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Author SHA1 Message Date
唐小鸭 a7e5181e2e test: make app fixtures portable to native Windows
- Token- and cache-shaped keys use Windows-legal spellings at the same
  sort position, so pagination still runs without relaxing key admission.
- The TLS root test falls back to a directory junction only when a
  symlink needs a privilege the runner lacks, and asserts the root is a link.
- Snapshot timestamps step by 1 us, which Windows SystemTime can represent.
- The receiver disk URL uses a slash-led path instead of a raw drive path.
2026-11-07 22:26:09 +08:00
唐小鸭 d45468ecab fix(ecstore): name the target record when a migration write fails
The existence probe reports a blocked record with its path, but the
commit path returns bare disk errors. On Windows a regular file in the
record's place reads as missing, so migration only fails at the write,
and startup reported "File access denied" without naming the record.
2026-11-07 22:26:09 +08:00
唐小鸭 4a69fd2e2e test: bypass the disk independence check in path-only topology tests
These tests parse endpoints whose local paths are never created. Unix
leaves missing paths out of the physical-disk independence check, but
Windows resolves them to their volume, so every disk counted as one
shared device and the parsing assertions never ran. The check keeps its
own coverage in the dedicated shared-volume tests.
2026-11-07 22:26:09 +08:00
Chris An 272b6587e0 fix(ci): bound workspace archive builds to two workers (#9222) 2026-11-07 06:32:41 -05:00
Chris An e3ed2cf2f4 fix(decommission): reserve owned source usage during activation (#9220) 2026-11-07 01:49:42 -05:00
Chris An bf03b1117a fix(swift): preserve bucket metadata with Swift tag values (#9218) 2026-11-07 01:49:12 -05:00
Boyi (Elliot) Li c3fe0f9649 test(rio,ecstore): add negative-branch durability unit tests (#9216)
Expand positive and negative branch unit test coverage across durability-critical modules:
- crates/rio/src/checksum.rs: Checksum::matches (unset hasher, multipart want_parts mismatch, digest mismatch), new_with_type, as_map, obj_type, from_header, add_part (CRC32/CRC32C/CRC64_NVME combine + error branches), and get_content_checksum header validation.
- crates/rio/src/hash_reader.rs: HashReader::new wrapping invariants (already-read inner reader, conflicting MD5 checksum, conflicting positive size, unbounded size propagation) and checksum helper error paths.
- crates/ecstore/src/set_disk/ops/bitrot_self_verify.rs: verify_written_bitrot_shards missing inline data, missing disk shard, and under-quorum rejection.
- crates/ecstore/src/erasure/coding/encode.rs: read_full_buf_or_eof immediate read error, InvalidData preservation after partial fill, and UnexpectedEof normalization.
- crates/ecstore/src/io_support/shard_integrity.rs: ShardVerifier out-of-bounds coding_index, empty proof sources fail-closed, and spilled (>1 MiB) index disk write + verify_index_file + restore_proof_replicas round-trip and all-corrupt fail-closed boundary.
- crates/ecstore/src/services/integrity/tests.rs: JobRequest::validate boundary/format checks with exact error messages and model::protection / model::unsupported classifications.
2026-11-07 02:38:43 +00:00
唐小鸭 6e31f6a183 fix(ecstore): complete and abort native multipart uploads on Windows (#9191) 2026-11-06 22:36:16 -05:00
Hauser Zhi d66d144309 feat(observability): record unary read RPC durations (#9202)
* feat(observability): record unary read RPC durations

Record complete server-side durations for ReadMultiple and BatchReadVersion, including error and cancellation paths.\n\nCo-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>\nCo-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* test(observability): cover unary duration handlers

Exercise ReadMultiple and BatchReadVersion missing-disk paths and assert operation duration histograms.\n\nCo-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>\nCo-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(observability): cache unary read RPC duration handles

Reuse cached duration histograms for ReadMultiple and BatchReadVersion once
the stable server label is available. Preserve the existing ReadVersion
handle and the fallback for other operations and backends.

Add an integration regression for handle reuse, startup fallback, labels,
and recorded values using the production cache path.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(observability): separate server duration from client RTT

Record unary ReadMultiple and BatchReadVersion handler lifetimes in a
separate server duration histogram while preserving existing client RTT
series and allocation-free cached handles for both measurements.

Cover client/server sample separation, cache reuse, startup and backend
fallbacks, and missing-disk handlers. Document the new server metric.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Chris An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-11-07 09:16:18 +08:00
cxymds 150836d707 feat(tier): support native Azure Blob endpoints (#9200)
* feat(tier): support native Azure Blob endpoints

* fix(tier): guard Azure version cleanup and prefix limits

* fix(tier): preserve Azure quoted headers and document version gate

* fix(tier): handle Azure forbidden current-version deletion

* test(tier): control transition commit lock failure timing
2026-11-07 09:16:06 +08:00
Henry Guo e4057b6746 fix(table-catalog): reject storage credentials for catalog access (#9185)
* fix(table-catalog): reject storage credentials for catalog access

* fix(table-catalog): avoid growing the s3s error macro footprint

Use the existing S3Error constructor for the storage-credential rejection
while preserving its AccessDenied code and message. Keep the merged PR
within the current s3s footprint baseline without relaxing the guard.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Hauser Zhi <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Chris An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-11-07 08:07:58 +08:00
Hauser Zhi cfdd705b62 fix(cors): preserve readiness and complete cache selectors (#9207)
Use a direct response future for originless requests and forward through
the polled-ready service. Nominate every retained CORS header input and
transfer evaluated headers without rebuilding the map.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-07 08:07:04 +08:00
Hauser Zhi a1d0fa41d0 fix: preserve usage generations and unify request tracing (#9204)
* fix(ecstore): prevent cached usage snapshot rollback

Order refreshed snapshots by their authoritative lineage before replacing cached usage. Share the rule with early bucket refreshes while retaining quota baselines, invalidation fencing, legitimate deletions, and clock recovery.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(server): skip trace propagation for disabled RPC spans

Avoid extracting and assigning a remote parent when RPC tracing is disabled after authentication and admission. Cover disabled logging and the production HTTP span propagation path.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): preserve usage ordering across refresh recovery

Retain the last good snapshot independently of negative-cache status. Order observations within the same authoritative baseline by their own coordinated epoch and cycle before wall time, including clock rollback and recovery. Capture persisted baseline identity without cloning its bucket maps.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* refactor(server): centralize request trace propagation

Let the HTTP span factory own parent extraction and assignment. Use actual span filtering, preserve span-only subscribers, and remove repeated tracing work from RPC authentication.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-07 08:06:47 +08:00
Chris An 7d4982f206 fix(storage): fence bounded deletes during rolling upgrades (#9214) 2026-11-07 08:06:28 +08:00
Chris An 1a7fb2461d fix(webdav): join connection and reload tasks on shutdown (#9213) 2026-11-07 08:06:14 +08:00
Chris An e1b9d1cb94 fix(ecstore): preserve ownership across multi-pool recovery (#9212) 2026-11-07 08:06:04 +08:00
Chris An 85313fc06f fix(runtime): release retained replay and allocator memory (#9211) 2026-11-07 08:05:46 +08:00
cxymds b5f3207378 fix(lock): preserve acquisition progress during multipart uploads (#9209)
* fix(lock): retain slow responses within the quorum deadline

* fix(lock): retain partial quorum timeout diagnostics

* fix(lock): avoid guard registry scheduling convoys

* chore(ecstore): trace metadata transaction lock purposes

* fix(scanner): keep capability probes on read fences

* fix(lock): preserve renewal and contention progress
2026-11-07 08:05:26 +08:00
Hauser Zhi 5490e493ab fix(s3): retain protected multipart ETags in object listings (#9208)
* fix(s3): retain protected multipart ETags in object listings

Record encrypted part ETag provenance, aggregate it at read quorum, and attest completed multipart ETags for keyless listings. Preserve legacy fingerprint protection and test versioned SSE-KMS and SSE-C upload, listing, and replay paths.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* perf(s3): stream multipart ETag aggregation

Restore the preserved ETag fast path when selected parts lack protected provenance. Stream native part digests through a fixed stack buffer, preserve legacy hex-or-raw semantics, and strengthen exact-output and override regression coverage.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(s3): preserve encrypted ETag proof during data movement

Capture quorum-backed source proof before multipart completion metadata updates, require exact preserved ETag and version identity, and retain proof only when publication keeps the source version. Cover real two-pool rebalance, null versions, legacy sources, and injected or rewritten identities.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(s3): retain encrypted multipart ETag proof on restore

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-11-07 08:04:54 +08:00
Hauser Zhi 134820c1e0 test(storage): reproduce HTTPS rejoin readiness in Docker (#9206)
* test(storage): reproduce HTTPS rejoin readiness in Docker

Compare cluster-only and node-ready/write gates on immutable native binaries. Preserve first-failure and latest-acknowledged-content evidence across recovery, capture lock diagnostics before restart, and limit cleanup to verified owned resources.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(testing): unify Docker repro ownership and controls

Use typed resource absence and one verified container inventory for staging, partial setup and retained nodes. Reject inherited experiment overrides before creating resources and remove duplicated state.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(testing): guard staging volumes and interrupted capture

Verify volume ownership before privileged staging and disable implicit image-content copying. Preserve failed evidence and continue owned finalization when capture or cleanup is interrupted.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(testing): capture live rejoin logs and verify trace coverage

Read live tmpfs logs inside the verified container and use one explicit stdout sink for diagnostics. Record bounded capture provenance and fail diagnostic coverage when acquisition, guard-drop or physical-release records are missing, without masking HTTP failures.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(testing): reject inherited aliases and finalize on SIGTERM

Reject inherited MINIO compatibility settings before Docker resource creation. Route SIGTERM through interrupt-aware finalization and restore the previous handler after each run. Cover real process signals and failure preservation.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(testing): normalize legacy controls and termination

Reject inherited MINIO compatibility aliases in neutral runtime images. Bridge run-mode SIGTERM into the existing interruption finalization and restore the caller signal handler on return or exception.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-07 08:04:28 +08:00
Chris An 2b9217b6f9 test(e2e): fix quota and conditional write fixtures (#9210) 2026-11-07 08:03:00 +08:00
Hauser Zhi 70a46d0e8c fix(webdav): support configured browser CORS access (#9205)
* fix(webdav): support configured browser CORS access

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hauser Zhi <housemecn@gmail.com>

* perf(webdav): streamline CORS policy and preflight parsing

Borrow connection-owned policy state and clone the backend only for actual requests. Validate borrowed header names and normalize HTTP lists when required.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hauser Zhi <housemecn@gmail.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Hauser Zhi <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-06 14:01:06 -05:00
Hauser Zhi a910ef0dd0 fix(cors): isolate cache variants and streamline policy evaluation (#9203)
Apply cache variation at the shared response boundary, preserve existing
Vary selectors, and reuse parsed global policy and compact CORS inputs.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-06 12:40:11 -05:00
Chris An 430ade191f fix(scanner): bound wide bucket-root fanout memory (#9193)
* fix(scanner): bound wide bucket-root fanout memory (#8961)

Root prefixes were excluded from ordinary compaction and force_compact only
flattened the root above a hardcoded 250k child ceiling, so buckets with
tens of thousands of top-level prefixes kept one cache entry each after
#8971. Compact wide roots outside checkpointed forward sweeps, and honor
force_compact's limit for root fanout.

* fix(scanner): keep root fanout on interrupted force_compact

Interrupted sweeps seal a resume frontier after force_compact. Applying
the ordinary 10k root limit there flattened frontier-named children and
made the next cycle replay completed prefixes. Use the emergency FORCE
ceiling on the interrupted path; successful completions still honor the
ordinary limit. Drop clippy assertions_on_constants in the new tests.

Signed-off-by: Chris An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>

* test(scanner): seal reloaded frontier after interrupted compaction

Const assertions keep the wide-root preconditions without tripping
clippy::assertions_on_constants. The interrupted and finished sweep
paths share one limit helper, and a cache wider than the ordinary
10k limit still seals its frontier child after reload.

Co-authored-by: Chris An <overtrue@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(scanner): isolate unreadable children during root compaction

* fix(scanner): isolate compacted namespace child errors

* fix(scanner): preserve compacted scan accounting and coverage

Commit isolated namespace child usage only after successful traversal, while retaining completed accounting on cancellation and resource deferral. Synchronize reduced root totals before the cancellation-prone flush boundary.

Treat skipped namespaces as incomplete coverage and invalidate legacy sampling baselines until a fresh verification pass succeeds. Keep provisional usage out of progress updates and retain the upstream symlink regression.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(scanner): preserve legacy retry coverage

* test(scanner): regress cancel overwrite after wide-root reduce

houseme's 714f590 already refreshes the root accumulator from the
compacted cache entry before flush_pacing. Add a unit regression that
simulates the interrupt replace_hashed path so a future regression
cannot reintroduce dangling child links over the aggregate.

Signed-off-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Chris An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Chris An <overtrue@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Hauser Zhi <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-06 12:36:25 -05:00
Hauser Zhi c5b15b7279 fix(container): unify directory setup and startup diagnostics (#9201)
* fix(container): explain log directory initialization failures

Report failed log directory creation with ownership guidance and a Compose quote hint while preserving configured values. Add a corrected example and real entrypoint regression coverage.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* refactor(container): unify startup directory preparation

Share directory creation, diagnostics, and best-effort ownership across data and log paths. Skip delimiter and regex subprocesses for ordinary volume paths without introducing a second parser. Expand real-entrypoint coverage for ownership, failures, delimiters, distributed ranges, and setup command counts.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-06 11:49:09 -05:00
cxymds 2a6da8208b fix(lock): converge cleanup after lost release acknowledgements (#9199)
* fix(lock): converge cleanup after lost release acknowledgements

* fix(log-analyzer): track updated unlock cleanup logs

* test(lock): align clocks in unlock cleanup regression
2026-11-06 10:40:28 -05:00
cxymds 93b704420f fix(ecstore): preserve multipart shards within write budgets (#9197) 2026-11-06 10:37:24 -05:00
Ramakrishna Chilaka dfd4d3e213 perf(ecstore): fuse overwrite commits and optimize delete recovery (#9194) 2026-11-06 03:32:34 -05:00
Hauser Zhi 1c1baa6b08 fix(observability): avoid duplicate process metric labels (#9182) 2026-11-05 23:07:02 -05:00
Chris An 0147b8671d ci: bump overtrue/cla-bot to v0.1.1 (#9189)
Co-authored-by: cursoragent <cursoragent@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-11-06 07:01:52 +08:00
Hauser Zhi 8cd751f9d1 feat(ecstore): record unary gRPC operation duration (#9187)
Record end-to-end durations for ReadAll, WriteAll, ReadMultiple, and BatchReadVersion alongside existing request, error, and payload metrics. This makes direct unary payload ABBA results observable through the internode operation duration family.

Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-06 07:01:38 +08:00
Hauser Zhi 5ea2991850 fix(ecstore): retry failed internode channel prewarm (#9186)
Release the per-peer prewarm deduplication marker when the best-effort dial fails, allowing a later RemoteDisk construction to retry the connection warmup without changing lazy connect fallback behavior.

Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-06 07:01:26 +08:00
Chris An 1556e05b8a fix(sftp): put directory objects as trailing-slash keys (#9180)
SFTP subdirectory mkdir and rmdir sent the on-disk __XLDIR__ marker
through the public S3 API. After the suffix was reserved, those calls
were rejected as invalid client keys, so ordinary directory operations
failed while bucket mkdir still succeeded.

Send the logical trailing-slash key and let storage encode the marker.

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Chris An <overtrue@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-11-06 07:00:58 +08:00
Hauser Zhi 32238a179c fix(server): bound rejoin waits and preserve recovery ownership (#9181)
* test(server): cover recovered-node admission boundaries

Document backend readiness and write-availability checks during rejoin.
Extend the existing regression through the production middleware order
without changing runtime admission or cluster-quorum semantics.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(server): bound rejoin waits and preserve recovery ownership

Enforce startup and unreachable-grace bounds while consuming peer replies.
Release admission when every set has its required peer majority and cancel
surplus read-only probes without carrying votes between rounds.

Bound local readiness observations and polling sleeps. Retain initialized
IAM across preparation failures, install the context once, and retry only
publication after readiness timeouts. Share preparation with inline startup.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* perf(server): make peer admission folding incremental

Compile peer-to-set memberships once and retain compact per-edge votes.
Consume each reply once, discard its payload, and update only affected
set counters instead of rescanning all sets and retained responses.

Recheck the captured deadline after polling and folding a reply so late
work cannot admit the node or clear an expired unreachable grace period.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-06 07:00:36 +08:00
Chris An 6b70584dde chore(ci): bump overtrue/cla-bot to v0.1.0 (#9188)
Pin CLA Check to f054da99 (v0.1.0) so built-in bot allowlist skips
cursoragent, Dependabot, GitHub Actions, Renovate, and Copilot without
requiring a CLA signature.

Co-authored-by: cursoragent <cursoragent@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-11-05 23:54:13 +08:00
Chris An d6210ac17b fix(s3,ecstore,table-catalog): bound work driven by client input (#9172)
* fix(ecstore,heal,select): bound storage-layer work driven by client input

Scan findings in the erasure store, heal, file metadata and S3 Select
layers, grouped because they share the disk walk, the multipart staging
area, delete recovery and the select snapshot lease:

- Multipart: upload ids are canonicalized before they name a staging path
  or a lock key (backlog#3027); trailing-slash keys are encoded like every
  other handler (backlog#3055); unlisted parts are removed at completion
  (backlog#3106); per-bucket uploads are found through a signed per-disk
  index instead of a scan of the shared staging area (backlog#3121);
  encrypted part ETags carry a per-upload secret so a write-only user
  cannot confirm plaintext guesses (backlog#3044).
- Delete and recovery: recovery walks are bounded per request
  (backlog#3038); a delete marker on a key whose xl.meta path is a
  directory, and sidecar names used as child keys, no longer wedge the
  journal (backlog#3035, backlog#3105); over-quota PUTs no longer list the
  bucket under the ledger lock (backlog#3128).
- Listing: scan_dir sends metadata without inline data (backlog#3052),
  counts delete markers against max-keys (backlog#3108), and rejects a
  marker that carries the cursor tag (backlog#3059).
- Heal: bucket metadata and heal records live in separate namespaces so
  DeleteBucket cannot erase a drive rebuild (backlog#3039), a deleted
  bucket is skipped instead of failing the rebuild (backlog#3040), and
  directory objects are encoded on readback (backlog#3061).
- Restore and tiering: RestoreObject preserves tags and the version's
  modification time (backlog#3073, backlog#3074); Snowball transport
  headers are not forwarded to the tier (backlog#3090); an epoch
  modification time round-trips through xl.meta (backlog#3063).
- Locks: PutObject takes its bucket locks after the body is staged
  (backlog#3131); SelectObjectContent releases its namespace locks once
  the snapshot is taken (backlog#3132).
- RPC and peers: the v3 signature check consumes the v2 nonce
  (backlog#3129); a bucket-metadata reload timeout no longer marks the
  peer offline (backlog#3124); replication target requests carry an
  operation deadline (backlog#3102); the scanner resumes its interrupted
  wait after a lifecycle write (backlog#3118).
- S3 Select: bounded schema inference, column cap and budgeted CSV
  batches, Parquet dictionary bounds and pre-planner projection checks
  (backlog#3075, backlog#3076, backlog#3077, backlog#3078).

* test(e2e): seed legacy duplicate bucket tags offline for the OPA contract

* fix(s3): authorize what handlers store and bound request-driven work

Scan findings in the S3 request layer (access hooks, object use cases,
HTTP server layers), grouped because they share the authorization
condition builder, the PutObject admission path and the response
layers. Builds on the storage-layer batch for the bounded recovery and
multipart APIs it calls.

Authorization and policy conditions:
- copy source is percent-decoded and version-canonical before the
  s3:x-amz-copy-source condition (backlog#3135); CopyObject authorizes
  the tag set it copies (backlog#3034); HeadObject with the replication
  check header still authorizes s3:GetObject (backlog#3047); the
  x-rustfs-source-version-id header feeds s3:versionid (backlog#3072);
  recursive force-delete with a REPLICA header authorizes every
  descendant as a delete (backlog#3070); include-deleted listings require
  s3:ListBucketVersions (backlog#3099); the metadata listing route keeps
  table isolation and uses the same prefix it authorizes (backlog#3053,
  backlog#3054); If-Match probing needs read permission (backlog#3097);
  Object Lambda checks s3:GetObjectVersion (backlog#3058); replication
  proxy fallback keeps ExistingObjectTag denies (backlog#3089); HeadObject
  returns lock and tag headers only with permission (backlog#3113);
  IPv4 clients on the dual-stack listener match IPv4 SourceIp conditions
  (backlog#3049); bucket policies are parsed once and cached
  (backlog#3032); keystone: access keys no longer verify with an empty
  secret (backlog#3043).
Admission and resource bounds:
- GetObject releases disk-read permits when the client stops reading
  (backlog#3023); PutObject takes buffer and foreground admission only
  after body bytes arrive and bounds the wait (backlog#3031,
  backlog#3084); xl.meta size is bounded on the write path
  (backlog#3100); XML compat layers stream instead of buffering whole
  bodies (backlog#3094); tier GETs stream the remote body (backlog#3046); on-demand migration pulls release permits on
  unread GETs (backlog#3110); SSE-KMS key policy covers UploadPart and
  completion (backlog#3130); MinIO admin decryption runs Argon2id off the
  async worker (backlog#3024).
Input validation and leaks:
- replication headers are validated (source ETag shape, original size)
  (backlog#3092, backlog#3093); control characters in keys and lifecycle
  rule IDs are rejected (backlog#3101, backlog#3117); Snowball member
  mtime needs s3:ReplicateObject (backlog#3083); DeleteObjects checks
  Content-MD5 and admin/STS reject SigV2 replays with altered query or
  body (backlog#3037, backlog#3026); request logs redact presigned
  queries and handler spans skip credentials (backlog#3068,
  backlog#3107); SSE-C listings and completions withhold plaintext
  metadata and checksums (backlog#3120, backlog#3050); CORS resolves the
  bucket like s3s does (backlog#3104); PutBucketTagging rejects duplicate
  keys (backlog#3126); notifications fire after a client disconnect
  (backlog#3127); ListenNotification streams re-check access
  (backlog#3119).

* fix(api): drop imports left unused by the base merge

* test(s3): move the KMS multipart denial test to the app layer

The test drives app-layer multipart use cases, so it belongs with them;
living in the SSE module it imported app code from the infra layer and
failed the layer dependency guard. The SSE test helpers it borrows are
exposed through the storage and app facades.

* fix(s3): keep the SSE-C key fingerprint on keyless multipart completion

The backlog#3050 fix withheld both the plaintext checksums and the
customer-key MD5 header from a CompleteMultipartUpload that did not
present the key. The checksums are a digest of the plaintext and stay
hidden; the key MD5 identifies the key only, and the S3 conformance suite
(test_copy_part_enc) expects it on a keyless completion, so it is echoed
again.

* fix(tier): stream GET bodies and document replication budgets

* fix(ecstore,s3): keep the multipart index and cold fill off disk lifetimes

Two lifecycle regressions surfaced once the storage and request batches
ran together against main:

- The multipart index owner cloned the disk's pinned publication root and
  bootstrapped on a task of its own. That kept the mount alive past the
  last LocalDisk owner (the disk lifecycle allows exactly three holders of
  the root FD) and left a stray task behind, which the local-disk and
  read-repair tests detect. The owner now keeps only the root path and
  reopens it for identity checks, and the bootstrap scan rides the disk's
  existing cleanup task, where stopping the disk abandons it and a
  reconnect resumes it.
- The disk-read admission wrapper defers releasing its permit until an
  in-flight read completes, so a cancelled client cannot widen disk
  concurrency. The cold-fill producer, however, drops a read it has
  already classified as stalled when its deadline fires, and that permit
  stayed pinned for the lifetime of the stuck read. The producer now
  abandons the admission explicitly on timeout.

* test(ecstore): pass the index owner to the Linux cleanup-loop test

* fix(s3): release cold-fill admission after watchdog handoff

* fix(s3,ecstore): close the round-1 adversarial review findings

Adversarial review of the combined request- and storage-layer batch found
fixes that fell short of their issues, two behaviour regressions for
legitimate clients and several unrequested costs:

- backlog#3038: a bulk DeleteObjects reserved the whole per-disk
  inspection allowance up front for every key in flight and exhausted the
  16 Mi request budget on any set wider than eight drives, failing healthy
  keys with SlowDown. Calls are now admitted while budget remains and
  charged for the entries they actually visited. Object-scoped discovery
  charges plain child keys at one entry per 64 names instead of one each,
  so deleting a missing key that names a folder prefix completes instead
  of answering 503 forever while a hostile prefix stays bounded. A peer
  still on the previous binary is reported
  as an unsupported participant, the repository's rolling-upgrade
  contract, instead of as a budget verdict.
- backlog#3037/#3026: a SigV2 configuration PUT without Content-MD5 was
  still replayable with another body; it is refused with MissingContentMD5
  while SigV4 keeps the optional-MD5 contract.
- backlog#3072: DeleteObject now resolves x-rustfs-source-version-id before
  authorization like PUT and COPY, so a replica delete cannot remove a
  version the policy never saw.
- backlog#3121: the multipart index no longer fsyncs a marker and four
  directories per multipart metadata write (it is rebuilt on every start),
  and ListMultipartUploads discovers roots concurrently.
- backlog#3077: Parquet SelectObjectContent decodes budget-sized batches
  instead of one row per batch.
- backlog#3031: a full upload buffer pool hands out an unpooled buffer
  instead of refusing the upload; the progress floor already bounds stalls.
- backlog#3023: the GET disk-read idle cut-off is configurable
  (RUSTFS_GET_DISK_READ_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECS, default 120 s) so a paused
  client is not truncated after 30 s.
- backlog#3075: JSON Lines schema inference keeps the sample collected at
  the 4 MiB bound instead of failing the query.
- backlog#3024: compat admin decryption queues briefly for a slot instead
  of refusing the third concurrent request.
- backlog#3113: HEAD skips its permission probes for the bucket owner.
- backlog#3117: control characters in a lifecycle rule ID are rejected on
  PutBucketLifecycle as well.

The lock-crate publication FIFO serves backlog#3111 and moves to the
table-catalog PR. Also fixed: a lossy admin error message, an unused
s3-client function, two unused test-util features, a duplicated key
validation, the s3s footprint baseline, and a stale log event name in the
reverse-proxy runbook. The ODM multipart write-back test runs on the large
test stack like its sibling.

* fix(table-catalog): bound maintenance work and isolate table namespaces (#9174)

* fix(table-catalog): bound maintenance work and isolate table namespaces

Scan findings in the Iceberg table catalog:

- Metadata maintenance deleted every unreferenced *.metadata.json in a
  table's directory without checking whether a renamed table in another
  namespace still owned those files (backlog#3060); it now resolves the
  owning table through the directory index before deleting.
- Manifest lists and manifests were decoded with the embedded Avro
  writer schema and no recursion depth limit; a self-referencing record
  schema overflowed the stack (backlog#3080). Schemas are validated for
  depth before decoding.
- Compaction decoded every input Parquet file into Arrow batches held in
  memory; a decompression bomb OOM-killed the server (backlog#3085). Row
  groups are streamed through a byte budget and oversized inputs are
  refused.
- An S3 request for a key outside an indexed table prefix listed the
  bucket's whole namespaces/ catalog prefix and failed once it held more
  than 4096 objects (backlog#3086); a per-bucket directory index answers
  index misses without the listing.
- The maintenance planner read whole orphan files to obtain their
  modification time (backlog#3087); it reads metadata only.
- A client disconnect between persisting active_rename_id and clearing it
  left the bucket's catalog entry locked at 503 (backlog#3088); the rename
  runs detached from the request future and clears the flag on every exit.
- Table commits held the bucket publication fence until publication,
  starving every object write (backlog#3111); commits now hold it under a
  deadline and object writes are admitted between commits.

The directory index is managed through three new admin routes under
{warehouse}/catalog/directory, registered in the admin route policy.

The durable-strong store is left as is (its snapshot partitioning for
backlog#3109 and the strong-path deadline are not ported): that backing
is being retired separately, so the new tests cover the object backing.

* fix(table-catalog): close the review gaps in the scan-fix batch

Adversarial review of the table-catalog batch found the fixes narrower
than the issues they close and two cost regressions:

- backlog#3085: the compaction footer check bounded nothing a page header
  could not override; parquet sizes its page buffers from the header.
  Walk every column chunk's page headers (Thrift compact, no decompression)
  and hold each page and the chunk total to the budget before decoding.
  The stored-input budget is per rewrite group, so a multi-group job no
  longer fails after writing earlier outputs.
- backlog#3086: the default index-miss scan still counted maintenance
  reports toward its 4096-object limit; only table entries count now, and
  the listing itself is bounded to 64 pages. The directory index remains
  an optional accelerator.
- backlog#3111: a create wrote its metadata file under the fence as the
  first durable mutation, which disarmed the deadline before the unbounded
  registration inventory. The write precedes publication now. The deadline
  gets its own knob (RUSTFS_TABLE_CATALOG_PUBLICATION_PREPARATION_TIMEOUT_SECS,
  default 30 s, never below the lock-acquire timeout) instead of reusing
  the 5 s lock timeout, and the ownership inventory reads entries
  concurrently.
- Directory candidates are written only while a directory exists; the
  backfill covers earlier entries. A directory on the migration-fence
  path is reported as a conflict instead of a parse error.
- Dead test hooks, a stale comment and the support-matrix text that did
  not match the code are removed or corrected.

* fix(select): preserve complete samples and Parquet batch limits

* fix(s3,ecstore): close the round-2 adversarial review findings

DeleteObject resolved x-rustfs-source-version-id for authorization on
every request while storage consumes it only for a REPLICA request, so a
non-replica caller with s3:DeleteObjectVersion could trigger a plain
delete of the current version. The hook now resolves the header under
the same predicate as storage, and the regression test covers the
non-replica case.

HEAD no longer skips its permission probes for the bucket owner; an
explicit bucket-policy Deny on the metadata actions binds the owner too.

Multipart index pages verify each root against the staging area and
prune markers whose staging root is gone, under the marker's own lease
with a re-check, so the per-drive index stays proportional to live
uploads instead of every key ever multipart-initiated on the drive.

SigV2 configuration PUTs that declare an empty body need no Content-MD5:
there is no body to replay. The minimum-progress floor stays independent
of RUSTFS_HTTP_REQUEST_BODY_READ_TIMEOUT; the knob's documentation now
says so instead of claiming 0 disables it. The quota bootstrap window
(503 until the background scan publishes the ledger) is kept, because
ledger admission must not come from scanner reporting; the compatibility
matrix now documents it.

The S3 compatibility matrix gains a section for the client-visible
validation bounds, and the drive-timeout tuning guide tabulates
RUSTFS_GET_DISK_READ_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECS.

* fix(lock): queue table-bucket publication writers fairly

Table commits take the bucket publication fence as a write lock; under a
stream of commits the lock's try-and-retry acquisition let a new commit
jump ahead of object writers that had been waiting longer, which is part
of what starved them (backlog#3111). Requests for the publication lock
path now take a FIFO ticket per shard: a waiter is admitted only when it
is at the head of the queue, cancelled waiters release their turn, and
batch acquisitions join the same queue. Other lock paths are unchanged.

This moved here from the request-layer batch, where no cited issue
covered it; it serves the table-catalog issue this PR closes.

* fix(table-catalog): close the round-2 adversarial review findings

Parquet page-header walker: read the size fields by field id as parquet
does, accepting I16/I32/I64 wire kinds and rejecting any other kind, so
a header encoding uncompressed_page_size as I64 can no longer bypass the
budget while parquet allocates it. Bound every list, set and map count by
the bytes remaining in the chunk, and reject bool collection elements
(parquet skips them with zero width, so either width would desynchronize
the two parsers); this removes the 2^63-iteration spin on LIST<BOOL>.
Start each column-chunk walk at the dictionary page offset whenever the
footer declares one, exactly as parquet's byte_range does, instead of
min(dictionary, data).

Footer pre-walk: before parquet decodes a footer, walk FileMetaData with
the hardened cursor and charge the declared row_groups count times the
RowGroupMetaData size to the decode budget, because parquet 59 reserves
that Vec before reading one element.

Preparation deadline: clamp the
RUSTFS_TABLE_CATALOG_PUBLICATION_PREPARATION_TIMEOUT_SECS knob to 86,400
seconds so Instant + Duration cannot overflow.

Index-miss scan: after each listing page, jump the cursor past the
maintenance subtree the page ended in, and allow one extra page per table
entry already listed, so job-report history scales with the catalog while
a report flood under one table stays bounded.

Migration fence: read the fence-path object once and decide from its
stored kind whether it is directory state or a fence.

Expired or failed create: remove the initial metadata file when the
registration fails before any catalog write may have begun; nothing else
references it. Correct the comment and support matrix that claimed
maintenance reclaims it.

Tests cover each walker divergence, the footer row-group reservation, the
deadline ceiling, the paging budget for honest catalogs and for a report
flood, and the removal of the unpublished metadata file.

* test(admin): register the catalog directory routes in the route matrix

The table-catalog batch added GET, POST and DELETE
{warehouse}/catalog/directory on both the Iceberg and the compat admin
prefixes without listing them in the admin route matrix, so
test_admin_route_matrix_matches_registered_routes failed on CI.

* fix(s3,ecstore): close the round-3 adversarial review findings

Multipart index pages now treat the cursor as the last examined marker
rather than the last root, so a page that pruned a stale marker still
validates and ListMultipartUploads keeps using the index. A marker is
written before its staging root is published, so pruning spares markers
younger than a five-minute grace period and an existing marker is
touched on every new upload; the prune re-checks both under the marker
lease. Bounded delete-recovery inspection rides the durable-mutation
lane like the unbounded path instead of the one-worker foreground lane.
The on-demand-migration inline body budget scales with the object size
(at least 64 KiB/s) instead of a flat 120 s. The control-body digest
service honors RUSTFS_HTTP_REQUEST_BODY_READ_TIMEOUT=0 as "no
inactivity timeout" like every other reader of that knob.

Quota reconciliation throttle objects are deleted together with a
retired generation's ledger, so bucket turnover leaves no residue. The PUT guard
test shim is gone; tests call the shared guard. Bounded DiskAPI defaults
answer MethodNotAllowed like their siblings. Stale
budget docs, an unreachable CSV arm, an always-Some limit parameter,
commented-out constants and a misplaced doc comment are cleaned up;
weak test assertions name the expected error; lifecycle rule-ID control
characters gain a test. The compatibility matrix records the CopyObject
tag-copy permission, the exact SigV2 empty-body predicate, replica and
migration writes of control-character keys, and the SigV2 DeleteObjects
digest rule.

* fix(table-catalog,heal): close the round-3 review findings

A. Pack compaction rewrite groups to min(max-rewrite-bytes-per-job,
   TABLE_COMPACTION_MAX_STORED_BYTES), reject an over-ceiling group before
   any output is written, and name the ceiling in the commit-path errors;
   document the effective cap in the support matrix and scheduler runbook.
B. Keep TaskCancelled/TaskTimeout classification on replacement passes:
   the namespace verification runs only for completed or storage-failed
   passes, in the erasure healer and the task bucket prepass.
C. Compare the replacement bucket pass per bucket: a recorded identity
   that is gone or replaced still errors or restarts the pass, buckets
   created mid-pass are appended to the identities, pending_buckets and a
   persisted positional order without rewinding progress or the
   checkpoint; verification ignores additions.
D. Read the migration-fence object once in the object-backed write permit
   and dispatch on its kind.
E. Drop the strong store's copy of maintenance_cleanup_roots.
F. Remove the unused test hooks fail_put_prefix, corrupt_put_prefix and
   pause_after_metadata; make compact_parquet_data_files and
   PublicationTicket.state private.
G. Document the body-revision identity, the legacy revalidation budget
   and its HTTP 503 in the support matrix.
H. Define HEAL_REPLACEMENT_RECOVERY_DIR once in ecstore and consume it
   from heal through the storage_api facade.

* fix(ecstore): cap the index pages one disk may answer

Pruned multipart index pages may carry few roots, so the page cursor no
longer bounds how many pages a peer can make a listing fetch. Cut a disk
off after 4096 pages (about one million examined markers) so it
contributes no coverage and the listing falls back to the staging scan.

* fix(ecstore,table-catalog): close the round-4 adversarial review findings

Multipart index markers dated in the future (a backwards clock step
between recording a marker and publishing its staging root) were judged
old and could be pruned while their upload was in flight; a future-dated
marker is now kept. The marker touch on EEXIST is best effort, so a
filesystem that refuses to set times no longer fails the upload commit.
Pruning runs on the durable-mutation lane instead of the one-worker
foreground lane.

Quota reconciliation keeps one throttle object per bucket incarnation (a
quota revision change replaces it instead of orphaning the previous
revision's object), the retirement cleanup deletes it ahead of the ledger
and also when the ledger is already gone, and a scan the retirement
already refused writes nothing back. Bounded DiskAPI defaults answer
UnsupportedDisk, the verdict the aggregate gives a peer without the
protocol. The compaction ceiling pre-check runs over every rewrite group
before any output is written, and the worker's ceiling error no longer
names a placeholder group.

Docs: the inline on-demand-migration client budget, the protocol-2
downgrade conflict of replacement passes, the exact footprint numbers.
2026-11-05 23:32:54 +08:00
Chris An 158aa276e9 fix(storage): bound heal retries and recover pool metadata (#9164)
* fix(ecstore): retry metadata writes rejected before staging

* fix(ecstore): reuse registered disks during startup

* fix(ecstore): retain remote health monitors during reconnect

* test(heal): release the commit barrier during graceful shutdown

* test(e2e): register graceful shutdown barrier regressions

* fix(ecstore): roll back interrupted pool metadata commits

* test(upgrade): honor the 1.0.4 delete recovery protocol

* fix(heal): bound admission during object rate pressure

* test(e2e): handle rebalance completion before stop

* test(e2e): observe rebalance activity before the start reply

* test(rebalance): hold the first run until stop cancels admission
2026-11-05 21:42:19 +08:00
Hauser Zhi 3362421240 fix(obs): add fine-grained object lock histograms (#9177)
Use explicit buckets that preserve millisecond lock acquisitions while retaining visibility into long-held delete and recovery locks. Add an exporter-backed regression test for both histogram instruments.

Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-05 08:11:08 +00:00
GatewayJ 57df9181d0 fix(audit): preserve OIDC identity in S3 request audits (#9178) 2026-11-05 06:03:33 +00:00
Hauser Zhi 371f5e4ffc fix(ecstore): streamline lock RPC and listing ownership (#9176)
* fix(ecstore): preserve lock cleanup and listing trace context

Own remote lock admission and dispatched RPC cleanup across caller cancellation. Reuse bounded late-result cleanup and retain the listing request span in metacache tasks.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* perf(ecstore): streamline lock RPC and listing fanout

Poll RPCs in callers and transfer pending work before channel eviction. Share walk options across producers and borrow cached peer keys. Keep deadline classification deterministic.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-05 05:59:05 +00:00
cxymds 8a5a2c9c93 fix(s3): treat duplicate CreateBucket as owned by the requester (#9167)
* fix(s3): treat duplicate CreateBucket as owned by the requester

The duplicate-bucket response was decided from the requester's root-owner
flag, so every IAM user recreating a bucket received 409
BucketAlreadyExists, including a user recreating a bucket it created.
BucketAlreadyExists means the bucket belongs to another account; a
deployment owns a single namespace, so the answer is purely region-based:
the default region returns the legacy 200 OK, any other region returns
BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou.

Both the existing-bucket fast path and the BucketExists path now share one
helper. Authorization still runs first, so a requester without
s3:CreateBucket gets AccessDenied and cannot probe bucket existence.

Refs #8493

* test(ci): refresh e2e selections for duplicate CreateBucket

The two new create_bucket_region cases join the e2e-smoke and e2e-full
selections, which main also extended with multipart_upload_id tests.

smoke is measured from a local nextest listing: removing the two new cases
reproduces main's committed digest exactly. e2e-full is derived the same way
from main's listing artifact (run 41933823399, babfeaed0) plus the two
multipart_upload_id cases, which reproduces main's committed linux digest
before the new cases are added; CI re-verifies both platforms.

test_bucket_create_exists_nonowner asserts BucketAlreadyExists for a second
identity, which a single-owner deployment cannot produce. Move it to
excluded_tests.txt with the deployment-ownership rationale; the IAM-user
duplicate paths stay covered by crates/e2e_test/src/create_bucket_region_test.rs.
2026-11-05 03:06:50 +00:00
Hauser Zhi babfeaed00 fix(io-core): preserve pooled capacity and accounting (#9171)
* fix(io-core): preserve pooled capacity and accounting

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(io-core): preserve pool allocation admission order

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* docs(io-core): clarify pool return locking

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-04 22:07:58 +00:00
Jose Meira 736bf777b4 feat(container): add declarative bucket bootstrap (#9162)
* feat(container): add declarative bucket bootstrap

* fix(container): handle false bucket versioning setting

* Update Rust base image to version 1.99.1-trixie

Signed-off-by: Hauser Zhi <housemecn@gmail.com>

* Update Rust base image version to 1.99.1

Signed-off-by: Hauser Zhi <housemecn@gmail.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Hauser Zhi <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Hauser Zhi <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-11-04 16:59:50 +00:00
KarlEmm 7babc7d621 fix(s3): report malformed multipart upload IDs as NoSuchUpload (#9147)
UploadPart, UploadPartCopy, ListParts and CompleteMultipartUpload returned 400 InvalidArgument for a malformed upload ID, while AbortMultipartUpload returned 404 NoSuchUpload. AWS S3 documents NoSuchUpload for an upload ID that might be invalid.

Report MalformedUploadID as NoSuchUpload through one helper used by all operations that address an existing upload, replacing the Abort-only special case. ListMultipartUploads keeps InvalidArgument for a malformed upload-id-marker.

Add the multipart_upload_id_test e2e module to the e2e-smoke profile. It asserts 404 NoSuchUpload from every operation that addresses an existing upload, for a malformed upload ID and for an aborted one, and updates the e2e-smoke and Linux e2e-full selection digests.

Co-authored-by: Karl Bastarache <bastarachek@google.com>
Co-authored-by: Hauser Zhi <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-11-04 16:25:00 +00:00
Hauser Zhi 4d46bd25f8 perf(ecstore): parallelize bulk-delete lock and metadata fan-out (#9155)
* perf(ecstore): probe bulk-delete write locks in parallel waves

Bulk delete acquired one distributed write lock per key in serialized
order, paying a full quorum round-trip per key. Probe the unique keys in
bounded parallel waves with a short timeout instead; any contention drops
the whole wave and the canonical serial order resolves it as before, so
two overlapping batches can never deadlock.

* perf(ecstore): probe bulk-delete transaction locks in parallel

The set-layer delete-transaction locks were also acquired one quorum
round-trip per key after the raw write locks. Apply the same optimistic
all-or-nothing probe wave with a canonical serial fallback, and keep the
per-key error reporting the fallback already provided.

* perf(ecstore): pre-fetch bulk-delete source metadata in parallel

The admission loop ran one metadata quorum fan-out per key in sequence
on top of the per-key lock round-trips. Pre-fetch the source reads the
loop needs with bounded parallelism under the locks already held, and
derive the per-key read inputs from one shared helper so the pre-fetch
and the loop cannot disagree.

* test(ecstore): drop unused import in batch-delete probe test

* refactor(ecstore,lock): await wave releases and unify probe waves

Adversarial review of the bulk-delete lock waves found three real
issues. Distributed guard release is fire-and-forget on drop, so the
serial fallback could re-acquire keys while unlock RPCs were still in
flight and block on locks it already owned: guards are now released
with an awaited unlock before the fallback runs. The wave also probed
every key after the first failure, adding up to one probe timeout per
chunk of pure overhead under contention: probing now stops at the
first failing chunk. Finally the two copy-pasted wave implementations
are replaced by one shared probe_lock_wave, and the per-key delete
read inputs are resolved once instead of being recomputed.

Tests now assert the wave/fallback counters so they prove which path
ran, and an overlapping-batch test pins the no-deadlock property.

* refactor(ecstore,lock): batch bulk-delete lock rounds per key

Replace the optimistic probe waves with the bulk lock primitive the lock
layer already supports on the wire: one lock_batch RPC per lock client
for a whole DeleteObjects key set, per-key quorum guards with the usual
TTL heartbeat, and per-key outcomes. The batched round is deadlock-free
by construction (every lock server orders concurrent batches by the
same global (shard, key) order), so the probe timeout, the wave
release-and-wait dance, and the canonical serial fallback all go away.

Per-key lock outcomes are now reported per key end to end: a locked-out
key fails alone in the response while the rest of the batch proceeds,
matching the S3 DeleteObjects contract and the set layer's existing
behavior. The set layer's raw-write-lock and delete-transaction-lock
waves fold into the same primitive via one shared resource-folding
helper, and the fast-lock batch fast path now counts acquisitions so
shard metrics keep their meaning.

* perf(ecstore): move journal publish off the one-worker namespace lane

A bulk delete publishes one recovery transaction per key, and every
journal inspection and settle-plan closure ran on the per-disk
foreground namespace lane (one worker), serializing the whole publish
phase per drive behind every other mutation. Route those closures onto
the durable-mutation lane the fused delete prepare already uses (eight
workers per disk, fsyncs coalesce in the filesystem journal), and keep
32 journal publications in flight so a 16-drive set can feed those
lanes.

* test(ecstore): flatten lock-error iteration in overlap test

* fix(ecstore,lock): refresh duplicate keys after recovery, bound unlock

Review findings on the batched lock rounds. A batch entry whose recovery
rolls back an interrupted prepared delete can bring a retained version
back; a later duplicate of the same key still held its pre-fetched
source-missing read, skipped the object-lock check, and deleted the
restored version. Recovery now evicts the pre-fetched reads of every
other entry naming the same object, so those entries take the loop's
live re-read and see the restored version.

The batch rollback release awaited the full unlock retry schedule,
including the deferred background pass, parking the request behind an
unreachable peer. The synchronous phase is now a single release pass
with the deferred retries spawned in the background.

* fix(ecstore): release local batch locks before deferred recovery

A set-layer batch delete that runs deferred key recovery re-acquires a
write lock on the same keys through recover_delete_object, but the raw
local batch guards were only ever released at function exit — the
distributed path releases its batch ids before the deferred loop and the
local path missed the mirror release, so the recovery deadlocked against
the batch's own locks and surfaced as a spurious Lock(Timeout) for every
deferred key.

A regression test plants the interrupted prepared delete this needs and
pins the end-to-end contract: a batch naming a GOVERNANCE-retained
version twice must deny both entries after the first entry's recovery
rolls the prepared delete back, and the restored version must survive.

* test(lock): cover batch acquire partial-grant rollback

The distributed acquire_guard_batch rollback path — a key granted by
fewer than quorum clients must fail alone and release its partial grants
before the call returns — was only reachable in distributed mode and had
no coverage. A scripted per-object LockClient pins both halves: the
below-quorum key reports QuorumNotReached with its partial vote, and the
orphaned grant is released synchronously while the quorate key's guard
stays held.
2026-11-04 13:20:13 +00:00
Ramakrishna Chilaka ff5f491c5a perf(ecstore): skip unmatched FdCache scans and maintenance wakeups (#9165)
Track active descriptor volumes, exact paths, and component prefixes in FdCacheTracker so unmatched invalidate_under, invalidate_volume, and invalidate_exact calls return without scanning Moka or waking the background maintenance task.
2026-11-04 13:12:11 +00:00
Hauser Zhi a8be876fd9 fix(s3): honor presigned x-amz-meta-* query parameters (#9146)
* fix(s3): honor presigned x-amz-meta-* query parameters

The AWS SDK presigners hoist signable x-amz-* headers into the query
string (smithy moveHeadersToQuery), and AWS S3 accepts the hoisted form
as the header it came from. RustFS read user metadata from headers only,
so a presigned PutObject carrying ?x-amz-meta-user-id=u1 returned 200 and
stored an object with empty metadata (rustfs/rustfs#9142).

Add one shared extractor for user-metadata query parameters and wire it
into every metadata-accepting write path (PutObject including snowball
members, CreateMultipartUpload, CopyObject REPLACE) plus the snowball
extract trigger, instead of normalizing per operation the way the
presigned UploadPart checksum fix did. The stored key form is produced by
the same helper as the header path, so the hoisted and header forms land
on disk identically.

Only a signature-covered query is honored: SigV4 signs the canonical
query string, while SigV2 signs headers plus a fixed subresource list
only, so honoring its query would let a presigned-URL holder add object
properties the presigner never authorized. Keys and values that could not
have arrived as a header are rejected rather than stored, since the read
path turns them into header fields and a control character would fail
every Head/Get of that object.

* refactor(s3): hoist signed x-amz query params at the request boundary

Replace the per-write-path query metadata extractor with one boundary
mechanism: restore the `x-amz-*` request properties the SigV4 presigners
hoist into the query (`@smithy/signature-v4` `moveHeadersToQuery`) as
request headers before s3s routes and deserializes the request.

One hook now covers every reader at once — s3s input parsing,
`extract_metadata_from_mime`, the snowball extract trigger and its
transport-key filter, tagging, storage class, object lock and copy
source — so PutObject, CreateMultipartUpload and CopyObject need no
changes at all. It also replaces repeated query parsing along the write
path with a single pass at the boundary.

An existing header always wins, so the hoist is purely additive and the
unsigned-header guard keeps rejecting anything the signer did not sign;
that guard now also accepts a header whose single value equals a
same-named query parameter, which is what the hoist produces and what
the signature covers.

`query_string_is_signed` rules out SigV2 before it trusts any SigV4
marker. SigV2's string-to-sign covers headers plus a fixed subresource
list rather than arbitrary query parameters, so a SigV2 presigned URL
stays valid after `X-Amz-Algorithm`/`X-Amz-Signature` markers are
appended to it; without this rule a URL holder could turn on
`x-amz-meta-snowball-auto-extract` and have a plain upload untarred
(review of #9146).

* fix(s3): hoist signed query params after s3s signature verification

The request-boundary hoist ran before s3s, so the restored `x-amz-*`
headers reached s3s's own verifier, which rejects any `x-amz-*` header
outside `X-Amz-SignedHeaders` (s3s `ops/signature.rs`,
`reject_unsigned_amz_headers`). A valid presigned PUT with
`SignedHeaders=host` and `?x-amz-meta-user-id=u1` therefore came back
with 403 AccessDenied before any handler ran (review of #9146).

Move the hoist to `authorize_request`, RustFS's shared authorization
entry: s3s has already verified the signature there, and policy
evaluation plus the handler read request properties after it, so the
restored headers reach every operation without ever appearing unsigned
to the verifier. The mechanism is unchanged — one gated, validated pass
over the signature-covered query.

CopyObject's replacement metadata now also reads the headers, because
s3s parsed `input.metadata` before the hoist ran.

The hoist itself and its tests stay in `server::layer`; the tower layer
is gone.

* perf(s3): single-pass signature-aware query hoist in auth

Move the query hoist into `auth.rs`, next to the unsigned-header rules it
is part of, so `storage` no longer reaches into `server` for it. Its
documented contract — which request properties the signature covers, and
why SigV2 must never be widened — now lives with the rule it protects.

Make the hot path allocation-free and single-pass. The caller no longer
clones the query just to satisfy the borrow checker, the function no
longer clones it again, and one `form_urlencoded::parse` pass both
recognizes the presigned-SigV4 marker set and stages the hoistable
parameters. Nothing is validated or applied until the gate passes, so a
request whose query is not signature-covered is never rejected here. A
single ASCII scan skips the whole thing when the query names no `x-amz-`
parameter at all, which is every ordinary `?versionId=`/`?uploadId=`
request and every queryless one.

The duplicate-parameter and header-value checks stay strict; only when
they moved, not how they behave.

* fix(s3): keep verifying a query-carried payload hash after the hoist

The hoist restores `?x-amz-content-sha256=<digest>` as a header, but it
runs after s3s has already built the request body. s3s reads its
payload-hash input from the headers only, so it installs no hash
validator for a digest that arrived in the query, and the restored header
then made `get_content_sha256_with_query` conclude the auth layer was
enforcing it. Neither layer verified the body, so a presigned PUT whose
digest exists only in the query accepted a modified payload (review of
#9146).

The question is not whether a digest header is present but whether the
digest reached the request as a query parameter: that one is always the
storage layer's to verify. A digest sent as a header is still left to the
auth layer, which wraps the body in a hash-validating reader for it, so
no payload is hashed twice.

* fix(auth): limit late query hoisting to user metadata

* refactor(s3): drop the stale payload-hash compensation, scope the pre-filter

Limiting the hoist to `x-amz-meta-*` user metadata means it never
manufactures an `x-amz-content-sha256` header, so the payload-hash
predicate's original signal — a digest header present at handler time is
one s3s is enforcing — is exact again. Restore it and drop the
query-aware form: that change existed only to undo a header the hoist is
no longer allowed to create, and it would have hashed a payload twice
for a presigned request that declared a real digest both in the query and
as a header.

Match the pre-filter to the same scope so a query carrying only a typed
property (`x-amz-tagging`, `x-amz-storage-class`, `versionId`) skips the
parse entirely instead of scanning past it.

* test(access): use explicit imports in the signed-query lock regression

The architecture migration rule requires RustFS storage-owner modules to
name their imports instead of pulling the parent module in wholesale, and
`signed_query_lock_permission_regression` was still on `use super::*`.
Import the two symbols it actually uses and drop the unused one.

* test(access): reference FS through the parent import

The layer dependency guard tracks `use crate::...` edges, and naming
`crate::storage::ecfs::FS` from the signed-query regression looked like a
new `infra -> interface` reverse dependency. `access.rs` already reaches
the same type through `use super::ecfs::FS`, so reuse that import instead
of introducing a second, tracked spelling of an edge the module has
always had. No baseline entry, no new edge.

---------

Co-authored-by: overtrue <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-11-04 10:41:52 +00:00
Hauser Zhi fe3ada0689 chore(deps): refresh Cargo dependencies (#9156)
* chore(deps): refresh Cargo dependencies

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* chore(deps): update rustfs kafka to 1.4.1

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-04 09:03:37 +00:00
Hauser Zhi 926355ae1f fix(api): keep SlowDownRead off write-path quorum failures (#9149)
* fix(api): keep SlowDownRead off write-path quorum failures

* refactor(api): write-safe quorum default, GET opts into SlowDownRead

* fix(api): keep object-read mapping behind error.rs architecture boundary

* refactor(api): drop redundant object-read mapper wrapper
2026-11-04 08:08:23 +00:00
Chris An 7f5fa4b8f6 fix(protocols,kms,keystone): enforce client CA, protect the KMS probe (#9168)
Scan findings in the alternate-protocol front ends and the KMS and
Keystone integrations:

- WebDAV and FTPS read RUSTFS_WEBDAV_CA_FILE / RUSTFS_FTPS_CA_FILE,
  checked that the file existed, and then built their TLS listeners
  with with_no_client_auth(), so mTLS was never enforced. A shared
  protocols::common::tls::server_config builds the rustls config with a
  client-certificate verifier from the configured CA, startup fails on
  an invalid CA, and a CA cannot be combined with cleartext
  (backlog#3069).
- The KMS readiness probe used a fixed key id that the key-lifecycle
  admin routes accepted like any customer key, so kms:DisableKey on it
  failed readiness on every node. The probe key is reserved from key
  management and a disabled probe key no longer counts as a backend
  failure (backlog#3115).
- The Keystone middleware answered anonymous requests carrying a junk
  X-Auth-Token with the configured Keystone URL in the body while
  Keystone was unreachable; failures no longer disclose upstream
  locations, and the login cache is bypassed when a subscription token
  refresh is required (backlog#3116).
2026-11-04 20:25:55 +08:00
Chris An a97c65895c fix(proxies,targets,obs): bound untrusted input in leaf crates (#9166)
Scan findings in crates whose behavior is driven by untrusted input and
that stand alone from the storage core:

- trusted-proxies: the simple implementation takes the client address
  from the right-most untrusted X-Forwarded-For hop instead of the
  left-most (backlog#3082); the legacy validator never falls back to the
  proxy identity when the chain is rejected and reads X-Forwarded-For
  unless RFC 7239 is explicitly selected (backlog#3051).
- targets: webhook and similar outbound clients drain responses up to a
  byte limit instead of buffering arbitrary bodies (backlog#3062); the
  on-disk notification queue has a shared byte budget in addition to the
  entry count, configurable via RUSTFS_TARGET_STORE_MAX_BYTES
  (backlog#3122); AMQP and Redis manifests declare the broker url as a
  secret and bind credentials to their connection fields, and the
  plugin-instance PUT refuses to restore a redacted secret when the
  connection fields changed (backlog#3065, backlog#3066).
- obs: the debug-level s3s response dump is filtered so STS and
  service-account credentials never reach the log (backlog#3029).
2026-11-04 19:49:53 +08:00
Chris An 73e7afa01a fix(iam): close identity, session and admin-authorization gaps (#9163)
Scan findings in the IAM crate and the admin identity handlers, grouped
because they share the IamCache mutation lock, the STS session sweep and
the admin client-address plumbing:

- Admin and STS authorization used the socket peer as aws:SourceIp
  behind a trusted proxy; they now read the verified client address the
  S3 path already uses (backlog#3025), and the admin usage route passes
  the bucket named in the path to the s3:ListBucket check (backlog#3033).
- AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity accepted HS256 ID tokens MACed with the OIDC
  client secret; only provider-signed tokens verify (backlog#3028), and
  JWKS refresh is single-flight with a failure cool-down (backlog#3103).
- A disabled group emptied the member's whole policy list, dropping
  every Deny; direct and other-group policies are preserved (backlog#3042).
- Identity rewrites (secret change, add-user, status) ran without a lock
  and without re-reading the record, so a user's password change could
  undo an admin disable or reset (backlog#3048). add-user on an existing
  user and in-flight AssumeRole both left sessions minted under the old
  secret valid (backlog#3071, backlog#3079); rotation now revokes under
  the per-key mutation lock and derived-credential publication is ordered
  with it.
- aws:groups never carried a built-in user's IAM group membership and
  jwt:iss was always the local marker, so group- and issuer-scoped
  Denies never matched; both now come from live IAM state
  (backlog#3095, backlog#3096).
- OPA mode skipped the account-status gates for service accounts and STS
  sessions of a disabled user (backlog#3057).
- The periodic IAM reload published nothing when any cache write raced
  it and kept stale partitions when a prefix listed empty, so a missed
  revocation never applied (backlog#3064, backlog#3114).
- update-group-members never evaluated admin:RemoveUserFromGroup
  (backlog#3098); ExportIAM compared the site-replicator account against
  a name it never has (backlog#3045); add-user accepted the access key of
  a live STS session or service account (backlog#3134); a service account
  could create or extend a lifetime beyond its own (backlog#3112);
  sts:DurationSeconds and svc:DurationSeconds were never populated
  (backlog#3136); temporary-account-info returned service accounts
  (backlog#3137); an access key the object layer refuses no longer holds
  the service-account lock through the write retries (backlog#3133).
2026-11-04 18:44:50 +08:00
Chris An e0f26a540d fix(ecstore): gate null-version overwrites under Object Lock (#9157)
A put-like write without a version id to a key that is not
versioning-Enabled replaces the key's null version in place. The
commit-time Object Lock gate in put_object_with_old_current_size_inner
ran only when the write carried an explicit version id, and the
request-layer pre-check reads the key's latest version. When the
retained null version was not the latest entry (a UUID version or a
delete marker sat above it), a user holding only s3:PutObject could
overwrite it together with its COMPLIANCE retention or legal hold, and
CompleteMultipartUpload had no commit-time gate at all.

Name the version a commit replaces (the explicit id, or the nil id when
the write is not versioned and the bucket's Object Lock snapshot is not
ConfirmedAbsent) and run the existing WORM gate against it, tolerating
a null delete marker. complete_multipart_upload gets the same gate at
its commit point, and ECStore::handle_complete_multipart_upload attaches
the bucket's Object Lock snapshot the way a single PUT already does.

Refs rustfs/backlog#3019 (ANT-2026-EH17ZP59).
2026-11-04 17:26:54 +08:00
Chris An 3b3cc018aa fix(policy): close condition, action, principal and resource gaps (#9160)
Eight scan findings in the shared policy engine, each a case where a
Deny did not apply or an Allow was broader than written:

- A bare `*` Action was parsed as `s3:*`, so `Deny *` never matched
  admin:, kms: or sts: actions. `Action::All` now denies every family
  while the historical S3-only Allow is preserved (backlog#3041).
- A bare IPv6 address in aws:SourceIp got `/32` appended, matching a
  2^96-address network; a bare address now means one host, and IPv4
  clients on a dual-stack listener are matched through their mapped
  form (backlog#3030).
- Date conditions on aws:EpochTime parsed the epoch seconds as RFC 3339
  and never matched, so a time-bounded Deny failed open (backlog#3036).
- NumericNotEquals and DateNotEquals evaluated to false when the key was
  absent; negated operators now follow the AWS rule and match
  (backlog#3123).
- Every trailing IfExists on a condition operator added a level of
  recursion without bound; the chain is rejected before parsing
  (backlog#3091).
- Policy variable substitution re-expanded its own output for up to ten
  passes, so an access key holding k placeholders grew to k^10; values
  are now substituted once as literal data (backlog#3067).
- A bucket-policy Service principal was matched against the signing
  access key, so a service account named after the service received its
  grants; Service principals round-trip but never match (backlog#3081).
- Resource matching cleaned the trailing slash off a directory object,
  so a Deny on `prefix/*` missed `prefix/` itself (backlog#3125).

Also deduplicate large Resource sets through a HashSet instead of a
quadratic scan.
2026-11-04 17:16:17 +08:00
Chris An f4f5635aab fix(auth): build policy conditions from the value a write stores (#9159)
PutObjectLegalHold and PutObjectTagging apply the value in their XML
body, and a POST upload applies its form fields, while the
s3:object-lock-legal-hold, s3:RequestObjectTag/<key> and
s3:RequestObjectTagKeys condition keys (and every other header-derived
key for POST) were built from the HTTP headers. The policy engine
therefore judged a value the handler did not store: absent when the
client sent no header, and whatever the caller wrote when it did. A
user limited by a Deny on the requested legal hold or tag value could
release a hold and delete the held version, or retag an object so a
tag-based grant exposed it.

Record the body value in request extensions before authorization, the
way PutObjectRetention already does, and let authorization_conditions
replace the header-derived keys with it. For POST uploads project the
parsed form fields over the headers that feed the condition map, removing
a header whose field is absent.

Refs rustfs/backlog#3018 (ANT-2026-KONBE376).
2026-11-04 17:00:42 +08:00
Chris An 36ad5a6b87 fix(ecstore): judge the null version a versionless delete removes (#9151)
DeleteObjects ran its Object Lock check on one version of a key and then
removed a different one. For an entry without a version id on a key that
is not versioning-Enabled, delete_objects_with_accounting judged the
key's latest entry and then had the disks remove the null version. When
a UUID version or a delete marker sat above a null version under
COMPLIANCE retention or legal hold, that retention was never read and a
user holding only s3:DeleteObject could remove the retained version. The
single-object DELETE on a Suspended key had the same gap.

Add SetDisks::check_null_version_object_lock_delete, which looks up the
null version under the lock the caller already holds and runs the
existing check_object_lock_delete against it when the latest entry
carries a UUID version id. The batch path is not gated on
source_missing because a delete marker on top makes the latest-version
lookup report the key as missing. Plain unversioned keys and
versioning-Enabled keys keep a single lookup and unchanged behavior.

Refs rustfs/backlog#3017 (ANT-2026-6ED2F7II).
2026-11-04 15:59:48 +08:00
Chris An 6c14128072 fix(s3): reserve the __XLDIR__ directory-marker suffix in client keys (#9153)
Storage encodes a directory object `photos/` as `photos__XLDIR__/xl.meta`
and LocalDisk::scan_dir decodes every directory entry ending in the
suffix back into a marker. The S3 write path never refused the suffix in
client keys, so a 1-byte PutObject to the key `__XLDIR__` made the walk
schedule the directory being scanned as its own child and recurse until
the stack overflowed, aborting the server on every restart until the
directory was removed by hand. Keys below a `*__XLDIR__/` segment were
stored but hidden from every listing and from quota accounting.

validate_object_key now rejects any client key containing the suffix,
which covers PutObject, CopyObject, Snowball extraction and the admin
internal put; CreateMultipartUpload and CompleteMultipartUpload now run
the same validation so uploads created before the key was reserved
cannot publish it. scan_dir additionally ignores a marker whose decoded
name is empty, so malformed markers left by older writers or corrupt
disks can no longer recurse into their parent.

Refs rustfs/backlog#3020 (ANT-2026-SBJ1JLC2).
2026-11-04 15:39:48 +08:00
Chris An addc258a24 fix(admin): keep Vault local-file reads on the operator connection (#9152)
POST /rustfs/admin/v3/kms/reconfigure and configure accepted
server-local file paths in the Vault request body (Kubernetes jwt_path,
AppRole secret_id_file, TokenFile path, TLS ca/client cert and key
paths), read the named file with the server's own authority and sent
its content to the Vault address given in the same body. A user holding
only kms:Configure could read any UTF-8 file the process can read,
including /proc/self/environ with the root credentials, and exfiltrate
it to an address of their choosing.

normalize_configure_request_secrets now runs
validate_vault_local_file_access for both handlers: a Vault request
that names a server-local file, or inherits the stored credentials by
sending a blank token, must keep the operator-configured address and
namespace, the same file-based auth method (role, path, mount) and the
same TLS paths and verification setting. Requests with explicit inline
credentials and no file paths are unchanged.

Refs rustfs/backlog#3021 (ANT-2026-F8MRFKCC).
2026-11-04 15:39:43 +08:00
Chris An 73ea527f55 fix(auth): canonicalize s3:VersionId before policy evaluation (#9150)
The object handlers accept several spellings of one version id (upper
case, unhyphenated, braced, urn:uuid:) and the storage layer resolves
all of them to the same version, but the s3:VersionId condition value
was the client string verbatim. A Deny with StringEquals on one version
could therefore be bypassed by re-spelling the id in ?versionId=.

Canonicalize the id once where the condition value is produced so every
hook and policy type (IAM, bucket, session) sees the spelling the server
emits: hyphenated lower-case UUID, with null in any case and the nil UUID
mapped to null. Non-UUID strings pass through unchanged and are rejected
by the handlers as before.

Refs rustfs/backlog#3022 (ANT-2026-O5MHY8VJ).
2026-11-04 15:39:38 +08:00
hector 55da14ad82 ci(nightly): embed the console UI in the GNU nightly build (#9158) 2026-11-04 15:21:41 +08:00
唐小鸭 116a5299b2 fix(replication): replay the MRF journal periodically (#9139)
* fix(replication): replay the MRF journal periodically

The persisted MRF journal was replayed only at startup. Delete-marker
purges whose watch window drained with targets unreachable, and
replications that overflowed the worker queues, reach the journal while
the server runs, so they waited for a restart to converge.

Move the startup pass into replay_mrf_journal and rerun it every five
minutes from a background loop. The existing recovery leader lock keeps
one pass at a time across the cluster, including the startup pass.

* fix(replication): space periodic MRF replay across nodes

Every node runs the MRF replay loop and the recovery leader lock only
serializes passes, so an N-node cluster replayed the same retained
backlog N times per interval while a target stayed down.

Record the start time of a pass that finds entries in a shared replay
stamp and skip a periodic pass when any node started one within the
interval. The startup pass still always runs.
2026-11-03 17:06:14 +00:00
Hauser Zhi fbc54f7212 fix(heal): treat SlowDown as a rate signal and bound page churn (#9144)
* fix(heal): treat SlowDown as a rate signal and bound page churn

* refactor(heal): unify page rate control and drop checkpoint clones

* refactor(heal): one pass-wide rate controller, single SlowDown observe

* fix(heal): address SlowDown backoff and checkpoint baseline review
2026-11-03 17:05:05 +00:00
Ramakrishna Chilaka 3aa492f5ee perf(ecstore,rpc): shard hot-path delete, multipart, and RPC lock tables (#9143)
Replace the single-mutex PREPARED_DELETE_RECEIPTS and ACTIVE_MULTIPART_SOURCE_HEADS maps in rustfs-ecstore with a 64-shard ShardedPathCache backed by SWAR canonical byte keys and xxh3_64 hashing. Replace PUT_FILE_TARGET_LOCKS in rustfs internode RPC with a 64-shard ShardedPutFileTargetLockRegistry using stack-buffered binary keys, in-place dead-Weak slot reuse, and amortized garbage collection.
2026-11-03 15:11:58 +00:00
Hauser Zhi 00a81b4048 chore(deps): refresh crate requirements and lockfile (#9140)
Run cargo update and cargo upgrade twice to bump compatible requirements (jiff, zip, dial9) and refresh transitive lockfile entries.
2026-11-03 15:04:29 +00:00
唐小鸭 20ef9ebf15 fix(replication): skip site-replication rules in replica delete fan-out (#9138)
* fix(replication): skip site-replication rules in replica delete fan-out

A site that receives a replicated delete forwards it to its own targets
so chained replication keeps propagating deletes. The fan-out used the
whole bucket config, including derived site-replication rules, so in a
site-replication mesh a replicated purge was echoed back to its origin
and duplicated to every other peer. The echo could remove the origin's
pending-purge version before its own delivery state was written back.

Ignore derived site-replication rules when computing the replica delete
fan-out. The origin already delivers and retries every delete to each
peer itself. Operator rules still fan out, so chained replication is
unchanged.

* fix(replication): keep operator rules matching the site-repl shape

Rule ids and target ARN shapes are not reserved for site replication:
an ordinary bucket target ARN carries its target id, so an operator rule
named site-repl-<target id> matched the derived shape and was dropped
from replica delete fan-out, breaking an A -> B -> C chain.

Skip a rule only when its deployment id is a current remote
site-replication peer, reading the peer set only when a rule has the
derived shape. If the state cannot be read, skip nothing.
2026-11-03 12:08:08 +00:00
Boyi (Elliot) Li cc08e0d11b feat(fips): route internode RPC HMAC through aws-lc-rs FIPS (#9137)
* feat(fips): route internode RPC HMAC through aws-lc-rs FIPS

* Revise KMS cryptographic compliance details

Updated the KMS cryptographic compliance documentation to reflect changes in HMAC authentication and added details about the internode RPC HMAC authentication.

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Hauser Zhi <housemecn@gmail.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Hauser Zhi <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Hauser Zhi <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-11-03 06:56:56 +00:00
Hauser Zhi 69294523d5 fix(heal): preserve lock, format, and repair identity (#9132)
* fix(heal): preserve lock, format, and repair identity

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): keep pool meta legacy error message stable for ratchet

Co-authored-by: houseme <4829346+houseme@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(heal): drop redundant clone in MRF dedup test

Co-authored-by: houseme <4829346+houseme@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Chris An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: houseme <4829346+houseme@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-11-03 04:59:06 +00:00
Chris An cd4d86f28a fix(replication): finish writeback for already purged versions (#9135) 2026-11-03 02:08:32 +00:00
Hauser Zhi 2f55cf69e1 perf(filemeta): grow metacache read chunks geometrically (#9133)
Large metacache elements (an xl.meta grown past 16 MiB with its version
history) were accumulated in fixed 64 KiB reads, paying hundreds of
read rounds per entry on the listing path. Double the per-round chunk up
to a 4 MiB bound so each reservation stays incremental and bounded
(rustfs/rustfs#2715 corrupt-length-prefix safety is unchanged) while
wide listings and oversized entries decode in far fewer rounds.

Add regression coverage for rustfs/rustfs#9120: a listing whose
aggregate stream exceeds the per-value 16 MiB bound, and an oversized
entry listed among ordinary neighbors with peek/skip interleaving.
2026-11-03 06:07:41 +08:00
Hauser Zhi fff6e94378 fix(metrics): reconcile peer-health gauge on successful RPCs and probes (#9134)
The rustfs_cluster_servers_offline_total gauge was event-driven only:
record_peer_reachable fired solely after a fresh connector.connect()
succeeded. When post-recovery traffic was served by a cached channel
(tonic auto-reconnect, addr-form cache-key split, or delete-recovery
channel), no fresh dial occurred and the gauge stayed stale until the
process restarted.

Add record_peer_reachable_if_offline (fast-path read / slow-path write)
and wire it into every successful peer interaction:
- remote-disk recovery probe success (gRPC DiskInfo)
- periodic TCP connectivity check success (bounded-interval reconcile)
- data-path RPC success (execute_with_timeout_for_op_and_health_action)
- lock-path RPC success (record_rpc_success and detached completion)

Fixes rustfs/rustfs#9119
Tracking: rustfs/backlog#3138
2026-11-02 19:07:37 +00:00
Hauser Zhi 41b13aeb8b fix(tls): unify FIPS provider policy across clients (#9125)
* fix(tls): enforce active FIPS provider at startup

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* ci: provision FIPS validation runner

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(tls): validate FIPS before observability startup

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* perf(tls): reuse the installed crypto provider

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): gate Linux-only commit helpers

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* refactor(tls): centralize FIPS provider policy

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Chris An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-11-02 16:58:42 +00:00
weile321 88587a8f94 fix(s3select-api): clamp overflowing u64 GetRange values to i64::MAX (#9118) 2026-11-02 14:05:07 +00:00
hector 8c8b5da63f ci(nightly): dispatch nightly-candidate-ready after asset publish (#9131)
After the nightly packages are on the auto-testing nightly release and
the schema 2 R2 candidate exists, post repository_dispatch to
rustfs/auto-testing. Vault lanes stay parallel, and the workflow_run
functional chain is left in place.

Co-authored-by: hector <majinghe@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-11-02 23:05:07 +08:00
Henry Guo 00a238f838 fix(table-catalog): resolve superseded staged commits (#9124)
fix(table-catalog): diagnose superseded staged commits

Co-authored-by: Chris An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-11-02 23:04:22 +08:00
hector 965d805a4f ci: run distributed and upgrade e2e on schedule only (#9126)
Remove pull_request from the distributed and upgrade workflows. Distributed
stays on the nightly cron, and upgrade stays on the Monday cron plus
version tags. Both remain manual-dispatch lanes and stay outside the
required merge checks.

Co-authored-by: majinghe <majinghe@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-11-02 23:03:36 +08:00
Hauser Zhi 9d66e04ae3 test(e2e): honor namespace backpressure in mixed workload (#9122)
Give each mixed-workload request a bounded policy for the server's
explicit namespace lock timeout response and Retry-After advice. Keep
unrelated SDK failures and data mismatches immediately visible.

Preserve 24 workers, four rounds, cross-node checks and all retained
objects. Cover exhausted SDK retries, bodyless HEAD, fatal responses,
persistent contention and incorrect acknowledged bytes, and include the
new cases in the protected distributed profile inventory.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-02 23:02:22 +08:00
dependabot[bot] 12c58d25b5 chore(deps): bump the dependencies group across 1 directory with 5 updates (#9113)
* chore(deps): bump the dependencies group across 1 directory with 5 updates

Bumps the dependencies group with 5 updates in the / directory:

| Package | From | To |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [pulsar](https://github.com/streamnative/pulsar-rs) | `6.9.0` | `6.9.1` |
| [arrow-array](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs) | `59.3.2` | `60.1.0` |
| [arrow-ipc](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs) | `59.3.2` | `60.1.0` |
| [arrow-schema](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs) | `59.3.2` | `60.1.0` |
| [parquet](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs) | `59.3.2` | `60.1.0` |



Updates `pulsar` from 6.9.0 to 6.9.1
- [Release notes](https://github.com/streamnative/pulsar-rs/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/streamnative/pulsar-rs/compare/v6.9.0...v6.9.1)

Updates `arrow-array` from 59.3.2 to 60.1.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs/compare/59.3.2...60.1.0)

Updates `arrow-ipc` from 59.3.2 to 60.1.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs/compare/59.3.2...60.1.0)

Updates `arrow-schema` from 59.3.2 to 60.1.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs/compare/59.3.2...60.1.0)

Updates `parquet` from 59.3.2 to 60.1.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/apache/arrow-rs/compare/59.3.2...60.1.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: arrow-array
  dependency-version: 60.1.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
  dependency-group: dependencies
- dependency-name: arrow-ipc
  dependency-version: 60.1.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
  dependency-group: dependencies
- dependency-name: arrow-schema
  dependency-version: 60.1.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
  dependency-group: dependencies
- dependency-name: parquet
  dependency-version: 60.1.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
  dependency-group: dependencies
- dependency-name: pulsar
  dependency-version: 6.9.1
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: dependencies
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

* chore(deps): update dependencies and pin pulsar 6.9.0

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* chore(deps): ignore pulsar 6.9 updates

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Hauser <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-02 23:01:55 +08:00
Ramakrishna Chilaka 1ac1d883f4 perf(ecstore): shard disk path lock registries with SWAR byte keys (#9127) 2026-11-02 23:00:48 +08:00
GatewayJ 45ba33291a fix(ecstore): release retained file descriptor cache invalidations (#9112)
* fix(ecstore): release retained descriptor cache invalidations

* test(ecstore): await descriptor cleanup after invalidation
2026-11-02 10:56:08 +00:00
hector 636eded277 ci(validation): resolve the newest nightly build on scheduled sweeps (#9114)
* ci(validation): resolve the newest nightly build on scheduled sweeps

The first scheduled sweep failed at candidate resolution: a schedule
carries no workflow inputs and resolve_functional_candidate.py only
derives a build from a workflow_run payload, so the empty
BUILD_RUN_ID crashed int(). Look up the newest successful
nightly-gnu run explicitly when the inputs are empty and feed it to
the resolver. Also downgrade the evidence artifact to
if-no-files-found: warn so an early infra failure does not cascade
into a second red step.

* ci(validation): read the resolver chain envelope correctly

CHAIN_OUTPUT is the chain envelope {schema, run_id, attempt,
workflow_sha, testing_sha, candidate}; the manifest lives under
candidate.manifest and the testing sha at the top level.

* ci(validation): sweep harness fixes from the first live run

- ssh -n in the inter-case cleanup loop: plain ssh consumed the case
  list from the loop's stdin, so the first dispatch executed only one
  of the twelve selected cases.
- Provide the managed Python 3.12 runtime for pool/ilm/replication
  cases, mirroring the chain validation job (pool.status reported
  INFRA_ERROR after its assertions passed; the missing runtime is the
  prime suspect).
- Record the auto-testing sha in the report step environment.
- Retain the last case's evidence tree in the sweep artifact so gate
  verdicts like INFRA_ERROR can be diagnosed from the run itself.

* ci(validation): install sweep Python client dependencies

Scheduled sweeps failed pool.status before any assertion because
pool_behavior.py exits when boto3 is missing. Install the auto-testing
validation requirements into a per-run virtualenv and put it on PATH,
matching the functional chain, so case scripts can import the client.

Co-authored-by: hector <majinghe@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: hector <majinghe@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-11-02 08:34:13 +00:00
Hauser Zhi ed4099ebe1 chore(deps): update crates and fix storage CI regressions (#9111)
* chore(deps): refresh crates and adopt openidconnect 4.1

Use published OIDC/OAuth2 releases and reject malformed HMAC signature
lengths before upstream verification. Refresh workspace and fuzz locks,
and advance the local zstd compatibility patch to 0.13.4 while retaining
the fixed 0.14.3 codec backend.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* chore(deps): refresh compatible lockfile resolutions

Resolve Prost build and derive dependencies with itertools 0.14 and
prefer windows-sys 0.61.2 within the existing supported version ranges.
Retain all package versions, sources and checksums.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* test(connect): separate cleanup checks from short probe windows

Use the functional measurement budget for the cleanup HTTP fixture so
setup and measured I/O can finish before checking delete status handling.
Exercise both normal scheduling and an in-flight PUT clock advance, and
include target classification in unexpected-failure diagnostics.

