diff --git a/backend/src/__tests__/exec.test.ts b/backend/src/__tests__/exec.test.ts
index e9e4718b..eb6940a1 100644
--- a/backend/src/__tests__/exec.test.ts
+++ b/backend/src/__tests__/exec.test.ts
@@ -355,6 +355,89 @@ describe('WebSocket upgrade - exec auth enforcement', () => {
     expect(code).toBe(403);
   });
 
+  it('rejects WebSocket upgrade with mfa_pending token (403)', async () => {
+    // Partial-auth must not open /ws (upgrade early-reject + generic deny-by-default).
+    // Pre-fix: any set scope skipped the admin check and unlocked execContainer.
+    const token = jwt.sign(
+      { scope: 'mfa_pending', user_id: 1, username: 'viewer' },
+      TEST_JWT_SECRET,
+      { expiresIn: '5m' },
+    );
+    const ws = new WebSocket(getWsUrl(), { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } });
+    const code = await new Promise<number>((resolve) => {
+      ws.on('unexpected-response', (_req, res) => resolve(res.statusCode ?? 0));
+      ws.on('error', () => resolve(0));
+    });
+    expect(code).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects WebSocket upgrade with pilot_enroll token (403)', async () => {
+    const token = jwt.sign(
+      { scope: 'pilot_enroll', nodeId: 1, enrollNonce: 'test-nonce' },
+      TEST_JWT_SECRET,
+      { expiresIn: '15m' },
+    );
+    const ws = new WebSocket(getWsUrl(), { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } });
+    const code = await new Promise<number>((resolve) => {
+      ws.on('unexpected-response', (_req, res) => resolve(res.statusCode ?? 0));
+      ws.on('error', () => resolve(0));
+    });
+    expect(code).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects WebSocket upgrade with an unknown scoped JWT (403)', async () => {
+    const token = jwt.sign({ scope: 'future_machine_scope' }, TEST_JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '1m' });
+    const ws = new WebSocket(getWsUrl(), { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } });
+    const code = await new Promise<number>((resolve) => {
+      ws.on('unexpected-response', (_req, res) => resolve(res.statusCode ?? 0));
+      ws.on('error', () => resolve(0));
+    });
+    expect(code).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts WebSocket upgrade with pilot_tunnel token (pilot loopback)', async () => {
+    // Agent loopback injects pilot_tunnel on every forwarded WS, including /ws.
+    const token = jwt.sign({ scope: 'pilot_tunnel', nodeId: 1 }, TEST_JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '1h' });
+    const ws = new WebSocket(getWsUrl(), { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } });
+    const connected = await new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {
+      ws.on('open', () => {
+        ws.close();
+        resolve(true);
+      });
+      ws.on('error', () => resolve(false));
+      ws.on('unexpected-response', () => resolve(false));
+    });
+    expect(connected).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts WebSocket upgrade with container-exec console_session (remote exec)', async () => {
+    const { mintConsoleSession } = await import('../helpers/consoleSession');
+    const token = mintConsoleSession({ path: 'container-exec' });
+    const ws = new WebSocket(getWsUrl(), { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } });
+    const connected = await new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {
+      ws.on('open', () => {
+        ws.close();
+        resolve(true);
+      });
+      ws.on('error', () => resolve(false));
+      ws.on('unexpected-response', () => resolve(false));
+    });
+    expect(connected).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects host-console console_session on /ws (path gate before allowlist)', async () => {
+    // Path mismatch is enforced in upgradeHandler (consoleSessionPathForPathname)
+    // before the generic allowlist; allowlist must not be the sole path gate.
+    const { mintConsoleSession } = await import('../helpers/consoleSession');
+    const token = mintConsoleSession({ path: 'host-console' });
+    const ws = new WebSocket(getWsUrl(), { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } });
+    const code = await new Promise<number>((resolve) => {
+      ws.on('unexpected-response', (_req, res) => resolve(res.statusCode ?? 0));
+      ws.on('error', () => resolve(0));
+    });
+    expect(code).toBe(403);
+  });
+
   it('accepts WebSocket upgrade with admin token', async () => {
     const token = jwt.sign(
       { username: TEST_USERNAME, role: 'admin' },
diff --git a/backend/src/websocket/generic.ts b/backend/src/websocket/generic.ts
index bf93c84b..29c339cd 100644
--- a/backend/src/websocket/generic.ts
+++ b/backend/src/websocket/generic.ts
@@ -7,6 +7,23 @@ import { NodeRegistry } from '../services/NodeRegistry';
 import { isDebugEnabled } from '../utils/debug';
 import { rejectUpgrade as reject } from './reject';
 
