Compare commits

...

229 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
houseme 0914a4253c test(heal): cover privileged mount readiness
Add Linux-only ignored replacement readiness tests for independent mount admission and same-device sibling rejection.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 13:33:39 +08:00
houseme 88e285c523 perf(ecstore): gate bounded GET metadata fanout (#5917)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 05:20:21 +00:00
houseme 785ee719e7 feat(heal): aggregate replacement recovery status (#5916)
Add a replacement recovery peer RPC so Admin v4 can distinguish definitive cluster proofs from unsupported, unavailable, or conflicting peer state without extending the existing background heal v3/v1 status protocol.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 05:03:27 +00:00
Zhengchao An a8c15e90ec docs(agents): tighten production code growth rules (#5907) 2026-08-10 11:12:52 +08:00
hector 63b564d064 fix: prevent tilde expansion in DEB version substitution (#5913)
The DEB version substitution used ${VERSION/-/~} which caused bash
to expand ~ to $HOME (e.g. /home/runner), producing an invalid
version string like '1.0.0/home/runnerrc.1'.

Store ~ in a variable first to prevent tilde expansion.
2026-08-10 11:11:49 +08:00
GatewayJ d51191f81b build(deps): use RustFS s3s fork (#5901)
* build(deps): use RustFS s3s fork

* ci: allow RustFS s3s source

---------

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 02:45:49 +00:00
houseme 1aeb84dd6b feat(heal): expose replacement recovery status (#5912)
Add a v4 admin status endpoint for local durable automatic replacement recovery records without changing the v3 background heal status or peer v1 payloads.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 01:48:18 +00:00
houseme f17ea7f146 fix(heal): harden replacement rebuild tracking (#5892)
* fix(heal): gate auto replacement formatting

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): require replacement target outcomes

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): bind resumes to replacement targets

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): fence healing marker ownership

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): cover replacement target completion

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* docs(heal): clarify replacement recovery status

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): canonicalize replacement target checks

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): satisfy marker test module lint

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): scope automatic replacement format

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): require a mounted replacement target

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): avoid cloned ref slice in test

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): revalidate replacement before scanning

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): reset stale resume checkpoints

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): release scanner disk map before probing

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): persist replacement intent before format

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): fail closed on mountinfo read errors

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): fence replacement target identity

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): order replacement completion cleanup

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): atomically seal replacement completion

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): census replacement target shards

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): fence replacement recovery ownership

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): preserve replacement recovery anchors

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): satisfy replacement recovery lint gates

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): bind replacement identity to mount lease

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): cover durable replacement recovery states

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): validate persisted resume task identifiers

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): avoid blocking replacement marker CAS

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): report failed marker rollback

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): pin replacement resume schema compatibility

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): preserve durable recovery anchors

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): preserve public disk path semantics

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): use canonical replacement task ids

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): cover automatic replacement in 3x4 cluster

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): verify replacement target commits

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): persist replacement completion proof

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(heal): expose durable replacement status

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): bound durable replacement discovery

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): remove replacement readiness bypass

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): retry terminal replacement cleanup

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): isolate replacement intents from legacy resume

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): migrate legacy replacement intents at startup

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* style(heal): apply strict clippy fix

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): prioritize active replacement recovery state

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): bind readiness to the admitted mount lease

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): atomically publish replacement intents

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): isolate replacement recovery directory

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): tolerate an empty recovery directory

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* style(heal): remove redundant disk bytes conversion

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): reconcile proof-first replacement recovery

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): fence torn intent recovery

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): cover replacement migration conflicts

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): fence replacement lease mount identity

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(heal): cover missing replacement path admission

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): reject conflicting legacy completion proof

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): fall back to proc mount identity

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(admin): expose replacement recovery status

Surface the local durable replacement recovery snapshot in the background heal status response so operators can tell whether replacement cleanup is definitive or still pending.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): keep replacement status compatible

Keep the existing background heal status response wire-compatible while retaining the Linux mount lease cleanup needed for the replacement recovery branch.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* style(ecstore): match linux mount lease formatting

Keep Linux rustfmt output stable for the replacement mount lease comparison.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): qualify mount lease test constant

Use the disk module path for the format config constant in the Linux mount lease regression test.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): keep procfd mount roots directory-safe

Use a procfd path with an explicit directory component so Unix directory guards can open the replacement mount lease root with O_NOFOLLOW while preserving handle-relative I/O semantics.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): delete empty leased buckets via dirfd

Use the held mount lease fd as the parent for non-force empty bucket deletion on Linux so procfd-rooted paths do not get rejected as BucketNotEmpty. Also make the download-part OpenOptions truncate behavior explicit and keep fsync test recording stable across procfd canonicalization.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): scan leased bucket paths for emptiness

Use the local disk I/O root for bucket emptiness probes before non-force bucket deletion and table-bucket metadata checks. This keeps validation on the same mount instance as the subsequent local disk delete path.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(ecstore): align lease path test probes

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): block unsafe replacement recovery restarts

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): defer blocked replacement candidates

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): retry transient replacement discovery

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): keep transient recovery errors retryable

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): block corrupt legacy replacement state

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): classify flat replacement intent corruption

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): keep transient resume loads retryable

Classify malformed legacy replacement state as blocking corruption while preserving disk and transient load failures for retry. This avoids permanently blocking replacement recovery on temporary storage errors.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): avoid latching transient legacy publishes

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): retry blocked legacy migrations

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(heal): defer blocked startup recoveries

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): preserve disk sync limiter across lease roots

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 08:32:47 +08:00
houseme 10a1d6b6e6 perf(get): avoid zeroing response body chunks (#5905)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 06:43:35 +08:00
Zhengchao An be0cea83b7 test(ecstore): pin persisted metadata key literals and bucket config goldens (#5904) 2026-08-09 22:12:26 +00:00
houseme b4b891afad fix(ecstore): raise replay cache auto headroom (#5902)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 18:34:27 +00:00
唐小鸭 88756ea8e1 test(ecstore): decouple kubernetes endpoint tests from kernel hostname (#5900)
Three Kubernetes endpoint-identity tests read the real kernel hostname
and panicked when it is an IP literal (e.g. macOS without a static
HostName, where DHCP/reverse-DNS sets the kernel hostname to an address
like 192.168.1.11).

Add a cfg(test) override seam (force_kernel_hostname_for_test, mirroring
the existing force_local_host_resolution_timeout_for_test pattern) and
route the production read through kernel_hostname_for_endpoint_identity()
so the tests inject deterministic hostnames instead of depending on the
host environment. Production behavior is unchanged.
2026-08-09 17:05:18 +00:00
唐小鸭 6333f21a2e feat(replication): SSE-C ciphertext passthrough replication (#5898)
Complete the encrypted-object replication series (backlog#1783, PR-C of
3, after #5872 and #5885): SSE-C objects replicate as ciphertext
passthrough — the source holds no customer key, so the stored bytes and
their encryption metadata travel verbatim and the replica decrypts only
with the original customer key, single-part and multipart.

- Sender: SSE-C objects read raw (raw_data_movement_read), transfer at
  ciphertext size, and range multipart parts over stored part sizes.
- Receiver: authorized replication PUTs restore the stored SSE-C keys
  from the transport headers (exact lowercase forms - the read-path
  check is case-sensitive), set ObjectOptions.preserve_ciphertext, and
  skip compression, bucket-default SSE, and sse_encryption behind one
  restore-derived gate. Multipart uses an internal session marker to
  store parts verbatim and strips it on complete.
- Convergence: the replication HEAD sends
  x-rustfs-source-replication-check; the target authorizes it as
  ReplicateObjectAction and skips SSE-C read validation for that
  request only, so keyless convergence HEADs see etag/size/mtime
  instead of 400 and SSE-C replicas stop re-driving forever.
- e2e: SSE-C contract flips to a key-gated readable replica (no-key and
  wrong-key GETs fail - the direct silent-plaintext detector); new
  multipart passthrough contract with ETag/marker/stability assertions.
2026-08-09 23:53:04 +08:00
Henry Guo 942faefb25 fix(ecstore): anchor Windows rename publication (#5677)
* fix(ecstore): anchor Windows rename publication

* fix(ecstore): complete Windows rename confinement

* test(ecstore): retain Windows retry assertion path

* fix(ecstore): accept configured Windows root paths

* fix(ecstore): size Windows rename buffers correctly

* fix(ecstore): use native relative rename on Windows

* fix(ecstore): preserve Windows rename parent guards

* fix(ecstore): reuse guarded Windows rename trees

* fix(ecstore): compile Windows publication helpers

* fix(ecstore): preserve configured Windows disk roots

* fix(ecstore): flush Windows shards with write access

* fix(ecstore): stage Windows rollback backup replacement

* fix(ecstore): defer Windows staged file cleanup

* fix(ecstore): type Windows staged write result

* fix(ecstore): retry Windows sharing violations

* fix(ecstore): share Windows staged deletes

* fix(ecstore): split Windows staged publication handles

* fix(ecstore): close Windows staged writer before rename

* fix(ecstore): share Windows staged publication deletes

* fix(ecstore): allow guarded Windows child publication

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 22:56:37 +08:00
houseme 08de165358 perf(get): reduce response body chunk overhead (#5897) 2026-08-09 22:36:39 +08:00
Zhengchao An 1e6f5f1e35 test: promote passing S3 compatibility cases (#5895)
test: promote passing s3 compatibility cases
2026-08-09 21:58:17 +08:00
Zhengchao An 5513dc75ee docs: update security advisory lessons (#5896) 2026-08-09 21:57:56 +08:00
Ramakrishna Chilaka d7f014cf5f fix(docker): support TZ environment variable (#5891)
Install tzdata in both published runtime variants and verify IANA timezone resolution during image builds.

Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-09 21:54:59 +08:00
cxymds 8f9633ee83 fix(rpc): negotiate authenticated file writes (#5880)
* fix(rpc): negotiate authenticated file writes

* fix(rpc): share capability probe failures

* test(rpc): cover dedicated capability route

* fix(rpc): satisfy capability cache lints

* fix(rpc): retry timed out capability probes

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 21:19:47 +08:00
cxymds 1be636b914 fix(replication): make resync recovery resilient (#5883)
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 19:42:06 +08:00
houseme ec7f5f7b7d perf(http): reduce tracing/logging hotpath overhead (#5893)
perf(http): reduce disabled tracing overhead

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 11:35:55 +00:00
唐小鸭 73e4ef4dd4 feat(replication): replicate managed-SSE objects via target re-encryption (#5885)
Open the managed-SSE replication gate (backlog#1783, PR-B of 3, after
#5872): the replication reader already decrypts through the injected
object-encryption resolver, so the source sends plaintext plus an
encryption intent header (AES256 / aws:kms, never the source key id) and
the target re-encrypts on its normal PUT path with its own KMS. No DEK
crosses sites.

- replication_put_object_options: fail closed only on Unsupported;
  insert the SSE intent after the strip loop.
- TargetClient::create_multipart_upload sends the full opts.header()
  set, fixing multipart replicas losing content-type/user metadata
  (plaintext included).
- Preserve source ETag and mtime on replicas (authorized replication
  only): receiver wires x-rustfs-source-etag into preserve_etag for PUT
  and CompleteMultipartUpload, resolve_complete_etag consumes it, and
  complete options carry source_etag/source_mtime (absent mtime
  degrades to epoch, not now_utc). Without this every replication HEAD
  comparison re-drives re-encrypted objects forever.
- e2e: managed SSE contracts flip to success on an independent-KMS
  dual-process pair (byte-identical plain GET proves target-owned
  envelopes; ETag/mtime preserved; version stable across scanner
  cycles; resync converges; multipart keeps structure and metadata);
  new target-without-KMS fail-closed contract; SSE-C stays FAILED.

Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 10:21:35 +00:00
houseme a71726ef49 perf(get): reduce response write allocations (#5890)
Avoid cloning cache-served GET bodies, preserve downstream vectored writes through the GET close-detection wrapper, and remove per-stripe EC decode sidecar allocations.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 08:58:41 +00:00
houseme 27ecdb88b1 fix(admin): allow owner service account updates (#5889)
* fix(admin): allow owner service account updates

* test(admin): cover console admin update scope

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: ccccpj <ccccpj@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 08:46:27 +00:00
houseme 2c7d0fb2ce feat: add hotpath observability for S3 data paths (#5860) 2026-08-09 08:36:58 +00:00
houseme f72ad77aa4 fix(ecstore): use existing two-set test fixture (#5887)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 07:59:02 +00:00
Zhengchao An 255f3395bc fix(ecstore): rename stale two_set_test_sets references to make_local_two_set_sets (#5886) 2026-08-09 07:56:51 +00:00
Zhengchao An a07ad4a9ff test(replication): cover rule id byte limit (#5873) 2026-08-09 14:48:44 +08:00
唐小鸭 c619d8f2d6 fix(replication): persist REPLICA status on inbound replication writes (#5878) 2026-08-09 14:10:34 +08:00
Zhengchao An 6ce0961780 fix(policy): accept object lock mode condition (#5874) 2026-08-09 14:10:25 +08:00
terem42 578d02977e fix(heal): log the number of drives actually healed, not the drives consulted (#5871) 2026-08-09 14:10:11 +08:00
唐小鸭 eb377209c1 docs(ci): make e2e-replication-nightly test-count comments drift-resistant (#5866) 2026-08-09 14:09:44 +08:00
terem42 9c1c44807d fix(admin): answer background-heal/status partially when peers are unreachable (#5862) 2026-08-09 14:09:34 +08:00
GatewayJ 70deb3284b fix(select): pin object snapshot for query lifetime (#5835) 2026-08-09 14:08:53 +08:00
houseme b9d1ca3e4d chore(deps): update flake.lock (#5884) 2026-08-09 14:07:33 +08:00
cxymds 0cb9952aa0 fix(rpc): make authenticated file writes atomic (#5879) 2026-08-09 12:26:09 +08:00
cxymds 47369ff027 fix(heal): defer scoped repair on suspended pools (#5876) 2026-08-09 11:50:17 +08:00
唐小鸭 10c7476883 fix(replication): rebuild SSE metadata boundary for encrypted objects (#5872)
Groundwork for encrypted-object replication (backlog#1783, PR-A of 3):

- classify_replication_source_encryption: accept the AES256 marker that
  every stored SSE-C object carries; the SseC arm was unreachable.
- Fail closed on sealed material without an SSE marker (MinIO-written
  objects) instead of replicating ciphertext as plaintext.
- Replace the dead VALID_SSE_REPLICATION_HEADERS table with a transport
  map keyed by the metadata keys the SSE writer actually persists, shared
  via the new rustfs_utils::http::object_encryption_keys module.
- Structurally strip all encryption metadata from outbound replication
  (x-rustfs-encryption-* envelopes previously passed the filters).
- Skip decrypt_checksums for encrypted objects at the boundary so its
  is_multipart=false (a response-path contract) cannot misroute
  encrypted multipart objects once managed replication opens.
- Redact X-Rustfs-Replication-* SSE transport values in FileInfo Debug.

A reconciliation test pins that every key encryption_material_to_metadata
produces is either transport-mapped or stripped. All four SSE replication
e2e contracts still assert FAILED unchanged.
2026-08-09 03:05:11 +00:00
Heracles 9996d567d9 fix(build): support non-Linux Unix targets (illumos/Solaris/*BSD) (#5853)
* fix(build): support non-Linux Unix targets (illumos/Solaris/*BSD)

Two independent build-infrastructure blockers kept RustFS from building on
non-Linux Unix platforms. Neither touches runtime logic.

1. pulsar regenerates its protobuf bindings in build.rs on every build, which
   needs `protoc`. Platforms without a packaged protoc (illumos/Solaris/*BSD)
   now enable pulsar's `protobuf-src` feature via a cfg-gated dependency, which
   builds a vendored protoc from C++ sources. Mainstream targets keep the lean
   dependency and their existing system/CI protoc.

2. clocksource 0.8.3 (pulled in transitively by ratelimit 0.10) used the
   Linux-only `CLOCK_MONOTONIC_COARSE`. ratelimit 2.0 dropped the clocksource
   dependency entirely, so upgrading removes the portability problem at the
   root rather than patching clocksource. The bandwidth throttle's bulk
   `consume()` is rewritten onto ratelimit 2.0's `try_wait_n`, preserving the
   best-effort partial-consumption semantics.

Verified: cargo check + bandwidth monitor unit tests pass; cargo tree confirms
protobuf-src is enabled only for illumos/Solaris/*BSD and clocksource is gone
from the graph. The final illumos build must be confirmed on-platform.

Closes #3195

* fix(ecstore): guard ratelimit v2 capacity overflow

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(ecstore): avoid slow bandwidth reader timeout

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(targets): drop vendored pulsar protobuf build

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 10:07:00 +08:00
houseme 6106cd3772 chore(hotpath): add samply symbol summary tools (#5875)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-09 09:25:29 +08:00
cxymds 3b9c67e79b fix(rpc): authenticate internode put file bodies (#5868) 2026-08-09 08:05:16 +08:00
cxymds d36166ffb5 fix(ecstore): bound decommission listing retries (#5861) 2026-08-09 08:05:12 +08:00
cxymds 963a107b33 fix(ecstore): fence bucket memo on live lock loss (#5852) 2026-08-09 08:00:46 +08:00
cxymds 02b4e082e8 fix(get): pin resume reads to resolved version (#5859) 2026-08-09 07:48:51 +08:00
cxymds b4133d69e6 fix(heal): respect scoped object repair limits (#5855) 2026-08-09 07:23:16 +08:00
houseme 134081b27b chore(deps): fix cargo shear dependency metadata (#5854)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 15:52:00 +00:00
houseme 7217cccc91 fix: isolate ssh stdin in hotpath artifact collection (#5851)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 15:09:39 +00:00
houseme dafc922e72 chore: harden hotpath profiling artifact collection (#5848)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 13:32:29 +00:00
houseme 6fcf0d250e fix(admin): return upgrade-required for v4 fallback (#5847)
Return HTTP 426 for unmatched admin v4 routes so madmin-go v4 can downgrade to RustFS admin v3 handlers.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 21:26:33 +08:00
cxymds 65e55c0f8e fix(rebalance): fence batch delete source pools (#5846) 2026-08-08 21:14:26 +08:00
cxymds 8c75a3834a fix(rebalance): fence writer pool lookups (#5845) 2026-08-08 21:14:11 +08:00
houseme f96346124e fix(multipart): recover part transactions by write quorum (#5844)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 20:22:51 +08:00
cxymds a7de957eb8 fix(rebalance): fence peers before activation (#5842) 2026-08-08 11:55:50 +00:00
houseme c2e23411e8 test(filemeta): cover crc heal classification (#5841)
* fix(filemeta): classify xl.meta CRC mismatch as FileCorrupt so heal repairs it

A failed CRC means the metadata bytes on disk are not the bytes that were
written — bitrot. Raising it as Error::other() surfaces a generic Io error,
which should_heal_object_on_disk does not recognise as heal-worthy: the drive
is skipped, disks_to_heal_count stays 0, heal_object returns ok, and the
corrupted xl.meta is never rewritten — while the scanner re-submits the same
no-op heal every deep-scan cycle. An explicit admin deep heal fails the same
way, so no heal path repairs metadata bitrot, and every one of them reports
success.

check_xl2_v1 already classifies a short or wrong-magic header as FileCorrupt
for exactly this reason (#5716); this completes the pattern for the two CRC
sites. The existing From<rustfs_filemeta::Error> for DiskError conversion maps
the variant to DiskError::FileCorrupt, which the heal path already handles.
The previously silent is_indexed_meta site now logs the mismatch (structured
event shape) like unmarshal_msg does.

Regression test: corrupt one byte of a marshalled FileMeta and assert
unmarshal_msg reports FileCorrupt; fails on the previous code, which returned
Io(Other).

Verified end-to-end on a 3-node / 12-drive EC:4 cluster: xl.meta corrupted on
2 of 12 drives via dd, admin deep heal — before this change the heal returns
ok with the corruption intact and the scanner loops forever; with it, both
copies are rewritten (decode-identical to the healthy quorum), the object
reads back byte-correct, and a follow-up heal reports all twelve drives
clean.

* test(filemeta): cover crc heal classification

Add regression coverage for the indexed xl.meta CRC path and the metadata-heal decision that consumes FileCorrupt.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: terem42 <9478806+terem42@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 11:36:44 +00:00
GatewayJ 4a234c0fe3 fix(iam): stabilize OIDC provider ordering (#5832) 2026-08-08 19:29:04 +08:00
GatewayJ 1b1b217826 fix(iam): preserve OIDC outbound policy errors (#5762) 2026-08-08 19:28:47 +08:00
terem42 7e8b500420 fix(filemeta): classify xl.meta CRC mismatch as FileCorrupt so heal repairs it (#5838)
A failed CRC means the metadata bytes on disk are not the bytes that were
written — bitrot. Raising it as Error::other() surfaces a generic Io error,
which should_heal_object_on_disk does not recognise as heal-worthy: the drive
is skipped, disks_to_heal_count stays 0, heal_object returns ok, and the
corrupted xl.meta is never rewritten — while the scanner re-submits the same
no-op heal every deep-scan cycle. An explicit admin deep heal fails the same
way, so no heal path repairs metadata bitrot, and every one of them reports
success.

check_xl2_v1 already classifies a short or wrong-magic header as FileCorrupt
for exactly this reason (#5716); this completes the pattern for the two CRC
sites. The existing From<rustfs_filemeta::Error> for DiskError conversion maps
the variant to DiskError::FileCorrupt, which the heal path already handles.
The previously silent is_indexed_meta site now logs the mismatch (structured
event shape) like unmarshal_msg does.

Regression test: corrupt one byte of a marshalled FileMeta and assert
unmarshal_msg reports FileCorrupt; fails on the previous code, which returned
Io(Other).

Verified end-to-end on a 3-node / 12-drive EC:4 cluster: xl.meta corrupted on
2 of 12 drives via dd, admin deep heal — before this change the heal returns
ok with the corruption intact and the scanner loops forever; with it, both
copies are rewritten (decode-identical to the healthy quorum), the object
reads back byte-correct, and a follow-up heal reports all twelve drives
clean.
2026-08-08 18:48:18 +08:00
houseme e342457830 perf(filemeta): reduce meta object key allocations (#5836)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 17:23:08 +08:00
Zhengchao An 778f1dfa21 chore(release): bump version to 1.0.0-rc.1 (#5834)
* chore(release): prepare 1.0.0-rc.1

* chore(release): align release assets for 1.0.0-rc.1
2026-08-08 15:04:11 +08:00
houseme 7e9e4b67e5 fix(ecstore): raise replay cache auto capacity (#5833)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 14:13:34 +08:00
cxymds f5463f4aa8 fix(rebalance): defer changed source cleanup (#5829) 2026-08-08 10:45:34 +08:00
terem42 cb93ac5df1 fix(ecstore): purge the stale destination data dir on healing rename_data commits (#5822)
* fix(ecstore): purge the stale destination data dir on healing rename_data commits

Heal commits reuse the version's existing data_dir, so when repairing
in-place corruption (bitrot) the destination directory still exists and
holds the corrupt shard files. rename(2) cannot replace a non-empty
directory (EEXIST on XFS, ENOTEMPTY on ext4), so the commit failed on
every attempt — including all scheduler retries — and in-place bitrot was
detected and reconstructed but never repaired.

Purge the stale destination data dir (move_to_trash) before the commit
rename, for healing commits only: fresh PUTs mint a new data_dir and can
never collide, and a non-healing collision keeps failing loudly. Adds the
FileInfo::is_healing() reader for the marker set_healing() already writes.

* style(ecstore): emit the heal purge failure as a structured event

The new warning was the only sentence-style log in `rename_data`'s commit
path — it sat ten lines above `info!(event = EVENT_DISK_LOCAL_RENAME_REJECTED,
component = ..., subsystem = ...)` and interpolated its values into the
message instead of carrying them as fields, so it is invisible to any operator
query keyed on `event`.

Give it the shape the rest of the file uses: a named
`EVENT_DISK_LOCAL_HEAL_PURGE_FAILED`, `component`/`subsystem`, `dst_path` and
`error` as fields, and a short label as the message. Level stays `warn` — the
purge is best effort and the rename below fails closed — and the condition,
the branch, and the control flow are unchanged.

---------

Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 23:10:53 +00:00
Zhengchao An 96d24bc006 docs(agents): make the structured-logging rule reachable and enforceable (#5828)
The RustFS event shape (`event`/`component`/`subsystem`/`result` + context,
message last) is specified only in
`.agents/skills/rustfs-logging-governance/SKILL.md`, and nothing routes a
change to it:

- `AGENTS.md`, which is what an agent actually loads by default, never
  mentions logging. Its only related line is "log unknown fields at `warn`"
  under Serde Safety, which is about level, not shape.
- The skill's `description` says "use when editing or reviewing RustFS logs",
  so a bugfix that adds one log line in passing — how most new log sites enter
  this repo — never matches it.
- `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` is a blocklist: 500+ `rg -F` literals
  that retire log lines which already shipped. It cannot see a newly written
  one. For `crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs` the only check is that
  `#[tracing::instrument]` is TRACE-only; `warn!`/`info!` shape is unchecked.

PR #5822 landed `warn!("heal rename_data: purging ... {:?} failed: {}", ...)`
in `disk/local.rs` — sentence-style, no fields, directly beside `info!(event =
EVENT_DISK_LOCAL_RENAME_REJECTED, component = ..., subsystem = ...)` — with
every check green. That is the gap, not an authoring mistake.

Close all three:

- `AGENTS.md`: a Logging section stating the field shape, the level policy,
  the reuse-the-file's-constants rule, and that it applies to any `tracing`
  macro added in passing, not only to log-focused changes.
- Skill `description`: trigger on adding or editing any `tracing` macro,
  naming the single-line-added-in-passing case explicitly.
- Guardrail: assert the event shape positively on the already-governed disk
  files — `error!`/`warn!`/`info!` must open with fields or a `target:`, never
  a bare string. Commented-out macros are excluded; `debug!`/`trace!` stay out
  of scope as targeted diagnostics. Self-test fixtures cover both directions.

`crates/ecstore/src/disk/mod.rs` carried the one live violation in that file
set (`conv_part_err_to_int`), so it is converted here; the guardrail would
otherwise fail on an untouched file.

Verification:
- `./scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` — passes
- Negative control: re-inserting PR #5822's exact `warn!` line into
  `disk/local.rs` makes it exit 1 pointing at that line
- `cargo fmt -p rustfs-ecstore -- --check`, `cargo check -p rustfs-ecstore`
2026-08-07 23:05:57 +00:00
houseme 74c6c114b1 fix(rpc): skip batch read-version JSON for msgpack peers (#5825)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 23:03:22 +00:00
cxymds b301588248 fix(rebalance): drain entry tasks before listing retry (#5820)
* fix(rebalance): drain entry tasks before listing retry

* test(rebalance): satisfy clippy in retry regression
2026-08-08 05:50:47 +08:00
Sergei Nikolaev 601c766fca fix(table-catalog): fix object kind validation (#5784)
Signed-off-by: Sergei Nikolaev <kinolaev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-08-08 05:50:04 +08:00
cxymds 41e262cdab test(e2e): wait for authoritative quota usage (#5816) 2026-08-08 05:44:40 +08:00
cxymds 23fef384ce test(e2e): align backpressure assertion with recovery (#5815) 2026-08-08 05:44:25 +08:00
cxymds d7f1ba9ae7 test(ecstore): stabilize free-version enqueue retry (#5813) 2026-08-08 05:44:10 +08:00
cxymds a4712fae81 test(e2e): make scanner snapshot tests deterministic (#5812)
* test(e2e): configure scanner snapshot timing

* style(e2e): format scanner snapshot tests
2026-08-08 05:43:56 +08:00
cxymds 8201a74f7f feat(rpc): advertise cross-pool fence capability (#5809)
* feat(rpc): advertise cross-pool fence capability

* refactor(rpc): narrow fence capability surface

* fix(rpc): state fence compatibility removal condition
2026-08-08 05:43:26 +08:00
cxymds ce7ca4cbb8 fix(policy): support version ID condition keys (#5810) 2026-08-08 05:42:52 +08:00
唐小鸭 6633c80151 refactor(kms): close the low-severity follow-ups from the #5668 adversarial re-review (#5817)
* refactor(kms): share the DEK spec mapping and stop re-parsing opened envelopes

- generate_key_material is now the single spec->length mapping for every
  backend that mints DEKs itself; the inline copies in the Static and Local
  backends are gone, and ChaCha20 (32 bytes, same as AES_256) is accepted
  uniformly instead of only by Static.
- The pub(crate) client decrypt of the Local, Vault KV2 and Vault Transit
  backends returns (plaintext, master_key_id), so KmsBackend::decrypt no
  longer re-parses the envelope it just opened (one JSON parse per SSE GET
  instead of two, and unknown-field observability is no longer double-counted).
- Malformed-envelope parse failures now report CryptographicError("parse")
  on all backends; Local was the last one mapping them to SerializationError.
- The four KmsBackend::generate_data_key adapters take fields out of
  DataKeyInfo instead of cloning, dropping a redundant un-zeroized plaintext
  DEK copy and a full ciphertext clone per call; a missing plaintext now
  fails closed everywhere instead of returning an empty key on three of four
  backends.

* test(kms): pin legacy header fallback, stored-AAD, and decrypt key-id contracts

- a_legacy_aws_kms_object_without_the_cipher_header_still_opens rebuilds the
  true pre-internal-header shape (aws:kms mode + S3 key-id header, no
  x-rustfs-* headers) and asserts the fallback normalizes the cipher and
  re-projects it.
- a_rewritten_sse_c_context_header_fails_authentication is the SSE-C flank of
  the stored-AAD tamper check; metadata_without_stored_context_bytes_still_opens
  covers the derived-AAD path for both flavours and pins the seal side to the
  canonical bytes (mutation-verified).
- data_key_spec_controls_the_length_of_the_generated_key requires every
  backend in the matrix to honour all three specs, asserts the envelope
  records the requested spec, and round-trips each blob.
- corrupt_ciphertext_fails_cleanly pins unparseable ciphertext to
  CryptographicError instead of merely not-InternalError.
- Deleted the never-called assert_validation_error / assert_cryptographic_error
  helpers.
2026-08-08 05:41:50 +08:00
唐小鸭 a0a8eaa0f3 fix(storage): reserve internal encryption prefixes in user metadata (#5819)
The write-side filter is_reserved_user_metadata_key only namespaced
x-amz-, x-rustfs-internal- and x-minio-internal- keys, while the
read-side should_skip_object_metadata_key also strips
x-rustfs-encryption-* / x-minio-encryption-* as internal. A client PUT
of x-amz-meta-x-rustfs-encryption-algorithm therefore landed on disk as
the bare internal key x-rustfs-encryption-algorithm, which the KMS
headers_to_metadata path treats as the preferred cipher selector. Not
exploitable today (the production decrypt path discards the parsed
algorithm and FromStr rejects invalid values), but any future wiring of
headers_to_metadata into decryption would hand cipher choice to the
client.

Reserve both encryption prefixes on the write side so client-supplied
keys are namespaced under x-amz-meta- like other reserved keys, hoist
the prefix constants to module scope shared with the read-side skip
logic, and pin the attack form (header injection and CopyObject REPLACE
metadata), the bare-header form, and the legitimate server-written SSE
metadata flow with regression tests.
2026-08-08 05:41:38 +08:00
Zhengchao An 027456032f fix(ecstore): enforce the NAME_MAX segment budget on the write path too (#5826)
#5804 added the on-disk segment budget to check_bucket_and_object_names, but PUT validates through check_put_object_args, which has its own checks and never calls it. An over-NAME_MAX key therefore still reached the disk layer and came back to the client as ENAMETOOLONG → InternalError 500, exactly the behavior #5785 reported.

Caught by re-running the acceptance suite against the locked build 4b2d79f5d, which contains #5804: S3-003 still failed with a 512-byte key.

Multipart is unaffected — check_new_multipart_args and check_multipart_object_args both route through check_object_args → check_bucket_and_object_names, which already carries the budget.

Verification: new test pins the same boundaries on check_put_object_args (255 ok / 256 rejected, byte-based via CJK, multi-segment long keys ok, __XLDIR__ budget for directory keys); cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore --lib -- bucket::utils 17 passed; cargo clippy -p rustfs-ecstore --all-targets clean; make pre-commit green.
2026-08-08 05:30:15 +08:00
houseme 58c49672ca perf(ecstore): cache modern erasure codec construction (#5824)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 18:52:31 +00:00
houseme aa4de7b9d6 perf(utils): avoid metadata key lowercase allocation (#5823)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 18:39:09 +00:00
Zhengchao An 4b2d79f5d5 fix(admin): serve the usage a scan measured instead of blanking the whole snapshot (#5818)
* fix(admin): serve the usage a scan measured instead of blanking the whole snapshot

query_data_usage_info_with_store replaced the entire DataUsageInfo with the default empty shape whenever the persisted snapshot did not cover every currently listed bucket. A freshly created bucket is by definition absent from the last completed scan, so every bucket creation zeroed out usage reporting for the whole deployment until a cycle covered it (rustfs#5806).

Instrumented on a single node (fresh data dir, 10 PUTs into one new bucket, polling the admin API every second while watching the on-disk documents): the scanner persisted correct usage within ~6s — the authoritative document held scanner_cycle=2, objects_total_count=10 and the bucket's entry — while the API kept answering with a default-constructed DataUsageInfo (scanner_cycle: None) for roughly another minute.

Narrow the snapshot to what it measured instead of discarding it. Buckets the scan never reached stay absent from buckets_usage, which already means unknown on the wire and stays distinct from a present zero, and the response is marked usage_snapshot_converged = Some(false) so clients can tell it is not the whole namespace. The protections that motivated the blanking are kept: a structurally incomplete snapshot is still dropped, and so is one that measured nothing the namespace still contains. Buckets deleted since the scan are now dropped from the response rather than lingering.

The old data_usage_snapshot_covers_namespace predicate has no callers left and is removed along with the test that pinned its all-or-nothing behavior; the new test covers the partial, full, stale-bucket, incomplete and empty-namespace cases.

Verification: cargo test -p rustfs --lib -- admin_usecase (24 passed), cargo clippy -p rustfs --lib clean, make pre-commit green.

* fix(admin): drop the orphaned test attribute left by the removed coverage test

Removing data_usage_snapshot_covers_namespace's test left its #[test] behind, which then attached to the following test as a duplicate attribute. Local 'cargo clippy -p rustfs --lib' does not build the test target, so it only surfaced in CI's --all-targets lane.
2026-08-07 18:13:47 +00:00
houseme 96665f4de9 docs(runtime): document allocator reclaim runtime (#5800)
* docs(runtime): document allocator reclaim runtime

Explain allocator reclaim enablement, idle gating, controller status semantics, and cancellation behavior.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* upgrade version

* upgrade version

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 17:38:36 +00:00
Zhengchao An 05a5be51ce fix(scanner): retry a superseded usage snapshot in seconds, not a full cycle (#5814)
A superseded cycle is the expected outcome of the dirty-usage fast path, not a signal of pathological load: a write burst marks buckets dirty, the scanner wakes within milliseconds, and the still-landing writes then supersede the snapshot it just took. Charging that first race SUPERSEDED_RETRY_BASE_INTERVAL = 60s meant the burst surfaced in usage and quota accounting roughly two cycles late.

Measured on an idle single-node instance (fresh data dir, 10 PUTs, polling /rustfs/admin/v3/datausageinfo every 5s): the dirty-usage wake fires 0.3s after the PUTs, its cycle is superseded 0.2s later, and the retry was then scheduled 55.6s out; usage first became visible at t+120s. With the base at 5s the retry is scheduled 4.7s out and usage becomes visible at t+70s.

The exponential growth in retry_interval is what protects against a persistently hot bucket driving an unbroken full-scan loop, so the base does not need to be a whole cycle: 5s, 10s, 20s, 40s ... still reaches minute-scale backoff within a handful of consecutive supersedes and keeps the SUPERSEDED_RETRY_MAX_INTERVAL cap. A configured cycle shorter than the base still wins, since retrying faster than the operator's own cadence buys nothing.

Verification: cargo test -p rustfs-scanner --lib (444 passed) with the three superseded-backoff tests updated to the new schedule; make pre-commit green; end-to-end probe above.
2026-08-07 16:09:26 +00:00
houseme 5187f91997 fix(s3select): replace deprecated parquet reader (#5811)
Implement a local AsyncFileReader over DataFusion's object store re-export so Parquet metadata loading no longer uses the deprecated ParquetObjectReader adapter.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 16:00:58 +00:00
houseme 9d996b82a8 perf(storage): skip read-version JSON for bin peers (#5808)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 15:24:17 +00:00
Zhengchao An ab35681928 perf(ecstore): memoize bucket-incarnation fence validation under lifecycle read-lock coverage (#5782)
* perf(ecstore): memoize bucket-incarnation fence validation under lifecycle read-lock coverage

The PUT commit fence from #5648 validated the bucket incarnation with an uncached read (a distributed metadata-transaction read lock plus an EC quorum read of bucket metadata) on every PUT commit. Under 64-concurrency 4KiB PUT load this adds two quorum round-trips per PUT and the resulting lock-manager pressure produced ~1,000 client-visible 'Lock acquisition timeout' failures per 5-minute window (see rustfs/backlog#1776).

Memoize the validation per node while lifecycle read-lock coverage is continuous: bucket deletion/recreation requires the lifecycle WRITE lock, so while at least one read guard on this node has been held continuously the incarnation cannot have changed. The first fenced PUT in a coverage window performs the exact authoritative disk validation as before; overlapping PUTs reuse its result. The memo clears when the node's last guard drops or any guard observes a lost lock, so the next PUT revalidates from disk. Fence semantics are unchanged; only the redundant re-validations under continuous coverage are elided.

Also right-size the s3s footprint ratchet baselines: -1 s3_error! line from this change's error-path consolidation, and +1 s3s-importing file inherited from #5763 (crates/obs/src/telemetry/filter.rs) which landed on main without the baseline bump.

* fix(ecstore): carry the bucket fence registry through the rebalance test store

The rebalance entry test constructor landed on main after this branch was cut and needs the new field.
2026-08-07 15:05:48 +00:00
cxymds ba5641237c ci(e2e): stabilize full-gate tooling (#5805) 2026-08-07 15:04:33 +00:00
唐小鸭 3792fed827 fix(replication): madmin reset/diff wire compat and config validation (#5799)
* fix(admin): align replication-reset responses with madmin ResyncTargetsInfo shape

The replication-reset and replication-reset-status responses serialized
their shell as "Targets" and per-target fields in PascalCase, while
madmin-go ResyncTargetsInfo/ResyncTarget expect the "target" shell key
and lowercase field tags (arn/resetid/resyncStatus/replicationCount/
completedReplicationSize/failedReplicationCount/failedReplicationSize).
Go json decoding is case-insensitive per field, but Targets vs target,
Status vs resyncStatus and the size/count key names cannot match, so
mc replicate resync decoded empty results.

Rename the serde tags to the exact madmin wire shape, keep the
ResetBeforeDate/Error RustFS extension keys (unknown keys are ignored
by Go decoders), pin the shape with a snapshot unit test, and update
the e2e client DTO to decode the madmin shape.

* fix(admin): stream bare madmin DiffInfo documents from replication diff

POST /v3/replication/diff returned a single enveloped object
({Entries, IsTruncated, ScannedVersions}) while madmin-go
BucketReplicationDiff decodes the body with a json.Decoder loop over
bare DiffInfo documents. The envelope decoded as exactly one DiffInfo
with an empty object, so mc replicate diff printed a phantom empty row
instead of the real backlog.

Emit one DiffInfo JSON document per line by default, using the exact
madmin json tags (object/versionId/rStatus/deletemarker/lastModified;
Size stays as a RustFS extension key that Go decoders ignore). The
enveloped shape moves to the opt-in ?aggregate=true RustFS extension,
which remains the only carrier of scan-coverage metadata; a truncated
default-mode scan is surfaced via a warn tracing event instead of
in-stream. Pin both shapes with unit tests and tighten the e2e helper
to reject any envelope in the stream.

* feat(replication): validate replication config structure before persisting

PutBucketReplication accepted structurally invalid configurations that
MinIO's replication.Config.Validate rejects: empty or oversized rule
lists, duplicate or negative rule priorities, over-long rule IDs,
filters carrying more than one of Prefix/Tag/And, and delete marker
replication enabled on tag-filtered rules. Such configs persisted
silently and later produced undefined routing (e.g. ambiguous priority
ties) instead of failing the PUT.

Add validate_replication_config_structure as a pure function in
rustfs-replication (limits documented as constants), surface it through
the ecstore api facade, and run it first in the PUT capability gate so
defects are named before any metadata write. Missing Priority counts as
zero for the uniqueness check, matching Go's zero-value semantics. The
self-target rejection deliberately stays at set-remote-target, where the
endpoint is known; a config can never reference a self-pointing ARN.
Document the rule-level Destination.StorageClass contract (use the
remote target's storage_class instead) and renumber the acceptance
matrix e2e to unique priorities, which MinIO would also require.

* test(replication): pin duplicated wire types with boundary reconciliation tests

rustfs-filemeta (xl.meta disk format) and rustfs-replication (MRF/resync
persistence format) deliberately each own ReplicationStatusType,
VersionPurgeStatusType and ReplicationState; the boundary converts
between them via as_str(), whose From<&str> impls fall back to Empty on
unknown tokens — a variant added on one side silently degrades to Empty
on the other.

Add reconciliation tests in replication_filemeta_boundary: exhaustive
matches with no wildcard arm on both sides of both enums (a new variant
fails compilation until the mapping is reconsidered), string-token
round-trip asserts (a token the other side does not recognize fails
instead of quietly becoming Empty), and a full-field ReplicationState
round-trip. Cross-reference the tests from both type definitions.
Struct drift was already compile-guarded by the exhaustive struct
literals in the conversion functions.

* docs(replication): define split completion criteria and milestone sequence

The ecstore replication split plan had no completion measure — the
boundary scaffolding risked ossifying because nothing said when the
migration counts as done. Record the criteria in the module inventory:
done means the Required Contracts table's 'Current dependency to
remove' column is empty; the end state moves pool/resyncer/state into
crates/replication, with the boundary micro-files dissolving as code
crosses the crate line (batch-merging them beforehand is explicitly
rejected — the guard scripts anchor on their file names, so merging is
churn with zero functional gain; only datatypes.rs can retire early).

Sequence the remaining work as M2 (resyncer pure decision logic, after
the oversized function splits) → M3 (worker runtime, highest risk,
last) → M4 (retire boundaries and guard entries). Refresh the stale
first-step text — the event sink / runtime contracts already landed —
and update the split-plan status table accordingly.

* fix(replication): align structural validator with MinIO semantics after adversarial review

Three interop corrections found by adversarial review of the new
structural validator, plus review fallout fixes:

- Delete-marker replication is now rejected only for a direct Filter.Tag,
  not for tags inside Filter.And — MinIO's validator only inspects the
  direct tag, and mc replicate add --tags "k1=v1&k2=v2" (delete-marker
  replication on by default) puts multiple tags into And.Tags, so the
  stricter check rejected mc-generated configs MinIO accepts.
- Rule ID length is measured in bytes (Go len semantics), not chars —
  a 255-char multibyte ID must not round-trip into a config MinIO
  rejects.
- An empty <Tag/> element (no key) counts as absent, matching MinIO's
  Tag.IsEmpty(); console form serializers emit empty tags, which would
  otherwise trip the exactly-one-of and delete-marker checks.

Also: repair the store-uninitialized PUT test whose empty-rules fixture
now (correctly) fails structural validation before reaching the store
lookup; pin the previously untested startTime madmin key in the
reset-status shape test; and signal a truncated default-mode diff scan
via the x-rustfs-replication-diff-truncated response header — the bare
madmin stream has no envelope, so a truncated scan was otherwise
indistinguishable from a complete healthy one (madmin/mc ignore unknown
headers).

* test(e2e): activate SSE-S3 replication contract and pin resync fail-closed path

The SSE-S3 replication contract e2e was ignored under backlog#1291
(silent plaintext replication); the fail-closed gate in
replication_target_boundary.rs closed that hole, so the ignore reason
expired. Un-ignore the test — it now pins the current fail-closed
contract (FAILED status, failure event, readable encrypted source,
stable absence of all target versions), verified green.

Add test_bucket_replication_sse_s3_resync_stays_fail_closed: drives the
existing-object resync path (PUT ?replication-reset) over a FAILED
SSE-S3 object and asserts the resync generation reaches a terminal
state without ever materializing a target version, with the
stays-absent window also spanning fast-scanner heal cycles. The new
start_bucket_replication_reset helper doubles as the madmin
ResyncTargetsInfo shape assertion (target[0].arn/resetid) for the
reset-start response.

Refresh the stale nextest count commentary (the module is at 20 fast +
36 nightly = 56 tests by cargo nextest list; the SSE-S3-ignored note no
longer holds).
2026-08-07 22:30:12 +08:00
Zhengchao An 7553715f62 fix(admin): stop logging STS AssumeRole JWT claims (#5802) 2026-08-07 22:17:56 +08:00
Zhengchao An 766afe12fb fix(ecstore): reject over-NAME_MAX key segments up front; classify irreconcilable parity as corrupt metadata (#5804)
fix(ecstore): reject over-NAME_MAX object key segments up front and classify irreconcilable parity as corrupt metadata

Two defects found during release acceptance and the backlog#1776 investigation:

Object keys with any path segment longer than 255 bytes could never be stored (each segment maps to one on-disk directory entry), but the failure surfaced only when the disk layer hit ENAMETOOLONG, which leaked to clients as InternalError 500 (rustfs#5785). Validate the on-disk segment budget in check_bucket_and_object_names so such keys fail deterministically as ObjectNameInvalid (4xx) before any I/O. Directory-object keys (trailing '/') account for the __XLDIR__ suffix their final segment carries on disk.

object_quorum_from_meta conflated two very different no-quorum situations (rustfs#5801): stray or foreign metadata whose parity values are garbage produced the same retryable-looking ErasureReadQuorum (503) as a genuine partial outage, so clients retried unrecoverable reads and monitoring could not tell corruption from capacity loss. Now (a) parity counts outside [0, total_shards] are treated as invalid entries instead of being clamped to i32::MAX, which could poison common_parity's occurrence counting, and (b) when a full read quorum of disks answers but their parity values cannot be reconciled, the error is FileCorrupt — heal-actionable and non-retryable — while too-few-healthy-replies keeps returning ErasureReadQuorum.

Verification: 4 new unit tests (segment budget boundaries incl. byte-vs-char and __XLDIR__ budget; garbage parity sanitization; corrupt-vs-quorum classification), metadata::tests + utils::tests 62/62, set_disk+bucket suites 1214 passed with the single pre-existing heal_queue_marks_missing_versioning_state_as_missed cross-test flake also failing on a clean tree (not introduced here), clippy clean, make pre-commit green.
2026-08-07 22:13:54 +08:00
cxymds f5929a8305 fix(ecstore): preserve newer writes during data movement (#5798) 2026-08-07 12:30:09 +00:00
cxymds 2a44985037 fix(capacity): stop background schedulers on shutdown (#5797) 2026-08-07 19:02:42 +08:00
cxymds bd15dd5784 ci: install awscurl for full e2e tests (#5796) 2026-08-07 10:53:13 +00:00
DIO a5c8052163 fix(s3): resume in-flight GET streams after rebalance relocation (#5791)
* fix(s3): resume in-flight GET streams after rebalance relocation

* fix(s3): address GET resume review findings

---------

Co-authored-by: zhengsf <zhengsf@kaopucloud.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: 马登山 <cxymds@qq.com>
2026-08-07 17:59:44 +08:00
cxymds 58d4bdc79f fix(rebalance): commit stats after source cleanup (#5795) 2026-08-07 17:18:15 +08:00
唐小鸭 8d582a096c fix(replication): tolerate Go zero-value expiration and ignore latency in remote target requests (#5789)
* test(replication): accept real madmin marshal payload with zero-value expiration

* fix(replication): tolerate Go zero-value expiration and ignore latency in remote target requests
2026-08-07 15:22:07 +08:00
cxymds f5bf1fc313 fix(ecstore): fence data movement source cleanup (#5794) 2026-08-07 15:19:20 +08:00
唐小鸭 10abef4791 fix(ecstore): parse ARN region and id in display order (#5790)
* test(ecstore): pin ARN display/parse round-trip field order

* fix(ecstore): parse ARN region and id in display order
2026-08-07 11:57:08 +08:00
cxymds b7b571dfa4 fix(ecstore): bind multipart convergence heal versions (#5786) 2026-08-07 09:54:47 +08:00
cxymds dd2e0328fd fix(ci): ignore strings in s3s footprint ratchet (#5787) 2026-08-07 01:53:24 +00:00
cxymds fe91b75d65 fix(ecstore): heal partial ordinary puts (#5783) 2026-08-07 08:59:35 +08:00
anthonymartin 706a8b6061 fix(scanner): publish bounded observational usage (#5742)
* fix(scanner): publish bounded observational usage

* test(ci): serialize embedded integration ports

* test(cache): isolate generation-change timeout

* fix(scanner): address observational usage review

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Anthony Martin <949506+anthonymartin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 08:52:34 +08:00
houseme 83cdea1f18 feat(rpc): expose and auto-size replay cache capacity (#5781)
* feat(metrics): expose replay cache pressure

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(rpc): auto-size replay cache capacity

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(cache): split runtime memory feature

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-07 08:52:02 +08:00
anthonymartin 77f2b948c2 fix(capacity): back off timed-out scans (#5770)
* fix(capacity): back off timed-out scans

* fix(capacity): guard incomplete metadata baselines

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Anthony Martin <949506+anthonymartin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-06 15:56:45 +00:00
houseme 5e7e25b7d1 perf(metrics): count internode RPC auth failures (#5777)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-06 15:42:59 +00:00
Zhengchao An da82fd995e feat(kms): report which keys have outlived their rotation period (#5769)
rustfs/backlog#1636 rejected a built-in rotation scheduler: rotation is a policy decision with a per-backend cost and a hard upgrade-ordering constraint, and a server that rotated on its own would make that decision on an operator's behalf at a moment they did not choose. This is what that issue resolved to deliver instead — the signal, without the actuator.

RUSTFS_KMS_ROTATION_MAX_AGE_SECS names the period. Unset leaves the verdict unreported rather than assuming a policy, because how often keys must be rotated is a compliance decision and a built-in default would report keys as overdue against a rule nobody wrote; an unparsable value is refused the same way, loudly. Values below an hour are raised to it, since a threshold of seconds reports every key as overdue moments after it was rotated and teaches operators to ignore the signal.

KeyInfo gains rotation_due and rotation_due_reason, both additive on the wire and both filled in by the manager rather than by each backend, so no two backends can disagree about what overdue means. A backend that does not advertise rotation reports unsupported and is never reported as due — it must not be told to do something it cannot. A key with no recorded rotation is measured from creation, which is how long its material has actually been in use, and is distinguished from a stale rotation so an operator can tell "overdue again" from "never once". Ages are computed saturating, so a timestamp from a node running ahead cannot manufacture an overdue key.

The verdict is advisory in the strongest sense: nothing consults it before encrypting or decrypting, a key reported as due keeps serving traffic, and readiness is unaffected.

The single-key describe response deliberately does not carry the verdict. Its type records a creation date but no rotation timestamp, so a verdict computed there could not tell a key rotated last week from one never rotated, and reporting never_rotated for a key that was in fact rotated is worse than reporting nothing.

The wraps-based branch the issue also specifies is not implemented: it depends on the per-key wrap accounting that does not exist yet.
2026-08-06 15:13:01 +00:00
anthonymartin 656a2f14bf fix(logging): bound hot-path span amplification (#5763)
* fix(logging): bound hot-path span amplification

* refactor(logging): reuse HTTP log target constant

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Anthony Martin <949506+anthonymartin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-06 14:29:18 +00:00
GatewayJ 87d32a6207 fix(auth): align ListBuckets discovery with IAM policies (#5746) 2026-08-06 22:13:47 +08:00
cxymds 3bad829b9a test(heal): cover partial rename retry admission (#5772) 2026-08-06 22:13:29 +08:00
唐小鸭 434663f2aa fix(replication): report remote target latency as Go duration nanoseconds (#5771)
madmin-go decodes LatencyStat.curr/avg/max as Go time.Duration
(nanosecond integers), but the list-remote-targets admin response
serialized them via the persisted milliseconds encoding, so mc showed
latency values shrunk by 10^6 (e.g. 50ms rendered as 50ns).

Extend remote_target_admin_json — the same response-only re-encode
path already used for healthCheckDuration/totalDowntime — to emit the
latency stats as nanoseconds, leaving the persisted bucket-targets
wire format (milliseconds) untouched. list_targets overwrites latency
from live health stats before serialization, so the response path is
the single conversion point.

Found by the MinIO compatibility review (P2).
2026-08-06 22:13:17 +08:00
Henry Guo 5f6fb024cc feat(table-catalog): validate Iceberg metadata graphs (#5758)
* feat(table-catalog): validate Iceberg metadata graphs

* fix(table-catalog): scope Iceberg graph validation

* fix(table-catalog): preserve commit validation semantics

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-06 22:11:57 +08:00
Zhengchao An c1b8136f9a fix(kms): hold the Local key directory and its files owner-only (#5768)
The Local backend's durability argument rests on properties of the filesystem it runs on, and those properties were assumptions: the crate had no test touching symlinks, none asserting a published file's mode, and none on directory replacement or cross-device behavior. Writing that verification surfaced three gaps.

The key directory's own permissions were never set and never read. create_dir_all applies the process umask, which is 0 in a good many container images, and the platform picks the mode far more often than an operator does: kubelet creates an emptyDir 0777, several PVC provisioners mkdir -m 0777, a --tmpfs mount lands at 1777. Write access there is the power to delete a key, destroying every object it protects, or to plant a record for a key id that does not exist yet. The directory is now created 0700 through DirBuilder::mode, so intermediate components are covered and no create-then-chmod window exists, and anything wider is narrowed on every start and re-read to confirm it took. Narrowing rather than refusing matches what the observability stack already does with its own directory; refusing would turn each of those platform defaults into a server that will not start while leaving the exposure on disk. Only a directory this process cannot secure is fatal.

An unspecified file_permissions meant whatever the umask said. The field is optional in the persisted configuration and stays optional, but with it absent the entire mode-application block was skipped, so under a 0 umask master key records were published world-readable. Absent now resolves to owner-only inside the commit protocol rather than at each call site, so the backup restore path — which passed the unset value straight through and published a legacy cluster's restored records at 0644 — is covered by construction.

Startup left symlinked commit temps behind forever, because the orphan sweep required a regular file. The protocol only ever creates temps with create_new, so an entry wearing a temp name and any other file type is either its own leftover or something planted.

Eight tests pin the boundaries: that a requested mode survives the umask, that an absent one still resolves owner-only, that a directory at each mode a real platform produces is narrowed, that publishing replaces a symlink instead of writing through it on both the hard_link and rename paths, that a planted hard link cannot be adopted as a key record, that a symlinked commit temp is removed without harming the key it pointed at, and that commit temps never leave the destination's directory. A real cross-device operation and a directory swapped between rename and fsync cannot be verified without a second filesystem and directory file descriptors respectively; both are recorded in the operations documentation rather than left looking covered.
2026-08-06 22:02:18 +08:00
Zhengchao An aff3d4a39f test(admin): pin the KMS admin route contract as a snapshot (#5766)
Adding a KMS route already fails `route_registration_test`, and `route_policy` pins each route's action and risk with individual assertions, but nothing records the surface as a whole. A change to an existing route's action or risk therefore lands as an edited assertion rather than as a visible before/after — and these are the routes where that matters, since the action decides who may reach key material and the risk level decides which confirmations the route demands.

Every field is derived from ADMIN_ROUTE_POLICY_SPECS, so the snapshot cannot drift from the routing table; there is nothing to keep in sync by hand. A second test asserts the snapshot actually covers the surface it claims to: every listed route must be under /kms/ and must gate on a dedicated kms:* action, so a KMS route registered outside the policy table or falling back to a generic admin action cannot leave the snapshot green.

Per-key authorization scoping is deliberately not restated here. It is enforced and tested where it is implemented, by single_key_endpoints_reject_a_key_outside_the_policy_scope in handlers::kms_keys; a second hand-maintained list would be a claim nothing checks.
2026-08-06 22:01:45 +08:00
Zhengchao An 8003912bb1 fix(kms): report unreadable keys and bound list-keys page size (#5764)
A key that cannot be described was handled two incompatible ways. Vault KV2 swallowed every describe failure and dropped the key from the page, so a damaged or newer-format record silently disappeared from the operator's inventory and from the deletion sweep's census. Local failed the whole listing instead, so one bad record stopped every scheduled deletion on the node for as long as the damage lasted. Both force a per-key problem into a whole-page answer.

ListKeysResponse now carries unreadable_key_ids, and the backends that read local key records classify per-key failures in one place: KeyNotFound is a concurrent deletion and is skipped, a material-level error names the key on the page, and anything else fails the listing, because it says nothing about a particular key and reporting it as key damage would turn a backend outage into a false data-loss alarm. A listing that covered the entire key set and found nothing readable still fails, since an empty page there is indistinguishable from a deployment with no keys; the guard is scoped to a page with no successor so a damaged key can never strand the keys behind it. The deletion sweep destroys the expired keys it can read, counts the unreadable ones, and withholds its lifecycle gauges rather than publishing a census over a key set it did not fully see.

Vault Transit needs the same treatment and is easy to miss: its per-key metadata records live in KV2 too, so folding every non-404 failure into a backend error left its per-key classification unreachable and one metadata record written by a newer build still failed every listing on the node.

Vault KV2 record reads gain the typed errors this needs: an unparseable body is MaterialCorrupt and an absent data envelope is MaterialMissing, where both were previously indistinguishable from Vault being unreachable. Only the parse failure's category and position are reported, because serde's own message embeds the offending scalar and that message reaches a log line and an admin HTTP body.

The admin list handlers refuse a malformed limit with 400 instead of silently substituting the default page size, and every page is capped at 1000 where it is cut, so a single request can no longer fan out one metadata lookup per key without bound. The four operation-level KMS metrics gain a backend label, since operation names are shared across backends and a Transit latency regression was previously indistinguishable from an AWS one. The Static backend captures its reported creation date once instead of reading the clock on every describe and list. POST /kms/clear-cache gains a named response type with an unchanged wire shape.
2026-08-06 22:01:30 +08:00
唐小鸭 6303aa9a42 fix(site-replication): translate policy mapping userType at MinIO wire boundary (#5751)
* test(site-replication): pin MinIO IAMUserType wire semantics for policy mappings

Red tests for P0-4: MinIO peers send SRPolicyMapping.UserType using the
madmin IAMUserType table (unknown=-1, regUser=0, stsUser=1, svcUser=2),
while RustFS deserializes the field as u64 and decodes it with the
internal RPC table (None=0, Svc=1, Sts=2, Reg=3).

- userType -1 (MinIO group mappings) fails to deserialize, rejecting the
  whole IAM item: group mappings never sync from MinIO.
- stsUser=1 decodes as Svc, landing federated STS mappings under the
  wrong prefix and silently dropping their effect.

* fix(site-replication): translate policy mapping userType at MinIO wire boundary

SRPolicyMapping.userType travels on the wire using MinIO's IAMUserType
table (unknown=-1, regUser=0, stsUser=1, svcUser=2), but RustFS stored
the field as u64 and reused the internal RPC encoding
UserType::to_u64/from_u64 (None=0, Svc=1, Sts=2, Reg=3) at the site
replication boundary. Consequences: MinIO group mappings (userType -1)
failed to deserialize and the whole IAM item was rejected, and MinIO STS
mappings (1) were stored as service-account mappings, silently dropping
federated users' policies.

- Widen SRPolicyMapping.user_type and SRCredInfo.iam_user_type to i64 so
  MinIO's -1 deserializes.
- Add sr_wire_user_type / user_type_from_sr_wire in rustfs-iam as the
  dedicated SR wire codec: MinIO table on both directions, groups always
  encoded as 0, and wire value 3 kept forever as an alias for Reg so
  mappings from pre-fix RustFS peers still decode; unknown values fail
  closed.
- Route the SR inbound (apply_iam_item) and outbound
  (mapped_policy_to_sr_mapping, policy-mapping change hooks) paths
  through the codec.

The internal UserType::to_u64/from_u64 encoding is untouched: it is the
intra-cluster node RPC contract and changing it would break rolling
restarts. Outbound compatibility with old RustFS peers is preserved
because UserType::None and Reg share the users prefix in
get_mapped_policy_path, so wire 0 lands in the same location Reg=3 did.
2026-08-06 22:00:28 +08:00
houseme 4855095446 obs: mirror log attributes into loki lines (#5776)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-06 21:59:59 +08:00
houseme fc0de983d8 perf: add RPC auth profiling diagnostics (#5775)
perf: add rpc auth profiling diagnostics

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-08-06 21:33:17 +08:00
anthonymartin e26b869259 fix(ecstore): preserve checksums through write transforms (#5765)
* fix: preserve checksums through write transforms

* test(e2e): cover SSE-KMS multipart CRC32

---------

Co-authored-by: Anthony Martin <949506+anthonymartin@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-06 17:02:08 +08:00
Zhengchao An efd5481b35 fix(auth): log structured denial reasons for generic AccessDenied responses (#5761) 2026-08-06 02:45:54 +00:00
唐小鸭 dbf51117a1 fix(replication): schedule replication for CopyObject and snowball extracted objects (#5753)
* test(replication): expect CopyObject and snowball extract to schedule replication

Red-phase TDD tests for P0-6: CopyObject never consults the bucket
replication config (no pending stamp, no schedule, and the destination
inherits the source's stale replication status metadata wholesale), and
snowball auto-extract members are never scheduled either.

- usecase white-box: observe MUST_REPLICATE_OBJECT_CALLS for
  execute_copy_object (currently 0, must be 1) and
  execute_put_object_extract (currently 0, must be 2 for a two-member
  archive), plus stale replication-status metadata cleanup assertions
  (MinIO filterReplicationStatusMetadata parity).
- e2e: CopyObject destination and snowball-extracted members must appear
  on the remote replication target and reach COMPLETED on the source.

Red evidence (before fix):
  copy_object_computes_replication_decision_and_strips_stale_status
    assertion failed: left: 0, right: 1
  put_object_extract_computes_replication_decision_per_entry
    assertion failed: left: 0, right: 2

* fix(replication): schedule replication for CopyObject and snowball extracted objects

CopyObject and snowball auto-extract never consulted the bucket
replication config: no PENDING stamp, no post-commit schedule, and no
scanner-heal backstop (heal only re-drives Pending/Failed objects, and
these objects carried no status at all). Worse, the copy path cloned the
source metadata wholesale, so a destination object inherited the
source's replication bookkeeping and could present a fake
COMPLETED/REPLICA state.

Mirroring the PUT path (single immutable decision drives both the
pending metadata and the post-commit schedule, rustfs/backlog#1320):

- execute_copy_object: strip the source's replication status metadata
  (internal replication/replica status + timestamps under both
  compatibility prefixes, plus x-amz-replication-status) for
  non-inbound requests — MinIO filterReplicationStatusMetadata parity;
  the cleanup runs before the decision so an inherited REPLICA status
  cannot suppress it. Then compute must_replicate_object once, stamp
  PENDING when it replicates, and schedule after the copy commits and
  the self-copy lock guard is released. Inbound replica writes keep
  their authorized metadata and are declined inside
  must_replicate_object, so replicas are never re-scheduled outbound.

- execute_put_object_extract: same stamp + schedule per extracted
  member object (MinIO PutObjectExtract parity).

- execute_put_object dispatch: an authorized inbound replication PUT is
  stored verbatim instead of being re-dispatched into the extract path.
  Extracted members keep x-amz-meta-snowball-auto-extract in their user
  metadata and the replication client replays stored metadata as
  headers, so the target used to try to untar each member's own bytes,
  permanently failing replication for non-archive members (surfaced by
  the new snowball e2e test).

Green evidence:
- copy_object_computes_replication_decision_and_strips_stale_status,
  put_object_extract_computes_replication_decision_per_entry (red: 0
  decisions; green: 1 and 2), plus the existing PUT/object-lock
  decision-count tests stay green.
- e2e test_copy_object_replicates_to_target and
  test_snowball_extract_replicates_members_to_target pass against two
  live instances.
2026-08-06 08:46:39 +08:00
Zhengchao An 5e0fdaa247 fix(table-catalog): route read_bounded_json_body errors through ApiError to hold s3s ratchet (#5759)
The namespace REST contracts PR (#5745) added 7 new s3_error! invocations in
read_bounded_json_body, pushing the s3s footprint counter from 1687 to 1693
and violating the ratchet baseline.

Replace those calls with ApiError::invalid_request() (gateway-side error
abstraction, rustfs/backlog#1677 F1, rustfs/backlog#1733) and lower the
baseline from 1687 to 1686.

- Add ApiError::invalid_request(message) constructor to rustfs/src/error.rs
- Replace 7 s3_error! calls in read_bounded_json_body with S3Error::from(ApiError)
- Lower S3_ERROR_LINES_BASELINE from 1687 to 1686

Verification:
- make pre-commit: all guard scripts + fmt-check + quick-check passed
- make clippy-check: passed
- cargo test table_catalog + admin handler tests: 406/406 passed
- s3s-e2e: 27/27 passed
2026-08-06 00:34:46 +00:00
唐小鸭 923e35efa0 fix(site-replication): use MinIO-compatible sts-account IAM item type (#5750)
* test(site-replication): expect MinIO sts-account IAM item type

MinIO madmin-go replicates STS credentials with SRIAMItem type
"sts-account" (SRIAMItemSTSAcc), but RustFS emits and accepts only
"sts-credential", so cross-implementation STS replication fails in
both directions (MinIO returns errSRInvalidRequest, RustFS returns
NotImplemented).

Red-light tests:
- pin the outbound AssumeRole replication item type to "sts-account"
  (construction extracted into assume_role_site_replication_item so it
  is testable, behavior unchanged in this commit)
- update the federated identity replication item snapshot to
  "sts-account"
- inbound apply_iam_item must dispatch both "sts-account" and the
  legacy "sts-credential" alias to the STS arm instead of the
  unknown-type NotImplemented fallback

* fix(site-replication): use MinIO-compatible sts-account IAM item type

MinIO madmin-go replicates STS credentials with SRIAMItem type
"sts-account" (SRIAMItemSTSAcc). RustFS emitted "sts-credential" and
accepted only that value inbound, so STS credential replication with
MinIO peers failed in both directions: MinIO rejected RustFS items as
errSRInvalidRequest and RustFS answered MinIO items with
NotImplemented.

- define SR_IAM_ITEM_STS_ACC ("sts-account") and
  SR_IAM_ITEM_STS_ACC_LEGACY ("sts-credential") in rustfs-madmin
- emit "sts-account" from both outbound sites (AssumeRole hook and
  federated identity OIDC hook)
- accept both types inbound; the legacy alias remains permanently for
  mixed-version RustFS rolling upgrades

Token verification and the retry/event mechanism are unchanged.
2026-08-06 08:29:17 +08:00
唐小鸭 733c7b0f67 fix(replication): accept remote target healthCheckDuration nanoseconds (#5754)
* test(replication): accept madmin nanosecond healthCheckDuration payloads

Red-phase TDD tests for P0-7: mc 'replicate add' sends the madmin default
healthCheckDuration=60s as a Go time.Duration nanosecond integer
(60000000000), which RustFS currently rejects as an unsupported field and
would misread as seconds. Also pins the defensive seconds-or-nanos read
for persisted bucket-targets metadata and the capability contract listing
healthCheckDuration as writable.

Currently failing (red):
- remote_target_request_accepts_go_duration_wire_values
- remote_target_request_accepts_legacy_seconds_health_check
- remote_target_health_check_duration_is_declared_writable
- bucket_target_reads_go_nanosecond_durations_defensively
- runtime_capabilities_response_reports_missing_topology_before_storage_init

* fix(replication): accept remote target healthCheckDuration nanoseconds

mc 'replicate add' always sends the madmin default healthcheck-seconds=60
serialized as a Go time.Duration nanosecond integer (60000000000), so the
default mc link-creation path (and 'mc replicate update') failed with
InvalidRequest. Move healthCheckDuration from the unsupported to the
writable remote-target field list; the capability contract in the runtime
capabilities response follows the constants automatically.

Fix the unit mismatch in both directions:
- Request parsing and persisted bucket-targets reads decode the value
  defensively: below 10^7 it is legacy RustFS seconds, otherwise Go
  time.Duration nanoseconds (also covers MinIO-written metadata).
  totalDowntime shares the same wire shape and gets the same handling.
- The list-remote-targets admin response re-encodes only these two fields
  as nanoseconds via a dedicated serialization path, leaving the persisted
  seconds-based wire format untouched for existing readers.

The per-target health-check interval is accepted for mc compatibility but
not yet applied; the heartbeat keeps its global env-configured interval,
and the explicit 'healthcheck' update op stays rejected. disableProxy,
edge, and edgeSyncBeforeExpiry remain explicitly rejected.
2026-08-06 08:27:27 +08:00
唐小鸭 ead419451a fix(replication): send source versionId as query param to remote targets (#5752)
* test(replication): assert remote PUT and multipart initiate carry versionId query

* fix(replication): send source versionId as query param to remote targets
2026-08-06 08:27:23 +08:00
Henry Guo 7211f29498 feat(table-catalog): complete namespace REST contracts (#5745)
* feat(table-catalog): complete namespace REST contracts

* fix(table-catalog): simplify namespace existence guard

* fix(table-catalog): restore migration guard coverage

* fix(table-catalog): preserve encoded namespace segments

* fix(table-catalog): reject implicit namespace creates

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-05 21:07:30 +00:00
唐小鸭 04722caa04 fix(madmin): accept MinIO PascalCase SRInfo fields and nil-map nulls (#5749)
* test(madmin): add MinIO PascalCase SRInfo fixture coverage

* fix(madmin): accept MinIO PascalCase SRInfo fields via serde alias

* test(madmin): cover MinIO nil-map SRInfo JSON output

* fix(madmin): tolerate Go nil-map null in SRInfo deserialization
2026-08-06 04:18:05 +08:00
唐小鸭 066e952df1 fix(site-replication): send peer join to MinIO peer/join route with encrypted payload (#5748)
* test(site-replication): pin peer join wire path to MinIO peer/join route

MinIO only ever registered PUT /minio/admin/v3/site-replication/peer/join;
the /site-replication/join path never existed upstream. Flip the wire-path
and payload-encryption expectations to the real MinIO route. These tests
fail until the outbound rewrite is fixed.

* fix(site-replication): send peer join to MinIO peer/join route with encrypted payload

MinIO only registers PUT /minio/admin/v3/site-replication/peer/join; the
/site-replication/join path never existed upstream, so the outbound join
special-case rewrote requests to a 404 route. Drop the special case so
peer join falls into the generic /rustfs -> /minio prefix rewrite, and
move the payload-encryption predicate to the peer/join route (MinIO's
SRPeerJoin force-decrypts the request body).

MinIO also replies with an empty body on a successful join, which the
previous strict JSON parse rejected. Tolerate an empty/whitespace body by
synthesizing the peer identity from the add preflight metainfo
(deployment id) already fetched for the site.

Inbound dual-path registration (join and peer/join under both admin
prefixes) is intentionally unchanged for rolling upgrades from older
RustFS peers that still send the legacy outbound path.
2026-08-06 04:15:35 +08:00
唐小鸭 ea8dbf49a2 fix(auth): route ListBuckets denial through ApiError to hold s3s ratchet (#5755)
fix(auth): route ListBuckets auth denial through ApiError to keep s3s ratchet at baseline

PR #5726 added one s3_error! call in authorize_request while PR #5739 froze
the s3_error! line baseline at 1686 counted before that merge, so a clean
main-derived branch fails the s3s footprint ratchet with +1.

Replace the new macro call with ApiError::access_denied().into(), a small
constructor on the gateway-side error abstraction (rustfs/backlog#1677 F1,
rustfs/backlog#1733) instead of raising the baseline. The converted S3Error
carries the identical AccessDenied code and "Access Denied" message, and the
filtered ListBuckets fallback matches on the code only.
2026-08-06 03:22:28 +08:00
Zhengchao An 5f3bc617fe fix: bump s3_error! footprint baseline to 1687 for auth ListBuckets fix (#5747) 2026-08-06 00:05:01 +08:00
hector 6f10ca18a9 feat(ci): add DEB/RPM packaging workflow (#5738) 2026-08-05 16:19:42 +08:00
Zhengchao An 759ade4770 fix(auth): restore filtered ListBuckets fallback (#5726) 2026-08-05 15:21:51 +08:00
Zhengchao An db1daaece2 ci(scripts): add s3s footprint ratchet ahead of s3gate migration (#5739)
Freeze the direct s3s dependency surface with a lower-only ratchet so it
cannot grow while the s3gate/gateway migration shrinks it
(rustfs/backlog#1677 review finding F1; acceptance criteria in
rustfs/backlog#1733). Baselines verified on 2026-08-05: 236 files
importing s3s, 1686 s3_error! invocation lines. Wired into make
pre-commit / pre-pr / dev-check and the Quick Checks job in ci.yml and
its ci-docs-only.yml mirror.
2026-08-05 15:21:35 +08:00
houseme f0c4fbd28f chore(deps): refresh mimalloc revision (#5736)
* chore(deps): refresh mimalloc revision

Update mimalloc and libmimalloc-sys to the requested git revision after running the dependency refresh flow.

Keep ratelimit excluded while accepting compatible dependency updates from cargo update and cargo upgrade.