Retain the cleanup deadline, outer timeout and delete-stage assertions.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* test(ecstore): isolate stalled multipart disk timeouts

Apply the short injected timeout only to the deliberately stalled disk.
Healthy disks retain their normal operation budgets, while logical lock,
physical owner, immediate CopyObject and final shard assertions remain.

Keep overrides scoped across cloned and reconnected handles, preserve
shorter caller deadlines and explicit zero timeouts, and report drive
health when the real CopyObject assertion fails.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(rebalance): retry metadata write lock quorum admission

Recognize typed write-lock quorum failures for rebalance.bin within the
existing bounded metadata admission retry policy. Each attempt must
acquire quorum before loading or saving metadata; data writes are not
replayed by this retry.

Cover recovered and persistent quorum failures, cancellation after a
failed attempt, and rejection of unrelated resource or read-lock errors.

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-02 06:49:24 +00:00
Boyi (Elliot) Li 3a1fac16e3 feat(tls): add opt-in fips feature for aws-lc-rs and rustls (#9084)
Add an opt-in `fips` Cargo feature to `rustfs` and `rustfs-tls-runtime`
that enables `rustls/fips` and `tokio-rustls/fips` (activating
`aws-lc-rs/fips` / `aws-lc-fips-sys` and `rustls-webpki/aws-lc-rs-fips`).

When compiled with `--features fips`, `startup_runtime_hooks` installs
`rustls::crypto::default_fips_provider()` as the process-wide default
crypto provider and asserts `provider.fips()` at startup.

Also lock `aws-lc-fips-sys v0.14.4` in `Cargo.lock`, allow the `OpenSSL`
license on `aws-lc-fips-sys` in `deny.toml`, and update
`docs/operations/kms-cryptographic-compliance.md` to document the scope
of `-p rustfs --features fips` vs. `rustfs-crypto`.

Co-authored-by: hector <42570491+majinghe@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-11-02 04:27:05 +00:00
Hauser Zhi b00e85f1a4 test(filemeta): cover visible version after tier cleanup (#9115)
Characterize how scanner metadata decoding and object listing handle a leading free version and a later delete marker.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-02 03:59:27 +00:00
Hauser Zhi ecbddc188a docs(scanner): define prefix statistics contract (#9116)
Define the scope, authority, coverage, persistence, and resource guarantees needed before scanner-derived current-object statistics can be enabled.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-02 02:43:28 +00:00
Chris An 2d63931bba fix(test): use available Docker privileges in OIDC live gate (#9109) 2026-11-02 09:03:15 +08:00
Ramakrishna Chilaka d429c6f792 perf(ecstore,rio,utils): accelerate MD5 ETag hashing and SWAR disk path checks (#9110) 2026-11-02 01:02:26 +08:00
hector e494dc2b4b ci(validation): sweep the migrated canonical validation cases nightly (#9107)
* ci(validation): sweep the migrated canonical validation cases nightly

The canonical release-validation cases migrated into auto-testing by
rustfs/auto-testing#113 (66 implemented, all non-heal) currently run
only through the manual validation flow; the last fleet executions
stopped on 2026-10-27 and nothing schedules them. Add a scheduled
validation sweep that closes the gap:

- nightly at 19:30 UTC (after the functional chain settles), rotating
  windows of the implemented catalog cases so the whole catalog is
  covered roughly weekly, with a bounded batch per night
- workflow_dispatch for a single case (--case), one module (--module),
  or an explicit batch (--limit), mirroring how the lanes are testable
  standalone
- fleet admission through functional_environment enter/finish with the
  same quarantine discipline as the lanes, inter-case node cleanup,
  per-case logs + reports retained as a sweep artifact
- a markdown sweep report uploaded to rustfs/dashboard under
  functional-reports/validation/ so the cases appear next to the lane
  reports, plus an alert-on-failure job for scheduled runs
- heal.* cases stay on the interactive validation flow: many need the
  reviewed native/tool collectors built by separate validation-tools
  runs before fleet execution

The registry gains the workflow responsibility (monitor: workflow,
max-age 60h so the watchdog notices a dead sweep) and the wiring test
baseline count moves with it.

Verified locally: check_wiring, check_test_wiring, test_validation_registry
(9/9), test_functional_chain + test_functional_chain_health +
test_security_workflow (99/99).

* ci(validation): group the sweep report by catalog module

The validation cases cover distinct areas (pool lifecycle, ILM
expiration, bucket/site replication, kms, data services, identity,
s3 compatibility), so a flat case table hides the category breakdown.
Render one section per catalog module with its own case table and a
Subtotal line, and keep the single grand - Total:/- PASS:/- FAIL:
block for the dashboard overview parser. Subtotals deliberately use
a different bullet prefix so the overview regexes cannot mistake a
module subtotal for the grand total.

* ci(validation): sweep the eight planned cases whose executors exist

The planned catalog entries are not all unimplemented: all eight
(kms.sse-kms-round-trip, tiering.transition-and-restore,
events.delivery, audit.request-correlation, iam.policy-enforcement,
oidc.login-and-session, s3.basic-object-round-trip and
scanner.usage-convergence) have dedicated executors routed in
run_validation_case.sh and live PASS evidence recorded in the
migration map. Widen the sweep filter to include them: the rotating
nightly batch now covers 74 cases (66 implemented + these 8), and the
fresh evidence each sweep produces feeds their acceptance review.
heal.* procedure-ready cases remain excluded - their executors need
the reviewed native/tool collectors built by separate
validation-tools runs before fleet execution.

---------

Co-authored-by: Hauser Zhi <housemecn@gmail.com>
2026-11-01 21:53:00 +08:00
Hauser Zhi 2b7c927ee8 perf(s3): streamline conditional multipart preflight (#9099)
* perf(s3): streamline conditional multipart preflight

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* test(e2e): isolate mc mirror fixture in full suite

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* test(connect): isolate cleanup deadline fixtures

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* test(ecstore): avoid lock cleanup refcount race

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): defer decommission lookup lock loss

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
2026-11-01 18:59:57 +08:00
Hauser Zhi 647846956f chore(deps): update flake.lock (#9108)
Flake lock file updates:

• Updated input 'nixpkgs':
    'github:NixOS/nixpkgs/674a202' (2026-10-24)
  → 'github:NixOS/nixpkgs/a078812' (2026-10-31)
• Updated input 'rust-overlay':
    'github:oxalica/rust-overlay/5b9f119' (2026-10-24)
  → 'github:oxalica/rust-overlay/6ecf534' (2026-10-31)
2026-11-01 06:26:39 +00:00
GatewayJ 04690f7da5 fix(s3-tables): clean empty catalogs and cache registration reads (#9063)
* fix(s3-tables): clean up empty tables and parallelize catalog reads

* fix(s3-tables): bound catalog registration index reads

* fix(s3-tables): cache validated registration ownership in memory
2026-11-01 04:49:50 +00:00
Ramakrishna Chilaka 3c0829049d perf(ecstore): optimize multipart commit, delete receipts, and fsync (#9105)
* perf(ecstore): fuse multipart commit, cache active upload heads, and scale fsync workers (#9077)

- Cache active multipart upload heads, committed part records, and per-part
  transaction state in ACTIVE_MULTIPART_SOURCE_HEADS with invalidation on
  mutation, retirement, abort, and delete paths.
- Fuse destination metadata preparation into MultipartFusedCommitOutcome,
  coalesce prepared metadata writes before sync_data(), and gate direct
  local part transaction settlement on disk.is_local().
- Retain quorum commit receipt publication before physical delete cleanup
  using PREPARED_DELETE_RECEIPTS, batch TARGET and PREPARED syncs, and skip
  redundant pre-reservation directory syncs for inline deletes.
- Scale DiskBlockingLane::Fsync to 8 workers per disk with idle_workers
  accounting and bounded per-disk batch fairness so concurrent fsyncs
  coalesce in the filesystem journal.
- Cache verified small stripe proof records in VERIFIED_STRIPE_RECORDS while
  recomputing payload digests on every read.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Copilot-Session: d85aaf47-2a4b-4c2c-97a3-dbe8c7717e2a

* fix(ecstore): align test/prod commit and cache paths and hold source lock across cache publication

* fix(ecstore): preserve fused commit cancellation/panic semantics and retire excess idle fsync workers

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot-Session: d85aaf47-2a4b-4c2c-97a3-dbe8c7717e2a

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Copilot-Session: d85aaf47-2a4b-4c2c-97a3-dbe8c7717e2a
2026-11-01 13:07:42 +08:00
Chris An 890a463218 test(e2e): stabilize mixed-version coordinator assertion against leader-lock refresh gaps (#9103)
Replace the immediate post-replacement leader identity comparison with a
polling stabilization loop (up to 20 x 500ms). A leader-lock refresh gap
during old-binary replacement can make leader() briefly observe a different
node; the loop waits for the measured new coordinator to be confirmed. A
persistent change to an old-binary node still fails with the observed
identity in the error message.

Removes the redundant immediate assertion that the stabilization loop
supersedes. Also consolidates the non-mixed leader/pid resolution to avoid
a double leader query.
2026-11-01 07:03:54 +08:00
Joep 25f45f6309 test(console): strengthen brotli buffer middleware test coverage (#9098)
Extend test_buffer_brotli_responses to verify body bytes are preserved
and Content-Length matches the exact body length.  Add two new cases:
non-brotli responses pass through unmodified, and a body stream error
strips Content-Encoding so clients do not attempt to decode an empty
body as brotli (covers the fix from #9085).
2026-11-01 05:10:43 +08:00
Ramakrishna Chilaka e3700614a1 perf(ecstore): optimize listing, versioned put, delete, and multipart (#9077) (#9094)
* perf(ecstore): optimize listing, versioned put, delete, and multipart (#9077)

- Buffer leaf object entries in LocalDisk::scan_dir and add zero-alloc
  FileMeta::buffers_match_strict, MetaCacheEntry::matches_strict_borrowed,
  and MetacacheReader::try_peek_buffered / skip_current for listing
- Add Linux PublicationRoot::open_directory_and_readonly_child and
  os::has_non_data_dir_entry_lazy_from_fd with RawDir stack buffer
- Fuse local versioned PUT overwrite commit, recoverable DELETE
  preparation/settlement, and multipart publication while preserving
  crash-consistency and fsync ordering invariants

Fixes #9077

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Copilot-Session: d85aaf47-2a4b-4c2c-97a3-dbe8c7717e2a

* fix(app): use multipart storage domain facade

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(ecstore): remove redundant multipart borrow

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Chris An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Hauser Zhi <housemecn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Copilot-Session: d85aaf47-2a4b-4c2c-97a3-dbe8c7717e2a
2026-10-31 16:26:52 +00:00
Chris An d4ab7704b3 fix(scanner): rebuild unreadable usage floor instead of stopping leader iteration (#9101)
backlog#2918 retires the usage floor as a quota proof. After dual-corruption
recovery has been attempted, an unreadable floor is reported and rebuilt
through a CAS overwrite with a bootstrap marker rather than stopping the
leader iteration for a supervisor retry. Transient I/O errors that prevent
reading the floor revision fall through to the existing stop-and-retry path.

The identity-less floor regression from rustfs/rustfs#8670 now verifies
automatic rebuild and recovery instead of bounded backoff.
2026-11-01 01:38:39 +08:00
Chris An 422e724051 fix(ecstore): clear stale BucketMetadataSys on ECStore drop (#9097)
When sequential test fixtures share the bootstrap InstanceContext, the
BucketMetadataSys stores a Weak<ECStore> to avoid a reference cycle. The
ExpiryState holds an Arc<ECStore> that keeps the store alive past the
test's own Arc drop; the next fixture's resize_workers releases it and
the weak goes dangling before init_bucket_metadata_sys installs a fresh
BucketMetadataSys. Any object_store() call in that window panicked.

Add Drop for ECStore that clears the context's BucketMetadataSys slot
when its weak handle is stale, so the next fixture always finds a clean
slot. Fixes the heal absence_receipt_regressions and dangling_grace
test failures under sequential execution.
2026-10-31 22:25:08 +08:00
overtrue e0bf54197d fix(ecstore): clear stale BucketMetadataSys on ECStore drop
When sequential test fixtures share the bootstrap InstanceContext, the
BucketMetadataSys stores a Weak<ECStore> to avoid a reference cycle. The
ExpiryState holds an Arc<ECStore> that keeps the store alive past the
test's own Arc drop; the next fixture's resize_workers releases it and
the weak goes dangling before init_bucket_metadata_sys installs a fresh
BucketMetadataSys. Any object_store() call in that window panicked.

Add Drop for ECStore that clears the context's BucketMetadataSys slot
when its weak handle is stale, so the next fixture always finds a clean
slot. Fixes the heal absence_receipt_regressions and dangling_grace
test failures under sequential execution.
2026-10-31 21:58:51 +08:00
Hauser Zhi b4af43c884 fix(s3): guard conditional multipart pool errors (#9092)
* test(s3): cover conditional writes over delete markers

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* perf(s3): avoid repeated ETag regex compilation

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* perf(s3): borrow conditional write headers

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* fix(s3): reject conditional completion on unknown pool

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* test(ci): update e2e smoke selection digest

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>

Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

* test(ci): update full E2E selection for marker regression

Co-Authored-By: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Chris An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-10-31 20:48:34 +08:00
Chris An 1cb4c0ebe2 ci: stamp the plan contract and rename the workspace lint-and-build key (#9095)
* ci: gate the plan on a contract marker

A base planner predating the NIGHTLY_JOBS split still emits the old required
set, and the strict verifier would reject it. Select now stamps plan_contract=2
and the workflow refuses any plan without the current marker, falling back to
the full matrix, so a stale base planner can neither authorize the new narrower
selection nor force a job the new workflow no longer schedules.

* ci: rename the workspace lint-and-build job key and evidence path

The job key test-and-lint named a job that runs no tests: it does Clippy, the
test-binary archive, doctests and the log-rule anchors, while the tests live in
workspace-tests. Anyone reading needs: [test-and-lint] would conclude tests had
already gated that dependency. The key becomes workspace-lint-and-build to
match its display name, and the shared evidence directory becomes
artifacts/workspace so the path stops asserting the same thing. The aggregate's
display name stays Test and Lint because that is the live ruleset check
context. ci-gates.md also stops attributing the ECStore test run to the wrong
job.
2026-10-31 17:41:02 +08:00
Chris An e5563e6004 feat(release): gate publication on candidate certification (R01) (#9090)
Add a fail-closed release certification path so incomplete or substituted
evidence blocks every official publication exit. scripts/release/release_gate.py
validates the versioned release-validation plan, the candidate identity and the
G01 evidence-envelope set, then re-checks promoted bytes against the passed
list. build/docker/package/helm publication jobs require that certification and
stage artifacts before promoting identical bytes.
2026-10-31 16:53:18 +08:00
Chris An 0a72b29a34 chore(e2e): isolated harness event drill (close after evidence) (#9089)
chore(e2e): isolated harness drill
2026-10-31 16:52:19 +08:00
Chris An 51275cb7d8 ci: move specialized lanes off the pull-request path (#9093)
Connect Feature Boundaries, real io_uring and the rio-v2, Swift, SFTP and
HTTP/3 feature lanes no longer gate a merge. They run only in the scheduled
and manual full-validation runs, which report a regression within a day; on
the pull-request path they bought no earlier signal worth the runner
occupancy (Connect alone measured 53.5 median minutes and occasionally set
the wall). Workspace lint and tests, the short core contract, the debug
build, E2E smoke and the S3 lanes stay required on PRs and merge groups.
2026-10-31 16:52:03 +08:00
Chris An 3bf270b49f ci: record CI01 measurements, drill evidence and fix the OIDC live gate (#9091)
* ci: retain CI01 timing sample and fix the OIDC live gate tool

Record the measured PR feedback and runner occupancy for the CI plan's CI01
criterion, including the honest gap between the experimental targets and the
sampled medians, and replace the awscurl dependency in the live Keycloak gate
with the AWS CLI so the security suite runs on PEP 668 managed fleets.

* docs(testing): attach live run evidence to the event-drill index
2026-10-31 05:10:38 +00:00
Chris An d8d064bd18 docs(testing): index event-class drills and retained CI evidence (#9088) 2026-10-31 11:21:46 +08:00
Hauser Zhi e5653ca055 chore(deps): refresh workspace dependencies (#9080)
Run cargo update --verbose and cargo upgrade --verbose twice from the
current main baseline. Upgrade the Tonic family to 0.14.9, Redis to 1.8.1,
sysinfo to 0.40.1, and hotpath to 0.30.2 with compatible transitive updates.

Synchronize the standalone fuzz lockfile and retain its PKCS#1 rc.4
resolution for compatibility with pinned RSA rc.18.

Co-authored-by: heihutu <heihutu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zhi22915 <qiuzgang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Chris An <anzhengchao@gmail.com>
2026-10-31 10:36:21 +08:00
Chris An 6413a11889 test(heal): align cleanup tests with removal-disabled heals (#9087) 2026-10-31 10:35:56 +08:00
Chris An 9e4ea9fdd1 fix(console): strip Content-Encoding on brotli buffer failure (#9085)
When to_bytes fails in buffer_brotli_responses the error path replaced
the body with empty while keeping Content-Encoding: br, producing a
malformed response (empty body claiming brotli encoding). Strip the
header and log a warning so the degradation is visible and the client
does not attempt to decode a missing body.
2026-10-31 09:02:10 +08:00
Joep 1a841fb7c7 fix(console): buffer brotli responses to set Content-Length for Firefox (#9076) (#9079)
tower_http's CompressionLayer streams brotli via Transfer-Encoding: chunked
without a Content-Length header. Firefox's incremental brotli decoder aborts
on this combination (NS_BINDING_ERROR), making the web console unusable in
Firefox. Chrome and Safari buffer the full body before decoding so they are
unaffected.

Add a thin middleware (buffer_brotli_responses) that runs after CompressionLayer,
collects the complete body for any brotli response that lacks Content-Length, and
re-emits it with the correct length header.
2026-10-31 08:07:28 +08:00
Chris An b8ee0301e9 feat(scanner): fair bucket service across restarts and budgeted first enumeration (#9083)
* feat(scanner): bound first-build enumeration with the cycle budget

Charge raw directory entries and their name bytes, and let one bucket scan hold a child budget that stops its own token while charging the cycle. A count budget also bounds one directory listing, so a wide first build can no longer finish a full read_dir before the first object is charged.

The new stop reason maps onto the persisted Directories variant so older readers keep decoding checkpoints. A directory with queued children keeps its index until they end, and every index on the active walk path is saved as an optional map field: losing either one would recharge its replay and stop a fixed budget from advancing.

* feat(scanner): keep bucket service order across restarts

Save each set's first-in-first-out bucket order as an optional map field of its usage cache, including after an incomplete cycle, which otherwise writes nothing. Durable age now outranks the dirty-first and leader-local cohort orders, which only break its ties, so a restart cannot hand the budget back to the same first buckets. Failed turns add visible debt without moving a bucket forward; a budget stop or a resource veto adds none. A bucket that spends its quantum and saves forward motion returns to the queue tail within the cycle.

The order authorizes nothing: another movement epoch or a corrupt value starts a new one, and a recreated bucket joins as a new arrival.

* test(scanner): cover quantum handoff and saved service order

Run the real worker queue with injected bucket shares and verify a spent bucket yields to waiters, a share without durable motion ends its turn, and the saved order keeps certified coverage while rejecting older owners.

* docs(scanner): describe budgeted first build and service order

* test(scanner): pin index retention and requeue motion

Bound the nested restart fixture tightly enough that dropping a directory index fails it, and cover a repeated share whose frontier never moves.

* fix(scanner): keep service generations and owner stops intact

Queue a new bucket behind waiters but ahead of buckets that already had a turn, matching the leader-local cohort, and keep the set cache untouched when the owner was cancelled so an interrupted cycle cannot advance its revision. The order holds one record per inventory bucket, like the set cache's entries, so a truncating bound that could starve the long-waiting buckets is removed. Publish the incomplete scope before saving so a contended lock cannot delay it.

* ci(e2e): refresh the full selection digests

* fix(scanner): correct a comment spelling

* fix(scanner): separate service debt from vetoes and stale owners

Keep a resource veto and a remote count-budget stop out of failure debt,
settle the claim before a requeue exposes the bucket to another worker, and
stamp the service order with its leader so an older owner cannot replace it
after an incomplete save. The checkpoint fixture's budget now covers both
service orders.

* fix(ecstore): create parents before resource-scoped writes

#9064 moved parent creation into the lazy writer, so a write that holds a
resource unit reached the native open without its parent directory and
failed with FileNotFound on nested paths.

