### Single vs double GPU
When TP=2 is enabled, each VM shards its model symmetrically across both GPUs. Inside the chat VM, both GPUs pulse together on every request, each holding exactly **248 GB of VRAM** (weights split + KV cache shards). With TP=1, GPU 1 sat at 0% for the entire run.
<img src="../../../.github/assets/images/smci/smci-demo2-per-gpu-chat.png" alt="Llama 3.3 70B per-GPU activity — TP=2">
Per-GPU utilisation inside `vm-chat` with TP=2.
<img src="../../../.github/assets/images/smci/smci-demo1-per-gpu-chat.png" alt="Llama 3.3 70B per-GPU activity — TP=1">
Same VM with TP=1.
### vLLM generation throughput
With TP=1, Qwen peaks at ~60 tok/s and Llama caps around 35 tok/s — both compute-bound on a single MI350X. Enabling TP=2 lifts Llama's peak to ~50 tok/s (+47%) as generation is distributed symmetrically across both GPUs. Qwen's throughput is slightly lower under TP=2 due to collective overhead on the shared-memory transport.
<img src="../../../.github/assets/images/smci/smci-demo1-vllm-throughput.png" alt="vLLM generation throughput — TP=1">
Generation throughput during Demo 1 (TP=1).
<img src="../../../.github/assets/images/smci/smci-demo2-vllm-throughput.png" alt="vLLM generation throughput — TP=2">
Generation throughput during Demo 2 (TP=2).
### 6. Teardown
```bash
# Stop workloads on each VM
for IP in "$YOLO_IP" "$VLM_IP" "$CHAT_IP"; do
ssh -i ~/.ssh/spinifex-key ubuntu@$IP 'docker stop $(docker ps -q)' || true
done
# Terminate all three instances — releases 6× MI350X back to the Spinifex pool
aws ec2 terminate-instances --instance-ids "$YOLO_ID" "$VLM_ID" "$CHAT_ID"
```
The six MI350Xs are immediately returned to the pool once the instances terminate, ready for a new allocation without touching the host.
### 7. Conclusion
This tutorial demonstrates how Spinifex can turn a single bare-metal chassis into a multi-tenant AI serving platform. Spinifex utilises the flexibility of PCIe passthrough to allocate GPU resources in whichever configuration is required by the workload/s.
Importantly, it does so with standard `aws ec2` CLI calls — `run-instances`, `describe-instances`, `terminate-instances` — against Spinifex's EC2-compatible endpoint. Teams already operating AWS infrastructure can point their existing tooling at a Spinifex node with a single profile change, against GPUs that sit in their own rack.
@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
---
title: "Arcee Trinity 400B FP8 on AMD MI350X with Spinifex"
description: "Provision, load, and benchmark arcee-ai/Trinity-Large-Preview-FP8 across two AMD MI350X GPUs on a Supermicro H14 using Spinifex's EC2-compatible API."
category: "Reference Architectures"
tags:
- supermicro
- amd
- mi350x
- gpu-passthrough
- vllm
- llm
- arcee
resources:
- title: "GPU Passthrough"
url: "/docs/gpu-passthrough"
- title: "Launching Instances"
url: "/docs/launching-instances"
- title: "Arcee AI Trinity"
url: "https://www.arcee.ai/trinity"
- title: "Trinity on HuggingFace"
url: "https://huggingface.co/arcee-ai/Trinity-Large-Preview-FP8"
- title: "AMD Instinct MI350X"
url: "https://www.amd.com/en/products/accelerators/instinct/mi300/mi350x.html"
- title: "vLLM Documentation"
url: "https://docs.vllm.ai"
sections:
- overview
- prerequisites
- instructions
---
## Overview
Spinifex is an open-source infrastructure platform that brings core AWS services including EC2, EBS and S3 to bare-metal, edge, and on-prem environments. It exposes an EC2-compatible API, so any tooling that works against AWS (the `aws` CLI, Terraform, SDKs) works against a Spinifex node unchanged, with a single profile swap.
### About Trinity
[Trinity](https://www.arcee.ai/trinity) is a family of open-weight language models from [Arcee AI](https://www.arcee.ai), built specifically for production agentic workloads: reliable tool calling, structured JSON output, coherent multi-turn conversations, and long-context reasoning. The family spans four sizes — Nano (6B), Mini (26B), Large Preview (400B), and Large Thinking (400B reasoning-optimised), with consistent capabilities and API surface across all of them. A workflow validated on Nano can be promoted to Large with no prompt changes.
Trinity Large Preview is a **sparse Mixture-of-Experts (MoE)** model. The headline number is 400B total parameters, but only **13B parameters activate per token** — the MoE routing selects a subset of experts for each forward pass, so inference cost is closer to a much smaller dense model than the raw parameter count suggests. The result is a 400B-class model with a **512K token context window** that fits on two high-memory GPUs and generates at competitive throughput.
Arcee has trained Trinity with a heavy focus on agent reliability — function selection accuracy, valid parameter generation, graceful failure recovery, and schema adherence for structured outputs. It is available as open weights on HuggingFace and is natively compatible with vLLM, SGLang, and llama.cpp.
### This guide
This writeup covers running Trinity Large Preview FP8 on a Supermicro H14 bare-metal node via Spinifex — our EC2-compatible orchestration layer. Two AMD Instinct MI350X GPUs (288 GB HBM3e each, 576 GB combined) provide just enough headroom for the FP8 weights plus active KV cache, provisioned and managed with standard `aws ec2` CLI commands.
At that scale the FP8 weights require around 400 GB of GPU memory — more than a single MI350X can hold. This guide covers splitting the model symmetrically across two MI350Xs using vLLM tensor parallelism (TP=2), running on a `g7e.12xlarge` instance provisioned via Spinifex on the H14.
The complete stack:
| Layer | Detail |
|---|---|
| Bare-metal host | Supermicro H14, 8× AMD Instinct MI350X |
| Orchestration | Spinifex (EC2-compatible API) |
| Instance type | `g7e.12xlarge` — 2× MI350X via PCIe passthrough |
| Disk | 800 GB (model weights alone are ~400 GB) |
| Inference runtime | vLLM (`rocm/vllm` Docker image) |
| Tensor parallelism | TP=2 — model sharded symmetrically across GPU 0 and GPU 1 |
| Model | `arcee-ai/Trinity-Large-Preview-FP8` |
### Platform
| Component | Specification |
|---|---|
| **Bare-metal host** | Supermicro H14 |
| **Host OS** | Ubuntu 24.04 LTS or Debian 13 (minimum) |
| **Orchestration** | Spinifex — EC2-compatible bare-metal API |
| **Guest OS** | Ubuntu 26.04 LTS |
| **GPUs** | 2× AMD Instinct MI350X (288 GB HBM3e each, 576 GB combined) |
| **GPU passthrough** | PCIe passthrough via vfio-pci |
| **Instance type** | `g7e.12xlarge` |
| **Container runtime** | Docker (with ROCm device access) |
| **Inference runtime** | vLLM (`rocm/vllm` image), tensor parallelism TP=2 |
| **Block storage** | Viperblock — EBS-compatible, 800 GB |
| **Model** | `arcee-ai/Trinity-Large-Preview-FP8` (400B MoE, ~13B active/token) |
Spinifex runs on the bare-metal host and presents an EC2-compatible API endpoint. Launching a `g7e.12xlarge` atomically claims two MI350Xs from the host's GPU pool and binds them to the guest VM via PCIe passthrough — the guest OS communicates with the hardware directly, with no software virtualisation layer in the data path. When the instance terminates, those two GPUs are immediately returned to the pool.
GPU passthrough requires a host kernel and OS that supports vfio-pci. Ubuntu 24.04 LTS (kernel 6.8+) and Debian 13 (kernel 6.12+) are the tested minimum baselines for the host. Guest VMs run Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, which ships with the ROCm-compatible kernel and userspace expected by the AMD GPU AMI.
## Prerequisites
- Supermicro H14 with at least 2× AMD Instinct MI350X installed
- Host OS: **Ubuntu 24.04 LTS** (kernel 6.8+) or **Debian 13** (kernel 6.12+) — minimum for vfio-pci support
- Spinifex installed and all services running (`systemctl status spinifex.target`)
- GPU passthrough configured — `spx admin gpu setup` (reboot required) then `spx admin gpu enable`
- AMD GPU AMI registered (`ami-ubuntu-amd-gpu`) — Ubuntu 26.04 LTS with ROCm-compatible kernel
- AWS CLI configured with `AWS_PROFILE=spinifex` pointing at the Spinifex endpoint
- SSH key pair imported, VPC and security group created (see [Launching Instances](/docs/launching-instances))
- Docker installed in the guest VM (included in the AMD GPU AMI)
- HuggingFace account with access to `arcee-ai/Trinity-Large-Preview-FP8`
GPU passthrough must be configured before launching GPU instances:
```bash
sudo spx admin gpu setup # binds GPUs to vfio-pci — requires reboot
# ... reboot ...
sudo spx admin gpu enable # confirms passthrough and makes GPU pool available
```
## Instructions
### 1. Provision the instance
Spinifex exposes a standard EC2 API on the bare-metal host. The only difference from a real AWS workflow is `AWS_PROFILE=spinifex`.
```bash
export AWS_PROFILE=spinifex
# Check available GPU instance types
aws ec2 describe-instance-types \
--query 'InstanceTypes[?GpuInfo].[InstanceType,GpuInfo.Gpus[0].Count,GpuInfo.Gpus[0].Name]' \
--output table
# Launch a g7e.12xlarge with 800 GB disk
# Spinifex atomically claims 2× MI350X via PCIe passthrough for this instance type
INSTANCE_ID=$(aws ec2 run-instances \
--image-id ami-ubuntu-amd-gpu \
--instance-type g7e.12xlarge \
--key-name spinifex-key \
--subnet-id <subnet-id> \
--security-group-ids <sg-id> \
--block-device-mappings 'DeviceName=/dev/sda1,Ebs={VolumeSize=800,DeleteOnTermination=true}' \
--count 1 \
--query 'Instances[0].InstanceId' --output text)
echo "Launched: $INSTANCE_ID"
# Wait for running state
aws ec2 wait instance-running --instance-ids "$INSTANCE_ID"
# Get the IP
INSTANCE_IP=$(aws ec2 describe-instances \
--instance-ids "$INSTANCE_ID" \
--query 'Reservations[0].Instances[0].PublicIpAddress' --output text)
echo "IP: $INSTANCE_IP"
```
Once SSH is available, confirm both GPUs are visible:
```bash
ssh -i ~/.ssh/spinifex-key ubuntu@$INSTANCE_IP 'lspci | grep -i amd'
```
Or install and run `amd-smi` on the instance:
<img src="../../../.github/assets/images/2gpus.png" alt="amd-smi inside the guest VM confirming two MI350Xs are directly attached, each with a unique UUID">
Two MI350X entries with distinct UUIDs confirm direct PCIe passthrough.
### 2. Pull the vLLM Docker image
```bash
ssh -i ~/.ssh/spinifex-key ubuntu@$INSTANCE_IP
# On the VM:
docker pull rocm/vllm:latest
```
> The `rocm/vllm` image is large (~20 GB). Pull it while the model is downloading in parallel if bandwidth allows.
### 3. Pull the model
Trinity Large Preview FP8 weighs roughly 400 GB, so expect the model download to take some time.
```bash
# On the VM:
pip install 'huggingface-hub[hf_xet]'
hf download 'arcee-ai/Trinity-Large-Preview-FP8' --repo-type model
# Monitor progress — looking for ~400 GB total
du -sh ~/.cache/huggingface/hub/
```
The model lands in `~/.cache/huggingface/hub/`. vLLM picks it up automatically from there on serve.
### 4. Run vLLM
Trinity needs TP=2 to fit across both MI350Xs:
```bash
# On the VM:
docker run --rm -d \
--name trinity \
--device /dev/kfd \
--device /dev/dri \
--group-add video \
--ipc host \
--network host \
-v ~/.cache/huggingface:/root/.cache/huggingface \
rocm/vllm:latest \
vllm serve arcee-ai/Trinity-Large-Preview-FP8 \
--tensor-parallel-size 2 \
--dtype auto \
--max-model-len 8192 \
--gpu-memory-utilization 0.90 \
--host 0.0.0.0 \
--port 8003
```
Watch the startup log:
```bash
docker logs -f trinity
```
Loading a 400B FP8 model across two GPUs takes **2–4 minutes**. Wait for:
```
INFO: Application startup complete.
```
Then verify:
```bash
curl http://localhost:8003/health
curl http://localhost:8003/v1/models | python3 -m json.tool
```
### 5. Test it
A quick sanity check via the OpenAI-compatible API before running benchmarks:
```bash
curl http://localhost:8003/v1/chat/completions \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"model": "arcee-ai/Trinity-Large-Preview-FP8",
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Explain tensor parallelism in three sentences."}],
"max_tokens": 256
}'
```
The first request will be slowest — KV cache is cold. Subsequent requests warm up noticeably.
### 6. Dashboard
We created a quick dashboard for a live view of the model's telemetry — throughput, latency, GPU utilisation, VRAM, and KV cache — streamed via SSE from the vLLM metrics endpoint and the GPU stats sidecar.
<p><video src="https://iso.mulgadc.com/trinity-workload.mp4" controls width="100%" style="border-radius:6px"></video></p>
### 7. Benchmark results
Two captures were run against the live model:
- **Chat session:** A short interactive session — low concurrency, variable cadence, 56 s total. Reflects real conversational use.
- **Scripted benchmark:** 5-minute sustained load driver — rotating batch of 15 long-form technical prompts at 1.5 s cadence. Reflects peak throughput.
| Metric | Chat session | Benchmark (5 min) |
|---|---|---|
| Peak tok/s | 67.1 | 67.0 |
| Avg tok/s (under load) | 18.7 | **52.9** |
| Avg TTFT | 1668 ms | 758 ms |
| Min TTFT | 1502 ms | 538 ms |
| Max TTFT | 1871 ms | 1165 ms |
| GPU 0 util (avg) | 30.2% | 88.8% |
| GPU 1 util (avg) | 30.1% | 88.7% |
| VRAM per GPU | 259.6 GB | 259.6 GB |
| Avg power (both GPUs) | 664 W | 788 W |
| Peak power | 828 W | 839 W |
| GPU temp | 65 °C | 65 °C |
The lower avg utilisation in the chat session reflects idle gaps between conversational turns; peak throughput is identical at ~67 tok/s in both runs, indicating the hardware ceiling rather than a software one.
### Generation throughput
<img src="../../../.github/assets/images/trinity/trinity-throughput.png" alt="Trinity generation throughput — scripted benchmark">
Generation and prompt-ingest tok/s over the 5-minute benchmark. The model sustains ~53 tok/s average at continuous load, peaking at 67 tok/s.
### Per-GPU compute utilisation
<img src="../../../.github/assets/images/trinity/trinity-per-gpu-util.png" alt="Trinity per-GPU utilisation — scripted benchmark">
GPU 0 and GPU 1 track each other closely throughout the benchmark — TP=2 distributes attention and FFN layers symmetrically across both MI350Xs.
### Per-GPU VRAM
<img src="../../../.github/assets/images/trinity/trinity-per-gpu-vram.png" alt="Trinity per-GPU VRAM — scripted benchmark">
Both GPUs hold 259.6 GB — model weights sharded evenly, plus KV cache. 90.2% of HBM3e is occupied at rest, leaving ~26 GB headroom per GPU for active KV cache during generation.
### Per-GPU power
<img src="../../../.github/assets/images/trinity/trinity-per-gpu-power.png" alt="Trinity per-GPU power — scripted benchmark">
Power draw during active generation peaks at ~420 W per GPU, for a combined chassis draw well under the MI350X's 750 W TDP per card. Idle between prompts returns to ~300 W.
### Latency
<img src="../../../.github/assets/images/trinity/trinity-latency.png" alt="Trinity latency — scripted benchmark">
Cumulative average TTFT and E2E latency over the benchmark. TTFT settles to ~758 ms avg once the KV cache is warm; E2E tracks request length as expected.
### KV cache utilisation
<img src="../../../.github/assets/images/trinity/trinity-kv-cache.png" alt="Trinity KV cache utilisation — scripted benchmark">
KV cache occupancy rises as requests pile up during the sustained load phase. The queue depth stays near zero — the model keeps pace with the 1.5 s prompt cadence.
### 8. Teardown
```bash
# Stop the container
ssh -i ~/.ssh/spinifex-key ubuntu@$INSTANCE_IP 'docker stop trinity'
# Terminate the instance — releases the 2× MI350X back to the Spinifex pool
aws ec2 terminate-instances --instance-ids "$INSTANCE_ID"
```
The two MI350Xs are immediately available to Spinifex for a new workload once the instance terminates.
### 9. Conclusion
Trinity Large Preview demonstrates that frontier-class open-weight models are now within reach of a two-GPU bare-metal setup. The MoE architecture is crucial: 400B total parameters with only 13B active per token means the model generates at ~53 tok/s sustained and peaks at 67 tok/s on a pair of MI350Xs — throughput that would be difficult to match with a dense model of comparable quality at that memory footprint.
Combining this with Spinifex as the infrastructure layer allows teams to own the entire workflow. Provisioning a `g7e.12xlarge` instance, pulling a 400 GB model, and serving it through vLLM took a handful of standard `aws ec2` commands and a single `docker run`. The same workflow runs identically on any Spinifex-managed bare-metal node, with the GPUs returned to the pool when instances terminate.
For teams evaluating Trinity for production agentic workloads — tool calling, structured outputs, long-context reasoning — this represents a credible self-hosted deployment path: open weights, Apache 2.0 license, owned hardware and familiar tooling.
+23 -1
View File
@@ -30,10 +30,12 @@ services:
publishes:
- "ec2.*"
- "elbv2.*"
- "acm.*"
- "iam.*"
depends_on:
- "ec2.*"
- "elbv2.*"
- "acm.*"
- "iam.*"
spinifex_daemon:
@@ -50,6 +52,7 @@ services:
- spinifex/daemon
- spinifex/handlers/ec2
- spinifex/handlers/elbv2
- spinifex/handlers/acm
- spinifex/handlers/iam
subscribes:
# EC2 instance lifecycle.
@@ -81,6 +84,12 @@ services:
- "spinifex.node.vms"
- "spinifex.nodes.discover"
- "spinifex.cluster.shutdown.progress"
# Coordinated cluster-shutdown phases (fan-out, no queue group).
- "spinifex.cluster.shutdown.gate"
- "spinifex.cluster.shutdown.drain"
- "spinifex.cluster.shutdown.storage"
- "spinifex.cluster.shutdown.persist"
- "spinifex.cluster.shutdown.infra"
- "spinifex.storage.config"
# ELBv2 control plane (handlers/elbv2/service_nats.go topic map).
- "elbv2.CreateLoadBalancer"
@@ -95,6 +104,15 @@ services:
- "elbv2.CreateListener"
- "elbv2.DeleteListener"
- "elbv2.DescribeListeners"
# ACM-alike certificate store (handlers/acm/service_nats.go topic map).
- "acm.ImportCertificate"
- "acm.DescribeCertificate"
- "acm.ListCertificates"
- "acm.DeleteCertificate"
- "elbv2.AddListenerCertificates"
- "elbv2.RemoveListenerCertificates"
- "elbv2.DescribeListenerCertificates"
- "elbv2.DescribeSSLPolicies"
publishes:
# → vpcd
- "vpc.create"
@@ -121,6 +139,8 @@ services:
- "ebs.delete"
- "ebs.sync"
- "ebs.snapshot.*"
- "ebs.config"
- "ebs.config.*"
# → predastore (S3 / AMI / keypair store)
- "s3.*"
# IAM lifecycle event
@@ -131,7 +151,7 @@ services:
- "s3.*"
vpcd:
path: spinifex/services/vpcd
path: spinifex/vpcd
# OVN-backed VPC / subnet / SG / NAT / IGW data plane.
subscribes:
- "vpc.create"
@@ -169,6 +189,8 @@ services:
- "ebs.delete"
- "ebs.sync"
- "ebs.snapshot.*"
- "ebs.config"
- "ebs.config.*"
publishes:
- "ebs.mount.response"
- "ebs.unmount.response"
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
---
title: "EKS with Addons + Access-Entry RBAC"
description: "Extend a single-node EKS cluster with a managed CoreDNS addon, access-entry RBAC, and a browsable load-balanced demo app, using Terraform on Spinifex."
category: "Terraform Workbooks"
tags:
- terraform
- eks
- kubernetes
- addons
- rbac
- iam
- workbook
resources:
- title: "Terraform AWS Provider"
url: "https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/aws/latest"
- title: "Terraform Kubernetes Provider"
url: "https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/kubernetes/latest"
- title: "Spinifex Repository"
url: "https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex"
- title: "OpenTofu"
url: "https://opentofu.org/"
---
# Terraform: EKS with Addons + Access-Entry RBAC
> Builds on the quickstart by installing a managed addon (CoreDNS) and granting a second IAM principal read-only cluster access — then deploys the same browsable, load-balanced demo app so you can see the result.