Harden all-feature test compilation by giving heavy integration test crates their own recursion limit and avoiding a cross-thread spawn for the embedded startup barrier future.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* upgrade version

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-05 04:46:13 +00:00
Zhengchao An 8550a8f9c3 refactor(ecstore): unify remaining heal logs to structured event style (#5720)
PR #5719 fixed the issue #5716 per-object heal log amplification (per-object statements demoted, heal spans forced to TRACE, raw metadata dumps banned by guardrail) and superseded the demotion originally proposed here. This PR now carries only the residual cleanup on top of it:

- Convert the remaining bare-field and format-arg heal logs in crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/heal.rs to the file's structured convention (event/component/subsystem + context fields): missing-object skip, disk-marked-for-healing, cannot-reconstruct errors, dangling-cleanup error, missing data_dir error, xl.meta regeneration warn, and orphan-reclaim failure warn.
- Demote the last remaining info! in the file — the per-set heal_format "set disk formats success, NoHealRequired" no-op message — to a structured debug! (error_count instead of a raw errs dump), and drop its whitelist exclusion in scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh so the no-INFO check for set-disk heal files is strict.

No control flow or behavior changes.
2026-08-05 03:54:27 +00:00
Zhengchao An 018f27d1cd test(ecstore): deflake multipart listing tests under plain cargo test (#5730)
Multipart upload ids embed the process-global deployment id at both create time and list time. Under plain cargo test (thread-parallel, shared process globals) a concurrently running test that re-initializes a store can swap the global between the two reads, making full-upload-id equality assertions fail spuriously (observed: core::sets::tests::list_multipart_uploads_merges_all_sets_without_pagination_loss failing when run concurrently with bucket::quota tests, passing in isolation).

Add a test-only upload_uuid_suffix helper next to deployment_upload_id and make the affected assertions compare only the decoded <uuid>x<timestamp> suffix. Where suffix normalization changes within-key ordering (base64 alphabet order is not byte order), both sides are sorted before comparison. nextest/CI is unaffected (process-per-test); this only hardens local plain cargo test runs.
2026-08-05 11:50:29 +08:00
Zhengchao An 6617708faa fix(ecstore): make local disk map initialization replace stale topology (#5734)
initialize_local_disk_maps appended pool entries to local_disk_set_drives and inserted into local_disk_map without ever clearing previous state. Every caller (both production startup entry points and all tests) passes the FULL topology, so re-initializing the same InstanceContext left the pool/set vectors sized for the stale topology and panicked with index-out-of-bounds for wider disk indices.

This surfaced as deterministic cross-test contamination under single-process cargo test: in crates/heal heal_b920_subquorum_union_test, a 4-disk test initialized pool 0 as [None; 4] on the process-level default context, and the two 8-disk tests then panicked at disk_idx 4. Each test passed alone, and CI never caught it because cargo nextest isolates every test in its own process.

Fix: clear both registries at the start of initialize_local_disk_maps so initialization is idempotent and last-topology-wins. Add a regression unit test in ecstore (process-isolation-proof, unlike the heal integration binary) that re-initializes the same context with a wider topology; it fails with the pre-fix code.
2026-08-05 11:50:11 +08:00
Zhengchao An f73054f6ad fix(s3): degrade multipart listings per upload instead of failing the bucket (#5721)
The multipart staging namespace is one flat set of sha256(bucket/object) directories shared by every bucket, and the cross-set listing rewrite reads every upload's metadata. Two shapes poisoned the whole ListMultipartUploads response with InternalError: Corrupted format: a healthy in-flight upload belonging to another bucket (its stored owner bucket fails the guard and fell into the corrupted-format arm), and a single upload directory whose xl.meta was torn by an unclean shutdown. Docker Distribution calls ListMultipartUploads on every PATCH/commit, so either shape broke OCI registry pushes entirely (issue #5716).

Foreign-bucket uploads are now skipped silently, and directories whose metadata is affirmatively corrupt at quorum are skipped with a debug log, while every other decode failure (quorum loss from offline disks, timeouts, transport errors) keeps failing the listing so clients retry instead of silently losing entries. The degrade-vs-propagate decision is a named corrupt-family classifier with a unit test pinning both sides. FileMeta::check_xl2_v1 now classifies a missing or wrong XL2 magic as FileCorrupt instead of an anonymous io error so damage is distinguishable from transient IO faults.

Refs #5716
2026-08-05 03:49:52 +00:00
Zhengchao An 8c9e884cf2 fix(ecstore): make inline-rollback reclamation file-precise to keep #5703's child-key safety (#5732)
#5724 reclaimed the synthetic inline-rollback dir after a committed rename with delete_data_dir(recursive: true), which has no notion of object metadata: for unversioned objects the synthetic UUID is a fixed, publicly-known constant, so object/<rollback-dir> can simultaneously be a legitimate child key's directory, and recursively deleting it reopens the authorization bypass #5703 closed (PutObject on K destroying K/<uuid> without DeleteObject permission).

Replace the recursive pass with a file-precise one: after quorum commit, delete exactly object/<rollback>/xl.meta.bkp with a non-recursive delete on every disk whose rollback dir is not also the cleanup dir. The parent-rmdir walk removes the dir only when the backup was its sole content, so the BucketNotEmpty leak fix is preserved (#5724's regression test passes unchanged) while a child key at the same path keeps its metadata. The undo path's restore_metadata_backup now also reclaims the emptied synthetic dir, mirroring restore_delete_rollback.
2026-08-05 03:32:41 +00:00
Zhengchao An 75d0c8d6b9 fix(quota): keep the degraded-baseline fallback off the write path's stack (#5728)
The fallback future embeds the whole snapshot loader, and every object write nests a quota check several futures deep, so inlining it grew each write's state machine by the loader's full size — the debug-build 2MiB worker-stack overflow class fixed for bucket-config writes in #5648. Box the fallback at its call site; the allocation only happens on the degraded path.
2026-08-05 03:02:33 +00:00
Zhengchao An d2e5346044 fix(heal): demote per-object heal logs and cap erasure-set failure warns (#5727)
fix(heal): demote per-object logs and cap erasure-set failure warns

Follow-up to rustfs/rustfs#5716. Per-object heal task kinds (Object/Metadata/MRF/ECDecode) queued by MRF/autoheal/scanner loops emitted info!/warn!/error! lines per object: task lifecycle (started/completed/timed_out/failed), the missing-object warn, queue admission full/drop/displacement warns, retry-admission decisions, and uncapped per-object warns in erasure-set sweeps.

Add a shared demote_to_debug_when! macro that keeps aggregate task kinds and admin/internal requests at operator-visible levels while demoting per-object occurrences to debug!, sample-cap the erasure-set transient_skip/failed warns per bucket via take_failure_log_sample (reusing the heal_bucket_objects precedent), demote the per-retry admission decision logs to debug! (covered by rustfs_heal_admission_total and the scheduler task_retrying/task_failed events), and record the previously unmetered duplicate-admission outcome.

Extend scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh with injection-verified regression guards and run it in both quick-checks jobs (ci.yml and its ci-docs-only.yml mirror).
2026-08-05 02:43:57 +00:00
Zhengchao An 204068e07e fix(targets): surface redacted construction error detail in target failures (#5729)
A failed target construction previously logged only reason=construction_failed and pushed an opaque "target construction failed" summary, discarding the underlying TargetError. Debugging rustfs#5115 showed the log repeated every 5s with no root cause, even though the error carried an actionable egress-policy rejection (RUSTFS_OUTBOUND_ALLOW_ORIGINS hint).

The Err branch now includes the error detail in both the error! log (detail field) and the returned failures summary. The detail is scrubbed against the instance's merged config via the loader's existing per-field redaction (secrets -> ***redacted***, endpoint URLs -> origin only, DSNs -> password masked) so credential-bearing values never reach logs or Admin-visible summaries.
2026-08-05 02:42:04 +00:00
anthonymartin ec135f8c4c fix(heal): bound per-object logging (#5719)
Co-authored-by: Anthony Martin <949506+anthonymartin@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-05 02:25:59 +00:00
Zhengchao An 5bd28048d5 fix(filemeta): redact sealed keys and elide inline data in FileInfo Debug (#5725)
FileInfo's derived Debug printed the full metadata map (including X-Rustfs/X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Sealed-Key and -Iv values, i.e. KEK-wrapped DEK ciphertext) and the full inline data bytes (plaintext user content for non-SSE small objects), so any whole-struct log dump such as the heal_object dumps leaked user data and sealed key material into logs.

Replace the derive with a manual Debug impl that redacts encryption metadata values (keys stay visible, values print as redacted with length) under both internal prefixes, and elides data/checksum bytes to a length summary. The exhaustive destructuring forces every future field through an explicit show/redact decision. starts_with_ignore_ascii_case is made pub in rustfs-utils for reuse.
2026-08-05 02:07:01 +00:00
Zhengchao An 53a8e02a08 fix(ecstore): reclaim synthetic inline-rollback dirs after rename commit (#5724)
#5703 split rollback state from old-data-dir cleanup so the synthetic inline-rollback dir is reported only as rollback_data_dir and never reclaimed as if it were a real data dir. But nothing reclaims it after a successful commit either: every overwrite of an inline version by a non-inline one leaves <object>/<rollback-dir>/xl.meta.bkp behind. The residue is not referenced by any version, so it survives object deletion and DeleteBucket fails with BucketNotEmpty forever — the mass teardown cascade currently failing the S3 Implemented Tests CI lane.

Reclaim the synthetic dirs in SetDisks::rename_data once the commit holds write quorum. The quorum-failure undo inside the same function is the only consumer of the backup, so its window is closed at that point. Best-effort with the same anti-misdelete posture as commit_rename_data_dir: never touch the just-committed data dir, and residue must not fail a durable write (backlog#898).
2026-08-05 02:04:46 +00:00
唐小鸭 15b9c1f4e3 fix(replication): make bucket replication rules editable from clients (#5715)
* fix(replication): accept explicit STANDARD destination storage class

The replication engine never reads Rule.Destination.StorageClass (replica
placement comes from the bucket-target config or the source object), yet the
validator rejected any config carrying the field. The console's add-rule form
always sends StorageClass=STANDARD, so every rule created through it failed
with InvalidRequest.

Tolerate exactly STANDARD as a no-op — semantically identical to omitting
the field — and keep rejecting every other value, which would be silently
ignored rather than honored. Document the deliberate omission from the
replication capability contract.

* feat(admin): support MinIO-style partial updates for set-remote-target

set-remote-target?update=true previously replaced every stored field and
required complete credentials in the body, so flipping a target's sync mode
from the console forced operators to re-enter the secret key, and real
mc replicate update bodies (madmin Clone() strips the secret) failed to
deserialize at all.

Adopt MinIO's TargetUpdateType contract: query params creds/sync/bandwidth/
path name the field groups to overlay onto the stored target, everything
else keeps its persisted value, and unsupported groups (proxy, healthcheck,
edge, edgeSyncBeforeExpiry) fail loudly. Credentials updates are skipped for
site-replication peer targets — probed by both scheme derivations of the
stored endpoint and the stored deployment id — because an operator never
knows the site replicator's credentials, and a body-supplied deployment id
is ignored on update since it anchors peer identity. madmin JSON aliases
(bandwidthlimit, storageclass, resetID, deploymentID, sessionToken) let mc
bodies parse under deny_unknown_fields.

e2e: cover a credential-free sync-only update preserving the stored
connection and the zero-ops no-op contract; align the missing-arn assertion
with the earlier validation error.

* chore(scripts): add two-site replication lab manager

site_replication_smoke.py spawns and manages two local rustfs processes,
pairs them via the site-replication admin API (idempotent), and verifies
bidirectional object replication. Subcommands: up/down/restart/status/logs/
smoke/info/remove/clean. Stdlib-only; requests are SigV4-signed the same
way as crates/e2e_test.

* chore(scripts): rename direction-suffixed payload variables for typos check

The typos linter reads the _ba suffix in payload_ba as a misspelling of
"by"; use payload_a_to_b / payload_b_to_a instead.

---------

Co-authored-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-05 01:50:31 +00:00
Zhengchao An 4042bc0a5e fix(quota): admit writes against a persisted usage baseline while authoritative usage is unavailable (#5722)
Upgrading from a pre-v2 release leaves only the legacy .usage.json snapshot, which has no completeness marker and is demoted to non-authoritative, so every write to a quota-enabled bucket failed closed with a retryable 503 until the scanner's first complete cycle persisted .usage.v2.json — a production outage on large namespaces (issue #5716).

Quota admission now degrades to the last persisted per-bucket size: normalize_loaded_data_usage returns the pre-discard bucket sizes, the TTL-bounded snapshot cache retains them (carried forward through failed refreshes), and QuotaChecker::get_real_time_usage falls back to that baseline when the authoritative caches miss. The baseline is static between snapshot loads, so hard-quota enforcement is advisory for the duration of the degraded window — strictly tighter than beta.11 (usage treated as 0) and strictly more available than a blanket 503. Buckets absent from every persisted snapshot still fail closed, and removing a bucket's usage from the backend purges the baseline so a recreated bucket cannot inherit the dead incarnation's size.

Refs #5716
2026-08-05 01:42:09 +00:00
Zhengchao An 4576c2e470 fix(iam): invalidate peer STS caches on revocation (#5718) 2026-08-05 01:17:36 +00:00
Zhengchao An 327fdd5fc2 fix(replication): report FAILED when replication put options cannot be built (#5717)
Both per-target replication methods assign the optimistic Completed status to rinfo before building put options, and the Err branch of replication_put_object_options returned rinfo unchanged. Since #5633 made the source encryption classification case-insensitive, managed SSE sources are rejected at this gate, and the rejection was reported as successful replication: the source object was marked COMPLETED, ObjectReplicationComplete was emitted, and nothing existed on the target.

Set replication_status = Failed (and record the error in the replicate_object branch) so the composite status, the OperationFailedReplication event, and MRF retries reflect the fail-closed outcome. This restores the contract pinned by test_bucket_replication_sse_kms_failure_contract, which timed out in the e2e-replication-nightly runs on 2026-08-03 and 2026-08-04.
2026-08-05 01:08:11 +00:00
houseme 16c2928965 refactor(metrics): migrate scanner report timestamps to jiff (#5710)
* refactor(metrics): migrate scanner report timestamps to jiff

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* refactor(madmin): migrate admin timestamps to jiff (#5712)

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* refactor(storage): migrate RPC DTO timestamps to jiff (#5713)

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 18:35:38 +00:00
houseme 3dabac4a09 perf(observability): avoid cgroup path allocation (#5711)
* perf(observability): avoid cgroup path allocation

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(e2e): satisfy regression test clippy

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 17:47:07 +00:00
Zhengchao An 15c2bade5f fix(iam): disambiguate OIDC virtual parent IDs (#5700) 2026-08-04 23:21:36 +08:00
Zhengchao An 624a4ab837 test(e2e): add P0/P1 regression tests for recurring issue patterns (#5709)
Add 21 E2E regression tests across 7 new test files covering the most
frequently regressing issue patterns identified from 5600+ issues in
rustfs/rustfs. Each test references specific regression issue numbers
and validates the exact failure path that caused the regression.

Regression categories covered:
- P0: Event notification startup race (rustfs#5387, #5681, #5401)
- P0: Lifecycle/ILM rule persistence (rustfs#5407, #5167, #4963)
- P0: Delete consistency (rustfs#5375, #4978, #760)
- P1: Listing completeness (rustfs#4810, #5051, #3191)
- P1: Bucket statistics accuracy (rustfs#5615, #3898, #1012)
- P1: Distributed startup quorum (rustfs#5655, #2945)
- P1: Tier/scanner persistence (rustfs#5218, #5013)

Ref: https://github.com/rustfs/backlog/issues/1670
2026-08-04 23:21:01 +08:00
lqb 4f43c0ca7e fix(compose): set log directory and wait for permission helper (#5646)
* Update docker-compose-simple.yml

Added RUSTFS_OBS_LOG_DIRECTORY=/app/logs in docker-compose-simple.yml

Signed-off-by: lqb <lqb@users.noreply.github.com>

* Added missing dependency to volume-permission-helper

Signed-off-by: lqb <lqb@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: lqb <lqb@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 23:20:55 +08:00
houseme 3405b4e980 perf(observability): avoid sampler stat allocations (#5708)
* perf(observability): avoid cgroup stat key allocations

Replace the memory.stat HashMap parser with a fixed-field parser so the memory observability sampler does not allocate String keys or hash every cgroup field on each interval.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* perf(observability): parse mimalloc stats without copying

Parse the mimalloc stats JSON while the mimalloc-owned buffer is still alive, then free it immediately. This avoids allocating an owned String on each allocator memory sample.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 23:20:49 +08:00
houseme 510b0350d6 refactor(time): migrate audit and notify timestamps to jiff (#5707)
* refactor(time): migrate audit and notify timestamps to jiff

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(ecstore): initialize heal walk decode error

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* refactor(targets): parse MySQL event time with jiff

Preserve MySQL DATETIME(6) wall-time formatting for RFC3339 eventTime values while removing the direct chrono dependency from rustfs-targets.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* chore(deps): prune unused workspace dependencies

Apply cargo shear --fix to remove unused path-clean and s3select-api tempfile entries after the scoped jiff migration.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(ecstore): remove duplicate heal walk decode error init

Remove the duplicate decode_error field from the heal walk test collector initializer so lib-test clippy compiles on CI.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* refactor(policy): emit OPA timestamps with jiff

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 23:20:44 +08:00
Zhengchao An b14805af47 fix(ci): block PR-controlled execution in performance A/B workflow (#5705)
fix(ci): block PR execution in performance workflow
2026-08-04 23:20:40 +08:00
Zhengchao An f3eba31aee fix(ecstore): retain namespace read locks for streaming GETs to prevent quota-bypass (#5699)
* fix(ecstore): retain locks for streaming GETs

* fix(rpc): keep disabled snapshot leases lint-clean
2026-08-04 23:20:35 +08:00
Zhengchao An 42af6e3b63 fix(ecstore): isolate inline rollback cleanup (#5703) 2026-08-04 23:20:29 +08:00
Zhengchao An a43267160d fix(auth): enforce object-lock actions for POST uploads (#5701) 2026-08-04 23:20:24 +08:00
Zhengchao An 2039ba5f65 fix(s3select): enforce SSE-KMS read authorization (#5698)
* fix(s3select): enforce SSE-KMS read authorization

* fix(app): route select SSE auth through facade
2026-08-04 23:20:19 +08:00
Zhengchao An 3a6f630ff1 fix(api): bound bucket rate limiter keys (#5706) 2026-08-04 15:13:25 +00:00
Zhengchao An 1695873e55 fix(auth): isolate embedded IAM contexts (#5704) 2026-08-04 23:12:35 +08:00
Zhengchao An c26419e357 fix(replication): restrict metadata replication targets (#5696) 2026-08-04 22:46:42 +08:00
Zhengchao An d401c65719 fix(policy): require unscoped KMS bundle grants (#5697) 2026-08-04 22:46:14 +08:00
cxymds eb87bb1faf fix(replication): harden resync and MRF recovery (#5694)
* fix(replication): harden resync and MRF recovery

* fix(replication): correct MRF validation regressions

* fix(replication): address CI validation failures

* fix(heal): initialize decode error in merge test
2026-08-04 13:40:50 +00:00
houseme 93fcd6b6b5 fix(observability): fallback mimalloc requested memory stats (#5695)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 21:10:29 +08:00
Zhengchao An c63dba7d3f fix(list): skip delete markers in single-object fast path for ListObjects (#5691) 2026-08-04 12:49:45 +00:00
cxymds 31959b90db fix(heal): harden resumable set repair failures (#5693)
* fix(heal): enforce resumable task control

* fix(ecstore): surface bucket and metadata heal errors

* chore: refresh guardrail path references

---------

Signed-off-by: cxymds <cxymds@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 12:35:58 +00:00
Zhengchao An 3c8bd5b929 fix(heal): surface stale versions from all disks during heal walk (#5692)
When a returning node carries a stale object version that was deleted on
the quorum, the heal disk-walk partial callback used `resolve_union`
which picks only one entry from divergent disk entries. The minority
version was never enumerated and therefore never cleaned up.

Replace `resolve_union` + `ingest` with a new `ingest_merged` that
collects all unique versions from every partial entry across disks,
deduplicating by (name, version_id). This ensures stale data on a
returning node is surfaced for healing and can be deleted as dangling.

Fixes #5029
2026-08-04 12:18:43 +00:00
Zhengchao An ec106548ba test(e2e): restore webhook redelivery regression coverage (#5690)
test(e2e): unquarantine webhook redelivery regression
2026-08-04 20:00:54 +08:00
Zhengchao An cfce7bd9b1 fix(filemeta): preserve FileInfo wire compatibility (#5689) 2026-08-04 09:25:28 +00:00
houseme b71483b1c8 fix(ecstore): split internal get metadata metrics (#5687)
Classify expected metadata-missing errors separately from unknown get pipeline failures and attribute internal meta-bucket reader failures to an internal_meta path instead of legacy_duplex.

This keeps scanner/data-usage metadata probes from polluting user GET/mixed failure attribution while preserving the existing read error behavior.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 08:37:09 +00:00
cxymds cebc28f678 fix(replication): fence MRF journal updates (#5686) 2026-08-04 11:49:16 +08:00
Henry Guo d6e11cf018 refactor(table-catalog): modularize catalog implementation (#5678)
* refactor(table-catalog): split catalog foundations

* refactor(table-catalog): split REST handler modules

* refactor(table-catalog): split domain and store modules

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-04 11:48:00 +08:00
Zhengchao An 71f2e7a209 fix(ecstore): treat transient network errors as unformatted during bootstrap (#5683)
When a fresh multi-node cluster starts, the first disk detects all disks
as unformatted and initializes the format. However, `should_init_erasure_disks`
and `quorum_unformatted_disks` only counted `UnformattedDisk` errors. Remote
peers that have not yet started their gRPC server return transient network
errors (connection refused, timeout) instead of `UnformattedDisk`, causing
the first disk to miss the "all unformatted" signal and creating a deadlock:
first disk retries endlessly while non-first disks wait for it.

Add `is_unformatted_or_transient_network` that treats transient network
errors as equivalent to `UnformattedDisk` for the bootstrap decision.
A remote disk that cannot be reached during fresh-cluster startup is
indistinguishable from an unformatted disk — the peer may simply not
have started its gRPC server yet.

Fixes #5655
2026-08-04 11:47:38 +08:00
Zhengchao An 1934cddd66 fix(ecstore): skip walkdir total timeout for listing operations (#5684)
Large buckets with millions of objects can take longer than the default
5-second walkdir timeout to produce the first page of listing results.
This causes timeouts in the web UI and mc CLI when opening or scanning
such buckets.

Skip the walkdir total timeout for S3 ListObjects operations when no
explicit walkdir_timeout is configured. The stall timeout (5s with no
forward progress) still protects against drives that stop responding.
This matches the scanner's existing behavior for the same reason.

Fixes #5647
2026-08-04 11:46:53 +08:00
Zhengchao An e08cf474db fix(audit): move audit init after IAM bootstrap to fix startup ordering (#5685)
Audit initialization requires the AppContext (server config + object
store) which is published by ensure_startup_after_iam inside
init_iam_runtime. Moving init_audit_runtime after init_iam_runtime
ensures the runtime sources are available when audit starts.

Fixes #5681

Co-authored-by: RustFS <hello@rustfs.com>
2026-08-04 11:45:48 +08:00
Zhengchao An 48c8d85f3b fix(ecstore): don't exclude pool when has_space_for is indeterminate (#5497) (#5682)
fix(ecstore): don't exclude pool when has_space_for is indeterminate

When `has_space_for` returns an error (not enough online disks to
reliably determine space), the old code treated this the same as
"definitely no space" via `unwrap_or_default()`, zeroing out the
pool's available capacity.  During pool decommission this creates a
false "Disk full" (500) for S3 PUT requests:

- Pool 0 (decommissioning) is correctly suspended → available = 0
- Pool 1 (active) has some disks whose disk_info call fails under
  heavy migration I/O → has_space_for returns Err → available forced
  to 0
- get_available_pool_idx sees total = 0 → returns None → DiskFull

Fix: distinguish Ok(false) (genuinely full) from Err (indeterminate).
On Err, log a warning and fall through to compute available space from
whatever disks did respond.  The actual write will enforce its own
quorum; a premature zero at the pool-selection layer is a false
rejection.

Closes #5497
2026-08-04 08:50:13 +08:00
cxymds 99701e9f52 fix(replication): fence journal snapshots with CAS (#5674) 2026-08-04 07:22:19 +08:00
Zhengchao An e64ed14fb0 fix(ecstore): address review comments for batch shard pread (#5680)
fix: address review comments for batch shard pread
2026-08-03 22:36:49 +00:00
cxymds cad0fd9b2f fix(replication): retain MRF failures during recovery (#5667)
* fix(replication): retain MRF failures during recovery

* fix(replication): harden MRF recovery retries

* fix(replication): preserve MRF recovery durability

* test(replication): assert MRF append entries explicitly

* fix(replication): detect committed MRF append retries

* fix(replication): tighten MRF persister recovery

* fix(replication): drain overflow after recovery shrink

* test(replication): avoid repeated MRF recovery decode

* test(replication): cover recovery overflow suffix

* fix(replication): gate MRF recovery flushes

* test(replication): satisfy MRF clippy checks

* fix(replication): drain closed MRF channels

---------

Co-authored-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 06:01:39 +08:00
rdiperri-wasabi de8cb5f26c perf(ecstore): batch local EC shard preads on GET (#5679)
Collapse per-shard blocking-pool round-trips into one spawn_blocking
pread batch when all online shards are local and mmap-read is enabled.

Co-authored-by: ba <ba@ubuntu-server.alpha30.bos16>
Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-04 05:53:22 +08:00
Zhengchao An 98d3619613 fix: address rc.1 release blockers (#5648)
* fix: address rc.1 release blockers

* fix: route release guards through architecture boundaries

* fix: close remaining rc.1 regression gaps

* refactor: group multipart listing options

* fix: resolve rc.1 CI regressions

* fix(ecstore): keep bucket-config writes off the caller's stack

A bucket-config write nests incarnation resolution (which can drive legacy
migration and a peer fan-out), a full metadata load, and `save` — itself an
object PUT that pulls in the whole erasure write path. Every request that
mutates bucket config is already several futures deep, so inlining all of
that into one state machine overflows the 2MiB worker stack in debug builds.

Two CI lanes aborted with SIGABRT on this:

  ILM Integration (serial)
    rustfs app::lifecycle_transition_api_test::
      compensation_driven_complete_multipart_upload_still_transitions
  Test and Lint (swift)
    rustfs-protocols::swift_metadata_persistence::
      swift_metadata_writes_are_durable

Neither test file is touched by this branch and both lanes are green on
main. Stack-pointer probing showed ~780KiB consumed between
`metadata_sys::update` and the config read alone, with single hops of
363KiB (`update` -> `acquire_config_write_guard_for_incarnation`), 125KiB
and 105KiB.

Box the deep sub-futures on both read-modify-write paths (`update` /
`update_checked` and `update_config_with` / `update_config_with_checked`)
so each guard's own state machine stays small. Behaviour is unchanged;
`update` -> guard drops to 253KiB and both tests pass on the default stack.

* fix(lifecycle): unbreak restore under the bucket generation fence

The ILM lane aborted on a stack overflow before reaching these, so they
were never reported; with that fixed, four restore tests fail. All four
are green on main and none of their test files are touched by this branch.

1. RestoreObject and ListMultipartUploads hard-required
   `opts.expected_bucket_incarnation_id`, but `apply_bucket_generation_guard`
   deliberately leaves it unset when no guard extension is present — only the
   S3 access layer installs one. Every direct caller therefore got
   `InternalError: ... bucket generation guard is missing`. Resolve the
   current generation instead, the way the copy path already does. The fence
   is unaffected: RestoreObject still re-reads the incarnation from disk and
   compares before admitting the restore, and the multipart listing is
   filtered by the value it resolves.

2. `restore_expiry_snapshot_matches` (new on this branch) rejected every
   restored-copy expiry whose `restore_expires` had not already elapsed.
   Whether the restored copy is due to expire is the ILM evaluator's
   decision, made when it emitted DeleteRestoredAction; re-deriving it in
   the set layer only adds a way for a legitimate action to be rejected.
   The stale-event risk it appears to guard is already covered by the
   surrounding snapshot match — a re-restore rewrites `restore_expires`,
   so a replayed event fails the equality check. Drop the clause; the
   fifteen identity clauses are unchanged.

Fixed:
  rustfs app::lifecycle_transition_api_test::
    restore_object_usecase_accepts_exactly_one_of_two_concurrent_restores
    restore_object_usecase_completes_suspended_null_version_in_place
    restore_object_usecase_reports_ongoing_conflict
  rustfs-scanner::lifecycle_integration_test serial_tests::
    test_restore_chain_local_read_expiry_keeps_remote_and_allows_re_restore

Verification: the CI ILM lane filter now runs 53/53 green locally.

* chore: address review follow-ups on this branch

Four items from the adversarial review that were still open.

- Restore the assertion `test_bucket_replication_replayed_delete_marker_
  preserves_source_mtime_without_source_restart` is named for. The branch
  had replaced the backlog#867 mtime check with `assert_replication_
  converged`, which any successful replication satisfies, and deleted the
  two helpers it needed — so the regression the test exists to catch would
  now pass. This matters here specifically because the branch changes the
  flag feeding `replication_delete_remove_options` and routes replay
  through a new file and ordering.

- Drop `read_config_no_lock_preserve_empty`: zero production callers (the
  one real consumer calls the `_with_metadata` variant directly). Its test
  stanza now exercises that variant, so the coverage moves to live code
  rather than being deleted.

- Revert the `bytesize` bump. It is a no-op: `Cargo.lock` already pinned
  2.7.0 before this branch and is untouched, so the caret range already
  resolved there. Nothing in the diff uses the crate.

- Split the AGENTS.md "Adversarial Validation" policy change out of this
  branch. The edit is defensible on its own, but it relaxes the review gate
  that this branch has to pass, so it should land as its own PR reviewed on
  its own merits rather than bundled with the change that benefits from it.
  The reverted hunks are unchanged and ready to re-apply.

Not changed, deliberately: the missing-sidecar path still fails closed.
`missing_bucket_incarnation_sidecar_for_new_metadata_fails_closed` pins
that on purpose, and serving a non-authoritative Object Lock state would
be the wrong trade. The residual concern stands and is recorded in review
— a crash between the two writes in `persist_new_and_set` leaves the
bucket unloadable until DeleteBucket+CreateBucket, and the repair branches
in `migrate_legacy_metadata` and `make_bucket` are unreachable dead code
for that case. Resolving it needs the read path and the (transaction-lock
holding) repair path to be separated, which is more than a follow-up edit.

* test(ci): serialize the new bucket-incarnation tests

The five tests this branch adds around the incarnation / lifecycle fence
drive `init_bucket_metadata_sys` and `bucket_metadata_sys_of` — process-global
OnceLock state that `serial_test`'s `#[serial]` cannot protect across
nextest's process boundary — and they delete+recreate buckets, the shape that
raced into InsufficientWriteQuorum in backlog#937.

Add them to the `ecstore-serial-flaky` group in both the default and ci
profiles (nextest evaluates a named profile's own overrides list, so the
ci mirror is required). Preventive serialization only, no retries.

Not a full fix for the review comment: `bucket_delete_waits_for_config_
mutation_fence` still proves liveness with a fixed 200ms sleep plus
`assert!(!delete.is_finished())`. Turning that into readiness polling needs
a production-side signal to wait on — asserting "still blocked" is inherently
a negative. Serializing the group removes the parallel-load pressure that
makes the window fragile; the sleep itself is left for a follow-up.

* test(ecstore): pin that a drained bucket is actually deletable

`DeleteBucket`'s emptiness check is `has_xlmeta_files`, a raw scan of the
bucket directory on local disks — not an S3-level listing. So "the client
drained the bucket" and "the bucket is deletable" are two different
contracts, and only the first one was covered.

That gap is what the `S3 Implemented Tests` lane is failing on: 219 cases,
all `BucketNotEmpty` on `nuke_prefixed_buckets`, with every test body
passing. The first one is `test_versioning_obj_suspend_versions`, reported
by pytest as PASSED followed by ERROR at teardown.

Add the missing assertion for the unversioned path: PUT, client DELETE,
then assert no `xl.meta` survives and `DeleteBucket` succeeds. It passes —
which is itself a result: the plain delete path leaves no residue, so the
s3-tests failure is not there.

The versioning-suspended path is the remaining suspect (the client DELETE
leaves a null delete marker, and draining means purging it by
`versionId=null`). It is not covered here: `BucketVersioningSys` resolves
through the ambient `get_bucket_metadata_sys()` OnceLock, which this unit
env cannot set, so the bucket never actually reports as suspended. That
repro belongs at the e2e layer where a real server owns the versioning
state.

* fix(ecstore): let an explicit null-version delete purge its delete marker

Root cause of the `S3 Implemented Tests` lane: 219 cases, all
`BucketNotEmpty` on `nuke_prefixed_buckets`, every test body passing.

On a versioning-suspended bucket a client DELETE leaves a null delete
marker — correct S3 semantics, and an `xl.meta` on disk. Draining the
bucket therefore means purging that marker as `?versionId=null`, which is
what `nuke_bucket` does before `DeleteBucket`. That purge was rejected:

    explicit null-version purge of the null delete marker must succeed,
    got [Some(MethodNotAllowed)]

so the marker survived, and `DeleteBucket`'s emptiness check — a raw
`has_xlmeta_files` scan of the bucket directory, not an S3 listing — kept
reporting the bucket as non-empty.

The two sides of the version comparison in the batch delete loop are in
different namespaces. `goi.version_id` is the client-facing identity, where
`from_file_info` synthesizes `Some(Uuid::nil())` for a null version on a
versioned *or versioning-suspended* bucket. `version_id` is the storage
identity, where `delete_file_info_version_id` maps an explicit
`?versionId=null` to `None`. Comparing them raw makes the purge look like a
version mismatch, so `explicit_delete_marker` is false and the
`MethodNotAllowed` from the lookup is recorded as a delete failure.

This only became reachable on this branch: previously `check_opts` did not
carry `dobj.version_id`, so `set_disk_delete_creates_delete_marker` was
true, `object_lock_check_required` was false, and the lookup that produces
`MethodNotAllowed` never ran. Adding the version id to `check_opts` lit up
a comparison that was already wrong.

Normalize both sides through `delete_file_info_version_id`.

The regression test injects a real Suspended bucket-config snapshot — the
delete path reads versioned/suspended from that snapshot, not from `opts`,
so without it `from_file_info` never synthesizes the null version id and
the branch is not reached. Mutation-checked: restoring the raw comparison
fails the test with the exact `MethodNotAllowed` above.

* fix(app): drop the now-needless struct update

Reverting `crates/replication` to main removed the extra `MrfReplicateEntry`
fields, so this literal specifies every field again and `..Default::default()`
trips `clippy::needless_update` under `-D warnings`.

Caught by CI, not locally: I had run `cargo check --workspace --all-targets`,
which does not see clippy-only lints. Ran `cargo clippy --workspace
--all-targets -- -D warnings` here — clean.

* test(e2e): assert the fresh-volume classification

four_node_empty_legacy_volumes_start_as_fresh only started the cluster and
listed buckets — no assertion, so any classification path that still permits
startup left it green without proving the pre-created empty `.minio.sys`
directories were treated as fresh volumes.

Pin what that classification actually leaves behind: no buckets adopted into
the namespace, `.rustfs.sys/format.json` written on every drive, and the empty
legacy directory left untouched rather than migrated into.

* fix(bucket): apply the requested Object Lock to existing buckets

Site replication replays make-with-versioning against the destination,
carrying the source's `lockEnabled`. When the destination bucket already
exists it takes `force_create`, and the whole option-application block was
gated on `confirmed_missing` — so the call returned success while the replica
stayed unlocked. Replicated versions could then be deleted without the
retention the source enforces.

Object Lock enable is one-way, so applying it to an existing bucket is safe:
move it out of the creation-only gate, keeping `created` and versioning-only
options creation-scoped as before.

An existing authoritative bucket takes the `cache_bucket_metadata_in` branch,
which only caches, so the enable would have been dropped on restart. Persist
instead when the enable actually changed something.

Mutation-checked: restoring the creation-only gate fails the new
`force_create_enables_object_lock_on_an_existing_bucket` with "Object Lock
must be enabled on the existing bucket".

cargo nextest run -p rustfs-ecstore --lib: 3633 passed.

* fix(ecstore): box the generation-checked config mutation paths too

The earlier stack fix boxed `update` and `delete`, but an authorized
bucket-config mutation carrying an incarnation takes `update_if_incarnation`
/ `delete_if_incarnation` instead — which were still inlining the whole
resolve/load/save chain into an already-deep request future. Same overflow,
sibling path.

* fix(restore): keep the nil-version normalization the strip removed

Reverting the replication subsystem to main took `set_disk/replication.rs`
with it, but one line in that file was this branch's own fix rather than
replication work:

    -  self.version_id.filter(|v| !v.is_nil()) == fi.version_id.filter(|v| !v.is_nil())
    +  self.version_id == fi.version_id

For a versioning-suspended object the expected version is `Some(Uuid::nil())`
while the read-back `FileInfo` carries `None`, so the raw compare reports
every suspended restore as "restored object changed before restore metadata
finalization" and the copy-back never commits. Same nil-vs-None mismatch as
the null delete-marker purge fixed earlier on this branch.

Caught by `Test and Lint (rio-v2)`, not by my local runs: the test lives in
`transition_commit_failure_tests`, gated behind `feature = "test-util"`, so
the 3633-test suite I had been running never included it. Re-ran with
`--features rio-v2,test-util`: 3722 passed.
2026-08-03 19:25:43 +00:00
Zhengchao An 5237a4465d feat(replication): purge delete markers by the target's own version id (#5676)
* feat(replication): purge delete markers by the target's own version id

When a delete marker is replicated, the target assigns it a version id. The
purge that follows derived one from the *source* uuid instead, which is only
correct when the target mirrors source version ids. A generic S3 target does
not: the derived id addresses a version that does not exist there, so the
purge is a no-op and the replica keeps a marker the source has already
removed. Same failure class as #4401.

Record the id the target reports and address it directly on purge.

Data path, all of it driven by the object's internal metadata rather than the
`ReplicationState` wire form, which encodes positionally and cannot carry a
map:

- `rustfs-utils`: the `replication-delete-marker-version-<arn>` key family,
  plus `strip_internal_prefix_preserving_case` — ARNs are case-sensitive and
  the existing `strip_internal_prefix` lowercases.
- `ReplicationState` gains the map and a `..._corrupt` flag, both
  `#[serde(skip)]`; `ReplicatedTargetInfo` carries the per-target id.
- `persist_target_delete_marker_versions` is merge-only. A delete arriving
  over internode RPC has an empty map, so treating it as authoritative would
  let a remote disk erase an id the local disk still holds.
- `delete_object_version` copies the map into `fi.metadata` before dispatch,
  so the durable carrier crosses the wire even though the field does not.
- The keys are folded into the quorum hash through their normalized form:
  the dual internal prefixes carrying one mapping share an identity, while a
  genuine disagreement between disks still shows up as a quorum difference.
- `corrupt` (the prefixes disagreed) fails closed: skip the purge and warn
  rather than guess an id and risk destroying a live version on the target.

Ported from the rc.1 branch, which cannot merge as a whole: its MRF replay
rewrite collides with #5659/#5671/#5672/#5673 and regressed
`MRF_PENDING_CAP`. main's MRF machinery is kept; only this capability moves
across. It touches no MRF code.

Two things did not survive the port, deliberately. The branch's
`missing_is_complete` purge regression does not exist here — it came from its
own HEAD-precheck rewrite, and main's simpler path never had it. And the
branch's `MrfReplicateEntry` ordering fields are MRF-redesign scope, left
behind.

Verification: cargo fmt --all --check, git diff --check,
cargo check --workspace --all-targets, and the suites for the four touched
crates — 4070 tests, 2 pre-existing failures unrelated to this change
(`system_resolver_negative_result_reaches_the_dns_allowlist`,
`test_resolve_domain_preserves_system_resolver_error_provenance`; both are
the sandbox DNS interception, they fail on a clean checkout too).

* fix(replication): keep the layer guard happy

scripts/check_architecture_migration_rules.sh matches on text, so the doc
comments naming `rustfs_filemeta::` read as a cross-layer dependency even
though nothing imports it. Reword them; the guard passes.

* fix(replication): make the target-version cap deterministic

Two defects in this PR, both found in review.

The cap was applied while iterating a `HashMap`, so *which* 1000 entries
survived depended on iteration order. Two disks decoding the same oversized
metadata could keep different subsets, hash differently, and lose quorum —
instead of both reporting the same corruption. Collect first, then truncate
in `BTreeMap` order, which is total and identical everywhere.

And `persist_target_delete_marker_versions` discarded the `corrupt` flag from
the RPC carrier, committing a delete-marker update that looked clean while the
exact remote marker identity was unknown. It now declines to merge a corrupt
carrier. Because the helper only ever inserts, declining leaves the durable
keys already on the object untouched, which is strictly safer than writing a
mapping we cannot trust.

Residual, stated rather than papered over: corruption confined to the RPC
carrier is not persisted as a sentinel, so a later reader of an object that
carried no durable keys still sees "legacy, no mapping" rather than "corrupt".
Persisting that would need a wire-format addition; the consumer already fails
closed on any corruption it can observe.

New test: `target_delete_marker_versions_cap_is_deterministic_across_decodes`
decodes the same 1050-entry map twice and asserts both the corrupt flag and
the retained subset agree.

* fix(replication): preserve multipart source mtime (#5669)

* fix(kms): repair unopenable ciphertext and cover the Vault backends (#5668)

* Add black-box behavior tests for KMS resilience and serialization

* fix(kms): repair unopenable ciphertext across backends

Black-box testing of the KMS crate surfaced several defects that make
encrypted data permanently unreadable.

Symmetric envelopes. The Local and Vault Transit backends returned raw
cipher output from `encrypt` while `decrypt` parsed a JSON envelope, so
anything sealed through the master-key path could never be opened again.
Local also discarded the AES-GCM nonce. Both now emit the same envelope
`decrypt` consumes, matching the Static backend.

Deterministic AAD. The object layer derived AEAD additional data by
serializing a `HashMap` directly. Iteration order differs per instance,
so a context rebuilt from storage produced different AAD bytes than the
one used to seal and the object stopped opening. Ordering by key removes
that dependency, matching the Static backend's existing `context_aad`.
Objects written with the default single-key context are unaffected,
since a one-entry map has only one serialization.

Cipher in the header projection. `metadata_to_headers` recorded the SSE
mode (`AES256` / `aws:kms`), which cannot represent ChaCha20-Poly1305,
so a ChaCha-sealed object came back claiming `aws:kms` and was opened
with the wrong cipher. The cipher now travels in
`x-rustfs-encryption-algorithm` — the header the storage layer already
reads but nothing ever wrote. Objects without it fall back as before.

Also: the Static backend ignored `key_spec` and always issued 256-bit
data keys; Local `list_keys` hardcoded `truncated: false`, ignored
`marker`, and paginated over unordered `read_dir`, so a paginating
client silently saw a partial key list; and Local and Vault KV2 reported
`key_id: "unknown"` from `decrypt` despite the envelope naming the
master key.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(kms): cover both Vault backends and key rotation

The behavior suite ran only against Local and Static, and its own harness
documented the gap: the Vault backends had no business-capability
coverage at all. Setting `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN` now adds Vault KV2 and
Vault Transit to every `for_each_backend` spec against a live server.
That lane is what surfaced the Transit envelope defect fixed in the
previous commit.

`rotate` and `versioning` are advertised only by the Vault backends, so
until now every capability-gated branch for them took the
`UnsupportedCapability` side and the working half was never asserted — a
rotation that dropped prior key versions would have gone green. The new
`behavior_rotation.rs` pins that half: material sealed before a rotation
still opens after it, repeated rotations accumulate versions rather than
overwriting a single spare, and the history survives a restart.

Two test defects fixed. `objects_round_trip_across_sizes_and_algorithms`
asserted a 1-byte object differs from its own ciphertext, which collides
once every 256 runs; the assertion now applies only where a collision is
not realistic, and small objects stay covered by the tag check and the
decrypt round-trip. `test_from_env_selects_token_file` depended on
`RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN` being absent from the caller's environment and
now clears it explicitly.

The snapshots directory was also removed from `.gitignore`: insta
snapshots are the assertions themselves, so leaving them untracked gives
CI nothing to compare against. Only `.snap.new` scratch files are
ignored now.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(kms): adapt behavior suite to current key APIs

Rebasing onto main brought four API changes the suite predates.

`DeleteKeyRequest` gained `confirm_key_id`, and immediate deletion is now
gated on the server's `allow_immediate_deletion`. Scheduled deletions pass
`None`; the four specs that destroy a key outright echo the key id back
and opt the harness config in, which is what the gate asks of a real
caller.

`LocalBackupExportRequest` gained `sanitized_config`. These specs cover
the key-material path, so they seal no configuration and pass `None`.

`KmsCacheStats` became a named struct with real hit, miss, and eviction
counters. `cache_stats_returns_an_entry_count_and_no_hit_or_miss_data`
existed to pin the old placeholder behavior — that the second tuple
element was always zero — which main has since fixed, so it is now
`cache_stats_reports_hits_and_misses_separately` and asserts the counters
actually move.

Starting the service provisions the reserved probe key, so it shows up in
listings and backup bundles. Exact-set assertions filter it through a new
`without_probe_key` helper rather than naming it, keeping those specs
about the keys they seeded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(kms): bind the AAD to the stored context bytes

Review caught that canonicalizing the AAD on decrypt breaks objects sealed
before canonicalization existed, and it was right. The AAD is the
*serialization* of the encryption context, and `x-rustfs-encryption-context`
stores that exact byte sequence: `encrypt_object` fed one `HashMap` to the
AEAD and then moved the same map into the metadata the header is written
from, so the stored string is byte-identical to the AAD the object was
sealed under. Those objects are therefore recoverable — but only while
nothing round-trips the value through a `HashMap` and re-serializes it.

Recomputing sorted AAD on decrypt would have turned a readable object into
a permanently unreadable one. The previous behavior was worse than the
first analysis credited: it did not merely fail intermittently, it made
the failure deterministic.

`EncryptionMetadata` now carries `context_aad`, the bytes the object was
actually sealed with. Encryption records what it fed the AEAD, the header
projection stores those bytes verbatim (and preserves a legacy ordering
across a re-projection rather than rewriting it into sorted form), and
`headers_to_metadata` carries the stored string through untouched. Both
decrypt paths, SSE-KMS and SSE-C, prefer it and fall back to canonical
serialization only when no stored serialization exists. Canonicalization
still applies to everything newly sealed, so the original ordering bug
cannot recur.

Two tests pin this: a legacy record whose sealed bytes are non-canonical
must survive a full header round trip unchanged, and a context header
rewritten to an equivalent-but-reordered serialization must fail
authentication rather than silently re-deriving a working AAD. Both were
mutation-checked against the reinstated bug on each side.

Also from review: the lifecycle churn test asserted only that every
request was accounted for, which holds whether the state gate exists or
not, so both branches are now pinned deterministically after the churn
(asserting `refused > 0` on the concurrent phase would only trade the hole
for a scheduling flake). And the Local and Vault KV2 envelopes compare
`encryption_context` without authenticating it — `DekCrypto` seals only
the plaintext — which is now documented at both sites; closing it needs a
versioned envelope, since existing ciphertext was sealed without AAD.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: ccccpj <ccccpj@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: 唐小鸭 <tangtang1251@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 17:11:27 +00:00
唐小鸭 62cc19e937 fix(kms): repair unopenable ciphertext and cover the Vault backends (#5668)
* Add black-box behavior tests for KMS resilience and serialization

* fix(kms): repair unopenable ciphertext across backends

Black-box testing of the KMS crate surfaced several defects that make
encrypted data permanently unreadable.

Symmetric envelopes. The Local and Vault Transit backends returned raw
cipher output from `encrypt` while `decrypt` parsed a JSON envelope, so
anything sealed through the master-key path could never be opened again.
Local also discarded the AES-GCM nonce. Both now emit the same envelope
`decrypt` consumes, matching the Static backend.

Deterministic AAD. The object layer derived AEAD additional data by
serializing a `HashMap` directly. Iteration order differs per instance,
so a context rebuilt from storage produced different AAD bytes than the
one used to seal and the object stopped opening. Ordering by key removes
that dependency, matching the Static backend's existing `context_aad`.
Objects written with the default single-key context are unaffected,
since a one-entry map has only one serialization.

Cipher in the header projection. `metadata_to_headers` recorded the SSE
mode (`AES256` / `aws:kms`), which cannot represent ChaCha20-Poly1305,
so a ChaCha-sealed object came back claiming `aws:kms` and was opened
with the wrong cipher. The cipher now travels in
`x-rustfs-encryption-algorithm` — the header the storage layer already
reads but nothing ever wrote. Objects without it fall back as before.

Also: the Static backend ignored `key_spec` and always issued 256-bit
data keys; Local `list_keys` hardcoded `truncated: false`, ignored
`marker`, and paginated over unordered `read_dir`, so a paginating
client silently saw a partial key list; and Local and Vault KV2 reported
`key_id: "unknown"` from `decrypt` despite the envelope naming the
master key.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(kms): cover both Vault backends and key rotation

The behavior suite ran only against Local and Static, and its own harness
documented the gap: the Vault backends had no business-capability
coverage at all. Setting `RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN` now adds Vault KV2 and
Vault Transit to every `for_each_backend` spec against a live server.
That lane is what surfaced the Transit envelope defect fixed in the
previous commit.

`rotate` and `versioning` are advertised only by the Vault backends, so
until now every capability-gated branch for them took the
`UnsupportedCapability` side and the working half was never asserted — a
rotation that dropped prior key versions would have gone green. The new
`behavior_rotation.rs` pins that half: material sealed before a rotation
still opens after it, repeated rotations accumulate versions rather than
overwriting a single spare, and the history survives a restart.

Two test defects fixed. `objects_round_trip_across_sizes_and_algorithms`
asserted a 1-byte object differs from its own ciphertext, which collides
once every 256 runs; the assertion now applies only where a collision is
not realistic, and small objects stay covered by the tag check and the
decrypt round-trip. `test_from_env_selects_token_file` depended on
`RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN` being absent from the caller's environment and
now clears it explicitly.

The snapshots directory was also removed from `.gitignore`: insta
snapshots are the assertions themselves, so leaving them untracked gives
CI nothing to compare against. Only `.snap.new` scratch files are
ignored now.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(kms): adapt behavior suite to current key APIs

Rebasing onto main brought four API changes the suite predates.

`DeleteKeyRequest` gained `confirm_key_id`, and immediate deletion is now
gated on the server's `allow_immediate_deletion`. Scheduled deletions pass
`None`; the four specs that destroy a key outright echo the key id back
and opt the harness config in, which is what the gate asks of a real
caller.

`LocalBackupExportRequest` gained `sanitized_config`. These specs cover
the key-material path, so they seal no configuration and pass `None`.

`KmsCacheStats` became a named struct with real hit, miss, and eviction
counters. `cache_stats_returns_an_entry_count_and_no_hit_or_miss_data`
existed to pin the old placeholder behavior — that the second tuple
element was always zero — which main has since fixed, so it is now
`cache_stats_reports_hits_and_misses_separately` and asserts the counters
actually move.

Starting the service provisions the reserved probe key, so it shows up in
listings and backup bundles. Exact-set assertions filter it through a new
`without_probe_key` helper rather than naming it, keeping those specs
about the keys they seeded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(kms): bind the AAD to the stored context bytes

Review caught that canonicalizing the AAD on decrypt breaks objects sealed
before canonicalization existed, and it was right. The AAD is the
*serialization* of the encryption context, and `x-rustfs-encryption-context`
stores that exact byte sequence: `encrypt_object` fed one `HashMap` to the
AEAD and then moved the same map into the metadata the header is written
from, so the stored string is byte-identical to the AAD the object was
sealed under. Those objects are therefore recoverable — but only while
nothing round-trips the value through a `HashMap` and re-serializes it.

Recomputing sorted AAD on decrypt would have turned a readable object into
a permanently unreadable one. The previous behavior was worse than the
first analysis credited: it did not merely fail intermittently, it made
the failure deterministic.

`EncryptionMetadata` now carries `context_aad`, the bytes the object was
actually sealed with. Encryption records what it fed the AEAD, the header
projection stores those bytes verbatim (and preserves a legacy ordering
across a re-projection rather than rewriting it into sorted form), and
`headers_to_metadata` carries the stored string through untouched. Both
decrypt paths, SSE-KMS and SSE-C, prefer it and fall back to canonical
serialization only when no stored serialization exists. Canonicalization
still applies to everything newly sealed, so the original ordering bug
cannot recur.

Two tests pin this: a legacy record whose sealed bytes are non-canonical
must survive a full header round trip unchanged, and a context header
rewritten to an equivalent-but-reordered serialization must fail
authentication rather than silently re-deriving a working AAD. Both were
mutation-checked against the reinstated bug on each side.

Also from review: the lifecycle churn test asserted only that every
request was accounted for, which holds whether the state gate exists or
not, so both branches are now pinned deterministically after the churn
(asserting `refused > 0` on the concurrent phase would only trade the hole
for a scheduling flake). And the Local and Vault KV2 envelopes compare
`encryption_context` without authenticating it — `DekCrypto` seals only
the plaintext — which is now documented at both sites; closing it needs a
versioned envelope, since existing ciphertext was sealed without AAD.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 23:33:08 +08:00
ccccpj d8d22599fe fix(replication): preserve multipart source mtime (#5669) 2026-08-03 14:46:04 +00:00
cxymds ee55691f63 test(replication): add mixed-version MRF acceptance matrix (#5673)
* feat(replication): add dormant MRF v2 reader

* test(replication): add mixed-version reader acceptance
2026-08-03 22:09:59 +08:00
cxymds 3ce17cd7dd feat(replication): add dormant MRF v2 reader (#5672) 2026-08-03 22:09:33 +08:00
cxymds 4310850103 fix(replication): retain MRF entries until completion (#5671) 2026-08-03 22:09:24 +08:00
Miguel Amador acce8b2253 fix(lock): let waiters hear releases and let acquisition succeed past registered waiters (#5670)
* fix(lock): let waiters hear releases and let acquisition succeed past registered waiters

Same-key write contention scaled superlinearly with writer count: 8
concurrent conditional PUTs on one key cost ~340-460 ms, 16 cost ~700 ms,
32 cost ~5 s, against ~4 ms per uncontended write and ~10 ms actual lock
holds (measured via RUSTFS_OBJECT_LOCK_DIAG at 1 ms thresholds). Outcomes
were always correct; the cost was pure waiting.

Two coupled defects in fast_lock caused it:

1. The slow path's early retries slept without subscribing to anything.
   notify_writer()/notify_readers() are gated on the waiter counters,
   which a sleeper never increments, so a release during the backoff
   woke nobody. The lock sat free while every loser slept out its full
   backoff, and the ladder compounded: successive acquires landed at
   the cumulative ladder offsets (10+20+40+80+100... ms).

2. try_acquire_exclusive demanded the entire packed state word be zero,
   including the readers_waiting/writers_waiting counter bits. A lock
   with registered waiters could be acquired by no one - including the
   waiters themselves, each blocked by the others' registration - so
   contended acquisition only succeeded in windows where every waiter
   happened to be unregistered. This is also why (1) could not be fixed
   by simply registering the sleepers: registration alone deadlocks
   acquisition until the acquire deadline. try_acquire_shared already
   masks correctly and preserves the counter bits in its CAS; the
   exclusive path now mirrors it.

The fix: mask the acquisition CAS to ownership bits only (writer flag,
active readers), and turn the early-retry sleep into a notification wait
bounded by the same backoff, so a release wakes a waiter immediately
while the bound still protects against lost or stolen wakeups exactly as
NOTIFY_WAIT_CAP does for the post-retry wait.

With both changes, 8 concurrent same-key CAS writers resolve in 17-29 ms
(was 340-460 ms) and 32 resolve in 20-53 ms (was ~5 s), with per-racer
cost now decreasing in N. Outcomes remain exactly one winner, N-1
precondition failures, zero errors at every width. cargo test -p
rustfs-lock passes 113/113 at pristine-parity runtime, including
test_concurrent_write_lock_contention, which previously only passed
because sleepers were invisible to it.

* test(lock): pin both halves of the waiter-starvation fix

The fix commit touched only production files, so reverting either half
left the suite green: test_concurrent_write_lock_contention only waits
for five writers to finish and never asserts that acquisition happens
before the backoff ladder runs out.

Three tests, one per revert:

* exclusive_acquisition_ignores_registered_waiters (state.rs) - a free
  lock with registered waiters must be acquirable, and the CAS must
  preserve the counters. Fails against the all-zero `expected`.

* early_retry_registers_as_waiter (shard.rs) - a waiter in the
  early-retry backoff must appear in the writer waiter count within the
  ~750ms early-retry phase, since notify_writer/notify_readers are gated
  on those counters. Fails against a bare `sleep`, which registers
  nowhere.

* contended_writers_drain_promptly_after_release (tests.rs) - 16 same-key
  writers, all registered behind one holder, must drain within 1s of the
  release rather than sit out their 5s acquire deadlines. Fails against
  the all-zero `expected` end to end.

Wakeup latency is deliberately not asserted anywhere. NOTIFY_POOL is a
process-global of 128 Notify slots shared by every lock, so a waiter in
a concurrently-running test can consume another's notify_one and push it
to the end of its rung: a 24-key latency probe measured ~150us in
isolation and ~92ms - a full unexpired rung - alongside the existing
64-key missed-wakeup test. That is the stolen wakeup NOTIFY_WAIT_CAP
already exists to bound, and it makes any in-suite latency budget flaky.

cargo test -p rustfs-lock: 116/116.

Signed-off-by: Miguel Amador <miguel@amador.one>

---------

Signed-off-by: Miguel Amador <miguel@amador.one>
2026-08-03 22:08:48 +08:00
ccccpj e20892ace9 fix(helm): exclude external hosts from mTLS certificate (#5666) 2026-08-03 22:01:39 +08:00
cxymds accc906b33 fix(replication): fence force-delete journal updates (#5661)
* feat(replication): add conditional config store APIs

* fix(replication): fence force-delete journal updates

* fix(replication): retry durable force-delete commits

* test(replication): fence lost force-delete journal leases

* fix(replication): bound force-delete journal retries
2026-08-03 22:00:49 +08:00
Zhengchao An 975003d60a fix(s3): stop authorizing DeleteBucketWebsite with a read action (#5665)
`delete_bucket_website` authorized through `s3:GetBucketPolicy` while
`put_bucket_website` used `s3:PutBucketPolicy`. The handler is a real
mutation — `rustfs/src/storage/ecfs.rs` calls
`delete_bucket_metadata_config(bucket, BUCKET_WEBSITE_CONFIG)`, permanently
removing the persisted website configuration.

So a principal holding only

    {"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetBucketPolicy"],
     "Resource":"arn:aws:s3:::victim"}

— an ordinary read-only "may read my bucket policy" grant — could send
`DELETE /victim?website` and destroy the configuration. On a bucket whose
policy grants that to `Principal: "*"`, it is reachable anonymously.

AWS treats this as its own permission: "This DELETE action requires the
S3:DeleteBucketWebsite permission." RustFS has no dedicated
`s3:PutBucketWebsite` / `s3:DeleteBucketWebsite` action, so this keeps the
existing bucket-config convention (`s3:PutBucketPolicy`, the same one
`put_bucket_request_payment` and `put_bucket_accelerate_configuration` use)
rather than adding actions, which would silently invalidate deployed
policies that already grant website writes.

Rather than correcting one constant, both handlers now route through a
single `bucket_website_config_authorize_action()`, so the read/write pair
cannot drift apart again.

Swept the rest of the surface while here: `delete_bucket_website` was the
only mutation handler authorizing through a Get*/List* action.
`delete_bucket_ownership_controls`, `put_bucket_ownership_controls` and
`put_bucket_metrics_configuration` return `Ok(())` with no authorization,
but none of them is implemented outside the access hook, so there is no
operation to authorize — left alone.

Adding a dedicated `s3:DeleteBucketWebsite` for full AWS parity is a
separate change with a policy-compatibility impact; noted, not done here.

Verification: cargo fmt --all --check, git diff --check,
cargo check -p rustfs --all-targets, cargo clippy -p rustfs --all-targets
(clean), and the new regression test. Mutation-checked: restoring
`GetBucketPolicyAction` turns
`bucket_website_config_never_authorizes_through_a_read_action` red.
2026-08-03 16:11:52 +08:00
Henry Guo b563230782 fix(ecstore): allow Windows renames under guarded parents (#5663)
Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-03 16:11:37 +08:00
cxymds 9b4a73f315 fix(replication): harden MRF replay durability (#5659)
* feat(replication): add MRF envelope capabilities

* fix(replication): retain failed MRF replay entries

* fix(replication): retain transient MRF source failures

* fix(replication): address MRF durability review feedback

* fix(replication): preserve MRF recovery handoff

* fix(replication): harden MRF recovery handoff
2026-08-03 15:35:00 +08:00
houseme 371a3529e5 chore(deps): refresh hotpath allocator support (#5660)
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-03 06:52:44 +00:00
houseme a8574d0104 fix(metrics): close dimension review gaps (#5656)
* fix(metrics): close dimension review gaps

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(metrics): cover dimension review gaps

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* test(metrics): cover failed disk info UUID fallback

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-03 04:12:31 +00:00
Zhengchao An 2fb88d2c60 test(ci): serialize cross-node metadata writes (#5654) 2026-08-03 02:00:43 +00:00
cxymds 380ec74ece fix(replication): persist force-delete handoff state (#5641)
* fix(replication): persist force-delete handoff state

* fix(arch): route force-delete config access through boundary

* style: format force-delete imports

---------

Co-authored-by: Zhengchao An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-08-03 01:44:28 +00:00
houseme 035ce5d784 feat(obs): add bounded metrics dimensions (#5645)
* feat(obs): add drive topology detail metrics

Expose additive drive info, topology, state, and per-drive API metrics while preserving the existing drive metric label sets.

Backlog: rustfs/backlog#1655

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(obs): preserve suspect drive runtime state

Keep suspect as a bounded drive runtime state and avoid all-zero runtime_state samples for that storage health state.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(obs): skip unknown drive inode samples

Avoid exporting zero inode gauges for missing or stale drive snapshots and ignore zero-count API latency buckets.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(obs): add scanner source work detail metrics

Expose additive scanner source and cycle work metrics with bounded server/source/state labels while leaving the existing aggregate scanner metrics unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(obs): add ilm action detail metrics

Expose additive ILM action/state task metrics with a server label while preserving the existing aggregate ILM series.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(obs): add delivery target server metrics

Expose additive audit and notification delivery target metrics with server labels and extend removed-target tombstones for the server-aware series.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(obs): add replication target flow metrics

Expose additive bucket replication target sent and failed-flow metrics while preserving existing bucket aggregates and target backlog series.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(obs): add request server metrics

Expose additive API request metrics with server labels while preserving the existing request and traffic metric label sets.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* style(obs): apply rustfmt to metrics changes

Apply rustfmt output to the metrics dimension changes without altering behavior.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* style(obs): reuse audit target label constant

Use the exported audit target_id label constant for legacy audit target metrics.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(obs): populate drive disk metrics

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(obs): add scanner bucket drive result metrics

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* feat(obs): add replication proxy server metrics

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(obs): address metric liveness review

Use checked division for drive API latency aggregation and keep recovered drive, scanner current-cycle, replication flow, audit target, and notification target series from retaining stale values.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(obs): address metric dimension review

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(obs): address additional metric review

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(obs): count drive calls at start

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(obs): address metrics dimension review

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(metrics): address dimension review gaps

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(metrics): address scanner review follow-ups

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(metrics): address runtime review follow-ups

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(metrics): reduce disk metric contention

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(metrics): address runtime review follow-ups

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

* fix(metrics): retire stale dimension series

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
2026-08-03 09:03:34 +08:00
cxymds 988cd8adbb fix(ci): keep PR e2e smoke lane from timing out (#5649)
fix(ci): prevent e2e smoke lane timeout
2026-08-03 06:13:46 +08:00
Zhengchao An 9dd0461f3e test(kms): exercise real Vault Raft failover (#5653) 2026-08-03 05:25:23 +08:00
Zhengchao An fbb6cebeb4 feat(kms): bound backend concurrency and failures (#5651) 2026-08-02 18:24:26 +00:00
cxymds 2ce670837c fix(ecstore): make transitioned deletes durable (#5644)
* fix(ecstore): make transitioned deletes durable

* fix(ecstore): journal force deletes

* fix(ecstore): journal force deletes
2026-08-02 18:00:11 +00:00
Zhengchao An 8a65017f36 fix(kms): bound persisted format parsing (#5652)
fix(kms): harden persisted format compatibility
2026-08-02 17:53:01 +00:00
Zhengchao An 3a5b6eb11d test(kms): verify AppRole against live Vault (#5650)
* test(kms): add ignored Vault AppRole live harness

* test(kms): tighten Vault AppRole live contract
2026-08-02 17:25:49 +00:00
Zhengchao An 0800f74874 fix(kms): version local key records safely (#5638) 2026-08-02 16:30:23 +00:00
cxymds a918f1a48a fix(replication): snapshot existing object admission targets (#5634) 2026-08-03 00:13:32 +08:00
cxymds ec67884f8d fix(replication): preserve durable MRF delete admission (#5643) 2026-08-02 23:53:53 +08:00
Henry Guo e5cfa8e375 feat(table-catalog): paginate Iceberg REST listings (#5466)
* feat(table-catalog): paginate Iceberg REST listings

* test(table-catalog): remove redundant token clones

---------

Co-authored-by: Henry Guo <marshawcoco@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-02 15:27:15 +00:00
cxymds 1fdcbd9225 fix(replication): fail closed on destination encryption (#5633)
* fix(replication): fail closed on destination encryption

* test(replication): avoid Debug bound in encryption assertion
2026-08-02 22:54:51 +08:00
cxymds 114b2420a2 feat(admin): expose versioned replication capabilities (#5631)
* feat(admin): expose replication capabilities

* fix(admin): route replication capabilities through facades
2026-08-02 22:54:38 +08:00
Zhengchao An 52c70738eb fix(kms): cover concurrent Vault KV2 rotation races (#5632)
* fix(kms): handle concurrent Vault KV2 baseline races

* test(kms): keep concurrent rotation regression fail-closed
2026-08-02 22:53:40 +08:00
Zhengchao An 60ee86c835 test(kms): pin AWS timeout and contract divergence (#5636) 2026-08-02 22:52:54 +08:00
Zhengchao An 5206c82423 ci: require MinIO interop reader matrix (#5640) 2026-08-02 22:34:19 +08:00
cxymds 00324e6936 test(e2e): add replication acceptance matrix (#5642) 2026-08-02 22:34:00 +08:00
GatewayJ 6028dad2f4 test(iam): freeze OIDC federation behavior (#5627) 2026-08-02 22:33:20 +08:00
Zhengchao An 54d8c02a2f fix(targets): explain webhook outbound allowlist failures (#5616) 2026-08-02 22:33:05 +08:00
唐小鸭 3f716746cf fix(replication): honor target TLS in health checks (#5613) 2026-08-02 22:32:56 +08:00
cxymds 779b5a49ea fix(replication): propagate metadata changes (#5635)
Preserve metadata replication operations in the durable MRF and route tagging, retention, and legal-hold updates through the existing full-object replication transport. Keep ACL propagation outside the contract because the current object model has no durable object ACL state.

Refs #1616
2026-08-02 13:50:24 +00:00
cxymds 2cc7443067 feat(replication): bound DeleteObjects queue admission (#5637)
feat(replication): batch DeleteObjects queue admission
2026-08-02 21:06:54 +08:00
cxymds 378c9ba67f fix(replication): enforce bucket write contract (#5629) 2026-08-02 11:51:47 +00:00
Zhengchao An 4473c548be test(admin): audit KMS deletion guard outcomes (#5628) 2026-08-02 11:39:37 +00:00
cxymds ac63808d3c fix(replication): make sync delivery target-granular (#5630) 2026-08-02 11:31:13 +00:00
cxymds 2cdba03dee fix(authz): gate replication-only PUT headers (#5625) 2026-08-02 19:28:54 +08:00
cxymds 885096d1de fix(replication): reject unsupported target options (#5622) 2026-08-02 19:28:30 +08:00
cxymds 921ddef2c7 fix(lifecycle): bind delete replication admission (#5621) 2026-08-02 19:27:39 +08:00
Zhengchao An f1a4588326 docs(kms): record CLI and console admin handoff matrix (#5639)
docs(kms): record client admin API handoff matrix
2026-08-02 19:27:19 +08:00
Zhengchao An 2698a03582 test(kms): pin admin KMS response shapes where they are served (#5626)
The snapshots in crates/kms/src/api_types.rs pinned DeleteKeyResponse,
ListKeysResponse, DescribeKeyResponse and CancelKeyDeletionResponse, none
of which is serialized by any handler: those endpoints answer with
DeleteKmsKeyResponse and siblings in rustfs/src/admin/handlers/kms_keys.rs,
separate types carrying different fields. A breaking change to an admin
response could not fail them. Tag, untag and update-description had the
same gap, where the handler discards the kms-side response and serves its
own KmsKeyMetadataResponse.

Pin the shapes in the crate that produces them, and delete the four kms
mirrors. They were never in the pub use api_types list, had no
constructors and no callers, and only looked live because those snapshots
named them.

Keep the api_types snapshots that pin something real: configure, start,
stop and status are served verbatim by kms_dynamic, and the tag family
are live ObjectEncryptionService return types whose snapshots pin this
crate's public API rather than a wire shape.
2026-08-02 11:20:17 +00:00
Zhengchao An b1ddda3bb2 fix(sse): rewrite data when a same-key copy changes encryption (#5618)
A same-name CopyObject marks the operation `metadata_only`, which lets the
store layer rewrite `xl.meta` in place and leave the data blocks untouched.
The handler independently strips the source encryption metadata and calls
`sse_encryption`, which mints a *fresh* DEK. On an unversioned bucket both
happen at once, so the object ends up with a new DEK sitting beside ciphertext
sealed under the old one, and can never be decrypted again.

The mirror case is silent: an encrypted source copied without any destination
SSE keeps its ciphertext while losing the key metadata, so GET returns raw
ciphertext as if it were plaintext, with HTTP 200 and no error anywhere.

Keep `metadata_only` off whenever either side of the copy is encrypted, so the
store layer performs a full read/write rewrite through `put_object`. This is
the same resolution the versioned historical-restore path already uses for
this risk (issue #4238), and it matches MinIO's
`isSourceEncrypted || isTargetEncrypted -> metadataOnly = false` guard in
CopyObjectHandler.

The target half of the predicate deliberately tests `effective_sse` rather
than the request headers MinIO inspects: `effective_sse` also resolves the
bucket default-encryption rule, and `sse_encryption` mints a DEK from that
resolved value. A header-only check would miss a same-key copy performed under
a bucket default rule. The source half reuses `ObjectInfo::is_encrypted` so a
future encryption flavour is covered here as soon as it is recognised there.

Versioned buckets were already safe: that path falls through to `put_object`
regardless of `metadata_only`. RestoreObject also sets `metadata_only` but
only appends restore keys and never re-derives a DEK, so it is unaffected.
2026-08-02 11:00:52 +00:00
Zhengchao An da531c8a97 docs(kms): guard outward FIPS wording (#5624) 2026-08-02 18:50:54 +08:00
Zhengchao An 40cd10c1d0 fix(scanner): surface per-tier usage in the data-usage snapshot (#5623)
SizeSummary::tier_stats was populated for every scanned object but
apply_scanner_size_summary dropped it, so per-tier usage never reached
DataUsageInfo. Wire it through the same merge chain repl_target_stats
already uses, up to DataUsageInfo::tier_stats.

DataUsageEntry used the derived MessagePack encoding, which serialises
structs as arrays: appending a field turns the whole cache into a decode
error for older readers, so mixed-version nodes would invalidate each
other's cache every scan cycle. Give it the same hand-written
map-encoded Serialize DataUsageCacheInfo already carries, and record the
invariant in AGENTS.md.