* fix(e2e): retry SlowDown codes during upgrade write readiness

The rolling-upgrade readiness probe only retried 503 ServiceUnavailable,
so a transient 503 SlowDown from a still-recovering node failed the
four_node_rolling_upgrade test immediately. Accept SlowDown and
SlowDownRead alongside ServiceUnavailable, matching the existing chaos
test transient-error set.
2026-10-31 07:57:18 +08:00
620 changed files with 83021 additions and 7708 deletions
+2 -2
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@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
sha256-linux=686dcc075e41a75dde3d37e5bd0393d016469f02f83aa3508f92bfc17f26a4d4
sha256-darwin=686dcc075e41a75dde3d37e5bd0393d016469f02f83aa3508f92bfc17f26a4d4
sha256-linux=348fa5eed9ae58962c06b33283ff4f15122cff97bce9b4eb1e3ffcb227264b0b
sha256-darwin=348fa5eed9ae58962c06b33283ff4f15122cff97bce9b4eb1e3ffcb227264b0b
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
sha256-darwin=67251cb7d9978d38e899268cac4d7898297ff7e5b5c48c9c1546dc760b93568d
sha256-linux=673da76c2e5710c4622fe2fa32d2b297730895769487fcf1152ee1c2366f32f4
sha256-darwin=219ac11e720b3f54dfee4d5d5e95171785ba159b2fe01db3037a8f5061c1ad32
sha256-linux=2d34698cc8ec52d5b6c37ac612919a1d21f36cd56a1af539a7522a4eea518e26
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
sha256-darwin=3814cdde8cacf4187e18188d342ed70931cc32e268e42e5bb438d565bb4d0f81
sha256-linux=663025a80273579f95ae3f49af02c0afcbfce94df09701c360a13e607b7637db
sha256-darwin=e84e04208f19dc0596b10d4d1b799ce43d6cc431415902f9c5458aa8232bc2d8
sha256-linux=1f9c7add72c44d1c12ef4ac050bb7917431be657c0c90b29f70c3df56f8bbae3
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
sha256=e9dc896774122a304e2b8b90f28c82d4d4e0af8ded36a82b147b30945ec994e3
sha256=5bdd4c2eadbc41625ae3184fff34062e000d328108436259b2b7c4fe2531ecaf
+2
View File
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ script-tests: ## Run shell script tests
./scripts/test_build_rustfs_options.sh
./scripts/test_docker_runtime_timezone.sh
./scripts/test_entrypoint_credentials.sh
./scripts/test_entrypoint_directories.sh
./scripts/test_internode_grpc_ab_bench.sh
./scripts/test_object_batch_bench_enhanced.sh
./scripts/test_package_service_scripts.sh
@@ -70,6 +71,7 @@ script-tests: ## Run shell script tests
$(RUSTFS_PYTHON_BIN) ./scripts/test_nightly_candidate.py
$(RUSTFS_PYTHON_BIN) ./scripts/test_functional_chain.py
$(RUSTFS_PYTHON_BIN) ./scripts/test_functional_chain_health.py
$(RUSTFS_PYTHON_BIN) ./scripts/test_repro_rejoin_readiness_docker.py
$(RUSTFS_PYTHON_BIN) ./scripts/test_validation_registry.py
$(RUSTFS_PYTHON_BIN) ./scripts/test_inspect_validation_runner.py
$(RUSTFS_PYTHON_BIN) ./scripts/test_retain_validation_evidence.py
+10 -4
View File
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ test-group = 'embedded-test-ports'
# processes cannot exhaust those budgets. Keep deadlines and assertions intact.
# The short HTTP fixtures are tracked in rustfs/backlog#2714.
[[profile.default.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs) & (binary(/^connect_registration$/) | binary(connect_inventory) | binary(connect_perf_drive) | (binary(connect_perf_client) & test(=configured_proxy_and_direct_endpoint_failures_are_distinct)) | (binary(connect_perf_object) & test(/^(real_rustfs_endpoint_and_production_cli_support_bounded_get_and_put|cleanup_uses_a_budget_independent_of_the_measurement_window|oversized_response_is_rejected_without_buffering_it)$/)))'
filter = 'package(rustfs) & (binary(/^connect_registration$/) | binary(connect_inventory) | binary(connect_perf_drive) | (binary(connect_perf_client) & test(=configured_proxy_and_direct_endpoint_failures_are_distinct)) | (binary(connect_perf_object) & test(/^(real_rustfs_endpoint_and_production_cli_support_bounded_get_and_put|cleanup_uses_a_budget_independent_of_the_measurement_window|cleanup_accepts_missing_object_and_still_deletes_the_bucket|cleanup_diagnostics_identify_each_disconnected_transport_stage|cleanup_diagnostics_identify_each_failed_http_stage_without_private_context|cleanup_diagnostics_identify_timeouts_without_resetting_the_shared_deadline|oversized_response_is_rejected_without_buffering_it)$/)))'
threads-required = "num-test-threads"
# This cancellation probe hashes the serving executable before acquiring its
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ filter = 'package(rustfs) & (binary(/^embedded.*_test$/) | binary(admin_diagnost
test-group = 'embedded-test-ports'
[[profile.ci.overrides]]
filter = 'package(rustfs) & (binary(/^connect_registration$/) | binary(connect_inventory) | binary(connect_perf_drive) | (binary(connect_perf_client) & test(=configured_proxy_and_direct_endpoint_failures_are_distinct)) | (binary(connect_perf_object) & test(/^(real_rustfs_endpoint_and_production_cli_support_bounded_get_and_put|cleanup_uses_a_budget_independent_of_the_measurement_window|oversized_response_is_rejected_without_buffering_it)$/)))'
filter = 'package(rustfs) & (binary(/^connect_registration$/) | binary(connect_inventory) | binary(connect_perf_drive) | (binary(connect_perf_client) & test(=configured_proxy_and_direct_endpoint_failures_are_distinct)) | (binary(connect_perf_object) & test(/^(real_rustfs_endpoint_and_production_cli_support_bounded_get_and_put|cleanup_uses_a_budget_independent_of_the_measurement_window|cleanup_accepts_missing_object_and_still_deletes_the_bucket|cleanup_diagnostics_identify_each_disconnected_transport_stage|cleanup_diagnostics_identify_each_failed_http_stage_without_private_context|cleanup_diagnostics_identify_timeouts_without_resetting_the_shared_deadline|oversized_response_is_rejected_without_buffering_it)$/)))'
threads-required = "num-test-threads"
# Preserve the cancellation probe's startup budget and assertions in CI too.
@@ -701,7 +701,7 @@ test-group = 'ecstore-serial-flaky'
[profile.e2e-smoke]
default-filter = """
package(e2e_test) & (
test(/^(delete_marker_migration_semantics|version_id_regression|list_objects_v2_pagination|list_object_versions_regression|list_objects_duplicates|list_buckets_double_slash|list_buckets_auth|list_buckets_iam_filter|leading_slash_key|special_chars|create_bucket_region|delete_objects_versioning|head_object_consistency|head_object_range|copy_object_metadata|copy_object_tagging|copy_source_invalid_date|content_encoding|compression|multipart_storage_class|storage_class_capability|ssec_copy|anonymous_access|bucket_policy_check|presigned_negative|negative_sigv4|admin_auth|notification_webhook|tls_hot_reload|console_smoke|admin_iam_crud|admin_pools|sts_query_compat|data_usage)_test::|^fake_s3_target::/)
test(/^(delete_marker_migration_semantics|version_id_regression|list_objects_v2_pagination|list_object_versions_regression|list_objects_duplicates|list_buckets_double_slash|list_buckets_auth|list_buckets_iam_filter|leading_slash_key|special_chars|create_bucket_region|delete_objects_versioning|head_object_consistency|head_object_range|copy_object_metadata|copy_object_tagging|copy_source_invalid_date|content_encoding|compression|multipart_storage_class|multipart_upload_id|storage_class_capability|ssec_copy|anonymous_access|bucket_policy_check|presigned_negative|negative_sigv4|admin_auth|notification_webhook|tls_hot_reload|console_smoke|admin_iam_crud|admin_pools|sts_query_compat|data_usage)_test::|^fake_s3_target::/)
| test(/^replication_extension_test::(test_replication_check_succeeds_with_remote_target|test_replication_check_rejects_target_without_object_lock|test_set_remote_target_rejects_unversioned_source_bucket|test_replication_check_rejects_unversioned_source_bucket|test_replication_check_rejects_missing_replication_config|test_replication_check_rejects_invalid_bucket|test_set_remote_target_rejects_same_bucket_on_same_deployment|test_set_remote_target_rejects_unversioned_target_bucket|test_set_remote_target_update_requires_arn|test_set_remote_target_update_rejects_missing_target|test_set_remote_target_rejects_invalid_target_url|test_set_remote_target_rejects_self_signed_https_target_without_skip_tls_verify|test_set_remote_target_rejects_private_ca_https_target_without_ca_cert_pem|test_list_remote_targets_rejects_empty_bucket|test_list_remote_targets_rejects_invalid_bucket|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_missing_target|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_missing_arn|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_invalid_bucket|test_remove_remote_target_rejects_target_used_by_replication|test_delete_bucket_replication_removes_remote_target)$/)
| test(/^reliant::lifecycle::/)
| test(/^conditional_delete_objects_test::/)
@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ slow-timeout = { period = "120s", terminate-after = 12, grace-period = "10s" }
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# e2e-distributed profile — 4-node 4-disk Actions suite
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Storage-sensitive PR / nightly / dispatch lane owned by
# Nightly and manual-dispatch lane owned by
# .github/workflows/e2e-distributed.yml.
# Each case starts four rustfs processes (and for site replication, two
# clusters). Upgrade cases also require RUSTFS_UPGRADE_SOURCE_BINARY.
@@ -976,6 +976,12 @@ test-group = 'e2e-vault'
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & (test(/^list_objects_v2_pagination_test::tests::(test_list_objects_v2_delimiter_small_page_traverses_all|test_list_objects_v2_max_keys_above_limit_returns_token|test_list_objects_v2_maxkeys_above_limit_with_delimiter)$/) | test(=reliant::tiering::test_hermetic_transition_restore_failure_expiry_and_retry))'
threads-required = "num-test-threads"
# The mc fixture uploads hundreds of objects concurrently before measuring listing.
# Reserve the runner so other server fixtures do not starve its disk operations.
[[profile.e2e-full.overrides]]
filter = 'package(e2e_test) & test(=mc_mirror_small_bucket_test::test_mc_mirror_small_bucket_completes_without_list_timeout)'
threads-required = "num-test-threads"
# Fixed, small contract for every executable server change. These existing
# scenarios exercise write/read, anonymous denial and retained bytes on restart.
[profile.core-contract]
+77
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
{
"schema_version": 1,
"plan_id": "rustfs-release-validation",
"description": "Versioned certification plan for every public RustFS release exit (rustfs/backlog#2662, R01). preview, prerelease and stable all require this explicit plan. Scripts/release/release_gate.py fail-closes publication on any missing, duplicate, stale, substituted or non-PASS required item.",
"release_types": ["preview", "prerelease", "stable"],
"targets": [
{"os": "linux", "arch": "x86_64", "abi": "musl"},
{"os": "linux", "arch": "aarch64", "abi": "musl"},
{"os": "linux", "arch": "x86_64", "abi": "gnu"},
{"os": "linux", "arch": "aarch64", "abi": "gnu"},
{"os": "macos", "arch": "aarch64", "abi": "none"},
{"os": "windows", "arch": "x86_64", "abi": "msvc"}
],
"targets_basis": "Platform matrix of .github/workflows/build.yml (prepare-platform-matrix). gnu and macOS targets build with the pyroscope feature; musl and Windows targets build with no extra features.",
"features": ["pyroscope"],
"trusted_workflows": [
{"repository": "rustfs/s3chaos", "workflow_id": "release-gate.yml"}
],
"trusted_workflows_basis": "The shared evidence envelope producer lives in rustfs/s3chaos (G01, fault/release_gate.rs) and its plan/live split workflow is .github/workflows/release-gate.yml there. Only results from these identities may enter a release certification; PR-uploaded JSON never gains release authority. R02 must extend this list when additional verifier workflows land, never widen it to untrusted sources.",
"lanes": [
{
"lane": "identity",
"harness_repository": "rustfs/s3chaos",
"harness_sha": "9a48f55c1d6d58ce63a8fb1ea7317e024f32f11d",
"harness_basis": "Fixed G01 evidence-envelope producer revision (rustfs/s3chaos PR #102 head recorded in rustfs/backlog#2658). R02 re-pins this when the live verifier ships.",
"timeout_seconds": 1800,
"environment_capabilities": ["process-exec"],
"cases": ["artifact-identity", "startup"],
"applies_to": {
"release_types": ["preview", "prerelease", "stable"],
"platforms": "all"
},
"applies_basis": "Artifact identity and startup checks are mandatory for every release type, preview included, on every shipped target (rustfs/backlog#2662 frozen design item 5)."
},
{
"lane": "upgrade",
"harness_repository": "rustfs/s3chaos",
"harness_sha": "9a48f55c1d6d58ce63a8fb1ea7317e024f32f11d",
"harness_basis": "Same fixed envelope producer as the identity lane; the workflow SHA and the product build SHA are bound separately and need not be equal.",
"timeout_seconds": 5400,
"environment_capabilities": ["process-exec", "previous-release-artifact"],
"cases": [
"direct-upgrade",
"mixed-version-upgrade",
"bucket-config-upgrade",
"bucket-config-rollback",
"multipart-layout-upgrade",
"multipart-layout-baseline"
],
"cases_basis": "Case IDs of the pinned previous-release matrix in .github/workflows/e2e-upgrade.yml (source.version/asset/sha256 and the case list mapped there).",
"applies_to": {
"release_types": ["prerelease", "stable"],
"platforms": [{"os": "linux", "arch": "x86_64", "abi": "gnu"}]
},
"applies_basis": "preview releases use the pre-declared smaller set (identity lane only). The upgrade lane is only exercised on linux-x86_64-gnu, the platform of the pinned source assets."
}
],
"upgrade_sources": {
"basis": "Exactly the two previous-release sources pinned in .github/workflows/e2e-upgrade.yml are exercised today (source.version / source.asset / source.sha256). No other N-1/N-2 compatibility is claimed, and these digests are not inferred from tags.",
"sources": [
{
"version": "1.0.1",
"role": "N-1",
"artifact_name": "rustfs-linux-x86_64-gnu-v1.0.1.zip",
"artifact_sha256": "9742e183cb0dfb0d48fa909797af572fe47b7f827569036baa4156e0d3958ee5"
},
{
"version": "1.0.0-rc.5",
"role": "N-2",
"artifact_name": "rustfs-linux-x86_64-gnu-v1.0.0-rc.5.zip",
"artifact_sha256": "3ee8df71e8edcfada533be452c4135868f697bc515460ae97b027313eade7a3d"
}
],
"rollback_supported": false,
"rollback_basis": "Only the bucket-config-rollback case (rollback_to_previous_release_reads_current_bucket_metadata) is exercised. Full data-plane rollback is not certified and is never a default claim."
}
}
+33 -3
View File
@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ The following files in the project root are essential for Docker operations:
| File | Description | Usage |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **`docker-buildx.sh`** | **Multi-Arch Build Script**<br>Automates building and pushing Docker images for `amd64` and `arm64`. Supports release and dev channels. | `./docker-buildx.sh --push` |
| **`Dockerfile`** | **Production Image (Alpine)**<br>Lightweight image using musl libc. Downloads pre-built binaries from GitHub Releases. | `docker build -t rustfs:latest .` |
| **`Dockerfile.glibc`** | **Production Image (Ubuntu)**<br>Standard image using glibc. Useful if you need specific dynamic libraries. | `docker build -f Dockerfile.glibc .` |
| **`Dockerfile.source`** | **Development Image**<br>Builds RustFS from source code. Includes build tools. Ideal for local development and CI. | `docker build -f Dockerfile.source .` |
| **`Dockerfile`** | **Production Image (Alpine)**<br>Lightweight image using musl libc. Downloads verified RustFS and `rc` binaries from GitHub Releases and bundles `/etc/rustfs/bootstrap`. | `docker build -t rustfs:latest .` |
| **`Dockerfile.glibc`** | **Production Image (Ubuntu)**<br>Standard image using glibc. Includes the bundled bootstrap configuration. | `docker build -f Dockerfile.glibc .` |
| **`Dockerfile.source`** | **Development Image**<br>Builds RustFS from source code and bundles `rc` and the default bootstrap configuration. | `docker build -f Dockerfile.source .` |
### Docker Compose Configurations
@@ -110,6 +110,36 @@ docker compose up -d
---
## Docker Compose environment values
Use map syntax when quoting environment values in YAML:
```yaml
services:
rustfs:
image: rustfs/rustfs:latest
ports:
- "9000:9000"
- "9001:9001"
volumes:
- ./data:/data
- ./logs:/var/log/rustfs
environment:
RUSTFS_ADDRESS: ":9000"
RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ADDRESS: ":9001"
RUSTFS_CONSOLE_ENABLE: "true"
RUSTFS_OBS_LOGGER_LEVEL: error
RUSTFS_OBS_LOG_DIRECTORY: "/var/log/rustfs/"
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY: "${RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY:?Set RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY}"
RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY: "${RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY:?Set RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY}"
```
Create the host directories and grant the container user write access before starting this example; official images run as UID/GID `10001:10001`. Set both credential variables to your own values, then run `docker compose config` to inspect the resolved configuration locally before `docker compose up -d`. The resolved output includes credentials, so do not share it publicly.
With list syntax, use `- RUSTFS_OBS_LOG_DIRECTORY=/var/log/rustfs/` or quote the whole item as `- "RUSTFS_OBS_LOG_DIRECTORY=/var/log/rustfs/"`. Writing `- RUSTFS_OBS_LOG_DIRECTORY="/var/log/rustfs/"` passes the inner quotes literally, making this a relative path beginning with `"`, which can fail with `mkdir: cannot create directory '"': Permission denied`. This also applies to addresses and credentials: fix every affected list item, rather than only the log directory. The entrypoint preserves configured values, including literal quotes in valid paths and secrets.
---
## 🔧 Common Operations
### Cleaning Up
@@ -28,6 +28,15 @@ processors:
check_interval: 1s
limit_mib: 1024
spike_limit_mib: 256
transform/metrics:
error_mode: ignore
metric_statements:
# RustFS process metrics already expose process_pid as a metric label.
# Remove only the duplicate datapoint label and keep the shared resource
# process.pid available to sibling metrics and lock histograms.
- context: datapoint
statements:
- delete_key(attributes, "process_pid") where IsMatch(metric.name, "^rustfs_system_process_")
transform/logs:
error_mode: ignore
log_statements:
@@ -112,7 +121,7 @@ service:
exporters: [ otlp/tempo, otlp/jaeger ]
metrics:
receivers: [ otlp ]
processors: [ batch ]
processors: [ transform/metrics, memory_limiter, batch ]
exporters: [ prometheus ]
logs:
receivers: [ otlp ]
+40
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1.6
# Copyright 2026 RustFS Team
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0.
# A compatible native runtime with Python 3.11+, getent and stat is required by
# the isolated fixture's staging/provenance checks. This is a test image.
ARG RUNTIME_BASE=python:3.13-slim-trixie
FROM ${RUNTIME_BASE}
ARG SOURCE_REVISION
ARG BINARY_SHA256
ARG BUILD_PROFILE=dev
COPY rustfs /usr/bin/rustfs
RUN python3 - "$SOURCE_REVISION" "$BINARY_SHA256" "$BUILD_PROFILE" <<'PY'
import hashlib
import os
import re
import shutil
import sys
source, digest, profile = sys.argv[1:]
if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{40}", source):
raise SystemExit("invalid source revision")
if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", digest):
raise SystemExit("invalid binary digest")
if profile not in ("dev", "release"):
raise SystemExit("invalid build profile")
with open("/usr/bin/rustfs", "rb") as binary:
if hashlib.file_digest(binary, "sha256").hexdigest() != digest:
raise SystemExit("binary digest mismatch")
for tool in ("getent", "stat"):
if shutil.which(tool) is None:
raise SystemExit(f"missing runtime tool: {tool}")
os.chmod("/usr/bin/rustfs", 0o755)
PY
LABEL io.rustfs.repro.source_revision="${SOURCE_REVISION}" \
io.rustfs.repro.binary_sha256="${BINARY_SHA256}" \
io.rustfs.repro.build_profile="${BUILD_PROFILE}"
USER 10001:10001
ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/bin/rustfs"]
+2
View File
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ updates:
- "overtrue"
- "majinghe"
ignore:
- dependency-name: "pulsar"
versions: [ "6.9.x" ]
- dependency-name: "object_store"
versions: [ "0.13.x" ]
- dependency-name: "libunftp"
+28 -5
View File
@@ -296,6 +296,32 @@
"origin": "baseline",
"alert_contract": "scheduled-validation"
},
{
"workflow": ".github/workflows/rustfs-validation-sweep.yml",
"name": "RustFS Validation Sweep",
"roles": [
"periodic",
"manual"
],
"events": [
"schedule",
"workflow_dispatch"
],
"cadence": "nightly",
"timezone": "UTC",
"schedule": [
"30 19 * * *"
],
"owner": "@overtrue",
"policy": "active",
"monitor": "workflow",
"max_age_hours": 60,
"result_owner": "rustfs-validation-sweep.yml",
"disposition": "canonical validation cases executed in rotating batches",
"failure_owner": "workflow",
"origin": "baseline",
"alert_contract": "scheduled-validation"
},
{
"workflow": ".github/workflows/btf-prototype-reference.yml",
"name": "BTF prototype reference",
@@ -743,12 +769,10 @@
"workflow": ".github/workflows/e2e-distributed.yml",
"name": "e2e-distributed",
"roles": [
"pr",
"periodic",
"manual"
],
"events": [
"pull_request",
"workflow_dispatch",
"schedule"
],
@@ -823,12 +847,11 @@
"workflow": ".github/workflows/e2e-upgrade.yml",
"name": "Upgrade Compatibility",
"roles": [
"pr",
"periodic",
"manual"
"manual",
"release"
],
"events": [
"pull_request",
"push",
"schedule",
"workflow_dispatch"
+311 -5
View File
@@ -814,13 +814,18 @@ jobs:
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="$R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"
export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION="auto"
# Determine upload path based on build type
# Determine upload path based on build type. Release and prerelease
# builds only stage their bytes here: the official
# artifacts/rustfs/release/ path is written solely by the
# certification-gated promote-release-artifacts job, from these same
# staged objects. Development builds keep the uncertified dev channel
# and never touch official or latest channels.
if [[ "$BUILD_TYPE" == "development" ]]; then
R2_PATH="s3://${R2_BUCKET}/artifacts/rustfs/dev/"
echo "📤 Uploading development build to R2 dev directory"
else
R2_PATH="s3://${R2_BUCKET}/artifacts/rustfs/release/"
echo "📤 Uploading release build to R2 release directory"
R2_PATH="s3://${R2_BUCKET}/artifacts/rustfs/staging/${GITHUB_RUN_ID}/${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}/"
echo "📤 Staging release build for certification-gated promotion"
fi
# Upload all rustfs zip files to R2 using S3-compatible API
@@ -869,6 +874,221 @@ jobs:
echo "This run does not trigger Docker publishing."
fi
# Aggregate the parent candidate batch. This job always collects results and
# retains its evidence, including on failure, and every publication job
# below requires its success. Missing, stale, substituted or non-PASS
# evidence fails closed here: only the trusted verification sources
# (rustfs/s3chaos release-gate envelopes, rustfs/backlog#2658) can satisfy
# it, so a PR-uploaded JSON set never gains release authority.
release-certification:
name: Release Certification
needs: [ build-check, build-rustfs ]
if: ${{ !cancelled() && needs.build-check.outputs.should_publish == 'true' && startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest # gh CLI required; the sm-standard-2 fleet does not ship it
timeout-minutes: 30
permissions:
contents: read
actions: read
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@f548e57e544e1ff5a4c46bf1e1b8685f8e4a348a # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Download all build artifacts
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
with:
path: ./artifacts
pattern: rustfs-*
merge-multiple: true
- name: Write candidate and collect trusted validation results
env:
# Cross-repo read of the trusted verification run. Falls back to the
# workflow token, which cannot read rustfs/s3chaos; a missing token
# therefore fail-closes instead of certifying.
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_VALIDATION_TOKEN || github.token }}
PRODUCT_COMMIT: ${{ github.sha }}
VERSION: ${{ needs.build-check.outputs.version }}
BUILD_TYPE: ${{ needs.build-check.outputs.build_type }}
FEATURES: ${{ needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'development' && '' || 'pyroscope' }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
mkdir -p results release-gate-output
PLAN_SHA256=$(python3 -c "import hashlib,json,sys; sys.path.insert(0,'scripts/release'); import release_gate; print(release_gate.canonical_sha256(json.load(open('.config/release-validation-plan.json'))))")
python3 - "$PLAN_SHA256" > candidate.json <<'PY'
import hashlib, json, os, sys, zipfile
plan_sha256 = sys.argv[1]
profile = {"release": "stable", "prerelease": "prerelease", "preview": "preview"}.get(os.environ["BUILD_TYPE"])
if profile is None:
raise SystemExit("release certification only covers preview, prerelease and stable builds")
def sha256(path):
digest = hashlib.sha256()
with open(path, "rb") as handle:
for chunk in iter(lambda: handle.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
digest.update(chunk)
return digest.hexdigest()
deliverables = []
for name in sorted(os.listdir("artifacts")):
if not name.startswith("rustfs-") or not name.endswith(".zip"):
continue
path = os.path.join("artifacts", name)
members = zipfile.ZipFile(path).namelist()
binary_name = "rustfs.exe" if "rustfs.exe" in members else "rustfs"
with zipfile.ZipFile(path) as archive:
binary_bytes = archive.read(binary_name)
import tempfile
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile() as handle:
handle.write(binary_bytes)
handle.flush()
binary_sha = sha256(handle.name)
deliverables.append({
"kind": "zip",
"name": name,
"location": "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/releases/download/{}/{}".format(os.environ["VERSION"], name),
"sha256": sha256(path),
"size": os.path.getsize(path),
"binary_sha256": binary_sha,
})
if not deliverables:
raise SystemExit("no built deliverables found to certify")
candidate = {
"schema_version": 1,
"product_commit": os.environ["PRODUCT_COMMIT"],
"version": os.environ["VERSION"],
"release_profile": profile,
"features": [f for f in os.environ.get("FEATURES", "").split(",") if f],
"plan_sha256": plan_sha256,
"validation_batch": {"run_id": os.environ["GITHUB_RUN_ID"], "run_attempt": int(os.environ["GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT"])},
"deliverables": deliverables,
}
json.dump(candidate, sys.stdout, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
print()
PY
# Trusted verification evidence only: the release-gate envelopes of
# rustfs/s3chaos for this exact product commit. Absence blocks below.
TRUSTED_REPO="rustfs/s3chaos"
TRUSTED_WORKFLOW="release-gate.yml"
TRUSTED_RUN=$(gh api "repos/${TRUSTED_REPO}/actions/workflows/${TRUSTED_WORKFLOW}/runs?head_sha=${PRODUCT_COMMIT}&status=success&per_page=1" --jq '.workflow_runs[0].id // empty' || true)
if [[ -z "$TRUSTED_RUN" ]]; then
echo "❌ No trusted verification run of ${TRUSTED_REPO}/${TRUSTED_WORKFLOW} for ${PRODUCT_COMMIT}; refusing to certify" >&2
else
gh run download "$TRUSTED_RUN" -R "$TRUSTED_REPO" -n release-validation-evidence -D results || \
echo "❌ Trusted verification run ${TRUSTED_RUN} published no release-validation-evidence artifact" >&2
fi
python3 scripts/release/release_gate.py validate \
--plan .config/release-validation-plan.json \
--candidate candidate.json \
--results results \
--output release-gate-output
- name: Upload certification evidence
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: release-certification
path: |
candidate.json
results/
release-gate-output/
if-no-files-found: warn
retention-days: 30
# The only writer of the official R2 release path. Promotion re-checks the
# exact bytes about to be published against the passed certification list
# and copies the staged objects byte-for-byte: no rebuild-after-verify.
promote-release-artifacts:
name: Promote Release Artifacts
needs: [ build-check, build-rustfs, release-certification ]
# Target-channel lock for the official R2 release path.
concurrency:
group: release-channel-r2-release
cancel-in-progress: false
if: needs.build-check.outputs.should_publish == 'true' && startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') && (needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'release' || needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'prerelease')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
permissions:
contents: read
actions: read
env:
R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
R2_ENDPOINT: ${{ secrets.R2_ENDPOINT }}
R2_BUCKET: ${{ secrets.R2_BUCKET }}
AWS_EC2_METADATA_DISABLED: true
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@f548e57e544e1ff5a4c46bf1e1b8685f8e4a348a # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Download build and certification artifacts
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
with:
path: ./artifacts
pattern: rustfs-*
merge-multiple: true
- name: Download certification evidence
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
with:
name: release-certification
path: ./certification
- name: Verify and promote staged release artifacts
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [[ -z "$R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID" || -z "$R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY" || -z "$R2_ENDPOINT" || -z "$R2_BUCKET" ]]; then
echo "❌ R2 credentials missing; refusing to promote to the official channel" >&2
exit 1
fi
for zip_file in artifacts/rustfs-*.zip; do
[[ -f "$zip_file" ]] || continue
name="$(basename "$zip_file")"
python3 scripts/release/release_gate.py verify-promotion \
--plan .config/release-validation-plan.json \
--candidate certification/candidate.json \
--summary certification/release-gate-output \
--artifact "$zip_file" \
--artifact-name "$name"
done
if ! command -v aws >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y awscli
fi
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="$R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID"
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="$R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"
export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION="auto"
STAGING_PATH="s3://${R2_BUCKET}/artifacts/rustfs/staging/${GITHUB_RUN_ID}/${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}/"
RELEASE_PATH="s3://${R2_BUCKET}/artifacts/rustfs/release/"
for zip_file in artifacts/rustfs-*.zip; do
[[ -f "$zip_file" ]] || continue
name="$(basename "$zip_file")"
staged="$(mktemp)"
aws s3 cp "${STAGING_PATH}${name}" "$staged" --endpoint-url "$R2_ENDPOINT" --only-show-errors
staged_sha="$(sha256sum "$staged" | awk '{print $1}')"
built_sha="$(sha256sum "$zip_file" | awk '{print $1}')"
if [[ "$staged_sha" != "$built_sha" ]]; then
echo "❌ Staged object ${name} does not match the verified bytes" >&2
exit 1
fi
aws s3 cp "$staged" "${RELEASE_PATH}${name}" --endpoint-url "$R2_ENDPOINT" --only-show-errors
rm -f "$staged"
echo "✅ Promoted ${name} (${built_sha})"
done
# Create GitHub Release for every valid release tag, including previews
create-release:
name: Create GitHub Release
@@ -1028,6 +1248,10 @@ jobs:
update-latest-version:
name: Update Latest Version
needs: [ build-check, publish-release ]
# Target-channel lock for the latest.json version pointer.
concurrency:
group: release-channel-oss-latest
cancel-in-progress: false
if: needs.build-check.outputs.should_publish == 'true' && startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') && (needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'release' || needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'prerelease')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
@@ -1068,6 +1292,45 @@ jobs:
rm -rf "$OSSUTIL_DIR" "$OSSUTIL_ZIP"
chmod +x "$OSSUTIL_BIN"
# Candidate/pointer ordering: an older candidate must never overwrite
# a newer pointer, even if its promotion job finishes later.
CURRENT_LATEST="${RUNNER_TEMP}/current-latest.json"
if "$OSSUTIL_BIN" cp oss://rustfs-version/latest.json "$CURRENT_LATEST" 2>/dev/null; then
python3 - "$CURRENT_LATEST" "$VERSION" <<'PY'
import json
import re
import sys
def key(version):
match = re.match(r"^(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)(?:-([0-9A-Za-z.-]+))?$", version)
if not match:
raise SystemExit(3)
core = tuple(int(part) for part in match.groups()[:3])
prerelease = match.group(4)
if prerelease is None:
return core + (1,)
return core + (0, tuple(int(p) if p.isdigit() else p for p in re.split(r"[.-]", prerelease)))
try:
current = json.load(open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8")).get("version", "")
proposed = sys.argv[2]
if current and key(current) > key(proposed):
raise SystemExit(1)
except SystemExit:
raise
except (OSError, ValueError, TypeError):
raise SystemExit(3)
PY
guard_status=$?
if [[ "$guard_status" -eq 1 ]]; then
echo "Current latest.json points at a newer version; refusing to downgrade" >&2
exit 0
elif [[ "$guard_status" -ne 0 ]]; then
echo "Existing latest.json is unparsable; refusing to overwrite it blindly" >&2
exit 1
fi
fi
# Create latest.json
cat > latest.json << EOF
{
@@ -1084,16 +1347,59 @@ jobs:
echo "✅ Updated latest.json for ${RELEASE_TYPE} release $VERSION"
# Publish release (remove draft status)
# Publish release (remove draft status). Requires the release-certification
# aggregate: without a complete legal success there is no public write.
publish-release:
name: Publish Release
needs: [ build-check, create-release, upload-release-assets ]
needs: [ build-check, create-release, upload-release-assets, release-certification ]
# Target-channel lock: concurrent releases serialize on this channel so an
# older candidate cannot interleave its publish with a newer one.
concurrency:
group: release-channel-github-release
cancel-in-progress: false
if: needs.build-check.outputs.should_publish == 'true' && startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') && (needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'preview' || needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'release' || needs.build-check.outputs.build_type == 'prerelease')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest # gh CLI required; the sm-standard-2 fleet does not ship it
timeout-minutes: 30
permissions:
contents: write
actions: read
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@f548e57e544e1ff5a4c46bf1e1b8685f8e4a348a # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Download certification evidence
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
with:
name: release-certification
path: ./certification
- name: Verify release assets against certification
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
TAG="${{ needs.build-check.outputs.version }}"
mkdir -p "$RUNNER_TEMP/promotion-assets"
gh release download "$TAG" --dir "$RUNNER_TEMP/promotion-assets" --pattern '*.zip'
found=0
for zip_file in "$RUNNER_TEMP"/promotion-assets/*.zip; do
[[ -f "$zip_file" ]] || continue
found=1
python3 scripts/release/release_gate.py verify-promotion \
--plan .config/release-validation-plan.json \
--candidate certification/candidate.json \
--summary certification/release-gate-output \
--artifact "$zip_file" \
--artifact-name "$(basename "$zip_file")"
done
if [[ "$found" -ne 1 ]]; then
echo "No release zip assets to verify against the certification" >&2
exit 1
fi
- name: Publish release
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ env:
RUST_BACKTRACE: 1
jobs:
# Readers: test-and-lint (workspace and ILM), build-rustfs-debug-binary,
# Readers: workspace-lint-and-build, workspace-tests (workspace and ILM), build-rustfs-debug-binary,
# e2e-tests, e2e-full.
warm-ci-dev:
name: Warm ci-dev
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ jobs:
if-no-files-found: error
# --all-targets covers the test binaries nextest builds, including
# e2e_test, which test-and-lint's own run excludes. The second build adds
# e2e_test, which the workspace run excludes. The second build adds
# the e2e-test-hooks feature resolution that build-rustfs-debug-binary uses
# and that no lint lane enables.
- name: Build ci-dev superset
+97 -35
View File
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ jobs:
printf '%s\n' 'mode=full' >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "Base CI policy unavailable; running the full matrix."
fi
if ! grep -q '^plan=' "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" || ! grep -q '^rehearse_shards=' "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"; then
if ! grep -q '^plan=' "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" || ! grep -q '^plan_contract=3$' "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"; then
printf '%s\n' 'mode=full' 'connect=true' 'full_validation=true' 'rehearse_shards=false' 'packages=' 'plan=' >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "Base policy does not cover this workflow contract; retaining the full matrix."
fi
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Run shared quick checks
uses: ./.github/actions/quick-checks
test-and-lint:
workspace-lint-and-build:
name: Workspace Lint and Build
if: contains(fromJSON('["full", "e2e"]'), needs.classify-changes.outputs.mode) && (github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.action != 'closed')
needs: [ quick-checks, classify-changes ]
@@ -193,13 +193,13 @@ jobs:
- name: Prepare test evidence
run: |
mkdir -p artifacts/test-and-lint
mkdir -p artifacts/workspace
{
echo "run_id=${GITHUB_RUN_ID}"
echo "job=${GITHUB_JOB}"
echo "runner=${RUNNER_NAME}"
echo "started_at=$(date --utc --iso-8601=seconds)"
} > artifacts/test-and-lint/run-metadata.txt
} > artifacts/workspace/run-metadata.txt
# Clippy gates every event, pull requests included. When it ran only after
# merge, a lint regression merged freely and then failed every main run
@@ -215,7 +215,8 @@ jobs:
- name: Archive workspace test binaries
env:
CARGO_BUILD_JOBS: ${{ (github.event_name == 'push' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch') && '3' || '2' }}
# Workspace test compilation has high per-process memory use.
CARGO_BUILD_JOBS: "2"
run: |
./scripts/ci/resource_sampler.sh start workspace-archive
trap './scripts/ci/resource_sampler.sh stop' EXIT
@@ -233,11 +234,11 @@ jobs:
- name: Run documentation tests
run: |
mkdir -p artifacts/test-and-lint
mkdir -p artifacts/workspace
set +e
timeout --verbose --signal=TERM --kill-after=30s 15m \
python3 scripts/ci_test_artifact.py cargo doc --configuration workspace \
2>&1 | tee artifacts/test-and-lint/doctest.log
2>&1 | tee artifacts/workspace/doctest.log
status=${PIPESTATUS[0]}
{
echo "command=cargo test --all --exclude e2e_test --doc"
@@ -246,7 +247,7 @@ jobs:
echo
echo "Remaining test-related processes:"
pgrep -af 'cargo|rustdoc|target/.*/deps/' || true
} > artifacts/test-and-lint/doctest-diagnostics.txt
} > artifacts/workspace/doctest-diagnostics.txt
exit "${status}"
- name: Upload test reports and diagnostics
@@ -255,7 +256,7 @@ jobs:
with:
name: junit-test-and-lint-${{ github.run_number }}-${{ github.run_attempt }}
path: |
artifacts/test-and-lint
artifacts/workspace
retention-days: 3
if-no-files-found: error
@@ -268,7 +269,7 @@ jobs:
workspace-tests:
name: Workspace tests
needs: [ test-and-lint, classify-changes ]
needs: [ workspace-lint-and-build, classify-changes ]
# The archive retains compile-time fixture paths and the large test set
# requires the same runner image until the hosted-runtime pilot passes.
runs-on: sm-standard-4
@@ -293,14 +294,14 @@ jobs:
- name: Extract and list workspace tests
run: |
mkdir -p artifacts/test-and-lint
mkdir -p artifacts/workspace
cargo nextest list --profile ci --archive-file "$RUNNER_TEMP/workspace-tests.tar.zst" --workspace-remap "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE" --extract-to "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE" --extract-overwrite --message-format json \
> artifacts/test-and-lint/core-test-listing.json
python3 scripts/check_test_wiring.py --check-core artifacts/test-and-lint/core-test-listing.json
> artifacts/workspace/core-test-listing.json
python3 scripts/check_test_wiring.py --check-core artifacts/workspace/core-test-listing.json
- name: Run nextest tests
run: |
mkdir -p artifacts/test-and-lint
mkdir -p artifacts/workspace
rm -f target/nextest/ci/junit.xml
./scripts/ci/resource_sampler.sh start nextest
trap './scripts/ci/resource_sampler.sh stop' EXIT
@@ -309,7 +310,7 @@ jobs:
cargo nextest run --profile ci --cargo-metadata target/nextest/cargo-metadata.json --binaries-metadata target/nextest/binaries-metadata.json \
--workspace-remap "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE" --target-dir-remap "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/target" \
--status-level all --final-status-level all \
2>&1 | tee artifacts/test-and-lint/nextest.log
2>&1 | tee artifacts/workspace/nextest.log
status=${PIPESTATUS[0]}
{
echo "command=workspace archive execution"
@@ -321,13 +322,13 @@ jobs:
echo
echo "Kernel OOM / kill events:"
dmesg -T 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'oom|out of memory|killed process' | tail -20 || true
} > artifacts/test-and-lint/nextest-diagnostics.txt
} > artifacts/workspace/nextest-diagnostics.txt
exit "${status}"
- name: Verify workspace execution completeness
run: |
python3 scripts/ci_test_artifact.py evidence artifacts/test-and-lint/core-test-listing.json target/nextest/ci/junit.xml
./scripts/check_migration_gate_count.sh evidence artifacts/test-and-lint/core-test-listing.json target/nextest/ci/junit.xml
python3 scripts/ci_test_artifact.py evidence artifacts/workspace/core-test-listing.json target/nextest/ci/junit.xml
./scripts/check_migration_gate_count.sh evidence artifacts/workspace/core-test-listing.json target/nextest/ci/junit.xml
- name: Run ignored ILM integration tests serially
if: needs.classify-changes.outputs.mode == 'full'
@@ -358,7 +359,7 @@ jobs:
name: workspace-test-evidence-${{ github.run_attempt }}
path: |
target/nextest/ci/junit.xml
artifacts/test-and-lint
artifacts/workspace
artifacts/ilm-integration
retention-days: 3
if-no-files-found: error
@@ -368,7 +369,7 @@ jobs:
if: needs.classify-changes.outputs.rehearse_shards == 'true'
run: |
python3 scripts/ci_test_shards.py prepare \
--listing artifacts/test-and-lint/core-test-listing.json \
--listing artifacts/workspace/core-test-listing.json \
--junit target/nextest/ci/junit.xml --output artifacts/workspace-shard-plan
- name: Upload same-run shard plan
if: needs.classify-changes.outputs.rehearse_shards == 'true'
@@ -449,7 +450,7 @@ jobs:
connect-feature-boundaries:
name: Connect Feature Boundaries
if: needs.classify-changes.outputs.mode == 'full' && needs.classify-changes.outputs.connect != 'false' && (github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.action != 'closed')
if: needs.classify-changes.outputs.mode == 'full' && needs.classify-changes.outputs.connect != 'false' && contains(fromJSON('["schedule", "workflow_dispatch"]'), github.event_name)
needs: [ quick-checks, classify-changes ]
runs-on: sm-standard-4
timeout-minutes: 90
@@ -497,13 +498,72 @@ jobs:
- name: Check offline enrollment E2E root boundary
run: ./scripts/check_offline_enrollment_e2e.sh
fips-provider:
name: FIPS provider boundaries
if: needs.classify-changes.outputs.mode == 'full' && contains(fromJSON('["schedule", "workflow_dispatch"]'), github.event_name)
needs: [ quick-checks, classify-changes ]
# This builds the RustFS library test target, which exceeds hosted-runner disk capacity.
runs-on: sm-standard-4
timeout-minutes: 90
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
mode: [default, fips]
env:
FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: "true"
CARGO_BUILD_JOBS: "2"
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@f548e57e544e1ff5a4c46bf1e1b8685f8e4a348a # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Rust environment
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
rust-version: stable
cache-shared-key: ci-fips-provider
cache-save-if: 'false'
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
- name: Install FIPS build tools
if: matrix.mode == 'fips'
run: sudo apt-get install -y cmake golang clang libclang-dev
- name: Verify provider installation
shell: bash
run: |
args=()
if [[ '${{ matrix.mode }}' == 'fips' ]]; then
args+=(--features fips)
fi
cargo nextest run --locked -p rustfs-tls-runtime --lib "${args[@]}" --no-tests fail -E 'test(provider_policy_isolated)'
cargo nextest run --locked -p rustfs-s3-client --lib "${args[@]}" --no-tests fail -E 'test(overflowing_closed_range_is_rejected_before_network_io)'
cargo nextest run --locked -p rustfs-targets --lib "${args[@]}" --no-tests fail -E 'test(validate_pulsar)'
cargo nextest run --locked -p rustfs-targets --lib "${args[@]}" --no-tests fail -E 'test(webhook_provider_policy_isolated)'
if [[ '${{ matrix.mode }}' == 'fips' ]]; then
cargo nextest run --locked -p rustfs-protocols --lib --features ftps,webdav,fips --no-tests fail -E 'test(protocols_reject_incompatible_host_provider)'
cargo nextest run --locked -p rustfs-targets --lib --features fips --no-tests fail -E 'test(fips_postgres_rejects_incompatible_host_provider)'
cargo nextest run --locked -p rustfs-s3-client --lib --features fips --no-tests fail -E 'test(fips_transition_rejects_incompatible_host_provider)'
fi
tests=(provider_installation_isolated prepared_generation_shares_crypto_and_serves_sni_with_mtls)
if [[ '${{ matrix.mode }}' == 'fips' ]]; then
tests+=(fips_provider_builds_fips_tls_configs fips_provider_tls_handshake_accepts_and_rejects_algorithms)
fi
for test_name in "${tests[@]}"; do
cargo nextest run --locked -p rustfs --lib "${args[@]}" --no-tests fail -E "test($test_name)"
done
cargo clippy --locked -p rustfs --lib "${args[@]}" -- -D warnings
test-and-lint-rio-v2:
name: Test and Lint (rio-v2)
# Alternate feature configurations run on the nightly schedule, merge
# groups and manual dispatch. The default workspace remains the PR gate and
# the per-push main baseline: repeating four feature builds on every merge
# bought nothing the nightly run does not report within a day.
if: needs.classify-changes.outputs.mode == 'full' && contains(fromJSON('["merge_group", "schedule", "workflow_dispatch"]'), github.event_name)
# Specialized boundary, hardware and alternate-feature lanes run only on
# the nightly schedule and manual dispatch. They do not gate a merge: the
# nightly run reports a regression within a day, and repeating these builds
# on every PR revision and merge group bought no earlier signal worth the
# runner occupancy. Workspace lint and tests, the core contract, the debug
# build, E2E smoke and the S3 lanes remain the pull-request gate.
if: needs.classify-changes.outputs.mode == 'full' && contains(fromJSON('["schedule", "workflow_dispatch"]'), github.event_name)
needs: [ quick-checks, classify-changes ]
runs-on: sm-standard-4
timeout-minutes: 90
@@ -540,12 +600,12 @@ jobs:
# --profile ci so the quarantine list (and its junit flaky markers)
# covers this leg too; the default profile is the local no-retry
# profile and silently ignored quarantined flakes here (rustfs#6703).
mkdir -p artifacts/test-and-lint
mkdir -p artifacts/workspace
rm -f target/nextest/ci/junit.xml
./scripts/ci/resource_sampler.sh start nextest-rio-v2
trap './scripts/ci/resource_sampler.sh stop' EXIT
cargo nextest run --profile ci -p rustfs -p rustfs-ecstore --features rio-v2 \
2>&1 | tee artifacts/test-and-lint/nextest.log
2>&1 | tee artifacts/workspace/nextest.log
cargo test -p rustfs --doc --features rio-v2
- name: Upload rio-v2 test reports and diagnostics
@@ -555,14 +615,14 @@ jobs:
name: junit-test-and-lint-rio-v2-${{ github.run_number }}-${{ github.run_attempt }}
path: |
target/nextest/ci/junit.xml
artifacts/test-and-lint
artifacts/workspace
retention-days: 3
if-no-files-found: error
test-and-lint-protocols:
name: "Test and Lint (${{ matrix.features.name }})"
# Same cadence as test-and-lint-rio-v2 above.
if: needs.classify-changes.outputs.mode == 'full' && contains(fromJSON('["merge_group", "schedule", "workflow_dispatch"]'), github.event_name)
if: needs.classify-changes.outputs.mode == 'full' && contains(fromJSON('["schedule", "workflow_dispatch"]'), github.event_name)
needs: [ quick-checks, classify-changes ]
runs-on: sm-standard-4
timeout-minutes: 90
@@ -631,7 +691,7 @@ jobs:
path: |
target/nextest/ci/junit.xml
artifacts/protocol-tests
artifacts/test-and-lint
artifacts/workspace
retention-days: 3
if-no-files-found: warn
@@ -783,7 +843,7 @@ jobs:
# job had neither, so each closed/merged PR really ran the whole io_uring
# suite (measured 4m17s / 7m19s / 7m31s on runs 30678272341 / 30678117601 /
# 30662728539) and kept the cancellation run in progress for minutes.
if: needs.classify-changes.outputs.mode == 'full' && (github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.action != 'closed')
if: needs.classify-changes.outputs.mode == 'full' && contains(fromJSON('["schedule", "workflow_dispatch"]'), github.event_name)
needs: [ quick-checks, classify-changes ]
# GitHub-hosted ubuntu-latest runs a recent kernel with io_uring and, unlike
# a container, applies no seccomp filter that would block io_uring_setup — so
@@ -978,7 +1038,7 @@ jobs:
path: |
${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-smoke-logs/
${{ runner.temp }}/rustfs-e2e-smoke-list.json
artifacts/test-and-lint
artifacts/workspace
if-no-files-found: warn
- name: Upload e2e smoke JUnit report
@@ -1389,12 +1449,13 @@ jobs:
- classify-changes
- typos
- quick-checks
- test-and-lint
- workspace-lint-and-build
- workspace-tests
- workspace-shards
- workspace-shard-evidence
- core-contract
- connect-feature-boundaries
- fips-provider
- test-and-lint-rio-v2
- test-and-lint-protocols
- build-rustfs-debug-binary
@@ -1422,10 +1483,11 @@ jobs:
needs:
- classify-changes
- connect-feature-boundaries
- fips-provider
- required-checks
- typos
- quick-checks
- test-and-lint
- workspace-lint-and-build
- workspace-tests
- core-contract
- test-and-lint-rio-v2
+1 -1
View File
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Run CLA Bot
if: github.event_name != 'merge_group'
uses: overtrue/cla-bot@5e5929846a60cfb42b16d0d38e135ef67d94fc88 # v0.0.9
uses: overtrue/cla-bot@4bd1387c19691168c42fcf5edfa17b15819b2ab3 # v0.1.1
with:
github-token: ${{ github.token }}
registry-token: ${{ steps.registry-token.outputs.token }}
+182 -2
View File
@@ -329,13 +329,75 @@ jobs:
echo " - Create latest: $create_latest"
echo " - Source ref: $source_ref"
# Consume the trusted release certification for the exact version this
# workflow wraps and verify the certified input digests. A manual dispatch
# without that certification fails here and pushes no official tag; only
# results from the trusted verification sources carry release authority.
release-certification:
name: Release Certification
needs: build-check
if: needs.build-check.outputs.should_build == 'true'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
permissions:
contents: read
actions: read
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@f548e57e544e1ff5a4c46bf1e1b8685f8e4a348a # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
ref: ${{ needs.build-check.outputs.source_ref }}
- name: Download and verify release certification
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_VALIDATION_TOKEN || github.token }}
TRIGGERING_RUN_ID: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }}
VERSION: ${{ needs.build-check.outputs.version }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
mkdir -p certification
run_id="$TRIGGERING_RUN_ID"
if [[ -z "$run_id" ]]; then
run_id="$(gh api --method GET \
"repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/actions/workflows/build.yml/runs" \
-f branch="$VERSION" -f status=success -F per_page=1 \
--jq '.workflow_runs[0].id // empty' || true)"
fi
if [[ -z "$run_id" ]]; then
echo "No certified Build and Release run found for ${VERSION}; failing closed" >&2
exit 1
fi
if ! gh run download "$run_id" -n release-certification -D certification; then
echo "Build run ${run_id} published no release-certification artifact; failing closed" >&2
exit 1
fi
python3 scripts/release/release_gate.py verify-promotion \
--plan .config/release-validation-plan.json \
--candidate certification/candidate.json \
--summary certification/release-gate-output \
--artifact-sha256 "$(jq -r '.deliverables[0].sha256' certification/candidate.json)" \
--artifact-name "$(jq -r '.deliverables[0].name' certification/candidate.json)"
# Input digest binding: every zip this image wraps must be the
# certified byte-for-byte content, never a mutable latest pointer.
while IFS=$'\t' read -r name location expected; do
echo "Verifying certified input ${name}"
actual="$(curl -fsSL "$location" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}')"
if [[ "$actual" != "$expected" ]]; then
echo "Certified input ${name} does not match its recorded digest" >&2
exit 1
fi
done < <(jq -r '.deliverables[] | select(.name | contains("linux")) | [.name, .location, .sha256] | @tsv' certification/candidate.json)
# Build multi-arch Docker images
# Strategy: Build images using pre-built binaries from dl.rustfs.com
# Supports both release and dev channel binaries based on build context
# Only runs when should_build is true (which includes workflow success check)
build-docker:
name: Build Docker Images
needs: build-check
needs: [ build-check, release-certification ]
if: needs.build-check.outputs.should_build == 'true'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 60
@@ -443,6 +505,14 @@ jobs:
# Output tags
echo "tags=$TAGS" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# Staging identity for this run's promotion: official tags are only
# created after the staged image verifies against the certification,
# and they point at this same digest (no rebuild-after-verify).
STAGING_TAG="staging-${GITHUB_RUN_ID}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}${VARIANT_SUFFIX}"
STAGING_TAGS="${{ env.REGISTRY_DOCKERHUB }}:${STAGING_TAG},${{ env.REGISTRY_GHCR }}:${STAGING_TAG},${{ env.REGISTRY_QUAY }}:${STAGING_TAG}"
echo "staging_tags=$STAGING_TAGS" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "staging_tag=$STAGING_TAG" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# Generate labels
LABELS="org.opencontainers.image.title=RustFS"
LABELS="$LABELS,org.opencontainers.image.description=RustFS distributed object storage system"
@@ -467,7 +537,9 @@ jobs:
file: ${{ matrix.file }}
platforms: ${{ env.DOCKER_PLATFORMS }}
push: ${{ needs.build-check.outputs.should_push == 'true' }}
tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
# Push to staging tags only: official tags are created by the
# certification-gated promotion step below from this same digest.
tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.staging_tags }}
labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
# No layer cache. This build compiles nothing — it downloads a
# release zip and runs apk/apt — so the cache could only save the
@@ -493,6 +565,114 @@ jobs:
no-cache: false
pull: true
# A later-built wrapper: the staged image must complete this platform's
# own binary identity verification before any official tag is written.
# It may not inherit an unverified package's conclusion.
- name: Verify staged image against certification
if: needs.build-check.outputs.should_push == 'true'
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_VALIDATION_TOKEN || github.token }}
TRIGGERING_RUN_ID: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }}
VERSION: ${{ needs.build-check.outputs.version }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
mkdir -p certification
run_id="$TRIGGERING_RUN_ID"
if [[ -z "$run_id" ]]; then
run_id="$(gh api --method GET \
"repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/actions/workflows/build.yml/runs" \
-f branch="$VERSION" -f status=success -F per_page=1 \
--jq '.workflow_runs[0].id // empty' || true)"
fi
gh run download "$run_id" -n release-certification -D certification
STAGING_REF="${{ env.REGISTRY_DOCKERHUB }}:staging-${GITHUB_RUN_ID}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}${{ matrix.suffix }}"
case "${{ matrix.variant }}" in
musl) libc="musl" ;;
glibc) libc="gnu" ;;
esac
for platform in linux/amd64 linux/arm64; do
case "$platform" in
linux/amd64) arch_sub="x86_64" ;;
linux/arm64) arch_sub="aarch64" ;;
esac
docker pull --platform "$platform" "$STAGING_REF"
container="$(docker create --platform "$platform" "$STAGING_REF")"
docker cp "$container:/usr/bin/rustfs" "$RUNNER_TEMP/staged-rustfs"
docker rm "$container" >/dev/null
actual="$(sha256sum "$RUNNER_TEMP/staged-rustfs" | awk '{print $1}')"
expected="$(jq -r --arg needle "linux-${arch_sub}-${libc}" \
'[.deliverables[] | select(.name | contains($needle)) | .binary_sha256][0] // empty' \
certification/candidate.json)"
if [[ -z "$expected" || "$actual" != "$expected" ]]; then
echo "Staged image binary for ${platform} does not match the certified binary digest" >&2
exit 1
fi
python3 scripts/release/release_gate.py verify-promotion \
--plan .config/release-validation-plan.json \
--candidate certification/candidate.json \
--summary certification/release-gate-output \
--artifact "$RUNNER_TEMP/staged-rustfs" \
--artifact-role binary
done
- name: Promote staged image to official tags
if: needs.build-check.outputs.should_push == 'true'
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
STAGING_REF="${{ env.REGISTRY_DOCKERHUB }}:staging-${GITHUB_RUN_ID}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}${{ matrix.suffix }}"
IFS=',' read -r -a official_tags <<< "${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}"
for tag in "${official_tags[@]}"; do
docker buildx imagetools create -t "$tag" "$STAGING_REF"
echo "Promoted $tag -> $STAGING_REF"
done
# Downstream consumers (Helm) verify this record instead of inheriting
# an unverified wrapper's conclusion.
- name: Record image promotion
if: needs.build-check.outputs.should_push == 'true'
shell: bash
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_VALIDATION_TOKEN || github.token }}
TRIGGERING_RUN_ID: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }}
VERSION: ${{ needs.build-check.outputs.version }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
mkdir -p certification
run_id="$TRIGGERING_RUN_ID"
if [[ -z "$run_id" ]]; then
run_id="$(gh api --method GET \
"repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/actions/workflows/build.yml/runs" \
-f branch="$VERSION" -f status=success -F per_page=1 \
--jq '.workflow_runs[0].id // empty' || true)"
fi
gh run download "$run_id" -n release-certification -D certification
STAGING_REF="${{ env.REGISTRY_DOCKERHUB }}:staging-${GITHUB_RUN_ID}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}${{ matrix.suffix }}"
digest="$(docker buildx imagetools inspect "$STAGING_REF" --format '{{json .Manifest}}' | jq -r '.digest')"
candidate_sha="$(python3 -c "import json,hashlib,sys; sys.path.insert(0,'scripts/release'); import release_gate; print(release_gate.canonical_sha256(json.load(open('certification/candidate.json'))))")"
jq -n \
--arg version "$VERSION" \
--arg digest "$digest" \
--arg staging_ref "$STAGING_REF" \
--arg candidate_sha256 "$candidate_sha" \
--arg tags "${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}" \
--slurpfile candidate certification/candidate.json \
'{schema_version: 1, version: $version, image_digest: $digest, staging_ref: $staging_ref,
promoted_tags: ($tags | split(",")), candidate_sha256: $candidate_sha256,
binary_sha256s: ($candidate[0].deliverables | map(.binary_sha256) | unique)}' \
> image-promotion-record.json
- name: Upload image promotion record
if: needs.build-check.outputs.should_push == 'true'
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: image-promotion-record${{ matrix.suffix }}
path: image-promotion-record.json
if-no-files-found: error
retention-days: 30
# Note: Manifest creation is no longer needed as we only build one variant
# Multi-arch manifests are automatically created by docker/build-push-action
+2 -28
View File
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@
# Each selected test starts a real localhost cluster via
# `RustFSTestClusterEnvironment` (4 processes; 4 drives per node unless the
# case is a two-site 4-node 1-drive pair or a 4-node upgrade). Membership is
# `[profile.e2e-distributed]` in `.config/nextest.toml`. Storage-sensitive PRs,
# nightly runs, and manual dispatches all execute the same fail-closed suite.
# `[profile.e2e-distributed]` in `.config/nextest.toml`. The nightly schedule
# and manual dispatches execute the same fail-closed suite.
# Upgrade cases download the same pinned previous release as e2e-upgrade.yml.
#
# Isolated pool filesystems: expand/decommission/rebalance cases require
@@ -33,32 +33,6 @@
name: e2e-distributed
on:
pull_request:
paths:
- "Cargo.lock"
- "Cargo.toml"
- ".config/nextest.toml"
- ".config/e2e-distributed-selection.txt"
- ".github/workflows/e2e-distributed.yml"
- "crates/audit/**"
- "crates/common/**"
- "crates/config/**"
- "crates/e2e_test/**"
- "crates/ecstore/**"
- "crates/filemeta/**"
- "crates/heal/**"
- "crates/iam/**"
- "crates/lock/**"
- "crates/madmin/**"
- "crates/notify/**"
- "crates/replication/**"
- "crates/s3-client/**"
- "crates/s3-ops/**"
- "crates/s3-types/**"
- "crates/scanner/**"
- "crates/storage-api/**"
- "crates/utils/**"
- "rustfs/**"
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
filter:
+7 -18
View File
@@ -12,30 +12,19 @@
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
# Single-node upgrade and rollback lane.
#
# The weekly Monday schedule, version tags, and workflow_dispatch run this
# suite. Distributed upgrade cases stay on the nightly e2e-distributed lane.
name: Upgrade Compatibility
on:
pull_request:
paths:
- ".github/workflows/e2e-upgrade.yml"
- "crates/e2e_test/src/common.rs"
- "crates/e2e_test/src/distributed/**"
- "crates/e2e_test/src/fake_s3_target/**"
- "crates/e2e_test/src/lib.rs"
- "crates/e2e_test/src/replication_extension_test.rs"
- "crates/e2e_test/src/rpc_fault_proxy.rs"
- "crates/e2e_test/src/upgrade_compatibility_test.rs"
- "crates/ecstore/**"
- "crates/filemeta/**"
- "crates/heal/**"
- "crates/kms/**"
- "crates/storage-api/**"
- "rustfs/**"
- "Cargo.lock"
push:
tags:
- "[0-9]*.[0-9]*.[0-9]*"
schedule:
# 03:17 UTC every Monday.
- cron: "17 3 * * 1"
workflow_dispatch:
@@ -44,7 +33,7 @@ permissions:
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
cancel-in-progress: false
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+93
View File
@@ -30,9 +30,102 @@ permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
# Consume the same trusted release certification as every other publication
# exit and verify the image promotion record of the Docker workflow. The
# chart wraps no binary of its own, so it may only reference an image whose
# platform verification already passed; it must not inherit an unverified
# package's conclusion. A run without that evidence fails closed here and
# never reaches the chart repository.
release-certification:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
permissions:
contents: read
actions: read
outputs:
version: ${{ steps.version.outputs.raw_tag }}
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@f548e57e544e1ff5a4c46bf1e1b8685f8e4a348a # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Normalize release version
id: version
env:
RAW_INPUT: ${{ github.event.inputs.version }}
RAW_BRANCH: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [ "${{ github.event_name }}" = "workflow_dispatch" ]; then
RAW="$RAW_INPUT"
else
RAW="$RAW_BRANCH"
fi
case "$RAW" in
refs/tags/*) RAW_TAG="${RAW#refs/tags/}" ;;
*) RAW_TAG="$RAW" ;;
esac
echo "raw_tag=$RAW_TAG" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Download and verify release certification and image record
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_VALIDATION_TOKEN || github.token }}
TRIGGERING_RUN_ID: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }}
RAW_TAG: ${{ steps.version.outputs.raw_tag }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
mkdir -p certification image-record
build_run="$TRIGGERING_RUN_ID"
if [[ -z "$build_run" ]]; then
build_run="$(gh api --method GET \
"repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/actions/workflows/build.yml/runs" \
-f branch="$RAW_TAG" -f status=success -F per_page=1 \
--jq '.workflow_runs[0].id // empty' || true)"
fi
if [[ -z "$build_run" ]]; then
echo "No certified Build and Release run found for ${RAW_TAG}; failing closed" >&2
exit 1
fi
if ! gh run download "$build_run" -n release-certification -D certification; then
echo "Build run ${build_run} published no release-certification artifact; failing closed" >&2
exit 1
fi
python3 scripts/release/release_gate.py verify-promotion \
--plan .config/release-validation-plan.json \
--candidate certification/candidate.json \
--summary certification/release-gate-output \
--artifact-sha256 "$(jq -r '.deliverables[0].sha256' certification/candidate.json)" \
--artifact-name "$(jq -r '.deliverables[0].name' certification/candidate.json)"
docker_run="$(gh api --method GET \
"repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/actions/workflows/docker.yml/runs" \
-f branch="$RAW_TAG" -f status=success -F per_page=1 \
--jq '.workflow_runs[0].id // empty' || true)"
if [[ -z "$docker_run" ]] || ! gh run download "$docker_run" -n image-promotion-record -D image-record; then
echo "No image promotion record for ${RAW_TAG}; a chart may not wrap an unverified image" >&2
exit 1
fi
candidate_sha="$(python3 -c "import json,hashlib,sys; sys.path.insert(0,'scripts/release'); import release_gate; print(release_gate.canonical_sha256(json.load(open('certification/candidate.json'))))")"
record_sha="$(jq -r '.candidate_sha256 // empty' image-record/image-promotion-record.json)"
if [[ "$record_sha" != "$candidate_sha" ]]; then
echo "Image promotion record does not belong to this certification" >&2
exit 1
fi
overlap="$(jq -r --slurpfile candidate certification/candidate.json \
'[.binary_sha256s[]] - ($candidate[0].deliverables | map(.binary_sha256)) | length' \
image-record/image-promotion-record.json)"
if [[ "$overlap" -ne 0 ]]; then
echo "Image promotion record carries binary digests outside the certification" >&2
exit 1
fi
build-helm-package:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
needs: [ release-certification ]
if: |
(github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && !contains(github.event.inputs.version, '-preview')) ||
(
+279 -7
View File
@@ -87,18 +87,206 @@ jobs:
install-build-packaging-tools: 'false'
install-test-tools: 'false'
- name: Download static console assets
shell: bash
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
run: |
# Packaging tools are off on this lane, so setup does not install unzip.
if ! command -v unzip >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sudo apt-get update -qq
sudo apt-get install -y -qq unzip
fi
if ! command -v unzip >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "unzip is required to extract console assets" >&2
exit 1
fi
mkdir -p ./rustfs/static
verify_sha256() {
local expected="$1"
local file="$2"
local actual=""
local actual_line=""
if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
actual_line=$(sha256sum -- "$file") || return 1
elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
actual_line=$(shasum -a 256 -- "$file") || return 1
else
echo "No SHA-256 verification tool found" >&2
return 1
fi
actual="${actual_line%%[[:space:]]*}"
if [ "$actual" = "$expected" ]; then
echo "SHA256 verified OK: $actual"
return 0
else
echo "SHA256 mismatch: expected=$expected actual=$actual" >&2
return 1
fi
}
download_console_assets() {
local curl_bin="curl"
local python_bin="python3"
local console_api="https://api.github.com/repos/rustfs/console/releases/latest"
local console_json="console-release.json"
local console_url
local console_sha256
local curl_auth_args=()
console_tag=""
chmod +w ./rustfs/static/LICENSE || true
if ! command -v "$python_bin" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
python_bin="python"
fi
if ! command -v "$python_bin" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "No Python interpreter found for release metadata parsing" >&2
return 1
fi
if [[ -n "${GITHUB_TOKEN:-}" ]]; then
curl_auth_args=(-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GITHUB_TOKEN}" -H "X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28")
fi
"$curl_bin" "${curl_auth_args[@]}" --fail -L "$console_api" \
-o "$console_json" --retry 3 --retry-delay 5 --max-time 300 || return 1
read -r console_tag console_url console_sha256 < <("$python_bin" - "$console_json" <<'PY'
import json
import re
import sys
with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as handle:
release = json.load(handle)
tag = release.get("tag_name", "") or "unknown"
for asset in release.get("assets", []):
name = asset.get("name", "")
digest = asset.get("digest", "")
url = asset.get("browser_download_url", "")
if name.startswith("rustfs-console-") and name.endswith(".zip") and digest.startswith("sha256:") and url:
sha256 = digest.split(":", 1)[1]
if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{64}", sha256):
raise SystemExit(f"console zip asset has invalid sha256 digest: {sha256}")
sys.stdout.buffer.write(f"{tag} {url} {sha256}\n".encode("utf-8"))
break
else:
raise SystemExit("no console zip asset with sha256 digest found")
PY
) || return 1
if [[ -z "$console_url" || -z "$console_sha256" ]]; then
echo "Console release metadata is missing URL or SHA-256 digest" >&2
return 1
fi
echo "Console release: ${console_tag}"
echo "Downloading console asset: ${console_url}"
"$curl_bin" --fail -L "$console_url" -o console.zip --retry 3 --retry-delay 5 --max-time 300 || return 1
verify_sha256 "$console_sha256" console.zip || return 2
unzip -o console.zip -d ./rustfs/static || return 2
}
if download_console_assets; then
rm -f console.zip console-release.json
else
status=$?
rm -f console.zip console-release.json
if [[ "$status" -eq 2 ]]; then
echo "Console asset integrity verification failed" >&2
fi
echo "Failed to download verified console assets" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ ! -s ./rustfs/static/index.html ]]; then
echo "Console asset archive is missing static/index.html" >&2
exit 1
fi
asset_count=$(find ./rustfs/static -type f | wc -l | tr -d '[:space:]')
echo "Console assets ready: version=${console_tag:-unknown}, ${asset_count} files extracted to ./rustfs/static"
- name: Build RustFS
# Pin the glibc baseline (`<target>.<glibc>` for cargo-zigbuild) so
# nightlies run on older distros such as RHEL/Rocky 9 (glibc 2.34); #8062.
run: cargo zigbuild --release --locked --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.2.31 -p rustfs --bins
shell: bash
run: |
# Force rebuild by touching build.rs so a restored cache cannot
# reuse a rustfs artifact compiled before these console assets existed.
touch rustfs/build.rs
cargo zigbuild --release --locked --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.2.31 -p rustfs --bin rustfs
- name: Verify glibc symbol baseline
run: |
python3 scripts/release/check_glibc.py 2.31 \
target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/rustfs \
target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/rustfs-cli
target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/rustfs
target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/rustfs --version | grep -Fx 'build target : x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu'
- name: Verify console
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
find_free_port() {
python3 - <<'PY'
import socket
with socket.socket() as sock:
sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
print(sock.getsockname()[1])
PY
}
binary="target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/rustfs"
data_dir="$(mktemp -d)"
log_file="${RUNNER_TEMP}/rustfs-console-smoke.log"
server_pid=""
trap '
if [[ -n "${server_pid:-}" ]]; then
kill "$server_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "$server_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
rm -rf "$data_dir"
' EXIT
if [[ ! -x "$binary" ]]; then
echo "rustfs binary not found: ${binary}" >&2
exit 1
fi
api_port="$(find_free_port)"
console_port="$(find_free_port)"
console_url="http://127.0.0.1:${console_port}/rustfs/console/"
"$binary" server \
--address "127.0.0.1:${api_port}" \
--console-enable \
--console-address "127.0.0.1:${console_port}" \
--access-key console-smoke \
--secret-key console-smoke-secret \
"$data_dir" >"$log_file" 2>&1 &
server_pid=$!
response=""
for _ in {1..40}; do
response="$(curl --silent --output /dev/null --write-out '%{http_code} %{content_type}' "$console_url" || true)"
if [[ "$response" == 200\ text/html* ]]; then
exit 0
fi
sleep 0.25
done
echo "Console endpoint did not return 200 text/html: $response" >&2
cat "$log_file"
exit 1
- name: Build DEB package
id: deb
shell: bash
@@ -346,12 +534,12 @@ jobs:
path: ${{ steps.publish.outputs.candidate_file }}
if-no-files-found: error
# Publish the deb/rpm pair to the auto-testing repo's `assets` branch so
# engineers can download and install the nightly directly. The branch is
# a single-commit orphan rewritten on every build, which keeps the repo
# small while the latest files stay reachable at stable raw URLs.
# Publish the deb/rpm pair as assets of the rolling `nightly` release on
# rustfs/auto-testing (see scripts/release/publish_nightly_assets.sh).
# The dispatch below runs only after this upload and the immutable R2
# candidate both succeed. It does not replace rustfs-functional-chain.yml,
# which still starts from this workflow's workflow_run completion.
# kms-vault-lane and kms-vault-ha-failover stay parallel with this job.
- name: Publish packages to auto-testing release assets
env:
ASSETS_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PF_TESTING_GH_TOKEN }}
@@ -360,6 +548,90 @@ jobs:
DEB_DATE: ${{ steps.deb.outputs.deb_date }}
BUILD_REF: ${{ env.NIGHTLY_BUILD_REF }}
run: bash scripts/release/publish_nightly_assets.sh
# Cross-repo repository_dispatch cannot use GITHUB_TOKEN. The secret is a
# PAT or GitHub App token for rustfs/auto-testing: classic `repo` scope,
# or fine-grained Contents write (the permission GitHub checks for
# POST /repos/{owner}/{repo}/dispatches). A dispatch failure fails this
# step, and therefore this job, so the scheduled failure alert fires.
# GitHub allows at most 10 top-level client_payload properties, so the
# schema 2 candidate object is nested under `candidate` and the release
# fields sit beside it.
- name: Dispatch nightly candidate to auto-testing
if: ${{ steps.publish.outputs.candidate_file != '' }}
env:
DISPATCH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.AUTO_TESTING_DISPATCH_TOKEN }}
CANDIDATE_FILE: ${{ steps.publish.outputs.candidate_file }}
DEB_DATE: ${{ steps.deb.outputs.deb_date }}
SOURCE_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
: "${DISPATCH_TOKEN:?AUTO_TESTING_DISPATCH_TOKEN is required to dispatch rustfs/auto-testing}"
: "${CANDIDATE_FILE:?nightly candidate manifest is required}"
: "${DEB_DATE:?DEB_DATE is required}"
[[ "${DEB_DATE}" =~ ^[0-9]{4}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}$ ]]
[[ "${SOURCE_REPO}" == "rustfs/rustfs" ]]
payload="${RUNNER_TEMP}/nightly-candidate-dispatch-${GITHUB_RUN_ID}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}.json"
jq -n --slurpfile candidate "${CANDIDATE_FILE}" \
--arg event_type "nightly-candidate-ready" \
--arg source_repo "${SOURCE_REPO}" \
--arg latest_alias_url "https://dl.rustfs.com/artifacts/rustfs/packages/nightly/rustfs-nightly-latest.deb" \
--arg auto_testing_release "https://github.com/rustfs/auto-testing/releases/tag/nightly" \
--arg channel "nightly" \
--arg deb_date "${DEB_DATE}" \
--arg nightly_workflow ".github/workflows/nightly-gnu.yml" \
'{
event_type: $event_type,
source_repo: $source_repo,
latest_alias_url: $latest_alias_url,
auto_testing_release: $auto_testing_release,
channel: $channel,
deb_date: $deb_date,
nightly_workflow: $nightly_workflow,
candidate: $candidate[0]
}' > "${payload}"
if ! jq -e '
.event_type == "nightly-candidate-ready"
and .source_repo == "rustfs/rustfs"
and .channel == "nightly"
and .deb_date == env.DEB_DATE
and .nightly_workflow == ".github/workflows/nightly-gnu.yml"
and .latest_alias_url == "https://dl.rustfs.com/artifacts/rustfs/packages/nightly/rustfs-nightly-latest.deb"
and .auto_testing_release == "https://github.com/rustfs/auto-testing/releases/tag/nightly"
and .candidate.schema == 2
and ((.candidate | keys | sort) == ["build_run_attempt","build_run_id","package_sha256","package_url","schema","source_ref","source_sha","workflow_sha"])
and ((keys | sort) == ["auto_testing_release","candidate","channel","deb_date","event_type","latest_alias_url","nightly_workflow","source_repo"])
' "${payload}" >/dev/null; then
echo "nightly dispatch payload does not match the nightly-candidate-ready contract" >&2
exit 1
fi
body="${RUNNER_TEMP}/nightly-candidate-dispatch-body-${GITHUB_RUN_ID}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}.json"
jq -n --slurpfile client_payload "${payload}" \
'{event_type: "nightly-candidate-ready", client_payload: $client_payload[0]}' > "${body}"
response="${RUNNER_TEMP}/nightly-candidate-dispatch-response-${GITHUB_RUN_ID}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}.txt"
status="$(curl -sS --retry 3 --connect-timeout 15 --max-time 60 \
-o "${response}" -w '%{http_code}' \
-X POST \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${DISPATCH_TOKEN}" \
-H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
-H "X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data-binary @"${body}" \
https://api.github.com/repos/rustfs/auto-testing/dispatches)" || {
echo "repository_dispatch request to rustfs/auto-testing failed before an HTTP status" >&2
exit 1
}
if [[ "${status}" != "204" ]]; then
echo "repository_dispatch to rustfs/auto-testing failed: HTTP ${status}" >&2
if [[ -s "${response}" ]]; then
cat "${response}" >&2
fi
exit 1
fi
echo "dispatched nightly-candidate-ready to rustfs/auto-testing (deb_date=${DEB_DATE}, run=${GITHUB_RUN_ID}, attempt=${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT})"
# Live-Vault lane for the rustfs-kms suite (rustfs/backlog#1774).
#
# RUSTFS_KMS_VAULT_TOKEN is the single switch that adds the Vault KV2 and
+210 -14
View File
@@ -225,10 +225,57 @@ jobs:
echo " Build run ID: $BUILD_RUN_ID"
echo " Build run number: $RUN_NUMBER"
# Consume the trusted release certification of the resolved build run and
# verify the certified input digests before any package is wrapped. A run
# without that certification fails closed here; packages built later must
# complete their own verification and cannot inherit an unverified
# conclusion.
release-certification:
name: Release Certification
needs: resolve
if: needs.resolve.result == 'success'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest # gh CLI required; the sm-standard-2 fleet does not ship it
timeout-minutes: 30
permissions:
contents: read
actions: read
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@f548e57e544e1ff5a4c46bf1e1b8685f8e4a348a # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Download and verify release certification
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_VALIDATION_TOKEN || github.token }}
BUILD_RUN_ID: ${{ needs.resolve.outputs.build_run_id }}
BUILD_TYPE: ${{ needs.resolve.outputs.build_type }}
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
mkdir -p certification
if [[ "$BUILD_TYPE" == "development" ]]; then
# Development artifacts are explicitly uncertified and never touch
# official or latest channels; only the staging/dev paths remain.
jq -n '{schema_version: 1, certified: false, reason: "development artifacts are explicitly uncertified"}' \
> certification/development-uncertified.json
exit 0
fi
if ! gh run download "$BUILD_RUN_ID" -n release-certification -D certification; then
echo "Build run ${BUILD_RUN_ID} published no release-certification artifact; failing closed" >&2
exit 1
fi
python3 scripts/release/release_gate.py verify-promotion \
--plan .config/release-validation-plan.json \
--candidate certification/candidate.json \
--summary certification/release-gate-output \
--artifact-sha256 "$(jq -r '.deliverables[0].sha256' certification/candidate.json)" \
--artifact-name "$(jq -r '.deliverables[0].name' certification/candidate.json)"
# Build DEB and RPM packages for each architecture and libc variant
package:
name: Package (${{ matrix.arch }}-${{ matrix.libc }})
needs: resolve
needs: [ resolve, release-certification ]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest # gh CLI required; the sm-standard-2 fleet does not ship it
timeout-minutes: 30
strategy:
@@ -494,6 +541,55 @@ jobs:
echo "rpm_file=$RPM_FILE" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "✅ RPM built: $RPM_FILE"
- name: Download certification evidence
if: needs.resolve.outputs.build_type != 'development'
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
with:
name: release-certification
path: ./certification
# Later-built wrapper verification: the binary inside each package must
# match the certified binary digest for this platform before anything is
# uploaded, and the package itself stays on staging until promotion.
- name: Verify wrapped binary against certification
if: needs.resolve.outputs.build_type != 'development'
shell: bash
env:
DEB_FILE: ${{ steps.deb.outputs.deb_file }}
RPM_FILE: ${{ steps.rpm.outputs.rpm_file }}
ARTIFACT_NAME: ${{ matrix.artifact_name }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
expected="$(jq -r --arg needle "$ARTIFACT_NAME" \
'[.deliverables[] | select(.name | contains($needle)) | .binary_sha256][0] // empty' \
certification/candidate.json)"
if [[ -z "$expected" ]]; then
echo "No certified binary digest recorded for ${ARTIFACT_NAME}" >&2
exit 1
fi
if ! command -v rpm2cpio >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y rpm2cpio
fi
if ! command -v cpio >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y cpio
fi
for package_file in "$DEB_FILE" "$RPM_FILE"; do
case "$package_file" in
*.deb)
dpkg-deb --fsys-tarfile "$package_file" | tar -xOf - ./usr/bin/rustfs > "$RUNNER_TEMP/wrapped-rustfs"
;;
*.rpm)
rpm2cpio "$package_file" | cpio -i --to-stdout ./usr/bin/rustfs > "$RUNNER_TEMP/wrapped-rustfs"
;;
esac
python3 scripts/release/release_gate.py verify-promotion \
--plan .config/release-validation-plan.json \
--candidate certification/candidate.json \
--summary certification/release-gate-output \
--artifact "$RUNNER_TEMP/wrapped-rustfs" \
--artifact-role binary
done
- name: Upload packages to artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
@@ -531,10 +627,14 @@ jobs:
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="$R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"
export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION="auto"
# Build-phase writes stay on staging for release types: the official
# packages/release and packages/latest paths are written only by the
# certification-gated promote-packages job, from these same staged
# objects. Development packages keep the uncertified dev channel.
if [[ "$BUILD_TYPE" == "development" ]]; then
R2_PREFIX="artifacts/rustfs/packages/dev"
else
R2_PREFIX="artifacts/rustfs/packages/release"
R2_PREFIX="artifacts/rustfs/packages/staging/${GITHUB_RUN_ID}/${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}"
fi
R2_PATH="s3://${R2_BUCKET}/${R2_PREFIX}/"
@@ -549,18 +649,6 @@ jobs:
echo "✅ Upload complete"
# Also upload as latest for release/prerelease
if [[ "$BUILD_TYPE" == "release" || "$BUILD_TYPE" == "prerelease" ]]; then
LATEST_PATH="s3://${R2_BUCKET}/artifacts/rustfs/packages/latest/"
for f in "$DEB_FILE" "$RPM_FILE"; do
if [[ -n "$f" && -f "$f" ]]; then
echo "Uploading latest: $(basename "$f")"
aws s3 cp "$f" "$LATEST_PATH" --endpoint-url "$R2_ENDPOINT" --only-show-errors
fi
done
echo "✅ Latest packages updated"
fi
- name: Upload packages to GitHub Release
if: needs.resolve.outputs.tag != ''
env:
@@ -614,6 +702,114 @@ jobs:
echo "✅ GitHub release assets updated"
# The only writer of the official packages/release and packages/latest R2
# paths. Promotion re-checks each package's wrapped binary against the
# passed certification list and copies the staged objects byte-for-byte:
# no rebuild-after-verify, no mutable latest resolution downstream.
promote-packages:
name: Promote Packages
needs: [ resolve, package, release-certification ]
# Target-channel lock for the official package paths.
concurrency:
group: release-channel-r2-packages
cancel-in-progress: false
if: needs.resolve.outputs.tag != '' && (needs.resolve.outputs.build_type == 'release' || needs.resolve.outputs.build_type == 'prerelease')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest # gh CLI required; the sm-standard-2 fleet does not ship it
timeout-minutes: 30
permissions:
contents: read
actions: read
env:
R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
R2_ENDPOINT: ${{ secrets.R2_ENDPOINT }}
R2_BUCKET: ${{ secrets.R2_BUCKET }}
AWS_EC2_METADATA_DISABLED: true
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@f548e57e544e1ff5a4c46bf1e1b8685f8e4a348a # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Download packages and certification
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
with:
path: ./packages
pattern: packages-*
merge-multiple: true
- name: Download certification evidence
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
with:
name: release-certification
path: ./certification
- name: Verify and promote staged packages
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [[ -z "$R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID" || -z "$R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY" || -z "$R2_ENDPOINT" || -z "$R2_BUCKET" ]]; then
echo "❌ R2 credentials missing; refusing to promote to the official channel" >&2
exit 1
fi
STAGING_PREFIX="s3://${R2_BUCKET}/artifacts/rustfs/packages/staging/${GITHUB_RUN_ID}/${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}/"
RELEASE_PATH="s3://${R2_BUCKET}/artifacts/rustfs/packages/release/"
LATEST_PATH="s3://${R2_BUCKET}/artifacts/rustfs/packages/latest/"
if ! command -v aws >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y awscli
fi
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="$R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID"
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="$R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"
export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION="auto"
if ! command -v rpm2cpio >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sudo apt-get install -y rpm2cpio
fi
if ! command -v cpio >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sudo apt-get install -y cpio
fi
promoted=0
for package_file in packages/*.deb packages/*.rpm; do
[[ -f "$package_file" ]] || continue
name="$(basename "$package_file")"
case "$package_file" in
*.deb)
dpkg-deb --fsys-tarfile "$package_file" | tar -xOf - ./usr/bin/rustfs > "$RUNNER_TEMP/wrapped-rustfs"
;;
*.rpm)
rpm2cpio "$package_file" | cpio -i --to-stdout ./usr/bin/rustfs > "$RUNNER_TEMP/wrapped-rustfs"
;;
esac
python3 scripts/release/release_gate.py verify-promotion \
--plan .config/release-validation-plan.json \
--candidate certification/candidate.json \
--summary certification/release-gate-output \
--artifact "$RUNNER_TEMP/wrapped-rustfs" \
--artifact-role binary
staged="$(mktemp)"
aws s3 cp "${STAGING_PREFIX}${name}" "$staged" --endpoint-url "$R2_ENDPOINT" --only-show-errors