## Table of Contents
- [Overview](#overview)
- [Instructions](#instructions)
- [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting)
---
## Overview
This workbook takes the same single-node cluster (and the same browsable demo app) from [EKS Quickstart](../eks-quickstart) and adds the two things you reach for on almost any real cluster:
1. **A managed addon.** CoreDNS is installed through the EKS API (`aws_eks_addon`) rather than `kubectl apply`, so its lifecycle is managed by the cluster. The demo app is deployed *after* CoreDNS, so a healthy page also confirms in-cluster DNS is working.
2. **Access-entry RBAC.** A second IAM role is granted read-only access via an `aws_eks_access_entry` plus an `aws_eks_access_policy_association` bound to the AWS-managed `AmazonEKSViewPolicy`. This is the modern access-entry path (`authentication_mode = "API"`) — no `aws-auth` ConfigMap.
When `apply` finishes, open the **`demo_url`** output and refresh — the `nginxdemos/hello` page reports which pod served each request.
**What you'll learn:**
- Installing a managed EKS addon with `aws_eks_addon`
- Registering an IAM principal with `aws_eks_access_entry` and scoping it with `aws_eks_access_policy_association`
- The difference between the cluster creator's admin access and a scoped viewer
- Deploying a workload with the Kubernetes provider once the addon is healthy
**What gets created**
| Resource | Name | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| VPC | `eks-addons-vpc` | Isolated network (10.31.0.0/16) |
| Subnets | `eks-addons-subnet-a/-b` | Public subnets for the cluster and worker |
| Internet Gateway | `eks-addons-igw` | Egress so the worker can pull the demo image |
| IAM Roles | `eks-addons-cluster-role`, `eks-addons-node-role` | Control-plane and worker roles |
| IAM Role | `eks-addons-viewer` | Stand-in principal granted read-only access |
| EKS Cluster | `eks-addons` | Public endpoint, API auth mode |
| Node Group | `default` | One `t3.medium` worker |
| Addon | `coredns` | Cluster DNS, managed via the EKS API |
| Access Entry + Assoc. | `eks-addons-viewer` → `AmazonEKSViewPolicy` | Read-only, cluster scope |
| SG Ingress Rule | `eks-addons-demo-nodeport` | Opens the demo NodePort on the worker SG |
| K8s Deployment + Service | `hello` | `nginxdemos/hello`, 2 replicas, NodePort |
**Spinifex specifics**
- Addon catalog is limited. Spinifex currently serves `coredns`, `aws-load-balancer-controller` and `spinifex-noop`. There is no `vpc-cni`, `kube-proxy`, `ebs-csi` or `metrics-server`.
- **Leave `addon_version` unset.** Spinifex defaults an unset version to its catalog default (`coredns` 1.11.1). Pinning is a dead end: the AWS provider rejects a bare `1.11.1` (it requires the `v`-prefixed `v1.11.1-eksbuild.N` form), while Spinifex's catalog only accepts the bare `1.11.1` — so no single string satisfies both.
- Cluster access policies are the four AWS-managed `cluster-access-policy/Amazon EKS{ClusterAdmin,Admin,Edit,View}Policy` ARNs.
- The worker SG is auto-managed and the worker AMI is always the `eks-node` image; the NodePort is exposed by adding one rule to the looked-up worker SG.
**Prerequisites:**
- Spinifex installed and running
- The Spinifex `eks-node` image available on the cluster
- OpenTofu or Terraform, plus `kubectl` and the AWS CLI
## Instructions
### Step 1. Get the Template
```bash
git clone --depth 1 --filter=blob:none --sparse https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex.git spinifex-tf
cd spinifex-tf
git sparse-checkout set docs/terraform-workbooks
cd docs/terraform-workbooks/eks-addons-access
```
Or create a `main.tf` file and paste the full configuration below.
<!-- INCLUDE: main.tf lang:hcl -->
### Step 2. Deploy
```bash
export AWS_PROFILE=spinifex
tofu init
tofu apply
```
Allow a few minutes for the cluster to reach `ACTIVE` and the worker to register. CoreDNS installs onto the worker, then Terraform deploys the demo app.
> Keep `AWS_PROFILE=spinifex` exported for the whole `apply` — the Kubernetes provider runs `aws eks get-token` against the Spinifex STS endpoint.
### Step 3. Open the Demo
```bash
tofu output demo_url
```
Open it in a browser and refresh — the `nginxdemos/hello` page shows the pod that answered, alternating between the two replicas.
### Step 4. Verify the Addon and Access Entry
```bash
aws eks list-addons --cluster-name eks-addons
aws eks describe-addon --cluster-name eks-addons --addon-name coredns --query 'addon.status'
aws eks list-access-entries --cluster-name eks-addons
aws eks list-associated-access-policies \
--cluster-name eks-addons \
--principal-arn "$(tofu output -raw viewer_principal_arn)"
```
The viewer principal is bound to `AmazonEKSViewPolicy` at cluster scope — it can read across the cluster but cannot mutate anything. The principal that ran `apply` keeps full cluster-admin from `bootstrap_cluster_creator_admin_permissions`.
### Cleanup
```bash
tofu destroy
```
## Troubleshooting
### Demo URL Doesn't Load
Same chain as the quickstart — check the worker's public IP, that the demo pods are `Running`, and that the NodePort rule landed on the worker SG:
```bash
kubectl get pods -o wide
aws ec2 describe-security-groups --filters "Name=group-name,Values=eks-cluster-eks-addons-nodegroup-sg" \
--query 'SecurityGroups[0].IpPermissions'
```
If the demo pods are stuck `ContainerCreating` with DNS errors, confirm CoreDNS is healthy first:
```bash
kubectl -n kube-system get deploy coredns
```
### Addon Stuck in CREATING / DEGRADED
CoreDNS needs a schedulable worker. Confirm the node group is `ACTIVE` and the node is `Ready`:
```bash
aws eks describe-nodegroup --cluster-name eks-addons --nodegroup-name default --query 'nodegroup.status'
kubectl get nodes
```
### Addon Version Rejected
This workbook leaves `addon_version` unset so Spinifex picks its catalog default. If you add an explicit `addon_version`, expect a wall: the AWS provider requires the `v`-prefixed `v1.11.1-eksbuild.N` form, but Spinifex's catalog only knows the bare `1.11.1` — a value that passes one is rejected by the other. Prefer omitting the field.
### Access Entry Not Taking Effect
Assume the viewer role and confirm it can read but not write:
```bash
kubectl auth can-i list pods --all-namespaces # yes
kubectl auth can-i create deployments # no
```
### Provider Connection Refused
```bash
sudo systemctl status spinifex.target
curl -k https://localhost:9999/
```
@@ -0,0 +1,468 @@
# Example: EKS with an Addon + Access-Entry RBAC (with a visible demo app)
#
# Builds on eks-quickstart: same single-worker cluster and browsable demo app,
# but adds two things you reach for on a real cluster:
#
# * a managed addon (CoreDNS) installed through the EKS API, and
# * a second IAM principal granted scoped, read-only access via an EKS access
# entry + access-policy association (authentication_mode = "API").
#
# After `apply`, open the demo_url output — the page reports the pod that
# served it, so a refresh shows requests landing on different replicas. CoreDNS
# being healthy is what lets in-cluster name resolution work.
#
# Usage:
# cd spinifex/docs/terraform-workbooks/eks-addons-access
# export AWS_PROFILE=spinifex
# tofu init && tofu apply
# # then open the demo_url output
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.6.0"
required_providers {
aws = {
source = "hashicorp/aws"
version = ">= 5.40, < 6.0"
}
kubernetes = {
source = "hashicorp/kubernetes"
version = ">= 2.20"
}
}
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Variables
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
variable "region" {
type = string
default = "ap-southeast-2"
}
variable "cluster_name" {
type = string
default = "eks-addons"
}
variable "k8s_version" {
type = string
default = "1.32"
}
variable "instance_type" {
type = string
default = "t3.medium"
}
variable "node_port" {
type = number
default = 30080
}
variable "replicas" {
type = number
default = 2
}
variable "browse_cidr" {
type = string
default = "0.0.0.0/0"
description = "CIDR allowed to reach the demo NodePort; tighten to your own IP in production"
}
variable "spinifex_endpoint" {
type = string
default = "https://127.0.0.1:9999"
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Providers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
provider "aws" {
region = var.region
endpoints {
ec2 = var.spinifex_endpoint
iam = var.spinifex_endpoint
sts = var.spinifex_endpoint
eks = var.spinifex_endpoint
}
skip_credentials_validation = true
skip_metadata_api_check = true
skip_requesting_account_id = true
skip_region_validation = true
}
provider "kubernetes" {
host = aws_eks_cluster.this.endpoint
cluster_ca_certificate = base64decode(aws_eks_cluster.this.certificate_authority[0].data)
exec {
api_version = "client.authentication.k8s.io/v1beta1"
command = "aws"
args = ["eks", "get-token", "--cluster-name", aws_eks_cluster.this.name, "--region", var.region]
}
}
data "aws_availability_zones" "available" {
state = "available"
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# VPC + two public subnets
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_vpc" "main" {
cidr_block = "10.31.0.0/16"
enable_dns_hostnames = true
enable_dns_support = true
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-vpc"
}
}
resource "aws_internet_gateway" "igw" {
vpc_id = aws_vpc.main.id
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-igw"
}
}
resource "aws_subnet" "a" {
vpc_id = aws_vpc.main.id
cidr_block = "10.31.1.0/24"
availability_zone = data.aws_availability_zones.available.names[0]
map_public_ip_on_launch = true
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-subnet-a"
}
}
resource "aws_subnet" "b" {
vpc_id = aws_vpc.main.id
cidr_block = "10.31.2.0/24"
availability_zone = data.aws_availability_zones.available.names[0]
map_public_ip_on_launch = true
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-subnet-b"
}
}
resource "aws_route_table" "public" {
vpc_id = aws_vpc.main.id
route {
cidr_block = "0.0.0.0/0"
gateway_id = aws_internet_gateway.igw.id
}
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-public-rt"
}
}
resource "aws_route_table_association" "a" {
subnet_id = aws_subnet.a.id
route_table_id = aws_route_table.public.id
}
resource "aws_route_table_association" "b" {
subnet_id = aws_subnet.b.id
route_table_id = aws_route_table.public.id
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# IAM — cluster role
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_iam_role" "cluster" {
name = "${var.cluster_name}-cluster-role"
assume_role_policy = jsonencode({
Version = "2012-10-17"
Statement = [{
Effect = "Allow"
Action = "sts:AssumeRole"
Principal = { Service = "eks.amazonaws.com" }
}]
})
}
resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "cluster" {
role = aws_iam_role.cluster.name
policy_arn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonEKSClusterPolicy"
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# IAM — node role
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_iam_role" "node" {
name = "${var.cluster_name}-node-role"
assume_role_policy = jsonencode({
Version = "2012-10-17"
Statement = [{
Effect = "Allow"
Action = "sts:AssumeRole"
Principal = { Service = "ec2.amazonaws.com" }
}]
})
}
resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "node_worker" {
role = aws_iam_role.node.name
policy_arn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonEKSWorkerNodePolicy"
}
resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "node_cni" {
role = aws_iam_role.node.name
policy_arn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonEKS_CNI_Policy"
}
resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "node_ecr" {
role = aws_iam_role.node.name
policy_arn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonEC2ContainerRegistryReadOnly"
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# IAM — a second principal to grant read-only cluster access to
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_iam_role" "viewer" {
name = "${var.cluster_name}-viewer"
assume_role_policy = jsonencode({
Version = "2012-10-17"
Statement = [{
Effect = "Allow"
Action = "sts:AssumeRole"
Principal = { Service = "ec2.amazonaws.com" }
}]
})
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# EKS cluster
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_eks_cluster" "this" {
name = var.cluster_name
role_arn = aws_iam_role.cluster.arn
version = var.k8s_version
vpc_config {
subnet_ids = [aws_subnet.a.id, aws_subnet.b.id]
endpoint_public_access = true
endpoint_private_access = false
}
access_config {
authentication_mode = "API"
bootstrap_cluster_creator_admin_permissions = true
}
depends_on = [aws_iam_role_policy_attachment.cluster]
tags = {
Name = var.cluster_name
}
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Node group
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_eks_node_group" "default" {
cluster_name = aws_eks_cluster.this.name
node_group_name = "default"
node_role_arn = aws_iam_role.node.arn
subnet_ids = [aws_subnet.a.id, aws_subnet.b.id]
scaling_config {
desired_size = 1
min_size = 1
max_size = 2
}
instance_types = [var.instance_type]
ami_type = "AL2_x86_64"
depends_on = [
aws_iam_role_policy_attachment.node_worker,
aws_iam_role_policy_attachment.node_cni,
aws_iam_role_policy_attachment.node_ecr,
]
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-default"
}
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Addon — CoreDNS
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_eks_addon" "coredns" {
cluster_name = aws_eks_cluster.this.name
addon_name = "coredns"
resolve_conflicts_on_create = "OVERWRITE"
# addon_version omitted on purpose. Spinifex defaults an unset version to its
# catalog default (coredns 1.11.1). The AWS provider rejects a bare "1.11.1"
# (it demands a v-prefixed form) which Spinifex's catalog would in turn
# reject — so pinning is a dead end here; let the server choose.
depends_on = [aws_eks_node_group.default]
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-coredns"
}
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Access entry — grant the viewer principal read-only access
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_eks_access_entry" "viewer" {
cluster_name = aws_eks_cluster.this.name
principal_arn = aws_iam_role.viewer.arn
type = "STANDARD"
}
resource "aws_eks_access_policy_association" "viewer" {
cluster_name = aws_eks_cluster.this.name
principal_arn = aws_iam_role.viewer.arn
policy_arn = "arn:aws:eks::aws:cluster-access-policy/AmazonEKSViewPolicy"
access_scope {
type = "cluster"
}
depends_on = [aws_eks_access_entry.viewer]
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Open the NodePort on the auto-managed nodegroup SG (see eks-quickstart)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
data "aws_security_group" "nodegroup" {
filter {
name = "group-name"
values = ["eks-cluster-${var.cluster_name}-nodegroup-sg"]
}
filter {
name = "vpc-id"
values = [aws_vpc.main.id]
}
depends_on = [aws_eks_node_group.default]
}
resource "aws_vpc_security_group_ingress_rule" "nodeport" {
security_group_id = data.aws_security_group.nodegroup.id
cidr_ipv4 = var.browse_cidr
from_port = var.node_port
to_port = var.node_port
ip_protocol = "tcp"
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-demo-nodeport"
}
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Demo workload — deployed after CoreDNS so name resolution is up
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "kubernetes_deployment_v1" "hello" {
metadata {
name = "hello"
namespace = "default"
labels = { app = "hello" }
}
spec {
replicas = var.replicas
selector {
match_labels = { app = "hello" }
}
template {
metadata {
labels = { app = "hello" }
}
spec {
container {
name = "hello"
image = "nginxdemos/hello"
port {
container_port = 80
}
}
}
}
}
depends_on = [aws_eks_addon.coredns]
}
resource "kubernetes_service_v1" "hello" {
metadata {
name = "hello"
namespace = "default"
}
spec {
selector = { app = "hello" }
type = "NodePort"
port {
port = 80
target_port = 80
node_port = var.node_port
}
}
depends_on = [kubernetes_deployment_v1.hello]
}
data "aws_instances" "workers" {
instance_tags = {
"spinifex:eks-cluster" = aws_eks_cluster.this.name
}
depends_on = [aws_eks_node_group.default]
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Outputs
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
output "cluster_name" {
value = aws_eks_cluster.this.name
}
output "viewer_principal_arn" {
value = aws_iam_role.viewer.arn
}
output "demo_url" {
value = "http://${data.aws_instances.workers.public_ips[0]}:${var.node_port}"
description = "Open in a browser; refresh to see different pods answer"
}
output "update_kubeconfig" {
value = "aws eks update-kubeconfig --name ${aws_eks_cluster.this.name} --region ${var.region}"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
---
title: "3-Node EKS behind an HTTPS ALB (ACM TLS)"
description: "Provision an HA-shaped EKS cluster with public + private API endpoints and three workers, deploy a demo app, and publish it through an internet-facing ALB that terminates TLS with an ACM-imported certificate, using Terraform on Spinifex."
category: "Terraform Workbooks"
tags:
- terraform
- eks
- kubernetes
- acm
- tls
- alb
- elbv2
- vpc
- workbook
resources:
- title: "Terraform AWS Provider"
url: "https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/aws/latest"
- title: "Terraform Kubernetes Provider"
url: "https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/kubernetes/latest"
- title: "Spinifex Repository"
url: "https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex"
- title: "OpenTofu"
url: "https://opentofu.org/"
---
# Terraform: 3-Node EKS behind an HTTPS ALB
> The largest EKS workbook, and the clearest demo. An HA-shaped cluster with public + private API endpoints and three workers, running a demo app published over HTTPS through an internet-facing ALB that terminates TLS with an ACM-imported certificate.
## Table of Contents
- [Overview](#overview)
- [Instructions](#instructions)
- [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting)
---
## Overview
This workbook is sized for a **3-node Spinifex deployment** and is built to show off. It brings together the pieces from the smaller EKS examples, deploys a demo app across three workers, and fronts it with a TLS-terminating load balancer. When `apply` finishes, fetch the ALB's public IP and open `https://<ip>` — the `nginxdemos/hello` page reports which pod answered, and refreshing moves between the three replicas spread across the cluster. That single page demonstrates a multi-node Kubernetes cluster load-balancing behind HTTPS.
- **Public + private API endpoints.** `endpoint_public_access` serves `kubectl` and the Kubernetes provider from your host (CIDR-restricted); `endpoint_private_access` exposes an in-VPC private endpoint the workers use to join.
- **Private workers + NAT.** The three workers sit in private subnets. They *join* the cluster over the in-VPC private endpoint, and a NAT gateway gives them outbound access to pull the demo container image.
- **CoreDNS** installed as a managed addon.