Widen TierStats counters from i32 to u64 so a tier past 2^31 versions
cannot make checked_merge reject an entire usage snapshot, and drop the
duplicate TierStats/AllTierStats definitions in the scanner crate in
favour of the data-usage ones.
2026-08-02 10:46:36 +00:00
567 changed files with 134121 additions and 43034 deletions
+16 -16
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
name: adversarial-validation
description: Execute the Adversarial Validation policy from the root AGENTS.md — run the seven reviewer roles (correctness, simplicity, security, concurrency/durability, compatibility, performance, test coverage) with RustFS-specific attack probes. Use on every behavior-affecting code change, bug fix, or design proposal before declaring it done.
description: Execute the Adversarial Validation policy from the root AGENTS.md — run the applicable reviewer roles with RustFS-specific attack probes. Use on every behavior-affecting code change, bug fix, design proposal, or agent-instruction change that alters execution before declaring it done.
---
# Adversarial Validation Playbooks
@@ -61,14 +61,15 @@ Null report example: "Attacked quorum-1 error reduction, exact max-keys listing
### Simplicity adversary
- Smaller-diff attack: rewrite the diff's change mentally (or actually, in scratch) as the minimal in-place edit and compare. Flag as findings: a helper function with exactly one caller introduced by this diff; a file rewrite where a 3-line edit inside the existing control flow suffices; reshaped control flow in init/locking/metadata/quorum paths beyond what the fix requires; new string literals duplicating existing constants (grep the token first); #[path] module inclusion. If the smaller diff achieves identical behavior, report it with the concrete replacement.
- Smaller-diff attack: inspect production growth separately from tests, fixtures, generated code, and documentation; test additions have no growth budget. Rewrite the production diff mentally (or in scratch) as the minimal equivalent edit. Report a finding only with a concrete smaller design that preserves correctness, compatibility, readability, and real boundaries; fewer lines alone are not evidence.
- Where: Any diff; extra scrutiny for crates/ecstore, crates/lock, rustfs/src/storage where 'preserve the existing control-flow shape' is an explicit rule
- Evidence: AGENTS.md 'Change Style for Existing Logic' (one-off helper ban, preserve control-flow shape in distributed/locking/metadata paths, no #[path]) and 'Reuse Before You Write' (constants clause); the Adversarial Validation roles list charters the simplicity adversary with exactly this attack.
- Reuse-and-necessity attack: for each new helper the diff introduces, run `ls crates/utils/src crates/common/src` and `rg -i 'fn \w*<term>'` over those dirs plus the touched crate (snake_case signatures — a full-text single-word grep drowns, a multi-word phrase returns nothing). A reimplementation of an existing workspace utility, or of plain std/tokio behavior no wrapper refines, is a finding — but so is forced reuse with mismatched semantics (normalization such as `clean` resolving `.`/`..` against raw S3 keys, error type, backoff, durability gating). For each new defensive branch, demand the nameable trigger and flag re-validation of what a validated upstream layer on the SAME path already guarantees — excluding the Cross-Cutting Domain Invariant patterns (nil/empty/absent UUID, dual metadata keys, unversioned-tier versionId) and re-checks before destructive actions, which are load-bearing even when redundant on the happy path. For each new test, flag near-duplicates pinning the same code path AND poison-value class as an existing test — boundary companions (n==max vs max+1, absent vs empty vs nil UUID, MetaObject vs MetaDeleteMarker) are never near-duplicates; the test-coverage skeptic playbook below mandates them.
- Where: Any diff adding helpers, branches on decoded/peer data, or tests; helper checks against crates/utils, crates/common, and the touched crate
- Evidence: AGENTS.md 'Change Style for Existing Logic' (conditional extraction rule, preserve sensitive control flow, canonical modules) and 'Reuse Before You Write'; the Adversarial Validation roles list charters this attack.
- Reuse-and-necessity attack: for each new helper, search `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, the touched crate, the likely domain owner, and relevant direct dependencies. A reimplementation is a finding, but forced reuse with mismatched normalization, error, backoff, or durability semantics is also a finding. Demand a nameable trigger for new defensive branches. Tests remain subject to validity and near-duplicate coverage review, never a size limit.
- Where: Any diff adding helpers, branches on decoded/peer data, or tests
- Evidence: AGENTS.md 'Reuse Before You Write' and 'Necessary Code Only'; GHSA-f4vq-9ffr-m8m3 (normalization-asymmetry traversal — why forced reuse of normalizing helpers on raw keys is itself an attack); docs/operations/tier-ilm-debugging.md nil-versionId incident (why boundary re-checks are load-bearing).
- Replacement-and-comment attack: when the diff introduces a replacement path or representation, trace all callers and flag a superseded in-scope path left behind without a compatibility requirement. Keep one canonical core behind compatibility adapters. Comments must state non-obvious invariants completely without narration or change history. Never demand unrelated deletion or trade away correctness, compatibility, or readability to reduce the diff.
Null report example: "Rewrote the diff as an in-place edit (no smaller equivalent exists), grepped both new helpers against crates/utils, crates/common, and the touched crate (no existing equivalent; call-site semantics checked), verified the two new defensive branches name concrete corrupt-input triggers, and checked the added tests against the existing suite (each pins a distinct poison-value class) — no break found."
Null report example: "Separated production growth from tests/docs, tested a smaller equivalent, checked helper reuse and superseded paths, and found no break."
### Security reviewer
@@ -195,9 +196,9 @@ Null report example: "Attacked dual-key metadata writes/removals against MinIO-o
### Performance reviewer
- For every `.clone()` the diff adds or moves onto a per-request/per-object path, open the cloned type and count heap fields (String, Vec, HashMap, Bytes). If >5 heap fields or it contains an EC block buffer, construct the cost: N concurrent PUTs x M objects -> N*M deep copies per second. Demand Arc-wrapping of heavy fields or pass-by-reference; also flag new `String` allocations in header/path/signature parsing where `&str`/`Cow<str>` suffices.
- For each `.clone()` or allocation added to a per-request/per-object path, identify the copied data and execution frequency. Report a finding only for a concrete repeated cost or benchmark regression. Recommend borrowing, moving, `Bytes`/`Arc`, `Cow`, or capacity reservation only when it reduces that cost without obscuring ownership or APIs.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/**, crates/ecstore/src/store*.rs, rustfs/src/storage/, crates/filemeta/, request handlers in rustfs/src/
- Evidence: crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md 'Allocation Discipline in Hot Paths' (no Clone on >5-heap-field structs, Arc for large buffers, &str/Cow for temporary computations); .agents/skills/rust-code-quality/SKILL.md ranks 'unnecessary clone in hot path' as P1 must-fix
- Evidence: crates/ecstore/AGENTS.md 'Allocation Discipline in Hot Paths'; .agents/skills/rust-code-quality/SKILL.md requires a concrete hot-path cost rather than a proxy metric
- For every new sync_all/sync_data/fdatasync/flush/File::sync call in the diff, trace the call chain to DurabilityMode / RUSTFS_DRIVE_SYNC_ENABLE resolution (crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs:291 DurabilityMode, :347 resolve_durability_mode) and to per-bucket durability overrides. Construct the run where the operator sets mode=none (or legacy RUSTFS_DRIVE_SYNC_ENABLE=false) and the new fsync still fires — that is an ungated durability cost and a regression on 4KiB writes.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs, crates/ecstore/src/bucket/durability.rs, crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/** (rename_data/commit paths), any crate doing tokio::fs or std::fs writes
- Evidence: #4221 fsync work caused a measured -10% 4KiB write regression (#814 investigation), later gated; durability modes added in eaff17cad (#4397), per-bucket tier overrides in 13e48d93a (#4407); 2df315baf (#4493) shows even ancestor-dir fsyncs are routed through the gate
@@ -230,12 +231,12 @@ Null report example: "Attacked the new rename_data commit-section work, durabili
### Test-coverage skeptic
- For every behavior claim in the PR description, revert that hunk (git stash / manual undo of the changed lines) and name the exact test (`cargo test -p <crate> <test_name>`) that fails. If no test fails on revert, the behavior is untested — file a finding, not a note. Especially verify the test exercises the REAL production call path, not a lookalike helper.
- For every testable behavior claim in the PR description, revert that hunk and name the focused test or executable check that detects the revert. If no reasonable check exists, require the reason and residual risk from the validation floor. Especially verify the check exercises the real production path, not a lookalike helper.
- Where: All crates; highest value in crates/ecstore, rustfs/src/storage, crates/heal
- Evidence: AGENTS.md exit criterion 'Every behavior change has a test that fails without it'. Real bug: PR #4220 (ghost-directory cleanup) merged with green tests but its fix never executed on the real delete path — required follow-up rustfs#4307, backlog#798 stayed OPEN. The tests exercised a path the production flow never took.
- Evidence: AGENTS.md testable-behavior exit criterion. Real bug: PR #4220 (ghost-directory cleanup) merged with green tests but its fix never executed on the real delete path — required follow-up rustfs#4307, backlog#798 stayed OPEN. The tests exercised a path the production flow never took.
- Read each added/modified test and confirm it asserts the real outcome (returned value, stored bytes, error variant), not merely 'call succeeded' or 'no panic'. Flag any test whose only observable is that the function returned, and any `assert!(result.is_err())` that never checks WHICH error. Then check: does the test prove the exploit/failure form is denied, or only that the intended form still works?
- Where: crates/e2e_test (security_boundary_test.rs pattern), and every #[cfg(test)] module in the diff
- Evidence: Commit dee8e4e63 (#4466) had to rewrite 277 lines of crates/e2e_test/src/security_boundary_test.rs because 'security boundary tests' passed without asserting real outcomes. .agents/skills/rust-code-quality/SKILL.md checklist: 'Every test function has at least one assert!'; .agents/skills/security-advisory-lessons/SKILL.md: 'Does the test prove the exploit form is denied, or only that the intended form still works?'
- Evidence: Commit dee8e4e63 (#4466) had to rewrite 277 lines of crates/e2e_test/src/security_boundary_test.rs because 'security boundary tests' passed without asserting real outcomes. .agents/skills/rust-code-quality/SKILL.md requires an observable failure criterion; .agents/skills/security-advisory-lessons/SKILL.md asks whether the exploit form is denied.
- When the diff adds a boolean/mode parameter or config flag, find the test that fails if the flag's effect is INVERTED inside the changed function. Tests that were mechanically updated to pass `false`/default at every call site assert nothing about the new behavior. Execute the check: flip the flag's branch in the source and confirm at least one test goes red for each branch.
- Where: crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ (e.g. build_codec_streaming_part_reader), any function gaining a parameter
- Evidence: Commit 05890d6e2 (#4573): PR #4560 added a 15th param allow_inplace_legacy_fallback; the arity tests were fixed by passing `false` everywhere — they assert Err outcomes independent of the flag, so the fallback behavior itself has no revert-detecting test at those sites.
@@ -260,7 +261,7 @@ Null report example: "Attacked the new rename_data commit-section work, durabili
- For any pagination/limit/truncation change, construct the exact-boundary test: result count == max (page exactly full), max+1, and a delimiter re-fold that lands precisely on the page boundary — assert both the item count AND the is_truncated/continuation marker. Off-by-one at the page boundary is a recurring shipped bug here.
- Where: crates/ecstore listing paths (list_objects, ListMultipartUploads, metacache), S3 handlers in rustfs/src/storage
- Evidence: Two shipped boundary bugs: fefa70b31 (#4447) ListMultipartUploads returned one upload past max-uploads; d91f4d455 (#4538) delimiter re-fold of a full page lost the truncation flag. Both survived existing tests because no test pinned n == max exactly.
- Green `cargo test -p <crate>` on the touched crate is not a coverage verdict for the diff's test code itself: run `cargo clippy --all-targets -p <crate>` and a workspace-wide test BUILD (`cargo check --workspace --all-targets` at minimum) before accepting the tests as evidence. Test-only code that doesn't compile workspace-wide or fails clippy has repeatedly broken main and masked whether tests ran at all.
- A green focused test is evidence only for the targets it builds. Follow the `AGENTS.md` validation tier: add package-scoped Clippy or broader test-target compilation only when changed targets, features, or dependents remain uncovered; do not require a workspace-wide build by default.
- Where: All crates; especially concurrent-branch merges into crates/ecstore
- Evidence: #4322 broke main because only cargo test ran (field_reassign_with_default is clippy-only). b06f3df6b (#4441) and 05890d6e2 (#4573): test code broke the workspace test build (E0061) on main after textually-clean merges, failing CI for every open PR.
@@ -271,7 +272,6 @@ Null report example: "Attacked revert-detection for all 3 claimed behaviors (eac
Probes are distilled from shipped bugs in git history (commit/PR references
above), GitHub security advisories (see the security-advisory-lessons
skill), scoped `AGENTS.md` rules, and invariants under `docs/architecture/`
and `docs/operations/`. Line numbers drift; when a cited location no longer
matches, trust the invariant and re-locate the code. When a new bug class
ships, add a probe with its evidence here rather than growing the policy
section in `AGENTS.md`.
and `docs/operations/`. Line numbers drift; re-locate the invariant. Merge
new incidents into an existing probe when they share a failure class; add a
new probe only for a distinct attack, rather than growing the root policy.
+7 -4
View File
@@ -24,15 +24,17 @@ Use this skill before `gh pr create`, before `gh pr edit`, or when reviewing whe
2. Inspect change scope
- Review the diff and summarize what changed.
- Inspect `git diff --stat` and `git diff --numstat`; assess production-code growth separately. Tests, fixtures, generated code, and documentation have no growth budget. Treat line counts as signals, not quotas.
- Call out unrelated edits, generated artifacts, logs, or secrets as blockers.
- Mark risky areas explicitly: auth, storage, config, network, migrations, breaking changes.
- Use the simplicity-adversary verdict instead of producing a per-symbol inventory. Block growth only when the review identifies duplication or gives a concrete smaller design that preserves correctness, compatibility, readability, and real boundaries.
- Confirm replacement implementations remove the superseded in-scope path or adapt compatibility at the boundary to one canonical core.
- Scan the diff for newly added string literals and confirm whether they duplicate values already defined as constants/enums/typed wrappers in the same module or shared modules.
- Treat introducing a new hardcoded literal where a project constant already exists as a likely regression risk; require either a refactor to reuse the constant or an explicit exception explanation in the PR body.
3. Verify readiness requirements
- Require `make pre-commit` before marking PRs ready when the diff changes Rust code, product behavior, CI behavior, runtime configuration, security-sensitive logic, migrations, storage, auth, networking, or other high-risk paths.
- For documentation-only, agent-instruction-only, or local developer-tooling-only changes, allow focused verification instead of `make pre-commit` when it directly validates the changed surface.
- For focused verification, explain why the full gate was not run and list the scope-specific commands in the PR body.
- Select checks from `AGENTS.md` "Verification Before PR" based on the final diff's risk tier. Do not replace a focused behavioral test with `make pre-commit`, or a required high-risk `make pre-pr` with a narrower gate.
- For focused verification, state why the selected tier is sufficient and list the scope-specific commands in the PR body.
- If `make` is unavailable, use the equivalent commands from `.config/make/`.
- Add scope-specific verification commands when the changed area needs more than the baseline.
- If required checks fail, stop and return `BLOCKED`.
@@ -81,13 +83,14 @@ Use this skill before `gh pr create`, before `gh pr edit`, or when reviewing whe
## Blocker rules
- Return `BLOCKED` if a code, behavior, CI, runtime configuration, security-sensitive, migration, storage, auth, networking, or other high-risk change has not passed `make pre-commit`.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the checks required by the `AGENTS.md` validation tier have not passed.
- Return `BLOCKED` if a documentation-only, agent-instruction-only, or local developer-tooling-only change lacks focused verification for the changed surface.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the diff contains unrelated changes that are not acknowledged.
- Return `BLOCKED` if required template sections are missing.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the title/body is not in English.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the title does not follow the repository's Conventional Commit rule.
- Return `BLOCKED` if the diff introduces string literals that should use existing constants but did not.
- Return `BLOCKED` for production-code growth only when the review identifies a duplicated or superseded implementation, or supplies a concrete smaller design with equivalent semantics. Fewer lines alone are not evidence.
## Reference
@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
- Confirm the branch is based on current `main`.
- Confirm the diff matches the stated scope.
- Confirm no secrets, logs, temp files, or unrelated refactors are included.
- Confirm `make pre-commit` passed for code, behavior, CI, runtime configuration, security-sensitive, migration, storage, auth, networking, or other high-risk changes.
- For documentation-only, agent-instruction-only, or local developer-tooling-only changes, confirm focused verification covered the changed surface and the PR body explains why the full gate was not run.
- Confirm the checks required by the `AGENTS.md` validation tier passed.
- For focused verification, confirm it covered the changed surface and the PR body explains why the selected tier is sufficient.
- Confirm extra verification commands are listed for risky changes.
- Confirm the PR title uses Conventional Commits and stays within 72 characters.
- Confirm the PR title does not use tool-specific prefixes such as `[codex]`.
+32 -32
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
name: rust-code-quality
description: Enforce Rust-specific code quality rules on every code change. Use before merge to catch unwrap abuse, silent truncation, unnecessary cloning, lock ordering violations, recursion risks, and error type anti-patterns.
description: Enforce Rust-specific code quality rules on every Rust change. Use before merge to catch unwrap abuse, silent truncation, unnecessary cloning, lock ordering violations, recursion risks, and error type anti-patterns.
---
# Rust Code Quality Gate
@@ -12,27 +12,29 @@ Use this skill on every Rust code change to enforce quality rules that `cargo cl
1. Identify changed `.rs` files.
2. Run automated checks on changed files.
3. Run manual review checklist on the diff.
4. Report findings; block merge if P0/P1 issues exist.
4. Resolve or rebut every finding with evidence; P0/P1 findings cannot be deferred.
## Automated Checks
Run these on every changed `.rs` file (excluding test modules):
Use these searches to find candidates in changed `.rs` files. Inspect syntax,
`#[cfg(test)]` scope, and the changed hunk before reporting a finding; text
filters do not reliably distinguish production code from tests.
```bash
# 1. unwrap/expect in production code
rg -n '\.unwrap\(\)|\.expect\(' <changed-files> | grep -v '#\[cfg(test)\]' | grep -v 'test' | grep -v 'bench'
# 1. unwrap/expect candidates
rg -n '\.unwrap\(\)|\.expect\(' <changed-files>
# 2. Silent type truncation via `as` cast
rg -n ' as (u8|u16|u32|u64|usize|i8|i16|i32|i64|isize)\b' <changed-files>
# 3. String as error type
rg -n 'Result<.*String>' <changed-files> | grep -v test
rg -n 'Result<.*String>' <changed-files>
# 4. Box<dyn Error> in public APIs
rg -n 'Box<dyn.*Error' <changed-files> | grep -v test
rg -n 'Box<dyn.*Error' <changed-files>
# 5. println/eprintln in production
rg -n 'println!\|eprintln!' <changed-files> | grep -v test
rg -n 'println!\|eprintln!' <changed-files>
# 6. Ordering::Relaxed usage (verify each is intentional)
rg -n 'Ordering::Relaxed' <changed-files>
@@ -46,37 +48,35 @@ rg -n 'unwrap_or_default\(\)|unwrap_or\(' <changed-files>
For every Rust code change, verify:
### Error Handling
- [ ] No `unwrap()` or `expect()` in production code without justification comment
- [ ] Every production `unwrap()` or `expect()` is infallible by type or a checked invariant; explain only non-obvious invariants, using an existing type, a useful `expect` message, or a concise comment
- [ ] No `Result<_, String>` in public API signatures
- [ ] No `Box<dyn Error>` in public trait/struct methods
- [ ] Public library APIs use domain errors unless deliberate error erasure at a boundary is part of the contract
- [ ] `Error::source()` is overridden when inner error is stored
- [ ] Error messages are actionable (what failed, with what input)
- [ ] Error messages are actionable without exposing secret input
### Type Safety
- [ ] No silent `as` truncation (negative→unsigned, large→small)
- [ ] `try_into()` or explicit clamping used for numeric conversions
- [ ] No `f64 as usize` without prior clamping
- [ ] Fallible numeric conversions use `TryFrom`/`try_into()` and return a typed error; clamp or saturate only when the domain explicitly requires it
- [ ] Floating-point to integer conversion validates finiteness, sign, and range before conversion
### Concurrency
- [ ] Lock acquisition order is documented when multiple locks are used, and matches every other call site taking any overlapping subset (ABBA check)
- [ ] No `tokio::sync` lock guard (read or write) held across `.await` without bounded hold time — long-lived read guards wedge writers (#4195)
- [ ] Concurrent counters use `compare_exchange` loops, not load-then-store
- [ ] Atomic read-modify-write uses the direct `fetch_*` operation when possible; use `compare_exchange` only for conditional updates
- [ ] `std::sync::Mutex` in async context is held only briefly, never across `.await`
### Memory and Performance
- [ ] No `.clone()` on structs with >5 heap-allocated fields in hot paths
- [ ] `HashMap::with_capacity()` / `Vec::with_capacity()` used when size is known
- [ ] Large buffers wrapped in `Arc` rather than cloned
- [ ] Temporary string computations use `&str` or `Cow<str>` instead of `String`
- [ ] On an identified hot path, report cloning or allocation only with a concrete per-request/per-object cost or benchmark signal
- [ ] Prefer borrowing, moving, `Bytes`/`Arc`, or capacity reservation only when it reduces that cost without obscuring ownership or APIs
### Recursion Safety
- [ ] Recursive functions have a depth limit or use iterative traversal
- [ ] Recursion over untrusted, persisted, or otherwise unbounded input has a depth limit or uses iterative traversal
- [ ] Tree/cache traversals handle corrupted/cyclic input safely
### Testing
- [ ] Every test function has at least one `assert!`
- [ ] Tests use `.expect("context")` not bare `.unwrap()`
- [ ] No `println!`/`eprintln!` in production code (use `tracing`)
- [ ] Tests have an observable failure criterion; delegated assertions, `#[should_panic]`, snapshot/property checks, and meaningful `Result` failures do not need a redundant `assert!`
- [ ] Use `expect` only when its message improves failure diagnosis; do not add boilerplate to self-evident test setup
- [ ] Test volume and line count are never treated as production-code growth
### Serde
- [ ] Structs from untrusted input have `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]`
@@ -88,18 +88,18 @@ For every Rust code change, verify:
- [ ] New string literals don't duplicate existing constants
### Reuse and Necessity
- [ ] No new helper duplicating an existing workspace utility (`crates/utils`, `crates/common`, the touched crate) or plain std/tokio behavior no wrapper refines; reused helpers match the call site's semantics (normalization, error type, backoff, durability gating)
- [ ] No new helper duplicates `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, the touched crate, the likely domain-owning crate, a relevant direct dependency, or plain std/tokio behavior; reused helpers match the call site's semantics
- [ ] No branch without a nameable concrete trigger; no re-validation of what a validated upstream layer on the same path already guarantees (Cross-Cutting Domain Invariant patterns and pre-destructive-action re-checks are load-bearing — keep them)
- [ ] Error context attached once where actionable, not re-wrapped at every hop; no typed→generic error conversion below aggregation/quorum layers
- [ ] No comments narrating the next line, restating a signature, or describing the change itself (invariant comments — lock ordering, `SAFETY`, unwrap justification — are not narration)
- [ ] Comments avoid narration and change history while completely stating non-obvious lock, `SAFETY`, durability, compatibility, and unwrap invariants
- [ ] No near-duplicate test pinning the same code path and poison-value class as an existing test (boundary companions — n==max vs max+1, absent/empty/nil UUID — are never near-duplicates)
## Severity Classification
- **P0 (Block merge)**: `unwrap()` in request hot path, silent truncation on user input, lock ordering violation, recursion without depth limit
- **P1 (Must fix)**: `Result<_, String>` in public API, unnecessary clone in hot path, `Box<dyn Error>` in trait method, `unwrap_or_default()` on a domain-required value (metadata, quorum, version id)
- **P2 (Should fix)**: Missing `assert!` in test, `println!` in production, missing `with_capacity`, new helper duplicating an existing workspace utility, defensive branch with no nameable trigger (corrupt or stale persisted/peer data is always a nameable trigger for boundary-crossing values), near-duplicate test, redundant error re-wrapping
- **P3 (Nice to fix)**: Naming convention violation, missing doc comment, `as_ptr()` vs `Arc::ptr_eq`, narrating comment
- **P0 (Block merge)**: demonstrated data loss, security breach, remote crash, or deadlock
- **P1 (Must fix)**: concrete correctness, compatibility, or material hot-path regression
- **P2 (Should fix)**: avoidable duplication or maintainability issue with a concrete simpler replacement
- **P3 (Nice to fix)**: local style or clarity issue with no behavioral risk
## Output Template
@@ -107,10 +107,10 @@ For every Rust code change, verify:
## Rust Code Quality Report
### Automated Scan
- unwrap/expect in production: N found
- as casts: N found
- String errors: N found
- println/eprintln: N found
- unwrap/expect candidates inspected: N
- numeric-cast candidates inspected: N
- error-type candidates inspected: N
- output-macro candidates inspected: N
### Findings
- [P1] `path:line` — description
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
# Rust Code Quality Checklist
Use this as a quick pre-merge checklist for every Rust code change.
## Critical (P0 — block merge)
| Check | Command |
|-------|---------|
| No `unwrap()` in request/storage hot path | `rg '\.unwrap\(\)' <files> \| grep -v test` |
| No `as` truncation on user input | `rg ' as (u32\|usize\|i32)' <files>` |
| Lock order consistent across call sites | Manual: trace all lock acquisitions |
| Recursive functions have depth limit | Manual: check for `max_depth` or iterative pattern |
| No `panic!`/`unwrap_or_else(panic!)` in production | `rg 'panic!\|unwrap_or_else.*panic' <files> \| grep -v test` |
## High (P1 — must fix)
| Check | Command |
|-------|---------|
| No `Result<_, String>` in public API | `rg 'Result<.*String>' <files> \| grep -v test` |
| No `Box<dyn Error>` in public trait | `rg 'Box<dyn.*Error' <files> \| grep -v test` |
| No unnecessary `.clone()` in hot path | Manual: check loops and per-request paths |
| `Error::source()` implemented when inner error stored | Manual: check `impl Error` |
| No `eprintln!`/`println!` in production | `rg 'println!\|eprintln!' <files> \| grep -v test` |
## Medium (P2 — should fix)
| Check | Command |
|-------|---------|
| Tests have assertions | Manual: check for `assert` in test functions |
| `HashMap`/`Vec` use `with_capacity` when size known | Manual: check `::new()` in loops |
| No `#![allow(dead_code)]` at crate root | `rg 'allow.dead_code' <files> \| grep 'lib.rs'` |
| Serde structs from untrusted input have `deny_unknown_fields` | Manual: check `#[derive(Deserialize)]` |
## Low (P3 — nice to fix)
| Check | Command |
|-------|---------|
| No camelCase statics | `rg 'static ref [a-z]' <files>` |
| `Arc::ptr_eq` instead of `as_ptr + ptr::eq` | `rg 'as_ptr\|ptr::eq' <files>` |
| Public functions have doc comments | `rg 'pub fn' <files> \| grep -v '///'` |
## Quick One-Liner
```bash
# Run all automated checks on changed files
CHANGED=$(git diff --name-only HEAD~1 -- '*.rs' | grep -v test | grep -v bench)
echo "=== unwrap/expect ===" && rg -c '\.unwrap\(\)|\.expect\(' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
echo "=== as casts ===" && rg -c ' as (u8|u16|u32|u64|usize|i8|i16|i32|i64|isize)\b' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
echo "=== String errors ===" && rg -c 'Result<.*String>' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
echo "=== println ===" && rg -c 'println!|eprintln!' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
echo "=== Ordering::Relaxed ===" && rg -c 'Ordering::Relaxed' $CHANGED 2>/dev/null
```
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
name: rustfs-logging-governance
description: Standardize and review RustFS logging with structured `tracing` events, lower noise on hot paths, preserve security-sensitive diagnostics, and extend guardrails to prevent legacy logging patterns from returning. Use when editing or reviewing RustFS logs, startup/config diagnostics, cloud metadata logs, request validation logs, or `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh`.
description: Standardize and review RustFS logging with structured `tracing` events, lower noise on hot paths, preserve security-sensitive diagnostics, and extend guardrails to prevent legacy logging patterns from returning. Use whenever a change adds or edits any `tracing` macro call (`error!`/`warn!`/`info!`/`debug!`/`trace!`/`#[instrument]`) — including a single log line added in passing while fixing unrelated logic, which is how most new log sites enter the repo — and when reviewing RustFS logs, startup/config diagnostics, cloud metadata logs, request validation logs, or `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh`.
---
# RustFS Logging Governance
@@ -66,14 +66,23 @@ For the full pattern map, read [advisory-patterns.md](references/advisory-patter
### STS, OIDC, and federation flows
- Every STS endpoint must have an explicit authentication story: SigV4 where required, OIDC token verification for web identity, and role/session policy validation before issuing credentials.
- For web identity, the JWT is the credential; exemption from SigV4 is not itself an authentication bypass. Treat pre-verification claims only as untrusted routing hints, bound token size, normalize public failures, rate-limit discovery, and issue credentials only after signature, issuer, audience, and expiration checks.
- JWT session tokens must be signed and verified by a trusted issuer/key path, not by service-account-controlled material or a reused root secret.
- JWT verification must enforce required claims and expiration for every bearer token path; "allow missing exp" is never acceptable for user-presented credentials.
- Public OIDC bootstrap and callback routes must treat `Host`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, redirect targets, `state`, and callback parameters as untrusted; credential-bearing redirects require a configured, allowlisted origin.
- OIDC discovery and validation URLs are SSRF sinks. Resolve and classify hostnames at connection time, reject rebinding to loopback/private/link-local ranges, and do not rely on literal string checks.
### S3 copy, multipart, and presigned POST
### IAM policy conditions and plugins
- Treat request headers as attacker-controlled even after SigV4; callers sign their own spoofed headers. Do not merge them into server-derived condition keys such as identity, groups, version ID, signature version, JWT, or LDAP claims.
- Keep the condition-key namespace explicit. Reserved server-derived keys must reject or ignore colliding headers, while intentional request-header keys such as `s3:x-amz-*` remain available.
- Quantified IAM condition tests need partially overlapping multi-value sets. Fully contained and fully disjoint sets cannot distinguish `ForAllValues` from `ForAnyValue` bugs.
- External policy plugins must receive the same security context as built-in policy evaluation. If OPA or another plugin depends on existing object tags, load and pass `ExistingObjectTag/*` before the plugin decision.
### S3 object actions, copy, multipart, and presigned POST
- Version-aware object requests need version-aware actions. Explicit `versionId` reads and copy sources must authorize `s3:GetObjectVersion`, not only `s3:GetObject`.
- Multipart copy must enforce source `GetObject` and destination `PutObject` semantics equivalent to `CopyObject`, including copy-source and policy conditions.
- Do not let `CreateMultipartUpload`, `UploadPartCopy`, `CompleteMultipartUpload`, or `AbortMultipartUpload` return success without authorization.
- Fallbacks from version actions to non-version actions must still pass the same public-access-block, anonymous-deny, and post-authorization gates as a direct allow.
- Presigned POST policies are server-side contracts. Enforce `content-length-range`, key prefix, exact metadata/content-type, and all signed policy conditions.
### Protocol frontends and IAM parity
@@ -132,6 +141,11 @@ For the full pattern map, read [advisory-patterns.md](references/advisory-patter
- When touching reader/writer wrappers such as hashing, encryption, compression, or warp readers, verify wrapper order and inspect stored bytes in regression tests.
- Avoid helper shortcuts that unwrap nested readers and accidentally bypass encryption or integrity layers.
### Object Lock and retention invariants
- Object Lock state must fail closed when bucket metadata is unreadable, fabricated, or unparsable. Only a confirmed absence of Object Lock configuration may permit unprotected deletes or writes.
- Do not collapse metadata read faults, missing persisted metadata, parse failures, and genuinely absent Object Lock config into one "not configured" result.
- Retention enforcement must cover foreground deletes, batch deletes, force-delete helpers, default-retention materialization on PUT, lifecycle expiry, scanner sweeps, and all-versions expiry.
## Review Prompts
Use these prompts while reviewing a diff:
@@ -148,5 +162,9 @@ Use these prompts while reviewing a diff:
- Does this outbound validation path resolve attacker-supplied hostnames and reject private, loopback, link-local, and rebound addresses at the actual connection boundary?
- Is an archive entry, object key, or policy resource normalized differently between authorization and storage?
- Is the same operation implemented in multiple paths, such as `CopyObject` vs `UploadPartCopy`, and do all paths enforce the same security contract?
- Does an explicit object version, fallback action, or plugin authorization path pass through the same action and post-authorization gates as the direct S3 path?
- Can a caller-controlled header populate a condition key that should be derived only by the server?
- Do condition tests include partially overlapping multi-value inputs for quantified operators?
- Does unreadable bucket metadata make Object Lock or retention enforcement fail closed rather than disappear?
- Does a preview or browser-surface fix preserve the original security invariant when adding alternate viewers or file-type detection?
- Does the test prove the exploit form is denied, or only that the intended form still works?
@@ -35,12 +35,21 @@ Update this file only when an advisory adds or changes a reusable lesson, affect
### STS, OIDC, and federation flows
- `GHSA-5qfg-mf7r-jp3w` and `GHSA-3473-5353-xhwh`: `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` was reachable through unauthenticated `POST /` routing and could issue temporary credentials from crafted web identity input. Lesson: every STS route needs explicit SigV4 or trusted identity-provider validation before role assumption, and unauthenticated exemptions must be narrowed to the exact action with uniform failure responses.
- `GHSA-ccrv-v8v9-ch9q` and `GHSA-48rf-7j3q-3hfv`: service-account-controlled material could self-sign JWT session tokens with forged policy claims, and missing `exp` was accepted for service-account tokens. Lesson: session tokens must be signed by a trusted issuer/key path, enforce required claims and expiration, and reject self-signed or principal-controlled tokens.
- `GHSA-jxrr-r6pv-h958`: unsigned JWT issuer data was decoded before verification to select an OIDC provider, and distinguishable failures could expose provider configuration. Lesson: web-identity routing may be unauthenticated, but pre-verification claims are untrusted routing hints; bound and rate-limit the request, normalize public errors, and verify signature, issuer, audience, and expiration before issuing credentials.
- `GHSA-ccrv-v8v9-ch9q`, `GHSA-48rf-7j3q-3hfv`, and `GHSA-xvfh-7c9g-hpw2`: service-account-controlled material could self-sign JWT session tokens with forged policy claims, and missing `exp` was accepted for service-account tokens. Lesson: session tokens must be signed by a trusted issuer/key path, enforce required claims and expiration, and reject self-signed or principal-controlled tokens.
- `GHSA-9pjf-w3c2-m32r`, `GHSA-4x2q-cpx9-9h26`, and `GHSA-xvpm-p3f7-34c3`: public OIDC authorize/callback flows trusted request `Host` or forwarded scheme when building credential-bearing redirects. Lesson: OIDC redirects must use configured allowlisted origins and trusted-proxy handling; never derive the post-login credential destination from direct client headers.
- `GHSA-m479-9x88-94w6`, `GHSA-frwq-mfqx-83p8`, `GHSA-q9q8-rf9r-fg9f`, and `GHSA-j5c2-hhf7-6gf5`: OIDC validation accepted attacker-controlled discovery URLs because hostname checks rejected only literal forbidden IPs, allowing DNS rebinding SSRF. Lesson: outbound federation URL validation must resolve and classify hostnames at the connection boundary and reject loopback, private, link-local, and rebound addresses.
### S3 copy, multipart, and upload policy validation
### IAM policy conditions and external policy plugins
- `GHSA-6r96-hmgc-726c`: request headers collided with lowercase server-derived condition keys such as `userid`, `groups`, `versionid`, and JWT/LDAP claims. Lesson: never let caller-controlled headers append to or replace server-derived policy context; reserve trusted condition keys and keep intentional request-header keys separate.
- `GHSA-v9cp-qfw9-9pfp`: quantified negated string conditions applied negation after aggregation, transposing `ForAllValues` and `ForAnyValue` semantics. Lesson: push negation into the per-value predicate for quantified operators and test partially overlapping multi-value sets.
- `GHSA-5w8r-p896-6vq2`: OPA policy mode skipped `ExistingObjectTag/*` loading, so tagged objects looked untagged to external policies. Lesson: external authorization plugins need the same object-tag and request context as built-in policy evaluation before they decide.
### S3 object actions, copy, multipart, and upload policy validation
- `GHSA-3ppv-fx5m-m749`: explicit `versionId` reads and copy sources authorized `s3:GetObject` instead of `s3:GetObjectVersion`. Lesson: version-specific object access must select version-specific actions for direct reads, `CopyObject`, and `UploadPartCopy`, with tests proving the backend is not reached on denial.
- `GHSA-x298-9x87-fvjq`: anonymous `ListObjectVersions` fell back to `ListBucket` and returned before public-access-block gates. Lesson: compatibility fallbacks must converge on the same post-authorization checks as direct grants, especially `RestrictPublicBuckets` and anonymous data-plane denies.
- `GHSA-mx42-j6wv-px98`: `UploadPartCopy` missed source authorization and allowed cross-bucket object exfiltration. Lesson: multipart copy must enforce the same source and destination contract as `CopyObject`.
- `GHSA-wfxj-ph3v-7mjf`: `UploadPartCopy` checked source and destination independently but missed destination copy-source policy constraints. Lesson: source read and destination write checks are not sufficient when policy constrains allowed copy sources.
- `GHSA-w5fh-f8xh-5x3p`: presigned POST accepted uploads without enforcing signed policy conditions. Lesson: parse and enforce all POST policy constraints server-side, including size, key prefix, and content type.
@@ -59,7 +68,7 @@ Update this file only when an advisory adds or changes a reusable lesson, affect
### Secrets, defaults, and cryptographic misuse
- `GHSA-j59h-h7q5-q348`, `GHSA-3wm5-wpm5-hmfm`, `GHSA-6wc8-xm48-qhmx`, `GHSA-9gf3-jx4p-4xxf`, and `GHSA-63xc-c3w3-m2cf`: RustFS shipped known default root credentials that could authenticate to S3, admin APIs, IAM, KMS, console, and token-signing surfaces. Lesson: root credentials must be operator-provided or generated per install; known defaults and warnings are not acceptable for network-reachable deployments.
- `GHSA-j59h-h7q5-q348`, `GHSA-3wm5-wpm5-hmfm`, `GHSA-6wc8-xm48-qhmx`, `GHSA-9gf3-jx4p-4xxf`, `GHSA-63xc-c3w3-m2cf`, and `GHSA-ch63-6q4v-hwp5`: RustFS shipped known default root credentials that could authenticate to S3, admin APIs, IAM, KMS, console, and token-signing surfaces. Lesson: root credentials must be operator-provided or generated per install; known defaults and warnings are not acceptable for network-reachable deployments.
- `GHSA-h956-rh7x-ppgj`: gRPC used the hard-coded token `rustfs rpc` on both client and server. Lesson: source-visible shared tokens are authentication bypasses.
- `GHSA-r5qv-rc46-hv8q`: internode RPC HMAC secret fell back to the public default `rustfsadmin`. Lesson: RPC/internode auth must fail closed instead of silently using public defaults.
- `GHSA-75fx-qg6f-8rm7` and `GHSA-68cw-96m3-h2cf`: internode RPC secrets were derivable from known root credentials, making raw storage RPC signatures forgeable when explicit RPC secrets were unset. Lesson: RPC auth keys must be independent random secrets, never derived from S3 root credentials, and raw storage RPC should not share the public S3 listener without an internode-only boundary.
@@ -92,6 +101,10 @@ Update this file only when an advisory adds or changes a reusable lesson, affect
- `GHSA-xrrf-67jm-3c2r`: SSE metadata reported encryption while reader composition bypassed `EncryptReader` and stored plaintext. Lesson: test actual bytes on disk and wrapper order, not only API metadata.
### Object Lock and retention invariants
- `GHSA-j548-9grx-fh4f`: Object Lock enforcement treated unreadable, fabricated, or unparsable bucket metadata as absent configuration and allowed retained objects to be deleted or expired. Lesson: retention must fail closed unless Object Lock absence is authoritative, and every delete, lifecycle, scanner, force-delete, and default-retention path needs the same state distinction.
### Serde deserialization and input validation
- No `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]` found across the entire codebase. Lesson: all structs deserialized from untrusted input (S3 API XML/JSON, lifecycle rules, bucket policies, replication configs) should have `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]` to reject malformed or adversarial payloads.
@@ -107,11 +120,13 @@ Use these targeted searches when a diff touches security-sensitive code:
rg -n "validate_admin_request|check_permissions|AdminAction::|deny_only|is_allowed" rustfs crates
rg -n "authorize_operation|FtpsDriver|SftpDriver|RETR|MKD|SIZE|MDTM|CreateBucket|GetObject|HeadObject" crates/protocols rustfs
rg -n "UploadPartCopy|upload_part_copy|CompleteMultipart|PostObject|content-length-range|starts-with" rustfs crates
rg -n "ListBucketVersions|GetObjectVersion|versionId|VersionId|ExistingObjectTag|ForAllValues|ForAnyValue|POLICY_PLUGIN|opa" rustfs crates
rg -n "normalize_extract_entry_key|Snowball|auto-extract|PathBuf::join|canonicalize|\\.\\.|x-forwarded-for|x-real-ip|SourceIp" rustfs crates
rg -n "DEFAULT_SECRET|DEFAULT_ACCESS|TEST_PRIVATE_KEY|rustfs rpc|RUSTFS_RPC_SECRET" rustfs crates
rg -n "TONIC_RPC_PREFIX|verify_rpc_signature|check_auth|NodeServiceServer|x-rustfs-signature" rustfs crates
rg -n "debug!|trace!|info!|error!|\\?resp|\\?merged_config|session_token|secret_key" rustfs crates
rg -n "HashReader|EncryptReader|SSE|server-side encryption|Access-Control-Allow-Credentials|Origin" rustfs crates
rg -n "ObjectLock|object_lock|retention|COMPLIANCE|GOVERNANCE|delete_prefix|lifecycle|scanner" rustfs crates
rg -n "deny_unknown_fields|serde.default|as u32|as usize|as i32" rustfs crates
```
@@ -121,9 +136,12 @@ rg -n "deny_unknown_fields|serde.default|as u32|as usize|as i32" rustfs crates
- Protocol frontend authz fixes: include denied `RETR`, `SIZE`/`MDTM`, `MKD`, bucket probe, and sibling allowed-operation cases, and assert denied paths do not reach the storage backend.
- IAM fixes: include import/update/list service-account cases with attacker-controlled parent, claims, access key, secret key, and policy.
- Copy/upload fixes: include cross-bucket, cross-user, source-denied, destination-denied, copy-source-condition, and multipart completion cases.
- Version-action fixes: include historical UUID, explicit current version, `null`, range, partNumber, presigned, STS/session, service-account, anonymous bucket-policy, copy source, and multipart-copy source cases.
- Policy-condition fixes: include reserved-key header collisions, missing keys, partially overlapping multi-value sets, plugin mode, and built-in policy mode.
- Path fixes: include encoded traversal, absolute path, nested traversal, archive entries with `..`, valid object keys that resemble traversal text but should be rejected, and canonical bucket/prefix boundary checks.
- Logging fixes: assert redacted output for structs and response bodies that may contain credentials.
- IAM export fixes: assert exported archives omit plaintext user and service-account secrets unless the format deliberately encrypts or seals them.
- RPC auth fixes: include captured metadata replay across two concrete methods, stale timestamps, wrong path, wrong method surrogate, wrong secret, and valid same-method calls.
- Browser/CORS fixes: assert no credentials on reflected/default origins, correct behavior for explicit allowlists, and no same-origin script execution for previewed object content.
- SSE fixes: inspect stored bytes and verify API metadata, read-back behavior, and on-disk ciphertext together.
- Object Lock fixes: include unreadable metadata, fabricated metadata defaults, unparsable config, confirmed absent config, COMPLIANCE/GOVERNANCE retention, lifecycle expiry, scanner sweeps, and force-delete paths.
+10
View File
@@ -60,6 +60,16 @@ body-cache-whitelist-check: ## Check the body-cache eligibility gate stays a fai
@echo "🧱 Checking body-cache whitelist guard..."
./scripts/check_body_cache_whitelist.sh
.PHONY: s3s-footprint-check
s3s-footprint-check: ## Check the s3s dependency footprint ratchet stays frozen
@echo "📦 Checking s3s footprint ratchet..."
./scripts/check_s3s_footprint.sh
.PHONY: fips-wording-check
fips-wording-check: ## Check outward docs do not make unsupported FIPS claims
@echo "📣 Checking FIPS wording guard..."
./scripts/check_fips_wording.sh
.PHONY: log-analyzer-rules-check
log-analyzer-rules-check: core-deps ## Check log-analyzer rule anchors still exist verbatim in source
@echo "🩺 Checking log-analyzer rule anchors..."
+3 -3
View File
@@ -19,13 +19,13 @@ planning-docs-check: ## Check that no planning-type documents are committed
./scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh
.PHONY: pre-commit
pre-commit: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast pre-commit checks without clippy/full tests
pre-commit: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast pre-commit checks without clippy/full tests
@echo "✅ All pre-commit checks passed!"
.PHONY: pre-pr
pre-pr: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check log-analyzer-rules-check clippy-check test ## Run full pre-PR checks with clippy and tests
pre-pr: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check log-analyzer-rules-check clippy-check test ## Run full pre-PR checks with clippy and tests
@echo "✅ All pre-PR checks passed!"
.PHONY: dev-check
dev-check: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast local development checks
dev-check: fmt-check unsafe-code-check architecture-migration-check logging-guardrails-check tokio-io-uring-check extension-schema-check body-cache-whitelist-check s3s-footprint-check fips-wording-check doc-paths-check planning-docs-check quick-check ## Run fast local development checks
@echo "✅ Fast development checks passed!"
+1
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ TEST_THREADS ?= 1
script-tests: ## Run shell script tests
@echo "Running script tests..."
./scripts/test_build_rustfs_options.sh
./scripts/test_docker_runtime_timezone.sh
./scripts/test_entrypoint_credentials.sh
./scripts/test_internode_grpc_ab_bench.sh
./scripts/test_object_batch_bench_enhanced.sh
+79 -12
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
# * bucket_lifecycle_ops::tests::concurrent_resend_same_part_commits_one_generation
# uses the shared multipart fixture and a deterministic uploadId-lock
# handoff, so it must not overlap another process mutating that fixture.
# * bucket::metadata_sys::tests::concurrent_config_writes_from_separate_nodes_do_not_lose_writes
# uses the shared transaction lock and must not overlap other ecstore tests.
#
# serial_test's #[serial] attribute does NOT serialize these across runs:
# nextest executes each test in its own process, where the in-process
@@ -27,6 +29,8 @@
[test-groups]
ecstore-serial-flaky = { max-threads = 1 }
embedded-test-ports = { max-threads = 1 }
e2e-vault = { max-threads = 1 }
# Reliability / fault-injection e2e tests each spawn a single-node 4-disk RustFS
# server and manipulate its disk directories at runtime (crates/e2e_test:
@@ -40,7 +44,7 @@ e2e-inline-boundaries = { max-threads = 1 }
# --- default profile (local): serialize the flaky groups, never retry --------
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & (test(concurrent_resend_same_part_commits_one_generation) | test(/^store::bucket::tests::bucket_delete_(mark_delete|purge_removes|default_s3_delete)/))'
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & (test(concurrent_resend_same_part_commits_one_generation) | test(concurrent_config_writes_from_separate_nodes_do_not_lose_writes) | test(/^store::bucket::tests::bucket_delete_(mark_delete|purge_removes|default_s3_delete)/))'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# Serialize the multipart crash-consistency scenarios (dist-2, backlog#1150):
@@ -52,12 +56,36 @@ test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & test(/^set_disk::ops::multipart::tests::crash_consistency::/)'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# The production-handler relocation regression builds an isolated 8-disk,
# 2-pool store and commits a 72 MiB multipart object. Keep that cross-disk IO
# from overlapping the ecstore commit fixtures above.
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs) & test(execute_get_object_resumes_from_relocated_pool_without_splicing_body)'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# Embedded integration-test binaries discover an ephemeral port and release
# the probe listener before RustFS binds it. Serialize that cross-process
# TOCTOU window; retries would only hide real startup failures.
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs) & (binary(/^embedded.*_test$/) | binary(admin_diagnostic_capability_e2e))'
test-group = 'embedded-test-ports'
# Serialize the durable manual-transition checkpoint test across nextest's
# process boundary; it mutates bucket lifecycle metadata and is not quarantined.
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & test(manual_transition_page_checkpoint_persists_durable_job_progress)'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# Serialize the bucket-incarnation / lifecycle-fence tests. They drive
# init_bucket_metadata_sys and bucket_metadata_sys_of, i.e. process-global
# OnceLock state that serial_test's #[serial] cannot protect across nextest's
# process boundary, and they delete+recreate buckets — the same shape that
# raced into InsufficientWriteQuorum in backlog#937. Preventive only, no
# retries. The matching ci-profile override is after [profile.ci].
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & (test(bucket_delete_waits_for_config_mutation_fence) | test(stale_config_request_cannot_mutate_a_recreated_bucket) | test(disk_incarnation_read_detects_stale_cache_until_peer_reload) | test(lifecycle_expiry_fails_closed_on_corrupt_object_lock_metadata) | test(expiry_configs_are_resolved_from_the_owning_store))'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# Serialize the 4-disk reliability / degraded-read e2e tests (see the
# e2e-reliability test-group note above). The matching ci-profile override is at
# the end of the file, after [profile.ci] is declared.
@@ -69,6 +97,12 @@ test-group = 'e2e-reliability'
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^inline_fast_path_cluster_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-inline-boundaries'
# Vault KMS tests share the fixed dev-server port 8200. serial_test's #[serial]
# does not cross nextest process boundaries, so keep these tests in one group.
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^kms::kms_vault_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-vault'
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ci profile — the strict CI gate (ci.yml `cargo nextest run --profile ci`)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -104,9 +138,9 @@ filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & test(/^store::bucket::tests::bucket_delete_(
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
retries = 2
# Keep the deterministic multipart handoff isolated across nextest processes.
# Keep deterministic ECStore write handoffs isolated across nextest processes.
[[profile.ci.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & test(concurrent_resend_same_part_commits_one_generation)'
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & (test(concurrent_resend_same_part_commits_one_generation) | test(concurrent_config_writes_from_separate_nodes_do_not_lose_writes))'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# QUARANTINE: OPEN rustfs#4690 — walk_dir stall-budget accounting test depends
@@ -131,12 +165,28 @@ test-group = 'e2e-reliability'
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & test(/^set_disk::ops::multipart::tests::crash_consistency::/)'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
[[profile.ci.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs) & test(execute_get_object_resumes_from_relocated_pool_without_splicing_body)'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# Match the default-profile embedded test isolation without quarantining or
# retrying failures in CI.
[[profile.ci.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs) & (binary(/^embedded.*_test$/) | binary(admin_diagnostic_capability_e2e))'
test-group = 'embedded-test-ports'
# Serialize the durable manual-transition checkpoint test under the ci profile
# too. No retries: failures stay visible.
[[profile.ci.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & test(manual_transition_page_checkpoint_persists_durable_job_progress)'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# Serialize the bucket-incarnation / lifecycle-fence tests under the ci profile
# too (see the matching default-profile override near the top). No retries.
[[profile.ci.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs-ecstore) & (test(bucket_delete_waits_for_config_mutation_fence) | test(stale_config_request_cannot_mutate_a_recreated_bucket) | test(disk_incarnation_read_detects_stale_cache_until_peer_reload) | test(lifecycle_expiry_fails_closed_on_corrupt_object_lock_metadata) | test(expiry_configs_are_resolved_from_the_owning_store))'
test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# e2e-smoke profile — PR smoke subset of the e2e_test crate (backlog#1149 ci-4)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -168,7 +218,7 @@ test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
# the nightly profile derives its set as "the replication module MINUS this
# allowlist", so any new replication test lands in nightly by default (never
# silently unrun) until it is explicitly blessed as fast here. Keep the two
# regexes byte-identical. Count invariant: 20 here + 28 nightly = 48 total
# regexes byte-identical. Count invariant: 20 here + 36 nightly = 56 total
# (authority: `cargo nextest list`; docs/testing/e2e-suite-inventory.md).
# HISTORY (2026-07-11): the 20 fast tests were briefly pulled out of this lane
# (#4724) because they set a loopback (127.0.0.1) replication target that the
@@ -204,7 +254,7 @@ test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
[profile.e2e-smoke]
default-filter = """
package(e2e_test) & (
test(/^(delete_marker_migration_semantics|version_id_regression|list_objects_v2_pagination|list_object_versions_regression|list_objects_duplicates|list_buckets_double_slash|leading_slash_key|special_chars|create_bucket_region|delete_objects_versioning|head_object_consistency|head_object_range|copy_object_metadata|copy_object_tagging|copy_source_invalid_date|content_encoding|multipart_storage_class|storage_class_capability|ssec_copy|anonymous_access|bucket_policy_check|presigned_negative|negative_sigv4|admin_auth|notification_webhook|tls_hot_reload|console_smoke|admin_iam_crud|admin_pools|sts_query_compat)_test::|^fake_s3_target::/)
test(/^(delete_marker_migration_semantics|version_id_regression|list_objects_v2_pagination|list_object_versions_regression|list_objects_duplicates|list_buckets_double_slash|list_buckets_auth|list_buckets_iam_filter|leading_slash_key|special_chars|create_bucket_region|delete_objects_versioning|head_object_consistency|head_object_range|copy_object_metadata|copy_object_tagging|copy_source_invalid_date|content_encoding|multipart_storage_class|storage_class_capability|ssec_copy|anonymous_access|bucket_policy_check|presigned_negative|negative_sigv4|admin_auth|notification_webhook|tls_hot_reload|console_smoke|admin_iam_crud|admin_pools|sts_query_compat)_test::|^fake_s3_target::/)
| test(/^replication_extension_test::(test_replication_check_succeeds_with_remote_target|test_replication_check_rejects_target_without_object_lock|test_set_remote_target_rejects_unversioned_source_bucket|test_replication_check_rejects_unversioned_source_bucket|test_replication_check_rejects_missing_replication_config|test_replication_check_rejects_invalid_bucket|test_set_remote_target_rejects_same_bucket_on_same_deployment|test_set_remote_target_rejects_unversioned_target_bucket|test_set_remote_target_update_requires_arn|test_set_remote_target_update_rejects_missing_target|test_set_remote_target_rejects_invalid_target_url|test_set_remote_target_rejects_self_signed_https_target_without_skip_tls_verify|test_set_remote_target_rejects_private_ca_https_target_without_ca_cert_pem|test_list_remote_targets_rejects_empty_bucket|test_list_remote_targets_rejects_invalid_bucket|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_missing_target|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_missing_arn|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_invalid_bucket|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_target_used_by_replication|test_delete_bucket_replication_removes_remote_target)$/)
| test(/^reliant::lifecycle::/)
| test(/^reliant::tiering::/)
@@ -212,6 +262,17 @@ default-filter = """
"""
fail-fast = false
[profile.e2e-smoke.junit]
path = "junit.xml"
# The pagination boundary cases can stall when a server/listing regression
# prevents the continuation request from completing. Keep the timeout scoped
# to those known failure modes so legitimate lifecycle/tiering waits retain
# their test-level timing budget.
[[profile.e2e-smoke.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^list_objects_v2_pagination_test::tests::(test_list_objects_v2_delimiter_small_page_traverses_all|test_list_objects_v2_max_keys_above_limit_returns_token|test_list_objects_v2_maxkeys_above_limit_with_delimiter)$/)'
slow-timeout = { period = "60s", terminate-after = 2, grace-period = "10s" }
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# e2e-repl-nightly profile — scheduled full replication e2e lane (repl-1)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -219,10 +280,12 @@ fail-fast = false
# tests that are unfit for the per-PR e2e-smoke gate:
#
# * 2 remote-target TLS validation tests.
# * 12 bucket-replication data-plane/helper tests — they PUT/delete objects
# and poll until source and target converge; two replicate over HTTPS, two
# pin active SSE failure contracts, and one guards event/history observers.
# The SSE-S3 contract remains ignored under backlog#1291.
# * 15 bucket-replication data-plane/helper tests — they PUT/delete objects
# and poll until source and target converge; two replicate over HTTPS,
# six pin SSE replication contracts (managed SSE-S3/SSE-KMS re-encrypt on
# the target incl. multipart and the resync path, SSE-C and
# target-without-KMS stay fail-closed), and one guards event/history
# observers.
# * 12 `_real_dual_node` site-replication tests — each spawns TWO full rustfs
# servers and drives the cross-process site-replication control plane.
# * 1 `_real_three_node` site-replication test.
@@ -288,9 +351,9 @@ path = "junit.xml"
#
# Each e2e test spawns its own single-node rustfs server on a random port with
# an isolated temp dir (crates/e2e_test/src/common.rs), so the set is
# parallel-safe — the same property e2e-smoke relies on. The exception is the
# 4-disk reliability / degraded-read fault-injection tests, serialized below
# (identical to the ci profile) so several 4-disk servers never run at once.
# parallel-safe — the same property e2e-smoke relies on. The exceptions are the
# 4-disk reliability / degraded-read fault-injection tests and the fixed-port
# Vault tests, both serialized below.
# KNOWN-FAILURE EXCLUSIONS (characterization run 29381309848, 2026-07-15:
# 341 ran / 32 failed on the suites' first automated run ever). Deterministic
# product failures cannot be quarantined away with retries, so each family is
@@ -326,3 +389,7 @@ test-group = 'e2e-reliability'
[[profile.e2e-full.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^inline_fast_path_cluster_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-inline-boundaries'
[[profile.e2e-full.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(/^kms::kms_vault_test::/)'
test-group = 'e2e-vault'
+15
View File
@@ -170,6 +170,10 @@ Important behavior notes:
- Logs and metrics usually appear during startup, so seeing those two signals
first is expected.
- The OpenTelemetry bridge sends `tracing` fields as log attributes. Loki stores
those attributes as structured metadata, and the Collector also mirrors the
common troubleshooting fields into the log line so simple line filters can
find them.
- Visible trace data usually requires real HTTP/S3/gRPC request traffic after
startup, because request-path spans are created on demand.
- `RUSTFS_OBS_LOGGER_LEVEL=info` keeps the top-level request span but filters
@@ -195,6 +199,17 @@ curl -I http://127.0.0.1:9000/health/ready
# Jaeger: http://localhost:16686
```
For a structured RustFS log such as an inter-node RPC authentication failure,
the Loki line now includes fields such as `event`, `component`, `subsystem`,
`failure_reason`, `rpc_service`, `rpc_method`, and `expected_audience`. Useful
LogQL checks:
```logql
{service_name="RustFS"} |= "RPC signature verification failed"
{service_name="RustFS"} |= "failure_reason="
{service_name="RustFS"} | failure_reason != ""
```
If logs and metrics are present but traces are sparse, the most common cause is
"no real request traffic yet" or "`info` level filtered nested spans", not an
OTLP routing failure.
+9
View File
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ RustFS 会自动在该基础 URL 后补全:
需要注意:
- 启动阶段通常会先看到日志和指标,因此“先有日志/指标、后有 trace”是正常现象。
- OpenTelemetry bridge 会把 `tracing` 字段作为日志 attributes 发送。Loki 会将这些 attributes 存为 structured metadata,同时 Collector 会把常用排障字段镜像进日志行,方便用简单的行内容过滤直接查到。
- 可见的 trace 数据通常依赖启动后的真实 HTTP/S3/gRPC 请求流量,因为请求路径上的 span 是按需创建的。
- `RUSTFS_OBS_LOGGER_LEVEL=info` 会保留顶层请求 span,但会过滤掉很多 `debug` 级别的嵌套 span。
如果 Tempo 或 Jaeger 中的 trace 看起来很稀疏,建议先改成 `RUSTFS_OBS_LOGGER_LEVEL=debug`,再判断是否是 collector 或 Tempo 问题。
@@ -192,6 +193,14 @@ curl -I http://127.0.0.1:9000/health/ready
# Jaeger: http://localhost:16686
```
对于 RustFS 结构化日志,例如节点间 RPC 鉴权失败,Loki 日志行现在会包含 `event``component``subsystem``failure_reason``rpc_service``rpc_method``expected_audience` 等字段。常用 LogQL 检查:
```logql
{service_name="RustFS"} |= "RPC signature verification failed"
{service_name="RustFS"} |= "failure_reason="
{service_name="RustFS"} | failure_reason != ""
```
如果日志和指标已经正常,但 trace 仍然稀疏,最常见的原因通常是
“还没有真实请求流量”或“`info` 级别过滤了嵌套 span”,而不是 OTLP 路由失败。
@@ -11500,6 +11500,831 @@
],
"title": "Compression Operations Rate",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"collapsed": false,
"gridPos": {
"h": 1,
"w": 24,
"x": 0,
"y": 332
},
"id": 531,
"panels": [],
"title": "Metrics Dimensions Drilldown",
"type": "row"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {
"color": {
"mode": "palette-classic"
},
"custom": {
"axisBorderShow": false,
"axisCenteredZero": false,
"axisColorMode": "text",
"axisLabel": "",
"axisPlacement": "auto",
"barAlignment": 0,
"barWidthFactor": 0.6,
"drawStyle": "line",
"fillOpacity": 10,
"gradientMode": "none",
"hideFrom": {
"legend": false,
"tooltip": false,
"viz": false
},
"insertNulls": false,
"lineInterpolation": "smooth",
"lineWidth": 1,
"pointSize": 5,
"scaleDistribution": {
"type": "linear"
},
"showPoints": "never",
"showValues": false,
"spanNulls": false,
"stacking": {
"group": "A",
"mode": "none"
},
"thresholdsStyle": {
"mode": "off"
}
},
"mappings": [],
"thresholds": {
"mode": "absolute",
"steps": [
{
"color": "green",
"value": 0
}
]
},
"unit": "ops"
},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {
"h": 8,
"w": 12,
"x": 0,
"y": 333
},
"id": 532,
"options": {
"legend": {
"calcs": [
"lastNotNull",
"max"
],
"displayMode": "table",
"placement": "right",
"showLegend": true
},
"tooltip": {
"hideZeros": false,
"mode": "multi",
"sort": "desc"
}
},
"pluginVersion": "12.3.2",
"targets": [
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "A",
"expr": "sum by (server, name, type) (rate(rustfs_api_requests_requests_total_by_server{job=~\"$job\",server=~\"$server\",name=~\"$api\"}[$__rate_interval]))",
"legendFormat": "{{server}} | {{name}} | {{type}}"
}
],
"title": "API Requests by Server and API",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {
"color": {
"mode": "palette-classic"
},
"custom": {
"axisBorderShow": false,
"axisCenteredZero": false,
"axisColorMode": "text",
"axisLabel": "",
"axisPlacement": "auto",
"barAlignment": 0,
"barWidthFactor": 0.6,
"drawStyle": "line",
"fillOpacity": 10,
"gradientMode": "none",
"hideFrom": {
"legend": false,
"tooltip": false,
"viz": false
},
"insertNulls": false,
"lineInterpolation": "smooth",
"lineWidth": 1,
"pointSize": 5,
"scaleDistribution": {
"type": "linear"
},
"showPoints": "never",
"showValues": false,
"spanNulls": false,
"stacking": {
"group": "A",
"mode": "none"
},
"thresholdsStyle": {
"mode": "off"
}
},
"mappings": [],
"thresholds": {
"mode": "absolute",
"steps": [
{
"color": "green",
"value": 0
}
]
},
"unit": "s"
},
"overrides": [
{
"matcher": {
"id": "byFrameRefID",
"options": "A"
},
"properties": [
{
"id": "unit",
"value": "none"
}
]
}
]
},
"gridPos": {
"h": 8,
"w": 12,
"x": 12,
"y": 333
},
"id": 533,
"options": {
"legend": {
"calcs": [
"lastNotNull",
"max"
],
"displayMode": "table",
"placement": "right",
"showLegend": true
},
"tooltip": {
"hideZeros": false,
"mode": "multi",
"sort": "desc"
}
},
"pluginVersion": "12.3.2",
"targets": [
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "A",
"expr": "max by (server, drive, pool_index, set_index, drive_index, state) (rustfs_system_drive_runtime_state{job=~\"$job\",server=~\"$server\",drive=~\"$drive\"})",
"legendFormat": "{{server}} | {{drive}} | p{{pool_index}}/s{{set_index}}/d{{drive_index}} | {{state}}"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "B",
"expr": "max by (server, drive, pool_index, set_index, drive_index) (rustfs_system_drive_offline_duration_seconds{job=~\"$job\",server=~\"$server\",drive=~\"$drive\"})",
"legendFormat": "{{server}} | {{drive}} | offline seconds"
}
],
"title": "Drive Runtime State and Offline Duration",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {
"color": {
"mode": "palette-classic"
},
"custom": {
"axisBorderShow": false,
"axisCenteredZero": false,
"axisColorMode": "text",
"axisLabel": "",
"axisPlacement": "auto",
"barAlignment": 0,
"barWidthFactor": 0.6,
"drawStyle": "line",
"fillOpacity": 10,
"gradientMode": "none",
"hideFrom": {
"legend": false,
"tooltip": false,
"viz": false
},
"insertNulls": false,
"lineInterpolation": "smooth",
"lineWidth": 1,
"pointSize": 5,
"scaleDistribution": {
"type": "linear"
},
"showPoints": "never",
"showValues": false,
"spanNulls": false,
"stacking": {
"group": "A",
"mode": "none"
},
"thresholdsStyle": {
"mode": "off"
}
},
"mappings": [],
"thresholds": {
"mode": "absolute",
"steps": [
{
"color": "green",
"value": 0
}
]
},
"unit": "ops"
},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {
"h": 8,
"w": 12,
"x": 0,
"y": 341
},
"id": 534,
"options": {
"legend": {
"calcs": [
"lastNotNull",
"max"
],
"displayMode": "table",
"placement": "right",
"showLegend": true
},
"tooltip": {
"hideZeros": false,
"mode": "multi",
"sort": "desc"
}
},
"pluginVersion": "12.3.2",
"targets": [
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "A",
"expr": "sum by (server, drive, pool_index, set_index, drive_index, api) (rate(rustfs_system_drive_api_calls_total{job=~\"$job\",server=~\"$server\",drive=~\"$drive\",api=~\"$drive_api\"}[$__rate_interval]))",
"legendFormat": "{{server}} | {{drive}} | p{{pool_index}}/s{{set_index}}/d{{drive_index}} | {{api}}"
}
],
"title": "Drive API Calls by Operation",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {
"color": {
"mode": "palette-classic"
},
"custom": {
"axisBorderShow": false,
"axisCenteredZero": false,
"axisColorMode": "text",
"axisLabel": "",
"axisPlacement": "auto",
"barAlignment": 0,
"barWidthFactor": 0.6,
"drawStyle": "line",
"fillOpacity": 10,
"gradientMode": "none",
"hideFrom": {
"legend": false,
"tooltip": false,
"viz": false
},
"insertNulls": false,
"lineInterpolation": "smooth",
"lineWidth": 1,
"pointSize": 5,
"scaleDistribution": {
"type": "linear"
},
"showPoints": "never",
"showValues": false,
"spanNulls": false,
"stacking": {
"group": "A",
"mode": "none"
},
"thresholdsStyle": {
"mode": "off"
}
},
"mappings": [],
"thresholds": {
"mode": "absolute",
"steps": [
{
"color": "green",
"value": 0
}
]
},
"unit": "ops"
},
"overrides": [
{
"matcher": {
"id": "byFrameRefID",
"options": "B"
},
"properties": [
{
"id": "unit",
"value": "short"
},
{
"id": "custom.axisPlacement",
"value": "right"
}
]
}
]
},
"gridPos": {
"h": 8,
"w": 12,
"x": 12,
"y": 341
},
"id": 535,
"options": {
"legend": {
"calcs": [
"lastNotNull",
"max"
],
"displayMode": "table",
"placement": "right",
"showLegend": true
},
"tooltip": {
"hideZeros": false,
"mode": "multi",
"sort": "desc"
}
},
"pluginVersion": "12.3.2",
"targets": [
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "A",
"expr": "sum by (server, source, state) (rate(rustfs_scanner_source_work_total{job=~\"$job\",server=~\"$server\",source=~\"$scanner_source\"}[$__rate_interval]))",
"legendFormat": "{{server}} | {{source}} | {{state}}"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "B",
"expr": "sum by (server, cycle_scope, source, state) (rustfs_scanner_cycle_source_work{job=~\"$job\",server=~\"$server\",source=~\"$scanner_source\"})",
"legendFormat": "{{server}} | {{cycle_scope}} | {{source}} | {{state}}"
}
],
"title": "Scanner Source Work by Server",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {
"color": {
"mode": "palette-classic"
},
"custom": {
"axisBorderShow": false,
"axisCenteredZero": false,
"axisColorMode": "text",
"axisLabel": "",
"axisPlacement": "auto",
"barAlignment": 0,
"barWidthFactor": 0.6,
"drawStyle": "line",
"fillOpacity": 10,
"gradientMode": "none",
"hideFrom": {
"legend": false,
"tooltip": false,
"viz": false
},
"insertNulls": false,
"lineInterpolation": "smooth",
"lineWidth": 1,
"pointSize": 5,
"scaleDistribution": {
"type": "linear"
},
"showPoints": "never",
"showValues": false,
"spanNulls": false,
"stacking": {
"group": "A",
"mode": "none"
},
"thresholdsStyle": {
"mode": "off"
}
},
"mappings": [],
"thresholds": {
"mode": "absolute",
"steps": [
{
"color": "green",
"value": 0
}
]
},
"unit": "ops"
},
"overrides": [
{
"matcher": {
"id": "byFrameRefID",
"options": "B"
},
"properties": [
{
"id": "unit",
"value": "short"
},
{
"id": "custom.axisPlacement",
"value": "right"
}
]
}
]
},
"gridPos": {
"h": 8,
"w": 12,
"x": 0,
"y": 349
},
"id": 536,
"options": {
"legend": {
"calcs": [
"lastNotNull",
"max"
],
"displayMode": "table",
"placement": "right",
"showLegend": true
},
"tooltip": {
"hideZeros": false,
"mode": "multi",
"sort": "desc"
}
},
"pluginVersion": "12.3.2",
"targets": [
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "A",
"expr": "sum by (server, bucket, drive, result) (rate(rustfs_scanner_bucket_drive_result_total{job=~\"$job\",server=~\"$server\",bucket=~\"$bucket\",drive=~\"$drive\",result=~\"$scanner_result\"}[$__rate_interval]))",
"legendFormat": "{{server}} | {{bucket}} | {{drive}} | {{result}}"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "B",
"expr": "sum by (server, cycle_scope, bucket, drive, result) (rustfs_scanner_cycle_bucket_drive_result{job=~\"$job\",server=~\"$server\",bucket=~\"$bucket\",drive=~\"$drive\",result=~\"$scanner_result\"})",
"legendFormat": "{{server}} | {{cycle_scope}} | {{bucket}} | {{drive}} | {{result}}"
}
],
"title": "Scanner Bucket Drive Results",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {
"color": {
"mode": "palette-classic"
},
"custom": {
"axisBorderShow": false,
"axisCenteredZero": false,
"axisColorMode": "text",
"axisLabel": "",
"axisPlacement": "auto",
"barAlignment": 0,
"barWidthFactor": 0.6,
"drawStyle": "line",
"fillOpacity": 10,
"gradientMode": "none",
"hideFrom": {
"legend": false,
"tooltip": false,
"viz": false
},
"insertNulls": false,
"lineInterpolation": "smooth",
"lineWidth": 1,
"pointSize": 5,
"scaleDistribution": {
"type": "linear"
},
"showPoints": "never",
"showValues": false,
"spanNulls": false,
"stacking": {
"group": "A",
"mode": "none"
},
"thresholdsStyle": {
"mode": "off"
}
},
"mappings": [],
"thresholds": {
"mode": "absolute",
"steps": [
{
"color": "green",
"value": 0
}
]
},
"unit": "ops"
},
"overrides": [
{
"matcher": {
"id": "byFrameRefID",
"options": "B"
},
"properties": [
{
"id": "unit",
"value": "Bps"
}
]
}
]
},
"gridPos": {
"h": 8,
"w": 12,
"x": 12,
"y": 349
},
"id": 537,
"options": {
"legend": {
"calcs": [
"lastNotNull",
"max"
],
"displayMode": "table",
"placement": "right",
"showLegend": true
},
"tooltip": {
"hideZeros": false,
"mode": "multi",
"sort": "desc"
}
},
"pluginVersion": "12.3.2",
"targets": [
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "A",
"expr": "sum by (bucket, target_arn) (rate(rustfs_bucket_replication_target_sent_count{job=~\"$job\",bucket=~\"$bucket\",target_arn=~\"$target_arn\"}[$__rate_interval]))",
"legendFormat": "sent objects | {{bucket}} | {{target_arn}}"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "B",
"expr": "sum by (bucket, target_arn) (rate(rustfs_bucket_replication_target_sent_bytes{job=~\"$job\",bucket=~\"$bucket\",target_arn=~\"$target_arn\"}[$__rate_interval]))",
"legendFormat": "sent bytes | {{bucket}} | {{target_arn}}"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "C",
"expr": "sum by (bucket, target_arn) (rate(rustfs_bucket_replication_target_total_failed_count{job=~\"$job\",bucket=~\"$bucket\",target_arn=~\"$target_arn\"}[$__rate_interval]))",
"legendFormat": "failed objects | {{bucket}} | {{target_arn}}"
}
],
"title": "Bucket Replication Target Flow",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {
"color": {
"mode": "palette-classic"
},
"custom": {
"axisBorderShow": false,
"axisCenteredZero": false,
"axisColorMode": "text",
"axisLabel": "",
"axisPlacement": "auto",
"barAlignment": 0,
"barWidthFactor": 0.6,
"drawStyle": "line",
"fillOpacity": 10,
"gradientMode": "none",
"hideFrom": {
"legend": false,
"tooltip": false,
"viz": false
},
"insertNulls": false,
"lineInterpolation": "smooth",
"lineWidth": 1,
"pointSize": 5,
"scaleDistribution": {
"type": "linear"
},
"showPoints": "never",
"showValues": false,
"spanNulls": false,
"stacking": {
"group": "A",
"mode": "none"
},
"thresholdsStyle": {
"mode": "off"
}
},
"mappings": [],
"thresholds": {
"mode": "absolute",
"steps": [
{
"color": "green",
"value": 0
}
]
},
"unit": "short"
},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {
"h": 8,
"w": 12,
"x": 0,
"y": 357
},
"id": 538,
"options": {
"legend": {
"calcs": [
"lastNotNull",
"max"
],
"displayMode": "table",
"placement": "right",
"showLegend": true
},
"tooltip": {
"hideZeros": false,
"mode": "multi",
"sort": "desc"
}
},
"pluginVersion": "12.3.2",
"targets": [
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "A",
"expr": "max by (server, target_id) (rustfs_audit_target_queue_length_by_server{job=~\"$job\",server=~\"$server\"})",
"legendFormat": "audit queue | {{server}} | {{target_id}}"
},
{
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"editorMode": "code",
"range": true,
"refId": "B",
"expr": "max by (server, action, state) (rustfs_ilm_action_tasks{job=~\"$job\",server=~\"$server\"})",