+/**
+ * Scoped JWTs allowed on the generic `/ws` upgrade after the upgrade handler's
+ * earlier gates. Deny-by-default: mfa_pending, pilot_enroll, node_proxy (also
+ * rejected via isProxyToken), and any unknown future scope must not skip the
+ * session admin check.
+ *
+ * - api_token: restricted scopes blocked upstream for /ws
+ * - console_session: path + one-time jti consumed upstream
+ * - pilot_tunnel: machine credential for agent loopback; no further path gate
+ *   (must stay allowed so hub-forwarded /ws still works on pilot agents)
+ */
+const GENERIC_WS_ALLOWED_SCOPES = new Set([
+  'api_token',
+  'console_session',
+  'pilot_tunnel',
+]);
+
 /**
  * Header the deploy/update/down routes carry the per-deploy correlation id on,
  * mirroring the `sessionId` the frontend sends in `{action:'connectTerminal'}`.
@@ -53,12 +70,16 @@ export function handleGenericWs(
 
   if (isProxyToken) return reject(socket, 403, 'Forbidden');
 
-  // Admin enforcement: container exec requires admin role.
-  // console_session tokens are already admin-gated at creation time and
-  // path/jti-gated in upgradeHandler. API tokens reaching this point have
-  // full-admin scope (read-only / deploy-only are blocked by the upgrade
-  // handler's scope gate).
-  if (!decoded.scope) {
+  // Admin enforcement for unscoped session JWTs: DB user must be admin.
+  // Scoped JWTs are deny-by-default via GENERIC_WS_ALLOWED_SCOPES (each
+  // allowed scope is reduced earlier in the upgrade pipeline, except
+  // pilot_tunnel which is the loopback machine credential itself).
+  if (decoded.scope) {
+    if (!GENERIC_WS_ALLOWED_SCOPES.has(decoded.scope)) {
+      console.warn('[Exec] Rejected scoped token on /ws:', decoded.scope);
+      return reject(socket, 403, 'Forbidden');
+    }
+  } else {
     const execUser = decoded.username ? DatabaseService.getInstance().getUserByUsername(decoded.username) : undefined;
     if (!execUser) {
       console.warn('[Exec] User account not found:', decoded.username);
diff --git a/backend/src/websocket/upgradeHandler.ts b/backend/src/websocket/upgradeHandler.ts
index 201ba34a..a10dd489 100644
--- a/backend/src/websocket/upgradeHandler.ts
+++ b/backend/src/websocket/upgradeHandler.ts
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
 import { DatabaseService, type UserRole } from '../services/DatabaseService';
 import { LicenseService } from '../services/LicenseService';
 import { NodeRegistry } from '../services/NodeRegistry';
-import { COOKIE_NAME } from '../helpers/constants';
+import { COOKIE_NAME, MFA_PENDING_SCOPE } from '../helpers/constants';
 import { handlePilotTunnel } from './pilotTunnel';
 import { handleMeshProxyTunnel } from './meshProxyTunnel';
 import { handleNotificationsWs } from './notifications';
@@ -212,6 +212,22 @@ export function attachUpgrade(
         };
       }
 
+      // Partial-auth (mfa_pending) and enroll-only (pilot_enroll) JWTs must not
+      // continue past shared cookie/Bearer auth. HTTP already rejects mfa_pending
+      // outside MFA routes; pilot_enroll is only valid on /api/pilot/tunnel
+      // (handled above). Reject here for every remaining WS path so handlers that
+      // do not re-check scope (logs, notifications, host console, etc.) cannot
+      // accept them. handleGenericWs used to treat any set scope as "already
+      // gated" and skip admin; that path is now deny-by-default too.
+      // pilot_tunnel is intentionally allowed: agent loopback injects it on every
+      // forwarded WS, including /ws container exec.
+      if (
+        decoded.scope === MFA_PENDING_SCOPE
+        || decoded.scope === 'pilot_enroll'
+      ) {
+        return reject(socket, 403, 'Forbidden');
+      }
+
       const parsedUrl = new URL(req.url || '', `http://${req.headers.host || 'localhost'}`);
       const pathname = parsedUrl.pathname;