- **TLS via ACM.** A self-signed certificate is generated with the `tls` provider and **imported into ACM** (Spinifex ACM supports `ImportCertificate`, not `RequestCertificate`). The ALB's HTTPS listener references the ACM ARN and forwards to the workers' NodePort.
- **The app, deployed by Terraform.** The Kubernetes provider deploys the Deployment + NodePort Service, and one security-group rule lets the ALB reach the NodePort.
<p align="center">
<img src="../../../.github/assets/diagrams/tf-eks-https-ingress.svg" alt="3-node EKS — public+private API endpoints, ALB in public subnets terminating TLS, three workers in private subnets behind a NAT gateway" width="900">
</p>
**What you'll learn:**
- Running an EKS cluster with both public and private API endpoints
- Placing workers in private subnets that join over the private endpoint and egress via NAT
- Importing a certificate into ACM and terminating TLS on an ALB HTTPS listener
- Wiring an ALB target group to managed node-group workers via a NodePort, including the SG rule that allows it
- Deploying a load-balanced workload with the Kubernetes provider
**What gets created**
| Resource | Name | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| VPC | `eks-https-vpc` | Isolated network (10.32.0.0/16) |
| Public Subnets | `eks-https-public-a/-b` | Host the ALB and NAT gateway |
| Private Subnets | `eks-https-private-a/-b` | Host the workers |
| Internet Gateway | `eks-https-igw` | Internet for the public subnets |
| NAT Gateway (+ EIP) | `eks-https-nat` | Outbound for the private workers (image pulls) |
| Route Tables | `eks-https-public-rt`, `eks-https-private-rt` | Public via IGW; private via NAT |
| IAM Roles | `eks-https-cluster-role`, `eks-https-node-role` | Control-plane and worker roles |
| EKS Cluster | `eks-https` | Public (CIDR-restricted) + private endpoints |
| Node Group | `workers` | Three `t3.large` workers in the private subnets |
| Addon | `coredns` | Cluster DNS |
| ACM Cert | `eks-https-ingress` | Self-signed cert imported into ACM |
| ALB + HTTPS Listener | `eks-https-alb` | Internet-facing, terminates TLS on :443 |
| Target Group | `eks-https-tg` | Instance targets on the NodePort |
| SG Ingress Rule | `eks-https-alb-nodeport` | Lets the ALB SG reach the worker NodePort |
| K8s Deployment + Service | `hello` | `nginxdemos/hello`, 3 replicas, NodePort |
**Spinifex specifics**
- ACM supports `ImportCertificate`, `DescribeCertificate`, `ListCertificates`, `DeleteCertificate` — there is no `RequestCertificate`/DNS-validation flow, hence the self-signed import.
- The ALB HTTPS listener resolves the cert from ACM. Valid SSL policies are `ELBSecurityPolicy-2016-08` (default) and `ELBSecurityPolicy-TLS13-1-2-2021-06`.
- The worker SG is auto-managed (`vpc_config.security_group_ids` is ignored) and admits only intra-cluster traffic. The ALB→NodePort rule is added by looking the SG up by its deterministic name and admitting the ALB SG.
- Worker discovery uses the `spinifex:eks-cluster` tag Spinifex stamps on node-group instances; the target-group attachment count is the known `node_desired_size`.
- Leave `addon_version` unset (see the addons workbook for why pinning it can't satisfy both the provider and the catalog).
**Prerequisites:**
- A 3-node Spinifex deployment, installed and running
- The Spinifex `eks-node` image available on the cluster
- OpenTofu or Terraform, plus `kubectl` and the AWS CLI
## Instructions
### Step 1. Get the Template
```bash
git clone --depth 1 --filter=blob:none --sparse https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex.git spinifex-tf
cd spinifex-tf
git sparse-checkout set docs/terraform-workbooks
cd docs/terraform-workbooks/eks-https-ingress
```
Or create a `main.tf` file and paste the full configuration below.
<!-- INCLUDE: main.tf lang:hcl -->
### Step 2. Deploy
```bash
export AWS_PROFILE=spinifex
tofu init
tofu apply
```
Expect several minutes: the control plane bootstraps, three workers launch and join over the private endpoint, the NAT gateway comes up, CoreDNS installs, the ALB is provisioned, and the Kubernetes provider rolls out the demo app.
> **Keep `AWS_PROFILE=spinifex` exported** for the whole `apply` — the Kubernetes provider authenticates with `aws eks get-token` against the Spinifex STS endpoint.
> **Tighten access in production.** `api_public_access_cidr` and `alb_ingress_cidr` both default to `0.0.0.0/0`. Set them to your own CIDR:
>
> ```bash
> export TF_VAR_api_public_access_cidr="203.0.113.10/32"
> export TF_VAR_alb_ingress_cidr="203.0.113.10/32"
> ```
### Step 3. Open the Demo over HTTPS
The ALB DNS name (`*.elb.spinifex.local`) won't resolve from your host, so fetch its public IP:
```bash
ALB_IP=$(aws elbv2 describe-load-balancers --names eks-https-alb \
--query 'LoadBalancers[0].AvailabilityZones[].LoadBalancerAddresses[].IpAddress' \
--output text)
```
The certificate is self-signed, so a browser will warn (proceed anyway) and `curl` needs `-k`:
```bash
curl -k https://$ALB_IP
curl -k https://$ALB_IP # refresh: the "Server name" changes between pods
```
Open `https://$ALB_IP` in a browser and refresh to watch requests land on different pods across the three nodes.
### Step 4. Inspect (optional)
```bash
aws eks update-kubeconfig --name eks-https --region ap-southeast-2
kubectl get nodes
kubectl get pods -o wide # three replicas, one per node
TG_ARN=$(aws elbv2 describe-target-groups --names eks-https-tg \
--query 'TargetGroups[0].TargetGroupArn' --output text)
aws elbv2 describe-target-health --target-group-arn "$TG_ARN"
```
### Cleanup
```bash
tofu destroy
```
## Troubleshooting
### Targets Unhealthy / ALB Returns 5xx
The ALB health-checks `/` on the NodePort. Targets turn healthy once the demo pods are running *and* the SG rule admits the ALB. Check, in order:
```bash
kubectl get pods -o wide # pods Running?
aws ec2 describe-security-groups \
--filters "Name=group-name,Values=eks-cluster-eks-https-nodegroup-sg" \
--query 'SecurityGroups[0].IpPermissions' # NodePort rule present?
aws elbv2 describe-target-health --target-group-arn "$TG_ARN"
```
If pods are `ImagePullBackOff`, the workers can't reach Docker Hub — confirm the NAT gateway is `available`:
```bash
aws ec2 describe-nat-gateways --query 'NatGateways[].[NatGatewayId,State]'
```
### Workers Never Join
The workers join over the private endpoint. Confirm it's enabled and the node group is progressing:
```bash
aws eks describe-cluster --name eks-https --query 'cluster.resourcesVpcConfig.endpointPrivateAccess'
aws eks describe-nodegroup --cluster-name eks-https --nodegroup-name workers --query 'nodegroup.status'
```
### Target-Group Attachment Errors at Apply
The attachment indexes the discovered worker IDs by `node_desired_size`. If `apply` errors with an index out of range, the workers weren't all tagged/running when the `aws_instances` lookup ran. Re-run `tofu apply` — the node group will be `ACTIVE` by then:
```bash
aws ec2 describe-instances --filters "Name=tag:spinifex:eks-cluster,Values=eks-https" \
--query 'Reservations[].Instances[].[InstanceId,State.Name]' --output text
```
### kubernetes provider: connection refused / Unauthorized
The provider runs `aws eks get-token` against the Spinifex STS endpoint. If the cluster was still `CREATING` when the provider first connected, re-run `tofu apply`. Otherwise confirm:
```bash
aws sts get-caller-identity
aws eks describe-cluster --name eks-https --query 'cluster.status'
```
### ACM Import / HTTPS Listener Errors
```bash
aws acm list-certificates
aws acm describe-certificate --certificate-arn "$(tofu output -raw certificate_arn)" \
--query 'Certificate.Status'
```
A `CertificateNotFound` on the listener means the ACM ARN didn't resolve — check the cert exists and belongs to the same account/profile.
### Provider Connection Refused
```bash
sudo systemctl status spinifex.target
curl -k https://localhost:9999/
```
@@ -0,0 +1,671 @@
# Example: 3-Node EKS behind an HTTPS ALB (ACM TLS) with a load-balanced app
#
# The largest EKS workbook, and the one with the clearest payoff. It stands up
# an HA-shaped cluster sized for a 3-node Spinifex deployment, deploys a demo
# web app across the workers, and publishes it through an internet-facing ALB
# that terminates TLS with a certificate held in ACM.
#
# After `apply`, fetch the ALB's public IP (see alb_public_ip_hint) and open
# https://<ip> in a browser. The page reports which pod answered; refresh and
# it moves between the three replicas spread across the cluster — a live picture
# of a multi-node Kubernetes cluster load-balancing behind HTTPS.
#
# What it builds:
# * VPC with two public subnets (ALB + NAT) and two private subnets (workers).
# * A NAT gateway so the private workers can pull the demo container image.
# * EKS cluster with BOTH a public endpoint (kubectl from your host) and a
# private endpoint (the in-VPC path the workers use to join).
# * A managed node group of three workers (t3.large) in the private subnets.
# * CoreDNS addon.
# * A self-signed cert imported into ACM (Spinifex ACM supports
# ImportCertificate, not RequestCertificate), wired to the ALB's HTTPS
# listener, which forwards to the workers' NodePort.
# * The demo Deployment + NodePort Service, deployed by the Kubernetes
# provider, plus the one SG rule that lets the ALB reach the NodePort.
#
# Usage:
# cd spinifex/docs/terraform-workbooks/eks-https-ingress
# export AWS_PROFILE=spinifex
# tofu init && tofu apply
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.6.0"
required_providers {
aws = {
source = "hashicorp/aws"
version = ">= 5.40, < 6.0"
}
tls = {
source = "hashicorp/tls"
version = ">= 4.0"
}
kubernetes = {
source = "hashicorp/kubernetes"
version = ">= 2.20"
}
}
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Variables
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
variable "region" {
type = string
default = "ap-southeast-2"
}
variable "cluster_name" {
type = string
default = "eks-https"
}
variable "k8s_version" {
type = string
default = "1.32"
}
variable "node_instance_type" {
type = string
default = "t3.large"
}
variable "node_desired_size" {
type = number
default = 3
description = "Worker count; spread across a 3-node Spinifex deployment for HA"
}
variable "node_port" {
type = number
default = 30080
description = "NodePort the ALB forwards to and the demo Service is published on"
}
variable "cert_common_name" {
type = string
default = "eks-https.spinifex.local"
}
variable "api_public_access_cidr" {
type = string
default = "0.0.0.0/0"
description = "CIDR allowed to reach the public Kubernetes API endpoint; tighten in production"
}
variable "alb_ingress_cidr" {
type = string
default = "0.0.0.0/0"
description = "CIDR allowed to reach the ALB HTTPS listener"
}
variable "spinifex_endpoint" {
type = string
default = "https://127.0.0.1:9999"
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Providers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
provider "aws" {
region = var.region
endpoints {
ec2 = var.spinifex_endpoint
iam = var.spinifex_endpoint
sts = var.spinifex_endpoint
eks = var.spinifex_endpoint
acm = var.spinifex_endpoint
elasticloadbalancingv2 = var.spinifex_endpoint
}
skip_credentials_validation = true
skip_metadata_api_check = true
skip_requesting_account_id = true
skip_region_validation = true
}
provider "kubernetes" {
host = aws_eks_cluster.this.endpoint
cluster_ca_certificate = base64decode(aws_eks_cluster.this.certificate_authority[0].data)
exec {
api_version = "client.authentication.k8s.io/v1beta1"
command = "aws"
args = ["eks", "get-token", "--cluster-name", aws_eks_cluster.this.name, "--region", var.region]
}
}
data "aws_availability_zones" "available" {
state = "available"
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# VPC — public subnets for the ALB + NAT, private subnets for the workers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_vpc" "main" {
cidr_block = "10.32.0.0/16"
enable_dns_hostnames = true
enable_dns_support = true
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-vpc"
}
}
resource "aws_internet_gateway" "igw" {
vpc_id = aws_vpc.main.id
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-igw"
}
}
resource "aws_subnet" "public_a" {
vpc_id = aws_vpc.main.id
cidr_block = "10.32.1.0/24"
availability_zone = data.aws_availability_zones.available.names[0]
map_public_ip_on_launch = true
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-public-a"
}
}
resource "aws_subnet" "public_b" {
vpc_id = aws_vpc.main.id
cidr_block = "10.32.2.0/24"
availability_zone = data.aws_availability_zones.available.names[0]
map_public_ip_on_launch = true
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-public-b"
}
}
resource "aws_subnet" "private_a" {
vpc_id = aws_vpc.main.id
cidr_block = "10.32.11.0/24"
availability_zone = data.aws_availability_zones.available.names[0]
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-private-a"
}
}
resource "aws_subnet" "private_b" {
vpc_id = aws_vpc.main.id
cidr_block = "10.32.12.0/24"
availability_zone = data.aws_availability_zones.available.names[0]
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-private-b"
}
}
resource "aws_route_table" "public" {
vpc_id = aws_vpc.main.id
route {
cidr_block = "0.0.0.0/0"
gateway_id = aws_internet_gateway.igw.id
}
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-public-rt"
}
}
resource "aws_route_table_association" "public_a" {
subnet_id = aws_subnet.public_a.id
route_table_id = aws_route_table.public.id
}
resource "aws_route_table_association" "public_b" {
subnet_id = aws_subnet.public_b.id
route_table_id = aws_route_table.public.id
}
# NAT gateway gives the private workers outbound internet to pull the demo
# container image. The workers still *join* the cluster over the in-VPC private
# endpoint, not through the NAT.
resource "aws_eip" "nat" {
domain = "vpc"
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-nat-eip"
}
}
resource "aws_nat_gateway" "nat" {
allocation_id = aws_eip.nat.id
subnet_id = aws_subnet.public_a.id
depends_on = [aws_internet_gateway.igw]
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-nat"
}
}
resource "aws_route_table" "private" {
vpc_id = aws_vpc.main.id
route {
cidr_block = "0.0.0.0/0"
nat_gateway_id = aws_nat_gateway.nat.id
}
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-private-rt"
}
}
resource "aws_route_table_association" "private_a" {
subnet_id = aws_subnet.private_a.id
route_table_id = aws_route_table.private.id
}
resource "aws_route_table_association" "private_b" {
subnet_id = aws_subnet.private_b.id
route_table_id = aws_route_table.private.id
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# IAM — cluster role
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_iam_role" "cluster" {
name = "${var.cluster_name}-cluster-role"
assume_role_policy = jsonencode({
Version = "2012-10-17"
Statement = [{
Effect = "Allow"
Action = "sts:AssumeRole"
Principal = { Service = "eks.amazonaws.com" }
}]
})
}
resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "cluster" {
role = aws_iam_role.cluster.name
policy_arn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonEKSClusterPolicy"
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# IAM — node role
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_iam_role" "node" {
name = "${var.cluster_name}-node-role"
assume_role_policy = jsonencode({
Version = "2012-10-17"
Statement = [{
Effect = "Allow"
Action = "sts:AssumeRole"
Principal = { Service = "ec2.amazonaws.com" }
}]
})
}
resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "node_worker" {
role = aws_iam_role.node.name
policy_arn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonEKSWorkerNodePolicy"
}
resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "node_cni" {
role = aws_iam_role.node.name
policy_arn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonEKS_CNI_Policy"
}
resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "node_ecr" {
role = aws_iam_role.node.name
policy_arn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonEC2ContainerRegistryReadOnly"
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# EKS cluster — public + private endpoints
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_eks_cluster" "this" {
name = var.cluster_name
role_arn = aws_iam_role.cluster.arn
version = var.k8s_version
vpc_config {
subnet_ids = [aws_subnet.private_a.id, aws_subnet.private_b.id]
endpoint_public_access = true
endpoint_private_access = true
public_access_cidrs = [var.api_public_access_cidr]
}
access_config {
authentication_mode = "API"
bootstrap_cluster_creator_admin_permissions = true
}
depends_on = [aws_iam_role_policy_attachment.cluster]
tags = {
Name = var.cluster_name
}
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Managed node group — three workers in the private subnets
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_eks_node_group" "workers" {
cluster_name = aws_eks_cluster.this.name
node_group_name = "workers"
node_role_arn = aws_iam_role.node.arn
subnet_ids = [aws_subnet.private_a.id, aws_subnet.private_b.id]
scaling_config {
desired_size = var.node_desired_size
min_size = var.node_desired_size
max_size = var.node_desired_size * 2
}
instance_types = [var.node_instance_type]
ami_type = "AL2_x86_64"
depends_on = [
aws_iam_role_policy_attachment.node_worker,
aws_iam_role_policy_attachment.node_cni,
aws_iam_role_policy_attachment.node_ecr,
]
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-workers"
}
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Addon — CoreDNS
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_eks_addon" "coredns" {
cluster_name = aws_eks_cluster.this.name
addon_name = "coredns"
resolve_conflicts_on_create = "OVERWRITE"
# addon_version omitted on purpose. Spinifex defaults an unset version to its
# catalog default (coredns 1.11.1). The AWS provider also rejects a bare
# "1.11.1" (it demands a v-prefixed form) which Spinifex's catalog would in
# turn reject — so pinning is a dead end here; let the server choose.
depends_on = [aws_eks_node_group.workers]
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-coredns"
}
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# TLS — self-signed certificate imported into ACM
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "tls_private_key" "ingress" {
algorithm = "RSA"
rsa_bits = 2048
}
resource "tls_self_signed_cert" "ingress" {
private_key_pem = tls_private_key.ingress.private_key_pem
subject {
common_name = var.cert_common_name
organization = "Spinifex EKS Demo"
}
dns_names = [var.cert_common_name]
validity_period_hours = 8760
early_renewal_hours = 720
allowed_uses = [
"key_encipherment",
"digital_signature",
"server_auth",
]
}
resource "aws_acm_certificate" "ingress" {
private_key = tls_private_key.ingress.private_key_pem
certificate_body = tls_self_signed_cert.ingress.cert_pem
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-ingress"
}
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ALB — internet-facing, HTTPS terminated with the ACM cert
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_security_group" "alb" {
name = "${var.cluster_name}-alb-sg"
description = "ALB HTTPS inbound, NodePort to workers"
vpc_id = aws_vpc.main.id
ingress {
description = "HTTPS"
from_port = 443
to_port = 443
protocol = "tcp"
cidr_blocks = [var.alb_ingress_cidr]
}
egress {
description = "All outbound"
from_port = 0
to_port = 0
protocol = "-1"
cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"]
}
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-alb-sg"
}
}
resource "aws_lb" "ingress" {
name = "${var.cluster_name}-alb"
internal = false
load_balancer_type = "application"
security_groups = [aws_security_group.alb.id]
subnets = [aws_subnet.public_a.id, aws_subnet.public_b.id]
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-alb"
}
}
resource "aws_lb_target_group" "workers" {
name = "${var.cluster_name}-tg"
port = var.node_port
protocol = "HTTP"
target_type = "instance"
vpc_id = aws_vpc.main.id
health_check {
path = "/"
protocol = "HTTP"
matcher = "200-399"
healthy_threshold = 2
unhealthy_threshold = 3
timeout = 5
interval = 10
}
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-tg"
}
}
# Discover the launched workers by their Spinifex EKS tag so the ALB can target
# them. depends_on the node group: the lookup must run after the workers exist.
data "aws_instances" "workers" {
instance_tags = {
"spinifex:eks-cluster" = aws_eks_cluster.this.name
}
depends_on = [aws_eks_node_group.workers]
}
# count is the known desired size, so it's resolvable at plan time even though
# the worker IDs themselves are only known after the node group launches.
resource "aws_lb_target_group_attachment" "workers" {
count = var.node_desired_size
target_group_arn = aws_lb_target_group.workers.arn
target_id = data.aws_instances.workers.ids[count.index]
port = var.node_port
}
resource "aws_lb_listener" "https" {
load_balancer_arn = aws_lb.ingress.arn
port = 443
protocol = "HTTPS"
ssl_policy = "ELBSecurityPolicy-TLS13-1-2-2021-06"
certificate_arn = aws_acm_certificate.ingress.arn
default_action {
type = "forward"
target_group_arn = aws_lb_target_group.workers.arn
}
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Let the ALB reach the workers' NodePort