"legendFormat": "ilm | {{server}} | {{action}} | {{state}}"
}
],
"title": "Audit and ILM by Server",
"type": "timeseries"
}
],
"preload": false,
@@ -11551,6 +12376,32 @@
"sort": 1,
"type": "query"
},
{
"allValue": ".*",
"current": {
"text": "All",
"value": "$__all"
},
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"definition": "label_values(rustfs_system_drive_api_calls_total,api)",
"includeAll": true,
"label": "Drive API",
"multi": true,
"name": "drive_api",
"options": [],
"query": {
"qryType": 1,
"query": "label_values(rustfs_system_drive_api_calls_total,api)",
"refId": "PrometheusVariableQueryEditor-drive_api"
},
"refresh": 2,
"regex": "",
"sort": 1,
"type": "query"
},
{
"allValue": ".*",
"current": {
@@ -11670,6 +12521,136 @@
"regex": "",
"sort": 1,
"type": "query"
},
{
"allValue": ".*",
"current": {
"text": "All",
"value": "$__all"
},
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"definition": "label_values(rustfs_api_requests_requests_total_by_server,server)",
"includeAll": true,
"label": "Server",
"multi": true,
"name": "server",
"options": [],
"query": {
"qryType": 1,
"query": "label_values(rustfs_api_requests_requests_total_by_server,server)",
"refId": "PrometheusVariableQueryEditor-server"
},
"refresh": 2,
"regex": "",
"sort": 1,
"type": "query"
},
{
"allValue": ".*",
"current": {
"text": "All",
"value": "$__all"
},
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"definition": "label_values(rustfs_api_requests_requests_total_by_server,name)",
"includeAll": true,
"label": "API",
"multi": true,
"name": "api",
"options": [],
"query": {
"qryType": 1,
"query": "label_values(rustfs_api_requests_requests_total_by_server,name)",
"refId": "PrometheusVariableQueryEditor-api"
},
"refresh": 2,
"regex": "",
"sort": 1,
"type": "query"
},
{
"allValue": ".*",
"current": {
"text": "All",
"value": "$__all"
},
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"definition": "label_values({__name__=\"rustfs_bucket_replication_target_sent_count\",bucket=~\"$bucket\"},target_arn)",
"includeAll": true,
"label": "Target ARN",
"multi": true,
"name": "target_arn",
"options": [],
"query": {
"qryType": 1,
"query": "label_values({__name__=\"rustfs_bucket_replication_target_sent_count\",bucket=~\"$bucket\"},target_arn)",
"refId": "PrometheusVariableQueryEditor-target_arn"
},
"refresh": 2,
"regex": "",
"sort": 1,
"type": "query"
},
{
"allValue": ".*",
"current": {
"text": "All",
"value": "$__all"
},
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"definition": "label_values(rustfs_scanner_source_work_total,source)",
"includeAll": true,
"label": "Scanner Source",
"multi": true,
"name": "scanner_source",
"options": [],
"query": {
"qryType": 1,
"query": "label_values(rustfs_scanner_source_work_total,source)",
"refId": "PrometheusVariableQueryEditor-scanner_source"
},
"refresh": 2,
"regex": "",
"sort": 1,
"type": "query"
},
{
"allValue": ".*",
"current": {
"text": "All",
"value": "$__all"
},
"datasource": {
"type": "prometheus",
"uid": "${datasource}"
},
"definition": "label_values(rustfs_scanner_bucket_drive_result_total,result)",
"includeAll": true,
"label": "Scanner Result",
"multi": true,
"name": "scanner_result",
"options": [],
"query": {
"qryType": 1,
"query": "label_values(rustfs_scanner_bucket_drive_result_total,result)",
"refId": "PrometheusVariableQueryEditor-scanner_result"
},
"refresh": 2,
"regex": "",
"sort": 1,
"type": "query"
}
]
},
@@ -29,11 +29,27 @@ processors:
limit_mib: 1024
spike_limit_mib: 256
transform/logs:
error_mode: ignore
log_statements:
- context: log
statements:
- set(attributes["message"], body.string)
- set(attributes["log.body"], body.string)
- set(attributes["message"], body.string) where IsString(body)
- set(attributes["log.body"], body.string) where IsString(body)
- set(body, Concat([body, " event=", attributes["event"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["event"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " component=", attributes["component"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["component"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " subsystem=", attributes["subsystem"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["subsystem"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " state=", attributes["state"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["state"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " result=", attributes["result"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["result"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " reason=", attributes["reason"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["reason"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " failure_reason=", attributes["failure_reason"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["failure_reason"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " rpc_path=", attributes["rpc_path"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["rpc_path"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " rpc_service=", attributes["rpc_service"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["rpc_service"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " rpc_method=", attributes["rpc_method"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["rpc_method"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " expected_audience=", attributes["expected_audience"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["expected_audience"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " peer_addr=", attributes["peer_addr"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["peer_addr"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " replay_scope_bootstrap_allowed=", attributes["replay_scope_bootstrap_allowed"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["replay_scope_bootstrap_allowed"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " error=", attributes["error"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["error"] != nil
- set(body, Concat([body, " exception_message=", attributes["exception.message"]], "")) where IsString(body) and attributes["exception.message"] != nil
exporters:
otlp/tempo:
@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@
# =============================================================================
#
# Metric source: the KMS operation-policy choke point in
# crates/kms/src/policy.rs. All label values are static enum strings
# (operation, op_class, outcome, error_class); key identifiers, key material,
# and tokens never appear in labels.
# crates/kms/src/policy.rs. All label values are bounded static strings
# (operation, op_class, outcome, error_class, backend, scope); key identifiers,
# key material, and tokens never appear in labels.
#
# Response procedures: docs/operations/kms-observability-runbook.md
#
@@ -70,8 +70,9 @@ groups:
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# 2. KmsBackendHighErrorRate
# Sustained share of operations terminating without success
# (fatal, budget_exhausted, deadline_exceeded). The cancelled
# outcome is excluded because shutdowns legitimately produce it.
# (fatal, budget/deadline exhaustion, admission backpressure,
# or an open circuit). The cancelled outcome is excluded because
# shutdowns legitimately produce it.
# The traffic guard keeps a single failure on a near-idle
# cluster from firing the alert.
# Threshold: 5% for 10m — conservative default, calibrate
@@ -94,9 +95,11 @@ groups:
summary: "KMS backend non-success ratio above 5% for 10m"
description: >-
{{ $value | humanizePercentage }} of KMS backend operations
are terminating in fatal, budget_exhausted, or
deadline_exceeded. Object encryption and decryption paths
depending on the KMS are degraded or failing.
are terminating in fatal, budget_exhausted,
deadline_exceeded, backpressure_timeout,
backpressure_rejected, or circuit_open. Object encryption
and decryption paths depending on the KMS are degraded or
failing.
runbook_url: "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/blob/main/docs/operations/kms-observability-runbook.md#kmsbackendhigherrorrate"
# ==========================================================================
@@ -186,3 +189,26 @@ groups:
Retryable failures are outlasting the retry budget, so
callers are seeing hard failures.
runbook_url: "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/blob/main/docs/operations/kms-observability-runbook.md#kmsbackendretrybudgetexhausted"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# 6. KmsBackendCircuitOpen
# Direct circuit-state signal, independent of operation traffic.
# A transient open can recover on its first half-open probe; alert
# only when the circuit remains open or half-open for one minute.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
- alert: KmsBackendCircuitOpen
expr: |
rustfs_kms_backend_circuit_open > 0
for: 1m
labels:
severity: warning
component: kms
annotations:
summary: "KMS backend circuit open ({{ $labels.backend }}/{{ $labels.scope }})"
description: >-
The KMS backend circuit for {{ $labels.backend }} scope
{{ $labels.scope }} has remained open or half-open for one
minute. Operations in this scope can terminate as
circuit_open until the half-open probe succeeds or returns
a non-retryable failure.
runbook_url: "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/blob/main/docs/operations/kms-observability-runbook.md#kmsbackendcircuitopen"
+2 -2
View File
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ runs:
using: "composite"
steps:
# protobuf-compiler is deliberately absent: the setup-protoc step below
# installs 34.1 into the tool cache and prepends it to PATH, so the apt
# installs 35.1 into the tool cache and prepends it to PATH, so the apt
# build (older, and never version-matched) was shadowed on every run and
# simply never used.
- name: Install system dependencies (Ubuntu)
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ runs:
- name: Install protoc
uses: rustfs/setup-protoc@a3705324d8f9bf5b6c3573fb6cf8ae421db55dd6 # v3.0.1
with:
version: "34.1"
version: "35.1"
repo-token: ${{ github.token }}
- name: Install flatc
+5
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ on:
- '.github/actions/**'
- '.github/workflows/**'
- 'scripts/release/create_or_update_release.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_performance_ab_workflow.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_preview_release_workflow.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_workflow_pins.sh'
pull_request:
@@ -36,6 +37,7 @@ on:
- '.github/actions/**'
- '.github/workflows/**'
- 'scripts/release/create_or_update_release.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_performance_ab_workflow.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_preview_release_workflow.sh'
- 'scripts/security/check_workflow_pins.sh'
schedule:
@@ -141,6 +143,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Check preview release workflow policy
run: ./scripts/security/check_preview_release_workflow.sh
- name: Check performance A/B workflow trust boundary
run: ./scripts/security/check_performance_ab_workflow.sh
dependency-review:
name: Dependency Review
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+6
View File
@@ -102,6 +102,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Check architecture migration rules
run: ./scripts/check_architecture_migration_rules.sh
- name: Check logging guardrails
run: ./scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh
- name: Check tokio io-uring feature guard
run: ./scripts/check_no_tokio_io_uring.sh
@@ -111,6 +114,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Check body-cache whitelist guard
run: ./scripts/check_body_cache_whitelist.sh
- name: Check s3s footprint ratchet
run: ./scripts/check_s3s_footprint.sh
- name: Check no planning docs committed
run: ./scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh
+72 -13
View File
@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Check architecture migration rules
run: ./scripts/check_architecture_migration_rules.sh
- name: Check logging guardrails
run: ./scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh
- name: Check tokio io-uring feature guard
run: ./scripts/check_no_tokio_io_uring.sh
@@ -146,6 +149,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Check body-cache whitelist guard
run: ./scripts/check_body_cache_whitelist.sh
- name: Check s3s footprint ratchet
run: ./scripts/check_s3s_footprint.sh
- name: Check no planning docs committed
run: ./scripts/check_no_planning_docs.sh
@@ -340,9 +346,11 @@ jobs:
- name: Annotate early-stop reason
if: failure() && github.event_name == 'pull_request'
run: |
echo "## CI early-stop" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "Job \`${GITHUB_JOB}\` (Test and Lint) failed; cancelling run ${GITHUB_RUN_ID} to free runners." >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "Sibling jobs showing **cancelled** were stopped by this job, not by their own failure." >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
{
echo "## CI early-stop"
echo "Job \`${GITHUB_JOB}\` (Test and Lint) failed; cancelling run ${GITHUB_RUN_ID} to free runners."
echo "Sibling jobs showing **cancelled** were stopped by this job, not by their own failure."
} >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
# curl rather than `gh`: every existing `gh` call in this repo runs on
# ubuntu-latest, and the sm-standard-* images are custom and trimmed (they
@@ -665,15 +673,17 @@ jobs:
- name: Make binary executable
run: chmod +x ./target/debug/rustfs
# Guard the security negative-auth smoke subset (backlog#1151 sec-5)
# against a rename or deletion silently dropping it out of the e2e-smoke
# filter. The script lists what the profile selects and fails if the count
# of security auth-rejection tests falls below the committed floor in
# .config/security-smoke-floor.txt (infra-12 count-floor mechanism). Run
# before the smoke suite so a thinned gate fails fast; the `nextest list`
# here compiles the e2e_test binaries the run below reuses.
- name: Check security smoke subset count floor
run: ./scripts/check_security_smoke_count.sh check
# Build the e2e test graph once. The archive is reused by the security
# count-floor check and the smoke run below, avoiding a second compile of
# the same e2e_test target on cold runners (backlog#1645).
- name: Archive e2e smoke test binaries
env:
NEXTEST_ARCHIVE: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-smoke.tar.zst
NEXTEST_LISTING: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-smoke-list.json
run: |
cargo nextest archive --profile e2e-smoke -p e2e_test --archive-file "${NEXTEST_ARCHIVE}"
cargo nextest list --profile e2e-smoke --archive-file "${NEXTEST_ARCHIVE}" --message-format json > "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
./scripts/check_security_smoke_count.sh check "${NEXTEST_LISTING}"
# PR smoke subset of the in-repo e2e suite (backlog#1149 ci-4). The
# profile.e2e-smoke default-filter in .config/nextest.toml is the single
@@ -681,7 +691,30 @@ jobs:
# adding new e2e jobs here. Each test spawns its own rustfs server on a
# random port and reuses the downloaded debug binary above.
- name: Run e2e smoke suite
run: cargo nextest run --profile e2e-smoke -p e2e_test
env:
NEXTEST_ARCHIVE: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-smoke.tar.zst
RUSTFS_E2E_LOG_DIR: ${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-smoke-logs
run: |
cargo nextest run --profile e2e-smoke --archive-file "${NEXTEST_ARCHIVE}" \
--status-level all --final-status-level all --failure-output final
- name: Upload e2e smoke diagnostics
if: failure()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
with:
name: e2e-smoke-diagnostics-${{ github.run_number }}
path: |
${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-smoke-logs/
${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-smoke-list.json
if-no-files-found: warn
- name: Upload e2e smoke JUnit report
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
with:
name: e2e-smoke-junit-${{ github.run_number }}
path: target/nextest/e2e-smoke/junit.xml
if-no-files-found: warn
- name: Install s3s-e2e test tool
uses: taiki-e/cache-cargo-install-action@7447f04c51f2ba27ca35e7f1e28fab848c5b3ba7 # v2
@@ -737,6 +770,32 @@ jobs:
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@ece7cb06caefa5fff74198d8649806c4678c61a1 # v6.3.0
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- name: Install awscurl
run: |
python3 -m pip install --user --upgrade pip "awscurl==0.44"
echo "AWSCURL_PATH=$HOME/.local/bin/awscurl" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Verify awscurl
run: test -x "$AWSCURL_PATH"
- name: Install Vault
run: |
VAULT_VERSION="1.17.6"
VAULT_ARCHIVE="vault_${VAULT_VERSION}_linux_amd64.zip"
curl -fsSLo "$RUNNER_TEMP/$VAULT_ARCHIVE" "https://releases.hashicorp.com/vault/${VAULT_VERSION}/${VAULT_ARCHIVE}"
echo "0cddc1fbbb88583b5ba5b845f9f8fae47c6fb39a6d48cd543c6ba6fd3ac1a669 $RUNNER_TEMP/$VAULT_ARCHIVE" | sha256sum --check --status
unzip -q "$RUNNER_TEMP/$VAULT_ARCHIVE" -d "$RUNNER_TEMP/vault-bin"
echo "RUSTFS_TEST_VAULT_BIN=$RUNNER_TEMP/vault-bin/vault" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Verify Vault
run: |
"$RUSTFS_TEST_VAULT_BIN" version
# Download after the cache restore so the freshly built binary from the
# build job always wins over anything restored into target/debug.
- name: Download debug binary
+14 -15
View File
@@ -14,25 +14,24 @@
# Nightly full replication e2e lane (backlog#1147 repl-1, deps: ci-4).
#
# The per-PR gate (ci.yml `e2e-tests` job, `--profile e2e-smoke`) runs the 20
# FAST replication tests. This scheduled lane runs the remaining 27
# heavier replication e2e tests that are unfit for a per-PR gate:
#
# * 2 remote-target TLS validation tests.
# * 12 bucket-replication data-plane/helper tests (PUT/delete + poll for
# convergence; two replicate over HTTPS, two pin active SSE failure
# contracts, and one guards event/history observers). The SSE-S3 contract
# remains ignored under backlog#1291.
# * 11 `_real_dual_node` site-replication tests (each spawns TWO rustfs
# servers and drives the cross-process site-replication control plane).
# * 1 `_real_three_node` site-replication test.
# * 1 `_real_single_node` service-account round-trip test.
# The per-PR gate (ci.yml `e2e-tests` job, `--profile e2e-smoke`) runs the
# FAST replication tests. This scheduled lane runs the remaining heavier
# replication e2e tests that are unfit for a per-PR gate: remote-target TLS
# validation, bucket-replication data-plane/helper tests (PUT/delete + poll
# for convergence, HTTPS targets, active SSE failure contracts, event/history
# observers), and the `_real_dual_node` / `_real_three_node` /
# `_real_single_node` site-replication tests that each spawn full rustfs
# server processes.
#
# The selection is the [profile.e2e-repl-nightly] default-filter in
# .config/nextest.toml — the single wiring mechanism (repl-1 / ci-4). Do NOT
# add ad-hoc cargo-test steps here; change the filterset instead.
# add ad-hoc cargo-test steps here; change the filterset instead. The
# authoritative membership and count come from
# `cargo nextest list -p e2e_test --profile e2e-repl-nightly`; the PR/nightly
# count invariant is maintained next to the filtersets in .config/nextest.toml
# (deliberately not duplicated here).
#
# Explicit division of labor: these 27 tests run ONLY here, never double-run
# Explicit division of labor: the nightly subset runs ONLY here, never double-run
# in ci-5's future e2e-full merge gate. TODO(ci-7): once the ci domain's
# consolidated scheduled e2e workflow exists, fold this interim repl-owned lane
# into it rather than growing a second scheduled entrypoint.
+9 -5
View File
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ jobs:
INTEROP_PACKAGE: rustfs
INTEROP_FEATURES: rio-v2
INTEROP_FILTER: "test(minio_generated_read_test::)"
INTEROP_REQUIRED_TESTS: '["reads_minio_generated_sse_s3_multipart_fixture", "reads_minio_generated_sse_kms_multipart_fixture", "rejects_minio_generated_sse_s3_fixture_with_wrong_kms_key", "rejects_minio_generated_sse_s3_fixture_with_truncated_ciphertext"]'
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
@@ -95,20 +96,23 @@ jobs:
# is a perfectly valid filterset that matches zero tests, so the next
# rename or module move would leave this job selecting nothing and
# reporting success without executing a single interop assertion. Count
# the selection and fail with a reason instead.
# the selection and require every core reader test, while allowing new
# reader cases to be added without changing this guard.
#
# Count only `filter-match.status == "matches"`: the top-level
# `test-count` in the JSON is the package total and ignores `-E` entirely.
- name: Assert the interop selector still matches tests
run: |
set -euo pipefail
count="$(cargo nextest list --run-ignored all \
selection="$(cargo nextest list --run-ignored ignored-only \
-p "$INTEROP_PACKAGE" --features "$INTEROP_FEATURES" \
-E "$INTEROP_FILTER" --message-format json \
| python3 -c 'import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(sum(1 for s in d.get("rust-suites", {}).values() for t in s.get("testcases", {}).values() if t.get("filter-match", {}).get("status") == "matches"))')"
| python3 -c 'import json,os,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); required=json.loads(os.environ["INTEROP_REQUIRED_TESTS"]); matched=[name for suite in d.get("rust-suites", {}).values() for name,test in suite.get("testcases", {}).items() if test.get("filter-match", {}).get("status") == "matches"]; missing=[test for test in required if not any(name.endswith("minio_generated_read_test::" + test) for name in matched)]; print(len(matched)); print(",".join(missing))')"
count="$(printf '%s\n' "$selection" | sed -n '1p')"
missing="$(printf '%s\n' "$selection" | sed -n '2p')"
echo "interop tests selected: ${count}"
if [ "${count}" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "::error::Selector '${INTEROP_FILTER}' in package '${INTEROP_PACKAGE}' matched 0 tests. The MinIO interop reader tests have moved or been renamed again; fix the selector instead of letting this job pass without running them. Context: rustfs/backlog#1638."
if [ -n "${missing}" ]; then
echo "::error::Selector '${INTEROP_FILTER}' in package '${INTEROP_PACKAGE}' is missing required tests: ${missing}. The MinIO interop reader tests have moved or been renamed; fix the selector instead of running an incomplete matrix. Context: rustfs/backlog#1638."
exit 1
fi
+465
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,465 @@
# Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
# Package Workflow - Build DEB/RPM packages
#
# This workflow builds DEB and RPM packages from pre-built Linux binaries
# and uploads them to Cloudflare R2.
#
# Trigger:
# - release published: automatically package when a GitHub release is published
# - workflow_dispatch: manual trigger with optional tag/run_id
#
# Flow:
# 1. Find the Build workflow run for the release tag
# 2. Download Linux binaries (x86_64-gnu, aarch64-gnu) from build artifacts
# 3. Build DEB packages for amd64 and arm64
# 4. Build RPM packages for x86_64 and aarch64
# 5. Upload all packages to Cloudflare R2
name: Package DEB/RPM
permissions:
contents: read
actions: read
on:
release:
types: [ published ]
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
tag:
description: "Release tag to package (e.g. 1.0.0-beta.12). Leave empty for latest main build."
required: false
type: string
build_run_id:
description: "Build workflow run ID (overrides tag lookup)"
required: false
type: string
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.release.tag_name || github.event.inputs.tag || github.run_id }}
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
# Resolve which build run to use and extract version info
resolve:
name: Resolve Build
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
outputs:
version: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.version }}
build_type: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.build_type }}
build_run_id: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.build_run_id }}
tag: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.tag }}
steps:
- name: Resolve build run
id: resolve
shell: bash
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
INPUT_TAG: ${{ github.event.inputs.tag }}
INPUT_RUN_ID: ${{ github.event.inputs.build_run_id }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# Determine tag
if [[ "${{ github.event_name }}" == "release" ]]; then
TAG="${{ github.event.release.tag_name }}"
elif [[ -n "$INPUT_TAG" ]]; then
TAG="$INPUT_TAG"
else
TAG=""
fi
echo "Tag: ${TAG:-<none>}"
# Determine build run ID
BUILD_RUN_ID=""
if [[ -n "$INPUT_RUN_ID" ]]; then
# Explicit run ID takes priority
BUILD_RUN_ID="$INPUT_RUN_ID"
echo "Using explicit build run ID: $BUILD_RUN_ID"
elif [[ -n "$TAG" ]]; then
# Find the build run that produced this tag
echo "Looking for build run for tag: $TAG"
BUILD_RUN_ID=$(gh api \
"repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/workflows/build.yml/runs?branch=${TAG}&status=success&per_page=1" \
--jq '.workflow_runs[0].id' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
if [[ -z "$BUILD_RUN_ID" || "$BUILD_RUN_ID" == "null" ]]; then
# Tag might not be a branch; try event=push with head_branch matching
BUILD_RUN_ID=$(gh api \
"repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/workflows/build.yml/runs?event=push&status=success&per_page=100" \
--jq ".workflow_runs[] | select(.head_branch == \"$TAG\") | .id" 2>/dev/null | head -1 || echo "")
fi
if [[ -z "$BUILD_RUN_ID" || "$BUILD_RUN_ID" == "null" ]]; then
echo "❌ No successful build run found for tag: $TAG"
exit 1
fi
echo "Found build run: $BUILD_RUN_ID"
else
# No tag — latest successful main build
echo "No tag specified, looking for latest main build"
BUILD_RUN_ID=$(gh api \
"repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/workflows/build.yml/runs?branch=main&status=success&per_page=1" \
--jq '.workflow_runs[0].id' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
if [[ -z "$BUILD_RUN_ID" || "$BUILD_RUN_ID" == "null" ]]; then
echo "❌ No successful main build found"
exit 1
fi
echo "Latest main build: $BUILD_RUN_ID"
fi
# Determine version and build type
if [[ -n "$TAG" ]]; then
VERSION="$TAG"
if [[ "$TAG" == *"-preview"* ]]; then
BUILD_TYPE="preview"
elif [[ "$TAG" == *"alpha"* || "$TAG" == *"beta"* || "$TAG" == *"rc"* ]]; then
BUILD_TYPE="prerelease"
else
BUILD_TYPE="release"
fi
else
SHORT_SHA=$(gh api "repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/runs/${BUILD_RUN_ID}" \
--jq '.head_sha' 2>/dev/null | head -c 7)
VERSION="dev-${SHORT_SHA}"
BUILD_TYPE="development"
fi
{
echo "version=$VERSION"
echo "build_type=$BUILD_TYPE"
echo "build_run_id=$BUILD_RUN_ID"
echo "tag=${TAG}"
} >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "📊 Resolved:"
echo " Version: $VERSION"
echo " Build type: $BUILD_TYPE"
echo " Build run ID: $BUILD_RUN_ID"
# Build DEB and RPM packages for each architecture
package:
name: Package (${{ matrix.arch }})
needs: resolve
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
include:
- arch: x86_64
deb_arch: amd64
rpm_arch: x86_64
artifact_name: "rustfs-linux-x86_64-gnu"
- arch: aarch64
deb_arch: arm64
rpm_arch: aarch64
artifact_name: "rustfs-linux-aarch64-gnu"
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Download binary artifact from build run
uses: actions/download-artifact@37930b1c2abaa49bbe596cd826c3c89aef350131 # v7
with:
pattern: ${{ matrix.artifact_name }}*
path: ./binary-artifact
run-id: ${{ needs.resolve.outputs.build_run_id }}
github-token: ${{ github.token }}
merge-multiple: true
- name: Extract binary
id: binary
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
ZIP_FILE=$(find ./binary-artifact -name "*.zip" -type f | head -1)
if [[ -z "$ZIP_FILE" ]]; then
echo "❌ No binary artifact found"
ls -la ./binary-artifact/ || true
exit 1
fi
echo "Found artifact: $ZIP_FILE"
mkdir -p ./bin
unzip -o "$ZIP_FILE" -d ./bin
if [[ ! -f ./bin/rustfs ]]; then
echo "❌ rustfs binary not found in archive"
exit 1
fi
chmod +x ./bin/rustfs
ls -lh ./bin/rustfs
echo "✅ Binary extracted"
- name: Build DEB package
id: deb
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
VERSION="${{ needs.resolve.outputs.version }}"
DEB_ARCH="${{ matrix.deb_arch }}"
# DEB version: replace - with ~ (1.0.0-beta.12 -> 1.0.0~beta.12)
# Use a variable for ~ to prevent tilde expansion by bash
TILDE='~'
DEB_VERSION="${VERSION/-/$TILDE}"
PKG_DIR="rustfs_${DEB_VERSION}_${DEB_ARCH}"
echo "Building DEB: ${PKG_DIR}.deb"
mkdir -p "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN"
mkdir -p "${PKG_DIR}/usr/bin"
mkdir -p "${PKG_DIR}/etc/default"
mkdir -p "${PKG_DIR}/lib/systemd/system"
mkdir -p "${PKG_DIR}/usr/share/doc/rustfs"
cp ./bin/rustfs "${PKG_DIR}/usr/bin/"
chmod 755 "${PKG_DIR}/usr/bin/rustfs"
cp deploy/build/rustfs.service "${PKG_DIR}/lib/systemd/system/"
cat > "${PKG_DIR}/etc/default/rustfs" << 'ENVEOF'
# RustFS Environment Configuration
# See https://rustfs.com/docs/ for more information
# RUSTFS_VOLUMES=""
# RUSTFS_ROOT_USER=""
# RUSTFS_ROOT_PASSWORD=""
ENVEOF
cat > "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/control" << EOF
Package: rustfs
Version: ${DEB_VERSION}
Section: utils
Priority: optional
Architecture: ${DEB_ARCH}
Depends: libc6 (>= 2.31)
Maintainer: RustFS Team <support@rustfs.com>
Description: High-performance distributed object storage
RustFS is a high-performance distributed object storage software
built using Rust. It is compatible with MinIO and S3 API.
Homepage: https://rustfs.com
EOF
cat > "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/postinst" << 'POSTINST'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
if ! getent passwd rustfs > /dev/null 2>&1; then
useradd -r -s /bin/false -d /opt/rustfs rustfs
fi
mkdir -p /opt/rustfs /data/rustfs /var/log/rustfs
chown rustfs:rustfs /opt/rustfs /data/rustfs /var/log/rustfs
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
systemctl daemon-reload
fi
echo "RustFS installed. Configure /etc/default/rustfs then: systemctl start rustfs"
POSTINST
chmod 755 "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/postinst"
cat > "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/prerm" << 'PRERM'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ] && systemctl is-active --quiet rustfs; then
systemctl stop rustfs
fi
PRERM
chmod 755 "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/prerm"
cat > "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/postrm" << 'POSTRM'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
systemctl daemon-reload
fi
POSTRM
chmod 755 "${PKG_DIR}/DEBIAN/postrm"
cp LICENSE "${PKG_DIR}/usr/share/doc/rustfs/"
cp README.md "${PKG_DIR}/usr/share/doc/rustfs/"
fakeroot dpkg-deb --build "${PKG_DIR}"
DEB_FILE="${PKG_DIR}.deb"
ls -lh "$DEB_FILE"
echo "deb_file=$DEB_FILE" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "✅ DEB built: $DEB_FILE"
- name: Build RPM package
id: rpm
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
VERSION="${{ needs.resolve.outputs.version }}"
RPM_ARCH="${{ matrix.rpm_arch }}"
echo "Building RPM for ${RPM_ARCH}"
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y ruby ruby-dev build-essential
sudo gem install fpm
fpm -s dir -t rpm \
--name rustfs \
--version "$VERSION" \
--architecture "$RPM_ARCH" \
--depends "glibc >= 2.31" \
--maintainer "RustFS Team <support@rustfs.com>" \
--description "High-performance distributed object storage" \
--url "https://rustfs.com" \
--license "Apache-2.0" \
--after-install <(cat <<'POSTINST'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
if ! getent passwd rustfs > /dev/null 2>&1; then
useradd -r -s /bin/false -d /opt/rustfs rustfs
fi
mkdir -p /opt/rustfs /data/rustfs /var/log/rustfs
chown rustfs:rustfs /opt/rustfs /data/rustfs /var/log/rustfs
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
systemctl daemon-reload
fi
POSTINST
) \
--before-remove <(cat <<'PRERM'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ] && systemctl is-active --quiet rustfs; then
systemctl stop rustfs
fi
PRERM
) \
--after-remove <(cat <<'POSTRM'
#!/bin/bash
set -e
if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
systemctl daemon-reload
fi
POSTRM
) \
--config-files /etc/default/rustfs \
./bin/rustfs=/usr/bin/rustfs \
deploy/build/rustfs.service=/lib/systemd/system/rustfs.service \
LICENSE=/usr/share/doc/rustfs/LICENSE \
README.md=/usr/share/doc/rustfs/README.md
RPM_FILE=$(ls -1 rustfs-*.rpm 2>/dev/null | head -1)
if [[ -z "$RPM_FILE" ]]; then
echo "❌ RPM build failed"
exit 1
fi
ls -lh "$RPM_FILE"
echo "rpm_file=$RPM_FILE" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "✅ RPM built: $RPM_FILE"
- name: Upload packages to artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@b7c566a772e6b6bfb58ed0dc250532a479d7789f # v6
with:
name: packages-${{ matrix.arch }}
path: |
*.deb
*.rpm
retention-days: 30
- name: Upload packages to Cloudflare R2
if: env.R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID != ''
env:
R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
R2_ENDPOINT: ${{ secrets.R2_ENDPOINT }}
R2_BUCKET: ${{ secrets.R2_BUCKET }}
AWS_EC2_METADATA_DISABLED: true
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [[ -z "$R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID" || -z "$R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY" || -z "$R2_ENDPOINT" || -z "$R2_BUCKET" ]]; then
echo "⚠️ R2 credentials missing, skipping upload"
exit 0
fi
if ! command -v aws >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y awscli
fi
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="$R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID"
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="$R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"
export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION="auto"
BUILD_TYPE="${{ needs.resolve.outputs.build_type }}"
if [[ "$BUILD_TYPE" == "development" ]]; then
R2_PREFIX="artifacts/rustfs/packages/dev"
else
R2_PREFIX="artifacts/rustfs/packages/release"
fi
R2_PATH="s3://${R2_BUCKET}/${R2_PREFIX}/"
echo "📤 Uploading to $R2_PATH"
DEB_FILE="${{ steps.deb.outputs.deb_file }}"
RPM_FILE="${{ steps.rpm.outputs.rpm_file }}"
for f in "$DEB_FILE" "$RPM_FILE"; do
if [[ -n "$f" && -f "$f" ]]; then
echo "Uploading: $f"
aws s3 cp "$f" "$R2_PATH" --endpoint-url "$R2_ENDPOINT" --only-show-errors
fi
done
echo "✅ Upload complete"
# Also upload as latest for release/prerelease
if [[ "$BUILD_TYPE" == "release" || "$BUILD_TYPE" == "prerelease" ]]; then
LATEST_PATH="s3://${R2_BUCKET}/artifacts/rustfs/packages/latest/"
for f in "$DEB_FILE" "$RPM_FILE"; do
if [[ -n "$f" && -f "$f" ]]; then
echo "Uploading latest: $(basename "$f")"
aws s3 cp "$f" "$LATEST_PATH" --endpoint-url "$R2_ENDPOINT" --only-show-errors
fi
done
echo "✅ Latest packages updated"
fi
# Summary
summary:
name: Summary
needs: [ resolve, package ]
if: always()
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
- name: Print summary
shell: bash
run: |
echo "## 📦 Package Summary" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "| Item | Value |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "|------|-------|" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "| Version | \`${{ needs.resolve.outputs.version }}\` |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "| Build Type | ${{ needs.resolve.outputs.build_type }} |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "| Build Run | #${{ needs.resolve.outputs.build_run_id }} |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "| Package Status | ${{ needs.package.result }} |" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
+14 -43
View File
@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@
# Two entry points, honestly scoped:
# * schedule (nightly, on main): post-merge detection — catches a regression
# within 24h of landing, not before merge.
# * pull_request labeled `perf-ab`: opt-in pre-merge gate for a specific PR.
# The `perf-deliberate-tradeoff` label runs the gate with --allow-regression so
# a deliberate correctness cost (e.g. the #4221 fsync durability fix) is
# recorded but does not block (rustfs/backlog#935 correction 1).
# * workflow_dispatch: an explicitly selected trusted ref.
# The dispatch input can run the gate with --allow-regression so a deliberate
# correctness cost (e.g. the #4221 fsync durability fix) is recorded, not
# blocked (rustfs/backlog#935 correction 1).
# DISABLED. This workflow is switched off in the repository's Actions settings
# (state: disabled_manually) and does not run on any trigger, including its cron
@@ -46,8 +46,6 @@ on:
required: false
default: false
type: boolean
pull_request:
types: [labeled, synchronize, reopened]
push:
# Every main commit pre-builds and caches its release binary (perf-3) so the
# nightly A/B restores a ready baseline instead of paying the double build.
@@ -55,14 +53,6 @@ on:
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
# Per-PR: a new push cancels the previous (up to 90-minute) A/B run instead of
# stacking them. Nightly schedule and manual dispatch get a unique group and
# always run to completion.
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.run_id }}
cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
@@ -70,8 +60,8 @@ env:
jobs:
# perf-3: on every push to main, build the release binary once and cache it
# keyed by commit SHA (rustfs-baseline-<sha>). The nightly A/B (and, later, the
# perf-7 PR gate) restore this instead of paying the ~32min-per-side source
# keyed by commit SHA (rustfs-baseline-<sha>). The warp-ab measurements
# restore this instead of paying the ~32min-per-side source
# build. That double build is what pushed the expanded 24-cell nightly past its
# ceiling — 2026-07-11..07-14 all cancelled on the 120min timeout. Incremental
# builds off the shared cargo cache keep each push cheap, and building on the
@@ -126,17 +116,11 @@ jobs:
warp-ab:
name: Warp A/B budget gate
# Always run on schedule / manual dispatch. Opt-in on PRs: only when the
# `perf-ab` label is present, and for `labeled` events only when the label
# being added is `perf-ab` itself (adding an unrelated label to an opted-in
# PR must not re-run the gate). Never on push — that event only feeds
# build-baseline-cache above.
# Always run on schedule / manual dispatch. Never on push — that event only
# feeds build-baseline-cache above.
if: >-
github.event_name == 'schedule' ||
github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' ||
(github.event_name == 'pull_request' &&
contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'perf-ab') &&
(github.event.action != 'labeled' || github.event.label.name == 'perf-ab'))
github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'
runs-on: sm-standard-2
# With perf-3's cached baseline binary the common (cache-hit) nightly is
# measurement-only and finishes well under 50min. This ceiling stays
@@ -174,10 +158,6 @@ jobs:
INPUT_ALLOW_REGRESSION: ${{ github.event.inputs.allow_regression }}
run: |
allow="false"
if [[ "${{ github.event_name }}" == "pull_request" ]] \
&& ${{ contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'perf-deliberate-tradeoff') }}; then
allow="true"
fi
if [[ "$INPUT_ALLOW_REGRESSION" == "true" ]]; then
allow="true"
fi
@@ -314,10 +294,10 @@ jobs:
echo "candidate binary: $cand_src"
if [[ "${{ steps.exempt.outputs.allow_regression }}" == "true" ]]; then
args+=(--allow-regression --exemption-reason "labeled perf-deliberate-tradeoff / dispatch override")
args+=(--allow-regression --exemption-reason "workflow dispatch override")
fi
# Do not let a gate FAIL abort the job here; capture status and surface
# it after the PR comment is posted.
# it after the step summary is written.
set +e
bash scripts/run_hotpath_warp_abba.sh "${args[@]}"
echo "status=$?" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
@@ -382,13 +362,6 @@ jobs:
fi
} >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
- name: Comment gate result on PR
if: always() && github.event_name == 'pull_request' && steps.ab.outputs.gate_md != ''
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
gh pr comment "${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}" --body-file "${{ steps.ab.outputs.gate_md }}"
# Scheduled failure alerting is handled by the alert-on-failure job below
# (perf-2 consuming ci-8's schedule-failure-issue composite action).
@@ -397,7 +370,7 @@ jobs:
run: |
status="${{ steps.ab.outputs.status }}"
if [[ "$status" != "0" ]]; then
echo "::error::warp A/B budget gate failed (exit $status). See the step summary / PR comment / gate.md artifact." >&2
echo "::error::warp A/B budget gate failed (exit $status). See the step summary / gate.md artifact." >&2
exit "$status"
fi
echo "warp A/B budget gate passed."
@@ -407,14 +380,12 @@ jobs:
needs: [warp-ab]
# `always()` is required: without it this job is skipped when a needed
# job fails. Alerts only for scheduled (nightly) runs (backlog#1149
# ci-8); PR and manual dispatch failures are already watched by a human.
# ci-8); manual dispatch failures are already watched by a human.
# `cancelled` is included alongside `failure` on purpose: a job that hits
# timeout-minutes ends as `cancelled`, and the 2026-07-11..07-14 nightly
# timeouts went silent precisely because the guard was failure-only. The
# composite action already reports cancelled/timed-out jobs in the issue
# body. (Scheduled runs get a unique concurrency group with
# cancel-in-progress off, so a cancellation here means a timeout/manual
# abort, never a superseding run.)
# body.
if: >-
always() && github.event_name == 'schedule' &&
(contains(needs.*.result, 'failure') || contains(needs.*.result, 'cancelled'))
+90
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
# Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
name: Windows Filesystem Tests
on:
push:
branches: [ main ]
paths:
- "crates/ecstore/src/disk/**"
- "crates/ecstore/src/store/init_format.rs"
- "crates/ecstore/Cargo.toml"
- "Cargo.toml"
- "Cargo.lock"
- ".github/actions/setup/**"
- ".github/workflows/windows-filesystem.yml"
pull_request:
branches: [ main ]
paths:
- "crates/ecstore/src/disk/**"
- "crates/ecstore/src/store/init_format.rs"
- "crates/ecstore/Cargo.toml"
- "Cargo.toml"
- "Cargo.lock"
- ".github/actions/setup/**"
- ".github/workflows/windows-filesystem.yml"
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
RUST_BACKTRACE: 1
jobs:
rename-safety:
name: Rename Safety
runs-on: windows-latest
timeout-minutes: 60
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: build-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
install-test-tools: 'false'
- name: Check production Windows dependencies
shell: pwsh
run: cargo check -p rustfs-ecstore --lib
- name: Test guarded rename publication
shell: pwsh
run: cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore --lib rename_all_ -- --nocapture
- name: Test Windows handle guards
shell: pwsh
run: cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore --lib windows_ -- --nocapture
- name: Test startup temporary-directory cleanup
shell: pwsh
run: cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore --lib cleanup_tmp_on_startup_ -- --nocapture
- name: Test fresh format publication
shell: pwsh
run: cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore --lib fresh_format_load_initializes_all_disks -- --nocapture
+4
View File
@@ -83,3 +83,7 @@ worktrees/*
# Local AI-agent review artifacts (omo evidence dumps)
.omo/
# insta scratch files; the accepted .snap files ARE the assertions and are committed
*.snap.new
*.pending-snap
+116
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
---
name: issue-triage
description: Triage a GitHub issue — determine if it is already fixed, needs implementation, or should be closed. Searches related commits and PRs, verifies implementation status, and posts a triage comment or closes the issue. Use when the user provides an issue URL and asks whether it can be closed or needs work.
---
# Issue Triage
Use this skill when the user provides a GitHub issue URL and asks "can this be closed?", "is this already implemented?", "check completion status", or similar triage questions.
## Workflow
### 1. Fetch issue context
```bash
gh issue view <N> --repo <owner/repo> --json title,body,state,comments,labels,updatedAt
```
Read the issue body to understand what was requested. Extract:
- The specific feature/fix/behavior described.
- Any linked PRs or commits mentioned in the body or comments.
- Any checklist items or sub-issues.
### 2. Search for related work
Search git history for commits referencing the issue:
```bash
git log --oneline --all --grep="<N>" | head -30
```
Search for related PRs:
```bash
gh pr list --search "fixes #<N> OR closes #<N> OR #<N>" --state all --json number,title,state,mergedAt
```
If the issue mentions specific PRs, check their status:
```bash
gh pr view <PR_N> --json state,mergedAt,title
```
### 3. Verify implementation
For each linked or related PR that is merged, verify the fix is actually present on the current main branch:
```bash
git log --oneline main | grep -i "<keyword>"
# or
git log --oneline main --grep="<PR_N>"
```
If the issue describes a specific defect, check the relevant code to confirm the fix is in place:
```bash
grep -n "<pattern>" crates/<relevant>/src/<file>.rs
```
For issues with checklists, verify each item individually. If sub-items are tracked as separate issues, check those too:
```bash
gh issue view <SUB_N> --repo <owner/repo> --json state
```
### 4. Determine verdict
- **All items fixed and merged**: Close with a summary comment listing what was fixed and which PRs.
- **Some items fixed, some remaining**: Comment with status of each item. Do not close.
- **Not yet implemented**: Comment with a summary of what remains. Do not close.
- **Superseded or no longer relevant**: Close with explanation.
### 5. Take action
Close with comment:
```bash
gh issue close <N> --repo <owner/repo> --comment "<body>"
```
Comment without closing:
```bash
gh issue comment <N> --repo <owner/repo> --body-file /tmp/triage.md
```
Update issue labels if needed:
```bash
gh issue edit <N> --repo <owner/repo> --add-label "completed" --remove-label "needs-triage"
```
Always use `--body-file` for multiline content, never inline `--body`.
### 6. Handle multi-issue batches
When the user asks to check multiple issues (e.g., "check all issues by user X" or "scan backlog for closable issues"):
1. List the issues: `gh issue list --repo <repo> --author <user> --state open --json number,title,updatedAt`
2. For each issue, run steps 1-5 above.
3. Report a summary table of all triaged issues with verdicts.
## Output format
### Issue Triage: #<N> — <title>
**State**: OPEN / CLOSED
**Linked PRs**: <list with merge status>
#### Assessment
<what was requested vs what is implemented>
#### Verdict
- Close — all items resolved by <PR list>
- Keep open — <remaining items>
- Not started — <what needs to be done>
#### Action taken
- Closed with comment / Commented / No action
## Notes
- The user may ask in Chinese ("是否可以关闭", "检查完成情况"); respond in the same language.
- When closing, always include a summary of what was fixed and which PRs resolved it — this creates a useful audit trail.
- For issues in `rustfs/backlog`, use `--repo rustfs/backlog`.
- For issues in `rustfs/rustfs`, use `--repo rustfs/rustfs`.
- If the issue has sub-issues (GitHub sub-issues API), check each one's state before declaring the parent complete.
+147
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
---
name: pr-review
description: Review a GitHub PR end-to-end from a URL or number — fetch metadata, inspect the diff, run multi-role adversarial review, check CI status, and post the review comment. Use when the user provides a PR link and asks to review it.
---
# PR Review
Use this skill when the user provides a GitHub PR URL or number and asks to review it. This covers the full review lifecycle: data gathering, code review, CI verification, and posting the result.
## Prerequisites
- Read `AGENTS.md` for the repository's adversarial validation policy and change-style rules.
- The `adversarial-validation` skill handles the review role playbooks; this skill orchestrates the workflow around it.
## Workflow
### 1. Gather PR context
```bash
gh pr view <N> --json title,author,state,body,additions,deletions,changedFiles,commits,baseRefName,headRefName
gh pr diff <N> --name-only
```
Read the PR body and linked issues to understand the change's purpose. If the PR references an issue, fetch that too:
```bash
gh issue view <ISSUE> --json title,body,state
```
### 2. Fetch the diff and classify the change
```bash
git fetch origin pull/<N>/head:pr-<N>
git diff main...pr-<N> --stat
```
Classify the change by risk tier (per AGENTS.md):
- **Exempt**: docs/comments/instruction-only, formatting, typos.
- **Mechanical**: renames, file moves, test-only or tooling changes.
- **Standard** (default): any behavior change.
- **High risk**: locking, erasure coding, quorum/heal, replication, multipart, RPC, lifecycle/tiering, metadata formats, persistence/fsync, IAM/KMS/auth, on-disk/on-wire formats, S3 API-visible behavior.
### 3. Cluster changed files and delegate review
Group the changed files into logical clusters (by crate or functional area). For each cluster, spawn a subagent with a focused review prompt that includes:
- The cluster's changed files and their diffs.
- The applicable adversarial role probes (from the `adversarial-validation` skill).
- The repository's AGENTS.md rules relevant to that domain.
For standard-tier changes: correctness adversary + simplicity adversary + test-coverage skeptic, plus every role whose domain the diff touches.
For high-risk changes: run all seven roles.
Each subagent must produce findings (concrete failure scenario with file:line) or a null report ("attacked X, Y, Z — no break found").
### 4. Check CI status
```bash
gh pr checks <N>
```
If any checks fail, investigate:
```bash
gh run view --log-failed --job=<JOB_ID>
```
Determine whether failures are pre-existing (on main), flaky, or caused by the PR.
### 5. Synthesize findings
Combine all subagent findings into a structured review:
- **Summary**: one-paragraph overview of the change and overall assessment.
- **Findings**: each finding with severity (critical/major/minor/nit), file:line, concrete failure scenario, and suggested fix.
- **CI status**: pass/fail with notes on any failures.
- **Verdict**: APPROVE, REQUEST_CHANGES, or COMMENT.
### 6. Post the review
Write the review body to a temp file and post via CLI:
```bash
# Request changes
gh pr review <N> --request-changes --body-file /tmp/pr_review.md
# Approve
gh pr review <N> --approve --body-file /tmp/pr_review.md
# Comment only (no verdict)
gh pr review <N> --comment --body-file /tmp/pr_review.md
```
For inline comments on specific lines, use the GitHub API:
```bash
cat > /tmp/pr_review.json <<'EOF'
{
"body": "review body",
"event": "REQUEST_CHANGES",
"comments": [
{
"path": "crates/foo/src/bar.rs",
"line": 42,
"body": "finding description"
}
]
}
EOF
gh api --method POST /repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/<N>/reviews --input /tmp/pr_review.json
```
Always use `--body-file` or `--input`, never inline multiline `--body`.
### 7. Handle follow-up
If the review requests changes:
- Monitor for new commits: `gh pr view <N> --json commits`
- Re-review changed files only: `git diff pr-<N>..origin/pull/<N>/head`
- Update the review when findings are addressed.
If CI was failing due to pre-existing main breakage:
- Comment on the PR noting the failure is pre-existing.
- Suggest updating the branch: `gh pr update-branch <N>`
## Output format
### PR Review: #<N> — <title>
**Author**: <author>
**Risk tier**: exempt | mechanical | standard | high-risk
**Changed files**: <count> across <cluster count> clusters
#### Summary
<one-paragraph overview>
#### Findings
| Severity | Location | Finding |
|----------|----------|---------|
| critical | file:line | concrete failure scenario |
#### CI Status
- All checks pass / Failing: <details>
#### Verdict
APPROVE / REQUEST_CHANGES / COMMENT
## Notes
- The user may ask for review in Chinese; respond in the same language but keep the review body in English per AGENTS.md rules.
- When the user asks for "多角色对抗 review", run the full adversarial validation protocol — this skill's step 3 covers that.
- If the PR is from a fork, check `maintainerCanModify` before attempting to push fixes.
- For very large PRs (>50 files), cluster aggressively and delegate in parallel to keep review time reasonable.
+46 -15
View File
@@ -51,26 +51,25 @@ If repo-level instructions conflict, follow the nearest file and keep behavior a
## Change Style for Existing Logic
- Prefer direct, local code over extracting one-off helpers.
- Extract a helper only when logic is reused or the extraction materially clarifies a non-trivial flow.
- Start with the smallest direct, local edit. Add production files, types, traits, helpers, wrappers, or abstraction layers only when current behavior requires them. Extraction must remove present duplication, enforce a real boundary, or materially clarify a non-trivial flow; anticipated reuse is not enough.
- Use Rust's default module file layout (`mod foo;` with `foo.rs` or `foo/mod.rs`/`foo/*.rs`).
Avoid `#[path = "..."]` for module inclusion; move files into the canonical module tree instead.
If an unavoidable generated-code, FFI, or test-fixture exception remains, keep it local and document why the canonical layout cannot work.
- Solve only the requested problem; do not add speculative features, configurability, or adjacent improvements.
- Prefer editing existing code over rewriting files or reshaping unrelated logic.
- Modify only what is required and remove only artifacts introduced by your own changes.
- Modify only what is required. Remove any in-scope path or representation superseded by the change. If compatibility or rollback requires retention, adapt at the boundary to one canonical core and follow the repository's `RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO` removal policy; never delete unrelated code merely to improve addition/deletion statistics.
- Preserve the existing control-flow and logic shape when fixing bugs or addressing review comments, especially in init, distributed coordination, locking, metadata, and concurrency paths.
- Do not refactor existing code only to make it easier to unit test.
- Keep fixes narrowly aligned with the requested behavior; avoid semantic-adjacent rewrites while touching sensitive paths.
- Keep code elegant, concise, and direct. Prefer minimal, readable implementations over over-engineering and excessive abstraction. Use comments to clarify non-obvious intent and invariants, not to compensate for unclear code.
- Do not write comments that narrate what the next line does, restate a signature, or describe the change you just made — that commentary belongs in the PR description, not the code. Required invariant comments — lock ordering, `SAFETY`, unwrap justification, `#[allow(dead_code)]` rationale, `RUSTFS_COMPAT_TODO` — are never narration.
- Keep code elegant, concise, and direct. Prefer the smallest readable design and existing abstractions over parallel managers, factories, adapters, or wrappers added only to make the design look extensible.
- Comments state non-obvious reasons, assumptions, and invariants in the shortest complete form. Their length follows the invariant's complexity: `SAFETY`, lock ordering, durability, and compatibility contracts may need a short list of conditions. Never narrate the next line, restate a signature, or record change history; move durable design rationale to architecture or operations documentation.
- Mention unrelated issues when useful, but do not fix them as part of a narrow task.
## Reuse Before You Write
Search for an existing implementation before writing a new one; extend what exists instead of duplicating it:
- **Helpers and utilities** (path/string handling, hashing, retry, env parsing, IO wrappers): check `ls crates/utils/src` first — file names map to operations (`retry.rs`, `envs.rs`, `hash.rs`, `path.rs`, `string.rs`, `io.rs`) — plus `crates/common` (shared structures/globals), then `rg -i 'fn \w*<term>' crates/utils/src crates/common/src <touched-crate>/src` for signatures. Helpers are snake_case: a full-text single-word grep over a large crate drowns you and a multi-word phrase returns nothing. Reimplementing an existing workspace helper — or hand-rolling what `std`, `tokio`, or an existing workspace dependency already provides — is a review finding, not a style preference.
- **Helpers and utilities** (path/string handling, hashing, retry, env parsing, IO wrappers): check `crates/utils`, `crates/common`, the touched crate, the likely domain-owning crate, and relevant direct workspace dependencies from `Cargo.toml`. Search snake_case signatures with a focused term. Reimplementing an existing workspace helper — or hand-rolling what `std`, `tokio`, or an existing dependency already provides — is a review finding, not a style preference.
- **Reuse requires matching semantics, not a matching name**: before adopting a helper, check its normalization (`clean` resolves `.`/`..` — never apply it to raw S3 object keys), error type, backoff/deadline behavior, and durability gating against the call site. When semantics differ, a new narrowly-named helper with a comment naming the rejected lookalike is the correct outcome. The inverse also holds: workspace wrappers exist because raw `std`/`tokio` semantics were insufficient (durability gates, retries) — prefer the wrapper over the raw call.
- **Constants and fixed tokens** (protocol labels, error identifiers, header keys, event names, metric names, command tags): search for existing constants/enums that already represent the same semantic value and reuse them. If a value is truly new, define one local constant near related logic; never scatter the literal across sites. When changing existing behavior, align naming and format with the established constants.
- **Test scaffolding**: reuse existing test utilities and fixtures (the touched crate's own `test_util` module and `tests/fixtures`, or `crates/test-utils`) instead of writing new setup code — run `rg -l '<fn-under-test>' <crate>/src <crate>/tests` before writing a test. A new test must pin a failure mode no existing test covers. Near-duplicate means same code path AND same poison-value class: this repo's boundary companions (n==max vs max+1, absent vs empty vs nil UUID bytes, MetaObject vs MetaDeleteMarker) are distinct by definition and must all be written.
@@ -79,6 +78,7 @@ Search for an existing implementation before writing a new one; extend what exis
Net-new code — files, types, branches, comments — is cost to justify, not progress:
- Inspect production-code additions separately. Tests, fixtures, generated code, and documentation do not count as production-code growth. Line counts are signals, not quotas: new production structures must map to a current requirement, and a blocker requires a concrete smaller design that preserves correctness, compatibility, readability, and real boundaries.
- Validate at the trust boundary — untrusted client input, bytes read from disk, RPC payloads, config (see Serde Safety and Cross-Cutting Domain Invariants) — then trust the type: do not re-check what the type system or a validated upstream layer already guarantees, and cite the establishing check (`file:line`) when the guarantee is not obvious.
- The exception is load-bearing: a value that crossed a persistence, RPC, or version boundary is never guaranteed by the code on the other side — a peer may be older or buggy, disk bytes may be corrupt — so the Cross-Cutting Domain Invariant patterns apply at every consumer, and re-checks immediately before a destructive action (delete, overwrite, quorum decision) stay. Deleting an existing guard is a behavior change requiring adversarial review, not cleanup.
- Every new branch needs a nameable trigger: a concrete input, state, or failure that reaches it — for boundary-crossing values, corrupt or stale persisted/peer data is always nameable. If you cannot name one, do not write the branch. If the case is truly unreachable, encode the invariant in the type; where that is impossible, return a typed internal error (fail closed). `debug_assert!` is acceptable only for pure internal arithmetic on values that never crossed a disk/RPC/config boundary — never as the sole guard on decoded or peer-supplied data.
@@ -218,9 +218,10 @@ not to bless it.
Pick the tier from the riskiest file touched; when in doubt, pick the higher.
- **Exempt:** docs/comments/instruction-only changes, formatting, typos with
no runtime surface. Skip this section.
- **Mechanical:** pure renames, file moves, test-only or tooling changes
- **Exempt:** docs/comments, formatting, and typos that cannot affect runtime,
builds, tests, or agent execution. Skip this section.
- **Mechanical:** pure renames, file moves, test-only or tooling changes, and
agent-instruction changes that alter execution —
correctness and simplicity adversaries only.
- **Standard (the default):** any change that affects behavior.
- **High risk:** touches locking, erasure coding, quorum/heal, replication,
@@ -242,7 +243,7 @@ encode this repo's shipped bugs.
- **Correctness adversary** — construct a concrete input/state/interleaving
that yields wrong output, data loss, or a crash. Probe error paths and edge
values (empty, nil UUID, zero-length, quorum1, missing version).
- **Simplicity adversary** — same behavior, less code. Hunt the materially smaller or more idiomatic diff (see Change Style for Existing Logic, Reuse Before You Write, and Necessary Code Only): reimplemented workspace helpers, one-caller extractions, rewrites where an in-place edit suffices, defensive branches with no nameable trigger, redundant error wrapping, near-duplicate tests, narration comments. A smaller diff achieving identical behavior is a finding, reported with the concrete replacement; forced reuse of a helper with mismatched semantics is equally a finding.
- **Simplicity adversary** — same behavior, less code. Hunt reimplemented helpers, rewrites where an in-place edit suffices, speculative abstractions, defensive branches with no nameable trigger, redundant error wrapping, near-duplicate tests, and narration comments. A one-caller helper is a finding only when it merely forwards or splits a short linear flow without adding domain naming, boundary isolation, an invariant, or useful error context. Report a concrete smaller replacement; fewer lines alone are not evidence.
- **Security reviewer** — authn/authz bypass, injection, secret leakage,
untrusted deserialization (see Serde Safety), path traversal, timing leaks.
- **Concurrency/durability reviewer** — lock ordering, races, cancellation,
@@ -253,10 +254,11 @@ encode this repo's shipped bugs.
time across IO, sync or CPU-heavy work on async runtime threads, added
fsync/flush outside the durability gate, hot-path logging noise. A
measurable regression on a per-request or per-object path is a finding.
- **Test-coverage skeptic** — for each claimed behavior, name the test that
fails if the change is reverted; then name a changed line that could be
wrong while all tests stay green — if one exists, coverage is insufficient.
A missing test is a finding, not a note.
- **Test-coverage skeptic** — for each testable behavior claim, name the test
or executable check that detects a revert; then name a changed line that
could be wrong while all checks stay green. If a focused check is not
reasonable, require the reason and residual risk from the validation floor.
Test additions have no line-count or growth budget.
Standard tier: correctness adversary + simplicity adversary + test-coverage
skeptic, plus every role whose domain the diff touches (async or
@@ -282,7 +284,9 @@ High risk: all seven roles.
- Every applicable role has run; every finding is fixed or rebutted with
evidence.
- Every behavior change has a test that fails without it.
- Every testable behavior change has a focused regression check. Exceptions
follow the validation floor and state why a check is impractical and what
risk remains.
- The Verification Before PR gates pass — adversarial review supplements
those gates, never replaces them.
- High risk only: record a one-line verdict per role in the PR description.
@@ -322,6 +326,28 @@ High risk: all seven roles.
- Use environment variables or vault tooling for sensitive configuration.
- For localhost-sensitive tests, verify proxy settings to avoid traffic leakage.
## Logging
Applies to **every** `tracing` macro you add or edit, including a single line
added in passing while fixing something else — not only to log-focused changes.
- Fields first, message second: `event`, `component`, `subsystem`,
`result`/`state`, then key context. The message is a short label, not a
sentence with values interpolated into it.
- Reuse the existing `EVENT_*` / `LOG_COMPONENT_*` / `LOG_SUBSYSTEM_*`
constants of the module you are editing; match the shape of the log sites
already in that file rather than introducing a second style next to them.
- Level policy: `error` for behavior/security-affecting failures, `warn` for
degraded or fallback paths, `info` for low-frequency lifecycle, `debug` for
targeted diagnostics, `trace` for hot paths. Per-object and per-request
success paths are `trace`.
- Never log secrets, tokens, credential payloads, or merged config dumps.
- `scripts/check_logging_guardrails.sh` enforces a subset of this on the files
it lists; passing it is a floor, not evidence the log matches the house style.
See `.agents/skills/rustfs-logging-governance/SKILL.md` for the full event
model, level policy, and guardrail-update checklist.
## Tools
### xl.meta decode tool Quick Use
@@ -347,6 +373,11 @@ cargo run -p rustfs-filemeta --example dump_fileinfo -- "/path/to/file/xl.meta"
absent, empty, and nil all mean "no value", never `Uuid::nil()`.
- A remote-tier version of `None`/`""` means the tier bucket is unversioned:
send **no** `versionId` on tier GET/DELETE.
- Structs persisted in the scanner data-usage cache (`DataUsageCacheInfo`,
`DataUsageEntry`) carry a hand-written map-encoded `Serialize`. MessagePack
encodes derived structs as arrays, where an appended field makes the whole
cache a decode error for older readers — keep new fields `#[serde(default)]`
and keep the map encoding rather than reverting to `derive(Serialize)`.
## Naming Conventions
Generated
+404 -378
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+62 -63
View File
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ edition = "2024"
license = "Apache-2.0"
repository = "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs"
rust-version = "1.97.1"
version = "1.0.0-beta.12"
version = "1.0.0-rc.1"
homepage = "https://rustfs.com"
description = "RustFS is a high-performance distributed object storage software built using Rust, one of the most popular languages worldwide. "
keywords = ["RustFS", "Minio", "object-storage", "filesystem", "s3"]
@@ -86,52 +86,52 @@ redundant_clone = "warn"
[workspace.dependencies]
# RustFS Internal Crates
rustfs = { path = "./rustfs", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-heal = { path = "crates/heal", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-audit = { path = "crates/audit", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-checksums = { path = "crates/checksums", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-common = { path = "crates/common", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-data-usage = { path = "crates/data-usage", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-config = { path = "./crates/config", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-concurrency = { path = "./crates/concurrency", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-credentials = { path = "crates/credentials", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-crypto = { path = "crates/crypto", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-ecstore = { path = "crates/ecstore", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-filemeta = { path = "crates/filemeta", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-iam = { path = "crates/iam", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-keystone = { path = "crates/keystone", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-lifecycle = { path = "crates/lifecycle", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-kms = { path = "crates/kms", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-lock = { path = "crates/lock", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-madmin = { path = "crates/madmin", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-notify = { path = "crates/notify", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-io-metrics = { path = "crates/io-metrics", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-io-core = { path = "crates/io-core", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-object-capacity = { path = "crates/object-capacity", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-object-data-cache = { path = "crates/object-data-cache", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-log-analyzer = { path = "crates/log-analyzer", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-obs = { path = "crates/obs", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-policy = { path = "crates/policy", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-protos = { path = "crates/protos", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-protocols = { path = "crates/protocols", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-replication = { path = "crates/replication", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-rio = { path = "crates/rio", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-rio-v2 = { path = "crates/rio-v2", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-s3-types = { path = "crates/s3-types", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-s3-ops = { path = "crates/s3-ops", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-s3select-api = { path = "crates/s3select-api", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-s3select-query = { path = "crates/s3select-query", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-scanner = { path = "crates/scanner", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-security-governance = { path = "crates/security-governance", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-extension-schema = { path = "crates/extension-schema", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-signer = { path = "crates/signer", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-storage-api = { path = "crates/storage-api", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-trusted-proxies = { path = "crates/trusted-proxies", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-targets = { path = "crates/targets", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-test-utils = { path = "crates/test-utils", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-tls-runtime = { path = "crates/tls-runtime", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-utils = { path = "crates/utils", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs-zip = { path = "./crates/zip", version = "1.0.0-beta.12" }
rustfs = { path = "./rustfs", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-heal = { path = "crates/heal", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-audit = { path = "crates/audit", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-checksums = { path = "crates/checksums", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-common = { path = "crates/common", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-data-usage = { path = "crates/data-usage", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-config = { path = "./crates/config", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-concurrency = { path = "./crates/concurrency", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-credentials = { path = "crates/credentials", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-crypto = { path = "crates/crypto", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-ecstore = { path = "crates/ecstore", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-filemeta = { path = "crates/filemeta", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-iam = { path = "crates/iam", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-keystone = { path = "crates/keystone", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-lifecycle = { path = "crates/lifecycle", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-kms = { path = "crates/kms", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-lock = { path = "crates/lock", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-madmin = { path = "crates/madmin", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-notify = { path = "crates/notify", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-io-metrics = { path = "crates/io-metrics", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-io-core = { path = "crates/io-core", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-object-capacity = { path = "crates/object-capacity", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-object-data-cache = { path = "crates/object-data-cache", version = "1.0.0-rc.1", default-features = false }
rustfs-log-analyzer = { path = "crates/log-analyzer", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-obs = { path = "crates/obs", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-policy = { path = "crates/policy", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-protos = { path = "crates/protos", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-protocols = { path = "crates/protocols", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-replication = { path = "crates/replication", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-rio = { path = "crates/rio", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-rio-v2 = { path = "crates/rio-v2", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-s3-types = { path = "crates/s3-types", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-s3-ops = { path = "crates/s3-ops", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-s3select-api = { path = "crates/s3select-api", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-s3select-query = { path = "crates/s3select-query", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-scanner = { path = "crates/scanner", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-security-governance = { path = "crates/security-governance", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-extension-schema = { path = "crates/extension-schema", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-signer = { path = "crates/signer", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-storage-api = { path = "crates/storage-api", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-trusted-proxies = { path = "crates/trusted-proxies", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-targets = { path = "crates/targets", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-test-utils = { path = "crates/test-utils", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-tls-runtime = { path = "crates/tls-runtime", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-utils = { path = "crates/utils", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
rustfs-zip = { path = "./crates/zip", version = "1.0.0-rc.1" }
# Async Runtime and Networking
async-channel = "2.5.0"
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ async_zip = { default-features = false, version = "0.0.18" }
mysql_async = { default-features = false, version = "0.37" }
async-compression = { version = "0.4.43" }
async-recursion = "1.1.1"
async-trait = "0.1.91"
async-trait = "0.1.92"
async-nats = { version = "0.50.0", default-features = false }
axum = "0.8.9"
futures = "0.3.33"
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ tower-http = { version = "0.7.0" }
# Serialization and Data Formats
apache-avro = "0.21.0"
bytes = { version = "1.12.1" }
bytesize = "2.6.0"
bytesize = "2.7.0"
byteorder = "1.5.0"
flatbuffers = "25.12.19"
form_urlencoded = "1.2.2"
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ zeroize = { version = "1.9.0" }
chrono = { version = "0.4.45" }
humantime = "2.4.0"
jiff = { version = "0.2.35" }
time = { version = "0.3.54" }
time = { version = "0.3.55" }
# Database
deadpool-postgres = { version = "0.14" }
@@ -228,15 +228,15 @@ atomic_enum = "0.3.0"
aws-config = { version = "1.10.1" }
aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.0" }
aws-sdk-kms = { default-features = false, version = "1.114.0" }
aws-sdk-s3 = { default-features = false, version = "1.140.0" }
aws-sdk-s3 = { default-features = false, version = "1.141.0" }
aws-sdk-sts = { default-features = false, version = "1.110.0" }
aws-smithy-http-client = { default-features = false, version = "1.2.0" }
aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.14.0" }
aws-smithy-types = { version = "1.6.1" }
base64 = "0.23.0"
base64 = "0.23.1"
base64-simd = "0.8.0"
brotli = "8.0.4"
clap = { version = "4.6.5" }
clap = { version = "4.6.6" }
const-str = { version = "1.1.0" }
convert_case = "0.11.0"
criterion = { version = "0.8" }
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ crossbeam-queue = "0.3.13"
crossbeam-channel = "0.5.16"
crossbeam-deque = "0.8.7"
crossbeam-utils = "0.8.22"
datafusion = { default-features = false, git = "https://github.com/apache/datafusion.git", rev = "dae03ee062b2abf986de8df12ea82fb1578a2d99" }
datafusion = { default-features = false, git = "https://github.com/apache/datafusion.git", rev = "e08aed1e5de41dcf81d529140dae07723b942a5e" }
#datafusion = { default-features = false, version = "54.1.0" }
derive_builder = "0.20.2"
enumset = "1.1.14"
@@ -274,12 +274,11 @@ num_cpus = { version = "1.17.0" }
nvml-wrapper = "0.12.1"
parking_lot = "0.12.5"
path-absolutize = "4.0.1"
path-clean = "1.0.1"
percent-encoding = "2.3.2"
pin-project-lite = "0.2.17"
pretty_assertions = "1.4.1"
rand = { version = "0.10.2" }
ratelimit = "0.10.1"
ratelimit = "2.0.0"
rayon = "1.12.0"
reed-solomon-erasure = { package = "rustfs-erasure-codec", version = "8.0.2" }
reed-solomon-simd = "3.1.0"
@@ -290,7 +289,7 @@ rustify = { version = "0.7", default-features = false }
rustix = { version = "1.1.4" }
rust-embed = { version = "8.12.0" }
rustc-hash = { version = "2.1.3" }
s3s = { git = "https://github.com/cxymds/s3s.git", rev = "fe3941d91fa1c69956f209a9145995c9f0235bff" }
s3s = { git = "https://github.com/rustfs/s3s.git", rev = "d7028511a53f69d41ed3c69f36899f9b1aede647" }
serial_test = "4.0.1"
shadow-rs = { default-features = false, version = "2.0.0" }
siphasher = "1.0.3"
@@ -303,7 +302,7 @@ sysinfo = "0.39.6"
temp-env = "0.3.6"
tempfile = "3.27.0"
test-case = "3.3.1"
thiserror = "2.0.19"
thiserror = "2.0.20"
tracing = { version = "0.1.44" }
tracing-appender = "0.2.5"
tracing-core = "0.1.36"
@@ -342,20 +341,20 @@ unftp-core = "0.1.0"
suppaftp = { version = "10.0.1" }
rcgen = { version = "0.14.8", default-features = false, features = ["aws_lc_rs", "crypto", "pem"] }
russh = { version = "0.62.5" }
russh-sftp = "2.3.0"
russh-sftp = "2.4.0"
# WebDAV
dav-server = "0.11.0"
# Performance Analysis and Memory Profiling
mimalloc = { version = "0.1.52", git = "https://github.com/xonatius/mimalloc_rust.git", rev = "1cdadea43e9c5a0f054b65be21200ce580e4eb13" }
libmimalloc-sys = { version = "0.1.49", git = "https://github.com/xonatius/mimalloc_rust.git", rev = "1cdadea43e9c5a0f054b65be21200ce580e4eb13", features = ["extended"] }
hotpath = { version = "0.22.0", default-features = false }
mimalloc = { version = "0.1.52", git = "https://github.com/xonatius/mimalloc_rust.git", rev = "ce6338661179c8be22e516b00af7483f151485a7" }
libmimalloc-sys = { version = "0.1.49", git = "https://github.com/xonatius/mimalloc_rust.git", rev = "ce6338661179c8be22e516b00af7483f151485a7", features = ["extended"] }