staged_sha="$(sha256sum "$staged" | awk '{print $1}')"
built_sha="$(sha256sum "$package_file" | awk '{print $1}')"
if [[ "$staged_sha" != "$built_sha" ]]; then
echo "❌ Staged package ${name} does not match the verified bytes" >&2
exit 1
fi
aws s3 cp "$staged" "${RELEASE_PATH}${name}" --endpoint-url "$R2_ENDPOINT" --only-show-errors
aws s3 cp "$staged" "${LATEST_PATH}${name}" --endpoint-url "$R2_ENDPOINT" --only-show-errors
rm -f "$staged"
promoted=$((promoted + 1))
echo "✅ Promoted ${name} (${built_sha})"
done
if [[ "$promoted" -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "No staged packages found to promote" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Summary
summary:
name: Summary
@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
# Copyright 2024 RustFS Team
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
name: RustFS Validation Sweep
# Executes the migrated canonical validation cases (rustfs/auto-testing#113)
# on the shared functional fleet. Everything with a lane executor is swept in
# rotating nightly batches so the whole set is covered roughly weekly; a
# single case or one module can be dispatched manually. That is the
# implemented catalog (66 today) plus the eight planned cases whose dedicated
# executors already exist and have live PASS evidence - fresh nightly
# evidence feeds their acceptance review. heal.* cases stay on the
# interactive validation flow: they require reviewed native/tool collectors
# built by separate validation-tools runs before fleet execution.
on:
schedule:
# After the nightly functional chain settles (chain starts ~16:48 UTC and
# runs for about two hours).
- cron: "30 19 * * *"
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
case:
description: 'Single canonical validation case id (overrides module and rotation), e.g. pool.decommission'
type: string
required: false
default: ''
module:
description: 'Restrict the sweep to one catalog module, e.g. bucket-replication'
type: string
required: false
default: ''
limit:
description: 'Maximum cases per sweep (0 = run everything selected)'
type: number
required: false
default: 12
build_run_id:
description: 'Successful nightly package run; empty resolves the latest'
type: string
required: false
default: ''
build_run_attempt:
description: 'Attempt of that package run'
type: string
required: false
default: '1'
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: rustfs-validation-sweep
cancel-in-progress: false
env:
RUSTFS_NODES: ${{ secrets.RUSTFS_NODES || vars.RUSTFS_NODES || 'vm000 vm001 vm002 vm003' }}
RUSTFS_SSH_USER: ${{ secrets.RUSTFS_SSH_USER || vars.RUSTFS_SSH_USER || 'azureuser' }}
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY }}
RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY: ${{ secrets.RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY }}
RUSTFS_NIGHTLY_PACKAGE_URL: ${{ vars.RUSTFS_NIGHTLY_PACKAGE_URL || 'https://dl.rustfs.com/artifacts/rustfs/packages/nightly/rustfs-nightly-latest.deb' }}
PF_TESTING_GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PF_TESTING_GH_TOKEN }}
jobs:
sweep:
if: github.repository == 'rustfs/rustfs'
runs-on: smoke-testing
timeout-minutes: 150
steps:
- name: Checkout chain tooling
uses: actions/checkout@f548e57e544e1ff5a4c46bf1e1b8685f8e4a348a # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Resolve nightly candidate
id: candidate
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PF_TESTING_GH_TOKEN }}
BUILD_RUN_ID: ${{ inputs.build_run_id }}
BUILD_RUN_ATTEMPT: ${{ inputs.build_run_attempt }}
CHAIN_OUTPUT: ${{ runner.temp }}/validation-sweep-candidate.json
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# Scheduled runs carry no inputs and the resolver only derives a
# build from a workflow_run payload (which a schedule cannot
# provide), so resolve the newest successful nightly build
# explicitly before invoking it.
if [ -z "${BUILD_RUN_ID:-}" ]; then
LATEST="$(gh api "repos/rustfs/rustfs/actions/workflows/nightly-gnu.yml/runs?branch=main&status=success&per_page=1" --jq '.workflow_runs[0]')"
BUILD_RUN_ID="$(printf '%s' "${LATEST}" | jq -r '.id')"
BUILD_RUN_ATTEMPT="$(printf '%s' "${LATEST}" | jq -r '.run_attempt')"
export BUILD_RUN_ID BUILD_RUN_ATTEMPT
echo "scheduled sweep pinned to nightly ${BUILD_RUN_ID} attempt ${BUILD_RUN_ATTEMPT}"
fi
python3 scripts/resolve_functional_candidate.py
python3 - <<'PY'
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
root = Path(os.environ["RUNNER_TEMP"]) / "validation-sweep"
root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
chain = json.loads((Path(os.environ["RUNNER_TEMP"]) / "validation-sweep-candidate.json").read_text())
manifest = chain["candidate"]["manifest"]
(root / "candidate.json").write_text(json.dumps({
"package_url": manifest["package_url"],
"package_sha256": manifest["package_sha256"],
"source_sha": manifest["source_sha"],
}, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
with open(os.environ["GITHUB_OUTPUT"], "a") as output:
output.write("testing_sha=" + chain["testing_sha"] + "\n")
output.write("package_url=" + manifest["package_url"] + "\n")
output.write("source_sha=" + manifest["source_sha"] + "\n")
PY
- name: Checkout auto-testing scripts
uses: actions/checkout@f548e57e544e1ff5a4c46bf1e1b8685f8e4a348a # v7
with:
repository: rustfs/auto-testing
ref: ${{ steps.candidate.outputs.testing_sha }}
token: ${{ secrets.PF_TESTING_GH_TOKEN }}
path: auto-testing
persist-credentials: false
- name: Prepare validation Python runtime
# The pool / ilm / replication validation runners require a managed
# Python, exactly like the chain's validation job provides.
uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7.0.0
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- name: Install validation Python requirements
# Case scripts call python3 and import boto3 at startup. Install the
# functional chain's client into a per-run env so that interpreter
# sees it without changing the runner's shared Python.
run: |
set -euo pipefail
validation_python="${RUNNER_TEMP}/rustfs-validation-python-${GITHUB_RUN_ID}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}"
test ! -e "${validation_python}"
python3 -m venv "${validation_python}"
"${validation_python}/bin/python" -m pip install \
-r auto-testing/scripts/validation_ilm/requirements.txt
printf '%s\n' "${validation_python}/bin" >> "${GITHUB_PATH}"
- name: Select sweep cases
id: select
env:
SELECTED_CASE: ${{ inputs.case }}
SELECTED_MODULE: ${{ inputs.module }}
CASE_LIMIT: ${{ inputs.limit }}
SWEEP_EVENT: ${{ github.event_name }}
SWEEP_ROOT: ${{ runner.temp }}/validation-sweep
run: |
set -euo pipefail
python3 - <<'PY'
import datetime
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
sweep_root = Path(os.environ["SWEEP_ROOT"])
catalog = json.loads(Path("auto-testing/validation-cases.json").read_text())
def sweepable(case):
status = case.get("source_status")
if status == "implemented":
return True
# The remaining planned non-heal cases route to the lane
# executors and already have live PASS evidence; sweeping them
# nightly produces fresh evidence for their acceptance review.
return status == "planned" and not case["id"].startswith("heal.")
selected = [(case["id"], module["id"]) for module in catalog["modules"]
for case in module["cases"]
if sweepable(case)]
if not selected:
raise SystemExit("catalog has no sweepable cases")
one_case = os.environ.get("SELECTED_CASE", "").strip()
module_filter = os.environ.get("SELECTED_MODULE", "").strip()
known = {case_id for case_id, _ in selected}
modules = {module_id for _, module_id in selected}
if one_case:
if one_case not in known:
raise SystemExit(f"unknown case or no lane executor for it: {one_case}")
selected = [(one_case, dict(selected)[one_case])]
elif module_filter:
if module_filter not in modules:
raise SystemExit(f"unknown module or no implemented cases: {module_filter}")
selected = [pair for pair in selected if pair[1] == module_filter]
elif os.environ.get("SWEEP_EVENT") == "schedule":
# Stateless rotation: every night take one window of the catalog
# so a full sweep needs len(selected)/limit nights and no state
# has to be carried between runs.
limit = max(1, int(os.environ.get("CASE_LIMIT") or 12))
day = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc).timetuple().tm_yday
start = (day * limit) % len(selected)
selected = (selected[start:] + selected[:start])[:limit]
limit = int(os.environ.get("CASE_LIMIT") or 0)
if one_case or module_filter or (not os.environ.get("SWEEP_EVENT") == "schedule"):
if limit > 0:
selected = selected[:limit]
(sweep_root / "sweep-cases.txt").write_text("".join(f"{case_id}\n" for case_id, _ in selected))
with open(os.environ["GITHUB_OUTPUT"], "a") as output:
output.write(f"count={len(selected)}\n")
print(f"selected {len(selected)} case(s):", ", ".join(c for c, _ in selected))
PY
- name: Admit clean shared environment
id: environment
timeout-minutes: 5
env:
FUNCTIONAL_ENVIRONMENT_RECEIPT: ${{ runner.temp }}/environment-validation-sweep.json
run: python3 scripts/functional_environment.py enter --suite heal
- name: Run validation cases
id: run_cases
timeout-minutes: 120
env:
AUTO_TESTING_SHA: ${{ steps.candidate.outputs.testing_sha }}
SWEEP_ROOT: ${{ runner.temp }}/validation-sweep
run: |
set -uo pipefail
mkdir -p "${SWEEP_ROOT}/results"
: > "${SWEEP_ROOT}/results.txt"
while read -r CASE_ID; do
[ -n "${CASE_ID}" ] || continue
echo "::group::case ${CASE_ID}"
rm -rf "${SWEEP_ROOT}/run"
if ./auto-testing/scripts/run_validation_case.sh \
"${CASE_ID}" "${SWEEP_ROOT}/candidate.json" \
"${AUTO_TESTING_SHA}" "${SWEEP_ROOT}/run" \
> "${SWEEP_ROOT}/results/${CASE_ID//\//_}.log" 2>&1; then
printf '%s\tPASS\n' "${CASE_ID}" >> "${SWEEP_ROOT}/results.txt"
echo "case ${CASE_ID}: PASS"
else
printf '%s\tFAIL\n' "${CASE_ID}" >> "${SWEEP_ROOT}/results.txt"
echo "case ${CASE_ID}: FAIL (log retained in the sweep artifact)"
fi
if [ -f "${SWEEP_ROOT}/run/report.md" ]; then
cp "${SWEEP_ROOT}/run/report.md" "${SWEEP_ROOT}/results/${CASE_ID//\//_}.report.md" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
echo "::endgroup::"
# Fleet hygiene between cases: the case runners set up their own
# topology, this purge guarantees the next case starts clean even
# when the previous one died mid-run.
for node in ${RUSTFS_NODES}; do
# -n keeps ssh from consuming the case list this loop reads from stdin
ssh -n -o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=10 "${RUSTFS_SSH_USER}@${node}" '
SUDO=""; [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ] && SUDO="sudo -n"
${SUDO} systemctl stop rustfs 2>/dev/null || true
if ${SUDO} dpkg -l rustfs 2>/dev/null | grep -q "^ii"; then
${SUDO} dpkg -P rustfs
fi
for i in 1 2 3 4; do ${SUDO} rm -rf /data/rustfs${i}/mnmd; done
${SUDO} rm -f /etc/default/rustfs
' || echo "inter-case cleanup failed on ${node} (continuing)"
done
done < "${SWEEP_ROOT}/sweep-cases.txt"
echo "sweep finished: $(wc -l < "${SWEEP_ROOT}/results.txt") case(s) executed"
- name: Generate sweep report
if: ${{ always() && steps.environment.outcome == 'success' }}
env:
SWEEP_ROOT: ${{ runner.temp }}/validation-sweep
PACKAGE_URL: ${{ steps.candidate.outputs.package_url }}
SOURCE_SHA: ${{ steps.candidate.outputs.source_sha }}
AUTO_TESTING_SHA: ${{ steps.candidate.outputs.testing_sha }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
python3 - <<'PY'
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
root = Path(os.environ["SWEEP_ROOT"])
catalog = json.loads(Path("auto-testing/validation-cases.json").read_text())
module_of = {case["id"]: module["id"] for module in catalog["modules"] for case in module["cases"]}
rows = []
for line in (root / "results.txt").read_text().splitlines():
if not line:
continue
case_id, status = line.split("\t")
rows.append((case_id, module_of.get(case_id, "?"), status))
passed = sum(1 for _, _, s in rows if s == "PASS")
failed = len(rows) - passed
run_url = (f"{os.environ.get('GITHUB_SERVER_URL', 'https://github.com')}/"
f"{os.environ.get('GITHUB_REPOSITORY', 'rustfs/rustfs')}/actions/runs/"
f"{os.environ.get('GITHUB_RUN_ID', '')}")
report = [
"# RustFS validation sweep report", "",
f"- Run: {run_url}",
f"- Attempt: {os.environ.get('GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT', '')}",
f"- Trigger: {os.environ.get('GITHUB_EVENT_NAME', '')}",
f"- Package: {os.environ.get('PACKAGE_URL', 'nightly (R2 latest)')}",
f"- Source SHA: {os.environ.get('SOURCE_SHA', '')}",
f"- auto-testing: {os.environ.get('AUTO_TESTING_SHA', '')}", "",
"Canonical validation cases (rustfs/auto-testing#113) executed by the sweep, grouped by catalog module.", "",
]
# Group the executed cases by catalog module (the major category:
# pool lifecycle, heal, ILM expiration, bucket/site replication, kms,
# data services, identity, s3 compatibility). Per-module subtotals
# deliberately use "- Subtotal:" so the dashboard overview regexes
# (which anchor on "- Total:") keep reading the grand totals below.
by_module = {}
module_order = []
for case_id, module, status in rows:
if module not in by_module:
by_module[module] = []
module_order.append(module)
by_module[module].append((case_id, status))
report += ["## Case Summary", ""]
for module in module_order:
cases = by_module[module]
mod_pass = sum(1 for _, st in cases if st == "PASS")
mod_fail = len(cases) - mod_pass
report += [f"### {module} ({len(cases)})", "",
"| Case | Status |", "| --- | --- |"]
report += [f"| {case_id} | {status} |" for case_id, status in cases]
report += ["", f"- Subtotal: {mod_pass} passed, {mod_fail} failed", ""]
report += [
"## Totals", "",
f"- Total: {len(rows)}",
f"- PASS: {passed}",
f"- FAIL: {failed}",
"- UNSUPPORTED: 0", "",
"Failing cases keep this workflow red only as a report; the sweep artifact",
"retains every case log and per-case report for diagnosis.", "",
]
(root / "report.md").write_text("\n".join(report))
(root / "cases.md").write_text("\n".join(f"| {c} | {m} | {s} |" for c, m, s in rows) + "\n")
PY
cat "${SWEEP_ROOT}/report.md" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
- name: Upload functional report to dashboard
if: ${{ always() && steps.environment.outcome == 'success' }}
timeout-minutes: 2
continue-on-error: true
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ env.PF_TESTING_GH_TOKEN }}
REPORT_FILE: ${{ runner.temp }}/validation-sweep/report.md
SUITE: validation
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [ -z "${GH_TOKEN:-}" ]; then
echo "PF_TESTING_GH_TOKEN is not configured; skipping dashboard upload"
exit 0
fi
DATE="$(date -u +%Y-%m-%d)"
REPORT_PATH="functional-reports/${SUITE}/${DATE}.md"
B64_FILE="$(mktemp)"
python3 -c 'import base64,sys;print(base64.b64encode(open(sys.argv[1],"rb").read()).decode())' "${REPORT_FILE}" > "${B64_FILE}"
SHA="$(gh api "repos/rustfs/dashboard/contents/${REPORT_PATH}" -q '.sha' 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -n "${SHA}" ]; then
jq -n --arg msg "report(${SUITE}): ${DATE}" --rawfile content "${B64_FILE}" --arg sha "${SHA}" \
'{message:$msg, content:($content|rtrimstr("\n")), sha:$sha}' \
| gh api --method PUT "repos/rustfs/dashboard/contents/${REPORT_PATH}" --input - >/dev/null
else
jq -n --arg msg "report(${SUITE}): ${DATE}" --rawfile content "${B64_FILE}" \
'{message:$msg, content:($content|rtrimstr("\n"))}' \
| gh api --method PUT "repos/rustfs/dashboard/contents/${REPORT_PATH}" --input - >/dev/null
fi
echo "dashboard updated: ${REPORT_PATH}"
- name: Retain sweep evidence
if: ${{ always() }}
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: rustfs-validation-sweep-${{ github.run_id }}-${{ github.run_attempt }}
path: |
${{ runner.temp }}/validation-sweep/report.md
${{ runner.temp }}/validation-sweep/results.txt
${{ runner.temp }}/validation-sweep/sweep-cases.txt
${{ runner.temp }}/validation-sweep/candidate.json
${{ runner.temp }}/validation-sweep/results/
${{ runner.temp }}/validation-sweep/run/
# warn (not error): an early infra failure legitimately leaves no
# per-case evidence, and the failing step is already red.
if-no-files-found: warn
retention-days: 30
- name: Cleanup environment (after)
id: environment_cleanup
timeout-minutes: 5
if: ${{ always() && steps.environment.outcome == 'success' }}
run: |
set -uo pipefail
cleanup_status=0
for node in ${RUSTFS_NODES}; do
ssh -o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=10 "${RUSTFS_SSH_USER}@${node}" '
set -euo pipefail
SUDO=""; [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ] && SUDO="sudo -n"
${SUDO} systemctl stop rustfs 2>/dev/null || true
if ${SUDO} dpkg -l rustfs 2>/dev/null | grep -q "^ii"; then
${SUDO} dpkg -P rustfs
fi
for i in 1 2 3 4; do ${SUDO} rm -rf /data/rustfs${i}/mnmd; done
${SUDO} rm -f /etc/default/rustfs
' || cleanup_status=$?
done
exit "${cleanup_status}"
- name: Release environment only after successful cleanup
if: ${{ always() && steps.environment.outcome == 'success' }}
timeout-minutes: 5
env:
FUNCTIONAL_ENVIRONMENT_RECEIPT: ${{ runner.temp }}/environment-validation-sweep.json
CLEANUP_OUTCOME: ${{ steps.environment_cleanup.outcome }}
run: python3 scripts/functional_environment.py finish --suite heal --cleanup-outcome "$CLEANUP_OUTCOME"
- name: Notify on failure
if: failure()
run: echo "RustFS validation sweep failed (harness/environment breakdown); see the sweep artifact for case logs."
- name: Enforce sweep result
if: ${{ always() && steps.environment.outcome == 'success' }}
env:
SWEEP_ROOT: ${{ runner.temp }}/validation-sweep
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if grep -q $'\tFAIL$' "${SWEEP_ROOT}/results.txt"; then
echo "validation sweep has failing cases:"
grep $'\tFAIL$' "${SWEEP_ROOT}/results.txt"
exit 1
fi
alert-on-failure:
name: Alert on scheduled failure
# A scheduled sweep failure usually means a canonical validation case
# regressed or the fleet environment broke; surface it as a tracking
# issue instead of leaving it in the Actions tab.
needs: [sweep]
if: github.repository == 'rustfs/rustfs' && (always() && github.event_name == 'schedule' && contains(needs.*.result, 'failure'))
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
permissions:
contents: read
issues: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v5.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Open or update failure-tracking issue
uses: ./.github/actions/schedule-failure-issue
with:
github-token: ${{ secrets.BACKLOG_ISSUE_TOKEN }}
+26
View File
@@ -107,6 +107,32 @@ jobs:
shell: pwsh
run: cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore --lib multipart_owned_record_parent_barriers_ -- --nocapture
# Native multipart completion publishes its payload from a different
# parent than its metadata, and abort renames under a precondition; both
# need their own Windows handle discipline.
- name: Test native multipart complete and abort publication
shell: pwsh
run: >-
cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore --lib --
native_abort_missing_state_with_actual_owned_records_never_becomes_legacy_or_missing
native_abort_pending_intent_is_not_a_delete_certificate_and_raw_cleanup_preserves_exact_evidence
--nocapture
# Owned-undo reclaim removes a directory it pinned, copy heal persists
# fault bytes through a handle, and metadata reads meet a directory.
- name: Test native multipart reclaim, copy heal, and directory reads
shell: pwsh
run: >-
cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore --lib --
native_multipart_owned_undo
native_multipart_copy_heal
orphan_multipart_cleanup_rejects_metadata_directory_on_one_disk
--nocapture
- name: Test directory removal fallback
shell: pwsh
run: "cargo test -p rustfs-ecstore --lib disk::fs::tests::test_remove -- --nocapture"
- name: Test Windows path conversion
shell: pwsh
run: "cargo test -p rustfs-utils --no-default-features --features path --lib dunce:: -- --nocapture"
+1
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
- IAM snapshot/deletion replay, target-assigned delete-marker purges, timestamp ordering, and best-effort peer broadcast now close the control-plane gaps found by the R6 review ([#7195](https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/pull/7195)).
- A `set-remote-target?update=true&creds=true` request on a site-replication peer's bucket target is now rejected with `400 InvalidRequest`, naming the target and why it counts as peer-owned. It used to return success while keeping the stored endpoint, credentials, and TLS settings, so an endpoint edit from the Console's bucket replication form appeared to apply but did not. Change a peer's address with a site-replication edit instead; see "Changing a site's address" in `docs/operations/site-replication-operations.md`. The `sync`, `bandwidth`, `proxy`, and `path` update groups are unchanged.
- Site-replication edits that omit the site name, such as `mc admin replicate update --deployment-id <ID> --endpoint <URL>`, now keep the stored name on the editing site and on every receiver instead of renaming the site after the new endpoint host. No persisted format changes.
- The persisted replication MRF journal is now replayed every 5 minutes while the server runs, not only at startup. Delete-marker purges whose targets were unreachable, and replications that overflowed the worker queues, now converge within one replay interval after the target returns instead of waiting for a restart. A target that stays down is re-attempted once per retained entry per interval across the cluster: the start time of the last pass is shared through a small `config/replication/mrf.bin.replay` object, so nodes do not each replay once per interval. Older versions ignore that object; existing persisted formats are unchanged.
- Upgrade and rollback: upgrade every node in one site consecutively and verify reconciliation before moving to the next site; do not intentionally run a site mixed-version. Target-version ledger keys are harmless on rollback, although old code cannot use their routing. Before rolling back past [#7307](https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/pull/7307), drain or repair every pending version purge: older code can free a retained version's data directory before its remote purge is acknowledged. See `docs/operations/site-replication-operations.md`.
### Security
Generated
+449 -232
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+20 -22
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@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ rustfs-zip = { path = "./crates/zip", version = "1.0.2" }
async-channel = "2.5.0"
async_zip = { default-features = false, version = "0.0.19" }
mysql_async = { default-features = false, version = "0.37.1" }
async-compression = { version = "0.4.51" }
async-compression = { version = "0.4.52" }
async-trait = "0.1.92"
async-nats = { version = "0.51.0", default-features = false }
axum = "0.8.9"
@@ -168,16 +168,16 @@ http-body-util = "0.1.5"
memchr = "2.8.3"
minlz = "1.2.3"
reqwest = "0.13.5"
rustfs-kafka-async = { version = "1.4.0" }
rustfs-kafka-async = { version = "1.4.1" }
socket2 = { version = "0.6.5" }
tokio = { version = "1.54.1" }
tokio-rustls = { default-features = false, version = "0.26.6" }
tokio-stream = { version = "0.1.19" }
tokio-test = "0.4.6"
tokio-util = { version = "0.7.20" }
tonic = { version = "0.14.8" }
tonic-prost = { version = "0.14.8" }
tonic-prost-build = { version = "0.14.8" }
tonic = { version = "0.14.9" }
tonic-prost = { version = "0.14.9" }
tonic-prost-build = { version = "0.14.9" }
tower = { version = "0.5.3" }
tower-http = { version = "0.7.1" }
h3 = "0.0.8"
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ quinn = { version = "0.11.12", default-features = false, features = [
# Serialization and Data Formats
apache-avro = { version = "0.22.0", features = ["snappy", "zstandard"] }
bytes = { version = "1.12.1" }
csv-core = "0.1.13"
bytesize = "2.7.0"
byteorder = "1.5.0"
flatbuffers = "25.12.19"
@@ -212,12 +213,13 @@ serde_urlencoded = "0.7.1"
# releases.
aes-gcm = { version = "0.11.1" }
argon2 = { version = "0.6.0" }
aws-lc-rs = { version = "1.19.0", default-features = false }
blake2 = "0.11.0"
chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.11.0" }
crc-fast = "1.10.0"
hmac = { version = "0.13.0" }
jsonwebtoken = { version = "11.1.0" }
openidconnect = { default-features = false, version = "4.0" }
openidconnect = { default-features = false, version = "4.1.0" }
pbkdf2 = "0.13.0"
p256 = { version = "0.14.0", features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
rsa = { version = "=0.10.0-rc.18" }
@@ -234,7 +236,7 @@ proptest = "1"
# Time and Date
chrono = { version = "0.4.45" }
humantime = "2.4.0"
jiff = { version = "0.2.38" }
jiff = { version = "0.2.39" }
time = { version = "0.3.55" }
# Database
@@ -253,9 +255,9 @@ atoi = "3.1.1"
atomic_enum = "0.3.0"
aws-config = { version = "1.13.0" }
aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.1" }
aws-sdk-kms = { default-features = false, version = "1.128.0" }
aws-sdk-s3 = { default-features = false, version = "1.156.0" }
aws-sdk-sts = { default-features = false, version = "1.123.0" }
aws-sdk-kms = { default-features = false, version = "1.129.0" }
aws-sdk-s3 = { default-features = false, version = "1.157.0" }
aws-sdk-sts = { default-features = false, version = "1.124.0" }
aws-smithy-async = { version = "1.3.1" }
aws-smithy-http-client = { default-features = false, version = "1.5.2" }
aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.19.2" }
@@ -319,7 +321,7 @@ rustfs-erasure-codec = { version = "9.0.0" }
reed-solomon-simd = "3.1.0"
regex = { version = "1.13.1" }
rumqttc = { package = "rumqttc-next", version = "0.34.0" }
redis = { version = "1.8.0" }
redis = { version = "1.8.1" }
rustify = { version = "0.7", default-features = false }
rustix = { version = "1.1.6" }
rust-embed = { version = "8.13.0" }
@@ -334,10 +336,10 @@ compact_str = "0.10.0"
snap = "1.1.2"
starshard = { version = "2.4.0" }
strum = { version = "0.28.0" }
sysinfo = "0.40.0"
sysinfo = "0.40.1"
temp-env = "0.3.6"
tempfile = "3.27.0"
test-case = "3.4.0"
test-case = "3.4.1"
thiserror = "2.0.21"
tracing = { version = "0.1.44" }
tracing-appender = "0.2.5"
@@ -356,13 +358,13 @@ winapi-util = "0.1.11"
windows = { version = "0.62.2" }
windows-sys = "0.61.2"
xxhash-rust = { version = "0.8.19" }
zip = "9.1.3"
zip = "9.3.0"
zstd = "0.14.3"
# Observability and Metrics
metrics = "0.24.6"
metrics-util = "0.20"
dial9 = { version = "0.5.6", default-features = false }
dial9 = { version = "0.5.7", default-features = false }
opentelemetry = { version = "0.33.1" }
opentelemetry-appender-tracing = { version = "0.33.1" }
opentelemetry-otlp = { version = "0.33.1" }
@@ -377,16 +379,16 @@ libunftp = { version = "0.24.0" }
unftp-core = "0.1.0"
suppaftp = { version = "12.2.1" }
rcgen = { version = "0.14.10", default-features = false, features = ["aws_lc_rs", "crypto", "pem"] }
russh = { version = "0.65.0" }
russh = { version = "0.65.1" }
russh-sftp = "3.0.1"
# WebDAV
dav-server = "0.11.0"
# Performance Analysis and Memory Profiling
rustfs-mimalloc = { version = "0.7.2" }
rustfs-mimalloc = { version = "0.7.3" }
# Preserve Unicode focus filters until rustfs/backlog#2302 is resolved.
hotpath = { version = "0.30.1", default-features = false }
hotpath = { version = "0.30.3", default-features = false }
# Snapshot testing for output format regression detection
insta = { version = "1.49" }
@@ -427,7 +429,3 @@ strip = "none"
# Pin upstream fixes until compatible crates.io releases are available.
[patch.crates-io]
zstd = { path = "crates/zstd-compat" }
# Preserve RustFS OIDC flows while migrating the old elliptic-curve dependency chain.
# Upstream: openidconnect-rs#244 and oauth2-rs#352.
openidconnect = { git = "https://github.com/ramosbugs/openidconnect-rs", rev = "2f77ee73bc4554e1cb6279adb386005429fb4e41" }
oauth2 = { git = "https://github.com/ramosbugs/oauth2-rs", rev = "89585f4a280afd7b285eaf1c9be0068874e03d22" }
+11 -3
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@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ FROM alpine:3.24.2 AS build
ARG TARGETARCH
ARG RELEASE=latest
ARG RC_RELEASE=latest
RUN apk add --no-cache ca-certificates curl jq unzip
WORKDIR /build
@@ -69,6 +70,9 @@ RUN set -eux; \
chmod +x /build/rustfs; \
rm -rf rustfs.zip /build/.tmp || true
COPY scripts/download_rc.sh /usr/local/bin/download_rc.sh
RUN sh /usr/local/bin/download_rc.sh "$TARGETARCH" musl "$RC_RELEASE" /build/rc
FROM alpine:3.24.2
@@ -95,14 +99,18 @@ RUN apk upgrade --no-cache && \
ca-certificates \
coreutils \
curl \
jq \
tzdata \
&& test "$(TZ=Asia/Kolkata date +%z)" = "+0530"
COPY --from=build /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/
COPY --from=build /build/rustfs /usr/bin/rustfs
COPY entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh
COPY --from=build /build/rc /usr/bin/rc
COPY entrypoint.sh /etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh
COPY bootstrap/ /etc/rustfs/bootstrap/
RUN chmod +x /usr/bin/rustfs /entrypoint.sh
RUN chmod +x /usr/bin/rustfs /usr/bin/rc /etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh && \
ln -s /etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh
RUN addgroup -g 10001 -S rustfs && \
adduser -u 10001 -G rustfs -S rustfs -D && \
@@ -124,6 +132,6 @@ VOLUME ["/data"]
USER rustfs
ENTRYPOINT ["/entrypoint.sh"]
ENTRYPOINT ["/etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh"]
CMD ["rustfs"]
+13 -4
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@@ -12,7 +12,10 @@
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
FROM rust:1.97.1-trixie
FROM rust:1.99.1-trixie
ARG TARGETARCH
ARG RC_RELEASE=latest
RUN set -eux; \
export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive; \
@@ -21,6 +24,7 @@ RUN set -eux; \
build-essential \
ca-certificates \
curl \
jq \
git \
pkg-config \
libssl-dev \
@@ -36,6 +40,7 @@ COPY . .
RUN ./scripts/static.sh
RUN cargo run --bin gproto
RUN cargo build --release --locked --bin rustfs
RUN sh /usr/src/rustfs/scripts/download_rc.sh "$TARGETARCH" musl "$RC_RELEASE" /usr/local/bin/rc
RUN set -eux; \
groupadd -g 10001 rustfs; \
@@ -50,8 +55,12 @@ RUN set -eux; \
chown -R rustfs:rustfs /data /logs /app; \
chmod 0750 /data /logs
COPY entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh
RUN install -m 0755 /usr/src/rustfs/target/release/rustfs /usr/bin/rustfs && chmod +x /entrypoint.sh
COPY entrypoint.sh /etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh
COPY bootstrap/ /etc/rustfs/bootstrap/
RUN install -m 0755 /usr/src/rustfs/target/release/rustfs /usr/bin/rustfs && \
install -m 0755 /usr/local/bin/rc /usr/bin/rc && \
chmod +x /etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh && \
ln -s /etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh
ENV RUSTFS_VOLUMES="/data" \
RUST_LOG="warn" \
@@ -63,5 +72,5 @@ ENV RUSTFS_VOLUMES="/data" \
EXPOSE 9000 9001
ENTRYPOINT ["/entrypoint.sh"]
ENTRYPOINT ["/etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh"]
CMD ["/usr/bin/rustfs"]
+11 -3
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@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ FROM ubuntu:26.04 AS build
ARG TARGETARCH
ARG RELEASE=latest
ARG RC_RELEASE=latest
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
ca-certificates \
@@ -76,6 +77,9 @@ RUN set -eux; \
chmod +x /build/rustfs; \
rm -rf rustfs.zip /build/.tmp || true
COPY scripts/download_rc.sh /usr/local/bin/download_rc.sh
RUN sh /usr/local/bin/download_rc.sh "$TARGETARCH" gnu "$RC_RELEASE" /build/rc
FROM ubuntu:26.04
ARG RELEASE=latest
@@ -99,14 +103,18 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get upgrade -y \
&& DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
ca-certificates \
curl \
jq \
tzdata \
&& test "$(TZ=Asia/Kolkata date +%z)" = "+0530" \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
COPY --from=build /build/rustfs /usr/bin/rustfs
COPY entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh
COPY --from=build /build/rc /usr/bin/rc
COPY entrypoint.sh /etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh
COPY bootstrap/ /etc/rustfs/bootstrap/
RUN chmod +x /usr/bin/rustfs /entrypoint.sh
RUN chmod +x /usr/bin/rustfs /usr/bin/rc /etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh && \
ln -s /etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh
RUN groupadd -g 10001 rustfs && \
useradd -u 10001 -g rustfs -m -s /sbin/nologin rustfs && \
@@ -131,6 +139,6 @@ VOLUME ["/data"]
USER rustfs
ENTRYPOINT ["/entrypoint.sh"]
ENTRYPOINT ["/etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh"]
CMD ["rustfs"]
+19 -7
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@@ -28,17 +28,19 @@ ARG TARGETPLATFORM
ARG BUILDPLATFORM
ARG TARGETARCH
ARG RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES=""
ARG RC_RELEASE=latest
# -----------------------------
# Build stage
# -----------------------------
FROM rust:1.97.1-trixie AS builder
FROM rust:1.99.1-trixie AS builder
# Re-declare args after FROM
ARG TARGETPLATFORM
ARG BUILDPLATFORM
ARG TARGETARCH
ARG RUSTFS_BUILD_FEATURES
ARG RC_RELEASE
# Debug: print platforms
RUN echo "Build info -> BUILDPLATFORM=${BUILDPLATFORM}, TARGETPLATFORM=${TARGETPLATFORM}"
@@ -52,6 +54,7 @@ RUN set -eux; \
build-essential \
ca-certificates \
curl \
jq \
git \
pkg-config \
libssl-dev \
@@ -166,6 +169,8 @@ RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/usr/local/cargo/registry \
;; \
esac
RUN sh /usr/src/rustfs/scripts/download_rc.sh "$TARGETARCH" musl "$RC_RELEASE" /usr/local/bin/rc
# -----------------------------
# Development stage (keeps toolchain)
# -----------------------------
@@ -199,10 +204,13 @@ ENV RUSTFS_VOLUMES="/data" \
# We rely on cargo run to build and run
EXPOSE 9000 9001
COPY entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh
RUN chmod +x /entrypoint.sh
COPY entrypoint.sh /etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh
COPY bootstrap/ /etc/rustfs/bootstrap/
RUN install -m 0755 /usr/local/bin/rc /usr/bin/rc && \
chmod +x /etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh && \
ln -s /etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh
ENTRYPOINT ["/entrypoint.sh"]
ENTRYPOINT ["/etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh"]
CMD ["cargo", "run", "--bin", "rustfs", "--"]
# -----------------------------
@@ -227,6 +235,7 @@ RUN set -eux; \
apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
ca-certificates \
curl \
jq \
tzdata \
coreutils; \
rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
@@ -248,8 +257,11 @@ RUN set -eux; \
# Copy the freshly built binary and the entrypoint
COPY --from=builder /usr/local/bin/rustfs /usr/bin/rustfs
COPY entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh
RUN chmod +x /usr/bin/rustfs /entrypoint.sh
COPY --from=builder /usr/local/bin/rc /usr/bin/rc
COPY entrypoint.sh /etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh
COPY bootstrap/ /etc/rustfs/bootstrap/
RUN chmod +x /usr/bin/rustfs /usr/bin/rc /etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh && \
ln -s /etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh
# Default environment (override in docker run/compose as needed)
ENV RUSTFS_VOLUMES="/data" \
@@ -263,5 +275,5 @@ EXPOSE 9000
VOLUME ["/data"]
# Keep root here; entrypoint will drop privileges using chroot --userspec
ENTRYPOINT ["/entrypoint.sh"]
ENTRYPOINT ["/etc/rustfs/entrypoint.sh"]
CMD ["/usr/bin/rustfs"]
+21
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@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
# RustFS image bootstrap
The official image bundles this directory at `/etc/rustfs/bootstrap`. The default `buckets.json` is an empty JSON array, so the image starts RustFS directly and does not require a bootstrap endpoint or bootstrap credentials.
To create buckets, replace `buckets.json` in a derived image with a JSON array of bucket names. The entrypoint creates each bucket if it does not exist and applies `public-access-block.json`, whose default blocks all four public access paths. Edit that file in the derived image only when public access is an explicit requirement.
Optional per-bucket files use the bucket name as the filename without an extension:
| Directory | File format | Applied operation |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `policies/` | S3 bucket policy JSON | `rc bucket anonymous set-json` |
| `versioning/` | JSON boolean (`true` or `false`) | Enable or suspend bucket versioning |
| `lifecycle/` | `rc bucket lifecycle rule import` JSON | Replace lifecycle rules |
| `cors/` | JSON or XML accepted by `rc bucket cors set` | Replace CORS rules |
| `notifications/` | JSON array of `{ "arn": "...", "events": ["..."] }` | Add or replace event rules by ARN (prefix/suffix filters are not currently accepted) |
Every per-bucket file must correspond to a bucket listed in `buckets.json`. Applying these files is repeatable: bucket creation ignores existing buckets, while each configuration operation replaces or reconciles that bucket's requested state.
When `buckets.json` is non-empty, set `RUSTFS_BOOTSTRAP_ENDPOINT` to the RustFS S3 endpoint reachable from the container, for example `http://rustfs:9000` for a Compose service or the internal service DNS name in Kubernetes. The entrypoint waits on that endpoint's `/health/ready`; it never assumes `localhost`. `RUSTFS_BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT` controls the readiness wait in seconds (default `120`, maximum `3600`). `RUSTFS_BOOTSTRAP_DIR` can point to a different in-image configuration directory; it defaults to `/etc/rustfs/bootstrap`. Set `RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY` and `RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY`, or their `_FILE` variants, for bootstrap authentication. The endpoint and credentials are read at runtime and are not baked into the image.
RustFS built-in IAM policies remain unchanged; the default bootstrap installs no custom bucket policies, lifecycle rules, versioning, CORS rules, or notification rules. The bundled RustFS CLI is resolved from a published release and its release checksum is verified. Set the Docker build argument `RC_RELEASE` to a version to pin it. Build the RustFS image after a CLI release containing the `bucket public-access-block` commands is available. For Kubernetes, the configured service must route traffic to the starting pod before its readiness probe succeeds (for example, with `publishNotReadyAddresses: true`); otherwise the service endpoint cannot reach the pod while the entrypoint waits for readiness.
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
[]
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
{
"block_public_acls": true,
"ignore_public_acls": true,
"block_public_policy": true,
"restrict_public_buckets": true
}
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+3 -3
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@@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ pub const ENV_TRUSTED_PROXY_VALIDATION_MODE: &str = "RUSTFS_TRUSTED_PROXY_VALIDA
/// Default validation mode is "hop_by_hop".
pub const DEFAULT_TRUSTED_PROXY_VALIDATION_MODE: &str = "hop_by_hop";
/// Environment variable to enable RFC 7239 "Forwarded" header support.
/// Select RFC 7239 "Forwarded" instead of "X-Forwarded-For" in legacy mode.
pub const ENV_TRUSTED_PROXY_ENABLE_RFC7239: &str = "RUSTFS_TRUSTED_PROXY_ENABLE_RFC7239";
/// RFC 7239 support is enabled by default.
pub const DEFAULT_TRUSTED_PROXY_ENABLE_RFC7239: bool = true;
/// Legacy mode uses X-Forwarded-For unless RFC 7239 is explicitly selected.
pub const DEFAULT_TRUSTED_PROXY_ENABLE_RFC7239: bool = false;
/// Environment variable for the maximum allowed proxy hops.
pub const ENV_TRUSTED_PROXY_MAX_HOPS: &str = "RUSTFS_TRUSTED_PROXY_MAX_HOPS";
+6
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@@ -146,3 +146,9 @@ pub const ENV_TARGET_STORE_COMPRESS: &str = "RUSTFS_TARGET_STORE_COMPRESS";
/// Queue-store compression is enabled by default to reduce disk footprint.
pub const DEFAULT_TARGET_STORE_COMPRESS: bool = true;
/// Maximum on-disk bytes in each target queue, including failed entries and pending writes.
pub const ENV_TARGET_STORE_MAX_BYTES: &str = "RUSTFS_TARGET_STORE_MAX_BYTES";
/// Queue writes fail at one GiB unless the operator sets another positive byte budget.
pub const DEFAULT_TARGET_STORE_MAX_BYTES: u64 = 1024 * 1024 * 1024;
+6 -1
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@@ -175,12 +175,17 @@ pub const ENV_HTTP_SOCKET_RECV_BUFFER_BYTES: &str = "RUSTFS_HTTP_SOCKET_RECV_BUF
pub const DEFAULT_HTTP_SOCKET_RECV_BUFFER_BYTES: usize = 0;
/// Environment variable for the S3 request-body inter-chunk read timeout
/// (seconds). Default: 300. Set to 0 to disable.
/// (seconds). Default: 300. Set to 0 to disable the inactivity timeout.
///
/// This bounds how long a `PutObject`/upload may wait for the *next* body chunk
/// while more bytes are still expected. It resets on every chunk, so it does not
/// penalize slow-but-progressing uploads — it only fires when a peer sends a
/// partial body and then goes silent *without* closing the connection (no EOF).
/// Independently of this knob, `PutObject` and `UploadPart` require at least
/// 64 KiB of body progress per 60 seconds of server wait (the minimum-progress
/// floor, logged as `upload_body_progress_stalled`); it bounds trickle uploads
/// that would otherwise pin upload admission indefinitely, and it stays in
/// force when this timeout is set to 0.
/// A reverse proxy or CDN that forwards a truncated body this way would
/// otherwise make RustFS wait forever for bytes that never arrive; with this
/// timeout the stalled read is aborted and logged with the received/expected
+55 -2
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@@ -675,6 +675,10 @@ impl DataUsageInfo {
/// cycle. The timestamp fallback preserves ordering for legacy snapshots that
/// predate those fields.
pub fn data_usage_snapshot_is_newer(candidate: &DataUsageInfo, baseline: &DataUsageInfo) -> bool {
data_usage_identity_is_newer(candidate.snapshot_identity(), baseline.snapshot_identity())
}
fn data_usage_identity_is_newer(candidate: DataUsageSnapshotIdentity, baseline: DataUsageSnapshotIdentity) -> bool {
match (
candidate.scanner_epoch.zip(candidate.scanner_cycle),
baseline.scanner_epoch.zip(baseline.scanner_cycle),
@@ -697,10 +701,18 @@ pub fn data_usage_snapshot_is_newer(candidate: &DataUsageInfo, baseline: &DataUs
/// already advance the authoritative timestamp when deleting a bucket, so a
/// rollback delete/recreate fences the previous bucket incarnation too.
pub fn observed_data_usage_is_newer(observed: &DataUsageInfo, authoritative: &DataUsageInfo) -> bool {
observed_data_usage_is_newer_than_identity(observed, authoritative.snapshot_identity())
}
/// Return whether a nonconverged observation may supersede `authoritative`.
///
/// This applies the structural, exact-baseline, and generation checks of
/// [`observed_data_usage_is_newer`] without retaining the baseline's bucket maps.
pub fn observed_data_usage_is_newer_than_identity(observed: &DataUsageInfo, authoritative: DataUsageSnapshotIdentity) -> bool {
observed.usage_snapshot_converged == Some(false)
&& (observed.is_complete_bucket_usage_snapshot() || observed.is_valid_partial_snapshot())
&& observed.usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline.as_ref() == Some(&authoritative.snapshot_identity())
&& data_usage_snapshot_is_newer(observed, authoritative)
&& observed.usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline == Some(authoritative)
&& data_usage_identity_is_newer(observed.snapshot_identity(), authoritative)
}
/// Metadata describing the status of a disk-level data usage snapshot.
@@ -3140,12 +3152,17 @@ mod tests {
};
assert!(observed_data_usage_is_newer(&observed, &authoritative));
assert!(observed_data_usage_is_newer_than_identity(&observed, authoritative.snapshot_identity()));
authoritative.last_update = Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(601));
assert!(
!observed_data_usage_is_newer(&observed, &authoritative),
"an old-binary namespace mutation must fence the prior bucket incarnation regardless of clock skew"
);
assert!(
!observed_data_usage_is_newer_than_identity(&observed, authoritative.snapshot_identity()),
"a captured identity must preserve the exact namespace fence"
);
}
#[test]
@@ -3172,6 +3189,18 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!observed_data_usage_is_newer(&candidate(2, 9, Some(false), true), &authoritative));
assert!(!observed_data_usage_is_newer(&candidate(2, 11, Some(true), true), &authoritative));
assert!(!observed_data_usage_is_newer(&candidate(2, 11, Some(false), false), &authoritative));
for (observed, expected) in [
(candidate(2, 11, Some(false), true), true),
(candidate(2, 9, Some(false), true), false),
(candidate(2, 11, Some(true), true), false),
(candidate(2, 11, Some(false), false), false),
] {
assert_eq!(
observed_data_usage_is_newer_than_identity(&observed, authoritative.snapshot_identity()),
expected,
"observation identity selection must preserve convergence, completeness, and generation gates"
);
}
let mut partial = candidate(2, 11, Some(false), false);
partial.usage_snapshot_partial = true;
@@ -3186,6 +3215,30 @@ mod tests {
segment_invalidation_proof: None,
}];
assert!(observed_data_usage_is_newer(&partial, &authoritative));
assert!(observed_data_usage_is_newer_than_identity(&partial, authoritative.snapshot_identity()));
}
#[test]
fn observation_identity_selection_keeps_legacy_timestamp_ordering() {
let baseline = DataUsageSnapshotIdentity {
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(10)),
// An epoch without a cycle is not a coordinated position.
scanner_epoch: Some(2),
scanner_cycle: None,
};
let mut observed = DataUsageInfo {
last_update: Some(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(11)),
scanner_epoch: Some(1),
usage_snapshot_complete: true,
usage_snapshot_converged: Some(false),
usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline: Some(baseline),
..Default::default()
};
assert!(observed_data_usage_is_newer_than_identity(&observed, baseline));
observed.last_update = baseline.last_update;
assert!(!observed_data_usage_is_newer_than_identity(&observed, baseline));
observed.last_update = None;
assert!(!observed_data_usage_is_newer_than_identity(&observed, baseline));
}
#[test]
+3 -3
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Registered in [`src/lib.rs`](src/lib.rs). Grouped by concern:
| **protocols** | [`src/protocols/`](src/protocols) | FTPS, WebDAV, SFTP compliance. Fixed ports, own guide: [`src/protocols/README.md`](src/protocols/README.md) |
| **reliant** | [`src/reliant/`](src/reliant) | Tests that reuse an **externally started** server (SQL/select, conditional writes, lifecycle, deleted-object reads, node-interact). Run via [`scripts/run_e2e_tests.sh`](../../scripts/run_e2e_tests.sh); see [`src/reliant/README.md`](src/reliant/README.md) |
| **cluster** | `cluster_concurrency_test`, `stale_multipart_cleanup_cluster_test`, `namespace_lock_quorum_test`, `admin_timeout_regression_test`, `object_lambda_test`, `replication_extension_test`, `tier_stats_cluster_test` | Multi-node scenarios via `RustFSTestClusterEnvironment` |
| **distributed 4×4** | [`src/distributed/`](src/distributed) | Storage-sensitive PR and nightly `e2e-distributed` lane: S3, object lock/WORM, versioning, bucket/site replication, quota, expand/decommission/rebalance, concurrency, chaos, 4-node upgrade of historical data and IAM AK/SK. Map: [`docs/testing/distributed-e2e.md`](../../docs/testing/distributed-e2e.md) |
| **distributed 4×4** | [`src/distributed/`](src/distributed) | Nightly `e2e-distributed` lane: S3, object lock/WORM, versioning, bucket/site replication, quota, expand/decommission/rebalance, concurrency, chaos, 4-node upgrade of historical data and IAM AK/SK. Map: [`docs/testing/distributed-e2e.md`](../../docs/testing/distributed-e2e.md) |
| **chaos / reliability** | [`src/chaos.rs`](src/chaos.rs), `reliability_disk_fault_test`, `heal_erasure_disk_rebuild_test`, `server_startup_failfast_test` | Disk offline/replace/corrupt, EC rebuild, heal, fail-fast startup |
| **upgrade compatibility** | `upgrade_compatibility_test` | Pinned previous-release writes followed by current-build reads on the same data directory |
@@ -194,9 +194,9 @@ the same profile for membership and execution with one nightly worker.
| `s3s-e2e` black-box | `e2e-tests` + `e2e-tests-rio-v2` jobs | **Active** (external conformance tool) |
| ILM / lifecycle (ignored) | `test-ilm-integration-serial` lane, `-j1` | **Active** (backlog#1148 ilm-1) |
| KMS suite | `e2e-full` job, merge queue + main | **Active** |
| Direct and mixed-version rolling upgrades from pinned previous release | `e2e-upgrade.yml`, storage-sensitive PRs + release tags + weekly | **Active** |
| Direct and mixed-version rolling upgrades from pinned previous release | `e2e-upgrade.yml`, release tags + weekly schedule + manual dispatch | **Active** |
| Cluster faults (`e2e-nightly` profile) | consolidated nightly workflow | **Active** (backlog#1149 ci-7) |
| Distributed 4-node 4-disk (`e2e-distributed` profile) | `.github/workflows/e2e-distributed.yml` | **Active** (storage-sensitive PR / nightly / dispatch) |
| Distributed 4-node 4-disk (`e2e-distributed` profile) | `.github/workflows/e2e-distributed.yml` | **Active** (nightly / dispatch) |
| Protocols (FTPS/WebDAV/SFTP) | consolidated nightly workflow, serial | **Active** (backlog#1149 ci-7) |
| Replication (fast subset) | `e2e-smoke` profile, `e2e-tests` job, every PR | **Active** (backlog#1147 repl-1) |
| Replication (slow + multi-node) | `e2e-repl-nightly` profile, consolidated nightly workflow | **Active** (backlog#1147 repl-1) |
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ async fn iam_policy_requires_if_match(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, admin: &Clien
let key = "guarded.txt";
admin_create_user(env, &user, user_secret).await?;
let policy = serde_json::json!({
let mut policy = serde_json::json!({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
@@ -268,9 +268,8 @@ async fn iam_policy_requires_if_match(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, admin: &Clien
"Resource": [format!("arn:aws:s3:::{bucket}/*")],
"Condition": { "Null": { "s3:if-match": "false" } }
}]
})
.to_string();
admin_add_and_attach_policy(env, &policy_name, &policy, &user).await?;
});
admin_add_and_attach_policy(env, &policy_name, &policy.to_string(), &user).await?;
admin.create_bucket().bucket(&bucket).send().await?;
let original = admin
@@ -293,6 +292,46 @@ async fn iam_policy_requires_if_match(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, admin: &Clien
.expect_err("PutObject without If-Match must be denied");
assert_error(&denied, "AccessDenied", 403, "unconditional PutObject");
let denied = client
.put_object()
.bucket(&bucket)
.key(key)
.if_match(&etag)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"missing-read-permission"))
.send()
.await
.expect_err("If-Match without GetObject must be denied");
assert_error(&denied, "AccessDenied", 403, "conditional PutObject without GetObject");
// S3 requires GetObject as well as PutObject for an ETag-based write.
policy["Statement"]
.as_array_mut()
.expect("policy statements")
.push(serde_json::json!({
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:GetObject"],
"Resource": [format!("arn:aws:s3:::{bucket}/{key}")]
}));
admin_add_canned_policy_via(
AdminTransport::Signed,
&env.url,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
&policy_name,
&policy.to_string(),
)
.await?;
let denied = client
.put_object()
.bucket(&bucket)
.key(key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"blind-overwrite"))
.send()
.await
.expect_err("GetObject permission must not allow an unconditional PutObject");
assert_error(&denied, "AccessDenied", 403, "unconditional PutObject with GetObject");
client
.put_object()
.bucket(&bucket)
@@ -301,6 +340,8 @@ async fn iam_policy_requires_if_match(env: &RustFSTestEnvironment, admin: &Clien
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"v2"))
.send()
.await?;
let written = client.get_object().bucket(&bucket).key(key).send().await?;
assert_eq!(written.body.collect().await?.into_bytes().as_ref(), b"v2");
let _ = admin.delete_object().bucket(&bucket).key(key).send().await;
let _ = admin.delete_bucket().bucket(&bucket).send().await;
@@ -502,10 +502,163 @@ mod tests {
assert!(response.contains(if expected == reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN {
"<Code>AccessDenied</Code>"
} else {
"<Code>BucketAlreadyExists</Code>"
"<Code>BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou</Code>"
}));
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// A deployment owns a single bucket namespace, so an IAM user that recreates
/// an existing bucket is the owner, not another account. In the default region
/// every such request returns the legacy idempotent `200 OK` (AWS CreateBucket
/// semantics), including buckets created by root and by another IAM user.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_create_bucket_duplicate_in_default_region_is_idempotent_for_iam_user()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec!["--region", "us-east-1"]).await?;
let root = env.create_s3_client();
admin_create_user(&env, "duplicate-iam", "duplicate-iam-secret").await?;
admin_attach_user_policy_via(
AdminTransport::Signed,
&env.url,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
"readwrite",
"duplicate-iam",
)
.await?;
let iam = Client::from_conf(build_test_s3_config(
&env.url,
"duplicate-iam",
"duplicate-iam-secret",
None,
"duplicate-create",
));
root.create_bucket()
.bucket("duplicate-root-owned")
.send()
.await
.expect("root creates the first bucket");
iam.create_bucket()
.bucket("duplicate-root-owned")
.send()
.await
.expect("an IAM user recreating a root-owned bucket in us-east-1 gets 200 OK");
iam.create_bucket()
.bucket("duplicate-iam-owned")
.send()
.await
.expect("the IAM user creates its own bucket");
iam.create_bucket()
.bucket("duplicate-iam-owned")
.send()
.await
.expect("the same IAM user recreating its bucket gets 200 OK");
root.create_bucket()
.bucket("duplicate-iam-owned")
.send()
.await
.expect("root recreating an IAM-created bucket gets 200 OK");
Ok(())
}
/// Outside the default region the same ownership answer becomes
/// `409 BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou` for every authorized requester. Requests that
/// lack `s3:CreateBucket` still fail authorization before the duplicate check.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_create_bucket_duplicate_outside_default_region_reports_owned_by_you() -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>
{
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(vec!["--region", "eu-west-1"]).await?;
let region = "eu-west-1";
let root = Client::from_conf(
env.create_s3_client()
.config()
.to_builder()
.region(Region::new(region))
.build(),
);
admin_create_user(&env, "duplicate-eu-iam", "duplicate-eu-iam-secret").await?;
admin_attach_user_policy_via(
AdminTransport::Signed,
&env.url,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
"readwrite",
"duplicate-eu-iam",
)
.await?;
let iam = Client::from_conf(
build_test_s3_config(&env.url, "duplicate-eu-iam", "duplicate-eu-iam-secret", None, "duplicate-create")
.to_builder()
.region(Region::new(region))
.build(),
);
admin_create_user(&env, "duplicate-eu-readonly", "duplicate-eu-readonly-secret").await?;
admin_attach_user_policy_via(
AdminTransport::Signed,
&env.url,
&env.access_key,
&env.secret_key,
"readonly",
"duplicate-eu-readonly",
)
.await?;
let readonly = Client::from_conf(
build_test_s3_config(
&env.url,
"duplicate-eu-readonly",
"duplicate-eu-readonly-secret",
None,
"duplicate-create",
)
.to_builder()
.region(Region::new(region))
.build(),
);
for (client, bucket) in [(&root, "duplicate-eu-root"), (&iam, "duplicate-eu-iam")] {
client
.create_bucket()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|error| panic!("{bucket} must be created: {error:?}"));
// Both the creator and the other authenticated identity own the namespace.
for creator in [&root, &iam] {
let error = creator
.create_bucket()
.bucket(bucket)
.send()
.await
.expect_err("a duplicate create outside us-east-1 must report ownership");
assert_eq!(
error.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code),
Some("BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou"),
"{bucket}"
);
assert_eq!(error.raw_response().map(|response| response.status().as_u16()), Some(409), "{bucket}");
}
}
let denied = readonly
.create_bucket()
.bucket("duplicate-eu-root")
.send()
.await
.expect_err("a requester without s3:CreateBucket must be denied before the duplicate check");
assert_eq!(denied.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code), Some("AccessDenied"));
Ok(())
}
}
@@ -16,8 +16,193 @@
mod tests {
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
use aws_sdk_s3::config::http::HttpResponse;
use aws_sdk_s3::error::{ProvideErrorMetadata, SdkError};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{BucketVersioningStatus, VersioningConfiguration};
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{BucketVersioningStatus, CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart, VersioningConfiguration};
fn assert_not_found<E: ProvideErrorMetadata + std::fmt::Debug>(error: &SdkError<E, HttpResponse>) {
assert_eq!(error.raw_response().map(|r| r.status().as_u16()), Some(404), "{error:?}");
assert_eq!(
error.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code),
Some("NoSuchKey"),
"{error:?}"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn conditional_writes_cannot_replace_delete_marker_with_if_match() {
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await.expect("create test environment");
env.start_rustfs_server(vec![]).await.expect("start RustFS");
let client = env.create_s3_client();
let bucket = "conditional-delete-marker-proof";
create_versioned_bucket(&client, bucket).await;
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key("source")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"source"))
.send()
.await
.expect("write copy source");
for operation in ["put", "copy", "multipart"] {
let old = client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(operation)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"old"))
.send()
.await
.expect("write historical version");
let old_etag = old.e_tag().expect("historical ETag");
let marker = client
.delete_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(operation)
.send()
.await
.expect("create delete marker");
let marker_id = marker.version_id().expect("delete marker version");
let (upload_id, completed) = if operation == "multipart" {
let upload = client
.create_multipart_upload()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(operation)
.send()
.await
.expect("initiate multipart upload");
let upload_id = upload.upload_id().expect("upload ID").to_owned();
let part = client
.upload_part()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(operation)
.upload_id(&upload_id)
.part_number(1)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"new"))
.send()
.await
.expect("upload part");
let completed = CompletedMultipartUpload::builder()
.parts(
CompletedPart::builder()
.part_number(1)
.set_e_tag(part.e_tag().map(str::to_owned))
.build(),
)
.build();
(Some(upload_id), Some(completed))
} else {
(None, None)
};
for etag in [old_etag, "\"00000000000000000000000000000000\""] {
match operation {
"put" => {
let err = client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(operation)
.if_match(etag)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"new"))
.send()
.await
.expect_err("If-Match must reject marker");
assert_not_found(&err);
}
"copy" => {
let err = client
.copy_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(operation)
.copy_source(format!("{bucket}/source"))
.if_match(etag)
.send()
.await
.expect_err("If-Match copy must reject marker");
assert_not_found(&err);
}
_ => {
let err = client
.complete_multipart_upload()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(operation)
.upload_id(upload_id.as_deref().expect("upload ID"))
.multipart_upload(completed.clone().expect("completed parts"))
.if_match(etag)
.send()
.await
.expect_err("If-Match completion must reject marker");
assert_not_found(&err);
}
}
let versions = client
.list_object_versions()
.bucket(bucket)
.prefix(operation)
.send()
.await
.expect("list versions after rejected write");
assert_eq!(versions.versions().len(), 1, "{operation}: failed write created a version");
assert_eq!(versions.delete_markers().len(), 1);
assert_eq!(versions.delete_markers()[0].version_id(), Some(marker_id));
assert_eq!(versions.delete_markers()[0].is_latest(), Some(true));
}
match operation {
"put" => {
client
.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(operation)
.if_none_match("*")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"new"))
.send()
.await
.expect("If-None-Match PUT over marker");
}
"copy" => {
client
.copy_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(operation)
.copy_source(format!("{bucket}/source"))
.if_none_match("*")
.send()
.await
.expect("If-None-Match copy over marker");
}
_ => {
client
.complete_multipart_upload()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(operation)
.upload_id(upload_id.as_deref().expect("upload ID"))
.multipart_upload(completed.expect("completed parts"))
.if_none_match("*")
.send()
.await
.expect("If-None-Match completion over marker");
}
}
let current = client
.get_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(operation)
.send()
.await
.expect("read successful conditional write")
.body
.collect()
.await
.expect("read object body")
.into_bytes();
let expected: &[u8] = if operation == "copy" { b"source" } else { b"new" };
assert_eq!(current.as_ref(), expected, "{operation}: unexpected current object");
}
}
async fn create_versioned_bucket(client: &Client, bucket: &str) {
client
@@ -12,11 +12,249 @@
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use super::harness::{DistCluster, DistLayout, TestResult, assert_object_bytes, payload_for, put_object, unique_bucket};
use super::harness::{DistCluster, DistLayout, TestResult, payload_for, s3_probe_client, sha256_hex, unique_bucket};
use crate::common::init_logging;
use aws_sdk_s3::{
Client,
error::{ProvideErrorMetadata, SdkError},
primitives::ByteStream,
};
use std::any::TypeId;
use std::collections::BTreeSet;
use std::fmt::Debug;
use std::future::Future;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::sync::Barrier;
use tokio::time::Instant;
const LOCK_ADMISSION_BUDGET: Duration = Duration::from_secs(45);
async fn after_lock_contention<T, E, F, Fut>(operation: &str, mut call: F) -> TestResult<Result<T, SdkError<E>>>
where
E: Debug + ProvideErrorMetadata + 'static,
F: FnMut() -> Fut,
Fut: Future<Output = Result<T, SdkError<E>>>,
{
let started = Instant::now();
let mut attempts = 0;
// The workload uses unique unversioned keys. Repeat only explicitly
// advertised lock backpressure; every step still needs its real result.
let outcome = tokio::time::timeout(LOCK_ADMISSION_BUDGET, async {
loop {
attempts += 1;
let result = call().await;
let retry = result.as_ref().err().is_some_and(|error| {
let Some(response) = error.raw_response() else {
return false;
};
let Some(service_error) = error.as_service_error() else {
return false;
};
// HEAD has no XML error body, so its SDK service error can
// lack a code even when the server supplies retry headers.
let namespace_code = service_error.code() == Some("ServiceUnavailable")
|| (service_error.code().is_none()
&& TypeId::of::<E>() == TypeId::of::<aws_sdk_s3::operation::head_object::HeadObjectError>());
response.status().as_u16() == 503
&& namespace_code
&& response.headers().get("x-rustfs-error-cause") == Some("namespace_lock_timeout")
&& response.headers().get("retry-after") == Some("1")
});
if !retry {
return result;
}
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
})
.await;
if attempts > 1 || !matches!(&outcome, Ok(Ok(_))) {
eprintln!(
"mixed workload request: operation={operation}, attempts={attempts}, elapsed={:?}",
started.elapsed()
);
}
outcome.map_err(|_| {
format!("{operation} exceeded its {LOCK_ADMISSION_BUDGET:?} request budget after {attempts} attempts").into()
})
}
async fn assert_workload_bytes(client: &Client, bucket: &str, key: &str, expected: &[u8]) -> TestResult {
let output = after_lock_contention(&format!("GET {key}"), || client.get_object().bucket(bucket).key(key).send()).await??;
let actual = output.body.collect().await?.into_bytes();
if actual.as_ref() != expected {
return Err(format!(
"object {key} bytes mismatch: expected {} bytes sha256={} got {} bytes sha256={}",
expected.len(),
sha256_hex(expected),
actual.len(),
sha256_hex(&actual)
)
.into());
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use aws_smithy_http_client::test_util::infallible_client_fn;
use aws_smithy_types::body::SdkBody;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
type Reply = (u16, &'static str, Option<&'static str>, Option<&'static str>, &'static str);
fn client(respond: impl Fn(usize) -> Reply + Send + Sync + 'static) -> (Client, Arc<AtomicUsize>) {
let requests = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
let seen = Arc::clone(&requests);
let transport = infallible_client_fn(move |_| {
let (status, code, cause, retry_after, body) = respond(seen.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst));
let body = if code.is_empty() {
body.to_string()
} else {
format!("<Error><Code>{code}</Code></Error>")
};
let mut response = http::Response::builder()
.status(status)
.header("content-type", "application/xml")
.header("content-length", body.len());
if let Some(cause) = cause {
response = response.header("x-rustfs-error-cause", cause);
}
if let Some(retry_after) = retry_after {
response = response.header("retry-after", retry_after);
}
response.body(SdkBody::from(body)).expect("scripted S3 response")
});
let config = crate::common::build_test_s3_config(
"http://contention.example.invalid",
"synthetic-access",
"synthetic-secret",
None,
"contention-test",
);
let client = Client::from_conf(config.to_builder().http_client(transport).build());
(s3_probe_client(&client), requests)
}
fn contention() -> Reply {
(503, "ServiceUnavailable", Some("namespace_lock_timeout"), Some("1"), "")
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn advertised_contention_recovers_after_standard_sdk_attempts_are_exhausted() -> TestResult {
let (client, requests) = client(|attempt| {
if attempt < 3 {
contention()
} else {
(200, "", None, None, "")
}
});
let standard = Client::from_conf(
client
.config()
.to_builder()
.retry_config(aws_sdk_s3::config::retry::RetryConfig::standard().with_max_attempts(3))
.build(),
);
standard
.put_object()
.bucket("bucket")
.key("key")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"body"))
.send()
.await
.expect_err("three advertised lock responses exhaust the standard SDK policy");
assert_eq!(requests.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 3);
requests.store(0, Ordering::SeqCst);
let started = Instant::now();
after_lock_contention("PUT recovery", || {
client
.put_object()
.bucket("bucket")
.key("key")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"body"))
.send()
})
.await??;
assert_eq!(requests.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 4);
assert!(started.elapsed() >= Duration::from_secs(3), "honor each Retry-After response");
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn bodyless_head_contention_uses_explicit_retry_headers() -> TestResult {
let (client, requests) = client(|attempt| {
if attempt == 0 {
(503, "", Some("namespace_lock_timeout"), Some("1"), "")
} else {
(200, "", None, None, "")
}
});
after_lock_contention("HEAD recovery", || client.head_object().bucket("bucket").key("key").send()).await??;
assert_eq!(requests.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 2);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn unrelated_or_malformed_responses_are_not_retried() -> TestResult {
for reply in [
(500, "InternalError", Some("namespace_lock_timeout"), Some("1"), ""),
(403, "AccessDenied", None, None, ""),
(404, "NoSuchKey", None, None, ""),
(503, "ServiceUnavailable", Some("storage_write_quorum"), None, ""),
(503, "ServiceUnavailable", Some("namespace_lock_unavailable"), Some("1"), ""),
(503, "InternalError", Some("namespace_lock_timeout"), Some("1"), ""),
(503, "", Some("namespace_lock_timeout"), Some("1"), ""),
(503, "ServiceUnavailable", None, Some("1"), ""),
(503, "ServiceUnavailable", Some("namespace_lock_timeout"), None, ""),
(503, "ServiceUnavailable", Some("namespace_lock_timeout"), Some("2"), ""),
] {
let (client, requests) = client(move |_| reply);
let result = after_lock_contention("PUT fatal response", || {
client
.put_object()
.bucket("bucket")
.key("key")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"body"))
.send()
})
.await?;
assert!(result.is_err(), "fatal response cannot become success: {reply:?}");
assert_eq!(requests.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1, "fatal response must remain visible: {reply:?}");
}
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn persistent_lock_contention_exhausts_the_request_budget() {
let (client, requests) = client(|_| contention());
let started = Instant::now();
let result = after_lock_contention("PUT unavailable", || {
client
.put_object()
.bucket("bucket")
.key("key")
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b"body"))
.send()
})
.await;
assert!(result.is_err(), "persistent contention cannot acknowledge an operation");
assert!(started.elapsed() >= LOCK_ADMISSION_BUDGET);
assert!(requests.load(Ordering::SeqCst) > 1);
assert!(requests.load(Ordering::SeqCst) <= LOCK_ADMISSION_BUDGET.as_secs() as usize + 1);
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn acknowledged_wrong_bytes_fail_without_retry() {
let (client, requests) = client(|_| (200, "", None, None, "wrong bytes"));
let error = assert_workload_bytes(&client, "bucket", "key", b"expected bytes")
.await
.expect_err("a successful but incorrect read is a consistency failure");
assert!(error.to_string().contains("bytes mismatch"));
assert_eq!(requests.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn four_node_high_concurrency_mixed_workload_is_consistent_on_every_node() -> TestResult {
@@ -24,7 +262,9 @@ async fn four_node_high_concurrency_mixed_workload_is_consistent_on_every_node()
let dist = DistCluster::start(DistLayout::FourByFour).await?;
let bucket = unique_bucket("conc");
dist.create_bucket(&bucket).await?;
let clients = Arc::new(dist.clients()?);
// This consistency probe owns its admission policy; unrelated responses
// must not be hidden by the SDK's general-purpose retries.
let clients = Arc::new(dist.clients()?.iter().map(s3_probe_client).collect::<Vec<_>>());
let worker_count = 24;
let rounds = 4;
let barrier = Arc::new(Barrier::new(worker_count));
@@ -44,31 +284,46 @@ async fn four_node_high_concurrency_mixed_workload_is_consistent_on_every_node()
let key = format!("source/worker-{idx:02}-round-{round}.bin");
let copy_key = format!("retained/worker-{idx:02}-round-{round}.bin");
let body = payload_for(&key, 64 * 1024);
put_object(writer, &bucket, &key, body.clone()).await?;
let context = format!("worker={idx} round={round}");
after_lock_contention(&format!("{context} PUT source"), || {
writer
.put_object()
.bucket(&bucket)
.key(&key)
.body(ByteStream::from(body.clone()))
.send()
})
.await??;
let head = reader.head_object().bucket(&bucket).key(&key).send().await?;
let head = after_lock_contention(&format!("{context} HEAD source"), || {
reader.head_object().bucket(&bucket).key(&key).send()
})
.await??;
if head.content_length() != Some(body.len() as i64) {
return Err(format!("HEAD returned the wrong size for {key}: {head:?}").into());
}
assert_object_bytes(reader, &bucket, &key, &body).await?;
assert_workload_bytes(reader, &bucket, &key, &body).await?;
copier
.copy_object()
.bucket(&bucket)
.key(&copy_key)
.copy_source(format!("{bucket}/{key}"))
.send()
.await?;
assert_object_bytes(writer, &bucket, &copy_key, &body).await?;
after_lock_contention(&format!("{context} COPY retained"), || {
copier
.copy_object()
.bucket(&bucket)
.key(&copy_key)
.copy_source(format!("{bucket}/{key}"))
.send()
})
.await??;
assert_workload_bytes(writer, &bucket, &copy_key, &body).await?;
writer.delete_object().bucket(&bucket).key(&key).send().await?;
let missing = reader
.head_object()
.bucket(&bucket)
.key(&key)
.send()
.await
.expect_err("deleted source key must not remain visible");
after_lock_contention(&format!("{context} DELETE source"), || {
writer.delete_object().bucket(&bucket).key(&key).send()
})
.await??;
let missing = after_lock_contention(&format!("{context} HEAD deleted source"), || {
reader.head_object().bucket(&bucket).key(&key).send()
})
.await?
.expect_err("deleted source key must not remain visible");
if missing.raw_response().map(|response| response.status().as_u16()) != Some(404) {
return Err(format!("deleted source {key} returned an unexpected result: {missing:?}").into());
}
@@ -82,14 +337,22 @@ async fn four_node_high_concurrency_mixed_workload_is_consistent_on_every_node()
for handle in handles {
inventory.extend(handle.await??);
}
assert_eq!(
inventory.len(),
worker_count * rounds,
"every worker round must retain its acknowledged copy"
);
let expected_keys: BTreeSet<_> = inventory.iter().map(|(key, _)| key.as_str()).collect();
for (node_idx, client) in clients.iter().enumerate() {
let listed = client.list_objects_v2().bucket(&bucket).prefix("retained/").send().await?;
let listed = after_lock_contention(&format!("node={node_idx} LIST retained"), || {
client.list_objects_v2().bucket(&bucket).prefix("retained/").send()
})
.await??;
let listed_keys: BTreeSet<_> = listed.contents().iter().filter_map(|object| object.key()).collect();
assert_eq!(listed_keys, expected_keys, "node {node_idx} returned a divergent retained-key listing");
for (key, body) in &inventory {
assert_object_bytes(client, &bucket, key, body)
assert_workload_bytes(client, &bucket, key, body)
.await
.map_err(|error| format!("node {node_idx} failed to read {key}: {error}"))?;
}
@@ -25,7 +25,8 @@
use super::harness::{
DistCluster, DistLayout, TestResult, cluster_admin, cluster_admin_ok, decommission_status_json, get_object_bytes,
payload_for, put_object, s3_probe_client, s3_probe_error_code, sha256_hex, unique_bucket, wait_until,
payload_for, put_object, rebalance_complete, rebalance_status_json, s3_probe_client, s3_probe_error_code, sha256_hex,
unique_bucket, wait_until,
};
use crate::chaos::{VersionShardCensus, census_object_version_on_disk};
use crate::common::{FAST_DATA_USAGE_SCANNER_ENV, RustFSTestClusterEnvironment};
@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ use tokio::time::{Instant, sleep};
use uuid::Uuid;
pub(crate) const MOVEMENT_BARRIER_DIR_ENV: &str = "RUSTFS_E2E_DATA_MOVEMENT_BARRIER_DIR";
pub(crate) const STAGE_AFTER_ENTRY_ADMISSION: &str = "after_entry_admission";
pub(crate) const STAGE_BEFORE_TARGET_COMMIT: &str = "before_target_commit";
pub(crate) const STAGE_BEFORE_SOURCE_CLEANUP: &str = "before_source_cleanup";
pub(crate) const STAGE_AFTER_RESPONSIBILITY_PERSISTED: &str = "after_responsibility_persisted";
@@ -1166,8 +1168,21 @@ pub(crate) async fn clear_decommission(cluster: &RustFSTestClusterEnvironment, p
.await
}
pub(crate) async fn stop_rebalance(cluster: &RustFSTestClusterEnvironment) -> TestResult<String> {
cluster_admin_ok(cluster, Method::POST, "/rustfs/admin/v3/rebalance/stop", None).await
pub(crate) async fn stop_rebalance(cluster: &RustFSTestClusterEnvironment, expected_id: &str) -> TestResult<String> {
let path = "/rustfs/admin/v3/rebalance/stop";
let (status, response) = cluster_admin(cluster, Method::POST, path, None).await?;
if status.is_success() {
return Ok(response);
}
// The run can finish between the active observation and the stop request.
// Only completion of that same run makes a not-started response acceptable.
if status == StatusCode::NOT_FOUND
&& response.contains("<Code>NoSuchResource</Code>")
&& rebalance_complete(&rebalance_status_json(cluster).await?, expected_id)?
{
return Ok(response);
}
Err(format!("POST {path} failed: {status} {response}").into())
}
pub(crate) fn decommission_pool_entry(status: &Value, pool_id: usize) -> TestResult<Value> {
@@ -1585,6 +1600,129 @@ pub(crate) async fn assert_every_node_serves(dist: &DistCluster, bucket: &str, l
mod tests {
use super::*;
const REBALANCE_NOT_STARTED: &str =
"<Error><Code>NoSuchResource</Code><Message>pool rebalance is not started</Message></Error>";
async fn mock_rebalance_stop(
stop_status: StatusCode,
stop_body: &str,
run_status: Value,
) -> TestResult<(TestResult<String>, Vec<String>)> {
use bytes::Bytes;
use http_body_util::Full;
use hyper::service::service_fn;
use hyper_util::rt::TokioIo;
use tokio::net::TcpListener;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use tokio::task::JoinSet;
let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await?;
let mut cluster = RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::new(1).await?;
cluster.nodes[0].url = format!("http://{}", listener.local_addr()?);
let stop_body = stop_body.to_string();
let (requests_tx, mut requests_rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let mut server = JoinSet::new();
server.spawn(async move {
loop {
let (stream, _) = match listener.accept().await {
Ok(connection) => connection,
Err(error) => return Err::<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>(error.into()),
};
let stop_body = stop_body.clone();
let run_status = run_status.clone();
let requests_tx = requests_tx.clone();
let handler = service_fn(move |request: hyper::Request<hyper::body::Incoming>| {
let route = format!("{} {}", request.method(), request.uri().path());
requests_tx.send(route.clone()).expect("record mock admin request");
let (status, body) = match route.as_str() {
"POST /rustfs/admin/v3/rebalance/stop" => (stop_status, stop_body.clone()),
"GET /rustfs/admin/v3/rebalance/status" => (StatusCode::OK, run_status.to_string()),
_ => (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "unexpected admin request".to_string()),
};
async move { http::Response::builder().status(status).body(Full::new(Bytes::from(body))) }
});
hyper::server::conn::http1::Builder::new()
.keep_alive(false)
.serve_connection(TokioIo::new(stream), handler)
.await?;
}
});
let outcome = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), stop_rebalance(&cluster, "run-1")).await?;
server.abort_all();
let requests = std::iter::from_fn(|| requests_rx.try_recv().ok()).collect();
Ok((outcome, requests))
}
fn completed_rebalance() -> Value {
serde_json::json!({
"id": "run-1",
"pools": [
{ "id": 0, "status": "Completed", "progress": { "versions": 113 } },
{ "id": 1, "status": "None" }
]
})
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn rebalance_stop_success_does_not_query_completion() -> TestResult {
let (outcome, requests) = mock_rebalance_stop(StatusCode::OK, "", Value::Null).await?;
assert_eq!(outcome?, "");
assert_eq!(requests, ["POST /rustfs/admin/v3/rebalance/stop"]);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn rebalance_stop_accepts_completed_run_after_not_started_response() -> TestResult {
let (outcome, requests) =
mock_rebalance_stop(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, REBALANCE_NOT_STARTED, completed_rebalance()).await?;
outcome?;
assert_eq!(
requests,
[
"POST /rustfs/admin/v3/rebalance/stop",
"GET /rustfs/admin/v3/rebalance/status"
]
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn rebalance_stop_rejects_unproven_completion_and_other_errors() -> TestResult {
let complete = completed_rebalance();
let mut invalid = vec![Value::Null];
for (pointer, value) in [
("/id", serde_json::json!("run-2")),
("/pools/0/status", serde_json::json!("Started")),
("/pools/0/status", serde_json::json!("Failed")),
("/pools/0/status", serde_json::json!("Stopped")),
("/pools/0/progress/versions", serde_json::json!(0)),
] {
let mut status = complete.clone();
*status.pointer_mut(pointer).expect("completion fixture field") = value;
invalid.push(status);
}
let mut pending = complete.clone();
pending["stopPropagation"] = serde_json::json!({ "pendingTerminalReload": true });
invalid.push(pending);
let mut failed = complete.clone();
failed["pools"][0]["lastError"] = serde_json::json!("migration failed");
invalid.push(failed);
for status in invalid {
let (outcome, _) = mock_rebalance_stop(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, REBALANCE_NOT_STARTED, status.clone()).await?;
assert!(outcome.is_err(), "unproven completion accepted: {status}");
}
for (code, body) in [
(StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, REBALANCE_NOT_STARTED),
(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, REBALANCE_NOT_STARTED),
(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "<Error><Code>NoSuchBucket</Code></Error>"),
] {
let (outcome, requests) = mock_rebalance_stop(code, body, complete.clone()).await?;
assert!(outcome.is_err(), "unrelated error accepted: {code} {body}");
assert_eq!(requests, ["POST /rustfs/admin/v3/rebalance/stop"]);
}
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn version_ids_normalize_null_spellings() {
for spelling in [None, Some(""), Some("null"), Some("00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")] {
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ use super::harness::{
wait_for_rebalance_active, wait_for_rebalance_complete,
};
use super::scanner_heal_topology_fixture::{
LiveWorkload, MOVEMENT_ACTIVE_TIMEOUT, MOVEMENT_COMPLETE_TIMEOUT, MovementOperation, SEED_POOL,
LiveWorkload, MOVEMENT_ACTIVE_TIMEOUT, MOVEMENT_COMPLETE_TIMEOUT, MovementOperation, SEED_POOL, STAGE_AFTER_ENTRY_ADMISSION,
STAGE_AFTER_RESPONSIBILITY_PERSISTED, STAGE_BEFORE_SOURCE_CLEANUP, STAGE_BEFORE_TARGET_COMMIT, TopologyManifest, TopologyRun,
assert_bucket_durability_strict, assert_every_node_serves, assert_probe_objects, assert_process_durability_strict,
assert_seed_pool_census_unchanged, assert_single_pool_placement, cancel_decommission, capture_seed_pool_census,
@@ -274,6 +274,7 @@ async fn wait_for_rebalance_stopped_or_completed(run: &TopologyRun, rebalance_id
#[tokio::test]
async fn scanner_heal_topology_rebalance_survives_live_writes_stop_and_restart() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
require_test_hooks();
let mut run = TopologyRun::start("rebalance").await?;
let manifest = seed_manifest(&run).await?;
assert_bucket_durability_strict(&run.dist.cluster, &manifest.buckets()).await?;
@@ -288,23 +289,52 @@ async fn scanner_heal_topology_rebalance_survives_live_writes_stop_and_restart()
.map(|entry| (entry.key.clone(), entry.sha256.clone()))
.collect();
let first_id = start_rebalance(&run.dist.cluster).await?;
wait_for_rebalance_active(&run.dist.cluster, &first_id, MOVEMENT_ACTIVE_TIMEOUT).await?;
let during_rebalance = put_probe_objects(&run.dist, &scratch, "during-rebalance", 4).await?;
let workload = tokio::spawn(run_live_workload(LiveWorkload {
clients: run.dist.clients()?,
bucket: scratch.clone(),
prefix: "live".to_string(),
writers: LIVE_WRITERS,
rounds: LIVE_ROUNDS,
baseline_bucket: manifest.plain_bucket.clone(),
baseline: baseline.clone(),
pause: Duration::from_millis(100),
}));
sleep(Duration::from_secs(2)).await;
stop_rebalance(&run.dist.cluster).await?;
let (first_outcome, first_status) = wait_for_rebalance_stopped_or_completed(&run, &first_id).await?;
let ops = workload.await??;
// Keep an admitted entry on the source until stop cancels admission. Start
// propagation may await that entry, so observe and stop before awaiting ACK.
let first_key = manifest.plain_key("external", 0)?;
run.movement_barrier
.arm_movement("rebalance", &manifest.plain_bucket, &first_key, STAGE_AFTER_ENTRY_ADMISSION)?;
let observe_first = async {
let (observed_id, reached) = tokio::time::timeout(MOVEMENT_ACTIVE_TIMEOUT, async {
let reached = run.movement_barrier.wait_reached(MOVEMENT_ACTIVE_TIMEOUT).await?;
let status = rebalance_status_json(&run.dist.cluster).await?;
let observed_id = status
.get("id")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.ok_or("rebalance status omitted id")?;
wait_for_rebalance_active(&run.dist.cluster, observed_id, MOVEMENT_ACTIVE_TIMEOUT).await?;
Ok::<_, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>((observed_id.to_string(), reached))
})
.await??;
let probes = put_probe_objects(&run.dist, &scratch, "during-rebalance", 4).await?;
let workload = run_live_workload(LiveWorkload {
clients: run.dist.clients()?,
bucket: scratch.clone(),
prefix: "live".to_string(),
writers: LIVE_WRITERS,
rounds: LIVE_ROUNDS,
baseline_bucket: manifest.plain_bucket.clone(),
baseline: baseline.clone(),
pause: Duration::from_millis(100),
});
let stop = async {
sleep(Duration::from_secs(2)).await;
stop_rebalance(&run.dist.cluster, &observed_id).await?;
let (outcome, status) = wait_for_rebalance_stopped_or_completed(&run, &observed_id).await?;
if outcome != "stopped" {
return Err("rebalance completed before stop; mid-run stop was not exercised".into());
}
Ok::<_, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>((outcome, status))
};
let (ops, (outcome, status)) = tokio::try_join!(workload, stop)?;
Ok::<_, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>((observed_id, reached, probes, ops, outcome, status))
};
let (first_id, (observed_id, first_reached, during_rebalance, ops, first_outcome, first_status)) =
tokio::try_join!(start_rebalance(&run.dist.cluster), observe_first)?;
if first_id != observed_id {
return Err(format!("rebalance start acknowledged {first_id}, but the stopped run was {observed_id}").into());
}
run.movement_barrier.disarm()?;
let live_state = expected_live_state(&ops);
for node_idx in 0..run.dist.cluster.nodes.len() {
@@ -333,8 +363,40 @@ async fn scanner_heal_topology_rebalance_survives_live_writes_stop_and_restart()
verify_from_every_node(&run.dist, &manifest, "after restart following the stop").await?;
verify_live_state(&run.dist.client(0)?, &scratch, &live_state, "after restart following the stop").await?;
let second_id = start_rebalance(&run.dist.cluster).await?;
wait_for_rebalance_active(&run.dist.cluster, &second_id, MOVEMENT_ACTIVE_TIMEOUT).await?;
// A short second run can finish before the start response reaches us.
// Hold one remaining source entry until its active state is observed.
let mut second_key = None;
for entry in manifest.plain_entries() {
if pools_holding(&run.dist, &manifest.plain_bucket, &entry.key, None)?.contains(&SEED_POOL) {
second_key = Some(entry.key.clone());
break;
}
}
let second_key = second_key.ok_or("no seed-pool object remains for the second rebalance")?;
let second_barrier = run.movement_barrier.next_phase();
second_barrier.arm_movement("rebalance", &manifest.plain_bucket, &second_key, STAGE_BEFORE_SOURCE_CLEANUP)?;
let observe_second = async {
let reached = second_barrier.wait_reached(MOVEMENT_ACTIVE_TIMEOUT).await?;
let status = rebalance_status_json(&run.dist.cluster).await?;
let observed_id = status
.get("id")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.ok_or("rebalance status omitted id")?;
if observed_id == first_id {
return Err("the second rebalance reused the stopped run id".into());
}
wait_for_rebalance_active(&run.dist.cluster, observed_id, MOVEMENT_ACTIVE_TIMEOUT).await?;
second_barrier.disarm()?;
second_barrier.release_movement()?;
Ok::<_, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>((observed_id.to_string(), reached))
};
// Worker propagation can hold the start response until movement drains.
let (second_id, (observed_id, second_reached)) = tokio::try_join!(start_rebalance(&run.dist.cluster), async {