#
# Spinifex auto-manages the nodegroup SG and admits only intra-cluster traffic.
# Look it up by its deterministic name and admit the ALB SG on the NodePort.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
data "aws_security_group" "nodegroup" {
filter {
name = "group-name"
values = ["eks-cluster-${var.cluster_name}-nodegroup-sg"]
}
filter {
name = "vpc-id"
values = [aws_vpc.main.id]
}
depends_on = [aws_eks_node_group.workers]
}
resource "aws_vpc_security_group_ingress_rule" "nodeport_from_alb" {
security_group_id = data.aws_security_group.nodegroup.id
referenced_security_group_id = aws_security_group.alb.id
from_port = var.node_port
to_port = var.node_port
ip_protocol = "tcp"
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-alb-nodeport"
}
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Demo workload — three replicas spread across the workers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "kubernetes_deployment_v1" "hello" {
metadata {
name = "hello"
namespace = "default"
labels = { app = "hello" }
}
spec {
replicas = var.node_desired_size
selector {
match_labels = { app = "hello" }
}
template {
metadata {
labels = { app = "hello" }
}
spec {
container {
name = "hello"
image = "nginxdemos/hello"
port {
container_port = 80
}
}
# Spread one replica per node so a refresh visibly hits different nodes.
topology_spread_constraint {
max_skew = 1
topology_key = "kubernetes.io/hostname"
when_unsatisfiable = "ScheduleAnyway"
label_selector {
match_labels = { app = "hello" }
}
}
}
}
}
depends_on = [aws_eks_addon.coredns]
}
resource "kubernetes_service_v1" "hello" {
metadata {
name = "hello"
namespace = "default"
}
spec {
selector = { app = "hello" }
type = "NodePort"
port {
port = 80
target_port = 80
node_port = var.node_port
}
}
depends_on = [kubernetes_deployment_v1.hello]
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Outputs
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
output "cluster_name" {
value = aws_eks_cluster.this.name
}
output "certificate_arn" {
value = aws_acm_certificate.ingress.arn
}
output "alb_dns_name" {
value = aws_lb.ingress.dns_name
}
output "alb_public_ip_hint" {
value = "aws elbv2 describe-load-balancers --names ${var.cluster_name}-alb --query 'LoadBalancers[0].AvailabilityZones[].LoadBalancerAddresses[].IpAddress' --output text"
}
output "demo_url_hint" {
value = "Fetch the ALB IP via alb_public_ip_hint, then open https://<that-ip> (self-signed cert: curl -k). Refresh to see different pods answer."
}
output "update_kubeconfig" {
value = "aws eks update-kubeconfig --name ${aws_eks_cluster.this.name} --region ${var.region}"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
---
title: "EKS Quickstart"
description: "Stand up a minimal managed-Kubernetes cluster and a browsable demo app — VPC, IAM roles, an EKS cluster, a single-worker node group, and a load-balanced web page — using Terraform on Spinifex."
category: "Terraform Workbooks"
tags:
- terraform
- eks
- kubernetes
- iam
- vpc
- workbook
resources:
- title: "Terraform AWS Provider"
url: "https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/aws/latest"
- title: "Terraform Kubernetes Provider"
url: "https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/kubernetes/latest"
- title: "Spinifex Repository"
url: "https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex"
- title: "OpenTofu"
url: "https://opentofu.org/"
---
# Terraform: EKS Quickstart
> The smallest end-to-end EKS example on Spinifex: a VPC, the two IAM roles EKS needs, a single-worker cluster, and a demo web app you can open in a browser.
## Table of Contents
- [Overview](#overview)
- [Instructions](#instructions)
- [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting)
---
## Overview
Provision a managed Kubernetes cluster on Spinifex with Terraform/OpenTofu — and finish with something you can actually see. As well as the cluster, this workbook deploys a small demo app onto it and publishes it on the worker's public IP. When `apply` finishes, open the **`demo_url`** output: the page is served by `nginxdemos/hello` and prints the name of the pod that answered. Refresh it and the answering pod changes, so even a non-technical viewer can watch Kubernetes scheduling and load-balancing in real time.
Under the hood it keeps things minimal: a VPC with two public subnets, an IAM role for the control plane, an IAM role for the workers with the three managed policies AWS-managed node groups expect, a public-endpoint `aws_eks_cluster`, and a single-node `aws_eks_node_group`. Terraform then uses the **Kubernetes provider** (authenticating exactly like `kubectl` does, via `aws eks get-token`) to deploy the Deployment + NodePort Service.
**What you'll learn:**
- Configuring the AWS provider to target Spinifex's `eks`, `ec2`, `iam` and `sts` endpoints
- Creating the EKS cluster and worker IAM roles with faithful managed-policy attachments
- Provisioning an `aws_eks_cluster` and a managed `aws_eks_node_group`
- Pointing the Kubernetes provider at the new cluster and deploying a workload from the same `apply`
- Opening one rule on the auto-managed worker security group to expose a NodePort
**What gets created**
| Resource | Name | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| VPC | `eks-quickstart-vpc` | Isolated network (10.30.0.0/16) |
| Subnets | `eks-quickstart-subnet-a/-b` | Public subnets for the cluster and worker |
| Internet Gateway | `eks-quickstart-igw` | Egress so the worker can pull the demo image |
| IAM Roles | `eks-quickstart-cluster-role`, `eks-quickstart-node-role` | Control-plane and worker roles |
| EKS Cluster | `eks-quickstart` | Public API endpoint, API auth mode, Kubernetes 1.32 |
| Node Group | `default` | One `t3.medium` worker |
| SG Ingress Rule | `eks-quickstart-demo-nodeport` | Opens the demo NodePort on the auto-managed worker SG |
| K8s Deployment | `hello` | `nginxdemos/hello`, 2 replicas |
| K8s Service | `hello` | NodePort publishing the demo on the worker |
**Spinifex specifics**
- The cluster's security groups are **auto-managed** — `vpc_config.security_group_ids` is ignored. To reach a NodePort, this workbook looks the worker SG up by its deterministic name (`eks-cluster-<name>-nodegroup-sg`) and adds a single ingress rule.
- The worker AMI is always Spinifex's `eks-node` image; `ami_type` is recorded but does **not** select the image.
- `authentication_mode` must be `"API"` (the `API_AND_CONFIG_MAP` mode is rejected).
- The workers need outbound internet (here via the IGW) to pull the demo container image.
**Prerequisites:**
- Spinifex installed and running (see [Installing Spinifex](/docs/install))
- The Spinifex `eks-node` image available on the cluster
- OpenTofu or Terraform, plus `kubectl` and the AWS CLI
## Instructions
### Step 1. Get the Template
```bash
git clone --depth 1 --filter=blob:none --sparse https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex.git spinifex-tf
cd spinifex-tf
git sparse-checkout set docs/terraform-workbooks
cd docs/terraform-workbooks/eks-quickstart
```
Or create a `main.tf` file and paste the full configuration below.
<!-- INCLUDE: main.tf lang:hcl -->
### Step 2. Deploy
```bash
export AWS_PROFILE=spinifex
tofu init
tofu apply
```
This single `apply` does the whole job: it creates the cluster (which bootstraps a control-plane VM and brings up k3s — a few minutes in `CREATING`), launches the worker, opens the NodePort, then deploys the demo app and waits for the pods to roll out.
> **Same profile for the Kubernetes provider.** The Kubernetes provider authenticates by shelling out to `aws eks get-token`, which has to reach the Spinifex STS endpoint. Keep `AWS_PROFILE=spinifex` exported for the whole `apply`.
### Step 3. Open the Demo
```bash
tofu output demo_url
```
Open that URL in a browser. You'll see the `nginxdemos/hello` page showing the **Server name** (the pod that handled the request). Refresh a few times — with two replicas, the pod name alternates, demonstrating that the Service is load-balancing across the cluster.
### Step 4. Inspect with kubectl (optional)
```bash
aws eks update-kubeconfig --name eks-quickstart --region ap-southeast-2
kubectl get nodes
kubectl get pods -o wide
```
`kubectl get pods -o wide` shows the demo pods and which node each landed on.
### Cleanup
```bash
tofu destroy
```
## Troubleshooting
### Demo URL Doesn't Load
The page is served from a NodePort on the worker's public IP. Work through the chain:
```bash
# Is the worker running with a public IP?
aws ec2 describe-instances --filters "Name=tag:spinifex:eks-cluster,Values=eks-quickstart" \
--query 'Reservations[].Instances[].[InstanceId,State.Name,PublicIpAddress]' --output text
# Did the demo pods roll out?
kubectl get pods -o wide
# Is the NodePort rule on the worker SG?
aws ec2 describe-security-groups --filters "Name=group-name,Values=eks-cluster-eks-quickstart-nodegroup-sg" \
--query 'SecurityGroups[0].IpPermissions'
```
If the pods are `Pending`, the worker may not be `Ready` yet — give it a moment. If they're `ImagePullBackOff`, the worker can't reach Docker Hub; confirm the IGW route and the worker's public IP.
### kubernetes provider: connection refused / Unauthorized
The provider runs `aws eks get-token` against the Spinifex STS endpoint. Confirm the AWS CLI is still pointed at Spinifex and the cluster is `ACTIVE`:
```bash
aws sts get-caller-identity
aws eks describe-cluster --name eks-quickstart --query 'cluster.status'
```
If the cluster was still `CREATING` when the provider first tried to connect, just re-run `tofu apply`.
### Cluster Stuck in CREATING
Control-plane bootstrap takes a few minutes. Confirm the underlying VM came up:
```bash
aws eks describe-cluster --name eks-quickstart --query 'cluster.status'
aws ec2 describe-instances --profile spinifex
```
### Provider Connection Refused
```bash
sudo systemctl status spinifex.target
curl -k https://localhost:9999/
```
@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
# Example: EKS Quickstart on Spinifex
#
# A minimal managed-Kubernetes cluster that ends in something you can see: a
# VPC, the two IAM roles EKS needs, a single-worker cluster, and a demo web app
# deployed onto it by Terraform and exposed on the worker's public IP.
#
# Once `apply` finishes, open the demo_url output in a browser. The page is
# served by the nginxdemos/hello image and prints the pod name that answered —
# refresh and it bounces between the app's replicas, showing the cluster is
# really scheduling and load-balancing pods.
#
# Demonstrates: VPC + subnets, EKS cluster + node IAM roles, an aws_eks_cluster
# and managed aws_eks_node_group, the Kubernetes provider authenticating to the
# cluster, and a Deployment + NodePort Service reachable from your browser.
#
# Usage:
# cd spinifex/docs/terraform-workbooks/eks-quickstart
# export AWS_PROFILE=spinifex
# tofu init && tofu apply
# # then open the demo_url output
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.6.0"
required_providers {
aws = {
source = "hashicorp/aws"
version = ">= 5.40, < 6.0"
}
kubernetes = {
source = "hashicorp/kubernetes"
version = ">= 2.20"
}
}
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Variables
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
variable "region" {
type = string
default = "ap-southeast-2"
}
variable "cluster_name" {
type = string
default = "eks-quickstart"
}
variable "k8s_version" {
type = string
default = "1.32"
description = "Kubernetes minor version for the control plane and workers"
}
variable "instance_type" {
type = string
default = "t3.medium"
}
variable "node_port" {
type = number
default = 30080
description = "NodePort the demo Service is published on"
}
variable "replicas" {
type = number
default = 2
description = "Demo app replicas; refresh the page to see requests land on different pods"
}
variable "browse_cidr" {
type = string
default = "0.0.0.0/0"
description = "CIDR allowed to reach the demo NodePort; tighten to your own IP in production"
}
variable "spinifex_endpoint" {
type = string
default = "https://127.0.0.1:9999"
description = "Spinifex AWS gateway endpoint"
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Providers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
provider "aws" {
region = var.region
endpoints {
ec2 = var.spinifex_endpoint
iam = var.spinifex_endpoint
sts = var.spinifex_endpoint
eks = var.spinifex_endpoint
}
skip_credentials_validation = true
skip_metadata_api_check = true
skip_requesting_account_id = true
skip_region_validation = true
}
# Authenticates to the cluster with the same `aws eks get-token` exec flow the
# generated kubeconfig uses, so the Kubernetes provider can deploy the demo app.
provider "kubernetes" {
host = aws_eks_cluster.this.endpoint
cluster_ca_certificate = base64decode(aws_eks_cluster.this.certificate_authority[0].data)
exec {
api_version = "client.authentication.k8s.io/v1beta1"
command = "aws"
args = ["eks", "get-token", "--cluster-name", aws_eks_cluster.this.name, "--region", var.region]
}
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Data sources
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
data "aws_availability_zones" "available" {
state = "available"
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# VPC + two public subnets (workers get public IPs to pull the demo image)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_vpc" "main" {
cidr_block = "10.30.0.0/16"
enable_dns_hostnames = true
enable_dns_support = true
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-vpc"
}
}
resource "aws_internet_gateway" "igw" {
vpc_id = aws_vpc.main.id
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-igw"
}
}
resource "aws_subnet" "a" {
vpc_id = aws_vpc.main.id
cidr_block = "10.30.1.0/24"
availability_zone = data.aws_availability_zones.available.names[0]
map_public_ip_on_launch = true
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-subnet-a"
}
}
resource "aws_subnet" "b" {
vpc_id = aws_vpc.main.id
cidr_block = "10.30.2.0/24"
availability_zone = data.aws_availability_zones.available.names[0]
map_public_ip_on_launch = true
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-subnet-b"
}
}
resource "aws_route_table" "public" {
vpc_id = aws_vpc.main.id
route {
cidr_block = "0.0.0.0/0"
gateway_id = aws_internet_gateway.igw.id
}
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-public-rt"
}
}
resource "aws_route_table_association" "a" {
subnet_id = aws_subnet.a.id
route_table_id = aws_route_table.public.id
}
resource "aws_route_table_association" "b" {
subnet_id = aws_subnet.b.id
route_table_id = aws_route_table.public.id
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# IAM — EKS cluster role
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_iam_role" "cluster" {
name = "${var.cluster_name}-cluster-role"
assume_role_policy = jsonencode({
Version = "2012-10-17"
Statement = [{
Effect = "Allow"
Action = "sts:AssumeRole"
Principal = { Service = "eks.amazonaws.com" }
}]
})
}
resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "cluster" {
role = aws_iam_role.cluster.name
policy_arn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonEKSClusterPolicy"
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# IAM — worker node role
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_iam_role" "node" {
name = "${var.cluster_name}-node-role"
assume_role_policy = jsonencode({
Version = "2012-10-17"
Statement = [{
Effect = "Allow"
Action = "sts:AssumeRole"
Principal = { Service = "ec2.amazonaws.com" }
}]
})
}
resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "node_worker" {
role = aws_iam_role.node.name
policy_arn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonEKSWorkerNodePolicy"
}
resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "node_cni" {
role = aws_iam_role.node.name
policy_arn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonEKS_CNI_Policy"
}
resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "node_ecr" {
role = aws_iam_role.node.name
policy_arn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonEC2ContainerRegistryReadOnly"
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# EKS cluster — public API endpoint, API (access-entry) auth mode
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_eks_cluster" "this" {
name = var.cluster_name
role_arn = aws_iam_role.cluster.arn
version = var.k8s_version
vpc_config {
subnet_ids = [aws_subnet.a.id, aws_subnet.b.id]
endpoint_public_access = true
endpoint_private_access = false
}
access_config {
authentication_mode = "API"
bootstrap_cluster_creator_admin_permissions = true
}
depends_on = [aws_iam_role_policy_attachment.cluster]
tags = {
Name = var.cluster_name
}
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Managed node group — one worker
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_eks_node_group" "default" {
cluster_name = aws_eks_cluster.this.name
node_group_name = "default"
node_role_arn = aws_iam_role.node.arn
subnet_ids = [aws_subnet.a.id, aws_subnet.b.id]
scaling_config {
desired_size = 1
min_size = 1
max_size = 2
}
instance_types = [var.instance_type]
ami_type = "AL2_x86_64"
depends_on = [
aws_iam_role_policy_attachment.node_worker,
aws_iam_role_policy_attachment.node_cni,
aws_iam_role_policy_attachment.node_ecr,
]
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-default"
}
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Open the NodePort on the auto-managed nodegroup SG
#
# Spinifex creates the worker SG itself (vpc_config.security_group_ids is
# ignored) and admits only intra-cluster traffic. To reach the demo NodePort
# from a browser, look the SG up by its deterministic name and add one rule.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
data "aws_security_group" "nodegroup" {
filter {
name = "group-name"
values = ["eks-cluster-${var.cluster_name}-nodegroup-sg"]
}
filter {
name = "vpc-id"
values = [aws_vpc.main.id]
}
depends_on = [aws_eks_node_group.default]
}
resource "aws_vpc_security_group_ingress_rule" "nodeport" {
security_group_id = data.aws_security_group.nodegroup.id
cidr_ipv4 = var.browse_cidr
from_port = var.node_port
to_port = var.node_port
ip_protocol = "tcp"
tags = {
Name = "${var.cluster_name}-demo-nodeport"
}
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Demo workload — deployed onto the cluster by Terraform
#
# nginxdemos/hello renders a page showing which pod served the request; with
# multiple replicas, refreshing the demo_url alternates between them.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "kubernetes_deployment_v1" "hello" {
metadata {
name = "hello"
namespace = "default"
labels = { app = "hello" }
}
spec {
replicas = var.replicas
selector {
match_labels = { app = "hello" }
}
template {
metadata {
labels = { app = "hello" }
}
spec {
container {
name = "hello"
image = "nginxdemos/hello"
port {
container_port = 80
}
}
}
}
}
depends_on = [aws_eks_node_group.default]
}
resource "kubernetes_service_v1" "hello" {
metadata {
name = "hello"
namespace = "default"
}
spec {
selector = { app = "hello" }
type = "NodePort"
port {
port = 80
target_port = 80
node_port = var.node_port
}
}
depends_on = [kubernetes_deployment_v1.hello]
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Discover the worker's public IP for the demo URL
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
data "aws_instances" "workers" {
instance_tags = {
"spinifex:eks-cluster" = aws_eks_cluster.this.name
}
depends_on = [aws_eks_node_group.default]
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Outputs
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
output "cluster_name" {
value = aws_eks_cluster.this.name
}
output "demo_url" {
value = "http://${data.aws_instances.workers.public_ips[0]}:${var.node_port}"
description = "Open in a browser; refresh to see different pods answer"
}
output "update_kubeconfig" {
value = "aws eks update-kubeconfig --name ${aws_eks_cluster.this.name} --region ${var.region}"
}
@@ -142,7 +142,6 @@ The ALB is internet-facing, but the DNS name Spinifex returns (`*.elb.spinifex.l
ALB_IP=$(aws elbv2 describe-load-balancers --names nginx-alb \
--query 'LoadBalancers[0].AvailabilityZones[].LoadBalancerAddresses[].IpAddress' \
--output text)
echo "ALB public IP: $ALB_IP"
```
Then hit the ALB — successive requests should alternate between Server 1 and Server 2:
@@ -163,8 +162,6 @@ TG_ARN=$(aws elbv2 describe-target-groups \
--query 'TargetGroups[0].TargetGroupArn' \
--output text)
echo "Target Group ARN: $TG_ARN"
aws elbv2 describe-target-health --target-group-arn $TG_ARN
```
+37 -7
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ tags:
- flask
- webapp
- workbook
- imds
- sts
- instance-profile
resources:
- title: "Terraform AWS Provider"
url: "https://registry.terraform.io/providers/hashicorp/aws/latest"
@@ -36,18 +39,21 @@ resources:
Deploy an EC2 instance running a Flask file-sharing web application backed by S3 (Predastore). Users can upload files through a web form and browse uploaded content — demonstrating Terraform managing both compute and object storage together.