hotpath = { version = "0.23.1", default-features = false }
# Snapshot testing for output format regression detection
insta = { version = "1.48" }
[workspace.metadata.cargo-shear]
ignored = ["rustfs"]
ignored = ["hotpath", "rustfs"]
[profile.dev]
# Full debuginfo roughly doubles compile+link time and produces multi-GB
+6 -1
View File
@@ -91,7 +91,12 @@ LABEL name="RustFS" \
# Upgrade base-image packages so published images pick up security fixes
# (e.g. openssl/libssl3 CVEs) without waiting for a new Alpine point release.
RUN apk upgrade --no-cache && \
apk add --no-cache ca-certificates coreutils curl
apk add --no-cache \
ca-certificates \
coreutils \
curl \
tzdata \
&& test "$(TZ=Asia/Kolkata date +%z)" = "+0530"
COPY --from=build /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/
COPY --from=build /build/rustfs /usr/bin/rustfs
+3 -1
View File
@@ -96,9 +96,11 @@ LABEL name="RustFS" \
# Upgrade base-image packages so published images pick up security fixes
# (e.g. tar/gzip/perl CVEs) without waiting for a new Ubuntu point release.
RUN apt-get update && apt-get upgrade -y \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
&& DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
ca-certificates \
curl \
tzdata \
&& test "$(TZ=Asia/Kolkata date +%z)" = "+0530" \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
COPY --from=build /build/rustfs /usr/bin/rustfs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ chown -R 10001:10001 data logs
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:latest
# Using specific version
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-beta.12
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-rc.1
```
If you use [podman](https://github.com/containers/podman) instead of docker, you can install the RustFS with the below command
+1 -1
View File
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ chown -R 10001:10001 data logs
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:latest
# 使用指定版本运行
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-beta.12
docker run -d -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 -v $(pwd)/data:/data -v $(pwd)/logs:/logs rustfs/rustfs:1.0.0-rc.1
```
如果您通过绑定挂载启用 TLS 证书目录,也请用同样方式准备该目录:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ hotpath.workspace = true
rustfs-targets = { workspace = true }
rustfs-config = { workspace = true, features = ["audit", "server-config-model"] }
rustfs-s3-types = { workspace = true }
chrono = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
const-str = { workspace = true, features = ["std", "proc"] }
futures = { workspace = true }
hashbrown = { workspace = true, features = ["serde", "rayon"] }
jiff = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
metrics = { workspace = true }
serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = { workspace = true, features = ["raw_value"] }
+24 -5
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use hashbrown::HashMap;
use jiff::Timestamp;
use rustfs_s3_types::EventName;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use serde_json::Value;
@@ -151,8 +151,8 @@ pub struct AuditEntry {
pub deployment_id: Option<String>,
#[serde(rename = "siteName", skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub site_name: Option<String>,
#[serde(with = "chrono::serde::ts_milliseconds")]
pub time: DateTime<Utc>,
#[serde(with = "jiff::fmt::serde::timestamp::millisecond::required")]
pub time: Timestamp,
pub event: EventName,
#[serde(rename = "type", skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub entry_type: Option<String>,
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ impl AuditEntryBuilder {
pub fn new(version: impl Into<String>, event: EventName, trigger: impl Into<String>, api: ApiDetails) -> Self {
Self(AuditEntry {
version: version.into(),
time: Utc::now(),
time: Timestamp::now(),
event,
trigger: trigger.into(),
api,
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ impl AuditEntryBuilder {
self
}
pub fn time(mut self, time: DateTime<Utc>) -> Self {
pub fn time(mut self, time: Timestamp) -> Self {
self.0.time = time;
self
}
@@ -342,4 +342,23 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(value["requestID"], Value::String("req-audit-123".to_string()));
assert!(value.get("request_id").is_none(), "historical audit contract must not expose request_id");
}
#[test]
fn audit_entry_time_serializes_as_epoch_milliseconds() {
let entry = AuditEntryBuilder::new(
"1",
EventName::ObjectCreatedPut,
"s3",
ApiDetailsBuilder::new()
.name("PutObject")
.status("OK")
.status_code(200)
.build(),
)
.time(Timestamp::from_millisecond(1_711_423_698_870).expect("timestamp should be valid"))
.build();
let value = serde_json::to_value(entry).expect("audit entry should serialize");
assert_eq!(value["time"], Value::Number(1_711_423_698_870_i64.into()));
}
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ async fn test_audit_log_dispatch_performance() {
return; // Alternatively: assert!(false, "AuditSystem failed to start");
}
use chrono::Utc;
use jiff::Timestamp;
use rustfs_targets::EventName;
use serde_json::json;
use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ async fn test_audit_log_dispatch_performance() {
version: "1".to_string(),
deployment_id: Some(format!("test-deployment-{id}")),
site_name: Some("test-site".to_string()),
time: Utc::now(),
time: Timestamp::now(),
event: EventName::ObjectCreatedPut,
entry_type: Some("object".to_string()),
trigger: "api".to_string(),
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ fn test_performance_requirements() {
for i in 0..3000 {
// Simulate event name parsing and processing
let _event_id = format!("s3:ObjectCreated:Put_{i}");
let _timestamp = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
let _timestamp = jiff::Timestamp::now().to_string();
// Simulate basic audit entry creation overhead
let _entry_size = 512; // bytes
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ fn create_sample_audit_entry() -> AuditEntry {
}
fn create_sample_audit_entry_with_id(id: u32) -> AuditEntry {
use chrono::Utc;
use jiff::Timestamp;
use rustfs_targets::EventName;
use serde_json::json;
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ fn create_sample_audit_entry_with_id(id: u32) -> AuditEntry {
version: "1".to_string(),
deployment_id: Some(format!("test-deployment-{id}")),
site_name: Some("test-site".to_string()),
time: Utc::now(),
time: Timestamp::now(),
event: EventName::ObjectCreatedPut,
entry_type: Some("object".to_string()),
trigger: "api".to_string(),
+4
View File
@@ -39,11 +39,15 @@ tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["fs", "rt-multi-thread"] }
tonic = { workspace = true, features = ["gzip", "deflate"] }
uuid = { workspace = true, features = ["v4", "fast-rng", "macro-diagnostics"] }
chrono = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
jiff = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
metrics = { workspace = true }
serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
rmp-serde = { workspace = true }
s3s = { workspace = true, features = ["minio"] }
tracing = { workspace = true }
[dev-dependencies]
serde_json = { workspace = true }
[lib]
doctest = false
+4
View File
@@ -356,6 +356,8 @@ pub struct HealChannelRequest {
pub recursive: Option<bool>,
/// Whether to dry run
pub dry_run: Option<bool>,
/// Whether to skip namespace locking
pub no_lock: Option<bool>,
/// Timeout in seconds (optional)
pub timeout_seconds: Option<u64>,
/// Origin of the request for operational status and queue accounting
@@ -560,6 +562,7 @@ pub fn create_heal_request(
update_parity: None,
recursive: None,
dry_run: None,
no_lock: None,
timeout_seconds: None,
source: HealRequestSource::Internal,
disk: None,
@@ -718,6 +721,7 @@ pub async fn send_heal_disk(set_disk_id: String, priority: Option<HealChannelPri
update_parity: None,
recursive: None,
dry_run: None,
no_lock: None,
timeout_seconds: None,
source: HealRequestSource::AutoHeal,
};
+438 -30
View File
@@ -15,9 +15,10 @@
use crate::heal_channel::HealScanMode;
use crate::last_minute::{AccElem, LastMinuteLatency};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use jiff::Timestamp;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::{
collections::HashMap,
collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap},
fmt::Display,
future::Future,
pin::Pin,
@@ -669,7 +670,7 @@ impl LockedLastMinuteLatency {
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
struct CurrentPathState {
path: String,
updated_at: DateTime<Utc>,
updated_at: Timestamp,
}
struct CurrentPathTracker {
@@ -678,10 +679,10 @@ struct CurrentPathTracker {
impl CurrentPathTracker {
fn new(initial_path: String) -> Self {
Self::new_at(initial_path, Utc::now())
Self::new_at(initial_path, Timestamp::now())
}
fn new_at(initial_path: String, updated_at: DateTime<Utc>) -> Self {
fn new_at(initial_path: String, updated_at: Timestamp) -> Self {
Self {
state: Arc::new(RwLock::new(CurrentPathState {
path: initial_path,
@@ -693,7 +694,7 @@ impl CurrentPathTracker {
async fn update_path(&self, path: String) {
let mut state = self.state.write().await;
state.path = path;
state.updated_at = Utc::now();
state.updated_at = Timestamp::now();
}
async fn get_state(&self) -> CurrentPathState {
@@ -701,6 +702,36 @@ impl CurrentPathTracker {
}
}
fn chrono_to_jiff_timestamp(dt: DateTime<Utc>) -> Timestamp {
let seconds = dt.timestamp();
let nanoseconds = match i32::try_from(dt.timestamp_subsec_nanos()) {
Ok(nanoseconds) => nanoseconds,
Err(_) => {
return if seconds < 0 { Timestamp::MIN } else { Timestamp::MAX };
}
};
match Timestamp::new(seconds, nanoseconds) {
Ok(timestamp) => timestamp,
Err(_) => {
if seconds < 0 {
Timestamp::MIN
} else {
Timestamp::MAX
}
}
}
}
fn timestamp_elapsed_seconds_since(now: Timestamp, earlier: Timestamp) -> u64 {
let duration = now.duration_since(earlier);
if duration.is_negative() {
return 0;
}
u64::try_from(duration.as_secs()).map_or(u64::MAX, |seconds| seconds)
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default)]
struct ScannerDiskBucketScanState {
concurrency_limit: u64,
@@ -708,6 +739,48 @@ struct ScannerDiskBucketScanState {
active: u64,
}
type ScannerDiskBucketScanKey = (String, String);
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ScannerDiskBucketScanSnapshot {
pub pool: String,
pub set: String,
pub concurrency_limit: u64,
pub queued: u64,
pub active: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
struct ScannerBucketDriveResultKey {
bucket: String,
drive: String,
result: String,
}
impl ScannerBucketDriveResultKey {
fn new(bucket: impl Into<String>, drive: impl Into<String>, result: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
Self {
bucket: bucket.into(),
drive: drive.into(),
result: result.into(),
}
}
}
const MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS: usize = 4096;
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct ScannerBucketDriveResults {
counts: HashMap<ScannerBucketDriveResultKey, ScannerBucketDriveResultValue>,
eviction_index: BTreeSet<(u64, ScannerBucketDriveResultKey)>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
struct ScannerBucketDriveResultValue {
count: u64,
last_seen: u64,
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Metrics
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -738,7 +811,11 @@ pub struct Metrics {
scanner_set_scan_concurrency_limit: AtomicU64,
scanner_set_scans_queued: AtomicU64,
scanner_set_scans_active: AtomicU64,
scanner_disk_bucket_scan_states: Mutex<HashMap<String, ScannerDiskBucketScanState>>,
scanner_disk_bucket_scan_states: Mutex<HashMap<ScannerDiskBucketScanKey, ScannerDiskBucketScanState>>,
scanner_bucket_drive_results: Mutex<ScannerBucketDriveResults>,
scanner_bucket_drive_result_clock: AtomicU64,
current_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results_start: Mutex<HashMap<ScannerBucketDriveResultKey, u64>>,
last_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results: Mutex<Vec<ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot>>,
scanner_leader_lock_state: RwLock<String>,
scanner_leader_lock_held: AtomicBool,
scanner_leader_lock_last_error: RwLock<String>,
@@ -958,6 +1035,14 @@ pub struct ScannerSourceWorkSnapshot {
pub missed: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot {
pub bucket: String,
pub drive: String,
pub result: String,
pub count: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ScannerReplicationRepairSnapshot {
pub source: String,
@@ -1112,12 +1197,12 @@ pub struct ScannerLastMinute {
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ScannerMetricsReport {
pub collected_at: DateTime<Utc>,
pub collected_at: Timestamp,
pub current_cycle: u64,
#[serde(default)]
pub current_cycle_active: bool,
pub current_started: DateTime<Utc>,
pub cycles_completed_at: Vec<DateTime<Utc>>,
pub current_started: Timestamp,
pub cycles_completed_at: Vec<Timestamp>,
pub ongoing_buckets: usize,
#[serde(default)]
pub active_scan_paths: usize,
@@ -1290,6 +1375,18 @@ pub struct ScannerMetricsReport {
pub partial_cycles: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ScannerRuntimeDetailsReport {
#[serde(default)]
pub disk_bucket_scan_states: Vec<ScannerDiskBucketScanSnapshot>,
#[serde(default)]
pub bucket_drive_results: Vec<ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot>,
#[serde(default)]
pub current_cycle_bucket_drive_results: Vec<ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot>,
#[serde(default)]
pub last_cycle_bucket_drive_results: Vec<ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot>,
}
impl CurrentCycle {
pub fn unmarshal(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
*self = rmp_serde::from_slice(buf)?;
@@ -1657,6 +1754,7 @@ pub fn emit_scan_cycle_superseded(duration: Duration) {
pub fn emit_scan_bucket_drive_complete(success: bool, bucket: &str, disk: &str, duration: Duration) {
let result = if success { "success" } else { "error" };
global_metrics().record_scanner_bucket_drive_result(bucket, disk, result);
metrics::counter!(
OTEL_SCANNER_BUCKETS_SCANNED,
"result" => result,
@@ -1673,6 +1771,7 @@ pub fn emit_scan_bucket_drive_complete(success: bool, bucket: &str, disk: &str,
}
pub fn emit_scan_bucket_drive_partial(bucket: &str, disk: &str, duration: Duration) {
global_metrics().record_scanner_bucket_drive_result(bucket, disk, SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_PARTIAL_LABEL);
metrics::counter!(
OTEL_SCANNER_BUCKETS_SCANNED,
"result" => SCAN_CYCLE_RESULT_PARTIAL_LABEL,
@@ -1723,6 +1822,10 @@ impl Metrics {
scanner_set_scans_queued: AtomicU64::new(0),
scanner_set_scans_active: AtomicU64::new(0),
scanner_disk_bucket_scan_states: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
scanner_bucket_drive_results: Mutex::new(ScannerBucketDriveResults::default()),
scanner_bucket_drive_result_clock: AtomicU64::new(0),
current_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results_start: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
last_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
scanner_leader_lock_state: RwLock::new("unknown".to_string()),
scanner_leader_lock_held: AtomicBool::new(false),
scanner_leader_lock_last_error: RwLock::new(String::new()),
@@ -2293,7 +2396,7 @@ impl Metrics {
queued: Option<usize>,
active: Option<usize>,
) {
let key = format!("{pool}/{set}");
let key = (pool.to_string(), set.to_string());
let mut states = self
.scanner_disk_bucket_scan_states
.lock()
@@ -2310,6 +2413,41 @@ impl Metrics {
}
}
pub fn record_scanner_bucket_drive_result(&self, bucket: &str, drive: &str, result: &str) {
if bucket.is_empty() || drive.is_empty() || result.is_empty() {
return;
}
let key = ScannerBucketDriveResultKey::new(bucket, drive, result);
let mut results = self
.scanner_bucket_drive_results
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner());
let last_seen = self.scanner_bucket_drive_result_clock.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
if let Some(previous_last_seen) = results.counts.get_mut(&key).map(|value| {
let previous_last_seen = value.last_seen;
value.count = value.count.saturating_add(1);
value.last_seen = last_seen;
previous_last_seen
}) {
results.eviction_index.remove(&(previous_last_seen, key.clone()));
results.eviction_index.insert((last_seen, key));
return;
}
if results.counts.len() >= MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS
&& let Some((_, stale_key)) = results.eviction_index.pop_first()
{
results.counts.remove(&stale_key);
}
if results.counts.len() < MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS {
results
.counts
.insert(key.clone(), ScannerBucketDriveResultValue { count: 1, last_seen });
results.eviction_index.insert((last_seen, key));
}
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// Read-side helpers
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -2481,6 +2619,11 @@ impl Metrics {
&self.current_scan_cycle_replication_repair_work_start,
&replication_repair_snapshot,
);
let bucket_drive_results = self.scanner_bucket_drive_result_counts();
match self.current_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results_start.lock() {
Ok(mut start) => *start = bucket_drive_results,
Err(poisoned) => *poisoned.into_inner() = bucket_drive_results,
}
self.current_scan_cycle_work_active.store(true, Ordering::Release);
snapshot
}
@@ -2493,6 +2636,11 @@ impl Metrics {
self.record_scan_cycle_work(work);
self.record_scan_cycle_source_work(&source_work);
self.record_scan_cycle_replication_repair_work(&replication_repair_work);
let bucket_drive_results = self.current_cycle_bucket_drive_result_snapshots();
match self.last_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results.lock() {
Ok(mut last) => *last = bucket_drive_results,
Err(poisoned) => *poisoned.into_inner() = bucket_drive_results,
}
self.current_scan_cycle_work_active.store(false, Ordering::Release);
}
@@ -2576,6 +2724,105 @@ impl Metrics {
}
}
fn scanner_bucket_drive_result_counts(&self) -> HashMap<ScannerBucketDriveResultKey, u64> {
self.scanner_bucket_drive_results
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner())
.counts
.iter()
.map(|(key, value)| (key.clone(), value.count))
.collect()
}
fn scanner_bucket_drive_result_snapshots(
counts: impl IntoIterator<Item = (ScannerBucketDriveResultKey, u64)>,
) -> Vec<ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot> {
let mut snapshots = counts
.into_iter()
.filter(|(_, count)| *count > 0)
.map(|(key, count)| ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot {
bucket: key.bucket,
drive: key.drive,
result: key.result,
count,
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
snapshots.sort_by(|left, right| {
left.bucket
.cmp(&right.bucket)
.then_with(|| left.drive.cmp(&right.drive))
.then_with(|| left.result.cmp(&right.result))
});
snapshots
}
fn scanner_bucket_drive_result_counter_snapshots(&self) -> Vec<ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot> {
Self::scanner_bucket_drive_result_snapshots(self.scanner_bucket_drive_result_counts())
}
fn current_cycle_bucket_drive_result_snapshots(&self) -> Vec<ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot> {
let current = self.scanner_bucket_drive_result_counts();
let start = self
.current_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results_start
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner())
.clone();
Self::scanner_bucket_drive_result_snapshots(current.into_iter().filter_map(|(key, count)| {
let delta = count.saturating_sub(start.get(&key).copied().unwrap_or_default());
(delta > 0).then_some((key, delta))
}))
}
pub fn scanner_runtime_details_report(&self) -> ScannerRuntimeDetailsReport {
self.scanner_runtime_details_report_for_active(self.current_scan_cycle_work_active.load(Ordering::Acquire))
}
fn scanner_runtime_details_report_for_active(&self, current_cycle_active: bool) -> ScannerRuntimeDetailsReport {
let current_cycle_bucket_drive_results = if current_cycle_active {
self.current_cycle_bucket_drive_result_snapshots()
} else {
Vec::new()
};
ScannerRuntimeDetailsReport {
disk_bucket_scan_states: self.scanner_disk_bucket_scan_state_snapshots(),
bucket_drive_results: self.scanner_bucket_drive_result_counter_snapshots(),
current_cycle_bucket_drive_results,
last_cycle_bucket_drive_results: self
.last_scan_cycle_bucket_drive_results
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner())
.clone(),
}
}
fn scanner_disk_bucket_scan_state_snapshots(&self) -> Vec<ScannerDiskBucketScanSnapshot> {
let mut disk_bucket_scan_states = match self.scanner_disk_bucket_scan_states.lock() {
Ok(states) => states
.iter()
.map(|((pool, set), state)| ScannerDiskBucketScanSnapshot {
pool: pool.clone(),
set: set.clone(),
concurrency_limit: state.concurrency_limit,
queued: state.queued,
active: state.active,
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>(),
Err(poisoned) => poisoned
.into_inner()
.iter()
.map(|((pool, set), state)| ScannerDiskBucketScanSnapshot {
pool: pool.clone(),
set: set.clone(),
concurrency_limit: state.concurrency_limit,
queued: state.queued,
active: state.active,
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>(),
};
disk_bucket_scan_states.sort_by(|left, right| left.pool.cmp(&right.pool).then_with(|| left.set.cmp(&right.set)));
disk_bucket_scan_states
}
fn scanner_source_work_values(&self) -> Vec<ScannerSourceWorkValues> {
ScannerWorkSource::all()
.iter()
@@ -2761,20 +3008,26 @@ impl Metrics {
/// Build a full metrics report snapshot.
pub async fn report(&self) -> ScannerMetricsReport {
self.report_with_runtime_details().await.0
}
pub async fn report_with_runtime_details(&self) -> (ScannerMetricsReport, ScannerRuntimeDetailsReport) {
let mut m = ScannerMetricsReport::default();
let runtime_details;
let has_cycle = {
let cycle = self.cycle_info.read().await;
let has_cycle = if let Some(cycle) = cycle.as_ref() {
m.current_cycle = cycle.current;
m.cycles_completed_at = cycle.cycle_completed.clone();
m.current_started = cycle.started;
m.cycles_completed_at = cycle.cycle_completed.iter().copied().map(chrono_to_jiff_timestamp).collect();
m.current_started = chrono_to_jiff_timestamp(cycle.started);
true
} else {
false
};
m.current_cycle_active = self.current_scan_cycle_work_active.load(Ordering::Acquire);
if m.current_cycle_active {
// Keep cycle_info before cycle-baseline locks so active scrapes cannot mix two cycle identities.
let current_work = self.scan_cycle_work_since(self.current_scan_cycle_work_start());
let current_source_work = self.scanner_source_work_since(&self.current_scan_cycle_source_work_start_values());
let current_replication_repair_work =
@@ -2797,19 +3050,20 @@ impl Metrics {
m.current_cycle_replication_repair =
self.scanner_replication_repair_work_snapshots(&current_replication_repair_work);
}
runtime_details = self.scanner_runtime_details_report_for_active(m.current_cycle_active);
has_cycle
};
if !has_cycle && let Some(init_time) = crate::get_global_init_time().await {
m.current_started = init_time;
m.current_started = chrono_to_jiff_timestamp(init_time);
}
m.collected_at = Utc::now();
m.collected_at = Timestamp::now();
let current_path_snapshots = self.current_path_snapshots().await;
m.active_scan_paths = current_path_snapshots.len();
m.oldest_active_path_age_seconds = current_path_snapshots
.iter()
.map(|(_, state)| m.collected_at.signed_duration_since(state.updated_at).num_seconds().max(0) as u64)
.map(|(_, state)| timestamp_elapsed_seconds_since(m.collected_at, state.updated_at))
.max()
.unwrap_or_default();
m.active_paths = current_path_snapshots
@@ -2826,15 +3080,11 @@ impl Metrics {
m.current_set_scan_concurrency_limit = self.scanner_set_scan_concurrency_limit.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
m.current_set_scans_queued = self.scanner_set_scans_queued.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
m.current_set_scans_active = self.scanner_set_scans_active.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
let disk_bucket_scan_states = self.scanner_disk_bucket_scan_state_snapshots();
let (disk_scan_concurrency_limit, disk_bucket_scans_queued, disk_bucket_scans_active) =
match self.scanner_disk_bucket_scan_states.lock() {
Ok(states) => states.values().fold((0, 0, 0), |acc, state| {
(acc.0 + state.concurrency_limit, acc.1 + state.queued, acc.2 + state.active)
}),
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner().values().fold((0, 0, 0), |acc, state| {
(acc.0 + state.concurrency_limit, acc.1 + state.queued, acc.2 + state.active)
}),
};
disk_bucket_scan_states.iter().fold((0, 0, 0), |acc, state| {
(acc.0 + state.concurrency_limit, acc.1 + state.queued, acc.2 + state.active)
});
m.current_disk_scan_concurrency_limit = disk_scan_concurrency_limit;
m.current_disk_bucket_scans_queued = disk_bucket_scans_queued;
m.current_disk_bucket_scans_active = disk_bucket_scans_active;
@@ -3003,7 +3253,7 @@ impl Metrics {
m.pacing_pressure = scanner_pacing_pressure(&m);
m.maintenance_control = scanner_maintenance_control(&m);
m
(m, runtime_details)
}
}
@@ -3089,6 +3339,22 @@ impl Drop for CloseDiskGuard {
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn scanner_metrics_report_timestamps_serialize_as_rfc3339_utc() {
let report = ScannerMetricsReport {
collected_at: Timestamp::constant(1_700_000_000, 123_456_000),
current_started: Timestamp::constant(1_699_999_940, 0),
cycles_completed_at: vec![Timestamp::constant(1_700_000_060, 987_654_000)],
..Default::default()
};
let value = serde_json::to_value(&report).expect("scanner metrics report should serialize");
assert_eq!(value["collected_at"].as_str(), Some("2023-11-14T22:13:20.123456Z"));
assert_eq!(value["current_started"].as_str(), Some("2023-11-14T22:12:20Z"));
assert_eq!(value["cycles_completed_at"][0].as_str(), Some("2023-11-14T22:14:20.987654Z"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn close_disk_guard_runs_cleanup_when_an_early_return_drops_it() {
let (closed_tx, closed_rx) = tokio::sync::oneshot::channel();
@@ -3147,7 +3413,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn report_counts_active_scan_paths() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
let updated_at = Utc::now() - chrono::Duration::seconds(12);
let updated_at = Timestamp::now() - jiff::SignedDuration::from_secs(12);
metrics.current_paths.write().await.insert(
"disk-a".to_string(),
Arc::new(CurrentPathTracker::new_at("bucket-a".to_string(), updated_at)),
@@ -3169,7 +3435,7 @@ mod tests {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
let tracker = Arc::new(CurrentPathTracker::new_at(
"bucket-a".to_string(),
Utc::now() - chrono::Duration::hours(1),
Timestamp::now() - jiff::SignedDuration::from_secs(60 * 60),
));
metrics
.current_paths
@@ -3942,7 +4208,7 @@ mod tests {
let report = metrics.report().await;
*crate::globals::GLOBAL_INIT_TIME.write().await = previous_init_time;
assert_eq!(report.current_started, cycle_started);
assert_eq!(report.current_started, chrono_to_jiff_timestamp(cycle_started));
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -4100,6 +4366,137 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(report.life_time_ops.get("scan_bucket_drive_failure"), Some(&1));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn report_includes_structured_bucket_drive_results() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result("photos", "/data1", "success");
let cycle_start = metrics.start_scan_cycle_work();
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result("photos", "/data1", "partial");
let active_report = metrics.scanner_runtime_details_report();
assert_eq!(
active_report.current_cycle_bucket_drive_results,
vec![ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot {
bucket: "photos".to_string(),
drive: "/data1".to_string(),
result: "partial".to_string(),
count: 1,
}]
);
metrics.finish_scan_cycle_work(cycle_start);
let report = metrics.scanner_runtime_details_report();
assert_eq!(
report.bucket_drive_results,
vec![
ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot {
bucket: "photos".to_string(),
drive: "/data1".to_string(),
result: "partial".to_string(),
count: 1,
},
ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot {
bucket: "photos".to_string(),
drive: "/data1".to_string(),
result: "success".to_string(),
count: 1,
},
]
);
assert!(report.current_cycle_bucket_drive_results.is_empty());
assert_eq!(
report.last_cycle_bucket_drive_results,
vec![ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot {
bucket: "photos".to_string(),
drive: "/data1".to_string(),
result: "partial".to_string(),
count: 1,
}]
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn scanner_bucket_drive_results_are_bounded() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
for index in 0..MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS {
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result(&format!("bucket-{index}"), "/data1", "success");
}
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result("overflow", "/data1", "success");
let report = metrics.scanner_runtime_details_report();
assert_eq!(report.bucket_drive_results.len(), MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS);
assert!(
report
.bucket_drive_results
.iter()
.any(|snapshot| snapshot.bucket == "overflow")
);
assert!(
report
.bucket_drive_results
.iter()
.all(|snapshot| snapshot.bucket != "bucket-0")
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn scanner_bucket_drive_result_eviction_keeps_recent_keys() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
for index in 0..MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS {
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result(&format!("bucket-{index}"), "/data1", "success");
}
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result("bucket-0", "/data1", "success");
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result("overflow", "/data1", "success");
let report = metrics.scanner_runtime_details_report();
assert_eq!(report.bucket_drive_results.len(), MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS);
assert!(
report
.bucket_drive_results
.iter()
.any(|snapshot| snapshot.bucket == "bucket-0" && snapshot.count == 2)
);
assert!(
report
.bucket_drive_results
.iter()
.all(|snapshot| snapshot.bucket != "bucket-1")
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn scanner_bucket_drive_result_eviction_survives_full_refresh() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
for index in 0..MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS {
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result(&format!("bucket-{index}"), "/data1", "success");
}
for index in 0..MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS {
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result(&format!("bucket-{index}"), "/data1", "success");
}
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result("overflow", "/data1", "success");
let report = metrics.scanner_runtime_details_report();
assert_eq!(report.bucket_drive_results.len(), MAX_SCANNER_BUCKET_DRIVE_RESULT_KEYS);
assert!(
report
.bucket_drive_results
.iter()
.any(|snapshot| snapshot.bucket == "overflow")
);
assert!(
report
.bucket_drive_results
.iter()
.all(|snapshot| snapshot.bucket != "bucket-0")
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn report_includes_usage_freshness_status() {
let metrics = Metrics::new();
@@ -4234,7 +4631,7 @@ mod tests {
let active = metrics.report().await;
assert!(active.current_cycle_active);
assert_eq!(active.current_cycle, 12);
assert_eq!(active.current_started, cycle_started);
assert_eq!(active.current_started, chrono_to_jiff_timestamp(cycle_started));
let idle_cycle = CurrentCycle {
current: 0,
@@ -4265,9 +4662,10 @@ mod tests {
};
let cycle_ten_start = metrics.start_scan_cycle_work_with_cycle(cycle_ten.clone()).await;
metrics.operations[Metric::ScanObject as usize].store(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result("cycle-ten", "/data1", "partial");
let paths = metrics.current_paths.write().await;
let mut report = Box::pin(metrics.report());
let mut report = Box::pin(metrics.report_with_runtime_details());
let waker = std::task::Waker::noop();
let mut context = std::task::Context::from_waker(waker);
assert!(report.as_mut().poll(&mut context).is_pending());
@@ -4284,12 +4682,22 @@ mod tests {
})
.await;
metrics.operations[Metric::ScanObject as usize].store(101, Ordering::Relaxed);
metrics.record_scanner_bucket_drive_result("cycle-eleven", "/data1", "partial");
drop(paths);
let snapshot = report.await;
let (snapshot, runtime_details) = report.await;
assert_eq!(snapshot.current_cycle, 10);
assert_eq!(snapshot.current_cycle_objects_scanned, 1);
assert_eq!(
runtime_details.current_cycle_bucket_drive_results,
vec![ScannerBucketDriveResultSnapshot {
bucket: "cycle-ten".to_string(),
drive: "/data1".to_string(),
result: "partial".to_string(),
count: 1,
}]
);
metrics
.finish_scan_cycle_work_with_cycle(cycle_eleven_start, CurrentCycle::default())
+3 -4
View File
@@ -177,10 +177,9 @@ const _: () = assert!(!DEFAULT_INTERNODE_RPC_REPLAY_SCOPE_STRICT);
///
/// The cache retains each nonce for the ~10-minute signature freshness envelope. Once peers use
/// replay-scoped v3 authentication, every authenticated RPC consumes one entry, so the steady
/// state holds roughly `authenticated RPC RPS x 601s` entries. The default sustains about 1,700
/// authenticated RPCs per second (about 120 MiB worst case, allocated only under sustained load);
/// operators must size it for the node's aggregate peak RPC rate before enabling strict replay
/// scope. Overflow fails closed — legitimate signed traffic is the only thing that can fill the
/// state holds roughly `authenticated RPC RPS x 601s` entries. This default is the minimum floor:
/// explicit operator values and resource-aware auto sizing both clamp upward to at least this
/// value. Overflow fails closed — legitimate signed traffic is the only thing that can fill the
/// cache (replays are rejected before insertion, and an attacker cannot mint valid nonces without
/// the shared secret) — and increments
/// `rustfs_system_network_internode_replay_cache_overflow_total`, so a sustained non-zero overflow
+446 -29
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize, ser::SerializeMap as _};
use std::{
collections::{HashMap, HashSet},
hash::{DefaultHasher, Hash, Hasher},
@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ pub const USAGE_LAST_UPDATE_FUTURE_TOLERANCE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5 *
/// Keeping the existing object name preserves rolling-upgrade and rollback
/// compatibility without allowing an ambiguous snapshot to become authoritative.
pub const DATA_USAGE_OBJECT_NAME: &str = ".usage.v2.json";
/// Latest structurally complete scanner observation. Unlike
/// [`DATA_USAGE_OBJECT_NAME`], this object is never authoritative for quota
/// admission because namespace activity may have raced the scan.
pub const DATA_USAGE_OBSERVED_OBJECT_NAME: &str = ".usage.observed.json";
/// Usage snapshot written by scanner implementations predating distributed
/// leadership fencing. It is read only when neither authoritative snapshot
@@ -51,24 +55,36 @@ pub fn usage_last_update_is_untrusted_future(existing_last_update: SystemTime, n
existing_last_update > now + USAGE_LAST_UPDATE_FUTURE_TOLERANCE
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Default, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Default, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct TierStats {
pub total_size: u64,
pub num_versions: i32,
pub num_objects: i32,
pub num_versions: u64,
pub num_objects: u64,
}
impl TierStats {
pub fn add(&self, u: &TierStats) -> TierStats {
TierStats {
total_size: self.total_size + u.total_size,
num_versions: self.num_versions + u.num_versions,
num_objects: self.num_objects + u.num_objects,
total_size: self.total_size.saturating_add(u.total_size),
num_versions: self.num_versions.saturating_add(u.num_versions),
num_objects: self.num_objects.saturating_add(u.num_objects),
}
}
/// True when [`TierStats::add`] would report the exact sum instead of saturating.
pub fn fits_add(&self, u: &TierStats) -> bool {
self.total_size.checked_add(u.total_size).is_some()
&& self.num_versions.checked_add(u.num_versions).is_some()
&& self.num_objects.checked_add(u.num_objects).is_some()
}
/// True when this tier contributed nothing, i.e. merging it is a no-op.
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.total_size == 0 && self.num_versions == 0 && self.num_objects == 0
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AllTierStats {
pub tiers: HashMap<String, TierStats>,
}
@@ -78,31 +94,35 @@ impl AllTierStats {
Self { tiers: HashMap::new() }
}
pub fn add_sizes(&mut self, tiers: HashMap<String, TierStats>) {
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.tiers.is_empty()
}
/// Folds a scan summary's per-tier map in.
///
/// Scanners seed the map with a zeroed entry for every configured tier, so
/// empty contributions are skipped to keep the persisted cache from growing
/// one key per tier on every folder that never held tiered data.
pub fn add_sizes(&mut self, tiers: &HashMap<String, TierStats>) {
for (tier, st) in tiers {
self.tiers
.insert(tier.clone(), self.tiers.get(&tier).copied().unwrap_or_default().add(&st));
if st.is_empty() {
continue;
}
let entry = self.tiers.entry(tier.clone()).or_default();
*entry = entry.add(st);
}
}
pub fn merge(&mut self, other: AllTierStats) {
for (tier, st) in other.tiers {
self.tiers
.insert(tier.clone(), self.tiers.get(&tier).copied().unwrap_or_default().add(&st));
}
pub fn merge(&mut self, other: &AllTierStats) {
self.add_sizes(&other.tiers);
}
pub fn populate_stats(&self, stats: &mut HashMap<String, TierStats>) {
for (tier, st) in &self.tiers {
stats.insert(
tier.clone(),
TierStats {
total_size: st.total_size,
num_versions: st.num_versions,
num_objects: st.num_objects,
},
);
}
/// True when [`AllTierStats::merge`] would report exact sums for every tier.
pub fn fits_merge(&self, other: &AllTierStats) -> bool {
other
.tiers
.iter()
.all(|(tier, right)| self.tiers.get(tier).is_none_or(|left| left.fits_add(right)))
}
}
@@ -183,6 +203,14 @@ pub struct DataUsageInfo {
pub objects_total_size: u64,
/// Replication info across all buckets
pub replication_info: HashMap<String, BucketTargetUsageInfo>,
/// Usage per storage class and remote tier across all buckets.
///
/// Absent on snapshots written before per-tier accounting was published,
/// and on clusters with no remote tier configured: the scanner classifies
/// objects by tier (including `STANDARD`/`REDUCED_REDUNDANCY`) only once a
/// tier exists, so an absent value means "not accounted", never "zero".
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub tier_stats: Option<AllTierStats>,
/// Total number of buckets in this cluster
pub buckets_count: u64,
@@ -194,6 +222,20 @@ pub struct DataUsageInfo {
/// explicit entry for every bucket, including confirmed-empty buckets.
#[serde(default)]
pub usage_snapshot_complete: bool,
/// Whether no namespace activity or dirty-usage generation changed while
/// the coordinated snapshot was being produced.
///
/// `false` still describes a structurally complete, useful point-in-time
/// usage view, but follow-up scanner work remains pending. `None` is kept
/// for snapshots written before this status became observable.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub usage_snapshot_converged: Option<bool>,
/// Identity of the authoritative snapshot from which a nonconverged
/// observation started. Admin readers require an exact match before using
/// the observation, so bucket namespace mutations fence old observations
/// without relying on synchronized clocks.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline: Option<DataUsageSnapshotIdentity>,
/// Deprecated kept here for backward compatibility reasons
pub bucket_sizes: HashMap<String, u64>,
/// Per-disk snapshot information when available
@@ -201,6 +243,59 @@ pub struct DataUsageInfo {
pub disk_usage_status: Vec<DiskUsageStatus>,
}
/// Stable identity fields changed by both coordinated scanner publication and
/// backward-compatible bucket namespace cleanup.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct DataUsageSnapshotIdentity {
pub last_update: Option<SystemTime>,
pub scanner_cycle: Option<u64>,
pub scanner_epoch: Option<u64>,
}
impl DataUsageInfo {
pub fn snapshot_identity(&self) -> DataUsageSnapshotIdentity {
DataUsageSnapshotIdentity {
last_update: self.last_update,
scanner_cycle: self.scanner_cycle,
scanner_epoch: self.scanner_epoch,
}
}
}
/// Return whether `candidate` was produced after `baseline`.
///
/// New coordinated snapshots are ordered by leadership epoch and scanner
/// cycle. The timestamp fallback preserves ordering for legacy snapshots that
/// predate those fields.
pub fn data_usage_snapshot_is_newer(candidate: &DataUsageInfo, baseline: &DataUsageInfo) -> bool {
match (
candidate.scanner_epoch.zip(candidate.scanner_cycle),
baseline.scanner_epoch.zip(baseline.scanner_cycle),
) {
(Some(candidate), Some(baseline)) => candidate > baseline,
(Some(_), None) => true,
(None, Some(_)) => false,
(None, None) => match (candidate.last_update, baseline.last_update) {
(Some(candidate), Some(baseline)) => candidate > baseline,
(Some(_), None) => true,
(None, Some(_) | None) => false,
},
}
}
/// Return whether a nonconverged observation may safely supersede the admin
/// view of `authoritative`.
///
/// The exact baseline identity is independent of clock ordering. Older binaries
/// already advance the authoritative timestamp when deleting a bucket, so a
/// rollback delete/recreate fences the previous bucket incarnation too.
pub fn observed_data_usage_is_newer(observed: &DataUsageInfo, authoritative: &DataUsageInfo) -> bool {
observed.usage_snapshot_converged == Some(false)
&& observed.is_complete_bucket_usage_snapshot()
&& observed.usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline.as_ref() == Some(&authoritative.snapshot_identity())
&& data_usage_snapshot_is_newer(observed, authoritative)
}
/// Metadata describing the status of a disk-level data usage snapshot.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct DiskUsageStatus {
@@ -562,7 +657,7 @@ impl ReplicationAllStats {
}
/// Data usage cache entry
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Deserialize)]
pub struct DataUsageEntry {
pub children: DataUsageHashMap,
// These fields do not include any children.
@@ -577,6 +672,34 @@ pub struct DataUsageEntry {
/// Number of objects that failed to scan (e.g., IO errors)
#[serde(default)]
pub failed_objects: usize,
/// Per-tier usage contributed by this entry, present only once a scan
/// observed tier-classified objects.
#[serde(default)]
pub all_tier_stats: Option<AllTierStats>,
}
impl Serialize for DataUsageEntry {
fn serialize<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
where
S: serde::Serializer,
{
// Keep entries map-encoded so older readers can ignore fields appended
// by newer scanner versions during rolling upgrades. The derived
// (array) encoding made any appended field a decode error for them.
let mut state = serializer.serialize_map(Some(11))?;
state.serialize_entry("children", &self.children)?;
state.serialize_entry("size", &self.size)?;
state.serialize_entry("objects", &self.objects)?;
state.serialize_entry("versions", &self.versions)?;
state.serialize_entry("delete_markers", &self.delete_markers)?;
state.serialize_entry("obj_sizes", &self.obj_sizes)?;
state.serialize_entry("obj_versions", &self.obj_versions)?;
state.serialize_entry("replication_stats", &self.replication_stats)?;
state.serialize_entry("compacted", &self.compacted)?;
state.serialize_entry("failed_objects", &self.failed_objects)?;
state.serialize_entry("all_tier_stats", &self.all_tier_stats)?;
state.end()
}
}
impl DataUsageEntry {
@@ -635,10 +758,22 @@ impl DataUsageEntry {
}
}
if let Some(o_tiers) = other.all_tier_stats.as_ref().filter(|tiers| !tiers.is_empty()) {
self.all_tier_stats.get_or_insert_with(AllTierStats::new).merge(o_tiers);
}
self.obj_sizes.merge_from(&other.obj_sizes);
self.obj_versions.merge_from(&other.obj_versions);
}
/// Folds a scan summary's per-tier map into this entry.
pub fn add_tier_sizes(&mut self, tiers: &HashMap<String, TierStats>) {
if tiers.values().all(TierStats::is_empty) {
return;
}
self.all_tier_stats.get_or_insert_with(AllTierStats::new).add_sizes(tiers);
}
pub fn checked_merge(&mut self, other: &DataUsageEntry) -> bool {
let scalar_counts_fit = self.objects.checked_add(other.objects).is_some()
&& self.versions.checked_add(other.versions).is_some()
@@ -698,7 +833,12 @@ impl DataUsageEntry {
}
};
if !scalar_counts_fit || !histograms_fit || !replication_fits {
let tier_stats_fit = match (&self.all_tier_stats, &other.all_tier_stats) {
(_, None) | (None, Some(_)) => true,
(Some(left), Some(right)) => left.fits_merge(right),
};
if !scalar_counts_fit || !histograms_fit || !replication_fits || !tier_stats_fit {
return false;
}
self.merge(other);
@@ -1038,6 +1178,7 @@ impl DataUsageCache {
versions_total_count: flat.versions as u64,
delete_markers_total_count: flat.delete_markers as u64,
objects_total_size: flat.size as u64,
tier_stats: flat.all_tier_stats.filter(|tiers| !tiers.is_empty()),
buckets_count: u64::try_from(buckets.len()).unwrap_or(u64::MAX),
buckets_usage,
usage_snapshot_complete: self.info.snapshot_complete,
@@ -1525,6 +1666,172 @@ mod tests {
buckets_count: u64,
}
fn tier_entry(tier: &str, stats: TierStats) -> DataUsageEntry {
let mut entry = DataUsageEntry::default();
entry.add_tier_sizes(&HashMap::from([(tier.to_string(), stats)]));
entry
}
#[test]
fn tier_stats_survive_entry_merge() {
let mut left = tier_entry(
"WARM",
TierStats {
total_size: 10,
num_versions: 2,
num_objects: 1,
},
);
let mut right = tier_entry(
"WARM",
TierStats {
total_size: 5,
num_versions: 1,
num_objects: 1,
},
);
right.add_tier_sizes(&HashMap::from([(
"COLD".to_string(),
TierStats {
total_size: 7,
num_versions: 1,
num_objects: 0,
},
)]));
assert!(left.checked_merge(&right), "merging exact tier totals must be accepted");
let tiers = &left.all_tier_stats.expect("merged entry keeps tier stats").tiers;
assert_eq!(
tiers.get("WARM"),
Some(&TierStats {
total_size: 15,
num_versions: 3,
num_objects: 2,
})
);
assert_eq!(
tiers.get("COLD"),
Some(&TierStats {
total_size: 7,
num_versions: 1,
num_objects: 0,
})
);
}
#[test]
fn tier_stats_merge_into_an_untiered_entry() {
let mut left = DataUsageEntry::default();
let right = tier_entry(
"WARM",
TierStats {
total_size: 10,
num_versions: 1,
num_objects: 1,
},
);
assert!(left.checked_merge(&right));
assert_eq!(
left.all_tier_stats.expect("tier stats adopted from the merged entry").tiers["WARM"],
TierStats {
total_size: 10,
num_versions: 1,
num_objects: 1,
}
);
}
#[test]
fn checked_merge_rejects_overflowing_tier_totals() {
let mut left = tier_entry(
"WARM",
TierStats {
total_size: u64::MAX,
num_versions: 1,
num_objects: 1,
},
);
let right = tier_entry(
"WARM",
TierStats {
total_size: 1,
num_versions: 1,
num_objects: 1,
},
);
assert!(!left.checked_merge(&right), "saturating tier totals must not be published");
assert_eq!(left.all_tier_stats.expect("left is untouched").tiers["WARM"].total_size, u64::MAX);
}
/// Entry shape released before per-tier accounting, using the derived
/// (array) encoding those writers produced.
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct LegacyEntry {
children: DataUsageHashMap,
size: usize,
objects: usize,
versions: usize,
delete_markers: usize,
obj_sizes: SizeHistogram,
obj_versions: VersionsHistogram,
replication_stats: Option<ReplicationAllStats>,
compacted: bool,
#[serde(default)]
failed_objects: usize,
}
#[test]
fn entries_are_map_encoded_so_appended_fields_stay_readable() {
// A derived (array) encoding turns every appended field into a decode
// error for readers built before it existed, which would cost a mixed
// -version cluster its whole scan cache. Entries must stay map-encoded.
let current = tier_entry(
"WARM",
TierStats {
total_size: 3,
num_versions: 1,
num_objects: 1,
},
);
let mut encoded = Vec::new();
current
.serialize(&mut rmp_serde::Serializer::new(&mut encoded))
.expect("encode current entry");
let legacy: LegacyEntry = rmp_serde::from_slice(&encoded).expect("legacy reader should ignore the appended field");
assert_eq!(legacy.objects, 0);
}
#[test]
fn legacy_array_encoded_entries_still_load() {
let legacy = LegacyEntry {
children: DataUsageHashMap::default(),
size: 12,
objects: 3,
versions: 4,
delete_markers: 1,
obj_sizes: SizeHistogram::default(),
obj_versions: VersionsHistogram::default(),
replication_stats: None,
compacted: false,
failed_objects: 2,
};
let mut encoded = Vec::new();
legacy
.serialize(&mut rmp_serde::Serializer::new(&mut encoded))
.expect("encode legacy entry");
let decoded: DataUsageEntry = rmp_serde::from_slice(&encoded).expect("current reader should default the missing field");
assert_eq!(decoded.size, 12);
assert_eq!(decoded.failed_objects, 2);
assert!(decoded.all_tier_stats.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn hash_path_uses_portable_slash_semantics() {
for (input, expected) in [
@@ -1547,6 +1854,8 @@ mod tests {
let current = DataUsageInfo {
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH),
usage_snapshot_complete: true,
usage_snapshot_converged: Some(false),
usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline: Some(DataUsageSnapshotIdentity::default()),
..Default::default()
};
let encoded = rmp_serde::to_vec_named(&current).expect("encode current data usage snapshot");
@@ -1554,6 +1863,76 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(legacy.buckets_count, 0);
assert!(current.is_complete_bucket_usage_snapshot());
assert_eq!(current.usage_snapshot_converged, Some(false));
}
#[test]
fn convergence_marker_defaults_to_unknown_for_older_snapshots() {
let encoded = rmp_serde::to_vec_named(&DataUsageInfo {
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH),
usage_snapshot_complete: true,
..Default::default()
})
.expect("encode pre-convergence data usage snapshot");
let decoded: DataUsageInfo = rmp_serde::from_slice(&encoded).expect("decode older data usage snapshot");
assert!(decoded.is_complete_bucket_usage_snapshot());
assert_eq!(decoded.usage_snapshot_converged, None);
}
#[test]
fn observation_selection_is_clock_independent_and_baseline_fenced() {
let mut authoritative = DataUsageInfo {
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(600)),
scanner_epoch: Some(7),
scanner_cycle: Some(10),
usage_snapshot_complete: true,
..Default::default()
};
let observed = DataUsageInfo {
// A newer leader may have a slower wall clock.
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(300)),
scanner_epoch: Some(8),
scanner_cycle: Some(1),
usage_snapshot_complete: true,
usage_snapshot_converged: Some(false),
usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline: Some(authoritative.snapshot_identity()),
..Default::default()
};
assert!(observed_data_usage_is_newer(&observed, &authoritative));
authoritative.last_update = Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(601));
assert!(
!observed_data_usage_is_newer(&observed, &authoritative),
"an old-binary namespace mutation must fence the prior bucket incarnation regardless of clock skew"
);
}
#[test]
fn observation_selection_requires_nonconverged_complete_newer_data() {
let authoritative = DataUsageInfo {
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH),
scanner_epoch: Some(2),
scanner_cycle: Some(10),
usage_snapshot_complete: true,
..Default::default()
};
let baseline = Some(authoritative.snapshot_identity());
let candidate = |epoch, cycle, converged, complete| DataUsageInfo {
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(1)),
scanner_epoch: Some(epoch),
scanner_cycle: Some(cycle),
usage_snapshot_complete: complete,
usage_snapshot_converged: converged,
usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline: baseline,
..Default::default()
};
assert!(observed_data_usage_is_newer(&candidate(2, 11, Some(false), true), &authoritative));
assert!(!observed_data_usage_is_newer(&candidate(2, 9, Some(false), true), &authoritative));
assert!(!observed_data_usage_is_newer(&candidate(2, 11, Some(true), true), &authoritative));
assert!(!observed_data_usage_is_newer(&candidate(2, 11, Some(false), false), &authoritative));
}
#[test]
@@ -1901,6 +2280,44 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(info.buckets_count, 2);
assert!(info.buckets_usage.is_empty());
assert_eq!(info.objects_total_count, 3);
assert!(info.tier_stats.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_dui_reports_tier_usage_from_the_flattened_tree() {
let root_hash = hash_path("root");
let bucket_hash = hash_path("bucket-a");
let mut cache = DataUsageCache {
info: DataUsageCacheInfo {
name: "root".to_string(),
..Default::default()
},
..Default::default()
};
cache.replace_hashed(&root_hash, &None, &DataUsageEntry::default());
cache.replace_hashed(
&bucket_hash,
&Some(root_hash),
&tier_entry(
"WARM",
TierStats {
total_size: 40,
num_versions: 2,
num_objects: 2,
},
),
);
let info = cache.dui("root", &["bucket-a".to_string()]);
assert_eq!(
info.tier_stats.expect("child tier usage should roll up to the root").tiers["WARM"],
TierStats {
total_size: 40,
num_versions: 2,
num_objects: 2,
}
);
}
#[test]
+259 -1
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,9 @@
//! Later batches tracked on backlog#1154: config get/set, info, pools status,
//! group lifecycle, import/export IAM.
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_ok, admin_request, init_logging};
use crate::common::{
RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_ok, admin_request, admin_request_with_session_token, build_test_sts_client, init_logging,
};
use aws_sdk_s3::config::{Credentials, Region};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::{Client, Config};
@@ -87,6 +89,262 @@ fn bucket_rw_policy(bucket: &str) -> String {
.to_string()
}
async fn create_user_with_service_account_update_policy(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
user: &str,
secret: &str,
policy: &str,
) -> TestResult {
admin_ok(
env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={user}"),
Some(serde_json::json!({ "secretKey": secret, "status": "enabled" }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={policy}"),
Some(
serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["admin:UpdateServiceAccount"]
},
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["sts:AssumeRole"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"]
}
]
})
.to_string(),
),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
env,
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/idp/builtin/policy/attach",
Some(serde_json::json!({ "policies": [policy], "user": user }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn create_service_account_for(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
parent: &str,
) -> Result<(String, String), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let response = admin_ok(
env,
http::Method::PUT,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/add-service-accounts",
Some(serde_json::json!({ "targetUser": parent }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
let response: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&response)?;
let access_key = response["credentials"]["accessKey"]
.as_str()
.ok_or("service account response should contain credentials.accessKey")?
.to_owned();
let secret_key = response["credentials"]["secretKey"]
.as_str()
.ok_or("service account response should contain credentials.secretKey")?
.to_owned();
Ok((access_key, secret_key))
}
async fn assert_admin_status(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
credentials: (&str, &str, Option<&str>),
path: &str,
body: String,
expected: StatusCode,
context: &str,
) -> TestResult {
let (access_key, secret_key, session_token) = credentials;
let (status, response) =
admin_request_with_session_token(&env.url, http::Method::POST, path, Some(body), access_key, secret_key, session_token)
.await?;
assert_eq!(status, expected, "{context}: got {status}: {response}");
if expected == StatusCode::FORBIDDEN {
assert!(response.contains("AccessDenied"), "{context}: expected AccessDenied body, got {response}");
}
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_update_service_account_enforces_owner_and_parent_scope() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let parent = "updateparent";
let parent_secret = "updateparentsecret";
let outsider = "updateoutsider";
let outsider_secret = "updateoutsidersecret";
let ordinary = "updateordinary";
let ordinary_secret = "updateordinarysecret";
create_user_with_service_account_update_policy(&env, parent, parent_secret, "update-parent-policy").await?;
create_user_with_service_account_update_policy(&env, outsider, outsider_secret, "update-outsider-policy").await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/idp/builtin/policy/attach",
Some(serde_json::json!({ "policies": ["consoleAdmin"], "user": outsider }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={ordinary}"),
Some(serde_json::json!({ "secretKey": ordinary_secret, "status": "enabled" }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
let (target_access_key, _) = create_service_account_for(&env, parent).await?;
let target_path = format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey={target_access_key}");
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(&env.access_key, &env.secret_key, None),
&target_path,
serde_json::json!({}).to_string(),
StatusCode::NO_CONTENT,
"root no-op update across parents must succeed",
)
.await?;
let custom_policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:GetObject"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::update-scope/*"]
}]
});
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(&env.access_key, &env.secret_key, None),
&target_path,
serde_json::json!({ "newPolicy": custom_policy }).to_string(),
StatusCode::NO_CONTENT,
"root implied-to-custom update across parents must succeed",
)
.await?;
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(parent, parent_secret, None),
&target_path,
serde_json::json!({ "newDescription": "updated by parent" }).to_string(),
StatusCode::NO_CONTENT,
"parent with UpdateServiceAccount may update its own service account",
)
.await?;
let takeover = serde_json::json!({
"newSecretKey": "cross-parent-takeover-secret",
"newDescription": "cross-parent takeover"
})
.to_string();
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(ordinary, ordinary_secret, None),
&target_path,
takeover.clone(),
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"ordinary user must not update another parent's service account",
)
.await?;
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(outsider, outsider_secret, None),
&target_path,
takeover.clone(),
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"non-owner consoleAdmin must not update across parents",
)
.await?;
let (derived_access_key, derived_secret_key) = create_service_account_for(&env, outsider).await?;
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(&derived_access_key, &derived_secret_key, None),
&target_path,
takeover.clone(),
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"service-account credential must not update across parents",
)
.await?;
let assumed = build_test_sts_client(&env.url, outsider, outsider_secret, None, "e2e-admin-update-service-account")
.assume_role()
.role_arn("arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/update-service-account")
.role_session_name("update-service-account-scope")
.send()
.await?;
let temporary = assumed
.credentials()
.ok_or("AssumeRole response should contain credentials")?;
assert_admin_status(
&env,
(temporary.access_key_id(), temporary.secret_access_key(), Some(temporary.session_token())),
&target_path,
takeover,
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"temporary credential must not update across parents",
)
.await?;
let info = admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::GET,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/info-service-account?accessKey={target_access_key}"),
None,
)
.await?;
let info: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&info)?;
assert_eq!(
info["impliedPolicy"].as_bool(),
Some(false),
"root update must replace the implied policy with a custom policy"
);
assert!(
info["policy"].as_str().is_some_and(|policy| policy.contains("s3:GetObject")),
"custom policy must round-trip through the handler: {info}"
);
assert_eq!(
info["description"].as_str(),
Some("updated by parent"),
"denied takeover attempts must not mutate target"
);
let (missing_status, missing_body) = admin_request(
&env.url,
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey=missing-service-account",
Some(serde_json::json!({}).to_string()),
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await?;
assert_eq!(missing_status, StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "missing target must fail closed: {missing_body}");
assert!(
missing_body.contains("NoSuchResource"),
"missing target must preserve the lookup error: {missing_body}"
);
env.stop_server();
Ok(())
}
/// Full user -> policy -> service-account lifecycle, proving each management
/// call takes effect on the data plane, not just that the endpoint answers 200.
#[tokio::test]
+83 -105
View File
@@ -16,91 +16,17 @@
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging};
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging, signed_s3_request};
use aws_sdk_s3::error::ProvideErrorMetadata;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{
AccelerateConfiguration, BucketAccelerateStatus, BucketLoggingStatus, IndexDocument, LoggingEnabled, Payer,
RequestPaymentConfiguration, WebsiteConfiguration,
};
use http::Method;
use http::header::CONTENT_TYPE;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::process::Command;
use tracing::info;
fn awscurl_binary_path() -> PathBuf {
std::env::var_os("AWSCURL_PATH")
.map(PathBuf::from)
.unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("awscurl"))
}
fn awscurl_available() -> bool {
Command::new(awscurl_binary_path()).arg("--version").output().is_ok()
}
fn execute_s3_awscurl(
method: &str,
url: &str,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
) -> Result<String, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let output = Command::new(awscurl_binary_path())
.args([
"--service",
"s3",
"--region",
"us-east-1",
"--access_key",
access_key,
"--secret_key",
secret_key,
"-i",
"-X",
method,
url,
])
.output()?;
if !output.status.success() {
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
return Err(format!("awscurl failed: stderr='{stderr}', stdout='{stdout}'").into());
}
Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).to_string())
}
fn parse_status(raw: &str) -> Option<u16> {
raw.lines()
.filter_map(|line| {
if line.starts_with("HTTP/") {
line.split_whitespace().nth(1)?.parse::<u16>().ok()
} else {
None
}
})
.next_back()
}
fn parse_body(raw: &str) -> String {
if let Some(pos) = raw.rfind("\r\n\r\n") {
return raw[pos + 4..].to_string();
}
if let Some(pos) = raw.rfind("\n\n") {
return raw[pos + 2..].to_string();
}
String::new()
}
fn parse_headers(raw: &str) -> String {
let start = raw.rfind("HTTP/").unwrap_or(0);
let tail = &raw[start..];
if let Some(pos) = tail.find("\r\n\r\n") {
return tail[..pos].to_string();
}
if let Some(pos) = tail.find("\n\n") {
return tail[..pos].to_string();
}
tail.to_string()
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_dummy_bucket_compatibility_endpoints() {
@@ -470,10 +396,6 @@ mod tests {
async fn test_dummy_bucket_endpoints_http_contracts() {
init_logging();
info!("Starting test: dummy-compat bucket API HTTP contracts");
if !awscurl_available() {
info!("Skipping test_dummy_bucket_endpoints_http_contracts: awscurl binary not found");
return;
}
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("Failed to create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await.expect("Failed to start RustFS");
@@ -488,56 +410,112 @@ mod tests {
.await
.expect("Failed to create bucket");
let logging_raw = execute_s3_awscurl("GET", &format!("{}/{bucket}?logging=", env.url), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key)
.expect("GetBucketLogging HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(parse_status(&logging_raw), Some(200), "GetBucketLogging should return 200");
let logging_body = parse_body(&logging_raw);
let logging_response = signed_s3_request(
Method::GET,
&format!("{}/{bucket}?logging=", env.url),
None,
None,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await
.expect("GetBucketLogging HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(logging_response.status(), 200, "GetBucketLogging should return 200");
let logging_body = logging_response
.text()
.await
.expect("Failed to read GetBucketLogging response body");
assert!(
logging_body.contains("<BucketLoggingStatus"),
"GetBucketLogging response should contain BucketLoggingStatus XML, got: {logging_body}"
);
let accel_raw = execute_s3_awscurl("GET", &format!("{}/{bucket}?accelerate=", env.url), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key)
.expect("GetBucketAccelerateConfiguration HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(parse_status(&accel_raw), Some(200), "GetBucketAccelerateConfiguration should return 200");
let accel_body = parse_body(&accel_raw);
let accel_response = signed_s3_request(
Method::GET,
&format!("{}/{bucket}?accelerate=", env.url),
None,
None,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await
.expect("GetBucketAccelerateConfiguration HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(accel_response.status(), 200, "GetBucketAccelerateConfiguration should return 200");
let accel_body = accel_response
.text()
.await
.expect("Failed to read GetBucketAccelerateConfiguration response body");
assert!(
accel_body.contains("<AccelerateConfiguration"),
"GetBucketAccelerateConfiguration response should contain AccelerateConfiguration XML, got: {accel_body}"
);
let payment_raw =
execute_s3_awscurl("GET", &format!("{}/{bucket}?requestPayment=", env.url), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key)
.expect("GetBucketRequestPayment HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(parse_status(&payment_raw), Some(200), "GetBucketRequestPayment should return 200");
let payment_body = parse_body(&payment_raw);
let payment_response = signed_s3_request(
Method::GET,
&format!("{}/{bucket}?requestPayment=", env.url),
None,
None,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await
.expect("GetBucketRequestPayment HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(payment_response.status(), 200, "GetBucketRequestPayment should return 200");
let payment_body = payment_response
.text()
.await
.expect("Failed to read GetBucketRequestPayment response body");
assert!(
payment_body.contains("<Payer>BucketOwner</Payer>"),
"GetBucketRequestPayment should return BucketOwner payer, got: {payment_body}"
);
let website_raw = execute_s3_awscurl("GET", &format!("{}/{bucket}?website=", env.url), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key)
.expect("GetBucketWebsite HTTP request failed");
let website_response = signed_s3_request(
Method::GET,
&format!("{}/{bucket}?website=", env.url),
None,
None,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await
.expect("GetBucketWebsite HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(
parse_status(&website_raw),
Some(404),
website_response.status(),
404,
"GetBucketWebsite should return 404 when website config is absent"
);
let website_content_type = parse_headers(&website_raw).to_ascii_lowercase();
let website_content_type = website_response
.headers()
.get(CONTENT_TYPE)
.expect("GetBucketWebsite response should include Content-Type")
.to_str()
.expect("GetBucketWebsite Content-Type should be valid ASCII")
.to_ascii_lowercase();
assert!(
website_content_type.contains("content-type:") && website_content_type.contains("xml"),
website_content_type.contains("xml"),
"GetBucketWebsite error response should be XML, got content-type: {website_content_type}"
);
let website_body = parse_body(&website_raw);
let website_body = website_response
.text()
.await
.expect("Failed to read GetBucketWebsite response body");
assert!(
website_body.contains("<Code>NoSuchWebsiteConfiguration</Code>"),
"GetBucketWebsite should return NoSuchWebsiteConfiguration code, got: {website_body}"
);
let delete_raw =
execute_s3_awscurl("DELETE", &format!("{}/{bucket}?website=", env.url), &env.access_key, &env.secret_key)
.expect("DeleteBucketWebsite HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(parse_status(&delete_raw), Some(204), "DeleteBucketWebsite should return 204");
let delete_response = signed_s3_request(
Method::DELETE,
&format!("{}/{bucket}?website=", env.url),
None,
None,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
)
.await
.expect("DeleteBucketWebsite HTTP request failed");
assert_eq!(delete_response.status(), 204, "DeleteBucketWebsite should return 204");
env.stop_server();
}
@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression tests for bucket statistics and data usage accuracy.
//!
//! Covers the recurring pattern where bucket statistics (object count, size)
//! show stale/incorrect values, remain at 0, or oscillate between complete,
//! partial, and zero. This has regressed 10+ times.
//!
//! ## Regression Issues
//!
//! - rustfs#5615: bucket statistics remain unchanged after data expiration
//! - rustfs#5008: Admin usage reports only one pool
//! - rustfs#5116: Admin usage reports stale 0/0 for non-empty bucket after upgrade
//! - rustfs#5055: console object count and size still loading
//! - rustfs#5010: Storage usage info changed abnormally
//! - rustfs#3662: Incorrect bucket, object count and size
//! - rustfs#3898: DataUsageInfo undercounts versioned bucket versions
//! - rustfs#1012: Object count in the console doesn't change
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV, RustFSTestEnvironment, awscurl_get, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{BucketVersioningStatus, VersioningConfiguration};
use rustfs_data_usage::DataUsageInfo;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::error::Error;
use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep};
use tracing::info;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
async fn get_data_usage(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment) -> Result<DataUsageInfo, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/datausageinfo", env.url);
let resp = awscurl_get(&url, &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
Ok(serde_json::from_str(&resp)?)
}
/// RT-09: Verify bucket object count updates after PUT.
///
/// Regression pattern: bucket stats remain at 0 after objects are uploaded
/// (rustfs#5055, rustfs#1012).
///
/// Steps:
/// 1. Create a bucket
/// 2. Upload 10 objects
/// 3. Query admin data usage API
/// 4. Verify object count > 0
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_bucket_object_count_updates_after_put() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-09: bucket object count updates after PUT");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV)
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt09-stats-put";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Upload 10 objects
for i in 0..10 {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(format!("stat-obj-{i:04}.txt"))
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"statistical data"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
}
// Wait for scanner to process (up to 90 seconds)
let mut found_nonzero = false;
let mut last_query_error = None;
for attempt in 0..18 {
sleep(Duration::from_secs(5)).await;
let usage = match get_data_usage(&env).await {
Ok(usage) => {
last_query_error = None;
usage
}
Err(err) => {
last_query_error = Some(err.to_string());
continue;
}
};
if let Some(bucket_usage) = usage.buckets_usage.get(bucket) {
info!(" attempt {attempt}: objectsCount = {}", bucket_usage.objects_count);
if bucket_usage.objects_count >= 10 {
found_nonzero = true;
break;
}
}
}
assert!(
found_nonzero,
"RT-09 FAIL: bucket object count did not update after PUT 10 objects (regression: stats stuck at 0); last query error: {}",
last_query_error.as_deref().unwrap_or("none")
);
info!("RT-09 PASS: bucket object count updates after PUT");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-09b: Verify bucket stats update after DELETE.
///
/// Regression pattern: stats remain unchanged after objects are deleted
/// (rustfs#5615).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_bucket_object_count_updates_after_delete() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-09b: bucket object count updates after DELETE");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV)
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt09b-stats-delete";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Upload 5 objects
for i in 0..5 {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(format!("del-stat-{i}.txt"))
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"data"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
}
let mut found_nonzero = false;
for attempt in 0..18 {
sleep(Duration::from_secs(5)).await;
if let Ok(usage) = get_data_usage(&env).await
&& let Some(bucket_usage) = usage.buckets_usage.get(bucket)
{
info!(" baseline attempt {attempt}: objectsCount = {}", bucket_usage.objects_count);
if bucket_usage.objects_count >= 5 {
found_nonzero = true;
break;
}
}
}
assert!(found_nonzero, "RT-09b setup failed: scanner did not observe the 5 uploaded objects");
// Delete all objects
for i in 0..5 {
client
.delete_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(format!("del-stat-{i}.txt"))
.send()
.await
.expect("delete object");
}
// Wait for scanner to update stats (up to 90 seconds)
let mut found_zero = false;
let mut last_query_error = None;
for attempt in 0..18 {
sleep(Duration::from_secs(5)).await;
let usage = match get_data_usage(&env).await {
Ok(usage) => {
last_query_error = None;
usage
}
Err(err) => {
last_query_error = Some(err.to_string());
continue;
}
};
if let Some(bucket_usage) = usage.buckets_usage.get(bucket) {
info!(" attempt {attempt}: objectsCount = {}", bucket_usage.objects_count);
if bucket_usage.objects_count == 0 {
found_zero = true;
break;
}
}
}
assert!(
found_zero,
"RT-09b FAIL: bucket object count did not update to 0 after deleting all objects (regression rustfs#5615); last query error: {}",
last_query_error.as_deref().unwrap_or("none")
);
info!("RT-09b PASS: bucket object count updates to 0 after DELETE");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-09c: Verify versioned bucket stats count all versions.
///
/// Regression pattern: DataUsageInfo undercounts versioned bucket versions
/// and delete markers (rustfs#3898).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_versioned_bucket_stats_count_all_versions() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-09c: versioned bucket stats count all versions");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt09c-versioned-stats";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
client
.put_bucket_versioning()
.bucket(bucket)
.versioning_configuration(
VersioningConfiguration::builder()
.status(BucketVersioningStatus::Enabled)
.build(),
)
.send()
.await
.expect("enable versioning");
// Create 3 versions of the same object
for i in 0..3 {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("multi-version.txt")
.body(ByteStream::from(format!("version-{i}").into_bytes()))
.send()
.await
.expect("put version");
}
// Create a delete marker
client
.delete_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("multi-version.txt")
.send()
.await
.expect("create delete marker");
// Verify versions via API (immediate, no scanner wait)
let versions = client
.list_object_versions()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list versions");
assert_eq!(
versions.versions().len(),
3,
"RT-09c FAIL: expected 3 versions, found {}",
versions.versions().len()
);
assert_eq!(
versions.delete_markers().len(),
1,
"RT-09c FAIL: expected 1 delete marker, found {}",
versions.delete_markers().len()
);
info!("RT-09c PASS: versioned bucket correctly tracks all versions and delete markers");
Ok(())
}
}
+101
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ use http::header::{CONTENT_TYPE, HOST};
use rustfs_signer::constants::UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD;
use rustfs_signer::sign_v4;
use s3s::Body;
use std::collections::BTreeSet;
use std::error::Error;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use tracing::info;
@@ -48,6 +49,34 @@ use walkdir::WalkDir;
type ChaosResult<T> = Result<T, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
/// Physical `xl.meta` and shard-file census for one object version on one disk.
///
/// A successful S3 GET only proves that a quorum can serve an object. Replacement
/// tests need this lower-level record to prove that the rebuilt target holds the
/// `xl.meta` selected for a specific version and every `part.N` it declares.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
pub(crate) struct VersionShardCensus {
pub version_id: Option<String>,
pub has_xl_meta: bool,
pub data_dir: Option<String>,
pub expected_part_numbers: BTreeSet<usize>,
pub present_part_numbers: BTreeSet<usize>,
}
impl VersionShardCensus {
pub(crate) fn is_complete(&self) -> bool {
self.has_xl_meta && self.expected_part_numbers == self.present_part_numbers
}
pub(crate) fn matches_manifest(&self, manifest: &Self) -> bool {
self.version_id == manifest.version_id
&& self.is_complete()
&& manifest.is_complete()
&& self.data_dir == manifest.data_dir
&& self.expected_part_numbers == manifest.expected_part_numbers
}
}
/// Single-node RustFS server with `disk_count` local volume directories that
/// can be faulted individually while the server is running.
pub struct DiskFaultHarness {
@@ -219,6 +248,78 @@ impl DiskFaultHarness {
pub fn object_metadata_exists_on_disk(&self, disk_index: usize, bucket: &str, key: &str) -> bool {
self.disks[disk_index].join(bucket).join(key).join("xl.meta").is_file()
}
/// Census the physical files selected by `version_id` on one disk.
///
/// Missing metadata and missing shard files are represented in the returned
/// census rather than as an error so callers can poll replacement progress.
/// Invalid metadata or an unknown requested version remains an error: treating
/// either as an incomplete rebuild would hide corruption or a wrong-version
/// recovery result.
pub(crate) fn census_object_version(
&self,
disk_index: usize,
bucket: &str,
key: &str,
version_id: Option<&str>,
) -> ChaosResult<VersionShardCensus> {
census_object_version_on_disk(&self.disks[disk_index], bucket, key, version_id)
}
}
/// Census one physical object version without requiring a single-node harness.
/// Cluster replacement tests use the same evidence as the disk-fault tests.
pub(crate) fn census_object_version_on_disk(
disk: &Path,
bucket: &str,
key: &str,
version_id: Option<&str>,
) -> ChaosResult<VersionShardCensus> {
let version_id = version_id.map(str::to_owned);
let object_dir = disk.join(bucket).join(key);
let meta_path = object_dir.join("xl.meta");
if !meta_path.is_file() {
return Ok(VersionShardCensus {
version_id,
has_xl_meta: false,
data_dir: None,
expected_part_numbers: BTreeSet::new(),
present_part_numbers: BTreeSet::new(),
});
}
let metadata = rustfs_filemeta::FileMeta::load(&std::fs::read(&meta_path)?)?;
let file_info = metadata.into_fileinfo(bucket, key, version_id.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(), true, false, true)?;
let expected_part_numbers = if file_info.inline_data() {
BTreeSet::new()
} else {
file_info.parts.iter().map(|part| part.number).collect()
};
let data_dir = file_info.data_dir.map(|id| id.to_string());
let part_dir = data_dir.as_ref().map_or_else(|| object_dir.clone(), |id| object_dir.join(id));
let present_part_numbers = match std::fs::read_dir(&part_dir) {
Ok(entries) => entries
.filter_map(Result::ok)
.filter_map(|entry| {
entry
.file_type()
.ok()
.filter(|kind| kind.is_file())
.and_then(|_| entry.file_name().to_str().map(str::to_owned))
})
.filter_map(|name| name.strip_prefix("part.").and_then(|number| number.parse::<usize>().ok()))
.collect(),
Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => BTreeSet::new(),
Err(error) => return Err(error.into()),
};
Ok(VersionShardCensus {
version_id,
has_xl_meta: true,
data_dir,
expected_part_numbers,
present_part_numbers,
})
}
/// `POST` a signed (SigV4, service `s3`) admin request without relying on the
+137 -27
View File
@@ -47,11 +47,34 @@ use walkdir::WalkDir;
pub const DEFAULT_ACCESS_KEY: &str = "rustfsadmin";
pub const DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY: &str = "rustfsadmin";
pub const ENV_RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES: &str = "RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES";
pub(crate) const FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV: &[(&str, &str)] =
&[("RUSTFS_SCANNER_CYCLE", "1"), ("RUSTFS_SCANNER_START_DELAY_SECS", "0")];
pub const TEST_BUCKET: &str = "e2e-test-bucket";
const RUSTFS_FULL_FEATURE: &str = "full";
fn build_test_s3_config(endpoint_url: &str, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str, provider_name: &'static str) -> Config {
let credentials = Credentials::new(access_key, secret_key, None, None, provider_name);
fn capture_log_path(log_dir: &Path, temp_dir: &str) -> Option<PathBuf> {
let temp_name = Path::new(temp_dir).file_name()?.to_string_lossy();
Some(log_dir.join(format!("{temp_name}.log")))
}
fn configured_capture_log_path(temp_dir: &str) -> Option<String> {
let log_dir = std::env::var_os("RUSTFS_E2E_LOG_DIR")?;
if stdfs::create_dir_all(&log_dir).is_err() {
warn!(?log_dir, "failed to create configured E2E server log directory");
return None;
}
capture_log_path(Path::new(&log_dir), temp_dir).map(|path| path.to_string_lossy().into_owned())
}
pub(crate) fn build_test_s3_config(
endpoint_url: &str,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
session_token: Option<&str>,
provider_name: &'static str,
) -> Config {
let credentials = Credentials::new(access_key, secret_key, session_token.map(str::to_owned), None, provider_name);
let mut config = Config::builder()
.credentials_provider(credentials)
.region(Region::new("us-east-1"))
@@ -66,6 +89,33 @@ fn build_test_s3_config(endpoint_url: &str, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str,
config.build()
}
pub(crate) fn build_test_sts_client(
endpoint_url: &str,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
session_token: Option<&str>,
provider_name: &'static str,
) -> aws_sdk_sts::Client {
let mut config = aws_sdk_sts::Config::builder()
.credentials_provider(aws_sdk_sts::config::Credentials::new(
access_key,
secret_key,
session_token.map(str::to_owned),
None,
provider_name,
))
.region(aws_sdk_sts::config::Region::new("us-east-1"))
.endpoint_url(endpoint_url)
.retry_config(aws_sdk_sts::config::retry::RetryConfig::standard().with_max_attempts(1))
.behavior_version_latest();
if endpoint_url.starts_with("http://") {
config = config.http_client(SmithyHttpClientBuilder::new().build_http());
}
aws_sdk_sts::Client::from_conf(config.build())
}
pub fn workspace_root() -> PathBuf {
let mut path = PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"));
path.pop(); // e2e_test
@@ -80,6 +130,57 @@ pub fn local_http_client() -> HttpClient {
.expect("failed to build local reqwest client")
}
pub(crate) async fn signed_s3_request(
method: http::Method,
url: &str,
body: Option<String>,
content_type: Option<&str>,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
signed_s3_request_with_session_token(method, url, body, content_type, access_key, secret_key, None).await
}
async fn signed_s3_request_with_session_token(
method: http::Method,
url: &str,
body: Option<String>,
content_type: Option<&str>,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
session_token: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<reqwest::Response, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("S3 URL missing authority")?.to_string();
let mut request = http::Request::builder()
.method(method.clone())
.uri(uri)
.header(HOST, authority)
.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
if let Some(content_type) = content_type {
request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, content_type);
}
let content_length = i64::try_from(body.as_ref().map_or(0, String::len)).map_err(|_| "S3 request body is too large")?;
let signed = sign_v4(
request.body(Body::empty())?,
content_length,
access_key,
secret_key,
session_token.unwrap_or_default(),
"us-east-1",
);
let mut request = local_http_client().request(method, url);
for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
request = request.header(name, value);
}
if let Some(body) = body {
request = request.body(body);
}
Ok(request.send().await?)
}
/// Signs and sends an admin HTTP request with the given credentials.
pub(crate) async fn admin_request(
base_url: &str,
@@ -88,30 +189,23 @@ pub(crate) async fn admin_request(
body: Option<String>,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
) -> Result<(StatusCode, String), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
admin_request_with_session_token(base_url, method, path_and_query, body, access_key, secret_key, None).await
}
pub(crate) async fn admin_request_with_session_token(
base_url: &str,
method: http::Method,
path_and_query: &str,
body: Option<String>,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
session_token: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<(StatusCode, String), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let url = format!("{base_url}{path_and_query}");
let uri = url.parse::<http::Uri>()?;
let authority = uri.authority().ok_or("admin URL missing authority")?.to_string();
let mut request = http::Request::builder()
.method(method.clone())
.uri(uri)
.header(HOST, authority)
.header("x-amz-content-sha256", UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD);
if body.is_some() {
request = request.header(CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json");
}
let content_length = i64::try_from(body.as_ref().map_or(0, String::len)).map_err(|_| "admin request body is too large")?;
let signed = sign_v4(request.body(Body::empty())?, content_length, access_key, secret_key, "", "us-east-1");
let mut request = local_http_client().request(method, &url);
for (name, value) in signed.headers() {
request = request.header(name, value);
}
if let Some(body) = body {
request = request.body(body);
}
let response = request.send().await?;
let content_type = body.as_ref().map(|_| "application/json");
let response =
signed_s3_request_with_session_token(method, &url, body, content_type, access_key, secret_key, session_token).await?;
let status = response.status();
let body = response.text().await?;
Ok((status, body))
@@ -361,6 +455,7 @@ impl RustFSTestEnvironment {
pub async fn new() -> Result<Self, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let temp_dir = format!("/tmp/rustfs_e2e_test_{}", Uuid::new_v4());
fs::create_dir_all(&temp_dir).await?;
let capture_log_path = configured_capture_log_path(&temp_dir);
// Use a unique port for each test environment
let port = Self::find_available_port().await?;
@@ -374,7 +469,7 @@ impl RustFSTestEnvironment {
access_key: DEFAULT_ACCESS_KEY.to_string(),
secret_key: DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY.to_string(),
process: None,
capture_log_path: None,
capture_log_path,
})
}
@@ -382,6 +477,7 @@ impl RustFSTestEnvironment {
pub async fn with_address(address: &str) -> Result<Self, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let temp_dir = format!("/tmp/rustfs_e2e_test_{}", Uuid::new_v4());
fs::create_dir_all(&temp_dir).await?;
let capture_log_path = configured_capture_log_path(&temp_dir);
let url = format!("http://{address}");
@@ -392,7 +488,7 @@ impl RustFSTestEnvironment {
access_key: DEFAULT_ACCESS_KEY.to_string(),
secret_key: DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY.to_string(),
process: None,
capture_log_path: None,
capture_log_path,
})
}
@@ -547,7 +643,12 @@ impl RustFSTestEnvironment {
/// Create an AWS S3 client configured for this RustFS instance
pub fn create_s3_client(&self) -> Client {
Client::from_conf(build_test_s3_config(&self.url, &self.access_key, &self.secret_key, "e2e-test"))
self.create_s3_client_with_credentials(&self.access_key, &self.secret_key)
}
/// Create an AWS S3 client with explicit credentials for this RustFS instance.
pub fn create_s3_client_with_credentials(&self, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str) -> Client {
Client::from_conf(build_test_s3_config(&self.url, access_key, secret_key, None, "e2e-test"))
}
/// Create test bucket
@@ -1279,6 +1380,7 @@ impl RustFSTestClusterEnvironment {
&self.nodes[node_idx].url,
&self.access_key,
&self.secret_key,
None,
"cluster-test",
)))
}
@@ -1392,6 +1494,14 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(normalize_rustfs_build_features(" , "), None);
}
#[test]
fn capture_log_path_uses_temp_directory_basename() {
assert_eq!(
capture_log_path(Path::new("/tmp/e2e-logs"), "/tmp/rustfs_e2e_test_abc"),
Some(PathBuf::from("/tmp/e2e-logs/rustfs_e2e_test_abc.log"))
);
}
#[test]
fn full_feature_enables_any_required_feature() {
assert!(rustfs_build_feature_enabled(Some("full"), "sftp"));
+28 -12
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ use rustfs_data_usage::DataUsageInfo;
use serial_test::serial;
use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep};
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, TEST_BUCKET, awscurl_get, init_logging};
use crate::common::{FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV, RustFSTestEnvironment, TEST_BUCKET, awscurl_get, init_logging};
async fn get_data_usage_info(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment) -> Result<DataUsageInfo, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/datausageinfo", env.url);
@@ -35,16 +35,26 @@ where
F: FnMut(&DataUsageInfo) -> bool,
{
let mut last_usage = DataUsageInfo::default();
let mut last_query_error = None;
for _ in 0..45 {
let usage = get_data_usage_info(env).await?;
if usage.buckets_usage.contains_key(bucket) && predicate(&usage) {
return Ok(usage);
match get_data_usage_info(env).await {
Ok(usage) => {
last_query_error = None;
if usage.buckets_usage.contains_key(bucket) && predicate(&usage) {
return Ok(usage);
}
last_usage = usage;
}
Err(err) => last_query_error = Some(err.to_string()),
}
last_usage = usage;
sleep(Duration::from_secs(2)).await;
}
Err(format!("bucket usage did not converge for {bucket}; last usage: {last_usage:?}").into())
Err(format!(
"bucket usage did not converge for {bucket}; last usage: {last_usage:?}; last query error: {}",
last_query_error.as_deref().unwrap_or("none")
)
.into())
}
/// Regression test for data usage accuracy (issue #1012).
@@ -56,7 +66,7 @@ async fn data_usage_reports_all_objects() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Erro
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV).await?;
let client = env.create_s3_client();
@@ -74,8 +84,14 @@ async fn data_usage_reports_all_objects() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Erro
.await?;
}
// Query admin data usage API
let usage = get_data_usage_info(&env).await?;
let usage = wait_for_bucket_usage(&env, TEST_BUCKET, |usage| {
usage
.buckets_usage
.get(TEST_BUCKET)
.map(|bucket_usage| usage.objects_total_count >= 1000 && bucket_usage.objects_count >= 1000)
.unwrap_or(false)
})
.await?;
// Assert total object count and per-bucket count are not truncated
let bucket_usage = usage
@@ -108,7 +124,7 @@ async fn data_usage_reports_versioned_objects_and_delete_markers() -> Result<(),
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV).await?;
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "data-usage-versioned";
@@ -184,8 +200,8 @@ async fn data_usage_reports_versioned_objects_and_delete_markers() -> Result<(),
assert_eq!(usage.versions_total_count, 3, "total version count should match bucket usage");
assert_eq!(usage.delete_markers_total_count, 1, "total delete marker count should match bucket usage");
env.stop_server();
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
env.restart_server_preserving_data(vec![], FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV)
.await?;
let restarted_usage = wait_for_bucket_usage(&env, bucket, |usage| {
usage
@@ -0,0 +1,445 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression tests for object delete operations.
//!
//! Covers the recurring pattern where DELETE succeeds at the API level but the
//! object remains visible in LIST, or deleted objects reappear after restart,
//! or versioned delete operations fail with FileAccessDenied.
//! This has regressed 15+ times across the entire release history.
//!
//! ## Regression Issues
//!
//! - rustfs#5375: delete object in a bucket list api also exist this object
//! - rustfs#5349: The deleted bucket was rebuilt after some time
//! - rustfs#5339: data not delete in Object Lock bucket
//! - rustfs#5029: Node Does Not Remove Files After Reconnect to Cluster
//! - rustfs#4978: DELETE fails with InternalError/FileAccessDenied on beta 10
//! - rustfs#760: Cannot delete a versioned bucket
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{BucketVersioningStatus, Delete, ObjectIdentifier, VersioningConfiguration};
use serial_test::serial;
use std::error::Error;
use tracing::info;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
/// RT-05: Verify DELETE → LIST → HEAD consistency.
///
/// Regression pattern: DELETE returns 200 but the object remains in LIST.
/// Covers rustfs#5375.
///
/// Steps:
/// 1. Create a bucket and upload an object
/// 2. Verify the object is in LIST
/// 3. DELETE the object
/// 4. Verify the object is NOT in LIST
/// 5. Verify HEAD returns 404
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_delete_removes_object_from_list() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-05: delete removes object from list");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt05-delete-consistency";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Upload an object
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("to-delete.txt")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"will be deleted"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
// Verify it appears in LIST
let list = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list objects before delete");
assert!(
list.contents()
.iter()
.map(|o| o.key().unwrap_or(""))
.any(|key| key == "to-delete.txt"),
"RT-05 FAIL: object not in LIST before delete"
);
// DELETE
client
.delete_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("to-delete.txt")
.send()
.await
.expect("delete object");
// Verify NOT in LIST
let list = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list objects after delete");
assert!(
!list
.contents()
.iter()
.map(|o| o.key().unwrap_or(""))
.any(|key| key == "to-delete.txt"),
"RT-05 FAIL: deleted object still in LIST (regression rustfs#5375)"
);
// Verify HEAD returns 404
let head = client.head_object().bucket(bucket).key("to-delete.txt").send().await;
assert!(head.is_err(), "RT-05 FAIL: HEAD on deleted object should return error, got success");
info!("RT-05 PASS: delete correctly removes object from LIST and HEAD");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-05c: Verify batch delete (DeleteObjects) consistency.
///
/// Regression pattern: batch delete returns success but some objects
/// remain in LIST.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_batch_delete_removes_all_objects() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-05c: batch delete removes all objects");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt05c-batch-delete";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Upload multiple objects
let keys: Vec<String> = (0..5).map(|i| format!("batch-{i:04}.txt")).collect();
for key in &keys {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"batch-delete-me"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
}
// Verify all in LIST
let list = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list before batch delete");
assert_eq!(
list.contents().len(),
5,
"RT-05c FAIL: expected 5 objects before batch delete, found {}",
list.contents().len()
);
// Batch delete
let objects: Vec<ObjectIdentifier> = keys
.iter()
.map(|k| ObjectIdentifier::builder().key(k).build().expect("build object id"))
.collect();
client
.delete_objects()
.bucket(bucket)
.delete(Delete::builder().set_objects(Some(objects)).build().expect("build delete"))
.send()
.await
.expect("batch delete");
// Verify all removed
let list = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list after batch delete");
assert!(
list.contents().is_empty(),
"RT-05c FAIL: {} objects remain after batch delete (regression: delete objects not fully applied)",
list.contents().len()
);
info!("RT-05c PASS: batch delete removes all objects");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-05d: Verify versioned delete → permanent delete → object gone.
///
/// Covers the pattern where permanent deletion of a specific version
/// fails with FileAccessDenied (rustfs#4978).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_versioned_permanent_delete() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-05d: versioned permanent delete");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt05d-permanent-delete";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
client
.put_bucket_versioning()
.bucket(bucket)
.versioning_configuration(
VersioningConfiguration::builder()
.status(BucketVersioningStatus::Enabled)
.build(),
)
.send()
.await
.expect("enable versioning");
// Upload a single object (single version)
let put_resp = client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("single-version.txt")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"to-be-permanently-deleted"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
let version_id = put_resp.version_id().expect("version ID should be present").to_string();
// Permanently delete the specific version (rustfs#4978: FileAccessDenied)
client
.delete_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("single-version.txt")
.version_id(&version_id)
.send()
.await
.expect("permanent delete should succeed (regression rustfs#4978)");
// Verify the object is completely gone
let versions = client
.list_object_versions()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list versions");
assert!(
versions.versions().is_empty(),
"RT-05d FAIL: version still present after permanent delete"
);
info!("RT-05d PASS: versioned permanent delete succeeds");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-05e: Verify delete marker + version history interaction.
///
/// Covers the pattern where creating a delete marker and then listing
/// versions shows incorrect state (rustfs#760).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_versioned_delete_marker_and_list_consistency() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-05e: versioned delete marker and list consistency");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt05e-dm-consistency";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
client
.put_bucket_versioning()
.bucket(bucket)
.versioning_configuration(
VersioningConfiguration::builder()
.status(BucketVersioningStatus::Enabled)
.build(),
)
.send()
.await
.expect("enable versioning");
// Create 3 versions
for i in 0..3 {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("history.txt")
.body(ByteStream::from(format!("v{i}").into_bytes()))
.send()
.await
.expect("put version");
}
// Create a delete marker
let del = client
.delete_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("history.txt")
.send()
.await
.expect("delete (create marker)");
assert!(del.delete_marker().unwrap_or(false), "RT-05e FAIL: should have created a delete marker");
// ListObjectVersions should show 3 versions + 1 delete marker
let versions = client
.list_object_versions()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list versions");
assert_eq!(
versions.versions().len(),
3,
"RT-05e FAIL: expected 3 versions, found {}",
versions.versions().len()
);
assert_eq!(
versions.delete_markers().len(),
1,
"RT-05e FAIL: expected 1 delete marker, found {}",
versions.delete_markers().len()
);
// Now delete the delete marker (restore the object)
let dm_version = &versions.delete_markers()[0];
client
.delete_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("history.txt")
.version_id(dm_version.version_id().expect("dm version id"))
.send()
.await
.expect("delete delete-marker");
// HEAD should succeed now (latest version is accessible)
let head = client.head_object().bucket(bucket).key("history.txt").send().await;
assert!(head.is_ok(), "RT-05e FAIL: HEAD should succeed after removing delete marker");
info!("RT-05e PASS: versioned delete marker and list consistency");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-05f: Verify object deletion does not leave orphan data on disk.
///
/// Regression pattern: after delete, the object data files remain on disk
/// (rustfs#5029: Node Does Not Remove Files After Reconnect).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_delete_removes_object_head_returns_404() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-05f: delete → HEAD 404 consistency");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt05f-delete-head";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Upload, delete, verify HEAD returns 404
let keys = vec!["small.txt", "medium.txt", "with-slash.txt", "special+chars.txt"];
for key in &keys {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(*key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"delete-me"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
}
for key in &keys {
client
.delete_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(*key)
.send()
.await
.expect("delete object");
}
// All HEAD requests should return 404
for key in &keys {
let head = client.head_object().bucket(bucket).key(*key).send().await;
assert!(head.is_err(), "RT-05f FAIL: HEAD on deleted key '{key}' should return error");
}
// LIST should be empty
let list = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list after all deletes");
assert!(
list.contents().is_empty(),
"RT-05f FAIL: {} objects remain after deleting all",
list.contents().len()
);
info!("RT-05f PASS: all deleted objects return 404 on HEAD");
Ok(())
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression tests for distributed cluster startup and quorum.
//!
//! Covers the recurring pattern where multi-node clusters fail to start due to
//! lock quorum issues, DNS resolution delays, or erasure quorum deadlocks.
//! This has regressed 7+ times.
//!
//! ## Regression Issues
//!
//! - rustfs#5416: RustFS cannot cold-start with 2/3 quorum when Pod DNS missing
//! - rustfs#2945: Distributed mode fails on K8s: erasure quorum deadlock
//! - rustfs#2794: distributed deployment does not become ready
//! - rustfs#2601: fresh pod immediately enters FaultyDisk state
//! - rustfs#4040: Distributed startup can fail lock quorum before AppContext initializes
//! - rustfs#5655: fix(ecstore): bootstrap fresh four-node clusters reliably
//! - rustfs#4954: S3/health endpoint unavailability after multi-pool scale-up
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{RustFSTestClusterEnvironment, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::error::Error;
use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep};
use tracing::info;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
/// RT-10: Verify 4-node cluster starts successfully and all nodes are ready.
///
/// Regression pattern: distributed startup fails with quorum deadlock or
/// lock acquisition timeout (rustfs#2945, rustfs#5655).
///
/// Steps:
/// 1. Create a 4-node cluster
/// 2. Start all nodes simultaneously
/// 3. Verify all nodes report healthy
/// 4. Verify S3 operations work through any node
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_four_node_cluster_startup_and_health() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-10: 4-node cluster startup and health");
let mut cluster = RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::new(4).await.expect("create 4-node cluster");
cluster.start().await.expect("start 4-node cluster");
// Create a bucket and verify it's accessible from all nodes
cluster
.create_test_bucket("rt10-startup")
.await
.expect("create bucket on cluster");
let clients = cluster.create_all_clients().expect("create per-node clients");
// Verify S3 operations work from every node
for (i, client) in clients.iter().enumerate() {
client
.put_object()
.bucket("rt10-startup")
.key(format!("from-node-{i}.txt"))
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"hello from node"))
.send()
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("PUT from node {i} failed: {e}"));
}
// Verify all objects are visible from node 0
let list = clients[0]
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket("rt10-startup")
.send()
.await
.expect("list objects from node 0");
assert_eq!(
list.contents().len(),
4,
"RT-10 FAIL: expected 4 objects (one per node), found {}",
list.contents().len()
);
info!("RT-10 PASS: 4-node cluster starts and serves S3 from all nodes");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-10b: Verify cluster handles node restart gracefully.
///
/// Regression pattern: after a node restart, it cannot rejoin the cluster
/// or enters a faulty state (rustfs#2601).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_cluster_survives_node_restart() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-10b: cluster survives node restart");
let mut cluster = RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::new(4).await.expect("create 4-node cluster");
cluster.start().await.expect("start cluster");
cluster.create_test_bucket("rt10b-restart").await.expect("create bucket");
// Write data
let clients = cluster.create_all_clients()?;
clients[0]
.put_object()
.bucket("rt10b-restart")
.key("before-restart.txt")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"persistent data"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object before restart");
// Stop node 3
cluster.stop_node(3).expect("stop node 3");
sleep(Duration::from_secs(2)).await;
// Verify cluster still works with 3/4 nodes (quorum)
clients[0]
.put_object()
.bucket("rt10b-restart")
.key("during-offline.txt")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"written while node 3 down"))
.send()
.await
.expect("PUT should succeed with 3/4 nodes");
// Restart node 3
cluster.start_node(3).await.expect("restart node 3");
// Wait for node to rejoin
sleep(Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
// Verify the restarted node can serve reads
let list = clients[3]
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket("rt10b-restart")
.send()
.await
.expect("list from restarted node");
assert!(
list.contents().len() >= 2,
"RT-10b FAIL: restarted node sees {} objects, expected >= 2",
list.contents().len()
);
info!("RT-10b PASS: cluster survives and recovers from node restart");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-10c: Verify bucket creation persists across all nodes.
///
/// Regression pattern: bucket metadata is not replicated to all nodes,
/// causing NoSuchBucket errors on some nodes (rustfs#3191).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_bucket_visible_from_all_nodes() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-10c: bucket visible from all nodes");
let mut cluster = RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::new(4).await.expect("create 4-node cluster");
cluster.start().await.expect("start cluster");
cluster
.create_test_bucket("rt10c-bucket-visibility")
.await
.expect("create bucket");
let clients = cluster.create_all_clients()?;
// Verify the bucket is visible from every node
for (i, client) in clients.iter().enumerate() {
let resp = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket("rt10c-bucket-visibility")
.send()
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("list from node {i} failed (NoSuchBucket?): {e}"));
assert!(resp.contents().is_empty(), "RT-10c: fresh bucket should be empty on node {i}");
}
info!("RT-10c PASS: bucket visible from all 4 nodes");
Ok(())
}
}
+81 -16
View File
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ pub struct RequestRecord {
#[derive(Default)]
struct ControlState {
scripts: HashMap<Operation, VecDeque<FaultAction>>,
keyed_scripts: HashMap<(Operation, String), VecDeque<FaultAction>>,
requests: VecDeque<RequestRecord>,
next_sequence: u64,
}
@@ -352,25 +353,44 @@ impl FakeS3Target {
state.buckets.entry(bucket).or_default();
}
/// Remove all retained object versions while preserving the bucket.
pub fn clear_bucket_objects(&self, bucket: &str) {
let mut state = lock(&self.backend.store);
let (removed_versions, removed_bytes) = state
.buckets
.get_mut(bucket)
.expect("fake target bucket must exist")
.objects
.drain()
.flat_map(|(_, versions)| versions)
.fold((0usize, 0usize), |(count, bytes), version| (count + 1, bytes + version.body.len()));
state.total_versions = state
.total_versions
.checked_sub(removed_versions)
.expect("fake target version accounting must not underflow");
state.total_bytes = state
.total_bytes
.checked_sub(removed_bytes)
.expect("fake target byte accounting must not underflow");
}
pub fn has_object(&self, bucket: &str, key: &str) -> bool {
lock(&self.backend.store)
.buckets
.get(bucket)
.and_then(|bucket| bucket.objects.get(key))
.and_then(|versions| versions.last())
.is_some_and(|version| !version.delete_marker)
}
/// Queue `times` copies of a fault for one operation.
pub fn inject(&self, operation: Operation, action: FaultAction, times: usize) {
if times == 0 {
return;
}
if let FaultAction::SlowDrain { chunk_bytes: 0, .. } = action {
panic!("slow-drain chunk size must be non-zero");
}
match &action {
FaultAction::Delay(duration) if *duration > MAX_FAULT_DURATION => {
panic!("fault delay must not exceed 30 seconds");
}
FaultAction::SlowDrain { delay, .. } if *delay >= MAX_FAULT_DURATION => {
panic!("slow-drain slice delay must be below 30 seconds");
}
_ => {}
}
validate_fault_action(&action);
let mut state = lock(&self.control);
let queued = state.scripts.values().map(VecDeque::len).sum::<usize>();
let queued = queued_fault_count(&state);
if queued.checked_add(times).is_none_or(|total| total > MAX_SCRIPTED_FAULTS) {
panic!("fake target queues at most 4096 scripted faults");
}
@@ -381,8 +401,28 @@ impl FakeS3Target {
.extend(std::iter::repeat_n(action, times));
}
/// Queue faults for one exact object key without affecting concurrent requests.
pub fn inject_for_key(&self, operation: Operation, key: impl Into<String>, action: FaultAction, times: usize) {
if times == 0 {
return;
}
validate_fault_action(&action);
let mut state = lock(&self.control);
let queued = queued_fault_count(&state);
if queued.checked_add(times).is_none_or(|total| total > MAX_SCRIPTED_FAULTS) {
panic!("fake target queues at most 4096 scripted faults");
}
state
.keyed_scripts
.entry((operation, key.into()))
.or_default()
.extend(std::iter::repeat_n(action, times));
}
pub fn clear_faults(&self) {
lock(&self.control).scripts.clear();
let mut state = lock(&self.control);
state.scripts.clear();
state.keyed_scripts.clear();
}
pub fn requests(&self) -> Vec<RequestRecord> {
@@ -420,6 +460,25 @@ fn lock<T>(mutex: &Mutex<T>) -> MutexGuard<'_, T> {
mutex.lock().unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner)
}
fn validate_fault_action(action: &FaultAction) {
if let FaultAction::SlowDrain { chunk_bytes: 0, .. } = action {
panic!("slow-drain chunk size must be non-zero");
}
match action {
FaultAction::Delay(duration) if *duration > MAX_FAULT_DURATION => {
panic!("fault delay must not exceed 30 seconds");
}
FaultAction::SlowDrain { delay, .. } if *delay >= MAX_FAULT_DURATION => {
panic!("slow-drain slice delay must be below 30 seconds");
}
_ => {}
}
}
fn queued_fault_count(state: &ControlState) -> usize {
state.scripts.values().map(VecDeque::len).sum::<usize>() + state.keyed_scripts.values().map(VecDeque::len).sum::<usize>()
}
#[async_trait]
impl S3Access for FaultAccess {
async fn check(&self, context: &mut S3AccessContext<'_>) -> S3Result<()> {
@@ -492,7 +551,12 @@ fn record_request(
content_length: Option<u64>,
) -> Option<RequestFault> {
let mut state = lock(control);
let action = state.scripts.get_mut(&operation).and_then(VecDeque::pop_front);
let action = parsed
.key
.as_ref()
.and_then(|key| state.keyed_scripts.get_mut(&(operation, key.clone())))
.and_then(VecDeque::pop_front)
.or_else(|| state.scripts.get_mut(&operation).and_then(VecDeque::pop_front));
state.next_sequence += 1;
let sequence = state.next_sequence;
if state.requests.len() == MAX_REQUEST_RECORDS {
@@ -574,7 +638,8 @@ fn parse_request(method: &Method, uri: &Uri) -> ParsedRequest {
(&Method::POST, true) if query.contains_key("uploads") => Operation::CreateMultipartUpload,
(&Method::POST, true) if upload_id.is_some() => Operation::CompleteMultipartUpload,
(&Method::DELETE, true) if upload_id.is_some() => Operation::AbortMultipartUpload,
(&Method::PUT, true) if only_query_keys(&[]) => Operation::PutObject,
// A replication PUT addresses the source version via `?versionId=`.
(&Method::PUT, true) if only_query_keys(&["versionId"]) => Operation::PutObject,
(&Method::GET, true) if only_query_keys(&["versionId"]) => Operation::GetObject,
(&Method::HEAD, true) if only_query_keys(&["versionId"]) => Operation::HeadObject,
(&Method::DELETE, true) if only_query_keys(&["versionId"]) => Operation::DeleteObject,
@@ -431,4 +431,104 @@ mod tests {
)
.into())
}
/// Issue #5850: `background-heal/status` must answer while a peer is down.
///
/// Exercises the production path in `read_cluster_heal_status` end to end,
/// which the unit tests around `merge_peer_heal_statuses` cannot: with one
/// node stopped, the endpoint must return 200 with
/// `clusterStatusComplete: false` and an explicit `degraded` (or, when
/// heal work is known active, `active`) state — never the previous
/// cluster-wide 500 — and must return to a complete, non-degraded answer
/// once the node rejoins. Reverting either all-or-nothing gate (the
/// topology early-return or the merge hard-fail) turns the down-window
/// response into a 500 and fails this test.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_background_heal_status_degrades_while_peer_down_and_recovers_after_rejoin()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
info!("Issue #5850: background-heal/status must degrade, not 500, while a peer is down");
let mut cluster = RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::new(4).await?;
cluster.set_env("RUSTFS_UNSAFE_BYPASS_DISK_CHECK", "true");
cluster.start().await?;
let status_url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/background-heal/status", cluster.nodes[0].url);
// Owned copies: the closure must not borrow `cluster`, which
// stop_node/start_node need mutably between polls.
let access_key = cluster.access_key.clone();
let secret_key = cluster.secret_key.clone();
let fetch_status = || async {
let body = signed_admin_post(&status_url, None, &access_key, &secret_key).await?;
let json: serde_json::Value =
serde_json::from_str(&body).map_err(|err| format!("heal status response is not JSON ({err}): {body}"))?;
Ok::<serde_json::Value, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>(json)
};
// Healthy cluster: the answer must be definitive. Poll briefly — the
// peer grid may still be settling right after start().
let mut healthy = fetch_status().await?;
for _ in 0..30 {
if healthy["clusterStatusComplete"] == serde_json::Value::Bool(true) {
break;
}
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
healthy = fetch_status().await?;
}
assert_eq!(
healthy["clusterStatusComplete"],
serde_json::Value::Bool(true),
"healthy cluster should report a complete heal status: {healthy}"
);
cluster.stop_node(1)?;
// While the peer is down every response must stay 200 (signed_admin_post
// fails on any non-2xx, so the old 500 fails the test immediately) and
// must degrade to an explicitly-partial answer. The peer query timeout
// is 5 s, so a couple of polls are enough for the dead peer to surface.
let mut degraded = serde_json::Value::Null;
for _ in 0..30 {
degraded = fetch_status().await?;
if degraded["clusterStatusComplete"] == serde_json::Value::Bool(false) {
break;
}
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
assert_eq!(
degraded["clusterStatusComplete"],
serde_json::Value::Bool(false),
"heal status must mark itself partial while a peer is down: {degraded}"
);
let state = degraded["state"].as_str().unwrap_or_default();
assert!(
state == "degraded" || state == "active",
"a partial answer must be labeled degraded (or active for known work), got {state:?}: {degraded}"
);
cluster.start_node(1).await?;
// After the rejoin the endpoint must return to a definitive answer.
let mut recovered = serde_json::Value::Null;
for _ in 0..60 {
recovered = fetch_status().await?;
if recovered["clusterStatusComplete"] == serde_json::Value::Bool(true) {
break;
}
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
assert_eq!(
recovered["clusterStatusComplete"],
serde_json::Value::Bool(true),
"heal status should be complete again after the node rejoined: {recovered}"
);
assert_ne!(
recovered["state"].as_str().unwrap_or_default(),
"degraded",
"a complete answer must not be labeled degraded: {recovered}"
);
Ok(())
}
}
@@ -1687,6 +1687,44 @@ async fn four_node_inline_storage_and_get_boundaries() -> TestResult {
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn four_node_empty_legacy_volumes_start_as_fresh() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut cluster = RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::new(4).await?;
for data_dir in cluster.nodes.iter().flat_map(|node| &node.data_dirs) {
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(Path::new(data_dir).join(".minio.sys")).await?;
}
cluster.start().await?;
// Starting is not the assertion. The regression is that an empty legacy
// `.minio.sys` must be classified as a *fresh* volume, not as an existing
// MinIO deployment to adopt or migrate. Pin what that classification leaves
// on disk and in the namespace.
let buckets = cluster.create_s3_client(0)?.list_buckets().send().await?;
assert!(
buckets.buckets().is_empty(),
"a fresh classification must not adopt buckets from the pre-existing directories, got {:?}",
buckets.buckets().iter().filter_map(|b| b.name()).collect::<Vec<_>>()
);
for data_dir in cluster.nodes.iter().flat_map(|node| &node.data_dirs) {
assert!(
Path::new(data_dir).join(".rustfs.sys").join("format.json").is_file(),
"each drive must be formatted as fresh: {data_dir} has no .rustfs.sys/format.json"
);
let mut legacy = tokio::fs::read_dir(Path::new(data_dir).join(".minio.sys")).await?;
assert!(
legacy.next_entry().await?.is_none(),
"the empty legacy directory must be left untouched, not migrated into: {data_dir}"
);
}
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn four_node_inline_fallback_controls() -> TestResult {
@@ -2173,11 +2211,6 @@ async fn four_node_manual_transition_distributed_admission_conflict_reports_stat
"queue_snapshot.{field} must be readable in terminal status: {terminal}"
);
}
assert!(
cold_tier_object_count(&cold_client).await? < 64,
"queue pressure should leave at least one object untransitioned"
);
Ok(())
}
@@ -21,9 +21,12 @@
use super::common::LocalKMSTestEnvironment;
use crate::common::{TEST_BUCKET, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{
ServerSideEncryption, ServerSideEncryptionByDefault, ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration, ServerSideEncryptionRule,
ChecksumAlgorithm, ChecksumMode, CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart, ServerSideEncryption,
ServerSideEncryptionByDefault, ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration, ServerSideEncryptionRule,
};
use rustfs_rio::{Checksum, ChecksumType};
use serial_test::serial;
use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
@@ -273,7 +276,7 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_sse_kms_put_object() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::err
/// Test 3: When bucket is configured with default encryption, create_multipart_upload should inherit the configuration
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
async fn test_bucket_default_sse_kms_multipart_crc32() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
info!("Testing bucket default encryption impact on create_multipart_upload");
@@ -309,15 +312,16 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
.await
.expect("Failed to set bucket encryption");
// Step 2: Create multipart upload (without specifying encryption parameters)
info!("Creating multipart upload (without specifying encryption parameters, should use bucket default configuration)");
let test_key = "test-multipart-bucket-default.txt";
// Step 2: Declare CRC32 without specifying encryption parameters. The AWS SDK
// calculates each UploadPart checksum and sends it as a flexible checksum.
info!("Creating CRC32 multipart upload that should use bucket default encryption");
let test_key = "test-multipart-bucket-default-crc32.bin";
let create_multipart_response = s3_client
.create_multipart_upload()
.bucket(TEST_BUCKET)
.key(test_key)
// Note: No encryption parameters specified here, should use bucket default configuration
.checksum_algorithm(ChecksumAlgorithm::Crc32)
.send()
.await
.expect("Failed to create multipart upload");
@@ -343,28 +347,61 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
"create_multipart_upload response should contain correct KMS key ID"
);
// Step 3: Upload a part and complete multipart upload
info!("Uploading part and completing multipart upload");
let test_data = b"test-multipart-bucket-default-encryption-data";
// Step 3: Upload two parts. The first is exactly the S3 minimum size so this
// follows the same managed SSE-KMS multipart path as issue #5756.
const PART_SIZE: usize = 5 * 1024 * 1024;
let part1: Vec<u8> = (0..PART_SIZE).map(|i| (i % 251) as u8).collect();
let part2: Vec<u8> = (0..1024 * 1024).map(|i| ((i + 17) % 251) as u8).collect();
let expected_body: Vec<u8> = part1.iter().chain(&part2).copied().collect();
// Upload part 1
let upload_part_response = s3_client
.upload_part()
.bucket(TEST_BUCKET)
.key(test_key)
.upload_id(upload_id)
.part_number(1)
.body(test_data.to_vec().into())
.send()
.await
.expect("Failed to upload part");
let upload_part = |part_number: i32, body: Vec<u8>| {
s3_client
.upload_part()
.bucket(TEST_BUCKET)
.key(test_key)
.upload_id(upload_id)
.part_number(part_number)
.checksum_algorithm(ChecksumAlgorithm::Crc32)
.body(ByteStream::from(body))
.send()
};
let etag = upload_part_response.e_tag().unwrap().to_string();
let expected_part1_crc32 = Checksum::new_from_data(ChecksumType::CRC32, &part1)
.expect("calculate part 1 CRC32")
.encoded;
let upload1 = upload_part(1, part1).await.expect("Failed to upload part 1 with CRC32");
assert_eq!(
upload1.checksum_crc32(),
Some(expected_part1_crc32.as_str()),
"UploadPart must return the CRC32 calculated over plaintext"
);
let expected_part2_crc32 = Checksum::new_from_data(ChecksumType::CRC32, &part2)
.expect("calculate part 2 CRC32")
.encoded;
let upload2 = upload_part(2, part2).await.expect("Failed to upload part 2 with CRC32");
assert_eq!(
upload2.checksum_crc32(),
Some(expected_part2_crc32.as_str()),
"UploadPart must return the CRC32 calculated over plaintext"
);
// Complete multipart upload
let completed_part = aws_sdk_s3::types::CompletedPart::builder()
.part_number(1)
.e_tag(&etag)
let completed_upload = CompletedMultipartUpload::builder()
.parts(
CompletedPart::builder()
.part_number(1)
.e_tag(upload1.e_tag().expect("No ETag for part 1"))
.checksum_crc32(upload1.checksum_crc32().expect("No CRC32 for part 1"))
.build(),
)
.parts(
CompletedPart::builder()
.part_number(2)
.e_tag(upload2.e_tag().expect("No ETag for part 2"))
.checksum_crc32(upload2.checksum_crc32().expect("No CRC32 for part 2"))
.build(),
)
.build();
let complete_multipart_response = s3_client
@@ -372,11 +409,7 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
.bucket(TEST_BUCKET)
.key(test_key)
.upload_id(upload_id)
.multipart_upload(
aws_sdk_s3::types::CompletedMultipartUpload::builder()
.parts(completed_part)
.build(),
)
.multipart_upload(completed_upload)
.send()
.await
.expect("Failed to complete multipart upload");
@@ -400,6 +433,7 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
.get_object()
.bucket(TEST_BUCKET)
.key(test_key)
.checksum_mode(ChecksumMode::Enabled)
.send()
.await
.expect("Failed to get object");
@@ -410,6 +444,13 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
Some(&ServerSideEncryption::AwsKms),
"Final object should contain SSE-KMS encryption information"
);
if let Some(completed_crc32) = complete_multipart_response.checksum_crc32() {
assert_eq!(
get_response.checksum_crc32(),
Some(completed_crc32),
"GetObject should return the persisted composite CRC32 when completion reports it"
);
}
// Verify data integrity
let downloaded_data = get_response
@@ -418,7 +459,11 @@ async fn test_bucket_default_encryption_multipart_upload() -> Result<(), Box<dyn
.await
.expect("Failed to collect body")
.into_bytes();
assert_eq!(&downloaded_data[..], test_data, "Downloaded data should match original data");
assert_eq!(
downloaded_data.as_ref(),
expected_body.as_slice(),
"Downloaded data should match the uploaded multipart body"
);
// Cleanup is handled automatically when the test environment is dropped
info!("Test passed: bucket default encryption correctly applied to multipart upload");
@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression test: a same-key CopyObject that only rewrites metadata must never re-key a
//! managed-SSE (SSE-S3 / SSE-KMS) object.
//!
//! On an **unversioned** bucket the handler marks a same-name copy `metadata_only`, and the
//! store layer then updates `xl.meta` in place without touching the data blocks. The handler
//! nevertheless strips the source encryption metadata and generates a *fresh* DEK for the
//! destination. Combining the two writes "new DEK + old ciphertext": the object is permanently
//! undecryptable. The fix forces a full data rewrite whenever the copy re-derives managed
//! encryption material, so the stored bytes always match the key metadata beside them.
//!
//! Companion to `copy_object_version_restore_sse_test` (issue #4238), which pins the same
//! invariant for the versioned historical-restore path.
use super::common::{LocalKMSTestEnvironment, create_key_with_specific_id};
use crate::common::init_logging;
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{
MetadataDirective, ServerSideEncryption, ServerSideEncryptionByDefault, ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration,
ServerSideEncryptionRule,
};
use serial_test::serial;
use tracing::info;
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_metadata_replace_self_copy_of_sse_object_stays_decryptable() {
init_logging();
info!("same-key CopyObject with REPLACE metadata must not re-key an SSE-S3 object");
let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("failed to create local KMS env");
let default_key_id = "rustfs-e2e-test-default-key";
let keys_dir = kms_env.kms_keys_dir.clone();
create_key_with_specific_id(&keys_dir, default_key_id)
.await
.expect("failed to create local KMS key");
kms_env
.base_env
.start_rustfs_server_with_env(
vec![
"--kms-enable",
"--kms-backend",
"local",
"--kms-key-dir",
&keys_dir,
"--kms-default-key-id",
default_key_id,
],
&[("RUSTFS_KMS_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV_DEFAULTS", "true")],
)
.await
.expect("failed to start RustFS with local KMS");
tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
let client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
// Deliberately an UNVERSIONED bucket: that is the branch where the store layer can service
// the self-copy as a pure metadata update.
let bucket = "copy-object-self-copy-sse-test";
let key = "secrets/report.txt";
client
.create_bucket()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("failed to create bucket");
// Content long enough that a truncated/garbled decrypt cannot coincidentally match.
let content = b"encrypted payload that must survive a metadata-only self copy -- 0123456789";
let put = client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.content_type("text/plain; charset=utf-8")
.metadata("stage", "before")
.server_side_encryption(ServerSideEncryption::Aes256)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(content))
.send()
.await
.expect("PUT failed");
assert_eq!(put.server_side_encryption(), Some(&ServerSideEncryption::Aes256));
// Copy the object onto itself, replacing user metadata. This is the `mc cp --attr` /
// "edit metadata in place" shape that AWS supports on an existing object.
let copy_out = client
.copy_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.copy_source(format!("{bucket}/{key}"))
.metadata_directive(MetadataDirective::Replace)
.content_type("text/plain; charset=utf-8")
.metadata("stage", "after")
.server_side_encryption(ServerSideEncryption::Aes256)
.send()
.await
.expect("same-key CopyObject with REPLACE metadata must succeed");
assert_eq!(copy_out.server_side_encryption(), Some(&ServerSideEncryption::Aes256));
// The object must still decrypt to the original plaintext. Before the fix the stored
// ciphertext was left untouched while the metadata carried a brand-new DEK, so this GET
// either failed outright or returned garbage.
let get = client
.get_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.send()
.await
.expect("GET after self-copy failed: the object was re-keyed without rewriting the ciphertext");
assert_eq!(get.server_side_encryption(), Some(&ServerSideEncryption::Aes256));
assert_eq!(
get.metadata().and_then(|m| m.get("stage")),
Some(&"after".to_string()),
"REPLACE metadata must take effect"
);
let body = get.body.collect().await.expect("collect body").into_bytes();
assert_eq!(
body.as_ref(),
content,
"object must still decrypt to the original plaintext after a metadata-only self copy"
);
kms_env.base_env.stop_server();
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_metadata_replace_self_copy_dropping_sse_rewrites_plaintext() {
init_logging();
info!("same-key CopyObject that drops SSE must rewrite the data, not orphan the ciphertext");
let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("failed to create local KMS env");
let default_key_id = "rustfs-e2e-test-default-key";
let keys_dir = kms_env.kms_keys_dir.clone();
create_key_with_specific_id(&keys_dir, default_key_id)
.await
.expect("failed to create local KMS key");
kms_env
.base_env
.start_rustfs_server_with_env(
vec![
"--kms-enable",
"--kms-backend",
"local",
"--kms-key-dir",
&keys_dir,
"--kms-default-key-id",
default_key_id,
],
&[("RUSTFS_KMS_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV_DEFAULTS", "true")],
)
.await
.expect("failed to start RustFS with local KMS");
tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
let client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
// Unversioned, and deliberately WITHOUT a bucket default-encryption rule, so the copy below
// resolves to "no destination encryption".
let bucket = "copy-object-self-copy-drop-sse-test";
let key = "secrets/report.txt";
client
.create_bucket()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("failed to create bucket");
let content = b"encrypted payload whose ciphertext must not survive as bogus plaintext -- 0123456789";
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.metadata("stage", "before")
.server_side_encryption(ServerSideEncryption::Aes256)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(content))
.send()
.await
.expect("PUT failed");
// Self-copy with REPLACE and no SSE header. Per AWS semantics the destination ends up
// unencrypted. The dangerous outcome is the silent one: the handler strips the source key
// metadata while a metadata-only copy leaves the ciphertext in place, so a later GET would
// hand back raw ciphertext as if it were plaintext — corruption with no error anywhere.
client
.copy_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.copy_source(format!("{bucket}/{key}"))
.metadata_directive(MetadataDirective::Replace)
.metadata("stage", "after")
.send()
.await
.expect("same-key CopyObject dropping SSE must succeed");
let get = client
.get_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.send()
.await
.expect("GET after self-copy failed");
assert_eq!(
get.server_side_encryption(),
None,
"destination must be unencrypted once the copy drops SSE"
);
assert_eq!(
get.metadata().and_then(|m| m.get("stage")),
Some(&"after".to_string()),
"REPLACE metadata must take effect"
);
let body = get.body.collect().await.expect("collect body").into_bytes();
assert_eq!(
body.as_ref(),
content,
"object must read back as the original plaintext, not the orphaned ciphertext"
);
kms_env.base_env.stop_server();
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_metadata_replace_self_copy_under_bucket_default_sse_stays_decryptable() {
init_logging();
info!("bucket default encryption must also keep a same-key copy off the metadata-only path");
let mut kms_env = LocalKMSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("failed to create local KMS env");
let default_key_id = "rustfs-e2e-test-default-key";
let keys_dir = kms_env.kms_keys_dir.clone();
create_key_with_specific_id(&keys_dir, default_key_id)
.await
.expect("failed to create local KMS key");
kms_env
.base_env
.start_rustfs_server_with_env(
vec![
"--kms-enable",
"--kms-backend",
"local",
"--kms-key-dir",
&keys_dir,
"--kms-default-key-id",
default_key_id,
],
&[("RUSTFS_KMS_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV_DEFAULTS", "true")],
)
.await
.expect("failed to start RustFS with local KMS");
tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
let client = kms_env.base_env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "copy-object-self-copy-bucket-default-sse-test";
let key = "secrets/report.txt";
client
.create_bucket()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("failed to create bucket");
// Store the object as PLAINTEXT first: no SSE header and no bucket default rule yet. This is
// what makes the case sharp — at copy time the source metadata carries no encryption markers,
// so the source-side half of the guard cannot fire.
let content = b"plaintext payload that must not be orphaned under a new DEK -- 0123456789";
let put = client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.metadata("stage", "before")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(content))
.send()
.await
.expect("PUT failed");
assert_eq!(put.server_side_encryption(), None, "the object must start out unencrypted");
// Only NOW enable bucket default encryption. The destination's encryption therefore comes
// from the bucket rule and from nowhere else: the source is unencrypted and the copy request
// carries no SSE header. A guard that only inspects request headers (MinIO decides
// `isTargetEncrypted` from `crypto.S3.IsRequested(r.Header)`) would let this through, yet
// `sse_encryption` still mints a fresh DEK from the resolved bucket default — which is why
// the guard keys off the *effective* encryption rather than the requested one.
let encryption_config = ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration::builder()
.rules(
ServerSideEncryptionRule::builder()
.apply_server_side_encryption_by_default(
ServerSideEncryptionByDefault::builder()
.sse_algorithm(ServerSideEncryption::Aes256)
.build()
.unwrap(),
)
.build(),
)
.build()
.unwrap();
client
.put_bucket_encryption()
.bucket(bucket)
.server_side_encryption_configuration(encryption_config)
.send()
.await
.expect("failed to set bucket default encryption");
// No SSE header on the copy — the bucket default alone drives the destination encryption.
client
.copy_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.copy_source(format!("{bucket}/{key}"))
.metadata_directive(MetadataDirective::Replace)
.metadata("stage", "after")
.send()
.await
.expect("same-key CopyObject under bucket default encryption must succeed");
let get = client
.get_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.send()
.await
.expect("GET after self-copy failed: the object was re-keyed without rewriting the ciphertext");
assert_eq!(get.server_side_encryption(), Some(&ServerSideEncryption::Aes256));
assert_eq!(
get.metadata().and_then(|m| m.get("stage")),
Some(&"after".to_string()),
"REPLACE metadata must take effect"
);
let body = get.body.collect().await.expect("collect body").into_bytes();
assert_eq!(
body.as_ref(),
content,
"object must still decrypt to the original plaintext after a metadata-only self copy"
);
kms_env.base_env.stop_server();
}
+3
View File
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ mod bucket_default_encryption_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod encryption_metadata_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod copy_object_self_copy_sse_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod copy_object_version_restore_sse_test;
+36
View File
@@ -290,6 +290,14 @@ mod overwrite_cleanup_regression_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod list_buckets_double_slash_test;
// Regression coverage for bucket-scoped ListBuckets authorization fallback.
#[cfg(test)]
mod list_buckets_auth_test;
// ListBuckets visibility follows IAM authorization, not bucket policy.
#[cfg(test)]
mod list_buckets_iam_filter_test;
// Regression test for backlog#629(b): region-aware CreateBucket SigV4.
#[cfg(test)]
mod create_bucket_region_test;
@@ -298,4 +306,32 @@ mod create_bucket_region_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod copy_source_invalid_date_test;
// P0 regression: event notification startup race (rustfs#5387, #5681, #5401, #5183, #5115, #4796)
#[cfg(test)]
mod notification_startup_regression_test;
// P0 regression: lifecycle/ILM object expiration (rustfs#5407, #5167, #4963, #5615, #4879)
#[cfg(test)]
mod lifecycle_regression_test;
// P0 regression: delete operations consistency (rustfs#5375, #5349, #5339, #5029, #4978, #760)
#[cfg(test)]
mod delete_regression_test;
// P1 regression: listing/metacache completeness (rustfs#5166, #5156, #5051, #4810, #4648, #3191)
#[cfg(test)]
mod listing_regression_test;
// P1 regression: bucket statistics accuracy (rustfs#5615, #5008, #5116, #5055, #3898, #1012)
#[cfg(test)]
mod bucket_stats_regression_test;
// P1 regression: distributed startup/quorum (rustfs#5416, #2945, #2794, #2601, #4040, #5655)
#[cfg(test)]
mod distributed_startup_regression_test;
// P1 regression: tier/ILM transition (rustfs#5218, #5130, #5011, #4826, #5024)
#[cfg(test)]
mod tier_transition_regression_test;
pub mod tls_gen;
@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression tests for lifecycle/ILM object expiration and transition.
//!
//! Covers the recurring pattern where ILM expiration rules do not actually
//! delete objects, or lifecycle rule parameters are silently corrupted.
//! This has regressed 6+ times.
//!
//! ## Regression Issues
//!
//! - rustfs#5407: lifecycle not delete any bucket object
//! - rustfs#5167: lifecycle not delete object
//! - rustfs#4963: lifecycle rule 3 days → effective value 0 days
//! - rustfs#5615: bucket statistics remain unchanged after data expiration
//! - rustfs#4879: ILM serial lane: restore transition never completes
//! - rustfs#5442: Uncheck of Replicate Delete still deletes the file
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{
BucketLifecycleConfiguration, BucketVersioningStatus, ExpirationStatus, LifecycleExpiration, LifecycleRule,
LifecycleRuleFilter, NoncurrentVersionExpiration, VersioningConfiguration,
};
use serial_test::serial;
use std::error::Error;
use tracing::info;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
async fn setup_versioned_bucket(client: &Client, bucket: &str) -> TestResult {
client
.create_bucket()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("create bucket: {e}"))?;
client
.put_bucket_versioning()
.bucket(bucket)
.versioning_configuration(
VersioningConfiguration::builder()
.status(BucketVersioningStatus::Enabled)
.build(),
)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("enable versioning: {e}"))?;
Ok(())
}
/// RT-03: Verify that a lifecycle expiration rule actually deletes objects.
///
/// Regression pattern: lifecycle rules are accepted but the scanner never
/// processes them, leaving expired objects in place.
///
/// Steps:
/// 1. Create a versioned bucket
/// 2. Upload several objects
/// 3. Apply a lifecycle rule with 1-day expiration
/// 4. Wait for the scanner to process
/// 5. Verify objects are still present (they shouldn't expire yet — 1 day)
/// 6. Verify the lifecycle rule was persisted correctly (not corrupted to 0 days)
///
/// This tests the rule persistence path (rustfs#4963: 3 days → 0 days).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_lifecycle_expiration_rule_persists_correctly() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-03: lifecycle expiration rule persists correctly");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt03-lifecycle-persist";
setup_versioned_bucket(&client, bucket).await?;
// Apply a lifecycle rule with 1-day expiration on a prefix
let rule = LifecycleRule::builder()
.id("expire-after-1-day")
.status(ExpirationStatus::Enabled)
.filter(LifecycleRuleFilter::builder().prefix("logs/").build())
.expiration(LifecycleExpiration::builder().days(1).build())
.build()
.expect("build lifecycle rule");
client
.put_bucket_lifecycle_configuration()
.bucket(bucket)
.lifecycle_configuration(
BucketLifecycleConfiguration::builder()
.rules(rule)
.build()
.expect("build lifecycle config"),
)
.send()
.await
.expect("put lifecycle configuration");
// Read back and verify the rule was not corrupted (rustfs#4963: days → 0)
let resp = client
.get_bucket_lifecycle_configuration()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("get lifecycle configuration");
let rules = resp.rules();
assert_eq!(rules.len(), 1, "RT-03 FAIL: expected exactly 1 lifecycle rule");
let retrieved = &rules[0];
assert_eq!(retrieved.id(), Some("expire-after-1-day"), "RT-03 FAIL: rule ID mismatch");
assert_eq!(retrieved.status(), &ExpirationStatus::Enabled, "RT-03 FAIL: rule should be Enabled");
let exp = retrieved.expiration().expect("expiration should be set");
assert_eq!(
exp.days(),
Some(1),
"RT-03 FAIL: expiration days corrupted (regression rustfs#4963: expected 1, got {:?})",
exp.days()
);
info!("RT-03 PASS: lifecycle expiration rule persists correctly");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-03b: Verify lifecycle rule with noncurrent version expiration.
///
/// Covers the pattern where noncurrent version expiration rules are
/// accepted but old versions are never cleaned up.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_lifecycle_noncurrent_version_expiration_rule_persists() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-03b: noncurrent version expiration rule persists");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt03b-noncurrent-expire";
setup_versioned_bucket(&client, bucket).await?;
// Create multiple versions of the same object
for i in 0..3 {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("versioned-obj.txt")
.body(ByteStream::from(format!("version-{i}").into_bytes()))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object version");
}
// Verify we have 3 versions
let versions = client
.list_object_versions()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list versions");
let count = versions.versions().len();
assert_eq!(count, 3, "RT-03b FAIL: expected 3 versions, found {count}");
// Apply noncurrent version expiration rule
let rule = LifecycleRule::builder()
.id("expire-noncurrent-after-1-day")
.status(ExpirationStatus::Enabled)
.filter(LifecycleRuleFilter::builder().prefix("").build())
.noncurrent_version_expiration(NoncurrentVersionExpiration::builder().noncurrent_days(1).build())
.build()
.expect("build lifecycle rule");
client
.put_bucket_lifecycle_configuration()
.bucket(bucket)
.lifecycle_configuration(
BucketLifecycleConfiguration::builder()
.rules(rule)
.build()
.expect("build lifecycle config"),
)
.send()
.await
.expect("put lifecycle configuration");
// Read back and verify
let resp = client
.get_bucket_lifecycle_configuration()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("get lifecycle configuration");
let rules = resp.rules();
assert_eq!(rules.len(), 1, "RT-03b FAIL: expected 1 rule");
let nc_exp = rules[0]
.noncurrent_version_expiration()
.expect("noncurrent expiration should be set");
assert_eq!(nc_exp.noncurrent_days(), Some(1), "RT-03b FAIL: noncurrent days corrupted");
info!("RT-03b PASS: noncurrent version expiration rule persists correctly");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-04: Verify lifecycle rule with prefix filter persists after restart.
///
/// Covers the pattern where lifecycle rules are accepted but silently lost
/// after restart. Transition rules require a configured remote tier
/// (tested in reliant/tiering.rs), so this test uses expiration only.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_lifecycle_prefix_rule_persists() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-04: lifecycle prefix rule persists");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt04-lifecycle-prefix";
setup_versioned_bucket(&client, bucket).await?;
let rule = LifecycleRule::builder()
.id("expire-archive-after-7-days")
.status(ExpirationStatus::Enabled)
.filter(LifecycleRuleFilter::builder().prefix("archive/").build())
.expiration(LifecycleExpiration::builder().days(7).build())
.build()
.expect("build lifecycle rule");
client
.put_bucket_lifecycle_configuration()
.bucket(bucket)
.lifecycle_configuration(
BucketLifecycleConfiguration::builder()
.rules(rule)
.build()
.expect("build lifecycle config"),
)
.send()
.await
.expect("put lifecycle configuration");
// Restart server
env.restart_server_preserving_data(vec![], &[]).await.expect("restart RustFS");
// Verify the rule survived restart
let resp = client
.get_bucket_lifecycle_configuration()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("get lifecycle after restart");
let rules = resp.rules();
assert_eq!(rules.len(), 1, "RT-04 FAIL: expected 1 rule after restart");
let exp = rules[0].expiration().expect("expiration should be set");
assert_eq!(exp.days(), Some(7), "RT-04 FAIL: expiration days corrupted after restart");
info!("RT-04 PASS: lifecycle prefix rule persists after restart");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-05b: Verify delete marker creation in versioned bucket.
///
/// Regression pattern: DELETE on a versioned object fails or does not
/// create a delete marker, or the delete marker is not visible in LIST.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_delete_marker_creation_and_visibility() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-05b: delete marker creation and visibility");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt05b-delete-marker";
setup_versioned_bucket(&client, bucket).await?;
// Put an object
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("marker-test.txt")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"to-be-deleted"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
// Delete without specifying versionId → should create a delete marker
let del_resp = client
.delete_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("marker-test.txt")
.send()
.await
.expect("delete object");
// The response should indicate a delete marker was created
assert!(
del_resp.delete_marker().unwrap_or(false),
"RT-05b FAIL: DELETE on versioned object did not create a delete marker"
);
// ListObjectVersions should show both the original version and the delete marker
let versions = client
.list_object_versions()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list versions");
let delete_markers: Vec<_> = versions
.delete_markers()
.iter()
.filter(|dm| dm.key() == Some("marker-test.txt"))
.collect();
assert_eq!(
delete_markers.len(),
1,
"RT-05b FAIL: expected 1 delete marker, found {}",
delete_markers.len()
);
info!("RT-05b PASS: delete marker created and visible");
Ok(())
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
// Copyright 2026 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression coverage for the MinIO-compatible filtered ListBuckets fallback.
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_ok, init_logging};
use std::error::Error;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
#[tokio::test]
async fn bucket_scoped_policy_returns_only_authorized_bucket() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let root_client = env.create_s3_client();
let allowed_bucket = "list-buckets-authorized";
let hidden_bucket = "list-buckets-hidden";
let user = "listbucketsuser";
let secret = "listbucketssecret";
let policy = "list-buckets-scoped";
root_client.create_bucket().bucket(allowed_bucket).send().await?;
root_client.create_bucket().bucket(hidden_bucket).send().await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={policy}"),
Some(
serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:*"],
"Resource": [
format!("arn:aws:s3:::{allowed_bucket}"),
format!("arn:aws:s3:::{allowed_bucket}/*")
]
}]
})
.to_string(),
),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={user}"),
Some(serde_json::json!({ "secretKey": secret, "status": "enabled" }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::POST,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/idp/builtin/policy/attach",
Some(serde_json::json!({ "policies": [policy], "user": user }).to_string()),
)
.await?;
let client = env.create_s3_client_with_credentials(user, secret);
// Capture ListBuckets first so the direct-access control cannot warm bucket metadata and mask the regression.
let listed = client.list_buckets().send().await;
client.list_objects_v2().bucket(allowed_bucket).send().await?;
let listed = listed?;
let names = listed
.buckets()
.iter()
.filter_map(|bucket| bucket.name().map(ToOwned::to_owned))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
assert_eq!(names, vec![allowed_bucket]);
Ok(())
}
@@ -0,0 +1,459 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_ok, build_test_s3_config, build_test_sts_client, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
use aws_sdk_s3::error::ProvideErrorMetadata;
use serial_test::serial;
use tokio::time::{Duration, Instant};
fn user_client(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str, session_token: Option<&str>) -> Client {
Client::from_conf(build_test_s3_config(
&env.url,
access_key,
secret_key,
session_token,
"list-buckets-iam-filter",
))
}
fn bucket_names(buckets: &[aws_sdk_s3::types::Bucket]) -> Vec<String> {
let mut names = buckets
.iter()
.filter_map(|bucket| bucket.name().map(str::to_owned))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
names.sort();
names
}
async fn create_user(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let body = serde_json::json!({ "secretKey": secret_key, "status": "enabled" }).to_string();
admin_ok(
env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={access_key}"),
Some(body),
)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn create_service_account(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
target_user: &str,
policy: Option<&serde_json::Value>,
) -> Result<(String, String), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let request = match policy {
Some(policy) => serde_json::json!({ "targetUser": target_user, "policy": policy }),
None => serde_json::json!({ "targetUser": target_user }),
};
let response = admin_ok(env, http::Method::PUT, "/rustfs/admin/v3/add-service-accounts", Some(request.to_string())).await?;
let response: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&response)?;
let access_key = response["credentials"]["accessKey"]
.as_str()
.ok_or("service account response should contain credentials.accessKey")?
.to_owned();
let secret_key = response["credentials"]["secretKey"]
.as_str()
.ok_or("service account response should contain credentials.secretKey")?
.to_owned();
Ok((access_key, secret_key))
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn list_buckets_filters_with_iam_bucket_resources() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.capture_log_path = Some(format!("{}/server.log", env.temp_dir));
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUST_LOG", "rustfs=debug,rustfs_notify=debug")])
.await?;
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
for bucket in [
"benchmark-artifacts",
"benchmark-denied",
"benchmark-location-only",
"benchmark-test1",
"testuser1-artifacts",
] {
admin_client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
}
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(admin_client.list_buckets().send().await?.buckets()),
vec![
"benchmark-artifacts",
"benchmark-denied",
"benchmark-location-only",
"benchmark-test1",
"testuser1-artifacts"
]
);
let access_key = "benchmark";
let secret_key = "benchmark-secret-1234567890";
create_user(&env, access_key, secret_key).await?;
let policy_name = "benchmark-bucket-prefix";
let policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:*"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-*", "arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-*/*"],
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"s3:prefix": [""],
"s3:delimiter": ["/"]
}
}
},
{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket", "s3:GetBucketLocation"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-denied"]
},
{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-location-only"]
},
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["sts:AssumeRole"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"]
}
]
})
.to_string();
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={policy_name}"),
Some(policy),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/set-user-or-group-policy?policyName={policy_name}&userOrGroup={access_key}&isGroup=false"),
Some(String::new()),
)
.await?;
let bucket_policy_allow = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": { "AWS": [access_key] },
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::testuser1-artifacts"]
}]
})
.to_string();
admin_client
.put_bucket_policy()
.bucket("testuser1-artifacts")
.policy(bucket_policy_allow)
.send()
.await?;
let bucket_policy_deny = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Principal": { "AWS": [access_key] },
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket", "s3:GetBucketLocation"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-artifacts"]
}]
})
.to_string();
admin_client
.put_bucket_policy()
.bucket("benchmark-artifacts")
.policy(bucket_policy_deny)
.send()
.await?;
let benchmark_client = user_client(&env, access_key, secret_key, None);
benchmark_client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket("testuser1-artifacts")
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(benchmark_client.list_buckets().send().await?.buckets()),
vec!["benchmark-artifacts", "benchmark-location-only", "benchmark-test1"]
);
let log_path = env.capture_log_path.as_deref().expect("server log path should be configured");
let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5);
let audit_log = loop {
let audit_log = tokio::fs::read_to_string(log_path).await?;
if [
"iam_implicit_deny",
"s3_authorization_denied",
"ListAllMyBucketsAction",
"benchmark",
"DEBUG",
]
.iter()
.all(|field| audit_log.contains(field))
|| Instant::now() >= deadline
{
break audit_log;
}
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
};
assert_eq!(audit_log.matches("iam_implicit_deny").count(), 1, "{audit_log}");
for field in ["s3_authorization_denied", "ListAllMyBucketsAction", "benchmark", "DEBUG"] {
assert!(audit_log.contains(field), "missing {field} in {audit_log}");
}
let denied_access_key = "no-bucket-access";
let denied_secret_key = "no-bucket-access-secret-1234567890";
create_user(&env, denied_access_key, denied_secret_key).await?;
let denied = user_client(&env, denied_access_key, denied_secret_key, None)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await
.expect_err("a user without IAM bucket permissions must be denied");
assert_eq!(denied.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code), Some("AccessDenied"));
let put_only_policy_name = "put-only-no-bucket-discovery";
let put_only_policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:PutObject"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-*/*"]
}]
})
.to_string();
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={put_only_policy_name}"),
Some(put_only_policy),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!(
"/rustfs/admin/v3/set-user-or-group-policy?policyName={put_only_policy_name}&userOrGroup={denied_access_key}&isGroup=false"
),
Some(String::new()),
)
.await?;
let denied = user_client(&env, denied_access_key, denied_secret_key, None)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await
.expect_err("an unrelated IAM action must not reveal bucket names");
assert_eq!(denied.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code), Some("AccessDenied"));
let list_all_policy_name = "list-all-buckets";
let list_all_policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:ListAllMyBuckets"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"]
}]
})
.to_string();
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/add-canned-policy?name={list_all_policy_name}"),
Some(list_all_policy),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!(
"/rustfs/admin/v3/set-user-or-group-policy?policyName={list_all_policy_name}&userOrGroup={denied_access_key}&isGroup=false"
),
Some(String::new()),
)
.await?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(
user_client(&env, denied_access_key, denied_secret_key, None)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?
.buckets()
),
vec![
"benchmark-artifacts",
"benchmark-denied",
"benchmark-location-only",
"benchmark-test1",
"testuser1-artifacts"
]
);
let group_user = "benchmark-group-user";
let group_secret = "benchmark-group-secret-1234567890";
let group_name = "benchmark-group";
create_user(&env, group_user, group_secret).await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
"/rustfs/admin/v3/update-group-members",
Some(
serde_json::json!({
"group": group_name,
"members": [group_user],
"isRemove": false,
"groupStatus": "enabled"
})
.to_string(),
),
)
.await?;
admin_ok(
&env,
http::Method::PUT,
&format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/set-user-or-group-policy?policyName={policy_name}&userOrGroup={group_name}&isGroup=true"),
Some(String::new()),
)
.await?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(
user_client(&env, group_user, group_secret, None)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?
.buckets()
),
vec!["benchmark-artifacts", "benchmark-location-only", "benchmark-test1"]
);
let (service_access_key, service_secret_key) = create_service_account(&env, group_user, None).await?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(
user_client(&env, &service_access_key, &service_secret_key, None)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?
.buckets()
),
vec!["benchmark-artifacts", "benchmark-location-only", "benchmark-test1"]
);
let service_account_policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket", "s3:GetBucketLocation"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-test1"],
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"s3:prefix": [""],
"s3:delimiter": ["/"]
}
}
}]
});
let (restricted_service_access_key, restricted_service_secret_key) =
create_service_account(&env, group_user, Some(&service_account_policy)).await?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(
user_client(&env, &restricted_service_access_key, &restricted_service_secret_key, None,)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?
.buckets()
),
vec!["benchmark-test1"]
);
let sts_client = build_test_sts_client(&env.url, group_user, group_secret, None, "list-buckets-iam-filter-sts");
let inherited = sts_client
.assume_role()
.role_arn("arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/list-buckets")