tokio::time::timeout(MOVEMENT_ACTIVE_TIMEOUT, observe_second).await?
})?;
if second_id != observed_id {
return Err(format!("rebalance start acknowledged {second_id}, but the active run was {observed_id}").into());
}
wait_for_rebalance_complete(&run.dist.cluster, &second_id, MOVEMENT_COMPLETE_TIMEOUT).await?;
verify_from_every_node(&run.dist, &manifest, "after the second rebalance completed").await?;
verify_live_state(&run.dist.client(3)?, &scratch, &live_state, "after the second rebalance completed").await?;
@@ -351,8 +413,8 @@ async fn scanner_heal_topology_rebalance_survives_live_writes_stop_and_restart()
&json!({
"gate": "G-REB",
"manifest": manifest_summary(&manifest),
"first_run": { "id": first_id, "outcome": first_outcome, "status": first_status, "versions_held_by_two_pools_after_stop": retained_after_stop },
"second_run": { "id": second_id, "versions_off_seed_pool": moved },
"first_run": { "id": first_id, "outcome": first_outcome, "status": first_status, "versions_held_by_two_pools_after_stop": retained_after_stop, "barrier_object": first_key, "barrier": first_reached },
"second_run": { "id": second_id, "versions_off_seed_pool": moved, "barrier_object": second_key, "barrier": second_reached },
"live_ops": ops,
"probe_placement_during_rebalance": during_placement,
"process_durability_strict_nodes": strict_nodes,
@@ -1636,20 +1636,53 @@ async fn hot_window_with_old_followers(
let mixed_initial_physical = if mixed { json!(converged_shards(&run)?) } else { Value::Null };
let scheduler_config = run.assert_default_cadence().await?;
let baseline = run.quiet_baseline().await?;
let leader = run.leader().await?;
let leader_pid = run.pid(leader)?;
// A leader-lock refresh gap during old-binary replacement can make
// `leader()` briefly observe a different node. Poll until the coordinator
// is stable before comparing against the measured fleet. A persistent
// change to an old-binary node is a genuine election outcome and fails.
let (leader, leader_pid) = if mixed {
let expected_leader = usize::try_from(
mixed_fleet["leader"]
.as_u64()
.ok_or("mixed fleet omitted its measured leader")?,
)?;
let expected_pid = mixed_fleet["leader_pid"]
.as_u64()
.ok_or("mixed fleet omitted its measured leader pid")?;
let mut resolved = None;
for _ in 0..20 {
let candidate = run.leader().await?;
let candidate_pid = u64::from(run.pid(candidate)?);
if Some(u64::try_from(candidate)?) == mixed_fleet["leader"].as_u64() && Some(candidate_pid) == Some(expected_pid) {
resolved = Some((candidate, run.pid(candidate)?));
break;
}
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(500)).await;
}
match resolved {
Some(pair) => pair,
None => {
let current = match run.leader().await {
Ok(node) => Some((node, run.pid(node).ok())),
Err(_) => None,
};
return Err(format!(
"the hot window did not retain its measured new coordinator after stabilization \
(expected node {expected_leader} pid {expected_pid}, observed {current:?})"
)
.into());
}
}
} else {
let leader = run.leader().await?;
(leader, run.pid(leader)?)
};
let producer = (leader + 1) % 4;
let producers = if fault.is_some() {
vec![producer, (leader + 2) % 4]
} else {
vec![producer]
};
if mixed
&& (mixed_fleet["leader"].as_u64() != Some(u64::try_from(leader)?)
|| mixed_fleet["leader_pid"].as_u64() != Some(u64::from(leader_pid)))
{
return Err("the hot window did not retain its measured new coordinator".into());
}
let producer_pid = run.pid(producer)?;
let producer_address = run.peer_address(producer);
let [cold_a, cold_b, hot] = run.buckets.clone();
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ mod tests {
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::error::Error;
use std::io::{Read, Write};
use std::io::{Read, Seek, SeekFrom, Write};
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::process::Command;
@@ -1654,6 +1654,89 @@ mod tests {
TargetEndpointBlackhole,
}
async fn release_heal_commit_barrier_after_shutdown(
log: &Path,
log_offset: u64,
barrier: &Path,
) -> Result<serde_json::Value, Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
// Observe within the existing graceful process-stop budget.
timeout(Duration::from_secs(45), async {
loop {
let mut file = std::fs::File::open(log)?;
file.seek(SeekFrom::Start(log_offset))?;
let mut tail = String::new();
file.read_to_string(&mut tail)?;
if let Some(event) = tail
.lines()
.filter_map(|line| serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(line).ok())
.find(|event| {
event["event"] == "server_shutdown_state"
&& event["component"] == "main"
&& event["subsystem"] == "startup"
&& event["state"] == "stopping"
})
{
// Local heal has stopped and HTTP shutdown has been signalled.
// Let admitted peer RPCs finish; keeping this synthetic barrier
// until process exit would make the fixture block its own drain.
std::fs::remove_file(barrier)?;
return Ok(event);
}
sleep(Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
}
})
.await?
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn heal_commit_barrier_waits_for_new_shutdown_event() -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let directory = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let log = directory.path().join("server.log");
let barrier = directory.path().join("barrier");
let event = serde_json::json!({
"event": "server_shutdown_state", "component": "main", "subsystem": "startup", "state": "stopping"
});
std::fs::write(&log, format!("{event}\n"))?;
std::fs::write(&barrier, "bucket/prefix/")?;
let log_offset = log.metadata()?.len();
let mut writer = std::fs::OpenOptions::new().append(true).open(&log)?;
writeln!(writer, "{}", serde_json::json!({"event": "shutdown_signal_received"}))?;
writeln!(writer, "{}", serde_json::json!({"event": "server_shutdown_state", "state": "stopping"}))?;
let release = release_heal_commit_barrier_after_shutdown(&log, log_offset, &barrier);
tokio::pin!(release);
assert!(
futures::poll!(release.as_mut()).is_pending(),
"old or unrelated events must not release the barrier"
);
assert!(barrier.is_file(), "the partial-rebuild barrier must remain armed before shutdown");
tokio::time::advance(Duration::from_secs(6)).await;
assert!(
futures::poll!(release.as_mut()).is_pending(),
"background shutdown may take longer than five seconds within the process-stop budget"
);
writeln!(writer, "{event}")?;
tokio::time::advance(Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
assert_eq!(release.await?, event, "retain the actual new shutdown witness");
assert!(!barrier.exists(), "shutdown must release the synthetic hold");
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn heal_commit_barrier_missing_shutdown_fails_without_releasing() -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let directory = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let log = directory.path().join("server.log");
let barrier = directory.path().join("barrier");
std::fs::write(&log, "")?;
std::fs::write(&barrier, "bucket/prefix/")?;
let error = release_heal_commit_barrier_after_shutdown(&log, 0, &barrier)
.await
.expect_err("missing shutdown evidence must fail the fixture");
assert!(error.is::<tokio::time::error::Elapsed>());
assert!(barrier.is_file(), "a missing shutdown witness must not release repairs");
Ok(())
}
async fn run_cluster_root_heal_interruption(scenario: InterruptionScenario) -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>> {
let server_binary = rustfs_binary_path();
let evidence_case = match scenario {
@@ -1791,6 +1874,7 @@ mod tests {
let mut created_online_objects = Vec::with_capacity(online_object_count);
let mut expected_manifests = Vec::with_capacity(online_object_count);
let mut unclean_shutdown_marker_observed = None;
let mut shutdown_barrier_release = None;
let mut attempt_count = 0usize;
let max_online_attempts = online_object_count.saturating_mul(topology.total_drives().max(1));
while expected_manifests.len() < online_object_count {
@@ -2373,7 +2457,21 @@ mod tests {
| InterruptionScenario::BackgroundTargetRestartEc84MultiSet
| InterruptionScenario::BackgroundCoordinatorRestart
) {
cluster.stop_node_gracefully(interruption_node).await?;
if interruption_node == 1
&& let Some(barrier) = &commit_barrier
{
let target_log = PathBuf::from(format!("{log_dir}/node1.log"));
let log_offset = target_log.metadata()?.len();
let (stopped, released) = tokio::join!(
cluster.stop_node_gracefully(interruption_node),
release_heal_commit_barrier_after_shutdown(&target_log, log_offset, barrier),
);
// Await both branches even on error so the child is reaped.
stopped?;
shutdown_barrier_release = Some(released?);
} else {
cluster.stop_node_gracefully(interruption_node).await?;
}
} else {
cluster.stop_node(interruption_node)?;
}
@@ -2415,7 +2513,9 @@ mod tests {
}
}
}
if let Some(barrier) = &commit_barrier {
if shutdown_barrier_release.is_none()
&& let Some(barrier) = &commit_barrier
{
std::fs::remove_file(barrier)?;
}
cluster.start_node_from_binary(interruption_node, &server_binary).await?;
@@ -2746,6 +2846,7 @@ mod tests {
"all_peers_bound_to_generation_window": true,
"pid_before": target_pid, "pid_after": restarted_pid,
"unclean_shutdown_marker": unclean_shutdown_marker_observed.unwrap_or(false),
"graceful_barrier_release": shutdown_barrier_release,
"objects": evidence_objects, "node_listings": node_listings,
});
if let Some(outage_write) = outage_write_diagnostic {
+3
View File
@@ -283,6 +283,9 @@ mod ssec_copy_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod multipart_storage_class_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod multipart_upload_id_test;
#[cfg(test)]
mod storage_class_capability_test;
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
// Copyright 2026 RustFS Team
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//! Multipart upload ID regression tests.
//!
//! Every operation that addresses an existing multipart upload must report an
//! upload ID that does not name a live upload as `404 NoSuchUpload`, whether
//! the ID is malformed or is a well-formed ID of an aborted upload.
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::common::{RustFSTestEnvironment, init_logging};
use aws_sdk_s3::Client;
use aws_sdk_s3::error::{ProvideErrorMetadata, SdkError};
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart};
type TestResult = Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>;
const BUCKET: &str = "multipart-upload-id";
const KEY: &str = "target.bin";
const COPY_SOURCE_KEY: &str = "copy-source.bin";
// RustFS upload IDs are URL-safe base64; '.' is outside that alphabet, so
// the object layer rejects this ID as malformed instead of looking it up.
const MALFORMED_UPLOAD_ID: &str = "malformed.upload.id";
const PART_NUMBER: i32 = 1;
const PART_BODY: &[u8] = b"multipart upload id regression part";
const PART_ETAG: &str = "\"00000000000000000000000000000000\"";
const NO_SUCH_UPLOAD_STATUS: u16 = 404;
const NO_SUCH_UPLOAD_CODE: &str = "NoSuchUpload";
const OBJECT_NOT_FOUND_STATUS: u16 = 404;
/// Describes how `result` differs from `404 NoSuchUpload`, or returns `None` when it matches.
fn no_such_upload_mismatch<T, E>(operation: &str, result: Result<T, SdkError<E>>) -> Option<String>
where
E: ProvideErrorMetadata + std::fmt::Debug,
{
let Err(error) = result else {
return Some(format!("{operation}: succeeded"));
};
let status = error.raw_response().map(|response| response.status().as_u16());
let code = error.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code);
(status != Some(NO_SUCH_UPLOAD_STATUS) || code != Some(NO_SUCH_UPLOAD_CODE))
.then(|| format!("{operation}: status {status:?}, code {code:?}: {error:?}"))
}
async fn start_server_with_copy_source() -> Result<(RustFSTestEnvironment, Client), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>
{
init_logging();
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server(Vec::new()).await?;
env.create_test_bucket(BUCKET).await?;
let client = env.create_s3_client();
client
.put_object()
.bucket(BUCKET)
.key(COPY_SOURCE_KEY)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(PART_BODY))
.send()
.await?;
Ok((env, client))
}
/// Sends every operation that addresses an existing upload and asserts that all of them report `404 NoSuchUpload`.
async fn assert_every_upload_operation_reports_no_such_upload(client: &Client, upload_id: &str) {
let upload_part = client
.upload_part()
.bucket(BUCKET)
.key(KEY)
.upload_id(upload_id)
.part_number(PART_NUMBER)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(PART_BODY))
.send()
.await;
let upload_part_copy = client
.upload_part_copy()
.bucket(BUCKET)
.key(KEY)
.upload_id(upload_id)
.part_number(PART_NUMBER)
.copy_source(format!("/{BUCKET}/{COPY_SOURCE_KEY}"))
.send()
.await;
let list_parts = client.list_parts().bucket(BUCKET).key(KEY).upload_id(upload_id).send().await;
let complete = client
.complete_multipart_upload()
.bucket(BUCKET)
.key(KEY)
.upload_id(upload_id)
.multipart_upload(
CompletedMultipartUpload::builder()
.parts(CompletedPart::builder().part_number(PART_NUMBER).e_tag(PART_ETAG).build())
.build(),
)
.send()
.await;
let abort = client
.abort_multipart_upload()
.bucket(BUCKET)
.key(KEY)
.upload_id(upload_id)
.send()
.await;
let mismatches: Vec<String> = [
no_such_upload_mismatch("UploadPart", upload_part),
no_such_upload_mismatch("UploadPartCopy", upload_part_copy),
no_such_upload_mismatch("ListParts", list_parts),
no_such_upload_mismatch("CompleteMultipartUpload", complete),
no_such_upload_mismatch("AbortMultipartUpload", abort),
]
.into_iter()
.flatten()
.collect();
assert!(
mismatches.is_empty(),
"upload ID {upload_id:?}: operations not reporting {NO_SUCH_UPLOAD_STATUS} {NO_SUCH_UPLOAD_CODE}:\n{}",
mismatches.join("\n")
);
}
/// Asserts that the rejected operations left neither a multipart upload nor an object under `KEY`.
async fn assert_no_upload_or_object_published(client: &Client) -> TestResult {
let uploads = client.list_multipart_uploads().bucket(BUCKET).prefix(KEY).send().await?;
assert!(uploads.uploads().is_empty(), "rejected operations must not leave an upload: {uploads:?}");
let head = client.head_object().bucket(BUCKET).key(KEY).send().await;
let status = head
.as_ref()
.err()
.and_then(|error| error.raw_response())
.map(|response| response.status().as_u16());
assert_eq!(
status,
Some(OBJECT_NOT_FOUND_STATUS),
"rejected operations must not publish {KEY}: {head:?}"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn malformed_upload_id_reports_no_such_upload_on_every_upload_operation() -> TestResult {
let (_env, client) = start_server_with_copy_source().await?;
assert_every_upload_operation_reports_no_such_upload(&client, MALFORMED_UPLOAD_ID).await;
assert_no_upload_or_object_published(&client).await
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn aborted_upload_id_reports_no_such_upload_on_every_upload_operation() -> TestResult {
let (_env, client) = start_server_with_copy_source().await?;
let created = client.create_multipart_upload().bucket(BUCKET).key(KEY).send().await?;
let upload_id = created.upload_id().ok_or("CreateMultipartUpload returned no upload ID")?;
client
.abort_multipart_upload()
.bucket(BUCKET)
.key(KEY)
.upload_id(upload_id)
.send()
.await?;
assert_every_upload_operation_reports_no_such_upload(&client, upload_id).await;
assert_no_upload_or_object_published(&client).await
}
}
+1 -3
View File
@@ -77,9 +77,7 @@ core protocol surface plus cross-protocol consistency:
existing path returns an error, bad-password authentication is rejected
- Cross-protocol via aws-sdk-s3: SFTP write then S3 read with SHA256 match,
S3 write then SFTP read with SHA256 match
- Cross-API directory visibility: SFTP-created sub-directory visible via S3
ListObjectsV2, S3-created `__XLDIR__` marker visible via SFTP readdir as a
directory entry
- Cross-API directory visibility: SFTP-created sub-directory visible via S3 ListObjectsV2, and an S3 trailing-slash directory object visible via SFTP readdir as a directory entry
#### sftp_compliance (`test_sftp_compliance_suite`)
+14 -13
View File
@@ -394,9 +394,9 @@ pub async fn test_sftp_core_operations() -> Result<()> {
info!("PASS: S3-written object matches via S3 GetObject and SFTP READ");
// --- Cross-API directory visibility: SFTP mkdir, S3 ListObjectsV2 ---
// SFTP mkdir writes a __XLDIR__ marker. The rustfs S3 listing path
// decodes that marker back to a trailing-slash key, so the asserted
// pattern is "subdir_sftp/".
// SFTP mkdir writes a zero-byte object at the trailing-slash key.
// Storage encodes that key to the __XLDIR__ marker, and the S3
// listing path decodes the marker back to a trailing-slash key.
info!("Testing SFTP: SFTP-created sub-directory visible via S3 ListObjectsV2");
let sftp_subdir_name = "subdir_sftp";
let sftp_subdir_path = format!("/{bucket}/{sftp_subdir_name}");
@@ -422,20 +422,21 @@ pub async fn test_sftp_core_operations() -> Result<()> {
);
info!("PASS: SFTP mkdir visible to S3 ListObjectsV2");
// --- Cross-API directory visibility: S3 marker, SFTP readdir ---
// aws-sdk-s3 PutObject writes a zero-byte marker keyed with the
// __XLDIR__ suffix. SFTP readdir must decode the marker back to a
// bare directory entry whose file_type reports as a directory.
info!("Testing SFTP: S3-created __XLDIR__ marker visible via SFTP readdir");
// --- Cross-API directory visibility: S3 directory object, SFTP readdir ---
// aws-sdk-s3 PutObject writes a zero-byte object at the trailing-slash
// key. The __XLDIR__ suffix is reserved on the client-key boundary, so
// a direct put of that suffix is rejected. Storage encodes the slash
// key, and SFTP readdir must show a directory entry.
info!("Testing SFTP: S3-created directory object visible via SFTP readdir");
let s3_subdir_name = "subdir_s3";
let s3_subdir_marker_key = format!("{s3_subdir_name}{XLDIR_SUFFIX}");
let s3_subdir_key = format!("{s3_subdir_name}/");
s3.put_object()
.bucket(bucket)
.key(&s3_subdir_marker_key)
.key(&s3_subdir_key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(b""))
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| anyhow!("S3 PutObject {}/{} failed: {:?}", bucket, s3_subdir_marker_key, e))?;
.map_err(|e| anyhow!("S3 PutObject {}/{} failed: {:?}", bucket, s3_subdir_key, e))?;
let bucket_entries: Vec<(String, bool)> = sftp
.read_dir(&bucket_path)
.await?
@@ -444,9 +445,9 @@ pub async fn test_sftp_core_operations() -> Result<()> {
let visible_via_sftp = bucket_entries.iter().any(|(name, is_dir)| name == s3_subdir_name && *is_dir);
assert!(
visible_via_sftp,
"S3-created marker must appear as a directory in SFTP readdir: entries were {bucket_entries:?}"
"S3-created directory object must appear as a directory in SFTP readdir: entries were {bucket_entries:?}"
);
info!("PASS: S3 marker visible to SFTP readdir as a directory");
info!("PASS: S3 directory object visible to SFTP readdir as a directory");
// --- Pre-cleanup of cross-protocol fixtures ---
// Removes the new files and sub-directories so the existing rmdir
+34 -4
View File
@@ -412,6 +412,38 @@ mod integration_tests {
);
}
async fn upload_after_quota_reconciliation(
env: &QuotaTestEnv,
key: &str,
size_bytes: usize,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>> {
let upload = async {
loop {
let result = env
.client
.put_object()
.bucket(&env.bucket_name)
.key(key)
.body(aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream::from(vec![0u8; size_bytes]))
.send()
.await;
match result {
Ok(_) => break,
Err(error) => assert_quota_rejection(
error.raw_response().map(|response| response.status().as_u16()),
error.as_service_error(),
&error,
),
}
sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
};
// The durable V1 ledger can retain the old charge for its 30-second reconciliation cooldown.
timeout(Duration::from_secs(45), upload)
.await
.map_err(|_| format!("PUT {key} did not succeed after quota reconciliation within 45 seconds").into())
}
async fn assert_put_rejected_by_quota(env: &QuotaTestEnv, key: &str, size_bytes: usize) {
let error = env
.client
@@ -573,8 +605,7 @@ mod integration_tests {
assert!(!env.object_exists("file1.txt").await?);
// Now we should be able to upload again (quota freed up)
env.upload_object("file3.txt", 256 * 1024).await?;
upload_after_quota_reconciliation(&env, "file3.txt", 256 * 1024).await?;
assert!(env.object_exists("file3.txt").await?);
env.cleanup_bucket().await?;
@@ -981,8 +1012,7 @@ mod integration_tests {
);
assert_eq!(delete_result.deleted().len(), 2);
// Now should be able to upload again (quota freed up)
env.upload_object("file3.txt", 256 * 1024).await?;
upload_after_quota_reconciliation(&env, "file3.txt", 256 * 1024).await?;
assert!(env.object_exists("file3.txt").await?);
env.cleanup_bucket().await?;
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ fn lock_result_from_response(response: rustfs_lock::LockResponse) -> GenerallyLo
success: response.success,
error_info: response.error,
lock_info: response.lock_info.and_then(|info| serde_json::to_string(&info).ok()),
..Default::default()
}
}
@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ fn lock_result_from_error(error: impl Into<String>) -> GenerallyLockResult {
success: false,
error_info: Some(error.into()),
lock_info: None,
..Default::default()
}
}
@@ -59,6 +61,7 @@ fn lock_result_from_release(lock_id: &rustfs_lock::LockId, success: bool) -> Gen
success: true,
error_info: None,
lock_info: None,
..Default::default()
}
} else {
lock_result_from_error(format!("lock not found for release: {lock_id}"))
@@ -164,6 +167,7 @@ impl NodeService for MinimalLockNodeService {
success: false,
error_info: Some(format!("can not decode args, err: {err}")),
lock_info: None,
..Default::default()
}));
}
};
@@ -175,6 +179,7 @@ impl NodeService for MinimalLockNodeService {
success: result.success,
error_info: result.error,
lock_info: lock_info_json,
..Default::default()
}))
}
Err(err) => Ok(Response::new(GenerallyLockResponse {
@@ -184,6 +189,7 @@ impl NodeService for MinimalLockNodeService {
args.resource, args.owner, err
)),
lock_info: None,
..Default::default()
})),
}
}
@@ -197,6 +203,7 @@ impl NodeService for MinimalLockNodeService {
success: false,
error_info: Some(format!("can not decode args, err: {err}")),
lock_info: None,
..Default::default()
}));
}
};
@@ -208,6 +215,7 @@ impl NodeService for MinimalLockNodeService {
success: result.success,
error_info: result.error_info,
lock_info: None,
..Default::default()
}))
}
Err(err) => Ok(Response::new(GenerallyLockResponse {
@@ -217,6 +225,7 @@ impl NodeService for MinimalLockNodeService {
args.resource, args.owner, err
)),
lock_info: None,
..Default::default()
})),
}
}
@@ -230,6 +239,7 @@ impl NodeService for MinimalLockNodeService {
success: false,
error_info: Some(format!("can not decode args, err: {err}")),
lock_info: None,
..Default::default()
}));
}
};
@@ -241,6 +251,7 @@ impl NodeService for MinimalLockNodeService {
success: result.success,
error_info: result.error_info,
lock_info: None,
..Default::default()
}))
}
Err(err) => Ok(Response::new(GenerallyLockResponse {
@@ -250,6 +261,7 @@ impl NodeService for MinimalLockNodeService {
args.resource, args.owner, err
)),
lock_info: None,
..Default::default()
})),
}
}
@@ -263,6 +275,7 @@ impl NodeService for MinimalLockNodeService {
success: false,
error_info: Some(format!("can not decode args, err: {err}")),
lock_info: None,
..Default::default()
}));
}
};
@@ -272,11 +285,13 @@ impl NodeService for MinimalLockNodeService {
success,
error_info: None,
lock_info: None,
..Default::default()
})),
Err(err) => Ok(Response::new(GenerallyLockResponse {
success: false,
error_info: Some(format!("can not refresh, err: {err}")),
lock_info: None,
..Default::default()
})),
}
}
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ use aws_sdk_s3::error::ProvideErrorMetadata;
use aws_sdk_s3::operation::list_object_versions::ListObjectVersionsOutput;
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{
BucketVersioningStatus, CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart, DeleteMarkerEntry, ObjectVersion, ServerSideEncryption,
VersioningConfiguration,
BucketVersioningStatus, CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart, Delete, DeleteMarkerEntry, ObjectIdentifier, ObjectVersion,
ServerSideEncryption, VersioningConfiguration,
};
use base64_simd::STANDARD as BASE64_STANDARD;
use bytes::Bytes;
@@ -3729,6 +3729,8 @@ async fn test_bucket_replication_converges_delete_marker_and_version_purge() ->
init_logging();
let mut source_env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
let source_log = format!("{}/source.log", source_env.temp_dir);
source_env.capture_log_path = Some(source_log.clone());
let mut source_env_vars = replication_fast_env();
source_env_vars.extend_from_slice(LOOPBACK_REPLICATION_TARGET_ENV);
source_env.start_rustfs_server_with_env(vec![], &source_env_vars).await?;
@@ -3791,19 +3793,66 @@ async fn test_bucket_replication_converges_delete_marker_and_version_purge() ->
"target did not preserve the source delete-marker version ID"
);
source_client
.delete_object()
let wait_for_source_writeback = || async {
let metrics_url = format!("{}/{source_bucket}?replication-metrics", source_env.url);
timeout(Duration::from_secs(30), async {
loop {
let response = signed_request(
http::Method::GET,
&metrics_url,
&source_env.access_key,
&source_env.secret_key,
None,
None,
)
.await?;
let metrics: serde_json::Value = response.error_for_status()?.json().await?;
let queued = metrics["queued"]["curr"]["count"]
.as_f64()
.ok_or("missing replication queue count")?;
if metrics["provider_available"] == true && queued == 0.0 {
return Ok::<(), Box<dyn Error + Send + Sync>>(());
}
sleep(Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
}
})
.await?
};
wait_for_source_writeback().await?;
let purged = source_client
.delete_objects()
.bucket(source_bucket)
.key(object_key)
.version_id(&purged_version_id)
.delete(
Delete::builder()
.objects(
ObjectIdentifier::builder()
.key(object_key)
.version_id(&purged_version_id)
.build()?,
)
.objects(
ObjectIdentifier::builder()
.key(object_key)
.version_id(delete_marker_version_id)
.build()?,
)
.build()?,
)
.send()
.await?;
assert!(purged.errors().is_empty(), "batch version purge failed: {:?}", purged.errors());
assert_eq!(purged.deleted().len(), 2, "both the data version and marker must be purged");
assert_replication_converged(&source_client, source_bucket, &target_client, target_bucket).await?;
let target_state = list_replication_state(&target_client, target_bucket).await?;
assert!(
target_state.iter().all(|entry| entry.version_id != purged_version_id),
"target retained the explicitly purged object version"
);
assert!(
target_state.iter().all(|entry| entry.version_id != delete_marker_version_id),
"target retained the explicitly purged delete marker"
);
assert!(
target_state
.iter()
@@ -3819,6 +3868,19 @@ async fn test_bucket_replication_converges_delete_marker_and_version_purge() ->
.await?;
assert_eq!(retained.body.collect().await?.into_bytes().as_ref(), b"versioned replication payload v2");
// Wait for the source workers to finish their final writeback, which runs
// after the remote purge has already become visible (rustfs#9121).
wait_for_source_writeback().await?;
let logs = fs::read_to_string(source_log).await?;
let writeback_failures: Vec<_> = logs
.lines()
.filter(|line| line.contains("apply_replication_delete_state"))
.collect();
assert!(
writeback_failures.is_empty(),
"a completed batch purge must not report a source writeback failure: {writeback_failures:?}"
);
Ok(())
}
+1
View File
@@ -2146,3 +2146,4 @@ mod tests {
);
}
}
// event-drill: isolated harness-only change
+9
View File
@@ -94,3 +94,12 @@ pub(crate) mod scanner_peer_bucket {
pub(crate) use ecstore_erasure::{ReedSolomonEncoder, calc_shard_size};
pub(crate) use ecstore_rpc::PeerRestClient;
}
/// Storage handles used to seed a pre-validation bucket record while the fixture server is stopped.
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) mod bucket_tag_fixture {
pub(crate) use rustfs_ecstore::api::bucket::metadata::load_bucket_metadata;
pub(crate) use rustfs_ecstore::api::layout::{DisksLayout, EndpointServerPools};
pub(crate) use rustfs_ecstore::api::runtime::InstanceContext;
pub(crate) use rustfs_ecstore::api::storage::{ECStore, init_local_disks_with_instance_ctx};
}
+147 -29
View File
@@ -360,12 +360,26 @@ impl OpaMock {
pub(crate) async fn expect_bucket_tags(&mut self, action: &str, bucket: &str, department: Option<&str>) -> TestResult {
let payload = self.next_request().await?;
Self::assert_bucket_tags(&payload, action, bucket, department);
Ok(())
}
async fn expect_versioned_tag_permission(&mut self, bucket: &str, object: &str, version: &str) -> TestResult {
let payload = self.next_request().await?;
Self::assert_bucket_tags(&payload, "s3:GetObjectVersionTagging", bucket, Some("finance"));
assert_eq!(payload["input"]["resource"]["object"], object);
assert_eq!(payload["input"]["context"]["conditions"]["versionid"], serde_json::json!([version]));
Ok(())
}
fn assert_bucket_tags(payload: &Value, action: &str, bucket: &str, department: Option<&str>) {
let input = &payload["input"];
assert_eq!(input["identity"]["account"], "opabuckettags");
assert_eq!(input["identity"]["is_owner"], false);
assert_eq!(input["action"], action);
assert_eq!(input["resource"]["bucket"], bucket);
let expected = department.map(|value| serde_json::json!([value]));
assert_eq!(input["context"]["conditions"].get("ExistingBucketTag/department"), expected.as_ref());
Ok(())
}
async fn wait_for_validation(&mut self) -> TestResult {
@@ -678,22 +692,61 @@ async fn test_list_buckets_opa_contract() -> TestResult {
Ok(())
}
/// Stop and reap the directory's owning server before opening the fixture store.
async fn seed_legacy_duplicate_bucket_tags(env: &mut RustFSTestEnvironment, bucket: &str) -> TestResult {
use crate::storage_api::bucket_tag_fixture::{
DisksLayout, ECStore, EndpointServerPools, InstanceContext, init_local_disks_with_instance_ctx, load_bucket_metadata,
};
let server = env
.process
.as_mut()
.ok_or("missing server process before offline fixture write")?;
server.kill()?;
server.wait()?;
env.process = None;
let layout = DisksLayout::from_volumes(std::slice::from_ref(&env.temp_dir))?;
let (pools, _) = EndpointServerPools::create_server_endpoints(&env.address, &layout).await?;
let context = std::sync::Arc::new(InstanceContext::new());
init_local_disks_with_instance_ctx(&context, pools.clone()).await?;
let store = ECStore::new_with_instance_ctx(env.address.parse()?, pools, Default::default(), context.clone()).await?;
let _cancel = context
.background_cancel_token()
.expect("store binds its shutdown token")
.drop_guard();
let mut metadata = load_bucket_metadata(store.clone(), bucket).await?;
let incarnation = metadata.bucket_incarnation_id;
let policy = metadata.policy_config_json.clone();
assert!(!incarnation.is_nil());
assert!(!policy.is_empty(), "the bucket-policy Allow must survive legacy seeding");
// Encode the duplicate tag set with the same bucket record and erasure writer used by the store.
let xml = b"<Tagging><TagSet><Tag><Key>department</Key><Value>finance</Value></Tag><Tag><Key>department</Key><Value>engineering</Value></Tag></TagSet></Tagging>";
metadata.tagging_config_xml = xml.to_vec();
metadata.save_with_store(store.clone()).await?;
let persisted = load_bucket_metadata(store, bucket).await?;
assert_eq!(persisted.bucket_incarnation_id, incarnation);
assert_eq!(persisted.policy_config_json, policy);
assert_eq!(persisted.tagging_config_xml.as_slice(), xml);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_bucket_tags_opa_contract() -> TestResult {
use aws_sdk_s3::primitives::ByteStream;
use aws_sdk_s3::types::{
BucketVersioningStatus, CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart, Tag, Tagging, VersioningConfiguration,
BucketVersioningStatus, CompletedMultipartUpload, CompletedPart, Tag, Tagging, TaggingDirective, VersioningConfiguration,
};
init_logging();
let mut opa = OpaMock::start().await?;
let mut env = RustFSTestEnvironment::new().await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_without_cleanup_with_env(&[
("RUSTFS_POLICY_PLUGIN_URL", opa.url.as_str()),
let opa_url = opa.url.clone();
let server_env = [
("RUSTFS_POLICY_PLUGIN_URL", opa_url.as_str()),
("RUSTFS_POLICY_PLUGIN_AUTH_TOKEN", OPA_AUTH_TOKEN),
("NO_PROXY", "127.0.0.1,localhost"),
])
.await?;
];
env.start_rustfs_server_without_cleanup_with_env(&server_env).await?;
let secret = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
create_user(&env, "opabuckettags", &secret).await?;
let client = aws_sdk_s3::Client::from_conf(build_test_s3_config(&env.url, "opabuckettags", &secret, None, "e2e-bucket-tags"));
@@ -733,7 +786,7 @@ async fn test_bucket_tags_opa_contract() -> TestResult {
.await?;
assert_eq!(read.body.collect().await?.into_bytes().as_ref(), b"report");
opa.expect_bucket_tags("s3:GetObjectVersion", source, Some("finance")).await?;
client
let head = client
.head_object()
.bucket(source)
.key("report")
@@ -741,6 +794,8 @@ async fn test_bucket_tags_opa_contract() -> TestResult {
.send()
.await?;
opa.expect_bucket_tags("s3:GetObjectVersion", source, Some("finance")).await?;
assert_eq!(head.tag_count(), Some(1));
opa.expect_versioned_tag_permission(source, "report", version).await?;
client.list_objects_v2().bucket(source).send().await?;
opa.expect_bucket_tags("s3:ListBucket", source, Some("finance")).await?;
client.list_object_versions().bucket(source).send().await?;
@@ -750,28 +805,65 @@ async fn test_bucket_tags_opa_contract() -> TestResult {
admin.create_bucket().bucket(destination).send().await?;
set_department(&admin, destination, "engineering").await?;
let copy_source = format!("{source}/report?versionId={version}");
let error = client
.copy_object()
.bucket(destination)
.key("copied")
.copy_source(&copy_source)
.send()
.await
.expect_err("source tags must not authorize a different destination");
assert_eq!(error.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code), Some("AccessDenied"));
opa.expect_bucket_tags("s3:GetObjectVersion", source, Some("finance")).await?;
opa.expect_bucket_tags("s3:PutObject", destination, Some("engineering"))
.await?;
for directive in [TaggingDirective::Copy, TaggingDirective::Replace] {
let error = client
.copy_object()
.bucket(destination)
.key("copied")
.copy_source(&copy_source)
.set_tagging_directive((directive == TaggingDirective::Replace).then_some(TaggingDirective::Replace))
.set_tagging((directive == TaggingDirective::Replace).then(|| "department=legal".to_owned()))
.send()
.await
.expect_err("source tags must not authorize a different destination");
assert_eq!(error.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code), Some("AccessDenied"));
opa.expect_bucket_tags("s3:GetObjectVersion", source, Some("finance")).await?;
if directive == TaggingDirective::Copy {
opa.expect_versioned_tag_permission(source, "report", version).await?;
}
opa.expect_bucket_tags("s3:PutObject", destination, Some("engineering"))
.await?;
let missing = admin
.head_object()
.bucket(destination)
.key("copied")
.send()
.await
.expect_err("denied COPY and REPLACE must leave no destination object");
assert_eq!(missing.raw_response().map(|response| response.status().as_u16()), Some(404));
}
set_department(&admin, destination, "finance").await?;
client
.copy_object()
.bucket(destination)
.key("copied")
.copy_source(&copy_source)
.send()
.await?;
opa.expect_bucket_tags("s3:GetObjectVersion", source, Some("finance")).await?;
opa.expect_bucket_tags("s3:PutObject", destination, Some("finance")).await?;
for directive in [TaggingDirective::Copy, TaggingDirective::Replace] {
client
.copy_object()
.bucket(destination)
.key("copied")
.copy_source(&copy_source)
.set_tagging_directive((directive == TaggingDirective::Replace).then_some(TaggingDirective::Replace))
.set_tagging((directive == TaggingDirective::Replace).then(|| "department=legal".to_owned()))
.send()
.await?;
opa.expect_bucket_tags("s3:GetObjectVersion", source, Some("finance")).await?;
// The access hook checks preliminary tags, then the copy use case checks
// the exact source reader's tags before publishing the destination.
for _ in 0..2 {
if directive == TaggingDirective::Copy {
opa.expect_versioned_tag_permission(source, "report", version).await?;
}
opa.expect_bucket_tags("s3:PutObject", destination, Some("finance")).await?;
}
let tags = admin.get_object_tagging().bucket(destination).key("copied").send().await?;
assert_eq!(tags.tag_set().len(), 1);
assert_eq!(tags.tag_set()[0].key(), "department");
assert_eq!(
tags.tag_set()[0].value(),
if directive == TaggingDirective::Copy {
"engineering"
} else {
"legal"
}
);
}
let upload = client
.create_multipart_upload()
@@ -847,6 +939,14 @@ async fn test_bucket_tags_opa_contract() -> TestResult {
assert_eq!(error.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code), Some("AccessDenied"));
opa.expect_bucket_tags("s3:GetObjectVersion", source, Some("engineering"))
.await?;
let missing = admin
.head_object()
.bucket(destination)
.key("denied-source")
.send()
.await
.expect_err("a denied source must leave no destination object");
assert_eq!(missing.raw_response().map(|response| response.status().as_u16()), Some(404));
set_department(&client, source, "finance")
.await
.expect_err("requested tags must not authorize their own mutation");
@@ -885,7 +985,7 @@ async fn test_bucket_tags_opa_contract() -> TestResult {
assert_eq!(read.body.collect().await?.into_bytes().as_ref(), b"report");
opa.expect_bucket_tags("s3:GetObject", destination, Some("engineering"))
.await?;
admin
let invalid_write = admin
.put_bucket_tagging()
.bucket(destination)
.tagging(
@@ -895,7 +995,25 @@ async fn test_bucket_tags_opa_contract() -> TestResult {
.build()?,
)
.send()
.await
.expect_err("new duplicate tags must be rejected before publication");
assert_eq!(invalid_write.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code), Some("InvalidTag"));
assert_eq!(invalid_write.raw_response().map(|response| response.status().as_u16()), Some(400));
set_department(&admin, source, "finance").await?;
seed_legacy_duplicate_bucket_tags(&mut env, destination).await?;
env.start_rustfs_server_without_cleanup_with_env(&server_env).await?;
// Prove this process can authorize the same caller and read a healthy bucket's persisted tags.
let read = client
.get_object()
.bucket(source)
.key("report")
.version_id(version)
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(read.body.collect().await?.into_bytes().as_ref(), b"report");
opa.expect_bucket_tags("s3:GetObjectVersion", source, Some("finance")).await?;
let error = client
.get_object()
.bucket(destination)
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ const SOURCE_BINARY_ENV: &str = "RUSTFS_UPGRADE_SOURCE_BINARY";
const G09_EVIDENCE_DIR_ENV: &str = "RUSTFS_SCANNER_HEAL_G09_EVIDENCE_DIR";
const RC5_COMMIT: &str = "40a2470feb567201165a5b809b7598bb4b1f68f5";
const STABLE_1_0_1_COMMIT: &str = "6de965ae3c965a78ff819fbcd7acd4aa44177d92";
const STABLE_1_0_4_COMMIT: &str = "46337942d55f3a8e6a97b147ca98d9ea8115555d";
const SSE_MASTER_KEY_ENV: &str = "RUSTFS_SSE_S3_MASTER_KEY";
const SSE_MASTER_KEY: &str = "QkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkI=";
const PLAIN_BUCKET: &str = "upgrade-plain-data";
@@ -954,7 +955,8 @@ async fn exercise_mixed_cluster(
phase: &str,
current_node: usize,
previous_node: usize,
) -> TestResult {
previous_has_delete_recovery: bool,
) -> Result<Option<String>, BoxError> {
let clients = cluster.create_all_clients()?;
wait_for_upgrade_write_readiness(&clients, MIXED_BUCKET, phase, LISTING_CONVERGENCE_TIMEOUT).await?;
wait_for_drive_readmission(&clients, MIXED_BUCKET, phase, DRIVE_READMISSION_TIMEOUT).await?;
@@ -1009,6 +1011,30 @@ async fn exercise_mixed_cluster(
vec![u8::try_from(MULTIPART_WORKERS - 1)?; 64 * 1024]
);
// 1.0.4 already implements the delete decision protocol. Use a separate
// old-writer key so the original seed still spans the entire rollout.
if previous_has_delete_recovery {
let key = format!(".upgrade-delete/{phase}/previous-writer");
previous_client
.put_object()
.bucket(MIXED_BUCKET)
.key(&key)
.body(ByteStream::from_static(UPGRADE_READINESS_BODY))
.send()
.await?;
for client in &clients {
assert_eq!(read_object(client, MIXED_BUCKET, &key, None).await?.1, UPGRADE_READINESS_BODY);
}
upgrade_probe_client(current_client)
.delete_object()
.bucket(MIXED_BUCKET)
.key(&key)
.send()
.await?;
assert_mixed_deletes_visible(&clients, std::slice::from_ref(&key)).await?;
return Ok(Some(key));
}
// Every online participant must understand the delete decision protocol.
// An upgrade phase can serve reads/writes while intentionally refusing a
// modern DELETE; rejecting it must leave the old writer's seed intact.
@@ -1029,6 +1055,31 @@ async fn exercise_mixed_cluster(
);
}
Ok(None)
}
async fn assert_mixed_deletes_visible(clients: &[Client], keys: &[String]) -> TestResult {
for (node, client) in clients.iter().enumerate() {
for key in keys {
let error = upgrade_probe_client(client)
.get_object()
.bucket(MIXED_BUCKET)
.key(key)
.send()
.await
.expect_err("a successful mixed-version DELETE must remain visible through every reader");
assert_eq!(
error.raw_response().map(|response| response.status().as_u16()),
Some(404),
"node {node}: {key}"
);
assert_eq!(
error.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code),
Some("NoSuchKey"),
"node {node}: {key}"
);
}
}
Ok(())
}
@@ -1112,8 +1163,9 @@ async fn wait_for_upgrade_writes(
match response {
Ok(Ok(_)) => break,
Ok(Err(error)) => {
let code = error.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code);
if error.raw_response().map(|response| response.status().as_u16()) != Some(503)
|| error.as_service_error().and_then(ProvideErrorMetadata::code) != Some("ServiceUnavailable")
|| !matches!(code, Some("ServiceUnavailable" | "SlowDown" | "SlowDownRead"))
{
return Err(format!("{phase}: node {node} {probe} failed: {error:?}").into());
}
@@ -2239,6 +2291,9 @@ async fn direct_upgrade_from_previous_release_preserves_object_contracts() -> Te
async fn rolling_upgrade_from_previous_release_preserves_mixed_version_contracts() -> TestResult {
init_logging();
let previous_binary = source_binary()?;
// Bind the expected protocol to the verified release source, never to the
// DELETE result itself. The older CI source pins retain their 503 contract.
let previous_has_delete_recovery = binary_source_revision(&previous_binary).await? == STABLE_1_0_4_COMMIT;
let evidence_context = g09_evidence_context(&previous_binary).await?;
let current_binary = rustfs_binary_path();
let mut cluster = RustFSTestClusterEnvironment::new(MIXED_NODE_COUNT).await?;
@@ -2259,7 +2314,10 @@ async fn rolling_upgrade_from_previous_release_preserves_mixed_version_contracts
cluster.stop_node(0)?;
cluster.start_node_from_binary(0, &current_binary).await?;
exercise_mixed_cluster(&cluster, "one-current-node", 0, 1).await?;
let mut mixed_deleted_keys = Vec::new();
if let Some(key) = exercise_mixed_cluster(&cluster, "one-current-node", 0, 1, previous_has_delete_recovery).await? {
mixed_deleted_keys.push(key);
}
// One controlled out-of-policy attempt proves fail-closed behavior below
// native write quorum; positive MPU writers remain paused while mixed.
assert_mixed_pending_refusal(&cluster, &pending, &sources).await?;
@@ -2267,7 +2325,9 @@ async fn rolling_upgrade_from_previous_release_preserves_mixed_version_contracts
for (node_idx, phase) in [(1, "two-current-nodes"), (2, "one-previous-node")] {
cluster.stop_node(node_idx)?;
cluster.start_node_from_binary(node_idx, &current_binary).await?;
exercise_mixed_cluster(&cluster, phase, 0, 3).await?;
if let Some(key) = exercise_mixed_cluster(&cluster, phase, 0, 3, previous_has_delete_recovery).await? {
mixed_deleted_keys.push(key);
}
}
cluster.stop_node(3)?;
@@ -2277,6 +2337,7 @@ async fn rolling_upgrade_from_previous_release_preserves_mixed_version_contracts
let completed_pending = finish_pending_multipart(&clients, &pending, pending_parts.concat()).await?;
exercise_homogeneous_multipart(&cluster, "homogeneous-current").await?;
verify_load_bodies(&clients, "homogeneous-previous", "multipart").await?;
assert_mixed_deletes_visible(&clients, &mixed_deleted_keys).await?;
for (node_idx, client) in clients.iter().enumerate() {
assert_eq!(
@@ -2325,6 +2386,7 @@ async fn rolling_upgrade_from_previous_release_preserves_mixed_version_contracts
cluster.start_with_binary(&previous_binary).await?;
prepare_release_baseline(&mut cluster, &previous_binary, "rollback").await?;
let old_clients = cluster.create_all_clients()?;
assert_mixed_deletes_visible(&old_clients, &mixed_deleted_keys).await?;
assert_resumed_multipart(&old_clients, &completed_pending).await?;
for phase in ["homogeneous-previous", "homogeneous-current"] {
verify_load_bodies(&old_clients, phase, "multipart").await?;
@@ -2389,6 +2451,8 @@ async fn rolling_upgrade_from_previous_release_preserves_mixed_version_contracts
"phases": phases,
"objects_per_phase": objects_per_phase,
"mixed_load": "plain-put",
"mixed_delete_protocol_supported": previous_has_delete_recovery,
"mixed_deleted_keys": mixed_deleted_keys,
"homogeneous_multipart_phases": ["homogeneous-previous", "homogeneous-current", "homogeneous-rollback"],
"multipart_objects_per_homogeneous_phase": MULTIPART_WORKERS * MULTIPART_UPLOADS_PER_WORKER,
"assertions": [
@@ -2421,7 +2485,11 @@ async fn rolling_upgrade_from_previous_release_preserves_mixed_version_contracts
"16x16 multipart load runs in homogeneous previous, current and rollback phases",
"one-current-node Complete returns typed 503 and preserves actual source authority and parts",
"the same legacy upload completes and replays once fully upgraded without adding a version",
"modern DELETE fails closed and preserves every byte while old peers remain"
if previous_has_delete_recovery {
"mixed-version DELETE succeeds and stays absent through every reader after upgrade and rollback"
} else {
"modern DELETE fails closed and preserves every byte while old peers remain"
}
],
}),
)?;
+4
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ workspace = true
[features]
default = []
fips = ["rustfs-s3-client/fips", "rustfs-utils/fips", "rustfs-tls-runtime/fips"]
diagnostic-read-version-caller = ["rustfs-io-metrics/diagnostic-read-version-caller"]
# Sampled wall/CPU diagnostics only; does not change the read backend.
diagnostic-local-batch = ["rustix/time"]
@@ -202,6 +203,9 @@ libc.workspace = true
# (backlog#1178); "thread" provides cleanup affinity; "fs" is a workspace default.
rustix = { workspace = true, features = ["process", "fs", "thread"] }
rustfs-madmin.workspace = true
rustfs-signer.workspace = true
rustfs-tls-runtime.workspace = true
quick-xml.workspace = true
reqwest = { workspace = true }
aws-sdk-s3 = { workspace = true, default-features = false, features = ["sigv4a", "default-https-client", "rt-tokio"] }
urlencoding = { workspace = true }
+32 -16
View File
@@ -191,7 +191,11 @@ pub mod bucket {
OBJECT_LOCK_CONFIG, UnreadableBucketConfig, is_unreadable_config_error, load_bucket_metadata,
table_catalog_path_hash, unreadable_config_refusal,
};
pub use crate::bucket::metadata::{BUCKET_DURABILITY_CONFIG, BUCKET_ON_DEMAND_MIGRATION_CONFIG};
pub use crate::bucket::metadata::{
BUCKET_DURABILITY_CONFIG, BUCKET_ON_DEMAND_MIGRATION_CONFIG, MAX_SWIFT_METADATA_COUNT, MAX_SWIFT_METADATA_VALUE_SIZE,
SWIFT_ACCOUNT_META_TAG_PREFIX, SWIFT_CONTAINER_META_TAG_PREFIX, SWIFT_TAGGING_MARKER,
};
pub use crate::bucket::metadata::{MAX_BUCKET_TAGS, is_swift_bucket_metadata_tag_key, validate_tag_set_entries};
}
pub mod config_parse_mode {
@@ -209,19 +213,20 @@ pub mod bucket {
pub mod metadata_sys {
pub use crate::bucket::metadata_sys::{
BUCKET_CONFIG_PUBLISH_HOOK, BucketConfigPublishHook, BucketMetadataMutationGuard, BucketMetadataSys,
ObjectLockConfigState, acquire_bucket_metadata_transaction_lock,
ObjectLockConfigState, ScannerBucketIncarnationReadGuard, acquire_bucket_metadata_transaction_lock,
acquire_bucket_metadata_transaction_lock_for_incarnation, acquire_scanner_bucket_incarnation_fence,
capture_bucket_metadata_incarnation, delete, delete_if_incarnation, delete_if_incarnation_at,
delete_under_transaction_lock, get, get_accelerate_config, get_bucket_policy, get_bucket_policy_raw,
get_bucket_targets_config, get_config_from_disk, get_cors_config, get_durability_config,
acquire_scanner_bucket_incarnation_read_fence, capture_bucket_metadata_incarnation, delete, delete_if_incarnation,
delete_if_incarnation_at, delete_under_transaction_lock, get, get_accelerate_config, get_bucket_policy,
get_bucket_policy_raw, get_bucket_targets_config, get_config_from_disk, get_cors_config, get_durability_config,
get_global_bucket_metadata_sys, get_lifecycle_config, get_logging_config, get_notification_config,
get_object_lock_config, get_object_lock_config_state, get_on_demand_migration_config,
get_on_demand_migration_config_in, get_public_access_block_config, get_quota_config, get_replication_config,
get_request_payment_config, get_sse_config, get_tagging_config, get_versioning_config, get_website_config,
init_bucket_metadata_sys, list_bucket_targets, reload_bucket_metadata, remove_bucket_metadata,
get_request_payment_config, get_s3_tagging_config, get_sse_config, get_tagging_config, get_versioning_config,
get_website_config, init_bucket_metadata_sys, list_bucket_targets, reload_bucket_metadata, remove_bucket_metadata,
remove_bucket_metadata_if_absent, set_bucket_metadata, update, update_bucket_targets_under_transaction_lock,
update_config_with, update_if_incarnation, update_if_incarnation_at, update_quota_if_incarnation,
update_quota_if_incarnation_at, update_under_transaction_lock, update_under_transaction_lock_at,
update_quota_if_incarnation_at, update_s3_tagging_config, update_under_transaction_lock,
update_under_transaction_lock_at,
};
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
pub use crate::bucket::metadata_sys::{ConfigWriteLockProbe, test_support};
@@ -331,8 +336,8 @@ pub mod bucket {
pub mod utils {
pub use crate::bucket::utils::{
check_bucket_and_object_names, check_list_objs_args, check_object_name_for_length_and_slash,
check_valid_bucket_name_strict, deserialize, has_bad_path_component, is_meta_bucketname, is_valid_object_prefix,
serialize,
check_valid_bucket_name_strict, deserialize, has_bad_path_component, has_xml_invalid_control_characters,
is_meta_bucketname, is_valid_object_prefix, serialize,
};
}
@@ -449,11 +454,18 @@ pub mod data_usage {
pub mod disk {
pub use crate::cluster::rpc::background_pipe::{BackgroundPipeReader, BackgroundPipeWriter, background_pipe};
pub use crate::cluster::rpc::background_reader_stream::BackgroundReaderStream;
pub use crate::disk::BOUNDED_DELETE_PREPARE_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
pub use crate::disk::background_memory::BackgroundEncodeBuffer;
pub use crate::disk::disk_store::get_object_disk_read_timeout;
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
pub use crate::disk::disk_store::wait_for_multipart_index_bootstrap;
pub use crate::disk::local::{ReplacementExecutionLease, ScanGuard};
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
pub use crate::disk::local::{local_durability_modes, set_local_rename_data_fail_after_metadata_commit};
pub use crate::disk::multipart_index::{
MULTIPART_INDEX_RPC_MAX_BYTES, MULTIPART_INDEX_RPC_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES, MultipartIndexPage, MultipartIndexRpcReply,
MultipartIndexRpcRequest,
};
pub use crate::disk::multipart_source::{
MULTIPART_SOURCE_PROTOCOL_VERSION, MultipartAbortCertificate, MultipartAbortProof, MultipartAbortProofKind,
MultipartAbortRound, MultipartSourceOperation, MultipartSourcePhase, MultipartSourceRequest, MultipartSourceResponse,
@@ -466,13 +478,15 @@ pub mod disk {
pub use crate::disk::os::{LocalPublicationPause, LocalPublicationStage};
pub use crate::disk::{
BATCH_READ_VERSION_MAX_ITEMS, BUCKET_META_PREFIX, BatchReadVersionItem, BatchReadVersionReq, BatchReadVersionResp,
CheckPartsResp, ConditionalFileUpdate, CurrentDeleteGeneration, CurrentDeleteTransition,
BoundedDeleteRecoveryDiscovery, BoundedDeleteRecoveryInspection, BoundedDeleteRecoverySettlement,
BoundedDeleteRecoverySettlementReply, CheckPartsResp, ConditionalFileUpdate, CurrentDeleteGeneration,
CurrentDeleteTransition, DELETE_RECOVERY_MAX_DISCOVERY_ENTRIES, DELETE_RECOVERY_MAX_INSPECTION_ENTRIES,
DELETE_RECOVERY_PROTOCOL_VERSION, DeleteOptions, DeleteRecoveryAction, DeleteRecoveryCursor, DeleteRecoveryDigest,
DeleteRecoveryInspection, DeleteRecoveryPage, DeleteRecoveryRpcOperation, DeleteRecoveryRpcReply, DeleteRecoveryState,
Disk, DiskAPI, DiskInfo, DiskInfoOptions, DiskLocation, DiskOption, DiskStore, FileInfoVersions, FileReader, FileWriter,
GuardedDeleteVersionsPayload, GuardedFileInfoVersions, HEALING_MARKER_PATH, NsScannerOpenRequest, OldCurrentSize,
POOL_META_NATIVE_CAS_METADATA_SUFFIX, PartTransactionAction, PoolMetaNativeBackup, PoolMetaNativeInspection,
PoolMetaNativeObject, PoolMetaNativeRecoveryRequest, PoolMetaNativeRecoveryResponse,
GuardedDeleteVersionsPayload, GuardedFileInfoVersions, HEAL_REPLACEMENT_RECOVERY_DIR, HEALING_MARKER_PATH,
NsScannerOpenRequest, OldCurrentSize, POOL_META_NATIVE_CAS_METADATA_SUFFIX, PartTransactionAction, PoolMetaNativeBackup,
PoolMetaNativeInspection, PoolMetaNativeObject, PoolMetaNativeRecoveryRequest, PoolMetaNativeRecoveryResponse,
QUOTA_MUTATION_FENCE_METADATA_SUFFIX, RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, RUSTFS_META_MULTIPART_BUCKET, RUSTFS_META_TMP_BUCKET,
ReadMultipleReq, ReadMultipleResp, ReadOptions, RenameDataResp, STORAGE_FORMAT_FILE, SnapshotLeaseToken,
UpdateMetadataOpts, VolumeInfo, WalkDirOptions, is_quota_mutation_fence_path, new_disk,
@@ -617,7 +631,7 @@ pub mod rebalance {
pub mod rio {
pub use crate::io_support::rio::{
DecryptReader, DynReader, EncryptReader, HardLimitReader, HashReader, ReadStream, Reader, WriteEncryption, WritePlan,
boxed_reader, compression_metadata_value, wrap_reader,
boxed_reader, compression_metadata_value, validate_compression_scheme, wrap_reader,
};
}
@@ -654,7 +668,9 @@ pub mod set_disk {
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
pub mod test_util {
pub use crate::bucket::quota::reservation::fail_next_quota_ledger_save_for_test;
pub use crate::bucket::quota::reservation::{
fail_next_quota_ledger_save_for_test, initialize_quota_ledger_for_test, retry_quota_reconciliation_for_test,
};
pub use crate::set_disk::ConditionalReadBenchmarkMetadataGuard;
pub use crate::set_disk::{MultipartCommitBarrier, MultipartCommitPause, PutObjectCommitBarrier, PutObjectCommitPause};
+325 -5
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ use crate::bucket::metadata::BucketMetadata;
use crate::bucket::metadata_sys::get_bucket_targets_config;
use crate::bucket::metadata_sys::get_replication_config;
use crate::bucket::remote_s3_client::{
PathStyle, REPLICATION_TARGET_RETRY_POLICY, RemoteCredentials, RemoteS3EndpointSpec, build_remote_s3_client,
PathStyle, REPLICATION_TARGET_RETRY_POLICY, RemoteCredentials, RemoteS3EndpointSpec, RemoteS3RetryPolicy,
UploadResponseDeadline, build_remote_s3_client,
};
use crate::bucket::replication::{ObjectLockIntegrity, object_lock_put_integrity, replication_etags_match};
use crate::bucket::replication::{ReplicationStatusType, ReplicationTargetConfigBridge};
@@ -119,6 +120,7 @@ impl From<&BucketTarget> for RemoteS3EndpointSpec {
ca_cert_pem: (!target.ca_cert_pem.trim().is_empty()).then(|| target.ca_cert_pem.clone()),
connect_timeout: None,
read_timeout: None,
operation_timeout: Some(TargetRequestTimeouts::from_env().request),
// Replication has no retry budget of its own on the request path,
// so it keeps the SDK's standard three attempts; stating it here
// pins the behaviour to this line instead of an SDK default.
@@ -1191,6 +1193,7 @@ impl BucketTargetSys {
health_check_duration: target.health_check_duration,
replicate_sync: target.replication_sync,
client: Arc::new(client),
timeouts: TargetRequestTimeouts::from_env(),
})
}
@@ -1922,6 +1925,83 @@ impl std::fmt::Display for S3ClientError {
}
}
/// Replication request budgets, snapshotted when a target client is built.
/// Streamed GET bodies are not subject to the upload-response budget.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
pub struct TargetRequestTimeouts {
request: Duration,
complete: Duration,
minimum_transfer_rate: u64,
}
impl Default for TargetRequestTimeouts {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
request: Duration::from_secs(60),
complete: Duration::from_secs(15 * 60),
minimum_transfer_rate: 1024 * 1024,
}
}
}
impl TargetRequestTimeouts {
fn from_env() -> Self {
let defaults = Self::default();
let seconds = |name: &str, fallback: Duration| {
let value = rustfs_utils::get_env_u64(name, fallback.as_secs());
Duration::from_secs(if (1..=86400).contains(&value) {
value
} else {
fallback.as_secs()
})
};
let minimum_transfer_rate =
rustfs_utils::get_env_u64("RUSTFS_REPLICATION_MIN_TRANSFER_RATE_BYTES_PER_SEC", defaults.minimum_transfer_rate);
Self {
request: seconds("RUSTFS_REPLICATION_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECS", defaults.request),
complete: seconds("RUSTFS_REPLICATION_COMPLETE_TIMEOUT_SECS", defaults.complete),
minimum_transfer_rate: if minimum_transfer_rate == 0 {
defaults.minimum_transfer_rate
} else {
minimum_transfer_rate
},
}
}
fn upload_timeout(self, size: i64) -> Result<Duration, S3ClientError> {
let size = u64::try_from(size).map_err(|_| S3ClientError::new("replication upload size must be non-negative"))?;
// The SDK can make three attempts. Leave transmission headroom for
// all three; the separate response deadline still bounds a trickling
// target after each upload finishes.
let attempts = match REPLICATION_TARGET_RETRY_POLICY {
RemoteS3RetryPolicy::Disabled => 1,
RemoteS3RetryPolicy::Standard { max_attempts } => u64::from(max_attempts.max(1)),
};
let seconds = size
.div_ceil(self.minimum_transfer_rate)
.checked_mul(attempts)
.ok_or_else(|| S3ClientError::new("replication upload timeout exceeds supported duration"))?;
let timeout = self
.request
.checked_add(Duration::from_secs(seconds))
.ok_or_else(|| S3ClientError::new("replication upload timeout exceeds supported duration"))?;
if Instant::now().checked_add(timeout).is_none() {
return Err(S3ClientError::new("replication upload timeout exceeds supported duration"));
}
Ok(timeout)
}
fn upload_override(self, size: i64) -> Result<aws_sdk_s3::config::Builder, S3ClientError> {
Ok(aws_sdk_s3::config::Builder::new()
.timeout_config(
aws_smithy_types::timeout::TimeoutConfig::builder()
.operation_timeout(self.upload_timeout(size)?)
.build(),
)
.interceptor(UploadResponseDeadline(self.request)))
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct TargetClient {
pub endpoint: String,
@@ -1935,6 +2015,7 @@ pub struct TargetClient {
pub health_check_duration: Duration,
pub replicate_sync: bool,
pub client: Arc<S3Client>,
pub timeouts: TargetRequestTimeouts,
}
impl TargetClient {
@@ -2360,12 +2441,11 @@ impl TargetClient {
Result::<_, aws_smithy_types::error::operation::BuildError>::Ok(req)
});
let mut config = self.timeouts.upload_override(size)?;
if forwards_source_checksum {
operation = operation.config_override(
aws_sdk_s3::config::Builder::new()
.request_checksum_calculation(aws_sdk_s3::config::RequestChecksumCalculation::WhenRequired),
);
config = config.request_checksum_calculation(aws_sdk_s3::config::RequestChecksumCalculation::WhenRequired);
}
operation = operation.config_override(config);
match operation.send().await {
Ok(output) => {
// Under SSE-KMS/DSSE or SSE-C the target's ETag is not the MD5
@@ -2501,6 +2581,7 @@ impl TargetClient {
}
Result::<_, aws_smithy_types::error::operation::BuildError>::Ok(req)
})
.config_override(self.timeouts.upload_override(size)?)
.send()
.await
{
@@ -2538,6 +2619,13 @@ impl TargetClient {
}
Result::<_, aws_smithy_types::error::operation::BuildError>::Ok(req)
})
.config_override(
aws_sdk_s3::config::Builder::new().timeout_config(
aws_smithy_types::timeout::TimeoutConfig::builder()
.operation_timeout(self.timeouts.complete)
.build(),
),
)
.send()
.await
{
@@ -2966,11 +3054,241 @@ mod tests {
health_check_duration: Duration::from_secs(5),
replicate_sync: false,
client: Arc::new(client),
timeouts: TargetRequestTimeouts::default(),
},
request_headers,
)
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
struct TimedResponseConnector {
upload_delay: Duration,
response_delay: Duration,
prefix_bytes: usize,
response: bytes::Bytes,
frames: Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize>,
dropped: Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize>,
}
struct ResponseDrop(Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize>);
impl Drop for ResponseDrop {
fn drop(&mut self) {
self.0.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
}
}
impl SmithyHttpConnector for TimedResponseConnector {
fn call(&self, request: HttpRequest) -> HttpConnectorFuture {
let settings = self.clone();
HttpConnectorFuture::new(async move {
http_body_util::BodyExt::collect(request.into_body())
.await
.map_err(aws_smithy_runtime_api::client::result::ConnectorError::io)?;
tokio::time::sleep(settings.upload_delay).await;
let guard = ResponseDrop(Arc::clone(&settings.dropped));
let stream = futures::stream::unfold(
(settings.prefix_bytes, Some(settings.response), true, guard),
move |(remaining, mut body, first, guard)| {
let frames = Arc::clone(&settings.frames);
async move {
if remaining == 0 && body.is_none() {
return None;
}
if !first {
tokio::time::sleep(settings.response_delay).await;
}
let bytes = if remaining > 0 {
bytes::Bytes::from_static(b" ")
} else {
body.take()?
};
frames.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
Some((
Ok::<_, std::io::Error>(http_body::Frame::data(bytes)),
(remaining.saturating_sub(1), body, false, guard),
))
}
},
)
.fuse();
let body = SdkBody::from_body_1_x(http_body_util::StreamBody::new(stream));
let mut response =
HttpResponse::new(aws_smithy_runtime_api::http::StatusCode::try_from(200u16).expect("status"), body);
response.headers_mut().insert("etag", "\"test-etag\"");
Ok(response)
})
}
}
fn timed_response_target(
upload_delay: Duration,
response_delay: Duration,
prefix_bytes: usize,
response: &'static [u8],
) -> (TargetClient, Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize>, Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize>) {
let frames = Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0));
let dropped = Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0));
let connector = SharedHttpConnector::new(TimedResponseConnector {
upload_delay,
response_delay,
prefix_bytes,
response: bytes::Bytes::from_static(response),
frames: Arc::clone(&frames),
dropped: Arc::clone(&dropped),
});
let http_client = http_client_fn(move |_settings, _components| connector.clone());
let (mut target, _) = header_recording_target_client(Vec::new());
target.timeouts = TargetRequestTimeouts {
request: Duration::from_secs(2),
complete: Duration::from_secs(10),
minimum_transfer_rate: 1024 * 1024,
};
target.client = Arc::new(S3Client::from_conf(
target
.client
.config()
.to_builder()
.http_client(http_client)
.retry_config(aws_sdk_s3::config::retry::RetryConfig::disabled())
.timeout_config(
aws_smithy_types::timeout::TimeoutConfig::builder()
.operation_timeout(target.timeouts.request)
.build(),
)
.build(),
));
(target, frames, dropped)
}
#[test]
fn replication_upload_budgets_preserve_large_transfers_and_reject_invalid_sizes() {
let policy = TargetRequestTimeouts::default();
assert_eq!(policy.upload_timeout(0).expect("empty upload"), Duration::from_secs(60));
assert_eq!(
policy.upload_timeout(5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024).expect("maximum single PUT"),
Duration::from_secs(15420)
);
assert!(policy.upload_timeout(-1).is_err());
let slow = TargetRequestTimeouts {
minimum_transfer_rate: 1,
..policy
};
assert!(slow.upload_timeout(i64::MAX).is_err());
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn replication_upload_response_deadline_is_independent_of_size_and_checksum_override() {
for operation in ["put", "forwarded-checksum", "part"] {
let (target, frames, dropped) = timed_response_target(Duration::from_secs(4), Duration::from_millis(500), 100, b"");
let body = vec![b'x'; 2 * 1024 * 1024];
let size = i64::try_from(body.len()).expect("size");
let started = tokio::time::Instant::now();
let error = if operation == "part" {
target
.put_object_part(
"bucket",
"key",
"upload",
1,
size,
ByteStream::from(body),
&PutObjectPartOptions::default(),
)
.await
.expect_err("response deadline")
} else {
let mut opts = PutObjectOptions::default();
if operation == "forwarded-checksum" {
opts.user_metadata.insert(
"x-amz-checksum-sha256".to_owned(),
"OoJ3yNhRwv3wwtZoGqEIPrPX9xwTnfLl+ka0wStN1g0=".to_owned(),
);
}
target
.put_object("bucket", "key", size, ByteStream::from(body), &opts)
.await
.expect_err("response deadline")
};
assert!(
started.elapsed() >= Duration::from_secs(6),
"upload gets its full independent window: {error}"
);
assert!(
started.elapsed() < target.timeouts.upload_timeout(size).expect("budget"),
"response must end before the larger total deadline"
);
assert!(
frames.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst) >= 2,
"trickle delivered progress before failure"
);
assert_eq!(dropped.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst), 1, "transport body released");
}
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn replication_slow_upload_preserves_transfer_window_and_streaming_get_body() {
let (target, _, _) = timed_response_target(Duration::from_secs(4), Duration::from_millis(100), 5, b"");
let body = vec![b'x'; 2 * 1024 * 1024];
let size = i64::try_from(body.len()).expect("size");
target
.put_object("bucket", "key", size, ByteStream::from(body), &PutObjectOptions::default())
.await
.expect("slow upload, prompt response");
let (target, _, dropped) = timed_response_target(Duration::ZERO, Duration::from_secs(1), 5, b"payload");
let response = target
.get_object("bucket", "key", None, None, None, HeaderMap::new())
.await
.expect("GET headers");
let started = tokio::time::Instant::now();
let body = response
.body
.collect()
.await
.expect("streamed GET remains outside upload deadline")
.into_bytes();
assert!(started.elapsed() > target.timeouts.request);
assert_eq!(&body[..], b" payload");
assert_eq!(dropped.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn replication_complete_processing_whitespace_has_a_separate_bounded_window() {
const RESULT: &[u8] = b"<CompleteMultipartUploadResult xmlns=\"http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/\"><ETag>\"etag\"</ETag></CompleteMultipartUploadResult>";
for prefix in [5, 100] {
let (target, frames, dropped) = timed_response_target(Duration::ZERO, Duration::from_secs(1), prefix, RESULT);
let started = tokio::time::Instant::now();
let result = target
.complete_multipart_upload(
"bucket",
"key",
"upload",
vec![CompletedPart::builder().part_number(1).e_tag("etag").build()],
&PutObjectOptions::default(),
)
.await;
if prefix == 5 {
assert!(result.is_ok(), "legal processing whitespace: {result:?}");
} else {
assert!(result.is_err());
assert!(started.elapsed() <= Duration::from_secs(11));
}
assert!(started.elapsed() > target.timeouts.request);
assert!(frames.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst) >= 2);
assert_eq!(dropped.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
}
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn replication_control_operation_deadline_covers_response_trickle() {
let (target, frames, dropped) =
timed_response_target(Duration::ZERO, Duration::from_millis(500), 100, b"<VersioningConfiguration/>");
let started = tokio::time::Instant::now();
assert!(target.get_bucket_versioning("bucket").await.is_err());
assert!(started.elapsed() <= Duration::from_secs(3));
assert!(frames.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst) >= 2);
assert_eq!(dropped.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
}
fn streaming_test_body(payload: &'static [u8]) -> ByteStream {
let stream = tokio_util::io::ReaderStream::new(std::io::Cursor::new(payload));
let body = http_body_util::StreamBody::new(futures::StreamExt::map(stream, |r| r.map(http_body::Frame::data)));
@@ -3279,6 +3597,7 @@ mod tests {
health_check_duration: Duration::from_secs(5),
replicate_sync: false,
client: Arc::new(client),
timeouts: TargetRequestTimeouts::default(),
},
request_uris,
)
@@ -3591,6 +3910,7 @@ mod tests {
health_check_duration: Duration::from_secs(5),
replicate_sync: false,
client: Arc::new(client),
timeouts: TargetRequestTimeouts::default(),
})
}
@@ -5487,6 +5487,14 @@ pub async fn put_restore_opts(
if !oi.user_tags.is_empty() {
meta.insert(AMZ_OBJECT_TAGGING.to_string(), (*oi.user_tags).clone());
}
if let Some(expires) = oi.expires {
meta.insert(
"expires".to_string(),
expires
.format(&time::format_description::well_known::Rfc3339)
.map_err(std::io::Error::other)?,
);
}
let restore_expiry = lifecycle::expected_expiry_time(OffsetDateTime::now_utc(), rreq.days.unwrap_or(1));
meta.insert(
metadata_keys::RESTORE.to_string(),
@@ -5506,7 +5514,6 @@ pub async fn put_restore_opts(
// computed MD5 is not the object's public plaintext ETag.
preserve_etag: oi.etag.clone(),
shard_integrity_write_mode: Some(oi.shard_integrity_write_mode()),
//expires: oi.expires,
..Default::default()
})
}
@@ -7144,6 +7151,25 @@ mod tests {
0,
"tier generation lease should release after EOF"
);
let unread = get_transitioned_object_reader_with_tier_manager(
&object_info.bucket,
&object_info.name,
&None,
&HeaderMap::new(),
&object_info,
&ObjectOptions::default(),
&manager,
None,
)
.await
.expect("open an unread transitioned response");
assert_eq!(TierConfigMgr::active_operation_lease_count(&manager, &tier).await, 1);
drop(unread);
assert_eq!(
TierConfigMgr::active_operation_lease_count(&manager, &tier).await,
0,
"canceling an unread response must release the tier lease"
);
}
#[cfg(feature = "test-util")]
+188
View File
@@ -256,6 +256,128 @@ pub const BUCKET_POLICY_CONFIG: &str = "policy.json";
pub const BUCKET_NOTIFICATION_CONFIG: &str = "notification.xml";
pub const BUCKET_LIFECYCLE_CONFIG: &str = "lifecycle.xml";
pub const BUCKET_SSECONFIG: &str = "bucket-encryption.xml";
/// Validate tag entries supplied to the S3 API.
pub fn validate_tag_set_entries(tag_set: &[s3s::dto::Tag]) -> std::result::Result<(), &'static str> {
validate_tag_entries(tag_set, validate_s3_tag_entry)
}
fn validate_tag_entries(
tag_set: &[s3s::dto::Tag],
mut validate_entry: impl FnMut(&str, &str) -> std::result::Result<(), &'static str>,
) -> std::result::Result<(), &'static str> {
let mut keys = std::collections::HashSet::with_capacity(tag_set.len());
for tag in tag_set {
let key = tag
.key
.as_deref()
.filter(|key| !key.is_empty())
.ok_or("Tag key cannot be empty")?;
let value = tag.value.as_deref().ok_or("Tag value cannot be null")?;
validate_entry(key, value)?;
if !keys.insert(key) {
return Err("Cannot provide multiple Tags with the same key");
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn validate_s3_tag_entry(key: &str, value: &str) -> std::result::Result<(), &'static str> {
fn is_valid_tag_text(value: &str) -> bool {
static VALID_TAG_TEXT: std::sync::OnceLock<std::result::Result<regex::Regex, regex::Error>> = std::sync::OnceLock::new();
VALID_TAG_TEXT
.get_or_init(|| regex::Regex::new(r"^[\p{L}\p{N}\p{Z}+\-=._:/@]*$"))
.as_ref()
.is_ok_and(|pattern| pattern.is_match(value))
}
if key.encode_utf16().count() > 128 || !is_valid_tag_text(key) {
return Err("The TagKey you have provided is invalid");
}
if value.encode_utf16().count() > 256 || !is_valid_tag_text(value) {
return Err("The TagValue you have provided is invalid");
}
Ok(())
}
pub const MAX_BUCKET_TAGS: usize = 50;
/// Maximum number of metadata headers on a Swift resource.
pub const MAX_SWIFT_METADATA_COUNT: usize = 90;
/// Maximum byte length of a Swift metadata value.
pub const MAX_SWIFT_METADATA_VALUE_SIZE: usize = 256;
/// Prefix for Swift account metadata persisted in tagging.xml.
pub const SWIFT_ACCOUNT_META_TAG_PREFIX: &str = "swift-account-meta-";
/// Prefix for Swift container metadata persisted in tagging.xml.
pub const SWIFT_CONTAINER_META_TAG_PREFIX: &str = "swift-meta-";
/// Marks a bucket whose shared tag config contains Swift-owned metadata.
/// The key cannot be supplied through S3's tag alphabet.
pub const SWIFT_TAGGING_MARKER: &str = "!rustfs-swift-metadata";
/// Whether a persisted tag belongs to Swift's internal metadata namespace.
pub fn is_swift_bucket_metadata_tag_key(key: &str) -> bool {
matches!(
key,
"swift-acl-read" | "swift-acl-write" | "swift-versions-location" | SWIFT_TAGGING_MARKER
) || key.starts_with(SWIFT_ACCOUNT_META_TAG_PREFIX)
|| key.starts_with(SWIFT_CONTAINER_META_TAG_PREFIX)
}
fn validate_persisted_bucket_tags(tags: &[s3s::dto::Tag]) -> std::result::Result<(), &'static str> {
const SWIFT_ACL_MAX_BYTES: usize = 8192;
const SWIFT_META_NAME_MAX_BYTES: usize = 128;
const MAX_PERSISTED_TAGS: usize = MAX_BUCKET_TAGS + 2 * MAX_SWIFT_METADATA_COUNT + 4;
if tags.len() > MAX_PERSISTED_TAGS {
return Err("Too many persisted bucket tags");
}
// Swift stores ACLs, versioning and metadata in the same XML as S3 tags.
// Only those known keys may carry values outside the S3 tag alphabet.
let mut account_metadata = 0;
let mut container_metadata = 0;
let mut s3_tags = 0;
validate_tag_entries(tags, |key, value| {
let swift_metadata = key
.strip_prefix(SWIFT_ACCOUNT_META_TAG_PREFIX)
.map(|name| (name, &mut account_metadata))
.or_else(|| {
key.strip_prefix(SWIFT_CONTAINER_META_TAG_PREFIX)
.map(|name| (name, &mut container_metadata))
});
if let Some((name, count)) = swift_metadata
&& name.len() <= SWIFT_META_NAME_MAX_BYTES
&& http::HeaderName::from_bytes(name.as_bytes()).is_ok()
&& value.len() <= MAX_SWIFT_METADATA_VALUE_SIZE
&& http::HeaderValue::from_str(value).is_ok()
{
*count += 1;
if *count > MAX_SWIFT_METADATA_COUNT {
return Err("Too many Swift metadata tags");
}
return Ok(());
}
if key == SWIFT_TAGGING_MARKER && value == "1" {
return Ok(());
}
let valid_swift_header = match key {
"swift-acl-read" | "swift-acl-write" => value.len() <= SWIFT_ACL_MAX_BYTES,
"swift-versions-location" => value.len() <= 256 && !value.is_empty() && !value.contains('/'),
_ => false,
};
if valid_swift_header && http::HeaderValue::from_str(value).is_ok() {
return Ok(());
}
s3_tags += 1;
if s3_tags > MAX_BUCKET_TAGS {
return Err("Cannot have more than 50 tags per bucket");
}
validate_s3_tag_entry(key, value)
})
}
pub const BUCKET_TAGGING_CONFIG: &str = "tagging.xml";
pub const BUCKET_QUOTA_CONFIG_FILE: &str = "quota.json";
pub const OBJECT_LOCK_CONFIG: &str = "object-lock.xml";
@@ -990,6 +1112,13 @@ impl BucketMetadata {
self.encryption_config_updated_at = updated;
}
BUCKET_TAGGING_CONFIG => {
if !data.is_empty() {
let tagging = deserialize::<Tagging>(&data).map_err(|_| {
Error::InvalidArgument(self.name.clone(), String::new(), "Invalid bucket tagging XML".to_owned())
})?;
validate_persisted_bucket_tags(&tagging.tag_set)
.map_err(|message| Error::InvalidArgument(self.name.clone(), String::new(), message.to_owned()))?;
}
self.tagging_config_xml = data;
// Drop the parsed form (like lifecycle above) so clearing the
// payload can't leave stale parsed tags to be cached.
@@ -1781,9 +1910,68 @@ mod test {
assert_eq!(metadata.bucket_incarnation_id, incarnation);
}
#[test]
fn persisted_bucket_tags_keep_separate_s3_and_swift_limits() {
use s3s::dto::Tag;
let tag = |key: String, value: &str| Tag {
key: Some(key),
value: Some(value.to_owned()),
};
let acl = tag("swift-acl-read".to_owned(), ".r:*,AUTH_other");
assert_eq!(
validate_tag_set_entries(std::slice::from_ref(&acl)),
Err("The TagValue you have provided is invalid")
);
let mut tags = vec![acl.clone()];
tags.extend((0..MAX_BUCKET_TAGS).map(|i| tag(format!("team-{i}"), "blue")));
tags.extend((0..MAX_SWIFT_METADATA_COUNT).map(|i| tag(format!("{SWIFT_CONTAINER_META_TAG_PREFIX}item!{i}"), "a,b")));
assert_eq!(validate_persisted_bucket_tags(&tags), Ok(()));
tags.push(tag(format!("{SWIFT_CONTAINER_META_TAG_PREFIX}overflow"), "a,b"));
assert_eq!(validate_persisted_bucket_tags(&tags), Err("Too many Swift metadata tags"));
tags.pop();
tags.push(acl);
assert_eq!(
validate_persisted_bucket_tags(&tags),
Err("Cannot provide multiple Tags with the same key")
);
tags.pop();
tags[0].value = Some(".r:*,".repeat(1700));
assert_eq!(validate_persisted_bucket_tags(&tags), Err("The TagValue you have provided is invalid"));
}
/// backlog#2292: a replicated config is stamped with the source
/// `updated_at` it was given, not the local clock, while the plain
/// `update_config` entry keeps stamping the local clock.
#[test]
fn bucket_tag_updates_reject_unreadable_shapes_without_replacing_metadata() {
let mut metadata = BucketMetadata::new("validated-tags");
let valid = br#"<Tagging><TagSet><Tag><Key>team</Key><Value></Value></Tag></TagSet></Tagging>"#.to_vec();
metadata
.update_config(BUCKET_TAGGING_CONFIG, valid.clone())
.expect("empty value is valid");
let updated = metadata.tagging_config_updated_at;
for invalid in [
"<Tagging><TagSet><Tag><Key>team</Key></Tag></TagSet></Tagging>".to_owned(),
"<Tagging><TagSet><Tag><Key></Key><Value>x</Value></Tag></TagSet></Tagging>".to_owned(),
"<Tagging><TagSet><Tag><Key>team</Key><Value>x</Value></Tag><Tag><Key>team</Key><Value>y</Value></Tag></TagSet></Tagging>".to_owned(),
format!("<Tagging><TagSet>{}</TagSet></Tagging>", (0..51).map(|i| format!("<Tag><Key>k{i}</Key><Value>v</Value></Tag>")).collect::<String>()),
] {
assert!(metadata.update_config_at(BUCKET_TAGGING_CONFIG, invalid.into_bytes(), updated + time::Duration::hours(1)).is_err());
assert_eq!(metadata.tagging_config_xml, valid);
assert_eq!(metadata.tagging_config_updated_at, updated);
}
metadata.tagging_config_xml = b"legacy corrupt tags".to_vec();
metadata
.update_config(BUCKET_TAGGING_CONFIG, Vec::new())
.expect("deletion repairs legacy corruption");
assert!(metadata.tagging_config_xml.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn update_config_at_stamps_the_given_time_and_update_config_stamps_now() {
let source_time = OffsetDateTime::now_utc() - time::Duration::hours(3);
+494 -50
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ use super::target::BucketTargets;
use crate::bucket::bucket_target_sys::BucketTargetSys;
use crate::bucket::metadata::{load_bucket_metadata_parse, load_bucket_metadata_parse_with_presence};
use crate::bucket::utils::is_meta_bucketname;
use crate::diagnostics::object_lock::ObjectLockAttempt;
use crate::disk::RUSTFS_META_BUCKET;
use crate::error::{Error, Result, is_err_bucket_not_found, is_err_strict_volume_not_found};
use crate::object_api::ObjectOptions;
@@ -599,7 +600,9 @@ pub(crate) async fn get_bucket_incarnation_id_for_options_in(
}
let sys = bucket_metadata_sys_of(ctx)?;
let sys = sys.read().await.clone();
let guard = acquire_bucket_metadata_transaction_read_lock_for_options_in(ctx, bucket, opts).await?;
let guard =
acquire_bucket_metadata_transaction_read_lock_for_options_in(ctx, bucket, opts, "bucket_incarnation_options_read")
.await?;
sys.get_bucket_incarnation_id_under_transaction_lock(bucket, &guard).await
}
@@ -683,6 +686,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn update_validated_in<F>(
bucket: &str,
config_file: &str,
data: Vec<u8>,
expected_incarnation_id: Option<Uuid>,
validate: F,
) -> Result<OffsetDateTime>
where
@@ -690,7 +694,7 @@ where
{
Box::pin(async {
let sys = require_bucket_metadata_sys_in(ctx)?;
let guard = acquire_config_write_guard(sys.clone(), bucket).await?;
let guard = acquire_config_write_guard_for_incarnation(sys.clone(), bucket, expected_incarnation_id).await?;
validate()?;
update_under_config_write_guard(sys, &guard, config_file, data, None).await
})
@@ -865,6 +869,30 @@ impl BucketMetadataMutationGuard {
}
}
/// Read-only scanner authority for one bucket incarnation.
///
/// Lock order is bucket lifecycle (read), then metadata transaction (read).
/// This guard cannot authorize a configuration mutation or scanner ACK write.
pub struct ScannerBucketIncarnationReadGuard {
bucket: String,
incarnation_id: Uuid,
lifecycle_guard: rustfs_lock::NamespaceLockGuard,
transaction_guard: rustfs_lock::NamespaceLockGuard,
}
impl ScannerBucketIncarnationReadGuard {
/// Returns the verified identity while both read fences remain valid.
///
/// # Errors
/// Returns an error if either lock has lost its lease.
pub fn checked_bucket_incarnation(&self) -> Result<(&str, Uuid)> {
if self.lifecycle_guard.is_lock_lost() || self.transaction_guard.is_lock_lost() {
return Err(Error::other("scanner bucket incarnation read lock was lost"));
}
Ok((&self.bucket, self.incarnation_id))
}
}
async fn acquire_config_write_guard(sys: Arc<RwLock<BucketMetadataSys>>, bucket: &str) -> Result<BucketMetadataMutationGuard> {
acquire_config_write_guard_for_incarnation(sys, bucket, None).await
}
@@ -891,6 +919,68 @@ pub async fn acquire_scanner_bucket_incarnation_fence(
acquire_config_write_guard_with_migration(sys, bucket, Some(expected_incarnation_id), false).await
}
/// Validate scanner read authority without serializing compatible metadata readers.
///
/// The returned guard retains both read locks. It never migrates metadata or
/// creates an incarnation; mutation callers must use the exclusive scanner fence.
///
/// # Errors
/// Returns an error for invalid bucket/owner identities, unavailable locks or
/// storage, absent incarnation metadata, or a deleted/recreated bucket.
pub async fn acquire_scanner_bucket_incarnation_read_fence(
bucket: &str,
expected_incarnation_id: Uuid,
expected_owner_id: Uuid,
) -> Result<ScannerBucketIncarnationReadGuard> {
acquire_scanner_bucket_incarnation_read_fence_with_sys(
get_bucket_metadata_sys()?,
bucket,
expected_incarnation_id,
expected_owner_id,
)
.await
}
async fn acquire_scanner_bucket_incarnation_read_fence_with_sys(
sys: Arc<RwLock<BucketMetadataSys>>,
bucket: &str,
expected_incarnation_id: Uuid,
expected_owner_id: Uuid,
) -> Result<ScannerBucketIncarnationReadGuard> {
super::utils::check_valid_bucket_name(bucket)?;
let metadata_sys = sys.read().await.clone();
if expected_owner_id.is_nil() || metadata_sys.object_store().id != expected_owner_id || expected_incarnation_id.is_nil() {
return Err(Error::other("scanner bucket incarnation owner does not match"));
}
let lifecycle_guard = metadata_sys.object_store().acquire_bucket_lifecycle_read_lock(bucket).await?;
let transaction_guard = await_bucket_namespace_operation(
Some(&lifecycle_guard),
bucket,
"scanner incarnation read transaction lock acquisition",
acquire_metadata_transaction_guard(
metadata_sys.object_store(),
bucket,
"scanner_incarnation_probe",
rustfs_lock::LockType::Shared,
),
)
.await?;
let incarnation_id = validate_bucket_metadata_guard_incarnation(
&metadata_sys,
bucket,
Some(expected_incarnation_id),
&lifecycle_guard,
&transaction_guard,
)
.await?;
Ok(ScannerBucketIncarnationReadGuard {
bucket: bucket.to_owned(),
incarnation_id,
lifecycle_guard,
transaction_guard,
})
}
async fn acquire_config_write_guard_with_migration(
sys: Arc<RwLock<BucketMetadataSys>>,
bucket: &str,
@@ -916,15 +1006,47 @@ async fn acquire_config_write_guard_with_migration(
Some(&lifecycle_guard),
bucket,
"bucket config transaction lock acquisition",
acquire_transaction_lock_with_sys(&sys, bucket),
acquire_transaction_lock_with_sys_for_purpose(
&sys,
bucket,
if migrate {
"bucket_config_update"
} else {
"scanner_incarnation_validation"
},
),
)
.await?;
let current_incarnation_id = validate_bucket_metadata_guard_incarnation(
&metadata_sys,
bucket,
expected_incarnation_id,
&lifecycle_guard,
&transaction_guard,
)
.await?;
Ok(BucketMetadataMutationGuard {
bucket: bucket.to_string(),
incarnation_id: current_incarnation_id,
lifecycle_guard,
transaction_guard,
})
}
async fn validate_bucket_metadata_guard_incarnation(
metadata_sys: &BucketMetadataSys,
bucket: &str,
expected_incarnation_id: Option<Uuid>,
lifecycle_guard: &rustfs_lock::NamespaceLockGuard,
transaction_guard: &rustfs_lock::NamespaceLockGuard,
) -> Result<Uuid> {
await_bucket_namespace_operation(
Some(&lifecycle_guard),
Some(lifecycle_guard),
bucket,
"bucket config existence validation",
await_bucket_namespace_operation(
Some(&transaction_guard),
Some(transaction_guard),
bucket,
"bucket config existence transaction validation",
async {
@@ -942,11 +1064,11 @@ async fn acquire_config_write_guard_with_migration(
)
.await?;
let current_incarnation_id = await_bucket_namespace_operation(
Some(&lifecycle_guard),
Some(lifecycle_guard),
bucket,
"bucket config incarnation validation",
await_bucket_namespace_operation(
Some(&transaction_guard),
Some(transaction_guard),
bucket,
"bucket config incarnation transaction validation",
load_bucket_incarnation(metadata_sys.object_store(), bucket),
@@ -959,12 +1081,7 @@ async fn acquire_config_write_guard_with_migration(
return Err(Error::BucketNotFound(bucket.to_string()));
}
Ok(BucketMetadataMutationGuard {
bucket: bucket.to_string(),
incarnation_id: current_incarnation_id,
lifecycle_guard,
transaction_guard,
})
Ok(current_incarnation_id)
}
/// Rewrite one config file while the caller already holds this bucket's
@@ -1173,11 +1290,23 @@ async fn delete_under_config_write_guard(
/// targets one, so a writer on another node cannot land a whole-file save in
/// the middle of this read-modify-write.
pub async fn update_config_with<F>(bucket: &str, config_file: &str, mutate: F) -> Result<OffsetDateTime>
where
F: FnOnce(&BucketMetadata) -> Result<Vec<u8>> + Send,
{
update_config_with_expected(bucket, config_file, None, mutate).await
}
async fn update_config_with_expected<F>(
bucket: &str,
config_file: &str,
expected_incarnation_id: Option<Uuid>,
mutate: F,
) -> Result<OffsetDateTime>
where
F: FnOnce(&BucketMetadata) -> Result<Vec<u8>> + Send,
{
let sys = get_bucket_metadata_sys()?;
let guard = Box::pin(acquire_config_write_guard(sys.clone(), bucket)).await?;
let guard = Box::pin(acquire_config_write_guard_for_incarnation(sys.clone(), bucket, expected_incarnation_id)).await?;
guard.ensure_valid(bucket)?;
let metadata_sys = sys.read().await.clone();
let updated = await_bucket_namespace_operation(
@@ -1196,6 +1325,70 @@ where
Ok(updated)
}
fn swift_manages_bucket_tags(tagging: &Tagging) -> bool {
tagging
.tag_set
.iter()
.any(|tag| tag.key.as_deref() == Some(super::metadata::SWIFT_TAGGING_MARKER) && tag.value.as_deref() == Some("1"))
}
/// Read the S3 tag set while keeping Swift's internal tags private.
pub async fn get_s3_tagging_config(bucket: &str) -> Result<(Tagging, OffsetDateTime)> {
let (mut tagging, updated) = get_tagging_config(bucket).await?;
if swift_manages_bucket_tags(&tagging) {
tagging.tag_set.retain(|tag| {
!tag.key
.as_deref()
.is_some_and(super::metadata::is_swift_bucket_metadata_tag_key)
});
}
Ok((tagging, updated))
}
/// Replace or clear S3 tags atomically while retaining Swift metadata.
///
/// The expected incarnation, when present, is checked under the bucket
/// lifecycle and metadata guards. A failed write leaves the previous config
/// intact. Repeated writes replace the same S3 set.
pub async fn update_s3_tagging_config(
bucket: &str,
tagging: Option<Tagging>,
expected_incarnation_id: Option<Uuid>,
) -> Result<OffsetDateTime> {
let tags = tagging.map(|tagging| tagging.tag_set).unwrap_or_default();
let invalid = |message: &str| Error::InvalidArgument(bucket.to_owned(), String::new(), message.to_owned());
if tags.len() > super::metadata::MAX_BUCKET_TAGS {
return Err(invalid("Cannot have more than 50 tags per bucket"));
}
super::metadata::validate_tag_set_entries(&tags).map_err(invalid)?;
update_config_with_expected(bucket, BUCKET_TAGGING_CONFIG, expected_incarnation_id, |metadata| {
let mut merged = metadata.tagging_config.clone().unwrap_or_default();
if swift_manages_bucket_tags(&merged) {