This workbook uses the idiomatic AWS credential model: the instance is launched with an **IAM instance profile** and the app pulls short-lived STS credentials from **IMDS** (`169.254.169.254`) through boto3's default credential chain. **No long-lived S3 keys are baked into the instance.** The Terraform run still uses the operator's admin credentials (to create the bucket, role, profile, and instance), but the running instance authenticates to S3 with credentials it fetches at runtime and which expire in ~1 hour.
**Architecture:**
<p align="center">
<img src="../../../.github/assets/diagrams/tf-s3-webapp.svg" alt="S3 webapp — browser to Flask EC2 instance to Predastore via S3 API" width="900">
<img src="../../../.github/assets/diagrams/tf-s3-webapp.svg" alt="S3 webapp — browser to Flask EC2 instance; the instance fetches short-lived STS credentials from IMDS (169.254.169.254) via its instance profile, then calls Predastore over the S3 API" width="900">
</p>
**What you'll learn:**
- Configuring the AWS provider with both Spinifex and Predastore endpoints
- Creating S3 buckets on Predastore via Terraform
- Deploying a Python webapp with cloud-init that talks to S3
- Passing credentials and configuration to instances via user-data
- Defining an IAM role, least-privilege managed policy, and instance profile, and passing the role to an instance (`iam:PassRole`)
- How the instance obtains short-lived credentials from IMDS via boto3's default credential chain — no static keys on the instance
- Deploying a Python webapp with cloud-init that signs S3 requests with the STS session token
**Prerequisites:**
@@ -55,6 +61,7 @@ Deploy an EC2 instance running a Flask file-sharing web application backed by S3
- Predastore running (S3 API on port 8443)
- An Ubuntu 26.04 AMI imported (see [Setting Up Your Cluster](/docs/setting-up-your-cluster))
- OpenTofu or Terraform installed
- The operator identity running the Terraform apply (`AWS_PROFILE=spinifex`) must be allowed to manage IAM and pass the role: `iam:CreateRole`, `iam:CreatePolicy`, `iam:AttachRolePolicy`, `iam:CreateInstanceProfile`, `iam:AddRoleToInstanceProfile`, and `iam:PassRole` on the new role. The bootstrap admin profile satisfies this.
- The EC2 instance must be able to reach Predastore — use the host's br-wan IP, not localhost
## Instructions
@@ -141,16 +148,39 @@ sudo systemctl status s3-webapp
sudo journalctl -u s3-webapp --no-pager -n 50
```
### Upload Fails or Files Not Appearing
### Upload Fails with `403 AccessDenied`
Check that the S3 credentials in `/opt/webapp/.env` are correct and that the bucket exists:
The instance reached S3 but was not authorized. The `.env` file deliberately holds **no** keys — credentials come from IMDS:
```bash
ssh -i s3-webapp-demo.pem ec2-user@<public_ip>
cat /opt/webapp/.env
/opt/webapp/venv/bin/python -c "import boto3; print('boto3 OK')"
cat /opt/webapp/.env # S3_ENDPOINT / S3_BUCKET / S3_REGION only — no keys
```
Check that:
- the managed policy is attached to the role (`s3:ListBucket` on the bucket, `s3:GetObject`/`s3:PutObject` on its objects), and the policy's bucket name matches `bucket_name`;
- the assumed-role session's account matches the bucket owner's account — Predastore enforces bucket ownership. Both are created by the same operator identity, so they align by construction; a mismatch surfaces as `403`.
### `NoCredentialsError` / No Credentials
boto3 could not obtain credentials, which means the IMDS credential chain did not resolve. From the instance:
```bash
ssh -i s3-webapp-demo.pem ec2-user@<public_ip>
# IMDSv2: fetch a token, then the role name behind the instance profile
TOKEN=$(curl -sX PUT http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token \
-H 'X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 60')
curl -s -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN" \
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
# Confirm the resolved identity — expect assumed-role/s3-webapp-role/<instance-id>
aws sts get-caller-identity --endpoint-url https://<predastore_host>
```
If the role name is empty, the instance profile was not attached — confirm `iam_instance_profile` on the instance and that `iam:PassRole` is allowed for the operator.
### AMI Not Found
Ensure you have imported an Ubuntu 26.04 image:
+70 -8
View File
@@ -8,13 +8,25 @@
# Architecture:
#
# Browser ──HTTP──▶ EC2 Instance (Flask webapp, port 80)
# │
# ▼ S3 API (boto3)
# │ ▲ IMDS: short-lived STS creds (ASIA + token)
# │ └──── 169.254.169.254
# ▼ S3 API (boto3, SigV4 with session token)
# Predastore (port 8443)
#
# Credentials:
# The Terraform run uses the operator's admin keys (s3_access_key /
# s3_secret_key) to create the bucket, IAM role, instance profile, and
# instance. The INSTANCE receives no long-lived secret — boto3's default
# credential chain pulls short-lived STS credentials from IMDS
# (169.254.169.254), resolved via the attached instance profile -> role.
#
# Prerequisites:
# - Spinifex services running (gateway on port 9999)
# - Predastore running (S3 API on port 8443)
# - The operator identity (AWS_PROFILE=spinifex) must be allowed
# iam:CreateRole / iam:CreatePolicy / iam:AttachRolePolicy /
# iam:CreateInstanceProfile / iam:AddRoleToInstanceProfile and
# iam:PassRole on the new role.
# - The EC2 instance must be able to reach the Predastore endpoint.
# Set `predastore_host` to the IP reachable from inside the VPC
# (e.g. the host's br-wan IP, NOT localhost).
@@ -80,13 +92,13 @@ variable "predastore_host" {
variable "s3_access_key" {
type = string
description = "S3 access key for Predastore"
description = "Operator S3 access key for the Terraform run (creates the bucket on Predastore); the instance uses IMDS, not this key"
}
variable "s3_secret_key" {
type = string
sensitive = true
description = "S3 secret key for Predastore"
description = "Operator S3 secret key for the Terraform run; the instance uses IMDS, not this key"
}
variable "bucket_name" {
@@ -154,6 +166,55 @@ resource "aws_s3_bucket" "uploads" {
bucket = var.bucket_name
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# IAM Instance Role — least-privilege S3 access fetched at runtime via IMDS
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resource "aws_iam_role" "webapp" {
name = "s3-webapp-role"
assume_role_policy = jsonencode({
Version = "2012-10-17"
Statement = [{
Effect = "Allow"
Principal = { Service = "ec2.amazonaws.com" }
Action = "sts:AssumeRole"
}]
})
}
resource "aws_iam_policy" "webapp_s3" {
name = "s3-webapp-policy"
policy = jsonencode({
Version = "2012-10-17"
Statement = [
{
Sid = "ListBucket"
Effect = "Allow"
Action = ["s3:ListBucket"]
Resource = ["arn:aws:s3:::${var.bucket_name}"]
},
{
Sid = "ObjectRW"
Effect = "Allow"
Action = ["s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject"]
Resource = ["arn:aws:s3:::${var.bucket_name}/*"]
}
]
})
}
resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "webapp" {
role = aws_iam_role.webapp.name
policy_arn = aws_iam_policy.webapp_s3.arn
}
resource "aws_iam_instance_profile" "webapp" {
name = "s3-webapp-profile"
role = aws_iam_role.webapp.name
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SSH Key Pair
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -273,9 +334,14 @@ resource "aws_instance" "webapp" {
subnet_id = aws_subnet.public.id
vpc_security_group_ids = [aws_security_group.webapp.id]
key_name = aws_key_pair.webapp.key_name
iam_instance_profile = aws_iam_instance_profile.webapp.name
associate_public_ip_address = true
# The role's permissions must exist before the instance boots and makes its
# first IMDS-credentialed S3 call
depends_on = [aws_iam_role_policy_attachment.webapp]
user_data_base64 = base64encode(<<-USERDATA
#!/bin/bash
set -euo pipefail
@@ -293,8 +359,6 @@ resource "aws_instance" "webapp" {
cat > /opt/webapp/.env <<'ENVFILE'
S3_ENDPOINT=https://${var.predastore_host}
S3_BUCKET=${var.bucket_name}
S3_ACCESS_KEY=${var.s3_access_key}
S3_SECRET_KEY=${var.s3_secret_key}
S3_REGION=${var.region}
ENVFILE
@@ -321,8 +385,6 @@ resource "aws_instance" "webapp" {
s3 = boto3.client(
"s3",
endpoint_url=env["S3_ENDPOINT"],
aws_access_key_id=env["S3_ACCESS_KEY"],
aws_secret_access_key=env["S3_SECRET_KEY"],
region_name=env["S3_REGION"],
verify=False,
config=Config(s3={"addressing_style": "path"}),
@@ -2,6 +2,11 @@
#
# The predastore_host must be reachable from INSIDE the VPC guest — not
# localhost. Use the host's br-wan or LAN IP, e.g. "192.168.1.10:8443".
#
# s3_access_key / s3_secret_key are the operator credentials for the Terraform
# run only — they create the bucket on Predastore and the IAM role/profile.
# They are NOT passed to the instance; the instance pulls short-lived STS
# credentials from IMDS via its instance profile.
predastore_host = "192.168.1.10:8443"
s3_access_key = "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
+21 -20
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
module github.com/mulgadc/spinifex
go 1.26.3
go 1.26.4
require (
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go v1.55.8
@@ -8,13 +8,14 @@ require (
github.com/charmbracelet/bubbletea v1.3.10
github.com/charmbracelet/lipgloss v1.1.0
github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.3.0
github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 v5.3.1
github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0
github.com/insomniacslk/dhcp v0.0.0-20260407060928-11b94ed970f2
github.com/kdomanski/iso9660 v0.4.0
github.com/klauspost/cpuid/v2 v2.3.0
github.com/mulgadc/predastore v1.5.0
github.com/mulgadc/viperblock v1.5.0
github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 v2.14.1
github.com/mulgadc/predastore v1.8.0
github.com/mulgadc/viperblock v1.8.0
github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 v2.14.2
github.com/nats-io/nats.go v1.52.0
github.com/ovn-kubernetes/libovsdb v0.8.1
github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2 v2.3.1
@@ -23,9 +24,10 @@ require (
github.com/spf13/viper v1.21.0
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1
go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0
golang.org/x/crypto v0.52.0
golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0
gopkg.in/ini.v1 v1.67.2
golang.org/x/crypto v0.53.0
golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0
gopkg.in/ini.v1 v1.67.3
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1
)
@@ -36,8 +38,8 @@ require (
github.com/antithesishq/antithesis-sdk-go v0.7.0 // indirect
github.com/armon/go-metrics v0.4.1 // indirect
github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4 // indirect
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.41.7 // indirect
github.com/aws/smithy-go v1.25.1 // indirect
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.42.0 // indirect
github.com/aws/smithy-go v1.27.1 // indirect
github.com/aymanbagabas/go-osc52/v2 v2.0.1 // indirect
github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/boltdb/bolt v1.3.1 // indirect
@@ -55,7 +57,7 @@ require (
github.com/clipperhouse/uax29/v2 v2.7.0 // indirect
github.com/containerd/console v1.0.5 // indirect
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 // indirect
github.com/dgraph-io/badger/v4 v4.9.1 // indirect
github.com/dgraph-io/badger/v4 v4.9.2 // indirect
github.com/dgraph-io/ristretto/v2 v2.4.0 // indirect
github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/erikgeiser/coninput v0.0.0-20211004153227-1c3628e74d0f // indirect
@@ -99,8 +101,8 @@ require (
github.com/muesli/cancelreader v0.2.2 // indirect
github.com/muesli/termenv v0.16.0 // indirect
github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 // indirect
github.com/nats-io/jwt/v2 v2.8.1 // indirect
github.com/nats-io/nkeys v0.4.15 // indirect
github.com/nats-io/jwt/v2 v2.8.2 // indirect
github.com/nats-io/nkeys v0.4.16 // indirect
github.com/nats-io/nuid v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/pierrec/lz4/v4 v4.1.14 // indirect
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 // indirect
@@ -108,7 +110,7 @@ require (
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/common v0.67.5 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.20.1 // indirect
github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.59.1 // indirect
github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.60.0 // indirect
github.com/rivo/uniseg v0.4.7 // indirect
github.com/sagikazarmark/locafero v0.12.0 // indirect
github.com/spf13/afero v1.15.0 // indirect
@@ -124,14 +126,13 @@ require (
go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.42.0 // indirect
go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.4 // indirect
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4 // indirect
golang.org/x/mod v0.35.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/net v0.55.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sys v0.45.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/telemetry v0.0.0-20260409153401-be6f6cb8b1fa // indirect
golang.org/x/term v0.43.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/text v0.37.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/mod v0.36.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/net v0.56.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/telemetry v0.0.0-20260508192327-42602be52be6 // indirect
golang.org/x/term v0.44.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/text v0.38.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/time v0.15.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/tools v0.44.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/tools v0.45.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/vuln v1.1.4 // indirect
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11 // indirect
)
+62 -58
View File
@@ -31,30 +31,30 @@ github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4 h1:EH0zSVneZPSuFR11BlR9YppQTVDbh5+16AmcJi4g1z
github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4/go.mod h1:ZY9tmq7sm5xIbd9bOK4onWV4S6X0u6GY7Vn0Yu86PYI=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go v1.55.8 h1:JRmEUbU52aJQZ2AjX4q4Wu7t4uZjOu71uyNmaWlUkJQ=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go v1.55.8/go.mod h1:ZkViS9AqA6otK+JBBNH2++sx1sgxrPKcSzPPvQkUtXk=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.41.7 h1:DWpAJt66FmnnaRIOT/8ASTucrvuDPZASqhhLey6tLY8=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.41.7/go.mod h1:4LAfZOPHNVNQEckOACQx60Y8pSRjIkNZQz1w92xpMJc=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws/protocol/eventstream v1.7.10 h1:gx1AwW1Iyk9Z9dD9F4akX5gnN3QZwUB20GGKH/I+Rho=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws/protocol/eventstream v1.7.10/go.mod h1:qqY157uZoqm5OXq/amuaBJyC9hgBCBQnsaWnPe905GY=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/credentials v1.19.16 h1:r3RJBuU7X9ibt8RHbMjWE6y60QbKBiII6wSrXnapxSU=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/credentials v1.19.16/go.mod h1:6cx7zqDENJDbBIIWX6P8s0h6hqHC8Avbjh9Dseo27ug=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/configsources v1.4.23 h1:GpT/TrnBYuE5gan2cZbTtvP+JlHsutdmlV2YfEyNde0=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/configsources v1.4.23/go.mod h1:xYWD6BS9ywC5bS3sz9Xh04whO/hzK2plt2Zkyrp4JuA=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/endpoints/v2 v2.7.23 h1:bpd8vxhlQi2r1hiueOw02f/duEPTMK59Q4QMAoTTtTo=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/endpoints/v2 v2.7.23/go.mod h1:15DfR2nw+CRHIk0tqNyifu3G1YdAOy68RftkhMDDwYk=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/v4a v1.4.24 h1:OQqn11BtaYv1WLUowvcA30MpzIu8Ti4pcLPIIyoKZrA=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/v4a v1.4.24/go.mod h1:X5ZJyfwVrWA96GzPmUCWFQaEARPR7gCrpq2E92PJwAE=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/accept-encoding v1.13.9 h1:FLudkZLt5ci0ozzgkVo8BJGwvqNaZbTWb3UcucAateA=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/accept-encoding v1.13.9/go.mod h1:w7wZ/s9qK7c8g4al+UyoF1Sp/Z45UwMGcqIzLWVQHWk=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/checksum v1.9.15 h1:ieLCO1JxUWuxTZ1cRd0GAaeX7O6cIxnwk7tc1LsQhC4=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/checksum v1.9.15/go.mod h1:e3IzZvQ3kAWNykvE0Tr0RDZCMFInMvhku3qNpcIQXhM=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/presigned-url v1.13.23 h1:pbrxO/kuIwgEsOPLkaHu0O+m4fNgLU8B3vxQ+72jTPw=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/presigned-url v1.13.23/go.mod h1:/CMNUqoj46HpS3MNRDEDIwcgEnrtZlKRaHNaHxIFpNA=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/s3shared v1.19.23 h1:03xatSQO4+AM1lTAbnRg5OK528EUg744nW7F73U8DKw=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/s3shared v1.19.23/go.mod h1:M8l3mwgx5ToK7wot2sBBce/ojzgnPzZXUV445gTSyE8=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/s3 v1.101.0 h1:etqBTKY581iwLL/H/S2sVgk3C9lAsTJFeXWFDsDcWOU=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/s3 v1.101.0/go.mod h1:L2dcoOgS2VSgbPLvpak2NyUPsO1TBN7M45Z4H7DlRc4=