.role_session_name("list-buckets-iam-filter-inherited")
.send()
.await?;
let inherited = inherited
.credentials()
.ok_or("AssumeRole response should contain inherited temporary credentials")?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(
user_client(
&env,
inherited.access_key_id(),
inherited.secret_access_key(),
Some(inherited.session_token()),
)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?
.buckets()
),
vec!["benchmark-artifacts", "benchmark-location-only", "benchmark-test1"]
);
let session_policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket", "s3:GetBucketLocation"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::benchmark-test1"],
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"s3:prefix": [""],
"s3:delimiter": ["/"]
}
}
}]
})
.to_string();
let assumed = sts_client
.assume_role()
.role_arn("arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/list-buckets")
.role_session_name("list-buckets-iam-filter")
.policy(session_policy)
.send()
.await?;
let temporary = assumed
.credentials()
.ok_or("AssumeRole response should contain temporary credentials")?;
assert_eq!(
bucket_names(
user_client(
&env,
temporary.access_key_id(),
temporary.secret_access_key(),
Some(temporary.session_token()),
)
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?
.buckets()
),
vec!["benchmark-test1"]
);
Ok(())
}
@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression tests for object listing and metacache consistency.
//!
//! Covers the recurring pattern where ListObjectsV2 returns incomplete results,
//! silently truncates with IsTruncated=false, or corrupts the metadata cache.
//! This has regressed 8+ times.
//!
//! ## Regression Issues
//!
//! - rustfs#5166: Metacache listing quorum failed timeout after cluster startup
//! - rustfs#5156: Metacache producer failed
//! - rustfs#5051: ListObjectsV2 returns empty results for shallow prefixes
//! - rustfs#4810: walk_dir timeout silently truncates listings (200, IsTruncated=false)
//! - rustfs#4648: Object listing oscillates between complete, partial, and zero
//! - rustfs#3191: ListObjectsV2 timeout corrupts metadata cache → NoSuchBucket
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::error::Error;
use tracing::info;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
/// RT-06: Verify ListObjectsV2 pagination completeness for medium-sized bucket.
///
/// Regression pattern: listing returns 200 with IsTruncated=false but
/// misses objects (rustfs#4810: walk_dir timeout truncation).
///
/// Steps:
/// 1. Upload 100 objects with known keys
/// 2. List all objects via pagination (max_keys=10)
/// 3. Verify all 100 keys are returned exactly once
/// 4. Verify no duplicates or skipped keys
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_list_objects_v2_completeness_100_objects() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-06: listing completeness with 100 objects");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt06-list-completeness";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Upload 100 objects
let expected_keys: Vec<String> = (0..100).map(|i| format!("obj-{i:04}.txt")).collect();
for key in &expected_keys {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"data"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
}
// Paginate through all objects (small page size to force multiple pages)
let mut all_keys: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
let mut continuation_token: Option<String> = None;
loop {
let mut req = client.list_objects_v2().bucket(bucket).max_keys(10);
if let Some(ref token) = continuation_token {
req = req.continuation_token(token);
}
let resp = req.send().await.expect("list objects page");
for obj in resp.contents() {
all_keys.push(obj.key().unwrap_or("").to_string());
}
if !resp.is_truncated().unwrap_or(false) {
break;
}
continuation_token = resp.next_continuation_token().map(|s| s.to_string());
}
// Verify completeness and uniqueness
let unique_keys: HashSet<&str> = all_keys.iter().map(|s| s.as_str()).collect();
assert_eq!(
all_keys.len(),
100,
"RT-06 FAIL: expected 100 objects, listed {} (regression: walk_dir truncation)",
all_keys.len()
);
assert_eq!(
unique_keys.len(),
100,
"RT-06 FAIL: found {} unique keys but listed {} total (duplicates!)",
unique_keys.len(),
all_keys.len()
);
for key in &expected_keys {
assert!(
unique_keys.contains(key.as_str()),
"RT-06 FAIL: key '{key}' missing from listing (regression rustfs#4810)"
);
}
info!("RT-06 PASS: all 100 objects listed completely and uniquely");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-06b: Verify listing with prefix filter returns correct subset.
///
/// Regression pattern: prefix filter returns empty or includes wrong keys
/// (rustfs#5051: empty results for shallow prefixes).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_list_objects_v2_prefix_filter_correctness() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-06b: prefix filter correctness");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt06b-prefix-filter";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Upload objects with different prefixes
for i in 0..5 {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(format!("logs/app-{i:04}.log"))
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"log data"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put log object");
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(format!("data/file-{i:04}.csv"))
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"csv data"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put data object");
}
// List with prefix "logs/" — should return exactly 5
let resp = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.prefix("logs/")
.send()
.await
.expect("list with prefix");
assert_eq!(
resp.contents().len(),
5,
"RT-06b FAIL: expected 5 objects with prefix 'logs/', found {} (regression rustfs#5051)",
resp.contents().len()
);
for obj in resp.contents() {
assert!(
obj.key().unwrap_or("").starts_with("logs/"),
"RT-06b FAIL: object '{}' does not match prefix 'logs/'",
obj.key().unwrap_or("?")
);
}
// List with prefix "data/" — should return exactly 5
let resp = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.prefix("data/")
.send()
.await
.expect("list with data/ prefix");
assert_eq!(
resp.contents().len(),
5,
"RT-06b FAIL: expected 5 objects with prefix 'data/', found {}",
resp.contents().len()
);
// List with prefix "nonexistent/" — should return 0
let resp = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.prefix("nonexistent/")
.send()
.await
.expect("list with nonexistent prefix");
assert!(
resp.contents().is_empty(),
"RT-06b FAIL: expected 0 objects with prefix 'nonexistent/', found {}",
resp.contents().len()
);
info!("RT-06b PASS: prefix filter returns correct subset");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-06c: Verify listing with delimiter and CommonPrefixes.
///
/// Regression pattern: delimiter handling produces incorrect CommonPrefixes
/// or misses objects at the delimiter boundary.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_list_objects_v2_delimiter_common_prefixes() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-06c: delimiter and CommonPrefixes");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt06c-delimiter";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Create a hierarchical structure
let keys = vec!["a.txt", "dir1/b.txt", "dir1/sub1/c.txt", "dir1/sub2/d.txt", "dir2/e.txt"];
for key in &keys {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(*key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"content"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
}
// List with delimiter "/" at root level
let resp = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.delimiter("/")
.send()
.await
.expect("list with delimiter");
// Should have 1 object (a.txt) and 2 common prefixes (dir1/, dir2/)
let contents: Vec<_> = resp.contents().iter().map(|o| o.key().unwrap_or("")).collect();
let prefixes: Vec<_> = resp.common_prefixes().iter().map(|p| p.prefix().unwrap_or("")).collect();
assert!(contents.contains(&"a.txt"), "RT-06c FAIL: root object 'a.txt' missing from listing");
assert_eq!(contents.len(), 1, "RT-06c FAIL: expected 1 root-level object, found {}", contents.len());
assert_eq!(prefixes.len(), 2, "RT-06c FAIL: expected 2 common prefixes, found {:?}", prefixes);
assert!(prefixes.contains(&"dir1/"), "RT-06c FAIL: 'dir1/' missing from CommonPrefixes");
assert!(prefixes.contains(&"dir2/"), "RT-06c FAIL: 'dir2/' missing from CommonPrefixes");
info!("RT-06c PASS: delimiter and CommonPrefixes correct");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-06d: Verify listing returns correct IsTruncated flag.
///
/// Regression pattern: IsTruncated=false when there are more objects
/// (rustfs#4810: walk_dir timeout truncation with false IsTruncated).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_list_objects_v2_is_truncated_correctness() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-06d: IsTruncated correctness");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt06d-truncated";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Upload 15 objects
for i in 0..15 {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(format!("item-{i:04}.txt"))
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"data"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object");
}
// List with max_keys=5 — should be truncated
let resp = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.max_keys(5)
.send()
.await
.expect("list with max_keys=5");
assert!(
resp.is_truncated().unwrap_or(false),
"RT-06d FAIL: IsTruncated should be true with 15 objects and max_keys=5"
);
assert_eq!(resp.contents().len(), 5, "RT-06d FAIL: expected 5 objects in first page");
assert!(
resp.next_continuation_token().is_some(),
"RT-06d FAIL: NextContinuationToken should be present when truncated"
);
// List with max_keys=100 — should NOT be truncated
let resp = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.max_keys(100)
.send()
.await
.expect("list with max_keys=100");
assert!(
!resp.is_truncated().unwrap_or(false),
"RT-06d FAIL: IsTruncated should be false with 15 objects and max_keys=100"
);
assert_eq!(resp.contents().len(), 15, "RT-06d FAIL: expected 15 objects with max_keys=100");
info!("RT-06d PASS: IsTruncated flag is correct");
Ok(())
}
}
+411 -50
View File
@@ -62,6 +62,33 @@ fn md5_hex(input: impl AsRef<[u8]>) -> String {
hex::encode(hasher.finalize())
}
async fn create_restricted_user(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
username: &str,
secret_key: &str,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/add-user?accessKey={username}", env.url);
let body = serde_json::json!({
"secretKey": secret_key,
"status": "enabled"
})
.to_string();
crate::common::awscurl_put(&url, &body, &env.access_key, &env.secret_key).await?;
Ok(())
}
fn restricted_user_client(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, username: &str, secret_key: &str) -> aws_sdk_s3::Client {
let credentials = aws_sdk_s3::config::Credentials::new(username, secret_key, None, None, "snowball-pax-auth-test");
let config = aws_sdk_s3::Config::builder()
.credentials_provider(credentials)
.region(aws_sdk_s3::config::Region::new("us-east-1"))
.endpoint_url(&env.url)
.force_path_style(true)
.behavior_version_latest()
.build();
aws_sdk_s3::Client::from_conf(config)
}
/// Env var consumed by the local SSE-S3 DEK provider when KMS is not configured.
///
/// Since rustfs#3564 the server fails closed on managed SSE (SSE-S3 or
@@ -3557,8 +3584,8 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_expires_field_missing_from_policy_co
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_accepts_object_lock_retention_fields() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>
{
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_object_lock_retention_without_permission()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
@@ -3567,8 +3594,6 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_accepts_object_lock_retention_fields() -> Re
let bucket = "anon-post-policy-object-lock-retention";
let object_key = "uploads/object-lock-retention.txt";
let retain_until = "2037-10-21T07:28:00Z";
let expected_body = b"post-policy-object-lock-retention-body".to_vec();
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
admin_client
.create_bucket()
@@ -3593,7 +3618,7 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_accepts_object_lock_retention_fields() -> Re
.text("x-amz-object-lock-retain-until-date", retain_until)
.part(
"file",
reqwest::multipart::Part::bytes(expected_body.clone())
reqwest::multipart::Part::bytes(b"post-policy-object-lock-retention-body".to_vec())
.file_name("upload.txt")
.mime_str("text/plain")?,
);
@@ -3607,26 +3632,8 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_accepts_object_lock_retention_fields() -> Re
let status = post_resp.status();
let response_body = post_resp.text().await?;
assert_eq!(status, reqwest::StatusCode::NO_CONTENT);
assert!(response_body.is_empty(), "204 response should not contain a body, got: {response_body}");
let retention = admin_client
.get_object_retention()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(object_key)
.send()
.await?;
let retention = retention.retention().expect("retention should be present");
assert_eq!(retention.mode().map(|value| value.as_str()), Some("GOVERNANCE"));
let retain_until_out = retention
.retain_until_date()
.expect("retain_until_date should be present")
.fmt(aws_sdk_s3::primitives::DateTimeFormat::DateTime)?;
assert_eq!(retain_until_out, retain_until);
let get_out = admin_client.get_object().bucket(bucket).key(object_key).send().await?;
let uploaded = get_out.body.collect().await?.into_bytes();
assert_eq!(uploaded.as_ref(), expected_body.as_slice());
assert_eq!(status, reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
assert!(response_body.contains("AccessDenied"));
Ok(())
}
@@ -3815,8 +3822,8 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_object_lock_retention_missing_from_p
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_accepts_object_lock_legal_hold_field() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>
{
async fn test_anonymous_post_object_rejects_object_lock_legal_hold_without_permission()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
@@ -3824,8 +3831,6 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_accepts_object_lock_legal_hold_field() -> Re
let bucket = "anon-post-policy-object-lock-legal-hold";
let object_key = "uploads/object-lock-legal-hold.txt";
let expected_body = b"post-policy-object-lock-legal-hold-body".to_vec();
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
admin_client
.create_bucket()
@@ -3848,7 +3853,7 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_accepts_object_lock_legal_hold_field() -> Re
.text("x-amz-object-lock-legal-hold", "ON")
.part(
"file",
reqwest::multipart::Part::bytes(expected_body.clone())
reqwest::multipart::Part::bytes(b"post-policy-object-lock-legal-hold-body".to_vec())
.file_name("upload.txt")
.mime_str("text/plain")?,
);
@@ -3862,26 +3867,8 @@ async fn test_anonymous_post_object_accepts_object_lock_legal_hold_field() -> Re
let status = post_resp.status();
let response_body = post_resp.text().await?;
assert_eq!(status, reqwest::StatusCode::NO_CONTENT);
assert!(response_body.is_empty(), "204 response should not contain a body, got: {response_body}");
let legal_hold = admin_client
.get_object_legal_hold()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(object_key)
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(
legal_hold
.legal_hold()
.and_then(|value| value.status())
.map(|value| value.as_str()),
Some("ON")
);
let get_out = admin_client.get_object().bucket(bucket).key(object_key).send().await?;
let uploaded = get_out.body.collect().await?.into_bytes();
assert_eq!(uploaded.as_ref(), expected_body.as_slice());
assert_eq!(status, reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
assert!(response_body.contains("AccessDenied"));
Ok(())
}
@@ -5658,6 +5645,70 @@ async fn test_signed_put_object_extract_preserves_object_lock_retention() -> Res
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_signed_put_object_extract_pax_retention_overrides_request_retention()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let bucket = "signed-extract-pax-retention-precedence";
let archive_key = "retention.tar";
let extracted_key = "alpha.txt";
let request_retain_until = aws_sdk_s3::primitives::DateTime::from_secs(2_114_380_800);
let pax_retain_until = "2040-01-01T00:00:00Z";
let client = env.create_s3_client();
client
.create_bucket()
.bucket(bucket)
.object_lock_enabled_for_bucket(true)
.send()
.await?;
let pax = HashMap::from([
("minio.metadata.x-amz-object-lock-mode", "COMPLIANCE".to_string()),
("minio.metadata.x-amz-object-lock-retain-until-date", pax_retain_until.to_string()),
]);
let archive = make_tar_with_pax_entry(extracted_key, b"alpha-body", None, &pax).await;
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(archive_key)
.object_lock_mode(aws_sdk_s3::types::ObjectLockMode::Governance)
.object_lock_retain_until_date(request_retain_until)
.body(ByteStream::from(archive))
.customize()
.mutate_request(|req| {
req.headers_mut().insert("x-amz-meta-snowball-auto-extract", "true");
})
.send()
.await?;
let retention = client
.get_object_retention()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(extracted_key)
.send()
.await?
.retention()
.expect("retention should be present")
.clone();
assert_eq!(retention.mode().map(|value| value.as_str()), Some("COMPLIANCE"));
assert_eq!(
retention
.retain_until_date()
.expect("retain_until_date should be present")
.fmt(aws_sdk_s3::primitives::DateTimeFormat::DateTime)?,
pax_retain_until
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_signed_put_object_extract_returns_archive_etag() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
@@ -5782,6 +5833,316 @@ async fn test_signed_put_object_extract_preserves_pax_metadata_and_version_id()
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_signed_put_object_extract_authorizes_each_pax_privilege_and_retention_conditions()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
if !crate::common::awscurl_available() {
return Ok(());
}
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
let bucket = "signed-extract-pax-auth";
let put_only_user = "snowball-put-only";
let put_only_secret = "snowball-put-only-secret";
let conditional_user = "snowball-retention-condition";
let conditional_secret = "snowball-retention-condition-secret";
let wrong_action_user = "snowball-wrong-action";
let wrong_action_secret = "snowball-wrong-action-secret";
let version_condition_user = "snowball-version-condition";
let version_condition_secret = "snowball-version-condition-secret";
let pax_context_user = "snowball-pax-context";
let pax_context_secret = "snowball-pax-context-secret";
let conditional_version_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
admin_client
.create_bucket()
.bucket(bucket)
.object_lock_enabled_for_bucket(true)
.send()
.await?;
create_restricted_user(&env, put_only_user, put_only_secret).await?;
create_restricted_user(&env, conditional_user, conditional_secret).await?;
create_restricted_user(&env, wrong_action_user, wrong_action_secret).await?;
create_restricted_user(&env, version_condition_user, version_condition_secret).await?;
create_restricted_user(&env, pax_context_user, pax_context_secret).await?;
let object_resource = format!("arn:aws:s3:::{bucket}/*");
let context_archive_resources = [
format!("arn:aws:s3:::{bucket}/tag-context.tar"),
format!("arn:aws:s3:::{bucket}/lock-context.tar"),
];
let tag_entry_resource = format!("arn:aws:s3:::{bucket}/tag-context-entry.txt");
let lock_entry_resource = format!("arn:aws:s3:::{bucket}/lock-context-entry.txt");
let policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "PutOnly",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": { "AWS": [put_only_user] },
"Action": ["s3:PutObject"],
"Resource": [object_resource.clone()]
},
{
"Sid": "RetentionWithLimit",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": { "AWS": [conditional_user] },
"Action": ["s3:PutObject", "s3:PutObjectRetention"],
"Resource": [object_resource.clone()]
},
{
"Sid": "DenyRetentionBeyondCutoff",
"Effect": "Deny",
"Principal": { "AWS": [conditional_user] },
"Action": ["s3:PutObject"],
"Resource": [object_resource.clone()],
"Condition": {
"DateGreaterThan": {
"s3:object-lock-retain-until-date": "2030-01-01T00:00:00Z"
}
}
},
{
"Sid": "WrongAdditionalAction",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": { "AWS": [wrong_action_user] },
"Action": ["s3:PutObject", "s3:PutObjectLegalHold"],
"Resource": [object_resource.clone()]
},
{
"Sid": "VersionConditionPut",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": { "AWS": [version_condition_user] },
"Action": ["s3:PutObject"],
"Resource": [object_resource.clone()]
},
{
"Sid": "VersionConditionReplicate",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": { "AWS": [version_condition_user] },
"Action": ["s3:ReplicateObject"],
"Resource": [object_resource],
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"s3:VersionId": conditional_version_id.clone()
}
}
},
{
"Sid": "PaxContextArchives",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": { "AWS": [pax_context_user] },
"Action": ["s3:PutObject", "s3:PutObjectRetention", "s3:PutObjectTagging"],
"Resource": context_archive_resources
},
{
"Sid": "PaxTagContextPut",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": { "AWS": [pax_context_user] },
"Action": ["s3:PutObject"],
"Resource": [tag_entry_resource.clone()],
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"s3:RequestObjectTag/classification": "public"
}
}
},
{
"Sid": "PaxTagContextAction",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": { "AWS": [pax_context_user] },
"Action": ["s3:PutObjectTagging"],
"Resource": [tag_entry_resource]
},
{
"Sid": "PaxLockContextPut",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": { "AWS": [pax_context_user] },
"Action": ["s3:PutObject"],
"Resource": [lock_entry_resource.clone()],
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"s3:object-lock-mode": "COMPLIANCE"
}
}
},
{
"Sid": "PaxLockContextAction",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": { "AWS": [pax_context_user] },
"Action": ["s3:PutObjectRetention"],
"Resource": [lock_entry_resource]
}
]
})
.to_string();
admin_client.put_bucket_policy().bucket(bucket).policy(policy).send().await?;
let put_only_client = restricted_user_client(&env, put_only_user, put_only_secret);
let conditional_client = restricted_user_client(&env, conditional_user, conditional_secret);
let wrong_action_client = restricted_user_client(&env, wrong_action_user, wrong_action_secret);
let cases = [
(
"legal-hold.tar",
put_only_client,
HashMap::from([("minio.metadata.x-amz-object-lock-legal-hold", "ON".to_string())]),
),
(
"retention-condition.tar",
conditional_client,
HashMap::from([
("minio.metadata.x-amz-object-lock-mode", "COMPLIANCE".to_string()),
("minio.metadata.x-amz-object-lock-retain-until-date", "2099-01-01T00:00:00Z".to_string()),
]),
),
(
"version-id.tar",
wrong_action_client,
HashMap::from([("minio.versionId", Uuid::new_v4().to_string())]),
),
];
for (archive_key, client, pax) in cases {
let archive = make_tar_with_pax_entry("entry.txt", b"must-not-write", None, &pax).await;
let err = client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(archive_key)
.body(ByteStream::from(archive))
.customize()
.mutate_request(|req| {
req.headers_mut().insert("x-amz-meta-snowball-auto-extract", "true");
})
.send()
.await
.expect_err("missing, conditional, or wrong PAX privilege must be rejected");
assert_eq!(
err.as_service_error().and_then(|error| error.meta().code()),
Some("AccessDenied"),
"{archive_key}"
);
}
let version_condition_client = restricted_user_client(&env, version_condition_user, version_condition_secret);
let mismatching_version_pax = HashMap::from([("minio.versionId", Uuid::new_v4().to_string())]);
let archive = make_tar_with_pax_entry("version-mismatch-entry.txt", b"must-not-write", None, &mismatching_version_pax).await;
let err = version_condition_client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("version-mismatch.tar")
.body(ByteStream::from(archive))
.customize()
.mutate_request(|req| {
req.headers_mut().insert("x-amz-meta-snowball-auto-extract", "true");
})
.send()
.await
.expect_err("a mismatching PAX version ID must fail the replication condition");
assert_eq!(err.as_service_error().and_then(|error| error.meta().code()), Some("AccessDenied"));
let err = admin_client
.head_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("version-mismatch-entry.txt")
.send()
.await
.expect_err("a denied PAX entry must not be written");
assert!(matches!(
err.as_service_error().and_then(|error| error.meta().code()),
Some("NoSuchKey" | "NotFound")
));
let matching_version_pax = HashMap::from([("minio.versionId", conditional_version_id)]);
let archive = make_tar_with_pax_entry("condition-entry.txt", b"condition-body", None, &matching_version_pax).await;
version_condition_client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("version-condition.tar")
.body(ByteStream::from(archive))
.customize()
.mutate_request(|req| {
req.headers_mut().insert("x-amz-meta-snowball-auto-extract", "true");
})
.send()
.await?;
let stored = admin_client
.get_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("condition-entry.txt")
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(stored.body.collect().await?.into_bytes().as_ref(), b"condition-body");
let pax_context_client = restricted_user_client(&env, pax_context_user, pax_context_secret);
let tag_pax = HashMap::from([("minio.metadata.x-amz-tagging", "classification=public".to_string())]);
let archive = make_tar_with_pax_entry("tag-context-entry.txt", b"tag-context-body", None, &tag_pax).await;
pax_context_client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("tag-context.tar")
.tagging("classification=restricted")
.body(ByteStream::from(archive))
.customize()
.mutate_request(|req| {
req.headers_mut().insert("x-amz-meta-snowball-auto-extract", "true");
})
.send()
.await?;
let tags = admin_client
.get_object_tagging()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("tag-context-entry.txt")
.send()
.await?;
assert!(
tags.tag_set()
.iter()
.any(|tag| tag.key() == "classification" && tag.value() == "public")
);
let pax_retain_until = "2040-01-01T00:00:00Z";
let lock_pax = HashMap::from([
("minio.metadata.x-amz-object-lock-mode", "COMPLIANCE".to_string()),
("minio.metadata.x-amz-object-lock-retain-until-date", pax_retain_until.to_string()),
]);
let archive = make_tar_with_pax_entry("lock-context-entry.txt", b"lock-context-body", None, &lock_pax).await;
pax_context_client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("lock-context.tar")
.object_lock_mode(aws_sdk_s3::types::ObjectLockMode::Governance)
.object_lock_retain_until_date(aws_sdk_s3::primitives::DateTime::from_secs(2_114_380_800))
.body(ByteStream::from(archive))
.customize()
.mutate_request(|req| {
req.headers_mut().insert("x-amz-meta-snowball-auto-extract", "true");
})
.send()
.await?;
let retention = admin_client
.get_object_retention()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("lock-context-entry.txt")
.send()
.await?
.retention()
.expect("PAX retention should be present")
.clone();
assert_eq!(retention.mode().map(|mode| mode.as_str()), Some("COMPLIANCE"));
assert_eq!(
retention
.retain_until_date()
.expect("PAX retain-until should be present")
.fmt(aws_sdk_s3::primitives::DateTimeFormat::DateTime)?,
pax_retain_until
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_signed_put_object_extract_accepts_compat_header() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression tests for the event notification startup race.
//!
//! Covers the recurring pattern where webhook/audit targets fail to load at boot
//! due to startup ordering (notification runtime starts before server config is
//! loaded). This has regressed 9+ times across beta.3 ~ beta.12.
//!
//! ## Regression Issues
//!
//! - rustfs#5387: webhook notifications broken again in beta.9+
//! - rustfs#5681: Audit webhook targets are not loaded at boot
//! - rustfs#5401: Event Destinations broken again
//! - rustfs#5183: Audit webhooks stay offline after restart
//! - rustfs#5115: init_event_notifier loses startup race against server config load
//! - rustfs#4796: Pulsar event destinations offline after restart
//! - rustfs#5428: MQTT bucket notifications stop on restarted cluster node
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{BucketVersioningStatus, VersioningConfiguration};
use serial_test::serial;
use std::error::Error;
use tracing::info;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
/// RT-01: Verify that the notification runtime initializes correctly at boot.
///
/// Regression pattern: notification runtime initializes before server config
/// is fully loaded, causing webhook targets to never come online.
///
/// This test verifies the startup ordering by checking that the server
/// starts successfully with notification enabled and can serve S3 requests.
/// A full webhook delivery test is in notification_webhook_test.rs.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_notification_enabled_server_starts_cleanly() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-01: notification enabled server starts cleanly");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false"), ("RUSTFS_NOTIFY_ENABLE", "true")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS with notifications enabled");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt01-notify-startup";
// Server should be healthy and able to serve S3 requests
client
.create_bucket()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("create bucket with notifications enabled");
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("test.txt")
.body(aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream::from_static(b"test"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object with notifications enabled");
info!("RT-01 PASS: notification enabled server starts and serves S3");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-02: Verify notification config persists after server restart.
///
/// Regression pattern: after a node restart, notification targets stay
/// offline permanently because the config is not re-loaded.
///
/// Steps:
/// 1. Start server with notification enabled
/// 2. Create bucket and configure notification
/// 3. Restart server
/// 4. Verify notification config still exists
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_notification_config_survives_restart() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-02: notification config survives restart");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false"), ("RUSTFS_NOTIFY_ENABLE", "true")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt02-notify-restart";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Enable versioning (required for notification configuration)
client
.put_bucket_versioning()
.bucket(bucket)
.versioning_configuration(
VersioningConfiguration::builder()
.status(BucketVersioningStatus::Enabled)
.build(),
)
.send()
.await
.expect("enable versioning");
// Note: We can't fully test notification config persistence without a
// configured target. But we verify the server restarts cleanly with
// notification enabled, which is the core regression scenario.
env.restart_server_preserving_data(vec![], &[])
.await
.expect("restart RustFS with notifications enabled");
// Verify bucket still exists and is accessible after restart
let list = client
.list_objects_v2()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("list objects after restart");
assert!(list.contents().is_empty(), "RT-02: bucket should be empty after restart");
// Verify we can still write objects (notification runtime initialized)
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("after-restart.txt")
.body(aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream::from_static(b"post-restart"))
.send()
.await
.expect("put object after restart — notification runtime must be initialized");
info!("RT-02 PASS: server with notifications survives restart");
Ok(())
}
}
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
//! * PUT / multipart-complete / DeleteObject / DeleteObjects each deliver one event with the correct
//! eventName, bucket, key, versionId and eTag.
//! * prefix/suffix filters drop non-matching keys (rule-engine gate).
//! * an event queued while the target endpoint is unreachable is redelivered
//! * an event queued while the target endpoint rejects delivery is redelivered
//! from the on-disk store once the endpoint recovers (store-and-forward).
//! * responseElements and the S3 response use the canonical request ID while
//! requestParameters preserve a conflicting client-supplied value.
@@ -897,11 +897,10 @@ async fn test_webhook_event_delivery_and_filtering() -> TestResult {
Ok(())
}
/// An event queued while the target endpoint is unreachable survives on the
/// An event queued while the target endpoint rejects delivery survives on the
/// durable store and is redelivered once the endpoint comes back.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
#[ignore = "FAILING deterministically on main since it landed (#4821): the target is created but never appears in /rustfs/admin/v3/target/arns, so wait_for_target_registered times out. Quarantined per the flake policy; remove with the fix for rustfs#4852"]
async fn test_webhook_redelivers_event_after_target_recovers() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
@@ -932,28 +931,55 @@ async fn test_webhook_redelivers_event_after_target_recovers() -> TestResult {
wait_for_target_registered(&env, target).await?;
put_notification_config(&client, bucket, target, "uploads/", ".dat").await?;
// Take the endpoint down (drops the listener, so connections are refused —
// a retryable NotConnected), then PUT: the event cannot be delivered and
// must survive on the durable queue store.
// Replace the healthy setup listener with one that rejects the first POST.
// Waiting for that response below proves the queued event reached a failed
// delivery attempt before the endpoint recovers.
setup_handle.abort();
let _ = setup_handle.await;
let listener = TcpListener::bind(("0.0.0.0", port)).await?;
let key = "uploads/redeliver.dat";
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"queued while target down"))
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"queued while target rejects"))
.send()
.await?;
// Hold the endpoint down long enough for at least one replay attempt to
// fail (the replay worker scans the store every 500ms), so recovery below
// exercises real redelivery rather than a first-attempt success.
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(2)).await;
let mut failure_handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().await?;
let (method, _) = timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), read_http_message(&mut stream)).await??;
if method == "HEAD" {
stream
.write_all(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\ncontent-length: 0\r\nconnection: close\r\n\r\n")
.await?;
stream.shutdown().await?;
continue;
}
if method == "POST" {
stream
.write_all(b"HTTP/1.1 503 Service Unavailable\r\ncontent-length: 0\r\nconnection: close\r\n\r\n")
.await?;
stream.shutdown().await?;
return Ok::<(), BoxError>(());
}
}
});
// Bring the endpoint back on the same port; the replay worker retries with
// exponential backoff and delivers the queued event.
let rejected = match timeout(Duration::from_secs(20), &mut failure_handle).await {
Ok(rejected) => rejected,
Err(_) => {
failure_handle.abort();
let _ = failure_handle.await;
return Err("webhook replay did not reach the rejecting endpoint".into());
}
};
rejected??;
// Bring the endpoint back on the same port; the replay worker rescans the
// durable queue and delivers the retained event.
let listener = TcpListener::bind(("0.0.0.0", port)).await?;
let (tx, mut rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let handle = serve_event_collector(listener, tx);
+29 -14
View File
@@ -12,9 +12,11 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, awscurl_delete, awscurl_get, awscurl_post, awscurl_put, init_logging};
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_request, awscurl_delete, awscurl_get, awscurl_post, awscurl_put, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
use http::{Method, StatusCode};
use serial_test::serial;
use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep, timeout};
use tracing::{debug, info};
fn skip_without_awscurl() -> bool {
@@ -37,7 +39,8 @@ impl QuotaTestEnv {
pub async fn new() -> Result<Self, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let bucket_name = format!("quota-test-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4());
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_SCANNER_CYCLE", "1"), ("RUSTFS_SCANNER_START_DELAY_SECS", "0")])
.await?;
let client = env.create_s3_client();
Ok(Self {
@@ -67,18 +70,7 @@ impl QuotaTestEnv {
}
pub async fn set_bucket_quota(&self, quota_bytes: u64) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/quota/{}", self.env.url, self.bucket_name);
let quota_config = serde_json::json!({
"quota": quota_bytes,
"quota_type": "HARD"
});
let response = awscurl_put(&url, &quota_config.to_string(), &self.env.access_key, &self.env.secret_key).await?;
if response.contains("error") {
Err(format!("Failed to set quota: {}", response).into())
} else {
Ok(())
}
self.set_bucket_quota_for(&self.bucket_name, quota_bytes).await
}
pub async fn get_bucket_quota(&self) -> Result<Option<u64>, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
@@ -178,6 +170,29 @@ impl QuotaTestEnv {
bucket: &str,
quota_bytes: u64,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let stats_path = format!("/rustfs/admin/v3/quota-stats/{bucket}");
let readiness = async {
loop {
let (status, response) =
admin_request(&self.env.url, Method::GET, &stats_path, None, &self.env.access_key, &self.env.secret_key)
.await?;
if status.is_success() {
return Ok::<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>(());
}
if status != StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE {
return Err(format!("quota usage readiness failed for {bucket}: {status} {response}").into());
}
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
};
match timeout(Duration::from_secs(30), readiness).await {
Ok(result) => result?,
Err(_) => {
return Err(format!("quota usage did not become authoritative for {bucket} within 30 seconds").into());
}
}
let url = format!("{}/rustfs/admin/v3/quota/{}", self.env.url, bucket);
let quota_config = serde_json::json!({
"quota": quota_bytes,
@@ -22,15 +22,16 @@
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::chaos::{DiskFaultHarness, signed_admin_post};
use crate::chaos::{DiskFaultHarness, VersionShardCensus, signed_admin_post};
use crate::common::init_logging;
use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart};
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{BucketVersioningStatus, CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart, VersioningConfiguration};
use serial_test::serial;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::collections::HashSet;
use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep, timeout};
use std::error::Error;
use tokio::time::{Duration, Instant, interval, timeout};
use tracing::info;
const GET_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
@@ -271,12 +272,17 @@ mod tests {
put_and_record(&client, bucket, "heal/nested/large.bin", payload(2 * 1024 * 1024, 34), &mut manifest).await?;
verify_manifest(&client, bucket, &manifest, "baseline before disk replacement").await?;
for (key, _) in &manifest {
assert!(
harness.object_metadata_exists_on_disk(0, bucket, key),
"disk0 should hold xl.meta for {key} before replacement"
);
}
let manifest_keys = manifest.iter().map(|(key, _)| key.clone()).collect::<Vec<_>>();
let target_manifest: Vec<(String, VersionShardCensus)> = manifest_keys
.iter()
.map(|key| {
let census = harness.census_object_version(0, bucket, key, None)?;
if !census.is_complete() {
return Err(format!("disk 0 has incomplete physical census for {key}: {census:?}").into());
}
Ok((key.clone(), census))
})
.collect::<Result<_, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>>()?;
harness.kill_server();
harness.replace_disk_with_empty(0)?;
@@ -287,21 +293,112 @@ mod tests {
signed_admin_post(&heal_url, Some(heal_body), &harness.env.access_key, &harness.env.secret_key).await?;
let client = harness.env.create_s3_client();
let mut remaining: HashSet<String> = manifest.iter().map(|(key, _)| key.clone()).collect();
let mut remaining: HashSet<String> = manifest_keys.iter().cloned().collect();
let heal_timeout_secs = std::env::var("RUSTFS_RELIABILITY_HEAL_TIMEOUT_SECS")
.ok()
.and_then(|value| value.parse::<u64>().ok())
.unwrap_or(120);
let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(heal_timeout_secs);
let mut retry = interval(Duration::from_secs(1));
for _ in 0..heal_timeout_secs {
remaining.retain(|key| !harness.object_metadata_exists_on_disk(0, bucket, key));
loop {
remaining.retain(|key| {
let expected = target_manifest
.iter()
.find(|(manifest_key, _)| manifest_key == key)
.map(|(_, manifest)| manifest)
.expect("every key has a physical manifest");
harness
.census_object_version(0, bucket, key, None)
.map(|census| !census.matches_manifest(expected))
.unwrap_or(true)
});
if remaining.is_empty() {
verify_manifest(&client, bucket, &manifest, "after fresh-disk heal completed").await?;
return Ok(());
}
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
if Instant::now() >= deadline {
break;
}
retry.tick().await;
}
Err(format!("fresh-disk heal did not rebuild {remaining:?} on the replaced disk within {heal_timeout_secs}s").into())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_versioned_shard_census_selects_each_version_data_dir() -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
info!("Reliability: physical shard census selects the requested object version");
let mut harness = DiskFaultHarness::new(4).await?;
harness.start_server().await?;
let client = harness.env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "reliability-versioned-census";
let key = "versions/large.bin";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
client
.put_bucket_versioning()
.bucket(bucket)
.versioning_configuration(
VersioningConfiguration::builder()
.status(BucketVersioningStatus::Enabled)
.build(),
)
.send()
.await?;
let first = client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.body(ByteStream::from(payload(256 * 1024, 41)))
.send()
.await?;
let first_version = first.version_id().ok_or("first PUT did not return a version ID")?;
let second = client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(key)
.body(ByteStream::from(payload(256 * 1024, 42)))
.send()
.await?;
let second_version = second.version_id().ok_or("second PUT did not return a version ID")?;
let delete = client.delete_object().bucket(bucket).key(key).send().await?;
let delete_version = delete.version_id().ok_or("delete marker did not return a version ID")?;
let first_census = harness.census_object_version(0, bucket, key, Some(first_version))?;
let second_census = harness.census_object_version(0, bucket, key, Some(second_version))?;
let delete_census = harness.census_object_version(0, bucket, key, Some(delete_version))?;
assert!(
first_census.is_complete(),
"first version physical census is incomplete: {first_census:?}"
);
assert!(
second_census.is_complete(),
"second version physical census is incomplete: {second_census:?}"
);
assert_ne!(
first_census.data_dir, second_census.data_dir,
"distinct object versions must select distinct physical data directories"
);
assert_eq!(
first_census.expected_part_numbers, second_census.expected_part_numbers,
"same single-part shape should expose the same part numbers"
);
assert!(
delete_census.is_complete(),
"delete marker physical census is incomplete: {delete_census:?}"
);
assert!(
delete_census.expected_part_numbers.is_empty(),
"delete marker must not declare object shards: {delete_census:?}"
);
assert!(
delete_census.present_part_numbers.is_empty(),
"delete marker must not select stale object shards: {delete_census:?}"
);
Ok(())
}
}
@@ -848,6 +848,13 @@ impl NodeService for MinimalLockNodeService {
Err(Status::unimplemented("lock-only test server"))
}
async fn replacement_recovery_status(
&self,
_request: Request<rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::ReplacementRecoveryStatusRequest>,
) -> Result<Response<rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::ReplacementRecoveryStatusResponse>, Status> {
Err(Status::unimplemented("lock-only test server"))
}
async fn get_metacache_listing(
&self,
_request: Request<rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::GetMetacacheListingRequest>,
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+189 -68
View File
@@ -12,13 +12,10 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_ok, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_sts::config::retry::RetryConfig;
use aws_sdk_sts::config::{Credentials, Region};
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_ok, build_test_s3_config, build_test_sts_client, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_sts::Client;
use aws_sdk_sts::error::ProvideErrorMetadata;
use aws_sdk_sts::operation::RequestId;
use aws_sdk_sts::{Client, Config};
use aws_smithy_http_client::Builder as SmithyHttpClientBuilder;
use bytes::Bytes;
use http::header::{AUTHORIZATION, CONTENT_TYPE};
use http::{Request, Response};
@@ -32,9 +29,8 @@ use serial_test::serial;
use std::collections::BTreeSet;
use std::convert::Infallible;
use std::error::Error;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::net::TcpListener;
use tokio::sync::{Notify, mpsc};
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tokio::task::{JoinHandle, JoinSet};
use tokio::time::{Duration, timeout};
@@ -43,22 +39,7 @@ type TestResult = Result<(), BoxError>;
const OPA_AUTH_TOKEN: &str = "sts-opa-token";
fn sts_client(url: &str, access_key: &str, secret_key: &str, session_token: Option<&str>) -> Client {
let mut config = Config::builder()
.credentials_provider(Credentials::new(
access_key,
secret_key,
session_token.map(str::to_owned),
None,
"e2e-sts-query-compat",
))
.region(Region::new("us-east-1"))
.endpoint_url(url)
.retry_config(RetryConfig::standard().with_max_attempts(1))
.behavior_version_latest();
if url.starts_with("http://") {
config = config.http_client(SmithyHttpClientBuilder::new().build_http());
}
Client::from_conf(config.build())
build_test_sts_client(url, access_key, secret_key, session_token, "e2e-sts-query-compat")
}
async fn create_root_service_account(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment) -> Result<(String, String), BoxError> {
@@ -145,6 +126,52 @@ async fn assert_access_denied(client: &Client, context: &str) -> TestResult {
Ok(())
}
async fn assert_list_buckets_access_denied(
env: &RustFSTestEnvironment,
access_key: &str,
secret_key: &str,
context: &str,
) -> TestResult {
let error = aws_sdk_s3::Client::from_conf(build_test_s3_config(
&env.url,
access_key,
secret_key,
None,
"e2e-list-buckets-opa-unavailable",
))
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await
.expect_err("ListBuckets must be denied while OPA is unavailable");
let service_error = error
.as_service_error()
.ok_or_else(|| format!("{context} should deserialize as an S3 service error: {error:?}"))?;
assert_eq!(error.raw_response().map(|response| response.status().as_u16()), Some(403));
assert_eq!(service_error.code(), Some("AccessDenied"));
Ok(())
}
async fn assert_opa_unavailable_denies_sts_and_list_buckets(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, context: &str) -> TestResult {
let user = "opaunavailable";
let secret = "stsOpaUnavailableSecret123";
create_user_with_policy(
env,
user,
secret,
"sts-opa-unavailable-local-policy",
serde_json::json!([{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:ListAllMyBuckets"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"],
}]),
)
.await?;
assert_access_denied(&sts_client(&env.url, user, secret, None), context).await?;
assert_list_buckets_access_denied(env, user, secret, context).await
}
async fn handle_opa_request(
request: Request<Incoming>,
requests: mpsc::UnboundedSender<Value>,
@@ -186,12 +213,15 @@ async fn handle_opa_request(
};
if payload.is_none() {
let _ = validation_started.send(());
if let OpaValidationMode::DelayedUnavailable(release) = validation_mode {
release.notified().await;
return Ok(Response::builder()
.status(503)
.body(Full::new(Bytes::new()))
.expect("static OPA unavailable response must be valid"));
match validation_mode {
OpaValidationMode::Blocked => std::future::pending::<()>().await,
OpaValidationMode::Unavailable => {
return Ok(Response::builder()
.status(503)
.body(Full::new(Bytes::new()))
.expect("static OPA unavailable response must be valid"));
}
OpaValidationMode::Ready => {}
}
}
let allow = match payload.as_ref().and_then(|value| value.pointer("/input/identity/account")) {
@@ -201,6 +231,25 @@ async fn handle_opa_request(
.and_then(Value::as_bool)
.unwrap_or(false),
Some(Value::String(account)) if account == "opadeny" => false,
Some(Value::String(account))
if account == "opaunavailable" && matches!(validation_mode, OpaValidationMode::Unavailable) =>
{
true
}
Some(Value::String(account)) if account == "opalistbuckets" => {
let action = payload
.as_ref()
.and_then(|value| value.pointer("/input/action"))
.and_then(Value::as_str);
let bucket = payload
.as_ref()
.and_then(|value| value.pointer("/input/resource/bucket"))
.and_then(Value::as_str);
matches!(
(action, bucket),
(Some("s3:ListBucket"), Some("opa-list-visible")) | (Some("s3:GetBucketLocation"), Some("opa-list-location"))
)
}
None => true,
_ => false,
};
@@ -215,17 +264,17 @@ async fn handle_opa_request(
.expect("static OPA response must be valid"))
}
#[derive(Clone)]
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
enum OpaValidationMode {
Ready,
DelayedUnavailable(Arc<Notify>),
Blocked,
Unavailable,
}
struct OpaMock {
url: String,
requests: mpsc::UnboundedReceiver<Value>,
validation_started: mpsc::UnboundedReceiver<()>,
validation_release: Option<Arc<Notify>>,
task: JoinHandle<()>,
}
@@ -234,9 +283,8 @@ impl OpaMock {
Self::start_with_mode(OpaValidationMode::Ready, Some(OPA_AUTH_TOKEN)).await
}
async fn start_delayed_unavailable() -> Result<Self, BoxError> {
let release = Arc::new(Notify::new());
Self::start_with_mode(OpaValidationMode::DelayedUnavailable(release), None).await
async fn start_blocked() -> Result<Self, BoxError> {
Self::start_with_mode(OpaValidationMode::Blocked, None).await
}
async fn start_with_mode(validation_mode: OpaValidationMode, auth_token: Option<&str>) -> Result<Self, BoxError> {
@@ -245,10 +293,6 @@ impl OpaMock {
let (requests_tx, requests) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let (validation_started_tx, validation_started) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let expected_authorization = auth_token.map(|token| format!("Bearer {token}"));
let validation_release = match &validation_mode {
OpaValidationMode::Ready => None,
OpaValidationMode::DelayedUnavailable(release) => Some(Arc::clone(release)),
};
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut connections = JoinSet::new();
loop {
@@ -257,7 +301,7 @@ impl OpaMock {
let Ok((stream, _)) = accepted else { break };
let requests = requests_tx.clone();
let validation_started = validation_started_tx.clone();
let validation_mode = validation_mode.clone();
let validation_mode = validation_mode;
let expected_authorization = expected_authorization.clone();
connections.spawn(async move {
let handler = service_fn(move |request| {
@@ -265,7 +309,7 @@ impl OpaMock {
request,
requests.clone(),
validation_started.clone(),
validation_mode.clone(),
validation_mode,
expected_authorization.clone(),
)
});
@@ -282,7 +326,6 @@ impl OpaMock {
url,
requests,
validation_started,
validation_release,
task,
})
}
@@ -298,12 +341,6 @@ impl OpaMock {
.await?
.ok_or_else(|| "OPA validation channel closed".into())
}
fn release_validation(&self) {
if let Some(release) = &self.validation_release {
release.notify_one();
}
}
}
impl Drop for OpaMock {
@@ -523,35 +560,119 @@ async fn test_sts_assume_role_opa_contract() -> TestResult {
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_sts_assume_role_fails_closed_while_opa_is_unavailable() -> TestResult {
async fn test_list_buckets_opa_contract() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut opa = OpaMock::start_delayed_unavailable().await?;
let mut opa = OpaMock::start().await?;
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(
vec![],
&[
("RUSTFS_POLICY_PLUGIN_URL", opa.url.as_str()),
("RUSTFS_POLICY_PLUGIN_AUTH_TOKEN", OPA_AUTH_TOKEN),
],
)
.await?;
let admin_client = env.create_s3_client();
for bucket in ["opa-list-hidden", "opa-list-location", "opa-list-visible"] {
admin_client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await?;
}
let user = "opalistbuckets";
let secret = "opaListBucketsSecret123";
create_user(&env, user, secret).await?;
let output = aws_sdk_s3::Client::from_conf(build_test_s3_config(&env.url, user, secret, None, "e2e-list-buckets-opa"))
.list_buckets()
.send()
.await?;
let mut names = output
.buckets()
.iter()
.filter_map(|bucket| bucket.name().map(str::to_owned))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
names.sort();
assert_eq!(names, ["opa-list-location", "opa-list-visible"]);
let mut evaluations = BTreeSet::new();
for _ in 0..6 {
let request = opa.next_request().await?;
assert_eq!(request.pointer("/input/identity/account").and_then(Value::as_str), Some(user));
assert_eq!(request.pointer("/input/context/deny_only").and_then(Value::as_bool), Some(false));
let action = request
.pointer("/input/action")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.ok_or("OPA ListBuckets input should include action")?;
let bucket = request
.pointer("/input/resource/bucket")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.ok_or("OPA ListBuckets input should include resource.bucket")?;
if bucket.is_empty() {
assert_eq!(action, "s3:ListAllMyBuckets");
assert!(request.pointer("/input/context/conditions/prefix").is_none());
assert!(request.pointer("/input/context/conditions/delimiter").is_none());
} else {
let expected_arn = format!("arn:aws:s3:::{bucket}");
assert_eq!(request.pointer("/input/context/conditions/prefix"), Some(&serde_json::json!([""])));
assert_eq!(request.pointer("/input/context/conditions/delimiter"), Some(&serde_json::json!(["/"])));
assert_eq!(
request.pointer("/input/resource/arn").and_then(Value::as_str),
Some(expected_arn.as_str())
);
}
evaluations.insert((action.to_owned(), bucket.to_owned()));
}
assert_eq!(
evaluations,
BTreeSet::from([
("s3:GetBucketLocation".to_owned(), "opa-list-hidden".to_owned()),
("s3:GetBucketLocation".to_owned(), "opa-list-location".to_owned()),
("s3:ListAllMyBuckets".to_owned(), String::new()),
("s3:ListBucket".to_owned(), "opa-list-hidden".to_owned()),
("s3:ListBucket".to_owned(), "opa-list-location".to_owned()),
("s3:ListBucket".to_owned(), "opa-list-visible".to_owned()),
])
);
assert!(
matches!(opa.requests.try_recv(), Err(mpsc::error::TryRecvError::Empty)),
"ListBuckets should not make redundant OPA evaluations"
);
env.stop_server();
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_sts_and_list_buckets_fail_closed_while_opa_is_initializing() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut opa = OpaMock::start_blocked().await?;
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_POLICY_PLUGIN_URL", opa.url.as_str())])
.await?;
opa.wait_for_validation().await?;
let user = "opaunavailable";
let secret = "stsOpaUnavailableSecret123";
create_user_with_policy(
&env,
user,
secret,
"sts-opa-unavailable-local-policy",
serde_json::json!([{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:ListAllMyBuckets"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::*"],
}]),
)
.await?;
assert_opa_unavailable_denies_sts_and_list_buckets(&env, "configured OPA initialization").await?;
assert_access_denied(&sts_client(&env.url, user, secret, None), "configured OPA initialization").await?;
env.stop_server();
Ok(())
}
opa.release_validation();
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(200)).await;
assert_access_denied(&sts_client(&env.url, user, secret, None), "configured OPA validation failure").await?;
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_sts_and_list_buckets_fail_closed_after_opa_validation_failure() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let mut opa = OpaMock::start_with_mode(OpaValidationMode::Unavailable, None).await?;
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_POLICY_PLUGIN_URL", opa.url.as_str())])
.await?;
opa.wait_for_validation().await?;
assert_opa_unavailable_denies_sts_and_list_buckets(&env, "configured OPA validation failure").await?;
env.stop_server();
Ok(())
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
// Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Regression tests for Tier/ILM transition operations.
//!
//! Covers the recurring pattern where tier transition fails silently, the
//! free-version recovery task loops forever, or transitioned objects cannot
//! be read back. This has regressed 6+ times.
//!
//! ## Regression Issues
//!
//! - rustfs#5218: Remote tier mutation commit failed
//! - rustfs#5130: tier_free_version_recovery task loops forever
//! - rustfs#5011: Idle tier free-version recovery rescans every 60 seconds
//! - rustfs#4826: Full GET of multipart transitioned object fails
//! - rustfs#5024: Some files succeeded in tier offloading, others failed
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, admin_ok, init_logging};
use serde_json::Value;
use serial_test::serial;
use std::error::Error;
use tracing::info;
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>;
/// RT-13: Verify lifecycle rule with transition persists and is retrievable.
///
/// Note: Actual transition requires a configured remote tier. This test
/// validates that an expiration-only rule (the persistence path) survives
/// a server restart.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_lifecycle_rule_persists_after_restart() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-13: lifecycle rule persists after restart");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "rt13-tier-persist";
client.create_bucket().bucket(bucket).send().await.expect("create bucket");
// Apply a lifecycle rule with expiration (transition needs a real tier)
let rule = aws_sdk_s3::types::LifecycleRule::builder()
.id("expire-after-90d")
.status(aws_sdk_s3::types::ExpirationStatus::Enabled)
.filter(aws_sdk_s3::types::LifecycleRuleFilter::builder().prefix("archive/").build())
.expiration(aws_sdk_s3::types::LifecycleExpiration::builder().days(90).build())
.build()
.expect("build rule");
client
.put_bucket_lifecycle_configuration()
.bucket(bucket)
.lifecycle_configuration(
aws_sdk_s3::types::BucketLifecycleConfiguration::builder()
.rules(rule)
.build()
.expect("build config"),
)
.send()
.await
.expect("put lifecycle");
// Restart server
env.restart_server_preserving_data(vec![], &[]).await.expect("restart RustFS");
// Verify the rule survived restart
let resp = client
.get_bucket_lifecycle_configuration()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect("get lifecycle after restart");
let rules = resp.rules();
assert_eq!(rules.len(), 1, "RT-13 FAIL: expected 1 rule after restart");
let exp = rules[0].expiration().expect("expiration should be set");
assert_eq!(exp.days(), Some(90), "RT-13 FAIL: expiration days corrupted after restart");
info!("RT-13 PASS: lifecycle rule persists after restart");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-13b: Verify admin tier configuration API is functional.
///
/// Regression pattern: tier add/verify/delete API fails or the tier
/// configuration is not persisted (rustfs#5218).
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_admin_tier_list_endpoint_returns_json() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-13b: admin tier list endpoint returns JSON");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
// Query the tier list endpoint
let body = admin_ok(&env, http::Method::GET, "/rustfs/admin/v3/tier", None)
.await
.expect("list remote tiers");
let json: Value = serde_json::from_str(&body).expect("tier list response should be valid JSON");
// Should return an array (possibly empty)
assert!(json.is_array(), "RT-13b FAIL: tier list response is not an array: {json}");
info!("RT-13b PASS: admin tier list endpoint returns valid JSON array");
Ok(())
}
/// RT-13c: Verify scanner configuration persistence.
///
/// Regression pattern: scanner admin config update reports success but
/// is not persisted (rustfs#5013), causing the scanner to not run or
/// use stale settings.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn test_scanner_config_persists_after_restart() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
info!("RT-13c: scanner config persists after restart");
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &[("RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE", "false")])
.await
.expect("start RustFS");
// Get current scanner status
let body = admin_ok(&env, http::Method::GET, "/rustfs/admin/v3/scanner/status", None)
.await
.expect("get scanner status");
let json: Value = serde_json::from_str(&body).expect("scanner status should be valid JSON");
info!(" scanner status: {:?}", json.as_object().map(|o| o.keys().collect::<Vec<_>>()));
// Restart and verify config is still accessible
env.restart_server_preserving_data(vec![], &[]).await.expect("restart RustFS");
let body2 = admin_ok(&env, http::Method::GET, "/rustfs/admin/v3/scanner/status", None)
.await
.expect("get scanner status after restart");
let json2: Value = serde_json::from_str(&body2).expect("scanner status after restart should be valid JSON");
// Both should be valid JSON objects
assert!(json2.is_object(), "RT-13c FAIL: scanner status after restart is not a valid JSON object");
info!("RT-13c PASS: scanner/config persists across restart");
Ok(())
}
}
+16 -1
View File
@@ -144,11 +144,13 @@ rustfs-lifecycle.workspace = true
rustfs-s3-types = { workspace = true }
rustfs-data-usage.workspace = true
rustfs-object-capacity.workspace = true
rustfs-object-data-cache = { workspace = true, features = ["runtime-memory"] }
arc-swap.workspace = true
async-trait.workspace = true
bytes = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
byteorder = { workspace = true }
chrono = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
jiff = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
glob = { workspace = true }
thiserror.workspace = true
flatbuffers.workspace = true
@@ -179,6 +181,7 @@ path-absolutize = { workspace = true }
rmp.workspace = true
rmp-serde.workspace = true
tokio-util = { workspace = true, features = ["io", "compat"] }
tokio-stream = { workspace = true, features = ["sync"] }
base64 = { workspace = true }
hmac = { workspace = true }
sha1 = { workspace = true }
@@ -237,7 +240,19 @@ rustfs-uring = "0.2.1"
[target.'cfg(windows)'.dependencies]
winapi-util.workspace = true
windows-sys = { workspace = true, features = ["Win32_Foundation", "Win32_Storage_FileSystem"] }
windows-sys = { workspace = true, features = [
"Wdk_Foundation",
"Wdk_Storage_FileSystem",
"Win32_Foundation",
"Win32_Security",
"Win32_Storage_FileSystem",
"Win32_System_IO",
"Win32_System_SystemServices",
"Win32_System_WindowsProgramming",
] }
[target.'cfg(windows)'.dev-dependencies]
windows-sys = { workspace = true, features = ["Win32_System_Ioctl"] }
[dev-dependencies]
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["rt-multi-thread", "macros", "test-util", "fs"] }
+55 -32
View File
@@ -130,13 +130,15 @@ pub mod bucket {
pub mod metadata_sys {
pub use crate::bucket::metadata_sys::{
BucketMetadataSys, acquire_bucket_metadata_transaction_lock, delete, get, get_accelerate_config, get_bucket_policy,
BucketMetadataMutationGuard, BucketMetadataSys, ObjectLockConfigState, acquire_bucket_metadata_transaction_lock,
capture_bucket_metadata_incarnation, delete, delete_if_incarnation, get, get_accelerate_config, get_bucket_policy,
get_bucket_policy_raw, get_bucket_targets_config, get_config_from_disk, get_cors_config, get_durability_config,
get_global_bucket_metadata_sys, get_lifecycle_config, get_logging_config, get_notification_config,
get_object_lock_config, get_public_access_block_config, get_quota_config, get_replication_config,
get_request_payment_config, get_sse_config, get_tagging_config, get_versioning_config, get_website_config,
init_bucket_metadata_sys, list_bucket_targets, reload_bucket_metadata, remove_bucket_metadata, set_bucket_metadata,
update, update_bucket_targets_under_transaction_lock, update_config_with, update_under_transaction_lock,
get_object_lock_config, get_object_lock_config_state, get_public_access_block_config, get_quota_config,
get_replication_config, get_request_payment_config, get_sse_config, get_tagging_config, get_versioning_config,
get_website_config, init_bucket_metadata_sys, list_bucket_targets, reload_bucket_metadata, remove_bucket_metadata,
set_bucket_metadata, update, update_bucket_targets_under_transaction_lock, update_config_with, update_if_incarnation,
update_under_transaction_lock,
};
}
@@ -178,20 +180,24 @@ pub mod bucket {
mrf_backlog_observability_snapshot,
};
pub use crate::bucket::replication::{
BucketReplicationResyncStatus, BucketStats, DeleteReplicationConfigSnapshot, DeletedObjectReplicationInfo,
DurableMrfBacklog, DynReplicationPool, MrfOpKind, MrfReplicateEntry, MustReplicateOptions, ObjectOpts,
REPLICATE_INCOMING_DELETE, ReplicateDecision, ReplicateObjectInfo, ReplicationConfig, ReplicationConfigurationExt,
BucketReplicationResyncStatus, BucketReplicationStats, BucketStats, DeleteReplicationConfigSnapshot,
DeletedObjectReplicationInfo, DurableMrfBacklog, DynReplicationPool, MrfOpKind, MrfReplicateEntry,
MustReplicateOptions, ObjectOpts, REMOTE_TARGET_CAPABILITY_CONTRACT_VERSION, REMOTE_TARGET_UNSUPPORTED_FIELDS,
REMOTE_TARGET_WRITABLE_FIELDS, REPLICATE_INCOMING_DELETE, REPLICATION_CAPABILITY_CONTRACT_VERSION,
REPLICATION_READ_ONLY_HISTORICAL_FIELDS, REPLICATION_WRITABLE_FIELDS, ReplicateDecision, ReplicateObjectInfo,
ReplicationBatchAdmission, ReplicationConfig, ReplicationConfigStructureError, ReplicationConfigurationExt,
ReplicationDeleteScheduleInput, ReplicationDeleteStateSource, ReplicationHealQueueResult, ReplicationObjectBridge,
ReplicationObjectIO, ReplicationOperation, ReplicationPoolTrait, ReplicationPriority, ReplicationQueueAdmission,
ReplicationScannerBridge, ReplicationState, ReplicationStats, ReplicationStatusType, ReplicationStorage,
ReplicationTargetValidationError, ReplicationType, ResyncOpts, ResyncStatusType, RuntimeReplicationTargetBacklog,
TargetReplicationResyncStatus, VersionPurgeStatusType, delete_replication_state_from_config,
delete_replication_version_id, get_global_replication_pool, get_global_replication_stats,
init_background_replication, invalid_replication_config_status_field, read_durable_mrf_backlog,
replication_state_to_filemeta, replication_status_to_filemeta, replication_statuses_map, replication_target_arns,
resync_start_conflict_id, should_remove_replication_target, should_schedule_delete_replication,
should_use_existing_delete_replication_info, should_use_existing_delete_replication_source,
unsupported_replication_config_field, validate_replication_config_target_arns, version_purge_status_to_filemeta,
TargetReplicationResyncStatus, VersionPurgeStatusType, commit_force_delete_intent, complete_force_delete_intent,
delete_replication_state_from_config, delete_replication_version_id, get_global_replication_pool,
get_global_replication_stats, init_background_replication, invalid_replication_config_status_field,
persist_force_delete_intent, read_durable_mrf_backlog, replication_state_to_filemeta, replication_status_to_filemeta,
replication_statuses_map, replication_target_arns, resync_start_conflict_id, should_remove_replication_target,
should_schedule_delete_replication, should_use_existing_delete_replication_info,
should_use_existing_delete_replication_source, unsupported_replication_config_field,
validate_replication_config_structure, validate_replication_config_target_arns, version_purge_status_to_filemeta,
};
}
@@ -200,7 +206,9 @@ pub mod bucket {
}
pub mod target {
pub use crate::bucket::target::{ARN, BucketTarget, BucketTargetType, BucketTargets, Credentials, LatencyStat};
pub use crate::bucket::target::{
ARN, BucketTarget, BucketTargetType, BucketTargets, Credentials, LatencyStat, duration_from_secs_or_nanos,
};
}
pub mod utils {
@@ -302,7 +310,8 @@ pub mod config {
pub mod data_usage {
pub use crate::data_usage::{
DATA_USAGE_CACHE_NAME, apply_bucket_usage_memory_overlay, compute_bucket_usage,
init_compression_total_memory_from_backend, invalidate_data_usage_snapshot_cache, live_bucket_usage_computations,
init_compression_total_memory_from_backend, invalidate_admin_data_usage_snapshot_cache,
invalidate_data_usage_snapshot_cache, live_bucket_usage_computations, load_admin_data_usage_from_backend_cached,
load_compression_total_from_memory, load_data_usage_from_backend, load_data_usage_from_backend_cached,
record_bucket_delete_marker_memory, record_bucket_object_delete_memory, record_bucket_object_version_write_memory,
record_bucket_object_write_memory, record_bucket_object_write_unknown_previous_memory, record_compression_total_memory,
@@ -317,8 +326,8 @@ pub mod disk {
pub use crate::disk::local::ScanGuard;
pub use crate::disk::{
BATCH_READ_VERSION_MAX_ITEMS, BUCKET_META_PREFIX, BatchReadVersionItem, BatchReadVersionReq, BatchReadVersionResp,
CheckPartsResp, DeleteOptions, Disk, DiskAPI, DiskInfo, DiskInfoOptions, DiskLocation, DiskOption, DiskStore,
FileInfoVersions, FileReader, FileWriter, HEALING_MARKER_PATH, NsScannerOpenRequest, OldCurrentSize,
CheckPartsResp, ConditionalFileUpdate, DeleteOptions, Disk, DiskAPI, DiskInfo, DiskInfoOptions, DiskLocation, DiskOption,
DiskStore, FileInfoVersions, FileReader, FileWriter, HEALING_MARKER_PATH, NsScannerOpenRequest, OldCurrentSize,
PartTransactionAction, RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, ReadMultipleReq, ReadMultipleResp, ReadOptions, RenameDataResp,
STORAGE_FORMAT_FILE, SnapshotLeaseToken, UpdateMetadataOpts, VolumeInfo, WalkDirOptions, new_disk,
validate_batch_read_version_item_count,
@@ -399,13 +408,16 @@ pub mod notification {
pub mod object {
pub use crate::object_api::{
BLOCK_SIZE_V2, ERASURE_ALGORITHM, EncryptionResolutionError, EncryptionResolutionErrorKind, GetObjectBodyCacheHook,
GetObjectBodyCacheHookLookup, GetObjectBodySource, GetObjectReader, ObjectEncryptionResolver, ObjectInfo,
ObjectMutationHook, ObjectOptions, PutObjReader, RangedDecompressReader, ReadEncryptionMaterial, ReadEncryptionMode,
ReadEncryptionRequest, StreamConsumer, get_object_body_cache_plaintext_len, lookup_get_object_body_cache_hook,
register_get_object_body_cache_hook, register_object_mutation_hook, unregister_get_object_body_cache_hook,
unregister_object_mutation_hook,
GetObjectBodyCacheHookLookup, GetObjectBodySource, GetObjectReader, NamespaceLockFence, ObjectEncryptionResolver,
ObjectInfo, ObjectLockConfigSnapshot, ObjectMutationHook, ObjectOptions, PutObjReader, RangedDecompressReader,
ReadEncryptionMaterial, ReadEncryptionMode, ReadEncryptionRequest, StreamConsumer, get_object_body_cache_plaintext_len,
lookup_get_object_body_cache_hook, register_get_object_body_cache_hook, register_object_mutation_hook,
unregister_get_object_body_cache_hook, unregister_object_mutation_hook,
};
pub use crate::store::{
PrepareSelectObjectSnapshotError, PreparedGetObjectReader, SelectObjectSnapshot, SelectObjectSnapshotReadError,
SnapshotConsistencyError,
};
pub use crate::store::PreparedGetObjectReader;
}
pub mod rebalance {
@@ -427,18 +439,29 @@ pub mod rpc {
pub use crate::cluster::rpc::{
AuthenticatedChannel, KMS_SIGNAL_SUBSYSTEM, LocalPeerS3Client, PEER_RESTDRY_RUN, PEER_RESTSIGNAL, PEER_RESTSUB_SYS,
PeerRestClient, PeerS3Client, S3PeerSys, SERVICE_SIGNAL_REFRESH_CONFIG, SERVICE_SIGNAL_RELOAD_DYNAMIC,
ScannerBucketListing, ScannerPeerActivity, TONIC_RPC_PREFIX, TonicInterceptor, gen_signature_headers,
gen_tonic_replay_scope_headers, gen_tonic_signature_headers, gen_tonic_signature_interceptor,
node_service_time_out_client, node_service_time_out_client_no_auth, normalize_tonic_rpc_audience,
set_tonic_canonical_body_digest, sign_ns_scanner_capability, sign_tonic_rpc_response_proof, tonic_boot_epoch_challenge,
tonic_boot_epoch_response_headers, verify_rpc_signature, verify_tonic_boot_epoch_response,
verify_tonic_canonical_body_digest, verify_tonic_mutation_body_digest, verify_tonic_rpc_response_proof,
verify_tonic_rpc_signature, verify_tonic_rpc_signature_with_bootstrap,
ScannerBucketListing, ScannerPeerActivity, TONIC_RPC_PREFIX, TonicInterceptor, build_put_file_auth_trailer,
check_and_record_signed_rpc_nonce, gen_signature_headers, gen_tonic_replay_scope_headers, gen_tonic_signature_headers,
gen_tonic_signature_interceptor, node_service_time_out_client, node_service_time_out_client_no_auth,
normalize_tonic_rpc_audience, set_tonic_canonical_body_digest, sign_ns_scanner_capability, sign_put_file_capability,
sign_tonic_rpc_response_proof, tonic_boot_epoch_challenge, tonic_boot_epoch_response_headers,
tonic_rpc_auth_failure_reason, verify_put_file_auth_trailer, verify_put_file_capability, verify_rpc_signature,
verify_tonic_boot_epoch_response, verify_tonic_canonical_body_digest, verify_tonic_mutation_body_digest,
verify_tonic_rpc_response_proof, verify_tonic_rpc_signature, verify_tonic_rpc_signature_with_bootstrap,
};
}
pub mod set_disk {
pub use crate::set_disk::{DEFAULT_READ_BUFFER_SIZE, SetDisks, get_lock_acquire_timeout, is_valid_storage_class};
/// Return the canonical object-metadata identity used for read-quorum grouping.
pub fn file_info_quorum_hash(meta: &rustfs_filemeta::FileInfo) -> [u8; 32] {
crate::set_disk::SetDisks::file_info_quorum_hash(meta)
}
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
pub mod test_util {
pub use crate::set_disk::{PutObjectCommitBarrier, PutObjectCommitPause};
}
}
pub mod store_list {
+101 -25
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
// limitations under the License.
use crate::bucket::bandwidth::reader::BucketOptions;
use ratelimit::{Error as RatelimitError, Ratelimiter};
use ratelimit::{Clock, Error as RatelimitError, Ratelimiter};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
@@ -24,6 +24,33 @@ use tracing::warn;
/// BETA_BUCKET is the weight used to calculate exponential moving average
const BETA_BUCKET: f64 = 0.1;
// ratelimit 2.0 stores tokens at six decimal places. Above this limit its
// scaled capacity and token-cost calculations saturate instead of preserving
// the configured bandwidth.
const MAX_RATELIMIT_TOKENS: i64 = 18_446_744_073_709;
fn consume_tokens<C: Clock>(limiter: &Ratelimiter<C>, n: u64) -> (u64, f64, u64) {
if n == 0 {
return (0, limiter.rate() as f64, 0);
}
let mut consumed = 0u64;
// Consuming one token also refills the bucket based on elapsed time, so
// the subsequent `available()` read reflects freshly accrued tokens.
if limiter.try_wait().is_ok() {
consumed = 1;
}
let available = limiter.available();
let to_consume = n - consumed;
let batch = to_consume.min(available);
if batch > 0 && limiter.try_wait_n(batch).is_ok() {
consumed += batch;
}
let deficit = n.saturating_sub(consumed);
let rate = limiter.rate() as f64;
(deficit, rate, consumed)
}
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct BucketThrottle {
limiter: Arc<Mutex<Ratelimiter>>,
@@ -34,9 +61,9 @@ impl BucketThrottle {
fn new(node_bandwidth_per_sec: i64) -> Result<Self, RatelimitError> {
let node_bandwidth_per_sec = node_bandwidth_per_sec.max(1);
let amount = node_bandwidth_per_sec as u64;
let limiter_inner = Ratelimiter::builder(amount, Duration::from_secs(1))
.max_tokens(amount)
.build()?;
// ratelimit 2.0's builder takes a per-second rate; the refill period
// defaults to one second, so `amount` tokens accrue per second.
let limiter_inner = Ratelimiter::builder(amount).max_tokens(amount).build()?;
Ok(Self {
limiter: Arc::new(Mutex::new(limiter_inner)),
node_bandwidth_per_sec,
@@ -47,32 +74,21 @@ impl BucketThrottle {
self.limiter.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()).max_tokens()
}
/// The ratelimit crate (0.10.0) does not provide a bulk token consumption API.
/// try_wait() first to consume 1 token AND trigger the internal refill
/// mechanism (tokens are only refilled during try_wait/wait calls).
/// directly adjust available tokens via set_available() to consume the remaining amount.
/// Best-effort bulk token consumption: consume up to `n` tokens and report
/// how many were taken plus any shortfall.
///
/// `try_wait_n` on the ratelimit crate is all-or-nothing, so we cannot ask
/// for `n` directly and still consume a partial amount. Instead we take one
/// token first (which also triggers the internal time-based refill), read
/// the now-current available count, and consume `min(remaining, available)`
/// in a single `try_wait_n` call — that batch never exceeds `available`, so
/// it always succeeds.
pub(crate) fn consume(&self, n: u64) -> (u64, f64, u64) {
let guard = self.limiter.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| {
warn!("bucket throttle mutex poisoned, recovering");
e.into_inner()
});
if n == 0 {
return (0, guard.rate(), 0);
}
let mut consumed = 0u64;
if guard.try_wait().is_ok() {
consumed = 1;
}
let available = guard.available();
let to_consume = n - consumed;
let batch = to_consume.min(available);
if batch > 0 {
let _ = guard.set_available(available - batch);
consumed += batch;
}
let deficit = n.saturating_sub(consumed);
let rate = guard.rate();
(deficit, rate, consumed)
consume_tokens(&guard, n)
}
}
@@ -329,6 +345,16 @@ impl Monitor {
"bandwidth limit too small for cluster size, per-node limit will clamp to 1 byte/s"
);
}
if limit_bytes > MAX_RATELIMIT_TOKENS {
warn!(
bucket = bucket,
arn = arn,
limit_bytes = limit_bytes,
max_limit_bytes = MAX_RATELIMIT_TOKENS,
"bandwidth limit exceeds ratelimiter capacity, throttling disabled for this target"
);
return;
}
let opts = BucketOptions {
name: bucket.to_string(),
replication_arn: arn.to_string(),
@@ -375,6 +401,30 @@ mod tests {
use super::*;
use std::panic::{AssertUnwindSafe, catch_unwind};
#[derive(Clone)]
struct TestClock {
elapsed_ns: Arc<AtomicU64>,
}
impl TestClock {
fn new() -> Self {
Self {
elapsed_ns: Arc::new(AtomicU64::new(0)),
}
}
fn advance(&self, duration: Duration) {
let elapsed_ns = u64::try_from(duration.as_nanos()).unwrap_or(u64::MAX);
self.elapsed_ns.fetch_add(elapsed_ns, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
}
impl Clock for TestClock {
fn elapsed(&self) -> Duration {
Duration::from_nanos(self.elapsed_ns.load(Ordering::Relaxed))
}
}
#[test]
fn test_set_and_get_throttle_with_node_split() {
let monitor = Monitor::new(4);
@@ -426,6 +476,15 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!monitor.is_throttled("b1", "arn1"));
}
#[test]
fn test_set_bandwidth_limit_rejects_unrepresentable_rate() {
let monitor = Monitor::new(1);
monitor.set_bandwidth_limit("b1", "arn1", MAX_RATELIMIT_TOKENS + 1);
assert!(!monitor.is_throttled("b1", "arn1"));
}
#[test]
fn test_consume_returns_deficit_when_tokens_exhausted() {
let throttle = BucketThrottle::new(100).expect("test");
@@ -436,6 +495,23 @@ mod tests {
assert!(rate > 0.0);
}
#[test]
fn test_consume_refills_continuously() {
let clock = TestClock::new();
let limiter = Ratelimiter::with_clock(100, clock.clone());
assert_eq!(consume_tokens(&limiter, 100), (100, 100.0, 0));
clock.advance(Duration::from_millis(250));
assert_eq!(consume_tokens(&limiter, 100), (75, 100.0, 25));
clock.advance(Duration::from_millis(250));
assert_eq!(consume_tokens(&limiter, 100), (75, 100.0, 25));
clock.advance(Duration::from_millis(500));
