fix(auth): gate scoped JWTs on container-exec WebSocket (#1741)

Partial-auth (mfa_pending) and enroll-only (pilot_enroll) tokens skipped
the admin check on /ws because any set scope was treated as already gated.
Reject those scopes in the shared upgrade pipeline, and deny unknown scopes
on the generic path while allowing api_token, console_session, and pilot_tunnel.
This commit is contained in:
Anso
2026-07-30 18:21:59 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent a1e2846d7d
commit ce4b91e90f
3 changed files with 127 additions and 7 deletions
+83
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@@ -355,6 +355,89 @@ describe('WebSocket upgrade - exec auth enforcement', () => {
expect(code).toBe(403);
});
it('rejects WebSocket upgrade with mfa_pending token (403)', async () => {
// Partial-auth must not open /ws (upgrade early-reject + generic deny-by-default).
// Pre-fix: any set scope skipped the admin check and unlocked execContainer.
const token = jwt.sign(
{ scope: 'mfa_pending', user_id: 1, username: 'viewer' },
TEST_JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '5m' },
);
const ws = new WebSocket(getWsUrl(), { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } });
const code = await new Promise<number>((resolve) => {
ws.on('unexpected-response', (_req, res) => resolve(res.statusCode ?? 0));
ws.on('error', () => resolve(0));
});
expect(code).toBe(403);
});
it('rejects WebSocket upgrade with pilot_enroll token (403)', async () => {
const token = jwt.sign(
{ scope: 'pilot_enroll', nodeId: 1, enrollNonce: 'test-nonce' },
TEST_JWT_SECRET,
{ expiresIn: '15m' },
);
const ws = new WebSocket(getWsUrl(), { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } });
const code = await new Promise<number>((resolve) => {
ws.on('unexpected-response', (_req, res) => resolve(res.statusCode ?? 0));
ws.on('error', () => resolve(0));
});
expect(code).toBe(403);
});
it('rejects WebSocket upgrade with an unknown scoped JWT (403)', async () => {
const token = jwt.sign({ scope: 'future_machine_scope' }, TEST_JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '1m' });
const ws = new WebSocket(getWsUrl(), { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } });
const code = await new Promise<number>((resolve) => {
ws.on('unexpected-response', (_req, res) => resolve(res.statusCode ?? 0));
ws.on('error', () => resolve(0));
});
expect(code).toBe(403);
});
it('accepts WebSocket upgrade with pilot_tunnel token (pilot loopback)', async () => {
// Agent loopback injects pilot_tunnel on every forwarded WS, including /ws.
const token = jwt.sign({ scope: 'pilot_tunnel', nodeId: 1 }, TEST_JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '1h' });
const ws = new WebSocket(getWsUrl(), { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } });
const connected = await new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {
ws.on('open', () => {
ws.close();
resolve(true);
});
ws.on('error', () => resolve(false));
ws.on('unexpected-response', () => resolve(false));
});
expect(connected).toBe(true);
});
it('accepts WebSocket upgrade with container-exec console_session (remote exec)', async () => {
const { mintConsoleSession } = await import('../helpers/consoleSession');
const token = mintConsoleSession({ path: 'container-exec' });
const ws = new WebSocket(getWsUrl(), { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } });
const connected = await new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {
ws.on('open', () => {
ws.close();
resolve(true);
});
ws.on('error', () => resolve(false));
ws.on('unexpected-response', () => resolve(false));
});
expect(connected).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects host-console console_session on /ws (path gate before allowlist)', async () => {
// Path mismatch is enforced in upgradeHandler (consoleSessionPathForPathname)
// before the generic allowlist; allowlist must not be the sole path gate.