github.com/aws/smithy-go v1.25.1 h1:J8ERsGSU7d+aCmdQur5Txg6bVoYelvQJgtZehD12GkI=
github.com/aws/smithy-go v1.25.1/go.mod h1:YE2RhdIuDbA5E5bTdciG9KrW3+TiEONeUWCqxX9i1Fc=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.42.0 h1:XvXMJTkFQtpBKIWZnmr9ZEOc2InWM2yldjXEJ/bymhA=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.42.0/go.mod h1:27+ACypSLljLAEKsCYOmrjKh83vuTRkuAe9Uv/3A4bg=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws/protocol/eventstream v1.7.13 h1:p1BBrg/Hhp6uK7zpejeI8QFXHJeC/mynzi04Sl03k9g=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws/protocol/eventstream v1.7.13/go.mod h1:8cIfkE9MDhkRZGpQ22aV6/lkYeYSozpz16Smrs5x4Ls=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/credentials v1.19.24 h1:2hQqYCV9yqyePQ9o6dCrZc/zO8U3TwPr9mIKlZnPu/I=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/credentials v1.19.24/go.mod h1:IDwpACtwqHLISdzfwUUNq4P9DsB/h5BLg4FwJPNfqFY=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/configsources v1.4.29 h1:f3vKqSo13fhTYb+JEcXwXefZQE26I1FB5eTSniU67ko=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/configsources v1.4.29/go.mod h1:MzoLFUArKGpGD+ukmPiTPG1X5x4o6M2kq4v2dr1FiEc=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/endpoints/v2 v2.7.29 h1:RdwIf/CuUsvJX3RgJagbOyotl/cxoLY4xviKuE7p2GY=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/endpoints/v2 v2.7.29/go.mod h1:71wt8W2EgswdZy9Mf9KNnzxZ3TiZlv4caKghPktDOkA=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/v4a v1.4.30 h1:VTGy885W5DKBxWRUJbym9hytNaYzsyaPkCHGRRMAOhU=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/internal/v4a v1.4.30/go.mod h1:AS0HycUvJRFvTt613AYDOgO2jzw+00cVSMny8XB3yMY=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/accept-encoding v1.13.12 h1:ZD2+BSw9vFsNlKYIasSNt3uDbjqqXIBcM13UJv/Lx2k=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/accept-encoding v1.13.12/go.mod h1:Ms4zlcVBbXbiP7EVLhl+lgjvA/a7YphqQ3Ih3174EmI=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/checksum v1.9.22 h1:V51LGlOq/1VsDsHUdoklAQi7rMmx4qQubvFYAlP2254=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/checksum v1.9.22/go.mod h1:4Pzhyz8hJOm2bepgl+NjvRx8vlUFAIIvJnZ/MkcNPpU=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/presigned-url v1.13.29 h1:DRebniUGZ2MqiiIVmQJ04vIXr918hubdHMnarSLEWyU=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/presigned-url v1.13.29/go.mod h1:LfRkPCD8YHDM2E5eTkos2UpwYeZnBcVarTa8L59bJHA=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/s3shared v1.19.29 h1:hiME6pBzC7OTl9LMtlyTWBuEl1f4QBcUmFDKC7MLXtc=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/s3shared v1.19.29/go.mod h1:G7RP+uhagpKtKhd1BM9N6JQqjCcGEU47K5lBVZQyRQw=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/s3 v1.103.3 h1:JRseEu/vIDMaWis4bSw0QbXL+cvIGc1XnX076H5ZXLE=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/s3 v1.103.3/go.mod h1:77ZAgynvx1txMvDG8gGWoWkO1augYDxkp9JElWFgjQU=
github.com/aws/smithy-go v1.27.1 h1:4T340VFndXtADGF52gYa1POyL7s9E4Z1OeZ1hCscIw8=
github.com/aws/smithy-go v1.27.1/go.mod h1:YE2RhdIuDbA5E5bTdciG9KrW3+TiEONeUWCqxX9i1Fc=
github.com/aymanbagabas/go-osc52/v2 v2.0.1 h1:HwpRHbFMcZLEVr42D4p7XBqjyuxQH5SMiErDT4WkJ2k=
github.com/aymanbagabas/go-osc52/v2 v2.0.1/go.mod h1:uYgXzlJ7ZpABp8OJ+exZzJJhRNQ2ASbcXHWsFqH8hp8=
github.com/beorn7/perks v0.0.0-20180321164747-3a771d992973/go.mod h1:Dwedo/Wpr24TaqPxmxbtue+5NUziq4I4S80YR8gNf3Q=
@@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ github.com/cpuguy83/go-md2man/v2 v2.0.6/go.mod h1:oOW0eioCTA6cOiMLiUPZOpcVxMig6N
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.0/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 h1:vj9j/u1bqnvCEfJOwUhtlOARqs3+rkHYY13jYWTU97c=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
github.com/dgraph-io/badger/v4 v4.9.1 h1:DocZXZkg5JJHJPtUErA0ibyHxOVUDVoXLSCV6t8NC8w=
github.com/dgraph-io/badger/v4 v4.9.1/go.mod h1:5/MEx97uzdPUHR4KtkNt8asfI2T4JiEiQlV7kWUo8c0=
github.com/dgraph-io/badger/v4 v4.9.2 h1:Wb5qw8gElqwV1a8msHTeQKova9b1V10heFKMIiPd80E=
github.com/dgraph-io/badger/v4 v4.9.2/go.mod h1:nJjaJTUOSsQEBhsq209FmwCvMJzEA3e74RjZw6V2pQI=
github.com/dgraph-io/ristretto/v2 v2.4.0 h1:I/w09yLjhdcVD2QV192UJcq8dPBaAJb9pOuMyNy0XlU=
github.com/dgraph-io/ristretto/v2 v2.4.0/go.mod h1:0KsrXtXvnv0EqnzyowllbVJB8yBonswa2lTCK2gGo9E=
github.com/dgryski/go-farm v0.0.0-20240924180020-3414d57e47da h1:aIftn67I1fkbMa512G+w+Pxci9hJPB8oMnkcP3iZF38=
@@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ github.com/go-stack/stack v1.8.0/go.mod h1:v0f6uXyyMGvRgIKkXu+yp6POWl0qKG85gN/me
github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2 v2.5.0 h1:vM5IJoUAy3d7zRSVtIwQgBj7BiWtMPfmPEgAXnvj1Ro=
github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2 v2.5.0/go.mod h1:oJDH3BJKyqBA2TXFhDsKDGDTlndYOZ6rGS0BRZIxGhM=
github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.1.1/go.mod h1:r8qH/GZQm5c6nD/R0oafs1akxWv10x8SbQlK7atdtwQ=
github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 v5.3.1 h1:kYf81DTWFe7t+1VvL7eS+jKFVWaUnK9cB1qbwn63YCY=
github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 v5.3.1/go.mod h1:fxCRLWMO43lRc8nhHWY6LGqRcf+1gQWArsqaEUEa5bE=
github.com/golang/protobuf v1.2.0/go.mod h1:6lQm79b+lXiMfvg/cZm0SGofjICqVBUtrP5yJMmIC1U=
github.com/golang/protobuf v1.3.1/go.mod h1:6lQm79b+lXiMfvg/cZm0SGofjICqVBUtrP5yJMmIC1U=
github.com/golang/protobuf v1.3.2/go.mod h1:6lQm79b+lXiMfvg/cZm0SGofjICqVBUtrP5yJMmIC1U=
@@ -286,22 +288,22 @@ github.com/muesli/cancelreader v0.2.2 h1:3I4Kt4BQjOR54NavqnDogx/MIoWBFa0StPA8ELU
github.com/muesli/cancelreader v0.2.2/go.mod h1:3XuTXfFS2VjM+HTLZY9Ak0l6eUKfijIfMUZ4EgX0QYo=
github.com/muesli/termenv v0.16.0 h1:S5AlUN9dENB57rsbnkPyfdGuWIlkmzJjbFf0Tf5FWUc=
github.com/muesli/termenv v0.16.0/go.mod h1:ZRfOIKPFDYQoDFF4Olj7/QJbW60Ol/kL1pU3VfY/Cnk=
github.com/mulgadc/predastore v1.5.0 h1:FtL9EquoGKl3tcIRIoAXGhQStkN4uPDx0TOQZ89Mh+c=
github.com/mulgadc/predastore v1.5.0/go.mod h1:fXIGz7yCKcHh68ybcw7aigdOdzIfyt19h/0diPF+JCU=
github.com/mulgadc/viperblock v1.5.0 h1:2OprAI1oAtitUosS5A9LbenU/RCaw0oxUJvUhv8+tgU=
github.com/mulgadc/viperblock v1.5.0/go.mod h1:lIuOaBO3gC0o/EwWhJPpCuhUEPQ3/y74xckGlcBKaos=
github.com/mulgadc/predastore v1.8.0 h1:Di/PlAP8nIVjXMmjVPuS9UtqQkqMjR41RrC5J21vHmw=
github.com/mulgadc/predastore v1.8.0/go.mod h1:TC6I4Z27RCe2gPqlxqUehJ2J+/jKggnH+4DyMq1H/ng=
github.com/mulgadc/viperblock v1.8.0 h1:kVyM5RxomokVa1uA2kbhtS02kZ9aDXKVj4MvGeqsKiM=
github.com/mulgadc/viperblock v1.8.0/go.mod h1:18zxN4szsp5h6w8nTqkZWP0SWmIrLU3NdpKXDYNanls=
github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 h1:C3w9PqII01/Oq1c1nUAm88MOHcQC9l5mIlSMApZMrHA=
github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822/go.mod h1:+n7T8mK8HuQTcFwEeznm/DIxMOiR9yIdICNftLE1DvQ=
github.com/mwitkow/go-conntrack v0.0.0-20161129095857-cc309e4a2223/go.mod h1:qRWi+5nqEBWmkhHvq77mSJWrCKwh8bxhgT7d/eI7P4U=
github.com/mwitkow/go-conntrack v0.0.0-20190716064945-2f068394615f/go.mod h1:qRWi+5nqEBWmkhHvq77mSJWrCKwh8bxhgT7d/eI7P4U=
github.com/nats-io/jwt/v2 v2.8.1 h1:V0xpGuD/N8Mi+fQNDynXohVvp7ZztevW5io8CUWlPmU=
github.com/nats-io/jwt/v2 v2.8.1/go.mod h1:nWnOEEiVMiKHQpnAy4eXlizVEtSfzacZ1Q43LIRavZg=
github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 v2.14.1 h1:wXs/a5fw9Hzm3CvuzLxGeIwpjPulSa7gMT3eSuhGkcg=
github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 v2.14.1/go.mod h1:4N17zLpuS7WMbG8T9gsE2B7z9hC9PraPyulVBfpK6nU=
github.com/nats-io/jwt/v2 v2.8.2 h1:XXRgB60MSTnqsRwejQurVDs/hcv2dkt+86GjI+I/bMc=
github.com/nats-io/jwt/v2 v2.8.2/go.mod h1:Ag/56sq9OblL4JgdYufDd16Egb17Kr/8WwwuO/forVc=
github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 v2.14.2 h1:Q7dRhCY03Y00rETFW3KV+KGaCIajlDfWgWUVgbMxyuk=
github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 v2.14.2/go.mod h1:lWpb1bSpRELZfRdlMkdz8E7lbXKKyNe8RIn0vvepIHs=
github.com/nats-io/nats.go v1.52.0 h1:n3avV4VBsCgsdwh71TppsTwtv+QdPs7ntSKM8qJLGsc=
github.com/nats-io/nats.go v1.52.0/go.mod h1:26HypzazeOkyO3/mqd1zZd53STJN0EjCYF9Uy2ZOBno=
github.com/nats-io/nkeys v0.4.15 h1:JACV5jRVO9V856KOapQ7x+EY8Jo3qw1vJt/9Jpwzkk4=
github.com/nats-io/nkeys v0.4.15/go.mod h1:CpMchTXC9fxA5zrMo4KpySxNjiDVvr8ANOSZdiNfUrs=
github.com/nats-io/nkeys v0.4.16 h1:rd5oAuLOb8mnAycB0xleuEBNS1pVVnN0fv/FF34Eypg=
github.com/nats-io/nkeys v0.4.16/go.mod h1:llLgWoI0o4z/Q57q2R1kHfmocyhGV6VG/U18Glg1Afs=
github.com/nats-io/nuid v1.0.1 h1:5iA8DT8V7q8WK2EScv2padNa/rTESc1KdnPw4TC2paw=
github.com/nats-io/nuid v1.0.1/go.mod h1:19wcPz3Ph3q0Jbyiqsd0kePYG7A95tJPxeL+1OSON2c=
github.com/ovn-kubernetes/libovsdb v0.8.1 h1:M2J8bcJt5mXCom0HqzfEtuHkT80CTSQRcYG7acT8gf4=
@@ -351,8 +353,10 @@ github.com/pterm/pterm v0.12.36/go.mod h1:NjiL09hFhT/vWjQHSj1athJpx6H8cjpHXNAK5b
github.com/pterm/pterm v0.12.40/go.mod h1:ffwPLwlbXxP+rxT0GsgDTzS3y3rmpAO1NMjUkGTYf8s=
github.com/pterm/pterm v0.12.83 h1:ie+YmGmA727VuhxBlyGr74Ks+7McV6kT99IB8EU80aA=
github.com/pterm/pterm v0.12.83/go.mod h1:xlgc6bFWyJIMtmLJvGim+L7jhSReilOlOnodeIYe4Tk=
github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.59.1 h1:0Gmua0HW1Tv7ANR7hUYwRyD0MG5OJfgvYSZasGZzBic=
github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.59.1/go.mod h1:upnsH4Ju1YkqpLXC305eW3yDZ4NfnNbmQRCMWS58IKU=
github.com/quic-go/go-ossfuzz-seeds v0.1.0 h1:APacT+iIaNF6fd8AGEiN3bT/Jtkd2jz4v4TzM7MFjy0=
github.com/quic-go/go-ossfuzz-seeds v0.1.0/go.mod h1:3IOHRbJIc+L6YKMwfDtJAM9Vj9k0YY4muhuyUYk5tbk=
github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.60.0 h1:xcQioE8OM66UQLeUMHltK1CCcOu3JbVB4JAQdDQSB+0=
github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.60.0/go.mod h1:wpKpjmPpftl30sL6pFh7REVpjbcCVy4zt2vDyK1TuJk=
github.com/rivo/uniseg v0.2.0/go.mod h1:J6wj4VEh+S6ZtnVlnTBMWIodfgj8LQOQFoIToxlJtxc=
github.com/rivo/uniseg v0.4.7 h1:WUdvkW8uEhrYfLC4ZzdpI2ztxP1I582+49Oc5Mq64VQ=
github.com/rivo/uniseg v0.4.7/go.mod h1:FN3SvrM+Zdj16jyLfmOkMNblXMcoc8DfTHruCPUcx88=
@@ -424,14 +428,14 @@ golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20180904163835-0709b304e793/go.mod h1:6SG95UA2DQfeDnf
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190308221718-c2843e01d9a2/go.mod h1:djNgcEr1/C05ACkg1iLfiJU5Ep61QUkGW8qpdssI0+w=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20200622213623-75b288015ac9/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPhUkYOs5KpL4U8rLKemX1yGLhDgUto=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210921155107-089bfa567519/go.mod h1:GvvjBRRGRdwPK5ydBHafDWAxML/pGHZbMvKqRZ5+Abc=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.52.0 h1:RMs7fP2rXdep0CftQlK8Uf+kibLm7qkCcradZWYz988=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.52.0/go.mod h1:1QgfPxDqh0T2M/elOJtp9RvuR95kVjir0e6/BvEmGbc=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.53.0 h1:QZ4Muo8THX6CizN2vPPd5fBGHyogrdK9fG4wLPFUsto=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.53.0/go.mod h1:DNLU434OwVakk9PzuwV8w62mAJpRJL3vsgcfp4Qnsio=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20231110203233-9a3e6036ecaa h1:FRnLl4eNAQl8hwxVVC17teOw8kdjVDVAiFMtgUdTSRQ=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20231110203233-9a3e6036ecaa/go.mod h1:zk2irFbV9DP96SEBUUAy67IdHUaZuSnrz1n472HUCLE=
golang.org/x/mod v0.6.0-dev.0.20220419223038-86c51ed26bb4/go.mod h1:jJ57K6gSWd91VN4djpZkiMVwK6gcyfeH4XE8wZrZaV4=
golang.org/x/mod v0.8.0/go.mod h1:iBbtSCu2XBx23ZKBPSOrRkjjQPZFPuis4dIYUhu/chs=
golang.org/x/mod v0.35.0 h1:Ww1D637e6Pg+Zb2KrWfHQUnH2dQRLBQyAtpr/haaJeM=
golang.org/x/mod v0.35.0/go.mod h1:+GwiRhIInF8wPm+4AoT6L0FA1QWAad3OMdTRx4tFYlU=
golang.org/x/mod v0.36.0 h1:JJjpVx6myfUsUdAzZuOSTTmRE0PfZeNWzzvKrP7amb4=
golang.org/x/mod v0.36.0/go.mod h1:moc6ELqsWcOw5Ef3xVprK5ul/MvtVvkIXLziUOICjUQ=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20180724234803-3673e40ba225/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20181114220301-adae6a3d119a/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20190108225652-1e06a53dbb7e/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4=
@@ -442,8 +446,8 @@ golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20200625001655-4c5254603344/go.mod h1:/O7V0waA8r7cgGh81R
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210226172049-e18ecbb05110/go.mod h1:m0MpNAwzfU5UDzcl9v0D8zg8gWTRqZa9RBIspLL5mdg=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20220722155237-a158d28d115b/go.mod h1:XRhObCWvk6IyKnWLug+ECip1KBveYUHfp+8e9klMJ9c=
golang.org/x/net v0.6.0/go.mod h1:2Tu9+aMcznHK/AK1HMvgo6xiTLG5rD5rZLDS+rp2Bjs=
golang.org/x/net v0.55.0 h1:bcvxaJn3e1U6InsFWt1JUq1aSjnRxLzT2rtD2KfkDF8=
golang.org/x/net v0.55.0/go.mod h1:L5U2KuzuOe1lY7Z+aWVIKK6qEeJXnXV9yzGA+WCHJww=
golang.org/x/net v0.56.0 h1:Rw8j/hFzGvJUZwNBXnAtf5sVDVt+65SK2C7IxCxZt5o=
golang.org/x/net v0.56.0/go.mod h1:D3Ku6r+V6JROoZK144D2XfMHFcMq/0zSfLelVTCFKec=
golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20190226205417-e64efc72b421/go.mod h1:gOpvHmFTYa4IltrdGE7lF6nIHvwfUNPOp7c8zoXwtLw=
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20181108010431-42b317875d0f/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20181221193216-37e7f081c4d4/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
@@ -452,8 +456,8 @@ golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20190911185100-cd5d95a43a6e/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJ
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20201207232520-09787c993a3a/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20220722155255-886fb9371eb4/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
golang.org/x/sync v0.1.0/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0 h1:e0PTpb7pjO8GAtTs2dQ6jYa5BWYlMuX047Dco/pItO4=
golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0 h1:HLII4xRRTtCRkxYp4HNFF0Js/Og6q2i++KXbg0gHCwM=
golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20180905080454-ebe1bf3edb33/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20181116152217-5ac8a444bdc5/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190215142949-d0b11bdaac8a/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
@@ -484,33 +488,33 @@ golang.org/x/sys v0.1.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.5.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.6.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.21.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
golang.org/x/sys v0.45.0 h1:dO4czNzziLiiXplLQgBCEpCvXQ3dnkn0SdaZSYdQ+FY=
golang.org/x/sys v0.45.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
golang.org/x/telemetry v0.0.0-20260409153401-be6f6cb8b1fa h1:efT73AJZfAAUV7SOip6pWGkwJDzIGiKBZGVzHYa+ve4=
golang.org/x/telemetry v0.0.0-20260409153401-be6f6cb8b1fa/go.mod h1:kHjTxDEnAu6/Nl9lDkzjWpR+bmKfxeiRuSDlsMb70gE=
golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0 h1:noSf2Fq6F8DBgS+LysIkx7rIExoNHJsxOAtPp4rthXw=
golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
golang.org/x/telemetry v0.0.0-20260508192327-42602be52be6 h1:HjU6IWBiAgRIdAJ9/y1rwCn+UELEmwV+VsTLzj/W4sE=
golang.org/x/telemetry v0.0.0-20260508192327-42602be52be6/go.mod h1:Eqhaxk/wZsWEH8CRxLwj6xzEJbz7k1EFGqx7nyCoabE=
golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20201126162022-7de9c90e9dd1/go.mod h1:bj7SfCRtBDWHUb9snDiAeCFNEtKQo2Wmx5Cou7ajbmo=
golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20210220032956-6a3ed077a48d/go.mod h1:bj7SfCRtBDWHUb9snDiAeCFNEtKQo2Wmx5Cou7ajbmo=
golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20210615171337-6886f2dfbf5b/go.mod h1:jbD1KX2456YbFQfuXm/mYQcufACuNUgVhRMnK/tPxf8=
golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20210927222741-03fcf44c2211/go.mod h1:jbD1KX2456YbFQfuXm/mYQcufACuNUgVhRMnK/tPxf8=
golang.org/x/term v0.5.0/go.mod h1:jMB1sMXY+tzblOD4FWmEbocvup2/aLOaQEp7JmGp78k=
golang.org/x/term v0.43.0 h1:S4RLU2sB31O/NCl+zFN9Aru9A/Cq2aqKpTZJ6B+DwT4=
golang.org/x/term v0.43.0/go.mod h1:lrhlHNdQJHO+1qVYiHfFKVuVioJIheAc3fBSMFYEIsk=
golang.org/x/term v0.44.0 h1:0rLvDRCtNj0gZkyIXhCyOb2OAzEhLVqc4B+hrsBhrmc=
golang.org/x/term v0.44.0/go.mod h1:7ze4MdzUzLXpSAoFP1H0bOI9aXDqveSvatT5vKcFh2Y=
golang.org/x/text v0.3.0/go.mod h1:NqM8EUOU14njkJ3fqMW+pc6Ldnwhi/IjpwHt7yyuwOQ=
golang.org/x/text v0.3.2/go.mod h1:bEr9sfX3Q8Zfm5fL9x+3itogRgK3+ptLWKqgva+5dAk=
golang.org/x/text v0.3.3/go.mod h1:5Zoc/QRtKVWzQhOtBMvqHzDpF6irO9z98xDceosuGiQ=
golang.org/x/text v0.3.7/go.mod h1:u+2+/6zg+i71rQMx5EYifcz6MCKuco9NR6JIITiCfzQ=
golang.org/x/text v0.7.0/go.mod h1:mrYo+phRRbMaCq/xk9113O4dZlRixOauAjOtrjsXDZ8=
golang.org/x/text v0.9.0/go.mod h1:e1OnstbJyHTd6l/uOt8jFFHp6TRDWZR/bV3emEE/zU8=
golang.org/x/text v0.37.0 h1:Cqjiwd9eSg8e0QAkyCaQTNHFIIzWtidPahFWR83rTrc=