if tags.iter().any(|tag| {
tag.key
.as_deref()
.is_some_and(super::metadata::is_swift_bucket_metadata_tag_key)
}) {
return Err(invalid("Tag key is reserved for Swift metadata on this bucket"));
}
merged.tag_set.retain(|tag| {
tag.key
.as_deref()
.is_some_and(super::metadata::is_swift_bucket_metadata_tag_key)
});
} else {
merged.tag_set.clear();
}
merged.tag_set.extend(tags);
if merged.tag_set.is_empty() {
Ok(Vec::new())
} else {
super::utils::serialize(&merged).map_err(Error::other)
}
})
.await
}
/// Acquire a bucket's metadata transaction lock, held across a whole
/// read-modify-write of its metadata file.
///
@@ -1234,13 +1427,18 @@ pub(crate) async fn acquire_bucket_metadata_transaction_lock_in(
pub(crate) async fn acquire_bucket_metadata_transaction_read_lock_in(
ctx: &crate::runtime::instance::InstanceContext,
bucket: &str,
) -> Result<rustfs_lock::NamespaceLockGuard> {
acquire_bucket_metadata_transaction_read_lock_in_for_purpose(ctx, bucket, "bucket_metadata_read").await
}
pub(crate) async fn acquire_bucket_metadata_transaction_read_lock_in_for_purpose(
ctx: &crate::runtime::instance::InstanceContext,
bucket: &str,
op: &'static str,
) -> Result<rustfs_lock::NamespaceLockGuard> {
let sys = bucket_metadata_sys_of(ctx)?;
let api = sys.read().await.object_store();
let lock = api
.new_ns_lock(RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, &bucket_metadata_transaction_lock_key(bucket))
.await?;
Ok(lock.get_read_lock(crate::set_disk::get_lock_acquire_timeout()).await?)
acquire_metadata_transaction_guard(api, bucket, op, rustfs_lock::LockType::Shared).await
}
/// Readers already holding an Object Lock snapshot must share its guard:
@@ -1249,6 +1447,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn acquire_bucket_metadata_transaction_read_lock_for_options_in
ctx: &crate::runtime::instance::InstanceContext,
bucket: &str,
opts: &ObjectOptions,
op: &'static str,
) -> Result<Arc<rustfs_lock::NamespaceLockGuard>> {
if let Some(snapshot) = opts.object_lock_config_snapshot.as_ref() {
let store = object_store_in(ctx).await?;
@@ -1258,12 +1457,22 @@ pub(crate) async fn acquire_bucket_metadata_transaction_read_lock_for_options_in
Error::other("Object Lock snapshot does not hold a valid metadata transaction fence for this bucket")
});
}
Ok(Arc::new(acquire_bucket_metadata_transaction_read_lock_in(ctx, bucket).await?))
Ok(Arc::new(
acquire_bucket_metadata_transaction_read_lock_in_for_purpose(ctx, bucket, op).await?,
))
}
async fn acquire_transaction_lock_with_sys(
sys: &Arc<RwLock<BucketMetadataSys>>,
bucket: &str,
) -> Result<rustfs_lock::NamespaceLockGuard> {
acquire_transaction_lock_with_sys_for_purpose(sys, bucket, "bucket_metadata_transaction_write").await
}
async fn acquire_transaction_lock_with_sys_for_purpose(
sys: &Arc<RwLock<BucketMetadataSys>>,
bucket: &str,
op: &'static str,
) -> Result<rustfs_lock::NamespaceLockGuard> {
// Resolve the store under a short-lived read guard: this runs before the
// write guard in `acquire_config_write_guards`, and must not still hold a
@@ -1272,12 +1481,22 @@ async fn acquire_transaction_lock_with_sys(
let lock = api
.new_ns_lock(RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, &bucket_metadata_transaction_lock_key(bucket))
.await?;
let acquire = lock.get_write_lock(crate::set_disk::get_lock_acquire_timeout());
let timeout = crate::set_disk::get_lock_acquire_timeout();
let mut attempt = ObjectLockAttempt::start(
op,
RUSTFS_META_BUCKET,
&bucket_metadata_transaction_lock_key(bucket),
None,
&lock,
"write",
timeout,
);
let acquire = lock.get_write_lock(timeout);
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "test-util"))]
{
tokio::pin!(acquire);
let mut notified = false;
let guard = futures::future::poll_fn(|cx| match std::future::Future::poll(acquire.as_mut(), cx) {
let result = futures::future::poll_fn(|cx| match std::future::Future::poll(acquire.as_mut(), cx) {
std::task::Poll::Pending => {
if !notified {
notify_config_write_lock_attempt(bucket);
@@ -1287,11 +1506,38 @@ async fn acquire_transaction_lock_with_sys(
}
std::task::Poll::Ready(result) => std::task::Poll::Ready(result),
})
.await?;
Ok(guard)
.await;
attempt.observe_acquisition(&result);
Ok(result?)
}
#[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "test-util")))]
Ok(acquire.await?)
{
let result = acquire.await;
attempt.observe_acquisition(&result);
Ok(result?)
}
}
pub(crate) async fn acquire_metadata_transaction_guard(
api: Arc<ECStore>,
bucket: &str,
op: &'static str,
lock_type: rustfs_lock::LockType,
) -> Result<rustfs_lock::NamespaceLockGuard> {
let object = bucket_metadata_transaction_lock_key(bucket);
let lock = api.new_ns_lock(RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, &object).await?;
let timeout = crate::set_disk::get_lock_acquire_timeout();
let mode = match lock_type {
rustfs_lock::LockType::Shared => "read",
rustfs_lock::LockType::Exclusive => "write",
};
let mut attempt = ObjectLockAttempt::start(op, RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, &object, None, &lock, mode, timeout);
let result = match lock_type {
rustfs_lock::LockType::Shared => lock.get_read_lock(timeout).await,
rustfs_lock::LockType::Exclusive => lock.get_write_lock(timeout).await,
};
attempt.observe_acquisition(&result);
Ok(result?)
}
/// The lock resource name is deliberately still the `bucket-targets` one it
@@ -1901,6 +2147,15 @@ impl BucketMetadataSys {
self.api.upgrade()
}
/// Whether the backing `ECStore` has been dropped.
///
/// Used by `InstanceContext::clear_bucket_metadata_sys_if_stale` during
/// `ECStore::drop` so a shared bootstrap context does not retain a
/// `BucketMetadataSys` whose weak handle is dangling.
pub(crate) fn is_store_stale(&self) -> bool {
self.api.upgrade().is_none()
}
fn metadata_publish_lock(&self, bucket: &str) -> Arc<Mutex<MetadataPublishLockState>> {
Self::bucket_lock_in(&self.metadata_publish_locks, bucket)
}
@@ -2784,13 +3039,13 @@ impl BucketMetadataSys {
}
async fn find_bucket_incarnation_id_from_disk(&self, bucket: &str) -> Result<Option<Uuid>> {
let transaction_lock = self
.object_store()
.new_ns_lock(RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, &bucket_metadata_transaction_lock_key(bucket))
.await?;
let _transaction_guard = transaction_lock
.get_read_lock(crate::set_disk::get_lock_acquire_timeout())
.await?;
let _transaction_guard = acquire_metadata_transaction_guard(
self.object_store(),
bucket,
"bucket_incarnation_disk_read",
rustfs_lock::LockType::Shared,
)
.await?;
self.find_bucket_incarnation_id_under_transaction_lock(bucket, &_transaction_guard)
.await
}
@@ -2866,13 +3121,13 @@ impl BucketMetadataSys {
/// revalidated at write quorum, so a stale snapshot can neither revert an
/// acknowledged configuration update nor outlive a delete/recreate.
async fn migrate_bucket_creation_commit(&self, bucket: &str) -> Result<BucketMetadataAuthority> {
let transaction_lock = self
.object_store()
.new_ns_lock(RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, &bucket_metadata_transaction_lock_key(bucket))
.await?;
let transaction_guard = transaction_lock
.get_write_lock(crate::set_disk::get_lock_acquire_timeout())
.await?;
let transaction_guard = acquire_metadata_transaction_guard(
self.object_store(),
bucket,
"bucket_creation_commit_migration",
rustfs_lock::LockType::Exclusive,
)
.await?;
let namespace_lock = self.object_store().new_ns_lock(bucket, bucket).await?;
let namespace_guard = namespace_lock
.get_read_lock(crate::set_disk::get_lock_acquire_timeout())
@@ -2922,13 +3177,13 @@ impl BucketMetadataSys {
}
async fn migrate_legacy_metadata(&self, bucket: &str) -> Result<BucketMetadataAuthority> {
let transaction_lock = self
.object_store()
.new_ns_lock(RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, &bucket_metadata_transaction_lock_key(bucket))
.await?;
let _transaction_guard = transaction_lock
.get_write_lock(crate::set_disk::get_lock_acquire_timeout())
.await?;
let _transaction_guard = acquire_metadata_transaction_guard(
self.object_store(),
bucket,
"bucket_metadata_legacy_migration",
rustfs_lock::LockType::Exclusive,
)
.await?;
let authority = self
.load_authoritative_metadata_from_disk_under_transaction_lock(bucket)
@@ -3418,7 +3673,7 @@ mod tests {
),
(
BUCKET_TAGGING_CONFIG,
r#"<Tagging><TagSet><Tag><Key>environment</Key><Value>测试-🦀</Value></Tag></TagSet></Tagging>"#.as_bytes(),
r#"<Tagging><TagSet><Tag><Key>environment</Key><Value>测试-rust</Value></Tag></TagSet></Tagging>"#.as_bytes(),
),
(BUCKET_REPLICATION_CONFIG, NEW_WRITER_REPLICATION_XML),
(
@@ -3967,6 +4222,12 @@ mod tests {
.await
.is_err()
);
assert!(
acquire_scanner_bucket_incarnation_read_fence_with_sys(sys.clone(), bucket, Uuid::new_v4(), store.id)
.await
.is_err(),
"read-only scanner validation must not migrate an absent incarnation"
);
assert!(load_bucket_incarnation(store, bucket).await.expect("read sidecar").is_none());
assert!(
sys.read()
@@ -4023,6 +4284,128 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 4)]
#[serial]
async fn scanner_incarnation_read_fence_shares_reads_and_blocks_mutations() {
let (_dirs, store) = isolated_store_over_temp_disks().await;
init_bucket_metadata_sys(store.clone(), Vec::new()).await;
let sys = bucket_metadata_sys_of(&store.ctx).expect("metadata owner");
let bucket = "scanner-read-fence";
store
.make_bucket(bucket, &MakeBucketOptions::default())
.await
.expect("create bucket");
let incarnation = store
.bucket_incarnation_id_from_disk(bucket)
.await
.expect("bucket incarnation");
let guard = acquire_scanner_bucket_incarnation_read_fence_with_sys(sys.clone(), bucket, incarnation, store.id)
.await
.expect("read-only scanner fence");
assert_eq!(guard.checked_bucket_incarnation().expect("valid read fences"), (bucket, incarnation));
let transaction_lock = store
.new_ns_lock(RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, &bucket_metadata_transaction_lock_key(bucket))
.await
.expect("metadata transaction namespace");
assert!(
transaction_lock.get_write_lock(Duration::from_millis(20)).await.is_err(),
"scanner read authority must exclude metadata writers"
);
let lifecycle_lock = store
.new_ns_lock(bucket, crate::storage_api_contracts::bucket::BUCKET_LIFECYCLE_LOCK_OBJECT)
.await
.expect("bucket lifecycle namespace");
assert!(
lifecycle_lock.get_write_lock(Duration::from_millis(20)).await.is_err(),
"scanner read authority must exclude delete and recreation"
);
let another = timeout(
Duration::from_secs(1),
acquire_scanner_bucket_incarnation_read_fence_with_sys(sys.clone(), bucket, incarnation, store.id),
)
.await
.expect("scanner readers must not serialize")
.expect("second read-only scanner fence");
let compatible = timeout(
Duration::from_secs(1),
acquire_bucket_metadata_transaction_read_lock_in(&store.ctx, bucket),
)
.await
.expect("metadata readers must remain compatible")
.expect("metadata transaction reader");
drop(compatible);
drop(another);
let mut mutation = Box::pin(acquire_config_write_guard_with_migration(sys.clone(), bucket, Some(incarnation), false));
assert!(matches!(futures::poll!(&mut mutation), std::task::Poll::Pending));
let mut deletion = Box::pin(store.acquire_bucket_lifecycle_write_lock(bucket));
assert!(matches!(futures::poll!(&mut deletion), std::task::Poll::Pending));
drop(deletion);
drop(guard);
let mutation = timeout(Duration::from_secs(1), mutation)
.await
.expect("metadata mutation must progress after scanner read release")
.expect("exclusive mutation fence");
drop(mutation);
let lifecycle = timeout(Duration::from_secs(1), store.acquire_bucket_lifecycle_write_lock(bucket))
.await
.expect("bucket delete fence must progress after readers release")
.expect("exclusive lifecycle fence");
drop(lifecycle);
for (owner, expected) in [
(Uuid::new_v4(), incarnation),
(Uuid::nil(), incarnation),
(store.id, Uuid::nil()),
] {
assert!(
acquire_scanner_bucket_incarnation_read_fence_with_sys(sys.clone(), bucket, expected, owner)
.await
.is_err(),
"invalid owner or nil incarnation must not receive authority"
);
}
assert!(
acquire_scanner_bucket_incarnation_read_fence_with_sys(sys.clone(), bucket, Uuid::new_v4(), store.id)
.await
.is_err(),
"a stale incarnation must not receive authority"
);
store
.delete_bucket(bucket, &DeleteBucketOptions::default())
.await
.expect("delete bucket");
assert!(
acquire_scanner_bucket_incarnation_read_fence_with_sys(sys.clone(), bucket, incarnation, store.id)
.await
.is_err(),
"deleted bucket must not receive authority"
);
store
.make_bucket(bucket, &MakeBucketOptions::default())
.await
.expect("recreate bucket");
let replacement = store
.bucket_incarnation_id_from_disk(bucket)
.await
.expect("replacement incarnation");
assert_ne!(replacement, incarnation);
assert!(
acquire_scanner_bucket_incarnation_read_fence_with_sys(sys.clone(), bucket, incarnation, store.id)
.await
.is_err(),
"recreation must reject the previous scanner identity"
);
let guard = acquire_scanner_bucket_incarnation_read_fence_with_sys(sys, bucket, replacement, store.id)
.await
.expect("replacement read-only scanner fence");
assert_eq!(
guard.checked_bucket_incarnation().expect("replacement remains fenced"),
(bucket, replacement)
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn old_node_metadata_rewrite_cannot_replace_bucket_incarnation_sidecar() {
let (dirs, ecstore) = isolated_store_over_temp_disks().await;
@@ -4546,8 +4929,13 @@ mod tests {
std::fs::create_dir_all(dir.path().join(bucket)).expect("bucket volume should be created");
}
let mut bm = BucketMetadata::new(bucket);
bm.update_config(config_file, raw.to_vec())
.expect("raw config should be stored");
if config_file == crate::bucket::metadata::BUCKET_TAGGING_CONFIG {
// Model legacy persisted corruption without passing the write-time validator.
bm.tagging_config_xml = raw.to_vec();
} else {
bm.update_config(config_file, raw.to_vec())
.expect("raw config should be stored");
}
sys.persist_new_and_set(bm).await.expect("initial metadata should persist");
}
@@ -5200,6 +5588,61 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn validated_config_update_rejects_a_different_bucket_incarnation() {
let (_dirs, store) = isolated_store_over_temp_disks().await;
init_bucket_metadata_sys(store.clone(), Vec::new()).await;
let bucket = "catalog-cleanup-incarnation";
store
.make_bucket(bucket, &MakeBucketOptions::default())
.await
.expect("create bucket");
let incarnation = store
.bucket_incarnation_id_from_disk(bucket)
.await
.expect("read bucket incarnation");
let called = std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool::new(false);
let result = store
.update_bucket_metadata_config_for_incarnation_validated(
bucket,
"quota.json",
br#"{"quota":1}"#.to_vec(),
Uuid::new_v4(),
|| {
called.store(true, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
Ok(())
},
)
.await;
assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::BucketNotFound(name)) if name == bucket));
assert!(
!called.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst),
"incarnation must be checked before the external fence"
);
let (metadata, _) = get_config_from_disk_with_presence_in(&store.ctx, bucket)
.await
.expect("read unchanged bucket metadata");
assert!(
metadata.quota_config_json.is_empty(),
"a stale cleanup must not modify the replacement bucket"
);
store
.update_bucket_metadata_config_for_incarnation_validated(
bucket,
"quota.json",
br#"{"quota":1}"#.to_vec(),
incarnation,
|| Ok(()),
)
.await
.expect("the current incarnation permits the validated update");
let (metadata, _) = get_config_from_disk_with_presence_in(&store.ctx, bucket)
.await
.expect("read updated bucket metadata");
assert_eq!(metadata.quota_config_json, br#"{"quota":1}"#);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn quota_admission_rejects_stale_cached_no_quota() {
@@ -5673,7 +6116,8 @@ mod tests {
// update only needs one interleaving to show up.
const ROUNDS: usize = 8;
for round in 0..ROUNDS {
let tagging = format!("<Tagging><Round>{round}</Round></Tagging>").into_bytes();
let tagging =
format!("<Tagging><TagSet><Tag><Key>round</Key><Value>{round}</Value></Tag></TagSet></Tagging>").into_bytes();
let policy = format!(r#"{{"Version":"2012-10-17","Round":{round}}}"#).into_bytes();
let start = Arc::new(tokio::sync::Barrier::new(2));
@@ -5746,7 +6190,7 @@ mod tests {
let blocked = tokio::spawn({
let node_b = node_b.clone();
async move { update_with_sys(node_b, bucket, BUCKET_TAGGING_CONFIG, b"<Tagging/>".to_vec()).await }
async move { update_with_sys(node_b, bucket, BUCKET_TAGGING_CONFIG, b"<Tagging><TagSet/></Tagging>".to_vec()).await }
});
// Long enough for the write to have finished had it not waited: the
+38 -3
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
use crate::bucket::metadata::BUCKET_METADATA_FILE;
use crate::bucket::replication::ReplicationMigrationBridge;
use crate::disk::{BUCKET_META_PREFIX, MIGRATING_META_BUCKET, RUSTFS_META_BUCKET};
use crate::error::{Error, Result, is_err_strict_not_found, is_err_strict_volume_not_found};
use crate::error::{Error, Result, is_err_strict_not_found, is_err_strict_volume_not_found, to_object_err};
use crate::object_api::{GetObjectReader, ObjectInfo, ObjectOptions, PutObjReader};
use crate::storage_api_contracts::{
bucket::{BucketInfo, BucketOperations, BucketOptions},
@@ -334,6 +334,14 @@ async fn migration_target_exists<S: EcstoreObjectOperations>(store: &S, path: &s
}
}
/// Names the target record in a failed migration write, as the existence
/// probe's error already does. The commit path returns bare disk errors, and on
/// Windows a blocked record is first seen here: reading through a regular-file
/// ancestor reports the record missing instead of refusing access to it.
fn migration_write_error(err: Error, path: &str) -> Error {
to_object_err(err, vec![RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, path])
}
async fn migrate_one_if_missing<S>(
store: Arc<S>,
opts: &ObjectOptions,
@@ -369,7 +377,10 @@ where
.unwrap_or(data);
let mut put_data = PutObjReader::from_vec(data);
store.put_object(RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, path, &mut put_data, opts).await?;
store
.put_object(RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, path, &mut put_data, opts)
.await
.map_err(|err| migration_write_error(err, path))?;
info!("Migrated {label}");
Ok(())
}
@@ -481,7 +492,10 @@ where
Err(_) => return Err(MigrationMetadataError::Incompatible(path.to_owned()).into()),
};
let mut put_data = PutObjReader::from_vec(data);
store.put_object(RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, path, &mut put_data, &opts).await?;
store
.put_object(RUSTFS_META_BUCKET, path, &mut put_data, &opts)
.await
.map_err(|err| migration_write_error(err, path))?;
info!("Migrated IAM config: {path}");
total_migrated += 1;
}
@@ -531,6 +545,27 @@ mod tests {
));
}
#[test]
fn migration_write_errors_name_the_target_record_without_fragmenting_groups() {
use super::{Error, migration_write_error};
let first = migration_write_error(Error::FileAccessDenied, "buckets/first/.metadata.bin");
let second = migration_write_error(Error::FileAccessDenied, "config/iam/format.json");
assert!(matches!(first, Error::PrefixAccessDenied(..)), "unexpected error: {first:?}");
assert!(
first.to_string().contains(".rustfs.sys/buckets/first/.metadata.bin"),
"the startup error must name the blocked record: {first}"
);
assert_eq!(first, second, "record paths must not fragment error grouping");
let unrelated = migration_write_error(Error::other("disk offline"), "buckets/first/.metadata.bin");
assert_eq!(
unrelated,
Error::other("disk offline"),
"errors without a record form pass through unchanged"
);
}
#[test]
fn migration_errors_group_by_cause_and_retain_typed_record_context() {
use super::{Error, MigrationMetadataError};
@@ -119,6 +119,21 @@ async fn durable_quota_reporting_retires_degraded_floors_without_changing_ledger
// Exercise the real storage entry point before testing the new
// reporting semantics: the same ledger must admit and refuse
// these writes even when a scanner floor claims a million bytes.
if protocol == 1 {
let mut bootstrap = PutObjReader::from_vec(vec![0x5a; 512]);
assert!(
matches!(
store
.put_object(&bucket, "bootstrap", &mut bootstrap, &ObjectOptions::default())
.await,
Err(StorageError::SlowDown)
),
"a missing authoritative ledger must not admit a write from scanner reporting"
);
crate::bucket::quota::reservation::retry_quota_reconciliation_for_test(store.clone(), &bucket)
.await
.expect("bootstrap authoritative usage through the production worker");
}
let mut too_large = PutObjReader::from_vec(vec![0x5a; 8192]);
assert!(
matches!(
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+87 -2
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,9 @@ use aws_smithy_runtime_api::client::http::{
HttpConnector as SmithyHttpConnector, HttpConnectorFuture, SharedHttpConnector, http_client_fn,
};
use aws_smithy_runtime_api::client::interceptors::Intercept;
use aws_smithy_runtime_api::client::interceptors::context::BeforeTransmitInterceptorContextMut;
use aws_smithy_runtime_api::client::interceptors::context::{
BeforeDeserializationInterceptorContextMut, BeforeTransmitInterceptorContextMut,
};
use aws_smithy_runtime_api::client::orchestrator::{HttpRequest, HttpResponse};
use aws_smithy_runtime_api::client::result::ConnectorError;
use aws_smithy_runtime_api::client::runtime_components::RuntimeComponents;
@@ -155,6 +157,8 @@ pub struct RemoteS3EndpointSpec {
pub ca_cert_pem: Option<String>,
pub connect_timeout: Option<Duration>,
pub read_timeout: Option<Duration>,
/// Entire SDK call, including non-streaming response bodies and retries.
pub operation_timeout: Option<Duration>,
/// How many wire requests one logical call may cost. Every consumer
/// declares it; see [`RemoteS3RetryPolicy`].
pub retry: RemoteS3RetryPolicy,
@@ -252,6 +256,78 @@ pub(crate) fn remote_sdk_credentials(credentials: &RemoteCredentials, now: Syste
Ok(builder.build())
}
/// Only installed on non-streaming upload operations. The budget begins at
/// response headers, independently of the potentially long request upload.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct UploadResponseDeadline(pub Duration);
impl Intercept for UploadResponseDeadline {
fn name(&self) -> &'static str {
"RustfsUploadResponseDeadline"
}
fn modify_before_deserialization(
&self,
context: &mut BeforeDeserializationInterceptorContextMut<'_>,
_runtime_components: &RuntimeComponents,
_cfg: &mut ConfigBag,
) -> Result<(), BoxError> {
let response = context.response_mut();
let inner = std::mem::replace(response.body_mut(), SdkBody::taken());
*response.body_mut() = SdkBody::from_body_1_x(UploadResponseBody {
inner: Some(inner),
deadline: Box::pin(tokio::time::sleep(self.0)),
});
Ok(())
}
}
struct UploadResponseBody {
inner: Option<SdkBody>,
deadline: std::pin::Pin<Box<tokio::time::Sleep>>,
}
impl http_body::Body for UploadResponseBody {
type Data = bytes::Bytes;
type Error = BoxError;
fn poll_frame(
mut self: std::pin::Pin<&mut Self>,
cx: &mut std::task::Context<'_>,
) -> std::task::Poll<Option<Result<http_body::Frame<Self::Data>, Self::Error>>> {
use std::future::Future as _;
use std::task::Poll;
if self.inner.is_none() {
return Poll::Ready(None);
}
// The absolute response budget never renews on data, empty frames,
// or trailers. A retry gets its own bounded response window.
if self.deadline.as_mut().poll(cx).is_ready() {
self.inner.take();
return Poll::Ready(Some(Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut,
"replication response body deadline exceeded",
)
.into())));
}
let Some(inner) = self.inner.as_mut() else {
return Poll::Ready(None);
};
let result = std::pin::Pin::new(inner).poll_frame(cx);
if matches!(result, Poll::Ready(None) | Poll::Ready(Some(Err(_)))) {
self.inner.take();
}
result
}
fn is_end_stream(&self) -> bool {
self.inner.as_ref().is_none_or(http_body::Body::is_end_stream)
}
fn size_hint(&self) -> http_body::SizeHint {
self.inner.as_ref().map(http_body::Body::size_hint).unwrap_or_default()
}
}
/// Appends a caller-identifying token to the SDK `User-Agent`. Runs after
/// signing: SigV4 excludes `user-agent` from the canonical request, so the
/// signature stays valid.
@@ -309,7 +385,7 @@ pub async fn build_remote_s3_config(spec: &RemoteS3EndpointSpec) -> Result<aws_s
config_builder = config_builder.http_client(http_client);
}
if spec.connect_timeout.is_some() || spec.read_timeout.is_some() {
if spec.connect_timeout.is_some() || spec.read_timeout.is_some() || spec.operation_timeout.is_some() {
let mut timeouts = TimeoutConfig::builder();
if let Some(connect_timeout) = spec.connect_timeout {
timeouts = timeouts.connect_timeout(connect_timeout);
@@ -317,6 +393,9 @@ pub async fn build_remote_s3_config(spec: &RemoteS3EndpointSpec) -> Result<aws_s
if let Some(read_timeout) = spec.read_timeout {
timeouts = timeouts.read_timeout(read_timeout);
}
if let Some(operation_timeout) = spec.operation_timeout {
timeouts = timeouts.operation_timeout(operation_timeout);
}
config_builder = config_builder.timeout_config(timeouts.build());
}
@@ -674,6 +753,7 @@ mod tests {
ca_cert_pem: None,
connect_timeout: None,
read_timeout: None,
operation_timeout: None,
retry: RemoteS3RetryPolicy::Disabled,
user_agent_suffix: "",
}
@@ -1027,11 +1107,16 @@ mod tests {
spec.user_agent_suffix = "RustFS-Test/0.0";
spec.connect_timeout = Some(Duration::from_secs(5));
spec.read_timeout = Some(Duration::from_secs(5));
spec.operation_timeout = Some(Duration::from_secs(12));
let config = build_remote_s3_config(&spec)
.await
.expect("spec should build")
.http_client(http_client)
.build();
assert_eq!(
config.timeout_config().and_then(TimeoutConfig::operation_timeout),
Some(Duration::from_secs(12))
);
S3Client::from_conf(config)
.head_bucket()
.bucket("bucket")
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ pub(crate) struct ReplicationMetadataStore;
impl ReplicationMetadataStore {
pub(crate) const MRF_REPLICATION_FILE: &'static str = "config/replication/mrf.bin";
pub(crate) const MRF_REPLICATION_RECOVERY_LOCK: &'static str = "config/replication/mrf.bin.recovery";
pub(crate) const MRF_REPLICATION_REPLAY_STAMP: &'static str = "config/replication/mrf.bin.replay";
pub(crate) const FORCE_DELETE_REPLICATION_FILE: &'static str = "config/replication/force-delete.bin";
pub(crate) const FORCE_DELETE_REPLICATION_TRANSACTION_LOCK: &'static str = "config/replication/force-delete.bin.transaction";
@@ -116,6 +117,10 @@ mod tests {
ReplicationMetadataStore::MRF_REPLICATION_RECOVERY_LOCK,
"config/replication/mrf.bin.recovery"
);
assert_eq!(
ReplicationMetadataStore::MRF_REPLICATION_REPLAY_STAMP,
"config/replication/mrf.bin.replay"
);
assert_eq!(
ReplicationMetadataStore::FORCE_DELETE_REPLICATION_FILE,
"config/replication/force-delete.bin"
@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ use super::replication_config_store::ReplicationConfigStore;
use super::replication_error_boundary::{Error as EcstoreError, is_err_object_not_found, is_err_version_not_found};
use super::replication_filemeta_boundary::{
MrfOpKind, MrfReplicateEntry, REPLICATE_HEAL_DELETE, ReplicateDecision, ReplicateObjectInfo, ReplicatedTargetInfo,
ReplicationStatusType, ReplicationType, ReplicationWorkerOperation, ResyncDecision, replicate_decision_for_admitted_targets,
replication_statuses_map, version_purge_statuses_map,
ReplicationGenerationSnapshot, ReplicationStatusType, ReplicationType, ReplicationWorkerOperation, ResyncDecision,
replicate_decision_for_admitted_targets, replication_statuses_map, version_purge_statuses_map,
};
use super::replication_lock_boundary::ReplicationLockTiming;
use super::replication_logging::{EVENT_REPLICATION_CONFIG_LOOKUP_SKIPPED, LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE, LOG_SUBSYSTEM_REPLICATION};
@@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ const MRF_CORRUPT_FILE_PREFIX: &str = "config/replication/mrf.corrupt";
const MRF_PENDING_CAP: usize = 200_000;
const MRF_RETRY_INITIAL_DELAY: Duration = Duration::from_millis(100);
const MRF_RETRY_MAX_DELAY: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
/// Interval between runtime replays of the MRF journal, cluster-wide. A pass
/// re-attempts every retained entry, so a target that stays down costs one
/// attempt per entry per interval.
const MRF_REPLAY_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(300);
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct DurableMrfBacklog {
@@ -615,7 +619,7 @@ async fn read_mrf_entries<S: ReplicationObjectIO>(storage: Arc<S>) -> Result<Vec
}
/// Acknowledge only the generation read by the recovery leader. Entries appended
/// after that generation are retained as a suffix and replayed on the next startup.
/// after that generation are retained as a suffix and replayed on the next pass.
/// Lock order: recovery leader lock -> MRF journal object lock.
async fn acknowledge_mrf_recovery<S: ReplicationStorage>(
storage: Arc<S>,
@@ -667,7 +671,7 @@ async fn acknowledge_mrf_recovery<S: ReplicationStorage>(
Err(EcstoreError::PreconditionFailed)
}
/// Acquires the MRF recovery leader lock for the startup replay.
/// Acquires the MRF recovery leader lock for one journal replay pass.
/// Returns `None` (after logging) when the lock cannot be created or another
/// node is already processing the backlog.
async fn acquire_mrf_recovery_guard<S: ReplicationStorage>(storage: &Arc<S>) -> Option<rustfs_lock::NamespaceLockGuard> {
@@ -1018,7 +1022,7 @@ fn admitted_mrf_replicate_object(oi: ObjectInfo, entry: &MrfReplicateEntry, op_t
}
/// Acknowledges the replayed MRF prefix and returns the retained backlog.
/// On acknowledgement failure the backlog is preserved for the next startup and
/// On acknowledgement failure the backlog is preserved for the next replay pass and
/// re-read (falling back to the replayed snapshot) so the published summary stays accurate.
async fn resolve_retained_mrf_entries<S: ReplicationStorage>(
storage: &Arc<S>,
@@ -1033,7 +1037,7 @@ async fn resolve_retained_mrf_entries<S: ReplicationStorage>(
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_REPLICATION,
error = %error,
"Failed to acknowledge the MRF recovery prefix; preserving it for the next startup"
"Failed to acknowledge the MRF recovery prefix; preserving it for the next replay pass"
);
match read_mrf_entries(storage.clone()).await {
Ok(current) => current,
@@ -1051,6 +1055,120 @@ async fn resolve_retained_mrf_entries<S: ReplicationStorage>(
}
}
fn unix_millis_now() -> i64 {
i64::try_from(OffsetDateTime::now_utc().unix_timestamp_nanos() / 1_000_000).unwrap_or(i64::MAX)
}
/// Whether a periodic pass may run, given the start time of the last pass on
/// any node. A stamp more than one interval ahead of this node's clock is skew
/// or a bad value, so it does not suppress replay.
fn mrf_replay_due(last_started_ms: Option<i64>, now_ms: i64, interval: Duration) -> bool {
let Some(last_started_ms) = last_started_ms else {
return true;
};
let interval_ms = i64::try_from(interval.as_millis()).unwrap_or(i64::MAX);
now_ms.saturating_sub(last_started_ms) >= interval_ms || last_started_ms.saturating_sub(now_ms) >= interval_ms
}
async fn read_mrf_replay_stamp<S: ReplicationStorage>(storage: &Arc<S>) -> Option<i64> {
let data = ReplicationConfigStore::read(storage.clone(), ReplicationMetadataStore::MRF_REPLICATION_REPLAY_STAMP)
.await
.ok()?;
std::str::from_utf8(&data).ok()?.trim().parse().ok()
}
async fn write_mrf_replay_stamp<S: ReplicationStorage>(storage: &Arc<S>, started_ms: i64) {
if let Err(error) = ReplicationConfigStore::save(
storage.clone(),
ReplicationMetadataStore::MRF_REPLICATION_REPLAY_STAMP,
started_ms.to_string().into_bytes(),
)
.await
{
warn!(
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_REPLICATION,
error = %error,
"Failed to record the MRF replay start time"
);
}
}
/// One MRF journal replay pass. The recovery leader reads the journal,
/// re-drives every entry, and acknowledges the replayed prefix; entries that
/// could not be admitted, and entries appended meanwhile, stay for the next pass.
///
/// Every node runs the periodic loop, and the leader lock only serializes
/// passes. With `min_interval`, a pass is skipped when a pass on any node
/// started within that interval, read from the shared replay stamp, so a
/// cluster replays once per interval rather than once per node. The startup
/// pass passes `None` and always runs. A pass that finds entries records its
/// start time. Returns whether the journal was read.
/// Lock order: recovery leader lock -> replay stamp object lock.
async fn replay_mrf_journal<S: ReplicationStorage>(storage: &Arc<S>, min_interval: Option<Duration>) -> bool {
let Some(recovery_guard) = acquire_mrf_recovery_guard(storage).await else {
return false;
};
let started_ms = unix_millis_now();
if let Some(interval) = min_interval
&& !mrf_replay_due(read_mrf_replay_stamp(storage).await, started_ms, interval)
{
return false;
}
let Some(entries) = load_mrf_recovery_entries(storage).await else {
return true;
};
if !entries.is_empty() {
write_mrf_replay_stamp(storage, started_ms).await;
}
set_durable_mrf_backlog_snapshot(durable_mrf_backlog_summary_from_entries(&entries));
let total = entries.len();
let mut queued_count = 0usize;
let mut retry_entries = Vec::new();
for entry in entries.iter() {
let Some(admission) = replay_mrf_entry(entry, storage, &mut retry_entries).await else {
continue;
};
if admission == ReplicationQueueAdmission::Missed {
retry_entries.push(entry.clone());
} else if admission == ReplicationQueueAdmission::Queued {
queued_count += 1;
}
}
let retained = resolve_retained_mrf_entries(storage, &recovery_guard, &entries, &retry_entries).await;
let retained_count = retained.len();
set_durable_mrf_backlog_snapshot(durable_mrf_backlog_summary_from_entries(&retained));
if queued_count > 0 {
info!(
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_REPLICATION,
recovered = queued_count,
total,
retained = retained_count,
"Replayed MRF entries admitted for retry"
);
}
true
}
/// Re-runs [`replay_mrf_journal`] every `period`. The recovery leader lock keeps
/// one pass at a time across the cluster, including the startup pass, and the
/// shared replay stamp spaces passes from different nodes by `period`.
fn spawn_mrf_replay_loop<S: ReplicationStorage>(storage: Arc<S>, period: Duration) -> JoinHandle<()> {
tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
tokio::time::sleep(period).await;
replay_mrf_journal(&storage, Some(period)).await;
}
})
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[error("replication resync {active_resync_id} is already active for {bucket}/{arn}")]
struct ResyncActiveConflictError {
@@ -1171,6 +1289,7 @@ impl<S: ReplicationStorage> ReplicationPool<S> {
// Start background tasks
pool.start_mrf_persister().await;
pool.start_mrf_processor().await;
pool.start_mrf_replayer().await;
pool.start_force_delete_processor().await;
pool
@@ -1462,7 +1581,7 @@ impl<S: ReplicationStorage> ReplicationPool<S> {
/// Queues a replica task
pub async fn queue_replica_task(&self, ri: ReplicateObjectInfo) -> ReplicationQueueAdmission {
// A version that is already queued or being uploaded is not driven a
// A source generation already queued or being uploaded is not driven a
// second time: the scanner heal pass sees it as PENDING until the
// first upload lands and would otherwise re-queue it every cycle
// (backlog#2362). The key is released when the worker finishes, or
@@ -1639,55 +1758,26 @@ impl<S: ReplicationStorage> ReplicationPool<S> {
/// Starts the MRF processor — one-shot at startup.
///
/// Reads the on-disk MRF file, re-injects admitted entries as Heal operations, and
/// rewrites any entries that could not be admitted for a later startup retry.
/// Replays the on-disk MRF journal once; [`Self::start_mrf_replayer`] repeats
/// the pass while the server runs.
async fn start_mrf_processor(&self) {
let storage = self.storage.clone();
let handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
let Some(recovery_guard) = acquire_mrf_recovery_guard(&storage).await else {
return;
};
let Some(entries) = load_mrf_recovery_entries(&storage).await else {
return;
};
set_durable_mrf_backlog_snapshot(durable_mrf_backlog_summary_from_entries(&entries));
let total = entries.len();
let mut queued_count = 0usize;
let mut retry_entries = Vec::new();
for entry in entries.iter() {
let Some(admission) = replay_mrf_entry(entry, &storage, &mut retry_entries).await else {
continue;
};
if admission == ReplicationQueueAdmission::Missed {
retry_entries.push(entry.clone());
} else if admission == ReplicationQueueAdmission::Queued {
queued_count += 1;
}
}
let retained = resolve_retained_mrf_entries(&storage, &recovery_guard, &entries, &retry_entries).await;
let retained_count = retained.len();
set_durable_mrf_backlog_snapshot(durable_mrf_backlog_summary_from_entries(&retained));
if queued_count > 0 {
info!(
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_REPLICATION,
recovered = queued_count,
total,
retained = retained_count,
"Replayed MRF entries admitted for retry"
);
}
replay_mrf_journal(&storage, None).await;
});
self.task_handles.lock().await.push(handle);
}
/// Starts the runtime MRF replayer — ongoing background task.
///
/// Entries reach the journal while the server runs (worker-queue overflow,
/// delete-marker purge intents whose watch window drained with targets still
/// dirty). Replaying only at startup left them waiting for a restart.
async fn start_mrf_replayer(&self) {
let handle = spawn_mrf_replay_loop(self.storage.clone(), MRF_REPLAY_INTERVAL);
self.task_handles.lock().await.push(handle);
}
async fn start_force_delete_processor(&self) {
let storage = self.storage.clone();
let handle =
@@ -1755,7 +1845,7 @@ impl<S: ReplicationStorage> ReplicationPool<S> {
/// writes them to the on-disk MRF file every flush interval (default 10s,
/// overridable via `RUSTFS_REPL_MRF_FLUSH_INTERVAL_MS`) or when 1 000 new
/// entries accumulate. Runtime writers append under the journal lock; only the
/// startup recovery leader may remove an acknowledged prefix.
/// recovery leader of a replay pass may remove an acknowledged prefix.
async fn start_mrf_persister(&self) {
let Some(mut rx) = self.mrf_save_rx.lock().await.take() else {
return;
@@ -2314,28 +2404,47 @@ impl<S: ReplicationStorage> ReplicationPool<S> {
}
/// Object versions currently queued or being uploaded, keyed by bucket,
/// object name and version. `queue_replica_task` admits a version only once
/// object name, version and source generation. `queue_replica_task` admits a generation only once
/// while it is in flight; the scanner heal pass and MRF replays that arrive
/// in the meantime are `Skipped` instead of driving a second complete upload
/// (backlog#2362). Entries are removed when the worker finishes the task or
/// when no worker accepted it.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub(crate) struct ReplicationInFlight {
keys: std::sync::Mutex<std::collections::HashSet<(String, String, Option<uuid::Uuid>)>>,
keys: std::sync::Mutex<std::collections::HashSet<ReplicationInFlightKey>>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
struct ReplicationInFlightKey {
bucket: String,
object: String,
version_id: Option<uuid::Uuid>,
generation: ReplicationGenerationSnapshot,
}
impl From<&ReplicateObjectInfo> for ReplicationInFlightKey {
fn from(info: &ReplicateObjectInfo) -> Self {
Self {
bucket: info.bucket.clone(),
object: info.name.clone(),
version_id: info.version_id,
generation: info.replication_generation.clone(),
}
}
}
impl ReplicationInFlight {
fn lock(&self) -> std::sync::MutexGuard<'_, std::collections::HashSet<(String, String, Option<uuid::Uuid>)>> {
fn lock(&self) -> std::sync::MutexGuard<'_, std::collections::HashSet<ReplicationInFlightKey>> {
self.keys.lock().unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner())
}
/// Claim `ri`; `false` when the same version is already in flight.
/// Claim `ri`; a metadata mutation is independent of its earlier generation.
fn try_begin(&self, ri: &ReplicateObjectInfo) -> bool {
self.lock().insert((ri.bucket.clone(), ri.name.clone(), ri.version_id))
self.lock().insert(ReplicationInFlightKey::from(ri))
}
fn finish(&self, ri: &ReplicateObjectInfo) {
self.lock().remove(&(ri.bucket.clone(), ri.name.clone(), ri.version_id));
self.lock().remove(&ReplicationInFlightKey::from(ri));
}
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -2348,26 +2457,21 @@ impl ReplicationInFlight {
/// including when replication panics.
struct ReplicationInFlightGuard {
in_flight: Arc<ReplicationInFlight>,
key: ReplicateObjectInfo,
key: ReplicationInFlightKey,
}
impl ReplicationInFlightGuard {
fn new(in_flight: Arc<ReplicationInFlight>, ri: &ReplicateObjectInfo) -> Self {
Self {
in_flight,
key: ReplicateObjectInfo {
bucket: ri.bucket.clone(),
name: ri.name.clone(),
version_id: ri.version_id,
..Default::default()
},
key: ReplicationInFlightKey::from(ri),
}
}
}
impl Drop for ReplicationInFlightGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
self.in_flight.finish(&self.key);
self.in_flight.lock().remove(&self.key);
}
}
@@ -3421,6 +3525,8 @@ mod tests {
allow_first_read: Notify,
read_count: AtomicUsize,
delete_storage_calls: AtomicUsize,
delete_error: StdMutex<EcstoreError>,
replay_stamp: StdMutex<Option<Vec<u8>>>,
reported_size: StdMutex<Option<i64>>,
stream_read_bytes: Arc<AtomicUsize>,
write_count: AtomicUsize,
@@ -3488,6 +3594,24 @@ mod tests {
_h: Self::HeaderMap,
_opts: &Self::ObjectOptions,
) -> Result<Self::GetObjectReader, Self::Error> {
if object.ends_with(ReplicationMetadataStore::MRF_REPLICATION_REPLAY_STAMP) {
let stamp = self
.shared
.replay_stamp
.lock()
.expect("test replay stamp lock should not be poisoned")
.clone()
.ok_or(EcstoreError::FileNotFound)?;
return Ok(Self::GetObjectReader {
object_info: ObjectInfo {
size: i64::try_from(stamp.len()).expect("test stamp length should fit i64"),
..Default::default()
},
stream: Box::new(Cursor::new(stamp)),
buffered_body: None,
body_source: Default::default(),
});
}
if !object.ends_with("/.replication/resync.bin")
&& !object.ends_with("config/replication/mrf.bin")
&& !object.ends_with("config/replication/force-delete.bin")
@@ -3551,6 +3675,16 @@ mod tests {
let lock = self.new_ns_lock(bucket, object).await?;
Some(lock.get_write_lock(Duration::from_secs(10)).await?)
};
if object.ends_with(ReplicationMetadataStore::MRF_REPLICATION_REPLAY_STAMP) {
let mut stamp = Vec::new();
data.stream.read_to_end(&mut stamp).await.map_err(EcstoreError::from)?;
*self
.shared
.replay_stamp
.lock()
.expect("test replay stamp lock should not be poisoned") = Some(stamp);
return Ok(ObjectInfo::default());
}
if opts.http_preconditions.is_some()
&& let Some(replacement) = self
.shared
@@ -3672,7 +3806,12 @@ mod tests {
_opts: Self::ObjectOptions,
) -> Result<Self::ObjectInfo, Self::Error> {
self.shared.delete_storage_calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
Err(EcstoreError::NotImplemented)
Err(self
.shared
.delete_error
.lock()
.expect("delete error lock should not be poisoned")
.clone())
}
async fn delete_objects(
@@ -3929,6 +4068,48 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(current_queue(&pool, "in-flight-bucket").await, (3, 3 * 4096));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn queue_replica_task_admits_metadata_changes_during_an_initial_upload() {
let pool = new_test_replication_pool(Arc::new(LoadResyncNodeStore::new("node-a", empty_resync_shared_state()))).await;
let (tx, mut rx) = mpsc::channel(4);
pool.workers.write().await.push(tx);
let initial = ReplicateObjectInfo {
bucket: "pending-tags-bucket".to_string(),
name: "object".to_string(),
version_id: Some(uuid::Uuid::new_v4()),
size: 4096,
replication_generation: ReplicationGenerationSnapshot {
mutation_id: Some(uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string()),
..Default::default()
},
..Default::default()
};
let metadata = ReplicateObjectInfo {
op_type: ReplicationType::Metadata,
user_tags: String::new(),
replication_generation: ReplicationGenerationSnapshot {
mutation_id: Some(uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string()),
..Default::default()
},
..initial.clone()
};
assert_eq!(pool.queue_replica_task(initial.clone()).await, ReplicationQueueAdmission::Queued);
assert_eq!(pool.queue_replica_task(metadata.clone()).await, ReplicationQueueAdmission::Queued);
assert_eq!(pool.queue_replica_task(metadata.clone()).await, ReplicationQueueAdmission::Skipped);
assert_eq!(pool.in_flight.len(), 2);
drop(ReplicationInFlightGuard::new(pool.in_flight.clone(), &initial));
assert_eq!(pool.in_flight.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(pool.queue_replica_task(metadata.clone()).await, ReplicationQueueAdmission::Skipped);
for expected in [&initial, &metadata] {
let ReplicationOperation::Object(queued) = rx.recv().await.expect("queued operation") else {
panic!("expected object replication");
};
assert_eq!(queued.replication_generation, expected.replication_generation);
}
drop(ReplicationInFlightGuard::new(pool.in_flight.clone(), &metadata));
assert_eq!(pool.in_flight.len(), 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn queue_replica_task_releases_the_version_when_no_worker_accepts_it() {
let pool = new_test_replication_pool(Arc::new(LoadResyncNodeStore::new("node-a", empty_resync_shared_state()))).await;
@@ -4171,6 +4352,8 @@ mod tests {
allow_first_read: Notify::new(),
read_count: AtomicUsize::new(0),
delete_storage_calls: AtomicUsize::new(0),
delete_error: StdMutex::new(EcstoreError::NotImplemented),
replay_stamp: StdMutex::new(None),
reported_size: StdMutex::new(None),
stream_read_bytes: Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0)),
write_count: AtomicUsize::new(0),
@@ -4221,6 +4404,103 @@ mod tests {
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn delete_worker_already_purged_source_completes_without_retry() {
let arn = "arn:test";
for delete_marker_version in [false, true] {
for version_id in [Uuid::new_v4(), Uuid::nil()] {
for error in [
EcstoreError::VersionNotFound("source".to_string(), "purged".to_string(), version_id.to_string()),
EcstoreError::ObjectNotFound("source".to_string(), "purged".to_string()),
EcstoreError::FileVersionNotFound,
EcstoreError::FileNotFound,
] {
let shared = empty_resync_shared_state();
*shared.delete_error.lock().expect("delete error lock should not be poisoned") = error;
let storage = Arc::new(LoadResyncNodeStore::new("purged-source", shared.clone()));
let delete = DeletedObjectReplicationInfo {
bucket: "source".to_string(),
delete_object: ReplicationDeletedObject {
object_name: "purged".to_string(),
version_id: (!delete_marker_version).then_some(version_id),
delete_marker_version_id: delete_marker_version.then_some(version_id),
replication_state: Some(ReplicationState {
replicate_decision_str: test_replicate_decision(&[arn]).to_string(),
purge_targets: HashMap::from([(arn.to_string(), VersionPurgeStatusType::Complete)]),
..Default::default()
}),
..Default::default()
},
op_type: ReplicationType::Delete,
..Default::default()
};
assert!(
replicate_delete_with_outcome(delete, storage).await,
"a confirmed target purge must complete when the source is already absent (marker={delete_marker_version}, version={version_id})"
);
assert_eq!(
shared.delete_storage_calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst),
2 + usize::from(!delete_marker_version && !version_id.is_nil()),
"the worker must lock and attempt writeback, reading a non-null data version first"
);
}
}
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn delete_worker_missing_source_does_not_hide_unfinished_replication() {
let arn = "arn:test";
for (version_purge, target_status, error) in [
(
true,
VersionPurgeStatusType::Pending,
EcstoreError::ObjectNotFound("source".to_string(), "purged".to_string()),
),
(true, VersionPurgeStatusType::Complete, EcstoreError::ErasureWriteQuorum),
(
false,
VersionPurgeStatusType::Empty,
EcstoreError::ObjectNotFound("source".to_string(), "purged".to_string()),
),
] {
let shared = empty_resync_shared_state();
*shared.delete_error.lock().expect("delete error lock should not be poisoned") = error;
let storage = Arc::new(LoadResyncNodeStore::new("unfinished-delete", shared));
let delete = DeletedObjectReplicationInfo {
bucket: "source".to_string(),
delete_object: ReplicationDeletedObject {
object_name: "purged".to_string(),
version_id: version_purge.then(Uuid::new_v4),
delete_marker: !version_purge,
replication_state: Some(ReplicationState {
replicate_decision_str: test_replicate_decision(&[arn]).to_string(),
targets: if version_purge {
HashMap::new()
} else {
HashMap::from([(arn.to_string(), ReplicationStatusType::Completed)])
},
purge_targets: if version_purge {
HashMap::from([(arn.to_string(), target_status)])
} else {
HashMap::new()
},
..Default::default()
}),
..Default::default()
},
op_type: ReplicationType::Delete,
..Default::default()
};
assert!(
!replicate_delete_with_outcome(delete, storage).await,
"unfinished target work, source I/O failures, and marker creation must remain retryable"
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn delete_worker_preserves_persisted_admission_without_live_config() {
let arn = "arn:test";
@@ -5304,6 +5584,8 @@ mod tests {
allow_first_read: Notify::new(),
read_count: AtomicUsize::new(0),
delete_storage_calls: AtomicUsize::new(0),
delete_error: StdMutex::new(EcstoreError::NotImplemented),
replay_stamp: StdMutex::new(None),
reported_size: StdMutex::new(None),
stream_read_bytes: Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0)),
write_count: AtomicUsize::new(0),
@@ -6268,6 +6550,108 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(retained.target_arns, entry.target_arns);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn mrf_replay_loop_drains_entries_persisted_after_startup() {
let shared = empty_resync_shared_state();
let storage = Arc::new(LoadResyncNodeStore::new("mrf-runtime-replay", shared.clone()));
// A force-delete intent from a superseded generation replays as
// Skipped, so a pass that reaches it acknowledges it off the journal.
let stale_intent = |object: &str| MrfReplicateEntry {
bucket: "mrf-runtime-replay".to_string(),
object: object.to_string(),
op: MrfOpKind::Delete,
force_delete_id: Some(uuid::Uuid::new_v4()),
force_delete_local_commit: false,
target_arns: vec!["arn:rustfs:replication:target-a".to_string()],
..Default::default()
};
let journal_drained = || async {
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), async {
while !shared.data.lock().expect("test data lock should not be poisoned").is_empty() {
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
}
})
.await
.is_ok()
};
let handle = spawn_mrf_replay_loop(storage, Duration::from_millis(20));
for object in ["first", "second"] {
*shared.data.lock().expect("test data lock should not be poisoned") =
encode_mrf_file(&[stale_intent(object)]).expect("MRF entry should encode");
assert!(
journal_drained().await,
"an MRF entry persisted while the server runs must be replayed without a restart ({object})"
);
}
handle.abort();
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn mrf_periodic_replay_runs_once_per_interval_across_nodes() {
let shared = empty_resync_shared_state();
let node_a = Arc::new(LoadResyncNodeStore::new("mrf-node-a", shared.clone()));
let node_b = Arc::new(LoadResyncNodeStore::new("mrf-node-b", shared.clone()));
let interval = Duration::from_secs(1);
let persist_backlog = |object: &str| {
let entry = MrfReplicateEntry {
bucket: "mrf-node-replay".to_string(),
object: object.to_string(),
op: MrfOpKind::Delete,
force_delete_id: Some(uuid::Uuid::new_v4()),
force_delete_local_commit: false,
target_arns: vec!["arn:rustfs:replication:target-a".to_string()],
..Default::default()
};
*shared.data.lock().expect("test data lock should not be poisoned") =
encode_mrf_file(&[entry]).expect("MRF entry should encode");
};
let journal_is_empty = || shared.data.lock().expect("test data lock should not be poisoned").is_empty();
persist_backlog("first");
assert!(replay_mrf_journal(&node_a, Some(interval)).await, "node A's periodic pass should replay");
assert!(journal_is_empty(), "node A's pass should acknowledge the replayed entry");
// Node B's timer fires within the same interval with a backlog present.
persist_backlog("second");
assert!(
!replay_mrf_journal(&node_b, Some(interval)).await,
"a node must not replay within one interval of another node's pass"
);
assert!(!journal_is_empty(), "the backlog should wait for the next interval");
assert!(
replay_mrf_journal(&node_b, None).await,
"the startup pass should replay regardless of the shared stamp"
);
assert!(journal_is_empty(), "the startup pass should acknowledge the replayed entry");
persist_backlog("third");
tokio::time::sleep(interval).await;
assert!(
replay_mrf_journal(&node_a, Some(interval)).await,
"a periodic pass should replay once the interval has elapsed"
);
assert!(journal_is_empty(), "the due pass should acknowledge the replayed entry");
}
#[test]
fn mrf_replay_due_tolerates_missing_and_skewed_stamps() {
let interval = Duration::from_secs(300);
let now = 1_000_000_000;
assert!(mrf_replay_due(None, now, interval));
assert!(!mrf_replay_due(Some(now - 299_999), now, interval));
assert!(mrf_replay_due(Some(now - 300_000), now, interval));
assert!(
!mrf_replay_due(Some(now + 1_000), now, interval),
"small clock skew should still space passes"
);
assert!(
mrf_replay_due(Some(now + 300_000), now, interval),
"a stamp an interval ahead must not suppress replay"
);
}
#[test]
fn mrf_entry_delete_marker_roundtrip() {
let dm_vid = Uuid::new_v4();
@@ -2809,17 +2809,22 @@ pub(crate) async fn replicate_delete_with_outcome<S: ReplicationStorage>(
true
}
Err(e) => {
error!(
event = EVENT_RESYNC_TARGET_OPERATION_FAILED,
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_REPLICATION_RESYNC,
bucket = %bucket,
arn = %dobj.target_arn,
object = %dobj.delete_object.object_name,
operation = "apply_replication_delete_state",
error = %e,
"Replication target operation failed"
);
// A batch purge or another worker may have removed this version
// already. Remote failures still control the final outcome below.
let source_already_purged = is_version_purge && (is_err_object_not_found(&e) || is_err_version_not_found(&e));
if !source_already_purged {
error!(
event = EVENT_RESYNC_TARGET_OPERATION_FAILED,
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_REPLICATION_RESYNC,
bucket = %bucket,
arn = %dobj.target_arn,
object = %dobj.delete_object.object_name,
operation = "apply_replication_delete_state",
error = %e,
"Replication target operation failed"
);
}
send_event(EventArgs {
event_name,
bucket_name: bucket.clone(),
@@ -2832,7 +2837,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn replicate_delete_with_outcome<S: ReplicationStorage>(
},
..Default::default()
});
false
source_already_purged
}
};
@@ -3010,7 +3015,7 @@ const DELETE_MARKER_PURGE_WATCH_INTERVAL: TokioDuration = TokioDuration::from_se
/// If the marker disappears (deleted before or while the replica landed),
/// purge the replicated marker from the targets, retrying failed targets on
/// later rounds. When the window drains with targets still dirty, persist the
/// purge intent as a durable MRF entry so the next startup replays it through
/// purge intent as a durable MRF entry so the next MRF replay pass re-drives it through
/// `purge_stale_delete_marker_targets`.
async fn watch_and_purge_source_delete_marker<S: ReplicationStorage>(
bucket: String,
@@ -3101,7 +3106,7 @@ async fn enqueue_delete_marker_purge_mrf(dobj: &DeletedObjectReplicationInfo, fa
/// Heal callers retry for the full watch window because the startup MRF
/// processor runs before bucket metadata (and thus target clients) finishes
/// initializing — the first pass can see `target_client_missing` and a later
/// round resolves the client; the replay loop is serial and startup-only, so
/// round resolves the client; replay passes are serial background work, so
/// blocking it for up to the window per dirty entry is acceptable. Live
/// callers run on replication workers where a down target would pin a worker
/// for the whole window, so they attempt once and lean on the durable intent
@@ -6604,6 +6609,7 @@ mod tests {
health_check_duration: std::time::Duration::from_secs(5),
replicate_sync: false,
client: Arc::new(aws_sdk_s3::Client::from_conf(config)),
timeouts: Default::default(),
})
}
+12
View File
@@ -259,6 +259,10 @@ pub fn check_object_name_for_length_and_slash(bucket: &str, object: &str) -> Res
pub fn check_new_object_args(bucket: &str, object: &str, data_movement: bool) -> Result<()> {
check_put_object_args(bucket, object)?;
if !data_movement && !is_meta_bucketname(bucket) && has_xml_invalid_control_characters(object) {
return Err(StorageError::ObjectNameInvalid(bucket.to_owned(), object.to_owned()));
}
if cfg!(target_os = "windows") && !data_movement && !is_meta_bucketname(bucket) && object.contains('\\') {
return Err(StorageError::InvalidArgument(
bucket.to_owned(),
@@ -270,6 +274,14 @@ pub fn check_new_object_args(bucket: &str, object: &str, data_movement: bool) ->
Ok(())
}
/// New public keys must remain representable in an unencoded XML listing.
/// Existing keys still use the read/delete validators so they can be removed.
pub fn has_xml_invalid_control_characters(object: &str) -> bool {
object
.chars()
.any(|character| character < ' ' && !matches!(character, '\t' | '\n' | '\r'))
}
pub fn check_copy_obj_args(bucket: &str, object: &str) -> Result<()> {
check_bucket_and_object_names(bucket, object)
}
+253 -36
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ use tokio::sync::Mutex as TokioMutex;
use tokio::task::JoinSet;
use tokio::time::timeout;
use tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken;
use tracing::{debug, error, warn};
use tracing::{Instrument, debug, error, warn};
const LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE: &str = "ecstore";
const LOG_SUBSYSTEM_METACACHE: &str = "metacache";
@@ -224,6 +224,8 @@ pub struct ListPathRawOptions {
pub recursive: bool,
pub incl_deleted: bool,
pub skip_hidden_prefix_check: bool,
pub hidden_entry_budget: usize,
pub pending_prefix: Option<String>,
pub filter_prefix: Option<String>,
pub forward_to: Option<String>,
pub min_disks: usize,
@@ -260,6 +262,8 @@ impl Clone for ListPathRawOptions {
recursive: self.recursive,
incl_deleted: self.incl_deleted,
skip_hidden_prefix_check: self.skip_hidden_prefix_check,
hidden_entry_budget: self.hidden_entry_budget,
pending_prefix: self.pending_prefix.clone(),
filter_prefix: self.filter_prefix.clone(),
forward_to: self.forward_to.clone(),
min_disks: self.min_disks,
@@ -289,6 +293,8 @@ fn walk_dir_options(opts: &ListPathRawOptions) -> WalkDirOptions {
recursive: opts.recursive,
incl_deleted: opts.incl_deleted,
skip_hidden_prefix_check: opts.skip_hidden_prefix_check,
hidden_entry_budget: opts.hidden_entry_budget,
pending_prefix: opts.pending_prefix.clone(),
report_notfound: opts.report_not_found,
filter_prefix: opts.filter_prefix.clone(),
forward_to: opts.forward_to.clone(),
@@ -301,13 +307,15 @@ fn walk_dir_options(opts: &ListPathRawOptions) -> WalkDirOptions {
}
/// How a merged raw listing stream ended.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ListPathRawOutcome {
/// At least one producer stopped at its per-disk limit instead of at the
/// end of its namespace, so the closed stream is not proof of exhaustion.
/// Carried in-band by the metacache stream trailer, so remote producers
/// report it as well.
pub limit_reached: bool,
/// Inclusive sorted boundary proved by every reader before a bounded stop.
pub scan_cut: Option<String>,
}
pub async fn list_path_raw(rx: CancellationToken, opts: ListPathRawOptions) -> disk::error::Result<()> {
@@ -363,10 +371,15 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
let producer_errs: Arc<[OnceLock<DiskError>]> = (0..opts.disks.len()).map(|_| OnceLock::new()).collect::<Vec<_>>().into();
let cancel_rx = CancellationToken::new();
let walk_options = Arc::new(walk_dir_options(&opts));
for (disk_idx, disk) in opts.disks.iter().enumerate() {
let opdisk = disk.clone();
let opts_clone = opts.clone();
let walk_options = walk_options.clone();
#[cfg(test)]
let test_reader_behavior = opts.test_reader_behaviors.get(disk_idx).cloned();
#[cfg(test)]
let test_disk_io_context_observed = opts.test_disk_io_context_observed.clone();
let fallback_claim_tracker = fallback_claim_tracker.clone();
let fds_clone = fds.clone();
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -376,17 +389,17 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
let disk_io_context_clone = disk_io_context.clone();
let (rd, wr) = tokio::io::duplex(64 * 1024);
readers.push(MetacacheReader::new(rd));
jobs.spawn(with_optional_disk_io_context(disk_io_context_clone, async move {
let producer = with_optional_disk_io_context(disk_io_context_clone, async move {
let mut wr = PublishedBytesWriter::new(wr);
#[cfg(test)]
if let Some(observer) = &opts_clone.test_disk_io_context_observed {
if let Some(observer) = &test_disk_io_context_observed {
observer.store(
crate::disk::current_disk_io_context().is_some_and(|context| context.class == DiskIoClass::Background),
std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Release,
);
}
#[cfg(test)]
let test_primary_error = if let Some(behavior) = opts_clone.test_reader_behaviors.get(disk_idx).cloned() {
let test_primary_error = if let Some(behavior) = test_reader_behavior {
match behavior {
TestReaderBehavior::Eof => return Ok(()),
TestReaderBehavior::Entries(entries) => {
@@ -443,8 +456,6 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
None
};
let wakl_opts = walk_dir_options(&opts_clone);
let mut need_fallback = false;
let mut last_err = None;
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -459,7 +470,7 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
if !need_fallback && let Some(disk) = opdisk {
let primary_walk_started = std::time::Instant::now();
match disk.walk_dir(wakl_opts, &mut wr).await {
match disk.walk_dir((*walk_options).clone(), &mut wr).await {
Ok(_res) => {
rustfs_io_metrics::record_stage_duration(
"metacache_walk_dir_primary",
@@ -483,8 +494,8 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
event = EVENT_METACACHE_LISTING,
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_METACACHE,
bucket = %opts_clone.bucket,
path = %opts_clone.path,
bucket = %walk_options.bucket,
path = %walk_options.base_dir,
disk_index = disk_idx,
state = "walk_dir_missing_path",
error = ?err,
@@ -495,8 +506,8 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
event = EVENT_METACACHE_LISTING,
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_METACACHE,
bucket = %opts_clone.bucket,
path = %opts_clone.path,
bucket = %walk_options.bucket,
path = %walk_options.base_dir,
disk_index = disk_idx,
state = "walk_dir_failed",
error = ?err,
@@ -598,8 +609,8 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
event = EVENT_METACACHE_LISTING,
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_METACACHE,
bucket = %opts_clone.bucket,
path = %opts_clone.path,
bucket = %walk_options.bucket,
path = %walk_options.base_dir,
disk_index = disk_idx,
state = "fallback_disk_missing_for_path",
error = ?err,
@@ -610,8 +621,8 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
event = EVENT_METACACHE_LISTING,
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_METACACHE,
bucket = %opts_clone.bucket,
path = %opts_clone.path,
bucket = %walk_options.bucket,
path = %walk_options.base_dir,
disk_index = disk_idx,
state = "fallback_disk_missing",
error = ?err,
@@ -626,7 +637,7 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
}
let fallback_walk_started = std::time::Instant::now();
match disk.as_ref().walk_dir(walk_dir_options(&opts_clone), &mut wr).await {
match disk.as_ref().walk_dir((*walk_options).clone(), &mut wr).await {
Ok(_r) => {
rustfs_io_metrics::record_stage_duration(
"metacache_walk_dir_fallback",
@@ -652,8 +663,8 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
event = EVENT_METACACHE_LISTING,
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_METACACHE,
bucket = %opts_clone.bucket,
path = %opts_clone.path,
bucket = %walk_options.bucket,
path = %walk_options.base_dir,
disk_index = disk_idx,
state = "fallback_walk_dir_missing_path",
error = ?err,
@@ -664,8 +675,8 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
event = EVENT_METACACHE_LISTING,
component = LOG_COMPONENT_ECSTORE,
subsystem = LOG_SUBSYSTEM_METACACHE,
bucket = %opts_clone.bucket,
path = %opts_clone.path,
bucket = %walk_options.bucket,
path = %walk_options.base_dir,
disk_index = disk_idx,
state = "fallback_walk_dir_failed",
error = ?err,
@@ -687,12 +698,13 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
// warn!("list_path_raw: while need_fallback done");
Ok(())
}));
});
jobs.spawn(producer.in_current_span());
}
let revjob_rx = rx.clone();
let mut revjobs = JoinSet::new();
revjobs.spawn(async move {
let merge = async move {
// Consumer-side peek timeout, and a caveat worth understanding
// (rustfs/backlog#1217).
//
@@ -722,6 +734,8 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
// Sticky across rounds: once any reader's trailer says its producer
// stopped at the per-disk limit, the merged stream may hide more keys.
let mut limit_reached = false;
let mut scan_cut = None;
let mut last_scanned_key: Option<String> = None;
loop {
let mut current = MetaCacheEntry::default();
@@ -733,7 +747,7 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
// );
if revjob_rx.is_cancelled() {
return Ok(ListPathRawOutcome { limit_reached });
return Ok(ListPathRawOutcome { limit_reached, scan_cut });
}
let mut top_entries: Vec<Option<MetaCacheEntry>> = vec![None; readers.len()];
@@ -747,6 +761,16 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
// Start every missing head read in the same round so one stalled
// disk cannot multiply the wait budget by the erasure-set width.
// Outcomes are still consumed below in stable disk-index order.
if !revjob_rx.is_cancelled() {
for (i, reader) in readers.iter_mut().enumerate() {
if errs[i].is_none()
&& pending_entries[i].is_none()
&& let Some(Ok(Some(entry))) = reader.try_peek_buffered()
{
pending_entries[i] = Some(entry);
}
}
}
let concurrent_peeks = readers.iter_mut().enumerate().filter_map(|(i, reader)| {
if errs[i].is_some() || pending_entries[i].is_some() {
return None;
@@ -783,7 +807,12 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
continue;
}
// eof
limit_reached |= r.limit_reached() == Some(true);
if r.limit_reached() == Some(true) {
limit_reached = true;
scan_cut = Some(last_scanned_key.clone().ok_or_else(|| {
DiskError::other("bounded listing reader ended without a scan boundary")
})?);
}
at_eof += 1;
// warn!("list_path_raw: peek eof, disk: {}", i);
continue;
@@ -857,7 +886,7 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
*r = MetacacheReader::new(detached_rd);
continue;
}
PeekOutcome::Cancelled => return Ok(ListPathRawOutcome { limit_reached }),
PeekOutcome::Cancelled => return Ok(ListPathRawOutcome { limit_reached, scan_cut }),
}
};
@@ -878,7 +907,7 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
}
if entry.name == current.name {
// If exact match, we agree.
if current.matches_strict(&entry) {
if current.matches_strict_borrowed(&entry) {
top_entries[i] = Some(entry);
agree += 1;
} else {
@@ -916,7 +945,7 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
if let Some(finished_fn) = opts.finished.as_ref() {
tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = revjob_rx.cancelled() => return Ok(ListPathRawOutcome { limit_reached }),
_ = revjob_rx.cancelled() => return Ok(ListPathRawOutcome { limit_reached, scan_cut }),
_ = finished_fn(&errs) => {}
}
}
@@ -966,6 +995,14 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
return Err(classify_listing_quorum_failure(&failures));
}
// The next head from a bounded reader is unknown. The previous
// globally consumed group is a safe cut; consuming another reader's
// later head would turn this absence of evidence into a skipped key.
// Check quorum failures above before accepting the bounded result.
if limit_reached {
break;
}
// Break if all at EOF or error.
if at_eof + has_err == readers.len() {
if has_err > 0
@@ -973,7 +1010,7 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
{
tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = revjob_rx.cancelled() => return Ok(ListPathRawOutcome { limit_reached }),
_ = revjob_rx.cancelled() => return Ok(ListPathRawOutcome { limit_reached, scan_cut }),
_ = finished_fn(&errs) => {}
}
}
@@ -984,16 +1021,19 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
break;
}
last_scanned_key = Some(current.name.clone());
if agree == readers.len() && !opts.preserve_replica_metadata {
for r in readers.iter_mut() {
let _ = r.skip(1).await;
if !r.skip_current() {
let _ = r.skip(1).await;
}
}
if let Some(agreed_fn) = opts.agreed.as_ref() {
// warn!("list_path_raw: agreed_fn start, current: {:?}", &current.name);
tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = revjob_rx.cancelled() => return Ok(ListPathRawOutcome { limit_reached }),
_ = revjob_rx.cancelled() => return Ok(ListPathRawOutcome { limit_reached, scan_cut }),
result = agreed_fn(current) => result?
}
// warn!("list_path_raw: agreed_fn done");
@@ -1009,7 +1049,7 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
}
for (i, r) in readers.iter_mut().enumerate() {
if top_entries[i].is_some() {
if top_entries[i].is_some() && !r.skip_current() {
let _ = r.skip(1).await;
}
}
@@ -1017,13 +1057,14 @@ async fn list_path_raw_inner(
if let Some(partial_fn) = opts.partial.as_ref() {
tokio::select! {
biased;
_ = revjob_rx.cancelled() => return Ok(ListPathRawOutcome { limit_reached }),
_ = revjob_rx.cancelled() => return Ok(ListPathRawOutcome { limit_reached, scan_cut }),
_ = partial_fn(MetaCacheEntries(top_entries), &errs) => {}
}
}
}
Ok(ListPathRawOutcome { limit_reached })
});
Ok(ListPathRawOutcome { limit_reached, scan_cut })
};
revjobs.spawn(merge.in_current_span());
let merge_started = std::time::Instant::now();
let Some(revjob) = revjobs.join_next().await else {
@@ -1187,6 +1228,24 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!options.skip_total_timeout);
}
#[test]
fn cloned_reader_options_preserve_hidden_scan_budget_and_pending_prefix() {
let request = ListPathRawOptions {
bucket: "versioned".to_owned(),
hidden_entry_budget: 100,
pending_prefix: Some("pending/".to_owned()),
forward_to: Some("pending/0099".to_owned()),
..Default::default()
};
// Both walks are built once from the shared options; the per-job clone
// must carry every field that the walk derives from the request.
let job = request.clone();
let walk = walk_dir_options(&job);
assert_eq!(walk.hidden_entry_budget, 100);
assert_eq!(walk.pending_prefix.as_deref(), request.pending_prefix.as_deref());
assert_eq!(walk.forward_to.as_deref(), Some("pending/0099"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn list_path_raw_empty_disks_returns_read_quorum() {
let err = list_path_raw(CancellationToken::new(), ListPathRawOptions::default())
@@ -1237,6 +1296,163 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn list_path_raw_fanout_retains_only_linear_disk_references() {
let root = tempfile::tempdir().expect("create disk root");
let endpoint = crate::disk::endpoint::Endpoint::try_from(root.path().to_str().expect("UTF-8 disk path"))
.expect("parse disk endpoint");
let local = Arc::new(
crate::disk::local::LocalDisk::new(&endpoint, false)
.await
.expect("open local disk"),
);
let wrapper = crate::disk::disk_store::LocalDiskWrapper::new(local, false);
let disk = Arc::new(crate::disk::Disk::Local(Box::new(wrapper)));
let baseline = Arc::strong_count(&disk);
for primary_count in [1, 4, 16] {
for fallback_count in [0, 2] {
let entered: Vec<_> = (0..primary_count).map(|_| Arc::new(tokio::sync::Notify::new())).collect();
let stopped: Vec<_> = (0..primary_count).map(|_| Arc::new(tokio::sync::Notify::new())).collect();
let behaviors = entered
.iter()
.zip(&stopped)
.map(|(entered, stopped)| TestReaderBehavior::StallWithSignals {
entered: entered.clone(),
stopped: stopped.clone(),
})
.collect();
let cancel = CancellationToken::new();
let listing = tokio::spawn(list_path_raw(
cancel.clone(),
ListPathRawOptions {
disks: vec![Some(disk.clone()); primary_count],
fallback_disks: vec![Some(disk.clone()); fallback_count],
min_disks: primary_count,
test_reader_behaviors: behaviors,
peek_timeout: Some(Duration::from_secs(60)),
..Default::default()
},
));
for signal in &entered {
timeout(Duration::from_secs(2), signal.notified())
.await
.expect("every producer must enter the real fanout before counting references");
}
// The merge owns the configured primary/fallback slots, each producer
// owns its primary, and the shared fallback queue owns each fallback.
let expected = baseline + 2 * (primary_count + fallback_count);
let retained = Arc::strong_count(&disk);
cancel.cancel();
timeout(Duration::from_secs(2), listing)
.await
.expect("cancellation must stop the listing")
.expect("listing task must join")
.expect("external cancellation must finish cleanly");
for signal in &stopped {
timeout(Duration::from_secs(2), signal.notified())
.await
.expect("cancellation must drop every producer");
}
assert_eq!(Arc::strong_count(&disk), baseline, "cancellation must release every fanout reference");
assert_eq!(
retained, expected,
"fanout must retain linear references for {primary_count} primary and {fallback_count} fallback slots"
);
}
}
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
async fn list_path_raw_producer_and_merge_preserve_request_span() {
use tracing_subscriber::{Layer, layer::SubscriberExt};
struct ProducerSpan(Arc<AtomicBool>);
#[derive(Default)]
struct StateField(bool);
impl tracing::field::Visit for StateField {
fn record_debug(&mut self, _: &tracing::field::Field, _: &dyn std::fmt::Debug) {}
fn record_str(&mut self, field: &tracing::field::Field, value: &str) {
self.0 |= field.name() == "state" && value == "walk_dir_missing_path";
}
}
impl<S> Layer<S> for ProducerSpan
where
S: tracing::Subscriber + for<'a> tracing_subscriber::registry::LookupSpan<'a>,
{
fn on_event(&self, event: &tracing::Event<'_>, context: tracing_subscriber::layer::Context<'_, S>) {
let mut state = StateField::default();
event.record(&mut state);
if state.0
&& context
.lookup_current()
.is_some_and(|span| span.name() == "flink_list_request")
{
self.0.store(true, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Release);
}
}
}
// The subscriber is thread-local; keep the spawned tasks on this runtime thread.
let producer_observed = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
let subscriber = tracing_subscriber::registry().with(ProducerSpan(producer_observed.clone()));
let _subscriber = tracing::subscriber::set_default(subscriber);
let request = tracing::info_span!("flink_list_request", request_id = "list-span-regression");
let root = tempfile::tempdir().expect("create disk root");
let endpoint = crate::disk::endpoint::Endpoint::try_from(root.path().to_str().expect("UTF-8 disk path"))
.expect("parse disk endpoint");
let local = Arc::new(
crate::disk::local::LocalDisk::new(&endpoint, false)
.await
.expect("open local disk"),
);
let wrapper = crate::disk::disk_store::LocalDiskWrapper::new(local, false);
let disk = Arc::new(crate::disk::Disk::Local(Box::new(wrapper)));
let error = list_path_raw(
CancellationToken::new(),
ListPathRawOptions {
disks: vec![Some(disk)],
bucket: "missing-bucket".to_owned(),
min_disks: 1,
..Default::default()
},
)
.instrument(request.clone())
.await
.expect_err("missing bucket must fail the real disk producer");
assert_eq!(error, DiskError::VolumeNotFound);
assert!(
producer_observed.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Acquire),
"disk error must retain the request span"
);
let merge_observed = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
let merge_sink = merge_observed.clone();
let request_id = request.id();
list_path_raw(
CancellationToken::new(),
ListPathRawOptions {
disks: vec![None],
min_disks: 1,
test_reader_behaviors: vec![TestReaderBehavior::Entries(vec![fallback_test_entry()])],
agreed: Some(Box::new(move |_| {
merge_sink.store(tracing::Span::current().id() == request_id, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Release);
Box::pin(async { Ok(()) })
})),
..Default::default()
},
)
.instrument(request)
.await
.expect("merge should deliver the test entry");
assert!(
merge_observed.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Acquire),
"merge callback must retain the request span"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn scanner_joinset_walk_uses_the_local_disk_background_gate() {
let root = tempfile::tempdir().expect("local disk root should be created");
@@ -1304,6 +1520,7 @@ mod tests {
outcome.limit_reached,
"a reader whose trailer reports a limit stop must mark the merged stream as possibly incomplete"
);
assert_eq!(outcome.scan_cut.as_deref(), Some("bucket/object"));
}
#[tokio::test]
+170 -13
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ use crate::storage_api_contracts::internode::{
PUT_FILE_AUTH_TRAILER_MAGIC, PUT_FILE_CAPABILITY_VERSION,
};
use hmac::{Hmac, KeyInit, Mac};
use http::uri::Authority;
use http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue, Method, Uri};
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -47,6 +46,7 @@ use rustfs_io_metrics::internode_metrics::{
global_internode_metrics,
};
use rustfs_object_data_cache::{MemoryBasis, resolve_effective_memory};
use rustfs_utils::crypto::{HmacSha256, KeyInit, Mac};
use rustfs_utils::get_env_bool;
use sha2::Digest as _;
use sha2::Sha256;
@@ -58,8 +58,6 @@ use time::OffsetDateTime;
use tracing::{error, info, warn};
use uuid::Uuid;
type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
const SIGNATURE_HEADER: &str = "x-rustfs-signature";
pub const RPC_BACKGROUND_ADMISSION_HEADER: &str = "x-rustfs-rpc-background-admission";
const RPC_BACKGROUND_ADMISSION_V1: &str = "v1";
@@ -368,10 +366,84 @@ fn resolve_replay_cache_capacity() -> usize {
decision.capacity
}
const RPC_NONCE_EXPIRATIONS_PER_PAGE: usize = 1_024;
struct RpcNonceExpiration {
nonce: Uuid,
expiry_offset_ns: u32,
valid_until_offset_secs: i32,
}
struct RpcNonceExpirationPage {
expires_at: Instant,
valid_until: i64,
entries: VecDeque<RpcNonceExpiration>,
}
#[derive(Default)]
struct RpcNonceExpirations {
pages: VecDeque<RpcNonceExpirationPage>,
}
impl RpcNonceExpirations {
fn push_back(&mut self, expires_at: Instant, valid_until: i64, nonce: Uuid) {
// Use exact offsets and start another page if either offset is too large.
// Fully drained pages can be freed while newer nonces are still valid.
if let Some(page) = self.pages.back_mut()
&& page.entries.len() < RPC_NONCE_EXPIRATIONS_PER_PAGE
&& let Some(offset) = expires_at.checked_duration_since(page.expires_at)
&& let Ok(expiry_offset_ns) = u32::try_from(offset.as_nanos())
&& let Some(offset) = valid_until.checked_sub(page.valid_until)
&& let Ok(valid_until_offset_secs) = i32::try_from(offset)
{
page.entries.push_back(RpcNonceExpiration {
nonce,
expiry_offset_ns,
valid_until_offset_secs,
});
} else {
self.pages.push_back(RpcNonceExpirationPage {
expires_at,
valid_until,
entries: VecDeque::from([RpcNonceExpiration {
nonce,
expiry_offset_ns: 0,
valid_until_offset_secs: 0,
}]),
});
}
}
fn pop_expired(&mut self, now: Instant, wall_time: i64) -> Option<Uuid> {
let page = self.pages.front_mut()?;
let entry = page.entries.front()?;
let elapsed = now.checked_duration_since(page.expires_at)?;
let valid_until = page.valid_until + i64::from(entry.valid_until_offset_secs);
if elapsed <= Duration::from_nanos(u64::from(entry.expiry_offset_ns)) || wall_time <= valid_until {
return None;
}
let nonce = entry.nonce;
page.entries.pop_front();
if page.entries.is_empty() {
self.pages.pop_front();
if self.pages.is_empty() {
self.pages.shrink_to_fit();
}
}
Some(nonce)
}
#[cfg(test)]
fn capacity(&self) -> usize {
self.pages.iter().map(|page| page.entries.capacity()).sum()
}
}
#[derive(Default)]
struct RpcNonceCache {
nonces: HashSet<Uuid>,
expirations: VecDeque<(Instant, i64, Uuid)>,
expirations: RpcNonceExpirations,
max_wall_time: i64,
}
@@ -427,16 +499,13 @@ fn publish_nonce_cache_metrics(metrics: Option<RpcNonceCacheMetrics<'_>>) {
impl RpcNonceCache {
fn remove_expired(&mut self, now: Instant, wall_time: i64) -> usize {
let mut removed = 0;
while matches!(
self.expirations.front(),
Some((expires_at, valid_until, _)) if *expires_at < now && *valid_until < wall_time
) {
let Some((_, _, nonce)) = self.expirations.pop_front() else {
break;
};
while let Some(nonce) = self.expirations.pop_expired(now, wall_time) {
self.nonces.remove(&nonce);
removed += 1;
}
if removed > 0 && self.nonces.is_empty() {
self.nonces.shrink_to_fit();
}
removed
}
@@ -470,7 +539,7 @@ impl RpcNonceCache {
}
self.nonces.insert(record.nonce);
self.expirations
.push_back((record.expires_at, record.signed_at.saturating_add(SIGNATURE_VALID_DURATION), record.nonce));
.push_back(record.expires_at, record.signed_at.saturating_add(SIGNATURE_VALID_DURATION), record.nonce);
(
Ok(()),
Some(RpcNonceCacheMetrics {
@@ -1590,7 +1659,13 @@ fn verify_tonic_replay_scope_signature(audience: &str, path: &str, headers: &Hea
if boot_epoch != tonic_rpc_boot_epoch() {
return Err(std::io::Error::other("RPC boot epoch is stale"));
}
check_and_record_tonic_nonce(nonce, signed_at, path)
check_and_record_tonic_nonce(nonce, signed_at, path)?;
// A body-bound request also carries a usable v2 signature. Consume both
// nonces so stripping the replay-scope headers cannot authorize it again.
if content_sha256 != UNSIGNED_PAYLOAD {
verify_tonic_rpc_signature_with_strictness(audience, path, headers, true)?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Verify gRPC authentication, preferring v2 without downgrade on malformed v2 metadata.
@@ -2581,6 +2656,43 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(path_error.to_string(), "Invalid RPC replay scope signature");
}
#[test]
fn replay_scope_consumes_the_body_bound_v2_nonce() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let audience = "node-a:9000";
let path = "/node_service.NodeService/RecoverDeleteTransaction";
let digest = "a".repeat(64);
for v3_first in [true, false] {
let mut headers =
gen_tonic_signature_headers(audience, "node_service.NodeService", "RecoverDeleteTransaction", Some(&digest))
.expect("body-bound v2 headers should build");
let timestamp = headers[TIMESTAMP_HEADER].to_str().expect("timestamp").to_string();
headers.extend(
gen_tonic_replay_scope_headers(audience, path, &timestamp, &digest, tonic_rpc_boot_epoch())
.expect("replay-scope headers should build"),
);
let mut downgraded = headers.clone();
for header in [
RPC_REPLAY_SCOPE_VERSION_HEADER,
RPC_REPLAY_SCOPE_SIGNATURE_HEADER,
RPC_REPLAY_SCOPE_NONCE_HEADER,
RPC_BOOT_EPOCH_HEADER,
] {
downgraded.remove(header);
}
let (first, replay) = if v3_first {
(&headers, &downgraded)
} else {
(&downgraded, &headers)
};
verify_tonic_rpc_signature_with_policy(audience, path, first, true, false, false)
.expect("the first delivery must be accepted");
let error = verify_tonic_rpc_signature_with_policy(audience, path, replay, true, false, false)
.expect_err("a mutation cannot replay through the other signature generation");
assert_eq!(error.to_string(), "RPC request replay detected");
}
}
#[test]
fn replay_scope_rejects_partial_metadata_and_stale_epoch_without_fallback() {
ensure_test_rpc_secret();
@@ -3137,6 +3249,51 @@ mod tests {
assert!(cache.nonces.contains(&nonce_b));
}
#[test]
fn nonce_cache_releases_expiration_storage_after_a_burst() {
let start = Instant::now();
let expiry = start + REPLAY_CACHE_RETENTION;
let mut cache = RpcNonceCache::default();
for nonce in 1..=4_096 {
let record = test_nonce_record(Uuid::from_u128(nonce), 100, start, 100, expiry, 4_096);
cache.check_and_record(record).0.expect("first use of nonce");
}
assert!(cache.expirations.capacity() >= 4_096);
assert_eq!(cache.remove_expired(expiry, 701), 0);
assert_eq!(cache.remove_expired(expiry + Duration::from_nanos(1), 400), 0);
assert_eq!(cache.remove_expired(expiry + Duration::from_nanos(1), 701), 4_096);
assert!(cache.nonces.is_empty());
assert_eq!(cache.nonces.capacity(), 0);
assert_eq!(cache.expirations.capacity(), 0, "expired entries must release their expiration storage");
}
#[test]
fn nonce_expirations_preserve_exact_deadlines_across_pages() {
let expiry = Instant::now();
let first = Uuid::from_u128(1);
let second = Uuid::from_u128(2);
let third = Uuid::from_u128(3);
let fourth = Uuid::from_u128(4);
let mut queue = super::RpcNonceExpirations::default();
let next = expiry + Duration::from_nanos(1);
let later = expiry + Duration::from_secs(5);
queue.push_back(expiry, 501, first);
queue.push_back(next, 500, second);
queue.push_back(later, 505, third);
queue.push_back(later, i64::MAX, fourth);
assert_eq!(queue.pages.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(queue.pop_expired(next, 501), None);
assert_eq!(queue.pop_expired(next, 502), Some(first));
assert_eq!(queue.pop_expired(next, 502), None);
assert_eq!(queue.pop_expired(later, 502), Some(second));
assert_eq!(queue.pages.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(queue.pop_expired(later, 506), None);
assert_eq!(queue.pop_expired(later + Duration::from_nanos(1), 506), Some(third));
assert_eq!(queue.pop_expired(later + Duration::from_nanos(1), i64::MAX), None);
}
#[test]
fn nonce_cache_metrics_mark_successful_records_only() {
let now = Instant::now();
@@ -2014,9 +2014,21 @@ impl PeerRestClient {
}
result
})
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|_| Err(Error::other(format!("load_bucket_metadata({bucket}) timed out"))));
self.finalize_result(result).await
.await;
self.settle_bucket_metadata_reload(bucket, result).await
}
async fn settle_bucket_metadata_reload(
&self,
bucket: &str,
result: std::result::Result<Result<()>, tokio::time::error::Elapsed>,
) -> Result<()> {
match result {
Ok(result) => self.finalize_result(result).await,
// A local operation deadline does not establish that the peer is
// unreachable. In particular, it must not gate IAM revocations.
Err(_) => Err(Error::other(format!("load_bucket_metadata({bucket}) timed out"))),
}
}
async fn load_bucket_metadata_once(&self, bucket: &str, scanner_maintenance_change: bool) -> Result<()> {
@@ -4753,6 +4765,31 @@ mod tests {
assert!(client.offline.load(Ordering::Acquire));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn bucket_metadata_deadline_does_not_gate_healthy_peer_notifications() {
let client = test_peer_client();
let elapsed = tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::ZERO, std::future::pending::<Result<()>>()).await;
let error = client
.settle_bucket_metadata_reload("slow-policy", elapsed)
.await
.expect_err("local budget expires");
assert!(error.to_string().contains("timed out"));
assert!(
!client.offline.load(Ordering::Acquire),
"local work must not suppress subsequent IAM RPCs"
);
client
.settle_bucket_metadata_reload("healthy", Ok(Ok(())))
.await
.expect("peer reply");
let error = client
.settle_bucket_metadata_reload("unreachable", Ok(Err(Error::from(tonic::Status::unavailable("connection refused")))))
.await
.expect_err("real transport failure");
assert!(error.to_string().contains("connection refused"));
assert!(client.offline.load(Ordering::Acquire), "transport failures must still enter recovery");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn peer_rest_client_finalize_result_keeps_online_for_business_errors() {
let client = test_peer_client();
+511 -24
View File
@@ -27,13 +27,13 @@ use crate::disk::multipart_source::{
MULTIPART_SOURCE_PROTOCOL_VERSION, MultipartSourceOperation, MultipartSourceRequest, MultipartSourceResponse,
};
use crate::disk::{