const { mintConsoleSession } = await import('../helpers/consoleSession');
const token = mintConsoleSession({ path: 'host-console' });
const ws = new WebSocket(getWsUrl(), { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } });
const code = await new Promise<number>((resolve) => {
ws.on('unexpected-response', (_req, res) => resolve(res.statusCode ?? 0));
ws.on('error', () => resolve(0));
});
expect(code).toBe(403);
});
it('accepts WebSocket upgrade with admin token', async () => {
const token = jwt.sign(
{ username: TEST_USERNAME, role: 'admin' },
+27 -6
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@@ -7,6 +7,23 @@ import { NodeRegistry } from '../services/NodeRegistry';
import { isDebugEnabled } from '../utils/debug';
import { rejectUpgrade as reject } from './reject';
/**
* Scoped JWTs allowed on the generic `/ws` upgrade after the upgrade handler's
* earlier gates. Deny-by-default: mfa_pending, pilot_enroll, node_proxy (also
* rejected via isProxyToken), and any unknown future scope must not skip the
* session admin check.
*
* - api_token: restricted scopes blocked upstream for /ws
* - console_session: path + one-time jti consumed upstream
* - pilot_tunnel: machine credential for agent loopback; no further path gate
* (must stay allowed so hub-forwarded /ws still works on pilot agents)
*/
const GENERIC_WS_ALLOWED_SCOPES = new Set([
'api_token',
'console_session',
'pilot_tunnel',
]);
/**
* Header the deploy/update/down routes carry the per-deploy correlation id on,
* mirroring the `sessionId` the frontend sends in `{action:'connectTerminal'}`.
@@ -53,12 +70,16 @@ export function handleGenericWs(
if (isProxyToken) return reject(socket, 403, 'Forbidden');
// Admin enforcement: container exec requires admin role.
// console_session tokens are already admin-gated at creation time and
// path/jti-gated in upgradeHandler. API tokens reaching this point have
// full-admin scope (read-only / deploy-only are blocked by the upgrade
// handler's scope gate).
if (!decoded.scope) {
// Admin enforcement for unscoped session JWTs: DB user must be admin.
// Scoped JWTs are deny-by-default via GENERIC_WS_ALLOWED_SCOPES (each
// allowed scope is reduced earlier in the upgrade pipeline, except
// pilot_tunnel which is the loopback machine credential itself).
if (decoded.scope) {
if (!GENERIC_WS_ALLOWED_SCOPES.has(decoded.scope)) {
console.warn('[Exec] Rejected scoped token on /ws:', decoded.scope);
return reject(socket, 403, 'Forbidden');
}
} else {
const execUser = decoded.username ? DatabaseService.getInstance().getUserByUsername(decoded.username) : undefined;
if (!execUser) {
console.warn('[Exec] User account not found:', decoded.username);
+17 -1
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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
import { DatabaseService, type UserRole } from '../services/DatabaseService';
import { LicenseService } from '../services/LicenseService';
import { NodeRegistry } from '../services/NodeRegistry';
import { COOKIE_NAME } from '../helpers/constants';
import { COOKIE_NAME, MFA_PENDING_SCOPE } from '../helpers/constants';
import { handlePilotTunnel } from './pilotTunnel';
import { handleMeshProxyTunnel } from './meshProxyTunnel';
import { handleNotificationsWs } from './notifications';
@@ -212,6 +212,22 @@ export function attachUpgrade(
};
}
// Partial-auth (mfa_pending) and enroll-only (pilot_enroll) JWTs must not
// continue past shared cookie/Bearer auth. HTTP already rejects mfa_pending
// outside MFA routes; pilot_enroll is only valid on /api/pilot/tunnel
// (handled above). Reject here for every remaining WS path so handlers that
// do not re-check scope (logs, notifications, host console, etc.) cannot
// accept them. handleGenericWs used to treat any set scope as "already
// gated" and skip admin; that path is now deny-by-default too.
// pilot_tunnel is intentionally allowed: agent loopback injects it on every
// forwarded WS, including /ws container exec.
if (
decoded.scope === MFA_PENDING_SCOPE
|| decoded.scope === 'pilot_enroll'
) {
return reject(socket, 403, 'Forbidden');
}
const parsedUrl = new URL(req.url || '', `http://${req.headers.host || 'localhost'}`);
const pathname = parsedUrl.pathname;