golang.org/x/text v0.37.0/go.mod h1:a5sjxXGs9hsn/AJVwuElvCAo9v8QYLzvavO5z2PiM38=
golang.org/x/text v0.38.0 h1:sXmwo9DwP3OK9EZ7PqAdaooSGozfl/3a6/xJcbzPRhE=
golang.org/x/text v0.38.0/go.mod h1:YXZt3QhHUKYT53r2lLKFIVi6Ao1jdzrTR/KQ09qyxF4=
golang.org/x/time v0.15.0 h1:bbrp8t3bGUeFOx08pvsMYRTCVSMk89u4tKbNOZbp88U=
golang.org/x/time v0.15.0/go.mod h1:Y4YMaQmXwGQZoFaVFk4YpCt4FLQMYKZe9oeV/f4MSno=
golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20180917221912-90fa682c2a6e/go.mod h1:n7NCudcB/nEzxVGmLbDWY5pfWTLqBcC2KZ6jyYvM4mQ=
golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20191119224855-298f0cb1881e/go.mod h1:b+2E5dAYhXwXZwtnZ6UAqBI28+e2cm9otk0dWdXHAEo=
golang.org/x/tools v0.1.12/go.mod h1:hNGJHUnrk76NpqgfD5Aqm5Crs+Hm0VOH/i9J2+nxYbc=
golang.org/x/tools v0.6.0/go.mod h1:Xwgl3UAJ/d3gWutnCtw505GrjyAbvKui8lOU390QaIU=
golang.org/x/tools v0.44.0 h1:UP4ajHPIcuMjT1GqzDWRlalUEoY+uzoZKnhOjbIPD2c=
golang.org/x/tools v0.44.0/go.mod h1:KA0AfVErSdxRZIsOVipbv3rQhVXTnlU6UhKxHd1seDI=
golang.org/x/tools v0.45.0 h1:18qN3FAooORvApf5XjCXgsuayZOEtXf6JK18I3+ONa8=
golang.org/x/tools v0.45.0/go.mod h1:LuUGqqaXcXMEFEruIVJVm5mgDD8vww/z/SR1gQ4uE/0=
golang.org/x/tools/go/expect v0.1.1-deprecated h1:jpBZDwmgPhXsKZC6WhL20P4b/wmnpsEAGHaNy0n/rJM=
golang.org/x/tools/go/expect v0.1.1-deprecated/go.mod h1:eihoPOH+FgIqa3FpoTwguz/bVUSGBlGQU67vpBeOrBY=
golang.org/x/tools/go/packages/packagestest v0.1.1-deprecated h1:1h2MnaIAIXISqTFKdENegdpAgUXz6NrPEsbIeWaBRvM=
@@ -534,8 +538,8 @@ gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8
gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20190902080502-41f04d3bba15/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20201130134442-10cb98267c6c h1:Hei/4ADfdWqJk1ZMxUNpqntNwaWcugrBjAiHlqqRiVk=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20201130134442-10cb98267c6c/go.mod h1:JHkPIbrfpd72SG/EVd6muEfDQjcINNoR0C8j2r3qZ4Q=
gopkg.in/ini.v1 v1.67.2 h1:JtOSMb9OuaCZKr7h5D/h6iii14sK0hLbplTc6frx4Ss=
gopkg.in/ini.v1 v1.67.2/go.mod h1:x/cyOwCgZqOkJoDIJ3c1KNHMo10+nLGAhh+kn3Zizss=
gopkg.in/ini.v1 v1.67.3 h1:iM9Lhz5MRSGhHVGGwCuzG9KO8PoirCXj/m/qTmOJJQw=
gopkg.in/ini.v1 v1.67.3/go.mod h1:x/cyOwCgZqOkJoDIJ3c1KNHMo10+nLGAhh+kn3Zizss=
gopkg.in/yaml.v2 v2.2.1/go.mod h1:hI93XBmqTisBFMUTm0b8Fm+jr3Dg1NNxqwp+5A1VGuI=
gopkg.in/yaml.v2 v2.2.2/go.mod h1:hI93XBmqTisBFMUTm0b8Fm+jr3Dg1NNxqwp+5A1VGuI=
gopkg.in/yaml.v2 v2.2.4/go.mod h1:hI93XBmqTisBFMUTm0b8Fm+jr3Dg1NNxqwp+5A1VGuI=
+112
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
// Package eksgw is the on-VM SigV4 client used by EKS helpers (eks-gateway-publish,
// eks-token-webhook) to POST over HTTPS to the AWS gateway instead of NATS.
// Signs with Predastore credentials for service "eks".
package eksgw
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"os"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/mulgadc/predastore/auth"
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/tlsconfig"
)
// Client posts SigV4-signed requests to the AWS gateway for the "eks" service.
type Client struct {
baseURL string
accessKey string
secretKey string
region string
httpClient *http.Client
}
// New builds a client. caPath optionally pins the gateway TLS CA; when empty the
// client relies on the system trust store. region defaults to us-east-1 when
// empty (SigV4 requires a non-empty region).
func New(baseURL, caPath, accessKey, secretKey, region string) (*Client, error) {
if baseURL == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("eksgw: baseURL is required")
}
if accessKey == "" || secretKey == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("eksgw: access key and secret key are required")
}
if region == "" {
region = "us-east-1"
}
tlsCfg := &tls.Config{
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13,
CurvePreferences: tlsconfig.Curves,
}
if caPath != "" {
pem, err := os.ReadFile(caPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("eksgw: read gateway CA %q: %w", caPath, err)
}
pool := x509.NewCertPool()
if !pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(pem) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("eksgw: gateway CA %q has no usable certificates", caPath)
}
tlsCfg.RootCAs = pool
}
return &Client{
baseURL: strings.TrimRight(baseURL, "/"),
accessKey: accessKey,
secretKey: secretKey,
region: region,
httpClient: &http.Client{
Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
Transport: &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: tlsCfg, MaxIdleConns: 2, IdleConnTimeout: 30 * time.Second},
},
}, nil
}
// Post SigV4-signs and sends body to path, returning the response body on 2xx.
// Errors include the gateway status and body. No retry; callers wrap as needed.
func (c *Client) Post(path string, body []byte) ([]byte, error) {
return c.do(http.MethodPost, path, body)
}
// Get SigV4-signs and sends a single GET to path (e.g.
// "/clusters/alpha/internal-addons?accountId=..."). Same contract as Post: 2xx
// body or an error carrying the gateway status. No retry.
func (c *Client) Get(path string) ([]byte, error) {
return c.do(http.MethodGet, path, nil)
}
func (c *Client) do(method, path string, body []byte) ([]byte, error) {
req, err := http.NewRequest(method, c.baseURL+path, bytes.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create request: %w", err)
}
if body != nil {
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-amz-json-1.1")
}
sum := sha256.Sum256(body)
if err := auth.SignReq(req, c.accessKey, c.secretKey, hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]), "eks", c.region); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("sign request: %w", err)
}
resp, err := c.httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("send request: %w", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
respBody, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("gateway returned %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, strings.TrimSpace(string(respBody)))
}
return respBody, nil
}
+3 -9
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,6 @@
// Package fipsboot enforces FIPS 140-3 mode at process startup.
//
// Blank-import this package from every binary's main:
//
// import _ "github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/fipsboot"
//
// Builds with GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 link the Go Cryptographic Module v1.0.0
// (NIST CMVP cert #5247). At runtime FIPS mode can still be turned off
// via GODEBUG=fips140=off; init() panics in that case to close the hole.
// Package fipsboot enforces FIPS 140-3 at startup via blank import in every binary.
// Requires GOFIPS140=v1.0.0 at build time; panics if GODEBUG=fips140=off disables
// the runtime FIPS mode.
package fipsboot
import (
+5 -26
View File
@@ -1,34 +1,13 @@
// Package tlsconfig pins the cluster-wide TLS 1.3 curve preference list.
//
// The list is hardcoded because mixed classification on a single cluster is
// not supported and the certified FIPS build is itself the per-deployment
// choice. A typo in a config string would silently downgrade where a missing
// constant cannot.
// Hardcoded to prevent silent downgrade via misconfiguration; the FIPS build
// is the per-deployment choice.
package tlsconfig
import "crypto/tls"
// Curves is the fixed TLS 1.3 curve allowlist:
//
// - X25519MLKEM768 — Cat 3 ML-KEM hybrid, wins under Go 1.26 stdlib filter
// - SecP384r1MLKEM1024 — Cat 5 ML-KEM hybrid, fallback for peers that prefer it
// - X25519 — classical TLS 1.3 fallback for SDKs without ML-KEM (aws CLI v2 today)
// - CurveP384 — classical TLS 1.3 fallback (Java/.NET enterprise SDKs)
//
// PQ-capable peers (browsers since 2024, Go aws-sdk v2 with Go 1.24+) always
// negotiate the hybrid first; classical fallback only triggers for peers that
// cannot do ML-KEM. Those connections still get TLS 1.3 + AES-256-GCM but
// remain HNDL-exposed — accepted trade-off until AWS CLI v2 / bundled
// OpenSSL ships ML-KEM (currently lagging upstream OpenSSL 3.5).
//
// Weak/niche entries from the Go stdlib default (SecP256r1MLKEM768, P-256,
// P-521) are intentionally excluded so they cannot be advertised.
//
// Go 1.26 stdlib treats tls.Config.CurvePreferences as an allowlist filter
// applied to the stdlib default order, not as a user-supplied order.
//
// Callers must not mutate this slice. Assign it directly to
// tls.Config.CurvePreferences; do not append to it.
// Curves is the fixed TLS 1.3 curve allowlist: two ML-KEM hybrids (PQ-capable
// peers always negotiate these) followed by two classical fallbacks for SDKs
// without ML-KEM. Weak Go defaults (SecP256r1MLKEM768, P-256, P-521) excluded.
var Curves = []tls.CurveID{
tls.X25519MLKEM768,
tls.SecP384r1MLKEM1024,
+5 -9
View File
@@ -46,11 +46,9 @@ func TestCurves_ExcludesWeakPrimitives(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestIntegration_NegotiatesPQHybrid spins up an httptest TLS server
// configured with Curves + TLS 1.3 minimum, dials it, and asserts a PQ
// hybrid is negotiated at TLS 1.3. Per Go 1.26 stdlib filter behavior the
// winner is X25519MLKEM768; the assertion checks for any approved hybrid
// to remain stable across stdlib reorderings of our 4 entries.
// TestIntegration_NegotiatesPQHybrid verifies that a Curves-configured server
// negotiates a PQ hybrid at TLS 1.3; checks for any approved hybrid to stay
// stable across Go stdlib reorderings.
func TestIntegration_NegotiatesPQHybrid(t *testing.T) {
cert := selfSignedCert(t)
srv := httptest.NewUnstartedServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
@@ -95,10 +93,8 @@ func TestIntegration_NegotiatesPQHybrid(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestIntegration_TLS12ClientRejected confirms MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13
// is enforced — a TLS 1.2-pinned client gets a handshake error rather than
// silently downgrading. This is the negative test that closes the HNDL gap
// on external surfaces.
// TestIntegration_TLS12ClientRejected confirms MinVersion TLS 1.3 is enforced:
// a TLS 1.2-pinned client must get a handshake error, not a silent downgrade.
func TestIntegration_TLS12ClientRejected(t *testing.T) {
cert := selfSignedCert(t)
srv := httptest.NewUnstartedServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-96
View File
@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
# Ansible Dev Lifecycle (parallel to bash scripts)
Experimental Ansible-based lifecycle for a single-node Spinifex dev host.
Lives alongside the existing `scripts/dev-*.sh` and `scripts/reset-dev-env.sh`;
neither set is removed. Decide which to keep after parity testing.
Plan: `docs/development/improvements/ansible-dev-lifecycle.md` (mulga top-level).
Bead: `mulga-siv-9`.
## Prerequisites
Venv lives at sub-repo root (`spinifex/.venv/`) — one venv per sub-repo,
shared by any future python tooling in spinifex. Bootstrap from `spinifex/`:
```
sudo apt install python3.13-venv
python3 -m venv .venv
source .venv/bin/activate
pip install 'ansible>=9'
ansible-galaxy collection install -r scripts/ansible/requirements.yml
```
Then `cd scripts/ansible` to run playbooks — `ansible.cfg` resolves the
inventory and roles relative to CWD.
## Playbooks
| Playbook | Purpose | Bash parity |
|---|---|---|
| `playbooks/dev-preflight.yml` | Dependency + port check | `dev-setup.sh` §checks |
| `playbooks/dev-teardown.yml` | Wipe state only (no reinstall) | `reset-dev-env.sh` §teardown |
| `playbooks/dev-install.yml` | Build + install + init + smoketest on clean box | `dev-install.sh` |
| `playbooks/dev-reset.yml` | Capture settings → teardown → build → install → init → smoketest | `reset-dev-env.sh` (full) |
| `playbooks/dev-deploy.yml` | Rebuild + swap binaries/microvm artifacts + restart (no setup.sh, no smoketest) | `make deploy` |
Upcoming (not yet implemented):
- `dev-mode-start.yml` / `dev-mode-stop.yml` — parity with `start-dev.sh` / `stop-dev.sh`
(lowest priority — deprecated bash scripts, CI-only callers).
## Invocation
```
ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-preflight.yml
ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-teardown.yml
ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-install.yml
ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-reset.yml
ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-deploy.yml
```
Or via `make` (from `spinifex/`):
```
make ansible-dev-preflight
make ansible-dev-teardown
make ansible-dev-install
make ansible-dev-reset
make ansible-dev-deploy
```
### When to use which
- First-time / clean box → `ansible-dev-install`
- Iterate on Go code, microvm initramfs, lb-agent → `ansible-dev-deploy` (fast)
- Changed systemd units, helper scripts, logrotate, setup.sh → `ansible-dev-reset` (slow, full rebuild)
- Need a clean slate without reinstall → `ansible-dev-teardown`
## Variable overrides
Defaults in `vars/defaults.yml`. Override per run with `-e`:
```
ansible-playbook playbooks/dev-teardown.yml -e spinifex_wipe_ssh_keys=true
```
Useful overrides:
| Var | Default | What it does |
|---|---|---|
| `spinifex_wipe_legacy_home` | `true` | Remove `$HOME/spinifex` (legacy dev-mode path) |
| `spinifex_wipe_ssh_keys` | `false` | Remove `~/.ssh/spinifex-key*` |
| `spinifex_wipe_aws_creds` | `false` | Remove spinifex profile from `~/.aws/credentials` |
| `teardown_process_wait_seconds` | `30` | Grace period for processes to exit |
| `spinifex_region` | `ap-southeast-2` | Region passed to `spx admin init` |
| `spinifex_az` | `{{ region }}a` | AZ passed to `spx admin init` |
| `spinifex_external_mode` | `pool` | `pool` \| `nat` external networking |
`dev-reset.yml` automatically captures `region`, `az`, `external_mode`,
pool range, gateway, prefix-len, nat gateway_ip from the existing
`/etc/spinifex/spinifex.toml` before teardown and replays them into
`init`. Use `-e` to override.
## Leak catalog
`roles/teardown/README.md` tracks every known state source. When teardown
misses something, add it there and in `roles/teardown/tasks/main.yml`.
-11
View File
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
[defaults]
inventory = inventory/localhost.yml
roles_path = roles
stdout_callback = ansible.builtin.default
host_key_checking = False
retry_files_enabled = False
interpreter_python = auto_silent
forks = 1
[callback_default]
result_format = yaml
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
---
all:
hosts:
localhost:
ansible_connection: local
ansible_python_interpreter: "{{ ansible_playbook_python }}"
-14
View File
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
---
# In-place artifact swap: rebuilds + replaces binaries/microvm artifacts on
# an already-installed node, then restarts spinifex.target. Use when iterating
# on code without altering systemd units, users, dirs, or running the full
# smoketest. For first-time or unit/script changes use dev-install / dev-reset.
- name: Dev deploy — build + swap binaries + restart (no setup.sh, no smoketest)
hosts: localhost
gather_facts: true
vars_files:
- ../vars/defaults.yml
roles:
- build
- deploy
-67
View File
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Dev install — build, install, init, smoketest (idempotent)
hosts: localhost
gather_facts: true
vars_files:
- ../vars/defaults.yml
pre_tasks:
- name: preflight
ansible.builtin.include_role:
name: preflight
- name: health — config file present?
ansible.builtin.stat:
path: "{{ spinifex_config_file }}"
register: health_config
- name: health — spinifex.target active?
become: true
ansible.builtin.command: systemctl is-active spinifex.target
register: health_target
changed_when: false
failed_when: false
- name: health — awsgw responds?
become: true
become_user: "{{ spinifex_invoking_user }}"
environment:
AWS_PROFILE: spinifex
ansible.builtin.command: aws ec2 describe-regions
register: health_gw
changed_when: false
failed_when: false
- name: health — spx binary installed?
ansible.builtin.stat:
path: /usr/local/bin/spx
register: health_spx
- name: health — set already_installed fact
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
spinifex_already_installed: >-
{{ health_config.stat.exists
and health_spx.stat.exists
and (health_target.stdout | trim) == 'active'
and health_gw.rc == 0 }}
- name: health — summary
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: |
Health:
spx binary: {{ 'present' if health_spx.stat.exists else 'missing' }}
config: {{ 'present' if health_config.stat.exists else 'missing' }}
target: {{ health_target.stdout | trim }}
awsgw: {{ 'ok' if health_gw.rc == 0 else 'not responding' }}
Already installed: {{ spinifex_already_installed }}
{% if spinifex_already_installed %}
→ Skipping build/install/init. Smoketest only.
{% else %}
→ Running full build → install → init → smoketest.