BatchReadVersionReq, BatchReadVersionResp, CheckPartsResp, ConditionalFileUpdate, DELETE_RECOVERY_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
DeleteOptions, DeleteRecoveryAction, DeleteRecoveryCursor, DeleteRecoveryDigest, DeleteRecoveryInspection,
DeleteRecoveryPage, DeleteRecoveryRpcOperation, DeleteRecoveryRpcReply, DiskAPI, DiskInfo, DiskInfoOptions, DiskLocation,
DiskOption, FileInfoVersions, FileReader, FileWriter, GuardedDeleteVersionsPayload, GuardedFileInfoVersions,
PartTransactionAction, PoolMetaNativeRecoveryRequest, PoolMetaNativeRecoveryResponse, ReadMultipleReq, ReadMultipleResp,
ReadOptions, RenameDataResp, SnapshotLeaseToken, UpdateMetadataOpts, VolumeInfo, WalkDirOptions,
batch_read_version_one_by_one,
BOUNDED_DELETE_PREPARE_PROTOCOL_VERSION, BatchReadVersionReq, BatchReadVersionResp, CheckPartsResp, ConditionalFileUpdate,
DELETE_RECOVERY_PROTOCOL_VERSION, DeleteOptions, DeleteRecoveryAction, DeleteRecoveryCursor, DeleteRecoveryDigest,
DeleteRecoveryInspection, DeleteRecoveryPage, DeleteRecoveryRpcOperation, DeleteRecoveryRpcReply, DiskAPI, DiskInfo,
DiskInfoOptions, DiskLocation, DiskOption, FileInfoVersions, FileReader, FileWriter, GuardedDeleteVersionsPayload,
GuardedFileInfoVersions, PartTransactionAction, PoolMetaNativeRecoveryRequest, PoolMetaNativeRecoveryResponse,
ReadMultipleReq, ReadMultipleResp, ReadOptions, RenameDataResp, SnapshotLeaseToken, UpdateMetadataOpts, VolumeInfo,
WalkDirOptions, batch_read_version_one_by_one,
disk_store::{
DEFAULT_RUSTFS_DRIVE_ACTIVE_MONITORING, ENV_RUSTFS_DRIVE_ACTIVE_MONITORING, SKIP_IF_SUCCESS_BEFORE,
get_drive_active_check_interval, get_drive_active_check_timeout, get_drive_disk_info_timeout, get_drive_list_dir_timeout,
@@ -996,21 +996,32 @@ fn internode_idempotent_read_retries() -> usize {
static PREWARMED_PEERS: std::sync::LazyLock<std::sync::Mutex<std::collections::HashSet<String>>> =
std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| std::sync::Mutex::new(std::collections::HashSet::new()));
fn claim_control_channel_prewarm(addr: &str) -> bool {
let Ok(mut prewarmed) = PREWARMED_PEERS.lock() else {
return false;
};
prewarmed.insert(addr.to_owned())
}
fn release_control_channel_prewarm(addr: &str) {
if let Ok(mut prewarmed) = PREWARMED_PEERS.lock() {
prewarmed.remove(addr);
}
}
/// Best-effort background prewarm of a peer's control channel (grpc-optimization P3-1). Deduped per
/// peer; a dial failure just falls through to the existing lazy connect and recovery monitor.
/// peer; a dial failure releases the marker so a later disk construction can retry the prewarm.
fn spawn_control_channel_prewarm(addr: String) {
{
let Ok(mut prewarmed) = PREWARMED_PEERS.lock() else {
return;
};
if !prewarmed.insert(addr.clone()) {
return;
}
if !claim_control_channel_prewarm(&addr) {
return;
}
tokio::spawn(async move {
match node_service_time_out_client_no_auth(&addr).await {
Ok(_) => debug!(addr = %addr, "internode control channel prewarmed"),
Err(err) => debug!(addr = %addr, error = %err, "internode control channel prewarm failed (best-effort)"),
Err(err) => {
release_control_channel_prewarm(&addr);
debug!(addr = %addr, error = %err, "internode control channel prewarm failed (best-effort)");
}
}
});
}
@@ -1021,6 +1032,7 @@ impl RemoteDisk {
volume: &str,
payload: Vec<u8>,
probe_only: bool,
bounded_prepare: bool,
) -> Result<DeleteVersionsResponse> {
if payload.len() > rustfs_protos::DELETE_RECOVERY_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES {
return Err(DiskError::FileCorrupt);
@@ -1045,6 +1057,8 @@ impl RemoteDisk {
.map_err(|status| {
if status.code() == Code::Unimplemented {
DiskError::GuardedDeleteUnsupported
} else if bounded_prepare && status.code() == Code::InvalidArgument {
DiskError::UnsupportedDisk
} else {
status.into()
}
@@ -1078,11 +1092,22 @@ impl RemoteDisk {
volume: &str,
operation: DeleteRecoveryRpcOperation,
) -> Result<DeleteRecoveryRpcReply> {
let protocol_version = match &operation {
DeleteRecoveryRpcOperation::ApplyVersion { opts, .. } | DeleteRecoveryRpcOperation::ApplyVersions { opts, .. }
if opts.requires_bounded_delete_recovery =>
{
BOUNDED_DELETE_PREPARE_PROTOCOL_VERSION
}
_ => DELETE_RECOVERY_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
};
let payload = rmp_serde::to_vec_named(&operation)?;
if payload.len() > operation.max_wire_payload_bytes() {
return Err(Error::other("delete recovery operation exceeds payload limit"));
}
let settle_timeout = if matches!(&operation, DeleteRecoveryRpcOperation::Settle { .. }) {
let settle_timeout = if matches!(
&operation,
DeleteRecoveryRpcOperation::Settle { .. } | DeleteRecoveryRpcOperation::SettleBounded(_)
) {
Some(crate::disk::get_delete_recovery_timeout()?)
} else {
None
@@ -1105,7 +1130,7 @@ impl RemoteDisk {
let mut request = Request::new(RecoverDeleteTransactionRequest {
disk: self.endpoint.to_string(),
volume: volume.to_owned(),
protocol_version: DELETE_RECOVERY_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
protocol_version,
operation: payload.into(),
});
let canonical_body = rustfs_protos::canonical_recover_delete_transaction_request_body(request.get_ref())
@@ -1123,7 +1148,7 @@ impl RemoteDisk {
}
})?
.into_inner();
if response.protocol_version != DELETE_RECOVERY_PROTOCOL_VERSION {
if response.protocol_version != protocol_version {
return Err(DiskError::UnsupportedDisk);
}
if !response.success {
@@ -1637,6 +1662,7 @@ impl RemoteDisk {
let initial_probe_ok = Self::perform_connectivity_check(&addr).await.is_ok();
if initial_probe_ok {
health.record_operation_success(&endpoint, "connectivity_probe_success");
rustfs_io_metrics::internode_metrics::record_peer_reachable_if_offline(&addr);
} else if health.mark_failure(&endpoint, "connectivity_probe_failed") {
warn!(
event = EVENT_REMOTE_DISK_HEALTH,
@@ -1708,6 +1734,7 @@ impl RemoteDisk {
// Perform basic connectivity check
if Self::perform_connectivity_check(&addr).await.is_ok() {
health.record_operation_success(&endpoint, "connectivity_probe_success");
rustfs_io_metrics::internode_metrics::record_peer_reachable_if_offline(&addr);
} else if health.mark_failure(&endpoint, "connectivity_probe_failed") {
warn!(
event = EVENT_REMOTE_DISK_HEALTH,
@@ -1778,6 +1805,7 @@ impl RemoteDisk {
}
_ = interval.tick() => {
if Self::perform_recovery_probe(&addr, &endpoint).await.is_ok() {
rustfs_io_metrics::internode_metrics::record_peer_reachable(&addr);
let became_online = health.mark_recovery_success(&endpoint, "disk_info_probe_success");
debug!(
event = EVENT_REMOTE_DISK_HEALTH,
@@ -2009,6 +2037,7 @@ impl RemoteDisk {
let operation_result = operation().await;
if operation_result.is_ok() {
self.health.record_operation_success(&self.endpoint, "operation_success");
rustfs_io_metrics::internode_metrics::record_peer_reachable_if_offline(&self.addr);
}
self.handle_network_like_error(op, timeout_duration, &operation_result, failure_health_action)
.await;
@@ -2023,6 +2052,7 @@ impl RemoteDisk {
// Log success; the waiting guard balances every exit path.
if operation_result.is_ok() {
self.health.record_operation_success(&self.endpoint, "operation_success");
rustfs_io_metrics::internode_metrics::record_peer_reachable_if_offline(&self.addr);
}
self.handle_network_like_error(op, timeout_duration, &operation_result, failure_health_action)
.await;
@@ -2711,8 +2741,56 @@ impl RemoteDisk {
#[async_trait::async_trait]
impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
async fn list_multipart_index_roots(
&self,
bucket: &str,
marker: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<crate::disk::multipart_index::MultipartIndexPage> {
use crate::disk::multipart_index::{MULTIPART_INDEX_RPC_MAX_BYTES, MultipartIndexRpcReply, MultipartIndexRpcRequest};
let expected_disk = self
.id
.lock()
.await
.filter(|id| !id.is_nil())
.ok_or(DiskError::DiskNotFound)?;
let query = MultipartIndexRpcRequest::new(bucket, marker);
let endpoint = self.endpoint.to_string();
let canonical = query.canonical_request(&endpoint)?;
let opts = serde_json::to_string(&query)?;
self.execute_with_timeout(
|| async {
let mut client = self.get_client().await?;
let mut request = Request::new(DiskInfoRequest {
disk: endpoint.clone(),
opts: opts.clone(),
});
crate::cluster::rpc::set_tonic_canonical_body_digest(&mut request, &canonical).map_err(Error::other)?;
let response = client.disk_info(request).await?.into_inner();
if !response.success {
return Err(response.error.unwrap_or_default().into());
}
if response.disk_info.len() > MULTIPART_INDEX_RPC_MAX_BYTES {
return Err(DiskError::FileCorrupt);
}
// An old server ignores the additive query and returns ordinary DiskInfo.
// It cannot satisfy the dedicated reply schema or the fresh challenge.
let reply: MultipartIndexRpcReply =
serde_json::from_str(&response.disk_info).map_err(|_| DiskError::MethodNotAllowed)?;
reply.validate(&query, expected_disk)?;
crate::cluster::rpc::verify_tonic_rpc_response_proof(
&query.canonical_response(&endpoint, &reply.page)?,
&reply.proof,
)
.map_err(Error::other)?;
Ok(reply.page)
},
get_drive_disk_info_timeout(),
)
.await
}
async fn supports_guarded_delete_versions(&self) -> Result<()> {
let response = self.guarded_delete_versions_rpc("", Vec::new(), true).await?;
let response = self.guarded_delete_versions_rpc("", Vec::new(), true, false).await?;
if !response.errors.is_empty() || !response.item_errors.is_empty() {
return Err(DiskError::FileCorrupt);
}
@@ -2725,7 +2803,12 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
opts: DeleteOptions,
) -> Vec<Option<DiskError>> {
let count = versions.len();
let payload = GuardedDeleteVersionsPayload { versions, opts };
let bounded_prepare = opts.requires_bounded_delete_recovery;
let payload = GuardedDeleteVersionsPayload {
versions,
opts,
bounded_recovery_protocol: bounded_prepare.then_some(BOUNDED_DELETE_PREPARE_PROTOCOL_VERSION),
};
if let Err(error) = payload.validate() {
return vec![Some(error); count];
}
@@ -2733,7 +2816,10 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
Ok(encoded) => encoded,
Err(error) => return vec![Some(error.into()); count],
};
match self.guarded_delete_versions_rpc(volume, encoded, false).await {
match self
.guarded_delete_versions_rpc(volume, encoded, false, bounded_prepare)
.await
{
Ok(response) => {
// New guarded peers must return typed errors, never lossy strings.
if response.item_errors.len() != count {
@@ -3624,7 +3710,13 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
);
}
let rpc_started = read_version_stage_timer(batch_read_version_attribution_enabled);
let response = match client.batch_read_version(request).await {
let response_result = client.batch_read_version(request).await;
if let Some(rpc_started) = rpc_started {
crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_batch_read_version_duration(
rpc_started.elapsed(),
);
}
let response = match response_result {
Ok(response) => {
record_batch_read_version_stage(INTERNODE_STAGE_BATCH_READ_VERSION_RPC_ROUNDTRIP, rpc_started);
response.into_inner()
@@ -4294,6 +4386,38 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
}
}
async fn discover_delete_transactions_bounded(
&self,
volume: &str,
object: &str,
max_entries: u32,
) -> Result<crate::disk::BoundedDeleteRecoveryDiscovery> {
// Older peers reject this variant. Do not retry through the unbounded protocol;
// they are reported as unsupported participants (rolling-upgrade contract).
match self
.recover_delete_transaction(
volume,
DeleteRecoveryRpcOperation::DiscoverBounded {
object: object.to_owned(),
max_entries,
},
)
.await
{
Ok(DeleteRecoveryRpcReply::DiscoveredBounded(page)) => Ok(page),
Ok(_) => Err(Error::FileCorrupt),
Err(error)
if matches!(error, Error::MethodNotAllowed | Error::UnsupportedDisk)
|| matches!(&error, Error::Io(source) if crate::cluster::rpc::client::embedded_tonic_status(source)
.is_some_and(|status| matches!(status.code(), tonic::Code::Unimplemented | tonic::Code::InvalidArgument))) =>
{
// No paginated fallback through the unbounded protocol; the peer
// is an unsupported participant until it is upgraded.
Err(Error::UnsupportedDisk)
}
Err(error) => Err(error),
}
}
async fn discover_delete_transactions(
&self,
volume: &str,
@@ -4329,6 +4453,62 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
_ => Err(Error::other("unexpected delete discovery reply")),
}
}
async fn settle_delete_transaction_bounded(
&self,
volume: &str,
request: crate::disk::BoundedDeleteRecoverySettlement,
_namespace_owner: Option<Arc<dyn Send + Sync>>,
) -> Result<crate::disk::BoundedDeleteRecoverySettlementReply> {
match self
.recover_delete_transaction(volume, DeleteRecoveryRpcOperation::SettleBounded(request))
.await
{
Ok(DeleteRecoveryRpcReply::SettledBounded(reply)) => Ok(reply),
Ok(_) => Err(Error::FileCorrupt),
Err(error)
if matches!(error, Error::MethodNotAllowed | Error::UnsupportedDisk)
|| matches!(&error, Error::Io(source) if crate::cluster::rpc::client::embedded_tonic_status(source)
.is_some_and(|status| matches!(status.code(), tonic::Code::Unimplemented | tonic::Code::InvalidArgument))) =>
{
// No paginated fallback through the unbounded protocol; the peer
// is an unsupported participant until it is upgraded.
Err(Error::UnsupportedDisk)
}
Err(error) => Err(error),
}
}
async fn inspect_delete_transaction_bounded(
&self,
volume: &str,
object: &str,
transaction: Uuid,
max_entries: u32,
) -> Result<crate::disk::BoundedDeleteRecoveryInspection> {
match self
.recover_delete_transaction(
volume,
DeleteRecoveryRpcOperation::InspectBounded {
object: object.to_owned(),
transaction,
max_entries,
},
)
.await
{
Ok(DeleteRecoveryRpcReply::InspectedBounded(page)) => Ok(page),
Ok(_) => Err(Error::FileCorrupt),
Err(error)
if matches!(error, Error::MethodNotAllowed | Error::UnsupportedDisk)
|| matches!(&error, Error::Io(source) if crate::cluster::rpc::client::embedded_tonic_status(source)
.is_some_and(|status| matches!(status.code(), tonic::Code::Unimplemented | tonic::Code::InvalidArgument))) =>
{
// No paginated fallback through the unbounded protocol; the peer
// is an unsupported participant until it is upgraded.
Err(Error::UnsupportedDisk)
}
Err(error) => Err(error),
}
}
async fn inspect_delete_transaction(
&self,
volume: &str,
@@ -4551,7 +4731,10 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
read_multiple_req_bin: read_multiple_req_bin.into(),
});
let response = client.read_multiple(request).await?.into_inner();
let rpc_started = Instant::now();
let response = client.read_multiple(request).await;
crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_read_multiple_duration(rpc_started.elapsed());
let response = response?.into_inner();
if !response.success {
return Err(response.error.unwrap_or_default().into());
@@ -4602,6 +4785,7 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
attach_mutation_body_digest(&mut request, canonical_body, "write_all")?;
crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_write_all_request();
let rpc_started = Instant::now();
let response = match client.write_all(request).await {
Ok(response) => response.into_inner(),
Err(err) => {
@@ -4610,6 +4794,7 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
}
};
crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_write_all_duration(rpc_started.elapsed());
crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_write_all_sent_bytes(data_len);
if !response.success {
@@ -4707,6 +4892,7 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
});
crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_read_all_request();
let rpc_started = Instant::now();
let response = match client.read_all(request).await {
Ok(response) => response.into_inner(),
Err(err) => {
@@ -4715,6 +4901,8 @@ impl DiskAPI for RemoteDisk {
}
};
crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_read_all_duration(rpc_started.elapsed());
if !response.success {
crate::cluster::rpc::runtime_sources::record_remote_disk_grpc_read_all_error();
return Err(response.error.unwrap_or_default().into());
@@ -4849,6 +5037,113 @@ mod tests {
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn bounded_delete_discovery_lost_remote_reply_leaves_no_cursor() {
runtime_sources::ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let peer = TestGrpcPeer::spawn(Bytes::new(), Bytes::new())
.await
.expect("test peer must bind");
let directory = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temporary disk");
let endpoint = Endpoint::try_from(directory.path().to_str().expect("disk path")).expect("endpoint");
let disk = Arc::new(
crate::disk::local::LocalDisk::new(&endpoint, false)
.await
.expect("local disk"),
);
disk.make_volume("bucket").await.expect("bucket");
let prefix = directory.path().join("bucket/prefix");
std::fs::create_dir(&prefix).expect("prefix");
for index in 0..64 {
std::fs::create_dir(prefix.join(format!("child-{index}"))).expect("legitimate child");
}
let fixture = Arc::new(TestBoundedDiscovery {
disk: Arc::clone(&disk),
response_gate: TestFormatReadGate::default(),
});
*peer.peer.bounded_discovery.lock().expect("bounded fixture") = Some(Arc::clone(&fixture));
let remote = remote_disk_for_addr(&peer.addr).await;
let task = tokio::spawn(async move { remote.discover_delete_transactions_bounded("bucket", "prefix", 8).await });
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), fixture.response_gate.entered.notified())
.await
.expect("disk completed bounded scan");
task.abort();
assert!(task.await.expect_err("caller cancelled").is_cancelled());
assert_eq!(disk.public_delete_discovery_sessions_for_test(), 0);
fixture.response_gate.release.cancel();
peer.stop().await;
assert_eq!(disk.public_delete_discovery_sessions_for_test(), 0);
assert!(prefix.join("child-63").is_dir());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn multipart_index_old_disk_info_handler_is_not_a_ready_empty_index() {
runtime_sources::ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let peer = TestGrpcPeer::spawn(Bytes::new(), Bytes::new())
.await
.expect("old peer must bind");
let remote = remote_disk_for_addr(&peer.addr).await;
remote
.set_disk_id(Some(Uuid::new_v4()))
.await
.expect("expected disk identity");
assert!(matches!(
remote.list_multipart_index_roots("bucket", None).await,
Err(DiskError::MethodNotAllowed)
));
assert_eq!(
peer.peer.disk_info_calls.load(Ordering::Acquire),
1,
"exercise the actual legacy JSON handler"
);
peer.stop().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn bounded_delete_discovery_old_peer_rejects_without_paginated_fallback() {
runtime_sources::ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let peer = TestGrpcPeer::spawn(Bytes::new(), Bytes::new())
.await
.expect("old peer must bind");
let remote = remote_disk_for_addr(&peer.addr).await;
assert_eq!(
remote
.discover_delete_transactions_bounded("bucket", "prefix", 4096)
.await
.expect_err("old peer cannot prove a bounded inventory"),
DiskError::UnsupportedDisk
);
let transaction = Uuid::new_v4();
assert_eq!(
remote
.inspect_delete_transaction_bounded("bucket", "prefix", transaction, 65536)
.await
.expect_err("old peer cannot inspect with a budget"),
DiskError::UnsupportedDisk
);
assert_eq!(
remote
.settle_delete_transaction_bounded(
"bucket",
crate::disk::BoundedDeleteRecoverySettlement {
object: "prefix".to_owned(),
transaction,
expected_fingerprint: [0; 32],
action: DeleteRecoveryAction::PublishCommit,
max_entries: 65536,
},
None
)
.await
.expect_err("old peer cannot settle with a budget"),
DiskError::UnsupportedDisk
);
assert_eq!(
*peer.peer.unsupported_methods.lock().expect("observed methods"),
vec!["/node_service.NodeService/RecoverDeleteTransaction"; 3]
);
peer.stop().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn multipart_source_recovery_old_peer_rejects_without_generic_fallback() {
runtime_sources::ensure_test_rpc_secret();
@@ -5740,10 +6035,18 @@ mod tests {
object_read_all_disks: Arc<StdMutex<Vec<String>>>,
format_data: Bytes,
read_all_data: Bytes,
fail_format_reads: Arc<AtomicBool>,
next_format_read_gate: Arc<StdMutex<Option<Arc<TestFormatReadGate>>>>,
bounded_discovery: Arc<StdMutex<Option<Arc<TestBoundedDiscovery>>>>,
unsupported_methods: Arc<StdMutex<Vec<String>>>,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct TestBoundedDiscovery {
disk: Arc<crate::disk::local::LocalDisk>,
response_gate: TestFormatReadGate,
}
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct TestFormatReadGate {
entered: tokio::sync::Notify,
@@ -5759,7 +6062,9 @@ mod tests {
object_read_all_disks: Arc::default(),
format_data,
read_all_data,
fail_format_reads: Arc::default(),
next_format_read_gate: Arc::default(),
bounded_discovery: Arc::default(),
unsupported_methods: Arc::default(),
}
}
@@ -5859,6 +6164,56 @@ mod tests {
Ok(grpc.unary(method, request).await)
})
}
"/node_service.NodeService/RecoverDeleteTransaction"
if self.peer.bounded_discovery.lock().expect("bounded fixture").is_some() =>
{
#[derive(Clone)]
struct BoundedSvc(Arc<TestBoundedDiscovery>);
impl tonic::server::UnaryService<RecoverDeleteTransactionRequest> for BoundedSvc {
type Response = rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::RecoverDeleteTransactionResponse;
type Future = Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = std::result::Result<Response<Self::Response>, Status>> + Send>>;
fn call(&mut self, request: Request<RecoverDeleteTransactionRequest>) -> Self::Future {
let fixture = Arc::clone(&self.0);
Box::pin(async move {
let request = request.into_inner();
let operation: DeleteRecoveryRpcOperation =
rustfs_protos::decode_delete_recovery_payload(&request.operation)
.map_err(|_| Status::invalid_argument("invalid bounded request"))?;
let DeleteRecoveryRpcOperation::DiscoverBounded { object, max_entries } = operation else {
return Err(Status::invalid_argument("unexpected fallback"));
};
let page = fixture
.disk
.discover_delete_transactions_bounded(&request.volume, &object, max_entries)
.await
.map_err(|_| Status::internal("bounded discovery failed"))?;
// Lose the response only after the real disk operation has completed.
fixture.response_gate.entered.notify_one();
fixture.response_gate.release.cancelled().await;
let result = rmp_serde::to_vec_named(&DeleteRecoveryRpcReply::DiscoveredBounded(page))
.map_err(|_| Status::internal("encode bounded reply"))?;
Ok(Response::new(rustfs_protos::proto_gen::node_service::RecoverDeleteTransactionResponse {
success: true,
protocol_version: DELETE_RECOVERY_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
result: result.into(),
error: None,
}))
})
}
}
let fixture = self
.peer
.bounded_discovery
.lock()
.expect("bounded fixture")
.clone()
.expect("configured fixture");
Box::pin(async move {
let codec = tonic_prost::ProstCodec::default();
let mut grpc = tonic::server::Grpc::new(codec);
Ok(grpc.unary(BoundedSvc(fixture), request).await)
})
}
"/node_service.NodeService/ReadAll" => {
#[derive(Clone)]
struct ReadAllSvc(AuthenticatedReadPeer);
@@ -5882,6 +6237,9 @@ mod tests {
gate.entered.notify_one();
gate.release.cancelled().await;
}
if peer.fail_format_reads.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
return Err(Status::unavailable("format read temporarily unavailable"));
}
peer.format_data.clone()
} else {
peer.object_read_all_disks
@@ -8847,6 +9205,124 @@ mod tests {
peer.stop().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial(remote_disk_recovery_probe)]
async fn endpoint_reconnect_failure_preserves_registered_remote_recovery() {
temp_env::async_with_vars(
[
(crate::disk::disk_store::ENV_RUSTFS_DRIVE_ACTIVE_MONITORING, Some("true")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_DRIVE_RETURNING_SUCCESS_THRESHOLD, Some("1")),
],
async {
runtime_sources::ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let mut reference = crate::layout::format::FormatV3::new(1, 1);
reference.erasure.this = reference.erasure.sets[0][0];
let peer = TestGrpcPeer::spawn(
Bytes::from(reference.to_json().expect("format should serialize")),
Bytes::from_static(b"recovered-peer-data"),
)
.await
.expect("authenticated regression peer is required");
let set = missing_read_set(&peer, reference).await;
let disk = crate::disk::new_disk(
&set.set_endpoints[0],
&DiskOption {
cleanup: false,
health_check: true,
},
)
.await
.expect("registered remote disk should construct");
let crate::disk::Disk::Remote(remote) = disk.as_ref() else {
panic!("fixture must create a remote disk");
};
assert!(remote.health_check);
remote.force_runtime_state_for_test(RuntimeDriveHealthState::Offline);
set.disks.write().await[0] = Some(Arc::clone(&disk));
peer.peer.fail_format_reads.store(true, Ordering::Release);
set.connect_disks().await;
peer.peer.fail_format_reads.store(false, Ordering::Release);
let cancelled_after_failure = remote.cancel_token.is_cancelled();
assert!(peer.peer.read_all_calls() > 0, "reconnect must attempt the failing format RPC");
assert!(
Arc::ptr_eq(&disk, set.disks.read().await[0].as_ref().expect("existing slot must remain")),
"a failed reconnect must not publish its unvalidated candidate"
);
remote.spawn_recovery_monitor_if_needed();
let recovery = time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), async {
while !disk.is_online().await {
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
}
disk.read_all("bucket", "object").await
})
.await;
disk.close().await.expect("stop the registered disk's monitoring");
peer.stop().await;
assert!(!cancelled_after_failure, "failed replacement must retain the registered monitor");
assert_eq!(
recovery
.expect("failed reconnect must leave the registered disk able to recover without another sweep")
.expect("the recovered registered disk must serve real I/O"),
Bytes::from_static(b"recovered-peer-data")
);
},
)
.await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial(remote_disk_recovery_probe)]
async fn endpoint_reconnect_stops_old_remote_monitor_only_after_publication() {
runtime_sources::ensure_test_rpc_secret();
let mut reference = crate::layout::format::FormatV3::new(1, 1);
reference.erasure.this = reference.erasure.sets[0][0];
let peer = TestGrpcPeer::spawn(
Bytes::from(reference.to_json().expect("format should serialize")),
Bytes::from_static(b"replacement-peer-data"),
)
.await
.expect("authenticated regression peer is required");
let set = missing_read_set(&peer, reference).await;
let disk = crate::disk::new_disk(
&set.set_endpoints[0],
&DiskOption {
cleanup: false,
health_check: true,
},
)
.await
.expect("registered remote disk should construct");
let crate::disk::Disk::Remote(remote) = disk.as_ref() else {
panic!("fixture must create a remote disk");
};
remote.force_runtime_state_for_test(RuntimeDriveHealthState::Offline);
set.disks.write().await[0] = Some(Arc::clone(&disk));
let gate = peer.peer.pause_next_format_read();
let pending_set = Arc::clone(&set);
let pending = tokio::spawn(async move { pending_set.connect_disks().await });
time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), gate.entered.notified())
.await
.expect("replacement must reach the format validation barrier");
let cancelled_before_publication = remote.cancel_token.is_cancelled();
gate.release.cancel();
pending.await.expect("validated replacement must finish publication");
let replacement = set.disks.read().await[0].clone().expect("replacement must occupy the slot");
let readback = replacement.read_all("bucket", "object").await;
replacement.close().await.expect("stop replacement monitoring");
peer.stop().await;
assert!(
!cancelled_before_publication,
"the registered monitor must survive pending format validation"
);
assert!(!Arc::ptr_eq(&disk, &replacement), "validated replacement must be published");
assert!(remote.cancel_token.is_cancelled(), "the displaced monitor must stop after publication");
assert_eq!(
readback.expect("replacement must serve real I/O"),
Bytes::from_static(b"replacement-peer-data")
);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial(remote_disk_recovery_probe)]
async fn endpoint_reconnect_admits_ready_drive_while_another_format_probe_is_blocked() {
@@ -11543,4 +12019,15 @@ mod tests {
accept_task.abort();
}
#[test]
fn prewarm_claim_is_deduplicated_and_released_after_failure() {
let addr = "http://prewarm-retry-test.invalid:9000";
release_control_channel_prewarm(addr);
assert!(claim_control_channel_prewarm(addr));
assert!(!claim_control_channel_prewarm(addr));
release_control_channel_prewarm(addr);
assert!(claim_control_channel_prewarm(addr));
release_control_channel_prewarm(addr);
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -481,6 +481,14 @@ pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_write_all_request() {
.record_outgoing_request_for_operation_and_backend(INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_WRITE_ALL, INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC);
}
pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_write_all_duration(duration: Duration) {
global_internode_metrics().record_duration_for_operation_and_backend(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_WRITE_ALL,
INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC,
duration,
);
}
pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_write_all_sent_bytes(bytes: usize) {
global_internode_metrics().record_sent_bytes_for_operation_and_backend(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_WRITE_ALL,
@@ -521,6 +529,14 @@ pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_read_all_request() {
.record_outgoing_request_for_operation_and_backend(INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_ALL, INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC);
}
pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_read_all_duration(duration: Duration) {
global_internode_metrics().record_duration_for_operation_and_backend(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_ALL,
INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC,
duration,
);
}
#[cfg(feature = "diagnostic-read-version-caller")]
fn read_version_request_mode(opts: &ReadOptions) -> ReadVersionRequestMode {
match (opts.read_data, opts.healing, opts.incl_free_versions) {
@@ -598,6 +614,17 @@ pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_batch_read_version_stage(stage: &'static s
);
}
pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_batch_read_version_duration(duration: Duration) {
if !rustfs_io_metrics::get_stage_metrics_enabled() {
return;
}
global_internode_metrics().record_duration_for_operation_and_backend(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_BATCH_READ_VERSION,
INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC,
duration,
);
}
pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_batch_read_version_error() {
if !rustfs_io_metrics::get_stage_metrics_enabled() {
return;
@@ -690,6 +717,14 @@ pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_read_multiple_recv_bytes(bytes: usize) {
record_grpc_payload_size(INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_MULTIPLE, bytes);
}
pub(crate) fn record_remote_disk_grpc_read_multiple_duration(duration: Duration) {
global_internode_metrics().record_duration_for_operation_and_backend(
INTERNODE_OPERATION_GRPC_READ_MULTIPLE,
INTERNODE_TRANSPORT_BACKEND_GRPC,
duration,
);
}
/// Payload-size threshold (bytes) above which a unary internode gRPC response is counted as a
/// "large payload" for alerting. Env-overridable via `RUSTFS_INTERNODE_RPC_LARGE_PAYLOAD_WARN_BYTES`.
fn internode_rpc_large_payload_warn_bytes() -> usize {
+1
View File
@@ -3506,6 +3506,7 @@ mod tests {
replication_decision: String::new(),
checksum: None,
multipart_completion_replayed: false,
backfilled_old_current_size: None,
}
}
}
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ use crate::storage_api_contracts::namespace::NamespaceLocking as _;
use codec::{fixture_inline_pool_meta_replicas as replicas, fixture_split_inline_pool_meta_replicas as split};
use std::path::PathBuf;
use tokio::fs;
use uuid::Uuid;
struct PhysicalFixture {
_directories: Vec<tempfile::TempDir>,
@@ -216,6 +217,264 @@ async fn pool_meta_native_physical_split_without_ordinary_commit_performs_no_mut
"all current heads, identities and complete backups must remain unchanged"
);
assert_eq!(state.active_transactions.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0);
state
.ensure_write_safe("ordinary authority temporarily unavailable")
.expect("missing ordinary authority alone must not install a permanent corruption latch");
}
async fn interrupted_first_commit_fixture() -> (PhysicalFixture, PoolMetaCommittedCandidate) {
let fixture = fixture(3).await;
let PoolMetaReplica::Valid {
previous: Some(previous),
committed: false,
..
} = decode_pool_meta_replica(fixture.pending.clone())
else {
panic!("fixture must retain its acknowledged predecessor");
};
let physical = disks(&fixture.store).await;
let prepared = replicas(&fixture.pending, OffsetDateTime::now_utc()).await;
for (index, disk) in physical[0].iter().enumerate() {
fs::write(object_path(disk).join("xl.meta"), &prepared[index])
.await
.expect("one pool must retain an ordinary-readable PREPARE");
}
(fixture, *previous)
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial(pool_meta_version_env)]
async fn pool_meta_native_physical_interrupted_first_commit_restores_proven_predecessor() {
let (mut fixture, previous) = interrupted_first_commit_fixture().await;
let before = read_pool_meta_replicas(fixture.store.pools.clone(), true).await;
assert!(
before[1..]
.iter()
.all(|read| matches!(read.replica, PoolMetaReplica::Unreadable(_)))
);
assert!(matches!(before[0].replica, PoolMetaReplica::Valid { committed: false, .. }));
let mut state = clean_state(&fixture);
let fence = PoolMetaPersistenceFence::Owned(owner(&fixture.store).await);
assert!(
repair(&fixture.store, &mut state, &fence)
.await
.expect("ordinary PREPARE must authorize restoring only its acknowledged predecessor")
);
state
.ensure_write_safe("first commit rollback")
.expect("rollback must finish its transaction");
assert_ne!(
previous.canonical, fixture.canonical,
"the interrupted COMMIT must not become authoritative"
);
fixture.canonical = previous.canonical;
fixture.revision = previous.revision;
assert_committed(&fixture).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial(pool_meta_version_env)]
async fn pool_meta_native_physical_interrupted_rollback_retains_authority_and_resumes() {
let (mut fixture, previous) = interrupted_first_commit_fixture().await;
let pause = Arc::new(NativeApplyPause::default());
let reached = pause.reached.notified();
tokio::pin!(reached);
reached.as_mut().enable();
let fence = PoolMetaPersistenceFence::Owned(owner(&fixture.store).await);
let mut state = clean_state(&fixture);
let recovery = tokio::spawn({
let store = Arc::clone(&fixture.store);
let pause = Arc::clone(&pause);
async move {
AFTER_NATIVE_POOL_APPLY
.scope(pause, async move { repair(&store, &mut state, &fence).await })
.await
}
});
tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10), reached)
.await
.expect("real rollback should pause after one pool is durably restored");
let partial = read_pool_meta_replicas(fixture.store.pools.clone(), true).await;
assert!(matches!(partial[0].replica, PoolMetaReplica::Valid { committed: false, .. }));
assert!(matches!(&partial[1].replica, PoolMetaReplica::Valid { canonical, committed: true, .. }
if canonical == &previous.canonical));
assert!(matches!(partial[2].replica, PoolMetaReplica::Unreadable(_)));
recovery.abort();
assert!(
recovery
.await
.expect_err("the paused repair must be cancelled")
.is_cancelled()
);
let mut state = clean_state(&fixture);
let fence = PoolMetaPersistenceFence::Owned(owner(&fixture.store).await);
assert!(
repair(&fixture.store, &mut state, &fence)
.await
.expect("restart must resume from the retained ordinary PREPARE")
);
fixture.canonical = previous.canonical;
fixture.revision = previous.revision;
assert_committed(&fixture).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial(pool_meta_version_env)]
async fn pool_meta_native_physical_rollback_resumes_after_last_prepare_loses_read_quorum() {
let (mut fixture, previous) = interrupted_first_commit_fixture().await;
let fence = PoolMetaPersistenceFence::Owned(owner(&fixture.store).await);
let inspected = inspect(&fixture.store.pools, &fence)
.await
.expect("physical rollback inventory");
let replacements = plan(
&inspected,
&fixture.canonical,
fixture.revision,
&fixture.identity,
Some(&previous.canonical),
)
.await
.expect("the ordinary PREPARE must authorize its predecessor");
for (pool, count) in [(1, 4), (2, 4), (0, 2)] {
for (index, replacement) in replacements[pool].iter().enumerate().take(count) {
let snapshot = &inspected[pool].snapshots[index];
assert_eq!(
inspected[pool].disks[index]
.pool_meta_native_recovery(Request::Apply {
object: PoolMetaNativeObject::PoolBin,
expected_disk_id: snapshot.disk_id,
expected_current_sha256: snapshot.current.as_ref().map(|raw| Sha256::digest(raw).into()),
expected_backup_inventory_sha256: snapshot.inventory_sha256().expect("original inventory hash"),
replacement: replacement.clone(),
})
.await
.expect("partial rollback must use the real conditional publication and sync path"),
Response::Applied
);
}
}
let partial = read_pool_meta_replicas(fixture.store.pools.clone(), true).await;
assert!(matches!(partial[0].replica, PoolMetaReplica::Unreadable(_)));
assert!(partial[1..].iter().all(|read| matches!(&read.replica,
PoolMetaReplica::Valid { canonical, committed: true, .. } if canonical == &previous.canonical)));
let mut state = clean_state(&fixture);
assert!(
repair(&fixture.store, &mut state, &fence)
.await
.expect("restored ordinary COMMIT must finish rollback after the last PREPARE becomes split")
);
fixture.canonical = previous.canonical;
fixture.revision = previous.revision;
assert_committed(&fixture).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial(pool_meta_version_env)]
async fn pool_meta_native_physical_rollback_backup_does_not_poison_reused_generation() {
let (mut fixture, previous) = interrupted_first_commit_fixture().await;
let mut state = clean_state(&fixture);
let fence = PoolMetaPersistenceFence::Owned(owner(&fixture.store).await);
assert!(repair(&fixture.store, &mut state, &fence).await.expect("initial rollback"));
let revision = PoolMetaRevision {
transaction_id: Some(Uuid::new_v4()),
..fixture.revision
};
let mut meta = previous.meta.clone();
meta.pools[0].last_update += Duration::seconds(1);
let canonical = encode_pool_meta_v3_envelope(&meta, revision, true, None).expect("later COMMIT");
let pending = encode_pool_meta_v3_envelope(&meta, revision, false, Some(&previous)).expect("later PREPARE");
let modified = OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + Duration::seconds(1);
let split = split(&pending, &canonical, modified).await;
let commit = replicas(&canonical, modified).await;
let prepared = replicas(&pending, modified).await;
let directory = Uuid::new_v4();
let retained = snapshots(&fixture.store).await;
for (pool_index, pool) in disks(&fixture.store).await.into_iter().enumerate() {
for (disk_index, disk) in pool.iter().enumerate() {
assert!(
!retained[pool_index][disk_index].backups.is_empty(),
"the abandoned PREPARE must remain as real on-disk evidence"
);
let object = object_path(disk);
fs::write(object.join("xl.meta"), &if pool_index < 2 { &split } else { &commit }[disk_index])
.await
.expect("install later partial COMMIT without clearing old backups");
fs::create_dir(object.join(directory.to_string()))
.await
.expect("later backup directory");
fs::write(object.join(directory.to_string()).join("xl.meta.bkp"), &prepared[disk_index])
.await
.expect("later PREPARE backup");
}
}
assert!(
repair(&fixture.store, &mut state, &fence)
.await
.expect("an ordinary later COMMIT must survive the abandoned sibling PREPARE")
);
fixture.canonical = canonical;
fixture.revision = revision;
assert_committed(&fixture).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial(pool_meta_version_env)]
async fn pool_meta_native_physical_rollback_rejects_retained_commit_without_mutation() {
let (fixture, _) = interrupted_first_commit_fixture().await;
let physical = disks(&fixture.store).await;
let commit = replicas(&fixture.canonical, OffsetDateTime::now_utc()).await;
let directory = Uuid::new_v4();
let object = object_path(&physical[0][0]);
fs::create_dir(object.join(directory.to_string()))
.await
.expect("retained COMMIT directory");
fs::write(object.join(directory.to_string()).join("xl.meta.bkp"), &commit[0])
.await
.expect("retain evidence that the interrupted transaction may already have committed");
let before = snapshots(&fixture.store).await;
let mut state = clean_state(&fixture);
let fence = PoolMetaPersistenceFence::Owned(owner(&fixture.store).await);
assert!(repair(&fixture.store, &mut state, &fence).await.is_err());
assert_eq!(snapshots(&fixture.store).await, before, "ambiguous COMMIT evidence must remain untouched");
assert_eq!(state.active_transactions.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial(pool_meta_version_env)]
async fn pool_meta_native_physical_rollback_rejects_competing_prepares_without_mutation() {
let (fixture, previous) = interrupted_first_commit_fixture().await;
let pending = encode_pool_meta_v3_envelope(
&previous.meta,
PoolMetaRevision {
transaction_id: Some(Uuid::new_v4()),
..fixture.revision
},
false,
Some(&previous),
)
.expect("competing PREPARE must remain structurally valid");
let physical = disks(&fixture.store).await;
let prepared = replicas(&pending, OffsetDateTime::now_utc()).await;
for (index, disk) in physical[1].iter().enumerate() {
fs::write(object_path(disk).join("xl.meta"), &prepared[index])
.await
.expect("second pool must expose the competing transaction through ordinary reads");
}
let before = snapshots(&fixture.store).await;
let mut state = clean_state(&fixture);
let fence = PoolMetaPersistenceFence::Owned(owner(&fixture.store).await);
let error = repair(&fixture.store, &mut state, &fence)
.await
.expect_err("two distinct prepared transactions must not authorize a guessed rollback");
assert_eq!(
error
.pool_metadata_failure()
.expect("transaction conflict must be typed")
.kind,
crate::error::PoolMetadataFailure::RecoveryRequired
);
assert_eq!(snapshots(&fixture.store).await, before, "competing transactions must remain untouched");
assert_eq!(state.active_transactions.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0);
}
struct IdentityEpochFork {
@@ -467,7 +726,7 @@ async fn pool_meta_native_physical_partial_apply_resumes_after_conditional_rejec
let inspected = inspect(&fixture.store.pools, &fence)
.await
.expect("real native snapshots should be obtained");
let replacements = plan(&inspected, &fixture.canonical, fixture.revision, &fixture.identity)
let replacements = plan(&inspected, &fixture.canonical, fixture.revision, &fixture.identity, None)
.await
.expect("physical recovery plan should validate");
let snapshot = &inspected[0].snapshots[0];
@@ -628,3 +887,559 @@ async fn pool_meta_native_physical_three_plus_one_checkpoint_converges_all_shard
);
}
}
async fn owner_repair_no_backups_fixture() -> PhysicalFixture {
let fixture = fixture(0).await;
for pool in disks(&fixture.store).await {
for disk in pool {
let object = object_path(&disk);
let mut entries = fs::read_dir(&object).await.expect("fixture metadata directory");
while let Some(entry) = entries.next_entry().await.expect("fixture directory entry") {
if entry.file_type().await.expect("fixture entry type").is_dir() {
fs::remove_dir_all(entry.path())
.await
.expect("remove task-owned fixture rollback directory");
}
}
}
}
fixture
}
async fn owner_repair_identity_heads(store: &ECStore) -> Vec<Vec<(Uuid, Bytes)>> {
let mut all = Vec::new();
for pool in &store.pools {
let set = pool.get_disks_by_key(POOL_META_IDENTITY_NAME);
let members = set
.disks
.read()
.await
.iter()
.cloned()
.map(|disk| disk.expect("identity fixture disk must be online"))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let mut heads = Vec::new();
for disk in members {
match disk
.pool_meta_native_recovery(Request::InspectIdentity {})
.await
.expect("physical identity inspection")
{
Response::IdentityInspected { disk_id, raw } => heads.push((disk_id, raw)),
_ => panic!("identity inspection must return its physical head"),
}
}
all.push(heads);
}
all
}
async fn legacy_native_owner_fixture(version: u16, stale: bool) -> (PhysicalFixture, Vec<u8>) {
let fixture = owner_repair_no_backups_fixture().await;
let mut meta = match decode_pool_meta_replica(fixture.canonical.clone()) {
PoolMetaReplica::Valid {
meta, committed: true, ..
} => meta,
_ => panic!("fixture must provide valid committed pool metadata"),
};
meta.version = version;
let raw = meta
.encode_config_data_for_v2_gate(version == POOL_META_VERSION)
.expect("legacy fixture should encode in its original version");
assert_eq!(u16::from_le_bytes([raw[2], raw[3]]), version);
let all = disks(&fixture.store).await;
let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
for pool in &all {
let heads = replicas(&raw, now).await;
for (index, disk) in pool.iter().enumerate() {
fs::write(object_path(disk).join("xl.meta"), &heads[index])
.await
.expect("install exact legacy head");
}
}
if stale {
let old = replicas(&raw, now - Duration::seconds(10)).await;
fs::write(object_path(&all[0][0]).join("xl.meta"), &old[0])
.await
.expect("install stale same-raw legacy head");
}
(fixture, raw)
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial(pool_meta_version_env)]
async fn pool_meta_native_heal_v1_with_all_upgrade_gates_disabled_keeps_exact_raw() {
temp_env::async_with_vars(
[
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V2_WRITE, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V2_FLEET_CONFIRMED, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V3_WRITE, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V3_FLEET_CONFIRMED, Some("false")),
],
async {
let (fixture, raw) = legacy_native_owner_fixture(POOL_META_V1_VERSION, false).await;
let guard = owner(&fixture.store).await;
let mut state = fixture.store.pool_meta_save_gate.lock().await;
let result = tokio::time::timeout(
std::time::Duration::from_secs(30),
fixture.store.heal_pool_meta_replica_under_fence(0, guard, &mut state),
)
.await
.expect("legacy native heal must terminate");
assert!(result.is_ok(), "fully online legacy native heal should succeed: {result:?}");
drop(state);
let reads = read_pool_meta_replicas(fixture.store.pools.clone(), true).await;
for read in &reads {
assert!(
matches!(&read.replica, PoolMetaReplica::Valid { raw: bytes, revision, .. }
if bytes == &raw && revision.version == POOL_META_V1_VERSION),
"native heal must not upgrade a V1 raw payload when both upgrade gates are disabled"
);
}
},
)
.await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial(pool_meta_version_env)]
async fn pool_meta_native_heal_rejects_legacy_source_with_trailing_bytes_without_writes() {
temp_env::async_with_vars(
[
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V2_WRITE, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V2_FLEET_CONFIRMED, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V3_WRITE, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V3_FLEET_CONFIRMED, Some("false")),
],
async {
for version in [POOL_META_V1_VERSION, POOL_META_VERSION] {
let (fixture, raw) = legacy_native_owner_fixture(version, false).await;
let mut source_raw = raw.clone();
// A second MessagePack value is readable by legacy decoding but
// must not be copied as part of an unverified repair payload.
source_raw.push(0xc0);
assert!(
matches!(decode_pool_meta_replica(source_raw.clone()), PoolMetaReplica::Valid { raw, .. } if raw == source_raw),
"ordinary legacy reads must remain compatible with trailing bytes"
);
let all_disks = disks(&fixture.store).await;
let source_heads = replicas(&source_raw, OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + Duration::seconds(1)).await;
for (index, disk) in all_disks[0].iter().enumerate() {
fs::write(object_path(disk).join("xl.meta"), &source_heads[index])
.await
.expect("install readable legacy source with trailing bytes");
}
let selection = load_pool_meta_replicas(fixture.store.pools.clone(), true)
.await
.expect("legacy semantic selection must remain readable");
assert_eq!(selection.legacy_raw.as_deref(), Some(source_raw.as_slice()));
let before = snapshots(&fixture.store).await;
let identities = owner_repair_identity_heads(&fixture.store).await;
let guard = owner(&fixture.store).await;
let mut state = fixture.store.pool_meta_save_gate.lock().await;
let result = tokio::time::timeout(
std::time::Duration::from_secs(30),
fixture.store.heal_pool_meta_replica_under_fence(1, guard, &mut state),
)
.await
.expect("legacy native heal must terminate");
drop(state);
assert!(result.is_err(), "version {version}: unparsed trailing source bytes must not be republished");
assert_eq!(snapshots(&fixture.store).await, before, "version {version}: no pool.bin head or backup may change");
assert_eq!(
owner_repair_identity_heads(&fixture.store).await,
identities,
"version {version}: no identity shard may change"
);
let reads = read_pool_meta_replicas(fixture.store.pools.clone(), true).await;
assert!(matches!(&reads[0].replica, PoolMetaReplica::Valid { raw, .. } if raw == &source_raw));
assert!(matches!(&reads[1].replica, PoolMetaReplica::Valid { raw: target, .. } if target == &raw));
}
},
)
.await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial(pool_meta_version_env)]
async fn pool_meta_native_heal_mixed_v1_v2_preserves_observed_format_floor() {
temp_env::async_with_vars(
[
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V2_WRITE, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V2_FLEET_CONFIRMED, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V3_WRITE, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V3_FLEET_CONFIRMED, Some("false")),
],
async {
for first_version in [POOL_META_V1_VERSION, POOL_META_VERSION] {
for target_pool in [0, 1] {
let (fixture, raw_v1) = legacy_native_owner_fixture(POOL_META_V1_VERSION, false).await;
let mut meta = match decode_pool_meta_replica(raw_v1.clone()) {
PoolMetaReplica::Valid { meta, committed: true, .. } => meta,
_ => panic!("initial V1 metadata must decode"),
};
meta.version = POOL_META_VERSION;
let raw_v2 = meta.encode_config_data_for_v2_gate(true).expect("equivalent V2 payload must encode");
assert_eq!(u16::from_le_bytes([raw_v1[2], raw_v1[3]]), POOL_META_V1_VERSION);
assert_eq!(u16::from_le_bytes([raw_v2[2], raw_v2[3]]), POOL_META_VERSION);
let semantic_v1 = match decode_pool_meta_replica(raw_v1.clone()) {
PoolMetaReplica::Valid { canonical, .. } => canonical,
_ => panic!("V1 payload must remain valid"),
};
let semantic_v2 = match decode_pool_meta_replica(raw_v2.clone()) {
PoolMetaReplica::Valid { canonical, .. } => canonical,
_ => panic!("V2 payload must remain valid"),
};
assert_eq!(semantic_v1, semantic_v2, "the two formats must carry equivalent metadata");
let other_version = if first_version == POOL_META_V1_VERSION { POOL_META_VERSION } else { POOL_META_V1_VERSION };
// Pool two follows pool zero; pools zero and one cover both
// orderings and both target formats in separate runs.
let versions = [first_version, other_version, first_version];
let physical = disks(&fixture.store).await;
let timestamp = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
for (pool_index, pool) in physical.iter().enumerate() {
let raw = if versions[pool_index] == POOL_META_V1_VERSION { &raw_v1 } else { &raw_v2 };
let heads = replicas(raw, timestamp).await;
for (index, disk) in pool.iter().enumerate() {
fs::write(object_path(disk).join("xl.meta"), &heads[index]).await.expect("install mixed legacy pool head");
}
}
let before = snapshots(&fixture.store).await;
let selection = load_pool_meta_replicas(fixture.store.pools.clone(), true)
.await.expect("equivalent legacy pools should be selectable");
assert_eq!(selection.revision.version, POOL_META_VERSION, "the observed V2 format floor must be retained");
assert_eq!(selection.canonical.as_deref(), Some(semantic_v2.as_slice()));
let guard = owner(&fixture.store).await;
let mut state = fixture.store.pool_meta_save_gate.lock().await;
tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30),
fixture.store.heal_pool_meta_replica_under_fence(target_pool, guard, &mut state))
.await.expect("mixed legacy heal must terminate")
.expect("equivalent legacy metadata should heal without downgrading the format floor");
drop(state);
let after = snapshots(&fixture.store).await;
let reads = read_pool_meta_replicas(fixture.store.pools.clone(), true).await;
for (pool_index, read) in reads.iter().enumerate() {
let expected_version = if pool_index == target_pool { POOL_META_VERSION } else { versions[pool_index] };
let expected_raw = if expected_version == POOL_META_V1_VERSION { &raw_v1 } else { &raw_v2 };
assert!(matches!(&read.replica,
PoolMetaReplica::Valid { raw, canonical, revision, committed: true, .. }
if raw == expected_raw && canonical == &semantic_v2 && revision.version == expected_version
), "pool {pool_index}, first={first_version}, target={target_pool}: preserve equivalent payload and expected legacy version");
for (index, snapshot) in after[pool_index].iter().enumerate() {
codec::validate_inline_pool_meta_shard(snapshot.current.as_ref().expect("physical head"), index, expected_raw)
.await.expect("every physical shard must match its selected legacy payload");
}
if pool_index != target_pool {
assert_eq!(after[pool_index], before[pool_index], "healing one pool must not modify other pools");
}
}
}
}
},
).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial(pool_meta_version_env)]
async fn pool_meta_native_heal_rejects_v1_and_v3_prepare_in_either_pool_order() {
temp_env::async_with_vars(
[
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V2_WRITE, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V2_FLEET_CONFIRMED, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V3_WRITE, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V3_FLEET_CONFIRMED, Some("false")),
],
async {
for prepare_pool in [0, 1] {
let (fixture, raw_v1) = legacy_native_owner_fixture(POOL_META_V1_VERSION, false).await;
let (legacy_meta, legacy_canonical) = match decode_pool_meta_replica(raw_v1.clone()) {
PoolMetaReplica::Valid {
meta,
canonical,
revision,
committed: true,
..
} if revision.version == POOL_META_V1_VERSION => (meta, canonical),
_ => panic!("baseline V1 metadata must be committed and readable"),
};
let previous = PoolMetaCommittedCandidate {
canonical: legacy_canonical,
meta: legacy_meta.clone(),
revision: PoolMetaRevision::legacy(POOL_META_V1_VERSION),
};
let mut next = legacy_meta;
next.version = POOL_META_GENERATION_VERSION;
next.pools[0].last_update += Duration::seconds(1);
let revision = PoolMetaRevision {
version: POOL_META_GENERATION_VERSION,
cluster_id: fixture.revision.cluster_id,
epoch: fixture.revision.epoch,
generation: 1,
transaction_id: Some(Uuid::new_v4()),
};
let pending = encode_pool_meta_v3_envelope(&next, revision, false, Some(&previous))
.expect("V3 PREPARE with V1 predecessor must encode");
assert!(matches!(decode_pool_meta_replica(pending.clone()),
PoolMetaReplica::Valid { committed: false, revision: actual, .. } if actual == revision));
let heads = replicas(&pending, OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + Duration::seconds(1)).await;
let physical = disks(&fixture.store).await;
for (index, disk) in physical[prepare_pool].iter().enumerate() {
fs::write(object_path(disk).join("xl.meta"), &heads[index])
.await
.expect("install task-owned V3 PREPARE evidence");
}
let reads = read_pool_meta_replicas(fixture.store.pools.clone(), true).await;
assert!(matches!(&reads[prepare_pool].replica,
PoolMetaReplica::Valid { raw, committed: false, revision: actual, .. }
if raw == &pending && *actual == revision));
let other_pool = 1 - prepare_pool;
assert!(matches!(&reads[other_pool].replica,
PoolMetaReplica::Valid { raw, committed: true, revision: actual, .. }
if raw == &raw_v1 && actual.version == POOL_META_V1_VERSION));
let before = snapshots(&fixture.store).await;
let identities = owner_repair_identity_heads(&fixture.store).await;
let guard = owner(&fixture.store).await;
let mut state = fixture.store.pool_meta_save_gate.lock().await;
let result = tokio::time::timeout(
std::time::Duration::from_secs(30),
fixture
.store
.heal_pool_meta_replica_under_fence(prepare_pool, guard, &mut state),
)
.await
.expect("mixed V1/V3 PREPARE heal must terminate");
drop(state);
assert!(
result.is_err(),
"pool {prepare_pool}: native heal must not overwrite a V3 PREPARE with legacy data"
);
assert_eq!(
snapshots(&fixture.store).await,
before,
"pool {prepare_pool}: rejection must retain all physical head and backup evidence"
);
assert_eq!(
owner_repair_identity_heads(&fixture.store).await,
identities,
"pool {prepare_pool}: rejection must not mutate identity evidence"
);
}
},
)
.await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial(pool_meta_version_env)]
async fn pool_meta_native_heal_rejects_v1_legacy_dont_save_true_without_writes() {
temp_env::async_with_vars(
[
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V2_WRITE, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V2_FLEET_CONFIRMED, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V3_WRITE, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V3_FLEET_CONFIRMED, Some("false")),
],
async {
let (fixture, safe_v1) = legacy_native_owner_fixture(POOL_META_V1_VERSION, false).await;
let meta = match decode_pool_meta_replica(safe_v1.clone()) {
PoolMetaReplica::Valid {
meta, committed: true, ..
} => meta,
_ => panic!("baseline V1 metadata must decode"),
};
let statuses = meta
.pools
.iter()
.map(|pool| {
assert!(pool.decommission.is_none(), "this regression fixture does not inject decommission state");
LegacyPoolStatus {
id: pool.id,
cmd_line: pool.cmd_line.clone(),
last_update: pool.last_update,
decommission: None,
}
})
.collect();
let legacy = LegacyPoolMeta {
version: POOL_META_V1_VERSION,
pools: statuses,
dont_save: true,
};
let mut dangerous_raw = Vec::new();
dangerous_raw.extend_from_slice(&POOL_META_FORMAT.to_le_bytes());
dangerous_raw.extend_from_slice(&POOL_META_V1_VERSION.to_le_bytes());
dangerous_raw.extend_from_slice(&rmp_serde::to_vec(&legacy).expect("legacy three-field tuple must serialize"));
let old_reader: LegacyPoolMeta =
rmp_serde::from_slice(&dangerous_raw[4..]).expect("legacy reader must decode source");
assert!(old_reader.dont_save, "the old reader would treat this source as permanently do-not-save");
assert_eq!(rmp::decode::read_array_len(&mut &dangerous_raw[4..]).expect("tuple length"), 3);
let source = match decode_pool_meta_replica(dangerous_raw.clone()) {
PoolMetaReplica::Valid {
canonical,
revision,
committed: true,
..
} => {
assert_eq!(revision.version, POOL_META_V1_VERSION);
canonical
}
_ => panic!("current reader must recognize the legacy source"),
};
assert!(matches!(decode_pool_meta_replica(safe_v1.clone()),
PoolMetaReplica::Valid { canonical, revision, committed: true, .. }
if canonical == source && revision.version == POOL_META_V1_VERSION));
let physical = disks(&fixture.store).await;
let source_heads = replicas(&dangerous_raw, OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + Duration::seconds(1)).await;
for (index, disk) in physical[0].iter().enumerate() {
fs::write(object_path(disk).join("xl.meta"), &source_heads[index])
.await
.expect("install legacy source on pool zero");
}
let reads = read_pool_meta_replicas(fixture.store.pools.clone(), true).await;
assert!(matches!(&reads[0].replica, PoolMetaReplica::Valid { raw, committed: true, .. } if raw == &dangerous_raw));
assert!(matches!(&reads[1].replica, PoolMetaReplica::Valid { raw, committed: true, .. } if raw == &safe_v1));
let before = snapshots(&fixture.store).await;
let identities = owner_repair_identity_heads(&fixture.store).await;
let guard = owner(&fixture.store).await;
let mut state = fixture.store.pool_meta_save_gate.lock().await;
let result = tokio::time::timeout(
std::time::Duration::from_secs(30),
fixture.store.heal_pool_meta_replica_under_fence(1, guard, &mut state),
)
.await
.expect("unsafe legacy heal must terminate");
drop(state);
let error = result.expect_err("native heal must reject a source whose old-reader dont_save is true");
assert!(
error.to_string().contains("dont_save"),
"rejection must identify the unsafe legacy field: {error}"
);
assert_eq!(
snapshots(&fixture.store).await,
before,
"rejection must preserve every original head and backup"
);
assert_eq!(
owner_repair_identity_heads(&fixture.store).await,
identities,
"rejection must not write identity shards"
);
let after = read_pool_meta_replicas(fixture.store.pools.clone(), true).await;
assert!(matches!(&after[0].replica, PoolMetaReplica::Valid { raw, .. } if raw == &dangerous_raw));
assert!(
matches!(&after[1].replica, PoolMetaReplica::Valid { raw, .. } if raw == &safe_v1),
"the dangerous source bytes must not be copied into the target pool"
);
},
)
.await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial(pool_meta_version_env)]
async fn pool_meta_native_heal_rejects_target_v1_dont_save_true_without_writes() {
temp_env::async_with_vars(
[
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V2_WRITE, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V2_FLEET_CONFIRMED, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V3_WRITE, Some("false")),
(rustfs_config::ENV_POOL_META_V3_FLEET_CONFIRMED, Some("false")),
],
async {
let (fixture, safe_v1) = legacy_native_owner_fixture(POOL_META_V1_VERSION, false).await;
let meta = match decode_pool_meta_replica(safe_v1.clone()) {
PoolMetaReplica::Valid {
meta, committed: true, ..
} => meta,
_ => panic!("baseline V1 metadata must decode"),
};
let statuses = meta
.pools
.iter()
.map(|pool| {
assert!(pool.decommission.is_none(), "this regression fixture does not inject decommission state");
LegacyPoolStatus {
id: pool.id,
cmd_line: pool.cmd_line.clone(),
last_update: pool.last_update,
decommission: None,
}
})
.collect();
let legacy = LegacyPoolMeta {
version: POOL_META_V1_VERSION,
pools: statuses,
dont_save: true,
};
let mut dangerous_raw = Vec::new();
dangerous_raw.extend_from_slice(&POOL_META_FORMAT.to_le_bytes());
dangerous_raw.extend_from_slice(&POOL_META_V1_VERSION.to_le_bytes());
dangerous_raw.extend_from_slice(&rmp_serde::to_vec(&legacy).expect("legacy three-field tuple must serialize"));
let old_reader: LegacyPoolMeta =
rmp_serde::from_slice(&dangerous_raw[4..]).expect("legacy reader must decode target");
assert!(old_reader.dont_save, "the old reader interprets the target as do-not-save");
assert_eq!(rmp::decode::read_array_len(&mut &dangerous_raw[4..]).expect("tuple length"), 3);
let source_canonical = match decode_pool_meta_replica(safe_v1.clone()) {
PoolMetaReplica::Valid {
canonical,
revision,
committed: true,
..
} => {
assert_eq!(revision.version, POOL_META_V1_VERSION);
canonical
}
_ => panic!("safe pool-zero source must decode"),
};
assert!(
matches!(decode_pool_meta_replica(dangerous_raw.clone()),
PoolMetaReplica::Valid { canonical, revision, committed: true, .. }
if canonical == source_canonical && revision.version == POOL_META_V1_VERSION),
"the dangerous target must remain semantically equivalent to the safe source"
);
let physical = disks(&fixture.store).await;
let target_heads = replicas(&dangerous_raw, OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + Duration::seconds(1)).await;
for (index, disk) in physical[1].iter().enumerate() {
fs::write(object_path(disk).join("xl.meta"), &target_heads[index])
.await
.expect("install legacy dangerous target head");
}
let reads = read_pool_meta_replicas(fixture.store.pools.clone(), true).await;
assert!(matches!(&reads[0].replica, PoolMetaReplica::Valid { raw, committed: true, .. } if raw == &safe_v1));
assert!(matches!(&reads[1].replica, PoolMetaReplica::Valid { raw, committed: true, .. } if raw == &dangerous_raw));
let before = snapshots(&fixture.store).await;
let identities = owner_repair_identity_heads(&fixture.store).await;
let guard = owner(&fixture.store).await;
let mut state = fixture.store.pool_meta_save_gate.lock().await;
let result = tokio::time::timeout(
std::time::Duration::from_secs(30),
fixture.store.heal_pool_meta_replica_under_fence(1, guard, &mut state),
)
.await
.expect("unsafe legacy target heal must terminate");
drop(state);
let error = result.expect_err("native heal must reject a target whose old-reader dont_save is true");
assert!(
error.to_string().contains("dont_save"),
"rejection must identify the unsafe legacy field: {error}"
);
assert_eq!(
snapshots(&fixture.store).await,
before,
"rejection must preserve all physical heads and backups"
);
assert_eq!(
owner_repair_identity_heads(&fixture.store).await,
identities,
"rejection must not write identity shards"
);
let after = read_pool_meta_replicas(fixture.store.pools.clone(), true).await;
assert!(matches!(&after[0].replica, PoolMetaReplica::Valid { raw, .. } if raw == &safe_v1));
assert!(
matches!(&after[1].replica, PoolMetaReplica::Valid { raw, .. } if raw == &dangerous_raw),
"unsafe target evidence must not be overwritten by the safe source"
);
},
)
.await;
}
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ pub(super) struct NativeApplyPause {
#[cfg(test)]
tokio::task_local! {
pub(super) static AFTER_NATIVE_APPLY: Arc<NativeApplyPause>;
pub(super) static AFTER_NATIVE_POOL_APPLY: Arc<NativeApplyPause>;
}
struct InspectedPool {
@@ -168,6 +169,7 @@ async fn plan(
canonical: &[u8],
revision: PoolMetaRevision,
identity: &[u8],
rollback: Option<&[u8]>,
) -> Result<Vec<Vec<Bytes>>> {
let mut pending = Vec::<Vec<u8>>::new();
let mut predecessors = Vec::<Vec<u8>>::new();
@@ -223,23 +225,83 @@ async fn plan(
}
}
}
let mut obsolete = Vec::<Vec<u8>>::new();
for payload in &decoded {
match decode_pool_meta_replica(payload.clone()) {
PoolMetaReplica::Valid {
// The last ordinary PREPARE can itself become split during rollback. In
// that case another pool already exposes the restored ordinary COMMIT.
// Its authority permits continuing the rollback, never promoting a child
// transaction reconstructed from disk evidence.
let mut continuation: Option<(Vec<u8>, PoolMetaRevision)> = None;
if rollback.is_none() {
let mut outstanding = Vec::new();
for pool in inspected {
for (index, snapshot) in pool.snapshots.iter().enumerate() {
let raw = snapshot.current.as_ref().ok_or_else(invalid)?;
if codec::validate_inline_pool_meta_shard(raw, index, canonical).await.is_err() {
outstanding.push((index, raw));
}
}
}
for payload in &decoded {
if let PoolMetaReplica::Valid {
canonical: candidate,
revision: candidate_revision,
committed: false,
previous: Some(previous),
..
} if candidate_revision == revision && candidate == canonical => {
if !pending.contains(payload) {
pending.push(payload.clone());
} = decode_pool_meta_replica(payload.clone())
&& previous.revision == revision
&& previous.canonical == canonical
{
let mut matches = true;
for (index, raw) in &outstanding {
matches &= codec::validate_inline_pool_meta_shard(raw, *index, payload).await.is_ok()
|| codec::validate_inline_pool_meta_shard(raw, *index, &candidate).await.is_ok();
}
if !predecessors.contains(&previous.canonical) {
predecessors.push(previous.canonical);
if matches {
if !outstanding.is_empty()
&& continuation.as_ref().is_some_and(|(selected, selected_revision)| {
selected != &candidate || *selected_revision != candidate_revision
})
{
return Err(known_validation(invalid(), "native_transaction_validation"));
}
continuation.get_or_insert((candidate, candidate_revision));
}
}
}
}
let (canonical, revision, rollback) = match &continuation {
Some((transaction, next_revision)) => (transaction.as_slice(), *next_revision, Some(canonical)),
None => (canonical, revision, rollback),
};
for payload in &decoded {
if let PoolMetaReplica::Valid {
canonical: candidate,
revision: candidate_revision,
committed: false,
previous: Some(previous),
..
} = decode_pool_meta_replica(payload.clone())
&& candidate_revision == revision
&& candidate == canonical
{
pending.push(payload.clone());
if !predecessors.contains(&previous.canonical) {
predecessors.push(previous.canonical);
}
}
}
if pending.len() > 1 {
return Err(known_validation(
Error::other("native V3 prepare records disagree on the predecessor"),
"native_transaction_validation",
));
}
let mut obsolete = Vec::<Vec<u8>>::new();
for payload in &decoded {
if pending.contains(payload) {
continue;
}
match decode_pool_meta_replica(payload.clone()) {
PoolMetaReplica::Valid { revision: older, .. }
if older.is_generation_protocol()
&& older.cluster_id == revision.cluster_id
@@ -251,6 +313,23 @@ async fn plan(
// fully reconstructed and bound into the native CAS.
obsolete.push(payload.clone());
}
PoolMetaReplica::Valid {
revision: abandoned,
committed: false,
previous: Some(previous),
..
} if abandoned.is_generation_protocol()
&& abandoned.cluster_id == revision.cluster_id
&& abandoned.epoch == revision.epoch
&& abandoned.generation == revision.generation
&& abandoned.transaction_id != revision.transaction_id
&& predecessors.contains(&previous.canonical) =>
{
// A rollback retains the failed PREPARE as evidence. A later
// transaction may reuse that generation, but only a backup of
// an uncommitted sibling with the same predecessor is obsolete.
obsolete.push(payload.clone());
}
PoolMetaReplica::Valid {
canonical: candidate,
revision: candidate_revision,
@@ -272,13 +351,7 @@ async fn plan(
_ => {}
}
}
if pending.len() > 1 {
return Err(known_validation(
Error::other("native V3 prepare records disagree on the predecessor"),
"native_transaction_validation",
));
}
if pending.is_empty() {
if pending.is_empty() || rollback.is_some_and(|previous| !predecessors.iter().any(|candidate| candidate == previous)) {
return Err(invalid());
}
for payload in &decoded {
@@ -294,13 +367,25 @@ async fn plan(
for (index, snapshot) in pool.snapshots.iter().enumerate() {
let raw = snapshot.current.as_ref().ok_or_else(invalid)?;
let mut matched = false;
for payload in std::iter::once(canonical).chain(pending.iter().map(Vec::as_slice)) {
for payload in std::iter::once(canonical)
.chain(pending.iter().map(Vec::as_slice))
.chain(rollback)
{
matched |= codec::validate_inline_pool_meta_shard(raw, index, payload).await.is_ok();
}
if !matched {
return Err(invalid());
}
for backup in &snapshot.backups {
if rollback.is_some()
&& codec::validate_inline_pool_meta_shard(&backup.data, index, canonical)
.await
.is_ok()
{
// A retained COMMIT might have been authoritative before
// this interruption. Never roll it back from PREPARE alone.
return Err(invalid());
}
let mut matched = false;
for payload in std::iter::once(canonical).chain(
pending
@@ -323,7 +408,7 @@ async fn plan(
let mut replacements = Vec::with_capacity(inspected.len());
for pool in inspected {
replacements.push(
codec::encode_inline_pool_meta_replicas(&current(pool)?, canonical, modified)
codec::encode_inline_pool_meta_replicas(&current(pool)?, rollback.unwrap_or(canonical), modified)
.await
.map_err(|error| codec_validation(error, "native_metadata_validation"))?,
);
@@ -338,10 +423,12 @@ pub(super) async fn repair(
) -> Result<bool> {
fence.ensure_held()?;
let reads = read_pool_meta_replicas(store.pools.clone(), true).await;
if !reads
let unreadable = reads
.iter()
.any(|read| matches!(read.replica, PoolMetaReplica::Unreadable(_)))
{
.enumerate()
.filter_map(|(index, read)| matches!(read.replica, PoolMetaReplica::Unreadable(_)).then_some(index))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
if unreadable.is_empty() {
return Ok(false);
}
state.ensure_write_safe("native pool metadata recovery")?;
@@ -360,8 +447,9 @@ pub(super) async fn repair(
{
return Err(invalid());
}
// Only an ordinary, successfully read COMMIT grants authority. Rebuilding
// two erasure shards below proves integrity, never a commit decision.
// Ordinary reads grant authority: a COMMIT selects its own state, while a
// PREPARE can select only its acknowledged predecessor. Reconstruction
// below proves integrity and never promotes an interrupted transaction.
let ordinary_commits = reads
.iter()
.filter_map(|read| match &read.replica {
@@ -375,7 +463,22 @@ pub(super) async fn repair(
_ => None,
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
if ordinary_commits.is_empty() {
let ordinary_prepares = reads
.iter()
.filter_map(|read| match &read.replica {
PoolMetaReplica::Valid {
canonical,
revision,
committed: false,
previous: Some(previous),
..
} if revision.is_generation_protocol() && previous.revision.is_generation_protocol() => {
Some((canonical.clone(), *revision, previous.canonical.clone()))
}
_ => None,
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
if ordinary_commits.is_empty() && ordinary_prepares.is_empty() {
return Err(invalid());
}
let selection = select_pool_meta_replica_reads(reads)
@@ -395,10 +498,20 @@ pub(super) async fn repair(
return Err(invalid());
}
let canonical = selection.canonical.as_ref().ok_or_else(invalid)?;
let mut rollback = None;
for (pending, revision, previous) in &ordinary_prepares {
if previous == canonical {
if rollback.is_some_and(|candidate| candidate != (pending, *revision)) {
return Err(latch_validation(state, known_validation(invalid(), "native_transaction_validation")));
}
rollback = Some((pending, *revision));
}
}
if !selection.revision.is_generation_protocol()
|| !ordinary_commits
.iter()
.any(|(raw, revision)| raw == canonical && *revision == selection.revision)
|| (rollback.is_none()
&& !ordinary_commits
.iter()
.any(|(raw, revision)| raw == canonical && *revision == selection.revision))
{
return Err(invalid());
}
@@ -445,13 +558,18 @@ pub(super) async fn repair(
.await
.map_err(|error| latch_validation(state, error))?;
let inspected = inspect(&store.pools, fence).await?;
let replacements = plan(&inspected, canonical, selection.revision, &identity_bytes)
let (transaction, revision) = rollback.unwrap_or((canonical, selection.revision));
let replacements = plan(&inspected, transaction, revision, &identity_bytes, rollback.map(|_| canonical.as_slice()))
.await
.map_err(|error| latch_validation(state, error))?;
fence.ensure_held()?;
let mut arm = state.arm_transaction();
arm.phase = Some("native_repair_apply");
for (pool, replacements) in inspected.iter().zip(replacements) {
let mut apply_order = inspected.iter().zip(replacements).enumerate().collect::<Vec<_>>();
// Preserve ordinary authority until all unreadable pools are repaired.
// Cancellation can then resume from a PREPARE or a restored COMMIT.
apply_order.sort_by_key(|(index, _)| !unreadable.contains(index));
for (_, (pool, replacements)) in apply_order {
for ((disk, snapshot), replacement) in pool.disks.iter().zip(&pool.snapshots).zip(replacements) {
fence.ensure_held()?;
let request = Request::Apply {
@@ -466,6 +584,11 @@ pub(super) async fn repair(
_ => return Err(invalid()),
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
if let Ok(pause) = AFTER_NATIVE_POOL_APPLY.try_with(Arc::clone) {
pause.reached.notify_one();
pause.resume.notified().await;
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
if let Ok(pause) = AFTER_NATIVE_APPLY.try_with(Arc::clone) {
@@ -627,7 +750,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn pool_meta_native_plan_restores_physical_split_with_fresh_common_identity() {
let f = fixture().await;
let repaired = plan(&f.pools, &f.commit, f.revision, &f.identity).await.unwrap();
let repaired = plan(&f.pools, &f.commit, f.revision, &f.identity, None).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(repaired.len(), 4);
for pool in repaired {
assert_eq!(
@@ -648,7 +771,7 @@ mod tests {
let mut f = fixture().await;
let wrong = replicas(b"different identity", f.modified).await;
f.pools[0].snapshots[0].identity = Some(wrong[0].clone());
assert!(plan(&f.pools, &f.commit, f.revision, &f.identity).await.is_err());
assert!(plan(&f.pools, &f.commit, f.revision, &f.identity, None).await.is_err());
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -671,10 +794,10 @@ mod tests {
.unwrap();
let wrong = replicas(&higher, f.modified + Duration::seconds(2)).await;
f.pools[0].snapshots[0].current = Some(wrong[0].clone());
assert!(plan(&f.pools, &f.commit, f.revision, &f.identity).await.is_err());
assert!(plan(&f.pools, &f.commit, f.revision, &f.identity, None).await.is_err());
f.pools[0].snapshots[0].current = Some(replicas(&f.pending, f.modified).await[0].clone());
f.pools[0].snapshots[0].backups[0].data = wrong[0].clone();
assert!(plan(&f.pools, &f.commit, f.revision, &f.identity).await.is_err());
assert!(plan(&f.pools, &f.commit, f.revision, &f.identity, None).await.is_err());
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -717,17 +840,17 @@ mod tests {
}
}
assert!(older_pending != f.pending);
assert!(plan(&f.pools, &f.commit, f.revision, &f.identity).await.is_ok());
assert!(plan(&f.pools, &f.commit, f.revision, &f.identity, None).await.is_ok());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn pool_meta_native_plan_rejects_missing_or_corrupt_evidence() {
let mut f = fixture().await;
let before = f.pools[1].snapshots[2].current.take();
assert!(plan(&f.pools, &f.commit, f.revision, &f.identity).await.is_err());
assert!(plan(&f.pools, &f.commit, f.revision, &f.identity, None).await.is_err());
f.pools[1].snapshots[2].current = before;
f.pools[1].snapshots[2].backups[0].data = Bytes::from_static(b"invalid metadata");
assert!(plan(&f.pools, &f.commit, f.revision, &f.identity).await.is_err());
assert!(plan(&f.pools, &f.commit, f.revision, &f.identity, None).await.is_err());
}
}
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ pub(super) async fn encode_inline_pool_meta_replicas(
.encode_with_shard_integrity(
Cursor::new(Bytes::copy_from_slice(canonical)),
&mut writers,
raw.len(),
crate::erasure::coding::encode::ShardWritePolicy::object(raw.len()),
1,
IntegrityEncodeMode::Inline(canonical.len()),
protected,
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+3 -2
View File
@@ -317,8 +317,9 @@ impl Sets {
&self.ctx
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) async fn stop_endpoint_monitor_for_test(&self) {
/// Stop endpoint reconnection and wait for any in-flight pass before a test owns disk probes.
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "test-util"))]
pub async fn stop_endpoint_monitor_for_test(&self) {
if let Some(exit_signal) = &self.exit_signal {
let _ = exit_signal.send(());
// Wait for an in-flight reconnect pass as well as its receiver to exit.
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ use tokio::fs;
use tokio::time::Instant;
pub(crate) const BARRIER_DIR_ENV: &str = "RUSTFS_E2E_DATA_MOVEMENT_BARRIER_DIR";
/// Rebalance holds its admission fence; no version of this entry has moved.
pub(crate) const STAGE_AFTER_ENTRY_ADMISSION: &str = "after_entry_admission";
/// Every target part is staged and the target version is not yet published.
pub(crate) const STAGE_BEFORE_TARGET_COMMIT: &str = "before_target_commit";
/// The target commit is durable and the source preflight matched; the source
+17 -1
View File
@@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ fn resolve_data_movement_abort_result(
#[derive(Debug)]
struct DataMovementStageError {
rendered: String,
stage: Option<String>,
source: Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>,
}
@@ -626,6 +627,7 @@ where
{
Error::other(DataMovementStageError {
rendered,
stage: None,
source: Box::new(err),
})
}
@@ -634,7 +636,21 @@ fn data_movement_stage_error<E>(op_label: &str, stage: &str, bucket: &str, objec
where
E: std::error::Error + Send + Sync + 'static,
{
data_movement_context_error(format!("{op_label}: {stage} failed for {bucket}/{object}: {err}"), err)
Error::other(DataMovementStageError {
rendered: format!("{op_label}: {stage} failed for {bucket}/{object}: {err}"),
stage: Some(stage.to_owned()),
source: Box::new(err),
})
}
pub(crate) fn data_movement_error_is_stage(err: &Error, stage: &str) -> bool {
let Error::Io(io_err) = err else {
return false;
};
io_err
.get_ref()
.and_then(|source| source.downcast_ref::<DataMovementStageError>())
.is_some_and(|source| source.stage.as_deref() == Some(stage))
}
#[cfg(test)]
+414 -22
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ pub use local_snapshot::{LocalUsageSnapshot, read_snapshot as read_local_snapsho
use rustfs_data_usage::{
BucketTargetUsageInfo, BucketUsageInfo, CompressionTotalInfo, DATA_USAGE_OBJECT_NAME, DATA_USAGE_OBSERVED_OBJECT_NAME,
DataUsageCache, DataUsageInfo, DiskUsageStatus, LEGACY_DATA_USAGE_OBJECT_NAME, SizeHistogram, VersionsHistogram,
observed_data_usage_is_newer,
observed_data_usage_is_newer, observed_data_usage_is_newer_than_identity,
};
use rustfs_io_metrics::record_system_path_failure;
use rustfs_utils::path::SLASH_SEPARATOR;
@@ -227,7 +227,10 @@ pub async fn lookup_degraded_bucket_usage_baseline(store: Arc<ECStore>, bucket:
/// endpoints for up to `DATA_USAGE_CACHE_TTL_SECS` between backend reads.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
struct CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
/// Last successful load, retained through failures for lineage comparison.
info: Option<DataUsageInfo>,
/// Controls serving independently from the retained ordering evidence.
last_load_failed: bool,
loaded_at: tokio::time::Instant,
/// Pre-discard per-bucket sizes from the same load, retained even when the
/// snapshot is incomplete and its bucket data is discarded. Consumed only
@@ -240,6 +243,7 @@ impl CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
fn result<T>(&self, project: impl FnOnce(&DataUsageInfo) -> T) -> Result<T, Error> {
self.info
.as_ref()
.filter(|_| !self.last_load_failed)
.map(project)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::other("data usage snapshot load recently failed"))
}
@@ -275,6 +279,17 @@ fn cache_data_usage_snapshot_result<T>(
mut degraded_baseline,
observed_unavailable,
}) => {
// A primary read can fall back to an older backup. Refresh the
// retry age without replacing a newer snapshot this process has
// already read; snapshot size itself is not an ordering signal.
if let Some(previous) = cache.as_mut()
&& let Some(cached_info) = previous.info.as_ref()
&& snapshot_predates(&info, cached_info)
{
previous.loaded_at = loaded_at;
previous.last_load_failed = false;
return Some(Ok(project(cached_info)));
}
// A flaky observed read must not shrink quota coverage for a TTL
// window: carry the previous refresh's baseline entries forward,
// letting the fresh (authoritative) values win where they exist.
@@ -286,21 +301,23 @@ fn cache_data_usage_snapshot_result<T>(
let projected = project(&info);
*cache = Some(CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
info: Some(info),
last_load_failed: false,
loaded_at,
degraded_baseline,
});
Ok(projected)
}
Err(e) => {
// Keep the previous baseline through a failed refresh: quota
// admission must not lose its last grounded values because one
// backend read errored.
let degraded_baseline = cache.take().map(|cached| cached.degraded_baseline).unwrap_or_default();
*cache = Some(CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
// A failed load is negatively cached, but cannot erase the last
// good snapshot's ordering proof or grounded quota baseline.
let cached = cache.get_or_insert_with(|| CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
info: None,
last_load_failed: true,
loaded_at,
degraded_baseline,
degraded_baseline: HashMap::new(),
});
cached.loaded_at = loaded_at;
cached.last_load_failed = true;
Err(e)
}
})
@@ -1245,7 +1262,7 @@ async fn load_data_usage_from_backend_with_baseline(store: Arc<ECStore>) -> Resu
let (loaded_snapshot, source) = load_data_usage_snapshot(store.clone()).await?;
// The observed-newness gate below compares against the snapshot as
// persisted, before normalization demotes or discards anything.
let authoritative_as_persisted = loaded_snapshot.clone();
let authoritative_as_persisted = loaded_snapshot.snapshot_identity();
let (info, mut degraded_baseline) = normalize_loaded_data_usage(loaded_snapshot, source.is_authoritative()).await;
// A bucket without a converged scanner cycle behind it — a freshly joined
@@ -1263,7 +1280,7 @@ async fn load_data_usage_from_backend_with_baseline(store: Arc<ECStore>) -> Resu
// read per snapshot refresh.
let mut observed_unavailable = false;
match load_observed_data_usage_snapshot(store).await {
Ok(Some(observed)) if observed_data_usage_is_newer(&observed, &authoritative_as_persisted) => {
Ok(Some(observed)) if observed_data_usage_is_newer_than_identity(&observed, authoritative_as_persisted) => {
backfill_degraded_baseline_from_observed(&mut degraded_baseline, &observed);
}
Ok(_) => {}
@@ -2367,6 +2384,9 @@ fn unknown_bucket_reload_due(cache: &Option<CachedDataUsageSnapshot>, bucket: &s
let Some(cached) = cache.as_ref() else {
return false;
};
if cached.last_load_failed {
return false;
}
let Some(info) = cached.info.as_ref() else {
return false;
};
@@ -2382,11 +2402,35 @@ fn unknown_bucket_reload_due(cache: &Option<CachedDataUsageSnapshot>, bucket: &s
.is_none_or(|attempted_at| now.duration_since(attempted_at) >= refresh_age)
}
/// Whether a freshly loaded snapshot is older than the cached one, as when a
/// primary read fails and the loader falls back to the previous `.bkp` copy.
fn snapshot_predates(loaded: Option<SystemTime>, cached: Option<SystemTime>) -> bool {
/// Compare authoritative lineage by the writer's epoch, cycle, then timestamp
/// order. Within one lineage, compare the observation's coordinated position
/// before its timestamp; a later observation cannot revive an older lineage.
fn snapshot_predates(loaded: &DataUsageInfo, cached: &DataUsageInfo) -> bool {
let loaded_baseline = loaded
.usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline
.unwrap_or_else(|| loaded.snapshot_identity());
let cached_baseline = cached
.usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline
.unwrap_or_else(|| cached.snapshot_identity());
let loaded_position = (loaded_baseline.scanner_epoch, loaded_baseline.scanner_cycle);
let cached_position = (cached_baseline.scanner_epoch, cached_baseline.scanner_cycle);
if loaded_position != cached_position {
return loaded_position < cached_position;
}
let (loaded, cached) = if loaded_baseline == cached_baseline {
let loaded_observation_position = loaded.scanner_epoch.zip(loaded.scanner_cycle);
let cached_observation_position = cached.scanner_epoch.zip(cached.scanner_cycle);
if loaded_observation_position != cached_observation_position {
return loaded_observation_position < cached_observation_position;
}
(loaded.last_update, cached.last_update)
} else {
(loaded_baseline.last_update, cached_baseline.last_update)
};
match (loaded, cached) {
(Some(loaded), Some(cached)) => loaded < cached,
(Some(loaded), Some(cached)) => {
loaded < cached && !rustfs_data_usage::usage_last_update_is_untrusted_future(cached, SystemTime::now())
}
(None, Some(_)) => true,
_ => false,
}
@@ -2427,22 +2471,15 @@ where
return false;
};
let mut cache = data_usage_snapshot_cache().write().await;
let cached_last_update = cache
.as_ref()
.and_then(|cached| cached.info.as_ref())
.and_then(|info| info.last_update);
if snapshot_predates(loaded.info.last_update, cached_last_update) {
return false;
}
cache_data_usage_snapshot_result(
&mut cache,
Ok(loaded),
tokio::time::Instant::now(),
refresh_generation,
data_usage_snapshot_generation(),
|_| (),
|info| info.buckets_usage.contains_key(bucket),
)
.is_some()
.is_some_and(|result| matches!(result, Ok(true)))
}
// Calls of `reload_unknown_bucket_usage` per bucket. Unit tests do not run in
@@ -4224,6 +4261,7 @@ mod tests {
let degraded_baseline = info.bucket_sizes.clone();
*data_usage_snapshot_cache().write().await = Some(CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
info: Some(info),
last_load_failed: false,
loaded_at: tokio::time::Instant::now()
.checked_sub(age)
.expect("the monotonic clock must reach back by the requested age"),
@@ -4700,6 +4738,355 @@ mod tests {