assert_eq!(consume_tokens(&limiter, 100), (50, 100.0, 50));
}
#[test]
fn test_consume_no_deficit_when_tokens_sufficient() {
let throttle = BucketThrottle::new(10000).expect("test");
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_monitored_reader_header_size_accounting() {
let monitor = Monitor::new(1);
monitor.set_bandwidth_limit("b1", "arn1", 100);
monitor.set_bandwidth_limit("b1", "arn1", 1_000_000_000);
let data = vec![0u8; 200];
let inner = TestAsyncReader::new(&data);
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -12,20 +12,127 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use s3s::dto::{BucketLifecycleConfiguration, ObjectLockConfiguration, ReplicationConfiguration};
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use std::sync::Arc;
use crate::bucket::metadata_sys;
use crate::error::Result;
use s3s::dto::{BucketLifecycleConfiguration, ObjectLockConfiguration};
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::bucket::metadata_sys::{self, ObjectLockConfigState};
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct LifecycleExpiryConfigs {
pub(crate) lifecycle: Option<Arc<BucketLifecycleConfiguration>>,
pub(crate) object_lock: Option<Arc<ObjectLockConfiguration>>,
pub(crate) bucket_incarnation_id: Uuid,
}
pub(crate) async fn get_expiry_configs(api: &crate::store::ECStore, bucket: &str) -> Result<LifecycleExpiryConfigs> {
let bucket_incarnation_id = api.bucket_incarnation_id_from_disk(bucket).await?;
let sys = metadata_sys::bucket_metadata_sys_of(&api.ctx)?;
let sys = sys.read().await.clone();
let metadata = sys.get_authoritative_metadata(bucket).await?;
if !metadata.bucket_incarnation_sidecar || metadata.bucket_incarnation_id != bucket_incarnation_id {
return Err(Error::other(format!("bucket lifecycle metadata is not authoritative: {bucket}")));
}
let lifecycle = if metadata.lifecycle_config.is_none() && !metadata.lifecycle_config_xml.is_empty() {
return Err(Error::other("persisted bucket lifecycle configuration is invalid"));
} else {
metadata
.lifecycle_config
.clone()
.filter(|config| !config.rules.is_empty())
.map(Arc::new)
};
if lifecycle.is_none() {
return Ok(LifecycleExpiryConfigs {
lifecycle: None,
object_lock: None,
bucket_incarnation_id,
});
}
let object_lock = match metadata_sys::object_lock_config_state_from_authoritative_metadata(&metadata)? {
ObjectLockConfigState::Configured { config, .. } => Some(Arc::new(config)),
ObjectLockConfigState::ConfirmedAbsent => None,
ObjectLockConfigState::Fabricated => {
return Err(Error::other(format!("bucket Object Lock metadata is not authoritative: {bucket}")));
}
};
Ok(LifecycleExpiryConfigs {
lifecycle,
object_lock,
bucket_incarnation_id,
})
}
pub(crate) async fn get_lifecycle_config(bucket: &str) -> Result<(BucketLifecycleConfiguration, OffsetDateTime)> {
metadata_sys::get_lifecycle_config(bucket).await
}
pub(crate) async fn get_object_lock_config(bucket: &str) -> Result<(ObjectLockConfiguration, OffsetDateTime)> {
metadata_sys::get_object_lock_config(bucket).await
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::bucket::metadata::BucketMetadata;
use crate::bucket::metadata_sys::{self, test_support::isolated_store_over_temp_disks};
use crate::storage_api_contracts::bucket::MakeBucketOptions;
use s3s::dto::{ExpirationStatus, LifecycleExpiration, LifecycleRule};
use serial_test::serial;
pub(crate) async fn get_replication_config(bucket: &str) -> Result<(ReplicationConfiguration, OffsetDateTime)> {
metadata_sys::get_replication_config(bucket).await
fn lifecycle_config() -> BucketLifecycleConfiguration {
BucketLifecycleConfiguration {
expiry_updated_at: None,
rules: vec![LifecycleRule {
status: ExpirationStatus::from_static(ExpirationStatus::ENABLED),
expiration: Some(LifecycleExpiration {
days: Some(1),
..Default::default()
}),
abort_incomplete_multipart_upload: None,
del_marker_expiration: None,
filter: None,
id: Some("expire".to_string()),
noncurrent_version_expiration: None,
noncurrent_version_transitions: None,
prefix: None,
transitions: None,
}],
}
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn expiry_configs_are_resolved_from_the_owning_store() {
let (_dirs_a, store_a) = isolated_store_over_temp_disks().await;
let (_dirs_b, store_b) = isolated_store_over_temp_disks().await;
let bucket = "same-name-expiry-config";
store_a
.peer_sys
.make_bucket(bucket, &MakeBucketOptions::default())
.await
.unwrap();
store_b
.peer_sys
.make_bucket(bucket, &MakeBucketOptions::default())
.await
.unwrap();
metadata_sys::init_bucket_metadata_sys(store_a.clone(), vec![bucket.to_string()]).await;
metadata_sys::init_bucket_metadata_sys(store_b.clone(), vec![bucket.to_string()]).await;
let mut metadata = BucketMetadata::new(bucket);
let lifecycle = lifecycle_config();
metadata.lifecycle_config_xml = crate::bucket::utils::serialize(&lifecycle).unwrap();
metadata.lifecycle_config = Some(lifecycle);
metadata_sys::set_new_bucket_metadata_in(&store_a.ctx, metadata)
.await
.unwrap();
metadata_sys::set_new_bucket_metadata_in(&store_b.ctx, BucketMetadata::new(bucket))
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(get_expiry_configs(&store_a, bucket).await.unwrap().lifecycle.is_some());
assert!(get_expiry_configs(&store_b, bucket).await.unwrap().lifecycle.is_none());
}
}
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ pub mod core;
pub mod evaluator;
pub mod manual_transition_job;
mod metadata_boundary;
pub(crate) use metadata_boundary::get_expiry_configs;
mod object_lock_boundary;
pub use self::core as lifecycle;
mod replication_sink;
@@ -21,12 +21,12 @@ pub(crate) fn is_object_locked_by_metadata(user_defined: &HashMap<String, String
rustfs_lifecycle::object_lock::is_object_locked_by_metadata(user_defined, is_delete_marker)
}
pub(crate) async fn check_object_lock_for_deletion(
bucket: &str,
pub(crate) fn check_object_lock_for_deletion_with_config(
config: Option<&s3s::dto::ObjectLockConfiguration>,
obj_info: &ObjectInfo,
bypass_governance: bool,
) -> Option<ObjectLockBlockReason> {
objectlock_sys::check_object_lock_for_deletion(bucket, obj_info, bypass_governance).await
) -> crate::error::Result<Option<ObjectLockBlockReason>> {
objectlock_sys::check_object_lock_for_deletion_with_config(config, obj_info, bypass_governance)
}
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -15,15 +15,14 @@
use rustfs_common::metrics::IlmAction;
use crate::bucket::lifecycle::lifecycle::ObjectOpts;
pub(crate) use crate::bucket::replication::ReplicationStatusType;
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) use crate::bucket::replication::ReplicateTargetDecision;
pub(crate) use crate::bucket::replication::VersionPurgeStatusType;
pub(crate) use crate::bucket::replication::{
ReplicateDecision, ReplicationState, ReplicationStatusType, VersionPurgeStatusType, replication_state_to_filemeta,
replication_statuses_map, version_purge_statuses_map,
DeleteReplicationConfigSnapshot, ReplicationObjectBridge, replication_state_to_filemeta,
};
use crate::bucket::replication::{ReplicationLifecycleBridge, ReplicationLifecycleConfig};
use crate::object_api::{ObjectInfo, ObjectOptions};
use crate::storage_api_contracts::object::{DeletedObject, ObjectToDelete};
use crate::storage_api_contracts::object::DeletedObject;
pub(crate) type LifecycleReplicationConfig = ReplicationLifecycleConfig;
@@ -57,15 +56,6 @@ pub(crate) fn lifecycle_action_waits_for_replication(action: IlmAction) -> bool
)
}
pub(crate) async fn check_delete_replication(
bucket: &str,
object: ObjectToDelete,
source: &ObjectInfo,
opts: &ObjectOptions,
) -> ReplicateDecision {
ReplicationLifecycleBridge::check_delete_replication(bucket, &object, source, opts).await
}
pub(crate) async fn schedule_delete(bucket: String, delete_object: DeletedObject) {
ReplicationLifecycleBridge::schedule_delete(bucket, delete_object).await;
}
@@ -74,7 +64,16 @@ pub(crate) async fn schedule_delete(bucket: String, delete_object: DeletedObject
mod tests {
use std::collections::HashMap;
use crate::bucket::replication::{DeleteReplicationConfigSnapshot, ReplicationObjectBridge};
use crate::object_api::{ObjectInfo, ObjectOptions};
use crate::storage_api_contracts::object::ObjectToDelete;
use rustfs_common::metrics::IlmAction;
use s3s::dto::{
BucketVersioningStatus, DeleteMarkerReplication, DeleteMarkerReplicationStatus, DeleteReplication,
DeleteReplicationStatus, Destination, ReplicationConfiguration, ReplicationRule, ReplicationRuleStatus,
VersioningConfiguration,
};
use uuid::Uuid;
use super::*;
@@ -139,4 +138,97 @@ mod tests {
assert!(lifecycle_action_waits_for_replication(IlmAction::TransitionVersionAction));
assert!(!lifecycle_action_waits_for_replication(IlmAction::NoneAction));
}
#[test]
fn lifecycle_delete_admission_uses_marker_and_version_switches_for_all_purges() {
for marker_enabled in [false, true] {
for purge_enabled in [false, true] {
let snapshot = DeleteReplicationConfigSnapshot::from_configs_for_test(
VersioningConfiguration {
status: Some(BucketVersioningStatus::from_static(BucketVersioningStatus::ENABLED)),
..Default::default()
},
Some(ReplicationConfiguration {
role: String::new(),
rules: vec![ReplicationRule {
delete_marker_replication: Some(DeleteMarkerReplication {
status: Some(if marker_enabled {
DeleteMarkerReplicationStatus::from_static(DeleteMarkerReplicationStatus::ENABLED)
} else {
DeleteMarkerReplicationStatus::from_static(DeleteMarkerReplicationStatus::DISABLED)
}),
}),
delete_replication: Some(DeleteReplication {
status: if purge_enabled {
DeleteReplicationStatus::from_static(DeleteReplicationStatus::ENABLED)
} else {
DeleteReplicationStatus::from_static(DeleteReplicationStatus::DISABLED)
},
}),
destination: Destination {
bucket: "arn:rustfs:replication:target".to_string(),
..Default::default()
},
existing_object_replication: None,
filter: None,
id: Some("lifecycle-delete-switches".to_string()),
prefix: Some(String::new()),
priority: Some(1),
source_selection_criteria: None,
status: ReplicationRuleStatus::from_static(ReplicationRuleStatus::ENABLED),
}],
}),
);
let source = ObjectInfo {
bucket: "bucket".to_string(),
name: "logs/object".to_string(),
..Default::default()
};
let marker = ObjectToDelete {
object_name: source.name.clone(),
..Default::default()
};
let marker_opts = ObjectOptions {
versioned: true,
..Default::default()
};
assert_eq!(
ReplicationObjectBridge::check_delete_with_snapshot(&marker, &source, &marker_opts, false, &snapshot)
.replicate_any(),
marker_enabled
);
for delete_marker in [false, true] {
for version_id in [Uuid::new_v4(), Uuid::nil()] {
let purge = ObjectToDelete {
object_name: source.name.clone(),
version_id: Some(version_id),
..Default::default()
};
let purge_source = ObjectInfo {
delete_marker,
..source.clone()
};
let purge_opts = ObjectOptions {
version_id: Some(version_id.to_string()),
versioned: true,
..Default::default()
};
assert_eq!(
ReplicationObjectBridge::check_delete_with_snapshot(
&purge,
&purge_source,
&purge_opts,
false,
&snapshot,
)
.replicate_any(),
purge_enabled,
"delete marker={delete_marker}, version_id={version_id}"
);
}
}
}
}
}
}
@@ -20,8 +20,10 @@ use tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken;
use tracing::{debug, warn};
use crate::bucket::lifecycle::config_boundary;
use crate::bucket::lifecycle::runtime_boundary;
use crate::bucket::lifecycle::tier_sweeper::{
Jentry, delete_confirmed_transition_candidate_exact_with_manager_and_identity,
Jentry, TierDeleteJournalState, TierDeleteSourceIdentity,
delete_confirmed_transition_candidate_exact_with_manager_and_identity,
delete_object_from_remote_tier_idempotent_with_manager_and_identity,
};
use crate::disk::RUSTFS_META_BUCKET;
@@ -30,7 +32,7 @@ use crate::object_api::{GetObjectReader, ObjectInfo, ObjectOptions, PutObjReader
use crate::services::tier::tier::tier_destination_id_from_metadata;
use crate::storage_api_contracts::{
list::ListOperations as _,
object::{DeletedObject, ObjectIO, ObjectOperations, ObjectToDelete},
object::{DeletedObject, HTTPPreconditions, ObjectIO, ObjectOperations, ObjectToDelete},
range::HTTPRangeSpec,
};
use crate::store::ECStore;
@@ -46,6 +48,7 @@ const TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_RECOVERY_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(300);
const TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_VERSION: u8 = 2;
const TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_EXACT_VERSION: u8 = 3;
const TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_STATE_VERSION: u8 = 4;
const TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_TRANSACTION_VERSION: u8 = 5;
pub(crate) const TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_PREFIX: &str = "ilm/tier-delete-journal/";
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
@@ -61,13 +64,22 @@ struct PersistedTierDeleteJournalEntry {
version_id_exact: Option<bool>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
version_state: Option<rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
state: Option<TierDeleteJournalState>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
source: Option<TierDeleteSourceIdentity>,
}
impl PersistedTierDeleteJournalEntry {
fn from_jentry(je: &Jentry) -> Result<Self> {
validate_version_state(je.version_state, &je.version_id, je.version_id_exact)?;
let legacy_unknown = je.version_state == rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState::Unknown;
let version = if legacy_unknown {
let version = if je.source.is_some() || je.state == TierDeleteJournalState::Prepared {
if je.backend_identity.is_none() {
return Err(Error::other("tier delete transaction is missing its backend identity"));
}
TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_TRANSACTION_VERSION
} else if legacy_unknown {
if je.backend_identity.is_some() {
TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_VERSION
} else {
@@ -87,6 +99,10 @@ impl PersistedTierDeleteJournalEntry {
backend_identity: je.backend_identity,
version_id_exact: je.version_id_exact.then_some(true),
version_state: (!legacy_unknown).then_some(je.version_state),
state: (version == TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_TRANSACTION_VERSION).then_some(je.state),
source: (version == TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_TRANSACTION_VERSION)
.then(|| je.source.clone())
.flatten(),
})
}
@@ -101,14 +117,21 @@ impl PersistedTierDeleteJournalEntry {
}
if self.version != TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_EXACT_VERSION
&& self.version != TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_STATE_VERSION
&& self.version != TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_TRANSACTION_VERSION
&& self.version_id_exact.unwrap_or(false)
{
return Err(Error::other(
"legacy tier delete journal entry has an unsupported exact version constraint",
));
}
let (backend_identity, version_id_exact, version_state) = match self.version {
1 => (None, false, rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState::Unknown),
let (backend_identity, version_id_exact, version_state, state, source) = match self.version {
1 => (
None,
false,
rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState::Unknown,
TierDeleteJournalState::Committed,
None,
),
TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_VERSION => (
Some(
self.backend_identity
@@ -116,6 +139,8 @@ impl PersistedTierDeleteJournalEntry {
),
false,
rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState::Unknown,
TierDeleteJournalState::Committed,
None,
),
TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_EXACT_VERSION => {
if self.version_id.is_empty() || self.version_id_exact != Some(true) {
@@ -128,6 +153,8 @@ impl PersistedTierDeleteJournalEntry {
),
true,
rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState::Exact,
TierDeleteJournalState::Committed,
None,
)
}
TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_STATE_VERSION => {
@@ -143,6 +170,31 @@ impl PersistedTierDeleteJournalEntry {
),
exact,
state,
TierDeleteJournalState::Committed,
None,
)
}
TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_TRANSACTION_VERSION => {
let state = self
.state
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other("tier delete journal v5 entry is missing its state"))?;
let source = self
.source
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other("tier delete journal v5 entry is missing its source identity"))?;
let exact = self.version_id_exact.unwrap_or(false);
let version_state = self
.version_state
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other("tier delete journal v5 entry is missing its version state"))?;
validate_version_state(version_state, &self.version_id, exact)?;
(
Some(
self.backend_identity
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other("tier delete journal v5 entry is missing its backend identity"))?,
),
exact,
version_state,
state,
Some(source),
)
}
version => return Err(Error::other(format!("unsupported tier delete journal version {version}"))),
@@ -154,6 +206,8 @@ impl PersistedTierDeleteJournalEntry {
backend_identity,
version_id_exact,
version_state,
state,
source,
})
}
}
@@ -201,6 +255,20 @@ pub(crate) fn tier_delete_journal_object_name(je: &Jentry) -> String {
hasher.update([0]);
hasher.update(b"exact-version-id");
}
if let Some(source) = &je.source {
hasher.update([0]);
hasher.update(source.bucket.as_bytes());
hasher.update([0]);
hasher.update(source.object.as_bytes());
hasher.update([0]);
hasher.update(source.version_id.as_deref().unwrap_or_default().as_bytes());
hasher.update([0]);
hasher.update(source.data_dir.as_deref().unwrap_or_default().as_bytes());
hasher.update([0]);
hasher.update(source.etag.as_deref().unwrap_or_default().as_bytes());
hasher.update([0]);
hasher.update(source.mod_time.as_deref().unwrap_or_default().as_bytes());
}
format!(
"{TIER_DELETE_JOURNAL_PREFIX}{}.json",
rustfs_utils::crypto::hex(hasher.finalize().as_slice())
@@ -246,6 +314,66 @@ where
.map_err(std::io::Error::other)
}
pub async fn commit_tier_delete_journal_entry<S>(api: Arc<S>, je: &Jentry) -> std::io::Result<()>
where
S: ObjectIO<
Error = Error,
RangeSpec = HTTPRangeSpec,
HeaderMap = http::HeaderMap,
ObjectOptions = ObjectOptions,
ObjectInfo = ObjectInfo,
GetObjectReader = GetObjectReader,
PutObjectReader = PutObjReader,
>,
{
let mut committed = je.clone();
committed.state = TierDeleteJournalState::Committed;
persist_tier_delete_journal_entry(api, &committed).await
}
pub async fn abort_tier_delete_journal_entry<S>(api: Arc<S>, je: &Jentry) -> std::io::Result<()>
where
S: ObjectOperations<
Error = Error,
ObjectInfo = ObjectInfo,
ObjectOptions = ObjectOptions,
FileInfo = FileInfo,
ObjectToDelete = ObjectToDelete,
DeletedObject = DeletedObject,
>,
{
remove_tier_delete_journal_entry(api, je).await
}
pub async fn abort_prepared_tier_delete_journal_entry(api: Arc<ECStore>, je: &Jentry) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let name = tier_delete_journal_object_name(je);
let (data, metadata) = match config_boundary::read_config_with_metadata(api.clone(), &name, &ObjectOptions::default()).await {
Ok(result) => result,
Err(Error::ConfigNotFound) | Err(Error::FileNotFound) => return Ok(()),
Err(err) => return Err(std::io::Error::other(err)),
};
let current = decode_tier_delete_journal_entry(&data).map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
if current.state != TierDeleteJournalState::Prepared {
return Ok(());
}
let etag = metadata
.etag
.ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("prepared tier delete journal has no entity tag"))?;
match config_boundary::delete_config_if_match(api, &name, &etag).await {
Ok(()) | Err(Error::ConfigNotFound) => Ok(()),
Err(Error::PreconditionFailed) => Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock,
"prepared tier delete journal changed before abort",
)),
Err(err) => Err(std::io::Error::other(err)),
}
}
pub(crate) async fn enqueue_committed_tier_delete_journal_entry(je: &Jentry) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let expiry_state = runtime_boundary::expiry_state_handle();
expiry_state.write().await.enqueue_tier_journal_entry(je)
}
pub async fn remove_tier_delete_journal_entry<S>(api: Arc<S>, je: &Jentry) -> std::io::Result<()>
where
S: ObjectOperations<
@@ -264,6 +392,13 @@ where
}
pub async fn process_tier_delete_journal_entry(api: Arc<ECStore>, je: &Jentry) -> std::io::Result<()> {
if je.state == TierDeleteJournalState::Prepared {
return reconcile_prepared_tier_delete_journal_entry(api, je).await;
}
process_committed_tier_delete_journal_entry(api, je).await
}
async fn process_committed_tier_delete_journal_entry(api: Arc<ECStore>, je: &Jentry) -> std::io::Result<()> {
if je.version_state == rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState::Unknown {
return Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
@@ -296,6 +431,87 @@ pub async fn process_tier_delete_journal_entry(api: Arc<ECStore>, je: &Jentry) -
remove_tier_delete_journal_entry(api, je).await
}
async fn reconcile_prepared_tier_delete_journal_entry(api: Arc<ECStore>, je: &Jentry) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let (data, metadata) =
config_boundary::read_config_with_metadata(api.clone(), &tier_delete_journal_object_name(je), &ObjectOptions::default())
.await
.map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
let current = decode_tier_delete_journal_entry(&data).map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
if current.state != TierDeleteJournalState::Prepared {
return Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock,
"prepared tier delete journal changed before reconciliation",
));
}
let Some(etag) = metadata.etag else {
return Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
"prepared tier delete journal has no entity tag",
));
};
let source = je
.source
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "prepared tier delete journal has no source"))?;
match api
.get_object_info(&source.bucket, &source.object, &source.lookup_options())
.await
{
Ok(info) if source.matches(&info) => {
match config_boundary::delete_config_if_match(api, &tier_delete_journal_object_name(&current), &etag).await {
Ok(()) => Ok(()),
Err(Error::PreconditionFailed) => Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock,
"prepared tier delete journal changed before abort",
)),
Err(err) => Err(std::io::Error::other(err)),
}
}
Ok(_info) if source.has_stable_identity() => {
commit_prepared_tier_delete_journal_entry_if_current(api, current, etag).await
}
Ok(_) => Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock,
"prepared tier delete journal source identity is not sufficient to confirm deletion",
)),
Err(Error::ObjectNotFound(_, _)) | Err(Error::FileNotFound) | Err(Error::FileVersionNotFound) => {
commit_prepared_tier_delete_journal_entry_if_current(api, current, etag).await
}
Err(err) => Err(std::io::Error::other(err)),
}
}
async fn commit_prepared_tier_delete_journal_entry_if_current(
api: Arc<ECStore>,
mut committed: Jentry,
etag: String,
) -> std::io::Result<()> {
committed.state = TierDeleteJournalState::Committed;
let data = encode_tier_delete_journal_entry(&committed).map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
match config_boundary::save_config_with_opts(
api.clone(),
&tier_delete_journal_object_name(&committed),
data,
&ObjectOptions {
max_parity: true,
http_preconditions: Some(HTTPPreconditions {
if_match: Some(etag),
..Default::default()
}),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
{
Ok(()) => process_committed_tier_delete_journal_entry(api, &committed).await,
Err(Error::PreconditionFailed) => Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock,
"prepared tier delete journal changed before commit",
)),
Err(err) => Err(std::io::Error::other(err)),
}
}
pub async fn recover_tier_delete_journal_entries(
api: Arc<ECStore>,
limit: usize,
@@ -482,10 +698,13 @@ mod tests {
decode_tier_delete_journal_entry, encode_tier_delete_journal_entry, record_tier_delete_journal_backend_identity,
tier_delete_journal_object_name,
};
use crate::bucket::lifecycle::tier_sweeper::Jentry;
use crate::bucket::lifecycle::tier_sweeper::{Jentry, TierDeleteJournalState, TierDeleteSourceIdentity};
use crate::error::Result;
use crate::object_api::ObjectInfo;
use std::time::Duration;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken;
use uuid::Uuid;
fn journal_entry() -> Jentry {
Jentry {
@@ -495,6 +714,8 @@ mod tests {
backend_identity: Some([7; 32]),
version_id_exact: true,
version_state: rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState::Exact,
state: TierDeleteJournalState::Committed,
source: None,
}
}
@@ -513,6 +734,55 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(decoded.version_state, je.version_state);
}
#[test]
fn tier_delete_transaction_roundtrips_prepared_source_identity() {
let mut je = journal_entry();
je.state = TierDeleteJournalState::Prepared;
je.source = Some(TierDeleteSourceIdentity {
bucket: "bucket".to_string(),
object: "object".to_string(),
version_id: Some("version".to_string()),
versioned: true,
version_suspended: false,
data_dir: Some("data-dir".to_string()),
etag: Some("etag".to_string()),
mod_time: Some("mod-time".to_string()),
});
let encoded = encode_tier_delete_journal_entry(&je).expect("prepared transaction should encode");
let value: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&encoded).expect("transaction should be JSON");
assert_eq!(value["version"], serde_json::json!(5));
assert_eq!(value["state"], serde_json::json!("Prepared"));
assert!(value["source"].is_object());
let decoded = decode_tier_delete_journal_entry(&encoded).expect("prepared transaction should decode");
assert_eq!(decoded.state, TierDeleteJournalState::Prepared);
assert_eq!(decoded.source, je.source);
}
#[test]
fn tier_delete_source_identity_rejects_recreated_object() {
let version_id = Uuid::from_u128(1);
let data_dir = Uuid::from_u128(2);
let mod_time = OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH + time::Duration::seconds(1);
let info = ObjectInfo {
bucket: "bucket".to_string(),
name: "object".to_string(),
version_id: Some(version_id),
data_dir: Some(data_dir),
mod_time: Some(mod_time),
..Default::default()
};
let source = TierDeleteSourceIdentity::from_object_info("bucket", "object", &info, true, false);
assert!(source.matches(&info));
let recreated = ObjectInfo {
data_dir: Some(Uuid::from_u128(3)),
..info
};
assert!(!source.matches(&recreated));
}
#[test]
fn tier_delete_journal_roundtrips_exact_put_response_constraint() {
let mut exact = journal_entry();
@@ -23,10 +23,12 @@ use crate::bucket::lifecycle::bucket_lifecycle_ops::ExpiryOp;
use crate::bucket::lifecycle::lifecycle::{self, ObjectOpts};
use crate::bucket::lifecycle::tier_delete_journal::persist_tier_delete_journal_entry;
use crate::client::signer_error::error_chain_contains_signer_header_marker;
use crate::object_api::ObjectInfo;
use crate::services::tier::tier::{TierConfigMgr, TierDestinationId, TierOperationLease};
use crate::storage_api_contracts::lifecycle::TransitionedObject;
use crate::store::ECStore;
use rustfs_utils::get_env_usize;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::any::Any;
use std::collections::VecDeque;
@@ -257,6 +259,8 @@ impl ObjSweeper {
rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState::SuspendedNull | rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState::Exact
),
version_state: self.transition_version_state,
state: TierDeleteJournalState::Committed,
source: None,
});
}
None
@@ -285,6 +289,76 @@ impl ObjSweeper {
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) enum TierDeleteJournalState {
Prepared,
Committed,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub(crate) struct TierDeleteSourceIdentity {
pub(crate) bucket: String,
pub(crate) object: String,
pub(crate) version_id: Option<String>,
pub(crate) versioned: bool,
pub(crate) version_suspended: bool,
pub(crate) data_dir: Option<String>,
pub(crate) etag: Option<String>,
pub(crate) mod_time: Option<String>,
}
impl TierDeleteSourceIdentity {
pub(crate) fn from_object_info(
bucket: &str,
object: &str,
info: &ObjectInfo,
versioned: bool,
version_suspended: bool,
) -> Self {
Self {
bucket: bucket.to_string(),
object: object.to_string(),
version_id: info.version_id.map(|id| id.to_string()),
versioned,
version_suspended,
data_dir: info.data_dir.map(|id| id.to_string()),
etag: info.etag.clone(),
mod_time: info.mod_time.map(|time| time.to_string()),
}
}
pub(crate) fn lookup_options(&self) -> crate::object_api::ObjectOptions {
crate::object_api::ObjectOptions {
version_id: self.version_id.clone(),
versioned: self.versioned,
version_suspended: self.version_suspended,
..Default::default()
}
}
pub(crate) fn matches(&self, info: &ObjectInfo) -> bool {
if self.bucket != info.bucket {
return false;
}
if let Some(version_id) = &self.version_id {
return info.version_id.map(|id| id.to_string()).as_deref() == Some(version_id.as_str())
&& self.data_dir == info.data_dir.map(|id| id.to_string());
}
if self.data_dir.is_some() {
return self.data_dir == info.data_dir.map(|id| id.to_string());
}
self.etag.is_some()
&& self.etag == info.etag
&& self.mod_time.is_some()
&& self.mod_time == info.mod_time.map(|time| time.to_string())
}
pub(crate) fn has_stable_identity(&self) -> bool {
self.version_id.is_some() || self.data_dir.is_some() || (self.etag.is_some() && self.mod_time.is_some())
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
#[allow(unused_assignments)]
pub struct Jentry {
@@ -294,6 +368,8 @@ pub struct Jentry {
pub(crate) backend_identity: Option<TierDestinationId>,
pub(crate) version_id_exact: bool,
pub(crate) version_state: rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState,
pub(crate) state: TierDeleteJournalState,
pub(crate) source: Option<TierDeleteSourceIdentity>,
}
impl ExpiryOp for Jentry {
@@ -554,9 +630,48 @@ pub fn transitioned_force_delete_journal_entry(
rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState::SuspendedNull | rustfs_filemeta::TransitionVersionState::Exact
),
version_state: transition_version_state,
state: TierDeleteJournalState::Committed,
source: None,
})
}
pub(crate) fn attach_tier_delete_source(
je: &mut Jentry,
bucket: &str,
object: &str,
info: &ObjectInfo,
versioned: bool,
version_suspended: bool,
) {
je.state = TierDeleteJournalState::Prepared;
je.source = Some(TierDeleteSourceIdentity::from_object_info(
bucket,
object,
info,
versioned,
version_suspended,
));
}
pub(crate) fn transitioned_delete_journal_entry_for_source(
version_id: Option<Uuid>,
versioned: bool,
suspended: bool,
bucket: &str,
object: &str,
source: &ObjectInfo,
) -> Option<Jentry> {
let mut je = transitioned_delete_journal_entry(
version_id,
versioned,
suspended,
&source.transitioned_object,
source.transition_version_state,
)?;
attach_tier_delete_source(&mut je, bucket, object, source, versioned, suspended);
Some(je)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
use crate::client::signer_error::invalid_utf8_header_error;
+101 -3
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ use super::versioning::VersioningApi;
use super::{quota::BucketQuota, target::BucketTargets};
use crate::bucket::replication::invalid_replication_config_status_field;
use crate::bucket::utils::deserialize;
use crate::config::com::{read_config, save_config};
use crate::config::com::{read_config, read_config_preserve_empty, save_config};
use crate::disk::BUCKET_META_PREFIX;
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
use crate::runtime::sources as runtime_sources;
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ use std::io::{Read, Write};
use std::sync::Arc;
use time::{Date, OffsetDateTime, PrimitiveDateTime, Time as CivilTime, UtcOffset};
use tracing::error;
use uuid::Uuid;
fn read_msgp_str<R: Read>(rd: &mut R) -> Result<String> {
let len = rmp::decode::read_str_len(rd)? as usize;
@@ -226,6 +227,7 @@ fn write_bin_field<W: Write>(wr: &mut W, key: &str, val: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
}
pub const BUCKET_METADATA_FILE: &str = ".metadata.bin";
pub const BUCKET_INCARNATION_FILE: &str = ".bucket-incarnation";
pub const BUCKET_METADATA_FORMAT: u16 = 1;
pub const BUCKET_METADATA_VERSION: u16 = 1;
@@ -277,6 +279,8 @@ pub struct BucketMetadata {
pub name: String,
pub created: OffsetDateTime,
pub lock_enabled: bool, // While marked as unused, it may need to be retained
pub bucket_incarnation_id: Uuid,
pub(crate) bucket_incarnation_sidecar: bool,
pub policy_config_json: Vec<u8>,
pub notification_config_xml: Vec<u8>,
pub lifecycle_config_xml: Vec<u8>,
@@ -347,6 +351,8 @@ impl Default for BucketMetadata {
name: Default::default(),
created: OffsetDateTime::UNIX_EPOCH,
lock_enabled: Default::default(),
bucket_incarnation_id: Uuid::nil(),
bucket_incarnation_sidecar: false,
policy_config_json: Default::default(),
notification_config_xml: Default::default(),
lifecycle_config_xml: Default::default(),
@@ -414,6 +420,7 @@ impl BucketMetadata {
pub fn new(name: &str) -> Self {
BucketMetadata {
name: name.to_string(),
bucket_incarnation_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
..Default::default()
}
}
@@ -479,6 +486,11 @@ impl BucketMetadata {
"Name" => self.name = read_msgp_str(rd)?,
"Created" => self.created = read_msgp_time_value(rd)?,
"LockEnabled" => self.lock_enabled = read_msgp_bool(rd)?,
"BucketIncarnationID" => {
let bytes = read_msgp_bin(rd)?;
self.bucket_incarnation_id =
Uuid::from_slice(&bytes).map_err(|err| Error::other(format!("invalid BucketIncarnationID: {err}")))?;
}
"PolicyConfigJSON" | "PolicyConfigJson" => self.policy_config_json = read_msgp_bin(rd)?,
"NotificationConfigXML" | "NotificationConfigXml" => self.notification_config_xml = read_msgp_bin(rd)?,
"LifecycleConfigXML" | "LifecycleConfigXml" => self.lifecycle_config_xml = read_msgp_bin(rd)?,
@@ -535,8 +547,8 @@ impl BucketMetadata {
/// Encode to msgp bytes. Field order follows MinIO BucketMetadata for compatibility.
pub fn encode_to<W: Write>(&self, wr: &mut W) -> Result<()> {
// Map size: MinIO fields (25) + RustFS extensions (18)
let map_len: u32 = 43;
// Map size: MinIO fields (25) + RustFS extensions (19)
let map_len: u32 = 44;
rmp::encode::write_map_len(wr, map_len)?;
// MinIO field order (same as Go struct)
@@ -549,6 +561,8 @@ impl BucketMetadata {
rmp::encode::write_str(wr, "LockEnabled")?;
rmp::encode::write_bool(wr, self.lock_enabled)?;
write_bin_field(wr, "BucketIncarnationID", self.bucket_incarnation_id.as_bytes())?;
write_bin_field(wr, "PolicyConfigJSON", &self.policy_config_json)?;
write_bin_field(wr, "NotificationConfigXML", &self.notification_config_xml)?;
write_bin_field(wr, "LifecycleConfigXML", &self.lifecycle_config_xml)?;
@@ -748,6 +762,10 @@ impl BucketMetadata {
self.quota_config_updated_at = updated;
}
OBJECT_LOCK_CONFIG => {
self.object_lock_config = None;
if !data.is_empty() {
self.lock_enabled = true;
}
self.object_lock_config_xml = data;
self.object_lock_config_updated_at = updated;
}
@@ -1115,6 +1133,29 @@ impl BucketMetadata {
}
}
pub(crate) async fn load_bucket_incarnation(api: Arc<ECStore>, bucket: &str) -> Result<Option<Uuid>> {
let path = format!("{BUCKET_META_PREFIX}/{bucket}/{BUCKET_INCARNATION_FILE}");
let data = match read_config_preserve_empty(api, &path).await {
Ok(data) => data,
Err(Error::ConfigNotFound) => return Ok(None),
Err(err) => return Err(err),
};
let incarnation =
Uuid::from_slice(&data).map_err(|err| Error::other(format!("persisted bucket incarnation is invalid: {err}")))?;
if incarnation.is_nil() {
return Err(Error::other("persisted bucket incarnation is nil"));
}
Ok(Some(incarnation))
}
pub(crate) async fn save_bucket_incarnation(api: Arc<ECStore>, bucket: &str, incarnation: Uuid) -> Result<()> {
if incarnation.is_nil() {
return Err(Error::other("cannot persist a nil bucket incarnation"));
}
let path = format!("{BUCKET_META_PREFIX}/{bucket}/{BUCKET_INCARNATION_FILE}");
save_config(api, &path, incarnation.as_bytes().to_vec()).await
}
pub async fn load_bucket_metadata(api: Arc<ECStore>, bucket: &str) -> Result<BucketMetadata> {
load_bucket_metadata_parse(api, bucket, true).await
}
@@ -1142,6 +1183,23 @@ pub(crate) async fn load_bucket_metadata_parse_with_presence(
}
};
let incarnation = load_bucket_incarnation(api, bucket).await?;
if persisted {
if let Some(incarnation) = incarnation {
if !bm.bucket_incarnation_id.is_nil() && bm.bucket_incarnation_id != incarnation {
return Err(Error::other("bucket incarnation sidecar does not match bucket metadata"));
}
bm.bucket_incarnation_id = incarnation;
bm.bucket_incarnation_sidecar = true;
} else if !bm.bucket_incarnation_id.is_nil() {
return Err(Error::other(format!(
"bucket incarnation sidecar is missing for new-format metadata: {bucket}"
)));
}
} else if incarnation.is_some() {
return Err(Error::other("bucket incarnation sidecar exists without bucket metadata"));
}
bm.default_timestamps();
if parse {
@@ -1209,6 +1267,10 @@ mod test {
// Same 4-byte format|version header (1|1) and msgpack layout as MinIO.
BucketMetadata::check_header(&blob).expect("valid .metadata.bin header");
let mut bm = BucketMetadata::unmarshal(&blob[4..]).expect("unmarshal MinIO bucket metadata");
assert!(
bm.bucket_incarnation_id.is_nil(),
"legacy MinIO metadata has no RustFS bucket incarnation field"
);
// Raw config fields survive the msgpack decode (PascalCase MinIO field names).
assert_eq!(bm.name, "interop");
@@ -1291,6 +1353,42 @@ mod test {
let new = BucketMetadata::unmarshal(&buf).unwrap();
assert_eq!(bm.name, new.name);
assert!(!bm.bucket_incarnation_id.is_nil());
assert_eq!(bm.bucket_incarnation_id, new.bucket_incarnation_id);
}
#[test]
fn bucket_incarnation_msgpack_rejects_invalid_binary_length() {
let mut fixture = Vec::new();
rmp::encode::write_map_len(&mut fixture, 1).unwrap();
rmp::encode::write_str(&mut fixture, "BucketIncarnationID").unwrap();
rmp::encode::write_bin(&mut fixture, &[0_u8; 15]).unwrap();
let err = BucketMetadata::unmarshal(&fixture).expect_err("non-UUID incarnation bytes must fail closed");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("invalid BucketIncarnationID"));
}
#[test]
fn same_name_bucket_metadata_gets_a_new_incarnation() {
let old = BucketMetadata::new("recreated");
let new = BucketMetadata::new("recreated");
assert!(!old.bucket_incarnation_id.is_nil());
assert!(!new.bucket_incarnation_id.is_nil());
assert_ne!(old.bucket_incarnation_id, new.bucket_incarnation_id);
}
#[test]
fn site_replication_config_updates_cannot_replace_bucket_incarnation() {
let mut metadata = BucketMetadata::new("site-replication-update");
let incarnation = metadata.bucket_incarnation_id;
metadata
.update_config(BUCKET_POLICY_CONFIG, br#"{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[]}"#.to_vec())
.unwrap();
metadata.update_config(OBJECT_LOCK_CONFIG, Vec::new()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(metadata.bucket_incarnation_id, incarnation);
}
#[test]
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -200,6 +200,29 @@ mod tests {
assert!(retention.retain_until_date.is_some());
}
/// backlog#1733 g-key-002: the persisted literal keys must still be read
/// through the current header constants, or WORM metadata fails open.
#[test]
fn persisted_compliance_lock_metadata_remains_effective() {
let mut meta = HashMap::new();
meta.insert("x-amz-object-lock-mode".to_string(), "COMPLIANCE".to_string());
meta.insert("x-amz-object-lock-retain-until-date".to_string(), "9999-01-01T00:00:00Z".to_string());
meta.insert("x-amz-object-lock-legal-hold".to_string(), "ON".to_string());
let retention = get_object_retention_meta(&meta);
assert_eq!(
retention.mode.as_ref().map(|mode| mode.as_str()),
Some(ObjectLockRetentionMode::COMPLIANCE)
);
assert!(retention.retain_until_date.is_some(), "persisted retention date must remain readable");
let legal_hold = get_object_legalhold_meta(&meta);
assert_eq!(
legal_hold.status.as_ref().map(|status| status.as_str()),
Some(ObjectLockLegalHoldStatus::ON)
);
}
#[test]
fn test_get_object_legalhold_meta_empty() {
let meta = HashMap::new();
@@ -12,10 +12,12 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use crate::bucket::metadata_sys::get_object_lock_config;
use crate::bucket::metadata_sys::{ObjectLockConfigState, get_object_lock_config, get_object_lock_config_state};
use crate::bucket::object_lock::objectlock;
use crate::error::{Error, Result, StorageError};
use crate::object_api::ObjectInfo;
use s3s::dto::{DefaultRetention, ObjectLockLegalHoldStatus, ObjectLockRetentionMode};
use s3s::dto::{Date, DefaultRetention, ObjectLockConfiguration, ObjectLockLegalHoldStatus, ObjectLockRetentionMode};
use s3s::header::{X_AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_LEGAL_HOLD, X_AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_MODE, X_AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_RETAIN_UNTIL_DATE};
use std::sync::Arc;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
@@ -37,6 +39,20 @@ impl BucketObjectLockSys {
}
}
pub(crate) fn ensure_recursive_force_delete_allowed_for_state(bucket: &str, state: &ObjectLockConfigState) -> Result<()> {
match state {
ObjectLockConfigState::ConfirmedAbsent => Ok(()),
ObjectLockConfigState::Configured { .. } => Err(StorageError::InvalidArgument(
bucket.to_string(),
String::new(),
"force-delete is forbidden on Object Locking enabled buckets".to_string(),
)),
ObjectLockConfigState::Fabricated => {
Err(Error::other(format!("bucket Object Lock metadata is not authoritative: {bucket}")))
}
}
}
/// Check if a retention period is still active based on mode and retain_until_date
pub fn is_retention_active(mode: &str, retain_until_date: Option<&s3s::dto::Date>) -> bool {
if mode != ObjectLockRetentionMode::COMPLIANCE && mode != ObjectLockRetentionMode::GOVERNANCE {
@@ -205,71 +221,122 @@ fn check_retention_blocks_deletion(
None
}
/// Check an object's lock metadata using an already resolved bucket Object
/// Lock configuration. `None` means the configuration is confirmed absent.
///
/// # S3 Standard Behavior
/// - COMPLIANCE mode: Cannot be deleted even with bypass header
/// - GOVERNANCE mode: Can be deleted if bypass_governance is true (caller must verify s3:BypassGovernanceRetention permission)
/// - Legal Hold: Cannot be bypassed regardless of mode
pub async fn check_object_lock_for_deletion(
bucket: &str,
pub(crate) fn check_object_lock_for_deletion_with_config(
config: Option<&ObjectLockConfiguration>,
obj_info: &ObjectInfo,
bypass_governance: bool,
) -> Option<ObjectLockBlockReason> {
) -> Result<Option<ObjectLockBlockReason>> {
if obj_info.delete_marker {
return None;
return Ok(None);
}
// 1. Check legal hold - cannot be bypassed (reuse has_legal_hold)
if has_legal_hold(&obj_info.user_defined) {
return Some(ObjectLockBlockReason::LegalHold);
}
// 2. Check explicit retention
let explicit_ret = objectlock::get_object_retention_meta(&obj_info.user_defined);
if let Some(mode) = &explicit_ret.mode {
let mode_str = mode.as_str();
if is_retention_active(mode_str, explicit_ret.retain_until_date.as_ref())
&& let Some(reason) = check_retention_blocks_deletion(
mode_str,
explicit_ret.retain_until_date.map(OffsetDateTime::from),
bypass_governance,
)
{
return Some(reason);
if let Some(status) = obj_info.user_defined.get(X_AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_LEGAL_HOLD.as_str()) {
if status.eq_ignore_ascii_case(ObjectLockLegalHoldStatus::ON) {
return Ok(Some(ObjectLockBlockReason::LegalHold));
}
if !status.eq_ignore_ascii_case(ObjectLockLegalHoldStatus::OFF) {
return Err(Error::other("persisted object legal-hold metadata is invalid"));
}
}
// 3. Check default retention only if no explicit retention is set
if explicit_ret.mode.is_none()
&& let Some(default_retention) = BucketObjectLockSys::get(bucket).await
let mode = obj_info.user_defined.get(X_AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_MODE.as_str());
let retain_until = obj_info.user_defined.get(X_AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_RETAIN_UNTIL_DATE.as_str());
let explicit_ret = match (mode, retain_until) {
(None, None) => None,
(Some(mode), Some(retain_until)) => {
let mode =
objectlock::parse_ret_mode(mode).ok_or_else(|| Error::other("persisted object retention mode is invalid"))?;
let retain_until = OffsetDateTime::parse(retain_until, &time::format_description::well_known::Iso8601::DEFAULT)
.map(Date::from)
.map_err(|_| Error::other("persisted object retention date is invalid"))?;
Some((mode, retain_until))
}
_ => return Err(Error::other("persisted object retention metadata is incomplete")),
};
if let Some((mode, retain_until)) = &explicit_ret {
let mode_str = mode.as_str();
if is_retention_active(mode_str, Some(retain_until))
&& let Some(reason) =
check_retention_blocks_deletion(mode_str, Some(OffsetDateTime::from(retain_until.clone())), bypass_governance)
{
return Ok(Some(reason));
}
}
if explicit_ret.is_none()
&& let Some(default_retention) = config.and_then(|config| config.rule.as_ref()?.default_retention.as_ref())
&& let Some(mode) = &default_retention.mode
{
let mode_str = mode.as_str();
if mode_str == ObjectLockRetentionMode::COMPLIANCE || mode_str == ObjectLockRetentionMode::GOVERNANCE {
// Calculate retention expiration date from object modification time
if let Some(mod_time) = obj_info.mod_time {
let now = objectlock::utc_now_ntp();
let retain_until = if let Some(days) = default_retention.days {
mod_time.saturating_add(time::Duration::days(days as i64))
} else {
let years = default_retention.years?;
add_years(mod_time, years)
};
let mod_time = obj_info
.mod_time
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other("persisted object modification time is missing"))?;
let now = objectlock::utc_now_ntp();
let retain_until = if let Some(days) = default_retention.days {
mod_time.saturating_add(time::Duration::days(i64::from(days)))
} else {
let years = default_retention
.years
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other("persisted bucket Object Lock retention period is invalid"))?;
add_years(mod_time, years)
};
if retain_until.unix_timestamp() > now.unix_timestamp()
&& let Some(reason) = check_retention_blocks_deletion(mode_str, Some(retain_until), bypass_governance)
{
return Some(reason);
}
if retain_until.unix_timestamp() > now.unix_timestamp()
&& let Some(reason) = check_retention_blocks_deletion(mode_str, Some(retain_until), bypass_governance)
{
return Ok(Some(reason));
}
}
}
None
Ok(None)
}
pub(crate) fn check_object_lock_for_deletion_with_state(
state: &ObjectLockConfigState,
obj_info: &ObjectInfo,
bypass_governance: bool,
) -> Result<Option<ObjectLockBlockReason>> {
match state {
ObjectLockConfigState::Configured { config, .. } => {
check_object_lock_for_deletion_with_config(Some(config), obj_info, bypass_governance)
}
ObjectLockConfigState::ConfirmedAbsent => check_object_lock_for_deletion_with_config(None, obj_info, bypass_governance),
ObjectLockConfigState::Fabricated => Err(Error::other("bucket Object Lock metadata is not authoritative")),
}
}
/// Compatibility wrapper for callers that predate fallible metadata lookup.
/// An authority/read/parse failure is represented as a blocking reason rather
/// than the old fail-open `None` result.
pub async fn check_object_lock_for_deletion(
bucket: &str,
obj_info: &ObjectInfo,
bypass_governance: bool,
) -> Option<ObjectLockBlockReason> {
match get_object_lock_config_state(bucket)
.await
.and_then(|state| check_object_lock_for_deletion_with_state(&state, obj_info, bypass_governance))
{
Ok(reason) => reason,
Err(_) => Some(ObjectLockBlockReason::LegalHold),
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use s3s::dto::{ObjectLockEnabled, ObjectLockRule};
use time::{Date, Month, PrimitiveDateTime, Time};
fn make_datetime(year: i32, month: u8, day: u8) -> OffsetDateTime {
@@ -278,6 +345,160 @@ mod tests {
PrimitiveDateTime::new(date, time).assume_utc()
}
fn default_retention_config(mode: &'static str) -> ObjectLockConfiguration {
ObjectLockConfiguration {
object_lock_enabled: Some(ObjectLockEnabled::from_static(ObjectLockEnabled::ENABLED)),
rule: Some(ObjectLockRule {
default_retention: Some(DefaultRetention {
mode: Some(ObjectLockRetentionMode::from_static(mode)),
days: Some(30),
years: None,
}),
}),
}
}
#[test]
fn deletion_with_config_blocks_active_default_compliance_even_with_bypass() {
let config = default_retention_config(ObjectLockRetentionMode::COMPLIANCE);
let obj_info = ObjectInfo {
mod_time: Some(OffsetDateTime::now_utc()),
..Default::default()
};
let result = check_object_lock_for_deletion_with_config(Some(&config), &obj_info, true);
assert!(matches!(result, Ok(Some(ObjectLockBlockReason::Retention { .. }))));
}
#[test]
fn deletion_with_config_allows_active_default_governance_with_bypass() {
let config = default_retention_config(ObjectLockRetentionMode::GOVERNANCE);
let obj_info = ObjectInfo {
mod_time: Some(OffsetDateTime::now_utc()),
..Default::default()
};
assert!(matches!(
check_object_lock_for_deletion_with_config(Some(&config), &obj_info, true),
Ok(None)
));
}
#[test]
fn deletion_with_default_retention_rejects_missing_object_mod_time() {
let config = default_retention_config(ObjectLockRetentionMode::COMPLIANCE);
let err = check_object_lock_for_deletion_with_config(Some(&config), &ObjectInfo::default(), false)
.expect_err("default retention needs an authoritative object modification time");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("modification time"));
}
#[test]
fn deletion_with_confirmed_absence_still_blocks_explicit_compliance() {
let retain_until = OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + time::Duration::days(30);
let mut user_defined = std::collections::HashMap::new();
user_defined.insert("x-amz-object-lock-mode".to_string(), ObjectLockRetentionMode::COMPLIANCE.to_string());
user_defined.insert(
"x-amz-object-lock-retain-until-date".to_string(),
retain_until
.format(&time::format_description::well_known::Rfc3339)
.expect("retain-until date should format"),
);
let obj_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(user_defined),
..Default::default()
};
let result = check_object_lock_for_deletion_with_config(None, &obj_info, true);
assert!(matches!(result, Ok(Some(ObjectLockBlockReason::Retention { .. }))));
}
#[test]
fn deletion_with_fabricated_bucket_metadata_fails_closed() {
let err = check_object_lock_for_deletion_with_state(&ObjectLockConfigState::Fabricated, &ObjectInfo::default(), false)
.expect_err("non-authoritative Object Lock metadata must block deletion");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("not authoritative"));
}
#[test]
fn recursive_force_delete_with_fabricated_bucket_metadata_fails_closed() {
let err = ensure_recursive_force_delete_allowed_for_state("bucket", &ObjectLockConfigState::Fabricated)
.expect_err("non-authoritative Object Lock metadata must block recursive deletion");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("not authoritative"));
}
#[test]
fn deletion_rejects_incomplete_persisted_retention_metadata() {
let mut user_defined = std::collections::HashMap::new();
user_defined.insert(
X_AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_MODE.as_str().to_string(),
ObjectLockRetentionMode::COMPLIANCE.to_string(),
);
let obj_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(user_defined),
..Default::default()
};
let err = check_object_lock_for_deletion_with_config(None, &obj_info, false)
.expect_err("mode without retain-until date must fail closed");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("incomplete"));
}
#[test]
fn deletion_rejects_each_malformed_persisted_retention_shape() {
let valid_date = (OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + time::Duration::days(30))
.format(&time::format_description::well_known::Rfc3339)
.expect("retain-until date should format");
let cases = [
("invalid mode", Some("INVALID"), Some(valid_date.as_str()), "retention mode"),
(
"invalid date",
Some(ObjectLockRetentionMode::COMPLIANCE),
Some("not-a-date"),
"retention date",
),
("date only", None, Some(valid_date.as_str()), "incomplete"),
];
for (case, mode, retain_until, expected) in cases {
let mut user_defined = std::collections::HashMap::new();
if let Some(mode) = mode {
user_defined.insert(X_AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_MODE.as_str().to_string(), mode.to_string());
}
if let Some(retain_until) = retain_until {
user_defined.insert(X_AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_RETAIN_UNTIL_DATE.as_str().to_string(), retain_until.to_string());
}
let obj_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(user_defined),
..Default::default()
};
let err = check_object_lock_for_deletion_with_config(None, &obj_info, false).expect_err(case);
assert!(err.to_string().contains(expected), "unexpected {case} error: {err}");
}
}
#[test]
fn deletion_rejects_invalid_persisted_legal_hold_metadata() {
let mut user_defined = std::collections::HashMap::new();
user_defined.insert(X_AMZ_OBJECT_LOCK_LEGAL_HOLD.as_str().to_string(), "INVALID".to_string());
let obj_info = ObjectInfo {
user_defined: Arc::new(user_defined),
..Default::default()
};
let err = check_object_lock_for_deletion_with_config(None, &obj_info, false)
.expect_err("invalid legal-hold value must fail closed");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("legal-hold"));
}
#[test]
fn test_add_years_normal() {
// Normal case: add 1 year to a regular date
+125 -9
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
// limitations under the License.
use super::{BucketQuota, QuotaCheckResult, QuotaError, QuotaOperation};
use crate::bucket::metadata_sys::{BucketMetadataSys, update};
use crate::bucket::metadata_sys::{BucketMetadataSys, update, update_if_incarnation};
use crate::data_usage::get_bucket_usage_memory;
use rustfs_common::metrics::Metric;
use rustfs_config::QUOTA_CONFIG_FILE;
@@ -145,14 +145,35 @@ impl QuotaChecker {
}
pub async fn set_quota_config(&mut self, bucket: &str, quota: BucketQuota) -> Result<OffsetDateTime, QuotaError> {
self.set_quota_config_for_incarnation(bucket, quota, None).await
}
pub async fn set_quota_config_if_incarnation(
&mut self,
bucket: &str,
quota: BucketQuota,
expected_incarnation_id: uuid::Uuid,
) -> Result<OffsetDateTime, QuotaError> {
self.set_quota_config_for_incarnation(bucket, quota, Some(expected_incarnation_id))
.await
}
async fn set_quota_config_for_incarnation(
&mut self,
bucket: &str,
quota: BucketQuota,
expected_incarnation_id: Option<uuid::Uuid>,
) -> Result<OffsetDateTime, QuotaError> {
let json_data = serde_json::to_vec(&quota).map_err(|e| QuotaError::InvalidConfig {
reason: format!("Failed to serialize quota config: {}", e),
})?;
let start_time = Instant::now();
let updated_at = update(bucket, QUOTA_CONFIG_FILE, json_data)
.await
.map_err(QuotaError::StorageError)?;
let updated_at = match expected_incarnation_id {
Some(incarnation_id) => update_if_incarnation(bucket, QUOTA_CONFIG_FILE, json_data, incarnation_id).await,
None => update(bucket, QUOTA_CONFIG_FILE, json_data).await,
}
.map_err(QuotaError::StorageError)?;
rustfs_common::metrics::Metrics::inc_time(Metric::QuotaSync, start_time.elapsed());
Ok(updated_at)
@@ -177,11 +198,36 @@ impl QuotaChecker {
}
pub async fn get_real_time_usage(&self, bucket: &str) -> Result<u64, QuotaError> {
get_bucket_usage_memory(bucket)
.await
.ok_or_else(|| QuotaError::UsageUnavailable {
bucket: bucket.to_string(),
})
if let Some(usage) = get_bucket_usage_memory(bucket).await {
return Ok(usage);
}
// Degraded window (issue #5716): with no authoritative usage — most
// prominently after upgrading from a pre-v2 release, whose legacy
// `.usage.json` is demoted to non-authoritative until the scanner's
// first complete cycle persists `.usage.v2.json` — failing closed
// turned every write to a quota-enabled bucket into a retryable 503
// for the whole window. Quota admission instead degrades to the last
// persisted per-bucket size. That baseline is static between snapshot
// loads (live writes do not advance it), so hard-quota enforcement is
// advisory for the duration of the window: the overrun is bounded by
// the writes issued before the next complete scanner cycle. Buckets
// with no persisted baseline anywhere keep failing closed.
let store = self.metadata_sys.read().await.object_store();
// Box the fallback: it embeds the whole snapshot-load future, and every
// object write nests a quota check several futures deep, so keeping it
// inline would grow each write's state machine by the loader's full
// size — the debug-build 2MiB worker-stack overflow class fixed for
// bucket-config writes in #5648. The allocation only happens on the
// degraded path; the authoritative fast path returns above.
if let Some(baseline) = Box::pin(crate::data_usage::lookup_degraded_bucket_usage_baseline(store, bucket)).await {
debug!(bucket, baseline, "Bucket quota admission using degraded persisted usage baseline");
return Ok(baseline);
}
Err(QuotaError::UsageUnavailable {
bucket: bucket.to_string(),
})
}
}
@@ -211,6 +257,76 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(result.quota_limit, None);
}
/// Regression (issue #5716): an upgrade from a pre-v2 release leaves only
/// the legacy `.usage.json` snapshot, which has no completeness marker and
/// is demoted to non-authoritative, and the scanner's first complete cycle
/// can be a long way off. Quota admission must degrade to that persisted
/// baseline instead of failing every write to a quota-enabled bucket with
/// a retryable 503 for the whole window.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn quota_admission_falls_back_to_legacy_snapshot_baseline() {
let (_dirs, ecstore) = isolated_store_over_temp_disks().await;
let sys = Arc::new(RwLock::new(BucketMetadataSys::new(ecstore.clone())));
let checker = QuotaChecker::new(sys);
let bucket = format!("quota-legacy-{}", Uuid::new_v4().simple());
let mut legacy = rustfs_data_usage::DataUsageInfo {
last_update: Some(std::time::SystemTime::now()),
buckets_count: 1,
..Default::default()
};
legacy.buckets_usage.insert(
bucket.clone(),
rustfs_data_usage::BucketUsageInfo {
size: 1_234,
..Default::default()
},
);
legacy.bucket_sizes.insert(bucket.clone(), 1_234);
// usage_snapshot_complete stays false: pre-v2 snapshots do not carry
// the field at all, so they always deserialize as incomplete.
let legacy_path = format!("{}/{}", crate::disk::BUCKET_META_PREFIX, rustfs_data_usage::LEGACY_DATA_USAGE_OBJECT_NAME);
crate::config::com::save_config(
ecstore.clone(),
&legacy_path,
serde_json::to_vec(&legacy).expect("legacy snapshot should encode"),
)
.await
.expect("legacy snapshot fixture should be stored");
crate::data_usage::invalidate_data_usage_snapshot_cache().await;
let usage = checker
.get_real_time_usage(&bucket)
.await
.expect("quota admission must degrade to the persisted legacy baseline");
assert_eq!(usage, 1_234);
// A bucket absent from every persisted snapshot still has no grounded
// baseline and must keep failing closed.
let unknown = format!("quota-unknown-{}", Uuid::new_v4().simple());
assert!(matches!(
checker.get_real_time_usage(&unknown).await,
Err(QuotaError::UsageUnavailable { .. })
));
// Deleting the bucket's usage from the backend must purge the
// baseline: a recreated bucket may not inherit the dead incarnation's
// size, so with no persisted trace left it fails closed again.
crate::data_usage::remove_bucket_usage_from_backend(ecstore.clone(), &bucket)
.await
.expect("bucket usage removal should succeed");
assert!(matches!(
checker.get_real_time_usage(&bucket).await,
Err(QuotaError::UsageUnavailable { .. })
));
crate::data_usage::prepare_bucket_usage_for_namespace_change(&bucket, None)
.await
.expect("test usage cache cleanup should succeed");
crate::data_usage::invalidate_data_usage_snapshot_cache().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn quota_usage_rejects_an_unknown_mutation_baseline() {
@@ -100,11 +100,41 @@ paths.
behind the ECStore replication facade; only `rustfs/src/app/storage_api.rs`
may retain direct object/delete replication helper calls.
## First Code-Bearing Step
## Completion Criteria
Start with `ReplicationRuntime` or `ReplicationEventSink`. Both can be added as
narrow internal contracts while keeping current queue, MRF, resync, and target
behavior unchanged. Do not start with a crate move.
The split is complete when the "Current dependency to remove" column in the
Required Contracts table above is empty: every row is either deleted because
the dependency is gone, or reduced to "none". No other signal — file count,
boundary count, line count — measures completion.
Target end state:
- `replication_pool.rs`, `replication_resyncer.rs`, and `replication_state.rs`
move into `crates/replication` behind the contracts above;
- the `*_boundary.rs` and `*_bridge.rs` micro-files dissolve naturally as the
code they fence moves across the crate boundary. They are the mechanical
seams of the migration ratchet — the architecture guard scripts anchor on
their file names — so batch-merging them beforehand is explicitly rejected:
it forces synchronized guard-script/mod/import churn with zero functional
gain;
- the only module that can retire early is `datatypes.rs`: delete it once its
facade consumers import the resync status enums through `rustfs-replication`
directly.
## Milestones
| Milestone | Scope | Status |
|---|---|---|
| M0 | Record the completion criteria and end state (this section). | Done |
| M1 | Contract extraction: resync/queue/stats/object-decision/filemeta/storage wire contracts owned by `crates/replication`; ECStore imports concentrated in `*_boundary.rs`; event sink and runtime access behind local contracts. | Done — see Required Contracts |
| M2 | Move resyncer pure decision logic (no IO) into `crates/replication`. | Pending; sequence after splitting the oversized resyncer/pool functions (`resync_bucket`, `replicate_all`, `start_mrf_processor`) so moves stay mechanical |
| M3 | Move the worker runtime (`replication_pool.rs`, the IO paths of `replication_resyncer.rs`, `replication_state.rs`) once the contract traits are stable. Highest-risk step of the whole plan; do it last. | Pending |
| M4 | Retire the boundary modules together with their guard-script entries; delete `datatypes.rs`. | Pending |
The original first code-bearing step (narrow `ReplicationEventSink` /
`ReplicationRuntime` contracts) has landed — `replication_event_sink.rs`
exists and runtime access goes through local boundary aliases — so new work
starts from M2.
Current compatibility guard: `crates/ecstore/tests/replication_facade_compat_test.rs`
keeps the ECStore replication facade types covered while architecture rules
+11 -10
View File
@@ -45,12 +45,12 @@ mod runtime_boundary;
pub use datatypes::ResyncStatusType;
pub use replication_config_boundary::{
ObjectOpts, ReplicationConfigurationExt, ReplicationTargetValidationError, invalid_replication_config_status_field,
replication_target_arns, should_remove_replication_target, unsupported_replication_config_field,
validate_replication_config_target_arns,
ObjectOpts, REMOTE_TARGET_CAPABILITY_CONTRACT_VERSION, REMOTE_TARGET_UNSUPPORTED_FIELDS, REMOTE_TARGET_WRITABLE_FIELDS,
REPLICATION_CAPABILITY_CONTRACT_VERSION, REPLICATION_READ_ONLY_HISTORICAL_FIELDS, REPLICATION_WRITABLE_FIELDS,
ReplicationConfigStructureError, ReplicationConfigurationExt, ReplicationTargetValidationError,
invalid_replication_config_status_field, replication_target_arns, should_remove_replication_target,
unsupported_replication_config_field, validate_replication_config_structure, validate_replication_config_target_arns,
};
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) use replication_filemeta_boundary::ReplicateTargetDecision;
pub(crate) use replication_filemeta_boundary::version_purge_statuses_map;
pub use replication_filemeta_boundary::{
MrfOpKind, MrfReplicateEntry, REPLICATE_INCOMING_DELETE, ReplicateDecision, ReplicateObjectInfo, ReplicationState,
@@ -70,16 +70,17 @@ pub use replication_object_decision_boundary::{
should_use_existing_delete_replication_source,
};
pub use replication_pool::{
DurableMrfBacklog, DynReplicationPool, ReplicationPoolTrait, get_global_replication_pool, get_global_replication_stats,
init_background_replication, read_durable_mrf_backlog, resync_start_conflict_id,
DurableMrfBacklog, DynReplicationPool, ReplicationPoolTrait, commit_force_delete_intent, complete_force_delete_intent,
get_global_replication_pool, get_global_replication_stats, init_background_replication, persist_force_delete_intent,
read_durable_mrf_backlog, resync_start_conflict_id,
};
pub use replication_queue_boundary::{
DeletedObjectReplicationInfo, ReplicationHealQueueResult, ReplicationOperation, ReplicationPriority,
ReplicationQueueAdmission,
DeletedObjectReplicationInfo, ReplicationBatchAdmission, ReplicationHealQueueResult, ReplicationOperation,
ReplicationPriority, ReplicationQueueAdmission,
};
pub use replication_resync_boundary::{BucketReplicationResyncStatus, ResyncOpts, TargetReplicationResyncStatus};
pub use replication_scanner_bridge::ReplicationScannerBridge;
pub use replication_state::{ReplicationStats, RuntimeReplicationTargetBacklog};
pub use replication_stats_boundary::BucketStats;
pub use replication_stats_boundary::{BucketReplicationStats, BucketStats};
pub use replication_storage_boundary::{ReplicationObjectIO, ReplicationStorage};
pub(crate) use replication_target_config_bridge::ReplicationTargetConfigBridge;
@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@
// limitations under the License.
pub use rustfs_replication::{
ObjectOpts, ReplicationConfigurationExt, ReplicationRuleExt, ReplicationTargetValidationError,
ObjectOpts, REMOTE_TARGET_CAPABILITY_CONTRACT_VERSION, REMOTE_TARGET_UNSUPPORTED_FIELDS, REMOTE_TARGET_WRITABLE_FIELDS,
REPLICATION_CAPABILITY_CONTRACT_VERSION, REPLICATION_READ_ONLY_HISTORICAL_FIELDS, REPLICATION_WRITABLE_FIELDS,
ReplicationConfigStructureError, ReplicationConfigurationExt, ReplicationRuleExt, ReplicationTargetValidationError,
invalid_replication_config_status_field, replication_target_arns, should_remove_replication_target,
unsupported_replication_config_field, validate_replication_config_target_arns,
unsupported_replication_config_field, validate_replication_config_structure, validate_replication_config_target_arns,
};
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
// limitations under the License.
use super::replication_error_boundary::Result;
use super::replication_storage_boundary::ReplicationObjectIO;
use super::replication_storage_boundary::{HTTPPreconditions, ObjectInfo, ObjectOptions, ReplicationObjectIO};
use crate::config::{com, storageclass};
use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -30,10 +30,98 @@ impl ReplicationConfigStore {
com::read_config(api, file).await
}
pub(crate) async fn read_limited<S>(api: Arc<S>, file: &str, max_bytes: usize) -> Result<Vec<u8>>
where
S: ReplicationObjectIO,
{
com::read_config_limited(api, file, max_bytes).await
}
pub(crate) async fn read_no_lock<S>(api: Arc<S>, file: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>>
where
S: ReplicationObjectIO,
{
com::read_config_no_lock(api, file).await
}
pub(crate) async fn read_no_lock_with_metadata<S>(api: Arc<S>, file: &str) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, ObjectInfo)>
where
S: ReplicationObjectIO,
{
com::read_config_with_metadata(
api,
file,
&ObjectOptions {
no_lock: true,
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
}
pub(crate) async fn read_no_lock_with_metadata_preserve_empty<S>(api: Arc<S>, file: &str) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, ObjectInfo)>
where
S: ReplicationObjectIO,
{
com::read_config_no_lock_preserve_empty_with_metadata(api, file).await
}
pub(crate) async fn save<S>(api: Arc<S>, file: &str, data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<()>
where
S: ReplicationObjectIO,
{
com::save_config(api, file, data).await
}
pub(crate) async fn save_no_lock<S>(api: Arc<S>, file: &str, data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<()>
where
S: ReplicationObjectIO,
{
com::save_config_no_lock(api, file, data).await
}
pub(crate) async fn save_conditional<S>(
api: Arc<S>,
file: &str,
data: Vec<u8>,
http_preconditions: HTTPPreconditions,
) -> Result<()>
where
S: ReplicationObjectIO,
{
com::save_config_with_opts_quiet(
api,
file,
data,
&ObjectOptions {
max_parity: true,
http_preconditions: Some(http_preconditions),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
}
pub(crate) async fn save_conditional_no_lock<S>(
api: Arc<S>,
file: &str,
data: Vec<u8>,
http_preconditions: HTTPPreconditions,
) -> Result<()>
where
S: ReplicationObjectIO,
{
com::save_config_with_opts_quiet(
api,
file,
data,
&ObjectOptions {
max_parity: true,
no_lock: true,
http_preconditions: Some(http_preconditions),
..Default::default()
},
)
.await
}
}
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ pub use rustfs_replication::{MrfOpKind, MrfReplicateEntry};
pub(crate) use rustfs_replication::{
REPLICATE_EXISTING, REPLICATE_EXISTING_DELETE, REPLICATE_HEAL_DELETE, ReplicateTargetDecision, ReplicatedInfos,
ReplicatedTargetInfo, ReplicationAction, ReplicationWorkerOperation, ResyncDecision, get_replication_state,
parse_replicate_decision, target_reset_header, version_purge_statuses_map,
parse_replicate_decision, replicate_decision_for_admitted_targets, target_reset_header, version_purge_statuses_map,
};
pub use rustfs_replication::{
REPLICATE_INCOMING_DELETE, ReplicateDecision, ReplicateObjectInfo, ReplicationState, ReplicationStatusType, ReplicationType,
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ pub(crate) fn replication_state_from_filemeta(state: &rustfs_filemeta::Replicati
.map(|(arn, status)| (arn.clone(), version_purge_status_from_filemeta(status.clone())))
.collect(),
reset_statuses_map: state.reset_statuses_map.clone(),
target_delete_marker_version_ids: state.target_delete_marker_version_ids.clone(),
target_delete_marker_version_ids_corrupt: state.target_delete_marker_version_ids_corrupt,
}
}
@@ -83,5 +85,120 @@ pub fn replication_state_to_filemeta(state: &ReplicationState) -> rustfs_filemet
.map(|(arn, status)| (arn.clone(), version_purge_status_to_filemeta(status.clone())))
.collect(),
reset_statuses_map: state.reset_statuses_map.clone(),
target_delete_marker_version_ids: state.target_delete_marker_version_ids.clone(),
target_delete_marker_version_ids_corrupt: state.target_delete_marker_version_ids_corrupt,
}
}
// Reconciliation tests for the deliberately duplicated wire types.
//
// `rustfs-filemeta` (xl.meta disk format) and `rustfs-replication` (MRF/resync
// persistence format) each own a copy of `ReplicationStatusType`,
// `VersionPurgeStatusType` and `ReplicationState`; the conversions above hop
// between them via `as_str()`, whose `From<&str>` impls fall back to `Empty`
// on any unknown token. That fallback silently degrades data the moment one
// side gains a variant the other lacks, so these tests pin the two sides
// together:
//
// - the `match` statements are exhaustive with no `_` arm — adding a variant
// on either side fails compilation here until the mapping is reconsidered;
// - the round-trips assert the string token survives both directions — a
// variant whose token the other side does not recognize fails the assert
// instead of quietly becoming `Empty`.
//
// Struct-shaped drift on `ReplicationState` is already compile-guarded by the
// exhaustive struct literals in the two conversion functions above; the
// round-trip test below additionally pins value fidelity for every field.
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use std::collections::HashMap;
#[test]
fn replication_status_variants_round_trip_across_boundary() {
use rustfs_replication::ReplicationStatusType as Repl;
let all = [
Repl::Pending,
Repl::Completed,
Repl::CompletedLegacy,
Repl::Failed,
Repl::Replica,
Repl::Empty,
];
for status in all {
// Exhaustive on the replication side: a new variant breaks this match.
match status {
Repl::Pending | Repl::Completed | Repl::CompletedLegacy | Repl::Failed | Repl::Replica | Repl::Empty => {}
}
let filemeta = replication_status_to_filemeta(status.clone());
assert_eq!(
filemeta.as_str(),
status.as_str(),
"replication->filemeta conversion must not degrade {status:?} (unknown tokens fall back to Empty)"
);
assert_eq!(replication_status_from_filemeta(filemeta), status);
}
// Exhaustive on the filemeta side: a new variant breaks this match.
fn _filemeta_side_is_covered(status: rustfs_filemeta::ReplicationStatusType) {
use rustfs_filemeta::ReplicationStatusType as Meta;
match status {
Meta::Pending | Meta::Completed | Meta::CompletedLegacy | Meta::Failed | Meta::Replica | Meta::Empty => {}
}
}
}
#[test]
fn version_purge_status_variants_round_trip_across_boundary() {
use rustfs_replication::VersionPurgeStatusType as Repl;
let all = [Repl::Pending, Repl::Complete, Repl::Failed, Repl::Empty];
for status in all {
// Exhaustive on the replication side: a new variant breaks this match.
match status {
Repl::Pending | Repl::Complete | Repl::Failed | Repl::Empty => {}
}
let filemeta = version_purge_status_to_filemeta(status.clone());
assert_eq!(
filemeta.as_str(),
status.as_str(),
"replication->filemeta conversion must not degrade {status:?} (unknown tokens fall back to Empty)"
);
assert_eq!(version_purge_status_from_filemeta(filemeta), status);
}
// Exhaustive on the filemeta side: a new variant breaks this match.
fn _filemeta_side_is_covered(status: rustfs_filemeta::VersionPurgeStatusType) {
use rustfs_filemeta::VersionPurgeStatusType as Meta;
match status {
Meta::Pending | Meta::Complete | Meta::Failed | Meta::Empty => {}
}
}
}
#[test]
fn replication_state_round_trips_every_field_across_boundary() {
let timestamp = time::OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(1_700_000_000).expect("valid timestamp");
let state = ReplicationState {
replica_timestamp: Some(timestamp),
replica_status: ReplicationStatusType::Replica,
delete_marker: true,
replication_timestamp: Some(timestamp),
replication_status_internal: Some("arn:a=PENDING;".to_string()),
version_purge_status_internal: Some("arn:a=FAILED;".to_string()),
replicate_decision_str: "arn:a=true;false;;".to_string(),
targets: HashMap::from([
("arn:a".to_string(), ReplicationStatusType::Completed),
("arn:b".to_string(), ReplicationStatusType::Failed),
]),
purge_targets: HashMap::from([("arn:a".to_string(), VersionPurgeStatusType::Pending)]),
reset_statuses_map: HashMap::from([("reset-arn:a".to_string(), "reset-id;ts".to_string())]),
target_delete_marker_version_ids: HashMap::from([("arn:a".to_string(), "version-1".to_string())]),
target_delete_marker_version_ids_corrupt: true,
};
let round_tripped = replication_state_from_filemeta(&replication_state_to_filemeta(&state));
assert_eq!(round_tripped, state);
}
}
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ pub(crate) struct ReplicationMetadataStore;
impl ReplicationMetadataStore {
pub(crate) const MRF_REPLICATION_FILE: &'static str = "config/replication/mrf.bin";
pub(crate) const MRF_REPLICATION_RECOVERY_LOCK: &'static str = "config/replication/mrf.bin.recovery";
pub(crate) const FORCE_DELETE_REPLICATION_FILE: &'static str = "config/replication/force-delete.bin";
pub(crate) const FORCE_DELETE_REPLICATION_TRANSACTION_LOCK: &'static str = "config/replication/force-delete.bin.transaction";
pub(crate) async fn replication_config(bucket: &str) -> Result<(ReplicationConfiguration, OffsetDateTime)> {
metadata_sys::get_replication_config(bucket).await
@@ -109,5 +112,17 @@ mod tests {
"buckets/bucket-a/.replication/resync.bin"
);
assert_eq!(ReplicationMetadataStore::MRF_REPLICATION_FILE, "config/replication/mrf.bin");
assert_eq!(
ReplicationMetadataStore::MRF_REPLICATION_RECOVERY_LOCK,
"config/replication/mrf.bin.recovery"
);
assert_eq!(
ReplicationMetadataStore::FORCE_DELETE_REPLICATION_FILE,
"config/replication/force-delete.bin"
);
assert_eq!(
ReplicationMetadataStore::FORCE_DELETE_REPLICATION_TRANSACTION_LOCK,
"config/replication/force-delete.bin.transaction"
);
}
}
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
use std::{collections::HashMap, sync::Arc};
use super::replication_error_boundary::Result;
use super::replication_filemeta_boundary::{ReplicateDecision, ReplicationStatusType, ReplicationType};
use super::replication_filemeta_boundary::{ReplicateDecision, ReplicatedTargetInfo, ReplicationStatusType, ReplicationType};
use super::replication_metadata_boundary::ReplicationInstanceContext;
use super::replication_object_config::{
DeleteReplicationConfigSnapshot, check_replicate_delete, check_replicate_delete_strict, check_replicate_delete_with_snapshot,
@@ -89,6 +89,13 @@ impl ReplicationObjectBridge {
snapshot.has_active_rule(object)
}
pub fn force_delete_target_set(
snapshot: &DeleteReplicationConfigSnapshot,
prefix: &str,
) -> Option<(Vec<String>, time::OffsetDateTime)> {
snapshot.force_delete_target_set(prefix)
}
pub fn check_delete_with_snapshot(
object: &ObjectToDelete,
source: &ObjectInfo,
@@ -112,6 +119,31 @@ impl ReplicationObjectBridge {
schedule_replication_delete(delete_object).await;
}
pub async fn schedule_deletes(delete_objects: &[DeletedObjectReplicationInfo]) {
if let Some(pool) = super::runtime_boundary::replication_pool() {
let _ = pool.queue_replica_delete_batch(delete_objects).await;
}
if let Some(stats) = super::runtime_boundary::replication_stats() {
for delete_object in delete_objects {
if let Some(rs) = &delete_object.delete_object.replication_state {
for k in rs.targets.keys() {
let ri = ReplicatedTargetInfo {
arn: k.clone(),
size: 0,
duration: std::time::Duration::default(),
op_type: ReplicationType::Delete,
..Default::default()
};
stats
.update(&delete_object.bucket, &ri, ReplicationStatusType::Pending, ReplicationStatusType::Empty)
.await;
}
}
}
}
}
pub async fn schedule_storage_delete(delete_object: DeletedObject, bucket: String, event_type: String) {
Self::schedule_delete(DeletedObjectReplicationInfo {
delete_object: deleted_object_for_replication(delete_object),
@@ -121,6 +153,19 @@ impl ReplicationObjectBridge {
})
.await;
}
pub async fn schedule_storage_deletes(delete_objects: Vec<DeletedObject>, bucket: String, event_type: String) {
let delete_objects = delete_objects
.into_iter()
.map(|delete_object| DeletedObjectReplicationInfo {
delete_object: deleted_object_for_replication(delete_object),
bucket: bucket.clone(),
event_type: event_type.clone(),
..Default::default()
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
Self::schedule_deletes(&delete_objects).await;
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ use crate::bucket::metadata::BucketMetadata;
use rustfs_utils::http::AMZ_BUCKET_REPLICATION_STATUS;
use s3s::dto::{BucketVersioningStatus, ReplicationConfiguration, ReplicationRuleStatus, VersioningConfiguration};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use tracing::error;
use super::replication_config_boundary::{
@@ -83,6 +84,15 @@ impl DeleteReplicationConfigSnapshot {
.and_then(|metadata| metadata.replication_config.as_ref())
}
pub(crate) fn force_delete_target_set(&self, prefix: &str) -> Option<(Vec<String>, OffsetDateTime)> {
self.metadata.as_ref().and_then(|metadata| {
metadata
.replication_config
.as_ref()
.map(|config| (config.filter_force_delete_target_arns(prefix), metadata.replication_config_updated_at))
})
}
pub(crate) fn has_active_rule(&self, object: &str) -> bool {
self.replication_config()
.is_some_and(|config| config.has_active_rules(object, true))
@@ -556,7 +566,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn must_replicate(bucket: &str, object: &str, mopts: MustReplic
let mut sopts = opts.clone();
sopts.target_arn = arn.clone();
let replicate = cfg.replicate(&sopts);
let replicate = cfg.replicate(&sopts) && mopts.metadata_target_is_eligible(&arn);
let synchronous = if let Some(cli) = cli { cli.replicate_sync } else { false };
dsc.set(ReplicateTargetDecision::new(arn, replicate, synchronous));
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
// limitations under the License.
pub use rustfs_replication::{
DeletedObjectReplicationInfo, ReplicationHealQueueResult, ReplicationOperation, ReplicationPriority,
ReplicationQueueAdmission,
DeletedObjectReplicationInfo, ReplicationBatchAdmission, ReplicationHealQueueResult, ReplicationOperation,
ReplicationPriority, ReplicationQueueAdmission,
};
pub(crate) use rustfs_replication::{
LARGE_WORKER_COUNT, ReplicationBackpressureRecommendation, ReplicationBackpressureState, ReplicationHealQueueAction,

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More