{% endif %}
roles:
- { role: build, when: not (spinifex_already_installed | default(false)) }
- { role: install, when: not (spinifex_already_installed | default(false)) }
- { role: init, when: not (spinifex_already_installed | default(false)) }
- smoketest
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Dev preflight — validate host dependencies
hosts: localhost
gather_facts: true
vars_files:
- ../vars/defaults.yml
roles:
- preflight
-57
View File
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Dev reset — capture settings, wipe, rebuild, reinstall, re-init, smoketest
hosts: localhost
gather_facts: true
vars_files:
- ../vars/defaults.yml
pre_tasks:
- name: capture — check existing spinifex.toml
ansible.builtin.stat:
path: "{{ spinifex_config_file }}"
register: reset_config_stat
- name: capture — slurp existing config
ansible.builtin.slurp:
src: "{{ spinifex_config_file }}"
register: reset_config_raw
when: reset_config_stat.stat.exists
- name: capture — decode config
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
reset_config_txt: "{{ reset_config_raw.content | b64decode }}"
when: reset_config_stat.stat.exists
# List-concat-and-take-first pattern: missing regex match falls back to current default.
- name: capture — extract scalars
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
spinifex_region: "{{ (reset_config_txt | regex_findall('region\\s*=\\s*\"([^\"]+)\"') + [spinifex_region])[0] }}"
spinifex_az: "{{ (reset_config_txt | regex_findall('\\baz\\s*=\\s*\"([^\"]+)\"') + [spinifex_az])[0] }}"
spinifex_external_mode: "{{ (reset_config_txt | regex_findall('external_mode\\s*=\\s*\"([^\"]+)\"') + [spinifex_external_mode])[0] }}"
spinifex_external_pool_start: "{{ (reset_config_txt | regex_findall('range_start\\s*=\\s*\"([^\"]+)\"') + [spinifex_external_pool_start])[0] }}"
spinifex_external_pool_end: "{{ (reset_config_txt | regex_findall('range_end\\s*=\\s*\"([^\"]+)\"') + [spinifex_external_pool_end])[0] }}"
spinifex_external_gateway: "{{ (reset_config_txt | regex_findall('gateway\\s*=\\s*\"([^\"]+)\"') + [spinifex_external_gateway])[0] }}"
spinifex_external_prefix_len: "{{ (reset_config_txt | regex_findall('prefix_len\\s*=\\s*([0-9]+)') + [spinifex_external_prefix_len | string])[0] }}"
spinifex_nat_gateway_ip: "{{ (reset_config_txt | regex_findall('gateway_ip\\s*=\\s*\"([^\"]+)\"') + [spinifex_nat_gateway_ip])[0] }}"
when: reset_config_stat.stat.exists
- name: capture — summary
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: |
{% if reset_config_stat.stat.exists %}
Captured settings from {{ spinifex_config_file }}:
region={{ spinifex_region }}, az={{ spinifex_az }}
external_mode={{ spinifex_external_mode }}
pool={{ spinifex_external_pool_start }}-{{ spinifex_external_pool_end }}
gateway={{ spinifex_external_gateway }}, prefix={{ spinifex_external_prefix_len }}
nat_gateway={{ spinifex_nat_gateway_ip }}
{% else %}
No existing config; using defaults from vars/defaults.yml (or -e overrides).
{% endif %}
roles:
- teardown
- build
- install
- init
- smoketest
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Dev teardown — wipe Spinifex state (no reinstall)
hosts: localhost
gather_facts: true
vars_files:
- ../vars/defaults.yml
roles:
- teardown
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
---
collections:
- name: community.general
version: ">=8.0.0"
- name: ansible.posix
version: ">=1.5.0"
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
---
galaxy_info:
role_name: build
description: Build spinifex + viperblock-nbdkit, stage tarball for setup.sh consumption.
license: BSD-3-Clause
min_ansible_version: "2.14"
dependencies: []
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
---
- name: build — spinifex (make build)
ansible.builtin.command:
cmd: make build
chdir: "{{ spinifex_root }}"
changed_when: true
- name: build — viperblock nbdkit plugin (make go_build_nbd)
ansible.builtin.command:
cmd: make go_build_nbd
chdir: "{{ mulga_root }}/viperblock"
changed_when: true
- name: build — detect microVM build script (present only on direct-boot branches)
ansible.builtin.stat:
path: "{{ spinifex_root }}/scripts/build-microvm-image.sh"
register: build_microvm_script
- name: build — microVM kernel + initramfs (direct-boot LBs)
ansible.builtin.command:
cmd: make build-microvm-image
chdir: "{{ spinifex_root }}"
changed_when: true
when: build_microvm_script.stat.exists
- name: build — verify build artifacts present
ansible.builtin.stat:
path: "{{ item }}"
register: build_artifacts
loop:
- "{{ spinifex_root }}/bin/spx"
- "{{ mulga_root }}/viperblock/lib/nbdkit-viperblock-plugin.so"
- name: build — assert artifacts exist
ansible.builtin.assert:
that: item.stat.exists
fail_msg: "Missing build artifact: {{ item.item }}"
loop: "{{ build_artifacts.results }}"
loop_control:
label: "{{ item.item }}"
- name: build — stage tarball contents (mirrors dev-install.sh)
ansible.builtin.shell: |
set -e
STAGING=$(mktemp -d)
trap 'rm -rf "$STAGING"' EXIT
cp "{{ spinifex_root }}/bin/spx" "$STAGING/spx"
cp "{{ mulga_root }}/viperblock/lib/nbdkit-viperblock-plugin.so" "$STAGING/"
cp "{{ spinifex_root }}/scripts/setup-ovn.sh" "$STAGING/"
mkdir -p "$STAGING/systemd"
cp "{{ spinifex_root }}/build/systemd/"* "$STAGING/systemd/"
mkdir -p "$STAGING/scripts"
cp "{{ spinifex_root }}/build/scripts/"* "$STAGING/scripts/"
cp "{{ spinifex_root }}/build/logrotate/spinifex" "$STAGING/logrotate-spinifex"
# microVM artifacts ship only when the branch built them.
if [ -f "{{ spinifex_root }}/build/microvm/vmlinuz" ] && [ -f "{{ spinifex_root }}/build/microvm/initramfs.cpio.gz" ]; then
mkdir -p "$STAGING/microvm"
cp "{{ spinifex_root }}/build/microvm/vmlinuz" "$STAGING/microvm/"
cp "{{ spinifex_root }}/build/microvm/initramfs.cpio.gz" "$STAGING/microvm/"
fi
tar czf "{{ build_tarball_path }}" -C "$STAGING" .
changed_when: true
- name: build — summary
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: "Built spx + nbdkit plugin{{ ' + microvm artifacts' if build_microvm_script.stat.exists else '' }}, tarball at {{ build_tarball_path }}"
-148
View File
@@ -1,148 +0,0 @@
---
# In-place artifact swap for an already-installed spinifex node. Mirrors
# `make deploy`: replace binaries + microvm artifacts, restart services.
# Does NOT run setup.sh (no user/dir/systemd-unit changes) or smoketest.
- name: deploy — fail fast if spinifex isn't already installed
ansible.builtin.stat:
path: "{{ spinifex_config_file }}"
register: deploy_installed_stat
failed_when: not deploy_installed_stat.stat.exists
- name: deploy — assert config present
ansible.builtin.assert:
that: deploy_installed_stat.stat.exists
fail_msg: |
{{ spinifex_config_file }} missing — this playbook only updates an
existing install. Run ansible-dev-install or ansible-dev-reset first.
- name: deploy — verify build artifacts present
ansible.builtin.stat:
path: "{{ item }}"
register: deploy_artifacts
loop:
- "{{ spinifex_root }}/bin/spx"
- "{{ mulga_root }}/viperblock/lib/nbdkit-viperblock-plugin.so"
- name: deploy — assert artifacts exist after build role
ansible.builtin.assert:
that: item.stat.exists
fail_msg: "Build artifact missing: {{ item.item }} — build role should have produced it"
loop: "{{ deploy_artifacts.results }}"
loop_control:
label: "{{ item.item }}"
- name: deploy — detect microvm artifacts (direct-boot branches only)
ansible.builtin.stat:
path: "{{ spinifex_root }}/build/microvm/{{ item }}"
register: deploy_microvm_stat
loop:
- vmlinuz
- initramfs.cpio.gz
- name: deploy — set microvm presence fact
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
deploy_microvm_present: "{{ deploy_microvm_stat.results | map(attribute='stat.exists') | min }}"
- name: deploy — detect nbdkit plugin directory
ansible.builtin.shell: |
set -e
nbdkit --dump-config | awk -F= '/^plugindir=/{print $2; exit}'
register: deploy_plugindir_cmd
changed_when: false
- name: deploy — set plugin path fact
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
deploy_plugindir: "{{ deploy_plugindir_cmd.stdout | trim }}"
- name: deploy — assert plugindir resolved
ansible.builtin.assert:
that: deploy_plugindir | length > 0
fail_msg: "Could not detect nbdkit plugin directory via `nbdkit --dump-config`"
- name: deploy — stop spinifex.target before binary swap
become: true
ansible.builtin.systemd:
name: spinifex.target
state: stopped
failed_when: false
- name: deploy — install spx binary
become: true
ansible.builtin.copy:
src: "{{ spinifex_root }}/bin/spx"
dest: /usr/local/bin/spx
mode: "0755"
owner: root
group: root
- name: deploy — install viperblock nbdkit plugin
become: true
ansible.builtin.copy:
src: "{{ mulga_root }}/viperblock/lib/nbdkit-viperblock-plugin.so"
dest: "{{ deploy_plugindir }}/nbdkit-viperblock-plugin.so"
mode: "0755"
owner: root
group: root
- name: deploy — ensure microvm dir
become: true
ansible.builtin.file:
path: /usr/share/spinifex/microvm
state: directory
mode: "0755"
owner: root
group: root
when: deploy_microvm_present
- name: deploy — install microvm kernel
become: true
ansible.builtin.copy:
src: "{{ spinifex_root }}/build/microvm/vmlinuz"
dest: /usr/share/spinifex/microvm/vmlinuz
mode: "0644"
owner: root
group: root
when: deploy_microvm_present
- name: deploy — install microvm initramfs
become: true
ansible.builtin.copy:
src: "{{ spinifex_root }}/build/microvm/initramfs.cpio.gz"
dest: /usr/share/spinifex/microvm/initramfs.cpio.gz
mode: "0644"
owner: root
group: root
when: deploy_microvm_present
- name: deploy — daemon-reload (covers any unit changes shipped via setup.sh later)
become: true
ansible.builtin.systemd:
daemon_reload: true
- name: deploy — start spinifex.target
become: true
ansible.builtin.systemd:
name: spinifex.target
state: started
- name: deploy — wait for awsgw to respond
become: true
become_user: "{{ spinifex_invoking_user }}"
environment:
AWS_PROFILE: spinifex
ansible.builtin.command: aws ec2 describe-regions
register: deploy_awsgw
retries: 15
delay: 2
until: deploy_awsgw.rc == 0
changed_when: false
- name: deploy — summary
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: |
Deployed:
spx → /usr/local/bin/spx
nbdkit plugin → {{ deploy_plugindir }}/nbdkit-viperblock-plugin.so
microvm → {{ '/usr/share/spinifex/microvm/{vmlinuz,initramfs.cpio.gz}' if deploy_microvm_present else 'skipped (not built on this branch)' }}
spinifex.target restarted; awsgw responding.
-7
View File
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
---
galaxy_info:
role_name: init
description: Run spx admin init, install CA trust, start services, import LB image.
license: BSD-3-Clause
min_ansible_version: "2.14"
dependencies: []
-84
View File
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
---
- name: init — base admin-init flags
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
init_base_flags: >-
--force
--region {{ spinifex_region }}
--az {{ spinifex_az }}
--node {{ spinifex_node_name }}
--nodes {{ spinifex_node_count }}
- name: init — pool-mode external flags
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
init_external_flags: >-
--external-mode=pool
--external-pool={{ spinifex_external_pool_start }}-{{ spinifex_external_pool_end }}
--external-gateway={{ spinifex_external_gateway }}
--external-prefix-len={{ spinifex_external_prefix_len }}
when:
- spinifex_external_mode == 'pool'
- spinifex_external_pool_start | length > 0
- spinifex_external_pool_end | length > 0
- name: init — NAT-mode external flags
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
init_external_flags: >-
--external-mode=nat
--gateway-ip={{ spinifex_nat_gateway_ip }}
--external-gateway={{ spinifex_external_gateway }}
--external-prefix-len={{ spinifex_external_prefix_len }}
when:
- spinifex_external_mode == 'nat'
- spinifex_nat_gateway_ip | length > 0
- name: init — assemble full flag string
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
init_all_flags: "{{ init_base_flags }} {{ init_external_flags | default('') }}"
- name: init — run spx admin init
become: true
ansible.builtin.command: "spx admin init {{ init_all_flags }}"
changed_when: true
- name: init — copy CA to system trust
become: true
ansible.builtin.copy:
src: "{{ spinifex_ca_src }}"
dest: "{{ spinifex_ca_trust_path }}"
mode: "0644"
remote_src: true
- name: init — rebuild CA bundle (not --fresh — preserve other CAs)
become: true
ansible.builtin.command: update-ca-certificates
changed_when: true
- name: init — start spinifex.target
become: true
ansible.builtin.systemd:
name: spinifex.target
state: started
# systemctl start returns as soon as units activate; awsgw still wires up
# to NATS + daemons after that. Bash start-dev.sh has internal wait loops;
# systemd path does not. Poll a benign call until gateway is fully ready.
- name: init — wait for AWS gateway readiness
become: true
become_user: "{{ spinifex_invoking_user }}"
environment:
AWS_PROFILE: spinifex
ansible.builtin.command: aws ec2 describe-regions
register: init_gw_ready
until: init_gw_ready.rc == 0
retries: 30
delay: 2
changed_when: false
- name: init — summary
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: |
Init complete:
region={{ spinifex_region }}, az={{ spinifex_az }}, node={{ spinifex_node_name }}
external_mode={{ spinifex_external_mode }}
spinifex.target: started
CA: {{ spinifex_ca_trust_path }}
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
---
galaxy_info:
role_name: install
description: Invoke setup.sh and setup-ovn.sh to install Spinifex into production paths.
license: BSD-3-Clause
min_ansible_version: "2.14"
dependencies: []
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
---
- name: install — assert tarball exists
ansible.builtin.stat:
path: "{{ build_tarball_path }}"
register: install_tarball
- name: install — fail if tarball missing
ansible.builtin.assert:
that: install_tarball.stat.exists
fail_msg: "Tarball {{ build_tarball_path }} missing. Run the build role first."
- name: install — stop spinifex.target before reinstall
become: true
ansible.builtin.systemd:
name: spinifex.target
state: stopped
failed_when: false
- name: install — reset failed state (spinifex-* scope)
become: true
ansible.builtin.command: systemctl reset-failed 'spinifex-*'
changed_when: false
failed_when: false
- name: install — scrub stale pid/log files from prior dev-mode installs
become: true
ansible.builtin.shell: |
for dir in {{ spinifex_data_dir }} {{ spinifex_log_dir }} {{ spinifex_etc_dir }}; do
if [ -d "$dir" ]; then
find "$dir" -name '*.pid' -delete 2>/dev/null || true
find "$dir" -name '*.log' -delete 2>/dev/null || true
find "$dir" -name '*.log.*' -delete 2>/dev/null || true
fi
done
changed_when: false
- name: install — remove legacy /var/lib/spinifex/config
become: true
ansible.builtin.file:
path: "{{ spinifex_data_dir }}/config"
state: absent
- name: install — run setup.sh (creates users, dirs, systemd units)
become: true
ansible.builtin.command:
cmd: "bash {{ spinifex_root }}/scripts/setup.sh"
environment:
INSTALL_SPINIFEX_TARBALL: "{{ build_tarball_path }}"
INSTALL_SPINIFEX_SKIP_NEWGRP: "1"
changed_when: true
- name: install — cleanup tarball
ansible.builtin.file:
path: "{{ build_tarball_path }}"
state: absent
- name: install — run setup-ovn.sh --management
become: true
ansible.builtin.command:
cmd: /usr/local/share/spinifex/setup-ovn.sh --management
changed_when: true
- name: install — summary
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: "Install complete — setup.sh + setup-ovn.sh ran. Services NOT yet started (init role handles that)."
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
---
galaxy_info:
role_name: preflight
description: Validate dev-host dependencies for Spinifex (parity with dev-setup.sh).
license: BSD-3-Clause
min_ansible_version: "2.14"
dependencies: []
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
---
- name: Check required commands
ansible.builtin.command: "which {{ item }}"
register: preflight_required
loop: "{{ spinifex_required_commands }}"
changed_when: false
failed_when: preflight_required.rc != 0
loop_control:
label: "{{ item }}"
- name: Check optional commands
ansible.builtin.command: "which {{ item }}"
register: preflight_optional
loop: "{{ spinifex_optional_commands }}"
changed_when: false
failed_when: false
loop_control:
label: "{{ item }}"
- name: Warn on missing optional commands
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: "WARN: optional command '{{ item.item }}' not found"
loop: "{{ preflight_optional.results }}"
when: item.rc != 0
loop_control:
label: "{{ item.item }}"
- name: Check OVN/OVS commands
ansible.builtin.command: "which {{ item }}"
register: preflight_ovn
loop: "{{ spinifex_ovn_commands }}"
changed_when: false
failed_when: false
loop_control:
label: "{{ item }}"
- name: Warn on missing OVN/OVS tools
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: "WARN: OVN/OVS tool '{{ item.item }}' not found (required for VPC networking). Install: sudo apt-get install ovn-central ovn-host openvswitch-switch"
loop: "{{ preflight_ovn.results }}"
when: item.rc != 0
loop_control:
label: "{{ item.item }}"
- name: Record OVN tool availability
ansible.builtin.set_fact:
preflight_ovs_present: "{{ (preflight_ovn.results | selectattr('item','eq','ovs-vsctl') | selectattr('rc','eq',0) | list | length) > 0 }}"
- name: Check br-int bridge
ansible.builtin.command: ovs-vsctl br-exists br-int
register: preflight_brint
changed_when: false
failed_when: false
when: preflight_ovs_present
- name: Warn if br-int missing
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: "WARN: br-int missing. Run scripts/setup-ovn.sh --management to initialise OVN networking."
when:
- preflight_ovs_present
- preflight_brint.rc | default(0) != 0
- name: Check sibling component directories
ansible.builtin.stat:
path: "{{ playbook_dir }}/../../../../{{ item }}/go.mod"
register: preflight_components
loop: "{{ spinifex_components }}"
loop_control:
label: "{{ item }}"
- name: Warn on missing component checkouts
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: "WARN: component '{{ item.item }}' not found at expected sibling path (no go.mod). Run scripts/clone-deps.sh."
loop: "{{ preflight_components.results }}"
when: not item.stat.exists
loop_control:
label: "{{ item.item }}"
- name: Check port availability
ansible.builtin.shell: "ss -tlnH 'sport = :{{ item.port }}' | head -1"
register: preflight_ports
loop: "{{ spinifex_ports }}"
changed_when: false
failed_when: false
loop_control:
label: "{{ item.service }} ({{ item.port }})"
- name: Warn on occupied ports
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: "WARN: port {{ item.item.port }} occupied (needed for {{ item.item.service }})"
loop: "{{ preflight_ports.results }}"
when: item.stdout | length > 0
loop_control:
label: "{{ item.item.service }}"
- name: Preflight summary
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: "Preflight passed. Required: {{ spinifex_required_commands | join(', ') }}. Warnings above (if any) are non-fatal."

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More