assert_snapshot_bucket(&cached, "bucket");
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn expired_usage_snapshot_refresh_keeps_newer_counts_over_an_older_backup() {
use crate::bucket::metadata_sys::test_support::isolated_store_over_temp_disks;
use crate::config::com::save_config;
let (_dirs, store) = isolated_store_over_temp_disks().await;
let mut current = usage_snapshot_with_new_bucket(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(2), 100);
current.scanner_epoch = Some(4);
current.scanner_cycle = Some(11);
current.usage_snapshot_converged = Some(true);
let mut backup = data_usage_info_for_test("existing", 1, 5, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(1));
backup.scanner_epoch = Some(4);
backup.scanner_cycle = Some(10);
backup.usage_snapshot_converged = Some(true);
for (path, info) in [
(DATA_USAGE_OBJ_NAME_PATH.as_str(), &current),
(DATA_USAGE_OBJ_BACKUP_PATH.as_str(), &backup),
] {
save_config(store.clone(), path, serde_json::to_vec(info).expect("encode usage snapshot"))
.await
.expect("persist initial usage snapshot");
}
invalidate_data_usage_snapshot_cache().await;
for loaded in [
load_data_usage_from_backend_cached(store.clone()).await,
load_admin_data_usage_from_backend_cached(store.clone()).await,
] {
assert_eq!(loaded.expect("prime usage cache"), current);
}
// Bucket cleanup can reduce usage without advancing the scanner
// position. Only its publication timestamp advances.
let mut after_delete = data_usage_info_for_test("existing", 1, 3, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(3));
after_delete.scanner_epoch = current.scanner_epoch;
after_delete.scanner_cycle = current.scanner_cycle;
after_delete.usage_snapshot_converged = Some(true);
let mut stale_observation =
data_usage_info_for_test("retired-incarnation", 99, 999, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(4));
stale_observation.scanner_epoch = Some(4);
stale_observation.scanner_cycle = Some(12);
stale_observation.usage_snapshot_converged = Some(false);
stale_observation.usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline = Some(backup.snapshot_identity());
assert!(observed_data_usage_is_newer(&stale_observation, &backup));
assert!(!observed_data_usage_is_newer(&stale_observation, &current));
save_config(
store.clone(),
DATA_USAGE_OBSERVED_OBJ_NAME_PATH.as_str(),
serde_json::to_vec(&stale_observation).expect("encode observation of an older namespace"),
)
.await
.expect("persist an observation anchored to the old backup");
for (payload, expected) in [
(b"not a usage snapshot".to_vec(), &current),
(serde_json::to_vec(&after_delete).expect("encode post-delete usage"), &after_delete),
] {
save_config(store.clone(), DATA_USAGE_OBJ_NAME_PATH.as_str(), payload)
.await
.expect("replace primary usage snapshot");
for cache in [data_usage_snapshot_cache(), admin_data_usage_snapshot_cache()] {
cache
.write()
.await
.as_mut()
.expect("usage cache should be populated")
.loaded_at = tokio::time::Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(DATA_USAGE_CACHE_TTL_SECS);
}
for loaded in [
load_data_usage_from_backend_cached(store.clone()).await,
load_admin_data_usage_from_backend_cached(store.clone()).await,
] {
assert_eq!(loaded.expect("refresh an expired usage cache"), *expected);
}
assert!(
!data_usage_snapshot_cache()
.read()
.await
.as_ref()
.expect("quota cache should remain populated")
.degraded_baseline
.contains_key("retired-incarnation"),
"a newer observation anchored to an older namespace must not backfill ghost usage"
);
}
invalidate_data_usage_snapshot_cache().await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[serial]
async fn expired_admin_usage_refresh_orders_observations_by_generation_before_time() {
use crate::bucket::metadata_sys::test_support::isolated_store_over_temp_disks;
use crate::config::com::save_config;
let (_dirs, store) = isolated_store_over_temp_disks().await;
let mut authoritative = data_usage_info_for_test("bucket", 1, 10, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(100));
authoritative.scanner_epoch = Some(7);
authoritative.scanner_cycle = Some(10);
authoritative.usage_snapshot_converged = Some(true);
save_config(
store.clone(),
DATA_USAGE_OBJ_NAME_PATH.as_str(),
serde_json::to_vec(&authoritative).expect("encode authoritative usage"),
)
.await
.expect("persist the common authoritative baseline");
let observation = |epoch, cycle, seconds, objects, size| {
let mut info =
data_usage_info_for_test("bucket", objects, size, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(seconds));
info.scanner_epoch = Some(epoch);
info.scanner_cycle = Some(cycle);
info.usage_snapshot_converged = Some(false);
info.usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline = Some(authoritative.snapshot_identity());
info
};
let first = observation(7, 11, 200, 11, 1_100);
let newer_cycle = observation(7, 12, 150, 12, 1_200);
let older_cycle = observation(7, 11, 300, 99, 9_900);
let newer_epoch = observation(8, 1, 50, 1, 100);
invalidate_data_usage_snapshot_cache().await;
for (observed, expected) in [
(&first, &first),
(&newer_cycle, &newer_cycle),
(&older_cycle, &newer_cycle),
(&newer_epoch, &newer_epoch),
] {
assert!(
observed_data_usage_is_newer(observed, &authoritative),
"the persisted observation must pass the real loader's selection gate"
);
save_config(
store.clone(),
DATA_USAGE_OBSERVED_OBJ_NAME_PATH.as_str(),
serde_json::to_vec(observed).expect("encode scanner observation"),
)
.await
.expect("persist scanner observation");
if let Some(cached) = admin_data_usage_snapshot_cache().write().await.as_mut() {
cached.loaded_at = tokio::time::Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(DATA_USAGE_CACHE_TTL_SECS);
}
let loaded = load_admin_data_usage_from_backend_cached(store.clone())
.await
.expect("refresh admin usage through the real backend loader");
assert_eq!(
&loaded,
expected,
"same-baseline observation ordering must follow epoch/cycle before wall clock: incoming={:?}",
observed.snapshot_identity()
);
}
invalidate_data_usage_snapshot_cache().await;
}
#[test]
fn expired_usage_snapshot_refresh_accepts_new_authority_over_a_later_old_observation() {
let loaded_at = tokio::time::Instant::now();
let baseline = data_usage_info_for_test("bucket", 3, 42, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(1));
let mut observed = data_usage_info_for_test("bucket", 5, 60, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(4));
observed.usage_snapshot_converged = Some(false);
observed.usage_snapshot_authoritative_baseline = Some(baseline.snapshot_identity());
let mut cache = Some(CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
info: Some(observed),
last_load_failed: false,
loaded_at,
degraded_baseline: HashMap::new(),
});
let after_delete = data_usage_info_for_test("bucket", 1, 7, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(3));
let refreshed = cache_data_usage_snapshot_result(
&mut cache,
Ok(loaded_usage_for_test(after_delete.clone())),
loaded_at,
1,
1,
DataUsageInfo::clone,
)
.expect("matching refresh generation")
.expect("a newer authority must retire observations of its predecessor");
assert_eq!(refreshed, after_delete);
}
#[test]
fn expired_usage_snapshot_refresh_orders_lineage_by_epoch_cycle_then_time() {
let loaded_at = tokio::time::Instant::now();
for (cached_position, loaded_position, loaded_time, accept) in [
((Some(2), Some(10)), (Some(1), Some(99)), 110, false),
((Some(2), Some(10)), (Some(2), Some(9)), 110, false),
((Some(2), Some(10)), (Some(3), Some(1)), 90, true),
((Some(2), Some(10)), (Some(2), Some(11)), 90, true),
((Some(2), Some(10)), (Some(2), Some(10)), 110, true),
((Some(3), None), (Some(2), Some(10)), 110, false),
((Some(2), Some(10)), (Some(3), None), 90, true),
((None, None), (None, None), 110, true),
((None, None), (None, None), 90, false),
] {
let mut previous = data_usage_info_for_test("bucket", 3, 42, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(100));
(previous.scanner_epoch, previous.scanner_cycle) = cached_position;
let mut loaded = data_usage_info_for_test("bucket", 1, 7, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(loaded_time));
(loaded.scanner_epoch, loaded.scanner_cycle) = loaded_position;
let expected = if accept { &loaded } else { &previous };
let mut cache = Some(CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
info: Some(previous.clone()),
last_load_failed: false,
loaded_at,
degraded_baseline: HashMap::new(),
});
let refreshed = cache_data_usage_snapshot_result(
&mut cache,
Ok(loaded_usage_for_test(loaded.clone())),
loaded_at,
1,
1,
DataUsageInfo::clone,
)
.expect("matching refresh generation")
.expect("a valid usage snapshot remains available");
assert_eq!(
&refreshed, expected,
"lineage ordering must match scanner publication: cached={cached_position:?}, loaded={loaded_position:?}, loaded_time={loaded_time}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn expired_usage_snapshot_refresh_preserves_rejection_backoff_and_baseline() {
let loaded_at = tokio::time::Instant::now();
let expected = data_usage_info_for_test("bucket", 3, 42, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(2));
let mut cache = Some(CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
info: Some(expected.clone()),
last_load_failed: false,
loaded_at,
degraded_baseline: HashMap::from([("bucket".to_string(), 42)]),
});
let refreshed_at = loaded_at + Duration::from_secs(DATA_USAGE_CACHE_TTL_SECS);
let refreshed = cache_data_usage_snapshot_result(
&mut cache,
Ok(loaded_usage_for_test(data_usage_info_for_test("bucket", 1, 7, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH))),
refreshed_at,
1,
1,
DataUsageInfo::clone,
)
.expect("matching refresh generation")
.expect("the newer cached snapshot remains available");
assert_eq!(refreshed, expected);
let retained = cache.as_ref().expect("cache should remain populated");
assert_eq!(retained.degraded_baseline.get("bucket"), Some(&42));
assert_eq!(retained.loaded_at, refreshed_at, "an older fallback must retain the TTL backoff");
let result =
cache_data_usage_snapshot_result(&mut cache, Err(Error::ErasureReadQuorum), refreshed_at, 1, 1, DataUsageInfo::clone)
.expect("matching refresh generation");
assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::ErasureReadQuorum)));
let failed = cache.as_ref().expect("negative cache should be populated");
assert!(failed.last_load_failed);
assert_eq!(failed.info.as_ref(), Some(&expected), "failure must retain the last good ordering proof");
}
#[test]
fn expired_usage_snapshot_refresh_accepts_clock_recovery() {
let loaded_at = tokio::time::Instant::now();
let now = SystemTime::now();
let future = now + rustfs_data_usage::USAGE_LAST_UPDATE_FUTURE_TOLERANCE + Duration::from_secs(60);
let mut cache = Some(CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
info: Some(data_usage_info_for_test("bucket", 3, 42, future)),
last_load_failed: false,
loaded_at,
degraded_baseline: HashMap::new(),
});
let recovered = data_usage_info_for_test("bucket", 1, 7, now);
let refreshed = cache_data_usage_snapshot_result(
&mut cache,
Ok(loaded_usage_for_test(recovered.clone())),
loaded_at,
1,
1,
DataUsageInfo::clone,
)
.expect("matching refresh generation")
.expect("a clock recovery snapshot must not be frozen behind an untrusted timestamp");
assert_eq!(refreshed, recovered);
}
#[test]
fn expired_usage_snapshot_refresh_keeps_last_good_lineage_across_a_failed_load() {
let loaded_at = tokio::time::Instant::now();
let current = data_usage_info_for_test("bucket", 3, 42, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(2));
let mut cache = None;
let first = cache_data_usage_snapshot_result(
&mut cache,
Ok(loaded_usage_for_test(current.clone())),
loaded_at,
1,
1,
DataUsageInfo::clone,
)
.expect("matching refresh generation")
.expect("prime the last successful snapshot");
assert_eq!(first, current);
let failed_at = loaded_at + Duration::from_secs(DATA_USAGE_CACHE_TTL_SECS);
let failure =
cache_data_usage_snapshot_result(&mut cache, Err(Error::ErasureReadQuorum), failed_at, 1, 1, DataUsageInfo::clone)
.expect("matching refresh generation");
assert!(matches!(failure, Err(Error::ErasureReadQuorum)));
assert!(
fresh_cached_data_usage_snapshot(
&cache,
failed_at + Duration::from_secs(DATA_USAGE_UNKNOWN_BUCKET_REFRESH_SECS),
Duration::from_secs(DATA_USAGE_CACHE_TTL_SECS),
|_| panic!("a failed load must not serve its retained snapshot as a success"),
)
.expect("the failed load remains inside its negative TTL")
.is_err()
);
assert!(
!unknown_bucket_reload_due(
&cache,
"unknown",
failed_at + Duration::from_secs(DATA_USAGE_UNKNOWN_BUCKET_REFRESH_SECS),
),
"an unknown bucket must not bypass the failed load's TTL"
);
let recovered_at = failed_at + Duration::from_secs(DATA_USAGE_CACHE_TTL_SECS);
let recovered = cache_data_usage_snapshot_result(
&mut cache,
Ok(loaded_usage_for_test(data_usage_info_for_test("bucket", 1, 7, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH))),
recovered_at,
1,
1,
DataUsageInfo::clone,
)
.expect("matching refresh generation")
.expect("a readable older backup must preserve the last good lineage");
assert_eq!(recovered, current);
assert_eq!(
cache.as_ref().expect("recovered cache").degraded_baseline.get("bucket"),
Some(&42),
"a failed load must not erase the baseline's ordering proof"
);
assert_eq!(
fresh_cached_data_usage_snapshot(&cache, recovered_at, Duration::from_secs(DATA_USAGE_CACHE_TTL_SECS), |info| info
.objects_total_size,)
.expect("the recovered load starts a fresh TTL")
.expect("the last successful snapshot is available again"),
42
);
}
#[test]
#[serial]
fn unavailable_observed_read_keeps_previous_baseline_coverage() {
@@ -4707,6 +5094,7 @@ mod tests {
let refresh_generation = data_usage_snapshot_generation();
let mut cache = Some(CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
info: Some(data_usage_info_for_test("bucket", 1, 42, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)),
last_load_failed: false,
loaded_at,
degraded_baseline: HashMap::from([("observed-only".to_string(), 7_u64), ("covered".to_string(), 1)]),
});
@@ -4740,6 +5128,7 @@ mod tests {
let refresh_generation = data_usage_snapshot_generation();
let mut cache = Some(CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
info: Some(data_usage_info_for_test("stale", 1, 42, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)),
last_load_failed: false,
loaded_at,
degraded_baseline: HashMap::new(),
});
@@ -5928,6 +6317,7 @@ mod tests {
let mut snapshot_cache = data_usage_snapshot_cache().write().await;
*snapshot_cache = Some(CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
info: Some(successor),
last_load_failed: false,
loaded_at: tokio::time::Instant::now(),
degraded_baseline: HashMap::new(),
});
@@ -5999,6 +6389,7 @@ mod tests {
let mut snapshot_cache = data_usage_snapshot_cache().write().await;
*snapshot_cache = Some(CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
info: Some(successor),
last_load_failed: false,
loaded_at: tokio::time::Instant::now(),
degraded_baseline: HashMap::new(),
});
@@ -6051,6 +6442,7 @@ mod tests {
let stale = data_usage_info_for_test(BUCKET, 7, 294, SystemTime::now());
*data_usage_snapshot_cache().write().await = Some(CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
info: Some(stale),
last_load_failed: false,
loaded_at: tokio::time::Instant::now(),
degraded_baseline: HashMap::new(),
});
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ fn scalar_projection_borrows_snapshot_and_preserves_unknown_and_zero() {
info.buckets_usage.insert("empty".to_string(), BucketUsageInfo::default());
let cache = Some(CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
info: Some(info),
last_load_failed: false,
loaded_at,
degraded_baseline: HashMap::new(),
});
@@ -66,6 +67,7 @@ fn projection_is_skipped_for_missing_failed_expired_or_invalidated_snapshots() {
cache = Some(CachedDataUsageSnapshot {
info: Some(data_usage_info_for_test("known", 1, 42, SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)),
last_load_failed: false,
loaded_at,
degraded_baseline: HashMap::new(),
});
@@ -127,6 +129,33 @@ fn projected_publication_moves_bucket_maps_into_cache() {
cached.buckets_usage.get_key_value("known").expect("cached bucket").0.as_ptr(),
original_key
);
let failure = cache_data_usage_snapshot_result(
&mut cache,
Err(Error::ErasureReadQuorum),
tokio::time::Instant::now(),
1,
1,
|_: &DataUsageInfo| -> u64 { panic!("a failed load must not project its retained snapshot") },
)
.expect("matching refresh generation");
assert!(matches!(failure, Err(Error::ErasureReadQuorum)));
let retained = cache
.as_ref()
.expect("negative cache")
.info
.as_ref()
.expect("last good ordering proof");
assert_eq!(
retained
.buckets_usage
.get_key_value("known")
.expect("retained bucket")
.0
.as_ptr(),
original_key,
"a failed load must retain the snapshot without copying its bucket maps"
);
}
#[test]
@@ -167,6 +167,16 @@ impl ObjectLockAttempt {
}
}
}
/// Correlate a raw guard's acquisition with its peer identities without
/// claiming ownership of the guard's lifetime. Peer release events retain
/// the identities needed to reconstruct when the actual owner releases it.
pub(crate) fn observe_acquisition(&mut self, result: &Result<NamespaceLockGuard, LockError>) {
self.observe(result);
if let Some(context) = self.0.as_mut() {
context.finished = true;
}
}
}
fn duration_ms(duration: Duration) -> u64 {
@@ -500,6 +510,45 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
)
}
#[test]
#[serial_test::serial]
fn raw_guard_acquisition_diagnostic_does_not_claim_guard_lifetime() {
temp_env::with_vars([(rustfs_config::ENV_OBJECT_LOCK_DIAG_ENABLE, Some("true"))], || {
let capture = CapturedLockEvents::default();
let runtime = tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()
.enable_all()
.build()
.expect("raw guard diagnostic runtime");
tracing::subscriber::with_default(capture.subscriber(), || {
runtime.block_on(async {
let lock = namespace();
let mut attempt = ObjectLockAttempt::start(
"bucket_incarnation_disk_read",
"bucket",
"transaction.lock",
None,
&lock,
"read",
Duration::from_secs(1),
);
let result = lock.get_read_lock(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
attempt.observe_acquisition(&result);
drop(attempt);
let guard = result.expect("retain the raw guard after diagnostic completion");
assert!(!guard.is_lock_lost());
let states = capture
.rows()
.iter()
.map(|row| row["fields"]["state"].as_str().expect("diagnostic state string").to_owned())
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
assert_eq!(states, ["acquiring", "acquired"]);
drop(guard);
assert_eq!(capture.rows().len(), 2, "the acquisition observer must not invent a guard release");
});
});
});
}
#[test]
#[serial_test::serial]
fn object_lock_diagnostics_disabled_does_not_allocate_context_or_emit() {
+205 -3
View File
@@ -55,6 +55,20 @@ use tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken;
use tracing::{info, warn};
use uuid::Uuid;
/// Join the local disk's actual bootstrap worker for deterministic coverage tests.
/// Completion may mean legacy fallback after a failed scan; callers must assert
/// the expected index result separately. Remote disks have no local worker.
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "test-util"))]
pub async fn wait_for_multipart_index_bootstrap(disk: &crate::disk::DiskStore) -> Result<()> {
match disk.as_ref() {
crate::disk::Disk::Local(local) => {
local.disk.wait_for_multipart_index_bootstrap().await;
Ok(())
}
crate::disk::Disk::Remote(_) => Err(DiskError::MethodNotAllowed),
}
}
/// Disk health status constants
const DISK_HEALTH_OK: u32 = 0;
const DISK_HEALTH_FAULTY: u32 = 1;
@@ -853,6 +867,8 @@ pub(crate) struct DiskHealthMetricEpoch {
fallback_operation_metrics: StdRwLock<HashMap<&'static str, Arc<DiskOperationMetrics>>>,
#[cfg(test)]
multipart_cleanup_observer: std::sync::Mutex<Option<std::sync::Weak<ScopedMultipartCleanupCompletions>>>,
#[cfg(test)]
operation_timeout_override: std::sync::Mutex<Option<Duration>>,
/// Caller API operations currently executing through the disk health wrapper.
api_waiting: AtomicU32,
/// Operations rejected because the disk was unavailable for the caller.
@@ -880,6 +896,8 @@ impl Default for DiskHealthMetricEpoch {
fallback_operation_metrics: StdRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
#[cfg(test)]
multipart_cleanup_observer: std::sync::Mutex::new(None),
#[cfg(test)]
operation_timeout_override: std::sync::Mutex::new(None),
api_waiting: AtomicU32::new(0),
total_errors_availability: AtomicU64::new(0),
total_errors_timeout: AtomicU64::new(0),
@@ -1573,6 +1591,20 @@ impl Default for DiskHealthTracker {
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct ScopedDiskOperationTimeout {
metrics: Arc<DiskHealthMetricEpoch>,
previous: Option<Duration>,
}
#[cfg(test)]
impl Drop for ScopedDiskOperationTimeout {
fn drop(&mut self) {
*self.metrics.operation_timeout_override.lock().expect("test timeout lock") = self.previous;
}
}
/// LocalDiskWrapper wraps a DiskStore with health tracking capabilities.
/// This is similar to Go's xlStorageDiskIDCheck.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
@@ -1914,6 +1946,23 @@ impl LocalDiskWrapper {
self.health_check
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn override_operation_timeout_for_test(&self, timeout: Duration) -> ScopedDiskOperationTimeout {
assert!(!timeout.is_zero(), "fault injection needs a positive timeout");
// The metrics epoch follows this drive across clones and reconnects.
// Its scoped override cannot shorten unrelated healthy drives' I/O.
let previous = self
.metrics
.operation_timeout_override
.lock()
.expect("test timeout lock")
.replace(timeout);
ScopedDiskOperationTimeout {
metrics: Arc::clone(&self.metrics),
previous,
}
}
/// Enable health monitoring after disk creation.
/// Used to defer health checks until after startup format loading completes.
pub fn enable_health_check(&self) {
@@ -2398,12 +2447,17 @@ impl LocalDiskWrapper {
.await
}
pub(crate) fn has_clean_active_multipart_source(&self, upload_or_part_path: &str, part_path: bool) -> bool {
self.disk.has_clean_active_multipart_source(upload_or_part_path, part_path)
}
pub(crate) async fn try_publish_prepared_delete_local(
&self,
volume: &str,
object: &str,
transaction: uuid::Uuid,
namespace_owner: Option<Arc<dyn Send + Sync>>,
work_budget: Option<Arc<crate::object_api::DeleteRecoveryWorkBudget>>,
) -> Result<Option<(crate::disk::DeleteRecoveryJournal, bool, bool)>> {
self.track_disk_health_mutation(
"settle_delete_transaction",
@@ -2411,7 +2465,7 @@ impl LocalDiskWrapper {
|| {
Box::pin(async {
self.disk
.try_publish_prepared_delete_local(volume, object, transaction, namespace_owner)
.try_publish_prepared_delete_local_with_budget(volume, object, transaction, namespace_owner, work_budget)
.await
})
},
@@ -2427,6 +2481,7 @@ impl LocalDiskWrapper {
transaction: uuid::Uuid,
journal: &crate::disk::DeleteRecoveryJournal,
namespace_owner: Option<Arc<dyn Send + Sync>>,
work_budget: Option<Arc<crate::object_api::DeleteRecoveryWorkBudget>>,
) -> Result<bool> {
self.track_disk_health_mutation(
"settle_delete_transaction",
@@ -2434,7 +2489,14 @@ impl LocalDiskWrapper {
|| {
Box::pin(async {
self.disk
.try_finish_and_finalize_prepared_delete_local(volume, object, transaction, journal, namespace_owner)
.try_finish_and_finalize_prepared_delete_local_with_budget(
volume,
object,
transaction,
journal,
namespace_owner,
work_budget,
)
.await
})
},
@@ -2634,6 +2696,13 @@ impl LocalDiskWrapper {
}
return result;
}
#[cfg(test)]
let timeout_duration = self
.metrics
.operation_timeout_override
.lock()
.expect("test timeout lock")
.map_or(timeout_duration, |injected| timeout_duration.min(injected));
// Execute the operation with timeout
let result = tokio::time::timeout(timeout_duration, operation).await;
@@ -2682,6 +2751,18 @@ impl LocalDiskWrapper {
#[async_trait::async_trait]
impl DiskAPI for LocalDiskWrapper {
async fn list_multipart_index_roots(
&self,
bucket: &str,
marker: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<crate::disk::multipart_index::MultipartIndexPage> {
if self.health.is_faulty() {
return Err(DiskError::FaultyDisk);
}
self.check_disk_stale().await?;
self.disk.list_multipart_index_roots(bucket, marker).await
}
async fn supports_guarded_delete_versions(&self) -> Result<()> {
// The local implementation shares this binary's capability. Availability
// and disk identity remain mutation checks and write-quorum inputs.
@@ -2735,6 +2816,62 @@ impl DiskAPI for LocalDiskWrapper {
)
.await
}
async fn discover_delete_transactions_bounded(
&self,
volume: &str,
object: &str,
max_entries: u32,
) -> Result<crate::disk::BoundedDeleteRecoveryDiscovery> {
self.track_disk_health_with_op(
"discover_delete_transactions",
|| async {
self.disk
.discover_delete_transactions_bounded(volume, object, max_entries)
.await
},
get_max_timeout_duration(),
)
.await
}
async fn inspect_delete_transaction_bounded(
&self,
volume: &str,
object: &str,
transaction: uuid::Uuid,
max_entries: u32,
) -> Result<crate::disk::BoundedDeleteRecoveryInspection> {
self.track_disk_health_with_op(
"inspect_delete_transaction",
|| async {
self.disk
.inspect_delete_transaction_bounded(volume, object, transaction, max_entries)
.await
},
get_max_timeout_duration(),
)
.await
}
async fn settle_delete_transaction_bounded(
&self,
volume: &str,
request: crate::disk::BoundedDeleteRecoverySettlement,
namespace_owner: Option<Arc<dyn Send + Sync>>,
) -> Result<crate::disk::BoundedDeleteRecoverySettlementReply> {
self.track_disk_health_mutation(
"settle_delete_transaction",
DiskMetricMutation::Delete,
|| async {
self.disk
.settle_delete_transaction_bounded(volume, request, namespace_owner)
.await
},
crate::disk::get_delete_recovery_timeout()?,
)
.await
}
async fn discover_delete_transactions(
&self,
volume: &str,
@@ -3703,7 +3840,11 @@ mod tests {
assert!(futures::poll!(&mut operation).is_pending());
time::advance(SLOW_DISK_OPERATION_THRESHOLD - Duration::from_millis(1)).await;
assert!(futures::poll!(&mut operation).is_pending());
assert!(logs.contents().is_empty(), "normal disk latency should not warn");
assert!(
!logs.contents().contains("disk_operation_slow") && !logs.contents().contains("WARN"),
"normal disk latency should not warn: {}",
logs.contents()
);
time::advance(Duration::from_millis(1)).await;
assert!(futures::poll!(&mut operation).is_pending());
let warning = logs.contents();
@@ -6040,6 +6181,67 @@ mod tests {
assert!(health.offline_duration().is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn scoped_operation_timeout_is_per_disk_and_preserves_caller_policy() {
let directories = [
tempfile::tempdir().expect("faulted drive"),
tempfile::tempdir().expect("healthy drive"),
];
let mut wrappers = Vec::new();
for directory in &directories {
let endpoint = Endpoint::try_from(directory.path().to_str().expect("UTF-8 drive path")).expect("drive endpoint");
let disk = Arc::new(LocalDisk::new(&endpoint, false).await.expect("local drive"));
wrappers.push(LocalDiskWrapper::new(disk, false));
}
let reconnected = LocalDiskWrapper::new_with_reconnect_state(
Arc::clone(&wrappers[0].disk),
false,
Some(wrappers[0].health_tracker_epoch_for_reconnect()),
);
let scope = wrappers[0].override_operation_timeout_for_test(Duration::from_secs(1));
tokio::time::pause();
let operation = || async {
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(2)).await;
Ok(())
};
let (faulted, healthy) = tokio::join!(
reconnected.track_disk_health_with_op_and_timeout_action(
"read_metadata",
operation,
Duration::from_secs(3),
TimeoutHealthAction::IgnoreFailure,
),
wrappers[1].track_disk_health_with_op_and_timeout_action(
"read_metadata",
operation,
Duration::from_secs(3),
TimeoutHealthAction::IgnoreFailure,
),
);
assert_eq!(faulted.expect_err("only the selected drive must time out"), DiskError::Timeout);
healthy.expect("healthy drive keeps its caller's deadline");
let shorter_started = tokio::time::Instant::now();
let shorter = wrappers[0]
.track_disk_health_with_op_and_timeout_action(
"read_metadata",
operation,
Duration::from_millis(500),
TimeoutHealthAction::IgnoreFailure,
)
.await;
assert_eq!(shorter.expect_err("fault injection cannot extend a caller deadline"), DiskError::Timeout);
assert!(shorter_started.elapsed() < Duration::from_secs(1));
wrappers[0]
.track_disk_health_with_op("read_metadata", operation, Duration::ZERO)
.await
.expect("explicit unbounded physical ownership cannot acquire a test deadline");
drop(scope);
reconnected
.track_disk_health_with_op("read_metadata", operation, Duration::from_secs(3))
.await
.expect("dropping the scope restores reconnected callers' deadlines");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn ignored_timeout_does_not_mark_drive_failure() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temp dir should be created");
+6
View File
@@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ pub enum DiskError {
#[error("guarded batch deletion is not supported by this disk")]
GuardedDeleteUnsupported,
#[error("foreground delete recovery work limit reached")]
DeleteRecoveryWorkLimit,
#[error("erasure write quorum")]
ErasureWriteQuorum,
@@ -770,6 +772,7 @@ impl Clone for DiskError {
DiskError::MethodNotAllowed => DiskError::MethodNotAllowed,
DiskError::ConditionalDeleteConflict => DiskError::ConditionalDeleteConflict,
DiskError::GuardedDeleteUnsupported => DiskError::GuardedDeleteUnsupported,
DiskError::DeleteRecoveryWorkLimit => DiskError::DeleteRecoveryWorkLimit,
DiskError::ErasureWriteQuorum => DiskError::ErasureWriteQuorum,
DiskError::ErasureReadQuorum => DiskError::ErasureReadQuorum,
DiskError::ShortWrite => DiskError::ShortWrite,
@@ -829,6 +832,7 @@ impl DiskError {
DiskError::RemoteClientUnavailable(_) => 0x2B,
DiskError::ConditionalDeleteConflict => 0x2C,
DiskError::GuardedDeleteUnsupported => 0x2D,
DiskError::DeleteRecoveryWorkLimit => 0x2E,
}
}
@@ -879,6 +883,7 @@ impl DiskError {
0x2B => Some(DiskError::RemoteClientUnavailable(String::new())),
0x2C => Some(DiskError::ConditionalDeleteConflict),
0x2D => Some(DiskError::GuardedDeleteUnsupported),
0x2E => Some(DiskError::DeleteRecoveryWorkLimit),
_ => None,
}
}
@@ -1662,6 +1667,7 @@ mod tests {
for (error, code) in [
(DiskError::ConditionalDeleteConflict, 0x2C),
(DiskError::GuardedDeleteUnsupported, 0x2D),
(DiskError::DeleteRecoveryWorkLimit, 0x2E),
] {
assert_eq!(error.to_u32(), code);
assert_eq!(DiskError::from_u32(code), Some(error.clone()));
+464 -2
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ use super::{FdCache, FdCacheEntry, FdKey};
use std::fs::File;
use std::os::unix::fs::FileExt;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
fn key(volume: &str, path: &str, direct: bool) -> FdKey {
FdKey {
@@ -52,7 +53,11 @@ async fn uring_fd_cache_exact_invalidation_removes_both_modes_and_preserves_othe
async fn uring_fd_cache_exact_invalidation_bumps_one_generation_and_rejects_old_epoch_inserts() {
let (_directory, file) = fixture();
let cache = FdCache::new();
let entry = Arc::new(FdCacheEntry { file, len: 3 });
let entry = Arc::new(FdCacheEntry {
file,
len: 3,
invalidated: AtomicBool::new(false),
});
let old_generation = cache.generation();
cache.invalidate_exact("v", "part").await;
let current_generation = cache.generation();
@@ -125,7 +130,7 @@ async fn uring_fd_cache_volume_and_clear_invalidation_cover_both_modes() {
cache.insert(key("v", "part", direct), Arc::clone(&file)).await;
assert!(
cache.get(&key("v", "part", direct)).await.is_some(),
"new entries must survive the earlier volume predicate"
"new entries must survive the earlier volume invalidation"
);
}
cache.clear();
@@ -164,6 +169,7 @@ async fn uring_fd_cache_invalidation_keeps_borrowed_old_inode_alive_and_allows_r
let replacement = Arc::new(FdCacheEntry {
file: Arc::new(File::open(directory.path().join("part")).expect("open replacement inode")),
len: 11,
invalidated: AtomicBool::new(false),
});
for direct in [false, true] {
let key = key("v", "part", direct);
@@ -177,3 +183,459 @@ async fn uring_fd_cache_invalidation_keeps_borrowed_old_inode_alive_and_allows_r
assert_eq!(fresh.len, 11);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn fd_cache_tracker_skips_unmatched_invalidations_and_handles_deep_prefixes() {
let (_directory, file) = fixture();
let mut cache = FdCache::new();
// Unmatched invalidations on an empty cache must not spawn the maintenance task.
cache.invalidate_under("v", "missing/prefix");
cache.invalidate_volume("v");
cache.invalidate_exact("v", "missing/prefix/part.1").await;
cache.clear();
assert!(
cache.maintenance_task.get().is_none(),
"empty-cache invalidations must not spawn maintenance"
);
// Populate a normal entry and verify matched vs unmatched filter gates directly,
// and ensure unmatched invalidations do not enqueue pending removals.
let cached_key = key("v", "obj-1/0198a3f0/part.1", false);
cache.insert(cached_key.clone(), Arc::clone(&file)).await;
assert_eq!(cache.tracker.live_entries(), 1);
assert!(cache.tracker.may_match_volume("v"));
assert!(!cache.tracker.may_match_volume("other-volume"));
assert!(cache.tracker.may_match_prefix("v", "obj-1"));
assert!(cache.tracker.may_match_prefix("v", "obj-1/0198a3f0"));
assert!(!cache.tracker.may_match_prefix("v", "obj-2/0198a3f0"));
assert!(cache.tracker.may_match_exact("v", "obj-1/0198a3f0/part.1"));
assert!(!cache.tracker.may_match_exact("v", "obj-1/0198a3f0/xl.meta"));
cache.invalidate_volume("other-volume");
cache.invalidate_under("v", "obj-2/0198a3f0");
cache.invalidate_exact("v", "obj-1/0198a3f0/xl.meta").await;
assert!(
!cache
.tracker
.has_pending_invalidations
.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst),
"unmatched invalidations must not enqueue maintenance removals"
);
assert!(cache.get(&cached_key).await.is_some());
// Deeply nested path (> FD_CACHE_MAX_INDEXED_PREFIXES slashes) must fall back
// to per-volume unindexed_counts without degrading other volumes.
let other_vol_key = key("v2", "shallow/part.1", false);
cache.insert(other_vol_key.clone(), Arc::clone(&file)).await;
let deep_path = "c1/c2/c3/c4/c5/c6/c7/c8/c9/c10/c11/c12/c13/c14/part.1";
let deep_key = key("v", deep_path, false);
cache.insert(deep_key.clone(), Arc::clone(&file)).await;
assert_eq!(
cache
.tracker
.unindexed_counts
.iter()
.map(|c| c.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Acquire))
.sum::<u32>(),
1
);
assert!(
!cache.tracker.may_match_prefix("v2", "unmatched/prefix"),
"deep key in volume v must not disable prefix filtering in volume v2"
);
cache.invalidate_under("v", "c1/c2/c3/c4/c5/c6/c7/c8/c9/c10/c11/c12/c13");
assert!(cache.get(&deep_key).await.is_none());
cache.invalidate_volume("v2");
assert!(cache.get(&other_vol_key).await.is_none());
// Replacing an invalidated key before maintenance drains pending_invalidations
// must release the old descriptor immediately and keep the replacement live
// even when a strong reference to the old CachedFdEntry shell survives until
// maintenance runs its Arc::ptr_eq check.
let old_file = Arc::new(tempfile::tempfile().expect("create replaced descriptor"));
let old_weak = Arc::downgrade(&old_file);
cache.insert(cached_key.clone(), old_file).await;
let held_old_shell = cache.cache.get(&cached_key).expect("cached shell must exist");
cache.invalidate_under("v", "obj-1/0198a3f0");
assert!(cache.get(&cached_key).await.is_none());
cache.insert(cached_key.clone(), Arc::clone(&file)).await;
assert!(
old_weak.upgrade().is_none(),
"replacing an entry must retire and drop the previous descriptor immediately"
);
tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5), async {
while cache
.tracker
.has_pending_invalidations
.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst)
{
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
}
})
.await
.expect("maintenance should drain pending invalidations");
drop(held_old_shell);
assert!(
cache.get(&cached_key).await.is_some(),
"stale pending invalidation must not evict a newer replacement"
);
assert_eq!(
cache
.tracker
.unindexed_counts
.iter()
.map(|c| c.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Acquire))
.sum::<u32>(),
0
);
// Dropping a cache while a live non-invalidated entry is present (even if a
// cloned Moka handle outlives FdCache and the maintenance task is aborted)
// must retire the descriptor and release FdCacheTracker without cycles.
let live_drop_file = Arc::new(tempfile::tempfile().expect("create live drop descriptor"));
let live_drop_weak = Arc::downgrade(&live_drop_file);
let shutdown_file = Arc::new(tempfile::tempfile().expect("create shutdown descriptor"));
let shutdown_weak = Arc::downgrade(&shutdown_file);
let tracker_weak = Arc::downgrade(&cache.tracker);
let cloned_moka = cache.cache.clone();
cache.insert(key("v", "live-on-drop/part.1", false), live_drop_file).await;
cache.insert(key("v", "shutdown/part.1", false), shutdown_file).await;
cache.invalidate_under("v", "shutdown");
if let Some(handle) = cache.maintenance_task.take() {
handle.abort();
let _ = handle.await;
}
drop(cache);
assert!(
live_drop_weak.upgrade().is_none(),
"Drop for FdCache must retire live descriptors even if a cloned Moka handle survives"
);
assert!(
shutdown_weak.upgrade().is_none(),
"dropping cache when maintenance is aborted must still release descriptors"
);
assert!(
tracker_weak.upgrade().is_none(),
"dropping cache must release FdCacheTracker without reference cycles"
);
drop(cloned_moka);
// Short-TTL expired entries (including mixed expired and fresh entries) must
// be retired by invalidate_under and clear() even though Moka's iterator skips
// expired entries.
let ttl_cache = FdCache::with_ttl(std::time::Duration::from_millis(15));
let expired_file = Arc::new(tempfile::tempfile().expect("create short-ttl descriptor"));
let expired_weak = Arc::downgrade(&expired_file);
ttl_cache.insert(key("v", "ttl-obj/part.1", false), expired_file).await;
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(30)).await;
let fresh_file = Arc::new(tempfile::tempfile().expect("create fresh descriptor"));
let fresh_weak = Arc::downgrade(&fresh_file);
ttl_cache.insert(key("v", "ttl-obj/part.2", false), fresh_file).await;
ttl_cache.invalidate_under("v", "ttl-obj");
tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5), async {
while expired_weak.upgrade().is_some() || fresh_weak.upgrade().is_some() {
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
}
})
.await
.expect("invalidate_under must retire both expired and fresh matching descriptors");
assert_eq!(ttl_cache.tracker.live_entries(), 0);
let clear_expired_file = Arc::new(tempfile::tempfile().expect("create clear short-ttl descriptor"));
let clear_expired_weak = Arc::downgrade(&clear_expired_file);
ttl_cache
.insert(key("v", "ttl-clear/part.1", false), clear_expired_file)
.await;
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(30)).await;
let clear_live_file = Arc::new(tempfile::tempfile().expect("create clear live descriptor"));
let clear_live_weak = Arc::downgrade(&clear_live_file);
ttl_cache.insert(key("v", "ttl-clear/part.2", false), clear_live_file).await;
ttl_cache.clear();
assert!(
clear_expired_weak.upgrade().is_none() && clear_live_weak.upgrade().is_none(),
"clear() must synchronously retire both TTL-expired and live descriptors"
);
assert_eq!(ttl_cache.tracker.live_entries(), 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn fd_cache_lockstep_oracle_equivalence_and_counter_conservation() {
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
let (_directory, file) = fixture();
let cache = FdCache::with_ttl(std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600));
let mut oracle: HashMap<FdKey, Arc<FdCacheEntry>> = HashMap::new();
let volumes = ["vol-a", "vol-b", "vol-c", ".rustfs.sys/multipart"];
let paths = [
"a/b",
"a/b/part.1",
"a/b/dir/part.2",
"a/bc",
"a/bc/part.1",
"prefix/obj-0001.bin/0198a3f0/part.1",
"prefix/obj-0002.bin/0198a3f0/part.1",
"d1/d2/d3/d4/d5/d6/d7/d8/d9/d10/d11/d12/d13/part.1",
];
let prefixes = [
"a",
"a/",
"a/b",
"a/b/",
"a/b/dir",
"a/bc",
"prefix",
"prefix/obj-0001.bin",
"prefix/obj-0001.bin/0198a3f0",
"d1/d2/d3/d4/d5/c_missing",
"d1/d2/d3/d4/d5/d6/d7/d8/d9/d10/d11/d12/d13",
"nonexistent/prefix",
];
let mut candidate_keys = Vec::new();
for v in volumes {
for p in paths {
for direct in [false, true] {
candidate_keys.push(key(v, p, direct));
}
}
}
let mut rng = 0x9e37_79b9_7f4a_7c15u64;
let mut next_u64 = || {
rng ^= rng << 13;
rng ^= rng >> 7;
rng ^= rng << 17;
rng
};
for step in 0..1000 {
let op = next_u64() % 100;
if op < 45 {
// Insert or replace (either fresh or stale generation)
let k = candidate_keys[(next_u64() as usize) % candidate_keys.len()].clone();
let entry = Arc::new(FdCacheEntry {
file: Arc::clone(&file),
len: step,
invalidated: AtomicBool::new(false),
});
let cur_gen = cache.generation();
let stale = (next_u64() % 5) == 0 && cur_gen > 0;
let gen_to_use = if stale { cur_gen - 1 } else { cur_gen };
cache.insert_if_fresh(k.clone(), Arc::clone(&entry), gen_to_use).await;
if !stale {
oracle.insert(k, entry);
}
} else if op < 65 {
// Exact invalidation
let v = volumes[(next_u64() as usize) % volumes.len()];
let p = paths[(next_u64() as usize) % paths.len()];
cache.invalidate_exact(v, p).await;
oracle.remove(&key(v, p, false));
oracle.remove(&key(v, p, true));
} else if op < 88 {
// Prefix invalidation
let v = volumes[(next_u64() as usize) % volumes.len()];
let raw_prefix = prefixes[(next_u64() as usize) % prefixes.len()];
cache.invalidate_under(v, raw_prefix);
let trimmed = raw_prefix.trim_end_matches('/');
oracle.retain(|k, _| {
!(k.volume == v && (k.path == trimmed || k.path.strip_prefix(trimmed).is_some_and(|r| r.starts_with('/'))))
});
} else if op < 97 {
// Volume invalidation
let v = volumes[(next_u64() as usize) % volumes.len()];
cache.invalidate_volume(v);
oracle.retain(|k, _| k.volume != v);
} else {
// Full clear
cache.clear();
oracle.clear();
}
// Verify lockstep equivalence against the reference oracle after every operation.
for k in &candidate_keys {
let got = cache.get(k).await;
let expected = oracle.get(k);
match (got, expected) {
(Some(g), Some(e)) => assert!(
Arc::ptr_eq(&g, e),
"step {step}: pointer mismatch for key ({}, {}, {})",
k.volume,
k.path,
k.direct
),
(None, None) => {}
(g, e) => panic!(
"step {step}: oracle mismatch for key ({}, {}, {}): got={}, expected={}",
k.volume,
k.path,
k.direct,
g.is_some(),
e.is_some()
),
}
}
}
// Clear and wait for maintenance to drain all entries, then verify exact counter conservation.
cache.clear();
tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5), async {
while cache.tracker.live_entries() != 0 || cache.tracker.has_pending_invalidations.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
}
})
.await
.expect("clear must drain all live entries and pending invalidations");
assert_eq!(cache.tracker.live_entries(), 0);
assert!(cache.tracker.unindexed_counts.iter().all(|c| c.load(Ordering::SeqCst) == 0));
assert!(cache.tracker.volume_counts.iter().all(|c| c.load(Ordering::SeqCst) == 0));
assert!(cache.tracker.exact_counts.iter().all(|c| c.load(Ordering::SeqCst) == 0));
assert!(cache.tracker.prefix_counts.iter().all(|c| c.load(Ordering::SeqCst) == 0));
assert!(cache.tracker.prefix_shards.iter().all(|s| s.lock().is_empty()));
assert!(cache.tracker.entry_shards.iter().all(|s| s.lock().is_empty()));
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 4)]
async fn fd_cache_concurrent_insert_and_invalidation_stress() {
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
let (_directory, file) = fixture();
let cache = Arc::new(FdCache::new());
// Deterministic Dekker-partner interleaving check: pause `CachedFdEntry::new`
// at `entry_shards[shard].lock()` after it has passed the initial generation
// check and incremented `volume_counts`, bump generation via an unmatched
// invalidation, and verify the post-`new()` recheck refuses publication and
// preserves the existing entry.
let seam_key = key("v-seam", "obj-1/part.1", false);
cache.insert(seam_key.clone(), Arc::clone(&file)).await;
let initial_entry = cache.get(&seam_key).await.expect("initial entry must exist");
let (vol_hash, vol_slot) = super::fd_cache_volume_hash_and_slot("v-seam");
let entry_shard = (vol_hash as usize) & (super::FD_CACHE_PREFIX_SHARDS - 1);
let stale_gen = cache.generation();
let stale_entry = Arc::new(FdCacheEntry {
file: Arc::clone(&file),
len: 999_999,
invalidated: AtomicBool::new(false),
});
let blocked_insert = {
let hold = cache.tracker.entry_shards[entry_shard].lock();
let cache_clone = Arc::clone(&cache);
let seam_key_clone = seam_key.clone();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
cache_clone.insert_if_fresh(seam_key_clone, stale_entry, stale_gen).await;
});
let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(5);
while cache.tracker.volume_counts[usize::from(vol_slot)].load(Ordering::SeqCst) < 2 {
assert!(
std::time::Instant::now() < deadline,
"insert never reached CachedFdEntry::new with the previous entry still live"
);
std::thread::yield_now();
}
cache.invalidate_under("v-seam", "unmatched-prefix");
drop(hold);
task
};
blocked_insert.await.expect("blocked insert task should complete");
let preserved = cache
.get(&seam_key)
.await
.expect("refused stale insert must not retire a valid previous entry");
assert!(Arc::ptr_eq(&preserved, &initial_entry));
cache.invalidate_volume("v-seam");
let floor_v1 = Arc::new(AtomicU64::new(0));
let floor_v2 = Arc::new(AtomicU64::new(0));
let mut handles = Vec::new();
for t in 0..8usize {
let cache = Arc::clone(&cache);
let file = Arc::clone(&file);
let floor_v1 = Arc::clone(&floor_v1);
let floor_v2 = Arc::clone(&floor_v2);
handles.push(tokio::spawn(async move {
for i in 0..250u64 {
let is_v1 = (t + i as usize).is_multiple_of(2);
let vol = if is_v1 { "v1" } else { "v2" };
let path = format!("dir-{}/obj-{}/part.1", t % 4, i % 16);
let k = key(vol, &path, i.is_multiple_of(2));
let g = cache.generation();
let entry = Arc::new(FdCacheEntry {
file: Arc::clone(&file),
len: g,
invalidated: AtomicBool::new(false),
});
cache.insert_if_fresh(k.clone(), entry, g).await;
let min_gen = if is_v1 {
floor_v1.load(Ordering::SeqCst)
} else {
floor_v2.load(Ordering::SeqCst)
};
if let Some(hit) = cache.get(&k).await {
assert!(
hit.len >= min_gen,
"stale descriptor served after volume invalidation: opened_gen={}, floor_gen={min_gen}",
hit.len
);
}
}
}));
}
for t in 0..4usize {
let cache = Arc::clone(&cache);
let floor_v1 = Arc::clone(&floor_v1);
let floor_v2 = Arc::clone(&floor_v2);
handles.push(tokio::spawn(async move {
for i in 0..250u64 {
let is_v1 = (t + i as usize).is_multiple_of(2);
let vol = if is_v1 { "v1" } else { "v2" };
match i % 4 {
0 => cache.invalidate_under(vol, &format!("dir-{}/obj-{}", t % 4, i % 16)),
1 => {
let p = format!("dir-{}/obj-{}/part.1", t % 4, i % 16);
cache.invalidate_exact(vol, &p).await;
}
2 => {
let before = cache.generation();
cache.invalidate_volume(vol);
let floor = before + 1;
if is_v1 {
floor_v1.fetch_max(floor, Ordering::SeqCst);
} else {
floor_v2.fetch_max(floor, Ordering::SeqCst);
}
}
_ => cache.invalidate_under("uncached-vol", "uncached/prefix"),
}
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
}
}));
}
for h in handles {
h.await.expect("worker task should succeed");
}
cache.clear();
tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5), async {
while cache.tracker.live_entries() != 0 || cache.tracker.has_pending_invalidations.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
}
})
.await
.expect("clear after concurrent stress must drain all live entries");
assert_eq!(cache.tracker.live_entries(), 0);
assert!(cache.tracker.unindexed_counts.iter().all(|c| c.load(Ordering::SeqCst) == 0));
assert!(cache.tracker.volume_counts.iter().all(|c| c.load(Ordering::SeqCst) == 0));
assert!(cache.tracker.exact_counts.iter().all(|c| c.load(Ordering::SeqCst) == 0));
assert!(cache.tracker.prefix_counts.iter().all(|c| c.load(Ordering::SeqCst) == 0));
assert!(cache.tracker.prefix_shards.iter().all(|s| s.lock().is_empty()));
assert!(cache.tracker.entry_shards.iter().all(|s| s.lock().is_empty()));
}
+31 -20
View File
@@ -148,47 +148,58 @@ pub async fn make_dir_all(path: impl AsRef<Path>) -> io::Result<()> {
native_io(move || create_dir_all_std(&path)).await
}
fn is_dir_error(e: &io::Error) -> bool {
fn is_dir_error(path: &Path, e: &io::Error) -> bool {
e.raw_os_error() == Some(libc::EISDIR)
|| e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::IsADirectory
// macOS: remove_file on a directory returns EPERM
|| (cfg!(target_os = "macos") && e.raw_os_error() == Some(libc::EPERM))
|| is_windows_dir_access_denied(path, e)
}
/// Windows reports `remove_file` on a directory (or directory symlink) as
/// ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED, which is indistinguishable from a real permission
/// failure without inspecting the entry itself.
#[cfg(windows)]
fn is_windows_dir_access_denied(path: &Path, e: &io::Error) -> bool {
use std::os::windows::fs::FileTypeExt;
e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied
&& std::fs::symlink_metadata(path).is_ok_and(|metadata| {
let file_type = metadata.file_type();
file_type.is_dir() || file_type.is_symlink_dir()
})
}
#[cfg(not(windows))]
fn is_windows_dir_access_denied(_path: &Path, _e: &io::Error) -> bool {
false
}
#[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip_all)]
pub async fn remove(path: impl AsRef<Path>) -> io::Result<()> {
// Try remove_file first; fall back to remove_dir if it's a directory
let file_path = path.as_ref().to_path_buf();
match native_io(move || std::fs::remove_file(file_path)).await {
Ok(()) => Ok(()),
Err(e) if is_dir_error(&e) => {
let path = path.as_ref().to_path_buf();
native_io(move || std::fs::remove_dir(path)).await
}
Err(e) => Err(e),
}
let path = path.as_ref().to_path_buf();
native_io(move || remove_std(path)).await
}
#[allow(dead_code, reason = "asserted by this file's tests (backlog#1823)")]
pub async fn remove_all(path: impl AsRef<Path>) -> io::Result<()> {
// Try remove_file first; fall back to remove_dir_all if it's a directory
let file_path = path.as_ref().to_path_buf();
match native_io(move || std::fs::remove_file(file_path)).await {
let path = path.as_ref().to_path_buf();
native_io(move || match std::fs::remove_file(&path) {
Ok(()) => Ok(()),
Err(e) if is_dir_error(&e) => {
let path = path.as_ref().to_path_buf();
native_io(move || std::fs::remove_dir_all(path)).await
}
Err(e) if is_dir_error(&path, &e) => std::fs::remove_dir_all(&path),
Err(e) => Err(e),
}
})
.await
}
#[tracing::instrument(level = "debug", skip_all)]
pub fn remove_std(path: impl AsRef<Path>) -> io::Result<()> {
// Try remove_file first; fall back to remove_dir if it's a directory
match std::fs::remove_file(path.as_ref()) {
let path = path.as_ref();
match std::fs::remove_file(path) {
Ok(()) => Ok(()),
Err(e) if is_dir_error(&e) => std::fs::remove_dir(path.as_ref()),
Err(e) if is_dir_error(path, &e) => std::fs::remove_dir(path),
Err(e) => Err(e),
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+636 -127
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
//! Single-disk object rename publication and rollback. The shared execution core
//! retains instrumentation, mutation leases, and commit guards through the syscall.
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
use super::has_rename_data_test_failpoints;
#[cfg(all(test, windows))]
use super::run_destination_commit_directory_preparation;
#[cfg(any(not(windows), test))]
@@ -96,7 +98,7 @@ struct RenameCommitContext<'a> {
data_paths: Option<&'a (PathBuf, PathBuf)>,
}
struct StagedRollbackBackup(PathBuf);
pub(super) struct StagedRollbackBackup(PathBuf);
impl StagedRollbackBackup {
fn path(&self) -> &Path {
@@ -175,17 +177,30 @@ pub(super) fn create_local_inline_rollback_backup(
dst_file_path: &Path,
staging_file_path: &Path,
old_metadata: &[u8],
sync: bool,
) -> std::io::Result<PathBuf> {
let Some(staging_parent) = staging_file_path.parent() else {
return Err(std::io::Error::new(ErrorKind::InvalidInput, "missing staging metadata parent"));
};
let backup_path = staging_parent.join(STORAGE_FORMAT_FILE_BACKUP);
remove_file_if_exists(&backup_path)?;
if (should_fail_local_inline_rollback_hardlink(dst_file_path) || std::fs::hard_link(dst_file_path, &backup_path).is_err())
&& let Err(err) = std::fs::write(&backup_path, old_metadata)
{
let _ = remove_file_if_exists(&backup_path);
return Err(err);
if should_fail_local_inline_rollback_hardlink(dst_file_path) || std::fs::hard_link(dst_file_path, &backup_path).is_err() {
let write_res = (|| -> std::io::Result<()> {
#[cfg(test)]
run_owned_file_before_open(&backup_path);
let mut file = std::fs::File::create(&backup_path)?;
std::io::Write::write_all(&mut file, old_metadata)?;
if sync && !old_metadata.is_empty() {
file.sync_data()?;
}
Ok(())
})();
if let Err(err) = write_res {
let _ = remove_file_if_exists(&backup_path);
return Err(err);
}
} else if sync && !old_metadata.is_empty() {
os::open_file_for_sync_std(&backup_path)?.sync_data()?;
}
Ok(backup_path)
}
@@ -220,11 +235,13 @@ fn rollback_inline_metadata_std(
}
}
fn fsync_inline_commit_std(
pub(super) fn fsync_inline_commit_std(
dst: &Path,
dst_volume_dir: &Path,
destination_was_absent: bool,
rollback_data_dir: Option<Uuid>,
local_backup: Option<&StagedRollbackBackup>,
new_data_dir: Option<&Path>,
commit_guard: &os::RenameCommitGuard,
) -> std::io::Result<()> {
if let Some(dst_parent) = dst.parent() {
@@ -234,7 +251,10 @@ fn fsync_inline_commit_std(
rustfs_io_metrics::PUT_STAGE_SET_DISK_RENAME_DST_DIR_FSYNC,
fsync_started,
);
rollback_inline_metadata_std(dst, None, local_backup)?;
rollback_inline_metadata_std(dst, rollback_data_dir, local_backup)?;
if let Some(new_data_path) = new_data_dir {
remove_dir_all_if_exists(new_data_path)?;
}
return Err(err);
}
rustfs_io_metrics::record_put_object_stage_duration_from(
@@ -255,7 +275,10 @@ fn fsync_inline_commit_std(
rustfs_io_metrics::PUT_STAGE_SET_DISK_RENAME_ANCESTOR_DIR_FSYNC,
fsync_started,
);
rollback_inline_metadata_std(dst, None, local_backup)?;
rollback_inline_metadata_std(dst, rollback_data_dir, local_backup)?;
if let Some(new_data_path) = new_data_dir {
remove_dir_all_if_exists(new_data_path)?;
}
return Err(err);
}
rustfs_io_metrics::record_put_object_stage_duration_from(
@@ -356,9 +379,12 @@ fn prepare_rename_commit_and_destination_metadata_std(
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
enum FusedCommitAttempt {
Committed(RenameDataResp),
Committed(Box<RenameDataResp>),
CommitErr(DiskError),
Fallback(os::RenameCommitGuard, Option<Bytes>, FileInfo),
RestoreDataSource(os::RenameCommitGuard, DiskError),
Fallback(os::RenameCommitGuard, Option<Bytes>, Box<FileInfo>),
#[cfg(test)]
ResumePanic(Box<dyn std::any::Any + Send + 'static>),
}
async fn prepare_rename_commit_and_destination_metadata(
@@ -470,6 +496,9 @@ impl LocalDisk {
state.preflight_rejection = Some(LocalRenamePreflightRejection(()));
})?;
crate::hp_guard!("LocalDisk::rename_data");
if dst_volume == super::super::RUSTFS_META_MULTIPART_BUCKET {
self.multipart_index.record_info(dst_path, &fi).await?;
}
#[cfg(feature = "e2e-test-hooks")]
if fi.is_healing() {
wait_for_heal_commit_test_barrier(&self.root, dst_volume, dst_path).await?;
@@ -540,7 +569,9 @@ impl LocalDisk {
None
};
let multipart_publication = if let Some(staging) = multipart_staging.as_ref() {
Some(pin_multipart_future(|| self.prepare_native_multipart_publication(src_path, &mut fi, staging)).await?)
Some(Arc::new(
pin_multipart_future(|| self.prepare_native_multipart_publication_deferred(src_path, &mut fi, staging)).await?,
))
} else {
None
};
@@ -741,11 +772,6 @@ impl LocalDisk {
&& !fi_healing
&& !os::dst_dir_fsync_group_commit_enabled()
&& !os::file_fdatasync_group_commit_enabled()
&& !super::has_rename_data_test_failpoints(dst_path)
&& !crash_inject::is_armed(CrashPoint::RenameAfterDataRename, dst_path)
&& !crash_inject::is_armed(CrashPoint::RenameAfterBackupBeforeMetaCommit, dst_path)
&& !crash_inject::is_armed(CrashPoint::RenameAfterMetaCommit, dst_path)
&& !super::has_delete_version_test_failpoints()
{
#[cfg(test)]
if !no_inline {
@@ -785,10 +811,11 @@ impl LocalDisk {
&dst_volume_dir_owned,
&publication_root_owned,
)?;
// An existing xl.meta can share versions or require rollback
// restoration when a post-rename directory sync fails.
if is_cancelled() || (sync_commit_metadata && has_dst_buf.is_some()) {
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::Fallback(guard, has_dst_buf, fi_moved));
// An existing xl.meta that replaces an existing version slot
// requires a rollback directory; appending a new version keeps
// an inline rollback backup for post-rename directory sync errors.
if is_cancelled() {
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::Fallback(guard, has_dst_buf, Box::new(fi_moved)));
}
let mut xlmeta = FileMeta::new();
let mut dst_meta_unparsable = false;
@@ -810,8 +837,20 @@ impl LocalDisk {
None
}
});
if rollback_data_dir.is_some() {
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::Fallback(guard, has_dst_buf, fi_moved));
if rollback_data_dir.is_some() && has_rename_data_test_failpoints(&dst_path_str) {
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::Fallback(guard, has_dst_buf, Box::new(fi_moved)));
}
#[cfg(test)]
let probe_active = os::file_sync_probe::is_active();
#[cfg(not(test))]
let probe_active = false;
if no_inline
&& sync_data_shards
&& let Some((src_data_path, _)) = has_data_dir_path_owned.as_ref()
&& (probe_active || !super::is_presynced_tmp_data_dir(src_data_path))
&& os::regular_files(src_data_path).is_ok_and(|files| files.len() >= os::PARALLEL_FILE_SYNC_THRESHOLD)
{
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::Fallback(guard, has_dst_buf, Box::new(fi_moved)));
}
let (old_current_size, old_current_source_checked, old_current_source) = observe_old_current(
has_dst_buf.is_some(),
@@ -821,6 +860,9 @@ impl LocalDisk {
&dst_path_str,
version_id,
);
if let Some(old_data_dir) = has_old_data_dir.as_ref() {
let _ = xlmeta.data.remove_two(version_id, *old_data_dir);
}
xlmeta.add_version(fi_moved)?;
let version_signature = rename_data_versions_signature(&xlmeta);
let new_dst_buf = xlmeta.marshal_msg().map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
@@ -830,13 +872,32 @@ impl LocalDisk {
skip_parent = dst_parent_owned.clone();
}
#[cfg(test)]
run_owned_file_before_open(&src_file_path_owned);
let mut prepared_metadata_source =
os::create_prepared_rename_source_with_commit_guard(&src_file_path_owned, &dst_file_path_owned, &guard)?;
prepared_metadata_source.write_all(&new_dst_buf, sync_commit_metadata)?;
prepared_metadata_source.write_all(&new_dst_buf, false)?;
if !no_inline {
run_inline_preparation_before_backup(&dst_path_str);
}
let mut staged_rollback_path = None;
if (!no_inline || rollback_data_dir.is_none())
&& let Some(ref old_metadata) = has_dst_buf
&& (rollback_data_dir.is_some() || sync_commit_metadata || cfg!(test))
{
let backup_path = create_local_inline_rollback_backup(
&dst_file_path_owned,
&src_file_path_owned,
old_metadata,
sync_commit_metadata,
)?;
staged_rollback_path = Some(StagedRollbackBackup(backup_path));
}
if no_inline {
if sync_data_shards && let Some((src_data_path, _)) = has_data_dir_path_owned.as_ref() {
let sync_result = if super::take_presynced_tmp_data_dir(src_data_path) {
let sync_result = if !probe_active && super::take_presynced_tmp_data_dir(src_data_path) {
// The payload was synced, but its part.1 directory entry
// must also be persisted before moving the data directory.
os::fsync_dir_std(src_data_path)
@@ -846,58 +907,212 @@ impl LocalDisk {
if let Err(err) = sync_result
&& err.kind() != ErrorKind::NotFound
{
if let Some(backup_path) = staged_rollback_path.as_ref().map(StagedRollbackBackup::path) {
let _ = remove_file_if_exists(backup_path);
}
return Err(err);
}
}
if sync_commit_metadata && let Err(err) = prepared_metadata_source.sync_data() {
if let Some(backup_path) = staged_rollback_path.as_ref().map(StagedRollbackBackup::path) {
let _ = remove_file_if_exists(backup_path);
}
return Err(err);
}
} else if sync_commit_metadata && let Err(err) = prepared_metadata_source.sync_data() {
if let Some(backup_path) = staged_rollback_path.as_ref().map(StagedRollbackBackup::path) {
let _ = remove_file_if_exists(backup_path);
}
return Err(err);
}
if is_cancelled() {
drop(prepared_metadata_source);
if let Some(backup_path) = staged_rollback_path.as_ref().map(StagedRollbackBackup::path) {
let _ = remove_file_if_exists(backup_path);
}
return Err(std::io::Error::new(ErrorKind::Interrupted, "commit cancelled"));
}
let guard = match super::remove_dst_base_before_commit_std(
&dst_path_str,
guard,
&src_parent_owned,
&dst_parent_owned,
&dst_volume_dir_owned,
&publication_root_owned,
) {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(err) => {
if let Some(backup_path) = staged_rollback_path.as_ref().map(StagedRollbackBackup::path) {
let _ = remove_file_if_exists(backup_path);
}
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::CommitErr(err));
}
};
if should_remove_staged_meta_before_commit(&dst_path_str) {
drop(prepared_metadata_source);
if let Some(backup_path) = staged_rollback_path.as_ref().map(StagedRollbackBackup::path) {
let _ = remove_file_if_exists(backup_path);
}
std::fs::remove_file(&src_file_path_owned)?;
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::CommitErr(DiskError::FileNotFound));
}
if no_inline {
if let Some((src_data_path, dst_data_path)) = has_data_dir_path_owned.as_ref()
&& let Err(err) = os::rename_all_with_commit_guard_on_thread(src_data_path, dst_data_path, &guard)
{
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::CommitErr(err));
if let Some(backup_path) = staged_rollback_path.as_ref().map(StagedRollbackBackup::path) {
let _ = remove_file_if_exists(backup_path);
}
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::RestoreDataSource(guard, err));
}
#[cfg(test)]
if has_data_dir_path_owned.is_some() {
run_rename_data_after_first_publication(&root_owned, &dst_volume_str, &dst_path_str);
if has_data_dir_path_owned.is_some()
&& let Err(panic_payload) = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
run_rename_data_after_first_publication(&root_owned, &dst_volume_str, &dst_path_str);
}))
{
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::ResumePanic(panic_payload));
}
if crash_inject::should_crash_at(CrashPoint::RenameAfterDataRename, &dst_path_str) {
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::CommitErr(DiskError::Unexpected));
}
if should_fail_before_old_metadata_backup(&dst_path_str) {
if let Some(backup_path) = staged_rollback_path.as_ref().map(StagedRollbackBackup::path) {
let _ = remove_file_if_exists(backup_path);
}
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::RestoreDataSource(guard, DiskError::Unexpected));
}
if let (Some(old_data_dir), Some(dst_buf)) = (rollback_data_dir, has_dst_buf.as_ref()) {
let backup_parent = dst_parent_owned.join(old_data_dir.to_string());
if let Err(err) =
os::mkdir_all_below_existing_base_std(&backup_parent, &skip_parent, &publication_root_owned)
{
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::RestoreDataSource(guard, to_file_error(err).into()));
}
let backup_path_guard = match guard.create_destination_directory_for_path_access(&backup_parent) {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(err) => return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::RestoreDataSource(guard, to_file_error(err).into())),
};
let backup_path = backup_parent.join(STORAGE_FORMAT_FILE_BACKUP);
if let Err(err) = check_path_length(backup_path.to_string_lossy().as_ref()) {
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::RestoreDataSource(guard, err));
}
#[cfg(test)]
run_owned_file_before_open(&backup_path);
if let Err(err) = backup_path_guard.write_file_for_path_access(
&backup_path,
dst_buf.as_ref(),
sync_commit_metadata,
sync_commit_metadata,
) {
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::RestoreDataSource(guard, to_file_error(err).into()));
}
}
if crash_inject::should_crash_at(CrashPoint::RenameAfterBackupBeforeMetaCommit, &dst_path_str) {
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::CommitErr(DiskError::Unexpected));
}
} else if let (Some(old_data_dir), Some(staged_backup)) =
(rollback_data_dir, staged_rollback_path.as_ref().map(StagedRollbackBackup::path))
{
let backup_parent = dst_parent_owned.join(old_data_dir.to_string());
let backup_path = backup_parent.join(STORAGE_FORMAT_FILE_BACKUP);
if let Err(err) = os::rename_all_with_precondition_and_parent_sync_std(
staged_backup,
&backup_path,
&dst_volume_dir_owned,
&publication_root_owned,
None,
sync_commit_metadata,
) {
let _ = remove_file_if_exists(staged_backup);
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::CommitErr(to_file_error(err).into()));
}
staged_rollback_path = None;
}
if let Err(err) = os::rename_prepared_source_on_thread(
prepared_metadata_source,
&src_file_path_owned,
&dst_file_path_owned,
&skip_parent,
&publication_root_owned,
&guard,
) {
if no_inline && let Some((src_data_path, dst_data_path)) = has_data_dir_path_owned.as_ref() {
let _ = std::fs::rename(dst_data_path, src_data_path);
let rename_res = if should_fail_commit_rename(&dst_path_str) {
drop(prepared_metadata_source);
Err(DiskError::other("test fail during metadata commit rename"))
} else {
os::rename_prepared_source_on_thread(
prepared_metadata_source,
&src_file_path_owned,
&dst_file_path_owned,
&skip_parent,
&publication_root_owned,
&guard,
)
};
if let Err(err) = rename_res {
if let Some(backup_path) = staged_rollback_path.as_ref().map(StagedRollbackBackup::path) {
let _ = remove_file_if_exists(backup_path);
}
if no_inline {
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::RestoreDataSource(guard, err));
}
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::CommitErr(err));
}
if sync_commit_metadata
&& let Err(err) =
fsync_inline_commit_std(&dst_file_path_owned, &dst_volume_dir_owned, destination_was_absent, None, &guard)
{
if no_inline && let Some((src_data_path, dst_data_path)) = has_data_dir_path_owned.as_ref() {
let _ = std::fs::rename(dst_data_path, src_data_path);
if should_fail_after_metadata_commit(&dst_path_str) {
if no_inline {
rollback_inline_metadata_std(&dst_file_path_owned, rollback_data_dir, staged_rollback_path.as_ref())?;
if let Some((_, new_data_path)) = has_data_dir_path_owned.as_ref() {
remove_dir_all_if_exists(new_data_path)?;
}
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::CommitErr(DiskError::Unexpected));
}
return Err(err);
let err =
rollback_inline_metadata_std(&dst_file_path_owned, rollback_data_dir, staged_rollback_path.as_ref())
.err()
.unwrap_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("test fail after metadata commit"));
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::CommitErr(DiskError::from(err)));
}
if crash_inject::should_crash_at(CrashPoint::RenameAfterMetaCommit, &dst_path_str) {
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::CommitErr(DiskError::Unexpected));
}
if sync_commit_metadata
&& let Err(err) = fsync_inline_commit_std(
&dst_file_path_owned,
&dst_volume_dir_owned,
destination_was_absent,
rollback_data_dir,
staged_rollback_path.as_ref(),
has_data_dir_path_owned
.as_ref()
.filter(|_| no_inline)
.map(|(_, new_data_path)| new_data_path.as_path()),
&guard,
)
{
if no_inline {
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::CommitErr(to_file_error(err).into()));
}
return Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::CommitErr(DiskError::from(err)));
}
if let Some(backup_path) = staged_rollback_path.as_ref().map(StagedRollbackBackup::path) {
let _ = remove_file_if_exists(backup_path);
}
if let Some(parent) = src_file_path_owned.parent() {
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir(parent);
}
Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::Committed(RenameDataResp {
Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::Committed(Box::new(RenameDataResp {
multipart_source: None,
old_data_dir: None,
rollback_data_dir: None,
cleanup_data_dir: None,
old_data_dir: has_old_data_dir,
rollback_data_dir,
cleanup_data_dir: has_old_data_dir,
sign: version_signature,
old_current_size,
old_current_source_checked,
old_current_source,
}))
})))
};
let attempt_res = if let Some(admission) = file_sync_admission.as_ref() {
@@ -917,7 +1132,23 @@ impl LocalDisk {
if let Some(receipt_mutation) = receipt_mutation.as_mut() {
receipt_mutation.complete();
}
return Ok(resp);
return Ok(*resp);
}
Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::RestoreDataSource(directory_guard, err)) => {
let commit = RenameCommitContext {
directory_guard,
publication_root: &self.publication_root,
mutation_lease,
source_metadata: &src_file_path,
destination_metadata: &dst_file_path,
source_volume_dir: &src_volume_dir,
data_paths: has_data_dir_path.as_ref(),
};
commit.restore_published_data_source().await?;
for part_path in &invalidate_part_paths {
self.io_backend.invalidate_cached_fd(dst_volume, part_path).await;
}
return Err(err);
}
Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::CommitErr(err)) | Err(err) => {
for part_path in &invalidate_part_paths {
@@ -925,11 +1156,269 @@ impl LocalDisk {
}
return Err(err);
}
#[cfg(test)]
Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::ResumePanic(panic_payload)) => {
std::panic::resume_unwind(panic_payload);
}
Ok(FusedCommitAttempt::Fallback(guard, dst_buf, restored_fi)) => {
fi = restored_fi;
fi = *restored_fi;
(guard, dst_buf)
}
}
} else if let Some(publication) = multipart_publication.as_ref()
&& no_inline
&& !preserve_upload_metadata
&& !publication.legacy
&& !fi_healing
&& !os::dst_dir_fsync_group_commit_enabled()
{
enum MultipartFusedCommitOutcome {
Committed(Box<RenameDataResp>),
AbortBeforeDataRename(DiskError),
RestoreDataSource(os::RenameCommitGuard, DiskError),
RestoreTargetAfterError(DiskError, bool),
}
let publication_owned = Arc::clone(publication);
let src_parent_owned = src_file_parent.to_path_buf();
let dst_parent_owned = dst_file_parent.to_path_buf();
let dst_file_path_owned = dst_file_path.clone();
let src_file_path_owned = src_file_path.clone();
let dst_volume_dir_owned = dst_volume_dir.clone();
let publication_root_owned = self.publication_root.clone();
let has_data_dir_path_owned = has_data_dir_path.clone();
let sync_data_shards = durability.syncs_data_shards();
let sync_commit_metadata = durability.syncs_commit_metadata();
let staging_cleanup = multipart_staging.as_ref().map(|s| s.cleanup_handle());
let dst_volume_str = dst_volume.to_string();
let dst_path_str = dst_path.to_string();
let fi_moved = fi;
#[cfg(test)]
let root_owned = self.root.clone();
let outcome = os::run_blocking_namespace_operation_with_sync(
mutation_lease.clone(),
true,
move || -> std::io::Result<MultipartFusedCommitOutcome> {
let (directory_guard_owned, has_dst_buf_owned) = match prepare_rename_commit_and_destination_metadata_std(
false,
&src_parent_owned,
&dst_parent_owned,
&dst_file_path_owned,
&dst_volume_dir_owned,
&publication_root_owned,
) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(err) => return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::AbortBeforeDataRename(to_file_error(err).into())),
};
let mut xlmeta = FileMeta::new();
let mut dst_meta_unparsable = false;
if let Some(dst_buf) = has_dst_buf_owned.as_ref() {
if FileMeta::is_xl2_v1_format(dst_buf)
&& let Ok(nmeta) = FileMeta::load(dst_buf)
{
xlmeta = nmeta;
} else {
dst_meta_unparsable = true;
}
}
let skip_parent_owned = if has_dst_buf_owned.is_some() {
dst_parent_owned.clone()
} else {
dst_volume_dir_owned.clone()
};
let version_id = fi_moved.version_id.unwrap_or_default();
let (old_current_size, old_current_source_checked, old_current_source) = observe_old_current(
has_dst_buf_owned.is_some(),
dst_meta_unparsable,
&xlmeta,
&dst_volume_str,
&dst_path_str,
version_id,
);
let has_old_data_dir = xlmeta.find_unshared_data_dir_for_version(Some(version_id));
if let Some(old_data_dir) = has_old_data_dir.as_ref() {
let _ = xlmeta.data.remove_two(version_id, *old_data_dir);
}
if let Err(err) = xlmeta.add_version(fi_moved) {
return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::AbortBeforeDataRename(err.into()));
}
let version_signature = rename_data_versions_signature(&xlmeta);
let new_dst_buf_owned = match xlmeta.marshal_msg() {
Ok(buf) => buf,
Err(err) => return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::AbortBeforeDataRename(err.into())),
};
let prepared_metadata_source = match publication_owned.prepare_and_install_head_on_thread(
&new_dst_buf_owned,
has_dst_buf_owned.as_deref(),
&dst_file_path_owned,
&directory_guard_owned,
) {
Ok(source) => source,
Err(err) => return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::AbortBeforeDataRename(err)),
};
#[cfg(test)]
let probe_active = os::file_sync_probe::is_active();
#[cfg(not(test))]
let probe_active = false;
// When presynced, shard payloads were synced during UploadPart and
// prepare_and_install_head_on_thread just fsynced src_data_path after
// writing RETIREMENT_ANCHOR.
if sync_data_shards
&& let Some((src_data_path, _)) = has_data_dir_path_owned.as_ref()
&& (probe_active || !super::take_presynced_tmp_data_dir(src_data_path))
&& let Err(err) = os::sync_dir_files_std(src_data_path)
&& err.kind() != ErrorKind::NotFound
{
return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::AbortBeforeDataRename(to_file_error(err).into()));
}
let directory_guard_owned = match super::remove_dst_base_before_commit_std(
&dst_path_str,
directory_guard_owned,
&src_parent_owned,
&dst_parent_owned,
&dst_volume_dir_owned,
&publication_root_owned,
) {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(err) => return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::AbortBeforeDataRename(err)),
};
if should_remove_staged_meta_before_commit(&dst_path_str) {
drop(prepared_metadata_source);
if let Err(err) = std::fs::remove_file(&src_file_path_owned) {
return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::AbortBeforeDataRename(to_file_error(err).into()));
}
return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::AbortBeforeDataRename(DiskError::FileNotFound));
}
if let Some((src_data_path, dst_data_path)) = has_data_dir_path_owned.as_ref() {
let Some(src_parent) = src_data_path.parent() else {
return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::AbortBeforeDataRename(DiskError::InvalidPath));
};
let payload_guard = match os::multipart_payload_commit_guard_std(&directory_guard_owned, src_parent) {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(err) => return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::AbortBeforeDataRename(to_file_error(err).into())),
};
if let Err(err) = os::rename_all_with_commit_guard_on_thread(src_data_path, dst_data_path, &payload_guard)
{
return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::RestoreDataSource(directory_guard_owned, err));
}
#[cfg(test)]
run_rename_data_after_first_publication(&root_owned, &dst_volume_str, &dst_path_str);
if crash_inject::should_crash_at(CrashPoint::RenameAfterDataRename, &dst_path_str) {
return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::AbortBeforeDataRename(DiskError::Unexpected));
}
if should_fail_before_old_metadata_backup(&dst_path_str) {
return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::RestoreDataSource(
directory_guard_owned,
DiskError::Unexpected,
));
}
if crash_inject::should_crash_at(CrashPoint::RenameAfterBackupBeforeMetaCommit, &dst_path_str) {
return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::AbortBeforeDataRename(DiskError::Unexpected));
}
}
let rename_res = if should_fail_commit_rename(&dst_path_str) {
drop(prepared_metadata_source);
Err(DiskError::other("test fail during metadata commit rename"))
} else {
os::rename_prepared_source_on_thread(
prepared_metadata_source,
&src_file_path_owned,
&dst_file_path_owned,
&skip_parent_owned,
&publication_root_owned,
&directory_guard_owned,
)
};
if let Err(err) = rename_res {
return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::RestoreDataSource(directory_guard_owned, err));
}
if should_fail_after_metadata_commit(&dst_path_str) {
return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::RestoreTargetAfterError(DiskError::Unexpected, false));
}
if crash_inject::should_crash_at(CrashPoint::RenameAfterMetaCommit, &dst_path_str) {
return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::AbortBeforeDataRename(DiskError::Unexpected));
}
if sync_commit_metadata {
if let Some(parent) = dst_file_path_owned.parent()
&& let Err(err) = os::fsync_commit_directory_limited_std(parent, &directory_guard_owned)
{
return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::RestoreTargetAfterError(to_file_error(err).into(), true));
}
if has_dst_buf_owned.is_none() {
let mut ancestor = dst_file_path_owned.parent().and_then(|object_dir| object_dir.parent());
while let Some(dir) = ancestor {
if !dir.starts_with(&dst_volume_dir_owned) {
break;
}
if let Err(err) = os::fsync_dir_limited_std(dir) {
return Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::RestoreTargetAfterError(
to_file_error(err).into(),
true,
));
}
if dir == dst_volume_dir_owned.as_path() {
break;
}
ancestor = dir.parent();
}
}
}
match publication_owned.finish_on_thread(sync_commit_metadata, staging_cleanup) {
Ok(result) => Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::Committed(Box::new(RenameDataResp {
multipart_source: Some(Box::new(result)),
old_data_dir: has_old_data_dir,
rollback_data_dir: None,
cleanup_data_dir: has_old_data_dir,
sign: version_signature,
old_current_size,
old_current_source_checked,
old_current_source,
}))),
Err(err) => Ok(MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::RestoreTargetAfterError(err, false)),
}
},
)
.await
.map_err(to_file_error)
.map_err(DiskError::from)?;
match outcome {
MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::Committed(resp) => {
for part_path in &invalidate_part_paths {
self.io_backend.invalidate_cached_fd(dst_volume, part_path).await;
}
return Ok(*resp);
}
MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::AbortBeforeDataRename(err) => return Err(err),
MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::RestoreDataSource(directory_guard, err) => {
let commit = RenameCommitContext {
directory_guard,
publication_root: &self.publication_root,
mutation_lease,
source_metadata: &src_file_path,
destination_metadata: &dst_file_path,
source_volume_dir: &src_volume_dir,
data_paths: has_data_dir_path.as_ref(),
};
commit.restore_published_data_source().await?;
return Err(err);
}
MultipartFusedCommitOutcome::RestoreTargetAfterError(err, invalidate_before_return) => {
if !invalidate_before_return {
for part_path in &invalidate_part_paths {
self.io_backend.invalidate_cached_fd(dst_volume, part_path).await;
}
}
pin_multipart_future(|| publication.restore_target_after_error(mutation_lease.clone())).await?;
if invalidate_before_return {
for part_path in &invalidate_part_paths {
self.io_backend.invalidate_cached_fd(dst_volume, part_path).await;
}
}
return Err(err);
}
}
} else {
prepare_rename_commit_and_destination_metadata(
!no_inline && !preserve_upload_metadata,
@@ -1053,71 +1542,82 @@ impl LocalDisk {
// after the commit rename, and a crash before the rename means the
// PUT was never acknowledged. A metadata commit: relaxed tiers
// leave it to the page cache.
if let Some(publication) = multipart_publication.as_ref() {
pin_multipart_future(|| publication.prepare_metadata(&new_dst_buf, has_dst_buf.as_deref())).await?;
}
let tmp_meta_sync = if durability.syncs_commit_metadata() || multipart_publication.is_some() {
SyncMode::FileOnly
} else {
SyncMode::None
};
// The tmp xl.meta write and the shard-file fdatasync are independent
// (disjoint paths) and both only need to be durable before the commit
// renames below, so run them concurrently to drop a blocking
// round-trip from the PUT commit critical path (rustfs/backlog#922
// step 2). The "contents durable -> rename -> dst dir fsync" ordering
// is unchanged — both futures complete before any rename — which the
// rename_data crash-consistency harness (backlog#935) exercises.
//
// Shard durability: once rename_data succeeds the write is
// acknowledged, so data must not live only in the page cache.
// Multipart parts were already synced during rename_part, so their
// fdatasync here is a cheap no-op. A missing source dir is left for the
// rename below to report through the existing rollback path. Payload
// durability is kept by both strict and relaxed.
let tmp_meta_write = {
let src_file_path = multipart_publication
.as_ref()
.map_or_else(|| commit.source_metadata.to_path_buf(), |publication| publication.prepared_path.clone());
let dst_file_path = dst_file_path.clone();
let owned_directory_guard = commit.directory_guard.clone();
let owned_mutation_lease = commit.mutation_lease.clone();
async move {
os::run_blocking_namespace_operation(owned_mutation_lease, move || {
#[cfg(test)]
run_owned_file_before_open(&src_file_path);
let mut prepared_metadata_source = os::create_prepared_rename_source_with_commit_guard(
&src_file_path,
&dst_file_path,
&owned_directory_guard,
)?;
prepared_metadata_source.write_all(&new_dst_buf, tmp_meta_sync != SyncMode::None)?;
Ok(prepared_metadata_source)
})
.await
.map_err(to_file_error)
.map_err(DiskError::from)
}
};
#[cfg(all(test, target_os = "linux"))]
let probe_active = os::file_sync_probe::is_active();
#[cfg(all(not(test), target_os = "linux"))]
let probe_active = false;
let shard_sync = async {
if durability.syncs_data_shards()
&& let Some((src_data_path, _)) = has_data_dir_path.as_ref()
&& let Err(err) = os::sync_dir_files_with_limiter(src_data_path, self.file_sync_permits.clone()).await
&& err.kind() != ErrorKind::NotFound
{
return Err::<(), DiskError>(to_file_error(err).into());
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
if !probe_active && super::take_presynced_tmp_data_dir(src_data_path) {
if multipart_publication.is_none()
&& let Err(err) = os::fsync_dir_with_owner(src_data_path, Some(commit.mutation_lease.clone())).await
&& err.kind() != ErrorKind::NotFound
{
return Err::<(), DiskError>(to_file_error(err).into());
}
return Ok(());
}
if let Err(err) = os::sync_dir_files_with_limiter(src_data_path, self.file_sync_permits.clone()).await
&& err.kind() != ErrorKind::NotFound
{
return Err::<(), DiskError>(to_file_error(err).into());
}
}
Ok(())
};
let (tmp_meta_res, shard_sync_res) = tokio::join!(tmp_meta_write, shard_sync);
// Surface a tmp-meta failure first (its prior serial position), then a
// shard-sync failure; either aborts before any rename, exactly as the
// sequential version did.
let prepared_metadata_source = tmp_meta_res?;
shard_sync_res?;
let prepared_metadata_source = match multipart_publication.as_ref() {
Some(publication) => pin_multipart_future(|| publication.install_head(prepared_metadata_source)).await?,
None => prepared_metadata_source,
let prepared_metadata_source = if let Some(publication) = multipart_publication.as_ref() {
let dst_file_path_ref = &dst_file_path;
let dir_guard_ref = &commit.directory_guard;
let lease_clone = commit.mutation_lease.clone();
let prepare_fut = pin_multipart_future(|| {
publication.prepare_and_install_head(
&new_dst_buf,
has_dst_buf.as_deref(),
dst_file_path_ref,
dir_guard_ref,
lease_clone,
)
});
let (tmp_meta_res, shard_sync_res) = tokio::join!(prepare_fut, shard_sync);
let prepared_metadata_source = tmp_meta_res?;
shard_sync_res?;
prepared_metadata_source
} else {
let tmp_meta_sync = if durability.syncs_commit_metadata() {
SyncMode::FileOnly
} else {
SyncMode::None
};
let tmp_meta_write = {
let src_file_path = commit.source_metadata.to_path_buf();
let dst_file_path = dst_file_path.clone();
let owned_directory_guard = commit.directory_guard.clone();
let owned_mutation_lease = commit.mutation_lease.clone();
let sync = tmp_meta_sync != SyncMode::None;
async move {
os::run_blocking_namespace_operation_with_sync(owned_mutation_lease, sync, move || {
#[cfg(test)]
run_owned_file_before_open(&src_file_path);
let mut prepared_metadata_source = os::create_prepared_rename_source_with_commit_guard(
&src_file_path,
&dst_file_path,
&owned_directory_guard,
)?;
prepared_metadata_source.write_all(&new_dst_buf, sync)?;
Ok(prepared_metadata_source)
})
.await
.map_err(to_file_error)
.map_err(DiskError::from)
}
};
let (tmp_meta_res, shard_sync_res) = tokio::join!(tmp_meta_write, shard_sync);
let prepared_metadata_source = tmp_meta_res?;
shard_sync_res?;
prepared_metadata_source
};
commit.directory_guard = remove_dst_base_before_commit(
dst_path,
@@ -1158,12 +1658,13 @@ impl LocalDisk {
);
}
if let Some((src_data_path, dst_data_path)) = has_data_dir_path.as_ref() {
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
#[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", windows))]
let payload_guard = if multipart_publication.is_some() {
Some(
os::multipart_payload_commit_guard(
&commit.directory_guard,
src_data_path.parent().ok_or(DiskError::InvalidPath)?,
commit.publication_root,
commit.mutation_lease.clone(),
)
.await
@@ -1172,9 +1673,9 @@ impl LocalDisk {
} else {
None
};
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
#[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", windows))]
let directory_guard = payload_guard.as_ref().unwrap_or(&commit.directory_guard);
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "linux", windows)))]
let directory_guard = &commit.directory_guard;
if let Err(err) = os::rename_all_with_commit_guard(
src_data_path,
@@ -1269,13 +1770,15 @@ impl LocalDisk {
// sync finish. A detached spawn_blocking writer could survive
// cancellation and later truncate a newer transaction's
// deterministic rollback backup.
let write_result = os::run_blocking_namespace_operation(commit.mutation_lease.clone(), move || {
let lease = commit.mutation_lease.clone();
let sync = backup_sync != SyncMode::None;
let write_result = os::run_blocking_namespace_operation_with_sync(lease, sync, move || {
#[cfg(test)]
run_owned_file_before_open(&backup_path);
backup_path_guard.write_file_for_path_access(
&backup_path,
backup_bytes.as_ref(),
backup_sync != SyncMode::None,
sync,
backup_sync == SyncMode::FileAndDir,
)
})
@@ -1457,13 +1960,22 @@ impl LocalDisk {
}
let multipart_source = match multipart_publication.as_ref() {
Some(publication) => match pin_multipart_future(|| publication.finish(commit.mutation_lease.clone())).await {
Ok(result) => Some(Box::new(result)),
Err(error) => {
pin_multipart_future(|| publication.restore_target_after_error(commit.mutation_lease.clone())).await?;
return Err(error);
Some(publication) => {
let target_already_synced = durability.syncs_commit_metadata();
let staging_cleanup = multipart_staging.as_ref().map(|s| s.cleanup_handle());
match pin_multipart_future(|| {
publication.finish(commit.mutation_lease.clone(), target_already_synced, staging_cleanup)
})
.await
{
Ok(result) => Some(Box::new(result)),
Err(error) => {
pin_multipart_future(|| publication.restore_target_after_error(commit.mutation_lease.clone()))
.await?;
return Err(error);
}
}
},
}
None => None,
};
Ok(RenameDataResp {
@@ -1663,13 +2175,8 @@ impl LocalDisk {
#[cfg(not(windows))]
let backup_path = {
let _backup = os::StageTimer::new(native_timing, "pool_meta_native_backup_create");
create_local_inline_rollback_backup(&dst, &src, old_metadata)?
create_local_inline_rollback_backup(&dst, &src, old_metadata, sync)?
};
#[cfg(not(windows))]
if sync {
let _backup_sync = os::StageTimer::new(native_timing, "pool_meta_native_backup_file_sync");
std::fs::File::open(&backup_path)?.sync_data()?;
}
staged_rollback_path = Some(StagedRollbackBackup(backup_path));
}
@@ -1711,7 +2218,9 @@ impl LocalDisk {
&dst,
&dst_volume_dir_for_commit,
destination_was_absent,
rollback_data_dir,
staged_rollback_path.as_ref(),
None,
&rename_commit_guard_for_preparation,
)
{

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